Title: In re Special Docket No. 73958

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Special Docket No. 73958, 115 Ohio St.3d 425, 2007-Ohio-5268.] 
 
 
IN RE SPECIAL DOCKET NO. 73958. 
[Cite as In re Special Docket No. 73958, 115 Ohio St.3d 425, 2007-Ohio-5268.] 
Asbestos litigation — Final, appealable orders — R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) — 
Provisional remedy — Finding by court on constitutionality of 
retroactively applying prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 2307.92 is 
provisional remedy — Such a finding is final and appealable when it 
determines action and prevents judgment with respect to that finding and 
denies appealing party meaningful remedy upon appeal from final 
judgment. 
(No. 2006-1279 — Submitted June 5, 2007 — Decided October 11, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
Nos. 87777 and 87816. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.   
A finding with respect to whether it is constitutional to retroactively apply 
the prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 2307.92 is a provisional 
remedy pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). 
2.   
When determining whether a finding on the constitutionality of 
retroactively applying the prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 2307.92 
is a final, appealable order, R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) requires a court to 
consider (a) whether the trial court has determined the action and 
prevented a judgment in favor of the appealing party with respect to that 
finding and (b) whether that party is denied a meaningful or effective 
remedy upon appeal from a final judgment in the action. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶1} 
The central issue presented for our consideration is whether the 
court of appeals correctly dismissed, for lack of a final, appealable order, an 
appeal from a finding by the trial court, rendered pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3), 
on the constitutionality of retroactively applying certain statutory provisions 
enacted by 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
such a finding is a provisional remedy pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), that the 
order of the trial court determined the action and prevented a judgment with 
respect to the provisional remedy, and that the aggrieved parties will be unable to 
obtain a meaningful or effective remedy upon appeal from a final judgment.  
Therefore, the trial court rendered a final, appealable order, pursuant to R.C. 
2505.02(B)(4). 
{¶2} 
In 1997, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas established 
Special Docket No. 73958, which reflects not only the court’s standing orders on 
issues such as pleading and discovery that apply to all pending asbestos-related 
personal-injury cases, but also filings and entries regarding individual and groups 
of asbestos litigants. 
{¶3} 
During its 2003-2004 session, the General Assembly reviewed the 
state of asbestos litigation in Ohio and found that the number of asbestos cases 
pending in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court had grown from 
approximately 12,800 in 1999 to more than 39,000, with 200 additional cases 
being filed every month.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, Section 3(A)(3)(e), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 3970, 3989.  Based on this and on its other legislative findings 
regarding the economic effects of asbestos litigation and the percentage of 
claimants who claim exposure to asbestos but who exhibit no physical symptoms, 
the legislature enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, stating its intent to “(1) give 
priority to those asbestos claimants who can demonstrate actual physical harm or 
illness caused by exposure to asbestos; (2) fully preserve the rights of claimants 
who were exposed to asbestos to pursue compensation should those claimants 
January Term, 2007 
3 
become impaired in the future as a result of such exposure; (3) enhance the ability 
of the state’s judicial systems and federal judicial systems to supervise and control 
litigation and asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings; and (4) conserve the 
scarce resources of the defendants to allow compensation of cancer victims and 
others who are physically impaired by exposure to asbestos while securing the 
right to similar compensation for those who may suffer physical impairment in the 
future.”  Id. at Section 3(B), 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3991. 
{¶4} 
This legislation requires claimants who file asbestos actions based 
on allegations of a nonmalignant condition to present a prima facie showing of an 
impairment that has been caused by exposure to asbestos.  R.C. 2307.92(B).  The 
legislation sets forth similar requirements for asbestos claimants who file a 
wrongful-death action or an action involving an individual who is a smoker and 
who has lung cancer.  R.C. 2307.92(C) and (D).  If a claimant fails to make such a 
showing, then the trial court is required to administratively dismiss the action 
without prejudice, until the claimant can satisfy the new prima facie requirements.  
R.C. 2307.93(C).  In addition, the requirement to present a prima facie case 
applies retroactively to causes of action arising before September 2, 2004, unless 
the trial court determines that retroactive application would be unconstitutional, in 
which case the statute directs the trial court to apply the law that existed before 
the effective date of the legislation.  R.C. 2307.93(A)(3)(c).  It is this latter 
directive that presents the issue in this case. 
{¶5} 
The record reveals that appellants, Goodrich Corporation and 
numerous others named as defendants in approximately 39,000 asbestos-related 
personal-injury cases pending in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, 
filed motions in the trial court to administratively dismiss certain actions pending 
against them in which the claimants had failed to present prima facie evidence in 
conformity with R.C. 2307.92.  In response, claimants asserted that retroactive 
application of the prima facie filing requirements violated the Ohio Constitution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶6} 
The court then conducted a hearing on the motions and, on January 
26, 2006, entered an order holding that “the retrospective application of 
Am.Sub.H.B. 292 is substantive rather than merely remedial in its effect and, 
insofar as it impairs the substantive rights of plaintiffs who filed their claims 
before the effective date of the statute, violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution.”  The court concluded that, based on its finding of 
unconstitutionality, the legislation required the court to “adjudicate substantive 
issues in asbestos cases filed before September 2, 2004 according to the law as it 
existed prior to” the enactment of R.C. 2307.92. 
{¶7} 
Appellants challenged this order in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Appeals, arguing that retroactive application of the prima facie filing 
requirements of R.C. 2307.92 is constitutional; claimants then moved to dismiss 
the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.  In an entry filed without opinion, 
the appellate court summarily granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. 
{¶8} 
Appellants sought discretionary review in this court, and we agreed 
to address their narrow proposition of law:  “As mandated by R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) 
and (B)(4), any party to an asbestos case may immediately appeal a finding made 
by a trial court under R.C. 2307.93(A)(3).”  Contending that the trial court’s 
finding constitutes a “provisional remedy” as defined in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), 
appellants argue that the order is presumptively final and appealable; they further 
assert that the order also is final and appealable because the court completely 
determined the provisional remedy and because, following trial, there would be 
no meaningful appellate review of the order in the absence of an interlocutory 
appeal.  The claimants, on the other hand, contend that the court’s order is not 
final and appealable, because it is advisory in nature, does not apply to any one 
case, is not a provisional remedy, and does not satisfy the additional requirements 
of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a) and (4)(b). 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶9} 
Accordingly, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals 
correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. 
{¶10} Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
“[c]ourts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to 
review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of 
record inferior to the court of appeals within the district * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  
We stated recently in Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 
2007-Ohio-607, 861 N.E.2d 519, ¶ 14, quoting Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266, “ ‘[i]t is well-established that 
an order must be final before it can be reviewed by an appellate court.  If an order 
is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.’ ” 
{¶11} At issue in this appeal is R.C. 2505.02(B), in which the General 
Assembly has provided:  
{¶12} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶13} “ * * * 
{¶14} “(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to 
which both of the following apply: 
{¶15} “(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
{¶16} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims, and parties in the action.” 
{¶17} In R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), the legislature defined the term 
“provisional remedy” as “a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not 
limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of 
privileged matter, suppression of evidence, a prima-facie showing pursuant to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
section 2307.85 or 2307.86 of the Revised Code, a prima-facie showing pursuant 
to section 2307.92 of the Revised Code, or a finding made pursuant to division 
(A)(3) of section 2307.93 of the Revised Code.”   (Emphasis added.) 
{¶18} Consequently, we look to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3), which states:  
{¶19} “(a) For any cause of action that arises before the effective date of 
this section, the provisions set forth in divisions (B), (C), and (D) of section 
2307.92 of the Revised Code are to be applied unless the court that has 
jurisdiction over the case finds both of the following: 
{¶20} “(i) A substantive right of a party to the case has been impaired. 
{¶21} “(ii) That impairment is otherwise in violation of Section 28 of 
Article II, Ohio Constitution.” 
{¶22} This court previously addressed the finality of orders concerning 
provisional remedies in State v. Muncie (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 746 N.E.2d 
1092, where we explained that “an order is a ‘final order’ if it satisfies each part 
of a three-part test: (1) the order must either grant or deny relief sought in a 
certain type of proceeding — a proceeding that the General Assembly calls a 
‘provisional remedy,’ (2) the order must both determine the action with respect to 
the provisional remedy and prevent a judgment in favor of the appealing party 
with respect to the provisional remedy, and (3) the reviewing court must decide 
that the party appealing from the order would not be afforded a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims, and parties in the action.”   Id. at 446, 746 N.E.2d 1092. 
Provisional remedy 
{¶23} We first concern ourselves with whether the order entered by the 
trial court is a “provisional remedy,” and, as we stated in Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 
at 447, 746 N.E.2d 1092, a “reviewing court must refer to the definition of 
‘provisional remedy’ that the General Assembly provided.” 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶24} R.C. 2505.02(A)(3)(a) defines “provisional remedy” to include “a 
finding made pursuant to division (A)(3) of section 2307.93 of the Revised 
Code.”  R.C. 2307.93(A)(3), in turn, provides that the prima facie filing 
requirements set forth in R.C. 2307.92(B), (C), and (D) apply retroactively unless 
the court finds both (1) that retroactive application impairs a substantive right of a 
party and (2) that the impairment violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Accordingly, a finding with respect to whether it is constitutional to 
retroactively apply the prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 2307.92 is a 
provisional remedy pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(A)(3). 
{¶25} In this case, the trial court determined that retroactive application 
of the prima facie filing requirements set forth in R.C. 2307.92 “impairs the 
substantive rights of plaintiffs who filed their claims before the effective date of 
the statute [and] violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.”  The 
court made this finding in accordance with the analysis mandated by R.C. 
2307.93(A)(3); therefore, its finding is a provisional remedy as defined by R.C. 
2505.02(A)(3). 
{¶26} Claimants contend that the trial court finding is advisory and does 
not specifically identify any case to which it applies.  The order is not advisory, 
however, because the court specifically stated it “will adjudicate substantive 
issues in asbestos cases filed before September 2, 2004 according to the law as it 
existed prior to the [legislation’s] enactment.”  Thus, on its face, the order applies 
to all relevant cases filed before the effective date of the legislation.  Moreover, 
R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) defines “provisional remedy” as including “a finding made 
pursuant to division (A)(3) of section 2307.93 of the Revised Code” (emphasis 
added), and it does not further specify that the finding must occur in any 
particular case.  Here, the trial court made the requisite finding pursuant to R.C. 
2307.93(A)(3), thus satisfying the statutory definition of a provisional remedy. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶27} We also reject the appellants’ contention that the General 
Assembly intended for a finding made pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3) to be 
presumptively final and appealable solely because it satisfies the definition of a 
provisional remedy set forth in R.C. 2505.02(A)(3).  This argument is not well 
taken because it ignores R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), which specifies that an order is final 
and appealable when it grants or denies a provisional remedy and “determines the 
action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the 
action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy” and 
“[t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by 
an appeal following final judgment.”  R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a) and (4)(b). 
Order that determines the action and prevents a judgment in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy 
{¶28} Having determined that the finding of the trial court is a 
provisional remedy, the next step in the analysis is to consider whether “[t]he 
order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and 
prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to 
the provisional remedy.”  R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a).  Our decision in Muncie 
illustrates the meaning of this statutory phrase.  There, a trial court granted the 
state’s request to forcibly administer psychotropic drugs to an offender who had 
been adjudicated incompetent, and the court of appeals dismissed the offender’s 
interlocutory appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.  On review, this court 
held that “[t]he forced medication order issued by the trial court determined the 
action against Muncie with respect to [the] petition for forced medication. * * *  
The order also prevented a judgment in favor of Muncie with respect to the 
proceeding for forced medication * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  91 Ohio St.3d at 
450-451, 746 N.E.2d 1092, citing Swearingen v. Waste Technologies Industries 
(1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 702, 713, 731 N.E.2d 1229, and State v. Saadey (June 
30, 2000), Columbiana App. No. 99CO49, 2000 WL 1114519. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
{¶29} As we have already acknowledged in connection with the first step 
of this analysis, the trial court in the instant matter ruled that, because retroactive 
application of the prima facie requirements in R.C. 2307.92 is unconstitutional, it 
“will adjudicate substantive issues in asbestos cases filed before September 2, 
2004 according to the law as it existed” before the effective date of the legislation.  
Thus, the court determined the action with respect to the appellants’ motion to 
apply the prima facie filing requirements retroactively pursuant to R.C. 
2307.93(A)(3), and the court’s decision prevented a judgment in favor of the 
appellants with respect to that proceeding, and to each of the approximately 
39,000 cases filed prior to September 2, 2004.  Hence, the trial court’s order 
satisfies the second step of the analysis because, per Muncie, “ ‘there was no 
further opportunity to petition the court for the remedy being sought,’ ” 91 Ohio 
St.3d at 451, 746 N.E.2d 1092, quoting Swearingen, 134 Ohio App.3d at 713, 731 
N.E.2d 1229, and there existed nothing further for the trial court to decide with 
respect to the provisional remedy. 
Meaningful or Effective Remedy on Appeal from a Final Judgment 
{¶30} The last part of the analysis requires consideration of whether the 
appealing party will be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal 
following a final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the 
action.  R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b).  In Muncie, we stated that R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) 
“recognizes that, in spite of courts’ interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation, 
occasions may arise in which a party seeking to appeal from an interlocutory 
order would have no adequate remedy from the effects of that order on appeal 
from final judgment.”  Id. at 451, 746 N.E.2d 1092.  As we further explained, 
“[i]n some instances, ‘the proverbial bell cannot be unrung.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Gibson-Myers & Assoc., Inc. v. Pearce (Oct. 27, 1999), Summit App. No. 19358, 
1999 WL 980562, * 2, and citing Cuervo v. Snell (Sept. 26, 2000), Franklin App. 
Nos. 99AP-1442, 99AP-1443, and 99AP-1458, 2000 WL 1376510. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶31} In the case before us, the trial court’s order denies the appellants’ 
motion to apply the prima facie filing requirements in R.C. 2307.92, which the 
General Assembly enacted with the intent to “give priority to those asbestos 
claimants who can demonstrate actual physical harm or illness caused by 
exposure to asbestos” and to enable courts to administratively dismiss the claims 
of those claimants who cannot present prima facie evidence of an impairment 
caused by exposure to asbestos.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, Section 3(B), 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 3991.  If the appellants in this matter are unable to challenge the 
trial court’s finding in an interlocutory appeal, they will be unable to obtain the 
remedy set forth in the legislation upon an appeal from a final judgment – it 
would be meaningless at that point either to require a claimant to present prima 
facie evidence, or to administratively dismiss a claimant’s case for failure to 
present prima facie evidence, after the case has proceeded to a final judgment on 
the merits.  As we stated in State v. Upshaw, 110 Ohio St.3d 189, 2006-Ohio-
4253, 852 N.E.2d 711, at ¶ 18, “without immediate judicial review, that mistake is 
uncorrectable.” 
Conclusion 
{¶32} A finding rendered pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(A)(3) is a provisional 
remedy, as defined by R.C. 2505.02(A)(3), but is not presumptively final and 
appealable.  When determining whether a finding on the constitutionality of 
retroactively applying the prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 2307.92 is a 
final, appealable order, R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) requires a court to consider (a) 
whether the trial court has determined the action and prevented a judgment in 
favor of the appealing party with respect to that finding and (b) whether that party 
is denied a meaningful or effective remedy upon appeal from a final judgment in 
the action.  In this case, the trial court’s order with respect to the provisional 
remedy satisfies both requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) and is, therefore, final 
January Term, 2007 
11 
and appealable.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the matter to that court for review of appellants’ assignments of error. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Shuster, and Nina I. 
Webb-Lawton, for appellants Goodrich Corp., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
CertainTeed Corp., 3M Co., ITT Industries, Inc., Allied Chemical Corp., Union 
Carbide Corp., Amchem Products, Inc., and American Standard, Inc., as alleged 
successor to Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Wade A. Mitchell, and Nichol M. Schoenfield, 
for appellant Ericsson, Inc. 
The Brunn Law Firm Co., L.P.A., and Thomas L. Brunn Sr., for appellant 
Alliance Machine Co. 
Roetzel & Andress and Susan Squire Box, for appellants C.P. Hall Co., 
ExxonMobil Corp., Ford Motor Co., and General Motors Corp. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and Laura Kingsley Hong, for 
appellants Ajax Manufacturing Co., Albany International Corp., Alcoa, Inc., 
Applied Industrial Technologies, Inc., Durametallic Corp., Ecodyne MRM, Inc., 
Gardner Denver, Inc., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. (sued as Devcon Corp.), the 
Kerite Co., National Machinery Co., Park Ohio Industries, Inc., Robertson-CECO 
Corp., f.k.a. H.H. Robertson Co., Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp., Warren 
Pumps, Inc., Weil-McLain Boilers, and Zurn Industries, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
Swartz Campbell, L.L.C., and John W. Bruni, for appellants Lexington 
Precision Corp., Allied Glove Corp., Cooper Industries, Inc., and Hinchcliffe & 
Keener, Inc. 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Bruce P. Mandel, and Kurt S. Siegfried, for 
appellants Borg Warner Corporation, CEECORP, Inc. (d.b.a. Cleveland Gypsum 
Co., f.k.a. Cleveland Builders Supply Co.), Dossert Corp., Durabla Manufacturing 
Co., Duro Dyne Corp., Edward R. Hart Co., Essex Group, Inc., Kentile Floors, 
Inc., Minster Machine Co., Ohio Valley Insulating Co., Inc., and Standard Glove 
& Safety Equipment Company. 
Brzytwa, Quick & McCrystal, L.L.P., Harry T. Quick, James L. 
McCrystal Jr., and Daniel F. Petticord, for appellants Eaton Corp. (sued as 
successor in interest to Cutler-Hammer, Inc., n.k.a. Eaton Electrical, Inc. and 
Eaton Corporation). 
Gallagher, Sharp, Kevin C. Alexandersen, Colleen A. Mountcastle, and 
Holly M. Olarczuk-Smith, for appellants Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 
Consolidated Rail Corp., American Premier Underwriters, Inc., CSX 
Transportation, Inc., Grand Trunk Western Railroad Corp., Beazer East, Inc., 
Tasco Insulation, Inc., Allen Refractories, Inc., Osborne, Inc., Ingersoll Rand Co., 
Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Co., Goulds Pumps, Inc., Thiem Corp. and its Universal 
Refractories Division, Carlisle Companies, Inc., Motion Control Industries, Inc., 
Safety First Industries, Inc., O'Connor Steel & Supply Co., Allis Chalmers 
Product Liability Trust, Cyprus Industries Minerals Co., Bryan Steam Corp., 
Burnham Corp., American Biltrite, Inc., Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc., C.D. 
Center Corp., Sherwin W. Berkheimer Co., Inc., Fulton Iron & Manufacturing, 
Inc., and Sur-Seal Gasket & Packing Co., Inc. 
Law Office of Susan S. Henderson and Susan S. Henderson, for appellant 
SB Decking, Inc., f.k.a. Selby, Battersby & Co. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
Sutter, O’Connell & Farchione, Matthew C. O’Connell, and Victoria 
Barto, for appellants Garlock Sealing Technologies, L.L.C., DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., Sepco Corp., Greene Tweed & Co., FMC Corp., D.B. Riley, Inc., 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., and ACF Industries, Inc. 
McLaughlin & McCaffrey, L.L.P., Dennis P. Zapka, and David H. 
Boehm, for appellant R.E. Kramig & Co., Inc. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Michael D. Eagen, for appellants Norton 
Co., n.k.a. Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Aurora Pump 
Division of Signal Corp., Dezurik, Inc., Lindberg MPH, and New York Air 
Brake. 
McMahon DeGulis, L.L.P., and Stephen H. Daniels, for appellants 
Advance Auto Parts, Inc., John Crane, Inc., Tuthill Corp., and Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. 
Bunda, Stutz & DeWitt, L.L.P., and David L. Gray, for appellant Owens-
Illinois, Inc. 
Davis & Young, C. Richard McDonald, and Jennifer Sardina, for 
appellants Nock Refractories Co., John Hancock Life Insurance Co., Hyster Co., 
and Hyster Mid East. 
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., and Christopher J. Caryl, for appellant BOC 
Group, Inc., f.k.a. Airco, Inc. 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., and Jennifer A. Riester, for appellants Engelhard 
Corp., Fidelity Builders Supply, Stevens Painton Corp., Graybar Electric Co., 
Inc., Morton International, Inc., and Akron Gasket & Packing Enterprise, Inc. 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., John L. Reyes, and Michael 
J. Matasich, for appellant Harwick Chemical Corp. 
Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co., L.P.A., Samuel R. Martillotta, 
and Edward O. Patton, for appellants ESAB Group, Inc., Hobart Brothers Co., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Lincoln Electric Co., McCord Corp., Pneumo Abex, L.L.C. (as successor in 
interest to Abex Corp.),  and A.W. Chesterton Co. 
Willman & Arnold, L.L.P., and Ruth A. Antinone, for appellants 
Honeywell International, Inc., f.k.a. Allied Signal, Inc., f.k.a. Bendix Corp., and 
Pittsburgh Metals Purifying Co. 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Robin E. Harvey, Diane L. Feigi, and Edward 
D. Papp, for appellant F.B. Wright Co. 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., and Timothy M. Fox, for appellant Georgia-
Pacific Corp. 
 Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., and Mark I. Wallach, for appellants 
Bondex International, Inc., and RPM, Inc. 
 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Nicholson Graham, L.L.P., and Ken Argentiera, 
for appellant Crane Co. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Thomas I. Michals, Matthew M. 
Mendoza, and Dineen LaMonica, for appellants Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Co., Toledo Edison Co., and Ohio Edison Co. 
Bonezzi, Switzer, Murphy & Polito Co., L.P.A., William D. Bonezzi, 
Kevin O. Kadlec, James E. Stephenson, and Joseph T. Ostrowski, for appellants 
F.B. Wright Co. of Cincinnati, A.O. Smith Corp., Mahoning Valley Supply Co., 
Hersh Packing & Rubber Co., Hollow Center Packing Co., Donald McKay Smith, 
and Brandon Drying Fabrics. 
Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., John A. Sivinski, and Anthony Gallucci, for 
appellees. 
Goldberg, Persky & White, P.C., Mark C. Meyer, David B. Rodes, and 
Joseph J. Cirilano, for appellees. 
Bevan & Associates, L.P.A., Thomas W. Bevan, and John Mismas, for 
appellees. 
Brent Coon & Associates and Christopher J. Hickey, for appellees. 
January Term, 2007 
15 
Young, Reverman & Mazzei Co., L.P.A., and Kelly W. Thye, for 
appellees. 
Baron & Budd and Theresa Ruck, for appellees. 
Mazur & Kittel, P.L.L.C., and John I. Kittel, for appellees. 
Climaco, Lefkowitz, Peca, Wilcox & Garofoli, L.P.A., John Peca, and 
Thomas M. Wilson, for appellees. 
Robert E. Sweeney Co., L.P.A., Robert E. Sweeney, and Robert P. 
Sweeney, for appellees. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Stephen P. Carney, Deputy State 
Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Jim Petro as Attorney General of 
Ohio. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, and 
Daniel C. Gibson, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers' 
Association, National Federation of Independent Business/Ohio, Ohio Chamber 
of Commerce, Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice, and Ohio Chemistry Technology 
Council. 
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