Title: Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan and Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan and Co.1988 WY 5748 P.2d 724Case Number: 87-27Decided: 01/13/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming

          COMPASS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

          

v.

CRAVENS, DARGAN AND 
COMPANY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofUintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Dennis W. 
Lancaster of Phillips, Lancaster and Thomas, P.C., Evanston, and Allan L. Larson 
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.

Timothy O. 
Beppler of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment against appellant Compass Insurance Company (Compass) awarding 
complete reimbursement to appellee Cravens, Dargan and Company (Cravens) for the 
amount it paid to the State of Wyoming for the clean-up of an oil 
spill.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part and 
reverse in part.

[¶3.]     The issue to be 
resolved is which of these insurers for the State of Wyoming insured the cost 
of cleaning up the oil spill.

[¶4.]     Sometime after 4:00 
p.m. on March 18, 1984, an unknown person entered the Wyoming highway department maintenance yard at Evanston, Wyoming, and opened the valve on an oil 
storage tank. Surrounding the maintenance yard was a ten-foot high chain link 
fence with barbed wire on top. Access gates to the maintenance yard were locked 
after 4:00 p.m. The maintenance yard had never before been vandalized, and the 
highway department personnel had no reason to believe that it would be 
vandalized.

[¶5.]     When the unlocked oil 
storage tank valve was opened, approximately 3,000 gallons of road oil valued at 
$2,337 flowed out of the tank, across the maintenance yard, down a hill, and 
into a drainage or irrigation ditch, and it was carried by water onto 
landowners' fields.

[¶6.]     Upon discovering the 
oil spill, the highway department immediately took steps to have the oil spill 
cleaned up. No formal complaint was ever made against the State of Wyoming by any third 
party for damage to any property caused by the oil spill. However, the highway 
department personnel did receive complaints from landowners that a fence was 
destroyed and fields were rutted during the clean-up process. One landowner also 
complained that his cows could not drink the polluted stock water. The highway 
department caused the fence to be replaced, the ruts to be filled with top soil, 
and water to be hauled to the landowner's stock until the polluted water was 
clean enough for the stock to drink.

[¶7.]     The cost of cleaning up 
the oil spill on the property owned by the State of Wyoming was $8,821, and 
the cost of cleaning up the oil spill on the property owned by others was 
$85,635.

[¶8.]     At the time of the oil 
spill incident, the State of Wyoming had an effective comprehensive 
liability insurance policy issued by Compass and an effective property insurance 
policy issued by Cravens. Thereafter, the State of Wyoming made claims 
against Compass and Cravens for $96,792, which included the costs associated 
with cleaning up the oil spill and the value of the oil spilled. Cravens 
ultimately paid the $96,792 claim and accepted a subrogation receipt from the 
State of Wyoming wherein the State subrogated all its 
rights, claims, and interest which it might have against any person or 
corporation liable for the loss and authorized Cravens to sue, compromise, or 
settle the claim in the name of the State. Compass refused the demand made by 
Cravens for reimbursement of the $96,792 Cravens had paid to the State of 
Wyoming. On 
April 29, 1985, a complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
styled "STATE OF WYOMING, Plaintiff, v. COMPASS INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York 
Corporation, Defendant," alleging that the State of Wyoming was liable for the 
cost of cleaning up the oil spill and any monetary damages arising therefrom and 
that, pursuant to the terms of the State's insurance policy with Compass, 
Compass was obligated to pay for those amounts.

[¶9.]     Compass filed its 
answer alleging that Cravens, and not the State of Wyoming, was the real 
party in interest and that, pursuant to the terms of the liability policy 
Compass had issued to the State, it owed no duty or obligation to either the 
State or Cravens for any expenses, costs, or damages occasioned by the oil 
spill.

[¶10.]  Cross-motions for summary judgment were 
denied, and the court ordered that the caption of the case be amended to 
substitute Cravens as the real party in interest in place of the State of 
Wyoming. On 
October 9, 1986, a bench trial was held, and, on December 4, 1986, the trial 
court entered judgment generally in favor of Cravens and against Compass for the 
sum of $118,144.09, which amount represents clean-up costs of $94,455, 
prejudgment interest of $13,567.88, attorneys fees of $10,000, and costs of 
$121.21.

[¶11.]  Two questions must be answered in order 
to resolve this case: (1) Does the Compass policy cover the oil spill; and (2) 
if the Compass policy does cover the oil spill, does Cravens have a right to 
reimbursement from Compass.

[¶12.]  The primary coverage language in the 
comprehensive liability policy issued by Compass provides in relevant 
part:

"The company will pay on 
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of * * * property damage * * * caused by an occurrence 
* * *."

The Compass 
policy defines "occurrence" as

"an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured[.]" (Emphasis 
added.)

It also defines 
"property damage" as:

"(1) physical injury to 
or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period, 
including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss 
of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed 
provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy 
period[.]"

[¶13.]  We disagree with Compass' assertion that 
the incident may not be an occurrence. A general finding and judgment carry with 
them every finding of fact which reasonably and fairly can be drawn from the 
evidence. Burk v. Burzynski, 
Wyo., 672 P.2d 419 (1983). Our 
examination of the record reveals that the trial court reasonably and fairly 
could have drawn from the evidence that one would not expect vandals to climb 
the ten-foot high chain link fence and open the valve on the oil storage 
tank.

[¶14.]  We also disagree with Compass' assertion 
that there is no evidence of damage to property of third parties. The evidence 
clearly shows that the oil spill resulted in the contamination of the ditch bank 
and the fields of landowners adjacent to the highway department maintenance yard 
and that the costs associated with cleaning up this property amounted to 
$85,635. The trial court could have reasonably and fairly drawn from the 
evidence that there was physical injury to, and loss of use of, tangible 
property; i.e., property damage as defined in the Compass 
policy.

[¶15.]  In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd 145 
N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363, 88 A.L.R.3d 172 (1976), the Superior Court of 
New Jersey 
decided a case with facts nearly identical to this one. In that case, a person 
or persons unknown opened the valve on two storage tanks causing some 14,000 
gallons of oil to leak from the tanks. The oil flowed into two storm drains 
which in turn emptied into the HackensackRiver. At the time of the incident, Lansco 
had an effective general comprehensive liability policy with provisions the same 
or similar to the Compass policy.

[¶16.]  The policy held by Lansco, like the 
Compass policy, defined an "occurrence" as an accident "`which results in bodily 
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured.'" Id. 350 A.2d  at 523. The court in Lansco, Inc. 
v. Department of Environmental Protection stated:

"`Accidental' is defined 
as happening unexpectedly or by chance; taking place not according to usual 
course. Webster's New International Dictionary, and Black's Law Dictionary * * 
*; Furr v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 111 N.J. Super. 596, 600, 270 A.2d 69 
(Law Div. 1970); see Linden Motor Freight Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 
511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963). Further, under the definition of `occurrence' 
contained in the policy, whether the occurrence is accidental must be viewed 
from the standpoint of the insured, and since the oil spill was neither expected 
nor intended by Lansco, it follows that the spill was sudden and accidental 
under the exclusion clause even if caused by the deliberate act of a third 
party." Id. 
350 A.2d  at 524.

That court 
concluded that coverage under the comprehensive general liability policy 
extended to statutory liability for damages to the environment. Id. at 524. The insurer 
was required to reimburse Lansco for its costs to clean up the spill. Id. at 525; see also 
Chemical Applications Company, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Company, 425 F. Supp. 777 
(D.Mass. 1977).

[¶17.]  Compass contends that the intent of its 
policy is to pay only damages for which the State is legally liable and that the 
State is not legally liable for the costs of cleaning up the property of a third 
party because no notice of claim has been filed against the State as required by 
law.1 Compass also contends that, in any 
event, the State cannot be held liable under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.2

[¶18.]  There is no question that the highway 
department had the legal liability to clean up the oil spill. The department of 
environmental quality, established by the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act,3 has the obligation to promulgate 
rules and regulations necessary to prevent, reduce, and eliminate waste. 
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. v. Environmental Quality 
Council, Wyo., 
590 P.2d 1324 (1979). In carrying out this obligation, the department prepared 
and put into effect Chapter IV, Section 5.c of its Water Quality Rules & 
Regulations, which provides that a person4 owning oil which is discharged is 
responsible for the cleanup of the discharged oil. The act and the rules and 
regulations promulgated to carry out the purpose of the act make it clear that 
the State is obligated to pay for these damages without there being a judicial 
determination of that fact.

[¶19.]  Compass contends that no right of 
subrogation exists in favor of one insurer against another insurer of the same 
insured. Assuming, arguendo, that Compass is correct, we fail to see how this 
provides any comfort to Compass. The learned trial judge in his wisdom wisely 
side-stepped this problem and ordered that the caption of the case be amended, 
substituting Cravens as the real party in interest in place of the State of 
Wyoming. This 
order was in accord with Compass' third defense which alleged that Cravens, not 
the State of Wyoming, was the real party in 
interest.

[¶20.]  We agree with Compass that Cravens does 
not have a right of subrogation on the basis of Compass being at fault for the 
oil spill. Cravens' action, however, is not on the basis of Compass' negligence. 
To the contrary, the action is for reimbursement on the theory that Compass, 
rather than Cravens, should have indemnified the State for the clean-up 
costs.

[¶21.]  Compass' contention that the State cannot 
be held liable because it is immune from strict liability by virtue of § 
1-39-102(b), W.S. 1977, of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is without merit 
in this instance. This subsection provides in part:

"This act does not impose 
[or] allow the imposition of strict liability for acts of governmental entities or public 
employees." (Emphasis added.)

There is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record indicating that a governmental entity or an 
employee of the State was in any way responsible for the oil spill. The evidence 
is that the oil spill was caused by unknown third persons.

[¶22.]  Compass' contention that there is no 
legal liability because no formal claims were filed is also without merit.5 If the insurer's promise to pay is 
to be of any practical value, it must include an obligation of good faith and 
reasonableness. From the beginning, the highway department was in a dilemma. If 
it did nothing to clean up the oil spill, the damages would be much greater. The 
damages would be much greater even if it waited only for determinations as to 
who was liable and who would direct the cleanup. An oil spill into flowing 
water, by its nature, requires an immediate clean-up response. That no formal 
claims were filed is a credit to the highway department's clean-up efforts, not 
an excuse for Compass to deny coverage. The principles of good faith and 
reasonableness require the insurer, under these circumstances, to acquiesce to 
the clean-up efforts. Compass has not pointed to any detriment which it has 
suffered from the highway department's actions. Compass stipulated to the damage 
amounts, and the liability is clear. Compass' coverage was not expanded in any 
way by the highway department's action. Rather, the highway department's actions 
limited the damages.

[¶23.]  Because the Compass policy does cover the 
oil spill, we reach the second question: Does Cravens have a right to 
reimbursement from Compass?

[¶24.]  Compass argues that Cravens voluntarily 
indemnified the State for the cost of the cleanup, that Cravens is liable 
because its policy has a debris removal clause, and that, if Cravens is entitled 
to contribution from Compass, it should be on the basis of the amount of the 
coverage provided by each policy. Cravens in turn argues that it was not a 
volunteer because it wanted to avoid a potential bad faith claim and that, even 
if the debris removal clause in its policy does apply, it still is not 
responsible for all the clean-up costs because of the "other insurance," 
"escape," and "super escape" clauses in its policy.

[¶25.]  The primary coverage language in the 
property insurance policy issued by Cravens provides in relevant 
part:

"Subject to the terms, 
conditions and exclusions hereinafter contained, this Policy insures all 
Property (including improvements and betterments) of the Insured * * * against 
ALL RISKS OF DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE * * *."

The Cravens 
policy also contains a debris removal clause:

"This Policy also covers, 
within the sum insured, expenses incurred in the removal of debris of the 
property covered hereunder which may be destroyed or damaged by a peril insured 
against."

[¶26.]  The Compass policy, in addition to its 
primary liability coverage language, contains an exclusion for pollution 
coverage:

"This insurance does not apply:

* * * * * 
*

"(f) to bodily injury or 
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, 
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon 
land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental[.]" 
(Emphasis added.)

It also includes 
an exclusion for damage "to property owned or occupied by or rented to the 
insured."

[¶27.]  To counter Compass' assertion that 
clean-up costs are "debris removal" costs and not "damages" to property, Cravens 
contends that the discharged oil caused injury to property and that the amount 
expended for clean-up costs is the proper measure of damages. We agree with 
Cravens that the discharged oil caused injury to the property covered by the 
oil. We also agree with Cravens and the court in Lansco, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Protection that the proper measure of property damage is the cost 
of cleaning up the oil when there is no residual damage to the 
property.

[¶28.]  General principles of construction will 
be followed when interpreting conditions of an insurance agreement. Commercial 
Union Insurance Company v. Stamper, Wyo., 732 P.2d 534 (1987). Two basic standards 
of construction applicable in Wyoming are:

1. "`Such [insurance 
policy] contracts should not be so strictly construed as to thwart the general 
object of the insurance. Miles v. Continental Casualty Company, Wyo., 386 P.2d 720, 722 
[(1963)].'" Id. at 539, quoting McKay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
United States, Wyo., 421 P.2d 166, 168 (1966).

2. "`The intention of the 
parties is the primary consideration and is to be ascertained, if possible, from 
the language employed in the policy, viewed in the light of what the parties 
must reasonably have intended. Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., [67 Wyo. 141], 215 P.2d 
[867,] 873-875 [(1950)].'" Id. at 539, quoting McKay v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society of United States, 421 P.2d  at 168.

[¶29.]  We stated in Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215 P.2d 867, 
874 (1950), quoting McGrail v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 
292 N.Y. 419, 55 N.E.2d 483, 486 (1944):

"`Consistently followed 
in this State has been the rule that the policy must be construed reasonably and 
that it must be given a practical construction, not thereby with the result that 
there is a revision of the policy or an increase of the risk and thus an 
extension of the resulting liability, but for the purpose of determining what 
the parties must reasonably have intended by its terms when the policy was 
written by defendant and accepted by the plaintiff.'"

[¶30.]  It is clear to this Court that the intent 
of the Cravens policy is to pay for damage to property of the State and that the 
intent of the Compass policy is to pay for damage to property of others caused 
by an incident neither expected nor intended; i.e., an occurrence. The trial 
court correctly found that Compass had the primary responsibility for the damage 
to the property of others. We will not now dissect the respective policies in an 
attempt to determine who wins the battle of the forms with respect to other 
insurance clauses.

[¶31.]  The combination of Compass' refusal to 
pay a claim for which it was primarily responsible and Cravens' good faith 
effort to settle the claim with minimal inconvenience to its insured resulted in 
the inequitable result of Compass paying nothing for a claim covered by its 
policy.

[¶32.]  Compass also claims that Cravens acted as 
a mere volunteer when it paid the State's claim and that, under the holding of 
Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Postin, Wyo., 610 P.2d 984 (1980), Cravens 
is not entitled to reimbursement from anyone. We disagree that Cravens acted as 
a mere volunteer. The test for voluntary payment by an insurer was addressed in 
Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Postin, 610 P.2d  at 990, wherein the 
holding in Wyoming Building & Loan Ass'n v. Mills Const. Co., 38 Wyo. 515, 
269 P. 45, 60 A.L.R. 418 (1928), was reaffirmed that an insurer who acts in good 
faith to discharge a disputed obligation does not become a mere volunteer if it 
is ultimately determined that the insurer's policy did not 
apply.

[¶33.]  The trial court's judgment carries with 
it the finding that Cravens' payment was "`in good faith'" and "`under a 
reasonable belief that it [was] necessary'" so as to not defeat the right to 
reimbursement. Commercial Union Insurance Company v. Postin, 610 P.2d  at 990. 
However, we cannot ignore the uncontradicted evidence that the discharged oil 
was also on State property and that the cost of cleaning up the oil on this 
property was $8,821. The State property is insured by Cravens and excluded from 
the coverage provided by Compass. Accordingly, we remand to the district court 
with directions that the judgment entered against Compass be reduced by $8,821 
plus the interest charged thereon.

[¶34.]  Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-39-113, W.S. 
1977.

2 Sections 1-39-101 
through 1-39-120, W.S. 1977.

3 Section 35-11-103(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977.

4 As set out in § 
35-11-103(a)(vi), W.S. 1977:

"`Person' means 
an individual, partnership, firm, association, joint venture, public or private 
corporation, trust, estate, commission, board, public or private institution, 
utility, cooperative, municipality or any 
other political subdivision of the state, or any interstate body or any 
other legal entity[.]" (Emphasis added.)

5 The limitation language 
in the Compass policy states:

"The insured shall not, 
except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or 
incur any expense other than for first aid to others at the time of 
accident."

And:

"No action shall lie 
against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have 
been full compliance with all of the terms of this policy, nor until the amount 
of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by 
judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the 
insured, the claimant and the company."

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶35.]  It is unusual, but rationally to be 
recognized, that neither the original litigants nor now the majority opinion and 
this dissent define the issue of this case in corollary status or by comparable 
question. Differing from the court in analysis of pleading, policies, and legal 
principles, I would conclude that the issue is not which of two insurers, one 
property-damage and the other liability (each insuring some interest of the 
state of Wyoming), should be liable to indemnify the state for 
malicious-mischief damage when vandals open the tank valves of a road oil 
storage facility at a highway department shop, but rather whether the 
property-damage carrier, after payment and with at least apparent liability on 
its policy, can secure "reimbursement" by either subrogation or contribution 
from the liability carrier.

[¶36.]  Little benefit will be afforded in 
writing the standard for this case in argumentation whether the property-damage 
carrier had a coverage responsibility, since first that fact appears reasonably 
discernible from the specific terms of the policy, and secondly, it must have 
been obvious since the carrier paid the claim without ostensible assertion of 
being a volunteer charity institution as a good samaritan in paying the state of 
Wyoming the claimed $94,455 even when coincidentally blessed with a policy with 
a scheduled property value of $341,312,860 and policy limits of $50 million, for 
physical-damage insurance coverage of state buildings and properties, comparable 
with the liability carrier's maximum coverage of $500,000 per 
incident.

[¶37.]  Factually and procedurally, this 
litigation is sufficiently strange so that, at least in contemplation of a 
standard for future litigation, we could leave its precedential value in a 
fashion akin to the paraphrased comment as Justice Felix Frankfurter once 
related in dissent, and I would find here similarly to be perceived, as the 
flying Dutchman known only as a floating hulk once briefly observed upon the 
silent sea to surely disappear as having been a temporary mirage in the ocean of 
law.

[¶38.]  Someone vandalized the state highway 
property in Evanston by opening a valve of a road oil 
storage tank. With a property-damage carrier, Cravens, and a liability carrier, 
Compass, the state made claims for the spilled oil clean-up costs on and off the 
property occupied by the highway department facility and for the oil lost in 
drainage.

[¶39.]  Cravens, the property-damage carrier, 
with a debris-clean-up provision reasonably defining its liability, paid the 
clean-up costs less $1,000 deductible, while the liability carrier, Compass, 
denied any claimed liability to be impressed from negligence of its insured, the 
state of Wyoming, and consequently declined to pay the state for what the state 
had collected from Cravens under the property-damage policy. Cravens, as the 
liability carrier, after taking a subrogation receipt, sued Compass in the name 
of the state, alleging that their mutual insured, the state, was liable for the 
clean up based on strict liability and lack of due care and that consequently 
the state of Wyoming was entitled to repayment of what it had expended, 
including interest and attorney's fees, which constituted its claim for 
subrogation after the state had been paid in full for expenditures less 
property-damage deductible. The only complaint ever filed was in the name of the 
state of Wyoming against Compass as liability carrier 
by attorneys for the subrogating property-damage carrier, and in no way included 
any direct subrogation claims of the property-damage carrier which had made the 
payment.

[¶40.]  The history of the pleadings assumed an 
interesting metamorphosis in that at a considerably later date, in ruling 
adversely to the "State's" motion for summary judgment, the trial court, without 
benefit of motion or request, determined that the obvious real party in interest 
was Cravens and not the state, and amended, in an order denying the summary 
judgment by substituting the additional litigative plaintiffs.1

[¶41.]  As noted, the complaint was filed 
pursuant to a subrogation receipt in the name of the state as the designated 
plaintiff, alleging the liability carrier's legal responsibility and the 
indemnity obligation of Compass (liability carrier) to the state for the damages 
sustained by the state and paid to the state less the deductible. Questionably, 
whether or not the suit was originally filed with approval of the state in the 
fashion not in evidence, a ratification by both a member of the office and the 
attorney general himself was subsequently filed to demonstrate the authorization 
of the law firm actually representing the subrogating insurance company to proceed in the name of the state of 
Wyoming. Nothing was pleaded about the interest of the subrogating carrier, 
nor was a motion for summary judgment ever made in its 
name.

[¶42.]  The subrogation receipt 
provided:

"SUBROGATION 
RECEIPT

* * * * * 
*

"In consideration of and 
to the extent of said payment the undersigned hereby subrogates said Insurance 
Company, to all of the rights, claims and interest which the undersigned may 
have against any person or corporation liable for the loss mentioned above, and 
authorizes the said Insurance Company to sue, compromise or settle in the 
undersigned's name or otherwise all such claims and to execute and sign releases 
and acquittances and endorse checks or drafts given in settlement of such claims 
in the name of the undersigned, with the same force and effect as if the 
undersigned executed or endorsed them.

"Warranted no settlement 
has been made by the undersigned with any person or corporation against whom a 
claim may lie, and no release has been given to anyone responsible for the loss, 
and that no such settlement will be made nor release given by the undersigned 
without the written consent of the said Insurance Company and the undersigned 
covenants and agrees to cooperate fully with said Insurance Company in the 
prosecution of such claims, and to procure and furnish all papers and documents 
necessary in such proceedings and to attend court and testify if the Insurance 
Company deems such to be necessary but it is understood the undersigned is to be 
saved harmless from costs in such proceedings.

"[Signed by a 
representative of the State of Wyoming.]"

[¶43.]  In the subsequently entered order denying 
summary judgment as filed "by the State 
of Wyoming," (emphasis added) the judge found 
and determined:

"Thereafter, the Attorney 
General of the State of Wyoming authorized this 
action to be filed in the name of the 
State of Wyoming by Cravens, Dargan & Company 
against the Compass Insurance Company, which is the insurance company which 
insures the State against personal liability. Obviously, the real party in 
interest in this case is Cravens, Dargan & Company, not the State of 
Wyoming. 
"Cravens, Dargan & Company seeks to recover from Compass the money which 
Cravens has paid to the State of Wyoming. Cravens contends that the State of 
Wyoming was 
`legally obligated to pay as damages' costs of cleaning up the oil (damage). 
Cravens seeks reimbursement from Compass of all monies which it paid, which 
includes the cost of the oil which was lost, the cost of cleaning up property 
belonging to the State of Wyoming and the cost of cleaning up property belonging 
to private citizens.

"Cravens has moved for summary judgment. 
Clearly, Cravens is not entitled to judgment against Compass for the sums paid 
for lost oil or damage to property belonging to the State of Wyoming. At most, Cravens 
would be entitled to reimbursement for the sums paid in discharge of liability 
of the State of Wyoming for damages to the property of 
others.

"Unfortunately, Cravens 
has not established:

"a) As a matter of law, 
the absolute liability of the State of Wyoming for the oil spill which occurred; 
or

"b) That the State of 
Wyoming did 
not enjoy immunity.

"Furthermore, if the 
State is not immune from suit, and if there is no absolute liability, there 
remain questions of fact concerning whether or not the State was 
negligent.

"THEREFORE, IT IS 
ORDERED:

"1. The caption of this 
case is amended to substitute the real party in interest in place of the State 
of Wyoming. 
The caption shall now read Cravens, Dargan & Company, a corporation, vs. 
Compass Insurance Company, a New York Corporation.

"2. The Motions for 
Summary Judgment are denied." (Emphasis added.) (Signed by the district judge 
and entered May 15, 1986.)2

[¶44.]  Intrinsic to the evidentiary status of 
this case is a total absence of any evidence in defined dollars as to damages 
sustained by any third parties. Actually, the record reflects that oil ran out 
onto the property of two ranchers, but no defined dollar amount was included to 
reflect the costs incurred separately for the clean up on their property or 
whether the substantial costs, which were for diking and retention and 
reclamation of the oil, could be considered to have occurred on property of the 
state of Wyoming through its public waterways or, in fact, may have occurred on 
private ditches of these or other adjoining landowners. Two maps which were 
referenced in the testimony which would have afforded some geographical 
description of what occurred (the first being a chalkboard exhibit at trial 
which was not marked and introduced, and the second being an earlier attachment 
to the Department of Environmental Quality report as the report was then 
introduced without attachment), are not included in the present record. 

[¶45.]  Succinctly then, the case in totality is 
an inquiry as to whether or not a liable property-damage carrier, after policy 
payment, can either get subrogation or contribution from a liability carrier 
arising from the contended negligence or duty-derived strict liability of the 
mutually insured. I do not even get to the questions of whether or not the 
Compass policy covered the oil spill, whether strict liability existed, or 
whether the state is entitled under these circumstances to indemnity, since the 
case dispositively should invoke a subrogation question between two carriers for 
the same insured. Although there was obvious damage to the property of the two 
ranchers, Crompton and Lowham, whether the particular clean-up costs and 
renovation damages on their particular property was the total amount of the 
claimed off-premises clean up of $85,635 or some fraction of that amount, was 
simply and totally undefined and unproven in the trial record and case 
pleadings. No one ever plead that the only two mentioned or any other linked 
parties sustained definable damages 
in the case facts and liability-policy provisions after the property-damage 
carrier reimbursed the state for all clean-up costs as claimed and paid within 
its malicious-mischief/debris-clean-up insurance policy 
clauses.

[¶46.]  The totality of my difference with the 
majority in this case is in contemplation of their 
statement:

"We agree with Compass 
that Cravens does not have a right of subrogation on the basis of Compass being 
at fault for the oil spill. Cravens' action, however, is not on the basis of 
Compass' negligence. To the contrary, the action is for reimbursement on the 
theory that Compass, rather than Cravens, should have indemnified the State for 
the clean-up costs."

[¶47.]  Reluctantly, I conclude that this 
critique of the case simply does not make sense. Not only does it not make any 
sense, but it was not the critical basis upon which the litigation was pursued 
by the parties in trial. The complaint, which is the only complaint ever filed, 
albeit in the name of the state of Wyoming, alleged against the state of 
Wyoming, inter alia:

"2.5 Under WS § 
35-11-101, et seq. Plaintiff State of Wyoming was strictly liable because of the 
extreme and permanent damage such pollution can and does cause to the land and 
property of others for both the costs of cleaning up the oil spill and any 
monetary damages arising therefrom; and Plaintiff State of Wyoming was therefore 
legally obligated to pay such damages within the terms of its insurance policy 
with Defendant Compass.

"2.6 Plaintiff State of 
Wyoming was strictly liable to the adjoining property owners under the doctrine 
of abnormally dangerous activities for both the costs of cleaning up the oil 
spill and any monetary damages arising therefrom; and Plaintiff State of Wyoming 
was therefore legally obligated to pay such damages within the terms of its 
insurance policy with Defendant Compass.

"2.7 Plaintiff State of 
Wyoming was strictly liable to the adjoining landowners under the doctrines of 
public and private nuisance for both the costs of cleaning up the oil spill and 
any monetary damages arising therefrom; and Plaintiff State of Wyoming was 
therefore legally obligated to pay such damages within the terms of its 
insurance contract with Defendant Compass.

"2.8 Based on allegations 
that the Plaintiff State of Wyoming failed to exercise due care in failing to 
take adequate safety precautions to prevent the subject oil spill, Plaintiff 
State of Wyoming was liable to adjoining landowners for both the costs of 
cleaning up the oil spill and any monetary damages arising therefrom; and 
Plaintiff State of Wyoming was therefore legally obligated to pay for such 
damages within the terms of its insurance contract with Defendant 
Compass.

"2.9 Under the terms of 
its insurance policy with Plaintiff State of Wyoming, Defendant Compass is 
obligated to pay Plaintiff State of Wyoming for both the amounts Plaintiff State 
of Wyoming expended in cleaning up the oil spill and the amount of any monetary 
damages arising therefrom.

* * * * * 
*

"WHEREFORE, Plaintiff 
State of Wyoming prays for judgment against Defendant Compass as 
follows:

"1. That Defendant 
Compass be held liable to Plaintiff State of Wyoming for damages in an amount to 
be proven at trial;

"2. That Defendant 
Compass be held liable to Plaintiff State of Wyoming for Plaintiff's costs and 
disbursements incurred herein * * *."

[¶48.]  In its brief filed in this court, 
appellant enunciates the issues as:

"I. CAN AN INSURANCE 
COMPANY PROVIDING PROPERTY INSURANCE BRING SUIT AGAINST ITS OWN INSURED, OR ITS 
OWN INSURED'S LIABILITY INSURER, FOR THE RECOVERY OF SUMS IT PAID OUT UNDER ITS 
POLICY?

"II. CAN A LIABILITY 
INSURER BE LIABLE WHERE ITS INSURED WOULD NOT BE?

"III. ASSUMING BOTH 
POLICIES COVERED THE LOSS, IS CRAVENS ENTITLED TO CONTRIBUTION, AND IF SO, HOW 
SHALL THE CONTRIBUTION BE APPORTIONED?"

[¶49.]  Appellee states the issues 
as:

"1. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT'S POLICY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERED AND THAT APPELLANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE WYOMING 
HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT TO CLEAN UP AN OIL SPILL FOR WHICH IT WAS STRICTLY LIABLE 
UNDER WYOMING 
LAW?

"2. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLEE, THE STATE OF WYOMING'S PROPERTY 
INSURER, WAS ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VALUE OF THE OIL WHICH WAS LOST AS A 
RESULT OF THE OIL SPILL?

"3. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLEE WAS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM 
APPELLANT FOR SUMS APPELLEE PAID TO THE STATE OF WYOMING ON ACCOUNT OF THE 
POLLUTION CLEAN-UP COSTS INCURRED BY THE WYOMING HIGHWAY 
DEPARTMENT?",

and in argument 
in the brief:

"Generally, Appellee 
contends that the trial court correctly determined that Appellant's liability 
insurance policy covered the pollution clean-up costs in question; that only the 
value of the oil lost, as a result of the oil spill, was covered by Appellee's 
property insurance policy; and that under these circumstances Appellee was 
entitled to be reimbursed by Appellant for sums Appellee had paid the State of 
Wyoming on account of the pollution clean-up."

[¶50.]  Appellee then further contends that the 
other insurance clause in its policy 
was a super-escape clause and as a result

"* * * Appellee was at 
most a secondary insurance provider and the effect of the respective policies 
was to create liability solely on the part of Appellant. Appellant issued the 
insurance coverage which was primarily applicable to the oil-spill incident. As 
a result, appellee was entitled to proceed in this action to seek reimbursement 
from appellant for the sums it had paid to the state on account of the pollution 
clean-up costs incurred [under its policy]."

[¶51.]  In resulting memoranda briefing and 
extended argument, Cravens continued to allege a legal liability of the state of 
Wyoming, the indemnity responsibility of Compass, and the resulting right of 
Cravens to be subrogated and repaid based on a primary responsibility of the 
liability carrier to repay the property-damage carrier.

[¶52.]  The principal issue of this case is the 
appearance of creating a novel and completely unaccepted rule that a 
property-damage carrier which pays for the physical damage to the insured's 
property can effectively allege negligence of its insured in order to subrogate 
against a liability carrier. It is pointless to argue that Cravens did not have 
original liability, because either they had liability when they made the payment 
under their issued insurance coverage, or they volunteered by payment in order 
to avoid a contested or contended liability which in itself does not afford any 
differing status for its subrogation posture. In this latter regard, Commercial 
Union Insurance Co. v. Postin, Wyo., 610 P.2d 984 (1980), is directly in 
point and is now apparently ignored by this court. An excellent synopsis of the 
law of subrogation of volunteered payment is found in Frago v. Sage, Mo. App., 
737 S.W.2d 482 (1987).

[¶53.]  In its misapprehension of the litigative 
issue, I would find in logical perspective no significance in this court's 
decision except that one insurance company won and the other lost in this 
particularly convoluted and inexplicable circumstance. To the contrary, if the 
rule of the case is considered to be its real issue of the right of subrogation 
of a property-damage carrier against its mutual insured's liability carrier, 
then we find ourselves not only in the Sargasso Sea attendant to the hulk of 
Frankfurter's perception, but flailing water by the teaspoonful when faced with 
a typhoon by challenging the weight of general law denying a right of 
subrogation. Illustrative only of the multitude of authorities that might be 
noted are Aetna Insurance Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc., 757 F.2d 1030 (9th 
Cir. 1985); United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied 474 U.S. 1070, 106 S. Ct. 830, 88 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1986); Frank Briscoe 
Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1983); Lanasse v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 921, 92 S. Ct. 1779, 32 L. Ed. 2d 120 
(1972); Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Gage Plumbing & Heating Co., 433 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1970); Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint & Varnish 
Co., 418 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Tex. 1976); Builders & Manufacturers Mutual 
Casualty Co. v. Preferred Automobile Ins. Co., 118 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1941); 
Moring v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Ala., 426 So. 2d 810 
(1982); Graham v. Rockman, Alaska, 504 P.2d 1351 (1972); Pendlebury v. Western 
Casualty & Surety Co., 89 Idaho 456, 406 P.2d 129 (1965); Truck Insurance 
Exchange v. Transport Indemnity Co., 180 Mont. 419, 591 P.2d 188 (1979); Home 
Insurance Co. v. Pinski Brothers, Inc., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972); 
Reeder v. Reeder, 217 Neb. 120, 348 N.W.2d 832 (1984); Manzo v. City of 
Plainfield, 59 N.J. 30, 279 A.2d 706 (1971); A & B Auto Stores of Jones St., 
Inc. v. City of Newark, 59 N.J. 5, 279 A.2d 693 (1971); Chenoweth Motor Co. v. 
Cotton, 2 Ohio Misc. 123, 207 N.E.2d 412 (1965); Board of Education of Jordan 
School District v. Hales, Utah, 566 P.2d 1246 (1977); Kirkland v. Ohio Casualty 
Ins., 18 Wn. App. 538, 569 P.2d 1218 (1977); Miller v. Kujak, 4 Wis.2d 80, 90 N.W.2d 137 (1958); Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 1164; Couch on 
Insurance 2d. It is axiomatic that:

"No right of subrogation 
can arise in favor of the insurer against its own insured, since by definition 
subrogation arises only with respect to rights of the insured against third 
persons to whom the insurer owes no duty." 16 Couch on Insurance 2d § 61:136 at 
195, also quoted in Moring v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
supra.

[¶54.]  Of current interest as a subrogation 
issue involving law firms and legal fees, see St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Perl, Minn., 415 N.W.2d 663 (1987).

[¶55.]  The judgment in favor of appellee 
subrogating insurance carrier, Cravens, provided:

"THIS MATTER having come 
on regularly for a trial before the Court, sitting without a jury, * * * and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises.

"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, 
awarded judgment in its favor and against Defendant in the sum of Ninety-Four 
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Five Dollars ($94,455.00), together with interest 
thereon at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum from September 20, 1984 to 
the date of trial in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Seven 
Dollars and Eighty-Eight Cents ($13,567.88), together with attorneys fees in the 
amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), and together with costs in the 
amount of One Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($121.21), for a 
total judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of One 
Hundred Eighteen Thousand One Hundred Forty-Four Dollars and Nine Cents 
($118,144.09), together with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) 
per annum from October 9, 1986 until paid in full."

[¶56.]  The only further learning we are afforded 
from the record as to the basis of decision was the statement of the trial court 
at the conclusion of oral argument, wherein he said:

"It's the order of this 
Court and the judgment of this Court that Compass shall be responsible for the 
sum of - Strike that. That Cravens shall be responsible for the sum of $2,237 
and Compass shall be responsible for the sum of - the difference between $2,237, 
the cost of the oil, and $96,792."

[¶57.]  Surely an emphatic and careful 
examination of the record would reveal that the case is a simple subrogation 
proceeding where, after the property-damage carrier has paid under its policy, 
it attempts to subrogate in the name of the state against the state to reach the 
state liability carrier. As demonstrable of the failure of issue analysis, the 
trial court judgment is primary evidence when the court even gave judgment 
against the liability carrier in favor of the property-damage carrier for clean 
up on the property of the insured. It was apparent that the basis of the trial 
court's decision was on a subrogation right to affix total liability on the 
liability carrier, even if it involved clean up on the property of the insured 
where no possibility of existence of liability could be inferred. The majority 
conversely seem to determine that the issue is liability of the state for oil 
spill without any understanding of insurance coverage in stating in conclusion 
what it had avoided in logical argument:

"* * * The trial court 
correctly found that Compass had the primary responsibility for the damage to 
the property of others. We will not now dissect the respective policies in an 
attempt to determine who wins the battle of the forms with respect to other 
insurance clauses."3

[¶58.]  The construction of the policies by this 
court simply has no basis in either subrogation law or the policy terminology. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Fidelity Casualty Company of New York, Wyo., 374 P.2d 754 (1962). Cravens undertook 
certain liabilities for property ownership including damage, malicious mischief 
and clean up while the defined basis of Compass was for indemnity where 
liability was asserted and demonstrated.4 

[¶59.]  A different basis for denial is to be 
found in the somewhat similar situations which were considered in the riot 
liability cases of A & B Auto Stores of Jones St. v. City of Newark, supra, 
and Manzo v. City of Plainfield, supra, where property-damage carriers as 
exposed to claims from the cities' race riots asserted subrogation against the 
towns which were subjected to absolute liability for property damage by statute. 
In denying subrogation, the court recognized actual fault of a third party and 
denied subrogation to the property-damage carriers. The fact that the city 
carried liability insurance would furthermore not justify subrogation as between 
the two carriers. Imposition of absolute liability did not include application 
of subrogation exposure to the liability carrier.

[¶60.]  What the court actually holds here is 
that the property-damage carrier is entitled to subrogate as either a volunteer 
or as the issuer of a secondary coverage which, in either case, is directly 
contrary to the statement that this is not a subrogation action, and to do so 
not premised on the joint insured's negligence but contended on statutorily 
impressed absolute liability. The insurer that accepted the premium for a policy 
of insurance including vandalism assumed the risk that a third-party vandal 
would appear and cause policy-covered property damage. Cf. Board of Education of 
Jordan School District v. Hales, supra.

[¶61.]  Synthesizing its position in subrogation 
letters written to a representative of Compass, Cravens 
stated:

"We insure the State of 
Wyoming on a 
first party basis. A claim in the amount of $95,455.58 has been submitted to us 
as first party carrier for an oil spill in Evanston, Wyoming. * * *

"In reviewing your 
policy, we feel that it should respond or at [least] participate in this 
loss."

And 
subsequently:

"We had just made payment 
of $96,792.06 to the State of Wyoming covering the oil 
spill.

"I believe you are 
familiar with the claim as C.G. Iversen of GAB was handling the claim on our 
behalf; I believe she also represented you.

"We did make full payment 
of the claim as we were getting pressure from the State of Wyoming and rather than 
put the state in the middle while we discussed responsibility, felt it best if 
we paid the claim.

"However, we definitely 
feel that you also had some, if not full, responsibility for this claim and so 
are looking to you for contribution."

Again in later 
correspondence:

"Under the facts and law 
as outlined above, Compass Insurance Company's policy with the State of 
Wyoming 
provides coverage for the damages resulting from the oil spill of March 19, 
1984. Cravens, Dargan & Company, as subrogee of the State of Wyoming, hereby demands that Compass Insurance Company 
immediately pay, as required under the terms of its policy with the State of 
Wyoming, 
$96,792.06 to Cravens, Dargan & Company."

[¶62.]  Conversely, the position of Compass is 
well stated and properly synthesized in its trial brief:

"As will be seen, 
plaintiff's lengthy argument that the Compass policy might cover the oil spill 
is irrelevant. The defendant will assume without conceding, for the purpose of 
the pending motions, that the oil spill was caused by an `occurrence', that the 
pollution exclusion does not exclude coverage, and that the State of Wyoming was 
`legally obligated' to pay for the cost of the clean-up, and that none of the 
terms of the Compass policy exclude coverage.

"However, whether the 
Compass policy might cover the oil spill is not the issue; Craven's claim 
against Compass is precluded (1) because it constitutes an impermissible attempt 
to subrogate against its own insurer, (2) because contribution cannot be 
enforced between insurers of diverse interests, property, and risk, and (3) if 
contribution is allowed, the `other insurance' clauses relieve Compass of any 
obligation or limit it to one percent of the loss."

Appellant there 
noted to the trial court, and re-emphasizes in accord with the standards of law 
presently existent, that Cravens was improperly attempting to subrogate against 
its own insured. I would agree with its characterization of this universally 
recognized rule firmly supported by the totality of case law and precedent that 
without entitlement to subrogate property damage, Cravens was also not benefited 
by right of contribution, since that theory is not available where policies of 
different kinds insure against different risks. Granite State Insurance Company 
v. Employers Mutual Insurance Company, 125 Ariz. 275, 609 P.2d 90 (1980); 
Republic Insurance Co., v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 166 Colo. 513, 444 P.2d 868 (1968); Indiana Insurance Company v. Sentry Insurance Company, Ind. 
App., 437 N.E.2d 1381 (1982); United Services Automobile Association v. 
Agricultural Insurance Co. of Watertown, New York, 67 N.M. 333, 355 P.2d 143 
(1960).

"* * * The authorities 
are legion that for a proportionate recovery clause to operate in the insurer's 
favor, or for the enforcement of contributions between insurers, there must be 
identity of risk." Northland Insurance Company v. Miles, Wyo., 
446 P.2d 160, 161 (1968).

I would also 
agree with the characterization expressed in another 
subrogation-contribution-excess insurance-coverage case where in dissent Justice 
Harnsberger observed:

"* * * The reasoning 
relied upon * * *, although subtly expressed, is neither persuasive nor 
sufficiently impressive to warrant overriding adherence to old legal 
principles." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of 
New York, 
supra, 374 P.2d  at 766.

[¶63.]  Two axioms are misinterpreted or ignored 
by the court in the conclusions made. The first is that Cravens either had 
ostensible or actual liability and satisfied a definable claim by payment to the 
state of Wyoming, or put itself in the position of a 
sheer volunteer without liability or obligation. Commercial Union Insurance Co. 
v. Postin, supra; Southwest Mississippi Electric Power Association v. Harragill, 
254 Miss. 460, 
182 So. 2d 220 (1966). See also Fulton v. Des 
Jardins, 67 Wyo. 517, 227 P.2d 240 (1951), cited with 
approval in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Postin, supra. The second axiom 
that follows is that in either regard the premise upon which reimbursement is 
requested is based upon the non-existent or secondary liability of Cravens and 
the primary liability of Compass as a matter of subrogation of a property-damage 
carrier against the liability carrier. Thirdly, not as a matter of an axiom, but 
rather as a matter of characterization, the liability status of the state of 
Wyoming for the oil spill in any defined dollar amount, and whether that defined 
liability is determinable in strict liability so as to impose a dollar liability 
on Compass, was and is a question upon which sufficient facts were not presented 
in the record for any decision; nor is a legal basis presented demonstrating 
compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and other comparable 
requirements and criteria for an indemnity obligation to arise when any 
potential liability of the insured was earlier discharged by another payment 
medium.

[¶64.]  I would reverse and remand for dismissal 
of the State of Wyoming/Cravens litigation to surcharge a 
liability carrier for what the property-damage carrier had paid under its 
insurance policy.

FOOTNOTES

1 The circumstance of an 
ex parte amendment of this kind by the court has curious facets, but none more 
interesting than the result on the demand for attorney's fees included in the 
original complaint, based upon § 26-15-124, W.S. 1977, which affords a remedy of 
an insured against his carrier for inopportunely denied payment of insurance 
benefits. The amount of attorney's fees was stipulated as reasonable, but a 
logical or a legally justified basis for award in a subrogation case of this 
kind is absolutely lacking. Although strongly presented in trial, the question 
of the attorney's fees was not separately presented on appeal, and no further 
inquiry will be pursued except to reiterate that a basis for the award is not 
presented in this record. See F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States for Use of 
Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 94 S. Ct. 2157, 40 L. Ed. 2d 703 (1974); 
Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 614 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980); 
Downing v. Stiles, Wyo., 635 P.2d 808 (1981); State Surety Co. v. Lamb 
Construction Co., Wyo., 625 P.2d 184 (1981). Cf. Bruegger v. National Old Line 
Insurance Co., 387 F. Supp. 1177 (D.Wyo. 1975), modified on other grounds, 529 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1976). In result, this was a subrogation and carrier's award 
of attorney's fees under a first-party insured's benefit 
statute.

It would be a 
well-reasoned assessment that judgment was entered in behalf of a litigant which 
was never pleaded as a party on a claim that it never made by the nominal 
plaintiff as its insured suing itself with attorney's fees awarded without any 
statutory or legal justification.

2 Two interesting facets 
of this order deserve note in this record. First, since Cravens was never a 
party it had never moved for summary judgment, and secondly, a $1,000 
deductible, which would have created and maintained a proper 
real-party-in-interest relationship with the state of Wyoming, Gardner v. 
Walker, Wyo., 373 P.2d 598 (1962), seemingly disappeared by disingenuous 
disregard of the litigant and the court. Purists in pleading would find all of 
this interesting, since an earlier stipulation entitled "The State of Wyoming v. 
Compass Insurance Company" reflected the reasonable clean-up cost and that no 
claim has ever been made against the highway department or the state of Wyoming 
by any third party for damages to the property caused by the oil spill; that 
Cravens had a $50 million policy and had paid the clean-up costs; and that 
"Cravens by letter dated July 10 and September 20, 1984, and March 8, 1985, * * 
* made demand upon Compass for repayment of all or a portion of those sums paid 
by Cravens to the State of Wyoming." The fiduciary responsibility of a 
subrogating insurance carrier for the deductible also seemingly evaporated. 
Compass had earlier raised the real-party-in-interest defense which was obviated 
by the action of the court in summary-judgment order amendment by unrequested 
substitution of parties when in the process the highway department's $1,000 
deductible got lost. The existence of a liability policy deductible was not 
addressed in this record, so if Cravens was entitled to recover, why the state 
was not repaid the deductible is a total mystery as at least a sail upon that 
silent sea.

3 The interjection of 
strict liability in addition to negligence occasions the confusion defining the 
scope of the Compass policy. Clearly, negligence was never demonstrated or even 
realistically contended. Consequently, a properly based contention of liability 
carrier indemnity obligation resulting from negligence of its insured is not 
presented. The premise of obligation moves to an occurrence concept of insurance 
indemnifying without regard to negligence premised on obligation of its insured 
which arises from ownership but not negligence.

The two cases cited by 
the majority, Lansco Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 138 N.J. 
Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd 368 A.2d 363 (1976), certification denied 
73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977), and Chemical Applications Co., Inc. v. Home 
Indemnity Co., 425 F. Supp. 777 (D.Mass. 1977), invoke no discussion of the 
subrogation conclusion, and consequently they have no precedential relation to 
the present issues. At issue in those cases was coverage protection between the 
insured and the liability carrier without consideration of either subrogation or 
governmental entity liabilities issues. See likewise, Evans v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 107 Misc.2d 710, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 
(1981).

4 Although otherwise at 
least tentatively presented by appellee Cravens, this court has declined 
consideration of insurance clauses of the respective policies which would raise 
the escape versus excess constructional attributes as frequently invoked albeit 
normally only if insurance of like kind. For a discussion of excess versus 
escape clauses, see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 551 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.Penn. 1982), aff'd 720 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1983). See the rule 
restated in Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 54 N.C. App. 
551, 284 S.E.2d 211 (1981). Cf. Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., Wyo., 487 P.2d 320 (1971). An excellent 
current review of "escape," "excess," and "pro-rata" insurance clauses is found 
in Comment, "Other Insurance" Conflicts in Arizona, 19 Ariz.L.J. 475 (1987).