Title: Monn v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Monn v. State1991 WY 82811 P.2d 1004Case Number: 90-117Decided: 05/24/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Curtis Leslie MONN, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Leonard Munker, State 
Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, and 
Christopher H. Hawks (argued), Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Sylvia A. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Theodore E. Lauer, Prosecution Assistance Program, and Lee F. Jantzen (argued) 
Student Intern, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Curtis Monn 
was convicted of incest, taking indecent liberties with a minor, and second 
degree sexual assault. The issue he presents is whether the State, by 
examination of his wife in eliciting her testimony, improperly put into evidence 
statements his wife gave to an investigator. Because no challenge to the 
testimony was made at trial in the form of a proper objection, we examine this 
case under the plain error doctrine.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     Monn states the 
issue:

"Whether by allowing the 
recorded statement of previously convicted witness Sarah Monn to be read into 
evidence the trial court erred and allowed otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
statements to be read into evidence before the jury thus violating appellant's 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation."

[¶4.]     Appellant's convictions 
arose from incidents with his daughter, PP, in 1984 and with his step-daughter, 
CGM, from 1987 to 1989. The daughter, PP, was 15 years old when the sexual 
assault occurred. The sexual assaults against the step-daughter, CGM, began when 
she was in the third grade and occurred daily.

[¶5.]     At trial, both victims 
testified in detail about Monn's sexual assaults and indecent acts. CGM 
testified that she was required to sleep with her stepfather Monn and her mother 
Sarah. She was not allowed to wear underwear to bed. Monn wore only a t-shirt. 
CGM identified various sexual paraphernalia and described how Monn would use 
them on her or force her to use them on her mother. She testified that Monn 
touched her with his penis on her vagina, anus and mouth. She testified that she 
saw Monn ejaculate and that he had ejaculated into her mouth. Evidence also 
showed that CGM, Monn, and Sarah Monn had Gardnerella or bacterial vaginitis, a 
disease sexually transmitted, and that CGM had an enlarged vagina consistent 
with penetration by an adult male.

[¶6.]     PP, Monn's daughter, 
testified that she went to live with Monn in January of 1984. She was forced to 
sleep naked with Monn and her stepmother Sarah. Monn forced PP to have oral sex 
and intercourse with him. She left the house the first chance she had which was 
a few days later. During May 1989, PP informed the NatronaCounty sheriff's office that appellant 
might be engaging in a sexual relationship with his ten-year-old 
stepdaughter.

[¶7.]     On May 11, 1989, Sarah 
Monn gave a sheriff's investigator a statement recounting the sordid details of 
Monn's sexual abuse, assaults, incest and intercourse with these young girls. 
Ten days before trial, Sarah Monn met with the prosecuting attorney and reviewed 
and reaffirmed her statement preparatory to trial and testifying. And so Sarah 
Monn was also called as a witness for the State. She testified that she had been 
imprisoned for incest. She testified that PP had slept in bed with Monn and 
herself. Then her memory began to fade. To some questions concerning sexual 
activity she responded by saying she could not remember; to other questions she 
responded without equivocation, sometimes contrary to the statement she gave to 
the sheriff's investigator. For example, she denied that a vibrator was used for 
sexual purposes. About CGM being told "not to say anything," when asked what CGM 
said "besides it hurt," Sarah Monn, contrary to her statement, said she did not 
know. She denied anything else occurred, then admitted appellant "made her [CGM] 
get down there by my vagina and lick it * * *." When asked about the last time 
anything happened, she said she did not know, then related the time. She stated 
that she never touched CGM in a sexual manner nor had CGM touched her in a 
sexual manner, which was inconsistent with her prior statement. The State's 
attorney undertook to impeach the witness with her prior inconsistent statements 
or to refresh her recollection by questioning her about the statements she made 
to a NatronaCounty sheriff's 
investigator on May 11, 1989. In response to the prosecuting attorney's 
questioning, Sarah Monn read the answers to questions from her statement. Her 
answers were that she had seen Monn use the vibrator on CGM, and CGM had been 
forced to use the vibrator on her; that Monn promised CGM candy for engaging in 
sexual acts; and that the sexual acts hurt CGM.

[¶8.]     The only objection 
interposed by Monn's counsel during Sarah Monn's testimony was the 
following:

     "Q. [By the State]: 
Why don't you go ahead and read the rest, if you don't remember it, following 
that what [sheriff's investigator] said?

     "[Monn's counsel]: 
Objection, I am not sure what the question is. Counsel is just going to have her 
read.

     "[The State]: I am 
sorry, it is on the same line of questioning and what did she say, referring to 
[CGM] when she said it hurt. What did she say?"

 

This objection was 
inadequate to draw the court's attention to a possible hearsay problem. 
United 
States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1465 n. 14 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Due to the absence of an objection adequate to alert the trial 
court to a problem, the admission of this hearsay must rise to plain error 
before it will be considered by this court. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 
(Wyo. 1986); 
W.R.E. 103(d); W.R.A.P. 7.05; W.R.Cr.P. 49(b).

[¶9.]     To invoke the plain 
error doctrine, three elements must be established. First, the record must 
clearly show what occurred at the trial without resort to speculation. Second, 
the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been violated in 
an obvious way. Third, this violation must have adversely affected some 
substantial right of the accused. McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 971 
(Wyo. 
1989).

[¶10.]  We question that even the first element 
of our plain error doctrine is satisfied, in that what occurred at trial is 
often not clearly shown. Thus, while the prosecutor's questions and witness 
Sarah Monn's answers clearly appear in the record, it is often unclear whether 
the witness was answering the question from her own knowledge and memory, was 
answering on the basis of refreshed memory, or was reading her answer from her 
transcribed prior statement which she had before her. The record does 
demonstrate that Sarah Monn was an uncooperative witness who either did not 
remember certain events or who blatantly testified falsely that she did not 
remember statements she had reviewed and affirmed with the prosecuting attorney 
just ten days earlier. She also testified, contrary to her statement, that no 
sexual activity involving the victims took place. Her statements to the 
investigator were used in her examination as prior inconsistent statements, for 
impeachment, as affecting her credibility, and to refresh her 
recollection.

[¶11.]  We cannot conclude that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated in an obvious way as required by the second 
element of our plain error doctrine. Appellant argues that Sarah Monn's 
statements to the sheriff's investigator were hearsay and the State did not meet 
the requirement for admitting the statement under the past recollection recorded 
exception. W.R.E. 803(5). However, Sarah Monn did not simply state she could not 
remember anything; she also denied certain sexual activity which was 
inconsistent with her statements to the sheriff's investigator. Inconsistent 
statements may be found in evasive answers, the inability to recall, silence, or 
changes of position. United 
States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 795 (8th Cir. 
1980). Except for silence, Sarah Monn's testimony is characterized by these 
types of responses. Prior inconsistent statements are admissible under W.R.E. 
613(b):

"(b) Extrinsic evidence 
of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite 
party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of 
justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a 
party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2)."

[¶12.]  Sarah Monn did attempt to explain the 
statements by claiming to have made them under stress. Monn's counsel 
interrogated Sarah Monn concerning these statements on cross-examination. We 
cannot say that had Monn's counsel properly brought the issue before the court, 
he would have not been afforded the opportunity to interrogate Sarah Monn before 
the statements were read. Thus, we cannot say on the basis of the record that 
the requirements of W.R.E. 613(b) were not met.

[¶13.]  Lastly, appellant's claim that the trial 
court erroneously permitted the State to put Sarah Monn's prior statement in 
evidence pursuant to a hearsay exception in W.R.E. 803(5) must fail. Some 
authority does exist to suggest that past recollections may be admissible under 
the 803(5) exception when the credibility of a witness's lack of memory is 
questionable. United States 
v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 841, 99 S. Ct. 131, 58 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1978); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 841, 91 S. Ct. 83, 27 L. Ed. 2d 76 
(1970). This statement, however, was never offered into evidence pursuant to 
W.R.E. 803(5), and the requirements of the rule never became a requirement in 
this case.

