Title: Vasquez v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vasquez v. State1999 WY 148990 P.2d 476Case Number: 97-140Decided: 11/16/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MARIO 
VASQUEZ, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Walter Eggers, Assistant Public Defender, representing 
appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      An officer of the 
Wyoming Highway Patrol arrested Mario Vasquez for driving while under the 
influence. The officer handcuffed Vasquez and placed him in the officer's patrol 
car.  After the arrest was 
completed, another officer saw spent handgun shells in the bed of Vasquez's 
truck, searched the passenger compartment and discovered cocaine inside the fuse 
box. Vasquez entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of cocaine 
after the district court denied various motions to suppress an inculpatory 
statement and evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle. The district 
court relied on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), which held that the passenger compartment of a vehicle may be 
searched as a contemporaneous incident to lawful arrest. Today, we must decide 
whether this motor vehicle search was permissible under the search and seizure 
provisions of the Wyoming and Federal Constitutions.

[¶2]      We hold that the 
motor vehicle search was incident to a lawful arrest and, therefore, permitted 
under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as held in Belton. Under 
an independent analysis of the search and seizure provision, Article 1, Section 
4, of our state constitution, we hold that the officer lawfully searched the 
passenger compartment of Vasquez's vehicle because that search and seizure 
provision permits a vehicle search for weapons incident to an arrest when 
reasonable suspicion exists that a vehicle occupant is armed. We hold that the 
district court correctly denied Vasquez's various motions to suppress and affirm 
his conviction.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Vasquez presents 
these issues for our review:

I. Whether the 
district court erred when it denied the appellant's motions to suppress all 
evidence seized because the search of the appellant's truck was 
illegal?

II. Whether the 
district court erred when it denied the appellant's motions to suppress the 
appellant's inadmissible statements to law enforcement?

III. Whether the 
district court erred when it denied the appellant's motions to suppress all 
evidence seized because the traffic stop of the appellant was 
illegal?

The State 
rephrases the issues as:

I. Did the 
district court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the cocaine seized 
during the search of his vehicle?

II. Did the 
district court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the statements he 
made to law enforcement?

FACTS

[¶4]      On June 16, 1996, 
at about 7:45 a.m., the Wyoming Highway Patrol received an anonymous REDDI 
(report every drunk driver immediately) report complaining that a newer model 
green Chevrolet pickup truck with Colorado plates was weaving all over the road 
and had almost hit the reporting person's car as it attempted to pass. It was 
reported that the truck carried three Hispanic males and was traveling 
northbound on Interstate 25 from the Colorado-Wyoming state line. The highway 
patrol officer headed in the reported direction and soon spotted a truck 
matching the description. He followed it and noticed that it was weaving only 
within its own lane; however, it veered towards another vehicle attempting to 
pass it. That vehicle swerved to avoid the green truck and, at that point, the 
officer initiated a stop of the green truck. Vasquez was driving that vehicle 
and was accompanied by two passengers. He smelled strongly of alcohol; after 
conducting field sobriety tests on Vasquez, the officer placed Vasquez under 
arrest for driving while under the influence. Vasquez was handcuffed and placed 
in the officer's patrol car.

[¶5]      Other officers 
arrived at the scene and noticed empty cartridges or casings for bullets in the 
bed and passenger compartment of the pickup truck. The officers removed the 
passengers from the truck and searched them and the truck for weapons. In a fuse 
box located on the left side of the steering wheel in front of the driver, the 
officers found a plastic bag containing a white substance. The officer who 
opened the fuse box testified he believed it was an ashtray large enough to 
contain a pistol. Vasquez was taken to jail and processed without having his 
rights read to him; however, he was not interrogated at the 
scene.

[¶6]      During the 
booking process, the arresting officer asked Vasquez questions about his name, 
social security number and birthdate in order to fill out a book-in sheet. 
Vasquez asked a deputy what the charge was against him. The arresting officer 
told the deputy that Vasquez was charged with driving while under the influence 
and could later be charged with possession of methamphetamine. Vasquez then 
stated that it was cocaine, not methamphetamine, and he was responsible for its 
presence in the truck. The arresting officer then advised Vasquez not to give 
any more information until he had been read his rights. The arresting officer 
and the deputy testified that Vasquez was obviously intoxicated and agitated. 
Upon being informed that Vasquez was under arrest for driving while under the 
influence, the deputy serving as jail custodian asked Vasquez how much he had to 
drink. The deputy also asked whether Vasquez had any drugs on his person. 
Vasquez was never read his Miranda rights by the arresting 
officer.

[¶7]      Later that day, 
agents from the Division of Criminal Investigation attempted to interview 
Vasquez but also gave up because he was intoxicated and agitated. Vasquez 
appeared in court that day on the driving while under the influence charge and 
plead guilty. He contends he completed documents requesting that counsel be 
appointed for him; however, the documents were dated the next day, June 17, 
1996. Although defense counsel disputed the accuracy of this date at the 
suppression hearing, that factual issue was not resolved.

[¶8]      The next morning, 
June 17, 1996, the DCI agents advised Vasquez of his Miranda rights and 
conducted an interview during which Vasquez made inculpatory statements. Vasquez 
testified that he requested counsel at the beginning of the interview; however, 
the DCI agents stated that Vasquez did not make this request until late in the 
interview. On June 17, Vasquez again appeared in court on a possession of 
cocaine charge. Vasquez moved to suppress his statements and the evidence seized 
during the warrantless search of his truck. After a hearing, the motion was 
denied and he entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge and 
filed an appeal. Vasquez served a sentence at the Wyoming Boot Camp in 
Newcastle. The remainder of his sentence was suspended in favor of two years 
supervised probation.

