Title: Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CITY OF COLUMBUS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, APPELLANT, v. MCGLONE ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 569.] 
Civil Rights Commission — Complaint alleges discrimination against applicant 
for position as firefighter recruit on basis of a handicap, his visual 
impairment — Person denied employment because of a physical impairment 
is not necessarily “handicapped” pursuant to former R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). 
A person denied employment because of a physical impairment is not necessarily 
“handicapped” pursuant to former R.C. 4112.01(A)(13). 
(No. 97-980 — Submitted March 25, 1998 — Decided August 12, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 96APE08-1032 and 
96APE08-1083. 
 
Appellee James McGlone applied for a position as a firefighter recruit with 
the city of Columbus on April 2, 1990.  At that time, the application process 
consisted of a written examination and a physical capability test.  Applicants who 
passed those tests were ranked on an eligible list based on their combined scores.  
Applicants on the eligible list then moved on to the next phases of the process, 
which included an aerial ladder climb, a background review, and a medical 
examination which included a vision test.  Applicants who failed any portion of 
the application process could not be considered for appointment to the firefighter 
training academy. 
 
McGlone was ranked number 156 on the eligible list after the written 
examination and physical capability test.  He then successfully completed the 
ladder climb and background review portions of the process.  However, McGlone 
failed the vision test portion of his medical examination.  The city’s visual acuity 
standard requires a firefighter applicant to have not less than 20/40 vision in both 
 
2
eyes without correction, acuity of not less than 20/20 in both eyes with correction, 
and normal color vision.  McGlone’s vision was 20/100 in both eyes without 
correction.  A person with 20/100 vision can see an object from twenty feet only 
as well as a person with 20/20 vision can see an object at one hundred feet.  Since 
he failed the vision portion of the medical examination, McGlone was removed 
from the eligible list on June 9, 1992. 
 
On November 17, 1992, McGlone filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission (“OCRC”), alleging that the city had discriminated against him on the 
basis of a handicap, his visual impairment.  The OCRC investigated the charge, 
issued a complaint, and held a hearing.  The OCRC hearing examiner found that 
the city had discriminated against McGlone on the basis of a perceived handicap 
and recommended that he be reinstated to the eligible list.  The hearing examiner 
did not recommend any back pay.  The OCRC adopted the hearing examiner’s 
finding of discrimination, but also awarded back pay and ordered the city to offer 
McGlone employment as a firefighter. 
 
The city appealed that decision to the Franklin County Common Pleas 
Court.  The common pleas court upheld the discrimination finding, but reversed 
the OCRC’s remedy.  The OCRC appealed the remedial portion of the court’s 
decision; the city cross-appealed on the discrimination finding.  The appellate 
court affirmed the finding of discrimination, holding that the city perceived 
McGlone to be handicapped and removed him from the eligible list because of that 
handicap, despite the fact that he could safely and substantially perform the 
essential functions of a firefighter with the reasonable accommodation of being 
allowed to wear contact lenses while on duty. 
 
3
 
With respect to the remedy, the appellate court reversed the trial court, 
holding that the remedy ordered by the OCRC was supported by reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Janet E. Jackson, City Attorney, Sherrie J. Passmore, Chief Labor 
Attorney, and Stephanie M. Hughes, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Michael G. Moore, for appellee James McGlone. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Duffy Jamieson and Matthew D. 
Miko, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Ohio Civil Rights Commission. 
 
Louis A. Jacobs; Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman and Frederick M. Gittes, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Employment Lawyers Association. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  We hold that a person denied employment because of a 
physical impairment is not necessarily “handicapped” pursuant to former R.C. 
4112.01(A)(13). 
 
To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the person 
seeking relief must demonstrate (1) that he or she was handicapped, (2) that an 
adverse employment action was taken by an employer, at least in part, because the 
individual was handicapped, and (3) that the person, though handicapped, can 
safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question. 
Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 25 OBR 331, 
333, 496 N.E.2d 478, 480.  This case revolves around the first element, i.e., 
whether McGlone was handicapped.  At the time this case arose, the predecessor 
 
4
to the current R.C. 4112.01(A)(13) was in effect, and it defined “handicap” as 
follows: 
 
“ ‘Handicap’ means a medically diagnosable, abnormal condition which is 
expected to continue for a considerable length of time, whether correctable or 
uncorrectable by good medical practice, which can reasonably be expected to limit 
the person’s functional ability, including, but not limited to, seeing, hearing, 
thinking, ambulating, climbing, descending, lifting, grasping, sitting, rising, any 
related function, or any limitation due to weakness and significantly decreased 
endurance, so that he cannot perform his everyday routine living and working 
without significantly increased hardship and vulnerability to what are considered 
the everyday obstacles and hazards encountered by the non-handicapped.” 143 
Ohio Laws, Part III, 4156. 
 
