Title: Ex parte Regina Deloise Trottman and Willie Ross. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: T.W., individually and as next friend of J.T., a minor v. Russell County Board of Education et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 03/16/2007 -- Ex parte Trottman and Ross
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1060073
____________________
Ex parte Regina Deloise Trottman and Willie Ross
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: T.W., individually and as next friend 
of J.T., a minor
v.
Russell County Board of Education et al.)
(Russell Circuit Court, CV-01-433)
STUART, Justice.
T.W., individually and as the next friend of J.T., her
daughter, a minor, sued the Russell County Board of Education;
1060073
2
Regina Deloise Trottman, individually and in her capacity as
an instructional assistant at Mount Olive Elementary School;
Dyanne D. Hood, individually and in her official capacity as
secretary at Mount Olive Elementary School; Willie Ross,
individually and in his official capacity as principal of
Mount Olive Elementary School; C.W., then an 18-year-old
former student of Mount Olive Elementary School; and others,
alleging claims of assault and battery, negligence and
wantonness, and negligent or wanton supervision or training.
Defendants Russell County Board of Education, Hood, Trottman,
and Ross moved for a summary judgment, arguing that they were
entitled to State-agent immunity.  See Ex parte Cranman, 792
So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  The trial court entered a summary
judgment for the Russell County Board of Education and Hood,
but denied the summary-judgment motion as to Trottman and
Ross.  Trottman and Ross then petitioned this Court for a writ
of mandamus directing the Russell Circuit Court to enter a
summary judgment for them on the basis of State-agent
immunity.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts 
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3
On November 16, 1999, J.T., then an 11-year-old girl
enrolled in the sixth grade at Mount Olive Elementary School,
informed her teacher that she was sick and wanted to go home.
The teacher instructed J.T. to telephone her mother.  J.T.
left the classroom and returned a few minutes later.  About 45
minutes after J.T. returned, the teacher was informed that
J.T. needed to come to the office to check out of school.
Trottman, an instructional assistant, was assisting in
the office that day and, at Ross's direction, was  checking
students in and out of the school.  C.W., an 18-year-old
former student at Mount Olive Elementary School, entered the
office and spoke with Hood.  Trottman did not overhear their
conversation.  C.W. then informed Trottman, outside Hood's
presence, that he needed to check his sister, J.T., out of
school.  When J.T. arrived at the office, Trottman checked her
out, permitting J.T. to leave with C.W.
After J.T. and C.W. left the school grounds, Trottman
remarked to Hood that J.T. had a nice brother.  Hood, knowing
that J.T. did not have a brother, realized that J.T. had left
the school grounds with C.W. under a false pretense.  Hood and
a teacher left the school grounds to search for J.T.  They
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4
found J.T. in C.W.'s vehicle, which was parked in a vacant lot
near his house.  When Hood approached the vehicle, she could
see that C.W. was sexually assaulting J.T.; Hood was able to
stop the sexual assault before it was completed.
Standard of Review
"The standard governing our review of an issue
presented in a petition for a writ of mandamus is
well established:
"'[M]andamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ to be issued
only where there is (1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to
the 
order 
sought; 
(2) 
an
imperative 
duty 
upon 
the
r e s p o n d e n t  
t o  
p e r f o r m ,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court. 
 
Barber 
v. 
Covington
County Comm'n, 466 So. 2d 945
(Ala. 1985).  In cases involving
the exercise of discretion by an
inferior 
court, 
mandamus 
may
issue to compel the exercise of
that discretion.  It may not,
however, issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion
except in a case of abuse.  Ex
parte Smith, 533 So. 2d 533 (Ala.
1988).'
"Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989)."
Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. 2000).
1060073
5
Discussion
Ross and Trottman maintain that the trial court exceeded
the scope of its discretion when it refused to enter a summary
judgment for them on the basis that they were not entitled to
the protection of State-agent immunity as provided in Ex parte
Cranman, supra.   According to Ross and Trottman, they are
entitled to State-agent immunity for the claim of negligent
supervision of students because, they say, their conduct in
allowing J.T. to leave the school grounds with C.W. fell
within the discretionary function of educating and supervising
students.  Additionally, Ross argues that he is entitled to
State-agent immunity on the claim of negligent supervision of
personnel because, he says, his conduct fell within the
discretionary 
function 
of 
exercising 
his 
judgment 
in
supervising personnel and formulating policies. 
In Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046 (Ala. 2003),
this Court set forth the law applicable to our analysis in a
case like this one, stating:
"In [Ex parte] Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.
2000)], this Court restated the doctrine of State-
agent immunity as follows:
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
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6
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment
in the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"'(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"'(b) allocating resources;
"'(c) negotiating contracts;
"'(d) 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or
supervising personnel; or
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"'(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to, law-
enforcement 
officers' 
arresting 
or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"'(5) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
1060073
7
"'Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a governmental agency require otherwise; or
"'(2) 
when 
the 
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"792 So. 2d at 405 ....
"We 
have 
established 
a 
'burden-shifting' 
process
when a party raises the defense of State-agent
immunity.  Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705 (Ala.
2002).  In order to claim State-agent immunity, the
[State agents] bear the burden of demonstrating that
[the plaintiff's] claims arise from a function that
would entitle them to immunity.  Wood, 852 So. 2d at
709; Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002).  If
the [State agents] make such a showing, the burden
then shifts to [the plaintiff], who, in order to
deny the [State agents] immunity from suit, must
establish that the [State agents] acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
their authority. Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte
Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  A State
agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not
immune when he or she 'fail[s] to discharge duties
pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist.'  Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)."
1060073
8
874 So. 2d at 1051-52.
A.  Claim of Negligent Supervision of Students Asserted
Against Ross and Trottman
Ex parte Cranman provides State-agent immunity for
individuals who are "exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in ...
educating students."  792 So. 2d at 405.  Educating students
includes not only classroom teaching, but also supervising and
educating students in all aspects of the educational process.
In Ex parte Blankenship, supra, this Court held that a
band director and a high school principal were entitled to
State-agent immunity because they were exercising their
discretion in educating students when they allowed a 19-year-
old male, who was not a student at the school, to participate
in the band.  In Blankenship, the parents of C.S., a female
band member, had asked Harold Blankenship, the band director,
to keep C.S. and Jason Howard, the 19-year-old male,
separated.  When the band returned to Elmore County from
marching at a football game in Troy, neither C.S.’s parents
nor the parents designated by C.S.’s parents to pick up C.S.
were available, even though C.S.’s parents knew that it was
their responsibility to provide C.S. with a ride home after
1060073
9
the trip.  C.S. and a girlfriend left with Howard and his
brother, who was at the high school to pick up Howard.  At
some point after that, C.S. and Howard engaged in sexual
intercourse.  When C.S. told her parents what had happened,
C.S.'s parents reported the incident to the police.  They
later sued Blankenship and Louie Fryer, the principal,
alleging that Blankenship and Fryer had failed to properly
supervise C.S. by allowing C.S. to leave the school grounds
with Howard.
Blankenship and Fryer moved for a summary judgment,
arguing that their actions were protected under the doctrine
of discretionary immunity.  C.S.'s parents argued that
Blankenship and Fryer had exceeded the scope of their
discretion and were not entitled to immunity because they had
allowed Howard, a nonstudent, to participate in the band when
the guidelines established by the Elmore County School Board
stated 
that 
"a 
child 
could 
not 
participate 
in 
an
extracurricular activity on a particular day if the child had
not attended school for the entire day."  806 So. 2d 1188.
After the trial court denied Blankenship and Fryer's motion,
they petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing
1060073
10
the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor.
This Court, recognizing that the guidelines did not limit the
discretion of a principal and a band director in allowing
nonstudents to participate in the band, held that Blankenship
and Fryer were protected under the doctrine of discretionary
immunity because their decision to allow Howard to participate
in the band was made while they were acting in their official
capacity discharging their duties in educating students.  We
stated:
"One with 20/20 hindsight might question the wisdom
of Blankenship and Fryer’s decision to allow a
person they thought was a student from a private
school outside Elmore County to participate in the
band activities and the wisdom of their failing to
verify that he was a student at the private school
he claimed to attend.  State-agent immunity protects
agents of the State in their exercise of discretion
in educating students.  We will not second-guess
their decisions."
806 So. 2d at 1190.
Applying the reasoning set forth in Blankenship, we
conclude that Ross and Trottman are entitled to the protection
of State-agent immunity.  Ross, in his official capacity as
principal of Mount Olive Elementary School, designated
Trottman to check students in and out of school on the day
J.T. left the school with C.W.  The documents before us
1060073
11
establish that allowing a student to leave with an older
sibling was a standard checkout procedure at Mount Olive
Elementary School.  As a consequence, Trottman permitted J.T.
to leave the school grounds with C.W., who represented to
Trottman that he was J.T.'s brother.  Therefore, Ross's and
Trottman's actions occurred while they were discharging their
official duties in educating students.  
Because Ross and Trottman established that their conduct
was based on their exercise of judgment in educating students,
the burden then shifted to T.W. to establish that Ross and
Trottman acted "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond [their] authority."   According to T.W., Ross
and Trottman acted beyond the scope of their authority
because, she argues, they did not follow the established
procedure for allowing a student to check out of school.  She
maintains that if the procedure designated in the 1998-1999
district-wide handbook and the proposed 1999-2000 Mount Olive
Elementary School handbook had been followed, J.T. would not
have been allowed to check out and leave the school grounds
with C.W.  She states that these handbooks provided "detailed
rules and regulations," which Ross and Trottman were required
1060073
12
to follow, and, because they did not follow these established
procedures in deciding to allow J.T. to check out and leave
the school grounds with C.W., they exceeded their authority.
In support of her argument, she also offered an affidavit
stating that when she enrolled J.T. at Mount Olive Elementary
School, she completed a form in which she indicated that in
the event she could not pick up J.T. at school, only T.W.'s
mother or T.W.'s aunt were authorized to pick up J.T. from
school.   
Ross and Trottman, however, presented evidence indicating
that there was not an official checkout policy in place at
Mount Olive Elementary School at the time of the incident.
They 
submitted 
an 
affidavit 
from 
Lee 
Henderson, 
the
superintendent of education for the Russell County Board of
Education at the time of J.T.’s assault.  He stated:
"The Russell County Board of Education did not
have any policies, procedures, rules or regulations
in place regarding the checking out of students
during the 1999-2000 school year.  While the Russell
County Board of Education did not require each
school to have its own handbook during the 1999-2000
school year, we were in a transition period where
each school was in the process of formulating its
own handbook addressing the specific needs of the
school.  During this school year, each principal,
including Mr. Ross, had the authority to put into
effect those procedures which best served the
1060073
T.W. does not contend that she was provided a copy of
1
this draft 1999-2000 handbook.
A copy of this enrollment form is not included in the
2
documents submitted to this Court.  According to Ross and
Trottman, a copy of the enrollment form was not submitted to
the trial court for review.  T.W. does not refute this
statement.
13
circumstances of their community and school.  Each
principal also had the authority to delegate the
responsibility for checking students out." 
Thus, Henderson’s affidavit establishes that there was not a
district policy regarding checking students out of school.
Additionally, Ross and Trottman presented evidence through the
depositions of Ross and other faculty and staff working at
Mount Olive Elementary School during the 1999-2000 school year
indicating that although there was a proposed 1999-2000
handbook for Mount Olive Elementary School, the handbook was
never adopted and there was no school policy regarding
checking students out of school.    Ross and Trottman further
1
state that the enrollment form T.W. completed when she
enrolled J.T. at Mount Olive Elementary School did not
designate certain individuals to pick J.T. up in the event
T.W. could not do so; rather, it provided names of individuals
whom the school could contact in case of an emergency.   
2
1060073
14
In light of the foregoing, T.W. has not established  that
a specific checkout policy existed at Mount Olive Elementary
School at the time of the incident; thus, she has not
established  that a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether Ross and Trottman exceeded the scope of their
discretion by permitting J.T. to leave the school grounds with
C.W.  Cf.  Giambrone v. Douglas, supra (holding that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether a wrestling coach
was entitled to State-agent immunity because evidence was
presented indicating that specific guidelines and rules had
been provided to the coach, thus removing the coach’s
discretion).  Consequently, the trial court exceeded the scope
of its discretion by refusing to enter a summary judgment for
Trottman and Ross on the ground of State-agent immunity with
regard to T.W.’s claim of negligent supervision of students.
B. Claim of Negligent Supervision of Personnel
Asserted Against Ross
Additionally, Ross contends that the trial court exceeded
the scope of its discretion in refusing to grant him State-
agent immunity with regard to T.W.’s claim that he was
negligent in his supervision of school personnel.  
1060073
15
Ex parte Cranman provides that an agent of the State is
protected from liability for decisions made while exercising
his or her judgment in the administration of a department or
agency of the State when assigning or supervising personnel.
792 So. 2d at 405.  In Hill v. Allen, 495 So. 2d 32 (Ala.
1995), this Court held that a school principal, who was
accused of negligent supervision of teachers and aides who had
allegedly assaulted mentally retarded students, was entitled
to State-agent immunity.  In Hill, the students maintained
that the principal knew or should have known of the alleged
abuses inflicted upon them, yet failed to prevent them.   This
Court held that the principal was entitled to immunity because
he was exercising his judgment in supervising the teachers at
the time of the assaults and that he did not exceed the scope
of his authority because the students did not allege or
establish that the principal had acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.  
Here, like the principal in Hill, Ross exercised
discretion within his authority when he  assigned Trottman to
check students in and out of school.  T.W. did not present any
evidence to establish that at the time Ross assigned
1060073
16
Trottman, under his supervision, to check students in and out
of school Ross acted "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith or beyond his ... authority."  Therefore, Ross is
entitled to State-agent immunity with regard to T.W.’s claim
that he negligently supervised Trottman.
Finally, T.W. argues that Ross is not entitled to State-
agent immunity because, she says, he exceeded the scope of his
discretion by failing to formulate and enforce proper checkout
procedures at Mount Olive Elementary School.  
Ex parte Cranman specifically provides that a State agent
is entitled to immunity when formulating policies.  792 So. 2d
at 405.  In Louviere v. Mobile County Board of Education, 670
So. 2d 873 (Ala. 1995), this Court held that a principal of an
elementary school was entitled to State-agent immunity on a
claim that he "negligently failed to exercise proper safety
measures, to monitor school equipment, to maintain safety
precautions, and to institute safety measures."  670 So. 2d at
877.  In Louviere an elementary school student was severely
burned when she stepped into a hole and her feet and ankles
were burned by hot water or steam, which allegedly was caused
1060073
See, e.g., Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 2002);
3
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Turner,
840 So. 2d 132 (Ala. 2002); and Byrd v. Sullivan, 657 So. 2d
17
by an underground boiler pipe.  This Court held that the
principal was immune from liability, stating:
"Whatever her action might have been, any decision
she might have made was related to the performance
of her duties as principal, and called for 'personal
deliberation[s], decision[s] and judgment[s]' in the
performance of her job.  Thus, in making that
decision she was engaged in the performance of
discretionary functions for which she possessed
constitutional immunity."
670 So. 2d at 877.
Like the principal in Louviere, Ross is also entitled to
State-agent immunity.  The development of a checkout policy at
Mount Olive Elementary School was within Ross’s discretion in
making decisions as principal for the school.  T.W. did not
present any evidence indicating that in formulating the
checkout 
policy 
Ross 
acted 
"willfully, 
maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his ... authority."
Therefore, Ross is entitled to State-agent immunity on this
claim.
Conclusion
The facts here, like those in Blankenship, supra, and
other similar cases,  make us question the wisdom of Ross's
3
1060073
830 (Ala. 1995).
18
and Trottman's decisions as they related to J.T.; hindsight,
however, is 20/20, and we will not second-guess their
decisions.  
Ross and Trottman have established a clear legal right to
the relief requested; therefore, we direct the trial court to
enter a summary judgment in favor of Ross and Trottman.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.