Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael M. Krill

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2435-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael M. Krill, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Michael M. Krill, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KRILL 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 20, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2435-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael M. Krill, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael M. Krill, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 20, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This case is before us pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule (SCR) 22.14(2) and SCR 22.17(2) on a stipulation between 
the parties, Attorney Michael M. Krill and the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  In the stipulation, Attorney Krill pled no 
contest to 24 counts of misconduct as alleged in the OLR's third 
amended complaint.  The referee issued a report recommending, 
consistent with the stipulation, that the court suspend Attorney 
Krill's license to practice law for three years, retroactive to 
August 23, 2017, order Attorney Krill to pay restitution to two 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
2 
 
clients, make satisfaction of a judgment as a condition of any 
future reinstatement, and order Attorney Krill to pay the full 
costs of this proceeding, which total $21,247.90 as of October 23, 
2019. 
¶2 
We approve the referee's recommendations with respect to 
the stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law and we adopt 
those findings and conclusions.  We determine that a three-year 
suspension is insufficient given the extremely serious nature of 
the misconduct.  We suspend Attorney Krill's license to practice 
law for four and one-half years, retroactive to August 23, 2017. 
We agree with the other recommended sanctions. 
¶3 
Attorney Krill was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin 
in 1991.  He practiced in Milwaukee and, until this matter, had 
not been the subject of professional discipline.  This court 
temporarily suspended Attorney Krill's law license on August 23, 
2017, pursuant to SCR 22.21, on the grounds that his continued 
practice of law posed a risk to the public and to the 
administration of justice.  OLR v. Krill, No. 2017XX955, 
unpublished order (S. Ct. August 23, 2017).  His law license 
remains suspended.  The reasons for the temporary suspension are 
reflected in this opinion, namely, Attorney Krill was implicated 
in a financial scam conducted by one of his clients. 
¶4 
On December 14, 2017, the OLR filed a disciplinary 
complaint against Attorney Krill.  Initially, the OLR sought 
revocation of Attorney Krill's law license.  The complaint was 
amended several times; the third and final amended complaint was 
filed September 5, 2019.  It contains some 166 separately numbered 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
3 
 
paragraphs describing 24 counts of misconduct in connection with 
Attorney Krill's representation of several clients.  In the amended 
complaint the OLR sought a three-year suspension.  
¶5 
Shortly before the scheduled three-day evidentiary 
hearing, Attorney Krill and the OLR entered into a stipulation in 
which Attorney Krill pled no contest to all the allegations of 
misconduct, and the parties also agreed on the sanctions they 
considered appropriate.   
¶6 
The 
referee, 
Jonathan 
V. 
Goodman, 
reviewed 
the 
stipulation and accepted the factual allegations of the third 
amended complaint as his findings of fact.  Based on those facts, 
the referee concluded that Attorney Krill had engaged in 24 
separate acts of professional misconduct.  Given the extensive 
nature of the allegations set forth in the stipulation and accepted 
by the referee, we provide a summary of each client matter, 
followed by summary information concerning Attorney Krill's 
misconduct. 
AMSAH, LLC Matter (Counts 1-8) 
¶7 
In October 2014, Attorney Krill was hired to represent 
S.A. and Z.H. and their business, AMSAH, LLC.  Attorney Krill 
represented these parties in two Racine County cases, each a 
dispute over the entitlement to insurance proceeds received from 
the settlement of a lawsuit. 
¶8 
In January 2015, $75,000 in settlement proceeds was 
deposited in Attorney Krill's IOLTA trust account.  By the end of 
March 2015, Attorney Krill had disbursed all the funds without 
court or client authorization, and without accounting to the 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
4 
 
clients for his disbursement of the funds.  In November 2016, 
$226,412.41 in settlement proceeds was deposited in Attorney 
Krill's trust account.  By February 15, 2017, Attorney Krill had 
disbursed all the funds without court or client authorization and 
without accounting to the clients for his disbursement of the 
funds. 
¶9 
By the end of 2016, due to a conflict, Attorney Krill 
ceased representing S.A. and Z.H., but continued as counsel for 
AMSAH.  In February 2017, the circuit court ordered Attorney Krill 
to provide an accounting of the $301,412.41 he was supposed to be 
holding in trust.  In March 2017, the circuit court ordered 
Attorney Krill to transfer these funds from his trust account to 
the trust account of Z.H.'s successor counsel. 
¶10 Attorney Krill failed to comply with any of the court's 
orders and was held in contempt.  The circuit court ordered that 
Attorney Krill could purge the contempt by delivering the proceeds 
and providing a full accounting.  In May 2017, Attorney Krill told 
the circuit court that he had "invested" the settlement money in 
bonds.  Attorney Krill was not authorized to do this.  Moreover, 
this representation was untrue.  In fact, Attorney Krill had 
transferred the funds from his trust account to banks in the United 
Kingdom and China, and had issued thousands of dollars in checks 
drawn on the trust account, payable to himself. 
¶11 At a status conference in August 2017, Attorney Krill 
promised the circuit court that he would deliver the proceeds 
"within two weeks."  The circuit court issued an order providing 
that if the proceeds were not repaid within two weeks, the circuit 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
5 
 
court would order Attorney Krill to be jailed as a contempt 
sanction. 
¶12 On September 6, 2017, the circuit court entered judgment 
against Attorney Krill in the sum of $301,412.41.  City of Racine 
v. AMSAH, LLC, Racine County Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.  
Attorney Krill did not deliver the proceeds by the circuit court 
imposed deadline and, on September 14, 2017, the circuit court 
ordered Attorney Krill jailed.  On September 26, 2017, the circuit 
court ordered judgment against Attorney Krill in the sum of $48,000 
as the accumulated contempt sanction for his failure to return the 
proceeds as ordered by the circuit court. 
¶13 Meanwhile, by March 2017, S.A. had filed a grievance 
against Attorney Krill and the OLR asked Attorney Krill to provide 
information related to the AMSAH matters.  Attorney Krill did not 
timely cooperate, failed to provide requested file materials, 
failed to provide business and trust account records, and still 
has not provided an accounting of the AMSAH proceeds.  
R.G. Matter (Counts 9-11) 
¶14 In 2013, Attorney Krill was retained to represent Eric 
Murray ("Murray").  Many of the remaining allegations of misconduct 
relate to an "advance fee scheme" conducted by Murray.1  The 
complaint alleges that Attorney Krill provided services to Murray 
                                                 
1 An advance fee scheme occurs when the victim pays money to 
someone in anticipation of receiving something of greater value – 
such as a loan, contract, investment of a gift – then receives 
little or nothing in return.  See https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-
safety/common-fraud-schemes/advance-fee-schemes. 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
6 
 
in connection with this scheme, with reckless disregard for whether 
Murray's transactions were fraudulent. 
¶15 In September 2015, Murray offered R.G. an "investment 
opportunity" and provided R.G. with a Non-Disclosure Agreement 
("NDA") form that Attorney Krill had prepared for Murray.  Attorney 
Krill then made changes to a draft agreement between Murray and 
R.G.  The parties agreed and the documents provided that R.G. would 
loan Murray $17,500 "to immediately close-out [a] Private Banking 
Transaction."  In exchange, Murray would pay R.G. $72,000 within 
14 days after execution of the agreement.  R.G. was to wire the 
funds to Attorney Krill's trust account, then Attorney Krill would 
wire the funds to Murray's representative in England.  Murray 
promised to deliver copies of various documents that would 
substantiate the transaction.  The NDA prohibited R.G. from 
contacting any of the institutions or related parties to determine 
the legitimacy of the private banking transaction due to its 
"sensitive" nature. 
¶16 All the documents purporting to substantiate the private 
banking transaction were forged and fraudulent.  Relying on the 
forged and fraudulent documents provided to him by Attorney Krill, 
and the false and fraudulent representations regarding the 
purported private banking transaction contained in both the NDA 
and the agreement, R.G. wired $17,500 to Attorney Krill's trust 
account on September 25, 2015. 
¶17 On September 29, 2015, Attorney Krill in turn wired 
$30,000 from his trust account pursuant to an international wire 
transfer to Lloyds Bank Plc, London, U.K., for deposit to the 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
7 
 
