Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JESSIE B JOHNSON

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 9, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 118351  
JESSIE B. JOHNSON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.   
This case involves the defense of entrapment.  The  
circuit court found that defendant was entrapped by the police  
and dismissed two charges of possession with intent to deliver  
more than 225, but less than 650, grams of cocaine.  MCL  
333.7401(2)(a)(ii).  The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split  
decision.1  We conclude that the lower courts clearly erred in  
1Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 19, 2000 
(Docket No. 219499).  
 
finding that defendant was entrapped under Michigan’s current  
entrapment test.  People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34, 56-57; 475  
NW2d 786 (1991) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.); People v Jamieson,  
436 Mich 61, 80; 461 NW2d 884 (1990) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.).  
Accordingly, 
we 
reverse the Court of Appeals decision, reverse  
the 
trial 
court’s 
order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss  
the charges, and remand to the trial court for further  
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
Defendant was a police officer in the city of Pontiac.  
He also owned a house in the city of Pontiac that he rented  
out as a residence.  
Defendant became the subject of a criminal investigation  
after one of defendant’s former tenants turned informant and  
reported to the Pontiac police department that defendant was  
instrumental in operating his rented house as a drug den.  The  
informant indicated that he sold crack cocaine from  
defendant’s 
house 
with 
defendant’s 
full 
knowledge 
and 
consent.  
Further, according to the informant, defendant arranged,  
oversaw, and protected the drug-selling operation.  In  
exchange, defendant received a substantial portion of the  
profits from the drug sales.  
The Pontiac police called in the state police for  
assistance 
in 
their 
investigation of defendant.  An undercover  
officer from the state police department, Lieutenant Sykes,  
2  
was introduced by the informant to defendant as a major drug  
dealer in Detroit and Mount Clemens who wished to expand his  
operations into Pontiac.  Defendant agreed to meet with Sykes,  
but not pursuant to any police investigation he was conducting  
himself.  Defendant was propositioned by Sykes to serve as  
protection and security from “rip-offs” and police raids for  
Sykes’ drug operations, as well as to identify potential  
locations for drug dens in Pontiac.  Defendant was to be  
compensated 
for 
his 
services.  Defendant agreed to participate  
only after he determined that Sykes was not an undercover  
officer known to defendant’s fellow Pontiac officers.  
Defendant made no attempt to arrest Sykes or report his  
illegal activities for further investigation.  
At 
Sykes’ 
request, defendant agreed to accompany Sykes to  
a mall on February 7, 1992, to assist him in purchasing drugs  
from a supplier.  The supplier was in reality another  
undercover state police officer.  
Defendant and Sykes arrived at the mall parking lot in  
different 
vehicles. 
 
After 
some 
preliminary 
discussions, 
Sykes  
drove over to the undercover officer to make the staged drug  
deal, while defendant walked.  Armed with a gun in his pocket,  
defendant stood one and a half car lengths from the passenger  
side of the second undercover officer’s vehicle.  After the  
transaction began, Sykes directed defendant to come to the  
driver’s side of the undercover officer’s vehicle.  Sykes then  
3  
 
 
handed defendant the package of drugs received from the  
supplier in the staged drug deal.  Defendant took the package  
and returned to Sykes’ vehicle and waited for Sykes.  At that  
time, defendant expressed some confusion regarding the exact  
procedures he was to follow, stating that he needed to know  
what to do “from A to Z.”  Sykes testified, and audiotapes of  
the February 7, 1992, drug deal confirm, that Sykes wanted  
defendant to take the drugs back to his car, check them,  
ensure that the package was correct, and notify Sykes of any  
problems.
 Sykes stated that in order for defendant to  
fulfill his duty to protect against “rip-offs,”  defendant  
would be required to hold and examine the drugs purchased.  
Sykes explained that he could not watch the supplier and the  
package at the same time.  After this conversation, while  
defendant and Sykes weighed the cocaine, defendant indicated  
that as a result of their discussion he had a better  
understanding of what Sykes wanted him to do. Defendant did  
not express his unwillingness to perform the duties explained  
by Sykes. 
Sykes then paid defendant $1,000 for his  
assistance.  
Sometime after this first drug deal, Sykes asked  
defendant if he wished to participate in future drug deals and  
told him that it was okay if he no longer wanted to  
participate.
 Defendant indicated that he wanted to be  
included in future transactions.  
As a result, a second,  
4  
 
similarly staged drug deal occurred on March 4, 1992,  
immediately after which defendant was arrested.  
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession with  
intent to deliver more than 225, but less than 650, grams of  
cocaine.  Defendant initially entered a Cobbs2 plea with a  
visiting judge for two consecutive sentences of five to thirty  
years, sentences that were substantially less than the  
mandatory statutory minimum of twenty years for each offense.  
However, 
these 
sentences were reversed as being unsupported by  
substantial 
and 
compelling reasons required to depart from the  
mandatory statutory minimum.  223 Mich App 170, 175; 566 NW2d  
28 (1997).  
When the case returned to the trial court, defendant  
withdrew his guilty pleas and moved to dismiss the charges on  
the basis of an entrapment theory.  The trial court granted  
defendant’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that Sykes had  
changed 
defendant’s 
duty during the first transaction from one  
of protection to one of actual drug possession, thus  
entrapping defendant into the drug possessions.  
As indicated, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split  
decision.
 The majority wrote that “[b]ecause many of the  
factors indicative of entrapment existed in this case, we hold  
that defendant has met his burden of proving that the police  
2People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).  
5  
conduct would have induced an otherwise law-abiding person in  
similar circumstances as defendant to commit the offenses  
charged.”  Slip op at 3. 
It also concluded that “Sykes’  
conduct in this case was so reprehensible as to constitute  
entrapment.” Id.  
The dissenting judge argued that defendant was not  
entrapped because “defendant willingly participated in the  
proposed criminal enterprise” and the police did nothing more  
than provide defendant with an opportunity to commit the  
crime. Slip op at 1. Further, the dissenter disagreed with  
the 
majority’s 
alternative 
conclusion 
that 
Sykes’s 
conduct 
was  
so reprehensible as to establish entrapment.  
This Court initially held plaintiff’s application in  
abeyance pending our consideration of People v Maffett, 464  
Mich 878; 633 NW2d 339 (2001), in which we ultimately denied  
leave to appeal.  We then granted leave to appeal in this  
case, directing the parties to include among the issues to be  
briefed 
whether 
this 
Court should adopt the federal subjective  
entrapment test, and invited amicus curiae briefing.  465 Mich  
911 (2001).  
II. Standard of Review  
A trial court’s finding of entrapment is reviewed for  
clear error.  Jamieson, supra at 80. Clear error exists if  
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm  
conviction that a mistake has been made.  People v Kurylczyk,  
6  
443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993) (opinion by GRIFFIN,  
J.).
 A defendant has the burden of establishing by a  
preponderance of the evidence that he was entrapped. People  
v D’Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 182; 257 NW2d 655 (1977).  
III. Analysis  
Under the current entrapment test in Michigan, a  
defendant is considered entrapped if either (1) the police  
engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce a law­
abiding person to commit a crime in similar circumstances or  
(2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it  
cannot be tolerated.  Juillet, supra; People v Ealy, 222 Mich  
App 508, 510; 564 NW2d 168 (1997).  However, where law  
enforcement 
officials 
present 
nothing 
more 
than 
an 
opportunity  
to commit the crime, entrapment does not exist.  People v  
Butler, 444 Mich 965, 966; 512 NW2d 583 (1994).  
A. Inducing Criminal Conduct  
When examining whether governmental activity would  
impermissibly induce criminal conduct, several factors are  
considered: (1) whether there existed appeals to the  
defendant’s sympathy as a friend, (2) whether the defendant  
had been known to commit the crime with which he was charged,  
(3) whether there were any long time lapses between the  
investigation and the arrest, (4) whether there existed any  
inducements that would make the commission of a crime  
unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen,  
7  
(5) whether there were offers of excessive consideration or  
other enticement, (6) whether there was a guarantee that the  
acts alleged as crimes were not illegal, (7) whether, and to  
what extent, any government pressure existed, (8) whether  
there existed sexual favors, (9) whether there were any  
threats of arrest, (10) whether there existed any government  
procedures 
that 
tended to escalate the criminal culpability of  
the defendant, (11) whether there was police control over any  
informant, and (12) whether the investigation was targeted.  
Juillet, supra at 56-57.  
In holding that defendant was entrapped, the Court of  
Appeals found that defendant had not previously committed the  
possession with intent to deliver offenses charged, the  
procedures employed by the government escalated defendant’s  
conduct to the charged offense, and the offer of consideration  
was excessive. On the basis of these three factors, it held  
that “[b]ecause many of the factors indicative of entrapment  
existed,” the defendant “met his burden of proving that the  
police conduct would have induced an otherwise law-abiding  
person in similar circumstances as defendant to commit the  
offenses charged.” Slip op at 3. We respectfully disagree.  
First, while the Court of Appeals noted that defendant  
had “merely owned” a crack house and that no evidence existed  
that defendant was a drug dealer or even a drug user, it  
ignored ample evidence presented that defendant had in fact  
8  
previously committed the offense of possession with intent to  
deliver.  To be convicted of the charge of possession with  
intent 
to 
deliver, 
the defendant must have knowingly possessed  
a controlled substance, intended to deliver that substance to  
someone else, and the substance possessed must have actually  
been cocaine and defendant must have known it was cocaine.  
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).  
Actual physical possession is unnecessary for a conviction of  
possession with intent to deliver; constructive possession  
will suffice.  People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d  
517 (1995).  Constructive possession exists when the totality  
of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between  
defendant and the contraband. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508,  
521; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).  Possession is attributed not only  
to those who physically possess the drugs, but also to those  
who control its disposition.  Konrad, supra at 271-272. In  
addition, possession may be either joint or exclusive.  People  
v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989).  
Defendant owned a home that he rented to tenants who  
operated it as a drug house. Despite being a police officer  
in the jurisdiction in which the house was located, defendant  
knew and consented to the house being used for drug sales.  
Further, defendant provided protection for the operation and  
received a portion of the profits from the drug sales,  
specifically $200 for each quarter ounce of drugs sold from  
9  
 
 
 
the house.  
The dissent suggests that in determining that defendant  
had engaged in drug activities, our opinion “strips the  
deference 
that 
is 
due credibility determinations made by lower  
courts . . . .”  Post at 7. The dissent is mistaken. Our  
conclusion that defendant previously possessed cocaine is one  
that we make as a matter of law. What the dissent concedes,  
that “the record supports the Court of Appeals conclusion that  
defendant did nothing more than own a crack house and accept  
money to keep silent,” is possession. Post at 4. Further,  
unlike the dissent, we do not limit our review of whether the  
lower courts clearly erred to the hearing testimony, but  
rather review the entire record.  While the hearing testimony  
arguably lends itself to different conclusions, the audio  
tapes admitted into the record do not.  While the dissent only  
cites an officer’s hearing testimony regarding corroboration,  
the undercover audio recordings of defendant’s conversation  
undisputedly establish that defendant played a role in the  
drug operation:  
[Informant]:  So I can take the hundred and  
invest it or what?  
[Defendant]:  Alright, man, I’m gonna give you  
one more shot.  
[Informant]: Okay, dig, the same arrangement, 
the two off every quarter?  
[Defendant]: Yeah.  
10  
As 
far 
as 
corroboration 
of 
defendant’s 
past 
participation  
in drug activities, this first taped telephone conversation  
between the informant and defendant is clear evidence that  
defendant previously received $200 for every quarter ounce of  
cocaine sold by the informant at the house and that defendant  
wished and agreed to continue this arrangement.  
Under these circumstances, it is clear these alleged  
previous actions by defendant could serve as the foundation  
for a conviction for possession with intent to deliver under  
a constructive possession theory.  Defendant had a duty to  
arrest the informant, yet not only did he permit the informant  
to sell drugs, he accepted money to provide protection for the  
operation.  Without such protection, drugs would not have been  
sold from the house.  Accordingly, defendant controlled the  
disposition of drugs at the house he owned and shared in the  
profits in so doing. For these reasons, we find clear error  
in the lower court’s deduction that there was insufficient  
evidence to surmise that defendant had not previously  
committed the offense of possession with intent to deliver  
cocaine. Further, we agree with the dissenting judge in the  
Court of Appeals that defendant’s prior actions, at the very  
least, are sufficient to establish the charge of possession  
with intent to deliver cocaine as an aider and abettor. See  
People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 371-372; 478 NW2d 901  
(1991).  
11  
Second, contrary to the Court of Appeals majority, we are  
not convinced that the procedures employed by the police  
escalated defendant’s criminal culpability. 
The Court of  
Appeals majority wrote:  
[T]he procedures employed by the police 
escalated defendant’s conduct from merely owning a 
drug house to possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine.
 Sykes initially “hired” defendant to 
protect against arrest and theft and to inform 
Sykes of any potential drug raids.  At the first  
staged drug buy, however, Sykes called defendant 
over and handed defendant the package of cocaine. 
It was only after the first transaction that  
defendant was informed that he was expected to 
handle the drugs, check them, and ensure that the 
package was “right.”  This active involvement was  
not contemplated prior to the buy.  Sykes’ actions, 
therefore, served to escalate defendant’s passive 
involvement 
in 
the 
enterprise 
to 
active  
participation beyond the scope of what defendant 
had agreed to beforehand and pressured defendant 
into complying with Sykes’ requests in order to 
remain a part of the enterprise. [Slip op at 3.]  
It is somewhat unclear whether the majority’s escalation  
analysis was based on its assessment of defendant’s prior drug  
activity at his rental home or its conclusions about  
defendant’s expected role in the undercover operation.  
However, regardless of what the majority held was escalated,  
it clearly erred.  
As 
discussed 
above, 
defendant’s 
previous 
actions  
concerning his drug house operation amounted to possession  
with intent to deliver.  Both offenses charged as a result of  
the undercover operation were possession with intent to  
deliver.  Therefore, no conduct by the state police in the  
12  
 
 
undercover 
operation 
could 
serve 
to 
escalate 
defendant’s 
prior  
criminal activity.  Rather, the government simply provided  
defendant with an additional opportunity to commit a crime  
that he had previously committed.  Presenting nothing more  
than an opportunity to commit the crime does not equate with  
entrapment. Butler, 
supra.  Because defendant’s previous drug  
activity amounted to possession with intent to deliver, the  
undercover activity at issue in this case did nothing more  
than present defendant with an opportunity to commit that  
crime. Accordingly, no escalation occurred.  
Similarly, defendant’s culpability was not escalated at  
the scene of the first transaction in regard to the role  
defendant agreed to play in the undercover drug transaction.  
The touchstone of the Court of Appeals opinion in this regard  
was that placing the drugs in the hands of defendant at the  
scene of the first drug deal was a violation of what defendant  
had agreed to do.   However, our review of the record leads us  
to conclude that touching the drugs should not have come as a  
surprise to defendant.3  
3We note that the dissent’s rationale for concluding that 
the lower courts correctly concluded that defendant could not 
have expected to handle the drugs at the transactions is 
based, again, on its limited review of the record. While the  
hearing 
transcript 
does indeed reflect that all parties agreed 
there was no evidence that defendant was informed that he  
would have to handle drugs on the February 7th audio tape, no 
such agreement was made regarding all the audio tapes 
introduced at the hearing.  A full review of the taped 
recordings, as we provide below, supplies ample evidence that  
13  
Although the taped recording of the first drug  
transaction suggests that defendant was unsure precisely what  
he was to do beyond providing “protection,” that confusion was  
not based on defendant’s lack of agreement to do more.  We  
disagree with the dissent’s argument that the defendant’s  
confusion about his role on the day of the first transaction  
was an absolute indication of defendant’s agreed-upon role in  
the entire enterprise.  Rather, the record clearly shows that  
defendant indicated many days before the first transaction  
that he was willing to handle the drugs.  Indeed, defendant  
was hired by Sykes to protect and secure against arrests,  
police raids, and “rip-offs.”  While the Court of Appeals  
construed “rip-off” as narrowly as possible by equating it  
with “theft,” protecting against a “rip-off” would seem to  
include ensuring that drug packages received at drug deals  
contain actual drugs in the negotiated quantity and quality,  
a task that necessarily requires taking possession of the  
drugs in order to properly inspect them.  A recorded audiotape  
of 
defendant 
and 
Sykes discussing their arrangement before the  
first 
staged 
drug 
transaction 
demonstrates 
that 
Sykes 
informed  
defendant that he would have to handle the drugs on occasion:  
defendant 
fully 
understood that his role included handling the 
drugs.  Contrary to the dissent’s allegation, this is not a 
mischaracterization of the record or a failure to give 
deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations. 
Rather, our conclusion is based on the actual audio recordings 
of the investigation that were admitted into the record.  
14  
Sykes:  . . . And probably on occasion, I’m 
gonna need your expertise to accompany me to pick 
up a package or two, okay. . . . So if, you know, 
just run here, run there, pick up some, and we’ll 
be straight, okay.  That’s, that’s basically all 
that you got to do, I’ll run the rest.  
Defendant: Okay.4  
In addition, defendant’s willingness to participate in  
the crimes charged is evidenced by his agreement to  
participate in further transactions after he participated in  
the 
first 
transaction, which included his taking possession of  
the drugs. We further note that the second drug transaction  
between defendant and the undercover police officers exposes  
a consideration that the lower courts appear to have  
overlooked during their review. Initial entrapment does not  
immunize a defendant from criminal liability for subsequent  
transactions that he readily and willingly undertook.  See  
People v Crawford, 143 Mich App 348, 353; 372 NW2d 550 (1985);  
People v Larcinese, 108 Mich App 511, 515; 310 NW2d 49 (1981).  
Accordingly, even if the Court of Appeals had been correct in  
concluding that defendant was entrapped during the first  
transaction, his willingness to participate in the second  
transaction, 
after his 
duties 
were 
more 
emphatically  
explained, would prohibit dismissal of the second charge.  
For these reasons, it is apparent that Sykes’ handing the  
4At the very least, this exchange between Sykes and 
defendant 
clearly 
establishes 
defendant’s 
approval 
to  
constructively possess drugs.  
15  
 
 
drugs 
to 
defendant 
for inspection during the first transaction  
failed to escalate defendant’s criminal culpability.  As a  
result, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in concluding  
otherwise.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals majority clearly erred in  
holding that the amount of money offered for defendant’s  
services 
was 
excessive and unusually attractive.  The majority  
held that defendant knew that he stood to earn up to $50,000  
by participating in the enterprise. The prosecutor suggests  
that the record reflects that Sykes stated that Sykes stood to  
earn about $50,000.  Our review of the record leads us to  
conclude that the record does not firmly establish either  
interpretation.  However, we conclude that, given defendant’s  
understanding 
that 
he 
would 
receive 
$1000 
for 
each  
transaction, the compensation was neither excessive or  
unusually 
attractive. 
 
Each 
transaction 
involved 
approximately  
ten ounces of cocaine, which had an estimated street value of  
$75,000.
 A $1,000 fee for a transaction involving almost  
$75,000, roughly one percent of the street value, is not  
excessive.  This is especially evident given that defendant  
previously earned a $200 profit, or nearly thirty percent of  
the street value, for the sale of one quarter ounce of cocaine  
at his crack house, which the record reflects had a street  
value of approximately $700.  Thus, the Court of Appeals  
clearly 
erred 
in 
ascertaining 
that 
defendant 
was 
impermissibly  
16  
induced 
because 
the 
consideration for his illegal services was  
excessive or unusually attractive.  
In sum, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals  
clearly erred in regard to each of the three factors that  
persuaded that Court to conclude that the police engaged in  
conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a  
crime in similar circumstances.  Therefore, because none of  
the remaining Juillet factors are at issue, we hold that  
defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the  
evidence that the police engaged in conduct that would induce  
a 
law-abiding 
person 
to 
commit 
a 
crime 
in 
similar  
circumstances. 
 
B. Reprehensible Conduct  
The Court of Appeals alternatively held that the police  
conduct was so reprehensible that, as a matter of public  
policy, it could not be tolerated regardless of its  
relationship 
to 
the 
crime 
and 
therefore 
constituted  
entrapment.  The majority based its reasoning primarily on its  
escalation analysis, finding that “Sykes waited until the  
scene of the staged drug buy to inform defendant that he was  
expected to handle the drugs and gave defendant no choice but  
to accept the package that was placed in defendant’s hands  
. . . .” Slip op at 3. We disagree.  
As we discussed above, defendant was hired to protect  
against arrests, raids, and “rip-offs.”  In light of his  
17  
 
 
alleged familiarity with drug operations, defendant should  
have expected that ensuring against “rip-offs” would include,  
among other things, examining the drugs for their legitimacy  
and holding the drugs to prevent a theft at the scene of the  
drug deal. 
More importantly, as indicated above, the  
negotiations between defendant and Sykes before the first  
transaction support this understanding.5  Given our conclusion  
that defendant had previously committed the offense of  
possession with intent to deliver and that he agreed to  
provide protection against “rip-offs,” which clearly includes  
handling the drugs in order to inspect them, the police did  
nothing more than provide defendant with an opportunity to  
commit a crime. Such conduct was not reprehensible and does  
not establish entrapment. Butler, supra.  
For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals  
clearly erred in finding that defendant established by a  
preponderance of the evidence that the police conduct in this  
case was so reprehensible as to constitute entrapment.  
C. The Entrapment Test in Michigan  
We originally granted leave to appeal in this case to  
5Further, as the dissenting Court of Appeals judge points 
out, defendant himself was a police officer and had a duty to 
arrest Sykes.  Instead, defendant willingly participated in 
the criminal enterprise and even met with Sykes at the Pontiac 
police department station before these drug deals in order to 
determine whether Sykes was an undercover officer who would be 
recognized by defendant’s fellow officers.  
18  
 
 
 
consider whether the current entrapment test in Michigan, a  
modified objective test, is the most appropriate one.  
Accordingly, we asked the parties to address whether this  
Court 
should 
adopt 
the federal subjective test for entrapment.  
Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435; 53 S Ct 210; 77 L Ed 413  
(1932).  However, because defendant’s case fails to meet even  
the current more lenient modified objective test,6 we do not  
need to reach that question.  
Nevertheless, 
after 
review 
of 
our 
entrapment 
defense 
law,  
we note that Chief Justice CORRIGAN has raised serious  
questions regarding the constitutionality of any judicially  
created entrapment test in Michigan. Maffett, supra at 878­
899 (CORRIGAN, C.J., dissenting). 
Accordingly, we urge the  
Legislature to consider these questions and determine whether  
a legislative response is warranted.  
IV. Conclusion 
 The Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that the  
defendant was entrapped by the government under Michigan’s  
current entrapment test. The police did not engage in conduct  
that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a crime in  
similar circumstances; nor was the police conduct in this case  
6The objective test is generally considered to be more 
favorable to defendants than the subjective test.  See Tawil, 
“Ready? Induce. Sting!”: Arguing for the government’s burden  
of proving readiness in entrapment cases, 98 Mich L R 2371, 
2378 (2000).  
19  
so reprehensible as to constitute entrapment.  Indeed, the  
record 
suggests 
that 
defendant had already committed the crime  
for which he was charged. Accordingly, we reverse the Court  
of Appeals decision, reverse the trial court’s order granting  
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges, and remand to the  
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this  
opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
20  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 118351  
JESSIE B. JOHNSON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in all but part III(C) of the opinion.  I do not  
join with the Court in hinting that the judicially created  
entrapment 
defense 
may 
be 
unconstitutional, 
and 
then 
referring  
that unanswered question to the Legislature.  
 
 
___________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 118351  
JESSIE B. JOHNSON,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I concur in the majority’s holding that the police  
conduct did not entrap defendant into the second transaction.  
However, I would conclude that the police conduct did entrap  
defendant 
into 
the 
first 
transaction; 
therefore, 
I  
respectfully dissent.  
The majority’s conclusion that defendant constructively  
possessed cocaine and, therefore, was not entrapped into  
committing the possession crimes is based on repeated  
references to the informant’s claim that defendant “arranged,  
oversaw, and protected” the drug sales at the home defendant  
owned.  See slip op at 2, 9 (“[d]efendant owned a home that he  
rented to tenants who operated it as a drug house” and  
protected and received money for drugs sold.)  Upon review of  
the entrapment hearing testimony, I question how the majority  
relies on this as support for its conclusion. The informant  
did not testify at the entrapment hearing.  Rather, the  
information 
that 
the 
informant allegedly relayed to the police  
came into evidence through the police officer the informant  
contacted 
about 
defendant.  This officer testified as follows:  
Q.  Now did this [informant] tell you how he 
[defendant] was involved?  
A.  Yes he did.  
Q. And would you tell us what it was?  
A. He said he was running a dope house.  
Q. When you say he, you mean [defendant]?  
A.  No. [The informant] was running a house 
that–[defendant] 
owned 
the 
house 
and 
[the 
informant] was selling crack out of the house with 
[defendant’s] full knowledge and consent and more 
or less participation; not in the actual sale, but 
in setting it up and providing protection and in 
running the operation.  
The majority’s focus on this portion of the police  
officer’s testimony to support its repeated assertion that  
there was sufficient evidence showing defendant was more  
involved than the Court of Appeals discussed is misplaced.  
The most crucial part of the officer’s testimony, which sheds  
light on the Court of Appeals reasoning, is omitted.  
Q.  Did you ever run across any independent  
2  
 
 
 
corroboration of [the informant’s] word?  
A. I’m sorry?  
Q.
 Independent corroboration meaning was 
there any evidence other than [the informant’s] 
statements that [defendant] had been involved in 
the–this proported [sic] dope house?  
A. At that point, no.  
Q. At any point?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And what was that?  
A.  I checked records on the house that was  
pointed out and [defendant] did in fact own that 
house; to me that was corroboration.  
Q. Well . . .  
A.  It was–I knew it personally to be a dope 
house.  However, prior to that point I did not know 
that [defendant] owned it.  
Q.  Okay. 
I guess what I’m asking is [the 
informant’s] story was that [defendant] was–knew 
about it and was looking the other way and taking 
money, isn’t that it?  
A. That’s correct.  
The police officer initially stated that the informant  
told him defendant set up, ran, and supervised the drug house.  
However, when asked what information corroborated what the  
informant allegedly said, the officer pointed to only the fact  
that defendant owned the home and accepted money to look the  
other way.  The trial court made its credibility determination  
on this testimony that defendant had no other involvement  
3  
beyond owning the drug house and bribery.  Contrary to the  
picture the majority paints of defendant’s part in the drug  
sales occurring in the home he owned, the record supports the  
Court of Appeals conclusion that defendant did nothing more  
than own a crack house and accept money to keep silent.  Thus,  
the majority’s mischaracterization of defendant’s involvement  
directly conflicts with this Court’s duty to give deference to  
credibility determinations in light of direct testimony  
4  
 
supporting them.1  
1The majority faults me for limiting my review to the 
hearing testimony from the entrapment hearing instead of the 
entire record, which, according to the majority, “supplies 
ample evidence” that defendant knew that his role was to 
“handle” the drugs.  Ante at 14, n 3. 
Contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, I did not limit my review, but extracted 
evidence from the entire record that I believe supports the 
conclusion that defendant was entrapped into possessing the 
drugs in the first transaction (the only transaction for which  
I would conclude defendant was entrapped).  To satisfy the 
majority’s concern, however, the following is an excerpt from 
the body recordings of the undercover officer and defendant, 
which again proves that the majority’s heavy reliance upon 
ambiguous dialog between defendant and the undercover officer 
before the February 7 audio tape is suspect.  See ante at 15.  
Even after the ambiguous discussion, which the majority 
quoted, defendant clearly stated that he thought his  
involvement was to protect.  
[Undercover Officer]: Ah man, alright, alright 
look, the reason, the reason I got you there is so 
that you there not eight places away.  If you eight 
places away, you ain’t doing me no good.  
[Defendant]: Two cars away.  
[Undercover Officer]: That ain’t doing me no 
good.  
[Defendant]: I heard everything you said.  
[Undercover Officer]: What?  
[Defendant]: I could hear you talking.  
[Undercover Officer]: No, no, I don’t want you  
to hear me talk.  I want you, I, you got to be 
there, that’s why I said ride up in the car with 
me. That way I can, if something happens man, I’m 
still stuck with the Goddamn package.  I want to  
pitch it . . . . That’s, that’s what I want.  
[Defendant]: Oh, you want me to handle it.  
[Undercover Officer]: I don’t want, no, no, 
no, no, I, but if you’re in the car, just roll down 
(continued...)  
5  
 
Moreover, the majority uses its own credibility judgment  
to supersede that of the lower courts to conclude that  
defendant knew about his duty to handle the drugs before the  
first 
transaction. 
 
The majority states, “A recorded audiotape  
of defendant and [the undercover officer] discussing their  
arrangement 
before the 
first 
staged 
drug 
transaction  
demonstrates that [the undercover officer] informed defendant  
that he would have to handle drugs on occasion . . . .”  Slip  
op at 14.  When faced with the same evidence, the lower court  
and 
the 
attorneys 
themselves disagreed with the police witness  
and came to the contrary conclusion:  
A.
 [Undercover Officer]: I believe I told  
[defendant] 
that 
we 
would–we 
met 
with 
the  
individual in which I was to make the purchase 
from, he was to take the drugs, check them, ensure 
that the package was right, let me know that it was 
right, and then we would leave.  
1(...continued) 
the window.  I can pitch it in there. I ain’t got, 
I ain’t holding nothing.  That’s what I’m talking 
about, see?  But you standing way over there, now I 
got to hold it and hold it, and hold it, until you 
get there because I, I, I can’t check the package 
and check him too.  Alright. 
That’s my boy, but 
business is business.  
[Defendant]: I thought you wanted protection,  
that’s what I was under the impression that you  
wanted me for.  [Emphasis added.]  
This 
conversation 
took 
place 
after 
the 
first 
transaction, 
thus revealing that defendant did not know he was to “handle” 
the drugs, but only thought he was to protect the undercover 
officer before the first transaction.  
6  
 
Q.
 [Defense Counsel]: Now, Lieutenant, I 
don’t see that in the transcript of the audio tapes 
that was made.  Let me hand this to you and maybe 
you can show me.  
Mr. Martin [Assistant Prosecutor]: Which  
transaction are we talking about?  
Mr. Szokolay [Defense Counsel]: The transcript 
of the recording, body recording made February 7, 
1992 [the first transaction].  
* * *  
The Court: Are you looking for something?  
Mr. Szokolay: Yes, your Honor.  The witness  
told us that he had told [defendant] prior to the 
buy that he would be expected to hold the package, 
and I asked him to find us where he said that.  
The Court: Mr. Martin, can you agree that 
maybe it’s not there?  
Mr. 
Martin: 
Your 
Honor, 
I 
believe 
the  
recording on February 7th doesn’t indicate prior to  
the deal that he was informed of that, but on page  
five it indicates that he was informed of that  
after, that it would be his job to check the  
package.  
The Court: That would be from the next  
transaction.  
The Court of Appeals did not clearly err in concluding  
that on the basis of this evidence, the defendant was not  
informed before the first transaction that he would have to  
hold the drugs.  Rather, all parties agreed that there was no  
evidence on that audio tape suggesting defendant was informed  
he would have to handle the drugs prior to the first  
transaction.  
7  
I cannot join a decision that not only mischaracterizes  
the facts in favor of a result, but also strips the deference  
that is due credibility determinations made by lower courts in  
such a way as the majority does today. Accordingly, I would  
reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals holding  
defendant 
was 
entrapped 
into 
the 
second 
possession 
transaction  
and affirm in part the decision of the Court of Appeals  
holding defendant was entrapped into the first.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
8