Title: Cornelius v. Browning

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

This case was originally assigned to another Justice on
1
this Court; it was reassigned to Justice Woodall on September
16, 2011.
rel: 12/02/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
____________________
1091378
____________________
Jeff Cornelius
v.
Ronald Browning et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-09-901392)
WOODALL, Justice.1
Ronald Browning and Susan Browning, Bubba Beck and Debbie
Beck, Allen Caprara and Pam Caprara, Bobby Fayet and Cindy
1091378
2
Fayet, David Kennamer and Brad Kennamer, Steve Russell and
Melinda Russell, and Gary Strickland and Jennifer Strickland
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs")
sued Jeff Cornelius, among others, alleging various claims
related 
to 
investments 
the 
plaintiffs 
had 
made 
in 
corporations
in which Cornelius was allegedly a principal.  The trial court
entered a default judgment against Cornelius based upon his
purported failure to appear for his deposition, awarding the
plaintiffs a total of $975,000 in damages.  Cornelius moved
the trial court pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
set aside the default judgment, arguing that he had not
received notice that the motion for a default judgment had
been filed. After a hearing, the trial court denied
Cornelius's motion to set aside the default judgment, and
Cornelius appealed.  We conclude that the trial court's
judgment is inconsistent with due process and is, therefore,
void.  Cornelius is entitled to have the default judgment set
aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.   Therefore,
we reverse and remand.
1091378
3
Facts and Procedural History
On April 24, 2009, the plaintiffs sued Molecular
Diagnostics of America, Inc. ("MDA, Inc."), Molecular
Diagnostics of Alabama, 
LLC ("MDA"), Medical 
Devices
International ("MDI"), and Cornelius, as well as fictitiously
named defendants, claiming breach of contract, negligence,
wantonness, fraudulent suppression, unjust enrichment, and
breach of fiduciary duties related to investments the
plaintiffs had made in MDA, Inc., MDA, and MDI.  According to
the plaintiffs' complaint, Cornelius "was an employee,
representative, agent, owner and/or principal of MDA, Inc.,
MDA and MDI" when the plaintiffs made their investments. 
The plaintiffs sought to recover as damages "a return of
their investment principal," "a reasonable and justified
return on said investment," damages for "mental anguish," and
"all damages available to the Plaintiffs under Alabama law,"
including punitive damages.  According to the complaint, the
plaintiffs' investments were as follows:
"a. Ronald & Susan Browning -- $25,000 --
September 24, 2002; 
"b. Bubba & Debbie Beck -- $75,000 (total) --
July 11, 2001, August 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002;
1091378
4
"c. Allen & Pam Caprara -- $25,000 -- on or
about March 2001;
"d. Bobby & Cindy Fayet -- $25,000 -- December
4, 2001; 
"e. David & Brad Kennamer -- $ 100,000 (total)
-- February 15, 2002 and March 6, 2002; 
"f. Steve & Melinda Russell -- $25,000 -- on or
about February 2002; and 
"g. Gary & Jennifer Strickland -- $50,000
(total) -- August 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002."
The plaintiffs also requested "a full and complete accounting
of the investments made the basis of this suit."
The plaintiffs first attempted to serve the complaint on
Cornelius by certified mail to his home address: on Maple
Drive in Blountsville ("the Maple Drive address").  Cornelius
testified by affidavit that he has resided at that address
since 1994.  The plaintiffs state that the complaint was
returned with a note indicating that it was "undeliverable as
addressed." 
 The 
plaintiffs 
also state that several 
subsequent
attempts were made to serve Cornelius personally at the Maple
Drive address but that it was not until July 2009, after they
had hired a private process server, that Cornelius was finally
served with the complaint. Cornelius testified in his
affidavit that the complaint was served on him at the Maple
1091378
5
Drive address.  The plaintiffs have provided no evidence to
the contrary.
On August 18, 2009, Cornelius, acting pro se, filed an
answer to the complaint.  In his answer, Cornelius listed his
address as  P.O. Box 190, Blountsville, AL 35031 ("the P.O.
