Title: Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP35 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David Rasmussen and Lisa A. Lindsay, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
General Motors Corporation, General Motors of 
Canada,  
Ltd., Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor Company of 
Canada,  
Ltd., Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor 
Sales USA,  
Inc., Toyota Canada, Inc., Honda Motor Company, 
Ltd.,  
American Honda Motor Company, Inc., Honda 
Canada, Inc.,  
Daimler Chrysler, Daimler Chrysler Canada, Inc., 
Mercedes  
Benz Canada, Inc., Nissan North America, Inc., 
Nissan  
Canada, Inc., BMW of North America, Inc., BMW 
Canada,  
National Automobile Dealers Association and 
Canadian  
Automobile Dealers Association, 
          Defendants, 
Nissan Motor Co., Limited, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 326 Wis. 2d 264, 787 N.W.2d 59 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Franke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
and oral argument by Owen Thomas Armstrong, Jr., von Briesen & 
Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs and oral 
argument by Daniel L. Goldberg, Bingham McCutchen, LLP, Boston, 
MA. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Katherine Stadler, 
Bryan J. Cahill and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison and Andrew C. 
Cook, Madison for the Wisconsin Civil Justice Council, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jamison E. Lynch and 
Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago and Dan Himmelfarb (admitted pro hac 
vice), Brian J. Wong (admitted pro hac vice) and Mayer Brown 
LLP, Washington, DC. For the Association of International 
Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. and the Organization for the 
International Investment. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2007AP35 
(L.C. No. 
2003CV8337) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David Rasmussen and Lisa A. Lindsay, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
General Motors Corporation, General Motors of 
Canada, Ltd., Ford Motor Company, Ford Motor 
Company of Canada, Ltd., Toyota Motor 
Corporation, Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 
Toyota Canada, Inc., Honda Motor Company, Ltd.,  
America Honda Motor Company, Inc., Honda 
Canada, Inc., Daimler Chrysler, Daimler 
Chrysler Canada, Inc., Mercedes Benz Canada, 
Inc., Nissan North America, Inc., Nissan 
Canada, Inc., BMW of North America, Inc., BMW 
Canada, National Automobile Dealers Association 
and Canadian Automobile Dealers Association, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Nissan Motor Co., Limited, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
2 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
circuit 
court's2 
order 
dismissing 
for 
lack 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction a defendant, the Japan-based Nissan Motor Company 
(Nissan Japan), from David Rasmussen's (Rasmussen) class-action 
lawsuit.  The issue presented to this court is whether Wisconsin 
has 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
Nissan 
Japan.3  
Accordingly, we are asked to address whether under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(d) (2007-08),4 Wisconsin's long-arm statute granting 
general personal jurisdiction over individuals engaged in 
"substantial and not isolated activities within" Wisconsin, 
Nissan Japan is subject to general personal jurisdiction here.  
If the answer to that question is yes, we are asked to decide 
whether the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over 
Nissan Japan comports with due process.   
¶2 
Rasmussen contends that Wisconsin has general personal 
jurisdiction over Nissan Japan5 under Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) 
                                                 
1 Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 2007AP35, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 2010). 
2 The Honorable John A. Franke of Milwaukee County presided.  
3 Rasmussen seeks only general personal jurisdiction before 
us; however, at the circuit court, Rasmussen sought both general 
personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Nissan Japan is a corporation organized and existing under 
the laws of Japan.  Nissan North America, Inc. is a corporation 
organized 
and 
existing under the laws of the State of 
California.  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
3 
 
based on the "substantial and not isolated activities" of Nissan 
North America, Inc. (Nissan North America),6 Nissan Japan's 
wholly owned subsidiary.  For the reasons set out below, we 
conclude that even assuming arguendo that Nissan North America 
were the agent of Nissan Japan, absent control by Nissan Japan 
sufficient to cause us to disregard the separate corporate 
identities of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America, the 
activities of the subsidiary corporation are insufficient to 
subject its nonresident parent corporation to general personal 
jurisdiction under § 801.05(1)(d).  We also conclude that 
Rasmussen has not met his burden to show that the corporate 
separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be 
disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in 
Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan.  Accordingly, the 
statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction under 
§ 801.05(1)(d) have not been met.   
¶3 
Because we conclude that the statutory requirements 
for general personal jurisdiction have not been met, we need not 
discuss whether exercising general personal jurisdiction over 
Nissan Japan comports with due process.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.  
                                                 
6 Nissan North America, Inc. was formerly known as Nissan 
USA, and at points throughout the record is referred to as such.  
However, at the time of this litigation, its name had been 
changed to Nissan North America, Inc.   
No. 
2007AP35   
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On September 18, 2003, Rasmussen filed a class-action 
complaint 
against 
numerous 
automobile 
companies, 
including 
Nissan Japan and its wholly owned subsidiary, Nissan North 
America.  The complaint alleges that the automobile company 
defendants violated Wisconsin's antitrust and conspiracy laws.  
Namely, Rasmussen alleges that defendants conspired to restrain 
"competition in the sale and lease of new cars in Wisconsin and 
throughout the United States" by "eliminat[ing] the import[ing] 
of [lower priced] new cars from Canada into the United States 
and thereby rais[ing], fix[ing], stabiliz[ing] or maintain[ing] 
prices of new automobiles sold or leased in the State of 
Wisconsin . . . at artificially high levels."7   
¶5 
The complaint further alleges that in an effort to 
advance a price-fixing scheme, the defendants required their 
United States dealers to, among other things, refuse to honor 
new car warranties on cars imported from Canada and refuse to 
provide recall information relating to new cars imported from 
Canada.8  According to the complaint, the defendants required 
their Canadian car dealers to investigate prospective buyers in 
an effort to identify buyers who may export the automobiles for 
resale in the United States, and to refuse to sell to those 
buyers.9  Rasmussen alleged that Canadian dealers were also 
                                                 
7 Compl., ¶¶72-73. 
8 Id., ¶74. 
9 Id., ¶75. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
5 
 
required to enter into "No Export" agreements with their 
customers that required the customer to pay a percentage of the 
car's value if the car was later found to have been resold in 
the United States.10   
¶6 
On December 22, 2003, Nissan Japan moved to dismiss 
the action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.  With 
regard to Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d),11 Nissan Japan argued that 
it fell outside the scope of this provision because it did not 
engage in any activities, much less substantial activities, in 
Wisconsin.  Moreover, Nissan Japan argued that it was not 
subject to personal jurisdiction based on the activities of 
Nissan North America because Nissan Japan and Nissan North 
America are separate and distinct corporations, with their own 
respective employees, facilities and records.  In addition, 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 For the purposes of this opinion, the relevant portions 
of Wisconsin's long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05, read: 
Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally.  A court 
of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has 
jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to 
s. 801.11 under any of the following circumstances: 
(1) Local presence or status.  In any action whether 
arising within or without this state, against a defendant 
who when the action is commenced:  
. . .  
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated 
activities within this state, whether such activities are 
wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
6 
 
Nissan Japan maintained that Nissan North America has never been 
an agent or instrumentality of Nissan Japan.   
¶7 
On April 5, 2004, a hearing was held on Nissan Japan's 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Following 
the hearing, the circuit court12 denied Nissan Japan's motion 
without prejudice.  The circuit court then ordered a period of 
jurisdictional discovery, after which time Nissan Japan would be 
free to renew its motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.13  
¶8 
After more than two years of discovery, the circuit 
court held a jurisdictional hearing.  At that hearing, Rasmussen 
argued that general personal jurisdiction was proper under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) for two reasons.  First, Rasmussen argued 
that under the definition of "manufacturer" in Wisconsin's Lemon 
Law, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, Nissan North America is the agent of 
Nissan Japan, and therefore it is proper to impute the 
                                                 
12 The Honorable Dennis P. Moroney of Milwaukee County 
presided over many of the initial hearings.  
13 Rasmussen filed a motion to compel discovery on June 4, 
2004.  On June 24, 2004, the circuit court ordered Nissan Japan 
to respond to specific discovery requests of Rasmussen.    The 
court also appointed a Special Master to handle any future 
discovery disputes.  As part of the discovery process, the 
parties entered into a Joint Written Report of the stipulations 
agreed upon by the parties.  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
7 
 
activities of Nissan North America to Nissan Japan.14  Second, 
Rasmussen 
argued 
that 
under 
the 
alter-ego 
theory 
of 
jurisdiction, Nissan Japan had sufficient control over Nissan 
North 
America 
to 
warrant 
exercise 
of 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction over Nissan Japan.15   
¶9 
Nissan Japan contended that Rasmussen's Lemon Law-
agency argument had no merit because Nissan Japan is not a 
warrantor and Nissan Japan has never been brought into any Lemon 
                                                 
14 At the circuit court hearing, Rasmussen acknowledged that 
this was the first time Wisconsin's Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171, was mentioned as a basis for general personal 
jurisdiction.  Rasmussen's attorney admitted, "And there's a 
particular statute that I'm embarrassed not to have called to 
the Court's attention before . . . that statute, Your Honor, is 
218.0171(c)."  
15 At oral arguments to this court, however, Rasmussen 
mentioned a slightly different agency-based ground on which he 
contended 
that 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction over Nissan Japan.  Rasmussen argued that Nissan 
North America and Nissan North America's dealers perform Nissan 
Japan's nondelegable contractual duties in Wisconsin under 
Wisconsin's Lemon Law.  "The [L]emon [L]aw is a warranty 
enforcement statute."  Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, 
¶26, 
234 
Wis. 2d 
670, 
610 
N.W.2d 
832; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(a).  However, it does not necessarily make the 
automobile dealers the agents of the manufacturer.  Malone v. 
Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 190 Wis. 2d 436, 442-43, 526 
N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1994).  Furthermore, nothing in the record 
supports the contention that Nissan Japan has any warranty 
obligations in Wisconsin. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
8 
 
Law case "under any theory let alone a theory of agency."16  
Moreover, with regard to the alter-ego theory of jurisdiction, 
Nissan Japan argued that the day-to-day functioning of Nissan 
North America is reserved to Nissan North America, and there is 
no basis to conclude that the relationship between Nissan Japan 
and Nissan North America contravenes corporate formalities.   
¶10 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court 
made findings of fact on the jurisdictional issues that relate 
to the conspiracy to price fix that Rasmussen alleged.  The 
findings relevant to this review are: 
• "In terms of general jurisdiction under Section 
801.05(1)(d), it seems absolutely clear that this 
section cannot be satisfied directly.  It is only 
satisfied if one accepts the plaintiffs' argument and 
alleged showing that the activities of the subsidiary 
should be imputed to the parent."   
• "[A]s to Nissan Japan . . ., there is not evidence of 
complete control or the sort of domination that 
requires that we fold one corporate entity into 
another 
for 
these 
purposes. 
 
There's 
been 
no 
significant showing, no showing at all really that 
corporate formalities were disregarded and certainly 
no evidence of fraud or undercapitalization." 
• "[T]here has not been a showing that there was not 
independent decision-making by the subsidiary."   
                                                 
16 Counsel for Nissan Japan also contended that by arguing 
for the first time that there was general personal jurisdiction 
based on the Lemon Law, Rasmussen violated his duties to respond 
to interrogatories.  Nissan had served Rasmussen with an 
interrogatory asking the bases for jurisdiction, and in the 
response, Rasmussen did not mention a Lemon Law basis.  In 
rebuttal arguments, Rasmussen argued he did not violate the duty 
to respond to interrogatories because "in the plaintiffs' 
discovery responses to Nissan, we had indicated we believed 
there was agency.  We simply had not cited 218.0171."   
No. 
2007AP35   
 
9 
 
• "There appears to have been observance of formal 
corporate legal requirements, at least no showing to 
the contrary."17  
¶11 Based on these findings of fact, the circuit court 
concluded that "there has clearly been a failure to demonstrate 
the corporate veil ought to be pierced[,] or that on any other 
theory, jurisdiction over Nissan Japan could be obtained because 
the subsidiary was simply a tool or an extension of the parent."  
Accordingly, the court dismissed Nissan Japan from the suit 
based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.  
¶12 Rasmussen appealed and the court of appeals affirmed 
the dismissal.  Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 2007AP35, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 2010).  The court of 
appeals, relying on Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 31 F. Supp. 
2d 660 (W.D. Wis. 1998), held that "the only provision of 
[Wisconsin's] personal jurisdiction statute authorizing personal 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on an agency 
relationship with its subsidiary is Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4)(a), 
which allows for specific personal jurisdiction."  Rasmussen, 
No. 2007AP35, unpublished slip op., ¶23.  Therefore, an agency 
theory provides no basis on which to ground general personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to § 801.05(1)(d), based on the acts of 
the nonresident parent's subsidiary.  Id.  The court noted, "the 
corporate 
structure 
and 
corresponding 
presumption 
of 
                                                 
17 These findings of fact have not been challenged on 
appeal. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
10 
 
separateness requires more than an agency theory to assert 
general jurisdiction over a parent corporation."18  Id.   
¶13 We granted review and now affirm the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 Whether 
there 
is 
personal 
jurisdiction 
under 
Wisconsin's long-arm statute is a question of law that we review 
independently.  Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 99, ¶10, 
245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662.  While our review is 
independent, we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, 
¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4.  We will not reverse the 
factual findings of the circuit court unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  Stated otherwise, findings 
of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are contrary 
to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  
State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 
748.  
B.  Long-Arm Personal Jurisdiction Principles 
                                                 
18 Rasmussen advanced two additional arguments to the court 
of appeals:  (1) that there was specific personal jurisdiction 
over Nissan Japan pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4); and (2) 
that if the court concluded that there was no personal 
jurisdiction over Nissan Japan, the case should be remanded to 
allow Rasmussen to conduct jurisdictional discovery directly on 
Nissan Japan.   Rasmussen, No. 2007AP35, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶24-31.  The court of appeals held against Rasmussen on both 
accounts.  Rasmussen does not challenge the conclusion that 
there is no basis for specific personal jurisdiction over Nissan 
Japan or the denial of additional discovery. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
11 
 
¶15 Under 
Wisconsin's 
long-arm 
statute, 
personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is of two basic types:  
general 
personal 
jurisdiction 
and 
specific 
personal 
jurisdiction.19  If general personal jurisdiction is accorded 
over a nonresident defendant, the defendant may be brought 
before Wisconsin courts for claims that are unrelated to the 
defendant's activities in Wisconsin.  Insolia, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 
668.  On the other hand, specific personal jurisdiction is more 
limited in nature.  In the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction, 
the 
claim 
for 
relief 
for 
which 
personal 
jurisdiction is sought must be substantially connected to or 
arise out of the defendant's contacts with Wisconsin.  Id.   
¶16 In determining whether personal jurisdiction may be 
exercised over a nonresident defendant, we employ a two-step 
inquiry.  Kopke, 245 Wis. 2d 396, ¶8.  The first step is to 
determine whether the defendant meets the criteria for personal 
jurisdiction under the Wisconsin long-arm statute.  Id.  If the 
requirements set out in the long-arm statute are satisfied, 
"then 
the 
court 
must 
consider 
whether 
the 
exercise 
of 
jurisdiction comports with due process requirements."  Id. at 
409. 
                                                 
19 "Personal jurisdiction" is distinct from "subject matter 
jurisdiction" in that personal jurisdiction refers to the 
court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a given individual.  
See generally, State v. Muentner, 138 Wis. 2d 374, 382, 406 
N.W.2d 415 (1987).  By contrast, subject matter jurisdiction is 
the power under the Wisconsin Constitution to hear a particular 
controversy.  See Vill. of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶8, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190.  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
12 
 
¶17 The plaintiff has a "minimal burden" of showing that 
the statutory and constitutional requirements are met.  Id.  In 
performing 
this jurisdictional analysis, "we may consider 
documentary 
evidence 
and 
weigh 
affidavits 
in 
reaching 
a 
determination as to whether this burden has been met.  Factual 
doubts are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff."  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Finally, the 
Wisconsin long-arm statute is to be construed liberally in favor 
of the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Clement v. United 
Cerebral Palsy of S.E. Wis., Inc., 87 Wis. 2d 327, 332, 274 
N.W.2d 688 (1979).     
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) 
¶18 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1), Wisconsin courts 
may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a defendant when 
that defendant takes up "local presence or status" within the 
state.20  See Druschel v. Cloeren, 2006 WI App 190, ¶¶7-8, 295 
Wis. 2d 858, 723 N.W.2d 430.  Subsection (d) provides that a 
nonresident defendant has the requisite "local presence or 
status" when he or she "[i]s engaged in substantial and not 
isolated activities within this state, whether such activities 
                                                 
20 Other subsections of Wis. Stat. § 801.05 provide for the 
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a particular 
defendant.  E.g., § 801.05(4).  Specific personal jurisdiction 
is proper "when the case itself arises out of or is related to 
the defendant's contact with the state."  Druschel v. Cloeren, 
2006 WI App 190, ¶18, 295 Wis. 2d 858, 723 N.W.2d 430 (quoting 
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Motor Sport, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 
1386, 1391 (E.D. Wis. 1997)). As aforementioned, Rasmussen has 
abandoned his arguments that Nissan Japan is subject to specific 
personal jurisdiction. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
13 
 
are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise."  When the 
statutory criteria set out in § 801.05(1)(d) are met, general 
personal jurisdiction may nevertheless be limited by the 
requirements of due process.  Vt. Yogurt Co. v. Blanke Baer 
Fruit & Flavor Co., 107 Wis. 2d 603, 607, 321 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. 
App. 1982).    
¶19 In evaluating whether general personal jurisdiction 
lies over a nonresident defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(d), we must determine whether the defendant has 
engaged 
in 
"substantial 
and 
not 
isolated 
activities" 
in 
Wisconsin.21  Our examination encompasses the defendant's general 
contacts with the state.  The factors we consider are the 
quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of those 
contacts, the source and connection of the contacts to the claim 
made, 
the 
interest 
of Wisconsin in the action and the 
convenience of the parties.  Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 
Wis. 2d 638, 648, 184 N.W.2d 876 (1971).  We consider the 
jurisdictional factors in relation to each other, recognizing 
that the contacts would have to be more significant in order to 
subject a defendant to general personal jurisdiction than if 
specific personal jurisdiction were sought.  Id.   
¶20 Although we do not discuss due process directly in the 
first step of a personal jurisdiction analysis, the legislative 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) "corresponds in a general 
way to the 'doing business' statute common in other states."  
Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 Wis. 2d 638, 646, 184 N.W.2d 876 
(1971).  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
14 
 
history underlying Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) shows that the 
statutory criteria and due process are intertwined.  This is so 
because § 801.05 "was intended to provide for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent 
consistent with the requisites of due process of law."22  
Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. King Bee Mfg. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 459, 
464, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964), overruled on other grounds by 
Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp., 25 Wis. 2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 
(1964); see also Vt. Yogurt, 107 Wis. 2d at 607 (explaining that 
"the legislature's purpose in creating the various subsections 
of 
the long-arm statute was to codify the due process 
requirements of 'minimum contacts' required under International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)").  
¶21 The five factors that we have considered in our due 
process analysis are:  (1) the quantity of defendant's contacts; 
(2) the nature and quality of defendant's contacts; (3) the 
source and connection of the cause of action with those 
contacts; (4) the interests of Wisconsin in the action; and (5) 
the convenience to the parties of employing a Wisconsin forum.  
Clement, 87 Wis. 2d at 334-35; Vt. Yogurt, 107 Wis. 2d at 608.  
                                                 
22 In Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. King Bee Manufacturing Co., 
24 Wis. 2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964), overruled on other 
grounds by Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp., 25 Wis. 2d 540, 131 
N.W.2d 331 (1964), we addressed jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 262.05 (1963), the predecessor statute to Wis. Stat. § 801.05.  
However, the relevant provisions to this appeal, the former 
§ 262.05(1)(d) and the current § 801.05(1)(d), contain identical 
language.  Therefore, the purpose behind § 262.05(1)(d) is 
rightfully attributable to § 801.05(1)(d). 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
15 
 
Because of the due process concerns that underlie the statutory 
criteria for personal jurisdiction, there are occasions, such as 
occurred in Nagel discussed above, when some of the due process 
factors also are employed in the statutory analysis.  See also 
Insolia, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 668; Vt. Yogurt, 107 Wis. 2d at 608. 
¶22 Occasionally, 
the 
"substantial 
and 
not 
isolated 
activities" 
language 
has 
been 
examined 
in 
light 
of 
the 
activities of someone other than the defendant for whom personal 
jurisdiction is sought, such as an agent of a corporation or the 
subsidiary of a nonresident parent corporation.  In those 
circumstances, 
we 
examine 
the 
relationship 
between 
the 
nonresident defendant and the alleged agent or corporation who 
conducted activities in Wisconsin.  When a corporation is 
involved, 
discussions 
generally 
focus 
on 
the 
functional 
integrity, or lack thereof, of the corporate form of existence.    
¶23 In Pavalon v. Fishman, 30 Wis. 2d 228, 140 N.W.2d 263 
(1966), we were asked to determine whether the brokerage firm 
that handled Pavalon's purchase of a note and stock warrant was 
the agent of the defendant so that the court had specific 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under Wis. Stat. 
§ 262.05(5)(e) (1965).23  Id. at 233-35.  We noted that "[t]he 
general rule, in Wisconsin as well as elsewhere, is that 
brokers, whether employed for a single transaction or a series 
                                                 
23 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 262.05(5)(e) 
(1965), 
a 
provision 
involving specific personal jurisdiction, is not part of the 
current statutory scheme relative to personal jurisdiction of 
nonresident defendants. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
16 
 
of transactions, are agents."  Id. at 235.  The circuit court 
concluded that an agency relationship existed based on this 
general principle, as well as on several documents that listed 
the brokerage firm as "agent."  Id.   
¶24 While Pavalon could be cited as support for the 
premise that the acts of an agent may be sufficient to support 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
under some circumstances, no Wisconsin appellate court has held 
that an agency relationship, without consideration of any other 
factor, is sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant.24  As Insolia correctly notes, no 
other provision of Wisconsin's long-arm statute besides Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.05(4), 
which 
relates 
to 
specific 
personal 
jurisdiction, "supports the exercise of jurisdiction based on an 
agency theory."  Insolia, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 671.  Specific 
personal jurisdiction is not at issue in the case before us. 
¶25 Although the concept of piercing the corporate veil 
generally is associated with attaching liability for corporate 
actions to someone other than the corporation, the analysis is 
somewhat similar to the analysis we employ in evaluating whether 
there is general personal jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 801.05 
                                                 
24 In Pavlic v. Woodrum, 169 Wis. 2d 585, 486 N.W.2d 533 
(Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals considered specific 
personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4).  Id. 
at 590-91.  The court of appeals concluded that a shareholder-
officer was not the agent of the failed corporation such that 
there was specific personal jurisdiction over the shareholder-
director.  The court of appeals did not examine general personal 
jurisdiction in Pavlic.  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
17 
 
over a nonresident defendant for the acts of another.  Consider, 
for example, Consumer's Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 142 
Wis. 2d 465, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988), where we were asked to 
pierce the corporate veil and impute the actions of a 
corporation to its shareholders so that a judgment against the 
corporation would become the shareholders' liability.  Id. at 
470.  We noted that under the law, a corporation is treated as 
an entity separate from its shareholders and that separateness 
is not to be lightly disregarded.  Id. at 474.  However, we 
explained that corporate separateness could be disregarded when 
observing it "would accomplish some fraudulent purpose, operate 
as a constructive fraud, or defeat some strong equitable claim."  
Id. at 475 (quoting Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Wis., 
203 Wis. 493, 496, 234 N.W. 748 (1931)).  We also explained that 
corporate 
separateness 
could 
be 
disregarded 
where 
the 
shareholders "made no serious attempt to hold corporate meetings 
or to maintain records of corporate meetings and that the 
corporation had no substantial assets."  Id. (brackets and 
citation omitted).  We concluded that the plaintiff had not met 
its 
burden 
to 
show 
that 
corporate 
integrity 
should 
be 
disregarded; and therefore, we did not permit the plaintiff to 
pierce the corporate veil.  Id. at 488. 
¶26 The relationship between corporations has generated 
significant discussion about the conditions under which the 
actions of one corporation are sufficient to impute those 
actions to another corporation.  For example, in Kerl v. Dennis 
Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, 273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 N.W.2d 328, we 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
18 
 
examined the relationship between a franchisor and franchisee 
when plaintiffs asserted a vicarious liability claim against the 
franchisor based on the alleged negligence of the franchisee.  
We concluded that "a franchisor may be held vicariously liable 
for the tortious conduct of its franchisee only if the 
franchisor has control or a right of control over the daily 
operation of the specific aspect of the franchisee's business 
that is alleged to have caused the harm."  Id., ¶7.  We noted 
that a master servant relationship is a type of agency and 
unless the agent is also a servant, vicarious liability 
generally cannot flow to the master.  Id., ¶20.25   
¶27 In 
Conservatorship 
of 
Prom 
v. 
Sumitomo 
Rubber 
Industries, Ltd., 224 Wis. 2d 743, 592 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 
1999), the court of appeals discussed whether a corporation that 
distributed 
its 
tires 
through 
a 
wholly 
owned 
subsidiary 
transacted business in Wisconsin such that the Secretary of 
State was a proper agent for service of process on the 
corporation.  In its discussion, the court of appeals affirmed 
the long held rule that "[t]he mere existence of a parent-
subsidiary 
relationship 
between 
two 
corporations 
is 
not 
sufficient to provide a court with jurisdiction."  Id. at 760.  
                                                 
25 We did note one exception to that rule of agency, the 
nondelegable 
duty 
exception. 
 
When 
the 
agent 
performs 
nondelegable 
duties 
of 
the 
principal 
as 
an 
independent 
contractor, the agent may subject the principal to vicarious 
liability.  Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 2004 WI 86, ¶20 n.2, 
273 Wis. 2d 106, 682 N.W.2d 328 (citing Arsand v. City of 
Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 54 n.8, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978)). 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
19 
 
The court of appeals explained that in order for a subsidiary to 
provide the necessary connections to Wisconsin, "the record must 
establish that the parent corporation had control over the 
subsidiary corporation . . . to such an extent that the separate 
corporate identity of the subsidiary should be disregarded."  
Id.  The court of appeals noted that Cemetery Services, Inc. v. 
Wisconsin Department of Regulation & Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 
827, 586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998), lists 15 factors that may 
be considered in determining whether the requisite control 
exists.  Conservatorship of Prom, 224 Wis. 2d at 760-61.  
D.  Application of Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) 
¶28 In regard to whether Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) accords 
general personal jurisdiction over Nissan Japan, Rasmussen 
argues that the "substantial and not isolated activities" of 
Nissan North America are imputed to Nissan Japan either through 
an agency theory26 or because Nissan Japan exercised sufficient 
                                                 
26 Rasmussen did not advance arguments to this court as to 
why Nissan North America was Nissan Japan's agent.  Instead, 
Rasmussen argued that if a determination of whether Nissan North 
America was or was not the agent of Nissan Japan was necessary 
to our review, we should remand that question to the court of 
appeals.   
Nissan Japan asserts there is no agency relationship and 
points 
primarily 
to 
Article 
4 
of 
the 
"Sole 
Distributor 
Agreement" between Nissan Japan and Nissan North America.  
Article 4 of that agreement explicitly states that Nissan North 
America is not the agent of Nissan Japan.  While "[t]he label 
the parties attach to their relationship is informative [it is] 
not dispositive."  Kerl, 273 Wis. 2d 106, ¶44. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
20 
 
control over Nissan North America to override the corporate 
integrity of Nissan North America.27   
¶29 In a jurisdictional analysis under Wisconsin's long-
arm statute, we generally consider the quantity of contacts; the 
nature and quality of the contacts; the source and connection of 
the cause of action with those contacts; the interests of 
Wisconsin in the action; and the convenience to the parties of 
employing a Wisconsin forum.  Clement, 87 Wis. 2d 334-35; Vt. 
Yogurt, 107 Wis. 2d at 608.   
¶30 However, here, there is no dispute that Nissan North 
America has had contacts with Wisconsin that are sufficient to 
afford general personal jurisdiction over Nissan North America.  
Rather, the question presented is whether the relationship 
between Nissan Japan and Nissan North America is such that 
Nissan North America's substantial and not isolated activities 
within Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan.  Therefore, 
                                                 
27 Rasmussen also contends that, for the purposes of ch. 
801, Wis. Stat. § 801.03(1) defines "defendant" as "the person 
named as defendant in a civil action, and where in this chapter 
acts of the defendant are referred to, the reference attributes 
to the defendant any person's acts for which acts the defendant 
is legally responsible."  Rasmussen then contends that because 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) accords general personal jurisdiction 
over any defendant who "is engaged in substantial and not 
isolated activities" in Wisconsin, those "activities" encompass 
the "acts" of Nissan Japan who is a defendant.  Rasmussen 
contends that by referring to the "acts" of Nissan Japan, 
§ 801.05(1)(d) attributes to Nissan Japan any acts of its 
agents, i.e., those for whom it is legally responsible.  
However, all of this begs the question of whether Nissan Japan 
is legally responsible for the alleged torts of Nissan North 
America.  The record before us contains nothing to show that it 
is.   
No. 
2007AP35   
 
21 
 
much of our discussion is focused on the relationship between 
the two corporations and how that impacts on the question of 
general personal jurisdiction.   
¶31 We begin by underscoring that Rasmussen is seeking 
general personal jurisdiction over Nissan Japan.  We have never 
grounded general personal jurisdiction of a corporation in an 
alleged agency relationship with another corporation.  Rasmussen 
provides no citation to a State of Wisconsin appellate decision 
that does so.  
¶32 It is true that in Pavalon liability was grounded in 
an agency relationship, that of a broker and client.  However, 
we accorded only specific personal jurisdiction, i.e., a limited 
jurisdiction that focuses on specific acts of an agent in a 
specifically delineated agency relationship.  Pavalon, 30 
Wis. 2d at 235.  Specific personal jurisdiction was also 
accorded in Kopke.  There, we assessed whether a nonresident 
corporation engaged in conduct of the type described in Wis. 
Stat. § 801.05(4), which statute provides for specific, not 
general, personal jurisdiction.  Kopke, 245 Wis. 2d 396, ¶11.   
¶33 Rasmussen 
asks 
us 
to 
extend 
the 
jurisprudence 
attendant to specific personal jurisdiction that applies to acts 
of an alleged agent to general personal jurisdiction based on 
the acts of an alleged agent.  Agency is grounded in the 
"manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
consent by the other so to act."  Marten Trans., Ltd. v. 
Hartford Specialty Co., 194 Wis. 2d 1, 13-14, 533 N.W.2d 452 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
22 
 
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We agree with 
Rasmussen that a corporation may act through its agents.  State 
v. Dried Milk Prods. Co-op, 16 Wis. 2d 357, 361, 114 N.W.2d 412 
(1962).  
¶34 We note that Wis. Stat. § 801.05(4) provides for 
specific personal jurisdiction based on the acts of an agent so 
that a Wisconsin forum is not denied when the facts show that a 
Wisconsin forum should be accorded.  Pavlic v. Woodrum, 169 
Wis. 2d 585, 590-91, 486 N.W.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1992); Insolia, 31 
F. Supp. 2d at 671.  Specific personal jurisdiction is a limited 
form of personal jurisdiction well tailored to an agency 
relationship.   
¶35 However, 
in 
order 
to 
accord 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant based on an 
alleged agency relationship, there must be something more than 
merely an agency relationship.  As in other circumstances where 
general personal jurisdiction is sought for a nonresident 
defendant based on the acts of another in an alleged agency 
relationship with a subsidiary, there also must be control by 
the nonresident parent corporation sufficient to cause us to 
disregard the separate corporate identities of the subsidiary 
and the parent corporations.  See Conservatorship of Prom, 224 
Wis. 2d at 760; Insolia, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 669.  
¶36 Furthermore, Rasmussen has provided us with no reason 
why we should expand the law that provides a Wisconsin forum 
under principles applicable to specific personal jurisdiction to 
also accord a forum based on general personal jurisdiction, and 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
23 
 
we perceive none.  Accordingly, even if we were to assume, 
arguendo, that Nissan North America were the agent of Nissan 
Japan, we decline to expand Wisconsin law attendant to specific 
personal jurisdiction such that general personal jurisdiction 
may rest solely on an alleged agency relationship.    
¶37 However, as Rasmussen also asserts, we have ascribed 
actions of another to a corporation when sufficient factors were 
present to cause us to disregard the corporate existence.  See 
Clement, 87 Wis. 2d at 336-37.  Cemetery Services lists 15 
factors, by way of example, that a court may consider in 
assessing control, as it relates to corporate integrity; 
however, all factors are not relevant in all cases.  Cemetery 
Servs., 221 Wis. 2d at 826-27.28     
                                                 
28 Cemetery Services, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of 
Regulation & Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. 
App. 1998), suggested the following factors for consideration 
when a court is asked to assess corporate integrity:  (1) 
whether there is common stock ownership; (2) whether the 
corporations have 
overlapping directors and officers; (3) 
whether the corporations combine their use of corporate offices; 
(4) whether the capitalization of the subsidiary was sufficient; 
(5) whether the operations of the subsidiary are financed by the 
parent; (6) whether the parent has a controlling interest in the 
subsidiary's stock; (7) whether the parent has use of the 
subsidiary's property; (8) the extent of inter-corporate loans; 
(9) whether the parent was the incorporator of the subsidiary; 
(10) whether the parent files consolidated tax returns; (11) 
whether the subsidiary exercises independent decision-making; 
(12) 
whether 
the 
directors 
of 
the 
subsidiary 
exercise 
independent decision-making; (13) whether formal corporate legal 
requirements are observed; (14) whether there are contracts 
between the subsidiary and parent; and (15) whether the 
observance of corporate integrity will result in fraud or 
injustice to third-parties.  Id. at 826-27. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
24 
 