DISCUSSION

Vehicle 
Search

Standard of 
Review

[¶9]      When reviewing an 
order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the findings of the trial court 
regarding the motion to suppress are binding on this Court unless clearly 
erroneous. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079 (1980). Whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in 
violation of constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo. Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 1996).

Federal 
Constitutional Analysis

[¶10]   Vasquez contends that the 
warrantless search of his truck was not conducted within the specific boundaries 
of any exception to the warrant requirement of the state and federal 
constitutions. The State contends that the district court correctly concluded 
that the search of the truck and the removal of the fuse box cover were 
justifiable as a search incident to a lawful arrest. In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682 (Wyo. 1982), this Court recognized and applied the rule from New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), stating that 
when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile. Lopez, 643 P.2d  at 685. Vasquez 
contends this search does not meet the requirements of Belton, and a state 
constitutional analysis does not permit this Court to extend Belton to these 
particular facts.

[¶11]   In this case, it was established 
that after performing field tests upon Vasquez, the arresting officer handcuffed 
him and placed him in the front passenger's seat of the officer's vehicle. A 
second officer arrived while the field tests were being performed and stood by 
the arresting officer's car and later a third officer arrived. Vasquez's two 
passengers remained seated in the truck, and the second and third officers 
approached the truck from the rear. Both officers testified they saw two empty 
gun cartridges or casings in the bed of the truck. Each officer asked the two 
passengers to step out of the truck, handcuffed them and led them away from the 
truck and had them kneel on the ground some distance from the truck. The 
officers then searched the vehicle and discovered the cocaine inside the fuse 
box.

[¶12]   In Belton, a police officer stopped 
a car for a traffic violation and smelled marijuana. On the floor of the 
vehicle, he saw an envelope marked "Supergold," a term he associated with 
marijuana. The officer removed the driver and three passengers, one of whom was 
Belton, from the car and placed them under arrest. He searched each of the 
occupants of the car and then searched the car, where he found a black leather 
jacket in the back seat. He unzipped one of the pockets and discovered cocaine. 
Belton, 453 U.S.  at 455-56, 101 S. Ct.  at 2861-62. The United States Supreme 
Court considered these facts in light of the test formulated in Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), allowing a 
search of the "area within the immediate control of the arrestee." Belton, 453 U.S.  at 460, 101 S. Ct.  at 2864. The Court concluded that courts had found no 
workable definition of this test and stated that

[w]hen a person 
cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual 
situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, 
nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.

Id. at 459-60, 
101 S. Ct.  at 2864.

[¶13]   The Supreme Court determined that a 
straightforward rule that would eliminate "subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions" was required, Belton, 453 U.S.  at 458, 101 S. Ct.  at 2863, and 
held that the search of the vehicle was lawful even though the jacket was not 
accessible to any of the occupants of the car, who could not, therefore, 
retrieve any weapons from the jacket or destroy any contraband which might be 
contained therein. The holding in Belton is as follows:

[W]e hold that 
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.

It follows from 
this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is 
within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. 
Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since 
the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy 
interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the 
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may 
have.

Id. at 460-61, 
101 S. Ct.  at 2864 (citations and footnotes omitted). Belton established that 
arrest justifies the search of a passenger compartment, including any open or 
closed container in it, without consideration of the privacy interest, and the 
validity of the search is not dependent upon the nature of the container. Id. 
This bright-line rule differed from previous decisions by the Supreme Court 
setting a plethora of complex, fact-driven rules potentially applicable to 
automobile probable cause searches; searches of containers found during an 
automobile search; automobile searches incident to arrest; officer safety; 
inventory; and consent searches, but causing difficulty for law enforcement and 
often the judiciary to understand when to apply which rule. Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); Chimel, 395 U.S.  at 763, 89 S. Ct.  at 2040; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1979, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 476, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 2470, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974); South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977); Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333-34, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977); 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 
(1979).

[¶14]   The plurality decision in Robbins 
v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1981), decided 
the same day as Belton, illustrates the uncertainty created by the numerous 
rules for automobile searches. Although factually similar to Belton because the 
occupants were arrested, Robbins considered the applicability of the automobile 
exception in conjunction with the law concerning a closed container search and 
decided it was unconstitutional during the lawful search of the vehicle to open 
two packages wrapped in opaque paper and placed in the vehicle's closed luggage 
compartment. Id. at 428-29, 101 S. Ct.  at 2847.

[¶15]   The next year, Robbins was 
overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), when the Court decided that the automobile exception permitted 
opening closed containers during a warrantless search. The only exception to 
Ross requiring a warrant would be those occasions when, before the search, the 
police believed that a particular container held evidence. That particular 
requirement was disposed of in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573-75, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 188-89, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).

