Title: State v. Lloyd

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Lloyd, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2015.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2015 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LLOYD, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Lloyd, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2015.] 
Criminal law—Sex offenders—R.C. 2950.04(A)(4)—Duty to register based on 
out-of-state conviction of sexually oriented offense—Offense of failure to 
register—Prosecution must prove that defendant had duty to register in 
state where offense was committed—conviction for failure to register 
reversed. 
(No. 2011-0212—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided May 8, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 09 CA 12,  
2010-Ohio-6562. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we explain the analysis that a court must undertake 
in determining (1) whether an out-of-state conviction is a sexually oriented 
offense that triggers a duty to register in Ohio and (2) the sanction for failure to 
register in Ohio based on a duty that arises from an out-of-state conviction.  For 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the reasons explained herein, we hold that the offense for which appellant Wesley 
Lloyd was convicted in Texas, aggravated sexual assault, is a sexually oriented 
offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio 
offense.  See R.C. 2950.01(A)(11).  Because rape in Ohio is a first-degree felony, 
a violation of Lloyd’s registration duties would also constitute a first-degree 
felony.  See R.C. 2950.99(A)(1)(a)(ii).  Accordingly, we approve those portions 
of the court of appeals’ opinion. 
{¶ 2} But we must set aside Lloyd’s convictions because the state failed 
to prove that at the time he moved to Ohio, Lloyd was under a duty to register in 
Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, as required by 
R.C. 2950.04(A)(4).  We hold that the decision of the court of appeals to affirm 
Lloyd’s convictions in the face of this plain error was improper and must be 
reversed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 3} On December 8, 1995, Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of 
aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In the 
fall of 2005, Lloyd moved to Auglaize County, Ohio, and began registering as a 
sexually oriented offender. 
{¶ 4} In 2008, Lloyd received notice from the Ohio Attorney General 
that he was reclassified as a Tier III sex offender, which required increased 
periodic registration.  Lloyd continued registering.  He last registered in Auglaize 
County on May 19, 2008. 
{¶ 5} On June 2, 2008, Lloyd moved to Holmes County, Ohio.  On June 
12, 2008, Lloyd was arrested by Holmes County authorities pursuant to a warrant 
for failure to register in Holmes County. 
{¶ 6} On April 7, 2009, a bench trial commenced on the following 
charges: (1) failure to register with the Holmes County Sheriff within three days 
of moving to Holmes County, in violation of R.C. 2950.04(E), (2) failure to 
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3 
 
provide written notice to the Holmes County Sheriff of intent to reside in Holmes 
County at least 20 days before moving, in violation of R.C. 2950.04(E), and (3) 
failure to provide written notice to the Auglaize County Sheriff of intent to reside 
in Holmes County at least 20 days before moving, in violation of R.C. 
2950.05(F)(1). 
{¶ 7} Lloyd was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. 
The Fifth District Litigation 
{¶ 8} On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals vacated Lloyd’s 
conviction on the charge of failure to provide 20 days’ notice to the Holmes 
County Sheriff.  State v. Lloyd, 5th Dist. No. 09 CA 12, 2010-Ohio-6562, at ¶ 18-
20.  It reasoned that pursuant to our decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 
266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, Lloyd was required to register in 
accordance with Megan’s Law, not the Adam Walsh Act, and the duty to give 
advance notice to the sheriff in the county to which one moves arises only under 
the Adam Walsh Act.  The court of appeals affirmed the remaining two 
convictions and reasoned, in part, that the Adam Walsh Act did not affect Lloyd’s 
registration requirements under those provisions.1   
{¶ 9} In so doing, the Fifth District rejected Lloyd’s argument that his 
convictions violated due process because he was not required to register as a sex 
offender in Ohio.  Id. at ¶ 21.  The appellate court concluded that the Texas 
offense of aggravated sexual assault is substantially equivalent to rape in Ohio 
and, therefore, Lloyd was required to register.  Id. at ¶ 35.  The Fifth District also 
rejected Lloyd’s argument that his convictions for first-degree felonies violated 
due process because they, in fact, constituted third-degree felonies.  Id. at ¶ 37.  
                                                 
1 Because we find that Lloyd’s convictions are infirm on unrelated grounds, we need not and do 
not in any way decide the propriety of the court of appeals’ decision to affirm his convictions 
under Megan’s Law when he was prosecuted under the Adam Walsh Act.  That legal issue is 
currently before us in 2011-1066, State v. Brunning, Cuyahoga App. No. 95376, 2011-Ohio-1936.     
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Lloyd’s argument to the Fifth District was that, if anything, aggravated sexual 
assault as defined in Texas constitutes sexual battery, a third-degree felony, if 
committed in Ohio.  Id. 
{¶ 10} Lloyd unsuccessfully attacked his convictions on numerous other 
grounds.  Importantly for purposes here, the Fifth District rejected Lloyd’s due 
process argument that targeted the state’s failure to offer any evidence whatsoever 
that Lloyd was under a duty to register in Texas at the time he moved to Ohio.  Id. 
at ¶ 85-86 and 89-91.  The Fifth District held that other evidence—namely, 
Lloyd’s testimony in his own defense, which came after the trial judge denied 
Lloyd’s first Crim.R. 29 motion—was sufficient to prove that element.  Id. at ¶ 86 
and 91. 
{¶ 11} We accepted jurisdiction over Lloyd’s discretionary appeal.  State 
v. Lloyd, 128 Ohio St.3d 1481, 2011-Ohio-2055, 946 N.E.2d 239. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
{¶ 12} The sole proposition of law before us asserts: “A court should 
conduct an elemental comparison of an out-of-state offense when determining 1) 
whether the offense triggers the duty to register in Ohio under R.C. 2950.01 and 
2) the punishment for failing to register in Ohio under R.C. 2950.99.”  We will 
address each prong in turn. 
ANALYSIS 
Duty to Register in Ohio under R.C. 2950.01 
{¶ 13} In all prosecutions under Ohio’s sex-offender-registration laws, the 
state must prove that the defendant had been convicted of a sexually oriented 
offense that triggered a duty to register.  Certain offenders who commit sexually 
oriented offenses out of state are subject to registration in Ohio.  R.C. 
2950.04(A)(4).  An out-of-state conviction is a sexually oriented offense under 
Ohio law if it is or was substantially equivalent to any of the Ohio offenses listed 
in R.C. 2950.01(A)(1) through (10).  R.C. 2950.01(A)(11). 
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5 
 
{¶ 14} The legislature did not explain the analysis that courts must 
undertake in determining whether an out-of-state offense is “substantially 
equivalent” to a listed Ohio offense.  We must, therefore, determine what the 
statute permits.  In doing so, we are mindful that we must look to the statutory 
language itself and the purpose to be accomplished by the statutory scheme.  
Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 
N.E.2d 938, at ¶ 12, citing Rice v. CertainTeed Corp., 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 
704 N.E.2d 1217 (1999).  First, we will discuss the federal modified-categorical 
approach to analyzing prior convictions, which we find instructive. 
The federal modified-categorical approach 
{¶ 15} In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 
L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), the United States Supreme Court explained the meaning of 
the word “burglary” as it was used in a sentence-enhancement statute and 
explained the analysis that federal courts must undertake in determining whether a 
state conviction is a burglary that triggers the enhancement.  Id. at 577-578 and 
602.  The federal criminal code, which prohibits the possession of firearms by 
certain individuals, including felons, contains a separate sentence-enhancement 
provision that is commonly known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).  
The ACCA provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ 
imprisonment for defendants found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm if 
they have three previous convictions of a violent felony.  18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1).  
The undefined term “burglary” is listed in the relevant definition of “violent 
felony.”  18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The court recognized that Congress had 
singled out the offense of burglary as an offense of violence because of its 
inherent potential harm to persons.  Id. at 588.  But burglary has many definitions, 
including one at common law.  Taylor at 580 (explaining that “ ‘burglary’ has not 
been given a single accepted meaning by the state courts; the criminal codes of 
the States define burglary in many different ways”). 
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{¶ 16} The court characterized its task, in part, as discerning whether 
Congress intended “burglary” to mean “whatever the State of the defendant’s 
prior conviction defines as burglary, or whether it intended that some uniform 
definition of burglary be applied.”  Id. 
{¶ 17} The court looked to the evolution of the enhancement statute over 
time and noted that the enhancement “always has embodied a categorical 
approach to the designation of predicate offenses,” as evidenced by the original 
provision’s inclusion of a definition of burglary.  Id.  Because amendments 
carried forward the categorical approach, the court concluded that Congress had 
intended to capture “all crimes having certain common characteristics * * * 
regardless of how they were labeled by state law.”  Id., 495 U.S. at 589, 110 S.Ct. 
2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. 
{¶ 18} In so holding, the court rejected as implausible the argument that 
Congress intended the meaning of “burglary” to depend on the definition adopted 
by the state of the prior conviction because “[t]hat would mean that [the sentence 
enhancement] would or would not [apply] * * * based on exactly the same 
conduct, depending on whether the state of the prior conviction happened to call 
that conduct ‘burglary.’ ”  Id. at 590-591. 
{¶ 19} The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the common-
law definition applies because it had been abandoned by most states and would, 
therefore, result in an unnaturally narrow reading of the statute.  Id. at 593-595.  
In doing so, the court acknowledged that federal law requires sentencing 
provisions to be construed in favor of the accused, but explained that “[t]his 
maxim of statutory construction * * * cannot dictate an implausible interpretation 
of a statute, nor one at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of 
a term.”  Id. at 596, citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49, 100 S.Ct. 311, 
62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), fn. 13.  The court concluded that Congress had intended 
for the generic definition of burglary to apply.  Id. at 598. 
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{¶ 20} There remained the problem of applying the generic definition 
when the state statute under which a defendant had been convicted varies from the 
generic definition.  Id. at 599.  The court considered a strict elemental comparison 
and noted that if the state statute is narrower than the generic view or the same as 
the generic view with only minor variations in terminology, “there is no problem, 
because the conviction necessarily implies that the defendant has been found 
guilty of all the elements of generic burglary.”  Id. 
{¶ 21} Some state statutes, however, are broader than the generic view.  
The court gave the example of a burglary statute that includes unlawful entry of 
automobiles as well as buildings.  A court may look beyond the statutory 
definition and rely on a limited portion of the record—the indictment, the 
information, and the jury instructions—in a narrow class of cases where the 
defendant’s previous conviction was necessarily based on conduct that falls 
within the generic definition of burglary.  Id. at 602.  If, based on a review of 
those documents, the court finds that the offense involved burglary of a building, 
and the jury had to find entry into a building in order to convict, the sentence 
enhancement would apply.  Id. 
{¶ 22} Recognizing that predicate convictions stem not only from jury 
trials but also from bench trials and guilty pleas, the court later explained that 
Taylor did not purport to strictly limit sentencing courts to consideration of 
charges and instructions.  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 125 S.Ct. 
1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).  Instead, by  limiting the evidence that the 
sentencing court may consider, the Taylor court rejected the “factual” approach, 
in which the sentencing court, in effect, conducts a “trial within a trial” to 
determine whether the defendant committed generic burglary.  Taylor at 601.  By 
the same token, a sentencing court is permitted to consider only facts necessarily 
proven by the prosecution or admitted by the defendant in the underlying 
litigation.  Shepard at 20.  Accordingly, Taylor and its progeny hold that, in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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determining which statutory phrase was the basis for a predicate conviction, 
sentencing courts confronted with the ACCA enhancement may consult charging 
documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from a bench trial, jury instructions, and jury verdict forms, or 
some comparable part of the record.  United States v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 130 
S.Ct. 1265, 1273, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).   
{¶ 23} This approach, which allows a court to go beyond the mere fact of 
conviction in order to determine whether the elements of the predicate offense are 
present, has become known as the modified categorical approach.  See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 187, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 
(2007). 
{¶ 24} With that framework in mind, we turn our attention to the Ohio 
statute at issue here.   
Statutory Purpose and Language 
{¶ 25} The General Assembly purportedly enacted the sex-offender 
registration laws for the purpose of protecting the safety and general welfare of 
the public.  R.C. 2950.02(B); State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 417, 700 N.E.2d 
570 (1998).  In order to accomplish that goal, the General Assembly identified 
certain Ohio offenses, the commission of which it concluded tends to indicate the 
likelihood of future dangerousness, and required persons convicted of those 
offenses to register their whereabouts so that the community can be made aware 
of their presence.  Id. 
{¶ 26} To that end, R.C. 2950.01(A)(1) provides a list of 11 Ohio criminal 
statutes, including R.C. 2907.02 (rape), and provides that convictions under those 
statutes are sexually oriented offenses.  The statute also lists other Ohio criminal 
statutes that qualify as sexually oriented offenses only if certain aggravating 
factors are present, such as sexual motivation.  See, e.g., R.C. 2950.01(A)(4) 
(providing that felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11 is a sexually oriented offense 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
when it is committed with a sexual motivation).  Finally, the statute defines some 
out-of-state convictions as sexually oriented offenses under Ohio law.  
Specifically, R.C. 2950.01(A)(11) provides: 
 
 
A violation of any former law of this state, any existing or 
former municipal ordinance or law of another state or the United 
States, any existing or former law applicable in a military court or 
in an Indian tribal court, or any existing or former law of any 
nation other than the United States that is or was substantially 
equivalent to any offense listed in division (A)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 
(6), (7), (8), (9), or (10) of this section. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 27} In defining out-of-state sexually oriented offenses by their 
substantial equivalence to the Ohio listed offenses, the General Assembly 
identified a uniform category of offenses that are sexually oriented offenses.  
Unlike the Taylor court, then, we need not struggle with defining the relevant 
statutory terms because that has been done by the General Assembly.  See R.C. 
2950.01(A)(1) through (10). 
{¶ 28} Another significant distinction between the Taylor court’s task and 
ours is that the ACCA sentence enhancement tolerated only “minor variations” 
between the relevant definitions.  In contrast, the Ohio statutory phrase 
“substantially equivalent” expressly leaves room for potential distinctions 
between the out-of-state statute and the relevant Ohio statute.  Miller v. Cordray, 
184 Ohio App.3d 754, 2009-Ohio-3617, 922 N.E.2d 973, ¶ 15; State v. Core, 191 
Ohio App.3d 651, 2010-Ohio-6292, 947 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 13.  “Equivalent” means 
“like in signification or import.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
769 (1986).  The General Assembly chose to modify “equivalent” with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“substantially,” which means “being that specified to a large degree.”  Id. at 2280.  
It is similarly defined as “ ‘being largely but not wholly that which is specified.’ ”  
Swan Creek Twp. v. Wylie & Sons Landscaping, 168 Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-
Ohio-584, 859 N.E.2d 566, ¶ 28, quoting Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 1174 (10th Ed.1996).  “Substantially” is the operative word. 
Lloyd’s proposed test 
{¶ 29} Lloyd contends that a court is always limited to comparing the 
elements of the out-of-state offense and the listed Ohio offenses in determining 
whether the out-of-state offense is “substantially equivalent” to a listed Ohio 
offense.  He argues that a court is permitted to make a finding of substantial 
equivalence when the statutes are differently worded only if they describe the 
same conduct and the same mental state.   
{¶ 30} The analysis suggested by Lloyd would permit a court to conclude 
that an out-of-state criminal conviction is substantially equivalent to a listed Ohio 
offense when the out-of-state statute is narrower than the relevant Ohio criminal 
provision or when the out-of-state statute is similar to Ohio’s with only minor 
variations.  See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607.  Those 
results would certainly be justified by the plain and ordinary meaning of 
“substantially equivalent.”  But this same approach would also require a court to 
conclude that an out-of-state conviction is not substantially equivalent to a listed 
Ohio offense when the out-of-state statute is broader.  See id.  The conclusory 
nature of the latter result is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the statutory phrase “substantially equivalent.”  That result would also thwart the 
legislature’s intent because it would prevent Ohio law from reaching some of the 
offenses identified by the General Assembly only because of idiosyncrasies in the 
criminal codes of foreign jurisdictions.  We, therefore, reject Lloyd’s proposed 
test. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
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Substantial-Equivalence Test 
{¶ 31} We find the reasoning of Taylor to be apt.  We conclude that in 
order to determine whether an out-of-state conviction is substantially equivalent 
to a listed Ohio offense, a court must initially look only to the fact of conviction 
and the elements of the relevant criminal statutes, without considering the 
particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction.  If the out-of-state statute 
defines the offense in such a way that the court cannot discern from a comparison 
of the statutes whether the offenses are substantially equivalent, a court may go 
beyond the statutes and rely on a limited portion of the record in a narrow class of 
cases where the factfinder was required to find all the elements essential to a 
conviction under the listed Ohio statute.  To do so, courts are permitted to consult 
a limited range of material contained in the record, including charging documents, 
plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, presentence reports, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, jury instructions and verdict forms, 
or some comparable part of the record. 
Lloyd’s Texas Conviction 
{¶ 32} Lloyd’s Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault is 
substantially equivalent to rape in Ohio under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), an offense 
listed in R.C. 2950.01(A)(1).  R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) provides: “No person shall 
engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the 
other person to submit by force or threat of force.”  In Texas, Lloyd was 
convicted of aggravated sexual assault in violation of Texas Penal Code 
22.021(a)(1), which provides that a person commits an offense if the person:   
 
(A) intentionally or knowingly:  
(i) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of 
another person by any means, without that person’s consent;  
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(ii) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person 
by the sexual organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or  
(iii) causes the sexual organ of another person, without that 
person’s consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual 
organ of another person, including the actor. 
 
{¶ 33} Lloyd concedes that the Texas statute is substantially equivalent to 
Ohio’s rape statute with one exception—the requisite mental states.  The Texas 
statute criminalizes certain sexual conduct when it is committed intentionally or 
knowingly.  Id. at (a)(1)(A).  Ohio’s rape statute requires proof that the prohibited 
acts were committed purposely.  R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).  We consult the portions of 
the record offered into evidence to determine which mental state was the basis for 
Lloyd’s Texas conviction.2   
{¶ 34} The record contains certified copies of the indictment, jury 
instructions, and judgment entry from Lloyd’s Texas case.  The two-count 
indictment charged aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault.  The aggravated-
sexual-assault count charged that Lloyd did 
 
intentionally and knowingly sexually assault [the victim]3 by 
causing his male sexual organ to penetrate the mouth of [the 
victim], without [her] consent, and * * * compelled [her] to submit 
                                                 
2 The state argues in the alternative that the offenses are substantially equivalent on their face 
because even “knowingly” is, as a practical matter, the same as “purposely.”  It queries, “Under 
what circumstance could Lloyd have satisfied all the elements of Aggravated Sexual Assault 
knowingly and not also have assaulted his victim purposely?”   Lloyd offers his answer to that 
question in his reply brief.  He contends that the distinction between knowingly and purposely has 
been carefully drawn in the Ohio Revised Code, and the two terms are not meant to be used 
interchangeably.  That issue, raised and argued in the alternative by the parties, is outside the 
scope of this appeal. 
 
3 The indictment refers to the victim as “95PSEUJLK.” 
January Term, 2012 
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and participate by the use of physical force and violence, and * * * 
did * * * intentionally and knowingly by acts and words place [the 
victim] in fear that serious bodily injury and death would be 
imminently inflicted on [her]. 
 
(Footnote added.) 
{¶ 35} That same count further charged, in almost identical language, that 
Lloyd intentionally and knowingly sexually assaulted the victim by causing his 
male sexual organ to penetrate the female sexual organ of the victim. 
{¶ 36} Lloyd argues that the jury instructions “ordered the jury to convict 
Mr. Lloyd of aggravated sexual assault” if they “found that he acted 
‘knowingly.’ ”  That statement is correct, but incomplete.  The jury was instructed 
that it was permitted to find Lloyd guilty if it concluded that he either 
intentionally or knowingly committed the prohibited acts.  The court explained to 
the jury that “[a] person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the 
nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct.”  The court further explained that “[a] person acts knowingly or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” 
{¶ 37} The judgment entry reflects that Lloyd was convicted of both 
intentionally and knowingly committing the prohibited acts because the jury 
verdict was “guilty of Aggravated Sexual Assault as charged in Count One of the 
indictment.”  (Emphasis added.)  That verdict was not prohibited under the 
instructions or the law. 
{¶ 38} For these reasons, we hold that the indictment, jury instructions, 
and judgment entry demonstrate that Lloyd was convicted of intentionally and 
knowingly committing aggravated sexual assault.  Because, as Lloyd concedes, 
“intentionally” is substantially equivalent to “purposely,” his Texas conviction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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was for an offense that is substantially equivalent to rape under R.C. 
2907.02(A)(2).  Consequently, Lloyd was convicted of an out-of-state offense that 
is a sexually oriented offense in Ohio.  We turn now to the second prong of the 
proposition before us today, i.e., determining the sanction for failing to register in 
Ohio. 
Sanction for Failing to Register in Ohio under R.C. 2950.99 
{¶ 39} In R.C. 2950.99, the General Assembly established the punishment 
for violations of the sex-offender-registration laws by providing for classification 
of the offenses.  See generally R.C. 2950.99(A)(1) (providing that violations of 
the registration laws are felonies of the first, second, third, or fourth degree, 
depending on certain factors).  Classification of the registration offense is 
primarily dependent on the classification of the underlying sex offense.  See id. 
{¶ 40} Lloyd contends that, in order to determine the classification of the 
underlying sex offense, a court must conduct a second elemental comparison.  
This second comparison, Lloyd suggests, involves examining the Ohio criminal 
code in order to determine whether there exists an Ohio offense so closely aligned 
with the Texas offense that the same act or acts, committed in Ohio, would 
constitute an offense under Ohio law.  Lloyd suggests that this second elemental 
comparison involves a more stringent standard than the substantial-equivalence 
test and requires the elements to be more precisely aligned.  For that reason, 
Lloyd concludes that even if his Texas conviction is substantially equivalent to 
rape, it would nonetheless constitute misdemeanor menacing if committed in 
Ohio.  For that reason, Lloyd turns to R.C. 2950.99(A)(1)(a)(iii), which provides, 
“If the most serious sexually oriented offense * * * that was the basis of the 
registration * * * requirement * * * is a * * * misdemeanor * * * or a comparable 
category of offense committed in another jurisdiction, the offender is guilty of a 
felony of the fourth degree,” and concludes that his convictions for failure to 
register are, by operation of law, fourth-degree felonies.  The fact that menacing is 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
not a sexually oriented offense in Ohio does not dissuade Lloyd of the correctness 
of his position. 
{¶ 41} The state counters that a second elemental test is not required.  
Accordingly, the state turns to R.C. 2950.99(A)(1)(a)(ii), which provides, “If the 
most serious sexually oriented offense * * * that was the basis of the registration 
* * * requirement * * * is a felony of the first, second, third, or fourth degree 
* * * or a comparable category of offense committed in another jurisdiction, the 
offender is guilty of a felony of the same degree * * *.”  The state therefore 
concludes that any violation of Lloyd’s registration duties would be a first-degree 
felony because rape, the Ohio offense that is substantially equivalent to Lloyd’s 
Texas conviction, is a first-degree felony.  As used in these subsections,  
 
“comparable 
category 
of 
offense 
committed 
in 
another 
jurisdiction” means a sexually oriented offense * * * that was the 
basis of the registration * * * requirement * * * that is a violation 
of an existing or former law of another state * * * and that, if it had 
been committed in this state, would constitute or would have 
constituted * * * a felony of the first, second, third, or fourth 
degree for purposes of division (A)(1)(a)(ii) of this section [and] a 
felony of the fifth degree or a misdemeanor for purposes of 
division (A)(1)(a)(iii) of this section * * *. 
 
R.C. 2950.99(A)(3). 
{¶ 42} Nowhere in this statutory scheme do we perceive the requirement 
that a court engage in a second elemental test to determine the “comparable” Ohio 
offense, as Lloyd suggests.  Instead, the penalty provision builds upon the 
registration provisions.  The General Assembly defined “comparable category of 
offense” by reference to the sexually oriented offense that was the basis of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
registration requirement and that is a violation of an existing or former law of 
another state.  Id.  This is plainly a reference to R.C. 2950.01(A)(11) (defining 
sexually oriented offense as an out-of-state offense that is or was substantially 
equivalent to a listed Ohio offense). 
{¶ 43} As the state succinctly puts it, “[a]n out-of-state violation can only 
be a sexually oriented offense and a basis for registration in this state if it is 
‘substantially equivalent’ to [a listed] Ohio offense * * *.”  The balance of the 
definition requires a court to determine the classification of the offense that would 
apply if the out-of-state offense had been committed in Ohio.  In defining 
“comparable category of offense,” the legislature not only presumed that the 
substantial-equivalence determination had already been made and the duty to 
register had already been proven, it incorporated the substantial-equivalence 
analysis into the definition.  We conclude that in doing so, the General Assembly 
requires courts to identify the level of offense of the listed Ohio crime that is or 
was the substantial equivalent of the out-of-state conviction in order to determine 
the classification of the registration violation that is based on an out-of-state 
conviction.  Because rape in Ohio is a first-degree felony, any violation of 
Lloyd’s registration duties is also a first-degree felony.  See R.C. 
2950.99(A)(1)(a)(ii). 
{¶ 44} Having addressed the two issues directly before us, we turn our 
attention to a deficiency in the state’s proof that is readily apparent from the 
record. 
Duty to Register in Ohio under R.C. 2950.04 
{¶ 45} Ohio’s sex-offender-registration laws are applicable to out-of-state 
offenders by operation of R.C. 2950.04(A)(4), which provides: 
 
Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was 
committed, each person who is convicted, pleads guilty, or is 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
adjudicated a delinquent child in a court in another state * * * for 
committing a sexually oriented offense shall comply with the 
following registration requirements if, at the time the offender 
* * * moves to and resides in this state * * *, the offender  * * * 
has a duty to register as a sex offender  * * * under the law of that 
other jurisdiction as a result of the conviction [or] guilty plea * * *. 
 
{¶ 46} Thus, the General Assembly imposes a duty to register on a person 
who has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense in another jurisdiction only 
if, at the time he moves to Ohio, he had a duty to register in the other jurisdiction 
as a consequence of the conviction.  Id.  Accordingly, the state not only had the 
burden to prove that Lloyd’s aggravated-sexual-assault conviction is a sexually 
oriented offense under Ohio law, but it was also required to prove that at the time 
Lloyd moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of the 
1995 conviction.  In this regard, the state failed to do what was required of it. 
Proof of Lloyd’s Duty to Register in Texas 
{¶ 47} In its case-in-chief, the state failed to produce any evidence 
whatsoever that at the time Lloyd moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register 
in Texas as a result of the conviction in that state.  The state failed to produce any 
evidence that Lloyd had registered as a sex offender in Texas or that he had been 
given notice by any Texas authority that he was under a duty to register in Texas.  
It failed to produce any judgment entry that reflected that Lloyd had been 
adjudicated a sex offender in Texas.  And it failed to call any witness to testify as 
to how Lloyd’s sex-offender status was established in Ohio.  It failed to make any 
legal argument about the consequences of Lloyd’s aggravated-sexual-assault 
conviction in Texas.  It failed in any way to establish Texas’s sex-offender 
registration law or its effect, if any, on Lloyd. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
{¶ 48} In holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Lloyd 
had a duty to register in Texas, the Fifth District agreed that the state failed to 
offer any proof at all as to this element.  Instead, it relied on Lloyd’s testimony in 
his own defense, which came after the trial judge denied Lloyd’s first Crim.R. 29 
motion.4  On direct examination, Lloyd acknowledged that he had been convicted 
of aggravated sexual assault in Texas.  He explained that he had moved to Texas 
because of military duties, and, a few months after he was released from prison in 
Texas, he moved to Ohio, where he was born and which he considers home.  
Before he moved to Ohio, he contacted the Auglaize County Sheriff’s Office, 
which classified him as a sexually oriented offender.  Lloyd registered as 
instructed. 
{¶ 49} In concluding that Lloyd testified that he had a duty to register in 
Texas as a result of his 1995 conviction, the Fifth District relied on the following 
testimony: 
 
 
Q. 
So, when were you released from prison? 
 
A. 
In I believe it was July of 2005 I believe. 
 
Q. 
And when did you move to Ohio? 
 
A. 
I believe it was October or November of 2005. 
 
Q. 
And why did you come here? 
A. 
I was born in Ohio.  The only reason I was really in 
Texas was because of my military duties; so this is kind of home 
for me Ohio is. 
                                                 
4 Lloyd’s otherwise extensive motion for acquittal did not expressly challenge the state’s failure to 
offer any evidence on this element.  We assume, without deciding, that the court of appeals 
properly considered Lloyd’s testimony in deciding the sufficiency of the evidence.  See State v. 
Miley, 114 Ohio App.3d 738, 742, 684 N.E.2d 102, citing Helmick v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 
39 Ohio St.3d 71, 73, 529 N.E.2d 464 (1996) (holding that, if a motion for acquittal is properly 
renewed, an appellate court reviewing the original motion examines only the portion of the record 
toward which the original motion was directed). 
 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
Q.   
And did you go through certain procedures to 
establish your duty to register before you left Texas? 
A. 
Yes.  I had to get a form.  They give you a form to 
take to the next place that you register and stuff.  So I got the form 
and then when I moved to Auglaize County I had to take that form 
in the sheriff’s office there and show them the form and they had 
the same issue that the codes weren’t comparable, so Texas and the 
officer there talked over the phone and everything else and they 
said “We don’t have this type of * * *.”  In Texas I was * * *. 
 
Q. 
To cut to the chase. 
 
A. 
Okay. 
 
Q. 
You were classified a sexually oriented offender. 
 
A. 
Sexually oriented offender because [sic]. 
 
{¶ 50} Contrary to the Fifth District’s characterization of this passage, it is 
apparent to us that Lloyd’s testimony did not constitute sufficient evidence to 
prove that at the time he moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas 
as a result of the 1995 conviction. 
{¶ 51} Although Lloyd discussed obtaining a form, he did not explain 
what the form was or where he got it.  He testified as to when he got it—that is, 
before he left Texas.  But he did not testify that he obtained it from Texas 
authorities.  His testimony does not confirm that the form was in any way related 
to the aggravated-sexual-assault conviction.  Moreover, Lloyd testified that there 
was some kind of confusion when Auglaize County determined his sex-offender 
status.  He testified that an officer in Texas told someone from the Auglaize 
County Sheriff’s Office that “We don’t have this type of * * *.”  Lloyd continued, 
“In Texas, I was * * *.”  Lloyd could have easily finished that sentence by saying, 
“not under a duty to register.”  Rather than acknowledge these obvious 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
ambiguities as we are required to do, the dissent would employ clairvoyance to 
supplement the record. 
{¶ 52} In an abundance of caution, Lloyd may very well have notified 
Ohio authorities of his Texas conviction despite not having a duty to register in 
Texas.  The state did not take the opportunity—even on cross-examination—to 
develop this issue.  The dissent quotes one word, “yes,” from Lloyd’s testimony 
out of context and would hold that it makes the state’s case.  Lloyd’s testimony, 
the only evidence on this issue, was that the Auglaize County Sheriff was 
confused about whether or how to classify Lloyd.  The courts cannot make 
inference upon inference. 
{¶ 53} The dissent also seeks to relieve the state of its burden to prove 
that Lloyd had a duty to register merely because Lloyd registered as instructed.  
Fundamentally, the dissent assumes that the Auglaize County Sheriff’s 
determination of Lloyd’s sex-offender status was legally and factually correct.  
That assumption is unreasonable, especially on this record. 
{¶ 54} The irregularities in the Auglaize County Sheriff’s employees’ 
handling of Lloyd’s registration are well documented.  One corrections officer 
testified that, as a matter of practice, the Auglaize County Sheriff’s Office would 
sometimes agree to permit offenders to update the registry late, thereby arguably 
waiving the deadline.  But it is not at all clear if Ohio law permits such a waiver.  
Also, the testimony of other officers revealed that none of the Auglaize County 
employees in charge of sex-offender registration were properly trained on how to 
certify the registration forms.  Tellingly, that practice was not corrected until after 
Lloyd was charged. 
{¶ 55} Finally, the Auglaize County officer working with Lloyd in his 
attempts to transfer his registration readily admitted under oath that he (the 
officer) did not know how the law works when a registrant cannot, as was the case 
here, supply a change of address 20 days in advance.  The applicable procedure is 
January Term, 2012 
21 
 
prominently set out in Ohio’s registration laws.  R.C. 2950.05(G)(1).  On the day 
that Lloyd moved to Holmes County, he phoned the Auglaize County Sheriff’s 
office, gave his new address to an officer there, and told him that he intended to 
appear in Holmes County to update the registry.  Focusing on quirks in the 
computer system, that officer unequivocally told Lloyd that it was not possible to 
register in Holmes County until he returned to Auglaize County to update the 
computer, thereby dissuading Lloyd from making a personal appearance in 
Holmes County.  The seven law-enforcement officers who testified on behalf of 
the state could not agree—even at the time of trial—whether Lloyd should have 
been able to register in Holmes County without first returning to Auglaize 
County.  Meanwhile, officials from both counties independently informed the 
courts that neither would have pursued prosecution if Lloyd had appeared in 
Holmes County to register, even if he had done so after the deadline and without 
first giving notice. 
{¶ 56} This case highlights the reasons why a court cannot assume that a 
defendant is under a duty to register merely because law enforcement claims that 
he is.  After all, the courts are still the independent venue for sorting out law 
enforcement’s allegations, on the basis of actual proof. 
{¶ 57} Lloyd’s convictions are, therefore, vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 58} Lloyd’s Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault is a 
sexually oriented offense in Ohio because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a 
listed Ohio offense.  Because rape in Ohio is a first-degree felony, violation of 
Lloyd’s registration duties would also constitute a first-degree felony.  
Accordingly, we approve those portions of the court of appeals’ opinion.  But we 
must set aside Lloyd’s convictions because the state failed to prove that Lloyd 
was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his 1995 conviction when he 
moved to Ohio, as it was required to do. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 59} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 60} The issue accepted for review in this case concerns whether the 
Texas offense of aggravated sexual assault is substantially equivalent to the crime 
of rape as defined in Ohio. I concur with the majority’s determination that these 
offenses are equivalent. 
{¶ 61} This court did not accept Lloyd’s fourth proposition of law that 
“[t]he State failed to prove that Mr. Lloyd had a duty to register under Megan's 
Law”; thus, any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions is not properly before the court. 
{¶ 62} On direct examination, Lloyd admitted that he had a duty to 
register in Texas and that that duty triggered a duty to register in Ohio when he 
moved to this state.  When asked by his attorney, “Did you go through certain 
procedures to establish your duty to register before you left Texas?” Lloyd 
answered, “Yes.”  Moreover, he testified that he had been classified as a sexually 
oriented offender on moving to this state, which meant that he had a duty to 
register once a year for ten years.  Thus, Lloyd’s own admissions demonstrate his 
knowledge of his duty to register as a sex offender in Ohio. 
{¶ 63} Further, Lloyd’s own testimony establishes that he violated the 
notice and registration requirements imposed on sex offenders.  He admitted that 
he had mailed his letter to the Auglaize County Sheriff less than 20 days prior to 
his move to Holmes County.  And although he called the Holmes County Sheriff 
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
on the day of his move, he failed to appear in person and register in Holmes 
County until more than a week after he had relocated there. 
{¶ 64} Accordingly, because the record supports the findings that Lloyd 
failed to provide 20 days’ notice before moving from Auglaize County and failed 
to timely register in Holmes County, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
__________________ 
Steve Knowling, Holmes County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean Mathew 
Warner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________