Title: State v. Fowler

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 116,803 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
BRANDON L. FOWLER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
For a multiple-conviction case, the phrase "the present crime of conviction" in 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9) refers to a criminal defendant's current primary grid 
crime for which an accurate criminal history and the severity level of the crime determine 
the applicable base sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. 
 
2. 
A sentencing judge's use of the same two prior misdemeanor domestic batteries 
both to calculate a defendant's criminal history for his or her base sentence on a current 
primary grid crime and to elevate a current domestic battery to a felony does not violate 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9)'s restriction on double counting.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 55 Kan. App. 2d 92, 408 P.3d 119 (2017). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER M. MAGANA, judge. Opinion filed February 14, 
2020. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.  
 
Caroline Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
2 
 
 
 
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.:  Brandon Fowler pleaded guilty to felony possession of 
methamphetamine, felony domestic battery, and violation of a protective order. His 
domestic battery conviction qualified as a felony rather than a misdemeanor because it 
was his third such conviction within five years. In calculating Fowler's criminal history 
score to determine the sentence for his drug possession conviction, the district court judge 
included the same two misdemeanor domestic battery convictions that had been used to 
elevate Fowler's current domestic battery to a felony.  
 
In his appeal, Fowler argues that the district judge engaged in prohibited "double 
counting" of two prior misdemeanor domestic battery convictions under K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 21-6810(d)(9), which then read:  "Prior convictions of any crime shall not be 
counted in determining the criminal history category if they enhance the severity level, 
elevate the classification from misdemeanor to felony, or are elements of the present 
crime of conviction." 
  
A majority of the Court of Appeals panel reviewing this challenge from Fowler 
rejected it, concluding that "[w]hen a defendant is being sentenced for multiple felony 
convictions, the term 'present crime of conviction' as contained in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6810(d)(9) refers only to the primary crime referred to in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6819(b)(2)." State v. Fowler, 55 Kan. App. 2d 92, Syl. ¶ 5, 408 P.3d 119 (2017). Court of 
Appeals Judge Thomas E. Malone dissented.  
  
3 
 
 
 
We agree with the majority's conclusion, although we reach it by a slightly 
different route. We therefore affirm its decision and the district court's judgment.  
 
PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT 
 
Fowler and the State reached a plea agreement, under which Fowler pleaded guilty 
to felony possession of methamphetamine, felony domestic battery, and violation of a 
protective order. The agreement was based in part on the parties' mutual belief that 
Fowler's criminal history score of "E" made his presumptive sentence probation under the 
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6801 et seq.  
 
The presentence investigation revealed instead that Fowler's criminal history score 
for sentencing of his "primary" or "base" crime of felony methamphetamine possession 
was "B"—based on two adult person felonies, two adult nonperson felonies, one adult 
person misdemeanor, and nine adult nonperson misdemeanors. Six person misdemeanors 
were converted to the two person felonies under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6811(a) (every 
three person misdemeanors convert to one person felony). Two of the six were domestic 
battery convictions on March 28, 2012, and December 23, 2013; these fell within a five-
year window immediately preceding the current domestic battery. This timing made 
Fowler's current misdemeanor battery a felony rather than a misdemeanor. See K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-5414(b)(3). 
 
Fowler's criminal history of "B" combined with the drug severity level 5 
classification of felony possession of methamphetamine placed him in the KSGA's grid 
box for a presumptive prison term of 32-34-36 months. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5706(a); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6805. The self-contained statute on his domestic battery 
conviction, a nongrid person felony, provided for a sentence of 90 days to one year in jail 
and a $1,000 to $7,500 fine. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5414(b)(3). Violation of a 
4 
 
 
 
protective order, a Class A person misdemeanor, carried a sentence of up to one year in 
jail and a $2,500 fine. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5924(a)(4), (b)(1).  
 
The district judge imposed a base sentence of 34 months' prison for the 
methamphetamine conviction. Fowler received 12 months in jail and a $1,000 fine for the 
felony domestic battery and 12 months in jail for violation of the protective order. All 
three sentences were ordered to run concurrent.  
 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
 
The Court of Appeals majority interpreted K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9)'s 
reference to "the present crime of conviction" in a multiple-conviction case to refer only 
to the crime designated as "primary." State v. Fowler, 55 Kan. App. 2d 92, Syl. ¶ 5, 408 
P.3d 119 (2017). It relied in part on State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 260, 970 P.2d 42 
(1998), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 
48 (2006). Thus, in the panel majority's view, the district judge did not err by using two 
of Fowler's prior misdemeanor domestic battery convictions both to calculate his criminal 
history score for the base methamphetamine conviction and elevate the nonbase domestic 
battery from a misdemeanor to a felony. Fowler, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 102.  
 
Judge Malone, who had handled Vontress during his service as a district judge, 
said in dissent that he regarded Vontress as distinct from Fowler's case. And he 
questioned the majority's fealty to the plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6810(d)(9):  
 
"The majority would have the statute read:  'Prior convictions of any crime shall not be 
counted in determining the criminal history category if they enhance the severity level, 
elevate the classification from misdemeanor to felony, or are elements of the primary 
5 
 
 
 
crime of conviction.' There is no indication that the Legislature intended to limit the 
application of the statute to the 'primary' crime of conviction. Instead, the statute's various 
limitations on the use of prior convictions to determine criminal history apply to 'the 
present crime of conviction.' K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9). In Fowler's case, 
domestic battery is a present crime of conviction; thus, the statute applies in calculating 
his criminal history score." 55 Kan. App. 2d at 107-08 (Malone, J., dissenting).  
 
For these reasons, Judge Malone would have vacated Fowler's sentences and 
remanded to the district court.  
 
We granted Fowler's petition for review.  
  
DISCUSSION 
 
An illegal sentence may be corrected "at any time while the defendant is serving 
such sentence." L. 2019, ch. 59, § 15 (eff. May 23, 2019). Cf. K.S.A. 22-3504(1) ("The 
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."). "[A]n appellate court has the 
authority to consider an illegal sentence issue raised for the first time on appeal." State v. 
Sartin, 310 Kan. 367, Syl. ¶ 2, 446 P.3d 1068 (2019).  
 
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law subject to unlimited review. 
Similarly, issues of statutory interpretation are also questions of law subject to unlimited 
review. 310 Kan. at 369.   
 
Review of Sentencing Provisions 
 
A brief review of the design and structure of criminal sentencing in Kansas will 
assist in explaining our resolution of this appeal.  
 
6 
 
 
 
Under the KSGA, the sentencing guidelines "apply equally to all offenders in all 
parts of the state" and are "applicable to felony crimes committed on or after July 1, 
1993." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6802(a), (c). Felony convictions are classified as grid, 
nongrid, or off-grid offenses. See State v. Collins, 303 Kan. 472, 475, 362 P.3d 1098 
(2015) ("nongrid" felony domestic battery distinguished from nondrug-grid, drug-grid 
felonies, their severity levels); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6806(c), (d) (listing off-grid 
crimes). Grid crimes are subdivided into nondrug and drug-grid crimes. See K.S.A. 2018 
21-6803(k) (defining "grid"). The grids for nondrug and drug crimes are distinct. See 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804 (grid for nondrug crimes); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6805 (grid 
for drug crimes). Each has two axes. "The grid's horizontal axis is the criminal history 
scale [that] classifies criminal histories." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(c). The vertical axis 
sets out the continuum of crime severity levels. A "grid block" is "formed by the 
intersection of the crime severity ranking of a current crime of conviction and an 
offender's criminal history classification." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6803(l). 
 
The grids define "presumptive punishments for felony convictions, subject to the 
sentencing court's discretion to enter a departure sentence." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6804(d). Each grid block sets a presumptive sentencing range and indicates a 
presumptive disposition of either imprisonment or nonimprisonment. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
21-6804(f). When sentencing a nondrug crime, the "sentencing court has discretion to 
sentence at any place within the sentencing range." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(e)(1). In 
a presumptive imprisonment case, a sentencing judge must "pronounce the complete 
sentence," which includes the prison sentence, maximum potential good-time credit, and 
the period of postrelease supervision. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(e)(2). In a presumptive 
nonprison sentence case, the sentencing judge must pronounce the prison sentence and 
duration of the nonprison sanction. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(e)(3). 
 
7 
 
 
 
Various subsections of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804 modify or supplement the 
general sentencing guidelines for certain nondrug felonies. For example, the sentence for 
a conviction for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer that would otherwise fall 
in grid block 6-H or 6-I "shall be presumed imprisonment." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6804(g); see also (h) (when firearm used to commit person felony, sentence presumed 
imprisonment); (j) (sentence for persistent sex offender double maximum duration of 
presumptive imprisonment term); (k) (certain gang-related felonies carry sentence of 
presumed imprisonment). The nondrug grid explicitly excludes certain felonies—
generally referred to as "nongrid felonies"—that typically have self-contained mandatory 
sentencing requirements. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(i). At times, the excluded 
crimes may be elevated from misdemeanors to felonies after multiple convictions. See, 
e.g., K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(D), (E) (third, subsequent DUI convictions 
nonperson felonies rather than misdemeanors). As alluded to above, when Fowler 
committed the domestic battery at the root of this case, domestic battery was one such 
excluded crime, and it would be elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony if committed a 
third time in a five-year period. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5414(b)(3). The same is true 
today. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5414(c)(1)(C).  
 
Various subsections of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6805 modify or supplement the 
general sentencing guidelines for felony drug crimes defined under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
21-5701 through K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5717 (controlled substances). The drug grid 
section contains special procedures for certain drug-related offenses, but, because the 
drug grid applies only to specific drug crimes, there is little overlap between its special 
sentencing circumstances and those present on the nondrug grid. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 
21-6805(e)-(g). The drug grid guidelines outline what the sentencing judge must 
pronounce from the bench for both presumptive prison and nonprison cases, just as the 
nondrug grid guidelines do. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6805(c)(2)-(3). 
 
8 
 
 
 
For both the drug grid and the nondrug grid, "criminal history" refers to an 
offender's criminal record "at the time such offender is sentenced." See K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 21-6803(c) ("criminal history" offender's criminal record "at the time such offender 
is sentenced"); (d) ("criminal history score" summation of convictions described as 
criminal history that place offender in category listed on horizontal axis of sentencing 
grid). The ultimate score assigned depends on a defendant's number of "prior 
convictions" for adult person and nonperson felonies; person and nonperson 
misdemeanors; and juvenile person and nonperson felony adjudications. See K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 21-6810(a). 
 
A "prior conviction" is  
 
"any conviction, other than another count in the current case which was brought in the 
same information or complaint or which was joined for trial with other counts in the 
current case pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3203, and amendments thereto, which occurred prior 
to sentencing in the current case regardless of whether the offense that led to the prior 
conviction occurred before or after the current offense or the conviction in the current 
case." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(a). 
 
The provision at issue before us today marks a rare exception to inclusion in a 
defendant's criminal history score:  "Prior convictions of any crime shall not be counted 
in determining the criminal history category if they enhance the severity level, elevate the 
classification from misdemeanor to felony, or are elements of the present crime of 
conviction." K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9). The same substantive provision to 
prevent double counting continues in effect today. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
6810(d)(10). But, in general, "all other prior convictions will be considered and scored." 
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9).  
 
9 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6809 assigns a letter for each category of criminal history. 
And, as alluded to above, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6811 dictates how to calculate a criminal 
history score. One of its provisions came into play in this case:  K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6811(a) dictated that every three person misdemeanors committed within three years of 
the "current crime of conviction" were to be converted into one person felony for 
criminal history calculation purposes.  
 
Severity levels used in classifying nondrug and drug felonies are defined in K.S.A. 
2018 Supp. 21-6807 and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6808, respectively.  
 
All of the provisions we reviewed above contemplate sentencing for a single 
conviction in a single case. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819 contains the procedures for 
sentencing in a multiple-conviction case such as Fowler's. 
 
In a multiple-conviction case, the sentencing judge must "establish a base sentence 
for the primary crime." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). "The primary crime is the 
crime with the highest crime severity ranking." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). If there 
are multiple crimes with the same severity ranking, the district judge must "designate 
which crime will serve as the primary crime." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). If one or 
more convictions in the current case are off-grid crimes, those crimes are ignored to 
determine the appropriate sentences for any grid crimes. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-
6819(b)(2). Nongrid crimes that have sentences prescribed by individual statutes also are 
excluded from grid calculation and thus can never qualify as primary crimes under the 
KSGA. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(i). 
 
Because the crime severity levels for nondrug-grid and drug-grid crimes differ, 
special rules apply when a defendant has a current conviction from both categories. If 
such a situation creates both prison and nonprison presumptions, then the crime that 
10 
 
 
 
presumes imprisonment qualifies as the primary crime. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). 
When both crimes presume the same disposition, the crime leading to the longest term 
qualifies as the primary crime. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). 
 
After determining the primary crime, the "base sentence [for the primary crime] is 
set using the total criminal history score assigned." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(3). 
Only a criminal history score of "I," which signifies no criminal history, is used to 
determine any nonbase sentences. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(5). 
 
A sentencing judge generally may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in 
multiple-conviction cases. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b). The total prison sentence 
imposed in a case cannot exceed twice the base sentence imposed for the primary crime. 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(b)(4).  
 
Prior Cases Dealing with the Double Counting Statute 
 
The double counting provision Fowler relies upon here has been the subject of 
several previous cases in this court and the Court of Appeals. The first of these was 
Vontress, the 1998 case over which the Court of Appeals panel majority and Judge 
Malone tangled.   
 
In Vontress, this court interpreted K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11), the predecessor statute 
to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9). The wording of the two statutes is identical but for 
K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11)'s additional exclusion of a prior conviction from criminal history 
if it enhanced "applicable penalties" for "the present crime of conviction." This difference 
is of no moment here because Fowler relies on other, common language forbidding 
counting of prior convictions for criminal history. He argues that his sentence must be 
vacated as illegal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9) because his two prior 
11 
 
 
 
convictions were used both to calculate criminal history for his current methamphetamine 
possession crime and to "elevate the classification [of his current domestic battery crime] 
from misdemeanor to felony." Compare K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9) ("elevate the 
classification from misdemeanor to felony") with K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) ("elevate the 
classification from misdemeanor to felony"). Fowler's focused argument avoids any need 
to distinguish Vontress on statutory language difference alone. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Damon L. Vontress of first-degree murder, aggravated 
robbery, aggravated battery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The district judge 
sentenced Vontress to a hard-40 life sentence for the off-grid first-degree murder 
conviction. For the grid crimes, the district judge used Vontress' aggravated robbery 
conviction as the primary crime to which a base sentence must be assigned using full 
criminal history. The calculation of Vontress' criminal history score included a prior 
person felony conviction that the State had also relied upon to prove an element of 
Vontress' current criminal possession of a firearm conviction. On appeal, Vontress argued 
that use of the prior conviction in both ways in a single case violated the double counting 
prohibition of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11). 266 Kan. at 259.  
 
The Vontress court concluded after brief discussion that Vontress' sentence did not 
conflict with the statute:  
 
"In cases of multiple convictions arising out of the same complaint, the 
sentencing court identifies the defendant's primary crime, i.e., the crime with the highest 
severity level, and computes the defendant's base sentence. The defendant's full criminal 
history is applied to the primary crime to establish the defendant's base sentence. K.S.A. 
21-4720(3). An off-grid crime shall not be used as the primary crime in determining the 
base sentence. K.S.A. 21-4720(2). The criminal history score shall not be applied to 
nonbase crimes. K.S.A. 21-4720(5). 
 
12 
 
 
 
"The exclusion in K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) does not pertain to any conviction 
where the prior felony does not provide an element of the offense or in some manner 
affect the penalty applicable to the conviction of the crime. Vontress' criminal history 
was not applied to his conviction for criminal possession of a firearm. Aggravated 
robbery was the primary crime for purposes of application of Vontress' criminal history 
score. The firearm conviction was not Vontress' primary crime. As a nonbase crime, a 
criminal history score of I was applied to the firearm conviction. Therefore, the prior 
felony was used as an element of the status crime and not used to establish the penalty for 
the firearm conviction. The sentencing court properly applied the felony conviction to 
that crime." 266 Kan. at 260. 
 
The Court of Appeals was next to address the double counting statute, particularly 
its intersection with a sentencing enhancement provision for persistent sex offenders. 
 
In State v. Taylor, 27 Kan. App. 2d 62, 998 P.2d 123 (2000), superseded by statute 
as stated in State v. Pearce, 51 Kan. App. 2d 116, 342 P.3d 963 (2015) (noting post-
Taylor statutory amendment removing "applicable penalties"), defendant Allen D. Taylor 
pleaded no contest to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Taylor's 
full criminal history, used to calculate his base sentence, included a prior conviction for 
indecent liberties with a child and three nonperson felonies. And the existence of the 
prior indecent liberties conviction qualified Taylor as a persistent sex offender, which 
doubled the length of the prison term for any new sex crime.  
 
