Title: State exrel Dept. of Human Services v. Rardin

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  April 14, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of Jennifer Jeannette Rardin,
a Minor Child,
STATE ex rel DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RARDIN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC No. 2590J; CA A125045; SC S51810)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the record February 4, 2005.
James A. Palmer, Eugene, filed the brief for petitioner on
review.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Karen S. Torry, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of
Jennifer Rardin, Minor Child.
DE MUNIZ, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Tillamook County Circuit Court.  Richard W.     
Roll, Judge.  On Order Denying Motion for Delayed Appeal    
and Order of Dismissal dated August 5, 2004.  
Mary J. Diets, Chief Judge.
DE MUNIZ, J.
A juvenile court terminated father's parental rights. 
Father appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals,
however, dismissed father's appeal, because that court concluded
that the notice of appeal was untimely and that father had failed
to raise a colorable claim of error.  ORS 419A.200(5)(a) permits
a party to file an untimely notice of appeal from a juvenile
court judgment if the party (1) demonstrates the existence of a
colorable claim of error in the underlying proceeding from which
the appeal is taken; and (2) demonstrates that the failure to
file a timely notice of appeal was not the party's fault. (1) 
The issue in this parental termination proceeding is whether
father has raised a "colorable claim of error" sufficient to
excuse his late-filed notice of appeal.  We conclude that
father's appeal raises a colorable claim of error, and we
therefore reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and remand
for further proceedings.
We take the facts from the trial court's letter
opinion.  In 1995, while father and mother were living together,
mother conceived and bore the child that is the subject of this
dispute.  Father signed the birth certificate, acknowledging his
status as the child's father.  About six months later, however,
mother informed father that child was not his.  In October 1995,
the Support Enforcement Division required father to pay child
support as the legal father.  When child was a year and a half
old, parents separated.  Father made some child support payments
after the separation.
Between 1997 and 1999, the Department of Human Services
(DHS) could not locate father.  When contacted in 1999, father
told DHS did not want to participate in child's upbringing and
support unless he could be convinced of his paternity through a
DNA test.  Father could not afford the fee, which was between
$1,250 and $2,500, and DHS would not pay for testing.  Father and
DHS corresponded intermittently from 1999 to 2001.
In April 2002, DHS sent father a letter of
expectation (2) stating that, if father worked with DHS, DHS
would assist him in developing a relationship with child and that
she eventually might be placed with him.  By mid-2002, however,
DHS became less interested in assisting father and decided to
seek the termination of his parental rights.  DHS instructed
father not to contact child directly but, instead, to send
letters, cards, pictures, and presents to her through DHS.  He
sent items at least once a week.  Later, however, DHS informed
father that it had stopped giving his cards and letters to child. 
Father initially did not understand that termination was DHS's
goal.  However, DHS did advise father that it had decided to seek
to terminate his parental rights because the changes that DHS
wanted  in father's actions had not occurred quickly enough.  In
August 2002, father paid for paternity testing that confirmed
that he was child's biological father.
In October 2002, DHS filed a petition for termination
of father's parental rights. (3)  The petition alleged, inter
alia, that father was 
"unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously
detrimental to the child and integration of the child
into the father's home is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change, including, but not limited to the following:
a) Failure to present a viable plan for the return of
the child to the parent's care and custody [and] b)
Abandonment of the child."
After a hearing, the trial court issued a lengthy and
detailed letter opinion.  The court made the following findings
regarding father's current living conditions:
"[Father] now lives in Pomeroy, Washington.  He
has lived there about five or six years.  He has
extended family living in that area.  [Father] has
other children with whom he gets along very well.  [He]
is engaged to be married to a woman who has a five year
old child.  [Father] currently lives in a trailer with
an addition which has two or three bedrooms.  The yard
is clean and fenced.  Two children live with the
family.  They have a poodle dog. * * * [Father] is
employed as a general contractor.  He has also been
working as a painter.  If [child] were to be  allowed
to live with [father], she would go to elementary
school in Pomeroy, Washington.  The school is about
eight blocks away and most of the children walk to
school.  After school, [father] or other extended
family members could watch [child].  Those family
members provide regular child care for the other
children living in his home."
