Title: Pratte v. Stewart

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pratte v. Stewart, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1860.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1860 
PRATTE, APPELLANT, v. STEWART, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pratte v. Stewart, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1860.] 
Statute of limitations — Childhood sexual abuse — R.C. 2305.111(C) — 
Retroactivity — Discovery rule inapplicable. 
(No. 2009-0953 — Submitted February 16, 2010 — Decided May 5, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 08-CA-95, 
2009-Ohio-1768. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  The 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action 
arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective 
date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed 
and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effective 
date of that subsection. 
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2.  Pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of 
childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches 
the age of majority. 
3.  R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories 
of childhood sexual abuse.  The discovery rule does not apply to toll the 
statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 
memories of that abuse. (Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 
N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.) 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal requires a determination of the appropriate statute of 
limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse in which the 
claimant alleges that memories of the abuse were repressed.  Appellant, Amy 
Pratte, asserts that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C), which 
became effective on August 3, 2006, cannot be applied retroactively to her claim 
that she suffered childhood sexual abuse, because her memory of the abuse was 
repressed until after the limitations period expired.  Pratte argues that pursuant to 
this court’s decision in Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, 
the statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse does 
not accrue until the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that she was sexually 
abused.  Pratte therefore contends that repressed memory continues as a tolling 
mechanism after the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). 
{¶ 2} Conversely, appellee, Rodney Stewart, contends that R.C. 
2305.111(C) unambiguously applies retroactively to Pratte’s claim and that the 
statute does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood 
sexual abuse.  Stewart therefore maintains that Pratte’s claim, which was filed 
beyond the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), is time-barred. 
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{¶ 3} We hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 
applies to all civil actions arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior 
to the effective date of the enactment of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no 
prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired 
before the effective date of that subsection.  We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 
2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse 
asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date 
on which the victim reaches the age of majority.  R.C. 2305.111(C) does not 
contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse.  
The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations while a victim 
of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse. (Ault v. Jasko 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, 
abrogated by statute.) 
{¶ 4} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 5} On April 14, 2008, Pratte filed a lawsuit against Stewart alleging 
that he sexually assaulted her on three occasions when she was a child, the most 
recent occasion happening in the fall of 1984.  Pratte was 33 years old at the time 
she filed the lawsuit.  She alleged that she had repressed memories of the sexual 
abuse until April 20, 2007, when a news event triggered the recovery of the 
memories. 
{¶ 6} Stewart moved to dismiss Pratte’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  More 
specifically, Stewart argued that Pratte’s complaint was time-barred by R.C. 
2305.111(C), which requires that a claim of childhood sexual abuse be brought 
within 12 years after the cause of action accrues.  Stewart relied upon the statute’s 
specification that a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues when the 
alleged victim attains the age of majority.  Because Pratte reached the age of 
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majority on July 13, 1992, Stewart argued that her claim must have been filed by 
July 13, 2004, and was untimely because it was not filed until April 14, 2008. 
{¶ 7} Pratte countered that this court’s holding in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870—that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of 
limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that 
abuse—remains viable despite the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C).  Because her 
memories of the alleged abuse were repressed until April 20, 2007, Pratte 
maintained that her claims were timely filed within one year of her recovery of 
the memories. 
{¶ 8} The trial court granted Stewart’s motion to dismiss, finding that the 
legislative intent in granting a minor 12 years after reaching majority in which to 
bring an action for childhood sexual abuse was to permit the minor a period of 
time to recall repressed memories.  The trial court therefore rejected Pratte’s 
arguments and held that her claim was filed beyond the time permitted by R.C. 
2305.111(C). 
{¶ 9} On Pratte’s appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, the 
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  The Second District found that “the 
legislature by enacting R.C. 2305.10(G) states that the twelve-year limitation 
period applies regardless of the previous rule of law established in Ault.”  2009-
Ohio-1768, at ¶ 17.  The court of appeals further concluded that the legislature 
intended to apply R.C. 2305.111(C) retroactively.  Id. 
{¶ 10} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary 
appeal.  122 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2009-Ohio-4233, 912 N.E.2d 107.  Pratte asserts 
four propositions of law for our consideration: 
{¶ 11} (1) “R.C. 2305.111(C) does not apply retroactively to deprive a 
repressed memory childhood sexual abuse victim of her cause of action.” 
{¶ 12} (2) “Repressed memory as a tolling mechanism of the civil statute 
of limitations remains viable after the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C).” 
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{¶ 13} (3) “The statute of limitations period for sexual abuse in Ohio 
begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was 
sexually abused, or when through the exercise of ordinary diligence, the victim 
should have discovered the abuse.” 
{¶ 14} (4) “The statute of limitations is tolled where a victim of childhood 
sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.” 
Analysis 
A.  History of the Statute of Limitations for Claims of Childhood Sexual 
Abuse  
{¶ 15} A discussion of the history of the limitations period applicable to 
claims of childhood sexual abuse is useful to our resolution of Pratte’s appeal. 
{¶ 16} Prior to the enactment of the statute at issue, the General Assembly 
had not enacted a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood sexual 
abuse.  In Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 
N.E.2d 402, this court was asked to determine what statute of limitations applied 
to such actions.  We concluded that a cause of action premised upon acts of sexual 
abuse was subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery in 
former R.C. 2305.111.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} Having determined the relevant limitations period, we went on to 
address when a claim for childhood sexual abuse accrues.  The defendants in Doe 
argued that such a claim accrued on the victim’s 18th birthday, while the plaintiff 
sought application of the discovery rule.  This court found that the facts of the 
case before it did not require us to consider whether to apply the discovery rule to 
toll the limitations period in cases involving childhood sexual abuse.  Id. at 541.  
The court ultimately held, “A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has one 
year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims 
against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the 
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identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has 
occurred.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 18} In Ault v. Jasko, however, we were presented with facts requiring 
us to determine whether to apply the discovery rule in cases alleging childhood 
sexual abuse.  The plaintiff, Kathy Ault, filed a complaint when she was 29 years 
old, alleging that she had been sexually abused as a child by her father.  Ault v. 
Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d at 114, 637 N.E.2d 870.  Her father moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations.  Ault responded that her cause 
of action did not accrue until she was able to verify that she had been sexually 
abused and that her father was responsible for that abuse. 
{¶ 19} This court held: “The discovery rule applies in Ohio to toll the 
statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 
memories of that abuse until a later time.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Thus, this court held: “The one-year statute of limitations period for sexual abuse 
in Ohio begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she 
was sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
victim should have discovered the sexual abuse.”  Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 20} Both Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Wright dissented from the 
majority’s creation of “a rule of law that would permit a person at any age after 
any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and the revived memory of 
such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages.”  Id. at 120.  Chief 
Justice Moyer emphasized that “[i]f that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General 
Assembly that should declare it as such rather than this court.”  Id.  Chief Justice 
Moyer further explained:  
{¶ 21} “The proper forum to determine such issues is in the General 
Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all scientific data, and all 
empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debated by those who have an 
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interest in the issue.  That process did not occur, nor could it have occurred, in the 
case before us. 
{¶ 22} “There probably will be a day, as there has been regarding the 
forensic use of DNA, when courts can be given reliable, competent information 
on the issue of repressed memory.  That day is not here.  We should dispose of 
this case with a strong dose of judicial restraint.  Until the General Assembly acts 
on the issue, we should apply our holding in Doe v. First United Methodist 
Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, and hold that Kathy Ault’s 
cause of action for assault and battery against John Jasko should have been filed 
within one year after the date of her eighteenth birthday.”  Id. 
{¶ 23} Justice Resnick concurred with the majority’s decision in Ault but 
agreed with the dissenters’ view that the General Assembly is the most 
appropriate body to establish a discovery rule for cases of child sexual abuse.  Id. 
at 119.  However, Justice Resnick believed that until the General Assembly chose 
to act, this court could interpret the relevant statute of limitations to allow 
potentially valid claims to proceed.  Id. 
