Title: Roberts v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SCOTT A. ROBERTS 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090194  
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 15, 2010 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Clarence N. Jenkins, Jr., Judge 
 
This appeal arises out of an action brought under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 
(2006 & Supp. I 2007), in which Scott Allen Roberts alleged 
that he suffered personal injury while working for CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSX).  Following a two-day trial, a jury 
found that although Roberts sustained $280,000 in damages, he 
was ninety-five percent at fault for his injuries, and CSX was 
five percent at fault.  In accordance with the jury verdict, 
the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Roberts in the 
amount of $14,000.00, plus interest and costs.  Because the 
circuit court failed to strike for cause a potential juror who 
was a stockholder in CSX and thereby forced Roberts to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove that juror from the jury panel, 
we will reverse the circuit court's judgment. 
I.  MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Although Roberts prevailed at trial, he appeals from the 
circuit court's judgment, presenting two assignments of error 
both of which deal exclusively with objections raised during 
voir dire of the venire.  The details of the evidence adduced 
at trial are not pertinent to the dispositive issue before us; 
therefore, we will recite only those facts relevant to that 
issue. 
During the circuit court's voir dire of the venire 
regarding matters that might reveal a prospective juror's 
prejudice or bias, a potential juror, identified as Donald 
Kemp, stated that he had been a shareholder of CSX for 
"[p]robably 30 years."  The court asked Kemp whether "being a 
stockholder with the corporation [would] have a bearing on 
[his] ability to be fair and impartial" and whether he 
"actively participate[d] in annual meetings."  As to both 
questions, Kemp responded, "No." 
Roberts moved that Kemp "be stricken for cause" because 
of his status as a long-time shareholder of CSX.  CSX, 
however, urged the circuit court not to strike Kemp for cause, 
arguing that "he answered . . . fairly quick[ly] and fairly 
candidly" that he could be fair and impartial.  The circuit 
court overruled Roberts' motion, finding that Kemp "did answer 
very adamantly that he had no problems with being able to 
listen to facts and make a fair and impartial decision."  
Roberts later used one of his peremptory strikes to remove 
Kemp from the jury panel. 
2 
After trial, Roberts moved for a new trial on the ground, 
inter alia, that "the trial court's failure to strike juror 
Donald Kemp for cause . . . is per se reversible error."  The 
circuit court denied the motion and entered judgment in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  This appeal ensued.  In the 
dispositive assignment of error, Roberts claims that the 
circuit court "erred by failing to strike prospective juror, 
Donald Kemp, for cause as a 30-year stockholder in defendant 
CSX." 
II.  ANALYSIS 
On appellate review, this Court gives deference to a 
trial court's decision whether to exclude a potential juror 
for cause.  Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115, 546 
S.E.2d 446, 451 (2001).  We defer " '[b]ecause the trial judge 
has the opportunity, which we lack, to observe and evaluate 
the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and 
demeanor of prospective jurors first hand,' " Juniper v. 
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 400, 626 S.E.2d 383, 408 (2006) 
(citation omitted), and "'to determine whether a prospective 
juror's responses during voir dire indicate that the juror 
would be prevented from or impaired in performing the duties 
of a juror,' " Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329, 619 
S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005) (citation omitted).  Thus, "a trial 
court's denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause 'will 
3 
not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest 
error amounting to an abuse of discretion.' "  Id. at 329-30, 
619 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 731, 732 (2001)); accord Cantrell v. 
Crews, 259 Va. 47, 50, 523 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2000). 
"Parties to litigation are entitled to a fair and 
impartial trial by a jury of persons who 'stand indifferent in 
the cause.'  'The right to a fair and impartial trial in a 
civil case is as fundamental as it is in a criminal case.' "  
Cantrell, 259 Va. at 50, 523 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting Temple v. 
Moses, 175 Va. 320, 336, 8 S.E.2d 262, 268 (1940)) (internal 
citation omitted).  To safeguard jury impartiality, the 
General Assembly has provided that "if it shall appear to the 
court that the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, 
another shall be drawn or called and placed in his stead for 
the trial of that case."  Code § 8.01-358.  Thus, "[i]t is the 
duty of the trial court, through the legal machinery provided 
for that purpose, to procure an impartial jury to try every 
case."  Salina v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 92, 93, 225 S.E.2d 
199, 200 (1976) (citing Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 
1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931)). 
A trial court must excuse for cause a potential juror who 
" 'has any interest in the cause, or is related to either 
party, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible 
4 
of any bias or prejudice' " regarding the action.  Spangler v. 
