Title: STATE v HENRICH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12075 I N THE SUPRME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1973 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - JERALENE HENRICH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John L. Adams argued, Billings, Montana Amicus Curiae David J. Pa.tterson argued, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Jonathan B. Smith argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Harold F, Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana, Submitted: March 27, 1973 Filed :APR 2 4 1 9 7 3 Decided : 2 4 1973 M r , Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court, This i s an appeal from a f i n a l order of the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court entered on November 16, 1972, i n Deer Lodge, Montana, Defendant, Jeralene Kye Henrich, was convicted by a jury i n the d i s t r i c t court of Yellowstone County on March 5, 1971, of the crime of manslaughter i n connection with the death of her two year old stepson, Carl William Henrich, Jr. On March 19, 1971, the d i s t r i c t court imposed a sentence of two years t o be sewed i n the Montana State prison a t Deer Lodge, Montana, with the l a s t year of the sentence suspended. This Court, on June 8, 1972, affirmed that conviction. State v. Henrich, 159 Mont. 365, 498 P.2d 124, 29 %.Rep, 445, Although t h i s Court has power t o modify sentences under section 95-2426, R.C.M, 1947, no issue was raised a s t o sentence on appeal and t h i s Court did not consider the matter. After affirmance of the judgment, defendant through counsel applied for review of the sentence by the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme Court under the provisions of section 95-2502, Defendant was a t a l l times represented by counsel and her case was reviewed by three d i s t r i c t judges s i t t i n g a s the Sentence Review Division. Their decision and order provides i n pertinent part: "The sentence be increased t o a term of five (5) years, 11 This court can see no therapeutic value t o the sentence a s it now stands, W e f e e l the defendant i s i n need of extensive treatment and care, The best way t o achieve t h i s would be t o increase the sentence t o allow the defendant t o receive the necessary treatment, guidance and training. 11 From that decision and order defendant brings t h i s appeal, petitioning t h i s Court t o vacate the sentence of the Sentence Review Division. In addition to being represented by her own counsel, a representative of the Montana Defender Project, Professor David J. Patterson of the University of Montana School of Law, was granted leave by this Court to file Brief Amici and argue orally an behalf of defendant, Jeralene Kye Henrich. The decision and order of the Sentence Review Division was made pursuant to provisions of section 95-2503, R , C . M . 1947, which provides in pertinent part: "The review division shall, in each case in which an application for review is filed in accordance with 95-2502, review the judgment so far as it re- lates to the sentence imposed, either increasing or decreasing the penalty, and any-other sentence imposed on the person at the same time, and may order such different sentence or sentences to be imposed as could have been imposed at the time of the imposition of the sentence under review, or may decide that the sentence under review should stand. * * * Time served on the sentence reviewed shall be deemed to have been served on the sentence substituted. The decision of the review division in each case shall be final and the reasons for such decision shall be stated therein, 11 (Emphasis added.) That the provisions of section 95-2503, R . C . M . 1947, grant to the Sentence Review Division the authority to increase as well as decrease sentences previously imposed is not challenged by either defendant or amicus. The issues presented on appeal concern the constitutionality of the statute and the action taken by the sentence review board. They contend that increasing defendant's previously imposed sentence is a violation of pro- tections granted under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 111, See, 27, of the Montana Constitution. Arguments presented encompass the three general legal principles of "double j eopardy" , "due process of law" and "equal protection of law". Section 95-2503, R.C.M, 1947, was enacted in 1967 and is identical, for purposes of this appeal, to section 51-196, General Statutes of Connecticut, The validity of the Connecticut statute was challenged in 1962 in Kohlfuss v . Warden of Connecticut State Prison, 149 Conn.692, 183 A.2d 626, 628, cert,den. 371 U.S, 928, 83 Sect. 298, 9 L ed 2d 235. There, petitioner Kohlfuss was convicted of robbery and sentenced and thereafter applied for sentence review, The sentence review court increased h i s sen- tence from two t o seven years, t o three t o seven years. The Connecticut Supreme Court i n upholding the sentence increase said : "The prohibition against double jeopardy has been stated t o mean, fundamentally, that no person shall be twice t r i e d and punished for the same offense. [Citing cases]. In the federal courts, it has been held t o be double jeopardy, and therefore violative of the f i f t h amendment t o the federal constitution, for a t r i a l court on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e t o increase the penalty once the execution of a valid sentence has begun. [Citing cases], Where, however, the con- victed person himself i n i t i a t e s further proceedings and they r e s u l t i n a heavier penalty, the federal courts do not hold it t o be double jeopardy, [Citing cases]" * * *, he jeopardy, so f a r as the sentence i s concerned, is a single, continuing one, and any change i n the sentence r e s u l t s from the sentenced person's own voluntary act. [Citing cases]. I I See also: State v. Heyward, 152 Conn. 426, 207 A.2d 730; Anno. 168 ALR 706, 709. Both defendant and amicus r e l y on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U,S. 711, 719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L ed 2d 656, i n support of t h e i r constitutional contentions. In that case, Pearce was convicted of assault with intent t o commit rape and sentenced t o a t e r m of twelve t o fifteen years. That conviction was l a t e r reversed on the ground that an involuntary confession had been used against Pearce, Upon r e t r i a l Pearce was again con- victed and sentenced t o an eight year t e r m , which when added t o the time he had already served i n prison, amounted t o a longer t o t a l sentence than that originally imposed. The United States Supreme Court upheld the federal d i s t r i c t and c i r c u i t courts in reversing the second s t a t e conviction. The United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantee against multiple pun- ishment provided by the double jeopardy clause af the Fifth Amendment requires that punishment already exacted be credited upon resentencing and that the due process clause of the Four- teenth Amendment precludes vindictiveness of a t r i a l judge from playing any part i n a resentencing and consequently affirmative findings must be included t o support an order augmenting the original sentence. Section 95-2503, R.C,M. 1947, specifically provides: I1 Time sewed on the sentence reviewed s h a l l be deemed t o have been served on the sentence sub- stituted." It appears obvious that the rule of Pearce i n t h i s regard has been followed i n the instant case. Section 95-2501, R.C.M. 1947, specifically provides: "No judge s h a l l s i t o r act on a review of sen- tence imposed by him. I I It likewise appears obvious that vindictiveness of the t r i a l judge cannot play a part in resentencing under the Montana sentence review statutes, Section 95-2503, R,C.M. 1947, specifically provides: "The decision of the review division i n each case s h a l l be f i n a l and the reasons for such decision s h a l l be stated therein. I' Although the Sentence Review Division is required by s t a t u t e t o issue a statement of reasons for its action, it appears doubtful that there i s any further requirement imposed under federal constitutional law precedent t o issue any statements or findings. This question was recently considered i n Robinson v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 455 F,2d 1172, 1176 (4th C i r . 1972), where that court stated: "The very purpose of sentence review is t o reconsider and reevaluate information bearing an the appropriate- ness of the prisoner's punishment, Ideally, review should quickly follow sentencing, and it is not designed t o examine a defendant's conduct i n the interim, There- fore, the sanction fashioned i n Rearce t o assure due process is inappropriate for sentence review. I t See also: Walsh v, Picard, 446 F.2d 1209 (1st C i r . 1971). The majority opinion i n Pearce l e f t no room f o r doubt as t o the lack of an absolute constitutional bar t o the imposition of an increased sentence upon r e t r i a l , stating: "~ong-established constitutional doctrine makes clear that, beyond the requirement already discussed, [credit for time previously served on the same of- fense], the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconviction. "* * * To hold t o the contrary would be t o cast doubt upon the whole validity of the basic principle enun- ciated i n United States v, Ball, [I63 U.S, 662, 16 Sect. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 3003, and upon the unbroken l i n e of deci- sions that have followed that principle for almost 75 years, W e think those decisions a r e entirely sound, and we decline t o depart from the concept they reflect. I1 The other argument advanced i n support of the propo- s i t i o n that the Constitution absolutely forbids the imposition of a more severe sentence on r e t r i a l i s grounded upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- teenth Amendment. * * * The argument, while not lacking i n ingenuity, cannot withstand close examination. * * * It simply cannot be said that a State has invidiously 'classified' those who successfully seek new t r i a l s , any more than that the State has invidiously 'classified' those prisoners whose convictionsare not - s e t aside by denying the members of that group the opportunity t o be acquitted. To f i t the problem of t h i s case i n t o an equal protection framework i s a task too Procrustean t o be rationally accomplished, "We hold, therefore, that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar t o a more severe sentence upon reconvic- tion." (Emphasis added,) Bearing i n mind that the nature of a voluntary legislative created sentence review system is fundamentally different from the constitutionally created right t o appeal criminal convictions, we find no constitutional law precedent established i n Pearce which favors the arguments of amicus with regard t o double jeopardy or equal protection. In State v. Fissette, 159 Mont, 501, 498 P, 2d 1208, 29 St.Rep. 580, t h i s Court recognized that there i s no absolute prohibition upon the imposition of an increased sentence, Concerning the due process argument, it i s contended that the authority conferred upon the Sentence Review Division under section 95-2503, R.C.M. 1947, has a "chilling effect" on prisoners applying for sentence review, except i n the case of those prisoners who have received maximum sentences. However, amicus i n h i s oral argument admitted t h i s is the f i r s t instance in over 300 applica- tions before the Sentence Review Division i n which a sentence has been increased, Amicus also acknowledged i n h i s brief that the state, upon informing defendant of her right of sentence review created under Montana statute, warned her that an increased sen- tence was possible, It should also be noted that in the comment of the Criminal Law Commission published with the applicable statute, it is noted that the sentence may be increased on appeal, In Robinson v . Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 455 F.2d 1172, 1177, the court considered an analogous due process issue in light of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Pearce: "~earce's ruling on due process is, however, not altogether inapplicable to sentence review. Though a state need not provide sentence review, if it does, it may not discourage applications for relief by vindictively imposing harsher sentences on those who exercise their statutory right. The enlightened policy of a legislature cannot be thwarted in this manner by a reviewing court. But there is in this record no suggestion that the state acted vindictively. Robinson has not shown that the 15-year sentence he received on review is excessive when compared to sentences imposed under similar circumstances. Nor does he point to a pattern of increased sentences from which one might infer an intent on the part of review panels to chill applica- tions for relief. t I Pearce stops short of holding the due process clause i m t e d by every increased sentence on retrial. and we believe that its- ruling should not be extended to absolutely prohibit a review panel from imposing an in- creased sentence, We conclude, therefore, that the statute on its face, and as it was applied in this case, does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . 11 In the instant case defendant has not shown her sentence to be excessive or disproportionate; she has shown no indication of malice or vindictiveness toward her; she has shown no pattern of increased sentences imposed by the Sentence Review Division effec- tively chilling applications, Here, we note that there is in Montana a presumption of constitutional validity attendant upon every legislative enactment, State v, Chapman, 152 Mont. 79, 4 4 6 P.2d 709; Parker v . County of Yellowstone, 140 Mont. 538, 374 P . 2 d 328. The burden of demon- strating violation of constitutional principles is incumbent on the petitioner, This burden has not been met. We find the powers conferred on the Sentence Review Division under section 95-2503, R.C.M. 1947, do not violate the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishment provided in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the equal protection clause, or of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; or of due process of law as guaranteed under Article 111, Sec. 27 of the Montana Constitution. We further find the action of the Sentence Review Division in defendant's case was neither malicious, vindictive nor violatgve of her rights. Although the Sentence Review Division is not required by federal or state precedent to issue a statement of findings, it is required by Montana statute to issue reasons. The Sentence Review Division did comply in issuing the statement, hereinabove quoted, concerning the petitioner's need for treatment, guidance and training. As stated in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U,S. 711, 723, 89 Sect. 2072, 23 L ed 2d 656, this action of the Sentence Review Division was: "* * * consonant with the principle, fully approved in Williams v, New York, [337 U,S. 241, 69 Sect, 1079, 93 L Ed 13371, that a State may adopt the 'prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. " The petition is denied and the decision and order of the Sentence Review Division is affirmed, -- /~s#ociate Justices I Hon. Edward T, Dussault, District Judge, sitting fox ~ssocia t e Justice Castles,