Title: Mitchell v. Purdue, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KENNETH MITCHELL, SR., 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 599, 2008      
 
Claimant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
PURDUE, INC.,  
§ 
C.A. No. SS08A-04-002 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Employer Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  April 22, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     May 21, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 21st day of May 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Kenneth Mitchell, Sr., claimant below-appellant, appeals from a 
Superior Court decision affirming the Industrial Accident Board’s (“IAB” or the 
“Board”) limited award of attorneys’ fees against Purdue, Inc., employer below-
appellee.  Mitchell raises two arguments on appeal.  First, Mitchell claims that the 
Board erred as a matter of law when it limited the award of attorneys’ fees.  
Second, he contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in determining 
that the Board’s award was reasonable.  We find no merit to these arguments and 
affirm. 
 
2
 
2. 
Mitchell sustained an injury to his shoulder and filed with the IAB a 
petition to determine compensation due.  The Board held a hearing on February 8, 
2008, at which Mitchell sought a ruling that his injury was a compensable work 
injury, an award of total disability benefits and medical expenses, and costs and 
attorneys’ fees.  Purdue disputed only the causation of Mitchell’s injury.1 
 
3. 
After the hearing, the Board issued a decision dated April 8, 2008, 
wherein it found that Mitchell’s injury was a compensable work injury and 
awarded him total disability benefits and medical expenses.  Specifically, the 
Board awarded medical expenses in the amount of $1,741.59 and total disability 
benefits from June 13, 2007 to August 17, 2007 at the rate of $467.76 per week, 
for a total of $4,410.46.2  The Board also awarded Mitchell medical witness 
expenses. 
 
4. 
In ruling upon the request for attorneys’ fees, the Board considered the 
ten factors enumerated in General Motors Corp. v. Cox.3  It noted that Mitchell’s 
                                          
 
1 Mitchell v. Purdue, Inc., I.A.B., No. 1306769, at 2 (Apr. 8. 2008) (“IAB Decision”). 
 
2 IAB Decision at 19. 
 
3  
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. 
(3) The fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances. 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
 
3
counsel submitted an affidavit attesting to 20 hours of preparation for this three-
hour hearing, and that the case was not novel or difficult, and did not require 
exceptional legal skills to try properly.  The Board also noted that Mitchell’s 
counsel argued that the acceptance of this case precluded other employment, that 
the case imposed time limitations upon counsel, and that Mitchell initially 
contacted counsel on August 14, 2007.  The Board further noted that it was argued 
that the fee arrangement was contingent, that counsel did not expect to receive 
compensation from any other source, and that Purdue was able to pay an award.  
After considering Mitchell’s counsel’s relative experience, reputation and ability, 
the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, the amounts 
involved, and the results obtained, the Board found that a reasonable attorneys’ fee 
was the lesser of 30% of Mitchell’s total award, or $5,750.4 
 
5. 
After the Board’s decision, Mitchell appealed to the Superior Court on 
the sole issue of the limited award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that the Board erred 
as a matter of law by failing to consider the non-monetary benefits counsel secured 
                                                                                                                                        
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services. 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(9) The employer’s ability to pay. 
(10) An affidavit from the claimant as to what fees and expenses, if any, have 
been received or will be received from any other source. 
 
See Cox, 304 A.2d 55, 57 (Del. 1973). 
 
4 IAB Decision at 17-18.  The total award was $6,152.05.  Thirty percent (30%) of that amount 
resulted in a fee award of $1,845.62.  
 
4
for Mitchell.  After briefing, the Superior Court held a teleconference in which the 
parties agreed that there was no explicit claim for non-monetary benefits as a basis 
for a larger fee award.  Instead, Mitchell’s counsel argued, that the claim was 
implicit: the dispute centered on determining causation―a non-monetary benefit.  
On November 25, 2008, the Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding 
that the Board was not required to value non-monetary benefits and that it had 
properly applied the Cox factors.5  This appeal followed. 
 
6. 
In reviewing decisions of the IAB, our role is limited.  We review the 
record to determine whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial 
evidence and is free from legal error.6  “Substantial evidence” means “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”7  However, we do not weigh the evidence, determine credibility or 
draw our own factual findings or conclusions.8   We review questions of law de 
novo.9 
                                          
 
5 Mitchell v. Purdue, Inc., Del. Super., No. SS08A-04-002, at 5, 7, 8 (Nov. 25, 2008) (“Superior 
Court Decision”). 
 
6 See Vincent v. E. Shore Markets, ___ A.2d ___, 2009 WL 922750, at *2 (Del. Supr. Apr. 7, 
2009); Histed v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993); see generally 29 
Del. C. § 10142(d) (establishing standard of review for agency decisions).   
 
7 Anchor Motor Freight v. Ciabottoni, 716 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 
8 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965). 
 
9 Anchor Motor Freight, 716 A.2d at 156. 
 
 
5
 
7. 
Mitchell claims that the Board erred as a matter of law by limiting its 
award of attorneys’ fees to 30% of the monetary award.  He argues that the Board 
should have considered the non-monetary benefits secured by counsel, resulting in 
an award disproportionately low in relation to the time spent and the results 
achieved. 
 
8. 
The IAB’s authority to award attorneys’ fees is found in 19 Del. C. 
§ 2320(10), which provides: 
a.  A reasonable attorney’s fee in an amount not to exceed 30 percent 
of the award or 10 times the average weekly wage in Delaware … at 
the time of the award, whichever is smaller, shall be allowed by the 
Board to any employee awarded compensation under Part II of this 
title and taxed as costs against a party…. 
 
 
This Court recently examined issues relating to attorneys’ fees awarded by 
the IAB, including the issue of whether those fees could be based upon both 
monetary and non-monetary benefits secured for the claimant by counsel.  In Pugh 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,10 we noted that the purpose of Section 2320(10) “is to 
relieve a successful claimant of the burden of legal fees and expenses, at least in 
                                          
 
10 945 A.2d 588 (Del. 2008). 
 
 
6
part.”11  Section 2320(10) was intended “to ensure that an employee may recover 
attorney’s fees from his employer based on the effort and accomplishment of his 
attorney.”12  That accomplishment need not be monetary―an employee is entitled 
to attorneys’ fees as the result of “any favorable change of position or benefit, as 
the result of a Board decision….”13 
 
9. 
Although Pugh holds that a fee award may be based on non-monetary 
benefits―such as the value of a finding of compensability, jurisdiction, or 
inapplicability of the statute of limitations―we also noted that non-monetary 
benefits arise in all cases where a claimant successfully obtains a benefit for a 
compensable injury.14  For that reason, non-monetary benefits “do not 
automatically translate into an additional sum beyond the amount determined by 
                                          
 
11 945 A.2d at 590 (quoting Ham v. Chrysler Corp., 231 A.2d 258, 263 (Del. 1967)).  Cf. Lattis 
v. Blackwell & Son, Inc., 608 A.2d 728 (Table), 1992 WL 53435, at *1 (Del. Supr. Feb. 28, 
1992) (“The statutory provision for the award of counsel fees in workmen’s compensation 
matters reflects a legislative intention that ‘an employee pursuing a meritorious claim for 
workmen’s compensation not be required to pay counsel fees from the proceeds of the award.’  
This Court has emphasized the public policy underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act that 
an injured employee should not be exposed to the hazards of litigation and, where forced to a 
hearing, an unsuccessful employer should pay the expenses in the form of counsel fees.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 
12 Pugh, 945 A.2d at 591 (quoting Acme Markets, Inc. v. Fry, 587 A.2d 454 (Table), 1991 WL 
22370, at *4 (Del. Supr. Jan. 25, 1991). 
 
13 Id. (citing Acme Markets, 1991 WL 22370, at *4). 
 
14 Id. 
 
 
7
reference to the monetary award.”15  Accordingly, while the Board is permitted to 
consider the non-monetary benefits gained for the claimant by counsel, the Board 
is not required to do so in its fee calculation.16  Because the statute did not require 
the Board to value non-monetary benefits, the Board’s mistaken belief that it was 
precluded from assigning any additional value to non-monetary benefits was found 
not to vitiate the award.17 
 
10. Here, Mitchell received more than simply a non-monetary benefit.  
After finding that his injury was a compensable work injury, the Board awarded 
Mitchell a monetary benefit totaling $6,152.05.  As we noted in Pugh, because 
every award of monetary benefits to a claimant is necessarily accompanied by a 
finding of causation, that non-monetary benefit does not automatically increase the 
base upon which attorneys’ fees are calculated.  The Board has discretion to 
consider such a benefit, but it is not required to do so.  Mitchell bore the burden of 
establishing his entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fee.  Because he did not 
request that the Board consider non-monetary benefits, the Board did not abuse its 
discretion by not doing so. 
                                          
 
15 Id. 
 
16 Id. 
 
17 Id. 
 
 
8
 
11. Mitchell 
also 
claims 
that 
the 
attorneys’ 
fees 
award 
was 
disproportionately low in relation to the time spent and results achieved in this 
matter.  He argues that when the Board is not constrained by the maximum fee 
limit in Section 2320(10), it customarily awards fees in the range of $260 to $325 
per hour for experienced counsel.18  Here, the Board’s award amounted to only $80 
per hour.19  
 
12. Cox sets forth the factors to be considered in determining a reasonable 
attorneys’ fee in a workers’ compensation case.20  A review of the Board’s  
decision here discloses that the Board thoroughly and adequately addressed the 
Cox factors.21  The Board concluded that Mitchell was entitled to attorneys’ fees 
amounting to the lesser of 30% of the total award, or $5,750.  The Board expressly 
found such an award was reasonable, given Mitchell’s counsel’s level of 
experience and the nature of the legal task, and noted that the award would be an 
                                          
 
18 See Cravens v. Wal-Mart Distribution Center, Del. Super., No. 07A-06-005, at 5-6 n.15 (Sept. 
22, 2008) (citing cases). 
 
19 30% of the total award of $6,152.05 is $1,845.62, which is less than the alternative award of 
$5,750.  Counsel submitted an affidavit attesting to 23 hours of work―$1,845.62 ÷ 23 = $80.24. 
 
20 See supra at n.3. 
 
21 See IAB Decision at 17-18. 
 
 
9
offset against fees that would otherwise be charged by counsel to Mitchell under 
their fee agreement.22 
 
13. Finally, Mitchell argues that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law 
by holding that attorneys’ fees could not be awarded based upon non-monetary 
benefits unless there is a “direct or explicit claim for the basis of a larger fee 
award.”  He contends that there is no statute, case law, or Board rule mandating 
such a restriction on fees, and that IAB procedures do not provide an opportunity to 
make a separate tailored request for attorneys’ fees after the underlying issues are 
resolved. 
 
14.  This argument lacks merit.  The Superior Court’s affirming decision was 
not, as Mitchell suggests, premised on its holding that a claimant must make a 
direct or explicit claim for non-monetary benefits as the basis of a larger fee award.  
Although the Superior Court did note that making such a request was advisable to 
enable the Board to consider whether such an award might be appropriate, that 
observation was not the ground of the Superior Court’s decision.  The rationale for 
the Superior Court upholding the Board’s exercise of discretion, was its correct 
application of our holding in Pugh that the Board is not required to include the 
value of non-monetary benefits in its fee calculation.23  
                                          
 
22 IAB Decision at 18-19. 
 
23 Superior Court Decision at 6. 
 
10
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice