Title: INGALLS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

INGALLS v. STATE2002 WY 7546 P.3d 856Case Number: 01-70Decided: 05/20/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                   

DAN 
EUGENE INGALLS, 

Petitioner,

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Respondent.

Petition 
for Writ of Review

Representing 
Petitioner: 

            
Sky D Phifer, Lander, Wyoming.

Representing 
Respondent: 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin 
Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      On April 4, 1999, 
the petitioner, Dan Ingalls (Ingalls), was involved in an altercation with 
Gerald Huelle when he tried to remove his cattle from Huelle's feed 
grounds.  For his role in the 
fracas, Ingalls was eventually convicted in the Fremont County Court (now 
circuit court) of three misdemeanorsproperty destruction, reckless endangering, 
and removal of property without the lienholder's consent.  The convictions were affirmed upon 
appeal to the district court.  On 
May 1, 2001, we granted Ingalls' Petition for Writ of Review.  Finding error in the proceedings leading 
to the convictions, we reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2]      The issues before 
this Court are:

            
1.         
Whether the circuit court complied with W.R.Cr.P. 11 in accepting 
Ingalls' pleas?

            
2.         
Whether ex parte communications occurred between the State and the 
circuit court that deprived Ingalls of due process?

FACTS

[¶3]      Ingalls was 
charged by citation with several misdemeanors.1  The unverified reports of the Fremont 
County Sheriff's office were filed along with the citations, but copies were not 
given to Ingalls.  At arraignment, 
Ingalls entered not guilty pleas to all charges and informed the circuit court 
that he would retain private counsel.  
His release order included the condition that an attorney enter an 
appearance on his behalf within ten working days.

[¶4]      Ingalls failed 
timely to have an attorney enter an appearance, so the circuit court entered an 
Order to Show Cause why he should not be held in contempt.  At the hearing on the show cause order, 
Ingalls requested appointment of counsel, and the circuit court appointed a 
public defender to represent Ingalls.  
Ingalls also requested that he be supplied with a copy of the sheriff's 
office reports.  The circuit court 
orally ordered the State to provide copies to Ingalls within three working 
days.  A month later, Ingalls filed 
a pro se Motion to Dismiss because he had not been provided with the sheriff's 
office reports.  The record does not 
reflect that the circuit court ever ruled on the motion to dismiss.  Despite repeated requests to the circuit 
court and the prosecuting attorney, Ingalls did not get a copy of the sheriff's 
office reports until three months after the charges were 
brought.

[¶5]      The circuit court 
held a scheduling conference on September 27, 1999, at which time the trial was 
set for November 8, 1999.  The next 
day, Ingalls filed a Motion for Disqualification of Judge, which was later heard 
and denied.  The trial was then 
reset for January 27, 2000.  On that 
date, rather than holding a trial, the circuit judge held a conference in his 
chambers.  The circuit judge and 
county attorney were present in person, while Ingalls and his attorney appeared 
by telephone.  No verbatim recording 
was made of this telephone conference.  
A plea bargain was discussed whereby the State would amend certain 
charges and Ingalls would change his plea to certain charges.  There was also discussion to the effect 
that Ingalls would change his pleas if he received no jail time.  The circuit court would not "guarantee" 
no jail time, but agreed to order a Presentence Investigation Report, and, 
according to Ingalls, agreed to follow its recommendations.  The Presentence Investigation Report was 
completed on February 18, 2000, and recommended that Ingalls receive 
unsupervised probation.

[¶6]      Sentencing was 
held on March 14, 2000.  Ingalls was 
sentenced to 180 days in jail for reckless endangering, and 180 days in jail for 
property destruction, with the sentences to run concurrently, and with all but 
thirty days suspended.  He was also 
fined $100.00 for removal of property without the lienholder's consent, and was 
assessed court costs and a victim's compensation 
surcharge.

[¶7]      Ingalls filed an 
appeal to the district court on March 16, 2000.  Because no record was made of the 
proceedings held in chambers on January 27, 2000, the circuit court received 
submissions from Ingalls and the State to attempt to settle the record pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  The circuit court 
accepted the State's submission and entered an Order Settling Record on 
September 7, 2000.  That version of 
the record indicated that, during the telephone conference in chambers, Ingalls 
pled no contest to reckless endangering and guilty to both property destruction 
and removal of property without lienholder's consent.  In affirming the convictions, the 
district court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court 
as to which version of the facts was correct, and concluded that Ingalls had 
failed to show violation of any substantial right.

DISCUSSION

            
W.R.Cr.P. 
11

[¶8]      This Court 
adopted the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1968.  The rules were revised and re-adopted in 
1991.  The purpose of the rules is 
set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 2:

            
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every 
criminal proceeding.  They shall be 
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.