Ashwell, 116 Va. 992, 996-97, 83 S.E. 930, 931 (1914) 
(citation omitted).  Although this Court generally disfavors 
per se rules of juror disqualification "by reason of [the 
juror's] status alone," we have nevertheless established 
"limited categories" of per se disqualification.  Townsend, 
270 Va. at 331, 619 S.E.2d at 74 (citing examples of per se 
disqualification).  One such category establishes "[t]hat a 
stockholder in a company which is party to a lawsuit is 
incompetent to sit as a juror" because such a person "could 
[not] be said to stand indifferent in the cause."  Salina, 217 
Va. at 93-94, 225 S.E.2d at 200-201; see Breeden v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976) 
(explaining Salina); accord Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 
743 F.2d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1984) (" 'That a stockholder in 
a company which is party to a lawsuit is incompetent to sit as 
a juror is so well settled as to be black letter law.' ") 
(quoting Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 971 (4th 
Cir. 1971)); Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 66 F.3d 1119, 
1122 (10th Cir. 1995) (a trial court must presume bias when a 
prospective juror is a stockholder in a corporation that is a 
party to the action).  And, it is immaterial whether a juror, 
who directly owns stock in a company that is a party to the 
5 
lawsuit, is called to sit in a civil or criminal case; the per 
se disqualification remains. 
In the criminal context, it is well-settled that a trial 
court commits "prejudicial error" if it "force[s] a defendant 
to use peremptory strikes to exclude a venire[person] from the 
jury panel if that person is not free from exception."  
Townsend, 270 Va. at 329, 619 S.E.2d at 73; accord Justus v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 975, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980); 
Breeden, 217 Va. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 737; Dowdy v. 
Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 727, 737 (1852).  We explained 
in Breeden that a defendant's use of a peremptory strike to 
remove a juror who is not free from exception was not harmless 
error because a defendant "has a right to an impartial jury 
drawn from 'a panel [of twenty] free from exceptions.' "  217 
Va. at 300, 227 S.E.2d at 736-37 (quoting former Code § 8-
208.19 (Cum. Supp. 1976), now Code § 8.01-357).  Today, we 
hold that it is likewise prejudicial error in the civil 
context when a trial court forces a party to use a peremptory 
strike afforded under Code § 8.01-359 to remove a venireperson 
who is not "free from exception" and should have been struck 
for cause.  See Reff-Conlin's Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 
45 P.3d 863, 866-67 (Mont. 2002) (prejudice as a matter of law 
results when a party is forced to use a peremptory challenge 
to remove a prospective juror who should have been excused for 
6 
cause); Kusek v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 552 N.W.2d 778, 783-
84 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (finding prejudicial error when a 
trial court refused to strike an ineligible venireperson, 
thereby forcing the challenging party to exercise a peremptory 
strike to remove the juror).  But see Bethea v. Springhill 
Mem'l Hosp., 833 So.2d 1, 4-7 (Ala. 2002) (applying a harmless 
error analysis to determine whether the failure to strike a 
venireperson for cause was erroneous when the challenged 
venireperson was peremptorily struck); State v. Hickman, 68 
P.3d 418, 419, 424 (Ariz. 2003) (same).  The statutory right 
to have an impartial jury drawn from a "panel free from 
exceptions," Code § 8.01-357, is no less fundamental in a 
civil case than in a criminal case.  See Cantrell, 259 Va. at 
50, 523 S.E.2d at 503.  In either instance, "a litigant is 
denied an opportunity to act on his or her intuitions and 
subjective feelings about venirepersons by having to 
prematurely exhaust his or her peremptory challenges to rid 
the panel of those who should have been struck as ineligible 
for implied bias."  Kusek, 552 N.W.2d at 783-84. 
Prospective juror Kemp directly owned stock in defendant 
CSX, thus rendering him not "indifferent in the cause" as a 
matter of law.  See Salina, 217 Va. at 94, 225 S.E.2d at 201.  
That he sincerely maintained he could faithfully and 
impartially perform his duties as a juror is without import.  
7 
A venireperson who cannot stand indifferent in the cause must 
be stricken despite any insistence as to impartiality, for 
"however willing [the juror might] be to trust himself, the 
law will not trust him."  Armistead v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. 
(11 Leigh) 688, 695 (1841) (citing Osiander v. Commonwealth, 
30 Va. (3 Leigh) 780 (1831)); accord Barrett, 262 Va. at 825-
27, 553 S.E.2d at 732-33; Justus, 220 Va. at 977-78, 266 
S.E.2d at 91-92; Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 872-
73 (1881); see also Gladhill, 743 F.2d at 1050 (If a "juror is 
legally disqualified from acting, the juror's analysis of his 
subjective qualifications is beside the point.").  Thus, the 
circuit court's refusal to strike Kemp for cause was "manifest 
error amounting to an abuse of discretion."  Townsend, 270 Va. 
at 330, 619 S.E.2d at 73.  Roberts' use of a peremptory strike 
to remove Kemp from the jury panel did not render that error 
harmless because Roberts was entitled, as a matter of law, to 
have a panel free from exception upon which to exercise his 
peremptory strikes.1  See Code §§ 8.01-357 and -359. 
                     
1 In Cudjoe v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 193, 475 S.E.2d 
821 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that the General 
Assembly, by enacting Code § 8.01-678, "abrogated the common 
law remedy of automatic reversal for the impairment of a 
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory strikes and 
replaced it with the harmless error standard of review."  Id. 
at 204, 475 S.E.2d at 826.  But see Winston v. Commonwealth, 
32 Va. App. 864, 869-71, 531 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2000) 
(following the holding in Breeden that use of a peremptory 
strike to remove a juror who should have been struck for cause 
8 
Our analysis does not end here.  CSX contends that 
resolution of the issue before us is not governed by the 
Virginia rule that it is prejudicial error for a trial court 
to force a party to use a peremptory strike to remove a 
venireperson from the jury panel who is not free from 
exception.  Instead, CSX insists that federal law governs 
because application of the Virginia rule would be "outcome 
determinative": "if federal law is applied, CSX[] is not at 
hazard of another trial whereas if [the Virginia rule] is 
applied, CSX[] must submit to another trial." 
CSX correctly notes that under federal law, the use of a 
peremptory strike to remove a juror who should have been 
excluded for cause, thereby effectively reducing the number of 
peremptory challenges afforded to a party, does not violate 
the constitutional right to an impartial jury.  Ross v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).  Peremptory challenges are 
only "a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury"; "[s]o 
long as the jury that sits is impartial, . . . that the 
                                                                
was not harmless error).  To the extent the holding in Cudjoe 
is not in accord with our decision today, it is overruled. 
We note, however, that in a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, loss of a peremptory challenge is not a 
"structural error," thus a showing of prejudice under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) is 
required.  Morrisette v. Warden, 270 Va. 188, 192-93, 613 
S.E.2d 551, 556-57 (2005). 
9 
defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that 
result does not [violate] the Sixth Amendment."  Id.  
Moreover, "a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges 
pursuant to [Fed. R. Crim. Proc.] 24(b) is not denied or 
impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for 
cause."  United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 
(2000).  In that situation, the defendant has been afforded 
"all he is entitled to under the Rule" and his decision to use 
the peremptory strike does not result in the "los[s of] a 
peremptory challenge[, but r]ather [its use] in line with a 
principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the 
constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury."  Id. 
at 315-16. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that 
"mistaken denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge" 
does not require automatic reversal as a matter of federal law 
but is a matter for the State to determine under its laws.  
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1455-56 
(2009).  The Supreme Court recognized: 
States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, 
that a trial court's mistaken denial of a peremptory 
challenge is reversible error per se.  Or they may 
conclude . . . that the improper seating of a 
competent and unbiased juror[, though] error[,] 
could rank as harmless under state law. 
 
10 
Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1456.  Thus, whether a second trial 
of Roberts' FELA claim is required depends on whether state or 
federal law governs resolution of the issue before us. 
FELA actions brought in state court are "subject to state 
procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is 
federal."  St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 
411 (1985); see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 
44, 46-47 (1931) ("[I]n proceedings under [FELA], wherever 
brought, the rights and obligations of the parties depend upon 
. . . applicable principles of common law as interpreted and 
applied in the federal courts.") (emphasis added); Norfolk S. 
Ry. v. Rogers, 270 Va. 468, 479-80, 621 S.E.2d 59, 65-66 
(2005) ("In FELA cases, Virginia law governs the admissibility 
of expert testimony" but "[t]he question whether an employer 
was negligent . . . is a question of federal law.").  "State 
laws are not controlling in determining what the incidents of 
this federal right [under FELA] shall be."  Dice v. Akron, 
Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952). 
While distinguishing "substance" from "procedure" is 
often difficult, see Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 
294, 296 (1949), issues found to be substantive, i.e., to 
affect the "rights and obligations" of the parties, and thus 
governed by federal law, include those involving whether a 
complaint was legally sufficient to state a cause of action 
11 
under FELA, id. at 296; whether a plaintiff is entitled to a 
jury trial on a question of fact under FELA, Dice, 342 U.S. at 
363; which defenses apply to a FELA claim, Kuhn, 284 U.S. at 
46-47; whether a jury instruction "concerning the measure of 
damages in an FELA action" must be given, Dickerson, 470 U.S. 
at 411; whether a jury may be presented with evidence of 
remuneration from third-parties, Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R. 
Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254-56 (1963); whether an award of pre-
judgment interest may be granted, Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. 
Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1988); and whether there was 
sufficient evidence to submit a case to a jury and to support 
its verdict, Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946).  
As the Supreme Court noted in Dice, federal law is controlling 
when "employees['] right to recover just compensation for 
injuries negligently inflicted by their employer" would "be 
defeated if states were permitted" to apply their rules, or 
those rules are "wholly incongruous" with that purpose and 
would undermine the "uniform application [of FELA] essential 
to effectuate its purposes"; or when the state's rule does not 
apply uniformly to all similar claims brought in state court.  
Dice, 342 U.S. at 361-63. 
Rather than addressing the procedural/substantive 
dichotomy, CSX urges the Court to utilize an "outcome 
determinative" test and claims that application of the 
12 
Virginia rule in this case is "outcome determinative" because 
a new trial would be required in this case.  Citing, inter 
alia, Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Price, 539 So.2d 202 
(Ala. 1988), and Lerner v. Karageorgis Lines, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 
824 (N.Y. 1985), CSX contends that a state cannot apply its 
procedural rules when doing so would " 'significantly affect 
the result of the litigation, i.e., would be outcome 
determinative.' "2  Lerner, 488 N.E.2d at 826 (citation 
omitted). 
In Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997), an analogous 
case to the present one although it involved a § 1983 claim, 
the Supreme Court considered "whether defendants in an action 
brought under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983[] in state court have a 
federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of 
qualified immunity."  Id. at 913.  The state court had ruled 
that the denial of a motion for summary judgment was not 
appealable under the state's rules because it was not a final 
order or judgment.  Id. at 914.  The Supreme Court held that 
the state's "decision not to provide appellate review for the 
vast majority of interlocutory orders – including denial of 
                     
2 Referencing both the substantive/procedural distinction 
and the outcome determinative test, the Alabama Supreme Court 
concluded that a FELA claim brought in an Alabama court was 
subject to a state rule of repose, thereby barring recovery in 
that case.  Price, 539 So.2d at 205-07.  The decision lends no 
support to CSX. 
13 
qualified immunity in § 1983 cases – is not 'outcome 
determinative' in the sense that [the Court] used that term" 
in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988).  Johnson, 520 
U.S. at 920.  The Court explained that a state procedural rule 
is outcome determinative only if it controls "the ultimate 
disposition of the case."  Id.  at 921.  Because application 
of the state procedural rule at issue there would not "produce 
a final result different from what a federal ruling would 
produce" but only postpone the timing of an appeal, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the state procedural rule was not 
pre-empted.  Id. at 921-23. 
Assuming without deciding that the outcome determinative 
test is appropriate to use in the case before us, application 
of the Virginia rule is not outcome determinative.  Reversing 
the circuit court's judgment and remanding for a new trial 
will not control "the ultimate disposition" of Roberts' FELA 
claim against CSX, id. at 921, affect the measure of damages 
he may recover, determine what defenses apply, burden his 
efforts to obtain a remedy for his injury, or frustrate 
Congress' "remedial" and "humane" purposes in enacting FELA, 
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427-28 
(1965).  Contrary to CSX's suggestion, whether CSX is "at 
hazard" for another trial is not the appropriate inquiry.  Nor 
will applying the Virginia rule affect the "rights and 
14 
obligations of the parties" under the procedural/substantive 
rubric.  Kuhn, 284 U.S. at 46.  Instead, it will extend to a 
litigant presenting a FELA claim in a Virginia court the 
statutory rights the General Assembly has afforded to all 
parties in jury trials, whether civil or criminal, i.e., a 
jury panel free from exception to which a party may then 
direct its full complement of peremptory strikes.  We 
therefore hold that the Virginia rule governs the disposition 
of Roberts' claim that the circuit court "erred by failing to 
strike prospective juror, Donald Kemp, for cause."  See 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Minor, 395 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1990) (evaluating under state law whether a trial court erred 
in striking a juror for cause in a FELA action); Auer v. 
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 428 N.W.2d 152, 159-61 (Neb. 1988) 
(same); Houghton v. Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 999 S.W.2d 39, 
45-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (same). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court's 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial.3 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
3 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to address 
Roberts' remaining assignment of error. 
15