Title: Lawrence v. Jenkins

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
ERIC R. LAWRENCE, 
ZONING ADMINISTRATOR, ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 990030   OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
    November 5, 1999 
JEFFREY G. JENKINS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FREDERICK COUNTY 
John R. Prosser, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether an individual 
requesting documents pursuant to the Virginia Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) is denied rights and privileges 
conferred by that act when a responding public official 
chooses to exercise an exemption, redacts the exempt 
information from the documents, but fails to timely 
reference the applicable Code section making portions of 
the requested documents exempt.  We conclude that, in this 
situation, the requesting individual was not denied rights 
and privileges under FOIA and that the circuit court 
therefore erred by issuing a writ of mandamus and ordering 
release of the exempt information.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
FACTS 
 
Appellee Jeffrey G. Jenkins submitted a written FOIA 
request to appellant Eric R. Lawrence, the zoning 
administrator for Frederick County, pursuant to Code 
§§ 2.1-340 through –346.1.1  In his request, Jenkins asked 
for “all documents with respect to any complaints made 
concerning [his] property located at 1631 Redbud Road, 
including, but not limited to, the complete original texts 
of any such complaints, the identity of the complainants, 
and the dates such complaints were made.”2  The zoning 
administrator timely furnished the requested information, 
with the exception of the identity of the complainants.  He 
redacted that information from the documents.  With regard 
to the redacted information, Lawrence stated in his 
response to the FOIA request that “the release of the 
identity of complainants are [sic] protected and is not 
provided for through the Freedom of Information Act.”  
However, he did not reference the specific Code section 
making the identity of the complainants exempt from 
disclosure. 
                     
1 The General Assembly amended several provisions of 
FOIA in 1999.  All references to FOIA in this opinion are 
to the provisions in effect before the 1999 amendments. 
 
2 Jenkins initiated his FOIA request after the zoning 
administrator had notified Jenkins that he was violating 
Frederick County’s zoning ordinances.  Jenkins appealed 
that determination to the Board of Zoning Appeals.  While 
his appeal was pending, Jenkins brought the use of his 
property into compliance with the zoning ordinances and 
subsequently withdrew his appeal.  Jenkins was not charged 
with the misdemeanor crime of violating the zoning 
ordinances. 
 
 
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Jenkins then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus.  
In that petition, he contended that the zoning 
administrator must either exercise a specific exemption 
under FOIA when refusing to disclose information or release 
the requested information.  Accordingly, Jenkins asked the 
circuit court to order the zoning administrator to produce 
the requested documents “in an unaltered form.” 
Shortly before a hearing on the petition, Lawrence 
advised Jenkins in writing that the redacted information 
was exempt from disclosure pursuant to Code § 2.1-
342(B)(1).3  Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that 
the zoning administrator had not timely invoked an 
exemption from disclosure pursuant to FOIA and that a 
violation of that act had therefore occurred.  Accordingly, 
the court issued a writ of mandamus and directed the zoning 
administrator to release the complete documents to Jenkins.  
We awarded Lawrence this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
The provision of FOIA at issue in this appeal is Code 
§ 2.1-342(A)(3).  That section provides that, when a public 
body is responding to a FOIA request and determines that an 
                     
3 Code § 2.1-342(B)(1) provides that “[m]emoranda, 
correspondence, evidence and complaints related to criminal 
investigations” are excluded from the provisions of FOIA 
but “may be disclosed by the custodian in his discretion.” 
 
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exemption applies to a portion of the requested 
information, the public body may  
delete or excise that portion of the records to which 
an exemption applies, but shall disclose the remainder 
of the requested records and provide to the requesting 
citizen a written explanation as to why these portions 
of the record are not available . . . with the 
explanation making specific reference to the 
applicable Code sections which make that portion of 
the requested records exempt.  
 
The public body must respond to the request within five 
work days.  Code § 2.1-342(A). 
Jenkins argues that the zoning administrator did not 
invoke the exemption provided in Code § 2.1-342(B)(1) 
because Lawrence failed to reference that specific Code 
section in his initial response to the FOIA request.  
According to Jenkins, Code § 2.1-340.1 thus mandates 
disclosure of the identity of the complainants in this 
case.  That section, which generally addresses the policy 
considerations underlying the enactment of FOIA, states 
that “[u]nless the public body specifically elects to 
exercise an exemption provided by this chapter or any other 
statute, . . . all reports, documents and other material 
shall be available for disclosure upon request.”  Jenkins 
also points out that, when Lawrence did cite Code § 2.1-
342(B)(1), the response time of five work days specified in 
Code § 2.1-342(A) had already expired.  Therefore, he 
 