[¶14.]  We cannot conclude that the use of Sarah 
Monn's statements to the sheriff's investigator resulted in a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law. Finally, we are comfortable in finding that 
whatever occurred did not affect a substantial right of the accused. Sarah 
Monn's testimony was confusing at best. Only a very bold person would undertake 
to say what effect it may have had upon the jury. But more significantly, there 
was ample other evidence from which the jury found that appellant had committed 
the crimes of which he was found guilty. PP testified clearly and unequivocally 
that appellant had taken sexual advantage of her when she was 15 years old. CGM 
testified at length about appellant's sexual aggression toward her. She 
testified graphically as to the different tactics appellant used to molest her 
sexually. Her testimony was corroborated by that of nurse Kenna Holman 
concerning the existence of a sexually transmitted disease in appellant, Sarah 
Monn, and CGM. Her testimony of sexual assault was also corroborated by Dr. 
Joanne Hedgecock's testimony that CGM's vaginal opening was abnormally large, 
consistent with penetration by an adult male, and that CGM's vaginal disease 
could, to her knowledge, only be transmitted through sexual intercourse. There 
was not plain error in the examination of Sarah Monn, nor was there prejudicial 
error in the trial of this case.

[¶15.]  Affirmed.

CARDINE, 
J., 
concurs.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶16.]  I am compelled now to proceed with a 
discussion of the inappropriate, improper, and unjustified appellate approach to 
this case in the dissent and to discuss the propriety of going outside the 
appellate record for evidence and facts, the incorrect statements and 
application of law, and the unwarranted attacks upon counsel and the 
court.

[¶17.]  Footnote 2 of the dissenting opinion 
informs us that the dissenting justice has ex parte gone outside the record on 
appeal and taken "judicial notice" of "[t]he criminal file of State v. Sarah 
Monn, Docket No. 40806, Natrona County, Wyoming * * * including specifically the 
prosecution and district court * * *." W.R.E. 201 provides that "[a] court may 
take judicial notice * * *." This "court" has never taken judicial notice of 
matters which the dissent identifies, and I do not believe each justice is 
privileged to separately undertake his own expansion of a record on 
appeal.

[¶18.]  Even more unprecedented is the fact that 
the specific documents which were judicially noticed are not presented, 
identified, marked as exhibits or made part of the record. We were informed that 
because information "was only a telephone call away," that the dissenting 
justice effected this judicial notice by telephone - so we have now in this case 
telephonic judicial notice. But what records were noticed and how - with whom 
was the telephone discussion? The actual summary in footnote 2 may be accurate 
or inaccurate. We do not know. The dissenting justice went outside the record, 
ex parte - without informing either counsel - and by telephone he developed his 
own facts, conducted his own investigation, and added his own development of 
facts to this appellate record. In Lawn v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 339, 354, 78 S. Ct. 311, 320, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 
(1958), the United 
States Supreme Court stated: "[The court] must 
look only to the certified record in deciding questions presented."

[¶19.]  In Brown v. Sutton, 158 Miss. 78, 121 So. 835, 
837 (1929), the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated:

"It follows that this 
court has no power to alter, amend or correct the records of trial courts in 
respect to the contents or recitals of those records. * * *

"It follows further that 
this court acts and must act only on the record as it is certified to us by the 
clerk of the trial court."

Evidence outside the 
record does not become part of the appellate record unless made so pursuant to 
rule in some regular proceeding. Suydam v. Williamson, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 
427, 15 L. Ed. 978 (1858). Records and evidence in another case cannot be 
considered by an appellate court unless introduced in evidence or made part of 
the record in some judicial proceeding. Damon v. Damon, 312 Mass. 268, 44 N.E.2d 657, 
143 A.L.R. 463 (1942). A telephone call does not satisfy the requirements of 
this rule. In addition, what occurred here was ex parte, i.e., without notice to 
any counsel, let alone one counsel.

[¶20.]  In Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 343-44 
(Wyo. 1986), 
Justice Urbigkit, writing for a unanimous court, said:

"Subsection (d) [W.R.E. 
201] also operates to limit judicial notice in that it provides the opportunity 
for a party to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed.

"Concerning this 
opportunity for notice, Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 58, p. 449 
(1977) states:

"`* * * The question 
always to be answered is whether the court has in fact embodied in its findings 
or opinion an adjudicative fact not found in or supported by the formal evidence 
in the case, and if so, whether the fact in question is a fact properly 
noticeable.'

* * * * * *

"`A major risk when 
the trial judge resorts to outside sources to verify facts is that he may choose 
to decide the whole dispute on the basis of his own independent research. * * * 
[S]uch procedure should be discouraged, at least until the parties are given 
ample opportunity to examine the sources in question before the judge formulates 
his own opinions and to present arguments upon the meaning of such sources and 
suggest additional sources.'" (emphasis added)

[¶21.]  A judicial proceeding is said to be "ex 
parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one 
party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely 
interested." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 517 (5th ed. 1979). An ex parte 
investigation is "[a]n investigation conducted about a person who is not 
personally contacted or questioned." Id. at p. 517. The telephone call to develop 
facts here was clearly not in accordance with established law, was 
inappropriate, and was ex parte.

[¶22.]  The balance of the dissent concerns the 
testimony of a witness (not a party), the witness Sarah Monn. Sarah had pled 
guilty to a sexual assault crime arising out of the same incidents for which 
appellant was on trial. She was sentenced, probably as a result of a favorable 
plea bargain, to two to four years and, at the time of trial, was serving her 
sentence at the women's prison at Lusk, Wyoming.

[¶23.]  The dissent complains that:

"Nothing in the record 
reveals an effort by defense counsel to learn whether a statement existed or 
whether its introduction might be attempted. There was the statement and even a 
subsequent interview by the prosecuting attorney with the witness, but no 
preliminary objection to introduction was raised nor was any Denno hearing on 
admissibility conducted." (emphasis in original) Dis. op. at p. 
1013.

It is not surprising that 
the record reveals nothing about defense counsel learning of the existence of a 
statement. It never does. Efforts to know of a statement are not evidence; 
defense counsel does not testify. Nor is it surprising there was no "Denno" 
hearing with respect to this witness' statement. She is a witness - not a 
defendant. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1783, 
12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964), provides that:

"A defendant 
objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in 
which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession 
are actually and reliably determined." (emphasis added) Sarah Monn was a 
witness. Often there are 15 to 20 witnesses in a trial. Were a Denno hearing 
required upon the statement of each witness, the trial would become a 
cumbersome, never-ending circus.

[¶24.]  Next it is said:

"The statement was 
neither marked for identification at trial nor tendered for introduction into 
evidence." Dis. op. at p. 1013. Again, not surprising. There is no rule of 
evidence that requires an attorney to mark and tender anything into evidence. 
What evidence and exhibits should be offered has always been left to trial 
counsel who decides how best to present and try his case.

[¶25.]  Next it is said:

"What we do not know is 
whether Sarah Monn was ever given a Miranda warning before her statements were 
obtained and specifically what assistance of counsel she had been provided 
before or after criminal charges had been filed against her." Dis. op. at p. 
1014.

Whether Sarah Monn was 
given Miranda warnings is simply immaterial in this case. She is only a witness. 
Miranda warnings are not required before a statement, given by a witness, is 
utilized. And if a Miranda warning was material to the charge filed against 
Sarah in the State's case against her, it was waived by her favorable plea 
bargain and guilty plea. So the fact is the Miranda warning requirement is not 
now relevant or material in either case.

