Title: Waldner v. Stephens

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 31, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVE WALDNER,
MICHELLE KASPER,
JACOB LAHMANN and MICHELLE KASPER, 
As Guardian Ad Litem For
Joshua Bush and Hanna Waldner, Minors,
Petitioners
on Review,
v.
STEPHEN STEPHENS,
Respondent
on Review.
STEPHEN STEPHENS,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
TRAN CO.,
an Oregon
corporation,
Third-Party
Defendant.
(CC
03C21165; CA A127595; SC S055351)
En Banc
On review from
the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and
submitted May 14, 2008.
Robert K.
Udziela, Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on
review.
Thomas W. Brown,
of Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review.  With him on the brief was Julie A. Smith.
Arthur C.
Johnson, and Douglas G. Schaller, of Johnson, Clifton, Larson and Schaller,
P.C., Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Pamela J. Pearson.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from
Marion County Circuit Court, Thomas M. Hart,
Judge. 213 Or App 610,
162 P3d 342 (2007).
GILLETTE, J.
In this action alleging negligence
and other claims, plaintiffs sought damages from their former landlord for various
injuries that, they alleged, had resulted from unhealthful conditions in a dwelling
that they rented from that landlord.  On defendant's ORCP 21 A(8) motion, the
trial court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in common-law
negligence, that the only claims that plaintiffs had pleaded were subject
to the one-year statute of limitations set out in ORS 12.125 for "action[s]
arising under a rental agreement or ORS Chapter 90 [(the Oregon Residential
Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA))],"(1)
and that dismissal therefore was warranted because plaintiffs had not filed their
action within that one-year limitations period.  Plaintiffs appealed, arguing
that they had pleaded a common-law negligence claim and that the
relevant limitations period was the two-year period set out at ORS 12.110(1) for
"injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and
not especially enumerated in [ORS Chapter 12]."  The Court of Appeals rejected
that argument and affirmed.  Waldner v. Stephens, 213 Or App 610, 162 P3d 342 (2007).  Plaintiffs
petitioned for review by this court, and we granted their petition to consider
whether plaintiffs' complaint states a claim in common-law negligence and, if
so, whether the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations to that
claim.
When we review a trial court's
dismissal of a claim under ORCP 21 A(8), as we do here, we accept as true all
well-pleaded allegations of fact and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from them.  Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159, 164, 921 P2d
1312 (1996).  The relevant allegations are contained in plaintiffs' third
amended complaint,(2)
which purports to assert a claim for common-law negligence based on certain
conditions in plaintiffs' home.(3) 
The negligence claim alleged, among other things, that, in 1997, plaintiffs entered
into a written agreement with defendant to rent a residential unit in a duplex
that defendant owned; that, under the written agreement, defendant retained sole
and exclusive control over the roof and exterior spaces of the building as well
as sole and exclusive responsibility to repair those areas;(4)
that, while plaintiffs occupied the unit, water and moisture intruded through
the roof and exterior walls of the building and, ultimately, into the
residence; that plaintiffs notified defendant of the water intrusions and of
defects relating to that problem; that defendant inspected plaintiffs'
residence and orally promised to make repairs; that, based on defendant's
promise, plaintiffs continued to occupy and make rental payments for the unit;
and that, as a result of the intrusion of water and moisture into the building,
mold spores, fungi, bacteria, and related toxins invaded plaintiffs' unit,
contaminating plaintiffs' personal property and causing them to develop serious
medical problems. 
The pleadings also contained other, more
specific allegations of negligence, some of which used terminology drawn
directly from the ORLTA:
"At said times and places, [defendant] was
negligent and failed to exercise reasonable care in one or more of the following
particulars:
"a. In failing to inspect, install,
maintain or keep in good repair the roof, walls, flooring and other structural
areas of the residence over which defendant maintained exclusive control, did
not convey to plaintiffs as part of the leasehold, and prohibited plaintiffs
from repairing; 
"b. In failing to provide and maintain
habitable premises by not keeping the premises safe for normal and reasonably
foreseeable uses;
"c. In failing to prevent the invasion of
water, moisture and * * * fungi, mildew, bacteria and other toxins;
"d. In neglecting or ignoring after notice
from plaintiffs the intrusion of toxins, water, moisture, mold, and other
harmful substances that invaded the premises;
"e. In failing to eliminate the toxic
conditions of the property that defendant (1) caused, (2) allowed
intentionally, or (3) allowed to exist in reckless disregard of the safety of
others;
"f. In failing to provide adequate
ventilation for the house;
"g. In failing to warn plaintiffs of the
dangers associated with roof leaks, wet rot, and mold in houses; 
"h. In failing to immediately take prompt
or effective measures to protect plaintiffs from harm. 
"At said times and places, [defendant] was
the owner and landlord of the premises leased to plaintiffs.  In his status as
a landlord, defendant retains the duty to maintain the leased premises in
habitable condition.  The duty continues through the course of the tenancy. 
Defendant was negligent and failed to exercise reasonable care in one or more
of the following particulars:
"a. In failing to provide and maintain a
dwelling in a habitable condition in that the waterproofing and weather
protection of the roof and exterior walls, including windows and doors, was [sic]
inadequate (ORS 90.320(a));
"b. In failing to provide and maintain
habitable premises by not keeping the building safe for normal and reasonably
foreseeable uses (ORS 90.320(f));
"c. In failing to provide and maintain
habitable premises by not maintaining the walls and ceilings in good repair
(ORS 90.320(h)); and
"d. In failing to provide and maintain
habitable premises by not providing or maintaining appropriate ventilation in
the dwelling (ORS 90.320(i))."
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs'
action in its entirety, arguing that all of the claims alleged were time barred
under ORS 12.125, the one-year statute of limitations that applies to "action[s]
arising under a rental agreement or [the ORLTA]."  Defendant reasoned that,
because plaintiffs' claims relied on defendant's status as plaintiffs' landlord
and on the landlord/tenant relationship that existed between defendant and plaintiffs,
they necessarily arose "under [the] rental agreement" that memorialized
that landlord/tenant relationship.  Defendant also argued that, because plaintiffs'
negligence claim referred to various duties that are imposed on landlords by
the ORLTA,(5)
that claim "ar[ose] under * * * [the ORLTA]" within the meaning of
ORS 12.125.  The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion, holding
that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim in common-law negligence but that,
instead, their claims "arose under" provisions of the ORLTA and were
time barred under ORS 12.125.  
On plaintiffs' appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed.  Waldner, 213 Or App at 612.  The court noted that the
complaint alleged that the parties had entered into a rental agreement under
which defendant retained sole and exclusive control of the roof, walls, and
other structural areas of the duplex and had further alleged that defendant had
a duty to plaintiffs, which arose out of plaintiffs' status as tenants, to
"be certain that the portions over which defendant retained control were
kept in a reasonably safe condition of repair, and to maintain the premises in
a habitable condition."  Id. at 617.  The court then concluded that,

"when read together, the above allegations make it
clear that plaintiffs' claims are based on the relationship that 'arises' or
originates from their rental agreement.  In that light, we readily conclude
that the legislature intended ORS 12.125 to apply to claims like those made by
plaintiffs."
Id.  The court also decided that, when the complaint alleged
that defendant had promised to repair the premises and plaintiffs had stayed on
in reliance on that promise, they once again were alleging a "rental
agreement," albeit a new, oral one.  Consequently, the court concluded, plaintiffs'
alternative negligence theory -- that defendant had assumed a duty to repair
independent of any rental agreement -- also "ar[o]se[] under a rental
agreement" and was time barred under ORS 12.125.  Id. at 618.(6)
Before this court, plaintiffs argue
that, contrary to the views expressed by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, they have alleged a common-law negligence claim in their third amended
complaint that does not "aris[e] under a rental agreement or [the ORLTA],"
and, thus, is not time barred under ORS 12.125.   Plaintiffs contend, instead,
that that claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations set out at
ORS 12.110(1), which applies to actions "for any injury to the person or
rights of another, not arising in contract and not especially enumerated in
[ORS chapter 12]."  
Plaintiffs do not deny that their negligence
claim in some broad sense relies on a rental agreement, in that their
status as tenants and their tenant/landlord relationship with defendant would
not exist without some form of rental agreement.  But, they contend, the mere fact
that a plaintiff and defendant are in a landlord/tenant relationship is not
sufficient in itself to bring ORS 12.125 into play.  They argue, and we agree,
that Vollertsen v. Lamb, 302 Or 489, 732 P2d 486 (1987), and Jones v.
Bierek, 306 Or 42, 755 P2d 698 (1988), disposed of that notion.(7)
The
Court of Appeals' contrary view in this case was based -- understandably, we
think -- on plaintiffs' allegation that, under the written rental agreement,
defendant "retained sole and exclusive control and sole and exclusive
responsibility to repair" the exterior spaces of the dwelling.(8)  The court
appeared to conclude that, because plaintiffs' negligence claim identified the
written rental agreement as a source of defendant's duty to repair the exterior
spaces of the dwelling and thereby rectify the water invasion problem, their
negligence claim necessarily "arose" under that agreement.   
A
brief summary of the present state of the common law of landlord-tenant
liability is appropriate to assist our explanation of why, in our view, the
Court of Appeals' conclusion was not correct.  First, we must acknowledge that
this court's view of the common law in this area has changed over time and
that, even taking that evolution into account, our cases may not have been
entirely consistent.  Still, we can identify at least one common law principle
that is relevant to the case at hand.  Specifically, we can say that the common-law
of Oregon recognizes that a landlord has a duty to maintain areas of the rented
premises over which he or she retains control in a reasonably safe condition,
and may be found liable both to tenants and to invitees for physical injury
caused by an unsafe condition arising in such areas of the premises, if the
landlord knew or should have known about the unsafe condition and could have
made the condition safe.(9) 
See generally Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548, 687 P2d 144 (1984)
(discussing instructions in action by visitor to apartment building against
landlord for injuries sustained when visitor fell on stairway that was under
control of landlord); Pritchard v. Terrill, 189 Or 662, 222 P2d 652
(1950) (action by tenant against landlord for injuries sustained when he fell
on stairway that was under control of the landlord); Lyons v. Lich, 145
Or 606, 610, 28 P2d 872 (1934) (owner of apartment house had duty toward
occupants and guests to see that portion of the premises over which the owner
retained control was in reasonably safe condition); Massor v. Yates, 137
Or 569, 3 P2d 784 (1931) (where landlord retained control over portion of
leased premises for use in common by different tenants, landlord had duty to
keep that area in reasonably safe condition and was liable for personal injury
resulting from his failure in that respect).  See also Restatement (Second)
Torts § 360.(10)
Plaintiffs'
negligence claim asserts a violation of common-law duties.  For example, in
paragraph 19 of the third amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that 
"defendant
had a duty to plaintiffs arising out of plaintiffs' status as tenants
which duty included but was not limited to defendant exercising ordinary care
for plaintiffs' protection; to be certain that the portions of the premises
over which  defendant retained control were kept in a reasonably safe
condition of repair; and to maintain the premises in a habitable condition."
(Emphasis
added.)
Similarly,
in paragraph 13, the third amended complaint alleges that defendant had a duty
to repair that was independent of the rental agreement:
"Defendant
had a duty to repair and maintain those portions of the premises over which
he exercised sole and exclusive control, and to take steps necessary to
protect plaintiffs from harm arising in or from those areas.  Defendant
inspected the water intrusion and thereafter assumed the duty to
remediate the water and moisture problem independent of any obligation
defendant retained pursuant to the rental agreement.  Defendant failed to
do so and further failed to effectuate repairs after notice of the entry of
water, and the effects of moisture entering the residential portion of the
dwelling." 
(Emphasis
added.)
As
noted, the Court of Appeals suggested that any claims arising out of those
allegations "arose under a rental agreement" because the rental
agreement provided that the landlord maintained control of the exterior of the
premises.  But a plaintiff in a common-law action must identify, allege, and
prove that the pertinent events occurred on the portion of the premises over
which the landlord maintains control.  It follows, we think, that the mere
fact that a plaintiff proves that essential fact by pointing to a term in a lease
agreement does not mean that the common-law action "arises
under" that agreement.
The
Court of Appeals further suggested that the allegations of plaintiffs'
complaint "arose under a rental agreement" because plaintiffs alleged
that a new, oral agreement was formed when defendant inspected the premises and
orally promised to make repairs, and when, based on that promise, plaintiffs
stayed on and continued to make rental payments.(11)  However, it is clear to
this court that, although plaintiffs elsewhere pleaded facts that would
establish the existence of an oral agreement of that sort, and that
they attempted to use the alleged oral agreement to establish a basis for
certain of their other theories of recovery, plaintiffs intended to (and did)
plead, in paragraphs 13 and 19, that defendant had a duty to repair that
existed wholly apart from any written or oral agreement.  According to
plaintiffs' pleadings, that duty arose out of defendant's landlord/tenant
relationship with plaintiffs and upon his acquisition of information showing
that a dangerous condition had arisen on a portion of the property over which
he (defendant) exercised exclusive control.  
Although we have rejected the Court
of Appeals' reading of the complaint, the possibility remains that, under some other
theory, the negligence claim that plaintiffs pleaded in paragraphs 13 and 19
(and, perhaps, elsewhere in the complaint) "ar[o]se[] under a rental
agreement or [the ORLTA]."  Defendant's theory in that regard is that,
because all of plaintiffs' allegations of negligence rely in some sense on duties
that were imposed on defendant by his rental agreement with plaintiffs or on landlords
in general by the ORLTA, plaintiffs' negligence claim "arises under" either
the ORLTA or the rental agreement within the meaning of ORS 12.125.
This court has stated on more than one
occasion that the ORLTA does not supersede the common law of personal injury
liability between a landlord and a tenant, and that a tenant may bring both
common-law negligence claims and claims under the ORLTA against his or her
landlord in the same action.  See, e.g., Davis v. Campbell, 327
Or 584, 592, 965 P2d 1017 (1998) (stating proposition); Bellika v. Green,
306 Or 630, 638, 762 P2d 997 (1988) (same).  We have explained that conclusion
in terms of a "general rule," recognized in Brown v. Transcon
Lines, 284 Or 597, 610, 588 P2d 1087 (1978), and other cases that, 
"if a statute which provides for a new remedy shows no
intention to negate, either expressly or by necessary implication, a
pre-existing common law remedy, the new remedy will be regarded as merely
cumulative rather than exclusive, with the result that a plaintiff may resort
to either the pre-existing remedy or the new remedy."
See also Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 91-97,
689 P2d 1292 (1984) (applying general rule and holding that, even when employment
discrimination statute and common law of wrongful discharge provide different
procedures and remedies, statutory remedy and wrongful discharge claim may
coexist in same complaint).   
We return, then, to defendant's present
theory -- that, regardless of plaintiffs' intent to plead a claim in common-law
negligence, the one-year statute of limitations at ORS 12.125 applies to that
claim because the claim is based on the alleged breach of a duty that is
addressed by the rental agreement or the ORLTA.  Defendant purports to base
that theory on the "plain meaning" of ORS 12.125.  He argues:
"Under its plain terms, ORS 12.125 applies
to all claims 'arising under' a rental agreement or the RLTA, regardless of the
label the plaintiff chooses to give to his or her claim.  Put differently,
properly construed, a claim 'arises under' a rental agreement or the RLTA, and
is therefore subject to the one-year limitation in ORS 12.125, so long as it
is based on a breach of a duty that is specifically addressed in one of those
two sources, even if the complaint does not expressly rely on either as the
source of that duty."    
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant arrives at that "plain
meaning" of ORS 12.125 by subjecting the statute to the analytical process
described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d
1143 (1993).  He contends that the legislature's intention is clear from text
and context alone.  In that regard, defendant notes, first, that the provision
is "broadly written" in that it refers to both the ORLTA and
rental agreements and does not limit its scope to actions "for"
breach of the rental agreement or provisions of the statute.  Defendant then
examines the ordinary dictionary meanings of the terms "arise" and
"under," and purports to find in those words meanings that, when the
words are used together, "support[s] the conclusion that a claim is
subject to ORS 12.125 if the claim is connected in some way to a specific term
of the rental agreement or a specific provision of the [O]RLTA." 
Defendant then "restates" that meaning in the following terms: 
"For purposes of ORS 12.125, plaintiffs' action 'arises under' the rental
agreement or the [O]RLTA if there is some nexus, (i.e., relationship)
between the alleged 'duty' on which the action is based and a particular term
or provision of one or both of those two sources."  
There is an obvious problem with
defendant's textual analysis:  By the clear terms of ORS 12.125, it is the action
that must arise under the statute or rental agreement:  it is not enough that
the ORLTA sections or the rental agreement terms on which a plaintiff relies
parrot a "duty" that the common law already recognizes.  Furthermore,
there is no textual basis for saying that the action must be connected to
"a particular term or provision" of the ORLTA or the rental
agreement.  The provision refers to both sources as undivided wholes.
In fact, we think that the text of
ORS 12.125 suggests a different interpretation than the one that defendant
offers.  Combining the ordinary meaning of "arise" ("to originate
from a specified source," "to come into being"(12))
and "under" ("in accordance with"(13)),
we think that the phrase "action arising under a rental agreement or [the
ORLTA]" is most naturally read as applying when the action itself
is authorized by, or brought in accordance with, one of those two sources.(14) 
At least on its face, the provision does not support defendant's sweeping interpretation,
which would have all landlord/tenant disputes subsumed under ORS 12.125.
Of course, PGE instructs us to
consider context as well as text at this stage of our analysis.  PGE,
317 Or at 611.  Plaintiffs point to Jones as relevant context that
confirms their view of the scope of ORS 12.125 -- i.e., that it applies only
to landlord-tenant claims brought directly under the ORLTA.  In that case, a
woman was injured when she fell on a poorly lighted common stairway in her
apartment building.  She filed an action against her landlord, alleging common-law
negligence and violation of a city ordinance pertaining to lighting.  The
landlord moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint "arose under"
the ORLTA and was untimely because it had not been filed within the one-year
period provided in ORS 12.125.  The trial court granted the landlord's motion,
but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff had a common-law
claim that was independent of the rental agreement and the ORLTA.  Jones v.
Bierek, 88 Or App 11, 743 P2d 1153 (1987).
On review, this court affirmed the
Court of Appeals decision.  Jones, 306 Or at 44.  The court acknowledged
that the ORLTA imposed a duty on landlords to keep electrical lighting in "good
working order," that a landlord's noncompliance with that duty may give
rise to tenant's claim for damages under that statute, and that such statutory
claims must be filed within a shorter (one-year) period.  But the court noted that
the plaintiff had alleged violation of a city ordinance and common-law
negligence, the latter claim being based on the theory that the landlord had
provided inadequate lighting in an area, "where the landlord would be
liable for unsafe conditions to other persons who lawfully used the stairway
besides tenants."  Id. at 45.  The court rejected the defendant's
suggestion that the ORLTA's shorter limitations period applied to the plaintiff's
claims.  The court was not persuaded that the legislature intended the ORLTA to
be the exclusive source of a tenant's remedies against a landlord, or that it
intended to allow landlords "to use [their] own noncompliance defensively
so as to bar actions that anyone other than a tenant could continue to commence
after one year, merely because the defendant happens to be the injured party's
landlord."  Id. at 45-46.    
Jones appears to reject
defendant's view that the legislature intended the one year limitations period
set out at ORS 12.125 to apply to any claim by a tenant against a
landlord that alleges a breach of a duty that the ORLTA also addresses.  It
suggests, instead, that ORS 12.125 applies only to landlord-tenant claims
brought directly under the ORLTA.
A final piece of contextual evidence,
drawn from a discussion of the history of ORS 12.125 in Vollertsen, helps
make our point.  In Vollertsen, this court observed that ORS 12.125
originally was enacted as part of the 1973 statute now known as the Oregon
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and that it then provided that "[a]n
action arising under a rental agreement or sections 1 to 33 of this Act shall
be commenced within one year."  302 Or at 495 (quoting and describing Or
Laws 1973, ch 559, § 39).  The court further observed that Legislative Counsel
moved the provision to chapter 12 during the process of compiling the 1973
statutes for inclusion in the Oregon Revised Statutes.  Id. at 496.  The
court noted that, in light of that history, there was no basis for suggesting
that the terms used in ORS 12.125 (and particularly the term "rental
agreement") meant anything other than what they meant in the specific
context of the ORLTA.  Id.
By the same logic, we think that all
of ORS 12.125 must be read in the context of -- and, indeed, as if it still
were part of -- the statute that now is codified at ORS chapter 90.  Given that
that statute explicitly provides for damages and other remedies when a tenant
or landlord fails to comply with either the rental agreement or requirements
imposed on them elsewhere in the statute,(15)
we think that it is likely that, when the 1973 Legislative Assembly provided a one-year
limitations period for "actions arising under a rental agreement or
sections 1 to 33 of this Act," it was referring to the set of claims that the
ORLTA explicitly authorizes.    
In the end, we hold that it is clear
from the text and context of ORS 12.125 that, when the legislature chose to
apply a one-year statute of limitations to "actions arising under the
rental agreement or [the ORLTA]," it did not intend to sweep into that
category all actions, including common-law actions, that merely bear some nexus
to the relationship between landlords and tenants under a rental agreement or the
ORLTA.  We read the one-year limitations period at ORS 12.125 as applying only
to claims that are directly authorized by the ORLTA, i.e., claims that seek
damages or injunctive relief as provided in the ORLTA for a violation of
either the rental agreement or some requirement imposed on landlords or tenants
only by a provision of the ORLTA.
The common-law negligence claim that
we already have identified in plaintiffs' complaint does not rely on the ORLTA
as direct authority in the sense we have described.  It is not subject to the
statute of limitations set out at ORS 12.125 but, instead, is limited by the
statute of limitations for actions for "an injury to the person or rights
of another, not arising on contract and not especially enumerated in [ORS
chapter 12]."  ORS 12.110(1).  Although it is true that the complaint is
laced with references to the ORLTA and the rental agreement that are not
relevant to that common-law claim, and which may have been susceptible to a
timely motion to strike, ORCP 21 E, or a motion to make more definite and
certain, ORCP 21 D, the inclusion of those allegations was not a permissible
ground for dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim under ORCP 21 A.  The
trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The ORLTA, originally enacted in 1973 and now codified at chapter 90
of the Oregon Revised Statutes, regulates residential landlord-tenant relations
in Oregon.  Of particular relevance here are:  (1) ORS 90.320, which provides
that landlords shall at all times maintain a rented dwelling unit in a
"habitable condition" and defines unhabitability in fairly detailed
terms; (2) ORS 90.360(2), which provides that, except in certain specified
circumstances, tenants "may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief
for any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or [the
habitability requirements of] ORS 90.320"; and (3) ORS 90.125, which
provides that "the remedies provided by this chapter shall be so
administered that an aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages."  In
Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 453, 600 P2d 398 (1979), this court held
that "appropriate damages" under ORS 90.125 (designated at that time
as ORS 91.725) would include "compensation for the loss of life or health
and the accompanying costs, and not only for the economic value of any goods
that may have been damaged or for the reduced rental value."
2. That is, the case as it comes to us concerns the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' third amended complaint.  Plaintiffs' first amended
complaint alleged negligence -- defendant's "failure to exercise
reasonable care of the rental property occupied by plaintiffs" -- in very
general terms.  The trial court dismissed that first complaint on the ground
that it failed to allege specific facts that established that defendant had
"violated a duty owed to [plaintiffs] under Oregon common law."  With
the trial court's leave, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint that added
more detailed specifications of negligence.  The trial court rejected the
second amended complaint, stating that plaintiffs' new specifications of
negligence expressly referred to duties imposed by the ORLTA, rather than the
common law.  Plaintiffs then filed the complaint that is at issue here, which
includes even more specifications of negligence.
3. The complaint also contained a claim for "Breach of an Agreement
to Repair/Make Habitable."  It alleged that, in the course of their
tenancy, plaintiffs had complained to defendant about the invasion of water and
moisture; that defendant had observed the problem and had promised to make
repairs; that, in reliance upon that representation, plaintiffs remained in,
and continued to pay rent for, the residential unit; that defendant did not
effectuate the promised repairs; and that, in consequence, plaintiffs were
injured, as described in the text.  Plaintiffs make no argument with respect to
that claim to this court, and we do not discuss it further in this opinion.   
4. As we discuss later, plaintiffs also alleged that defendant had a
duty to remedy a problem that was independent of the rental agreement.  
5. Defendant pointed primarily to ORS 90.320, which provides, among
other things:
"(1) A landlord shall at all times during
the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition.  For purposes
of this section, a dwelling unit shall be consider unhabitable if it
substantially lacks:
"(a)
Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls,
including windows and doors; 
"*
* * * *
"(f)
Buildings, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement of the
rental agreement in every part safe for normal and reasonably foreseeable uses,
clean, sanitary and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish,
garbage, rodents and vermin, and all areas under control of the landlord kept
in every part safe for normal and reasonably foreseeable uses, clean, sanitary
and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and
vermin;
"*
* * * * 
"(h)
Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair;
"(i)
Ventilating, air condition and other facilities and appliances * * * maintained
in good repair if supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord."  
6. Using the same reasoning, the Court of Appeals concluded that
plaintiffs' second claim -- for breach of a promise to repair/make habitable --
also was time barred under ORS 12.125.  Waldner, 213 Or App at 618-19. 
As noted above, plaintiffs do not challenge the Court of Appeals decision
concerning the second claim, and we do not address that claim. 
