Title: State ex rel. Fairfield City Schools v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Fairfield City Schools v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2378.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2378 
THE STATE EX REL. FAIRFIELD CITY SCHOOLS, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Fairfield City Schools v. Indus. Comm., Slip 
Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2378.] 
Workers’ compensation — R.C. 4123.343 — Employer sought handicap 
reimbursement for total disability compensation awarded to one of its 
employees — Employer did not prove that employee’s hypertension 
qualified as a cardiac disease, as that term is used in R.C. 4123.343. 
(No. 2010-0674 — Submitted March 22, 2011 — Decided May 24, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-271,  
2010-Ohio-871. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Fairfield City Schools (“Fairfield”) seeks handicap 
reimbursement under R.C. 4123.343(D)(2)1 for total disability compensation 
awarded to one of its employees. Created in 1955, the handicap reimbursement 
program encourages employers to hire persons with certain mental or physical 
conditions that could hinder employment.  R.C. 4123.343(A)(1) through (25). 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 642, 126 Ohio Laws 947.  The program  does so by charging to 
the state surplus fund all or part of the cost arising from an industrial injury 
sustained by an employee who has  one of the statute’s enumerated “diseases or 
conditions” if the disease or condition either caused or aggravated the industrial 
injury leading to death or disability. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} Edward Carpenter Jr., a Fairfield employee, has had hypertension 
since at least 1995.  In 2002, he injured his back while at work.  Carpenter’s back 
injury has resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation—first 
temporary total and now permanent total.  In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap 
reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for at least part 
of the disability payments made to Carpenter.  Fairfield’s  application alleged that 
Carpenter’s pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease, one of the conditions 
listed in R.C. 4123.343(A)(3), that delayed his recovery from back surgery, 
contributing to prolonged disability payments.  
                                                 
1 “(2) Whenever a handicapped employee is injured or disabled or dies as a result of an injury or 
occupational disease and the administrator finds that the injury or occupational disease would have 
been sustained or suffered without regard to the employee's pre-existing impairment but that the 
resulting disability or death was caused at least in part through aggravation of the employee's pre-
existing disability, the administrator shall determine in a manner that is equitable and reasonable 
and based upon medical evidence the amount of disability or proportion of the cost of the death 
award that is attributable to the employee's pre-existing disability and the amount found shall be 
charged to the statutory surplus fund. 
 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 3} Fairfield submitted the April 5, 2008 report of Dr. Paul T. Hogya, 
who had reviewed Carpenter’s medical records.  The report stated: 
{¶ 4} “The claimant does have history of hypertension with complicating 
cardiac arrhythmia in 1995.  His hypertension has been managed with Lisinopril.  
* * *  The hypertension would reasonably contribute to a handicap assessment 
with respect to his multiple lumbar surgeries * * *.  Chronic hypertension plays a 
role in delaying healing from these surgeries, exacerbated by his chronic smoking.  
Hypertension results in stiffer arteries, which limits healing, particularly involving 
the fusion surgeries.  Excellent blood flow is required to consolidate the bony 
fusion.  In this case, there was a failed back surgery with non-union.  This led to 
the two-stage surgery on 12/2/03 and 1/24/04.  Consequently, there was 
substantial delay in recovery, resulting in the need for a second procedure, which 
involved two stages over two months.  Therefore, a reasonable handicap 
assessment attributed to the cardiac disease (hypertension) would be 50%.” 
{¶ 5} The bureau rejected Dr. Hogya’s report as “insufficient to establish 
cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition that delayed recovery.”  It described 
the report as “speculative and tenuous” and stated that the report did not show that 
Carpenter’s injury was affected by hypertension but instead merely explained that 
in general, injuries are affected by hypertension.  It accordingly denied 
reimbursement, and Fairfield appealed to appellee, the Industrial Commission of 
Ohio. 
{¶ 6} A commission district hearing officer denied reimbursement, and 
on July 29, 2008, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) affirmed that decision for three 
reasons: (1) hypertension is not an R.C. 4123.343(A) enumerated condition, (2) 
Fairfield did not establish that Carpenter’s hypertension constituted a cardiac 
disease, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish that Carpenter’s high 
blood pressure contributed to the cost of his workers’ compensation claim. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 7} Fairfield appealed to the commission and submitted an August 12, 
2008 report from Dr. Hogya in which he explained why hypertension should be 
considered a cardiac disease.  The commission, however, refused further appeal. 
{¶ 8} Fairfield filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County, challenging the denial of reimbursement.  Fairfield relied 
heavily on a newly submitted piece of evidence—a one-page Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation document entitled “Handicap Reimbursement Guidelines.”  This 
document stated that “[e]vidence of high blood pressure/hypertension, without 
more explanation, does not constitute evidence of cardiac disease.” (Emphasis 
sic.)  Fairfield argued that it had satisfied the guidelines through Dr. Hogya’s 
reports that explained why Carpenter’s hypertension should be considered a 
cardiac disease.  Fairfield  urged the court to find that the commission had abused 
its discretion in rejecting that evidence. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals denied the writ. It stressed that the guidelines 
on which Fairfield relied were not commission guidelines, but bureau guidelines 
that had not been promulgated in accordance with R.C. 4123.343(A) and 119.03.  
Describing them as internal guidelines, the court of appeals noted that Fairfield 
cited no authority that bound one state agency to the internal guidelines of 
another.  The court also held that the commission’s exclusive authority to weigh 
the evidence permitted it to find that Dr. Hogya’s reports were insufficient 
evidence.  Emphasizing the commission’s substantial expertise in the area of 
handicap reimbursement, the court of appeals held that the commission did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that Carpenter’s hypertension was not a cardiac 
disease for handicap reimbursement purposes. 
{¶ 10} Fairfield now appeals to this court as of right. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} For handicap reimbursement to issue, an employer must first 
establish that its employee had one of the enumerated conditions under R.C. 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
4123.343(A).2  The condition currently at issue—hypertension—is not a 
designated condition.  Cardiac disease is listed in R.C. 4123.343(A)(3), although 
the term is not defined in the statute. 
{¶ 12} Fairfield argues that Carpenter’s hypertension should be classified 
as a cardiac disease and advances two propositions: one relies on dictionary 
definitions and would make hypertension a cardiac disease per se, the other relies 
on Dr. Hogya’s reports and would qualify Carpenter’s hypertension as a cardiac 
disease.  The commission contends that hypertension should not be considered to 
                                                 
2 {¶ a} (A) As used in this section, "handicapped employee" means an employee who is 
afflicted with or subject to any physical or mental impairment, or both, whether congenital or due 
to an injury or disease of such character that the impairment constitutes a handicap in obtaining 
employment or would constitute a handicap in obtaining reemployment if the employee should 
become unemployed and whose handicap is due to any of the following diseases or conditions: 
{¶ b} (1) Epilepsy; 
{¶ c} (2) Diabetes; 
{¶ d} (3) Cardiac disease; 
{¶ e} (4) Arthritis; 
{¶ f}  (5) Amputated foot, leg, arm, or hand; 
{¶ g} (6) Loss of sight of one or both eyes or a partial loss of uncorrected vision of more than 
seventy-five per cent bilaterally; 
{¶ h} (7) Residual disability from poliomyelitis; 
{¶ i}  (8) Cerebral palsy; 
{¶ j}  (9) Multiple sclerosis; 
{¶ k} (10) Parkinson's disease; 
{¶ l}  (11) Cerebral vascular accident; 
{¶ m} (12) Tuberculosis; 
{¶ n} (13) Silicosis; 
{¶ o} (14) Psycho-neurotic disability following treatment in a recognized medical or mental 
institution; 
{¶ p} (15) Hemophilia; 
{¶ q} (16) Chronic osteomyelitis; 
{¶ r} (17) Ankylosis of joints; 
{¶ s} (18) Hyper insulinism; 
{¶ t} (19) Muscular dystrophies; 
{¶ u} (20) Arterio-sclerosis; 
{¶ v} (21) Thrombo-phlebitis; 
{¶ w} (22) Varicose veins; 
{¶ x} (23) Cardiovascular, pulmonary, or respiratory diseases of a firefighter or police officer 
employed by a municipal corporation or township as a regular member of a lawfully constituted 
police department or fire department; 
{¶ y} (24) Coal miners' pneumoconiosis, commonly referred to as "black lung disease"; 
{¶ z} (25) Disability with respect to which an individual has completed a rehabilitation 
program conducted pursuant to sections 4121.61 to 4121.69 of the Revised Code. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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be a cardiac disease per se, and argues that the evidence in this case did not 
support a finding that Carpenter’s hypertension qualifies as a cardiac disease.  For 
the following reasons, we hold in the commission’s favor. 
{¶ 13} Fairfield initially argues that because R.C. Chapter 4123 does not 
define “cardiac disease,” it must be “accorded its plain, everyday meaning.” 
Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.E.2d 1386.  In 
asserting that Carpenter’s high blood pressure should be classified as a cardiac 
disease, Fairfield relies on extrapolation: because the term “cardiac” means 
relating to the heart, and hypertension affects the blood vessels that supply the 
heart, hypertension is a cardiac disease.  We reject this proposition. 
{¶ 14} If the mere fact of blood circulation were sufficient to transform a 
chronic condition into a cardiac disease, then ostensibly leukemia and anemia 
would also be cardiac diseases because they, too, affect the blood.  Fairfield’s 
reasoning could permit employer reimbursement for many conditions never 
anticipated by the legislature. 
{¶ 15} Second, Fairfield’s logic would permit handicap reimbursement in 
situations where a person’s hypertension has never manifested itself with the 
symptomatology of a cardiac disease.  High blood pressure can certainly lead to 
very serious heart problems, but many people—including Carpenter—control 
their hypertension and suffer no heart-related effects.  Dr. Hogya reported that 
Carpenter’s hypertension has been effectively managed with medication, and he 
did not conclude that Carpenter’s hypertension has had any cardiac implications. 
{¶ 16} Third, the “primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State ex rel. v. Cordray v. Midway 
Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15.  
In this case, the interpretation that Fairfield advocates is not consistent with the 
General Assembly’s purpose in creating the handicap reimbursement program. 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
{¶ 17} The stated purpose of R.C. 4123.343 is to encourage employers to 
hire and retain handicapped employees with the conditions that are listed.  To an 
employer, any of the conditions may raise concerns about an employee’s 
productivity or the employer’s ability to respond in the event of an emergency.  
Without an incentive to hire those suffering from these conditions, an employer 
might be less inclined to employ them. 
{¶ 18} According to the American Heart Association, however, one in 
three adults has hypertension,3 so no incentive is needed to hire these persons into 
the workforce—they are already there.  Equally important, high blood pressure, 
unlike many of the enumerated conditions, can be controlled, so it is far less likely 
to disrupt workplace productivity or safety.  Simply put, hypertension is not the 
impediment to employment that the enumerated conditions might be. 
{¶ 19} This is not to say that hypertension can never be classified as an 
R.C. 4123.343(A)(3) cardiac disease.  The commission, however, found that the 
evidence submitted by Fairfield did not establish that Carpenter’s hypertension 
constituted a cardiac disease. 
{¶ 20} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating 
evidentiary weight and credibility. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d  936.  Dr. Hogya’s 
April 5, 2008 report stated that Carpenter’s hypertension had been successfully 
managed with medication, and he did not attribute any cardiac symptoms to that 
condition.  From this, the commission concluded that Carpenter’s hypertension 
was not a cardiac disease.  Fairfield argues that any shortcomings in that report 
were remedied by Dr. Hogya’s August 12, 2008 narrative.  That report, however, 
was submitted after the SHO hearing, so it is not relevant to discussion of the 
                                                 
3  http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HighBloodPressure/AboutHighBloodPressure/ 
Understanding-Blood-Pressure-Readings_UCM_301764_Article.jsp. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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SHO’s order. State ex rel. Cordray v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 99, 561 
N.E.2d 917. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 21} We accordingly affirm the court of appeals’ judgment holding that 
the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Fairfield’s application for 
handicap reimbursement. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ, concur. 
__________________ 
Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A., David C. Korte, Michelle D. Bach, and Joshua 
R. Lounsbury, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Elise Porter, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
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