Title: DeRolph v. State (Opinion of Justice F.E. Sweeney)

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

DEROLPH ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Constitutional law -- Education -- Schools -- Ohio’s elementary and 
secondary public school financing system violates Section 2, 
Article vI of the Ohio Constitution -- Specific school funding 
statutes that are unconstitutional. 
Ohio’s elementary and secondary public school financing system violates 
Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, which mandates a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.  
The following specific provisions are unconstitutional: 
 
(a) R.C. 133.301, granting borrowing authority to school districts; 
 
(b) R.C. 3313.483, 3313.487, 3313.488, 3313.489, and 3313.4810, the 
emergency school assistance loan provisions; 
 
(c) R.C. 3317.01, 3317.02, 3317.022, 3317.023, 3317.024, 3317.04, 
3317.05, 3317.051 and 3317.052, the School Foundation Program; 
 
(d) R.C. Chapter 3318, the Classroom Facilities Act, to the extent that it 
is underfunded. 
(No. 95-2066 -- Submitted September 10, 1996 -- Decided March 24, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Perry County, No. 94-CA-477. 
 
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The constitutionality of Ohio’s public elementary and secondary school 
finance system is at issue in this case.  The named plaintiffs-appellants are the 
Youngstown City School District Board of Education, Mahoning County; the 
Lima City School District Board of Education, Allen County; the Dawson-
Bryant Local School District Board of Education, Lawrence County; the 
Northern Local School District Board of Education, Perry County; the 
Southern Local School District Board of Education, Perry County; and the 
superintendents and certain named members of the boards of education of these 
districts, as well as certain teachers, pupils and next friends.  Numerous 
organizations representing such diverse groups as teachers’ unions, 
administrators, school boards, and handicapped children, and various 
legislators, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Ohio AFL-
CIO, have filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the appellants. 
 
The defendants-appellees are the state of Ohio, the State Board of 
Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Ohio Department 
of Education.  The Alliance for Adequate School Funding, Stanley Aronoff, 
 
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JoAnn Davidson, and Governor George Voinovich have filed amicus curiae 
briefs on behalf of the appellees. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On December 19, 1991, appellants filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County, seeking a 
determination 
that 
Ohio’s 
system 
of 
funding 
public education is 
unconstitutional.  Trial began on October 25, 1993 and lasted thirty days, 
culminating in more than five thousand six hundred pages of transcript and the 
admission of approximately four hundred fifty exhibits into evidence.  Sixty-
one witnesses testified at trial or by way of sworn deposition.  Although the 
parties disagree over the constitutionality of the relevant statutes, plaintiff and 
defense witnesses alike testified as to the inadequacies of Ohio’s system of 
school funding and the need for reform.  In fact, defendant State Board of 
Education has not only advocated comprehensive reform but has stated the 
following three goals of such reform:  equity, adequacy and reliability of 
school funding. 
 
4 
 
Following trial, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The court determined that Ohio’s system of school funding 
violates numerous provisions of the Ohio Constitution,
 including Section 2, 
Article VI, requiring a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
throughout the state.  The trial court ordered the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and the State Board of Education to prepare legislative proposals 
for submission to the General Assembly to eliminate wealth-based disparities 
among Ohio’s public school districts.  The trial court retained jurisdiction in 
the matter only for a period of time to ensure that the order was followed and 
that appropriate steps were taken to institute a totally new system of school 
funding.  The trial court also awarded costs and attorney fees to appellants. 
 
The State Board of Education voted not to appeal from the trial court’s 
decision.  However, the Ohio Attorney General filed a notice of appeal to the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals.  The court of appeals, in a split decision, 
reversed the trial court.  The majority relied on Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 12 O.O.3d 327, 390 N.E.2d 813, and 
found that the current system of school funding is constitutional.  The court 
 
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also determined that the trial court had erred in awarding attorney fees to 
appellants and in retaining jurisdiction in the case.   
 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Reader conceded that current school  
funding was insufficient, but was unwilling to find the statutory scheme 
unconstitutional.  Instead, he stated that it is up to this court to declare the 
current system unconstitutional and for the General Assembly to repair it.  
Despite this position, Judge Reader emphasized the peculiar nature of this case 
and the lack of dispute over the evidence: 
 
“***  The defendants, the State of Ohio, the State Board of Education, 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Ohio Department of 
Education in their appellate brief indicated that there are few facts in dispute.  
Of course, there aren’t -- they agreed with almost everything the [plaintiffs] 
stated.  In fact, an examination of testimony by defense witnesses in this case 
would indicate that these witnesses stated that the system of funding was 
immoral and inequitable.  If there was ever a case where the parties acted more 
in concert than this one, I haven’t seen it.  ***  Further, it is a matter of public 
 
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record that the appellants, having previously indicated their satisfaction with 
the trial court’s decision, were literally forced to appeal the ruling.” 
 
Judge Gwin, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the trial court that 
Ohio’s statutory scheme for financing its schools violates the “thorough and 
efficient” clause of the Ohio Constitution.  He stressed that due to the glaring 
discrepancies in school buildings, facilities, access to technology and 
curriculum, some students within the state are being deprived of educational 
opportunity.  Furthermore, Judge Gwin stated that the state had shirked its duty 
to generate revenue for the schools by underfunding Ohio schools and by 
permitting schools to borrow against future revenue.  He also criticized the 
majority for disregarding certain findings of fact by the trial court and for 
essentially conducting a de novo review.  Judge Gwin found that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________ 
 
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Bricker & Eckler, Nicholas A. Pittner, John F. Birath, Jr., Sue W. Yount, 
Michael D. Smith and Susan B. Greenberger, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Sutton, State 
Solicitor; Christopher M. Culley and Sharon A. Jennings, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for appellees. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, Lawrence A. Kane, Jr., Mark A. VanderLaan, Joel S. 
Taylor, David K. Mullen and William M. Mattes, Special Counsel for appellees 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction and State Department of Education. 
 
