Title: Massee and Massee

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  January 22, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

DAVID MASSEE,

	Respondent on Review,

	and

CONSTANCE GENEVIEVE MASSEE,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 93C-31338; CA A84859; SC S43076)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted March 7, 1997.

	J. Michael Alexander, of Burt, Swanson, Lathen, Alexander,
McCann & Smith, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs on
behalf of petitioner on review. 

	John Hemann, of Garrett, Hemann, Robertson, Paulus, Jennings
& Comstock, P.C., Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs on
behalf of respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

*	Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

	Rodney W. Miller, Judge.

	138 Or App 589, 911 P2d 320 (1996).

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March
31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		We address two questions in this marital dissolution
action.  The first question is whether the appreciation, during
the marriage, of assets brought to the marriage by husband and
held separately by him is a marital asset under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
(set forth below).  The trial court divided the marital property
without deciding this question.  We conclude, as did a divided
Court of Appeals sitting en banc, that such appreciation is a
marital asset.  

		The second question is whether wife is entitled to
share in that marital asset.  The trial court concluded that wife
was not entitled to share in the appreciation of husband's
separately held assets and awarded husband all the interest in
those assets, including any appreciation in the value of those
assets that occurred during the marriage.  On appeal, the Court
of Appeals concluded that husband successfully rebutted the
presumption in ORS 107.105(1)(f) that both spouses contributed
equally to the acquisition of marital assets and affirmed the
trial court's division of the marital property.  Massee and
Massee, 138 Or App 589, 599, 601, 911 P2d 320 (1996) (en banc). 
As we explain post, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse the judgment of the
circuit court, and remand the case to the circuit court for
further proceedings.

 		The Court of Appeals reviewed this case de novo. 
Pursuant to ORS 19.125(4), this court also may review de novo, or
it may limit its review to questions of law.  The facts relevant
to the resolution of the issues before us are not in dispute,
although their legal significance is.  Accordingly, there is no
reason to review de novo.  Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 238,
951 P2d 693 (1998).  We take the following undisputed facts from
the opinion of the Court of Appeals and from the record.

		The parties were married in February 1991, and husband
filed for dissolution of the marriage in February 1993.  Husband
has been a farmer for most of his adult life.  At the time of the
marriage, he owned substantial farming, business, and real estate
holdings.  Those holdings included the Mission Nut Company, the
Mission Cherry Company, a farm, a residence, a large tract of
land known as the "bayou property," and commercial buildings in
Salem and Wilsonville.  The Wilsonville building contained a
retail hardware business and related equipment that husband
owned.

		Wife brought into the marriage a car and some personal
items.  Before the marriage, wife worked as a clerk at a local
bank and had completed a variety of classes at Chemeketa
Community College.  Her principal source of income before the
marriage was the sale of stocks given to her by her mother.  At
the time of the marriage, wife was employed part-time as a
manicurist.   Wife also brought into the marriage a small amount
of personal debt, less than $5,000.  Husband paid that debt
during the marriage.

		During the first year of the marriage, wife worked
infrequently as a manicurist.  She also worked, without pay, for
no more than four months as manager of husband's hardware store. 
Wife worked between 45 and 70 hours during one hazelnut harvest
and was paid by husband for that work.  She worked for husband
between 10 hours and 50 hours during one cherry harvest.  Husband
did not pay her for that work.  On occasion, wife also provided
refreshments to farmers while they waited to unload crops at
husband's cherry and hazelnut businesses.  

		Early in the marriage, wife expressed a desire to
attend school and acquire additional vocational training. 
Husband requested that wife stay home and manage the household,
and he assured her that he would take care of her in the future
and that she need not work outside the home.  Wife acquiesced in
that matter. 

		The parties separated briefly in August 1991,
approximately six months after their marriage.  The parties
separated again in late 1991.  In November 1991, wife stopped
working at the hardware store.  She took approximately $5,000
from the hardware store business account.  Contemplating filing
for dissolution of the marriage, she spent about $1,500 of that
money on legal fees and about $300 on food and incidentals.  She
later returned the remainder to husband's accounts. 

		Husband did not place wife's name on any of his
properties.  Wife did not contribute any of her separate money to
the upkeep or improvement of the businesses, equipment, or
properties that husband brought into the marriage.  Throughout
the marriage, husband kept all his bank accounts separate from
wife's, with two exceptions.  Wife was on the hardware store
business account during her tenure as manager of that business. 
The parties also maintained a joint checking account for
household expenses.  Husband typically deposited $550 each month
into that joint checking account, which wife then used for
groceries, clothing, and incidental expenses.  Husband paid the
home mortgage and all improvements, repairs, and utilities from
his separate accounts.

		Throughout the marriage, except for the periods when
the parties were separated, wife worked as a homemaker, in
addition to the occasional paid and unpaid employment in
husband's businesses noted above.  She did the shopping, cooking,
errands, and laundry, and she generally managed the marital
household.  Wife also spent approximately 1,000 hours improving
the exterior appearance of the family residence, including
spraying for weeds, power-washing the house and carport, and
maintaining and improving landscaping. 

		The parties' final separation occurred in early 1993,
and husband filed for dissolution of the marriage in February
1993.  The trial court concluded that the parties had not
commingled their financial affairs, that the parties easily could
be restored to their premarital financial positions, and that the
property division should be in the nature of a "rescission,"
"notwithstanding whatever appreciation occurred in the assets." 
Massee, 138 Or App at 592.  Accordingly, the trial court did not
determine husband's exact net worth either at the time of
marriage or at the time of dissolution.  The trial court awarded
husband all the assets that he brought into the marriage,
including any appreciation of those assets that occurred during
the marriage.  Id.  The trial court awarded wife the property she
brought into the marriage and six months of spousal support at
$1,750 per month, as well as most of the personal property
acquired jointly during the marriage, with an approximate total
value of $17,250.  Id.

		Wife appealed, assigning error to the trial court's
division of property.  She argued that the trial court should
have awarded her a share of the appreciation, during the
marriage, of the assets that husband brought into and held
separately during the marriage, because such appreciation is a
marital asset.  Id. at 592-93.  Wife also argued that the trial
court's application of the rescission doctrine, without regard to
ORS 107.105(1)(f), failed to recognize her efforts as a homemaker
and ignored the statutory presumption of equal contribution to
the acquisition of marital assets.  Id. at 593.  The Court of
Appeals concluded that the appreciation, during the marriage, of
husband's separately held assets is a marital asset, and that the
statutory rebuttable presumption of equal contribution, ORS
107.105(1)(f), applied to the acquisition of that appreciation. 
Id. at 594-96.  The court then affirmed the trial court's
property division after concluding that wife did not contribute,
either directly or indirectly, to the appreciation of husband's
separately held assets, and that husband thus had overcome the
statutory rebuttable presumption of equal contribution.  Id. at
599-600.  We allowed wife's petition for review.

		We begin our analysis with the pertinent statutory
wording.  ORS 107.105(1)(f) governs the division of marital
property in a marital dissolution action.  That paragraph is
long, complicated, and somewhat cumbersome.  The first, third,
and fourth sentences of paragraph (1)(f) are relevant to this
case.  We quote those sentences as they appear in the statute:

		"(1)	Whenever the court grants a decree of marital
annulment, dissolution or separation, it has power
further to decree as follows:

		"* * * * *

		"(f)	For the division or other disposition between
the parties of the real or personal property, or both,
of either or both of the parties as may be just and
proper in all the circumstances. * * * The court shall
consider the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as
a contribution to the acquisition of marital assets. 
There is a rebuttable presumption that both spouses
have contributed equally to the acquisition of property
during the marriage, whether such property is jointly
or separately held."(1)

		In interpreting the wording of a statute, this court's
task is to discern the intent of the legislature.  PGE v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 
We discern that intent by examining, first, the text and context
of the statute.  Id. at 610-11.  The context includes "other
provisions of the same statute and other related statutes," id.
at 611, as well as relevant judicial construction of those
statutes.  See Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435, 918 P2d 808
(1996) (context includes judicial constructions of earlier
versions of relevant statutes).  If our analysis of those sources
discloses the legislature's intent, we proceed no further.  PGE,
317 Or at 611.

