Title: DAVID R. ALLEN AND BARBARA ALLEN v. SAFEWAY STORES INCORPORATED, A Maryland Corporation, THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, G.E. ROCK, SAM URESK, DOE I and DOE II

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAVID R. ALLEN AND BARBARA ALLEN v. SAFEWAY STORES INCORPORATED, A Maryland Corporation, THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, G.E. ROCK, SAM URESK, DOE I and DOE II1985 WY 58699 P.2d 277Case Number: 84-108Decided: 05/02/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
DAVID R. ALLEN AND 
BARBARA ALLEN, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

SAFEWAY STORES 
INCORPORATED, A MARYLAND CORPORATION, THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND SOCIAL SERVICES, G.E. ROCK, SAM URESK, DOE I AND DOE II, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
C.M. Aron and 
Sid L. Moller of Aron and Hennig, Laramie, for appellants.

Jack D. Palma, 
II, Carol A. Statkus, and Marilyn Kite of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne; Kathryn E. Miller and Gregory A. Eurich of 
Holland & Hart, Denver, 
Colo., for appellees Safeway Stores, 
Incorporated and G.E. Rock.

Vincent J. Horn, 
Jr., Cheyenne, 
for appellees The State of Wyoming 
Department of Health and Social Services and Sam Uresk.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants David R. 
Allen and Barbara Allen were employees of appellee Safeway Stores, Incorporated 
(Safeway). Appellee Sam Uresk (Uresk) is an employee of appellee State of 
Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services (State), and as such conducted 
an inspection of the Safeway store at Rock Springs, which was under the 
management of David R. Allen, and of the Safeway store at Green River, which was 
under the control of Barbara Allen, as assistant manager in the absence of the 
store manager. David Allen and Barbara Allen are married. The inspection was 
with reference to the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) being administered by the State. After Uresk reported bad 
attitudes by the Allens to appellee G.E. Rock (Rock), immediate supervisor to 
David R. Allen and immediate supervisor of the store manager at Green River, who was the immediate supervisor of Barbara 
Allen, Rock discharged the Allens from their positions. The Allens brought this 
action against Uresk and the State for intentional interference with a contract 
and against Rock and Safeway for breach of contract and for violation of public 
policy. The trial court granted the motion of the State and Uresk for summary 
judgment, and it dismissed the complaint against Rock and Safeway with 
prejudice. Appellants appeal from the summary judgment and the dismissal of the 
complaint.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶3.]     A summary judgment is 
proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. A fact is 
material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting 
one of the essential elements of the cause of action. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 867 (1975).

[¶4.]     The basic facts in this 
case are not disputed. Uresk's inspections were for the purpose of determining 
whether or not the stores were complying with the WIC requirements; e.g., 
requesting ID folders from WIC customers, selling only approved foods to WIC 
customers, etc. She found the Rock 
Springs store fully in compliance with the WIC program 
and complimented the check-out clerk for following the WIC guidelines. The clerk 
asked Uresk to pass on the compliment to the clerk's supervisor, David Allen. 
During her conversation with David Allen, Uresk asked him if he had completed a 
price survey which she had requested by mail. Completion of the price survey was 
not required by the contract between WIC and the store, and David Allen said he 
had thrown the form away. He said to Uresk that if she wanted the survey, she 
should do it herself and that he did not approve of the program or of the 
government paying people to sit around on their derrieres. Uresk said he used 
the word "`asses.'" David Allen said he used the word "`butts.'" In her 
deposition, Uresk testified that at that time she assumed he was talking about 
the WIC participants, and it was not until she read the complaint that she knew 
he was talking about the State people. She noted that WIC participants often had 
to be coaxed into going back into a store because of rude treatment there and 
embarrassment caused to them there.

[¶5.]     The day following the 
inspection of the Rock Springs store, Uresk 
inspected the Green River store and found it in 
noncompliance with the WIC program in many areas. When she discussed the 
inspection with Barbara Allen, Uresk advised Barbara Allen of the statement made 
by David Allen relative to not approving of the government paying people to sit 
around on their derrieres. Barbara Allen said that she agreed with her husband 
and that the program took up too much of their time. Barbara Allen asked if the 
7-Eleven or Mini-Mart stores were on the program, and when she was told that 
they were, she asked why the program was not turned over to them since they 
needed the business, not Safeway. Later on it was determined that Barbara Allen 
was not distinguishing between the WIC program and the food stamp program, and 
that much of her criticism was of the food stamp program.

[¶6.]     Upon returning to her 
office, Uresk telephonically advised Rock of her problems with the Allens. He 
asked her to put the information into a letter to him. She did so, writing a 
separate letter concerning each store. Appellants were discharged from their 
positions. In his deposition, Rock testified that Uresk's complaint was a major 
reason for discharge of David Allen, although he specified a number of customer 
and employee complaints which contributed to the action. He further testified 
that the major reason for discharge of Barbara Allen was customer and employee 
complaints, although Uresk's complaint contributed to the discharge 
cause.

[¶7.]     Applying these facts to 
the elements of the tort of intentional interference with a contract, we find 
that appellants cannot recover as a matter of law. We have accepted the 
definitions relative to the tort of intentional interference of a contract as 
set forth in the Restatement of Torts 2d. Martin v. Wing, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1159 
(1983). Section 766, 4 Restatement of Torts 2d (1979), 
provides:

"One who intentionally 
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract 
to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the 
other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the 
third person to perform the contract." (Emphasis added.)

If the 
interference is not improper a necessary element of the tort is lacking. Section 
772 of 4 Restatement of Torts 2d, supra, provides in pertinent 
part:

"One who intentionally 
causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a 
prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with 
the other's contractual relation, by giving the third 
person

"(a) truthful 
information, * * *"

[¶8.]     Common sense requires 
recognition of the propriety of one who is a customer or a business contact of a 
public-related enterprise to truthfully notify the owners or those in the 
management echelon of treatment accorded to such customer or business contact by 
those employed by the enterprise. Many businesses publicly request such 
comments. Some furnish forms with services or products upon which comments 
concerning such treatment are requested to be noted for return to the employer. 
Whether solicited or not, comments or notifications, truthfully given, cannot 
become actionable for tortious interference with a contract of employment. The 
comment to § 772 of 4 Restatement of Torts 2d reads:

"b. Truthful information. There is of course 
no liability for interference with a contract or with a prospective contractual 
relation on the part of one who merely gives truthful information to another. 
The interference in this instance is clearly not improper. This is true even 
though the facts are marshaled in such a way that they speak for themselves and 
the person to whom the information is given immediately recognizes them as a 
reason for breaking his contract or refusing to deal with another. It is also 
true whether or not the information is requested. * * *"

[¶9.]     There is no issue or 
question concerning the information furnished by Uresk to appellants' employer. 
It was contained in two letters which were made exhibits to depositions. The 
record contains nothing to contest the truth of the contents of the letters. 
Thus, there is no genuine issue of a material fact, and, since the information 
upon which the action against Uresk and the State is premised is true, the 
action must fail as a matter of law.

DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT

[¶10.]  Appellants word the issue relative to the 
dismissal of their complaint against Safeway and Rock as 
follows:

"Whether it is wrongful 
as contrary to public policy to discharge an employee for the reason that she is 
married to, and agrees with an opinion expressed by, another employee who has 
been discharged."

Section 5.01(2), 
W.R.A.P., requires appellants to set forth the issues presented for review, and 
perhaps we should limit our review in this case to the one issue set forth, Cline v. Safeco Insurance Companies, 
Wyo., 614 P.2d 1335 (1980). However, because of the table of contents 
contained in appellants' brief and the topical arrangement of the arguments 
therein, we will consider the statement of the issues to be in the nature of a 
typographical or unintentional error of omission and recognize that appellants 
contend that (1) the complaint stated a claim for breach of employment contract 
by Rock and Safeway, and (2) the complaint stated a tort claim for wrongful 
discharge as a matter of public policy even if the employment of appellants was 
at will.1

"When considering a 
motion to dismiss a complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., on the 
ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the facts 
alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs. State Highway Commission v. Bourne, 
Wyo. 1967, 425 P.2d 59. We therefore treat as true all the allegations of plaintiffs' 
complaint." Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 
Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 
(1979).

[¶11.]  In this instance the allegations of the 
complaint are generally the same as are the facts developed through discovery. 
The complaint reflected that copies of the letters sent by Uresk to Rock 
concerning her inspection of the Rock Springs and Green River stores were 
attached as Exhibits A and B "and [each] by this reference is incorporated 
herein."

[¶12.]  The complaint characterized such letters 
as "inaccurate and malicious." Assuming the letters to be inaccurate, the fact 
that the information contained in them, accurate or not, had been conveyed to 
Rock and Safeway was alleged. Additionally, other allegations of the complaint 
verify some of the information contained in the letters. The complaint alleged 
that, in response to Uresk's request for a price survey, David 
Allen

"* * * refused to comply 
and expressed his opinion to the effect that he was tired of government people 
telling him how to do his job and asking him to do their jobs while they `sat on 
[their] butts in Cheyenne'." (Bracketed material in 
original.)

The complaint 
also alleged that Barbara Allen advised Uresk that she agreed with her husband's 
comments and that,

"* * * URESK then 
solicited additional opinions of Plaintiff BARBARA ALLEN concerning the WIC 
program."

Further, the 
complaint alleged that, with reference to each appellant, the statements by 
them, "and all other comments and expressions of his [her] feelings, attitudes 
or opinions, constituted speech which is protected," by the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions.

I. Contract Claim

[¶13.]  Appellants did not allege the existence 
of contracts with definite terms of employment. Thus, the employment 
relationships were terminable at will by either party. The trial judge, the 
Honorable Kenneth G. Hamm, correctly set forth the legal result thereof in his 
opinion letter:

"Casper Nat'l. Bank v. Curry, 51 Wyo. 284, 296-7, 65 P.2d 1116 (Wyo. 1937) 
states:

"`In the case of Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, 98 N.E. 18, it was held that as a contract of employment, wherein no period of service 
is specified, is terminable at the will of either party, where a person 
contracted to devote his whole time and attention to the business of a 
corporation, at a specified weekly wage, such contract could be concluded at any 
time at the option of either of the parties, . . .'

"`A similar rule was 
stated in The J.P. Schuh, 223 Fed. 
455 in this language:

"`"A hiring at so much a 
day, week, or month, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no 
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at a fixed rate for 
whatever time the party may serve. Unless the understanding of the parties was 
mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, 
it is an indefinite hiring, and is determinable at the will of either party; and 
a recovery may be had for the services actually 
rendered."'

"Also, in Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 548, 136 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1943), the Court 
said:

"`The original contract 
of 1929 was a promise of defendant to employ and of plaintiff to serve for an 
indefinite time, commonly called a hiring at will. See authorities cited in Casper National Bank v. Curry, 51 Wyo. 
284, 297, 65 P.2d 1116, 110 A.L.R. 360; Restatement of Agency, Section 442. "An 
employment of this sort, which is terminable at any time, is subject to 
modification at any moment by either party as a condition of its continuing at 
all."'

"Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607, 611 
(Wyo. 1967) 
said:

"`Some argument is also 
advanced with respect to plaintiff's termination of the employment, but any 
argument in that regard overlooks the evidence that the employment here was a 
"hiring at will" and the plaintiff or defendants were free to terminate the 
employment at any time.'

"and cited the above 
cases as authority therefor.

"Furthermore, Section 
1-23-105, W.S. 1977 provides:

"`(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

"`(i) Every agreement 
that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof;'

"Plaintiffs have not 
alleged that there was a written agreement providing that they were to be 
employed for more than one year, and this being so the alleged oral contract of 
employment is unenforceable. They did allege that `at the end of 3 years of 
their employment in Rock Springs and Green River' 
they `would be afforded the opportunity to return to Salt Lake City to continue 
their employment with Safeway.' However, if that was indeed the agreement, it 
was not in writing and falls within the statute of 
frauds."

Subsequent to 
Judge Hamm's opinion letter, we affirmed that said in the cases cited by him. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984).

[¶14.]  In their brief, appellants refer to the 
allegation in the complaint that the agreement between David Allen and Safeway 
included the understanding referred to by Judge Hamm that "at the end of 3 years 
of their employment in Rock Springs and Green River, Plaintiff and his wife 
would be afforded the opportunity to return to Salt Lake City to continue their 
employment with SAFEWAY" as "a probable three-year term." Subjective 
understandings and expectations do not establish an employment contract with a 
definite term of duration. Goodpaster v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wn. App. 199, 665 P.2d 414 (1983). A "probable" term of 
employment is by definition not a "definite" term. Specific provisions in an 
employment contract, other than one fixing a definite term of employment, do not 
make the contract other than one terminable at will. E.g., Singh v. Cities Service Oil Company, 
Okla., 554 P.2d 1367, 93 A.L.R.3d 654 (1976), and Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corporation, 
35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974), with specific provision for annual 
rate of compensation; Jackson v. Minidoka 
Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977), and Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 
Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957), with specific provision for seniority rights. 
The court in the Utah case stated:

"* * * Seniority rights 
depend upon an employer-employee relationship, they do not guarantee that 
relationship, they merely define the rights of the employee when that status is 
in existence. * * *" 307 P.2d  at 212.

[¶15.]  Inasmuch as appellants' employments were 
"at will," they could resign at any time without breaching their employment 
contracts, and Safeway could discharge them at any time without breaching the 
employment contracts.

II. Tort Claim

[¶16.]  However, appellants contend that 
notwithstanding the fact that their employments were on "at will" bases, their 
discharges were in violation of public policy and, therefore, render appellees 
subject to a tort action for damages. The contention is without merit. The 
public policies contended by appellants to be involved (other than those 
concerning contract) are those with respect to free speech, pension rights, sex 
discrimination, and marriage status.

[¶17.]  To contend that an employee can talk in a 
derogatory fashion to customers or business contacts of his employer and be 
protected from disciplinary action by the employer by virtue of the right to 
speak freely is so obviously in error as to need little consideration. The 
constitutional right to speak freely is not an absolute right. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, reh. denied 417 U.S. 977, 94 S. Ct. 3187, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1974); Adderley v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S. Ct. 242, 17 L. Ed. 2d 149 
(1966), reh. denied 385 U.S. 1020, 87 S. Ct. 698, 17 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1967); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965); Poulos v. State of 
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 73 S. Ct. 760, 97 L. Ed. 1105 
(1953). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution has reference to 
government action curbing the right to speak freely. It provides in pertinent 
part:

"Congress shall make no 
law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * *."

Article 1, § 20 
of the Wyoming Constitution recognizes the limitation of the right to speak 
freely. It provides in pertinent part:

"Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right; * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Provisions have 
been made for defamation actions when the right is abused, but redress for such 
abuse is not limited to such actions. In discharging appellants, Safeway was 
protecting a legitimate business interest in eliminating a cause or potential 
cause for loss of sales through WIC or to other customers. The fact that the 
discharges were occasioned by a verbal attack on a customer or business contact 
rather than a physical one does not make the discharges constitutionally 
improper. Of interest is the fact that appellants complain about interference 
with their freedom of speech, when their action against Uresk is premised upon 
her exercise of the right to speak freely.

[¶18.]  David Allen alleges that his discharge 
was "in part because Defendant SAFEWAY was attempting to avoid its pension 
obligations to him," but he also alleged that his pension rights had not vested 
at the time he was terminated. The prescribed conditions to qualify for a 
pension must be fulfilled before there exists an entitlement to receive them, 
and the pension may be modified or withdrawn prior to the time it vests. Wong v. Boeing Company, 26 Wn. App. 557, 
613 P.2d 788 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka 
Irrigation District, supra; Dictaphone Corporation v. Clemons, Colo. 
App., 488 P.2d 226, 50 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1971); Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Company, 
Wyo., 395 P.2d 291 (1964); Murphy v. 
American Home Products Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N YS.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).

[¶19.]  Barbara Allen's allegation that her 
discharge was contrary to public policy against sex discrimination and public 
policy favoring marriage status is inconsistent with the allegations in the 
complaint reflecting Safeway's discharge of both appellants: a male and a 
female. The only case cited by appellants in support of the argument relative to 
sex and marriage allegations, Monge v. 
Beebe Rubber Company, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 62 A.L.R.3d 264 (1974), 
concerned the discharge of a female employee for refusing to date and have 
sexual relations with her supervisor. Such is a different public policy concern 
than in this case. Additionally, with reference to these allegations, appellants 
further allege that the discharges are in violation of the Wyoming Fair 
Employment Practices Act of 1965; i.e., § 27-9-101 et seq., W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement). The Act sets forth a specific procedure for processing complaints 
under it. Appellants' remedy for discriminatory discharges is under such 
procedure and not as here attempted. 

[¶20.]  A tort action premised on violation of 
public policy results from a recognition that allowing a discharge to go 
unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go unvindicated. If there 
exists another remedy for violation of the social policy which resulted in the 
discharge of the employee, there is no need for a court-imposed separate tort 
action premised on public policy. Viestenz v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 972, 103 S. Ct. 303, 74 L. Ed. 2d 284; Mahoney v. 
Crocker National Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287, (D.C.Cal. 1983). As said in Wehr v. Burroughs Corporation, 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (D.C.Pa. 1977):

"It is clear then that 
the whole rationale undergirding the public policy exception is the vindication 
or the protection of certain strong policies of the community. If these policies 
or goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently 
served. Therefore, application of the public policy exception requires two 
factors: (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and 
(2) that there be no remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or 
society." (Footnote omitted.)

The Wyoming Fair 
Employment Practices Act of 1965, § 27-9-101 et seq., W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982) provide appellants with a 
remedy for discharge based on sex discrimination.

[¶21.]  As noted in Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
supra, we restricted our holding to the parameters of that case. We do likewise 
here. Counsel cite cases in which tort actions premised on violations of public 
policies have been upheld; e.g., Nees v. 
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), discharge for serving on a jury; Hansen v. Harrah's, Nev., 675 P.2d 394 
(1984); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas 
Company, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 63 A.L.R.3d 973 (1973), and Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County 
Department of Labor Services, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981), 
discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claims. Such cases are 
not similar to this case. The complaint in this case does not state a tort claim 
upon which relief could be granted against Safeway and Rock based on appellants' 
discharges from employment.

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

1 The issue listed as such 
by appellants is included in the tort claim contention.