Title: Hooten v. Safe Auto. Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Hooten v. Safe Auto. Ins. Co., 100 Ohio St.3d 8, 2003-Ohio-4829.] 
 
 
HOOTEN, APPELLEE, v. SAFE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Hooten v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 100 Ohio St.3d 8, 2003-Ohio-4829.] 
Civil procedure — Summary judgment — Trial court need not notify parties of 
the date of consideration of a motion for summary judgment or the 
deadlines for submitting briefs and Civ.R. 56 materials, when. 
(No. 2002-1349 — Submitted May 14, 2003 — Decided September 24, 2003.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-010576. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A trial court need not notify the parties of the date of consideration of a motion for 
summary judgment or the deadlines for submitting briefs and Civ.R. 56 
materials if a local rule of court provides sufficient notice of the hearing 
date or submission deadlines. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
This case addresses whether local rules of court can adequately 
provide parties with notice of the deadline for filing a response to a motion for 
summary judgment or of the date the trial court will consider such motion. 
I 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶2} 
On May 21, 1998, plaintiff-appellee, Henry L. Hooten, filed a 
complaint against defendant-appellant, Safe Auto Insurance Company (“Safe 
Auto”), in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.  Hooten alleged that Safe Auto 
had improperly refused payment under an auto insurance policy between Hooten 
and Safe Auto for a 1997 accident.  Safe Auto answered that the policy excluded 
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coverage when a vehicle’s operator was without a “valid driver’s license or 
without driving privileges” at the time of an accident and that Hooten was 
operating his vehicle without a valid license or driving privileges when his 
accident occurred. 
{¶3} 
Safe Auto’s assertions related to a conviction that Hooten had 
received in 1996 for driving under the influence of alcohol, a resulting suspension 
of his driver’s license, his subsequent receipt of occupational driving privileges 
conditioned on his use of an ignition-interlock device, and alleged irregularities 
within that series of events that Safe Auto claimed had caused the driver’s license 
to be invalid at the time of the accident.  Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, Safe Auto sought 
summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion for summary judgment 
on August 16, 1999. 
{¶4} 
Hooten appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for 
Hamilton County, which, on May 19, 2000, reversed the judgment of the trial 
court and remanded the matter for further proceedings, finding that an issue of 
fact existed as to whether Hooten had had a valid driver’s license when he was 
involved in the accident. 
{¶5} 
On remand, the case was assigned to a different trial judge, and 
shortly thereafter, to a third judge.  On December 28, 2000, Hooten filed a motion 
for summary judgment, to which Safe Auto responded on January 16, 2001.  At a 
hearing on April 4, 2001, which primarily involved the parties’ discovery 
disputes, the trial court denied Hooten’s motion for summary judgment.  The trial 
court expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of the case and denied Hooten’s 
request for a continuance.  On April 26, 2001, Safe Auto took Hooten’s 
deposition for the first time in the litigation, earlier attempts having been 
unsuccessful.  On May 3, 2001, Safe Auto moved for leave to file a new motion 
January Term, 2003 
3 
for summary judgment.  Hooten filed no opposition to the motion for leave, and 
on June 4, 2001, the trial court granted leave to Safe Auto to file its motion. 
{¶6} 
Safe Auto filed its motion for summary judgment on July 9, 2001.  
Within this motion, Safe Auto contended that because Hooten’s driver’s license 
had been suspended at the time of the accident and no reinstatement fee had been 
paid, Hooten did not hold a valid driver’s license in 1997.  Consequently, Safe 
Auto asserted, it had justifiably denied Hooten’s claim. 
{¶7} 
On July 20, 2001, Hooten moved, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F), to 
continue the trial court’s hearing of the summary judgment motion pending 
further discovery.  Hooten did not request an oral hearing on the summary 
judgment motion and gave no indication of an intention to file any response to 
Safe Auto’s motion.  On August 9, 2001, the trial court granted Safe Auto’s 
motion for summary judgment and denied Hooten’s motion for a Civ.R. 56(F) 
continuance. 
{¶8} 
Hooten appealed the grant of summary judgment against him to the 
First District Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had erred by 
never setting a date for a hearing on or submission of Safe Auto’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings, finding that the trial court had erred by not setting a hearing date.  In 
the decision, considered on an accelerated calendar and with little analysis, the 
court of appeals cited several of its previous decisions as support for its position.  
Because the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment as 
procedurally flawed, the court did not consider Hooten’s substantive argument on 
the merits. 
{¶9} 
This case comes to us by way of a certified conflict between the 
judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and a decision of the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals in Hall v. Klien (Sept. 3, 1999), Wood App. No. WD-99-001, 
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1999 WL 682584, on the following issue:  “Must a trial court, before ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56, either set an oral or non-oral 
hearing date or establish a cut-off date for parties to submit affidavits or materials 
opposing the motion?”1  The cause is now before this court upon our finding that 
a conflict exists. 
II 
Summary Judgment Procedural Considerations 
{¶10} In supporting its view of the certified issue, Safe Auto argues that a 
trial court need not set a date for consideration of a summary judgment motion or 
establish deadlines for parties’ briefs and Civ.R. 56 materials when a local court 
rule clearly does so.  Loc.R. 14(B) of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton 
County provides that a memorandum in opposition to any motion, including one 
for summary judgment, “shall be served upon movant’s trial attorney within ten 
days from the date the memorandum in support of the motion and proof of service 
thereof, was served.  Failure to serve and file a memorandum contra may be cause 
for the Court to grant the motion as served and filed.” 
{¶11} The court of appeals acknowledged the existence of Loc.R. 14(B), 
but found that it does not dispense with the requirement that a trial court inform 
the parties of either a hearing date or a deadline for submitting materials.  The 
court of appeals’ decision in this regard generally conflicts with decisions of 
several other appellate districts. 
{¶12} Before proceeding to the certified issue, we first consider case law 
relevant to Civ.R. 56 and summary judgment motion practice.  Civ.R. 56(C) 
provides that a summary judgment motion “shall be served at least fourteen days 
before the time fixed for hearing.  The adverse party, prior to the day of hearing, 
                                                 
1. 
A “nonoral hearing” may include “as little as the submission of memoranda and 
evidentiary materials for the court’s consideration.”  Brown v. Akron Beacon Journal Publishing 
January Term, 2003 
5 
may serve and file opposing affidavits.”  Civ.R. 56(C) then lists the standards by 
which to determine the merits of the motion and also lists the materials that the 
trial court will consider in making its determination. 
{¶13} Although Civ.R. 56(C) sets out the procedure by which summary 
judgments are issued, the rule’s requirements are general.  Case law and local 
rules of court have delineated additional procedures, which can vary significantly 
depending on the jurisdiction.  For example, the Hamilton County Court of 
Appeals requires that trial courts set hearing and submission dates, while many 
other appellate districts do not. 
{¶14} On the other hand, there is consensus on many aspects of the 
procedural requirements of summary judgment.  Ohio’s appellate courts uniformly 
agree that a trial court is not required to schedule an oral hearing on every motion 
for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Manor Care Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Thomas 
(1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 481, 486, 704 N.E.2d 593, from the First District Court 
of Appeals, and Anania v. Daubenspeck Chiropractic (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 
516, 522, 718 N.E.2d 480, from the Second District Court of Appeals.  The 
“hearing” contemplated by Civ.R. 56(C) may be either a formal, oral hearing (in 
which the trial court entertains oral arguments from counsel on a scheduled date 
preceded by the parties’ filings of memoranda and Civ.R. 56 evidentiary 
materials) or a “nonoral,” informal one.  Brown v. Akron Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 135, 139, 610 N.E.2d 507; Wise v. Ohio 
Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 11, 15, 616 N.E.2d 251.  
Whether to grant a party’s request for oral hearing is a decision within the trial 
court’s discretion.  Doe v. Beach House Dev. Co. (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 573, 
582, 737 N.E.2d 141; Potter v. Troy (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 372, 378, 604 
                                                                                                                                     
Co. (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 135, 139, 610 N.E.2d 507. 
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N.E.2d 828; Gates Mills Invest. Co. v. Pepper Pike (1978), 59 Ohio App.2d 155, 
164, 13 O.O.3d 191, 392 N.E.2d 1316. 
{¶15} Many of the above considerations regarding oral argument are 
incorporated into the Local Rules of the Hamilton County Court of Common 
Pleas, which instruct that “motions in civil cases” will not “be set for oral 
argument” unless certain procedures are followed.  Loc.R. 14(C)(1)(a) and (b).  
The local rules further allow the trial judge, upon receipt of a request for oral 
argument, to “make whatever disposition the judge feels is proper” or to “set the 
matter for oral argument.”  Loc.R. 14(C)(2).  In addition, Loc.R. 14(C)(4) 
provides, “If no request for oral argument is made by any interested party within 
ten days after the filing of such motion, the motion shall be considered by the 
assigned judge for decision.”  These rules are typical of local rules addressing the 
scheduling of oral arguments and appear generally to be consistent with Civ.R. 
7(B)(2):  “To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order 
for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief 
written statements of reasons in support and opposition.”  See, also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 
78, which contains identical wording. 
{¶16} Federal courts take the same general view of the hearing 
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.  See Annotation, Necessity of Oral Argument on 
Motion for Summary Judgment (1991), 105 A.L.R.Fed. 755, 761, Section 3 
(generally, oral argument is not a requirement for a summary judgment 
“hearing”).  Ohio’s Civ.R. 56 is based upon the federal rule, and so the two are 
similar.  See 1970 Staff Notes to Civ.R. 56.  The most notable difference for our 
purposes is that Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) requires that a motion for summary judgment 
be served “at least 10 days” before the hearing, rather than the 14 days provided 
for in Civ.R. 56(C). 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶17} Most Ohio appellate courts agree that when a trial court does not 
hold an oral hearing on a summary judgment motion, Civ.R. 56 requires, as a 
matter of due process, that the nonmoving party receive notice of the deadline date 
for the opposing party’s response to the summary judgment motion or of the date 
on which the motion is deemed submitted for decision.  See, e.g., Anania, 129 
Ohio App.3d at 522-523, 718 N.E.2d 480; Manor Care, 123 Ohio App.3d at 486-
487, 704 N.E.2d 593; Rhoads v. New Vienna (Mar. 25, 2002), 12th Dist. No. 
CA2001-10-0333, 2002 WL 450728; Sysco Food Serv. of Cleveland, Inc. v. 
Tabler-Martin Corp. (Feb. 12, 1996), 5th Dist. No. 95-CA-0308, 1996 WL 
132227. 
{¶18} These courts reason that Civ.R. 56 itself provides no specific 
deadline for the filing of a response to a motion for summary judgment, and so the 
notice does not come from the provisions of that rule.  Civ.R. 56(C)’s only 
relevant instructions are that the motion be served at least 14 days before the 
hearing is held and that opposing affidavits may be filed up to the day before the 
hearing. 
{¶19} Some of the difficulties in interpreting the requirements preceding 
the “hearing” envisioned in Civ.R. 56(C) are engendered by the failure of that rule 
to provide a point of reference for the “fixed” hearing it refers to.  If the trial court 
conducts an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment, it must notify the 
parties of the hearing date so that all parties are aware of deadlines for filing briefs 
and Civ.R. 56 materials.  However, most summary judgment rulings are reached 
without oral argument.  When a trial court decides a motion for summary 
judgment without oral hearing, nothing in Civ.R. 56 pinpoints the deadlines. 
{¶20} We are aware that some courts have found that Civ.R. 56(C) itself 
provides the parties with sufficient notice of the submission date because it states 
that the matter may be deemed submitted 14 days after the summary judgment 
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motion is served.  See, e.g., Hudak v. Valleyaire Golf Club, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2000), 
9th Dist. No. 3010-M, 2000 WL 1732401 (notice requirement of Civ.R. 56[C] is 
satisfied by service of motion for summary judgment upon opposing party).  See, 
also, 2 Klein & Darling, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Civil Practice (1997) 568-569, 
Section AT 56-17 (Civ.R. 56 “makes no provision for the case in which no 
hearing of any kind is scheduled or held.”  However, barring a more generous 
local rule, Civ.R. 56 gives a “defender” 14 days to prepare a response to the 
summary judgment motion). 
{¶21} We recognize that our decisions provide some support for this 
position.  See, for example, State ex rel. Freeman v. Morris (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
458, 460-461, 605 N.E.2d 27 (“appellant had notice of the motion for summary 
judgment from the moment he received it * * * [and] was not entitled to further 
notice”), and State ex rel. The V. Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 472, 
692 N.E.2d 198 (court “was not required to give [appellant] fourteen days notice 
of date it would rule on the * * * summary judgment motion”). 
{¶22} We find, however, that Freeman and The V. Cos. are 
distinguishable from this case and so confine the above statements to the specific 
facts of each case.  In those cases, the nonmoving party had filed a response to the 
motion for summary judgment.  See Freeman, 65 Ohio St.3d at 460, 605 N.E.2d 
27; The V. Cos., 81 Ohio St.3d at 471, 692 N.E.2d 198.  We therefore determine 
that those decisions are not dispositive of the precise issues we encounter here.  
Although we acknowledge that Civ.R. 56(C) anticipates a cutoff date for a 
response to a motion for summary judgment, we determine that the rule is not 
sufficiently explicit to apprise the parties of that date.  Notice must come from 
some other source or sources. 
{¶23} Obviously, if the trial court does set an explicit hearing date for the 
summary judgment motion, it succeeds in providing the requisite notice.  
January Term, 2003 
9 
Likewise, if the trial court sets explicit cutoff dates for the parties to file briefs and 
Civ.R. 56 materials, it succeeds in putting the parties on notice of the date that the 
motion will be ripe for decision.  This case centers on whether there is another 
way that the required notice can be provided—specifically through a local rule of 
court.2 
III 
Can a Local Rule of Court Provide the Requisite Notice? 
{¶24} The specific point of disagreement among this state’s appellate 
courts is whether a local rule of court can provide notice to the parties of the 
hearing date or date of submission.  If notice cannot come from a local rule, then 
the trial court must provide notice of the hearing date in some form so that all 
affidavits are filed and served by the day before that date, or at least provide a 
deadline date when all memoranda and Civ.R. 56 material must be submitted.  
See Civ.R. 56(C).  The day after that date effectively becomes the earliest possible 
hearing date in that circumstance, subject to Civ.R. 56(C)’s requirement that at 
least 14 days have elapsed after the motion is served. 
{¶25} As illustrated by its decision in this case, the First District Court of 
Appeals has consistently taken the view that Civ.R. 56(C) requires a trial court 
either to set a firm date for a hearing or a firm date for submission of affidavits 
and other Civ.R. 56 evidentiary materials before the court may rule on a motion 
for summary judgment, notwithstanding any local rule.  See, e.g., Griffith v. 
Wackenhut Corp. (July 6, 1988), Hamilton App. No. C-870836, 1988 WL 71609 
                                                 
2. 
Many Ohio appellate courts apparently agree that a general case-management scheduling 
order can provide the requisite notice in the appropriate situation.  See Hall v. Klien, Wood App. 
No. WD-99-001, 1999 WL 682584; Davis v. Pelfrey (June 15, 1987), 12th Dist. No. CA-86-11-
021, 1987 WL 12734.  Research has revealed no decisions from the First District on this precise 
issue.  However, from the absolute nature of its decisions on the issue in this case, it appears that 
the First District would agree with this position only if the relevant scheduling order was so 
unambiguous that it unmistakably provided notice of the actual hearing date or actual cutoff date 
for submission of Civ.R. 56 materials. 
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(“a fair reading of Civ.R. 56[C] appears to require a hearing or a date of 
submission; otherwise no obligation would devolve on parties opposing summary 
judgment to serve and file their opposing affidavits”); Estep v. Insignia Mgt. Co. 
(Mar. 26, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-960092, 1997 WL 133441 (“In Griffith, 
we held that, notwithstanding Loc.R. 14[B] of the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas, which is the analog of Loc.R. V[4] of the [Hamilton County] 
Municipal Court, the trial court, before determining a summary judgment motion, 
is required to set either a date for hearing or a date of submission”); Manor Care, 
supra, 123 Ohio App.3d at 486, 704 N.E.2d 593 (“We do not see how a party can 
be cognizant of when it must file affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment if a hearing on the motion is conducted without proper notice”; Loc.R. 
14[B] pertains only to memoranda and not to affidavits); Hyman v. McGraw (Dec. 
10, 1999), Hamilton App. No. C-990013, 1999 WL 1127295 (“In accordance with 
our prior cases, * * * we hold that, in the absence of a hearing date or a date of 
submission, the trial court erred in deciding the motion for summary judgment on 
the merits”); Birkenheuer v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. (Dec. 19, 2001), 
Hamilton App. No. C-010442, 2001 WL 1887703 (affirming “bright-line rule” 
that notice before ruling on summary judgment motion is required “even where it 
appears that there is only a remote possibility that such notice will affect the 
outcome of the case”). 
{¶26} The First District Court of Appeals is not alone in its view.  In 
Laituri v. Nero (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 797, 802-803, 723 N.E.2d 1119, the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals found that Civ.R. 56(C) implicitly requires a 
trial court to set a hearing date for its consideration of a summary judgment 
motion and thereby to give written notice to the parties of the date on which the 
response to the motion is due.  The court found a local rule allowing a trial court 
to consider a motion for summary judgment 20 days after the filing of the motion 
January Term, 2003 
11 
unenforceable because it allowed the court to grant summary judgment without 
providing the requisite 14 days’ notice of the hearing date.  Id. at 802, 723 N.E.2d 
1119.  See, also, from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Wise v. Ohio Dept. of 
Rehab. & Corr., 84 Ohio App.3d at 15, 616 N.E.2d 251 (“actual notice in writing 
of the day fixed for the hearing, whether oral or non-oral, must be given to the 
non-moving party at least fourteen days prior to the day fixed for the hearing and 
no local rule can dispense with this requirement”).  But, see, Hayes v. Murtha 
(Oct. 10, 1996), 10th Dist. No. 96APE04-512, 1996 WL 589268 (finding, without 
distinguishing or citing Wise, that local rules setting date for hearing of motion for 
summary judgment and time limit for filing response were effective in giving 
party opposing motion notice of hearing date and of deadline for filing 
memorandum and Civ.R. 56[C] material). 
{¶27} A majority of districts that have considered this question take a 
different view from that taken by the First District in this case.  The Second, 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Twelfth Districts (as well as the Tenth 
District, as qualified above), have found that a local rule of court can notify the 
parties that a motion for summary judgment may be entertained by a specific date.  
In Hall v. Klien, 6th Dist. No. WD-99-001, 1999 WL 682584, the case certified as 
in conflict with this case, the Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the relevant 
local rule (providing that responses to motions, including those for summary 
judgment, are to be filed within 14 days after service of the motion) was sufficient 
to provide notice of the deadlines for filing a response and supporting Civ.R. 56 
materials to oppose the motion for summary judgment.  The Hall court 
specifically rejected the “cumbersome approach” adopted by the First and 
Eleventh Districts requiring the trial court to give written notice of the date for the 
nonoral hearing even if a local rule sets a deadline for the filing of a response or 
sets the date for consideration of the motion. 
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{¶28} There are many variations of local rules regarding the filing of 
responses to motions for summary judgment and the date on which the motions 
will be deemed submitted or when the hearing may be held.  Cases in which 
courts have found such local rules sufficient to notify parties that a decision on a 
motion for summary judgment is imminent include Slack v. Burton (June 9, 
2000), 2d Dist. No. 99 CA 42, 2000 WL 731696 (local rule gave party opposing 
motion for summary judgment 14 days after filing of motion to respond and also 
provided that motion is deemed submitted on 21st day after its filing); Cowen v. 
Lucas (June 30, 1997), 4th Dist. No. 96CA2456, 1997 WL 362013; Novosel v. 
Gusto, Inc. (Dec. 3, 1998), 8th Dist. No. 73575, 1998 WL 842135 (local rule 
giving party opposing motion for summary judgment 30 days after service of the 
motion to file response sufficient to put parties on notice that motion may be ruled 
on after 33 days have passed, if motion was served by mail); Brown, 81 Ohio 
App.3d at 138-139, 610 N.E.2d 507 (local rule gave party opposing motion for 
summary judgment 10 days after receipt of motion to respond and also provided 
that motion may be ruled on any time after 14 days of its filing); Chestnut Ridge 
Dev. Co. v. Ohio Bar Title Ins. Co. (Jan. 31, 1996), 9th Dist. No. 95CA006129, 
1996 WL 37755 (local rule provided that briefs opposing motions are to be filed 
within 14 days after filing of the motion and that court will rule on motion at that 
time if no oral hearing is set). 
{¶29} In addition, other courts have recognized that local rules of court 
can provide notice of the deadline to file a response to a motion for summary 
judgment, even though no adequate local rule existed in the county from which 
the appeal originated.  See, e.g., Ohio Bank v. Le-Flor Ent., Ltd. (Nov. 2, 2001), 
3d Dist. No. 5-01-20, 2001 WL 1354413; Rhoads v. New Vienna, supra, 12th 
Dist. No. CA2001-10-0333 (local rule providing simply that “Motions for 
Summary Judgment shall be dealt with in accordance with Ohio Civil Rule 56” 
January Term, 2003 
13 
not sufficient to give notice).  The feature common to all of the cases in which 
courts have found a local rule sufficient to provide the parties notice of the 
summary judgment submission date is that the relevant local rule was determined 
to complement Civ.R. 56’s basic structure and not to contradict it. 
{¶30} In an appellate district made up of only one county (i.e., the First 
District, from which this appeal originates, as well as the Eighth and Tenth 
Appellate Districts), considering the impact of local rules generally requires a 
reviewing court of appeals to focus on only the rules adopted in that county, with 
the result that there is no need to have a different view of what is required by local 
rules depending on where the appeal originated (although a common pleas court 
in that county might have a local rule on a subject different from that adopted by a 
municipal court).  Consequently, the decisions of the First District Court of 
Appeals on the certified issue have focused on the adequacy of only Loc.R. 14(B) 
(or its “analog,” Hamilton County Municipal Court Loc.R. V[4]) in providing 
notice, and that court has never had an opportunity to consider the adequacy of 
local rules with different provisions.  To the extent that Loc.R. 14(B) is 
fundamentally different from some of the local rules at issue in cases from other 
districts, there may not truly be a conflict between the First District’s decisions 
and those of some of the other districts cited above. 
{¶31} On the other hand, in a multicounty appellate district, there can be 
as many variations on local rules as there are counties that comprise the district 
(again, municipal courts or county courts within the district may have their own 
local rules).  This point is illustrated by Slack v. Burton, supra, 2d Dist. No. 99 
CA 42, 2000 WL 731696, in which the Second District Court of Appeals found a 
Miami County local rule sufficient to provide notice, and Ashworth v. Enon (Oct. 
18, 1995), 2d Dist. No. 95 CA 43, 1995 WL 614345, in which the same court 
found that the Clark County local rules did not provide notice.  See, also, Cowen 
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v. Lucas, supra, 4th Dist. No. 96CA2456, 1997 WL 362013, which the Fourth 
Appellate District distinguishes from Birchfield v. Warncke (Mar. 25, 1996), 
Adams App. No. 95CA593, 1996 WL 148592, and Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Stratton (June 28, 1989), Highland App. No. 694, 1989 WL 74871.  
There were no local rules relevant to the question in Birchfield and Stratton, the 
court noted, but a Scioto County local rule provided the required notice in Cowen.  
As these cases demonstrate, it is crucial to focus on the precise terms of local rules 
to determine whether the notice they provide is sufficient. 
{¶32} The majority view among Ohio’s appellate districts that a local rule 
of court is capable of providing the parties with notice of the date of hearing or 
deadline date for submission of materials is supported by decisions of several 
federal circuit courts of appeal.  See Geear v. Boulder Community Hosp. (C.A.10, 
1988), 844 F.2d 764, 766 (a local rule providing that responses to motions for 
summary judgment “must be submitted within a certain time period of at least ten 
days fulfills the notice requirement of rule 56[c]”); Cowgill v. Raymark Industries, 
Inc. (C.A.3, 1985), 780 F.2d 324, 329 (party opposing motion for summary 
judgment is not entitled to notice that the motion will be entertained on a 
particular date); Howell v. Tanner (C.A.5, 1981), 650 F.2d 610, 614 (a local rule 
can fulfill the notice requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).  But, see, Griffith v. 
Wainwright (C.A.11, 1985), 772 F.2d 822, 824 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56[c] “requires that 
summary judgment cannot be entered against a party unless that person has been 
given express notice, ten days in advance, of his rights under that rule and how he 
might best defend them”). 
{¶33} We are persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that find that a 
local rule of court may notify parties of a summary judgment hearing or of 
deadlines for submission of memoranda and Civ.R. 56 materials.  Therefore, we 
hold that a trial court need not notify the parties of the date of consideration of a 
January Term, 2003 
15 
motion for summary judgment or the deadlines for submitting briefs and Civ.R. 
56 materials if a local rule of court provides sufficient notice of the hearing date or 
submission deadlines.3 
{¶34} Our holding should not be taken as condoning a hasty judgment.  
One of the overriding goals of Civ.R. 56 is fundamental fairness to all litigants, 
given the high stakes involved when summary judgment is sought.  See Murphy v. 
Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360, 604 N.E.2d 138 (because summary 
judgment terminates litigation without the benefit of a trial on the merits, 
compliance with the letter and spirit of the rule is of paramount importance).  
Civ.R. 56’s procedural fairness requirements place significant responsibilities on 
all parties and judges to ensure that summary judgment should be granted only 
after all parties have had a fair opportunity to be heard.  See Petrey v. Simon 
(1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 154, 4 OBR 396, 447 N.E.2d 1285, paragraphs one and two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶35} A trial court’s better practice is to schedule an explicit cutoff date 
for submission of materials on the motion for summary judgment and to set a date 
for any hearing.  However, if a local rule provides notice of either of these dates, 
the trial court’s scheduling of such dates is not an implicit requirement of Civ.R. 
56. 
IV 
Additional Considerations 
{¶36} In this case, we find that Loc.R. 14(B) provides a cutoff date for 
the filing of a response to a motion for summary judgment and therefore 
adequately gives notice of the date by which such a response must be filed.  Since 
Hooten never requested oral argument on the motion, he acquiesced to a nonoral 
                                                 
3. 
Consistent with the principles of our holding, it necessarily follows that a case-
management scheduling order is capable of giving the parties notice of a date of hearing on a 
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16 
hearing under Loc.R. 14(C)(4), and Loc.R. 14(B) supplied him with the date by 
which to file his response to the motion for summary judgment. 
{¶37} Even though we find Loc.R. 14(B) sufficient to provide adequate 
notice of the submission date for a motion for summary judgment, a close 
examination of that rule compared to local rules adopted in other courts reveals 
that it is not an absolute model of clarity.  Other courts have adopted local rules 
that, in addition to providing the time limits for filing responses to motions for 
summary judgment, more clearly specify the date on which the motion will be 
considered.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Murtha, supra, 10th Dist. No. 96APE04-512, 1996 
WL 589268, and its discussion of Loc.R. 21.01, 57.01, and 57.02 of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Franklin County. 
{¶38} A rule that specifies both the deadlines for filing responses to a 
motion for summary judgment and the date the hearing will occur leaves less 
room for uncertainty, particularly regarding the filing of Civ.R. 56 materials that 
the First Appellate District has focused on in finding Loc.R. 14(B) deficient.  
However, we determine that Loc.R. 14 provides the requisite notice. 
{¶39} This court has found that, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), a hearing on a 
summary judgment motion may not take place until at least 14 days have passed 
from service of the motion.  See State ex rel. The V. Cos., 81 Ohio St.3d at 470, 
692 N.E.2d 198.  To the extent that Loc.R. 14(B) could be interpreted to authorize 
a hearing after ten days from service of the motion, the rule would conflict with 
Civ.R. 56(C).  We note, however, that the rule appears to envision a period of 
more than 14 days before a hearing because it allows for the filing of a reply 
memorandum after a response has been filed, which means that in the normal 
case, the trial court must wait for the time for reply to expire (seven days after 
service of the responsive memorandum) before the matter is deemed submitted.  
                                                                                                                                     
summary judgment motion or cutoff date for the submission of briefs and Civ.R. 56 materials. 
January Term, 2003 
17 
When, as here, no reply memorandum will be filed because no response was filed, 
Civ.R. 56(C) prohibits the hearing until at least 14 days have passed.  Because 
Loc.R. 14(B) is read in conjunction with Civ.R. 56(C), the two are not in conflict.  
Many of the local rules considered in cases from other districts cited in this 
opinion specifically require that the trial court wait at least 14 days after service of 
the motion, and in many cases longer, before entertaining a motion for summary 
judgment. 
{¶40} A motion for summary judgment is rarely granted after only 14 
days from service of the motion.  In this case, one month had passed after the 
motion’s filing when the trial court ruled on it (July 9, 2001, to August 9, 2001).  
See, also, Hall v. Klien, Wood App. No. WD-99-001, 1999 WL 682584 (trial 
court ruling issued more than one month after filing of motion for summary 
judgment [November 12, 1998, to December 14, 1998]); Brown, 81 Ohio App.3d 
at 138, 610 N.E.2d 507 (trial court waited for “approximately eleven months” 
before ruling on the motion); Davis v. Pelfrey (June 15, 1987), 12th Dist. No. CA-
86-11-021, 1987 WL 12734 (trial court waited almost three months after filing of 
motion for summary judgment before ruling on it [July 28, 1986, to October 21, 
1986]).  See, also, Ohio Bank v. Le-Flor Ent., Ltd., 3d Dist. No. 5-01-20, 2001 
WL 1354413 (court of appeals reversed grant of motion for summary judgment 
that was ruled on less than six hours after it was filed).  In all cases, a trial court is 
under an obligation to allow time for a full and fair response before ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, but a party opposing such a motion must be aware 
that any relevant local rules of court that set cutoff dates for the filing of a 
response or that set the date of the hearing cannot be ignored. 
{¶41} Taken together, Civ.R. 56 and Loc.R. 14 establish a general 
framework for procedures to be followed in cases in Hamilton County Common 
Pleas Court when an oral hearing on a summary judgment motion will not be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
held.  Once a motion for summary judgment is filed with the court, the responding 
party has ten days after service of the motion to file and serve a response.  The 
trial court may extend the time to file a response on its own initiative, upon 
reviewing affidavits filed by the opposing party under Civ.R. 56(F), or pursuant to 
a general motion by the opposing party for an extension of time.  See Loc.R. 
14(B), which provides that the court may extend these time periods “for good 
cause shown, upon application therefor.”  If no extension is granted, the earliest 
possible hearing date is 14 days after service of the motion under Civ.R. 56(C).  
Therefore, all parties should have their affidavits and other Civ.R. 56(C) materials 
filed by the day before that time or seek approval from the court to file later.  The 
party that does not file a response to a motion for summary judgment within ten 
days and does not file its Civ.R. 56 materials within at least 13 days of service of 
the motion risks a judgment rendered merely on its pleadings under Civ.R. 56(E). 
{¶42} Although Hooten did file a Civ.R. 56(F) motion for a continuance, 
the success of that motion was unlikely, given previous rulings of the trial court 
that the additional discovery Hooten sought was not relevant to the key issues in 
his case.  Hooten never gave any indication of an intent to file a response to the 
motion for summary judgment and never requested a simple extension of time.  
Furthermore, this case has been pending for several years, and the parties have 
filed numerous motions and responses within that time.  Hooten’s failure to 
respond to the merits of the motion for summary judgment was at his own peril, 
and under our holding, he was not entitled to further notice that the trial court’s 
consideration of Safe Auto’s motion for summary judgment was imminent.4 
{¶43} However, even though we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals on the certified issue, it does not necessarily follow that the trial court’s 
January Term, 2003 
19 
grant of summary judgment in Safe Auto’s favor must be affirmed on the merits.  
The lack of an adequate response to a motion for summary judgment by a 
monmoving party does not entitle the moving party to summary judgment.  Civ.R. 
56(E) provides that when a party fails to respond properly to a summary judgment 
motion, summary judgment, “if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, Hooten’s argument to the court of appeals that 
there is a genuine issue of fact making summary judgment inappropriate remains.5  
The court of appeals did not address that question, and we remand the matter to 
that court for its consideration. 
{¶44} For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, GRADY, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
THOMAS J. GRADY, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Edward M. Ryder, David K. Frank 
and Rudy A. Bisciotti, for appellant. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                                     
4. 
Hooten did not raise an issue in the court of appeals regarding the propriety of the trial 
court’s decision to deny his Civ.R. 56(F) motion in the same entry that granted Safe Auto’s motion 
for summary judgment. 
5. 
To the extent that Loc.R. 14(B) seems to imply that the failure to file a response to a 
motion for summary judgment authorizes the court “to grant the motion as served and filed” with 
no further consideration, it is without effect.  A local rule of course cannot dispense with the 
requirements of Civ.R. 56(C) or Civ.R. 56(E).