Title: MARSHALL BATTEN V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARSHALL BATTEN V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION2007 WY 173170 P.3d 1236Case Number: 06-290Decided: 11/02/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MARSHALL 
BATTEN,Appellant(Petitioner),v.WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION DRIVERS' LICENSE 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David J. Willms, Assistant 
Attorney General.          

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Marshall Batten 
appeals from the Office of Administrative Hearings' (OAH) order upholding the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation's (WYDOT) suspension of his driver's 
license for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI).  He claims his constitutional rights were 
violated because the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him in 
order to conduct field sobriety tests after the original purpose of the stop had 
concluded and the trooper did not have probable cause to arrest him for 
DWUI.  We conclude the record 
contains substantial evidence to support the OAH findings of fact and, as a 
matter of law, Mr. Batten's constitutional rights were not violated.  Consequently, we affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Batten does 
not present a separate statement of the appellate issues as required by W.R.A.P. 
7.01.  However, his discussion 
includes the following statement, which summarizes his arguments on 
appeal:

 
 

I.                    
The 
decision of the hearing officer was arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance 
with law.

 
 

a)                 
Trooper 
Adams did not posses[s] the requisite 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to detain Mr. 
Batten.

 
 

b)                 
[Trooper] 
Adams lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Batten.

 

The 
State rephrases the issue as:

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred in affirming the decision of the hearing officer who 
determined there was reasonable suspicion to stop [Mr.] Batten and probable 
cause to arrest him.  Further, 
whether there was substantial evidence to support [Mr.] Batten's per se driver's 
license suspension?1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At 
approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 7, 2005, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Michael 
Adams observed a white GMC "Jimmy" driving southbound on Highway 410 in 
Uinta County, Wyoming.  
The trooper stopped the Jimmy because the right headlight was not 
working.  Mr. Batten was the driver 
and sole occupant of the vehicle.  
He provided the trooper with his driver's license, but was unable to 
locate the proof of insurance for the vehicle.  The trooper informed Mr. Batten that one 
of his headlights was broken.  He 
indicated he was aware of the problem and it was scheduled to be repaired the 
next day.    

 
 
[¶4]      The trooper wrote 
a warning ticket for the broken headlight and failure to provide proof of 
insurance.  As he approached the 
Jimmy with the ticket, he noticed the odor of alcohol coming from Mr. 
Batten.  Trooper Adams asked Mr. Batten if he had been drinking, and he 
replied that he had just come from a bar where he had consumed one drink.  Trooper Adams asked Mr. Batten to exit his vehicle to perform 
field sobriety maneuvers, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one leg 
stand, and walk and turn tests.  The 
trooper also administered a portable breath test to Mr. Batten, which indicated 
an alcohol concentration of .107%.    

 
 
[¶5]      Trooper Adams 
arrested Mr. Batten and took him to the UintaCounty jail.  He read Mr. Batten the implied consent 
advisement, and Mr. Batten consented to take another breath test, resulting in 
an alcohol concentration of .09%.  
WYDOT sent Mr. Batten a letter indicating that, because he had been 
arrested for driving with an alcohol concentration of greater than .08%, his 
driver's license would be suspended for 90 days pursuant to Wyoming's Implied 
Consent statute, Wyo. Stat. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2003).2  Mr. Batten challenged the suspension and 
requested a contested case hearing.  
He appeared at the hearing; WYDOT did not appear but presented its 
certified record.  The OAH upheld 
the suspension, and Mr. Batten filed a petition for review of the agency 
decision with the district court.  
The district court affirmed, and he appealed to this Court.    

            

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We accord no 
deference to a district court decision reviewing an administrative agency 
order.  Instead, we review the case 
as if it came directly from the administrative agency.  Bradshaw v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. Drivers' 
License Div., 2006 WY 70, ¶ 10, 135 P.3d 612, 615 (Wyo. 2006); Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 4, 120 P.3d 176, 178 (Wyo. 2005).  Our review is governed by Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007):

 
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

            
            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed;  and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

                        
            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

                        
            
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

                        
            
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

                        
            
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

                        
            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶7]      "Where both 
parties present evidence at an administrative hearing, we review the entire 
record to determine if the agency findings are supported by substantial 
evidence."  Bradshaw, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d  at 616; Bush, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d  at 179.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.  Id.  Phrased another way, "[f]indings of fact 
are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the 
record, we can conclude a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as adequate 
to support the agency findings."  
Id.  We review the agency's conclusions of 
law de novo.  Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 
2006 WY 137, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 442, 
446 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Batten 
challenges the OAH decision on two bases.  
First, he claims Trooper Adams did not have reasonable suspicion to 
detain him for the purpose of performing the field sobriety tests.  He also claims the trooper did not have 
probable cause to justify his warrantless arrest for DWUI.  If either of these arguments is correct, 
then his arrest was unlawful and the provisions of the implied consent statute 
do not apply to mandate suspension of his driver's license.  Marshall v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 941 P.2d 42, 44, 46 (Wyo. 1997).  

            

1.                  
Reasonable 
Suspicion

 
 
[¶9]      The Fourth 
Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Mr. Batten provides a 
general constitutional argument and does not specifically claim that the Wyoming 
Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment under these 
circumstances; consequently, we will limit our analysis to the federal 
principles.  See Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 620, 623-24 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶10]   A traffic stop is a limited 
investigatory detention and implicates constitutional protections.  Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).  In accordance 
with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), we consider the 
following questions to determine the validity of the detention:  1) Was the initial stop justified? and 
2)  Were the officer's actions 
during the detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first instance[?]'"  O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 46, 117 P.3d 401, 414 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 11, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).   
Mr. Batten focuses his argument on the second part of the Terry analysis, 
presumably because the trooper was justified in stopping him for the broken 
headlight.  

 
 
[¶11]   "[A]n investigative detention must 
be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification."  O'Boyle, ¶ 47, 117 P.3d  at 414.  A law enforcement officer may expand the 
investigative detention beyond the scope of the initial stop if the traveler 
consents to the expanded detention or if the officer has "an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring" or a 
reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is armed.  Id. at ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 414, citing Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2003), and Brown v. 
State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997).   In the context of this case, the 
trooper was required to show "the presence of specific and articulable facts 
and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion'" that Mr. 
Batten had driven while under the influence of alcohol in order to justify the 
continued detention for purposes of performing the field sobriety tests.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25, 
quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 
1994).  The totality of the evidence is 
considered in determining whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend 
the detention.  Custer, ¶ 20, 135 P.3d  at 626. 

 
 
[¶12]   Because we are reviewing an 
administrative agency's rulings on this constitutional question, we apply the 
substantial evidence standard to the OAH's findings of fact.3  Bradshaw, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d  at 616.  "The question of whether an unreasonable 
search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a 
question of law and is reviewed de 
novo."  Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 13, 148 P.3d 38, 42 (Wyo. 2006).    

 
 
[¶13]   The hearing examiner ruled that the 
odor of alcohol and Mr. Batten's admission that he had consumed "one drink" 
established reasonable suspicion to detain him to conduct the field sobriety 
tests.  Mr. Batten apparently does 
not contest the hearing examiner's findings of fact on this issue.  Instead, he argues that the facts do not 
support the hearing examiner's legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion 
existed to detain him in order to conduct the field sobriety tests.  Mr. Batten maintains that the only 
indication the trooper had that he was possibly driving while intoxicated was 
the "moderate odor" of alcohol, and that was insufficient.  We disagree that characterizing the odor 
of alcohol as "moderate" prevents that odor from constituting an adequate basis 
for reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence.  Even if that were true, the record 
contains other undisputed facts to support the hearing examiner's conclusion 
that reasonable suspicion existed.  
In addition to the odor of alcohol, the trooper asked Mr. Batten if he 
had been drinking and he admitted he had just left a bar where he had consumed 
one drink.  Furthermore, he could 
not locate the proof of insurance for the vehicle when the trooper requested it 
and he was driving a vehicle late at night with knowledge that it had a broken 
headlight.  

 
 
[¶14]   The Idaho Supreme Court concluded 
that reasonable suspicion existed under circumstances comparable to those 
presented here.  State v. Ferreira, 988 P.2d 700, 710 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999).  In that 
case, Mr. Ferreira was speeding, "disregarding what he admittedly knew to be the 
speed limit in the area."  
Id.  
While discussing the speeding violation, the officer detected the 
odor of alcohol and asked Mr. Ferreira if he had been drinking, and he replied 
affirmatively.  Based on these 
circumstances, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded the trooper had reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Ferreira had violated that state's drunk-driving laws.  Id.  

 
 
[¶15]   Similarly, the undisputed facts in 
this case, including the odor of alcohol, Mr. Batten's admission he had been 
drinking shortly before he was stopped, his inability to locate proof of 
insurance, and his knowing violation of a traffic law by driving with a broken 
headlight at night, support the hearing examiner's conclusion that the trooper 
had reasonable suspicion to further detain Mr. Batten in order to conduct field 
sobriety tests.   We hold, 
therefore, the seizure of Mr. Batten for purposes of administering the field 
sobriety tests did not violate Mr. Batten's Fourth Amendment  rights.

  

            
2.         Probable Cause

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Batten also argues the hearing 
examiner erred by concluding Trooper Adams had probable cause to arrest him for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol.   "Probable cause for a warrantless 
arrest exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent, 
reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to believe that a crime has 
been or is being committed and that the individual arrested is the 
perpetrator."  Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 116 (Wyo. 1992).   Similar to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the 
hearing examiner's factual findings concerning whether the trooper had probable 
cause to arrest, but review the constitutionality of the particular seizure de novo.  Bradshaw, ¶ 24, 135 P.3d  at 619; Smith v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 
11 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2000); Moulton, ¶ 13, 148 P.3d  at 42.4

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Batten argues the trooper did 
not have probable cause to arrest him because the portable breath test was 
improperly administered and the results of the field sobriety tests were 
inconclusive.  During the contested 
case hearing, he challenged the trooper's use of the portable breath test at the 
scene of the stop, arguing that administration of the test prior to an arrest 
violated the implied consent statute.  
The hearing examiner specifically ruled that he would not consider the 
portable breath test result "for any purpose."  We do not need to delve into whether the 
portable breath test was properly administered or whether it was admissible for 
the purposes of determining probable cause because we are able to affirm the 
hearing examiner's probable cause ruling without taking the results of that test 
into account.  

 
 
[¶18]   Our case law has consistently condoned the 
use of field sobriety tests in determining whether probable cause exists to 
support an arrest for DWUI.  See, e.g., Bradshaw, ¶ 25, 135 P.3d at 619-20; Smith, 11 P.3d  at 935-36.  The hearing examiner made the following 
factual findings concerning Mr. Batten's performance on the field sobriety 
tests:  

 
 
            
On the Horizontal Gaze, the Licensee showed lack of smooth pursuit, onset 
prior to forty-five degrees, and nystagmus at maximum deviation in both 
eyes.  On the one leg stand, the 
trooper reported that the Licensee put his foot down at the count[s] of 3, 4, 5, 
6 and 28, raised his arms and swayed.  
The Licensee missed the number 27 when counting and said two numbers 
twice while counting.  On the walk 
and turn, the trooper reported that Licensee started too soon, missed heel to 
toe several times, and raised his arms for balance.  In watching the video tape, the Office 
also notes that Licensee said the numbers 12 and 21 twice during the one leg 
stand and that he stepped out of position and started too soon on the walk and 
turn maneuver.

 
 
[¶19]   The agency record, including the 
trooper's report and a video tape of the stop which Mr. Batten introduced into 
evidence at the contested case hearing, supports the hearing examiner's factual 
findings.  In addition to the 
information recited in the hearing examiner's findings of fact, the trooper's 
report indicated Mr. Batten's eyes were bloodshot and watery and his performance 
on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test resulted in six out of a possible six 
clues indicating impairment.  The 
report also stated that the one leg stand test resulted in three clues of 
impairment and the walk and turn test showed two clues.  The report further indicated that Mr. 
Batten was swaying and stated his balance was poor.  This evidence all supported the hearing 
examiner's ultimate finding that Mr. Batten's performance on the field sobriety 
tests was "poor."    

