Title: Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. McSween

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

347 So. 2d 1118 (1977) LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. Harold B. McSWEEN. No. 57805. Supreme Court of Louisiana. July 1, 1977. *1119 John B. Scofield, Lake Charles, Chairman, Sam J. D'Amico, Baton Rouge, Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, Leonard Fuhrer, Alexandria, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, Edgar H. Lancaster, Jr., Tallulah, Henry A. Politz, Shreveport, John F. Pugh, Thibodaux, A. Russell Roberts, Metairie, Thomas O. Collins, Jr., New Orleans, Counsel for Louisiana State Bar Association Committee on Professional Responsibility, for petitioner. Camille F. Gravel, Jr., Dee D. Drell, Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Alexandria, for respondent. PER CURIAM. On November 5, 1975, Harold B. McSween, former president of the Rapides Savings and Loan Association and a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association since 1950, was indicted under a four-count indictment returned by the grand jury of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Count I was dismissed. McSween entered guilty pleas to counts II, III, and IV, each of which charged him with the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (receiving money from a federally insured savings and loan association with intent to defraud). He was sentenced to prison for a period of one year on each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 on each of the three counts. Execution of the sentences of imprisonment was suspended and McSween was placed on supervisory probation for a period of five years. As a special condition of probation he was ordered to refrain from the practice of law for one year from January 31, 1976. On April 2, 1976, the Louisiana State Bar Association, through its Committee on Professional Responsibility, filed in this Court a petition charging McSween with professional misconduct and seeking disciplinary action. We appointed Cecil E. Ramey, Jr. Commissioner to conduct a hearing and make recommendations. After reviewing the transcript of the evidentiary hearing at which McSween was the only witness, as well as all other affidavits and documents of record, we adopt the Commissioner's findings of fact which, in pertinent part, provide:[*] Article XV, § 8, paragraph 7 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, under which this proceeding was brought, provides in pertinent part: An essential element of the crime for which respondent was convicted was the "intent to defraud" Rapides Savings and Loan Association. See, 18 U.S.C. § 1006. The issue of respondent's criminal intent was concluded against him by his plea of guilty and could not be tried anew in this proceeding. The only question before the Commissioner, and that with which we are here faced, is whether the crime warrants discipline, and if so, to what extent. The offense in question, a felony involving intent to defraud, trenches upon at least two basic precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Disciplinary Rule 1-102 provides in part: "(A) A lawyer shall not: Nevertheless, evidence of mitigating circumstances properly introduced before the Commissioner convince us that the harshest penalty, disbarment, is not in order. Respondent has been a member of the bar for many years and despite his present difficulties, has maintained a good reputation among many of his professional associates and members of the lay community. Furthermore, since January 31, 1977, when respondent was no longer required as a condition of his probation to refrain from practicing law, he has voluntarily done so in a spirit of contrition. The Commissioner recommended that McSween be suspended from the practice of law for a period of at least two years from January 31, 1977. We have considered all of the mitigating evidence of record, not as tending to disprove McSween's guilt, but for the sole purpose of determining whether the crime warrants discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. Article XV, § 8(7) (d) of the Louisiana State Bar Association Articles of Incorporation. In our opinion, the criminal behavior of the respondent warrants a three-year suspension from the practice of law. Accordingly, it is ordered that Harold B. McSween be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, dating retroactively from his suspension on January 31, 1976 by federal court order, at respondent's cost. [*] Citations to the transcript and footnotes are omitted from the Commissioner's findings of fact.