Title: Calene v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Calene v. State1993 WY 17846 P.2d 679Case Number: 90-264Decided: 02/05/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
John 
CALENE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell 
County, Timothy J. Judson, and 
Terrence L. O'Brien, JJ.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender 
Aid Program, and Darold S. Melchior, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Student 
Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jennifer L. Gimbel, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, P. Jaye 
Rippley and Beverly J. Montoya, Prosecution Assistance Program, Student Interns, 
for appellee. 

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired January 1, 
1993.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal tests 
the procedures utilized under Wyoming law when ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel is alleged by the convicted defendant.

[¶2]      This opinion will 
address the procedures available for appellant to factually develop any 
contention claiming ineffectiveness of his legal representation which was not 
documented within the original trial record. We reverse the decision of the 
trial court which denied a hearing on the motion for a new trial. This case is 
remanded for the trial court to hold a factual hearing on the validity of the 
allegations made by John Calene of ineffective representation following his 
conviction of four conspiracy and larceny offenses.

I. FACTS

[¶3]      John Calene 
(Calene) was arrested and tried for the felonies of receiving stolen property, 
possessing a vehicle with an altered identification, accessory before the fact 
of felony larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. He was convicted of all four 
charges and received sentences of two-to-four years on all four counts, with 
counts one and two to run concurrently with each other and counts three and four 
to run concurrently with each other, but the sentences for counts one and two 
were ordered to run consecutively with the sentences for counts three and four. 
Consequently, Calene received a total sentence of two consecutive two-to-four 
year terms.

[¶4]      The object of these 
charges was a Datsun 280Z which had been stolen in Lakewood, 
Colorado by 
other parties and delivered to Gillette, 
Wyoming, 
where it was repainted by Calene. The vehicle had been impounded in Gillette by 
the police and was then stolen from the police impound lot and returned to 
Colorado 
where it was again recovered as a stolen vehicle. The entire episode was 
initiated in Gillette by an anonymous call to the police. Identification of the 
anonymous caller was later established by the police, but the informant was not 
called to testify at Calene's trial.

[¶5]      Following his 
conviction, Calene wrote a letter to the trial judge describing claims of 
ineffective conduct of his appointed counsel. In this July 
30, 1990 
letter, he asked for a new trial. The letter was followed by a September 4, 1990 
request by Calene's counsel to withdraw. Withdrawal was granted by court order 
and a successor counsel was appointed.

[¶6]      Second counsel 
refiled the motion for a new trial, alleging the same general grounds of 
ineffectiveness of the original trial attorney. That motion for a new trial was 
combined with the sentencing hearing and heard on September 13, 1990. 
The motion was summarily denied and the sentence was orally entered followed by 
a written order on September 30, 1990 
denying the motion for new trial and entering the sentence.

[¶7]      At the 
September 13, 1990 new 
trial/sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

THE 
COURT: Mr. Calene, the very first thing, we have to deal with is there is a 
motion filed for a new, new trial.

I 
received the letter that you sent me, and the court - or the letter, of course, 
is at best accusatory and simply conclusory in nature, and the court believes 
that even if the things that you claim in that letter are true, that they are 
properly handled on appeal.

For 
that reason, the court does not grant but rather denies your motion for a new 
trial. And if you wish to appeal, you may take those issues up on 
appeal.

[¶8]      The letter to the 
trial judge stated:

I'm 
writing to you in hope of having a mistrial declared on the grounds of improper 
representation by my court-appointed attorney, * * *.

There are several matters I feel weren't handled properly 
before and during my trial.

The 
first happened as I was to have my preliminary hearing in county court. [Defense 
counsel] wanted me to postpone the hearing so that he could have time to prepare 
for it. I was afraid of losing my right to a speedy trial so I asked for him to 
come visit me at the Detention 
Center 
before my hearing. Instead of coming to see me he sent [another attorney] to 
tell me the only choice I had was to postpone because he was to[o] busy with a 
jury trial. The jury trial he was in wasn't even assigned to him. He was just a 
spectator. I ended up postponing my hearing to give him time to 
prepare.

As 
the hearing approached I contacted him to see how things were going to only hear 
that he hadn't been able to look over my files. He ended up having me waive my 
preliminary hearing because he hadn't had time to prepare a defense.

During this delay he hired two investigators to do research 
on my case: * * *. I gave them both a list of several witnesses that would be 
needed in order to prove my innocence.

During my release from jail on bond I checked in with 
[defense counsel] about once a week to only hear that the investigators hadn't 
been able to contact my witnesses. I gave them all the information required to 
get in touch with them. I believe that the only people interviewed were the 
State's witnesses against me. Both of whom told conflicting stories to the 
investigators.

Then 
the day of my pretrial was set and he was sick that day and I was told I wasn't 
required to be there.

Further attempts to contact him regarding my case were 
futile because the next week he was on vacation. I was informed by his office to 
meet with him the following Sunday, an appointment that was not kept by [defense 
counsel]. The following week he was required to attend a trial advocacy school 
and another Sunday appointment was scheduled. He called me on that Sunday the 
day before my trial and asked me a few simple questions and told me he didn't 
need to see me.

The 
next day at my trial I felt there were several issues that need[ed] 
attention.

