Title: Bellville v. Kieffaber

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Bellville v. Kieffaber, 114 Ohio St.3d 124, 2007-Ohio-3763.] 
 
 
VILLAGE OF BELLVILLE, APPELLEE, v. KIEFFABER, APPELLANT. 
Cite as Bellville v. Kieffaber, 114 Ohio St.3d 124, 2007-Ohio-3763. 
Criminal law — Municipal ordinance — Traffic regulations — Citation for 
speeding that contains notice of both the prima facie offense and the basic 
facts supporting that charge includes all the necessary elements of the 
offense even if the citation does not also allege that the speed is 
unreasonable for existing condition — Driver may rebut or negate the 
prima facie case with evidence that the speed was neither excessive nor 
unreasonable. 
(No. 2006-0824 — Submitted February 27, 2007 — Decided August 8, 2007.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Richland County,  
No. 2005CA0061, 2005-Ohio-6879. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A citation for speeding that contains notice of both the prima facie offense and the 
basic facts supporting the charge includes all the necessary elements of the 
offense even if the citation does not also allege that the speed is unreasonable 
for existing conditions.  The driver may rebut or negate the prima facie case 
with evidence that the speed was neither excessive nor unreasonable.  
(Cleveland v. Keah (1952), 157 Ohio St. 331, 47 O.O. 195, 105 N.E.2d 402, 
approved and followed.) 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This certified-conflict case requires us to consider the meaning of, 
and evidentiary burdens associated with, the phrase “prima facie case” in the 
context of a traffic citation for excessive speed. 
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Background and Case Procedure 
{¶ 2} An officer with appellee, the village of Bellville, charged 
appellant, Gary Kieffaber, with speeding in violation of Bellville Ordinance 73.10 
on February 13, 2005.  When the matter proceeded to a bench trial, Kieffaber 
requested dismissal.  Kieffaber based his request on the officer’s failure to check 
the box on the citation form indicating that Kieffaber’s speed was unsafe for the 
conditions.  Without that particular box being checked, Kieffaber asserted, the 
citation failed to state all the elements of the speeding offense necessary to 
support a conviction.  The trial court denied Kieffaber’s dismissal request and 
proceeded with the trial. 
{¶ 3} At the trial, the officer who wrote the citation testified that radar 
determined Kieffaber’s speed to have been 41 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone.  
Additional testimony from the officer indicated that the roads were clear and that 
Kieffaber had been traveling at dusk in a residential neighborhood with no 
adverse weather conditions.  The officer’s testimony was consistent with the 
boxes marked on the citation describing the conditions surrounding the traffic 
stop, including that the pavement was dry with no adverse weather conditions, the 
stop occurred at dusk in a residential area, the traffic volume was moderate, and 
no crash was involved.  On the citation handed to Kieffaber at the traffic stop, the 
“over the limits” box was marked. 
{¶ 4} During cross-examination, Kieffaber asked the officer why the 
citation did not have the “unsafe for conditions” box marked.  The officer replied 
that the “unsafe for conditions” marking was inappropriate for Kieffaber’s 
situation because Kieffaber was not “actually going less than the speed limit but 
[nonetheless] going at a speed that would be unsafe for the conditions.  For 
example, if the road was very icy.”  Kieffaber did not testify or present any 
witnesses or evidence.  The trial court found Kieffaber guilty of speeding and 
fined him $100 and court costs. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 5} On appeal, Kieffaber’s conviction was affirmed.  Bellville v. 
Kieffaber, Richland App. No. 2005CA0061, 2005-Ohio-6879.  The majority 
opinion reasoned that the citation set forth both the essential facts and numerical 
designation of the offense charged.  Id. at ¶ 13.  As a result, it concluded that the 
“unsafe for conditions” box did not need to be marked in order to sustain the 
conviction under the prima facie provision of the statute.  Id.  The dissenting 
opinion, however, concluded that the village’s failure to check the “unsafe for 
conditions” box rendered the citation defective for failing to “allege all the 
necessary elements of the offense.”  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 6} The appellate court certified its decision as being in conflict with 
State v. Oglesby (Sept. 1, 2000), Erie App. Nos. E-99-077 and E-99-076, 2000 
WL 1232411. 