Ben Espy Co., L.P.A., and Ben E. Espy; Jan Michael Long, urging 
reversal for amici curiae members of the Ohio House of Representatives Mary 
Abel, John Bender, Ross Boggs, Dan Brady, Samuel Britton, Jack Cera, Jack 
Ford, Robert Hagan, David Hartley, William Healy, Troy Lee James, Jerry 
Krupinski, Lloyd Lewis, Jr., Sean Logan, June Lucas, Mark Mallory, Dan 
Metelsky, William Ogg, Darrell Opfer, C.J. Prentiss, Tom Roberts, Frank 
Sawyer, Michael Shoemaker, Betty Sutton, Vernon Sykes, and Charleta 
Tavares; Ohio Senators Robert Boggs, Robert Burch, James Carnes, Ben Espy, 
Linda Furney, Leigh Herington, Jeffrey Johnson, Anthony Latell, Jan Michael 
 
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Long, Rhine McLin, and Alan Zaleski; and U.S. Representatives Louis Stokes, 
Robert Ney, and Frank Cremeans. 
 
Joan M. Englund, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
 
Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and Kimball H. 
Carey, urging reversal for amici curiae Buckeye Association of School 
Administrators, Ohio School Boards Association and Ohio Association of 
School Business Officials.  
 
James A. Ciocia, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cleveland Teachers 
Union. 
 
Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell Co., L.P.A., and Frederick I. Taft, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Coalition for School Funding Reform (Bay 
Village City School District, Cleveland Heights-University Heights City 
School District, Lakewood City School District, and Shaker Heights City 
School District). 
 
Patrick F. Timmins, Jr., urging reversal for amicus curiae Coalition of 
Rural and Appalachian Schools. 
 
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David Goldberger and Edward B. Foley, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Institute for Democracy in Education. 
 
Goldstein & Roloff and Morris L. Hawk, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Ohio Association of Elementary School Administrators and Ohio Association 
of Secondary School Administrators. 
 
Buckley, King & Bluso, Robert J. Walter and Thomas C. Drabick, Jr., 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Public School 
Employees (OAPSE)/AFSCME Local 4, AFL-CIO. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Schnorf & Schnorf Co., L.P.A., David M. Schnorf and Johna M. Bella, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Federation of Teachers. 
 
Susan G. Tobin, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Legal Rights 
Service and Ohio Coalition for the Education of Children with Disabilities. 
 
Berry, Shoemaker & Clark and Kevin Shoemaker, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Professional Staff Union. 
 
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Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, John J. Chester and Donald C. Brey, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Governor George Voinovich. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, P.L.L., and N. Victor 
Goodman, urging affirmance for amici curiae Stanley J. Aronoff, President of 
the Ohio Senate, and JoAnn Davidson, Speaker of the Ohio House of 
Representatives. 
 
Walter & Haverfield and James E. Betts, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Alliance for Adequate School Funding. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.   In 1802, when our forefathers convened to 
write our state Constitution, they carried within them a deep-seated belief that 
liberty and individual opportunity could be preserved only by educating Ohio’s 
citizens.  These ideals, which spurred the War of Independence, were so 
important that education was made part of our first Bill of Rights.  Section 3, 
Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution of 1802.  Beginning in 1851, our 
Constitution has required the General Assembly to provide enough funding to 
 
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secure a “thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the 
State.” 
 
Over the last two centuries, the education of our citizenry has been 
deemed vital to our democratic society and to our progress as a state.  
Education is essential to preparing our youth to be productive members of our 
society, with the skills and knowledge necessary to compete in the modern 
world.  In fact, the mission statement of defendant, Ohio State Board of 
Education, echoes these concerns: 
 
“The mission of education is to prepare students of all ages to meet, to 
the best of their abilities, the academic, social, civic, and employment needs of 
the twenty-first century, by providing high-quality programs that emphasize the 
lifelong skills necessary to continue learning, communicate clearly, solve 
problems, use information and technology effectively, and enjoy productive 
employment.”  State Board of Education, Preparing Ohio Schools for the 21st 
Century, Sept. 1990, ii. 
 
Today, Ohio stands at a crossroads.  We must decide whether the 
promise of providing to our youth a free, public elementary and secondary 
 
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education in a “thorough and efficient system” has been fulfilled.  The 
importance of this case cannot be overestimated.  It involves a wholesale 
constitutional attack on Ohio’s system of funding public elementary and 
secondary education.  Practically every Ohioan will be affected by our 
decision:  the 1.8 million children in public schools and every taxpayer in the 
state.  For the 1.8 million children involved, this case is about the opportunity 
to compete and succeed. 
 
Upon a full consideration of the record and in analyzing the pertinent 
constitutional provision, we can reach but one conclusion:  the current 
legislation fails to provide for a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools, in violation of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we dismiss as unfounded any suggestion that 
the problems presented by this case should be left for the General Assembly to 
resolve.  This case involves questions of public or great general interest over 
which this court has jurisdiction.  Section 2(B)(2)(d), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
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Under the long-standing doctrine of judicial review, it is our sworn duty 
to determine whether the General Assembly has enacted legislation that is 
constitutional.  Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.  
We are aware that the General Assembly has the responsibility to enact 
legislation and that such legislation is presumptively valid.  R.C. 1.47(A); 
Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 361, 653 
N.E.2d 212, 214.  However, this does not mean that we may turn a deaf ear to 
any challenge to laws passed by the General Assembly.  The presumption that 
laws are constitutional is rebuttable.  Id.   The judiciary was created as part of a 
system of checks and balances.  We will not dodge our responsibility by 
asserting that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question.  To do so is 
unthinkable.  We refuse to undermine our role as judicial arbiters and to pass 
our responsibilities onto the lap of the General Assembly. 
 
We quote, with approval, the Texas Supreme Court’s remarks when it 
addressed a similar challenge to its authority to review its state’s school 
funding system: 
 
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“‘[W]e have not been unmindful of the magnitude of the principles 
involved, and the respect due to the popular branch of the government.  ***  
Fortunately, however, for the people, the function of the judiciary in deciding 
constitutional questions is not one which it is at liberty to decline.  ***  [We] 
cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the 
confines of the constitution; [we] cannot pass it by because it is doubtful; with 
whatever doubt, with whatever difficulties a case may be attended, [we] must 
decide it, when it arises in judgment.’”  Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby 
(1989), 777 S.W.2d 391, 394, quoting Morton v. Gordon (Republic of 
Tex.1841), Dallam 396, 397-398. 
 
Therefore, we are clearly within our constitutional authority in reviewing 
this matter and in declaring Ohio’s school financing system unconstitutional.  
We turn now to a review of the record. 
OHIO’S SYSTEM OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING 
 
Ohio’s statutory scheme for financing public education is complex.  At 
the heart of the present controversy is the School Foundation Program (R.C. 
Chapter 3317) for allocation of state basic aid and the manner in which the 
 
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allocation formula and other school funding factors have caused or permitted to 
continue vast wealth-based disparities among Ohio’s schools, depriving many 
of Ohio’s public school students of high quality educational opportunities. 
 
According to statute, the revenue available to a school district comes 
from two primary sources:  state revenue, most of which is provided through 
the School Foundation Program, and local revenue, which consists primarily of 
locally voted school district property tax levies.  Federal funds play a minor 
role in the financing scheme.  Ohio relies more on local revenue than state 
revenue, contrary to the national trend. 
 
Under the foundation program,1 state basic aid is available for school 
districts that levy at least twenty mills of local property tax revenue for current 
operating expenses.2  R.C. 3317.01(A).  State basic aid for qualifying school 
districts is calculated each biennium as part of the General Assembly’s budget 
pursuant to a formula set forth in R.C. 3317.022.3 
 
The “formula amount” has no real relation to what it actually costs to 
educate a pupil.  In fact, Dr. Howard B. Fleeter, Assistant Professor at the 
School of Public Policy and Management at Ohio State University, stated that 
 
16 
the foundation dollar amount “is a budgetary residual, which is determined as a 
result of working backwards through the state aid formula after the legislature 
determines the total dollars to be allocated to primary and secondary education 
in each biennial budget.  Thus, the foundation level reflects political and 
budgetary considerations at least as much as it reflects a judgment as to how 
much money should be spent on K-12 education.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The foundation formula amount, which was set at $2,817 per pupil in the 
1992-1993 school year, 144 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4122, is adjusted by a school 
district equalization factor, now called the “cost of doing business” factor.  
R.C. 3317.02(E).  These rates of adjustment vary from county to county and 
apply equally to all districts within the county without regard to the actual costs 
of operations within the individual school districts.  The cost-of-doing-business 
factor assumes that costs are lower in rural districts than in urban districts. 
 
A target amount of combined local and state aid per district is reached by 
multiplying the formula amount, the cost-of-doing-business factor and the 
average daily membership.  R.C. 3317.022(A).  However, subtracted or 
“charged off” from that figure is the total taxable value of real and tangible 
 
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personal property in the district times a certain percentage.  Id.  Subtracting the 
applicable charge-off results in a figure constituting basic state aid for the 
district in question.  The effect of an increase in this percentage would be to 
decrease the amount of basic state aid, resulting in an even greater burden for 
local schools to fund education through local property and/or income taxes. 
 
The financing scheme is further complicated when special factors are 
taken into account.  For instance, additional appropriations may be made for 
categorical programs, such as vocational education, special education and 
transportation.  R.C. 3317.024.  However, no adjustment is made for the 
relative wealth of the receiving district.  Moreover, children in funded 
handicapped “units” are not included in the state basic aid formula.  R.C. 
3317.02(A).  Thus, funds for handicapped students, for instance, whose 
education costs are substantially higher (due to state mandates of small class 
size and because of related extra services) are disbursed in a flat amount per 
unit (see R.C. 3317.05).  If the actual cost exceeds the funds received, wealthier 
districts are in a better position to make up the difference. 
 
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In addition, school districts with children whose families collect Aid to 
Dependent Children (“ADC”) receive additional distributions which increase 
according to the concentration of ADC pupils.  R.C. 3317.023(B).  However, 
the level of distributions freezes once the concentration reaches twenty percent.  
R.C. 3317.023(B)(1).  Thus, districts with higher concentrations of ADC pupils 
are forced to carry more of the extra cost.  Moreover, testimony revealed that 
above the twenty-percent concentration level, educational need increases at a 
faster rate than the concentration percentage. 
 
The School Foundation Program does contain certain guarantees so that 
a school district receives the greater of the program amount or the guarantee 
amount.  See R.C. 3317.04 and 3317.0212.  However, testimony revealed that 
the guarantees work to the substantial benefit of the wealthier districts and 
represent a flaw in the system of school funding, because they work against the 
equalization effect of the formula. 
 
Another weakness in the system is certain “tax reduction factors” 
introduced into law by the General Assembly’s 1976 enactment of R.C. 
319.301 in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 920, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3182, 3194.  The 
 
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purpose of R.C. 319.301, as amended, is to limit growth of real property tax 
revenues that would otherwise occur as a consequence of inflation of property 
values.4  R.C. 319.301 requires the application of tax reduction factors when 
property values increase due to reappraisal or update.  The result is that a 
school district will receive the same number of dollars from voted tax levies 
after reappraisal as it did before reappraisal, even though real property 
valuation in the district has increased through real estate inflation.  As a direct 
result of these tax reduction measures introduced by H.B. No. 920, local 
revenues cannot keep pace with inflation, and school districts have been 
required to propose additional tax levies -- most of which ultimately fail. 
 
H.B. No. 920 has also resulted in a phenomenon called “phantom 
revenue.”  As already explained, tax reduction factors limit revenue growth that 
would otherwise occur due to inflation of real property values.  However, at the 
same time, the increased valuation of property is taken into account in the 
charge-off portion of the foundation formula.  R.C. 3317.022(A).  Thus, a 
school district can experience an increase in the valuation of its taxable real 
 
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property without enjoying any additional income and yet receive less under the 
formula because the total taxable value of property has increased. 
 
Another inherent weakness in the system stems from forced borrowing.  
Districts unable to meet their budgets are forced to borrow funds.  The first 
type of state-mandated loan is the “spending reserve” loan.  R.C. 133.301.  
Under the spending reserve loan program, school districts are permitted to 
borrow against a subsequent year’s revenue with approval of the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction.  Id.  Although there is a statutory 
maximum amount that can be borrowed by a school district, the superintendent 
may (and does) permit borrowing beyond that limit.  R.C. 133.301(C). 
 
If a school district cannot meet its current operating needs through a 
spending reserve loan, it is then required to seek approval of a loan under R.C. 
3313.483.  These loans are obtained from commercial lenders.  R.C. 
3313.483(D). 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 3313.483(A), local boards of education in such 
circumstances declare by resolution that they are unable to remain open for 
instruction and are unable to meet their expenses.  The board must then request 
 
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that the State Auditor determine that such a condition exists.  Id.  If the auditor 
finds that the board has exhausted all available revenue sources, the auditor 
must certify that finding to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the 
State Board of Education and must also certify the amount of operating deficit 
the district will have at the end of the fiscal year.  R.C. 3313.483(B).  A school 
district that has been certified as having a projected operating deficit must 
apply for a loan from a commercial lender.  R.C. 3313.483(D).  However, if the 
commercial loan is denied, a school district must submit a plan for reducing the 
district’s budget.  R.C. 3313.483(E)(1).  The budget reduction plan must 
provide for repayment of the loan within two years (ten years for very large 
amounts), R.C. 3313.483(E)(2), but the plan need not provide for repayment of 
any spending reserve loan.  The loan is repaid by diverting funds otherwise 
available to the school district under the school foundation program to the 
commercial lender.  R.C. 3313.483(E)(3). 
 
Effective December 1992, if a district receives an R.C. 3313.483 
emergency school assistance loan in excess of seven percent of the district’s 
general fund expenditures and has received a loan under R.C. 3313.483 within 
 
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the last five years, the district is subject to state supervision under R.C. 
3313.488 for that year and the ensuing two years.  R.C. 3313.4810.  School 
districts subject to state supervision are prohibited from making any 
expenditure of money or any employment, purchase or rental contract, giving 
any order involving the expenditure of money, or increasing any wage or salary 
schedule without written approval of the superintendent.  R.C. 3313.488(A).  
 
The debt which stems from mandated borrowing programs is in many 
instances staggering, and the cyclical effect of continued borrowing has made it 
more difficult to maintain even minimal school operations.  See R.C. 133.301 
and 3313.483.  These loan programs, discussed above, are nothing less than a 
clever disguise for the state’s failure to raise revenue sufficient to discharge its 
constitutional obligations. 
 
The School Foundation Program contains no aid expressly for capital 
improvements for Ohio’s public schools.  Aid for that purpose is provided by 
the Classroom Facilities Act, R.C. Chapter 3318.  However, the evidence 
showed, and the trial court found, that the Act is insufficiently funded to meet 
the needs of districts that are poor in real property value. 
 
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A “THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF COMMON SCHOOLS” 
 
In urging this court to strike the statutory provisions relating to Ohio’s 
school financing system, appellants argue that the state has failed in its 
constitutional responsibility to provide a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools.5  We agree. 
 
Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution requires the state to 
provide and fund a system of public education and includes an explicit 
directive to the General Assembly:   
 
“The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the State ***.” 
 
The delegates to the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention recognized 
that it was the state’s duty to both present and future generations of Ohioans to 
establish a framework for a “full, complete and efficient system of public 
education.”  II Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for 
the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51 (1851) 
(“Debates”).  Thus, throughout their discussions, the delegates stressed the 
 
24 
importance of education and reaffirmed the policy that education shall be 
afforded to every child in the state regardless of race or economic standing.  
Debates at 11, 13.  Furthermore, the delegates were concerned that the 
education to be provided to our youth not be mediocre but be as perfect as 
could humanly be devised.  Debates at 698-699.  These debates reveal the 
delegates’ strong belief that it is the state’s obligation, through the General 
Assembly, to provide for the full education of all children within the state.  
 
Dr. Samuel Kern Alexander, a leading professor in the area of school law 
and school finance, testified that, in the context of the historical development 
of the phrase “thorough and efficient,” it is the state’s duty to provide a system 
which allows its citizens to fully develop their human potential.  In such a 
system, rich and poor people alike are given the opportunity to become 
educated so that they may flourish and our society may progress.  It was 
believed by the leading statesmen of the time that only in this way could there 
be an efficient educational system throughout the state.   
 
This court has construed the words “thorough and efficient” in light of 
the constitutional debates and history surrounding them.  In Miller v. Korns 
 
25 
(1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 297-298, 140 N.E. 773, 776, this court defined what 
is meant by a “thorough and efficient” system of common schools throughout 
the state: 
 
“This declaration is made by the people of the state.  It calls for the 
upbuilding of a system of schools throughout the state, and the attainment of 
efficiency and thoroughness in that system is thus expressly made a purpose, 
not local, not municipal, but state-wide. 
 
“With this very purpose in view, regarding the problem as a state-wide 
problem, the sovereign people made it mandatory upon the General Assembly 
to secure not merely a system of common schools, but a system thorough and 
efficient throughout the state. 
 
“A thorough system could not mean one in which part or any number of 
the school districts of the state were starved for funds.  An efficient system 
could not mean one in which part or any number of the school districts of the 
state lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 
387, 12 O.O.3d 327, 338, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825, cited Miller with approval.  
 
26 
Additionally, Walter recognized that while the General Assembly has wide 
discretion in meeting the mandate of Section 2, Article VI, this discretion is not 
without limits.  Id.  Walter found that a school system would not be thorough 
and efficient if “a school district was receiving so little local and state revenue 
that the students were effectively being deprived of educational opportunity.”  
Id. 
 
Other states, in declaring their state funding systems unconstitutional,6 
have also addressed the issue of what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” or 
a “general or uniform” system of public schools.  We recognize that some of 
these decisions were decided on different grounds or involved different 
education provisions.  Despite these differences, we still are persuaded by the 
basic principles underlying these decisions. 
 
For instance, in Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, supra, 777 
S.W.2d 391, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated its state funding structure, in 
which annual per-student expenditures varied from $2,112 in the poorest 
districts to $19,333 in the wealthiest districts.  The court noted at 393: 
 
27 
 
“Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which 
there is no opportunity to free themselves.  Because of their inadequate tax 
base, they must tax at significantly higher rates in order to meet minimum 
requirements for accreditation; yet their educational programs are typically 
inferior.  The location of new industry and development is strongly influenced 
by tax rates and the quality of local schools.  Thus, the property-poor districts 
with their high tax rates and inferior schools are unable to attract new industry 
or development and so have little opportunity to improve their tax base.”   
 
The plaintiffs in Edgewood presented compelling evidence of how fiscal 
inequities produced inadequate educational opportunities.  The court in 
Edgewood stated that the inequalities resulting from Texas’s school funding 
system violated the constitutional requirement of efficiency.  Thus, the court 
declared that the legislature must provide for an efficient system in which funds 
are distributed more equitably.  As the court noted, at 397, to correct the 
deficiencies, “[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed.” 
 
The dissent believes that we rely too heavily upon anecdotal evidence to 
support our holding that the current system is unconstitutional.  Glaringly 
 
28 
absent from the dissenting opinion, however, is any consideration of the 
massive evidence presented to us.  There is one simple reason for this 
noticeable omission.  The facts are fatal to the dissent.  The dissent wisely 
recognizes that it could not, in good conscience, address these facts and then 
conclude that Ohio is providing the opportunity for a basic education.  
Therefore, it does the only thing that it could do, it ignores them.  Instead, it 
turns to facts outside the record and to laws passed by the General Assembly 
after this lawsuit was filed as a means of justifying its position.7  We, however, 
know that it is imperative to consider the record as presented to us.  In doing 
so, we find that exhaustive evidence was presented to establish that the 
appellant school districts were starved for funds, lacked teachers, buildings, 
and equipment, and had inferior educational programs, and that their pupils 
were being deprived of educational opportunity. 
 
In 1989, the General Assembly directed the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction to conduct a survey of Ohio’s public school buildings.  Section 8, 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 140, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 837.  The purpose of this survey 
was to determine the cost of bringing all facilities into compliance with state 
 
29 
building codes and asbestos removal requirements, as well as all other state and 
local provisions related to health and safety.  Id. 
 
The results of this study were published in the 1990 Ohio Public School 
Facility Survey.  The survey identified a need for $10.2 billion in facility repair 
and construction. 
 
Among its findings, the survey determined that one-half of Ohio’s school 
buildings were fifty years old or older, and fifteen percent were seventy years 
old or older.  A little over half of these buildings contained satisfactory 
electrical systems; however, only seventeen percent of the heating systems and 
thirty-one percent of the roofs were deemed to be satisfactory.  Nineteen 
percent of the windows and twenty-five percent of the plumbing and fixtures 
were found to be adequate.  Only twenty percent of the buildings had 
satisfactory handicapped access.  A scant thirty percent of the school facilities 
had adequate fire alarm systems and exterior doors. 
 
Over three years after the 1990 survey was published, the current 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, John Theodore Sanders, averred that his 
visits to Ohio school buildings demonstrated that some students were “making 
 
30 
do in a decayed carcass from an era long passed,” and others were educated in 
“dirty, depressing places.” 
 
Robert Franklin, the Building Assistant Supervisor for the Ohio 
Department of Education, gave disturbing examples of incidents where the 
health and safety of students were threatened.  In Buckeye Local, Belmont 
County, three hundred students were hospitalized because carbon monoxide 
leaked out of heaters and furnaces.  In another school district in Wayne County, 
an elementary school built in 1903 had floors so thin that a teacher’s foot went 
through the floor while she was walking across her classroom. 
 
Another major health and safety hazard is asbestos, which has yet to be 
removed from 68.6 percent of Ohio’s school buildings, in direct violation of a 
1987 mandate by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.  In fact, 
over ninety-nine percent of public school structures in Ohio have asbestos in 
them.  Jack D. Hunter, supervisor of school facilities with the Ohio Department 
of Education, testified that around seventy-five percent of Ohio’s public school 
facilities “have asbestos that should be abated *** either immediately or near-
term.”  For fiscal year 1990, over two hundred forty school districts applied for 
 
31 
$140,000,000 in asbestos-abatement money from the state.  Only sixty-three 
districts received funds. 
 
Other conditions which existed within the appellant school districts were 
equally deplorable.  The Nelsonville York Elementary School in Athens 
County is sliding down a hill at a rate of an inch per month.  The school district 
has hired a registered surveyor to monitor the building’s movement.  At Eastern 
Brown High School, the learning-disabled classroom is a converted storage 
room with no windows for ventilation; a fan is placed on the floor to provide 
ventilation.  The students at Ash Ridge Elementary eat lunches at their desks 
because there is no school cafeteria. 
 
In the Dawson-Bryant school system, where a coal heating system is 
used, students are subjected to breathing coal dust which is emitted into the air 
and actually covers the students’ desks after accumulating overnight.  Band 
members are forced to use a former coal bin for practice sessions where there is 
no ventilation whatsoever, causing students to complain of headaches.  Special 
education classes are also held in a former closet that has one bare lightbulb 
hanging from the ceiling. 
 
32 
 
Deering Elementary is not handicapped accessible.  The library is a 
former storage area located in the basement.  Handicapped students have to be 
carried there and to other locations in the building.  One handicapped third-
grader at Deering had never been to the school library because it was 
inaccessible to someone in a wheelchair. 
 
The Northern Local School District in Perry County has also been 
plagued with deteriorating facilities, which include bulging bricks and walls 
which bow out at the now closed Somerset Elementary School, leaking roofs 
and windows, outdated sewage systems which have actually caused raw 
sewage to flow onto the baseball field at Sheridan High School, and the 
presence of arsenic in the drinking water in the Glenford Elementary School 
buildings. 
 
Equally alarming are the conditions found in the Southern Local School 
District in Perry County, where buildings are crumbling and chunks of plaster 
fall from the walls and ceiling.  In fact, the problem was so severe that the 
principal and custodians at Miller Junior High at Shawnee deliberately knocked 
 
33 
plaster off the ceilings so that the plaster would not fall on the students during 
the day.8 
 
Appellant Christopher Thompson poignantly described his experience 
growing up in this school district.  While Chris attended New Straitsville 
Elementary School in Perry County, plaster was falling off the walls and 
cockroaches crawled on the restroom floors.  Chris said the building gave him a 
“dirty feeling” and that he would not use the restroom at school because of the 
cockroaches.  In subsequent years, Chris had to contend with a flooded library 
and gymnasium, a leaky roof where rainwater dripped from the ceiling like a 
“waterfall,” an inadequate library, a dangerously warped gymnasium floor, 
poor shower facilities, and inadequate heating.  In fact, due to construction and 
renovation of the heating system, when Chris attended high school, there was 
no heat from the beginning of the fall of 1992 until the end of November or 
beginning of December.  Students had to wear coats and gloves to classes and 
were subjected to kerosene fumes from kerosene heaters which were used when 
the building became very cold. 
 
34 
 
Obviously, state funding of school districts cannot be considered 
adequate if the districts lack sufficient funds to provide their students a safe 
and healthy learning environment.   
 
In addition to deteriorating buildings and related conditions, it is clear 
from the record that many of the school districts throughout the state cannot 
provide the basic resources necessary to educate our youth.  For instance, many 
of the appellant school districts have insufficient funds to purchase textbooks 
and must rely on old, outdated books.  For some classes, there were no 
textbooks at all.  For example, at Southern Local during the 1992-1993 school 
year, none of the students in a Spanish I class had a textbook at the beginning 
of the year.  Later, there was a lottery for books.  Students who picked the 
lucky numbers received a book. 
 
The accessibility of everyday supplies is also a problem, forcing schools 
to ration such necessities as paper, chalk, art supplies, paper clips and even 
toilet paper.  A system without basic instructional materials and supplies can 
hardly constitute a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
throughout the state as mandated by our Constitution. 
 
35 
 
Additionally, many districts lack sufficient funds to comply with the 
state law requiring a district-wide average of no more than twenty-five students 
for each classroom teacher.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-35-03(A)(3).  Indeed, some 
schools have more than thirty students per classroom teacher, with one school 
having as many as thirty-nine students in one sixth grade class.  As the 
testimony of educators established, it is virtually impossible for students to 
receive an adequate education with a student-teacher ratio of this magnitude. 
 
The curricula in the appellant school districts are severely limited 
compared to other school districts and compared to what might be expected of 
a system designed to educate Ohio’s youth and to prepare them for a bright and 
prosperous future.  For example, elementary students at Dawson-Bryant have 
no opportunity to take foreign language courses, computer courses, or music or 
art classes other than band.  Junior high students in this district have no science 
lab.  In addition, Dawson-Bryant offers no honors program and no advanced 
placement courses, which disqualifies some of the students from even being 
considered for a scholarship or admittance to some universities.  Dawson-
 
36 
Bryant is not alone -- similar problems were being experienced by each of the 
appellant school districts. 
 
None of the appellant school districts is financially able to keep up with 
the technological training needs of the students in the districts.  The districts 
lack sufficient computers, computer labs, hands-on computer training, 
software, and related supplies to properly serve the students’ needs.  In this 
regard, it does not appear likely that the children in the appellant school 
districts will be able to compete in the job market against those students with 
sufficient technological training. 
 
Lack of sufficient funding can also lead to poor academic performance.  
Proficiency tests are a method of measuring education.  The ninth grade 
proficiency test was designed to measure that body of knowledge pupils are 
expected to have mastered by the ninth grade.  R.C. 3301.0710.  Passage of the 
ninth grade proficiency test is required before a student may receive a high 
school diploma.  R.C. 3313.61(A).  As of the fall of 1993, thirty-two out of 
ninety-nine seniors at Dawson-Bryant had not passed all parts of the ninth 
grade proficiency test.  This means that nearly one third of the senior class had 
 
37 
not met basic graduation requirements.  The district did not have enough 
money to pay tutors to assist these students.  Poor performance on the ninth 
grade proficiency tests is further evidence that these schools lack sufficient 
funds with which to educate their students. 
 
The dissent emphasizes that since schools have complied with minimum 
standards enacted in 1983, students are being provided with an adequate 
education.  However, in March 1992, the State Superintendent suspended 
routine minimum standard evaluations.  Consequently, these minimum 
standards have not been regularly enforced since that time. 
 
All the facts documented in the record lead to one inescapable 
conclusion -- Ohio’s elementary and secondary public schools are neither 
thorough nor efficient.  The operation of the appellant school districts conflicts 
with the historical notion that the education of our youth is of utmost concern 
and that Ohio children should be educated adequately so that they are able to 
participate fully in society.  Our state Constitution was drafted with the 
importance of education in mind.  In contrast, education under the legislation 
being reviewed ranks miserably low in the state’s priorities.  In fact, the 
 
38 
formula amount is established after the legislature determines the total dollars 
to be allocated to primary and secondary education in each biennial budget.  
Consequently, the present school financing system contravenes the clear 
wording of our Constitution and the framers’ intent. 
 
Furthermore, rather than following the constitutional dictate that it is the 
state’s obligation to fund education (as this opinion has repeatedly 
underscored), the legislature has thrust the majority of responsibility upon local 
school districts.  This, too, is contrary to the clear wording of our Constitution.  
The responsibility for maintaining a thorough and efficient school system falls 
upon the state.  When a district falls short of the constitutional requirement that 
the system be thorough and efficient, it is the state’s obligation to rectify it.  
See DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 (1983), 279 Ark. 340, 349, 651 
S.W.2d 90, 95. 
 
Also, when we apply the tests of Miller and Walter as to what is meant 
by the words “thorough and efficient,” the evidence is overwhelming that many 
districts are “starved for funds,” and lack teachers, buildings, or equipment.  
These school districts, plagued with deteriorating buildings, insufficient 
 
39 
supplies, inadequate curricula and technology, and large student-teacher ratios, 
desperately lack the resources necessary to provide students with a minimally 
adequate education.  Thus, according to the tests of Miller and Walter, it is 
painfully obvious that the General Assembly, in structuring school financing, 
has failed in its constitutional obligation to ensure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools.  Clearly, the current school financing scheme is a 
far cry from thorough and efficient.  Instead, the system has failed to educate 
our youth to their fullest potential. 
 
In so finding, we reject appellees’ contention that Walter is controlling.  
The equal yield formula challenged in Walter was repealed shortly after the 
case was decided.  See former R.C. 3317.022 as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
221, 137 Ohio Laws, Part I, 581, and repealed by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 59, 138 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 188, 200, 230.  Moreover, Walter involved a challenge to 
only one aspect of school funding.  In contrast, the case at bar involves a 
wholesale constitutional attack on the entire system.  Additionally, in creating 
the funding system at issue in Walter, the General Assembly had relied on a 
determination of a legislative committee that the statutorily guaranteed amount 
 
40 
actually was sufficient to provide a high quality education.  Id., 58 Ohio St.2d 
at 372, 12 O.O.3d at 329, 390 N.E.2d at 817.  Here, however, the evidence 
clearly indicates that the funding level set by today’s School Foundation 
Program has absolutely no connection with what is necessary to provide each 
district enough money to ensure an adequate educational program.  The system 
in place today differs dramatically from that in place nearly twenty years ago; 
thus, our holding in Walter does not control the outcome in this case.  
 
We also reject the notion that the wide disparities in educational 
opportunity are caused by the poorer school districts’ failure to pass levies.  
The evidence reveals that the wide disparities are caused by the funding 
system’s overreliance on the tax base of individual school districts.  What this 
means is that the poor districts simply cannot raise as much money even with 
identical tax effort.  For example, total assessed property valuation in the 
Dawson-Bryant School District in 1991 was $28,882,580, while Beachwood 
School District in Cuyahoga County had $376,229,512.  (The two districts 
have about the same number of pupils.) 
 
41 
 
We recognize that disparities between school districts will always exist.  
By our decision today, we are not stating that a new financing system must 
provide equal educational opportunities for all.  In a Utopian society, this lofty 
goal would be realized.  We, however, appreciate the limitations imposed upon 
us.  Nor do we advocate a “Robin Hood” approach to school financing reform.  
We are not suggesting that funds be diverted from wealthy districts  and given 
to the less fortunate.  There is no “leveling down” component in our decision 
today. 
 
Moreover, in no way should our decision be construed as imposing 
spending ceilings on more affluent school districts.  School districts are still 
free to augment their programs if they choose to do so.  However, it is futile to 
lay the entire blame for the inadequacies of the present system on the taxpayers 
and the local boards of education.  Although some districts have the luxury of 
deciding where to allocate extra dollars, many others have the burden of 
deciding which educational programs to cut or what financial institution to 
contact to obtain yet another emergency loan.  Our state Constitution makes the 
 
42 
state responsible for educating our youth.  Thus, the state should not shirk its 
obligation by espousing cliches about “local control.” 
 
We recognize that money alone is not the panacea that will transform 
Ohio’s school system into a model of excellence.  Although a student’s success 
depends upon numerous factors besides money, we must ensure that there is 
enough money that students have the chance to succeed because of the 
educational opportunity provided, not in spite of it.  Such an opportunity 
requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio’s children attend schools which are 
safe and conducive to learning.  At the present, Ohio does not provide many of 
its students with even the most basic of educational needs. 
 
Since the filing of this lawsuit, the General Assembly has scrambled to 
enact new laws to soften the blow of the failing system.  For instance, 
beginning in 1992, “equity funds” were provided to supplement distributions 
under the funding system to those districts with low property valuations and 
low income.  R.C. 3317.0213 and 3317.0214 (Sub.H.B. No. 671, 144 Ohio 
Laws, Part IV, 6062, effective 6-30-92).  In addition, funds were appropriated 
for technology grants to assist poorer school districts in purchasing computer 
 
43 
equipment.  Id. at Section 4.  However, appropriations for computers are 
meaningless when school systems cannot use the equipment due to asbestos, 
faulty electrical wiring, or the lack of teachers.  While these programs and 
funds are desperately needed, they simply are insufficient to get the job done 
and do not rectify the serious problems inherent in Ohio’s financing scheme. 
 
School funding has been, and continues to be, a Herculean task.  As 
thirty-seven lawmakers concede in their amicus curiae brief, despite their 
recent efforts, the General Assembly has not funded our public schools 
properly.  They assert that unless this court rules in favor of the appellants, the 
urgency of resolving public school funding will quickly fade.  We find that this 
brief eloquently expresses the helplessness felt even by many of our state 
legislators. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We know that few issues have the potential to stir such passion as school 
financing.  In many districts in this great state of ours, students and teachers 
must fight a demoralizing uphill battle to make the system work.  All parties 
concede that the current system needs to be reformed. 
 
44 
 
By our decision today, we send a clear message to lawmakers:  the time 
has come to fix the system.  Let there be no misunderstanding.  Ohio’s public 
school financing scheme must undergo a complete systematic overhaul.  The 
factors which contribute to the unworkability of the system and which must be 
eliminated are (1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the 
emphasis of Ohio’s school funding system on local property tax, (3) the 
requirement of school district borrowing through the spending reserve and 
emergency school assistance loan programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient 
funding in the General Assembly’s biennium budget for the construction and 
maintenance of public school buildings.  The funding laws reviewed today are 
inherently incapable of achieving their constitutional purpose. 
 
We therefore hold that Ohio’s elementary and secondary public school 
financing system violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, which 
mandates a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the 
state.  The following specific provisions are unconstitutional: 
 
(a) R.C. 133.301, granting borrowing authority to school districts; 
 
45 
 
(b) 
R.C. 3313.483, 3313.487, 3313.488, 3313.489, and 3313.4810, the 
emergency school assistance loan provisions; 
 
(c) 
R.C. 3317.01, 3317.02, 3317.022, 3317.023, 3317.024, 3317.04, 
3317.05, 3317.051 and 3317.052, the School Foundation Program. 
 
(d) 
R.C. Chapter 3318, the Classroom Facilities Act, to the extent that 
it is underfunded. 
REMEDY 
 
Although we have found the school financing system to be 
unconstitutional, we do not instruct the General Assembly as to the specifics of 
the legislation it should enact.9  However, we admonish the General Assembly 
that it must create an entirely new school financing system.  In establishing 
such a system, the General Assembly shall recognize that there is but one 
system of public education in Ohio.  It is a statewide system, expressly created 
by the state’s highest governing document, the Constitution.  Thus, the 
establishment, organization and maintenance of public education are the state’s 
responsibility.  Because of its importance, education should be placed high in 
the state’s budgetary priorities.  A thorough and efficient system of common 
 
46 
schools includes facilities in good repair and the supplies, materials, and funds 
necessary to maintain these facilities in a safe manner, in compliance with all 
local, state, and federal mandates. 
 
We recognize that a new funding system will require time for adequate 
study, drafting of the appropriate legislation and transition from the present 
scheme of financing to one in conformity with this decision.  Therefore, we 
stay the effect of this decision for twelve months. 
 
Appellants are entitled to recover against the state their attorney fees and 
costs as found by the trial court.  Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 157, 160, 648 N.E.2d 488, 490. 
 
The court of appeals’ judgment is reversed.  We remand this cause to the 
trial court with directions to enter judgment consistent with this opinion.  The 
trial court is to retain jurisdiction until the legislation is enacted and in effect, 
taking such action as may be necessary to ensure conformity with this 
opinion.10 
                                                                                                  Judgment reversed 
                                                                                              and cause remanded. 
 
47 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur and concur separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
Footnotes: 
1 
The current version of the School Foundation Program is contained in 
R.C. 3317.01 et seq.  The School Foundation Program for allocation of state 
aid has operated in a similar manner from 1981 through the present day despite 
numerous amendments.  The statutory provisions at issue are those that were in 
existence in January 1992 at the time the amended complaint was filed.  
2 
A  mill is one tenth of a cent.  The required twenty mills of local tax 
includes unvoted or “inside” millage (that portion of the total available ten-
mills of unvoted property tax authorized by Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio 
Constitution that may be levied by a school district) and voted or “outside” 
millage approved by the voters.  The appellant school districts have all 
participated in the School Foundation Program. 
3 
The formula was as follows: (school district equalization factor X the 
formula amount X ADM) - (.02 X total taxable value) = state aid.  Former R.C. 
3317.022(A).  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 298, 144 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3987, 4122.  
 
48 
The basic state aid calculation remains essentially the same in the current 
version of R.C. 3317.022(A). 
4 
Inside millage (millage levied without the approval of the electorate and 
limited to a ten-mill ceiling on unvoted property taxes), new construction 
growth and, of course, tangible personal property are not subject to tax 
reduction factors. 
5 
Appellants also contend that education is a fundamental right and that the 
current funding system violates equal protection.  They further argue that the 
school financing system violates Section 3, Article VIII and Section 4, Article 
XII.  However, since we decide that Ohio’s school financing system violates 
the Thorough and Efficient Clause of our state Constitution, we decline to 
address appellants’ other constitutional claims. 
6 
The following states have declared their school funding statutes 
unconstitutional:  Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. v. Bishop (1994), 179 
Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 806; DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 (1983), 279 Ark. 
340, 651 S.W.2d 90; Serrano v. Priest (1976), 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 
345, 557 P.2d 929; Horton v. Meskill (1977), 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359; 
 
49 
Rose v. Council for Better Edn. (Ky.1989), 790 S.W.2d 186; McDuffy v. Secy., 
Executive Office of Edn. (1993), 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516; Helena 
Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State (1989), 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684; 
Abbott v. Burke (1990), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359; Tennessee Small School 
Sys. v. McWherter (Tenn.1993), 851 S.W.2d 139; Edgewood Indep. School 
Dist. v. Kirby (Tex.1989), 777 S.W.2d 391; Brigham v. State (Vt.1997), ___ 
A.2d ___, 1997 WL 51794; Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State 
(1978), 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71; Pauley v. Kelley (1979), 162 W.Va. 672, 
255 S.E.2d 859; Washakie Cty. School Dist. One v. Herschler (Wyo.1980), 606 
P.2d 310. 
7 
In State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 
500, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held that a reviewing court may not rely 
upon matters outside the record in deciding the appeal.  Contrary to this 
holding, the dissent relies upon a nationwide survey of test results which was 
not part of the record.  Since the dissent finds this way of proceeding 
acceptable, we feel at liberty to point out the stark reality of Ohio’s plight.  A 
June 1996 survey conducted by the United States General Accounting Office 
 
50 
demonstrates the woeful lack of progress in Ohio’s schools.  The report notes 
that ninety-five percent of Ohio’s schools reported a need to upgrade or repair 
buildings to good overall condition.  School Facilities:  Profiles of School 
Condition by State, A Report to Congressional Requesters by the General 
Accounting Office (June 1996) 143.  In 1993-1994, Ohio spent an average of 
only $38 per student for K-12 school facilities.  Id.  Additionally, Ohio ranked 
last in the number of students per computer among the fifty states.  School 
Facilities:  America’s Schools Not Designed or Equipped for 21st Century, A 
Report to Congressional Requesters by the General Accounting Office 
(Apr.1995) 43. 
8 
In late 1990, the Southern Local School District was successful in 
obtaining Classroom Facilities Act funds and passed a tax levy and a bond 
issue to help construct new facilities.  However, the trial court found that even 
after the completion of the project in 1993, significant problems will remain.  
The project will not address all the district’s outstanding needs, and the 
building assistance program will not provide operating and maintenance funds 
to keep the facilities in good working order. 
 
51 
9 
The dissent faults us for failing to provide specific guidelines for the 
General Assembly to follow.  However, we recognize that the proper scope of 
our review is limited to determining whether the current system meets 
constitutional muster.  We refuse to encroach upon the clearly legislative 
function of deciding what the new legislation will be. 
10 We grant plenary jurisdiction to the trial court to enforce our decision.  
This authority includes the right to petition this court for guidance, if the need 
arises.