[¶16]   These decisions resulted in 
virtually1 eliminating the "closed container" 
analysis from automobile exception searches and the "area of control" analysis 
from searches incident to arrest. In doing so, the Court has simplified Fourth 
Amendment law regarding automobiles, effectively prohibiting only general 
searches and essentially eliminating the individual's right to the 
constitutional protection of a judicially-issued warrant for almost all 
automobile searches.2 The Supreme Court majority believed 
it was a reasonable construction of the Fourth Amendment to formulate 
bright-line rules. Soon, state courts chose to consider whether this lowering of 
federal constitutional standards was permissible under their own state 
constitutions.

[¶17]   Wyoming considered Belton's 
application in Lopez. A police officer received a report that a tannish-colored 
older car, with no license places and a Casper dealer's tag on the rear end, had 
left the scene of a burglary at a bar. Lopez, 643 P.2d  at 683. He began to 
pursue the vehicle, but could not stop it. Another officer assisted, and the car 
was stopped about forty-five minutes later. The driver matched the description 
of the suspect and was arrested on suspicion of burglary. A search of the car 
produced a rifle stolen from the bar in plain sight on the floor of the driver's 
side. Id. Lopez challenged the rifle's admission into evidence, and this Court 
applied the bright-line rule of Belton, approvingly noting that "the court 
appears to have established an understandable and workable rule with respect to 
the search of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest." Id. at 
685.

[¶18]   The Lopez search could have been 
ruled valid under either a Chimel search incident to arrest for a weapon within 
the arrestee's immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala 
v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this Court deliberately shunned those analyses 
and chose to recognize the Belton rule in response to a federal constitutional 
challenge because of its ease in application. Vasquez has made that same federal 
constitutional challenge and, because this Court has previously applied Belton, 
there is no reason not to apply it to the facts of this case in response to this 
federal constitutional challenge. Under the Federal Constitution, Belton permits 
a search of Vasquez's vehicle, including the fuse box, as a valid search 
incident to a lawful arrest although Vasquez had been removed from the vehicle, 
handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car. Belton, 453 U.S.  at 462-63, 101 S. Ct. 
at 2865; accord, United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Patterson, 993 F.2d 121, 122-23 (6th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 1985); but see United States v. Vasey, 
834 F.2d 782, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1987).

[¶19]   In Lopez, this Court did not, 
however, conduct an independent state constitutional analysis to determine if 
Belton should apply under Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, the search 
and seizure provision. Vasquez contends this state constitutional provision 
should be considered as providing greater protection of individual rights and, 
accordingly, this Court should reject the Belton rule either because his arrest 
and the securing of the other occupants effectively eliminated any threat to the 
officers which necessitated the search for the suspected handgun, or because the 
"ash tray" was not a container which the officer was authorized to 
search.

State 
Constitutional Analysis

[¶20]   The texts of the search and seizure 
provisions in the Wyoming Constitution and the Federal Constitution are 
substantially similar although the Wyoming provision does require an affidavit 
to secure a warrant.

Amendment 4 
SECURITY FROM UNWARRANTABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

[¶21]   The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.

U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.

§ 4. Security 
against search and seizure.

The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing 
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 4.

[¶22]   This Court has stated that the 
affidavit requirement strengthened the state provision because it creates a 
permanent record. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 204, 194 P. 342, 346 (1920). 
This Court's recent search and seizure jurisprudence has not distinguished 
between the two provisions. Vasquez contends that the textual difference and 
history of the state provision suggest it offers greater protection than that 
offered by the federal provision. Since the Belton bright-line rule was 
promulgated, the majority of states have followed it usually without addressing 
applicability under their respective state constitutions. Commonwealth v. White, 
669 A.2d 896, 905 (Pa. 1995) (collecting cases). In the state courts that have 
independently analyzed whether their state provisions provided greater 
protection, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington have not adopted Belton while 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have.3 Those courts rejecting Belton 
generally agree that the search incident to arrest exception is permitted when 
required for the protection of the officer, the preservation of evidence, or 
when it is relevant to the crime for which defendant is being arrested and is 
reasonable in light of all the facts. See White, 669 A.2d  at 906-07. Those 
courts independently analyzing their state constitutions to determine the 
permissible scope of an automobile search incident to the arrest of its driver 
or passengers usually have either a long tradition of such independent analysis 
or have sufficient constitutional history to permit departing from federal 
precedent through principled reasoning.

[¶23]   In the case of Wyoming's search and 
seizure provision, there is little constitutional history available to provide 
clues as to the framers' intent when drafting it. Further hampering our analysis 
is the fact that this Court both initiated and then all but abandoned 
independent analysis of the state constitutional provision during the 1920s and 
1930s and began determining search and seizure issues under the Fourth Amendment 
with strict adherence to United States Supreme Court decisions. This practice 
was essentially required in order to comply with the Supreme Court's expansive 
protection provided to individual rights during the 1960s and 1970s, enforced by 
the Supreme Court's mandate that states comply with its interpretations of the 
minimum Fourth Amendment protections offered or have the exclusionary rule 
imposed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court began reducing 
protection under the Fourth Amendment, producing many fragmented decisions. The 
bright-line rules of Belton and Ross eliminated much of the seemingly 
inconsistent rulings caused by fact-driven analysis and cleared confusion 
concerning automobile search law for law enforcement and the local judiciary. 
The shifting precedent of the Supreme Court from restrictive interpretations to 
Belton's authorization of broad searches freed state courts to return to 
analyzing these issues under their own constitutions, and leading constitutional 
authorities soon began urging independent interpretations for state 
courts.

