Title: Snowney v. Harrah's

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/6/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
FRANK SNOWNEY et al., 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
S124286 
 
v. 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B164118 
HARRAH’S ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al., ) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents.  
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC267575 
______________________________________ ) 
 
 
In this case, a California resident filed a class action against a group of 
Nevada hotels for failing to provide notice of an energy surcharge imposed on 
hotel guests.  Although these hotels conduct no business and have no bank 
accounts or employees in California, they do advertise heavily in California and 
obtain a significant percentage of their business from California residents.  These 
advertising activities include billboards located in California, print ads in 
California newspapers, and ads aired on California radio and television stations.  
These hotels also maintain an Internet Web site and toll-free phone number where 
visitors or callers may obtain room quotes and make reservations.  We now 
consider whether, based on these activities, California courts may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over these hotels, and conclude that they may. 
 
2 
I. 
Defendants Harrah’s Las Vegas, Inc., Harrah’s Laughlin, Inc., Harrah’s 
Operating Company, Inc. (HOC), Rio Properties, Inc., and Harveys Tahoe 
Management Company, Inc. (collectively defendants) own and operate hotels in 
Nevada.  Plaintiff Frank Snowney is a California resident.  In 2001, plaintiff 
reserved a room by phone from his California residence at one of the hotels owned 
and operated by defendants.  To make the reservation, plaintiff gave the 
reservation agent his credit card number.  At the time plaintiff made the 
reservation, the agent told him that the room would cost $50 per night plus the 
room tax.  When plaintiff paid his bill at checkout, however, the bill included a $3 
energy surcharge. 
Plaintiff filed the instant class action against defendants and other entities1 
on behalf of himself and other “persons who were charged an energy surcharge as 
an overnight hotel guest in one of the defendant’s hotels, yet were never given 
notice that there was an energy surcharge and/or what such charge would be.”  In 
the complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants charged him and other guests an 
energy surcharge during their stays at hotels owned and operated by defendants 
without providing notice of these charges during the reservation or check-in 
process.  He further alleged that, in doing so, defendants charged more than the 
advertised or quoted price.  His complaint alleged causes of action for:  (1) 
fraudulent and deceptive business practices in violation of Business and 
                                              
1 
These other entities are Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (HEI), Rio Hotel & 
Casino, Inc., Harveys Casino Resorts, Harrah’s Reno Holding Company, Inc., Rio 
Vegas Hotel & Casino, Inc., Harrah’s Management Company, and Harveys P.C., 
Inc.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal as to these 
defendants, and Snowney did not petition for review of, and does not appear to 
challenge, this portion of the court’s ruling. 
 
3 
Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (2) breach of contract; (3) unjust 
enrichment; and (4) violations of Business and Professions Code section 
17500 et seq. 
In response, defendants and other entities filed a motion to quash the 
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.  In support of the motion, defendants 
submitted a declaration from Brad L. Kerby, the corporate secretary of HEI.  
Kerby stated that defendants were incorporated in either Nevada or Delaware and 
maintained their principal place of business in Nevada.  According to Kerby, 
defendants conducted no business in California and had no bank accounts or 
employees in California.  Kerby, however, acknowledged that HOC was licensed 
to do business in California and that Harrah’s Marketing Services Corporation 
(HMSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of HOC, operated offices in California to 
“assist customers who contact those offices” and “attempt[ed] to attract a limited 
number of high-end gaming patrons to Harrah’s properties.” 
In opposition, plaintiff submitted several declarations, a transcript of 
Kerby’s deposition, and various exhibits.  This evidence established that 
defendants:  (1) advertised extensively to California residents through billboards in 
California, California newspapers, and California radio and television stations; (2) 
had a joint marketing agreement with National Airlines, which served Los Angeles 
and San Francisco, and advertised in the airline’s print media; (3) maintained an 
interactive Web site that accepted reservations from California residents, provided 
driving directions to their hotels from California, and touted the proximity of their 
hotels to California; (4) accepted reservations from California residents through 
their Internet Web site and a toll-free phone number listed on the site and in their 
advertisements; (5) obtained a significant percentage of their patrons from 
California through reservations made through the toll-free number and Web site; 
and (6) regularly sent mailings to those California residents among the four to six 
 
4 
million people enrolled in their “Total Rewards” program.  Plaintiff’s evidence 
also confirmed that HSMC maintained several offices in California to handle 
reservations and market defendants’ hotels. 
The trial court granted the motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
Specifically, the court found that plaintiff had failed to establish either general or 
specific jurisdiction.  Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeal reversed as to defendants, concluding that defendants 
had “sufficient contacts with California to justify the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction.”  Specifically, the court held that:  (1) “by soliciting and receiving the 
patronage of California residents” through their advertising activities, defendants 
“have purposefully directed their activities at California residents, have 
purposefully derived benefit from their contacts with California, and have 
established a substantial connection with this state”; (2) defendants’ California 
contacts “are substantially connected to causes of action that challenge an alleged 
mandatory surcharge imposed on all hotel guests”; and (3) the exercise of 
jurisdiction over defendants would be fair and reasonable.  In doing so, the court 
declined to follow Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Superior Court (1981) 120 
Cal.App.3d 546 (Circus Circus), disapproved in part in Vons Companies, Inc. v. 
Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 464 (Vons). 
We granted review to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over 
defendants is proper. 
II. 
“California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis 
consistent with the Constitution of California and the United States.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 410.10.)  The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
comports with these Constitutions ‘if the defendant has such minimum contacts 
with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “ ‘traditional 
 
5 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’  ([Vons], supra, 14 Cal.4th [at 
p.] 444, quoting Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(Internat. Shoe).)”  (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 
(Pavlovich).) 
“The concept of minimum contacts . . . requires states to observe certain 
territorial limits on their sovereignty.  It ‘ensure[s] that the States, through their 
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.’ ”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445, 
quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(World-Wide Volkswagen).)  To do so, the minimum contacts test asks “whether 
the ‘quality and nature’ of the defendant’s activity is such that it is ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘fair’ to require him to conduct his defense in that State.”  (Kulko v. California 
Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 92, quoting Internat. Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 
pp. 316-317.)  The test “is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the 
facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating 
circumstances’ are present.”  (Kulko, at p. 92.) 
Under the minimum contacts test, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be either 
general or specific.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.)  Because plaintiff does 
not claim general jurisdiction, we only consider whether specific jurisdiction 
exists here. 
“When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the 
‘ “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” ’  
(Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414, quoting 
Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 U.S. 186, 204.)  A court may exercise specific 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if:  (1) ‘the defendant has 
purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 
at p. 446); (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s 
 
6 
contacts with the forum” ’ (ibid., quoting Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414); 
and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and 
substantial justice’ ” ’  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447, quoting Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473 [(Burger King)].)”  (Pavlovich, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) 
“When a defendant moves to quash service of process” for lack of specific 
jurisdiction, “the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying 
the exercise of jurisdiction.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.)  “If the plaintiff 
meets this initial burden, then the defendant has the burden of demonstrating ‘that 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.’ ”  (Pavlovich, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 273, quoting Vons, at p. 449.)  Where, as here, “ ‘no conflict in the 
evidence exists . . . the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the 
reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.’ ”  (Vons, at 
p. 449.)  Applying these standards to the facts of this case, we conclude that 
California may exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. 
A. 
We first determine whether defendants purposefully availed themselves of 
the privilege of doing business in California.  Based on defendants’ purposeful and 
successful solicitation of business from California residents, we find that plaintiff 
has established purposeful availment. 
“ ‘The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant’s 
intentionality.  [Citation.]  This prong is only satisfied when the defendant 
purposefully and voluntarily directs [its] activities toward the forum so that [it] 
should expect, by virtue of the benefit [it] receives, to be subject to the court’s 
jurisdiction based on’ [its] contacts with the forum.”  (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at p. 269, quoting U.S. v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd. (1st Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 610, 
623-624.)  Thus, purposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant 
 
7 
“ ‘purposefully direct[s]’ [its] activities at residents of the forum” (Burger King, 
supra, 471 U.S. at p. 472), “ ‘purposefully derive[s] benefit’ from” its activities in 
the forum (id. at p. 473), “create[s] a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum” 
(id. at p. 475), “ ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within” the 
forum (id. at pp. 475-476), or “has created ‘continuing obligations’ between 
[itself] and residents of the forum” (id. at p. 476).  By limiting the scope of a 
forum’s jurisdiction in this manner, the “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement 
ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . .”  (Id. at p. 475.)  Instead, the 
defendant will only be subject to personal jurisdiction if “ ‘it has clear notice that 
it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation 
by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks 
are too great, severing its connection with the state.’ ”  (Pavlovich, at p. 269, 
quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297.) 
Here, defendants’ contacts with California are more than sufficient to 
establish purposeful availment.  We begin by examining defendants’ Internet 
contacts.  To determine whether a Web site is sufficient to establish purposeful 
availment, we first look to the sliding scale analysis described in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. 
Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa. 1997) 952 F.Supp. 1119 (Zippo).  (See Pavlovich, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 274.)  “At one end of the spectrum are situations where a 
defendant clearly does business over the Internet.  If the defendant enters into 
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and 
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is 
proper.  [Citation.]  At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has 
simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in 
foreign jurisdictions.  A passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the 
 
8 
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction.  [Citation.]  The middle ground is occupied by 
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host 
computer.  In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining 
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information 
that occurs on the Web site.”  (Zippo, at p. 1124.) 
Defendants’ Web site, which quotes room rates to visitors and permits 
visitors to make reservations at their hotels, is interactive and, at a minimum, falls 
within the middle ground of the Zippo sliding scale.2  In determining whether a 
site falling within this middle ground is sufficient to establish purposeful 
availment, however, courts have been less than consistent.   
“Some courts have held that sufficient minimum contacts are established, 
and the defendant is ‘doing business’ over the Internet where the defendant’s 
website is capable of accepting and does accept purchase orders from residents of 
the forum state.”  (Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Products (D.Md. 2004) 346 
F.Supp.2d 804, 810.)  Other courts have suggested that “ ‘something more’ ” is 
necessary, such as “ ‘deliberate action’ within the forum state in the form of 
transactions between the defendant and residents of the forum or conduct of the 
defendant purposefully directed at residents of the forum state.”  (Millennium, 
supra, 33 F.Supp.2d at p. 921; see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A. 
                                              
2  
Snowney contends the site falls within the first Zippo category and 
establishes that defendants conduct business in California.  Although we question 
this contention (see Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc. (E.D.Mo. 2001) 
200 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1087-1088 (Bell) [holding that a hotel’s Web site permitting 
visitors to make online reservations falls in the middle of the Zippo continuum]; 
Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP (D.Or. 1999) 33 F.Supp.2d 
907, 920 (Millennium) [holding that a Web site that permits visitors to purchase 
the defendants’ merchandise falls in the middle of the Zippo continuum]), we need 
not resolve it here because defendants’ California contacts clearly establish 
purposeful availment. 
 
9 
(3d Cir. 2003) 318 F.3d 446, 454 [“there must be evidence that the defendant 
‘purposefully availed’ itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly 
targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the 
forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts”].)  Other 
courts “have criticized Zippo’s emphasis on website interactivity” (Shamsuddin, at 
p. 810) and focus instead on “traditional due process principles” (id. at p. 811), 
asking whether the site expressly targets “residents of the forum state” (Hy Cite 
Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C. (W.D.Wis. 2004) 297 F.Supp.2d 1154, 
1160).  According to these courts, “Website interactivity is important only insofar 
as it reflects commercial activity, and then only insofar as that commercial activity 
demonstrates purposeful targeting of residents of the forum state or purposeful 
availment of the benefits or privileges of the forum state.”  (Shamsuddin, at p. 813; 
see also Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. (6th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 883, 
890 [“A defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of acting in a state 
through its website if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically 
intended interaction with residents of the state”].) 
We need not, however, decide on a particular approach here because 
defendants’ Web site, by any standard, establishes purposeful availment.  By 
touting the proximity of their hotels to California and providing driving directions 
from California to their hotels, defendants’ site specifically targeted residents of 
California.  (See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 472.)  Defendants also 
concede that many of their patrons come from California and that some of these 
patrons undoubtedly made reservations using their Web site.  As such, defendants 
have purposefully derived a benefit from their Internet activities in California (id. 
at p. 473), and have established a substantial connection with California through 
their Web site (id. at p. 475).  In doing so, defendants have “purposefully availed 
[themselves] of the privilege of conducting business in” California “via the 
 
10 
Internet.”  (Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. U-Haul International, Inc. (E.D.Mo. 
2004) 327 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1042-1043 [holding that a Web site that specifically 
targeted the forum state and its residents established purposeful availment].) 
Defendants’ attempt to analogize their Web site to the site in Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 937 F.Supp. 295, is unavailing.  In 
Bensusan, the federal district court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant based on his Web site.  But, unlike the Web site at issue here, the 
site in Bensusan was wholly passive—not interactive—and did not specifically 
target forum residents.  (Id. at p. 297.)  Moreover, the defendant in Bensusan, 
unlike defendants here, conducted no business with forum residents through his 
Web site. 
In any event, even assuming that defendants’ Web site, by itself, is not 
sufficient to establish purposeful availment, the site in conjunction with 
defendants’ other contacts with California undoubtedly is.  Aside from their Web 
site specifically targeting California residents, defendants advertised extensively in 
California through billboards, newspapers, and radio and television stations 
located in California.  They also listed a toll-free phone number for making 
reservations at their hotels in their California advertisements and on their Web 
site, and many of their California patrons used this number to make reservations.  
Finally, defendants regularly sent mailings advertising their hotels to selected 
California residents.  As a result of these promotional activities, defendants 
obtained a significant percentage of their patrons from California.  Thus, 
defendants purposefully and successfully solicited business from California 
residents.  In doing so, defendants necessarily availed themselves of the benefits of 
 
11 
doing business in California and could reasonably expect to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of courts in California.3 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendants’ contention that no 
purposeful availment exists here because the subject matter of their contracts with 
California residents resides exclusively in Nevada.  Unlike the cases cited by 
defendants, which held that a few contracts with California residents could not, by 
themselves, establish purposeful availment,4 our finding of purposeful availment 
is not premised solely on defendants’ contracts with forum residents.  Rather, our 
finding is premised on defendants’ purposeful and successful solicitation of 
business within California.  Indeed, “it is an inescapable fact of modern 
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail 
and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical 
presence within a State in which business is conducted.”  (Burger King, supra, 
                                              
3  
(See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines (9th Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 377, 382-383 
(Shute) [holding that advertising in local media, through brochures sent to travel 
agents in the forum, and through promotional seminars in the forum established 
purposeful availment], revd. on other grounds in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute (1991) 499 U.S. 585; Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno (D.C. 2000) 746 
A.2d 320, 331 (Shoppers Food Warehouse) [holding that the defendant 
“conducted ‘purposeful, affirmative activity within the’ ” forum “by purposefully 
directing advertisements for its . . . stores at a potential customer base in the” 
forum]; Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc. (Mich.Ct.App. 2001) 633 N.W.2d 
408, 415 (Oberlies) [finding purposeful availment because “the defendant engaged 
in widespread advertising in” the forum “that particularly targeted” forum 
“residents”].) 
4  
(See Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 907 [finding 
no purposeful availment based solely on the defendants’ execution of “sales, 
security and escrow agreements” with a forum resident]; Doe v. Unocal Corp. 
(9th Cir. 2001) 248 F.3d 915, 924 [finding no purposeful availment based solely 
on the defendant’s contractual relations with a forum resident]; McGlinchy v. Shell 
Chemical Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 845 F.2d 802, 816 [finding no purposeful availment 
based solely on the defendant’s contract with a forum resident].) 
 
12 
471 U.S. at p. 476.)  Where, as here, “[t]he actions taken by” defendants “to solicit 
business within” California “were clearly purposefully directed toward residents 
of” California, “it is irrelevant where” their hotels are located.  (Shute, supra, 897 
F.2d at p. 382; cf. Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 149-150 [finding 
purposeful availment even though the accident giving rise to the action did not 
occur in the forum state].) 
We also find inapposite Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 
853, and Spirits, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 918.  Unlike 
defendants here, neither of the defendants in Archibald and Spirits engaged in 
extensive advertising that specifically targeted California residents and resulted in 
numerous transactions with California residents.  (See Archibald, at p. 864 
[refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a hotel based solely on the activities of an 
independent travel agency that sold accommodations at the hotel to a California 
resident]; Spirits, at p. 925 [refusing to exercise jurisdiction based solely on the 
defendant’s purchase of products from a California distributor and the defendant’s 
proximity to California].) 
Finally, we do not find persuasive the purposeful availment analysis in 
Circus Circus, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 546.  In Circus Circus, the plaintiffs 
brought a negligence action against the defendant, a Nevada hotel, after the theft 
of their property during their stay at the hotel.  (Id. at p. 552.)  In refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court of Appeal spent the bulk of its 
opinion finding that no general jurisdiction existed and that the controversy did not 
relate to or arise out of the defendant’s contacts with California. 5  Nonetheless, 
                                              
5  
In Vons, we rejected the proximate cause test applied by Circus Circus in 
determining whether the plaintiff’s claims related to or arose out of the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
13 
the court also concluded that the defendant did not avail “itself of any benefits 
afforded by the State of California” or seek the “ ‘protection of its laws’ ” based 
on the defendant’s maintenance of a toll-free phone number for reservations (id. at 
p. 569) and “advertising in California newspapers, a service paid for and rendered 
without any involvement of the forum state’s laws or public facilities” (ibid.). 
By focusing solely on the defendant’s involvement with California’s laws 
or public facilities, however, Circus Circus applied an overly narrow interpretation 
of the purposeful availment test.  Purposeful availment may exist even though the 
defendant did not invoke the legal protections of the forum state.  Indeed, 
purposeful availment exists whenever the defendant purposefully and voluntarily 
directs its activities toward the forum state in an effort to obtain a benefit from that 
state.  (See ante, at pp. 6-7.)  And, to the extent Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 546, holds that advertising activities 
targeted at forum residents can never establish purposeful availment, we 
disapprove of it.  In any event, defendants’ promotional activities—which were far 
more extensive than the promotional activities at issue in Circus Circus—
unequivocally establish that defendants purposefully and voluntarily directed their 
activities at California residents.6  Accordingly, we conclude that defendants 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 464.)  We 
apparently left undisturbed its analysis of purposeful availment. 
6  
Our finding of purposeful availment does not rely on the “ ‘economic 
reality’ ” test rejected in Circus Circus, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at pages 570-571.  
Rather, it relies on defendants’ purposeful and successful solicitation of business 
within California—and not on the mere foreseeability that California residents will 
patronize businesses of a neighboring state.  
 
14 
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in 
California. 
B. 
We now turn to the second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction (the 
relatedness requirement), and determine whether the controversy is related to or 
arises out of defendants’ contacts with California.  We find that it is. 
In Vons, we carefully examined the relatedness requirement.  After 
reviewing the relevant cases and the rationale behind the specific jurisdiction 
doctrine, we declined to apply a proximate cause test7 (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 
pp. 462-464) or a “but for” test8 (id. at pp. 467-469).  Following a detailed 
discussion of the relevant law and policy considerations, we also rejected the 
“substantive relevance” test proposed by Professor Brilmayer.9  (Id. at pp. 469-
474.)  Instead, we adopted a substantial connection test and held that the 
relatedness requirement is satisfied if “there is a substantial nexus or connection 
between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.”  (Id. at p. 456.)   
In adopting this test, we observed that “for the purpose of establishing 
jurisdiction the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to 
those contacts are inversely related.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.)  “[T]he 
more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a 
connection between the forum contacts and the claim.”  (Id. at p. 455.)  Thus, “[a] 
                                              
7  
The proximate cause test asks whether “the alleged injury was proximately 
caused by the contacts in the forum state.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 462.) 
8  
The “but for” test asks “whether the injury would have occurred ‘but for’ 
the forum contacts.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 467.) 
9  
The substantive relevance test asks whether “conduct constituting a forum 
contact that took place in the forum normally would be pleaded under state 
substantive law applicable to the plaintiff’s cause of action.”  (Vons, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 469.) 
 
15 
claim need not arise directly from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be 
sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.”  
(Id. at p. 452.)  Moreover, the “forum contacts need not be directed at the plaintiff 
in order to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.”  (Id. at p. 455.)  Indeed, 
“ ‘ “[o]nly when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the 
defendant’s contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does not 
arise from that [contact].” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 455, quoting Third Nat. Bank in Nashville 
v. Wedge Group Inc. (6th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2d 1087, 1091.) 
Amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States urges us to 
reconsider Vons and, instead, adopt the substantive relevance test.  It, however, 
presents nothing new.  Indeed, in Vons, we carefully considered and rejected the 
very reasons cited by amicus curiae for adopting the substantive relevance test.  
(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 469-475.)  We therefore continue to apply the 
substantial connection test established in Vons. 
Applying this test, we find that plaintiff’s claims have a substantial 
connection with defendants’ contacts with California.  Plaintiff’s causes of action 
for unfair competition, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and false advertising 
allege that defendants failed to provide notice of an energy surcharge during the 
reservation process and in their advertising.  Thus, plaintiff’s causes of action are 
premised on alleged omissions during defendants’ consummation of transactions 
with California residents and in their California advertisements.  Because the harm 
alleged by plaintiff relates directly to the content of defendants’ promotional 
activities in California, an inherent relationship between plaintiff’s claims and 
defendants’ contacts with California exists.  Given “the intensity of” defendants’ 
activities in California, we therefore have little difficulty in finding a substantial 
connection between the two.  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 453.)  The fact that 
many of defendants’ contacts with California do not directly arise out of plaintiff’s 
 
16 
transaction with defendants is immaterial.  (See Logan Productions, Inc. v. 
Optibase, Inc. (7th Cir. 1996) 103 F.3d 49, 53 [refusing to limit the relevant 
contacts to “those contacts directly arising out” of defendant’s “deal with” the 
plaintiff].)  By purposefully and successfully soliciting the business of California 
residents, defendants could reasonably anticipate being subject to litigation in 
California in the event their solicitations caused an injury to a California resident.  
(See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 475-476.) 
Cases holding that claims for injuries suffered during a plaintiff’s stay at a 
hotel or resort are not related to and do not arise from that hotel’s or resort’s 
advertising in the forum state are inapposite.10  As an initial matter, most, if not 
all, of these cases did not apply the substantial connection test established in Vons.  
In any event, even if we agree with the holdings in these cases,11 they are 
                                              
10  
(See, e.g., Circus Circus, supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 569 [holding that a 
tort claim arising out of a burglary of the plaintiff’s hotel room does not relate to 
or arise out of that hotel’s advertising in the forum]; Breschia v. Paradise 
Vacation Club, Inc. (N.D.Ill. 2003) 2003 WL 22872128, p. *4 [holding that a 
claim arising out of the plaintiff’s slip and fall at a resort did not relate to or arise 
out of that resort’s advertising in the forum]; Bell, supra, 200 F.Supp.2d at p. 1088 
[holding that a claim arising out of the plaintiff’s slip and fall at a hotel did not 
relate to or arise out of that hotel’s advertising in the forum]; Dagesse v. Plant 
Hotel N.V. (D.N.H. 2000) 113 F.Supp.2d 211, 218 [same]; Imundo v. Pocono 
Palace, Inc. (D.N.J. 2002) 2002 WL 31006145, p. *2, revd. on reconsideration on 
another ground in 2002 WL 31006143 [same]; Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel 
(D.N.J. 1999) 49 F.Supp.2d 743, 749 [same]; Smith v. Sands Hotel & Casino 
(D.N.J. 1997) 1997 WL 162156, p. *6 (Smith); Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis 
International Hotels (E.D.Pa. 1999) 1999 WL 718556, p. *1 [same]; Oberlies, 
supra, 633 N.W.2d 416-417 [holding that a claim arising out of the plaintiff’s slip 
and fall at a ski resort did not relate to or arise out of the resort’s advertising in the 
forum].)  
11  
Indeed, several courts have reached the opposite conclusion—that injuries 
suffered during a stay at a hotel or resort are related to and do arise from that 
hotel’s or resort’s advertising in the forum state.  (See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How 
Investments, Ltd. (1st Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 708, 715-716; Mallon v. Walt Disney 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
17 
distinguishable.  Unlike the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in those cases, the 
injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff in this case relates directly to the content of 
defendants’ advertising in California.  As such, the connection between plaintiff’s 
claims and defendants’ contacts is far closer than the connection between the 
claims and contacts alleged in the cases cited above.  Indeed, some courts that 
have refused to exercise jurisdiction where a plaintiff suffered an injury during a 
stay at a hotel or resort acknowledge that they would have reached a different 
conclusion if that plaintiff had alleged false advertising or fraud.  (See Smith, 
supra, 1997 WL 162156 at p. *6 [suggesting that claims of false advertising or 
fraudulent misrepresentation would meet the relatedness requirement]; Oberlies, 
supra, 633 N.W.2d at p. 417 [“A foreign corporation that advertises in Michigan 
can reasonably expect to be called to defend suits in Michigan charging unlawful 
advertising or alleging that the advertising, itself, directly injured a Michigan 
resident”].)  Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff has met the relatedness 
requirement. 
C. 
Having concluded that plaintiff has satisfied the purposeful availment and 
relatedness requirements, we now determine “whether the assertion of specific 
jurisdiction is fair.”  (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476.)  In making this 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
World Co. (D.Conn. 1998) 42 F.Supp.2d 143, 147; O’Brien v. Okemo Mountain, 
Inc. (D.Conn. 1998) 17 F.Supp.2d 98, 101; Rooney v. Walt Disney World Co. 
(D.Mass. 2003) 2003 WL 22937728, p. *4; Sigros v. Walt Disney World Co. 
(D.Mass. 2001) 129 F.Supp.2d 56, 67; Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra, 746 
A.2d at p. 336; Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc. (Mass. 1994) 625 N.E.2d 549, 553-554; 
Radigan v. Innisbrook Resort & Golf Club (N.J.Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1977) 375 A.2d 
1229, 1231.) 
 
18 
determination, the “court ‘must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests 
of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.  It must also 
weigh in its determination “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 
most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 476, 
quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)  
“Where[, as here,] a defendant who purposefully has directed [its] activities at 
forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, [it] must present a compelling case 
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable.”  (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 477.)  In this case, defendants 
do not contend the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable, and 
we see no reason to conclude otherwise.  Therefore, we hold that defendants are 
subject to specific jurisdiction in California. 
III. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 116 Cal.App.4th 996 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S124286 
Date Filed: June 6, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Peter D. Lichtman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Schreiber & Schreiber, Edwin C. Schreiber and Eric A. Schreiber for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Fulbright & Jaworski, Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Joshua D. Lichtman, Alisha M. Lee and Andrea K. Pallios for 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Robin S. Conrad; Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner, Roy T. Englert, Jr., Alan E. Untereiner, 
Max Huffman and Alice W. Yao for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Edwin C. Shreiber 
Schreiber & Schreiber 
16501 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 401 
Encino, CA  91436-2068 
(818) 789-2577 
 
Eric A. Schreiber 
Schreiber & Schreiber 
16501 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 401 
Encino, CA  91436-2068 
(818) 789-2577 
 
Robert W. Fischer, Jr. 
Fulbright & Jaworski 
865 South Figueroa Street, 29th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 892-9200