account of "Optra Sales and Services."  This transaction included 
R.G.'s funds.  Attorney Krill provided no written accounting to 
R.G. regarding his distribution of R.G.'s funds.  To date, R.G. 
has not been repaid the sum invested or any other monies due him 
under the agreement. 
¶18 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to detail, 
among other things, the sources of certain documents used in the 
transaction, to disclose where R.G.'s funds were deposited or held, 
to disclose the identity of "independent sources" that he told the 
OLR had confirmed that the funds for the purported private banking 
transaction were in place, and to explain how he certified that 
the documents he provided to R.G. were not fraudulent. 
¶19 Attorney Krill provided a partial response to the OLR 
but did not respond to the OLR's questions regarding the location 
of R.G.'s funds or the identity of the "independent sources" who 
could confirm various aspects of the transaction.  Attorney Krill 
denied the transaction was fraudulent and provided a letter dated 
January 26, 2017, purportedly from a London, U.K., solicitor, 
Harvey Graham ("Graham Letter"), denying that Attorney Krill 
engaged in any kind of fraudulent transaction.  The Graham Letter 
is printed on what purports to be letterhead stationery of "HARVEY 
GRAHAM SOLICITORS & CO." in Holborn, London, U.K. 
¶20 The OLR determined that the Graham Letter was false and 
fraudulent.  To date, Attorney Krill has not provided an accounting 
of R.G.'s funds or other details regarding the purported private 
banking transaction. 
 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
8 
 
D.R. Matters (Counts 12–17) 
¶21 From May 2014 to March 2016, Attorney Krill represented 
D.R. in several legal matters.  In May 2014, Attorney Krill and 
D.R. discussed whether D.R. might participate in one of Murray's 
"investment opportunities."  Attorney Krill did not disclose to 
D.R. that his simultaneous representation of them created a 
concurrent conflict of interest and he neither sought nor obtained 
written informed consent of each client to the representation. 
¶22 In June 2014, Attorney Krill sent D.R. an email stating: 
Please find attached a copy of the Inland Revenue 
Certificate which requires a payment of $16,500 to 
release the $10,500,000.00 and a confirmation of the 
wire.  [Murray] has $2,500 to invest in this transaction. 
He needs $14,000 to complete.  For this investment you 
will be paid $500,000.00.  My investment to date is 
$30,000.00.  I have been working on this transaction for 
two months.  Paulinus Blair is the banker in London that 
[Murray] is working with to get this transaction 
completed.  I just got off the phone with him.  Mr. 
Paulinus confirmed that the $10,500,000.00 wire will be 
released by Suntrust Bank in the US within 24 hours of 
receipt of the certificate. 
¶23 Attorney Krill then forwarded to D.R. a series of 
purportedly authentic documents he had received from Murray, 
including:  
 A letter from the "Home Office Inland Revenue Services" 
dated May 20, 2014 allegedly serving as a "letter of 
guarantee" for IRS Tax Clearance; 
 An undated "Swift Telegraphic Transfer" allegedly 
showing a transfer of $10,500,000 to Murray.   
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
9 
 
 A certification from a Chinese entity showing indemnity 
or 
bonding 
coverage 
in 
the sum 
of 
$16,200,000 
benefitting Murray's company, Unite2Jam, Inc.;  
 A letter from the Bank of China (Hong Kong) to Natwest 
Bank, requesting payment of $78,400 for release of what 
was described as a hand over certificate of bond for 
the benefit of Murray;  
 A "Letter of Guarantee" from the Bank of England to the 
Director of the "Foreign Operations Department" of the 
Saudi British Bank, seeking the "Final Funds Release 
Order" documents;  
 A Certified Statement Invoice from HM Revenue and 
Customs; and  
 A letter from Harvey Graham to Murray stating that upon 
receipt of $47,000 we will "immediately proceed to the 
H.R.M.C. OFFICE to obtain the required F.D.I.C.C. 
Digital signature and complete the transaction without 
any further delay."   
All these documents were forged and fraudulent.  In forwarding the 
email and documents to D.R., Attorney Krill recklessly disregarded 
whether the documents were forged and fraudulent.  
¶24 Relying on Attorney Krill's representations and the 
documents Attorney Krill provided him, D.R. gave Attorney Krill 
$107,000 to invest with Murray, which Attorney Krill deposited in 
his trust account.  These funds were the property of J.A.  J.A. 
had agreed to transfer funds to Attorney Krill based on an 
understanding that the funds would be retained in Attorney Krill's 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
10 
 
trust account until J.A. had sufficient funds to purchase a 
building.  Attorney Krill wired the funds from his trust account 
to foreign banks for deposit in foreign bank accounts within days 
after their receipt.  Attorney Krill provided no accounting. 
¶25 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to detail 
the source of certain documents used in connection with these 
transactions, the basis for the promises described in the 
agreements, the identity of every individual who received the 
funds, and where the funds were deposited or held, along with 
supporting documentation.  Attorney Krill's lawyer sent the OLR a 
letter stating that Attorney Krill was in litigation with D.R. and 
that while Attorney Krill sought to cooperate with the OLR, 
"providing information to your office places Krill at a 
disadvantage in the civil lawsuit."  The letter contained no 
substantive response and included no documentation.  Attorney 
Krill has not responded to the OLR's requests for information 
regarding this matter, and has not provided an accounting of the 
funds or other details regarding the transactions. 
¶26 Meanwhile, in 2013, a judgment of foreclosure and sale 
was entered against a Milwaukee condominium owned by Attorney 
Krill.  D.R. and Attorney Krill entered into an oral agreement 
whereby D.R. agreed to serve as a "straw man" on Attorney Krill's 
behalf and to purchase the condominium at the sheriff sale.  In 
return, Attorney Krill agreed to stay in the condominium, pay 
property taxes, and the parties would renegotiate ownership of the 
property at a later date. 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
11 
 
¶27 Attorney Krill did not prepare a writing enumerating the 
details of the straw man transaction with D.R.  D.R. performed the 
agreement and purchased the property at the sheriff's sale.  On 
February 3, 2014, the court confirmed the sale. 
¶28 D.R. later asserted that Attorney Krill promised D.R. 
that he could keep Attorney Krill's condominium if Murray failed 
to repay monies advanced by his entities.  In November 2016, D.R. 
sued Attorney Krill in Milwaukee County Circuit Court over the 
ownership of the condominium. 
¶29 In December 2017, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to provide 
copies of documents associated with the condominium transaction as 
well as details regarding the money provided to Attorney Krill as 
part of the Murray transaction.  Attorney Krill's lawyer sent the 
OLR a letter stating that Attorney Krill was in litigation with 
D.R. and that while Attorney Krill sought to cooperate with the 
OLR, "providing information to your office places Krill at a 
disadvantage in the civil lawsuit."  The letter contained no 
substantive response and included no documentation. 
J.S. Matter (Counts 18-20) 
¶30 J.S. sought financing to launch a new business venture.  
In late April or early May 2015, Attorney Krill and J.S. discussed 
J.S.'s involvement in one of Murray's "investment opportunities."  
J.S. loaned $5,400 to Murray.  Attorney Krill agreed to guaranty 
the return of the loan by executing a promissory note payable to 
J.S.  
¶31 In May 2015, consistent with the "agreement," J.S. wired 
$5,400 to Attorney Krill's trust account in consideration of 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
12 
 
Attorney Krill executing a promissory note payable in 30 days to 
J.S. for $5,400 principal and $5,400 interest.  The note stated 
that "proceeds from this loan shall be used to finalize the release 
of funding from Echo Bank, South Africa in the amount of 
$1,800,000.00."  The note also stated that "[a]s additional 
consideration for this loan [J.S.] shall be entitled to a payment 
of $300,000.00 from said tranche of funds which will be 
incorporated into a total equity investment" in J.S.'s business 
venture for which she sought financing.  In May 2015, Attorney 
Krill issued a check payable to himself from the trust account in 
the sum of $5,800.  
¶32 The statements in the promissory note regarding the 
"release" of funding from Echo Bank in South Africa and the 
purported deposit of "$l6.2 million" at the Federal Reserve were 
false and fraudulent.  Attorney Krill recklessly disregarded 
whether the transactions described were false and fraudulent.  
¶33 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to respond 
to J.S.'s grievance.  Attorney Krill responded, but failed to 
provide requested information and denied the transaction was 
fraudulent.  He attached a letter purportedly from the London, 
U.K., solicitor, Harvey Graham, denying that Attorney Krill 
engaged in any kind of fraudulent transaction.  The OLR determined 
that the Graham Letter was false and fraudulent.  Attorney Krill 
has neither repaid J.S. nor provided an accounting. 
L.P. Matter (Count 21) 
¶34 In response to an inquiry from the OLR, L.P. told the 
OLR that Attorney Krill had solicited him to participate in one of 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
13 
 
Murray's "investment opportunities."  In May 2015, L.P. gave 
Attorney Krill $25,000.  Attorney Krill deposited the funds into 
his trust account and used the funds to wire transfer $24,600 to 
an account in the United Kingdom.  The OLR asked Attorney Krill to 
detail the various aspects of the transactions.  Attorney Krill 
received several extensions of time but did not respond to the 
OLR.  
J.A. Matter (Counts 22-24) 
¶35 In November 2014, a fire destroyed commercial property 
owned by J.A.  With the assistance of D.R. (whose interactions 
with Attorney Krill were discussed supra at ¶¶21-29), J.A. 
submitted an insurance claim.  The parties settled and the insurer 
issued a check in the sum of $235,721.32 payable to J.A.  The check 
was endorsed and D.R. deposited the check into a business account 
pending purchase of new property. 
¶36 J.A. then retained Attorney Krill for assistance with a 
second insurance claim.  After the insurance proceeds described 
above had been deposited, D.R. told J.A. that Attorney Krill should 
hold certain of J.A.'s funds in trust until J.A. found another 
property to purchase.  During the summer of 2015, D.R. transferred 
$107,000 of J.A.'s money into Attorney Krill's trust account for 
purposes of investing the funds with one of Murray's "investment 
opportunities." 
¶37 In January 2016, Attorney Krill prepared an agreement 
pursuant to which J.A. agreed to loan funds for a "Private Banking" 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
14 
 
transaction.2  Pursuant to the agreement, J.A. was to be repaid 
$235,721 within 30 days after release of the funds from the private 
banking transaction and was to receive $500,000 within 60 days of 
the release of the funds from the private banking transaction.  
J.A. has not received either the entire $235,721 or the $500,000 
investment funds that was to be paid under the agreement.   
¶38 In September 2017, J.A. filed a grievance against 
Attorney Krill with the OLR.  The OLR asked Attorney Krill to 
detail the various aspects of the transactions and to identify the 
transfers of funds made by D.R.  Attorney Krill requested follow-
up information and sought several extensions of time, but never 
provided the requested information and has not provided J.A. any 
accounting for the use of the funds deposited in Attorney Krill's 
trust account.3 
¶39 Attorney Krill's misconduct violated a number of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  The stipulation 
provided and the referee concluded that by failing to hold client 
                                                 
2 The agreement refers to the sum of $147,000, but the OLR 
could only verify the transfer of $107,000 from accounts controlled 
by D.R. to Attorney Krill's trust account.  Again, these funds 
belonged to J.A. 
3 On or about October 10, 2017, J.A. filed a claim with the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection ("Fund") seeking 
reimbursement from the Fund in the sum of $235,721 for the loss 
incurred due to Attorney Krill's misconduct in relation to the 
insurance proceeds.  On or about March 27, 2017, the Fund paid 
J.A. the sum of $147,000. 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
15 
 
funds in trust, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:1.l5(b)(l)4 in the 
AMSAH matter (Count 1).  
¶40 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
by disbursing proceeds without providing his clients or any other 
interested party an accounting, Attorney Krill violated former 
SCR 20:1.l5(d)(2) and/or SCR 20:1.15(e)(2)5 in the following 
client matters:  AMSAH (Count 2), R.G (Count 9), D.R. (Count 13) 
J.S. (Count 18) and J.A. (Count 22). 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd 
parties that is in the lawyer's possession in connection 
with a representation.  All funds of clients and 3rd 
parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with 
a representation shall be deposited in one or more 
identifiable trust accounts. 
5 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. Ct. 
Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former 
SCR 
20:1.15(d)(2) 
was 
renumbered 
as 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(2).  The text of the rule was not changed 
and provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 
3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or 3rd party any funds or other property that the client 
or 3rd party is entitled to receive.   
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
16 
 
¶41 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
by making cash withdrawals from his trust account, Attorney Krill 
violated former SCR 20:1.l5(j)(3)a. and/or SCR 20:1.15(f)(2)6 in 
the AMSAH matter (Counts 3-4).  
¶42 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
by knowingly making false statements of fact to a tribunal 
regarding his purported investment of client funds proceeds, 
Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(l)7 in the AMSAH matter 
(Count 5). 
¶43 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
by knowingly disobeying orders of the court, leading to the court 
holding him in contempt, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:3.4(c)8 in 
the AMSAH matter (Count 6).  
                                                 
6 Former 
SCR 
20:1.15(j)(3)a. 
was 
renumbered 
as 
SCR 20:1.15(f)(2).  The text of the rule was not changed and 
provides:  "No withdrawal of cash shall be made from a trust 
account or from a deposit to a trust account.  No check shall be 
made payable to 'Cash.'  No withdrawal shall be made from a trust 
account by automated teller or cash dispensing machine." 
7 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made 
to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
8 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an 
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists."   
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
17 
 
¶44 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:8.4(c)9 (Misconduct) as follows: 
 By disbursing client proceeds without authorization 
from his clients or the court, thereby converting the 
proceeds (AMSAH Matter, Count 7); 
 By drafting and providing R.G. with the NDA and the 
agreement while recklessly disregarding whether there 
was a non-fraudulent "Private Banking" transaction 
(R.G. Matter, Count 10);  
 By representing that various documents were legitimate, 
while recklessly disregarding whether the documents 
were in fact false and/or fraudulent (D.R. Matter, Count 
14); 
 By making the statements to J.S. in the promissory note 
referencing an investment at Echo Bank, South Africa in 
the amount of $1,800,000, with a further promise of 
payment of $300,000, while recklessly disregarding 
whether the statements were false and/or fraudulent 
(J.S. Matter, Count 19); and 
 By preparing the agreement to ratify the use of J.A's 
funds for investment with Attorney Krill's client under 
circumstances 
where 
he 
recklessly 
disregarded 
information suggesting that the purported investment 
opportunity was fraudulent (J.A. Matter, Count 23). 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
18 
 
¶45 The stipulation further provided and the referee 
concluded that by failing to timely respond to the OLR's notice of 
formal investigation, failing to provide the OLR information 
responsive to the OLR's inquiries, by unilaterally postponing a 
scheduled investigative interview, and by providing false and 
misleading information to the OLR, Attorney Krill violated 
SCR 22.03(2)10 and SCR 22.03(6),11 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)12 in 
the following matters: AMSAH (Count 8), R.G. (Count 11), D.R. 
                                                 
10 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts and 
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may allow 
additional time to respond.  Following receipt of the 
response, the director may conduct further investigation 
and may compel the respondent to answer questions, 
furnish documents, and present any information deemed 
relevant to the investigation.   
11 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents 
and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are 
misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in 
the grievance."  
12 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by SCR 
21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR 
22.04(1)." 
 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
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(Counts 15 and 17), J.S. (Count 20), L.P. (Count 21), and J.A. 
(Count 24). 
¶46 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that 
by representing Murray in ways that were directly adverse to J.A. 
without obtaining the clients' informed consent, Attorney Krill 
violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(l)13 (D.R. Matter, Count 12).  
¶47 Finally, the stipulation provided and the referee 
concluded that by entering into a business transaction regarding 
his condominium with his client D.R., without preparing a writing 
detailing the terms of the transaction, advising D.R. of the 
desirability of seeking counsel, and obtaining D.R.'s informed 
consent in writing, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:1.8(a)14 (D.R. 
Matter, Count 16). 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.7(a)(1) provides:  "Except as provided in par. 
(b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict 
of interest exists if the representation of one client will be 
directly adverse to another client." 
14 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
enter 
into 
a 
business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless:  
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by 
the client;  
(2) the client is advised in writing of the 
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 
counsel on the transaction; and  
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
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¶48 Attorney Krill pled no contest to each of the 24 counts 
of misconduct.  The parties' stipulation recites that Attorney 
Krill understands the allegations of the complaint, that he enters 
the stipulation freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and that he 
understands that he had a right to contest the matters and consult 
with and be represented by counsel.  The parties stipulated that 
a three-year suspension was appropriate discipline, to be imposed 
retroactive to the date of Attorney Krill's temporary suspension.  
The referee agreed, and also recommended restitution and payment 
of the judgment entered against Attorney Krill in the AMSAH matter 
as a condition of reinstatement, both as stipulated by the parties, 
as well as costs. 
¶49 No appeal was filed from the referee's report and 
recommendation, so our review proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).  
When reviewing a report and recommendation in an attorney 
disciplinary proceeding, we affirm a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 
N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's conclusions of law on a de 
novo basis.  Id.  We determine the appropriate level of discipline 
given the particular facts of each case, independent of the 
referee's recommendation, but benefitting from it.  In Re 
                                                 
