Title: Allen v. Duvall

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

316 S.E.2d 267 (1984) W.R. ALLEN and wife, Annette Allen v. Roy Lee DUVALL, Melba Jean Duvall and Charlie Byrd Duvall. No. 437PA83. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 5, 1984. *269 Erwin, Winner & Smathers, P.A. by Patrick U. Smathers, Canton, for plaintiffs-appellants. Redmond, Stevens, Loftin & Currie, by Thomas R. West, Asheville, for defendants-appellees. MARTIN, Justice. We granted discretionary review in this case to consider the single question: Was the language quoted above in the 7 October 1914 deed to W.S. McCracken, predecessor in title to defendants, sufficient as a matter of law to create by express reservation the appurtenant easements claimed by plaintiffs? We hold that it was sufficient and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals based its opinion upon the premise that this Court's opinion in Borders v. Yarbrough, 237 N.C. 540, 75 S.E.2d 541 (1953), was overruled by Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393 (1971). In so doing, the Court of Appeals erred. Oliver did not overrule Borders, either expressly or by implication. In Oliver the paperwriting in question failed to create an easement because the description was uncertain in itself and was *270 not capable of being reduced to certainty as it did not refer to anything extrinsic. The grantees in Oliver attempted to create an easement for a road, and although a road existed prior to the attempted grant, no reference to it was made in the paper. The description being vague and indefinite, it was patently ambiguous and void for uncertainty. On the other hand, the description in Borders, while indefinite, expressly referred to a preexisting sewer line (for which the easement was created) across the land of the servient estate. The description in Borders, therefore, was capable of being rendered to a certainty by a recurrence to something extrinsic (the preexisting sewer line) to which it referred. Oliver v. Ernul, supra. Oliver and Borders are not inconsistent, and we reaffirm the holdings in both opinions. Further, since Oliver, 1971, this Court has relied upon and cited with approval Borders v. Yarbrough, supra, in Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 215 S.E.2d 563 (1975); Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1 (1973); and Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 192 S.E.2d 449 (1972). The Court of Appeals itself has cited and relied upon Borders in Hanes v. Kennon, 46 N.C.App. 597, 265 S.E.2d 488 (1980); Adams v. Severt, 40 N.C.App. 247, 252 S.E.2d 276 (1979); Prentice v. Roberts, 32 N.C.App. 379, 232 S.E.2d 286, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977), all after Oliver was filed in 1971. We hold that the result in this appeal is controlled by Borders v. Yarbrough, supra. 237 N.C. at 542, 75 S.E.2d at 543. When an easement is created by deed, either by express grant or by reservation, the description thereof "must either be certain in itself or capable of being reduced to a certainty by a recurrence to something extrinsic to which it refers.... There must be language in the deed sufficient to serve as a pointer or a guide to the ascertainment of the location of the land." Thompson v. Umberger, 221 N.C. 178, 180, 19 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1942) (and cases cited therein) (emphasis ours). See Oliver v. Ernul, supra, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393. It is to be stressed that an alleged grant or reservation of an easement will be void and ineffectual only when there is such an uncertainty appearing on the face of the instrument itself that the courtreading the language in the light of all the facts and circumstances referred to in the instrumentis yet unable to derive therefrom the intention of the parties as to what land was to be conveyed. Thompson v. Umberger, supra. In the case at bar, the language of reservation in the 1914 deed was clearly sufficient to create the two easements in question: The requisite intent to reserve the two rights-of-way is plain and unmistakable. The reservation of the easement refers to "a road for wagons and all purposes" and to "a right of way for a road to be kept open from the above road out to the Beaverdam Road." The evidence showed that these two roads were being used across the property in question at the time of the reservation. Plaintiffs introduced surveys, photographs, and maps enabling the trier of fact to conclude that recognizable roadways exist and follow identifiable courses and distances. To establish the existence of the road prior to the 1914 reservation, the plaintiff produced the testimony of four witnesses between the ages of seventy-six and eighty-four. Having grown up on or near the land in question, these men identified plaintiffs' exhibits above as the same roads referred to in the 1914 deed. The law endeavors to give effect to the intention of the parties, whenever that can be done consistently with rational construction. 2 Thompson, Real Property § 332 (1980). When the terms used in the deed leave it uncertain what property is intended to be embraced in it, parol evidence is admissible to fit the description to the landnever to create a description. Thompson v. Umberger, supra, 221 N.C. 178, 19 S.E.2d 484; Self Help Corp. v. Brinkley, 215 N.C. 615, 2 S.E.2d 889 (1939). When, as here, the ambiguity in the description is not patent but latentreferring to something extrinsic by which identification might be madethe reservation will not be held to be void for uncertainty. Oliver v. Ernul, supra, 277 N.C. 591, 178 S.E.2d 393; Thompson v. Umberger, supra. The use of the roads in question by plaintiffs' predecessors in title, acquiesced in by defendants' predecessors in title of the servient estate, sufficiently locates the roads on the ground, which is deemed to be that which was intended by the reservation of the easements. Borders v. Yarbrough, supra, 237 N.C. 540, 75 S.E.2d 541. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further remand to the Superior *272 Court, Haywood County, for reinstatement of the judgment rendered therein. REVERSED AND REMANDED. MITCHELL, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.