¶38 As we consider the applicable law and apply it to the 
facts found, we note that in assessing corporate separateness, 
Wisconsin courts have focused most directly on the amount of 
control that one corporation exercises or has the right to 
exercise over the other; whether both corporations employ 
independent decision-making; whether corporate formalities were 
observed; whether the corporations operated as one corporation; 
and 
whether 
observing 
the 
corporate 
separateness 
would 
facilitate fraud.  See Consumer's Co-op, 142 Wis. 2d at 483-84; 
Clement, 87 Wis. 2d at 336-37; Conservatorship of Prom, 224 
Wis. 2d at 760.  
¶39 Here, the circuit court found no factor that would 
weigh in favor of ignoring the separate corporate identities of 
Nissan Japan and Nissan North America.  To the contrary, the 
circuit court found that:  (1) Nissan Japan did not have 
"complete control" or "domination" of Nissan North America; (2) 
requisite corporate formalities were observed; (3) there was no 
showing that Nissan North America did not exercise independent 
decision-making; (4) there was no showing that corporate legal 
requirements were not followed; and (5) there was no showing of 
fraud or undercapitalization.  These findings have not been 
challenged, and in addition, our examination of the record shows 
that they are not clearly erroneous. 
¶40 Given the law, which presumes corporate separateness, 
and the facts found about the relationship between Nissan Japan 
and Nissan North America, we conclude that Nissan Japan did not 
have control over Nissan North America sufficient to cause us to 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
25 
 
disregard the separate corporate identities of the nonresident 
parent and the subsidiary such that we impute the acts of the 
subsidiary to the parent.  The reasoning of Insolia is 
consistent with our conclusion.   
¶41 The issue in Insolia was whether Wisconsin had general 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation 
based on the Wisconsin activities of its subsidiary.  In order 
to make the required determination, the court examined the 
degree to which the two corporations actually were separate 
entities.  In that regard, the court noted that while "[c]ourts 
begin with the presumption of corporate separateness": 
courts confronted with this issue . . . have focused 
on an additional factor:  whether the parent managed 
the subsidiary with a degree of control greater than 
that normally associated with common ownership and 
directorship.  This factor is borrowed from the so-
called 
"alter-ego" 
doctrine, 
applicable 
to 
shareholders who exert "not mere majority or complete 
stock control, but complete domination . . . so that 
the corporate entity [has] . . . no . . . separate 
existence of its own." 
Insolia, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 669 (quoting Consumer's Co-op, 142 
Wis. 2d at 484) (other internal citations and quotation omitted; 
alterations in original).  The court in Insolia concluded that 
while "'[p]arents of wholly owned subsidiaries necessarily 
control, direct and supervise the subsidiaries to some extent' 
. . . anything less than the degree of control necessary to 
pierce 
the 
parent 
corporation's 
veil 
of 
liability 
is 
insufficient 
to 
establish 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
parent."  Id. (quoting IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
26 
 
Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998)).  Insolia ultimately 
concluded that the nonresident parent was not the alter ego of 
the subsidiary and that there was no basis for disregarding the 
corporate integrity of the subsidiary; therefore, there was no 
basis on which to accord general personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident parent corporation.  Id.  
¶42 Here too, the facts found by the circuit court 
demonstrate the corporate integrity of Nissan North America has 
not been overridden by Nissan Japan's control of its subsidiary.   
¶43 The 
reasoning in Conservatorship of Prom, which 
addressed under what factual scenario service of process on the 
Secretary of State is sufficient to accord personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident corporation, is also helpful when examining 
corporate separateness.  Conservatorship of Prom, 224 Wis. 2d at 
752.  The court's reasoning is consistent with the reasoning of 
Insolia.  In Conservatorship of Prom, the court held that in 
order to employ service on the Secretary of State as service on 
the nonresident defendant based on the activities of the 
subsidiary, it was necessary that the record establish that the 
nonresident parent corporation "controls its subsidiary to such 
an extent that the separate corporate identity of the subsidiary 
should be disregarded."  Id. at 760.  The mere presence of a 
subsidiary that conducts business in Wisconsin was insufficient.  
Id.  In deciding whether facts sufficient to disregard the 
corporate identity of the subsidiary had been established, the 
court considered the 15 factors set out in Cemetery Services.  
Id. at 760-61.  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
27 
 
¶44 Accordingly, based on the facts found, the law 
applicable and the reasoning we have held to be persuasive, we 
conclude that Rasmussen has not met his burden of showing a 
basis for disregarding the corporate integrity of Nissan North 
America.  He has provided no evidence of control by Nissan Japan 
sufficient to cause us to disregard the separate corporate 
identities of the subsidiary and parent.  There is no evidence 
that Nissan Japan and Nissan North America were not operated as 
separate and independent corporations; no evidence that Nissan 
North America did not independently decide how to operate; and 
no evidence of fraud or undercapitalization.  In sum, Rasmussen 
has not shown that the activities of Nissan North America can be 
imputed to Nissan Japan.  Without the attribution of Nissan 
North America's activities in Wisconsin to Nissan Japan, 
Rasmussen has provided no basis to demonstrate the "substantial 
and not isolated activities" within Wisconsin that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(d) requires for general personal jurisdiction over 
Nissan Japan.  Accordingly, we conclude that Nissan Japan was 
properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.   
¶45 Rasmussen cites Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 
& Omaha Railway Co., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958) and Lau 
v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 
N.W.2d 158 (1961), as decisions that support his position.  
Neither case is helpful to Rasmussen's cause.  
¶46 In 
Huck, 
the 
issue 
was 
whether 
Wisconsin 
had 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under the "doing 
business" general personal jurisdiction statute in place at the 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
28 
 
time.29  Huck, 4 Wis. 2d at 135.  There, we held that even though 
the nonresident corporation's only activity in the state was 
solicitation, the solicitation included maintaining an office in 
Milwaukee to facilitate its activities that were "substantial 
and extensive" enough to subject the corporation to jurisdiction 
of Wisconsin courts.  Id. at 139-41.   
¶47 Similarly, in Lau, we concluded that under the same 
statute 
at 
issue 
in 
Huck, 
there 
was 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
Missouri 
corporation 
based 
on 
the 
solicitation activities of its employees in Wisconsin and the 
Milwaukee office it maintained.  Lau, 14 Wis. 2d at 331-32.  
Neither Huck nor Lau considered whether there was jurisdiction 
over a corporation based on the actions of its subsidiary.  
Rather, as Nissan Japan points out, Huck and Lau "stand for the 
unremarkable 
proposition 
that, 
when 
corporations 
maintain 
offices in Wisconsin, have employees who permanently staff those 
offices 
in 
Wisconsin, 
and 
regularly 
solicit 
business 
in 
Wisconsin, they are subject to general [personal] jurisdiction."   
¶48 Rasmussen also points us to Clement.  In Clement, we 
held that Wisconsin had general personal jurisdiction over the 
United Cerebral Palsy Association (United Cerebral Palsy), a New 
York non-profit corporation.  The plaintiff brought a breach of 
                                                 
29 The statute that was repealed in 1975 stated that 
Wisconsin courts had jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if 
it "is doing business in Wisconsin at the time of service."  
Huck v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 
132, 135, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958) (citing Wis. Stat. § 262.09(4) 
(1957)).  
No. 
2007AP35   
 
29 
 
employment contract claim against United Cerebral Palsy and 
United Cerebral Palsy of Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc. (Wisconsin 
Cerebral Palsy), a Wisconsin non-profit, when Wisconsin Cerebral 
Palsy found itself without adequate funds to pay plaintiff's 
salary.  Clement, 87 Wis. 2d at 330.  Prior to the contract 
dispute, United Cerebral Palsy loaned Wisconsin Cerebral Palsy 
$13,000 on the condition that a controlling number of United 
Cerebral Palsy representatives would be placed on the Wisconsin 
Cerebral Palsy board of directors.  Id. at 329.  Consequently, 
our conclusion that there was general personal jurisdiction over 
United Cerebral Palsy was based in large part on the amount of 
control the circuit court found that the United Cerebral Palsy 
had over Wisconsin Cerebral Palsy.  Id. at 336.  For example, 
the trial court found that United Cerebral Palsy used its 
controlling vote on the board to overrule previous decisions 
made by Wisconsin Cerebral Palsy.  Id. at 337.   
¶49 Control sufficient to cause a court to disregard 
separate corporate identities is the sine qua non of the alter-
ego theory for piercing the corporate veil.30  And, while the 
alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction was not mentioned in 
Clement, the amount of control exercised by United Cerebral 
                                                 
30 As we mentioned above in paragraph 25, piercing the 
corporate veil is generally associated with attaching liability 
for corporate actions to someone other than the corporation.  
However, the analysis of control employed therein is similar to 
that employed in assessing the issue of control when general 
personal jurisdiction is at issue.  Insolia v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669 (W.D. Wis. 1998). 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
30 
 
Palsy over Wisconsin Cerebral Palsy mirrors the control parent 
corporations have over subsidiaries in cases where courts have 
disregarded the separateness of corporate identities.31   
¶50 We are not persuaded that the decisions Rasmussen 
cited should lead us to the conclusion he seeks.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Rasmussen has provided no factual or legal 
predicates for disregarding the separate corporate identities of 
Nissan Japan and Nissan North America.  Therefore, Nissan Japan 
is not subject to general personal jurisdiction based on the 
substantial and not isolated activities of Nissan North America. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 We conclude that even assuming arguendo that Nissan 
North America were the agent of Nissan Japan, absent control by 
Nissan Japan sufficient to cause us to disregard the separate 
corporate identities of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America, 
the activities of the subsidiary corporation are insufficient to 
subject its nonresident parent corporation to general personal 
jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d).  We also conclude 
that Rasmussen has not met his burden to show that the corporate 
separateness of Nissan Japan and Nissan North America should be 
disregarded such that the activities of Nissan North America in 
Wisconsin should be imputed to Nissan Japan.  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
31 See Consumer's Co-op of Walworth Cnty. v. Olsen, 142 
Wis. 2d 465, 484, 419 N.W.2d 211 (1988); see also Piercing the 
Corporate Law Veil:  The Alter Ego Doctrine under Federal Common 
Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 866-67 (Feb. 1982). 
No. 
2007AP35   
 
31 
 
statutory prerequisites for general personal jurisdiction under 
§ 801.05(1)(d) have not been met.   
¶52 Because we conclude that the statutory requirements 
for general personal jurisdiction have not been met, we need not 
discuss whether exercising general personal jurisdiction over 
Nissan Japan comports with due process.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶53 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  General 
personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation "is an important 
and controversial area that lies at the intersection of civil 
procedure and corporate law."1   
¶54 I write separately to put the issue of general 
personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation in context, to 
explore the complicated nature of the issue presented, and to 
raise concern about the majority opinion's references to 
"agency."    
¶55 The issue presented is the circuit court's general 
personal 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
parent 
corporation 
for 
the 
continuous and substantial acts of its wholly owned subsidiary 
corporation in Wisconsin.2  The instant case adds a twenty-first 
century global twist because the parent corporation is a private 
multinational corporation.3  
¶56 The instant case raises a question of jurisdiction 
over the parent corporation, not the liability of the parent for 
                                                 
1 Jennifer A. Schwartz, Piercing the Corporate Veil of an 
Alien Parent for Jurisdictional Purposes: A Proposal for a 
Standard that Comports with Due Process, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 731, 
732 (2008). 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d). 
3 The development of multinational private enterprises 
raises a conflict between the power of the enterprise and the 
power of any nation over the enterprise.  In the United States 
the development of multinational enterprises raises a conflict 
between the power of the enterprise, the power of each 
individual state of the union, and the power of federal courts.  
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 731-32; Yitzhak Hadari, The Structure 
of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 729 
(1973). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
2 
 
the conduct of the subsidiary.  In other words, the case does 
not concern substantive rights against the parent corporation.4    
¶57 To establish that a Wisconsin circuit court has 
general personal jurisdiction over a defendant, including a 
parent corporation, two criteria must be met:  jurisdiction must 
be authorized by the Wisconsin long-arm statute5 and the exercise 
of jurisdiction must not violate the parent corporation's 
constitutional due process rights.6  The Wisconsin long-arm 
statute authorizes jurisdiction to the extent allowed by federal 
constitutional due process.7  Therefore, the only analysis that 
need be done is a due process analysis.  
¶58 The essence of the analysis of general personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation is whether the corporation has 
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 
                                                 
4 Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and 
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Calif. L. Rev. 12 (1925-26). 
Phillip 
I. 
Blumberg, 
The 
Law 
of 
Corporate 
Groups: 
Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations (1983 & Supp. 2000), addresses the law of parent 
and subsidiary corporations in the area of procedure; concern 
with substantive liability and limited liability is rarely 
involved.  
5 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d). 
6 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311, 320 
(1945).  See Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 245 Wis. 2d 396, 408-
09, 629 N.W.2d 662 (2001) (two-part inquiry); Clement v. United 
Cerebral Palsy of S.E. Wis., Inc., 87 Wis. 2d 327, 334-35, 274 
N.W.2d 688 (1979) (due process analysis of jurisdiction over 
foreign non-profit corporation for conduct of local affiliate). 
7 Schroeder v. Raich, 89 Wis. 2d 588, 593, 278 N.W.2d 871 
(1979).  
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
3 
 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.'"8    
¶59 In the present case, there is no dispute that general 
personal jurisdiction lies over Nissan Japan's wholly owned 
subsidiary corporation, Nissan North America; Nissan North 
America has substantial, systematic, and continuous contacts in 
Wisconsin. 
 
It 
is 
further 
undisputed 
that 
the 
parent 
corporation, Nissan Japan, does not in and of itself have 
minimum contacts in Wisconsin for a Wisconsin court to invoke 
general personal jurisdiction over it.  For general personal 
jurisdiction over the parent, a court's focus is on the 
activities of the parent in relation to the subsidiary so that 
the actions of the subsidiary in the forum can be understood as 
constituting the parent's presence in the forum.  A court 
examines 
whether 
the 
parent's 
contacts 
establish 
general 
personal jurisdiction over the parent under the pertinent 
general personal jurisdictional principles (a long-arm statute 
and constitutional principles of fairness).   
¶60 The 
issue 
of 
a 
trial 
court's 
general 
personal 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation on the basis of the 
conduct of a subsidiary has been and continues to be the subject 
of numerous cases in federal and state courts at least since 
                                                 
8 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
4 
 
1925, when the United States Supreme Court decided Cannon 
Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).9   
¶61 In Cannon, a complainant attempted to establish 
jurisdiction in North Carolina over a Maine corporation on the 
basis of the activities of a wholly owned subsidiary corporation 
in North Carolina.  Justice Brandeis, writing a brief, four-page 
opinion for the United States Supreme Court, took a formalistic 
approach, concluding that the North Carolina court could not 
assert jurisdiction as long as the subsidiary corporation had 
remained 
a 
"distinct 
corporate 
entity. . . . The 
corporate 
separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real."10  The exact 
basis of the Cannon holding has been disputed, namely whether it 
is based on the federal constitution,11 on federal common law,12 
                                                 
9 For discussions and compilations of cases addressing this 
issue, see Blumberg, supra note 4; Robert C. Casad & William B. 
Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 4-3[5], at 496-98 (3d 
ed. 2004); 1 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the 
Law of Corporations § 43.70, at 323-34  (2006 rev. ed.); 4A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1069.4 (3d ed. 2002); Schwartz, supra note 1; Lonny 
Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1023 (2003-04); William A. Voxman, Jurisdiction 
Over 
a 
Parent 
Corporation 
in 
Its 
Subsidiary's 
State 
of 
Incorporation, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 327, 330-31, 337 (1992). 
10 Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 
333, 335, 337 (1925). 
11 At that time the constitutional basis for jurisdiction 
was presence.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  
12 The 
federal 
common 
law 
for 
diversity 
jurisdiction 
analysis was abolished by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
5 
 
on the absence of statutory authorization,13 or on some natural 
law concept of the attributes of a corporation.14      
¶62 The case law (as well as academic commentary) is not 
consistent in the interpretation or application of Cannon.  Some 
cases refuse to attribute the activities of the subsidiary 
corporation to a parent corporation as long as the corporation 
has followed the formal requirements mandated by state law.15  
Other cases do not adhere to the strict formalistic approach in 
Cannon and view Cannon as authorizing the examination of the 
nature of the relationship between the two corporations to 
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is warranted.16  
¶63 Still 
other cases have questioned the continued 
validity of the Cannon case after International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945), and view International 
Shoe as altering or eroding the jurisdictional test of Cannon.  
Some of these cases conclude that the only due process 
limitations on the exercise of state court jurisdiction are the 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin has a long-arm statute. 
14 Daniel G. Brown, Jurisdiction Over A Corporation on the 
Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation:  Do You Have 
To Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 595, 602 
(1992-93); 
Lea 
Brilmayer 
& 
Kathleen 
Paisley, 
Personal 
Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, 
Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986). 
15 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 9, at 1042 (discussing 
disagreement about holding of Cannon); Voxman, supra note 9, at 
330-31, 337 (1992). 
16 Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (the degree of control by the parent must be greater 
than 
that 
normally 
associated 
with 
common 
ownership 
and 
directorship); Voxman, supra note 9, at 337-39 (1992).   
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
6 
 
minimum contacts with the state and fairness standards of 
International Shoe.17      
¶64 Regardless of whether a court uses the Cannon or 
International Shoe approach, an analysis of general personal 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation begins with the deeply 
rooted principle of law that a corporation is a separate 
juridical entity.  A corporation is a legal entity distinct from 
its 
shareholders 
and 
employees. 
 
Corporations 
are 
legal 
fictions, granting limited liability to the owners of the 
corporation.  Although a legal fiction, a corporation is also a 
legal fact.  Thus, ordinarily a shareholder, including a parent 
corporation as a shareholder, is not subject to the jurisdiction 
of a court on the basis of the activities of the corporation.  
Jurisdiction 
over 
a 
wholly 
owned 
subsidiary 
does 
not 
automatically establish jurisdiction over the parent corporation 
in any forum in which the subsidiary has continuous and 
substantial contacts.18    
¶65 Courts and commentators (as well as the parties and 
the amici in the present case, and the majority opinion) have 
articulated and purport to apply numerous tests to impute 
jurisdiction over the parent corporation based upon the acts of 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil 
Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978); Voxman, supra note 9, at 
331-36, (1992).   
18 Hadari, supra note 3, at 770-71. 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
7 
 
the subsidiary: the subsidiary is the parent's alter ego,19 
agent,20 adjunct,21 creature, dummy, tool, mere department,22 or 
instrumentality;23 the corporate veil should be "pierced";24 the 
parent exercises a high degree of day-to-day control over the 
                                                 
19 For discussions of the alter ego theory of jurisdiction 
and 
case 
law, 
see 
Bauman 
v. 
DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 
___ 
F.3d. ___, ___, 2011 WL 1879210 (9th Cir. May 18, 2011); Casad & 
Richman, supra note 9, § 4-3[5], at 496-98; Schwartz, supra note 
1, at 746-48; Voxman, supra note 9, at 348. 
20 For discussions of the agency theory of general personal 
jurisdiction, 
see 
Bauman 
v. 
DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 
___ 
F.3d. ___, ___, 2011 WL 1879210 (9th Cir. May 18, 2011); Gordon 
v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 635, 653 (Tenn. 2009) 
(jurisdiction may exist when there is an agency relationship 
between a parent and subsidiary); Casad & Richman, supra note 9, 
§ 4-3[5], at 498-501; 4A Wright & Miller, supra note 9, 
§ 1069.4.   
21 See, e.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 
576 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
22 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech 
Aircraft Co., 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984).   
23 See generally Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 
n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (describing agency test, alter ego test, 
instrumentality test and entity test, tests courts developed to 
determine substantive liability to determine jurisdiction); 
Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 652 n.14. 
24 For a discussion of the "piercing the corporate veil" 
theory of jurisdiction and case law, see generally Casad & 
Richman, supra note 9, § 4-3[5], at 496-98; Schwartz, supra note 
1, at 746-48. 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
8 
 
subsidiary notwithstanding formal corporate separateness;25 and 
the enterprise theory based on economic integration of parent 
and subsidiary.26  
¶66 Several of these "tests" are borrowed from substantive 
fields of law such as contract and tort liability.  The meaning 
of these tests in substantive law cases might be different from 
the meaning of these tests in general personal jurisdiction 
cases.27  
¶67 Thus, the circuit court and the majority opinion tread 
in murky waters when they use indeterminate substantive legal 
                                                 
25 Factors used to determine the extent of the parent's 
control include: whether a parent arranges financing for and 
capitalization of a subsidiary; whether the corporations keep 
separate books, tax returns, and financial statements; whether 
the officers ad directors are the same; whether the parent holds 
its subsidiary as an agent; the method of payment made to the 
parent by the subsidiary; and the extent of control over the 
daily affairs of the subsidiary.  Courts are generally more 
likely 
to 
assert 
jurisdiction 
when 
the 
subsidiary 
is 
undercapitalized or the complainant would suffer injustice 
absent personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent.  Schwartz, 
supra note 1, at 748-49. 
26 For discussions of the enterprise theory examining the 
corporate group as a unit, see Blumberg, supra note 4, § 1.03, 
at 23-25; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 735; Brilmayer & Paisley, 
supra note 14, at 30. 
27 Commentators and courts explain that the justifications 
for holding or not holding a parent corporation substantively 
liable for the acts of a subsidiary may be different than the 
justifications for exercising general personal jurisdiction over 
the parent.  See, e.g., 1 Fletcher, supra note 9, § 43.70 at 
326-27.  Furthermore, commentators argue that if the same 
standard is used for jurisdictional and substantive law issues, 
then the jurisdictional ruling may be used as collateral 
estoppel, preventing the parties from relitigating the issue in 
the determination of liability.  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 
14, at 621. 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
9 
 
tests, such as piercing the corporate veil, to determine whether 
general personal jurisdiction lies.  Tying the jurisdictional 
test to a substantive legal test such as piercing the corporate 
veil seems "to allow consideration of a wide and freewheeling 
variety of veil-piercing factors for jurisdictional purposes, 
divorced from any meaningful appraisal of the defendant's 
conduct in relation to the litigation and the forum."28  "The 
standards by which we measure whether to pierce the corporate 
veil tell us nothing about the various interests that must be 
balanced 
in 
the 
constitutional 
evaluation 
of 
judicial 
jurisdiction."29  
¶68 Using an analysis based upon the extent of control to 
determine whether the parent company has sufficient contacts 
with the forum state (through the control of the subsidiaries 
actions in the state), as opposed to determining whether the 
corporate entities should be merged or the corporate veil 
pierced, moors the jurisdictional analysis to jurisdictional 
principles and avoids the potentially confusing interplay of 
using a substantive legal test for jurisdictional analyses. 
                                                 
28 Hoffman, supra note 9, at 1094. 
29 Id. at 1085.  See also Blumberg, supra note 4, 2000 Supp. 
at xii-xiii ("[F]ruitful analysis of such procedural questions 
relating to such constituent corporations most advantageously 
starts with an articulation of the objectives and policies of 
the doctrine in question.  It then inquires whether these 
particular objectives and policies are better implemented by 
treating the constituents of the group for the purpose at hand 
as a single enterprise or by treating each of them as a separate 
and distinct entity with its legal responsibilities entirely 
unaffected by its role as part of an integrated business."). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶69 Although the various "tests," often borrowed from the 
substantive law, at base may function to determine the extent of 
control of the parent, what must not be lost in using these 
"tests" for jurisdictional purposes is that they are being 
applied to determine whether jurisdictional principles (minimum 
contacts, fair play, and substantial justice) are met, not 
whether substantive law principles are met.  The majority 
opinion relies on the tests developed in substantive law cases 
and does not acknowledge that the tests for substantive and 
jurisdictional law are not necessarily one and the same.   
¶70 Furthermore, the majority opinion relies on tests, 
such as "piercing the corporate veil," that are considered worn 
and meaningless epithets and metaphors.30  Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo (then Judge of the New York Court of Appeals) warned in 
1926 against using worn epithets and metaphors as a substitute 
for rigorous analysis as follows: 
                                                 
30 "When the haze of jurisdictional law collides with the 
metaphor-filled fog of the 'piercing the corporate veil' 
doctrine, the result is, predictably, a smog of the thickest 
variety. . . . Few areas of the law are as clouded by the use of 
metaphors in place of substantive legal analysis as is the area 
of piercing the corporate veil."  Brown, supra note 14, at 595, 
598.   
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been 
analogized to lightning: "rare, severe, and unprincipled."  
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and 
the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 89 (1985). 
Piercing the corporate veil "has been derisively called 
many things:  'unprincipled,' 'defy[ing] any attempt at rational 
explanation,' 'not entirely comprehensible,' 'dysfunctional,' 
and 'freakish[].'"  Hoffman, supra note 9, at 1075 (internal 
citations omitted). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
11 
 
The whole problem of the relation between parent and 
subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped 
in the mists of metaphor.  Metaphors in law are to be 
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate 
thought, they end often by enslaving it.  
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (a 
substantive tort-liability case).  
¶71 The rationale for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the parent corporation, regardless of the name given the test, 
is that the parent exercises "such domination and control over 
its subsidiary 'that they do not in reality constitute separate 
and distinct corporate entities but are one and the same 
corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.'"31  The focus should 
be on the control of the parent over the subsidiary as it 
relates 
to 
the 
minimum 
contacts 
necessary 
to 
establish 
jurisdiction over the parent under the pertinent general 
personal jurisdictional principles (a long-arm statute and 
constitutional principles of fairness).     
¶72 Evidence of parental control over the day-to-day 
operations of the subsidiary's contacts in the forum would 
rightly be considered a relevant fact in determining whether the 
parent corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum.  If a parent controls the acts of a subsidiary in the 
state, then the parent ostensibly acts in the state, and the 
state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction over the parent 
corporation.     
                                                 
31 Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159 (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore & 
Jo Desha Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶4.25[6], at 4-273 (2d 
ed. 1982).  
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶73 In other words, when the parent corporation's control 
over the subsidiary in the forum state is such that the entities 
should be treated as one and the same for purposes of exercising 
general personal jurisdiction over the parent, the subsidiary's 
forum contacts are treated as the parent's forum contacts.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws states the rule as 
follows: 
Judicial jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation 
does not of itself give a state judicial jurisdiction 
over the parent corporation.  This is true even though 
the parent owns all of the subsidiary's stock.  So a 
state does not have judicial jurisdiction over a 
parent corporation merely because a subsidiary of the 
parent does business within its territory. 
. . . . 
Judicial jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation 
will [] give the state judicial jurisdiction over the 
parent corporation if the parent so controls and 
dominates the subsidiary as in effect to disregard the 
latter's independent corporate existence. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 52, cmt. b (1971).  
¶74 I write to stress that no one has formulated a 
mechanical rule that furnishes a certain jurisdictional test.  
"Because every corporate relationship may differ significantly 
from every other corporate relationship, generalizations about 
the characteristics that will or will not indicate the existence 
of the requisite lack of separateness or the existence of 
sufficient control are almost impossible to draw."32  
¶75 To disregard corporate separateness and assert general 
personal jurisdiction over the parent corporation on the basis 
                                                 
32 Casad & Richman, supra note 9, § 3-2(b)(ix), at 359. 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
13 
 
of the activities of the subsidiary in the forum, all that can 
be stated is that a court must closely examine the nature and 
character of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary 
corporations, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
forum 
contacts 
of 
the 
subsidiary, and the degree of control exercised by the parent 
over the subsidiary in relation to those forum contacts.33  A 
court's inquiry is necessarily fact dependent.34  
¶76 This analysis, in contrast with the use of the various 
substantive legal "tests" often used by the courts, begins and 
ends with the appropriate question:  Does the extent and 
continuity of what the parent corporation has done in the forum 
state make it reasonable to bring that parent corporation before 
a court in the forum? 
¶77 The circuit court in the present case discussed 
numerous tests and theories, recognizing numerous approaches and 
expressing 
frustration 
that 
it 
was 
uncertain 
about 
the 
appropriate test.  It expressed the confusion surrounding the 
analysis of general personal jurisdiction as follows:  "There is 
a significant issue as to whether or not the activities of the 
United States subsidiaries should be imputed to either parent.  
This seems to be an area where we really allowed the 
jurisdictional issue to become extremely complex." 
¶78 After examining and applying various approaches, the 
circuit court analyzed the parent corporation's control over the 
subsidiary in the present case.  Although using the language of 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., 1 Fletcher, supra note 9, § 43.70, at 323. 
34 4A Wright & Miller, supra note 9, § 1069.4, at 164, 185. 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
14 
 
"piercing the corporate veil," the circuit court concluded that 
the 
facts 
do 
not 
demonstrate 
pervasive, 
day-to-day, 
or 
dominating control by Nissan Japan over the subsidiary in 
Wisconsin.   The circuit court opined that "there has clearly 
been a failure to demonstrate the corporate veil ought to be 
pierced or that on any other theory, jurisdiction over Nissan 
Japan could be obtained because the subsidiary was simply a tool 
or an extension of the parent."  The record supports the circuit 
court's findings of fact about Nissan Japan's lack of pervasive 
control over the subsidiary in Wisconsin.  I therefore concur in 
the mandate. 
¶79 I should be able to end this concurrence at this 
point.  I cannot do so, however, because I have not yet analyzed 
the point of dispute between the parties in this court and their 
main arguments.   
¶80 The parties debate the significance of an agency 
relationship between a parent and subsidiary corporation in 
determining general 
personal jurisdiction over the parent 
corporation.   
¶81 The plaintiff argues that the subsidiary in the 
present case is the agent of the parent corporation and that 
therefore the circuit court has jurisdiction over the parent 
corporation based on the Wisconsin contacts of the subsidiary 
corporation.  The plaintiff's assertion, while not stated as 
such, at base suggests that all of the wholly owned subsidiary's 
contacts 
in 
Wisconsin 
are 
in 
furtherance 
of 
the 
agency 
relationship between the subsidiary and the parent corporation 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
15 
 
in the present case, and so all Wisconsin contacts of the 
subsidiary are attributable to the parent corporation.    
¶82 The defendant parent corporation, Nissan Japan, argues 
that the forum contacts of a subsidiary cannot be imputed to a 
parent corporation based solely on the existence of a purported 
principal-agent relationship between a parent corporation and a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
¶83 Thus the parties debate whether an agency relationship 
between the two corporations will give the forum general 
personal jurisdiction over the parent corporation.  The majority 
addresses the parties' dispute by "assuming arguendo that Nissan 
North America were the agent of Nissan Japan."  Majority op., 
¶2.   
¶84 To address the parties' dispute, I have to begin by 
explaining that the word "agent" can have more than one legal 
meaning; the word is not self-explanatory.35  "Agency encompasses 
a wide and diverse range of relationships and circumstances."36  
The concept of agency in the broadest sense includes every 
relationship in which one person or entity acts for or 
represents another.37      
                                                 
35 Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) 
("[T]he standard for determining that a natural person is the 
agent of another differs from the standard for attribution of 
the actions of a corporation to another entity."). 
36 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. c, at 19 
(2006). 
37 See, 
e.g., 
Gordon, 
300 
S.W.3d at 
653; 
St. 
Clair 
Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Intermediate Educ. Assoc./Mich. Educ. 
Ass'n, 581 N.W.2d 707, 716 (Mich. 1998).  
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶85 A corporation can act only through another, either 
through an individual or through another corporation (which in 
turn acts through an individual or a corporation).  Under 
general legal principles, a corporate subsidiary, even a wholly 
owned subsidiary, is not automatically an agent of a parent 
corporation.38     
¶86 Agency hinges on a principal's right to control the 
actions of the agent.39  "A principal's right to control the 
agent is a constant across relationships of agency, but the 
content or specific meaning of the right varies."40  "The fact 
that the substantive law may make the defendant vicariously 
liable for the act of someone else does not necessarily mean 
that the one who acted was the agent of the defendant for long-
arm jurisdiction purposes."41  To assert general personal 
                                                 
38 See cases cited at Reporter's Note, Restatement (Third) 
of Agency § 1.01, at 45-46 (2006); Blumberg, supra note 4,  
§ 1.02.2 at 21-23 (traditional agency almost always does not 
exist between a parent corporation and a subsidiary; the word 
"agency" is often misused in jurisdiction cases and linked with 
other metaphors, like alter ego or piercing the corporate veil 
that establish a common legal identity). 
Despite an agency relationship, a principal and agent 
retain separate legal personalities.  Restatement (Third) of 
Agency § 1.01 cmt. c, at 20 (2006).  
39 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. c, at 20 
(2006). 
40 Id. 
41 Casad & Richman, supra note 9, § 4-3[5], at 479 ("The 
agency question for [jurisdictional] basis purposes is distinct 
from the agency question for process purposes, and both are 
distinct from the question of alter ego or piercing the 
corporate veil, although the distinctions often are blurred in 
the cases."  Id. at 496.). 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
17 
 
jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on the forum 
contacts of a subsidiary, the complainant must demonstrate that 
the parent corporation exerts significant control over the 
actions of the subsidiary.42  Evidence of a parent corporation's 
significant control over the forum contacts of the subsidiary, 
not the indeterminacy of labeling a wholly owned subsidiary an 
agent of the parent corporation, is determinative of imputing 
the forum contacts of the subsidiary to the parent corporation 
for purposes of general personal jurisdiction.   
* * * * 
¶87 In sum, I write separately to highlight that the 
analysis for imputing the contacts of a wholly owned subsidiary 
to a parent corporation for purposes of general personal 
jurisdiction is not necessarily the same as the analysis for a 
corporate parent's substantive liability for the acts of its 
wholly owned subsidiary.  
¶88 The 
majority 
opinion 
recognizes 
the 
distinction 
between 
jurisdiction 
and 
substantive 
liability. 
 
But 
in 
discussing 
jurisdictional 
concepts, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
references 
principles 
that 
are 
applicable 
to 
substantive 
analyses 
without 
making 
a 
distinction 
in 
applying 
those 
principles to the jurisdictional analysis.  These references in 
the majority opinion are, in my opinion, potentially confusing. 
The analysis of general personal jurisdiction and the analysis 
of substantive liability in situations involving a wholly owned 
                                                 
42 Coca-Cola Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 
306 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Voxman, supra note 9, at 341 (1992).    
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
18 
 
subsidiary and its parent should not be confused as being one 
and the same.     
¶89 No one has formulated a mechanical rule that furnishes 
a certain general personal jurisdictional test in the parent and 
subsidiary context.  The essence of the answer to the question 
whether general personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation 
lies because of the forum contacts of its subsidiary is the 
degree of control of the parent over the forum contacts of the 
subsidiary.   
¶90 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
     
 
 
No.  2007AP35.ssa 
 
1