Title: State v. Charles E. Young

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 98 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2968-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles E. Young,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 227 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 11, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 98
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2968-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2002CF1213) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles E. Young, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming the convictions of 
Charles Young (Young) for possession of marijuana, resisting an 
officer, and obstructing an officer.  Prior to trial, Young 
moved to suppress evidence of marijuana on grounds that it was 
obtained pursuant to an illegal seizure.  The circuit court for 
Kenosha County, Michael S. Fisher, Judge, denied Young's motion, 
                                                 
1 State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, 277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 
N.W.2d 866. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
2 
 
finding that a Kenosha police officer had reasonable suspicion 
to initiate an investigatory stop. 
¶2 
Young raises three issues on appeal.  First, he argues 
the marijuana seized incident to his arrest should have been 
suppressed because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion when 
he initiated contact.  Second, Young asserts that his conviction 
for obstruction should be reversed because the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion at the time he ordered Young to stop, and 
therefore, the officer was not acting with lawful authority.  
Third, Young contends that his conviction for resisting should 
be reversed because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion when 
he chased and physically apprehended Young, and therefore, the 
officer was not acting with lawful authority. 
¶3 
Critical to resolving these issues is the question of 
when a "seizure" occurs under the Fourth Amendment.  Young 
maintains that a person is seized "only if, in view of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave," which is the 
test first articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980).  The State takes the position that a person is 
seized when an officer applies physical force, however slight, 
to restrain the person's movement or when the person submits to 
a show of authority.  This is the test in California v. Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
¶4 
In State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶33, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777, this court adopted the Hodari D. 
test "for when a seizure occurs."  Nevertheless, Young argues 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
3 
 
that Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment and that 
this court should join the state courts that choose to follow 
Mendenhall rather than Hodari D. 
¶5 
After 
considering 
the 
relative 
merits 
of 
the 
Mendenhall and Hodari D. tests, we believe that the two tests 
can coexist and that the Hodari D. test applies when a suspect 
refuses to submit to a show of authority.  On the facts, we 
reach the following conclusions: First, the Kenosha police 
officer had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of 
the parked car in which Young was sitting.  We need not decide 
whether the car and the occupants other than Young were seized.  
Second, when the officer ordered Young to return to the car 
after Young started to run away, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to believe Young was committing a crime.  Third, 
applying Hodari D., Young was not seized within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment until the officer physically detained him.  
Accordingly, the officer lawfully seized Young, and we affirm 
Young's convictions on all three counts. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
By October 2002 City of Kenosha Police Officer David 
Alfredson (Alfredson) had been a member of the Kenosha police 
force for more than seven years.  During that entire time he 
patrolled Area 15, a sector of the city that included 52nd and 
53rd Streets and 21st Avenue.  Fifty-second Street was the site 
of two popular bars, The Barn and Coins, and had become "a 
problem area" for the police.  There were problems with fights 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
4 
 
("a lot of fights"), drinking in cars, and drug use outside the 
two establishments.  Neighbors had complained to elected 
officials and law enforcement about people leaving beer bottles 
in their yards, playing loud music, and talking boisterously as 
they came and went.  Littering had become so serious that the 
two bars sent people out after closing to pick up beer bottles 
to minimize complaints.  Fifty-second Street had become a 
priority area for police patrol, and it was heavily patrolled 
after 10:00 p.m. 
¶7 
On the evening of October 26, 2002, Officer Alfredson 
was driving south on 21st Avenue, a narrow residential street 
around the corner from The Barn.  At approximately 11:40 p.m., 
he spotted an unfamiliar car with Illinois license plates, 
parked on the right side of the street along with other cars.  
There were five people sitting in the car.  Alfredson did not 
stop, but continued driving, turning right on 53rd Street. 
¶8 
Alfredson had developed a regular practice of looking 
for occupied cars as he patrolled the neighborhood near the 
bars.  When he observed an occupied car, he would continue on 
his patrol and double back some time later to check whether the 
car was still occupied.  If the car was still occupied, he would 
stop and investigate.  He estimated that he had made dozens of 
similar stops in the preceding year. 
¶9 
Traveling back to 52nd Street, Alfredson stopped near 
The Barn to break up a heated argument and disperse the 
participants.  He then went back to his marked squad car, turned 
the corner, and drove again down 21st Avenue.  He saw the same 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
5 
 
car with Illinois plates, still occupied with five people.  His 
interest piqued, Alfredson decided to stop and investigate.  It 
was 11:49 p.m.  At the motion to suppress hearing, Alfredson 
testified: 
[The car] was still occupied with five people in it.  
That length of time, they would have had time there to 
park and go out somewhere.  They would have more than 
enough time to go out and do that, so it [aroused] my 
suspicion for possible drinking or narcotics; so I’ll 
stop and check it out. 
¶10 Because another car was parked directly behind the car 
in which Young was seated,2 Alfredson stopped his squad in the 
middle of the street next to the car behind Young's car.  He 
illuminated Young's car with his spotlight, and turned on his 
flashing emergency lights to alert other vehicles that his squad 
had stopped.  He did not activate his red-and-blue rolling 
lights, but did notify "Dispatch" of the Illinois license. 
¶11 Before Alfredson could get out of his squad, Young 
exited his car from the rear passenger-side door.  In response, 
Alfredson got out of his car.  At the suppression hearing, 
Alfredson described what happened next: 
I ordered him back into the vehicle.  He turned and 
started walking away from the vehicle.  I then yelled 
louder.  I said, "Get back in that car right now."  
And I started heading toward him around my squad.  He 
turned and looked at me and started running up toward 
the house directly to the west of him.  He ran up to 
the porch and tried to get into the door.  I was able 
to close up on to him.  I grabbed him by the back, and 
                                                 
2 For ease of reference, this car will be referred to as 
"Young's car" even though he was neither the driver nor the 
owner. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
6 
 
I was able to grab one arm; and I told him to knock it 
off, stop right here, police.  He turned around and 
looked at me and got his arm out of his coat.  I re-
secured the arm, and I had him by the collar.  I said, 
"Stop resisting."  He continued to struggle. 
Eventually, Alfredson subdued and handcuffed Young. 
¶12 In the course of the struggle, Young slipped out of 
the coat he was wearing and threw it towards the door of the 
house.  Later, Alfredson found a vial containing marijuana 
inside a pocket of the coat. 
¶13 The Kenosha County District Attorney charged Young 
with 
possession of 
THC 
as 
a repeater, in 
violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(e) 
(2003-04),3 
961.48(1), 
and 
939.62(1)(b); obstructing an officer as a repeater, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 946.41(1) and 939.62(1)(a), for running from 
Alfredson after being ordered to stop; and resisting an officer 
as a repeater, in violation of §§ 946.41(1) and 939.62(1)(a), 
for struggling with Alfredson when Alfredson tried to arrest 
him. 
¶14 Young pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the 
marijuana, arguing Alfredson lacked reasonable suspicion for an 
investigatory stop, and thus, the evidence was obtained pursuant 
to an illegal stop.  The circuit court denied Young's motion, 
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion at the time he 
initiated the investigatory stop. 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
7 
 
¶15 After a one-day trial, the jury found Young guilty of 
all three counts.  The circuit court sentenced Young to two and 
one-half years for possession of THC, with initial confinement 
of one and one-half years and one year of extended supervision.  
It withheld sentence and imposed two years probation consecutive 
to Young's prison sentence for the counts of obstructing and 
resisting. 
¶16 Young appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.  
The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, 
277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866.   Applying Hodari D., the court 
of appeals held that Alfredson did not seize Young until he 
grabbed him on the porch of the house, by which time Alfredson 
had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of Young 
committing a crime.  See Young, 277 Wis. 2d 715, ¶¶18-19.  
Notably, although the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court, it expressed serious doubt about the wisdom of following 
Hodari D., stated a preference for the Mendenhall test for 
seizure, and urged this court to reconsider its adoption of 
Hodari D.  See Young, 277 Wis. 2d 715, ¶¶20-26.  We ultimately 
accepted review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Whether a person has been seized is a question of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶17, 255 
Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.  As such, we accept the circuit 
court's findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous, but we determine independently whether or 
when a seizure occurred.  See id.  Similarly, in reviewing a 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
8 
 
motion to suppress, we employ a two-step analysis.  State v. 
Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶16, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  We 
will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  Whether those facts constitute reasonable 
suspicion, however, is a question of law we review de novo.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶18 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution4 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution5 protect 
people from unreasonable searches and seizures.  Because not all 
police-citizen contacts constitute a seizure, however, many such 
contacts do not fall within the safeguards afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); 
Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20.  As long as a reasonable person 
would have believed he was free to disregard the police presence 
and go about his business, there is no seizure and the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 
(1991); see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); 
Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4.  Generally, therefore, police-
citizen contact becomes a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment "when an officer 'by means of physical force or 
                                                 
4 In relevant part, the Fourth Amendment states: "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
5 In relevant part, Article I, Section 11 states: "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
9 
 
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen . . . .'" 
 
Williams, 
255 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶20 
(quoting 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552). 
¶19 As implied by the Williams decision, this court 
ordinarily adopts and follows the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
of the United States Supreme Court. 
¶20 The Supreme Court and this court have recognized two 
types of seizure.  The first type, an investigatory or Terry 
stop,6 usually involves only temporary questioning and thus 
constitutes only a minor infringement on personal liberty.  An 
investigatory 
stop 
is 
constitutional 
if 
the 
police 
have 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being 
committed, or is about to be committed.7  State v. Waldner, 206 
Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  An investigatory stop, 
though a seizure, allows police officers to briefly "detain a 
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior 
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."  Id. 
at 55. 
                                                 
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
7 The legislature codified the standard for an investigatory 
stop in Wis. Stat. § 968.24, which provides: 
After having identified himself or herself as a law 
enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may 
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects 
that such person is committing, is about to commit or 
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and 
address of the person and an explanation of the 
person's 
conduct. 
 
Such 
detention 
and 
temporary 
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where 
the person was stopped.  
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
10 
 
¶21 Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer 
possess specific and articulable facts that warrant a reasonable 
belief that criminal activity is afoot.  Id.  A mere hunch that 
a person has been, is, or will be involved in criminal activity 
is insufficient.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  On the other hand, 
"police officers are not required to rule out the possibility of 
innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop."  State v. 
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990).  As we have 
explained: 
[S]uspicious conduct by its very nature is ambiguous, 
and the [principal] function of the investigative stop 
is to quickly resolve that ambiguity.  Therefore, if 
any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be 
objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence 
of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the 
officers have the right to temporarily detain the 
individual for the purpose of inquiry. 
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 84.  The detention, however, must be no 
longer than necessary to clarify the ambiguity.  See Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 
¶54, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72. 
¶22 The second type of seizure, a full-blown arrest, is a 
more permanent detention that typically leads to "a trip to the 
station house and prosecution for crime . . . ."  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 16.  An arrest is not constitutionally justified unless 
the police have probable cause to suspect that a crime had been 
committed. 
 
Royer, 
460 
U.S. 
at 
496. 
 
Probable 
cause 
requires that an arresting officer have sufficient knowledge at 
the time of the arrest to "lead a reasonable police officer to 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
11 
 
believe that the defendant probably committed or was committing 
a crime."  State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 
N.W.2d 387 (1999).  Whereas a mere hunch is insufficient to 
establish 
reasonable 
suspicion, 
reasonable 
suspicion 
is 
insufficient to establish probable cause.  Id.  Inevitably, the 
lines between hunch, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause 
are fuzzy, with each case requiring an examination of the facts.8  
That being said, probable cause does not require proof "beyond a 
reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not."  
See id. 
¶23 Before we determine whether Officer Alfredson had 
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to seize Young, it 
is necessary to address the question of when Alfredson seized 
Young.  The moment of "seizure" is critical for two reasons: (1) 
it determines when Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 
protections become applicable; and (2) it limits the facts we 
may consider in evaluating whether Alfredson had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Young, which in turn affects whether Alfredson 
had probable cause to arrest Young. 
¶24 There is no doubt Alfredson seized Young when he 
physically detained and handcuffed Young after the scuffle on 
                                                 
8 As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged: 
"Articulating 
precisely 
what 
'reasonable 
suspicion' 
and 
'probable cause' mean is not possible."  Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).  "They are commonsense, 
nontechnical 
conceptions 
that 
deal 
with 
the 
factual 
and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."  Id. (internal 
punctuation omitted). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
12 
 
the porch.  This action clearly restrained Young's liberty, led 
to a custodial arrest, and culminated in prosecution.  See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
¶25 The 
more 
difficult 
question 
is 
whether 
any 
of 
Alfredson's actions prior to the arrest constituted a seizure.  
Was Young "seized" in a constitutional sense when Alfredson 
pulled up behind Young's car, activated his emergency flashers, 
and put his spotlight on the car?  Was Young seized when 
Alfredson first ordered Young to return to the car?  Was Young 
seized when Alfredson ordered Young a second time, but in a 
louder voice, to return to the car?  Was Young seized when 
Alfredson began chasing Young?  Or, did the seizure not occur 
until Alfredson made physical contact with Young on the porch? 
A. 
When Was Young Seized? 
¶26 Under Hodari D. and Kelsey, an uncomplied-with show of 
authority cannot constitute a seizure.  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 
629; Kelsey, 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶33.  Thus, if Hodari D. applies, 
Charles Young was not seized when Alfredson illuminated his car 
with the spotlight; he was not seized either time Alfredson 
ordered him to return to the car; and he was not seized when 
Alfredson began to chase him.  If any or all of these actions 
constituted a show of authority, they did not effect a seizure 
because Young did not comply with any of them.  Hodari D. 
compels the conclusion that Young was not seized until Alfredson 
physically apprehended him on the porch of the house.  Under 
Hodari D. there seems to be no question that the circuit court 
correctly denied Young's motion to suppress the marijuana, so 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
13 
 
long as the State could show reasonable suspicion at some point 
prior to the seizure. 
¶27 Young, however, argues that we should reject Hodari D. 
and 
interpret 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution to afford greater protections to individual liberty 
interests than does the Fourth Amendment.  In support of his 
position, Young argues that the defect in Hodari D. is that it 
threatens an individual's privacy rights and liberty interests 
by unduly restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  More 
specifically, Young argues Hodari D. (1) isolates from scrutiny 
the initial stages in police-citizen encounters; (2) shifts the 
focus of the Fourth Amendment from police conduct to the 
citizen's response to police conduct; and (3) fails to recognize 
that pursuit and attempted arrest substantially interfere with 
personal liberty and should therefore be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶28 Young maintains that a better test of when a seizure 
occurs is the "objective" Mendenhall standard; that is, a 
seizure 
occurs 
when, 
in 
view 
of 
all 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed he was not free to leave.  See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
554.  Applying Mendenhall, Young contends he was seized the 
moment Alfredson pulled up behind his car, turned on the 
flashers, and illuminated Young's car with the spotlight, 
because at that moment no reasonable person would have felt free 
to disregard the police presence. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
14 
 
¶29 The State insists that Alfredson did not seize Young 
until he physically apprehended Young.  Predictably, the State 
urges us to reaffirm our commitment to Hodari D. and interpret 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution coextensively.  In response to Young's criticism of 
Hodari D., the State argues that the better policy is to require 
submission to a show of authority before Fourth Amendment 
protections apply.  This procedure gives officers advance 
knowledge of what actions are constitutional, because officers 
have to assume people will obey and that the exclusionary rule 
will apply if the police exceed their authority.  Encouraging 
people to comply with police orders also minimizes the risks of 
police pursuit.  In sum, the State argues Article I, Section 11 
should be interpreted to follow the Fourth Amendment as 
interpreted in Hodari D. 
¶30 Typically, this court interprets Article I, Section 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in tandem with the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.  
Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶24 n.10.  Of course, we do not always 
follow the Supreme Court's lead,9 and the Court does not require 
us to do so when we supplement the United States Constitution's 
                                                 
9 See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899; 
State 
v. 
Dubose, 
2005 
WI 
126, 
¶¶40-41, 
285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (noting that although the due 
process clauses of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution are similar, we retain the right to interpret our 
constitution to provide greater protections). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
15 
 
protections with protections under our own constitution.  See 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("It is fundamental 
that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in 
interpreting their state constitutions.").10  We embrace the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court when we perceive soundness in Supreme Court analysis and 
value in uniform rules.  We follow that course in this case. 
¶31 In deciding whether to adopt the Hodari D. or 
Mendenhall framework for seizure analysis under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, we believe it is necessary to consider how these 
cases relate to one another, as well as the public policy 
reasons for and against following Hodari D. 
1. 
Can Hodari D. and Mendenhall Coexist? 
¶32 Mendenhall defined a seizure as occurring "only if, in 
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave."  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  In Mendenhall Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents investigating narcotics 
trafficking in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport approached 
Mendenhall after she disembarked from a Los Angeles flight 
because Mendenhall's actions fit the profile of a drug courier.  
Id. at 547.  The agents identified themselves and asked to see 
Mendenhall's identification and airline ticket; they discovered 
                                                 
10 See also Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶57 (listing United 
States Supreme Court decisions that acknowledge the right of 
state 
courts 
to 
afford 
greater 
protections 
under 
state 
constitutions). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
16 
 
that the two bore different names.  Id. at 547-48.  Upon 
returning both documents to Mendenhall, the agents asked her to 
accompany them to the DEA office, which she did.  Id. at 548.  
Upon reaching the DEA office, the agents also asked for and 
received Mendenhall's consent to search her handbag and her 
person.  Id. at 548-49.  In the course of the search, the agents 
found heroin.  Id. at 549.  Before trial, Mendenhall moved to 
suppress the heroin, claiming she had been seized when the DEA 
agents first approached her and that they lacked reasonable 
suspicion at the inception of the stop. 
¶33 Justice Stewart concluded——although a majority of the 
Court 
did 
not 
join 
him——that 
the 
agent's 
approach 
and 
Mendenhall's cooperation did not constitute a seizure, because a 
person is seized "only if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave," and that given the 
conduct of the DEA agents, a reasonable person would have felt 
free to walk away.  Id. at 554-55; see id. at 560 n.1 (Powell, 
J., concurring).11 
¶34 Subsequently, a majority of the Court adopted Justice 
Stewart's Mendenhall test for seizure.  See INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 215 (1984); Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573; Bostick, 501 
U.S. at 434.  These cases make clear that either physical force 
                                                 
11 Three members of the Court (Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Powell and Blackmun) concluded that the initial 
questioning constituted a seizure but that the agents had 
reasonable suspicion to make the stop.  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 546 (1980). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
17 
 
or a show of authority sufficient to give rise to a belief in a 
reasonable person that he was not free to leave, is necessary 
for a seizure.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
at 573; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.   
¶35 In 
Delgado 
and 
Bostick, 
as 
in 
Mendenhall, 
the 
individuals did not flee in response to an official show of 
authority.  In Delgado the plaintiffs answered questions by INS 
agents at their workplace.  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220-21.  The 
Court concluded that none of the plaintiffs had been seized 
because, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would not have believed that he or 
she was "not free to continue working or to move about the 
factory."  Id.  In Bostick the defendant, a passenger on a bus, 
challenged the search of his luggage as nonconsensual, claiming 
that police presence on the bus created a coercive atmosphere 
that induced consent.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435.  The Court 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court's holding that suppression of 
cocaine produced by the search was appropriate, and it remanded 
the case to state court for a determination of whether a 
reasonable person would have felt free to "decline the officers' 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."  Id. at 436.  In 
both cases, the Court applied the Mendenhall test for seizure 
because the individuals cooperated. 
¶36 The 
Court 
also 
applied 
the 
Mendenhall 
test 
in 
Chesternut where the defendant ran when he saw a police car and 
was observed discarding controlled substances as he ran.  The 
Court concluded that the police had not made a sufficient show 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
18 
 
of authority because, although a police car slowly followed 
Chesternut, the police did not activate a siren or flashers, did 
not order Chesternut to stop, did not display any weapons, and 
did not maneuver the police car in any way to limit the 
defendant's movement.  Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575.  Absent a 
show of authority, there was nothing for Chesternut to submit 
to, and no possibility of seizure. 
¶37 Mendenhall is the appropriate test for situations 
where the question is whether a person submitted to a police 
show 
of 
authority 
because, 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would not have 
felt free to leave.  If a reasonable person would have felt free 
to leave but the person at issue nonetheless remained in police 
presence, perhaps because of a desire to be cooperative, there 
is no seizure.  As this court noted in Williams, "most citizens 
will respond to a police request," and "the fact that people do 
so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, 
hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response."  
Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216). 
¶38 Hodari D., which was foreshadowed by Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Chesternut, supplements the Mendenhall test to 
address situations where a person flees in response to a police 
show of authority.  See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628.  In Hodari 
D. police officers in an unmarked squad car rounded a corner in 
a high-crime neighborhood and came upon a group of youths who 
immediately dispersed at the sight of the car.  Hodari D., 499 
U.S. at 622-23.  One of the officers chased Hodari on foot.  Id. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
19 
 
at 623.  Shortly before the officer caught the suspect, Hodari 
threw away a rock of crack cocaine.  Id.  Hodari argued he was 
seized once he saw the officer pursuing him and that the 
evidence of the cocaine should be suppressed as the fruit of an 
illegal seizure.  Id.  The Court disagreed, concluding that 
although the officer's pursuit constituted a show of authority 
and although the officer lacked reasonable suspicion when he 
initiated the pursuit, Hodari was not seized until the officer 
tackled him, because Hodari did not submit to the show of 
authority.  Id. at 629.  Hence, Hodari abandoned the cocaine 
before he was seized, and it was admissible.  Id. 
¶39 Because Mendenhall and its progeny did not confront 
the situation where a person refuses to yield to a show of 
authority, the Hodari D. court found the Mendenhall test 
insufficient: 
[The Mendenhall test] says that a person has been 
seized "only if," not that he has been seized 
"whenever"; 
it 
states 
a 
necessary, 
but 
not 
a 
sufficient, condition for seizure——or, more precisely, 
for seizure effected through a "show of authority."  
Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of 
a "show of authority" is an objective one: not whether 
the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to 
restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words 
and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 
person.  Application of this objective test was the 
basis for our decision in . . . Chesternut . . . where 
we concluded that the police cruiser's slow following 
of the defendant did not convey the message that he 
was not free to disregard the police and go about his 
business.  We did not address in Chesternut, however, 
the question whether, if the Mendenhall test was met——
if the message that the defendant was not free to 
leave had been conveyed——a Fourth Amendment seizure 
would have occurred. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
20 
 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628.  The Mendenhall test applies when 
the subject of police attention is either subdued by force or 
submits to a show of authority.  Where, however, a person flees 
in response to a show of authority, Hodari D. governs when the 
seizure occurs.  Deciding when a seizure occurs is important 
because the moment of a seizure limits what facts a court may 
consider in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion 
for that seizure. 
 
¶40 The Hodari D. test does not supersede the Mendenhall 
test, it supplements the Mendenhall test.  United States v. 
Drayton confirms this.12  Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2002).  
Decided more than ten years after Hodari D., Drayton retains a 
Mendenhall-inspired test for seizure, adapted to a police-
citizen encounter on a bus.  Under Drayton, a person is seized 
if a reasonable person would not "feel free to decline the 
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."  Id. 
at 202 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).  Unlike Hodari D., 
the defendant in Drayton did not flee or attempt to flee from 
the officers.  In a similar vein, this court cited both 
Mendenhall and Hodari D. in Williams.  Thus, the Mendenhall and 
                                                 
12 See also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629-30 (2003). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
21 
 
Hodari D. tests are compatible and can coexist.  The applicable 
test depends upon the facts.13 
2. 
Policy Considerations Encircling Hodari D. 
¶41 Justice Scalia, the author of Hodari D., gives two 
policy reasons in support of the Hodari D. test for seizure.  
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627.  First, by postponing the moment at 
which the protection of the exclusionary rule becomes available 
to an individual who flees from the police until there has been 
a seizure, Hodari D. encourages compliance with police orders, 
thereby obviating the need for police pursuits that pose risks 
to the public.  Id.  Instead of employing self-help remedies 
like flight, citizens should seek relief from unlawful police 
interference in the courts through use of the exclusionary rule 
and, if need be, civil rights suits. 
¶42 Second, although Hodari D. restricts the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia contends that it will have no 
adverse effect upon the privacy rights and liberty interests of 
the citizenry.  See id.  One purpose of the Fourth Amendment and 
its exclusionary rule is to deter illegal government activity.  
State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶22, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 
                                                 
13 Justice Bradley's dissent ignores the fact that a court 
does not reach the Hodari D. test until a defendant refuses to 
submit to a police show of authority.  Curiously, her dissent 
relies upon Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003), a per curiam 
opinion, to intimate that perhaps the Supreme Court has 
abandoned Hodari D.  In response, we note that there was no 
question of flight in Kaupp; the defendant instantaneously 
submitted to the police show of authority.  See Kaupp, 538 U.S. 
at 628. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
22 
 
(Knapp II).  "Unlawful orders will not be deterred . . . by 
sanctioning through 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
those 
[unlawful 
orders] that are not obeyed."  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627.  
Police officers shout "Stop!" or "Get back in that car right 
now," expecting to be obeyed; the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule is still realized if it applies only to 
"successful seizures" resulting from these orders.  Id.  In 
short, because the majority of people confronted with a direct 
command will obey the command, police officers must understand 
that the exclusionary rule will constrain their conduct in these 
situations. 
¶43 Perhaps the most powerful criticism of Hodari D. can 
be found in Justice Stevens' dissent.  Much of the scholarly 
criticism of Hodari D. simply amplifies the points he makes.14  
First, Justice Stevens chastises the majority for adopting too 
literal a construction of the term "seizure" because it limits 
the application and protective function of the Fourth Amendment 
to the common law conception of arrest, which required physical 
contact. 
 
Hodari 
D., 499 
U.S. at 
631-33 
(Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Instead, Justice Stevens argues that because an 
attempted arrest also infringes upon an individual's privacy and 
liberty, the Fourth Amendment should apply to unlawful attempted 
arrests.  Id. at 631-32, 637. 
                                                 
14 See e.g., 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(d) 
(4th ed. 2004); Tracy Maclin, "Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking 
the Fourth Amendment Seriously," 77 Cornell L. Rev. 723, 745-52 
(1992); Thomas K. Clancy, "The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Seizure Analysis after Hodari D. and Bostick," 28 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 799 (1991).  
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
23 
 
¶44 Second, 
Justice 
Stevens 
criticizes 
the 
majority 
decision as inconsistent with the Court's precedent in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment 
protects 
against 
"seizures" 
of 
oral 
statements 
obtained by electronic surveillance), and Terry (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment extends to investigatory stops that fall 
short 
of 
a 
common-law 
arrest), 
both 
of 
which 
allegedly 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment expansively to afford greater 
protection to liberty interests and privacy rights.  Hodari D., 
499 U.S. at 633-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
¶45 Third, Justice Stevens criticizes the majority for 
shifting the analysis of whether a seizure occurs from an 
objective analysis of how a reasonable person would interpret 
the police officer's conduct to the individual's reaction to 
that conduct.  Id. at 641, 643.  Thus, police officers can 
create reasonable suspicion or even probable cause where there 
was none by coercively infringing upon the individual's right to 
be let alone, and waiting for an arguably suspicious reaction.15  
Id. at 645-46 & n.18. 
¶46 Adding to these arguments about individual liberty, 
Justice Stevens maintains that the majority's decision abandons 
                                                 
15 Stated otherwise, Professor LaFave suggests that Hodari 
D. will encourage unlawful displays of force that "'turn a hunch 
into reasonable suspicion by inducing the conduct justifying the 
suspicion,' that is, the flight of the individual ultimately 
stopped."  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(d), at 
461-62 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 429 
N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 1981)). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
24 
 
a standard that permits police officers to "determine in advance 
whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth 
Amendment."  Id. at 643-44.  Because of these shortcomings, 
Justice Stevens would reject the Hodari D. test, and instead 
require a court to evaluate the constitutionality of police 
conduct based on the conditions at the time the officer took 
action, when liberty is first restrained and privacy first 
infringed.  Id. at 645. 
¶47 Although we recognize the strength of these critiques, 
we remain unconvinced that Hodari D. should be discarded.  We 
acknowledge the potential that police officers may rely upon 
Hodari D. to manufacture reasonable suspicion by attempting to 
seize individuals in expectation that they will flee.  This is 
not such a case.  There is no indication in the record that 
Officer Alfredson was attempting to induce flight or other 
suspicious conduct.  On the facts here, the concerns prompting 
the criticism of Hodari D. appear unwarranted. 
¶48 We disagree that adhering to Hodari D. will leave 
police 
officers 
unable 
to 
determine 
in 
advance 
whether 
contemplated conduct will 
implicate 
the Fourth 
Amendment.  
Contra Hodari D., 499 U.S. 643-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  As 
Hodari D. and other decisions suggest, most people will 
acquiesce with a police show of authority, in which case the 
Fourth Amendment applies and the exclusionary rule will exclude 
any evidence obtained in the absence of reasonable suspicion.  
See id. at 627; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205.  Consequently, before 
initiating an investigatory stop, police officers must presume 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
25 
 
that the target of the stop will comply and the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule will have full effect. 
¶49 The exclusionary rule is the primary means by which 
Fourth Amendment rights are protected.  Its primary purpose is 
to deter future unlawful police conduct.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Knapp II, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶22.  The 
exclusionary rule is not absolute.  Id., ¶23.  The benefits of 
any increased deterrence must be weighed against the substantial 
social costs exacted.  Id., ¶22.  The exclusionary rule "applies 
only in contexts 'where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served.'"  Id., ¶23 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).  Because a police 
officer cannot know in advance that a suspect will flee or not 
comply with a show of authority, and because a police officer 
must presume that people will comply with orders and thus the 
officer must adhere to the Fourth Amendment to prevent the 
exclusion of evidence, we fail to see how rejecting Hodari D. 
will further deter Fourth Amendment violations.  The benefits of 
extending the exclusionary rule to situations before seizure, 
when a person does not comply with a police order, appear to be 
negligible. 
¶50 Under Hodari D. the protection afforded by the 
exclusionary rule remains unless the person confronted by a show 
of authority chooses to abandon its protective embrace by opting 
for self-help flight.  Under Hodari D. courts have created an 
incentive for people to obey police orders without creating an 
incentive for police to violate the Fourth Amendment.  Under 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
26 
 
Hodari D. courts remain the final arbiter of whether police 
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, not the citizen on the 
street. 
¶51 There is one additional policy consideration for 
following the Hodari D. test: stare decisis.  Less than five 
years ago this court elected to follow Hodari D.  Kelsey C.R., 
243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶¶30-33.  Absent special justification,16 such 
as a showing that our earlier adoption of Hodari D. has resulted 
in the widespread erosion of liberty interests, we decline to 
overrule Kelsey C.R. 
¶52 Given that Young fled in response to a show of 
authority, Hodari D. supplies the proper analysis to evaluate 
when Young was seized.  Applying Hodari D., we conclude Young 
was not seized until Alfredson physically apprehended him on the 
porch because Young did not submit to any show of authority 
prior to that moment. 
B. 
Was There Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause to Justify 
the Seizure? 
¶53 Our analysis cannot end here because this case is 
unlike Hodari D. in one significant respect: Young did not 
                                                 
16 We have recognized several criteria for departing from 
precedent, including: (1) changes or developments in the law 
that undermine the rationale behind a decision; (2) the need to 
make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) a 
showing that a decision has become detrimental to coherence and 
consistency in the law; (4) a showing that a decision is unsound 
in principle; and (5) a showing that a decision is unworkable in 
practice.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 
2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 118, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
27 
 
abandon the contraband before he was seized.  Thus, we cannot 
rely on abandonment as the basis for admitting the incriminating 
evidence.  Instead, we must inquire whether Alfredson's search 
of Young's coat was justified. 
¶54 We begin with the rule that warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Williams, 255 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶18.  There are, however, "'specifically established 
and well-delineated' exceptions to 
the Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant requirement."  Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).  One 
of these exceptions is for searches incidental to a lawful 
arrest.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969); see 
also Wis. Stat. §§ 968.10 (authorizing a search incident to 
arrest) and 968.11 (authorizing a search incident to arrest for 
the purpose of, inter alia, "[d]iscovering and seizing the 
fruits of the crime"). 
¶55 There is a similar, albeit more limited, exception for 
searches incident to an investigatory stop.  See Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27; State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 93-94, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992).  If a police officer reasonably suspects a person of 
committing a crime, he may frisk the person if he reasonably 
believes the person is armed and if a reasonable officer would 
have believed the person posed a safety risk to the officer or 
others.  Id. at 93-94; see also Wis. Stat. § 968.25. 
¶56 We need not resolve whether Alfredson's search of 
Young's coat was a frisk or a search, because we conclude that 
Alfredson had probable cause to believe Young had violated 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
28 
 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)——obstructing an officer——by the time he 
arrested Young on the porch, thereby justifying a full-blown 
search. 
¶57 To prove Young guilty of obstruction, the State was 
required to show: (1) Young obstructed an officer, meaning his 
conduct prevented or made more difficult Alfredson's performance 
of his duties; (2) Alfredson was acting in an official capacity; 
(3) Alfredson was acting with lawful authority; and (4) Young 
knew Alfredson was acting in his official capacity and with 
lawful authority and that his conduct would obstruct the 
officer.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1766.  Young contests the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to the third element, whether 
Alfredson had reasonable suspicion when he ordered Young to 
return to the car.  Without reasonable suspicion at the time he 
ordered Young to return to the car, Alfredson would have lacked 
lawful authority.  See id. 
¶58 To determine whether Officer Alfredson had reasonable 
suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop, we examine the 
facts leading up to the stop to determine whether these 
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion.  See 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
¶59 An officer need not dispel all innocent inferences 
before 
conducting 
an 
investigatory 
stop. 
 
Anderson, 
155 
Wis. 2d at 84.  Indeed, the suspicion necessary to justify an 
investigatory 
stop 
is 
"considerably 
less 
than 
proof 
of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence."  United States 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
29 
 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  As a leading commentator 
notes in regard to reasonable suspicion: 
Such generalities as "he didn't look right" will not 
suffice; like Officer McFadden in Terry, the officer 
must 
relate 
what 
he 
has 
observed, 
and, 
when 
appropriate, indicate why his knowledge of the crime 
problem and the habits of the residents on his beat or 
of the practices of those planning or engaging in 
certain forms 
of criminal conduct 
gives special 
significance to what he observed. 
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 476 (4th ed. 
2004). 
¶60 Alfredson testified at a preliminary examination, at a 
suppression hearing, and at the jury trial.  His testimony was 
consistent. 
¶61 First, Alfredson testified to his knowledge of the 
neighborhood.  It was "a problem area" with several nearby bars.  
It was known for fights, drinking in cars, littering, and drug 
use.  The police had made the area a priority for patrol, 
especially after 10:00 p.m., because of these problems.  Many 
cars were in the area on Saturday, October 26, 2002. 
¶62 Second, Alfredson testified that he was an experienced 
officer who had patrolled this area for seven years.  He was 
familiar with local automobiles and local practices.  Alfredson 
understood there was a correlation between people remaining in 
their cars for an extended time and the use of alcohol and 
narcotics in those cars.  Based on his nightly patrols, 
Alfredson knew this type of activity was common in the 
neighborhood. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
30 
 
¶63 Third, Alfredson testified to the facts that aroused 
his suspicion.  Specifically, five people had lingered in an 
unfamiliar car with Illinois license plates for five to ten 
minutes.  It was nearly midnight.  Alfredson did not see these 
people get out to go to a bar or a local party, or come back 
from one.  He did not see them drop off one of their number.  If 
any of the occupants were going to spend the night at a dwelling 
on 21st Avenue, they could have left the car and gone inside.  
Alternatively, the whole group might be driving back to Illinois 
after an evening of drinking.  Perhaps they were still drinking 
in the car.  Five people sitting in a car for about ten minutes, 
around the corner from a major bar, shortly before midnight: The 
facts were not necessarily unusual, but they were not usual, 
either. 
¶64 Although there are innocent explanations for why five 
people would be sitting in a car for five to 10 minutes, 
Alfredson was not required to rule out all these potential 
explanations before initiating his investigation.  The officer 
described the particular facts that made him suspicious and 
linked those facts to his seven years of experience patrolling 
the neighborhood.  At the time Alfredson stopped his squad car, 
turned on his flashers, and illuminated Young's car, we think 
there were sufficient facts for Alfredson to initiate an 
investigatory stop.17 
                                                 
17 The court of appeals believed it was doubtful whether 
Alfredson had reasonable suspicion to detain Young and the 
occupants of the car based on these facts.  Young, 277 Wis. 2d 
715, ¶10 n.4. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
31 
 
¶65 Determining that Officer Alfredson had reasonable 
suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop is different from 
determining that he "seized" the vehicle and its occupants.  
That is a close question with respect to the persons in the car 
other than Young.  When a marked squad car pulls up behind a 
car, activates emergency flashers, and points a spotlight at the 
car, it certainly presents indicia of police authority.18  Yet, 
not every display of police authority rises to a "show of 
authority" that constitutes a seizure.  As both Mendenhall and 
Hodari D. teach, not every police action, initiative, display of 
authority, 
or 
interaction 
with 
a 
citizen 
would 
cause 
a 
reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave.  A 
police officer's actions must be assessed in view of all the 
circumstances surrounding the incident. 
¶66 Not every contact between the police and a citizen 
constitutes a seizure.  In this case, the officer did not stop a 
moving vehicle or a vehicle about to move.  Compare State v. 
Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996).  Young's car was 
already stopped and had been parked for some time.  When 
                                                 
18 Although a police officer's use of a spotlight in 
conjunction with emergency flashers may constitute a show of 
authority, we note that many courts have concluded that the use 
of a spotlight is not a show of authority sufficient to effect a 
seizure.  See State v. Baker, 107 P.3d 1214, 1216-18 (Idaho 
2004) (use of spotlight is no seizure; collecting cases holding 
the same); State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681, 688-89 (Wash. 1998) 
(finding 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
illuminating the defendant with a spotlight does not a seizure 
make). We are mindful that emergency flashers are often used in 
situations that have nothing to do with investigating criminal 
activity, and spotlights are likely to be used at night. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
32 
 
Alfredson's squad approached Young's car, he was not able to 
pull in behind it, out of the lane of traffic.  This presented 
him with two choices.  He could park his car at some distance 
and proceed on foot, or he could stop in the lane of traffic and 
turn on some warning lights. 
¶67 Young 
concedes 
that 
Alfredson 
had 
authority 
to 
approach the suspect car on foot to check it out and make 
inquiry.  We think, however, that it would be unreasonable to 
expect an officer, traveling alone near midnight, in a problem 
area, to leave his squad car and approach a suspicious car full 
of people, without being able to see clearly the situation into 
which he was walking.  We think this would ask too much and 
would discourage effective law enforcement.19  Cf. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 23 (noting "it would be unreasonable to require that 
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of 
their duties").   
¶68 Instead, Alfredson turned on his emergency flashers 
and a spotlight, two actions consistent with a concern for the 
safety of passing motorists and the safety of the officer.  We 
believe the flashing lights are the same lighting the officer 
would have used if he had stopped to aid a motorist.  The 
officer never turned on his red-and-blue rolling lights. 
                                                 
19 At oral argument, Young's attorney suggested that if 
Alfredson had parked his car down the street or around the 
corner and approached Young's car on foot to direct inquiries to 
the occupants there would have been no Fourth Amendment 
violation.  Such a suggestion strikes us as impractical and an 
unjustified impediment to effective police work.  
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
33 
 
¶69 On these facts, we are reluctant to conclude that the 
positioning of the officer's car, together with the lighting he 
employed, necessarily involved such a show of authority that "a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave."  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  We are not required to 
make that determination in this case.   
¶70 Even if we were to determine that the officer's show 
of authority constituted a seizure and that he did not have 
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, it would not 
help Young.  Young's situation is governed by a different rule 
because of Hodari D. 
¶71 At 
the 
very 
moment 
Alfredson 
illuminated 
the 
spotlight, Young got out of his car.  This might have been a 
coincidence, but a reasonable officer could suspect that it was 
not.  In response, the officer called out to Young.  This call 
was either not heard or it was ignored.  If there were any doubt 
that Alfredson had reasonable suspicion before he illuminated 
the car, there can be no doubt that Alfredson had reasonable 
suspicion after Young got out of the car and disregarded 
Alfredson's first order. 
¶72 One might argue that at the moment Young exited the 
car, a reasonable officer in Alfredson's position would have had 
no way of knowing what the person intended.  Alfredson's first 
order for Young to return to the car may be viewed as a 
reasonable attempt to clarify the ambiguity in Young's conduct.  
It is also a standard tactic for police officer safety.  Once 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
34 
 
Young disregarded the command and began to flee, Alfredson had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Young. 
¶73 Officer Alfredson testified that after he ordered 
Young to return to the car the first time, Young "turned and 
started walking away."  We acknowledge that people may have the 
right to disregard the police and walk away without giving rise 
to reasonable suspicion.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
125 (2000).  Where a police officer, "without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the 
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his 
business."  Id. (emphasis added).  Under these circumstances, 
"any 'refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the 
minimal level of objective justification needed for a [stop] or 
[arrest].'"  Id. 
¶74 Plainly, however, a person who disregards a police 
officer's order assumes the risk that the officer cannot 
establish that he had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop.  The person who believes he is exercising his Fourth 
Amendment rights by disregarding the officer may be subjecting 
himself to criminal prosecution if the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to make a stop.20 
                                                 
20 We note that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment is not offended when a police officer asks a person to 
identify himself if the officer's inquiry is justified at its 
inception by reasonable suspicion and the inquiry is related to 
that suspicion.  See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 185-86 (2004). 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
35 
 
¶75 Young's actions were not consistent with disregarding 
the police presence and going about his business.  Young had 
remained in the car for at least five to 10 minutes.  The 
instant Alfredson illuminated Young's car with the spotlight, 
Young altered his course of conduct and got out of the car.  It 
is improbable that the timing of Alfredson's appearance and 
Young's abrupt departure, with no word to the officer, were mere 
coincidence.  Young's action smacked of evasion and flight, 
which can properly give rise to reasonable suspicion when viewed 
in the totality of the circumstances.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 
125.  Thus, we conclude that Young's evasive action, set against 
the above-described facts, reinforced reasonable suspicion. 
¶76 Because Alfredson had reasonable suspicion before he 
issued his second command for Young to return to the car, we 
conclude Alfredson was acting with lawful authority when he 
issued this second order.  Thus, there is sufficient evidence in 
the record for a jury to have convicted Young of obstruction. 
 
¶77 As a result of this conclusion, it also follows that 
when Young disregarded Alfredson's second command to return to 
the car, Alfredson had probable cause to arrest Young for 
obstruction.  Because a search incident to arrest is one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
Alfredson lawfully searched Young's jacket, in which he found 
the vial of marijuana.  See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.  Thus, the 
circuit court properly denied Young's motion to suppress 
evidence of the marijuana. 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
36 
 
¶78 Lastly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to 
convict 
Young 
of 
resisting 
an 
officer, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).  For Young to be guilty of resisting, 
the State had to prove: (1) Young resisted an officer, meaning 
he used force to oppose Alfredson; (2) Alfredson was acting in 
an official capacity; (3) Alfredson was acting with lawful 
authority; and (4) Young knew Alfredson was acting in his 
official capacity and with lawful authority and that his conduct 
would resist the officer.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1765.  As with 
his conviction for obstructing, Young only contests the third 
element; that is, whether Alfredson was acting with lawful 
authority.  Because we have concluded that Alfredson had 
probable cause to arrest Young for obstruction before he 
physically apprehended Young, there is sufficient evidence in 
the record for a jury to have convicted Young of resisting. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶79 Having considered the relative merits of the Hodari D. 
and Mendenhall tests, we conclude that the two tests can coexist 
and that the analysis supplied by Hodari D. applies when a 
suspect refuses to submit to a show of authority.  Because Young 
fled in response to the police officer's show of authority, 
Hodari D. supplies the framework to analyze when Young was 
seized.   
¶80 On the facts, we conclude the following: First, the 
Kenosha 
police 
officer 
had 
reasonable 
suspicion 
for 
an 
investigatory stop of the parked car in which Young was sitting.  
We need not decide whether the car and the occupants other than 
No. 2003AP2968-CR 
 
37 
 
Young were seized.  Second, when the officer ordered Young to 
return to the car after Young started to run away, the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to believe Young was committing a 
crime.  Third, applying Hodari D., Young was not seized within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until the officer physically 
detained him.  Accordingly, the officer lawfully seized Young, 
and we affirm Young's convictions on all three counts. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶81 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  The majority, in affirming all three 
convictions of Charles Young (Young),1 concludes the following:  
first, the Kenosha police officer had reasonable suspicion for 
an investigatory stop of the parked car that the defendant, 
Young, was sitting in; second, when the officer ordered Young to 
return to the car after Young started to run away, the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to believe Young was committing a 
crime; third, Young was not seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment until the officer physically detained him.  
Majority op., ¶¶5, 80.  Because I agree that Young was not 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until the 
officer physically detained him, I concur with and join Part III 
A of the majority opinion.  I also join that portion of the 
mandate that affirms the judgments of conviction for each of the 
possession and resisting counts, albeit on different grounds.  
Because I conclude that the police initially lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop Young in the first instance, I conclude that 
the 
evidence 
is 
insufficient 
to 
support 
the 
charge 
of 
obstructing an officer.  Consequently, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals with respect to that count. 
¶82 The four elements of obstructing an officer pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), are as follows: 
1. The defendant obstructed an officer.  
                                                 
1 Young was convicted of one count each for possession of 
marijuana, resisting an officer, and obstructing an officer. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
2. The officer was doing an act in an official 
capacity. 
3. The officer was acting with lawful authority. 
4. The defendant knew that (officer) was an officer 
acting in an official capacity and with lawful 
authority and that the defendant knew (his)(her) 
conduct would obstruct the officer. 
Wis. JI—Criminal 1766 (2003) (footnotes omitted).  See also 
State v. Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d 242, 248, 546 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (citing § 946.41(1)).   
¶83 There is no question that the officer was acting in an 
official capacity when he pulled alongside the vehicle and 
ordered Young to stop.  For purposes of this analysis, I also 
accept that the term "obstructed" as used in the first element, 
means "hindered, delayed, impeded, frustrated or prevented an 
officer from performing his or her duties[.]"  State v. 
Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d 532, 541, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984).  See also 
Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d at 249-50.  At issue is whether the 
officer was acting with lawful authority at the time he 
initially ordered Young to stop, and whether Young knew that the 
officer was acting with lawful authority.  See State v. Lossman, 
118 Wis. 2d 526, 348 N.W.2d 159 (1984).  
¶84 For the reasons stated in Justice Bradley's dissenting 
opinion,2 I conclude that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion 
of the parked car in which Young was sitting.  An investigatory 
stop is constitutional if the police have a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed.  
Majority op., ¶20 (citing State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 
                                                 
2 Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶94 n.1. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
556 N.W.2d 681 (1996)).  "Reasonable suspicion requires that a 
police officer possess specific and articulable facts that 
warrant 
a 
reasonable 
belief 
that 
criminal 
activity 
is 
afoot. . . . A mere hunch that a person has been, is, or will be 
involved in criminal activity is insufficient."  Majority op., 
¶21 (citing Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 27 (1968)). 
¶85 Simply stated, five individuals sitting in a legally 
parked vehicle for nine minutes at night provides no specific or 
articulable facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal 
activity is afoot.  The officer had no complaints linking the 
vehicle that Young was sitting in to any criminal activity.  The 
individuals in the vehicle had done nothing suspicious to 
suggest that they were involved in criminal activity, unless, of 
course, sitting in a vehicle is considered inherently suspicious 
activity.  No one in the car was observed drinking what appeared 
to be alcohol.  No one in the car appeared to be engaged in drug 
transactions.  No one in the car appeared to be arguing.  The 
vehicle's radio was not being played at a loud volume.  There 
was no evidence of littering around the vehicle.   
¶86 The fact that the vehicle was unfamiliar to the 
officer adds nothing to the majority's analysis, as that would 
allow any officer to stop any vehicle that officer was 
unfamiliar with at any time, without regard to whether the 
person was acting suspicious.  Moreover, while Wisconsin sports 
fans might view people from Illinois in a suspicious light, a 
person from Illinois being present in a Wisconsin border 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
community provides no specific or articulable facts that 
criminal activity is taking place.  No massaging of the facts 
here leads to a viable conclusion that reasonable suspicion 
existed prior to the stop.   
¶87 The ramifications of the majority's analysis are 
downright frightening.  If police can stop anyone they fail to 
recognize who is in a "problem area" without any articulable 
showing that the person is doing something to suggest criminal 
activity, such a rationale could be used to support the 
wholesale interference of anyone who fails to fit the "community 
profile":  a person who fails to match the racial profile of a 
community, a person who has out-of-state license plates, etc.  
Moreover, if this court were to allow such stops within the 
state, then other states might treat our citizens in the same 
manner.  Would a car possessing Wisconsin license plates provide 
the basis for a lawful investigatory stop in Rockford, Illinois?  
What about Duluth, Minnesota?  Would wearing a cheesehead 
provide a sufficient basis for a lawful stop in another state?  
Of course, such a result would be ridiculous and intolerable.   
¶88 Based on the majority's analysis, the focus is no 
longer on the behavior of the accused, but would now rest solely 
on the character of the community.  I am not aware of any 
decision that justifies the interference of one's liberty 
without considering that person's conduct.  I would not adopt 
such a rule now.  The officer in this case lacked reasonable 
suspicion that Young and the others who were with him were 
engaged in criminal activity prior to illuminating Young's 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
vehicle with his spotlight and turning on his flashing emergency 
lights. 
¶89 Justice Bradley correctly observes that when the 
police "do not possess reasonable suspicion to justify such a 
seizure, citizens have the right to go about their business and 
walk away."  Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶97 (citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).  The mere "refusal to 
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."  
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).  Young, therefore, 
had every right to go about his business and walk away, which, 
according to the majority opinion, is exactly what he did.  
Majority op., ¶11.  Young got out of the vehicle, which he had a 
right to do absent reasonable suspicion.  When ordered to get 
back into the vehicle, he started to walk away, which he also 
had a right to do absent reasonable suspicion.  It was after the 
officer ordered Young to return to the vehicle a second time 
that Young started running toward the house, subsequently 
resisted the officer, and finally slipped out of his coat (which 
contained marijuana). 
¶90 This court has recognized that "[f]light at the sight 
of police is undeniably suspicious behavior."  State v. 
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990).  Similarly, 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that unprovoked 
flight is not a mere refusal to cooperate, but, by its very 
nature, is the opposite of "going about one's business[.]"  
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  While both 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
courts recognize that there are many innocent explanations for 
flight from police,3 "flight is not necessarily indicative of 
ongoing criminal activity.  This fact is undoubtedly true[.]"  
Id.  As such, while flight "does not rise to a level of probable 
cause,"4 it does provide the officer with "a reasonable suspicion 
that all is not well."  Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 84.  See also 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. 
¶91 It is Young's flight, his physical resistance of the 
officer, coupled with this court's decision in State v. Hobson, 
218 Wis. 2d 350, 380, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998) (abrogating the 
previously recognized common law privilege to forcibly resist an 
unlawful arrest),5 that compel the conclusion that the officer 
was justified in arresting Young on the porch.  It does not 
matter that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to 
initially stop Young.  For public policy reasons,6 he had no 
right to physically resist the officer, and in any case, Young's 
flight ultimately provided the officer with a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  Similarly, Young's 
                                                 
3 State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 
(1990); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
4 Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 84.  See also Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
at 125.  The majority errs in concluding to the contrary, 
ignoring this controlling precedent.  Majority op., ¶56. 
5 I do not mean to suggest that this decision relieves the 
State of its burden to establish the element of lawful 
authority.  Compare e.g. Wis. JI—Criminal 795 and 1765 (2003).  
Young has not challenged the sufficiency of evidence of the 
resisting count. 
6 State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 371-80, 577 N.W.2d 825 
(1998). 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
coat could be seized and searched incident to his arrest for 
resisting the officer on the porch. 
¶92 The same cannot be said of the obstructing count.  
Prior to Young's flight, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion 
that would justify a Terry7 stop.  Thus, he was without lawful 
authority to order Young to get back in or return to the 
vehicle.  Absent that lawful authority, the State has failed to 
establish the third element of the offense here, that being that 
the officer was acting with lawful authority prior to Young's 
flight.  Thus, his flight cannot provide the basis for the 
obstructing charge.  Further, the State has not and cannot 
establish that Young subjectively knew that the officer was 
acting with lawful authority.  See Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d at 542-
43.  To conclude otherwise would relieve the State of its burden 
of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, and render 
the third and fourth elements meaningless.  Consequently, I 
would reverse the court of appeals decision with respect to the 
obstructing count, as the evidence is insufficient to support 
that charge. 
¶93 For the forgoing reasons, I concur with the mandate 
affirming Young's convictions for possession of marijuana and 
for resisting an officer, but I respectfully dissent from the 
decision 
and 
mandate 
affirming 
Young's 
conviction 
for 
obstructing an officer.       
 
                                                 
7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶94 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Although I 
disagree with the majority opinion in several respects I write 
to focus on its unfortunate, perhaps even needless, adherence to 
the test for a seizure under the now-infamous case of California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).1  As a consequence of this 
test, the right that Wisconsin citizens once possessed to go 
about their business and "walk away" from police during the 
course of a casual encounter may no longer exist. 
¶95 In applying Hodari D., the majority: 
(I) embraces a case that has been widely criticized and 
oft rejected for good reason; 
(II) ignores the test for a seizure as stated in the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision of Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 
626 (2003); and 
(III) assumes that this court previously adopted Hodari D. 
even though that is less than clear. 
¶96 I would decline to apply Hodari D.  Instead, I would 
continue to follow the test the Court set forth in United States 
                                                 
1 I disagree with the majority that the investigating 
officer had reasonable suspicion for a stop of the parked car in 
which Young was sitting.  See majority op., ¶¶5, 58-64.  Police 
do not possess reasonable suspicion simply because individuals 
remain in a parked vehicle at night for approximately 10 minutes 
in a "problem area."  It adds nothing to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis here that the vehicle was also "unfamiliar" 
to the investigating officer and had Illinois license plates.  
The stop took place in Kenosha, a populous area that borders 
Illinois.  The court of appeals was right to "harbor doubt" as 
to whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the 
parked car.  State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, ¶10 n.4, 277 
Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and recently reaffirmed in 
Kaupp in order to determine whether a citizen has been seized. 
¶97 Under this test the existence of a seizure does not 
depend on whether the citizen submitted to a police show of 
authority, absent physical force.  Rather, a citizen is seized 
when, taking into account all of the circumstances involved in 
an encounter with police, a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave.  Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 629; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
554.  In the case of a temporary seizure (a Terry stop), as is 
implicated here, when police do not possess reasonable suspicion 
to justify such a seizure, citizens have the right to go about 
their business and walk away.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
498 (1983).2 
¶98 Ultimately, I am convinced that the distinctions the 
majority draws between what constitutes the legitimate exercise 
of the right to walk away and what constitutes illegitimate 
flight will often amount to a line drawn in the sand on a windy 
day.  For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶99 Commentators 
and 
courts 
alike 
have 
criticized 
Hodari D.  Many courts have rejected it.  This is for good 
reason. 
                                                 
2 This court and the court of appeals have followed this 
test in cases after California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 
(1991).  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶¶20-23, 255 
Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834; State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 26, ¶¶9-
21, 278 Wis. 2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104, review denied, 2005 WI 134, 
282 Wis. 2d 720, 700 N.W.2d 272. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶100 Professor LaFave, in his leading treatise on the law 
of search and seizure, devotes approximately 13 pages to the 
matter, impressively synthesizing a large body of Fourth 
Amendment case law.  Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure 
§ 9.4(d), at 453-66 (4th ed. 2004). 
¶101 Numerous other commentators have approached Hodari D. 
with similar skepticism.  Juan F. Alanis, To Seize or not to 
Seize . . . , 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 461, 474-478 (1996); Ronald J. 
Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 Ky. L.J. 145, 
146, 179-188 (1993); Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth 
Amendment Seizure Analysis after Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 799, 841-842 (1991); Patrick T. Costello, 
California v. Hodari D.: The Demise of the Reasonable Person 
Test in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 12 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 463, 
483-84 (1992);  Michelle R. Ghetti, Seizure Through the Looking 
Glass:  Constitutional Analyses in Alice’s Wonderland, 22 S.U. 
L. Rev. 231, 243 (1995); Randolph Alexander Piedrahita, A 
Conservative Court says "Goodbye to All That" and Forges a New 
Order in the Law of Seizure——California v. Hodari D., 52 La. L. 
Rev. 1321, 1333 (1992); Victor R. Quiros, The Impact of 
California v. Hodari D. Upon Police Pursuits in California:  The 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree is No Longer Poisonous, 19 W. St. U. 
L. Rev. 641, 661-62 (1992); Alyssa Saks, Can Attempted Seizures 
be Unreasonable?:  Applying the Law of Attempt to the Fourth 
Amendment, 37 Cal. W. L. Rev. 427, 429-430, 438 (2001); Richard 
W. Zahn, California v. Hodari D.:  An Evolving Definition of 
Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 447, 466 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
(1992); Defining a Seizure——Police Chases and Bus Sweeps:  
Florida v. Bostick and California v. Hodari D., 105 Harv. L. 
Rev. 297, 298-299 (1991). 
¶102 I highlight some of the most compelling criticisms as 
summarized by Professor LaFave.3 
¶103 Criticism 1.  Contrary to the Hodari D. hypothesis, 
pursuit constitutes an immediate infringement on the suspect's 
freedom of movement.  This is because the person being pursued 
reasonably knows that the object of the chase is capture; that 
the police purpose is to restrain his liberty; that if he 
stopped running, he would not be free to leave; and that in 
effecting the capture police will resort to physical force if 
necessary.  4 Search and Seizure § 9.4(d), at 459-60. 
¶104 Criticism 2.  Under Hodari D., the timing of a seizure 
is governed not by the officer's conduct but by the citizen's 
reaction, a result inconsistent with other established Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The Court in Michigan v. Chesternut, 
486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988), for example, emphasized the necessity 
of a standard that "allows the police to determine in advance 
whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth 
Amendment."  
¶105 Criticism 3.  When applying Hodari D., courts will 
frequently be confronted with difficult questions concerning 
precisely when the requisite physical force or submission to 
authority commenced.  4 Search and Seizure § 9.4(d), at 462.  As 
                                                 
3 As the majority states, many of the criticisms of 
Hodari D. amplify the points made by the dissent in Hodari D.  
See majority op., ¶43. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Justice Stevens put it in his dissent to Hodari D.:  "The range 
of possible responses to a police show of force, and the 
multitude of problems that may arise in determining whether, and 
at which moment, there has been 'submission,' can only create 
uncertainty and generate litigation."  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 
644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
¶106 Some 
cases 
may 
involve 
rather 
obvious 
flight.  
However, it may be difficult for courts in future cases to 
distinguish between what constitutes the legitimate exercise of 
the right to walk away and what constitutes illegitimate flight. 
¶107 Criticism 4.  Under Hodari D., it will be advantageous 
to police officers to place the seizure at the latest possible 
moment so as to be able to use any earlier-revealed evidence as 
part of the basis for a Terry stop.  4 Search and Seizure 
§ 9.4(d), at 462.  Such an approach diminishes the established 
constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.   
¶108 No fewer than 11 other courts of last resort have 
rejected Hodari D.  State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1309 (Conn. 
1992); Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 863-68 (Del. 1999); State 
v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 362 (Haw. 1992); Baker v. Commonwealth, 
5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 665 N.E.2d 
93, 97-98 (Mass. 1996); Matter of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780-83 
(Minn. 1993); State v. Clayton, 45 P.3d 30, 34 (Mont. 2002); 
State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 405 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. 
Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 771-76 (Pa. 1996); State v. Randolph, 74 
S.W.3d 330, 331-37 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681, 
687 (Wash. 1998); see also People v. Holmes, 619 N.E.2d 396, 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
397-98 (N.Y. 1993) (without citing Hodari D., holding that 
police pursuit of an individual significantly impedes the 
person's freedom of movement and thus must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion). 
¶109 The widespread criticism and rejection of Hodari D. is 
well founded.  Hodari D. states that, absent physical force, a 
seizure does not occur unless the citizen under investigation 
yields to the police show of authority.  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 
626.  This statement is difficult to reconcile with the Court's 
other established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
¶110 For example, I cannot reconcile Hodari D.'s statement 
with Terry, which held: 
[C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility 
to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing 
or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security 
without the objective evidentiary justification which 
the Constitution requires.  When such conduct is 
identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and 
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal 
trials.  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
¶111 Similarly, I cannot reconcile Hodari D.'s statement 
with Chesternut.  In Chesternut, the Court held:  "[The test for 
a seizure] calls for consistent application from one police 
encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's 
response to the actions of the police."  Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 
574 (emphasis added). 
¶112 Moreover, the Court's decision in Mendenhall strongly 
suggests that its test contemplated that suspects may often 
attempt to flee or otherwise evade police but that this did not 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
forestall 
the 
seizure. 
 
In 
Mendenhall, 
the 
Court 
gave 
"[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave."  Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).  The Court's use of "even where" 
evinces its assumption that in the course of a typical seizure 
the suspect often would attempt to leave. 
¶113 The examples the Court gave of what might "indicate a 
seizure" include "the threatening presence of several officers, 
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of 
the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled."  Id.  These examples of what might 
"indicate a seizure" further suggest that the test for a seizure 
does not encompass a citizen's response to the police officers' 
conduct. 
¶114 Yet, in Hodari D., the Court did not say it was 
overruling any of this previous jurisprudence.  On the contrary, 
it purported to rely on at least some of it.  Hodari D., 499 
U.S. at 627-28. 
¶115 I am persuaded by the commentators and courts that 
have rightly criticized and rejected Hodari D. 
¶116 So was the court of appeals.  In the case before us, 
it expressed serious reservations about the problems with 
Hodari D.  "[W]e are less than enthusiastic," the court flatly 
stated, "about the result that Hodari D. mandates in this case."  
State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, ¶19, 277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 866.  The court then explained its concern that Hodari D. 
may eviscerate the right to walk away: 
[A]fter Hodari D., [Young's] supposed right to "go on 
his way" becomes an empty right because it vests 
police with the authority to pursue and detain anew.  
In short, the person is penalized for legal conduct 
while police are rewarded for illegal conduct. 
Id., ¶20. 
¶117 The court of appeals was correct.  The right to go 
about one's business and "walk away" cannot coexist with a rule 
that, absent physical force, no seizure may attach before a 
citizen submits to the police show of authority. 
¶118 Even the majority feels it necessary to "recognize the 
strength" of some of the criticisms described.  Majority op., 
¶47.  Unfortunately, the majority embraces Hodari D. anyway. 
II 
¶119 Adding to my concern with the majority's embrace of 
Hodari D. is that the United States Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Kaupp leaves uncertain the present status of 
Hodari D.   
¶120 In Kaupp, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed what I 
always understood to be the Mendenhall test:   
A seizure of the person within the meaning of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments occurs when . . . the 
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable 
person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police 
presence and go about his business. 
Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 629 (emphasis added; internal quotations 
omitted). 
¶121 In Kaupp the Court did not say that a seizure "may 
occur when" or "can occur when" or "occurs 'only' when."  In 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
other words, the Court in Kaupp was clear that "when" police 
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he 
was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about 
his business, that is a sufficient condition to effect a 
seizure.4 
¶122 Unlike the straightforward reading of Mendenhall that 
the Court in Kaupp reaffirmed, the Court in Hodari D. sliced and 
diced and nuanced the text of Mendenhall.  See Hodari D., 499 
U.S. at 628 ("[Mendenhall] says that a person has been seized 
'only if' [a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave], not that he has been seized 'whenever'; it 
states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
                                                 
4 The full text of the relevant portion of Kaupp v. Texas, 
538 U.S. 626 (2003), reads as follows: 
A seizure of the person within the meaning of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments occurs when, "taking 
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated 
to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to 
ignore 
the 
police 
presence 
and 
go 
about 
his 
business.'"  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 
(1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 
569 (1988)).  This test is derived from Justice 
Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980), see California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 627-628 (1991), which gave several "[e]xamples of 
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave," including 
"the threatening presence of several officers, the 
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of 
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with 
the 
officer's 
request might 
be 
compelled."  
Mendenhall, supra, at 554. 
Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 629-30. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
seizure--or, more precisely, for seizure effected through a 
'show of authority.'") (emphasis in original).5 
¶123 Thus, the interpretative gloss the Court placed on 
Mendenhall in Hodari D. does not square with its subsequent 
reaffirmation of the Mendenhall test in Kaupp. 
¶124 The majority does not account for the test in Kaupp. 
Unlike the majority, I would give credence to the most recent 
pronouncement of the Court.  Following Kaupp, I would ask "when, 
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the 
police presence and go about his business."  Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 
629 (internal quotations omitted).6 
III 
¶125 What is additionally unfortunate about the majority's 
embrace of Hodari D. today is that it may have been needless.  
The majority assumes that "[i]n State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 
                                                 
5 In Kaupp, the Court also recounted how in United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), it "gave several [e]xamples of 
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave,   including the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer's request might be compelled."  Kaupp, 538 U.S. 
at 630 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted). 
6 The majority states that I "ignore[] the fact that a court 
does not reach the Hodari D. test until a defendant refuses to 
submit to a police show of authority."  Majority op., ¶40 n.13.  
This "fact" is nothing but the majority's own attempt to explain 
how the test for a seizure as stated in Hodari D. can somehow be 
squared with the test as stated in other United States Supreme 
Court cases, including Kaupp. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
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54, ¶33, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777, this court adopted the 
Hodari D. test for 'when a seizure occurs'"  Majority op., ¶4; 
see also majority op., ¶¶26, 51.  It is less than clear, 
however, whether this court adopted Hodari D. in Kelsey C.R.  In 
order to see why, I begin by delving deeper into Kelsey C.R.  
¶126 The language in Kelsey C.R. "adopting" Hodari D. comes 
from the "majority" opinion of three justices.  Two justices 
concurred.  Kelsey C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶¶52, 72.  Two 
justices dissented.  Id., ¶¶73, 98.   
¶127 The defendant in Kelsey C.R. was a juvenile girl, who 
police officers suspected might be a runaway.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  They 
found her sitting in the middle of a block in a high-crime 
neighborhood in Milwaukee.  Id., ¶4.  From their car, the 
officers asked her some questions, remained concerned based on 
her answers, and told her to "stay put" so they could make a U-
turn to be on the same side of the street as Kelsey to ask her 
more questions.  Id., ¶5.  At that point, she fled.  Id. 
¶128 After a 30- to 40-second chase, the officers caught 
Kelsey.  They contacted her mother, who asked that they bring 
Kelsey home.  Id., ¶6.  Before the officers placed her in their 
car, they conducted a pat-down search and found a loaded 
handgun.  Id., ¶7.7   
¶129 The three-justice opinion in Kelsey C.R. stated three 
issues:   
                                                 
7 The male officers waited 20 minutes for a female officer 
to arrive and conduct the pat-down.  State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 
WI 54, ¶7, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
One, did the police officers seize Kelsey, thereby 
invoking 
her 
constitutional 
protection 
against 
unreasonable seizures, when [one of the officers] told 
her to "stay put" but she ran away?  Two, was the 
investigative detention after she fled based on a 
reasonable suspicion that she had committed, was 
committing, or was about to commit, a crime?  Three, 
was 
the 
pat-down 
search 
of 
Kelsey 
based 
on 
a 
reasonable suspicion that she may be armed and 
dangerous? 
Id., ¶11. 
 
¶130 In addressing the first issue, three justices clearly 
applied Hodari D. to determine that there was no seizure of 
Kelsey until the officers applied physical force by catching her 
after a chase.  Id., ¶33.  Those justices did not, however, stop 
with Hodari D.  They also addressed the first issue using a 
community caretaker analysis, concluding that "if this initial 
exchange was a seizure, then it was reasonable under the police 
community caretaker function."  Id., ¶37.  They then addressed 
the second issue, another Terry stop question, and the third 
issue, which involved the pat-down.  Id., ¶¶38, 47. 
¶131 Without mention of Hodari D., the concurring opinion 
in Kelsey C.R. stated that it agreed with "the majority's two-
part analysis of the stop in this case."  Id., ¶52 (Sykes, J., 
concurring).  It is less than clear what the concurrence was 
referencing because there were two asserted "stops" in the case, 
and the "majority" concluded that only the second was a seizure.  
Like the concurrence, the dissent made no mention of Hodari D. 
¶132 The lack of clarity as to whether a majority of 
justices took a position on Hodari D. in Kelsey C.R. is 
underscored by an examination of the court of appeals' decisions 
that have subsequently interpreted Kelsey C.R.   
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
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¶133 In State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 249 Wis. 2d 329, 
639 N.W.2d 213,8 the court of appeals interpreted Kelsey C.R. as 
follows:  "Apparently, all of the justices agreed that the 
officers did not seize Kelsey by telling her to 'stay put.'"  
Hart, 249 Wis. 2d 329, ¶16 (emphasis added).  In a footnote, the 
court of appeals elaborated: 
The plurality relied on California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991), to hold that in order to 
effect a seizure, an officer must make a show of 
authority, and the citizen must actually yield to that 
show of authority.  State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, 
¶33, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777.  Because Kelsey 
did not yield to the officer when he told her to "stay 
put," no seizure occurred until the officers caught 
her after she fled.  Id.  Neither the concurring or 
dissenting opinions disagreed with this portion of the 
plurality's decision. 
Hart, 249 Wis. 2d 329, ¶16 n.6 (emphasis added).  Thus, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
all 
of 
the 
justices 
"[a]pparently" 
agreed 
that 
Hodari 
D. 
applied 
because 
a 
"plurality" relied on Hodari D. and because neither the 
concurring nor dissenting opinions expressly "disagreed" that it 
applied. 
¶134 In a later case, State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 143, 275 
Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d 869, the court of appeals was not so 
equivocal.  There, it interpreted Kelsey C.R. differently.  It 
unequivocally stated that in Kelsey C.R. "the supreme court 
held, 'In order to effect a seizure, an officer must make a show 
of authority, and the citizen must actually yield to that show 
                                                 
8 This court overruled State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 249 
Wis. 2d 329, 639 N.W.2d 213, in part on other grounds in State 
v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶33, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277. 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
of authority.'"  Powers, 275 Wis. 2d 456, ¶8 (quoting Kelsey 
C.R., 243 Wis. 2d 422, ¶33).     
¶135 Then, in State v. Washington, 2005 WI App 123, 284 
Wis. 2d 456, 700 N.W.2d 305, the court of appeals seemed to give 
Kelsey C.R. yet a third interpretation, again taking a slightly 
different view of the case.  It first said that "[o]ur supreme 
court has indicated that it 'will follow the Hodari D. standard 
for when a seizure occurs.'"  Washington, 284 Wis. 2d 456, ¶13 
n.4.  However, it qualified:  "While Kelsey C.R. was a case 
concerning . . . the community caretaker function, this court 
[the court of appeals] has also employed the Hodari D. standard 
in a Terry stop case."  Id., ¶13 n.4.  The case to which the 
court of appeals was referring was its decision in the case now 
before us. 
¶136 Whether more than three justices in Kelsey C.R. 
adopted Hodari D. is less than clear from the Kelsey C.R. 
decision.  The court of appeals has interpreted Kelsey C.R. at 
least three times, each time in a slightly different way.  For 
me, this underscores the lack of clarity as to whether a 
majority of this court even adopted Hodari D. in Kelsey C.R.  
Yet today, the majority simply assumes that Hodari D. is settled 
law in Wisconsin.  It laments the strength of the criticisms of 
Hodari D., while professing to be bridled by its own recent 
precedent.  See majority op., ¶¶43, 51. 
IV 
¶137 For the reasons stated, I would decline to apply 
Hodari D.  Instead, I would continue to follow the test the 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
Court set forth in Mendenhall and recently reaffirmed in Kaupp 
in order to determine the moment that a citizen is seized.  
Under that test the existence of a seizure does not depend on 
whether the citizen submitted to a police show of authority.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶138 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2003AP2968-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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