Title: Bolling v. D'Amato

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,∗ Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
TEDDY WAYNE BOLLING, CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF TED GUY BOLLING, DECEASED 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 990818 
March 3, 2000 
 
LUCIANO D'AMATO, M.D. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY 
J. Robert Stump, Judge 
 
 
In this civil action brought under the Death by Wrongful 
Act statutes for alleged medical malpractice, the dispositive 
question is whether the appointment of a so-called "co-
administrator," for purpose of bringing the action on behalf of 
the decedent's estate, was void. 
 
On August 26, 1993, Ted Guy Bolling came under the care of 
appellee, Luciano D'Amato, M.D., in Wise County as the result of 
injuries allegedly received in a logging accident.  Bolling died 
later that day. 
 
On September 2, 1993, the clerk of the court below 
appointed Betty Chloe Bolling, the decedent's widow, as 
administrator of the intestate's estate.  She duly qualified as 
the personal representative, giving bond in the penalty of 
$50,000. 
                     
∗ Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
 
On August 21, 1995, a judge of the trial court (not the 
judge who ultimately presided over the dispute that is the 
subject of this appeal) entered the order that is the focus of 
this controversy.  The order, entered under the style "Teddy 
Wayne Bolling, Petitioner, vs: In re:  The Estate of Ted Guy 
Bolling, Deceased," provided: 
 
"This action came upon motion of Teddy Wayne 
Bolling to be appointed co-administrator for the 
exclusive purpose of bringing a legal action for the 
benefit of the estate. 
 
 
"By agreement of the parties, the Court does 
ORDER that Teddy Wayne Bolling is appointed co-
administrator of the estate of Ted Guy Bolling for the 
exclusive purpose of bringing legal action on behalf 
of the estate. 
 
 
"In that this appointment is for an exclusive 
purpose, it is ORDERED that Betty Chloe Bolling 
retains the exclusive authority to administer the 
estate of Ted Guy Bolling, and that this Order confers 
no power upon Teddy Wayne Bolling for the 
administration of the estate. 
 
 
"Should there be any administrator's fee 
associated with the prosecution of the anticipated 
legal action on behalf of the estate, said fee shall 
be divided equally between the co-administrators." 
 
 
The order was endorsed "Requested" by an attorney for Teddy 
Wayne Bolling, the decedent's son, and "Seen" by an attorney for 
Betty Chloe Bolling. 
 
On August 23, 1995, the present action was filed by 
appellant "Teddy Wayne Bolling, Co-Administrator of the Estate 
of Ted Guy Bolling" as plaintiff.  The motion for judgment 
 
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alleged the defendant breached the applicable standard in caring 
for the decedent and caused his death. 
 
Responding, the defendant filed a motion to abate.  See 
Code § 8.01-276 (abolishing pleas in abatement but allowing any 
defense heretofore permitted to be made by such plea, including 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to be made by written 
motion). 
 
The motion assigned two grounds:  (1) that plaintiff had 
"no right or standing to bring this action" because the order 
appointing the "co-administrator" was "contrary to Virginia law, 
null and void"; and (2) that, even if plaintiff was properly 
appointed as administrator of the estate, "plaintiff has no 
right or standing to bring this action without the other co-
administrator joining in the action." 
 
On March 6, 1996, the same judge who entered the August 21, 
1995 order entered an order under the style "Betty Chloe 
Bolling, Plaintiff, vs. Teddy Wayne Bolling, Defendant."  The 
order recited that Betty Chloe Bolling requested she be allowed 
to withdraw as administrator of the estate "in favor of 
appointing an independent administrator, namely Walter Rivers, 
as to fulfill the duties as the Administrator of the Estate of 
Ted Guy Bolling." 
 
The order allowed the withdrawal and appointed Rivers "as 
the acting Administrator" of the estate.  The order was endorsed 
 
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"I ask for this" by Betty Bolling's attorney and as "Seen" by 
the attorney for Teddy Wayne Bolling and by Rivers individually. 
 
On July 15, 1998, under the style of the wrongful death 
action, the plaintiff filed a motion "for leave to amend the 
pleadings to add as a party plaintiff Walter Rivers, co-
administrator of the estate of Ted Guy Bolling." 
 
