Title: Wis. Indus. Energy Group v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 89 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2762   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group, Inc. and 
Citizens Utility Board, 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
     v. 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin 
Power and Light Company, 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, 
          Intervenor.   
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John C. Albert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed).  
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners-appellants there were briefs by Kira E. 
Loehr and Citizens Utility Board, Steven A. Heinzen, P. Duncan 
Moss and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Kira E. Loehr. 
For the respondent-respondent there were briefs by Cynthia 
Smith, Justin W. Chasco, Steven Levine and Public Service 
Commission of Wisconsin and oral argument by Justin W. Chasco. 
For the intervenors-respondents there were briefs by Brian 
D. Winters, Joseph Orion Wilson and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee, 
Michael 
Greiveldinger, 
Arshia 
Javaherian, 
and 
 
 
2
Wisconsin Power and Light Company, and oral argument by Michael 
S. 
Greiveldinger 
and 
Joseph 
Orion 
Wilson.
 
 
2012 WI 89
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2762 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV4313) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group, Inc. and 
Citizens Utility Board, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin 
Power and Light Company, 
 
          Intervenors-Respondents, 
 
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, 
 
          Intervenor. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court of Dane County.  
Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes before 
us by certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2009–10).1  We are asked to decide whether the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009–10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
2 
 
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSC) correctly concluded 
that Wisconsin Power and Light's (WPL) application to construct 
a large, out-of-state, electric generating facility was properly 
reviewed under Wis. Stat. § 196.49(3), the "Certificate of 
Authority" (CA) statute,2 or whether Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3), the 
"Certificate 
of 
Public 
Convenience 
and 
Necessity" 
(CPCN) 
statute, should have been applied. 
¶2 
Applying due weight deference, we conclude that the 
PSC's interpretation of the CPCN law as applying exclusively to 
in-state 
facilities 
and 
its 
decision 
to 
analyze 
WPL's 
application under the CA law were reasonable, and that there is 
not a more reasonable interpretation of the laws.  The PSC 
examined the language, purpose, and context of both the CA and 
the CPCN laws and concluded that the CA law governed WPL's 
application 
to 
construct 
an 
out-of-state 
facility.  
Additionally, the PSC concluded that applying the CPCN law to an 
out-of-state facility would exceed the jurisdiction of Wisconsin 
laws and lead to unreasonable results.  Based on our review of 
these statutes and the corresponding administrative rules, we 
conclude that there is not a more reasonable interpretation of 
the CA and the CPCN laws.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
                                                 
2 The titles "Certificate of Authority," as referring to 
Wis. Stat. § 196.49, and "Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity," as referring to Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3), are 
somewhat misleading, in that both laws refer to the PSC's 
consideration 
of 
"public 
convenience 
and 
necessity."  
Nonetheless, the parties have used these titles, and we adopt 
their terminology in this case.  
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
3 
 
court's order,3 which affirmed the PSC's November 6, 2008, 
Interim Order in PSC Docket No. 6680–CE–173. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On June 6, 2008, WPL filed an application with the PSC 
for the construction of a 200-megawatt wind-powered electric 
generating facility in Freeborn County, Minnesota, to be known 
as the Bent Tree Wind Project.  The application was entitled 
"Application 
for 
Certificate 
of 
Public 
Convenience 
and 
Necessity" and was filed "pursuant to the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 196.49, 196.491 . . . and any other rule or law deemed 
applicable by the [PSC]." 
¶4 
In response to WPL's application, the PSC issued a 
Notice of Proceeding and Request for Comments, seeking public 
comment on whether WPL's application should be reviewed under 
the CPCN or the CA law.  Petitioners here, Wisconsin Industrial 
Energy Group, Inc. and Citizens Utility Board (collectively, 
WIEG), filed comments in response to the PSC's Notice, arguing 
that the PSC was statutorily required to apply the CPCN law 
because 
Bent 
Tree 
exceeded 
the 
CPCN 
law's 
100-megawatt 
threshold, thereby triggering that law's more demanding review 
procedures.  The PSC held an open meeting at which it 
deliberated on the issue. 
¶5 
On November 6, 2008, the PSC issued an Interim Order 
wherein it concluded that the CA law was the appropriate statute 
                                                 
3 The Honorable John C. Albert of Dane County presided in 
the circuit court. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
4 
 
under which to review WPL's Bent Tree application.  In its 
Interim Order, the PSC acknowledged that neither the CA nor the 
CPCN law explicitly addressed whether either law applied to out-
of-state facilities.  However, the PSC ultimately concluded that 
the CA law could validly be applied to such facilities, based on 
the language, context, and historical application of that law. 
¶6 
Additionally, the PSC noted that the procedures for 
reviewing applications under the CA law afforded ample ratepayer 
protections, such that the CPCN did not need to be stretched to 
apply to out-of-state facilities in an attempt to better protect 
ratepayers.  Rather, the PSC concluded that applying the CPCN 
law to an out-of-state facility would present problems because 
multiple provisions in the CPCN law would be unreasonable or 
absurd if applied to applications for out-of-state facilities. 
¶7 
The PSC noted the "'elementary principle[] that the 
laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, 
except so far as is allowed by comity,'" quoting Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).  Additionally, the PSC recognized 
that Wisconsin law specifically contemplates a limitation based 
on the state's physical boundaries, citing Wis. Stat. § 1.01 
("[t]he sovereignty and jurisdiction of this state extend to all 
places within the boundaries declared in article II of the 
constitution."). 
¶8 
The PSC discussed multiple provisions of the CPCN law 
that, if applied to an out-of-state facility, could require the 
PSC to assert regulatory authority beyond the state's borders.  
Such effect, the PSC concluded, could interfere with the host 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
5 
 
state, while affording no benefit to Wisconsin residents.  The 
PSC rejected the possibility of narrowly construing certain 
provisions of the CPCN law to make that law more reasonable as 
applied to out-of-state facilities; instead, the PSC decided 
that the most reasonable approach was to interpret the CPCN law 
as applying exclusively to facilities within the state. 
¶9 
The PSC noted that its conclusion was supported by the 
legislative history of the CPCN law, which included a statement 
from the Legislative Reference Bureau's (LRB) analysis of the 
bill.  The LRB analysis stated that the CPCN law "establishes a 
method whereby the development of major electric generating and 
transmission facilities in this state is subject to scrutiny by 
the public . . . and to approval by [the PSC and the DNR]."  
(Emphasis in Interim Order.)  The PSC found this helpful because 
the LRB's analysis was "'printed with and displayed on the bill 
when it [was] introduced in the legislature,'" quoting Dairyland 
Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶32, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 
719 N.W.2d 408. 
¶10 Finally, the PSC concluded that it could reasonably 
apply the CA law to review out-of-state construction projects, 
with no need to sever or modify any of that law's provisions.  
The PSC noted that it had previously applied the CA law to 
review public utilities' applications for out-of-state projects, 
and that the relevant rules, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § PSC 
112.05(2) (May 2008),4 expressly contemplated such applications.  
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the May 2008 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
6 
 
Accordingly, the PSC concluded the most reasonable course was to 
evaluate WPL's Bent Tree application under the CA law. 
¶11 Commissioner Lauren Azar dissented from the Interim 
Order. She agreed with WIEG's primary argument that the more 
demanding application and hearing procedures under the CPCN law 
were mandatory whenever a construction project was proposed that 
exceeded the 100-megawatt threshold under the CPCN, regardless 
of location.  She relied on the notion that the CPCN law was 
intended to afford greater ratepayer protections, and therefore 
allowing applications for large facilities to be processed under 
the CA law could erode such protections. 
¶12 After entry of the PSC's Interim Order, the PSC held a 
hearing and open meetings on WPL's Bent Tree application, and 
considered both in-person and pre-filed testimony.  On July 30, 
2009, the PSC granted WPL a Certificate of Authority for the 
Bent Tree project. 
¶13 On August 27, 2009, WIEG petitioned for judicial 
review of the PSC's decision in the Dane County Circuit Court, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 196.41 and Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  The 
circuit court concluded that, although de novo review applied to 
the PSC's decision to apply the CA rather than the CPCN law, the 
PSC's decision was correct.  WIEG appealed, and the court of 
appeals then certified the question to this court.  We accepted 
the certification. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
7 
 
¶14 This is a review of an administrative agency's 
decision under Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  When an administrative 
agency's decision is challenged in the circuit court under 
§ 227.52, an appellate court reviews the decision of the agency, 
not that of the circuit court.  Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 
9, ¶14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.  We are asked to review 
whether the PSC properly concluded that the CA law was the 
correct 
standard 
under 
which 
to 
review 
WPL's 
Bent 
Tree 
application, or whether the CPCN law should have been applied.  
The 
interpretation 
of 
statutes 
and 
their 
application 
to 
undisputed 
facts 
are 
questions 
of 
law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently.  Id. 
¶15 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute at issue.  Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶14, 311 
Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369.  "If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id. (quoting State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  The plain meaning of a statute 
can be discerned from the words used, as well as the context in 
which those words are used.  Id.  Additionally, statutory 
purpose is helpful in a plain meaning analysis; courts will 
favor an interpretation of statutory language that fulfills the 
statute's purpose.  See State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶17, 338 
Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390.  Statutory purpose can be stated 
expressly or it may be discerned from context and structure.  
Id.  Moreover, statutory language is not interpreted in 
isolation "but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
8 
 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Watton, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 
¶14 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
¶16 If the meaning of the statutory language is plain, the 
statute is applied according to the plain meaning of the terms 
used.  Id., ¶15.  However, if a statute is "capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses, then the statute is ambiguous."  Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶47) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  "When a statute is ambiguous, we may consult 
extrinsic sources to discern its meaning.  While extrinsic 
sources are usually not consulted if the statutory language 
bears a plain meaning, we nevertheless may consult extrinsic 
sources to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶48, 50-51) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
¶17 When we review an agency's interpretation of statutes, 
our process of statutory interpretation is modified slightly.  
We have historically afforded varying levels of deference to 
agencies' interpretations of statutes, depending on an agency's 
relative expertise in the area of law and the reasonableness of 
its interpretation.  See Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶¶14–
15.  To determine whether the agency's interpretation of a 
statute is reasonable, we review the statute independently from 
the 
agency's 
interpretation, thereby "embrac[ing] a major 
responsibility of the judicial branch of government, deciding 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
9 
 
what statutes mean."  Id., ¶19 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
¶18 Deference to agency decisions is based in part on the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 227.57, governing judicial review of 
agency decisions.  Under § 227.57(2), a court "shall affirm the 
agency's action" "[u]nless the court finds a ground for setting 
aside, 
modifying, 
remanding 
or 
ordering 
agency 
action."  
Specifically, courts are directed to accord due weight to "the 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of 
the agency involved."  § 227.57(10).   
¶19 Courts reviewing agency interpretations of statutes 
typically afford such interpretations one of three levels of 
deference:  great weight, due weight, or no deference, also 
referred to as de novo review.  Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 
¶15.  The level of deference accorded an agency's interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
is 
influenced 
by 
multiple 
considerations, 
"including the extent to which the administrative agency's 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge aid 
the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute 
and 
the 
comparative 
institutional 
capabilities 
and 
qualifications of the court and the administrative agency."  
Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, ¶38, 
282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (quoting Hutson v. Wis. Pers. 
Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212) 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
¶20 The highest level of deference, great weight, is 
reserved for an agency's interpretation of a statute in which 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
10 
 
four criteria are met.  See id., ¶39.  Great weight deference is 
appropriate where: 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2) 
the 
interpretation of the statute is one of long-standing; 
(3) the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) the 
agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and 
consistency in the application of the statute. 
Id., ¶39 (quoting Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶32) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
¶21 For a court to accord great weight deference, the 
agency need not have examined the statute under the precise 
facts at issue; instead, where the agency has substantial 
experience interpreting the statutory scheme at issue, great 
weight deference may be appropriate when the other criteria 
listed above are met.  Id., ¶40.  Where a reviewing court 
determines that great weight deference is proper, the court will 
uphold the agency's interpretation if the interpretation is 
reasonable, even if a more reasonable interpretation exists.  
See id., ¶41. 
¶22 The next level of deference, due weight, is warranted 
where an agency has some experience interpreting the statutory 
scheme at issue, but the agency has not developed any particular 
expertise interpreting and applying the statutes to place the 
agency in a better position than a reviewing court.  Responsible 
Use of Rural & Agric. Land (RURAL) v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 
2000 WI 129, ¶24, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888.  Accordingly, 
due weight deference is not based as much on the agency's 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
11 
 
experience interpreting a particular statutory scheme as it is 
on the legislature having granted the agency the authority to 
interpret the statutory scheme at issue.  Id. (concluding that 
due weight deference was appropriate for PSC and DNR's decisions 
under CPCN law).  A court affording due weight deference will 
uphold an agency's interpretation where such interpretation is 
reasonable, 
and 
where 
there 
is 
not 
a 
more 
reasonable 
interpretation.  Id., ¶¶24–25. 
¶23 Under the lowest level of deference, no deference or 
de novo review, an agency's interpretation of a statute "is 
given no weight at all."  Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶43 
(quoting Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶34) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  De novo review is appropriate where an interpretation 
of the statute is a first for the agency, or where the agency's 
interpretation of the statute has been so inconsistent that it 
provides a court no real guidance.  Id. 
¶24 In the present case, we conclude that the PSC's 
decision to apply the CA law to WPL's Bent Tree application, as 
well as the PSC's interpretation of the CPCN as applying 
exclusively to in-state facilities, are entitled to due weight 
deference.  The PSC is charged with interpreting both the CA and 
the CPCN statutes, and its interpretations of both statutes 
under differing factual scenarios are of long standing.  See 
id., ¶253.  In determining which statutory scheme to apply to 
Bent Tree, the PSC received comments from interested parties and 
weighed these comments against its own extensive experience in 
reviewing 
applications 
for 
construction 
of 
new 
electric 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
12 
 
generating facilities.  In its Interim Order, the PSC examined 
the two statutes, as well as its own rules, Wis. Admin. Code ch. 
PSC 112, and noted that it had applied the CA law to out-of-
state projects in the past.   
¶25 The novelty of the question presented counsels in 
favor of applying due weight deference, rather than great 
weight.  See RURAL, 239 Wis. 2d 660, ¶23.  The question here 
cannot 
be 
decided 
based 
exclusively 
on 
the 
PSC's 
prior 
experience applying either the CA or the CPCN law; although the 
PSC has applied the CA law to applications for out-of-state 
facilities 
in 
the 
past, the PSC has never reviewed an 
application for an out-of-state facility that generates 100 
megawatts or more, which is the trigger for the CPCN law.  
Nonetheless, based on the PSC's general expertise in reviewing 
applications for electric generating facilities under both CA 
and CPCN laws and its legislatively granted authority in this 
area of law, we conclude that the PSC's decision to apply the CA 
rather than the CPCN law to WPL's Bent Tree application is 
entitled to due weight deference.  Accordingly, we will uphold 
the PSC's interpretation if it is reasonable, unless we conclude 
that another more reasonable interpretation exists. 
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 196.49 and Wis. Stat. § 196.491 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 196 is entitled "Regulation of 
Public Utilities."  The prevailing purpose of regulation under 
ch. 196 is to ensure that public utilities' actions are in the 
public interest.  See, e.g., Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n (WPL I), 45 Wis. 2d 253, 259, 172 N.W.2d 639 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
13 
 
(1969); GTE N. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 176 Wis. 2d 
559, 568, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993); Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n of Wis. (WPL II), 148 Wis. 2d 881, 891–92, 437 
N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1989).  To facilitate this purpose, the 
legislature has provided that the PSC "has jurisdiction to 
supervise and regulate every public utility in this state and to 
do all things necessary and convenient to its jurisdiction."  
Wis. Stat. § 196.02(1).  The legislature has also authorized the 
PSC to "adopt reasonable rules to govern its proceedings and to 
regulate the mode and manner of all inspections, tests, audits, 
investigations and hearings."  § 196.02(3).  The PSC has 
exercised this authority, and enacted Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 
112, which sets forth procedures that electric public utilities 
must follow when undertaking certain construction projects. 
¶27 "Public utility" is a term of art for purposes of ch. 
196, and is defined in Wis. Stat. § 196.01(5)(a) to mean: 
every corporation, company, individual, association 
. . . and every sanitary district, town, village or 
city that may own, operate, manage or control any toll 
bridge or all or any part of a plant or equipment, 
within the state, for the production, transmission, 
delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power 
either directly or indirectly to or for the public. 
Although this definition establishes which entities qualify as 
public utilities, Wis. Stat. § 196.49(1)(am) shows that further 
certification may be necessary for such entities to actually 
transact business as a public utility.  Under that provision, 
any "public utility" that intends to provide heat, light, water, 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
14 
 
or power must "obtain[] a certificate from the [PSC] authorizing 
it to transact public utility business."  § 196.49(1)(am). 
¶28 In addition, under the CA law, a public utility may be 
required to obtain further certification from the PSC to begin 
any 
construction, 
installation, 
extension, 
improvement, 
or 
addition to any plant, equipment, property, apparatus, or 
facility.  See Wis. Stat. § 196.49(2).  Prior to the PSC 
certifying a utility's proposed project, the PSC may also demand 
that the utility demonstrate that public convenience and 
necessity require the project.  See § 196.49(3)(b). 
The commission may refuse to certify a project if it 
appears that the completion of the project will do any 
of the following: 
 
