Title: State v. International Paper Company

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

163 So. 2d 607 (1964)
STATE of Alabama
v.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY.
1 Div. 168.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 16, 1964.
Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., Willard W. Livingston and Wm. H. Burton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.
McCorvey, Turner, Johnstone, Adams & May, Mobile, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
The State Department of Revenue made an assessment against International Paper Company of an additional forest products severance tax for the period January 1, 1959, through December 31, 1959. International appealed to the circuit court of Mobile County, in equity, where a decree was rendered setting aside and annulling the assessment. The State brings this appeal from that decree.
The evidence consisted of testimony taken orally before the court and a stipulation entered into by the parties.
The question to be resolved is whether the term "pulpwood," as used in the Forest *608 Products Severance Tax Act (Act No. 169, appvd. June 23, 1945, Acts 1945, p. 285, § 3, Subdivision 3, as amended by Act No. 385, appvd. Sept. 9, 1955, Acts 1955, Vol. II, p. 921 [the amendment did not change Subdivision 3 of § 3]; Recompiled Code 1958, Tit. 8, § 231(4)) includes "wood chips" made by lumber manufacturers from slabs, edgings, or the residue removed or sawed from logs in manufacturing lumber from such logs and then sold to paper manufacturers for use in making pulp.
The parts of the Act here pertinent are as follows:
*609 The parts of the stipulation here pertinent are as follows:
The position taken by the State is that "pulpwood" includes "wood chips," as here involved, since they are used by paper manufacturers in making pulp the same as chips made by such manufacturers at their plants from "pulpwood" purchased from others by the standard cord of 128 cubic feet. In other words, as stated in appellant's brief, "pulpwood" is "any wood suitable to be made into pulp, and subsequently into paper or paper products." International, on the other hand, contends (and the undisputed evidence shows) that the term "pulpwood," at the time the Severance Tax Act was passed in 1945, had a clearly understood meaning in Alabama, that is, a round log of not less than four inches in diameter at the small end, with a diameter of not *610 over twenty-two inches at the large end, of varying lengths from 52 to 75 inches, and measured, as specifically provided for in the Severance Tax Act, by the "standard cord of 128 cubic feet"; that "wood chips," as here involved, were unknown commercially in this state when the Act was passed in 1945; that the slabs, edgings, or residue removed or sawed from logs in manufacturing lumber were considered waste material when said Act was passed; and that it was not intended by said Act to require a severance tax to be paid on such "wood chips."
In determining coverage under a statute levying a tax, the rule is that such statute is to be construed strictly against the taxing power and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. State v. T. R. Miller Mill Company, 272 Ala. 135, 139, 130 So. 2d 185; State v. Birmingham Bolt Company, 271 Ala. 528, 530, 125 So. 2d 520; State v. Grayson Lumber Company, 271 Ala. 35, 38, 122 So. 2d 126; State v. Helburn Co., 269 Ala. 164, 167, 111 So. 2d 912; Al Means, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 268 Ala. 31, 36, 104 So. 2d 816; State ex rel. Woodruff v. Centanne, 265 Ala. 35, 38, 89 So. 2d 570; State v. Reynolds Metals Company, 263 Ala. 657, 661, 83 So. 2d 709. Another accepted rule of statutory construction is that, where there is nothing to indicate to the contrary, words in a statute will be given the meaning generally accepted in popular, every-day usage at the time of passage of the statute. See: Carter Oil Co. v. Blair, 256 Ala. 650, 655, 57 So. 2d 64. When the question of coverage in this case is tested by these rules, we are brought, "like a martin to its gourd," to the same conclusion as that reached by the trial court.
We find nothing in the Act to justify a holding that the legislature intended to include the slabs, edgings, or residue, considered waste material when the Act was passed, within the term "pulpwood." There is clear indication of a contrary intent. The measure of the tax prescribed by the Act ("six (6¢) cents per standard cord of one hundred twenty-eight (128) cubic feet"), when considered in the light of the undisputed evidence as to the generally accepted meaning of "pulpwood" at the time of passage of the Act, evinces a legislative purpose to lay the severance tax on "pulpwood" as so defined in the evidence and not on the waste material from which the "wood chips" here involved were made.
Whether there are other reasons why the decree should be affirmed, as argued by International, there is no need to decide.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and COLEMAN and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.