[¶24]   The issue of whether this Court 
should consider an independent interpretation of the Wyoming Constitution's 
search and seizure provision was answered affirmatively with instructions that a 
litigant must provide a precise, analytically sound approach when advancing an 
argument to independently interpret the state constitution. Dworkin v. L.F.P., 
Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621-24 
(Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). Vasquez analyzes several factors 
recommended in Saldana to advance his argument that the state constitutional 
provision provides greater protection than its federal counterpart. He points 
first to textual differences between the state and federal constitutions and 
constitutional history to justify his greater protection 
argument.

Textual 
Differences

[¶25]   The Wyoming Constitution, drafted 
in 1889, was written to include a "declaration of rights" which included many 
provisions textually either the same or substantially the same as the Federal 
Constitution as well as many provisions which have no counterpart in the Federal 
Constitution. Vasquez theorizes that the drafters "declared" existing, natural 
rights in contrast to the Federal Constitution's bill of rights which confers 
rights not already in existence. He contends this evidence as well as the 
difference in the preamble texts of the two documents suggests Wyoming has 
recognized natural rights, signifying that the framers of the Wyoming 
Constitution held dearly the notion of individual rights and intended to 
strongly limit the scope of governmental intrusion into individual 
rights.

[¶26]   The text of the preamble to the 
Wyoming Constitution differs from the federal constitutional text by referring 
to what some commentators identify as "natural rights" of which the Federal 
Constitution's preamble makes no mention:

We, the people 
of the State of Wyoming, grateful to God for our civil, political and religious 
liberties, and desiring to secure them to ourselves and perpetuate them to our 
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.

No state 
constitutional history exists which would lead us to believe that Wyoming 
initially included individual rights as a strong statement of societal values or 
because it intended to provide greater protection of individual rights. The most 
that can be definitely ascertained from the differences in the constitutional 
histories of the two documents may well be explained by the simple fact that it 
was the prevailing view that protection of individual rights was considered to 
be the province of the state and the federal rights acted only upon the federal 
government, and the Wyoming drafters acted accordingly. Peterson, 27 Wyo. at 
213, 194 P.  at 350. This view prevailed even though the Civil War Amendments 
were clearly intended to operate on the states, and ultimately this view legally 
changed because of the 1961 decision of Mapp v. Ohio.

[¶27]   The authors of the two foremost 
treatises on the Wyoming Constitution's history believe that they have discerned 
an intent by the framers to provide greater protection of citizens' rights. 
Although the Wyoming Declaration of Rights was passed "without rancorous 
debate," there is evidence the framers "endorsed the principle of liberal 
construction of the Declaration of Rights." Robert B. Keiter and Tim Newcomb, 
The Wyoming State Constitution, A Reference Guide 11-12 
(1993).

In the beginning 
of the century, when the Wyoming Supreme Court was composed of former delegates 
to the constitutional convention, the court understood this section to protect 
liberty more stringently than the level of protection provided by the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. That early court adopted the equivalent to 
Miranda rights and the exclusionary rule more than fifty years before the 
federal judiciary followed suit (Maki v. State, [18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334] 
(1911). But now, in the aftermath of the Warren Court's criminal procedure 
rulings, the Wyoming Supreme Court appears to follow federal precedent and 
typically treats this provision as offering no greater protection than does the 
Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 35. 
Liberal construction of state constitutions in the Rocky Mountain Region was the 
prevailing view. Id. at 12 The framers' deep rooted concern for individual 
rights was demonstrated during a debate at the constitutional convention over 
whether it was worth the cost to create and support a supreme court. "Lawyer 
George C. Smith of Rawlins asked: `what is the matter of a few thousand dollars 
compared with the rights of life and liberty.'" T.A. Larsen, History of Wyoming 
248 (1965). It appears that there was little direct history available to the 
authors, and they properly resorted to other sources to competently theorize 
about the framers' intent; however, for our purposes, these textual differences 
do not assist us one way or another in our determination.

[¶28]   Vasquez also contends that the 
simple fact that Article 1, § 4 has different language from the Fourth Amendment 
demonstrates an intent to provide greater protection. Again, we have no way of 
knowing whether this is true, and tend to think that the slight textual 
difference demonstrates little. Nor do we think that had the provisions been 
identical, it would demonstrate an intent that the Wyoming provision provide the 
same protection as the federal provision. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
60-61, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1901-02, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968); Cooper v. California, 
386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S. Ct. 788, 791, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1967); People v. Belton, 
432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982) (recognizing that identical provisions do not mean 
that an independent interpretation is not warranted).

[¶29]   In general, the Wyoming 
Constitution does contain a longer list of rights using more detailed and more 
specific language that positively declares rights in contrast to the Federal 
Constitution's use of prohibitory language. The Wyoming Constitution also 
contains language and rights not provided for in the Federal Constitution. It is 
a unique document, the supreme law of our state, and this is sufficient reason 
to decide that it should be at issue whenever an individual believes a 
constitutionally guaranteed right has been violated. Just as we have done with 
other state constitutional provisions which have no federal counterpart, we 
think that Article 1, § 4 deserves and requires the development of sound 
principles upon which to decide the search and seizure issues arising from state 
law enforcement action despite its federal counterpart and the activity it 
generates for the United States Supreme Court. Development of sound 
constitutional principles on which to decide these issues may lead to decisions 
which parallel the United States Supreme Court; may provide greater protection 
than that Court; or may provide less, in which case the federal law would 
prevail; but whatever the result, a state constitutional analysis is required 
unless a party desires to have an issue decided solely under the Federal 
Constitution.

[¶30]   When a state court independently 
analyzes a state constitutional provision which has a federal counterpart, it 
can address the state issue first; or first decide whether the claim fails under 
the Federal Constitution before addressing the state issue; or decide that 
resolution of the state issue will always parallel the Fourth Amendment 
decisions.4 Our decision requiring an 
independent analysis upon development of sound constitutional principles would 
obviously not be workable under the third choice, and the second choice, or 
interstitial approach, is often criticized as result-oriented. We do not think 
this would necessarily have to be the case; however, the first approach best 
suits our decision that we must further develop our own constitutional 
principles under the state provision by consideration of constitutional theory 
appropriate to this state.

[¶31]   Having decided that the Wyoming 
Constitution's declaration that people "be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" requires an 
independent interpretation regardless of its similarities to or differences from 
the Federal Constitution, we must review this Court's past decisions on the 
provisions in order to analyze the permissible scope of searches, including a 
warrantless, automobile search.

[¶32]   Before examining those decisions, 
however, we must first address State v. Perry, an opinion, later withdrawn, in 
which a majority of this Court ruled that the Wyoming Constitution's search and 
seizure provision, Article 1, § 4, did not permit this Court to follow the 
Belton rule. State v. Perry, 821 P.2d 1273 (Wyo. 1991), withdrawn, Perry v. 
State, 821 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1992). Because Perry was withdrawn, we hold that 
Perry has no precedential value. We would also point out that shortly after 
Perry was withdrawn and before the issue was raised again, this Court ruled that 
state constitutional issues would only be decided by a precise, analytically 
sound approach and advised litigants that unless they advanced such an argument 
to independently interpret the state constitution, this Court would refuse to 
consider the alleged error. Dworkin, 839 P.2d  at 909; Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 
621-24 (Golden, J., concurring). The criteria listed in Saldana are part of an 
analytically sound approach to developing our own constitutional theory 
concerning the rights declared in the Wyoming Constitution, and litigants need 
not restrict their analysis to distinguishing between the state and federal 
constitutions.

Prior 
Interpretations

[¶33]   Beginning in 1920, this Court 
decided search and seizure cases under the state provision with great discussion 
of similar decisions by the United States Supreme Court and other state courts. 
State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342 (1920). It was often noted in various 
ways that adoption of this amendment was not an idle ceremony but the 
cornerstone of constitutions:

This is the 
provision of the Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure which was 
adopted in England to protect against the wrongs which had arisen under what was 
called "General Warrants," was adopted as the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, and appears in all state constitutions in 
slightly varying language.

Id. at 197, 194 P.  at 344-45. Our early decisions understood it to represent "fundamental props 
of English and American liberty of the individual citizen and to be most 
sacredly observed" and meant to restrain the legislature from enacting statutes 
allowing unreasonable search and seizures; to operate upon executives to forbid 
enforcement; and upon the judiciary to denounce as unlawful any unreasonable 
search and seizure. Id. at 198, 194 P.  at 345. This Court said, however, that 

Section 4 of 
Article 1 of our Constitution must necessarily be construed in the light of the 
immemorial usages in connection with the rightful arrest of a defendant. In such 
cases the right of seizure of certain property is incidental to the right of 
arrest. . . . The law is well settled that an officer has the right to search 
the party arrested and take from his person and from his possession property 
reasonably believed to be connected to the crime. . . .

Wiggin v. State, 
28 Wyo. 480, 491, 206 P. 373, 376 (1922). In Wiggin, this Court probed the 
parameters of this exception, ultimately concluding that it need not decide the 
issue; however, it outlined the argument as:

The case before 
us suggests, however, the difficulty encountered by the courts in construing the 
constitutional provisions above quoted, so as to leave on the one hand, 
unimpaired the force and vigor thereof, and on the other hand not abrogate the 
immemorial rights exercised in connection with lawful 
arrests.

Id. at 494, 206 P.  at 377. The limitations of the exception with regard to the search of the 
arrested person were explained in Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 482 (Wyo. 1988) 
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.  at 762-63, 89 S. Ct. at 
2040).

[¶34]   The next few decisions indicated 
that this Court remained willing to recognize exceptions to the search warrant 
requirement, allowing the seizure of property plainly in view in an open field 
away from the home of defendant who had been lawfully arrested upon probable 
cause. State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 239, 231 P. 683, 688 (1924). This Court 
also did not consider that the provision's safeguards would be compromised by 
ruling a violation of the provision was harmless error as happened in State v. 
Crump, 35 Wyo. 41, 51, 246 P. 241, 244 (1926). Crump claimed that it was 
reversible error to admit evidence gained from an illegal search, but this Court 
determined that, where there had not been an adequate objection to the admission 
and the defendant had testified and admitted his possession of illegal liquor, 
the violation would be considered harmless. Id. at 51, 246 P.  at 244. Those 
rulings issued from a standard of review that only unreasonable searches are 
forbidden, and whether or not a search is reasonable is a question of law to be 
decided from all the circumstances of a case whether the search was with or 
without a warrant. George, 32 Wyo. at 239, 231 P.  at 688. This Court did 
consider prosecutorial contentions that a warrantless search was proper because 
the citizen had not resisted it as threatening the constitutional safeguards and 
firmly disposed of the idea that a citizen's peaceful submission to a search 
amounted to a consent. We adopted a clear and convincing standard, defined 
consent as "really voluntary and with a desire to invite search, and not done 
merely to avoid resistance," and then threw out the conviction. Tobin v. State, 
36 Wyo. 368, 374, 255 P. 788, 789 (1927).

[¶35]   Several of this Court's last 
decisions independently interpreting the search and seizure provision arose from 
violations of the federal constitutional prohibition against sale and transport 
of alcohol. The result of that interpretation was recognition that the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement extended to automobiles. We decided that a 
search of an automobile without a warrant cannot be said to be unreasonable 
under all circumstances, and specifically allowed automobile searches when there 
is probable cause for believing that a vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal 
goods and searches incidental to lawful arrest. State v. Kelly, 38 Wyo. 455, 
459-60, 268 P. 571, 572 (1928); State v. Young, 40 Wyo. 508, 281 P. 17 (1929); 
State v. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404, 408, 4 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1931). Munger recognized 
that Wiggin authorized a search incident to a lawful arrest but ruled the 
defendant's arrest was unlawful and reversed his conviction without comment 
about the permissible scope of an automobile search incident to arrest. Munger, 
43 Wyo. at 409, 4 P.2d  at 1095. Kelly, for the first time, recognized that 
automobiles were granted less protection than homes from warrantless searches 
under the Federal Constitution, but held that probable cause must justify a 
warrantless automobile search. Kelly, 38 Wyo. at 458, 268 P.  at 572. That 
distinction was again discussed in Gilkison v. State, 404 P.2d 755 (Wyo. 1965), 
when we confirmed the constitutionality of a game and fish statute allowing 
warrantless automobile searches upon probable cause, noting 
that:

The right to 
search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. 
They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief 
that the contents of the automobile offend against the 
law.

Gilkison, 404 P.2d  at 757-758.

[¶36]   Without specifying whether the 
claim was that the state or the federal provision had been violated, the court's 
next cases clarified that the court followed its early decisions in permitting 
warrantless automobile searches which are reasonable under all of the 
circumstances and followed the United States Supreme Court decisions that, in 
these cases, it did not have to consider whether it is practical to procure a 
search warrant. Whiteley v. State, 418 P.2d 164, 168 (Wyo. 1966); Belondon v. 
City of Casper, 456 P.2d 238, 241 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 927 
(1970). Whiteley was stopped and arrested for burglary. After the arrest, his 
car was searched and several items related to the burglary were recovered. He 
appealed, claiming the search required a warrant, and we upheld it as a 
permissible warrantless automobile search incident to arrest without discussion 
of its scope. Whiteley, 418 P.2d  at 166.5

[¶37]   It was not until 1979 that this 
Court recognized the federal rationale that the inherent mobility of automobiles 
as well as a diminished expectation of privacy involved in the use and 
regulation of automobiles allowed disparate treatment of automobiles as compared 
to other property. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Wyo. 1979). In 
Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899 
(1981), without discussion, this Court held that the provision had a standing 
requirement which must be met as well as a requirement that the claimant must 
have had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. Parkhurst 
decided that a car owner and a passenger had standing and legitimate 
expectations of privacy in a vehicle and its trunk sufficient to permit 
challenge to the search. Id. at 1374.

[¶38]   These past decisions establish that 
Article 1, § 4 allows searches incident to arrest and can be said to allow 
automobile searches because arrestees had possession of it, and the arrest 
authorizes law enforcement to search it for evidence related to the crime. 
Wiggin, 28 Wyo. at 491, 206 P.  at 376. The provision requires, however, that 
searches be reasonable under all of the circumstances. Kelly, 38 Wyo. at 460, 
268 P.  at 572.

[¶39]   In the case of Vasquez, his erratic 
driving permitted an investigatory stop, and the strong smell of alcohol and 
failure of field sobriety tests authorized an arrest for driving while under the 
influence based upon probable cause. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404 -09, 4 P.2d  at 1095. 
The characteristics of a driving while under the influence arrest for suspected 
alcohol intoxication permit a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
for any intoxicant, alcohol or narcotic, as evidence related to the crime of 
driving while under the influence.

[¶40]   We have not considered whether, 
under the state provision, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest 
for automobiles includes containers, and the specific question before us is 
whether the search of the fuse box for evidence related to the crime was 
reasonable under all of the circumstances. The State contends that Belton should 
be adopted as the rule under the state provision. Belton was formulated in 
answer to the specific question whether any privacy right existed for a vehicle 
occupant after arrest which justified limiting the permissible scope of a 
warrantless automobile search and which outweighed the need for national 
uniformity in a clear set of rules that would aid police. Belton clearly offers 
minimal protection against an unreasonable search and seizure in order to 
effectively apply to the vast, national citizenry with which the United States 
Supreme Court must be concerned. Our earliest decisions reveal our willingness 
to recognize exceptions to the warrant requirement for homes, automobiles, and 
other property, and implicitly recognize a Belton-type search without discussion 
of privacy interests or other rationale, but Belton's national citizenry 
rationale does not apply in Wyoming.

[¶41]   The United States Supreme Court and 
other jurisdictions recognize that the rationale for permitting searches 
incident to arrest is to prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons or 
concealing or destroying evidence. See White, 669 A.2d  at 905. A search incident 
to arrest under our state provision for these reasons is reasonable. The 
inherent mobility of automobiles in combination with officer and public safety 
concerns created when a driver or a passenger is arrested are exigent 
circumstances weighing in favor of not restricting the scope, timing, or 
intensity of such a search. In Vasquez's case, as the officers approached the 
vehicle with two passengers seated in it, shell casings in the back alerted them 
to the possibility of a small handgun, and an officer testified it was the 
possibility of the presence of this weapon which led to the search of the 
vehicle and the fuse box. The shell casings and the presence of two adult 
passengers presented an officer safety and a public safety concern which 
permitted a search incident to arrest although Vasquez's arrest had been 
accomplished and he was secure inside a patrol car. It appears from the record 
that the passengers were also arrested and, although we are not told, it would 
seem their arrest created the need for the officers to secure the vehicle if 
left on the roadside. In this particular case, we believe that the arrest 
justified a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and all 
containers in it, open or closed, locked or unlocked, for evidence related to 
the crime and for weapons or contraband which presented an officer or a public 
safety concern.

[¶42]   Is this result a narrower 
application than Belton? We think so. This result eschews a bright-line rule and 
maintains a standard that requires a search be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances as determined by the judiciary, in light of the historical intent 
of our search and seizure provision. Peterson, 27 Wyo. at 204, 194 P.  at 345. It 
will not be common that a search of an automobile incident to arrest will 
violate that provision, and our decision should not raise new concerns for law 
enforcement.

Legality of the 
Traffic Stop

[¶43]   In his next issue, Vasquez contends 
that the traffic stop made by law enforcement violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights against unwarranted search and seizure. Vasquez's argument 
relies on Fourth Amendment decisions and does not advance an argument under the 
state constitution specific to traffic stops, and we will, therefore, decide 
this issue under the Fourth Amendment. He contends that the stop was made on the 
basis of an anonymous tip in violation of Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 
110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990).

[¶44]   We held in McChesney v. State, No. 
97-63, slip op. at 6-7, 9, 1999 WL 918786 at *6-7 (Wyo., Oct. 20, 1999), that, 
usually, an anonymous REDDI tip, by itself, is not sufficiently reliable to 
warrant an investigatory stop. In this case, the REDDI tip described the color, 
make and direction of travel of Vasquez's vehicle, described the occupants, and 
described its erratic driving. McChesney held that "where . . . the informant 
makes no prediction of future behavior indicating `inside information,' the 
investigating officer is required to corroborate the tip in some other fashion, 
usually by observing either a traffic violation or driving indicative of 
impairment." Id. at 6 (citing Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. Ap. 4 
Dist. 1996)).

[¶45]   In this case, the officer did 
observe firsthand an objective manifestation of criminal activity. Olson v. 
State, 698 P.2d 107, 111 (Wyo. 1985). "The intrusiveness of a search or seizure 
will be upheld if it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." 
Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Wyo. 1997). Here, the officer had received 
a report of erratic driving by a pickup truck containing three occupants that 
had veered toward and almost hit the reporting party as it attempted to pass. 
The officer spotted a truck matching that description and observed it weaving 
slightly within its own lane. When it veered towards a passing car, the officer 
had reasonable suspicion of impaired driving ability and initiated a legitimate 
investigatory stop. We find no federal constitutional violation caused by the 
traffic stop.

Denial of Motion 
to Suppress Statements

[¶46]   Finally, Vasquez contends that the 
statements he made on June 16 during "booking" procedures were involuntary and 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and asserts that his statements to DCI agents on June 17 were 
obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.

[¶47]   A trial court's ruling on a motion 
to suppress a statement for involuntariness is reviewed de novo. Simmers v. 
State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Wyo. 1997). Factual findings made by a trial court 
considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Wyo. 1997). Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the credibility 
of the witnesses, and to make the necessary inferences, deductions, and 
conclusions therefrom, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination. Id.

[¶48]   Vasquez contends that the "booking" 
procedure requires defendants to answer questions which violate Miranda. We need 
not address that issue now because this particular statement which he moved to 
suppress was not in response to an officer's question, but was an unsolicited 
voluntary remark made by Vasquez after an officer responded to his query 
regarding the charges against him. Miranda warnings require police to inform an 
accused during custodial interrogation that he may remain silent, that anything 
said may be used against him in court, and that he is entitled to an attorney, 
either retained or appointed. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wyo. 1996). In 
determining whether Miranda was violated, we focus on whether the defendant was 
subjected to "custodial interrogation" before he made statements to the 
officers. Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Wyo. 1997). Interrogation is 
defined as "words or actions on the part of police officers that they should 
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1197. "A statement that is not the product of interrogation or 
compulsion attributable to authorities or some other improper action is 
voluntary and admissible." Id.

[¶49]   Vasquez was in custody at the time 
he made his incriminating statement regarding the cocaine; however, there is no 
evidence that interrogation or compulsion by the officers caused him to make it. 
He asked an officer what the charges against him were; when told the charge was 
driving while under the influence, but that he might be charged later for 
possession of methamphetamine, he voluntarily stated that the substance was 
cocaine. The officer then advised him not to say anything else. The trial court 
correctly ruled this statement was admissible as a voluntary 
statement.

[¶50]   Next, Vasquez claims that his 
appearance in county court on June 16 regarding the driving while under the 
influence charge invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that it 
extended to the possession charge. Consequently, he contends that the officers 
were constitutionally barred from interviewing him on June 17 because he did not 
initiate the interview or waive his right to have counsel present. We will 
assume that Vasquez properly requested the appointment of counsel. The State 
contends that the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is offense specific, and cannot be extended to prospective 
future prosecutions relating to other offenses. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2208, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991). In McNeil, the 
defendant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery and was represented by a 
public defender during a bail hearing. The defendant was visited in jail, waived 
his Miranda rights, and then was questioned about other crimes including a 
murder. He admitted to those crimes and was convicted of them. Pretrial motions 
to suppress his statements were denied, and the decision was upheld on appeal. 
The Supreme Court held that McNeil had invoked his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, but that right is offense specific, and it cannot be invoked once for 
all future prosecutions. McNeil, 501 U.S.  at 175, 111 S. Ct.  at 
2207.

[¶51]   Vasquez invoked a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel for the offense of driving while under the influence. That 
invocation was ineffective for the offense of cocaine possession, and his 
statements were properly admitted. Moreover, McNeil tells us that an invocation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not imply a Miranda right to 
counsel. Id. at 177, 111 S. Ct. 2208. The trial court apparently did not believe 
Vasquez's testimony that he requested counsel at the beginning of the interview; 
that is within the trial court's discretion, and his statements were properly 
admitted.

[¶52]   The conviction is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In Houghton 
v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (1998), cert. granted, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 31 (1998), this Court determined that, under the United States 
Constitution, the automobile exception did not permit the search of the personal 
effects of a passenger or guest without probable cause. On April 5, 1999, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision, holding that police 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger's 
personal belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to 
believe contains contraband. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 
143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).

2 Although 
many would consider the automobile search decisions to be a series of 
bright-line rules, apparently the Court does not as seen in Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d (1996), where the Court 
said:

We 
have long held that the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." 
Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the 
totality of the circumstances.

In 
applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead 
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry.

Id. 
at 421. Robinette held that officers do not need to advise a lawfully detained 
motorist of the right to refuse to consent to an automobile 
search.

3 Rejecting 
Belton: State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. 
Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266-68 (Mass. 1983); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 960 
(N.J. 1994); People v. Blasich, 541 N.E.2d 40, 44-45 (N.Y. 1989); State v. 
Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 37 (Nev. 1993); State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 
(N.D. 1993); State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 114-15 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 862 (1992); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446, 448-49 (Ore. App. 1984); 
Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 908 (Pa. 1995); State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Wash. 1986). Utah applies a "Belton-type analysis" because that 
court has decided that its state constitution provides greater protection than 
the federal search and seizure provision. State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1121 
(Utah App. 1997). Accepting Belton under their own state constitution: State v. 
Waller, 612 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Conn. 1992); State v. Charpentier, 962 P.2d 1033, 
1037 (Idaho 1998); People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ill. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984); State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Iowa 1981); 
State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D. 1982); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 
571 (Wis. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).

4 "There are 
several general models for analyzing and applying the rights provisions in state 
constitutions. The primacy model views the `state constitution as an independent 
source of rights and relies on it as the fundamental law.' The interstitial 
model recognizes the rights afforded by the United States Constitution as 
minimal guarantees and seeks to ascertain if those federal protections are 
supplemented or enhanced by state constitutional provisions. The dual 
sovereignty model evaluates the applicable rights in both state and federal 
constitutions in the context of each case. The lockstep model is premised on the 
proposition that a state constitutional provision with an analogous federal 
counterpart should be construed precisely the same way. Accordingly, `[u]nder 
the lockstep formulation, changes or clarifications of federal law by the United 
States Supreme Court lead to parallel changes in state constitutional law.'" 
Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 Temp. L.Rev. 
989, 1004 (Fall 1996) (footnotes omitted). See also, Robert B. Keiter, An Essay 
on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land and Water L.Rev. 527, 541-550 
(1986).

5 Besides 
addressing the search incident to arrest, Whiteley discussed whether the 
arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest. A justice of the peace 
issued a warrant for Whiteley's arrest and a state police bulletin issued. The 
arrest occurred in another county by an officer acting upon that bulletin. This 
Court determined that the bulletin provided probable cause for arrest. Whiteley, 
418 P.2d  at 167. In Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 
91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the bulletin did not provide probable cause for the arrest and ruled the arrest 
and seizure of the stolen goods were unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶53]   I agree that Vasquez's conviction 
should be affirmed. I do not wish to have my joinder in that result as 
manifesting, to any degree, any recession from my position articulated in my 
dissent in McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1999 WL 918786 (Wyo. 1999). I 
remain steadfast in my view that the anonymous report in this instance would 
have provided the requisite articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory 
stop.

[¶54]   I also add a caveat to the choice 
of pursuing, on an ad hoc basis, an independent state constitutional analysis in 
instances in which the criminal conduct is proscribed by both state and federal 
law. Reality is that, because of the action of Congress in adopting strict 
sentencing guidelines, many violations of the controlled substances statutes are 
taken to federal court in lieu of state court. The adoption of broader 
protections under the Wyoming Constitution in such instances can lead to further 
erosion of State judicial sovereignty in favor of a federalist 
approach.