Title: State v. Bess

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Bess, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3292.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3292 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BESS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bess, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3292.] 
While a person purposely avoids prosecution for a crime, R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls 
the statute of limitations for all crimes he or she committed. 
(No. 2009-1196 — Submitted March 9, 2010 — Decided July 20, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91429, 
182 Ohio App.3d 364, 2009-Ohio-2254. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations for all offenses committed by an 
accused during the time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution, 
regardless of whether an indictment has been returned or whether 
underlying criminal activity has been discovered. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an indictment against 
Larry Bess as barred by the statute of limitations.  The issue presented here 
concerns whether R.C. 2901.13(G), which provides that the statute of limitations 
shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution, 
tolls the limitations period for all offenses the accused committed, or whether it 
applies only to those offenses for which an indictment has been returned or 
underlying criminal activity has been discovered before the accused absconds. 
{¶ 2} Nothing in this statute limits its application to only those crimes 
that had been discovered at the time the accused avoided prosecution.  Rather, 
R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations for all offenses committed by an 
accused during the time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution for any 
offense.  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the 
indictment is reinstated. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} In the early 1980s, Larry Bess began living with Theresa Ogden, 
and the couple married in 1986.  Theresa had two children from a prior 
relationship: a son and a daughter.  They lived at the Sunrise Cove Condominiums 
in North Royalton, where Bess began sexually abusing Theresa’s daughter.  The 
abuse continued until February 1989, when the daughter revealed it to a school 
counselor, who then reported the abuse to law-enforcement personnel and 
children’s services. 
{¶ 4} Bess also allegedly sexually abused Theresa’s son during this same 
time period, but when Detective Allen Napier of the North Royalton Police 
Department interviewed him as part of the investigation of his sister’s claims, he 
said that his sister had lied, and he denied having been sexually abused by Bess. 
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{¶ 5} When Bess became aware of the investigation, he began making 
plans to change his identity and leave town.  He told Theresa that he planned to 
leave and assume a new identity because he did not believe that he could defend 
himself against her daughter’s allegations and did not want to go to jail. 
{¶ 6} Bess and Theresa sold their home in North Royalton and split the 
proceeds.  Bess then purchased a van, loaded his belongings, and left.  When 
asked why she had not told authorities about Bess’s plans to abscond, Theresa 
testified, “He hadn’t been indicted or — you know.  Nobody asked.” She did not 
try to stop him from leaving, because she did not believe that he had sexually 
abused her daughter. 
{¶ 7} On November 2, 1989, after Bess left the jurisdiction, a Cuyahoga 
County grand jury indicted him on three counts of rape and seven counts of gross 
sexual imposition in connection with the abuse of Theresa’s daughter.  The 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas issued a capias for his arrest on 
November 27, 1989, when he failed to appear in court.  Bess successfully 
concealed his identity and his whereabouts until March 5, 2007, when the FBI 
arrested him in Bogart, Georgia, where he had been living under an alias of 
Norman E. Weatherby. 
{¶ 8} Following Bess’s apprehension, Detective David Sword of the 
North Royalton Police Department began looking for witnesses in the case.  He 
met with Theresa’s son, who eventually revealed that Bess had sexually abused 
him from 1982 to 1989. 
{¶ 9} Based on his statements, the state obtained a second indictment 
against Bess, charging him with six counts of rape, two counts of gross sexual 
imposition, and one count each of attempted rape and complicity in the 
commission of rape. 
{¶ 10} The trial court tried Bess for the offenses committed against 
Theresa’s daughter, which were not time-barred, because he had purposely 
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avoided that prosecution, and a jury subsequently found him guilty of those 
charges.  The court of appeals affirmed.  See State v. Bess, Cuyahoga App. No. 
91560, 2009-Ohio-2032. 
{¶ 11} Bess moved to dismiss the indictment that charged crimes against 
Theresa’s son, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations established by 
former R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)1 had expired.  The state objected, contending that R.C. 
2901.13(G)2 tolled the statute of limitations during the time when Bess had 
purposely avoided prosecution.  The trial court granted Bess’s motion and 
dismissed the indictment relating to charges involving crimes against Theresa’s 
son, finding that Bess had not purposely avoided prosecution for those alleged 
crimes. 
{¶ 12} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court.  Relying on State v. McGraw (June 16, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65202, 
the author of the appellate court opinion3 concluded that Bess’s flight and his 
concealment from prosecution for the sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter tolled 
the statute of limitations for those crimes, but did not toll the statute of limitations 
for charges related to the sexual abuse of Theresa’s son, which the state learned 
about after Bess’s apprehension. 
                                                          
 
1.  In 1998, the General Assembly enacted Sub.H.B. No. 49, effective 1999, which amended R.C. 
2901.13(A) to increase the statute of limitations for the offenses of rape and gross sexual 
imposition to 20 years.  147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 299-300. 
 
2.   The version of R.C. 2901.13(G) in effect at the time that Bess allegedly committed the crimes 
and at the time that the statute of limitations would have expired if not tolled provided: “The 
period of limitation shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. 
Proof that the accused absented himself from this state or concealed his identity or whereabouts is 
prima-facie evidence of his purpose to avoid prosecution.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 1866, 1896-1897.  The General Assembly subsequently amended R.C. 2901.13(G) to 
incorporate gender-neutral language.   
 
3.   The author’s opinion in the court of appeals did not receive a second vote.  A second judge 
concurred in judgment only and a third judge on the panel dissented. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 13} The state appealed, and we agreed to address the following 
proposition of law: “The statute of limitations upon criminal offenses is tolled 
pursuant to former R.C. § 2901.13 (G) when the accused purposely avoids 
prosecution for an offense.” 
{¶ 14} The state contends that R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of 
limitations for “any and all prosecutions against an accused who purposely avoids 
prosecution,” noting that this statute contains no language that expressly limits 
tolling to those prosecutions that the accused specifically intended to avoid.  
According to the state, the purpose of the statute of limitations is to discourage 
inefficient or dilatory law enforcement, not to permit offenders to evade 
responsibility for criminal conduct; thus, tolling should not apply when the 
offender’s action causes the delay in prosecution. 
{¶ 15} Bess, on the other hand, asserts that R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the 
statute of limitations only when the evidence shows that “the accused left the 
jurisdiction purposefully to avoid the offense charged.”  He maintains that both 
the rule of lenity, which requires criminal statutes to be strictly construed against 
the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused, and the purpose of a 
statute of limitations in general – to protect the accused from having to defend 
against stale charges – support his construction of the statute.  Bess also notes that 
Theresa’s son did not report abuse to anyone before Bess was apprehended, which 
he now suggests shows that he could not have purposely avoided prosecution for 
those charges. 
{¶ 16} Thus, the issue is whether R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the limitations 
period of all crimes allegedly committed by an accused during the time the 
accused purposefully avoids prosecution, or whether it applies only to the 
offenses the accused specifically intended to avoid at the time the accused 
absconded. 
Law and Analysis 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} R.C. 2901.13(G) provides: “The period of limitation shall not run 
during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. Proof that the 
accused departed this state or concealed the accused’s identity or whereabouts is 
prima-facie evidence of the accused’s purpose to avoid prosecution.” 
{¶ 18} This case presents a question of statutory interpretation of the term 
“prosecution” as used in R.C. 2901.13(G).  As we explained in State v. Buehler, 
113 Ohio St.3d 114, 2007-Ohio-1246, 863 N.E.2d 124, in construing statutes, “ 
‘our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.’   State ex 
rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, 
¶ 21.  Furthermore, ‘[i]n determining this intent, we first review the statutory 
language, reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to 
the rules of grammar and common usage.’ Id.”  Buehler at ¶ 29.  Thus, as the 
court stated in State v. Teamer (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 491, 696 N.E.2d 1049, 
“[w]e must give effect to the words of a statute and may not modify an 
unambiguous statute by deleting words used or inserting words not used.” 
{¶ 19} As Bess argues, the word “prosecution” could refer to a particular 
prosecution, that is, “[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried,” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1258.  If “prosecution” is defined this way, 
tolling occurs only when a person avoids prosecution for specific charges. 
{¶ 20} The word “prosecution,” however, could also refer to the more 
general process by which an accused is tried and punished for criminal activity.  
See Thomas v. Peoria (C.A.7, 2009), 580 F.3d 633, 638-639 (“ ‘Prosecution’ * * 
* just means law enforcement by public officers”); Merriam-Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th  Ed.2003) (defining “prosecution” to mean “the act or 
process of prosecuting”).  If this more general definition of “prosecution” was 
intended by the General Assembly, then the statute encompasses all offenses 
committed by the accused and tolls the crimes’ statute of limitations when an 
January Term, 2010 
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accused leaves the state or conceals his or her identity or whereabouts with the 
purpose of avoiding being prosecuted for any crime. 
{¶ 21} The context in which the word “prosecution” is used in R.C. 
2901.13(G) reveals that the word refers to the more general process by which an 
accused is tried and punished for alleged criminal activity, not a specific 
proceeding against an accused, and the statute of limitations is tolled when an 
accused acts to purposely avoid being prosecuted for any offense. 
{¶ 22} While this is a question of first impression in our court, federal 
courts interpreting similar language in Section 1073, Title 18, U.S.Code, have 
defined the words “to avoid prosecution” to mean “ ‘to avoid being prosecuted.’ ”  
United States v. Frank (C.A.3, 1988), 864 F.2d 992, 1007, quoting United States 
v. Bando (C.A.2, 1957), 244 F.2d 833, 843; see also Lupino v. United States 
(C.A.8, 1959), 268 F.2d 799, 801; United States v. McKinney (D.Md., 1992) 785 
F. Supp. 1214, 1218.  These courts have explained that Section 1073, which 
criminalizes crossing state lines with the intent to avoid prosecution, does not 
require the existence of a pending prosecution, but rather “[i]t is sufficient if the 
fleeing felon is ‘subject to prosecution.’ ”  Bando, 244 F.2d at 843.  Cf. State v. 
Gleason (Iowa, 1988), 431 N.W.2d 363, 364 (defining unlawful flight “to avoid 
prosecution” in an Iowa statute to mean flight “which was to prevent even the 
occurrence of prosecution”). 
{¶ 23} Notably, R.C. 2901.13(G) contains no language suggesting that its 
application should be limited only to those cases where the accused sought to 
avoid a particular prosecution.  Nor is there language suggesting a limitation to 
only those prosecutions that had been commenced before the accused absconded 
or to those cases where the state can prove that the accused intended to avoid 
prosecution for a specific crime.  The lack of any qualifying or limiting language 
reveals the legislature’s intent to toll the statute of limitations with respect to all 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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offenses during the time when an accused purposely avoids prosecution for any 
offense. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, the manifest purpose of R.C. 2901.13(G) is to prevent 
the accused from benefitting from the statute of limitations when he or she has 
purposely acted to avoid being prosecuted, thereby causing the state to fail to 
commence a timely prosecution.  Importantly, it is the actions of the accused in 
avoiding prosecution, not the actions of the state in commencing a prosecution, 
that triggers the tolling of the statute of limitations.  Thus, the General Assembly 
did not intend to limit tolling to only those offenses that authorities knew about at 
the time the accused absconded while allowing the statute of limitations to run on 
undiscovered crimes. 
{¶ 25} Our construction of R.C. 2901.13(G) accords with the General 
Assembly’s intent in enacting the statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A). As we 
explained in State v. Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., 
L.P.A. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 582, 709 N.E.2d 1192, the purpose of a statute of 
limitations is “to discourage inefficient or dilatory law enforcement rather than to 
give offenders the chance to avoid criminal responsibility for their conduct.”  Id. 
at 586, citing State v. Hensley (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 136, 138, 571 N.E.2d 711.  A 
statute of limitations “ ‘protect[s] individuals from having to defend themselves 
against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of 
time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-
distant past.’ ” Id., quoting Toussie v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 112, 114-
115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156. 
{¶ 26} These statutory purposes are not furthered, however, when the 
accused purposely avoids prosecution, because it is the conduct of the accused, 
not a lack of diligence on the part of the state, that causes the delay in the 
prosecution.  Thus, an accused who purposefully avoids prosecution cannot 
complain of prejudice resulting from the failure of the state to promptly 
January Term, 2010 
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commence the prosecution or from the unavailability of evidence as a result of the 
passage of time.  Just as the statute of limitations creates an incentive for the 
prompt investigation of suspected criminal activity, tolling of the limitations 
period during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution reduces 
the incentive for the accused to abscond from justice. 
{¶ 27} Federal caselaw construing Section 3290, Title 18, U.S.Code, the 
federal tolling statute, provides further support for our interpretation of R.C. 
2901.13(G).  We recognize that Section 3290, which provides that “[n]o statute of 
limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice,” is phrased differently 
from R.C. 2901.13(G).  However, federal courts hold that Section 3290 tolls the 
federal statute of limitations when “the defendant concealed himself with the 
intent to avoid prosecution.”  (Emphasis added.) United States v. Greever (C.A.6, 
1998) 134 F.3d 777, 780; see also Streep v. United States (1895), 160 U.S. 128, 
133, 16 S.Ct. 244, 40 L.Ed. 365 (“In order to constitute a fleeing from justice, * * 
* [i]t is sufficient that there is a flight with the intention of avoiding being 
prosecuted, whether a prosecution has or has not been actually begun”).  Thus, 
because Section 3290 is substantively equivalent to R.C. 2901.13(G), federal 
caselaw analyzing Section 3290 provides persuasive authority in construing R.C. 
2901.13(G). 
{¶ 28} Federal appellate courts have held that Section 3290 tolls the 
statute of limitations for all federal crimes during the time of a person’s flight 
from justice, even if the person only intended to avoid prosecution on unrelated 
state or federal crimes.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that 
“the fact that appellee was fleeing prosecution from unrelated state crimes offers 
him no assistance in his attempt to take advantage of the federal statute of 
limitations.  Appellee was fleeing justice – be it state or federal – and thereby 
triggered the tolling provision of § 3290; he cannot now have the privilege of the 
federal statute of limitations.”  United States v. Morgan (C.A.10, 1991) 922 F.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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1495, 1499.  See also United States v. Hoffman (C.A.6, 1997), 124 F.3d 200 
(Table), 1997 WL 476513 (holding that the accused’s flight to avoid prosecution 
on state child-abuse charges in California tolled the statute of limitations for a 
federal tax offense); United States v. Rivera-Ventura (C.A.2, 1995), 72 F.3d 277, 
283 (“when a defendant has been indicted by a federal grand jury in one district 
and is unaware of that indictment, his flight to avoid prosecution in a different 
federal district under an unrelated federal indictment of which he is aware tolls 
the running of the statute on the charges of which he is unaware”). 
{¶ 29} Federal courts thus do not require a specific intent to avoid a 
particular prosecution for Section 3290 to toll the statute of limitations.  Rather, as 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Marshall (C.A.7, 
1988), 856 F.2d 896, 900, “[t]he tolling statute reflects the congressional belief 
that where the defendant impedes the discovery and prosecution of his criminal 
conduct by ‘fleeing from justice,’ his right to avoid prosecution for distant 
offenses is diminished while the government's need for additional discovery time 
is strengthened.” 
{¶ 30} For these reasons, we hold that R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of 
limitations for all offenses committed by an accused during the time when the 
accused purposely avoids prosecution for any offense. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 31} The legislature has mandated that the period of limitations shall 
not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution.  The 
word “prosecution” means the process of bringing those who commit crimes to 
justice, and in the context of the statute, that definition is not limited to the crimes 
of which the authorities are aware or for which the accused has been indicted.  In 
this case, if Bess committed the alleged crimes against Theresa’s son, then he 
knew that when he fled, but his motivations in fleeing the jurisdiction are known 
only to him.  The General Assembly, however, did not intend to require the state 
January Term, 2010 
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to prove the accused’s specific intent in absconding, nor did it intend to toll the 
statute of limitations as to crimes known to the state but not toll it as to crimes 
unknown to the state.  If we interpreted the statute otherwise, an accused would 
benefit from absconding from prosecution of crimes unknown to the state.  This 
would be an illogical interpretation of the statute. 
{¶ 32} Thus, R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations for all 
offenses committed by an accused during the time when the accused purposely 
avoids prosecution for any offense, regardless of whether an indictment has been 
returned or whether underlying criminal activity has been discovered.  Because 
the court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations had expired in this 
case notwithstanding Bess’s conduct in avoiding prosecution, that judgment is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} I dissent because the majority’s broad interpretation of R.C. 
2901.13(G) violates the rule of lenity set forth in R.C. 2901.04(A): “Except as 
otherwise provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, sections of the Revised 
Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, 
and liberally construed in favor of the accused.” 
{¶ 34} The majority opinion frankly admits: “As Bess argues, the word 
‘prosecution’ could refer to a particular prosecution, that is, ‘[a] criminal 
proceeding in which an accused person is tried,’ Black’s Law Dictionary (8th 
Ed.2004) 1258.  If ‘prosecution’ is defined this way, tolling occurs only when a 
person avoids prosecution for specific charges.”  (Emphasis added.)  Majority 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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opinion at ¶ 19.  Yet in spite of the fact that this is a reasonable construction of the 
statute, the majority continues by adopting the more favorable position for the 
state—that is, the general fugitive-from-justice interpretation that applies to a 
federal statute, Section 1073, Title 18, U.S.Code. 
{¶ 35} In enacting Section 1073, Title 18, U.S.Code, Congress elected to 
provide a number of different instances in which an alleged offender is deemed to 
be a fugitive from justice and may be prosecuted for fleeing.  The language used 
in the federal statute suggests that Congress wanted the statute to be interpreted 
broadly, which it since has been.  See United States v. Frank (C.A.3, 1988), 864 
F.2d 992, 1007. 
{¶ 36} But R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations when “the 
accused purposely avoids prosecution.”  The word “accused” implies that the 
person already has been implicated in a crime by someone.  The mental state of 
“purposely” is defined in R.C. 2901.22(A): “A person acts purposely when it is 
his specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a 
prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender 
intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of 
that nature.”  The statute of limitations also explains when a “prosecution” begins: 
“A prosecution is commenced on the date an indictment is returned or an 
information filed, or on the date a lawful arrest without a warrant is made, or on 
the date a warrant, summons, citation, or other process is issued, whichever 
occurs first. A prosecution is not commenced by the return of an indictment or the 
filing of an information unless reasonable diligence is exercised to issue and 
execute process on the same. A prosecution is not commenced upon issuance of a 
warrant, summons, citation, or other process, unless reasonable diligence is 
exercised to execute the same.”  R.C. 2901.13(E).  The tolling of the statute of 
limitations therefore begins when an alleged offender purposely flees the 
jurisdiction to avoid a particular indictment or information. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 37} This language chosen by the General Assembly comports with the 
position advanced by the defense: tolling occurs when a person avoids 
prosecution for specific charges.  Although a case may be, and has been, made for 
the state’s alternative theory, I cannot subscribe to the idea that the limitations 
period is tolled for all crimes that an accused may have committed before the 
period that an accused avoids prosecution for a specific charge. 
{¶ 38} Bess was convicted of three counts of rape and two counts of gross 
sexual imposition as a result of his stepdaughter’s accusations that were made in 
1989.  State v. Bess, 8th Dist. No. 91560, 2009-Ohio-2032.  He purposely avoided 
that prosecution.  When Bess left, there was no thought of an investigation into 
possible crimes against his stepson.  The stepson had been interviewed and had 
denied even the possibility that his sister’s accusations were true. 
{¶ 39} Interpreting R.C. 2901.13(G) as suggested would not mean that an 
indictment or information would need to be filed against an accused before the 
statute of limitations would be tolled.  The accused would need only know that an 
investigation is taking place or is likely to take place and that by leaving the 
jurisdiction, he or she is avoiding prosecution for that specific crime. 
{¶ 40} Bess’s absence from Ohio never prevented or interfered with an 
investigation from proceeding on this matter, for there had been no accusation 
relating to crimes against his stepson. Bess could not have purposely avoid 
prosecution for alleged crimes that were unknown to authorities. 
{¶ 41} A prosecution against a person based on evidence that is obtained 
almost 20 years after the alleged crime was committed is exactly the kind of 
prosecution the statute of limitations is designed to bar.  Toussie v. United States 
(1970), 397 U.S. 112, 114-115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed2d 156 (a statute of 
limitations “protect[s] individuals from having to defend themselves against 
charges when the basic facts have become obscured by the passage of time”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 42} R.C. 2901.13(G) cannot toll the statute of limitations for a 
prosecution that has not yet been commenced against an accused.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
David L. Doughten, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
and Brandon J. Lester, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Attorney General. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________