[¶9]      Consonant with 
these purposes, W.R.Cr.P. 3 and 3.1 provide that misdemeanors may be charged by 
citation rather than by indictment or information.  Likewise, subsections (b) and (c) of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 allow for less formal advisements at arraignment where a defendant 
charged only with a misdemeanor is represented by counsel.  Nevertheless, the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure contemplate certain formalities in the plea process.  For instance, whether charged by 
indictment, information, or citation, and whether charged with a felony or 
misdemeanor, each defendant must be arraigned pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
10:

            
Arraignments shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of 
reading the indictment, information or citation to the defendant or stating to 
the defendant the substance of the charge and calling on the defendant to plead 
thereto.  The defendant shall be 
given a copy of the indictment, information or citation before being called upon 
to plead.

[¶10]   It is in the acceptance of guilty 
and nolo contendere pleas that the judge is most strictly required to follow the 
dictates of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, in general, and W.R.Cr.P. 
11, in particular.  Several 
subsections of W.R.Cr.P. 11 bear directly on the issues at 
hand:

            
(b)       
Advice to Defendant.  
  Except for forfeitures on 
citations (Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), before accepting a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to a misdemeanor when the 
defendant is not represented by counsel, the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court and, unless the defendant has been previously advised 
by the court on the record and in the presence of counsel, inform the defendant 
of, and determine that the defendant understands, the 
following:

(1)       The nature 
of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty 
provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and 
other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the 
general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime 
Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, 
restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential loss of 
entitlement to federal benefits.  . 
. .

            
* * *

            
(2)       
The defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every 
stage of the proceeding and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent 
the defendant;

            
(3)       
The defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that 
plea if it has already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that 
trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the 
testimony of other witnesses, and the right against compelled 
self-incrimination;

            
(4)       
If a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there 
will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo 
contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial; and

            
(5)       
If the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the record, 
and in the presence of counsel, about the offense to which the defendant has 
pleaded guilty, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the 
defendant in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.

            
(c)        
Waiver of advisements.  
  A misdemeanor defendant 
represented by counsel may waive the advisements required in subdivision 
(b).

            
(d)       
Insuring that plea is voluntary.    
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without 
first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that 
the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises 
apart from a plea agreement.  The 
court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney 
for the state and the defendant or the defendant's 
attorney.

            
* * *

            
(f)         
Determining accuracy of plea.  Notwithstanding the acceptance of 
a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without 
making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the 
plea.

            
(g)       
Record of proceedings.  
  A verbatim record of the 
proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the record shall include, without 
limitation, the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into the 
voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry into the 
accuracy of a guilty plea.

            
(h)        
Harmless error.  
  Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded.

[¶11]   W.R.Cr.P. 11 is supposed to act as 
a guideline for the courts in determining that a plea by a defendant is 
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary, and that the plea has been entered with an 
understanding of the consequences.  
Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Wyo. 1995), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 907 (2000); 
Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Wyo. 1988).  Strict compliance with the rule is 
required to ensure due process of law; failure to comply is unconstitutional and 
requires reversal.  Hoggatt v. 
State, 606 P.2d 718, 725 (Wyo. 1980).  The attorneys for the state and for the 
defendant have a duty to make sure that the court does not omit necessary 
inquiries.  Sanchez v. State, 
592 P.2d 1130, 1136 (Wyo. 1979) (quoting State v. Darling, 109 Ariz. 148, 
506 P.2d 1042, 1047 (1973)).  Further, resort to the extended record 
should not be required; the record made at the time a guilty plea is entered 
should satisfy the rule's requirements.  
Id. (quoting Darling, 506 P.2d at 
1047).

[¶12]   Before we address the particular 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 deficiencies that mandate reversal of Ingalls' convictions, we will 
first describe the procedural messiness that characterizes this entire case and 
which contributes to the decision to reverse.  We noted at the outset of this opinion 
that Ingalls was charged with several misdemeanors.  The record on appeal, however, contains 
only one citation, that being for reckless endangering.  The State's appellate brief begins by 
referencing that one citation.  
Ingalls' appellate brief, on the other hand, suggests that the original 
charges were reckless endangering, property destruction, and three counts of 
battery.

[¶13]   This confusion, or perhaps just 
lack of clarity, persists throughout the record.  Several documents carry five circuit 
court docket numbers, no doubt reflecting the five original charges.  The Order for Presentence Investigation 
has only one docket number and indicates that Ingalls pled guilty only to 
property destruction.  The 
Presentence Investigation Report itself shows a guilty plea to property 
destruction, "no plea agreement provided," and "no disposition" as to reckless 
endangering and the three battery counts.  
The Judgment and Sentence, to the contrary, is headed with three docket 
numbers and reflects pleas of guilty to property destruction and removal of 
property without the lienholder's consent, and a plea of nolo contendere to 
reckless endangering.  There are no 
amended charging documents in the record, and there is no indication that 
Ingalls was ever arraigned on amended charges.  Capping off this untidiness is the fact 
that the Judgment and Sentence states that Ingalls pled guilty to property 
destruction in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a) and (b)(i) (1977 as 
amended) and that he pled nolo contendere to reckless endangering in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(a) and (b)(i) (1977 as amended).  Property destruction is actually found 
at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201 (LexisNexis 2001) and reckless endangering is found 
at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504 (LexisNexis 2001).

[¶14]   This imprecision carried over into 
the taking of Ingalls' pleas, and it is that imprecision that requires reversal 
of the Judgment and Sentence.  
Ingalls contends that at no time did he even enter pleas; rather, there 
was simply a discussion of a proposed plea agreement.  While this issue seemingly was resolved 
against Ingalls when the circuit court adopted the State's W.R.A.P. 3.03 
submittal, that submittal says only that Ingalls "offered" pleas to the three 
charges as amended.2  There is no indication that such pleas, 
if offered, were accepted by the circuit court, or that, in accepting the pleas, 
the circuit court performed any of the tasks mandated by W.R.Cr.P. 11.  The lack of a verbatim record, which 
itself is a violation of W.R.Cr.P. 11(g), prevents us from knowing whether the 
circuit court read or described the charges to Ingalls, whether the circuit 
court advised Ingalls as to his rights and as to the consequences of his pleas, 
whether the circuit court determined the voluntariness of the pleas, or whether 
the circuit court determined the accuracy of the pleas.  Furthermore, there is no indication in 
the record that, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(c), Ingalls waived the necessary 
advisements.

            
Ex Parte 
Communications

[¶15]   When an information is filed, the 
court decides whether there is probable cause to issue a summons or warrant by 
reading the verified information or an accompanying affidavit.  W.R.Cr.P. 4.  The effect of a citation, on the other 
hand, is to allow a defendant to be charged, and to promise to appear in court, 
without the necessity of court involvement at this preliminary charging stage of 
the proceedings.  W.R.Cr.P. 
3.1.  In the case of an information, 
the judge issuing the warrant or summons gains knowledge of the facts alleged in 
the information or affidavit.  In 
the case of a citation, the judge does not gain such 
knowledge.

[¶16]   In the instant case, when the 
investigating officer filed the citations with the circuit court, he also filed 
the unverified sheriff's office reports concerning the case.  The State has conceded that such reports 
are filed with all citations in Riverton's circuit court.  For reasons unexplained in the record, 
Ingalls had some difficulty in obtaining copies of those reports from the 
State.3  He now contends that the filing of the 
sheriff's office reports constituted an ex parte communication between 
the State and the circuit court, and his inability to obtain a copy of the 
sheriff's office reports violated due process.

[¶17]   Because these claims present 
questions of law, de novo review is required.  If the district court's decision is in 
accordance with law, it is affirmed; if not, it is corrected.  Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 
472 (Wyo. 1999).  In support of his complaint that an 
ex parte communication occurred, Ingalls cites to Moore v. Moore, 
809 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1991) and Coletti v. State, 769 P.2d 361 
(Wyo. 1989), 
claiming that this Court "has made it quite clear that submitting a report by a 
Sheriff's Deputy to the Court, unbeknownst to the defendant, constitutes 
improper ex parte communication."  
Moore and Coletti are distinguishable from this case.  Unlike Coletti, Ingalls knew about the 
sheriff's office reports.  Further, 
the sheriff's office reports in the instant case were not submitted to influence 
the circuit court for sentencing purposes as was the letter in 
Coletti.  Coletti, 769 P.2d  at 362.  In Moore, the 
trial court discussed a custody decision with the child's guardian ad litem 
prior to ruling on the custody issue.  
Moore, 809 P.2d  at 264.  Nothing like that occurred 
here.

[¶18]   In both Moore and 
Coletti, the challenged communications were made directly to the trial 
judge rather than, as here, being filed as an addendum to the charging documents 
that initiated the case.  Thus, the 
judge in both Moore and Coletti was directly involved in the ex 
parte communications.  Even 
then, this Court did not find reversible error in either case.  In Moore, we 
stated:

            
Furthermore, a claim of error relating to ex parte contact is 
susceptible to waiver, as is true of most claims of error.  The trial judge certainly made known to 
the parties the fact of the ex parte contact.  The appellant did not object at that 
time.  The appellant did not seek to 
explore the tenor of the ex parte contact.  Instead, the parties accepted what the 
court said as being a full disclosure of the event.  It was only after the articulation of an 
adverse ruling that the appellant became concerned about the matter of ex 
parte contact.  That matter 
should have been raised and explored at the trial.

Moore, 809 P.2d  at 264.

[¶19]   The same is true in the instant 
case.  If filing the sheriff's 
office reports constituted an improper ex parte communication, Ingalls 
should have made that objection in the circuit court.  Instead, Ingalls' counsel actually 
relied on the sheriff's office reports during argument at sentencing.  Ingalls waived any objections to the 
filing of the sheriff's office reports.

[¶20]   Ingalls further alleges prejudice 
because he was not given a copy of the sheriff's office reports until he was 
appointed an attorney in late July, in violation of due process.  He relies in particular on W.R.Cr.P. 
5(b), which requires, in pertinent part, that the "defendant shall be given a 
copy of the information or citation and any supporting affidavits before being 
called upon to plead."  As we noted 
above, supporting affidavits are filed with informations, but not with 
citations.  The investigative 
reports that may exist in both situations are not part of the charging documents 
and need not be provided to a defendant prior to entry of an initial plea.  To hold otherwise would jeopardize the 
purposes of the rules set forth above.4

[¶21]   Ingalls also argues that his early 
requests for copies of the sheriff's office reports were denied.  We consider this to be a discovery 
issue.  As noted above, Ingalls did 
receive copies of the sheriff's office reports prior to sentencing and he did 
not pursue this issue at the sentencing hearing.  We perceive nothing in the record 
suggesting prejudice to Ingalls by any delay in discovery.  Since this case is being reversed and 
remanded on Ingalls' first issue, any remaining discovery issues should be 
addressed in the circuit court.  We 
decline to address the underlying issue of whether such reports ever should be 
placed in the court file along with the citation.  This question was not adequately 
briefed.

CONCLUSION

[¶22]   We are mindful that W.R.Cr.P. 11(h) 
recognizes harmless error where variances from the rule's mandates have not been 
shown to have affected a defendant's substantial rights.  Before we will consider harmless error, 
however, there must have been a reasonable modicum of required formality in the 
plea proceedings.  In the instant 
case, even if we conclude, as did the district court, that Ingalls uttered the 
magic words, "I plead guilty" over the telephone on January 27, 2000, we simply 
cannot conclude that Ingalls pled guilty with the knowledge and voluntariness 
that is to be ensured by compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  As we have previously stated, "[a]ny 
error in accepting a guilty plea under W.R.Cr.P. 15 [now W.R.Cr.P. 11] must be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because such an error implicates a denial of 
constitutional rights."  Stice v. 
State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1990).  We continue also to adhere to the 
additional holding of Stice as to the reasons strict compliance with 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 is necessary:

Those 
purposes are to assist the judge in making the constitutionally required 
determination that a defendant's plea is truly voluntary, to produce a complete 
record at the time the plea was entered of the factors relevant to this 
voluntariness determination, and to enable more expeditious disposition of the 
numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional 
validity of guilty pleas.

Stice, 799 P.2d  at 1209.

[¶23]   We conclude that the circuit 
court's failure to follow W.R.Cr.P. 11 in accepting Ingalls' pleas requires that 
the Judgment and Sentence in this case be reversed.  We further hold that W.R.Cr.P. 5(b) does 
not require delivery of law enforcement investigative reports to a defendant 
before entry of a plea.  In the 
instant case, Ingalls has not shown that he was prejudiced by the allegedly 
delayed production of copies of such reports to his attorney.  The case is remanded to the district 
court for the purpose of further remand to the circuit court for proceedings 
pursuant to Ingalls' pleas to the original charges or other resolution of this 
matter.

FOOTNOTES

  1The details of those charges and 
their eventual dispositions will be discussed later 
herein.

  2Long after the January 27, 2000, 
telephone conference, the pleas were still being characterized in the record as 
future events.  Even as late as the 
March 14, 2000, sentencing hearing, counsel indicated that, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, Ingalls "will" plead guilty to the amended 
charges.

  3Why Ingalls simply did not copy them 
from the court file is not explained in the record.

  4Many defendants appear in court on 
citations long before any law enforcement reports become available even to the 
prosecutor, no less the defendant.  
We would impose 
unmanageable delays, particularly in the circuit courts, were we to disallow 
entry of a plea prior to completion and full discovery of those 
reports.