The 
first being lack of witnesses called on my behalf. My cousin * * * who wouldn't 
appear voluntarily because of being on his honeymoon should have been subpeoned 
[sic]. He could have verified the fact that I was hired by Mike & Brett to 
paint a car and that I had no knowledge of the fact that they had stolen the car 
until my trip to Denver 
with Mr. McMasters. Kirby Lyons should have been subpeoned [sic] to prove falacy 
[sic] with Shawn McMaster's testimony about talking with him the day the car was 
confinscated [sic] and to tell the court that I left town because I was afraid 
of what was going to happen with Mike & Brett wanting to steal the car back. 
Also I feel that he should have subpeoned [sic] Mr. Allard of the Gillette Tire 
Store to testify to the fact that I had never recieved [sic] a title from him or 
even inquired about one. Also my wife Patsy Martinez should have been subpeoned 
[sic] because she knew that I was just hired to paint the car. Also I feel he 
should have entered the tape of Shawn McMasters['] interview with Mr. Hanson to 
prove that he will say almost anything required to keep himself out of a 
jam.

[Defense counse] should never have stated that his client; 
(myself) was stupid in addressing the jury in his closing argument.

One 
other thing I thought to be wrong in my trial I felt that in your instructions 
to the jury you should have made it more clear that each charge was seperate 
[sic] from the other. And that they should be treated as such.

In 
light of the facts that I have brought to your attention I hope that you will 
grant me a new trial on the grounds that stand: Improper counsel on the part of 
the public defender; [defense counsel]. Thank you for taking this matter into 
consideration because I truly don't want to go to prison for crimes that I 
didn't commit.

[¶9]      The motion for a new 
trial by the second counsel stated as a basis, denial "of a fair trial due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel" and attached as an exhibit the letter which 
had been filed in July.

II. 
ISSUE

[¶10]   The structure of this case is presented 
with an appellate record which furnishes this court no basis for analysis of the 
validity or invalidity of the claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. Furthermore, 
the record demonstrates that the trial court did not exercise discretion, based 
on any factual finding, in rendering the decision to deny the new trial motion. 
Our determination will establish how the facts will be developed for appellate 
review since ineffectiveness of counsel, by our precedent, requires these issues 
to be presented during the initial appeal or otherwise be procedurally 
defaulted. The more defined issue involves procedures for those cases where 
evidence beyond the trial record is required to make a proper and informed 
judicial decision regarding the constitutionally-required competent assistance 
of legal counsel.

[¶11]   We reverse the order denying the motion 
for a new trial and remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶12]   To make a decision for this case, this 
court will examine the processes available under the particular structure of 
Wyoming's 
ineffectiveness of counsel law in order to provide the system for factual 
development by the trial court in its initial decision. That record and decision 
will then be available for review on appeal or subsequent proceedings in the 
federal court system, if pursued, by constitutional inquiry to that 
jurisdiction. It is recognized that Wyoming 
law, on this subject, differs generally from most jurisdictions.1 This court applies a procedural default, waiver 
of constitutional right, perspective to ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims 
in all cases if not presented by the initial appeal. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 
1991); Murray v. 
State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 
1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1989); Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 
1989); Campbell v. 
State, 772 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 
1989); Schuler v. State, 771 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 
1989); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 
1988). This poses the evidentiary problem which we now must resolve in order to 
avoid adjudication from ignorance where some ineffectiveness claims cannot be 
resolved without supplementation of evidence which was not developed by 
inclusion in the initial trial record. Normally, such additional evidence would 
include testimony of the trial lawyer, the accused, and a requirement for the 
convicted defendant to demonstrate a viable factual basis which would support 
his claim regarding the claimed adverse quality of representation he was 
provided. This answer comes within either a post-sentence motion for a new trial 
based on ineffectiveness of counsel or within a remand hearing provided 
following institution of appeal.2 

[¶13]   The practical problem for reliance on 
usage of the motion for a new trial, initially, is the short time permitted 
after trial to make such a motion and the likelihood that appellate counsel has 
not yet become involved. It is recognized that trial counsel should neither be 
asked nor expected to contend ineffectiveness of performance by himself or 
herself within the trial or plea bargaining activities. People v. Hayes, 229 
Ill. 
App.3d 55, 170 Ill.Dec. 850, 593 N.E.2d 739 (1992). Consequently, the new trial 
forum in the usual case, differing from events occurring here with a very early 
change in counsel, could realistically be used only generally for 
ineffectiveness cases involving extrinsic circumstances and not intrinsic 
performance questions. This is so because the extrinsic circumstance case is 
occasioned by events uncontrolled by trial counsel. The intrinsic cases involve 
determinative decisions of counsel, planned or unplanned as it may have been. 
The basis for counsel action or inaction will frequently not be documented in 
the trial record.

[¶14]   A different result may develop as here, 
however, where the defendant may move pro se based upon the contention that 
appointed counsel has failed to prepare; as, for example, investigate an alibi 
witness on his behalf. People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). Where the trial court refused to rule on a pro se motion for 
a new trial based on trial court ineffectiveness of counsel performance, see 
People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App.3d 394, 110 Ill.Dec. 746, 511 N.E.2d 923 (1987). 
See also Hayes, 170 Ill.Dec. 850, 593 N.E.2d 739, where there was a trial 
counsel misunderstanding of the controlling principle of insanity defense law. 
In addition, the trial court had a mistaken belief that a new trial could not be 
granted, "based on ineffective assistance of counsel if there is substantial 
prejudice." Id. at 
857, 593 N.E.2d  at 746.

[¶15]   The Hayes court recognized, regarding 
the motion for a new trial:

Next, defendant correctly asserts that the trial court 
mistakenly believed that ineffective assistance of counsel was not a permissible 
basis for granting a motion for a new trial. A new trial can be granted based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel if there is substantial prejudice.

Id.