Box 190 address"), and included a telephone number in the
address block.  The answer was mailed to the plaintiffs'
counsel in an envelope on which the following return address
was written: "G. Edward Coey, P.O. Box 834, Hanceville, AL."
Cornelius had consulted Coey, an attorney in Hanceville,
regarding the case; however, Cornelius did not hire Coey to
represent him, and Coey never filed a notice of appearance as
counsel for Cornelius.
On August 27, 2009, the plaintiffs electronically filed
a notice of their intention take Cornelius's deposition on
September 15, 2009.  However, Cornelius was not registered as
a 
participant 
in 
the 
electronic-filing 
system. 
 
The 
plaintiffs
also mailed a deposition notice to Cornelius at the P.O. Box
190 address, but the notice was returned on August 30, marked
as "not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward." 
1091378
6
On September 8, 2009, the plaintiffs moved the trial
court for a default judgment, stating:
"1. The Complaint giving rise to this case was
filed on April 24, 2009.  The Plaintiffs effected
personal service on the Defendant Jeff Cornelius on
July 19, 2009.
"2. On or about August 17, 2009, the Defendant
Jeff Cornelius filed an Answer pro se.  In his
answer, Mr. Cornelius listed his address as 'P.O.
Box 190, Blountsville, AL 35031.'  However, the
Answer was received by the undersigned counsel on
behalf of the Plaintiffs in [an] envelope ... [on
which] [t]he return on the address is for a G.
Edward Coey, believed to be an attorney in
Hanceville, Alabama.
"3. On August 27, 2009, the Plaintiffs issued a
deposition notice to the Defendant Jeff Cornelius.
The notice of deposition was mailed to Jeff
Cornelius at the address provided by Mr. Cornelius
in his answer, to wit: P.O. Box 190, Blountsville,
AL 35031.
"4. On or about August 30, 2009, the envelope
that was utilized to serve the notice of deposition
was returned to the undersigned counsel as 'not
deliverable as addressed, unable to forward.' 
"5. The above described facts demonstrate that
a default judgment should be entered on behalf of
the Plaintiffs against the Defendant Jeff Cornelius.
First, Mr. Cornelius has provided a false address to
the 
Plaintiffs, 
via 
the 
undersigned 
counsel.
Accordingly, the undersigned counsel has no way to
conduct legal proceedings with this Defendant.
Second, said Defendant has failed to provide the
undersigned counsel with an appropriate address so
that discovery can proceed in this case.  The fact
that the Defendant Cornelius provided the Court and
1091378
7
the undersigned counsel with a fraudulent address
demonstrates that the Defendant is completely
unwilling to abide by the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure and, additionally, to participate in this
case as a Defendant pro se or otherwise. 
"6. The Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the
Court enter a default judgment against the Defendant
Jeff Cornelius with leave to prove damages in the
future."
(Citations omitted.)
The certificate 
of 
service on the default-judgment motion
indicates that it, too, was electronically filed.  However,
the plaintiffs state that they also mailed a copy of the
motion to the P.O. Box 190 address, along with a letter
advising Cornelius of the existence of the default-judgment
motion and stating that the plaintiffs intended to ask the
trial court for a hearing on the motion.  A copy of the motion
was also sent to Coey.  Coey acknowledged receipt of the
motion in a letter to the plaintiffs' counsel but stated that
he was not, and had never been, counsel for Cornelius
regarding this matter.  Coey later told Cornelius's attorney
that he had tried to forward the motion to Cornelius at the
P.O. Box 190 address but that it had been returned to him as
"not deliverable as addressed."
1091378
8
 On October 26, 2009, there was an entry of default
against Cornelius. On October 28, 2009, the trial court
entered a judgment by default against MDA, Inc., MDA, MDI, and
Cornelius, awarding the plaintiffs damages totaling $975,000.
It does not appear that the trial court held a hearing on the
default-judgment motion before entering the judgment.
On March 11, 2010, the plaintiffs initiated a garnishment
proceeding in an attempt to collect the judgment against
Cornelius.  According to Cornelius's affidavit testimony, he
was served at the Maple Drive address with notice of the
garnishment and a subpoena for a postjudgment deposition.  On
March 23, 2010, Cornelius moved the trial court to set aside
its October 28 judgment and the subsequent garnishment
proceeding, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Cornelius argued in his motion that he did not receive a copy
of the plaintiffs' default-judgment motion and that allowing
the default judgment to stand would be "a miscarriage of
justice" and would violate principles of due process.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to Cornelius's motion,
and the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion.  At the
hearing, the trial court heard oral argument and gave the
1091378
9
parties time to file additional pleadings and evidentiary
material.  On May 19, 2010, the trial court entered an order
denying Cornelius's motion.  The order provided: 
"This suit was filed on April 24, 2009.
Defendant Jeff Cornelius was served and filed an
answer on August 18, 2009, listing his home address
as P.O. Box 190, Blountsville, AL 35031. 
"A default judgment was entered against Mr.
Cornelius on October 28, 2009, as a result of his
failure to appear for a deposition.  The Motion to
Set Aside Judgment was filed on March 23, 2010.
Defendant contends the judgment should be set aside
under Rule 60(b)(6), Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure because plaintiffs' attorney failed to
properly notify defendant. 
"The Court finds that there is no basis to set
aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Therefore,
the Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Garnishment is
denied."
Cornelius has appealed the trial court's judgment.
Issues
Cornelius argues that this case presents four issues for
this Court to consider: (1) whether "the default judgment in
this case [is] void because the trial court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process because [Cornelius] was not
given notice of the filing of the motion against him for a
default judgment," Cornelius's brief, at 4; (2) whether a
default judgment is void "if it awards damages in excess of
1091378
10
those claimed in the complaint," id.; (3) whether the default
judgment is void "because the damages were not assessed by a
jury," id.; and (4) whether the facts "show a basis for
setting aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of the
Alabama 
Rules 
of 
Civil 
Procedure 
because 
there 
are 
aggravating
circumstances 
and 
reasons 
justifying 
relief 
from 
the 
operation
of the judgment." Id.
Standard of Review
Generally, "'[a] trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside a
default judgment.  In reviewing an appeal from a trial court's
order refusing to set aside a default judgment, this Court
must determine whether in refusing to set aside the default
judgment the trial court exceeded its discretion.'"  Carroll
v. Williams, 6 So. 3d 463, 466-67 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Zeller
v. Bailey, 950 So. 2d 1149, 1152 (Ala. 2006) (citations
omitted)).  However, 
"'"[w]hen the grant or denial of relief [from a
default judgment] turns on the validity of the
judgment, as under Rule 60(b)(4)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.],
discretion has no place.  If the judgment is valid,
it must stand; if it is void, it must be set aside.
A judgment is void only if the court rendering it
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the
1091378
11
parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process."'"
Pirtek USA, LLC v. Whitehead, 51 So. 3d 291, 295 (Ala. 2010)
(quoting Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 9 So. 3d 1241, 1244
(Ala. 2008), quoting in turn Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc.
v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So. 2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991)
(emphasis added)).
Analysis
Cornelius first argues that he is entitled to have the
default judgment set aside as void, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4),
Ala. R. Civ. P., on the basis that "the trial court acted in
a 
manner 
inconsistent 
with 
due 
process 
because [Cornelius] was
not given notice of the filing of the motion against him for
1091378
The plaintiffs argue that "Cornelius is estopped from
2
claiming that the default judgment is void under [Rule]
60(b)(4)," because "at no point in time before the trial court
did Cornelius even mention, much less argue, that the judgment
was void pursuant to [Rule] 60(b)(4).  Instead, in literally
every pleading he filed before the trial court, Cornelius
limited his argument to Rule 60(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]."
The plaintiffs' brief, at 22-23.  However, it is well settled
that the nature of a pleading is determined by its substance
and not by its style.  See Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23, 26
(Ala. 1997) ("The substance of a motion and not its style
determines what kind of motion it is.").  Cornelius argued
that he did not receive notice that a motion for a default
judgment had been filed or have an opportunity to contest the
motion. 
 
Cornelius 
also 
argued 
that, 
"[u]nder 
the
circumstances, ... he [was] entitled to relief from the
operation of the [default] [j]udgment in that to do otherwise
would be a miscarriage of justice and constitute a taking of
property without due process." "A judgment is void ... if the
court rendering it ... acted in a manner inconsistent with due
process."  Pirtek USA, 51 So. 3d at 295.  Rule 60(b)(4)
provides that a judgment can be set aside if the "judgment is
void."  Thus, Cornelius's Rule 60(b) motion was, in substance,
a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, and we will consider it as such. 
12
a default judgment."   Cornelius's brief, at 28.  This Court
2
has stated: 
"Procedural due process, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States
Constitution and Article I, § 6, of the Alabama
Constitution 
of 
1901, 
broadly 
speaking, 
contemplates
the rudimentary requirements of fair play, which
include a fair and open hearing before a legally
constituted court or other authority, with notice
and the opportunity to present evidence and
argument, representation by counsel, if desired, and
information as to the claims of the opposing party,
with reasonable opportunity to controvert them.  It
is generally understood that an opportunity for a
1091378
13
hearing before a competent and impartial tribunal
upon proper notice is one of the essential elements
of due process."
Ex parte Weeks, 611 So. 2d 259, 261 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis
added; citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated:
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.
The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information, and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance.  But if with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case these
conditions are reasonably met the constitutional
requirements are satisfied. 'The criterion is not
the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just
and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute
deals.'
"But when notice is a person's due, process
which is a mere gesture is not due process. The
means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence
the constitutional validity of any chosen method may
be defended on the ground that it is in itself
reasonably certain to inform those affected, or,
where conditions do not reasonably permit such
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially
less likely to bring home notice than other of the
feasible and customary substitutes."
1091378
14
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314-15 (1950) (quoting American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S.
47, 67 (1911) (emphasis added; citations omitted)).  See also
Thomas v. Alabama Mun. Elec. Auth., 432 So. 2d 470, 477 (Ala.
1983) ("The method of notice chosen must give reasonable
assurance of actually giving notice in light of other
available means.").
Cornelius argues that the default judgment entered
against him violated principles of due process because he did
not receive notice of the default-judgment motion.  The
plaintiffs argue that "Cornelius was not due any notice of the
motion for default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2)[, Ala.
R. Civ. P.,] because he did not file a proper appearance in
this case."  The plaintiffs' brief, at 28.  Rule 55(b)(2)
provides, in pertinent part:
"If the party against whom judgment by default is
sought has appeared in the action, the party (or, if
appearing 
by 
representative, 
the 
party's
representative) shall be served with written notice
of the application for judgment at least three (3)
days prior to the hearing on such application,
provided, however, that judgment by default may be
entered by the court on the day the case is set for
trial without such three (3) days notice."
1091378
15
Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that Cornelius's failure
to provide a valid address for service of process rendered his
answer insufficient to establish an "appearance" in this case
and that, therefore, Cornelius was not entitled to notice
before a default judgment was entered.  
The plaintiffs cite no authority in support of their
argument.  "'[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a
party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments
for a party based on undelineated general propositions not
supported by sufficient authority or argument.'" Butler v.
Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Dykes v.
Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).
Moreover, Cornelius's answer, which disputed the claims
made against him in the complaint and which included his
telephone number, was sufficient to constitute an appearance
under our caselaw.  See, e.g., Progress Indus., Inc. v.
Wilson, 52 So. 3d 500, 506 (Ala. 2010) ("'"An appearance in
an action involves some submission or presentation to the
court by which a party shows his intention to submit himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. ..."'" (quoting Lee v.
Martin, 533 So. 2d 185, 186 (Ala. 1988), quoting in turn
1091378
Rule 5(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Whenever under
3
these rules service is required ... to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the
court.  Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be
made by delivering a copy to the attorney or the party or by
mailing it to the attorney or the party at the attorney's or
party's last known address, or, if no address is known, by
leaving it with the clerk of court. ... Service by mail is
complete upon mailing."  
16
Cockrell v. World's Finest Chocolate Co., 349 So. 2d 1117,
1120 (Ala. 1977) (overruled on other grounds by Ex parte
Keith, 771 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 1998))). Therefore, the
plaintiffs' argument in this regard is without merit.
The plaintiffs also argue that, pursuant to Rule 5(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.,  they properly served Cornelius with the
3
default-judgment motion by mailing it to Cornelius's "last
known address," which, they say, was the P.O. Box 190 address.
Cornelius argues that such service did not satisfy the
requirements of due process because, he says, the plaintiffs
were aware at the time the motion was filed that Cornelius
would not receive mail sent to the P.O. Box 190 address.  We
agree with Cornelius.
On or about August 27, 2009, the plaintiffs mailed a
notice of Cornelius's deposition to the P.O. Box 190 address.
1091378
17
The 
notice 
was 
returned 
a 
few 
days 
later, 
marked
"undeliverable as addressed."  On September 8, 2009, the
plaintiffs moved the trial court for a default judgment,
arguing:
"Cornelius has provided a false address to the
[p]laintiffs, 
via 
the 
undersigned 
counsel.
Accordingly, the undersigned counsel has no way to
conduct legal proceedings with [Cornelius].  Second,
[Cornelius] has failed to provide the undersigned
counsel with an appropriate address so that
discovery can proceed in this case.  The fact that
... Cornelius provided the Court and the undersigned
counsel with a fraudulent address demonstrates that
[Cornelius] is completely unwilling to abide by the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure and, additionally,
to participate in this case as a Defendant pro se or
otherwise."
(Emphasis added.)
The record clearly indicates that, at the time they filed
the default-judgment motion, the plaintiffs knew that
Cornelius would not receive mail sent to the P.O. Box 190
address.  Nevertheless, they relied on what they described in
their motion as a "false" and "fraudulent" address as the only
means of directly notifying Cornelius, who had filed an answer
pro se, that a default-judgment motion had been filed.  It is
true that the plaintiffs also mailed a copy of the motion to
Coey, an attorney.  However, Coey had never filed a notice of
1091378
18
appearance on Cornelius's behalf. There is no indication that
the  plaintiffs made any other attempt to notify Cornelius of
the pending default-judgment motion, even though they had
successfully served Cornelius with their complaint at the
Maple Drive address only a few months before filing the motion
and had what by all appearances was Cornelius's telephone
number.
We 
cannot conclude that the plaintiffs' 
purported attempt
to notify Cornelius of the default-judgment motion –- mailing
the motion to an address at which they knew Cornelius would
not receive it –- was "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise [Cornelius] of the pendency of the
[default-judgment motion] and afford [him] an opportunity to
present [his] objections," Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, nor can
we conclude that it "g[a]ve reasonable assurance of actually
giving notice in light of other available means."  Thomas, 432
So. 2d at 477.  "Process which is a mere gesture is not due
process," Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, and the trial court erred
in failing to set aside the default judgment against
Cornelius.
1091378
19
The plaintiffs argue that Piel v. Dillard, 414 So. 2d 87
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982), is "direct authority for the
proposition that a party is entitled to rely upon addresses
included within pleadings in order to determine service at the
'last known address.'" The plaintiffs' brief, at 33.  However,
their reliance on Piel is misplaced.  The Court of Civil
Appeals in Piel addressed the issue whether service was proper
when a suggestion of death was mailed to an address that "was
not the address of [the plaintiff's] counsel appearing on the
original complaint nor any subsequent pleading of either
party," and "[t]he record [did] not disclose legal evidence
of whence [the address] came."  Piel, 414 So. 2d at 90.  The
Court of Civil Appeals did not consider whether an address
provided in a pleading could be relied on as the "last known
address" when, as here, the plaintiffs knew that it was not
a valid address for the defendant and when the plaintiffs were
aware of another address for the defendant at which service
in the case had ultimately been successful.  Thus, Piel is
distinguishable from this case and does not support the
plaintiffs' argument.
1091378
Our decision to set aside the default judgment on this
4
ground pretermits consideration of Cornelius's arguments with
regard to the amount of the damages awarded to the plaintiffs,
the absence of a jury assessment of the damages, and issues
related to Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
20
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the default
judgment entered against Cornelius is inconsistent with due
process and is, therefore, void.  See Pirtek USA, 51 So. 3d
at 295 ("A judgment is void ... if the court rendering it ...
acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.").  Cornelius
is entitled to have the default judgment set aside, pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Therefore, we reverse the
trial court's judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.4
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Malone, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and
Wise, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs in the result.
1091378
21
PARKER, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result.
Although I agree with the majority opinion that the
default judgment must be reversed, I reach that conclusion on
different grounds.  In resolving a motion for a default
judgment, a trial court must consider the three factors set
forth in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service,
Inc., 524 So. 2d 600, 605 (Ala. 1988): "1) whether the
defendant has a meritorious defense; 2) whether the plaintiff
will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set
aside; and 3) whether the default judgment was a result of the
defendant's own culpable conduct."  See Manci v. Ball, Koons
& Watson, 995 So. 2d 161 (Ala. 2008); Zeller v. Bailey, 950
So. 2d 1149, 1152-53 (Ala. 2006); Royal Ins. Co. of America
v. Crowne Invs., Inc., 903 So. 2d 802, 808 (Ala. 2004) (noting
that "a trial court must consider" the factors set forth in
Kirtland (emphasis added)); Rooney v. Southern Dependacare,
Inc., 672 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1995) (nothing that "when
determining whether to set aside a default judgment, the trial
court must consider" the factors set forth in Kirtland
(emphasis added)); Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605; Campbell v.
1091378
22
Campbell, 910 So. 2d 1288, 1291 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Smith
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 884 So. 2d 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003);
Cobb v. Loveless, 807 So. 2d 566 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); TCI
Cablevision of Alabama, Inc. v. Tehranchi, 739 So. 2d 519
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Sawyer v. Perkins, 717 So. 2d 432 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998); and White v. Westmoreland, 680 So. 2d 348
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996).  Relying upon our well established
precedent, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals stated in
Ethridge v. Wright, 688 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996):
"Because Ethridge [a defendant against whom a
default judgment had been entered] requested that a
default judgment be set aside, the trial court was
required to consider both whether Ethridge had
established Rule 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] grounds
to set aside the judgment and whether she had met
the standards for setting aside default judgments so
clearly explained by our supreme court in Kirtland
v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d
600, 605-08 (Ala. 1988). See DaLee v. Crosby Lumber
Co., 561 So. 2d 1086, 1091 (Ala. 1990). According to
the supreme court, Ethridge was required not only to
establish a meritorious defense as described in
Kirtland, but also to 'demonstrate the ground under
Rule 
60(b) 
justifying 
relief 
from 
the 
final
judgment.' DaLee, 561 So. 2d at 1091."
688 So. 2d at 819.
It is clear from our precedent that in resolving a motion
to set aside a default judgment the trial court must consider
both whether the movant "established Rule 60(b) grounds to set
1091378
23
aside the judgment" and whether the movant satisfied the
Kirtland factors.  In the present case, although Cornelius may
have established a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., ground for
setting aside the default judgment, there is nothing in the
record before us to affirmatively indicate that the trial
court considered the factors set forth in Kirtland in
resolving Cornelius's motion to set aside the default judgment
against him.  The majority opinion would cut the trial court's
analysis in half by not requiring the trial court to consider
the Kirtland factors in resolving a motion to set aside a
default judgment, effectively overruling some 23 years of
precedent.  I do not believe that such a change in our
precedent is desirable or needed at this juncture.  Instead,
consistent with our precedent, I would reverse the trial
court's judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with
directions for it to consider the Kirtland factors in
resolving Cornelius's motion to set aside the default
judgment.
As set forth in the main opinion, the record indicates
that Cornelius's conduct, if not the sole factor, certainly
contributed to the fact that he was never served with the
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plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment.  Cornelius's
mailbox at his home address was destroyed, thereby preventing
mail from being delivered to him at that address; Cornelius
provided a false address in his answer, whether intentionally
or inadvertently; Cornelius also listed an attorney's address
as the return address on an envelope containing a document
filed with the trial court when he had not retained the
attorney as counsel.  Such facts should be considered by a
trial court under the third Kirtland factor -- "whether the
default judgment was a result of the defendant's own culpable
conduct."  Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605.  Therefore, I would
reverse the default judgment and remand the case to the trial
court for the mandatory consideration of the Kirtland factors.