Title: DeRolph v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as DeRolph v. State, 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 2000-Ohio-437.] 
 
 
 
DEROLPH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1.] 
Constitutional law — Education — Schools — Defendants provided with more 
time to comply with Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution — 
Supreme Court declines to appoint special master to oversee state’s 
further efforts to comply with Section 2, Article VI — Supreme Court 
maintains continuing jurisdiction with matter continued to June 15, 
2001. 
1.  “[T]he sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General Assembly to 
secure not merely a system of common schools,” but rather a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools.  Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 
287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 773, 776, approved and followed. 
2.  “The attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that system” of common 
schools is “expressly made a purpose, not local, not municipal, but state-
wide.”  Id., approved and followed. 
3.  A thorough system means that each and every school district has enough funds 
to operate.  An efficient system means one in which each and every school 
district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that 
are in compliance with state building and fire codes, and equipment 
sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational opportunity. 
(No. 99-570 — Submitted November 16, 1999 — Decided May 11, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County, No. 22043. 
 
In DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph 
I”), at the syllabus, this court determined that “Ohio’s elementary and secondary 
public school financing system violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution, which mandates a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
 
2 
throughout the state.”  For the background and procedural history of the events 
that led up to that opinion, see 78 Ohio St.3d at 193-195, 677 N.E.2d at 734-735. 
 
In DeRolph I, this court recognized that a new funding system could not 
be crafted and implemented without time and deliberation.  Therefore, we stayed 
the effect of our decision for twelve months, id. at 213, 677 N.E.2d at 747, in 
order to give the General Assembly time to enact remedial legislation.  We 
remanded the cause to the trial court, ordering the trial court to “retain jurisdiction 
until the legislation is enacted and, in effect, taking such action as may be 
necessary to ensure conformity with this opinion.”  Id. 
 
In entries issued after that decision, this court expounded on its order of 
remand to the trial court.  In particular, in response to a request from the 
defendants for clarification and reconsideration of the decision, this court stated 
that local property taxes could be part of the revised funding plan, but property 
taxes could not be the primary means of funding a thorough and efficient system 
of schools.  78 Ohio St.3d 419, 678 N.E.2d 886, 887.  Furthermore, this court 
stated that, consistent with the DeRolph I decision, upon remand to the trial court 
the parties could present evidence regarding the enacted remedy, to establish 
whether the remedy satisfied the Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution.  78 Ohio St.3d at 420-421, 678 N.E.2d at 887-888.  The parties 
could then appeal the trial court’s ruling directly to this court, for final 
determination.  Id. at 421, 678 N.E.2d at 888. 
 
From August 24, 1998 through September 3, 1998, the trial court held a 
hearing on the General Assembly’s efforts in the wake of DeRolph I to create a 
new funding method.  Plaintiffs, who continued to assert that Ohio’s system of 
funding public education is unconstitutional, are essentially the same plaintiffs 
who pressed that position in DeRolph I.  The defendants argued that the revised 
system complies with the Ohio Constitution. 
 
3 
 
During the hearing, the trial court propounded inquiries to this court.  This 
court responded by stating that (1) the remand to the trial court involved the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution and did not involve the 
Equal Protection Clause, and (2) the state bore the burden of production and proof 
on remand, and was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Constitution had been satisfied in order to prevail.  83 Ohio St.3d 1212, 699 
N.E.2d 518, 518-519. 
 
After extensive briefing and the presentation of a great deal of evidence, 
the trial court issued its decision on February 26, 1999.  The decision, reported at 
(1999), 98 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 712 N.E.2d 125, is two hundred sixty-three pages in 
length in the Ohio Official Reports.  Upon determining that the state had failed to 
implement a complete systematic overhaul of Ohio’s school-funding system, the 
trial court concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden of proof that it had 
complied with the requirements of the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at 263, 712 N.E.2d 
at 297. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the defendants’ appeal as of 
right from the trial court decision, under the procedures established in DeRolph I 
and subsequent orders of this court. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Nicholas A. Pittner, John F. Birath, Jr., Sue 
Wyskiver Yount, Quintin F. Lindsmith and Susan B. Greenberger, for appellees. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Mary Lynn Readey, Roger F. 
Carroll and James G. Tassie, Assistant Attorneys General; Jones, Day, Reavis & 
Pogue and Jeffrey S. Sutton; Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Joel S. Taylor, for 
appellants. 
 
Joseph P. Sulzer, urging affirmance for amici curiae members of the Ohio 
House of Representatives John R. Bender, Jack Ford, Barbara C. Pringle, Daniel 
Metelsky, Charles A. Wilson, Jr., Troy Lee James, Barbara Boyd, William L. 
 
4 
Ogg, Tom Roberts, David Hartley, Jerry Krupinski, Sylvester Patton, Jr., Sean D. 
Logan, Joe Sulzer, William Healy, June H. Ferderber, Peter Lawson Jones, Dale 
Miller, Betty Sutton, Vernon Sykes, Samuel Britton, Dixie J. Allen, Darrell Opfer, 
Erin Sullivan, John E. Barnes, Jr., Bryan Flannery, L. George Distel, Jeanine 
Perry, Chris Verich, Catherine L. Barrett, Robert Gooding, Joyce Beatty, Ray 
Miller, and Shirley A. Smith; and Ohio Senators Ben Espy, Leigh Herrington, 
Daniel Brady, Robert F. Hagan, Michael C. Shoemaker, Mark Mallory, and C.J. 
Prentiss. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, James E. Betts and Frederick W. Whatley, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Alliance for Adequate School Funding. 
 
Raymond Vasvari and Gino J. Scarselli, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
 
Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Kimball H. Carey and 
Katherine A. Francis, urging affirmance for amici curiae Buckeye Association of 
School Administrators, Ohio School Boards Association, and Ohio Association of 
School Business Officials. 
 
Patrick F. Timmins, Jr., urging affirmance for amicus curiae Coalition of 
Rural and Appalachian Schools. 
 
Louis B. Geneva Co., L.P.A., and M. Jayne H. Geneva, urging affirmance 
for amici curiae Coalition for School Funding Reform, Cleveland Heights-
University Heights City School District, East Cleveland City School District, 
Grand Valley Local School District, Lakewood City School District, Shaker 
Heights City School District, Waverly City School District, and Coalition for 
Greater Cleveland’s Children. 
 
Courtney Williams, urging affirmance for amicus curiae League of 
Women Voters of Ohio. 
 
Bernard Cohen, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Child Caring Agencies. 
 
5 
 
John T. Ryerson, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association 
for Gifted Children. 
 
Buckley King & Bluso, Robert J. Walter and Thomas C. Drabick, Jr., 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Public School 
Employees (OAPSE)/AFSCME Local 4, AFL-CIO. 
 
Christopher Lopez; Kalniz, Iorio & Feldstein Co., L.P.A., Ted Iorio, 
Christine A. Reardon and Donato Iorio, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Education Association. 
 
Schnorf & Schnorf Co., L.P.A., David M. Schnorf and Johna M. Bella, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Federation of Teachers. 
 
Ohio Legal Rights Service and Susan G. Tobin, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Legal Rights Service. 
 
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer and C. Bronston McCord III, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae West Clermont Local School District Board of Education. 
 
John M. Haseley, urging affirmance for amicus curiae United States 
Congressman Ted Strickland. 
 
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe and John J. Chester, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Governor Bob Taft. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., and N. Victor Goodman, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Richard H. Finan, President of the Ohio Senate, 
and Jo Ann Davidson, Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
I 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
In DeRolph I, after an exhaustive review of the evidence, a majority of this 
court concluded that Ohio’s system of primary and secondary public schools in 
place at that time fell well short of the mandate of Section 2, Article VI.  DeRolph 
 
6 
I recognized that, despite the earnest efforts of the General Assembly, it was 
simply impossible to characterize the existing system as “thorough and efficient.”  
Accordingly, this court declared the system unconstitutional and stated that the 
General Assembly must devise and implement a new “thorough and efficient” 
system. 
 
Now, this court is called upon to consider the same basic constitutional 
question that was before us in DeRolph I—Can the revised system be 
characterized as thorough and efficient pursuant to Section 2, Article VI of the 
Ohio Constitution?  Although the key inquiry is the same, the specifics of that 
inquiry have changed commensurately with the state’s attempts to institute the 
necessary reforms.  Therefore, realizing that legislation involving schools is an 
ongoing and ever-changing process as new laws are continuously enacted and 
former laws are constantly amended or repealed, it is incumbent upon us to 
examine the extent of those reforms to consider whether the mandate of the 
Constitution has been satisfied. 
 
The benchmark of our inquiry remains the Thorough and Efficient Clause, 
as set forth in Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution: 
 
“The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State * * *.” 
 
We reiterate the standard for a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools as set out in Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 
773, 776: 
 
“This declaration is made by the people of the state.  It calls for the 
upbuilding of a system of schools throughout the state, and the attainment of 
efficiency and thoroughness in that system is thus expressly made a purpose, not 
local, not municipal, but state-wide. 
 
7 
 
“With this very purpose in view, regarding the problem as a state-wide 
problem, the sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General Assembly to 
secure not merely a system of common schools, but a system thorough and 
efficient throughout the state. 
 
“A thorough system could not mean one in which part or any number of 
the school districts of the state were starved for funds.  An efficient system could 
not mean one in which part or any number of the school districts of the state 
lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment.” 
 
Furthermore, in Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 
Ohio St.2d 368, 387, 12 O.O.3d 327, 338, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825, this court 
observed that a school system could not be thorough and efficient if any school 
district in Ohio “was receiving so little local and state revenue that the students 
were effectively being deprived of educational opportunity.”  See, also, DeRolph 
I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 204, 677 N.E.2d at 741, citing both Miller and Walter with 
approval. 
 
In DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747, this court 
identified four aspects of the school-funding scheme in place at that time that 
contributed “to the unworkability of the system and which must be eliminated.”  
Those four aspects were “(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) 
the emphasis of Ohio’s school funding system on local property tax, (3) the 
requirement of school district borrowing through the spending reserve and 
emergency school assistance loan programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient funding 
in the General Assembly’s biennium budget for the construction and maintenance 
of public school buildings.” 
 
This court, in declaring the statutes unconstitutional, stated in DeRolph I at 
213, 677 N.E.2d at 747, that “[b]ecause of its importance, education should be 
placed high in the state’s budgetary priorities.  A thorough and efficient system of 
common schools includes facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and 
 
8 
funds necessary to maintain these facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with 
all local, state, and federal mandates.” 
 
The defendants claim that they have enacted a package of remedial 
legislation that meets and even exceeds the requirement for a system that is both 
thorough and efficient.  Defendants argue that the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed and ask this court to “give the new, ongoing remedy a chance 
to succeed.” 
 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, urge this court to find that the state has fallen 
woefully short of its obligations to craft a thorough and efficient system.  
Plaintiffs argue that this court should affirm the judgment of the trial court, which 
was in their favor on every significant point.  Furthermore, plaintiffs request that 
this court (1) declare that the right to an education is a fundamental right under 
the Ohio Constitution, with a corresponding duty on the state to justify any 
disparities in the funding system; (2) specify what programs and services must be 
provided to children at every level, in order to define what level of educational 
opportunities must be made available; (3) retain jurisdiction of the case and direct 
the parties to a settlement conference under the supervision of a special master; 
and (4) issue an interim funding order that, among other things, requires the state 
to fund the foundation level at $5,051 per pupil, updated for inflation from FY99, 
and also requires the state to fund school facilities at a minimum level of $1 
billion for each fiscal year. 
 
In DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 198, 677 N.E.2d at 737, this court stated 
that “Ohio’s statutory scheme for financing public education is complex.”  In 
addition, this court noted that “[s]chool funding has been, and continues to be, a 
Herculean task.”  Id. at 211, 677 N.E.2d at 746.  These remarks apply with equal 
force to the system now at issue.  In fact, the educational system continues to be 
extraordinarily complex, and as evidenced by the record now before us, 
reforming that system continues to be a task of unparalleled magnitude.  It is 
 
9 
impossible to overstate the scope of the challenge presented to the state by this 
case.  This case implicates more than just funding; it also involves other complex 
intertwined issues. 
 
The General Assembly must give this problem its undivided attention.  If 
it is not addressed and solved immediately, it will only increase in magnitude.  
For example, the 1990 Ohio Public School Facility Survey determined that Ohio’s 
public primary and secondary schools then needed $10.2 billion for building 
repair and construction.  In 1997, the Legislative Budget Office completed a study 
and concluded that the need had risen to a staggering $16.5 billion, with the 
state’s share estimated to be $7.2 billion and the local share estimated at $9.3 
billion.  In a 1996 report of the United States General Accounting Office, Ohio 
was ranked very near the bottom among the states in many categories regarding 
the condition of its school facilities, and was ranked dead last among the states in 
percentage of schools with at least one inadequate building feature.  Furthermore, 
Ohio was ranked forty-eighth among the fifty states in percentage of schools 
reporting the need to spend money to repair or upgrade schools to good overall 
condition, with more than ninety-five percent of Ohio schools needing to spend 
for that improvement.  In a report released in March 2000 concerning construction 
expenditures for school facilities, the General Accounting Office found that the 
national average annual state construction expenditure per student for FY90 
through FY97 was $473.  Ohio ranked fortieth among the states, with an average 
annual expenditure for the time period of $274 per student.  School Facilities, 
Construction Expenditures Have Grown Significantly in Recent Years, 
GAO/HEHS-00-41 (Mar. 3, 2000) 29-30. 
 
Other statistics also illustrate the magnitude of the school-funding 
challenge.  There are six hundred eleven separate school districts in this state and 
forty-nine joint vocational school districts.  There are approximately 1.8 million 
school children in primary and secondary public schools in Ohio and 
 
10 
approximately one hundred eight thousand public school teachers.  There are 
approximately three thousand nine hundred public school buildings in the state.  
Appropriations for primary and secondary education account for about forty 
percent of the state’s overall budget for this biennium, with more than $6.5 billion 
appropriated for FY00 for primary and secondary education out of a total state 
budget of more than $16.2 billion.  For FY01 the appropriation is more than $6.9 
billion for primary and secondary education out of a total state budget of more 
than $17.2 billion.  These numbers reflect only the share contributed by the state 
for the funding of primary and secondary education and do not include the federal 
and local shares. 
 
In FY97, a statewide total of more than $10 billion in local, state, and 
federal funds was spent on primary and secondary education.  The federal 
government’s contribution was approximately six percent of that total.  
Considering only the combined state and local revenues of the districts, the state 
contribution was about 43.8 percent, and the local share was about 56.2 percent.  
These statistics illustrate the accuracy of this court’s observation in DeRolph I, 78 
Ohio St.3d at 199, 677 N.E.2d at 738, that “Ohio relies more on local revenue 
than state revenue, contrary to the national trend.” 
 
The Ohio school-funding system’s reliance on local revenue, chiefly in the 
form of local property taxes, is one aspect of the overall system with deep 
historical roots.  In Ohio, as in many other states, the tradition of using local 
property taxes as the primary means to fund public schools has been entrenched 
since early statehood.  See, e.g., 19 Ohio Laws 51, 55.  As we recognized in 
DeRolph I, Ohio is just one of many states in recent years to face the fundamental 
problems caused by an overreliance on local property taxes. 
 
The inherent inequities of funding systems that rely too much on local 
property taxes not only are extremely difficult to rectify, but also run counter to 
our Constitution’s explicit requirement for a statewide system of public schools.  
 
11 
The valuation of local property has no connection whatsoever to the actual 
education needs of the locality, with the result that a system overreliant on local 
property taxes is by its very nature an arbitrary system that can never be totally 
thorough or efficient.  In a very real sense, this problem underlies most of the 
other deficiencies in Ohio’s school system and is either the direct or indirect cause 
of them.  The majority and all three separate concurring opinions in DeRolph I 
specifically recognized the inadequacies of a system that is overreliant on local 
property taxes. 
 
We recognize that the problems associated with school funding being 
faced by recent and current sessions of the General Assembly are not of recent 
vintage.  Many of the current deficiencies in school-funding policies arose over a 
long time and are the products of the failure for so many years of legislators who 
have long since retired to appropriately place education as a high priority in the 
state budget.  To a significant degree, current members of the General Assembly 
have inherited a problem that has been coming to a head for many years.  Our 
current legislators must confront problems that General Assembly members of the 
past were reluctant to address because education was simply not in the forefront 
of public concerns.  Education was too often ignored, and issues relating to it 
were too often given short shrift. 
 
