Title: Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88352-Agenda 17-March 2000.
DELORES SMITHBERG, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS
								 MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case concerns
entitlement to the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF)
death benefit of James Smithberg. Following James' death,
competing claims were filed with the IMRF for James' death
benefit: one by James' first wife, Nancy Smithberg; another by his
second wife, Delores Smithberg, to whom he was married at the
time of his death. Upon receiving notice from the IMRF that it
would not pay the death benefit "without an agreement between
the claimants or direction from a court," Delores filed a complaint
against the IMRF seeking a declaratory judgment that she is the
rightful beneficiary. The IMRF answered and interpleaded the
death benefit between Delores and Nancy. Nancy answered and
filed a counter-complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to
establish her right to the death benefit. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Delores is the rightful
beneficiary of the death benefit. Nancy's notice of appeal was
timely filed on December 9, 1998.
	On appeal, applying equitable principles, the appellate court
reversed and remanded with directions that summary judgment be
entered in favor of Nancy. 306 Ill. App. 3d 1139. We granted
Delores' leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court. The following facts are relevant
to our disposition.
	On August 1, 1996, a judgment of dissolution of marriage was
entered in the circuit court of Cook County dissolving the 33-year
marriage of James and Nancy Smithberg. Through their marital
settlement agreement, which was approved by the court and
incorporated in the judgment for dissolution, James and Nancy
sought to "settle between themselves *** issues relating to their
respective rights of property *** whether now or later owned or
possessed by either of them." They acknowledged they had "freely
and voluntarily entered into [the] agreement, free of any duress or
coercion and with full knowledge of each and every provision
contained in [the] agreement, and the consequences thereof." As
part of the agreement, and in exchange for her waiver of any right
or claim to other retirement benefits belonging to James, it was
agreed that Nancy would be "listed as the recipient of any benefits
payable upon the death of" James from the IMRF, and that he
would "not designate any other survivors, or allocate any
survivorship benefits, to anyone other than" Nancy.
	Subsequently, on a date not disclosed in the record, James
remarried and, contrary to the express terms of the judgment and
marital settlement agreement, designated his second wife, Delores,
as the recipient of his IMRF death benefit. Upon learning of
James' action, Nancy filed an emergency petition for rule to show
cause why James should not be held in contempt for his willful
violation of the judgment of dissolution. The petition was
designated an "emergency" petition, because James was believed
to be "seriously ill" at the time. Affidavits and exhibits
subsequently presented in this case show that hearing on the
petition was postponed and continued by agreement on February
19, 1998, due to certain representations made on, and perhaps
before, February 18, 1998, by James' attorney, Raymond Meader.
It appears from a letter of that date that Meader led Nancy's
attorney, David Jaffe, to believe that James had agreed to do that
which he was obligated to do pursuant to his original agreement
and the judgment of dissolution: unconditionally designate Nancy
as the beneficiary of his IMRF death benefits. In his letter, Meader
indicated that he would ask James to sign the IMRF form naming
Nancy as primary beneficiary and would then "forward to the
Village of Romeoville [James' employer] for forwarding to
IMRF."
	On February 20, 1998, Meader obtained James' signature on
the form, but was purportedly instructed by James "to make sure
everything was resolved with regard to the Petition for Rule before
finalizing the matter." Meador also claimed that James wanted to
consider other benefit options before filing the designation with
the IMRF, although it is not clear how, if at all, the designation of
a beneficiary for death benefits would impact the availability of
other benefits or why James believed he could choose not to file
the beneficiary designation.
	According to Meador's affidavit, he received a telephone call
from attorney Jaffe on February 21, 1998, and on that date advised
Jaffe that the form had been signed, but still needed to be
completed. Pursuant to Jaffe's request, Meador faxed Jaffe a copy
of the form, which bore James' signature and named Nancy as his
beneficiary. Meador claimed he told Jaffe that he "needed a
complete resolution of th[e] matter" including the issue of
"attorney's fees and costs" claimed in Nancy's petition for rule to
show cause. Meador's affidavit does not, however, specifically
state that he informed Jaffe the form would not be sent to the
IMRF until Nancy agreed to relinquish her claim for attorney fees
and costs.