1. 
Substantially impair the efficiency of the 
service of the public utility.  
 
2. 
Provide facilities unreasonably in excess of 
the probable future requirements.  
 
3. 
When placed in operation, add to the cost of 
service without proportionately increasing the value 
or available quantity of service unless the public 
utility waives consideration by the commission, in the 
fixation of rates, of such consequent increase of cost 
of service. 
Id. 
¶29 In Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 112, the PSC has 
established a more particularized procedure for reviewing public 
utilities' 
applications 
to 
construct 
electric 
generating 
facilities.  For example, the PSC has specified in Wis. Admin. 
Code § PSC 112.05(1) that "[n]o electric utility may begin 
construction, install or place in operation" various types of 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
15 
 
facilities, listed thereunder, without PSC approval.  The PSC 
also established threshold amounts that trigger the mandatory 
application and certification requirements.  The threshold 
amount depends on the proposed project's expected cost in 
relation to the applicant's prior revenues, such that PSC review 
and approval is required if a project's cost exceeds a utility's 
specific threshold amount.  § PSC 112.05(1) & (3)(a). 
¶30 To 
secure 
PSC 
approval, 
a 
public 
utility 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
its 
proposed 
project 
complies 
with 
the 
requirements that the PSC has established under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ PSC 112.06(1m).  These requirements are extensive, and include 
demonstrating the overall purpose and necessity of the project, 
as well as providing specific descriptions of the project's 
design, construction schedule, environmental impact, effect on 
the quality and reliability of utility service, and compliance 
with energy efficiency standards.  § PSC 112.06(1m). 
¶31 Finally, 
the 
PSC 
has 
provided 
that 
if 
"upon 
consideration of the application, together with any supplemental 
information and objections, the commission finds that the public 
convenience and necessity require the project as proposed and 
the 
project 
complies 
with 
s. 
196.49(3)(b), 
Stats., 
the 
commission may authorize the project without public hearing but 
with modifications and conditions it considers necessary."  Wis. 
Admin. Code § PSC 112.07(1).  If the PSC is not able to 
determine, based solely on the application and supporting 
materials, that public convenience and necessity require the 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
16 
 
project, the agency "shall hold a public hearing on the 
application."  § PSC 112.07(2). 
¶32 Accordingly, although the CA statute simply affords 
the PSC discretion to consider certain factors in determining 
whether a project serves the public convenience and necessity, 
see Wis. Stat. § 196.49(3)(b), the PSC has crafted a thorough 
and mandatory procedure by which it evaluates applications to 
construct electric generating facilities under the CA law. 
¶33 The other relevant statutory scheme under which the 
PSC is authorized to review and approve applications for 
construction of electric generating facilities is the CPCN law, 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3).  Under the CPCN law, or "Plant Siting 
Law," as it has been called, see Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, 
¶16, the PSC is required to review applications for certain 
large-scale electric generating facilities to determine whether 
the facility serves public convenience and necessity, based on 
the PSC's consideration of numerous factors, many of which are 
site-specific to the proposed facility.  See § 196.491(3)(d)3., 
4., 6. 
¶34 As a threshold matter, the CPCN law's requirements are 
not implicated unless the proposed project meets the statutory 
definition of a "facility."  Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a)1.  As 
relevant here, "facility" is defined as "electric generating 
equipment 
and 
associated 
facilities 
designed 
for 
nominal 
operation 
at 
a 
capacity 
of 
100 
megawatts 
or 
more."  
§ 196.491(1)(e), (g).  Therefore, the trigger for the review 
procedures under the CPCN law is the generating capacity of a 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
17 
 
facility, not the facility's cost.  Additionally, whereas the CA 
law applies to "public utilities," the CPCN law applies to 
"persons," and provides that "no person may commence the 
construction of a facility unless the person has applied for and 
received a certificate of public convenience and necessity under 
[the CPCN procedures]."5  § 196.491(3)(a)1. 
¶35 Upon receiving an application for the construction of 
a "facility" under the CPCN law, the PSC "shall hold a public 
hearing . . . in the area affected," in accordance with the 
contested case procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 227.44.  
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(b).  After reviewing any contested case 
proceedings, as well as the application materials, the PSC is 
required to determine, prior to issuing a CPCN, that the 
proposed facility complies with numerous factors.  Some of the 
relevant factors that the PSC must consider include whether: 
 
2. 
The 
proposed 
facility 
satisfies 
the 
reasonable needs of the public for an adequate supply 
of electric energy. . . .  
 
3. 
The design and location or route is in the 
public interest considering alternative sources of 
supply, alternative locations or routes, individual 
hardships, engineering, economic, safety, reliability 
and environmental factors . . . . 
[Provisions 
relating 
exclusively 
to 
high-voltage 
transmission lines omitted] 
 
4. 
The proposed facility will not have undue 
adverse impact on other environmental values such as, 
but not limited to, ecological balance, public health 
                                                 
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26), "person" includes "all 
partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate." 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
18 
 
and welfare, historic sites, geological formations, 
the aesthetics of land and water and recreational 
use. . . .  
 
5. 
The proposed facility complies with the 
criteria under s. 196.49(3)(b) if the application is 
by a public utility as defined in s. 196.01. 
 
6. 
The proposed facility will not unreasonably 
interfere with the orderly land use and development 
plans for the area involved. 
[Provision governing wholesale providers omitted] 
 
8. 
For a large electric generating facility, 
brownfields, as defined in s. 560.13(1)(a),[6] are used 
to the extent practicable. 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d). 
¶36 In addition, the law also establishes time limits 
within which materials must be submitted by the applicant and 
decided upon by the PSC and the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR).  First, at least 60 days prior to the filing of 
an application for a CPCN, the applicant must provide the DNR 
with an engineering plan for the proposed facility, including 
the expected effects of the facility on air and water quality, 
wetlands, 
and 
other 
natural 
resources. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 196.491(3)(a)3.a.  Within 30 days, the DNR is required to 
inform the applicant of any permits that will be necessary for 
the facility, after which the applicant has 20 days to apply for 
such permits.7  Id. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 560.13(1)(a) was renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 238.13(1)(a) by 2011 Wis. Act 32, § 3341. 
7 The DNR application procedure continues parallel to the 
PSC application, with further timing requirements not relevant 
here.  See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a)3.b. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
19 
 
¶37 Within ten days after receipt of a CPCN application, 
the PSC must send copies of the application to the clerk of each 
municipality in which the proposed facility will be located, and 
to the main public library for the county where the facility 
will be located.  Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a)1.  Next, within 30 
days of receipt of an application, the PSC must determine 
whether the application is complete, or must notify the 
applicant 
of 
any 
additional 
filings 
that 
are 
required.  
§ 196.491(3)(a)2.  If the PSC fails to make a completeness 
determination within 30 days, the application will be deemed 
complete.  Id.  After the application is complete, the PSC must 
take final action on the application within 180 days,8 or the PSC 
will be considered as having issued a CPCN for the proposed 
facility.  § 196.491(3)(g). 
¶38 Finally, 
the 
CPCN 
law 
also 
includes 
provisions 
intended to preempt local ordinances that would prohibit 
applicants from engaging in activities that the PSC has allowed 
under the CPCN law.  In particular, Wis. Stat. § 196.491(2r) 
preempts any local ordinance that would prohibit or restrict 
testing activities intended to determine the suitability of a 
site for facility placement.  Moreover, when the PSC grants a 
CPCN for a facility, § 196.491(3)(i) provides that any local 
                                                 
8 Exception may be made if the PSC petitions the Dane County 
Circuit Court for an extension.  Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(g).  
Upon a showing of good cause, the court may grant an extension 
for a maximum of 180 days more.  Then, too, if the PSC fails to 
act on the application, the CPCN will be deemed to have been 
granted for the proposed facility.  Id. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
20 
 
ordinances 
precluding 
or 
inhibiting 
construction 
may 
be 
disregarded. 
C.  Application of CA and CPCN Laws to Out-of-State Projects 
¶39 In determining whether the PSC reasonably construed 
the CA and the CPCN laws as applied to out-of-state facilities, 
we begin with the language of those statutes.  Neither Wis. 
Stat. § 196.49 nor Wis. Stat. § 196.491 explicitly states 
whether 
the 
law 
applies 
to 
out-of-state 
facilities.  
Notwithstanding the omission of an explicit statement in this 
regard, the scope of each law is made plain by the language, 
purpose, and context of the laws.  Therefore, we conclude that 
neither statute is ambiguous as to out-of-state application.  
Reading these statutes in context, we hold that the PSC 
reasonably concluded:  (1) that the CA law controlled WPL's 
application to construct an out-of-state electric generating 
facility, and (2) that the CPCN law applies exclusively to in-
state facilities.  We examine each of these conclusions in turn. 
¶40 The PSC determined that the CA law could validly be 
applied to WPL's out-of-state project, based largely on the 
language 
of 
the 
CA 
law, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 196.49, 
and 
its 
corresponding administrative rules, Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 
112.  First, the language of the CA law plainly governs WPL's 
application to construct Bent Tree.  Under Wis. Stat. ch. 196, 
WPL is a statutory "public utility," and is subject to 
regulation under the CA law, based on WPL's intention to 
construct a new electric generating facility.  That is, as a 
public utility, WPL is subject to the CA law's mandate that any 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
21 
 
public utility seeking to construct a new facility must comply 
with any applicable rules or orders of the PSC.  See § 196.49(2) 
and (3).  As relevant here, the PSC's rules required that WPL 
submit an application to the PSC, including a comprehensive 
description of the project, as well as sufficient facts to 
demonstrate the purpose and necessity of such project.  Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.05–.06. 
¶41 WPL complied with the mandates of the CA law.  Prior 
to beginning construction of Bent Tree, WPL submitted an 
application to the PSC, notifying the agency of WPL's project 
and providing information relating to all of the categories of 
required materials under Wis. Admin. Code § PSC 112.06(1m).  
Accordingly, as an application by a public utility to commence 
construction of a new electric generating facility, WPL's Bent 
Tree application was subject to the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.49(2) and (3), as well as the mandatory review procedures 
set forth in Wis. Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.05–.07. 
¶42 Moreover, 
because 
the 
CA 
law 
governs 
"public 
utilities," nothing in the law precludes its application to 
public utilities seeking to construct out-of-state facilities.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 196.01(5)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 196.49(1)(am), 
every "public utility" has availed itself of Wisconsin's 
regulatory jurisdiction by obtaining authorization to engage in 
public utility business.  Therefore, when the PSC reviews an 
application under the CA law, it is a statutory entity that is 
being regulated, not a person's activity of constructing a 
facility, as is the case under the CPCN law.  In this sense, 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
22 
 
regulating a public utility is comparable to regulating other 
statutorily ordained entities whose licensure or accreditation 
may be affected by the entities' activities, even out of state.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(ag)5. and 5m. (license for 
distribution of alcohol subject to revocation upon showing that 
licensee was convicted of certain offenses in another state); 
Wis. Stat. § 343.03(5) (where automobile license applicant is 
licensed in another state, DOT "shall obtain information on the 
applicant's license status with the state of licensure before 
issuing a license").  Accordingly, the PSC reasonably concluded 
that WPL's Bent Tree application was subject to review under the 
CA law. 
¶43 Notwithstanding the applicability of the CA law, WIEG 
contends that because WPL's application was for a facility 
generating more than 100 megawatts, the plain language of the 
CPCN law required the PSC to review WPL's application under the 
CPCN law, exclusively.  However, based on the language and scope 
of the CPCN law, the PSC determined that the CPCN law could not 
reasonably be applied to Bent Tree.  We now turn to the 
application of the CPCN law to out-of-state facilities, and 
conclude that the PSC reasonably construed the CPCN law as 
inapplicable to WPL's Bent Tree facility. 
¶44 Our conclusion that the PSC reasonably interpreted the 
CPCN as applying exclusively to in-state facilities rests on 
three interrelated premises:  (1) the CPCN's regulation of 
"persons" demonstrates that that law does not contemplate 
regulation of out-of-state activities; (2) the purpose of the 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
23 
 
CPCN law, to require the PSC to engage in thorough review of 
site-specific factors, does not reasonably accord with out-of-
state activities; and (3) none of the options that could be 
followed to make the CPCN more reasonable as applied to out-of-
state facilities is as reasonable as construing the law to apply 
exclusively to in-state facilities. 
¶45 First, the CPCN law regulates "persons" by providing 
that "no person may commence the construction of a facility 
unless the person has applied for and received a [CPCN] under 
this subsection."  Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a)1.  If this 
provision were interpreted to apply to out-of-state activities, 
it could be read to prohibit a person in another state from 
constructing a 100-megawatt electric generating facility outside 
Wisconsin, unless the person complied with the CPCN law's 
application and review procedures.  For example, if read to 
apply to out-of-state persons and facilities, the CPCN law's 
plain 
language 
could 
prohibit 
a 
person 
in 
Texas 
from 
constructing a "facility" like Bent Tree in California, unless 
the 
person 
complied 
with 
all 
the 
factors 
listed 
in 
§ 196.491(3)(d), and obtained permits from the Wisconsin DNR, 
under § 196.491(3)(a)3.a. 
¶46 Given this result, we cannot ignore the State of 
Wisconsin's lack of authority to regulate a person's activities 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
24 
 
in another state.9  As applied to "persons," "[t]he general rule, 
unquestionably, is that laws of a state have no extraterritorial 
effect."  State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 391, 171 N.W.2d 414 
(1969); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 421–22 (2003) ("A State does not acquire power or 
supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely 
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be 
affected . . . .") (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
824 (1975)); see also K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., 
962 
F.2d 
728, 
730 
(7th 
Cir. 
1992) 
(discussing 
"presumption of exclusive domestic application" based on states' 
lack of "any . . . power to reach outside their borders").  
Although limited exceptions to this general rule might exist, 
explicitly prohibiting "persons" from engaging in activities 
outside the state does not fall within one of those exceptions.  
See Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d at 393.  Accordingly, the language and 
                                                 
9 Under the CPCN, "persons" might be construed as including 
only those persons who are located in Wisconsin during the 
construction of facilities outside the state, thereby making the 
CPCN applicable exclusively to in-state "persons" subject to the 
State's regulatory authority.  Even disregarding that such 
construction would still regulate out-of-state activity, such 
reading suggests a distinction between "types" of persons.  For 
example, a partnership, which is considered a "person" under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(26), 
and 
which 
could 
potentially 
be 
understood to "remain" in Wisconsin while its out-of-state 
facility was constructed, might be treated differently than a 
natural person who is a resident of Wisconsin, but who might 
physically leave the state entirely to construct a "facility" 
out of state, thereby removing him or her from Wisconsin's 
regulatory authority.  The statutory language does not support 
any such distinction between "types" of "persons," and we 
therefore decline to adopt such an interpretation. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
25 
 
context of the CPCN law strongly suggest that its regulatory 
scope——persons engaging in particular activities——is wholly 
intrastate.10 
¶47 Next, the purposes of the CA and the CPCN laws further 
suggest that the CA law may reasonably be applied to a public 
utility's application for an out-of-state facility, but that the 
PSC reasonably concluded that the CPCN law applied exclusively 
to in-state facilities.  We have noted that a prevailing purpose 
of Wisconsin public utility laws is to protect the consuming 
public, i.e., ratepayers.  See WPL I, 45 Wis. 2d at 259.  This 
purpose is manifest in the authority granted to the PSC to 
consider 
ratepayers' 
interests 
in 
reviewing 
any 
proposed 
projects under the CA statute, Wis. Stat. § 196.49(3)(b).  Under 
the CA statute, the PSC may refuse to authorize construction 
projects 
that 
would 
impair 
utility 
efficiency, 
provide 
unnecessary facilities, or increase cost without a corresponding 
increase in value.  § 196.49(3)(b).  When these considerations 
are construed in pari materia with the mandatory application and 
review provisions under Wis. Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.05–.07, it 
                                                 
10 The dissent misperceives the import of State v. Mueller, 
44 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N.W.2d 414 (1969), when it asserts that 
Mueller stands for the proposition that the State may "regulate 
the out–of-state actions of 'persons.'"  Dissent, ¶69.  Mueller, 
who was a Wisconsin resident, was not sanctioned for marrying 
out of state; rather, he was sanctioned because, as a Wisconsin 
resident required to comply with Wisconsin law, he had failed to 
obtain an in-state court order before marriage when child 
support was due in Wisconsin.  Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d at 395.  
Mueller provides no support for extraterritorial application of 
the laws of Wisconsin to persons beyond the state's physical 
boundaries.  
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
26 
 
is evident that the purpose of the CA law and its corresponding 
agency rules is to protect ratepayers by affording comprehensive 
review of proposed utility projects.  See WPL II, 148 Wis. 2d  
at 892–93. 
¶48 While the CPCN law also protects ratepayers, that is 
not the law's central focus.  Rather, as demonstrated by the 
CPCN law's provisions, its central focus is to require the PSC 
to thoroughly and efficiently review applications for large-
scale facilities to ensure that such facilities will comply with 
each of the factors listed under Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d), 
many of which involve site-specific considerations for the 
facility's proposed locale.11  See Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, 
¶87 (noting "streamlined certificate application process" under 
CPCN law).  For example, when evaluating an application for a 
                                                 
11 The PSC must also consider whether "brownfields . . . are 
used to the extent practicable."  Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)8.; 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 560.13(1)(a) 
(renumbered 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 238.13(1)(a) 
by 
2011 
Wis. 
Act 
32, 
§ 3341) 
(defining 
brownfields as "abandoned, idle or underused industrial or 
commercial facilities or sites, the expansion or redevelopment 
of 
which 
is 
adversely 
affected 
by 
actual 
or 
perceived 
environmental contamination"); see also Scott W. Brunner, Note, 
Sharing the Green:  Reformatting Wisconsin's Forgotten Green 
Space Grant with a Public-Private Partnership Design, 95 Marq. 
L. Rev. 305, 309–19 (2011) (discussing local benefits of 
brownfield 
reclamation). 
 
WIEG 
points 
to 
the 
identical 
requirement in the CA law in support of its argument that the CA 
law 
is 
no 
more 
reasonable 
when 
applied 
to 
out-of-state 
facilities than is the CPCN.  We conclude, however, that the 
qualification, "to the extent practicable," affords the PSC 
sufficient discretion to determine, in the context of an 
application for an out-of-state facility, whether the use of 
brownfields, 
either 
in 
Wisconsin 
or 
out 
of 
state, 
is 
"practicable." 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
27 
 
CPCN, the PSC must consider such site-specific factors as the 
"design and location" of the proposed facility, protection of 
"scenic 
beauty," 
minimization 
of 
"environmental 
impacts," 
protection of land use plans "for the area involved," and 
"environmental values such as, but not limited to, ecological 
balance, public health and welfare, historic sites, geological 
formations, the aesthetics of land and water and recreational 
use."  § 196.491(3)(d)3., 3m., 3r., 4., 6.  Indeed, soon after 
its passage, we referred to the CPCN law as the "plant siting 
bill," 
referring 
to 
the 
law's 
focus 
on 
the 
particular 
characteristics of the proposed facility's site.  Falkner v. N. 
States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 145, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977); 
see also Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶¶16–17. 
¶49 The CPCN law also affords ratepayer protections, but 
it does so by expressly incorporating the CA law wholesale.12  
See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)5.  Therefore, we are not 
persuaded by WIEG's argument that the CPCN must be applied here 
because that law's mandatory hearing procedure better protects 
                                                 
12 The dissent repeatedly asserts that the CPCN provides 
"greater ratepayer protections."  Dissent, ¶¶67, 79, 81, and 87.  
The dissent cites incomplete authority for its repetitive 
assertion.  It summarily concludes that because the CPCN 
requires a hearing and the CA does not, the CPCN must provide 
"greater ratepayer protections."  This contention ignores the 
facts of this case in which a public hearing was held.  It also 
ignores the expertise of the PSC members and their commitment to 
carefully consider the applications for electric generating 
facility construction, which careful consideration included 
holding a public hearing.   
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
28 
 
ratepayers.13 
 
First, 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§§ PSC 
112.05–.07 
establish mandatory procedures by which the PSC must review an 
application for a CA.  Accordingly, although the PSC might not 
require a contested case hearing in every instance, the PSC has 
imposed upon itself a duty to comprehensively review numerous 
factors relevant to the protection of ratepayers' interests.  
See Wis. Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.06(1m), .07.  Failure to act 
reasonably upon such information would be an erroneous exercise 
of the agency's discretion.  See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Wis. Sys. v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 2002 WI 79, ¶26, 254 Wis. 2d 
148, 646 N.W.2d 759.  Second, and more importantly, because the 
purpose of the CPCN law is to require more thorough review of 
local site-specific factors, and not primarily greater ratepayer 
                                                 
13 We note that neither the CA law nor the CPCN law directly 
governs ratemaking per se.  Instead, the PSC's determination of 
rates occurs under a separate provision, Wis. Stat. § 196.20(1), 
which states that "No change may be made by any public utility 
in its [rate] schedules except by filing the change as proposed 
with the commission."  Here, WPL moved to reopen the Bent Tree 
docket after the project had been certified and construction 
commenced.  It was in that separate proceeding, which included a 
contested case hearing, that the PSC allowed a rate increase for 
WPL's customers. 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
29 
 
protections, as WIEG contends,14 WIEG's focus on ratepayer 
protection under the CPCN law is misplaced.15 
¶50 The third premise supporting our conclusion that the 
PSC reasonably construed the CPCN law is that none of the 
options for modifying the CPCN law to make the law applicable to 
                                                 
14 Primarily, WIEG argues that the large, 100-megawatt 
facilities that trigger the CPCN law are more expensive and, 
therefore, demand greater scrutiny to protect ratepayers.  Cost, 
however, is not the criterion that the legislature adopted for 
the CPCN.  Indeed, the PSC has reviewed applications under the 
CA law for facilities almost double Bent Tree's estimated cost 
of $497 million.  See, e.g., PSC Docket No. 6630-CE-299, 
Certificate and Order, at 1, 15, Application of Wisconsin 
Electric Power Company for Authority to Construct Wet Flue Gas 
Desulfurization and Selective Catalytic Reduction Facilities and 
Associated Equipment for Control of Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen 
Oxide Emissions at its Oak Creek Power Plant Units 5, 6, 7, and 
8, 
http://psc.wi.gov/apps35/ERF_view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=97457 
(certifying $830 million construction project under CA law).  
15 Similarly, the dissent sets forth a chart listing 
purported contrasts in ratepayer protections between the CA and 
CPCN review processes.  The dissent's chart, however, proceeds 
from the incorrect premise that the central purpose of the CPCN 
law is to protect ratepayers.  As discussed above, the central 
purpose of the CPCN law is to ensure that the PSC gives due 
consideration 
to 
the 
environmental 
impact 
of 
large-scale 
facilities on the locales in which they will be sited.  
Moreover, while the dissent's chart lists mandatory findings 
that the PSC must make when approving large-scale facilities, 
the 
dissent 
does 
not 
provide 
statutory 
support 
for 
its 
conclusion that the legislature intended the CPCN law to be a 
"ratepayer protection" law, rather than, as this court recently 
recognized, a "plant siting law."  See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, ¶16, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 
N.W.2d 768.  Furthermore, and as discussed above, the review 
procedures that the PSC has mandated under the CA law require 
the agency to consider the same information under that law as 
the legislature has required the agency to consider under the 
CPCN law.  See generally Wis. Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.05–.07 
(setting forth information that CA applicants must submit and 
which the PSC must consider). 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
30 
 
out-of-state facilities is as reasonable as construing the law 
as applying exclusively to in-state facilities.  To validly 
apply out of state, certain statutory provisions that would 
preempt local laws would have to be severed from the CPCN law.  
Additionally, other provisions of the law directing the PSC and 
the DNR to review out-of-state factors might be validly applied, 
but doing so would not directly benefit the State of Wisconsin 
or its citizens.  Accordingly, applying those provisions would 
lead to unreasonable or absurd results, but disregarding them 
would undermine the CPCN law's purpose of requiring thorough 
review of those site-specific factors.   
¶51 In addition, the CPCN law includes numerous provisions 
that could involve the PSC and the DNR in out-of-state 
activities. For example, the PSC is required to send copies of a 
CPCN application to county clerks and local libraries in the 
area of the proposed facility, Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a)1., and 
the PSC must hold a contested case hearing "in the area 
affected" by a proposed facility, § 196.491(3)(b).  Also, 
applicants must inform the DNR of the facility's expected impact 
on local natural resources, and the DNR is then required to 
notify the applicant of those permits that will likely be 
required for the facility.  § 196.491(3)(a)3.a.  And, as 
discussed, the PSC must review a proposed facility's impact on 
multiple site-specific factors.  § 196.491(3)(d)3., 4., 6. 
¶52 It is possible that these particular provisions would 
not necessarily require the PSC or the DNR to exercise 
extraterritorial control, in that the agencies might be able to 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
31 
 
consider 
relevant 
factors 
or 
mail 
materials 
to 
foreign 
depositories without trenching upon the exclusive regulatory 
authority of another state.  However, requiring such actions by 
Wisconsin agencies "would burden local officials and sow 
confusion without serving any legitimate Wisconsin purpose."  
(PSC Interim Order at 6–7).  More importantly, if a Wisconsin 
agency 
did 
prohibit 
or 
attempt 
to 
condition 
a 
person's 
construction of a facility in another state based on any of 
these factors, the agency's action could be construed as an 
attempt at extraterritorial regulation.  Such interjection of 
authority 
into 
another 
state 
could 
undermine 
fundamental 
principles of federalism.  See State Farm Mut., 538 U.S. at 421–
22; Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d at 391. 
¶53 Additionally, under the CPCN law, the PSC is directed 
to consider "public convenience and necessity," but it is not 
clear from the language of the statute which "public" would 
properly be considered for an out-of-state facility:  residents 
of Wisconsin or residents of the facility's host state?  If "the 
public" is construed to mean Wisconsin residents, it seems that 
a foreign facility would have little to no bearing on those 
residents' convenience and necessity, especially if the facility 
was not providing power to Wisconsin.  Alternatively, construing 
"the public" to mean residents of a foreign state would impose 
an absurd requirement on the PSC:  determining what is 
convenient and necessary for another state's residents. 
¶54 Furthermore, two provisions of the CPCN law expressly 
preempt any local ordinance that would conflict with PSC 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
32 
 
decisions.  See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(2r) and (3)(i).  If applied 
out of Wisconsin, these provisions would require precisely the 
type of extraterritorial assertion of Wisconsin laws that we 
generally have forbidden.  See Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d at 391. 
¶55 To save the CPCN law from invalidation as applied to 
out-of-state 
facilities, 
WIEG 
urges 
that 
we 
sever 
those 
provisions that could not validly be applied to such facilities.  
Specifically, WIEG asks that we apply Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11), 
which provides that "[t]he provisions of the statutes are 
severable. . . .  If any provision of the statutes . . . is 
invalid, . . . such invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
or applications which can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application." 
¶56 We have stated that severing invalid provisions is 
favored where doing so would not frustrate the purpose of a law.  
See State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 378–79, 580 N.W.2d 260 
(1998).  Here, however, it seems that any severance would 
frustrate a significant purpose of the CPCN law, which is to 
require the PSC to consider multiple site-specific factors in 
determining whether a facility should be sited at a particular 
location.  We, therefore, decline to engage in severance as a 
means to save the CPCN law for application out of Wisconsin. 
¶57 Alternatively, if we decline to sever those provisions 
and the CPCN law were applied to out-of-state facilities, the 
PSC would be required to undertake unreasonable, or even absurd, 
actions that would have little, if any, direct benefit on the 
State of Wisconsin or its residents.  We construe statutes 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
33 
 
whenever possible to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.  See 
Watton, 311 Wis. 2d 52, ¶14.  Construing the CPCN to require, 
for example, that the PSC mail copies of applications to 
Minnesota libraries or thoroughly consider the impact of a 
Minnesota facility on the local ecology of Minnesota would be 
unreasonable and absurd. 
¶58 Any unreasonable or absurd results are avoided by the 
PSC's construction of the CPCN law as applying exclusively to 
facilities in this state.  As the PSC represented to us, 
"[e]ither the Wisconsin Legislature enacted a law that requires 
the PSC to ignore several of the law's provisions or the 
Wisconsin Legislature enacted a law whose every word has 
meaning, but applies only to in-state projects."   
¶59 Accordingly, from the foregoing, we conclude that the 
PSC's interpretations of the CA and CPCN laws are reasonable, 
and that there is not a more reasonable interpretation of those 
laws. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 Applying due weight deference, we conclude that the 
PSC's interpretation of the CPCN law as applying exclusively to 
in-state 
facilities 
and 
its 
decision 
to 
analyze 
WPL's 
application under the CA law were reasonable, and that there is 
not a more reasonable interpretation of the laws.  The PSC 
examined the language, purpose, and context of both the CA and 
the CPCN laws and concluded that the CA law governed WPL's 
application 
to 
construct 
an 
out-of-state 
facility.  
Additionally, the PSC concluded that applying the CPCN law to an 
No. 
2010AP2762   
 
34 
 
out-of-state facility would exceed the jurisdiction of Wisconsin 
laws and lead to unreasonable results.  Based on our review of 
these statutes and the corresponding administrative rules, we 
conclude that there is not a more reasonable interpretation of 
the CA and the CPCN laws.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
court's order, which affirmed the PSC's November 6, 2008, 
Interim Order in PSC Docket No. 6680–CE–173. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
1 
 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The reason that 
the 
Public 
Service 
Commission 
(PSC) 
can 
regulate 
the 
construction of the Bent Tree Wind Farm, even though the 
facility is located across the state border, has nothing to do 
with the majority's distinction between "persons" and "public 
utilities."  Rather, the reason that the PSC can regulate the 
construction of this 200-megawatt out-of-state facility is that 
it is a public utility that will generate electricity solely for 
Wisconsin consumers and the $497 million construction costs as 
well as the operational costs will be paid exclusively by 
ratepayers in Wisconsin.   
¶62 Like the majority, I recognize that both statutes are 
silent on their application to out-of-state facilities.  Neither 
the Certificate of Authority (CA) statute nor the Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) statute is perfectly 
tailored to address the PSC's regulation of an out-of-state 
facility.  I part ways with the majority, however, when it 
transforms that silence into an unambiguous directive that 
erodes the legislative policy of providing protection for 
Wisconsin ratepayers. 
¶63 I conclude that the protections found in the CPCN 
statute better comport with the legislative policy of protecting 
Wisconsin ratepayers, and that the PSC should have applied that 
statute to this large facility.  Because the majority’s 
interpretation unreasonably seizes upon a distinction between 
persons and public utilities, concludes that it is a clear 
indicator of unambiguous legislative intent, and ignores the 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
2 
 
reason for regulating the construction of these facilities, I 
respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶64 The majority recognizes that both statutes are silent 
on their application to out-of-state facilities.  Majority op., 
¶39.  It implicitly acknowledges that neither the CA statute nor 
the CPCN statute is perfectly tailored to address the PSC’s 
regulation 
of 
an 
out-of-state 
facility. 
 
See 
id., 
¶44.  
Nevertheless, it contends that the "the CPCN [law applies] 
exclusively to in-state facilities."  Id.  This contention is 
rooted in a distinction between the CA statute that regulates 
"public utilities" and the CPCN law that regulates "persons," as 
well as the "general rule" that a state cannot "prohibit[] 
'persons' from engaging in activities outside the state."  Id., 
¶46.     
¶65 The majority asserts that the PSC can review an 
application for an out-of-state facility submitted by a public 
utility because "it is a statutory entity that is being 
regulated, not a person's activity of constructing a facility, 
as is the case under the CPCN law."  Id., ¶42 (emphasis 
omitted).  However, it asserts, "the CPCN's regulation of 
'persons' demonstrates that that law does not contemplate 
regulation of out-of-state activities."  Id., ¶44.   
¶66 The majority further posits that if the CPCN were 
interpreted "to apply to out-of-state persons and facilities, 
the CPCN's law's plain language could prohibit a person in Texas 
from constructing a 'facility' like Bent Tree in California, 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
3 
 
unless the person complied with all the factors listed in [the 
CPCN] and obtained permits from the Wisconsin DNR."  Id., ¶45.  
Ultimately, the majority contends that even though the statutes 
are silent on the issue, "neither statute is ambiguous as to 
out-of-state application."  Majority op., ¶39.  It concludes 
that the CA statue alone regulates out-of-state facilities.  
II 
¶67 Given that the CPCN statute does not specify whether 
it can be applied to an out-of-state facility that generates 
more than 100 megawatts of electricity for Wisconsin consumers, 
the court is required to make a policy choice.  It can apply the 
CA statute to this "large electric generating facility," meaning 
that it must sacrifice those portions of the CPCN statute that 
are 
intended 
to 
provide 
greater 
protection 
to 
Wisconsin 
ratepayers.  Alternatively, it can apply the greater ratepayer 
protections in the CPCN but sever those site-specific provisions 
of 
that 
statute 
that 
cannot 
be 
applied 
to 
out-of-state 
facilities. 
¶68 Rather than acknowledging that it is making a policy 
choice, 
the 
majority 
infers 
legislative 
intent 
from 
a 
distinction between "persons" and "public utilities."  Because 
it attaches such significance to this distinction, it fails to 
acknowledge the obvious——the reason that the PSC can regulate 
the Bent Tree facility is not only because it is constructed by 
a public utility, but also, because the energy it produces will 
be sold to Wisconsin consumers who will bear the cost of the 
facility.       
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
4 
 
¶69 The majority's inference about legislative intent is 
based on a generalization about principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction that is not established in the cases it cites.  The 
majority cites State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N.W.2d 414 
(1969) for the "general rule" that a state cannot "prohibit[] 
'persons' from engaging in activities outside the state."  
Majority op., ¶46.  In fact, Mueller also stands for the 
opposite 
proposition 
that 
the 
state 
may, 
under 
some 
circumstances, regulate the out-of-state actions of "persons."  
¶70 In that case, a statute required Wisconsin residents 
who owed child support from a prior marriage to obtain a court 
order prior to remarrying in Wisconsin or elsewhere.  44 
Wis. 2d at 390.  Mueller, who owed child support for the 
children of two prior marriages, remarried in Illinois without 
obtaining a court order.  The court held that the statute was 
constitutional, even though it punished Mueller for an act that 
occurred outside the boundaries of the state.  Additionally, the 
court acknowledged that "every state may, in the regulation of 
its own internal affairs, authorize certain acts to be done 
outside of its limits, and describe what effect they shall have 
within them."  Id. at 393 (quoting State ex rel. Chandler v. 
Main, 16 Wis. 422 (1863).    
¶71 Because the majority imputes undue weight to the 
distinction between 
"persons" and "public utilities," its 
interpretation of both statutes is unreasonable.  It determines 
that under the CPCN statute, Wisconsin can never regulate an 
out-of-state facility built by a person that is not a public 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
5 
 
utility——even if the construction of the facility will be funded 
solely by Wisconsin ratepayers.  Conversely, it concludes that 
under the CA statute, Wisconsin can regulate any facility built 
by a public utility registered in Wisconsin, even if that 
facility will have no effect on Wisconsin ratepayers.   
¶72 At once, the majority construes the CPCN statute too 
narrowly and the CA statute too broadly.  In this case, the 
reason that the PSC can regulate the "person" constructing the 
Bent Tree Wind Farm under the CPCN statute is straightforward.  
The electricity produced by the out-of-state facility will be 
sold in Wisconsin to Wisconsin consumers.  Wisconsin can 
regulate both persons and public utilities that build large 
electrical generating facilities when Wisconsin consumers will 
pay for the construction of the facility through their rates. 
¶73 The majority's construction of the CA statute is 
likewise unreasonable.  It contends that the CA law is 
applicable to an out-of-state facility because "every 'public 
utility' 
has 
availed 
itself 
of 
Wisconsin's 
regulatory 
jurisdiction," majority op., ¶42, and, "as a public utility, WPL 
is subject to the CA law's mandate that any public utility 
seeking to construct a new facility must comply with any 
applicable rules or orders of the PSC," id., ¶40.   
¶74 Under this interpretation, Wisconsin could regulate 
the construction of a facility that a Wisconsin public utility 
builds in Texas for the purpose of supplying power to California 
residents, even if that facility had no bearing on the rates 
paid by Wisconsin residents.  What interest would Wisconsin have 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
6 
 
in regulating the construction of such a facility, unless the 
facility would somehow affect the cost or the services provided 
to Wisconsin residents?1      
¶75 If the legislature made a determination that the CPCN 
should not be applied to out-of-state facilities, it had at its 
disposal a much more direct way to signal its intent than 
declaring that the statute applied to "persons."  It could have, 
and I suspect would have, demonstrated this intent by declaring 
that "the CPCN statute will not be applied to out-of-state 
facilities."  This, the legislature did not do. 
¶76 Further, there is a much more logical explanation for 
the legislature's choice to use the word "persons" in the CPCN 
statute, and this alternative explanation is consistent with the 
basis of regulation set forth above.  Wisconsin public utilities 
distribute electricity to Wisconsin consumers.  However, not all 
electricity distributed by public utilities is generated by 
public utilities.  Rather, a public utility can contract with an 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Admin. Code § PSC 112.05(2) provides that a 
Wisconsin electric utility must "notify" the PSC if it intends 
to construct a facility in another state the utility serves, and 
that it may be required to apply for approval "if a significant 
portion of the cost of the project will be allocated to 
Wisconsin for ratemaking purposes."  Accordingly, under this 
regulation, a Wisconsin utility that proposes to build an out-
of-state facility will not be required to secure the PSC's 
approval if a significant portion of the cost of the facility 
will not be allocated to Wisconsin ratepayers.   
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
7 
 
independent producer who will supply the public utility with 
electricity to sell to Wisconsin consumers.2   
¶77 The legislature's selection of the term "persons" in 
the CPCN statute signals its intent to regulate not just public 
utilities, but the construction of facilities by independent 
producers that supply large quantities of electricity to public 
utilities in Wisconsin.  It appears that the legislature made a 
policy choice to regulate the construction of facilities by 
"persons" when the facilities will be large enough and produce 
enough electricity to influence the rates paid by Wisconsin 
consumers.   
¶78 I recognize that some of the provisions of the CPCN 
statute cannot be applied to an out-of-state facility.  It would 
not be wholly unreasonable to conclude that, because of this 
difficulty, it is easier to apply the CA statute and trust the 
Commission to appropriately exercise its discretion under the CA 
statute. 
 
However, 
it is unreasonable to seize upon a 
distinction between persons and public utilities, conclude that 
                                                 
2 The 
Commission's 
website 
provides 
the 
following 
explanation: "The electricity used in your home or place of 
business can come from many sources.  The generating plant may 
be owned and operated by your local utility and located in or 
near your community.  Or the power can be bought from another 
producer who may be located nearby, within your area of the 
state or in another state entirely.  These generation owners 
could be another regulated utility or an Independent Power 
Producer (IPP).  An IPP is an unregulated entity that produces 
electricity and sells it under contract or on the open 
market. . . . The PSC has statutory jurisdiction over the 
construction of generation plants of 100MW or larger."  Electric 
Industry 
Overview, 
available 
at 
http://psc.wi.gov/utilityinfo/electric/index-electric.htm 
(last 
visited June 14, 2012).       
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
8 
 
it is a clear indicator of unambiguous legislative intent, and 
ignore the reason for regulating the construction of these 
facilities——that Wisconsin ratepayers are on the hook for the 
improvements.3    
¶79 Likewise, the majority ignores the statutory authority 
that provides for greater ratepayer protections under the CPCN 
statute.  It chastises the dissent for providing "incomplete 
authority for its repetitive assertion" that the CPCN statute 
provides greater protections.  Majority op., ¶49 n.12.  The 
authority, however, is in plain sight.    
¶80 More 
rigorous 
economic 
and 
environmental 
review 
requirements as well as procedural protections are embodied in 
the CPCN statute.  The following chart summarizes the statutory 
authority for some of these greater protections: 
 
 
                                                 
3 Additionally, the majority errs by applying due weight 
deference to the Commission's decision.  De novo review is 
appropriate because the Commission has never been given occasion 
to determine whether it can apply the CPCN statute to an out-of-
state facility, see majority op., ¶25, and because this is a 
question about the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction and 
authority, see id., ¶¶6, 26.   
Nevertheless, this is not a problem because there is no 
significant difference between due weight deference and de novo 
review.  In both cases, the court is required to select the more 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  Racine Harley 
Davidson v. State Division of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 
¶¶18-19, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.   
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
9 
 
 
RATEPAYER PROTECTIONS 
CA 
Statute 
CPCN 
Statute 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(b) - the PSC must 
hold a public hearing. 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)3 – the PSC must 
find that the design and location of the 
facility is in the public interest. 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)4 - the PSC must 
find that there will not be an undue adverse 
impact on other environmental values 
affecting Wisconsin. 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)5; Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.49(3)(b)3 - the PSC must find that the 
facility will not add to the cost of service 
without proportionately increasing the value 
or available quantity of service. 
No 
Yes 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)7 - the PSC must 
find that the proposed facility will not 
have a material adverse impact on 
competition in the relevant market. 
No 
Yes 
 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)5; Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.49(3)(b)2 - the PSC must find that the 
project will not provide facilities 
unreasonably in excess of the probable 
future requirements. 
No 
Yes 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)5; Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.49(3)(b)1 - the PSC must find that the 
service efficiency of the public utility is 
not substantially impaired. 
No 
Yes 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)2 - the PSC must 
find that the facility satisfies the 
reasonable needs of the public for an 
adequate supply of electric energy. 
No 
Yes 
¶81 The chart above demonstrates that the CPCN law is a 
plant siting law that provides greater ratepayer protections 
than does the CA law.4 
                                                 
4 The majority misconstrues the dissent by setting up a 
false dichotomy.  It asserts that the dissent concludes "that 
the legislature intended the CPCN law to be a 'ratepayer 
protection' law, rather than, as this court recently recognized, 
a 'plant siting law.'" Majority op., ¶49 n.15.   
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
10 
 
III 
¶82 Having determined that the majority's analysis is 
unpersuasive, I turn to an examination of the relevant statutes.  
There 
are 
two 
statutory 
procedures 
for 
regulating 
the 
construction 
of 
electrical 
generation 
facilities, 
the 
CA 
procedure under Wis. Stat. § 196.49 and the CPCN procedure under 
Wis. Stat. § 196.491.  Neither the CA statute nor the CPCN 
statute explicitly addresses whether it can be applied to a 
proposed out-of-state facility, the costs of which will be paid 
by Wisconsin ratepayers.5   
¶83 For purposes of this discussion, there are three 
significant differences between these procedures.  First, it is 
the size of a proposed electric generating facility that 
triggers the provisions of the CPCN statute.  While the CA 
statute is implicated by the construction of "any public utility 
plant, extension or facility," the CPCN statute applies only 
                                                                                                                                                             
