Title: Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. City of Madison

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP537 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Madison, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 728, 902 N.W.2d 808  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Eric M. McLeod, Jeffrey L. Vercauteren, Joseph S. 
Diedrich, and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison.  There was an oral 
argument by Eric M. McLeod. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Amanda J. Kaiser, Evan B. Tenebruso, and Boardman & Clark LLP, 
Madison.  There was an oral argument by Evan B. Tenebruso. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Outdoor 
Advertising Association of Wisconsin by Thomas S. Hornig, Kraig 
A. Byron, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Madison. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities by Daniel M. Olson and League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities, Madison. 
 
 
2018 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP537 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV2497) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Madison, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Adams Outdoor 
Advertising Limited Partnership, seeks review of an unpublished 
per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Adams' 
takings claim against the City of Madison.1  The court of appeals 
concluded that Adams failed to show that the City took any 
property 
requiring 
just 
compensation. 
 
Specifically, 
it 
                                                 
1 Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Madison, No. 
2016AP537, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 2017) 
(affirming judgment of the circuit court for Dane County, 
Richard G. Niess, Judge). 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
2 
 
determined that Adams failed to demonstrate a cognizable right 
that underlies its asserted protected property interest. 
¶2 
Both parties agree that the City did not physically 
take any of Adams' property.  They likewise agree that the City 
did not enact any zoning regulation restricting the use of 
previously acquired property interests.  Instead, Adams asserts 
that its property was taken when the City constructed a 
pedestrian bridge over the Beltline Highway that blocked the 
visibility from the highway of the west-facing side of Adams' 
billboard. 
¶3 
According to Adams, the City took its property 
interest in its "vested rights in the legal nonconforming use" 
of its billboard.  It alleges that a taking occurred because the 
City deprived it of all economically beneficial use of the west-
facing side of its billboard, and therefore Adams is entitled to 
just compensation. 
¶4 
The City disagrees, arguing that Adams has failed to 
identify a recognized right sufficient to support its taking 
claim.  Specifically, the City contends that property owners 
have no right to continued and unobstructed visibility of their 
property from a public road. 
¶5 
Like the court of appeals, we determine that a right 
to visibility of private property from a public road is not a 
cognizable right giving rise to a protected property interest.  
Because Adams' claim, in essence, rests on asserting this 
unrecognized right, its takings claim must fail.  See Wis. Med. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
3 
 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, ¶38, 328 Wis. 2d 469, 787 
N.W.2d 22. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶7 
The billboard at issue in this case is located near 
the Beltline Highway in Madison on a single, irregularly shaped 
parcel of land, less than one-half of an acre in size.  It is a 
single pole sign structure with two opposite-facing panels that 
was built in approximately 1995.  One panel faces east and the 
other west, allowing for separate and distinct advertising 
messages. 
¶8 
Adams bought the irregularly shaped parcel of land 
containing the billboard for $200,000 in 2007.  No other 
building or structure is located on Adams' land.  Adams has not 
made any substantial improvements to its billboard since it 
purchased the parcel.  Pursuant to Madison City Ordinance 
§ 31.11(1), the billboard is nonconforming.2  As such, the 
billboard is permitted to remain, but Adams cannot modify its 
height or location. 
                                                 
2 Madison General Ordinance § 31.11(1) provides that "new, 
relocated and replacement advertising signs are prohibited."  
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinance § 31.11(1) (2015).  However 
"[e]xisting advertising signs are nonconforming and permitted to 
remain" in specified districts, including certain commercial and 
industrialized districts.  Id. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
4 
 
¶9 
In 2013, pursuant to an agreement with the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation, the City built the Cannonball 
Bridge (the bridge), a pedestrian and bicycle overpass crossing 
the Beltline Highway.  The bridge is located adjacent to, but 
not on, Adams' property. 
¶10 The bridge obstructs the view of the west-facing side 
of the billboard from Beltline traffic.3  Adams asserts that 
since the construction of the bridge, it has not been able to 
sell 
advertising 
space 
on 
the 
west-facing 
panel 
of 
its 
billboard.  The view from the east-facing side of the billboard 
remains unobstructed, and Adams continues to sell advertising 
space on the east-facing panel. 
¶11 Adams' 
appraiser 
determined 
that 
before 
the 
construction of the bridge, the estimated value of Adams' 
                                                 
3 Adams states that the bridge "completely" blocks the view 
of the west-facing sign.  However, the City explained: 
[T]he west-facing side of the sign is not completely 
obscured.  I've seen it several times myself.  I know 
what it says.  But the legal argument doesn't change, 
whether it's partially obscured or totally obscured.  
So if Adams wants for the summary judgment record to 
say that it's totally obscured, that's fine with me 
for purposes of the summary judgement decision. 
At oral arguments before this court, the City reiterated that 
its stipulation that the bridge "completely" obstructs the view 
of the billboard was for the purposes of summary judgment only. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
5 
 
property was $1,460,000.  After the bridge was erected, it 
asserts that the value of Adams' property declined to $720,000.4 
¶12 Adams filed a complaint alleging in relevant part5 that 
it has "constitutional protected property rights in [its] 
[p]roperty and [s]ign," and that the City has "occupied [its] 
[p]roperty and fully obstructed the west-facing [s]ign . . . ."  
It asserts that the City's construction of the bridge deprived 
Adams of substantially all beneficial uses of its property and 
sign.  Therefore, according to Adams, it is entitled to initiate 
an inverse condemnation action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.10 
(2013-14)6 because the City took its property and sign without 
compensation. 
                                                 
4 The City's appraiser disputes those figures, concluding 
that Adams' appraiser "overstate[d] the diminution value" in the 
appraisal prepared for the purposes of this lawsuit.  According 
to the City's appraiser, it was "hard pressed to understand 
th[e] substantial change in real estate market value" asserted 
by Adams' appraiser because Adams purchased the property for 
$200,000 in 2007, yet it was assessed at over $1.4 million seven 
years later when no substantial improvements had been made to 
the property. 
5 In its amended complaint, Adams asserted a variety of 
other claims against the City related to the construction of the 
bridge——namely trespass, nuisance, equal protection and due 
process 
violations, 
and 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
Highway 
Beautification Act.  All were rejected by the lower courts.  The 
only claim remaining before this court is Adams' takings claim. 
6 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.10——the 
inverse 
condemnation 
procedure——is the legislative direction for fulfilling the 
mandate of the just compensation clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.   E-L Enters., Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶36, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 785 N.W.2d 409.  It 
provides in relevant part: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
6 
 
¶13 The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
Adams' takings claims must fail because it does not identify a 
recognized property right taken by the City.  Specifically, the 
City contends that there is no property right to continued 
visibility of a billboard.  Further, the City argues that Adams 
cannot prove that the City took its property because there was 
neither an actual physical occupation of Adams' property by the 
City, nor did the City deprive Adams of all or substantially all 
of the beneficial uses of its property. 
¶14 The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment 
motion.  Relying on Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 
249 N.W. 73 (1933), it concluded that "there is no property 
right at issue that has been taken by the placement of this 
bridge over the highway in close proximity but not on the 
property belonging to the plaintiff" because "[t]here's no 
property right to be seen." 
¶15 It further explained that "[w]hat we have instead is a 
consequential or incidental result of the construction and 
                                                                                                                                                             
If any property has been occupied by a person 
possessing the power of condemnation and if the person 
has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute 
condemnation proceedings, shall present a verified 
petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein 
the land is situated asking that such proceedings be 
commenced. . . .  The court shall make a finding of 
whether the defendant is occupying property of the 
plaintiff without having the right to do so. . . . 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
7 
 
maintenance 
[of 
the 
bridge] . . . which 
is . . . not 
a 
protectable interest that is if invaded subject to compensation 
for a taking."  Finally, the circuit court determined that Zealy 
v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996), 
requires that courts "value the billboard as a whole and not one 
side versus the other.  And as a whole, it cannot be said that 
all or substantially all of the beneficial use of this property 
has been obstructed." 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished per 
curiam opinion.  Like the circuit court, the court of appeals 
relied on Randall, 212 Wis. 374, to reach its conclusion that 
obstruction of a view is not a taking of private property.  
Adams Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Madison, No. 
2016AP537, unpublished slip op., ¶¶8-10 (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 
2017). 
¶17 Adams petitioned this court for review. 
II 
¶18 In this case we are asked to review the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City, dismissing Adams' takings claims 
against the City. 
¶19 This 
court 
reviews 
a 
decision 
granting 
summary 
judgment independently, applying the same methodology as does 
the circuit court.  Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶17, 380 
Wis. 2d 512, 909 N.W.2d 402.  "Summary judgment is appropriate 
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Id. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
8 
 
III 
¶20 The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions require 
payment of just compensation for private property taken for 
public use.  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in relevant part:  "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides:  "The property of no person shall be 
taken for public use without just compensation therefor."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 13.7 
¶21 In order to maintain an unconstitutional takings 
claim, four factors must be demonstrated:  (1) a property 
interest exists; (2) the property interest has been taken; (3) 
the taking was for public use; and (4) the taking was without 
just compensation.  Wis. Med. Soc'y, 328 Wis. 2d 469, ¶38 
(citing Wis. Retired Teachers Ass'n v. Emp. Tr. Funds Bd., 207 
Wis. 2d 1, 18–24, 558 N.W.2d 83 (1997)). 
¶22 It is undisputed that the alleged taking here was for 
public use and the City did not compensate Adams for any damages 
sustained due to the construction of the bridge.  Accordingly, 
the two disputed inquiries before this court are (1) whether a 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin courts generally apply the same standard when 
determining whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred 
under the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  Wis. Med. 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, ¶38, 328 Wis. 2d 469, 787 
N.W.2d 22 (citing Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 
374, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996)). 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
9 
 
property interest exists and, if so, (2) whether that property 
interest has been taken.  Wis. Med. Soc'y, 328 Wis. 2d 469, ¶38. 
A 
¶23 We must first identify the precise property interest 
at issue.  Once identified, we examine next whether that 
property interest exists, that is, whether it is based on a 
right recognized under our takings jurisprudence. 
¶24 Adams asks this court to characterize the property 
interest at stake as the preexisting right to the legal 
nonconforming use of its property.  The City contends that the 
property interest in question is grounded on the right to 
continued "visibility of private property from a public road."8 
                                                 
8 The dissent errs by relying on a claim that is not made 
and facts that do not exist.  It asserts that "the permit for 
the west-facing billboard" is the property interest at issue.  
Dissent, ¶47.  This alternative definition of the property 
interest was first proposed in an amicus brief to this court by 
the Outdoor Advertising Association of Wisconsin.  Neither party 
raised or briefed this alternative framing of the issue during 
the nearly four years of litigation in this matter. 
In its complaint and amended complaint in the circuit 
court, Adams consistently and expressly framed its property 
interest as the "property rights in the [p]roperty and [s]ign."  
There is no mention of the billboard "permit" in Adams' amended 
complaint, or in its briefs to the court of appeals or this 
court.  As further illustration that this case has nothing to do 
with a permit, neither party saw it necessary to introduce the 
permit into evidence.  There is no billboard permit in this 
record. 
Indeed, at oral arguments Adams conceded several times that 
it did not make a claim in this case that its billboard permit 
was the property interest that was taken: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court:  You're not claiming here, are you, that 
you have a property interest in the permit?  I didn't 
see it in your complaint, I didn't see the word permit 
in your briefs, so I didn't think you were claiming 
that. 
Adams:  I think we do have a property interest in the 
permit.  But I don't think that the property interest 
in the permit has been specifically taken in this 
case.  The nature of the takings claim is the 
obstruction of the sign face (emphasis added). 
The court:   . . . You're not claiming that in this 
case that the property that you want compensation for 
is the permit?  Is that correct? 
Adams: 
 
Not——That's 
correct, 
your 
honor. 
 
Not 
specifically. 
Certainly Adams has forfeited any claim that the billboard 
permit constitutes a property interest.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 
21, ¶¶29–30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  Additionally, we 
decline to address this argument raised for the first time in an 
amicus brief, as it is not properly before us.  Cty. of Barron 
v. LIRC, 2010 WI App 149, ¶30, 330 Wis. 2d 203, 792 N.W.2d 584 
(citations omitted) (explaining that "courts need not consider 
arguments raised only by amici").  We save such a claim for 
another day. 
The dissent also errs by relying heavily on facts not 
present in the record.  Specifically, the dissent asserts that 
the City of Madison treats the two sides of its billboard as 
separate property by requiring an individual permit for each 
side, rather than issuing a single permit that covers the 
billboard structure as a whole.  See dissent, ¶49.  Indeed, this 
unsubstantiated 
factual 
allegation 
permeates 
the 
dissent's 
analysis.  See id., ¶¶47, 55-56, 58-61, 63-69, 72-74. 
At oral argument, the City disputed these alleged facts 
explaining that they are "not in the record" and that the City 
did not "believe that it's true" that separate permits were 
issued for each side of the billboard.  The City explained: 
[Counsel for Adams] stated in the oral argument today 
[that] it is a critical piece of the analysis that the 
City issued separate permits for the separate faces of 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
11 
 
¶25 Adams disagrees with the City's characterization of 
its property interest as relying on a "right to be seen."  
Before this court Adams asserts that "this case is not about a 
freestanding right to be seen" and that "[t]he outcome of this 
case does not depend on whether any generalized right to be seen 
exists." 
¶26 In 
contrast, 
before 
the 
circuit 
court, 
Adams 
repeatedly emphasized the import of the right to be viewed when 
describing the property interest at issue: 
What is the protected interest?  It's the legal 
nonconforming use, the vested rights that we have in 
maintenance of that use.  And what is the use?  It's 
the display of advertising signs that can be viewed by 
the public. 
Adams further explained to the circuit court that "[t]he nature 
of this use is to be viewed.  If there's no right to be viewed, 
then it is illusory that the rights, the pre-existing use that 
we've got is illusory.  If it can't be viewed, we have no value.  
In this context it has to be a protected property right." 
¶27 At oral arguments before this court, counsel for Adams 
stated that "[t]he issue that has been presented in this case is 
                                                                                                                                                             
the sign.  Well there's a critical error in that 
argument.  That being that that is not in the record.  
And I don't believe that it's true.  There is some 
discussion in the amicus brief from the [Outdoor 
Advertising] Association regarding some law that the 
Association says would allow the City to do that, but 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
City has actually treated the billboard that way and I 
don't believe that the City has.  So that is a 
critical——critical problem. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
12 
 
whether Adams has the right to continue a preexisting use of its 
property, the sole purpose of which is to display advertising 
and be seen."  Counsel for Adams explained further that: 
In this case the use that we are seeking to protect is 
the [] display of the billboard which is to be seen.  
I am not trying to suggest that our ability to be seen 
is not a critical piece of this but it is a critical 
piece of it by virtue of the specific use here, not 
because we are seeking to establish a right to be 
seen. 
Thus, on one hand Adams disclaims that it is relying on a right 
to visibility of its billboard from a public road.  On the other 
hand, Adams consistently refers to the "critical" fact that this 
case would not be before this court but for the fact that the 
sole harm it has suffered is to the visibility of its private 
property from a public road. 
¶28 We decline to characterize the property interest here 
in the overly broad and generalized fashion advocated by Adams.  
Such an expansive framing begs the question:  what is the 
essence of the property interest in dispute? 
¶29 Adams' 
billboard 
continues 
to 
enjoy 
its 
legal 
nonconforming status.  It is undisputed that the City neither 
physically altered Adams' property in any way, nor did it enact 
any regulation restricting the use of Adams' property.  Thus, we 
determine that the essence of Adams' asserted property interest 
is based on a right to visibility.  But for the reduction in 
visibility of Adams' billboard from a public road, there would 
be no asserted takings claim. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
13 
 
B 
¶30 Having determined that the property interest asserted 
here is based upon a right of visibility of private property 
from a public road, we turn next to address whether it is a 
recognized property right under our takings jurisprudence.  See 
Wis. Med. Soc'y, 328 Wis. 2d 469, ¶38; Luber v. Milwaukee Cty., 
47 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970) (explaining that to 
determine whether there has been a taking, "a court of necessity 
must define property and determine what interests in property 
are significant enough to be protected from a taking without 
compensation"). 
¶31 The City asserts——and we agree——that Randall, 212 Wis. 
374, is dispositive here.  It provides that "[a]lthough [a 
property owner] may sustain consequential damages in so far as 
[a] street improvement will somewhat obstruct or interfere with 
ingress and egress, and the view to and from their land to the 
vehicular traveled portion of the street, that is not a taking 
of private property for public use . . . ."  Id. at 382. 
¶32 In 
Randall, 
the 
City 
of 
Milwaukee 
proposed 
to 
construct an underground pedestrian tunnel and a shelter 
covering the entrance to the tunnel that would abut Randall's 
property.  
Id. 
at 376-77.  The proposed shelter 
would 
substantially obstruct and interfere with the ingress and egress 
to Randall's property and the view from the street of any 
building erected on Randall's property.  Id. at 377.  Randall 
argued that the construction of the subway shelter would 
constitute an unconstitutional taking because it would impair 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
14 
 
Randall's property rights of "easements of access and view."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶33 The 
Randall 
court 
disagreed, 
explaining 
that 
a 
property owner's rights "as an abutting owner are subject to 
such public street use and purpose as the location of the street 
requires."  Id. at 378.  As the Randall court explained: 
[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental 
powers, and not directly encroaching upon private 
property, though their consequences may impair its 
use, are universally held not to be a taking within 
the meaning of the constitutional provision.  They do 
not entitle the owner of such property to compensation 
from the state or its agents, or give him any right of 
action.  This is supported by an immense weight of 
authority.  That has been the rule in this state. 
212 Wis. at 382 (internal quotations omitted). 
¶34 Randall reasoned that public thoroughfares, including 
highways, are dynamic spaces that must change and adapt over 
time.  Id. at 378.  It explained: 
Lands are set aside for public streets and highways, 
not for the present, with its necessities and modes of 
use, but for all time, with all the added demands that 
may be made upon the public ways within the scope of 
their original design, in the course of natural 
development that is constantly going on. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Thus, "the public rights in [streets] 
are plainly paramount" to those of private landowners.  Id. at 
380 (citation omitted). 
¶35 Adams counters that Randall's conclusion that there is 
no recognized right to be seen from the street is limited to 
cases that deal with prospective, undeveloped uses of property 
where no vested rights were taken and nonconforming use status 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
15 
 
was not at issue.  We disagree.  Neither Randall, nor various 
cases citing Randall, contain such limiting language.  See, 
e.g., Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 
81, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979); More-Way N. Corp. v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 44 Wis. 2d 165, 170, 170 N.W.2d 749 (1969); Wis. Power & 
Light Co. v. Columbia Cty., 3 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 87 N.W.2d 279 
(1958). 
¶36 Furthermore, it is well-established that "there is no 
property right to the flow of traffic along a highway."  Surety 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Dep't of Transp. Div. of Highways, 54 
Wis. 2d 438, 444, 195 N.W.2d 464 (1972); see also 118th St. 
Kenosha, LLC v. Wis. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶31, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 
N.W.2d 486 ("The State may exercise its police power to 
authorize the relocation of a highway" and is "not always 
required to compensate all who are adversely affected by the 
relocation."); Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, DOT, 2016 WI 5, ¶26, 
366 
Wis. 2d 372, 
874 
N.W.2d 533 
(explaining 
that 
"the 
legislature enabled DOT to periodically change the terms and 
conditions by which any person——abutter or otherwise——has access 
to a controlled-access highway"). 
¶37 Given that a private property owner does not have a 
right to the continued flow of traffic from a public road, it 
reasonably follows that it does not have a property interest in 
the continued visibility of its property from that road.  See, 
e.g., Troiano v. Colo. Dep't of Highways, 463 P.2d 448, 455 
(Colo. 1969) (explaining that because "a property owner has no 
right to have the traveling public pass his property, logically 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
16 
 
it would be inconsistent to say that a property owner has a 
right to have the traveling public afforded a clear view of his 
property"); State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. HI Boise, LLC, 282 P.3d 
595, 603 (Idaho 2012) ("If . . . a property owner does not have 
a property right in traffic flow around his property, it 
directly follows that he cannot assert a property right in that 
same traffic's ability to see his property"); State v. Schmidt, 
867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a landowner has no 
vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has no 
right to insist that his premises be visible to them."). 
¶38 In sum, private property owners abutting public roads 
are aware that public roads are subject to change.  See Randall, 
212 Wis. at 378.  There is an ever-present risk that public 
roads may be improved in any number of ways.  Id.  Streets are 
routinely expanded or relocated and can be elevated or modified 
by the construction of electrical poles, signage, or pedestrian 
shelters.  Id. at 379-82.  Often roads can be closed for an 
extended period of time due to construction.  A myriad of 
examples exists. 
¶39 Property owners are on notice that such changes may 
alter or obstruct the view of their private property from the 
public road.  Id. at 379-81.  It is not reasonable for a 
property owner to rely on the fact that it is located near a 
public road in a certain condition at a particular moment in 
time.  See Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 54 Wis. 2d at 444. 
¶40 Numerous jurisdictions also have concluded that the 
right to visibility from a public road is not a recognized 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
17 
 
property right.9  Indeed, Adams fails to cite any jurisdiction 
recognizing a right to visibility of private property from a 
public road in the absence of a physical taking.10 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Reid v. Jefferson Cty., 672 So. 2d 1285, 1289-
90 (Ala. 1995); Regency Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 139 P.3d 119, 121 (Cal. 2006); Troiano v. Colorado 
Dep't of Highways, 463 P.2d 448, 455 (Colo. 1969); Moreton 
Rolleston, Jr. Living Tr. v. Dep't of Transp., 531 S.E.2d 719, 
722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. HI Boise, 
LLC, 282 P.3d 595, 602-04 (Idaho 2012); Stagni v. State ex rel. 
Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 812 So. 2d 867, 871 (La. Ct. App. 
2002); Kansas City v. Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470, 474 
(Mo. 1965); Probasco v. City of Reno, 459 P.2d 772, 774 (Nev. 
1969); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Lavasek, 385 
P.2d 361, 364 (N.M. 1963); Acme Theatres, Inc. v. State, 258 
N.E.2d 912, 914-15 (N.Y. 1970); Adams Outdoor Advert. of 
Charlotte v. Dep't of Transp., 434 S.E.2d 666, 669 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993); Filler v. City of Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237, 244 (N.D. 
1979); In re Condemnation by the Delaware River Port Auth., 667 
A.2d 766, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Outdoor Advert. Ass'n. of 
Tenn. v. Shaw, 598 S.W.2d 783, 788-90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); 
State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993); see also 
Malone v. Commonwealth, 389 N.E.2d 975, 979 (Mass. 1979). 
Some jurisdictions take a more nuanced approach, providing 
that when there is a physical taking of private property, loss 
of visibility may be considered as an element of severance 
damages.  See, e.g., 8,960 Sq. Feet, More or Less v. State, 
Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 806 P.2d 843, 848 (Alaska 
1991); State by Humphrey v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 561-62 (Minn. 
1992); State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 
874-76 (N.J. 1997); Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage 
Corp., 275 P.3d 208, ¶19 (Utah 2011).  However, as the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey explained, "[t]he critical factor [] in 
determining if loss of visibility is a compensable element of 
damages in a partial-taking condemnation[] is whether the loss 
arises 
from 
changes 
occurring 
on 
the 
property 
taken."  
Weiswasser, 693 A.2d at 876 (emphasis added).  Here, it is 
undisputed that there was no physical taking or change made to 
Adams' property. 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
18 
 
¶41 For example, the California Supreme Court rejected a 
takings claim by a billboard owner who asserted that palm trees 
that did not physically occupy any land owned by the billboard 
company reduced the visibility of its billboards, constituting a 
taking.  Regency Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 
139 P.3d 119, 121 (2006).  The California Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that "owners and occupiers of roadside 
property do not possess a 'right to be seen' that requires the 
payment of compensation for municipal landscaping efforts having 
no injurious effect on any property rights other than the 
claimed right to visibility."  Id. 
¶42 As here, the Regency court was assessing a takings 
claim in the context of a preexisting use of a billboard, where 
the sole harm alleged was that of loss of visibility from a 
public road.  Id. at 122.  The California Supreme Court 
explained that courts generally rely on three justifications for 
the "virtually unanimous" rule that there is no right to be seen 
from a public road.  Id. at 125-27.  Those justifications are:  
(1) road improvements that may limit visibility are foreseeable; 
(2) the government has the authority to maintain and improve the 
road system; and (3) the abridgment of the right to reasonable 
ingress and egress is an abutter's only right warranting 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The dissent, too, appears to concede that the right to 
visibility from a public road is not a recognized property 
right.  See dissent, ¶55 (listing four property interests at 
stake in this case, none of which includes a right of 
visibility). 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
19 
 
compensation when the government acts to improve a road.  Id. at 
127. 
¶43 Adams attempts to distinguish Regency by asserting 
that the billboards in Regency were not "nonconforming."  Yet, 
Adams cites no authority for its proposition that owners of 
legal 
nonconforming 
property 
should 
be 
provided 
broader 
protection than legally conforming property owners.  As a policy 
matter, such an argument is unpersuasive. 
¶44 Likewise, we do not find persuasive Adams' argument 
that the particular use of its land as containing solely a 
billboard gives rise to a right of visibility justifying special 
consideration under our taking law.11  Various courts have 
                                                 
11 Before the circuit court, counsel for Adams argued:  "[A] 
property owner doesn't have an absolute right to unrestricted or 
unimpaired view of their property from some public space.  But 
that assumes that the nature of the use or the use of your 
property isn't solely to be viewed.  And that's what we've got 
here." 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
20 
 
expressly rejected providing special consideration to billboard 
owners in this context.12 
¶45 Further, we observe that Adams' complaint is not that 
the City has invaded or unfairly restricted its property.  
Rather, Adams takes issue with a consequence of the City's 
modification of public property.  See Randall, 212 Wis. at 383; 
see also State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Lavasek, 385 
P.2d 361, 364 (N.M. 1963) (explaining that "[a]n easement of the 
right of view in an abutting property owner would create a 
burden on the servient tenement, the highway.").  We decline to 
impose a burden on the City's ability to improve public roads 
here. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Tr. v. Dep't of 
Transp., 531 S.E.2d 719, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding 
that impaired visibility of a nonconforming billboard from a 
highway due to the construction of a bridge does not constitute 
a taking and the "fact that [an owner] uses its property in a 
particular commercial manner does not change this result"); 
Outdoor Advert. Ass'n of Tenn. v. Shaw, 598 S.W.2d 783, 790 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting the contention that "the 
licensing 
of 
a 
billboard 
confers 
some 
special 
right 
of 
visibility or imposes some special duty upon the State to 
maintain 
visibility 
of 
the 
licensed 
billboard"); 
In 
re 
Condemnation by the Delaware River Port Auth., 667 A.2d 766, 768 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (explaining that "what the [billboard] 
owner is losing, in fact, is the benefit——entirely unearned by 
him——to his land of the commercially exploitable proximity of 
heavy traffic.  Since he has no right to this benefit and has 
done nothing to create it, he should have little cause to 
complain at losing it.") (citation omitted); see also Regency 
Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 139 P.3d 119, 128-
29 (Cal. 2006); Adams Outdoor Advert. of Charlotte v. Dep't of 
Transp., 434 S.E.2d 666, 668 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
2016AP537 
 
21 
 
¶46 In sum, we conclude that a right to visibility of 
private property from a public road is not a cognizable right 
giving rise to a protected property interest.  Because we 
determine that Adams failed to establish that a property 
interest exists here, we need not address whether a property 
interest was taken.  See Wis. Med. Soc'y, 328 Wis. 2d 469, ¶38. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶47 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  "Property 
rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership 
empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a 
world where governments are always eager to do so for them."  
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).  The majority 
allows the constructive taking of Adams Outdoor's real property 
by misapprehending the property interest at issue to be a "right 
to visibility" rather than the permit for the west-facing 
billboard.  See, e.g., Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶59, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803; 
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2017 WI App 
15, ¶¶10, 24, 374 Wis. 2d 348, 893 N.W.2d 24, review denied, 
2017 WI 81, 376 Wis. 2d 641, 899 N.W.2d 704.  Because the City 
of Madison deprived Adams Outdoor of all economically beneficial 
use of its permit by constructing a bridge that obliterated the 
permit's value, the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Adams 
Outdoor's inverse condemnation claim.  I would reverse the court 
of appeals' decision and remand for a determination of the 
proper compensation owed for the constructive taking of the 
west-facing billboard permit.  I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶48 Adams Outdoor owns an irregular-shaped piece of land 
comprising less than half an acre in size along the Beltline 
Highway in Madison.  The land's only "occupant" is a structure 
containing two billboards, also owned by Adams Outdoor.  One 
billboard faces eastbound traffic and the other billboard faces 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
2 
 
westbound traffic.  The City of Madison treats each billboard as 
separate property by requiring an individual permit for each 
side.  Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinance § 31.041(3) (2015).  Adams 
Outdoor paid separate fees to secure the required permit for 
each billboard, it must pay advertising copy change fees per 
side when the content displayed on the billboard changes, and it 
is taxed separately for the west-facing and the east-facing 
billboard permit.  Adams Outdoor owns the permits.1 
¶49 Many years ago, the City of Madison enacted an 
ordinance banning any new off-premise advertising signs.  See 
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinance § 31.11.  As a result of the 
ordinance, no new permits may be issued for any billboards not 
already in existence.  The billboards with permits predating the 
ban are classified as legal, nonconforming signs.  Id., § 31.05.  
As property that is finite and restricted as legal-nonconforming 
use by Madison's zoning ordinances, permits for existing 
billboards carry significant value.  See Adams Outdoor Advert., 
Ltd., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶85 ("Value primarily inheres in the 
permit because the City has severely restricted the number of 
permits, artificially driving up their value.").     
¶50 The land upon which Adams Outdoor's billboard sits was 
valued at $1.46 million before the construction of the bridge.  
After the bridge was erected, the value of the land dropped to 
                                                 
1 Because a billboard permit is real property, the permit 
holder is referred to as the permit owner.  See, e.g., Clear 
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2017 WI App 15, ¶13, 
374 Wis. 2d 348, 893 N.W.2d 24, review denied, 2017 WI 81, 376 
Wis. 2d 641, 899 N.W.2d 704. 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
3 
 
$720,000.  For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that 
the bridge completely obscures the west-facing billboard.   
¶51 The 
majority 
identifies 
"the 
essence" 
of 
Adams 
Outdoor's property interest to be "based upon a right of 
visibility of private property from a public road," denies a 
property 
owner 
any 
"property 
interest 
in 
the 
continued 
visibility of its property," and declines to address whether a 
taking occurred.  Majority op. ¶¶29-30, 37, 46 ("In sum, we 
conclude that a right to visibility of private property from a 
public road is not a cognizable right giving rise to a protected 
property interest.").  As a result, Adams Outdoor loses the 
freedom to use its property as it wishes and instead must submit 
to the government's preferences. 
II 
¶52 Whether 
the 
City's 
construction 
of 
a 
bridge 
constructively took Adams Outdoor's property is a question of 
law reviewed independently.  See Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State 
Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 80, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979).  Both 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States Constitution 
prohibit the City from taking Adams Outdoor's property without 
just compensation.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 13 ("The property of 
no 
person 
shall 
be 
taken 
for 
public 
use 
without 
just 
compensation therefor."); U.S. Const. amend. V. ("[N]or shall 
private 
property 
be 
taken 
for 
public 
use, 
without 
just 
compensation.").  In order to establish an unconstitutional 
taking, Adams Outdoor needs to show:  "(1) a property interest 
exists; (2) the property interest has been taken; (3) the taking 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
4 
 
was for public use; and (4) the taking was without just 
compensation."  Wis. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 94, 
¶38, 328 Wis. 2d 469, 787 N.W.2d 22.  "[I]t is 'imperative that 
the Court maintain absolute fidelity to' the [Takings] Clause's 
express limit on the power of the government over the 
individual, no less than with every other liberty expressly 
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights more 
generally."  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 507 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment)). 
¶53 A property owner proves a taking when a government 
regulation or action denies him all or substantially all 
practical uses of his property.  Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 
Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996).  Stated otherwise, a 
taking occurs when the government denies a property owner all 
"economically viable use of his [property]."  Id. (quoting Lucas 
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).    
¶54 In order to determine whether the government deprived 
an owner of all or substantially all economically viable use of 
property, a court first must define the property interest——
commonly deemed the "denominator" because the court must compare 
the value taken from the property with the value that remains 
and the property's value therefore "furnish[es] the denominator 
of the fraction."  Id. at 375 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)).  Defining the 
denominator drives the analysis.  The United States Supreme 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
5 
 
Court offers guidance in properly identifying the denominator——
the property interest: 
[N]o single consideration can supply the exclusive 
test for determining the denominator.  Instead, courts 
must consider a number of factors.  These include the 
treatment of the [property] under state and local law; 
the physical characteristics of the [property]; and 
the prospective value of the regulated [property].  
The 
endeavor 
should 
determine 
whether 
reasonable 
expectations about property ownership would lead a 
[property ]owner to anticipate that his holdings would 
be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate 
[property].  The inquiry is objective[.]  
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
A 
¶55 Ascertaining the denominator——identifying the property 
interest——presents the threshold issue for the court to resolve.  
"[T]he answer to this question may be outcome determinative."  
Id. at 1944.  This case involves several distinct property 
interests:  (1) the half-acre of land; (2) the permit for the 
west-facing billboard; (3) the permit for the east-facing 
billboard; and (4) the billboard structure itself.2  Adams 
Outdoor owns all four pieces of property.   
¶56 The majority avoids selecting any of these as the 
denominator; instead, it defines the property interest as the 
"right to visibility."  In so doing, the majority ignores the 
essential fact that the west-facing billboard permit itself 
                                                 
2 The billboard structure itself is not real property; 
rather, it is personal property assessed separately from the 
permit and the land.  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶¶31, 33, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803; 
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 374 Wis. 2d 348, ¶¶6-10. 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
6 
 
constitutes individual real property and the correct denominator 
in the takings analysis.  Consequently, the majority reaches a 
legally erroneous outcome.  
¶57 In Murr, the United States Supreme Court identified 
state law treatment of the property as a factor for determining 
the denominator.  137 S. Ct. at 1945.  In Adams Outdoor Advert., 
Ltd., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶59, this court recognized that a 
billboard permit itself is individual real property:  "We 
conclude that a billboard permit is a right or privilege 
appertaining to real property and thus falls within the 
definition of 'real property' in Wis. Stat. § 70.03."3  "Because 
a billboard permit confers a right or privilege to erect and 
operate a billboard on a designated piece of land and because a 
permit cannot be transferred to a different location, we 
conclude a billboard permit falls within the definition of real 
property."  Id., ¶64. 
¶58 Our court of appeals recently reiterated the same 
legal principle——"billboard permits are real property" and "the 
permit is the entire property itself."  See Clear Channel 
Outdoor, 
Inc., 
374 
Wis. 2d 348, 
¶¶10, 
24. 
 
This 
legal 
classification of billboard permits as real property distinct 
from both the billboard itself and the land upon which the 
structure sits points powerfully to the west-facing billboard 
permit as the proper denominator. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.03 defines real property as "not only 
the land itself but . . . all fixtures and rights and privileges 
appertaining thereto[.]" 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶59 Under Murr, courts must "give substantial weight to 
the treatment of the [property], in particular how it is bounded 
or divided, under state and local law."  137 S. Ct. at 1945.  
Wisconsin law plainly designates billboard permits as real 
property, separate and distinct from the land with which they 
are 
associated. 
 
See 
Clear 
Channel 
Outdoor, 
Inc., 
374 
Wis. 2d 348, ¶24 (agreeing with the circuit court's conclusion 
"the permit is the entire property itself.").  The west-facing 
billboard permit is separate and distinct from both the 
billboard structure and the land the structure inhabits.  The 
City's treatment of the permit as separate property lends 
further support for designating the west-facing billboard permit 
as the denominator.  The City:  (1) requires a separate permit 
for each side of a billboard, rather than issuing a single 
permit that covers the billboard structure as a whole; (2) 
charges fees for each permit (rather than each billboard); and 
(3) assesses distinct property taxes on each permit.  According 
these considerations substantial weight, as 
Murr directs, 
militates in favor of designating the west-facing billboard 
permit the appropriate denominator.  
¶60 The second Murr factor directs courts to examine the 
physical characteristics of the property.  137 S. Ct. at 1945.  
In Murr, the Supreme Court determined that two separate but 
contiguous parcels of land together constituted the denominator 
in the takings analysis.  Id. at 1948-50.  In this case, there 
is a single parcel of land, a billboard structure, and two 
billboard permits.  Obviously, the physical characteristics of a 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
8 
 
billboard 
permit——unlike 
the 
land 
at 
issue 
in 
Murr——are 
irrelevant to a takings analysis.  Such a permit is intangible; 
nevertheless, it is valuable and it is what gave the small, 
irregular-shaped parcel of land adjoining the Beltline Highway 
its $1.46 million value before the City erected the bridge.  
After the City built the bridge, the land parcel's value 
plummeted fifty percent.  The west-facing permit lost its entire 
worth, while the unaffected east-facing permit retained its full 
value.   
¶61 Each permit's value depends entirely on prospective 
advertisers' willingness to rent the permitted billboard.  In 
this regard, the physical characteristics of the billboard 
structure become relevant.  City ordinance prohibits altering 
the structure in any manner that would restore the permit's 
value.  However, in order to ameliorate the obstruction caused 
by the City's construction of the bridge, the billboard 
structure would need to move or be heightened.  This is 
impossible because a City ordinance bans relocating, enlarging, 
repositioning, or raising in height any legal non-conforming 
sign.  See Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinance § 31.05; see also Adams 
Outdoor Advert. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Madison, No. 2016AP537, 
unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. July 20, 2017) (per 
curiam) ("Adams' billboard is a legal non-conforming use, which 
means that Adams cannot change its height or location.").  As a 
result, Adams Outdoor is left with a small, half-acre of 
irregularly-shaped land adjoining the Beltline Highway, on which 
sits one rentable sign, the value of which is half what it was 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
9 
 
when the land enjoyed two rentable signs.  The physical 
characteristics of this parcel suggest its only valuable use is 
to anchor signage; otherwise, its value would not be so 
precisely tied to the two signs posted there.   
¶62 The City argues that Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 365, and 
Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933), 
govern the outcome in this case.  But the properties in both 
Zealy and Randall were solely physical land parcels and neither 
case dealt with the complexities of a combination of land with 
other real property like the billboard permits we consider in 
this case.  The status of the billboard permit as separate, 
standalone real property distinguishes this case from both Zealy 
and Randall.  In Zealy, the property owner was farming 10.4 
acres of a single piece of contiguous, undeveloped land but 
anticipating residential use in the future.  201 Wis. 2d at 369-
70.  The City rezoned 8.2 acres from residential to conservancy 
use.  Id. at 370-71.  This zoning change did not impair the 
property owner's ability to continue the existing farming use, 
but it did preclude the property owner from developing 8.2 of 
the 10.4 acres into residential property.  Id.  The Zealy court 
held this was not a taking because (1) the land was one 
contiguous property——"part of a single purchase"——that should 
not be divided into segments; and (2) looking at the property as 
a whole, the rezoning did not deprive Zealy of "all or 
substantially all of the use of his land"——Zealy retained 
beneficial and substantial uses for his property, including "its 
historical use, farming."  Id. at 378-80. 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
10 
 
¶63 In contrast, the affected property of Adams Outdoor is 
not a single, contiguous plot of land acquired in a single 
purchase and Adams Outdoor does not wish to change the nature of 
its use of the property in the future.  Rather, Adams Outdoor 
owns several distinct units of property it desires to use in 
exactly the same manner it had always used the property, until 
the City materially interfered.  Although the west-facing permit 
is connected in a sense to the other property, it is nonetheless 
treated as a distinct unit of individual real property under the 
law.  Unlike Zealy, in which the property owner's use was 
unchanged by the rezoning, the bridge altogether extinguished 
Adams Outdoor's use of the west-facing billboard permit, thereby 
denying Adams Outdoor all economically viable use of not merely 
a segment of its property but the whole thing; no beneficial use 
of the west-facing permit remains. 
¶64 Like Zealy, Randall also involved an undeveloped piece 
of contiguous land.  The City of Milwaukee placed a pedestrian 
shelter on the sidewalk in front of part of the property owners' 
land, which abutted the street.  Randall, 212 Wis. at 376.  The 
Randall court decided the shelter did not cause a taking of the 
owners' property because the shelter only "somewhat obstruct[ed] 
or interfere[d] with ingress and egress, and the view to and 
from their land" to the street.  Id. at 382.  The Randall court 
suggested this "impairment" could result in the landowner 
collecting consequential damages from the City under Wis. Stat. 
§ 80.47, but concluded the act was not a taking.  Id. at 383-84.  
Like Zealy, Randall does not control this case because the City 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
11 
 
of Milwaukee merely impaired the property owners' use of the 
single, contiguous parcel of land whereas in this case the City 
of Madison extinguished all use of the separate and distinct 
unit of real property owned by Adams Outdoor.4  Neither Zealy nor 
Randall compels us to artificially meld the half-acre of land, 
the billboard, and the two permits into a single piece of 
property. 
¶65 The third Murr factor examines "the value of the 
property under the challenged [governmental action], with 
special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of 
other holdings."  137 S. Ct. at 1946.  The west-facing billboard 
permit possessed significant value before the bridge was 
constructed.  Its substantial value rested in the right to erect 
and maintain a billboard that the permit authorized.  This is 
evident from the appraised value of the plot of land upon which 
the billboard sits.  When both the west-facing billboard permit 
and the east-facing permit could be beneficially used, the land 
enjoyed an appraised value of $1.46 million, but when only one 
of the permits could be beneficially used, the land's appraised 
value declined to $720,000.  This drastic diminution in value 
indicates the west-facing billboard permit's value after the 
erection of the bridge is zero.  In effect, the City's 
construction of the bridge constructively revoked the permit by 
                                                 
4 Significantly, Randall does acknowledge that "an owner of 
land abutting on a street has the right" of, among other things, 
"view"; the right to view is "subject to such public street use 
and purposes as the location of the street requires."  Randall 
v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933).   
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
12 
 
abolishing Adams Outdoor's ability to employ any economically 
beneficial use of its west-facing billboard permit.  The third 
Murr factor also supports designating the permit as the 
appropriate denominator. 
¶66 Based on Wisconsin case law recognizing the billboard 
permit as the "entire" real property in and of itself, the 
permit for the west-facing sign is the appropriate denominator 
for 
assessing 
whether 
a 
constructive 
taking 
occurred, 
a 
conclusion that is bolstered by the Murr factors.  
B 
¶67 Having decided the proper denominator, the remaining 
question is whether the City's construction of the bridge 
constituted a compensable taking of Adams Outdoor's west-facing 
billboard permit.  A compensable taking occurs if the City's 
action denied Adams Outdoor of all or substantially all 
"economically beneficial or productive use" of its property.  
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); 
see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Zinn 
v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) (taking 
occurs "when the government restriction placed on the property 
'practically or substantially renders the property useless for 
all reasonable purposes'" (quoted source omitted)).     
¶68 The only economically beneficial or productive use of 
the west-facing billboard permit is renting the west-facing 
billboard to advertisers.  There is no question that before the 
bridge existed, this is exactly what Adams Outdoor did.  The 
income from using the west-facing billboard permit was $8,000 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
13 
 
per month or $96,000 per year.  Adams Outdoor asserts this use 
of 
the 
west-facing 
billboard 
permit 
no 
longer 
exists.  
Advertisers will not want to rent the west-facing billboard, 
rendering its corresponding permit useless.  
¶69 The City argues that the property retains beneficial 
use because Adams Outdoor can still profitably use its east-
facing sign, and the law, according to the City, will not divide 
property into separate segments.  The City's argument fails 
because the law recognizes each permit as a distinct, standalone 
unit of real property.  The west-facing billboard permit is not 
a "piece" of the pie.  It is the whole pie. 
¶70 This case is more akin to Maxey v. Redevelopment 
Authority, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980), than the cases 
the City cites involving single, contiguous plots of land.  
Maxey involved a redevelopment project that "placed a moratorium 
on the issuance of theater licenses in the central business 
section of [the city]" where Maxey operated a theater as a long-
term leaseholder in the Baker Block Building.  Id. at 385.  As a 
result, Maxey could not renew his theater license, thereby 
"eliminat[ing] 
the 
economic 
value 
of 
the 
theater" 
and 
"substantially depriv[ing] [Maxey] of his economic interest in 
the property."  Id. at 391.  The Maxey court held that "where 
rental income was Maxey's only significant interest in the 
property, all, or substantially all, of the beneficial use of 
his property was taken from him."  Id. at 392.  So too here. 
¶71 Adams 
Outdoor's 
property 
interest 
resembles 
the 
property interest in Maxey, not the single, contiguous piece of 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
14 
 
real property in Randall and Zealy.  Maxey involved property 
with distinct and separate units:  the lessor's interest as the 
owner of the building, and Maxey's interest as the owner of both 
a 99-year lease and an annually-renewable theatre license from 
the City.  Id. at 384, 391, 400-01.  The Maxey court used the 
theatre license as the denominator, correctly deciding that 
without the license to operate the theatre, the lease was 
worthless.  Id. at 391.  The building had been constructed to be 
a theater, and that was its existing use.  Id.  The City's 
denial of the license constituted a taking because it deprived 
Maxey of all economic use of the property.  Id. at 391-92. 
¶72 The same is true for Adams Outdoor.  It owns the west-
facing billboard permit, whose sole economic benefit derives 
from renting the west-facing billboard to advertisers.  The 
bridge deprives Adams Outdoor of economic use of the west-facing 
billboard permit, defeating Adams Outdoor's investment-backed 
expectations developed over years of consistent, unhindered use.  
The west-facing billboard permit is rendered useless as a result 
of the City's constructive taking of the west-facing billboard 
permit and the consequent deprivation of rental income.  The 
City's action is a compensable taking.  Id. at 392 (citing Luber 
v. Milwaukee Cty., 47 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970)). 
C 
¶73 Takings law, properly applied, prevents unfair burdens 
from being imposed on a single property owner for a government 
project that will benefit the public as a whole.  Murr, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1943.    
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
15 
 
In adjudicating regulatory takings cases a proper 
balancing of these principles requires a careful 
inquiry informed by the specifics of the case.  In all 
instances, the analysis must be driven "by the purpose 
of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the 
government from 'forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice 
should be borne by the public as a whole.'" 
Id. (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 
(2001)).  It is undisputed that the bridge over the Beltline 
Highway benefits the public as a whole.  But, this public 
benefit forced Adams Outdoor to bear a heavy burden——the 
destruction of all economically viable use of its property.  
Moreover, Adams Outdoor cannot take any steps to mitigate its 
losses because its legal but non-conforming use status precludes 
Adams Outdoor from reconfiguring or moving the structure in 
order to restore the rentability of the west-facing billboard.  
The bridge completely deprived Adams Outdoor of the only 
economically viable use (and therefore the entire value) of its 
west-facing billboard permit.  As the owner of real property 
whose value the City wholly eliminated, Adams Outdoor is 
entitled to fair and just compensation.    
* * * 
 
¶74 A lawful mechanism exists for invading the "sacred and 
inviolable rights of private property" as Blackstone outlined 
centuries ago: 
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private 
property, that it will not authorize the least 
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of 
the whole community . . . .  In vain may it be urged, 
that the good of the individual ought to yield to that 
of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow 
any private man . . . to be the judge of this common 
good . . . .  In this . . . the legislature alone 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
16 
 
can . . . interpose, and compel the individual to 
acquiesce.  But how does it interpose and compel?  Not 
by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in 
an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full 
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby 
sustained.  The public is now considered as an 
individual, 
treating 
with 
an 
individual 
for 
an 
exchange.  All that the legislature does is to oblige 
the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable 
price. 
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 78-80 
(George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938) (1765).  The City of Madison's 
construction of the bridge effected a compensable taking of 
Adams Outdoor's permit for the west-facing billboard because the 
City eliminated the only economically viable use of that permit.5  
While the City possessed the power to do this, it may not impose 
the economic burden of the public bridge on one property owner.  
I would reverse and remand for a determination as to the proper 
compensation owed for this constructive taking. 
 
¶75 The majority permits the unconstitutional taking of 
private property without just compensation, thereby threatening 
                                                 
5 I acknowledge that the City maintains it conceded that the 
bridge completely obscured the west-facing billboard only for 
purposes of this appeal.  The City asserts that if this court 
determines 
a 
taking 
occurred, 
the 
"completely 
obscured" 
stipulation no longer applies and the circuit court would need 
to find what percentage of the west-facing billboard has 
actually been obscured.   
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
17 
 
the freedom of all private property owners in Wisconsin. I 
respectfully dissent.6 
                                                 
6 The majority objects to addressing the permit as the 
denominator because this argument was raised in the amicus 
curiae brief, the permit is not in the record, the City's 
attorney believes there is not a separate permit for each side 
of the billboard, and forfeiture should apply.  See majority 
op., ¶24 n.8.  Amicus curiae, or "friend of the court" briefs, 
may be filed only with permission of this court.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.19(7).  An effective amicus brief "'bring[s] something new 
and interesting to the case.'  This might be better research, 
more cogent analysis or a more convincing demonstration of the 
impact of the decision on the public at large."  Randy S. 
Parlee, A Primer on Amicus Curiae Briefs, 62 Wis. Law. 15 (Nov. 
1989) (quoted source omitted).  The amicus brief did just that 
in this case.  The amicus argument that the permit was the real 
property at issue dominated the first half of the oral argument, 
generating multiple questions and discussion on the topic——from 
three justices.  The majority quotes an excerpt from oral 
argument making it appear that Adams Outdoor's lawyer forfeited 
the issue.  But the excerpt does not give the whole story.  The 
majority omits the clarification Adams Outdoor's lawyer made 
immediately after answering "Not, that's correct, Your Honor, 
not specifically":  
Chief Justice:  So, you're not claiming that the 
income you earn by based on the permit, you're not 
claiming that's a concern for us, right? 
Adams Outdoor's lawyer:  That is a concern, your Honor—— 
Chief Justice:  Alright, that's different than your answer 
to Justice [A.W.] Bradley's question.       
Adams 
Outdoor's 
lawyer: 
 
Maybe 
I 
misunderstood 
the 
question.  Certainly, in terms of measuring the damages or 
impact or the value of that interest, whether you identify 
the value as flowing from the permit in the display of that 
sign or you just recognize that sign exists  . . .   And it 
will generate a certain amount of revenue through the 
display of advertising.  That number, tied to the permit or 
tied to the sign face will be the same issue. 
(continued) 
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18 
 
  
¶76  I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice DANIEL KELLY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In fact, Adams Outdoor's lawyer told the court at oral 
argument:  "The permit to display the billboard is certainly a 
separate property interest that could be the subject of takings 
analysis in this case.  I don't disagree with the amicus brief 
in that respect."  And, he represented:  "In fact, the city 
treats both sign faces as separate economic units by virtue of 
the fact that they have licensed both sign faces separately.  
And that's a critical piece of our analysis here.  Certainly 
that license could stand for its own separate property interest 
that could be the subject of takings analysis."  He asserted "I 
think we do have a property interest in the permit . . . ." 
The City's attorney did not speak as definitively in 
responding that he merely believes Adams Outdoor's lawyer is 
wrong about the City issuing a separate permit for both the 
east- and west-facing billboards.  Both the amicus lawyers and 
the lawyer representing Adams Outdoor unequivocally represented 
that the City issued two permits.  Indeed, applicable law 
requires it.  Far from being an "unsubstantiated factual 
allegation" as the majority characterizes it, majority op., ¶24 
n.8, the existence of two permits is required by the City's own 
ordinance, Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinance § 31.041(3) (2015). 
As 
for 
forfeiture, 
it 
"is 
a 
rule 
of 
judicial 
administration, and as such, a reviewing court has the inherent 
authority to disregard a [forfeiture] and address the merits of 
an unpreserved issue in exceptional cases."  Village of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶17, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190. 
 
"[C]ourts 
have 
authority 
to 
ignore 
the 
[forfeiture]."  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 
N.W.2d 749 (1999); see also Wis. Stat. § 751.06 (allowing 
discretionary review of issue not raised in circuit court).  
This court should not ignore a dispositive issue of law. 
No.  2016AP537.rgb 
 
 
 
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