The Court of Appeals held that K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) "flatly prohibits use of 
prior convictions to determine the criminal history category 'if they enhance the severity 
level or applicable penalties,'" and "[t]here can be no doubt that classification as a 
persistent sex offender enhances the applicable penalties." 27 Kan. App. 2d at 65. Indeed, 
"the classification of a person as a persistent sex offender is relevant only with respect to 
sentencing and is for the purpose of punishment, so the sentencing guidelines provision 
13 
 
 
 
of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) is applicable. . . . [T]he prior . . . conviction is covered by the 
literal language of the statutory prohibition against consideration of a '[p]rior conviction' 
that enhances the severity level or applicable penalty." 27 Kan. App. 2d at 68. Taylor's 
sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing as a result. 27 Kan. App. 2d 
at 68. 
 
 
State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422, 24 P.3d 77 (2001), came next. In that case, this 
court examined the sentencing of defendant David Zabrinas, which mirrored that at issue 
in Taylor. Zabrinas had been convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a child, and 
his prior conviction for aggravated indecent solicitation of a child was used by the district 
judge in two ways—to double his sentence under the persistent sex offender provision 
and to count as one of two prior convictions that made his criminal history score a "B." 
Zabrinas invoked K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) to attack his sentence on appeal, and this court 
approved and applied the "well-reasoned" decision in Taylor to grant relief. Zabrinas' 
sentence was vacated and his case remanded for resentencing, with this court noting that 
he should continue to be treated as a persistent sex offender but that the prior aggravated 
indecent solicitation of a child should be dropped from the criminal history used to arrive 
at his base sentence. 271 Kan. at 443-44.   
 
 
The next case, State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 55 P.3d 903 (2002), trod the same 
path as Taylor and Zabrinas, although it did so on the court's own initiative. 274 Kan. at 
649 (problem not raised in parties' briefs). The same prior sex offense had been used to 
classify defendant William C. Moore as a persistent sex offender and to calculate his full 
criminal history score used to arrive at his base sentence. As in Taylor and Zabrinas, 
Moore's sentence was vacated and his case remanded for resentencing. 274 Kan. at 651.    
 
This court returned to the Vontress template in State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 61 
P.3d 701 (2003).  
14 
 
 
 
 
In that case, defendant Quincy B. Davis was convicted of first-degree 
premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of 
a firearm, and aggravated robbery. His prior conviction for aggravated battery was used 
to calculate his criminal history score underlying the base sentence for his current 
primary crime of aggravated kidnapping and as an element of his current criminal 
possession conviction. Following Vontress, this court rejected Davis' K.S.A. 21-
4710(d)(11)-based challenge to these two uses in his multiple-conviction case. 275 Kan. 
at 125.   
 
The Vontress template reappeared in the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in two 
later unpublished cases. These cases also involved defendants who unsuccessfully 
challenged use of a particular prior conviction to calculate criminal history for their 
current primary crime and its associated base sentence on the one hand and prove a 
necessary element of a current criminal possession of a firearm charge on the other. See 
State v. Berkstresser, No. 94,131, 2007 WL 518832, at *6 (Kan. App. 2007); State v. 
Loggins, No. 90,171, 2004 WL 1086970, at *5 (Kan. App. 2004).  
 
The legal principles arising from the final Kansas case before Fowler's to deal with 
interpretation of the double counting statute reflect the Taylor/Zabrinas/Moore mold 
rather than the Vontress template.  
 
In that case, State v. Smith, 299 Kan. 962, 327 P.3d 441 (2014), a jury convicted 
defendant Francis Smith of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and 
two counts of indecent liberties with a child. 299 Kan. at 963-64. At sentencing, Smith's 
criminal history included "four prior sex offense convictions:  two for aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child; one for aggravated criminal sodomy; and one for rape." 
299 Kan. at 982. 
15 
 
 
 
 
Under Jessica's Law, the sentencing judge elevated Smith's two current aggravated 
indecent liberties convictions from hard 25 to hard 40 sentences based on the existence of 
two, unspecified prior convictions. The judge also used at least three of Smith's prior 
crimes to arrive at a criminal history score of "A" to sentence Smith for his primary grid 
crime. A criminal history score of "A" results from "three or more" prior adult person 
felony convictions. Finally, because Smith also qualified as a persistent sex offender 
based on his prior convictions, his base grid sentence was doubled. 299 Kan. at 983. 
 
On appeal, Smith challenged his sentence on Count III, his primary grid crime, 
under K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11). The State conceded the sentencing judge had erred, and 
this court agreed:  
 
"[Smith] argues the process used to arrive at the sentences [for the offgrid convictions 
under Count I and Count II enhanced by Jessica's Law] is relevant to his sentencing 
challenge on Count III because using two prior convictions to impose them precluded the 
court from using those priors again when calculating Smith's criminal history score on 
Count III. Smith is correct. Imposing the hard 40 sentences left only two prior 
convictions available for calculating the sentence for Count III. 
 
