Title: Chin v. Merriot

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11715 
 
CHESTER CHIN  vs.  EDITH E. MERRIOT.1 
 
 
 
Franklin.     October 6, 2014. - January 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment, 
Separation agreement.  Statute, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Franklin Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on January 11, 2011. 
 
 
A 
complaint 
for 
modification, 
filed 
on 
March 
11, 
2013, 
was 
heard 
by Beth A. Crawford, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
William Sanford Durland, III, for Chester Chin. 
 
Leslie H. Powers for Edith E. Merriot. 
 
The following submitted briefs amicus curiae: 
 
Rachel B. Biscardi for Women's Bar Association of 
Massachusetts. 
 
Richard M. Novitch, Maureen McBrien, & Charles P. Kindregan, 
pro se. 
 
David H. Lee & Holly A. Hinte, pro se. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  After twelve years of marriage, Chester Chin and 
                                                 
1 Formerly known as Edith E. Chin. 
 
2 
 
Edith E. Merriot were divorced by a judgment of divorce nisi in 
August, 
2011.  At 
the 
time 
of 
the 
divorce, 
Chin 
was 
sixty-seven 
years 
old and Merriot was sixty-nine.  Pursuant to a merged provision of 
the 
parties' 
separation 
agreement, 
Chin 
was 
obligated 
to 
pay 
alimony 
to 
Merriot 
in 
the 
amount 
of 
$650 
per 
month 
until 
"the 
death 
of 
either 
party or the wife's remarriage." 
In 
March, 
2013, 
Chin 
filed 
an 
amended 
complaint 
for 
modification 
in the Probate and Family Court in which he sought to terminate his 
alimony 
obligation.  To 
support 
his 
claim 
for 
relief, 
Chin 
asserted 
as "changed circumstances" that he had attained the age of 
sixty-eight, 
"full 
retirement 
age" 
as 
defined 
by 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 48.  
He argued that, pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (retirement 
provision), "general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the 
payor 
attaining 
the 
full 
retirement 
age."  Chin 
thereafter 
filed 
an 
amended complaint asserting, as a further change in circumstances, 
that Merriot had "been cohabiting with another person . . . and 
maintaining a common household" for more than three months; 
cohabitation 
alone 
is 
a 
basis 
for 
termination 
of 
alimony 
under 
G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (d) (cohabitation provision). 
The 
retirement 
and 
cohabitation 
provisions 
on 
which 
Chin 
relies 
were enacted as part of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, 
c. 124 (alimony reform act or act).  The act was made effective as 
of 
March 
1, 
2012, 
more 
than 
seven 
months 
after 
entry 
of 
the 
parties' 
 
3 
 
judgment of divorce nisi.  Following a trial on the complaint for 
modification, 
a 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court 
judge 
concluded 
that 
neither 
provision applied retroactively to divorce judgments ordering 
general term alimony that were in existence prior to the effective 
date 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act.  Applying 
the 
change 
of 
circumstances 
standard in effect before March 1, 2012, the judge determined that 
Chin had not shown a material change of circumstances warranting 
modification of the alimony order,2 and dismissed the complaint.  
Chin appealed from the judgment of dismissal,3 and we allowed his 
petition for direct appellate review. 
The question we confront in this case is whether modification 
of an obligation to pay periodic or general term alimony that is 
contained in a merged provision of a divorce judgment is governed 
by the alimony reform act, where the act became effective after the 
date of entry of the judgment.4  We conclude that, with respect to 
                                                 
2 Chin 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
judge's 
conclusion 
that 
he 
did 
not 
show 
a 
material 
change 
in 
the 
parties' 
circumstances, 
the 
applicable 
standard prior to enactment of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 
2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act). 
 
3 The complaint sought also to terminate Chin's obligation to 
maintain life insurance for the benefit of Edith E. Merriot.  The 
judge denied the request; that denial is not part of Chin's appeal. 
 
4 Because both the judgment nisi and the judgment absolute 
predate the effective date of the alimony reform act, we need not 
decide whether language in the act that its provisions "apply 
prospectively" to "alimony judgments" refers to judgments nisi or 
to absolute judgments. 
 
4 
 
the alimony obligation at issue here, both the retirement provision 
and the cohabitation provision apply prospectively, and therefore 
afford 
no 
basis 
upon 
which 
to 
terminate 
the 
alimony 
order.  That 
the 
Legislature intended these provisions to apply prospectively is 
reflected in the language of several uncodified provisions of the 
alimony reform act, which we consider together with the codified 
provisions at issue here.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of 
dismissal.5 
1.  Background.  We summarize the judge's findings of fact, 
adding 
certain 
uncontested 
facts 
from 
the 
record.  Chin 
and 
Merriot 
were married in Massachusetts on November 28, 1998.  Both had been 
married previously; Chin has two children from his prior marriage, 
and Merriot has four children from hers.  The parties' marriage 
produced 
no 
children.  During 
their 
marriage, 
Chin 
had 
been 
a 
teacher 
and 
Merriot 
a 
paraprofessional 
and 
substitute 
teacher.  By 
the 
time 
of the divorce, each had retired. 
The parties last lived together in January, 2011.  On August 
17, 2011, they entered into a separation agreement allocating their 
real and personal property.  Article VI of that agreement provided 
that Chin "shall pay to the Wife alimony in the monthly amount of 
six 
hundred 
and 
fifty 
($650) 
dollars . . . .  The 
Husband's 
alimony 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts; Richard M. Novitch, Maureen McBrien, 
and Charles P. Kindregan; and David H. Lee and Holly A. Hinte. 
 
5 
 
obligation shall terminate upon the death of either party or the 
Wife's remarriage."  Under the terms of the separation agreement, 
"Article VI . . . shall be merged and incorporated into the divorce 
judgment and shall not retain independent legal significance."6 
A judgment of divorce nisi entered on August 17, 2011.7  The 
judgment reflects that the judge found the parties' agreement to be 
"fair, equitable and reasonable, voluntarily entered into and not 
the 
product 
of 
coercion 
or 
duress."  The 
judgment 
provides 
also 
that 
the agreement "shall survive and remain as an independent contract 
between the parties, except with respect to Article VI, which is 
incorporated and merged herein."  When the divorce judgment nisi 
entered, Chin was sixty-seven years old. 
One year after the effective date of the alimony reform act, 
                                                 
6 The agreement also allocated responsibility for outstanding 
debt, made provision for medical insurance and uninsured dental and 
medical costs, and contained general representations that the 
parties 
had 
made 
full 
financial 
disclosure 
to 
each 
other; 
stated 
that 
they had entered into the agreement freely, voluntarily, and fully 
apprised 
of 
their 
rights; 
and 
stated 
that 
they 
believed 
the 
agreement 
to 
be 
"fair, 
adequate 
and 
reasonable 
. 
. 
. 
commensurate 
with 
[their] 
needs, income, and financial worth, and their previous standard of 
living and with full consideration of . . . all factors" set forth 
in G. L. c. 208, § 34. 
 
7 The 
judgment 
of 
divorce 
nisi 
was 
amended 
due 
to 
a 
scrivener's 
error.  The amended judgment was entered on the Probate and Family 
Court docket on August 26, 2011, dated nunc pro tunc to August 17, 
2011.  A judgment of divorce becomes absolute ninety days after the 
entry of a judgment nisi.  See G. L. c. 208, § 21.  It is unclear 
from the record why the judgment absolute in this case entered on 
January 19, 2012. 
 
