Title: State v. Kevin P. Sullivan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2244-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Kevin P. Sullivan,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 603, 568 N.W.2d 39 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 25, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Crooks, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Steinmetz and Wilcox, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Steven D. Phillips, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney general with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kevin P. Sullivan,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Sullivan, No. 96-2244-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 26, 1997), affirming judgments of conviction of the Circuit 
Court for Kenosha County, S. Michael Wilk, Judge. 
¶2 
This case involves the admissibility of "other acts" 
evidence under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2)(1995-96).1  Kevin P. 
Sullivan, the defendant, was convicted of battery to a woman 
with 
whom 
he 
was 
romantically 
involved 
(hereafter, 
the 
complainant) and of disorderly conduct.2  The other acts evidence 
                     
1 All further references are to the 1995-96 Wisconsin 
Statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The jury acquitted the defendant of false imprisonment and 
intimidation of a witness. 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
2 
admitted was the testimony of the defendant's ex-wife and a 
neighbor that two years earlier the defendant had abused his ex-
wife, not physically, but by using insulting and intimidating 
words including threats to assault her. 
¶3 
Two issues are raised in this review.  First, did the 
circuit court erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting 
the other acts evidence?  See Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 904.04(2) and 
904.03.  Second, if the circuit court erred in admitting the 
other acts evidence, was the error harmless? 
¶4 
The first issue, the admissibility of other acts 
evidence, is addressed by using the three-step analysis set 
forth below.  This analytical framework (or one substantially 
similar) 
has 
been 
spelled 
out 
in 
prior 
cases,3 
in 
Wis 
JICriminal No. 275 Comment at 2 (Rel. No. 28—12/91) and in Wis 
JICriminal No. 275.1 Comment:  Other Acts Evidence (Rel. No. 
24-1/90). 
                     
3 Some cases set forth these three steps as a two-step 
analysis, with the first step having two parts.  The two-step 
analysis is set forth as follows:  First, the circuit court must 
consider whether the proposed evidence is being offered for a 
valid purpose as identified in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  
Implicit in this first step is the determination that the 
evidence is relevant to an issue in the case.  Second, the court 
must determine whether the probative value of that evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the 
jury, 
or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.  See, e.g., State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987); State v. 
Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 729,  324 N.W.2d 426 (1982).  See also 
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence § 404.5, at 
113 (1991). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
3 
¶5 
The three-step analytical framework is as follows: 
¶6 
(1)  Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), such as 
establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident? 
¶7 
(2)  Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering 
the two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.01?4  The first consideration in assessing relevance is 
whether the other acts evidence relates to a fact or proposition 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action.  The 
second consideration in assessing relevance is whether the 
evidence has probative value, that is, whether the other acts 
evidence has a tendency to make the consequential fact or 
proposition more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
¶8 
(3)  Is the probative value of the other acts evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the 
jury, 
or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence?  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03.  
¶9 
If the other acts evidence was erroneously admitted in 
this case, the second issue presented is whether the error is 
harmless or prejudicial. 
                     
4 See 7 Daniel D. Blinka,  Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence 
§ 401.1, at 63 (1991); 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 773-74 
(John W. Strong, ed., West Publishing Co. 4th ed. 1992). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
4 
¶10 The circuit court admitted the other acts evidence.  
The court of appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction of the 
circuit court.  For the reasons set forth, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  We conclude as follows: 
¶11 (1)  The other acts evidence in this case was 
proffered to establish the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  
¶12 (2)  With regard to relevance, the other acts evidence 
relates to a consequential fact in this case, namely the 
defendant's intent or absence of accident.  The other acts 
evidence is dissimilar enough from the incident upon which the 
charged offenses were based that the evidence is not probative 
of the defendant's intent or absence of accident. 
¶13 (3)  Even if the other acts evidence had probative 
value with regard to the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident, the probative value of the other acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the 
defendant. 
¶14 (4)  The admission of the other acts evidence in this 
case is reversible error. 
I 
¶15 We first comment on the circuit court's and the court 
of appeals' mode of addressing other acts evidence.  In this 
case, the circuit court admitted the other acts evidence.  
Although the prosecutor, the proponent of the evidence, and the 
circuit court referred to the three-step framework described 
above, they failed to relate the specific facts of this case to 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
5 
the analytical framework.  The prosecutor and the circuit court 
did not carefully probe the permissible purposes for the 
admission of the other acts evidence; they did not carefully 
articulate whether the other acts evidence relates to a 
consequential fact or proposition in the criminal prosecution; 
they did not carefully explore the probative value of the other 
acts evidence; and they did not carefully articulate the balance 
of probative value and unfair prejudice. 
¶16 The proponent and the opponent of the other acts 
evidence must clearly articulate their reasoning for seeking 
admission or exclusion of the evidence and must apply the facts 
of the case to the analytical framework.  The circuit court must 
similarly articulate its reasoning for admitting or excluding 
the evidence, applying the facts of the case to the analytical 
framework.  This careful analysis is missing in the record in 
this case and has been missing in other cases reaching this 
court.  Without careful statements by the proponent and the 
opponent of the evidence and by the circuit court regarding the 
rationale for admitting or excluding other acts evidence, the 
likelihood of error at trial is substantially increased and 
appellate review becomes more difficult.  The proponent of the 
evidence, in this case the State, bears the burden of persuading 
the circuit court that the three-step inquiry is satisfied. 
¶17 The court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the 
circuit court, concluding that the other acts evidence was 
relevant to the issues of intent and absence of accident and was 
admissible to show the defendant's propensity to commit the 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
6 
charged offenses.  See Sullivan, unpublished slip op. at 9-10.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals expressed 
concern that the supreme court and the court of appeals over the 
years have chipped away at Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 
N.W.2d 557 (1967), this court's seminal decision regarding other 
acts evidence.  Referring to State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 
398 N.W.2d 763 (1987), and State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 
493 N.W.2d 376 (1992), the court of appeals concluded that "the 
supreme court has signaled that a defendant's motive to commit 
the charged offense can be established by prior acts which 
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to commit such acts.  
That seems contrary to Whitty and § 904.04(2)."  Sullivan, 
unpublished slip. op at 7-8.5 
¶18 In light of the decision and comments of the court of 
appeals, we take this opportunity to reaffirm the vitality of 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) and Whitty, as both the State and 
the defendant have urged us to do. 
II 
                     
5 The Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has analyzed the 
cases involving other acts evidence, commenting that "although 
many of the decisions  . . .  have approved the admission of 
other acts evidence and have tended to expand the range of 
admissible evidence, there are also many cases that have found 
admission to be error."  Wis. JICriminal No. 275.1 Comment at 4 
(Rel. No. 24-1/90) (citations omitted).  The Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee also commented that the cases demonstrate 
that a "'greater latitude of proof' applies to the admission of 
other-crimes evidence in sex crimes cases, especially those 
dealing with children as victims."  Wis. JICriminal No. 275.1 
Comment at 3 (Rel. No. 24-1/90). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
7 
¶19 The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of 
battery to the complainant contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19 and 
disorderly conduct contrary to § 947.01.  The conviction stems 
from an incident which occurred in the early morning hours of 
October 3, 1994, between the defendant and the complainant, his 
then girlfriend. 
¶20 The complainant and the deputy sheriff who responded 
to the complainant's call for help gave different accounts of 
what happened that day. 
¶21 According to the deputy, on October 3, 1994, at 
approximately 5:20 a.m., he responded to a call made from the 
American Legion Hall in Silver Lake.  Inside the Legion Hall, he 
found the complainant upset and crying.  The deputy observed 
that the complainant's lips were swollen and bloody and that 
there were blood spots on her left cheek.  The inside of her 
mouth was also cut.  The deputy photographed the complainant's 
injuries.6 
¶22 The deputy testified that the complainant said she and 
the defendant had been fighting and that she feared the 
defendant.  According to the deputy, the complainant said she 
and the defendant had been out earlier that night, the defendant 
had started drinking, and she had left him to go home.  The 
complainant also told the deputy that the defendant becomes 
hostile and violent when intoxicated. 
                     
6 The deputy's testimony at the preliminary hearing and 
trial was substantially the same.    
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
8 
¶23 According to the deputy, the complainant said she went 
to bed and awoke to find the defendant standing over her.  She 
attempted to leave the bedroom, but the defendant pushed her 
back onto the bed.  When she tried again to leave, he punched 
her in the mouth.  She pleaded with him to let her leave the 
house, but he punched her in the cheek. 
¶24 According to the deputy, the complainant said that at 
one point she told the defendant she was going to call the 
sheriff's 
department, 
whereupon 
the 
defendant 
pulled 
the 
telephone cord out of the wall.  The complainant stated that the 
defendant kept her in the bedroom for about 30 minutes, after 
which time he fell asleep; she then ran from the house, got into 
the defendant's car and drove to the American Legion Hall.  The 
bartender there called for help.  According to the deputy, the 
complainant said she had been in such a panic to get away from 
the defendant that she drove through the yard and over a small 
fence. 
¶25 The deputy further testified that the complainant said 
she did not want the defendant to be arrested or charged.  She 
refused to give the deputy a written statement and refused 
medical treatment.  The complainant said she wanted only to be 
safe from the defendant and to have him out of her house.  She 
gave the deputy permission to go to her house to find the 
defendant. 
¶26 The deputy testified that when he arrived at the 
complainant's residence, he found the defendant intoxicated and 
arrested him.  The deputy observed that a telephone cord in the 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
9 
living room was unplugged.  He also observed that gravel from 
the driveway was scattered on the street.  Later, upon 
inspecting the car, he found a dent in the rear bumper and a 
piece of fence hanging from the undercarriage. 
¶27 At trial a secretary who worked at the Kenosha County 
District Attorney's Office testified that she received a 
telephone call on October 3, 1994, from a woman who identified 
herself as the complainant.  The caller indicated that she was 
upset about the charges against the defendant and said that if 
necessary, she would change her story to stop the charges. 
¶28 The complainant testified at the preliminary hearing 
on October 2, 1994, that she and the defendant had gone to the 
Auctioneer's Inn in Burlington.7  When the defendant started 
drinking, the complainant became upset, stormed out of the 
tavern and drove home. 
¶29 According to the complainant's testimony, when she 
arrived home she took a tranquilizer and fell asleep.  She awoke 
to find the defendant in her bedroom, saying he wanted to talk. 
 When she got out of bed and began pacing between the bedroom 
and the living room, the defendant followed her, insisting that 
they talk.  She yelled at him, telling him she did not want to 
talk.  
¶30 The complainant testified that while in the bedroom, 
she turned around to push the defendant away from her, whereupon 
                     
7 The complainant's testimony at the preliminary hearing and 
trial was substantially the same. 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
10
she fell backwards, hitting the back of her head on either a 
dresser or the bed footboard.  The complainant testified that 
there was no physical contact between the defendant and her that 
morning. 
¶31 Finally, the complainant testified that she walked out 
of the house and got into the defendant's car.  As she was 
leaving, she drove over a piece of fencing, through the yard, 
and through a ditch.  She went to the Legion Hall, where someone 
called 911. 
¶32 The 
complainant 
did 
not 
cooperate 
with 
the 
prosecution.  She was not responsive to the district attorney's 
attempts to interview her, and at trial she testified that she 
still had feelings for the defendant.   
¶33 In a pretrial motion the State sought the circuit 
court's permission to admit evidence of ten separate episodes 
involving the defendant and his ex-wife that had occurred 
between 14 and 26 months before the incident involving the 
complainant.8  The State sought admission of the other acts 
evidence for the purposes of showing "an intent on the part of 
the defendant to threaten, intimidate, control, and harass women 
with whom he is involved in relationships."  The State also 
argued that the other acts evidence would demonstrate "what kind 
of an individual the defendant [was], in terms of how he related 
                     