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contends that Lawrence’s failure to strictly comply with 
Code § 2.1-342(A)(3) constitutes a denial of his request 
and a violation of FOIA. 
In response to Jenkins’ argument, Lawrence 
acknowledges that, when he initially responded to the FOIA 
request, he technically violated Code § 2.1-342(A)(3) by 
failing to refer to the specific Code section making the 
identity of the complainants exempt from disclosure.  He 
also admits that the response time of five work days had 
expired when he provided the Code section to Jenkins.  
Nevertheless, Lawrence asserts, and we agree, that he 
utilized the exemption contained in Code § 2.1-342(B)(1) by 
redacting the identity of the complainants from the 
documents and stating in his initial response that their 
identity is protected from disclosure under FOIA.  Thus, 
the issue before us is whether the trial court erred in 
issuing the writ of mandamus and ordering the release of 
the redacted information solely because the zoning 
administrator, in electing to exercise an exemption 
provided in FOIA, failed to timely refer to the specific 
Code section making that portion of the requested documents 
exempt. 
A writ of mandamus is one of the remedies available 
under Code § 2.1-346 when a person is denied rights and 
 
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privileges conferred under the provisions of FOIA.4  
However, “[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedial 
process, which is not awarded as a matter of right but in 
the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.”  Richmond-
Greyhound Lines v. Davis, 200 Va. 147, 151, 104 S.E.2d 813, 
816 (1958).  One of the elements necessary before a writ of 
mandamus issues is the clear right of the petitioner to the 
relief being sought.  Stroobants v. Fugate, 209 Va. 275, 
278, 163 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1968)  Thus, a writ of mandamus 
was appropriate in this case only if Jenkins was denied 
clearly established rights and privileges under FOIA.  We 
conclude that he was not. 
The identity of the complainants, which Lawrence 
redacted from the documents disclosed to Jenkins, is not 
the kind of information subject to mandatory disclosure 
under any provision of FOIA.  Rather, that information 
                     
4 In addition to issuing a writ of mandamus, a court 
may also award injunctive relief, reasonable costs, and 
attorney’s fees.  Code § 2.1-346.  If a court determines 
that a violation of the provisions of FOIA “was willfully 
and knowingly made,” it shall impose on the offending 
public official, in an individual capacity, “a civil 
penalty of not less than $25 nor more than $1,000.”  Code 
§ 2.1-346.1. 
In the present case, Jenkins asked not only for a writ 
of mandamus but also for an award of costs and attorney’s 
fees and the imposition of a civil penalty.  The circuit 
court issued only the writ of mandamus.  Jenkins did not 
assign cross-error to the court’s refusal to grant the 
other requested relief. 
 
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comes within the exemption contained in Code § 2.1-
342(B)(1).5  Consequently, its disclosure is subject to the 
discretion of the zoning administrator.  Lawrence exercised 
that discretion and elected to withhold the identity of the 
complainants.  He redacted that information from the 
requested documents and then advised Jenkins not only as to 
the nature of the redacted information but also that it was 
protected from disclosure under FOIA. 
Thus, we conclude that Jenkins received all the 
information that he was entitled to receive under FOIA.  
Lawrence’s failure to refer to Code § 2.1-342(B)(1) within 
five work days did not bring about a denial of any rights 
or privileges afforded to Jenkins under the provisions of 
FOIA and did not operate as a waiver of Lawrence’s 
otherwise valid exercise of an applicable exemption.  Cf. 
Tull v. Brown, 255 Va. 177, 184, 494 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1998) 
(public official’s decision to provide transcript of 911 
tape recording did not waive right to deny access to tape 
itself under applicable exemption).  Accordingly, a writ of 
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy in this case.  See 
Stroobants, 209 Va. at 276-77, 163 S.E.2d at 193-194 
                     
5 Jenkins has never asserted that the identity of the 
complainants does not fall within the exemption created in 
Code § 2.1-342(B)(1). 
 
 
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(citing Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac Ry. Co. v. 
Fugate, 206 Va. 159, 162, 142 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1965)). 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and dismiss Jenkins’ petition for a writ of 
mandamus.6
Reversed and writ denied.
                     
6  Jenkins also asserts that Lawrence failed to 
preserve the issues that he raises in this appeal.  We find 
no merit in Jenkins’ position.  The statement of facts 
certified by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 5:11 
includes the zoning administrator’s position and argument 
presented to the circuit court.  Thus, the record 
demonstrates that Lawrence properly preserved his 
objections. 
We also do not need to address Lawrence’s other 
assignment of error. 
 
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