Following a hearing and argument of counsel on the motion 
to abate, the trial court granted the motion, abated the action, 
and dismissed it from the docket.  The court did not rule on the 
motion to amend the pleadings.  We awarded the plaintiff this 
appeal from the December 1998 final order. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff assigns two errors.  He contends 
the trial court erred (1) by granting the motion to abate and by 
finding that he lacked standing to bring this action, and (2) by 
refusing to substitute Rivers as a party plaintiff.  We do not 
reach the second contention because the trial court did not rule 
on that issue, and the plaintiff has not assigned error to the 
court's alleged inaction.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
Regarding the first contention, we do not agree with the 
plaintiff that the trial court erred.  The case turns upon the 
validity of the August 21, 1995 order, purportedly appointing 
the decedent's son "co-administrator" for a limited purpose to 
serve with the decedent's widow, who, according to the order, 
retained "the exclusive authority to administer the estate."  
 
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This was the state of the record when this action was filed on 
August 23, 1995, although the widow later withdrew and Rivers 
was appointed "an independent administrator." 
 
In other words, whether Teddy Wayne Bolling, as "co-
administrator," had the authority and standing to prosecute the 
action on August 23 depends upon whether the order of August 21 
was valid.  We hold that it was void. 
 
An order is void when it has been entered by a court that 
did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Evans v. 
Smyth-Wythe Airport Comm'n, 255 Va. 69, 73, 495 S.E.2d 825, 828 
(1998). 
 
A circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction 
regarding probate and the grant of administration of estates.  
See, e.g., Code §§ 64.1-75, -116, and -118.  Such a court has 
jurisdiction regarding the whole subject matter and, even if it 
errs in taking jurisdiction in a particular case, the order 
generally is not void, but only voidable and cannot be 
questioned in any collateral proceeding.  Andrews v. Avory, 55 
Va. (14 Gratt.) 229, 236 (1858). 
 
The foregoing rule has two exceptions, one of which 
controls this case.  If an intestate already has "a personal 
representative in being" when the order appointing another 
administrator is entered, such order is void.  Id.  This is 
because "[t]here must be an office, and that office must be 
 
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vacant, in order to [have] a valid appointment of a personal 
representative."  Until the office is vacant, "there is in fact 
no 'subject matter,' to be within the jurisdiction of the court.  
That subject matter is[] the appointment of a personal 
representative to a decedent who has none, and whose personal 
estate is therefore without an owner."  Id. at 236-37. 
 
This ancient and settled rule has been followed 
consistently in our case law.  For example, in Beavers v. 
Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 423, 39 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1946), this Court 
held that when an administrator had been appointed and 
qualified, "the power of the court or clerk is exhausted, and no 
further appointment can be made until a vacancy occurs in the 
office in some way recognized by law."  See Rockwell v. Allman, 
211 Va. 560, 561, 179 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1971) (citing Andrews). 
 
The Andrews rule has not been altered by statute.  We have 
found no statutory authority for the procedure employed in this 
case with regard to the August 21 order, and the plaintiff has 
referred us to none.  Indeed, the rule is consistent with the 
provisions of Code § 64.1-131, which enumerates the 
circumstances when the court may allow another to qualify on an 
estate and plainly requires an incumbent administrator to resign 
before allowing "any other person to qualify as executor or 
administrator." 
 
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Consequently, under the Andrews rule, the August 21 order 
is void because, at the time the order was entered, the decedent 
already had a properly qualified administrator in Virginia, 
Betty Chloe Bolling.  Certainly, as the plaintiff argues, 
Virginia law allows joint administration of an estate.  But that 
argument is irrelevant here.  To obtain joint administration in 
this case, Betty Chloe Bolling's appointment should first have 
been revoked and then the son and widow could have been 
appointed as joint administrators.  See Lingle v. Cook's Adm'rs, 
73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 262, 265, 268 (1879). 
 
Therefore, because the August 21 order is void, the 
plaintiff lacked standing to bring this wrongful death action 
for the reason that he was not the personal representative of 
the decedent's estate.  Code § 8.01-50(B) (every wrongful death 
action "shall be brought by and in the name of the personal 
representative" of the deceased person).  This means, of course, 
that the trial court properly granted the motion to abate, and 
the order dismissing the action will be affirmed. 
 
Our decision today, however, shall be limited to the 
present case and shall operate prospectively only; this decision 
will not affect the validity of any orders entered in the past 
under circumstances similar to those underlying the order in 
issue here. 
Affirmed. 
 
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