Title: State v. Nguyen

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

916 P.2d 689 (1996) 81 Hawai`i 279 STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tuan Quoc NGUYEN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 17535. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. May 7, 1996. *690 James S. Tabe, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Mark R. Simonds, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., County of Maui, on the briefs, Wailuku, for plaintiff-appellee. Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. NAKAYAMA, Justice. Defendant-appellant Tuan Quoc Nguyen, a resident alien, appeals from the denial of his Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 32(d) motion to withdraw his 1985 "no contest" plea to Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree. Based on our review of the record, we affirm. On November 18, 1975, Nguyen immigrated from Vietnam to the United States. Since his immigration, Nguyen has lived in the United States as a resident alien and has continued to retain his Vietnamese citizenship. On November 16, 1984, Police Officers David Shishido and Carl Washington observed Nguyen driving his automobile erratically on Honoapiilani Highway, Lahaina, Maui. Believing that Nguyen was driving under the influence of an intoxicant, Officer Shishido and Officer Washington had Nguyen *691 pull over to the side of the highway. When Officer Shishido and Officer Washington asked Nguyen to produce his license, automobile registration, and proof of insurance, they detected an odor of alcohol emanating from Nguyen's breath, and they noticed that Nguyen was trying to push a plastic packet containing a white substance under the floor-carpet with his foot. During the ensuing investigation, Officer Shishido and Officer Washington discovered that the white substance in the plastic packet was cocaine, and they also found marijuana inside of Nguyen's automobile. Nguyen was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Drugs, Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-7 (1985), Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, HRS § 712-1243 (1985), and Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree, HRS § 712-1249 (1985). On April 15, 1985, a grand jury indicted Nguyen for Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree and Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree. On November 14, 1985, Nguyen entered a plea of "no contest"[1] in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit court) with respect to the cocaine-related charge of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree in exchange for the State of Hawai`i's (prosecution) promise to dismiss the marijuana-related charge of Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the Third Degree. Nguyen signed a "No Contest" plea form indicating that he was pleading "no contest" to Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, and stating that he "will stipulate to the factual basis for the one charge listed in this document." Nguyen's "No Contest" plea form stated, in pertinent part, the following: Nguyen's attorney also signed the "No Contest" plea form, which contained a "Certificate of Counsel" section that stated the following: Although Nguyen made his "no contest" plea at the court hearing on November 14, 1985, with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter, Nguyen had some command of the English language. At Nguyen's hearing, the following dialogue took place between Judge E. John McConnell, Nguyen, Nguyen's attorney, Deputy Public Defender Tom Griswold, Nguyen's interpreter, An Nguyen, and Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Ruby Hamili: At Nguyen's subsequent sentencing hearing on January 17, 1986, Judge McConnell sentenced Nguyen to probation for a period of five years under the following terms: commitment to the Maui Community Correctional Center for a period of six months, with the issuance of mittimus suspended as long as Nguyen complied with all the terms and conditions of probation; a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars; and two hundred and fifty hours of community service. Final judgment for this conviction was entered on January 20, 1986. Over seven years later, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced involuntary deportation proceedings against Nguyen based upon his 1986 conviction for the cocaine-related charge of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree. On April 30, 1993, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing to Nguyen, requiring Nguyen to appear before an immigration judge to show cause why he should not be deported from the United States.[2] In response, on September 10, 1993, Nguyen filed a motion in the circuit court to withdraw his earlier "no contest" plea. Nguyen predicated his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea on HRS Chapter 802E, enacted in 1988, which requires courts to warn defendants about, among other things, the possibility of deportation, before courts accept pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Nguyen alleged that (1) when he had offered his "no contest" plea on November 14, 1985, Judge McConnell had failed to warn him that his "no contest" plea might result in deportation, (2) in light of the INS's subsequent deportation proceedings, Nguyen was the victim of manifest injustice, and (3) thus, he deserved to have his "no contest" plea withdrawn. On September 15, 1993, the prosecution and Nguyen's attorney appeared before Judge McConnell to present oral arguments addressing Nguyen's motion to withdraw the plea. Counsel for Nguyen introduced, among other things, three exhibits into evidence: (1) Nguyen's "No Contest" plea form; (2) an official court reporter's transcript from the hearing on November 14, 1985, in which Nguyen had offered his "no contest" plea; and (3) a copy of the "Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing" showing that the United States Department of Justice was considering the possibility of deporting Nguyen. After reviewing the exhibits and arguments from both sides, Judge McConnell concluded that Nguyen had failed to make a sufficient showing of manifest injustice and, *696 furthermore, that in 1985 the court had not been required to warn Nguyen that a "no contest" plea might possibly lead to Nguyen's deportation because the Hawai`i legislature had not yet enacted HRS Chapter 802E: On October 15, 1993, Judge McConnell issued the order denying Nguyen's motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea, ruling in pertinent part as follows: Nguyen asserts that he should have been allowed to withdraw his "no contest" plea as a result of the subsequent enactment of HRS Chapter 802E (1993). HRS Chapter 802E currently requires a trial judge to advise a defendant who is not a United States citizen that a conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere could lead to deportation. Nguyen contends that (A) the circuit court abused its discretion in 1993 by denying his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea; and (B) the circuit court committed plain error in 1985 by accepting Nguyen's "no contest" plea. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Nguyen's motion to withdraw his plea. HRPP Rule 32(d) provides: "This court has observed that a liberal approach is to be taken when a motion to withdraw a plea is made under HRPP 32(d) before sentence is imposed." State v. Adams, 76 Hawai`i 408, 411, 879 P.2d 513, 516 (1994). The court should grant such a motion before imposition of sentence if (1) the defendant has presented "fair and just reasons" for his or her request, and (2) the prosecution has not relied upon the plea to its substantial prejudice. State v. Merino, ___ Hawai`i ___, ___ _ ___, 915 P.2d 672, 697-98 (1996); State v. Gomes, 79 Hawai`i 32, 36, 897 P.2d 959, 963 (1995); Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 411, 879 P.2d at 516. In contrast, when a defendant moves to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere under HRPP 32(d) after imposition of sentence, only a showing of manifest injustice will entitle the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 411, 879 P.2d at 516. When a trial court denies a motion to withdraw a plea, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown. State v. Smith, 61 Haw. 522, 523, 606 P.2d 86, 88 (1980); Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 411, 879 P.2d at 516. "The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant and a strong showing is required to establish it." State v. Faulkner, 1 Haw.App. 651, 654, 624 P.2d 940, 943 (1981). An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a *697 party litigant. Merino, ___ Hawai`i at ___, 915 P.2d at 685; Gomes, 79 Hawai`i at 36, 897 P.2d at 963; Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 411, 879 P.2d at 516; Faulkner, 1 Haw.App. at 654, 624 P.2d at 943. On November 14, 1985, when Nguyen entered his plea of "no contest" to his cocaine-related charge of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, HRPP 11(c) and (d) required the circuit court to do the following: Nguyen does not dispute that the circuit court fulfilled the express requirements of Rule 11 as it existed on November 14, 1985. However, Nguyen contends that when he subsequently moved to withdraw his "no contest" plea in 1993 and told the circuit court he had not known that his "no contest" plea might eventually result in deportation, the circuit court abused its discretion by finding that Nguyen failed to demonstrate manifest injustice and by refusing to apply HRS § 802E-3 retrospectively. Courts need not inform defendants prior to accepting their guilty or nolo contendere pleas about every conceivable collateral effect that a conviction might have. Cf. Reponte v. State, 57 Haw. 354, 364, 556 P.2d 577, 584 (1976) (rejecting an appellant's argument that his burglary conviction should be vacated because the court had not informed him that by pleading guilty he would no longer be allowed to hold ammunition or a gun). Accordingly, it is the general rule that, absent a rule or statute, a court has no duty to warn defendants pleading guilty or "no contest" about the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction. Cf. id. at 364 n. 10, 556 P.2d at 584 n. 10 (citing Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945, 93 S. Ct. 1389, 35 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1973)).[3] *698 The New York Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue when an alien defendant had pled guilty to manslaughter without any warning about the possibility of deportation: People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273-74, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); accord, Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir.1976) (holding that an alien defendant need not be advised of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea, because deportation is a sanction controlled by a federal agency over which a trial judge has neither control nor responsibility), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895, 97 S. Ct. 256, 50 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1976).[4] The same rationale applies to defendants who plead nolo contendere or "no contest" without any warning about the collateral consequence of possible deportation. State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994) ("There is no duty to inform alien defendants [pleading nolo contendere] of the collateral consequence of possible or certain deportation."). Nevertheless, Nguyen correctly asserts that a statute, HRS Chapter 802E, currently requires courts, prior to accepting a plea of nolo contendere, to advise defendants that, if they are not citizens of the United States, their convictions "may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States." HRS § 802E-2 (1993).[5] Effective September 2, 1988, an amendment to HRPP Rule 11(c)(5) also requires courts to determine that such defendants understand the collateral consequence of possible deportation.[6] "If *699 the court fails to advise the defendant as required by section 802E-2 and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which the defendant pleaded ... nolo contendere may have the consequence[] for the defendant of deportation, ... the court shall vacate the judgment[.]" HRS § 802E-3 (1993).[7] However, the Hawai`i legislature enacted HRS Chapter 802E through Act 382 on June 15, 1988, over two and a half years after Nguyen had already entered his "no contest" plea. 1988 Haw.Sess.L.Act 382, §§ 1-3 at 749-50. To apply HRS Chapter 802E to Nguyen's "no contest" plea on November 14, 1985, would require retrospective operation. In similar situations, other jurisdictions have not allowed retrospective operation of statutes that required courts to advise alien defendants about the collateral consequence of possible deportation, primarily because of three reasons: (1) before the enactment of such statutes, it was the general rule that courts have had no duty to warn alien defendants about possible deportation; (2) some legislatures have intended such statutes to apply only prospectively; and (3) because courts have been under no duty to warn defendants about deportation prior to the enactment of such statutes, retrospective operation of these statutes would suddenly expose large numbers of past convictions to collateral attack. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to retrospectively apply District of Columbia (D.C.) Code § 16-713, a law that required courts to admonish defendants about possible deportation whenever defendants pled guilty, even though the Council of the District of Columbia (Council) had enacted D.C.Code § 16-713 one day before an appellant received his sentence. Alpizar v. United States, 595 A.2d 991 (D.C. 1991). When the appellant had pled guilty to armed robbery on January 25, 1983, the court had not warned him that his guilty plea might result in deportation, but a little more than one month later, on March 10, 1983, the Council enacted D.C.Code § 16-713, which "require[d] the trial court to vacate any guilty plea upon request and without regard to any other circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea, if it was entered by a defendant who risked deportation but was not so informed by the court as required by the statute." Id. at 993. The following day, on March 11, 1983, the appellant received his sentence without any admonishment about possible deportation. Two years later, the appellant received notice from the Department of Justice that he was subject to deportation as a result of his convictions. In response, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-713. Reviewing a lower court's denial of the motion, the Alpizar court noted that "[c]onstruing the statute as applying to guilty pleas entered before the statute was enacted would have far reaching consequences for the criminal justice system and possibly for immigration proceedings based upon those convictions that would then be vacated." Id. at 993. Furthermore, the Alpizar court's "review of the text of the statute as well as the legislative history reveal[ed] no ... legislative intent" to apply the statute retrospectively. Id. at 994. Id. at 994. Although an Ohio appellate court vacated and remanded part of an appellant's sentence on other grounds in State v. Odubanjo, 80 Ohio App.3d 329, 609 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jenkins, 1995 WL 248526 (Ohio Ct.App.1995), the Odubanjo court specifically rejected the "appellant's contention that he was prejudiced in his guilty pleas because he was not advised of the possibility of his deportation pursuant to R.C. 2943.031," a statute providing "that the court must ask a defendant if he is a citizen of the United States, and if he is not, then the court is required to" advise the defendant that pleading guilty or "no contest" might subsequently result in, among other things, deportation. The date of the appellant's indictment for various offenses was June 5, 1989, and the date of the appellant's guilty pleas was July 21, 1989. Odubanjo, 609 N.E.2d at 208. Although the appellant did not receive his sentence until one year later on July 28, 1990, id., the effective date for R.C. 2943.031 "was October 2, 1989, subsequent to the date of appellant's arrest and indictment and, therefore, [R.C. 2943.031] was not controlling." Id. at 209. The Odubanjo court concluded that "we cannot hold the court accountable for the advisement required in R.C. 2943.031 because of the date of its effectiveness[.]" Id. at 210. Thus, "[t]he court was not responsible under the dictates of R.C. 2943.031 for informing appellant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea[.]" Id. When an appellant in Texas applied for a writ of habeas corpus and writ of audita querela on the ground that a court had not warned him that his guilty plea might subsequently result in deportation, a Texas appellate court reversed a lower court's decision to grant both writs, even though article 26.13(a)(4) of "the Code of Criminal Procedure [currently] requires that before accepting a guilty plea, the court must admonish the defendant that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may result in deportation or the denial of naturalization." State v. Vasquez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex.Ct.App.1994). The appellant had pled guilty to a felony in 1981, but the statutory admonishment pursuant to article 26.13(a)(4) "was not required until 1985, four years after [the appellant] entered his guilty plea." Id. Unwilling to apply the article 26.13(a)(4) retrospectively, the Vasquez court held that the appellant had "received all that was statutorily required" at the time of his guilty plea, id., and thus, the trial court had committed reversible error by granting both writs. Id. at 590-92. In Hawai`i, "[n]o law has any retrospective operation unless otherwise expressed or obviously intended." HRS § 1-3 (1993). On the other hand, "HRS § 1-3 is only a rule of statutory construction and where the legislative intent may be ascertained, it is no longer determinative." State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 213, 638 P.2d 319, 322 (1981). "Our task then is to ascertain whether there is an expression or obvious intendment that the amendment was to have `any retrospective operation.'" Graham Const. Supply, Inc. v. Schrader Const., 63 Haw. 540, 546, 632 P.2d 649, 653 (1981). When enacting HRS Chapter 802E through Act 382, the Hawai`i legislature specifically stated that Act 382 would not operate retrospectively: 1988 Haw.Sess.L.Act 382, § 2 at 750. Thus, the circuit court's refusal to apply HRS Chapter 802E retrospectively to Nguyen's 1986 conviction was clearly consistent with the legislative intent of HRS Chapter 802E. Nguyen contends that, although the Hawai`i legislature intended that HRS Chapter 802E was not to operate retrospectively, it *701 was still manifestly unjust for the circuit court to accept Nguyen's "no contest" plea in 1985 without warning him about the possible consequence of deportation. However, as already stated, without a court rule or a statute, the circuit court had no duty to warn Nguyen that his "no contest" plea might have the collateral consequence of deportation. Cf. Reponte, 57 Haw. at 364 n. 10, 556 P.2d at 584 n. 10 (citing Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945, 93 S. Ct. 1389, 35 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1973)).[8] Because the Hawai`i legislature specifically intended that HRS Chapter 802E shall apply only to pleas accepted after June 15, 1988, we are not persuaded to give retrospective operation to HRS Chapter 802E. Only defendants who had the statutorily created right to receive a deportation advisement at the time of their pleas can invoke, as a matter of absolute entitlement, the remedy for the deprivation of that right pursuant to HRS Chapter 802E. Under the circumstances of this case, however, the circuit court did not deprive Nguyen of any right when it accepted Nguyen's "no contest" plea in 1985 without advising him about the collateral consequence of possible deportation, and, thus, the subsequent enactment of HRS Chapter 802E more than two years later in 1988 provided no basis for requiring the circuit court to subsequently permit Nguyen to withdraw his "no contest" plea. Nguyen further asserts that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to exercise its "statutory discretion" when it denied his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea. In support of his contention, Nguyen notes that, although the Hawai`i legislature stated that HRS Chapter 802E would not apply retrospectively, the Hawai`i legislature also stated that "[n]othing in this Act, however, shall be deemed to inhibit a court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, from vacating a judgment and permitting a defendant to withdraw a plea." 1988 Haw. Sess.L.Act 382, § 2 at 750. While Nguyen is correct in his assertion that the circuit court had discretion to grant his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea, Nguyen is not correct in his assertion that the circuit court failed to exercise its "statutory discretion" by denying Nguyen's motion. The record shows that, on September 15, 1993, after reviewing the exhibits and arguments from both sides, the circuit court denied Nguyen's motion not only because HRS Chapter 802E does not have retrospective operation, but also because the circuit court specifically found that Nguyen had failed to make a sufficient showing of manifest injustice. See supra at 285-286, 916 P.2d at 695-696. Indeed, in the circuit court's subsequent written order, issued on October 15, 1993, the circuit court reiterated that Nguyen failed to demonstrate "manifest injustice" sufficient to otherwise convince the circuit court to grant Nguyen's motion in the exercise of the circuit court's discretion. See supra at 286, 916 P.2d at 696. Contrary to what Nguyen suggests, the record shows that the circuit court did in fact exercise its "statutory discretion"; the circuit court simply exercised its discretion and reached a conclusion that Nguyen did not like. Nguyen also asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea because, Nguyen claims, the circuit court allegedly did not take into consideration that the United States government was in the process of deporting Nguyen. However, a review of the record shows that Nguyen's assertion is without merit, because, at the hearing for his motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea, Nguyen introduced into evidence a copy of the "Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing" showing that the United States Department of Justice was *702 considering the possibility of deporting Nguyen. Additionally, during oral arguments for the motion, counsel for Nguyen specifically informed the circuit court about Nguyen's pending deportation proceeding. The circuit court was clearly aware that Nguyen was in danger of being deported as a result of his "no contest" plea, and thus, the circuit court was able to take this fact into consideration when the circuit court came out with its finding and final disposition. While Nguyen's predicament might justifiably evoke sympathy, under Hawai`i law Nguyen was entitled to withdraw his plea of "no contest" after imposition of sentence only upon a showing of manifest injustice. State v. Cornelio, 68 Haw. 644, 646, 727 P.2d 1125, 1126-27 (1986). Manifest injustice occurs when a defendant makes a plea involuntarily or without knowledge of the direct consequences of the plea. Cf. Reponte, 57 Haw. at 362, 556 P.2d at 583 (a plea of guilty is not constitutionally acceptable unless made voluntarily and with a full understanding of the consequences); State v. James, 176 Wis.2d 230, 500 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Wis.Ct.App.1993) (a "manifest injustice" occurs when a defendant makes a plea involuntarily, or without knowledge of the charge, the consequences of the plea or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed), review denied, 505 N.W.2d 138 (Wis.1993); Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 427 Pa.Super. 387, 629 A.2d 154, 158 (1993) ("To establish manifest injustice, [the defendant] must show that his plea was involuntary or was given without knowledge of the charge."), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 620, 637 A.2d 280 (1993). There is no manifest injustice when a trial court has made an affirmative showing through an on-the-record colloquy between the court and the defendant which shows that the defendant had a full understanding of what his or her plea connoted and its direct consequences. Cornelio, 68 Haw. at 646-47, 727 P.2d at 1127. The on-the-record colloquy on November 14, 1985, between the circuit court and Nguyen shows that the circuit court determined that Nguyen made his plea voluntarily, and that Nguyen had a full understanding of what his "no contest" plea connoted and its direct consequences. See supra at 282-286, 916 P.2d at 692-695. Thus, the on-the-record colloquy supports the circuit court's finding that Nguyen failed to demonstrate manifest injustice that would warrant granting the withdrawal of his "no contest" plea. Moreover, regardless of whether we completely agree with the circuit court's finding, we would not disturb the circuit court's denial of Nguyen's motion to withdraw his plea unless the record showed that the circuit court had abused its discretion by clearly exceeding the bounds of reason or disregarding rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of Nguyen. Merino, 81 Hawai`i at 201, 915 P.2d at 685; Gomes, 79 Hawai`i at 36, 897 P.2d at 963; Adams, 76 Hawai`i at 411, 879 P.2d at 516; Faulkner, 1 Haw.App. at 654, 624 P.2d at 943. In denying Nguyen's motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea, the circuit court acted within the bounds of reason and followed the relevant law. Considering the record and the relevant law, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nguyen's motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea. Finally, Nguyen contends that the circuit court committed plain error by accepting his initial "no contest" plea in 1985 without warning him about the collateral consequence of possible deportation.[9] Pursuant to HRPP Rule 52(b), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." This court's power to deal with plain error is one to be exercised with caution because the plain error rule is a departure from the position usually presupposed by the adversary system that parties must look to counsel for protection and must bear the cost of counsel's mistakes. Raines v. State, 79 Hawai`i 219, 226, 900 P.2d 1286, 1293 (1995). Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delineated the primary components of the plain error rule: United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392, 80 L. Ed. 555 (1936) (citations omitted); accord, State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 56, 760 P.2d 670, 675-76 (1988). Thus, the decision to take notice of plain error must turn on the facts of the particular case to correct errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Fox, 70 Haw. at 56, 760 P.2d at 676. It is too late for Nguyen to raise the issue of plain error with respect to his "no contest" plea in 1985, the final judgment from which was entered on January 20, 1986. Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b) requires that "[i]n a criminal case, ... the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the circuit court or district court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from." (Emphasis added). Nguyen's deadline for appealing his 1986 conviction has long since passed. "[W]e have permitted belated appeals under two sets of circumstances, namely, when (1) defense counsel has inexcusably or ineffectively failed to pursue a defendant's appeal, or (2) the lower court's decision was unannounced and no notice of the entry of judgment was ever provided." Grattafiori v. State, 79 Hawai`i 10, 13-14, 897 P.2d 937, 940-41 (1995). Nguyen has not asserted either that his counsel ineffectively failed to pursue an appeal within thirty days of his 1986 conviction or that the circuit court failed to announce and give notice of its judgment convicting Nguyen on January 20, 1986. Therefore, neither of the two exceptions for belated appeals applies to the instant case. Nevertheless, even if Nguyen's 1986 conviction were presently on appeal before us, we would detect no error that rises to a level sufficient to invoke the plain error rule. Our power to deal with plain error is a power to be exercised sparingly and with caution. Fox, 70 Haw. at 57, 760 P.2d at 676. As stated, when Nguyen entered his "no contest" plea on November 14, 1985, Hawai`i courts were under no duty to advise defendants that pleading "no contest" might have the collateral consequence of possible deportation. Cf. Reponte, 57 Haw. at 364 n. 10, 556 P.2d at 584 n. 10. In accepting Nguyen's "no contest" plea in 1985 without warning Nguyen about the collateral consequence of possible deportation, the circuit court's errors, if any, were not obvious, nor did they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings under the law at that time. Therefore, in addition to being untimely, Nguyen's assertion of plain error with respect to his 1986 conviction lacks merit. The circuit court found that Nguyen failed to demonstrate manifest injustice that would warrant the withdrawal of Nguyen's "no contest" plea. After reviewing the record and relevant law, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly exceed the bounds of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of Nguyen, and, thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nguyen's motion to withdraw his "no contest" plea. Accordingly, we affirm. [1] Nolo contendere, or "no contest," is defined as a "[t]ype of plea which may be entered with leave of court to a criminal complaint or indictment by which the defendant does not admit or deny the charges, though a fine or sentence may be imposed pursuant to it. The principle difference between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere is that the latter may not be used against the defendant in a civil action based upon the same acts. .... Such a plea shall be accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice." Black's Law Dictionary 1048 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). [2] The INS's Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing alleged in pertinent part as follows: You were, on January 17, 1986, convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of Hawaii, for the offense of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, in violation of Section 712-1243 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, to wit, cocaine. . . . . AND on the basis of the foregoing allegations, it is charged that you are subject to deportation pursuant to the following provision(s) of law: . . . . Section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), as amended, in that, at any time after entry, you have been convicted of a violation of (or conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana. . . . . WHEREFORE, YOU ARE ORDERED to appear for a hearing before an immigration Judge of the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the United States Department of Justice ... and show cause why you should not be deported from the United States on the charge(s) set forth above..... [3] See also People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273-74, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (1995); State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994); Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 47 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); State v. Vasquez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Tex.Ct.App.1994); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 863 (N.D.1994); State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct.App. 1994), cert. denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995); State v. Christie, 655 A.2d 836, 838, (Del.Super.Ct.1994), affirmed, 655 A.2d 306 (Del.1994); State v. Baeza, 174 Wis.2d 118, 496 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1993); State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 861 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 936, 127 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1994); State v. Odubanjo, 80 Ohio App.3d 329, 609 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jenkins, ___ N.E.2d ___, 1995 WL 248526 (Ohio Ct.App.1995); State v. Hasnan, 806 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), disagreed with on other grounds by State v. Reynolds, 819 S.W.2d 322 (Mo.1991); Alpizar v. United States, 595 A.2d 991, 994 (D.C.1991); State v. Vera, 159 Ariz. 237, 766 P.2d 110, 112 (1989); Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo.1988); Matter of Peters, 50 Wash. App. 702, 750 P.2d 643, 645 (1988); State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960, 960-61 (Fla.1987), superseded by rule, In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 536 So. 2d 992 (Fla.1988); State v. Chung, 210 N.J.Super. 427, 510 A.2d 72, 75 (1986); Daley v. State, 61 Md.App. 486, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (1985). [4] Cf. United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942, 111 S. Ct. 352, 112 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1990); United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1293 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir.1985); Downs-Morgan, v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir.1975). [5] HRS § 802E-2 (1993) states as follows: 802E-2 Court advisement concerning alien status required. Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any offense punishable as a crime under state law, except offenses designated as infractions under state law, the court shall administer the following advisement on the record to the defendant: If you are not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the consequence of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of the advisement as described in this section. [6] HRPP Rule 11(c)(5), as amended on September 2, 1988, currently requires the following: Rule 11. PLEAS. .... (c) Advice to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and determining that he understands the following: .... (5) that if he is not a citizen of the United States, a conviction of the offense for which he has been charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. [7] HRS § 802E-3 (1993) states as follows: § 802E-3 Failure to advise; vacation of judgment. If the court fails to advise the defendant as required by section 802E-2 and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States, on defendant's motion, the court shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of guilty. Absent a record that the court provided the advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be presumed not to have received the required advisement. [8] In fact, at the time of the 1988 enactment of Act 382, the Hawai`i legislature was acutely aware that Hawai`i law did not require courts to inform alien defendants that their pleas of guilty or "no contest" might result in deportation. See Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 533-88, in 1988 House Journal, at 1040 ("At present, Hawaii's laws do not require that aliens be informed that entering a plea of guilty or no contest may result in deportation or denial of naturalization."); see also Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 2546, in 1988 Senate Journal, at 1078 ("Currently, the courts are not required to inform or warn aliens that entry of an acceptance of guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere may result in deportation, exclusion from the United States or denial of naturalization."). [9] Nguyen does not assert "plain error" with respect to the circuit court's order denying Nguyen's motion to withdraw his plea of "no contest," issued October 15, 1993.