8 The other acts evidence not admitted included violation of 
non-contact orders, making threatening telephone calls to his 
ex-wife, throwing paint cans and stones, pulling a telephone off 
a tavern wall, and threatening his ex-wife's attorney.   
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
11
to women."  Over the objection of defense counsel, the circuit 
court admitted evidence of one of these other acts.   
¶34 The other acts evidence admitted by the circuit court 
was the testimony of the defendant's ex-wife and a neighbor 
about a domestic disturbance on July 24, 1992.  At trial the ex-
wife testified that the defendant, while intoxicated, refused to 
leave her home and insisted on talking with her.  After she 
repeatedly asked him to leave, he called her a "bitch" and 
threatened to assault her.  She testified that she went to a 
neighbor's house and called the police.  The neighbor's 
testimony confirmed the wife's account of the incident. 
¶35 In admitting the other acts evidence, the circuit 
court reasoned as follows: 
 
Section (Rule) 904.04(2) does permit the State to 
establish the defendant's intent, in the absence of 
accident 
in 
this 
case, 
and 
to 
establish 
the 
defendant's 
knowledge 
and 
motive 
and 
establish 
credibility of the witnesses testifying at trial.  
[The] court believes that, in as much as there has 
been essentially a recantation by the complaining 
witness, that the credibility of the complaining 
witness in recanting and also the credibility of the 
arresting officer, in terms of taking . . .  the 
statement . . .  are at issue. 
¶36 The circuit court gave a cautionary instruction to the 
jury that the other acts evidence is to be considered only on 
the issues of motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or 
accident, or credibility.  The circuit court further instructed 
the jury that the other acts evidence is not to be used to 
conclude that the defendant is a bad person and for that reason 
guilty of the offense charged.  The cautionary instruction 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
12
tracks for the most part the list of permissible purposes set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), with the exception of 
the issue of credibility, which is not enumerated as a purpose 
in § (Rule) 904.04(2).  The circuit court did not tailor the 
cautionary instruction to the facts of the case.  
¶37 The defendant argues that the admission of the 
testimony of his ex-wife and the neighbor as to the other act 
was not probative of his intent or absence of accident, unfairly 
prejudiced him at trial and constituted reversible error. 
III 
¶38 The 
applicable 
standard for 
reviewing 
a circuit 
court's admission of other acts evidence is whether the court 
exercised appropriate discretion.  See State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 349 N.W.2d 498 (1983).  An appellate court 
will sustain an evidentiary ruling if it finds that the circuit 
court examined the relevant facts; applied a proper standard of 
law; and using a demonstrative rational process, reached a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  See Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) 
(citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971)). 
¶39 A circuit court's failure to delineate the factors 
that influenced its decision constitutes an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  See McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 282.  When a circuit 
court fails to set forth its reasoning, appellate courts 
independently review the record to determine whether it provides 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
13
a basis for the circuit court's exercise of discretion.  See 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343. 
IV 
¶40 In Wisconsin the admissibility of other acts evidence 
is governed by Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 904.04(2) and 904.03.  
Section (Rule) 904.04(2) provides as follows: 
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  This 
subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered 
for 
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 provides as follows: 
 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) precludes proof 
that an accused committed some other act for purposes of showing 
that the accused had a corresponding character trait and acted 
in conformity with that trait.9  In other words, § (Rule) 
904.04(2) forbids a chain of inferences running from act to 
character to conduct in conformity with the character.10 
                     
9 7 See Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence 
§ 404.5, at 110. 
10 The chart below depicts the theory of admissibility 
banned by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
14
¶42 The reasons for the rule excluding other acts evidence 
were set forth by the court in Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 292, as 
follows: 
 
(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person 
likely to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn 
not because he is believed guilty of the present 
charge but because he has escaped punishment from 
other offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who 
is not prepared to demonstrate the attacking evidence 
is fabricated; and (4) the confusion of issues which 
might result from bringing in evidence of other 
crimes. 
Id. at 292.  In short, the exclusion of other acts evidence is 
based on the fear that an invitation to focus on an accused's 
character magnifies the risk that jurors will punish the accused 
for being a bad person regardless of his or her guilt of the 
crime charged. 
¶43 Although Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) precludes the 
admission of character or propensity evidence, it permits the 
                                                                  
 
Item of evidence  
 
Intermediate 
inference  
 
 
Ultimate inference 
 
The accused's  
other act 
 
The accused's 
subjective,  
personal character, 
disposition, or 
propensity 
 
 
The accused's 
conduct in 
conformity with his 
or her character on 
the charged occasion 
 
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's 
Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea:  The Doctrines that 
Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 Mil. 
L. Rev. 41 (1990). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
15
admission of other acts evidence if its relevance does not hinge 
on an accused's propensity to commit the act charged.  The 
second sentence in § (Rule) 904.04(2) sets forth a series of 
evidential propositions which do not violate the propensity 
inference:  motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  This 
list is not exhaustive or exclusive.  See State v. Kaster, 148 
Wis. 2d 789, 797, 436 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1989). 
¶44 In determining whether to admit other acts evidence, 
counsel and courts should engage in the three-step analytical 
framework we outlined earlier. 
¶45 The first step in the analysis is to determine whether 
the other acts evidence is offered for a permissible purpose 
under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), such as to establish 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, 
plan, 
knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  
¶46 At trial, the prosecutor argued that the other acts 
evidence was related to intent, motive and purpose.  His 
language, however, indicated that the evidence was aimed at the 
defendant's character and propensity.  The prosecutor said: 
 
What [the other acts evidence] tells us is that this 
is an individual who's not going to be told what to 
do.  But anybody, whether it's a woman, God forbid it 
should be a woman, telling him what to do . . . This 
is a man who lives a life outside of the norms and 
rules of society, outside of any control.  It tells us 
volumes about his motivation, about his intent, about 
his purpose. 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
16
¶47 The circuit court admitted the other acts evidence, 
stating that it was probative of motive, intent, knowledge, 
absence of mistake or accident, and credibility.  On appeal the 
State concedes that the circuit court's list of exceptions 
applicable to the other acts evidence in this case is too broad. 
 The State argues, however, that the conviction can be saved 
because the other acts evidence is admissible for the purpose of 
establishing intent or absence of accident, which are closely 
intertwined in this case.  Criminal intent is the state of mind 
that negatives accident or inadvertence.  Evidence of other acts 
may be admitted if it tends to undermine an innocent explanation 
for an accused's charged criminal conduct.11 
¶48 With regard to the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident, the State argues that to convict the defendant of 
battery, it had to prove the defendant intended to cause bodily 
harm to the complainant.  Based on the complainant's testimony 
at the preliminary hearing, the State assumed that she would 
testify at trial that her injuries were the result of an 
accident, not the result of the defendant's intent to cause 
bodily harm.12   
                     
