Title: In re HC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

In re HC1999 WY 94983 P.2d 1205Case Number: C-98-4Decided: 07/02/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF HC, a Minor Child: CAC, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

NATRONA COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee (Petitioner).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge.

Ann M. Rochelle 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P. C., Casper, Wyoming, representing 
appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Chief Deputy Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan 
S. Wilde, Assistant Attorney General representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998. 

Golden, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Following 
Appellant CAC's second misdemeanor conviction of child endangerment, which 
constituted a felony conviction because of the enhancement provision under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-403(a)(ii) and (c), and following her filing of the notice of 
appeal of right from that conviction, which matter is now pending in this Court, 
the Department of Family Services, State of Wyoming (DFS), filed a petition in 
the district court for the termination of CAC's parental rights to her daughter, 
HC, on the grounds that (1) CAC neglected HC, DFS's efforts to rehabilitate the 
family have been unsuccessful, and HC's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by returning HC to CAC, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii); and (2) 
CAC is incarcerated because of a felony conviction and is unfit to have the 
custody and control of HC, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv). After CAC 
answered, denying the allegations, DFS filed a motion for summary judgment on 
its petition, supported by affidavits and court documents. CAC opposed the 
motion, filing counter affidavits. Without holding a hearing on the motion the 
district court granted summary judgment and entered its order terminating CAC's 
parental rights to HC based on the two statutory grounds advanced by DFS. 
Appealing that order, CAC contends that genuine issues of material fact exist 
relating to the grounds, that DFS's affidavits do not comply with the 
requirements of W. R. C. P. 56(e), and that the district court did not afford 
CAC due process of law when it granted DFS's motion.

[¶2]      This Court holds 
that reversal of the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings are 
required for several reasons. For one thing, the district court's failure to 
hold a hearing on the motion violated CAC's right to due process of law. For 
another thing, this Court holds that the affidavits submitted by DFS to support 
its motion do not comply with the requirements of W. R. C. P. 56(e), and, 
therefore, the district court erred in granting the motion which was not 
supported by admissible clear and convincing evidence as the law requires. 
Finally, this Court takes notice that CAC's felony conviction, which is central 
to one of the grounds for termination advanced by DFS, is on appeal of right to 
this Court and, until resolved by this Court, cannot qualify as a "conviction" 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) for the purpose of the termination of 
CAC's parental rights to HC. For all of these reasons, this Court has no other 
choice but to reverse the summary judgment in DFS's favor and to remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant CAC 
presents these issues for our review:

1. Under Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-309 (a)(iii), were there no material issues of fact and was summary 
judgment proper as a matter of law?

2. Under Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-309(a)(iv), were there no material issues of fact and was summary judgment 
proper as a matter of law?

Appellee 
rephrases the issues as:

Whether the District 
Court properly granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment?

FACTS

[¶4]      "Upon examination 
of a summary judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, giving [her] all favorable inferences which 
may be drawn from the facts." In Interest of DG, 916 P.2d 991, 996 (Wyo. 1996) 
(quoting Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 629 (Wyo. 
1989)).

[¶5]      On November 12, 
1997, DFS filed an amended petition for termination of CAC's parental rights to 
her six-year-old daughter, HC. That petition stated that the child had been 
abused or neglected; efforts by the State had not successfully rehabilitated the 
family; and the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by 
returning her to CAC. It further stated that CAC was incarcerated for a felony 
conviction and unfit to have the custody and control of the child. On December 
16, 1997, DFS filed the affidavit of the social worker assigned to the case 
involving the child. That affidavit stated that all information in it was 
obtained while working in that capacity, from documentation in the DFS files, 
and from data provided by the DFS investigator assigned to the case. On December 
18, 1997, DFS moved for summary judgment, relying upon this affidavit, an 
affidavit signed by a DFS investigator which repeated the first affidavit, and 
the judgment and sentence and court documents from CAC's misdemeanor and felony 
convictions for child endangerment. The court documents included affidavits of 
the officers investigating the injuries to HC which resulted in CAC's 
convictions for misdemeanor and felony child endangerment.