"One of Smith's remaining prior convictions was used to qualify him as a 
persistent sex offender, requiring the district court to double his gridblock sentences on 
both [current] indecent liberties with a child convictions under K.S.A. 21-4704(j). Using 
that prior conviction to classify Smith as a persistent sex offender precluded using it to 
calculate Smith's criminal history score. See State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 651, 55 P.3d 
903 (2002) (district court erred in failing to remove prior conviction from criminal 
history after using it to classify defendant as a persistent sex offender). So Smith had only 
one prior adult person felony conviction available for use in calculating his criminal 
history score when sentencing him for the indecent liberties with a child conviction in 
Count III." Smith, 299 Kan. at 983. 
  
16 
 
 
 
The Smith opinion did not cite any previous case to support the first of its 
conclusions quoted above:  that the two prior convictions used to support the Jessica's 
Law enhancements could not be reused as part of Smith's criminal history underlying his 
sentence for the current primary grid crime. But, in disallowing the practice under K.S.A. 
21-4710(d)(11), it appeared to place it in the category of decisions to which Taylor, 
Zabrinas, and Moore belong rather than under the Vontress template. In other words, a 
Jessica's Law enhancement from a hard 25 sentence to a hard 40 sentence, despite its off-
grid, extra-KSGA character, was viewed in the same way as a statutorily required 
doubling of a base sentence for a persistent sex offender, rather than as an element of a 
nonbase status crime such as criminal possession of a firearm, also independent of the 
KSGA sentencing grid.  
 
The second conclusion from the Smith opinion quoted above followed directly 
from the cited Moore opinion, and from its predecessors, Taylor and Zabrinas. Once a 
prior conviction was used to qualify Smith as a persistent sex offender, that same prior 
could not be used again in his criminal history underlying the base sentence for his 
primary crime. See Moore, 274 Kan. at 651; Zabrinas, 271 Kan. at 443-44; Taylor, 27 
Kan. App. 2d at 68.  
 
Thus Smith's sentence for Count III violated K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) in two ways, 
making it illegal and necessitating vacation and remand of the case for resentencing on 
that count. That resentencing would have to depend on a criminal history counting only 
one prior conviction. Smith, 299 Kan. at 984-85. Two of the four prior convictions would 
be "used up" by his Jessica's Law enhancement, and a third by his persistent sex offender 
classification.  
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Answering the Question at Hand 
 
Although the previous cases on double-counting that we have reviewed have 
settled certain issues and may have implied resolutions to others, they have not explicitly 
addressed the question squarely presented in this case:  To which crime does K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 21-6810(d)(9)'s phrase "the present crime of conviction" refer? 
 
The Court of Appeals panel majority concluded "that where a defendant is being 
sentenced for multiple felony convictions, the term 'present crime of conviction' . . . 
refers only to the primary crime referred to in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2)" for 
which a base grid sentence must be established. Fowler, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 101. Judge 
Malone questioned whether this reading was demanded by Vontress, and he criticized the 
majority's conclusion as "contrary to the plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6810(d)(9)." 55 Kan. App. 2d at 106 (Malone, J., dissenting). 
 
We agree with Judge Malone in certain respects. Vontress is not on all fours 
factually or legally with Fowler's case. Although one of the uses of the prior crime in 
Vontress was as a component of criminal history for determination of the base sentence 
on a current primary crime, which matches this case, the other use was as proof of an 
element of a current criminal possession of a firearm, which does not match this case. 
The second use of the prior crimes in Fowler's case was as elevation to make his current 
domestic battery a felony rather than a misdemeanor.  
 
But the observation of these distinctions is no more persuasive than our additional 
note that Fowler's case is even more distinct from the Taylor/Zabrinas/Moore line. All of 
those decisions granted relief to defendants when a sentencing judge used one or more 
prior convictions in two ways that affected the sentence on the primary crime—once by 
labeling the defendant a persistent sex offender whose prison term would be doubled and 
18 
 
 
 
once by inclusion in the criminal history that would determine an applicable base grid 
sentence. Smith, for its part, is also distinct from Fowler's case in the additional gloss it 
added to the Taylor/Zabrinas/Moore rulings:  a sentencing judge also is not permitted to 
enhance a Jessica's Law sentence based on a prior conviction used to determine criminal 
history underlying a base sentence for a current primary crime.    
 
The important point, however, to take from all of the prior cases is not what is 
dissimilar but what is similar. All of the cases placed analytical emphasis under the 
double counting statute on what was done by the sentencing judge vis-a-vis the current 
primary grid crime. Without ruling explicitly that it must always be so, several lineups of 
justices on this court and judges on the Court of Appeals have apparently considered it 
obvious that it must always be so. Assumption cannot substitute for analysis, of course, 
but its recurrence over many years and many cases at least favors the panel majority over 
Judge Malone.  
 
That said, we are sympathetic with Judge Malone's insistence that the plain 
language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9) can answer what the Legislature meant 
when it wrote "the present crime of conviction." This court has what now qualifies as a 
long-standing express affection for relying on plain legislative language whenever 
possible. See, e.g., State v. Gensler, 308 Kan. 674, 677, 423 P.3d 488 (2018) (legislative 
intent governs statutory interpretation; reliance on plain, unambiguous language "the best 
and only safe rule" for determining intent; only if language ambiguous does court move 
to statutory construction). However, Judge Malone errs in characterizing the language he 
relies upon as plain; in fact, it is not even present. Judge Malone treats the "the" before 
"crime of conviction" as though it is an "a" or an "any."    
 
"The" is singular and specific. See Webster's New World College Dictionary 1501 
(5th ed. 2014) ("that [one] being spoken of or already mentioned"). "A" is singular but 
19 
 
 
 
nonspecific. See Webster's New World College Dictionary 1 (5th ed. 2014) ("a2" "1 one; 
one sort of . . . 2 each; any one"). "Any" can precede a singular or a plural noun, but it is 
nonspecific as well. See Webster's New World College Dictionary 64 (5th ed. 2014) 
("one, no matter which, of more than two"). The placement of the word "the" before 
"present crime of conviction" must mean an individual, particular crime of conviction, 
not merely "a" or "any" present crime of conviction. Certainly, the Legislature could have 
been more clear by talking about the "primary grid" present crime of conviction or the 
"base" sentence ultimately to be assigned to it, but the absence of such explicit guidance 
does not eliminate the meanings those words would convey from among the Legislature's 
intentions. All we can take from its shorthand choice of "the" as the introductory article 
in the phrase, the actual plain language of the statute, is partial silence on the question 
before us. Partial silence in this situation equates to ambiguity.  
 
Widening our lens as we must when ambiguity forces us to march from statutory 
interpretation to construction, we believe the final answer to the question posed by this 
case can be answered through examination of the Legislature's overall crafting of the 
KSGA.  
 
It is evident from that broader perspective that the Legislature generally designed 
and drafted the KSGA using a framework that required calculation of sentences for 
individual convictions. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(d) ("The appropriate 
punishment for a felony conviction should depend on the severity of the crime of 
conviction when compared to all other crimes and the offender's criminal history." 
[Emphasis added.]); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6804(f) ("Each grid block states the 
presumptive sentencing range for an offender whose crime of conviction and criminal 
history place such offender in that grid block." [Emphasis added.]); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 
21-6806 (defining off-grid crimes requiring life sentences); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
20 
 
 
 
6810(a) ("prior conviction" any conviction, "other than another count in the current case," 
which occurred before sentencing in current case).  
 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819 is the exception to this design imperative, dealing as it 
does with multiple-conviction cases. But it does not alter the Legislature's overall 
structure:  The KSGA is based on an assumption that sentences are calculated for each 
conviction, independent of other convictions. For any grid crime, the sentence for a 
particular conviction depends on the defendant's criminal history score for that conviction 
and the severity level of that crime. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6811(i) (requiring certain 
prior convictions to be scored as person felonies based on identity of "current crime of 
conviction"). Even in the portion of the KSGA governing multiple-conviction cases, the 
sentence for each conviction still depends on the defendant's criminal history score for 
that conviction and the severity level for that crime. If the crime is the primary grid 
crime, the criminal history score used to calculate the sentence reflects the defendant's 
accurate criminal past; if the crime is not the primary crime, a criminal history score of 
"I" is assigned, regardless of its actual accuracy. In other words, even in multiple-
conviction cases, the Legislature chose to treat each conviction as discrete for sentencing 
purposes. Once each crime has a corresponding sentence systematically assigned to it, 
then the district judge makes a call on their concurrent or consecutive service. See K.S.A. 
2018 Supp. 21-6819. 
 
With the overall design and structure of the KSGA as our guideposts, we conclude 
that including Fowler's prior domestic battery convictions in his criminal history 
calculation for his primary grid conviction did not violate the double-counting provision 
of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9). Fowler's prior domestic battery convictions did not 
elevate his possession of methamphetamine conviction's classification from misdemeanor 
to felony. Nor did they enhance his possession conviction's severity level or constitute an 
element of that crime. For that discrete conviction, the district judge used Fowler's prior 
21 
 
 
 
domestic battery convictions once each as a part of his criminal history. The judge's use 
of the same prior convictions to elevate a different current crime of Fowler's, the 
domestic battery, from a misdemeanor to a felony was also discrete and permissible. 
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals majority realized, Fowler's sentencing on the felony 
domestic battery was not governed by the grid system of the KSGA at all. See K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 21-5414(b)(3); 2015 Supp. 21-6804(i) (domestic battery sentence governed 
by mandatory sentencing requirements of domestic battery statute).  
 
Finally, we note that our ultimate construction is not merely consistent with 
legislative design. It also is consistent with the Legislature's stated policy goals in 
enacting the KSGA:  uniformity in sentencing. See State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 674, 697, 
387 P.3d 835 (2017). To adopt Fowler's position and hold that his convictions must be 
excluded from his felony drug conviction's criminal history would mean that a defendant 
in his same position, but charged in separate cases, would be subject to a longer sentence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision affirming 
Fowler's sentences.  
 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, District Judge Retired, assigned.1 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Retired District Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 
116,803 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the 
vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.  
 
22 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
ROSEN, J., concurring:  I agree with the majority's conclusion that including 
Fowler's prior domestic battery convictions in his criminal history calculation for his 
primary grid conviction did not violate the double-counting provision of K.S.A. 2015 
Supp. 21-6810(d)(9). I write separately to emphasize that the cause of the confusion that 
resulted in this appeal—the lack of an accurate criminal history determination prior to the 
entry of the plea—and the necessity of having two appellate courts address this 
sentencing issue is completely avoidable. I will not dwell on the point; I will simply refer 
to my concurring opinion in State v. Garcia, 295 Kan. 53, 64, 283 P.3d 165 (2012), and 
reiterate that, consistent with Kansas law and the heightened constitutional protections 
demanded in criminal proceedings, we should require a predetermined, accurate criminal 
history to be part of plea negotiations. Not only would this give Fowler and similarly 
situated defendants the knowledge necessary to effectuate a knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver of the right to trial, it would recognize the significance that criminal 
history plays in the sentencing scheme and would avoid the problems associated with the 
criminal history crapshoot currently employed in most plea proceedings. In most plea 
negotiation scenarios, an understanding of the presumptive sentence resulting from the 
acceptance of a plea is an essential component of reaching an agreement. This was 
especially true in this case.  
 
Fowler and the State reached a plea agreement, under which Fowler pleaded guilty 
to felony possession of methamphetamine, felony domestic battery, and violation of a 
protective order. The agreement was based on the parties' mutual belief that Fowler had a 
criminal history score of "E" making his presumptive sentence probation under the 
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6801 et seq. 
However, the presentence investigation report, ordered and prepared post-plea, concluded 
Fowler had a criminal history score of "B" instead of the "E" that the parties believed to 
23 
 
 
 
be controlling upon entry of the plea. This resulted in not only changing the statutory 
presumptive disposition from probation to prison but nearly tripled the duration of an 
agreed upon controlling sentence from 12 months to 34 months.  
 
Instead of facing a sentencing that all parties anticipated would be in a 
presumptive probation posture, Fowler was now forced to file a motion for dispositional 
departure based on the discrepancy between his anticipated and actual criminal history. 
At sentencing, the State even joined Fowler's request for a dispositional departure 
because that was the "spirit" of the plea agreement. The district judge denied the motion 
and imposed the 34-month presumptive prison sentence.  
 
My point in Garcia was and still continues to be that there is simply no reason to 
not have an accurate criminal score calculated before the plea is accepted. This would 
provide to all the parties involved the ability to knowingly negotiate the terms of a plea 
and intelligently consider all of the sentencing possibilities and ramifications that result 
from the convictions of the plea. We simply should not continue to legitimize a plea 
negotiation process that undermines the presumption of fairness and dignity that serves to 
protect our liberty interests.