Title: Tamburello v. Jaeger

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

184 So. 2d 544 (1966) 249 La. 25 August TAMBURELLO v. Andrew S. JAEGER, Jr. No. 47910. Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 28, 1966. Porteous & Johnson, C. Gordon Johnson, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant. Hubert, Baldwin & Zibilich, by Leon D. Hubert, Jr., New Orleans, for respondent. HAMLIN, Justice: We directed Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, in order that we might review its judgment (176 So.2d 707) which amended and affirmed a judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. 248 La. 436, 179 So. 2d 275. The Court of Appeal increased to $7,437.35 the trial court's award of $4,000.00 to plaintiff. *545 This is an action for damages for personal injuries resulting to plaintiff from a kick by defendant's three-month-old filly. The Court of Appeal correctly stated: "* * * Alleging substantially the same facts as found above, plaintiff further alleged in his petition that the accident was caused by defendant's negligence which consisted of: (a) knowingly allowing and/or requesting petitioner to go near the filly with knowledge of its dangerous propensities; (b) knowingly allowing and/or requesting petitioner to go near the filly without giving any warning or indication as to the animal's dangerous propensities; (c) not putting a halter on an animal with dangerous propensities; and (d) not taking the proper precautions to protect petitioner. Defendant denied plaintiff's allegations of negligence and alternatively pleaded the contributory negligence of plaintiff in the following respects: (a) in cruelly and callously mistreating the filly; (b) in negligently approaching the filly; (c) in failing to take proper precautions to protect himself; and (d) in failing to act as a reasonable and/or prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. The trial court found that plaintiff had no knowledge that the filly had previously displayed dangerous propensities to kick. In its opinion, plaintiff did not assume the risk. The Court of Appeal stated: The Court of Appeal noted that assumption of risk is factual and stated it would not disturb the finding of the trial court in the absence of manifest error. The Court was not convinced strongly enough to the *546 contrary to justify a reversal of the trial court's finding that the defendant had knowledge of the filly's "vicious" or "dangerous" "propensities." The lack of conviction was based on the absence of expert testimony of the customary behavior of three-month-old colts. In this Court, defendant-relator urges: The question of the liability or responsibility of an owner for the actions of his animal is not new to our jurisprudence or law. Article 2321 of West's LSA-C.C. provides: In Delisle v. Bourriague, 105 La. 77, 29 So. 731, 734, 54 L.R.A. 420, we said that Article 2321 is founded upon the presumption that the fault is chargeable to the owner of the animal that caused the damage, or to the person in whose use or under whose care it was at the time of the accident, and that presumption can be made to give way only in the presence of proof either of an unforeseen event or by the imprudence of the one injured. In Marsalis v. LaSalle, La.App., 94 So. 2d 120, it was very pertinently stated: Cases relating to injuries caused by animals are generally divided into types, according to the nature of the animal. The classification depends upon whether the animal is ferae naturae (wild) or mansuetae naturae (domesticated). A horse comes within the classification of domestic animals or animals mansuetae naturae. Durham v. Barnes, La.App., 124 So. 2d 792. In speaking of what constitutes viciousness, it is stated in 3 C.J.S. Animals § 148 c, pp. 1250-1251: Application of the above jurisprudence and law to the instant facts constrains us to conclude that plaintiff has borne his burden of proof, and that defendant has failed in the proof of his averments. The evidence of record reflects that plaintiff did not know at the time of the accident that the three-month-old filly had previously kicked human beings. Each person or animal is constituted differently as to temperament, breeding, size, strength, and other characteristics. Whether the filly's kicking was playful mischievousness or viciousness, it endangered the safety of others and was therefore a "vicious" or "dangerous" "propensity." The evidence of record is uncontradicted to the effect that defendant had knowledge of two prior episodes of the filly's kicking. He himself was the victim of one attack and received a substantial blow. We find that the defendant was negligent in not warning the plaintiff of the "dangerous propensity" of the filly. Such warning would have alerted the plaintiff to the animal's characteristics and made him anticipatory of its reactions to touch. Defendant has not exculpated himself from negligence. Kennedy v. Frierson, La.App., 142 So. 2d 838; Liner v. McEnery, La.App., 176 So. 2d 786. Under the facts and circumstances herein, we find that plaintiff did what a reasonable man would do. He was familiar with the actions of horses, as he himself owned a small race horse which he quartered in one of defendant's stalls. As stated supra, he was not informed of the "dangerous propensity" of the filly. In leaning over the opening of the stall and taking hold of the filly's mane, he did what he thought was prudent; he was attempting to apply medication as had been requested. He certainly did not acquiesce in any danger nor assume any risk; he anticipated no trouble. Under the instant facts, there was no reason for him to anticipate that the filly would abruptly turn around and kick him. Cf. Jack v. Sylvester, La.App., 150 So. 2d 789; Dallas v. Crescent Forwarding & Transportation Co., Ltd., La.App., 13 So. 2d 113; Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., La.App., 15 So. 2d 132; 7 C.J.S. Assumption, Assumption of risk, p. 137; Mungo v. Bennett, *548 238 S.C. 79, 119 S.E.2d 522; Hatchell v. Field, 238 S.C. 398, 120 S.E.2d 401. We find plaintiff free of negligence and entitled to recover damages for the personal injuries he suffered. The Court of Appeal has adequately covered the issue of quantum. We find no error in its conclusions. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, is affirmed. All costs to be borne by defendant. FOURNET, C.J., absent.