Title: Cave v. Conrad

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cave v. Conrad, 94 Ohio St.3d 299, 2002-Ohio-793.] 
 
 
CAVE, APPELLEE, v. CONRAD, ADMR., APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Cave v. Conrad (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 299.] 
Workers’ compensation — Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), reasonable 
videotaped deposition expenses may be taxed as costs and awarded to a 
successful workers’ compensation claimant in an action brought 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. 
(No. 00-2083 — Submitted December 11, 2001 — Decided February 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Pike County, No. 00CA645. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), reasonable videotaped deposition expenses may be 
taxed as costs and awarded to a successful workers’ compensation 
claimant in an action brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, Acting C.J.  On March 6, 1985, appellee, Yolanda Cave, 
suffered an industrial injury during the course of and arising from her 
employment.  The Industrial Commission allowed appellee’s initial claim for 
injuries sustained to her neck and back.  On May 13, 1996, appellee sought to 
reactivate her workers’ compensation claim by filing for recognition of an 
additional medical condition, disc herniation.  The Industrial Commission denied 
this additional condition. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, appellee filed an appeal from the denial of this 
claim on March 10, 1997, to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas.  A jury 
trial was held, during which appellee presented the videotaped deposition 
testimony of two expert witnesses, Dr. Thomas J. Hawk and Dr. R. Michael 
Kelly.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee, finding that she was 
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entitled to an award from the Workers’ Compensation Fund for the condition of 
disc herniation.  On October 12, 1999, the trial court entered judgment on the 
verdict and, pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(D) and (F), further ordered the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation to pay appellee certain expenses incurred by her in 
connection with her trial. 
 
The trial court also permitted appellee to file a motion to tax as costs 
certain expenses for videotaping the depositions of Drs. Hawk and Kelly.  
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court ordered the videotaped 
deposition expenses to be paid by the bureau as “cost of legal proceedings” 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F). 
 
Appellant, the Administrator of Workers’ Compensation, filed an appeal 
to the Pike County Court of Appeals.  The sole issue raised by appellant was in 
regard to the trial court’s order awarding appellee the expenses of the videotaping.  
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  Cave v. Conrad (2000), 140 
Ohio App.3d 202, 746 N.E.2d 1179.  This cause is now before this court upon the 
allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that R.C. 4123.512(F) 
entitled appellee as the prevailing party to recover from the bureau the videotaped 
deposition expenses as the “cost of any legal proceeding.”  Both courts arrived at 
this conclusion even though R.C. 4123.512(D) also required the bureau to pay 
appellee the costs of stenographic transcription of the same depositions. 
 
Appellant questions the propriety of assessing “dual payments” for both 
videotaped deposition costs and stenographic deposition costs.  Appellant 
contends that neither the bureau nor a self-insured employer should ever be 
responsible for paying both.  We disagree. 
 
R.C. 4123.512 sets forth the procedure in cases of injury or occupational 
disease whereby a claimant or an employer may appeal an order of the Industrial 
Commission or an order of a staff hearing officer from which the commission has 
January Term, 2002 
3 
refused to hear an appeal.  R.C. 4123.512 contains two provisions, R.C. 
4123.512(D) and (F), whereby a claimant may recover costs of an appeal. 
 
R.C. 4123.512(D) provides: 
 
“The bureau of workers’ compensation shall pay the cost of the 
stenographic deposition filed in court and of copies of the stenographic deposition 
for each party from the surplus fund and charge the costs thereof against the 
unsuccessful party if the claimant’s right to participate or continue to participate is 
finally sustained or established in the appeal.” 
 
In Akers v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 78, 31 OBR 190, 
508 N.E.2d 964, the court interpreted paragraph six of former R.C. 4123.519, the 
substantively identical precursor to R.C. 4123.512(D), as providing that “[t]he 
stenographic and reproduction costs of depositions are to be paid from the 
Industrial Commission surplus fund under the ‘cost of the deposition’ provision * 
* * whether or not the claimant successfully establishes a right to participate 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”  Id. at syllabus; for former R.C. 
4123.519, see 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3940.  The court determined that 
stenographic and reproduction costs of depositions are borne by the surplus fund 
in the first instance and that, under this section, reimbursement of the surplus fund 
is conditioned on claimant’s right to participate in the fund being established or 
sustained on appeal.  In that event, the stenographic and reproduction deposition 
costs are to be charged against the nonprevailing party, either the self-insured 
employer or the Industrial Commission.  Id. at 79-80, 31 OBR at 192, 508 N.E.2d 
at 965-966.  Thus, according to former R.C. 4123.519 and current R.C. 
4123.512(D), a claimant never bears responsibility for stenographic deposition 
costs, regardless of the outcome of his or her claim. 
 
R.C. 4123.512(F), the second subsection allowing for taxing of costs, 
provides: 
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“The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this section, including an 
attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney to be fixed by the trial judge, based upon 
the effort expended, in the event the claimant’s right to participate or to continue 
to participate in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal, 
shall be taxed against the employer or the commission if the commission or the 
administrator rather than the employer contested the right of the claimant to 
participate in the fund.” 
 
This court has on prior occasions concluded that the phrase “cost of any 
legal proceedings” in R.C. 4123.512(F) is considerably broader in scope than the 
phrase “cost of the deposition” in R.C. 4123.512(D).  In interpreting this section, 
this court has consistently adhered to the mandate of R.C. 4123.95 to construe 
workers’ compensation laws liberally in favor of employees and the dependents 
of deceased employees.  For instance, in Moore v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1985), 18 
Ohio St.3d 259, 18 OBR 314, 480 N.E.2d 1101, the court held that an expert 
witness’s fee for preparing for and giving a deposition was reimbursable under the 
predecessor section to R.C. 4123.512(F), R.C. 4123.519.  Additionally, we 
recently held that “an attorney’s travel expenses incurred in taking a deposition of 
an expert are a reimbursable ‘cost of any legal proceedings’ under R.C. 
4123.512(F).”  Kilgore v. Chrysler Corp. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 184, 749 N.E.2d 
267, syllabus. 
 
Central to the court’s dispositions in Moore and Kilgore was the rationale 
that statutes providing for reimbursement of costs to successful claimants in 
workers’ compensation appeals are “designed to minimize the actual expense 
incurred by an injured employee who establishes his or her right to participate in 
the fund.”  Moore, 18 Ohio St.3d at 261-262, 18 OBR at 316, 480 N.E.2d at 1103.  
Accordingly, in enacting statutes such as R.C. 4123.512(F), the General 
Assembly “has demonstrated its intent that a claimant’s recovery shall not be 
dissipated by reasonable litigation expenses connected with the preparation and 
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presentation of an appeal pursuant to R.C. 4123.519,” the predecessor of R.C. 
4123.512.  Id. at 262, 18 OBR at 317, 480 N.E.2d at 1103; see, also, Kilgore, 92 
Ohio St.3d at 186, 749 N.E.2d at 271.  We see no reason to retreat from that 
reasoning now. 
 
Appellant also argues that costs taxable to the nonprevailing party are 
allowed only by authority of statute.  Appellant contends that according to 
Williamson v. Ameritech Corp. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 342, 691 N.E.2d 288, there 
is no statute allowing deposition expenses to be taxed and included in the 
judgment. 
 
It is true that “[t]his court has consistently limited the categories of 
expenses which qualify as ‘costs.’ ”  Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 50, 23 O.O.3d 88, 89, 430 N.E.2d 925, 926.  “Costs are 
generally defined as the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors and 
others are entitled for their services in an action and which the statutes authorize 
to be taxed and included in the judgment.”  Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 
259, 39 O.O.2d 410, 227 N.E.2d 197, paragraph one of the syllabus. “The subject 
of costs is one entirely of statutory allowance and control.”  State ex rel. Michaels 
v. Morse (1956), 165 Ohio St. 599, 607, 60 O.O. 531, 535, 138 N.E.2d 660, 666, 
principle reaffirmed in Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 
at 51, 23 O.O.3d at 89, 430 N.E.2d at 926, and quoted in Vance v. Roedersheimer 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 555, 597 N.E.2d 153, 156. 
 