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing the client 
in the transaction. 
No. 
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Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶50 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
which the parties have stipulated and as adopted by the referee.  
We now turn to the appropriate sanction for Attorney Krill's 
misconduct.   
¶51 A lengthy suspension is clearly required.  Indeed, the 
OLR initially sought revocation.  The parties then stipulated that 
a 
three-year 
suspension 
would 
be 
appropriate, 
commencing 
retroactive to August 23, 2017, the date when Attorney Krill's 
license to practice law was temporarily suspended by this court.  
¶52 The referee described this as one of the most serious 
cases he has seen.  The referee acknowledged that entering into 
the stipulation obviated the need for a three-day evidentiary 
hearing, but expressed concern that the length of suspension was 
insufficient.  He noted that Attorney Krill has engaged in delay 
tactics throughout these proceedings.  Attorney Krill also failed 
to cooperate with the OLR's investigation regarding the advance 
fee scheme matters.  Attorney Krill lied to the circuit court and 
was jailed for contempt for failing to comply with the court's 
orders to return and account for client money.  
¶53 The referee considered three cases involving conversion 
in which this court imposed an 18-month license suspension, albeit 
for conversion of lesser amounts or where mitigating circumstances 
were present.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jelinske, 
2018 WI 94, 383 Wis. 2d 604, 917 N.W.2d 542; In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Voss, 2014 WI 75, 356 Wis. 2d 382, 850 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
22 
 
N.W.2d 190; and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meisel, 
2017 WI 40, 374 Wis. 2d 655, 893 N.W.2d 558.  Ultimately, the 
referee was persuaded to recommend a three-year suspension, 
imposed retroactive to the temporary license suspension. 
¶54 After careful deliberation, we conclude that a three-
year suspension, imposed retroactive to the temporary suspension, 
is insufficient in light of Attorney Krill’s egregious misconduct.  
It is this court's responsibility to determine the appropriate 
discipline to be imposed for an attorney's misconduct.   In making 
that determination, we are free to impose discipline more or less 
severe than that recommended by the referee.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Elliott, 133 Wis. 2d 110, 394 N.W.2d 313 
(1986);  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39, 
279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894.  In determining discipline we 
consider: (1) the seriousness, nature, and extent of the 
misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed to protect the 
public, the courts, and the legal system from repetition of the 
attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress upon the attorney 
the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter other 
attorneys from committing similar misconduct.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Mulligan, 2015 WI 96, 365 Wis. 2d 43, 870 
N.W.2d 233 (citations omitted).  
¶55 We acknowledge the sanctions brief filed with the 
referee, in which the OLR provided case law in support of the 
recommended three-year suspension.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gatzke, 2016 WI 37, 368 Wis. 2d 422, 878 
N.W.2d 668 
(imposing 
three-year 
suspension 
for 
misconduct 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
23 
 
including the lawyer investing his client's funds in businesses 
where Attorney Gatzke was an investor when he did not first obtain 
the client's written consent, converting some of these funds, and 
then failing to account for the funds); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against D'Arruda, 2015 WI 62, 362 Wis. 2d 760, 864 
N.W.2d 873 (imposing  three-year suspension for 42 counts of 
misconduct that affected 12 clients, that included violation of 
trust account rules, false statements to a tribunal, acts of 
dishonesty, 
and 
failure 
to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
OLR's 
investigation).   
¶56 However, 
imposition 
of 
a 
retroactive 
three-year 
suspension would render Attorney Krill eligible to petition for 
reinstatement not long after the date of this order, an outcome 
the court finds untenable.  Moreover, we consider the audacity and 
scope of the misconduct extremely troubling.  We consider this 
case more akin to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against George, 
2008 WI 21, 308 Wis. 2d 50, 746 N.W.2d 236, where we suspended 
Attorney George following his conviction in federal court, on entry 
of a guilty plea, of one count of conspiracy to commit offenses 
against federal program funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 for 
his involvement in a plan in which he accepted "kickbacks" in 
exchange for exercising his political influence over federal 
grants as well as programs financed by state revenues.  We have 
determined that a four and one-half year suspension is appropriate 
in this matter. 
¶57 Consistent with our past practice we will make this 
suspension retroactive to the date we imposed a temporary 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
24 
 
suspension based on our concern that the misconduct alleged posed 
a danger to the public.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Knickmeier, 
2004 
WI 
115, 
275 
Wis. 2d 69, 
683 
N.W.2d 445 
(attorney's license revocation made effective as of the date of 
the court's order temporarily suspending respondent's license).   
¶58 We emphasize that Attorney Krill will remained barred 
from practicing law in Wisconsin unless and until he proves his 
fitness in a formal reinstatement proceeding.  Moreover, as a 
condition of any future reinstatement, Attorney Krill shall 
demonstrate that he has paid the $301,412.41 judgment he owes to 
the defendants in City of Racine v. AMSAH, LLC, Racine County 
Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.15 
¶59 We further agree that Attorney Krill should be ordered 
to pay restitution as stipulated by the parties and recommended by 
the referee:  $17,500 to R.G. and $5,400 to J.S.16   
                                                 
15 The referee and the OLR's sanction brief state an amount 
of $301.442.41.  The complaint and the docket entries from the 
Racine County case reflect the amount of the judgment is 
$301,412.41.  We use this figure.  Neither the stipulation nor the 
referee specifically required Attorney Krill to satisfy the 
$48,000 judgment imposed for contempt sanctions as a condition to 
any future reinstatement.  However, the question whether this 
judgment has been satisfied will be part of the standard 
reinstatement inquiry.  SCR 22.29(4m). 
16 With respect to restitution, in its first complaint the OLR 
requested the court order Attorney Krill to pay $124,900 in 
restitution to D.R.  The OLR later determined that these funds 
actually belonged to J.A., so it did not pursue this restitution 
request.   
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
25 
 
¶60 Finally, because this case presents no extraordinary 
circumstances and no objection to costs has been filed, we 
determine that Attorney Krill should be required to pay the full 
costs of this proceeding.  See SCR 22.24(1m) (supreme court's 
general policy upon a finding of misconduct is to impose all costs 
upon the respondent attorney). 
¶61 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael M. Krill to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of four and 
one-half years, commencing the date of his temporary license 
suspension, August 23, 2017. 
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Michael M. Krill shall pay as restitution $17,500 to 
R.G. and $5,400 to J.S. 
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a condition of any future 
reinstatement, Michael M. Krill shall pay the $301,412.41 judgment 
                                                 
In its first amended complaint, the OLR added a request that 
this court award restitution to L.P. in the amount of $25,000.  
The OLR later determined that L.P. owed Attorney Krill attorney 
fees in excess of this amount.  Accordingly, the OLR did not pursue 
this restitution request.  
In its second amended complaint, the OLR requested the court 
direct Attorney Krill to reimburse the Fund for a payment of 
$147,000 made to J.A.  The OLR later determined that it would not 
seek an order directing Attorney Krill to reimburse the Fund with 
respect to J.A.  The OLR explains, in its restitution statement 
filed October 7, 2019, that it has determined that J.A. received 
more from the Fund ($124,000) than it could confirm Attorney Krill 
transferred from his trust account ($107,000).  In addition, in a 
related matter, Attorney Krill surrendered his condominium to 
D.R., so the OLR has determined that Attorney Krill "gave up more 
in the matter than the $107,000 of [J.A.'s] funds actually in his 
trust account."  We accede to the OLR's recommendation with respect 
to restitution in these client matters.   
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
26 
 
entered against him in favor of Z.H. and S.A. in City of Racine v. 
AMSAH, LLC, Racine County Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.  
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Michael M. Krill shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the full costs of this proceeding, which are $21,247.90 
as of October 23, 2019. 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified 
above and satisfaction of the judgment is to be completed prior to 
paying costs to the Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael M. Krill shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person 
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended. 
¶67 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
No. 
2017AP2435-D   
 
 
 
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