Title: Kleinschmidt v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kleinschmidt v. State1996 WY 40913 P.2d 438Case Number: 95-88Decided: 03/18/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

CHRISTOPHER KLEINSCHMIDT, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

The STATE of WYOMING, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County 

The 
Honorable Harry E. Leimback, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah 
Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Donna D. Hoffdahl (argued), Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Kimberly A. Baker (argued), Assistant Attorney General. 

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant appeals 
his conviction of first degree sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping and indecent 
liberties with a minor, asserting that he was denied his right to a speedy trial 
and that the court erred by failing to suppress evidence of prior bad 
acts.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant and the 
State identify the following issues:

 

1.         Was 
Appellant denied his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial?

 

2.         Did 
reversible error occur because the District Court did not follow the procedure 
mandated in Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1993)?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In the early 
morning hours of April 27, 1994, the victim, a seventeen-year-old girl, was 
sleeping in her basement bedroom. Awakened by appellant's tapping on her bedroom 
window, the victim recognized appellant as her sister's former boyfriend. 
Appellant asked the victim to come out to his car because he had something for 
her sister. The victim dressed, climbed out of the window and went with 
appellant to his car. Appellant then forced the victim into the car and drove 
her to a nearby park. The victim tried unsuccessfully to escape from appellant 
on two occasions, but each time she was caught and forcibly brought back to the 
car. Ultimately, appellant forced the victim into the car and sexually assaulted 
her.

 

[¶5]      After the 
assault, appellant drove the victim back to her home. There, she woke her sister 
who called 911. The victim was later examined at the hospital. Following a jury 
trial, appellant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, aggravated 
kidnaping and indecent liberties with a minor.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Speedy 
Trial

 

[¶6]      Appellant's trial 
began 123 days after he was arraigned. Appellant urges that he was denied his 
right to a speedy trial, citing McDermott 
v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Wyo. 1995) wherein we stated that W.R.Cr.P. 
48 was mandatory.

 

[¶7]      Rule 48 states in 
pertinent part:

 

(b) Speedy 
trial.

* 
* * * * *

 

(2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial 
within 120 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.

* 
* * * * *

 

(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the 
date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as 
follows:

 

(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; 
or

 

(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the 
court if:

 

(i) The defendant expressly 
consents;

 

(ii) The state's evidence is unavailable and the 
prosecution has exercised due diligence; or

 

(iii) Required in the due administration of justice 
and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; 
and

 

(C) 
If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be 
notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the 
delay may prejudice the defense.

* * * * * *

 

(6) Any criminal case not tried or continued as 
provided in this rule shall be dismissed 120 days after 
arraignment.

 

[¶8]      Appellant failed 
in his argument to address factors important to the resolution of this issue. 
First, the court continued the trial three times within the 120-day period. 
Appellant and his counsel were timely notified of each continuance, and no 
objection was posed to any extension. Second, appellant filed no request for a 
speedy trial within the 120-day period. Pursuant to Rule 48(b)(2) and (4)(C), 
there was no violation of speedy trial. The court continued the matter after 
notification to appellant and absent any objection.

 

[¶9]      Less than 
vigorous assertions of the right to a speedy trial are given little weight. Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Wyo. 
1995). Accordingly, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48, this action could have been 
dismissed on the 120th day, refiled and a new 120-day period been afforded from 
the time of arraignment on the refiled charges. We acknowledge that this type of 
claim based solely on W.R.Cr.P. 48 would be afforded little weight if the trial 
court would place on the record the reason for the continuance beyond the 
120-day period. Technically, however, the formal action is not required so long 
as a defendant is notified of the proposed continuance and does not object in 
writing.

 

[¶10]   It is clear from the record that 
the final continuance resulted in starting the trial on a Monday, the 123rd day, 
rather than Friday, the 120th day. With no objection from appellant that the 
continuance would be prejudicial, it is clear that the continuance was required 
by the court in the due administration of justice. As we stated in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 
(Wyo. 1996), W.R.Cr.P. 48 does not fully cover the concerns which may be raised 
by a constitutional speedy trial claim. It is possible for a defendant to be 
tried within the time limits of Rule 48 and yet suffer a constitutional 
deprivation due to delay which can be shown to have seriously prejudiced his 
defense. Moreover, it would seem illogical to view the 120-day time limit of the 
rule as, in itself, constitutionally mandatory when an appellate court may 
extend that deadline or when the State is permitted to refile charges and thus 
proceed with a prosecution pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(6). Rule 48 therefore 
addresses only part of any constitutional speedy trial 
question.

 

[¶11]   In this appeal, we find that Rule 
48 was not violated and further that appellant has failed to allege factors to 
be considered in an evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim as set 
forth in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo. 1972).

 

Prior Bad 
Acts

 

[¶12]   The State filed a Notice of Intent 
to offer evidence of prior acts or misconduct of appellant pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b). At a Motion to Suppress hearing, the State informed the court that the 
evidence would not be used in its case in chief, but only in the event appellant 
chose to testify. The court did not articulate the five-part test set out in Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 (Wyo. 
1993). The basis of the court's ruling was that the purpose of the proposed 
evidence went to the credibility of appellant in the event he chose to testify. 
Appellant, however, did not testify; and the evidence was not introduced. 
Appellant asserts that because of the court's ruling, he was effectively 
estopped from taking the stand for fear that the evidence would be used against 
him.

 

[¶13]   This court has recognized that "in 
cases involving sexual misconduct[,] prior conduct consisting of bad acts is of 
increased pertinency." Carey v. 
State, 715 P.2d 244, 248 (Wyo. 1986). Consequently, the court has permitted 
the use of prior bad acts evidence on cross-examination or as rebuttal evidence 
that would otherwise not be admissible in the State's case in chief. Id. When the accused claims consent, 
"evidence which contradicts his denials of previous use of force in sexual 
encounters is of assistance to the trier of fact in evaluating his * * * 
credibility." Id.

 

[¶14]   To the extent appellant's testimony 
would have alleged he had never forced a woman to have sex, the State would have 
been entitled to rebut with evidence to the contrary, pursuant to W.R.E. 405. Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 655 (Wyo. 
1993). The court's ruling did not estop appellant from taking the stand. It did 
no more than provisionally allow the admission of the evidence if appellant 
testified in such a manner as to make W.R.E. 404(a)(1) and W.R.E. 405 
applicable.

 

[¶15]   The evidence was therefore not 
going to be introduced pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), and it was not introduced at 
trial. Accordingly, the court's failure to apply the Dean factors is not 
error.

 

[¶16]   Affirmed. 

 

MACY, Justice, specially concurring. 

[¶17]   Once again, I agree with the 
majority, but I am compelled to write separately because I believe that the 
constitutional analysis established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), which we adopted in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 
(Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973), should no longer be utilized by this 
Court in deciding speedy trial issues. It is my opinion that W.R.C.P. 48 
dispositively addresses the circumstances which are present in this case and 
that the majority should have limited its discussion 
accordingly.

 

[¶18]   I have thoroughly explained my 
position in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1996) (Macy, J., specially concurring), and Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1038 (Wyo. 
1995) (Macy, J., specially concurring). I find that the sentiments in those 
specially concurring opinions are appropriate to this case and adopt them 
herein.