Title: Estate of Gagnon v. Anthony

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME 142 
Docket: 
Yor-15-118 
Argued: 
October 8, 2015 
Decided: 
November 10, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and 
HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF PAUL J. GAGNON et al. 
 
v. 
 
KEITH ANTHONY 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  The Estate of Paul J. Gagnon1 appeals from a judgment of the Superior 
Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) entered upon a jury’s verdict in favor of Keith 
Anthony on the Estate’s negligence claim.  The Estate argues that (1) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Gagnon was at least as 
negligent as Anthony and (2) the court erred by denying the Estate’s motion for a 
new trial.  We affirm the judgment and the denial of the motion for a new trial.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On May 2, 2011, around 2:30 in the afternoon, Keith Anthony asked 
his neighbor, Paul Gagnon, to help fell a rotted tree at Anthony’s residence in 
                                         
1  Deborah Gagnon, the widow of Paul Gagnon, also appeals from the judgment in this case resulting 
from the jury’s verdict in favor of Anthony on her claim for loss of consortium.  Because her claim is 
dependent upon the outcome of the Estate’s negligence claim, the appellants are collectively referred to as 
the Estate throughout this decision. 
 
2 
Shapleigh.  Both men were experienced woodcutters.  The tree to be felled was 
approximately thirty inches in diameter with a large limb growing out of it.  
Gagnon used a chainsaw to make a wedge cut in the tree below the limb while 
Anthony used the bucket of his Bobcat skid-steer loader to push the limb away 
from the house and a nearby sapling. 
[¶3]  As they performed their respective tasks, the tree “exploded” and the 
limb fell on Gagnon, knocking him unconscious, pinning him to the ground, and 
causing him to sustain several injuries.2  Two years later, Gagnon filed a complaint 
against Anthony alleging that Anthony failed to warn him about the possibility that 
the limb could snap because of the rotted condition of the tree, and also alleging 
that Anthony was negligent in his operation of the Bobcat.  In his answer to the 
complaint, Anthony raised an affirmative defense of comparative negligence.  See 
14 M.R.S. § 156 (2014). 
[¶4]  Following a two-day trial in January 2015, the jury found that both 
Anthony and Gagnon were negligent and that Gagnon was at least as negligent as 
Anthony in causing his own injuries.  The Estate’s motion for a new trial was 
denied, and this appeal followed. 
                                         
2  Paul Gagnon died from an unrelated illness in August 2013, and his Estate was substituted as the 
plaintiff. 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  The Estate’s challenges to the jury’s finding of comparative negligence 
and the court’s denial of the motion for a new trial are both based upon the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the record.  Accordingly, we consider them together.  
However, our standard of review is different as to each challenge. 
 [¶6]  First, as to the jury’s finding that Gagnon was at least as negligent as 
Anthony, it is important to note that Anthony, not the Estate, had the burden of 
proof at trial on the challenged issue of comparative negligence.  Because the 
Estate did not have the burden at trial on this issue, its claim of insufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s finding is examined under a clear error standard of 
review.  See State v. Price-Rite Fuel, Inc., 2011 ME 76, ¶ 18, 24 A.3d 81.3  “We 
will uphold a jury verdict if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, there is any credible evidence in the record to support the 
verdict.”  Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, ¶ 22, 901 A.2d 189 
(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶7]  Second, as to the court’s denial of the motion for a new trial, “we 
review a denial of a motion for a new trial for a ‘clear and manifest abuse of 
                                         
3  The standard is different when the party with the burden of proof on an issue challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence that led to an adverse finding, as with the Estate’s contention that Anthony 
was negligent.  In that situation, the party must demonstrate that the evidence compelled the contrary 
result.  St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 2012 ME 116, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 443. 
 
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discretion.’”  Seabury-Peterson v. Jhamb, 2011 ME 35, ¶ 14, 15 A.3d 746.  The 
Estate, as the movant, “must show that the jury verdict was so manifestly or clearly 
wrong that it is apparent that the conclusion of the jury was the result of prejudice, 
bias, passion, or a mistake of law or fact.”  Daniel v. Ouellette, 560 A.2d 566, 567 
(Me. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 [¶8]  It is clear from the record that neither man expected the tree to 
“explode” as it had.  In a recorded statement that was admitted in evidence, 
Gagnon explained that the tree “broke way too soon, it should have never broke at 
that point.”  In his statement, Gagnon placed no blame on Anthony, stating that he 
did not believe that Anthony was doing anything with the skid-steer that 
contributed to the tree breaking or falling too soon.  Anthony corroborated the 
accidental nature of the event, testifying that the tree “just dropped suddenly 
without warning or anything.”   
 
[¶9]  The jury learned that both Gagnon and Anthony had substantial 
experience cutting trees and working in the woods, and both were aware of the 
rotted condition of the tree they were working on.  It would not be unreasonable to 
infer from this circumstance that both men knew, or should have known, the risks 
associated with cutting the rotted tree, and both should have known that the plan to 
use the Bobcat to fell that tree was ill advised.  
 
5 
[¶10]  Based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury, therefore, 
could have found, that (1) Anthony was negligent in his operation of the Bobcat; 
(2) either Anthony or Gagnon or both were negligent because the dangerousness of 
the method they undertook to fell the rotted tree should have been obvious to each; 
or (3) neither of them was negligent, and the limb falling onto Gagnon was simply 
an unexpected accident.  Where the causal fault of both parties is in dispute, we 
have stated that, “‘it is the sole prerogative of the jury to determine the 
comparative degrees of fault of each of the parties to a negligence action.’”  
Bourgeois v. Hoyt, 383 A.2d 1095, 1095 (Me. 1978) (per curiam) (quoting Lyman 
v. Bourque, 374 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1977)); see also Minott v. F.W. Cunningham 
& Sons, 413 A.2d 1325, 1332 (Me. 1980).   
[¶11]  The jury was instructed that it could find that there was a condition 
related to the tree that created a risk of injury; that Anthony had a duty to warn or 
take reasonable action; and that Gagnon had a duty to take reasonable care for his 
own safety.  The jury returned a special verdict form finding that both Anthony and 
Gagnon were negligent, but the causative fault of Gagnon was at least equal to or 
greater than the fault of Anthony in causing his injuries.   
[¶12]  Although the trial court record did contain evidence that Anthony 
accepted some responsibility for Gagnon’s injuries, and although a licensed Maine 
arborist testified that pushing a tree with a skid-steer is “not the proper way to do 
 
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it,” there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding 
that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony, and we conclude that the court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion for a new trial. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Arthur H. Dumas, Esq., Arthur H. Dumas, PA, Sanford, for 
appellants Estate of Paul J. Gagnon et al. 
 
Kenneth D. Pierce, Esq., Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland for 
appellee Keith Anthony 
 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-192 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY