Title: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2024 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2007 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., Barron County  
Developmental Services, Inc., Diversified 
Services, Inc.,  
Black River Industries, Inc. and Headwaters, 
Inc., 
          Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778 
 (2023 – published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 14, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas  
 
JUDGE: 
Kelly J. Thimm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined with respect to ¶¶110-61 and 163-98. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioners-respondents-petitioners, there were 
briefs filed by Kyle H. Torvinen, and Torvinen, Jones & 
Saunders, S.C., Superior; Eric C. Rassbach (pro hac vice), 
 
 
2 
Nicholas R. Reaves (pro hac vice), Daniel M. Vitagliano (pro hac 
vice), and The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, 
D.C. There was an oral argument by Eric Rassbach.  
 
For the respondent-appellant and respondent-co-appellant, 
there was a brief filed by Christine L. Galinat, and Department 
of Workforce Development, Madison; Jeffrey J. Shampo, and Labor 
and Industry Review Commission, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Jeffrey J. Shampo.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr, and 
Hughes & Suhr LLC, Chicago, IL; Caleb R. Gerbitz, James M. 
Sosnoski, and Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols SC, Milwaukee, 
on behalf of Maranatha Baptist University, Maranatha Baptist 
Academy, Concordia University Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Family 
Counsel, and the Wisconsin Association of Christian Schools. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert S. Driscoll, and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren SC, Milwaukee; Stephen M. Judge (pro 
hac vice), Tiernan Kane (pro hac vice), and South Bank Legal, 
South Bend, IN, on behalf of Catholic Conferences of Illinois, 
Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gene C. Schaerr (pro 
hac vice), James C. Phillips (pro hac vice), and Schaerr Jaffee 
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Matthew M. Fernholz, and Cramer, Multhauf 
& Hammes, LLP, Waukesha, on behalf of Minnesota-Wisconsin 
Baptist Convention, Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, National 
Association of Evangelicals, American Islamic Congress, The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, General Council on 
Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church, The 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, and Islam and Religious 
Freedom Action Team. 
 
 
 
3 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy Feldhausen, 
Tiffany Woelfel, and Amundsen Davis LLC, Green Bay; Sarah M. 
Harris (pro hac vice), Mark S. Storslee (pro hac vice), Rohit P. 
Asirvatham (pro hac vice), and Williams & Connolly LLP, 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of Professors Douglas Laycock & 
Thomas C. Berg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Levi W. Swank, Benjamin 
Hayes, and Goodwin Procter LLP, D.C.; Dina Ljekperic, and 
Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY; David W. Simon, Gregory N. 
Heinen, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness and The Sikh 
Coalition. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jon P. Axelrod, J. 
Wesley Webendorfer, and DeWitt LLP, Madison; Howard Slugh (pro 
hac vice), and The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, 
Washington, D.C., on behalf of Jewish Coalition for Religious 
Liberty. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Samuel Troxell Grover, 
Patrick C. Elliott, Madison, on behalf of Freedom From Religion 
Foundation. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David Earleywine, and 
Wisconsin Catholic Conference, Madison; Bradley G. Hubbard (pro 
hac vice), Elizabeth A. Kiernan (pro hac vice), Zachary 
Faircloth (pro hac vice), Jason J. Muehlhoff (pro hac vice), and 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas, TX, on behalf of Wisconsin 
Catholic Conference. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jonathan Judge, and 
ArentFox Schiff LLP, Chicago, IL, on behalf of Catholic 
Charities USA. 
 
 
4 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ryan J. Walsh, John D. 
Tripoli, and Eimer Stahl LLP, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin 
State Legislature. 
 
 
2024 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP2007 
(L.C. No. 2019CV324) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., Barron County 
Developmental Services, Inc., Diversified 
Services, Inc., Black River Industries, Inc. 
and Headwaters, Inc., 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, 
 
          Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 14, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., joined with respect to ¶¶110-61 and 163-98. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Catholic 
Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) and four of its sub-entities, seek 
an exemption from having to pay unemployment tax to cover their 
employees.  They assert that they are exempt from coverage under 
Wisconsin's Unemployment Compensation Act because they are 
operated primarily for religious purposes.   
¶2 
Accordingly, CCB together with the four sub-entities 
(Barron 
County 
Developmental 
Services, 
Inc., 
Diversified 
Services, Inc., Black River Industries, Inc., and Headwaters, 
Inc.) seek review of a court of appeals decision reinstating a 
decision of the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) 
concluding that CCB and the four sub-entities were not "operated 
primarily for religious purposes" and thus not exempt from 
making contributions to the state unemployment insurance system.1  
The petitioners specifically contend that they are exempt from 
unemployment insurance contributions pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. (2019-20),2 which exempts from the definition 
of "employment" covered by the Act those "[i]n the employ of an 
organization operated primarily for religious purposes and 
                                                 
1 Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, 406 
Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778 (reversing the order of the circuit 
court for Douglas County, Kelly J. Thimm, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
3 
 
operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a 
church or convention or association of churches."3     
¶3 
They assert that they are "operated primarily for 
religious purposes" because the Diocese of Superior's motivation 
is primarily religious, i.e., their charitable works are carried 
out to operationalize Catholic principles.  The petitioners 
further argue that a contrary interpretation would run afoul of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and that 
as a result it also would violate Article I, Section 18 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.4  
¶4 
On the other hand, LIRC advances that it is the 
organization's actual activities, and not its motivations, that 
are paramount in the analysis.  Under this formulation, LIRC 
contends the petitioners do not fulfill the religious purposes 
                                                 
3 Both parties agree that the first half of the statute is 
not at issue, that is that CCB is "operated, supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention 
or association of churches." 
4 Although CCB and its sub-entities allege a violation of 
the Wisconsin constitution, they did not develop an argument 
apart 
from 
their 
assertions 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.   They assert in a footnote that if the statute 
violates the First Amendment, then it must also violate the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  It is true that "[t]he Wisconsin 
Constitution, with its specific and expansive language, provides 
much broader protections for religious liberty than the First 
Amendment."  Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶66, 320 
Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868 (citing State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 
56, 64, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996)).  However, any argument that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. 
violates 
the 
state 
constitution 
specifically is undeveloped.  We generally do not address 
undeveloped arguments, and we will not do so here.  Sw. Airlines 
Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶32 n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 
N.W.2d 384. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
4 
 
exemption because their activities are secular.  Such an 
analysis, in LIRC's view, does not violate the First Amendment 
or Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶5 
We determine that in our inquiry into whether an 
organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., we must 
examine 
both 
the 
motivations 
and 
the 
activities 
of 
the 
organization.  Applying this analysis to the facts before us, we 
conclude that the petitioners are not operated primarily for 
religious purposes within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.  We 
further conclude that the application of § 108.02(15)(h)2. as 
applied to the petitioners does not violate the First Amendment 
because the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the 
statute as applied to them is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I  
¶7 
Each Roman Catholic diocese in Wisconsin has a social 
ministry arm, referred to as Catholic Charities.  As a whole, 
Catholic Charities' mission "is to provide service to people in 
need, to advocate for justice in social structures and to call 
the entire church and other people of good will to do the same." 
¶8 
The Catholic Charities entity at issue in this case is 
that of the Diocese of Superior, which we refer to as CCB.  Its 
statement of philosophy indicates that it has "since 1917 been 
providing 
services 
to 
the 
poor 
and 
disadvantaged 
as 
an 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
5 
 
expression of the social ministry of the Catholic Church in the 
Diocese of Superior" and that its "purpose . . . is to be an 
effective sign of the charity of Christ."  In its provision of 
services, CCB assures that "no distinctions are made by race, 
sex, or religion in reference to clients served, staff employed 
and board members appointed."  CCB aims to provide services that 
are "significant in quantity and quality" and not duplicative of 
services provided by other agencies. 
¶9 
Occupying the top position in CCB's organizational 
chart is the bishop of the Diocese of Superior, who exercises 
control over CCB and its sub-entities.  The bishop serves as 
CCB's president and appoints its membership, whose function is 
to "provide[] essential oversight to ensure the fulfillment of 
the mission of Catholic Charities Bureau in compliance with the 
Principles of Catholic social teaching."  CCB's code of ethics, 
which is "displayed prominently in the program office of all 
affiliate agencies," likewise sets forth the expectation that 
"Catholic Charities will in its activities and actions reflect 
gospel values and will be consistent with its mission and the 
mission of the Diocese of Superior."   
¶10 Under 
the 
umbrella 
of 
CCB, 
there 
are 
numerous 
separately 
incorporated 
sub-entities. 
 
These 
sub-entities 
operate "63 programs of service . . . to those facing the 
challenges of aging, the distress of a disability, the concerns 
of children with special needs, the stresses of families living 
in poverty and those in need of disaster relief." 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
6 
 
¶11 Four sub-entities are involved in this case.  The 
first is Barron County Developmental Services, Inc. (BCDS).  
BCDS contracts with the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation 
to provide job placement, job coaching, and an "array of 
services to assist individuals with disabilities [to] get 
employment in the community."  Prior to December of 2014, BCDS 
was not affiliated with the Diocese of Superior, and in fact had 
no religious affiliation at all.  At that time, BCDS reached out 
and requested to become an affiliate agency of the Diocese.  It 
receives no funding from the Diocese. 
¶12 The 
second 
sub-entity 
at 
issue 
is 
Black 
River 
Industries, Inc. (BRI).  It provides services to people with 
developmental or mental health disabilities, as well as those 
with a limited income.  These services include home-based, 
community-based, and facility-based job training and daily 
living services.  Among BRI's offerings are a food services 
program, a document shredding program, and a mailing services 
program.  BRI's funding comes largely from county and state 
government.  It does not receive funding directly from the 
Diocese. 
¶13 Diversified Services, Inc. (DSI) is the third sub-
entity 
implicated 
in 
this 
appeal. 
 
It 
provides 
work 
opportunities to individuals with developmental disabilities.  
Additionally, DSI hires individuals without disabilities for 
production work.  It is not funded by the Diocese, instead 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
7 
 
receiving its funding from Family Care, a Medicaid long-term 
care program,5 and private contracts. 
¶14 Finally, the fourth sub-entity involved is Headwaters, 
Inc., which provides "various support services for individuals 
with disabilities," "training services related to activities of 
daily 
living," "employment 
related 
training 
services" 
and 
additional employment-related support.  It also provides Head 
Start home visitation services, and at one time offered birth-
to-three services before a different entity took over that 
aspect of its operations.  Like the other sub-entities, 
Headwaters is funded primarily through government contracts and 
does not receive funding from the Diocese. 
¶15 These four sub-entities are overseen by CCB, which, 
among 
other 
things, 
provides 
management 
services 
and 
consultation; establishes and coordinates the missions of the 
sub-entities; and approves all capital expenditures, certain 
sales of real property, and investment policies of the sub-
entities. 
 
In 
turn, 
the 
sub-entities 
themselves 
set 
organizational goals and make plans to accomplish those goals, 
employ staff, set program policies, enter into contracts, raise 
funds, and assure regulatory compliance.   
¶16 Additionally, CCB's executive director supervises the 
operations of each of the sub-entities.  However, neither those 
employed by nor those receiving services from CCB or the sub-
entities are required to be of any particular religious faith.  
                                                 
5 See Wis. Admin. Code ch. DHS 10. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
8 
 
Individuals participating in the programs do not receive any 
religious training or orientation, and CCB and the sub-entities 
do not try to "inculcate the Catholic faith with program 
participants."  
¶17 In 1972, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations made a determination that CCB was subject to the 
unemployment compensation law after CCB submitted a form that 
self-reported the nature of its operations as "charitable," 
"educational," and "rehabilitative," not "religious."6  CCB has 
been making unemployment contributions since that time. 
¶18 In 2015, the Douglas County Circuit Court determined 
that a sub-entity of CCB not involved in the present case was 
"operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus exempt from 
contributing to the state unemployment system.7  The following 
year, CCB and the sub-entities sought a similar determination 
that they qualified for the exemption, bringing their claim 
first to the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). 
¶19 DWD denied the petitioners' request to withdraw from 
the state system.  It stated:  "It has been determined these 
organizations are supervised and controlled by the Roman 
Catholic Church, but it has not been established they are 
                                                 
6 CCB and the sub-entities are exempt from federal income 
tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which provides exemption 
to, among other entities, those "operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes." 
7 Challenge Ctr., Inc. v. LIRC, Douglas County Case No. 
2014CV384 (George L. Glonek, Judge). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
9 
 
operated primarily for religious purposes."  CCB and the sub-
entities appealed DWD's determination, and an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) reversed.  Consequently, DWD petitioned LIRC for 
review, and LIRC reversed the ALJ, concluding consistent with 
the original DWD decision that the petitioners are not operated 
primarily for religious purposes.  It observed that "while 
services may be religiously motivated and manifestations of 
religious 
belief, 
a 
separate 
legal 
entity 
that 
provides 
essentially secular services and engages in activities that are 
not religious per se . . . falls outside the scope of Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.," regardless of any affiliation the entity may 
have with a religious organization. 
¶20 Subsequently, CCB and the sub-entities sought judicial 
review in the circuit court and the pendulum swung again, as the 
circuit court reversed LIRC's decision.  DWD and LIRC appealed, 
and the court of appeals reversed, reinstating LIRC's decision 
that CCB and the sub-entities did not establish a religious 
purpose.8  Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, 
406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778.  The court of appeals concluded 
that "for an employee's services to be exempt from unemployment 
tax the organization must not only have a religious motivation, 
but 
the 
services 
provided——its 
activities——must 
also 
be 
primarily religious in nature."  Id., ¶33.  Such an analysis, in 
                                                 
8 The court of appeals initially certified the appeal to 
this court, but we denied the certification.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61; Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, No. 
2020AP2007, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 
2021). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
10 
 
the court of appeals' view, does not violate either the federal 
or 
state 
constitution 
because 
"focusing 
on 
the 
stated 
motivations 
and 
the 
organization's 
activities 
allows 
the 
reviewing body to conduct an objective, neutral review that is 
'highly fact-sensitive' without examining religious doctrine or 
tenets."  Id., ¶54.   
¶21 Applying this understanding, the court of appeals 
determined that "CCB and its sub-entities failed to meet their 
burden to establish that they are exempt from Wisconsin's 
unemployment insurance program and that LIRC properly determined 
that each of the employers was 'operated primarily to administer 
[or provide] social service programs' that are not 'primarily 
for religious purposes.'"  Id., ¶55.  CCB and the sub-entities 
petitioned for this court's review. 
II 
¶22 In an appeal from a LIRC determination, we review 
LIRC's decision rather than that of the circuit court.  Masri v. 
LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 405, 850 N.W.2d 298.  Our 
review is limited by statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 108.09(7)(c)6.  
We may either confirm the commission's order or set it aside on 
one of three grounds:  (1) if the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; (2) if the order was procured by fraud; or 
(3) if the commission's findings of fact do not support the 
order.  Id.  LIRC acts outside of its power when it incorrectly 
interprets a statute.  DWD v. LIRC, 2018 WI 77, ¶12, 382 
Wis. 2d 611, 914 N.W.2d 625. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
11 
 
¶23 We will uphold LIRC's findings of fact as long as 
there is substantial and credible evidence to support them.  
Friendly Vill. Nursing and Rehab, LLC v. DWD, 2022 WI 4, ¶13, 
400 Wis. 2d 277, 969 N.W.2d 245.  We review LIRC's legal 
conclusions, i.e., questions of law, independently of the 
decisions rendered by the circuit court, the court of appeals, 
and the commission.  Id.; Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 
75, ¶84, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21. 
¶24 In our review, we are called upon to interpret 
Wisconsin 
statutes. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations of the circuit court, the court of appeals, and 
the commission.  Greenwald Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Village of 
Mukwonago, 2023 WI 53, ¶14, 408 Wis. 2d 143, 991 N.W.2d 356; 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶84. 
¶25 Additionally, our review is informed by constitutional 
principles.  The application of constitutional principles 
likewise presents a question of law.  St. Augustine Sch. v. 
Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶24, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635.  
III 
¶26 We 
begin 
with 
a 
short 
summary 
of 
Wisconsin's 
unemployment insurance scheme and then address the competing 
interpretations of "operated primarily for religious purposes" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  In examining 
this question, we address first whether we must look to the 
purpose of the church in operating the organization or the 
purpose of the nonprofit organization itself in our analysis.  
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
12 
 
We address second whether the organization's motivations, 
activities, or both, drive the analysis of whether a purpose is 
"religious" within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Next, we 
apply our interpretation of the statute to the facts before us.  
Finally, we examine the petitioners' assertion that such 
interpretation violates the First Amendment. 
A 
¶27   The 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
passed 
the 
first 
unemployment compensation law in the nation in 1932.9  Then, as 
now, the law evinces a strong public policy in favor of 
compensating the unemployed.  Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶31, 
375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426.   
¶28 At a macro level, "[t]he system generally provides for 
collecting limited funds from a large number of employers, 
particularly during periods of stable employment, then paying 
out benefits during periods of high unemployment from the funds 
that have been accumulated."  Maynard G. Sautter, Employment in 
Wisconsin § 12-1 (Matthew Bender 2023).  The statutes were 
enacted "to avoid the risk or hazards that will befall those 
who, because of employment, are dependent upon others for their 
livelihood."  Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 69, 
330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).  "Consistent with this policy, Wis. Stat. 
ch. 
108 
is 
'liberally 
construed 
to 
effect 
unemployment 
                                                 
9 See Daniel Nelson, The Origins of Unemployment Insurance 
in Wisconsin, 51 Wis. Mag. Hist. 109, 109 (1967); Operton v. 
LIRC, 
2017 
WI 
46, 
¶57, 
375 
Wis. 2d 1, 
894 
N.W.2d 426 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
13 
 
compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent 
upon others in respect to their wage-earning status.'"  Operton, 
375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32 (quoting Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 62). 
¶29 The legislature has recognized the social cost of 
unemployment and the need to share the burden presented by 
unemployment.  See Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1).  "In good times and 
in bad times unemployment is a heavy social cost, directly 
affecting many thousands of wage earners.  Each employing unit 
in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this social cost, 
connected with its own irregular operations, by financing 
benefits for its own unemployed workers."  Id. 
¶30 "Generally, any service for pay for a public, private, 
or nonprofit employer is employment [covered by ch. 108], but 
the service must be provided in Wisconsin or be provided for an 
employer with operations in Wisconsin."  Peter L. Albrecht et 
al., Wisconsin Employment Law § 12.3 (8th ed. 2023).  However, 
some services are statutorily exempt from the "employment" 
services addressed by the unemployment compensation law.  E.g., 
Wis. Cheese Serv., Inc. v. DILHR, 108 Wis. 2d 482, 486, 322 
N.W.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1982) (examining whether an individual is 
exempt 
from 
the 
unemployment 
system 
as 
an 
independent 
contractor); see Sautter, Employment in Wisconsin § 12-3.  It is 
one of those exemptions, which we will refer to as the 
"religious purposes" exemption, that is at issue in the present 
case. 
¶31  The religious purposes exemption is set forth as part 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h), which provides in full: 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
14 
 
"Employment" as applied to work for a nonprofit 
organization, except as such organization duly elects 
otherwise with the department's approval, does not 
include service: 
1. In the employ of a church or convention or 
association of churches; 
2. In the employ of an organization operated primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes 
and 
operated, 
supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches; or 
3. By a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed 
minister of a church in the exercise of his or her 
ministry or by a member of a religious order in the 
exercise of duties required by such order. 
¶32 Specifically, CCB and the sub-entities seek exemption 
pursuant to subd. 2, which contains two conditions that both 
must be fulfilled in order for the exemption to apply.  First, 
the subject organization must be "operated primarily for 
religious 
purposes." 
 
Second, 
the 
organization 
must 
be 
"operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a 
church or convention or association of churches."  It is 
undisputed that the second condition is satisfied, as CCB and 
the sub-entities are without question "operated, supervised, 
controlled, 
or 
principally 
supported" 
by 
the 
Diocese 
of 
Superior.  Our inquiry thus focuses on the first condition only:  
"operated primarily for religious purposes." 
¶33 In addressing the issue presented, we must answer the 
threshold question of whose purposes we must examine in our 
analysis——those of the Diocese or those of CCB and the sub-
entities.  To resolve this inquiry, we look first to the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Sw. Airlines Co. v. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
15 
 
DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶22, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384 (citing 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). 
¶34 Like the court of appeals, our review of the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. leads us to conclude 
that "the reviewing body is to consider the purpose of the 
nonprofit organization, not the church's purpose in operating 
the organization."  Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, 
¶24.  There are several textual cues in this language that guide 
us to our conclusion.  We look first to the sentence structure 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  This structure indicates that 
the religious purposes exemption applies to "service . . . [i]n 
the employ" of an "organization," as opposed to service in the 
employ of a church.  The way the sentence is structured, the 
phrase "operated primarily for religious purposes" modifies the 
word "organization," not the word "church." 
¶35 Such an understanding is confirmed by a look to the 
surrounding provisions.  See Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, 
¶15, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373.  The subdivision directly 
before 
the 
religious 
purposes 
exemption, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)1., exempts from the definition of "employment" 
for unemployment compensation purposes service "[i]n the employ 
of 
a 
church." 
 