{¶ 7} We determined that a conflict existed and accepted the following 
certified question:  “In a traffic law enforcement citation for ‘excessive speed’ 
does the complaint fail, as a matter of law, to charge a necessary element of the 
offense if it does not also allege that the speed is ‘prima-facie’ unlawful and the 
speed alleged is not charged as a ‘per se’ violation of the traffic code?”  Bellville 
v. Kieffaber, 109 Ohio St.3d 1493, 2006-Ohio-2762, 848 N.E.2d 856. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} In his appeal, Kieffaber asserts that the citation issued by the 
village failed to properly charge the speeding offense of which he was convicted.  
Kieffaber asserts it was necessary for the “unsafe for conditions” box on the 
citation to be checked in order to state all the elements of an offense under 
Bellville Ordinance 73.10.1  Bellville Ordinance 73.10 reads:   
{¶ 9} "(A) No person shall operate a motor vehicle at a speed greater or 
less than is reasonable or proper, having due regard for the traffic, surface, and 
                                                 
1.  The language of Bellville Ordinance 73.10 mirrors that contained in R.C. 4511.21.   
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width of the street or highway and any other conditions, and no person shall drive 
any motor vehicle in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will 
permit him or her to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. 
{¶ 10} "(B) It is prima facie lawful, in the absence of a lower limit 
declared pursuant to this section by the Director of Transportation or local 
authorities, for the operator of a motor vehicle to operate the same at a speed not 
exceeding the following: 
{¶ 11} "* * * 
{¶ 12} "(2) Twenty-five miles per hour in all other portions of the 
municipality, except on state routes outside business districts, through highways 
outside business districts, and alleys; 
{¶ 13} “* * * 
{¶ 14} “(C) It is prima facie unlawful for any person to exceed any of the 
speed limitations in [division (B)] of this section or any declared pursuant to this 
section by the Director or local authorities and it is unlawful for any person to 
exceed any of the speed limitations in division (D) of this section.” 
{¶ 15} Bellville Ordinance 73.10(D) addresses the per se violations, 
which are not at issue in this matter.  It is undisputed that Kieffaber’s speed at 41 
m.p.h. exceeded the prima facie limit of 25 m.p.h. 
{¶ 16} Because Kieffaber’s appeal questions the evidentiary burden of 
production by the village, Cleveland v. Keah (1952), 157 Ohio St. 331, 47 O.O. 
195, 105 N.E.2d 402, is implicated.  In Keah, this court discussed whether a speed 
greater than that specified in a municipal ordinance established unlawful conduct 
per se or a prima facie case.  In the first paragraph of the syllabus, we held:  
{¶ 17} “Where a municipal ordinance makes it prima facie unlawful for a 
motor vehicle to exceed a certain speed limit in a described locality, a speed 
greater than that specified does not establish the commission of an offense or 
constitute unlawful conduct per se, but establishes only a prima facie case under 
January Term, 2007 
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the ordinance.  Such a provision as to speed is merely a rule of evidence raising a 
rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by evidence showing that in the 
circumstances the speed was neither excessive nor unreasonable.” 
{¶ 18} As noted on Kieffaber’s citation, he was traveling at 41 m.p.h. in a 
25 m.p.h. zone and the box marked “over limits” was checked.  If proved, these 
facts would establish the village’s prima facie case under the ordinance.  Keah, 
157 Ohio St. at 331, 47 O.O. 195, 105 N.E.2d 402, paragraphs one and two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 19} Consistent with the goal of ensuring simplicity and uniformity in 
procedure, a “complaint prepared pursuant to [the Ohio Traffic Rules] simply 
needs to advise the defendant of the offense with which he is charged, in a manner 
that can be readily understood by a person making a reasonable attempt to 
understand.”  Barberton v. O’Connor (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 218, 221, 17 OBR 
452, 478 N.E.2d 803.  In the traffic-citation context, this has generally been 
interpreted as focusing on whether the defendant had notice of the nature and the 
cause of the accusation.  See Youngstown v. Starks (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 269, 
271, 4 OBR 488, 448 N.E.2d 480, citing Strongsville v. McPhee (1944), 142 Ohio 
St. 534, 538, 27 O.O. 466, 53 N.E.2d 522.  Notice is satisfied when a defendant is 
apprised of the nature of the charge together with a citation of the statute or 
ordinance involved.  Cleveland v. Austin (1978), 55 Ohio App.2d 215, 220, 9 
O.O.3d 368, 380 N.E.2d 1357. 
{¶ 20} Contrary to Kieffaber’s assertion, the citation presented to him 
stated all the elements for an offense under Bellville Ordinance 73.10.  It 
designated Kieffaber’s speed, specified the location and time that Kieffaber drove 
at that speed, and indicated that Kieffaber’s speed was in excess of the posted 
speed limit.  The citation also contained the appropriate village ordinance section 
Kieffaber was charged with violating.  Although the specific statutory subsection 
was not indicated, Kieffaber had sufficient information to know the nature and 
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cause of the accusation against him and not to be misled in the preparation of his 
defense.  See, e.g., Niles v. Yeager, Trumbull App. No. 2004-T-0004, 2004-Ohio-
6698, at ¶ 18 (defendant had sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the 
charge when the traffic citation included the proper statutory designation but not 
subsection).  The citation thus comported with the requirements of the Ohio 
Traffic Rules and contained sufficient information to properly allege that 
Kieffaber drove in excess of the speed permitted by Bellville Ordinance 
73.10(B)(2). 
{¶ 21} Kieffaber, however, was entitled to present evidence to overcome 
the rebuttable presumption that arose from the proof that he drove over the 25 
m.p.h. speed limit.  He could have shown that under all the conditions present his 
“speed was neither excessive nor unreasonable.”  Keah, 157 Ohio St. at 331, 47 
O.O. 195, 105 N.E.2d 402, paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, there is no 
evidence within the record before us to support such a conclusion.  Kieffaber did 
not testify or present any witnesses or evidence.  Kieffaber did engage in a limited 
cross-examination of the officer who issued the citation by asking why the 
“unsafe for conditions” box was not marked.  In response, the officer asserted that 
such a notation was not required because Kieffaber was driving over the speed 
limit, rather than driving within the speed limit but in an unsafe manner.  In sum, 
Kieffaber failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut and overcome the 
village’s prima facie case.  Id. 
{¶ 22} In view of the foregoing, we hold that a citation for speeding that 
contains notice of the prima facie offense and the basic facts supporting that 
charge includes all the necessary elements of the offense even if the citation does 
not also allege that the speed is unreasonable for the existing conditions.  The 
driver may rebut or negate the prima facie case with evidence that the speed was 
neither excessive nor unreasonable. 
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{¶ 23} As applied to the present case, the citation issued by the village 
gave Kieffaber sufficient notice of the offense charged against him and facts 
supporting that charge.  The municipal ordinance under which he was cited 
classified Kieffaber’s speed as a prima facie violation.  Kieffaber failed to 
successfully rebut the village’s prima facie case with evidence that his speed was 
neither excessive nor unreasonable in light of the circumstances.  Accordingly, 
the village’s prima facie case was not overcome and the evidence supported the 
trial court’s finding of guilty.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals for Richland 
County is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Renwick, Welsh & Burton, and John D. Studenmund, Bellville Law 
Director, for appellee. 
 
Gary Kieffaber, pro se. 
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