[¶26.]  Next it is said:

"What distresses me about 
this record is the abject failure at this trial to provide Sarah Monn the 
opportunity to have the assistance of counsel which she needed to avoid 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11, or to 
advise her about the privilege held by a wife not to testify against her husband 
under the statute." (emphasis in original) Dis. op. at p. 1014.

It was unnecessary to 
advise her of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because 
she could not incriminate herself. She had already pled guilty to a criminal 
activity arising out of this incident. Double jeopardy would prevent her from 
being charged again. And this court has said clearly and succinctly that the 
wife's privilege not to testify against her husband does not exist in a child 
abuse case. We have said in Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1978):

     "In Chamberlain v. 
State, Wyo., 348 P.2d 280 (1960), we held that it is within the purview of our 
statute [§ 1-142, supra (now W.S. 1-12-104)] that the wife be permitted to 
testify where she has suffered a special, particular and personal wrong through 
the rapacious assault upon her child. We reasoned that cases in which there is a 
wrong against the child of the wife fall within the § 1-142 exception applicable 
to `criminal proceedings for a crime committed by one [spouse] against the 
other' * * *. If we abandoned the construction placed on § 1-142, supra, in 
Chamberlain, we would encourage defendants to silence their spouses in 
child-abuse or child-homicide cases. This is not the policy of this 
State."

[¶27.]  Next it is stated that "[t]his case 
provides neither impeachment nor refreshed recollection." Dis.op. at p. 1014. 
The essence of the claim is that one who says "I don't remember" may not be 
impeached. Again, a surprising contention. Suppose she is lying when she says 
she cannot remember. Surely the state attorney can impeach her by showing she is 
lying. The transcript of testimony attached to the dissent demonstrates 
precisely that. For example, see the following questions and 
answers:

     "Q. Do you remember 
anything happening while she was sleeping in your bed?

     "A. Not 
really.

     "Q. Do you remember 
giving a statement before that you remember something happening?

     "A. I don't 
remember.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Didn't you call 
[Investigator] and tell him what was going on in your house?

     "A. No, I don't, I 
didn't call him, I had talked to somebody else.

     "Q. Didn't you call * 
* * at DPASS? 

     "A. Yes, I talked to 
[DPASS personnel].

     "Q. And you told her 
that you had information for her about things that were going on in your 
house?

     "A. Things that I 
thought were going on.

     "Q. In fact things 
that you were involved in?

     "A. Yes.

* * * * * *

     "Q. Didn't you give a 
factual basis to an incest charge that you did those things?

     "A. I possibly 
did.

     "Q. Isn't it true that 
when these things were going on in your house, Curtis was also present with you 
and your daughter?

     "A. 
Possibly.

     "Q. And isn't it true 
that you saw Curtis Monn and [Curtis's daughter] sexually engaged?

     "A. I can't say that I 
remember that.

     "Q. Again did you or did you 
not give a statement to Investigator * * * and myself about that 
incident?

     "A. I don't remember 
giving you a statement.

     "Q. Did you in 
response to a question tell me that?

     "A. I may 
have."

[¶28.]  From the whole of her testimony, it is 
apparent that she discussed the case with appellant a few days before trial, 
that she is lying when she says she does not remember, and that she attempted to 
influence her daughter's testimony. Thus, she testified:

"Q. Isn't it true that 
you have been in contact with him [defendant] the last several days?

     "A. Very good 
possibility, yeah.

      "Q. And isn't it 
true that you wrote a letter to your daughter just recently?

     "A. Yes, I probably 
did.

     "Q. In that letter 
didn't you tell her that if she testified Daddy would go away?

     "A. Telling her the 
truth, apparently you didn't take into consideration what else I said to her, 
did you, I would be happy to tell everybody unless there is something you want 
to hide from it."

Then the letter was read 
to the jury. An excerpt from that letter follows:

"Now I hear [the 
Investigator] talked to you about daddy. He said you wanted to tell everyone 
what daddy did. You know, if daddy goes to jail, you, [other daughter] and momma 
[sic] won't be able to ever see or talk to him ever again. Do you really want 
that to happen[?]"

[¶29.]  The dissent objects that "[t]he 
prosecutor was relentless in ignoring her claim that she did not remember giving 
the prior statement." Dis. op. at p. 1015. The dissent is correct; he was 
relentless, and he should have been relentless. A trial is a search for the 
truth. The truth in this case is that this lady knew exactly what appellant had 
done to these girls and she tried to hide behind, "I don't 
remember."

[¶30.]  Next it is stated:

"Defense counsel at trial 
and this court in opinion disregard without reference Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145 (Wyo. 1979), which clearly determined the scope of admissibility of the 
proffered testimony here even if it had been done right and then, if a 
limited instruction would have been given, states that `[t]he prior statement of 
this witness does not qualify for substantive use to prove a fact but only for 
the limited purpose of impeachment.' Id. at 1149-50. Without citing authority, we 
now sub rosa overrule Channel, adopt a minority rule without discussion or 
citation of authority and confuse both the law of refreshed recollection and of 
impeachment." (emphasis in original) Dis. op. at p. 1014.

This case does not 
overrule Channel nor adopt a minority rule. In Channel, defense counsel 
requested a limiting instruction. It was refused. That was error. In this case, 
there was no request for a limiting instruction. If requested, it would have 
been given. Thus, there was no error.

[¶31.]  Finally, there are the continuing, 
appalling attacks on trial and appellate counsel found in the following 
statement in the dissent:

"Complete preclusive 
ineffectiveness in trial preparation and presentation existed and is not 
presented for this appeal by the appellate student defender counsel in appellate 
brief writing and, consequently, the majority safely justifies what occurred at 
trial by absolution and resolution of plain error incantation. Lozano v. State, 
751 P.2d 1326 (Wyo. 1988); Schmunk v. State, 
714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986); Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150 (Wyo. 1978)." Dis. op. at p. 1014.

[¶32.]  I found the brief of appellate defense 
counsel superior in research, writing and scholarship. Presentation of argument 
was far above average. Professor Gerald Gallivan, for whom I have utmost 
respect, is director of the student defender program, and supervises research 
and preparation of brief and argument and was present at counsel table for oral 
argument. Both trial and appellate counsel did an admirable job representing 
this appellant in a case in which there was not much with which to defend. Even 
the dissent recognizes this fact when it begins by stating "[t]his case presents 
a sordid scene of parental sexual abuse and misconduct with their children," 
dis. op. at p. 1011, and concludes by stating "[n]o matter how reasonably 
assured conviction might have been * * *." Dis. op. at p. 1016. If the 
conviction was reasonably assured, then at least we ought to accept that what 
occurred at trial was not prejudicial, i.e., its absence would not change the 
outcome or result in an acquittal, and there was no error.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶33.]  This case presents a sordid scene of 
parental sexual abuse and misconduct with their children. As punishment for her 
participation, the mother was sentenced to a term in the Wyoming Women's Center. 
The father, appellant, was sentenced to a term of six to eight years for Count 
II, a term of four to five years for Count III, and a term of fourteen to 
sixteen years for Count IV, with Counts III and IV to be served concurrently 
with each other and served consecutive to Count II. The tragedy revealed in the 
incestuous family behavior cannot now justify, however, the obvious 
ineffectiveness of appellant's trial counsel as an issue not presented through 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel or the result of totally inappropriate 
usage of a prior recorded statement of the wife to convict appellant by forcing 
his wife to read back her statement one question at a time before the 
jury.

[¶34.]  A more effective way to misuse the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence than was evidenced here cannot be imagined. Proper 
trial methods are available, but certainly not demonstrated in this record.1 I dissent.

[¶35.]  In order to set the stage for these most 
serious criminal proceedings, an understanding of the case development is 
required - sketchy as the record may be in many details.

[¶36.]  The case develops from a June 2, 1989 
criminal information filing which claimed criminal sexual abuse of children as 
charges against the father commencing in 1984 and continuing to May 1989. 
Appellant Curtis L. Monn, age forty-five, had apparently been arrested in 
Illinois and extradited to Casper, Wyoming to face the charges. His wife, Sarah 
Monn, age thirty-nine, had also been charged with sexual abuse offenses, pled 
guilty, and, at trial time for appellant, was serving a sentence in the Wyoming 
Women's Center in Lusk, Wyoming.2 On May 11, 1989, Sarah Monn, in 
jail after her arrest, had given a statement to police officials, but probably 
before she was given any opportunity to secure counsel.

[¶37.]  Trial commenced for appellant on February 
5, 1990. Sarah Monn, who was serving her sentence in the Wyoming Women's Center, 
had been brought back as a prosecution witness and was being held in the jail in 
Casper pending 
appearance on the witness stand. Whether directly informed or not, appellant's 
counsel would have cause to have known about the anticipated testimony by check 
of the record which revealed that the State intended to present Sarah Monn as a 
witness for prosecutorial evidence. Nothing in the record reveals an effort by 
defense counsel to learn whether a statement existed or whether its introduction 
might be attempted. There was the statement and even a subsequent interview by 
the prosecuting attorney with the witness, but no preliminary objection 
to introduction was raised nor was any Denno hearing on admissibility conducted. 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). Nothing in this record reflects consideration 
by counsel of the witness privilege under W.S. 1-12-101 or right against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11.

[¶38.]  The statement was neither marked for 
identification at trial nor tendered for introduction into evidence. It is not 
contained in this record except for the process used to have Sarah Monn 
personally read segments to the jury by the prosecutor in her examination. The 
record further reveals that the interview between the police officer and Sarah 
Monn was tape recorded and the tape was neither marked as an exhibit nor 
tendered into evidence.

[¶39.]  Sarah Monn's entire testimony from crude 
start to absurd finish, as sickening as its text is found to be, is attached as 
an appendix without deletion. In its course of twenty 
pages in transcript, one objection was taken which involved and decided without 
court ruling:

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
Objection, I am not sure what the question is. Counsel is just going to have her 
read.

      [PROSECUTOR]: I 
am sorry, it is on the same line of questioning and what did she say, referring 
to [daughter] when she said it hurt. What did she say?

[¶40.]  After Sarah Monn's testimony was 
completed, the investigating officer was called to testify about the process 
used for the interview:

     Q. Was this 
information kept in your recorded form?

     A. Yes, interview on 
May 11th was tape recorded.

     Q. Have you reviewed 
that tape, was a transcript made of that statement?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Have you reviewed the tape 
and transcript?

     A. Yes, I 
have.

     Q. Does it accurately 
reflect the conversation that you had?

      A. Yes, it 
does.

     Q. With Sarah. Is that 
the same transcript which Sarah Monn was reading from in the courtroom 
yesterday?

     A. Yes.

     Q. And were the 
answers she gave, were the answers she gave to you on May 11th?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Were you also 
present when Sarah and I talked about this case on January 26th of 
1990?

     A. Yes, I 
was.

     Q. How was Sarah 
acting that day?

     A. Fine.

     Q. Any sign of 
duress?

    A. No.

     Q. 
Anxiety?

     A. No.

     Q. Anger?

     A. No.

     Q. Again did she state 
the same facts as recited by her in the testimony in the taped transcript as she 
related yesterday?

     A. Yes, she 
did.

 

[¶41.]  What we do not know is whether Sarah Monn 
was ever given a Miranda warning before her statements were obtained and 
specifically what assistance of counsel she had been provided before or after 
criminal charges had been filed against her. There is nothing specifically found 
in this record for any adjudication to determine whether what she said was 
forced, coerced or voluntary and, of course, no finding of voluntariness was 
asked for or made.

[¶42.]  What distresses me about this record is 
the abject failure at this trial to provide Sarah Monn the opportunity to 
have the assistance of counsel which she needed to avoid self-incrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11, or to advise her about 
the privilege held by a wife not to testify against her husband under the 
statute.

[¶43.]  Complete preclusive ineffectiveness in 
trial preparation and presentation existed and is not presented for this appeal 
by the appellate student defender counsel in appellate brief writing and, 
consequently, the majority safely justifies what occurred at trial by absolution 
and resolution of plain error incantation. Lozano v. State, 751 P.2d 1326 
(Wyo. 1988); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 1986); Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150 
(Wyo. 
1978).

[¶44.]  This case provides neither impeachment 
nor refreshed recollection. The prosecutor, in a process of testifying himself 
to establish credibility, forces Sarah Monn to testify against her husband for 
evidence of his guilt by a non-tendered statement transcribed from a non-offered 
tape recording. Plain error in conjunction with ineffectiveness of counsel could 
not be more plainly revealed. W.R.Cr.P. 49(b). See Schmunk, 714 P.2d 724 and 
Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶45.]  I dissent because it was improper for the 
trial judge to allow an alleged prior statement to be read to the jury as 
testimony when the process used was to neither "refresh recollection" nor to 
impeach. W.R.E. 612. See Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 1979) and Hernandez v. State, 587 P.2d 1094 
(Wyo. 1978). I 
object because there was never a foundation laid to establish the facts or 
events of the prior statement, Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1980); Epperson v. State, 600 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1979), or to provide 
the best evidence if substantive use was intended. Phillips, 597 P.2d 456. 
Somehow we disregard prior Wyoming case law and ignore a whole squadron 
of procedural infirmities and improprieties.3 Defense counsel at trial and this 
court in opinion disregard without reference Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145 
(Wyo. 1979), which clearly determined the scope of admissibility of the 
proffered testimony here even if it had been done right and then, if a 
limited instruction would have been given, states that "[t]he prior statement of 
this witness does not qualify for substantive use to prove a fact but only for 
the limited purpose of impeachment." Id. at 1149-50. Without citing authority, we 
now sub rosa overrule Channel, adopt a minority rule without discussion or 
citation of authority and confuse both the law of refreshed recollection and of 
impeachment. See, for example, Annotation, Use or Admissibility of Prior 
Inconsistent Statements of Witness as Substantive Evidence of Facts to Which 
They Relate in Criminal Case - Modern State Cases, 30 A.L.R.4th 414 (1984); 
Annotation, Denial of Recollection As Inconsistent With Prior Statement So As To 
Render Statement Admissible, 99 A.L.R.3d 934 (1980); and Annotation, Use of 
Prior Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment of Testimony of Witnesses Under 
Rule 613, Federal Rules of Evidence, 40 A.L.R.Fed. 629 (1978). See also Graham, 
Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A 
Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1565 (1977).

[¶46.]  The current case law on the new mode of 
presenting prosecutorial evidence by disavowed statement is near endless, but 
some standard principles remain. When a witness is unwilling or unable to 
testify as to the contents of a memorandum, the memorandum is admissible as 
substantive evidence "if (1) the witness once had knowledge of the contents of 
the memorandum, (2) the memorandum was prepared by the witness, or at his [or 
her] direction, (3) the memorandum was prepared when the knowledge of the 
contents was fresh in the mind of the witness, and (4) the witness is able to 
swear that he believed the memorandum correct at the time it was made." People 
v. Fields, 151 A.D.2d 598, 542 N YS.2d 356, 358 (1989). See James v. Com., 8 
Va. App. 98, 
379 S.E.2d 378 (1989). In Fields, although the issue was not preserved in 
appeal, that court reviewed and reversed a trial court's improper use of 
refreshed recollection under an interest of justice standard. That court 
indicated it was reversing because the witness was not able to swear he believed 
the memorandum correct at the time it was made. In that case, the appellant 
maintained he made the prior statement while under the influence of narcotics 
and was in fear because of his status as a parolee and asserted he would have 
told the police anything.

[¶47.]  A like circumstance exists here. When 
asked about the statement, Sarah Monn said "I remember giving something, but the 
state of mind I was in at the time, I do not recollect what I have said." 
Despite consistent testimony that she could not swear the memorandum was 
accurate at the time she gave the statement, the prosecutor continued to 
question her and then have her read her prior statements into the record. The 
prosecutor was relentless in ignoring her claim that she did not remember giving 
the prior statement:

Q. Do you remember giving 
a statement before that you remember something happening?

     A. I don't 
remember.

* * * * * *

     Q. If I showed you a 
statement would that refresh your recollection?

     A. To be perfectly 
honest with you, no, that wouldn't because what I said when I gave the  statement I was under duress. And I am 
not going to be responsible for what I said.

* * * * * *

     A. Didn't you admit to 
[Investigator] that you did those things?

     Q. I don't remember if 
I did or not.

* * * * * *

A. Again did you make a 
statement to [Investigator] about the use of that particular 
vibrator?

     A. I don't 
remember.

* * * * * *

     Q. And what did you 
say?

     A. I said, yes, but 
apparently you haven't recollected that I made a statement that I don't remember 
what I said, and that I was under duress when this statement was 
given.

* * * * * *

Q. Do you remember what 
Curtis would do to get [daughter] to do sexual things with you?

     A. I don't recollect. 
I am sure I will be informed.

And finally, the 
prosecutor's persistence paid off:

     Q. And do you recall 
the question: When was the last time that something happened between Curtis, 
yourself and [daughter]?

     A. No, why don't you 
just let me have the statement and ask the question, I will read what you have 
down there?

[¶48.]  At that point, the prosecutor was able to 
have Sarah Monn actually read the statement to the jury in a manner that allowed 
that statement to become her trial testimony4 Even though appellant's defense 
counsel should have pursued a course of vigorous objection to the non-tendered 
document for which no foundation had been laid, the result is vested in plain 
error where we have this non-tendered and perhaps inadmissible statement, 
ineffectiveness of defense counsel,5 and pro forma testimony of the 
prosecutor combined to provide substantive evidence of guilt. No matter how 
reasonably assured conviction might have been, it could have been secured by 
properly introduced evidence and accepted standards of the presentation of 
proof.

[¶49.]  I dissent.

APPENDIX

SARAH MONN'S 
TESTIMONY

Direct 
Examination

BY [MR. 
PROSECUTOR]:

     Q. Would you state 
your name and age, please?

     A. Sarah Monn, I am 
thirty-nine years old.

     Q. And are you 
married?

     A. Yes, 
sir.

    Q. And who are you married 
to?

    A. Curtis Monn.

    Q. How old is 
Curtis?

     A. I think he is 
forty-five.

     Q. Do you know what 
his date of birth is?

     A. 
3-22-44.

     Q. When were you 
married to Curtis?

     A. Well by law's 
manner we were married the 23rd of February.

     Q. Of.

     A. Of '84.

     Q. Does that mean you 
were living with him prior to that?

     A. Yes, I have lived 
with him prior to that, yes. 

     Q. And during that 
time period where did you live?

     A. You want all of the 
places?

     Q. No, during the time 
period, you were about that time period you were married in February of '84 and 
prior, just prior.

     A. We were living at 
Scott Hill.

     Q. And who also lived 
there?

     A. My 
daughter.

     Q. And what was her 
name?

     A. * * *.

     Q. And what 
relationship is * * * to Curtis?

     A. His 
stepdaughter.

    Q. Who is * * *?

     A. Curtis's 
daughter.

     Q. Do you remember her 
coming to the house at Scott Hill?

     A. 
Occasionally.

     Q. Did she ever come 
to stay for a while?

     A. I really don't 
remember that far back.

     Q. Do you remember 
giving a statement to [Investigator] that you remembered that?

     A. I remember giving 
something, but the state of mind I was in at the time, I do not recollect what I 
have said.

     Q. Do you remember 
talking to me about two weeks ago when you told me you remembered 
that?

     A. Yes, I do remember 
talking to you.

     Q. And do you remember 
[Curtis's daughter] coming to live with you guys at ScottHills staying overnight?

     A. Possibly, 
yes.

     Q. Where are you 
residing now?

     A. I am a convicted 
felon, and I have been down in Lusk, I am now incarcerated up here in jail 
during the trial.

     Q. And what are you 
convicted for?

     A. I believe it is 
called incest.

     Q. Do you remember 
[Curtis's daughter] sleeping in your and Curtis's bed in ScottHills?

     A. Could possibly, 
yes.

     Q. And do you remember 
why she was sleeping in your bed?

     A. Not really, just 
that she was scared, something had happened to her earlier, and she just wanted 
to be close.

     Q. Do you remember 
anything happening while she was sleeping in your bed?

     A. Not 
really.

     Q. Do you remember 
giving a statement before that you remember something happened?

     A. I don't 
remember.

     Q. Isn't it true that 
you gave a statement to [Investigator] on May 11th, 1989?

      A. Well, I have 
probably, yes.

     Q. And you also 
remember talking to me approximately two weeks ago of this year?

     A. I remember being 
with you, yes.

     Q. Okay. Do you 
remember what we talked about?

     A. Oh, yes, I can 
remember it.

     Q. And what did we 
talk about?

     A. What you talked 
about was that my testimony was very important to the case, and that if I didn't 
give a testimony that my husband could possibly go free and how -

     Q. Did we talk 
specifically about your testimony, did I ask you questions?

     A. Oh, you asked me 
quite a few questions, yes.

     Q. And did you answer 
those questions?

     A. Well, I probably 
did.

     Q. And what is your 
answer now to the question, did something happen between Curtis and [Curtis's 
daughter]?

     A. I don't 
remember.

    Q. If I showed you a 
statement would that refresh your recollection?

     A. To be perfectly 
honest with you, no, that wouldn't, because what I said when I gave the 
statement I was under duress. And I am not going to be responsible for what I 
said.

     Q. Your statement to 
[Investigator] was under duress?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Didn't you call 
[Investigator] and tell him what was going on in your house?

    A. No, I don't, I didn't 
call him, I had talked to somebody else.

    Q. Didn't you call * * * at 
DPASS?

     A. Yes, I talked to 
[DPASS personnel].

     Q. And you told her 
that you had information for her about things that were going on in your 
house?

     A. Things that I 
thought were going on.

     Q. In fact things that 
you were involved in?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Okay, and what 
things were you involved in?

     A. Oh, I supposedly 
had touched my daughter, but the way it is stated I don't remember doing 
it.

     Q. Didn't you admit to 
[Investigator] that you did those things?

     A. I don't remember if 
I did or not.

     Q. Didn't you give a 
factual basis to an incest charge that you did those things?

     A. I possibly 
did.

     Q. Isn't it true that 
when these things were going on in your house, Curtis was also present with you 
and your daughter?

