Title: Coray v. Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 50570 
 
CHRISTINE CORAY, 
 
     Claimant-Appellant- 
Cross Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO REGIONAL HAND & UPPER 
EXTREMITY CENTER, PLLC, Employer; 
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety 
 
     Defendants-Respondents- 
Cross Appellants. 
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Boise, May 2024 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: June 27, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
 
The decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Monroe Law Office, Boise, for Appellant Christine Coray. Darin G. Monroe 
argued. 
 
Anderson Julian & Hull, LLP, Boise, for Respondents. Matthew O. Pappas argued. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice.  
This is an appeal from a declaratory ruling issued by the Idaho Industrial Commission (“the 
Commission”) relating to the scheduling of an independent medical examination in a worker’s 
compensation case. The declaratory ruling concerned an interpretation of Idaho Code section 72-
433, which grants an employer the right to schedule an independent medical examination (“IME”) 
for an employee who has been injured in a workplace accident and has filed a claim for benefits. 
After her physician recommended back surgery, Christine Coray submitted to an IME as requested 
by her employer and its surety. The employer and its surety denied liability for the surgery and 
ongoing benefits, contending that Coray had recovered from the workplace injury and that surgery 
was necessitated by preexisting conditions. After she underwent back surgery outside of the 
worker’s compensation system, her employer subsequently requested she submit to a second IME, 
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to be performed by a different physician. Coray refused to attend the second IME and requested a 
declaratory ruling from the Commission on whether Idaho Code section 72-433 requires an 
employer to utilize the same physician to conduct multiple examinations of a single injury. 
 The Commission held that Idaho Code section 72-433 does not require an employer or 
surety to use only one physician to evaluate a discrete injury. However, the Commission also held 
that each request for an IME is subject to a reasonableness standard, and the burden of proof for 
establishing reasonableness falls on the employer. Coray appeals the Commission’s interpretation 
of section 72-433, arguing the Commission’s conclusion is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute. The employer and surety cross-appeal the Commission’s conclusion that the employer or 
surety bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a second IME scheduled with a 
different physician. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the Idaho Industrial Commission’s 
decision.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In December 2018, Christine Coray was injured when she slipped and fell on ice while 
exiting her car in the parking lot of her employer’s place of business, Idaho Regional Hand & 
Upper Extremity Center. Coray suffered injuries to her left knee and left wrist, as well as a hand 
sprain and low back strain. Coray sought medical treatment and filed a claim for workers’ 
compensation benefits, which were initially paid through the employer’s surety, Idaho State 
Insurance Fund. 
Over the next year-and-a-half, Coray continued to experience back pain and received a 
variety of treatments, including epidural steroid injections. However, she received little benefit 
from those treatments, and her physician, Dr. Steven Hansen, ultimately recommended fusion 
surgery. The employer requested Coray submit to an IME, pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-433, 
with Dr. Qing-Min Chen. Following the examination, Dr. Chen opined that as of March 4, 2019, 
Coray had completely recovered from all injuries related to the workplace accident with no 
permanent impairment; Coray’s ongoing back pain, he opined, was due to pre-existing conditions 
and degenerative disease. Dr. Chen further opined that all prospective treatment, including fusion 
surgery, was not necessitated by the workplace accident, and Coray could return to work as a 
receptionist with no restrictions. Accordingly, the surety notified Coray that it would not authorize 
any further medications or treatment. 
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Coray eventually secured alternative funding for the fusion surgery and underwent the 
procedure in December 2021. Nine months later, in September 2022, Coray arranged an 
examination with Dr. James Bates to assess her current impairment level and apportion causation 
between the workplace accident and any other medical condition. Dr. Bates opined that Coray had 
a six percent whole person impairment from the workplace accident and did not apportion any 
impairment to a pre-existing condition. He also provided permanent workplace restrictions, 
including restrictions on lifting and other movement restrictions. 
Following receipt of Dr. Bates’s medical opinion, the employer attempted to schedule a 
second IME with Dr. Charles Timothy Floyd, an orthopedic surgeon Coray had not seen before. 
Coray objected and refused to attend the exam. The employer filed a motion with the Commission 
to compel Coray’s attendance. In response, Coray submitted a petition for declaratory ruling, 
seeking an answer from the Commission as to whether Idaho Code section 72-433 requires each 
IME for a single injury to be conducted by the same physician.  
 
The Commission issued an order concluding that “the plain language of Idaho Code 
[section] 72-433 does not require a surety to use one and only one physician for the evaluation of 
discrete injuries.” The Commission determined that the statute was not ambiguous and “[i]n no 
way” could be read to require an employer “to use only one physician for a discrete injury.” The 
Commission explained that the statute only requires that any employer-requested IME of an 
employee’s injury be conducted by a physician “who is qualified to perform it.” The Commission 
declined to rule on whether Coray would be required to submit to an examination by Dr. Floyd, 
reserving that issue for a later determination by the Referee. However, the Commission also 
determined that each IME is subject to a reasonableness standard; because Coray had refused to 
attend the second IME, the Commission held the burden will fall on the employer to prove before 
the Referee assigned to Coray’s worker’s compensation claim that its request for Coray to see Dr. 
Floyd is reasonable. 
 
Coray timely appealed to this Court, challenging the Commission’s interpretation of Idaho 
Code section 72-433. The employer cross-appealed the Commission’s conclusion that it will have 
the burden of proof to establish that its request for Coray to submit to a second IME with Dr. Floyd 
is reasonable. 
 
 
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II.  
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this Court “exercises free 
review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial 
and competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings.” Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, 
Inc., 165 Idaho 133, 135, 443 P.3d 147, 149 (2019) (quoting Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 174, 176-
77, 30 P.3d 952, 954-55 (2001)). This Court exercises free review over the interpretation of 
statutes. Id. 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Commission did not err in concluding that the plain language of Idaho Code 
section 72-433 does not prohibit an employer or surety from using different 
physicians to perform multiple examinations of a single injury. 
Coray contends that the Commission erred in concluding that Idaho Code section 72-
433(1) does not prohibit an employer from using different physicians to perform repeat 
examinations of an injured worker’s discrete injury. Coray argues that the statute is unambiguous, 
but the Commission’s interpretation is contrary to its plain language, which “limits an employer 
to an examination by a single duly qualified physician or surgeon when there is a single injury at 
issue.” We disagree. 
“The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a statute; those words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a 
whole.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Provisions should not be read in isolation, but 
must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.” Nelson v. Evans, 166 Idaho 815, 820, 
464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020) (quoting State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361–62, 313 P.3d 1, 17–18 
(2013)). The words contained in the statute are given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings, 
and this Court will “give effect to all the words of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, 
or redundant.” Id. (quoting Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361–62, 313 P.3d at 17–18). “ If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Verska, 151 
Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (citation omitted). 
 In this case, the meaning of the first sentence of Idaho Code Section 72-433 is in dispute. 
Section 72-433(1) grants an employer the right to request an IME of a worker after the employee 
has been injured in a workplace accident and has filed for benefits: 
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After an injury or contraction of an occupational disease and during the period of 
disability the employee, if requested by the employer or ordered by the 
commission, shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places 
to a duly qualified physician or surgeon. 
 I.C. § 72-433(1). 
Coray contends that the statute unambiguously prohibits an employer from scheduling 
multiple examinations of an employee’s discrete injury with different physicians. She argues that 
the statute’s singular use of the word “injury” and its singular use of “a duly qualified physician 
or surgeon” indicate that when there is a single injured body part at issue, an employer-requested 
examination of the injured employee must be conducted by a single, duly qualified physician. 
However, Coray concedes that multiple examinations by different physicians are permitted under 
the statute should an employee suffer injuries to multiple body parts. Coray also concedes that 
multiple examinations may be permitted under the statute for the same injured body part, but she 
argues all such examinations must be conducted by the same physician. Coray argues that to hold 
otherwise would encourage an employer or surety to engage in “doctor shopping” to obtain a 
medical opinion that justifies a denial of benefits.  
The Commission rejected Coray’s argument that the singular use of “physician or surgeon” 
means the same physician must conduct every employer-requested medical examination of an 
injured worker’s discrete injury. The Commission explained that “[t]he purpose and focus of the 
statute is to afford an employer the right to have access to an injured worker to the end that 
employer may perform such medical examinations as it deems necessary to adjust or defend the 
claim.” The Commission further explained that this right to require an employee to submit to such 
an examination is qualified by three specific phrases that appear in the statute: (1) “After an 
injury”; (2) “at reasonable times and places”; and (3) “to a duly qualified physician or surgeon.” 
I.C. § 72-433(1). The final qualifier, “to a duly qualified physician or surgeon,” the Commission 
concluded, does not refer to a specific physician, but simply means that whoever conducts the 
examination must be qualified to perform it. The Commission then concluded that Coray’s 
interpretation “subverts a fair reading of the statute,” statutory construction was not needed, and 
“nothing in [the] statute prevents an employer from using a different physician or physicians from 
exam to exam.”  
We agree with the Commission’s conclusions. Section 72-433(1) of the Idaho Code is not 
ambiguous. A plain reading reveals that the statute has three primary provisions: (1) it grants an 
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employer the right to obtain an IME of an injured worker; (2) it ensures that all examinations be 