The 
subdivision 
directly 
after, 
§ 108.02(15)(h)3., exempts service "[b]y a duly ordained, 
commissioned or licensed minister of a church."  Those employed 
by a church are thus addressed in subdivisions 1. and 3., 
indicating, as the court of appeals concluded, that "employees 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
16 
 
who fall under subd. 2. are to be focused on separately in the 
statutory scheme from employees of a church."  Cath. Charities 
Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶25.  
¶36 Thus, a focus on the church's purpose rather than the 
organization's purpose would render a significant portion of 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. surplusage.  See State v. Martin, 
162 Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) ("A statute should 
be construed so that no word or clause shall be rendered 
surplusage and every word if possible should be given effect.").  
To explain, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. contains two provisions 
that both must be fulfilled.  In order to be exempt, a nonprofit 
organization must be "operated primarily for religious purposes" 
and "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported 
by a church."  § 108.02(15)(h)2.   
¶37 If we looked to the church's purpose in operating the 
organization only, then any religiously affiliated organization 
would always be exempt.  A church's purpose is religious by 
nature, and this focus is reflected in all of its work, 
including any sub-entities it oversees.  If the tax-exempt 
status of a nonprofit organization operating under the umbrella 
of a church is predicated on the religious purposes of the 
church, an organization operated or controlled by a church 
always will automatically satisfy the first condition.  In other 
words, the second condition of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. 
would subsume the first.  This would cause the first requirement 
of the statute to be surplusage, a reading we cannot endorse.  
We 
therefore 
will 
examine 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
nonprofit 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
17 
 
organization, and not that of the church, in determining whether 
a nonprofit organization is "operated primarily for religious 
purposes." 
B 
¶38 Having determined that we look to the purpose of CCB 
and the sub-entities, and not that of the Catholic Church in 
operating CCB and the sub-entities, we turn next to another 
methodological disagreement between the parties.  CCB and the 
sub-entities contend that in our inquiry into whether an 
organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" we 
must look primarily to the organization's motivations, while 
LIRC advances that the organization's activities are paramount.10 
¶39 Specifically, CCB and the sub-entities argue that the 
court of appeals incorrectly limited the religious purposes 
exemption to church-controlled entities with both purposes and 
                                                 
10 Other jurisdictions have taken varying approaches to 
similar questions.  For example, some jurisdictions have 
considered the activities of an organization in determining 
religious purpose.  See, e.g., Samaritan Inst. v. Prince-Walker, 
883 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1994) (concluding that an organization does 
not "operate primarily for religious purposes" because the 
"services offered are essentially secular"); Cathedral Arts 
Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 95 So. 3d 970, 973 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining that although an 
organization's motivation may be religious, the organization's 
"primary purpose in operating . . . is to give art instruction 
to underprivileged children" and it is therefore not entitled to 
the exemption).  Conversely, other jurisdictions have granted a 
religious purpose exemption based on the motivations of the 
organization.  See, e.g., Dep't of Emp. v. Champion Bake-N-
Serve, Inc., 592 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Idaho 1979) (concluding that a 
bakery operated by Seventh Day Adventist church was operated 
primarily for religious purposes despite a commercial aspect). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
18 
 
activities that are religious.  They assert that the court of 
appeals' analysis fails to follow the statutory language because 
the statute refers only to a religious "purpose" and not 
religious "activities." 
¶40 LIRC responds that looking at only an organization's 
motivation would allow the organization to determine its own 
status without consideration of its actual function.  It 
advances that such an interpretation would run afoul of the 
maxim that tax exemptions are to be narrowly construed.  In 
LIRC's view, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the 
term "operated," which appears in the statute, "connotes an 
action 
or 
activity." 
 
See 
Cath. 
Charities 
Bureau, 
406 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶31. 
¶41 Again, we begin our analysis with the language of the 
statute, and in particular the language at the center of this 
case:  "operated primarily for religious purposes."  The court 
of appeals commenced its analysis by examining the key words 
"operated" and "purposes," and we do likewise.   
¶42 An oft-cited dictionary defines "operate" as "to work, 
perform, 
or 
function, 
as 
a 
machine 
does." 
 
Operate, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/operate (last visited Feb. 27, 
2024), see also Operate, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operate (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2024) (defining "operate" as "to perform a function").  
As the court of appeals concluded, this definition suggests an 
action being taken——in the context of the statute at issue 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
19 
 
meaning "what the nonprofit organization does and how it does 
it."  Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶31. 
¶43 This same dictionary defines "purpose" as "the reason 
for which something exists or is done, made, used, etc."  
Purpose, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/purpose (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2024).  The use of "reason" in this definition implies 
"motivation," or as the court of appeals put it, "why the 
organization acts."  Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, 
¶31.  
¶44 In examining the meaning of the statute, we must give 
reasonable effect to every word.  State v. Rector, 2023 WI 41, 
¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 321, 990 N.W.2d 213.  We read the statute as a 
whole.  Belding, 352 Wis. 2d 359, ¶15.  Accordingly, both 
"operated" and "purposes" must be given full effect.  In order 
to illustrate how to do this, we consider first the consequences 
if our analysis considered motivations only or activities only 
in determining whether an organization is operated primarily for 
religious purposes.   
¶45 Considering purposes, i.e., motivations, alone would 
give short shrift to the word "operated."  In this scenario, an 
organization could be exempt based purely on its stated reason 
for doing what it does, but its actual "operations" would not 
enter the calculus.  Conversely, if we were to consider 
activities only, then "purposes" would be rendered surplusage.  
A singular focus on the "operations" of the organization at the 
expense of the "purpose" would lead us to excise from the 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
20 
 
analysis the connection between the organization's activities 
and its religious mission that the statute requires. 
¶46 Reading the statute as a whole, the text and structure 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. indicate that both activities 
and motivations must be considered in a determination of whether 
an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes."  
Such an interpretation is consistent with the unemployment 
compensation law's legislatively-recognized purpose.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 108.01; Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 61 (explaining 
that 
in 
determining 
liability 
under 
the 
Unemployment 
Compensation Act, "the act itself should be put in perspective, 
and the underlying purpose of the act should be given paramount 
consideration").  The unemployment compensation law addresses an 
"urgent public problem" and does so by sharing "fairly" the 
economic burdens of unemployment.  Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1)-(2).   
¶47 In light of this, we have stated that the unemployment 
compensation law is "remedial in nature and should be liberally 
construed to effect unemployment compensation coverage for 
workers who are economically dependent upon others in respect to 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
21 
 
their wage-earning status."  Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 62.11  
As a corollary to this principle, it follows that if a statute 
is liberally construed, then exceptions must be narrowly 
construed.  McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶10, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 
731 N.W.2d 273. 
¶48 Correctly demonstrating a narrow construction of the 
exception, the court of appeals here concluded that looking at 
an organization's motivations in a vacuum "would cast too broad 
a net."  Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶37.  Sole 
reliance on self-professed motivation would essentially render 
an 
organization's 
mere 
assertion 
of 
a 
religious 
motive 
                                                 
11 Although the United States Supreme Court has in the past 
applied a similar principle of liberal construction of remedial 
statutes, see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968), recent 
cases suggest a potential step back from this approach.  See, 
e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 
1134, 1142 (2018).  Nevertheless, we follow (and do not 
overrule) 
the 
Wisconsin 
approach 
to 
our 
Unemployment 
Compensation Act and our precedent regarding the interpretation 
of remedial statutes under the Act.  See Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶32; Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 
N.W.2d 169 (1983); see generally Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 
2010 WI 75, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493; Stuart v. 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 22, ¶21, 308 
Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762 (explaining that "remedial statutes 
must be liberally construed to advance the remedy that the 
legislature intended to be afforded").  The statutory text 
confirms the original intent of the legislature to provide broad 
coverage for unemployed workers that is "shared . . . fairly" 
among employers.  See generally Wis. Stat. § 108.01.   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
22 
 
dispositive.12  See Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal 
Revenue, 950 F.2d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 1991) ("While we agree with 
Living Faith that an organization's good faith assertion of an 
exempt purpose is relevant to the analysis of tax-exempt status, 
we cannot accept the view that such an assertion be dispositive.  
Put simply, saying one's purpose is exclusively religious 
doesn't necessarily make it so.").   
¶49 Although the motivations of an organization certainly 
figure into the analysis, allowing self-definition to drive the 
exemption would open the exemption to a broad spectrum of 
organizations based entirely on a single assertion of a 
religious motivation.13  This would run counter to the direction 
that we construe the exemption narrowly.  Considering the 
                                                 
12 The stopping point of the argument presented by CCB and 
the sub-entities is unclear.  For example, at the administrative 
hearing in the present case, the Archbishop of Milwaukee 
testified that he is responsible for overseeing numerous grammar 
schools and high schools, 10 hospitals, and five colleges.  
Under the petitioners' argument, these entities' employees, 
numbering in the thousands, would seemingly lack coverage under 
the state unemployment system. 
13 The argument advanced by the petitioners did not garner 
anywhere close to a majority vote when addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court.  At oral argument, Justice Thomas's 
concurrences in both Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 196-98 
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. 
v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069-70 (2020) 
(Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.), were invoked to 
support 
the 
idea 
that 
courts 
must 
wholly 
defer 
to 
an 
organization's good-faith claims instead of examining the 
activities of the organization.  However, this position was not 
supported by the majority in either case. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
23 
 
organization's activities in addition to its motivations is in 
line with the directive that we follow a narrow construction. 
¶50 Our decision in Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC, 2009 
WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868, additionally buttresses 
our conclusion.  In that case, the court addressed an issue of 
whether 
a 
teacher's 
position 
in 
a 
religious 
school 
is 
"ministerial" such that the First Amendment bars suit under the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.14   
¶51 In examining this question, the court applied the two-
part "primary duties" test.  "The first step is an inquiry into 
whether the organization in both statement and practice has a 
fundamentally religious mission."  Id., ¶48.  Second, the court 
inquires "into how important or closely linked the employee's 
work is to the fundamental mission of that organization."  Id., 
¶49. 
¶52 Although the legal issue and context were different in 
Coulee, we agree with the court of appeals that it "provides 
guidance in understanding the religious purposes exemption 
                                                 
14 The "ministerial exception" recognizes "that the First 
Amendment protects houses of worship from state interference 
with the decision of who will teach and lead a congregation."  
Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶39.  Premised on the "idea 
that the 'introduction of government standards [in]to the 
selection 
of 
spiritual 
leaders 
would 
significantly, 
and 
perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and 
state,'" the exception "recognizes that 'perpetuation of a 
church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to 
preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its 
doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at 
large.'"  Id. (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
24 
 
here."  Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶43.  To 
explain, the first step of the primary duties test involves an 
inquiry into an organization's mission.  In analyzing such a 
question, the Coulee court examined both the "statement" and 
"practice" of the organization.  Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶48.  See also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. 
Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2067-69 (2020).  
In other words, it analyzed both the professions and actions of 
the organization to determine the organization's "mission."   
¶53 The "mission" inquiry in Coulee is analogous to the 
"purpose" analysis we conduct in the present case.  Indeed, 
mission and purpose are even listed as synonyms by a popular 
thesaurus.  Mission, 
https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/mission 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2024).  The concepts are thus related, 
and the Coulee court's analysis of two factors, professions and 
operations, in its "mission" inquiry supports our examination of 
similar dual considerations in the "purpose" question in the 
present case.  See also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 
at 2067-69. 
¶54 Further, the Seventh Circuit's decision in United 
States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), lends support 
to the assertion that the organization's activities have a role 
to play in determining the organization's "purpose."  In Dykema, 
which involved a determination of a pastor's tax liability, the 
Seventh Circuit observed that "religious purposes" is a "term of 
art in tax law" and that the IRS, in order to determine whether 
such 
a 
purpose 
is 
present, 
must 
examine 
whether 
an 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
25 
 
organization's "actual activities conform to the requirements 
which Congress has established as entitling them to tax exempt 
status."  Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).  
¶55 The Dykema court also emphasized that its inquiry into 
religious purpose is based on "objective criteria," which 
"enable the IRS to make the determination required by the 
statute without entering into any subjective inquiry with 
respect to religious truth which would be forbidden by the First 
Amendment."  Id. at 1100.  It further charted "[t]ypical 
activities of an organization operated for religious purposes" 
as including: 
(a) 
corporate 
worship 
services, 
including 
due 
administration 
of 
sacraments 
and 
observance 
of 
liturgical rituals, as well as a preaching ministry 
and 
evangelical 
outreach 
to 
the 
unchurched 
and 
missionary 
activity 
in 
partibus 
infidelium; 
(b) 
pastoral counseling and comfort to members facing 
grief, illness, adversity, or spiritual problems; (c) 
performance 
by 
the 
clergy 
of 
customary 
church 
ceremonies affecting the lives of individuals, such as 
baptism, marriage, burial, and the like; (d) a system 
of nurture of the young and education in the doctrine 
and discipline of the church, as well as (in the case 
of mature and well developed churches) theological 
seminaries for the advanced study and the training of 
ministers. 
Id.  We reproduce this list not to create any requirement for an 
organization to be determined to have a religious purpose, but 
merely as an illustration.  The Dykema court's listed hallmarks 
of a religious purpose are by no means exhaustive or necessary 
conditions and the listed activities may be different for 
different faiths.   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
26 
 
¶56 We do not adopt a rigid formula for deciding whether 
an organization is operated primarily for religious purposes.  
See Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal 
Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).  Instead, we 
agree with the 
Dykema court that an examination of an 
organization's activities lends itself to an objective inquiry 
that does not lead us into a First Amendment quagmire, as will 
be discussed further below.15 
¶57 We therefore conclude that in determining whether an 
organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., we must 
examine 
both 
the 
motivations 
and 
the 
activities 
of 
the 
organization. 
                                                 
15 Our examination of an organization's activities also 
finds support in a federal law utilizing the same language as 
the statute we examine here.  See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B).  A 
report of the House Ways and Means Committee on that law sets 
forth an example of its application that focuses on an 
organization's activities: 
Thus, the services of the janitor of a church would be 
excluded, but services of a janitor for a separately 
incorporated college, although it may be church 
related, 
would 
be 
covered. 
 
A 
college 
devoted 
primarily to preparing students for the ministry would 
be exempt, as would a novitiate or a house of study 
training candidates to become members of religious 
orders. 
 
On 
the 
other 
hand, 
a 
church 
related 
(separately 
incorporated) 
charitable 
organization 
(such as, for example, an orphanage or a home for the 
aged) would not be considered under this paragraph to 
be operated primarily for religious purposes. 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-612, at 44 (1969).  Congress thus envisioned 
that an examination of activities, and not merely motivations, 
would be undertaken given the language we examine in this case. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
27 
 
C 
¶58 We turn next to apply our statutory interpretation to 
the facts before us.  The burden to establish an exemption is on 
CCB and the sub-entities.  See Princess House, 111 Wis. 2d at 
66; Sw. Airlines, 397 Wis. 2d 431, ¶24 (explaining that "[t]he 
burden is on the party seeking the exemption to prove its 
entitlement" and "taxation is the rule and exemption is the 
exception").   
¶59 CCB and the sub-entities profess to have a religious 
motivation.  Specifically, they state that their services "are 
based on gospel values and the principles of the Catholic Social 
Teachings."  Indeed, it is part of CCB's mission to "carry on 
the redeeming work of our Lord by reflecting gospel values and 
the moral teaching of the church."  We accept these statements 
at face value, and LIRC does not argue that these assertions of 
religious motivation are insincere, fraudulent, or otherwise not 
credible.  Cf. Holy Trinity Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. Kahl, 82 
Wis. 2d 139, 155, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978) (indicating that the 
court is "obliged to accept the professions of the school" as to 
its affiliation and "to accord them validity without further 
inquiry" but the court may "look behind such decisions where 
there is evidence of fraud or collusion").   
¶60 However, accepting an organization's motivations does 
not end the inquiry as we must also examine its activities.  We 
look for guidance from prior cases to further the analysis.  In 
Dykema, the court's examination of activities focused on whether 
an organization participated in worship services, religious 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
28 
 
outreach, ceremony, or religious education.  Dykema, 666 F.2d at 
1100.  Here, such criteria weigh in favor of a determination 
that CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are not "primarily" 
religious in nature.  The record demonstrates that CCB and the 
sub-entities, which are organized as separate corporations apart 
from the church itself, neither attempt to imbue program 
participants with the Catholic faith nor supply any religious 
materials to program participants or employees.  Although not 
required, these would be strong indications that the activities 
are primarily religious in nature.   
¶61 Our own precedent, albeit in another First Amendment 
context, further bolsters this conclusion.  In Coulee Catholic 
Schools, 
320 
Wis. 2d 275, 
¶48, 
we 
distinguished 
"one 
religiously-affiliated organization committed to feeding the 
homeless [that] has only a nominal tie to religion" from 
"another 
religiously-affiliated 
organization 
committed 
to 
feeding the homeless [that] has a religiously infused mission 
involving teaching, evangelism, and worship" for purposes of the 
ministerial exception.  CCB and the sub-entities fit into the 
former category.  Both employment with the organizations and 
services 
offered 
by 
the 
organizations 
are 
open 
to 
all 
participants regardless of religion. 
¶62 CCB's and the sub-entities' activities are primarily 
charitable and secular.  The sub-entities provide services to 
individuals with developmental and mental health disabilities.  
These activities include job training, placement, and coaching, 
as well as services related to activities of daily living.  CCB 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
29 
 
provides background support and management services for these 
activities——a wholly secular endeavor.  See supra, ¶¶10-15.   
¶63 Such services can be provided by organizations of 
either religious or secular motivations, and the services 
provided would not differ in any sense.  This is illustrated by 
a historical look at one of CCB's sub-entities, BCDS.  As noted 
by the court of appeals, BCDS was not under the CCB umbrella 
until 2014, before which it had no affiliation with any 
religious organization.  See Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶59.  Yet the services provided before and after 
BCDS's partnership with CCB commenced were exactly the same.  We 
agree with the court of appeals that "[t]he fact that the manner 
in which BCDS carried out its mission did not change after it 
became an affiliate of CCB supports our conclusion that BCDS' 
purpose and operations are not primarily religious."  Id.   
¶64 The other three sub-entities at issue offer services 
comparable to those offered by BCDS.  In other words, they offer 
services that would be the same regardless of the motivation of 
the provider, a strong indication that the sub-entities do not 
"operate primarily for religious purposes." 
¶65 This result is further supported with a look to 
federal law.  We observe that Wisconsin's religious purposes 
exemption contains verbatim language to a provision of federal 
law, with which Wisconsin's law was enacted to conform.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B); 1971 S.B. 330 (noting that the proposed 
changes to Wisconsin law "will bring Wisconsin's law in line 
with the 1970 amendments to the federal unemployment tax act" 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
30 
 
and that "[a]ny less coverage would cost federal tax credits").  
A report of the House Ways and Means Committee on that federal 
law indicates that, identical to Wisconsin's law, it: 
excludes services of persons where the employer is a 
church or convention or association of churches, but 
does not exclude certain services performed for an 
organization which may be religious in orientation 
unless it is operated primarily for religious purposes 
and 
is 
operated, 
supervised, 
controlled, 
or 
principally supported by a church (or convention or 
association of churches).  
H.R. Rep. No. 91-612, at 44 (1969).  Importantly, the House 
Report continues and provides examples of employment that would 
and would not be entitled to the exemption: 
Thus, the services of the janitor of a church would be 
excluded, but services of a janitor for a separately 
incorporated college, although it may be church 
related, 
would 
be 
covered. 
 
A 
college 
devoted 
primarily to preparing students for the ministry would 
be exempt, as would a novitiate or a house of study 
training candidates to become members of religious 
orders. 
 
On 
the 
other 
hand, 
a 
church 
related 
(separately 
incorporated) 
charitable 
organization 
(such as, for example, an orphanage or a home for the 
aged) would not be considered under this paragraph to 
be operated primarily for religious purposes. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
¶66 Comparing the services offered by CCB and the sub-
entities here to the listed examples, the "orphanage" or "home 
for the aged" is analogous.  The services provided by a 
religiously run orphanage and a secular one do not differ in any 
meaningful sense.  The same is true of a "home for the aged."  
And the same principle applies to the developmental services 
provided by the sub-entities at the center of this case.   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
31 
 
¶67 Although CCB and the sub-entities assert a religious 
motivation behind their work, the statutory language indicates 
that this is not enough to receive the exemption.  An objective 
examination of the actual activities of CCB and the sub-entities 
reveals that their activities are secular in nature.  We 
therefore conclude that CCB and the sub-entities are not 
operated primarily for religious purposes within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.   
IV 
¶68 Finally, we examine the petitioners' assertion that 
the 
above 
statutory 
interpretation 
violates 
the 
First 
Amendment.16  Specifically, they advance that such analysis and 
conclusion creates a conflict with the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution by violating both the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause. 
¶69 Together referred to as the Religion Clauses, the 
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses provide in their 
entirety: 
 
"Congress 
shall 
make 
no 
law 
respecting 
an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. I.   
¶70 The Establishment Clause protects against three main 
evils:  sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement 
                                                 
16 In full, the First Amendment provides:  "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
32 
 
of the sovereign in religious activity.  Jackson v. Benson, 218 
Wis. 2d 835, 856, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998) (citing Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).  In other words, it operates 
to prohibit the government from enacting laws that "aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another."  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 
U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).   
¶71 It further prohibits the excessive entanglement of the 
state 
in 
religious 
matters, 
a 
principle 
known 
as 
the 
entanglement doctrine.  St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶42.  
Excessive entanglement occurs "if a court is required to 
interpret church law, policies, or practices."  L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 687, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997).  Such an 
inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment.  Id.  However, "a 
court may hear an action if it will involve the consideration of 
neutral principles of law."  Id. 
¶72 On the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause assures 
"the right to harbor religious beliefs" by "protecting the 
ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live 
out their faiths in daily life."  Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. 
Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 524 (2022).  It protects religious 
organizations' right "to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine."  Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶37 
(quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
33 
 
¶73 Both Religion Clauses inform a doctrine known as the 
church autonomy principle, which "is perhaps best understood as 
marking a boundary between two separate polities, the secular 
and the religious, and acknowledging the prerogatives of each in 
its own sphere."  Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir. 
2013).  "The church-autonomy doctrine respects the authority of 
churches 
to 
select 
their 
own 
leaders, 
define 
their 
own 
doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own 
institutions free from governmental interference."  Id. (quoted 
source omitted).  In other words, it protects religious 
institutions from "secular control or manipulation."  Kedroff, 
344 U.S. at 116.  
¶74 The Religion Clauses are inherently in tension with 
each other.  We acknowledged this complicated interplay in State 
v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 444, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971) aff'd 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  Indeed, the Religion 
Clauses are "not the most precisely drawn portions of the 
Constitution."  Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.  Both clauses are "cast 
in absolute terms," id., and therefore have the tendency to 
"overlap, can conflict, and cannot always be squared on any 
strict theory of neutrality."  Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d at 444.   
¶75 The United States Supreme Court has also acknowledged 
these tensions, instructing that "[a]dherence to the policy of 
neutrality" is paramount to prevent "the kind of involvement 
that would tip the balance toward government control of churches 
or governmental restraint on religious practice."  Walz, 397 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
34 
 
U.S. at 669-70.  At the same time, it emphasizes that strict 
adherence is not always feasible:   
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area 
cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could 
well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, 
which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or 
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.  The 
general principle deducible from the First Amendment 
and all that has been said by the Court is this:  that 
we will not tolerate either governmentally established 
religion or governmental interference with religion.  
Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts 
there is room for play in the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious 
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference. 
Id. at 669.   
¶76 A religious institution's First Amendment rights are 
not unlimited.  Just as there are limitations on First Amendment 
free speech, i.e., the proverbial prohibition of yelling "fire" 
in a crowded theater,17 so too are there limitations here.  The 
challenge is to balance the competing interests.  We are 
assisted in achieving this balance by a review of precedent, and 
by a review of how other jurisdictions have navigated the 
challenge.   
¶77 An as-applied challenge, such as that brought by CCB 
and the sub-entities, requires an assessment of the merits of 
the challenge by considering the facts of the particular case in 
                                                 
17 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
35 
 
front of the court.18  State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶43, 264 
Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785.  For an as-applied challenge to 
succeed, the challenger must demonstrate that the challenger's 
constitutional 
rights 
were 
actually 
violated. 
 
State 
v. 
Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶18, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.  If 
such a violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as 
to the facts presented for the party asserting the claim.  Id.  
We presume that the statute is constitutional, and the party 
raising 
a 
constitutional 
challenge 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
challenged statute has been applied in an unconstitutional 
manner beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; State v. Christen, 2021 
WI 39, ¶32, 396 Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746; State v. Wood, 2010 
WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  
¶78 With this standard in mind, we turn now to the 
petitioners' constitutional claims to determine whether CCB and 
                                                 
18 There are two major types of constitutional challenges:  
facial and as-applied.  State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, ¶17, 395 
Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.  A party challenging a law as 
unconstitutional on its face must show that the law cannot be 
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.  Id.  In 
contrast, in an as-applied challenge, the court assesses the 
merits of the challenge by considering the facts of the 
particular case before it.  Id., ¶18.  The parties' briefing was 
not particularly clear regarding which type of challenge CCB and 
the sub-entities bring here.  Both LIRC and the court of appeals 
interpreted the petitioners' challenge to be an as-applied 
challenge, and we do the same.  See Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶47 ("[W]e note that the parties do not argue that 
the statute itself violates the First Amendment, meaning that 
CCB does not assert a facial constitutional challenge.").  In 
any event, the standard for a facial challenge is more 
stringent, and if an as-applied challenge fails, then a facial 
challenge will also necessarily fail because the law can be 
constitutionally applied in at least one circumstance. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
36 
 
the sub-entities have made the requisite showing that Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. has been unconstitutionally applied to them 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  CCB and the sub-entities claim that 
LIRC's statutory interpretation leads to a violation of the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in three ways:  
(1) by causing an excessive state entanglement with religion, 
(2) by violating the church autonomy principle, and (3) by 
discriminating "against religious entities with a more complex 
polity" and "penalizing CCB for its Catholic beliefs regarding 
how it must serve those most in need."  We address each argument 
in turn. 
A 
¶79 CCB and the sub-entities assert initially that LIRC's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statutory 
exemption 
violates 
the 
Establishment 
Clause 
by 
occasioning 
an 
excessive 
state 
entanglement with religion.  Specifically, they argue that 
examination of an organization's activities "requires Wisconsin 
courts (and government officials) to conduct an intrusive 
inquiry into the operations of religious organizations that seek 
the religious purposes exemption." 
¶80 However, the protection provided by the Establishment 
Clause is not a blanket protection against any type of 
governmental inquiry into a religious organization.  There are 
certain instances that require some investigation, including 
determining tax liability or the applicability of a tax 
exemption. 
 
See 
Walz, 
397 
U.S. 
at 
675-76. 
 
In 
fact, 
investigations into tax-exempt status are consistent with a 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
37 
 
long-standing tradition of treating religious organizations 
equally under the law.  See id. at 680.  Indeed, both taxation 
of churches and exemption "occasion[] some degree of involvement 
with religion."  Id. at 674. 
¶81 The Establishment Clause does not treat religion as a 
third rail that courts cannot touch.  Rather, it ensures that 
the inevitable "degree of involvement" in such a determination 
does not cross into an evaluation of religious dogma.  The 
Supreme Court, in fact, has "upheld government benefits and tax 
exemptions that go to religious organizations, even though those 
policies have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion," 
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 
2092 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
¶82 Although 
such 
an 
inquiry 
necessarily 
links 
the 
government 
with 
religious 
organizations, 
"some 
degree 
of 
involvement" does not offend the First Amendment.  Walz, 397 
U.S. at 674; see also id. at 697 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
An inquiry evaluating "the scope of charitable activities in 
proportion to doctrinal pursuits may be difficult," but such 
difficulty "does not render it undue interference with religion" 
as long as it "does not entail judicial inquiry into dogma and 
belief."  Id. at 697 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
¶83 The truth or falsity of a religious belief is not a 
proper matter for us, or any other court to decide, but courts 
still must answer "delicate question[s]" to avoid "allowing 
every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in 
which society as a whole has important interests."  Yoder, 406 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
38 
 
U.S. at 215-16.  The key is for any inquiry a court undertakes 
to remain on the right side of the line and not involve an 
examination into the religious beliefs, practices, or dogma of 
an organization.  Cf. St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶¶47-
49.  For example, in St. Augustine School, we observed that an 
examination of "a school's professions that are published on its 
public website or set forth in filings with the state does not 
necessarily require any investigation or surveillance into the 
practices of the school."  Id., ¶48.  Consideration of 
"professions" 
without 
any 
surveillance 
of 
whether 
an 
organization's practices are consistent with a particular 
religious dogma ensures that the inquiry remains on the right 
side of the line.  Id., ¶49.  
¶84 Such is our challenge here.  We begin the inquiry by 
again looking at the statute at issue.  As set forth above, the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. dictates that we 
examine both the organization's motivations and activities to 
determine whether the organization is "operated primarily for 
religious purposes" and thus is entitled to exemption from 
unemployment tax.   
¶85 Examining both the motivations and activities of the 
organization requires minimal judicial inquiry into religion, as 
there is no examination of whether CCB's or the sub-entities' 
activities 
are 
consistent 
or 
inconsistent 
with 
Catholic 
doctrine.  A court need only determine what the nature of the 
motivations and activities of the organizations are——not whether 
they are "Catholic" enough to qualify for the exemption.   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
39 
 
¶86 Again, 
this 
inquiry 
requires 
"some 
degree 
of 
involvement" with religion.  See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.  But 
rather than necessarily creating a constitutional problem, such 
an inquiry is inherent in any statutory scheme that offers tax 
exemption to religious entities.  Id.; see id. at 675 ("There is 
no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of 
religion.").  The review we endorse in this case is a neutral 
and secular inquiry based on objective criteria, examining the 
activities and motivations of a religious organization.  See St. 
Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶5 (concluding that a "neutral 
and 
secular 
inquiry" 
into 
a 
religious 
organization 
is 
constitutional); Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1100 (applying "objective 
criteria" to an investigation into a religious organization's 
activities.) 
¶87 Our conclusion is consistent with those of other 
courts that have examined similarly "delicate" questions.  For 
example, 
in 
Dykema, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
examined 
an 
organization's actual activities, just as we do here.  Id. 
("Objective criteria for examination of an organization's 
activities . . . enable the IRS to make the determination 
required by the statute without entering into any subjective 
inquiry with respect to religious truth which would be forbidden 
by the First Amendment.").  Our examination of the motivations 
and actual activities of an organization here is akin to our 
consideration of a school's corporate documents, professions 
with regard to self-identification and affiliation, and website 
to which we gave a constitutional seal of approval in St. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
40 
 
Augustine School.  398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶5.  This "neutral and 
secular" inquiry does not intrude on questions of religious 
dogma.  See id.    
¶88 Further, a look to history strongly supports our 
consideration of an organization's activities, to which CCB and 
the sub-entities object.  As detailed below, this history 
establishes two essential principles for our purposes here.  
First, 
that 
an 
inquiry 
into 
"purpose" 
that 
examines 
an 
organization's actual activities has long been established in 
statutory enactments and the common law, and second, that courts 
have embraced, rather than shunned, a judicial inquiry into an 
organization's 
actual 
activities 
in 
order 
to 
make 
a 
determination of "purpose" to inform whether the organization 
qualifies for exemption.  Our decision here is thus consistent 
with court's historical treatment of similar questions. 
¶89 Religious tax exemption has been traced from ancient 
times through the British common law.  See John W. Whitehead, 
Tax Exemption and Churches:  A Historical and Constitutional 
Analysis, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 521, 524-36 (1992).  British common 
law, and certain colonial legislatures, widely granted property 
tax exemptions to church property.  John Witte, Jr., Tax 
Exemption of Church Property:  Historical Anomaly or Valid 
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363, 372-74 (1991).  
The law of equity, on the other hand, also accorded tax 
exemption to church properties, but only to those which were 
devoted to "charitable uses."  Id. at 375.  Thus, there has 
historically been some examination of a property's actual use, 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
41 
 
not just reliance on an organization's religious character.  In 
other words, courts have long placed import on what a religious 
organization does, and not just on what it says. 
¶90 As 
these 
exemptions 
evolved, 
statutory 
language 
likewise focused on an organization's "purpose."  Indeed, from 
the earliest statutory enactments regarding tax exemption for 
religious 
entities, 
an 
examination 
of 
an 
organization's 
activities has been part and parcel of the inquiry.   
¶91 For instance, the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, 
one of the earliest tax statutes that referenced an exemption 
for religious purposes, provided a tax exemption to a flat 
income tax.  It stated:   
"[N]othing 
herein 
contained 
shall 
apply 
to . . . corporations, 
companies, 
or 
associations 
organized 
and 
conducted 
solely 
for 
charitable, 
religious, 
or 
educational 
purposes, 
including 
fraternal beneficiary associations."  Though the law 
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 
1895, the exemption language contained in the act 
would provide the cornerstone for tax legislation 
involving 
charitable 
organizations 
for 
the 
next 
century.  
Paul Arnsberger, et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector:  An 
SOI Perspective, IRS Stat. of Income Bull. 105, 106-07 (Winter 
2008), 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf. 
 
Similarly, 
a 
subsequent enactment, the Revenue Act of 1909, granted exemption 
to "any corporation or association organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, 
no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
42 
 
private stockholder or individual."  Id. at 107 (emphasis 
added).   
¶92 The ubiquity of religious tax exemptions and the 
analytical consequences of such exemptions have been recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court.  Specifically, the Walz 
Court observed that "Congress, from its earliest days, has 
viewed the Religion Clauses of the Constitution as authorizing 
statutory real estate tax exemption to religious bodies," noting 
several examples from the early 1800's.  Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.  
As stated above, however, the Walz court also emphasized that 
"some degree of involvement" with religion is a necessary 
consequence of offering tax exemption to religious entities.  
Id. at 674.    
¶93 Tax exemptions for entities with a religious "purpose" 
being well-established in historical enactments, it is paramount 
that there be a mechanism for determining if an organization 
qualifies.  See Ecclesiastical Order of Ism of Am, Inc. v. 
Chasin, 653 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("Without [an 
examination of religious activities], it would be difficult to 
see how any church could qualify as a tax exempt organization 
'for religious purposes.'").  Such an endeavor inherently 
requires judicial inquiry and has on many occasions throughout 
the history of both federal and state law resulted in denial of 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
43 
 
tax exemption where religion is claimed as the basis of the 
exemption.19   
¶94 For the above reasons, we conclude that CCB and the 
sub-entities have failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt an unconstitutional entanglement with religion.  The 
motivations and activities framework dictated by the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. does not require the court to stray 
from 
a 
neutral 
and 
secular 
inquiry 
to 
an 
impermissible 
examination of religious dogma. 
B 
¶95 CCB and the sub-entities contend next that LIRC's 
interpretation violates the church autonomy principle.  Namely, 
they argue that the church autonomy principle is violated 
because LIRC's interpretation penalizes the choice CCB made to 
structure itself and its sub-entities as corporations separate 
from the church itself.  CCB and the sub-entities advance that 
the church autonomy principle is violated by "divid[ing] up 
religious bodies according to secular principles."  They point 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 
407 (1886); All Saints Par. v. Inhabitants of Town of Brookline, 
59 N.E. 1003, 1004 (Mass. 1901); Trinity Church v. City of New 
York, 10 How. Pr. 138, 140-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); In re City 
of Pawtucket, 52 A. 679, 679 (R.I. 1902); Frederick Cnty. 
Comm'rs v. Sisters of Charity of Saint Joseph, 48 Md. 34, 43 
(Md. 1878); see also Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 
462-63, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992); Midtown Church of Christ, Inc. v. 
City of Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 72, 73-74, 264 N.W.2d 281 (1978); 
John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches:  A Historical and 
Constitutional Analysis, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 521, 545 n.184 (1992) 
(collecting cases both upholding and disallowing property tax 
exemptions for churches and other religious organizations).  
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
44 
 
to Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94, to assert that the government is 
thereby "interfering with the Church's internal governance," 
which adversely affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.  
¶96  Kedroff 
illustrates 
the 
type 
of 
ecclesiastical 
governance matters protected by the church autonomy principle.  
At issue in Kedroff was an inter-church controversy over the 
right to use a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York City.  Id. 
at 96-97.  The controversy arose between the North American 
Russian Orthodox churches, which claimed the right to use the 
cathedral belonged to an archbishop elected by them, and the 
Supreme Court Authority, which claimed the right belonged 
instead to an archbishop appointed by the patriarch in Moscow.  
Id.  New York's highest court ruled in favor of the North 
American churches, based on a state law requiring every Russian 
Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination of 
the 
governing 
body 
of 
the 
North 
American 
churches 
as 
authoritative.  Id. at 99 n.3.    
¶97 The Kedroff Court concluded that the state statute at 
issue was unconstitutional because it allowed the "power of the 
state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to 
the principles of the First Amendment" by "displac[ing] one 
church administrator with another . . . [thereby] pass[ing] the 
control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church 
authority to another."  Id. at 119.  The right to acquire the 
cathedral 
was 
determined 
to 
be 
"strictly 
a 
matter 
of 
ecclesiastical government."  Id. at 115. 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
45 
 
¶98 In contrast to the New York statute at issue in 
Kedroff, Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. neither regulates internal 
church 
governance 
nor 
mandates 
any 
activity.  
Section 108.02(15)(h)2. defines what employment is for the 
purposes of unemployment insurance without reference to any 
religious principles or any attempt to control internal church 
operations.  Put simply, it does not concern matters that are 
"strictly" or even remotely "ecclesiastical," which belong to 
the church alone.  See id. 
¶99 CCB and the sub-entities claim that viewing their 
motives and activities separate from those of the church 
penalizes 
their 
"choice 
to 
be 
'structured 
as 
separate 
corporations'——a religious decision grounded in church polity 
and internal governance."  On the contrary, the claim that in 
order to receive the exemption the church is now required to 
structure itself as a single entity rather than separately 
incorporated subsidiaries is unpersuasive.  The statute at issue 
dictates that it is the motivation and activities of the non-
profit that determine its tax-exempt status, not its corporate 
structure.   
¶100 It 
is 
not 
difficult 
to 
imagine 
a 
non-profit 
organization structured as a separate sub-entity of a church 
that is "operated primarily for religious purposes," that is, 
with both motivations and activities that are religious.  For 
example, if one of the religiously-motivated sub-entities in 
this case partook in activities such as those cited by the 
Dykema court as indicative of a religious purpose, see supra, 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
46 
 
¶55, it would have a stronger argument that, despite being 
incorporated separately from a religious institution, it is 
nevertheless "operated primarily for religious purposes" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.20  Thus, CCB and the 
sub-entities have failed to demonstrate that the church autonomy 
principle has been violated beyond a reasonable doubt because 
the statute does not interfere with its internal governance or 
any ecclesiastical matters.  
C 
¶101 Next, CCB and the sub-entities claim that LIRC's 
proposed interpretation as applied to them abandons "[the] 
bedrock principle of neutrality among religions" and violates 
the Free Exercise Clause in at least two ways.  First, CCB and 
the sub-entities advance that it violates the principle of 
neutrality because "it discriminates against religious entities 
with a more complex polity."  In other words, CCB and the sub-
entities contend that the Catholic Church is penalized under 
LIRC's interpretation for "organizing itself as a group of 
                                                 
20 See also Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 895 A.2d 
965, 970 (Me. 2006) (concluding that a nonprofit organization 
which, in part, provides healthcare to island communities, is 
operated primarily for religious purposes because of its 
religious motivations and activities including bringing pastors 
to 
island 
communities, 
offering 
Christmas 
programs, 
and 
employing clergy members); Peace Lutheran Church v. State, 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 906 So. 2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that a child care center 
located at a church was operated primarily for religious 
purposes because it provided outreach for the church and its 
"religious purposes pervade all aspects of the school/day care 
center.").   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
47 
 
separate corporate bodies——in contrast to other religious 
entities that include a variety of ministries as part of a 
single incorporated or unincorporated body."   
¶102 Second, CCB and the sub-entities claim that LIRC's 
interpretation is not neutral because it penalizes them "for 
[their] Catholic beliefs regarding how [they] must serve those 
most in need."  They point to LIRC's and the court of appeals' 
decisions as "identifying [certain21] characteristics of CCB's 
ministry as factors favoring denial of an otherwise-available 
exemption."  Such an interpretation, in the petitioners' view, 
"flies in the face of Catholic beliefs about care for the poor" 
and "favors religious groups that require those they serve to 
adhere 
to 
the 
faith 
of 
that 
group 
or 
be 
subject 
to 
proselytization."   
¶103 As a threshold matter, a party making a free exercise 
challenge must demonstrate that the challenged law burdens their 
religious exercise in a 
constitutionally significant way.  
"[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a 
governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the 
program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise 
religious rights."  Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of 
                                                 
21 LIRC and the court of appeals observe that CCB does not 
engage in any of the following activities:  inculcating Catholic 
faith; 
teaching 
the 
Catholic 
religion; 
evangelizing 
or 
participating 
in 
religious 
rituals 
or 
worship 
services; 
requiring employees, participants or board members to be of 
Catholic faith; requiring attendance at religious training, 
orientation, or services; and disseminating religious materials.  
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
48 
 
Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington 
Twp., 374 U.S. at 223 ("[I]t is necessary in a free exercise 
case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it 
operates against him in the practice of his religion.").  If 
such a burden has been shown, then the analysis proceeds to the 
second step, where a party may carry its burden of proving a 
free exercise violation by showing that a governmental entity 
has burdened a sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy 
that is not "neutral" or "generally applicable."  Bremerton, 507 
U.S. at 525.   
¶104 Importantly for our Free Exercise analysis, LIRC 
asserts that CCB and the sub-entities have not shown that "the 
unemployment insurance system burdens their religious beliefs."  
In LIRC's view, "[i]nclusion in the unemployment program is not 
a 
constitutionally 
significant 
burden." 
 
LIRC's 
argument 
continues: "The commission's interpretation does not prohibit 
the Diocese or the employers from engaging in any activity.  The 
employers have participated in the State unemployment insurance 
program 
for 
many 
years 
and 
do 
not 
contend 
that 
their 
participation was a significant or substantial burden on their 
religious practices or beliefs."   
¶105 A look to United States Supreme Court precedent 
illustrates that LIRC's position is correct.  "[T]o the extent 
that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases 
the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious 
activities, 
any 
such 
burden 
is 
not 
constitutionally 
significant."  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization 
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
49 
 
of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).  "[T]he very essence of such 
a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions 
of religious belief."  Id. at 394; see Hernandez v. Comm'r of 
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (concluding that 
the burden imposed by a provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
governing charitable deduction was "no different from that 
imposed by any public tax or fee" and that even a "substantial 
burden would be justified by the 'broad public interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions 
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.'") (quoted 
source omitted); accord Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 Wis. 2d 275, ¶65 
("General laws related to building licensing, taxes, social 
security, and the like are normally acceptable."). 
¶106 Such is the nature of the unemployment tax at issue 
here.  CCB and the sub-entities have not identified how the 
payment of unemployment tax prevents them from fulfilling any 
religious function or engaging in any religious activities.  As 
the United States Supreme Court said, the decrease in the money 
available for religious or charitable activities that comes with 
paying a generally applicable tax is not a constitutionally 
significant burden.  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391.  
CCB and the sub-entities thus cannot surmount the threshold 
inquiry to demonstrate a Free Exercise violation.  Because CCB 
and the sub-entities have failed to demonstrate that the statute 
imposes a constitutionally significant burden on their religious 
practice, we need not address the petitioners' argument that the 
statute violates principles of neutrality.   
No. 
2020AP2007   
 
50 
 
¶107 Accordingly, we conclude that CCB and the sub-entities 
have therefore not met their burden under their Free Exercise 
claim 
to 
show 
that 
the 
law 
as-applied 
to 
them 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.22 
V 
¶108 In sum, we determine that in our inquiry into whether 
an organization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., we must 
examine 
both 
the 
motivations 
and 
the 
activities 
of 
the 
organization.  Applying this analysis to the facts before us, we 
conclude that the petitioners are not operated primarily for 
religious purposes within the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2.  We 
further conclude that the application of § 108.02(15)(h)2. as 
applied to the petitioners does not violate the First Amendment 
because the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the 
statute as applied to them is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶109 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
22 To the extent that CCB and the sub-entities argue that 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is facially unconstitutional, such 
a challenge also fails.  For a facial challenge to be 
successful, it must be demonstrated that the law cannot be 
constitutionally enforced under any circumstances.  Roundtree, 
395 Wis. 2d 94, ¶17.  Our conclusion that § 108.02(15)(h)2. can 
be constitutionally enforced under the present circumstances 
necessarily precludes such an argument.   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶110 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   
"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." 
Matthew 22:21 (King James). 
¶111 The State of Wisconsin gives a tax exemption to any 
nonprofit 
organization 
"operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes and operated . . . by a church . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 
108.02(15)(h)2.  Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. and four of its 
sub-entities (collectively, "Catholic Charities") are operated 
primarily for a religious purpose——fulfillment of the command of 
Jesus Christ himself to serve others——and operated by the Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin.  The majority rewrites 
the statute to deprive Catholic Charities of the tax exemption, 
rendering unto the state that which the law says belongs to the 
church.      
¶112 Impermissibly entangling the government in church 
doctrine, the majority astonishingly declares Catholic Charities 
are not "operated primarily for religious purposes" because 
their activities are not "religious in nature."  Majority op., 
¶60.  The statute, however, requires only that a nonprofit be 
operated primarily for a religious reason.  "The statute is 
neutral as to the type of service an organization provides; it 
speaks only in terms of the purpose of the organization."  
Cathedral Arts Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 95 
So. 3d 970, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (Swanson, J., 
dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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¶113  The majority's misinterpretation of the exemption 
renders the statute in violation of the First Amendment of the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
as 
well 
as 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  By focusing on whether a nonprofit primarily 
engages in activities that are "religious in nature," the 
majority transforms a broad exemption into a denominational 
preference 
for 
Protestant 
religions 
and 
a 
discriminatory 
exclusion of Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Hare Krishna, and the Church of Latter Day Saints, 
among others.  The First Amendment forbids the government from 
such religious discrimination and commands neutrality among 
religions in the provision or denial of a government benefit.  
¶114 The 
majority's 
misinterpretation 
also 
excessively 
entangles the government in spiritual affairs, requiring courts 
to determine what religious practices are sufficiently religious 
under the majority's unconstitutional test.  The majority says 
secular entities provide charitable services, so such activities 
aren't religious at all, even when performed by Catholic 
Charities.  The majority's determination directly contradicts 
Catholic Charities' faith: 
The [Catholic] Church's deepest nature is expressed in 
her three-fold responsibility:  of proclaiming the 
word 
of 
God 
(kerygma-martyria), 
celebrating 
the 
sacraments (leitourgia), and exercising the ministry 
of charity (diakonia).  These duties presuppose each 
other and are inseparable.  For the Church, charity is 
not a kind of welfare activity which could equally 
well be left to others, but is a part of her nature, 
an indispensable expression of her very being.     
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
3 
 
Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, ¶25 (2005).1  Courts should 
be uncomfortable judging matters of faith.  Not only does the 
constitution forbid the exercise, but courts are susceptible to 
mischaracterizing deeply religious activities, which for some 
faith traditions include dancing, Bhakti-yoga, and sharing a 
meal, as amicus curiae, International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness and the Sikh Coalition, informs this court.  The 
majority instead looks through a seemingly Protestant lens to 
deem works of charity worthy of the exemption only if 
accompanied 
by 
proselytizing——a 
combination 
forbidden 
by 
Catholicism, Judaism, and many other religions.2 
¶115 The majority mangles Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. to 
reflect its policy preferences, supplanting the law actually 
enacted by the people's representatives in the legislature.  The 
majority's activism renders the exemption unconstitutional.  I 
dissent.3   
                                                 
1 https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est.html. 
2 Amicus Br. Professors Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, at 
15-16 (internal citations omitted) ("Many evangelical Christians 
view conversion and overt worship as indispensable elements of 
their charitable activities.  But Catholics and Jews view 
service itself as a distinct mode of worship that should remain 
separate from proselytizing.").   
3 Continuing its telling trend, the majority refuses to 
address any arguments against its desired result.  Clarke v. 
Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 79, ¶206, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 
N.W.2d 370 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting the 
majority "pretend[ed] the respondents made an argument that 
[was] easier for the majority to dismiss" instead of addressing 
the parties' actual argument).  This dissent details the 
majority's analytical blunders, which lead the majority to 
absurdly 
conclude 
Catholic 
Charities 
are 
purely 
secular.  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
4 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶116 Every Roman Catholic diocese in Wisconsin has a 
Catholic Charities entity, which is its social ministry arm.  
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (CCB) is the Catholic Charities 
entity for the Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin.  The purpose of 
CCB "is to be an effective sign of the charity of Christ" by 
providing services according to an "[e]cumenical orientation," 
meaning the organization makes no distinction on the basis of 
race, sex, or religion regarding those served, employed, or who 
serve on its board.  CCB has separately incorporated sub-
entities, four of which are parties in this dispute.  The bishop 
of the Diocese of Superior oversees CCB's programs and services 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Brian Hagedorn also dissents, questioning why the 
majority 
reads 
the 
exemption 
narrowly 
in 
the 
face 
of 
constitutionally protected religious freedom.  If the majority 
sincerely stands behind its analysis, it should explain where 
the dissents go astray.  As Justice Antonin Scalia put it,  
When I have been assigned the opinion for the Court in 
a divided case, nothing gives me as much assurance 
that I have written it well as the fact that I am able 
to respond satisfactorily (in my judgment) to all the 
onslaughts of the dissents or separate concurrences.  
The dissent or concurrence puts my opinion to the 
test, providing a direct confrontation of the best 
arguments on both sides of the disputed points.  It's 
a cure for laziness, compelling me to make the most of 
my case.   
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 
33, 41 (1994).  Pitifully, the majority does not make the most 
of its case.  Generally, when a party fails to respond to the 
legal arguments advanced in a case, the court considers the 
arguments conceded.  United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI 
App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (citing Schlieper 
v. DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994)).  
By refusing to offer a word of rebuttal in response to the 
dissents, the majority concedes its analysis lacks legal merit.   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
5 
 
and is in charge of Catholic Charities.  It is uncontested that 
Catholic Charities are operated for a religious reason.     
¶117 In 2016, Catholic Charities asked to withdraw from the 
Wisconsin unemployment tax system.  The Department of Workforce 
Development (DWD) denied the request.  Catholic Charities 
appealed, and an administrative law judge reversed DWD's 
decision.  The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) 
reversed the administrative law judge's decision. 
¶118 LIRC determined Catholic Charities are not "operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.  LIRC decided "[t]he activities, not the 
religious motivation behind them or the organization's founding 
principles, determine whether an exemption from participation in 
the unemployment insurance program is warranted."  Although 
"[Catholic Charities'] services may be religiously motivated and 
manifestations of religious belief," LIRC decided Catholic 
Charities' activities are not "religious per se."  LIRC 
determined "the provision of help to the poor and disabled" is 
"essentially secular," and therefore denied Catholic Charities 
the exemption.  The circuit court reversed LIRC's decision.  The 
court of appeals then reversed the circuit court.   
¶119 The court of appeals decided Catholic Charities do not 
operate primarily for religious purposes——holding that Catholic 
Charities' 
activities 
are 
not 
sufficiently 
"viewed 
as . . . inherently religious."  Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. 
LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, ¶45, 406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778.  The 
court of appeals held that to receive the exemption under Wis. 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
6 
 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., 
Catholic 
Charities 
must 
have 
a 
religious 
motivation 
and 
engage 
primarily 
in 
activities 
"religious in nature."  Id., ¶34.  According to the court of 
appeals, "a religious motivation does not, by itself, mean that 
the organization is operated primarily for religious purposes."  
Id., ¶62.  It is "the type of religious activities engaged in by 
the organization" that determines its eligibility for the 
exemption.  Id., ¶45.  The court of appeals acknowledged 
Catholic Charities have a religious motivation for conducting 
their charitable activities. Id., ¶¶56-57.  Nevertheless, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decided 
Catholic 
Charities' 
charitable 
activities "are neither inherently or primarily religious 
activities":   
CCB and its sub-entities do not operate to inculcate 
the Catholic faith; they are not engaged in teaching 
the Catholic religion, evangelizing, or participating 
in religious rituals or worship services with the 
social service participants; they do not require their 
employees, participants, or board members to be of the 
Catholic faith; participants are not required to 
attend 
any 
religious 
training, 
orientation, 
or 
services; their funding comes almost entirely from 
government contracts or private companies, not from 
the Diocese of Superior; and they do not disseminate 
any religious material to participants.  Nor do CCB 
and its sub-entities provide program participants with 
an "education in the doctrine and discipline of the 
church." 
Id., ¶58 (quoting United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1100 
(7th Cir. 1981)).  "While [Catholic Charities'] activities 
fulfill the Catechism of the Catholic Church to respond in 
charity to those in need, the activities themselves are not 
primarily religious in nature."  Id., ¶59.  The court of appeals 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
7 
 
held any "spreading of [the] Catholic faith accomplished" by 
Catholic Charities' activities is only "indirect."  Id., ¶61.  
The court of appeals concluded that although "the Catholic 
Church's tenet of solidarity compels it to engage in charitable 
acts, the religious motives of CCB and its sub-entities appear 
to be incidental to their primarily charitable functions."  Id., 
¶62.                   
II.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
¶120 The Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act provides 
temporary benefits to eligible unemployed workers.  Employers 
contribute to a government account via a tax.  In 1972, the 
state exempted certain religious nonprofits from paying the tax.  
See 
ch. 
53, 
Laws 
of 
1971. 
 
Currently, 
the 
law 
says, 
"'Employment' as applied to work for a nonprofit organization . 
. . does not include service . . . [i]n the employ of an 
organization operated primarily for religious purposes and 
operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a 
church or convention or association of churches[.]"  Wis. Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.     
¶121 To 
receive 
an 
exemption 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
108.02(15)(h)2., a nonprofit must meet two requirements:  (1) 
the organization must be "operated primarily for religious 
purposes" 
and 
(2) 
the 
organization 
must 
be 
"operated, 
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches[.]"4  The parties agree 
                                                 
4 Cf. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South 
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 782 n.12 (1981).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
8 
 
Catholic Charities are "operated, supervised, controlled, or 
principally supported by a church."  The parties dispute whether 
Catholic 
Charities 
are 
"operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes." 
 
An 
examination 
of 
the 
statute's 
language 
unencumbered by the majority's policy agenda shows Catholic 
Charities are operated for religious purposes and entitled to 
the exemption.  
¶122 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain a 
law's objective meaning.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶47, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶25, 260 Wis. 2d 
633, 660 N.W.2d 656); see Friends of Black River Forest v. 
Kohler Co., 2022 WI 52, ¶39, 402 Wis. 2d 587, 977 N.W.2d 342 
(stating the Kalal framework involves "ascertaining statutory 
meaning," not what the legislature or "statute 'intended'").  
Courts are supposed to focus on the text of the statute to 
derive "the fair meaning [from] the text itself."  Brey v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 
N.W.2d 1 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52); Friends of 
Black River Forest, 402 Wis. 2d 587, ¶28 n.13 (In a "textually 
driven analysis . . . the language of the cited statutes drives 
the inquiry . . . .").  "Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 
(citations omitted); see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  If a 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
9 
 
statute's meaning is plain, the interpretive process ends.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citations omitted).   
¶123 To determine the meaning of a statute, this court 
consults the text, context, and structure of the statute.  Brey, 
400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11 (citing Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶11, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 
153).  Canons of construction, dictionaries, and the rules of 
grammar "serve as 'helpful, neutral guides'" to determine a 
statute's meaning.  James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶23 n.12, 397 
Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 
(2012)); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 
(1998) (first citing Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); and then citing 
Swatek v. Cnty. of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 
(1995)) 
("For 
purposes 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
or 
construction, the common and approved usage of words may be 
established by consulting dictionary definitions."); Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 140 ("Words are to be given the meaning that 
proper grammar and usage would assign them."); Neil M. Gorsuch, 
A Republic, If You Can Keep It 132 (2019) (noting the rules of 
grammar "play no favorites" in statutory interpretation).  
Application of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation 
inexorably leads to the unremarkable conclusion that a nonprofit 
is "operated primarily for religious purposes" if it is managed 
primarily for religious reasons.  Ascertaining the meaning of 
the religious exemption's first requirement ("operated primarily 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
10 
 
for religious purposes") requires a proper understanding of two 
words——"operated" and "purposes."   
A.  Operated 
¶124 LIRC argues the word "operated" means "to work, 
perform, or function."  According to LIRC, the word "operate" 
"connotes" activity.  The majority agrees.  Majority op., ¶42.  
Catholic Charities argue the word means "managed" or "used."  A 
textual analysis reveals the word "operated," as used in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., 
means 
"managed." 
 
Basic 
grammar 
verifies the correctness of this interpretation.       
¶125 "Although 
drafters, 
like 
all 
other 
writers 
and 
speakers, sometimes perpetrate linguistic blunders, they are 
presumed to be grammatical in their compositions.  They are not 
presumed to be unlettered."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 140 
(footnotes 
omitted). 
 
Courts 
are 
supposed 
to 
prefer 
interpretations in accord with the rules of grammar over non-
grammatical readings.  See Indianhead Motors v. Brooks, 2006 WI 
App 266, ¶9, 297 Wis. 2d 821, 726 N.W.2d 352 (rejecting an 
interpretation that "defie[d] the rules of grammar").  The word 
"operated" appears twice in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Each 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
11 
 
time, "operated" is a transitive verb,5 taking the word 
"organization" as its direct object.  "Operated" should be 
interpreted in its transitive sense.  See State ex rel. DNR v. 
Wis. Ct. of Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶29, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 
909 N.W.2d 114.  "Managed" is a common definition of "operated" 
when used as a transitive verb.  E.g., Operate, The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 1009 (1st unabridged ed. 
1966) (defining "operate" in the transitive sense as "[t]o 
manage 
or 
use"; 
"[t]o 
put 
or 
keep . . . working 
or 
in 
operation"; and "[t]o bring about out, effect, or produce, as by 
action or the exertion of force or influence").  Other textual 
clues confirm "operated" means "managed."       
¶126 The whole text of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. must be 
considered when interpreting the word "operated."  "Statutory 
interpretation centers on the 'ascertainment of meaning,' not 
the recitation of words in isolation."  Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 
¶13 (citation omitted).  "Context is a primary determinant of 
meaning." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167; see Clarke v. Wis. 
                                                 
5 In its brief, LIRC insists "operated" is an intransitive 
verb with no direct object.  The majority agrees, citing 
internet dictionary definitions of "operate" in the intransitive 
sense.  See majority op., ¶42.  LIRC and the majority are wrong; 
"operated" is a transitive verb in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  
It is the "organization"——the direct object——that is "operated"—
—transitive 
verb——"primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes" 
and 
"operated"——transitive verb——"by a church or convention or 
association 
of 
churches[.]" 
 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.   
Section 108.02(15)(h)2. 
has 
a 
passive 
construction. 
 
See 
generally Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern English Usage 676 
(4th ed. 2016).  "[O]nly transitive verbs can appear in the 
passive voice."  C. Edward Good, A Grammar Book for You and I . 
. . Oops, Me! 33 (2002).                
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
12 
 
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 79, ¶198, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d 
370 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing  Towne v. 
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).  The word "operated" is used 
twice in § 108.02(15)(h)2.:  "operated primarily for religious 
purposes and operated, supervised, controlled, or principally 
supported 
by 
a 
church 
or 
convention 
or 
association 
of 
churches[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  "[A]bsent textual or structural 
clues to the contrary[,]"  we presume a word used multiple times 
in a statute bears the same meaning throughout.  DNR, 380 Wis. 
2d 354, ¶30 (citations omitted); DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 
WI 15, ¶29, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 (quoting Harnischfeger 
Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 663, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)) ("It 
is a basic rule of construction that we attribute the same 
definition to a word both times it is used in the same statute 
or 
administrative 
rule."). 
 
The 
text 
and 
structure 
of 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. confirm the word "operated" bears the same 
meaning in both uses.  Section 108.02(15)(h)2. uses the word 
"operated" twice within the same sentence, providing strong 
evidence the word means the same thing in both instances.  Miss. 
ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 171 (2014) 
(quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)) ("[T]he 
'presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing 
throughout a statute' is 'at its most vigorous when a term is 
repeated within a given sentence.'").  Additionally, the word 
"operated" is a transitive verb in both uses, sharing the same 
direct object:  "organization."  It is not credible that the 
word "operated," which is used twice in the same sentence, 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
13 
 
sharing the same direct object, means something different in 
each use.  See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 
(1941) ("It is hardly credible that Congress used the term 
'person' in different senses in the same sentence.").     
¶127 In 
its 
second 
appearance 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., the word "operated" is followed by the verbs 
"supervised, controlled, [and] principally supported."  It is a 
basic principle of statutory interpretation that the meaning of 
words should be understood "by reference to their relationship 
with other associated words or phrases."  State v. Popenhagen, 
2008 WI 55, ¶46 n.25, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611.  When 
words "are associated in a context suggesting that the words 
have something in common, they should be assigned a permissible 
meaning that makes them similar.  The [associated-words canon] 
especially holds that 'words grouped in a list should be given 
related meanings.'"  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 195 (citing 
Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 
322 (1977)).  "Managed" is a definition of "operated" that works 
for both uses of the word "operated" in the statute, and 
"managed" has a related meaning to "supervised, controlled, 
[and] principally supported."  § 108.02(15)(h)2.  The majority's 
proffered interpretation of "operated"——"to work, perform, or 
function, as a machine does[,]" majority op., ¶42 (quoted source 
omitted)——is 
utterly 
unlike 
"supervised, 
controlled, 
[and] 
principally supported."  § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Because "operated" 
means "managed" in its second appearance, it most likely means 
"managed" in its first appearance as well.     
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶128 The text, its context, and the canons of construction 
all support the conclusion that "operated" means "managed" in 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  The definition of "operated" 
advanced by LIRC and adopted by the majority simply does not 
work.  Both define "operated" to mean "to work, perform, or 
function . . . ."  Majority op., ¶42 (citations omitted).  Both 
treat "operated" as a synonym for the word "activity"——an 
interpretation unsupported by the statutory text.  Treating 
"operated" as a stand in for the noun "activity" either assigns 
"operated" two different senses in the same sentence, or gives 
"operated" a meaning oddly dissimilar to the words surrounding 
it in its second use.  See § 108.02(15)(h)2. (requiring the 
nonprofit 
to 
be 
"operated, 
supervised, 
controlled, 
or 
principally supported by a church or convention or association 
of churches").  Additionally, defining "operated" to mean 
"activity" transmogrifies a verb, "operated," into a noun, 
"activity." 
 
The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
"operated" 
violates 
the 
"fundamental 
rule 
of 
textual 
interpretation . . . that neither a word nor a sentence may be 
given a meaning that it cannot bear."  Scalia & Garner, supra, 
at 31.    
B.  Purposes 
¶129 The majority correctly concludes the word "purposes" 
means the reasons for which something is done.  Majority op., 
¶43 (quoting Purpose, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/purpose 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2024)); purpose, The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 1167 (1st unabridged ed. 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
15 
 
1966) (defining "purpose" as "the reason for which something 
exists or is done, made, used, etc."); see also Brown Cnty. v. 
Brown Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, 2022 WI 13, ¶38, 400 Wis. 2d 781, 
971 N.W.2d 491 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Purpose, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/purpose (last visited Feb. 14, 2022)) 
(the "common definition" of "purpose" is "the reason why 
something is done or used" or "the aim or intention of 
something").  To be "primarily operated for religious purposes," 
the nonprofit must be managed primarily for a religious reason.   
¶130 LIRC 
resists 
this 
common-sense 
understanding 
of 
"purposes," 
insisting 
"purposes" 
means 
"[t]he 
employers' 
business activity, objectives, goals and ends."  LIRC argues 
this court should not consider the reasons why a nonprofit is 
operated.  LIRC cites a legal dictionary——purpose, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1493 (11th ed. 2019)——for its conclusion that 
"purposes" means "business activity."  Because "purposes" is an 
ordinary term,6 however, we should use ordinary dictionaries to 
                                                 
6 In its brief, LIRC tepidly argues the term "religious 
purposes" is a term of art in tax law, citing United States v. 
Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981).  The majority gestures at 
(but does not commit to) the same argument, likewise relying on 
Dykema.  Majority op., ¶54.  While Dykema deemed "religious 
purposes" a "term of art in tax law," 666 F.2d at 1101, it did 
not cite any authority to support its contention; it also failed 
to explain why it believed the phrase is a term of art.  No 
cases support Dykema's assertion; only two parroted it.  The 
only cases to treat "religious purposes" as a term of art are 
Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1101, Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
950 F.2d 365, 376 (7th Cir. 1991), which cited Dykema, and 
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 12, ¶39, 
406 Wis. 2d 586, 987 N.W.2d 778, the court of appeals decision 
in this case, which cited only Dykema.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Dykema court interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
16 
 
aid our search for its meaning.  See Sanders v. State of Wis. 
Claims Bd., 2023 WI 60, ¶14, 408 Wis. 2d 370, 992 N.W.2d 126 
(lead opinion) (internal citations omitted) ("To determine 
common and approved usage, we consult dictionaries.  To 
determine the meaning of legal terms of art, we consult legal 
dictionaries."); see majority op., ¶43 (quoted source omitted).  
Unless a word or phrase is a legal term of art or statutorily 
defined, words and phrases are given their "common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  "Business 
activity" is anything but the ordinary meaning of "religious 
purposes."   LIRC's assertion that "purposes" means "objectives, 
goals and ends" does not logically lead to considering only 
Catholic 
Charities' 
activities, 
much 
less 
whether 
those 
activities are inherently religious.  An objective, goal, or end 
cannot be divorced from motives.  "Purposes" means the reason 
something is done, the motivation underlying the action.  As a 
matter of simple logic, "purposes" does not mean the action 
itself.    
                                                                                                                                                             
which exempts entities operated exclusively for "religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes."  Federal regulations undermine Dykema's 
characterization of "religious purposes" as a term of art.  
Regulations define what "charitable," "educational," "testing 
for public safety," and "scientific" mean.  26 C.F.R. § 
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)-(5).  Conspicuously absent is any definition 
of 
what 
"religious" 
means 
under 
the 
statute. 
 
Dykema's 
representation that "religious purposes" is a term of art in tax 
law is also severely undermined by divergent interpretations of 
"operated primarily for religious purposes" embraced by state 
courts.  See majority op., ¶38 n.10 (collecting a sample of 
cases).  Neither Dykema, LIRC, nor the majority have provided 
any basis for construing "religious purposes" as a term of art.           
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
17 
 
C.  Applying the Plain Meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. 
¶131 As a matter of statutory construction, common usage of 
ordinary terms, and basic grammar, "operated primarily for 
religious purposes" means managed primarily for religious 
reasons.  See, e.g., Czigler v. Adm'r, Ohio Bureau of Emp. 
Servs., 501 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).  No one disputes 
that the only reason the Catholic Church operates Catholic 
Charities is religious.  See majority op., ¶59; see also Cath. 
Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶47 ("[N]either DWD nor this 
court dispute that the Catholic Church holds a sincerely held 
religious belief as its reason for operating CCB and its sub-
entities.").  It's no surprise the issue is uncontested——
Catholic Charities' raison d'être is religious.  A court must 
accept a religious entity's good faith representations that 
religious beliefs motivate an operation and the operation 
furthers a religious mission.  Holy Trinity Cmty. Sch., Inc. v. 
Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 154-55, 262 N.W.2d 210 (1978); See United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Corp. of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) 
("Determining 
that 
certain 
activities 
are 
in 
furtherance 
of 
an 
organization's 
religious 
mission . . . is . . . a means by which a religious community 
defines itself."); See also Kendall v. Dir. of Div. of Emp. 
Sec., 473 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Mass. 1985); Hollis Hills Jewish Ctr. 
v. Comm'r of Lab., 461 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) 
(stating that an employer's statement that its operation 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
18 
 
furthers a religious objective, "made in good faith, must be 
accepted by civil courts").  That should end the inquiry, and 
Catholic Charities should receive the tax exemption.  Regardless 
of whose motivations are relevant——Catholic Charities' or the 
Diocese of Superior's——Catholic Charities are managed primarily 
for religious reasons.   
D.  Whose Purposes   
¶132 Because it is undisputed that the only reason Catholic 
Charities are operated is religious (no matter whose purposes 
are relevant under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.) the majority 
need not decide whose purposes are relevant.  Nevertheless, the 
majority answers the question, botching the analysis.  The 
answer should be obvious from the statutory text:  The purposes 
of the entity that operates the nonprofit are the relevant 
purposes under the statute.  When trying to figure out why a 
nonprofit exists, ask the manager, not those managed.  
¶133 The majority comes to the opposite conclusion, deeming 
the nonprofit's subjective motivations relevant.  Majority op., 
¶34.  The majority's rationale is unconvincing.  As a 
preliminary matter, the majority relies on a false dichotomy.  
The majority asks whether——in all cases——the analysis focuses on 
the church's motivations or the nonprofit's motivations.  See 
id., ¶33.  Not all cases, however, will present those two 
options.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. indicates it 
is the operator's motivations that are relevant.  A nonprofit 
could operate itself.  Alternatively, a "church or convention or 
association 
of 
churches" 
could 
operate 
the 
nonprofit.  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
19 
 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.  As a third option, a third party could 
operate the nonprofit.  The statute's language contemplates that 
a nonprofit may be operated by a third party and the exemption 
will be available if the nonprofit is "operated primarily for 
religious purposes" and "supervised, controlled, or principally 
supported 
by 
a 
church 
or 
convention 
or 
association 
of 
churches[.]"  § 108.02(15)(h)2.   
¶134 With the majority's false dichotomy discredited, the 
majority's conclusion collapses.  There is no surplusage under a 
textualist reading.  When a church operates a nonprofit, 
focusing on the church's motivations for doing so will not lead 
to every religiously affiliated organization "automatically" 
receiving 
an 
exemption 
because 
"[a] 
church's 
purpose 
is 
religious by nature."  See majority op., ¶37.  When a nonprofit 
is self-operated or operated by a third party other than a 
church, 
the 
"operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes" 
requirement still has force.7  The "operated primarily for 
religious purposes" requirement is not "pointless," Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 176, if the relevant motives are that of the 
nonprofit's operator, which could be the nonprofit itself or a 
third party other than a church.  The surplusage canon applies 
only if an interpretation renders a word or phrase meaningless 
                                                 
7 The majority's surplusage argument is additionally flawed 
because it relies on the false assumption that a church's 
purposes are by definition religious.  Id., ¶37.  While that 
sounds reasonable, it is not universally true.  Nothing 
precludes a church from taking an action for a nonreligious 
reason.  Similarly, it is not true that a school's motivations 
are by definition educational.  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
20 
 
or redundant.  See id.  That is not the case under a fair 
reading of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. 
¶135 The majority also argues we should focus on the 
nonprofit's motivations because the exemption relates to the 
services of the employees of a nonprofit, not a church.  
Majority op., ¶34.8  But whose services are exempt under the 
statute does not indicate whose purposes are relevant under Wis. 
Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  The majority's conclusion simply 
doesn't follow from its premises.  The majority persists with 
its fallacious analysis, arguing the nonprofit's motivations are 
always the relevant motivations because "the phrase 'operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes' 
modifies 
the 
word 
'organization,' not the word 'church'" in § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Id.  
No one denies it is the nonprofit that must be operated 
primarily for religious purposes, not the church.  But that 
doesn't mean the nonprofit's motivations control the application 
of the statute.     
¶136 If (as the majority agrees) "purposes" means one's 
subjective reason for doing something, then in determining why a 
nonprofit is being operated, it is the operator's motives that 
matter.  According to the majority, however, the court can 
determine the subjective reason why a nonprofit is operated 
without examining the motives of the entity operating the 
                                                 
8 The majority similarly argues that "[t]hose employed by a 
church are . . . addressed in subdivisions 1. and 3. [of Wis. 
Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)], indicating . . . that 'employees who 
fall under subd. 2. are to be focused on separately in the 
statutory scheme from employees of a church.'"  Id., ¶35 
(quoting Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶25).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
21 
 
nonprofit. 
 
The 
majority's 
conclusion 
refutes 
itself.  
Apparently the majority would ask a car why it is being operated 
rather than asking the driver.  If the majority's analysis seems 
ridiculous, that's because it is. 
E.  The Majority's Test 
¶137 The majority affirms LIRC's denial of the exemption 
under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. using a two-prong test:  A 
nonprofit must (1) operate primarily for a religious reason and 
(2) primarily engage in activities that are "religious in 
nature."  Majority op., ¶¶59-67.  The majority's test, however, 
is unmoored from the text of § 108.02(15)(h)2.  The majority 
insists its test is the only way to "give reasonable effect to 
every word" in the statute because considering purposes alone 
would "give short shrift to the word 'operated.'"  Id., ¶¶44-45.  
But the majority's reformulation of the text relies on an 
unreasonable 
interpretation 
of 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., 
while 
impermissibly adding words to the statute.   
¶138 The majority offends basic rules of grammar by 
transmuting "operated," a transitive verb, into a noun——
"activity."  It does not address what "operated" means in its 
second use in Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.; instead, the 
majority completely ignores the fact that the word is used 
twice, employing a divide-and-conquer method of statutory 
interpretation this court has rebuked many times.    E.g., Brey, 
400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶13 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47); see 
also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167; King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 
473, 
500-01 
(2015) 
(Scalia, 
J., 
dissenting) 
("[S]ound 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
22 
 
interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not 
homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections.  Context 
always matters.").   
¶139 The 
majority 
completely 
reimagines 
the 
statute.  
Compare the statute's actual language to the majority's remaking 
of it: 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.:  "'Employment' as 
applied 
to 
work 
for 
a 
nonprofit 
organization . . . does not include service . . . [i]n 
the employ of an organization operated primarily for 
religious 
purposes 
and 
operated, 
supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches[.]"     
 Majority's interpretation:  "'Employment' as applied 
to work for a nonprofit organization . . . does not 
include 
service . . . [i]n 
the 
employ 
of 
an 
organization operated that has primarily for religious 
purposes and primarily performs activities that are 
religious 
in 
nature, 
which 
is 
and 
operated, 
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a 
church or convention or association of churches[.]"     
The 
majority's 
interpretation 
violates 
the 
"cardinal 
maxim . . . that courts should not add words to a statute to 
give it a certain meaning."  State v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶24, 
389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271 (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 
WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
23 
 
248, 938 N.W.2d 521 (quoting Fond Du Lac Cnty. v. Town of 
Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 
1989)).  Instead of reading words into the statute and 
rearranging the words to meet a desired result, we must 
"'interpret the words the legislature actually enacted into 
law.'"  Neill, 390 Wis. 2d 248, ¶23 (quoting Fitzgerald, 387 
Wis. 2d 384, ¶30).   
 
¶140 Troublingly, the majority's redefinition of "operated" 
to mean "activities" does not require a nonprofit to primarily 
engage in activities that are "religious in nature."  The 
majority fails to identify the source of its "religious in 
nature" requirement; it simply declares it and moves on.  The 
majority also fails to explain where——in the text——the majority 
derives the factors it uses to deny Catholic Charities the 
exemption.    
¶141 With no support for its interpretation in the text of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., 
the 
majority 
attempts 
to 
"buttress[] [its] conclusion" with this court's decision in 
Coulee Catholic Schools.  Majority op., ¶50.  But that decision 
concerned the ministerial exception under the First Amendment, 
not the statute at issue in this case.  Coulee Cath. Schs. v. 
LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.  Because 
Coulee Catholic Schools has nothing to say about the meaning of 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., the case is irrelevant.  The majority baldly 
asserts the decision "'provides guidance in understanding the 
religious 
purposes 
exemption 
here[,]'" 
majority 
op., 
¶52 
(quoting Cath. Charities Bureau, 406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶43), but 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
24 
 
fails to explain how Coulee Catholic Schools sheds any light on 
the meaning of § 108.02(15)(h)2., a statute it never mentions.         
¶142 The majority also mistakenly relies upon federal cases 
interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which exempts from taxation 
"[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational 
purposes . . . ." 
 
Cases 
interpreting 
and 
applying 
this 
exemption do not support the majority's conclusion that an 
exemption under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is available only 
if (1) a nonprofit's motivations are primarily religious and (2) 
the actual activities engaged in by the nonprofit are primarily 
"religious in nature."  The majority relies on a case from the 
Seventh Circuit, United States v. Dykema.  But the majority 
misunderstands Dykema and other federal cases interpreting 26 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).     
¶143   To 
the 
extent 
federal 
courts 
evaluate 
an 
organization's activities, they do not delve into whether the 
organization's activities are "religious in nature," as the 
majority does.  Instead, some federal courts use activities as 
evidence of motive in cases interpreting and applying 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3).  Dykema is not an exception.  As the court in 
Dykema explained, "it is necessary and proper for the IRS to 
survey all the activities of the organization, in order to 
determine whether what the organization in fact does is to carry 
out a religious mission or to engage in commercial business."  
666 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis added).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
25 
 
¶144 The Seventh Circuit later verified the limited role an 
organization's activities might play in the inquiry.  As the 
Seventh Circuit explained in Living Faith v. Commissioner, in 
evaluating "whether [an organization] is 'operated exclusively' 
for exempt purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3)" "[the 
court] focus[es] on 'the purposes toward which an organization's 
activity are directed, and not the nature of the activities."  
950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoted source omitted).  The 
activities and the "particular manner in which an organization's 
activities 
are 
conducted" 
are 
simply 
"evidence" 
used 
to 
"determin[e] whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt 
purpose" because "an organization's purposes may be inferred 
from its manner of operations."  Id. at 372; accord Presbyterian 
& Reformed Publ'g. Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 
1984) (stating the "inquiry must remain that of determining the 
purpose to which the . . . activity is directed"); B.S.W. Grp., 
Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978) (citation omitted) 
("[T]he purpose towards which an organization's activities are 
directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves, is 
ultimately dispositive of the organization's right to be 
classified as a section 501(c)(3) organization exempt from tax 
under section 501(a)."); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Comm'r, 41 
T.C. 719, 728 (1964) (first citing Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 
263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924); and then citing Unity Sch. of 
Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 70 (1926)) ("The statute requires, in 
relevant part, that the committee be organized and operated 
exclusively for religious purposes.  In this requirement, the 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
26 
 
statutory 
language 
treats 
as 
a 
touchstone, 
not 
the 
organization's activity, but rather the end for which that 
activity is undertaken.").  Activities serve only as "useful 
indicia of the organization's purpose or purposes."  Living 
Faith, 
950 
F.2d 
at 
372.9 
 
Dykema's 
list 
of 
"[t]ypical 
activities"10 in which an organization operated for religious 
                                                 
9 See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (stating "[a]n 
organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or 
more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities 
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified 
in section 501(c)(3).  An organization will not be so regarded 
if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in 
furtherance of an exempt purpose").   
10  Dykema provided the following list: 
(a) 
corporate 
worship 
services, 
including 
due 
administration 
of 
sacraments 
and 
observance 
of 
liturgical rituals, as well as a preaching ministry 
and 
evangelical 
outreach 
to 
the 
unchurched 
and 
missionary 
activity 
in 
partibus 
infidelium; 
(b) 
pastoral counseling and comfort to members facing 
grief, illness, adversity, or spiritual problems; (c) 
performance 
by 
the 
clergy 
of 
customary 
church 
ceremonies affecting the lives of individuals, such as 
baptism, marriage, burial, and the like; (d) a system 
of nurture of the young and education in the doctrine 
and discipline of the church, as well as (in the case 
of mature and well developed churches) theological 
seminaries for the advanced study and the training of 
ministers. 
Dykema, 666 F.2d at 1100. 
It is unclear why the majority relies on Dykema's list as 
heavily as it does.  Dykema did not cite any legal authority 
supporting its list of typical religious activities.  See id.  
The court simply made it up.  Moreover, Dykema's list is not 
used by other courts.  The only published opinions having relied 
on its list are the court of appeals, below, and this court——in 
this very case.  Moreover, Dykema's list was meant to serve only 
as a list of "[t]ypical activities" done for a religious 
purpose.  Id.  Nothing in Dykema suggests a nonprofit is 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
27 
 
purposes might engage is just that——a list of typical religious 
activities.  666 F.2d at 1100.  Courts interpreting and applying 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) have acknowledged that religious purposes 
might be unorthodox or resemble secular purposes.  E.g., Golden 
Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719 (holding a commercial enterprise 
was operated for religious purposes because it was created as an 
illustration of the applicability of a church's teachings in 
daily life); accord Dep't of Emp. v. Champion Bake-N-Serve, 
Inc., 592 P.2d 1370 (Idaho 1979) (holding a bakery was "operated 
primarily for religious purposes" under state law because the 
students at issue worked at the bakery as a part of their 
religious training); see Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting "[c]hurches often regard the 
provision of [community services] as a means of fulfilling 
religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a 
church seeks to foster").   
¶145 Federal cases interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) do 
not support the majority's bifurcated purpose-activities test, 
under which courts must determine whether an activity is 
religious or secular in nature.  At most, the federal cases 
support examining an organization's activities as evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
"operated 
primarily 
for 
religious 
purposes" 
only 
if 
the 
organization engages primarily in activities that are "religious 
in nature," as the majority requires.      
The majority also wrongly asserts that the Dykema court 
"examined an organization's actual activities."  Majority op., 
¶87.  The Dykema court did no such thing.  The court reversed a 
district court decision denying the enforcement of an IRS 
summons that called for 14 categories of records belonging to a 
church.  666 F.2d at 1098, 1104.     
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
28 
 
motive.  Because both LIRC and the majority concede that the 
reason Catholic Charities are operated is religious, federal 
precedent 
supplies 
no 
support 
for 
the 
majority's 
faulty 
conclusion.  
¶146 It is unsurprising that no other court has adopted the 
majority's 
approach; 
it 
is 
incoherent. 
 
The 
majority's 
bifurcated purpose-activities test falls apart upon the faintest 
scrutiny.  Most obviously, religious activities cannot be 
separated from religious purposes.  It is the underlying 
religious motivation that makes an activity religious.  See, 
e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
715-16 (1981); Univ. of Great Falls v. N.L.R.B., 278 F.3d 1335, 
1346 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  For example, anyone——religious or 
irreligious——could use peyote,11 kill animals,12 grow a 1/2–inch 
beard,13 or use Saturday as a day of rest.14   One could read the 
Bible for secular or religious reasons.  Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712, 734-35 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that "the study of theology does not necessarily implicate 
religious devotion or faith" since it may be done "from a 
secular perspective as well as from a religious one").  One 
                                                 
11 Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990).   
12 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993).   
13 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (holding a prison's 
refusal to allow a Muslim to grow a 1/2-inch beard violated the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).   
14 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
29 
 
could erect a cross to promote a Christian message or honor 
fallen soldiers.  See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S. 
___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2082 (2019).  Such activities are 
religious activities only if motivated by religious beliefs.  
See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360-61 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717 n.28 (2014); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("A way of life, however 
virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to 
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on 
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the 
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious 
belief."). 
 
Unable 
to 
divorce 
religious 
activities 
from 
religious motivations, the majority's activities prong swallows 
the majority's purposes prong.  The only activities that are 
"religious in nature," according to the majority, are activities 
that presuppose a religious purpose——e.g., proselytizing and 
teaching one's religious doctrine.  Majority op., ¶¶55, 60.  The 
majority's purposes prong is superfluous.   
¶147 The majority's activities prong doesn't simply ask 
whether an activity is religious, it asks whether it is 
"religious in nature."  But no activities are inherently 
religious; religious motivation makes an activity religious.  
The majority actually inquires whether Catholic Charities' 
activities are stereotypically religious.  Nothing in the text 
of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., however, prompts the court to 
determine 
what 
religious 
activities 
are 
sufficiently 
stereotypical.  The majority never explains what an inherently 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
30 
 
religious activity is, leaving it up to courts to make 
determinations of religiosity on an ad hoc basis.    What is 
inherently religious will simply reflect what an individual 
judge subjectively regards as religious enough.  The statute 
does not demand this exercise, and more importantly the 
constitution bars such an inquiry.  Infra, ¶¶163-97.   
¶148 Further 
highlighting 
the 
deficiencies 
of 
the 
majority's test, the majority fails to explain why the factors 
it furnishes make an activity more or less "religious in 
nature."  For example, why does offering a service to those of a 
different faith tradition make the activity less "religious in 
nature"?  See majority op., ¶61.  Doesn't this factor conflict 
with the majority's statements that religious outreach and 
evangelism are "religious in nature"?  Id., ¶60.  The majority 
asserts that activities resembling secular ones are less 
"religious in nature."  Id., ¶¶63-64, 66.  But the overlap 
between secular and religious conduct does not make the 
religious conduct any less religious.  As the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit explained, "[t]hat a 
secular university might share some goals and practices with a 
Catholic or other religious institution cannot render the 
actions of the latter any less religious."  Univ. of Great 
Falls, 278 F.3d at 1346.            
¶149 Incoherency aside, the majority's primarily-religious-
in-nature-activities 
requirement 
is 
highly 
susceptible 
to 
manipulation.  "[T]he definition of a particular program can 
always be manipulated" such that the inquiry may be "'reduced to 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
31 
 
a simple semantic exercise.'"  See Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. 
for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 215 (2013) (quoting 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001)).  The 
activities of Catholic Charities can be characterized as the 
provision of charitable social services.  They can also be 
characterized 
as 
"providing 
services 
to 
the 
poor 
and 
disadvantaged as an expression of the social ministry of the 
Catholic Church in the Diocese of Superior" and acting as "an 
effective sign of the charity of Christ."  A religious activity 
can be described narrowly, making it sound more secular, or 
described broadly, making it sound more religious.  Baking 
sounds secular while religious training sounds religious; both 
characterizations could fit the activities at issue in a case.  
See Champion Bake-N-Serve, Inc., 592 P.2d 1370.  Whether one is 
entitled to the exemption under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. 
cannot turn on word games.        
¶150 The court makes meager effort to explain why it 
considers activities like proselytizing and teaching religious 
doctrine more religious than religiously motivated charitable 
services.  Many religions consider charity a central religious 
practice.  As one amicus——the Jewish Coalition for Religious 
Liberty ("the Jewish Coalition")——explains, it believes each of 
the commandments in the Torah is a divine obligation.15  One of 
the obligations is charity, which the Jewish Coalition explains 
                                                 
15 Amicus Br. Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty, at 7. 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
32 
 
is sometimes connected to religious rituals and sometimes not; 
regardless, both equally express the Jewish commandments.16     
¶151 The majority's conclusion that Catholic Charities' 
activities are not religious because their activities are 
charitable is unsupportable.  In this case, there is no daylight 
between religious activities and charitable activities.  See St. 
Augustine's Ctr. for Am. Indians, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab., 449 
N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting St. Vincent DePaul 
Shop v. Garnes, No. 74AP-76, 1974 WL 184313, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 17, 1974) (unpublished opinion)) (alterations in original) 
("[T]he terms 'charitable' and 'religious' are not mutually 
exclusive and . . . 'the fact that an organization is charitable 
does not preclude it from being religious.'").  In their briefs, 
Catholic Charities explain that charity is a religious activity 
for Catholics, in which Catholic Charities engages as the 
Diocese of Superior's social ministry arm.  According to 
Catholic Charities, "[c]harity is 'the greatest' of the Catholic 
Church's 
theological 
virtues . . . . 
 
Charity . . . is 
a 
'constitutive 
element 
of 
the 
Church's 
mission 
and 
an 
indispensable expression of her very being.'"  Consistent with 
Catholic doctrine——as documented in the briefs——"[t]he Catholic 
Church 'claims works of charity as its own inalienable duty and 
right.'"  Catholic Charities explains that according to the 
Catholic faith, charity is a religious duty they must fulfill in 
an impartial manner, without proselytizing.  As Catholic 
Charities inform us, "'the Church's missionary spirit is not 
                                                 
16 Id. at 7-8. 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
33 
 
about 
proselytizing, 
but 
the 
testimony 
of 
a 
life 
that 
illuminates the path, which brings hope and love.'"    Catholic 
Charities "carr[y] on [the Diocese of Superior's] good work by 
providing programs and services that are based on gospel values 
and principles of the Catholic Social Teachings."    The purpose 
of Catholic Charities "is to be an effective sign of the charity 
of Christ[.]"  Multiple amici similarly confirm that charity is 
a 
religious 
activity 
in 
each 
of 
their 
respective 
faith 
traditions.  As one court observed, "the concept of acts of 
charity as an essential part of religious worship is a central 
tenet of all major religions."  W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of 
Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1994).   
For example, one of the five Pillars of Islam——the 
fundamental ritual requirements of worship, including 
ritual prayer——requires Muslims of sufficient means to 
give alms to the poor and other classes of recipients.  
Also, Hindus belonging to the Brahmin, Ksatriya, and 
Vaisya castes are required to fulfill five daily 
obligations of worship, one of which is making 
offerings to guests, symbolized by giving food to a 
priest or giving food or aid to the poor.  The concept 
finds its place in Judaism in the form of tendering to 
the poor clothing for the naked, food for the hungry, 
and benevolence to the needy.   
Id. 
(internal 
citations 
omitted). 
 
Reflecting 
this 
understanding, an Illinois court17 recently reversed a state 
agency determination that an organization was not primarily 
operated for religious purposes, holding the agency "erred by 
recharacterizing [the provision of meals, homework help, and 
                                                 
17 Illinois courts consider the activities of a nonprofit in 
cases 
under 
the 
Illinois 
equivalent 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2.  E.g., Concordia Ass'n v. Ward, 532 N.E.2d 411 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1988).    
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
34 
 
literacy 
improvement] 
as 
secular 
activities" 
when 
the 
organization "characterized [those activities] as religious 
exercises" of the organization.  By The Hand Club for Kids, NFP, 
Inc. v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 188 N.E.3d 1196, ¶52 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2020).  The same is true in this case.  Catholic Charities' 
charitable activities are a part of their religious exercise, 
which means those activities are religious.  This court 
belittles Catholic Charities' faith——and many other faith 
traditions——by mischaracterizing their religiously motivated 
charitable activities as "secular in nature," majority op., ¶67—
—that is, not really religious at all.  
¶152 Ultimately, the majority demolishes its own test, 
obliquely saying the activities the majority will consider 
inherently religious "may be different for different faiths."  
Id., ¶55.  If what constitutes an inherently religious activity 
might be different for different faiths, the majority must 
explain why religiously motivated charity is not an inherently 
religious activity for Catholics.  It never does.                
¶153 The 
majority's 
erroneous 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.——which produces the 
demeaning conclusion that the social ministry arm of the Diocese 
of Superior is inherently secular——would be baffling but for the 
majority's 
admissions 
of 
its 
results-oriented 
approach.  
According to the majority, a plain reading of the statute would 
be "'too broad'" a policy, so the majority adopts a contorted 
construction instead.  Id., ¶48 (quoting Cath. Charities Bureau, 
406 Wis. 2d 586, ¶37).  The majority anxiously speculates a 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
35 
 
plain reading might exempt Catholic colleges, schools, and 
(gasp) hospitals.  Id., ¶48 n.12.18  This court has neither the 
authority nor competency to decide how broad or narrow a policy 
should be.  The legislature decided how broadly the exemption 
sweeps, and it is not for this court to second-guess that policy 
decision.  Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 
WI 57, ¶96, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) ("The people of Wisconsin elect judges 
                                                 
18 The majority's footnote expressing indignation at the 
prospect that religious colleges, schools, and hospitals might 
be exempt under Catholic Charities' reading of the exemption 
appears to prejudge issues not before this court.  Amicus 
curiae, Maranatha Baptist University, et al., comprises a 
collection of faith-based nonprofits that primarily provide 
education.  Its brief notes that a number of its members 
currently 
qualify 
for 
the 
exemption 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., but would likely lose that exemption if this 
court upholds the court of appeals.  Amicus Br. Maranatha 
Baptist University, et al., at 5-6.  Amicus argues "[t]he 
federal government has long counted religious schools as being 
operated primarily for religious purposes."  Id. at 9 n.1 
(citing Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 28-87, U.S. 
Dept. of Labor (June 10, 1987)) ("'The second category of 
services exempt from the required coverage are those performed 
in 
the 
employ 
of 
religious 
schools 
and 
other 
entities . . . .'").  The majority simply ignores this argument.   
Curiously, the majority's assumption that Catholic colleges 
and schools cannot qualify for the exemption exists in tension 
with the cases upon which it relies.  The majority analogizes 
its test to cases applying the ministerial exception under the 
First Amendment. In each of the cases the majority cites, 
however, the religious school received the exception.  Our Lady 
of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 
2049 (2020); Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 
275, 768 N.W.2d 868; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).  The majority 
neglects to explain why Catholic colleges and schools receive 
such radically different treatment under the test it employs in 
this case.   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
36 
 
to interpret the law, not make it."); See also Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 21; Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law 20 (1997) ("Congress can enact 
foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for courts 
to decide which is which and rewrite the former.").  "Courts 
decide what the law is, not what it should be.  In the course of 
executing this judicial function, we neither endorse nor condemn 
the legislature's policy choices."  See Sanders, 408 Wis. 2d 
370, ¶44.  Judges have no authority to advance their favored 
policies by expanding or narrowing a statute's text beyond what 
the fair meaning of the statute contemplates.    
¶154 To mask its policy-driven reasoning, the majority 
employs the shibboleth that remedial statutes are liberally 
construed 
and 
exemptions 
are 
narrowly 
construed——a 
long-
discredited 
maxim 
that 
pawns 
judicial 
activism 
off 
as 
legitimate, 
textual 
interpretation. 
 
See 
CTS 
Corp. 
v. 
Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 12 (2014) (stating the remedial statute 
canon is not "a substitute for a conclusion grounded in the 
statute's text and structure").  The majority's unabashed 
reliance on the remedial statute canon is troubling given the 
immense criticism the so-called canon has received.  The 
majority makes clear it is aware of these criticisms, but uses 
the maxim anyway, without defending it.  Majority op., ¶47 n.11.  
The majority should not employ the maxim so thoughtlessly, since 
it has been severely criticized and abandoned by many jurists 
espousing a wide range of judicial philosophies.  E.g., Regions 
Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2019) 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
37 
 
(expressly refusing to apply the so-called remedial statute 
canon because of its "dubious value"); Dir., Off. of Workers' 
Comp. Programs, Dep't of Lab. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry 
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 135 (1995) (calling the maxim the "last 
redoubt of losing causes"); Keen v. Helson, 930 F.3d 799, 805 
(6th Cir. 2019) (describing the maxim as the least useful of the 
interpretive tools a judge might use); see also E. Bay Mun. 
Util. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 142 F.3d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) ("express[ing] . . . general doubts about the canon").  
Antonin Scalia once compared the canon's use to Chinese water 
torture, in which "one's intelligence [is] strapped down 
helplessly" as the maxim is repeated as a "ritual error[]."  
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 
40 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 581, 581 (1989) [hereinafter Assorted 
Canards].        
¶155 Judges have discarded the remedial statute canon 
because it has three critical flaws.  The first is the canon's 
"indeterminate coverage."  Regions Bank, 936 F.3d at 1195.  
Jurists have been unable to agree on what constitutes a remedial 
statute.  Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra, at 583-86; Ober 
United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 135 F.3d 822, 
825 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Although courts have often used the 
maxim[,] . . . it is not at all apparent just what is and what 
is 
not 
remedial 
legislation."). 
 
This 
is 
unsurprising, 
considering "almost every statute might be described as remedial 
in the sense that all statutes are designed to remedy some 
problem."  CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 12; accord Scalia & Garner, 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
38 
 
supra, at 364 ("Is any statute not remedial?  Does any statute 
not seek to remedy an unjust or inconvenient situation?"); Keen, 
930 F. 3d at 805 (noting that the canon's "trigger——a 'remedial 
statute'——is hopelessly vague").   
¶156 Second, what constitutes a "liberal" or "strict" 
construction is unanswerable.  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 365.  
As Antonin Scalia noted, the canon "lay[s] a judicial thumb" "of 
indeterminate weight"  "on one or the other side of the scales" 
in statutory interpretation.  Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra, 
at 582.  "How 'liberal' is liberal, and how 'strict' is strict?"  
Id.  No one can say.   
¶157 Finally, the maxim is "premised on two mistaken ideas:  
(1) that statutes have a singular purpose and (2) that [the 
legislature] wants statutes to extend as far as possible in 
service of that purpose.  Instead, statutes have many competing 
purposes, 
and 
[the 
legislature] 
balances 
these 
competing 
purposes by negotiating and crafting statutory text."  Keen, 930 
F.3d at 805 (citing Newport News, 514 U.S. at 135-36); CTS 
Corp., 573 U.S. at 12 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 
U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)) ("[T]he Court has 
emphasized that 'no legislation pursues its purposes at all 
costs.'"); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. ___, 138 
S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (citations omitted).  As Richard Posner 
explained, 
the 
maxim 
is 
"unrealistic 
about 
legislative 
objectives" and "ignore[s] the role of compromise in the 
legislative process and, more fundamentally, the role of 
interest groups, whose clashes blunt the thrust of many 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
39 
 
legislative 
initiatives." 
 
Richard 
A. 
Posner, 
Statutory 
Interpretation——in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 800, 808-09 (1983).  The maxim ignores that 
"limiting provisions . . . are no less a reflection of the 
genuine 'purpose' of the statute than the operative provisions, 
and it is not the court's function to alter the legislative 
compromise."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 21.  Those who employ 
the maxim rarely appreciate that "[t]oo much 'liberality' will 
undermine the statute as surely as too literal an interpretation 
would."  In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).     
¶158 In fact, the remedial statute "canon" is not a canon 
at all.  It is "an excuse" to reach a desired result.  Keen, 930 
F.3d at 805; Scalia, Assorted Canards, supra, at 586 (stating 
the maxim "is so wonderfully indeterminate" it can always be 
used to "reach[] the result the court wishes to achieve").  Its 
vagueness makes it "an open invitation" to ignore the statute's 
text and "engage in judicial improvisation" to reach the judge's 
preferred outcome.  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 365-66.  This 
court should abandon the maxim and return to deciding cases 
based upon the fair meaning of the text.  Instead of reading the 
exemption strictly, "the court need only determine 'how a 
reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have 
understood the text at the time it was issued.'"  United Am., 
LLC v. DOT, 2021 WI 44, ¶44, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 33).  The majority violates the rule that a 
"strict construction" cannot be "an unreasonable construction."  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
40 
 
Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶25, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 
N.W.2d 384 (citing Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. City of 
Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, ¶32, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906); 
see also McNeil v. Hansen, 2007 WI 56, ¶10, 300 Wis. 2d 358, 731 
N.W.2d 273 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371 (2006)) (stating 
exemptions to remedial statutes "'should be strictly, and 
reasonably, construed and extend only as far as their language 
fairly warrants'").  To the extent the maxim delivers any value, 
it is not even applicable in this case because the statute is 
unambiguous.  State of Wis. Dep't of Just. v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, 
¶32, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 (quoting Salazar v. Ramah 
Navajo 
Chapter, 
567 
U.S. 
182, 
207 
(2012) 
(Roberts, 
J., 
dissenting)). 
¶159 The majority compounds its errors by using legislative 
history to contradict (rather than confirm) the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51; State 
v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 897 n.5, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).  
Legislative history is not the law, and it cannot override the 
law's clear meaning.  See State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶55, 
380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (Kelly, J., concurring) ("[W]e 
give effect only to what the legislature does, not what it tried 
to do.").  In this case, the majority does not even cite state 
legislative history; instead, it relies upon federal legislative 
history to contravene the plain meaning of a state law.  In so 
doing, the majority makes another "law's history superior to the 
law itself[.]"  Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, ¶91, 398 
Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
41 
 
dissenting). 
 
Using 
long-discredited 
methodologies, 
the 
majority's interpretation discards the statutory text, ignores 
its plain meaning, and triggers constitutional quandaries.        
III.  THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 
¶160 The majority's decision is an egregious example of 
legislating from the bench.  It takes a simple statute and 
twists its language to narrow its sweep.  In so doing, the 
majority engages in religious discrimination and entangles the 
state with religion in violation of the First Amendment.19   
Courts sometimes——though inappropriately——warp a statute's fair 
meaning to save it from unconstitutionality.  See St. Augustine 
Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶112, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(discussing 
a 
particularly egregious example).  In this case, the majority 
bends over backwards to alter the statute's meaning and create a 
constitutional violation, turning the canon of constitutional 
avoidance on its head.  State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶8, 281 
Wis. 2d 484, 697 N.W.2d 769 (quoting Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 
52, ¶65, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666); Jankowski v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 104 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981) 
(quoting Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 50, 
                                                 
19 Any constitutional issues arising from a plain-meaning 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. are not before 
the court.  Similarly, the constitutionality of the second prong 
of § 108.02(15)(h)2., requiring the nonprofit to be "operated, 
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches[,]" is not before the 
court.  See, e.g., Christian Sch. Ass'n of Greater Harrisburg v. 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 423 A.2d 1340, 1346-47 
(Pa. 1980).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
42 
 
268 N.W.2d 153 (1978)); Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 
239 N.W.2d 536 (1976) ("Where there is serious doubt of 
constitutionality, we must look to see whether there is a 
construction of the statute which is reasonably possible which 
will avoid the constitutional question.").         
¶161 The First Amendment declares:  "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment apply to the states via 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing 
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940).20  Catholic Charities claim an inquiry into 
                                                 
20 Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme 
Court has questioned whether the Establishment Clause properly 
applies to states.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-
79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45, 49-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-93 
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U.S. 565, 604-07 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 
588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2095 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 
591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263-64  (2020) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Thomas has argued the Establishment Clause 
is a "federalism provision," Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment), which merely prohibits Congress 
"from establishing a national religion" and "interfer[ing] with 
state establishments."  Id. at 50.  It does "not protect any 
individual right."  Id.  Under this theory, the Establishment 
Clause, "resists incorporation."  Id. at 45.  "[A]n incorporated 
Establishment Clause would prohibit exactly what the text of the 
Clause seeks to protect:  state establishments of religion."  
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citation omitted).  Scholars have debated whether the 
Establishment Clause was meant to be incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Compare Vincent Philip Muñoz, The 
Original 
Meaning 
of 
the 
Establishment 
Clause 
and 
the 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
43 
 
whether their activities are "religious in nature" violates the 
First Amendment by discriminating against their religious 
practices and excessively entangling the government in religious 
affairs.       
¶162 The majority improperly stacks the deck against 
Catholic Charities' claims under the Religion Clauses from the 
outset, requiring Catholic Charities to prove their First 
Amendment rights are violated "beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Majority op., ¶77.  "The United States Supreme Court has 
abandoned the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for assessing 
the constitutionality of statutory law[,]" and this court must 
follow the Court's pronouncements on issues of federal law.  
Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶65, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940 
N.W.2d 875 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing 
Edward C. Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality 
Based on Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 97, 
109 (2013)).  "No United States Supreme Court case since 1984 
                                                                                                                                                             
Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 J. Const. L. 585 (2006), 
and William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: 
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 
1191 (1990), with Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the 
Establishment 
Clause: 
The 
Rise 
of 
the 
Nonestablishment 
Principle, 27 Ariz. State L.J. 1085 (1995), and Nathan S. 
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Agreeing to Disagree: How the 
Establishment Clause Protects Religious Diversity and Freedom of 
Conscience 75-84 (2023).  Regardless, the Court has held the 
Establishment Clause applies to the states, and we are duty 
bound to apply the Court's decisions interpreting and applying 
the Establishment Clause.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶18-
19, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142; cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to 
prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this 
Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how 
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."). 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
44 
 
has applied a strong presumption of constitutionality in 
challenges to federal statutes."  Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients 
& Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶78, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 
678 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (citing Dawson, 
supra, at 109 n.43).  Instead, the Court "will strike down 
statutes upon a 'plain showing' of their unconstitutionality, or 
when their unconstitutionality is 'clearly demonstrated.'"  Id., 
¶80.  "This court continues to reflexively apply the rule 
without any acknowledgement of the United States Supreme Court's 
reformulation of the standard."  Id. (citations omitted).  
Conforming to the standards articulated by the Court would end 
the 
absurdity 
of 
applying 
the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard.  The majority does not hold Catholic Charities' First 
Amendment rights are not violated by its interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2.; instead, it merely holds Catholic 
Charities failed to prove their rights are violated "beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  See C.S., 391 Wis. 2d 35, ¶67 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).                        
A.  Religious Discrimination 
¶163 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. violates the First Amendment's Free Exercise 
Clause 
and 
Establishment 
Clause 
by 
discriminating 
among 
religious faiths.  The majority sidesteps the issue of religious 
discrimination by declaring Catholic Charities failed to show 
the law burdens their free exercise of religion.  Majority op., 
¶¶105-07. 
 
The 
majority, 
however, 
misapprehends 
Catholic 
Charities' alleged burden, causing it to erroneously conclude 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
45 
 
there is no burden on their free exercise at all.  Contrary to 
the majority's assertions, Catholic Charities do not allege that 
paying the tax itself burdens their free exercise of religion.  
See Id.21  Catholic Charities never argued the Free Exercise 
Clause guarantees them an exemption from paying the unemployment 
tax.  Instead, Catholic Charities assert that discriminatorily 
denying them the exemption under § 108.02(15)(h)2. burdens their 
free exercise of religion.   
¶164 Catholic Charities are correct.22  The United States 
Supreme Court has long held that withholding a benefit or 
privilege based on religious status or activity may constitute a 
burden on the free exercise of religion.  Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 
Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 466 (2017) (holding expressly 
requiring a religious institution to renounce its religious 
character in order to receive a public benefit imposes a penalty 
                                                 
21 The majority exclusively relies upon cases in which the 
litigant argued the Free Exercise Clause required the state to 
provide an exemption from a generally applicable tax.  Majority 
op., ¶105 (first citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of 
Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990); and then citing 
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989)); see also 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting that the 
Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from paying social 
security taxes even if the payment of such taxes violates one's 
sincerely held religious beliefs).   
22 The Free Exercise Clause would not, absent Wis. Stat. § 
108.02(15)(h)2., require the state to exempt Catholic Charities 
from paying the tax.  After it creates a religious exemption, 
however, the state cannot discriminate against certain religions 
or religious practices in applying the exemption.  See Carson v. 
Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 785 (2022); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. 
Comm'r, 41 T.C. 719, 729 (1964).        
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
46 
 
on the free exercise of religion); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of 
Revenue, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (quoted 
source omitted) (noting "precedents have 'repeatedly confirmed' 
the straightforward rule that . . . [w]hen otherwise eligible 
recipients are disqualified from a public benefit 'solely 
because of their religious character,' we must apply strict 
scrutiny"); Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 786-88 (2022) 
(holding religious status or activity cannot be the basis for 
denying a benefit or privilege); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988).  As the Supreme 
Court said long ago, "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that 
the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the 
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."  
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (citations omitted).   
¶165 Supreme Court precedent has focused on the denial of a 
"generally available" benefit to those with a religious status 
or who engage in certain religious activities.  Carson, 596 U.S. 
at 780.  For example, in Sherbert, an employer fired a member of 
the Seventh-day Adventist Church because she would not work on 
Saturdays, and the state later denied her otherwise generally 
available unemployment benefits because it determined her 
religious beliefs were not "good cause" to reject other 
employment.  374 U.S. at 400.  The Supreme Court held that 
denying her unemployment benefits because of her religious 
practices placed a burden on her free exercise of religion:   
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared 
ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the 
practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to 
forego that practice is unmistakable.  The ruling 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
47 
 
forces her to choose between following the precepts of 
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, 
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in 
order to accept work, on the other hand.  Governmental 
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of 
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a 
fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday 
worship. 
Id. at 404.  As the court concluded, "to condition the 
availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to 
violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively 
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties."  
Id. at 406.23   
¶166 In Trinity Lutheran, a state offered grants to 
nonprofits to help finance the purchase of rubber playground 
surfaces.  582 U.S. at 454.  The program awarded grants based on 
several religiously neutral criteria, such as the level of 
poverty in the surrounding area and the applicant's plan to 
promote recycling.  Id. at 455.  However, the state denied 
Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center a grant it was 
otherwise qualified to receive because of the state's policy to 
deny grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, 
sect, or religious entity.  Id. at 455-56.  The Court held that 
denying Trinity Lutheran the otherwise available grant burdened 
                                                 
23 See also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that failure to provide a Jehovah's 
Witness unemployment benefits because he quit his job due to his 
religious objections to making armaments burdened his free 
exercise); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 
U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that failure to provide a member of the 
Seventh-day Adventist Church unemployment benefits because she 
was fired after refusing to work from sundown on Friday to 
sundown on Saturday in accordance with her religious beliefs 
burdened her free exercise of religion).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
48 
 
Trinity Lutheran's free exercise of religion.  The Court 
reasoned 
a 
denial 
based 
on 
religion 
penalizes 
religious 
exercise:   
[T]he Department's policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a 
choice:  It may participate in an otherwise available 
benefit program or remain a religious institution.  Of 
course, Trinity Lutheran is free to continue operating 
as a church . . . .  But that freedom comes at the 
cost of automatic and absolute exclusion from the 
benefits of a public program for which the Center is 
otherwise fully qualified.  And when the State 
conditions a benefit in this way, . . . the State has 
punished the free exercise of religion:  "To condition 
the 
availability 
of 
benefits . . . upon 
[a 
recipient's] 
willingness 
to . . . surrender[] 
his 
religiously impelled [status] effectively penalizes 
the free exercise of his constitutional liberties."  
Id. at 462 (some alterations in original) (quoting McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)).  The Court 
acknowledged the state's policy did not constitute direct 
coercion over religious exercise.  Id. at 463.  But withholding 
an otherwise available benefit based on religious status creates 
constitutionally intolerable indirect coercion over, and a 
penalty on, religious exercise.  Id. (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 
450) ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause protects against 'indirect 
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just 
outright prohibitions.'").   
 
¶167 In Carson, a state provided tuition assistance to 
parents who lived in school districts that were unable to 
operate a secondary school.  596 U.S. at 773.  Under the 
program, parents chose the school they wanted their child to 
attend and the state school administrative units paid the 
school.  Id. at 773-74.  In order for a private school to 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
49 
 
receive 
the 
payment, 
the 
school 
needed 
to 
meet 
basic 
requirements under the state compulsory education law, like 
offering a course on the history of the state.  Id. at 774.  
State 
law 
excluded 
"sectarian" 
schools 
from 
the 
tuition 
reimbursement program.  Id.  The petitioners wished to send 
their children to schools that were, but for the "nonsectarian" 
requirement, eligible to receive the tuition assistance.  Id. at 
776.   
 
¶168 The 
Court 
held 
the 
program's 
"nonsectarian" 
requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause because the law 
"'effectively penalize[d] the free exercise' of religion" by 
conditioning the tuition assistance on the school's religious 
character.  Id. at 780.  The state argued that lesser scrutiny 
should apply because it was not discriminating against religious 
status, but withheld state funds if the school engaged in 
certain religious activities.  Id. at 786-87.  The Court 
rejected the status-activities distinction, noting that "[a]ny 
attempt to give effect to such a distinction by scrutinizing 
whether and how a religious school pursues its educational 
mission 
would . . . raise 
serious 
concerns 
about 
state 
entanglement with religion and denominational favoritism."  Id. 
at 787 (citations omitted).     
¶169 The exemption in this case is available only to 
religiously 
affiliated 
institutions. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. (requiring the nonprofit to be "operated, 
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches" in order to receive the 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
50 
 
tax 
exemption). 
 
Nonetheless, 
the 
principles 
underlying 
Sherbert, Trinity Lutheran, and Carson have equal force when the 
alleged discrimination occurs among religious institutions, 
rather than between religious and secular entities.    
¶170 The Sherbert-Trinity Lutheran-Carson line of cases 
prohibit indirect coercion and penalties on religious exercise.  
E.g., Carson, 596 U.S. at 778 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450); 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 ("Where the state conditions receipt 
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious 
faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct 
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.").  Failure to 
provide 
a 
benefit, 
which 
is 
otherwise 
available 
to 
any 
religiously affiliated entity, to a religious institution 
because 
of 
its 
religious 
status 
or 
religious 
activities 
"condition[s] the availability of [a] benefit[] upon [its] 
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [its] religious 
faith[,] effectively penaliz[ing] the free exercise of [its] 
constitutional liberties."  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.  Even if 
a 
benefit 
is 
available 
only 
to 
religiously 
affiliated 
organizations, the denial of the benefit still pressures the 
entity to forego its religious practices, forcing the entity to 
"choose between following the precepts of [its] religion and 
forfeiting benefits."  Id. at 404.  As in Sherbert, Trinity 
Lutheran, and Carson, such a choice burdens the free exercise of 
religion.  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
51 
 
¶171 At their core, the Religion Clauses prohibit the 
government from discriminating among religions.  "From the 
beginning, 
this 
nation's 
conception 
of 
religious 
liberty 
included, at a minimum, the equal treatment of all religious 
faiths without discrimination or preference."  Colo. Christian 
Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008).  
Historically, England privileged the Church of England and 
penalized non-established religions and practices.  In the 16th 
century, Parliament enacted the Thirty-nine Articles of Faith, 
which determined the tenets of the Church of England and the 
liturgy for religious worship.  Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Agreeing to Disagree: How the Establishment Clause 
Protects Religious Diversity and Freedom of Conscience 12-13 
(2023).  Additionally, "[t]he Acts of Uniformity of 1549, 1559, 
and 
1662 
required 
all 
ministers 
to 
conform 
to 
these 
requirements, making the Church of England the sole institution 
for lawful public worship."  Id. at 13.  "There were also 
specific 'Penal Acts' suppressing the practice of faiths whose 
tenets were thought to be inimical to the regime."  Id. at 14.  
The practice of establishing churches "of the old world [was] 
transplanted 
and . . . thrive[d] 
in 
the 
soil 
of 
the 
new 
America."  Everson, 330 U.S. at 9.  In the American colonies 
religious dissenters were often penalized for their heterodox 
religious practices.  For example, in Connecticut in the 1740s, 
religious dissenters were fined and imprisoned for preaching and 
meeting.  Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 90 
(2002).  In Virginia, laws "fin[ed] 'scismaticall persons' who 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
52 
 
refused to have their children baptized, prohibit[ed] the 
immigration 
of 
Quakers, 
and 
outlaw[ed] 
Quaker 
religious 
assemblies."  Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 17.   
¶172 "During the Revolution, American establishments lost 
their severity," and states tended to abandon direct penalties 
on non-established religions and religious practices while 
retaining privileges for the established religion and religious 
practices of the state.  Hamburger, supra, at 89-90.  By the 
time the First Amendment was written, "at least ten of the 
twelve state constitutional free exercise provisions required 
equal 
religious 
treatment 
and 
prohibited 
denominational 
preferences."  Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257 (citing 
Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious 
Liberty, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1559, 1637–39 (1989)).  One of the 
"essential legal elements of disestablishment" in the states was 
denominational equality.  Chapman & McConnell, supra, at 57.  
The principle that the government cannot prefer one religion 
over 
another 
has 
"strong 
historical 
roots 
and 
is 
often 
considered one of the most fundamental guarantees of religious 
freedom." 
 
Jeremy 
Patrick-Justice, 
Strict 
Scrutiny 
for 
Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y.C. L. 
Rev. 53, 54-55 (2005).  The constitutional bar on religious 
discrimination among faiths emanates from both Religion Clauses.  
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982); Colo. Christian 
Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257.  
¶173 The Supreme Court has unwaveringly affirmed the 
central principle that government cannot prefer one religion 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
53 
 
over another:  "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause 
is 
that 
one 
religious 
denomination 
cannot 
be 
officially 
preferred over another."  Larson 456 U.S. at 244; Everson, 330 
U.S. at 15 (stating that under the Establishment Clause, a state 
cannot "pass laws which . . . prefer one religion over 
another."); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) 
(stating religious exemptions must be "administered neutrally 
among different faiths"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 
(1952) ("The government must be neutral when it comes to 
competition between sects."); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. 
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 707 (1994) ("[I]t is clear 
that neutrality as among religions must be honored."); Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our 
democracy . . . must be neutral in matters of religious theory, 
doctrine, and practice.  It may not . . . aid, foster, or 
promote 
one 
religion 
or 
religious 
theory 
against 
another . . . ."); see also Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 662 
(2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting from grant of application to 
vacate stay) (describing denominational neutrality as "the 
Establishment Clause's core principle").  "At a minimum, the 
protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at 
issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or 
regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for 
religious reasons."  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (citations omitted); Emp. 
Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 
(1990).  State laws and practices "which happen to have a 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
54 
 
'disparate 
impact' 
upon 
different 
religious 
organizations" 
resulting 
from 
secular 
criteria 
do 
not 
amount 
to 
a 
denominational preference or religious discrimination, but laws 
that do not merely incidentally discriminate against certain 
religions or religious practices receive strict scrutiny.  
Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Colo. 
Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1257.   
¶174 The 
majority's 
primarily-religious-in-nature-
activities test necessarily and explicitly discriminates among 
certain religious faiths and religious practices.  As the 
majority 
construes 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., 
religious 
institutions that do not perform sufficiently religious acts to 
satisfy the court's subjective conceptions of religiosity will 
be denied the exemption.  The government cannot "discriminate 
between 'types of institutions' on the basis of the nature of 
the religious practice these institutions are moved to engage 
in."   Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1259.   
¶175 While the application of secular criteria that leads 
to 
disparate 
treatment 
of 
religions 
is 
not 
religious 
discrimination, the relevant criteria under the majority's test 
are not secular.  The majority denies the exemption to 
institutions if they do not primarily engage in activities the 
court deems "religious in nature"——a criterion that can only be 
described as religious.  See Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 
("A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious 
practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language 
or context.").  It includes only a small, and ill-defined, 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
55 
 
subset of religious activities.  The majority employs factors 
that are similarly not secular.  For example, the majority asks 
whether a nonprofit engages in worship services, religious 
ceremonies, serves only co-religionists, or imbues program 
participants 
with 
the 
nonprofit's 
faith. 
 
Such 
criteria 
certainly sound religious, not secular.   
 
¶176 The majority declares Catholic Charities ineligible 
for the exemption because Catholic Charities do not participate 
in worship services, engage in religious outreach, perform 
religious 
ceremonies, 
provide 
religious 
education, 
"imbue 
program participants with the Catholic faith[,] []or supply any 
religious materials to program participants or employees."  
Majority op., ¶60.  Additionally, the majority denies the 
exemption on the non-secular and discriminatory basis that 
Catholic Charities employ and serve non-Catholics.  Id., ¶61.  
In the majority's view, Catholic Charities' religious practices 
resemble secular social services too much.  Id., ¶¶63-64, 66.  
The majority's "test" compares the nonprofit's activities to an 
arbitrary 
list 
of 
stereotypical 
religious 
activities 
to 
determine whether the activities are sufficiently religious.  
Id., ¶100 (explaining that activities like those listed in 
Dykema are more likely to be "religious in nature" in the eyes 
of the court).     
¶177 The majority's test overtly discriminates against 
Catholic Charities because they follow Catholic doctrine.  As 
Catholic Charities explain, Catholic doctrine commands they 
engage in charity without limiting their assistance to fellow 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
56 
 
Catholics and bars them from proselytizing when conducting 
charitable acts.  Under the Free Exercise Clause, the state 
cannot condition a benefit upon the abandonment of religious 
practices.  The majority puts Catholic Charities to a choice:  
They may receive the tax exemption by violating their religious 
beliefs or they can conduct their operations in accordance with 
their faith and forgo the exemption.  Conditioning a benefit in 
this manner burdens the free exercise of religion.  Trinity 
Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 462.        
¶178 The 
majority's 
primarily-religious-in-nature-
activities test poses a particular danger for minority faiths.  
The majority's conception of what constitutes activities that 
are "religious in nature" reflects a narrow view of what 
religious practice looks like.  Many amici submitted briefs to 
this court explaining how a test like the majority's will 
discriminate against minority faiths.   
¶179 The brief of the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness and the Sikh Coalition ("the Coalition") is 
particularly illuminating.  It notes that government officials 
are less likely to be familiar with minority faith traditions, 
and therefore may perceive minority religious practices as less 
"religious 
in 
nature" 
than 
the 
activities 
of 
majority 
religions.24  The Coalition identifies many activities central to 
their faiths but likely to fail the majority's test, which 
compares a nonprofit's activities to a list of stereotypical 
                                                 
24 Amicus 
Br. 
International 
Society 
for 
Krishna 
Consciousness and the Sikh Coalition, at 11. 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
57 
 
(and largely Protestant) religious activities, because the list 
is derived from a "Western" understanding of religion.25  For 
example, adherents of Hare Krishna have a religious practice 
called "Prasadam," during which adherents prepare food, offer it 
to their deity, and distribute it to the general population.26  
Sikhs have a religious practice of providing a community 
kitchen, "serving free meals and allowing people of all faiths 
to break bread together."27  According to the Coalition, this 
practice is "foundation[al] to the Sikh way of life; it 
represents the principle of equality among all people regardless 
of religion . . . ."28  The Coalition rightly worries that these 
religious practices will be characterized by courts as "secular 
in nature" under the majority's test.   
¶180 State actors cannot treat 
one faith's religious 
practices as "religious in nature" and another's practices as 
"secular in nature."  Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 
70 (1953) ("To call the words which one minister speaks to his 
congregation a sermon, immune from regulation, and the words of 
another minister an address, subject to regulation, is merely an 
indirect way of preferring one religion over another.").  The 
United States Supreme Court subjects such overt religious 
discrimination to strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Espinoza, 140 S. 
                                                 
25 Id. at 11-13. 
26 Id. at 12-13. 
27 Id. at 13. 
28 Id.  
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
58 
 
Ct. 
at 
2278 
(Gorsuch, 
J., 
concurring) 
(stating 
"any 
discrimination against religious exercise must meet the demands 
of strict scrutiny").  A government policy satisfies strict 
scrutiny only if it "advances 'interests of the highest order' 
and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests."  Fulton v. 
City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 541 (2021) (quoting Church 
of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546).  "That standard 'is not watered 
down'; it 'really means what it says.'"  Tandon v. Newsom, 593 
U.S. 61, 65 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Church of Lukumi, 508 
U.S. at 546).  As scholars have noted, however, "'[i]t is 
difficult 
to 
imagine 
the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
the 
government would have a compelling need to prefer some religions 
over others."  Richard F. Duncan, The Clearest Command of the 
Establishment 
Clause: 
Denominational 
Preferences, 
Religious 
Liberty, and Public Scholarships that Classify Religions, 55 
S.D. L. Rev. 390, 392 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional 
Law: Substance and Procedure 14 (3d ed. 1999)); see also Church 
of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 578-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing a law that discriminates against religion 
automatically fails strict scrutiny because such a law in not 
narrowly tailored "by definition").   
¶181 LIRC does not even suggest the state has a compelling 
interest 
in 
denying 
the 
exemption 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. in a manner that discriminates among the 
various faiths.  LIRC, like the majority, misunderstands 
Catholic Charities' asserted burden on the free exercise of 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
59 
 
their religion.  LIRC believes the asserted burden is paying a 
tax.  In response to this misconception of Catholic Charities' 
claim, LIRC asserts the whole of Wis. Stat. ch. 108 is justified 
by the compelling interest in "providing broad unemployment 
insurance access to workers . . . ."  LIRC then argues the law 
is narrowly tailored because "it is impossible to construct 
workable tax laws that account for the 'myriad of religious 
beliefs.'"  LIRC's arguments miss the mark.  Under strict 
scrutiny, 
LIRC 
needed 
to 
provide 
a 
compelling 
interest 
justifying the discrimination between religions.  See Fulton, 
593 U.S. at 541; Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1269.  LIRC 
failed to do so.  This court cannot invent justifications for 
the state to save the statute from unconstitutionality.  See 
Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1268 ("We cannot and will not 
uphold a statute that abridges an enumerated constitutional 
right on the basis of a factitious governmental interest 
. . . ."); Redeemed Christian Church of God (Victory Temple) 
Bowie v. Prince George's Cnty., 17 F.4th 497, 510-11 (4th Cir. 
2021) (citation omitted) ("To survive strict scrutiny review, 
the government must show that pursuit of its compelling interest 
was the actual reason for its challenged action."); Kennedy v. 
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 543 n.8 (2022) (quoting 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)) (noting 
"'justification[s]' for interfering with First Amendment rights 
'must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in 
response to litigation'").  In the absence of any compelling 
interest to justify the state's discrimination among religions, 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
60 
 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2., as interpreted by the majority, cannot 
survive strict scrutiny. 
¶182 This case illustrates the interconnection between the 
right to free exercise and the Constitution's bar on religious 
establishments.  Citizens are inhibited from freely practicing 
their faiths when the government doles out benefits or imposes 
penalties on the basis of religious practice.  As Justice Neil 
Gorsuch explained:   
The First Amendment protects religious uses and 
actions for good reason.  What point is it to tell a 
person that he is free to be Muslim but he may be 
subject to discrimination for doing what his religion 
commands, attending Friday prayers, living his daily 
life in harmony with the teaching of his faith, and 
educating his children in its ways?  What does it mean 
to tell an Orthodox Jew that she may have her religion 
but may be targeted for observing her religious 
calendar?  Often, governments lack effective ways to 
control what lies in a person's heart or mind.  But 
they can bring to bear enormous power over what people 
say and do.  The right to be religious without the 
right to do religious things would hardly amount to a 
right at all. 
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2277 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  The 
"free 
competition 
between 
religions" 
protected 
by 
the 
Establishment Clause requires "that every denomination . . . be 
equally at liberty to exercise and propagate its beliefs.  But 
such equality would be impossible in an atmosphere of official 
denominational preference."  Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.  The 
Religion Clauses "make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and 
creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary" by 
"sponsor[ing] an attitude on the part of government that shows 
no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
61 
 
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its 
dogma."  Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.  "Free exercise thus can be 
guaranteed only when legislators——and voters——are required to 
accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to 
small, new, or unpopular denominations."  Larson, 456 U.S. at 
245. 
¶183 While the Free Exercise Clause does not require the 
state to provide a tax exemption to religious nonprofits, 
"[w]hat benefits the government decides to give, whether meager 
or munificent, it must give without discrimination against 
religious conduct."  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2277 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring).  In our constitutional order, there are no second-
class religions or religious practices.  The Religion Clauses 
bar discrimination against religious status, beliefs, and 
practices: 
 
"Eliminating 
[religious] 
discrimination 
means 
eliminating all of it."  See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. 
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 206 
(2023).  The majority errs by inventing and operationalizing a 
test that discriminates against Catholic Charities' religious 
practices——and those of many faith traditions going forward.   
¶184 The protection against religious preferences embodied 
in the First Amendment is even more explicit in the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which bars the state from giving "any preference . 
. . by law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship."29  Wis. Const. art. I, § 18; Coulee Cath. Schs., 320 
                                                 
29 Article I, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in full:   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
62 
 
Wis. 
2d 
275, 
¶60 
(explaining 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
"provid[es] expansive protections for religious liberty" beyond 
what the First Amendment provides).  As this court proclaimed in 
Weiss, Article I, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
sometimes called the No Preference Clause,30 "probably furnished 
a more complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination 
against, any religious sect, organization, or society than any 
other state in the Union."  State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of 
Sch. Dist. No. 8 of City of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 208, 44 N.W. 
967 (1890) (Cassoday, J., concurring).31   
¶185 The 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 108.02(15)(h)2. blatantly violates the No Preference Clause.           
In Weiss, this court explained that the phrase "modes of 
worship" is capacious, embracing "any and every mode of 
worshiping the Almighty God."  Id. at 211-12.   It includes 
                                                                                                                                                             
The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be 
infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any 
control of, or interference with, the rights of 
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by 
law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or 
religious or theological seminaries. 
30 King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 61, 517 N.W.2d 
671 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).   
31 While the discussion appears in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Cassoday, it was on a subject expressly reserved for his 
consideration, which makes it the opinion of the court.  State 
ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 165 n.3, 115 N.W.2d 
761 (1962).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
63 
 
"'the performance of all those external acts, and the observance 
of those rites and ceremonies, in which men engage with the 
professed and sole view of honoring God.'"  Id. at 212 (listing 
additional dictionary definitions).  Because the statute, under 
the majority's interpretation, provides benefits for religiously 
affiliated nonprofits that engage in activities the court deems 
"religious in nature," it prefers some modes of worship over 
others.  Catholic Charities explained that charitable works are 
a form of worship for Catholics, who may not proselytize while 
engaged in acts of charity.  The majority denies the exemption 
to Catholic Charities because they did not engage in other modes 
of worship, like proselytizing.  The majority's test prefers 
some types of worship (e.g., proselytizing) over others (e.g., 
religiously motivated charity).     
¶186 Instead of addressing the Wisconsin Constitution's 
impact on this case, the majority dodges the issue, dismissing 
it in a footnote as "undeveloped."  Majority op., ¶3 n.4.  But 
that is not true.  The Wisconsin Legislature, as amicus curiae, 
thoroughly explains in its brief why a test like the one 
employed by the majority violates the No Preference Clause.  
That clause "operate[s] as a perpetual bar to the state . . . 
giving . . . any preference by law to any religious sect or mode 
of worship."  Weiss, 76 Wis. at 210-11.  The majority's 
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preference for some religious practices over others violates the 
Wisconsin Constitution.32   
B.  Religious Entanglement 
¶187 The Establishment Clause provides, "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," U.S. 
Const. amend. I, and "prohibits the excessive entanglement of 
the state in religious matters."  St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 
2d 92, ¶42 (citing L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 686, 563 
N.W.2d 434 (1997)).  The Establishment Clause precludes the 
state from making "intrusive judgments regarding contested 
questions of religious belief or practice."  Colo. Christian 
Univ., 534 F.3d. at 1261.  "[T]he Religion Clauses protect the 
right of churches and other religious institutions to decide 
matters of faith and doctrine without government intrusion . . . 
and any attempt by government to dictate or even to influence 
such matters . . . constitute[s] one of the central attributes 
of an establishment of religion."  Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. 
Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020) 
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
¶188 Civil courts may answer only factual and legal 
questions; they lack any authority or competency to answer 
theological questions.  Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
                                                 
32 Because the majority dodges the religious discrimination 
issues presented by its test, litigants likely will bring such 
claims in the future, forcing the majority to admit its error.  
"This decision might as well be written on the dissolving paper 
sold in magic shops."  Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 
522, 551 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).   
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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445-47, 449-50 (1969).  As James Madison explained in his 
Memorial and Remonstrance, the idea that a "Civil Magistrate is 
a competent Judge of Religious truth . . . is an arrogant 
pretension" that has been "falsified" by history.  James 
Madison, 
Memorial 
and 
Remonstrance 
Against 
Religious 
Assessments, reproduced in Everson, 330 U.S. at 67 (appendix to 
dissent of Rutledge, J.).  The majority's opinion proves 
Madison's thesis.  The majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 
108.02(15)(h)2. not only encourages excessive entanglement with 
religion, it compels such entanglement.   
¶189 The 
majority's 
requirement 
that 
a 
nonprofit's 
activities be primarily "religious in nature" forces courts to 
answer debatable theological questions courts have no authority 
to answer.  The majority's test requires courts to decide what 
activities are sufficiently religious to qualify as "religious 
in nature."  The First Amendment bars the government from 
ranking activities on a scale from least to most religious.  See 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 ("The determination of what is a 
'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a 
difficult and delicate task . . . .  However, the resolution of 
that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the 
particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs 
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible 
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.").  
"Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation," and this 
court cannot choose which religiously motivated actions are, in 
their essence, religious.  Id. at 716.  A court cannot decide 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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whether an organization primarily conducts activities that are 
"religious in nature" without violating the First Amendment.        
¶190 Determining whether an organization's activities are 
primarily "religious in nature" will lead to examining the 
activities performed by nonprofits, which will be forced to 
prove 
whether 
their 
religiously 
motivated 
activities 
are 
sufficiently religious.  "What makes the application of a 
religious-secular distinction difficult is that the character of 
an activity is not self-evident.  As a result, determining 
whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching 
case-by-case analysis.  This results in considerable ongoing 
government entanglement in religious affairs."  Amos, 483 U.S. 
at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Espinosa v. 
Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 481 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 951 
(1982).   
¶191 For example, religious schools will be forced to 
defend the religious nature of textbooks, class instruction, 
examinations, fieldtrips, employees, students, parents, and 
more.  "[T]his sort of detailed inquiry into the subtle 
implications 
of 
in-class 
examinations 
and 
other 
teaching 
activities would itself constitute a significant encroachment on 
the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."  New 
York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 132 (1977).  "The 
prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does 
or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
religious 
establishment . . . ."  Id. at 133; accord Presbyterian Church 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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in U.S., 393 U.S. at 449 ("First Amendment values are plainly 
jeopardized when . . . litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious 
doctrine 
and 
practice."). 
 
The 
intrusive 
inquiries 
the 
majority's test demands may recur.  While a court initially may 
deem a nonprofit's activities primarily "religious in nature," 
the nonprofit may later lose its exempt status.  See Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("Qualification for tax 
exemption is not perpetual or immutable[.]").  The majority 
gives the state license to monitor whether nonprofits fail to 
hit the proper ratio of activities that are "religious in 
nature" to "secular in nature." "'[P]ervasive monitoring' for 
'the subtle or overt presence of religious matter' is a central 
danger against which [the Court has] held the Establishment 
Clause guards."  See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 
(1989) (citations omitted).  To force religious entities to 
repeatedly 
satisfy 
the 
state 
that 
their 
activities 
are 
"religious in nature" is anathema to the First Amendment.   
¶192 The 
majority's 
primarily-religious-in-nature-
activities 
test 
puts 
state 
officials 
and 
courts 
in 
the 
constitutionally 
tenuous 
position 
of 
second-guessing 
the 
religious significance and character of a nonprofit's actions.  
Catholic 
Charities 
strenuously 
maintain 
their 
charitable 
activities 
are 
religious 
and 
central 
to 
their 
faith.  
Nevertheless, 
this 
court 
rejects 
Catholic 
Charities' 
understanding of the religious significance of their own 
activities, insisting those activities are actually "secular in 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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nature."  The First Amendment forbids such second-guessing and 
recharacterization of Catholic Charities' activities.  Lyng, 485 
U.S. at 457-58 ("[T]he dissent's approach would require us to 
rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own 
religious beliefs.  We think such an approach cannot be squared 
with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would 
cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to 
play."); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 ("[I]t is not within the 
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the 
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the 
commands of their common faith.").   
¶193 The 
entanglement 
occasioned 
by 
the 
impermissible 
second-guessing of sincere religious claims is compounded by the 
majority's claim that what constitutes an activity that is 
"religious in nature" "may be different for different faiths."  
Majority op., ¶55.  The majority has already made clear it will 
not take nonprofits at their word that their activities are 
"religious in nature."  For what constitutes an activity that is 
"religious in nature" to change from religion to religion, the 
court must study the doctrines of the various faiths and decide 
for itself what religious practices are actually religious.  The 
Constitution bars civil courts from such intrusions into 
spiritual affairs.  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) 
(stating civil courts are barred from "resolving . . . disputes 
on the basis of religious doctrine and practice").  "Plainly, 
the First Amendment forbids civil courts from" "determin[ing] 
matters at the very core of a religion——the interpretation of 
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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particular 
church 
doctrines 
and 
the 
importance 
of 
those 
doctrines to the religion."  Presbyterian Church in U.S., 393 
U.S. at 450.  The majority opinion strikes at the heart of 
religious autonomy.       
¶194 The majority denies Catholic Charities the exemption 
under Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. in part because they employ 
and serve those of other religions.  This is not a lawful 
criterion.  Courts are not allowed to determine who is and is 
not a co-religionist.  "[W]ho or what is Catholic . . . is an 
inquiry that the government cannot make."  Holy Trinity, 82 Wis. 
2d at 150-51.  Deciding who is and is not a co-religionist is 
plagued with entanglement problems.  Are those no longer 
practicing a faith co-religionists?  Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 
2069.  Who decides?  "Would the test depend on whether the 
person in question no longer considered himself or herself to be 
a member of a particular faith?  Or would the test turn on 
whether the faith tradition in question still regarded the 
person as a member in some sense?"  Id.  "What characteristics, 
professions of faith, or doctrinal tenets render a [person] part 
of a particular denomination?  The statute doesn't tell us, and 
it would be unconstitutional for any state actor, including a 
court, to resolve the question."  St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 
2d 92, ¶138 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).  Who 
constitutes 
a 
co-religionist 
is 
a 
religious, 
not 
legal, 
question.  Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1264-65 (noting 
such a question "requires [the state] to wade into issues of 
religious contention").              
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¶195 Whether a nonprofit engages in religious education or 
"imbue[s] program participants with the Catholic faith" presents 
additional entanglement problems.  Majority op., ¶60.  The court 
must decide what constitutes religious education and evangelism—
—religious questions whose answers will vary from faith to 
faith.  Does conducting charity as an illustration of the love 
of one's deity count?  What about engaging in a commercial 
enterprise to illustrate one's faith applied to daily life?  See 
Golden Rule Church Ass'n, 41 T.C. 719.  "What principle of law 
or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's 
assertion that a particular act" educates others about his faith 
and acts as a form of proselytizing or evangelism?  See Smith, 
494 
U.S. 
at 
887. 
 
Whether 
activities 
are 
"'[religious 
education]' 
or 
mere 
'education' 
depends 
as 
much 
on 
the 
observer's point of view as on any objective evaluation of the 
educational activity."  Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.2d. at 
1263.  "The First Amendment does not permit government officials 
to sit as judges of the 'indoctrination' quotient" of a 
nonprofit.  Id.  Similar problems abound with the majority's 
declaration that activities involving worship services and 
religious ceremonies are more "religious in nature."  See 
Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 633-34 (2d Cir. 
2020) ("The government must normally refrain from making 
assumptions about what religious worship requires.").  The 
majority's criteria invite the state and courts to make 
religious determinations and second-guess the sincere assertions 
of religiosity of those operating nonprofits.   
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¶196 The majority does not deny its inquiry entangles 
church and state, but simply asserts that the entanglement 
occasioned by its misreading of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2. is 
"inherent in any statutory scheme that offers tax exemption to 
religious entities"33——a preposterous claim in light of the 
majority's failure to properly interpret the statute, which 
simply requires the nonprofit's motivations be religious.34  The 
majority believes its consideration of whether a nonprofit 
primarily performs activities "religious in nature" does not 
unduly entangle government and religion because its inquiry is a 
"neutral and secular inquiry based on objective criteria."  
Majority op., ¶86.  But there is nothing neutral, secular, or 
objective about the majority's test for whether activities are 
"religious in nature."  The majority's test asks whether the 
activities are similar——in some undefined and arbitrary way——to 
stereotypical religious activities listed in a Seventh Circuit 
decision, which made the list up from whole cloth.  See id., 
¶100 (stating that "if one of the religiously motivated sub-
entities in this case partook in activities such as those cited 
by the Dykema court as indicative of a religious purpose" the 
court would be more likely to decide it is operated primarily 
                                                 
33 Majority op., ¶86. 
 
34 The majority claims that without an examination of a 
nonprofit's activities, it wouldn't be possible for a nonprofit 
to qualify for a tax exemption premised on a "religious 
purposes" requirement.  See id., ¶93 (citing Ecclesiastical 
Order of Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 653 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 
(E.D. Mich. 1986)).  Of course, the court could simply accept 
Catholic Charities' sincere claims that they operate for 
religious purposes.       
No.  2020AP2007.rgb 
 
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for religious purposes).  The test does not "rel[y] exclusively 
on objective, well-established concepts of . . . law familiar to 
lawyers and judges."  Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.  Instead, it 
relies upon each justice's subjective sense of what is genuinely 
religious and what is not.   
¶197 While the majority does not ask "whether [Catholic 
Charities] are 'Catholic' enough to qualify for the exemption," 
majority op., ¶85, the majority improperly entangles itself with 
religion by asking whether Catholic Charities' concededly 
religious activities are sufficiently religious.  The majority's 
protestation that its decision doesn't "intrude on questions of 
religious dogma"35 is dystopian——"a manner of Orwellian newspeak 
by which 'religious' means something other than 'religious.'"  
St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, ¶141 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., dissenting).  The majority doesn't simply answer 
"'delicate' questions," majority op., ¶87, it treads where the 
Constitution forbids the judiciary from intruding.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶198 The 
majority's 
decision 
constitutes 
a 
profound 
overreach of the judicial power.  The majority radically 
transforms Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)2., which provides a tax 
exemption for nonprofits managed primarily for a religious 
reason "and operated, supervised, controlled, or principally 
supported 
by 
a 
church 
or 
convention 
or 
association 
of 
churches[.]"  Finding the exemption too broad as a matter of 
policy, the majority excludes nonprofits it deems insufficiently 
                                                 
35 Id., ¶87.   
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religious.  As newly interpreted, the statute violates the First 
Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution.  The majority's 
primarily-religious-in-nature-activities 
test 
embodies 
an 
unlawful preference for some religious practices and thereby 
discriminates against others.  The test also requires courts to 
answer 
theological 
questions 
well 
beyond 
the 
judiciary's 
purview.  The majority exercises the power of the legislature, 
rewriting § 108.02(15)(h)2., and proclaims itself the arbiter of 
what is and is not religious.  Whatever authority the majority 
believes it possesses to assume these roles is not found in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  I respectfully dissent. 
¶199 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins ¶¶110-61 and ¶¶163-98 of this dissent.             
 
 
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¶200 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  Although I would 
not reach the constitutional questions and do not sign onto 
every point in the analysis, I agree with the construction of 
the statute in Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's thoughtful 
dissent.  I also agree with the excellent discussion of the 
majority's misplaced reliance on the remedial statute canon.  
Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶¶154-58.  There is no 
particular reason to assume a statutory exemption in an area 
like religious freedom——a constitutionally protected category to 
which the law regularly gives wide latitude——should be construed 
narrowly.  I respectfully dissent.   
 
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