     A. 
Possibly.

     Q. And isn't it true 
that you saw Curtis Monn and [Curtis's daughter] sexually engaged?

      A. I can't say 
that I remember that.

     Q. Again did you or 
did you not give a statement to Investigator * * * and myself about that 
incident?

     A. I don't remember 
giving you a statement.

     Q. Did you in response 
to a question tell me that?

     A. I may 
have.

     Q. What do you 
remember about you and Curtis and your daughter being together in your 
bedroom?

     A. I really don't 
remember.

     Q. Hand[]ing you what 
I have marked State's Exhibit No. 1 for identification, do you recognize 
this?

     A. Yes.

     Q. What is 
that?

     A. That is what they 
call a massager or vibrator.

     Q. And how do you 
recognize it?

     A. I used it when I 
was giving massages on my back or had my husband give me a massage.

     Q. Was it also used in 
any sexual connotation, any sexual relations?

     A. No.

     Q. It never 
was?

     A. No.

     Q. Again did you make 
a statement to [Investigator] about the use of that particular 
vibrator?

     A. I don't 
remember.

     Q. Let me refer your 
attention to and an asterisk by initials DT standing for [Investigator] and your 
initials SM for Sarah Monn, did [sic] you read the question [Investigator] gave 
you?

     A. Had you seen Curt 
use the vibrator on [Sarah's daughter]?

     Q. And what did you 
say?

     A. I said, yes, but 
apparently you haven't recollected that I made a statement that I don't remember 
what I said, and that I was under duress when this statement was 
given.

Q. Isn't it true that you 
contacted the authorities to come talk to you about these things?

     A. I probably 
did.

     Q. Isn't it true you 
also told me the exact same thing two weeks ago?

     A. I don't recollect 
that I said that, no.

     Q. When did you move 
into 4260 and a half Dodge Street? 

     A. I believe it was 
April of 1986.

     Q. And was that a 
trailer house or a house?

     A. It is a 
trailer.

     Q. And how long did 
you live there?

     A. I have lived there 
until, `86 until I was incarcerated in `89.

     Q. Who else lived 
there?

     A. My husband, my 
daughter * * *, and then an[ot]her daughter that I gave birth to by the name of 
* * *.

     Q. And who is * * * 
father?

     A. Curtis.

     Q. Was - how do you 
refer to [Sarah's daughter].

     A. * * *.

     Q. Was [Sarah's 
daughter] involved in sexual acts with yourself or with Curtis or 
both?

     A. I don't really know 
that she was in sexual acts with either of us.

     Q. Do you remember 
giving a statement to [Investigator] in May of `89 about that 
question?

     A. Well, I am sure I 
did.

     Q. And do you remember 
telling me the same thing two weeks ago?

     A. Well, 
probably.

     Q. Do you remember 
telling [Investigator] about how many times this happened at your  house between you and Curt and [Sarah's 
daughter].

     A. I can remember what 
I was told that I said, yes.

      Q. What you were 
told that you said?

     A. Yes.

     Q. And who told you 
that?

     A. [Investigator] and 
you.

     Q. Isn't it true we 
asked the questions and you answered them?

     A. I don't deny 
that.

     Q. And do you remember 
asking the question how old she was when these things started to 
happen?

     A. No, I 
don't.

     Q. Then I will refer 
your attention to that statement that you gave to [Investigator] on May 11, 
1989. [Investigator] stated: Do you remember what grade [Sarah's daughter] was 
in when this started, and what did you answer?

     A. According to this I 
said seven years old.

     Q. Do you remember 
what Curtis would do to get [Sarah's daughter] to do sexual things with 
you?

     A. I don't recollect. 
I am sure I will be informed.

     Q. On top of of the same statement says, 
Dad promised her candy. Did he follow through and give her candy, and what did 
you respond?

     A. Oh, 
yeah.

     Q. How often would 
this happen, do you remember how often this would happen?

     A. No, I 
don't.

     Q. Do you remember in 
response to: How often this would happen by [Investigator], what your response 
was?

     A. Huh. That is 
interesting, according to what you have down here I said, it seems like it would 
happen just about every other day.

     Q. And do you recall 
the question: When was the last time that something happened between Curtis, 
yourself and [Sarah's daughter]?

     A. No, why don't you 
just let me have the statement and ask the question, I will read what you have 
down there?

     Q. And I will refer 
you to and your response.

     A. What do you mean, 
responding to?

     Q. Where the asterisk 
is, when was the last time this happened?

     A. It says, I don't 
really know because I was working nights and from what I was informed, if you 
will see, I said informed from yesterday from [Sarah's daughter] that he did it 
when I was at work. I have no idea when the last time was. He could have done it 
the last night he was with her. 

     Q. What about the last 
time all three of you were involved?

     A. I don't know.

     Q. You recall giving 
the statement to [Investigator] and what your response was?

     A. Well, let's see, it 
says here the last time all three of us were involved that was, I would say, a 
good three or four months.

     Q. In relation to 
sexual activities between Curtis and [Sarah's daughter], the question by 
[Investigator]: Did [Sarah's daughter] ever say that it hurt? Do you recall what 
you, do you recall if [Sarah's daughter] ever said it hurt?

     A. Well, if she is 
like her mother she probably said, yes.

     Q. You don't recall 
what the statement was, Have you ever heard [Sarah's daughter] say it 
hurts?

     A. I can't recollect 
that I have.

     Q. Again I will refer 
your attention to , the response to that question by [Investigator]?

     A. I heard her a 
couple of times say it did. Let me have this so I can refer to the stuff that 
you are asking me the questions and bring it back to me.

     Q. Why don't you go 
ahead and read the rest, if you don't remember it, following that what 
[Investigator] said?

     [Defense Counsel]: 
Objection, I am not sure what the question is. Counsel is just going to have her 
read.

     [Mr. Prosecutor]: I am 
sorry, it is on the same line of questioning and what did she say, referring to 
[Sarah's daughter] when she said it hurt. What did she say?

     Q. What did she say 
besides it hurt?

     A. I don't 
know.

     Q. On the statement to 
[Investigator], do you recall that?

     A. She told Dad to 
stop because it was hurting her.

     Q. Okay.

     A. Huh?

     Q. And in response 
what would he say when [Sarah's daughter] told him it hurt?

     A. I don't know, I 
suppose anybody would respond.

     Q. Do you recall him 
saying anything when [Sarah's daughter] told him it hurt and to 
stop?

     A. No, I 
don't.

     Q. Again I refer your 
attention to the top of , what is your response at that time?

     A. Gee, I didn't know, 
he would get mad and say the hell with you, and he did, sometimes he would pull 
away from her and just roll over and say to hell with you, and other times he 
would say I am not hurting you and not quit doing it until he decided to 
quit.

      Q. Did Curtis 
ever tell [Sarah's daughter] not to say anything about what was going on in the 
home?

      A. I don't know. 
You would have to ask him.

     Q. Do you recall 
telling [Investigator] that you recall the statement by Curtis telling [Sarah's 
daughter] not to say anything?

      A. Not 
really.

     Q. In response to the 
question: Did he ever say anything to her about her telling or not telling 
anybody, what was your response?

     A. Why can't somebody 
else read this - where am I reading this at? Yes, he did, he said if anybody 
ever asks you any questions, say nothing is going on.

     Q. Okay. Did [Sarah's 
daughter] ever do anything to you, with you?

     A. Yes, I suppose she 
did.

     Q. Can you tell us 
what that was?

     A. Not 
really.

    Q. Do you recall [Sarah's 
daughter] doing anything, touching you in private areas?

     A. Oh, she touched me 
in private areas, but -

     Q. Do you recall 
touching her in private areas? 

     A. Well, naturally, I 
have given her baths and things.

     Q. Beyond that, in a 
sexual capacity, sexual relationship?

     A. I wouldn't say 
sexual relationship, no.

     Q. Okay. Again do you 
recall making a statement to [Investigator] on May 11th as to the question: When 
these things were happening, did [Sarah's daughter] ever do anything to 
you?

     A. A few times, 
yes.

     Q. In response to the 
question: What was that, what was that?

     A. Let me read it. Oh, 
let's see. A few times, yes.

     Q. What was 
that?

     A. Oh, her dad would 
have her put the vibrator on her hand and stick her hand up inside my vagina and 
then he started out putting the vibrator on my vagina, and she was doing this, 
you know, touched here in areas on me, it would get me excited, and then he had 
me holding the vibrator, when he had her do that to me, and he would sit there 
and he would watch. That don't make much sense.

      Q. Did [Sarah's 
daughter] ever do anything else to you?

      A. 
No.

      Q. Again 
referring to your statement.

     A. No, she never did 
that, she has never done that.

     Q. Okay, let's go on 
and see what else did he do, go ahead and read that.

     A. He made her get 
down there by my vagina and lick it a few times. Huh.

     Q. And in response to 
the questions, what would Dad or Curtis's reaction be when he would have the two 
of you doing things to each other, how would he react?

     A. I don't know. Let 
me read it off my statement. Well, it would look like he was getting a thrill 
out of it, you know, it kind of turned it [sic] on or something, and he would 
just sit there and he would just really, I mean, he just literally have his eyes 
glued. A couple of times I found him stroking himself, to himself up and it is, 
oh, brother, I ain't never seen him stroke himself.

     Q. And how many times 
did these things happen when you and Curtis and [Sarah's daughter] were 
together?

     A. Oh, we have always 
been together.

     Q. How many times did 
these sexual relationships, did this happen when the three of you were 
together?

     A. Gee, I don't know, 
I don't recollect.

     Q. Could it have 
happened twenty times?

     A. I don't know. I 
wouldn't think so.

     Q. Do you recall 
giving Investigator * * * some answer to that question, could it have  happened twenty times?

     A. Well, I suppose, I 
know what was said on there.

     Q. And what did you 
say?

     A. Well, what I said 
and what is on there is not -

     Q. This is not the 
same as what you said. Wasn't this tape recorded at your house?

     A. At my house, not 
that I know of.

     Q. I am sorry, tape 
recorded at the sheriff's office?

     A. We had a tape 
running, yes.

     Q. Isn't it true that 
you are afraid of Curtis?

     A. No, I am 
not.

     Q. Didn't you tell 
Investigator * * * that you were afraid of Curtis?

     A. I am always afraid 
of any man, it doesn't matter if it is Curtis or whoever it is, I 
am.

     Q. Didn't you tell me 
two weeks ago that you were afraid of Curtis?

     A. I don't recollect 
that.

     Q. Isn't it true that 
you have been in contact with him the last several days?

     A. Very good 
possibility, yeah.

     Q. And isn't it true 
that you wrote a letter to your daughter just recently?

     A. Yes, I probably 
did. 

     Q. In that letter 
didn't you tell her that if she testified Daddy would go away?

     A. Telling her the 
truth, apparently you didn't take into consideration what else I said to her, 
did you, I would be happy to tell everybody unless there is something you want 
to hide from it.

     The Witness: Your 
Honor, could I see what I said in the letter?

     The Court: No, just 
answer the question.

     Q. The things you told 
Investigator * * *, didn't you also tell me two weeks ago?

     A. No, I don't believe 
I did.

    Q. Investigator * * * was 
present.

     A. Yes, he was 
present.

     Q. I do have the 
letter that you wrote to [Sarah's daughter] last week. I believe that is the 
case, could you tell me what this is?

     A. What do you mean 
tell you what it is?

     Q. What is 
that?

     A. It is a letter to 
my daughter.

     Q. And here is your 
chance, why don't you read it?

     A. Dear [Sarah's 
daughter]: Hi, sweetheart. How are you doing? Sure do miss you, baby. How's your 
ears, keeping good care of them, don't let them get infected. Now I hear 
[Investigator] talked to you about daddy. He said you wanted to tell everyone 
what daddy did. You know, if daddy goes to jail, you, [other daughter] and momma 
won't be able to ever see or talk to him ever again. Do you really want that to 
happen. Hey, momma loves you, and I love daddy and [other daughter]. I don't 
like to see us all not together, but it is your choice, you are old enough to 
make up your own mind. Baby, if you go through with telling on daddy don't be 
upset and afraid that momma will be angry with you. I won't. You have to decide 
on your own. I love you, Honey, hope you are doing okay, and hope I get to see 
you real soon. Hope I get to talk to you today too always remember when you are 
sad and you feel all alone, go to your room by yourself and talk to Jesus. He 
may not talk to you like you think, but he does listen, and he will answer in 
his own way. Believe in him, baby. Jesus loves you, you love him with all your 
heart, soul and mind, he will never, never leave you, baby. Daddy and * * * love 
you very much, and I know you want us all together right? Well, Hon, I got to 
write to * * * now, so be happy and keep your grades or keep your grades, you 
can do it, you are smart, and you know it, don't you. God bless you my precious 
daughter. Love always, Mom.

     Q. Who is * * 
*?

     A. Ou[r] daughter * * 
*.

     Q. Sarah, have you 
always been there for you daughter?

     A. I always 
have.

     Q. Are you there for 
her now?

     A. Oh, 
yes.

     Q. Then why didn't you 
protect her?

     A. I protected 
her.

     [Mr. Prosecutor]: 
Nothing further.

Cross 
Examination

BY [DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:

     Q. Mrs. Monn, you have 
been reading through, I guess, a statement [Prosecutor] has been handing 
you.

     A. Yes, 
sir.

     Q. Do you recognize 
that statement, do you recall those conversations?

     A. No, sir, I don'[t] 
recall what I have said, I was very upset and very much distressed.

     Q. How many different 
times have you met with [Investigator]?

      A. I would say 
at least four.

     Q. Are you aware if 
any of the other conversations were tape recorded when you met with 
him?

     A. No, I don't, sir, 
they might have been.

     Q. Do you specifically 
recall [Curtis's daughter] being over to your house on ScottHills? 

     A. She came over and 
visited us occasionally, yes.

     Q. Do you recall her 
spending the night?

      A. She has spent 
nights, several times, sir.

     Q. Do you recall being 
in bed with [Curtis's daughter] and Curtis Monn?

     A. Not 
really.

     Q. Did you ever use 
that vibrator on your daughter for sexual purposes?

     A. No.

     Q. The matters in your 
statement are those truthful matters that you told [Investigator] or 
not?

     A. Like I said several 
times, at the time I was very upset, I was under duress, they kept asking me 
questions, and I do not recollect anything or just, they just got me when I 
wasn't functioning like I should have been.

     Q. Has Mr. Monn ever 
told you that [Curtis's daughter] is his daughter?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Has he ever 
questioned whether or not he is the father?

     A. No, 
sir.

     Q. Do you know when it 
was, when you were first contacted by the sheriff's office?

     A. What do you mean 
when first contacted?

     Q. Concerning these 
allegations, when was the first time [Investigator] got hold of you?

     A. I don't really 
remember the exact date, but I think it was just before he talked to me I guess 
on the 5th of May.

Q. Did he ask any of the 
similar questions that you have been reading from in the interview?

     A. Do you mean, when 
did he ask me this?

     Q. The first time you 
had contact with [Investigator], did he ask you if there was anything 
inappropriate going on in the home regarding sexual behavior?

     A. I don't remember if 
he did or not.

     Q. What was the 
purpose of his contact with you then?

     A. Well, I guess, 
because I had supposedly called to talk to him.

     Q. Isn't it true that 
at the time that you gave the statement you were in [the] process of moving to 
Cheyenne, moving 
out on your husband?

     A. Well, I don't really 
recollect that I was moving out on my husband, I was going to Cheyenne, yes, but hadn't [sic] intentions of moving out, 
and I did go to Cheyenne.

     Q. That was just a 
temporary trip down there and you were coming back?

     A. Yes.

     Q. Did you ever tell 
your daughter that she wasn't allowed to wear undergarments?

     A. No.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have 
no further questions.

[MR. PROSECUTOR]: No 
further questions.