7. In Vollertsen, a landlord brought an action against his former
tenants for "waste" more than one year after the alleged waste
occurred.  This court considered, but rejected the tenants' contention that the
action was time barred under ORS 12.125, because that statute applies to all
residential landlord and tenant disputes.  The court noted that the landlord's
claim relied on ORS 105.805 and not the ORLTA, and that he had not pleaded his
claim "as an attempt to enforce the rental agreement."
In Jones, the plaintiff sued her
landlord in negligence when she fell on an inadequately lighted stairway and
was injured.  Confronted with the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's
claim was time barred under ORS 12.125, this court listed and considered four
different possible meanings of that statute, including the possibility that
"the legislature intended to impose a one-year limitation on all disputes
between a landlord and a tenant, regardless of the nature of the
dispute."  Jones, 306 Or at 44.  The court rejected that
interpretation out of hand, as failing to capture the concept of a claim
"arising under" a rental agreement or the ORLTA.  Id.
8. The rental agreement provided that "[m]anagement will make
necessary repairs to the exterior, with reasonable promptness, after receipt of
written notice from resident."  (Emphasis omitted.) 
9. In Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 734
P2d 1326 (1987), this court introduced a general "foreseeability"
formula to replace traditional concepts of duty, breach, and causation, as
those concepts were used in negligence cases, when determining whether a case
required resolution of facts by a jury.  Fazzolari stated, however, that
that general foreseeability formula applied unless the parties
"invoke a status, a relationship, or a  particular standard of conduct
that creates, defines or limits the defendant's duty."  Id. at 17. 
This court since has indicated that there are distinct standards of conduct --
generally set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts -- that are
relevant to the question of a landlord's legal duty to a tenant.  See, e.g.,
Coulter Property Management, Inc. v. James, 328 Or 164, 170-75, 970 P2d
209 (1998) (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358); Park v.
Hoffard, 315 Or 624, 329-32, 847 P2d 852 (1993) (discussing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 379A); Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 643-47,
762 P2d 997 (1988) (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts §
356).
10. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 360 (1974) provides:
"A possessor of land who leases a part
thereof and retains in his own control any other part which the lessee is
entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is subject to
liability to his lessee * * * for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition
upon that part of the land retained in the lessor's control, if the lessor by
the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the condition and the
unreasonable risk involved therein and could have made the condition
safe." 
Although this court never has explicitly adopted or rejected
section 360 as a statement of common-law landlord-tenant liability in Oregon,
the court's common-law landlord-tenant cases appear to be consistent with that
statement of the law.  
11. The Court of Appeals pointed to paragraph 8 of the third amended
complaint, where plaintiffs alleged that, after inspecting water damage in
plaintiffs' residence, defendants "promised to effectuate repairs"
and that, "based upon defendant's representations that repairs would be
forthcoming, plaintiffs remained on the premises and continued to make rental
payments." 
12. Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 117 (unabridged ed 2002).
13. Id. at 2487. 
14. In other words, when ORS 12.125 refers to actions that arise
under the ORLTA, it speaks not just to the landlord's duties, listed at
ORS 90.320, but to the provisions in that statute that imply a right of action
by, for example, describing a landlord's and tenant's "remedies" for
various violations, in terms of "damages," "injunctive
relief," and the like.  
15. For example, ORS 90.360 sets out various tenant remedies, providing, in
part:
"(1)(a) Except as provided in this chapter,
if there is a material noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement
or a noncompliance with ORS 90.320 or 90.730, the tenant may [terminate the
rental agreement with 30 days' notice].
"* * * * *
"(2) Except as provided in this chapter,
the tenant may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any
noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or ORS 90.320 or
90.730."
Similarly,  ORS 90.401 provides:
"Except as provided in this chapter:
"(1) A landlord may pursue any one or more
of the remedies set forth in ORS 90.342, 90.394, 90.396 and 90.398 [all
providing for termination of rental agreement as provided in eviction statutes
for various acts or omissions by tenant], 90.403 [taking possession from
unauthorized sublettor as provided in eviction statutes] and 90.405
[termination of rental agreement as provided in eviction statutes],
simultaneously or sequentially.
"(2) In addition to the remedies provided
in ORS 90.342, 90.394, 90.396 and 90.398, a landlord may recover damages and
obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental
agreement or ORS 90.325 or 90.740."