Title: WOODTICK v CROSBY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12981 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A CEDRIC WOODTICK, a /k/a CEDRIC PLBINFEATHER, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, RODNEY TJ. C R O S B Y , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Towe, Neely and Ball, Billings, Montana Thomas E. Towe argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Hibbs, Sweeney and Colberg, Billings, Montana William T. Wagner argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: September 29, 1975 Decided: " I ; % F ! ~ a ; , ; JL A / - Mr., J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t court, Big Horn County, from a f i n a l judgment dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint f o r lack of subject matter jurisdiction. P l a i n t i f f , a competent Crow Indian, was issued a patent i n f e e simple on October 13, 1971 t o land s i t u a t e within the e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e Crow Indian Reservation. Subse-- quently, by warranty deed dated October 29, 1971, p l a i n t i f f con- veyed t h i s land t o Rodney L. Crosby, a non-Indian. By h i s complaint, f i l e d July 23, 1974, p l a i n t i f f seeks cancellation of t h e deed given Crosby alleging t h a t bythis deed Crosby became the non-Indian owner of more acreage of land within t h e Crow Indian Reservation than permitted under the provisions of Section 2, Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 751), and, therefore, pursuant t o the e x p l i c i t language of t h a t Act, the deed was void. By motion on August 30, 1974, defendant Crosby moved t o dismiss the complaint on grounds t h a t the courts of t h i s s t a t e a r e without jurisdiction over t h e subject matter of t h i s controversy. By order dated December 6, 1974, the d i s t r i c t court granted de- fendant's motion t o dismiss. The land which i s the subject matter of t h i s case l i e s e n t i r e l y within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of t h e Crow Indian Reser- vation. A s such, Montana s t a t e courts have j u r i s d i c t i o n over it only t o the extent granted by Congress. Section 4(2) of Montana's Enabling Act (25 Stat. 676), under which P4ontana w a s admitted t o the Union and i t s Constitution adopted, provides: h hat the people * * * [of ~ o n t a n a ] * * * do agree and declare t h a t they forever disclaim a l l r i g h t and t i t l e t o the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and t o a l l lands lying within said l i m i t s owned o r held by any Indian o r Indian t r i b e s ; and t h a t u n t i l t i t l e thereto s h a l l l ~ a v e been extinguished by the United States * * * said Indian lands s h a l l remain under the absolute j u r i s d i c t i o n and control of the Congress oi- the United States J ; 9 : 9c." (Emphasis supplied.) Identical language i s contained i n Ordinance No. 1, 52, Montana Constitution of 1889. A r t i c l e I, 1972 Montana Constitu- t i o n provides that both t h e Enabling Act and Ordinance No. 1 a r e t o "continue i n f u l l force and e f f e c t u n t i l revoked by the con- sent of the United States and the people of Montana. I I By the Crow Indian Allotment Act of June 4 , 1920 (41 Stat. 751), a s amended by the Act of May 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 6581, Con- gress undertook allotment of Crow Reservation lands among members of the Crow Tribe. Section 1 of t h e Act provides f o r allotments i n severalty t o be evidenced by "patents i n f e e t o competent Indians + : * * but by t r u s t patent t o minors and incompetent Indians, the force and l e g a l e f f e c t of the t r u s t patents t o be a s is prescribed by the General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, a s amended. (Twenty-fourth Statutes a t Large, page 388)", now 25 United States Code, 5 5 348,349. Section 348 e s s e n t i a l l y provides t h a t the United States i s t o hold l e g a l t i t l e t o the a l l o t t e d lands "in t r u s t " and con- tinue t o exercise i t s exclusive guardianship duties over t h e a l l o t t e e and h i s lands f o r a period of 25 years. Section 349 fur- t h e r provides t h a t a t t h e expiration of the 25 year period, o r sooner i f t h e Secretary of the I n t e r i o r determines t h a t a given 11 a l l o t t e e i s competent and capable of managing h i s o r her a f f a i r s f 1 , a f e e patent i s t o issue whereupon "* * * each and every a l l o t t e e s h a l l have the benefit of and be subject t o the laws, both c i v i l and criminal, of the S t a t e JC * i n which they may r e s i d e * * ;kl'. The United States Supreme Court has held t h a t upon issuance of a fee patent t o t h e Indian, questions a r i s i n g there- a f t e r pertaining t o t i t l e f a l l within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s t a t e courts. Dickson v. Luck Land Co., 242 U.S. 371, 37 S.Ct. 167, 61 L ed 371; Larkin v.laugh, 276 U.S. 431, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L ed 640, 644, 645. A s observed i n Larkin: "F7ith t h e issue of the patent, the t i t l e n o t only passed from t h e United States but the prior t r u s t and incidental r e s t r i c t i o n against alienation were terminated. This put an end t o the authority theretofore possessed by the Secretary of the In- t e r i o r by reason of the t r u s t and r e s t r i c t i o n -- so t h a t t h e r e a f t e r a l l questions pertaining t o the t i t l e were subject t o examination and determina- t i o n by t h e courts, appropriately those i n Nebraska, the land being there. * >k * "t7e a r e of the opinion therefore t h a t there was nothing i n t h e congressional s t a t u t e s t o prevent the local court from taking and exercising j u r i s - diction of the administrator's s u i t J c * brought a f t e r t h e issue of the f e e simple patent. * a" P l a i n t i f f has received a patent i n f e e simple. A t t h i s point it appears t h a t the p a r t i e s agree t h a t jurisdiction generally a s it applies t o Indians resides i n the s t a t e courts. However, the point of difference and t h e l e g a l i s s u e presented t o t h i s Court concerns the e f f e c t , i f any, the Crow Indian Allotment Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 751) has on s t a t e jurisdiction. t h e pertinent p a r t of Section 2 of the Act prohibits and declares void any conveyance of f e e patent land by a Crow Indian t o any person, company o r corporation who owns more than 1,280 acres of grazing land, o r who by such conveyance would become the owner of more than 1,920 acres of grazing land, within t h e boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. Act of June 4, 1920, Sec. 2 (41 Stat. 751). By the Act of June 8, 1940, only those conveyances t o non-Indians owning i n excess of the prohibited acreages a r e now prohibited. (54 Stat. 252). Defendant argues t h a t because of the Crow Indian Allotment Act t h e federal r e s t r i c t i o n s have simply not been terminated. Thus, the cases above c i t e d a r e recognized by defendant but distinguished on the grounds t h a t the additional r e s t r i c t i o n s of t h e Crow Allotment Act were not involved i n those cases. Defendant goes on t o argue t h a t i n t h i s event p l a i n t i f f must meet t h e conditions of S t a t e ex r e l . Iron Bear v. D i s t r i c t Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 and r e l a t e d cases, o r f a i l i n h i s attempt t o e s t a b l i s h j u r i s - diction i n the s t a t e court. A case c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f a s principal authority but not discussed by defendant i s Dillon v. Antler Land Company, 341 F. Supp. 734, 740, 741, (D.C. Mont. 1972), affirmed 507 F.2d 940 (9th C i r . 1974). In Dillon the Crow Indian attempts t o s e t aside a conveyance of Indian lands conveyed i n 1955 a f t e r receiving a patent and t h e elements of the fraud complained of were known a s e a r l y a s 1956. Judge Russell E. Smith, a f t e r mentioning other grounds and recognizing an alleged violation of t h e Crow Indian Allotment Act, held the claim f o r r e l i e f barred by the Montana s t a t u t e of limitations. Judge Smith held d i r e c t l y t h a t there i s no c o n f l i c t with 25 U.S.C., 5 349, which declares a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s , e t c . s h a l l be removed with issue of patent. H e s t a t e d "* * fc the e f f e c t of Section 2 of the Crow Act was t o l i m i t the power of a buyer t o buy. The Indian was not forbidden t o s e l l ; the penalty w a s directed solely a t t h e buyer." In h i s discussion Judge Smith comments t h a t t h e market was limited but t h i s i s t r u e i n other comparable instances a s well. Further, the Court held: "The General A.llotment Act throughout i t s h i s tory has and the Crow Act does distinguish t h e competent from the incom~etent Indian and the t r u s t lands from the f e e lands. S t a t e law controls here because Congress has e x p l i c i t l y s a i d t h a t it does. The language of 25 U.S.C. 5 349 i s ; ? * when the lands have been conveyed t o the Indians by patent i n fee * * * then each and every a l l o t t e e s h a l l have the benefit of and be subject t o the laws, both c i v i l and criminal, of t h e S t a t e * * *'. "The patent e x i s t s . It has not been cancelled." (Emphasis supplied. ) Judge Smith f u r t h e r commented i n Dillon: "The issuance of the f e e patent had a broader e f f e c t than merely t o f r e e p l a i n t i f f t o s e l l her land--it freed t h e United States from i t s t r u s t e e d u t i e s and a l t e r e d t h e relationship of the land and p l a i n t i f f t o the S t a t e of Montana. 11 H e c i t e d the Montana Enabling Act (25 Stat. 676), and Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189 (9th C i r . 1942). The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Smith i n a l l p a r t i c u l a r s and a l s o c i t e d Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 F.2d 189, 192, which s t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s t a t u t e on t h e issue of f e e patents: I 1 The obvious purpose of the provision i s t o define t h e s t a t u s of t h e individual Indians i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o the s t a t e . Having been released from tutelage, the Indians a r e t h e r e a f t e r t o be regarded a s members of the community with the privileges and duties incident t o citizenship. r 1 The issue before t h i s Court has been d i r e c t l y ruled upon and decided by the federal courts, therefore further discussion i s unnecessary p a r t i c u l a r l y since both firms of attorneys i n t h i s matter appeared i n the federal d i s t r i c t court i n the proceeding i n Dillon. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s reversed and t h e cause remanded f o r further proceedings on t h e merits not inconeistent with t h i s opinion, W e Concur: Y 4 @ ( I" i:*!,+#f>' d / $ * f .2d f , t t , ,". La i . * * * , . : Chief J u s t i c e