The trial court noted father's desire to have a
relationship with child:
"[Father] wants a relationship with [child]. * * *
Since the petitions have been filed, [father] has asked
to see [child] but has not been allowed to see her. 
His attempts to write to her have also been limited.  
* * *  DHS['s] only concern about [father] is his lack
of a relationship with [child]."
With respect to child having had little contact with father
during her life, the trial court noted:
"Treatment providers believe [child's]
relationship to [father] is further complicated by the
fact that [child] has had other father figures who have
been abusive and hurtful.  As a result, [child] does
not trust men.  She is confused by the fact that her
father had not met her yet, but writes and says he
loves her.  She wonders why he now wants to be involved
with her.  She does not remember him and does not
recall ever meeting him.  She thinks of him as a
stranger."
In addition, the trial court noted the psychologist's
observations:
"Dr. Eastman was aware that there were no alcohol
or drug issues raised concerning [father].  Dr. Eastman
also opined that had visitation started with the father
a year ago, that might have been a viable plan. 
However, according to Dr. Eastman, any biological
father should be reintegrated into his child's life not
later than the child's third birthday.  Had services
been provided earlier, [father] might now be
reintegrated into [child's] family relationships."
(Footnotes omitted.)  The court then explained the circumstances
for the lack of contact between father and child:
"[Child] was three years old in 1998.  At that
time, [father] knew of [child's] circumstances.  DHS
has contacted with him [sic], but he chose to do
nothing to avail himself of services because of his
self-imposed DNA test precondition to contact with
[child] and acceptance of services.  * * *  The Court
notes that the current reasons [father] has not met
[child] is that counselors and DHS have asked him to
wait for [child] to become emotionally better prepared
for that meeting.  The Court further notes that this
issue would never have arisen had [father] promptly
acknowledged paternity or promptly agreed to
participate in reunification service."
On the merits, the trial court concluded that DHS had
failed to prove abandonment.  The remaining legal issue,
according to the trial court, was whether father had presented a
"viable plan for the return of the child to the parent's care and
custody[.]"  The trial court acknowledged that father had a
suitable home and family, and a plan for child's schooling. 
Emphasizing the delays that ensued in the contacts between father
and DHS, however, the court concluded that father's "contact came
so late that [child] is not psychologically able to accept him as
a * * * parent":  
"The fact that he now presents a viable place for
physical location of [child] is not sufficient.  As a
result of the delayed contact between [father] and
[child], it is not emotionally viable for [child] to be
incorporated into [father's] home within a reasonable
time.  The Court concludes that these facts establish
by clear and convincing evidence that [father] has
failed to present any viable plan to return [child] to
his home, care and custody."
The court continued:
"With regard to [father's] petition, the evidence
is uncontradicted that a biological father should be
integrated into a child's life not later than the
child's third birthday.  After the child's third
birthday, the child will usually view the absent father
as a stranger.  At that point, establishing a plan to
introduce the father to the child may take substantial
time, because the child must be allowed time to admit a
stranger into her life and accept him emotionally as
the father."
Thus, as the trial court saw it, the only consideration that
justified terminating father's parental rights was that father's
attempts to establish a relationship with child came too late.
On May 6, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment
terminating father's parental rights.  Relying on ORS 419B.504,
the judgment stated that 
"father is unfit by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child and integration of
the child into the father's home is improbable within a
reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change, including the following:  failure to present
a viable plan for the return of the child to the
parent's care and custody."  
The judgment also stated, relying on ORS 419B.506, that 
"father has failed and neglected without reasonable and
lawful cause to provide for the basic physical and
psychological needs of the child for six months prior
to the filing of the petition as shown by his:  failure
to implement a plan designed to lead to the integration
of the child into the father's home."
Father wanted to appeal.  However, father's court-appointed appellate counsel was not informed that a judgment had
been signed and entered.  On May 26, 2004, the Tillamook County
Juvenile Department (department) informed father's trial attorney
that a final judgment had not been signed and that the Department
would mail a copy to father's counsel when it was signed.  When
appellate counsel contacted a trial court staff person about the
case, he was told, as late as June 1, 2004, that the court had
not yet signed the judgment.  On June 4, 2004, when father's
trial attorney inquired again about the judgment, he also was
told that the judgment had not been signed.  On June 9, 2004, the
trial court administrator informed father's trial attorney that
the court had signed the judgment on May 4, 2004, and that three
copies had been sent to the Department of Justice.  As of June
14, 2004, neither mother's or father's trial attorneys had been
sent a copy of the judgment, either by the trial court or the
state.  
On June 10, 2004, father's appellate counsel learned 
that the judgment had been entered on May 6, 2004.  By that time,
the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal had expired. 
ORS 419A.200(3)(c).  On June 14, 2004, father filed a Motion to
Allow Late Filing of Notice of Appeal and a Notice of Appeal. 
The state filed a response and moved to dismiss the appeal.  The
state conceded that father had demonstrated that his failure to
file a timely notice of appeal was not personally attributable to
him and that he had filed his request for delayed appeal within
90 days of entry of the trial court's judgment, as ORS
419A.200(5)(c) requires.  Nevertheless, the state moved to
dismiss the appeal, arguing that father had not satisfied the
"colorable claim of error" requirement set out in ORS
419A.200(5)(a)(A).  In response, father filed an affidavit
completed by his trial attorney that framed the issues at stake
in the trial, including an attempted refutation of the trial
court's conclusion that it had been too late for father to
present a viable plan for the return of child because too much
time had passed.
On August 5, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued an order
denying father's motion for delayed appeal and dismissing the
case.  The Court of Appeals concluded that father had failed to
demonstrate a colorable claim of error under ORS
419A.200(5)(a)(A).  In doing so, however, the Court of Appeals
tested father's arguments against "the trial court's
determination that father had abandoned the child."  The trial
court, however, had made no such determination.  In fact, it had
reached the opposite conclusion, viz., that the state had failed
to prove abandonment.  We now evaluate father's claims against
the actual grounds upon which the trial court relied to justify
termination of father's parental rights.
The legislature has not defined the phrase "colorable
claim of error," as that phrase is used in ORS 419A.200(5)(a)(A). 
Any inquiry into the legislature's intended meaning of that
phrase must be undertaken according to the principles set out in
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  Pursuant to that methodology, we first examine
the text and context of the statute, giving words of common usage
"their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 611.  If
the legislature's intent is clear from the text and context of
the statute, then further analysis is unnecessary.  Id. 
Statutory context "includes other provisions of the same statute
and other related statutes, as well as the preexisting common law
and the statutory framework within which the [statute] was
enacted[.]"  Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693
(1998).  
Here, the ordinary meaning of the term "colorable" is
"seemingly valid and genuine:  having an appearance of truth,
right, or justice: PLAUSIBLE[.]"  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 449 (unabridged ed 2002). (4)  Furthermore, as
context for defining the term "colorable claim of error," we find
helpful some discussion from Waybrant v. Bernstein, 294 Or 650,
661 P2d 931 (1983) -- a case that issued before the legislature
enacted ORS 419A.200(5)(a)(A) and that is procedurally analogous
to this one.  There, the plaintiff had brought a wrongful death
action against the personal representative of a decedent's
estate.  The plaintiff's action subsequently was dismissed
without prejudice.  The estate was later closed and the defendant
discharged as personal representative.  The plaintiff did not
appeal the judgment closing the estate, even though it was
appealable.  Several months later, the plaintiff filed another
action against the decedent's estate, but the personal
representative moved to dismiss the complaint based on the
earlier judgment that had closed the estate.  The plaintiff then
filed a motion to vacate the earlier judgment closing the estate
on the basis that he had not received notice of the judgment. 
The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion.  The plaintiff
appealed that denial, but the Court of Appeals ruled that the
order in question was not appealable.  This court allowed review
to address that conclusion.  Id. at 656.
The court began by observing the general rule that,
when a court issues an appealable judgment, and the litigants
miss the deadline by which to appeal, the litigants will not get
a second opportunity for appellate review of the correctness of
the judgment if a trial court later denies a motion to vacate the
judgment.  The court noted, however, that one exception to the
rule is that a litigant may obtain appellate review if her or she
can show that the appealable judgment is void.  The plaintiff in
Waybrant had argued in the Court of Appeals that the judgment
closing the estate was void as applied to him.  This court
therefore concluded that it would need to "determine whether the
plaintiff ha[d] established a colorable claim" that the judgment
was void as to him, thus mandating further analysis by the Court
of Appeals.  Id. at 656.  The court then analyzed the potential
merits of the plaintiff's claim that the judgment was void as
pertaining to him in light of his lack of notice.  The court
concluded that, if the plaintiff could establish that he had been
entitled to notice, that he had not received notice, and that his
claim otherwise was not barred, then the judgment closing the
estate indeed may have been void as applied to the plaintiff. 
And, if the judgment was void, the trial court's order denying
his motion to vacate the judgment would be appealable.  Based on
that analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
established a colorable claim that the judgment closing the
estate was void at to him.  Id. at 659.
Taking into account the definition of "colorable" from
Webster's dictionary, and the discussion of the term "colorable
claim" set out in Waybrant, we conclude that the legislature
intended the phrase "colorable claim of error" as used in ORS
419A.200(5)(a)(A) to describe a claim that a party reasonably may
assert under current law and that is plausible given the facts
and the current law (or a reasonable extension or modification of
current law).  We now test father's claim against that standard.
In justifying termination of father's parental rights,
the trial court initially relied on ORS 419B.504, which provides:
 


"The rights of the parent * * * may be terminated
* * * if the court finds that the parent or parents are
unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously
detrimental to the child * * * and integration of the
child * * * into the home of the parent * * * is
improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or
conditions not likely to change."
This court has construed ORS 419B.504 to impose two separate
requirements before a trial court may terminate a parent's
rights:
"ORS 419B.504 sets out a two-part test for
determining whether to terminate parental rights, both
parts of which must be met before the court orders
termination.  First, the court must address a parent's
fitness:  The court must find that the parent is 'unfit
by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental
to the child.'  That, in turn, requires a two-part
inquiry:  The court must find that: (1) the parent has
engaged in some conduct or is characterized by some
condition;  and (2) the conduct or condition is
'seriously detrimental' to the child.  Second--and only
if the parent has met the foregoing criteria--the court
also must find that the 'integration of the child into
the home of the parent or parents is improbable within
a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not
likely to change.'  That second part of the test for
termination requires the court to evaluate the relative
probability that, given particular parental conduct or
conditions, the child will become integrated into the
parental home 'within a reasonable time.'"
State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145-46, 36 P3d 490
(2001).
ORS 419B.504 also lists several nonexclusive
considerations that a court may use as factors in its
decision. (5)  In addition, the Court of Appeals has added a
consideration to the list, that of whether the parent has failed
to present a viable plan for the return of the child to his or
her care and custody.  State ex rel SOSCF v. Blum, 175 Or App
447, 459, 28 P3d 1231 (2001); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Boren,
105 Or App 599, 607-08, 806 P2d 149 (1991). (6) 
Here, the trial court relied on that last nonstatutory
consideration in such a manner as to encompass both requirements
set out in ORS 419B.504.  That is, in the trial court's view,
father's failure to present a "viable" plan encompassed both (1)
the requirement that the parent has engaged in some conduct or is
characterized by some condition that is "seriously detrimental"
to the child; and (2) the requirement that the "integration of
the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable
within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change."
The crux of the trial court's decision to terminate
father's parental rights was that it was too late for father to
establish a relationship with his child, even though he had
demonstrated that he could provide her with a home, education,
and family support.  After the age of three, according to the
trial court, a parent cannot reestablish a relationship with his
or her child.  The trial court concluded that the parent -- here,
father, is a "stranger" at that point and that, in this case,
child therefore must be moved into to foster care.
As noted earlier, father challenged that conclusion at
trial.  He argued -- and still argues on review -- that the
actions of DHS had hindered and prevented him from reestablishing
a relationship with child earlier. 
Father's argument implicitly challenges the trial
court's conclusion that a father, or any parent, cannot
reestablish a relationship with a child after the age of three. 
The trial court concluded that it would be preferable to place
child with unrelated persons, i.e., foster parents, than to
permit father to reestablish a relationship with his biological
child.  The trial court presented its conclusion as a
consideration not only of psychological significance, but as a
rule or presumption of far-reaching consequences.  We question
whether such a conclusion is consistent with the legislative
intent expressed in ORS 419B.504.  However, as explained further
below, we need not decide as much to resolve this case.
