Title: State Dep’t of Justice v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 114 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1488 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, 
          Respondent, 
Joell Schigur, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 361 Wis. 2d 196, 861 N.W.2d 789) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No. 2015 WI App 22 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Juan B. Colas 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. 
(Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, R.G. BRADLEY, J.J., did not 
participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Peter J. Fox and Fox & Fox, S.C., Monona, and oral argument 
by Peter J. Fox. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, the caused was argued by 
Winn S. Collins, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 114
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1488 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV2125) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, 
 
          Respondent, 
 
Joell Schigur, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 
App 22, 361 Wis. 2d 196, 861 N.W.2d 789, which affirmed the 
decision of the Dane County circuit court,1 which reversed the 
decision of the Equal Rights Division of the Department of 
Workforce Development ("DWD").  The Equal Rights Division of the 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Juan B. Colas presided. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
2 
 
DWD concluded that Joell Schigur ("Schigur") had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Department of Justice 
("DOJ") 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 230.80-.89 
(2011-12),2 
the 
subchapter 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
230 
designated 
"Employee 
Protection," by taking retaliatory action against her because 
she lawfully disclosed, or the DOJ believed that she lawfully 
disclosed, information under § 230.81. 
¶2 
On April 15, 2008, Schigur attended a staff meeting 
for 
Bureau 
Directors 
of 
the 
DOJ's 
Division 
of 
Criminal 
Investigation ("DCI") at which her superior, Mike Myszewski 
("Myszewski"), explained that the DCI would provide Wisconsin's 
then-Attorney General J. B. Van Hollen with 24-hour security at 
the 2008 Republican National Convention in Minnesota.  A few 
days later, Schigur sent an e-mail to Myszewski and two other 
individuals employed by the DOJ in which she stated her concern 
that use of state resources at the event might violate state law 
and Office of State Employment Relations ("OSER") regulations.  
One month later, Schigur was removed from her position as DCI 
Public Integrity Director and returned to her previous position 
as Special Agent In-Charge.  
¶3 
This case involves a narrow question of statutory 
interpretation: we must determine whether Schigur's e-mail 
communications to Myszewski are entitled to protection under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89, given that "only certain disclosures 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
3 
 
made a particular way and regarding a subject matter covered in 
the statute will qualify for protection."  Hutson v. Wis. Pers. 
Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶37, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212.  
Simply stated, we examine whether Schigur's opinion alone, as to 
the lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity is 
"information" such that it is entitled to protection under 
§§ 230.80-.89, whether other portions of Schigur's e-mails 
relating 
to 
the 
proposed 
security 
detail 
constitute 
"disclosure[s]" of information under Wis. Stat. § 230.81, and 
whether Schigur's disclosure is protected because the DOJ 
believed that Schigur had "disclosed information" under the 
statute.  
¶4 
Schigur makes two specific arguments on review.  
First, she argues that disclosure of a "belief"——namely her 
opinion 
regarding 
the 
lawfulness 
or 
appropriateness 
of 
government activity——is disclosure of "information" under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 230.80-.89, and that the DOJ therefore may not 
discipline her for sending e-mail communications that disclosed 
such a belief.  Second, Schigur argues that the DOJ believed 
that Schigur engaged in activity protected under §§ 230.80-.89, 
and that Schigur is entitled to protection from discipline on 
that basis as well.  In response, the DOJ argues, among other 
things, that expressing a belief about known information is not 
"disclosing information" under the statute, and that Schigur 
forfeited her second argument by failing to raise it in the 
administrative proceeding below.  
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
4 
 
¶5 
We conclude that: (1) an opinion alone, as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity is not 
"information" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5); 
(2) under the specific facts of this case, and assuming without 
deciding that Schigur's e-mail contained "information" regarding 
the 
proposed 
security 
detail, 
the 
communication 
of 
the 
information to Myszewski, Jed Sperry, and Cindy O'Donnell was 
not a "disclosure" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 because the 
information was already known to the recipients of the e-mails; 
and (3) Schigur's argument that the DOJ believed that she 
"disclosed 
information" 
rests 
on 
a 
misinterpretation 
of 
§ 230.80(8)(c) and therefore fails.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On 
May 
28, 
2006, 
DCI 
Administrator 
Jim 
Warren 
("Warren") promoted Schigur from her position as Special Agent 
In-Charge within DCI to the position of Director of DCI's Bureau 
of Public Integrity.  Schigur was subject to a two-year 
probationary 
period 
and 
received 
probationary 
performance 
evaluations every three months.  From September 2006 to November 
2007, Joell received six positive probationary performance 
evaluations from Warren.  
¶7 
On January 3, 2008, Myszewski became DCI's Acting 
Administrator and Schigur's supervisor.  On February 22, 2008, 
Myszewski completed Schigur's seventh probationary performance 
evaluation.  The evaluation was again positive, and recommended 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
5 
 
that Schigur "be removed from probation and receive permanent 
status as a director."   
¶8 
On April 15, 2008, Schigur attended a staff meeting 
for DCI Bureau Directors.  At the meeting, Myszewski informed 
the attendees that then-Wisconsin Attorney General J. B. Van 
Hollen would be attending the Republican National Convention in 
Minnesota.  Myszewski explained that DCI would provide the 
Attorney General with 24-hour security at the event, and that 
the head of DCI's tactical unit, Jed Sperry ("Sperry"), would 
plan the security detail. 
¶9 
On 
April 
21, 
2008, 
Schigur 
sent 
an 
e-mail 
to 
Myszewski, Sperry, and Cindy O'Donnell ("O'Donnell"), the 
Administrator of the DOJ's Division of Management Services 
("DMS"), which stated in part: 
In our April 15th staff meeting, a discussion was 
held regarding providing the Attorney General with a 
24 hour security detail of special agents while he 
attends 
the 
Republican 
National 
[Convention] 
in 
Minnesota.  SAC Jed Sperry was selected as the 
individual responsible for coordinating this effort.  
The Office of State Employee Relations in the bulletin 
numbered 
OSER-0053-MRS 
(attached) 
clarified 
permissible political activities for state employees.  
According to Section 6(h), a state employee may 
participate as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a 
political convention provided he or she is off duty 
and not on state property. 
I am concerned that providing state resources to 
the Attorney General while he participates in a 
political 
activity 
off 
duty 
may 
violate 
OSER 
regulations and state law.  I am expressing this 
concern in hopes that this decision will be further 
evaluated to avoid possible scrutiny of our Attorney 
General, our agency and our special agents. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
6 
 
Schigur attached to the e-mail OSER bulletin OSER-0053-MRS. 
¶10 On April 23, 2008, Myszewski e-mailed Schigur. He 
wrote in part: 
I have read both your [e-mail] and the attached 
OSER bulletin with great interest.  Thank you for 
calling my attention to your concerns about the 
potential of improper political activity by our 
agent(s) who will provide security for the Attorney 
General at the [Republican National Convention] in 
September.  I will forward your concerns up the chain 
of command so that they can be evaluated. 
However, I do not think that an on duty DCI agent 
who is protecting the Attorney General at a political 
event, at which certain groups have threatened to 
violently disrupt, constitutes political activity on 
the part of an agent.  
¶11 The same day, Schigur responded with another e-mail 
message, which read in part:  
To clarify, the concern is not regarding agents 
participating in political activity; rather can state 
resources be used by the [Attorney General] at a 
political event where he is not representing DOJ, 
rather the Republican Party.  Parallel issues [came 
up] in the Jensen/Chvala investigation.  
Thanks for looking into this further.    
¶12 On May 21, 2008, Myszewski and O'Donnell met with 
Schigur 
and 
presented 
her 
with 
her 
final 
probationary 
performance evaluation.  The evaluation stated that, during the 
time 
since 
her 
previous 
evaluation, 
Schigur 
had 
"been 
persistently unwilling to carry out administration policies, 
argumentative, disrespectful, suspicious of management, and 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
7 
 
insubordinate" as well as "openly critical and defiant of 
management's policies and decision making."3 
¶13 Effective May 22, 2008, the DOJ removed Schigur from 
her position as DCI Public Integrity Director and returned her 
to her previous position as Special Agent In-Charge.  
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶14 On July 11, 2008, Schigur filed a complaint with the 
Equal Rights Division of the DWD.  The complaint alleged that 
the DOJ had unlawfully retaliated against her by terminating her 
probation and demoting her to her previous position for 
e-mailing Myszewski about Schigur's concerns regarding the 
proposed security detail at the Republican National Convention.  
On September 26, 2008, the Equal Rights Division of the DWD 
issued an "Initial Determination" that there was probable cause 
to believe that the DOJ violated Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 by 
"[t]aking any retaliatory action because the employee lawfully 
disclosed, 
or 
the 
respondent 
believed 
the 
employee 
had 
disclosed, information under sec. 230.81, Stats."  The case was 
certified for an administrative hearing on the merits of 
Schigur's complaint.  
                                                 
3 In the evaluation, Myszewski provides purported examples 
of this behavior.  However, the issues involving the quality of 
Schigur's performance at the DOJ are not before this court.  As 
will be explained, the Administrative Law Judge below concluded 
that Schigur's (putative) disclosure of information to Myszewski 
in her April 2008 e-mails was "a factor" in the DOJ's decision 
to terminate Schigur's probation and reinstate Schigur as 
Special Agent In-Charge.   
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
8 
 
¶15 From September 28 to September 30, 2009, a hearing on 
the DOJ's liability was held before Administrative Law Judge 
Deborah Little Cohn ("ALJ").  The ALJ stated on the first day of 
the hearing that: 
Ms. Schigur filed a complaint with the Wisconsin 
Equal Rights Division . . . alleging that the [DOJ] 
violated the Wisconsin Whistle Blower Law, Section 
230.80-230.89 of the Wisconsin Statutes, by taking 
retaliatory action because she lawfully disclosed——or 
the [DOJ] believed that she had disclosed information 
under Section 230.81 Wis. Stats. 
On April 29, 2011, the Equal Rights Division of the DWD issued a 
"Non-Final Decision and Memorandum Opinion" finding that Schigur 
had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the DOJ had 
violated Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 by taking retaliatory action 
against her "because she lawfully disclosed, or the [DOJ] 
believed that she had lawfully disclosed, information" under 
§ 230.81.  
¶16 On July 7, 2011, the DOJ filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the ALJ's non-final decision.  In its motion, 
the DOJ argued for the first time that, among other things, 
Schigur had not "disclose[d]" "information" under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 230.81(1)(a) and 230.80(5)(a), respectively.  In response, 
Schigur submitted that the DOJ had no right to ask for 
reconsideration of a written decision of an Equal Rights 
Division ALJ.  On September 19, 2011, the ALJ denied the DOJ's 
motion.  The ALJ stated that she believed she possessed 
authority to reconsider her non-final decision, but that the 
issues raised by the DOJ were "best addressed on appeal." 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
9 
 
¶17 On October 4, 2011, a remedy hearing was held before 
the ALJ.  On April 4, 2012, the Equal Rights Division of the DWD 
issued a second "Non-Final Decision and Memorandum Opinion" 
ordering the DOJ to take certain actions to remedy its violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89.  
¶18 On April 30, 2012, the Equal Rights Division of the 
DWD issued a "Final Decision and Memorandum Opinion."  The 
decision again found that Schigur had proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the DOJ had violated Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-
.89 by taking retaliatory action against her "because she 
lawfully disclosed, or the [DOJ] believed that she had lawfully 
disclosed, information" under § 230.81.  The decision concluded 
that "Schigur disclosed 'information' as defined under Wis. 
Stat. sec. 230.80(5) in her April 21 and 23, 2008 [e-mails] to 
her supervisor," and that Schigur had proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the "DOJ decided that she failed to pass 
probation as a Bureau Director and reinstated her to her former 
position as a Special Agent In-Charge because she disclosed 
information under Wis. Stat. sec. 230.81."  The decision again 
ordered the DOJ to take certain actions to remedy its violation. 
¶19 On May 29, 2012, the DOJ filed a petition for judicial 
review of the April 30, 2012 decision in Dane County circuit 
court.  On May 21, 2013, the circuit court issued a decision and 
order reversing the decision of the Equal Rights Division of the 
DWD. 
 
The 
court 
found 
that 
Schigur 
had 
not 
disclosed 
"information" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5), 
and that Schigur's communications were therefore not entitled to 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
10 
 
protection under §§ 230.80-.89.  On July 2, 2013, Schigur filed 
a notice of appeal.   
¶20 On February 5, 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's decision.  DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI App 22, ¶31, 361 
Wis. 2d 196, 861 N.W.2d 789.  The court of appeals concluded 
that "Schigur's statements in the [e-mails] did not disclose 
'information,' but rather expressed her opinion that providing 
security to the Attorney General might be a violation of law."  
Id., ¶30.  On March 4, 2015, Schigur filed a petition for review 
in this court.  On June 12, 2015, we granted the petition.   
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 "In an administrative appeal, the scope of our review 
is identical to that of the circuit court and is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57."  Andersen v. DNR, 2011 WI 19, ¶24, 332 
Wis. 2d 41, 796 N.W.2d 1 (citation omitted).  In this case we 
interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89.  "The interpretation of a 
statute and its application to undisputed facts is a question of 
law that we review de novo."  Id., ¶26 (citation omitted).  In 
appropriate cases we accord a level of deference to an agency's 
interpretation and application of a statute.  See, e.g., id., 
¶¶26-29.  However, the ALJ below did not examine any of the 
statutory questions we answer today.  Therefore, there is no 
decision to which we might defer. 
¶22 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'  Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
11 
 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 
(citations 
omitted). 
Additionally, 
we 
interpret 
statutory language "reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 230 governs "State Employment 
Relations", that is, state government employment relations.  
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 230.01 
(Statement 
of 
policy).  
Subchapter III of ch. 230, see Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89, is 
titled "Employee Protection."  We have referred to this statute 
as "the whistleblower law" because "it includes provisions 
intended to encourage employees to disclose certain types of 
information and protect employees from retaliation that might 
result from such disclosures."  Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶1 & 
n.1.  Under Wis. Stat. § 230.83, "[n]o appointing authority, 
agent of an appointing authority or supervisor may initiate or 
administer, 
or 
threaten 
to 
initiate 
or 
administer, 
any 
retaliatory action against an employee." Wis. Stat. § 230.83(1). 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 230.80(8) defines "[r]etaliatory 
action" as:  
[A] disciplinary action taken because of any of the 
following:  
(a) The employee lawfully disclosed information 
under s. 230.81 or filed a complaint under s. 
230.85(1).  
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
12 
 
(b) The employee testified or assisted or will 
testify or assist in any action or proceeding relating 
to 
the 
lawful 
disclosure 
of 
information 
under 
s. 230.81 by another employee.  
(c) The 
appointing 
authority, 
agent 
of 
an 
appointing 
authority 
or 
supervisor 
believes 
the 
employee engaged in any activity described in par. (a) 
or (b).  
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8) (emphases added).  
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 230.81(1) states in part: "An 
employee with knowledge of information the disclosure of which 
is not expressly prohibited by state or federal law, rule or 
regulation may disclose that information to any other person."  
Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1) (emphases added).  However, "to obtain 
protection under s. 230.83, before disclosing that information 
to 
any 
person" 
the 
employee 
must 
first 
"[d]isclose 
the 
information in writing" either to the employee's supervisor or 
to a "governmental unit" selected by the Equal Rights Division 
of the DWD.  Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1)(a)-(b).4  
¶26 "Information" is defined in the statute as: 
[I]nformation 
gained 
by 
the 
employee 
which 
the 
employee reasonably believes demonstrates:  
(a)  A violation of any state or federal law, 
rule or regulation.  
(b)  Mismanagement or abuse of authority in state 
or local government, a substantial waste of public 
funds or a danger to public health and safety.  
                                                 
4 This requirement is subject to certain exceptions not 
applicable here.  See Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1). 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
13 
 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5). The words "disclose" and "disclosure" 
are not defined in the statute. 
¶27 The DOJ argues that Schigur is not entitled to 
protection under Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 for three reasons: (1) 
Schigur did not "disclose information" under § 230.81; (2) 
Schigur did not comply with the statutory requirement to 
disclose 
the 
information 
in 
writing 
to 
her 
supervisor, 
Myszewski, before disclosing it to other individuals, namely 
O'Donnell and Sperry, see § 230.81(1)(a); and (3) Schigur's 
opinion that the information she disclosed demonstrated a 
violation of law was not "reasonabl[e]."  See § 230.80(5)(a). 
¶28 Schigur disputes each of these contentions.  In 
addition, she argues that even if she did not "disclose 
information" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81, her communication is 
still entitled to protection because the DOJ believed that she 
disclosed 
information 
under 
§ 230.81. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 230.80(8)(c). 
¶29  We conclude that an opinion alone, as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity is not 
"information" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5). 
We further conclude that under the specific facts of this case, 
and assuming without deciding that Schigur's e-mail contained 
"information" regarding the proposed security detail, the 
communication of the information to Myszewski, Sperry, and 
O'Donnell was not a "disclosure" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
because the information was already known to the recipients of 
the e-mails.  These conclusions render it unnecessary to examine 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
14 
 
the DOJ's other arguments.  See, e.g., State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 
2014 WI 87, ¶143, 357 Wis. 2d 41, 849 N.W.2d 748 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) ("[W]e are generally obliged to decide our cases on 
the 
'narrowest 
possible 
grounds.'" 
(citations 
omitted)). 
Finally, we conclude that Schigur's argument that the DOJ 
believed 
that 
she 
"disclosed 
information" 
rests 
on 
a 
misinterpretation of Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c) and therefore 
fails. 
A.  Liberal Construction of Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 
¶30 Before we begin our textual analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 230.80-.89, we must address Schigur's contention that we are 
to construe the statute liberally.  Wisconsin Stat. § 230.02, 
"Liberal construction of statutes," states that "[s]tatutes 
applicable to the office shall be construed liberally in aid of 
the purposes declared in s. 230.01."  Wis. Stat. § 230.02.5  
Schigur draws our attention to the following purposes set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 230.01: 
It is the policy of the state to ensure its employees 
opportunities 
for 
satisfying 
careers 
and 
fair 
                                                 
5 The "office" is the office of state employment relations.  
Wis. Stat. § 230.03(10w).  Schigur does not discuss how we are 
to know when a statute is "applicable to the office" of state 
employment relations.  Wis. Stat. § 230.02.  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.04(1) states that "[t]he director is charged with the 
effective administration of" Wis. Stat. ch. 230.  § 230.04(1).  
The "director" is the director of the office of state employment 
relations. Wis. Stat. § 230.03(9e), (10w).  We therefore will 
assume without deciding that Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 are 
"[s]tatutes applicable to the office" of state employment 
relations. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
15 
 
treatment based on the value of each employee's 
services.  It is the policy of this state to encourage 
disclosure of information under subch. III ["Employee 
Protection"] and to ensure that any employee employed 
by a governmental unit is protected from retaliatory 
action for disclosing information under subch. III. 
Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2).6  We take such a directive from the 
legislature seriously.  However, none of the purposes cited by 
Schigur affect today's statutory inquiry. 
¶31 We will examine the purposes Schigur lists in reverse 
order.  First, "[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage 
disclosure of information under subch. III and to ensure that 
any employee employed by a governmental unit is protected from 
retaliatory action for disclosing information under subch. III."  
Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2) (emphases added).  This policy contains 
the very language we must interpret in this case.  We cannot 
construe 
the 
statute 
liberally 
in 
aid 
of 
disclosure 
of 
information 
and 
protection 
from 
retaliatory 
action 
for 
disclosure 
of 
information 
until 
we 
know 
what 
the 
terms 
"disclosure of information" and "retaliatory action" mean.  In 
other words, we must first give these specific terms their 
"common, ordinary, and accepted meaning[s]" or their "special 
definitional meaning[s]" if definitions are provided.  Kalal, 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 230.01 contains other state policies, 
such as "correct[ing] pay inequities based on gender or race in 
the state civil service system" and "tak[ing] affirmative action 
which is not in conflict with other provisions of" Wis. Stat. 
ch. 230.  Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2).  Schigur does not claim that 
any of the other purposes affect our analysis and we do not 
address them. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
16 
 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  Only when the content of these words is 
identified can the rest of the statute be interpreted liberally 
in aid of disclosure of information and protection from 
retaliatory action. 
¶32 The only issue we examine today to which this policy 
might apply without necessitating circular reasoning is the 
question of whether the DOJ believed Schigur lawfully disclosed 
information under Wis. Stat. § 230.81.  That issue requires us 
to interpret Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c).  However, "a provision 
can be construed 'liberally' as opposed to 'strictly' only when 
there is some ambiguity to construe,"  Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 
Chapter, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2199 (2012) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting), and as we will demonstrate, § 230.80(8)(c) is 
not ambiguous. 
¶33 Second, "[i]t is the policy of the state to ensure its 
employees 
opportunities 
for 
satisfying 
careers 
and 
fair 
treatment based on the value of each employee's services."  Wis. 
Stat. § 230.01(2).  We are at a loss as to how this policy, 
amorphous in this context, is supposed to alter our statutory 
interpretation in this case.  Schigur has not provided us with 
any 
additional 
guidance. 
 
"[W]e 
do 
not 
usually 
address 
undeveloped arguments."  State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 n.13, 
345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (citation omitted). 
¶34 In sum, there may be cases where the "liberal 
construction" provision affects our analysis of a statute, but 
this is not one of them.  We proceed to address Schigur's 
arguments. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
17 
 
 
B.  Whether Schigur Lawfully Disclosed "Information"  
Under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
¶35 Under Wis. Stat. § 230.83(1), "retaliatory action[s]" 
are prohibited.  One type of retaliatory action occurs when "a 
disciplinary 
action 
[is] 
taken 
because . . . [an] 
employee 
lawfully disclosed information under s. 230.81."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(8)(a).  
¶36 Under Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1), "[a]n employee with 
knowledge of information the disclosure of which is not 
expressly prohibited by state or federal law, rule or regulation 
may disclose that information to any other person."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.81(1) (emphases added).  As stated, "information" is 
defined in the statute as  
[I]nformation 
gained 
by 
the 
employee 
which 
the 
employee 
reasonably 
believes 
demonstrates: 
(a) 
A 
violation of any state or federal law, rule or 
regulation.  (b) Mismanagement or abuse of authority 
in state or local government, a substantial waste of 
public funds or a danger to public health and safety. 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5).  
¶37 The 
DOJ 
argues 
that 
Schigur 
did 
not 
"disclose 
information" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81.7  Schigur's argument in 
                                                 
7 Schigur argued before the circuit court and the court of 
appeals below that the DOJ had forfeited this argument because 
the DOJ did not raise the argument until it filed its motion for 
reconsideration of the ALJ's non-final decision regarding the 
DOJ's liability.  It is unclear whether Schigur renews this 
argument before this court.  We have stated in an analogous 
context that "[w]hen an issue involves a question of law rather 
than of fact, when the question of law has been briefed by both 
parties and when the question of law is of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision, this court may exercise its 
discretion to address" an issue not raised until appeal.  Apex 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
18 
 
response is that an opinion alone, as to the lawfulness or 
appropriateness of certain government activity is "information" 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5).  According to this reasoning, when 
Schigur notified Myszewski, Sperry, and O'Donnell of her 
concerns about the lawfulness or appropriateness of the security 
detail that Myszewski had proposed, she was protected from 
retaliatory action for that communication. 
¶38 We agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1) "does not cover employee statements 
that merely voice opinions or offer criticism."  DOJ v. DWD, 361 
Wis. 2d 196, 
¶27 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).  We think the language of the statute clearly mandates 
this interpretation. 
¶39 The 
statute's 
definition 
of 
"information" 
itself 
contains the word "information."  The statute thus extends 
protection only to the disclosure of a certain type of 
information: (1) information gained by the employee; (2) that 
the employee reasonably believes demonstrates one of the 
enumerated 
inappropriate 
activities. 
 
Schigur's 
opinion 
regarding the security detail's lawfulness or appropriateness 
fulfills the second of these factors, but not the first.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Elec. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998) 
(party failed to raise issue in circuit court).  All three 
prerequisites are met in this case with regard to the DOJ's 
argument 
that 
Schigur 
did 
not 
"disclose 
information."  
Therefore, assuming without deciding that the DOJ forfeited this 
argument, we will address the DOJ's argument.   
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
19 
 
¶40 Schigur's argument does not comport with the statute's 
definition of information.  If an opinion as to the lawfulness 
or appropriateness of government activity itself constituted 
"information gained by [an] employee," then under the statute 
the employee would have to reasonably believe that the opinion 
itself demonstrated inappropriate government conduct.  But one 
person's ultimate conclusion that certain conduct is unlawful or 
inappropriate 
does 
not, 
alone, 
demonstrate 
unlawful 
or 
inappropriate government conduct.  For example, the statement "I 
believe that it is illegal for the government to censor free 
speech" does not in and of itself demonstrate that the 
government has censored free speech; there are no facts alleged 
in the conclusion that demonstrate that the government has 
engaged in conduct that constitutes censorship. This is why 
"information" in this context instead refers to the details of 
underlying conduct rather than to an opinion alone, as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of that conduct.  An employee's 
opinion——her "reasonabl[e] belie[f]," Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)——
regarding that conduct's unlawfulness or inappropriateness is 
necessary for the statute's protection to cover disclosure of 
that conduct, but the conduct itself is the "information" that 
is disclosed, not the opinion that the conduct is unlawful or 
inappropriate.  Cf. Kinzel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
Sys., No. 2012AP1586, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2013) (examining Wis. Stat. § 230.90, which provides 
protection from retaliation on the basis of an employee's 
exercise of her free speech rights, and explaining that that 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
20 
 
statute "does not cover employee statements that merely voice 
opinions or offer criticism" (citation omitted)).8  
¶41 We 
conclude 
that 
an 
opinion 
alone, 
as 
to 
the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity is not 
"information" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5).9 
 
C.  Whether Other Portions of Schigur's E-mails Relating to the 
Proposed Security Detail are "Disclosure[s]" of Information 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
¶42 While Schigur's e-mail contained details regarding the 
proposed security detail at the Republican National Convention, 
she does not contend that these facts constitute "information." 
                                                 
8 Schigur attempts to draw a distinction between her opinion 
and the opinion given by the plaintiff in Kinzel v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, No. 2012AP1586, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013). Schigur 
claims the opinion in Kinzel was merely a "statement of personal 
disapproval," not a belief that a law would be violated or that 
state resources would be misused.  That may be so, but as it 
pertains to the issue before us, it is a distinction without a 
difference.  
9 Schigur claims that Kmetz v. State Historical Society, 304 
F. Supp. 2d 1108 
(W.D. 
Wis. 
2004), 
rev'd 
in 
part 
on 
reconsideration sub nom. Kmetz v. Vogt, No. 03-C-107-C, 2004 WL 
298102 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2004), "compels a ruling" in her 
favor on this issue.  We do not agree with this contention.  The 
court in Kmetz did not conclude that an opinion alone as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of certain government activity 
constituted "information" under the statute it was analyzing, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.65 (renumbered Wis. Stat. § 230.90; see 2005 
Wis. Act 155, § 60). The court in that case was instead 
concerned with the meaning of the word "disclosure."  See Kmetz, 
304 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. The Kmetz court held that "[§ 895.65] 
does not protect employees that voice their opinions and offer 
criticism."  Id. at 1115.  Schigur again attempts to distinguish 
her opinion from the opinions given by the plaintiff in Kmetz, 
but the distinctions do not affect our conclusion. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
21 
 
Schigur's attorney clarified multiple times at oral argument 
Schigur's view that it was Schigur's opinion alone, as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity that 
constituted "information" under Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5). For 
instance, the following exchange occurred between Justice 
Ziegler and Schigur's attorney:  
Justice 
Ziegler:  Can 
I 
try 
to 
clarify 
something? . . . The "information" isn't the travel 
with security detail.  You're saying the "information" 
is her legal opinion that doing so is unlawful. 
Schigur's attorney:  Exactly.  
Justice Ziegler:  There's a difference.  I think 
people were considering the "information" to be the 
travel with security, versus, you're saying the 
"information" is her legal opinion about that conduct 
being unlawful. 
Schigur's attorney:  Yeah.  Or the "information" 
is her belief that the use of state resources in this 
way was unlawful, constituted a violation of OSER.  
¶43 And in response to a line of questioning posed by 
Justice Gableman at oral argument, Schigur's attorney declared, 
"[W]hat [Schigur] disclosed was not the existence of the 
security detail. What she disclosed was its unlawfulness."  
Schigur argues to the same effect in her brief: "For the Court 
of Appeals (and the Circuit Court before it) to declare that an 
expression of belief is not protected . . . is wrong."  
¶44 Even assuming, without deciding, that other portions 
of Schigur's e-mail constitute "information" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(5), 
we 
nonetheless 
conclude 
that 
Schigur's 
communication of this information is not protected under 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
22 
 
§§ 230.80-.89 because the communication was not a "disclosure" 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.81.  
¶45 After attending the staff meeting led by Myszewski, 
Schigur e-mailed Myszewski, Sperry, and O'Donnell. But as 
Schigur made clear before the circuit court, "the decision to 
utilize State agents to provide a security detail to the 
Attorney General was known to those whom Schigur [e-mailed]." 
Myszewski in particular is the person who had informed Schigur 
of the proposed security detail in the first place. 
¶46 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 230.80-.89 
protects 
"employee 
disclosure[s]" 
of 
information. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 230.81; 
see 
§ 230.80(8); § 230.83.  We have held, in another context, that 
to "disclose" information, "the recipient must have been 
previously unaware of the information at the time of the 
communication."  State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶23, 253 
Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330.  We arrived at our definition of 
the 
word 
"disclose" 
in 
Polashek 
after 
examining 
several 
dictionary 
definitions 
of 
"disclose," 
as 
well 
as 
the 
interpretations of that word by multiple federal courts.  See 
id., ¶20-22.  We stated in that case that "a lack of knowledge 
on the part of the recipient is inherent in a disclosure."  Id., 
¶21.  
¶47 "What 
is 
of 
paramount 
importance 
is 
that 
[the 
legislature] be able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the 
language it adopts."  Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 
(1989), superseded by statute as stated in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
23 
 
Allapattah Serv., Inc., 125 U.S. 546, 557-58 (2005).  Therefore 
we would require a convincing reason indeed to interpret 
"disclose" any differently in this context.    
¶48 Perhaps Schigur does not seriously pursue an argument  
that 
other 
portions 
of 
her 
e-mail 
constitute 
disclosed 
"information" under the statute because the argument would 
require this court to adopt a definition of the word "disclose" 
that would lead to truly absurd results. As discussed, to 
disclose "information" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81, an employee 
must disclose "information gained by the employee which the 
employee reasonably believes demonstrates" enumerated types of 
unlawful or inappropriate government activity.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(5).  The definition of "information" makes clear that 
the employee need only disclose the details of the underlying 
conduct.  The employee need not disclose her reasonable belief 
that the information demonstrates unlawful or inappropriate 
government activity; instead, the employee need only hold that 
belief.  If this court were to conclude that a "disclosure" 
under § 230.81 does not require a lack of knowledge on the part 
of the recipient, then an employee who merely repeated a 
supervisor's statement back to the supervisor, while inwardly 
believing that the conduct the statement described was unlawful 
or inappropriate, would thereby become entitled to protection 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.83 (assuming that the employee otherwise 
complied with statutory procedures).  This pushes the concept of 
"whistleblowing" a tad too far. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
24 
 
¶49 We conclude that, under the specific facts of this 
case, and assuming without deciding that Schigur's e-mail 
contained "information" regarding the proposed security detail, 
the communication of the information to Myszewski, Sperry, and 
O'Donnell was not a "disclosure" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
because the information was already known to the recipients of 
the e-mails.  Consequently, those portions of the e-mail are not 
protected under Wis. Stat. § 230.83.   
 
D.  Whether the DOJ Believed Schigur Lawfully  
Disclosed Information Under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
¶50 Another type of retaliatory action prohibited under 
Wis. Stat. § 230.83 occurs when "a disciplinary action [is] 
taken because . . . [t]he appointing authority, agent of an 
appointing authority or supervisor believes the employee engaged 
in any activity described in par. (a) or (b)."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(8)(c) (emphasis added).  The activities referenced in 
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(a) and (b) are: "(a) The employee 
lawfully disclosed information under s. 230.81 or filed a 
complaint under s. 230.85(1)"; and "(b) The employee testified 
or assisted or will testify or assist in any action or 
proceeding relating to the lawful disclosure of information 
under s. 230.81 by another employee."  
¶51 Schigur argues that the DOJ engaged in retaliatory 
action against her because it believed she disclosed information 
under Wis. Stat. § 230.81.  The DOJ argues in response that 
Schigur forfeited the claim "by failing to timely assert it 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
25 
 
before the administrative agency," and that we cannot review the 
claim because it presents a question of fact. 
¶52 Schigur did not argue before the ALJ that the DOJ 
engaged in retaliatory action under Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c).  
However, the ALJ stated on the first day of the hearing on the 
DOJ's liability that: 
Ms. Schigur filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Equal 
Rights Division . . . alleging that the [DOJ] violated 
the Wisconsin Whistle Blower Law, Section 230.80-
230.89 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes, 
by 
taking 
retaliatory action because she lawfully disclosed——or 
the [DOJ] believed that she had disclosed information 
under Section 230.81 Wis. Stats.   
The ALJ's final decision similarly stated that Schigur had 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the DOJ had 
violated Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89 by taking retaliatory action 
against her "because she lawfully disclosed, or the [DOJ] 
believed that she had lawfully disclosed, information" under 
Wis. Stat. § 230.81.  
¶53 Schigur contends that her argument that the DOJ 
believed she disclosed information was a response to certain of 
the DOJ's arguments that it raised for the first time in its 
motion for reconsideration before the ALJ.  The ALJ did not 
reconsider her decision, concluding that the DOJ's new arguments 
were "best addressed on appeal."  Schigur says she raised her 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 230.80(8)(c) 
claim 
at 
the 
first 
possible 
opportunity: before the circuit court.  She reasserted the 
argument again at the court of appeals, and the issue was one of 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
26 
 
two that she presented in her petition for review before this 
court. 
¶54 The procedural circumstances of this case are somewhat 
unique.  As stated, supra note 7, "[w]hen an issue involves a 
question of law rather than of fact, when the question of law 
has been briefed by both parties and when the question of law is 
of sufficient public interest to merit a decision, this court 
may exercise its discretion to address" an issue not raised 
until appeal.  Apex Elec. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 
577 N.W.2d 23 (1998).  Both parties have briefed the issue.10  As 
will be shown, the issue Schigur raises is legal rather than 
factual under the circumstances of this case.  Finally, we 
granted review of the issue and find it of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision.  Therefore, assuming Schigur 
forfeited the issue, a question we do not decide today, we 
exercise our discretion to review the issue. 
¶55 In arguing that the DOJ believed Schigur disclosed 
information, Schigur states, "clearly the DOJ believed that 
Schigur's disclosures were protected under the statute."  In 
other words, Schigur reads Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c) as defining 
retaliatory actions to include instances where a supervisor 
                                                 
10 The DOJ chose not to address the merits of the argument 
in its brief, but we ordered briefing on the issues raised in 
the petition for review.  To rule that the parties had not 
"briefed the issue" simply because the DOJ declined to brief it 
when given the opportunity would be to give the DOJ control of 
whether or not this court reviews a forfeited issue. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
27 
 
makes a mistake of law as to whether an employee's communication 
is a "disclosure of information."  According to this argument, 
even if Schigur did not "disclose information" as defined in the 
statute, she is still protected if the DOJ believed she 
"disclosed information" as defined in the statute.  Schigur 
misinterprets 
§ 230.80(8)(c). 
 
The 
most 
reasonable 
interpretation of the provision is that it is aimed at 
situations where a supervisor retaliates on the basis of a 
mistake of fact, such as when a supervisor is told that an 
employee engaged in conduct that could constitute disclosure of 
information, but the employee had not in fact engaged in that 
conduct.  Put differently, § 230.80(8)(c) would be applicable, 
for example, if a supervisor believed that an employee had sent 
e-mail disclosures and retaliated against the employee on that 
basis, but the employee had not in fact sent any such e-mails at 
all.  
¶56 Schigur essentially asks us to hold that although she 
is not protected by Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-.89, the DOJ believed 
she was protected by §§ 230.80-.89, and she is therefore 
protected.  The argument is illogical:  an employer would not 
retaliate against an employee "because" the employer mistakenly 
believed that the employee would receive protection against 
retaliation.  Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8).  Instead, an employer 
might retaliate against an employee because the employer 
mistakenly believed that the employee had engaged in conduct 
that the employee had not in fact engaged in. 
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
28 
 
¶57 Because there is no dispute in this case that Schigur  
e-mailed Myszewski, Sperry, and O'Donnell11 after attending the 
staff meeting led by Myszewski, and because there is no dispute 
about the content of the e-mails, Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c) is 
not applicable here.  
¶58 We conclude that Schigur's argument that the DOJ 
believed 
that 
she 
"disclosed 
information" 
rests 
on 
a 
misinterpretation of Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c) and therefore 
fails. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that: (1) an opinion alone, as to the 
lawfulness or appropriateness of government activity is not 
"information" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5); 
(2) under the specific facts of this case, and assuming without 
deciding that Schigur's e-mail contained "information" regarding 
the 
proposed 
security 
detail, 
the 
communication 
of 
the 
information to Myszewski, Jed Sperry, and Cindy O'Donnell was 
not a "disclosure" under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 because the 
information was already known to the recipients of the e-mails; 
and (3) Schigur's argument that the DOJ believed that she 
"disclosed 
information" 
rests 
on 
a 
misinterpretation 
of 
§ 230.80(8)(c) and therefore fails.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
                                                 
11 We do not decide whether Schigur complied with the 
procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1) when she e-
mailed Myszewski, Sperry, and O'Donnell simultaneously.  
No. 
2013AP1488   
 
29 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶60 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., and REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did 
not participate. 
 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
1 
 
 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).     
¶62 The Wisconsin Legislature recognized the important 
role of whistleblowers in maintaining accountable government.  
The legislative purpose of the statute is expressly declared:  
"It is the policy of this state to encourage disclosure of 
information... and to ensure that any employee employed by a 
governmental unit is protected from retaliatory action for 
disclosing information..."  Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2).   
¶63 Employees are encouraged to disclose information, 
including a violation of any law or regulation and any 
mismanagement or substantial waste of public funds.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.80(5).  In aid of this, the legislature has directed   
that the statues "shall be construed liberally in aid of the 
purposed declared..."  Wis. Stat. § 230.02.       
¶64  I write separately because the majority opinion 
undermines the legislative purpose of Wisconsin's whistleblower 
statute.  First, the majority creates a heretofore unknown rule 
that bars the application of the explicit legislative directive 
of liberal construction.  Second, it writes new language into 
the statute thereby limiting the protections available to 
whistleblowers.  Third, it turns the legislative policy on its 
head, creating an absurd result. 
¶65 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that Joell 
Schigur lawfully disclosed information pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.81.  I would reverse the court of appeals and uphold the 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
2 
 
determination  of the Department of Workforce Development, Equal 
Rights Division.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶66 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") selected Joell 
Schigur to be its Director of the Bureau of Public Integrity.  
She was demoted after she sent emails to her supervisor, Michael 
Myszewski, expressing her concern regarding Attorney General Van 
Hollen's use of a taxpayer paid security detail at the upcoming 
Republican National Convention.   
¶67 Schigur wrote that she "was concerned that providing 
state resources to the Attorney General while he participates in 
a political activity off duty may violate OSER regulations and 
state law."  Attached to Schigur's email was a bulletin from the 
Office of State Employee Relations ("OSER") regarding prohibited 
political activities.  Schigur explained that she was sending 
the email "in hopes that this decision will be further evaluated 
to avoid possible scrutiny of our Attorney General, our agency 
and our special agents."  
¶68 Schigur explained in a second email that "the concern 
is not regarding agents participating in political activity; 
rather can state resources be used by the AG at a political 
event where he is not representing DOJ, rather the Republican 
Party. 
 
Parallel 
issues 
came 
up 
in 
the 
Jensen/Chvala 
investigation."  Ultimately, no security detail was sent to the 
Republican National Convention. 
¶69 Prior to sending the above emails to Myszewski, 
Schigur received quarterly job performance evaluations that were 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
3 
 
uniformly positive.  Shortly before Schigur sent the emails, 
Myszewski 
completed 
her 
21-month 
probationary 
performance 
evaluation.  He wrote:  "Joell continues to do an outstanding 
job of leading the Public Integrity Bureau and the Internet 
Crimes Against Children Program.  Joell is a nationally 
recognized leader in the area of protecting children from 
Internet predators.  Joell has successfully mastered all of the 
objectives and standards for a bureau director.  I recommend 
that Joell be removed from probation and receive permanent 
status as a director."   
¶70 Yet, 
shortly 
after 
Schigur 
sent 
the 
emails 
to 
Myszewski, she received her 24-month probationary performance 
evaluation that was negative and markedly different from her 
prior uniformly positive evaluations.  As a result, Schigur was 
removed from her Bureau Director position and demoted.  
¶71 In its findings of fact, the Department of Workforce 
Development, Equal Rights Division, found that 
"Schigur's 
disclosure in her April 21 and 23, 2008 emails to Myszewski and 
O'Donnel was a factor in DOJ's decision that she failed to pass 
probation as a Bureau Director on May 21, 2008."1    The 
Department determined that the DOJ violated Wis. Stat. § 230.80-
89 by "raking retaliatory action against [Schigur] because she 
lawfully disclosed, or the Respondent believed that she had 
lawfully disclosed, information under sec. 230.81."   
                                                 
1 Cindy O'Donnell, Administrator of the DOJ's Division of 
Management Services, as well as Jed Sperry, the head of the 
DOJ's Division of Criminal Investigation's tactical unit, also 
received copies of the emails. 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
4 
 
¶72 The majority reverses the Department's determination.  
It concludes that "under the specific facts of this case, and 
assuming without deciding that Schigur's 
e-mail contained 
'information' regarding the proposed security detail, the 
communication of the information to Myszewski, Jed Sperry, and 
Cindy O'Donnell was not a 'disclosure' under Wis. Stat. § 230.81 
because the information was already known to the recipients of 
the e-mails..."  Majority op., ¶5.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the majority declines to follow the directive that the statute 
be liberally construed to effect its purpose and instead writes 
into the statute a "new" requirement. 
II 
¶73 "It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the 
judiciary to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the 
legislature..."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Kalal 
instructs that we must give judicial deference to the policy 
choices enacted by the legislature."  See Id., ¶44. 
¶74 The majority turns a blind eye not only to the above 
instructions 
but 
also 
to 
recognized 
rules 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Instead of embracing precedent, the majority 
sub silencio overrules it, while creating its own contrary, and 
heretofore unknown, rule of statutory interpretation.  
¶75 The express mandate of Kalal, which the majority sub 
silencio overrules, provides: "a plain-meaning interpretation 
cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose."  Id., ¶49.  Kalal explained that purpose is "perfectly 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
5 
 
relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous 
statute" as long as it is ascertainable from the text of the 
statute itself and not extrinsic sources.  Id., ¶48.   
¶76 But the majority will have none of this.  It dutifully 
sets forth the purpose that is ascertainable from the text as 
declared by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 230.01(2): "It is 
the 
policy 
of 
this 
state 
to 
encourage 
disclosure 
of 
information... and to ensure that any employee employed by a 
governmental unit is protected from retaliatory action for 
disclosing information..."  Id., ¶30.  The majority likewise 
acknowledges that the legislature expressed in the text of Wis. 
Stat. § 230.02 that it should be liberally construed:  "Statutes 
applicable to the office shall be construed liberally in aid of 
the purposes declared in § 230.01."  Majority op., ¶30 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 230.02). 
¶77 Nevertheless, the majority contends that it cannot 
apply the legislature's explicit directive to liberally construe 
the statute.  Why?   
¶78 The majority claims that a provision can be construed 
liberally only when there is some ambiguity to construe.2  It 
also asserts that "[w]e cannot construe the statute liberally in 
                                                 
2 The 
majority 
applies 
this 
new 
rule 
of 
statutory 
interpretation to Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(c), which prohibits 
retaliation when a "supervisor believes the employee engaged in 
any activity described in par. (a) or (b)."  The activities 
referenced in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(8)(a) include whether "[t]he 
employee lawfully disclosed information under s. 230.81…"  
Accordingly, the majority's statutory interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 230.80(8)(c) cannot be separated from its interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 230.81.   
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
6 
 
aid of disclosure of information and protection from retaliatory 
action for disclosure of information until we know what the 
terms 'disclosure of information' and 'retaliatory action' 
mean."  Id., ¶31.  
¶79 A liberal construction "is often used to signify an 
interpretation which produces broader coverage or more inclusive 
application of statutory concepts.  What is called a liberal 
construction is ordinarily one which makes a statute apply to 
more things or in more situations than would be the case under a 
strict construction."  In re R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 871-72, 
471 N.W.2d 16 (1991) (citing Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, sec. 58.02 (4th ed. 1984)). 
¶80 The majority's reasoning that it cannot construe the 
statute liberally until it first defines the terms in the 
statute is backwards.  "Liberal construction of any statute 
consists in giving the words a meaning which renders it 
effectual to accomplish the purpose or fulfill the intent which 
it plainly discloses."  State ex rel Mueller v. Sch. Dist. Bd., 
208 Wis. 257, 260, 242 N.W. 574 (1932).   
¶81 Instead of applying the statutorily required liberal 
construction, the majority defines the terms "disclose" and 
"information" narrowly so that Schigur's claims do not fall 
within the statute.  It then reasons that we need not construe 
the statute liberally because Schigur's claims do not fall 
within the statute.   
¶82 The point of liberal construction is to interpret the 
statue in a way that furthers the legislative goal, which in 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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this case is to protect employees who act as whistleblowers.  
Yet, the majority has done the opposite here by defining the 
terms of the statute in a way that denies protection for 
whistleblowers. 
¶83 The majority's contention that a statute cannot be 
construed liberally unless it is ambiguous is a heretofore 
unknown rule of statutory interpretation.3  It sub silencio 
overrules the widely accepted rule of statutory interpretation 
set forth in Kalal——that a plain-meaning interpretation cannot 
contravene a textually manifest statutory purpose.  271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶49. 
¶84 Kalal's well-recognized rule has been relied upon for 
years by judges, attorneys and litigants.4  In fact, as recently 
                                                 
3 The majority cites to Justice Roberts's dissent in Salazar 
v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, where he stated without citation that 
"a provision can be construed 'liberally' as opposed to 
'strictly' only when there is some ambiguity to construe."  132 
S. Ct. 2181, 2199 (2012).  Salazar is not controlling because it 
concerns the interpretation of a government contract provision.  
132 S. Ct. at 2199.  While both the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act ("ISDA") and government contracts 
under the act are to be liberally construed, Justice Robert's 
dissent concerns the interpretation of a government contract, 
not the statutory language of the ISDA.  Id.  As in Wisconsin, 
it is well established in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
a remedial statute is entitled to liberal construction in order 
to effectuate legislative intent.  See, e.g., Clifford F. 
MacEvoy Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Clavin Tompinks Co., 322 U.S. 102 
(1944) ("The [act] is highly remedial in nature.  It is entitled 
to a liberal construction and application in order to properly 
effectuate the Congressional intent…"). 
4 See, e.g., Linveille v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 
705, 715-18, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994) (In Wisconsin, a statute may 
be liberally construed even if it is not ambiguous). 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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as a few months ago, we again embraced that established rule of 
statutory interpretation in State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶36, 
355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467 ("In addition to the statutory 
history and structure, the contextually manifest purposes of 
[the statute] are relevant to our plain meaning analysis."). See 
also State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶101, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 
N.W.2d 787 ("scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant 
to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute, so 
long as they are ascertainable from the statute itself.  
Importantly, a plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a 
textually 
or 
contextually 
manifest 
statutory 
purpose.") 
(Ziegler, J. dissenting) (quotations and citations omitted); 
Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶17, 325 Wis. 2d 
135, 785 N.W.2d 302 ("A plain-meaning interpretation cannot 
contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory 
purpose.") (citation omitted). 
¶85 Unfortunately, the majority's newly minted rule of 
statutory interpretation will have far-reaching consequences 
that go well beyond this whistleblower statute.  For example, 
Wisconsin's Fair Employment law contains a legislative directive 
that it be liberally construed to advance the purposes of the 
statute.  Wis. Stat. § 111.31(3).  Likewise, Wisconsin's 
Consumer Transactions law contains the same directive.  Wis. 
Stat. § 421.102(1).  Will the legal rights of Wisconsin's 
workers and consumers be similarly limited under the majority's 
new rule of statutory interpretation? 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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¶86 The numerous Wisconsin laws that contain similar 
legislative directives range across the broadest spectrum of our 
statutes. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 766.001(1) 
(Marital 
Property); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 16.001(2) 
(Department 
of 
Administration); Wis. Stat. § 32.71 (Eminent Domain); Wis. Stat. 
§ 707.57(4) (Time-Share Ownership); Wis. Stat. § 231.24 (Health 
and Educational Facilities Authority); Wis. Stat. § 401.305(1) 
(Uniform 
Commercial 
Code); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0301 
(2) 
(Intergovernmental 
Cooperation); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 645.01(3) 
(Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation).    
¶87 The juggernaut of the majority's analysis rests on its 
new rule of statutory interpretation: a provision can be 
construed liberally only when there is some ambiguity to 
construe.  Majority op., ¶32.  As discussed above, the 
majority's new rule: (a) bars the application of the statutory 
directive of liberal construction to effectuate the legislative 
purpose; (b) sub silencio overrules part of Kalal, a seminal 
statutory interpretation case; and (c) has broad negative 
consequences.  Simply put, the majority's new rule of statutory 
interpretation should not stand.   
III 
¶88 The majority's insistence that a "disclosure" must 
contain "new" information writes language into the statute which 
dramatically limits whistleblower protections.  According to the 
majority, in order to "disclose" information, "the recipient 
must have been previously unaware of the information at the time 
of the communication."  Id., ¶46 (citing State v. Polashek, 2002 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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WI 74, ¶23, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330).  It maintains that 
Schigur's emails were "not a 'disclosure' under Wis. Stat. § 
230.81 because the information was already known to the 
recipients of the e-mails."  Id., ¶49.  Accordingly, the 
majority concludes that Schigur has no recourse under the law 
for any retaliation that resulted from her emails regarding the 
Attorney General's security detail at the Republican National 
Convention.      
¶89 The plain language of Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-89 contains 
no requirement that the disclosed information be previously 
unknown.  It neither contains the words "new" or "secret" nor 
any other word or phrase that could be interpreted as a synonym.  
Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1)(a) states:  
An 
employee 
with 
knowledge 
of 
information 
the 
disclosure of which is not expressly prohibited by 
state or federal law, rule or regulation may disclose 
that information to any other person.  However, to 
obtain protection under s. 230.83, before disclosing 
that information to any person… the employee shall... 
disclose the information in writing to the employee's 
supervisor.   
Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)(a) and (b) define "information" as:  
'Information' means information gained by the employee 
which the employee reasonably believes demonstrates:  
(a) A violation of any state or federal law, rule 
or regulation.    
(b) Mismanagement or abuse of authority in state 
or local government, a substantial waste of 
public funds or a danger to public health and 
safety. 
¶90  "It is presumed that the legislature is cognizant of 
what language to include or omit when it enacts laws."  In re 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
11 
 
Incorporation of Portion of Town of Sheboygan, 2001 WI App 279, 
¶9, 248 Wis. 2d 904, 637 N.W.2d 770.  Reading an unwritten 
requirement for new or secret information into the whistleblower 
statutes dramatically narrows the scope of protected disclosures 
in contravention of legislative intent.  As this court has 
previously explained, "[o]ur duty to fulfill legislative intent 
ensures that we uphold the separation of powers by not 
substituting judicial policy views for the views of the 
legislature."  State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, 
¶7, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686 (quoting State ex rel. 
Cramer v. Schwartz, 2000 WI 86, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 
591).     
 ¶91 The majority relies on State v. Polashek for its 
conclusion that "disclosure" means "new information."  Polashek 
is a slender reed upon which to rest such a conclusion.  
Although the Polashek court determined that "the term 'disclose' 
in § 48.981(7) requires that the recipient not have knowledge of 
the 
information 
communicated," 
its 
determination 
is 
not 
controlling.  253 Wis. 2d 527, ¶3.  It is construing a penal 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7)(f), which provides a criminal 
penalty 
for 
the 
unauthorized 
disclosure 
of 
confidential 
information relating to reports of suspected child abuse or 
neglect.  See id., ¶1.    
¶92 Penal statutes are strictly construed.  See, e.g., 
State v. Christensen, 110 Wis. 2d 538, 547, 329 N.W.2d 382 
(1983).  "This cannon of strict construction is grounded on two 
public policies.  The first favors notice as to what conduct is 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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criminal.  The second recognizes that 'since the power to 
declare 
what 
conduct 
is 
subject 
to 
penal 
sanctions 
is 
legislative, rather than judicial, it would risk judicial 
usurpation of the legislative function for a court to enforce a 
penalty where the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally 
prescribed it.'"  Id., 110 Wis. 2d 538, 546-457 (citations 
omitted).   
¶93 Given that Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) is a penal statute, 
the cannon of strict construction required the Polachek court to 
interpret "disclosure" narrowly so that the definition of 
criminal conduct under the statute was not expanded by the 
judiciary.  In Polachek, the disclosure of information was an 
element of the crime.  253 Wis. 2d 527, ¶23.  By narrowly 
defining "disclosure of information" to recipients who were 
unaware of the information, the Polachek court properly limited, 
rather than expanded, criminal conduct under the statute.        
¶94 The purpose and effect of Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-89 is 
the opposite of Wis. Stat. § 48.981(7) because the whistleblower 
act is a remedial statute.  In contrast to penal statutes, 
"[u]nder 
the 
accepted 
law 
of 
Wisconsin 
and 
of 
other 
jurisdictions, remedial statutes should be liberally construed 
to 'suppress the mischief and advance the remedy which (the 
statute) intended to afford.'"  City of Madison v. Hyland, Hall 
& Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 373, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976).  In this 
case, the cannons of statutory interpretation demand that 
"disclosure" and "information" be liberally construed so that 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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protections for whistleblowers are advanced and retaliation by 
employers is suppressed.  
¶95 Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)(a) and (b) define "information" 
as:  
'Information' means information gained by the employee 
which the employee reasonably believes demonstrates:  
(a) A violation of any state or federal law, rule 
or regulation.    
(b) Mismanagement or abuse of authority in state 
or local government, a substantial waste of 
public funds or a danger to public health and 
safety. 
¶96 The majority reaches two conclusions regarding why 
Schigur's emails are not information under the statute.  First, 
"an opinion alone, as to the lawfulness or appropriateness of 
government activity is not 'information' as that term is defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)."  Majority op., ¶5, 29, 41 & 59.  
Second, "that under the specific facts of this case, and 
assuming without deciding that Schigur's e-mail contained 
'information' regarding the proposed security detail, the 
communication... 
was 
not 
a 
'disclosure'... 
because 
the 
information was already known to the recipients of the e-mails." 
Id., ¶29.  I address each in turn. 
¶97 I address first the majority's conclusion "that an 
opinion alone, as to the lawfulness or appropriateness of 
government activity is not 'information' as that term is defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5).  Id., ¶29.  Relying on Kinzel v. Bd. 
of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., an unpublished court 
of appeals decision, the majority asserts that Wis. Stat. § 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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230.90 "does not cover employee statements that merely voice 
opinions or offer criticism."  Id., ¶40 (citing Kinzel, No. 
2012AP1586, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 
2013). 
¶98 In Kinzel, the plaintiff claimed to have disclosed 
information about an abuse of authority, which is protected 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.80(5)(2).  Kinzel, No. 2012AP1586, 
¶20.  The court of appeals determined that Kinzel did not 
disclose information about an abuse of authority, but "merely 
gives his opinion and criticizes."  Id.  Kinzel did "not set 
forth specific facts regarding the events associated with the 
suspension."  Id., ¶21.  Kinzel did "not present any information 
supporting his opinion that these people are blameless."  Id., 
¶22.  
¶99 In furtherance of its discussion, the majority offers 
a sample of the type of opinion that was addressed in Kinzel and 
deemed inadequate to constitute "information."  The majority 
offers: "For example, the statement 'I believe that it is 
illegal for the government to censor free speech.'"  Majority 
op., ¶40.  If that were the genre of opinion that was offered by 
Schigur, I would agree with the majority that without more, it 
is not information.  But here there was more, much more. 
¶100 Schigur did not merely voice a generic opinion saying 
"I believe that it is illegal for the DOJ to violate the law and 
expend taxpayer money for private political purposes."  As the 
Director of the Bureau for Public Integrity, she included 
specifics facts underlying the concerns that she advanced:  
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
15 
 
● 
The Attorney General was going to use a state paid 
security detail while he attended the Republican 
National Convention. 
● 
She raised a concern about the use of state resources 
given the facts that he would be "off duty," not 
representing the DOJ, but rather representing a 
political party. 
● 
She provided a copy of the state regulation that she 
thought may be violated. 
● 
She cited to "parallel issues (that) came up in the 
Jensen/Chvala investigation."  
 
¶101 The facts demonstrate a "reasonable belief" for her 
concern that there may be a violation of a law or regulation and 
a "reasonable belief" that that there may be "mismanagement" of 
or "a substantial waste of public funds."  This is the very 
definition of information under the statute and it is exactly 
what the statue required.     
¶102 Even if the rewriting of the statue by the majority 
inserting the word "new" into it were to be condoned, the facts 
here would meet that test.  Until Schigur sent her supervisor  
emails 
expressing 
her 
concern, 
he 
was 
unaware 
that 
she 
reasonably believed that the DOJ might be violating the law or 
committing an abuse of funds.  Yet, the majority cannot allow 
Schigur's concern to be interpreted as new information because 
it would satisfy even the most restrictive definition of 
"disclose."   
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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¶103 The majority advances next that even assuming that the 
emails provided information, it was not a "disclosure... because 
the information was already known to the recipients of the e-
mails."  Majority op., ¶29. 
¶104 The majority goes so far as to argue that "[t]he 
employee need not disclose her reasonable belief that the 
information demonstrates unlawful or inappropriate government 
activity; instead, the employee need only hold that belief."  
Id., ¶48 (emphasis in the original).  This assertion finds no 
support in the plain language of the statute.   
¶105  What about an attorney who is called upon to provide 
a purely legal opinion about whether facts revealed by another 
employee constitute illegality or misuse of state funds?  The 
attorney would be compelled to disclose her legal opinion, but 
would not be protected under the whistleblower act because the 
opinion would not be "information."  The firing of an attorney 
because she does not give the legal opinion that her supervisor 
wants should violate the statute.  However, under the majority's 
analysis, the attorney could be fired without recourse for 
providing an ethical, but unpopular, legal opinion. 
¶106 The majority has taken a statutory notice requirement 
from Wisconsin's whistleblower law and turned it into a double-
edged sword.  Under the majority's decision, a government 
employee 
who 
tries 
to 
prevent 
wrongdoing 
risks 
losing 
whistleblower protection even if she complies with the law.  If 
an employee does not provide her supervisor with notice of an 
alleged wrongdoing, she has no protection under the law.  
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
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However, according to the majority, if the supervisor already 
knows about the wrongdoing, the whistleblower still has no 
protection under the law even though she provided the required 
notice.  
                         IV  
¶107 Statutory language should be interpreted "reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 
¶46. 
 
The 
majority's 
statutory 
interpretation 
of 
"disclosure" 
and 
"information" 
leads 
to 
an 
absurd 
and 
unreasonable 
result. 
 
In 
some 
instances 
the 
majority's 
interpretation would protect the wrongdoer, rather than the 
whistleblower.  For example, what if an employee reported 
evidence of theft to her supervisor without knowing that he was 
actually the thief?  The corrupt supervisor could fire the 
employee and she would have no protection as a whistleblower 
because the information was already known.  This result turns 
the legislative purpose of the act on its head by discouraging, 
rather than encouraging, reporting.    
¶108 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.81(1)(a), an employee 
with knowledge of information shall disclose the information in 
writing to her supervisor before disclosing it to any other 
person. The majority has taken a simple notice requirement and 
turned it into a trap for the unwary.  "Employees should not be 
discouraged from the normal route of pursuing internal remedies 
before going public with their good faith allegations.  Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 
478 (3rd Cir. 1993).   
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
18 
 
¶109 "Indeed, it is most appropriate, both in terms of 
efficiency and economics... that employees notify management of 
their observations..."  Id.  "Employers benefit from a system in 
which the employee reports suspected violations to the employer 
first; the employee should not, in any event, be penalized for 
bestowing 
that 
benefit 
on 
the 
employer." 
 
Sullivan 
v. 
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F.Supp. 716, 725 (D. Conn. 
1992).  Under the majority's decision, an employee is penalized 
for reporting a violation if the supervisor already knew about 
the violation. 
¶110  
The consequences of this decision may be far-
reaching.  Not only will whistleblowers suffer retaliation 
without 
recourse, 
but 
all 
of 
Wisconsin's 
citizens 
lose 
protection 
against 
government 
corruption. 
 
Absent 
legal 
protections, it will be the rare employee who will risk her 
livelihood to act as a whistleblower.  "Without employees who 
are willing to risk adverse employment consequences as a result 
of whistleblowing activities, the public would remain unaware of 
large-scale and potentially dangerous abuses."  Dolan v. Cont'l 
Airlines, 563 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 1997).      
V 
¶111   In its findings of fact, the Department concluded 
that "Schigur's disclosure in her April 21 and 23, 2008 emails 
to Myszewski and O'Donnel was a factor in DOJ's decision that 
she failed to pass probation as a Bureau Director on May 21, 
2008."  We will uphold an agency's findings of fact if they are 
supported by credible and substantial evidence.  See, e.g., 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
19 
 
Brown v. State Dep't of Children and Families, 2012 WI App 61, 
¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827.  No one has argued here 
that this finding of fact is not supported by credible and 
substantial evidence.  We must therefore resolve this case with 
the understanding that this fact is exactly as the Department 
found. 
¶112 In sum, for the reasons stated above, I conclude that 
Schigur lawfully disclosed information pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.81.  Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and 
uphold the decision of the Department of Workforce Development, 
Equal Rights Division, which  concluded that the DOJ violated 
Wis. Stat. §§  230.80-89 when it terminated Joell Schigur's 
probation.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
No. 2013AP1488.awb     
 
 
 
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