Title: Parker v. Town of Milton

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Parker v. Town of Milton  (97-422); 169 Vt. 74; 726 A.2d 477

[Opinion Filed 18-Dec-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 16-Feb-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-422

Wilbur Parker, et al.                             Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Chittenden Superior Court

Town of Milton, et al.                            June Term, 1998

       Linda Levitt, J.

       John L. Franco, Jr., Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Ron Shems, Assistant Attorney
  General, and David Groff, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for
  Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Katz,
          Supr. J., Specially Assigned

       JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiffs, six individual Vermont residents and two
  labor unions, appeal a superior court order dismissing their complaint. 
  Plaintiffs opposed the construction of a bridge in the Town of Milton and
  alleged violations of the public trust doctrine, their constitutional
  rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, and the Vermont
  Administrative Procedures Act. The superior court dismissed thier complaint
  for lack of standing with respect to their declaratory judgment action, and
  failure to state a claim with respect to their constitutional and statutory
  causes of action.  We affirm.

       The Town of Milton (Town) applied for a required encroachment
  permit (FN1) to build a bridge across Arrowhead Mountain Lake that would
  connect Route 7 with a town highway and

 

  an industrial site owned by Husky Injection Moldings.  The Department of
  Environmental Conservation (DEC) held a public information meeting
  concerning the Town's permit application after a petition was  presented
  pursuant to 29 V.S.A. §405(a).  The DEC subsequently issued an encroachment
  permit to the Town of Milton on June 6, 1997, which allowed construction of
  the proposed bridge.(FN2)

       On July 25, 1997, plaintiffs filed an action in superior court arguing
  that because the public trust doctrine (FN3) prevents the Legislature from
  granting rights in the public trust property for private use, see State v.
  Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 153 Vt. 337, 344, 571 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1989), the
  Legislature therefore has a nondelegable duty to determine whether the
  bridge at issue in this case in fact serves a public use.  Specifically,
  plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that, in addition to
  obtaining an encroachment permit, the Town of Milton is required to obtain
  (1) a legislative grant of airspace over the lake and (2) a legislative
  determination that the bridge is a "public use" within the meaning of the
  public trust doctrine.(FN4)

       Plaintiffs also claim they were denied their rights under the United
  States Constitution to procedural due process and equal protection because
  their representative was not allowed to present their interests at the
  public hearing.  Plaintiffs allege that others in attendance at the hearing
  shouted to prevent their representative from speaking and the DEC officer
  conducting the hearing ruled their representative out of order.  Finally,
  plaintiffs allege that the encroachment permit violated the Vermont
  Administrative Procedures Act, 3 V.S.A. §§ 801-849 (VAPA),

 

  because it was issued without a "contested case" hearing, which plaintiffs
  allege is required by 3 V.S.A. § 801(b)(2).

       The superior court dismissed plaintiffs' challenge to the 
  encroachment permit, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing to mount
  such a challenge because they merely asserted the legal conclusion that the
  public trust was being derogated and did not describe any actual injury,
  only generalized grievances.  The trial court further found that plaintiffs
  had not alleged elements sufficient to sustain an equal protection claim
  and were not "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of the VAPA, and
  therefore dismissed the constitutional and VAPA-based causes of action for
  failure to state a claim.

                         I. The Standing Requirement

       We first address whether plaintiffs have standing to request a
  declaratory judgment with respect to the encroachment permit.  A plaintiff
  must allege facts sufficient to confer standing "[o]n the face of the
  complaint."  Town of Cavendish v. Vt. Pub. Power  Supply Auth., 141 Vt.
  144, 147-48,