Title: Commonwealth v. Asher

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11663 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEFFREY ASHER. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 4, 2015. - June 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Assault and 
Battery.  Police Officer.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Self-
Defense.  Evidence, Self-defense.  Defense of 
Others.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Holyoke Division of 
the District Court Department on October 14, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Maureen E. Walsh, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Andrew J. Gambaccini for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth Dunphy Farris, Assistant District Attorney 
(Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, with her) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  This case concerns the beating of an unarmed 
civilian by the defendant Jeffrey Asher, a police officer who 
responded to another officer's request for assistance with a 
2 
 
traffic stop in Springfield.  The defendant was charged with 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), and assault and battery in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a).  At trial, the defendant contended, 
and presented evidence seeking to show, that the beating was 
justified based on the need for self-defense and defense of 
others present.  The jury found him guilty of both charges.  We 
affirm the convictions. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  Based on the evidence presented at 
trial, the jury could have found the following.  On the evening 
of November 27, 2009, Officer Michael Sedergren and Lieutenant 
John Bobianski of the Springfield police department were on 
patrol in a cruiser when they observed a black Honda Civic 
automobile dragging its muffler and causing sparks to fly behind 
it.  The officers stopped the vehicle, and Bobianski spoke to 
the driver, Malika Barnett.  While Bobianski was speaking to 
Barnett, Sedergren observed Barnett's companion, Melvin Jones, 
who was the sole passenger in the vehicle (and the victim in 
this case), slide toward the floor in the right front 
passenger's seat and stuff something in his waistband.  
Concerned that the victim could be hiding a weapon or other 
contraband, Sedergren requested assistance over the police radio 
from Officer Theodore Truoiolo and the defendant, who were 
together on patrol that night in a separate vehicle. 
3 
 
 
Once Truoiolo and the defendant arrived, all four officers 
approached the Honda, with two officers on each side of the 
vehicle.1  Truoiolo and Sedergren went to the passenger's side 
and asked the victim to step out of the vehicle so that they 
could conduct a patfrisk of him.  The victim complied.  At the 
officers' instruction, the victim moved to the rear of the 
vehicle and placed his hands on the trunk.  Truoiolo then began 
patting the victim's outer garments to check for weapons.  When 
Truoiolo reached the victim's front right pants pocket, Truoiolo 
felt a hard object no bigger than his palm.2  Truoiolo squeezed 
the object and yanked the victim toward himself; as he did so, 
the victim threw his elbow and forearm into Truoiolo's chest and 
tried to run away. 
 
Sedergren caught the victim around the neck about five feet 
from the vehicle, but the victim continued to try to run, and 
the two men ended up against the side of the hood of the second 
police cruiser.  Truoiolo then grabbed hold of the victim's 
collar and right shoulder, while Sedergren had the victim in a 
"choke hold type maneuver" and was on top of the victim's back.  
At this point, the victim was bent forward over the hood of the 
 
1 The victim in this case was a black male.  All four 
officers involved in the incident were white males. 
 
 
2 On cross-examination, Officer Theodore Truoiolo admitted 
that the object in the victim's pants pocket could not have been 
a gun, and that Truoiolo never indicated to the other officers 
that the victim might be armed. 
                     
4 
 
police cruiser, with his head facing the windshield and his legs 
spread apart.  The defendant, having seen the victim try to run, 
went over to the cruiser where the victim was lying spread 
eagle.  The defendant was unable to see the victim's hands, but 
in response to a statement of Sedergren's, the defendant began 
to hit the victim repeatedly around his head with a flashlight.3  
Although not all of the blows hit the victim's head, the 
defendant swung the flashlight at the victim fourteen or more 
times.  At least three strikes made contact with the victim's 
head and upper body. 
 
The victim continued to move after the first strikes to his 
head.  The officers were shouting commands such as, "don't move" 
and, "give us your hands," but they did not state that the 
victim was under arrest.  Eventually, Truoiolo cuffed the 
victim's right hand but could not reach the victim's left hand 
because of where Sedergren was positioned.  The defendant, 
realizing that many of his blows were hitting the hood of the 
cruiser rather than the victim's upper body, moved down and 
 
3 The exact words that Officer Michael Sedergren used were 
somewhat in dispute.  Sedergren testified that he said, "He's 
got my fucking gun, smash him"; the defendant testified that 
Sedergren said, "He's got my gun, hit him, hit him."  However, 
the jury also heard that the defendant's written report of the 
incident, filed the day after it occurred, did not quote either 
statement, but simply said that Sedergren informed the other 
officers that he believed the victim was trying to grab his gun.  
In a bystander's video recording of the event, introduced at 
trial and discussed infra, the words "smash him in the knees" 
are audible, but no reference to a gun can be heard. 
                     