11 See 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Federal 
Evidence, 
§404.22[1][a], 
at 
404-70 
(Joseph 
M. 
McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
12 In this case the defendant did not take the stand at 
trial.  The theory developed by the defense counsel in cross-
examination of the complainant and in summation was that the 
complainant accidentally caused her own injuries. 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
17
¶49 Dean Wigmore offers a famous example of the use of 
other acts evidence to show intent or absence of accident.  In 
Wigmore's example, a hunter is charged with having shot a 
companion, 
and 
the 
hunter 
claims 
that 
the 
shooting 
was 
accidental.  Under these circumstances evidence of the hunter's 
having fired at the companion on other occasions becomes 
admissible to disprove the claim of accidental shooting.13  
¶50 We agree with the State that the use of other acts 
evidence in this case to prove intent or absence of accident is 
permissible.  We therefore conclude that the State has met its 
burden to show that the purpose is permissible under step one of 
the three-step analysis. 
¶51 We now turn to the second step in the analysis:  Is 
the other acts evidence relevant?  Under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.01, relevance has two facets.  The first consideration in 
assessing relevance is whether the evidence relates to a fact or 
proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.14  The substantive law determines the elements of the 
                     
13 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 302, at 241 (Chadbourn rev. 
1979).  See also United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 334 
(7th Cir. 
1987) (in murder 
prosecution, evidence of the 
defendant's use of gun two other times on the same day was 
properly admitted to show that the firing of the gun was 
intentional rather than accidental or inadvertent). 
14 If intent is not an issue in the case, the exception for 
intent under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) does not apply.  See 
State v. Danforth, 129 Wis. 2d 187, 201, 385 N.W.2d 125 
(1986)(in 
prosecution for 
cruel maltreatment 
of 
children, 
evidence that the defendant had struck the child on two prior 
occasions was irrelevant since intent to injure was not an 
element of the offense).  See also Judicial Council Committee 
Notes, § (Rule) 904.04, 59 Wis. 2d R79 (1973).  
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
18
crime charged and the ultimate facts and links in the chain of 
inferences that are of consequence to the case.  Thus the 
proponent of the evidence, here the State, must articulate the 
fact or proposition that the evidence is offered to prove.  The 
parties agree, as does this court, that intent or absence of 
accident is of consequence to the case and that the evidence was 
offered to prove intent or absence of accident.15  
¶52 The second consideration in assessing relevance is 
probative value, that is, whether the evidence has a tendency to 
make a consequential fact more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
¶53 The probative value of the other acts evidence in this 
case depends on the other incident's nearness in time, place and 
circumstances to the alleged crime or to the fact or proposition 
sought to be proved.  See Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294.  Since it 
is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere 
chance that carries probative weight, the probative value lies 
in the similarity between the other act and the charged offense. 
 The stronger the similarity between the other acts and the 
charged offense, the greater will be the probability that the 
                     
15 Some might use the terminology of materiality instead of 
consequence and say that intent or absence of accident is a 
material issue in the case. In Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01 the 
concept of consequential facts replaces the common law term 
"materiality."  7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Evidence § 
401.1, at 64 (1991). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
19
like result was not repeated by mere chance or coincidence.16  In 
other words, "[I]f a like occurrence takes place enough times, 
it can no longer be attributed to mere coincidence.  Innocent 
intent will become improbable."  State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 
424, 443, 407 N.W.2d 256 (1987).  
¶54 The required degree of similarity between the other 
act and the charged offense and the required number of similar 
other acts cannot be formulated as a general rule. The greater 
the similarity, complexity and distinctiveness of the events, 
the stronger is the case for admission of the other acts 
evidence.17 How many similar events are enough depends on the 
                     
16 As described by Dean Wigmore, who labeled the theory "the 
doctrine of chances," the relevance of similar acts evidence on 
the issue of intent rests on "that logical process which 
eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying 
instances of the same result until it is perceived that this 
element cannot explain them all."  2 Wigmore, Evidence § 302, at 
241 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).  One accidental discharge of a 
hunter's gun in the direction of the companion is plausible.  
However, if two shots from the gun narrowly miss the companion 
and 
a 
third 
shot 
kills 
the 
companion, 
"the 
immediate 
inference . . . is that [the hunter] shot at [the companion] 
deliberately."  Id. 
17 For cases discussing whether other acts evidence is 
relevant to show intent or absence of accident, see State v. 
Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 443, 407 N.W.2d 256 (1987) (other acts 
evidence not admissible on intent); Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 
269, 280-81, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980) (other acts evidence 
admissible on intent); King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 46, 248 
N.W.2d 458 (1977) (other acts evidence admissible on intent and 
absence of mistake or accident); State v. Bustamante, 201 
Wis. 2d 562, 575-76, 549 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1996) (other acts 
evidence 
admissible 
to 
negate 
statements 
defendant 
made 
suggesting he had accidentally caused his infant son's fatal 
injuries).  
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
20
complexity and relative frequency of the event rather than on 
the total number of occurrences.18   
¶55 The State argues in this court that there were 
numerous similarities between the other incident and the 
incident being prosecuted, and thus that the other acts evidence 
was probative of the issue of intent or absence of accident.  
The State sets forth the similarities of the two incidents as 
follows:  In both incidents the defendant was intoxicated; the 
defendant was at the home of a woman with whom he had been 
romantically involved; the defendant repeatedly insisted on 
talking to the woman; the woman refused to talk; the defendant 
became verbally abusive when the woman rejected his demands to 
talk; the woman asked him to leave; the defendant remained in 
the woman's home. 
¶56 We agree with the State that many circumstances of the 
two incidents are similar.  Nevertheless, the other incident 
does not support the inference, urged by the State, that the 
defendant intentionally hits women with whom he has been 
romantically involved. 
¶57 First, the State's comparison involves only one other 
incident, not a series of incidents.  Second, the factual 
                     
18 For instance, if the hunter in Wigmore's example fired 
thousands of shots over the course of decades of hunting with 
the same companion, only three of which passed near the 
companion, the possibility that all three shots were accidental 
remains plausible.  See Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of 
Chances to Prove Actus Reus in Child Abuse and Acquaintance 
Rape: People v. Ewoldt Reconsidered, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 355, 
382 (1996). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
21
descriptions of the incidents do not involve particularly 
complex or unusual facts.  Third, and most important, the State 
glosses over one significant and telling difference between the 
two 
incidents: 
 
The 
prior 
incident 
involved 
a 
domestic 
disturbance between the defendant and his ex-wife in which they 
argued but there was no physical contact between them.  The 
charged offense in this case, by contrast, involved the 
defendant punching the complainant. 
¶58 That the defendant could have confronted and argued 
with his ex-wife, threatened her, swore at her and refused to 
leave her house does not make it more probable that he 
intentionally hit the complainant during an argument two years 
later. 
¶59 Accordingly, we conclude that the other acts evidence 
was not probative of the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in admitting the other acts evidence. 
¶60 We need not go further in the three-step analysis, but 
if we were persuaded that the other acts evidence is probative 
of a permissible purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), 
the final step of our analysis would be to determine whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in weighing 
the probative value of the other acts evidence against the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
22
¶61 Were we to reach the third analytical step, we would 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in the balancing test under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03.  The probative value, if any, of the other acts evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant. 
¶62 Unfair prejudice results when the proffered evidence 
has a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or if 
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury 
to 
base 
its 
decision 
on something 
other 
than the 
established propositions in the case.  See State v. Mordica, 168 
Wis. 2d 593, 605, 484 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Lease 
Am. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 88 Wis. 2d 395, 401, 276 
N.W.2d 767 (1979)).  In this case the danger of unfair prejudice 
was that the jurors would be so influenced by the other acts 
evidence that they would be likely to convict the defendant 
because the other acts evidence showed him to be a bad man.19 
¶63 The State relies on two factors to show that there was 
no unfair prejudice:  the defendant was acquitted of two 
charges, and the circuit court gave the jury cautionary 
instructions.   
                     
19 "[T]he legal prejudice of which we speak here is the 
potential harm in a jury's concluding that because an actor 
committed one bad act, he necessarily committed the crime with 
which he is now charged."  State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 
261-62, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) (citing State v. Tarrell, 74 
Wis. 2d 647, 657, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976)). 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
23
¶64 First, the State argues that the jury apparently bore 
the cautionary instruction in mind since it acquitted the 
defendant of two of the four counts with which he was charged.  
We are not persuaded that acquittal of two charges in this case 
demonstrates that the jury was not influenced by the other acts 
evidence in convicting on the other two charges.  In this case 
the defendant's character traits inferred from the other acts 
evidence seems more pertinent to the convicted offense of 
battery than to the acquitted offenses of false imprisonment and 
intimidation of a witness.  Acquittal of the two charges does 
not demonstrate that the jury was not influenced by the other 
acts evidence in convicting the defendant on the battery charge.  
¶65 Second, the State correctly points out that the 
circuit court gave a cautionary instruction.  As courts have 
stated, a cautionary instruction, even if not tailored to the 
case, can go "'far to cure any adverse effect attendant with the 
admission of the [other acts] evidence.'"  State v. Mink, 146 
Wis. 2d 1, 17, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting State v. 
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 262, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985)). 
¶66 We are not persuaded by this argument.  Although 
cautionary instructions reduce the risk that a jury will find an 
accused guilty simply because he or she is a bad person, in this 
case the cautionary instruction to the jury about the other acts 
evidence 
was 
too 
broad 
and 
its 
cautionary 
effect 
was 
significantly diminished. 
¶67 Furthermore, the prosecutor referred to the other acts 
evidence extensively in both the opening and closing statements 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
24
and urged the jury to consider what the evidence revealed about 
the defendant's character.  In the opening statement, the 
prosecutor said the defendant was a man who would not let a 
woman tell him what to do.  The prosecutor indicated that the 
evidence would show "what [the defendant] does when he drinks 
and becomes disruptive," namely that he "engages in threatening 
behavior, abusive behavior, even behavior that takes place in 
the presence of law enforcement officers." 
¶68 During his closing argument, the prosecutor explained 
that the other incident placed the current charges "in context," 
revealing the defendant's "motives" for committing these crimes.  
¶69 The prosecutor explained how the other incident showed 
that the defendant "knows exactly what is going on, what is and 
is not allowed because he's been arrested before for similar 
type behavior in the past."  The prosecutor returned to this 
theme during his rebuttal argument.   
¶70 In light of the prosecutor's repeated references to 
the other acts evidence in the opening and closing statements, 
and the fact that the cautionary instruction was not limited to 
evidence of the defendant's intent or absence of accident, we 
conclude that the cautionary instruction was insufficient to 
cure the prejudicial impact of the other acts evidence. 
¶71 Were we to reach the third analytical step, we would 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in the balancing test under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03.  The probative value, if any, of the other acts evidence 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
25
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant. 
V 
¶72 Having concluded that it was error to admit the other 
acts evidence, the remaining question is whether the error was 
harmless in this case.  The test for harmless error is whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the conviction.  See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985); Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 265.  The conviction 
must be reversed unless the court is certain the error did not 
influence the jury.  See Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 541-42.  
¶73 The 
burden 
of 
proving 
no 
prejudice 
is 
on 
the 
beneficiary of the error, here the State.  The State must 
establish that there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the conviction.  See Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543. 
¶74 After a careful reading of the record we conclude that 
the State has not proven that the error did not contribute to 
the conviction.  
¶75 The State was unable to present a witness who could 
link the complainant's injuries to the defendant's intentional 
conduct.  Although the deputy testified to the statements the 
complainant made to him on October 3, 1994, the complainant's 
testimony at trial conflicted with the deputy's account of her 
earlier statements.  The jury had to decide at what point the 
complainant was telling the truth—the morning of the incident or 
at trial.  Was she telling the truth in her out-of-court 
statements to the deputy implicating the defendant or in her in-
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
26
court statements exonerating the defendant?  In light of the 
complainant's inconsistent statements, any evidence that tended 
to support one version over the other necessarily influenced the 
jury. 
¶76 By his own words the prosecutor conceded the weakness 
of the State's case and the critical need for the other acts 
evidence if the State were to carry its burden of proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the hearing on the motion to 
admit other acts evidence the prosecutor argued: 
 
In this particular case, we're going to have a victim 
who is not going to offer testimony that evidence is 
the defendant's state of mind.  She's completely 
recanted on that, and all we have are the bare 
minimums of what she informed the police of on that 
day as well as her behavior in fleeing from the 
defendant . . . .  That's why the prior acts evidence 
is demonstrably critical to a full presentation of the 
facts and to flush out those specific elements of the 
offense. 
 
 . . .  
 
I submit that . . . a defense attorney can easily 
argue 
that 
when 
the 
State's 
burden 
is 
beyond 
reasonable doubt, and we have a victim saying one 
thing on one occasion and saying totally opposite on 
another, that there is clearly doubt, a reasonable 
doubt as to what occurred, and that the State has not 
met its burden of proof, and that is the scenario that 
comes across if none of the prior acts evidence come 
in.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶77 Based on our review of the record and the prosecutor's 
own view of the case, we conclude that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the other acts evidence contributed to the 
defendant's convictions.  Accordingly we conclude that the State 
No. 96-2244-CR 
 
27
has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict. 
¶78 In sum, we conclude as follows:   
¶79 (1)  The 
other 
acts 
evidence 
in 
this 
case 
was 
proffered to establish the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). 
¶80 (2)  With regard to relevance, the other acts evidence 
relates to a consequential fact in this case, namely the 
defendant's intent or absence of accident.  The other acts 
evidence is dissimilar enough from the incident upon which the 
charged offenses were based that the evidence is not probative 
of the defendant's intent or absence of accident. 
¶81 (3)  Even if the other acts evidence had probative 
value with regard to the defendant's intent or absence of 
accident, the probative value of the other acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the 
defendant. 
¶82 (4)  The admission of the other acts evidence in this 
case is reversible error.   
¶83 Accordingly we reverse the judgments of conviction and 
remand the cause to the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
1 
¶84 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Dissenting).    I dissent.  
Although I agree with many portions of the majority opinion, I 
disagree with the majority's conclusions in four respects.  
First, there is substantial evidence in the record that the 
circuit court judge delineated the factors influencing his 
decision to admit the other acts evidence.  As such, this 
court's review of the admission of other acts evidence is 
limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.   Second, the other acts evidence is 
significantly similar to the charged offenses in several 
respects and is therefore probative of the defendant's intent or 
absence of accident in the present case.  Third, the probative 
value of the other acts evidence is not substantially outweighed 
by any unfair prejudice to the defendant.   Fourth, the jury 
instruction given on other acts evidence was not so overly broad 
that it significantly diminished any cautionary effect. 
¶85 The majority correctly states that "[t]he applicable 
standard for reviewing a circuit court's admission of other acts 
evidence is whether the court exercised appropriate discretion." 
 Majority op. at 12.   The majority also correctly states that a 
circuit court's evidentiary ruling will be sustained provided 
the circuit court considers the relevant facts, applies the 
appropriate standard of law, and uses a demonstrative rational 
process to reach a reasonable conclusion.  See Majority op. at 
13.  In the present case, the circuit court engaged in a 
thorough discussion of:  (1) the facts surrounding the July 24, 
1992, incident and the evidence in the present case; (2) the 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
2 
application of Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04(2) and 904.03 under the 
circumstances; and (3) the probative value of the other acts 
evidence, including the conclusion that the probative value of 
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial 
effect.   
¶86 In addressing the State's request to admit evidence of 
the July 24, 1992, incident, the circuit court made the 
following detailed analysis of the facts: 
 
In terms of, first of all, the elements, there's an 
allegation that the defendant at that time was 
intoxicated and verbally abusive.  I should note, in 
terms of the intoxication element in the instant case, 
the facts allege that the complaining witness and the 
defendant ended up at [an establishment]  . . .  and 
the defendant began to drink . . . . 
 
 . . .  
 
[T]he Court is not going to speculate as to whether 
[the defendant] was either under some order not to 
drink or was--  had a drinking situation in which he 
had been committed from the drinking.  Whatever it 
was, that was an issue, and the Court will accept, for 
purposes of prior acts, that drinking was some kind of 
a problem for the defendant.  [In the present case] 
the officer had indicated that, in the preliminary, 
that the [defendant] appeared in the [complainant's] 
bedroom, that he had been drinking. 
 
 . . .  
 
And [the officer in the present case] reported that 
[the complainant] said that [the defendant] and she 
had been out . . . and when he became too intoxicated, 
she left him; and he becomes hostile and violent when 
he drinks alcohol.  . . .  
 
This prior act on July 24, 1992, with reference to 
that, 
the 
officer 
from 
the 
Burlington 
Police 
Department was dispatched in the city of Burlington to 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
3 
a domestic disturbance in progress.  And, upon 
arrival, he indicated that he located a female 
standing by a van crying and obviously upset; and that 
was [the neighbor] indicating that the man later 
identified as [the defendant] had been at the address 
causing trouble between [the defendant] and his ex-
wife . . . .  And she indicated that [the defendant] 
had been verbally abusive and refused to leave upon 
request.   
 
And 
then 
the 
officer 
interviewed 
[the] 
ex-wife, 
apparently, of the defendant; and she indicated that 
the defendant was seated on the porch and had recently 
arrived at her home and refused to leave, and that the 
defendant was intoxicated and verbally abusive to her 
and to her children and [her neighbor], and that [her 
neighbor's] husband was also present. 
 
And the officer approached the defendant, asked him 
his name.  The defendant told the officers his last 
name was Sullivan and then said that was all he was 
going to tell me. 
 
The ex-wife [] indicated that the defendant had 
approached—- she had approached the defendant while in 
the driveway of the home when he arrived.  An argument 
ensued.  She stated that [the defendant] began yelling 
at her; in the process of doing this, called her 
[derogatory names], and that he was going to take her 
in the backyard and beat her up. 
In light of the similarities in the two instances, the circuit 
court concluded that "it would seem appropriate on those issues, 
that under 904.04, that so much of the July 24, 1992 incident, 
as I've discussed, be admitted as a prior act."   
¶87 The circuit court also made a determination on the 
record that the probative value of the evidence of the July 24, 
1992, incident was not substantially outweighed by any unfairly 
prejudicial effect.  
 
[The] Court believes that while the information is 
obviously prejudicial to the defendant, that it is not 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
4 
unfairly prejudicial, in that the issue before the 
Court is his actions on the night in question.  And in 
as much as there has been a recantation, the Court 
believes that it is appropriate for the State to be 
able to, under 904.04, to establish the defendant's 
intent in the absence of accident . . . .  The Court 
believes that while the acts are similar, for which 
they must be in order to qualify under 904.04, that 
they do not unfairly prejudice the defendant. 
¶88 Although 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that it was not unfairly 
prejudicial.  This is an accurate analysis since under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03 the probative value of the other acts evidence is 
appropriately "weighed against the danger of misleading the jury 
and unfair prejudice, not prejudice."  State v. Grande, 169 
Wis. 2d 422, 434, 485 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1992). 
¶89 These excerpts from the record evince the circuit 
court's extensive analysis in finding the other acts evidence 
admissible.  Our review involves an analysis of whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting 
the evidence of the incident involving the defendant and his ex-
wife.  See State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983).  "The question on appeal is not whether this court, 
ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence, would 
have permitted it to come in, but whether the trial court 
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal 
standards and in accordance with the facts of record."  State v. 
Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979) (citing 
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
5 
¶90 The cases cited by the majority for the proposition 
that this court's review should be independent are factually 
distinguishable from the present case.  For example, in 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 282, the circuit court judge failed to 
provide any reason why a nine year near-maximum sentence for a 
non-violent crime (forging a $50 check) was appropriate where 
the defendant was a first offender.  In that case, the judge 
"very well and properly stated his reasons why probation was not 
appropriate, but gave no reason for the sentence he did 
impose."20  Id.  (emphasis supplied). 
¶91 Similarly, in Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343, this court  
independently reviewed the record where the circuit court "had 
not explicitly engaged in the balancing test required by sec. 
904.03, Stats., nor had the [circuit] court articulated clearly 
the reasons for admitting the [other acts] evidence."  The 
circuit court's entire discussion of the evidence in Pharr was 
as follows:  "I think that the evidence of [the shooting] would 
be admissible for reasons [the prosecution] stated.  Evidence of 
any armed robbery of any bank would appear to me to be highly 
prejudicial and would appear to me to be inadmissible."  Id. at 
339. 
                     
20 The circuit court's only discussion of the sentence 
imposed consisted of the following:  "I intend to follow the 
recommendation of the Probation Department, and I will not grant 
probation in this case.  I'm prepared to make disposition 
thereon.  The laws of society apply to every member thereof, 
whether in a nichey type attitude he considers himself to be 
above them or not."  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 268, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971). 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
6 
¶92 In the present case, the circuit court made an in-
depth analysis of the facts surrounding the July 24, 1992, 
incident and determined that the evidence would be properly 
admitted to show the defendant's intent and absence of accident 
under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2).21  
The 
circuit 
court 
also 
considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03, and concluded that its probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.   
¶93 The majority states that the incident on July 24, 
1992, "relates to a consequential fact in this case, namely the 
defendant's intent or absence of accident."  Majority op. at 28. 
 However, the majority concludes that "[t]he other acts evidence 
is dissimilar enough from the incident upon which the charged 
offenses were based that the evidence is not probative of the 
defendant's intent or absence of accident."  Id.  
¶94 The majority concedes "that many circumstances of the 
two incidents are similar."  Majority op. at 21.  These 
similarities include the defendant's intoxication, the defendant 
being at the homes of women with whom he had a romantic 
relationship, the defendant insisting on speaking with the 
women, the women refusing to speak with the defendant, the 
defendant physically threatening the women and becoming verbally 
abusive, the women asking him to leave their residence and the 
defendant refusing, and the women contacting law enforcement 
                     
21 The circuit court also admitted the other act evidence to 
show motive, knowledge, and witness credibility.    
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
7 
officers for assistance.  These numerous similarities evince 
that the other acts evidence of the incident on July 24, 1992, 
is probative of the defendant's intent or absence of accident in 
the present case.  The evidence is particularly relevant to the 
defendant's absence of accident regarding the battery charge 
since the complainant recanted her story and claimed that the 
bodily harm resulted from an accident.  The defendant's physical 
threats and verbal abuse, intoxication, and refusal to leave his 
ex-wife's home under circumstances significantly similar to the 
present case make it more probable that the intoxicated 
defendant intended to physically threaten and batter the 
complainant.   
¶95 The majority's main concern with the other acts 
evidence appears to be the fact that the prior incident did not 
involve any bodily harm to the defendant's ex-wife.  Thus, the 
majority concludes that the prior act makes it no more probable 
that the defendant physically assaulted the complainant in the 
present case.  Although the other acts evidence is probative to 
the battery charge in any event, the majority's conclusion fails 
to recognize that the defendant was facing charges on three 
separate countsbattery, false imprisonment, intimidation of a 
victimall of which require intent as an element of the offense 
and only one of which requires the element of bodily harm.22  
                     
22 The counts for which the defendant was charged that 
include intent as an element of the crime are battery contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1); false imprisonment contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.30; and intimidation of a victim contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.44(1).  The defendant was also charged with 
disorderly conduct contrary to Wis. Stat. § 947.01. 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
8 
¶96 The defendant's intoxicated state, physical threats, 
and refusal to leave his ex-wife's residence on a prior occasion 
make it more probable that the intoxicated defendant threatened 
the complainant, refused to leave the complainant's residence 
and intentionally refused to let her leave.  Moreover, the 
defendant's intoxication and repeated threats and verbal abuse 
of his ex-wife on July 24, 1992, make it more probable that the 
defendant intentionally prevented the complainant from calling 
law enforcement officers to report that the defendant caused her 
bodily harm and refused to let her leave her residence. The 
complainant was able to escape her residence and report the 
incident only after the defendant had fallen asleep.23 
¶97 The majority also fails to consider that not only did 
the 
circuit 
court 
undertake 
a 
thorough 
analysis 
of 
the 
particular incident that was ultimately admitted as other acts 
evidence, but the circuit court carefully considered and denied 
several other instances of prior acts that the State sought to 
                     
