Title: W&W Partnership v. Prince William County Board of Zoning Appeals

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
 
W&W PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 090328 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
          
 
  February 25, 2010 
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY BOARD 
OF ZONING APPEALS, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a voluntary conveyance 
of land to the Commonwealth for a road that physically divided 
the landowners’ remaining property resulted in a legal 
subdivision of that remaining property. 
Background 
In 1940, Bryon D. and Georgette I. Woodside (the 
Woodsides) conveyed 1.44 acres of an approximately 48-acre 
tract of land located in Prince William County to the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.  The 1.44 acres of land was used to 
extend a public road, Route 234, which then bisected the 
remainder of the Woodsides’ tract of land, leaving 
approximately 40 acres to the south of Route 234 and 5.17 acres 
to the north. 
The deed conveying the land to the Commonwealth only 
contains a metes and bounds description of the strip of land 
conveyed to the Commonwealth.  The deed does not contain a 
metes and bounds description of the property retained by the 
Woodsides, and no plat showing the Woodsides’ remaining 
property was entered into the land records.  The Woodsides’ 
remaining property continued to be taxed as one parcel. 
The Woodsides owned the remaining property until 2000, 
when it was conveyed by legal description to the First Baptist 
Church of Gainesville.  The property was conveyed to W&W 
Partnership in 2005.  Thereafter, W&W Partnership subdivided 
and conveyed a portion of the 40 acres to the south of Route 
234, leaving W&W Partnership with 15.3 acres of property 
consisting of 10.13 acres to the south of Route 234 and 5.17 
acres to the north. 
W&W Partnership sought a separate address and Grid Parcel 
Identification Number (GPIN)1 from the Prince William County 
Zoning Administrator (Zoning Administrator) for the 5.17 acres 
of land north of Route 234, claiming that the 5.17 acres of 
land were a separate, legally nonconforming lot created in 1940 
by the Woodsides’ sale of the 1.44 acres to the Commonwealth.  
The Zoning Administrator ruled that the Woodsides’ parcel was 
not legally subdivided by the conveyance in 1940, but rather 
the property the Woodsides retained after the 1940 conveyance  
                     
1 A GPIN is a unique 10-digit number that is used to 
identify a specific parcel of land for tax, permitting and 
other similar purposes. 
 
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to the Commonwealth continued as one parcel with two 
noncontiguous portions.  Thus, ruled the Zoning Administrator, 
the designated 5.17-acre portion of W&W Partnership’s 15.3-acre 
parcel could not receive a separate address and GPIN because 
the new 5.17-acre lot, created through subdivision of the 15.3-
acre parcel, would not meet Prince William County’s A-1 zoning 
district requirement, enacted in 1982, that all lots be at 
least 10 acres. 
W&W Partnership appealed to the Prince William County 
Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which affirmed the decision of 
the Zoning Administrator.  W&W Partnership appealed to the 
circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed the BZA decision.  
W&W Partnership appeals the judgment of the circuit court. 
Analysis 
 
W&W Partnership claims that the circuit court erred in 
failing to find that the conveyance in 1940 by the Woodsides 
was an action by the owners that legally subdivided the 5.17 
acres north of Route 234 from the rest of the Woodsides’ 
parcel.  W&W Partnership claims that the 5.17 acres of land 
north of Route 234 was a separate conforming A-1 zoning 
district lot in 1958, when Prince William County adopted its 
first zoning ordinance.  Thus, it claims that in 1982 when the 
Prince William County zoning ordinances were amended to require 
lots in A-1 zoning districts to contain at least 10 acres, the 
 
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5.17-acre parcel of land became a legal nonconforming lot.  W&W 
Partnership argues that the 5.17 acres of land located north of 
Route 234 is therefore entitled to a separate GPIN and address. 
Responding, the BZA and Zoning Administrator contend that 
the 5.17 acres of land north of Route 234 was not legally 
separated from the parent tract in 1940 and presently is part 
of a 15.3-acre parcel owned by W&W Partnership.  They contend 
that the 15.3-acre parcel is located within an A-1 zoning 
district, which, as of 1982, requires all new lots to contain 
at least 10 acres.  Thus, the court did not err in affirming 
the BZA’s decision denying W&W Partnership’s request for a 
separate GPIN and address for the 5.17-acre portion of the 
parcel. 
On appeal from the BZA to the circuit court, “the findings 
and conclusions of the board of zoning appeals on questions of 
fact shall be presumed to be correct.”  Code § 15.2-2314.  The 
circuit court considers questions of law de novo.  Id.  
Likewise, this Court accords a presumption of correctness to 
the circuit court’s factual findings but reviews its 
conclusions of law de novo.  Hale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 
277 Va. 250, 268, 673 S.E.2d 170, 179 (2009); Lovelace v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals, 276 Va. 155, 158, 661 S.E.2d 831, 832 
(2008). 
We must resolve the issue of whether the 5.17 acres of 
 