		The legislative intent underlying ORS 107.105(1)(f) is
clear from the text and context of the statute.  The overall goal
of paragraph (1)(f), as indicated by its first sentence, is a
distribution of marital property(2) that is "just and proper in all
the circumstances."  See, e.g., Denton, 326 Or at 246 ("The goal
continues to be the establishment of a property division that is
just and proper.").  The remainder of ORS 107.105(1)(f) lists
specific circumstances that the court may encounter in making a
division of marital property and specifically directs the court
as to how it should treat those circumstances when making a
property division.  The statute thus announces principles that
are the guide to the court's exercise of its discretion when
dividing marital property.  See Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117,
120, 653 P2d 1258 (1982) (so holding; construing former ORS
107.105(1)(e), renumbered as ORS 107.105(1)(f)); Haguewood and
Haguewood, 292 Or 197, 199-204, 638 P2d 1135 (1981) (same).  Each
of the three quoted sentences in paragraph (1)(f) states a
significant component of the legislature's policy regarding the
division of property in a marital dissolution action. 
Accordingly, we analyze each sentence in detail.

		As noted above, the first sentence of paragraph (1)(f)
grants the court broad authority to make a "division or other
disposition" of the parties' property "as may be just and proper
in all the circumstances."  ORS 107.105(1)(f).  That authority is
limited, however.  The third and fourth sentences of paragraph
(1)(f) create two requirements that guide the court in deciding
how to exercise the authority granted by the first sentence.

		The third sentence of paragraph (1)(f) applies if,
during the marriage, one spouse was a "homemaker."  The statute
provides no definition of that term.  Thus, we rely for the
meaning of the term "homemaker" on its common dictionary
definition:

	"one that makes a home:  one whose occupation is
household and family management -- usu. used of a wife
or mother as distinguished from a paid housekeeper." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1083 (unabridged
ed 1993).

The parties oftentimes will agree, as they apparently did here,
that one spouse functioned during the marriage as a homemaker. 
If the parties do not agree, the court must decide from the
evidence whether the party who claims to have functioned as a
homemaker during the marriage has proved that fact.

		The third sentence of ORS 107.105(1)(f) requires
recognition of the homemaker spouse as an economic contributor to
the marriage, rather than as a passive recipient of economic
benefits provided by the breadwinner spouse.  See, e.g., Pierson,
294 Or at 122 (stating principle).  A homemaker spouse
contributes to the acquisition of marital assets, because the
performance of domestic tasks by one spouse frees the other
spouse to devote energy and concentration to other tasks that may
generate marital assets.  See, e.g., Denton, 326 Or at 243
(wife's full-time work outside of the home and her performance of
homemaker tasks frees husband to devote energy and concentration
to medical school studies and dermatology internship).

		The third sentence of paragraph (1)(f) has two
significant features.  First, that sentence requires the court to
determine that a homemaker spouse made "a contribution" (emphasis
added) to the acquisition of marital assets.  That sentence
prohibits the court from determining that the homemaker spouse
made no contribution to the acquisition of marital assets simply
because that spouse attended to the home and family and,
consequently, played no direct role in the business or other
activity that created marital assets.  Second, that sentence does
not assign any particular evidentiary weight to the homemaker's
contribution.  The court must determine the magnitude and, thus,
the legal effect of a homemaker's contribution to the acquisition
of marital assets in accordance with the evidence in each case.

		The fourth sentence of paragraph (1)(f) addresses the
manner in which the court determines the comparative evidentiary
weight of the parties' respective contributions to the
acquisition of marital assets.  That sentence creates a
rebuttable presumption that both spouses have contributed equally
to the acquisition of marital assets.(3)

		The rebuttable presumption created by the fourth
sentence of paragraph (1)(f) functions in the same manner as any
other rebuttable presumption.  The basic fact required for the
operation of the presumption of equal contribution in paragraph
(1)(f) is that the parties acquired property during their
marriage.  If a party establishes that fact, the court, in the
absence of rebuttal evidence, is bound to accept as true that the
parties contributed equally to the acquisition of the marital
assets.  If neither party seeks to rebut the presumption of equal
contribution, the court has no occasion to consider or compare
the parties' actual contributions, including the contribution of
a homemaker spouse, to the acquisition of marital assets.  In
that type of case, paragraph (1)(f) directs that the court
presume that the parties' relative contributions to the
acquisition of marital assets were equal.  The case at bar is not
that type of case.

		If either or both of the parties seek to rebut the
presumption of equal contribution, the burden of proof identified
in Stice and Stice, 308 Or 316, 326, 779 P2d 1020 (1989),
applies:

		"OEC 308, which is applicable to marital
dissolution cases, provides:

			"'In civil actions and proceedings, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of proving that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than its existence.'