5 
 
delivered three hard blows with the flashlight to the victim's 
upper leg.  Then, in response to another statement from 
Sedergren, the defendant hit the victim behind his left knee.4  
Following that blow, the victim fell to the ground with the 
officers on top of him.  The defendant continued to hit the 
victim as he was lying still on the ground, this time around the 
victim's upper body and his feet.  Eventually, the officers 
rolled the victim to the side while he lay on the ground and 
finished handcuffing him, and then Truoiolo reached into the 
victim's pocket and pulled out the hard object that he had felt 
earlier, a small bag that was determined to contain "crack" 
cocaine and marijuana.  The victim had no weapons on his person, 
and no weapons were found in the vehicle. 
 
The victim was taken by ambulance to Baystate Medical 
Center.  The right side of his face was deformed from swelling 
and bruising, and he suffered fractures of his orbital socket 
and nose.  The victim was also diagnosed with a choroidal 
rupture, an eye injury resulting from blunt force trauma to the 
head and causing loss of vision in his right eye.  At the time 
 
4 Sedergren testified that he called for the defendant to 
strike the victim again after Sedergren heard Truoiolo say that 
the victim was "going for his waist."  However, as previously 
noted, Truoiolo knew that the victim did not have a gun in his 
waistband, and Truoiolo gave no indication to the other officers 
following the patfrisk that the victim might be armed.  Truoiolo 
admitted on cross-examination that any possible threat of deadly 
force against the officers was neutralized by the time that 
Truoiolo handcuffed the victim's right hand. 
                     
6 
 
of trial, in February, 2012, the victim continued to experience 
vision loss. 
 
Two persons in a house across the street from where the 
officers stopped the vehicle noticed the incident developing and 
recorded much of it on a video camera.  The recording, which 
includes both audio and video, was admitted as an exhibit at 
trial. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  On October 14, 2010, a complaint 
issued from the Holyoke Division of the District Court 
Department, charging the defendant with assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery.  Several 
months later, the defendant filed a notice stating that he would 
raise as defenses (1) self-defense, (2) defense of another, and 
(3) "[d]efense of a law enforcement officer's right to use force 
reasonably necessary to effect an arrest, overcome physical 
resistance and/or prevent escape."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) 
(3), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  Thereafter, 
approximately three months before trial, the defendant filed an 
expert witness report of Dr. Frank Gallo, director of the master 
of science in policing program at Western New England 
University, that the defendant claimed supported a conclusion 
that the defendant's use of force against the victim was 
7 
 
reasonable.5  The Commonwealth responded to the notice of 
defenses and to the expert witness report by filing a motion in 
limine to exclude any defense based on the reasonable force 
necessary to effect an arrest.6  In response, in two subsequent 
pretrial hearings regarding Gallo's proposed testimony, the 
defendant's trial counsel stated repeatedly that reasonable 
force to effect an arrest was not the legal theory on which the 
defendant was relying and on which Gallo's testimony would be 
based.  Rather, counsel asserted that the defendant's theory of 
the case, reflected in Gallo's testimony (see note 5, supra), 
 
5 Dr. Frank Gallo's report is not part of the record on 
appeal.  However, Gallo testified in a pretrial voir dire 
hearing that he had concluded the defendant's use of force was 
"objectively reasonable," given that the defendant was presented 
with an individual who had resisted a Terry-type stop and then 
tried to disarm an officer.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968). 
 
 
6 The Commonwealth's argument for the exclusion of this 
defense was essentially that the defendant used deadly force 
against the victim, and that such force is authorized for the 
purpose of effecting an arrest only when the arrest is for a 
felony and the crime for which the arrest is made involved 
conduct including the use or threatened use of force, or there 
is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause 
death or serious bodily harm if he or she remains at large.  See 
Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 396 & n.1 (1980) (civil suit 
against police officers; jury properly charged regarding limits 
on officer's use of deadly force in making arrest in accordance 
with Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 120.7 [1975]); 
Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 829-830 (1977) (similar 
limitations applied in criminal case against civilian who used 
deadly force in citizen's arrest; jury properly charged in 
accordance with Model Penal Code § 3.07).  The Commonwealth 
reiterates this argument on appeal.  However, because of the 
manner in which we resolve this case, we need not address the 
claim. 
                     
8 
 
was that the defendant used force to effect a Terry-type stop 
and a patfrisk of the victim, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968), and that, ultimately, the force used was reasonably 
necessary for self-defense and defense of others, and also based 
on a police officer's training to escalate the use of force in 
response to a deadly threat, such as a suspect obtaining an 
officer's gun.7  The Commonwealth indicated that if the defendant 
was not asserting that he used reasonable force to effect an 
arrest, then the Commonwealth's motion in limine to exclude 
evidence of this defense was moot.  The trial judge does not 
appear to have ruled on the motion in limine to exclude, but she 
did rule preliminarily that Gallo would be allowed to testify at 
trial. 
 
The defendant was tried before a jury in February, 2012.  
Despite the trial judge's preliminary ruling concerning Gallo, 
the defendant did not call Gallo as a trial witness.  At the 
 
7 For example, at the first of the two pretrial hearings, on 
November 25, 2011, the defendant's trial counsel stated, 
"[Melvin Jones is] not under arrest.  This victim is not [under 
arrest].  This reasonable force to effect an arrest, that's not 
my theory.  I don't know where that came from.  I apologize for 
that.  But from the outset this is a threshold inquiry, a pat 
down frisk, and force is escalated to the point where it's the 
defense argument that deadly force should be used in response to 
the testimony, '[h]e's going for my gun.'"  At the second 
pretrial hearing, on December 6, 2011, trial counsel reiterated 
this position and responded affirmatively when the judge asked 
for confirmation that in the defense's view, this case had 
nothing to do with resisting arrest and was all about "the 
alternative theory of self-defense or defense of others." 
                     
9 
 
close of the evidence, the defendant submitted a request for 
jury instructions that included repeated reference to the 
defendant's status as a police officer, to a police officer's 
right to use force in making an arrest, and to the fact that a 
person who is being arrested by a police officer may not use 
force to resist arrest.  The defendant also proposed 
instructions on self-defense and defense of another that 
mirrored in most respects the District Court's model jury 
instructions on these defenses, and that included the duty to 
exhaust all other options, including retreat, before resorting 
to force.  See Instruction 9.260 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009), at 1-5, 17 
(Instruction 9.260).  In connection with each of the defendant's 
proposed instructions, including the instruction on self-
defense, the defendant sought a statement regarding his status 
as a police officer. 
 
At the charge conference, the judge indicated initially 
that she would instruct the jury on the definition of arrest and 
on police privilege in some form, although not using the 
defendant's proposed language.  The judge later presented both 
counsel with a proposed instruction stating that "[b]ecause of 
the nature of the job, a police officer is permitted to use 
force in carrying out his official duties if such force is 
necessary and reasonable," and that a civilian who is arrested 
10 
 
by a police officer must submit to the arrest, but a police 
officer may not use "excessive or unnecessary force" to make an 
arrest.8  The defendant indicated his satisfaction with this 
instruction.  The Commonwealth, however, objected to it on the 
grounds, among others, that it was essentially an instruction on 
resisting arrest, a defense the defendant had earlier eschewed.  
After further discussion with counsel, the judge determined that 
the planned instruction was confusing and misstated the law, and 
that, therefore, the instruction would not be given; the 
defendant objected.  The judge's instructions to the jury 
ultimately included self-defense and defense of another, but did 
not reference the defendant's status as a police officer in 
connection with those defenses or otherwise. 
 
The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges.  The 
defendant timely appealed.  We transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant primarily challenges 
the trial judge's decision not to give the jury the instruction 
she had proposed on police privilege and resisting arrest, which 
had the effect of eliminating entirely from her jury 
8 The judge's proposed instruction was a somewhat modified 
version of the District Court's model jury instruction on police 
privilege and resisting arrest.  See Instruction 9.260 of the 
Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
(2009).  The full text of the proposed instruction is included 
at note 10, infra. 
                     
11 
 
instructions any reference to a police officer's ability to use 
reasonable force in connection with official duties.  This issue 
was exacerbated, the defendant argues, by the judge's 
instructions on self-defense, which included reference to the 
duty to retreat -- a requirement that in the defendant's view is 
inappropriate when the person asserting the defense is a police 
officer.  At trial, the defendant's actual objection to the jury 
instructions before and after the jury charge specifically 
focused on the judge's decision not to give her proposed 
instruction on police privilege and resisting arrest.  
Nevertheless, because the defendant's status as a police officer 
was clearly a central issue throughout the trial and a focal 
point of the defense,9 on appeal, we treat the defendant's 
challenge to the judge's instructions generally as preserved.  
We therefore review the judge's instructions for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  In 
doing so, we conclude that the judge's instructions, insofar as 
they contained no reference to the defendant's status as a 
police officer and included the duty to retreat in the 
explanation of self-defense, were flawed.  We further conclude, 
however, that the errors were not prejudicial when considered in 
 
9 As previously noted, the defendant's proposed jury 
instructions included numerous references to the defendant's 
status as a police officer.  In addition, Sedergren, Truoiolo, 
and the defendant each testified regarding his training on the 
appropriate use of force in conducting his duties. 
                     
12 
 
the context of the evidence in the case and the instructions as 
a whole. 
 
We consider first the judge's decision not to give her 
proposed police privilege and resisting arrest instruction.10  
This decision was appropriate in the circumstances of this case 
for two reasons.  The first concerns fairness.  By initially 
suggesting an intent to pursue the defense of effecting an 
arrest and then disavowing it, counsel effectively indicated to 
the Commonwealth that it need not present evidence aimed at 
10 The judge's proposed instruction stated as follows: 
 
"Because of the nature of the job, a police officer is 
permitted to use force in carrying out his official duties 
if such force is necessary and reasonable.  Members of the 
jury in your deliberations you are to determine whether the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant Jeffrey Asher [is] guilty of the offenses 
charged.  Melvin Jones is not the defendant in this trial -
- however you did hear testimony in this trial about the 
actions of Melvin Jones when confronted by members of the 
Springfield Police Department. 
 
"A person who is arrested by someone who he knows is a 
police officer is not allowed to resist that arrest with 
force, whether the arrest is lawful or not.  Even if the 
arrest is illegal, the person must resort to the legal 
system to restore his liberty. 
 
"However, a police officer may not use excessive or 
unnecessary force to make an arrest -- whether the arrest 
is legal or illegal -- and the person who is being arrested 
may defend himself with as much force as reasonably appears 
to be necessary." 
 
                     
13 
 
overcoming this defense.11  Indeed, the prosecutor argued during 
the charge conference that had she anticipated a defense based 
on the use of force to effect an arrest and a related jury 
instruction, she would have called a potential expert witness to 
rebut this theory.12 
 
Second, and more importantly, the judge was correct in her 
eventual conclusion that her proposed instruction would have 
confused and potentially misled the jury.  The planned 
instruction was based on the District Court's model jury 
instruction on police privilege and resisting arrest, which 
primarily serves to articulate that a civilian who is being 
arrested by someone the civilian knows is a police officer must 
submit to the arrest and may not use force against the arresting 
officer unless the officer uses excessive or unnecessary force 
to make the arrest.  See Instruction 9.260, at 12-13.13  This 
 
11 Although defense counsel's express disavowals were made 
during pretrial hearings, during the trial itself counsel did 
not suggest a change in position until the final charge 
conference that took place after the close of the evidence. 
 
 
12 The defendant's late-breaking about-face also put the 
judge in the position of having to determine, after the close of 
the evidence, whether an instruction on a theory that the 
defendant had previously disclaimed was nevertheless warranted 
based on the facts.  In these circumstances, the judge's last-
minute change of approach may have been at least in part a 
product of the confusion that the defendant generated on this 
issue. 
 
13 In addition to the substance of the model instruction, 
the cases cited at the end of that instruction suggest that it 
                     
14 
 
case, however, presents the opposite scenario:  the defendant 
was a police officer charged with assault and battery on a 
civilian.  In addition, to the extent that both the model 
instruction and the trial judge's proposed instruction discussed 
self-defense, like the model instruction, the proposed 
instruction spoke only of a civilian's right to defend himself 
or herself against a police officer who uses excessive force, 
not the other way around.14  See note 10, supra.  See also 
Instruction 9.260.  Accordingly, the instruction was structured 
so as to focus the jury on evaluating the actions of the 
putative arrestee and on whether those actions were reasonable 
in light of the police officer's use of force, rather than on 
the reasonableness of the police officer's actions.  But here, 
is designed for use in cases involving charges of resisting 
arrest or assault and battery on a police officer or similar 
authority figure.  See Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 
(1983) (assault and battery of police officer); Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 369 Mass. 640 (1976) (various charges stemming from 
assault of correction officer); Commonwealth v. Urkiel, 63 Mass. 
App. Ct. 445 (2005) (resisting arrest); Commonwealth v. Graham, 
62 Mass. App. Ct. 642 (2004) (resisting arrest and three counts 
of assault and battery of police officer); Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 576 (1987) (assault and battery of 
correction officer);  Commonwealth v. McMurtry, 20 Mass. App. 
Ct. 629 (1985) (assault and battery of correction officer). 
 
 
14 For an example that illustrates a civilian's right to use 
self-defense against a police officer in limited circumstances, 
see Commonwealth v. Graham, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 649-654 
(2004), in which the Appeals Court noted that "where the officer 
uses excessive or unnecessary force to subdue the arrestee, 
. . . the arrestee may defend himself by employing such force as 
reasonably appears to be necessary."  Id. at 652, quoting 
Moreira, 388 Mass. at 601. 
                                                                  
15 
 
where the defendant was a police officer who claimed that his 
actions were necessary for self-defense and defense of others 
against violence at the hands of the victim, the opposite focus 
was the essential one, that is, whether the officer's claims in 
response to the victim's alleged use of force and related 
conduct were reasonable.  Given the context, the proposed 
instruction's potential for creating juror misunderstanding was 
a real one. 
 
But that is not the end of the matter.  Although the judge 
did not err in declining to give her proposed instruction, this 
case was fundamentally about the reasonableness of a police 
officer's use of force against a civilian; therefore, the 
judge's instructions should have acknowledged the defendant's 
status and explained that, as a police officer, the defendant 
would have been justified in using force in connection with his 
official duties, including effecting an arrest, as long as such 
force was necessary and reasonable.15  The language that begins 
the model instruction on police privilege and resisting arrest 
 
15 Cf. Commonwealth v. Young, 326 Mass. 597, 601-602 (1950) 
(police officer convicted of manslaughter of civilian; 
reasonableness of officer's acts in attempting to arrest armed 
suspect was key question for trier of fact to decide); Powers v. 
Sturtevant, 199 Mass. 265, 265-266 (1908) (tort action for 
assault by police officer on civilian; judge properly instructed 
jury that defendant had right "to arrest the plaintiff and to 
use such force as was reasonably necessary to overcome any 
resistance which he offered[,] but the defendant had not the 
right to use unreasonable or excessive force"). 
                     
16 
 
is not the only possible approach, but this language does convey 
a police officer's right to use reasonable force.  See 
Instruction 9.260, at 12 ("Because of the nature of the job, a 
police officer is permitted to use force in carrying out his 
[her] official duties if such force is necessary and 
reasonable"). 
 
In addition, the defendant raises legitimate concerns with 
respect to the judge's instruction on self-defense.  In keeping 
with the model jury instruction on self-defense, the judge 
referenced a defendant's obligation to do "everything reasonable 
in the circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting 
to force" including considering "avenues of escape that were 
reasonably available."  See Instruction 9.260, at 2, 4.  We 
agree with the defendant that a police officer has an obligation 
to protect his fellow officers and the public at large that goes 
beyond that of an ordinary citizen, such that retreat or escape 
is not a viable option for an on-duty police officer faced with 
a potential threat of violence.  Cf. Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 
331 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991), 
recognized as overruled on other grounds, Edgerly v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 956 n.14 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force "may be 
inconsistent with police officers' duty to the public to pursue 
investigations of criminal activity" and should not apply absent 
17 
 
clear authority, which plaintiff had not identified).  The 
supplemental model instruction on the duty to retreat before 
resorting to the use of force in self-defense should not have 
been given in this case.  Furthermore, while it is appropriate 
to require a police officer to do "everything reasonable in the 
circumstances to avoid physical combat before resorting to 
force" against a civilian, the question must be whether the 
defendant as a police officer had reasonable options available 
other than to use force -- not whether a similarly situated 
civilian would have had other options. 
 
In sum, the judge's instructions to the jury were erroneous 
in two respects:  (1) they failed to acknowledge, particularly 
in connection with the claim of self-defense, that the defendant 
was a police officer and that he was entitled to use force in 
carrying out his official duties if and to the extent such force 
was necessary and reasonable; and (2) the self-defense 
instruction included an erroneous statement that the defendant 
had a duty to retreat if possible under the circumstances.  We 
turn, then, to the question whether the errors were prejudicial 
to the defendant.  "An error is not prejudicial if it 'did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect'; however, if 
we cannot find 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that 
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error,' 
18 
 
then it is prejudicial."  Cruz, 445 Mass. at 591, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
Considering the jury instructions as a whole, as we must, 
see Commonwealth v. Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 720 (1998), S.C., 451 
Mass. 1008 (2008), as well as the strength of the Commonwealth's 
case, we conclude that the errors were not prejudicial.  At 
trial, the defendant admitted to hitting the victim repeatedly 
with the flashlight, the victim clearly sustained significant 
injuries, and the only issue was whether the defendant's acts 
were justified.  The record as a whole presents extremely strong 
evidence that the defendant did not strike the victim in the 
manner that he did in self-defense and in defense of his fellow 
officers.  The video recording of the beating showed three 
officers surrounding a single victim, who was bent over the hood 
of a car as the defendant struck him repeatedly with a 
flashlight.  Sedergren, who was on top of the victim's back and 
was holding him around the neck, weighed between 250 and 260 
pounds at the time of the incident; the victim, by comparison, 
weighed about 165 or 170 pounds.  None of the officers saw the 
victim's hand on Sedergren's gun.  Moreover, based on the 
officers' positioning around the victim, it was implausible if 
not impossible that the victim could have reached the gun, 
because it was holstered on the right side of Sedergren's body, 
19 
 
where Truoiolo was.16  As previously noted, the video recording 
also belied the defense's theory, because although an officer 
can be heard on the recording yelling "smash him in the knees," 
see note 3, supra, there was no audible statement or reference 
regarding a gun. 
 
Furthermore, as part of her charge on self-defense and 
defense of another, the judge explained that whether a defendant 
was justified in using force in his or her own defense or in 
defense of others depended upon what a reasonable person would 
have done in the circumstances that were presented to the 
defendant.  See Instruction 9.260, at 1-5, 17.  Even in the 
absence of a specific instruction on the defendant's status as a 
police officer, it was clear to the jury that he was, in fact, 
an officer, and that at the time of the incident, he was 
involved in a traffic stop as part of his official duties.  
Moreover, through Sedergren's and Truoiolo's testimony, the 
defendant introduced evidence concerning the "continuum" of 
force that police officers are trained to use in responding to 
 
16 Although Truoiolo did not have control of the victim's 
hands, he testified that the victim's left hand was on the other 
side of Sedergren (meaning Sedergren's left side) and that the 
victim's right hand was somewhere in front of the victim.  This 
positioning was consistent with the fact that the victim was 
bent over the hood, with Sedergren over the victim's back on the 
left side and Truoiolo to the victim's right.  If the victim's 
left hand was on Sedergren's left side, and the victim's right 
hand was in front of him, the victim could not have reached a 
gun that was on the right side of Sedergren's body. 
                     
20 
 
an individual who presents varying degrees of threatening 
behavior or resistance.  We presume that the jury followed the 
judge's instruction, and in doing so, we assume that they 
evaluated the defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of 
others from the perspective of what a reasonable police officer 
would have done in the circumstances presented to him or her. 
 
Finally, we conclude with "fair assurance," Cruz, 445 Mass. 
at 591, that if the judge had charged the jury that the 
defendant was entitled to use such force as was necessary and 
reasonable to carry out his official duties, the addition of 
this instruction would not have had an effect on the verdicts.  
The force that the defendant used here -- repeated blows with a 
flashlight to the head and other parts of the body of a victim 
who was bent over the hood of an automobile, and later lying on 
the ground -- was extreme and went beyond that which was 
necessary for the accomplishment of any of the defendant's 
responsibilities as a police officer that night.  Even if the 
defendant believed at one point that the victim was trying to 
grab Sedergren's gun, that danger would have completely 
dissipated by the time the victim was on the ground; yet even 
then, the defendant continued to strike the victim.  In these 
circumstances, assuming the jury had been instructed properly 
about the defendant's police officer status, the jury reasonably 
could not have found that the beating was justified. 
21 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons that have been discussed, the 
jury instructions in this case should have been more narrowly 
tailored to reflect the fact that the defendant was a police 
officer engaged in his official duties at the time of the 
incident.  However, given the strength of the evidence against 
the defendant and the weakness of his defenses, we conclude that 
the errors were not prejudicial and that the defendant is not 
entitled to a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.