Title: State of Wisconsin-Department of Corrections v. David H. Schwarz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 34 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2001 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin-Department of Corrections,  
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearings and Appeals,  
          Respondent, 
James Dowell,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 136 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 225, 685 N.W.2d 585 
(Ct. App. 2004 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 24, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy G. Dugan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent. 
BUTLER, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Robert G. Pultz, Madison, and oral argument by Robert G. 
Pultz. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2005 WI 34 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2001  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 8905) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin-Department of  
Corrections,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearings and Appeals,  
 
          Respondent, 
 
James Dowell,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 24, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The Department of Corrections 
(DOC) seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, DOC v. Schwarz, 2004 WI App 136, 275 Wis. 2d 225, 685 
N.W.2d 585, which reversed an order of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Timothy G. Dugan, Judge.  The circuit court had 
reversed a decision from the Division of Hearings and Appeals 
No. 
03-2001   
 
2 
 
(DHA) that held the DOC did not have jurisdiction under 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3)1 (2001-02) to revoke the parole of 
Respondent James Dowell (Dowell).  The issue presented on appeal 
is whether § 304.072(3) provides the DOC jurisdiction to revoke 
parole for any violation occurring between the offender's 
initial release on parole and the date of discharge on the 
underlying sentence, or whether its jurisdiction is limited to 
violations occurring during the offender's current period of 
parole.   
¶2 
We hold that the phrase "term of supervision" in 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) is ambiguous, since it can reasonably be 
interpreted to apply to both the current term of supervision and 
any time prior to the final discharge from an underlying 
sentence. 
 We rely upon 
extrinsic 
sources 
such as the 
legislative history and relevant case law behind § 304.072(3), 
and the interplay among parole statutes to determine that the 
phrase "term of supervision" was intended to apply to all parole 
violations that occur before the offender's date of discharge 
from his or her entire sentence.   We conclude that the 
legislature intended to promote offender accountability and, 
therefore, the DOC had jurisdiction to revoke Dowell's parole 
for a violation that he committed during his first period of 
parole supervision.   
I 
                                                 
1 All other references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
03-2001   
 
3 
 
 
¶3 
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute.  
On March 30, 1994, Dowell was convicted of two counts of armed 
robbery and one count of operating a vehicle without owner's 
consent in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  Judge Maxine A. 
White sentenced him to 90 months in Wisconsin State Prisons.2  
After serving nearly three years of his sentence, Dowell was 
paroled in May 1997.  However, the DOC revoked his parole in 
March 1998 and returned him to prison.   
 
¶4 
Dowell served three more years in prison and was 
paroled again on July, 17, 2001, due to Wisconsin's mandatory 
release law, Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1).3  Subsequently, while Dowell 
was on parole, the DOC became aware of evidence that Dowell's 
DNA matched semen found on the clothing of a victim of a sexual 
assault and armed robbery that had been committed on May 23, 
1997, during Dowell's first of two periods of parole.  The DOC 
was unaware of information linking Dowell to these crimes when 
it recommended a revocation of Dowell's first parole in March 
1998.  Based on the new allegations, the DOC sought to revoke 
                                                 
2 Dowell was sentenced to 90 months for both counts of armed 
robbery, and two years for operating a vehicle without the 
owner's consent.  However, Judge White ordered that Dowell serve 
the three sentences concurrently.   
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(1) states in relevant part: "The 
warden or superintendent shall keep a record of the conduct of 
each 
inmate, 
specifying 
each 
infraction 
of 
the 
rules.  
. . . each inmate is entitled to mandatory release on parole by 
the department.  The mandatory release date is established at 
two-thirds of the sentence." 
No. 
03-2001   
 
4 
 
Dowell's second parole and force him to serve the final two 
years, one month, and 14 days of his sentence in prison.4 
 
¶5 
After a revocation hearing on June 18, 2002, an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Andrew Reidmaier, ruled that the 
DOC lacked jurisdiction to revoke parole based on conduct 
committed during an earlier parole term.  He concluded that any 
subsequent parole is a new and distinct "term of supervision."  
The ALJ relied on Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3), which limits the 
DOC's jurisdiction to actions taken prior to the expiration of 
the parolee's "term of supervision."  The ALJ determined that 
since the second revocation request was not during the same 
"term of supervision" as the alleged violation, the DOC did not 
have jurisdiction. 
 
¶6 
The DOC appealed this ruling to the Administrator of 
the DHA, David H. Schwarz (Schwarz).  Schwarz affirmed the ALJ's 
decision 
and 
agreed 
with 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3), that the DOC's jurisdiction applies 
only to the current term of supervision, not a subsequent term 
of supervision.  Moreover, Schwarz held that the ALJ's decision 
                                                 
4 The DOC does not allege that Dowell committed any 
violations during his term of parole supervision after his 
mandatory release.  It alleges that Dowell violated Rules 1 and 
11 of his Parole Conditions during his first period of parole.  
Rule 1 states: "You shall avoid all conduct which is in 
violation of federal or state statute, municipal or county 
ordinances or which is not in the best interest of the public 
welfare or your rehabilitation."  Rule 11 states in relevant 
part: "You shall not purchase, possess, own or carry any firearm 
or any weapon unless you get approval in advance from your 
agent." 
No. 
03-2001   
 
5 
 
was consistent with the DOC's past practices, as the Department 
has never sought to revoke any person's parole supervision based 
on conduct that occurred during a previous term of parole.   
 
¶7 
The DOC petitioned for certiorari review in Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court.  On May 2, 2003, the circuit court, 
Timothy G. Dugan, Judge, reversed the decision of the DHA.  The 
court 
held 
that 
the 
phrase 
"term 
of 
supervision" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) could reasonably be interpreted to mean 
a prisoner's entire sentence.  The court concluded that the 
purpose of the statute was to codify State ex rel. Cox v. DHSS, 
105 Wis. 2d 378, 314 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1981), by extending 
the DOC's jurisdiction beyond a parolee's final date of 
discharge, when revocation proceedings are commenced before the 
discharge 
date. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
jurisdiction of the DOC exists until the parolee's final 
discharge from his or her entire sentence.  The court read 
§ 304.072(3) in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 304.06(3) and 
other statutes governing parole supervision.  The DHA appealed.  
 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court in a 
split decision.  It concluded that Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
unambiguously limits the DOC to pursuing parole revocation for 
violations committed during a parolee's current parole term of 
supervision.  Judge Patricia S. Curley, writing for the 
majority, determined that the phrase "term of supervision" in 
§ 304.072(3) means the current term of supervision.  Unlike the 
circuit court, the court of appeals did not consider extrinsic 
sources when interpreting § 304.072(3), because it found the 
No. 
03-2001   
 
6 
 
plain language unambiguous.  Schwarz, 275 Wis. 2d 225, ¶11.  The 
court also cited policy concerns to justify the limitation of 
the DOC's jurisdiction.  It held that violations from prior 
periods of parole would be hard to prove and difficult to defend 
against, and that serious violations committed during an earlier 
parole period could be addressed through new criminal charges.  
Id., ¶16.   
 
¶9 
In dissent, Judge Charles B. Schudson found the phrase 
"term of supervision" in Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) ambiguous, 
because reasonable, well-informed State officials could not 
agree on its meaning.  Judge Schudson relied on extrinsic 
sources such as apparent legislative intent, case law, and the 
interplay of statutes, to determine that the phrase "term of 
supervision" encompasses an individual's entire sentence.  He 
specifically noted that the apparent legislative intent behind 
§ 304.072(3) and the provision's interplay with other parole 
statutes, specifically Wis. Stat. §§ 302.11(6) and (7)(d), make 
clear that the court of appeals erroneously interpreted the 
statute.  Id., ¶¶19-20 (Schudson, J., dissenting). 
 
¶10 The DOC petitioned for review of the decision of the 
court of appeals.  We accepted review, and we now reverse.    
II 
¶11 This case turns on whether the phrase "term of 
supervision" within Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) allows the DOC to 
retain jurisdiction over a prisoner's entire sentence.  This 
issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law, 
which we review de novo, independently of the reasoning of the 
No. 
03-2001   
 
7 
 
circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their 
analyses.  See State v. Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶17, 273 
Wis. 2d 538, 684 N.W.2d 103.    
¶12 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
"determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
"'We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the 
statutory language.'"  Lombard, 273 Wis. 2d 538, ¶18 (quoting 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44).   
¶13 Accordingly, our analysis of Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
should begin with its plain language.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45.  If we determine that the language of the statute "'yields 
a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, 
and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of 
its meaning.'"  Id., ¶46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 
2003 WI 28, ¶8, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  Where such 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, 
we 
need 
not 
consider 
extrinsic sources of interpretation.  See Meriter Hosp. Inc. v. 
Dane County, 2004 WI 145, ¶13, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 689 N.W.2d 627; 
see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
¶14 Conversely, if the statute "is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses," then the statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶47.  Only when the statutory language is ambiguous may we 
consult extrinsic sources to ascertain legislative intent.  Id., 
¶51.  "By 'extrinsic sources' we mean interpretive resources 
No. 
03-2001   
 
8 
 
outside the statutory text——typically items of legislative 
history."  Id., ¶50 (citation omitted).  Additionally, in 
certain circumstances, "[a]mbiguity can be found in the words of 
the statutory provision itself, or by the words of the provision 
as they interact with and relate to other provisions in the 
statute 
and 
to 
other 
statutes." 
 
State 
v. 
Sweat, 
208 
Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997) (citation omitted).     
¶15 This case also requires us to review an administrative 
agency decision.  We must decide whether the DHA properly 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) as a matter of law, and we 
are not bound by its determination.  See Dodgeland Educ. Ass'n 
v. WERC, 2002 WI 22, ¶22, 250 Wis. 2d 357, 639 N.W.2d 733.   
Frequently, 
we 
defer 
to 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
interpretation of a statute, "[i]f the agency's 'experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid the agency 
in its interpretation and application of the statute. . . .'"  
Id.  (citing West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 
357 N.W.2d 534 (1985)).  To review an agency's statutory 
interpretation, this court generally applies one of three 
standards of review, with varying degrees of deference.  See 
Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶12, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755.    
The three standards of deference that we apply are great weight, 
due weight, or de novo:  See id.   
First, if the administrative agency's experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid 
the agency in its interpretation and application of 
the statute, the agency determination is entitled to 
"great weight."  The second level of review provides 
that if the agency decision is "very nearly" one of 
No. 
03-2001   
 
9 
 
first impression it is entitled to "due weight" or 
"great bearing."  The lowest level of review, the de 
novo standard, is applied where it is clear from the 
lack of agency precedent that the case is one of first 
impression for the agency and the agency lacks special 
expertise and experience in determining that question 
presented.  
Dodgeland, 250 Wis. 2d 357, ¶22 (quoting Jicha v. DILHR, 169 
Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992)).  Because both 
parties agree that this case presents a question of first 
impression, we conclude that de novo review is applicable to the 
case before us.   
III 
¶16 With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute 
in question.  Wisconsin Stat. § 304.072(3) provides:  
Except as provided in s. 973.09(3)(b), the department 
preserves jurisdiction over a probationer, parolee or 
person on extended supervision if it commences an 
investigation, issues a violation report or issues an 
apprehension request concerning an alleged violation 
prior 
to 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
probationer's, 
parolee's or person's term of supervision.   
¶17 According to Dowell, the court of appeals correctly 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) was unambiguous.  He 
contends that the phrase "term of supervision" plainly means the 
current period of time that a "probationer, parolee, or person 
on extended supervision" is being supervised.  He argues that 
the DOC exceeded its jurisdiction by revoking his current term 
of parole for a violation that occurred during a previous term 
of parole.   
 
¶18 The DOC, on the other hand, argues that the phrase 
"term of supervision" could mean one of two things.  First, the 
No. 
03-2001   
 
10 
 
phrase could mean a "final discharge from the underlying 
sentence."  Second, the phrase could mean "that a period of 
supervision ends when revocation or some other event occurs."  
Although the DOC emphasizes that the more logical interpretation 
is that the phrase means final discharge from the entire 
sentence, because the statute relates to jurisdiction over the 
person, it also argues that either interpretation is reasonable, 
thereby making the statute ambiguous.      
 
¶19 We agree with the DOC that both interpretations of 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) are reasonable.  As stated, if the 
statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses," then the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 (citations omitted).  In 
this case, there is inconsistency in interpreting § 304.072(3) 
between state agencies, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals: "Here, where even State officials are at odds over the 
interpretation of these seemingly simple words, one thing seems 
quite clear: 'term of supervision' is ambiguous."  Schwarz, 275 
Wis. 2d 225, ¶19 (Schudson, J., dissenting).   
 
¶20 Furthermore, 
if 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
were 
not 
ambiguous, the court of appeals would not have needed to insert 
the word "current" into its interpretation of the statute.  The 
court held that "[t]he only reasonable interpretation of the 
statute is that the DOC's jurisdiction to initiate parole 
revocation proceedings is limited to the current 'term of 
supervision.'"  Id., ¶11.  By adding the word "current" into its 
interpretation of § 304.072(3), the court of appeals attempted 
No. 
03-2001   
 
11 
 
to make an ambiguous provision unambiguous.  We will not "read 
into the statute language that the legislature did not put in."  
Brauneis v. State, 2000 WI 69, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 
N.W.2d 635 (citation omitted).  "One of the maxims of statutory 
construction is that courts should not add words to a statute to 
give it a certain meaning."  Fond du Lac County v. Town of 
Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(citation omitted).  Such an action is a clear sign that the 
statutory 
language, 
as 
written, 
is 
ambiguous. 
 
Upon 
determination of an ambiguous statute, we shift our focus to 
extrinsic sources for the ascertainment of legislative intent.    
 
¶21 We agree with the DOC that the proper methodology is 
to 
examine 
the 
legislative 
history 
and 
case 
law 
behind 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3), and the interplay among several parole 
statutes.  In doing so, it becomes clear to us that the 
legislature intended to provide the DOC with jurisdiction to 
enforce offender accountability throughout the term of parole, 
until the expiration of the entire underlying sentence.   
¶22 We begin our analysis of extrinsic sources with the 
legislative history behind Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3).5  Subsection 
(3) of § 304.072 was added to the statute in 1983 Act 528, § 20.6     
                                                 
5 The court of appeals did not discuss the legislative 
history behind Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3).  It held: "Inasmuch as 
we are satisfied that the statute is not ambiguous, we need not 
resort 
to 
extrinsic 
aids 
to 
ascertain 
the 
meaning 
of 
§ 304.072(3)." 
6 When 1983 Act 528 was drafted, the statute in question was 
numbered Wis. Stat. § 57.072.  It was not renumbered until 1989 
Act 107, § 1704.   
No. 
03-2001   
 
12 
 
In enacting 1983 Act 528, the legislature made various changes 
relating to parole.  Materials were incorporated in the drafting 
record that provide insight into legislative intent.  In the 
drafting record, prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
we find evidence of the legislature's intent to preserve DOC 
jurisdiction and promote offender accountability.  We have 
previously held that analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau "is significant in determining legislative intent." See 
Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168,  184, 532 N.W.2d 690 
(1995) (citation omitted).   
¶23 In the drafting record, under the heading, "Toll on 
Period of Probation or Parole," the Legislative Reference Bureau 
stated, "[t]he bill also provides a procedure for the department 
to preserve its probation or parole jurisdiction by taking 
certain 
action 
prior 
to 
the 
expiration 
of 
a 
term 
of 
supervision."  From this statement, we are able to find support 
for the conclusion that the legislature intended to promote 
offender accountability for violations by providing a method to 
continue jurisdiction past the expiration date for parole 
supervision.7     
                                                 
7 The DOC makes another argument that seems to strengthen 
its position that the legislative intent behind 1983 Wis. Act 
528 was to extend personal jurisdiction over offenders on 
parole.  It cites a drafting note in the record by Senior 
Legislative Attorney Bruce Feustel.  The note applies to 
Wis. Stat. § 53.11 (later renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 302.11), 
and states in relevant part:  
Note: This addition to the revised s. 53.11 is 
intended to clarify that the only time which actually 
vests, or cannot be taken away from a convicted 
No. 
03-2001   
 
13 
 
¶24 Evidence of the intent to provide for offender 
accountability is furnished by the legislature's decision to 
codify Cox, when enacting 1983 Act 528, § 20.  While we have 
held that "when the legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed 
to do so with full knowledge of the existing law," Peters v. 
Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 187, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999) 
(citations omitted), this presumption is strengthened by direct 
evidence in the Drafting Record that the legislature considered 
the Cox decision when amending the statute.8  In Cox, the 
defendant claimed that the Department of Health and Social 
Services (DHSS) did not have jurisdiction to revoke his 
probation.  The DHSS issued a warrant during the defendant's 
probationary term and did not order revocation until after his 
probation term was effectively over.  The court of appeals held 
                                                                                                                                                             
offender is time spent in prison or in jail in 
connection with the underlying offense.  Therefore, if 
a parolee serves a period of time under supervision 
prior to violation of parole and revocation, this 
period is automatically forfeited, and is added to the 
time 
to 
be 
served 
after 
the 
parolee 
is 
re-
released. . . .   
8 There is a page in the Drafting Record which states the 
following:  
"57.072 Jurisdiction of Prorlee [sic] 
State ex rel. Cox v. State DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 378 
Probation violation warrant issued during probation period 
preserved 
revocation 
jurisdiction 
even 
though 
not 
executed." 
See Drafting Record to 1983 Act 528, § 20. 
No. 
03-2001   
 
14 
 
that the DHSS had jurisdiction.  It further held that "[t]o 
require custody to toll the probation period would effectively 
deprive the Department of any control over a probationer during 
the last months of the probationary term."  Cox, 105 Wis. 2d at 
381 (citation omitted). 
¶25 We next examine the interplay among several statutes 
relating to parole.  The DOC cites Wis. Stat. § 302.11(6)9 and 
(7)(d)10 for the proposition that a parolee is responsible for 
parole violations until the expiration of his or her underlying 
sentence.  Both statutes refer only to parole, not probation or 
extended 
supervision, 
and 
use 
the 
phrase 
"expiration 
of 
sentence" instead of "term of supervision."  More important, 
both statutes were repealed and recreated in 1983 Act 28, the 
same bill that produced Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3). 
¶26 Dowell argues, and the court of appeals' majority 
agreed, that harmonizing the statutes is neither necessary nor 
appropriate.  Dowell argues that the DOC cannot incorporate the 
language of other parole statutes into Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
and ignore the legislature's use of the phrase "term of 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(6) provides, in relevant part: 
"Any inmate released on parole under sub. (1) or (1g)(b) or s. 
304.02 or 304.06(1) is subject to all conditions and rules of 
parole until the expiration of the sentence or until he or she 
is discharged by the department."  
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(7)(d) states: "A parolee who is 
subsequently released either after service of the period of time 
determined by the reviewing authority or by a grant of parole 
under par. (c) is subject to all conditions and rules of parole 
until expiration of sentence or discharge by the department."   
No. 
03-2001   
 
15 
 
supervision."  The majority of the court of appeals held that 
because the legislature used the phrase "term of supervision," 
instead of the phrase "expiration of sentence," which is used in 
Wis. Stat. §  302.11(6) and (7)(d), it intended to limit the 
DOC's jurisdiction to commence parole revocation proceedings 
under § 304.072(3) to the current "term of supervision."  
Specifically, the court held:  "Had the statute been worded to 
read that the DOC retained jurisdiction until the 'expiration of 
sentence' or until the 'date of the person's final discharge 
from parole, probation, or extended supervision,' it would yield 
the result desired by the DOC."  Schwarz, 275 Wis. 2d 225, ¶16.          
 
¶27 The DOC further argues that Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
must be read together with and harmonized with other statutes 
relating to parole, particularly Wis. Stat. § 302.11(6) and 
(7)(d), in order to fully discern legislative intent.  See State 
v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 
(footnote 
omitted) 
("[a] 
general 
rule 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is that statutes dealing with the same subject 
matter should be read together and harmonized").  The DOC 
maintains that §§ 302.11(6) and (7)(d) clearly demonstrates that 
the DOC's jurisdiction is not divided into terms, but is rather 
one single term of continuous supervision.   
 
¶28 We agree with the DOC that the interplay among  
statutes relating to parole is helpful in determining the 
legislature's apparent intent behind the phrase "term of 
supervision."  It is our duty to attempt to harmonize statutes 
that are allegedly in conflict, if it is possible, "in a way 
No. 
03-2001   
 
16 
 
which will give each full force and effect."  Kilgore, 193 
Wis. 2d at 184 (citation omitted).  As stated, both Wis. Stat. § 
302.11(6) and (7)(d) use the term "expiration of sentence" when 
referring to the DOC's jurisdiction of parole violations.  This 
is important to emphasize, because the majority of the court of 
appeals denied jurisdiction, in part, on its holding that the 
legislature 
instead 
chose 
to 
use 
the 
phrase 
"term 
of 
supervision" when enacting Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3).  We disagree 
with the reasoning of the court of appeals' majority.  The 
legislature could not have used the phrase "expiration of 
sentence" in § 304.072(3), because that statute applies to 
parole, probation, and extended supervision, and probation is 
not a sentence.  Judge Schudson, in his dissent, stated that 
this "all but defeats the majority's rationale."  Schwarz, 275 
Wis. 2d 225, ¶20 (Schudson, J., dissenting). 
 
¶29 We 
also 
recognize 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) 
concerns the DOC's jurisdiction of a person, rather than the 
Department's 
jurisdiction, 
specifically, 
over 
a 
parole 
violation.11  The circuit court correctly made this distinction 
and we agree with its reasoning:   
The hearing examiner and the Division relied entirely 
on § 304.072(3), however this statute is silent with 
                                                 
11 The 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
held 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) is a personal jurisdiction statute.  It 
held: "Section 304.072(3) allows the department to retain 
jurisdiction over a person on supervision after the regularly 
scheduled maximum discharge date when the DOC takes one of three 
prescribed actions.  . . . [T]his statute is silent with respect 
to the department's jurisdiction over a parole violation."   
No. 
03-2001   
 
17 
 
respect to the department's jurisdiction over a parole 
violation.  For this reason, the court must look to 
other 
statutes 
governing 
parole 
violation.  
Specifically, § 304.06(3)12 provides that every paroled 
prisoner remains in custody of the department until 
his or her discharge date, and the department may take 
physical custody of any prisoner for the investigation 
of alleged parole violations.  Section 304.072(3), 
when read in conjunction with other statutes governing 
parole 
supervision, 
implicitly 
authorizes 
the 
department to hold offenders accountable for all 
behaviors in violation of the rules until final 
discharge from the entire sentence.     
 
¶30 We agree with the DOC that the legislative history, 
codification of Cox, and the interplay among the statutes 
discussed are "instructive as to how and when an offender is 
suspected of violating supervision and the case is near 
discharge."  This evidence of legislative intent surrounding the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) strengthens our conclusion 
that the legislature intended to preserve DOC jurisdiction until 
the offender's final date of discharge from his or her entire 
sentence.       
¶31 Our 
interpretation 
of 
legislative 
intent, 
stated 
above, is also consistent with sound principles of public 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 304.06(3) states, in relevant part:  
Every paroled prisoner remains in the legal custody of 
the 
department unless 
otherwise 
provided 
by the 
department.  If the department alleges that any 
condition or rule of parole has been violated by the 
prisoner, the department may take physical custody of 
the prisoner for the investigation of the alleged 
violation.  If the department is satisfied that any 
condition or rule of parole has been violated it shall 
afford the prisoner such administrative hearings as 
are required by law. 
No. 
03-2001   
 
18 
 
policy.  By allowing the DOC to retain jurisdiction over a 
parolee until the parolee's date of discharge from the entire 
sentence, we are allowing it to hold an offender accountable for 
all violations committed during his or her entire sentence.  In 
this case, our decision means that Dowell's parole will be 
revoked, and he will serve the final two years, one month, and 
14 days of his original sentence in prison.  Any other 
interpretation could, in effect, create amnesty for a parole 
offender who committed a violation during an earlier period of 
parole, and reward such offender for successfully concealing the 
violation.   
¶32 Both Dowell and the majority of the court of appeals 
argue, however, that because Dowell was convicted criminally for 
his parole violation, he will be held sufficiently accountable.  
The court of appeals' majority held "[a]ny criminal act 
committed during an earlier parole is subject to a new criminal 
charge.  Dowell can attest to this fact——his earlier parole 
violation resulted in an eighty-year sentence."  Schwarz, 275 
Wis. 2d 225, ¶17.     
¶33 Although this may satisfy the  accountability concern 
in this particular case, we recognize that in other cases it 
will not.  For example, under the approach of the majority of 
the court of appeals, if Dowell, or an offender like him, had 
committed a noncriminal parole violation during his first period 
of parole, that was not uncovered during that initial parole 
period, there would be no accountability or liability for the 
violation.  We recognize that because "parole may be revoked for 
No. 
03-2001   
 
19 
 
conduct which does not violate the criminal law," State ex rel. 
Flowers v. H&SS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 385, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978) 
(citation 
omitted), 
a 
violation 
of 
parole, 
absent 
DOC 
jurisdiction, would go unpunished.  This clearly violates public 
policy favoring accountability.   
¶34 Additionally, 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) results in the treatment of all parole 
violators with fairness and consistency.  This point is 
illustrated with an example that the DOC provided in its brief:  
Offender A is convicted of First Degree Sexual Assault 
and receives a 20-year sentence.  Offender A is 
released to parole after 10 years, but is revoked for 
absconding and returned to prison for one year and 
subsequently released again to parole.  After several 
months the agent 
discovers Offender A 
committed 
another sexual assault during the first term of parole 
and gets a no revoke ruling pursuant to the Division 
of Hearings and Appeals' position in this case.  
Compare this to Offender B with an identical sentence 
structure who is revoked after two years on parole for 
committing a sexual assault and is returned to prison 
for the entire ten years remaining on the sentence.  
Similar violations, but remarkably dissimilar results.  
Moreover, this disparity is unfair to both offenders 
and 
victims. 
 
Such 
a 
system 
does 
not 
promote 
consistency, fairness or public safety. (Footnote 
omitted.)   
 
¶35 Although the court of appeals' majority based its 
decision, in part, on its view of public policy, its position is 
not persuasive.  The majority stated: "Not only would stale 
violations be difficult to prove or defend against, but a truly 
rehabilitated person who earned the right to be paroled might be 
confronted with long-ago violations never pursued during the 
earlier 'term of supervision.'"  Schwarz, 275 Wis. 2d 225, ¶16.  
No. 
03-2001   
 
20 
 
While these policy concerns may be legitimate, they are trumped 
by 
the 
need 
for 
offender 
accountability, 
concern 
with 
rehabilitation, and the need for fairness and consistency within 
the parole system.   
IV 
¶36 In sum, we hold that the phrase "term of supervision" 
in Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) is ambiguous, since it can reasonably 
be interpreted to apply to both the current term of supervision 
and any time prior to the final discharge from an underlying 
sentence. 
 We rely upon 
extrinsic 
sources 
such as the 
legislative history and relevant case law behind § 304.072(3), 
and the interplay among parole statutes to determine that "term 
of supervision" was intended to apply to all parole violations 
that occur before the offender's date of discharge from his or 
her entire sentence.   We conclude that the legislature intended 
to promote offender accountability and, therefore, the DOC had 
jurisdiction to revoke Dowell's parole for a violation that he 
committed during his first period of parole supervision.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
¶38 The question presented is whether parole revocation 
proceedings authorized by Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) can be 
initiated during a second term of parole based solely on the 
parolee's conduct during the parolee's first term of parole.  To 
"answer" this question, the majority opinion examines case law, 
legislative history, and other statutes.  None of these sources 
supports the majority opinion's holding.  I therefore dissent. 
¶39 The lone case-law authority, State ex rel. Cox v. 
DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 378, 314 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1981), does not 
support the majority's holding.  See majority op., ¶24.  Cox 
stands for a simple proposition: When the department with 
jurisdiction over a probationer issues a probation violation 
warrant before the expiration of the probationary term, the 
running of that term is tolled.13  The execution of the warrant 
and the revocation proceedings need not occur within that 
probationary term, only the issuance of the warrant.14  As the 
court of appeals correctly noted in Cox, to require all 
revocation proceedings to occur within the probationary term 
would "effectively deprive the Department of any control over a 
probationer during the last months of the probationary term."15 
                                                 
13 State ex rel. Cox v. DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 378, 380, 314 
N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1981). 
14 Id. at 381. 
15 Id. 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶40 Cox's 
holding remains a 
simple proposition 
when 
applied to the instant case: If the Department wants to revoke 
parole before the expiration of the parole term, it must 
initiate revocation proceedings before the expiration of the 
parole term.   
¶41 Cox brings us no closer to understanding what "term of 
supervision" might mean.  Cox neither uses the phrase "term of 
supervision" nor deals with a situation in which the defendant 
was twice placed on parole or probation and the second parole or 
probation term was revoked based on conduct occurring during the 
first term. 
¶42 Legislative history does not support the majority's 
holding.  According to the majority opinion, the drafting 
records indicate that Wis. Stat. § 57.072 (the precursor to Wis. 
Stat. § 304.072) codified Cox.16   I agree, but without more, the 
legislative history is no more useful than is Cox in divining 
the meaning of the phrase "term of supervision." 
¶43 The drafting records provide two tea leaves for the 
majority opinion to contemplate; neither resolves the issue 
presented in this case.  One hand-written note cites Cox and 
posits, "Probation violation warrant issued during probation 
period 
preserved 
revocation 
jurisdiction 
even 
though 
not 
executed."17  Another note in the record succinctly states what 
the Legislature likely gleaned from Cox: "The bill also provides 
a procedure for the department to preserve its probation or 
                                                 
16 Majority op., ¶24 (citing 1983 Act 528, § 20). 
17 Id., ¶24 n.8 (citing Drafting records for 1983 Act 528). 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
3 
 
parole jurisdiction by taking certain action prior to the 
expiration of a term of supervision."18  Neither Cox, nor the 
legislative history codifying Cox, provides the answer to the 
question presented.   
¶44 The majority opinion, like the dissent in the court of 
appeals, then turns to other statutes, putting significant 
weight on language contained in Wis. Stat. §§ 302.11(6)19 and 
(7)(d).20  These two statutes state that a parolee is subject to 
all conditions and rules of parole until the "expiration of 
[the] sentence" or until he or she is "discharge[d] by the 
department."  These two chapter 302 statutes use the phrases 
"expiration 
of 
[the] 
sentence" 
and 
"discharge[d] 
by 
the 
department" rather than the phrase "term of supervision."     
¶45 The chapter 302 provisions do not provide a mechanism 
for revocation of parole, probation, or extended supervision.  
They certainly do not tell us what "term of supervision" means; 
they never use the phrase.  They do not tell us whether Wis. 
Stat. § 304.072(3) allows action taken by the Department in a 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶23 (citing Drafting Records for 1983 Act 528).  
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(6) reads in relevant part as 
follows: "Any inmate released on parole . . . is subject to all 
conditions and rules of parole until the expiration of the 
sentence or until he or she is discharged by the department." 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(7)(d) reads in relevant part as 
follows: "A parolee who is subsequently released either after 
service of the period of time determined by the reviewing 
authority or by a grant of parole . . . is subject to all 
conditions and rules of parole until expiration of sentence or 
discharge by the department." 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
4 
 
second term of parole to be based solely on conduct occurring 
during a parolee's first term of parole.   
¶46 After reviewing the three sources upon which the 
majority hangs its hat, the question remains: What does "term of 
supervision" as used in Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) mean, and can 
conduct during a term of parole lead to revocation of a second 
term of parole?  None of the sources, separately or together, 
support any more than the simple proposition first stated in 
Cox: The Department tolls the running of a term of probation, 
parole, or extended supervision when it takes certain action 
before the expiration of that term. 
¶47 I agree with the court of appeals that the statutory 
phrase "term of supervision" means exactly what it says.  The 
text of the statute matters.  When the legislature wanted to 
refer to "expiration of the sentence" and "discharged by the 
department," it used those words.   
¶48 The Department of Corrections' jurisdiction in parole 
matters is limited to seeking revocation only for violations 
that occur during that term of supervision.  This interpretation 
does not hinder the state in prosecuting crime and does not 
threaten public safety.  The State can prosecute a parolee for 
criminal conduct committed during any period of parole, and the 
parolee may be subject to imprisonment.  In the present case, 
for example, the defendant's parole violation during his first 
parole was prosecuted as a crime, resulting in an eighty-year 
sentence.     
¶49 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  03-2001.ssa 
 
 
 
1