	"The spouse disputing the presumption of equal
contribution has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it is more probable
than not that the other spouse did not contribute
equally to the acquisition of the property.  OEC 308;
ORS 107.105(1)(f)."  (Emphasis in original.)

In deciding whether either party has rebutted the presumption of
equal contribution, the court may consider any admissible
evidence that is probative of the question whether the parties
contributed unequally to the acquisition of marital assets.

		In assessing the magnitude of the homemaker spouse's
contribution, and in comparing the homemaker spouse's
contribution to that of the breadwinner spouse in order to
determine whether the presumption of equal contribution is
rebutted, the court must refrain from either overvaluing or
undervaluing the contribution of the homemaker spouse merely
because the homemaker spouse made that contribution in the
context of the household or the family, rather than in a
commercial or other nondomestic context.  The court also must
keep in mind that, in the categorical sense, a homemaker spouse's
contribution in a domestic setting is indistinguishable
analytically from a breadwinner spouse's contribution to the
acquisition of marital assets in a business or other nondomestic
setting.  Stice, 308 Or at 329.

		In deciding whether the presumption of equal
contribution is rebutted, the court first must determine the
magnitude of each spouse's overall contribution to the
acquisition of marital assets from evidence in the record.  If
one spouse is a homemaker, that determination necessarily will
include an assessment of the homemaker spouse's contribution to
the enterprise of homemaking.(4)  A homemaker spouse's overall
contribution may consist of a combination of domestic
contributions and economic or other nondomestic contributions.(5)

		Once the court has determined each spouse's overall
contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, the court
compares the respective contributions of the spouses.  The
ultimate question is whether the spouse seeking to rebut the
presumption of equal contribution has proved, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the other spouse did not contribute equally
to the acquisition of marital assets.  If the court determines
that the presumption of equal contribution is rebutted, the
presumption drops from the case and the court divides the
property according to the magnitude of each spouse's contribution
to the acquisition of marital assets.  In other words, the court
distributes the marital assets without regard to any presumption,
but in a manner that is just and proper in all the circumstances,
including the proven contributions of the parties to the
acquisition of marital assets.

		We now turn to the question whether the Court of
Appeals correctly applied ORS 107.105(1)(f) in this case.  We
begin by inquiring whether the appreciation, during the marriage,
of husband's separately held assets is a marital asset.    

		As noted above, ___ Or at ___ n 2 (slip op at 7-8 n 2),
ORS 107.105(1)(f) creates two classes of property -- marital
property and marital assets.  Pierson, 294 Or at 121-22.  Marital
property is "the real or personal property, or both, of either or
both of the parties," and constitutes the entire class of
property subject to the dispositional authority of the court in a
marital dissolution action.  ORS 107.105(1)(f); Pierson, 294 Or
at 121.  "Marital assets" include all the "real or personal
property, or both, acquired by either of the spouses, or both,
during the marriage."  ORS 107.105(1)(f); Stice, 308 Or at 325;
Pierson, 294 Or at 121-22.

		To determine whether the appreciation, during the
marriage, of husband's separately held assets constitutes a
marital asset under ORS 107.105(1)(f), we first must determine
whether the appreciation of those assets is "property."  Second,
we must determine whether the "acquisition" of that property
occurred during the marriage.  ORS 107.105(1)(f); Stice, 308 Or
at 325; Pierson, 294 Or at 121-22.

		The word "property" means something that is or may be
owned or possessed, or the exclusive right to possess, use,
enjoy, or dispose of a thing.  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary at 1818.  Thus, the appreciation of property is itself
property.  It may be owned or possessed, and rights of
possession, use, and enjoyment attach to it.  We conclude that
the appreciation, during the marriage, of husband's separately
held assets is "property" as that word is used in ORS
107.105(1)(f).  

		"Acquisition" means "the act or action of acquiring." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary at 19.  The parties here
agree that the marital asset at issue in this case was acquired
during the marriage.

		Because the appreciation, during the marriage, of
husband's separately held assets is property, and because the
acquisition of that property occurred during the marriage, we
hold that any such appreciation is a marital asset.  ORS
107.105(1)(f).

		That holding is consistent with this court's prior
decisions interpreting the term "marital assets" in ORS
107.105(1)(f).  In Pierson, 294 Or at 122-23, the court held that
property inherited solely by the wife, during the marriage,
constituted "marital assets."  In Stice, 308 Or at 328, the court
held that stock acquired during the marriage and held separately
by one spouse constituted "marital assets," as did the
appreciation, during the marriage, of that stock.  "Marital
assets" also include property received as a gift by one spouse
during the marriage, Jenks and Jenks, 294 Or 236, 240, 656 P2d
286 (1982), and property acquired by one spouse after separation
but before dissolution of the marriage.  Lemke and Lemke, 289 Or
145, 148, 611 P2d 295 (1980).  The fact that property acquired
during the marriage is solely in one spouse's name does not
change its characterization as a marital asset.  ORS
107.105(1)(f); Stice, 308 Or at 325; Jenks, 294 Or at 241.

		Because the appreciation, during the marriage, of
husband's separately held assets is a marital asset, the
rebuttable presumption of equal contribution in ORS 107.105(1)(f)
applies.  The record in this case indicates that wife generally
managed the marital household, attending to the cooking,
cleaning, shopping, and laundry, and that she also helped
maintain the family home, grounds, and landscaping.  She thus was
a homemaker.  ORS 107.105(1)(f); Jenks, 294 Or at 241; Pierson,
294 Or at 122; Engle and Engle, 293 Or 207, 213-15, 646 P2d 20
(1982). 

		As noted above, there is no difference in kind,
analytically, between husband's contribution to the acquisition
of the marital assets at issue here and wife's homemaker
contribution to that acquisition.  The only difference may be one
of magnitude.  Husband, here the spouse challenging the
presumption of equal contribution, must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that wife did not contribute equally to the
acquisition of the appreciation, during the marriage, of
husband's separately held assets.  Stice, 308 Or at 236.

		The Court of Appeals concluded that husband
successfully rebutted the presumption of equal contribution.  In
reaching that conclusion, the court said:

	"The businesses, real property and equipment have
always been in husband's name alone.  All business
accounts have been kept separate from wife, and wife
had no power to draw funds from them.  Husband made all
financial contributions to the maintenance, operation
and improvement of the businesses, and he alone was
responsible for and paid all debts that were incurred
in operating them.  Husband alone was responsible for
managing the businesses.

		"Wife did briefly work as a manager of husband's
hardware store.  She also worked for approximately one
week on a single hazelnut harvest.  She occasionally
did 'errands.'  And she provided refreshments to
visiting farmers one season as they unloaded their
crops.  The record shows that, apart from those
isolated instances of assistance, wife did not
regularly contribute to the operation of the business
or in any other way directly or indirectly contribute
to the appreciation in the value of the assets at
issue."  Massee, 138 Or App at 599-600.

		The question becomes whether, in deciding that husband
had rebutted the presumption of equal contribution, the 
Court of Appeals gave the statutorily required consideration to
wife's contribution as a homemaker.  We conclude that it did not. 
The court's findings regarding wife's contribution make no
mention, let alone demonstrate consideration, of wife's homemaker
role.  The court noted that "wife did not regularly contribute to
the operation of the business."  However, the court also found
that wife "did not in any other way directly or indirectly
contribute to the appreciation in the value of the assets at
issue."  It may be that wife's contribution as a homemaker to the
appreciation of the asset in question was not a "direct" one. 
However, the court's finding that wife, as a homemaker, failed to
make even an indirect contribution improperly deprives wife of
the consideration of her homemaker contribution to which she is
entitled by ORS 107.105(1)(f).  The court cannot decide lawfully
whether husband has rebutted the presumption of equal
contribution unless it first gives the required consideration to
wife's contribution as a homemaker to the acquisition of marital
assets.  The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that husband
had rebutted the statutory presumption of equal contribution to
the acquisition of marital assets in ORS 107.105(1)(f), because
that court, in its analysis, did not give proper consideration to
wife's contribution as a homemaker.  If proper consideration were
given to the record before the court at this time, including
wife's homemaker contribution, the question whether husband has
carried his burden of proof and rebutted the statutory
presumption of equal contribution is indeed a close one.  

		This court ordinarily would resolve this case in one of
two ways.  The first possibility is that this court review de
novo pursuant to ORS 19.125(4), make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and modify the trial court's judgment
accordingly.  As noted above, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 2), we
reject that approach.  The second possibility is that this court
remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration
in light of this opinion.  This would allow the Court of Appeals
to give the necessary consideration to wife's homemaker
contribution, and to then decide whether husband had rebutted the
presumption of equal contribution.  We reject that approach as
well.  The record in this case lacks evidence on several
important facts, including husband's net worth at the time of
marriage and at the time of dissolution, which likely will
influence, if not control, any ultimate property division after
remand.  Resolution of this case thus requires further
development of the factual record.  Consequently, we remand the
case to the trial court for the taking of additional evidence and
reconsideration in light of this opinion.

		We address one further issue that may arise on remand. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's reliance on a
"rescission" approach to the division of marital property.  Under
that approach, a court, in dividing the marital property upon
dissolution of a "short-term" marriage, seeks to place the
parties "as nearly as possible in the financial position they
would have held if no marriage had taken place."  See, e.g., York
and York, 30 Or App 937, 939, 569 P2d 32 (1977) (so stating).(6) 
This court first applied that approach in Jenks.  In Jenks,
however, this court modified the rescission approach to marital
property division and focused not on the duration of the marriage
but, instead, on the extent to which the parties had "commingled"
their financial affairs.  294 Or at 242.

		A court's reliance solely on the concept of a "short-term" marriage, as defined either by York or by Jenks, as a
criterion that compels restoration of property held by the
parties before marriage will lead to analytical mistakes.  The
factors set forth in ORS 107.105(1)(f) are the guide to the
court's discretion in dividing marital property.  It is not
proper for the court to focus solely on either the duration of
the marriage or the extent to which the parties commingle their
financial affairs when dividing that marital property.  See
Miller and Miller, 294 Or 660, 664-66, 661 P2d 1361 (1983)
(emphasizing that statutory factors control property division on
dissolution of marriage, and rescission is appropriate only after
giving due consideration to those factors).  Only after the trial
court has completed its task under ORS 107.105(1)(f) will the
court be in a position to achieve the just and proper disposition
that the law requires.  ORS 107.105(1)(f).

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.

1. 	The 1995 amendments to ORS 107.105 do not affect the
outcome of this case.  See Or Laws 1995, ch 22, § 1; Or Laws
1995, ch 608, § 3.

2. 	ORS 107.105(1)(f) creates two classes of property --
marital property and marital assets.  Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or
117, 121-22, 653 P2d 1258 (1982).  Marital property is the "real
or personal property, or both, of either or both of the parties,"
and constitutes the entire class of property subject to the
dispositional authority of the court in a marital dissolution
action.  ORS 107.105(1)(f); Pierson, 294 Or at 121.  "Marital
assets" include all the "real or personal property, or both,
acquired by either of the spouses, or both, during the marriage." 
ORS 107.105(1)(f); Stice and Stice, 308 Or 316, 325, 779 P2d 1020
(1989); Pierson, 294 Or at 121-22.  "Marital assets" do not
include assets brought into the marriage by either spouse, nor do
they include assets acquired after dissolution of the marriage. 
Id. at 121.  Marital property is a larger class of property than
marital assets:  "[p]roperty may be subject to the dispositional
authority of the court, yet not be a marital asset."  Stice, 308
Or at 325.

3. 	A presumption is a rule of law requiring that, once a
basic fact is established, the factfinder must find a certain
presumed fact, in the absence of evidence rebutting that presumed
fact.  Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 72 (3d ed 1996).  A
presumption "may be created by statute if there is some
justification of public policy, or a rational connection between
the fact proved and the fact presumed."  State Land Board v.
United States, 222 Or 40, 50, 352 P2d 539 (1960), reversed on
other grounds, United States v. Oregon, 366 US 643, 81 S Ct 1278,
6 L Ed 2d 575 (1961).

4. 	"Homemaking" is "the creation and maintenance of a
wholesome family environment."  Webster's Third Int'l Dictionary,
1083 (unabridged ed 1993).

5. 	This court said in dictum in Stice, 308 Or at 329, that
the homemaker provision in ORS 107.105(1)(f) may be applied only
to support the presumption of equal contribution, but not to
rebut the presumption of equal contribution in favor of the
homemaker spouse.  On further reflection, we withdraw that
comment.  ORS 107.105(1)(f) entitles either or both of the
spouses to attempt to rebut the presumption of equal
contribution.

6. 	York predates the adoption in 1977 of the modern
version of the property division statute, former ORS
107.105(1)(e), renumbered as ORS 107.105(1)(f).