Title: In re Children of Anthony M.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 146 
Docket: 
Pen-18-185 
Submitted 
 
 on Briefs: 
October 10, 2018 
Decided: 
November 6, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF ANTHONY M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother and father of three children appeal from a judgment of 
the District Court (Bangor, Jordan, J.) terminating their parental rights to their 
two older children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), 
(b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1  The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the court’s determination of parental unfitness and further contend 
that the court erred by concluding that termination of their parental rights is in 
the best interests of the children.  We affirm the judgment.   
                                         
1  The judgment terminating parental rights also includes a jeopardy order that pertains to a 
separate child protection action relating to the parents’ third and youngest child.  The mother initially 
appealed the jeopardy order but later withdrew it, leaving only the appeal from the termination order 
relating to the two older children.  Unless indicated otherwise, our references in this opinion to the 
children mean the two older children as to whom the parents’ rights have been terminated. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts, which are supported by the evidence, are drawn 
from the judgment2 and the procedural record.  See In re Children of Nicole M., 
2018 ME 75, ¶ 2, 187 A.3d 1. 
[¶3]  In July of 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services filed 
a petition for preliminary protection and a child protection petition with 
respect to the mother and father’s two children, the younger of whom had just 
been born.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032-4033 (2017).  The preliminary protection 
order was granted by the court (Budd, J.), and the children were placed in the 
custody of the Department at that time.   
[¶4]  By agreement, in February of 2017, the court (Jordan, J.) made a 
finding of jeopardy against the mother and father based on the father’s history 
of violence and criminal involvement, the mother’s pattern of choosing unsafe 
partners, and each parent’s untreated mental illness.  The court’s permanency 
planning order included requirements that each parent complete a mental 
health evaluation and that the father be evaluated for the batterers intervention 
                                         
2  The judgment also contains descriptions of testimony that the court did not characterize as 
findings of fact.  We restrict our narrative to those facts that the court framed as its findings.  
 
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program.  Both parents were ordered to follow any recommendations made by 
the evaluators.   
[¶5]  The following June, the Department petitioned the court to 
terminate both parents’ parental rights.  While the termination petition was 
pending, the mother gave birth to the parents’ third child, who is the subject of 
a separate child protection proceeding.  See supra n.1.  After holding a three-day 
hearing in March of 2018, the court entered a judgment terminating both 
parents’ parental rights to the two older children.  Based on clear and 
convincing evidence, the court found that each parent was unwilling or unable 
to protect those children from jeopardy and that that was unlikely to change 
within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and that each 
parent was unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children and could 
not do so within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  The court also determined, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the 
children’s best interests.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).   
[¶6]  The court made the following factual findings, all of which are drawn 
from competent evidence in the record: 
. . . The parents have a substantial history with the Department of 
Health & Human Services (DHHS) Child Protection Division.  Each 
 
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parent has other children in the custody of other parties.  Both 
parents have been determined by the Court to have longstanding 
problems that impact on their ability to safely parent children.  The 
principal question before this Court: Have they addressed those 
problems in a substantial enough fashion that jeopardy has been 
alleviated?   
. . . .  
 
. . . [The mother’s] jeopardy is based upon threat of neglect and 
neglect/failure to protect.  She was diagnosed with PTSD and was 
not in treatment at the time of the Jeopardy Order.  She also had a 
pattern of choosing unsafe partners including . . . the father of these 
. . . children.  The jeopardy as to [the father] was due to physical 
abuse and threat of neglect.  He was found to have a lengthy history 
of violence, including being physically violent with [the mother] 
while she was pregnant with [the middle child].  He had untreated 
mental health issues including bi-polar disorder and, at that time, 
had warrants in the State of Nebraska.   
 
The parties both have criminal records. . . .  [The mother’s] 
convictions [include] theft, . . . and operating while license 
suspended or revoked on June 21, 2017.  [The mother] also has a 
number of pending charges.   
 
The criminal record of [the father] is also significant [and includes] 
. . . assault; . . . domestic violence assault, criminal mischief, and 
operating with a suspended license, conviction date April 5, 2010; 
two unlawful possession of scheduled drugs, conviction date 
August 19, 2010; unlawful furnishing of drugs, conviction on 
November [8], 2012; two Class C felony convictions for unlawful 
possession of hydrocodone and oxycodone respectively on 
April 19, 2013; [three convictions for] operating while license is 
suspended or revoked [in] 2017; and a theft conviction on 
October 4, 2017.  [The father] also acknowledges having a domestic 
abuse conviction from 2016 in Nebraska involving [the mother].   
 
 
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. . . [A] Licensed Clinical Social Worker who does batterers 
intervention program [BIP] assessments . . . did an assessment of 
[the father]. . . .  She testified that there were inconsistencies 
between the paperwork and her face-to-face interview with [the 
father].   
 
[The LCSW] stated that those inconsistencies concern substance 
abuse and domestic violence.  In his written report [the father] 
denied having any substance abuse problems.  He also denied any 
domestic abuse.  When interviewed by [the LCSW], he 
acknowledged that he had several convictions for drugs.  He also 
verbally admitted to three convictions for domestic abuse.  He 
explained the apparent inconsistencies by stating that although he 
pled guilty to the domestic violence charges, he had not been 
domestically violent.   
 
The Court finds that [the father’s] explanation does not make sense.  
. . . Having been convicted on a number of occasions of drug 
possession or furnishing drugs, he clearly had legal problems.  The 
same analysis applies to the domestic violence area. . . .  The Court 
finds that his answers were evasive and attempts to avoid 
responsibility for his conduct.  Neither of those findings is helpful 
to showing an alleviation of jeopardy. 
 
. . . [A nurse who] works at Eastern Maine Medical Center in the 
neonatal intensive care unit . . . worked with these parents when 
their [youngest child] was born [in August of 2017].  [The child] 
was exhibiting symptoms of neonatal abstinence syndrome.  
Essentially, she was experiencing withdrawal from the drugs she 
was exposed to while in utero.   
 
[The nurse] testified that [in one interaction she had with the 
father, he] became very angry and threatening toward [her].  She 
credibly testified he said that if she did not leave the room, he might 
do something that would get him kicked out. . . .  The Court finds 
that this circumstance also points to continuation of jeopardy as of 
the date of birth of [the youngest child.]  
 
 
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. . . . 
Just prior to the last hearing date, [the father] began attending 
. . . BIP.  [The person who] runs that program . . . testified that [the 
father] first came to their program in May 2017 [but] did not do the 
intake work until January 2018 [and his] first session was 
February 8, 2018. . . . [The father] had attended two sessions out of 
the forty-eight [as of the end of February of 2018]. . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
[The mother] and [the father] have both tested positive for illegal 
substances in 2017.  [The father] tested positive as recently as 
November 2017 for opiates and other drugs.  The meconium of [the 
youngest child] tested positive for cocaine and another drug.  The 
Court finds that the positive test of the meconium could only have 
come from [the mother’s use of] cocaine during pregnancy. . . . 
 
. . . . 
. . . The Court found [the father’s current therapist] to be very 
credible.  He testified that [the father’s] attendance has improved 
since his sporadic first attendance.  He testified that [the father] has 
a severe cannabis use disorder. . . .  
 
[The father’s therapist] testified that during the last five weeks [the 
father] has done well with his attendance.  He has concluded that 
[the father] still lacks insight into his problems.  He testified that 
[the father] is in the pre-contemplative mode, which means he 
doesn’t believe there is a problem. . . . 
 
[The therapist] also testified that [the father] is impulsive and 
immature, but he is authentic in who he presents himself to be.  
[The father] has shown a willingness to do better.  The treatment 
plan for [the father] is lengthy.  The goal is to first get him off of 
drugs, and then get at the underlying problems.  [The therapist] 
testified that he believes [the father] can benefit from an intensive 
 
7 
outpatient treatment program.  The Court concludes the evidence 
supports that opinion. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
The two oldest children have been in State custody for over 
eighteen months.  The Court cannot set a firm date for when 
jeopardy would be alleviated enough to have a trial home 
placement.  The uncertainty regarding that time and how long a 
trial home placement could go (and whether it would be 
successful) . . . puts this case well beyond the statutory timelines 
for permanency for these two children. . . . 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
[the mother] and [the father] have been unwilling or unable to 
protect the children from jeopardy within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.  The Court 
further finds that [the mother] and [the father] have been unwilling 
or unable to take responsibility for the children which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.   
 
