Title: State v. Christopher Baron

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1289-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Christopher Baron, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
2008 WI App 90 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 789, 754 N.W.2d 175 
(Ct. App 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson   
 
JUDGE: 
Randy R. Koschnick   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Daniel P. Dunn and the Dunn Law Office, Madison, and oral 
argument by Daniel P. Dunn. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Jeffrey 
J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1289-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2006CF496) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher Baron, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.  This is a review of a 
published court of appeals' decision1 that reversed the decision 
of the Jefferson County Circuit Court, Randy R. Koschnick, 
Judge. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c)(2005-06),2 which punishes the unauthorized use of 
another individual's personal identifying information in order 
to harm the individual's reputation, was unconstitutional as 
applied to Baron.  The State appealed, and the court of appeals 
                                                 
1 State v. Baron, 2008 WI App 90, 312 Wis. 2d 789, 754 
N.W.2d 175.  
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
2 
 
reversed the circuit court.  Baron petitioned this court for 
review, which we accepted.  We affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
¶2 
This case requires us to decide whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) is unconstitutional as applied to Baron because 
it violates his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  We 
conclude that the State has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that 
§ 943.201(2)(c), as applied to Baron, is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest and therefore does not 
violate Baron's constitutional right to freedom of speech. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Christopher Baron worked as an emergency medical 
technician for the city of Jefferson under the direction of Mark 
Fisher who was the director of Jefferson's Emergency Medical 
Services.   
¶4 
As alleged in the criminal complaint, on August 10, 
2006, Baron accessed Mark Fisher's e-mail account by using 
Fisher's password, which Baron had previously acquired.  After 
accessing Fisher's e-mail account, Baron found a number of  
e-mails allegedly showing that Fisher was having an extramarital 
affair.  Baron organized the various e-mails into one e-mail 
message and then sent the message to people in the Jefferson 
community.  The similar subject line of the e-mail message sent 
was such as: "What's Mark been up to."  The e-mails were 
discussions between Fisher and a woman other than his spouse 
about their sexual activity and sexual preferences.  Even though 
Baron was the one who organized and sent the e-mails, he did so 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
3 
 
in a manner that made the e-mails appear to come from Mark 
Fisher's e-mail account.  The day after Baron sent out the  
e-mails, Fisher committed suicide. 
¶5 
When questioned by authorities, Baron admitted that he 
had sent the e-mails to get Fisher in trouble.  Baron stated 
that he originally intended to send the e-mails only to Fisher's 
wife, but he then sent them to other people so they could see 
that Fisher was not "golden." 
¶6 
Baron was charged as follows: criminal defamation in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 942.01(1), which was voluntarily 
dismissed by the State; two counts of obstructing an officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1); two counts of computer 
crimes in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.70(2); and identity 
theft in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c).  
¶7 
The only charge at issue in this appeal is the 
identity theft violation under Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c).  With 
regard to that charge, the complaint provided that Baron "did 
intentionally use personal identifying information or personal 
identification documents . . . of Mark G. Fisher to harm the 
reputation of [Fisher] without [Fisher's] authorization or 
consent by representing that he was [Fisher] . . . ."  The 
information, which was filed on November 13, 2006, clarified 
that the personal identifying information that Baron used was 
Mark Fisher's name.  
¶8 
Baron filed a motion to dismiss the Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) charge because he argued that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to his conduct.  The circuit court 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
4 
 
granted 
the 
motion. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
reasoned 
that 
§ 943.201(2)(c) contains a defamation element, which interferes 
with Baron's First Amendment right to free speech, i.e., his 
First Amendment right to defame a public official.  The circuit 
court concluded that while it was not a clear cut case and there 
were reasonable arguments on both sides, it had concerns about 
the chilling effect that would arise by applying this statute to 
Baron's conduct. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision.  It concluded that Baron's logic was flawed because he 
focused on the "purpose" element in isolation.  The court of 
appeals stated that "Wisconsin statutes are replete with 
provisions that criminalize conduct that may otherwise be 
constitutionally protected, if that conduct is carried out in an 
unlawful manner."3  As a result, Baron petitioned this court for 
review, which we accepted.    
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law that we review de novo.  State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 
124, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999).  A presumption of constitutionality 
generally exists for a legislative enactment, and as a result, 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals, relying on an argument made by the 
State, also reasoned that Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) was 
constitutional because if Baron's logic was followed, the 
bribery 
statute——Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.10(1)——would 
be 
unconstitutional.  We decline the opportunity to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the bribery statute because that issue is 
not now before the court and it is not determinative in our 
evaluation of § 943.201(2)(c).   
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
5 
 
those challenging a statute's constitutionality must show it is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  However, 
because Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) implicates First Amendment 
rights, the State has the burden to prove that the statute is 
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 124-25.  As 
discussed in ¶¶31-32, the State must, therefore, prove that this 
statute passes either strict or intermediate scrutiny to be 
deemed constitutional.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.201, "Unauthorized use of an 
individual's personal identifying information or documents," 
provides in relevant part: 
(2) Whoever, for any of the following purposes, 
intentionally uses, attempts to use, or possesses with 
intent to use any personal identifying information or 
personal identification document of an individual, 
including 
a 
deceased 
individual, 
without 
the 
authorization or consent of the individual and by 
representing that he or she is the individual, that he 
or she is acting with the authorization or consent of 
the individual, or that the information or document 
belongs to him or her is guilty of a Class H felony: 
 . . . . 
(c) 
To 
harm 
the 
reputation 
. . . 
of 
the 
individual.4 
¶12 The First Amendment5 provides: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
                                                 
4 We limit our analysis and decision in this case to the 
portion of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) that was charged, i.e., 
the portion of the statute that prohibits the intent to harm an 
individual's 
reputation 
by 
the 
unauthorized 
use 
of 
the 
individual's personal identifying information. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
6 
 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
¶13 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), Baron was 
charged with one count of identity theft; the State alleged that 
Baron "did intentionally use personal identifying information or 
personal identification documents . . . of Mark G. Fisher to 
harm the reputation of [Fisher] without [Fisher's] authorization 
or consent by representing that he was [Fisher] . . . ." 
¶14 In order to determine if Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), 
as applied to Baron, violates his First Amendment rights we must 
address two crucial questions: First, does § 943.201(2)(c) 
regulate speech6 or conduct alone?  If neither speech nor 
expressive conduct is being regulated, we need not utilize a 
First Amendment analysis because the statute does not implicate 
the First Amendment.  Second, if speech or expressive conduct is 
being regulated, is the statute's regulation content based or 
content neutral?  A content-based statute must survive strict 
scrutiny whereas a content-neutral statute must survive only 
intermediate scrutiny.  In either event, it is the State's 
burden to prove that § 943.201(2)(c) is constitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution incorporated the First Amendment so that it 
applies to state governments.  DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, 185 
F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 1999). 
6 Speech includes expressive conduct.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989). 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
7 
 
¶15 Baron argues that the charge must be dismissed because 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is a content-based statute that does 
not survive strict scrutiny, and in turn, the charge against 
Baron violates his constitutional right to free speech.  In 
response, the State argues the following three points: First, 
this statute regulates conduct and not speech; second, if speech 
is being regulated, the statute is content neutral and survives 
intermediate scrutiny; and third, if the statute is content 
based, 
it 
survives 
strict 
scrutiny. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
§ 943.201(2)(c), as applied to the facts of this specific case, 
is content based and regulates speech in addition to conduct,7 
and as a result, the statute should be analyzed under strict 
scrutiny.  However, because, as applied to Baron, the statute is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, 
it is nonetheless constitutional. 
                                                 
7 This statute regulates conduct because it regulates the 
use of another's identity and the distribution of reputation-
harming materials.  In this case, however, the statute also 
regulates speech because speech——i.e., the e-mail's content——was 
used with the intent to harm another's reputation and this is 
also the basis of Baron's criminal conduct.  While Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) regulates conduct and speech in the case at 
hand, this may not always be the case.  Potentially, conduct 
alone could constitute identity theft used with the intent to 
harm the individual's reputation.  We do not decide that issue 
today. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
8 
 
 
A. Speech or conduct 
¶16 In order to determine if a First Amendment analysis is 
required, we must first consider whether conduct alone or 
speech, which includes expressive conduct, is being regulated.  
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989); State v. 
Robins, 2002 WI 65, ¶41, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287.  If 
speech or expressive conduct is being regulated, the First 
Amendment is implicated. 
¶17 In Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether the act of flag desecration was 
considered 
speech 
such 
that 
it 
possessed 
"sufficient 
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play."  
The statute at issue, "Desecration of Venerated Object," 
provides in part: "'(a) A person commits an offense if he 
intentionally or knowingly desecrates: . . . a state or national 
flag.'"  Id. at 400 (citing Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) 
(1989)).  The defendant burned the American flag while at a 
protest demonstration.  Id. at 399.  The Court concluded that 
his 
actions 
were 
"'sufficiently 
imbued 
with 
elements 
of 
communication'" "to implicate the First Amendment."  Id. at 406 
(citation omitted).  As a result, the Court continued with a 
First Amendment analysis and ultimately concluded that the 
defendant's conduct was protected by the First Amendment.  Id. 
at 407-20.  
¶18 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), 
the 
Court 
considered 
whether 
the 
act 
of 
destroying 
a 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
9 
 
"registration certificate"8 constituted speech.  The statute at 
issue in O'Brien subjected a person to criminal liability if he 
"'knowingly destroys (or) knowingly mutilates' a certificate."  
Id. at 375 (citation omitted).  The Court noted that the statute 
"plainly does not abridge free speech on its face" and "on its 
face deals with conduct having no connection with speech."  Id.  
The Court stated that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea."  Id. at 376.  Nonetheless, the Court undertook 
a First Amendment analysis "on the assumption that the alleged 
communicative element in O'Brien's conduct [wa]s sufficient to 
bring into play the First Amendment."  Id.  
¶19 In Robins, 253 Wis. 2d 298, ¶¶39-44, this court 
considered whether the child enticement statute regulated speech 
or conduct.  The statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.07, provides that 
"[w]hoever,  . . . causes or attempts to cause any child who has 
not attained the age of 18 years to go into any vehicle, 
building, room or secluded place is guilty of a Class BC 
felony." 
 
Id., 
¶25 
(citing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.07 
(1999-
                                                 
8 The Court described the registration certificate as 
follows: "When a male reaches the age of 18, he is required by 
the Universal Military Training and Service Act to register with 
a local draft board.  He is assigned a Selective Service number, 
and within five days he is issued a registration certificate."  
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1968).  "The 
registration certificate specifies the name of the registrant, 
the date of registration, and the number and address of the 
local board with which he is registered." Id. at 373.   
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
10 
 
2000)(original emphasis omitted)).  The defendant argued that 
that his conviction violated his right to free speech because 
statements9 he had made to entice the child were used in his 
conviction.  Id., ¶39.  This court concluded that the statute 
did not regulate speech or any variation of speech, such as 
expression.  Id., ¶¶41-43.  The court, citing to Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949), stated that 
"[t]he United States Supreme Court has rejected the contention 
that the First Amendment extends to speech that is incidental to 
or part of a course of criminal conduct."  "It is not 'an 
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of 
conduct 
illegal 
merely 
because 
the 
conduct 
was 
in 
part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, 
either spoken, written, or printed.'"  Robins, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 
¶¶41-42. 
                                                 
9 Robins, who was 46 years old had internet conversations 
with a minor that included in part: 
WI4kink: So you ever get to Milwaukee? 
Benjm13: sometimes withmy [sic] mom 
WI4kink: cool so how would we ever meet? 
Benjm13: i dont know u can come here if u want 
. . .  
WI4kink: could just get a room somewhere 
Benjm13: oh that would be cool-like a motel 
WI4kink: yup 
State v. 
Robins, 
2002 WI 65, ¶6, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 
N.W.2d 287. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
11 
 
¶20 Rather than regulating speech, this court concluded in 
Robins that the child enticement statute regulated conduct.  
Id., 
¶43. 
 
This 
court 
reasoned 
that 
Robins' 
internet 
conversations did not constitute the crime of child enticement, 
but rather, his internet conversations were "circumstantial 
evidence of his intent to entice a child."  Id., ¶44.  Just 
because "some of the proof in [a] case consists of internet 
'speech' does not mean" the First Amendment has been implicated.  
Id.  
¶21 In the case at hand, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2) provides 
in relevant part: "Whoever, for any of the following purposes[, 
e.g., to harm the reputation of the individual,] intentionally 
uses . . . any personal identifying information . . . of the 
individual . . . without the authorization or consent of the 
individual and by representing that he or she is the individual, 
. . . is guilty of a Class H felony."   
¶22 We conclude that, as charged and as applied to the 
facts of this case, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) regulates speech 
in addition to conduct.  The statute punishes a person for using 
another individual's personal identifying information with the 
intent to harm that individual's reputation.10  Under the facts 
                                                 
10 As provided in Wis JI——Criminal 1458, the elements of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2) in this case are as follows: 
 
1. The defendant intentionally used personal 
identifying information of [the] individual. 
 
2. The defendant intentionally used personal 
identifying information of [the] individual to harm 
the reputation . . . of the individual. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
12 
 
of this case, the statute regulates conduct because it restricts 
the 
use 
of 
another's 
identity 
and 
the 
distribution 
of 
reputation-harming materials, but speech is also being regulated 
because the content of the e-mails is critical in order to 
evidence Baron's intent to use personal identifying information 
to harm Fisher's reputation.  Therefore, this is not a case as 
in Robins where the conduct was merely initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out in part by speech.  Rather, this is a case where the 
reputation-harming portion of the charge is evidenced by the 
content of the speech, i.e., the content of the e-mails.    
¶23 Unlike in Robins, where speech was used to show the 
defendant's intent to entice a child, speech in this case is not 
used to show the defendant's intent to use another individual's 
personal identifying information.  Absent the e-mails, i.e., 
speech, which were used with the intent to harm Fisher's 
reputation, Baron has not committed an element of the crime as 
alleged.  Therefore, just as communicative elements were being 
regulated in Johnson and O'Brien, communicative elements are 
being regulated in this case.  Under the statute as charged and 
applied to the facts of this case, it is the content of the  
e-mails, i.e., the speech, that evidences the defendant's intent 
to use personal identifying information to harm Fisher's 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3. The defendant acted without the authorization 
or consent of [the] individual and knew that [the] 
individual did not give authorization or consent. 
 
4. The defendant intentionally represented that 
he was [the] individual. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
13 
 
reputation.  Thus, here, speech in addition to conduct is being 
regulated.11    
¶24 The State argues that the prohibited conduct under 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is the unauthorized use of an 
individual's personal identifying information and not speech 
that is intended to harm another individual's reputation.  
Therefore, under the State's argument, it is only conduct that 
is being regulated and not speech, and thus, the First Amendment 
is not implicated.  The State relies on State v. Derango, 2000 
WI 89, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833, and bases its 
argument on an analogy to the child enticement statute, Wis. 
Stat. 948.07.  The State explains that the child enticement 
statute criminalizes the act of causing a child to go to a 
secluded place rather than the underlying sexual misconduct that 
is set forth in subsections (1) through (6) of the statute.   
¶25 The child enticement statute applied in Derango reads:  
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following 
acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has 
not attained the age of 18 years to go into any 
vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of 
a Class BC felony: 
                                                 
11 Arguably, under the current statutory language, if Baron 
had used Fisher's identity but did not do so in a manner to harm 
Fisher's reputation, the State would be relegated to charging 
another subsection of the identity theft statute or some other 
statute altogether.  While this may not have been what the 
legislature intended, that is, the legislature may have intended 
to criminalize the unauthorized use of another's identity, the 
current statutory language, under subsection (c) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2), 
would 
seem 
to 
allow 
such 
use 
of 
another 
individual's identity if that use is not harmful to the 
reputation of the individual.  
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
14 
 
(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02 or 948.095. 
(2) Causing the child to engage in prostitution. 
(3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the 
child to expose a sex organ in violation of s. 
948.10. 
(4) Taking a picture or making an audio recording of 
the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
(5) Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. 
(6) Giving or selling to the child a controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
in 
violation of ch. 961. 
Id., ¶16 (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.07 (1995-96)).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 943.201(2) provides: 
Whoever, 
for 
any 
of 
the 
following 
purposes, 
intentionally uses, attempts to use, or possesses with 
intent to use any personal identifying information or 
personal identification document of an individual, 
including 
a 
deceased 
individual, 
without 
the 
authorization or consent of the individual and by 
representing that he or she is the individual, that he 
or she is acting with the authorization or consent of 
the individual, or that the information or document 
belongs to him or her is guilty of a Class H felony:  
(a) To 
obtain 
credit, 
money, 
goods, 
services, 
employment, or any other thing of value or 
benefit. 
(b) To avoid civil or criminal process or penalty. 
(c) To harm the reputation, property, person, or 
estate of the individual. 
¶26 According to the State, an analogy to the child 
enticement 
statute 
shows 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) 
prohibits only conduct and does not regulate speech.  Under the 
State's theory, the prohibited conduct is the unauthorized use 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
15 
 
of another individual's personal identifying information, and 
therefore, subsections (a) through (c) are simply ways to carry 
out that identity theft.  The State's argument in this regard is 
unpersuasive because the subsections of the child enticement 
statute are not analogous to the subsections of the identity 
theft statute.   
¶27 The child enticement statute criminalizes one act, 
i.e., the act of causing a child to go into a secluded place, 
but the act has six different possible modes of commission.  
Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶¶15-25.  This court reasoned in 
Derango that multiple acts were not being punished because 
multiple prohibited acts arise and "warrant separate punishment 
when [the prohibited acts] are separate in time or are 
significantly 
different 
in 
nature." 
 
Id., 
¶21. 
 
Under 
subsections (1) through (6) of the child enticement statute, "a 
defendant might very often possess more than one prohibited 
intention when enticing a child."  Id.  For example, intent to 
have sexual intercourse "also encompasses intent to expose or 
cause the child to expose a sex organ; or, a defendant may 
entice a child with the dual purpose of giving her drugs and 
exploiting her sexually."  Id.    
¶28 Subsections (a) through (c) of the identity theft 
statute, on the other hand, are significantly different in 
nature, and thus identity theft can occur in multiple ways.12  As 
                                                 
12 Cf. State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 499-500, 485 
N.W.2d 1 (1992) (concluding that the sexual assault statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225, intended multiple punishments and thus 
prohibits multiple acts). 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
16 
 
a result, the prohibited conduct charged includes more than 
simply the use of Fisher's identity.  The way in which the State 
charged the offense here involved the use of Fisher's identity 
to distribute communications that were intended to harm the 
reputation of Fisher.  Therefore, this statute prohibits the 
combination of the use of the individual's personal identifying 
information with the intent to harm the reputation of that 
individual.  Since in this case, the use of another's personal 
identifying information was coupled with reputation-harming 
speech, i.e., the content of the e-mails, we conclude that, in 
this case, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) regulates speech in 
addition to conduct.  As a result, we must proceed further with 
a First Amendment analysis to determine whether § 943.201(2)(c) 
is content based or content neutral. 
B. Content based or content neutral 
¶29 The State, relying on the court of appeals' decision 
in this case, argues that the statute is content neutral because 
it does not impose any cognizable burden on political speech.  
Baron, on the other hand, argues that the statute regulates 
speech based on the ideas or message expressed, and as a result, 
it is content based.   
¶30 "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the 
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself 
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, 
and adherence."  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 
622, 641 (1994).  "Our political system and cultural life rest 
upon this ideal."  Id.   
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
17 
 
¶31 As a result, government action that regulates speech 
is 
appropriately 
limited. 
 
However, 
if 
speech 
is 
being 
regulated, the regulation must survive strict scrutiny if it is 
content based or intermediate scrutiny if it is content neutral.  
Id. at 642.  
¶32 Determining when the regulation of speech is content 
based or content neutral can prove difficult.  Id.  As a general 
rule, laws that "distinguish favored speech from disfavored 
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content 
based."  Id. at 643.  However, "laws that confer benefits or 
impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views 
expressed" are generally content neutral.  Id.  A review of, 
primarily, United States Supreme Court precedent is helpful in 
delineating 
between 
content-based 
and 
content-neutral 
regulations. 
¶33 For example, in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), 
the Court concluded that the statute at issue was content based.  
The governing statute provided that "'[i]t shall be unlawful to 
display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted 
to . . . bring into public odium any foreign government . . . 
within 500 feet of any . . . embassy . . . .'"  Id. at 316 
(emphasis added)(citation omitted).  Protestors claimed the 
statute prohibited them from engaging in "expressive activities" 
that were critical of the Soviet Union and Nicaragua.  Id. at 
315-16.  The Court concluded the statute was content based by 
reasoning that "[w]hether individuals may picket in front of a 
foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their picket signs 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
18 
 
are critical of the foreign government."  Id. at 318-19.  While 
favorable speech is permitted, "[o]ne category of speech has 
been completely prohibited."  Id. at 319. 
¶34 In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), the Court 
concluded that the relevant statute was content based.  The 
governing statute provided that "'[w]ithin . . . 100 feet from 
the entrances, and the building in which the polling place is 
located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other 
campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials, and 
solicitation of votes . . . are prohibited.'"  Id. at 193-94 
(emphasis added) (internal brackets and citation omitted).  A 
campaign official challenged the statute because it "limited her 
ability to communicate with voters."  Id. at 194.  The Court 
concluded that the statute was content based.  It reasoned that 
"[w]hether individuals may exercise their free speech rights 
near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is 
related to a political campaign."  Id. at 197.   
¶35 On the other hand, in Members of City Council of City 
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), 
the Court concluded the ordinance at issue was content neutral.  
The governing ordinance provided that "'[n]o person shall paint, 
mark or write on, or post or otherwise affix, any hand-bill or 
sign to or upon any . . . electric light or power or telephone 
or telegraph or trolley wire pole . . . .'"  Id. at 792 n.1 
(citation omitted).  A group supporting a candidate for public 
office attached cardboard signs to various utility poles.  Id. 
at 792-93.  Pursuant to the ordinance, city employees removed 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
19 
 
the signs, which resulted in the group seeking an injunction 
against enforcing the ordinance.  Id. at 793.  The Court 
concluded the ordinance was content neutral.  It reasoned that 
"there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's 
enactment or enforcement of this ordinance," and "[t]here is no 
claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas 
that the City finds distasteful."  Id. at 804.  The Court 
further stated that the "text of the ordinance is neutral——
indeed it is silent——concerning any speaker's point of view."  
Id. 
¶36 Similarly, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court concluded that the ordinance 
at issue was content neutral.  The applicable ordinance 
prohibited any "'adult motion picture theater' from locating 
within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-
family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any 
school."  Id. at 44.  The Court acknowledged that the ordinance 
did "not appear to fit neatly into either the 'content-based' or 
the 'content-neutral' category," but it ultimately concluded the 
ordinance was content neutral.  Id. at 47-48.  The Court 
reasoned that "[t]he ordinance by its terms [wa]s designed to 
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain 
property values, and generally 'protect and preserve the quality 
of the city's neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the 
quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of 
unpopular views."  Id. at 48 (citing Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976) (brackets omitted).  
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
20 
 
The Court further stated that "'if the city had been concerned 
with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it 
would have tried to close them or restrict their number rather 
than circumscribe their choice as to location.'"  Id. (brackets 
omitted).  
¶37 In United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 
1994) affirmed by United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th 
Cir. 1996), the applicable statute provided that anyone who "by 
force 
or 
threat 
of 
force 
or 
by 
physical 
obstruction, 
intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with any person 
because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate 
such person or any other person or any class of persons from, 
obtaining or providing reproductive health services."  Id. at 
856 (citing in relevant part 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)).  The 
district court concluded that the statute was content neutral 
because it sought to "protect[] ingress to and egress from 
clinics," id. at 861, and it was "'justified without reference 
to the content of' any regulated speech."  Id. at 865 (citation 
omitted).     
¶38 In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) is content based because whether Baron's conduct 
is prohibited depends entirely upon whether Baron's speech, 
i.e., the content of the e-mails, was intended to be reputation-
harming speech, which is similar to the content-based provisions 
in Boos and Burson where the prohibition was dependent upon 
whether signs were critical of foreign governments or related to 
political campaigns.  However, we do not decide today whether 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
21 
 
subsection (c) of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2) must always be deemed 
content based under all circumstances as we do not address 
potential situations where something other than speech is used 
with the intent to harm another's reputation.  
¶39 Unlike Taxpayers for Vincent, Renton, or Brock where 
the statutes were not designed to suppress certain ideas, this 
statute under the facts of this case, suppresses reputation-
harming speech when it is accompanied by intentionally using 
another's identity.  There is no identity theft in this case 
unless the trier of fact determines that Baron used Fisher's 
personal identifying information with the intent to harm 
Fisher's reputation.  Therefore, Baron is prohibited from 
disseminating speech that is intended to be harmful to Fisher's 
reputation when that speech occurs through the unauthorized use 
of Fisher's personal identifying information.  As a result, Wis. 
Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), as applied to Baron, is content based.   
¶40 The State, in effect, argues that the justification 
behind the identity theft statute is to punish people for using 
another individual's identity without consent, and therefore, 
the statute does not regulate a specific category of speech.  
While the State may be correct with respect to the application 
of the identity theft statute to other factual scenarios, under 
the facts of this case and as charged here, the content of the 
e-mails was critical to the charge in that Baron must have used 
Fisher's personal identifying information with the intent to 
harm Fisher's reputation.   
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
22 
 
¶41 In Boos, 485 U.S. at 320, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that regulations are content neutral when they 
"'are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech.'"  (Citation omitted.)  For example, "[s]o 
long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do 
with content, i.e., the desire to suppress crime has nothing to 
do with the actual films being shown inside adult movie 
theaters," the regulation can be analyzed as content neutral.  
Id.  
¶42 The district attorney's justification for charging 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) is based upon the content of the  
e-mails because that is what is intended to be harmful to 
Fisher's reputation, and thus, the e-mails, i.e., speech, is 
necessary proof of an element of the crime.  When the Wisconsin 
legislature included intending to harm another's reputation as 
an element of Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), the justification, in 
part, and under the facts of this case became based on the 
content of the speech.   
¶43 We conclude that, under facts of this case, Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) is content based and regulates speech in 
addition to conduct.  However, this may not be the case under 
all circumstances given that one may be able to intend to harm 
the reputation of another without using speech.   
¶44 Accordingly, the State bears the burden of showing 
that the statute overcomes strict scrutiny in order to survive 
Baron's as-applied challenge. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
23 
 
 
C. Strict scrutiny  
¶45 To survive strict scrutiny, the State has the burden 
to show that the "'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end.'"  Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted). 
¶46 In Burson, 504 U.S. at 193-94, 211, the Court 
concluded that the applicable statute, which prohibited a person 
from displaying or distributing campaign literature within 100 
feet of a polling station, survived strict scrutiny.  The Court 
asserted that it "has recognized that a State 'indisputably has 
a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its 
election process.'"  Id. at 199 (citation omitted).  As a 
result, the State had a compelling government interest in 
preventing voter intimidation and election fraud, which history 
reveals has been a persistent battle since the country's 
founding.  Id. at 200-06.  In addition, the Court also concluded 
that the statute was narrowly drawn to achieve the government's 
compelling interest.  Id. at 211.  The Court reasoned that the 
"minor geographic limitation" does not constitute a significant 
impingement.  It asserted that the state of Tennessee has made 
the constitutionally sound decision that "the[] last 15 seconds 
before its citizens enter the polling place should be their own, 
as free from interference as possible."  Id. at 210. 
¶47 In contrast, the Court in Boos, 485 U.S. at 324, 
concluded that the statute at issue did not survive strict 
scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored.  In Boos, the 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
24 
 
statute, which was only applicable to Washington D.C., made it 
unlawful to display anything within 500 feet of an embassy that 
brought "into public odium or public disrepute . . . of a 
foreign government."  Id. at 316.  The Court compared the 
statute with another provision, which was applicable outside of 
D.C., 
that 
criminalized 
"willful 
acts 
or 
attempts 
to 
'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass a foreign official or 
an official guest or obstruct a foreign official in the 
performance of his duties.'"  Id. at 324-25 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 112(b)(2)).  Based on this comparison, the Court concluded 
that while the D.C. ordinance "may serve an interest in 
protecting the dignity of foreign missions, [] it is not 
narrowly tailored; a less restrictive alternative is readily 
available."  Id. at 329.   
¶48 In the case at hand, Baron concedes that the State has 
a compelling interest in preventing identity theft.13  He, 
however, asserts that the statute is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest because it eliminates Baron's First 
Amendment 
right 
to 
defame 
a 
public 
official 
with 
true 
information.  The State, in turn, argues that the statute 
survives strict scrutiny because the statute is narrowly 
tailored 
in 
that 
it 
applies 
only 
when 
the 
defendant 
intentionally uses an individual's personal information to harm 
                                                 
13 Baron's strict scrutiny argument is limited to asserting 
that this statute, as applied to Baron, is not narrowly 
tailored.  Baron further states: "We do not contest the fact 
that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the 
victims of identity theft." 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
25 
 
that individual's reputation.  We agree with the State and 
conclude that this is one of those "rare cases" that a 
government regulation survives strict scrutiny.  See Burson, 504 
U.S. at 211 (stating "we reaffirm that it is the rare case in 
which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny").  As 
applied to Baron, the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the government's compelling interest.   
¶49 First, 
as 
the 
State 
asserts, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) has limited applicability.  While Baron's First 
Amendment right to defame a public official is somewhat 
curtailed by this statute because it impacts whether Baron can 
use Fisher's identity to dispense the harmful information, the 
restriction is limited.  The statute does not prevent Baron from 
revealing the reputation-harming information so long as the 
method chosen does not entail Baron pretending to be Fisher.  
Just as the statute in Burson was limited because it set forth 
restrictions only within 100 feet from polling places, this 
identity theft statute is limited in that it applies only when 
one has stolen another person's identity and proceeds to use 
that 
identity 
with 
the 
intent 
to 
harm 
the 
individual's 
reputation.  Specifically, a defendant, with the intent to harm 
a person's reputation, must use the individual's personal 
identifying information without consent and by representing that 
he or she is the individual.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1458. 
¶50 Second, this statute does not chill Baron's right to 
free speech because he could have intended to harm Fisher's 
reputation without pretending to be Fisher.  For example, Baron 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
26 
 
could have disseminated the information through Baron's own e-
mail account or stood on the street corner and distributed 
flyers.  As a result, it is not the case that this statute 
punishes Baron for criticizing a public official.  Rather, the 
statute punishes Baron for intentionally using an individual's 
personal identifying information with the intent to harm the 
individual's reputation.  
¶51 Third, unlike in Boos where a more narrow statute 
could have been drafted, we can find no alternative way to draft 
the 
statute 
and 
still 
achieve 
the 
compelling 
government 
interest.  A "get out of jail free" card could not have been 
intended for someone who uses a public official's e-mail account 
without authorization in order to send reputation-harming e-
mails.  There are far more civilized methods that are authorized 
by law to ensure that our officials are appropriately conducting 
the peoples' business.14  
¶52 Baron argues that for Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) to be 
narrowly tailored, it should not criminalize harming a public 
official's reputation with true information.  In other words, 
Baron essentially argues that this statute eliminates his First 
Amendment right to defame a public official.  Baron relies on 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), to assert that he has 
a right to disseminate truthful information about a public 
official regardless of its defamatory nature or his defective 
                                                 
14 See generally Wis. Stat. § 19.35. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
27 
 
method of dissemination.  Baron is, in effect, arguing that he 
has an unlimited right to defame a public official by utilizing 
any method he chooses so long as it is not done with actual 
malice.  Baron's arguments are unpersuasive for three reasons. 
¶53 First, while speech that is intended to be harmful to 
one's reputation is implicated by the statute, the State does 
not need to prove that the speech was false or done with actual 
malice, which could be required if Baron was charged with 
defamation.15  Under Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), truthfulness and 
actual malice are irrelevant considerations given the language 
chosen by the legislature.  The crux of the issue before the 
court involves the combination of (1) the inappropriate use of 
the individual's identity that (2) is intended to harm the 
reputation of that individual.  Therefore, Baron's emphasis on 
truthfulness or actual malice is irrelevant. 
¶54 Second, while Baron is correct that he has a First 
Amendment right to defame a public official under Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 279-80, nothing suggests that this right is without 
boundaries.  In fact, the Supreme Court has asserted on a number 
of occasions that there are limits to the First Amendment.  See, 
e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804 (citing Schenck v. 
                                                 
15 If 
charges 
are 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 942.01, 
"Defamation," the State must show the statement was false if a 
private citizen is being defamed, and if a public official is 
being defamed, the State must show the statement was made with 
actual malice pursuant to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  Otherwise First Amendment protections 
can arise. 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
28 
 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating "[i]t has been 
clear since this Court's earliest decisions concerning the 
freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech 
when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state 
interest").  We are aware of no case that holds that one has a 
constitutional right to intentionally use another individual's 
identity without consent in order to harm that individual's 
reputation.  Therefore, we reject Baron's argument that his 
First Amendment right is unlimited.  So long as Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.201(2)(c) survives the requisite level of scrutiny, it is 
perfectly valid and no precedent exists to the contrary.  While 
the requisite level of scrutiny may at times be difficult to 
satisfy, this does not eliminate a government's right to, at 
times, disallow certain fraudulent methods of disseminating 
speech. 
¶55 Third, Bartnicki does not support Baron's argument 
that so long as the information is true, he has an unlimited 
right to harm a public official's reputation even while 
pretending to be that official.  In Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-
19, a radio host aired an unfavorable audio clip that he had 
obtained from a third party who acquired it illegally.  While 
the 
Court 
stated 
that 
enforcing 
the 
provision 
at 
issue 
"implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it 
imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of 
public concern," id. at 533-34, the Court did not set forth an 
unlimited right to publish such information while intentionally 
and falsely pretending to be that public official.  In fact, the 
No. 
2007AP1289-CR   
 
