Title: Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

230 Kan. 368 (1981)
634 P.2d 1127
GLYNN DEAN ALBERTSON, Appellee,
v.
VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, a foreign corporation; and VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey corporation, Appellants.
No. 53,293

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 23, 1981.
Robert L. Howard, of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Jerry G. Elliott and James D. Oliver, of the same firm, were with him on the brief for the appellants.
Gerald Michaud, of Michaud, Cordry & Michaud, Chartered, of Wichita, argued the cause and Richard D. Cordry, of the same firm, was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HERD, J.:
This case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas and comes to this court by certification from that court under authority of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 60-3201 et seq. The certifying court shows by its order it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this suit and that the law of Kansas controls the substantive legal issues of the case. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). We accepted certification.
On December 7, 1975, Glynn Albertson, while driving a 1961 Volkswagen van in Wichita, collided with a vehicle owned and driven by Vernon Travis. Albertson sued Travis in the District Court of Sedgwick County. Under a comparative negligence instruction to find 100% of the fault for Albertson's injury, the jury determined his damages to be $275,000, with 40% of the *369 fault attributed to Albertson, and 60% to Travis. The judgment in the amount of $165,000 was entered against Travis and satisfied.
Albertson then filed suit against Volkswagen, manufacturer of the van, on November 18, 1975, in the U.S. District Court, alleging injuries and damages caused by a defective product but arising from the same collision with Travis which has been litigated in state court. Defendants contended the rules relating to comparative fault bar the suit against them and moved for summary judgment. At this juncture in the litigation, U.S. District Judge Frank Theis certified the following question to the Kansas Supreme Court:
Judge Theis ruled collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the amount of Albertson's damages which were established at $275,000. Since Travis has already paid 60% or $165,000, plaintiff can recover a maximum of $110,000 in this action. Judge Theis then ruled collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of the percentages of fault determined in the first action:
Since we deem the doctrine of comparative fault dispositive of the certified question, we need not respond to the collateral estoppel issue.
Albertson claims the injuries he suffered were enhanced and increased by design defects of the Volkswagen van under the theory of "second collision." He contends the design of the Volkswagen van was defective and dangerous in that the door handle would activate from the slightest contact; the door would open, and the occupant would be ejected. As a consequence, plaintiff suffered more substantial injuries than he would have in a properly designed crashworthy vehicle. He further argued the "second collision" theory was adopted in Larsen v. General *370 Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.1968), by the United States Court of Appeals, where the court held:
Albertson contends by 1977 twenty-nine other jurisdictions had adopted the "second collision" theory as noted in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1977). He argues that although Kansas has not specifically adopted the theory, it has defined a manufacturer's duty in design of products:
It is Albertson's argument the holding in Garst, plus the adoption of strict liability in tort, Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976), is tantamount to adoption of the "second collision" theory. This court has never had occasion to rule on the availability of the second collision theory in Kansas. The nature of the question before us does not require that we do so now.
The issues which do deserve our attention are best premised by a brief discussion of the relevant Kansas law. K.S.A. 60-258a presents a logical place to begin. Standing alone, the comparative negligence act does not require all potentially liable parties be sued in the same action. The joinder provision is K.S.A. 60-258a(c) which provides:
This section applies only to defendants and is permissive. As usual, significant gaps remain in the legislative fabric of the law which, of necessity, have been filled by court decisions declaring legislative intent. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978), presented the question of whether a plaintiff could avoid proportionate liability by suing only one of several tortfeasors. This court responded in the negative:
Eurich v. Alkire, 224 Kan. 236, 579 P.2d 1207 (1978), followed, and the court made sweeping statements regarding the legislative intent of the act. It pointed out that the comparative negligence act provided the machinery "for drawing all possible parties into a lawsuit to fully and finally litigate all issues and liability arising out of a single collision ...." p. 237. The court then concluded:
The foregoing cases hold in a negligence action all parties to the occurence shall have their rights and liabilities determined in one action.
The stage was set for application of the comparative negligence concept to other actions based on other types of fault. In Wilson v. Probst, 224 Kan. 459, 581 P.2d 380 (1978), this court applied the comparative negligence statute to a highway defect case. Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Salem Township, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271 (1978), produced a similar result. In both Wilson and Thomas the basis of liability was not common-law negligence, but rather statutorily created negligence per se. But for the application of *372 comparative negligence, the defense of contributory negligence would have applied. This court properly ruled the act applied.
Wilson and Thomas were followed by Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842, 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), where this court considered whether to apply comparative negligence to K.S.A. 21-4209, which prohibits the sale of explosives to persons under eighteen years of age. This case also involved negligence per se where contributory negligence would be a valid defense in the absence of application of comparative negligence. The court held comparative negligence applied, barring the defense of contributory negligence or an "analogous defense." It is argued this broadened the act beyond the intent of the legislature.
Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452, 618 P.2d 788 (1980), came next. This court noted its decisions in Wilson, Thomas and Arredondo had applied comparative negligence
Albertson urges Kennedy v. City of Sawyer applied only comparative fault principles, and not the comparative negligence statute, to actions in strict liability. We can conceive no stronger or more definitive statement the court could have made to adopt the doctrine of comparative fault than the foregoing statement made in Kennedy. Albertson relies on the court's use of the words "principles of comparative negligence" at various times in Kennedy. That phrase was necessary, however, because K.S.A. 60-258a speaks only of "negligence." In Kennedy we judicially adopted the system statutorily set out in K.S.A. 60-258a and applied it to actions in strict liability.
Albertson contends the application of the principles of comparative negligence to strict liability actions will place an unfair and burdensome hardship on all plaintiffs in products liability cases, effectively nullifying this court's opinion in Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698. Plaintiff cites Justice Mosk's dissent in Daly v. General Motors Corp. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 764, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), where the Supreme Court of California held principles of comparative negligence applied to strict liability actions. Justice Mosk stated:
Albertson thus claims it is unjust to evaluate the plaintiff's negligence when the defendant is being judged on strict liability in tort. He argues negligence cannot be compared to strict liability in tort since negligence is based on fault and strict liability imposes absolute liability, thereby eliminating comparison. We reject that argument and hold strict liability in tort does have a fault basis, therefore subjecting it to comparison with other fault concepts. This position serves the ideal of judicial neutrality and will prevent a multiplicity of suits.
In answering the actual question presented, we are mindful of the proliferation of problems prompted by the enactment of the comparative negligence law (K.S.A. 60-258a), and the recognition of the doctrine of comparative fault by this court. Within the context of this case, several of those problems are cited by Judge Theis in his memorandum:
Nevertheless, we feel constrained under the doctrine of case and controversy (NEA-Topeka, Inc. v. U.S.D. No. 501, 227 Kan. 529, 531, 608 P.2d 920 [1980]), to restrict our response to the question certified.
Albertson's injuries were allegedly caused by a combination of the collision and the lack of crashworthiness of the vehicle in which he rode. They resulted from one occurrence. Albertson's total injuries were evaluated by the jury and determined to be $275,000. Albertson was found responsible for 40% of his own injuries; 60% were caused by others. Albertson was paid for all of his injuries caused by the liability of others. The action is over. Volkswagen could have been sued in state court but plaintiff chose not to join the corporation for strategic reasons. Albertson is bound by that decision. Under the doctrine of comparative fault all parties to an occurrence must have their fault determined in one action, even though some parties cannot be formally joined or held legally responsible. Those not joined as parties or for determination of fault escape liability.
Under the facts of this case, we answer the certified question in the negative.
IT IS BY THE COURT SO ORDERED THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 1981.