Many factors have contributed in recent years to make what had been a 
problematical system into one that has reached crisis proportions throughout the 
state.  The problems have escalated in part due to “unfunded mandates” imposed 
by the state and federal governments, causing the cost of educating our children to 
rise dramatically.  Even when the state or federal government does fund a 
particular program or endeavor, significant associated local costs may be incurred.  
Increased costs for numerous programs and needs, such as special education, R.C. 
3323.04, vocational education, R.C. 3313.90, gifted-student programs, R.C. 
3313.21, transportation, R.C. 3327.01, facilities improvements (e.g., asbestos 
 
12 
abatement and wiring for technology, as well as day-to-day maintenance on 
deteriorating buildings), compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act, 
Sections 12101 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, employee costs (e.g., benefits such as 
health care, and for teacher certification, licensing, and development), increased 
staffing needs (e.g., additional teachers of science, math, and computer skills, and 
speech, hearing, and psychological educational aides), textbooks and supplies, 
R.C. 3315.17(A), science labs, computers and other technology purchases, 
summer school remediation, dropout-prevention programs, adolescent-pregnancy 
programs, Head Start and preschool programs, adult-literacy programs, substance-
abuse-prevention programs, school lunch and breakfast programs, R.C. 
3313.813(C), and a myriad of other things, have exacerbated problems that seem 
less and less manageable as total expenditures continually rise within a system 
impeded by the arbitrariness of its revenue stream. 
 
It is apparent that the task of passing and implementing legislation 
involving education is exceedingly complex—studies must be conducted, experts 
must be consulted, goals must be formulated, and priorities set.  There are many 
options to choose from, and deciding upon the best option and then reaching a 
consensus are formidable undertakings.  In addition, a consensus must be reached 
in a climate in which other budgetary considerations are always present, with 
other spending priorities constantly lobbying for their own larger pieces of the 
limited state budget pie.  Political realities, such as an individual legislator’s 
reelection concerns, also complicate the effort to devise a fair and adequate 
system.  These budgetary and political concerns must yield, however, when 
compliance with a constitutional mandate is at issue.  The task is difficult enough 
in prosperous times, when the state’s coffers are full.  However, the funding 
system that is devised must be solid enough that it can also function in an 
economic downturn, because a consistent revenue stream is an absolute necessity 
for a thorough and efficient system. 
 
13 
 
Because the arguments before both the trial court and this court focused so 
narrowly on school funding, it is extremely important to recognize that funding is 
only one aspect of a thorough and efficient system of schools.  We would be 
remiss if we failed to acknowledge that thoroughness and efficiency embrace far 
more than simply adequate funding.  Even if the system were very generously 
funded, if other factors are ignored, it might still not be thorough and efficient.  If 
teachers are ill prepared and students are unaware of what is expected of them, 
then our state has failed them.  If students have access to the latest technology but 
cannot take advantage of it, then our state has failed them.  If students have the 
most up-to-date textbooks but cannot comprehend the material in those books, 
then our state has failed them. 
 
The definition of “thorough and efficient” is not static; it depends on one’s 
frame of reference.  What was deemed thorough and efficient when the state’s 
Constitution was adopted certainly would not be considered thorough and 
efficient today.  Likewise, an educational system that was considered thorough 
and efficient twenty-five years ago may not be so today.  Moreover, it is 
impossible to generate an all-inclusive list that specifically enumerates every 
possible component of a thorough and efficient system.  In light of this, we offer 
the following guidance:  A thorough system means that each and every school 
district has enough funds to operate.  An efficient system is one in which each and 
every school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings 
that are in compliance with state fire and building codes, and equipment sufficient 
for all students to be afforded an educational opportunity. 
 
In November 1998, former Governor George Voinovich requested a study 
by a group of experts, Achieve, Inc.,1 the purpose of which was to provide 
incoming Governor Robert Taft and the new State Superintendent of Education, 
as well as legislators and others, a candid assessment of the strengths and 
 
14 
weaknesses of Ohio’s reform strategy.  When completed in March 1999, the 
Achieve, Inc. Report made the following observations: 
 
“Ohio can be proud of a substantial set of policy initiatives it has launched 
in the 1990s, and of the deepening investments it has made in educational 
improvement.  Since Fiscal Year 1991, state education funding has increased by 
approximately 50 percent, twice the rate of inflation.  The increase has been 
greatest for low-wealth districts.  Legislation already enacted guarantees an 
additional 40 percent increase in state aid over the next five years. 
 
“Over and above these increases in general state aid for education, there 
have been substantial new investments in early childhood education, technology, 
facilities, and urban education, and major policy initiatives to overhaul teacher 
education and strengthen public accountability for results.  Each of these 
initiatives deserves comment, for each could be an important element in a 
comprehensive state strategy to close the gap in student and school performance.” 
 
In some ways, funding is the most easily quantifiable of the many factors 
that play a part in establishing a thorough and efficient system of schools.  When 
considering the per-pupil spending disparities and the inadequacies in facilities 
that have of late characterized our system of schools, it is evident that some of the 
most glaring problems are engendered by inadequate funding.  Therefore, 
remedying those problems is naturally of paramount importance.  Yet all of the 
other requirements of a thorough and efficient system of education must be 
developed along with funding.  Ensuring adequate school funding is simply one 
of the means to reach the end—with the end being a statewide thorough and 
efficient system of schools that is adequately funded and that has statewide 
standards for success. 
 
Even though remedying the scheme for school funding is not an end unto 
itself, it is an important step in establishing the type of school system that the 
Constitution requires.  No one can ensure that adequate facilities and educational 
 
15 
opportunities will lead to the success of the students of this state.  One thing that 
is apparent, though, is that substandard facilities and inadequate resources and 
opportunities for any of those students are a sure formula for failure. 
 
Our decision in DeRolph I required the General Assembly to respond to 
the untenable funding situation that had developed over time.  Rather than 
allowing the status quo to continue, we realized that we could not, in good 
conscience, ignore the overwhelming evidence before us that our statewide 
system of public schools was simply not a thorough and efficient system.  
Significant changes had to be made in the way primary and secondary public 
education is funded, and if it took a judgment of this court to make those changes 
happen, then so be it. 
 
We fully realize that no miraculous alternatives will suddenly appear and 
make the General Assembly’s task any easier.  In order to create a thorough and 
efficient system of statewide common schools, hard choices must be made.  
Moreover, because the stakes in this endeavor cannot be overestimated—we are 
dealing with the futures of the children of this state and in reality the very future 
of our state—the course must be stayed.  As past experience has shown, the 
longer an inadequate funding system is allowed to continue, the more difficult it is 
to reform the system.  The General Assembly should not allow the momentum of 
recent efforts to be impeded for any reason.  Everyone’s cooperation and best 
efforts are required as we strive to ensure that educational opportunities are 
available to all children in this great state, not just those residing in affluent 
suburbs or in well-to-do neighborhoods. 
 
Throughout its history, this case has presented two contradictory features 
that have made it difficult for all parties involved, including the courts of this 
state, to define the roles of those charged with solving the system’s problems.  On 
the one hand, the courts of this state are entrusted with the authority to determine 
whether a school-funding scheme complies with the Constitution.  See DeRolph I 
 
16 
at 198, 677 N.E.2d at 738.  However, this court in DeRolph I did not require a 
specific funding scheme and did not instruct the General Assembly as to what 
legislation should be enacted, leaving it to the General Assembly to determine the 
specifics of the remedial legislation.  Id. at 212-213, 677 N.E.2d at 747.  The 
reason for this is the doctrine of separation of powers.  The legislature has the 
power to draft legislation, and the court has the power to determine whether that 
legislation complies with the Constitution.  However, while it is for the General 
Assembly to legislate a remedy, courts do possess the authority to enforce their 
orders, since the power to declare a particular law or enactment unconstitutional 
must include the power to require a revision of that enactment, to ensure that it is 
then constitutional.  If it did not, then the power to find a particular Act 
unconstitutional would be a nullity.  As a result there would be no enforceable 
remedy.  A remedy that is never enforced is truly not a remedy. 
 
Thus, it might be tempting for this court to do its own analysis, for 
example, determining the level of funding per pupil to achieve a thorough and 
efficient system, and then ordering that amount of funding.  For instance, we 
conceivably could simply order, as plaintiffs request, that the foundation amount 
be set in excess of $5,000 per pupil for FY00, and order the General Assembly to 
fund that amount.  However, this court respectfully declines to pursue that course.  
That degree of involvement in fashioning a remedy in this case is not, nor should 
ever be, how we perceive our role.  Our role, as we have declared in past cases, is 
to decide issues of constitutionality—not to legislate, as some may believe. 
II 
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
 
A substantial amount of legislation has been enacted since DeRolph I was 
decided.  There are indications that Governor Taft and the General Assembly 
have taken some of the steps necessary to remedy a situation that has been 
neglected for more than twenty-five years.  We now examine the laws that have 
 
17 
been enacted in response to DeRolph I.  Before we consider the specifics of the 
legislation in context, we summarize the developments that have occurred.  The 
key initiatives include: 
• Am.Sub.S.B. No. 102 (“S.B. 102”) (signed into law on May 20, 1997) 
created the Ohio School Facilities Commission (see R.C. 3318.30), transferred 
responsibility for the Classroom Facilities Assistance Program from the State 
Board of Education to that commission, required that commission to establish the 
Emergency School Building Repair Program (see R.C. 3318.35), and instituted 
and authorized money for the so-called Big Eight Repair Program for major 
renovations and repairs of school facilities in some of the largest school districts 
in the state (Section 7 of the Act). 
• Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215 (“H.B. 215”) (the Biennial Budget Bill for FY98 
and FY99, signed into law on June 30, 1997) made adjustments in the basic aid 
formula amount (R.C. 3317.022) and made other changes to R.C. Chapter 3317.  
It also provided additional equity aid (Section 50.05 of the Act; see R.C. 
3317.0213), additional funding for textbooks (Section 50.16), additional funding 
for facilities (Section 188), and additional funding for the SchoolNet (Section 
69.01) and SchoolNet Plus (Section 69.03) programs, as well as creating and 
providing initial funding for the Disability Access Program (Sections 50 and 69). 
• Am.Sub.S.B. No. 55 (“S.B. 55”) (signed into law on August 22, 1997), the 
student and school district “Academic Accountability Bill,” established school 
district performance standards (R.C. 3302.02) and school district report cards 
(R.C. 3302.03), increased high school graduation requirements (R.C. 3313.603), 
and instituted a “fourth-grade guarantee,” preventing students who do not pass the 
fourth-grade proficiency test from advancing to the fifth grade unless exceptions 
apply (R.C. 3313.608). 
 
18 
• Sub.H.B. No. 412 (“H.B. 412”) (signed into law on August 22, 1997), the 
“School District Fiscal Accountability Act,” requires school districts to maintain 
budget reserves (former R.C. 5705.29[K], now R.C. 5705.29[H]) and requires set-
asides for building maintenance (R.C. 3315.18) and textbooks and instructional 
materials (R.C. 3315.17), and created the school district solvency assistance fund 
(R.C. 3316.20). 
• Am.Sub.H.B. No. 650 (“H.B. 650”) (signed into law on February 13, 
1998) and Am.Sub.H.B. No. 770 (“H.B. 770”) (signed into law on June 17, 1998) 
make up the heart of the General Assembly’s remedy.  H.B. 650’s stated purpose 
is “to establish a new system for funding education.”  H.B. 770, among other 
things, modified some of H.B. 650’s provisions.  This legislation set out the 
essence of the current R.C. Chapter 3317 school-funding formula, including the 
base cost amount and the adjustments and subsidies.  It also provided money for 
school facilities.  H.B. 650 at Section 14. 
• Am.Sub.H.B. No. 850 (“H.B. 850”) (the capital appropriations bill for the 
biennium ending June 30, 2000, signed into law on December 17, 1998) provided 
money for school facilities, some specified for districts with exceptional needs.  
Sections 6 and 26 of the Act. 
• Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282 (“H.B. 282”) (the biennial Education Budget Bill 
for FY00 and FY01, signed into law on June 29, 1999) marks the first time that 
the state has created an education budget separate from its main operating budget, 
by placing the education budget into its own bill.  H.B. 282 made adjustments to 
the R.C. 3317.02 per-pupil formula amount, and made other adjustments in the 
R.C. Chapter 3317 funding formula, enacted R.C. Chapter 3324 pertaining to 
gifted students, and provided additional money for SchoolNet plus.  Section 11 of 
the Act. 
 
19 
• Am.Sub.H.B. No. 283 (“H.B. 283”) (the Biennial Budget Bill for FY00 
and FY01, signed into law on June 30, 1999) the main operating budget bill for 
the biennium, allocated state budget surplus revenue to SchoolNet Plus and for 
school facilities, with some of the facilities money to go to districts with 
exceptional needs.  Section 124 of the Act. 
• Am.Sub.S.B. No. 192 (“S.B. 192”) (signed into law on March 3, 2000) 
provided for the allocation of money received by the state pursuant to the 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, committing a significant amount of 
tobacco settlement funds for school construction and repair.  R.C. 183.02(F) and 
183.26.  See, also, Section 17 of the Act. 
 
In addition, other initiatives are pertinent to our inquiry, including 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 (“H.B. 1”) (signed into law March 30, 1999; implemented the 
OhioReads initiative); Am.Sub.S.B. No. 1 (signed into law May 6, 1999; 
established school safety zones); and Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 (concurred in 
by the House on May 4, 1999), which placed on the November 2, 1999 ballot a 
proposed constitutional amendment (ultimately approved by the voters of the 
state) to allow the state to issue general obligation bonds to pay for school 
facilities (Sections 2n and 17, Article VIII). 
III 
REMEDIAL LEGISLATION AND ITS EFFECTS 
 
We will now examine the foregoing legislation and assess its compliance 
with Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
We emphasize that due to the extent of some of the legislation, especially 
H.B. 650 and H.B. 770, our discussion of it is not in any way intended to be 
exhaustive. 
A 
Cost of an Adequate Education 
 
20 
 
In DeRolph I, this court noted that Ohio’s system of public education is a 
“statewide system” and admonished the General Assembly to “create an entirely 
new school financing system.”  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 N.E.2d at 747. 
 
An essential aspect of the school-funding program contained in R.C. 
Chapter 3317 is “basic state aid,” which provides eligible school districts with a 
guaranteed minimum amount of support.  R.C. 3317.022.  It is dependent on the 
base cost, calculated as the unweighted average cost per student of educating 
students who were enrolled in a school district that in fiscal year 1994 met 
seventeen out of eighteen performance criteria and that was not excluded on the 
basis of wealth or income.  R.C. 3317.012(B). 
 
In determining basic state aid, several components are considered in 
calculating the amount a school district will receive:  the guaranteed minimum 
dollar level of financial support (the formula amount), the district’s cost-of-doing-
business factor, average daily membership (“ADM”), adjusted total taxable value, 
and the charge-off amount.  R.C. 3317.022. 
 
A district’s cost-of-doing-business factor is based on the cost of goods and 
services in the county where the district is located.  R.C. 3317.02(N)(1).  Since 
the cost of goods and services is not uniform throughout the state, the cost-of-
doing-business factor is intended to put all school districts on a more level playing 
field. 
 
The ADM represents the number of students enrolled in a given school 
district and is calculated pursuant to R.C. 3317.03(A).  R.C. 3317.02(D)(1).  If it 
is more advantageous, a district may use a “three-year average formula ADM” to 
calculate its ADM.  R.C. 3317.02(D)(2);  3317.022(A). 
 
A school district’s “adjusted total taxable value” is defined in R.C. 
3317.02(W) and 3317.022(A)(2). 
 
The “charge-off amount” defines a district’s responsibility for its portion 
of the funding requirement.  To calculate the charge-off amount, a district’s 
 
21 
adjusted total taxable value is multiplied by the charge-off rate, which is currently 
twenty-three mills ($0.023) per dollar of valuation.  R.C. 3317.022.  Subtracting 
the charge-off amount from the rest of the formula yields the amount of basic 
state aid the district will receive.  Id. 
 
All of these variables function together so that the amount that an eligible 
district will receive from the state as basic aid can be determined.  The current 
formula for basic state aid is:  Cost-of-doing-business factor × formula amount × 
(the greater of formula ADM or the three-year average of formula ADM) – 
(0.023) (adjusted total taxable value).  R.C. 3317.022(A)(1).  The formula 
demonstrates that as more per-pupil revenue is generated locally, the state’s 
contribution declines. 
 
The formula amount is the “base cost for the fiscal year specified in 
section 3317.012,” adjusted with a phase-in.  R.C. 3317.012(B) sets forth the 
criteria used by the General Assembly to determine the base cost figure for FY96.  
This number was then adjusted for inflation at an annual rate of 2.8 percent.  R.C. 
3317.012(A).  Consequently, the base cost per pupil in FY00 is $4,177 and in 
FY04 will be $4,665.  Id. 
 
The base cost figure is phased in over a period of three years.  R.C. 
3317.02(B).  Commencing in July 2001, and every six years thereafter, the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are 
required to appoint three members to a committee, which will reexamine the cost 
of an adequate education.  R.C. 3317.012(C).  This is certainly a positive step in 
view of the fact that the cost of an adequate education in Ohio had not been 
determined since 1973-1974.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 261, 677 N.E.2d at 780 
(Resnick, J., concurring). 
 
In addition to the basic aid, the state provides funding for certain programs 
and school district operations individually, according to formulas established by 
the General Assembly.  Such programs include funding for special education, 
 
22 
R.C. 3317.022(C), education for gifted students, R.C. 3317.024(P), vocational 
education, R.C. 3317.022(E), transportation, R.C. 3317.024(E) and 3317.07, and 
Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid (“DPIA”), R.C. 3317.029.  These supplemental 
expenditures are often referred to collectively as categorical aid.  If the formula 
takes local wealth into account, then the formula is referred to as equalized. 
 
Special education is funded by the state in addition to the basic aid 
formula. H.B. 650 and H.B. 770 require special education students to be counted 
in ADM for determining basic aid.  R.C. 3317.03(A).  In addition to basic aid, 
districts receive separate state aid for special education pupils based on a 
weighted ADM, which is calculated based on the severity of the student’s 
disability.  R.C. 3317.013, 3317.022(C), and 3317.02(F)(1) through (3).  This 
treatment of handicapped students differs from the prior law, under which 
students whose education was separately funded were not also included in ADM 
for basic aid purposes.  Former R.C. 3317.02(A), H.B. 215;  former R.C. 
3317.024(N), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 230, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10301, 10304. 
 
The state continued to fund education programs for gifted children through 
funding units separate from basic aid in 1999, R.C. 3317.024(P), and H.B. 650 
increased the number of funding units available for FY99 from nine hundred 
twenty-seven to nine hundred fifty.  In H.B. 770 the General Assembly stated that 
it would review and revise the formula used to fund education for gifted children.  
Former R.C. 3317.024(P)(2). 
 
Vocational education is another program for which districts receive funds 
from the state in addition to those provided by the basic aid formula.  “The 
average vocational education additional cost per pupil can be expressed as a 
multiple of the base cost per pupil calculated under section 3317.012 of the 
Revised Code.”  R.C. 3317.014.  Generally speaking, each vocational student is 
counted as one ADM in the basic aid calculation, R.C. 3317.03, and an additional 
 
23 
percentage, which is called a “weight,” is added to take into account additional 
costs incurred in providing vocational education.  R.C. 3317.022(E). 
 
The state also pays for transportation costs apart from the basic aid 
formula.  A district’s predicted costs are based on the density of the student 
population and the number of miles traveled.  R.C. 3317.022(D)(2).  The state’s 
share of calculated transportation costs in FY00 is 52.5 percent.  R.C. 
3317.022(D)(3).  The percentage will increase annually until FY03, when the 
state’s share will be sixty percent.  Id. 
 
Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid (“DPIA”) is available to districts that 
satisfy certain requirements.  DPIA is designed to provide funding for programs 
such as all-day kindergarten and class-size reduction to provide a select group of 
students with individual attention.  R.C. 3317.029. 
 
The present school-funding scheme contains a variety of guarantees and 
caps.  For instance, there are guarantees for basic aid, R.C. 3317.0212, 
transportation funding, R.C. 3317.022(D)(4), and DPIA funding, R.C. 
3317.029(B).  Guarantees are often criticized because they tend to provide some 
districts with more money than they would receive under the foundation formula 
alone.  “[G]uarantees work to the substantial benefit of wealthier districts and 
represent a flaw in the system of school funding, because they work against the 
equalization effect of the formula.”  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 200, 677 N.E.2d 
at 739.  Warren G. Russell, the current Director of Legislative Services for the 
Ohio School Boards Association, expressed the belief that the continued need for 
guarantees indicates that the basic aid formula has structural problems. 
 
Even though the current formula is almost identical to its predecessor, we 
acknowledge that the state has made some alterations to the school-funding 
scheme that was at issue in DeRolph I.  See id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 199-200, 218, 
677 N.E.2d at 738-739, 751.  However, this does not mean that we retreat from 
our mandate in DeRolph I, requiring Ohio’s public school financing scheme to 
 
24 
undergo a “complete systematic overhaul.”  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 
N.E.2d at 747.  Our assessment of compliance with this mandate is qualitative 
rather than quantitative. 
 
In order to determine the cost of a basic education, the state engaged the 
services of Dr. John G. Augenblick, an expert in school finance.  The state 
adopted Augenblick’s methodology, with three significant changes, which 
ultimately lowered his base cost figure. 
 
The Augenblick methodology is an outputs-based approach, which uses 
the eighteen performance levels enumerated in S.B. 55 to ascertain whether a 
district is effective.  R.C. 3302.02 and 3302.03(B)(1).  A district that meets 
seventeen of the eighteen criteria is deemed an effective district.  R.C. 
3302.03(B)(1).  Augenblick screened out some districts using criteria intended to 
measure administrative efficiency.  In the first of the three changes to 
Augenblick’s method, the General Assembly did not use this screening procedure. 
 
In the second change, the General Assembly enlarged the screen that was 
intended to remove anomalous districts in terms of personal income, from the 
fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles recommended by Augenblick to the tenth and 
ninetieth percentiles.  According to Dr. Stephen P. Klein, an independent 
consultant, who is also employed as a Senior Research Scientist with Rand 
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, this change lowered the basic 
expenditure amount by “several hundred dollars.” 
 
Using these two screens, Augenblick selected one hundred two districts.  
As a result of the first two changes, the method used by the General Assembly 
selected a substantially overlapping group of one hundred three districts.  Of the 
one hundred three districts used, the district with the lowest base cost per pupil 
spent $2,755 per pupil, and the district with the highest base cost per pupil spent 
$5,898. 
 
25 
 
In the third change, the method used to calculate the base figure was 
changed from a weighted per-pupil average to an unweighted district average, 
R.C. 3317.012, with no convincing rationale given for the change.  This alteration 
further reduced the figure for the base cost of an adequate education. 
 
As a result of these three changes, the base cost of an adequate education 
was reduced from $4,269 for FY99 to $4,063.  We can only hope that Howard 
Fleeter, an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Policy and Management at 
the Ohio State University, was incorrect when he opined that the legislature made 
these changes in order to come up with a lower number because some legislators 
were concerned with cost and the “necessity of responding to the DeRolph 
decision at all because of the feeling that the state had already made significant 
progress since 1991 and that they didn’t need to do anything else.” 
 
Although we recognize that deciding what methodology to adopt is a 
policy determination, we are perplexed by the General Assembly’s actions of 
enlisting an expert in the area of school financing and then, with no adequate 
explanation, altering his method.  According to Senator Robert Cupp, no one in 
the working group was an expert in statistics or Augenblick’s methodology.  
Russell testified that he did not believe that the legislature had the expertise to 
understand the impact of the changes made to the Augenblick methodology and to 
grasp the statistical concepts involved.  We share Russell’s concern.  Furthermore, 
Klein questioned whether the Augenblick methodology or the one adopted by the 
General Assembly would provide adequate funding for Ohio’s public schools. 
 
Another matter that concerns us is the process of phasing in the base cost 
over a three-year period.  See R.C. 3317.02(B).  Because of the phase-in, the 
$4,063 figure that was deemed by R.C. 3317.012 to be the base cost of an 
adequate education for FY99 will not be reached until FY01 in inflation-adjusted 
dollars.  We find it difficult to understand how the state can justify its position 
that it is funding a thorough and efficient education for Ohio’s public school 
 
26 
children when it is currently funding below the level that the General Assembly 
deemed to be the base amount for an adequate education. 
B 
Budgetary Residual 
 
In DeRolph I, we recognized that the state was funding education as a 
“residual after other mandated programs” were funded.  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 261, 
677 N.E.2d at 780.  This method for calculating the cost of a basic education 
involved determining how much money the state could afford for education and 
working backward to arrive at the per-pupil basic subsidy. 
 
According to Speaker Davidson, the General Assembly’s response to the 
court’s concern that “the formula amount has no relation to what it actually costs 
to educate a pupil” is the funding scheme set forth in H.B. 650 and H.B. 770.  
Speaker Davidson claimed that the General Assembly has made a commitment to 
fund primary and secondary education “based upon a rational methodology of 
adequacy,” which is “locked into House Bill 650.”  Senator Cupp claimed that as 
a result, “there is no priority in that budget that now has a higher priority than 
education.” 
 
The General Assembly divided the budget for the 2000-2001 biennium 
into two sections:  H.B. 282, the Education Budget Bill, and H.B. 283, the 
Biennial Budget Bill.  Prior to this, the budget had never been split into two 
separate bills, with one bill dedicated solely to the education budget.  Both bills 
proceeded through the General Assembly together and were passed almost 
simultaneously.  Governor Taft signed H.B. 282, the Education Budget Bill, into 
law on June 29, 1999, and H.B. 283 the next day. 
 
The system’s skeptics allege that residual budgeting remains despite the 
new legislation.  Dr. Samuel Kern Alexander, the current president of Murray 
State University, a regional state university in Kentucky, criticized the formula for 
being unreliable and subject to manipulation.  Alexander testified that “factors are 
 
27 
just being added and subtracted to reach a dollar amount that is available, a 
predetermined, presumably, dollar amount that the Legislature can afford, and Dr. 
Augenblick is justifying it.”  In July 1997, Speaker Davidson stated that the 
General Assembly was considering lowering the $4,269 per pupil figure 
recommended by Augenblick because “the amount was calculated on inexact data 
and that lower per-pupil funding would help make up revenues lost from 
scrapping the cigarette tax and expanding property tax relief.” 
 
We acknowledge the progress the General Assembly has made in this 
area.  We give defendants the benefit of the doubt, particularly in light of recent 
developments, in their contention that they have not merely disguised residual 
budgeting.  However, we cannot totally discount evidence that the actual cost 
might have been the deciding factor in selecting the method used to determine the 
base cost of an adequate education. 
C 
School Facilities—Funding for Construction and Maintenance 
 
In DeRolph I, we held that the Classroom Facilities Act, R.C. Chapter 
3318, was unconstitutional to the extent that it was underfunded.  Id., 78 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, syllabus.  Our opinion presented graphic examples of 
some of the deplorable conditions existing in primary and secondary schools 
throughout the state.  Id. at 206-208, 677 N.E.2d at 743-744.  We further 
remarked that “state funding of school districts cannot be considered adequate if 
the districts lack sufficient funds to provide their students a safe and healthy 
learning environment.”  Id. at 208, 677 N.E.2d at 744. 
 
The Classroom Facilities Act in R.C. Chapter 3318 was enacted in 1957 
and was substantially amended in May 1997.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 102.  William L. 
Phillis, who serves as the executive director in a consultant relationship with the 
Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding, testified that 
“historically not much money had been put into that program until the beginning” 
 
28 
of the 1990s.  The 1990 Ohio Public School Facility Survey indicated that $10.2 
billion was needed for facility repair and construction.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d 
at 206, 677 N.E.2d at 742.  The amount required as of August 1997 was estimated 
to be $16.5 billion.  Phillis also testified that a 1996 report issued by the United 
States General Accounting Office listed Ohio as the state having the highest 
percentage of school buildings with major flaws. 
 
The General Assembly’s response to this situation was Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
102, which was signed into law on May 5, 1997.  S.B. 102 established the Ohio 
School Facilities Commission, R.C. 3318.30(A), which oversees the Classroom 
Facilities Assistance Program (R.C. 3318.02 through 3318.041), the Emergency 
School Building Repair Program (R.C. 3318.35), and the Big Eight Program 
(Section 7, S.B. 102). 
 
The commission is also charged with assessing all classroom facility needs 
and conditionally approving repair and construction projects.  R.C. 3318.02(A) 
and 3318.04.  Those districts whose adjusted valuation per pupil ranks in the 
lowest one to five percent shall have priority in project approval.  R.C. 
3318.02(B).  Once the commission conditionally approves a district’s project, the 
project is submitted to the State Controlling Board for final approval.  R.C. 
3318.04.  If the board approves it, the district has one year to pass a half-mill levy 
representing its share of the cost.  R.C. 3318.05.  See, also, R.C. 3318.032.  If the 
district does not pass a levy within that time, the conditional approval for the 
project shall lapse, and the amount reserved and encumbered for the project is 
released.  R.C. 3318.05.  If conditional approval for the district’s project lapses, 
that district shall be given first priority for project funding as such funds become 
available.  Id.  The entire process, from approval of the project to its completion, 
may take as long as four years. 
 
S.B. 102 also established the Emergency School Building Repair Program 
in order to fund districts’ urgent repair needs.  R.C. 3318.35.  Each eligible 
 
29 
district that applied could receive up to $500,000 in emergency repair funds, and 
districts were not required to provide matching funds.  As of trial, a total of two 
hundred fifty-four districts had received emergency repair funds, totaling $118 
million. 
 
The Big Eight Program is a repair program for the eight school districts in 
the state that, roughly speaking, have more than twelve thousand pupils, thirty 
percent of whom receive Aid to Dependent Children.  Section 7, S.B. 102.  S.B. 
102 set aside $100 million for this program, which requires these eight school 
districts to match funds received from the state and use them for major repairs and 
renovations of school facilities.  Id. 
 
In July 1997, the General Assembly adopted Sub.H.B. No. 412, effective 
November 21, 1997.  One of H.B. 412’s provisions requires districts to establish a 
capital and maintenance fund and to deposit “four per cent * * * of all revenues 
received by the district that would otherwise have been deposited in the general 
fund, except that money received from a permanent improvement levy authorized 
by section 5705.21 of the Revised Code may replace general revenue moneys in 
meeting the requirements of this section.”  R.C. 3315.18(A). 
 
We recognize that the General Assembly has attempted to formulate a 
viable plan to fund the construction of new school facilities and to repair Ohio’s 
decaying school buildings; however, we are not without concern.  For instance, a 
high school in the Mad River-Green Local School District in Clark County has a 
bathroom that is infested with a lethal mold.  Beacon Journal, “Schools Suffering 
Despite State’s Fix” (Apr. 10, 2000).  This situation appears to be of an urgent 
nature, yet it has not been remedied.  Consequently, Mad River-Green Local 
Superintendent Denny Howell must keep the bathroom boarded up in order to 
prevent students from being exposed to the lethal mold that resulted from “a leak 
that allowed urine and feces to drain slowly into a ceiling.”  The situation in the 
Mad River-Green Local School District is not an isolated incident.  Many other 
 
30 
facilities issues plaguing our schools involve sewage problems.  At Park Street 
Middle School, in the South-Western City School District, a section of a locker 
room in the school’s basement had to be sealed off due to a sewage backup. 
During a visit to one school, Phillis walked through a “stream of water” in the 
building and smelled the odor of sewage. 
 
Randall Fischer, the Executive Director of the Ohio School Facilities 
Commission, testified at the trial court hearing that except for the reserve for 
emergency repair funds, the funds available for the Classroom Facilities 
Assistance Program have been completely exhausted.  In light of this, Fischer 
testified that emergency situations were still in existence at the time of trial.  For 
example, thirteen schools in the Youngstown City School District did not receive 
funds for asbestos abatement.  Likewise, the Jackson City School District applied 
for but did not receive funds for asbestos removal.  The Ruhlin Company served 
as one of the Site Evaluation Team Leaders for the Ohio School Facilities 
Commission Emergency Repair Grant Program and visited over one hundred ten 
schools in forty-eight school districts in northwest Ohio.  The Ruhlin Company 
made the following observations:  “Many of these buildings were built in the 
1920s and 1930s.  Although the roofs are not original, many are over 20 years old 
and have reached the end of their expected life.  Masonry tuckpointing has been 
neglected in many buildings and exterior windows are old and leaking.  The 
electrical systems are not able to handle today’s power requirements for 
computers, TV’s and other electronic equipment.  Because of the rural nature of 
many of the schools, well water and septic systems are utilized and do not meet 
today’s current EPA standards and need [to be] replaced.  Boilers are old and are 
nursed through each heating season with yearly retubings and expensive 
maintenance.” 
 
Another troublesome aspect of the Classroom Facilities Assistance 
Program is that an eligible district must pass a levy within one year in order to 
 
31 
receive funds from the state.  R.C. 3318.05.  Thus, a district that fails to pass a 
levy the first time must wait until the General Assembly appropriates more funds 
for the program and still must pass a levy as a condition of receiving the funds. 
 
Again, referring to the report compiled by Achieve, Inc., we note that 
“despite significant recent investments the challenge remains severe.  Although 
estimates differ on the magnitude of the problem, by all accounts too many Ohio 
children, especially in poor rural and urban districts, attend classes in dreadfully 
sub-standard facilities.  [Emphasis sic.] * * * During this decade [the 1990s] the 
state has invested over $1 billion in capital improvement funds for schools, more 
than tripling the investments made over the previous four decades.  However, 
without a reliable inventory of the state’s facilities and a solid cost estimate for 
bringing all Ohio school[s] up to standard, it is impossible to know just how much 
progress has been made.  While the state has at least made a down payment on a 
long deferred problem, this is a major piece of unfinished business for Ohio’s 
policymakers.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In addition, according to Fischer, there is no degree of certainty as to what 
the future funding from the state will be.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 770, effective June 
17, 1998, requires the Governor to recommend and request that no less than $300 
million be appropriated annually to school facilities when future budgets are 
submitted to the General Assembly.  R.C. 107.031.  R.C. 107.031 merely requires 
that the Governor shall “ensure that among the various budget recommendations 
made * * * to the general assembly each biennium there are recommendations for 
appropriations to the Ohio school facilities commission, aggregating not less than 
three hundred million dollars per fiscal year.”  R.C. 107.031.  Phillis testified that 
at a rate of $300 million per year, it would take fifty-five years to correct the 
$16.5 billion deficit, and this estimate does not take into account “rolling decay.” 
 
While visiting some of Ohio’s schools, Phillis made several observations.  
At trial, Phillis described a school building in the Morgan Local School District 
 
32 
that was built before 1900 and has sunk approximately six inches.  As a result of 
this settling, the doors no longer fit in their frames.  Phillis visited a school that 
was heated with a coal-fired furnace and saw coal dust in the classrooms.  During 
a visit to Bloom Carroll Middle School, which was built in the early 1900s, Phillis 
noticed that the brick on the building’s façade was cracked.  Additionally, Phillis 
noted that many of the buildings he visited lacked handicapped access. 
 
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that this is an important area that 
will continue to require the attention of the Governor and future General 
Assemblies.  We acknowledge the initiatives in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 850 (effective 
March 19, 1999), which appropriated $505 million for school facilities (see 
Sections 6 and 26 of the Act), and Am.Sub.H.B. No. 283, which appropriated an 
additional $325.7 million, by devoting money from the state’s budget surplus to 
school facilities.  See Section 124 of the Act.  When combined with moneys 
appropriated from Am.Sub.S.B. No. 102, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 650, and commitments from other sources, recent appropriations for facilities 
are in excess of $1.6 billion, yet the immediate needs are much greater.  As 
recognized in the reply brief of amicus curiae Governor Taft, on September 9, 
1999, the Governor proposed a school facilities allocation plan called “Rebuilding 
Ohio’s Schools:  A 12-Year Commitment.”  The plan proposes to allocate an 
additional $23.1 billion in state and local funds to school facilities from FY01 to 
FY12.  The state share of that amount would be $10.2 billion, broken down into 
$5.9 billion from the capital budget, $1.8 billion from cash appropriations and 
interest earnings, and $2.5 billion from the state tobacco litigation settlement.  
The plan calls for the state share to be accompanied by $12.9 billion in local 
matching funds.  In addition, the plan calls for the establishment of a trust fund 
with some of the tobacco settlement money to take care of future school needs. 
 
At the time of this writing, a significant component of the Governor’s plan 
appears to be in place.  On March 3, 2000, the Governor signed into law 
 
33 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 192, which provides for the distribution of money received by 
the state pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement.  As pertinent to 
our consideration here, this legislation allocates nearly $2.5 billion in tobacco 
settlement funds through FY12 to go for school construction and repair, through 
the Education Facilities Trust Fund.  See R.C. 183.02(F) and 183.26.  The 
legislation also allocates funds for classroom technology, see R.C. 183.02(H) and 
183.28, and establishes and allocates money to an Education Facilities 
Endowment Fund, with investment earnings transferred each quarter to the 
Facilities Trust Fund, R.C. 183.02(G) and 183.27.  Provisions are also made 
addressing appropriations for school construction and repair from FY12 to FY25.  
Section 17 of the Act.  The firmness of all the commitments contained within this 
legislation is of course limited by the prohibition of Section 22, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from appropriating for 
more than a two-year period.  Thus, even though the long-term plan is in place, 
the General Assembly must appropriate the money every two years. 
 
The task at hand is not one to be taken lightly.  One-half of Ohio’s school 
buildings are fifty years old or older.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 206, 677 
N.E.2d at 742.  Constructing and maintaining school buildings is an ongoing 
process, and this court recognizes that it would be unreasonable to require the 
General Assembly to remedy overnight what has taken decades of neglect to 
develop, yet there remains an extensive amount of work to be done in order to 
educate Ohio’s students in “safe and healthy learning” environments.  Id. at 208, 
677 N.E.2d at 744.  Continuing funding in this area is of the utmost importance. 
D 
Borrowing 
 
In DeRolph I, this court found the following provisions, relating to forced 
borrowing, unconstitutional: R.C. 133.301, which granted borrowing authority to 
school districts, and R.C. 3313.483, 3313.487, 3313.488, 3313.489, and 
 
34 
3313.4810, which provided for emergency school assistance loans.  Id., 78 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, syllabus.  These statutes were deemed to be an 
inherent weakness in the state’s school-financing system because they required 
districts that were unable to satisfy their budgetary requirements to borrow funds 
at commercial lending rates.  Id. at 201, 677 N.E.2d at 739.  When these 
borrowing statutes were in effect, over $700 million was borrowed by local 
school districts so that they could keep their schools operating. 
 
The first type of borrowing held unconstitutional in DeRolph I was the 
“spending reserve” loan in R.C. 133.301, which enabled school districts to borrow 
against a subsequent year’s revenue, as long as the district received approval from 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction.  Id. at 201, 677 N.E.2d at 739.  If the 
spending reserve loan was not enough to enable the district to meet current 
operating needs, then the district was required to seek necessary funding from a 
commercial lender.  Id. at 201, 677 N.E.2d at 739; R.C. 3313.483 and 
3313.483(D).  These borrowing programs, which were characterized by this court 
as “nothing less than a clever disguise for the state’s failure to raise revenue 
sufficient to discharge its constitutional obligations,” drove school districts into 
deeper financial distress.  Id. at 202, 677 N.E.2d at 740. 
 
What is the status of forced borrowing today?  Although the General 
Assembly has taken some steps to eliminate forced borrowing from the school-
financing scheme, it remains unclear whether these changes will rectify the 
problem. 
 
The Spending Reserve Loan Program is being phased out pursuant to R.C. 
5705.29(F)(1) and (2).  Additionally, the School District Solvency Assistance 
Fund, which is operated by the Ohio Department of Education, was established in 
H.B. 412 and went into effect on November 21, 1997.  R.C. 3316.20.  The 
Solvency Assistance Fund provides interest-free “advancements to school districts 
to enable them to remain solvent and to pay unforeseeable expenses of a 
 
35 
temporary or emergency nature that they are unable to pay from existing 
resources.”  Id. 
 
One concern voiced by Russell is that many districts will still be forced to 
borrow funds, because the circumstances that necessitated the initial borrowing 
still exist, despite the recent legislation.  Likewise, Charles Brown, the Assistant 
Director of the Division of School Finance of the Ohio Department of Education, 
is concerned that H.B. 412’s set-aside requirements will require additional 
borrowing in order to comply with the mandates. 
 
The plaintiffs allege that the School Solvency Assistance Fund is no 
different from the former Emergency School Assistance Loan Program, other than 
the fact that the School Solvency Assistance Program Fund provides for interest-
free loans.  According to Brown, the procedures for obtaining and repaying loans 
are virtually identical under both programs.  For instance, the repayment period 
for both types of loans is typically two years.  Furthermore, districts must exhaust 
their spending reserve before they can access advances from the solvency fund. 
R.C. 3316.20.  This requirement mirrors one in the former Emergency School 
Assistance Loan Program that required a district to borrow from its spending 
reserve fund before obtaining approval for an emergency loan.  See R.C. 
3313.483(B). 
 
In addition to our concerns about the impact that the School Solvency 
Assistance Fund will have on future borrowing, we are also troubled by the 
influence H.B. 650 and H.B. 770 will have.  At his deposition, David Brunson, 
the Assistant Director of the Ohio Legislative Budget Office (“LBO”), testified 
that the LBO did not research or analyze the effect that H.B. 650 and H.B. 770 
would have on borrowing.  Moreover, Augenblick did not take borrowing or the 
repayment of existing loans into account in arriving at a base cost figure.  
Augenblick had no knowledge of the amount of money that school districts would 
be required to pay in FY99 for borrowing that occurred during and prior to 1999. 
 
36 
 
The final loans under the former Emergency School Assistance Loan 
Program were approved by the State Controlling Board on February 9, 1998.  
Repayment of these loans will continue through at least 2007 and will be made 
from funds that districts would otherwise receive as school foundation payments. 
 
The lingering effects of the forced-borrowing scheme will haunt school 
districts for many years to come.  As we examine the new legislation promulgated 
by the General Assembly in response to our holding in DeRolph I, we are dubious 
that the new measures will resolve the problem.  We recognize that some type of 
borrowing provision may be necessary to provide funds in the case of extreme 
emergencies or unexpected calamities; however, any system that entails 
borrowing from future funds to meet ordinary expenses is not a thorough and 
efficient system.  Except in extreme cases, reliance on loans must be eradicated, 
and loans certainly must not be employed as a method to meet school districts’ 
daily operational expenses. 
E 
Overreliance on Local Property Taxes 
 
In DeRolph I, this court held that one of the principal factors rendering the 
school-funding system unworkable was the state’s heavy reliance on local 
property taxes to fund primary and secondary education.  Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 
212, 677 N.E.2d at 747.  Our holding in DeRolph I did not say that local property 
taxes could not be a component of the state’s school-funding formula, but rather 
that local property taxes could no longer be the primary means of providing for a 
thorough and efficient system of schools.  See id. at 262, 677 N.E.2d at 780 
(Resnick, J., concurring).  For instance, in FY97, the state contributed 
approximately 43.8 percent to districts for school funding, excluding federal 
funds, while the local share was approximately 56.2 percent. 
 
Property taxes are still the single most important source of funding for 
schools, and seventy percent or more of all property taxes levied are allocated to 
 
37 
public schools.  Overreliance on local property taxes was one of the factors that 
rendered the school-funding scheme deficient, yet this aspect of the former system 
persists in the state’s current funding plan, wholly unchanged.  The system’s 
dependence on local property taxes has resulted in vast disparities among Ohio’s 
six hundred eleven public school districts due to the differences in revenue 
generated by each.  For instance, according to a memorandum prepared by Mike 
Sobul at the Ohio Department of Taxation for the 1995 fiscal year, a one-mill 
property tax on Class I real property produced $272.90 per student in the district 
with the highest property tax base and $13.34 per student in the district with the 
lowest.  A system that places too much reliance on local property taxes puts 
property-poor districts at a disadvantage because “ ‘they must tax at significantly 
higher rates in order to meet minimum requirements for accreditation; yet their 
educational programs are typically inferior.’ “  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 204, 
677 N.E.2d at 741, quoting Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby (Tex.1989), 
777 S.W.2d 391, 393. 
 
The state would like this court to believe that overreliance on local 
property taxes will dissipate once the new measures are fully phased in, so that 
the only reason a district would have to look to local property taxes would be that 
the district wants to fund beyond adequacy.  Unfortunately, the reality of the 
situation at this time appears to be otherwise. 
 
A perfect example of overreliance on local property taxes is the situation 
currently affecting the Toledo Public Schools.  Toledo schools are faced with an 
$18 million deficit, and in March voters rejected a 6.9-mill operating levy that 
would have provided Toledo schools with $17.1 million annually.  Toledo Blade 
(Mar. 5 and Apr. 16, 2000).  Now school officials may be forced to shut down 
two secondary schools and eliminate two hundred thirty-five teaching positions.  
This should not happen in a state-funded system of common schools. 
 
38 
 
Moreover, recent legislation has the potential to actually increase reliance 
on local property taxes beyond the level deemed unsatisfactory in DeRolph I.  The 
phase-out of the inventory tax in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 283 will result in significant 
revenue losses.  See R.C. 5711.22(E).  As of May 1999, inventory was assessed at 
a rate of twenty-five percent of its true value and then subjected to local property 
taxation.  In 1997, inventory tax revenues provided 7.77 percent of the total local 
property tax revenue received by districts.  The Legislative Budget Office 
estimates that as a result of the phase-out local school districts will lose $60.9 
million in revenue in 2002.  The state has provided minimal replacement revenue.  
According to a report prepared by Dr. Howard Fleeter in May 1999 for the 
Education Tax Policy Institute (“ETPI”),2 this reduction “reduces the property tax 
revenues received by all of Ohio’s local government entities, including school 
districts.”  Furthermore, Fleeter used data collected for the years 1984 through 
1993 to reach the conclusion that “school district millage increases play an 
important role in ameliorating the decreases in revenue brought about by 
reductions” in the inventory rate.  In fact, Fleeter’s report establishes that “local 
tax increases served to reduce actual revenue losses in Ohio school districts by 
more than 50%.”  We are in accord with Fleeter’s opinion that “the fact that local 
taxpayers are bearing at least some of the brunt of this state policy change seems 
inescapable.” 
 
Additionally, the unfunded mandates in Sub.H.B. No. 412 and 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 55 will likely require increased reliance on property taxes.  
These bills are projected to cost districts $343,758,940.  According to Brown, 
districts may be forced to levy additional taxes in order to satisfy the set-aside 
requirements of H.B. 412. 
 
Ohio’s system of public education is a “statewide system.”  DeRolph I, 78 
Ohio St.3d at 213, 677 N.E.2d at 747.  The state is responsible for funding an 
adequate education for all primary and secondary students who attend public 
 
39 
schools.  In our earlier opinion, this court informed the General Assembly that a 
school-funding scheme that relies too heavily on local property taxes for revenue 
would not satisfy the Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  
See id. at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747.  Consequently, a revised funding scheme that 
increases reliance on local property taxes would not be “thorough and efficient.”  
Thus, the General Assembly must avoid compounding the school-funding 
system’s infirmities with new legislation that increases reliance on local property 
taxes. 
 
The state’s failure to specifically address the school-funding system’s 
overreliance on local property taxes is of paramount concern as we evaluate the 
state’s attempts to craft a thorough and efficient system of funding.  The state’s 
argument that it can minimize this problem by addressing the other aspects 
identified in DeRolph I as contributing to the unworkability of the system in place 
at that time, see 78 Ohio St.3d at 212, 677 N.E.2d at 747, is unconvincing.  We 
see no indication that anything significant has been done to remove this primary 
impediment, which was the major factor in the previous funding system found 
unconstitutional in DeRolph I.  No further effort at specifically addressing this 
overreliance on property taxes has been made since the voters of the state rejected 
the one-cent sales tax increase on the May 5, 1998 ballot.  The problem of 
overreliance on local property taxes must be independently addressed, and all 
potential solutions to this problem must be explored.  The inequities inherent in a 
system that relies too heavily on local property taxes will remain until this 
problem is resolved by the General Assembly. 
F 
Phantom Revenue 
 
The phenomenon known as “phantom revenue” is one of the weaknesses 
this court identified in DeRolph I as plaguing Ohio’s system of school finance.  
Id., 78 Ohio St.3d  at 201, 677 N.E.2d at 739.  Although phantom revenue is not 
 
40 
easily defined, Frederick Church of the Legislative Budget Office says that it can 
be thought of as occurring “when the growing property wealth of a school district 
gives the illusion of a commensurably increasing revenue stream, which, in fact, 
is not realized.” 
 
The consulting firm of Levin & Driscoll has identified three types of 
phantom revenue. 
 
“Type I” phantom revenue, which is sometimes referred to as “phantom 
millage,” occurs when a school district fails to levy at least twenty-three effective 
mills.  “[P]hantom revenue in this type equals the difference between the revenue 
obtained from the district’s effective tax rate and the revenue that the district 
would receive from a 23 mill effective rate.”  Type I phantom revenue can occur 
as a result of either the application of 1976 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 920, 136 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3182, or a district’s failure to obtain voter approval for at least 
twenty-three mills.  R.C. 319.301. 
 
Levin & Driscoll characterizes “Type II” phantom revenue as property tax 
revenue credited to a school district when its tax base increases, but which is 
never actually received by the district due to H.B. 920’s tax-reduction factors, 
found in R.C. 319.301.  See DeRolph I at 200-201, 677 N.E.2d at 739.  R.C. 
319.301 “requires the application of tax reduction factors when property values 
increase due to reappraisal or update.”  Id. at 201, 677 N.E.2d at 739.  The 
purpose is to “limit the effect of inflation in property values on growth of real 
property tax revenues.”  Id. at 221, 677 N.E.2d at 753.  R.C. 319.301 gives real 
property owners a tax credit, so that the amount paid on voted millage remains the 
same as it was prior to the reappraisal or update.  Consequently, a school district 
receives the same amount of revenue “from voted tax levies after reappraisal as it 
did before reappraisal, notwithstanding that real property valuation in the district 
has increased through inflation since the time of the initial tax levy.”  Id. at 221, 
677 N.E.2d at 753 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
41 
 
“Type III” phantom revenue “results from the use of an income-adjusted 
tax base rather than actual taxable value for purposes of computing a school 
district’s chargeoff.”  Type III phantom revenue is the difference between the 
revenue received from twenty-three mills and the yield required by the chargeoff. 
 
According to a report prepared by Levin & Driscoll, all three types of 
phantom revenue are problematic for school districts, because the basic aid 
formula “counts local revenue without empowering the district to raise that 
revenue.” 
 
The state maintains that the phantom revenue problem has been resolved 
because H.B. 650 provides for a charge-off supplement and power equalization.  
R.C. 3317.0216(B) and (C); 3317.0215. 
 
The charge-off supplement is intended to ensure that districts obtain the 
full amount of state and local funds that the basic aid formula allocates to them.  
The charge-off supplement is also referred to as “gap aid.”  If a district’s charge-
off amount is greater than the district’s total receipts available for current 
expenses, then the state will pay the district an amount representing the 
difference.  R.C. 3317.0216(B).  When new local revenue is generated, a district’s 
charge-off supplement is reduced dollar for dollar. 
 
Power equalization is intended to act as an incentive for districts with 
below-average property wealth to levy more than twenty-three mills.  Power 
equalization applies only to the Class I effective rate and mills between twenty-
three and twenty-five.  R.C. 5713.041; 3317.0215.  “If the total effective 
operating tax rate of a district is greater than two and three-tenths per cent, the 
district shall receive a payment computed by multiplying the lesser of two-tenths 
of one per cent or the equalized tax rate by the amount by which the state taxable 
value per pupil exceeds the district’s total taxable value per pupil times the 
district’s formula ADM.”  R.C. 3317.0215(B).  Maxwell provided the trial court 
with the following illustrative example of how power equalization works:  if the 
 
42 
valuation per pupil in the state were $95,000, then one mill would yield $95, and 
if an eligible district has a valuation per pupil of $55,000, then one mill would 
yield $55 per pupil.  Since only $55 is raised locally, under the concept of power 
equalization, the state makes up the difference, $40, to arrive at the $95. 
 
In spite of provisions in H.B. 650, not every type of phantom revenue has 
disappeared.  Although we are encouraged by testimony that the charge-off 
supplement is reducing Type I phantom revenue, we are mindful that this type of 
phantom revenue may continue in some districts.  Furthermore, H.B. 650 does not 
alleviate Type II phantom revenue, which results from the application of H.B. 
920’s tax-reduction factors. 
 
Another concern is that H.B. 650 may even compound the phantom 
revenue predicament by creating additional types of phantom revenue.  Both 
Russell and Maxwell testified that a new type of phantom revenue results from 
power equalization.  Maxwell believes that since “property valuation increases 
due to reappraisal cause the millage rate to be reduced regularly,” some districts 
may lose equalization payments and “would have to vote millage every time 
reappraisal occurs.”  Additionally, Maxwell testified that including special 
education pupils in a district’s ADM creates a new type of phantom revenue.  
Ultimately, certain school districts may be required to go back to the voters and 
ask for additional tax increases to make up for lost revenue. 
 
Requiring school districts to seek additional tax increases to make up for 
lost revenue is something that should be avoided, especially in view of our 
holding in DeRolph I, which required overreliance on local property taxes to be 
eliminated.  The Achieve, Inc. report quoted one school superintendent who 
stated, “I spend every third year running a political campaign, not running my 
school district.”  This is not how a thorough and efficient system should function 
and further serves to emphasize why heavy reliance on local property taxes must 
end. 
 
43 
G 
Accountability 
 
In response to our decision in DeRolph I, the General Assembly enacted 
several new pieces of legislation.  Two of the bills focus primarily on school 
district accountability:  H.B. 412 is directed at fiscal accountability, and S.B. 55 
establishes academic accountability. 
 
Fiscal Accountability: House Bill 412 
 
H.B. 412 centers on implementing fiscal accountability for school 
districts.  This bill contains three set-aside requirements:  a capital and 
maintenance fund (R.C. 3315.18), a textbook and instructional materials fund 
(R.C. 3315.17), and a “reserve balance fund” (R.C. 5705.29[H]). 
 
R.C. 3315.18(A) requires each district’s board of education to create a 
capital and maintenance fund and to deposit into that fund “four per cent of all 
revenues received by the district that would otherwise have been deposited in the 
general fund, except that money received from a permanent improvement levy 
authorized by section 5705.21 of the Revised Code may replace general revenue 
moneys” in meeting these requirements.  Money placed in this fund can be used 
only for “acquisition, replacement, enhancement, maintenance, or repair of 
permanent improvements.”  Id.  The four-percent requirement is phased in 
according to the schedule set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 117-2-23(B). 
 
R.C. 3315.17(A) requires each board of education to “establish a textbook 
and instructional materials fund” and to “deposit into that fund four per cent, or 
another percentage if established in rules adopted under division (C) of this 
section, of all revenues received by the district for operating expenses.”  The four-
percent requirement is phased in according to the schedule set forth in Ohio 
Adm.Code 117-2-23(A).  Money deposited in this fund “shall be used solely for 
textbooks, instructional software, and instructional materials, supplies, and 
equipment.”  R.C. 3315.17(A).  If a district does not use all of these funds in a 
 
44 
given fiscal year, the funds carry forward to the next fiscal year.  Id.  
Additionally, pursuant to subsection (D), a school district may opt out of this 
requirement.  R.C. 3315.17(D).  We are not addressing the content of the opt-out 
provision at this time. 
 
R.C. 5705.29(H)(1) requires each board of education to “establish a 
reserve balance account to accumulate currently available resources to stabilize 
the school district’s budget against cyclical changes in revenues and 
expenditures.”  Subject to certain exceptions, see Ohio Adm.Code 117-2-24, 
“[t]he balance in the reserve balance account shall not at any time be less than 
five per cent of general fund revenues for the most recently concluded fiscal 
year.”  R.C. 5705.29(H)(1).  Beginning in fiscal year 2000, a district is required, 
subject to limited exceptions, to set aside one percent of its revenue “until the 
balance in the reserve balance account equals five per cent of the district’s 
revenues received for current expenses for the preceding fiscal year.”  R.C. 
5705.29(H)(2)(a). 
 
Academic Accountability: Senate Bill 55 
 
S.B. 55 is composed of various provisions mandating academic 
accountability.  The bill raises the number of credits required for high school 
graduation (R.C. 3313.603[B]), creates a fourth-grade reading guarantee (R.C. 
3313.608[A]), and sets standards for school district performance (R.C. 3302.02 
and 3302.03). 
 
“Beginning September 15, 2001, the requirements for graduation 
from every high school shall include twenty-one units earned in grades 
nine through twelve.”  R.C. 3313.603(B).  S.B. 55 increases the number of 
credits required for English language arts, mathematics, science, and 
social studies.  R.C. 3313.603(B)(1), (3), (5), and (6). 
 
The fourth-grade reading guarantee states that “[b]eginning with students 
who enter fourth grade in the school year that starts July 1, 2001, no * * * school 
 
45 
* * * shall promote to fifth grade any student who fails to attain” the designated 
score on the test prescribed in R.C. 3301.0710(A)(1) that measures reading 
ability, unless either the pupil was excused from taking the test or the pupil is 
deemed to be “academically prepared” to be promoted to the fifth grade.  R.C. 
3313.608(A)(1) and (A)(2). 
 
Pursuant to S.B. 55, school districts will be rated on performance and 
receive annual report cards.  R.C. 3302.03(A) and (D)(1).  The provision for 
evaluating district performance states that beginning July 1, 1999 (FY00), “every 
three years the department of education shall calculate and report for each school 
district its percentages on each of the performance indicators listed in section 
3302.02 of the Revised Code and shall specify for each such district the extent to 
which the acceptable performance indicator has been achieved and whether the 
district is an effective school district, needs continuous improvement, is under an 
academic watch, or is in a state of academic emergency.”  R.C. 3302.03(A).  In 
addition to performance reports, the Department of Education is required to “issue 
annual report cards for each school district and for the state as a whole based on 
education and fiscal performance data.”  R.C. 3302.03(D)(1). 
 
Discussion of Accountability 
 
Jeffrey Sutton, the state’s attorney, described the current school-funding 
system as placing “[k]ids first, money second,” and having “accountability 
throughout.”  We agree that accountability is an important component of a system 
that provides funds.  What is problematic, however, is a system that increases 
academic requirements and accountability, yet fails to provide adequate funding. 
 
A Fiscal Note and Local Impact Statement prepared by the Ohio 
Legislative Budget Office for S.B. 55 indicated that the “state would increase its 
school funding in the range of a billion dollars per year beginning in FY 1999” 
and that this “funding increase would help districts to make any necessary 
changes to meet performance standards proposed by the bill.”  The increased 
 
46 
funding was not part of S.B. 55 and was dependent on voter approval of a one-
cent sales tax increase.  Both S.B. 55 and H.B. 412 were proceeding through the 
General Assembly at the same time as the proposed sales tax increase.  On 
February 17, 1998, the Ohio Senate approved H.B. 697, which placed the one-
cent sales tax increase on the May 5, 1998 ballot for voter approval.  The one-cent 
sales tax increase, which appeared on the May 5 ballot as Issue 2, was not 
approved by voters.  Consequently, school districts are required to adhere to the 
bills’ additional requirements and standards of accountability, but the anticipated 
funding must now come from a different source. 
 
Since these mandates are essentially unfunded, a paramount concern is 
that H.B. 412 and S.B. 55 will impose additional costs on school districts.  David 
Brunson testified that the Legislative Budget Office did not do a detailed analysis 
to estimate what the cost of S.B. 55’s increased graduation requirements would be 
throughout the state; however, the Fiscal Note indicates that those “districts that 
currently require less than 21 units of credit for graduation would incur additional 
costs.”  The Legislative Budget Office conducted a random survey of twenty 
school districts in an attempt to determine the potential impact of S.B. 55, and 
fourteen of the twenty districts indicated that they would incur additional 
expenses as a result of the bill.  Additional costs may be incurred in establishing 
appropriate scientific laboratories and in hiring more teachers, especially those 
qualified to teach mathematics and science courses.  The Department of 
Education estimates that the average cost for a biology laboratory is $140,000.  
Districts may also face increased costs as a consequence of R.C. 3313.608(B) 
through (E), which require remediation and intervention services for those 
students who do not pass the fourth-grade reading test.  What is particularly 
bothersome about these unfunded mandates is that if a district does not have 
sufficient funds in its existing budget, then it may have to seek additional funds 
from other sources, such as passing additional levies or borrowing from lenders. 
 
47 
 
From the foregoing discussion regarding academic accountability, we do 
not want our concerns to be misconstrued as disfavor for the general concept of 
accountability.  Instead, we clearly state that in order to have a thorough and 
efficient system of schools, there must be statewide standards that are fully 
developed, clearly stated, and understood by educators, students, and parents.  
The report compiled by Achieve, Inc. succinctly sets forth the perspective that 
“states need to have at the heart of their education reform strategy clear and 
rigorous academic standards, challenging assessments designed to measure 
progress against those standards, and an accountability system that rewards 
success and takes action against persistent failure.  We do not mean to suggest 
that standards, assessment, and accountability can by themselves produce 
significant changes in student performance; but they can and should be important 
drivers of change in curriculum, instructional practice, and school organization.  
They need, most importantly, to be accompanied by a thoughtful, comprehensive, 
sustained strategy for strengthening the capacity of teachers, principals, and other 
education professionals to change their practice, and a commitment to provide 
extra resources and support to students and schools who start out furthest from the 
goal line.  But without a clear roadmap for teachers, parents, and students (i.e., 
standards), an agreed-upon yardstick for measuring progress (i.e., assessments) 
and consequences for results (i.e., accountability), states in our view are unlikely 
to help their schools significantly improve student performance.  Ohio has 
important building blocks in place in its standards-assessment-accountability 
system, but we believe each of these elements needs to be substantially 
strengthened if this system is to become a powerful lever for improving teaching 
and learning in the classroom.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The Achieve, Inc. report recognized that the lack of standards was a 
significant deficiency in Ohio’s system.  The report noted that “[s]trictly 
speaking, Ohio does not really have statewide academic standards, at least as 
 
48 
that term is used in most other states.  The absence of standards is particularly 
troublesome because virtually all participants in Ohio education reform activities 
agree that clear standards should be the basis for pre-service training for teachers, 
the curriculum, student assessments, classroom materials, and ongoing 
professional development.  Unless there is clear understanding of what students 
are expected to learn, how can teachers’ colleges know what teachers are 
supposed to teach?  How can assessment developers know what to test?  How can 
publishers of textbooks and instructional materials know what to include at each 
grade level?  How can students prepare for the tests if there is no clear-cut 
agreement about what they are supposed to learn?”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Some of the same concerns encountered with regard to S.B. 55 arise with 
respect to the set-aside requirements in H.B. 412.  According to Maxwell and 
Goff, those districts that are most likely to be affected are the ones borrowing or 
paying back money that was previously borrowed.  A Fiscal Note and Local 
Impact Statement prepared by the LBO for H.B. 412 predicts that the four-percent 
set-aside requirement for capital and maintenance and the four-percent set-aside 
for textbooks and instructional materials could each total approximately $400 
million statewide. 
 
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a great deal of work has yet 
to be done before Ohio can be said to have a constitutional thorough and efficient 
system of public schools.  We recognize that much more is involved in this 
process than merely providing funds.  Consequently, educators, lawmakers, 
businesses, parents, and students must all work together to strengthen Ohio’s 
system of public schools. 
 
Governor Taft recognized this need in his January 19, 2000 State of the 
State Address, when he said, “Education is a matter of survival in today’s world 
and the [proficiency] tests are helping to lift student achievement.  We must never 
retreat from high standards, rigorous assessment and accountability for results!  In 
 
49 
fact, I believe we can do even more to build on our success and help students 
reach those high standards, not only on the fourth grade test but also on the new 
tenth grade exams.  That’s why we must closely align what we expect, what we 
teach, how we assess, and how we reward performance and correct failure.” 
 
Strict statewide standards must be developed and implemented, so 
teachers know what they are required to teach, and students know what they are 
required to learn.  Governor Taft has recognized this need and has taken steps in 
the right direction, as evidenced by his January 19, 2000 State of the State 
Address in which he declared, “So today, I propose to establish the Governor’s 
Commission for Student Success.  Its members will represent employers, colleges 
and universities, parents and children, educators, school board members and 
legislators.  I will ask this commission to address four questions: 
 
“How do we make it crystal clear to students, parents, and educators what 
students should know and be able to do in each grade and before graduation? 
 
“How should we measure student performance and progress in each 
grade? 
 
“How should we hold students and adults responsible for academic 
achievement? 
 
“And how do we make sure that all parts of the system work together in 
complete alignment?” 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the present time, it is apparent to us that, despite the past and present 
efforts of Governor Taft and our General Assembly, the mandate of the 
Constitution has not yet been fulfilled.  We acknowledge the effort that has been 
made, and that a good faith attempt to comply with the constitutional 
requirements has been mounted, but even more is required.  The process must 
continue. 
 
50 
 
The most glaring weakness in the state’s attempts to put in place a 
thorough and efficient system of education is the failure to specifically address the 
overreliance on local property taxes.  If this problem is not rectified, it will be 
virtually impossible for the revised school-funding system to be characterized as 
thorough and efficient. 
 
Despite our vast concerns over the failure to address the funding system’s 
overemphasis on local property tax, we do perceive evidence of some positive 
developments.  Finally the Governor and General Assembly have recognized that 
education can no longer be funded as a residual in the state budget.  Funding must 
be provided consistently with the Section 2, Article VI constitutional mandate of a 
“thorough and efficient system of common schools.”  With the recent passage of 
H.B. 282, there is now a separate state budget for education.  In addition, 
Governor Taft has provided the impetus for recent initiatives to provide 
significantly more money for school building construction and maintenance. 
 
Furthermore, other significant initiatives are being developed.  The 
SchoolNet and SchoolNet Plus programs, recognizing the value of developing 
computer-literate students, continue to evolve and are clearly positive steps.  See 
H.B. 282, R.C. 3301.80 and 3301.801.  Yet there is so much yet to be done in this 
area.  We are still a long way from the goal of providing sufficient computers to 
allow a high quality education in this computer age.  Moreover, there is no 
specific program in place to provide computers for students above the fifth-grade 
level.  This is a crucial need so that students nearing graduation will be computer-
literate. 
 
The OhioReads initiative put into motion by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, effective 
March 30, 1999, is another laudable step being championed by the Governor.  See 
R.C. 3301.85 et seq.  By providing several types of grants (both to schools and 
communities, see R.C. 3301.86 and 3301.87) to promote the fourth-grade reading 
guarantee, and also by encouraging volunteer tutors to become involved in their 
 
51 
local school districts (see R.C. 3301.91[A]), OhioReads appears to be a 
significant agent for improvement.  Yet only time will tell if this initiative will be 
successful in furthering the goals of the fourth-grade reading guarantee. 
 
In light of the progress that the Governor and General Assembly have 
made, in some areas, thus far, and unwilling to reject in toto the sum of those 
efforts, we determine that the best course of action at this time is to provide the 
defendants more time to comply with Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution.  We are confident that, given the additional opportunity presented 
by this extension of time, the General Assembly and the Governor will continue 
to deliberate over the many obstacles they face, and will continue to seek 
solutions to these complex problems. 
 
The following major areas warrant further attention, study, and 
development by the General Assembly, but are not by any means the only areas 
requiring scrutiny: 
 
(1)  Continued reliance on local property taxes as a primary means to fund 
Ohio’s schools has not been specifically addressed and may in fact be 
compounded by H.B. 283’s phase-out of the inventory tax, which may result in 
even greater reliance on local contributions in the future.  The failure to address 
this problem will make it exceedingly difficult for any system of school funding 
to comply with the Thorough and Efficient Clause, since the inherent inequities 
will remain. 
 
(2)  The basic aid formula has structural deficiencies and may not in fact 
reflect the amount required per pupil to provide an adequate education.  The 
phase-in aspect of the basic aid amount should be reconsidered. 
 
(3)  Continuing attention must be given to the mechanism implemented to 
fund the construction of new school facilities and to repair older, decaying school 
buildings, until the task is complete.  Additionally, requiring local districts to pass 
levies as a prerequisite for obtaining state funding should be reviewed. 
 
52 
 
(4)  The School Solvency Assistance Fund established by H.B. 412 must 
be reevaluated, so that funds are available and used only in case of extreme 
emergencies and not for unfunded mandates or day-to-day expenses. 
 
(5)  The unfunded mandates in H.B. 412 and S.B. 55, which will 
necessitate either increased reliance on local property taxes or additional 
borrowing from the School Solvency Assistance Fund, must be addressed and 
immediately funded. 
 
(6)  The phenomenon known as phantom revenue has not been eliminated 
and may increase as a consequence of H.B. 650. 
 
(7)  Strict, statewide academic guidelines must be developed and 
rigorously followed throughout all of Ohio’s public school districts. 
 
The foregoing are the major areas that necessitate further attention and 
review by all parties involved in Ohio’s educational system.  We hope that 
partisan views will be put aside and that everyone will work cooperatively for 
Ohio’s children, as they are our future.  The General Assembly, in particular, 
must look beyond the political considerations involved, and must provide Ohio’s 
school children with a thorough and efficient system of common schools as the 
Ohio Constitution requires. 
 
As the Achieve, Inc. report noted, “this may be a propitious moment to 
forge a new social compact between Ohio’s government policymakers and its 
education community.  The terms of the compact would be relatively simple and 
straightforward:  governmental leaders will commit to fix the funding system and 
provide adequate time and resources to enable educators to develop the skills they 
need to teach to higher standards, in return for which the education community 
will agree to be held accountable for making annual, measurable progress in 
helping virtually all young people meet higher academic standards. 
 
“ * * * 
 
53 
 
“ * * * Now is the time for Ohio’s governmental, educational, and 
corporate leaders to forge a new agreement to enable local communities and their 
schools to move forward to realize those goals.” 
 
Governor Taft is providing the leadership to establish this compact, and 
now is the time for the General Assembly, educators, corporate leaders, and 
parents to join his efforts.  As a result of this combined effort, Ohio can succeed 
in providing all young people with a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools pursuant to Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
We affirm those portions of the trial court decision that are consistent with 
the foregoing opinion.  We decline to appoint a special master to oversee the 
state’s further efforts to comply with Section 2, Article VI.  This court will 
maintain continuing jurisdiction.  The matter is continued to June 15, 2001, at 
which time this court will establish a briefing schedule. 
So ordered. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
COOK, J., separately dissents. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
According to its own description: 
 
“Achieve, Inc., is an independent, non-profit, bipartisan organization 
created by the nation’s governors and business leaders to help them follow up on 
the commitments made at the 1996 National Education Summit.  Its twelve 
member Board of Directors includes former Governor Voinovich and John 
Pepper, Chairman of Procter & Gamble and Chairman of the Ohio Business 
Roundtable.  Achieve provides advice and assistance to state policy leaders on 
issues of academic standards, assessment, and accountability.  It has a small staff, 
 
54 
augmented by a team of Senior Associates, and conducts much of its work in 
partnership with other education and business organizations.  To carry out this 
review, Achieve drew upon three of its Senior Associates—Denis Doyle, Diane 
Ravitch, and Warren Simmons—as well as Susan Traiman, who directs The 
Business Roundtable’s education work.  The review team was headed by 
Achieve’s President, Robert Schwartz, and was assisted by Seth Reynolds, 
graduate student at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.” 
 
2. 
The Education Tax Policy Institute (“ETPI”) was formed in 1977 
to act as an “independent, data-driven organization” for the purpose of analyzing 
tax policy issues.  ETPI’s membership includes approximately one hundred 
school districts and several state-level groups representing public sector 
organizations and employees. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  On March 24, 1997, this court released the 
opinion in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 
(“DeRolph I”).  The opinion included a strong dissent severely castigating the 
majority for violating the separation of powers doctrine and for deciding a 
nonjusticiable question.  Id. at 264-283, 677 N.E.2d at 780-795.  Joining this 
chorus were the then Governor of Ohio, the leaders and some other members of 
the General Assembly, several large Ohio newspapers through their reporting and 
editorial facilities, and a few representatives of business interests.  The message 
was always the same—there is a crazy majority in the Ohio Supreme Court and, 
with the school-funding decision, Armageddon is at hand.  Notwithstanding all of 
that clamor and criticism,3 the DeRolph I majority remained silent even though 
the temptation to respond was great.  It is now fair to say that, three years later, 
the world has not come to an end, the republic has survived, and there is light at 
the end of the tunnel. 
 
55 
 
Admittedly, the tunnel is long, the road remains full of potholes, and the 
ultimate success of the journey is still in doubt, but we at least are on our way.  I 
believe that any fair-minded observer of the controversy would have to admit that 
sans DeRolph I we would not have progressed to the point at which we find 
ourselves today.  Due at least in part to DeRolph I, thousands of Ohio’s young 
citizens attending schools, teachers, principals, superintendents, and other 
administrators are better off educationally than they were three years ago.  Of 
course, as with every contested issue, some will say that not enough has been 
done and others will say that we have now reached the golden gates and no 
further action is needed.  All we can do, as Justice Resnick has so well done, is to 
take the facts as they are presented to us, apply the law, and then reach a decision 
that accommodates without capitulation, sheds light rather than heat, and 
constructively builds rather than destroys.  Unfortunately, not everyone joins us in 
this quest on behalf of Ohio’s education system. 
 
The dissenters herein, once again, criticize the majority for doing 
anything—then criticize us for not doing enough.  They can’t have it both ways, 
and the majority opinion, recognizing this dichotomy, strikes a balance by, in 
specifics, respectfully pointing out the constitutional shortcomings of the General 
Assembly’s remedial efforts while refraining from mandating a particular course 
of action.  In doing so the majority further respects and recognizes that it is the 
right and prerogative, as well as the sworn sacred duty, of the members of the 
General Assembly to put in place the nuts and bolts of our state’s educational 
system.  In this regard, many of the proposals of the Ohio Coalition for Equity 
and Adequacy of School Funding, such as “A Call To Build:  Appropriate 21st 
Century School Facilities” (Apr. 2000), while well-documented and well-
researched, are specifics (details) to be debated and decided by the General 
Assembly rather than this court.  Our sole mission is to see to it that the 
Constitution is honored and that Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution is 
 
56 
being obeyed.4  When it has been, we should say so.  When it has not—then it is 
our duty to say that too. 
 
Central to all of this is the role of Governor Bob Taft.  As we have seen in 
other states,5  Governors can be and are the players, more than any other persons 
or institutions, with the standing and clout to shape the direction of policymaking 
in education.  The only caveat is that a Governor must choose to lead.  Ours has!  
The attention he and his staff have devoted to the school facilities problem has 
been extraordinary.  He has chosen to immerse himself personally in the never-
ending death struggle that generally comes before passage of anything worthwhile 
in education.  He has lent and continues to lend credence to the age-old adage that 
Governors “usually get what they want.”  It is not unconstitutional to say that with 
his leadership “all things are possible.” 
 
It is also fair to say that with the notable exception of the dissenters herein, 
a number of the severest critics of the majority decision in DeRolph I have 
responsibly moved to help decision-makers reach consensus on many of the 
divisive issues.  Significant, among others, was the lead editorial in The 
Columbus Dispatch of Thursday, April 13, 2000, titled “Classroom Math.”  The 
first paragraph said that “Gov. Bob Taft’s proposal to spend $1 billion in the next 
two years to fix or replace deteriorating school buildings in the state deserves full 
support in the General Assembly.”  The last paragraph said, “Clearly, Ohio’s 
leaders have taken the court’s ruling seriously and have reoriented state priorities 
to put education needs at the top of the list.”  Such pronouncements have not gone 
unnoticed or unappreciated. 
 
While much more could be said, in writing now I confine myself to two 
specific matters.  I believe that these matters lie at the heart of the next phase of 
the continued quest for a constitutional funding system that strives, at the very 
least, for an equal opportunity for all of Ohio’s school-age students to receive a 
basic “thorough and efficient” education. 
 
57 
I 
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 650 (“H.B. 650”) 
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 770 (“H.B. 770”) 
 
As so well set out by Justice Resnick in the lead opinion, H.B. 650, as 
supplemented by H.B. 770, is the cornerstone of the General Assembly’s school-
funding-formula remedy.  While the lead opinion properly points out a number of 
remaining concerns with this legislative remedy, I also join the majority opinion 
because I, somewhat differently, believe that the General Assembly has made a 
good-faith effort at progress and that we should give its handiwork time to prove 
itself worthy and, if the effort falls short, then there is time enough for the 
Governor and the legislature to fine-tune, tinker with, and/or scrap what has been 
done in their (and our) incessant search to do what is constitutional, necessary, 
and right. 
 
For me the heart of H.B. 650 is the “caps” formula.  The General 
Assembly had to balance the complexities of urban districts, poor districts, 
wealthy districts, and districts with growing and declining enrollment.  Just as 
with shoes, no one size fits all.  Thus the initial nine-and-one-half-percent and 
eleven-percent caps for the first effective year and the ten-percent and twelve-
percent caps for the next year were necessary both fiscally and logistically.  While 
the caps appear to help some districts and hurt some districts, a real start has been 
made and, for me, the redeeming feature is that all caps roll off in the year 2002 
when the formula will take full effect.  At that time, if I understand the formula, 
major increases in state-funded support will then take effect in a number of our 
state’s neediest school districts. 
 
Is that soon enough?  Will the level of support be adequate?  Can those 
districts in trouble survive the wait?  Districts in the greatest need, and there are 
more than one hundred, will answer “no.”  Those persons in charge of making 
policy and finding the finances to make progress will answer “yes.”  The majority 
 
58 
of this court answers “maybe,” and therein lies the reasoning for the one-year 
grace period provided in the lead opinion. 
 
Obviously, this counsels patience.  I recognize that Ludwig Börne (1786-
1837), a German political author and satirist, had a point when he once said, “Not 
through patience, but through impatience, are peoples liberated.”  The 
International Dictionary of Thoughts (1969) 543.  However, Edmund Burke 
(1729-1797), an eighteenth-century British statesman, political writer, and orator, 
allowed that “[o]ur patience will achieve more than our force.”  Id.  With patience 
acorns become oak trees; aggregate, sand, and cement become concrete; and 
revolutions spawn democracies.  Force, on the other hand, even if available, is to 
be eschewed as only compounding an already difficult problem.  John Milton 
(1608-1674), the English poet, was instructive when he counseled that “[w]ho 
overcomes by force, hath overcome but half his foe.”  Id. at 298. 
 
While the education revolution, in which we are all engaged, seems to be 
endless, it is well to remember the progress that has been made in just the three 
short years since DeRolph I, especially when compared with the twenty-one-year 
period (and before) since this court issued its decision in Cincinnati School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 12 O.O.3d 327, 390 N.E.2d 813. 
 
Is there still work to be done?  Yes—substantial—which brings me to my 
second issue. 
II 
Overreliance on Local Property Taxes 
 
In Part III(E) of the majority opinion, Justice Resnick, ably and without 
flourish, lays out the brutal facts.  Those facts and the conclusions to which they 
lead are inescapable.  When the foundation of a structure is weak and is built on 
shifting sand, the structure is doomed to fall.  While well-meaning at its inception 
and effectively marketed (by those who would avoid their responsibility) under 
the rubric of local control, heavy reliance on local property taxes for school 
 
59 
funding is the inherent weakness in the foundation and, inevitably, the structure 
will continue to fall—piece by piece—until this difficult issue is met, at least in 
part, head-on. 
 
None would dispute the importance of education to the very existence of 
democracy.  Scholarly commentators at home and abroad (Alexis de Tocqueville 
and Baron Acton, to name two) often made the point that our education system in 
America, open to all regardless of rank or residence in our society, favorably set 
us apart from life in European societies.  How then has our system, at one time so 
widely acclaimed, grown progressively weaker?  While it is contended that there 
are other reasons such as lack of accountability, waste, control by others than 
school boards and administrators, family failures and discipline, it must also be 
conceded, I believe, by any fair-minded observer that funding, and the method of 
funding, also factors large into the equation.  This should not surprise us, as the 
problem is not of recent vintage. 
 
It is interesting to note that from the beginning of our republic, the method 
for funding public education did not support the goal of having an equal and open 
educational opportunity for all.  In 1777, when Thomas Jefferson was Governor 
of Virginia, he shepherded through the House of Burgesses a bill whose purpose 
was “For the Greater Diffusion of Knowledge.”  Unfortunately, and it is a familiar 
story in many of our United States, the Virginia legislature did not provide an 
adequate funding structure to support the legislation Jefferson had caused to be 
enacted.  Sometime later, in the 1820s and just before Jefferson’s death, he 
recognized the weak and faulty foundation of educational funding when he 
lamented the actions of his beloved state by expressing his disappointment that 
the legislature had not provided commonwealth-wide taxes to support education 
but, instead, had provided an educational funding system based on local, town-by-
town taxation.  Jefferson said that such a system would never work because the 
wealthier towns in the commonwealth would never support the education of those 
 
60 
children who found themselves in the poorer towns of the commonwealth.  That 
was one hundred eighty years ago, and, as in so many other venues where we hark 
back to the revered genius of Monticello, we again find him right.  This is where 
we have found ourselves for a long time in our state, and all that has happened is 
that the problem has grown worse.  This is where we found ourselves at the time 
of Walter (1979) and DeRolph I (1997).  And this is where we still find ourselves 
today. 
 
For whatever reason, the General Assembly has chosen to ignore this basic 
fundamental problem and our request that something be done to reverse the 
course of heavy reliance on local property taxes.  In fact, since DeRolph I, the 
problem has been exacerbated.  Local share of total funding vis-à-vis state share 
of total funding has increased since 1997.  All the while, since our decision in 
March 1997, not only was the local tax issue ignored, but also the General 
Assembly has given tax refunds of $1,257,474,801 to Ohio citizens that, I would 
venture to say, most Ohioans (including me) didn’t even realize we were 
receiving.  If even one-half of that sum had been applied to the total 
$6,000,000,000 of local real estate and personal property taxes paid to support our 
common schools, a one-time reduction of ten percent of those taxes could have 
been realized with the promise that we are moving in the right direction (a dollar-
for-dollar shift to sales and income taxes) and that more effort would follow.  
Instead, we see yet today that there is talk in the General Assembly of yet another 
tax refund of millions and millions of dollars with no consideration being given to 
the fundamental problem that causes the lack of equal protection (opportunity) for 
all of Ohio’s elementary and secondary students. 
 
In March of this year, one hundred sixty-one school districts in Ohio had 
to seek additional local funds from their voters to operate, repair, and/or build 
their schools.  The passage rate was sixty-eight percent.  Thus it is clear that the 
citizens of Ohio are doing and are prepared to do their part.  Notwithstanding this, 
 
61 
an overwhelming majority of these good citizens have asked this court for our 
help because others have been unresponsive.  Well over five hundred of Ohio’s 
six hundred eleven school districts are party plaintiffs in this suit.  The response 
of the dissenters herein, who so severely take us to task for having a different 
view than they do, is, “Just stay out of it.” 
 
In 1996, at the Jesse Fell Lecture Series at Illinois State University, 
Distinguished Professor Emeritus George Alan Karnes Wallis Hickrod said that 
“[w]e have a society that is increasingly unequal, we have schools that are 
increasingly unequal, and if we do not do something about it we will end up with 
an increasingly well educated ‘elite’ and an increasingly poorly educated 
‘underclass.’  No responsible observer that I know expects democracy to do well 
under those conditions.”  Our mission statement cannot be better stated.  The 
cause of educational opportunity is a noble one.  We should not shrink from our 
duty.  In order to meet the dictates of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution, the General Assembly must, as Governor Engler and the legislature 
did in the state of Michigan, actively pursue a solution to the continued heavy 
overreliance on local property taxes for school funding.  Unless and until that 
happens, it is difficult to see how any legislative response would make this case 
go away—a hope that all involved fondly cherish. 
III 
 
It is easy to criticize.  It is far more difficult to be a problem-solver than a 
problem maker.  The majority herein prefers to be problem-solvers by helping the 
Governor and General Assembly solve a problem that, by any objective appraisal 
and appraiser, has existed for far too long.  The dissenters would continue the 
status quo by simply saying “Let George do it.” 6  Well, my valued colleagues, 
“George” hasn’t done it!  It is obvious that “George” was nowhere to be found 
until our decision in DeRolph I.  Now the dissenters would have us say “all is 
well” when even they know that would be calumny of the first order. 
 
62 
 
The prophets of gloom and doom have now declared that they were right.  
The court should just have ignored the plaintiffs and their hard evidence and 
given only a wink to our Constitution.  They warned us, they say, thus attempting 
to bring about their own self-fulfilling prophecy.  But where would the kids and 
school system of this state be today if the dissenters in DeRolph I had prevailed?  
Just to ask the question answers it.  I, very respectfully, concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
3. 
Canon 3(B)(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] 
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.  A 
judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of 
criticism.” 
 
4. 
It is well to repeat just what this section of the Constitution 
provides—as opposed to what a number of pundits have tried to make it say:  
“The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, 
with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
5. 
To date the Supreme Courts of sixteen of our sister states have 
found their state’s school funding system unconstitutional, interpreting language 
in their Constitutions that is, in many, exactly or remarkably like the words used 
in our Ohio Constitution.  See DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 204, 677 N.E.2d at 741 
(naming fourteen states); see, also, Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (1997), 
142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353; Opinion of the Justices No. 338 (Ala.1993), 624 
So.2d 107.  In addition, twelve other states have school funding litigation pending 
at some level.  Viewing these statistics, it would seem that our action in DeRolph 
I was not such an aberration after all. 
 
6. 
“George” is generic in nature and makes reference to no particular 
individual, dead or alive. 
 
63 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  Two very different constitutional interpretations 
and consequential courses of action are again laid out by the members of this 
court. 
 
There is, of course, the simple and efficient alternative constitutional 
interpretation offered by Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Cook and Lundberg 
Stratton.  Despite the state’s failure ever to advance this theory, my dissenting 
colleagues continue to argue that Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution 
has no discernible meaning, or if it has meaning, it is up to the General Assembly 
rather than this court to interpret its meaning and decide upon compliance. 
 
In doing so, the dissenters pay no heed to Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. 
of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 384, 12 O.O.3d 327, 336, 390 
N.E.2d 813, 824, where this court stated that “the issue concerning legislation 
passed by the General Assembly pursuant to Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio 
Constitution presents a justiciable controversy.”  In the dissenters’ view, this court 
is unable to interpret the phrase “thorough and efficient” and should therefore not 
even try.  But, see, id., 58 Ohio St.2d at 383, 12 O.O.3d at 336, 390 N.E.2d at 823 
(“We wish to state clearly at the outset that this court has the authority, and indeed 
the duty, to review legislation to determine its constitutionality under the 
Constitution of Ohio and to declare statutes inoperative.”).  Instead, my dissenting 
colleagues would essentially throw up their hands in dismay at the difficulty of 
interpreting two rather common words:  “thorough” and “efficient” are, after all, 
used every day by both common and uncommon people. 
 
Their approach strikes at the core of constitutional law, that courts are the 
final arbiters of what the Constitution means, which was decided long ago.  See 
Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.  See, also, Walter,  
58 Ohio St.2d at 383, 12 O.O.3d at 336, 390 N.E.2d at 823 (“The doctrine of 
judicial review is so well established that it is beyond cavil.”). 
 
64 
 
They quote one college professor, a legal encyclopedia, and a second-year 
law student.  They do not, however, mention Marbury or any of the hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of cases decided in this country, in which judges have 
declared federal or state legislation to be unconstitutional.  They essentially state 
that the Thorough and Efficient Clause is little more than an aspiration, even if it 
is part of Ohio’s Constitution. 
 
It is a very tidy solution—simple, efficient and inexpensive.  
Unfortunately, it would turn two hundred years of constitutional jurisprudence, 
dating back to Marbury v. Madison, on its head.  It also would allow the General 
Assembly to continue to disregard the section of the Constitution that mandates a 
“thorough and efficient” education system.  See Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio 
St. 287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 773, 776. 
 
Despite the protestations of my dissenting colleagues and some members 
of the General Assembly, this court’s decision in DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, is binding legal authority in this state.  
Subsequent to the announcement of this court’s March 24, 1997 DeRolph 
decision, the General Assembly has slowly embarked on a course of action that 
addressed some well-documented deficiencies in Ohio’s system of public 
education, but only marginally confronted the constitutional shortcomings that are 
at the core of this case.  Specific and detailed guidance is apparently required, and 
now possibly is even desired by the General Assembly. 
 
“The general assembly shall make such provisions * * * as * * * will 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.” 
Section 2, Article VI, Constitution of the State of Ohio. 
 
The first step toward constitutional compliance is monumental.  It requires 
acceptance of the fact that the simple declaration of Section 2 was intended by the 
framers to, and therefore does, require a specific and ongoing duty to act.  
 
65 
Presumably, a respect for the Ohio Constitution and for this court’s duty to 
interpret it will help foster that realization. 
 
The second step, setting statewide minimum educational requirements, 
while subject to continued revision, is seemingly in place and not the subject of 
dispute in this case.  The State Department of Education and the General 
Assembly have determined what constitutes a basic education.  This court has not 
been a part of that discussion.  The reason that DeRolph is here is not because the 
state does not know what it takes to provide a basic education, but because some 
children are not receiving what the state has determined that they need.  For 
example, setting minimum requirements for the availability of basic modern 
textbooks and computers does not meet the mandate of Section 2, Article VI when 
those standards are simply not met for many school children.  It is the duty of the 
state to ensure actual compliance with its own standards. 
 
Assessing the cost of those basic requirements is where the state continues 
to stumble.  Compliance with minimum requirements would necessarily entail a 
certain threshold minimum cost.  Here the state did understand this court in 
DeRolph and undertook the task of determining minimum cost.  However, new 
programming and other new mandated local school expenditures were not 
included in the calculation.  The incomplete minimum cost in dollar value, having 
been determined, was then fractionally reduced and then complete compliance 
was deferred for several years.  Finally, no provision was made to update this 
financial cost measurement for each biannual budget. 
 
The bedrock constitutional challenge undertaken in this case focuses on 
the horrible funding inequities that persist between school districts in Ohio due to 
the state’s heavy reliance on local property taxes in formulating the school 
foundation formula.  That was the constitutional tripwire in DeRolph I and could 
not have been set forth more forcefully by this court.  It is in conquering this 
 
66 
colossus that the General Assembly decided to polish up the existing formula, 
declare victory, and call in their legal team without attempting the climb. 
 
Local property taxes raise such a mountain of money that it is not realistic 
to expect total replacement.  That is not what the Constitution requires, nor was it 
suggested by this court.  What is required is an immediate good faith effort to 
comply with the Constitution. 
 
Getting there is fourth grade math.  First, determine an honest per-pupil 
current minimum operating cost.  Next, determine the minimum property tax 
millage rate that every school district in Ohio will be expected to collect in 
support of the minimum operating cost.  Finally, fill the gaps by adopting a 
minimum state school foundation formula that lifts every school district and 
school student in this state to the minimum dollar target beginning this next 
school year.  Those simple steps, properly completed, will bring the state to the 
threshold of constitutional compliance.  It is not a very high place. 
 
There will still be room for a supplemental education budget that allows 
legislators to provide, on a rational basis, extra state funds for all the special needs 
of children in circumstances that merit targeted funding. 
 
Tracking in tandem with these school-funding issues are the considerable 
school facilities deficiencies.  While the school building problems are much easier 
to visualize, they are somewhat harder to fit into a mold of constitutional 
compliance or noncompliance.  Unfortunately, school facilities have become so 
desperate that Ohio has been ranked at or near the bottom of the nation by outside 
observers of these conditions.  It is the shame of low rankings rather than the 
hammer of this litigation that has prompted legislative action. 
 
Is the state’s commitment large enough, fast enough, or certain enough? 
Certainty is a constitutional impossibility, given a constitutionally mandated two-
year budget cycle.  The dollar amount is large, but so is the documented need.  
Section 2, Article VI would appear to be met by a plan that commits the state to a 
 
67 
timely path of remediation and includes a method for constant review of the need 
and for acceleration of assistance when warranted. 
 
This case is not about high standards.  It is about a constitutionally 
required foundation of basic educational opportunity.  The difficulty lies not in 
building that foundation, but in sustaining a democracy without it. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  The sole issue now before us, as it was in 
DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), is 
whether the Ohio General Assembly has violated the words and intent of the Ohio 
Constitution that require it to “make such provisions, by taxation or otherwise, as * * 
* will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the 
State.”  Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution.  In DeRolph I a majority of 
this court held that Ohio school-financing laws then in place did not comply with 
this constitutional provision. 
 
I, along with Justices Cook and Lundberg Stratton, dissented, recognizing 
that the General Assembly had in fact established a statewide school system in 
which schools were open, teachers were teaching, buses were running, and all 
Ohio children had available to them an opportunity to learn.  Our dissent was 
based on our conviction that resolution of issues of the level and method of school 
funding is dependent upon judgments regarding the quality of education to be 
provided by the state.  It was further grounded on our firm belief that 
constitutional history, precedent, and logic warrant the conclusion that those 
qualitative judgments should be committed to the will of the people as expressed 
in the election of representatives to the General Assembly and local school boards 
and in the determination of voted taxation issues to support the schools.  In short, 
the determination of what constitutes minimum levels of educational opportunity 
to be provided to Ohio’s children is committed by the Ohio Constitution to 
 
68 
legitimate policy makers—not the courts, whose proper role is interpretation and 
application of law. 
 
The wide divergence of opinion between the majority and the minority 
members of this court as to proper interpretation of the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause, as manifested in the various separate opinions in DeRolph I, remains.  I 
continue to believe that decisions regarding the level of educational quality to be 
made available to Ohio school children are dependent upon policy decisions—
political, budgetary, and value judgments—that require a balancing of interests that 
is not appropriately struck in the Supreme Court of Ohio.  “The judicial branch is 
simply neither equipped nor empowered to make these kinds of decisions.”  
DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 269, 677 N.E.2d at 785-786 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
 
Today the majority, having examined the current statutory school-funding 
system, acknowledges that significant steps have been taken since our decision in 
DeRolph I by the General Assembly, as well as by two Ohio Governors, to improve 
public elementary and secondary education in our state.  The majority summarizes a 
multitude of initiatives adopted by the executive and legislative branches in recent 
years to improve school quality in Ohio, and specifically recognizes that the General 
Assembly has taken steps to “formulate a viable plan to fund the construction of new 
school facilities and to repair” physical deficiencies in Ohio school buildings.  The 
majority recognizes the complexity of the educational system, and describes the task 
of reforming that system as one of “unparalleled magnitude.” 
 
What the majority fails to fully recount is the magnitude of the state’s 
monetary commitment to education.  Pursuant to the Classroom Facilities Act, from 
1990 to May 1998, twenty-three new construction projects had been completed and 
fourteen more were under construction.  The General Assembly has earmarked $1.6 
billion for the School Facilities Commission for classroom facilities improvements 
since DeRolph I.  Funding for technology improvements in the schools totaled $256 
million at the time of trial before the common pleas court in 1998, 1997 
 
69 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 215, Section 69, with additional funding of $196 million 
appropriated in 1999, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 282, Section 11.  The General Assembly 
has provided a $50 million textbook subsidy for all but the wealthiest school 
districts, 1997 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, Sections 50 and 50.16.  Since fiscal year 1991, 
the Department of Education has received the largest increase in state dollars of any 
agency, totaling approximately $1.7 billion, and receives more state money than any 
other agency or department in the state. 
 
Nevertheless, although the majority acknowledges progress in achieving the 
criteria set in DeRolph I, including significant initiatives and developments, it 
concludes that “a great deal of work has yet to be done before Ohio can be said to 
have a constitutional thorough and efficient system of public schools.” 
 
The majority retains jurisdiction of this case for at least another year, after 
which it will again scrutinize the public school statutory framework in light of its 
own unpredictable and indefinite concepts of educational thoroughness and 
efficiency.  In the interim, the General Assembly and the executive branch of 
government are asked to further improve the system, in accordance with direction 
created by the majority which remains vague and generalized.  In so doing, and 
while recognizing that the coequal executive and legislative branches of government 
have acted in good faith to comply with DeRolph I, the majority in effect claims veto 
power over policy determinations made by the General Assembly, thereby reserving 
to itself ultimate authority over public educational policy within the state. 
 
In DeRolph I, our joint dissent expressed the view that the majority had 
failed to provide the General Assembly with sufficient guidance for creating a 
constitutional school-financing system and noted that “[a]spirational phrases urging 
that state financing of educational systems enable citizens to ‘fully develop their 
human potential,’ and afford ‘high quality educational opportunities’ are no more 
amenable to judicial interpretation or enforcement than is the term ‘thorough  and 
efficient.’ ”  78 Ohio St.3d at 268-269, 677 N.E.2d at 785.  This criticism applies to 
 
70 
today’s majority opinion as well.  The majority still has not clearly told the General 
Assembly what “thorough and efficient” means, or what “overreliance” on property 
tax is, or what would constitute the kind of educational opportunity it believes the 
Ohio Constitution guarantees to every Ohio child.  Instead, the majority today tells 
the General Assembly once again to go back to the drawing board, while not 
describing in a meaningful way what the final design must look like. 
 
Today the majority elevates two statements from Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 
Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773, to syllabus law.  Paragraph one of the syllabus provides 
that the General Assembly must secure not merely a system of common schools but 
rather a thorough and efficient system of common schools.  The second paragraph of 
today’s syllabus provides that the attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that 
system is a statewide purpose, that is, efficiency and thoroughness throughout the 
state are goals toward which the General Assembly should strive.  I do not object to 
adoption of these principles, although I remain committed to the proposition that 
determination of whether Ohio’s public school system is thorough and efficient is 
committed by the Constitution to the General Assembly itself. 
 
The third paragraph of the syllabus constitutes an attempt to define the 
phrases “thorough system” and “efficient system.”  The majority defines a thorough 
system as one in which each and every school district has “enough” funds to operate, 
and an efficient system as one in which each and every school district has “ample” 
teachers and equipment, “sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational 
opportunity,” as well as buildings compliant with building and fire codes.  However, 
in attempting to clarify the ambiguous phrase “thorough and efficient,” the majority 
merely substitutes additional ambiguous and subjective criteria.  Whether a district 
has “enough” funds, or an “ample” number of teachers, is in the eye of the beholder. 
 
Moreover, I take issue with the majority’s conclusion that an efficient system 
is dependent upon “each and every school district” in the state meeting the criteria.  
The majority thereby shifts its focus from analysis of the educational system to case-
 
71 
by-case analysis of individual school districts, and presumably individual schools 
themselves.  One can only infer that the majority intends to retain jurisdiction of this 
case until it finds every school in the state to be thorough and efficient, even though 
the Constitution requires, by its own terms, only a thorough and efficient system—
not a system in which every school is thorough and efficient. 
 
This inference is reinforced by the majority’s recitation of instances of 
deficiencies in individual schools, e.g., schools with mold-infested  bathrooms, or 
schools plagued by sewage problems.  But problems in individual schools do not in 
and of themselves demonstrate a failure of the statewide system of common schools 
as a whole.  For instance, William L. Phillis, executive director of the Ohio Coalition 
for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding, testified at trial that he walked through 
a “stream of water” and smelled the odor of sewage at Park Street Middle School, in 
the South-Western City School District, where a section of a locker room in the 
school’s basement had to be sealed off due to a sewage backup.  However, in 
November 1998, voters in the South-Western City School District approved a 4.92-
mill bond issue to build seven new schools and improve others. See South-Western 
City Schools web site, http://www.swcs.k12.oh.us/construction.htm.  Park Street 
Middle School is to be demolished following the scheduled opening in 2001 of a 
new 
intermediate 
school, 
now 
under 
construction. 
 
See 
id. 
at 
http://www.swcs.k12.oh.us/psms.htm.  The statewide system of common schools in 
effect in 1998 thus appears to have been adequate to correct the problem described 
by Phillis’s anecdotal evidence. 
 
One need not have served on a board of education to know that the condition 
of the physical facilities, the quality of school learning materials, the salaries of 
teachers and employees, and the efficiency of school administrators are determined, 
in large measure, by decisions made in each local school district.  The majority 
opinion takes no account of that significant reality. 
 
72 
 
Nor do I agree that the mandate of the Constitution to the General Assembly 
to establish a thorough and efficient system of common schools is equivalent to a 
mandate that the General Assembly establish a state-funded system of common 
schools.  Even accepting the proposition that Ohio’s system of public education is to 
be a “statewide system,” I disagree with the majority’s statement that the “state is 
responsible for funding an adequate education for all primary and secondary 
students who attend public schools.”  (Emphasis added.) What words of the 
Constitution preclude a system in which local school districts are held even partially 
responsible for funding a basic education at local schools?  An overriding state 
obligation may be desirable, but the issue before us is the interpretation of a 
constitutional mandate, not the desirability of a particular legislative policy. 
 
Furthermore, such a construction is totally inconsistent with the history of 
education in Ohio as well as the circumstances surrounding  public education at the 
time the Thorough and Efficient Clause was adopted.  See DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d 
at 280, 677 N.E.2d at 793 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“While it is true that the framers 
of our Education Clause envisioned educational opportunity for all, the framers 
contemporaneously acknowledged and approved of a statewide educational system 
in which local districts were primarily responsible for providing educational 
opportunity to their children.  When the Education Clause was adopted, 
determination of adequacy was dependent upon the resources available at the local 
level and the amount local residents were willing to spend on educating local 
children.”). 
 
The majority includes a list of seven major areas that it asks the General 
Assembly to scrutinize, and presumably change, before the majority will relinquish 
jurisdiction of this case.  However, the list raises questions with no answers. 
 
For instance, the majority finds fault with continued “reliance” on local 
property taxes as a “primary” means to fund Ohio’s schools.  Each member of this 
court may hold an opinion regarding the appropriateness of the real property tax 
 
73 
versus other more uniform or statewide forms of taxation, but that has never been 
the test for determining the constitutionality of statutory law.  The majority notes 
that statewide, state funding constitutes forty-four percent of the total, excluding 
federal funds, versus fifty-six percent from local funding, and implicitly finds that 
proportion to be constitutionally deficient as a primary reliance or an overreliance on 
local property tax, even though the majority has already conceded that property tax 
may be continued as a legitimate source of school funding.  DeRolph v. State (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 419, 419-421, 678 N.E.2d 886, 887. 
 
Today the majority says the General Assembly has not gone far enough in 
increasing the proportion of state funding to local funding, noting that “this aspect of 
the former system [overreliance on local property tax] persists in the state’s current 
funding plan, wholly unchanged.”  (Emphasis sic.)  It makes this statement despite 
the fact that the poorest Ohio school districts now receive roughly ninety percent of 
new construction costs in state aid, with a ten-percent local contribution.  
“Reliance,” however, remains undefined, let alone “overreliance.”  If the percentage 
of local to state funding were inverted would that be sufficient, or is the majority 
seeking only a fifty-one-percent reliance on state funds?  In stating that the General 
Assembly must establish a state-funded system of common schools, the majority 
hints, without expressly saying, that it intends to retain jurisdiction until the property 
tax component of school funding is significantly changed, or eliminated, despite its 
earlier ruling that local property taxes could be part of a constitutionally acceptable 
revised funding plan.  DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d at 419, 678 N.E.2d at 887.  
But ultimately one can only guess as to the meaning of these terms. 
 
Moreover, reliance on property tax has very little, if anything, to do with 
thoroughness and efficiency.  The majority explicitly observes that the flaw in 
dependence on local property tax is the creation of “vast disparities among Ohio’s 
six hundred eleven public school districts,” noting that it puts “property-poor 
districts at a disadvantage.”  But these are statements directed not to the adequacy of 
 
74 
funding of the public schools, but rather to the equity of the system.  Indeed, the 
majority opinion more than once suggests that the fundamental problem with 
property tax funding is that it creates inequities.  Yet this court has previously 
expressly rejected the contention that the Ohio Constitution mandates equal 
educational opportunity throughout the state.  DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 211, 677 
N.E.2d at 746. 
 
Even while claiming not to be retreating from its prior mandate in DeRolph I 
that the General Assembly make a “complete systematic overhaul” and “create an 
entirely new school financing system,” id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 212 and 213, 677 
N.E.2d at 747, the majority asks the General Assembly to give further attention to 
the basic aid formula and the phenomenon of phantom revenue attributable in part to 
1976 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 920, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3182, and to 1998 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 650, both of which affect local, i.e., property-tax-based school 
funding.  In view of the majority’s earlier position that property tax need not be 
eliminated as a source of school funding, it remains unclear whether the General 
Assembly can eliminate overreliance on property tax by simply fine-tuning the 
underlying formulas of the current school-funding method or must instead eliminate 
it. 
 
This court has still not provided a positive definition of a thorough and 
efficient system of common schools or outlined its constituent elements in a 
meaningful way.  The majority again today reiterates its standard for a thorough and 
efficient system by quoting Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. at 298, 140 N.E. at 776:  
“A thorough system could not mean one in which part or any number of the school 
districts of the state were starved for funds.  An efficient system could not mean one 
in which part or any number of the school districts of the state lacked teachers, 
buildings, or equipment.”  (Emphasis added.)  But although hypothesizing as to what 
would not be thorough and efficient, neither the Miller court nor the majority has 
defined that phrase positively, except to say that an “ample” number of teachers and 
 
75 
“sufficient” equipment affording all students “educational opportunity” must be 
provided, in buildings compliant with state building and fire codes. 
 
Similarly, the majority notes that this court in Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 387, 12 O.O.3d 327, 338, 390 N.E.2d 
813, 825, determined that the state’s educational system would not be deemed 
thorough and efficient if school districts received so little funding from all sources 
that students were “being deprived of educational opportunity.”  (Emphasis added.)  
But again, this phrase is inherently ambiguous and is left unclarified by the majority.  
Does it mean deprivation of all educational opportunity, such as described in Miller, 
i.e., where children have no schools, no teachers, no books?  If so, such a situation 
simply does not currently exist in Ohio, nor did it exist at the time of DeRolph I. 
 
I believe that the majority instead means that students in a thorough and 
efficient system must be provided educational opportunities that meet a level of 
quality that it, rather than the people of the state speaking through their elected 
representatives, finds satisfactory.  The majority is really saying that it does not think 
that the minimum educational standards now in place are high enough, thereby 
substituting its own judgment of educational sufficiency for constitutional analysis. 
 
For example, the majority implies that a thorough and efficient system of 
common schools providing educational opportunity to its students now includes as a 
required element the provision of sufficient computers to allow students nearing 
graduation to be computer-literate.  Some members of the General Assembly may 
share this view, along with Governor Taft, as demonstrated by his 2000 State of the 
State Address.  But that fact is of no legal relevance and does not change the fact that 
decisions as to the universal provision of computers, or advanced placement courses, 
or multiple foreign language offerings remain decisions of educational policy that 
are appropriately made only by the legislative and executive branches of 
government. 
 
76 
 
I am additionally dismayed by the majority’s apparent expansion of its 
view of thoroughness and efficiency beyond the issues of school financing and 
improvement of physical school facilities, which was the focus of DeRolph I, as 
reflected in its syllabus. 
 
The majority cites with approval a March 1999 report of Achieve, Inc.  That 
report acknowledged that state education funding has increased by approximately 
fifty percent, with the greatest increase in low-wealth school districts, and recounted 
other “substantial new investments” in education.  The report then opines that 
remedying funding and spending disparities and facilities deficiencies might not be 
enough, stating that other requirements of a thorough and efficient system of 
education must be developed.  The Achieve Report further advised that “clear and 
rigorous academic standards, challenging assessments designed to measure progress 
against those standards, and an accountability system that rewards success and takes 
action against persistent failure” constitute the heart of education reform. 
 
But the experts who developed the Achieve Report were reporting to 
legitimate policymakers, members of the legislative and executive branches—not 
judges.  Indeed, Achieve, Inc. describes itself as existing to provide advice and 
assistance to state policy leaders on issues of academic standards, assessment, and 
accountability.  The opinions contained in its report were not intended to constitute a 
legal or constitutional analysis, nor are the members of the organization necessarily 
competent to provide one.  Nevertheless, with this report as its underpinning, the 
majority expands the constitutional concept of a thorough and efficient system 
beyond DeRolph I and suggests that student success is yet another criterion by which 
the thoroughness and efficiency of Ohio schools is to be judged. 
 
The majority concludes that “thoroughness and efficiency embrace far more 
than simply adequate funding” and that “[e]ven if the system were very generously 
funded, if other factors are ignored, it might still not be thorough and efficient.”  It 
states that “much more is involved in this process than merely providing funds” 
 
77 
before it will find Ohio’s public education system to be thorough and efficient.  
Moreover, the majority states, “If students have access to the latest technology but 
cannot take advantage of it, then our state has failed them.  If students have the most 
up-to-date textbooks but cannot comprehend the material in those books, then our 
state has failed them.” 
 
The majority’s suggestion that Ohio policymakers must establish criteria of 
academic success and then assess the performance of Ohio students against those 
criteria in an attempt to demonstrate accountability in order to meet the 
constitutional mandate of a “thorough and efficient system,” while perhaps well 
intentioned, is not constitutionally required.  It thus hints that the ultimate criterion 
of thoroughness and efficiency is whether some undefined percentage of Ohio 
students are achieving academically. 
 
Measurement of academic achievement is a goal we can all support, but it is 
not a reasonable criterion against which the thoroughness and efficiency of Ohio’s 
system of providing public schools should be judged.  In my view, it is neither 
appropriate nor fair to hold the educational system ultimately responsible for failings 
that may be attributable to individuals, or the greater society, rather than to the 
educational system itself.  As noted in the joint dissent to DeRolph I,  proficiency 
test results are not necessarily correlated to expenditures, and external 
socioeconomic factors may be more significant.  78 Ohio St.3d at 279, 677 N.E.2d at 
792.  See Rodgers & Rodgers, Centralized Wisdom? DeRolph v. State and the Rise 
of Judicial Paternalism (1997), 45 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 753, 765-766, citing various 
research findings supporting this conclusion, including a Cleveland Plain Dealer 
analysis concluding that “factors related to families and economic opportunity—not 
school districts—most influence how well students perform on standardized tests.”  
See, also, Traub, What No School Can Do, New York Times Magazine (Jan. 16, 
2000) 52, 54-55 (“[M]oney does not buy educational equality.  Although the 
premise of many a crusading volume, including Jonathan Kozol’s ‘Savage 
 
78 
Inequalities,’ is that ghetto schools have been allowed to rot, many of the most 
catastrophically failing school districts, like Newark’s [New Jersey], spend far more 
money per student than do middle-class communities nearby.  Labor economists 
have had a field day proving that school spending is not correlated with school 
achievement.”). 
 
I also take issue with the majority’s discussion of the process and possible 
motivations by which the General Assembly arrived at the figure of $4,063 for FY99 
as the base cost of an adequate education.  It is of no consequence to this court or to 
its constitutional analysis how the General Assembly produced the legislation we 
review.  It is our responsibility to examine only the final result in light of the 
Constitution.  Laws adopted by the General Assembly need not be perfect, nor is the 
method or motives by which they are created of any judicial concern. 
 
Even assuming that they are of our concern, why is the majority so averse to 
placing its confidence in a Governor who has dramatically and effectively expressed 
his deep commitment to improving public education in Ohio and in a General 
Assembly that has increased public expenditures at record levels?  The work is their 
work to do.  I have confidence in their will and in their ability to do it. 
Conclusion 
 
In DeRolph I the majority placed itself in the constitutionally uncomfortable 
position of ordering the General Assembly to pass remedial legislation.  Today’s 
majority opinion oversteps the bounds of appropriate judicial review of legislative 
enactments, going so far as to decree that the General Assembly give its “undivided 
attention” to realizing the majority’s vision of constitutionally adequate public 
education, even while purporting to give deference to the principle that it is this 
court’s role to “decide issues of constitutionality—not to legislate.”  Such an 
admonition of a supreme court to a legislature is not appropriate.  So long as the 
majority reserves ultimate veto power over any new funding system, its protest that 
it is not retaining control over educational policy in Ohio should convince no one. 
 
79 
 
The majority states that “educators, lawmakers, businesses, parents, and 
students must all work together to strengthen Ohio’s system of public schools.”  No 
person who cares about education, and I and my fellow dissenting justices do indeed 
care deeply about education, is likely to disagree with this expression of such a 
laudable goal.  However, in the final analysis, that declaration constitutes the 
expression of the majority’s estimation of good public policy; it has nothing to do 
with constitutional law. 
 
The majority’s disposition of this case is legally unwarranted and 
inappropriate.  See Rodgers, supra, 45 Cleve.St.L.Rev. at 753-754 (stating that this 
court’s decision in DeRolph I is “dangerous precedent, inasmuch as it dispirits the 
sacrosanct role a legislature assumes in a democratic society and overtly legitimizes 
judicial policymaking” and its “vision of a thorough and efficient school system, via 
more economic parity, ultimately undermines the General Assembly of the State and 
will not extricate Ohio schools,” while further predicting that the decision will 
“markedly fail to advance the quality of the Ohio public school system”). 
 
Our fear as dissenters in DeRolph I, 78 Ohio St.3d at 270, 677 N.E.2d at 786, 
that the judicial intervention in development of state educational policy that the 
majority began would necessitate deeper judicial involvement over time is 
unfortunately being realized.  This case is now over eight years old, with no end in 
sight.  The likelihood of protracted judicial supervision over public education by this 
court for many years to come appears certain. The majority’s failure to define 
educational thoroughness and efficiency, while taking the position that it will know 
it when it sees it, only makes it more likely, if not certain, that judicial involvement 
will continue indefinitely. 
 
The appellees did not demonstrate a violation of the Ohio Constitution in 
1997 when DeRolph I was decided, nor have they in the record before us.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
80 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I view the majority opinions in DeRolph I and now 
DeRolph II as proceeding from a faulty premise—that Ohio’s Thorough and 
Efficient Clause provides the basis for this court to continually veto and/or revise 
the policy decisions of our coequal branch, the General Assembly. 
 
Professor David Mayer of Capital University advances the argument that 
the premise is faulty by analogizing Ohio’s Thorough and Efficient Clause to the 
clause in the United States Constitution that empowers Congress to “provide for 
the common Defence.”  David N. Mayer, DeRolph School Funding Ruling Goes 
Against Bedrock Principles, Toledo Blade (Sept. 12, 1998); see, also, Section 8, 
Article I, United States Constitution.  The two clauses are structurally similar—
both include the directive word “shall.”  Mayer suggests that we imagine the 
federal courts declaring the military budget unconstitutional based on the 
“common Defence” provision.  This is implausible enough, Mayer notes, but 
would the United States Supreme Court then order Congress to prioritize a certain 
defense system above all other national budgetary concerns and give Congress a 
year to allocate sufficient funds?  As Mayer concludes, such an order would be 
“absurd—a flagrant intrusion by one branch of government upon the prerogatives 
of another branch.”  Id. 
 
Our case suffers, at its core, from the same absurdity.  That absurdity is 
why this court will continue to find itself, as it does today, in a quagmire 
concerning its role in remedying the unconstitutionality that it finds.  Today this 
court publishes an opinion that concedes on one page that its role is “not to 
legislate” but merely to “decide issues of constitutionality,” and on another page 
asserts the power to “require a revision” of the General Assembly’s enactments. 
 
81 
 
Instead of compounding our errors, we ought to use this, our second 
review of the merits of the constitutionality claim, to acknowledge our prior 
misjudgment.  We should be conceding in this opinion that the Thorough and 
Efficient Clause is so imprecise and so incapable of adequate and meaningful 
enforcement that it is not self-executing.  See State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 513, 728 N.E.2d 342.  Like the constitutional declaration we examined only 
recently in Williams—that all Ohio citizens possess inalienable rights to life, 
liberty, property, happiness, and safety—the Thorough and Efficient Clause is 
standardless and incomplete.  Id.  “[A] constitutional provision which depends 
upon legislative action for its effectiveness is ipso facto not self-executing * * *.”  
16 American Jurisprudence 2d (1998), Constitutional Law, Section 103. 
 
Even if the non-self-executing Thorough and Efficient Clause could be the 
basis for this court’s finding that certain legislation is void, it does not follow that 
this court—as opposed to the General Assembly, to which the constitutional 
provision is directed—has any role in fashioning a remedy for a violation.  
American Jurisprudence cites an Ohio Supreme Court case for this proposition of 
constitutional law:  “Even if a constitutional provision contains a mandatory 
requirement that the legislature adopt a particular provision, there is no remedy if 
the legislature fails to obey * * *.  [I]t is for the legislature to choose the time and 
form for carrying out the command.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., Section 99, citing 
Ursuline Academy of Cleveland v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1943), 141 Ohio St. 563, 
26 O.O. 152, 49 N.E.2d 674, overruled in part on other grounds by Denison Univ. 
v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 17, 31 O.O.2d 10, 205 N.E.2d 896; 
Palmer v. Bd. of Edn. of Union Free School Dist. No. 2, Town of Geddes, 
Onondaga Cty. (1937), 276 N.Y. 222, 11 N.E.2d 887. 
 
I have raised this point in a prior dissent.  DeRolph v. State (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 1208, 1209, 699 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Cook, J., dissenting) (“Nor can this 
court alter the balance of constitutional power by ordering the legislature to pass 
 
82 
new laws as part of a ‘remedy.’ ”).  I do so again because I view this court’s ill-
conceived foray outside its legitimate role to be a most serious affront to 
individual freedom and democratic ideals.  By not abiding by the American form 
of government, we invite a lessening of public trust in the court as an institution.