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Batten argues that the video 
tape does not support some of the trooper's findings.  For example, he states that he did not 
raise his arms high enough during the one leg stand or walk and turn tests to 
qualify as indicators of impairment.  
Our job is not to re-weigh the evidence or determine credibility of 
witnesses.  That is the 
responsibility of the finder of fact.   See, e.g., Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 WY 
127, ¶ 26, 36 P.3d 608, 617 (Wyo. 
2001).  On this record, we have no 
difficulty determining there was substantial evidence to support the hearing 
examiner's findings of facts, including his finding that Mr. Batten's 
performance on the field sobriety tests was poor.   

 
 

[¶21]   The hearing examiner's factual 
findings all support the legal conclusion that the trooper had probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Batten for driving while under the influence of alcohol.  Given the results of the field sobriety 
tests and the other indicators discussed above, a prudent, 
reasonable, and cautious peace officer would have believed that Mr. Batten had 
committed the crime of driving while intoxicated.  We rule, as a matter of law, probable cause 
existed to sustain the trooper's warrantless arrest of Mr. Batten. 

 
 
[¶22]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Except in 
the context of the constitutional challenges, Mr. Batten does not contest the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the per se administrative suspension of 
his driver's license.  Thus, we will 
not separately address that issue in this decision.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 
states in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) If 
arrested for an offense as defined by  
W.S. 31-5-233:

            
(i) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state is deemed to have given 
consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to a chemical test or tests of 
his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration or controlled substance content of his blood.  The test or tests shall 
be:

            
     (A) 
Incidental to a lawful arrest;

            
     (B) Given 
as promptly as possible after the arrest;

            
     (C) 
Administered at the direction of a peace officer who has probable cause to 
believe the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
upon a public street or highway in this state in violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) 
or any other law prohibiting driving under the influence as defined by W.S. 
31-5-233(a)(v).  The peace officer 
who requires a test pursuant to this section may direct that the test shall be 
of blood, breath or urine.  However, 
if the officer directs that the test be of the person's blood or urine, the 
person may choose whether the test shall be of blood or urine.  The person has this option unless the 
peace officer has probable cause to believe there is impairment by a controlled 
substance which is not subject to testing by a blood or breath test in which 
case a urine test may be required.

            
(ii) For tests required under this act, the arrested person shall be 
advised that:

            
     (A) His 
failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer 
shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense or 
eighteen (18) months for a second or subsequent offense as provided by W.S. 
31-6-107;

            
     (B) If a 
test is taken and the results indicate the person is under the influence of 
alcohol or a controlled substance, he may be subject to criminal penalties and 
his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall 
be suspended for ninety (90) days;

            
     (C) After 
submitting to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer at a 
place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the agency employing 
the peace officer, the arrested person may go to the nearest hospital or clinic 
and secure any additional tests at his own expense;

            
     (D) If he 
refuses to take all required tests, he shall not be eligible for limited driving 
privileges.

 
 
 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2003) states in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) As used 
in this section:

          
(i) "Alcohol concentration" means:

            
     (A) The 
number of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of 
blood;

            
     (B) The 
number of grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath;  or

            
     (C) The 
number of grams of alcohol per seventy-five (75) milliliters of 
urine.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
(b) No 
person shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this 
state if the person:

            
(i) Has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent 
(0.08%) or more;  
or

            
(ii) To a degree which renders him incapable of safely 
driving:

            
     (A) Is 
under the influence of alcohol;

            

3Our 
application of the substantial evidence standard of review to the agency's 
factual findings distinguishes administrative cases from criminal cases where we 
review the district court's findings of fact regarding a claim of an illegal 
search or seizure under the clearly erroneous standard.  Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 13, 148 P.3d 38, 42 (Wyo. 2006).

 

4The standard of review 
recited here is a refinement of the standard applied in other driver's licenses 
cases where we simply reviewed the hearing examiner's probable cause 
determination for substantial evidence.  
See, e.g., Bradshaw, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d  at 616.  Smith v. State ex rel., Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 
11 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2000).  
We continue to follow the long standing rule that the ultimate question 
of whether a search or seizure violated the constitution is a question of law, 
which we review de novo.