Title: State of Idaho v. Dean Keith Hickman Grand theft

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 33750 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,                 
                                 
           Plaintiff-Respondent, 
                                 
 v.                              
                                 
 DEAN KEITH HICKMAN,             
                                 
           Defendant-Appellant.  
                                 
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Boise, February 2008 
 
2008 Opinion No. 54 
 
Filed:  April 25, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bingham County.  Hon. James C. Herndon, District Judge. 
Conviction and sentence for grand theft, affirmed. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  Diane 
Marie Walker, Deputy Public Defender argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Kenneth K. 
Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General argued. 
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Justice 
Dean Keith Hickman was convicted of grand theft and sentenced to ten years, one year 
fixed.  Hickman appeals.  We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On May 24, 2006, Appellant Dean Keith Hickman was gambling at Fort Hall Casino (the 
Casino).  After another patron, Edward Cain, reported his wallet was missing, the Casino 
reviewed its video surveillance.  The surveillance showed Hickman bending down to pick 
something up off of the floor near Cain, going to the restroom, and then walking out of the 
Casino.  Hickman returned to the Casino in different clothing about two hours later.  He was 
recognized, detained by security guards, and subsequently arrested for grand theft. 
 
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Hickman was convicted by a jury of grand theft.  The district court imposed a ten year 
sentence on Hickman, with one year fixed.  Hickman then brought this appeal.   
II. ANALYSIS 
Hickman argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a ten year 
sentence, that his substantial rights were violated due to the variance existing between the 
charging document and the jury instructions, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction of grand theft.  We will address each issue in turn.  First, however, we will discuss the 
existence of a clerical error as it relates to Hickman’s conviction.  
A. Clerical Error 
 
The Amended Information and jury instructions support a conviction of grand theft 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3), theft of financial transaction cards.  However, the Judgment 
on Verdict and the Judgment/Order of Commitment state Hickman is convicted of grand theft 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(1), theft of property having value exceeding one thousand 
dollars.  The reference to I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(1) appears to be a clerical mistake which may be 
corrected by the district court.  See I.C.R. 36.  There is no indication from the record that either 
party brought this error to the attention of the district court.  Nor does Hickman now argue the 
mistake mandates reversal.  Therefore, we conclude the incorrect statutory reference in the 
Judgment on Verdict and in the Judgment/Order of Commitment is a clerical mistake.  On this 
appeal, we review the case to determine whether a conviction pursuant to I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3) 
is supported by the record. 
B. Jury Instructions 
Hickman argues the district court’s sentence was excessive, and as such, an abuse of 
discretion.  Hickman asserts that because the jury was not properly instructed as to the felony 
charge the jury verdict only supported a conviction and consequently, a sentence, for a 
misdemeanor.  The State asserts that although Hickman is characterizing his claim as a 
sentencing error, the claim is actually that the jury instructions were erroneous.     
We agree Hickman’s argument is a jury instruction issue and not a sentencing issue.  The 
omission of an essential element in a jury instruction is reviewed for harmless error.  State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79, 90 P.3d 298, 304 (2004); State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 716-717, 52 
P.3d 857, 861-62 (2002); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1999).  Hickman 
relies heavily on State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19-21, 981 P.2d 738, 744-46 (1999), where this 
 
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Court remanded the case for resentencing as a misdemeanor when the jury instructions only 
supported a misdemeanor conviction and not a felony conviction.  However Nath was decided 
after Nunez; in Nath the omission of a material element from the jury instructions was reviewed 
for harmless error and the remedy was to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.  To 
determine whether the omission of an essential element from the jury instructions is harmless, 
this Court must determine “whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a 
contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.”  Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 79, 90 P.3d at 304; 
see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. 
However, before we can reach the question of whether the omission was harmless, we 
must first determine whether we can review the omission at all.   
1. Fundamental error 
Idaho Criminal Rules 30(b) states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict . . . .”  Hickman did not object to the jury instructions at the time of trial.  Nonetheless, 
this Court will review fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence of an objection 
below.  State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, __, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007).  To determine whether 
there was fundamental error, the Court must first determine whether there was any error, and, if 
so, then whether the error is fundamental.  Id. at __, 170 P.3d at 891. 
Jury instructions must correctly inform the jury as to the elements of the crime charged.  
Anderson, 144 Idaho at __, 170 P.3d at 892 (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 
(2004)).  “When reviewing jury instructions, this Court must determine whether ‘the instructions, 
as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law.’” State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003) (quoting Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 
136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002)).  An erroneous instruction is reversible error when 
the instructions, taken as a whole, “misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  Id. 
We agree with Hickman that Instruction No. 14 does not contain the elements necessary 
to prove grand theft.  Theft occurs when “with intent to deprive another of property or to 
appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds 
such property from an owner thereof.”  I.C. § 18-2403(1).  Theft is divided into two degrees: 
grand theft and petit theft.  I.C. § 18-2407.  The statutory scheme lists specific actions or 
 
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circumstances that constitute grand theft; all other theft is petit theft.  Id.  It is grand theft if the 
property taken consists of a financial transaction card.  I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3).   
Jury Instruction No. 14 encompasses the elements of petit theft, but does not include any 
element which would constitute grand theft.1  Nonetheless, the State argues there is no error 
because the jury was instructed that the prosecution must “prove every material allegation 
contained in the Amended Information beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”  The Amended 
Information was included in the jury instructions and alleges Hickman “wrongfully, took, 
obtained, or withheld a financial transaction card . . . .” 
 
Even though the information accuses Hickman of taking a financial transaction card, we 
conclude that as a whole, the jury instructions misled the jury.  The Verdict form asks the jury to 
answer whether Hickman is “guilty or not guilty of Grand Theft.”  Instruction No. 14 sets forth 
what the State must prove in order to show Hickman is guilty of grand theft, and it erroneously 
omits an essential element.  It further states if “each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of Theft.”  (Emphasis added).  In this case, 
the jury instructions were unclear on whether it was necessary the State prove the property taken 
was a financial transaction card, and therefore, the jury instructions were erroneous. 
 
Error is fundamental error if it “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest 
injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.”  Anderson, 144 
Idaho at __, 170 P.3d at 891 (quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 
(1992) (internal quotations omitted)).  Here, the omission of a material element in the jury 
                                                 
1 Jury Instruction No. 14 provided: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about May 24, 2006 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant, Dean Keith Hickman, wrongfully took, obtained, or withheld property 
4. from an owner, and 
5. the defendant took, obtained, or withheld the property with the intent to deprive an owner of the 
property or to appropriate the property. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty of Theft.  If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty of Theft. 
Property was defined as “anything of value.” 
 
 
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instructions constitutes fundamental error.  As we noted in Anderson, a jury instruction violates 
due process if it fails to give effect to the requirement that the State prove every element of the 
offense.  Id. at __, 170 P.3d at 892.  In this case, the State was not required to prove Hickman 
took a financial transaction card, which was a necessary element to support the grand theft 
conviction, and consequently, Hickman was denied due process.  Therefore, although there was 
no objection made below, the error was fundamental and we will review it on appeal. 
 
2. Harmless error 
We will only reverse a conviction for fundamental error, if that error was not harmless.  
The omission of an essential element from a jury instruction is not harmless when “the record 
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted 
element.”  Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 79, 90 P.3d at 304; see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 19. 
Here, the omitted element was that the property taken was a financial transaction card.  
The jury concluded Hickman took or withheld property.  Hickman was only accused of taking 
Cain’s wallet and its contents.  The evidence that the wallet contained financial transaction cards 
was uncontroverted.  There is absolutely no evidence in the record that could rationally lead to a 
finding that the wallet did not contain financial transaction cards.  Thus, we hold the omission of 
the element that the property taken be financial transaction cards is harmless error. 
C.  Variance Between Charging Document and Jury Instructions 
Hickman also asserts there was an impermissible variance between the Amended 
Information and the jury instructions because the jury instructions allowed the State to prove 
grand theft by proving that Hickman “took, obtained, or withheld any property, regardless of the 
value of the property or if the property was a financial transaction card.”  Consequently, 
Hickman contends, his substantial rights were affected because the jury was not required beyond 
a reasonable doubt to find Hickman took, obtained, or withheld property that is a financial 
transaction card. 
Whether there is an impermissible variance between the charging document and jury 
instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. Sherrod, 
131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998).  A variance between the charging 
document and jury instructions is fatal when “the record suggests the possibility that the 
defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his defense.”  State v. 
 
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Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935)). 
In this case, assuming for the purposes of argument that there was a variance, Hickman 
has not shown he was misled or embarrassed in the preparation of his defense.  The Amended 
Information accused him of taking a wallet containing financial transaction cards and the State 
presented evidence showing Hickman took the wallet and its contents.  Hickman was not 
embarrassed in his defense which was that he did pick up a wallet, but it was his own and not 
Cain’s.  Thus, we hold there was no impermissible variance between the Amended Information 
and the jury instructions. 
D. Substantial and Competent Evidence 
 
Hickman contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of grand theft beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, he asks this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motions for 
directed verdict and to vacate the conviction because the jury verdict is unsupported by the 
evidence. 
This Court has observed that: 
A directed verdict for defendant, however, or judgment for acquittal as it 
is now called, is an important safeguard to the defendant.  It tests the sufficiency 
of the evidence against him, and avoids the risk that a jury may capriciously find 
him guilty though there is no legally sufficient evidence of his guilt. 
State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 130, 594 P.2d 639, 640 (1979), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000).   
 
Idaho Criminal Rules 29 provides: 
(a) Motion before submission to jury.  The court on motion of the defendant or 
on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more 
offenses charged in the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence on 
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such 
offense or offenses. 
On review, this Court must determine whether “the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of the crime charged.”  State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 
(1994).  This Court examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s guilt as to each material element of the 
offense was proven.  State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996).   
Theft requires that “with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same 
to himself or to a third person, [the defendant] wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such 
 
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property from an owner thereof.”  I.C. § 18-2403(1).  The theft is grand theft if the property is a 
“financial transaction card.”  I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3).   
Hickman argues there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of grand theft 
because there was insufficient evidence connecting Hickman to the wallet and because there was 
insufficient evidence the wallet contained financial transaction cards. 
 
1. Theft of the wallet 
Hickman argues the evidence shows nothing more than that he bent over and picked up 
something near Cain, and he emphasizes that there was no other information showing any other 
connection between Hickman and Cain or between Hickman and Cain’s wallet.  The State argues 
the evidence is sufficient because it showed Hickman picking something up from under Cain at 
the relevant time, and Hickman admitted to picking up a wallet.  Furthermore, the State contends 
simply because the evidence is circumstantial does not mean it is insufficient.  We hold that the 
evidence presented by the State is sufficient for a reasonable mind to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Hickman committed theft of Cain’s wallet. 
 
There was a video from the Casino’s surveillance department showing Hickman bend 
down near Cain and pick something up, walk to the bathroom, and exit the casino.  Cain testified 
that in his wallet he had between six to nine hundred dollars in denominations of hundreds, 
twenties, fives, and ones when he started playing the machine.  David Johnson of the Bingham 
County Sheriff’s Office testified that Hickman’s wallet contained hundred dollar bills, twenty 
dollar bills, five dollar bills, and one dollar bills.  Ethan Tendore, the Casino’s security 
supervisor, testified as to the following conversation between himself and Hickman: 
Q:  
Mr. Tendore, you took him – did you ask him any questions after you got 
him away from his machine other than would he come with you?  
A:  
Yeah.  I asked him if he’d been in the casino earlier.  He said, “Yes.” 
 
I might have – but I’m not sure.  I showed him a picture and asked him if 
it was him.  And he said, “Yeah, that was me.  I was in here earlier.”  But he was 
wearing different clothes. 
 
And then I asked him if he’d found anything on the – in the casino, if he 
picked anything off the floor.  And he said, “Yeah.  I dropped my wallet, and I 
picked it up.”  And then – 
 
. . . 
Q:  
Okay. Prior to him making the comment about the wallet, had anybody 
said anything about a wallet being on the floor? 
 
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A:  
No. 
 
Though this evidence does require the jury to make inferences, it is sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable mind to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hickman took Cain’s wallet. 
 
 
2. Financial transaction cards 
A person is guilty of grand theft when the property consists of a “financial transaction 
card or financial transaction card account number as those terms are defined in section 18-3122, 
Idaho Code . . . .”  I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3).  A financial transaction card is a credit card or debit 
card “issued by the issuer for the use of the card holder in obtaining money, goods, services, or 
anything else of value on credit . . . .”  I.C. § 18-3122(6).  A card holder is “any person or 
organization named on the face of a financial transaction card to whom, or for whose benefit, a 
financial transaction card is issued by an issuer.”  I.C. § 18-3122(3).  An issuer is “a business 
organization or financial institution or its duly authorized agent which issues a financial 
transaction card.”  I.C. § 18-3122(8). 
 
Hickman points out there are distinct definitions for an “expired financial transaction 
card,” a “revoked financial transaction card,” and simply a “financial transaction card,” I.C. § 
18-3122(5), (6), and (11); consequently, when the legislature made theft of a “financial 
transaction card” a felony without reference to the other two defined terms, the legislature 
intended the felony only include valid financial transaction cards.   
Statutory construction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.  
State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 656, 665 (2004).  This Court “interprets statutes 
according to the plain, express meaning of the provision in question, and will resort to judicial 
construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with 
other laws.”  Id.  A construction that leads to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result is 
disfavored.  Id. at 690, 85 P.3d at 666.  The goal “is to give effect to the purpose of the statute 
and the legislative intent in enacting it, which may be implied from the language used or inferred 
on grounds of policy or reasonableness.”  The Senator, Inc., v. Ada County, Bd. of Equalization, 
138 Idaho 566, 570, 67 P.3d 45, 49 (2003). 
 
In the grand theft statute the legislature chose to use the defined term “financial 
transaction card” instead of “expired financial transaction card” or “revoked financial transaction 
card.”  See I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3).  An “expired financial transaction card” and a “revoked 
financial transaction card” are distinct from a “financial transaction card” in that they are no 
 
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longer valid.  I.C. § 18-3122(5), (6), and (11).  Thus, it is reasonable to infer from the language 
used in the statutes and on grounds of reasonableness that a “financial transaction card” is a valid 
card and that the legislature intended grand theft of a “financial transaction card” involve only 
valid cards and not revoked or expired financial transaction cards.  Therefore, the financial 
transaction card must have been valid at the time it was taken.  See I.C. § 18-2403(1); I.C. § 18-
2407(1)(b)(3).  
 
The only evidence as to the financial transaction cards came from Cain’s testimony: 
Q:  
Okay.  Did you have any other items in your wallet? 
A:  
Yes, I did.  I had a credit card.  It had a – I had $15,000 on it. 
Q:  
Do, do you remember what – 
A:  
Visa. 
Q:  
Okay. 
A:  
I had three concealed weapons for different states.  I had my badge that I 
use in my job and, and miscellaneous other things. 
Q:  
Okay.  Other than the Visa card, did you have any other type of like a 
credit card or debit card? 
A:  
I had – well, actually I have another debit card, a Visa debit card, in there 
for one of my other accounts.  That had a 30,000-dollar limit. 
Q:  
Okay. Any identification in your wallet indentifying it as you? 
A:  
Yes, a driver’s license. 
Additionally, on cross-examination, Cain testified that no one tried to use his credit card or debit 
card and that immediately after noticing the missing wallet he used his cellular phone to cancel 
his cards.     
Hickman argues the State’s evidence was insufficient to show that Cain’s credit card and 
debit card were valid, that Cain was the “card holder” on the card, that the cards were issued by 
an “issuer,” or that the cards were for the use of the card holder in obtaining money, goods, or 
services.  The State contends though the evidence requires inferences be made, it is sufficient to 
support the jury verdict—that credit cards and debit cards are used by the card holder to obtain 
money, goods, or services is common knowledge, and Cain’s testimony that the cards were in his 
wallet and that when he discovered his wallet was missing he called to cancel his cards leads to a 
 
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reasonable conclusion that he was the card holder, the cards were issued by an issuer, and that 
the cards were valid at the time they were taken.2 
We conclude this evidence is such that a reasonable mind could conclude Hickman’s 
guilt as to obtaining, taking, or withholding a “financial transaction card” as defined by statute 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.    Therefore, we affirm the jury verdict and the denial of 
Hickman’s motion for a directed verdict. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the erroneous jury instructions resulted in harmless error, that there was no 
impermissible variance between the charging document and the jury instructions, and that the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain the grand theft conviction.  We affirm Hickman’s conviction and 
sentence. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR. 
   
J. JONES, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the Court’s opinion except for Part II.B.2, which concludes that the defect 
in Jury Instruction No. 14 was harmless, and Part II.D.2, which holds that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a conviction for theft of a financial transaction card.  I would vacate the 
conviction on the ground there was not sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Hickman was guilty of theft of a financial transaction card.  I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3).   
 
For a relatively short trial, this case seems to have accumulated more than its share of 
defects.  Each of the participants below contributed their part.  While I agree with the Court that 
some of the defects can be overlooked, I can’t conclude that the record supports Hickman’s 
conviction.  The Judgment shows that Hickman was convicted of subsection (1) of I.C. § 18-
2407(1)(b), rather than subsection (3), and I would concur in treating this as a clerical error, 
provided that the record would support a conviction for violation of subsection (3).  I concur that 
the defect in Jury Instruction No. 14 – failing to say that the property taken was a financial 
transaction card – constituted fundamental error and would be inclined to agree that the error was 
harmless, had the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that valid financial transaction 
cards were contained in Cain’s wallet.  The variance between the Amended Information and the 
                                                 
2 In this case the evidence is sufficient to show Cain is the actual card holder.  However, we note that it is not 
necessary Cain be the actual card holder; the evidence would be sufficient if it showed Cain had a right to 
possession of the financial transaction cards superior to that of Hickman.  See I.C. § 18-2402(6). 
 
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jury instructions did not rise to the level of reversible error. And, while the evidence that 
Hickman took Cain’s wallet is rather thin – the less-than-perfect video did not show what the 
item was that Hickman picked up from the floor but Hickman did tell the casino’s security 
supervisor it was a wallet (his wallet) – there may have been just enough to allow the jury to 
conclude that it was Cain’s wallet.   
 
The troublesome part is the scanty evidence in the record that the wallet contained valid 
financial transaction cards.  I have a hard time concluding that the evidence established this 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the Court notes, the only evidence as to the financial 
transaction cards came in the form of Cain’s few lines of testimony on the matter.  With regard 
to items he had in his wallet, other than cash, Cain testified that he had a credit card.  He stated, 
“I had $15,000 on it.”  (emphasis added).  Since there was no further testimony regarding the 
credit card, we don’t know whether it had been activated and, if so, whether it had a $15,000 
limit, whether $15,000 worth of charges were on it (which may be the better interpretation since 
he had $15,000 on it), whether the card was in good standing, whether the card, if valid, was 
maxed out, or whatever.  The Court is correct in concluding that a financial transaction card must 
be valid in order to fit within the purview of I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3) but we are left with less than 
compelling evidence regarding the validity of this card. 
 
With respect to the debit card, there was no testimony clearly placing it in the wallet.  
The prosecutor inquired, “Other than the Visa card, did you have any other type of like a credit 
card or debit card?”  The question did not end with the phrase “in your wallet.”  The answer was, 
“I had – well, actually I have another debit card, a Visa debit card, in there for one of my other 
accounts.”  (emphasis added).  Had Mr. Cain not changed “I had” to “I have” another card, it 
might have been reasonable to infer that the debit card was in the wallet at the time he lost it.  It 
is interesting that the “had” was changed to “have”, which might indicate that he still had it at the 
time of trial and it wasn’t in the wallet at the time the wallet went missing.  Mr. Cain did not 
explain where “in there” was.  Again, there was no inquiry regarding the present validity of the 
card or anything else about it.  If we are going to impose a ten-year sentence (one year fixed) on 
an individual for depriving another of financial transaction cards, it seems the proof should go 
somewhat deeper.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
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I.C. § 18-3122(6) defines a financial transaction card as: 
[A]ny instrument or device known as a credit card, credit plate, bank services 
card, banking card, check guarantee card, debit card, telephone credit card or by 
any other name issued by the issuer for the use of the card holder in obtaining 
money, goods, services, or anything else of value on credit, or in certifying or 
guaranteeing to a person or business the availability to the card holder of the 
funds on deposit that are equal to or greater than the amount necessary to honor a 
draft or check payable to the order of such a person or business; or any instrument 
or device used in providing the card holder access to a demand deposit account or 
a time deposit account for the purpose of making deposits of money or checks 
therein, or withdrawing funds in the form of money, money orders, or traveler’s 
checks or other representative of value therefrom or transferring funds from any 
demand account or time deposit account to any credit card account in full or 
partial satisfaction of any outstanding balance existing therein.  
 
While it is not necessary for the prosecution to show every particular detail outlined in the 
definition, it would be handy to at least know the names of the card holder and issuer, whether 
the card had been activated, and the fact that credit or funds are available to the card holder at the 
time of its loss (i.e. that the card is not expired, revoked or maxed out).  Unfortunately, that 
information is not in the record with regard to the cards at issue here.   
On cross examination, Cain stated that he called and canceled his Visa cards when he 
found they were missing.  This might tend to show that they were valid, although it does not 
place the debit card in his wallet.  On the other hand, it might also show that he was acting 
prudently, regardless of the validity of the cards.  With the present day concern regarding 
identity theft, it would make sense for a person to call in to report the loss of a financial 
transaction card even if it is expired or revoked.  After all, either can be used to commit criminal 
offenses (I.C. §§  18-3124 and 18-3125) or to endanger a person’s credit.  
With the skimpy evidence about the financial transaction cards, compounded by the 
omission from Jury Instruction No. 14 that the property taken consisted of financial transaction 
cards, I would vacate the conviction.