Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3662.]  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3662 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. GRUTTADAURIO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3662.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Failure to act with reasonable diligence—Failure to 
place fees into client trust account—Failure to refund unearned fees—
Failure to perform contracted work—Engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on lawyer’s fitness to practice law—Knowingly making false 
statements during disciplinary proceedings—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2012-2060—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided August 28, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-114. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Gruttadaurio of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0042083, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1989. 
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{¶ 2} In December 2011, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline certified a nine-count complaint 
filed by relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, alleging that 
Gruttadaurio failed to place client fees received pursuant to a flat-fee arrangement 
into a client trust account as required, failed to refund unearned client payments, 
failed to advise his clients that he did not carry malpractice insurance, failed to 
perform contracted work, and lied to relator’s investigator.  Relator further 
alleged 
that 
Gruttadaurio 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation, that his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
and that it adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 3} The panel found that Gruttadaurio committed most of the charged 
misconduct but recommended that alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) 
(prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection 
with a disciplinary matter) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) contained in 
Count Three of relator’s complaint be dismissed.  Based in large part on its view 
that these two serious alleged violations were not proven, the panel recommended 
that Gruttadaurio be suspended from the practice of law for two years with the 
final 18 months of that suspension stayed on conditions.  The board adopted the 
panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and its recommended sanction.  
Neither party has filed objections to the board’s report. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, except that 
having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find, contrary to the board, that relator 
has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Gruttadaurio engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and knowingly 
made a false statement of material fact to relator’s investigator during the course 
of the disciplinary investigation as alleged in Count Three of relator’s complaint.  
Therefore, we find that Gruttadaurio has violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
as charged in that count, reject the board’s recommended sanction, and 
indefinitely suspend Gruttadaurio from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Misconduct 
The Aldo Britta Matter—Counts One, Five, and Six 
{¶ 5} Aldo Britta was convicted in 2008 of four counts of gross sexual 
imposition and sentenced to eight years in prison.  An attorney with the Lake 
County public defender’s office filed an appellate brief in the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals on his behalf on July 6, 2009.  In June or July 2009, Britta and 
his mother, Luigia Britta, retained Gruttadaurio to represent Britta in his appeal in 
the Eleventh District and, if necessary, in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
{¶ 6} In a written engagement letter dated July 23, 2009, Gruttadaurio 
agreed to assume representation in Britta’s appeal by filing a notice of substitution 
of counsel, filing a reply brief (if one was necessary), and presenting oral 
argument.  But he did not notify Britta’s public defender that he had been retained 
or file a notice of substitution of counsel in the case.  Although Gruttadaurio 
attended the oral argument of Britta’s appeal on January 12, 2010, he sat in the 
gallery while the public defender argued the case. 
{¶ 7} The engagement letter that Gruttadaurio had provided Aldo Britta 
stated that he would provide legal representation pro bono, but that Britta would 
be responsible for the costs of the litigation.  Despite the terms of that agreement, 
and prior to its execution, Gruttadaurio quoted Luigia Britta a flat fee of $4,000, 
which she paid in monthly installments over a ten-month period. 
{¶ 8} On March 15, 2010, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
affirmed Britta’s convictions.  State v. Britta, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-017, 
2010-Ohio-971, 
2010 
WL 
891357. 
 
Notwithstanding 
Gruttadaurio’s 
representations to Luigia Britta that he would appeal that judgment to this court, 
he failed to timely file a notice of appeal and memorandum in support of 
jurisdiction on Britta’s behalf.  On July 6, 2010, attorney Ken Bossin, who by that 
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time had been retained to represent Britta, moved this court for leave to file a 
delayed appeal.  Although we granted the motion for leave, 126 Ohio St.3d 1543, 
2010-Ohio-3855, 932 N.E.2d 338, we subsequently declined to accept jurisdiction 
over the case.  127 Ohio St.3d 1484, 2010-Ohio-6371, 939 N.E.2d 183. 
{¶ 9} From the time that Luigia Britta retained Gruttadaurio until the 
deadline for initiating Britta’s appeal in this court, she made multiple efforts to 
reach Gruttadaurio to discuss the case.  Gruttadaurio often failed to answer or 
return her telephone calls, and her letters to him were returned unclaimed. 
{¶ 10} Gruttadaurio did not inform either of the Brittas that he had failed 
to timely file an appeal to this court.  And despite having failed to assume 
representation in Britta’s appeal in the Eleventh District and having failed to file a 
timely appeal in this court, Gruttadaurio did not refund any of the fees that he had 
collected. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board found that Gruttadaurio 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client) as charged in Count One and Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) 
(requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter) as charged in Count Six.  The board also found that by accepting payment 
for services he did not perform and failing to refund any of Luigia Britta’s 
payments, Gruttadaurio violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive 
fee) as charged in Count Five.  We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 
The Elizabeth Leroy Matter—Count Two 
{¶ 12} During the pendency of Britta’s appeal in the Eleventh District 
Court of Appeals, Luigia Britta retained Gruttadaurio to represent her daughter, 
Elizabeth Leroy, in a domestic-relations matter.  He filed the complaint, appeared 
for at least one pretrial conference, and drafted settlement paperwork, but he 
failed to appear at the final hearing.  The parties stipulated and the board found 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
that by failing to attend the final hearing, Gruttadaurio violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
as charged in Count Two. 
{¶ 13} We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct and also find that 
Gruttadaurio agreed to represent Leroy and to complete all the briefing in Britta’s 
appeal to this court for an additional combined fee of $1,000.  Gruttadaurio 
received the $1,000 payment shortly after that agreement was reached. 
Failure to Inform Clients Regarding Lack of  
Malpractice Insurance—Counts Four and Eight 
{¶ 14} When he opened his solo practice in 2009, Gruttadaurio began to 
research the cost of malpractice insurance.  In his engagement letters at that time, 
he advised clients that he was “in the process” of applying for legal-malpractice 
insurance, but he failed to advise those clients later that he had discontinued his 
efforts to obtain insurance when it became clear to him that he could not afford it.  
Moreover, he never advised the Brittas that he did not carry malpractice 
insurance.  The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client if the 
lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance) as charged in Counts 
Four and Eight of relator’s complaint.  We adopt these conclusions. 
Client-Trust-Account Violations Involving Britta’s Fee—Count Seven 
{¶ 15} Gruttadaurio did not maintain a client trust account during the time 
that he represented Britta.  Gruttadaurio’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing 
establishes that he deposited the funds he received from Luigia Britta into his 
business and personal bank accounts.  The board found that his conduct regarding 
those funds violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of 
clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own 
property) as charged in Count Seven. 
{¶ 16} We adopt the board’s findings of fact as to Count 7.  For the 
reasons that follow, we, like the board, do not accept Gruttadaurio’s explanation 
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justifying his handling of these funds.  Gruttadaurio claimed at the disciplinary 
hearing that he applied the payments to work that he had already performed on 
Britta’s behalf, but he did not maintain records of the hours spent on the case or 
the tasks he performed—information that only he could know. 
{¶ 17} In his March 8, 2011 response to relator’s letter of inquiry, 
Gruttadaurio acknowledged that his written agreement with Britta required him to 
take over Britta’s representation in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and to 
present oral argument before that court.  He also acknowledged that he had agreed 
to handle that representation for a flat fee of $4,000.  But Gruttadaurio stated in 
that response that because the Public Defender’s Office was handling the appeal 
effectively and had more experience with the judges on the appellate panel, he 
decided to allow the public defender to complete the appeal.  Although he claimed 
to have advised the Brittas of his decision, Luigia Britta testified that she did not 
recall such a conversation. 
{¶ 18} In his response letter to relator, Gruttadaurio admitted that he had 
not performed all the promised work, but also claimed that he was entitled to keep 
the entire $4,000 flat fee based on his assertions that he had performed 
approximately 70 hours of work on the case, and that had he billed the case 
hourly, “[it] would have been far more costly than the fee paid.”  But the key flaw 
in Gruttadaurio’s position is that he did not accept the representation on an hourly 
fee basis—he agreed to a flat fee for the work and then he did not complete it.  
Therefore, he could not have been entitled to retain the entire flat fee. 
{¶ 19} We acknowledge that when representation is undertaken pursuant 
to an hourly fee agreement, if the value of the work the attorney has already 
performed exceeds the amount of a client’s installment payment, the money 
received should not be deposited into the attorney’s client trust account.  This is 
inherently true because at the time such a payment is remitted, it has already been 
earned and rightfully belongs to the attorney. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 20} Flat-fee 
representation, 
however, 
is 
distinguishable 
from 
representation pursuant to an hourly-fee arrangement.  Comment 6A to 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 explains that a flat fee “is a fee of a set amount for performance 
of agreed work, which may or may not be paid in advance but is not deemed 
earned until the work is performed.”  The comment further states, “An earned 
upon receipt fee is a flat fee paid in advance that is deemed earned upon payment 
regardless of the amount of future work performed.  When a fee is earned affects 
whether it must be placed in the attorney’s trust account, see Rule 1.15, and may 
have significance under other laws such as tax and bankruptcy.” 
{¶ 21} While the Rules of Professional Conduct permit an attorney to 
deem a fee earned upon receipt, Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(d)(3) prohibits an attorney 
from entering into an arrangement for, charging, or collecting fees that are 
“earned upon receipt,” “nonrefundable,” or similarly designated “unless the 
client is simultaneously advised in writing that if the lawyer does not complete 
the representation for any reason, the client may be entitled to a refund of all or 
part of the fee based upon the value of the representation pursuant to division (a) 
of this rule.”  Otherwise, Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) provides:  “A lawyer shall 
deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in 
advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses 
incurred.” 
{¶ 22} As we stated in Disciplinary Counsel v. Summers, 131 Ohio St.3d 
467, 2012-Ohio-1144, 967 N.E.2d 183, ¶ 18: 
 
When a lawyer agrees to represent a client through the 
conclusion of the case for a flat fee, and that lawyer withdraws 
from representation without cause before the work is completed, he 
cannot retain the entire flat fee by resorting to a mathematical 
calculation of his billable hours.  To hold otherwise would leave 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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clients at the mercy of lawyers who charge significant flat fees to 
provide complete representation only to withdraw when the 
demands of the case become too onerous.  While we recognize that 
[the attorney] is entitled to be compensated for the services he has 
provided, [the clients] are also entitled to receive a benefit for their 
flat-fee bargain. 
 
{¶ 23} Here, there is no evidence that Gruttadaurio advised either Luigia 
Britta or Aldo Britta in writing that they would be entitled to a refund of all or 
part of the fee if he did not complete Britta’s representation.  While Gruttadaurio 
may have been entitled to collect part of the flat fee based on the work he had 
already performed, the record shows that he clearly did not complete all the 
services that were necessary to earn the entire flat fee.  In fact, Gruttadaurio 
admitted that he failed to enter an appearance in the court of appeals, that he 
failed to orally argue the case before the court of appeals, and that the notice of 
appeal and memorandum in support of jurisdiction that he prepared for Britta 
were never filed in this court.  Therefore, we adopt the board’s finding that 
Gruttadaurio violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) by failing to place any portion of 
Britta’s flat fee into a client trust account. 
Conduct Adversely Reflecting on Gruttadaurio’s 
Fitness to Practice Law—Count Nine 
{¶ 24} In Count Nine of the complaint, relator alleged that Gruttadaurio’s 
conduct with respect to Counts One through Eight violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The parties stipulated that his conduct with 
respect to all those counts, with the exception of Counts Three, Five, and Seven, 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) as charged.  The board found that Gruttadaurio’s 
conduct with respect to all those counts, with the exception of Count Three, 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  We agree that multiple violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h) were proven. 
Misrepresentations to Relator’s Investigator about  
the Britta Matter—Count Three 
{¶ 25} In Count Three of the complaint, relator alleged that Gruttadaurio 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) by falsely advising relator’s investigator 
that he had mailed Britta’s notice of appeal and memorandum in support of 
jurisdiction to this court, and had served them on the prosecuting attorney by 
regular U.S. mail, when Gruttadaurio knew that he had not done so.  Relator 
further alleged that by failing to mail the documents to this court, Gruttadaurio 
delayed Britta’s appeal to this court, thereby violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
{¶ 26} The board found that in the course of the disciplinary investigation, 
Gruttadaurio stated that he had prepared and mailed Britta’s notice of appeal and 
memorandum in support of jurisdiction to this court on or about April 21, 2010, 
by regular U.S. mail, and also stated that he had mailed copies of the documents 
to the prosecutor.  The board also found that Gruttadaurio stated to the 
investigator that he had called this court “on a couple of occasions” and was 
informed that the documents were “in the system,” but that they were not yet on 
the docket, and was informed that this circumstance “was not unusual.” 
{¶ 27} The board found that at a second meeting with the investigator, 
however, Gruttadaurio stated that “he may not have called” this court to follow up 
on the filings as he had previously represented.  Gruttadaurio also produced a 
ledger during the second meeting that referred to a payment to this court and 
stated that his first indication that the documents may not have been received by 
this court was when he discovered that the check for the filing fee had not cleared 
his account. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 28} As alleged in the complaint, the board found that the documents 
were not received by this court or by the prosecuting attorney in Britta’s case, and 
that the U.S. Postal Service had not returned the documents to Gruttadaurio. 
{¶ 29} Relator offered into evidence the cover letter, notice of appeal, and 
memorandum in support of jurisdiction that Gruttadaurio claimed to have timely 
mailed, and Gruttadaurio testified, “I prepared them for mailing.  What happened 
after that, I honestly don’t know.”  This testimony, however, even if it was 
accurate, does not insulate from scrutiny certain other statements made by 
Gruttadaurio that are highly problematic. 
{¶ 30} The board concluded that Gruttadaurio’s conduct in this matter 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  
Citing insufficiency of the evidence, however, the board recommends that the 
claimed violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) arising out of Gruttadaurio’s 
allegedly false statements to relator’s investigator be dismissed. 
{¶ 31} In attorney-discipline matters, “[t]he Supreme Court is not bound 
by the conclusion of either the panel or the board regarding the facts or law when 
determining the propriety of an attorney’s conduct and the appropriate sanction.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth, 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 181, 754 N.E.2d 219 (2001), 
citing Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 330, 708 N.E.2d 193 
(1999).  Nonetheless, we typically defer to the factual findings of the panel and 
board unless the record weighs heavily against those determinations.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, 
citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 
N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  Having independently reviewed the record in this case, we 
cannot agree with the board’s recommendation to dismiss the alleged violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c). 
{¶ 32} Gruttadaurio admitted at the disciplinary hearing that he had 
initially told relator’s investigator, Howard Mishkind, that he had timely mailed 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
the Britta appeal documents to this court via regular U.S. Mail.  He also advised 
Mishkind the first time they met that he had made one or two calls to the clerk of 
this court to check on the status of the filing.  He met with Mishkind a second 
time within about a week of the first meeting, however, and reported that he could 
not find any telephone records to confirm that he had called the Supreme Court of 
Ohio to check the status of the filing.  At that time, he acknowledged that he 
might not have placed such a call. 
{¶ 33} At the disciplinary hearing, Gruttadaurio testified that he had 
prepared the documents and put them in the envelopes, but that he did not know 
what happened after that.  He then attempted to explain his initial false statement 
to Mishkind, stating: 
 
Quite frankly, given everything that had happened, I honestly 
believe that I sort of—not sort of—blurred what happened, what I 
knew should have happened.  And I—I think, sitting there in the 
moment with Mr. Mishkind, I made what I believed, in my mind, 
to be an accurate statement; and replaying it as he left and as I 
went back over my records, I realized that it was in error.  And 
that’s all. 
 
{¶ 34} Thus Gruttadaurio claims that he made the false representations 
regarding both the mailing of the documents and the calls to this court when put 
on the spot in his first meeting with relator’s investigator.  He contends that he 
believed those statements to be true when he made them, and represents that 
further investigation caused him to realize his “error.” 
{¶ 35} Gruttadaurio’s explanation might be credible if his statement to 
relator’s investigator was his first claim that he had mailed Britta’s notice of 
appeal.  But he first made those representations in a March 8, 2011 letter to 
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relator—a letter that according to his own testimony was sent two to three months 
before he first met with Mishkind.  In that letter, Gruttadaurio stated: 
 
As I expected, I didn’t have much of a problem fashioning the 
necessary paperwork to file, so due to other obligations I decided 
to mail the filing package to the Court.  I did so with a week to 
spare before my deadline, but unfortunately in an ill-advised fit of 
economy, I sent it regular mail. 
At this point, there is no sense in stating anything other 
than that I dropped the ball.  I called the Court once to confirm the 
filing, but they told me that it was not in the system, but given the 
timing was probably in process.  After that, the matter moved to 
waiting for a scheduling order, and I did not notice that there was a 
problem until a few months down the road when I realized that my 
check for the filing fee had not cleared. 
 
{¶ 36} Gruttadaurio made this statement in a four-page, single-spaced 
letter, in which he first apologized for his delay in responding to relator’s inquiry, 
stating, “While it took [me] longer than I had hoped to track down elements of my 
files due to changes in my computing equipment, I should have contacted you for 
a time extension.”  Thus, contrary to his claim that he blurred what should have 
happened with what did happen in the heat of the moment during his first meeting 
with relator’s investigator, it is evident that he had already engaged in careful 
reflection and review of his records before he made the false representations in his 
earlier letter to relator.  Although Gruttadaurio testified that he had no difficulties 
with his memory or cognition, his recall of the events surrounding the alleged 
mailing became conveniently less clear when he realized that relator’s 
investigation was not going away. 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
{¶ 37} Gruttadaurio’s representations that he had called this court to 
inquire about the alleged filing of Britta’s documents further demonstrate that he 
knew his statements were false when he made them.  While he claimed to have 
made at least one such call in both his March 8, 2010 letter and during his first 
interview with relator’s investigator—even going so far as to relate what a court 
employee supposedly told him about the status of the case—he later 
acknowledged to the investigator that he might not have made such a call.  And 
when asked at the disciplinary hearing whether he had ever placed a call to this 
court’s clerk’s office to check on the status of the filing, he completed his 
backpedaling and testified, “I don’t believe so, no.” 
{¶ 38} Our review of Gruttadaurio’s testimony shows that it is not 
plausible that he could have made a call to this court regarding another case and 
misremembered that call as related to Britta’s appeal.  He testified at the 
disciplinary hearing that he had filed only two previous cases in this court—both 
during his previous tenure with a large firm where the legal assistants handled the 
filing of court documents.  One would reasonably expect an attorney with no 
cognitive deficits to recall details of his rare interactions with this court—
particularly when, as here, he was concerned about whether his client’s appeal 
documents had been timely received by the court.  We find that Gruttadaurio’s 
claims that he neither intentionally failed to cooperate nor attempted to hide what 
had happened ring false and are belied by the record. 
{¶ 39} Thus, despite the board’s findings to the contrary, we find that in 
addition to establishing a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) regarding Count Three 
of the complaint, relator has proven by clear and convincing evidence that 
Gruttadaurio also knowingly made false statements of material fact in the course 
of a disciplinary investigation and thereby engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) 
and 8.4(c) as charged in Count Three. 
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Sanction 
{¶ 40} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 41} The board found that four of the aggravating factors identified in 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) are present—a pattern of neglect, multiple offenses, 
failure to fully acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct, and failure to 
make timely restitution.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), (d), (g), and (i).  As 
mitigating factors, the board cites the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the 
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, and a cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), and (d). 
{¶ 42} Relator argued at the disciplinary hearing that Gruttadaurio’s 
misconduct warrants a two-year actual suspension from the practice of law.  In 
support of that sanction, relator cited our decisions in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Manning, 111 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006-Ohio-5794, 856 N.E.2d 259 (imposing a 
two-year actual suspension on an attorney who accepted money from clients, 
deposited it into his law firm’s operating account, failed to perform the contracted 
work, falsely advised the clients that he had filed a malpractice action on their 
behalf, and fabricated a settlement agreement to avoid being sued by the clients 
for malpractice), and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-
Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 618 (imposing a two-year suspension with the second 
year stayed on conditions on an attorney who failed to perform his duties as 
counsel for three clients, failed to return their unearned fees, misled one of those 
clients about the status of her driver’s license suspension and other traffic 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
citations, and failed to cooperate in two of the disciplinary investigations; 
mitigating factors included the absence of a prior disciplinary record, a 
debilitating sleep disorder that compromised the attorney’s energy level and 
focus, and letters from three judges attesting to the attorney’s good character and 
competence). 
{¶ 43} Gruttadaurio argued in favor of a suspension for a definite term, 
fully or at least partially stayed on the conditions that he attend courses in law-
office management, make restitution to Luigia Britta, and have a mentor oversee 
his office practices. 
{¶ 44} Citing Gruttadaurio’s “genuine remorse” and his “efforts to 
improve the management of his practice,” the board found that his penalty 
“should not be as severe as the sanctions imposed in Manning or Larson.”  
Therefore, the board recommends that Gruttadaurio be suspended for two years 
with the final 18 months stayed on the conditions that he be required to certify to 
the Supreme Court that he has completed six hours of continuing legal education 
(“CLE”) in law-office management and has made restitution of $4,000 to Luigia 
Britta.  Additionally, the board recommends that he be required to serve a two-
year period of monitored probation upon his return to the active practice of law. 
{¶ 45} While Gruttadaurio may have shown some remorse for his 
stipulated misconduct, it was more than outweighed by his failure to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of what are arguably his most egregious acts—his claims that 
he earned the entire flat fee he collected in the Britta matter and his false 
statements to relator’s investigators to the effect that he had mailed Britta’s appeal 
documents when he knew that he had not done so.  Moreover, our review of the 
record shows only that Gruttadaurio is willing to participate in CLE and to work 
with a mentor to improve his practice—not that he has actually engaged in such 
efforts.  Therefore, we cannot in good conscience consider Gruttadaurio’s claimed 
remorse, his alleged cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding, or his alleged 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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efforts to improve the management of his practice as mitigating factors weighing 
in favor of a lesser sanction. 
{¶ 46} We find that like Manning and Larson, Gruttadaurio accepted 
money from his clients and failed to perform the promised work.  While 
Gruttadaurio did not affirmatively misrepresent to his clients the status of their 
cases for extended periods of time as Manning and Larson did, he deceived his 
clients by advising them that he was in the process of obtaining malpractice 
insurance and failing to advise them that he later decided that he could not afford 
such coverage.  He also failed to reasonably communicate with his clients given 
that he did not respond to Leroy’s calls about her final divorce hearing and 
stopped answering Luigia Britta’s calls following the deadline for filing Britta’s 
appeal with this court, conceding that he was “scared to death” that he had 
screwed up. 
{¶ 47} Throughout the disciplinary proceedings, Gruttadaurio refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct with respect to some of his most 
egregious acts—his handling of the flat fees and his false statements in the course 
of the disciplinary proceedings.  He maintained that he was not required to deposit 
Luigia Britta’s payments into a client trust account because, in his opinion, he had 
already earned the money—even though he had not completed all the promised 
tasks.  He ultimately conceded that Britta’s notice of appeal and memorandum in 
support of jurisdiction were not filed in this court, admittedly rendering his 
representation “valueless” to Britta.  Finally, his self-serving statements and 
misrepresentations in the course of the disciplinary proceedings are indicative of a 
calculated attempt to avoid accepting responsibility for his deficient 
representation. 
{¶ 48} We have recognized that the act of accepting retainers or legal fees 
and failing to carry out contracts of employment is tantamount to theft of the fee 
from the client and that the presumptive sanction for that offense is disbarment.  
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. Moushey, 104 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-6897, 
819 N.E.2d 1112, ¶ 16, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Sigall, 14 Ohio St.3d 15, 
17, 470 N.E.2d 886 (1984), and Disciplinary Counsel v. France, 97 Ohio St.3d 
240, 2002-Ohio-5945, 778 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 11.  That presumption, however, may be 
tempered with sufficient mitigating evidence, which may include a substantial 
period of legal practice with no prior disciplinary offenses.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Smith, 101 Ohio St.3d 27, 2003-Ohio-6623, 800 N.E.2d 1129, ¶ 9 
(attorney who had been licensed for approximately 45 years without any previous 
ethical infraction indefinitely suspended for misappropriating client funds).  In 
this case, Gruttadaurio practiced law for 30 years without incident before 
committing the charged misconduct. 
{¶ 49} We have also explained: “A lawyer who engages in a material 
misrepresentation to a court * * * violates, at a minimum, the lawyer’s oath of 
office that he or she will not ‘knowingly * * * employ or countenance any * * * 
deception, falsehood, or fraud.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), quoting former Gov.Bar R. I(8)(A). 
{¶ 50} Because we have found that Gruttadaurio has engaged in 
dishonesty not only in his handling of his client matters but also in the 
disciplinary proceedings before this court, we find that his conduct is most 
analogous to those attorneys who have taken their clients’ money, failed to 
perform the promised legal work, and then failed to cooperate in the resulting 
disciplinary investigation.  We have repeatedly held that such misconduct 
warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-2076, 865 N.E.2d 891, 
¶ 19 (attorney indefinitely suspended for neglecting clients’ cases, mismanaging 
his client trust account, and failing to cooperate throughout the disciplinary 
process); Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Verbiski, 86 Ohio St.3d 627, 628, 716 N.E.2d 
702 (1999) (attorney indefinitely suspended for failure to seek the lawful 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
objectives of her client, failure to timely refund an unearned retainer, and failure 
to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation). 
{¶ 51} Accordingly, John Joseph Gruttadaurio is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Gruttadaurio. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would impose a two-year suspension 
with 18 months stayed on conditions as recommended by the board. 
____________________ 
Heather M. Zirke, Assistant Bar Counsel; Bolek Besser Glesius, L.L.C., 
and Cathleen M. Bolek; and Dunson & Dunson Co., L.P.A., and Joseph P. 
Dunson, for relator. 
John Joseph Gruttadaurio, pro se. 
________________________