Title: Steele v. Harris

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Steele v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5480.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5480 
STEELE, APPELLANT, v. HARRIS, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Steele v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5480.] 
Habeas corpus—Inmate has not alleged deviation from jurisdictional requirements 
in his case and therefore has failed to state claim cognizable in habeas—
Court of appeals’ dismissal of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2020-0151—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided December 2, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 2019-T-0066, 
2019-Ohio-4839. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Sean M. Steele, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional 
Institution, appeals the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We affirm. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Background 
{¶ 2} In September 1999, Steele was charged with two counts of aggravated 
murder in Franklin County Juvenile Court.  Steele was 15 years old at the time of 
the offenses.  In November 1999, the juvenile court continued the case for an 
amenability hearing after finding probable cause to believe that Steele committed 
the offenses.  Following an amenability hearing held in December 1999, the 
juvenile court determined that Steele was not amenable to rehabilitation as a 
juvenile and that the safety of the community may require Steele’s incarceration 
beyond the age of majority.  Therefore, the court transferred the case to the general 
division of the common pleas court (“adult court”). 
{¶ 3} After the transfer, Steele was indicted in adult court on four counts of 
aggravated murder.  He was acquitted of those charges but convicted of two counts 
of murder, a lesser included offense.  The trial court sentenced Steele to an 
aggregate prison term of 30 years to life. 
{¶ 4} On September 24, 2019, Steele filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus against Warden Brandeshawn Harris in the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals.  Steele alleged that his transfer from juvenile court to adult court was void 
and that therefore, the resulting convictions were also void, under three theories. 
{¶ 5} First, Steele asserted that the juvenile court could not assess whether 
he was amenable to rehabilitation until it first undertook efforts at rehabilitation.  
Therefore, according to Steele, the juvenile court failed to satisfy the preconditions 
for the adult court to obtain lawful jurisdiction.  Second, Steele cited Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Steele claimed that transferring a case from juvenile court serves to increase the 
maximum penalty (because the maximum penalty in juvenile court is commitment 
January Term, 2020 
 
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to the Department of Youth Services until the age of 21) and that the facts relevant 
to the transfer decision therefore should have been submitted to a jury.  Third, 
Steele argued that transferring a juvenile to adult court creates a presumption of 
guilt, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 6} In November 2019, the court of appeals granted Harris’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The court noted that Steele had unsuccessfully challenged the 
bindover decision in his first direct appeal, and it therefore held that his habeas 
petition was barred by res judicata.  2019-Ohio-4839, ¶ 6, 19.  In addition, the court 
of appeals rejected Steele’s three theories on the merits.  Id. at ¶ 20-22. 
{¶ 7} Steele filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court of appeals 
denied.  Steele then appealed to this court. 
Legal analysis 
Standard of review 
{¶ 8} This court reviews de novo a decision granting summary judgment in 
a habeas corpus case.  State ex rel. Shafer v. Wainwright, 156 Ohio St.3d 559, 2019-
Ohio-1828, 130 N.E.3d 268, ¶ 7.  However, before we review the court of appeals’ 
application of res judicata, which is a merits decision, we will consider whether the 
petition states a claim within our jurisdiction in the first place. 
Statutory framework 
{¶ 9} A “delinquent” child is one who violates any federal or state law or 
ordinance of a political subdivision, other than a juvenile traffic offender, if the act 
would be an offense if committed by an adult.  R.C. 2151.011(B)(12) and 
2152.02(E)(1).  The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction concerning 
any child alleged to be a delinquent child.  R.C. 2151.23(A)(1); In re M.P., 124 
Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-559, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11.  Thus, when a child is 
arrested for a felony or misdemeanor, proceedings regarding the child must initially 
be held in the juvenile court.  R.C. 2152.03. 
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{¶ 10} If a child is old enough and is alleged to have committed an act that 
would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may transfer its 
jurisdiction to the appropriate adult court for criminal prosecution (“a discretionary 
transfer”) or may be required to transfer jurisdiction (“a mandatory transfer”).1  
Whether an alleged offender is subject to mandatory or discretionary transfer 
depends on such factors as the nature of the offense, the age of the child, and the 
child’s prior criminal history, if any.  See R.C. 2152.12(A) and (B).  These transfers 
occur through a statutory process that “is generally referred to as a bindover 
procedure.”  State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 
{¶ 11} If a child appears to be eligible for mandatory transfer, the juvenile 
court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the child meets the eligibility 
criteria and whether there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the 
act charged.  R.C. 2152.12(A)(1); Juv.R. 30(A).  But when considering a 
discretionary transfer, in addition to determining eligibility and probable cause, the 
juvenile court must determine whether the child is “amenable to care or 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system” and whether “the safety of the community 
may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.”  R.C. 2152.12(B)(3).  Thus, 
a discretionary transfer “allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to 
adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.”  
State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000).  Before ordering 
a discretionary transfer, the juvenile court must conduct an amenability hearing.  
State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10-12; R.C. 
2152.12(B).  In addition, before ordering the transfer, the juvenile court must order 
                                                 
1. R.C. 2152.02(C)(1) defines “child” as a person under the age of 18.  In general, the minimum age 
for mandatory transfer is 16, R.C. 2152.10(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2), and the minimum age to be eligible 
for a discretionary transfer is 14, R.C. 2152.10(B).  However, different age limits apply when the 
alleged offense is aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder.  
See R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a). 
January Term, 2020 
 
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an investigation into the child’s social history, education, family situation, and “any 
other factor bearing on whether the child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation.”  
R.C. 2152.12(C). 
{¶ 12} An alleged child offender shall not be tried as an adult for a juvenile 
offense unless the person has been transferred pursuant to these statutory bindover 
procedures (or if the person was over the age of 21 when apprehended or taken into 
custody).  R.C. 2152.12(H).  Such a transfer “abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint,” so that all further 
proceedings relating to the charged act must be discontinued in the juvenile court, 
and “the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is 
transferred.”  R.C. 2152.12(I). 
Steele’s petition fails to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show that 
he is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty and that he is entitled to immediate 
release from prison or confinement.  R.C. 2725.01; State ex rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 
155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10.  Habeas corpus is 
generally available only when the petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and 
he is being held unlawfully.  Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 702 
N.E.2d 1198 (1998).  And in those circumstances, the writ is not available when 
there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  Billiter v. Banks, 
135 Ohio St.3d 426, 2013-Ohio-1719, 988 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 8.  “However, there is a 
limited exception to the adequate-remedy requirement: ‘when a court’s judgment 
is void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite 
the availability of appeal.’ ”  Leyman v. Bradshaw, 146 Ohio St.3d 522, 2016-Ohio-
1093, 59 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 9, quoting Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 
656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995). 
{¶ 14} Steele’s habeas petition is premised on the latter theory.  At one time, 
if a juvenile court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the bindover 
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statute, its purported transfer of the case to adult court was ineffective and any 
judgment issued by the transferee court was void.  Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 
93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 752 N.E.2d 1153 (2001).  And in such cases, the defendant 
could challenge in habeas a conviction following an improper transfer.  Gaskins at 
151. 
{¶ 15} However, we recently overruled Gaskins in part in Smith v. May, 159 
Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542.  Whereas we had held in Gaskins 
that any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure could create a valid habeas 
corpus claim, we held in Smith that “[d]eviation from a bindover procedure gives 
rise to a potentially valid habeas claim only if the applicable statute clearly makes 
the procedure a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult 
court.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  Thus, we made clear in Smith that only a jurisdictional defect 
would be potentially cognizable in habeas corpus.  The question is whether the 
procedural requirement “clearly establishes a barrier to the transfer of jurisdiction.”  
Id. at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 16} Applying the Smith standard to Steele’s three theories shows that he 
has failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas.  He does not allege any deviations 
from jurisdictional requirements in his particular case.  Rather, he challenges the 
constitutionality of the statutory scheme itself. 
{¶ 17} Under Steele’s first theory, he contends that the Ohio Constitution 
and Revised Code “categorically require juvenile courts to first provide children 
with care and rehabilitation before they may even consider whether children are 
amendable thereto.”  In other words, Steele is asserting that a juvenile court may 
never bind over a first-time offender to adult court, for any offense.  He draws this 
conclusion from the “purposes” and implications of the statute, not from any 
language in the statute.  But he has not alleged that the juvenile-court judge deviated 
from a particular jurisdictional requirement in his case, which is a prerequisite for 
a habeas challenge under Smith. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 18} Likewise, in his second theory, he claims that under the Constitution 
and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, a jury must make 
the determinations required by R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), even though the statute does 
not provide for a jury.  And his third premise—that the entire transfer system creates 
an unconstitutional presumption of guilt—is a challenge to the system itself, not a 
claim of a jurisdictional defect. 
{¶ 19} Based on our decision in Smith, we conclude that Steele has failed 
to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus.  It is well established that habeas 
corpus will not lie to challenge the constitutionality of a statute under which the 
defendant was convicted, so long as the court in which the defendant was convicted 
had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional question (in which case, the 
defendant has or had an adequate remedy by way of appeal).  Fortune v. Reshetylo, 
33 Ohio St.2d 22, 26, 294 N.E.2d 880 (1973). 
{¶ 20} For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Steele’s habeas corpus 
petition.  Given our disposition of his petition, it is unnecessary for us to consider 
the remaining legal arguments presented in Steele’s petition and merit brief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Timothy B. Hackett, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
_________________