Title: Ayers v. Ayers

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ayers v. Ayers, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1833.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1833 
AYERS, APPELLEE, v. AYERS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ayers v. Ayers, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1833.] 
Domestic relations—Child support—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) 
requires that the domestic-relations court’s child-support order include an 
express determination of voluntary unemployment or underemployment as 
a condition precedent to imputing potential income for child-support-
calculation purposes—Domestic-relations court’s lack of express 
determination of voluntary employment was reversible error—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to domestic-relations 
court. 
(No. 2022-0560—Submitted March 1, 2023—Decided May 15, 2024) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Wood County, 
No. WD-21-010, 2022-Ohio-403. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} In a child-support dispute involving an unemployed parent, the 
domestic-relations court must first determine whether the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed1 before the court may proceed to impute potential income to that 
parent for purposes of calculating child support.  We are asked to determine 
whether we must assume that the domestic-relations court properly determined that 
a parent was voluntarily unemployed when the court’s child-support order is silent 
regarding voluntary unemployment but imputes potential income to the parent for 
child-support-calculation purposes.  We hold that an assumption from silence in 
this context is improper.  The plain language of R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)2 requires that 
the domestic-relations court’s order include an express determination of voluntary 
unemployment as a condition precedent to imputing potential income for child-
support-calculation purposes.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Sixth 
District Court of Appeals, and we remand the cause to the trial court. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Deborah Belleville, formerly known as Deborah Ayers, and 
appellant, David Ayers, were married in 2006.  The couple had three children 
during the course of their marriage.  Deborah filed a complaint for divorce in July 
2019. 
{¶ 3} At the time the divorce action began, David and Deborah were both 
employed with comparable incomes.  David had been employed at CSX 
 
1. This decision applies to both voluntary unemployment and voluntary underemployment.  Any 
references to “voluntary unemployment” alone are merely for the sake of brevity. 
 
2. Since the inception of this case, the General Assembly renumbered subdivisions within R.C. 
3119.01 without making any substantive changes to the pertinent provisions of the statute.  See 2018 
Sub.H.B. No. 366 (recodifying R.C. 3119.01(C)(11) as R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)).  For clarity and unless 
specified, references to former R.C. 3119.01(C)(11) will cite to R.C. 3119.01(C)(17).  We note that 
effective April 3, 2024, R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) has been recodified as R.C. 3119.01(C)(18).  See 2023 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33. 
January Term, 2024 
 
3 
Transportation as a load-engineering and design-services coordinator since June 
2011.  In February 2020, David’s position was eliminated due to organizational 
changes.  He remained unemployed at the time of the final divorce hearing, which 
took place over the course of three different days in August, September, and 
October 2020 in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
Division. 
{¶ 4} David testified at the final divorce hearing that he was seeking 
employment but that the job market was “very small” due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  Deborah testified that she believed that David could get a new job.  The 
testimony of the parties and other witnesses at the final divorce hearing otherwise 
covered a great number of issues not germane to this appeal. 
{¶ 5} After the final divorce hearing, the parties submitted requests for and 
proposals of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In David’s proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, he asserted: “[David] is now unemployed due to no 
fault of his own.”  In Deborah’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
she asserted: “While [David’s] employment was terminated by [CSX], his 
unemployment has not been for over one year and new employment is very likely.”  
She asserted that she should be awarded child support and that the amount should 
be calculated based on David’s last base pay with CSX from 2019 plus the average 
of the annual bonus he received in 2017, 2018, and 2019. 
{¶ 6} On December 9, 2020, the trial court issued an order that, among 
many other things, designated Deborah as the residential parent and legal custodian 
of the parties’ three children and ordered David to pay child support.  The court 
stated that under R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(b), it could calculate child support based on 
the “potential income” of “a parent who is unemployed or underemployed.”  The 
court further stated that it could impute potential income to the unemployed parent 
by analyzing the factors listed in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi).  Of note, 
the court did not mention that under R.C. 3119.01(C)(17), it must first determine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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that the parent “is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed” before it 
may consult the factors enumerated in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi) to 
impute potential income. 
{¶ 7} In addressing Deborah’s request to impute David’s potential income, 
the trial court found that “David lost his job with CSX Transportation due to several 
organizational changes at CSX.”  The court also found that at the time, “the 
availability of employment opportunities [was] tight due to the * * * virus 
pandemic.”  However, it stated that “a vaccine should be available within the next 
six months or so.”  The court otherwise found that “David had substantial prior 
employment experience with CSX; he is well educated; he has no physical or 
mental disabilities; he does not have a felony conviction; and there is no evidence 
that David does not have the ability to earn the imputed income.”  The court then 
imputed potential income to David based on his previous earnings, adopting the 
amount calculated by Deborah in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  The court ordered Deborah’s attorney to prepare a final judgment consistent 
with the December 9, 2020 order. 
{¶ 8} The trial court entered a final judgment entry of divorce on January 
22, 2021.  The entry is silent regarding David’s employment situation.  Yet the 
judgment entry states that the monthly child-support amount ordered was based on 
a calculation worksheet, which incorporated David’s imputed potential income. 
{¶ 9} David appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Sixth District Court 
of Appeals, arguing, in pertinent part, that the trial court had erred in imputing his 
potential income for child-support purposes.  2022-Ohio-403, ¶ 18.  David argued 
that the trial court had (1) decided he was involuntarily unemployed by stating that 
David lost his job due to “organizational changes” and (2) therefore improperly 
imputed his potential income.  Id. at ¶ 19.  The court of appeals disagreed, 
concluding that the trial court determined that David was voluntarily unemployed 
by considering several factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.01(C)(17)(a) to impute 
January Term, 2024 
 
5 
potential income.  See id. at ¶ 20.  The Sixth District more generally held that R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17) “does not require the trial court to expressly find [David] is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and it is sufficiently implied where the 
record reflects the trial court considered the factors to determine [David’s] 
‘potential income’ for child support purposes.”  Id. at ¶ 25.  The Sixth District 
therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
{¶ 10} In light of its holding regarding express versus implied findings of 
voluntary unemployment, the Sixth District granted David’s motion to certify a 
conflict after determining that its judgment was in conflict with the judgment of the 
Ninth District in Misleh v. Badwan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23284, 2007-Ohio-5677.  
We recognized that a conflict existed and ordered briefing on the following 
question certified by the Sixth District: 
 
“Does a trial court have to expressly find that a parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed as a condition precedent to imputing 
income for child support calculation purposes, or can the trial 
court’s silence be construed as an implied finding that is sufficient 
to impute income?” 
 
167 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2022-Ohio-2162, 189 N.E.3d 818, quoting 9th Dist. Wood 
No. WD-21-010, 2022 Ohio App. LEXIS 1361, at 9 (Apr. 26, 2022). 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} This certified-conflict case turns on the interpretation of R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17).  “[I]ssues of statutory construction constitute legal issues that we 
decide de novo.”  New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Hts. Income Tax Bd. of 
Rev., 150 Ohio St.3d 386, 2016-Ohio-7582, 82 N.E.3d 1105, ¶ 8.  We must focus 
first and foremost on the text of the statute.  State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 
2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 10.  If the text is clear and unambiguous, we 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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must apply it as written.  Id.  Unless a word has a specialized meaning or specific 
statutory definition, it must be taken in its usual, ordinary, or customary meaning.  
See Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville, 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 480 N.E.2d 412 
(1985); see also R.C. 1.42. 
{¶ 12} The terms within the statutory scheme governing child-support 
orders are “mandatory in nature and must be followed literally and technically in 
all material respects.”  Marker v. Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496 
(1992), paragraph two of the syllabus; see Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 
616 N.E.2d 218 (1993) (requiring strict compliance with the requirements of child-
support statutes). 
The statutory regime 
{¶ 13} To calculate the amount of child support owed, the domestic-
relations court must first determine the annual income of each parent.  See R.C. 
3119.021(A).  The term “income” is defined as: 
 
(a) For a parent who is employed to full capacity, the gross 
income of the parent; 
(b) For a parent who is unemployed or underemployed, the 
sum of the gross income of the parent and any potential income of 
the parent. 
 
R.C. 3119.01(C)(9).  “Potential income” applies to “a parent who the court pursuant 
to a court support order * * * determines is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily 
underemployed.”  R.C. 3119.01(C)(17).  Once determined to be voluntarily 
unemployed, a parent’s potential income may include: 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
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(a) Imputed income that the court or agency determines the 
parent would have earned if fully employed as determined from the 
following criteria: 
(i) The parent’s prior employment experience; 
(ii) The parent’s education; 
(iii) The parent’s physical and mental disabilities, if any; 
(iv) The availability of employment in the geographic area 
in which the parent resides; 
(v) The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic 
area in which the parent resides; 
(vi) The parent’s special skills and training; 
(vii) Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability 
to earn the imputed income; 
(viii) The age and special needs of the child for whom child 
support is being calculated under this section; 
(ix) The parent’s increased earning capacity because of 
experience; 
(x) The parent’s decreased earning capacity because of a 
felony conviction; 
(xi) Any other relevant factor. 
 
R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi). 
{¶ 14} Thus, R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)’s plain language requires the domestic-
relations court to make two specific determinations when calculating potential 
income.  First, the court must determine that a parent’s unemployment or 
underemployment was voluntary.  R.C. 3119.01(C)(17).  Second, the court must 
determine what the parent would have earned if fully employed, using the criteria 
enumerated in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The conflict among Ohio appellate districts 
{¶ 15} We have previously explained that the two questions of (1) a parent’s 
voluntary unemployment and (2) the amount of potential income to be imputed to 
that parent are both questions of fact for the domestic-relations court that should 
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Rock, 67 Ohio St.3d at 
112, 616 N.E.2d 218.  But we have not addressed whether the domestic-relations 
court must make an express determination of voluntary unemployment before it is 
authorized to determine the amount of potential income to be imputed.  The caselaw 
from Ohio courts of appeals on this latter issue is inconsistent. 
{¶ 16} The Sixth District appears to be at one end of the spectrum by taking 
the bright-line position that the determination of voluntary unemployment should 
be inferred so long as the domestic-relations court considers the factors to impute 
potential income that are enumerated in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi).  
2022-Ohio-403 at ¶ 25.  In other words, as long as the domestic-relations court 
completed step two, we should assume that it completed step one.  On the opposite 
end of the spectrum is the judgment determined to be in conflict with the Sixth 
District’s judgment.  In Misleh, the Ninth District took the bright-line position that 
if the domestic-relations court fails to make an explicit finding of voluntary 
unemployment, it may not impute potential income.  2007-Ohio-5677 at ¶ 5-6.  In 
other words, if the domestic-relations court does not explicitly state that it 
completed step one, it is prohibited from completing step two. 
{¶ 17} We disagree with the approach taken by the Sixth District.  And 
although we find the proper approach to be less formalistic and extreme as the 
approach taken by the Ninth District in Misleh, we agree that it is generally 
improper to infer from the domestic-relations court’s silence that it made a proper 
determination of voluntary unemployment. 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
9 
An express determination of voluntary unemployment is statutorily required 
{¶ 18} Remaining mindful of the fact that our inquiry is grounded in the 
text of the statute, we note that the language found in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) has 
changed since the time of our decision in Rock, 67 Ohio St.3d at 112, 616 N.E.2d 
218.  The relevant statutory language at the time of Rock provided that “potential 
income” applies to “ ‘a parent that the court determines is voluntarily unemployed 
or voluntarily underemployed.’ ”  Id. at 111, quoting former R.C. 3113.215(A)(5); 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 591, 143 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5957, 5998. 
{¶ 19} Former R.C. 3113.215 was repealed effective March 22, 2001, and 
the pertinent language regarding “potential income” from that statute was enacted 
in former R.C. 3119.01(C)(11).  See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 180, 148 Ohio Laws, Part 
V, 9782, 9788-9790, 10051-10052, 10055, 10482-10483.  Before it was repealed, 
the pertinent provision of former R.C. 3113.215(A)(5) provided that “potential 
income” applied to “a parent that the court, or a child support enforcement agency 
* * * determines is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed.”  2000 
Sub.H.B. No. 495, 148 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5309, 5319, 5321.  The language 
enacted in former R.C. 3119.01(C)(11) provided that “potential income” applied to 
“a parent who the court pursuant to a court support order, or a child support 
enforcement agency pursuant to an administrative child support order, determines 
is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 180, 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 10055.  Although former R.C. 
3113.215 was silent about how or when the domestic-relations court was to make 
the predicate determination of voluntary unemployment, R.C. 3119.01—both 
currently and as enacted—includes language specifying that there must be an order 
reflecting a determination of voluntary unemployment. 
{¶ 20} One takeaway from the foregoing changes to the statutory language 
regarding “potential income” is that caselaw applying the language of former R.C. 
3113.215(A)(5) is of limited value.  The Sixth District’s decision here was founded 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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on that caselaw.  See 2022-Ohio-403 at ¶ 25, citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 6th Dist. 
Ottawa No. OT-04-025, 2005-Ohio-1025, ¶ 26-27 (interpreting former R.C. 
3113.215).  The Sixth District held in Wheeler that the domestic-relations court 
need not expressly determine that a parent is voluntarily unemployed based on the 
fact that former R.C. 3113.215 was silent on the matter.  Wheeler at ¶ 26.  R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17) is not so silent, and the reasoning set forth in Wheeler is thus no 
longer on point. 
{¶ 21} Another takeaway from the changes to the statutory language 
regarding “potential income” is that the domestic-relations court must include a 
determination of voluntary unemployment in its order.  It remains true that the 
substance of the court’s determination of a parent’s voluntary unemployment, as 
well as the substance of its decision to impute potential income to that parent, are 
factual questions that may not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  
Rock, 67 Ohio St.3d at 112, 616 N.E.2d 218.  But specific instructions that the 
determination of voluntary unemployment be “pursuant to a court support order,” 
R.C. 3119.01(C)(17), indicate a mandatory rather than discretionary obligation, 
which must be “followed literally and technically in all material respects,” Marker, 
65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} It is undisputed in this case that the trial court failed to articulate in 
any order or otherwise expressly determine that David was voluntarily 
unemployed.  We conclude that the trial court’s failure was error. 
The lack of an express determination of voluntary employment was reversible 
error in this case 
{¶ 23} Although R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) requires that a parent’s voluntary 
employment be determined “pursuant to a court support order,” that provision does 
not require a recitation of particular words.  The formal requirements contained in 
R.C. 3119.01 assure the parties and appellate courts that the domestic-relations 
court adhered to the relevant substantive requirements and ensure that the domestic-
January Term, 2024 
 
11 
relations court’s order is subject to meaningful appellate review.  See Marker at 
142.  The precise wording is therefore inconsequential, but the domestic-relations 
court’s order must clearly evince a finding that a parent’s unemployment or 
underemployment is voluntary. 
{¶ 24} In the present case, none of the trial court’s statements in its 
December 2020 order or its January 2021 order may be interpreted as a 
determination that David was voluntarily unemployed.  The court made findings 
that attributed David’s initial unemployment to organizational changes of his 
employer, and it attributed his continued unemployment to the “tight” job market 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Both of these findings point to a determination 
of involuntary unemployment. 
{¶ 25} The trial court did find that “David had substantial prior employment 
experience with CSX; he is well educated; he has no physical or mental disabilities; 
he does not have a felony conviction; and there is no evidence that David does not 
have the ability to earn the imputed income.”  These findings are more or less 
relevant3 to establish a potential income that may be imputed to David under R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17)(a), but they do not by themselves establish that David’s lack of 
income at the time of the final hearing was voluntary under R.C. 3119.01(C)(17). 
{¶ 26} The trial court’s attributing David’s initial unemployment to 
organizational changes of his employer and his continued unemployment to the 
“tight” job market during the COVID-19 pandemic may not be construed as a 
determination of voluntary unemployment, and the record did not contain 
overwhelming evidence that David was voluntarily unemployed.  The court’s 
decision imputing potential income to David for purposes of calculating child 
 
3. The last of the trial court’s findings was a misstatement of R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(vii): 
“[w]hether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn the imputed income.”  The court’s 
apparent requirement for David to prove that he did not have the ability to earn the imputed potential 
income incorrectly shifted the burden of proof. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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support was therefore reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified-conflict question 
in the affirmative by holding that the domestic-relations court must expressly find 
that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as a condition precedent 
to imputing potential income for child-support-calculation purposes.  The trial 
court’s failure to do so in this case was reversible error.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, and we remand the cause to the 
trial court for it to determine whether David was voluntarily unemployed in 
accordance with R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) and for further proceedings in accordance 
with that determination. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
FISCHER, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by DETERS, 
J. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 28} “[M]eaningful appellate review is precluded where a trial court’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are inadequate to disclose the controlling 
facts or basis for the court’s findings.”  Blair Constr., Inc. v. McBeth, 273 Kan. 679, 
688, 44 P.3d 1244 (2002).  And while Ohio law permits a child-support order to 
impute potential income to a voluntarily unemployed or underemployed parent, the 
trial court in this divorce case never made a finding that appellant, David Ayers, 
was voluntarily unemployed.  Further, the trial court not only misstated the 
statutory standard for imputing potential income, but it also made findings 
indicating that Ayers was not voluntarily unemployed and that potential income 
January Term, 2024 
 
13 
could not be imputed to him.  For these reasons, I concur in the court’s judgment 
reversing the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals and remanding this 
matter to the trial court.  I write separately, however, because my reasoning is 
different from that of the majority. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 29} CSX Transportation abolished Ayers’s position and terminated his 
employment effective February 1, 2020.  According to Ayers’s testimony in the 
divorce proceeding, he was not fired and no replacement was hired.  He accepted a 
severance package that allowed him to receive his regular pay for six months.  
Beginning on August 2, 2020, Ayers began receiving unemployment benefits, 
which provided him with $750 every two weeks for 26 weeks—a small fraction of 
what he had earned at CSX.  The unemployment benefits became his sole source 
of income. 
{¶ 30} As a benefit of his severance package, Ayers worked with an 
employment-coaching firm, LHH.  He testified that although he had been seeking 
employment by using the networking skills that LHH had taught him, he had not 
yet had success.  Ayers attributed his failure to find a job by the late summer and 
early fall of 2020 to disruptions in the economy that had been caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  He explained that in a normal economy, he would have 
already been employed; however, “due to [the pandemic], [it had] been difficult” 
and there had been few job opportunities in his field. 
{¶ 31} The only evidence in the divorce proceeding indicating that Ayers 
could have found a job was conclusory statements made by appellee, Deborah 
Belleville, during her testimony, such as that Ayers “has the ability to get a job” 
and that “there are jobs out there.”  And Belleville provided the only testimony 
regarding the amount of potential income Ayers could earn—she asserted that 
Ayers could make the same salary he had made at CSX because “[h]e was able to 
before.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 32} In its child-support order, the trial court found that “[i]n February 
2020 [Ayers] lost his job with CSX Transportation due to several organizational 
changes at CSX.”  The court also stated that “the availability of employment 
opportunities [was] tight due to the * * * virus pandemic” but that “a vaccine should 
be available within the next six months or so.”  Nonetheless, it imputed potential 
income to Ayers based on the earnings he had previously received from CSX.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no error.  2022-Ohio-
403, ¶ 42. 
Imputing Income to an Unemployed Parent 
{¶ 33} R.C. 3119.01(C)(9) defines “income” for purposes of calculating a 
parent’s child-support obligation as including the “potential income” that a parent 
who is unemployed or underemployed could earn if fully employed.  But R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17) clarifies that a calculation of “potential income” applies to “a 
parent who the court pursuant to a court support order * * * determines is 
voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 34} Whether a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and 
the amount of potential income to be imputed to a parent found to be voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed are matters to be determined by the trial court based 
on the facts and circumstances of each case.  Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 
111-112, 616 N.E.2d 218 (1993) (construing former R.C. 3113.215(A)(5)).  
Although these determinations are committed to the trial court’s discretion, id. at 
112, this court explained in Rock that “an appellate court must be able to ascertain 
from the trial court’s journal entry * * * the trial court’s reasons for imputing 
income to a child support obligor,” id. at 113.  Therefore, an appellate court must 
be able to determine from the entry imputing potential income to a parent that the 
trial court found that the parent’s unemployment or underemployment was, in fact, 
voluntary. 
January Term, 2024 
 
15 
{¶ 35} The trial court did not make that finding here.  Further, it is unclear 
whether the trial court understood that it could impute potential income to Ayers 
only if it first found that his unemployment was voluntary.  It stated in its child-
support order that “[f]or a parent who is unemployed or underemployed, gross 
income can include any potential income of the parent.”  But that is not true.  A 
trial court cannot impute income to a parent simply because he or she is 
unemployed—the parent must be voluntarily unemployed.  By omitting the word 
“voluntary” from the above-quoted sentence, the trial court misstated the standard 
for imputing potential income to a parent.  It is therefore not possible to infer that 
the trial court found that Ayers’s unemployment was voluntary. 
{¶ 36} Nor do the findings that the trial court made in its child-support order 
demonstrate that the court knew that potential income could be imputed to Ayers 
only if his unemployment was voluntary.  In calculating Ayers’s child-support 
obligation, the trial court noted in its order that “[i]n February 2020 [Ayers] lost his 
job with CSX Transportation due to several organizational changes at CSX.”  The 
court also stated that “the availability of employment opportunities [was] tight due 
to the * * * virus pandemic” but that “a vaccine should be available within the next 
six months or so.”  These findings tend to establish that at the time the court entered 
its order, Ayers’s unemployment was involuntary—he had lost his job through no 
fault of his own while the pandemic made finding a new job difficult, if not 
impossible. 
{¶ 37} The trial court then compounded its error by shifting the burden of 
proof.  In deciding to impute potential income to Ayers, the court stated in its child-
support order that “there is no evidence that [Ayers] does not have the ability to 
earn the imputed income.”  But as the majority correctly points out, Ayers did not 
have the burden to prove his inability to earn the imputed income.  Rather, 
Belleville bore the burden to prove that Ayers was voluntarily unemployed.  And 
she failed to carry that burden, because the only evidence that Ayers could have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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found a job was her conclusory statements that Ayers “has the ability to get a job” 
and that “there are jobs out there.”  But Belleville was not qualified to give an expert 
opinion on the labor market, and she provided no evidence, such as local 
unemployment data or job postings, to support her statements. 
{¶ 38} For these reasons, the trial court erred in imputing potential income 
to Ayers.  In reviewing the trial court’s child-support order, the court of appeals 
could only speculate that the trial court had made the finding of voluntary 
unemployment that was necessary to impute potential income to Ayers.  Moreover, 
the facts in the record do not support such a finding.  Therefore, I concur in the 
court’s judgment reversing the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals and 
remanding this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 39} Before a trial court may impute income to a parent for purposes of 
calculating child support, it is required to determine that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed.  In this case, the trial court made no such 
determination, so it is appropriate to reverse the judgments below. 
{¶ 40} But the majority goes further.  It also imposes a new requirement 
that a trial judge make an “express” determination of voluntary unemployment—a 
requirement that is not supported by the text of the relevant statute, R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17).  Because I would stick to the text of the statute, I cannot join the 
opinion of the majority and concur only in its judgment. 
The Trial Court Failed to Find that the Father Was Voluntarily Unemployed 
{¶ 41} Ohio’s child support statute requires a judge to impute “potential 
income” to a parent who is unemployed or underemployed.  R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(b).  
The imputation of potential income applies to “a parent who the court pursuant to 
a court support order * * * determines is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily 
underemployed.”  R.C. 3119.01(C)(17).  As the majority correctly explains, 
January Term, 2024 
 
17 
 
R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)’s plain language requires the domestic-
relations court to make two specific determinations when 
calculating potential income.  First, the court must determine that a 
parent’s unemployment or underemployment was voluntary.  R.C. 
3119.01(C)(17).  Second, the court must determine what the parent 
would have earned if fully employed, using the criteria enumerated 
in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i) through (xi). 
 
Majority opinion, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 42} Here, the trial court skipped directly to the second step.  There is 
nothing in the relevant court order that includes a determination—explicit or 
implicit—that the father was voluntarily unemployed.  Nor is there anything else in 
the record from which we could glean that the trial court considered the 
voluntariness issue.  Indeed, one plausible reading of the court’s order is that it 
believed that it could impute income based on unemployment alone.  See Ayers v. 
Ayers, Wood C.P. No. 2019 DR 0090, 17 (Dec. 9, 2020) (“For a parent who is 
unemployed or underemployed, * * * a court can impute income to a parent after 
an analysis of the factors listed in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i)-(xi)”). 
We Should Stick to the Plain Language of the Statute 
{¶ 43} Because the trial court failed to make the necessary determination 
regarding voluntary unemployment, I concur in the majority’s judgment reversing 
its decision.  But I disagree with the majority’s decision to go beyond the plain 
language of the statute.  While disclaiming the need for “a recitation of particular 
words,” majority opinion at ¶ 23, the majority edits R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) to add a 
requirement that trial courts must “expressly” find that unemployment is voluntary, 
id. at ¶ 27.  This requirement is found nowhere in the statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 44} Nothing in the statute requires that the trial court’s determination of 
voluntary unemployment be express.  As the majority notes, R.C. 3119.01 simply 
requires that there “be an order reflecting a determination of voluntary 
unemployment.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  Certainly an order can reflect that the court has made 
a determination of voluntary unemployment without including an explicit finding.  
Indeed, one can imagine a number of circumstances where an order makes it clear 
that the court determined that the parent was voluntarily unemployed, even though 
the order doesn’t expressly recite words to that effect.  Under the statute, such a 
determination is sufficient. 
{¶ 45} What the majority outlines may well be the best practice for trial 
judges to follow in drafting child support orders.  But it is not a statutory mandate.  
“This court expects a statutory requirement to be ‘written * * * into the statute.’ ”  
(Ellipsis in original.)  TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for 
Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 172 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-4677, 223 
N.E.3d 371, ¶ 62, quoting Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield, 24 Ohio St.2d 24, 
27-28, 263 N.E.2d 249 (1970).  The majority’s new requirement is not.  And in any 
case, “[i]t is our duty to apply the statute as the General Assembly has drafted it; it 
is not our duty to rewrite it.”  Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
122 Ohio St.3d 12, 2009-Ohio-1360, 907 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 29.  We should be 
reviewing court orders for compliance with statutes, not with atextual judge-made 
requirements. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} Because the trial court failed to determine whether David Ayers was 
voluntarily unemployed, I concur in this court’s judgment reversing the judgment 
of the Sixth District Court of Appeals and remanding the matter to the trial court.  
The majority goes further and not only reverses the decisions below but also adds 
a new requirement that is unsupported by statutory text.  As a consequence, I concur 
only in the majority’s judgment. 
January Term, 2024 
 
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DETERS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Bostdorff Legal, L.L.C., Elizabeth B. Bostdorff, for appellee. 
 
Karin L. Coble, for appellant. 
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