[¶6]      The first 
officer's affidavit revealed that she was advised that on April 14, 1992, CAC 
brought an injured HC, then eight months old, to the emergency room at the 
Wyoming Medical Center in Casper, Wyoming. The officer was told by a doctor that 
an examination revealed that HC had a right side skull fracture and a left femur 
fracture that was in the process of healing, as well as facial bruising. DFS 
reported that the examination established that HC had also suffered three rib 
fractures, but the documentation of the examination was not attached to either 
affidavit. The affidavit also stated that CAC's boyfriend, Floid Boyer, admitted 
to the officer that he had inflicted the injuries on HC.

[¶7]      CAC pled guilty 
to misdemeanor child endangerment and was placed on probation for one year for 
failure to protect HC from harm and for a delay in seeking medical treatment for 
the injured child. DFS reported, without accompanying documentation, that HC was 
placed in the legal and physical custody of DFS on April 16, 1992, and DFS 
provided extensive services to CAC to improve her parenting skills with the 
purpose of reuniting her with HC. Physical custody was returned to CAC in 
September of 1994.

[¶8]      The affidavit 
stated that DFS received reports of extreme filth and unsanitary and unsafe 
conditions in CAC's home, which were substantiated by DFS in April of 1995, and 
a court hearing was held on child neglect complaints. Following that hearing, 
physical and legal custody were returned to CAC on May 15, 1995. Documentation 
of the neglect complaint, the investigation substantiating the neglect, and 
court hearing were not filed with the affidavits.

[¶9]      On June 28, 1995, 
DFS received a report that HC, then age three, was at the Wyoming Medical Center 
where she was being treated for second and third degree burns over twenty 
percent of her body. The officer's affidavit reported that another officer told 
him that these injuries were inflicted by Boyer who claimed to have spilled 
coffee on HC, that CAC learned of the burns in the afternoon, observed them at 
7:00 p.m. that evening when she returned home from work, and left HC in the care 
of a fourteen-year old babysitter while she and Boyer went to play darts. CAC 
told the babysitter of the injuries but did not provide special instructions or 
medication for HC. The officer's affidavit reported that another officer told 
him he had observed CAC pushing HC in a stroller at about 3:00 a.m., and she 
informed him that she was taking HC to the hospital emergency room for 
treatment. The officer's affidavit reported that a fire inspector and a plastic 
surgeon informed him that the injuries were burns from an open flame. Supporting 
documentation about the examination and its results were not included with the 
affidavit. DFS's affidavits reported, without accompanying documentation, that 
in addition to CAC's failing to promptly get medical care for her daughter, 
CAC's home was extremely filthy and dangerous to a child with burns who was at 
serious risk of infection.

[¶10]   Soon after this burn incident, law 
enforcement authorities arrested CAC and charged her with child endangerment. HC 
was placed in foster care on June 30, 1995, where she has remained to this day. 
After much delay in the criminal proceeding, CAC was found guilty of child 
endangerment on May 16, 1997. Because that conviction was her second conviction 
of that offense, under the applicable enhancement statute it constituted a 
felony conviction. On July 1, 1997, the court entered judgment and sentence on 
the conviction which resulted in CAC's incarceration at the Wyoming Women's 
Center for a term of not less than twenty-four months and not more than 
forty-eight months with credit for nine days pre-trial incarceration. On July 
14, 1997, CAC filed her notice of appeal of right from that conviction, serving 
a copy of that notice on, among others, the district 
attorney.

[¶11]   Nine days later, on July 23, 1997, 
DFS, through the assistant district attorney, filed its petition to terminate 
CAC's parental rights to her minor daughter, HC. On November 12, 1997, DFS filed 
an amended petition. After CAC filed her answer which denied DFS's allegations, 
discovery ensued. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting 
material. The record does not include any mention of the district court's 
conducting a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. On February 4, 1998, 
the district court issued its decision letter in which it announced it was 
granting DFS's motion for summary judgment. In the decision letter, the court 
noted that efforts to rehabilitate the family were unsuccessful as evidenced by 
the 1995 neglect complaint, HC's 1995 burn injuries, and CAC's second child 
endangerment conviction. The court was persuaded by the convictions that HC's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by being returned to CAC. The 
court ruled that the essential elements for termination of CAC's parental rights 
to HC, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (iv), were established, and 
granted summary judgment in DFS's favor by order on April 23, 1998. CAC timely 
filed her notice of appeal of right from that summary judgment. Meanwhile, CAC's 
appeal of right from the felony child endangerment, which was filed before DFS's 
parental rights termination petition, remains pending in this Court, having been 
submitted in oral argument on March 16, 1999.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶12]   On rare occasions, a termination of 
parental rights can be accomplished by summary judgment where the petitioner 
establishes its case under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309. Matter of Adoption of 
JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 1989). Parental rights are a recognized fundamental 
liberty right protected by both the federal and state constitutions. DS v. Dept. 
of Public Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918-19 (Wyo. 1980). We 
apply a strict scrutiny standard to the application of the termination statutes 
because the constitutional right conflicts with the state's compelling interest 
in protecting the welfare of children. We will, however, uphold a termination of 
parental rights when the procedures used satisfy due process and the evidence is 
clear and convincing. MB v. Laramie County Dept. of Family Services in Interest 
of LB, 933 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Wyo. 1997).

"Summary judgment is 
appropriately granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W. R. C. P. 
56(c).

[W]e review the judgment 
in the same light as the district court, using the same information. A party 
moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Material fact has been defined as one which, if 
proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element 
of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Upon examination of a 
summary judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be 
drawn from the facts."

In Interest of 
DG, 916 P.2d 991, 995 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d  
at 629 (citations omitted)). We may uphold the grant of summary judgment upon 
any proper legal ground finding support in the record. Ahearn v. Anderson-Bishop 
Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 422 (Wyo. 1997). 

[¶13]   Initially, we are concerned with 
the lack of a record establishing that a hearing was held on the motions for 
summary judgment. Neither party addresses this issue; however, this Court may 
review issues directly involving an appellant's fundamental rights. Herdt v. 
State, 816 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Wyo. 1991). This Court has concluded that parental 
rights are fundamental and are of constitutional magnitude, and has determined 
that "[w]hen addressing fundamental rights of constitutional magnitude, the 
court must accommodate to the keenest spirit of procedural due process." Matter 
of BJB, 888 P.2d 216, 219 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶14]   Matter of Adoption of JLP is our 
seminal decision on the propriety of summary judgments in a parental rights 
termination action. While it is true that this Court in Matter of Adoption of 
JLP held that "summary judgment is not necessarily precluded in every 
termination of parental rights case," this Court qualified that holding by 
stating it would consider such summary judgment procedure on a case-by-case 
basis. Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d  at 628. In this case, the naturally 
abbreviated summary judgment process was further shortened when the district 
court failed to conduct a hearing before granting DFS's summary judgment 
motion.

[¶15]   In a parental rights termination 
proceeding, due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard, i. e., 
some kind of hearing. Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d  at 632. In Matter of 
Adoption of JLP, an abbreviated summary judgment motion hearing, at which 
appellant appeared through counsel, was found to be sufficient where, in 
response to appellees' initial showing, appellant had the burden to come forth 
with specific evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact; he failed to do so; 
and it was manifestly obvious that he could not do so. We held that, under the 
circumstances of the case, the applicable grounds for termination of appellant's 
parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence at the summary 
judgment hearing; appellant was accorded adequate due process under the 
circumstances; and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 
We emphasized and cautioned, however, that the decision was limited to the 
specific and unusual facts presented, and we said that we could foresee few 
other situations in which summary judgment could properly be utilized to effect 
a termination of parental rights. Id.

[¶16]   In order for this Court to 
determine if some sort of hearing should have been granted in the district 
court, Matter of Adoption of JLP directs us to conduct a factual review. CAC's 
contention that the grant of summary judgment in DFS's favor was not based upon 
admissible evidence establishing all elements of the parental rights termination 
statute or complying with W. R. C. P. 56(e) necessitates the same review. In 
opposing DFS's summary judgment motion, CAC contended that DFS had not provided 
the court with admissible evidence satisfying all elements of the parental 
termination statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309. That statute provides for the 
termination of the parent-child legal relationship if clear and convincing 
evidence establishes any one or more enumerated grounds:

(iii) The child has been 
abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental 
health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the 
family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning 
to the parent;

(iv) The parent is 
incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is 
unfit to have the custody and control of the child.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-309(a)(iii)1 and (iv) (Michie Supp. 1998). Rule 
56(e) states in relevant part:

Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith.

W. R. C. P. 
56(e).

[¶17]   Our review of the evidence before 
the district court reveals that DFS's affidavits submitted to support the motion 
for summary judgment are not based upon personal knowledge, making them 
inadmissible at trial; contain unsupported conclusions; and lack supporting 
documentation in violation of W. R. C. P. 56(e). DFS's affidavits were the only 
evidence establishing the element of unsuccessful rehabilitative efforts. 
Without these affidavits, the complete story of HC's injuries and other neglect 
issues, and DFS's rehabilitative efforts, cannot be established. The police 
officers' affidavits were provided to supply probable cause for CAC's two child 
endangerment arrests, but probable cause is a lesser standard than that required 
for terminating parental rights. These affidavits do not satisfy Rule 56(e) 
because they contain multiple hearsay and hearsay on hearsay, do not have 
supporting documentation attached, and are not completely based upon the 
personal knowledge of each officer. We have consistently required that the 
evidence which is relied upon to sustain or defeat a motion for summary judgment 
must be such as would be admissible at trial, and that it should be as carefully 
tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which would be presented to 
the court at the time of trial. Equality Bank of Evansville, Wyo. v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Gennings v. First National Bank of 
Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 155 (Wyo. 1982); and Newton v. Hunter, 423 P.2d 648, 
650 (Wyo. 1967)). Compliance with Rule 56 is mandatory. Greenswood v. Wierdsma, 
741 P.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Wyo. 1987). Recognizing that DFS's affidavits did not 
document that efforts to effect her rehabilitation were unsuccessful or meet the 
clear and convincing standard in proving her unfit, CAC countered with 
documentation indicating her rehabilitation had been successful and showing HC's 
injuries had been received from Boyer while CAC was at 
work.

[¶18]   Given this state of the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to CAC, the district court was unable to find 
that DFS had proved adequate rehabilitation efforts had taken place. Instead, 
without a hearing, the district court concluded that a subsequent child 
endangerment conviction satisfied the element of unsuccessful rehabilitation, 
and concluded that a felony conviction which has not been affirmed on appeal 
satisfied that element of section (a)(iv) of the statute. The district court 
does not explain why a hearing was not held and, under these circumstances, the 
failure to provide a hearing before granting summary judgment deprived CAC of 
due process. We agree with CAC that DFS failed to comply with Rule 56(e) to such 
an extent that the clear and convincing evidence standard was not met to 
establish the circumstances of the injuries, the basis of the child endangerment 
convictions, other neglect issues, and unfitness. Accordingly, the admissible 
evidence before us does not establish the elements required under either Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) or (a)(iv), and we reverse the summary judgment 
and remand with instructions to vacate the order terminating CAC's parental 
rights and for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

Felony 
Conviction Requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(iv)

[¶19]   CAC's state trial court felony 
conviction of child endangerment is pending in this Court on direct appeal of 
right. Because of the status of that conviction, we have raised on our own the 
question whether the DFS petition to terminate CAC's parental rights may rely 
upon the statutory ground of felony conviction incarceration and unfitness, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv). We addressed a somewhat similar situation in RW v. 
Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance, 766 P.2d 555, 557 (Wyo. 1989). In RW, 
the state relied upon subsection (a)(iv) to terminate the parental rights of 
parents who had been convicted in federal district court of second degree murder 
and aiding and abetting second degree murder. Although a federal circuit court 
of appeals had affirmed their convictions on direct appeal of right, the 
appellants' application for a discretionary writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court was pending. The appellants claimed that the "conviction" 
requirement of subsection (a)(iv) was not met because of their pending 
application. Although this Court considered as "clearly pertinent" the 
appellants' legal authority, a line of California cases deriving from In Re 
Sonia G., 158 Cal. App. 3d 18, 204 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501-02 (1984), it decided that 
resolution of "any and all issues which might arise concerning the meaning of 
the word `conviction,'" as used in the subsection, was unnecessary to dispose of 
the appellants' claim. RW, 766 P.2d  at 557. We held that the pendency of the 
appellants' application for a discretionary writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, following the affirmance on direct appeal of the trial 
court convictions by a federal circuit court of appeals, did not affect the 
status of those convictions for purposes of subsection (a)(iv). Id. Of course, 
RW does not answer the question we must raise here, namely, whether the 
"conviction" requirement of subsection (a)(iv) is met when the state trial court 
felony conviction is pending on direct appeal of right to this Court. Because we 
are reversing and remanding, we will answer the question.

[¶20]   The legislature did not in 
subsection (a)(iv) or elsewhere define the term "conviction" for purposes of the 
statute. We recognized in RW "that the word `conviction' may have different 
meanings within different contexts." RW, 766 P.2d  at 557. Faced with a similar 
situation, a Wisconsin intermediate court of appeals held that the term 
"conviction" was ambiguous, i. e., it is reasonable to construe the term to mean 
either the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court or a conviction 
after the completion of the appeal as of right. In Interest of Kody D. V., 548 N.W.2d 837, 840-41 (Wis. App. 1996). After reviewing the nature and purposes of 
parental rights termination proceedings, the court of appeals found troubling 
the consequences of adopting the meaning of trial court judgment. Id. at 842. It 
observed:

If an appeal of a 
judgment of conviction is pending when the termination of parental rights 
occurs, there is the chance the judgment may be reversed. There may be a new 
trial, which could result in either a guilty verdict or an acquittal. If the 
reversal is due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant cannot be 
retried. Meanwhile, the parent's rights would have been terminated and the child 
possibly already adopted.

The lack of finality of a 
conviction that is being appealed raises the question as to whether that 
conviction is clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness. That lack of 
finality also does not ultimately promote permanency and stability for the 
child. Until the right to appeal has been exhausted, there is no certainty that 
the supposedly permanent arrangements made for the child will not be disrupted 
after a successful appeal.

Id. at 842-43 
(citations omitted). Based upon those reasons, the court of appeals concluded 
that the construction of "conviction" more consistent with the nature and 
purposes of parental rights termination proceedings and the legislature's intent 
was a conviction after the exhaustion of the appeal as of right. Id. at 843. See 
In re D. D. F., 801 P.2d 703, 707-08 (Okla. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 922 
(1991) (convictions pending on appeal are not final and cannot be the basis for 
a parental rights termination); In Re Sonia G., 158 Cal. App. 3d 18, 204 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (1984) (judgment of conviction that may be reversed on appeal falls 
short of "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for parental rights 
termination); but see In Interest of T. T., 845 P.2d 539, 540-41 (Colo. App. 
1992) ("long-term confinement" under parental rights termination statute is 
ground for termination although appeal is pending; verdict and sentence in trial 
court satisfies "clear and convincing" standard of proof).

[¶21]   We find that the analysis in In Re 
Interest of Kody, D. V. closely tracks the method of statutory construction we 
employ, Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 1993), and represents the better reasoning for the various 
interests affected by our parental rights termination statutes. Consequently, we 
hold that, for purposes of the parental rights termination statutes, the term 
"conviction" in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) means a conviction after the 
completion of the appeal as of right. Because the appeal as of right of CAC's 
felony conviction has not been completed, the DFS petition to terminate CAC's 
parental rights as to her minor daughter, HC, may not be based upon subsection 
(a)(iv).

[¶22]   We reverse and remand the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in DFS's favor with instructions to 
proceed in accordance with this opinion.

 

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) was amended in 1999 by inserting the word "reasonable" 
preceding "efforts by an authorized agency." Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 156 § 
1.