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land was legally subdivided from the parent tract prior to 
1982, so as to qualify the 5.17 acres as a separate 
nonconforming lot.  All parties agree that this Court’s 
decision in Chesterfield County v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697, 554 
S.E.2d 49 (2001), is controlling in this instance. 
This Court stated in Stigall that the creation of a new 
lot “is a legal separation of property because it results from 
action by the owner and involves, at a minimum, a change in the 
legal description of the property, either by metes and bounds 
or by plat, which is duly recorded in the appropriate land 
records.”  Id. at 705, 554 S.E.2d at 54.  In Stigall, the 
landowner’s parcel of property was physically divided when the 
Commonwealth acquired, by eminent domain, a portion of the 
parcel for the construction of a freeway.  Id. at 700, 554 
S.E.2d at 51.  The freeway bisected the remaining parcel into 
two unequal sections, but the property continued to be taxed as 
one parcel and the owner did not record a subdivision in the 
county’s land records.  Id. at 700-01, 554 S.E.2d at 51.  We 
concluded that a legal separation of the landowner’s remaining 
parcel had not been effected by the physical separation caused 
by the freeway because the Commonwealth acquired the property 
by eminent domain, not through an action by the owner, and the 
owner had not duly recorded a change in the legal description 
of the remaining property.  Id. at 705, 554 S.E.2d at 54. 
 
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While conceding that Stigall is controlling authority, W&W 
Partnership argues that its correct application yields the 
opposite result to that reached by the circuit court.  W&W 
Partnership argues that Stigall found that a physical division 
of land, caused by an action of the state (condemnation), did 
not effect a “legal separation” or subdivision of property.  
W&W Partnership contends, however, that some “action by the 
owner,” such as a conveyance, is sufficient to effect legal 
separation of property, and the 1940 conveyance was an “action 
by the owner” sufficient to legally separate the 5.17 acres 
from the parent tract. 
W&W Partnership claims a distinction between a 
condemnation, which it claims effects a mere physical 
separation of property, and a voluntary conveyance by an owner, 
which it argues results in a legal separation of the remaining 
property.  W&W Partnership further argues that the 1940 
Woodsides deed memorialized a bona fide sale of 1.4 acres to 
the Commonwealth with a metes and bounds description and that a 
“change in the legal description of the property” resulted when 
the Woodsides’ 1940 deed of conveyance was recorded.  Thus, W&W 
Partnership argues that the 5.17 acres was separated legally 
and physically by the 1940 conveyance.  We disagree. 
We recognize that when Bryon and Georgette Woodside 
conveyed the 1.44-acre parcel of land to the Commonwealth, the 
 
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conveyance physically bisected their remaining property, 
creating noncontiguous portions.  Moreover, in contrast to 
Stigall, in which the Commonwealth acquired the parcel by 
eminent domain, the Woodsides voluntarily conveyed the 1.44-
acre parcel to the Commonwealth.  This was indeed an action on 
the part of the landowners.  However, we hold that the mere act 
of conveying property to the Commonwealth did not legally 
separate the noncontiguous portions of the Woodsides’ remaining 
property.  Such legal separation of property must be shown by 
proof that the owner, at minimum, duly recorded a change in the 
legal description of the property either by metes and bounds or 
by plat.  Stigall, 262 Va. at 705, 554 S.E.2d at 54. 
Upon conveyance of the 1.44 acres to the Commonwealth in 
1940, the Woodsides did not record a changed legal description 
of their property.  The 1940 deed only provides a metes and 
bounds description of the 1.44-acre parcel conveyed to the 
Commonwealth.  The 1940 deed does not set forth a new legal 
description of the remaining noncontiguous lot, and the 
Woodsides did not file a plat in the land records showing any 
new boundaries.  Thus, the owners did not memorialize, by metes 
and bounds or by plat, any intended or desired legal separation 
of the noncontiguous portions.  Neither did the owners record 
in the appropriate land records anything indicating that the 
 
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property was no longer one unit.2  On the contrary, the 
Woodsides continued to treat the property as one parcel after 
the 1940 conveyance.  The tax records reflect that their 
property continued to be taxed as one parcel.  Therefore we 
hold that the 1940 conveyance to the Commonwealth did not 
legally separate the Woodsides’ remaining property, and that 
the 5.17 acres of land is not entitled to its own GPIN and 
address as a separate lot. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit 
court’s judgment. 
Affirmed. 
                     
2 With no plat or metes and bounds describing the 5.17-acre 
portion as a unit, it clearly was not a “lot” when Prince 
William County adopted its 1958 zoning ordinance, which 
required the property to be “shown on a plat of record or 
considered as a unit of property and described by metes and 
bounds” in order to be a separate lot.  Prince William County, 
Zoning Ordinance § 1-44 (1958). 
 
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