Title: Truck Rentals v. Mo Carroll-Newton

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

623 So. 2d 1106 (1993)
TRUCK RENTALS OF ALABAMA, INC., and Rollins Leasing Corporation
v.
M.O. CARROLL-NEWTON COMPANY, INC.
1910924, 1910925.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 30, 1993.
J. Franklin Ozment and Robert D. Hunter of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellants.
James J. Robinson and Carol H. Stewart of Burr & Forman, Birmingham, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Truck Rentals of Alabama, Inc. ("TRA"), and Rollins Leasing Corporation appeal from judgments on jury verdicts in favor of M.O. *1107 Carroll-Newton Company, Inc. ("M.O. Carroll"). The jury returned a verdict against TRA in the amount of $196,840.50 on M.O. Carroll's claims of fraud and breach of contract, and against Rollins in the amount of $196,840.50 on M.O. Carroll's claims of breach of contract and conversion. In addition, the jury awarded Rollins and TRA $24,708.50 each on their counterclaims against M.O. Carroll for the rental value of certain vehicles provided by TRA to M.O. Carroll. The trial judge denied motions by TRA and Rollins for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and TRA and Rollins appealed. We affirm.
M.O. Carroll, a wholesale grocer, uses tractor trailer rigs to deliver groceries to small grocery stores in Alabama and surrounding states. In early 1987, Sam Carroll, III, vice president in charge of operations at M.O. Carroll, began negotiating with Bo Harrison, a representative of Truck Rentals of Alabama, regarding the possibility of leasing TRA trucks to meet the business obligations of M.O. Carroll. Initial discussions were not fruitful; however, in December 1987, Sam Carroll began negotiating with Richard Nicholas of TRA regarding the possibility of a business relationship. Nicholas presented Sam Carroll with a proposal to lease 10 trucks for a period of 5 years. Those trucks were to be serviced by TRA, and M.O. Carroll was to have parking privileges on TRA lots. In addition, TRA was to purchase 10 used trucks from M.O. Carroll. Negotiations continued between the parties, and changes were made to the original proposal. Ultimately, M.O. Carroll decided to lease 5 vehicles for 6-½ years, with the option to rent additional vehicles at a specified rate. Under the new proposal, TRA was to purchase 16 used trucks from M.O. Carroll and M.O. Carroll would be allowed to set up office trailers at various TRA locations. In addition, TRA would provide fuel for the trucks at cost and perform routine maintenance on the trucks.
The changes to the agreement were to be submitted to the Birmingham office of TRA for approval and, according to Sam Carroll, he was informed that all approval had been received. A draft of the agreement was then drawn up by TRA in January 1988 and signed by Sam Carroll. The document was then sent to the Birmingham office. Almost immediately, TRA began to abide by the terms of the agreement with regard to the delivery of the trucks and M.O. Carroll obtained the insurance required on the leased vehicles pursuant to the contract. TRA also held an orientation meeting with all M.O. Carroll drivers and explained TRA policies and procedures to them. In addition, TRA provided fuel at cost, in compliance with the contract, and performed routine maintenance on the vehicles pursuant thereto. According to the trial testimony, however, Sam Carroll became concerned when M.O. Carroll did not receive a check in payment for the trucks that TRA was to purchase. Sam Carroll testified at trial that he made numerous telephone calls to TRA and was assured, at least on one occasion, that the "check was in the mail." According to Sam Carroll, telephone calls to Buddy Jackson, vice president and general manager of TRA in Birmingham, regarding the status of the check in payment of the used vehicles, went unreturned.
Almost simultaneously with the negotiations between TRA and M.O. Carroll, TRA was negotiating with Rollins Leasing Corporation with regard to the sale of certain TRA assets to Rollins. The sale was to include equipment and leases and, although the agreement between Rollins and TRA provided that all potential leases would not be signed until authorized by Rollins, there was evidence that TRA's home office never informed its district managers and account representatives of this fact and did not discourage them from obtaining new leases during the negotiations. Although TRA appeared to abide by the M.O. Carroll lease to the letter from January to the end of March, with the exception of paying for the used vehicles it was to purchase from M.O. Carroll, no one ever informed M.O. Carroll that TRA or Rollins had not in fact approved the lease or that they had no intention of doing so. Then, on March 29, 1988, Rollins, having refused to accept the lease agreement, had Buddy Jackson of TRA write Sam Carroll and inform him that all trucks should be returned to TRA and that the lease was being rejected.
*1108 Following Jackson's letter to Sam Carroll, Rollins's agreement to purchase TRA's assets became effective and Rollins sent M.O. Carroll a letter that stated:
Rollins continued to bill M.O. Carroll for leased vehicles, according to the agreement between M.O. Carroll and TRA; however, following the above-quoted letter, Rollins notified M.O. Carroll of a rate increase that would become effective around the middle of April. When M.O. Carroll notified Rollins that it considered the lease agreement to be binding on Rollins, Rollins proceeded to require M.O. Carroll to return the leased vehicles and refused to service for M.O. Carroll the vehicles that had not yet been returned.
M.O. Carroll filed a complaint against TRA and Rollins on July 7, 1988. Rollins, in turn, filed a complaint against M.O. Carroll on July 8, 1988. The two cases were consolidated on September 22, 1988. TRA and Rollins thereafter filed a counterclaim in which TRA sought rental payments and Rollins incorporated the allegations of its separate complaint.
M.O. Carroll amended its original complaint in November 1988; that complaint is set out in pertinent part as follows:
TRA contends that the trial judge erred in submitting the issue of affirmative misrepresentation to the jury. In particular, TRA argues that neither the complaint, the amended complaint, nor the trial brief contained any allegation of an affirmative misrepresentation and that, therefore, TRA lacked sufficient notice to defend against that theory. Instead, it claims to have had notice only of the theory of suppression of material facts. TRA states as follows in its brief on appeal:
Contrary to its argument, TRA, by acknowledging theory number (2) as a pre-trial theory of M.O. Carroll's complaint, admits the knowledge of an affirmative misrepresentation theory.
The trial judge's instructions to the jury with regard to misrepresentation include the following:
"An action for deceit, under § 6-5-103 and § 6-5-104, results from either a willful or reckless misrepresentation or a suppression of material facts with an intent to mislead." Whitlow v. Bruno's Inc., 567 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (Ala.1990). In the amended complaint as quoted above, M.O. Carroll charged that TRA was guilty of violating § 6-5-103 and § 6-5-104. The amended complaint also charges that TRA agreed to purchase 16 trucks and knew that Rollins had no intention of abiding by that agreement.
Furthermore, we have reviewed the record and we agree with M.O. Carroll that, even if the complaint did not state a claim for an affirmative misrepresentation, such a claim was tried by implied consent. "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Rule 15(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. There is evidence in the record that TRA had sufficient notice of the affirmative misrepresentation theory to defend against it, particularly in the depositions taken by the parties during discovery. In *1110 particular, the deposition of Sam Carroll indicated that he had been told by a TRA representative that the check for the vehicles allegedly purchased pursuant to the agreement between the parties should reach him within a few days. Also, he stated that he had been told that TRA had approved the lease agreement in question.
Based on the pleadings, discovery, and the evidence given at trial, the trial judge did not err in charging the jury with regard to affirmative misrepresentation.
TRA and Rollins next argue that the alleged contract was void under the Statute of Frauds because, they say, it was an agreement not to be performed within a year, but was not expressed in a writing signed by TRA or Rollins. See § 8-9-2(1), Ala.Code 1975. They argue that, because the original proposal submitted to M.O. Carroll in December was significantly changed, it cannot constitute the contract. In addition, they contend that the proposal ultimately signed by Sam Carroll in January specifically stated that it would not be binding on TRA until approved and signed by a TRA officer; they contend this despite the fact that the document was drawn up by an agent of TRA and despite the fact that Sam Carroll was advised before the document was drawn up that all approval had been received.
TRA, by entering into performance in accordance with the agreement, may well be estopped to deny that the contract was in force. As previously stated, according to Sam Carroll, a TRA representative had told him that the agreement had been approved and that he should expect the check for the used vehicles within a few days. In addition, testimony at trial revealed that TRA had entered the agreement into its computer and that it usually did not make such entries until after a contract had been approved.
Dean v. Myers, 466 So. 2d 952, 955 (Ala.1985).
Moreover, M.O. Carroll argues that there were numerous papers that, if considered together, are sufficient to meet the requirement imposed by the Statute of Frauds that the contract be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. In particular, M.O. Carroll points out that the December *1112 proposal was accompanied by a transmittal letter signed by a TRA officer and that both parties negotiated changes, which were reported to Sam Carroll as having been approved by TRA. Thereafter, the January agreement itself was prepared by TRA on a TRA letterhead. In addition, M.O. Carroll points out that it received weekly invoices with TRA endorsements consistent with the terms of the agreement.
We agree that the documents taken together suffice to meet the requirement of the Statute of Frauds. The negotiated contract constitutes an "agreement or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration... in writing," and the invoices submitted by TRA to M.O. Carroll, as well as TRA's endorsements of checks submitted by M.O. Carroll, are sufficient under these circumstances to meet the requirement of the Statute of Frauds that the writing be "subscribed by the party to be charged therewith." In addition, the letter from Rollins to M.O. Carroll indicates that Rollins had assumed "the agreement" between TRA and M.O. Carroll. Thus, the arguments based on the Statute of Frauds have no merit.
In regard to the conversion claim against Rollins, Rollins contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the testimony of Bruce Sexton, because his name was not submitted on the list of all proposed witnesses in compliance with the pre-trial order. Whether to allow witness to testify is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Mitchell v. Moore, 406 So. 2d 347, 350 (Ala.1981). See also Alford v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 496 So. 2d 19, 21 (Ala. 1986). We find no abuse of discretion here.
We have considered the remaining arguments of TRA and Rollins, and we find them to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed as to appeal number 1910924, which is the appeal by TRA and Rollins from the judgment for M.O. Carroll in its action against TRA and Rollins.
The notice of appeal filed by TRA and Rollins included on its face the circuit court docket number for the case that Rollins had filed against M.O. Carroll, so the notice of appeal was treated as raising an appeal in that case, and the number 1910925 was assigned to that purported appeal. No appeal has in fact been taken from the judgment for Rollins in its action that was treated as a counterclaim, so case number 1910925 is due to be dismissed.
1910924AFFIRMED.
1910925DISMISSED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.