[¶16]   Consequently, when a bona fide issue of 
performance does, in its infrequency of occurrence, realistically exist 
regarding preparation and trial time performance, opportunity is needed for 
appellate counsel to document the facts involved for judicial decision. Since 
the time for filing a motion for a new trial will usually have passed, the 
process remaining is for appellate counsel to file a motion of partial remand 
for a factual hearing. This process leaves the only opportunity for state 
exhaustion of factual review. Although in absence of a request, our procedural 
default decisions would apply under state law. Within federal rules applicable 
to this subject, in the absence of the right of the defendant to obtain a 
hearing, preclusive procedural default cannot exist under the federal 
constitution.

[¶17]   This case is illustrative since the 
only documentation available, beyond trial evidence, is the letter of complaint 
by appellant addressed to the trial court. The preliminary hearing had been 
waived and no transcript of any pretrial conference session is available. 
Without some factual development regarding defense counsel's trial preparation, 
pretrial investigation, witness interview and evidentiary presentation, this 
court is called to adjudicate from abject ignorance - which we decline to 
do.

[¶18]   Synthesizing the original statements 
now presented in briefing, contentions of ineffectiveness of counsel are 
threefold. They include: (a) lack of preparation for the preliminary hearing 
resulting in required waiver; (b) failure to be available to confer, to 
interview witnesses, or to investigate in preparation for trial; and (c) failure 
to subpoena witnesses to be available for trial testimony.3

[¶19]   The circumstantial evidence introduced 
at trial against Calene was substantial. Furthermore, this is not a sufficiency 
of the evidence appellate review. To defend against the web of unfavorable 
implications resulting from trial established historical events, Calene claimed 
he did not know the vehicle was originally stolen, did not have anything to do 
with the changed VIN plate, and did not involve himself in the removal of the 
car from the police impound lot. It was to be his "I didn't do any of it" 
defense.

[¶20]   These contentions and available 
evidence were summarized in Calene's appellate brief:

Appellant maintained that he had no knowledge that the car 
he agreed to paint was stolen, at least not until after the car was painted and 
impounded by the police. There existed ample evidence that would support 
Appellant's "lack of knowledge" defense, evidence that counsel knew about but 
which he did not investigate or make an effort to have reasonably investigated. 
Appellant provided counsel with a list of witnesses who could verify his "lack 
of knowledge" defense. Appellant provided counsel with the names of Mr. Dan 
Hartwig, Mr. Kirby Lyons, Mr. Allard, and Ms. Patsy Martinez. Mr. Hartwig, the 
person who knew and initially introduced Appellant to the two men who "owned" 
the car in question, could have verified that Appellant was hired by the two men 
to paint the car, and that Appellant had no knowledge that the car to be painted 
was stolen. Mr. Hartwig could have further provided names, both first and last, 
of the two men who stole the car and arranged to have it painted by Appellant. 
Mr. Kirby Lyons could have testified that Appellant did not talk with Shawn 
McMaster, State's key witness, the day the car was confiscated as McMaster 
testified at trial, and that Appellant left town because he was fearful of what 
was going to happen relative to the two men and their plan to steal the 
impounded car from the police impound lot. Mr. Allard, owner of Gillette Tire 
Store, could have testified that Appellant did not procure a title to the car in 
question from Gillette Tire Store, contrary to McMaster's testimony at trial. 
Patsy Martinez could have testified that Appellant was hired by two men from 
Denver to 
paint their car, and that Appellant had no knowledge that the car was 
stolen.

Second, there are several incidents that occurred during 
the course of counsel's association with Appellant that strongly suggest that 
counsel's decision not to call or subpoena certain witnesses was largely, if not 
solely, the result of counsel's inadequate preparation and investigation, and 
not strategic decision making. First, Appellant, after requested by counsel to 
postpone his preliminary hearing so as to allow counsel to prepare for same, was 
forced to waive his right to the preliminary hearing because counsel indicated 
to Appellant that he had not had time to prepare a defense. Second, 
investigators hired by counsel to research Appellant's case claimed that they 
were unable to contact witnesses whose names had been given them by Appellant, 
despite Appellant's giving them the necessary information to ensure contact. 
Further, counsel made no effort to have these witnesses subpoenaed so he could 
ascertain the value of their testimony relative to Appellant's overall defense 
strategy. Third, the weeks that followed Appellant's scheduled pretrial 
conference, which was not attended by counsel due to his being ill, nor by 
Appellant because he was instructed that it was unnecessary for him to be there, 
were filled with a myriad of circumstances which prevented counsel from 
performing his duty to present for Appellant a reasonable defense. There were 
broken and canceled appointments, counsel's vacation, council's [sic] mandatory 
attendance at trial advocacy school, and other damaging impasses that prevented 
counsel from effectively representing Appellant. Counsel finally made contact by 
phone with Appellant the day before his trial, and asked Appellant a few brief 
questions. It was not until the next day at trial that Appellant realized the 
magnitude of counsel's unpreparedness, for there were only two witnesses 
available to testify on behalf of Appellant, neither of whom could have provided 
eye-witness testimony supporting Appellant's defense theory.

[¶21]   There is no evidence of any kind 
provided for this court to make a factual assessment of these contentions, nor 
was any factual assessment actually made by the trial court. Actually, first 
counsel withdrew without defense of the quality of his representation. Second 
counsel provided perfunctory participation which did not even include the 
preparation of an affidavit to support the statements included in the initial 
letter. All of this is probably explainable because the trial judge demonstrated 
no interest in providing time for a factual hearing.4

[¶22]   We address the right of the individual 
defendant to secure a factual hearing in the state court system on contentions 
of ineffectiveness of counsel regarding events undocumented in the trial record. 
In providing a definite and available system for factual development where 
needed, it is recognized that in absence, procedural default cannot occur from 
the standpoint of federal constitutional standards. To retain the principal 
decision making in the state court system, Wyoming judicial procedures should 
provide for factual inquiry when ineffectiveness of counsel issues are created 
which are not determinable from the initial trial record. Within the particular 
structure of Wyoming 
law, competent appellate counsel is required to present ineffectiveness 
contentions within the initial appeal to avoid state procedural default. 
However, without a state system, there cannot be procedural default of this 
issue from the standpoint of the application of the United States Constitution 
in federal court proceedings. The construction of an adequate state judicial 
decision for resolution of ineffectiveness of counsel contentions combines three 
goals. First is the opportunity for adequate fact finding and consequent 
sustainable decisions by the trial court. Second is a developed record for 
appellate review by this court. Finally, there will have been provided a state 
court decision which will be accorded justified deference in any subsequent 
federal court review. Consequently, we combine the procedural default 
delineations of Murray, 776 P.2d 206; Kallas, 776 P.2d 198; Amin, 774 P.2d 597; 
and Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257, with a Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) standard for constitutional 
review.

[¶23]   Any fact finding analysis for system 
construction is divided into ineffectiveness of counsel allegations for which 
the initial appellate record is dispositive, e.g., Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 
(Wyo. 1990) - providing a complete record, or, conversely, further fact finding 
is required after an opportunity to elicit necessary evidence is provided. The 
first category involves appeals where the appellate record is sufficient for 
factual resolution and issue disposition. That type of case is contrasted with 
the cases where the events at issue are not determinable from trial evidence 
documented in the appellate record. Consequently, the record does not supply a 
defined factual basis for appellate decision. The general category of cases 
where fact finding might arguably be required, most numerous within a broad 
array of types of claims, includes instances where appellant argues a 
misunderstanding or misadvice about his testifying at trial, counsel's failure 
to call witnesses, or to inadequately investigate and prepare.

[¶24]   In stages, then, these issues can be 
separated into: (a) the ineffectiveness of trial counsel contentions; which, as 
an allegation, are sufficiently insubstantial that fact finding by the trial 
court could provide no substantive or material additional information, e.g., 
contention of improper advice to plead guilty which is directly disproved by the 
specific transcript of the plea and sentencing proceedings; (b) ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel; which, as an allegation, can be determined from the trial 
record; and (c) contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel that involve 
facts external to the trial record which normally would involve trial counsel's 
conduct in advice, investigation and trial preparation. It is only to this third 
class that additional fact finding is required or presently directed in our 
analysis.

[¶25]   In first separation, there is a basic 
requirement regarding allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel in the initial 
trial proceeding which can foreclose any right to a hearing, whether by remand 
or motion for a new trial. This court has dispositively determined that it is 
necessary for serious and specific allegations of ineffectiveness to be 
sufficiently stated and documented to show a real issue before the trial court 
can be put to the additional requirement of providing an evidentiary hearing. 
Leach v. State, 836 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 
1992). The sufficient statement prerequisite of Leach is mandatory. To be 
determined next is whether the existent record is insufficient to answer factual 
contentions by relevant factually disputable contentions.

[¶26]   Assuming the initiating requirements of 
Leach have been met and some relevant factual issue really exists, the process 
to be available involves alternatives which might be pursued by either a 
requested factual hearing before the trial court through a motion for a new 
trial or, thereafter, in conjunction with appellate briefing for defendant to 
file a motion for remand for an ineffectiveness factual hearing and decision. 
Smizer v. State, 835 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶27]   Within the purview of current decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court, findings and the decisional statement of the 
state trial court should be sufficiently specific to permit normal appellate 
review by this court and to justify deference within any 28 U.S.C. § 2244 habeas 
corpus review by a federal court. Having first answered the criteria of our 
decision, we will then address the complicated and voluminous case law to 
explain why. Basic rules to guide and direct the Wyoming 
court system "[are] both feasible and desirable." Sanders v. 
United States, 
373 U.S. 1, 
15, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963).

IV. 
BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[¶28]   In considering ineffectiveness cases, a 
well-defined grouping into three categories exists: (a) dual representation - 
conflict of counsel cases; (b) state interference cases - extrinsic factor 
situations; and (c) challenged competency of performance - intrinsic 
ineffectiveness claims.

[¶29]   We need not expand discussion to 
dispose of the dual representation cases. The Wyoming 
rule is fixed and defined for existence of dual representation cases. W.R.Cr.P. 
44(c) states that compliance is mandatory and, in absence, conflict situations 
require conviction reversal. Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 
(Wyo. 
1992); Kenney v. State, 837 P.2d 664 (Wyo. 
1992). Cf. Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1992), where the issue, 
rather than dual representation, was defense counsel status. See also 
United States v. 
Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1992).

[¶30]   The second category, extrinsic 
ineffectiveness claims, see Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense 
Representation as a Ground for Post-conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 
Nw.U.L.Rev. 289, 301-41 (1964), would be more likely subject to resolution on 
the original trial record. In general, these cases have been categorized by one 
authority to include: (a) restriction upon counsel assistance; and (b) late 
appointment of counsel. 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11.8 (1984).

[¶31]   This category of cases is succinctly 
described in the seminal effectiveness of counsel case of Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-2064:

Government violates the right to effective assistance when 
it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent 
decisions about how to conduct the defense. See, e.g., Geders v. 
United States, 
425 U.S. 80 
[96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592] (1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation 
during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 [95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593] (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 [92 S. Ct. 1891, 1895, 32 L. Ed. 2d 358] (1972) (requirement that 
defendant be first defense witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593-596 
[81 S. Ct. 756, 769-770, 5 L. Ed. 2d 783] (1961) (bar on direct examination of 
defendant).

[¶32]   Other frequently cited United States 
Supreme Court cases addressing the extrinsic interference include the primary 
right to counsel in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330, 47 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1976) (restriction on overnight conference between attorney and 
client); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) 
(restriction on cross-examination precluded defense from showing possible bias 
of witness); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 
(1932) (belated appointment, inadequate time to prepare); cf. 
United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) (claimed insufficient time to prepare 
and inexperience of counsel not dispositive in absence of demonstration of 
specific errors made by trial counsel).

[¶33]   There is another category of these 
extrinsic interference cases involving the state invasion of lawyer/client 
relationships. See 2 LaFave and Israel, 
supra, § 11.8 at 73 in citation of United States v. 
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S. Ct. 665, 66 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1981); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977); and Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966). See also Haworth v. 
State, 840 P.2d 912 (Wyo. 
1992), Urbigkit, J., dissenting, and cases therein considered.

[¶34]   The contentions of ineffectiveness 
presented for review in this appeal involve the third category of contended 
ineffective performance of legal counsel based upon the attorney's intrinsic 
ineffectiveness.

Here, the courts refused to adopt prophylactic standards 
and reject the assumption that an assessment of prejudice is too speculative to 
be part of the standard of judicial review. They turn instead to a 
fact-sensitive analysis which seeks to measure the quality and impact of 
counsel's representation under the circumstances of the individual 
case.

2 
LaFave and Israel, 
supra, § 11.10 at 93.

[¶35]   These cases commonly include a variety 
of distinctive but distinguishable functions in representation; including, 
generally, faulty or delayed advice regarding plea negotiations or decisions, 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); 
failure to prepare, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976); failure to interview and obtain presence of witnesses, King 
v. State, 810 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1991); unfamiliarity with the applicable law, 
Tillery v. United States, 419 A.2d 970 (D.C.App. 1980); decisions made by 
counsel based on negligence rather than strategic choice, Marzullo v. Maryland, 
561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 1011, 98 S. Ct. 1885, 56 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1978); failure to make highly appropriate trial objections, Tollett 
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973); Com. v. 
Roundtree, 469 Pa. 241, 364 A.2d 1359 (1976); and, failure to contact known 
witnesses, Com. v. Richey, 249 Pa. Super. 365, 378 A.2d 338 (1977). The 
significance of the partial enumeration of cases is to illustrate that, in some 
cases, contentions of ineffectiveness can be easily and dispositively resolved 
from the original trial record; while in other cases, it is most unlikely that 
the trial record would provide the requisite information.

[¶36]   The fundamental analysis we are 
required to undertake is to understand the structure of United States Supreme 
Court decision-making on the subject of federal constitutional claims involving 
ineffectiveness of counsel and corollary procedural default - waiver and 
forfeiture decisions, which determine our necessity and approach to reach a 
primary goal of disposition of contentions of ineffectiveness as completely as 
may be possible through state court proceedings where the state court 
prosecution was pursued. We deem it a primary responsibility of the state 
adjudication process to dispose of issues involving those proceedings in the 
state court to the extent realistically possible. In that pursuit, certain 
directed concepts are clear.

A. 
Right to Counsel

[¶37]   The right to counsel in state court 
proceedings is required through the Fourteenth Amendment as a matter of 
effectuation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Powell, 
287 U.S. 45, 
53 S. Ct. 55; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), the right was dispositively assigned that an 
indigent defendant in a criminal trial has the right to have the assistance of 
counsel as a fundamental right essential to a fair trial, and defendant's trial 
and conviction, without the assistance of counsel, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978). That right was extended to 
counsel on initial appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963); and confined to initial appeal and not a discretionary 
appeal, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974), or 
collateral proceedings, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987).

[¶38]   The right to counsel extends to 
effective counsel and a proper record. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980); McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441; Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S. Ct. 1402, 18 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1967); and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

[¶39]   Interference with or denial of a right 
to counsel in a state proceeding invokes a federal issue subject to review 
through federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, whether arising from direct 
appeal, Penson, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S. Ct. 346, or collateral proceedings, Humphrey 
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S. Ct. 1048, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1972).

[¶40]   The issue of effectiveness of counsel 
involving intrinsic ineffectiveness apprehends a mixed question of law and fact 
and the standard for ineffectiveness review by the federal courts is different 
than commonly applied in Fourth Amendment search and seizure federal certiorari 
collateral review cases.

Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal 
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is 
not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ineffectiveness is not a question of "basic, primary, or 
historical fac[t]," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309, n. 6 [83 S. Ct. 745, 755 n. 6, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770] (1963). Rather, like the 
question whether multiple representation in a particular case gave rise to a 
conflict of interest, it is a mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 
342 [100 S. Ct.  at 1714]. Although state court findings of fact made in the 
course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference 
requirement of § 2254(d), and although district court findings are subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both 
the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are 
mixed questions of law and fact.

Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2070. See Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, ___ 
U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1992); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 103 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1989); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944); and Poyner v. Murray, 
964 F.2d 1404, 1416 (4th Cir. 1992). Exhaustion of state remedies is 
required.

[¶41]   In the event that a factual issue is 
presented for review which is undeveloped in any available proceeding in the 
state court, the factual review is then pursued in the federal court habeas 
corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (3); Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1990); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Osborn v. Shillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 (D.Wyo. 1986), aff'd 861 F.2d 612 (10th 
Cir. 1988), appeal after remand 806 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1991); Kennedy v. Shillinger, 
759 F. Supp. 1554 (D.Wyo. 1991), aff'd 971 F.2d 558 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 623, 121 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1992). See also Braley v. 
Shillinger, 902 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Knox v. State, 959 F.2d 866 (10th 
Cir. 1992) and Wade v. Franzen, 678 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982).

[¶42]   If a proper state court fact finding 
hearing has been held, deference is given to the fact finding function of the 
state court regarding ineffectiveness of counsel contentions. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976). This is the converse of the state 
court procedural default inhibition to federal habeas corpus relief. Coleman v. 
Thompson, ___ U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, ___ 
U.S. 
___, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1991); Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392 
(10th Cir. 1992); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 
___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 431, 116 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1991).

[¶43]   The test that the Wyoming Supreme Court 
has elected to follow is generally enunciated in Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-2065:

The 
Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of 
effective assistance in [intrinsic ineffectiveness claims] - that is, those 
presenting claims of "actual ineffectiveness." In giving meaning to the 
requirement, however, we must take its purpose - to ensure a fair trial - as the 
guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.

* * 
* * * *

A 
convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to 
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.

* * 
* [T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective 
assistance. * * * When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of 
counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.

More 
specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 
"counsel," not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It 
relies instead on the legal professions' maintenance of standards sufficient to 
justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the 
adversary process that the Amendment envisions. * * * The proper measure of 
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.

Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain 
basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel 
owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interests. * * * 
From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overreaching 
duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult 
with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of 
important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty 
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable 
adversarial testing process. * * *

These basic duties neither exhaustively define the 
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance. * * *

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. * * * A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in 
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."

[¶44]   In addition to an examination of the 
standard of representation, there is a further requirement that prejudice to the 
defendant is required:

[A]ny deficiencies in counsel's performance must be 
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under 
the Constitution.

Id. at 
692, 104 S. Ct.  at 2067.

When 
a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. * * *

In 
making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must 
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.

Id. at 
695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.

[¶45]   In addition to the "opportunity" or 
challenge to the state court to provide an opportunity for a hearing, there is a 
procedural default constitutional right/forfeiture in the event that state court 
processes are not exhausted. While we consider our state court processes for 
this fact finding opportunity, we recognize the preclusion provided in the 
default rules of federal courts in the event that some appropriate opportunity 
existed and was unused. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977) set the stage. The United States Supreme 
Court established the rule in that case that an unchallenged right to a Miranda 
warning, before an inculpatory statement was made, was waived for any federal 
habeas attack by the defendant's failure to request a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964) hearing in state court, or otherwise 
raise an evidentiary challenge for the issue before resort to the federal court 
proceedings. Application of the Wainwright rule has been expanded to other 
constitutional deprivation contentions otherwise available for review in the 
federal habeas proceedings which, to a yet not clearly determined degree, would 
include ineffectiveness of counsel failures to initially present the issue 
within available state court proceedings. Ylst, ___ U.S. at 
___, 111 S. Ct.  at 2593.

[¶46]   The rigorous application made for the 
waiver forfeiture was redefined and reemphasized by the current case of Keeney, 
___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318; see also Sawyer v. Whitley, ___ 
U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992) and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982), procedural default, waiver, 
forfeiture for non-compliance with contemporaneous objection rule. Further 
application of the Wainwright rule is found in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986). Furthermore, inadvertence of counsel 
is not a cause required to escape the Wainwright waiver forfeiture rule 
involving procedural default. Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986).

[¶47]   With the preclusive effect of waiver 
forfeiture not now in question and the probability that a reliable fact finding 
decision by the state court will be given imposing deference, we will answer our 
challenge to settle state court issues in the state court system. We establish 
regular processes to provide an adequate hearing where a factual inquiry is 
realistically required to resolve the constitutional contention of deprivation 
of effective assistance of counsel. Fundamental fairness can more adequately and 
accurately be determined best and first in state court proceedings. See 2 LaFave 
and Israel, 
supra, § 11.10 at 45 (Supp. 1991).

[¶48]   How then do we accommodate these 
variant interests in the clearly defined procedural direction for trial court 
and counsel in Wyoming 
practice?

[¶49]   First, if an ineffectiveness contention 
is recognized within the trial record, inclusion of the issue should occur in 
first appeal by statement of the issues and appropriate briefing detail. An 
opportunity seldom provided could also be utilized if identification comes early 
enough to move for a new trial on the basis of ineffectiveness of counsel with a 
requirement that the evidentiary hearing be held on the motion. Leach, 836 P.2d 336. If a hearing is held, the record will be settled by the findings of the 
trial court and that decision will be considered by this court by application of 
the normal appellate review rule of substantial sustaining evidence. True Oil 
Co. v. Sinclair Oil Co., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 
1989). The decision for ineffectiveness review presents a mixed question of fact 
and law for both the trial court, initially, and this court on appellate review. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

[¶50]   If these contentions of ineffectiveness 
are first developed by appellate counsel during record examination and appellate 
briefing preparation, a motion for remand should be made and appropriately 
supported by contentions defining and supporting any ineffectiveness claim in 
detail and supported, as may be appropriate, by affidavit sufficient to 
establish substantially. Cf. Leach, 836 P.2d 336, where no adequate support was 
provided to justify an evidentiary remand hearing.

[¶51]   Following a hearing, the trial court 
will provide a specific decision addressing separate contentions by examination 
and resolution of the validity of any trial court ineffectiveness of counsel 
contentions. Appellate briefing can then include ineffectiveness of counsel 
hearing transcripts and decision conjunctively with any appeal discussion 
considering other issues presented as claimed error in the initial 
trial.

V. 
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE

[¶52]   The theory of defense presented by 
Calene in this case was the lack of his knowledge of the status of the stolen 
vehicle. He claims ineffectiveness of counsel relating to counsel's failure to 
investigate and present witnesses which may have countered the state's evidence. 
King, 810 P.2d 119. This concept was particularized in reversal by this court in 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 
1986). There is a further contention of dilatory preparation and investigation 
which resulted in a required waiver of preliminary hearing. Calene then alleges 
a lack of contact with the witnesses for determination of trial usefulness. In 
general, this is the failure to investigate or interview witnesses, followed by 
failure to subpoena persons competent to give favorable testimony as an 
ineffectiveness of counsel contention. King, 810 P.2d  at 122.

[¶53]   We do not assume or determine that 
valuable witnesses did exist or that a failure of investigation and preparation 
adversely denied valuable testimony to the defendant. We find the contentions 
sufficiently substantial in the record now presented that a hearing should be 
held. At the hearing, defense counsel can testify and Calene can provide 
additional evidence for any substantiation regarding the usefulness of 
non-called witnesses as evidence upon which the trial court's decision may be 
rendered regarding the standard of counsel performance.

[¶54]   The right of a defendant within this 
process to secure any hearing on an ineffectiveness charge is far different than 
the requirements for actual relief in reversing the conviction. Since this court 
has adopted the Strickland test for ineffectiveness review, in order for 
defendant to secure the relief of a new trial, he must first demonstrate that 
the conduct of the attorney fell below a deficiency standard of competent 
practice and, further, that any failure, such as it may have been, was actually 
prejudicial. Consequently, the test for a hearing to be held is the existence of 
a substantial issue. The requirement for affirmative relief is the heavy burden 
of prejudicial ineffectiveness of counsel. This court has addressed those 
criteria in following Strickland in a number of cases and opportunity to the 
defendant for a favorable conclusion has been noticeably confined.5 

[¶55]   In this appeal, Calene places heavy 
emphasis on potential testimony from Mr. Hartwig, Mr. Lyons, Mr. Allard, and Ms. 
Martinez. Relief by a grant of a new trial will likely be unavailable to Calene 
unless he can demonstrate availability and potential favorable character of 
resulting testimony from one or more of these witnesses which would not be 
cumulative or exculpatory in his case. The burden of persuasion is vested, of 
course, upon appellant in demonstration to the trial court that ineffectiveness 
is shown and is prejudicial in result.

VI. 
CONCLUSION

[¶56]   This case is reversed and remanded to 
the trial court for a hearing to be held regarding ineffectiveness of counsel 
contentions presented in appellant's motion for remand. This court will 
otherwise retain jurisdiction.

CARDINE, 
J., concurs in the result only.

GOLDEN, 
J., files a concurring opinion.

GOLDEN, 
Justice, concurring.

[¶57]   I agree with the majority that this 
case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing concerning the ineffectiveness 
issues raised by the defendant's motion for new trial. In the words of a 
distinguished jurist, "however, I do not agree with the packaging of the 
majority opinion for publication." Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186, 197 
(Wyo. 
1992), Brown, Ret. J., concurring.

[¶58]   The issue before the court is simple. 
In defendant's motion for a new trial, he raised specific allegations that his 
defense trial counsel was ineffective in his pre-trial preparation and in his 
failure to obtain testimony of several potential witnesses whose testimony 
allegedly would have been favorable to the defendant's theory of defense, viz., 
he had no knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Since no record concerning the 
subject matter of these allegations existed, the trial court should have 
conducted an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of creating such a record and 
obtaining evidence upon which the trial court could make an informed decision 
about the validity of the ineffectiveness allegations. Had that simple procedure 
been employed, this appellate court would have had a complete record upon which 
to review the defendant's claims of error. Since we have no such complete 
record, we are compelled to remand so that a complete record can be 
made.

Footnotes 

 

 1 The normal rule for review of claims of intrinsic 
ineffectiveness of counsel is placed within post-conviction relief processes, 
including habeas corpus, petition for post-conviction relief or a motion for a 
new trial, to be pursued by a hearing if a bona fide evidentiary conflict is, or 
may be, created. In the federal system, the accepted method is the habeas corpus 
petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, unless the trial record provides clear and 
dispositive detail for decision. The case law is truly exhaustive, but recent 
cases would include: United States v. Johnson, 954 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. McGill, 952 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Bounds, 
943 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Murdock, 928 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Schmidt, 922 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199 
(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 
466 U.S. 943, 104 S. Ct. 1926, 80 L. Ed. 2d 472, cert. denied 469 U.S. 863, 105 S. Ct. 200, 83 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1984); Harley v. State, 594 So. 2d 352 (Fla.App. 
1992); Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 274, 393 S.E.2d 229 (1990); Com. v. Licata, 412 
Mass. 654, 591 N.E.2d 672 (1992); Com. v. DeGeorge, 506 Pa. 445, 485 A.2d 1089 
(1984); Com. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967); 
Horton v. State, 411 S.E.2d 223 (S.C. 1991); and State v. Wickline, 184 W. Va. 
12, 399 S.E.2d 42 (1990). See also Murray v. 
State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 
1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 
1989); and Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 
1989).

2 The 
California 
judicial processes provide a hybrid system permitting factual analysis by a 
motion for a new trial or a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding which is 
normally considered on appeal with other appellate issues. People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253 (1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 849, 102 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1989); People v. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 
233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 (1987); People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144 (1983).

3 One 
of the more comprehensive classifications of these many cases is provided in a 
frequently cited law journal review. Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense 
Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief In Criminal Cases, 59 
Nw.U.L.Rev. 289 (1964). Wyoming has 
seen some, if not most, of these contentions in prior case review. Two general 
classes predominate in instances where a reversal or at least a comprehensive 
factual hearing is required. In essence, they may be essentially the same 
situation, but described differently. The first group is within the category of 
pretrial preparation, failure to interview or call witnesses: King v. State, 810 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1991); Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1987); Gist v. State, 
737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), appeal after remand 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1988); Frias 
v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 431, 116 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1991) 
(Missouri case); United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1989); Code v. 
Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 444 U.S. 944, 100 S. Ct. 302, 62 L. Ed. 2d 311 
(1979); Wickline, 399 S.E.2d 42.

The 
second category is distilled into the unfavorable description of "gave up" 
representation: Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1990); Cochran v. 
State, 262 Ga. 
106, 414 S.E.2d 211 (1992); People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457, 384 N.Y.S.2d 404, 348 N.E.2d 880 (1976); Culton v. State, 818 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1991); Wickline, 
399 S.E.2d 42.

The 
Anders brief cases provide a similarly identified attitude of counsel: Anders v. 
California, 
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). See Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541 
(Wyo.), 
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984); cf. Engberg, 820 P.2d 70.

 4 The record, including demands for witness 
statements and documentation, realistically portrays, at best, a moderately 
energized defense. If other witnesses were available for defense, they certainly 
were needed since supporting testimony to make the defense credible was 
critical.

5 
Ineffectiveness of counsel issues have not provided a major ingredient in the 
Wyoming Supreme Court appellate activities. Among opinions published since 
January 1, 1986, 
only thirty-six decisions rendered by written opinion of this court have 
included clearly stated ineffectiveness of counsel, trial court and appeal, 
appellate contentions. Most significant within that number have been procedural 
access rehearing of some kind and not substantive review of issues of 
ineffectiveness themselves. Within approximately 330 criminal opinion appeals, 
and those thirty-six which in some way alleged ineffectiveness, only three have 
been reversed by this court as substantively meritorious. This does not include 
two conflicts cases, Kenney, 837 P.2d 664 and Shongutsie, 827 P.2d 361, where 
the disassociative subject of conflict of interest was involved, or one other 
misdemeanor appeal which was remanded to the district court where the first 
appellate review was given to establish by whose decision a delayed appellate 
notice was caused. Foote v. State, 751 P.2d 884 (Wyo. 
1988).

Among those three cases reversed, the defendant was retried 
and acquitted in Frias, 722 P.2d 135; the defendant was retried and the 
conviction reversed in Gist, 737 P.2d 336; and the defendant pleaded out his 
criminal charge after reversal in King, 810 P.2d 119. Consequently, 
ineffectiveness was rejected as a basis for reversal on appeal in twenty-nine 
cases.

Among those cases, first appeal procedural default/waiver 
forfeiture of issues numbered the most rejected cases when included with the 
similar subject of right to counsel on post-conviction-relief appeal. Engberg, 
820 P.2d 70; Miller v. State, 806 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1991); Stogner v. State, 792 P.2d 1358 (Wyo. 1990); Martin v. State, 780 P.2d 1354 (Wyo. 1989); Kallas, 776 P.2d 198; Murray, 776 P.2d 206; Amin, 774 P.2d 597; Campbell, 772 P.2d 543; 
Schuler, 771 P.2d 1217; Cutbirth, 751 P.2d 1257.

Among the remaining nineteen cases, issues presenting 
contentions of ineffectiveness included: advice for plea bargain, Duffy v. 
State, 730 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1986); Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1990); Duffy 
v. State, 837 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 1992); Flores v. State, 822 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1991); 
Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1991); Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 
1990); failure to interview and call witnesses, Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523 
(Wyo. 1991); Laing, 746 P.2d 1247; Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628 (Wyo. 1986); 
miscellaneous trial complaints and internal conduct of counsel, Miller v. State, 
830 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1992); Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1991); Osborn, 806 P.2d 259; Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1990); Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1986); external events controlling quality of conduct of defense 
counsel, Capshaw v. State, 714 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1986); conduct of prosecutor, 
Schmidt v. State, 738 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1987); denied time to investigate and 
prepare, tactical decision or counsel mistake, Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232 
(Wyo. 1986); Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1986); and failure to pursue 
intoxication defense to a homicide charge, Barron v. State, 819 P.2d 412 (Wyo. 
1991).

It 
is quickly apparent that the only successful avenue has related to investigation 
and obtaining witnesses, e.g. Frias, Gist, and King. The major issue with which 
this court has, however, been faced, was not the basic contended ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel, but examination of the method and process appropriately 
available to obtain a hearing when complaints were made and the concepts of 
procedural default as a constitutional right waiver and default were created. It 
is that specific topic with which we are provided in this appeal and for which 
specific and clearly defined rules and criteria are to be provided for 
assistance and direction of the judicial system and to accord with the 
constitutionally required directives provided by the United States Supreme Court 
involving the constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment of effective 
assistance of counsel for those who are criminally charged. Evitts, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S. Ct. 830; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052; Anders, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396. The urgency of decision is particularly manifested by 
recognition that procedural defaults have shoved this court into ineffectiveness 
evaluations which more simply could have been resolved by substantive 
examination of the original issue at a prior stage by a hearing, when necessary, 
or otherwise by a specific decision of the trial court after a fair 
hearing.