Title: Dubois v. Office of the Attorney General

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 67 
Docket: 
Yor-17-191 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
October 24, 2017 
Decided: 
May 8, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
MARCEL DUBOIS et al. 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL et al. 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
[¶1]  In an order entered in April of 2017, the Superior Court (York 
County, O’Neil, J.)  affirmed a decision of the Maine Office of the Attorney 
General denying a request made by Dubois Livestock, Inc., pursuant to the 
Freedom of Access Act, 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414 (2017), for drafts of a letter sent in 
January of 2016 by the Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Forestry (DACF) to Dubois Livestock.  In the same order, the court determined 
that the Office of the Attorney General did not have just and proper cause to 
deny Dubois Livestock’s FOAA request for a series of emails preparatory to a 
meeting held among agents of several state agencies in connection with 
enforcement efforts against Dubois Livestock.   
 
2 
[¶2]  Two individuals associated with Dubois Livestock—Marcel Dubois, 
and Sol Fedder, who submitted the FOAA request on behalf of Dubois 
Livestock—appeal the first aspect of the court’s order, which we affirm because 
the drafts of the January 2016 letter constitute privileged work product 
material not subject to FOAA disclosure.  The Office of the Attorney General and 
Assistant Attorneys General Emily K. Green and Scott Boak (collectively, OAG) 
cross-appeal from the latter part of the order, which we vacate because the 
emails regarding the meeting are also protected as work product.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The following facts are drawn from the court’s findings, which are 
supported by the record, and from assertions contained in OAG’s filings that 
Dubois and Fedder have not disputed.1  See Dubois v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
2017 ME 224, ¶ 3, 174 A.3d 314.   
                                         
1  As is discussed in the text, OAG filed affidavits pursuant to the court’s order to support its 
position.  Dubois and Fedder assert that the affidavits submitted by OAG are “incompetent” because 
the information contained in them is not based on personal knowledge.  Dubois and Fedder have not 
developed that argument on appeal, however, and so it is waived.  See Laqualia v. Laqualia, 2011 ME 
114, ¶ 34, 30 A.3d 838.  Further, Dubois and Fedder challenged only the process by which the 
information contained in the affidavits was presented to the court, so the information itself is 
undisputed.  Finally, even if Dubois and Fedder are correct that the affidavits must be based on 
personal knowledge, the affidavits would be proper because their contents make clear that they are 
based on personal knowledge.   
 
3 
[¶4]  In May of 2015, DACF and the Maine Department of Environmental 
Protection began to receive and investigate numerous odor complaints relating 
to Dubois Livestock’s business operations, which include producing compost.  
Because the complaints generated both agricultural and environmental 
concerns, DACF and DEP conducted a coordinated investigation into these 
complaints.  During that effort, DEP and DACF were represented by assistant 
attorneys general.  On May 8, 2015, Michael Clark, a DEP project manager 
whose responsibilities encompass regulation of Dubois Livestock’s compost 
operations, requested information from Dubois Livestock about the material 
spread on its fields.  Three days later, Dubois Livestock notified Clark that it 
intended to file a complaint against DEP for criminal trespass based on an entry 
by state officials onto the farm’s premises.  After receiving this letter, Clark met 
with the assistant attorney general who represented DEP to discuss obtaining 
an administrative inspection warrant to enter Dubois Livestock’s fields and 
facilities.  DEP began drafting an application for the warrant shortly after this 
meeting.  On November 20, 2015, DEP filed an enforcement action against 
Dubois Livestock.   
[¶5]  As for DACF, on October 16, 2015, DACF Agricultural Compliance 
Officer Matt Randall sent an email to Dubois Livestock also requesting 
 
4 
information about the materials spread on its fields.  In response, Dubois 
Livestock notified DACF that it would not be “coerced or bullied into 
answering” the agency’s questions about the farming operations.  At that point, 
DACF began to consider bringing its own action against Dubois Livestock to 
enforce agriculture laws based both on the underlying complaints and on 
Dubois Livestock’s refusal to cooperate with the State’s investigation.  During 
his investigation, Randall became aware that Dubois had threatened to bring a 
criminal trespass action against DEP.  In January of 2016, Randall, on behalf of 
DACF, sent a letter to the directors and managers of the various Dubois 
Livestock entities explaining that legal protections against nuisance complaints 
were not available to the farms unless they cooperated with DACF’s 
investigation.  It appears from OAG’s briefs filed with the trial court and on this 
appeal that the January 2016 letter was the final product of the drafts that 
Dubois and Fedder seek to obtain in this action.   
[¶6]  On April 27, 2016, OAG received a FOAA request from Sol Fedder as 
representative of Dubois Livestock.  See 1 M.R.S. § 408-A.  The request sought 
drafts of the January 2016 letter that Randall sent to Dubois Livestock and 
documents pertaining to a meeting of DEP, DACF, and OAG employees held on 
 
5 
December 4, 2015.2  OAG denied the FOAA request in its entirety, see id. 
§ 408-A(4), asserting that the records were prepared in anticipation of 
litigation and were therefore protected as work product not subject to FOAA 
disclosure, see id. § 402(3)(b).   
[¶7]  Dubois and Fedder challenged OAG’s denial of the FOAA request in 
an action filed in the Superior Court.3  See 1 M.R.S. § 409.  On motion filed by 
OAG, the court issued a scheduling order directing OAG to submit the contested 
documents under seal for the court’s in camera review and to file with the court, 
with a copy to Dubois and Fedder, an exceptions log identifying the documents 
and the reasons they were withheld.  The scheduling order also permitted OAG 
                                         
2  Apparently, Dubois learned of the December 4, 2015, meeting from documents inadvertently 
disclosed by DACF to Dubois Livestock pursuant to a separate FOAA request.  In its April 29 letter, 
OAG notified Dubois Livestock that the inadvertently disclosed documents were privileged work 
product and requested that it “return or discard all copies.”   
3  Although Dubois and Fedder styled their complaint in part as an appeal from agency action filed 
pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B (which, because the challenge is to a decision of a state 
agency, would be governed by Rule 80C), that Rule does not govern this action.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80B, 
80C; 1 M.R.S. § 409 (2017).  As presently constituted, 1 M.R.S. § 409(1) creates a procedure for a party 
aggrieved by the denial of a FOAA request to file an “appeal” in the Superior Court.  See id.  That 
statute, however, authorizes the court to take testimony and other evidence as the court deems 
necessary in order to resolve any disputed facts and adjudicate whether the denial was proper.  See 
id.; Dubois v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 10, 174 A.3d 314.  Similarly, the prior version of 
section 409(1) specified that the court was to conduct a “trial de novo,” see 1 M.R.S. § 409(1) (2014) 
(amended by P.L. 2015, c. 249, § 2 (effective Oct. 15, 2015)), a process that is not appellate in nature 
or function, see Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 22, 715 A.2d 148.  Neither the 
current procedural framework nor the one it replaced call for the court to act in an appellate capacity 
because both versions of the statute contemplate that the court will take evidence and act in a 
fact-finding role.  See 1 M.R.S. § 409(1); 1 M.R.S. § 409(1) (2014) (repealed by P.L. 2015, c. 249, § 2 
(effective Oct. 15, 2015)).   
 
6 
to file with the court, again with a copy to Dubois and Fedder, an affidavit 
explaining its decision to withhold the documents at issue.  The order allowed 
Dubois and Fedder to then file “supporting materials” and established a briefing 
schedule.  With its brief, OAG filed affidavits executed by Randall and another 
DEP official.  Dubois and Fedder filed a brief containing arguments of law, but 
they did not submit their own affidavits or any other material.   
[¶8]  The court conducted an in camera review of the documents 
submitted by OAG and held oral argument.  In April of 2017, the court issued an 
order concluding that the drafts of the letter sent by DACF to Dubois Livestock 
were not subject to disclosure pursuant to FOAA because they were created in 
anticipation of litigation and therefore protected as work product containing 
mental impressions, conclusions, and legal theories.  The court determined, 
however, that the emails concerning the December 4, 2015, meeting among 
DEP and DACF agents and assistant attorneys general representing those 
agencies were not privileged and ordered OAG to produce those emails.  Dubois 
appealed, and OAG cross-appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).4 
                                         
4  This appeal was filed before September 1, 2017; therefore, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate 
Procedure do not apply.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).   
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  Dubois and Fedder raise challenges to the process used by the court, 
which we address before proceeding to the merits of the parties’ appeals.   
A. 
Due Process 
 
[¶10]  Dubois and Fedder argue that the trial court violated their right to 
due process by declining to order OAG to produce an exceptions log that is more 
detailed than what was already provided pursuant to the scheduling order and 
by relying on the two affidavits submitted by OAG as the basis for the court’s 
factual findings.5   
[¶11]  We review due process claims de novo.  State v. Jones, 2012 ME 
126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.  “Due process is a flexible concept” analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis.  Bog Lake Co. v. Town of Northfield, 2008 ME 37, ¶ 10, 
942 A.2d 700 (quotation marks omitted).  The two essential elements of due 
process are notice and the opportunity to be heard.  Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. 
Envtl. Improvement Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1, 15 (Me. 1973).   
                                         
5  Dubois and Fedder also assert that they were entitled to see the documents reviewed by the 
court in camera so that they could be heard on whether the documents should be disclosed to them.  
We have recently rejected this internally fallacious argument in a case also involving Dubois and 
Fedder, see Dubois v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 9, 174 A.3d 314, and do not address it 
further here. 
 
8 
1. 
Exceptions Log 
 
[¶12]  Pursuant to FOAA, a person or agency that refuses access to a 
public record is required, within five business days after receiving the request, 
to provide the requesting party with “written notice of the denial, stating the 
reason for the denial . . . .”  1 M.R.S. § 408-A(4).  Additionally, in this particular 
proceeding the court ordered OAG to file an “Exceptions Log itemizing the 
documents at issue and the reason(s) they were withheld.”  OAG complied with 
the requirements of both the statute and the order.  Dubois and Fedder’s 
reliance on the more extensive exceptions log requirements created in Maine 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A) is misplaced, because neither FOAA nor the 
court’s scheduling order incorporates that Rule’s procedure for pretrial 
discovery.  See 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414.  The exceptions log provided to Dubois and 
Fedder was sufficient to provide them with information necessary to assert 
their rights pursuant to FOAA, and the court did not deprive Dubois and Fedder 
of their due process rights when it declined to order OAG to submit a more 
detailed exceptions log.   
2. 
Affidavits 
[¶13]  FOAA provides that in a Superior Court proceeding involving a 
challenge to a denial of a request for access to public documents, the court may 
 
9 
conduct “a review, with taking of testimony and other evidence as determined 
necessary” to determine whether the denial “was not for just and proper cause.”  
1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  This authorizes the court to establish the procedure it deems 
necessary for the presentation of evidence that will bear on its ultimate 
determination and allows the court to specify the process it will use to resolve 
disputed facts, “giving due consideration to the efficacy, costs, and time 
required for each method of presentation of evidence.”  See Dubois v. Dept. of 
Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 10, 174 A.3d 314.6 
 
[¶14]  Exercising that statutory authority, the court provided OAG with 
the opportunity to file affidavits relating to its refusal to disclose the requested 
documents.  Although it did not explicitly specify that Dubois and Fedder could 
do the same, in the same order the court provided them with an opportunity to 
file “their brief and any supporting materials.”  (Emphasis added.)  Both parties 
were therefore effectively given the same opportunity to submit evidence.  
Nonetheless, Dubois and Fedder did not submit any supporting materials but 
rather limited their filings to legal argument.  The order issued by the court 
reveals that it fully considered the evidence submitted by the parties and their 
                                         
6  This constitutes a shift from the requirement of a trial de novo prescribed by an earlier version 
of section 409(1).  See supra n.3.  We have described the statutory change as creating an “improved 
evidentiary process.”  Dubois v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 11, 174 A.3d 314. 
 
10 
legal arguments.  The procedural course of the case was well within the court’s 
statutory authority and did not constitute an abuse of discretion, see Dubois v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 10, 174 A.3d 314, and Dubois and Fedder 
were not denied an opportunity to be heard.  
B. 
Work Product Privilege 
 
[¶15]  We now address the merits of the parties’ respective challenges to 
the court’s determinations that the drafts of the January 2016 letter are not 
subject to FOAA disclosure because they are work product, and that the emails 
sent in preparation for the December 2015 meeting are not work product and 
thus not protected.  “In reviewing whether a government entity complied with 
the FOAA, we review factual findings for clear error, but review the trial court’s 
interpretation of the FOAA de novo.”  Hughes Bros., Inc. v. Town of Eddington, 
2016 ME 13, ¶ 21, 130 A.3d 978 (citations omitted).    
[¶16]  Pursuant to FOAA, “[t]he burden of proof is on the agency or 
political subdivision from which the information is sought to establish just and 
proper cause for the denial of a FOAA request.”  MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 
2013 ME 100, ¶ 9, 82 A.3d 104 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted); see 1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  Courts must give FOAA liberal construction and 
application, and “[s]tatutory exceptions to the FOAA are to be strictly 
 
11 
construed.”  Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP v. State Tax Assessor, 2014 ME 
6, ¶ 10, 86 A.3d 30. 
[¶17]  The starting point for the FOAA analysis is the statutory principle 
that a person has the right to inspect and copy “any public record.”  1 M.R.S. 
§ 408-A(1).  As pertinent to this case, “public record” includes any matter in 
tangible or electronic form “that is in the possession or custody of [a State] 
agency or public official . . . and [that was] received or prepared for use in 
connection with the transaction of public or governmental business or contains 
information relating to the transaction of public or governmental business.”  
See 1 M.R.S. § 402(3).  The definition of “public record,” however, is subject to a 
number of exceptions, one of which is central to this case: “[r]ecords that would 
be within the scope of a privilege against discovery or use as evidence recognized 
by the courts of this State in civil or criminal trials if the records or inspection 
thereof were sought in the course of a court proceeding.”  Id. § 402(3)(B) 
(emphasis added). 
[¶18]  This exception encompasses the work product privilege.  Pursuant 
to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), “a party may obtain discovery of 
documents . . .  prepared in anticipation of litigation” but only if the party 
demonstrates that it has a “substantial need” for the documents to prepare its 
 
12 
case and cannot obtain the “substantial equivalent” of such documents without 
“undue hardship.”  Even where a party can make this showing, the requesting 
party is not entitled to records that contain an attorney’s mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation.7  Id.; 
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 2000 ME 126, ¶ 13, 754 A.2d 353.  
“A document is protected as work product only if it was created because of the 
party’s subjective anticipation of future litigation[,]” which must be “objectively 
reasonable.”  Id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted).  “[A] document prepared in 
the regular course of business may be prepared in anticipation of litigation 
when the party’s business is to prepare for litigation.”  Harriman v. Maddocks, 
518 A.2d 1027, 1034 (Me. 1986) (quotation marks omitted).  As we have 
recently held, documents “prepared in anticipation of regulatory enforcement 
or other compliance-related litigation” constitute a form of work product.  
Dubois v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 ME 224, ¶ 17, 174 A.3d 314. 
                                         
7  While it is clear that Dubois and Fedder contend that the material at issue is not work product 
in the first place, it is less clear that they are also contending that if that material is work product, 
they are nonetheless entitled to its access because of the conditional nature of the work product 
privilege as noted in the text.  We nonetheless address that issue to round out the work product 
analysis. 
 
13 
1. 
Drafts of January 2016 DACF Letter  
[¶19]  Dubois and Fedder assert that the court erred by concluding that 
the work product privilege shielded from FOAA disclosure the drafts of the 
letter that, in final form, DACF sent to Dubois Livestock in January of 2016.  The 
drafts were circulated for review and comment among several DEP and DACF 
employees and the assistant attorneys general who represented those agencies 
in connection with the investigations into Dubois Livestock.   
[¶20]  The contents of the drafts, which remain sealed pursuant to the 
court’s order, plainly demonstrate that both the drafts and the resulting final 
version of the letter were created in anticipation of litigation and that the drafts 
are fully protected from FOAA access because they contain attorneys’ mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the 
prospective litigation.  
[¶21]  As the court found, with support in the record, DACF reasonably 
anticipated litigation with Dubois Livestock as early as May of 2015, and that 
anticipation continued throughout the time the letter—which concerned the 
matters being investigated—was being drafted.  Given these circumstances, the 
court did not err when it concluded that the drafts comprised work product 
 
14 
material and were not subject to any exception to that privilege.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(3).   
[¶22]  Dubois and Fedder argue that any anticipation of litigation was not 
reasonable because DACF had not completed the procedural steps necessary to 
bring an enforcement action.  As a predicate to concluding an investigation into 
a complaint involving a farm, DACF’s administrative rules require the agency to 
make a determination and render findings and any recommendations 
prescribing best management practices, and in some situations the 
Commissioner is required to send a written report to the Attorney General.  See 
1 C.M.R. 01 001 010-3 § 3(5) (2007); 7 M.R.S. § 158 (2017).  Even though those 
regulatory steps had not yet been completed when Randall sent the letter, the 
circumstances demonstrate that the letter was drafted when there existed a 
reasonable anticipation that litigation would occur.  See Springfield Terminal, 
2000 ME 126, ¶ 16, 754 A.2d 353.  
 
[¶23]  Dubois and Fedder also argue that the work product privilege was 
waived because DACF collaborated on the drafts with DEP employees and 
assistant attorneys general representing DEP.8  A party waives the work 
                                         
8  As part of their argument that OAG waived any privilege, Dubois and Fedder claim that the 
administrative enforcement efforts constituted the federal crime of obstruction of justice and that 
 
15 
product protection by disclosing the material “in a way inconsistent with 
keeping it from an adversary.”  U.S. v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 
(1st Cir. 1997).  Here, as the court found, DACF and DEP coordinated their 
investigations into Dubois Livestock’s operations because the two agencies had 
overlapping regulatory and enforcement interests.  They coordinated their 
efforts in consultation with their attorneys, and OAG did not disclose the drafts 
of the letter in a way that would expose that material to an adversary.  
Therefore, neither DACF nor its attorneys waived the work product privilege 
by consulting with DEP and its attorneys.  See id.  
2.  
Scheduling Emails  
[¶24]  OAG argues that the work product privilege also applies to a series 
of emails that involved planning for a strategy meeting held on December 4, 
2015, and that the court erred by concluding otherwise.  We agree.  
[¶25]  The court found that the emails were not work product because 
they “merely contain correspondence . . . about the scheduling of a meeting.”  
The emails, however, were written and circulated to schedule a meeting that 
was to be held because of the prospect of litigation reasonably anticipated by 
                                         
the internal information is therefore not protected.  See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1503 (LEXIS through Pub. 
L. No. 115-164).  On the record before us, this argument is entirely without merit.   
 
16 
the agencies and their attorneys.  The emails reveal the purpose of the meeting 
and the efforts made to accommodate the schedules of people who were to 
attend the meeting, which by itself points to the nature of issues and strategies 
that likely would be considered.  Additionally, several of the emails explicitly 
discuss DACF’s investigative and legal options.  Therefore, the scheduling 
emails are privileged as work product.  Springfield Terminal, 2000 ME 126, ¶ 17, 
754 A.2d 353.  We accordingly vacate the judgment as to these emails and 
remand for entry of judgment that the emails are work product and not subject 
to disclosure pursuant to FOAA.   
C. 
Conclusion 
[¶26]  Because the documents at issue in this case are protected work 
product material, they are not “public records” within the meaning of section 
402(3), and OAG’s denial of the request to inspect or copy those documents was 
therefore “just and proper.”  See 1 M.R.S. § 409(1).   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed as to the draft letters 
(documents 1-20).  Judgment vacated as to the 
emails (documents 21-31).  Remanded for entry 
of judgment denying the plaintiffs’ request for 
disclosure of those documents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Marcel Dubois and Sol Fedder, appellants pro se 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Thomas A. Knowlton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for cross-appellants Office of the Attorney 
General, Emily K. Green, and Scott Boak 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-21 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY