Title: Alabama v. Anderson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

rel: 06/29/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
_________________________
1110793
_________________________
Ex parte Amy Bishop Anderson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  State of Alabama
v.
Amy Bishop Anderson)
(Madison Circuit Court, CC-11-1131)
PER CURIAM.
Amy Bishop Anderson petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Madison Circuit Court to compel the
1110793
2
Office of Indigent Defense Services and the Comptroller's
Office within the Department of Finance to comply with the
circuit court's orders and disburse interim payments of fees
to Bishop's retained experts.  We deny the petition.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Anderson was indicted on charges of capital murder and
attempted murder after she shot several of her colleagues
during a biology-department faculty meeting at the University
of Alabama in Huntsville on February 2, 2010.  Anderson's
defense counsel have served notice that they intend to argue
that Anderson is not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect.
On May 23, 2011, the circuit court entered an order
granting defense counsel's ex parte motion for extraordinary
expenses.  The circuit court authorized defense counsel to
retain the services of a neuropsychiatrist, Dr. James
Merikangas, as an expert who would evaluate Anderson and
ordered the comptroller to make immediate payment to cover Dr.
Merikangas's retainer.  According to Anderson, Dr. Merikangas
began working on the case with a reasonable expectation of
being paid at a later date.  No payment was made by the
1110793
Attachment C to Anderson's petition for a writ of
1
mandamus is a June 16, 2011, memorandum issued by the
comptroller to all judges and lawyers, advising them that
revisions to § 15-12-21, Ala. Code 1975, were effective
immediately and that changes to the statute included the
following:
"Expert 
fees 
shall 
remain 
reimbursable, 
if
reasonable and approved in advance by the trial
court as necessary.
3
comptroller in response to the circuit court's order.
However, on July 11, 2011, defense counsel received a letter
from the comptroller that stated:
"I've reviewed the court order for interim
payment of expenses in the above matter and, while
the State Comptroller takes court orders quite
seriously, we are bound by existing statutes and
rules when authorizing expenditures from the Fair
Trial Tax Fund.  Alabama law does not permit
prepayment or interim payment to members of the
defense team or to experts.  The Code of Alabama
[1975], § 15-12-21(e) states, in pertinent part,
'Preapproved expert fees shall be billed at the time
the court is notified that all work by the expert
has been completed, and shall be paid forthwith.
Once an expert has been paid for services on a
particular case, that expert shall not be allowed to
receive further payment on the case.'  In order to
seek payment of expert fees, the expert must have
fully concluded his or her work in the case.  There
is no legal authority for the payment of expert fees
before that expert's work has been completed.
"This code section has been revised effective
June 14, 2011, to allow interim payments; however
prepayment in the form of a retainer still cannot be
made."1
1110793
"....
"Interim payments for attorney fees and/or expenses
may be authorized by the Director of Indigent
Defense Services."
According to Anderson, UAB Hospital requires payment at
2
the time of service.
4
Because Dr. Merikangas's initial assessment of Anderson
was that she suffered from a mental disease and neurological
injuries that required further testing, defense counsel filed
another ex parte motion seeking extraordinary expenses.  On
September 27, 2011, the circuit court again authorized and
preapproved 
extraordinary 
expenses 
and 
ordered 
interim 
payment
of those expenses.  The expenses included the fee for testing
at the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital ("UAB
Hospital") by Dr. David Clark, a neurologist at UAB Hospital.2
The order required that Dr. Clark provide defense counsel with
an estimate of his fee; that defense counsel submit the fee
estimate to the circuit court; and that, upon approval by the
circuit 
court, 
the 
comptroller 
make 
the 
interim 
payment 
within
15 days.  
On December 9, 2011, after the estimate of Dr. Clark's
fee had been approved by the circuit court, defense counsel
1110793
5
moved for payment according to the circuit court's September
27, 2011, order.  The circuit court ordered the comptroller to
disburse the interim payment to defense counsel within 15
days.  In response to the circuit court's December 9 order,
the 
Office 
of 
Indigent 
Defense 
Services 
wrote 
defense 
counsel,
advising that the interim payment would not be disbursed
because there were no procedures in place by which to make
such payments. 
Anderson attached two ex parte motions entitled "Notice
of Inability to Provide Effective Assistance of Counsel" to
her petition for a writ of mandamus.  In those motions,
defense counsel indicated that they were unable to provide
effective assistance of counsel because the comptroller had
failed to comply with the circuit court's orders of May 23,
September 27, and December 7, 2011, ordering that interim
payments be made to Anderson's experts.  Defense counsel
sought no relief in those ex parte motions; they merely
provided notice that "they [were] presently unable to provide
[Anderson] with effective assistance of counsel."
On January 30, 2012, Anderson filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals and also sought
1110793
6
a stay of the proceedings in the circuit court pending the
consideration of her mandamus petition by that court.  The
Court of Criminal appeals denied the petition by an order
dated March 8, 2012, because, it stated, Anderson had failed
to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought.  That
court also denied Anderson's motion to stay. 
Anderson subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus "compel[ling] named respondents at the Office of
Indigent Defense Services and the Comptroller's Office  in the
Department of Finance to disburse interim payments as
previously ordered by the trial court on May 23, September 27,
and December 7, 2011, so that [Anderson] may obtain expert
assistance and diagnostic testing essential to her defense."
II. Standard of Review
"Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and will be
issued '"only when there is: (1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought, (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so, (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy, and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."'  Ex parte Land, 775 So.
2d 847, 850 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Horton,
711 So. 2d 979, 983 (Ala. 1998)).  When we consider
a mandamus petition, the scope of our review is to
determine whether the trial court clearly exceeded
its discretion.  Ex parte Tegner, 682 So. 2d 396
(Ala. 1996)."
1110793
7
State v. Bui, 888 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Ala. 2004).
III. Analysis
Anderson argues in her petition that this Court should
direct the circuit court to compel the Office of Indigent
Defense Services and the comptroller to disburse payments as
ordered by the circuit court on May 23, September 27, and
December 7, 2011.  In the petition, Anderson claims to "have
submitted numerous ex parte motions notifying the trial court
of the Department of Finance's refusal to disburse these
court-ordered funds."  Yet, she says, "[t]he trial court has
refused to find [the Office of Indigent Defense Services and
the comptroller] in contempt of court, or compel the
Comptroller of the Office of Indigent [Defense] Services to
make these payments."  Anderson also claims that "[t]he trial
court has refused to find these officials in contempt or
otherwise attempt to remedy these constitutional violations.
After filing numerous motions in the trial court, defense are
left with no other adequate remedy."
In this case, the circuit court entered orders on May 23,
September 27, and December 7, 2011, ordering that interim
payments be made to Anderson's experts.  Anderson, however,
1110793
8
has not supported the claims made in the petition that defense
counsel filed multiple contempt motions notifying the circuit
court of the comptroller's refusal to disburse the funds and
the refusal of the Office of Indigent Defense Services to pre-
approve the disbursal of the funds and seeking the circuit
court's enforcement 
of 
its orders through its contempt powers.
Instead, Anderson merely states in her brief that she sought
enforcement by filing contempt motions and that the circuit
court refused to find the Office of Indigent Defense Services
and the comptroller in contempt, but she has provided no
attachments to her petition indicating those circumstances.
The contempt motions she says she filed are not included in
the materials submitted with Anderson's petition for a writ of
mandamus.  See, e.g., Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 21
So. 3d 1222, 1228 (Ala. 2009) (stating that the "'record
cannot be changed, altered or varied on appeal by statements
in briefs of counsel'" (quoting Cooper v. Adams, 295 Ala. 58,
61, 322 So. 2d 706, 708 (1975))).
Rule 21(a)(1)(B), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a
petitioner for a writ of mandamus is to provide this Court
with a "statement of the facts necessary to an understanding
1110793
9
of the issues presented by the petition."  We have explained
the role of the parties in assembling the materials to be
reviewed in a mandamus proceeding as follows:
"'The materials reviewed by this Court
in considering a petition for writ of
mandamus consist of exhibits provided by
the parties:
"'"[A] petitioner for a writ of
mandamus is obliged to provide
with the petition 'copies of any
order or opinion or parts of the
record that would be essential to
an understanding of the matters
set forth in the petition.'  Rule
21(a), Ala. R. App. P.  In the
event the petition is not denied,
the respondent is directed to
file an answer to the petition,
which provides the respondent
with 
an 
'opportunity 
to
supplement 
the 
"record" 
by
attaching 
exhibits 
of 
its
own....'"
"'Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d
71, 74 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte
Miltope Corp., 522 So. 2d 272, 273 (Ala.
1988)).'
"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 232 n. 2 (Ala. 2004). ...
"When this Court considers a petition for a writ
of mandamus, the only materials before it are the
petition and the answer and any attachments to those
documents.  There is no traditional 'record'
submitted to this Court by the trial court clerk as
in an appeal."  
1110793
10
Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control, Inc., 21 So. 3d at 1227–28.
As the petitioner, Anderson is obliged to advise this
Court of all the "facts necessary to an understanding of the
issues presented by the petition," Rule 21(a)(1)(B), Ala. R.
App. P., and to show "a clear legal right ... to the order
sought and an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so," none of which have been
shown.  Here, the circuit court entered the orders directing
interim payments for Anderson's experts.  Anderson, however,
has not shown that the circuit court has refused to enforce
those orders.  Based on the foregoing, Anderson has not
satisfied her burden of showing a refusal by the circuit
court to enforce its orders.
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Anderson has not
satisfied her burden, and we deny the petition. 
PETITION DENIED.  
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, Main,
and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Parker and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.