Title: Spaulding v. Miller

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed April 6, 1960.
Petition for rehearing denied May 10, 1960.
*505 Edward L. Clark, Jr., and Owen M. Panner argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Clark and Marsh, Salem, and McKay, Panner and Marvin, Bend.
Asa L. Lewelling, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Roy Harland, Salem.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, O'CONNELL and HARRIS, Justices.
REVERSED.
HARRIS, J. (Pro Tempore)
This proceeding was initiated by a petition for removal of defendant, Ernest H. Miller, as guardian, filed in the matter of the guardianship of the estate of Elva Maude Miller by Bruce Spaulding as a friend and attorney for Elva Maude Miller who, in July, 1949, was committed by the circuit court of Marion county to the Oregon State Hospital. The record also shows that on April 25, 1951, the same court, upon a representation that it was necessary for the care and attention of the estate of said Elva Maude Miller that a guardian thereof be appointed, did appoint her son, the defendant Ernest H. Miller, as guardian of her estate. The plaintiff was employed in 1947 to represent *506 Elva Maude Miller in divorce proceedings that had been brought against her in Clackamas county by her husband, Ernest A. Miller, who is the father of the defendant Ernest H. Miller. This divorce suit is still pending on the countersuit of Elva Maude Miller.
The petition herein alleged that the defendant, Ernest H. Miller, the guardian of the estate of Elva Maude Miller, has been unfaithful to and neglectful of his trust in certain particulars, to the probable loss of the estate. It is also alleged the guardian has personal interests which conflict with those of the ward and her estate and that he has failed, refused and neglected to discharge his trust duties as guardian. The defendant's answer denies these charges and alleges that he and his brother, as the ward's next of kin, are the only persons interested in the ward's estate. The prayer of the petition is for the removal of defendant as guardian, the appointment of a bank as guardian, and for an accounting by Ernest H. Miller. From an adverse order, plaintiff appeals.
1. Shortly before the cause was argued in this court the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground it was moot. This motion was based upon an order of the circuit court dated March 10, 1960, by which the guardianship of the ward was terminated, her guardian discharged and final accounting approved. However, on March 14, 1960, this order was set aside by the circuit court as having been improvidently granted. The motion to dismiss the appeal is, therefore, denied.
On March 14, 1960, the defendant presented to this court (by motion to augment the record, which we allow) a certified copy of an order of "competency" of the ward entered in the circuit court on October 1, 1959. For the guidance of the court and the parties *507 hereto, we feel it is our duty to pass upon the legal effect of this order of "competency." The order of "competency" entered by the circuit court was made pursuant to ORS 426.305, which reads as follows:
It will thus be noted that the order entered by the circuit court as required by ORS 426.305 is to be made if it sufficiently appears from the "certificate of discharge filed pursuant to ORS 426.300" that the patient is competent.
ORS 426.300, which provides for a certificate of discharge, reads as follows:
The certificate or notice of discharge executed by the superintendent of the Oregon State Hospital pursuant to ORS 426.300 reads as follows:
We thus have the unusual situation wherein it appears from the certificate or notice of discharge executed by the superintendent of the Oregon State Hospital that he has discharged the patient from the state hospital under authority of § (c) of ORS 425.300(1) which provides for the discharge of a patient who has not recovered from mental illness and at the same time the superintendent has underscored the word "competent" on the certificate, presumably to indicate that the patient was "competent" at the time of discharge.
2. In State v. Garver, 190 Or 291, 303, 225 P2d 771, and in civil cases therein cited, this court holds that the law presumes that insanity (here established in *509 1949) having once been shown to exist, continues until the contrary is made to appear.
3. Assuming, however, that under the circumstances mentioned, the order of "competency" made by the court on October 1, 1959, was valid, such an order, in our opinion, only determines that the patient was competent to be free from custodial restraint of any nature. (ORS 33.820(4)) A determination of the foregoing would not be a determination of such a restoration as to terminate the necessity of the guardianship of the estate of the ward, i.e., a determination that the ward was able to handle and take care of his own property.
4. As stated in In re Des Granges, 102 Cal App 592, 598, 283 P 103:
In 28 (old) Am Jur 679, 680, Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 36, it is held:
*510 The Supreme Court of California in In re Zanetti, 34 Cal2d 136, 143, 208 P2d 657 (1949) held:
5. There is no indication that the legislature intended the procedures set forth in ORS 426.300-426.305 to be the equivalent of or to replace the procedure set forth in ORS 126.510(2) for the judicial determination that a guardian appointed for an incompetent or mentally diseased person may be discharged by the court when it appears to the court that such guardianship is no longer necessary.
ORS 126.510(2) reads as follows:
6. There is no indication that the perfunctory order provided for in ORS 426.305, based as it is entirely on a superintendent's certificate, ex proprio vigore, constitutes a legal determination that a ward under guardianship as an incompetent would thereby be made to appear to possess the ability to manage and take care of his property.
We, therefore, hold that no legal determination has yet been made justifying the termination of the guardianship proceedings.
*511 We have carefully studied the record and the contentions advanced by the parties to this appeal. We follow the advice of this court where in an analogous situation it is stated:
7, 8. It is sufficient to state we are of the opinion that the record discloses the fact that there is such a conflict between the interests of defendant and those of the ward that he ought not to remain as guardian of her estate. There is also evidence tending to indicate the present guardian has not fully marshalled all assets of the ward's estate. We do not pass on the merits of this issue which cannot herein be litigated. We do hold, under all the facts, circumstances and conditions shown by the record, that a disinterested guardian should be placed in charge of the ward's estate, who will cause all the alleged derelictions of duty and charges of misconduct to be fully investigated. The holding of this court in In re Faulkner's Estate, 156 Or 23, 28, 65 P2d 1045, is here applicable.
9-12. Defendant asserts, however, that plaintiff is not a proper person to initiate this proceeding to remove defendant as guardian. ORS 126.505 provides:
Plaintiff has been the ward's attorney for several years in the divorce proceeding earlier mentioned. Since her confinement to the state hospital as an incompetent, no further action could be taken therein. Under the record it appears there was no one but plaintiff to bring to the attention of the court the alleged wrongful conduct of the guardian.
ORS 115.490, made applicable to guardians by ORS 126.505, provides:
A court of equity "will not suffer a wrong without a remedy." We hold, therefore, that plaintiff, as a friend and attorney of the ward and as an officer of the court, had authority to bring the matters shown by the petition to the attention of the court to the end that the rights of the ward might be fully protected *513 in accordance with the principles stated by the California court in In re Des Granges, supra, at p 598, as follows:
Moreover, assuming plaintiff did not have legal capacity to institute the instant proceeding, this was a matter that appeared on the face of the petition, and by failing to demur to the petition on the ground of lack of capacity to sue, the matter was waived by defendant. In this connection this court held in Harney Valley Irr. Dist. v. Weittenhiller, 101 Or 1, 7, 198 P 1093:
We hold that in failing to remove the defendant, Ernest H. Miller, as guardian of the estate of Elva Maude Miller, the court abused its discretion. The order of the circuit court appealed from is, therefore, in all things reversed and set aside and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to enter an order removing the defendant, Ernest H. Miller, as guardian of the estate of Elva Maude Miller and appointing a disinterested and qualified guardian of the estate of Elva Maude Miller and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.