23 Although 
the 
complainant's 
claim 
of 
accident 
was 
specifically directed at the battery charge, the proffered other 
acts evidence is relevant to the defendant's intent as well as 
absence of accident.  As stated, intent is an element of the 
battery 
charge, 
the 
false 
imprisonment 
charge, 
and 
the 
intimidation of a victim charge. 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
9 
introduce.24  More importantly, the circuit court undertook such 
a detailed analysis of the July 24, 1992, incident that it went 
so far as to prohibit the State from presenting to the jury 
certain portions of the incident that were not similar to the 
present case.25   
¶98 In addition to the thorough analysis of the other acts 
evidence, the circuit court gave a cautionary instruction to the 
jury that the evidence of the July 24, 1992, incident was 
                     
24 The majority opinion finds it relevant that the State's 
other acts evidence "involves only one other incident, not a 
series of incidents."  See Majority op. at 21.  A single 
instance of other acts evidence is not per se inadmissible.  See 
State v. Roberson, 157 Wis. 2d 447, 455 n.1, 459 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. 
App. 1990), review denied, 464 N.W.2d 424 (Wis., Oct 16, 1990). 
 Several other incidents were proferred as evidence; however, 
the circuit court denied the State's request to admit other acts 
evidence 
of 
incidents 
that 
occurred 
on 
July 
26, 
1992 
(defendant's telephone calls to neighbor verbally abusing and 
threatening the neighbor and defendant's ex-wife); September 7, 
1992 (defendant's telephone calls to ex-wife threatening her and 
her male friend); September 8, 1992 (defendant was intoxicated 
and creating a disturbance at a local tavern, and defendant 
threw items and pulled the phone out of the wall); September 10, 
1992 (defendant threatening ex-wife's divorce attorney at the 
attorney's office); September 11, 1992 (defendant abusive and 
intoxicated at ex-wife's divorce attorney's office, resulting in 
defendant's arrest); February 4, 1993 (defendant's verbally 
abusive and threatening telephone calls to ex-wife); June 2, 
1993 (defendant contacting ex-wife in spite of bond conditions 
ordering no contact); August 11, 1993 (defendant's contact with 
ex-wife in violation of court orders). 
25 There was evidence in the police report from the July 24, 
1992, incident that the neighbor believed the defendant had a 
weapon in his van at that time, that the defendant recklessly 
handled weapons, and that the defendant bought and resold a 
number of guns.  The circuit court denied admission of any 
testimony referencing a weapon, stating "[t]he Court does not 
believe that that testimony is similar or relevant." 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
10
probative only of the defendant's motive, intent, knowledge, 
absence of mistake or accident, and credibility.  See WI 
JICriminal 275.  Although the use of the evidence in the 
present case is only permissible to prove defendant's intent or 
absence of accident, the circuit court's instruction was not so 
"broad that its cautionary effect was significantly diminished." 
 Majority op. at 24. 
¶99 In State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 
(1985), the circuit court admitted other acts evidence under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.04(2) 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
showing 
the 
defendant's motive, intent, preparation or plan.  Accordingly, 
the cautionary instruction given to the jury in Fishnick stated 
that the other acts evidence was admitted to show motive, 
intent, preparation or plan.  See id. at 260.  On appeal, this 
court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting the evidence because the 
evidence was relevant for purposes of motive and identity.  See 
id.  However, this court determined that the evidence was 
inadmissible to show plan, preparation, or intent to do the act. 
 Although the jury instruction in Fishnick was broad, this court 
upheld the admission of the evidence concluding that "[t]he jury 
was properly instructed that the evidence was introduced on the 
issue of motive."  Id. at 261.   
¶100 Furthermore, in State v. Roberson, 157 Wis. 2d 447, 
459 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 464 N.W.2d 424 
(Wis., Oct. 16, 1990), the court of appeals upheld the circuit 
court's admission of other acts evidence.  In admitting the 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
11
evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury that the other 
act was admissible because it was relevant to the issue of the 
defendant's alleged plan.  See id. at 452.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the evidence was not admissible to show the 
defendant's plan, but that it was admissible to show the 
defendant's intent.  See id. at 454.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court, stating that "[a]lthough the trial 
court articulated the wrong reason for admission of the [other 
acts] evidence, we will affirm if the ruling is proper on other 
grounds."  Id. at 453-54. 
¶101 I agree with the majority that the vitality of Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2) and Whitty should be reaffirmed.  See Majority 
op. at 7.  Whitty states that other acts evidence should be used 
sparingly and only when reasonably necessary.  See Whitty, 34 
Wis. 2d at 297.  However, a determination of admissibility must 
be made on a case-by-case basis, using a detailed analysis of 
the facts.  There is neither a presumption of exclusion nor a 
presumption of admission regarding other acts evidence.  See 
State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1114, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993).  
If the evidence is relevant for an admissible purpose under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2), it will be admitted unless its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  See id. 
at 1115.   
¶102 In the present case, the circuit court articulated its 
reasons why the July 24, 1992, incident was probative to show 
the defendant's intent or absence of accident and applied the 
proper Wis. Stat. § 904.03 analysis.  The circuit court 
No. 96-2244.npc 
 
12
considered the relevant facts, applied the appropriate standard 
of law, and demonstrated a rational process in reaching the 
conclusion to admit the other acts evidence.  The other acts 
evidence had definite probative value on the issues of intent 
and absence of accident.  That probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by the dangers set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03, such as unfair prejudice.  There was no erroneous 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court judge in allowing 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
to 
be 
presented 
to 
the 
jury.  
Furthermore, consistent with our prior decisions, the cautionary 
instruction given was appropriate, since the jury was instructed 
that the evidence was admitted for the purposes of showing the 
defendant's intent and absence of accident. 
¶103 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶104 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.