Title: Vargas-Rocha v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vargas-Rocha v. State1995 WY 33891 P.2d 763Case Number: 94-104Decided: 03/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Juan 
VARGAS-ROCHA, a/k/a Wienceseloas Martinez, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, and David Gosar, Asst. 
Public Defender, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Juan 
Vargas-Rocha appeals from his conviction for possessing cocaine with the intent 
to deliver.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Appellant did not 
include a statement in his brief of the issues which are being presented for our 
review as is required by W.R.A.P. 7.01(d). He does, however, make seven 
arguments in his brief:

Argument I

Evidence derived from the illegal stop of the vehicle 
in which Appellant was a passenger, and the subsequent unconstitutional NCIC 
computer search of his identification, was "fruit of the poisonous tree" and 
should have been suppressed[.]

Argument II

Appellant's state and federal constitutional rights 
against compelled self-incrimination were violated by testimony and comment on 
Appellant's silence[.]

Argument III 

Testimony and comment expressing a belief that the 
Appellant was guilty of the charged crime was an improper and inadmissible 
opinion on the ultimate issue[.]

Argument IV

Reversible error occurred when the court failed to 
give a cautionary instruction requested by defense 
counsel[.]

Argument V

Reversible error occurred when the trial court failed 
to instruct the jury that their verdict must be 
unanimous[.]

Argument VI

The Appellant was deprived of a fair trial by the 
prosecutor's improper and prejudicial closing argument[.]

Argument VII

Appellant's conviction should be reversed pursuant to 
the doctrine of cumulative error[.]

Facts

[¶4]      On October 4, 
1993, while Stephen Townsend, a Wyoming highway patrolman, was completing a 
traffic stop south of Cheyenne on Highway 85 near the Colorado-Wyoming state 
line, a vehicle traveling north passed him. Patrolman Townsend observed that the 
vehicle had a Colorado license plate on its rear and that it did not have a 
license plate on its front. He decided to stop the vehicle, intending to issue a 
warning citation to the driver for improperly displaying license 
plates.

[¶5]      Patrolman 
Townsend stopped the vehicle and asked the driver for his driver's license and 
the vehicle registration. The driver gave the vehicle registration to Patrolman 
Townsend but not his driver's license, so the patrolman asked the driver for his 
name and date of birth.1 The name which the driver gave to 
Patrolman Townsend was not the same name as was listed on the vehicle 
registration. In addition to the driver, Appellant and two other passengers 
occupied the vehicle. Patrolman Townsend asked the three passengers what their 
names were and asked them if they had any identification. Appellant gave his 
nonresident alien identification card and his social security card to the 
patrolman, but none of the other passengers had any 
identification.

[¶6]      Patrolman 
Townsend took Appellant's documents and the information which he had obtained 
from the driver and returned to his patrol car. He radioed the dispatcher, 
requesting that a computerized search be made of the data base maintained by the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to determine whether the driver or 
Appellant had a valid driver's license or any outstanding wants or warrants.2 The search revealed that a Colorado 
warrant existed for Appellant's arrest.3 Patrolman Townsend decided to 
arrest Appellant pursuant to the Colorado arrest warrant, and he radioed for 
additional patrolmen to be sent to help him make the 
arrest.

[¶7]      When the 
additional patrolmen arrived approximately ten minutes later, Patrolman Townsend 
returned to the vehicle and asked the occupants to exit one at a time. When 
Appellant exited, Patrolman Townsend "patted him down" and found a roll of 
currency which measured approximately one inch to two inches in diameter and 
which totaled about $750 in Appellant's right front pants pocket. None of the 
other occupants was carrying any money. 

[¶8]      Because none of 
the occupants had a driver's license, Patrolman Townsend determined that the car 
would have to be towed, and he began making an inventory search of the car. 
During the inventory search, he found a clear plastic bag on the floor under the 
seat located in front of what had been Appellant's seat. The bag contained 
eighteen one-half gram bindles of cocaine, a small amount of marijuana, and a 
small rock of cocaine.

[¶9]      Patrolman 
Townsend held up the bag and asked the occupants who owned it. No one said 
anything. Since the bag contained what appeared to be controlled substances, 
Patrolman Townsend called the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and two 
DCI special agents were dispatched to the scene. One of the DCI agents advised 
Appellant of his Miranda rights and 
questioned him in the agents' vehicle. Appellant denied that he knew anything 
about the bag of drugs, and he claimed that he was carrying the currency because 
he planned to buy a car in Cheyenne.

[¶10]   The DCI agents transported 
Appellant to their office in Cheyenne and resumed their questioning after they 
again advised Appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant admitted that 
the drugs were his, but he claimed that they were for his personal 
use.

[¶11]   Appellant was charged with 
possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver in violation of WYO. STAT. §§ 
35-7-1031(a)(i) and 35-7-1016(b)(iv) (1994). A jury found him guilty, and the 
district court sentenced him to serve a term of not less than five years nor 
more than seven years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Appellant appealed to 
this Court.

Standard 
of Review

[¶12]   Appellant bases only two of his 
claims on appeal upon contemporaneous objections which were made by defense 
counsel. The remaining issues are, therefore, subject to our plain error 
standard of review. See Christian v. State, 883 P.2d 376, 380 (Wyo. 1994). We 
conclude, however, that it is not necessary for us to apply our plain error 
standard of review in this case because we do not discern any error which 
occurred in the proceedings below. See Smith v. State, 880 P.2d 573, 574 (Wyo. 
1994).

Motion to 
Suppress

[¶13]   Appellant contends that the traffic 
stop was illegal and violated his state and federal constitutional rights and 
that the evidence derived from the traffic stop should have been suppressed 
because it was the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Specifically, he claims that 
the patrolman had no authority to stop the vehicle for a violation of Colorado 
law and that, therefore, the initial traffic stop was illegal. He further claims 
that all the evidence derived from the stop of the vehicle should have been 
suppressed because the patrolman did not have a reasonable suspicion that 
Appellant was engaged in, or about to become engaged in, criminal activity when 
he requested that a search of the NCIC data base be made and because the search 
of the NCIC data base was a "prohibited pretext search."

[¶14]   Patrolman Townsend had authority to 
make the initial traffic stop. His authority originated in two statutes. First, 
WYO. STAT. § 24-12-102 (1993) states in pertinent part: "The state highway 
patrol . . . shall enforce all the motor vehicle laws of this state." Second, 
WYO. STAT. § 31-2-201 (1994) requires owners of vehicles which are being driven 
in Wyoming to apply for Wyoming registrations if their vehicles do not display 
license plates in accordance with the laws of another state. Section 
31-2-201(a), (d)(vi), (d)(vii).

[¶15]   The car in this case had a Colorado 
license plate on its rear but did not have any license plate on its front. The 
Colorado statutes require that a vehicle have a license plate on both its rear 
and its front. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-3-113(1) (1993) (amended 1994). Since the 
car's license plates were not displayed in accordance with Colorado law, 
Patrolman Townsend had a reason to suspect that the driver was violating Wyoming 
law, and he had authority to stop the car.

[¶16]   Appellant claims that the district 
court should have suppressed the roll of currency, the bag of drugs, and the 
statements which Appellant made to the investigating officers. We do not agree. 
Patrolman Townsend testified that he had decided the car would have to be towed 
because none of the occupants had a driver's license and that he, therefore, 
performed an inventory search to document the items which were left in the car. 
While he was performing the valid inventory search, Patrolman Townsend found the 
bag of drugs on the floor under the seat which was in front of where Appellant 
had been sitting.

[¶17]   An inventory search of an impounded 
automobile is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is conducted 
pursuant to a standardized police procedure. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); see also Williams v. 
State, 557 P.2d 135, 139 (Wyo. 1976). "`[I]nventory procedures serve to protect 
an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against 
claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from 
danger.'" Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1990) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987)).

[¶18]   The evidence derived from the 
traffic stop was admissible because the officers would have discovered all the 
evidence which they discovered in this case through the valid inventory search 
whether or not the search of the NCIC data base had been 
made.

Exclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably 
have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a 
criminal trial. . . .

. . . .

. . . [W]hen . . . the evidence in question would 
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or 
misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is 
admissible.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446-48, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2510-11, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 
(1984).

Comments 
Concerning Silence

[¶19]   Appellant alleges that his state 
and federal constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination were 
violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony and made comments about 
Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent.

[¶20]   "`[T]he use for impeachment 
purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving 
Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1716, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993) (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 
2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976)). This Court has extended the protection offered by 
the federal constitution by broadly interpreting Wyoming's constitutional 
prohibition against infringing upon a defendant's right to remain 
silent:

Historically, our Court has jealously guarded the 
right provided in Art. 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
against any infringement. . . . [U]nder this section of our state constitution 
any comment upon an accused's exercise of his right of silence, whether by 
interrogation of the accused himself, or by interrogation of others inherently 
is prejudicial, and will entitle an accused to reversal of his conviction. Such 
a breach of the accused's constitutional protections is plain error and 
prejudicial per se.

Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978). See also Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 1984). 
We apply the Clenin rule on a case-by-case basis. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1381 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 
(1981). "Absent a showing of prejudice and where the statement is not a comment 
upon an appellant's silence, but merely a reference to it, we will not reverse." 
628 P.2d  at 1382. We consider the comments in the context in which they were 
made. Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53, 55-56 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶21]   Appellant refers to five 
occurrences which he claims constituted direct comments concerning his silence. 
The first two occurrences took place while the prosecutor was questioning 
Patrolman Townsend:

Q. . . . You testified you found this baggie as you 
indicated on the diagram, which would be at the feet of [Appellant]. What did 
you then do? 

A. I held the baggie up so the four of them could see 
it, asked who owned it, and none of them 
said anything.

. 
. . .

Q. [Defense counsel] asked you if it was true that 
[Appellant] was the most cooperative out there, do you remember that 
question?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did [Appellant] admit to you that they were 
his drugs when you first found that bag, stood up and turned and said whose are 
these, did he say anything then?

A. No.

(Emphasis added.) The second 
two occurrences took place during the prosecutor's direct examination of one of 
the DCI agents:

Q. He indicated to you that he was looking at coming 
to Cheyenne and maybe buying a car?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he explain how it was that he could drive a 
car away and he didn't have a driver's license?

A. I was looking through his wallet and I was asking 
him why he was coming to Cheyenne to buy a car and drive it out since he didn't 
have a driver's license, he didn't 
answer.

. 
. . .

Q. Any conversations as you drove to 
town?

A. While we were going back, I told [Appellant] that 
we were going to submit all the drugs to the crime lab to be analyzed, and I 
told him that one of the things they do is take fingerprints off the bags and 
off the bindles and if the drugs weren't his, then he wouldn't have to worry 
because his fingerprints won't be on them. But I asked him if there was any 
reason why they should be on there and he didn't say anything. So I told him 
to think about it and we would talk a little more down at the 
office.

(Emphasis added.) The last 
occurrence transpired during the prosecutor's closing 
argument:

That's what we know. Then we have a search of the car 
and we find the bindles of cocaine that you've seen in the plastic bag. 
Patrolman Townsend pulls it out of the car, holds it up in the air, calls back 
to the four people and says whose is this. Nobody says anything. So he calls [one 
of the DCI special agents who] comes out to the scene.

. 
. . .

Now if you recall [defense counsel] in his opening 
statement characterized that as cooperation. You will see and the testimony will 
show [defense counsel] said his client cooperated with law enforcement. Well, 
what I just described to you, the testimony of the officers, is that cooperation 
or is it more limited self-serving statements and actions that he does as he 
needs to as the case unfolds and he's confronted with the 
evidence.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶22]   Appellant argues that these 
comments were much like the comments which we condemned in Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1976). While some of the comments in this case were similar to 
those in Jerskey, they were not made in a similar context at trial. In Jerskey, 
the prosecutor raised the issue of the defendant's silence when he elicited 
testimony about that silence from the investigating officers. 546 P.2d  at 
178-79. We concluded that the prosecution had elicited the testimony "to create 
the inference that an honest answer would have established the appellant's 
guilt." 546 P.2d  at 183.

[¶23]   Here, by contrast, defense counsel 
opened the door to the comments by repeatedly raising the issue of Appellant's 
cooperation. The defense claimed that Appellant would not have been cooperative 
if he had intended to deliver the cocaine rather than to possess it for his own 
use. The prosecutor offered the comments in an effort to rebut Appellant's 
theory. In this context, the statements were not comments which pertained to 
Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. See Gomez, 718 P.2d  at 
55-56. We conclude that the comments did not constitute a violation of either 
the state constitution or the federal constitution when they are considered in 
the context in which they were made. 

Comments 
Concerning Guilt

[¶24]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court improperly allowed the testimony in which the witness expressed a belief 
that Appellant was guilty of the crime charged to be admitted into evidence and 
that the testimony deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights 
to have a fair trial.

[¶25]   "[T]estimony offering an opinion as 
to the guilt of the defendant, when elicited by a prosecuting attorney, should 
be perceived as error per se." Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 
1989).

The inquiry by the court when claims like this are 
raised, assuming that proper objections are presented, must be whether the 
testimony sought to be elicited will constitute a direct, and therefore 
impermissible, opinion with respect to the innocence or guilt of the accused or 
whether it is nothing more than related information offered to assist the jury 
in resolving the factual issues placed before it. Testimony that is given only 
as an aid to the jury in its pursuit of the facts and does not address directly 
the guilt of the accused in a conclusional way does not deprive a defendant of 
the constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 617 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted).

[¶26]   Appellant claims that in four 
instances the district court improperly allowed comments which pertained to his 
guilt to be admitted into evidence. All four comments occurred during the 
prosecutor's direct examination of a DCI agent:

Q.        Who did he 
say had packaged up each and every one of the 18 separate 
bindles?

A.        He said he 
had.

Q.        Did you 
question him about that?

A.        I told him 
that was a lot of work to go to. He had indicated that it was for personal use. 
And I told him that given the fact that we had found a large amount of currency 
in small denominations, which is consistent with the sale of small quantities of 
cocaine, due to the fact that we had found him with a lot of individual bindles 
that appeared to be ready for resale, the fact that he had the cocaine rock 
there ready to cut some more off possibly to sell or whatever, I told him that all those . . . factors 
taken into consideration showed to me that indeed he had brought that cocaine up 
from Greeley to sell in Cheyenne; that it wasn't for personal use, that there 
was no way that he would take that much with him from Greeley to Cheyenne if it 
was just for personal use.

Q.        How did he 
respond?

A.        Well, he 
said that he had forgotten that he had it with him when he left Colorado, that 
when the Highway Patrolman pulled in behind him, turned [his] lights on, he got 
scared because he remembered he had it with him then and that he had hidden it 
under the seat at that time.

Q.        He told you 
that he forgot he left Greeley with it and he remembered he had 
it?

A.        After the 
Patrolman pulled in behind him.

Q.        Did you 
talk to him about going to the trouble of packaging 18 separate little bindles 
each with exactly one half gram in it for his own use?

A.        I did ask 
him about that, yes.

Q.        How did he 
respond?

A.        He said 
that he knew exactly how much cocaine he was using if he had them all weighed 
out and packaged like that, and I told 
him I didn't believe that.

. 
. . .

Q. Did you confront him with that very statement, 
it's not consistent with what I know?

A. Yes, I told him all the factors taken into 
consideration, what we had caught him with, the money, the drugs packaged in 
that way, all indicated to me that he 
was up here to sell cocaine -

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'll object, I'll 
object.

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, that's the form of the 
question he confronted the Defendant with.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it's an opinion and I 
request that it be excluded, it's an opinion that goes to the ultimate issue, 
the ultimate fact in issue and request that the - if the Court allows the 
testimony that the Court instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which 
it is presented.

THE COURT: The objection is 
overruled.

Q.        [By 
[Prosecutor]) Did you confront him, in essence, with your expertise saying 
nobody does it that way?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        How did he 
respond?

A.        He said he 
did it that way.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶27]   None of the DCI agent's statements 
constituted a direct statement of opinion with respect to Appellant's guilt. 
Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 617. The statements were not direct statements to the jury; 
they merely related the DCI agent's conversation with Appellant to the jury. The 
statements were offered to assist the jury in resolving the factual issue of 
whether Appellant was telling the truth. Since the statements did not constitute 
a direct opinion as to Appellant's guilt, the district court properly allowed 
them to be admitted.

Cautionary 
Instruction

[¶28]   Appellant claims that the district 
court violated W.R.E. 105 and thereby deprived him of his state and federal 
constitutional rights to have a fair trial when it failed to give the cautionary 
instruction to the jury which defense counsel requested during the prosecutor's 
direct examination of the DCI agent. He maintains that the jury should have been 
instructed that the DCI agent's opinion, as expressed through his conversation 
with Appellant, was not evidence of guilt but was to be considered only to place 
Appellant's responses into context.

W.R.E. 105 states in pertinent 
part:

When evidence which is admissible . . . for one (1) 
purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the court, 
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly.

"A legally and factually 
correct instruction must be tendered to the court before error can be predicated 
upon refusal to give it." Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 813 (Wyo. 1980). When 
a party wishes to limit the purpose for which evidence is admitted, that party 
should set forth the purpose in a request for a limiting instruction. See, e.g., 
id. "If the rule incorporated in a proffered instruction is included in other 
instructions, it properly may be refused by the trial court." Johnson v. State, 
872 P.2d 93, 99 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶29]   The instructions which were given 
to the jury stated that the State had the burden of proving that the defendant 
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was for the jury to decide issues 
of fact, and that "[l]aw enforcement officers are not entitled to any greater 
credence than any other witness appearing before you." We have previously 
concluded that, because the DCI agent's testimony did not constitute a direct 
comment with regard to Appellant's guilt, the district court properly allowed 
the testimony which defense counsel sought to limit to be admitted. Since the 
testimony was properly allowed, the district court had no reason to restrict its 
scope pursuant to W.R.E. 105.

Unanimous 
Verdict Instruction

[¶30]   Appellant asserts that reversible 
error occurred when the district court failed to instruct the jury that its 
verdict must be unanimous.

[¶31]   Article 1, Section 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution recognizes the right of an accused to receive a unanimous verdict 
by twelve impartial jurors. Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo. 1991). 
W.R.Cr.P. 31 states in part:

(a) Return. - The verdict shall be unanimous. It 
shall be returned by the jury to the judge in open court.

. 
. . .

(d) Poll of jury. - When a verdict is returned and 
before it is recorded the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or 
upon the court's own motion. If upon the poll there is not unanimous 
concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may 
be discharged.

"`Polling is one means of 
ensuring unanimity.'" United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875, 877 (10th 
Cir.) (quoting United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir. 1979)), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844, 111 S. Ct. 125, 112 L. Ed. 2d 94 
(1990).

[¶32]   In this case, after the jury's 
verdict had been announced, defense counsel requested that the jury be polled. 
The district court polled the jury, and all the jurors concurred in the verdict. 
The poll of the jury ensured that the verdict was unanimous; therefore, no error 
occurred.

Closing 
Argument

[¶33]   Appellant alleges that the 
prosecutor's improper closing argument deprived him of his right to have a fair 
trial.

[¶34]   With respect to closing arguments, 
we have stated:

The prosecutor may comment on the evidence, and he 
may make any reasonable inferences that follow from that evidence. He may not, 
however, inflame or mislead the jury. The trial court is in the best position to 
consider the appropriateness of the argument. Counsel are allowed wide latitude 
in the scope of their argument.

Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 
659 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted).

In the course of our review, we consider the entire 
closing argument and do not take individual sentences or phrases out of context. 
We also consider the closing argument in the context of the entire trial 
record.

Smith, 880 P.2d  at 574 
(citations omitted).

[¶35]   We have already addressed the 
comment made by the prosecutor during his closing argument which Appellant 
claims was an improper comment on his right to remain silent. Appellant also 
claims that several instances occurred during the prosecutor's closing argument 
in which the prosecutor implied that Appellant was guilty by referring to him as 
a "drug dealer" or by referring to his "drug dealing activities." None of these 
instances amounted to a direct comment with respect to Appellant's guilt. See 
Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 617. The prosecutor's comments constituted reasonable 
inferences on the basis of the evidence adduced, and they were, therefore, 
proper. Taul, 862 P.2d  at 659.

[¶36]   Appellant lists numerous additional 
comments which the prosecutor made during his closing argument and which 
Appellant claims were improper. We have thoroughly examined all the comments 
listed and the parties' arguments with respect to each of the comments. The 
prosecutor's comments were all within the wide latitude which attorneys enjoy 
while they are presenting their closing arguments.

Cumulative 
Error

[¶37]   Appellant contends that his 
conviction should be reversed pursuant to the doctrine of cumulative error. No 
error occurred in this case. When no error has occurred, a claim of cumulative 
error cannot be recognized. Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 453 (Wyo. 
1993).

Conclusion

[¶38]   Appellant's conviction for 
possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver is affirmed.

 

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring, with whom LEHMAN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶39]   I write separately only to address 
briefly the accused's complaint that he was deprived of a fair trial by the 
prosecutor's improper closing argument.

[¶40]   Charged with possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver, the accused admitted possession but denied having the 
intent to deliver, claiming he possessed it for his own personal use. Thus, the 
battle at trial was joined over the single discrete issue of whether the 
prosecution could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the 
intent to deliver the cocaine he admitted possessing.

[¶41]   The accused possessed eighteen 
one-half gram bindles (a small folded piece of paper) and "a small rock" of 
cocaine (weight unknown). When arrested, he had $750, consisting of several 
hundred dollar bills and various other denominations, including twenties and 
fifties. He told one of the law enforcement personnel who questioned him that he 
purchased "a rock" of cocaine in Mexico and, for his own personal use, had 
placed one-half gram portions from the "rock" in the separate bindles. The 
accused further told him he had a job in Greeley where he had earned the $750 he 
was carrying; that he was traveling from Greeley to Cheyenne to buy a car with 
the money; that he had forgotten he had the cocaine with him until stopped by 
the Wyoming Highway Patrol at which time he remembered he had it so he hid it 
under the car seat in front of him.

[¶42]   One of the law enforcement 
personnel testified that from his law enforcement experience it was known that 
ordinarily a personal user of cocaine would not package separate bindles for 
personal consumption. Cocaine sellers ordinarily package their product in 
separate bindles.

[¶43]   Also on behalf of the prosecution, 
a jail informant, who had shared quarters with the accused following the 
latter's arrest, testified that the accused told him that when arrested he was 
traveling to Cheyenne to sell cocaine to a friend to whom he had been selling 
for a year.

[¶44]   The above and foregoing hard 
evidence was the product of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The accused 
presented no evidence in his defense-in-chief.

[¶45]   From an evidentiary perspective, 
the prosecution's case that the accused had the intent to deliver the eighteen 
bindles and perhaps more was strong. This was not a close 
case.

[¶46]   During the prosecutor's initial 
closing argument, the accused's experienced defense counsel voiced no objections 
about improper argument. In the approximately ten pages of transcript of the 
prosecutor's initial closing statement, the prosecutor emphasized the key pieces 
of hard evidence: the $750 cash, the eighteen packaged bindles, the ordinary way 
sellers sell is with bindles, and the accused's admission to the jailhouse 
informant of his intent to sell to a friend in Cheyenne to whom he had been 
selling for a year.

[¶47]   With respect to these ten pages of 
transcript of the prosecutor's initial closing argument, the accused's appellate 
counsel points to many instances in which he finds improper comment, ranging 
from personal belief of guilt, to the accused's possible illegal alien status, 
to comment on the right to remain silent, to linking the accused's nationality 
with drug trafficking from Mexico, to the ease with which the accused could make 
money selling drugs, to characterizing the accused's defense as one that 
challenged the jury's intelligence, and to encouraging the jury to perform their 
civic duty.

[¶48]   I have read these passages in the 
context of the whole case and the entirety of the closing argument. Many of the 
instances complained about are not improper argument. The few that are 
borderline are not so flagrant that they survive the application of the rule of 
waiver. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶49]   During the prosecutor's rebuttal 
closing argument, which consists of approximately five pages of transcript, the 
accused's experienced trial counsel voiced but one objection. In context this is 
what occurred. In his closing argument, defense counsel had argued that the 
prosecution's jailhouse informant was not credible because the law enforcement 
authorities had not investigated information he had given them about the 
presence of a quantity of cocaine at a location in Greeley. In rebuttal, the 
prosecutor commented on facts not in evidence when he 
stated:

Perhaps [defense counsel] forgot, but I'm sure you 
haven't. Remember, it was all over the paper about three weeks ago about all the 
arrests down in Greeley.

To this remark, defense 
counsel objected "that's not in evidence." The trial judge did not rule on the 
objection, the prosecutor continued in rebuttal, and defense counsel said 
nothing further. Within seconds, the prosecutor remarked that Colorado law 
enforcement authorities do act on information provided by Wyoming law 
enforcement authorities and then he added, "[a]nd yet people get killed in 
shoot-outs, but that's indeed the violent nature of this 
drug."

[¶50]   Defense counsel did not object to 
this remark. On appeal, however, appellate defense counsel assigns this remark 
as plain error, but provides precious little analysis of the alleged material 
prejudice to the accused's substantial right to a fair 
trial.

[¶51]   Another remark made by the 
prosecutor during rebuttal, which also did not draw defense counsel's objection, 
occurred when the prosecutor commented on defense counsel's argument that the 
evidence had shown each of the eighteen bindles possessed by the accused 
contained only 0.2 grams instead of 0.5 grams. Accusing defense counsel of 
minimizing the accused's activity, the prosecutor argued:

He says when you add it all together that's all there 
is. But it's much more likely, ladies and gentlemen, the tip of the iceberg. 
What you see above water is no where near what's under water. What you see here in court is no where near 
the volume sales this individual has been doing. (emphasis 
added)

[¶52]   On appeal, appellate defense 
counsel alleges that this remark constituted plain error - it was so flagrant as 
not to escape the rule of waiver. Appellate defense counsel correctly points out 
that the accused was on trial for the charged crime, not for "the high volume of 
sales" with which the prosecutor suspected him to be involved. Appellate defense 
counsel sees the prosecutor's remark as "a blatant attempt to secure a 
conviction outside the evidence presented in the case." He asks us to condemn 
strongly improper remarks of this nature. We have in the past, we do now, and we 
will do so in the future should they recur, which they, regrettably, probably 
will. Given our standard of review applicable to this particular kind of error 
and considering these remarks in the context of the total case and the entirety 
of closing argument, I cannot say that the "so flagrant" line was crossed in 
these instances.

[¶53]   That is not to say, however, that 
this particular prosecutor, or any other prosecutor in this state, has a free 
ticket from this Court to repeat this type of improper argument. It must stop - 
now!

[¶54]   Perhaps we must remind both 
prosecutors and defense counsel, again, about their respective roles with 
respect to this particular issue. See, e.g., Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384-85 
(Wyo. 1992) and Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893-95 (Wyo. 1982). I hope they 
reflect on their solemn responsibilities. I hope they rededicate themselves to 
pursuing the ideal of justice, of fairness, of due process. I hope they get the 
message. The survival of our system of justice depends on 
it.

 

Footnotes

1 The record indicates that the driver 
did not understand the English language and that Appellant acted as an 
interpreter for Patrolman Townsend and the driver.

2 The record does not clearly indicate 
why Patrolman Townsend requested that a warrant check be made for Appellant, 
although he did testify that requesting the check was standard 
procedure.

3 The search also revealed that no 
license was on file for the name which the driver had given to Patrolman 
Townsend. The driver later admitted that he was the registered owner of the car. 
Patrolman Townsend requested that a second search, using the driver's true name, 
be made of the NCIC data base. He, consequently, learned that the driver's 
Colorado driving privileges had been suspended. The patrolman eventually cited 
the driver for driving while his privileges were suspended, and he charged him 
with interfering with a police officer because he had given a false name to the 
patrolman. The record suggests that the other two passengers' names were also 
entered during the second search of the NCIC data 
base.