	When Meador visited the offices of the City of Romeoville on
February 24, 1998, he handed the designation of beneficiary form
to Doris Mann, the village employee who handled IMRF matters,
and told her not to process the document with the IMRF until he
instructed her to do so.
	James died in the early morning of February 25, 1998. The
affidavit of Doris Mann indicates that, having received no further
instruction, she remained in possession of the designation of
beneficiary form until March of 1998, when the IMRF contacted
her and requested it.
	When the IMRF refused to pay the death benefit to Delores
barring an agreement between the competing claimants or
"direction from a court," Delores sought a resolution of the matter
in the circuit court. By interpleading the death benefit and
requesting relief as the circuit court deemed "equitable," the IMRF
itself implicitly acknowledged the authority of the circuit court to
order the benefit paid directly to either claimant and agreed to pay
the benefit to either party. The IMRF invoked in the process the
panoply of judicial powers traditionally at a court's disposal and
set the stage for redress of James' blatant wrongdoing as set forth
in Nancy's pleadings and evinced in Delores' own affidavits. As
will appear hereafter, there was no statutory or procedural
impediment to a just result.
	With that observation, we turn to our analysis and resolution
of this case. Although the ultimate issue here concerns entitlement
to James Smithberg's IMRF death benefit, the facts and arguments
raise a broader, more troubling matter, specifically, a challenge to
the power of a court in this context to enforce by equitable means
a judgment based upon the incorporated terms of a marital
settlement agreement effecting an agreed distribution of marital
assets.
	Clearly, James was obligated by the express terms of his
agreement with Nancy to name her and no other as the beneficiary
of his IMRF death benefit. The marital settlement agreement,
which was incorporated in the court's judgment of dissolution,
acknowledged that James had "freely and voluntarily entered into
[the] agreement, free of any duress or coercion and with full
knowledge of each and every provision contained in [the]
agreement, and the consequences thereof." James agreed to name
Nancy as the beneficiary of his IMRF death benefit in exchange
for her waiver of any right or claim to certain other retirement
benefits belonging to James, benefits, we might add, in which
Nancy clearly would have had an interest in view of the parties'
33-year marriage.
	It appears that James, at some point subsequent to the
judgment of dissolution, designated Delores as the beneficiary of
his death benefit. James' action was nothing less than an attempt
to deprive Nancy of her vested substantive rights under the parties'
marital settlement agreement and it constituted a clear violation of
the court's judgment of dissolution. In response, Nancy filed an
emergency petition for rule to show cause. Had the cause
proceeded in the circuit court, James undoubtedly would have
faced a finding of contempt of court; he would have been ordered
to reinstate Nancy as the beneficiary of his death benefit; and he
would have been required to pay Nancy's reasonable attorney fees
pursuant to section 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act. See 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 1998); In re
Marriage of Scott, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059 (1996).
	James avoided that result only by means of an agreement to
postpone the hearing on Nancy's petition. The resulting
continuance was apparently achieved by either the representations,
or misrepresentations, of his attorney to the effect that James
would forthwith comply with the terms of his marital settlement
agreement and the judgment of dissolution. However, after he had
obtained the continuance of the hearing, James seems to have
violated the latter agreement as well. Instead of unconditionally
placing the form designating Nancy as beneficiary with the Village
of Romeoville for forwarding to the IMRF, James' attorney,
contrary to representations he made in a letter dated February 18,
1998, advised Doris Mann not to send the form on to the IMRF
until instructed to do so upon the pretext that James wished to
inquire about other IMRF benefits. Obviously, having obtained his
continuance, James either wished to use the form as further
leverage against Nancy's meritorious claim for attorney fees and
costs or, realizing that his demise was imminent, he wanted to
deprive Nancy of the death benefit altogether. Since there is no
indication in the record that James' estate has sufficient funds to
compensate Nancy in the amount of the death benefit due her, it is
speculative at best to suggest, as Delores repeatedly does, that
Nancy's avenue of redress lies solely in a suit against James'
estate. As the appellate court held, equity will regard as done that
which ought to be done. 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1143.
	Equity is defined as follows:
			"Justice administered according to fairness as
contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of common
law. *** The term 'equity' denotes the spirit and habit of
fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate
the intercourse of men with men." Black's Law
Dictionary 540 (6th ed. 1990).
Those principles should serve as a beacon to any court charting a
course through conflicting case authorities, and we believe they
are particularly apt in the resolution of this case.
	Delores argues for a strict application of section 7-118 of the
Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/7-118 (West 1998)
(definition of "beneficiary")), without regard to the attendant
circumstances. Section 7-118(a) states that "[d]esignations of
beneficiaries shall be in writing on forms prescribed by the board
and effective upon filing in the fund offices." 40 ILCS 5/7-118(a)
(West 1998). According to Delores, since section 7-118(b) allows
for a change of beneficiary at any time (40 ILCS 5/7-118(b) (West
1998)), and since the form on file with the IMRF as of the date of
James' death named her as the beneficiary of his death benefit, the
Code compelled payment to her in spite of James' wrongdoing,
and the court system is, in effect, powerless to right the wrong
done Nancy. We disagree.
	It is an elementary principle of law that a court is vested with
the inherent power to enforce its orders. In re Baker, 71 Ill. 2d 480, 484 (1978). Where a domestic relations order has been
entered, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its order (In
re Marriage of Hartman, 305 Ill. App. 3d 338, 343 (1999)), as
further performance by the parties is often contemplated (In re
Marriage of Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764 (1999)). In the
case of the court that rendered James and Nancy's judgment of
dissolution, jurisdiction was expressly retained for the purpose of
enforcing all of its terms and conditions. Had James lived, there is
no doubt that he could have been compelled by the use of
contempt proceedings to abide by the terms of his marital
settlement agreement as incorporated in the court's judgment. His
death, however, does not leave the courts powerless to rectify his
wrongdoing and enforce Nancy's right to the death benefit.
	Irrespective of empowering statutes, a court retains its
traditional equitable powers. Such inherent equitable power,
derived from the historic power of equity courts, cannot be taken
away or abridged by the legislature. Marsh v. Illinois Racing
Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 495 (1997); Ardt v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation, 154 Ill. 2d 138, 146 (1992). When the
legislature encroaches upon a fundamentally judicial prerogative,
this court has not hesitated to protect judicial authority. Murneigh
v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 302-03 (1997); People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 43 (1986).
	Although the court's contempt power became useless with
James' death as a means by which to enforce the judgment of
dissolution, the circuit court in this case had equitable remedies at
its disposal and should have employed them to afford Nancy relief.
As the appellate court did, and as this court has previously done
(Cesena v. Du Page County, 145 Ill. 2d 32, 38 (1991); Ward v.
Sampson, 395 Ill. 353, 366-67 (1946)), the circuit court could have
simply considered "that as done which ought to be done." In
Cesena, this court invoked its equitable powers and deemed an
accident report filed as of the date and time that an attempt was
made to file it. Cesena, 145 Ill. 2d  at 38. In this case, the appellate
court properly exercised its equitable powers and deemed the
designation of beneficiary form filed with the IMRF when it
should have been filed, prior to James' death.
	Additionally, even had the death benefits been awarded to
Delores, according to the beneficiary form on file with the IMRF
as of the date of James' death, a constructive trust would have
been imposed upon those death benefits. When a person has
obtained money to which he is not entitled, under such
circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not
retain it, a constructive trust can be imposed to avoid unjust
enrichment. Norton v. City of Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 620, 628
(1997); Frederickson v. Blumenthal, 271 Ill. App. 3d 738, 741
(1995); Restatement of Restitution §160, Comment c (1937).