{¶ 24} This court next examined the availability of the discovery rule in 
cases of childhood sexual abuse in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268.  We followed our holding in Doe v. 
First United Methodist Church and declined to apply the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations in a case of childhood sexual abuse against the employer of 
an alleged perpetrator where the victim knew the identity of the perpetrator and 
the employer of the perpetrator and knew that a battery had occurred.  Id. at 
syllabus.  The majority found the Ault ruling to be inapplicable because Doe had 
not alleged that he had repressed his memory of the alleged abuse.  Id. at ¶ 25.  
However, we stressed that the remedy sought by Doe required a legislative 
response to create an exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations and 
endorsed Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent in Ault.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
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{¶ 25} Shortly before the decision in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati 
was released, on March 29, 2006, the General Assembly enacted a statute of 
limitations expressly for causes of action resulting from childhood sexual abuse, 
in 2006 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 17.  S.B. 17 became effective on August 3, 2006, and 
amended former R.C. 2305.111 to create a 12-year statute of limitations for 
actions for childhood sexual abuse.  It is the construction and applicability of R.C. 
2305.111, and the viability of the discovery rule adopted in Ault, that we must 
consider today. 
B. Retroactive Application of R.C. 2305.111(C) 
{¶ 26} In her first proposition of law, Pratte challenges the retroactive 
application of R.C. 2305.111(C) to her claim against Stewart.  Pratte argues that 
this court must presume that the legislature did not intend to apply the 12-year 
statute of limitations to repressed-memory victims who do not recover their 
memories before the age of 30 years.  Otherwise, Pratte contends, the statute runs 
afoul of her constitutional guarantee to a remedy and open courts in Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
1. Retroactivity 
{¶ 27} Although neither party nor the lower courts address retroactivity 
correctly, the proper analysis for determining whether a statute can be applied 
retroactively is summarized in State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-
4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167: 
{¶ 28} “It is well-settled law that statutes are presumed to apply 
prospectively unless expressly declared to be retroactive.  R.C. 1.48; Van Fossen 
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 105, 522 N.E.2d 489.  It is 
also settled that the General Assembly does not possess an absolute right to adopt 
retroactive statutes.  Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the 
retroactive impairment of vested substantive rights.  See State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 13.  However, the General 
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Assembly may make retroactive any legislation that is merely remedial in nature.  
See State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 537, 542, 8 O.O. 
531, 9 N.E.2d 505.”  (Plurality opinion.)  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 29} With these principles in mind, this court reiterated its two-part test 
for evaluating whether a statute may be applied retroactively: 
{¶ 30} “First, the reviewing court must determine as a threshold matter 
whether the statute is expressly made retroactive.  LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d at 181, 
772 N.E.2d 1172, citing Van Fossen,36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, at 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  The General Assembly’s failure to 
clearly enunciate retroactivity ends the analysis, and the relevant statute may be 
applied only prospectively.  Id.  If a statute is clearly retroactive, though, the 
reviewing court must then determine whether it is substantive or remedial in 
nature.  LaSalle at 181, 772 N.E.2d 1172.”  Id. at ¶ 10. 
2. Express Designation of Retroactivity  
{¶ 31} We begin our analysis by ascertaining whether the General 
Assembly expressly made the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 
retroactive.  As part of S.B. 17, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.10(E), 
which states, “An action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting 
any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined in section 2305.111 
of the Revised Code, shall be brought as provided in division (C) of that section.” 
{¶ 32} Uncodified Section 3(B) of S.B. 17 states: 
{¶ 33} “The amendments to section 2305.111 of the Revised Code made 
in this act shall apply * * * to all civil actions brought by a victim of childhood 
sexual abuse for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or 
after the effective date of this act * * * and to all civil actions brought by a victim 
of childhood sexual abuse for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse that 
occurred prior to the effective date of this act in relation to which a civil action for 
that claim has never been filed and for which the period of limitations applicable 
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to such a civil action prior to the effective date of this act has not expired on the 
effective date of this act.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} In Hyle v. Porter, 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 
899, we discussed two examples of clear expressions of retroactivity.  We first 
referred to our holding in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988) 36 Ohio 
St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, where we found a clearly expressed legislative intent 
for former R.C. 4121.80 to apply retroactively based on the following passage:  “ 
‘This section applies to and governs any action * * * pending in any court on the 
effective date of this section * * * notwithstanding any provisions of any prior 
statute or rule of law of this state.’ ”  Hyle at ¶ 15, quoting former R.C. 
4121.80(H).  We also cited our determination in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio 
St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, that the General Assembly specifically made former 
R.C. 2950.09 retroactive by making the statute applicable to anyone who “ ‘was 
convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense prior to the effective 
date of this section, if the person was not sentenced for the offense on or after’ 
that date.”  Id. at ¶ 16, quoting former R.C. 2950.09(C)(1). 
{¶ 35} Similar to former R.C. 4121.80 and 2950.09, Section 3(B) of S.B. 
17 expressly makes the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) 
applicable to acts of sexual abuse committed prior to the effective date of S.B. 17.  
Thus, we conclude that the statute includes strong, unequivocal declarations of 
retroactivity. 
3. Substantive v. Remedial 
{¶ 36} Because R.C. 2305.111(C) was expressly made retroactive, we 
must next determine whether the statute retroactively impairs a vested substantive 
right or is merely remedial in nature.  Van Fossen, supra. 
{¶ 37} It is well established that a statute is substantive if it impairs or 
takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction, or 
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creates a new right.  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 N.E.2d 489.  
Remedial laws, however, are those affecting only the remedy provided, and 
include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the 
enforcement of an existing right.  Id.  A purely remedial statute does not violate 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, even if applied retroactively.  Id. 
{¶ 38} Prior to the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C), the common law, 
as expressed in Ault, permitted a victim of childhood sexual abuse to file a cause 
of action within one year from when he or she recalled or otherwise discovered 
that he or she had been sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the sexual abuse.  Pratte 
maintains that she had not discovered that she had been sexually abused prior to 
S.B. 17’s enactment.  Because Pratte’s cause of action had not yet accrued under 
the law existing prior to the enactment of S.B. 17, Pratte, or any victim with 
repressed memories, did not have a vested right or an accrued substantive right to 
file a lawsuit.  Thus, R.C. 2305.111(C) did not impair vested rights or affect an 
accrued substantive right. 
{¶ 39} Pratte’s argument that the retroactive application of R.C. 2305.111 
violates the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution is not persuasive and does not establish that the statute is substantive 
and not remedial.1   
{¶ 40} “Any constitutional analysis must begin with the presumption of 
constitutionality enjoyed by all legislation, and the understanding that it is not this 
court’s duty to assess the wisdom of a particular statute.”  Groch v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 141.  In Groch, 
this court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. 
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 199, 551 N.E.2d 938, that the right-to-a-remedy 
                                          
 
1.  Pratte did not raise this constitutional challenge in any of the lower court proceedings. 
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provision of Section 16, Article I applies only to existing, vested rights, and it is 
state law that determines what injuries are recognized and what remedies are 
available.  Id. at ¶ 117–119 and 148.  Moreover, “[a] person has no property, no 
vested interest, in any rule of the common law. * * * Indeed, the great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to 
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.”  Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 
U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77; see also Groch at ¶ 117.  Thus, as we affirmed in 
Groch, “ ‘[t]his court would encroach upon the Legislature’s ability to guide the 
development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule 
enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the 
courts. * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances 
between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the 
healthy growth of the law.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 118, quoting Freezer Storage, Inc. v. 
Armstrong Cook Co. (1978), 470 Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715. 
{¶ 41} In accordance with the constitutional principles espoused in Groch, 
the retroactive application of the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C) 
does not violate Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Pratte did not have 
a vested right in the common-law discovery rule announced in Ault, and we would 
offend the separation-of-powers doctrine by invalidating the legislature’s decision 
to impose a reasonable statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse. 
{¶ 42} In so holding, we observe that if Pratte’s view prevailed, any 
statute of limitations that does not afford explicit discovery tolling provisions 
would violate the right-to-a-remedy provision, irrespective of whether it is applied 
retroactively or prospectively.  Furthermore, the adoption of Pratte’s position 
would discount the axiom that statutes of limitation serve a gate-keeping function 
for courts by “(1) ensuring fairness to the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt 
prosecution of causes of action, (3) suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and 
(4) avoiding the inconveniences engendered by delay—specifically, the 
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difficulties of proof present in older cases.”  Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 
109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 10.  Justice is not served 
in such cases. 
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of 
limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) can be applied retroactively and does not violate 
the right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article of the Ohio Constitution.  
R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood sexual abuse 
that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no 
prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired 
before the effective date of that subsection. 
C.  Construction of R.C. 2305.111(C) and Viability of the Discovery Rule 
{¶ 44} Having determined that R.C. 2305.111(C) can be applied 
retroactively, we now turn to Pratte’s remaining propositions of law, which aver 
that the repressed-memory tolling mechanism in Ault remains viable after the 
enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C).  We disagree. 
{¶ 45} The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature.  State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-
Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11.  In interpreting statutes, this court has long held 
that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language 
employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express 
plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no 
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.”  Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 
66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “A court is neither 
to insert words that were not used by the legislature nor to delete words that were 
used.”  Cleveland Mobile Radio Sales, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, 113 Ohio St.3d 
394, 2007-Ohio-2203, 865 N.E.2d 1275, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 46} R.C. 2305.111(C) provides: 
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{¶ 47} “[A]n action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse 
asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, shall be brought within 
twelve years after the cause of action accrues.  For purposes of this section, * * * 
a cause of action for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse, accrues upon 
the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.  If the defendant in an 
action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting a claim resulting 
from childhood sexual abuse that occurs on or after the effective date of this act 
has fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff facts that form the basis of the claim, 
the running of the limitations period with regard to that claim is tolled until the 
time when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered those facts.” 
{¶ 48} We find that the language of R.C. 2305.111(C) is plain and 
unambiguous.  It is beyond dispute from the unambiguous statutory language that 
R.C. 2305.111(C) governs a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse.  The 
statute clearly provides that a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood 
sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood abuse accrues upon the 
date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. 
{¶ 49} The only exception to the accrual of the cause of action on the date 
the victim reaches the age of majority is when the defendant fraudulently conceals 
facts from the plaintiff.2  While R.C. 2305.111(C) explicitly sets forth a tolling 
provision for cases involving fraudulent concealment, the statute does not contain 
a tolling provision for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual 
abuse.  The legislature could have included a tolling provision for repressed 
memory, but it chose not to do so.  That decision is a legislative prerogative that 
we are not permitted to overrule.  Pratte is asking this court to disregard that rule 
                                          
 
2.  Pratte does not rely on the tolling provision for fraudulent concealment. 
January Term, 2010 
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and to contravene established axioms of statutory construction by inserting words 
in the statute that were not used by the General Assembly. 
{¶ 50} Our rationale in Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati is particularly 
germane to the issues herein: 
{¶ 51} “The remedy Doe seeks requires a legislative response to create 
such an exception to our long-standing statutes of limitations.  The dissent of 
Chief Justice Moyer in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114 [120], 637 N.E.2d 870, is 
on point with the situation we consider today:  
{¶ 52} “ ‘The majority opinion announces a rule of law that would permit 
a person at any age after any lapse of time between the alleged sexual abuse and 
the revived memory of such abuse to sue the alleged abuser for money damages.  
If that is to be the law of Ohio, it is the General Assembly that should declare it as 
such rather than this court. * * * 
{¶ 53} “ ‘We simply do not have in the record in this case sufficient 
scientific, empirical or other information from which to craft a rule of law that 
will protect those accused of being abusers and those who have been abused or 
believe they have been abused as children.  The proper forum to determine such 
issues is in the General Assembly where all views, all relevant information, all 
scientific data, and all empirical studies can be presented, reviewed and debated 
by those who have an interest in the issue.’ ”  Id., 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-
2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 51–53. 
{¶ 54} Like the plaintiff’s argument in Doe, Pratte’s argument asks this 
court to step into the role of the legislature and extend the limitations period for 
claims of childhood sexual abuse.  Our basis for rejecting Doe’s argument has 
even greater weight herein, given that the legislature has now created a specific 
limitations period and considered tolling provisions.  We are cognizant of the 
proposition that some victims of childhood sexual abuse may not recover their 
memories of the abuse prior to the expiration of the 12-year statute of limitations, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and we are not without compassion for those victims.  But this court would invade 
the province of the legislature and violate the separation of powers if it rewrote 
the statute to include a tolling provision for repressed memory.  See Arbino v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21.  
This court will not engage in such a practice and must leave it to the General 
Assembly to rewrite the statute if it deems it necessary. 
{¶ 55} Pratte’s reliance on the discovery rule adopted in Ault to extend the 
statute of limitations is improper.  Ault was an equitable rule of law created at a 
time when the legislature had not enacted a limitations period for claims of 
childhood sexual abuse and this court had adopted a one-year limitations period 
for claims of childhood sexual abuse.  That case is patently and materially 
different from the situation with which we are now faced, in which the General 
Assembly has responded by establishing a substantially longer limitations period 
of 12 years. 
{¶ 56} We can reasonably infer that the General Assembly considered 
repressed memory by increasing the limitations period for claims of childhood 
sexual abuse from one year to 12 years.  It is further reasonable to infer that the 
legislature was reacting to Ault’s adoption of a discovery rule for repressed 
memory in enacting R.C. 2305.111(C).  The fact that the legislature did not 
expressly denounce Ault is of no consequence.  When the legislature amends an 
existing statute, the presumption is that it is aware of our decisions interpreting it.  
Clark v. Scarpelli (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 N.E.2d 719. 
{¶ 57} We therefore presume that when the legislature amended R.C. 
2305.111(C) to include a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood 
sexual abuse, it was aware of our decision in Ault.  It is reasonable to conclude 
that the legislature had Ault in mind when it increased the limitation period from 
one year to 12 years and sought to afford victims a greater period of time in which 
to recover their repressed memories. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 58} For these reasons, we hold that effective August 3, 2006, the 
statute of limitations for a cause of action of childhood sexual abuse is governed 
by R.C. 2305.111(C).  The General Assembly did not include a tolling provision 
for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, and it is not our 
province to add such a provision where one plainly does not exist.  In light of the 
legislature’s unambiguous enactment, the discovery rule for repressed memory 
announced in Ault is no longer viable and has been abrogated by R.C. 
2305.111(C).  Because Pratte did not file her claim against Stewart within the 12-
year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), and the fraudulent-concealment 
tolling provision is inapplicable, the court of appeals soundly affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment dismissing Pratte’s claim. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 12-year statute of 
limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood 
sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 
2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not 
expired before the effective date of that subsection. 
{¶ 60} We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of 
action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting 
from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches 
the age of majority.  R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for 
repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse.  The discovery rule does not apply 
to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses 
memories of that abuse. (Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 
870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.) 
{¶ 61} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Kircher Law Office, L.L.C., and Konrad Kircher, for appellant. 
Matan, Wright & Noble and Scott E. Wright, for appellee. 
 
Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Catherine G. Hoolahan, urging reversal 
for amici curiae, National Association to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of Children, 
Survivors’ Network of Those Abused by Priests, and National Center for Victims 
of Crime. 
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