Father's argument raises an additional -- and, we
conclude dispositive -- question under ORS 419B.504 and Stillman,
namely, whether father is unfit.  Stillman explains that, under
ORS 419B.504, a trial court must address a parent's fitness
before reaching the question of integration into the parent's
home.  Stillman emphasized that 
"the court must address a parent's fitness:  The court
must find that the parent is 'unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the
child.'  That, in turn, requires a two-part inquiry: 
The court must find that: (1) the parent has engaged in
some conduct or is characterized by some condition; 
and (2) the conduct or condition is 'seriously
detrimental' to the child."
333 Or at 145.  Contrary to that explanation from Stillman, the
trial court appeared in this case to emphasize the issue of
integration over the prerequisite issue of fitness.  
Father maintained before the trial court -- and still
maintains -- that he is a fit parent, arguing that "the only
evidence presented was that father was a good parent to the child
in his household, and that the agency had no concerns about his
parenting ability."  The trial court, however, did not address
any issue respecting father's fitness.  Instead, the court
rejected the "viability" of father's "plan," terms unfamiliar to
the text of ORS 419B.504.  The court's emphasis on the question
of viability turned solely on father's lack of a relationship
with child and, ultimately, the court's conclusion that father
could not reestablish a relationship after child had turned
three.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that father has
raised a "colorable claim of error," viz., whether the trial
court adhered to ORS 419B.504 and this court's cases in
terminating father's parental rights.  
The judgment terminating father's parental rights also
referred to the standard set out in ORS 419B.506.  Under ORS
419B.506, a parent's rights may be terminated if the court finds
that the parent has "failed or neglected without reasonable and
lawful cause to provide for the basic physical and psychological
needs of the child * * * for six months prior to the filing of a
petition."  It is undisputed that DHS limited father's contact
with child between April 2002 and the filing of the petition in
October 2002.  Father argues that DHS prevented him from
establishing a relationship with child during that period by, for
example, forbidding him from having contact with child.  Father's
argument may establish a plausible defense to parental
termination under ORS 419B.506.  We therefore conclude that
father's argument is "colorable" on that ground, as well.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals erred in denying father's motion to file an untimely
notice of appeal under ORS 419 A. 200 and in dismissing the appeal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
1. ORS 419A.200(5)(a) provides:
"Upon motion of a person, other than the state,
entitled to appeal under subsection (1) of this
section, the appellate court shall grant the person
leave to file a notice of appeal after the time limits
described in subsection (3) of this section if:
"(A) The person shows a colorable claim of error
in the proceeding from which the appeal is taken; and
"(B) The person shows that the failure to file a
timely notice of appeal is not personally attributable
to the person."
2. A "letter of expectation" is "a written statement
developed by [DHS] that identifies needs and services and
clarifies agency expectations and timelines, without the joint
participation or agreement of the parents."  OAR 413-040-0005(6).
3. The petition bears a file stamp of October 14, 2002.  We are
unable to determine why the letter opinion states that the
petition was filed in May 2002.
4. We note that the legislature also has employed the term
colorable in other contexts involving legal advocacy.  See, e.g.,
ORS 138.071(4)(a)(B) (criminal-appeal analog to ORS 419A.200);
ORS 138.222(7) ("defendant may appeal under this subsection only
upon showing a colorable claim of error * * *"); ORS 197.845(1)
("Upon application of the petitioner, the board may grant a stay
of a land use decision or limited land use decision under review
if the petitioner demonstrates:  (a) A colorable claim of error
in the land use decision or limited land use decision under
review; and (b) That the petitioner will suffer irreparable
injury if the stay is not granted."). 
5. Those statutory considerations under ORS 419B.504 are: 
"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care
for the child or ward for extended periods of time.
"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel
or sexual nature.
"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating
liquors or controlled substances to the extent that
parental ability has been substantially impaired.
"(4) Physical neglect of the child or ward.
"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make it possible for the child or ward to safely return
home within a reasonable time or failure of the parent
to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts
by available social agencies for such extended duration
of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting
adjustment can be effected.
"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's
ability to provide adequate care for the child or
ward."
6. This case presents no issue respecting the propriety of
that additional, nonstatutory criterion, and we express no
opinion in that regard.