Title: Miles v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Miles v. State, No. 36, September Term, 2012
CRIMINAL LAW - CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.  Death row inmate, whose sentence
survives repeal of capital punishment but has not been converted to life without parole,
asserts that the sentence violates the clause in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Art. 16,
providing:  "That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent with the
safety of the State[.]"  The clause is unchanged from adoption as Art. 14 in 1776.  Inmate
contends that, at that time, a "sanguinary" law meant the death penalty for any crime, without
regard to the method of imposition. 
Held:  Inmate's sentence not illegal.  Article 14 was not retroactive.  It applies to
legislation in the future.  Death by hanging for murder was the common law penalty for that
common law crime and is not affected by Art. 14.  Subsequent enactments classifying murder
into degrees did not change the common law crime.
Alternatively, the sanguinary laws clause, if retroactive, was not intended to include
death by hanging for murder. This is evidenced by acknowledgments of the continued
existence of capital punishment in the first draft of the 1776 Declaration of Rights and in the
text, as adopted.  Continued existence of capital punishment was further recognized by
legislation enacted relatively shortly after the Revolution, by provincial and English
legislation considered to be in effect after the Revolution, and by death warrants signed by
revolutionary era Governors.
Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County
Case No. 17-K-97-004789
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 36
September Term, 2012
__________________________________________
JODY LEE MILES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_________________________________________
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
*Bell
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
McDonald, J., dissents
________________________________________
Filed: November 25, 2013
*Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
The appellant, Jody Lee Miles (Miles), is a convicted murderer who was condemned
to death by a jury in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County on March 19, 1998.  After
numerous reviews,  Miles, in July 2011, filed a second motion to correct his sentence,
1
claiming that it was illegal.2
Miles asserts that his sentence is illegal because the Maryland death penalty statute
violates the Declaration of Rights (MDR) Article 16, which reads:   
"That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent with the
safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties
ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter."
Appellant's principal position is that, on November 3, 1776, when the Maryland
Constitutional Convention adopted our first Constitution and Declaration of Rights, then
MDR Article 14, by its reference to "sanguinary laws," abolished capital punishment, subject
The conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court.  Miles v. State, 365 Md.
1
488, 781 A.2d 787 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1163, 122 S. Ct. 1175  (2002).  His initial
petition for post-conviction relief, as supplemented, was denied August 21, 2006.  This
Court denied leave to appeal.  Miles v. State, 397 Md. 352, 918 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 552
U.S. 883, 128 S. Ct. 291 (2007).  His initial motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed
August 10, 2007, was denied January 3, 2008.  This Court affirmed that denial.  Miles v.
State, 421 Md. 596, 28 A.3d 667 (2011), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 1743
(2012).
By the Acts of 2013, Chapter 156, the General Assembly repealed the death penalty,
2
effective October 1, 2013.  Adoption of that legislation does not moot this appeal under the
savings of penalties provision in Maryland Code (1957, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Article 1, § 3. 
Chapter 156 amends Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol. and 2012 Cum. Supp.), § 7-
601(a)(1) of the Correctional Services Article by authorizing the Governor to "change a
sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole," but, as of this
writing, that provision has not been invoked.
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to the State safety exception, without regard to the nature of the crime or the method of
imposition of that punishment.  Article 14 read:
"That sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, as far as is consistent with the
safety of the State; and no law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties
ought to be made in any case, or at any time hereafter."
D. Friedman, The History, Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 637, 656 (1998) (Friedman-Temple).  
Miles also contends that his sentence is illegal because it violates MDR Article 24,
which provides:
"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by
the Law of the land."
That argument is directed to the provision in the death penalty statute under which his jury
determined "whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances
outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances."  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 413(h)(1), more recently Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 2-303(i)(1)
of the Criminal Law Article.3
The circuit court denied Miles's motion, and he noted this appeal.  He presents two
questions:
This section was repealed by Chapter 156 of the Acts of 2013.
3
- 3 -
"1.
Is Mr. Miles' death sentence unconstitutional and illegal under
the 'sanguinary Laws' clause of Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights?
"2.
Is Mr. Miles' capital sentence illegal where the jury did not find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors?"
We shall affirm for the reasons set forth below.
Motion to Dismiss
The State has moved to dismiss the appeal.
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time."  The State correctly observes that Miles's use of Rule 4-345(a) is not within the
letter of our previously decided cases.  We have indicated, however, that a sentence may be
reviewable under Rule 4-345(a) where a United States Supreme Court decision, promulgated
after sentencing, announces a new judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision that
brings into question the validity of the statute on which the sentence is based.  See Evans v.
State, 396 Md. 256, 272, 914 A.2d 25, 34-35 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 835, 128 S. Ct.
65 (2007).  If the death penalty statute does not comply with the Declaration of Rights, the
statute fails, and with it, the sentence.  Here, Miles asks this Court to declare a constitutional
rule of first impression.  We hold that this issue of substantive constitutional law is within
Rule 4-345(a).  
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We conclude otherwise with respect to the dismissal of Miles's appeal on the second
issue.  His contention is not within Rule 4-345(a) for the reasons ably stated by the circuit
court.  
"As noted supra, Defendant challenged this weighing procedure in his
August, 2007 motion to correct illegal sentence.  In that motion, defendant
primarily relied on Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), a U.S.
Supreme Court decision that was published in January, 2007.  Defendant
argued that, pursuant to Cunningham, Maryland's capital sentencing scheme
violates the Sixth Amendment unless it requires that aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant
additionally asserted that the sentencing procedure violates Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See MD. CODE, ANN., CONST. Art. 21 (2003,
2011 Supp.).
"This Court denied the motion on January 4, 2008.  Defendant timely
appealed.  Significantly, Defendant never explicitly raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the weighing procedure under the Declaration of Rights. 
Rather, Defendant focused his argument on the Sixth Amendment.  For
reasons not directly pertinent to the issues currently before this Court, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion, holding that
'Maryland's capital sentencing procedure does not violate [the] Sixth
Amendment.'  Miles v. State, 421 Md. 596, 607[, 28 A.3d 667, 673] (2011). 
The Court did not address the sentencing procedure's constitutionality with
respect to the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
"Defendant's current motion, again, challenges the sentencing
procedure under the Declaration of Rights.  Defendant concedes that although
Article 21 was mentioned in the 2007 motion, the Declaration of Rights issue
was not explicitly raised before the Court of Appeals.  Defendant now
'requests that this Court vacate his sentence of death on the ground that
permitting the death sentence based on a jury finding by a preponderance of
the evidence that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors
violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights.'  Revised Supplemental Motion
at 2.  This time, Defendant primarily relies on Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights which provides, in pertinent part, that 'no man ought to be ... deprived
of his life ... but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.'  MD.
CODE ANN., CONST. Art. 24. (2003, 2011 Supp.).
- 5 -
*       *       *
"Defendant cites no new judicial interpretation in the case at bar. 
Consequently, Defendant's motion may be cognizable under Rule 4-345(a)
only under the general rule, where the alleged error resulted in illegality of the
sentence itself.  Defendant's Article 24 argument does not challenge the
inherent illegality of his death sentence.  Rather, it alleges error in the
underlying procedure that resulted in the sentence.  'The notion of an "illegal
sentence" ... deals with substantive law, not procedural law.'  Corcoran v.
State, 67 Md. App. 252, 255[, 507 A.2d 200, 202] (1986).  An error in a
sentencing procedure, even if it is of a constitutional dimension, may very
well result in an inherently and substantively legal sanction.  Cf. State v.
Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 275[, 900  A.2d 765, 769] (2006) (citing Randall [Book
Corp. v. State], 316 Md. [315,] 323[, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989)]) ('An error
committed by the trial court during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily
cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sentence or sanction is
itself lawful.'); Evans [396 Md. at 271-72, 914 A.2d at 34].  Indeed, 'a
sentence, proper on its face, [does not] become[] an "illegal sentence" because
of some arguable procedural flaw in the sentencing procedure.'  Corcoran, 67
Md. App. at 255[, 507 A.2d at 202].  Therefore, the motion to correct an
illegal sentence is not an appropriate vehicle to address Defendant's Article 24
argument.
"The Court's decision is consistent with the narrow scope of the motion
to correct illegal sentence.  See Tshiwala [v. State], 424 Md. [612], 619[,  37
A.3d 308, 312 (2012)].  A [Rule] 4-345(a) motion is generally cognizable
only where there is no conviction warranting any sentence, see, e.g., Ridgeway
v. State, 369 Md. 165[, 797 A.2d 1287] (2002), or where the sentence exceeds
the limits imposed by law, see, e.g., Matthews [v. State], 424 Md. 503[, 36
A.3d 499 (2012)].  See Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466[, 918 A.2d 506,
509-10] (2007).  Because imposing a punishment under these circumstances
is particularly egregious, Rule 4-345(a) 'creates a limited exception to the
general rule of finality, and sanctions a method of opening a judgment
otherwise final and beyond the reach of the court.'  State v. Griffiths, 338 Md.
485, 496[, 659 A.2d 876, 882] (1995).  In all other cases, the interests of
finality outweigh a defendant's interests in challenging alleged errors beyond
a direct appeal and a post-conviction petition."
(Footnotes omitted).
- 6 -
Because Miles's second contention is not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a), the circuit
court was correct in denying relief under that rule on the preponderance argument.  That
does not result, however, in a dismissal of the appeal on that issue.  Rather, we shall affirm.
Parties' Contentions
Miles's Submission
The principal argument advanced by Miles is that, textually, Article 14 of the 1776
MDR abrogated capital punishment.  The argument consists of four steps, which we have
reordered.
1.  "A 'sanguinary law' is a law authorizing the imposition of the death
penalty";
2.  "The word 'ought' means 'shall'";
3.  "'[T]o be avoided' means 'to be refrained from' or 'to be made void'"; and
4.  "The phrase 'as far as is consistent with the safety of the State' means
'unless necessary for the security of the State of Maryland.'"4
The Press had reported that there was an effort to petition Chapter 156 of the Acts
4
of 2013 to referendum, under Maryland Constitution, Article XVI.  On July 3, 2013, after
it had become clear that no referendum petition had been filed, Miles applied to this Court
for leave to file a supplemental brief arguing that the repeal of the death penalty evidenced
that the death penalty, as a "sanguinary" law, is not necessary for the safety of the State.  We
granted that request on August 14, 2013, together with the requested briefing schedule under
which Miles's reply to the State's answer was filed October 21, 2013.
As will be made clear, infra, the safety of the State exception is immaterial to our
decision.
- 7 -
Miles undertakes, in the major portion of his brief, to demonstrate that, in 1776, the
well understood meaning of "sanguinary," particularly when modifying "laws," was capital
punishment.  His hypothesis is that, in 1776, the constitutional convention proscribed capital
punishment for any offense, including murder, that did not impact State security, and that
the proscription operated without regard to the method of executing the sentence.  This
absolutist position is essential to Miles's hypothesis because Maryland's modern death
penalty statute, if applied to Miles, does not infringe constitutional prohibitions against cruel
or unusual punishment or against cruel and unusual pains and penalties.  See, e.g., Johnson
v. State, 303 Md. 487, 542, 495 A.2d 1, 29 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S. Ct.
868 (1986); Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 373, 473 A.2d 903, 924, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
900, 105 S. Ct. 276 (1984); Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 126-27, 472 A.2d 953, 972, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 226 (1984); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 606, 468 A.2d
45, 65 (1983) (holding that modern death penalty statute satisfies Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and MDR Articles 16 and 25), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 2374 (1984); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 436, 439 A.2d 542,
559-60 (1982); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 729, 415 A.2d 830, 848 (1980) (finding that
modern death penalty statute satisfied Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and MDR Article 25 but remanding for re-sentencing because death
sentence had been applied arbitrarily).
- 8 -
The thesis advanced by Miles begins with an intellectually influential work by Cesare
Beccaria (1738-1794), An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, written in Italian in 1764 and
first published in English in 1767 (Beccaria).   See also XI W. Holdsworth, A History
5
of English Law, at 575, notes 11 & 12 (1938) (Holdsworth).  Beccaria advocated
proportionality in sentencing.  Beccaria at 21-26.  He opposed capital punishment and
proposed lifelong slavery as the alternative punishment for murder.  Id. at 102-17.  Because
of the possibility that a revolutionary might escape, he believed that capital punishment was
justified only to protect the safety of the state.  Id. at 103-04.
The term "sanguinary" does not appear in the English translation of Beccaria's work. 
The Legal Classics English edition includes an unsigned commentary, usually attributed to
Voltaire, that uses the term "sanguinary" in the title of chapter thirteen, which describes the
death sentence imposed on a poor French man for breaking his Lenten fast by eating "a
morsel of horse-flesh," out of "the most intolerable hunger."  Commentary at 43.  The point
of the commentary is the shocking lack of proportionality in that case.
Miles, acknowledging computer searches for his ability to survey the subject, has
presented us with an array of quotations using the term  "sanguinary" in historical, political,
philosophical, legal, and other writings, particularly from the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.  For example, we are referred to eleven writers of those centuries who, as Miles
Our references to Beccaria are to the Legal Classics Library Edition published by
5
Gryphon (1991).
- 9 -
synthesizes their quotations, "say that Solon abolished the sanguinary laws of Draco, except
the ones for murder, thereby implying that the death penalty for murder is a sanguinary law." 
Brief of Appellant at 16 n.4.6
Miles also directs our attention to the use of "sanguinary" by those who opposed
capital punishment under any circumstances.  The Maine Constitution, Article I, § 9 (1820),
provided:  "Sanguinary laws shall not be passed; all penalties and punishments shall be
proportioned to the offense ... nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted."  In 1836 a Joint
Select Committee on Capital Punishment considered this provision and reported, in relevant
part: 
"Sanguinary is derived from a Latin word which signifies blood, and is
synonymous with the Latin sanguinarius and the French sanguinaire, both of
which signify bloody, murderous, cruel.  These are the definitions given by
Webster, and other lexicographers; and it is in this sense that it is here used. 
If an objection be raised to this construction, on the ground that the law
requiring the punishment of death by hanging, for certain offences, is not one
requiring the blood of a fellow-being, it will be readily perceived that such an
objection is unwarranted by the common use of language.  If one man shall
put to death another, whether by poisoning, strangulation, or suffocation, he
is said to be guilty of the blood of the murdered person, and is even said to
When presented syllogistically, the argument is illogical. 
6
The laws of Draco were sanguinary.  
Capital punishment for Murder was a law of Draco.
Therefore, capital punishment for murder is sanguinary.
I.M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, at 119 (7th ed. 1986), calls the logical error the Fallacy of
Division, Type 2.  That which is true collectively is not necessarily true distributively.  
- 10 -
have shed his blood, although no blood has literally been spilt.  It is in this
sense that the advocates of the punishment of death explain and make the
practical application of the passage of Scripture, 'Whoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed.'  Hence, they say, the man who has
shed the blood of another should be hung upon the gallows; that is, his blood
should be shed to expiate the crime.  It is obviously true that the taking of life
and the shedding of blood are used synonymously.  In this sense, hanging a
man with a halter till he is dead is as much a sanguinary punishment as
decapitation.  The law, therefore, prescribing this mode of punishment is a
sanguinary law, and consequently unconstitutional."
T. Purrington, Report of Capital Punishment, Made to the Maine Legislature in 1836, at 28-
29 (2d ed. 1852).  Maine abolished the death penalty in 1876, reinstated it for murder in
1883 and permanently abolished it in 1887.  See D.W. Denno, Getting to Death, Are
Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 448 n.824 (Jan. 1997). 
With respect to "ought" in the sanguinary laws clause, Miles asserts that it is
mandatory, and not directory.  Significantly, Miles recognizes that the clause is a
"'restriction' and 'limitation' on the power of the General Assembly."  Appellant's Brief and
Appendix at 8 (quoting Harford County v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 272 Md. 33,
39-40, 321 A.2d 151, 154-55 (1974)).  Citing to Samuel Johnson's 1775 dictionary and to
Black's Law Dictionary 136 (6th ed. 1990) for the meaning of "to avoid," Miles observes
that the seventh meaning assigned by the former, and a meaning included by the latter, is "to
annul."  He concludes that, in the sanguinary laws clause, it  
"could mean either 'to be refrained from' or 'to be made void.'  If it means the
former, the clause would prohibit the legislature from enact[ing] 'sanguinary
Laws' to the extent that such a prohibition was 'consistent with the safety of
the State."  If the latter, the clause would require that 'sanguinary Laws' be
- 11 -
voided 'as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State.'  Under either
interpretation, the result is the same."
Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 8-9.
The Circuit Court's Decision and 
The State's Submission
In a thirty-nine page opinion, the learned circuit court undertook to define a
sanguinary law.  Addressing the plain meaning of the text of 1776 MDR Article 14, it
reviewed the dictionaries of the era. 
"The many founding-era dictionaries consulted by the Court do not
directly define the phrase 'sanguinary laws.'  The dictionaries of the time,
however, consistently define the word 'sanguinary' as 'cruel; bloody;
murderous.'  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: 
ABSTRACTED FROM THE FOLIO EDITION (1768); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:  IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE
DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS (1799); WILLIAM KENDRICK, A NEW
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1773); JOHN WALKER, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775); NATHAN BAILEY, A
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1794); THOMAS
SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796);
NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1806).  The word 'sanguinary' is, indeed, rooted in the Latin word 'sanguis,'
meaning 'blood.'  D. P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY ([Funk] &
Wagnalls 1977) (1959).
"It is instructive to further define the words that comprise the definition
of 'sanguinary.'  The word 'cruel,' was defined by founding-era dictionaries as
'[p]leased with hurting others; inhuman, hard-hearted; barbarous.'  SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:  ABSTRACTED FROM
THE FOLIO EDITION (1768); NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1806) ('hardhearted, inhuman, bloody, fierce'). 
The term 'blood,' in turn, means 'stained with blood, murderous, cruel.'  NOAH
WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1806);
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: IN WHICH
THE WORDS ARE DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS (1799) ('cruel; murderous: 
- 12 -
applied either to men or facts').  'Inhuman' was defined as '[b]arbarous;
savage; cruel; uncompassionate.'  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE:  IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE DEDUCED FROM THEIR
ORIGINALS (1799).  Similarly, 'barbarous' had a meaning of '[c]ruel; inhuman'
and '[s]tranger to civility; savage; uncivilized.'  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:  ABSTRACTED FROM THE FOLIO
EDITION (1768).   Finally, 'murderous' was defined as '[b]loody, guilty of
murder.'  RICHARD COXE, WALKER'S DICTIONARY, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1813)."
The court reviewed the historical context of the sanguinary laws clause from "The
Bloody Code of England" through the "Harsh Laws in Colonial Maryland," to "The Age of
Enlightment."  It concluded: 
"The overwhelming weight of evidence reveals that 'sanguinary laws'
are laws which impose severe, inhumane, barbarous, cruel, and grossly
disproportionate punishment.  Sanguinary laws are reminiscent of the extreme
punishments instituted by the Bloody Code of England.  Through the
Sanguinary Laws Clause, Maryland's founding fathers rejected the harsh
punishments characteristic of the Bloody Code and declared that criminal
sanctions shall be both humane and proportioned to the offence.  The
Sanguinary Laws Clause was a mandate to reform the criminal law by
bringing punishments in line with Enlightment-era principles.
"Defendant's assertion that the phrase 'sanguinary laws' means laws that
authorize the death penalty is neither consistent with the common usage of the
phrase, nor with the historical context of Article 16.  Certainly, if a statute
made theft a capital crime, that law would be sanguinary.  Common founding-
era usage of the term 'sanguinary law,' however, would not encompass
imposition of the death penalty for the most serious and heinous crimes, such
as first degree murder.  This interpretation is consistent with history.  Despite
the reforms to criminal laws that followed the founding of the states whose
constitutions limit 'sanguinary laws,' the death penalty was never abolished for
first degree murder and other serious offenses."
The State agrees with the circuit court's analysis, but it also points out that it is
unnecessary to the decision of this case to define sanguinary laws for all purposes.  It is
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sufficient to decide whether capital punishment for murder, carried out by lethal injection,
is prohibited by current MDR Article 16.
Rules of Construction
In general, the same rules that apply to statutory construction apply to the
construction of constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861
A.2d 78, 80 (2004).  We look first to the plain meaning of the provision, in the context of
the instrument as a whole.  See Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172, 935 A.2d 699, 708
(2007).  If the meaning remains ambiguous, we consult the history of the enactment or
adoption, which we may consult in any event as a check or verification on the apparent plain
meaning.  See Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454, 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007).  
In construing constitutional provisions,
"It is not until the means of solution afforded by the entire Constitution have
been exhausted without success that the Court is justified in calling outside
facts or considerations to its aid.  When that becomes necessary, however, it
is permissible to inquire into the prior state of the law, the previous and
contemporary history of the people, the circumstances attending the adoption
of the organic law, as well as broad considerations of expediency.  The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers to enact the provision in
dispute and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole instrument in such way as to effect that purpose.  The
Court may avail itself of any light that may be derived from such sources, but
it is not bound to adopt it as the sole ground of its decision."
Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 561, 115 A.2d 218, 287 (1955).
Ambiguity
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Here, as the arguments of, and the authorities cited by, the parties make plain,
"sanguinary Laws" is an ambiguous phrase.  Further, "ought to be avoided" is an ambiguous
phrase.  
Miles submits that, when used in the MDR, and in current Article 16 in particular,
"ought" means "shall."  He claims that the word's appearance in a constitutional provision
must mean that the provision is mandatory, not simply directory.  Such a sweeping
generalization is, however, inaccurate.  The word "ought" appears in twenty-eight of the
forty-seven articles of the current MDR, almost all of which originated in the 1776 MDR. 
Examination of those provisions reveals a full spectrum of meanings depending on context,
ranging in character from a mere statement of policy to an imperative command.
In some instances, the word "ought" conveys nothing more than a statement of public
policy in the most general of terms.  See MDR Article 43 ("That the Legislature ought to
encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious system of
general education, the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, agriculture, commerce and
manufactures, and the general melioration of the condition of the People.").  
7
In other instances, the word "ought" may reasonably be interpreted as conveying a
prohibition upon the Executive, General Assembly or Judiciary.  See, e.g., Article 17 ("no
The second sentence of Article 43 ("The Legislature may provide that land actively
7
devoted to farm or agricultural use shall be assessed on the basis of such use and shall not
be assessed as if sub-divided.") is of more recent vintage.  See Chapter 65 of the Acts of
1960.  The first sentence dates, without change, to Article 41 of the 1851 MDR.  See
Friedman-Temple at 673.
- 15 -
ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or
required");  Article 18 ("That no Law to attaint particular persons of treason or felony, ought
8
to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter."); Article 22 ("That no man ought to be
compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case."); Article 24 ("That no man
ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land."); Article 25 ("That excessive
bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted, by the Courts of Law."); Article 26 ("all general warrants to search suspected
places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the
person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted"); Article 36 ("no person ought by
any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or
profession, or for his religious practice ... nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent,
or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any
ministry"); Article 40 ("That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that
every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.").   It is no coincidence that
9
The phrase "nor any retrospective oath, or restriction be imposed, or required" dates
8
only to the 1867 MDR; the rest of this article is original to the 1776 MDR.  See Friedman-
Temple at 656.
The provision of Article 40 guaranteeing freedom of the press is original to the 1776
9
(continued...)
- 16 -
many of these provisions, specifically Articles 17, 22, 24, 25, 26, and 40, have been read
either in pari materia with corresponding, mandatory, provisions in the United States
Constitution, or as guaranteeing even greater protection.
Miles's request that the Court read "ought" as the equivalent of "shall" ignores the fact
that several provisions of the 1776 MDR that employed "ought" were later changed to
"shall," suggesting that "ought" is more directory than mandatory.  See Article 27 ("That no
conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.");  Article 31 ("That no
10
soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner,
nor in time of war, except in the manner prescribed by Law.");  Article 33 ("the Judges shall
11
not be removed, except in the manner, and for the causes provided in this Constitution. No
Judge shall hold any other office, civil or military, or political trust, or employment of any
kind, whatsoever, under the Constitution or Laws of this State, or of the United States, or any
(...continued)
9
MDR, but freedom of speech was not added until the 1864 MDR.  See Friedman-Temple
at 672.
The version of Article 27 that appeared in 1776 MDR, then Article 24, used the
10
word "ought":  "That there ought to be no forfeiture of any part of the estate of any person
for any crime except murder, or treason against the State, and then only on conviction and
attainder."  "Ought" was replaced by "shall" in the 1851 MDR.  See Friedman-Temple at
661.
The word "ought" appeared in 1776 MDR, then Article 28.  It was replaced by
11
"shall" in the 1864 MDR.  See Friedman-Temple at 662.
- 17 -
of them");  Article 35 ("That no person shall hold, at the same time, more than one office
12
of profit, created by the Constitution or Laws of this State; nor shall any person in public
trust receive any present from any foreign Prince or State, or from the United States, or any
of them, without the approbation of this State.").   
13
Indeed, at least one of the "shall" provisions has been interpreted as being not only not
mandatory, but of very limited effect, specifically, Article 23's provision that "the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law."  See Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 48 A.3d 242 (2012); Montgomery
v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 654 (1981); Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558
(1980).
It is against this spectrum of meaning that the Court is asked to determine the meaning
of "ought to be avoided" in 1776 MDR Article 14.  Samuel Johnson gave three alternative
definitions of the verb "ought": 1) the preterite of the verb "owe," i.e., "Owed; was bound to
pay; have been indebted"; 2) "To be obliged by duty"; or 3) "To be fit; to be necessary."  S.
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, at 1428 (1755).  The same definitions appear
in Johnson's 1768 revised third edition.  Usage examples from Johnson's 1755 edition suggest
that the second definition carried more of an aspirational tone (Bacon: "Judges ought to
remember, that their office is to interpret law, and not to make or give law"; Pope: "Morals
criticks ought to show"; Pope: "She acts just as she ought, But never, never reach'd one
All instances of the word "shall" in the present Article 33 date to 1851 MDR, then
12
Article 30; the 1776 MDR had employed "ought."  See Friedman-Temple at 663.
"Ought" was replaced by "shall" in the 1867 MDR.  See Friedman-Temple at 665.
13
- 18 -
generous thought"), whereas the third definition had a somewhat stronger meaning (Locke:
"If grammar ought to be taught, it must be to one that can speak the language already").  The
accepted meaning of "ought" may have shifted over the centuries.  In more modern usage,
the auxiliary verb "ought" is "used to express moral obligation, duty, or necessity ... or what
is correct, advisable, or expedient ... or what is naturally expected or logically sound." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged), at 1599 (1961, 1976 ed.).  In
modern legal usage, "Ought should be reserved for expressions of necessity, duty, or
obligation; should, the weaker word, expresses mere appropriateness, suitability, or
fittingness."  B.A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, at 396 (1987).
Furthermore, in the sanguinary Laws clause the auxiliary verb "ought" is paired with
the main verb "avoid."  This is the only appearance of the word "avoid" in the MDR. 
Johnson gives four definitions for the verb "to avoid": 1) "To shun; to escape"; 2) "To
endeavour to shun"; 3) "To evacuate; to quit"; 4) "To oppose; to hinder effect."   S. Johnson,
A Dictionary of the English Language, at 184 (1755).  Modern definitions are similar.  In
Webster's unabridged Third Edition, after obsolete, archaic and legal ("to make void: annul,
vacate, defeat, evade, invalidate") definitions, the fourth definition reads: "a) to keep away
from: stay clear of ... b) to prevent the occurrence or effectiveness of ... refrain from." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged), at 151 (1961, 1976 ed.). 
- 19 -
Non-retroactivity of MDR Article 16
In any event, there is no indication that Article 16 was intended to change pre-existing
law.  The only MDR provision explicitly referring to pre-existing law is Article 5(a)(1),
which adopts the common law and statutes of England.  Nothing in Article 5(a)(1) purports
to change existing law in a self-executing manner.  Compare Article 5(c), proposed by 1992
Md. Laws 203, 204 ("That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing in this
Constitution prohibits trial by jury of less than 12 jurors in any civil proceeding in which the
right to a jury trial is preserved.") (emphasis added).  Friedman-Temple at 686 n.166.
Article 16 itself contains no explicit directive that it should be applied retrospectively. 
On the contrary, the second clause of Article 16 provides: "and no Law to inflict cruel and
unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter." 
(Emphasis added).  Although the second clause of Article 16 does not necessarily control the
sanguinary Laws clause, there is nothing in the sanguinary Laws clause suggesting it should
be treated any differently.
Determining the intent of the sanguinary Laws clause takes us back to the 1776
Constitutional Convention.  There is no record of the debates of that Convention.  
14
Scholars, however, have determined that there were two drafts of the 1776 MDR, the first
of August 27, 1776, and the second of September 17, 1776.  The MDR was adopted by the
For a record of the proceedings of the Convention, see The Decisive Blow is Struck: 
14
A facsimile edition of The Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1776 and the
First Maryland Constitution (1977).
- 20 -
convention on November 3, 1776.  See Friedman-Temple at 647.  See also D. Friedman,
Tracing the Lineage:  Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State
Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 Rutgers L.J. 929, 941 and
n.47 (2002) (Friedman-Rutgers).  
DISCUSSION
I.
Death was the common law penalty for murder.  
The penalty was not abrogated by 1776 MDR Article 14,
which applies only to future legislation.
Overview of Analysis I
1776 MDR Article 14 was a non-retroactive limitation on then future legislation by
the General Assembly.  It had no effect on the imposition by the judiciary of the penalty of
death by hanging for murder that had been in force in the Province of Maryland by the
common law of England and that constitutionally became the law of the revolutionary State
of Maryland by 1776 MDR Article 3 (now, as amended, Article 5).  Murder remains a
common law crime in Maryland and, until October 1, 2013, the possible penalty for certain
murders continued to be death.  Statutory enactments subsequent to 1776 reduced the crimes
and the types of murders qualifying for the death penalty and made changes in the method
of execution that were intended to make capital punishment more humane.  Miles does not
contend that, if capital punishment for murder is not a sanguinary law, per se, death by lethal
injection makes it sanguinary.
Pre-Revolutionary Criminal Punishments
- 21 -
At the time of the 1776 Maryland Constitutional Convention, the law of the newly
independent state, including the law of crimes and punishments, consisted of the common
law of England, an uncertain number of British statutes, and acts of the provincial assembly,
that might or might not have been repealed by implication.  
XI Holdsworth at 556 substantially agrees with Blackstone's description of eighteenth
century English criminal punishments.  The latter said at IV Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England, at 376-77 (1765), as quoted by Holdsworth:
"'Some punishments are capital, which extend to the life of the offender, and
consist generally in being hanged by the neck till dead; though in very
atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace are
superadded, as in treasons of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place
of execution; in high treason affecting the King's person or government,
emboweling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder a public
dissection.  And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment
is to be burned alive.  ... Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, by
abjuration of the realm, or transportation:  others in loss of liberty, by
perpetual or temporary imprisonment.  Some extend to confiscation, by
forfeiture of lands or movables, or both, or of the profits of lands for life:  
others induce a disability of holding offices or employments, being heirs,
executors, and the like.  Some, though rarely, occasion a mutilation or
dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears:  others fix a lasting stigma on 
the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or cheek.  Some
are merely pecuniary, by stated or discretionary fines; and lastly there are
others, that consist principally in their ignominy, though most of them are
mixed with some degree of corporal pain; and these are inflicted chiefly for
such crimes, as either arise from indigence, or render even opulence
disgraceful.  Such as whipping, hard labour in the house of correction or
otherwise, the pillory, the stocks, and the ducking stool.'"
- 22 -
Criminal punishments enacted by the provincial assembly during and after 1715 are
summarized in N. Mereness, Maryland as a Proprietary Province, at 277-78 n.1 (The
MacMillan Co., New York, 1901):
"The penalties that were imposed by acts of the Maryland Assembly, during
or after the year 1715, were, principally, the following:  a person convicted of
embezzling, impairing, razing, or altering any will or record within the
province, whereby the estate or inheritance or freehold of any person should
be defeated, injured, or in any ways altered, was to forfeit all his goods,
chattels, lands, and tenements, be set in the pillory for two hours, and have
both his ears nailed thereto and cut from off his head; a person convicted of
stealing that which was valued at less than one thousand pounds of tobacco
was to pay fourfold, be put in the pillory, and given not to exceed forty lashes;
a person convicted of fornication was to be fined 30s. or six hundred pounds
of tobacco; a person convicted of adultery was to be fined £3 or twelve
hundred pounds of tobacco; a person convicted of wilfully burning a
courthouse was to suffer death without benefit of clergy; a person convicted
of blasphemy was for the first offence to be bored through the tongue and
fined £20 sterling, or, if unable to pay the fine, be imprisoned for six months;
for the second offence, to be stigmatized by burning in the forehead with the
letter B and fined £40, or, if unable to pay the fine, be imprisoned for one
year; and for the third offence to suffer death without benefit of clergy; a
person found guilty of profane swearing was to be fined 2s. 6d. for the first
offence and 5s. for every offence after the first; a drunkard was to be fined 5s.
for every offence of drunkenness – if the swearer or drunkard was unable to
pay the fine, he was to be put in the stocks or given not to exceed thirty-nine
lashes; a person convicted of breaking the Sabbath was to be fined two
hundred pounds of tobacco; a negro or other slave convicted of petit treason,
or murder, or wilfully burning a house, might be sentenced to have his right
hand cut off, hanged, head severed from the body, body divided into four
quarters and set up in the most public places of the county where the act was
committed; a person convicted of breaking into a shop, storehouse, or
warehouse, and stealing from thence any goods to the value of 5s., was to
suffer death as a felon without benefit of clergy; a person convicted of cutting
or destroying tobacco or exciting others to do so was to be fined £100 sterling
and be imprisoned for six months; a person convicted of wilfully burning
another's tobacco, or of aiding or abetting in such an offence, was to suffer
death as a felon without benefit of clergy; a slave convicted of insurrection,
- 23 -
murder, poison, rape of white women, or burning houses, was to suffer death
as a felon without benefit of clergy."
With respect to murder and the other common law felonies, XI Holdsworth at 557
traces the penalty of death by hanging to the judges of the thirteenth century.  ("The
punishment of death by hanging for all felonies was due to the judicial practice of the
thirteenth century.").
Coke similarly attributed to the common law, as distinguished from statute, death by
hanging as the ordinary penalty for murder.  In 3 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Law of
England (1797), Coke states at 48:
"This offence [poisoning] was so odious, that by act of parliament [22
Henry VIII, c.9 (1530)], it was made high treason, and inflicted a more
grievous and lingering death then [sic] the common law prescribeth, viz. That
the offender should be boyled [sic] to death in hot water[.]"
Further, Coke explained at 210:
"Of judgements, some be by the common law, and some by statute law,
and some by custome [sic].
"Of judgements by the common law, some be in criminall [sic] causes,
or pleas of the crown, concerning the life of man (whereof we are principally
to intreat,) and of these some be expressed, and some implied.
....
"All pleas of the crown, concerning the life of a man, are divided into
treason and felony.  ... [I]n all the severall [sic] cases of felony, though some
be more hainous [sic] then [sic] other, yet all being but felony, one and the
same judgement is given."
- 24 -
We need not sort through the inventory of eighteenth century punishments and
distinguish those which the framers of 1776 MDR Article 14 considered to be sanguinary
from those that were not.  It is sufficient for present purposes to note that, under the common
law of England and of the Maryland province, death by hanging was the penalty for the
common law offense of murder.  
The 1776 Convention
There were five provisions before the 1776 Constitutional Convention that are
relevant to the "sanguinary Laws" issue in this case.  The governing law for the self-declared
sovereignty, or at least the standard for determining governing law, was answered by 1776
MDR Article 3.  It read:
"3.  That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of
England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the
benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first
emigration, and which by experience have been found applicable to their local
and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in
England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used, and practised, by
the courts of law or equity; and also to all acts of assembly in force on the first
of June seventeen hundred and seventy four, except such as may have since
expired, or have been, or may be altered by acts of Convention, or this
Declaration of Rights, subject nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment
or repeal by, the legislature of this state; and the inhabitants of Maryland are
also entitled to all property derived to them from or under the charter granted
by his majesty Charles the first to Caecilius Calvert baron of Baltimore."
F. Green, A Declaration of Rights, and the Constitution and Form of Government, Agreed
to by the Delegates of Maryland, in Free and Full Convention Assembled, at 6 (1776)
- 25 -
(available from the Maryland State Archives, MSA SC M 3145, at 221, et seq.,
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003145/html/m3145-0221.html).15
In State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 1821 WL 482 (Md. 1821), one issue was
whether common law conspiracy was a crime in Maryland or whether the common law
principles for determining proscribed conspiracies had been limited by 33 Edw. I, c.2
(1304), so that the indictment against Buchanan did not charge a crime.  Overruling
dismissal of the charges by the trial court, this Court said:
"If there had never been in Maryland, since the original settlement of the
colony by our ancestors, a prosecution for murder, arson, assault and battery,
libel, with many other common law offences, and consequently no judicial
adoption of either of those branches of the common law, could it therefore be
contended, that there was now no law in the State for the punishment of such
offences?  The third section of the Bill of Rights ... has no reference to
adjudications in England anterior to the colonization, or to judicial adoptions
here, of any part of the common law, during the continuance of the colonial
government, but to the common law in mass, as it existed here, either
potentially, or practically, and as it prevailed in England at the time, except
such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument, and the
nature of our new political institutions."  
5 H. & J. at 358.
Two separate articles of the 1776 MDR, as adopted, address cruel and/or unusual
pains, penalties or punishments.  In the August 27th draft, the sanguinary laws clause was
contained in Article 12.  Article 14 of that draft provided that "no law to inflict unusual
"When royal Governor Robert Eden sailed for a visit to England on May 28, 1774,
15
proprietary control of Maryland effectively ended.  In Eden's absence, Maryland was
governed by an unofficial government by convention."  D. Friedman, The Maryland State
Constitution, at 4 (2011).
- 26 -
pains and penalties, unknown to the common law, ought to be made in any case, or at any
time hereafter."  F. Green, The Declaration and Charter of Rights (available at MSA SC M
3145, at 1960,  http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003145/html/m3145-
1960.html).  The two clauses were combined in the September 17th draft, and adopted, as
Article 14.  See Friedman-Temple at 656 and included notes.  The two clauses of Article 14
speak of laws that "ought to be avoided" and "ought [not] to be made."  
The other article of the 1776 MDR that dealt with cruel or unusual punishments is
Article 22.  It read:
"22.  That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted by the court of law."
F. Green, A Declaration of Rights, and the Constitution  and  Form  of  Government, Agreed
to by the Delegates of Maryland, in Free and Full Convention Assembled, at
9 
(1776) 
(available 
at 
MSA 
SC 
M 
3145, 
at 
221, 
et 
seq.,
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003145/html/m3145-0221.html).   
The plain language of these two Articles informs us that Article 14 was a restriction
on legislative action while Article 22 was a restriction on judicial action.  That Article 14
was intended to be independent of Article 22 was confirmed by the proceedings of the 1864
Maryland Constitutional Convention.  Discussing Article 14, Friedman condenses what
happened.  
"The independent content of this provision [Article 14] was suggested
at the 1864 Maryland Constitutional Convention.  Delegate Henry
Stockbridge, Sr. of Baltimore City argued that this article, and the 'cruel or
- 27 -
unusual punishments' article [Article 22], embraced the same topic and ought
to be combined.  Delegate Oliver Miller of Anne Arundel County (later a
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (1867-1892)) persuaded the
convention that the provisions were different in that this article is directed to
the legislature in adopting penalties, while the other is directed exclusively to
the judiciary in imposing sentences.  This view is reinforced by the fact that
between the August 27, 1776 draft and the September 17, 1776 draft, Article
22 was changed to emphasize the fact that that article was directed specifically
to the judiciary."
Friedman-Rutgers at 1018-19.  The change referred to was the addition in Article 22 of the
phrase, "by the court of law."   
16
The fourth and fifth provisions before the 1776 Convention that are relevant to the
sanguinary laws issue before us will be considered in Part II.
Because death by hanging was the penalty for murder at common law and because
death was and, until Chapter 156 of the Acts of 2013, remained, a possible penalty for
certain murders, legislation subsequent to 1776 did not make or create death as the penalty
Friedman's discussion of the sanguinary laws clause continues beyond the above-
16
quoted paragraph.  He writes:
"Independent content may also be given to this provision by reference
to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, drafted days prior in Philadelphia. 
The Pennsylvania Constitution used the word 'sanguinary' twice.  In both
instances, the Pennsylvania framers used the word to describe punishments
that were unnecessary or disproportionate to the offenses committed. 
Professsor A. E. Dick Howard has traced this provision, and those like it in
other state constitutions, to Chapter 20 of the Magna Carta, which requires
punishments to be proportionate to the crimes.  If true, the origins of this
provision are distinct from the origins of provisions prohibiting 'cruel' and/or
'unusual punishments.'"
Friedman-Rutgers at 1019 (footnotes omitted).
- 28 -
for murder.  Consequently, adoption of the sanguinary laws clause did not eradicate capital
punishment for murder because that clause applied only prospectively, to legislation "to be
avoided."  
The Act of 1809 and Maryland Cases
By Chapter 138 of the Acts of 1809, the General Assembly addressed crimes and
punishments.  The enactment's preamble recited:  
"WHEREAS it frequently happens, that men resigning themselves to
the dominion of inordinate passion, commit great violations upon the lives,
liberties or property, of others, which it is the great business of the laws to
protect and secure, and experience evinces that the surest way of preventing
the perpetration of crimes, and of reforming offenders, is by a mild and justly
proportioned scale of punishments[.]"
As to murder, sections III and IV of Chapter 138 provided, in part:
"AND, whereas the several offences which are included under the
general denomination of murder, differ so greatly from each other in the
degree of their atrociousness, that it is unjust to involve them in the same
punishment, therefore, BE IT ENACTED, That all murder which shall be
perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, or to burn any barn,
tobacco-house, stable, warehouse, or other out-house, not parcel of any
dwelling-house, having therein any tobacco, grain, hay, horses, cattle, or
goods, wares and merchandise, rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery or burglary,
shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kind of murder shall
be deemed murder of the second degree[.]
....
"... Every person convicted of murder of the first degree, his or her
aiders, abettors and counsellors, shall suffer death, by hanging by the neck."
- 29 -
It is well settled that Chapter 138 did not enact a new, statutory crime, for which
capital punishment was created as the penalty.  Rather, by dividing murder into degrees, the
enactment reduced the types of murders (not to mention other felonies) for which capital
punishment was prescribed or discretionarily available.  The death penalty remained
unchanged for those murders that were found to be in the first degree.
Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355, 1874 WL 4723 (1874), has been repeatedly cited by this
Court for the proposition that the statutory division of common law murder into degrees
simply graduated the penalty.  Davis was convicted of a murder that was found to be in the
first degree.  On writ of error, he argued that the indictment failed to allege the
circumstances required by Chapter 138 to establish first degree murder.  This Court rejected
that contention.  After quoting the preamble and enacting language of Chapter 138, our
predecessors said:  
"'Murder' is here recognized as a general denomination, including
offenses differing from each other in their degrees of atrocity, but not in their
nature or kind; no attempt is made to explain or modify its meaning or abridge
its range.  Its common law sense is left unimpaired; the measure of
punishment only is sought to be graduated according to the circumstances
under which it was committed."
Id. at 374.
The appellant in Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 146 A.2d 17 (1958), was sentenced
to death for felony murder, arising out of a robbery, as was Miles.  He argued that the
evidence failed to prove premeditation.  Referring to the then form of the first degree statute,
Maryland Code (1957), Article 27, § 407, this Court said:
- 30 -
"We have held that the quoted sections do not create any new crime,
but merely classify murder, as it was known at common law, into degrees. 
Wood v. State, 191 Md. 658, 666, 62 A.2d 576[, 580 (1948)]; Abbott v. State,
188 Md. 310, 312, 52 A.2d 489[, 490 (1947)].  At common law, a killing in
the perpetration of a robbery was murder, regardless of intent.  See Clark and
Marshall, Crimes (4th ed.), sec. 245.  As used in the statute, the 'common law
sense is left unimpaired; the measure of punishment only is sought to be
graduated according to the circumstances under which it was committed.' 
Davis v. State, supra.  It is perfectly clear that a finding either that the killing
was wilful, deliberate and premeditated, or that it was in perpetration of a
robbery, would support a verdict of first degree murder."
Id. at 260, 146 A.2d at 20.
To the same effect, see Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 435-36, 408 A.2d 711, 715
(1979); Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389-90, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974); Brooks v. State,
104 Md. App. 203, 216-17, 655 A.2d 1311, 1317 (1995); McDowell v. State, 31 Md. App.
652, 657, 358 A.2d 624, 627 (1976); Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 565-66, 350 A.2d
173, 177-78 (1976).
The protection to the people under the 1776 MDR from the enforcement of cruel or
unusual punishments under laws existing at the time of Independence lay in the restriction
on the courts in Article 22, prohibiting the infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments," and
in Article 3, expressly qualifying the incorporation of British and provincial assembly
statutes.  We have seen that the death penalty for murder, administered by lethal injection,
is not a cruel or unusual punishment.  In the area of crimes and punishments, the former
Article 3 (now Article 5(a)(1)) protection required adjudication, but the need for
adjudication was greatly reduced by Chapter 138 of the Acts of 1809.
- 31 -
Miles argues that "sanguinary Laws" cannot mean "laws that impose severe,
barbarous, cruel and grossly disproportionate punishment," as the circuit court concluded,
because that reading of the sanguinary laws clause in 1776 MDR Article 14 renders as
surplusage the "cruel and unusual pains and penalties clause."  We recognize that imposition
of the death penalty for crimes that are not comparable to murder or treason may, depending
on the circumstances, raise substantial questions of cruel and unusual punishment.  We
further recognize that some of the methods of executing capital punishment that were
permitted as of 1776 and that, at times, had been carried out, particularly in England, would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  It is a question of proportionality.  But, even if the
sanguinary laws and cruel and unusual punishments clauses overlapped, there would be no
surplusage because the two clauses serve different purposes.  Rephrased to an affirmative
statement, the sanguinary laws clause, standing alone, authorized the General Assembly
prospectively to enact sanguinary laws when "consistent with the safety of the State." 
Standing alone, that clause left Article 14 with only a negative implication as protection
from future laws that might authorize "cruel and unusual pains and penalties." 
Consequently, it would seem to have been necessary, or at least desirable, to affix the "cruel
and unusual" clause to Article 14. 
- 32 -
II.
The framers did not intend death as the penalty
for murder to be included in sanguinary laws.
Even if the sanguinary laws clause had been intended to operate retroactively, the
words "sanguinary laws" were not intended to include death by hanging as the penalty for
murder.  Otherwise, there would be irreconcilable conflicts.  
The Text
The August 27, 1776 draft of MDR Article 19 read:
"19.  That in all capital or criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be
informed of the accusation against him, to be allowed counsel, to be
confronted with the accusers, or witnesses, to examine evidence on oath in his
favour, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous
consent he ought not to be found guilty."
F. Green, The Declaration and Charter of Rights (available at MSA SC M 3145, at 1960,
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003145/html/m3145-1960.html) 
(emphasis added).  See also Friedman-Temple at 658.  If Miles's construction of
"sanguinary" is correct, then the express inclusion of capital cases was a collosal drafting
error by the drafting committee for the Bill of Rights and Form of Government at the 1776
Convention.  But, the committee's members were Samuel Chase, William Paca, Matthew
Tilghman, George Plater, Charles Carroll, Barrister, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Robert
Goldsborough, and later Thomas Johnson.   See R. Walsh and W.L. Fox, Maryland, A
17
This impressive list includes three of Maryland's four signers of the Declaration of
17
Independence (Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Chase, and Paca), three future Maryland
governors (Johnson, Paca, and Plater), three future judges of one of Maryland's post-
(continued...)
- 33 -
History, 1632-1974, at 96-97 (1974).  Much more likely is that the words "capital or" were
deleted from the 1776 MDR as surplusage because "criminal prosecutions" covered the
subject. 
Completely consistent with the recognition in the first draft of 1776 MDR Article 19
that capital prosecutions would survive the 1776 MDR is Article 24 of that document, the
original language of which appeared in the MDR from 1776 to 1851.  It read:
"That there ought to be no forfeiture of any part of the estate of any person for
any crime, except murder, or treason against the state, and then only on
conviction and attainder."
F. Green, A Declaration of Rights, and the Constitution and Form of
Government, Agreed to by the Delegates of Maryland, in Free and Full
Convention Assembled, at 10 (1776)  (available at MSA SC M 3145, at 221, et seq.,
(...continued)
17
revolutionary courts, the General Court (Chase, Johnson, and Paca), and two future associate
justices of the United States Supreme Court (Chase and Johnson).  Goldsborough had served
as Maryland Attorney General from 1766-68.  Tilghman had served as a delegate to the
Continental Congress before being replaced by Charles Carroll of Carrollton.  Paca also later
served as a federal judge in Maryland.  Of the eight men, at least five were lawyers (Charles
Carroll, Barrister, Chase, Goldsborough, Johnson, and Paca).  See generally E. Papenfuse,
A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635-1789 (1985); The
Biographical Cyclopedia of Representative Men of Maryland and District of Columbia
(1879).  Charles Carroll of Carrollton also studied law in France and at the Middle Temple
in London but was prohibited from practicing law because he was a Roman Catholic.  See
R. Hoffman, Princes of Ireland, Planters of Maryland: A Carroll Saga, 1500-1782, at 163-64
(2007).
- 34 -
http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003145/html/m3145-0221.html).  And
see Friedman-Temple at 661.18
IV Blackstone at 380-81 describes attainder.
"When sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment in the
laws of England, is pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence by
the common law is attainder.  For when it is now clear beyond all dispute, that
the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as
a monster and a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy upon
him, puts him out of its protection, and takes no further care of him than
barely to see him executed.  He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained, or
blackened.  ... [F]or, by an anticipation of his punishment, he is already dead
in law.  This is after judgment:  for there is great difference between a man
convicted and attainted; though they are frequently through inaccuracy
confounded together.  After conviction only, a man is liable to none of these
disabilities; for there is still in contemplation of law a possibility of his
innocence.  ... But when judgment is once pronounced, both law and fact
conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there is not the remotest
possibility left of anything to be said in his favour.  Upon judgment therefore
of death, and not before, the attainder of a criminal commences: or upon such
circumstances as are equivalent to judgment of death; as judgment of outlawry
on a capital crime, pronounced for absconding or fleeing from justice, which
tacitly confesses the guilt.  And therefore either upon judgment of outlawry,
or of death, for treason or felony, a man shall be said to be attainted."
A related provision is § 58 of the 1776 Maryland Constitution, directing that "all
penalties and forfeitures, heretofore going to the king or proprietary, shall go to the state,
save only such as the general assembly may abolish or otherwise provide for."
Attainder was abolished by Chapter 138 of the Acts of 1809 in § 10.   
19
Former Article 24 is now Article 27.
18
Attainder was reintroduced in the 1864 MDR before being permanently abolished
19
by 1867 MDR Article 27.  See Friedman-Temple at 661.
- 35 -
Contemporaneous Practical Construction
 of 1776 MDR Article 14
1776 MDR Article 14 was renumbered to Article 16 in the Constitutions and
Declarations of Rights of 1864 and 1867.  Friedman-Temple at 656.  In 1883, this Court
decided the appeal of a wife beater who had been sentenced to sixty days confinement and
to be whipped seven lashes.  Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264, 1883 WL 4110 (1883).  He argued
that flogging violated the second clause of Article 16.  Our predecessors' response to this
argument is equally responsive to Miles's "discovery" of the meaning of "sanguinary Laws."
"The terms 'cruel and unusual pains and penalties,' and 'cruel or
unusual punishment,' have been incorporated in each successive Constitution
in this State from 1776 to the present time.  That the punishment of whipping
was not considered a 'cruel or unusual punishment,' and, therefore, coming
within the prohibition of the Constitution, is most conclusively shown by the
fact that the punishment by whipping was recognized by the statute law of the
State under all these Constitutions, certainly down to the Constitution of 1864,
and then only obliterated from the statute book, not by direct repeal, but by
force of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.
"It is true, that under some of the later Constitutions the punishment by
the laws was confined to negroes and slaves, but the words 'cruel or unusual'
covered all cases of punishment, and were as applicable to negroes and slaves
as to whites.  At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1776, and for
a long time before, and for a long time thereafter, the punishment of whipping
for certain offences was imposed upon whites and blacks alike.  We are not
dealing with the expediency, justice, or efficacy of this punishment, but only
with the true interpretation of the terms of the Constitution under which we
live.  When, therefore, we find that the people who made this Constitution,
and who must be presumed to understand the meaning of the terms they use,
have, from the time these words were first incorporated, in 1776 down to
1882, a period of more than a hundred years, through the several successive
Legislatures, uniformly held that the punishment of whipping was not
included in that class which the Constitution forbids, we should violate the
plainest principles of the construction of statutes now to decide otherwise. 
- 36 -
We have not only the contemporaneous, but the continued, exposition of the
meaning of the words in this long course of legislative construction, upheld
and continually enforced by the courts, in the imposition of the punishment."
Id. at 266-68.
In the two and one-half decades immediately following the adoption of 1776 MDR
Article 14, the General Assembly enacted laws requiring or permitting the death penalty. 
See the chart below.  (We have omitted enactments punishing treason with death which may
implicate the exception for state safety.)
Laws of Maryland (1776-1799)
Year
Chapter
Section
Description 
Penalty
1778
XVII
N/A
Prohibits forging or altering
certificate for payment of journal
of accounts, or knowingly passing
the same in payment.
Death without
benefit of
clergy.
1790
V
I-XIII
XIV
Establishes bank in Baltimore-
town.
Prohibits forging or passing
counterfeit checks or notes of the
bank.
Adjudged
felon;
punishable in
discretion of
court, "so as
the same do
not extend to
death" or more
than seven
years.
- 37 -
1793
LVII
II
XII
XXVIII
Authorizes Governor to appoint
justices of oyer and terminer and
gaol delivery in Baltimore County
to try felonies and other crimes.
Maiming punishable as felony. 
General Court and the other
county courts given same
jurisdiction.
Death without
benefit of
clergy or
imprisonment
at labor.
As above.
1799
LXI
I
II
Horse stealing.
Arson of ship.
Death without
benefit of
clergy.  
Death without
benefit of
clergy.
1799
LXXXII
II
Causing immediate loss of vessel.
Death without
benefit of
clergy.
1809
CXXXVIII
III &
IV(1)
IV(6)
    (7)
V(1)
   (2)
Murder in first degree.
Rape.
Carnal knowledge.
Arson.
Storehouse burning.
Death by
hanging.
Death by
hanging or
prison.
Death by
hanging or
prison.
Death by
hanging or
prison.
- 38 -
Kilty's Code20
Pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly adopted at the November 1798
session, William Kilty was engaged to compile, in chronological order, those enactments or
session laws passed by the provincial and state assemblies from the year 1692 "to the end
of the present session," noting those that were in force and those that had been repealed or
had expired, "or have ceased to have any operation."  I Kilty's Laws of Maryland, at 2
(1799).  Obviously, if the sanguinary laws clause of 1776 MDR Article 14 had abolished
capital punishment (but for state safety), then Kilty should not have included in this report
a Maryland-originating statute providing for the death penalty.  Nevertheless, we find
included in Kilty's Code, as a statute in force, the following:
Laws 1720, c.25, § 2, making willfully burning any courthouse where records
are actually or usually kept punishable by death without benefit of clergy, "in
the same manner as if such offender had been convict[ed] of maliciously and
wilfully burning a mansion-house."  
Laws 1737, c.2, § 4, making theft of a ship or slave punishable by death as a
felon without benefit of clergy.  The legislation carried a three year sunset
provision.  It was renewed by Laws 1740 c.6 and made permanent by Laws
1798 c.71.
William Kilty, born in 1757, was a Revolutionary War veteran who practiced law
20
in Annapolis and in Washington, D.C.  In 1801, he was appointed chief judge for the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia.  Returning to Maryland in 1806, he was appointed
Chancellor and served to his death in 1821.  See W.L. Marbury, "The High Court of
Chancery and the Chancellors of Maryland," Report of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the
Maryland State Bar Association, at 137-55 (1905).
- 39 -
Laws 1744, c.5, § 2, making arson of tobacco punishable by death without
benefit of clergy.  The legislation carried a three year sunset provision.  It was
renewed by Laws 1747 c.11 and made "perpetual" by Laws 1751 c.7.
Laws 1785, c.87, § 8, providing that "every person charged, apprehended or
indicted, for any capital crime" shall have the right of habeas corpus.
Laws 1799, c.61, § 1, making horse stealing punishable by death without
benefit of clergy.
Laws 1799, c.61, § 2, making arson of a ship punishable by death without
benefit of clergy.
Kilty's British Statutes
By a resolution of the General Assembly at the November 1809 session, the
Chancellor (Kilty) and the judges of the Court of Appeals were "directed to report all such
parts of the English Statutes as were proper to be introduced and incorporated into the body
of the Statute law of the State."  J. Alexander, A Collection of British Statutes In Force in
Maryland, Preface at vii (1870).  Kilty undertook the work.  His 1811 report (Report) is
entitled  
"A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS EXISTED AT THE
TIME OF THE FIRST EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND,
AND WHICH BY EXPERIENCE HAVE BEEN FOUND APPLICABLE TO
THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES; AND OF SUCH
OTHERS AS HAVE SINCE BEEN MADE IN ENGLAND OR GREAT-
BRITAIN, AND HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED, USED AND PRACTISED,
BY THE COURTS OF LAW OR EQUITY; AND ALSO SUCH PARTS OF
THE SAME AS MAY BE PROPER TO BE INTRODUCED AND
INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE
STATE.  MADE ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIONS OF THE
LEGISLATURE, BY WILLIAM KILTY, CHANCELLOR OF MARYLAND. 
TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED, AN INTRODUCTION AND LISTS OF THE
STATUTES WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FOUND APPLICABLE TO THE
- 40 -
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PEOPLE: WITH FULL AND COMPLETE
INDEXES.  PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO A RESOLUTION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY."
In Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 392, 403, 1822 WL 445 (Md. 1822), the
Court of Appeals said that Kilty's Report "was compiled, printed, and distributed, under the
sanction of the State, for the use of its officers, and is a safe guide in exploring an otherwise
very dubious path." 
Kilty divided the British Statutes into three classes:  (1) statutes that did not extend
to Maryland; (2) statutes that, although applicable, should not be incorporated into Maryland
law; and (3) those that were applicable to Maryland and proper to be incorporated.
Kilty lists as a statute proper to be incorporated, the Statute of Westminster 2, 13
Edw. I, Stat. 1, c. 34 (1285).  It provided, in the first branch thereof, "That if a Man from
henceforth do ravish a Woman married, Maid, or other, where she did not consent, neither
before nor after, he shall have Judgement of Life and of Member."  Report at 213.  Kilty
referred to cases in the province where offenders were "capitally convicted" for this offense. 
Id.  He included that "[t]his statute was therefore in force in the province and in the state,
and remains so as to such offences committed before the passing of the Act of 1809,
concerning crimes and punishments, (Ch. 138,) ....  By the 4th section of the said [1809] act,
the punishment for this offence (and of the accessory before) is death by hanging, or
confinement in the penitentiary[.]"  Id.
- 41 -
Applicable, but not proper to be incorporated, was 1 Edward VI, c. 12 (1547). 
Section 10 of that statute took away benefit of clergy from several offenses, including
murder.  Kilty concluded that it should not be incorporated because the punishment for the
offense, hanging, was already recognized by the 1809 statute.  Report at 164-65.  Section
13 of the 1547 British statute declared wilful killing by poisoning to be murder.  Kilty points
out that the purpose of Section 13 was only to repeal an earlier British statute which had
made murder by poisoning treason, punishable by boiling to death.  Section 13 of the 1547
act was not necessary or proper to be incorporated because of the 1809 Maryland legislation. 
Report at 165.
The statute of 21 James I, c. 27 (1623) was entitled, "An Act to Prevent the
Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children."  Citing IV Blackstone at 198, Kilty states
"that it has been usual in England, upon trials for this offence, to require some sort of
presumptive evidence, that the child was born alive, before the other constrained
presumption (that the child whose death is concealed, was therefore killed by its parent) is
admitted to convict the prisoner."  Report at 172.  Kilty found that, commencing with the
year 1665, there had been upwards of thirty prosecutions in Maryland under this statute, "in
many of which the offenders were sentenced to death[.]"  Id.  On account of "the injustice
and inhumanity of enforcing [the 1623 statute], and the change made in the law respecting
murder, by the act of 1809, Ch. 138, it may confidently be said, that this statute is not proper
to be incorporated with our laws."  Id. at 173.
- 42 -
If Miles is correct, then Kilty was oblivious to the invalidity of capital punishment
under the 1809 legislation under 1776 MDR Article 14. 
Death Warrants
Attached to this opinion, as Appendix A, is an excerpt from the State's brief
referencing the numerous death warrants signed by Maryland governors between 1782 and
1792, both inclusive.
The Constitutional Convention Commission
Fast forwarding two centuries, we find that the sanguinary Laws clause was
addressed in the Report of the Maryland Constitutional Convention Commission (1967). 
That Commission proposed eliminating the clause.  In the Comment to the Commission's
draft MDR § 1.11, "Unusual Punishment," the Commission said in relevant part: 
"This draft section omits the admonition in Article 16 of the present
Declaration that 'sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent
with the safety of the State.'  In modern usage a 'sanguinary law' is one
providing for capital punishment.  The Commission suggests that a law
prescribing capital punishment for other than a most serious crime would be
considered 'cruel and unusual' by present day standards, and so would be
prohibited by this draft section."
Id. at 111 (emphasis added).  The new constitution proposed by the 1967-1968
Constitutional Convention similarly would have omitted the sanguinary Laws clause from
present MDR Article 16.
  There is no indication that the Commission or the Convention
21
The proposed constitution would have provided:  
21
(continued...)
- 43 -
thought that the sanguinary laws clause abolished the death penalty in 1776 and that, by
eliminating that clause in the proposed, but never ratified, constitution, they were opening
the door for the General Assembly to reinstitute the death penalty for most serious crimes.
CONCLUSION
Death was the common law penalty for murder.  The sanguinary laws clause applied
to legislative action and has never been triggered by any Maryland statutory modifications
of the common law relating to the types of murders to which the death penalty may apply
or by the statutes modifying the method of executing the death penalty.  Alternatively, if the
sanguinary Laws clause of current MDR Article 16, as originally adopted, was retroactive
and self-executing, as to existing common law, the clause was not intended to exclude death,
per se, as a possible penalty for murder.  Consequently, we do not reach Miles's
supplementally briefed argument that the legislative repeal of the death penalty demonstrates
that the death penalty is not necessary for the safety of the State.
DENIAL BY THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR QUEEN ANNE'S COUNTY OF
(...continued)
21
"Section 1.11.  Unusual Punishments.
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.  Conviction of crime shall not work
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."
Constitutional Convention of Maryland, Comparison of Present and Proposed
Constitutions, at 123 (1968).  
- 44 -
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL
SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.
Appendix A
Death Warrants
"[D]uring his tenure, Governor Paca approved the death penalty for six
criminal defendants.   Specifically, Governor Paca authorized a warrant of
execution on December 10, 1782, for James, slave of James Perdue of
Worcester County, said execution by hanging to take place on December 27,
1782, for the crimes of housebreaking and stealing the contents therein. 
GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL (PARDON PAPERS), 1782-1784, Maryland State
Archive citation no. S1061-2, Location 02/46/01/002, Box 2, Folder 22.
"Governor Paca also approved death warrants on October 25, 1783, for
the execution by hanging of John Lee and Robert Connaway, said executions
to take place on November 5, 1783, for the crimes of breaking into the
storehouse of one John McLuse and carrying away certain goods.  GOVERNOR
AND COUNCIL (PARDON PAPERS), 1782-1784, Maryland State Archive citation
no. S1061-2, Location 02/46/01/002, Box 2, Folder 55.
"On December 31, 1783, Governor Paca authorized a warrant of
execution to be carried out on January 9, 1784, against George Riggs of
Worcester County for housebreaking and robbery of the house of William
Ironshire on or about March 10, 1783.  GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL (PARDON
PAPERS), 1782-1784, Maryland State Archive citation no. S1061-2, Location
02/46/01/002, Box 2, Folder 60.
"Governor Paca approved a warrant of execution on October 8, 1784,
for William Merchmant of Talbot County, for breaking into the house of one
Henry Hooper, said execution by hanging to take place on October 15, 1784. 
GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL (PARDON PAPERS), 1782-1784, Maryland State
Archive citation no. S1061-2, Location 02/46/01/002, Box 2, Folder 112.
"Bridget Martin of Baltimore County was also the subject of a warrant
of execution approved by Governor Paca on July 23, 1784, for the murder by
poison of one Elizabeth Brown on or about December 10, 1783.  GOVERNOR
- 45 -
AND COUNCIL (PARDON PAPERS), 1782-1784, Maryland State Archive citation
no. S1061-2, Location 02/46/01/002, Box 2, Folder 113.
....
"...  Governor William Smallwood (who served from November 26,
1785, to November 24, 1788), and Governor John Eager Howard (who served
from November 24, 1788, to November 14, 1791) issued numerous warrants
of execution.
"Governor Smallwood, for example, signed death warrants on April 25,
1786, December 1, 1786, May 8, 1787, October 4, 1787, December 13, 1787,
March 6, 1788, July 28, 1788, and September 13, 1788, for criminal
defendants who committed various crimes, including murder, housebreaking,
highway robbery, and returning after banishment.  GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL
(PARDON RECORD), Record of Pardons, Noli Prosequies and Death Warrants
and Proclamations commencing December 1785 ending November 1790,
1785-1790, Maryland State Archive citation no. S1107-1, Location
02/26/05/026, pages 4, 31, 45, 58, 64, 86, 95 and 99.
"For his own part, Governor John Eager Howard personally signed
death warrants on January 31, 1789, March 19, 1789, April 10, 1789, April
28, 1789, June 9, 1789, August 13, 1789, August 28, 1789, February 17,
1790, and September 24, 1790.  Id. at pages 108, 116, 117, 121, 128, 130,
138, and 155.  Governor Howard additionally signed death warrants on
January 25, 1791, September 23, 1791, October 12, 1791, and November 7,
1791.  GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL (PARDON RECORD), Record of Pardons, Noli
Prosequies, Death Warrants, Proclamations commencing January 1791 and
ending February '97, 1791-1806, Maryland State Archive citation no. S1107-
2, Location 02/26/05/026, pages 3, 4, 21, and 22."
(Footnote omitted).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 36
September Term 2012
JODY LEE MILES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
        
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
          *Bell
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J.
Filed: November 25, 2013
*Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of the Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in reaching the decision 
in this case.
I would dismiss the appeal as moot under Maryland Rule 8-602(a)(10) in light of the
enactment of Chapter 156, §1, Laws of Maryland 2013.  That law repealed the statutory
provisions for carrying out a death penalty, formerly found in Maryland Code, Correctional
Services Article, §3-901 et seq.
To the extent that the Court feels compelled to address the State constitutional
question raised by Appellant, more analysis would be necessary before I would agree that the
Sanguinary Laws Clause could not limit application of the death penalty.   As the Circuit
1
Court recognized, the federal Constitution has no analog to the Sanguinary Laws Clause in
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  And, as the Majority opinion acknowledges, one state
with a similar constitutional provision abolished capital punishment apparently on the basis
of that provision.  Majority slip op. at 9-10.
It appears from historical sources that the phrase “sanguinary laws” refers to
punishments such as the death penalty.  This peculiar phrase is found in an 18th century
commentary on an essay of a contemporary legal philosopher who advised against the use
of capital punishment – works that were familiar to lawmakers when the first State
Constitution was drafted and that were found in the library of one of the primary drafters of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states
that such a punishment is to be “avoided” unless necessary for the “safety of the State.”  The
At one point, the Majority opinion states that Petitioner argues that the constitutional
1
language “abrogated capital punishment” in 1776.  Majority slip op. at 6.  This appears to be
an overstatement; the Appellant recognizes the qualifying language that permits capital
punishment when necessary for the “safety of the State” and argues that the Sanguinary Laws
Clause “limits” – not abolishes – the death penalty.  Appellant’s Brief at 3. 
Majority opinion reasons that the Sanguinary Laws Clause addresses only legislative action
taken after adoption of the 1776 constitution.  Like the Circuit Court, I would think that this
limitation, even if directed in the first instance to legislative action, would likewise apply to
the courts.   While it may be true that the Legislature enacted laws including capital
2
punishment following the adoption of the 1776 constitution, Majority slip op. at 35-37, a
constitutional principle is not necessarily limited by a subsequent legislative enactment.  
3
Finally, the Majority opinion does not specifically analyze the qualifying phrase that limits
such punishments to matters implicating the “safety of the State.”  But, given the recent
elimination of the death penalty in this State, resolution of these issues seems an unnecessary
exercise.
The First Amendment to the federal Constitution states that “Congress shall make no
2
law ....” respecting certain important freedoms, but it seems doubtful one could argue that 
these limitations do not apply to the courts.
It is also sometimes the case that principles stated in foundational documents are not
3
immediately put into practice (e.g., “... all men are created equal...”).
2