Title: Harris v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
REGINALD HARRIS, 
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No. 557, 2004
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County
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STATE OF DELAWARE, 
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No. 0402010364A
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: July 7, 2005
Decided: August 15, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 15  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the
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parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)  The defendant-appellant, Reginald Harris, appeals from his
convictions on various drug and weapons offenses following a jury trial in the
Superior Court.  Harris takes issue with two rulings made by the Superior Court
that denied his motion to suppress and motion for a mistrial.  We conclude that
the Superior Court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in either
of its rulings.  Accordingly, we affirm.
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(2)  Harris’ arrest and subsequent convictions stem from the police
finding a firearm, drugs and drug paraphernalia on his person after being
dispatched to investigate a shooting.  Officers of the Wilmington Police
Department were called to a residence located in Wilmington, Delaware in
response to gunshots being fired.  When the officers arrived, Harris was sitting
behind the wheel of a red Suzuki Sidekick and was blocked in the middle of the
street as a result of the arrival of several marked police vehicles.  While
investigating the shooting inside the residence, officers on the scene received
word from police headquarters that an anonymous caller had advised that the
person in the red Suzuki was involved in the shooting and involved in drugs.
(3)  The officers subsequently approached Harris and asked him to exit
the vehicle.  Harris complied.  The officers next placed Harris against the rear
of his vehicle and ordered him to place his hands on his head.  Harris again
complied.  The officers then asked Harris if he was carrying any dangerous
weapons.  Harris indicated that he had a firearm in his jacket pocket.  The
officers retrieved the firearm and arrested Harris for carrying a concealed
deadly weapon.  The officers further searched Harris’ person, finding
marijuana, cocaine, $1,416.00 in cash and a digital scale.  Throughout the entire
search process, Harris provided complete cooperation.  
 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 298 (Del. 2005) (citing Lopez v. State, 861 A.2d
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1245, 1248 (Del. 2004); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001)).  
 Id. (citing Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 718 (Del. 2003); Virdin v. State, 780 A.2d
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1024, 1030 (Del. 2001)).  
 Id. (citing Lopez, 861 A.2d at 1249).  
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 Id (citing Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 486 (Del. 2003)).  
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(4)  Harris’ first argument on appeal is that the Superior Court
improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the
search conducted outside the residence.  He argues that the officers did not have
a reasonable and articulable suspicion to warrant such a search under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 6 of the
Delaware Constitution.  The crux of his argument is that because no evidence
was ever found to link him in any way to the shooting that initially brought the
police to the residence, the information provided by the anonymous caller did
not warrant the search and seizure that took place.  
(5)  Although Harris’ argument raises a constitutional issue, we are
deferential to the Superior Court’s findings of fact.   We, therefore, review the
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Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.   “If the
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historical facts are properly established, ‘the issue is whether an undisputed rule
of law is or is not violated.’”   To the extent Harris’ appeal from the denial of
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his motion to suppress implicates his constitutionally protected right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, our review is de novo.4
 805 A.2d 854 (Del. 2001).
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 Id. at 858 (citing Woody, 765 A.2d at 1263).    
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 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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(6)  In support of his argument Harris cites Flonnory v. State  as
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precedent for an anonymous tip not providing enough reasonable suspicion to
detain a defendant.  While Flonnory held that an anonymous tip providing only
readily observable facts cannot serve as the sole basis for conducting a stop, it
also stated that determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exited
for such a stop must incorporate “the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the situation ‘viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in
the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an
officer’s subjective interpretation of those facts.’”  
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(7)  Applying that test here, the totality of the circumstances suggest the
presence of the reasonable and articulable suspicion required for the police to
detain Harris and to conduct a Terry  search.  At the residence, the officers
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observed bullet holes in the walls as well as cartridges and live rounds on the
floor.  Because it is illegal to discharge a firearm in the City of Wilmington, it
was clear that a crime had taken place.  Since the anonymous caller had
provided information that Harris was involved in a crime that had already been
verified as having just occurred, the officers had a reasonable and articulable
 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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suspicion necessary to detain Harris outside of his car for questioning.  Because
the officers were already investigating the nearby shooting, they also had a
basis to conduct a Terry search for weapons.  Once  Harris disclosed that he
was in possession of a firearm, the officers could conduct a search of Harris’
person and passenger compartments of his vehicle incident to his lawful arrest
for carrying a concealed deadly weapon.   Therefore, the Superior Court
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properly denied Harris’ motion to suppress.
(8)  Harris’ final argument is that the Superior Court improperly denied
his motion for a mistrial after the suppression hearing was mentioned during the
testimony of one of the investigating officers.  Specifically, the officer stated
that he “didn’t have to testify at the suppression hearing.”  This response came
after he was questioned about whether and when he had reviewed police reports
related to this case.  Harris claims that this reference to the suppression hearing
permitted the jury to improperly speculate as to the evidence possibly
suppressed.  He maintains that such speculation, when coupled with his election
not to testify at trial, unfairly prejudiced the jury against him, thereby violating
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
 Garvey, 873 A.2d at 299 (citing Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 332 (Del. 2004);
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Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2003); Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del.
2002)).  
 Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1974) (citing United States
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v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824)).  
 Garvey, 873 A.2d at 298 (citing Banther, 823 A.2d at 486).  
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(9)  We generally review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse
of discretion.   A mistrial is only proper when a “manifest necessity” arises
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where the “ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”   To the extent
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Harris’ appeal from the denial of his motion for a mistrial implicates his
constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination, our review is de novo
to determine whether an error of law has been committed.     
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(10)  In the instant case, the officer’s brief mention of the suppression
hearing did not reveal what transpired at the hearing, what the hearing was
about or the ultimate outcome.  The Superior Court was, therefore, correct in
denying Harris’ motion for a mistrial.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely       
Justice