. . . The Court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
termination is in the children’s best interests.  The Court further 
finds that it is in [the] best interests of [the children] to be free for 
adoption . . . . 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  “We review the trial court’s factual findings that a parent is unfit and 
that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest for clear error 
and the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of 
 
8 
discretion.”  In re Child of Amber L., 2018 ME 91, ¶ 3, 188 A.3d 876 (quotation 
marks omitted).    
A. 
Parental Unfitness 
[¶8]  “[I]n order to terminate parental rights[,] the court must find, by 
clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the four statutory grounds of 
parental unfitness.”  In re Children of Melissa F., 2018 ME 110, ¶ 9, 191 A.3d 348 
(alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted).  A finding of parental 
unfitness will be vacated “only if there is no competent evidence in the record 
to support it, if the fact-finder clearly misapprehends the meaning of the 
evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not 
represent the truth and right of the case.”  In re Child of Amber L., 2018 ME 91, 
¶ 4, 188 A.3d 876 (quotation marks omitted).    
[¶9]  Each parent contends that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to support either of the two types of parental unfitness found by the 
court given the evidence of their progress toward alleviating their parenting 
deficits.  We conclude that competent evidence in the record exists to support 
both types of parental unfitness.   
[¶10]  Since the court’s February 2016 finding of jeopardy, each parent’s 
court-ordered engagement in mental health treatment has been inconsistent.  
 
9 
As the court found, with support in the record, the parents’ attendance in 
individual counseling was often sporadic, and the father’s delay in enrolling in 
the batterers intervention program—despite knowing that his attendance in 
the program was a condition for increased contact with the children—meant 
that, as of the time of the termination hearing, he had barely begun the program.  
While the court recognized that the parents had made some progress in their 
mental health treatment by the time of the termination hearing, the testimony 
of the parents’ mental health professionals indicated—and the court found—
that each parent still has a long therapeutic road ahead.  Moreover, since the 
jeopardy hearing, both parents have tested positive for illegal substances, and 
both parents have been involved in new criminal activity.   
[¶11]  “Marginal progress toward reunification and a simple desire to 
remain parents is not enough to ameliorate jeopardy . . . .”  In re Hope H., 
2017 ME 198, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 813.  On this record, the court did not clearly err 
by finding that, despite their recent progress, the parents are unlikely to 
become fit within a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the 
children.  See In re Child of Amber L., 2018 ME 91, ¶ 5, 188 A.3d 876.    
 
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B. 
Best Interests of the Children 
[¶12]  The parents also contend that the court failed to provide a 
sufficient explanation for its finding that the termination of each parent’s 
parental rights is in the best interests of the children.  Contrary to this assertion, 
the court’s findings, based on clear and convincing evidence in the record, are 
sufficient to support its best interest determination.   
[¶13]  The children at issue here have been in foster care since July of 
2016, and in the home of their current foster family since November of 2016.  
At the time of the termination proceedings, the older child was three years old, 
and the younger was nineteen months.  The court acknowledged the parents’ 
recent progress toward alleviating jeopardy but also properly found that, at 
best, “it would take many more months” before the parents could participate 
even in a trial home placement that would be safe for the children.   
[¶14]  The Legislature has explicitly stated that the purposes of the 
termination statute include “[e]liminat[ing] the need for the children to wait 
unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which 
prevent their return to the family” and “[p]romot[ing] the adoption of children 
into stable families rather than allowing the children to remain in the 
 
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impermanency of foster care.”  22 M.R.S. § 4050(2)-(3) (2017).  See In re 
Children of Melissa F., 2018 ME 110, ¶ 13, 191 A.3d 348.   
[¶15]  The court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the best 
interests of the children would be served, not by forcing them to continue to 
wait for an uncertain and unreasonable amount of time for the parents to 
alleviate circumstances of jeopardy, but by allowing them to be free for 
adoption.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert E. Meggison, Esq., Belfast, for appellant father 
 
Nicholas Fowler, Esq., Bangor, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2016-47 and PC-2017-80 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY