Title: State ex rel. Rohr v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Rohr v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3756.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3756 
THE STATE EX REL. ROHR, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Rohr v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3756.] 
Workers’ compensation — Permanent total disability compensation — Industrial 
Commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction — New and changed 
circumstances. 
(No. 2010-0083 — Submitted July 6, 2010 — Decided August 18, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-94, 
2009-Ohio-6416. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jeffrey T. Rohr, was awarded permanent total disability 
compensation.  After three years, appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
exercised its continuing jurisdiction and ordered Rohr to undergo a medical 
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examination to determine if he was still permanently and totally disabled.  Rohr 
challenges that decision. 
{¶ 2} Rohr’s 2004 permanent total disability award was based on his 
allowed psychological conditions — “major depressive episode, recurrent, 
moderate severity; dysthymic disorder.”  In finding that these conditions 
prevented sustained remunerative employment, a staff hearing officer relied on 
the reports of Drs. Steven B. Van Auken and Gregg A. Martin. 
{¶ 3} Both psychologists described Rohr as expressionless with 
noticeably slowed speech and a flat affect.  Van Auken noted that Rohr’s “tonal 
quality suggested a mechanical, robotic mode of speech.”  He also characterized 
Rohr as “resigned [and] dispirited. His [Rohr’s] short-term memory appeared 
unreliable; he was able to recall none of three objects after five minutes.  His 
long-term memory appeared questionable * * *.  His concentration appeared quite 
negatively impacted * * *.” 
{¶ 4} Dr. Martin made similar statements and added that Rohr’s speech 
was “notable for mild to moderate dysfluencies with considerable word finding 
hesitations and very slow output.” 
{¶ 5} In 2007, Rohr’s employer, appellee Gerstenslager Company, hired 
an investigator to initiate surveillance of Rohr.  When Gerstenslager reviewed the 
surveillance evidence, it questioned whether Rohr was still permanently and 
totally disabled and asked him to submit to further medical examination.  Rohr 
refused. 
{¶ 6} Gerstenslager then asked the commission to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction and order Rohr to attend an independent medical exam.  A staff 
hearing officer reviewed the surveillance evidence and contrasted what he saw 
with the observations made by Dr. Van Auken in 2004: 
{¶ 7} “The employer presented a CD of an investigation performed by a 
Mr. Walters who was at hearing and as part of said investigation, Mr. Walters 
January Term, 2010 
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engaged in a verbal conversation with the claimant in which the claimant was 
heard by this Hearing Officer and showed that the claimant’s speech was clear, 
cogent and goal oriented. 
{¶ 8} “The Hearing Officer further finds that in said conversation the 
claimant experienced remarkably well short-term and remarkably well long-term 
memory in speaking to the investigator concerning his neighbors, the length of 
time that the neighbors have owned certain property, what property was owned 
and by whom.  The Hearing Officer further finds that the speech was normal in its 
flow and in no way ‘noticeably slowed and paced’ as indicated by Dr. Van Auken 
in the report of 09/14/2004, and that the claimant showed a mode of speech that 
was hardly mechanical or robotic.” 
{¶ 9} “ * * * 
{¶ 10} “The Hearing Officer finds that * * * [these] activities along with 
the huge discrepancy between the conversation that was heard by this Hearing 
Officer and the examination by Dr. Van Auken in September, 2004 necessitates 
the granting of the employer’s motion to have the claimant re-examined by a 
doctor examining on the allowed psychological conditions to determine whether 
the claimant is still permanently and totally disabled.” 
{¶ 11} Reconsideration was denied. 
{¶ 12} Rohr filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in ordering 
him to attend the psychological examination.  The court of appeals found that the 
commission’s decision was supported by evidence and denied the writ. 
{¶ 13} Rohr now appeals to this court as of right. 
{¶ 14} The commission can invoke its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 
4123.52 when one of the following exists:  (1) new and changed circumstances, 
(2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by an 
inferior tribunal. State ex rel. B & C Machine Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 
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Ohio St.3d 538, 541-542, 605 N.E.2d 372.  Gerstenslager presented evidence that 
suggested that Rohr’s previously disabling psychological conditions had 
significantly improved.  The commission found that this evidence demonstrated 
new and changed circumstances sufficient to exercise continuing jurisdiction, and 
ordered Rohr to appear for a medical examination. 
{¶ 15} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating 
evidentiary weight and credibility, State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 68 
Ohio St.2d 165, 22 O.O.3d 400, 429 N.E.2d 433, and as long as there is evidence 
supporting its order, the order must be upheld, State ex rel. Burley v. Coil 
Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  Rohr 
concedes that the surveillance packet constituted evidence of new and changed 
circumstances.  He argues, however, that the surveillance evidence is not as 
significant as it was in State ex rel. Spohn v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 329, 
2007-Ohio-5027, 875 N.E.2d 52, and thus does not warrant termination of his 
permanent total disability compensation.  This argument, however, is premature.  
The issue in this case is simply whether the commission properly exercised its 
continuing jurisdiction to order Rohr to be medically examined.  Whether the 
present claimant remains permanently and totally disabled — which was the issue 
in Spohn — will be a determination that the commission will make after Rohr is 
medically examined. 
{¶ 16} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
M. Blake Stone, L.P.A., Inc., and M. Blake Stone, for appellant. 
Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, Ltd., and Susan E. Baker, for appellee 
Gerstenslager Company. 
January Term, 2010 
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Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Colleen C. Erdman, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________