Title: State ex rel. Secretary, Department for Children & Families v. M.R.B.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 122,696 
 
STATE of KANSAS, ex rel.,  
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,  
J.F., Minor Child, By and Through the  
Mother and Natural Guardian, E.F., and E.F., 
Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
M.R.B. JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When an initial child custody determination lies only between the parents as 
parties to the cause of action, the best interests of the child are the paramount 
consideration for the court.  
 
2. 
Once the best interests of the child have been determined and residential custody 
with one parent established, the district court may modify custody and residency when a 
material change of circumstances is shown. The nonresidential parent carries the burden 
to show that such a material change has occurred.  
 
3. 
The district court is in the best position to make the necessary inquiries and 
determinations concerning material circumstances, custody, residency, visitation, and 
 
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parenting time, so its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of 
judicial discretion. 
 
4. 
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial 
court's findings regarding a child's best interests, an appellate court reviews the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below. 
 
5. 
An appellate court errs when it reweighs the evidence, substitutes its evaluation 
for that of the trial court, or passes upon the credibility of the witnesses.  
 
6. 
The Supreme Court will not consider issues not included in the petition for review 
but may address a plain error not presented.  
 
7. 
When an appellate court finds abuse of discretion by the district court in child 
custody cases, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for a new determination. 
Under these facts, even if the district court erred in concluding Mother would be 
financially unable to exercise parenting time out of state, it is still the role of the district 
court to make custody decisions. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 16, 
2020. Appeal from Douglas District Court; SALLY D. POKORNY, judge. Opinion filed July 23, 2021. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed on the issue subject to our 
review. The case is remanded to the district court with directions. 
 
 
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Shaye L. Downing, of Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, McEntire & Jarboe, L.L.C., of Lawrence, 
argued the cause, and Kelly J. Trussell, Emily A. Hartz, and Krystal L. Vokins, of the same firm, were 
with her on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Jody M. Meyer, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WILSON, J.:  M.R.B. Jr. (Father), a resident of Pennsylvania, moved the trial court 
to modify residential custody of his daughter, J.F., who currently resides in Kansas with 
her mother, E.F. (Mother). The district court denied Father's motion, and he appealed to 
the Court of Appeals. That panel concluded that the trial court abused its discretion 
concerning two findings of fact when it denied the motion to change residential custody. 
The panel then reversed the decision of the trial court, ordering primary residential 
custody of J.F. be changed to Father.  
 
Mother timely petitioned for review by this court. However, her petition did not 
address all the panel's holdings of error. Even so, the panel's decision presents plain error 
by making its own factual findings after reweighing the evidence and reaching the 
conclusion of which parent should have residential custody. We reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals on the issue subject to our review and remand this case to the 
district court for further proceedings.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
J.F.'s parents met in July 2011 when Father was stationed at Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky. The relationship spanned only a few weeks before the two lost contact for a 
 
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while until Mother reached out to inform Father, she was pregnant. J.F. was born in 2012, 
by which time both parents were in different states. 
 
In August 2012, Father filed a motion for temporary order of parenting time 
alongside his voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. At that hearing, the district court 
awarded joint legal custody to the parents, primary residency with Mother, and 
reasonable parenting time with Father. This allowed him to exercise his first parenting 
time during Labor Day weekend in 2012. 
 
Between deployments and a military training school, Father was only able to visit 
J.F. about 10 times during the first five years of her life. J.F.'s primary caretakers were 
her maternal grandmother, Mother, and Mother's boyfriend, Joe.  
 
During those years, J.F. and Mother moved residences a few times, all in northeast 
Kansas. They generally either lived with a boyfriend of Mother—like Joe—or in a place 
of their own. J.F. also spent significant time in her maternal grandmother's home, where 
she had a room of her own.  
 
In 2017, Father moved to modify residential custody of J.F., arguing several 
reasons why J.F. should live with him and his family in Pennsylvania. In general, he 
argued that Mother did not communicate effectively with him or provide a stable 
environment for J.F. Father was concerned about J.F.'s well-being, partly because J.F. 
reported being spanked by Mother's boyfriend and because there were also some minor 
health concerns, like dental work. 
 
The trial court ordered the parties to mediate, which was ultimately unsuccessful. 
The court then ordered a limited home study and custody evaluation and held a trial on 
 
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Father's motion to modify in November of 2017. The court ultimately denied Father's 
motion, specifying that it was Father's burden to show that there were substantial changes 
in circumstances that required a change of custody; a burden which he had not met.  
 
According to the district court, there was not a change in circumstances or any 
neglect, but a breakdown in communications. The court acknowledged that Mother 
constantly feared Father was building a case against her while Father feared he would be 
shut out of J.F.'s life. It cautioned both parties that although they never had a relationship 
where they could build up trust in each other and each other's judgments, they needed to 
do so for J.F.'s sake.  
 
In July 2018, Father moved the court for a psychologist's examination of J.F. 
because she reported being spanked by Mother and her boyfriend. The court appointed 
Danielle Rowley, a licensed master's level social worker, to examine J.F. and begin 
weekly therapy sessions. Meanwhile, the court entered a journal entry for parenting plan, 
which dictated that Mother would continue to have residential custody. Only a month 
after that journal entry, Father filed an emergency motion to set it aside. The district court 
appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), ordered J.F. to continue therapy with Rowley, and 
set an evidentiary hearing for April 2019.  
 
At that evidentiary hearing, there was extensive testimony given by Father, 
Mother, Joe, J.F.'s maternal grandmother, Father's wife, and Rowley. The hearing 
testimony covered the full gamut of J.F.'s life, including each of Mother's shifting 
relationships and living situations; J.F.'s ability to communicate, including her Skype or 
FaceTime calls with Father; J.F.'s relationship with Joe and his son; any potential 
spankings or abuse of J.F.; and even J.F.'s performance at school and interactions with 
her friends there. 
 
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Rowley detailed her extensive work with J.F. and was able to articulate several 
concerns from her therapy sessions with J.F. The main theme of these concerns was for 
J.F.'s emotional health due to the continued changes in her regular schedule and her 
ability to feel secure, which was largely based on Mother's relationships. At the hearing, 
Rowley stated: 
 
"[S]o when you are looking at the emotional well-being of a child and how they form 
their basis for what relationships should look like in the future and what they are looking 
for as they grow, as a therapist, it concerns you as to what foundation is laying for what 
[J.F.] will later search for in life for relationships as well." 
 
But Rowley's testimony and report also seemed to indicate J.F. was affected by the 
disharmony between her parents: 
 
"I believe that [J.F.] is just—she is a child that is torn in two different directions. And I 
think she is scared to show how she feels for some reason about her desire to want to be 
with dad and spend time with him, or to seem excited, is my opinion."  
 
"[J.F.] has historically been resistant to discussing things in therapy if she feels that 
whoever brought her is close enough to hear."  
 
 
Ultimately, without making a custody recommendation, Rowley's testimony and 
written reports tended to paint the picture that J.F. was facing much instability living with 
Mother and might not face all the same instability were she to live with Father.  
 
Throughout the proceedings, the court-appointed GAL was a full participant. The 
GAL read all the pleadings filed in the case, read all the reports from professionals, spoke 
with those professionals, met with both parents, spoke to counsel for both parents, met 
 
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with J.F., and even questioned each witness at the hearing. The GAL ultimately 
recommended to the court that Father have residential custody.  
 
But Rowley's testimony and the GAL's recommendation did not stand alone. 
Mother, Joe, and J.F.'s maternal grandmother all testified that J.F. was happy and doing 
well. While Rowley seemed concerned that J.F.'s life in Kansas was unstructured and did 
not provide stability and routine, Mother's testimony indicated that J.F. was doing well 
with her and she believes J.F. to be emotionally stable. Mother also rebutted several of 
the smaller, specific details which gave rise to Rowley's concerns.  
 
 
Father's motions and the testimony at the hearing—essentially everything after the 
original journal entry—expressed concern relating to custody and parenting time issues 
but did not mention support. Father did file a domestic relations affidavit and proposed 
child support worksheet, which are included in the record on appeal. It is not clear how 
financial information was presented or considered by the district court below. 
 
Panel's Decision 
 
Father's appeal of the district court's decision centered around his contention that 
the district court abused its discretion. As part of his argument, he specifically challenged 
four factual findings of the district court, alleging they were not supported by substantial 
competent evidence:  Mother would be financially unable to exercise parenting time out 
of state; J.F. does well in the mother's home, has the needs of a typical child, and has 
adjusted to her home, school, and community; there was no evidence of domestic abuse 
in Mother's home; and neither parent respects or appreciates the bond the child has with 
the other parent. 
 
 
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The panel found error with two of these district court findings:  That Mother 
would be financially unable to exercise parenting time out of state and that J.F. does well 
in the mother's home. But the panel concluded that these errors in fact constituted an 
abuse of discretion so egregious that it warranted reversing the decision of the trial court 
and ordering primary residential custody of J.F. to be awarded to her father. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Mother's petition for review presents two intertwined issues:  That the panel erred 
by finding the trial court ignored the GAL's recommendation and it again erred by 
reweighing the evidence, specifically with regards to the GAL's recommendations and 
the testimony of the therapist. We, in turn, address these as two parts of the same issue, 
specifically, whether the panel erred by reweighing the evidence presented to the district 
court to find the court had abused its discretion. 
 
 
We begin our analysis with the factual finding that J.F. does well in her mother's 
home because that is essentially the only factual finding implicated by Mother's petition 
for review to this court.  
 
 
Before the panel, Father challenged this fact only insomuch as the reports and 
testimony of child welfare experts tended to show that J.F. does not do well in Mother's 
home. He did not take issue with the finding with regards to J.F.'s adjustment to her 
school or community. The panel found fault with the trial court "ignoring" Rowley's 
testimony and the GAL's recommendations by issuing written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which do not acknowledge the GAL's recommendation and only 
briefly mention Rowley's role.  
 
 
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The panel highlighted Rowley's considerable testimony at the hearing and her 
detailed written reports where she presented evidence that J.F.'s life with Mother was 
unstable and that it negatively affected her emotional well-being. The panel took issue 
with the trial court neglecting to mention this in its written findings of fact, because "'a 
factfinder cannot disregard undisputed evidence that is not improbable, unreasonable, or 
untrustworthy. Such evidence must be regarded as conclusive.'" State, ex rel., Secretary, 
Department for Children and Families v. M.R.B., No. 122,696, 2020 WL 6106463, at *13 
(Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Casco v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 283 
Kan. 508, 515, 154 P.3d 494 [2007]).  
 
 
In the panel's opinion, the district court erred because Mother offered no expert 
testimony or other qualified evidence to dispute Rowley's diagnoses, nor did she dispute 
the instability of J.F. changing homes and schools. 
 
The Court of Appeals reweighed the evidence and made its own factual findings upon 
which it, in turn, found the district court abused its discretion. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-3201 et seq. outlines and directs a trial court's discretionary 
determination of a child's custody, residency, and parenting time according to the child's 
best interests. (These matters concerning J.F. were first determined pursuant to this 
statute's predecessor, K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 38-1121[d].) K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-3203 
provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for the district court to consider when 
determining the best interests of a child. When a custody dispute lies only between the 
parents, the child's welfare and best interests are the paramount consideration for the 
court. Neither parent has a vested interest in custody or residency of the child, and there 
 
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is no presumption that the mother should have custody, regardless of the age of the child. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-3204.  
 
However, once the best interests of the child have been determined and custody 
with one parent established, as it was for J.F. in 2012, the district court may modify 
custody or residency only when a material change of circumstances is shown. K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 23-3218. By filing a motion for change of custody, Father carried the burden 
to show that such a material change had occurred and that it was now in J.F.'s best 
interests that he have residency. Because the district court is in the best position to make 
the inquiry and determination, its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is 
an abuse of sound judicial discretion. Cheney v. Poore, 301 Kan. 120, 128, 339 P.3d 1220 
(2014).There are three ways in which a district court can abuse its discretion:  "(1) when 
no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court; (2) when a ruling 
is based on an error of law; or (3) when substantial competent evidence does not support 
a district court's finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based." 301 Kan. at 
128. 
 
The district court commits an error of fact if substantial competent evidence does 
not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion is based. State v. Ward, 
292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).  
 
"When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial 
court's findings regarding a child's best interests, this court reviews the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prevailing party below to determine if the court's factual findings 
are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings support the 
court's legal conclusion." In re Marriage of Vandenberg, 43 Kan. App. 2d 697, 704, 229 
P.3d 1187 (2010).  
 
 
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Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable 
person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. Geer v. Eby, 309 Kan. 
182, 190, 432 P.3d 1001 (2019). 
 
Discussion 
 
 
We first address the heavy focus the panel placed on the district court's departure 
from the GAL's recommendation. Mother argues that the panel adhered to a standard 
which does not exist:  that the district court must either follow the GAL recommendation 
or explicitly outline why it is choosing to depart.  
 
Mother is correct in her assertion that the panel emphasized the importance of the 
GAL when it stated: 
 
"[T]he GAL is a critical tool in child custody determinations. '[T]he need for an 
independent guardian ad litem is particularly compelling in custody disputes. Often, 
parents are pitted against one another in an intensely personal and militant clash.' Elrod, 
Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 495, 526 (2001) (quoting Short ex rel Oosterhous v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 
1037, 1039 [D. Colo. 1990]). Thus, given the importance of the GAL, a court runs the 
risk of committing an error of fact by disregarding the GAL's recommendations." M.R.B., 
2020 WL 6106463, at *15.  
 
The panel points out that the district court did not address the GAL's 
recommendations in its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, commenting that 
if the only document included in the appellate record was the trial court's written order, it 
would not know that a GAL had been appointed.  
 
 
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Without question, a GAL does have an important role in child custody disputes, 
but the panel's apparent presumption that the district court disregarded the GAL's 
recommendation is not supported in the record. Mother validly reminds us that the 
written order is not the only document in the appellate record and the GAL was a full and 
active participant throughout the proceedings from the time she was appointed, including 
during the evidentiary hearings. We can only presume the district court heard and 
considered the GAL's questions and her recommendations, all as set forth and included in 
the official record. The only conclusion we can make with assurance is that the district 
court did not agree with the GAL. But the court is not required to agree with the GAL. 
 
 
At its heart, Mother's argument is part of the larger issue that the panel reweighed 
evidence—evidence which was already seen and heard by the district court—in favor of 
Father.  
 
Mother presents her argument with extreme brevity, simply stating that while the 
trial court relied on the testimony of the parents, the panel chose to emphasize the 
therapist's testimony, which was an inappropriate reweighing of the evidence. We agree.  
 
We are persuaded that the panel erred, but Mother's reference to the GAL's 
recommendation and Rowley's testimony misses the forest for the trees. The district 
court's consideration of those two pieces of evidence is a tree, so to speak. The forest is 
the court's overall discretion as it relates to the best interests of the child. Within the 
context of that discretion, the court weighs all the evidence, not only the GAL's 
recommendation and Rowley's testimony. The panel erred by failing to view all the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Mother as the prevailing party within the context of 
that discretion, and then the panel improperly reweighed that evidence.  
 
 
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The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses, 
and the appellate court will not reweigh the evidence, substitute its evaluation of it for 
that of the trial court's, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. In re Adoption of 
B.C.S., 245 Kan. 182, 187, 777 P.2d 776 (1989).  
 
 
Given all the available evidence and considering it in a light most favorable to the 
prevailing party—Mother—we cannot find that it was unreasonable for the district court 
to conclude that J.F. was well adjusted in her home. In concluding otherwise, the panel 
erred by improperly reweighing the evidence in favor of Father, when—according to the 
applicable standard of review—it should have been viewing that evidence in a light most 
favorable to Mother. 
 
Remedy 
 
 
The problem with mother's petition for review is that while she prevails on the 
issue that the panel reweighed the evidence concerning J.F.'s emotional health in 
Mother's home, she completely ignored the panel's holding that the district court abused 
its discretion insofar as it considered Mother's financial position. "The Supreme Court 
will not consider issues not raised before the Court of Appeals or issues not presented or 
fairly included in the petition for review, cross-petition, or conditional cross-petition. The 
court, however, may address a plain error not presented." Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 56).  
 
As stated in our rules, we will not address the financial issue because Mother has 
not included it in her petition for review. However, we do feel the need to address a plain 
error not presented. After the Court of Appeals found abuse of discretion on the part of 
 
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the district court, it ultimately concluded that residential custody of J.F. would go to 
Father. That was overreach.  
 
When the panel found abuse of discretion by the district court, it should have 
remanded the case for a new determination. The panel could not have determined itself 
that residential custody should go to Father without also making additional findings of 
fact regarding a material change in circumstances and J.F.'s best interests.  
 
Even in light of the holding that the district court erred in concluding Mother 
would be financially unable to exercise parenting time out of state, the panel's remedy of 
a custody change was inappropriate. It is still the role of the district court to make 
decisions concerning J.F.'s custody and the parties' parenting time. As reflected in our 
standard of review, the district court is inherently in the best place to make those inquiries 
and determinations; an appellate court reading from the cold record is not.  
 
In 2012, the district court—by agreement of both parties—ordered residential 
custody with Mother. Because both parents were parties to the action, we apply the 
presumption that the district court considered its order to be in the best interests of the 
child at that time. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2215(d) (formerly cited as K.S.A. 38-1121). 
The district court may modify that previous order if there has been a material change of 
circumstances since the original order. If so, the district court then determines where the 
best interests of J.F. lie after that material change. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-3218 
(formerly cited as K.S.A. 60-1610). To the extent the district court's decisions are partly 
based on finances or anything else, the basis for all findings of fact must be supported by 
the record.  
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed on the 
issue subject to our review. The case is remanded to the district court with directions.  
 
STANDRIDGE, J., not participating.  
KATHLEEN M. LYNCH, District Judge, assigned.1  
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Lynch was appointed to hear case No. 122,696 
vice Justice Standridge under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) 
of the Kansas Constitution.