Title: Lineweaver v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JASON LINEWEAVER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 696, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1209017747 
§   
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 1, 2015 
Decided: 
June 25, 2015 
Revised: 
June 29, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of June, upon consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court 
Rule 26(c) brief, the State’s response, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that:   
(1) 
On November 5, 2012, Jason Lineweaver was indicted on multiple 
charges arising from a home invasion in which Lineweaver and two other people 
broke into a home, beat and tied up the homeowner, and stole firearms.  On April 
17, 2013, Lineweaver pled guilty to Possession of a Firearm During Commission 
of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Assault in the Second Degree, Home Invasion, and 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (“PDWBPP”).  On June 
 
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28, 2013, Lineweaver was sentenced to a total of forty-six years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after fifteen years for decreasing levels of supervision.  
Lineweaver did not appeal the Superior Court’s judgment.   
(2) 
On January 10, 2014, Lineweaver filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  In this 
motion, Lineweaver argued that his former counsel (“Former Counsel”) was 
ineffective because: (i) he refused to obtain Lineweaver’s mental health records, 
which might have contained information that could be used in a motion to suppress 
Lineweaver’s statement to the police; and (ii) he did not file a motion to suppress 
Lineweaver’s statement to the police based on Lineweaver being under the 
influence of psychiatric medication at the time of his statement.  Postconviction 
counsel (“Postconviction Counsel”) was appointed to represent Lineweaver.   
(3) 
Former Counsel submitted an affidavit in response to Lineweaver’s 
motion for postconviction relief.  Former Counsel stated that Lineweaver never 
asked him to obtain psychiatric records for use in his defense.  Former Counsel 
further stated that his communications with Lineweaver and his family were 
primarily focused on Lineweaver’s drug addiction.  As to a motion to suppress, 
Former Counsel stated that he discussed such a motion with Lineweaver, but 
Former Counsel did not believe a motion to suppress was viable because 
Lineweaver did not appear under the influence at the time of his statement.  Even if 
 
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Lineweaver’s statement had been suppressed, Former Counsel noted that 
Lineweaver’s co-defendants made statements implicating Lineweaver. 
(4) 
On August 8, 2014, Postconviction Counsel informed the Superior 
Court that Lineweaver wished to proceed with his motion for postconviction relief.  
Postconviction Counsel also amended Lineweaver’s motion to include a claim that 
Lineweaver’s mental health records could have had a mitigating effect on 
Lineweaver’s sentence.  Postconviction Counsel subsequently filed a motion to 
withdraw as Lineweaver’s counsel under Rule 61(e)(2).  Postconviction Counsel 
stated he reviewed the record and did not find any evidence of ineffective 
assistance by Former Counsel. 
(5) 
In a letter dated November 26, 2014, the Superior Court denied 
Lineweaver’s motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court found that 
Former Counsel and Lineweaver discussed the pros and cons of a motion to 
suppress and Former Counsel made a strategic decision not to file a motion to 
suppress.  As to Lineweaver’s claim regarding his mental health records, the 
Superior Court noted that no mental health records were offered to support 
Lineweaver’s claim.  The Superior Court concluded that Lineweaver failed to 
establish his Former Counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness” under Strickland v. Washington.1  This appeal followed.        
                                                 
1 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 
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(6) 
On appeal, Postconviction Counsel filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”).  Postconviction Counsel 
asserts that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are 
no arguably appealable issues.  Postconviction Counsel represents that he provided 
Lineweaver with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief and   
informed Lineweaver of his right to identify any points he wished this Court to 
consider on appeal.  Lineweaver has not identified any points for this Court to 
consider.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and moved to affirm the 
Superior Court’s judgment.   
(7) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii) 
must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so 
totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
(8) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Lineweaver’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Lineweaver’s counsel has made a 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 
 
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conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined 
that Lineweaver could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior  
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice