Title: Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden, 88 Ohio St.3d 454, 2000-Ohio-381.] 
 
 
 
 
 
KAINE, APPELLANT, v. MARION PRISON WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 454.] 
Habeas corpus sought to compel Marion Prison Warden to release relator from 
prison — Dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 99-2103 — Submitted April 11, 2000 — Decided May 17, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-99-56. 
 
On August 28, 1996, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas entered 
a judgment convicting appellant, Charles Kaine, of aggravated arson and insurance 
fraud, and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of seven to twenty-seven 
years.  The common pleas court suspended execution of sentence and placed Kaine 
on two-years’ probation.  Although the court’s entry was dated July 29, 1996, it 
was not entered as a judgment until August 28, 1996. 
 
On July 29, 1998, the common pleas court revoked Kaine’s probation and 
ordered Kaine to serve his previously suspended prison sentence.  Although the 
entry was dated July 22, 1998, it was not entered as a judgment until July 29, 1998. 
 
In September 1999, Kaine filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Marion 
County for a writ of habeas corpus.  Kaine claimed that he was entitled to release 
from prison because his probationary period had already expired by the time the 
trial court revoked his probation.  The court of appeals dismissed the petition. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Charles Kaine, pro se. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Katherine E. Pridemore, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Kaine claims that at the time the trial court revoked his 
probation, his two-year probationary period had expired and divested the trial court 
of jurisdiction.  Under R.C. 2951.09, “[a]t the end or termination of the period of 
probation, the jurisdiction of the judge or magistrate to impose sentence ceases and 
the defendant shall be discharged.”  And pursuant to the statute, “ ‘[i]t matters not 
that the alleged violation of probation occurred during the period of probation and 
could have resulted, if timely prosecuted, in a revocation of probation and 
imposition of sentence.’ ”  State v. Jackson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 345, 348, 666 
N.E.2d 255, 257, quoting State v. Jackson (1988), 56 Ohio App.3d 141, 565 
N.E.2d 848. 
 
Kaine’s claim is meritless.  He erroneously relies on a date before his trial 
court’s judgment placing him on probation was journalized to be the starting date 
for his two-year probationary period.  Crim.R. 32(C) expressly provides that a 
judgment in a criminal case “is effective only when entered on the journal by the 
clerk.”  The rule reflects the axiom that courts speak only through their journal 
 
 
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entries.  See State ex rel. White v. Junkin (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 337, 686 
N.E.2d 267, 269; Schenley v. Kauth (1953), 160 Ohio St. 109, 51 O.O. 30, 113 
N.E.2d 625, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Based on the foregoing, Kaine’s two-year probationary period did not 
commence until his judgment of conviction and sentence was entered, i.e., August 
28, 1996.  And his probation was revoked by a judgment entered on July 29, 1998, 
which was within his probationary period.  Therefore, Kaine’s trial court had the 
requisite jurisdiction to revoke his probation and order him to serve his previously 
suspended sentence, and he is not entitled to extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.