scheduled “at reasonable times and places,” and (3) it ensures that any employer-requested 
examination is conducted by “a duly qualified physician or surgeon.” I.C. § 72-433(1); see also 
Moser v. Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc., 165 Idaho 133, 136-37, 443 P.3d 147, 150-51 (2019) 
(explaining that  Idaho Code section 72-433 “allows an employer to investigate the validity of a 
claim [for workers’ compensation benefits] when there has been no determination of whether the 
claim is compensable.”). Nothing about the use of “a” in front of “physician,” or the singular use 
of “physician” or “surgeon,” suggests an employer is limited to using only one specific physician 
to conduct all IMEs. Indeed, under a plain reading of the statute, multiple physicians or surgeons 
could perform multiple examinations of an injured worker, so long as each IME is reasonably 
scheduled and conducted by “a duly qualified physician or surgeon.” Id. (emphasis added). The 
phrase “a duly qualified physician or surgeon” is a baseline regulation on who may perform the 
IME; for example, it cannot be performed by a nurse or some other professional whose scope of 
practice does not include diagnostic or functional medical examinations. The Commission’s 
interpretation of Idaho Code section 72-433 is consistent with the plain language. 
To the extent that Coray raises valid concerns that employers will engage in “doctor 
shopping” to perfect a denial of an employee’s legitimate claim for benefits, these concerns are 
addressed by the Commission’s reading of Idaho Code sections 72-433 and 434 together to impose 
a reasonableness standard on all employer-requested IMEs. As explained below, we affirm this 
reading. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission did not err in declaring that the plain 
language in Idaho Code section 72-433 does not prohibit an employer or surety from using 
different physicians to perform multiple examinations of a single injury.  
B. 
The Commission did not err in holding that the employer/surety has the burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of its requested IME under Idaho Code sections 72-
433 and 434, including its choice of physician, if raised by the employee. 
The employer contends that the Commission erred when it concluded that the Referee 
assigned to Coray’s worker’s compensation claim will have to determine whether the employer 
“ha[s] met [its] burden of showing that it is reasonable to require [Coray] to submit to the proposed 
exam by Dr. Floyd.” The employer argues that the only reasonableness standard contained in Idaho 
Code section 72-433 pertains to the scheduling of the examination—“at reasonable times and 
places”—but does not impose any overarching burden that an employer must prove the entire 
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examination, and specifically who performs it (so long as they are “duly qualified”), is also 
reasonable. We disagree. 
In interpreting section 72-433 of the Idaho Code, we do not confine our analysis solely to 
subsection (1) and the phrase “at reasonable times and places[;]” instead, we examine the workers’ 
compensation act as a whole to ascertain “the purpose and intent of the legislature and give full 
force and effect thereto.” Izaguirre v. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 155 Idaho 229, 234, 308 
P.3d 929, 934 (2013) (quoting George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539, 797 
P.2d 1385, 1387 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011)). This Court “liberally construe[s] the provisions of the 
workers’ compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purposes for 
which the law was promulgated.” Atkinson v. 2M Company, Inc., 164 Idaho 577, 580, 434 P.3d 
181, 184 (2019) (citing Murray-Donahue v. Nat’l Car Rental Licensee Ass’n, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 
900 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1995)). “The humane purposes which [the workers’ compensation law] 
serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction.” Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 
910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). 
In imposing on the employer the burden of proving the reasonableness of its request for a 
second IME, as scheduled with Dr. Floyd, the Commission examined Idaho’s workers’ 
compensation law as a whole, and particularly Idaho Code section 72-434, to understand the rights 
and responsibilities of both parties with respect to an employer-requested IME and an employee’s 
refusal to attend. Section 72-434 sets forth the consequences to an employee who unreasonably 
fails to attend an IME: 
If an injured employee unreasonably fails to submit to or in any way obstructs an 
examination by a physician or surgeon designated by the commission or the 
employer, the injured employee’s right to take or prosecute any proceedings under 
this law shall be suspended until such failure or obstruction ceases, and no 
compensation shall be payable for the period during which such failure or 
obstruction continues. 
 I.C. § 72-434. The Commission noted that this Court had made it clear that this statute places the 
burden on the employer to prove that an injured worker’s refusal to attend an IME is unreasonable 
in Hewson v. Asker’s Thrift Store, 120 Idaho 164, 168, 814 P.2d 424, 428 (1991). The Commission 
also explained that it does not condone the practice of repeated examinations absent a showing of 
good cause: 
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The Commission does not condone the practice of repeated § 720-733(1) [sic] 
exams without a showing of good cause. Historically, where claimants in litigation 
have sought, by motion, to avoid an additional IME after one has occurred, referees 
have carefully considered that motion and the defendants’ reasons for requesting 
another IME. Indeed, if surety used the practice of requiring repeated IMEs as a 
means to unreasonably delay or deny benefits, Idaho Code § 72-804 sanctions 
would apply. 
Niebhur v. Aapex Construction, Inc., 092211 IDWC, IC 2006-5113568 (Idaho Industrial 
Commission Decision, 2011).  
Looking to the case at hand, the Commission then explained that Coray has refused to 
attend a second examination by a different physician and had raised a concern that the employer 
has changed physicians as a means “to perfect a blanket denial” of her claim, and the Commission 
noted the employer had not explained the reasoning for the change in its choice of physicians. The 
Commission concluded that, in light of the employer’s request for an order to compel Coray’s 
attendance at a second IME and Coray’s challenge to that request, the employer will have the 
burden of proving the reasonableness of the second IME as scheduled, including its choice of Dr. 
Floyd as the attending physician, before the Referee.  
 
The employer argues that the imposition of the burden on an employer to prove the 
reasonableness of its choice of Dr. Floyd in a second IME is inconsistent with the plain language 
of Idaho Code section 72-433. The employer argues that the only reasonableness standard imposed 
by section 72-433 is with regards to the time and place of the exam but does not include the 
employer’s choice of physician. In support of this argument, the employer cites to Moser v. 
Rosauers Supermarkets, Inc., 165 Idaho 133, 137, 443 P.3d 147, 151 (2019). However, the 
employer’s reliance on Moser is misplaced. 
 
In Moser, we held that an employee who had filed a claim for disability benefits was within 
a “period of disability” and was therefore required to attend an employer-requested IME. Id. We 
noted that by filing the claim for benefits, the employee was required to attend a medical 
examination “so long as it was at a ‘reasonable time and place.’ ” Id. The employee in that case 
had “not attacked the ‘reasonableness’ of the medical exam” as scheduled with the employer’s 
choice of physician; thus, the reasonableness of the exam was presumed. Id., quoting I.C. § 72-
433. The only issue on appeal was whether Moser was in her “period of disability.” Id. In contrast, 
in this case, Coray has attacked the reasonableness of the employer scheduling a second IME with 
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Dr. Floyd by arguing that the second IME is a means for the employer to engage in “doctor 
shopping” to perfect a blanket denial of her claims.  
 
Next, we are unpersuaded by the employer’s contention that the reasonableness standard 
imposed by Idaho Code section 72-433 pertains only to the “times and places” of a scheduled 
examination. The employer’s interpretation is too narrow a reading that is not supported by 
workers’ compensation law as a whole. Two reasons support this conclusion. First, an examination 
is not held at a “reasonable time or place” if it is not reasonable for it to be held at all. Second, the 
employer’s narrow reading of section 72-433(1) ignores Idaho Code section 72-434 and this 
Court’s holding in Hewson v. Asker’s Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 815 P.2d 424 (1991). 
In Hewson, we held that Idaho Code section 72-734 “puts the burden on the employer or 
surety to prove that the employee has unreasonably refused or obstructed the examination.” 
Hewson, 120 Idaho at 168, 814 P.2d at 428. Hewson concerned an employee’s refusal to submit 
to an examination after the surety had informed the attending physician that the employee could 
not tape record the visit. Id. at 165, 814 P.2d at 425. As a result of the employee’s refusal, the 
surety determined she had obstructed the evaluation of her injury and terminated her workers’ 
compensation benefits pursuant to section 72-734. Id. The Commission upheld the surety’s 
termination of the employee’s benefits, concluding that, “before any tape recording would be 
allowed during a medical examination the employee must file a motion with the Commission 
which will only grant it ‘for good cause shown.’ ” Id. at 168, 814 P.2d at 428. However, we 
reversed the Commission’s termination of benefits on appeal, holding that the tape recording was 
not an unreasonable obstruction of the examination, and more importantly here, the Commission 
erred by improperly placing the burden on the employee to prove she did not unreasonably obstruct 
the examination. Id. at 168, 814 P.2d at 428.  
In this case, Coray has refused to attend the second IME scheduled with Dr. Floyd; 
accordingly, the employer has the burden of establishing that her refusal to attend is unreasonable 
under section 72-434. Section 72-434 grants employers the right to request two consequences to 
an employee who unreasonably obstructs or refuses to attend an IME: suspension of the 
employee’s “right to take or prosecute any proceedings,” and termination of any workers’ 
compensation during the time period in which the employee was unreasonably refusing attendance 
or obstructing the examination. A prerequisite for proving that an employee has unreasonably 
refused to attend an IME includes proving that the exam, as scheduled, is reasonable. 
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Although the employer here did not request a sanction under section 72-434 for Coray’s 
refusal to attend the second IME, the employer did file a motion with the Commission to compel 
her attendance. Because an employer bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its 
requested IME pursuant to section 72-434, it follows that an employer also bears the burden of 
proving the exam’s reasonableness under section 72-433 in a motion to compel attendance if the 
employee objects to the exam’s reasonableness. Reading section 72-433 and section 72-434 
together to place the burden on the employer to prove the reasonableness of its requested IME 
protects the employee against multiple unwarranted (and potentially intrusive) examinations.  
“[T]he legislative intent of I.C. § 72-433 is to protect an employee compelled to undergo medical 
examination by physicians whom he or she did not select against potential intrusive questions and 
techniques.” Hewson, 120 Idaho at 175, 814 P.2d at 427. This purpose would not be given effect 
if the Commission were to grant an employer’s motion to compel attendance at an IME, without 
considering an employee’s objection to the reasonableness of the exam, simply because the 
employer did not seek a suspension of the worker’s compensation proceedings under section 72-
434. This is precisely why the Commission has adopted its “good cause shown” standard before 
ordering an employee’s attendance at a second employer-requested examination. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s declaratory ruling that the employer will bear 
the burden of proving the reasonableness of its requested second IME, including the 
reasonableness of scheduling the exam with Dr. Floyd. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission’s declaratory ruling is affirmed.  
  
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices MOELLER, ZAHN, and MEYER CONCUR.