- Witness Excused 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 Neither the trial judge 
nor this court consider any aspects of the Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination or the wife-husband privilege provided by W.S. 1-12-101, 
which states in part:

(a) The following persons 
shall not testify in certain respects:

* * * * * *

(iii) Husband or wife, 
except as provided in W.S. 1-12-104[.]

See, however, Seyle v. 
State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978).

2 The criminal file of 
State v. Sarah Monn, Docket No. 40806, Natrona 
County, Wyoming, with which the 
participants in the Casper trial should have been generally 
familiar, including specifically the prosecution and district court, which I 
judicially notice for historical background relative to her continued testimony 
about the incident, additionally documents:

     After a complaint had 
been filed and a warrant issued against Curtis Monn on May 9, 1989, he was 
apparently arrested on May 19. A complaint was also issued against Sarah Monn on 
May 9, which in terminology as with the subsequent information filed on May 25, 
charged precisely the same four offenses which had been filed against 
Curtis Monn. Sarah Monn was arrested on May 10 and she apparently remained in 
jail thereafter. Following arrest, she gave an interview on May 11 in the 
sheriff's office. The Curtis Monn record does not reflect specifically whether 
it occurred before or after her appearance in county court when she had asked 
for appointment of counsel, but one would rationally expect that after arrest on 
May 10 and comprehensive interrogation on May 11, she was first then taken to 
county court for an opportunity to obtain counsel since she was obviously 
interviewed without counsel present. See attached transcript documentation in 
State v. Curtis Monn.

     A representative of 
the public defender's office in Casper, different from appellant's counsel, was 
designated to represent Sarah Monn on May 11 by the county court. Following 
waiver of preliminary hearing, an information was then filed on May 
25.

     Upon initial 
appearance in district court on June 9 for arraignment, Sarah Monn pled not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and was sent to 
the WyomingStateHospital for observation. In their report, 
a copy of which was furnished to the prosecuting attorney and the office of the 
public defender, she was found to have mild brain damage, either from 
developmental delay or heavy drinking - to be mentally ill - but not to have 
such mental illness that would qualify her for consideration of a legal finding 
of insanity.

     On September 12, a 
plea bargain was presented to the district court for her to plead guilty to 
Counts I and III with dismissal of Counts II and IV. On November 9, she was 
sentenced to the Wyoming Women's Center for a term of two to four years on Count 
I, a consecutive sentence of one to two years on Count III with the sentence on 
Count III suspended for a two year probation.

     From this current 
Curtis Monn record involving her husband's trial, we also are informed that 
Sarah Monn was again interviewed on January 26, 1990 by return to the jail in 
Casper after 
being sentenced and sent to the penitentiary. The interview was conducted by the 
assistant prosecuting attorney and the investigating officer in preparation of 
the trial of appellant which commenced February 5, 1990. Obviously, at least as 
shown by this record, Sarah Monn's attorney was again not present for that 
interview. These events provide the factual background for her to testify in the 
prosecution case of her husband on February 5, 1990 when again her counsel was 
neither present nor consulted as far as the present record and transcript 
reveals.

     The telephone call to 
which Justice Cardine makes reference in the majority - special concurrence - 
was a call from this office by the judicial assistant to obtain a copy of the 
formal court record relating to the conviction of Sarah Monn as a co-participant 
in the identical charged criminal offenses. That record shows date of arrest, 
arraignment in county court, arraignment in district court, plea and sentence. 
It also includes medical information obtained regarding her mental condition by 
report from the WyomingStateHospital. It does not 
include any transcript of testimony or indications relative to any action having 
been taken to suppress the confession which is the present subject matter of the 
evidence used in this case and attached by appendix to 
this dissent. The ex parte charge by critical comment of Justice Cardine is 
summarily rejected as factually untrue and legally invalid since reference in 
the dissent is made only to historical facts taken from a record where the same 
district court participated in both cases. W.R.E. 201. The prosecutor was the 
same and the office of the public defender was involved in both. The real 
substantive objection which permeates the special concurrence is derived from 
facts which state what happened as that subject is questioned within the court 
file regarding the history of the co-actor/wife and now principal witness in her 
testimony in this case. The Sarah Monn record provides dates and court 
appearance events which supplement the close and specific examination of the 
circumstances factually established by the Curtis Monn record now under 
appellate review. See W.R.E. 201; Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 540 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 
1975); Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 
1987), reconfirmed 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988); 
State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165 (Wyo. 
1981) and see also Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987).

     See also Sweetwater 
County Planning Committee for Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971) and Washakie County 
School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980), where this court judicially noticed documented 
information for opinion recitation.

     We do not retry or 
even reconsider the conviction or sentence of Sarah Monn in this case. We 
consider here the propriety, approach and appropriateness of the way her 
testimony was used in this case to convict her husband.

3 To try a few: a) 
voluntariness of the statement; b) Miranda; c) W.R.E. 1002 - best evidence; d) 
W.R.E. 803(5) - recorded recollection; e) W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) - prior statement 
of witness is given under oath when used in a criminal proceeding; f) W.R.E. 613 
- prior statement of witness; g) W.R.E. 612 - writing or object used to refresh 
memory; h) W.R.E. 607 - who may impeach; i) W.R.E. 609 - impeachment by evidence 
of conviction of a crime; j) W.R.E. 105 - limited admissibility; k) W.S. 
1-12-104 - husband and wife as witness in civil or criminal case; and finally, 
1) impropriety of counsel vouching for credibility by self-testimony in method 
of examination. Not only the inappropriate inference, but the prejudicial 
process here used was directly identified and emphatically condemned in Douglas 
v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 
(1965).

4 Furthermore, I agree 
with appellant that this process of engineering improper prejudice against him 
by the presentation of an uninformed adverse witness is contrary to the basic 
concept of our recent case of Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1989) and, cited 
therein, Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 
(1963). See likewise Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965), which developed on appeal from a very similar trial 
process.

5 Appellant developed some 
fearful appreciation for what had occurred. Shortly after Sarah Monn's testimony 
had been completed, the following colloquy occurred after evening recess when 
appellant asked to speak to the judge:

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. 
Monn has indicated to me this morning before commencement of the trial that he 
wishes to visit with the Court. I am not real sure concerning what, but his 
desire to come in and visit before the trial commences.

     THE DEFENDANT: Well, I 
was told by me [sic] wife that, her words not exactly maybe, but that she had 
been threatened by the loss of her daughter, and threatened a lot of things, 
which she is telling me, and I feel that an injustice is being served right now 
on both parties and I don't feel that things are quite up to par, the way they 
should be. I don't feel that I have totally got representation to the 
fullest.

     THE COURT: It appears 
to me that your representation has been very adequate, and if you have any 
problems with any proceedings you should discuss them with your attorney, and I 
am sure he will take appropriate action.

     THE DEFENDANT: Well, I 
have asked and told him of people that I have known over the years, people I 
know, know me. I said I don't remember a lot of things, I don't even remember 
what I did yesterday for sure, part of it I do and some of it I don't, and I 
don't feel totally getting [sic] proper representation, while, you see, that I 
am, I understand that because I have never been in court before, but I don't 
feel myself that I am getting total representation to the fullest.

     THE COURT: Well, it 
appears to me that you are, but you should discuss these matters with [Defense 
Counsel].

     THE DEFENDANT: Well, 
my wife has told me various things that if she was spoken with by herself, I 
think, she would probably shed more light on this than I could, because she 
knows a lot more about it than I do, about what is going on.

     THE COURT: That is 
something that you should advise [Defense Counsel] of, and he will do what he 
thinks is proper.

     THE DEFENDANT: That is 
all that I can do then.

     THE COURT: 
Yes.