In the current version of R.C. 4112.01(A)(13), even if a person is not 
handicapped, he can gain the protection of handicap discrimination laws if he is 
“regarded [by an employer] as having a physical or mental impairment.”  While 
the “regarded as handicapped” language was not part of the statute when this case 
arose, the pertinent Administrative Code section in effect at the time, Ohio 
Adm.Code 4112-5-02(H), included in its definition of a “handicapped person” 
“any person who is regarded as handicapped by a respondent.”  We therefore find 
that it was appropriate for the OCRC and the reviewing courts to consider whether 
the city perceived McGlone as handicapped. 
 
The question before this court then is whether a person can be foreclosed 
from a particular job based upon a physical impairment without at the same time 
being handicapped, or perceived as handicapped, under former R.C. 
4112.01(A)(13), and therefore due the protections of the Ohio Civil Rights Act.  
 
5
We find that McGlone was neither handicapped nor perceived as handicapped by 
the city. 
 
To find that McGlone was handicapped, we would have to conclude that his 
nearsightedness was a “medically diagnosable, abnormal condition which is 
expected to continue for a considerable length of time * * * which can reasonably 
be expected to limit [his] functional ability * * * so that he cannot perform his 
everyday routine living and working without significantly increased hardship and 
vulnerability to what are considered the everyday obstacles and hazards 
encountered by the nonhandicapped.” 
 
There is no dispute that McGlone’s 20/100 vision is a medically 
diagnosable condition that is expected to continue.  Whether that condition limits 
his functional ability so that he cannot perform his everyday routine living and 
working without significantly increased hardship is another matter.  The record 
shows that McGlone leads a normal life.  The fact that he wears eyeglasses or 
contact lenses is not a significant hardship.  It is a common burden shared by 
millions, including a majority of this court. 
 
McGlone’s nearsightedness has led to one major hardship in his life, his 
inability to become a firefighter.  But the statute speaks in terms of “everyday 
routine living and working.”  It is a broad reference to a general quality of life.  
The handicap discrimination statute was designed to protect those who live with a 
handicap that significantly affects the way they live their lives on a day-to-day 
basis. 
 
The federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is similar to the Ohio 
handicap discrimination law.  It defines a disability as a “physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] 
individual.” Section 12102(2)(A), Title 42, U.S.Code.  We can look to regulations 
 
6
and cases interpreting the federal Act for guidance in our interpretation of Ohio 
law. Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 
575 N.E.2d 1164. 
 
In its interpretation of the ADA, Section 1630.2(j)(3), Title 29, C.F.R. 
discusses what factors should be considered in determining whether an individual 
is substantially limited in a major life activity: 
 
“With respect to the major life activity of working — 
 
“(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability 
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.  
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of working.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
There is no evidence that McGlone’s vision disqualified him from a class of 
jobs or a wide range of jobs.  The city merely precluded him from one position, 
firefighter.  In Bridges v. Bossier (C.A.5, 1996), 92 F.3d 329, the court held that 
an applicant who was disqualified from performing firefighting jobs for the city 
based on a mild form of hemophilia was not disabled under the ADA, since the 
field of firefighting jobs was too narrow a field to constitute a “class of jobs.”  We 
agree with the Bridges court’s interpretation that the position of firefighter does 
not constitute a class of jobs, but is merely one job.  We further conclude that the 
inability to perform a single job does not present significantly increased hardship 
to a person’s everyday routine living and working. 
 
Other federal courts have refused to find that nearsightedness constitutes a 
disability.  In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (C.A.10, 1997), 130 F.3d 893, 
plaintiffs, twin sisters, were denied employment by United Air Lines for failure to 
have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better in each eye.  The Sutton court found 
 
7
that the impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity, and that the 
sisters were not disabled.  In Chandler v. Dallas  (C.A.5, 1993), 2 F.3d 1385, 
1390, the court held that a person is not handicapped if his vision can be corrected 
to 20/200.  In Joyce v. Suffolk Cty. (E.D.N.Y.1996), 911 F.Supp. 92, a plaintiff 
denied a job as a police officer because of impaired eyesight was found not to 
have a disability.  See, also, Walker v. Aberdeen-Monroe Cty. Hosp. 
(N.D.Miss.1993), 838 F.Supp. 285; Trembczsynski v. Calumet City (Aug. 31, 
1987), N.D.Ill. No. 87 C 0961, unreported, 1987 WL 16604. 
 
We conclude that McGlone’s 20/100 vision is not a handicap under the 
statute. His vision problem did not create significantly increased hardship in 
McGlone’s functional ability to perform his everyday living and working. 
 
We further conclude that the city did not perceive McGlone as handicapped.  
We stated above that the inability to perform a single job because of an abnormal 
condition does not transform that condition into a handicap.  The city in this case 
considered McGlone nearsighted, not handicapped, merely lacking a single 
physical requirement for a single job.  For McGlone to succeed on a theory of 
perceived handicap, the city would have had to consider McGlone’s 
nearsightedness as foreclosing him from a class of jobs.  There is no evidence that 
the city had such a perception. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.