In setting up this dichotomy, the majority suggests that 
the purposes are mutually exclusive.  They are not.  The 
legislature did not intend that the purposes be an either-or 
proposition.  Rather, as the chart above illustrates, the 
legislature intended that the CPCN law is a plant siting law 
that also provides greater ratepayer protections than does the 
CA law. 
5 As the circuit court explained, "the statute's silence on 
the in state/out of state distinction is deafening to this 
court."  And, as the Commission asserted in its interim order, 
"Both laws are written broadly enough that, on first impression, 
they appear to regulate both in-state and out-of-state electric 
utility construction projects." 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
11 
 
when a "person" seeks to build a "large" facility which will 
produce over 100 megawatts of electricity.6        
¶84 Second, the CPCN statute provides more protections for 
the ratepayers who bear the costs of these larger facilities.  
Most significantly, the CPCN statute requires the PSC to hold a 
hearing.7  Further, the PSC cannot approve the proposal unless it 
determines that the proposed facility satisfies the reasonable 
needs of the public and that, when considering economic factors 
and alternatives, the design of the facility is in the public 
interest.  Wis. Stat. §§ 196.491(3)(d)2, 196.491(3)(d)3.   
¶85 By contrast, as the chart above demonstrates, the CA 
statute leaves more to the PSC's discretion.8  The PSC may, in 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(a) ("no person may commence 
the construction of a facility . . ."); § 196.491(1)(e) ("In 
this 
section: . . . "'Facility' 
means 
a 
large 
electric 
generating facility or a high-voltage transmission line."); 
§ 196.491(1)(g) ("'Large electric generating facility' means 
electric generating equipment and associated facilities designed 
for nominal operation at a capacity of 100 megawatts or more."")  
7 See Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(b) ("The commission shall hold 
a 
public 
hearing 
on 
an 
application 
filed 
under 
par. 
(a)1 . . .").  
8 The 
majority 
seems 
to 
contend 
that 
by 
virtue 
of 
administrative regulations related to the CA law, the ratepayer 
protections offered by the CA law and the CPCN law are 
essentially identical. See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶29-32, 49 
(discussing Wis. Admin. Code §§ PSC 112.05-.07).  This is not 
accurate. 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
12 
 
its discretion, hold a contested case hearing, or it may choose 
to approve a project without holding a hearing.9  The PSC has 
discretion to approve a project even if the facility will 
substantially impair the efficiency of the service of the public 
utility.  Wis. Stat. § 196.49(3)(b)1.  The PSC may approve a 
project even if the facility is unreasonably in excess of the 
probable 
future 
energy 
requirements. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 196.49(3)(b)2.  The PSC may approve the project even if it is 
not cost effective.  Wis. Stat. § 196.49(3)(b)3.  Additionally, 
according to Commissioner Azar who dissented to the PSC's 
                                                                                                                                                             
It is correct that applicants under the CA law are required 
to provide detailed applications. Wis. Admin. Code § 112.06(1m).  
This does not alter the crucial fact that under the CPCN law the 
PSC must deny an application if it finds, among other things, 
that the project will substantially impair the efficiency of the 
service 
of 
the 
public 
utility, 
will 
provide 
facilities 
unreasonably in excess of the probable future requirements, or 
will add to the cost of service without proportionately 
increasing the value or available quantity of service. See Wis. 
Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)5. 
Under the CA law, on the other hand, the PSC is not so 
constrained.  In fact, under the CA law, the PSC could grant an 
application 
even 
if 
it 
found 
that 
the 
project 
would 
substantially impair efficiency, provide facilities unreasonably 
in excess of probable future requirements, and add to the cost 
of service without proportionally increasing value.  Even given 
those circumstances, under the CA law the PSC has the discretion 
to approve or disapprove the application. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 196.49(3)(b) (providing that the PSC "may refuse to certify a 
project" if it will have the negative effects on ratepayers 
listed above (emphasis added)). 
9 By way of example, in this very case, one of the three 
Commissioners voted not to hold a public hearing prior to 
approving the Bent Tree facility.  
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
13 
 
interim order, the PSC may delegate all of these discretionary 
decisions to a Division Administrator.10 
¶86 Third, in addition to providing greater protections 
for ratepayers, the CPCN statute also sets forth additional 
site-specific considerations not included in the CA statute.  
Many of these considerations, such as scenic beauty and some 
environmental 
factors, 
do 
not 
fit 
comfortably 
with 
the 
Commission's regulation of a facility located in another state.11 
¶87 If the Bent Tree facility were located in Wisconsin, 
there would be no doubt that it would be subject to the CPCN 
statute. 
 
It 
is 
projected to produce 200 megawatts of 
                                                 
10 Commissioner Lauren Azar's dissent to the PSC's interim 
order provided the "following hypothetical [as] an example of 
what the majority decision could lead to": 
The 
Division 
Administrator 
could 
approve 
the 
construction of a two billion dollar 600 megawatt (MW) 
out-of-state coal plant that would be paid for by 
Wisconsin ratepayers.  This would be possible even if 
that plant:  (1) was unnecessary, and/or (2) was not 
cost effective, and/or (3) would impair the service of 
the utility.  The commission would neither see the 
application nor the final decision. 
Application by Wisconsin Power and Light Company to Construct up 
to 200 MW of Wind Generation to be Called Bent Tree Wind Farm, 
in Freeborn County, in South Central Minnesota, No. 6680-CE-173, 
PSC Interim Order, Nov. 6, 2008 (Commissioner Azar, dissenting, 
at 1).   
11 Although site-specific factors are not incorporated into 
the CA statute, the PSC has incorporated many analogous 
provisions into the administrative rules governing CA approval.  
Majority op., ¶¶29-30.  Accordingly, just as some of the 
statutory site-specific criteria do not fit comfortably with a 
CPCN application for an out-of-state facility, some of the site-
specific criteria found in the CA regulations likewise do not 
fit comfortably with a CA application for an out-of-state 
facility. 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
14 
 
electricity, double the threshold for invoking the greater 
ratepayer protections and site-specific considerations of the 
CPCN.  However, the facility is not located within the state's 
borders.   
¶88 Although everyone agrees that the CA statute can be 
applied to an out-of-state facility, the parties disagree about 
whether the CPCN statute can be applied to an out-of-state 
facility.  As stated above, the answer is not found in the text 
of the statute.12   
                                                 
12 In her dissent to the PSC's interim order, Commissioner 
Azar posited that the reason that neither statute explicitly 
addresses the possibility of out-of-state facilities is because 
of the historical context in which both statutes were drafted.  
The CA statute was created in 1931, and the CPCN statute was 
created 
in 
1975. 
 
Commissioner 
Azar 
asserted 
that 
the 
legislature would not have considered whether the statute could 
be applied to out-of-state facilities because building a 
facility 
in 
Minnesota 
to 
generate 
energy 
for 
Wisconsin 
ratepayers was not part of the "old utility world" approach: 
Given the historical context within which the CPCN law 
was written, it is clear that the Legislature was 
considering only in-state projects in the law.  The 
CPCN statute was written in 1975 during the "old" 
utility world, before the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act, Energy Policy Act of 1992 and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission Order 888——events that 
have dramatically reshaped the electric industry.  
Specifically, 
the CPCN statute was created when 
utilities were generally expected to build generation 
within their own service territories.  The thought of 
wheeling power across state lines was unnecessary 
unless a utility service territory happened to span 
between neighboring states.  Beginning in 1996, the 
"new" energy world saw the creation of the open access 
transmission grid, allowing public utilities to begin 
building generation facilities far away from their 
service territories, indeed, even in other states 
because they knew they would have the opportunity to 
transmit the energy back to their service territory.  
Hence, it was only after 1996, twenty-one years after 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
15 
 
¶89 As I 
read the CPCN, it appears to reflect a 
legislative decision that some facilities require more scrutiny 
from the PSC because they are too big, too expensive, and 
produce too much electricity to leave it within the PSC's 
discretion whether to hold a hearing and whether to provide 
ratepayer protections.  In her dissent to the PSC’s interim 
order, Commissioner Azar concluded that application of the CPCN 
was 
necessary 
to 
protect 
the 
ratepayers 
of 
Wisconsin.  
Otherwise, she feared, large out-of-state projects could be 
certified with minimal scrutiny.   
¶90 According to Commissioner Azar, the PSC has empowered 
the Division Administrator to make decisions on applications for 
electric construction orders which do not require a CPCN.  She 
stated that if the CPCN statute is not applicable, "[t]he 
Division Administrator could approve the construction of a two 
billion dollar 600 megawatt out-of-state coal plant that would 
be paid for by Wisconsin ratepayers."  The construction could be 
approved even if the plant was "unnecessary," "was not cost 
effective," and "would impair the service of the utility."  
According to Commissioner Azar, the Division Administrator could 
approve the project without showing the application or the final 
decision to the PSC.      
                                                                                                                                                             
the passage of the CPCN law, that the wheeling of 
power across state lines became common place. 
Bent Tree Wind Farm, PSC Interim Order (Commissioner Azar 
dissenting, at 3-4). 
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
16 
 
¶91 I share Commissioner Azar's concerns.  When Wisconsin 
ratepayers will fund the costs of large facilities, whether in-
state or out-of-state, it is sensible to require a hearing and 
scrutiny by the commission that is empowered by statute to 
regulate Wisconsin energy.   
¶92 I recognize that portions of the CPCN statute are 
difficult to square with regulation of a facility outside of 
Wisconsin’s borders.13  The best solution to this problem would 
be for the legislature to craft a statute that squarely 
addresses PSC oversight of out-of-state facilities.  However, 
while the PSC waits for the legislature to act, any provision 
that requires an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction could 
be severed.  See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11).   
¶93 I conclude that the CPCN statute should have been 
applied to the application for construction of the Bent Tree 
Wind Farm.  While neither statute is perfectly tailored to 
address the PSC’s regulation of an out-of-state facility, I 
conclude that the protections found in the CPCN statute better 
comport with the legislative policy of protecting Wisconsin 
ratepayers.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶94 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
                                                 
13 Likewise, in applying the CA procedure, it may be 
necessary to sever some site-specific provisions that do not 
comport well with regulation of out-of-state facilities.    
No.  2010AP2762.awb 
 
 
 
1