Although some form of wrongdoing is generally required for the
imposition of a constructive trust (Suttles v. Vogel, 126 Ill. 2d 186,
193 (1988)), wrongdoing is not always a necessary element
(Norton, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 628; Frederickson, 271 Ill. App. 3d at
740-41). For example, a constructive trust may be imposed in the
case of mistake, although no wrongdoing is involved. Martin v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 55 (1994); Suttles, 126 Ill. 2d  at 193. Constructive trusts are appropriate remedies where
one spouse has transferred property in fraud of the rights of
another. Restatement of Restitution §168, Comment c (1937).
	A constructive trust is created when a court declares the party
in possession of wrongfully acquired property the constructive
trustee of that property because it would be inequitable for that
party to retain possession of it. The sole duty of the constructive
trustee is to transfer title and possession of the wrongfully
acquired property to the beneficiary. Suttles, 126 Ill. 2d  at 193;
Frederickson, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 740.
	Although the transaction challenged in a constructive trust
case is usually one between the parties vying for the property in
question, that relationship is not a prerequisite. Roth v. Carlyle
Real Estate Ltd. Partnership VII, 129 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438-39
(1984). Except where a bona fide purchaser for value is concerned
(Frankel v. Otiswear, Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d 204, 216 (1991)), a
constructive trust may be imposed even though the person
wrongfully receiving the benefit is innocent of collusion (Brennan
v. Persselli, 353 Ill. 630, 636 (1933)). By accepting the property,
he adopts the means by which it was procured. Brennan, 353 Ill. 
at 636; Sadacca v. Monhart, 128 Ill. App. 3d 250, 256-57 (1984).
	Equitable relief, be it by constructive trust or some other form,
has been frequently employed in situations very similar to the one
now confronting us. In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v.
Watson, 71 Ill. App. 3d 900 (1979), a property settlement
agreement, incorporated into a divorce decree, required the
husband to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the
parties' son. A policy was issued, but no one was ever named
beneficiary, and a default provision presumed the insured's
surviving spouse (he had remarried) to be the beneficiary. When
the insured died and the insurance company was faced with
competing claims, it filed an interpleader action to determine the
rights of the rival claimants. Upon motions for summary judgment,
the trial court directed payment to the son who should have been
named beneficiary by the terms of the marital settlement
agreement and divorce decree. The appellate court affirmed,
noting that " 'equity regards as done that which ought to be
done.' " Lincoln National Insurance Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d at 902.
	It has been generally held that, when marital settlement
agreements require an insured to maintain life insurance for the
benefit of a particular beneficiary, that beneficiary has an
enforceable equitable right to the proceeds of the insurance
policies against any other named beneficiary except one with a
superior equitable right. In re Schwass, 126 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514
(1984) (constructive trust imposed); Appelman v. Appelman, 87
Ill. App. 3d 749, 753-54 (1980) (constructive trust appropriate);
Brunnenmeyer v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 66 Ill.
App. 3d 315, 319 (1978) (remand with directions to insure that
"equitable rights *** are protected"). The same result has obtained
where the requirement is the result of the court's decree, rather
than the parties' agreement. See Perkins v. Stuemke, 223 Ill. App.
3d 839, 846-47 (1992) (constructive trust imposed in the proceeds
of a subsequent policy where the policy referred to in the judgment
of dissolution had lapsed).
	Delores argues that those cases are inapplicable to these facts
simply because the requirement of beneficiary designation in this
case pertained to a public pension fund, as opposed to private
insurance or a private pension. She cites anti-alienation provisions
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the Code which she claims
place public pension funds beyond the immediate reach of the
courts, or at least did so prior to July 1, 1999, the effective date of
a statute pertaining to "Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations
Orders" (QILDROs) which purports to give domestic relations
courts limited powers to effect distributions of public pension
benefits through QILDROs directed to nonlitigant pension funds.
40 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 1998). Before that legislation, no specific
statutory authority in Illinois authorized a domestic relations court
order directing payment of a governmental pension benefit to a
person other than the regular payee. Although the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq.
(1994)) would have allowed for a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (QDRO) in this situation had James been a member of a
private pension plan, ERISA is not applicable to governmental
pension funds (29 U.S.C. §1003(b) (1994)).
	We note in passing that Illinois' new QILDRO provision,
among other things, states that a QILDRO will not apply to or
affect "the payment of any survivor's benefit, death benefit,
disability benefit, life insurance benefit, or health insurance
benefit" (40 ILCS 5/1-119(b)(4) (West 1998)), unlike ERISA,
which would allow for QDROs which affect survivorship benefits.
29 U.S.C. §1056 (d)(3)(F) (1994). Moreover, with regard to
benefits subject to its terms, the new QILDRO provision would
appear to require the consent of any member who began
participating in the retirement system on or before the effective
date of the enabling statute in order for a QILDRO to be effective
(40 ILCS 5/1-119(m)(1) (West 1998)). We will not comment
further on the wisdom or effect of this new legislation, as the
parties do not contend that it controls the disposition of the case
before us. It is not necessary, in this context, to delineate the extent
to which the new statute has wrought a change in the law as it
existed prior to July 1, 1999.
	By the parties' marital settlement agreement, James consented
and agreed to name Nancy, his wife of 33 years, as the sole
recipient of his "survivorship benefit." Nancy obtained a vested,
contingent right to those benefits when the marital settlement
agreement was incorporated in the judgment of dissolution and
that judgment became final. The death benefit is similar to a
survivor benefit, which has been held to be a "distinct property
interest" and, though contingent in nature (In re Marriage of
Moore, 251 Ill. App. 3d 41, 44 (1993)), it, like any other property
right created by a judgment of dissolution, becomes a vested right
when the judgment is final (see In re Marriage of Hubbard, 215
Ill. App. 3d 113, 116 (1991)).
	Although Delores argues that longstanding anti-alienation
provisions of the Illinois Constitution and the Code prohibited any
orders that required a public pension fund to pay benefits directly
to the former spouse of a covered employee, she admits that
retirement benefits have long been presumed to be marital
property to the extent that the beneficial interest was acquired
during the marriage. She could hardly argue otherwise, as that
proposition has been so firmly established in this state over the
years as to be beyond dispute. See In re Marriage of Hackett, 113 Ill. 2d 286, 292-93 (1986); In re Marriage of Krane, 288 Ill. App.
3d 608, 616-17 (1997); In re Marriage of Carlson, 269 Ill. App.
3d 464, 468-71 (1995); Moore, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45; In re
Marriage of Roehn, 216 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895 (1991); In re
Marriage of Papeck, 95 Ill. App. 3d 624, 629 (1981). The 1999
amendment to section 503(b)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/503(b)(2) (West 1998))
now acknowledges as much.
	Section 5 of article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970
does provide that membership in a public pension fund shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall
not be diminished or impaired. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §5.
However, this court has construed that provision as a guarantee
that all public pension benefits are to be determined under a
contractual theory rather than being treated as mere gratuities as
some pensions had been previously. Buddell v. Board of Trustees,
State University Retirement System, 118 Ill. 2d 99, 102 (1987).
	 The IMRF statute, like other statutes establishing public
pension funds under the Code, also contains a provision broadly
prohibiting alienation of benefits payable to participating
employees. 40 ILCS 5/7-217 (West 1996). However, as noted, this
court in Hackett held that the spouse of a public pension
participant obtains an actual ownership interest in the pension
benefit as marital property. This court found no inconsistency
between section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, pars. 503(a), (b)) and a
similar anti-alienation provision of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,
ch. 108½, par. 4-135), observing as follows:
		"The purpose and the legislative intent of section 4-135
was to protect retired firemen and their beneficiaries from
creditors. Considering the beneficial interest to be marital
property does not conflict with that purpose; it provides
for a division of the benefits between those individuals
whom the statute was intended to protect." Hackett, 113 Ill. 2d  at 292-93.
	To be sure, in many cases pension benefits may constitute one
of the most important items of property acquired in a marriage of
long duration; in some perhaps, it may be the only asset of any
significant value. To deprive a domestic relations court of the
power to apportion the value of such a significant marital asset,
and enforce that apportionment, would, in many cases, deprive the
court of the ability to do justice between the parties. A court's
authority to enforce its judgment, equitably apportioning marital
assets, surely cannot be subordinate to the whims of one of the
parties in the divorce proceeding or defeated by his or her blatant
violation of the parties' agreement as incorporated in a judgment
of dissolution. As we have demonstrated, courts are not powerless
to enforce their judgments.
	Although, as Delores notes, prior to passage of QILDRO
provisions, some courts had interpreted anti-alienation provisions
to preclude court orders requiring direct payments from a
nonlitigant, public pension fund to a nonemployee, divorced
spouse, regardless of the circumstances (see Roehn, 216 Ill. App.
3d at 894 (authorizing pension payments to go first to the member,
then to the former spouse), others considered such holdings
erroneous interpretations, and unwarranted extensions, of
statements made in Papeck in an entirely different context (see
Carlson, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 469-72 (holding that pension funds
could be ordered to pay the former spouse directly)).
	 In Papeck, the trial court ordered the Retirement Board
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund to restore to a wife her own
nonmarital funds that she had previously paid into her husband's
retirement fund on his behalf. As observed by the Carlson court,
Papeck held only that former spouses who are creditors could not
directly reach pension fund assets. The wife in Papeck sought to
recover her own nonmarital property from the fund. She did not
claim entitlement to pension benefits by virtue of her marital
status. The Papeck court in fact attempted to clearly restrict the
breadth of its holding, stating:
			"We caution that our holding is not to be construed as
affecting the rights of nonemployee spouses to receive a
portion of their husband's pension benefits as part of the
marital property. *** The spouse of the plan participant,
upon dissolution of the marriage, obtains an actual co-ownership interest in the benefits as marital property.
Thus a divorced wife is not in the position of a mere
'creditor,'and the anti-attachment provision of the
[statute] does not bar her claim to a certain proportion of
the benefits." (Emphasis omitted.) Papeck, 95 Ill. App. 3d
at 629-30.
	Prior to the change in the law brought about by the QILDRO
provisions, there was no statutory mechanism in place to
implement provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act and case authority which recognized as "marital
property" a person's interest in his or her spouse's public pension
benefits. To some extent, the decisions rendered during that period
reflected the uncertainty. We do not criticize or condemn the
results reached by the courts in those varied scenarios. We address
only this case, and these facts.
	In this case, no court has sought to reach out and impose its
domestic relations order upon the administrators of a public
pension fund and direct, inconvenience or confuse them in any
way. The party who argues so vociferously against such an action
is the very party who has embroiled the IMRF in this litigation.
The IMRF, through interpleader, in essence has laid the death
benefit before the circuit court and asked, "Who do we pay?" The
IMRF took no position as to which claimant is entitled to the death
benefit. By its own pleadings, the IMRF requested an equitable
resolution of this matter and agreed to pay as ordered by the court.
The IMRF takes no position as to which claimant is entitled to the
benefit. The claimant's themselves asked for a declaration of their
rights in the res.
	We agree with the appellate court's decision in Carlson to the
extent that it held no statute or precedent prohibited a public
pension fund from agreeing to make payment to a nonemployee,
divorced spouse entitled to pension benefits. See Carlson, 269 Ill.
App. 3d at 470-71. In June of 1998, the IMRF filed in the circuit
court a counter-complaint for interpleader, agreeing to pay the
death benefit to "the person lawfully entitled thereto." Nancy
Smithberg is entitled to James Smithberg's death benefit. Given
these facts and circumstances, the only matter remaining to be
resolved concerns the mechanics of that resolution.
	 In view of the IMRF's interpleader and presence in this case
as a litigant, we deem it proper and most expedient to consider
done that which ought to have been done. As the appellate court
ordered, summary judgment should be entered in favor of Nancy
Smithberg.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.