6 
 
Chin 
filed 
a 
complaint 
for 
modification 
asserting 
that 
he 
had 
reached 
"full retirement age" according to the act, and seeking termination 
of 
his 
obligation 
to 
pay 
alimony.  Merriot 
denied 
that 
there 
had 
been 
a material change in circumstances because, at the time the divorce 
judgment entered, her former husband already had passed "full 
retirement age."  Chin thereafter amended his complaint to include 
as an additional ground for modification that Merriot had been 
cohabiting with another person since November 19, 2012. 
Following a trial on the complaint for modification, the judge 
found that Chin had remarried in 2012, and, at the time of trial, 
Chin, his new wife, and her sixteen year old son were residing 
together.  Chin was the primary source of support for his new wife 
and 
stepson, 
and 
his 
wife 
contributed 
some 
income 
from 
child 
support 
and part-time employment.  Merriot "moved in with her significant 
other" 
in 
September, 
2012, 
and, 
by 
the 
time 
of 
trial, 
he 
and 
Merriot 
were "in a committed relationship and . . . [were] economically 
interdependent"; they had "continuously maintained a common 
household for more than three months." 
The judge concluded that modification of the alimony order was 
not governed by either the retirement provision or the cohabitation 
provision, 
because 
uncodified 
§ 4 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act 
provides 
that 
G. L. 
c. 208, § 49, 
applies 
prospectively 
to 
alimony 
judgments 
entered 
on 
or 
after 
March 
1, 
2012.  St. 
2011, 
c. 
124, 
' 4 
(uncodified 
 
7 
 
section).  The judge therefore looked to the statute governing 
modification of divorce judgments that was in effect prior to 
enactment of the alimony reform act to inform her determination 
whether there had been a material change in the parties' 
circumstances 
warranting 
modification 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
alimony.  See 
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293 (2009), quoting Schuler v. 
Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981).  The judge concluded that Chin 
had 
not 
established 
a 
material 
change 
in 
circumstances 
and 
dismissed 
the amended complaint. 
2.  Discussion.  Under the alimony reform act, the periodic 
payment of support to an economically dependent spouse falls within 
the 
definition 
of 
"general 
term 
alimony."  G. 
L. 
c. 208, § 48.  See 
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 656 (2014) (prior alimony statute 
"recognized only one category of postjudgment alimony, which the 
[alimony] reform act now classifies as 'general term alimony'").  
Chin contends that, under the retirement provision, his obligation 
to pay alimony must be terminated because, "[o]nce issued, general 
term 
alimony 
orders 
shall 
terminate 
upon 
the 
payor 
attaining 
the 
full 
retirement age."  See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f).  Chin also maintains 
that he is entitled to termination of the alimony order under the 
cohabitation provision, which provides: 
"General term alimony shall be suspended, reduced, or 
terminated upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse when 
the payor shows that the recipient spouse has maintained a 
 
8 
 
common household, as defined in this subsection, with another 
person for a continuous period of at least [three] months." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d).  Chin's argument effectively disregards the 
uncodified provisions of the alimony reform act, contained in St. 
2011, 
c. 
124 
§§ 4-6 
(uncodified 
sections).  These 
provisions 
reflect 
the Legislature's intent that the act apply prospectively except as 
to 
"durational 
limits," 
which 
are 
based 
on 
the 
length 
of 
the 
parties' 
marriage, and the clear indication that neither retirement nor 
cohabitation constitute durational limits.8 
a.  Standard of review.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 
(2014).  Under well-established principles of statutory 
construction, 
"a 
statute 
must 
be 
interpreted 
according 
to 
the 
intent 
of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary 
and 
approved 
usage 
of 
the 
language, 
considered 
in 
connection 
with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied 
and 
the 
main 
object 
to 
be 
accomplished, 
to 
the 
end 
that 
the 
purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. 
                                                 
8 The 
term 
"durational 
limits" 
is 
not 
defined 
in 
the 
uncodified 
sections of the alimony reform act, St. 2011, c. 124, §§ 4-6 
(uncodified sections).  However, the term is also used in G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (b), inserted by St. 2011, c. 124, § 3.  We interpret 
"durational limits" as it appears in the uncodified sections as 
referring 
specifically 
and 
solely 
to 
the 
provisions 
of 
G. L. 
c. 208, 
§ 49 (b). 
 
9 
 
v. 
President 
& 
Fellows 
of 
Harvard 
College, 
445 
Mass. 
745, 
749 
(2006).  
Although 
we 
look 
first 
to 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
provision 
at 
issue 
to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we consider also other 
sections of the statute, and examine the pertinent language in the 
context of the entire statute.  "Significantly, a statute must be 
interpreted 'as a whole'; it is improper to confine interpretation 
to the single section to be construed."  Johnson v. Kindred 
Healthcare, Inc., 466 Mass. 779, 784 (2014), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012).  Cf. Abramski v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267 (2014), quoting Maracich v. Spears, 
133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013) ("we must [as usual] interpret the 
relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory 
context, 'structure, history and purpose'"). 
The same standards of construction are applicable to both 
codified and uncodified provisions of the general laws.  We 
therefore construe the language of the uncodified sections of the 
alimony reform act together with the codified sections, according 
to their plain meaning, unless reliance on the literal words would 
produce an absurd result, or a result contrary to the Legislature's 
manifest 
intent.  See Murphy 
v. 
Department 
of 
Correction, 
429 
Mass. 
736, 737-738 (1999), and cases cited. 
Sections 
4 
through 
6 
of 
the 
uncodified 
provisions 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform act provide essential context.  As a general matter, 
 
10 
 
uncodified provisions of an act express the Legislature's view on 
some aspect of its operation; they are not the source of the 
substantive provisions of the law.  Uncodified provisions may, for 
example, address when the legislation will take effect, state if it 
will have retroactive effect, and provide mechanisms for handling 
special situations during the transition period between the date of 
enactment and the effective date of the new statute.  See, e.g., 
Murphy v. Department of Correction, supra at 737 (uncodified 
provision stating act's effective date and that act will apply 
retroactively); 
Commissioner 
of 
Banks 
v. 
Chase 
Sec. 
Corp., 
298 
Mass. 
285, 
309 
(1937) 
(uncodified 
provision 
precluding 
application 
of 
act 
to 
agreements 
existing 
prior 
to 
act's 
effective 
date 
which 
were 
valid 
under earlier statute); Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 
150, 153-154 (2014) (uncodified provision "imposes early deadline 
for 
submission 
of" 
biological 
samples).  Uncodified 
provisions 
also 
may include severability clauses, savings clauses, and statements 
concerning the fiscal consequences of legislation.  See, e.g., 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 4th 647, 661-662 
(2013). 
Here, uncodified § 7 of St. 2011, c. 124, sets March 1, 2012, 
as the effective date of the alimony reform act; uncodified §§ 4 
through 6 describe whether, to what extent, and when, the act will 
 
11 
 
be applied to alimony judgments in existence prior to that date.9 
                                                 
9 "SECTION 4.  (a) [General Laws c. 208, § 49,] shall apply 
prospectively, such that alimony judgments entered before March 1, 
2012 shall terminate only under such judgments, under a subsequent 
modification or as otherwise provided for in this act. 
 
"(b) [G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-55], inclusive, . . . shall not be 
deemed 
a 
material 
change 
of 
circumstance 
that 
warrants 
modification 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
existing 
alimony 
judgments; 
provided, 
however, 
that 
existing alimony judgments that exceed the durational limits under 
[G. L. c. 208, § 49,] shall be deemed a material change of 
circumstance that warrant modification. 
 
"Existing 
alimony 
awards 
shall 
be 
deemed 
general 
term 
alimony.  
Existing alimony awards which exceed the durational limits 
established in [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] shall be modified upon a 
complaint for modification without additional material change of 
circumstance, unless the court finds that deviation from the 
durational limits is warranted. 
 
"(c) Under no circumstances shall [G. L. c. 208, §§ 48-55], 
inclusive, . . . provide a right to seek or receive modification of 
an existing alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that 
their alimony judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties 
have 
expressed 
their 
intention 
that 
their 
agreed 
alimony 
provisions 
survive the judgment and therefore are not modifiable. 
 
"SECTION 5.  Any complaint for modification filed by a payor 
under 
[§] 4 
of 
this 
act 
solely 
because 
the 
existing 
alimony 
judgment 
exceeds the durational limits of [G. L. c. 208, § 49,] may only be 
filed under the following time limits: 
 
"(1) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [five] 
years or less, may file a modification action on or after March 1, 
2013. 
 
"(2) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [ten] 
years or less, but more than [five] years, may file a modification 
action on or after March 1, 2014. 
 
"(3) 
Payors 
who 
were 
married 
to 
the 
alimony 
recipient 
[fifteen] 
years or less, but more than [ten] years, may file a modification 
action on or after March 1, 2015. 
 
12 
 
b.  Prospective application of retirement and cohabitation 
provisions.  Of 
particular 
import 
here 
is 
uncodified 
§ 4 (a), 
which 
states 
that 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 49, 
"shall 
apply 
prospectively, 
such 
that 
alimony 
judgments 
entered 
before 
March 1, 
2012 
shall 
terminate 
only 
under 
such 
judgments, 
under 
a 
subsequent 
modification 
or 
as 
otherwise 
provided for in this act."  This sentence sets out three separate 
circumstances under which alimony included in a judgment that 
predated the effective date of the alimony reform act will be 
terminated.  Chin appears to read the sentence as meaning that, 
because the alimony reform act expressly provides for termination 
of alimony on retirement or cohabitation by the recipient spouse, 
he currently is entitled to terminate his alimony obligation.  We 
disagree.  To explain our reasoning, it is useful to review each of 
the 
circumstances 
allowing 
termination 
that 
are 
set 
out 
in 
uncodified 
§ 4 (a). 
(i) Termination "under such judgments".  The first clause of 
uncodified § 4 (a) provides that alimony judgments entered before 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
"(4) Payors who were married to the alimony recipient [twenty] 
years 
or 
less, 
but 
more 
than 
[fifteen] 
years, 
may 
file 
a 
modification 
action on or after September 1, 2015. 
 
"SECTION 
6.  Notwithstanding 
clauses 
(1) 
to 
(4) 
of 
[§] 5 
of 
this 
act, any payor who has reached full retirement age, as defined in 
[G. L. c. 208, § 48,] or who will reach full retirement age on or 
before 
March 
1, 
2015 
may 
file 
a 
complaint 
for 
modification 
on 
or 
after 
March 1, 2013." 
 
13 
 
March 1, 2012, may terminate "only under such judgments."  We 
interpret this to mean that alimony judgments entered into before 
the effective date of the alimony reform act may be terminated only 
in accordance with provisions governing termination that are 
contained within the existing judgment, either by a judge following 
a 
trial 
or 
by 
the 
parties 
through 
a 
negotiated 
agreement 
incorporated 
in the judgment.  Orders for payment of alimony in judgments issued 
based on evidence in a contested divorce generally will be subject 
to 
modification 
on 
a 
showing 
of 
a 
material 
change 
in 
circumstances.10  
See 
Schuler 
v. 
Schuler, 
382 
Mass. 
366, 
368 
(1981); 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 37.11  
                                                 
10 The 
change 
in 
circumstances 
standard 
by 
which 
alimony 
may 
be 
modified 
was 
established 
through 
decisional 
law.  See, 
e.g., 
Schuler 
v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981), citing Robbins v. Robbins, 
343 
Mass. 
247, 
249 
(1961), 
and 
Hinds 
v. 
Hinds, 
329 
Mass. 
190, 
191-192 
(1952); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 325 Mass. 573, 576 (1950); Whitney v. 
Whitney  325 
Mass. 
28, 
31-32 
(1949).  Under 
that 
standard, 
"[w]hile 
alimony is modifiable on the showing of a material change in 
circumstances, 
. 
. 
. 
property 
settlements 
are 
not."  Heins 
v. 
Ledis, 
422 Mass. 477, 483 (1996). 
 
11 The first paragraph of G. L. c. 208, § 37, provides: 
 
"After 
a 
judgment 
for 
alimony 
or 
an 
annual 
allowance . . . 
for the spouse . . . , the court may, from time to time, upon 
the action for modification of either party, revise and alter 
its judgment relative to the amount of such alimony or annual 
allowance and the payment thereof, and may make any judgment 
relative thereto which it might have made in the original 
action." 
 
This paragraph has been in effect, employing substantially the same 
language, 
since 
at 
least 
1860.  See 
Graves 
v. 
Graves, 
108 
Mass. 
314, 
317-318 (1871) (court may "from time to time, on the petition of 
either party, revise and alter any decree respecting the amount of 
 
14 
 
When parties to a divorce negotiate an agreement for alimony that 
is "incorporated and merged into [such a] judgment" upon approval 
by a judge and in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 1A or 1B, the 
judgment also is subject to modification based on a material change 
in circumstances.12  Even where provisions regarding alimony in a 
separation agreement are merged and do not survive the divorce 
judgment, "it is nevertheless appropriate for a judge to take heed 
of the parties' own attempts to negotiate terms mutually acceptable 
to them" when determining whether to modify or terminate alimony.  
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 302 (2009), quoting Bercume v. 
Bercume, 428 Mass. 635, 644 (1999). 
Thus, an order for alimony in a divorce judgment that entered 
prior 
to 
March 
1, 
2012, 
includes, 
as 
part 
of 
its 
terms, 
the 
standards 
for modification existing at the time the judgment entered, unless 
the parties explicitly agreed otherwise, or the alimony reform act 
itself 
unequivocally 
provides 
a 
specific 
exception 
that 
a 
provision 
governing modification is to have retroactive effect.  See Hay v. 
Cloutier, 389 Mass. 248, 253 (1983), quoting Hanscom v. Malden & 
                                                                                                                                                             
such alimony or . . . the payment thereof, . . . and may make any 
decree respecting the same which it might have made in the original 
suit"); Gen. Stats. c. 107, § 47 (1860). 
 
12 To 
modify 
an 
agreement 
that 
survives 
the 
judgment, 
"something 
more than a 'material change of circumstances' must be shown."  
Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 515 (1982). 
 
15 
 
Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3 (1914).13 
(ii) Termination "under a subsequent modification".  The 
second 
clause 
of 
uncodified 
§ 4 (a) 
provides 
that 
alimony 
judgments 
that entered prior to March 1, 2012, may be terminated "only . . . 
under a subsequent modification."  We interpret "words in a 
statute . . . in light of the other words surrounding them."  
Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 462 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428 (1974).  The placement 
of the phrase "under such judgments," immediately preceding the 
phrase "under a subsequent modification," indicates that the 
Legislature 
intended 
the 
latter 
to 
refer 
to 
the 
former, 
and 
that 
the 
language 
of 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act 
must 
be 
read 
to 
state 
that 
alimony 
judgments entered prior to March 1, 2012, may terminate only under 
a 
"subsequent 
modification" 
of 
such 
judgments.  In 
other 
words, 
such 
alimony judgments, as well as subsequent modifications of such 
judgments, may be modified only under the terms and standards of 
modification existing at the time the judgment entered. 
The mere filing of a complaint after March 1, 2012, seeking 
modification 
of 
an 
alimony 
judgment 
that 
entered 
prior 
to 
that 
date, 
based on the retirement or cohabitation provisions, cannot be what 
                                                 
13 The issue of alimony was not before the court in Hay v. 
Cloutier, 
389 
Mass. 
248, 
253 
& 
n.7 
(1983).  In 
that 
case, 
we 
addressed 
the 
retroactive 
effect 
of 
new 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
in 
connection 
with 
aspects 
of 
G. 
L. 
c. 
208, 
§ 34, 
concerning 
the 
division 
of 
marital 
property. 
 
16 
 
the Legislature intended by "subsequent modification."  Such a 
reading not only would disregard the context in which the phrase 
appears in uncodified § 4 (a), but also would not take into account 
the remaining provisions of uncodified §§ 4, 5, and 6.  By 
emphasizing the limitations on prospective application of the 
alimony reform act in three separate provisions in the uncodified 
sections of the act, the Legislature could not have expressed its 
intent more clearly:  only a claim for modification based on 
durational limits may, but will not always, apply retroactively to 
existing alimony judgments. 
This point is made evident by considering uncodified § 4 (a) 
in combination with uncodified § 4 (b).  That section states that 
G. L. c. 208, §§ 48 to 55, which include the retirement and 
cohabitation provisions, "shall not be deemed a material change of 
circumstance that warrants modification of the amount of existing 
alimony judgments; provided, however, that existing alimony 
judgments 
that 
exceed 
the 
durational 
limits 
under 
[G. 
L. 
c. 208, 
§ 49 
(f),] 
shall 
be 
deemed 
a 
material 
change 
of 
circumstance 
that 
warrant 
modification."  The 
Legislature's 
intent 
as 
expressed 
in § 4 
(b) 
is 
unambiguous.  Alimony 
judgments 
entered 
prior 
to 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act may be modified only under the existing material change of 
circumstances standard, with the single exception that the new 
 
17 
 
durational limits of the act14 will be considered a material change 
of circumstances for purposes of this standard.  It follows, 
therefore, that the provisions of G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) and (f), 
do not warrant relief in the absence of a material change of 
circumstances. 
(iii) Termination "as otherwise provided for in this act."  
Chin 
focuses 
particularly 
on 
the 
third 
clause 
of 
uncodified 
§ 4 (a), 
which states that G. L. c. 208, ' 49, "shall apply prospectively," 
except "as otherwise provided for in this act."  He argues that the 
new provisions for termination of alimony in the cohabitation 
retirement provision fall within the meaning of the phrase "as 
otherwise provided for in this act." 
We do not agree that uncodified § 4 (a) was intended to 
incorporate, 
as 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
alimony 
reform 
act's 
general 
rule 
of prospective application, all of the provisions in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49.  Such a reading renders meaningless the specific exclusions 
from prospective application set forth in uncodified § 4 (b), and 
is inconsistent with principles of statutory construction under 
which we "give effect to all words of a statute, assuming none to 
be superfluous."  Commonwealth v. Semegen, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 
                                                 
14 Chin does not dispute that the cohabitation and retirement 
provisions, set out in G. L. c. 208, § 49(d) and (f), respectively, 
are not durational limits, which are defined in G. L. c. 208, § 49 
(b). 
 
18 
 
480 
(2008).  Chin 
argues 
in 
essence 
that 
the 
provision 
should 
be 
read 
as 
follows:  General 
Laws 
c. 
208, § 49, 
"shall 
apply 
prospectively, 
such that alimony judgments entered before March 1, 2012 shall 
terminate 
. 
. 
. 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
[§ 49]."  This 
view 
requires 
that we read into the provision language that the Legislature did 
not include.  We will not "read into the statute a provision which 
the Legislature did not see fit to put there."  Commissioner of 
Correction 
v. 
Superior 
Court 
Dep't 
of 
the 
Trial 
Court 
for 
the 
County 
of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006). 
Moreover, the reading Chin proposes is inconsistent with the 
over-all scheme of the alimony reform act.  Where possible, we seek 
to 
harmonize 
the 
provisions 
of 
a 
statute 
with 
related 
provisions 
that 
are part of the same statutory scheme "so as to give full effect to 
the expressed intent of the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. Hampe, 
419 Mass. 514, 518 (1995).  As stated, G. L. c. 208, § 37, governs 
alimony judgments entered prior to the act's effective date, under 
the material change in circumstances standard then in effect. 
 
c.  Material 
change 
in 
circumstances.  In 
this 
case, 
the 
judge 
found 
that 
no 
other 
circumstances 
warranted 
a 
finding 
that 
there 
were 
changed 
circumstances 
that 
would 
require 
an 
adjustment 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
alimony 
Chin 
had 
been 
ordered 
to 
pay.  See 
Bush 
v. 
Bush, 
402 
Mass. 
406, 412 n.9 (1988), quoting Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617, 
625 (1986) (rejecting claim that alimony should be modified "solely 
 
19 
 
on the basis of a finding of cohabitation").  See also Pierce v. 
Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 302 (2009) (rejecting claim that retirement 
triggers termination of alimony obligation without showing of 
material change in circumstances, because "no such provision was 
included within the separation agreement").  A judge has 
considerable discretion in fashioning an appropriate modification 
judgment, and we will not disturb her judgment in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion.  See Pierce v. Pierce, supra at 293; Heistand 
v. Heistand, 384 Mass. 20, 26-27 (1981).  Nothing in the record 
suggests that there was an abuse of discretion here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.