29 
 
Court stated that "[a]s a general matter, 'state action to 
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can 
satisfy constitutional standards.'"  Id. at 527 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  While regulating the dissemination of 
truthful information may "seldom" be constitutional, it does not 
mean that such a regulation is never valid.   
¶56 Moreover, the Court's reasoning for protecting the 
radio host's First Amendment right in Bartnicki was not that he 
had an unlimited right to publish such information.  Rather, the 
Court concluded that while the government's interest justified 
prohibiting the "interceptor" from using the illegally obtained 
information, "it by no means follows that punishing disclosures 
of lawfully obtained information of public interest by one not 
involved in the initial illegality is an acceptable means of 
serving those ends."  Id. at 529.  The Court, therefore, stopped 
short of setting forth the rule asserted by Baron. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that the State has shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c), as applied to 
Baron, is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government 
interest and does not violate Baron's constitutional right to 
freedom of speech. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the statute is constitutional as applied.  
Majority op., ¶57.  I write separately, however, because I 
disagree with the majority that the statute regulates speech as 
well as conduct.  Rather, I believe that the court of appeals 
got it right——this statute as applied regulates only conduct.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶60 The court of appeals noted that "because the statute 
at issue implicates First Amendment rights, the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is 
constitutional."  State v. Baron, 2008 WI App 90, ¶7, 312 
Wis. 2d 789, 754 N.W.2d 175.  To determine whether the State has 
met its burden, I begin by examining the elements of the 
statute.1   
¶61 Under 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
State 
must 
demonstrate that Baron (1) intentionally used Fisher's personal 
identifying information (2) for the purpose of harming Fisher's 
reputation (3) by intentionally representing that he was Fisher 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) provides: 
Whoever, 
for 
any 
of 
the 
following 
purposes, 
intentionally uses, attempts to use, or possesses with 
intent 
to 
use 
any 
personal 
identifying 
information . . . without the authorization or consent 
of the individual and by representing that he or she 
is the individual . . . is guilty of a Class H felony: 
. . . .  
(c) To harm the reputation, property, person, or 
estate of the individual. 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
(4) without Fisher's consent.  It is the second element which 
implicates First Amendment rights.          
¶62 The court of appeals concluded that the statute does 
not criminalize each element of the statute in isolation.  
Baron, 312 Wis. 2d 789, ¶10.  That is, this statute does not 
criminalize the intent to harm an individual's reputation alone.  
Rather, it is the whole act——the use of an individual's identity 
for a prohibited purpose——that is criminalized.  The court noted 
that "Wisconsin statutes are replete with provisions that 
criminalize conduct that may otherwise be constitutionally 
protected, if that conduct is carried out in an unlawful 
manner."  Id. 
¶63 One 
particularly 
apt 
example 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.10(1), which criminalizes bribery of public officers.  
This statute is violated if the defendant (1) transfers property 
(2) to a public officer (3) that the officer was not authorized 
to receive for the performance of official duties, and (4) "the 
defendant intend[s] to influence the conduct of [the officer] in 
relation to any matter which by law [is] pending or might have 
come before [the officer] in an official capacity." See Wis JI——
Criminal 1721 (emphasis supplied).  
¶64 The court of appeals correctly noted that "[t]he 
fourth element requires that the defendant intended to engage in 
conduct that, were it not accompanied by a bribe, would be 
protected by the First Amendment."2  Baron, 312 Wis. 2d 789, ¶12.  
                                                 
2 The 
First 
Amendment 
guarantees 
"the 
right 
of 
the 
people . . . to 
petition 
the 
Government 
for 
redress 
of 
grievances."  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Similarly, the identity theft statute requires the State to 
prove that the defendant was motivated by a purpose which, if 
not accompanied by the theft of the individual's identity, would 
be protected under the First Amendment.    
¶65 The court of appeals' decision in this case was cited 
favorably by the author of a three-volume treatise on the First 
Amendment.  See Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom 
of Speech § 24:19 (2009).  After discussing the court of 
appeals' analogy to bribery, the treatise concludes: "The First 
Amendment cannot plausibly be interpreted to protect identity 
theft, any more than it protects bribery. . . . If the law does 
not protect the corrupt influencing of a public official by 
under-the-table payments, it does not protect the corrupt 
defaming of public officials by hacking into their computers and 
stealing their identity and e-mails."  Id.   
¶66 We have previously stated, "It is not an abridgement 
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct 
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, 
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, 
written, or printed."  State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, ¶42, 253 
Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage, 
336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).  In Robins, we discussed whether the 
use of e-mail constituted speech in the context of the crime of 
child enticement.   
¶67 The defendant, who was charged with child enticement, 
claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment as applied 
to his attempt to entice a child through internet speech.  
No.  2007AP1289-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Intent to entice a child was an element of the offense.  We 
concluded that the statute did not regulate speech and observed 
that 
"internet 
conversations 
and 
e-mails . . . do 
not 
by 
themselves constitute the crime of child enticement.  Rather, 
[the] internet conversation and e-mails are circumstantial 
evidence of his intent to entice a child . . . ."   Id., ¶44.3  
Likewise here, the speech——the content of the e-mail——is 
evidence of Baron's intent to harm Fisher's reputation.   
¶68 For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the 
State has met its burden to demonstrate that the statute is 
constitutional.  Although the application of strict scrutiny is 
not warranted in this case because the statute criminalizes 
conduct rather than speech, I agree with the majority that the 
statute would withstand a strict scrutiny challenge.  See 
majority op., ¶¶48-56.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in 
the majority's opinion. 
                                                 
3 See also Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Speech from 
Conduct, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 621, 622 (1994) ("A significant 
number 
of 
crimes 
either 
require 
or 
frequently 
involve 
communication.  Simply giving money to the bribee would be 
ineffective because she would have no idea of why she was 
receiving it unless somebody communicated with her.  Similarly, 
perjury punishes false statements made under oath. . . . I am 
aware of no serious argument that any of this 'speech' ought to 
be constitutionally protected."). 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶69 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
In 
2006 
Christopher Baron was charged with violating several statutes, 
including Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) (2007-08).1  After argument, 
the circuit court dismissed the § 943.201 charge on grounds that 
the statute was unconstitutional as applied.  This decision was 
subsequently reversed by the court of appeals.  See State v. 
Baron, 2008 WI App 90, 312 Wis. 2d 789, 754 N.W.2d 175.  I 
concur in this court's decision to affirm the court of appeals 
but write separately to offer a different perspective on the 
legal issues. 
¶70 Wisconsin created a comprehensive criminal code in the 
1953 session of the legislature.  Ch. 623, Laws of 1953.  As 
Professor Gordon Baldwin later recalled, one of the first topics 
of the Legislative Council's criminal code project "was the law 
relating to crimes against property."  Gordon L. Baldwin, 
Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin-Part I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 
253, 253 (1960-61).  "Crimes involving acts directed against 
property were divided into three types, crimes involving damage 
to property, trespass upon property and misappropriation of 
property."  Id.  "MISAPPROPRIATION" is now one of the four 
subchapter headings in Chapter 943, "Crimes Against Property."   
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.201 has been located under this 
heading.  The word "misappropriation" is not defined in the 
statutes 
and 
it 
does 
not 
appear 
in 
§ 943.201, 
but 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
misappropriation is embedded in the subchapter and is the very 
heart of the statute in question. 
¶72 Black's Law Dictionary defines "misappropriation" as 
"The application of another's property or money dishonestly to 
one's own use."  Black's Law Dictionary 1013 (7th ed. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  Wisconsin's theft statute, § 943.20, also is 
included 
in 
the 
subchapter 
on 
misappropriation.  
Misappropriation may include theft, but it does not have to 
include theft. 
¶73 Subsection (1) of § 943.201 contains two terms: (a) 
"personal identification document" and (b) "personal identifying 
information."  "Personal identifying information" includes basic 
information such as "[a]n individual's name," "[a]n individual's 
address," 
"[a]n 
individual's 
telephone 
number," 
"[a]n 
individual's employer or place of employment," and "[t]he maiden 
name of an individual's mother."  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(b)1., 
2., 3., 6., 8.  Most of this information is not especially 
confidential and its release is not especially damaging.  There 
are, of course, exceptions, and those exceptions can have 
profound consequences to the individuals involved.2   
¶74 Other "personal identifying information," such as 
"[a]n individual's social security number," "[a]n individual's 
taxpayer identification number," and "[a]n individual's code or 
account number," Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(b)5., 10., 12.a., 
frequently present more ominous problems because of their 
                                                 
2 Cf., e.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810 (1999). 
No.  2007AP1289-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
potential "misappropriation" by people attempting to obtain 
"credit, money, goods, services, employment, or any other thing 
of value or benefit" without authorization or consent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 943.201(2)(a).  This kind of information is closely 
linked to theft or fraud. 
¶75 Still 
another 
type 
of 
"personal 
identifying 
information," "[a]n individual's deoxyribonucleic acid profile," 
Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(b)11., is at the core of an individual's 
personal privacy. 
¶76 In 
subsection 
(1)(a), 
"Personal 
identification 
document" includes "[a] document containing personal identifying 
information."  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(a)1.  This description is 
very broad.  It may include an individual's resume, his 
telephone records, his tax returns, his medical records, and his 
e-mails.  See Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(a) & (b).  Also included 
in "personal identification documents" are "cards" and "plates," 
such as credit and debit cards.  Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1)(a)2. 
¶77 In an information age, the legislature is concerned 
about the unauthorized use, especially the misappropriation, of 
an individual's personal identifying information.  Yet there are 
limits on the state's authority and ability to control such 
information. 
 
Statutes 
on 
this 
subject 
must 
be 
drafted 
carefully. 
¶78 In this case, Baron allegedly accessed Mark Fisher's 
e-mail account by using Fisher's personal password.  Even if he 
acquired the password lawfully, Baron surely was not authorized 
to rummage through Fisher's e-mail account, if he did so.  Baron 
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then allegedly collected embarrassing e-mails, "the personal 
identification documents," in Fisher's account and combined them 
into a new "personal identification document."  He then 
allegedly 
transmitted 
the 
new 
"personal 
identification 
document," without authorization or consent, to people in the 
community.  He allegedly did this from Fisher's own e-mail 
account using Fisher's name.  He allegedly did this with the 
intent of harming the reputation of Fisher.  If Baron did these 
things, he misappropriated Fisher's password, he misappropriated 
Fisher's personal identifying documents, he misappropriated 
Fisher's e-mail account to send out the documents, and he 
misappropriated Fisher's name, with the intent to harm Fisher's 
reputation. 
¶79 Mark Fisher was a government employee.  As such, he 
was inevitably subject to attacks on his reputation, especially 
if the attacks were true.  But a lawful end did not justify 
these alleged unlawful means, especially the misappropriation of 
Fisher's name, i.e., the false representation of Fisher as the 
sender of the widely distributed e-mail. 
¶80 If a person were to send documents from his own 
computer under his own name, he would have a defense, on these 
facts, under this statute.  A person who misappropriates another 
person's name as he attempts to injure the other person does not 
have such a defense.  If a person distributed information 
anonymously, he also would have a defense under this statute.  A 
person so consumed with malice that he uses another person's 
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name, without authority, to discredit that person, forgoes his 
defense under the statute. 
¶81 The First Amendment does not protect a defendant 
accused of violating the statute in the manner alleged here, 
because the statute requires the state to prove that the 
defendant intentionally misrepresented his role as the sender of 
the 
message. 
 
The 
statute 
punishes 
intentional 
misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation is not a 
First Amendment freedom. 
¶82 "A good name is rather to be chosen than great 
riches."  Proverbs 22:1.  "A good name is better than precious 
ointment."  Ecclesiastes 7:1.  This is the wisdom of the ages.  
Misappropriating a person's name is taking that person's most 
valuable possession.  The legislature understood that this 
conduct is a grave offense and should be punished accordingly. 
¶83 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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