Title: McChristian v. Hooten

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

436 S.W.2d 844 (1969) Noble McCHRISTIAN et al., Appellants, v. Tommy HOOTEN et al., Appellees. No. 5-4771. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 27, 1969. Rehearing Denied March 3, 1969. *845 Dobbs, Pryor & Shaver, Ft. Smith, for appellants. Hardin, Barton, Hardin & Jesson, Ft. Smith, for appellees. JONES, Justice. Tommy, Rhoda and Michael Hooten filed suit in the Sebastian County Circuit Court against Joseph R. Marlow and Noble McChristian for personal injuries and property damages sustained as a result of an automobile collision in Madison County, Arkansas. McChristian cross-complained against Marlow for contribution as a joint tort feasor, and Marlow cross-complained against McChristian for his property damage. Tommy Hooten alleged damages in the amount of $35,000.00 for personal injuries and $3,500.00 for property damages to his automobile. A jury trial resulted in a verdict against McChristian for $40,000.00 in favor of Tommy Hooten; for $1,200.00 in favor of Rhoda Hooten and for $188.00 in favor of Michael Hooten. Tommy Hooten only proved $1,400.00 damage to his automobile, so upon a voluntary remittitur of $3,600.00, judgment was entered in his favor for $36,400.00. Judgment was entered on the verdict for Rhoda and Michael Hooten. McChristian has appealed and relies on the following points for reversal: The record reveals that on February 12, 1967, Tommy, Rhoda and Michael Hooten were riding in an automobile belonging to Tommy and being driven by a friend, Jerry Parker. They were traveling west and slightly upgrade on state highway 74 near Huntsville, Arkansas. Marlow was driving his automobile east and downgrade on the same highway, meeting the Hooten *846 automobile. McChristian drove his pickup truck south from a side road into highway 74 and turned east onto the highway between the oncoming Hooten and Marlow automobiles. In an effort to avoid colliding with the McChristian vehicle, the Marlow vehicle skidded approximately 462 feet from the crest of a hill, went off the pavement into the gravel on the south side of the highway behind the McChristian vehicle. It then cut back across the south side of the highway immediately behind the McChristian vehicle; went around the McChristian vehicle, and collided head-on with the Hooten automobile on the north side of the highway a few feet east, and in front of, the McChristian vehicle. The testimony is in conflict as to whether the McChristian vehicle stopped before entering the highway and whether it had completely cleared the north side of the highway and had completely straightened out on its south and proper side of the highway when the collision occurred. McChristian testified that he stopped his vehicle and looked both ways before entering the highway and that he saw no vehicle approaching from either direction. He testified that he had completely crossed the north side of the highway and had turned his vehicle straight into the south lane and his proper side of the highway when the collision occurred. Marlow and the driver of the Hooten automobile testified that they saw McChristian drive slowly from the side road out into the highway between the two oncoming automobiles and that they did not see him stop before entering the highway. They testified that the left rear wheel of his pickup was about on the center line of the highway when the collision occurred. The case was submitted to the jury upon interrogatories signed by jurors as follows: We now discuss appellants' points in the order designated. The appellants' motion for directed verdict was presented in the form of requested instructions which were denied by the trial court. In passing on assignment of error in refusing *848 to direct a verdict for the defendant in Hawkins v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Thompson, Trustee, 217 Ark. 42, 228 S.W.2d 642, this court said: And again in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 114 Ark. 112, 169 S.W. 786, we said: We conclude that the trial court was correct in denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict. In arguing his second point the appellants would disqualify two of the ten jurors who found that Tommy Hooten's damages amounted to $40,000.00, because these two jurors failed to sign interrogatories 1 and 3 finding Marlow not guilty of negligence and apportioning the negligence all to the appellant McChristian. The appellants cite cases from Wisconsin in support of their contention, but we conclude that the laws of Arkansas make no such distinction. The Wisconsin constitution, as cited by the appellants, authorizes the legislature to provide "that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) The legislature of Wisconsin by statute provided "a verdict, finding or answer agreed to by five-sixths of the jurors shall be the verdict, finding or answer of the jury." (Emphasis supplied.) The number of jurors required to return a verdict in Arkansas is fixed by the constitution, Amendment 16 to Art. 2, § 7, which provides: As to special verdicts, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-1741.2 (Repl.1962) provides: We shall not attempt a fine distinction between the constitutional provisions and statutory laws of Wisconsin and those of Arkansas for the reason that the difference in the language used makes the distinction obvious; and for the further and primary reason, that we find no conflict between the findings of the jurors under the interrogatories 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this case. Interrogatory No. 4 simply asks for a determination of the damages sustained by Tommy Hooten. It stands alone and is not dependent upon answers to any other interrogatories at all. Certainly there was no conflict, and actually no connection, in assessing the amount of damages sustained by Hooten in the collision and apportioning the percentage of negligence between the parties causing the collision. There might be considerable damage without negligence in an automobile collision, and there might be considerable negligence without damage. The crux of appellants' argument is that all interrogatories in special verdicts must be signed by the same nine jurors before that part of the verdict becomes legal and binding. *849 The trial court gave the jury the following instruction: We are of the opinion that this instruction was proper. We construe "as many as nine of the jurors," as used in constitutional Amendment 16 to Art. 2, § 7, supra, to mean any nine of the jurors and not necessarily the same nine jurors where more than one issue of fact is presented on special verdict to be returned by the jury. We, therefore, hold that the answer to each interrogatory in special verdicts is to be considered as a separate verdict on that particular issue of fact, and that where as many as any nine of the jurors agree upon the finding as to the particular fact in issue, such agreement constitutes the verdict of the jury on such issue. As to appellants' third point, the jury returned a verdict for $40,000.00 damages which was properly reduced by a remittitur of $3,600.00 on the motion of appellee, and judgment was entered for $36,400.00. The verdict of the jury was based upon evidence that the appellee Tommy Hooten suffered a skull fracture and was rendered unconscious; that he suffered a severe fragmentation fracture of the head of the left humerus and spent some twenty days in the hospital, the first week of which was in intensive care. There was evidence that the appellee Hooten underwent surgery by open reduction for the repair of the fractured humerus and that he had difficulty sleeping and remained under medication for pain in his arm for approximately two months after leaving the hospital. There is uncontradicted evidence that approximately sixteen weeks following the initial surgery, the appellee was rehospitalized and surgery again performed in order to remove the rod which had been inserted in the humerus during the initial surgery, and that the open reduction surgery resulted in extensive scar tissue which was still draining at the time of trial. The X ray exhibits clearly show that the head of the humerus was fragmented and displaced. There was medical evidence that there would be permanent partial disability of 15% in the loss of use of appellee's left arm. Appellee's medical expenditures amounted to $2,636.00, his loss of wages amounted to $2,300.00, and his property damage amounted to $1,400.00. The remainder of the $36,400.00 was necessarily apportioned to pain and suffering, future medical expenses, physical disfigurement, permanent injury and loss of future earning capacity. The appellee was twenty-three years of age at the time of his injury. As was said in the similar case of Fred's Dollar Store, Inc. v. Adams, 238 Ark. 468, 382 S.W.2d 592: Upon consideration of all the evidence before the jury in this case, we are unable to say that the verdict of the jury, as reduced by the remittur, was excessive. The judgment is affirmed.