Notwithstanding, we find this argument of appellant not to be well taken.  
What appellant fails to recognize is that a distinct difference exists between civil 
cases in general and those involving workers’ compensation claims.  The court 
noted in Moore that compared to a tort action where more than mere economic 
losses may be sought, “[u]nder the terms of participation in the State Insurance 
Fund, a claimant may recover relatively modest amounts.”  Moore, 18 Ohio St.3d 
at 262, 18 OBR at 316, 480 N.E.2d at 1103.  Thus, because a workers’ 
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compensation claim is confined to recovery of only part of a claimant’s economic 
loses, and “costs” are expressly provided for in R.C. 4123.512, “the traditional 
dichotomy between ‘costs’ and ‘expenses’ in civil cases * * * is not directly 
applicable in the workers’ compensation area.”  Kilgore, 92 Ohio St.3d at 187, 
749 N.E.2d at 271. 
 
Moreover, the Ohio Rules of Superintendence have made videotaped 
deposition costs an exception to the long-standing principle that costs are allowed 
solely by statutory authority.  We have previously recognized that videotaped 
depositions are governed by the Ohio Rules of Superintendence.  State ex rel. 
Williams v. Colasurd (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 642, 645-646, 646 N.E.2d 830, 833, 
citing Gold v. Orr Felt Co. (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 214, 216, 21 OBR 228, 231, 
487 N.E.2d 347, 349.  In Williams, the court found that former C.P.Sup.R. 
12(D)(1) allowed for various expenses associated with videotaped depositions and 
specified “by whom the costs are to be assumed.”  Id. at 645, 646 N.E.2d at 833; 
see 59 Ohio St.2d xxxvii for former C.P.Sup.R. 12.  Similar provisions are now in 
Sup.R. 13,1 which provides, “The reasonable expense of recording testimony on 
videotape, the expense of playing the videotape recording at trial, and the expense 
of playing the videotape recording for the purpose of ruling upon objections shall 
be allocated as costs in the proceeding in accordance with Civil Rule 54.”2  
Sup.R. 13(D)(2). 
 
Furthermore, in Barrett v. Singer Co. (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 7, 14 O.O.3d 
122, 396 N.E.2d 218, the court held, “The expense of videotape depositions not 
used as evidence at trial is to be borne by the party taking such depositions and 
not taxed as costs in the action.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at syllabus.  See, also, 
Fairchild v. Lake Shore Elec. Ry. Co. (1920), 101 Ohio St. 261, 128 N.E.2d 168, 
                                                          
 
1. 
See 78 Ohio St.3d CCVII. 
2. 
Civ.R. 54(D) provides: 
 
“Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs 
shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” 
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7 
paragraph three of the syllabus (“Either party may take depositions while error 
proceedings are pending in a reviewing court to reverse the judgment of the trial 
court.  If such depositions are not used, the expense of taking them cannot be 
taxed in the costs of the case.”).  In Barrett, the court noted that “the judicial 
decisions prior to the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Superintendence reveal that 
the expense of depositions taken de bene esse is to be taxed as costs only if the 
depositions were used at trial, unless there are overriding considerations.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 9, 14 O.O.3d at 123, 396 N.E.2d at 219. 
 
The videography expenses now in dispute concern the videographer’s 
attendance and the cost of the videotape.  The trial court was correct to tax costs 
of the videotaped deposition against the bureau.  Sup.R. 13(D)(1) does provide, 
however, that “[t]he expense of videotape as a material shall be borne by the 
proponent.”  Thus, the trial court erred in including in the award the cost of the 
videotape as a material. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), reasonable 
videotaped deposition expenses may be taxed as costs and awarded to a successful 
workers’ compensation claimant in an action brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.  
Thus, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment. 
 
MOYER, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
Eric S. Bravo, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
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