Title: Ortiz v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
SEBASTIAN ORTIZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 072449 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 October 31, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Sebastian Ortiz was convicted by a jury in the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County of one count of rape of a female 
child under the age of thirteen in violation of Code § 18.2-61.  
Ortiz appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which 
denied Ortiz’ petition in an unpublished order.  Ortiz v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0587-07-4 (October 30, 2007).  We 
awarded Ortiz this appeal in which he challenges: (1) the trial 
court’s refusal to appoint an expert witness on the 
suggestibility of children and confirmatory bias, (2) the 
admission of evidence of subsequent other crimes or bad acts, 
(3) the exclusion of the victim’s prior allegations of sexual 
abuse against a third party, (4) the victim’s competency to 
testify, (5) the amendment of the indictment on which Ortiz was 
found guilty, (6) the trial court’s denial of Ortiz’ motion for 
a continuance upon the amendment of the indictment, and (7) the 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
BACKGROUND 
Applying well-established principles of appellate review, 
we present the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  Porter v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 215-16, 661 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2008); 
Bishop v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 9, 11, 654 S.E.2d 906, 907  
(2008). 
The victim (the child), who was born on January 6, 1998, 
lived in Arlington County with her mother (the mother) and 
other family members.  Ortiz is the maternal step-grandfather 
of the child.  Ortiz and his wife (the grandmother) also lived 
in Arlington County until 2005 when they moved to Greenbelt, 
Maryland. 
The child spent substantial time with Ortiz and the 
grandmother at their Arlington residence and, after 2005, at 
their Maryland residence.  Ortiz routinely picked up the child 
Fridays after school, then took the grandmother to work in 
Washington, D.C.  Ortiz was alone with the child for several 
hours until the grandmother returned from work at 10 p.m. 
In April 2006, the mother noticed that the child was 
bringing home new shoes, new clothing, school supplies and 
sometimes money after spending the weekend at Ortiz’ residence.  
When the mother pressed the child on the reason for her new 
possessions, the child told the mother that Ortiz had touched 
 
2
her and put “his thing on her” while the grandmother was not 
there.  The next day, April 19, 2006, the mother reported the 
alleged abuse to Detective Borelli of the Special Victims Unit 
of the Arlington County Police Department. 
Based upon an interview with the child, which included her 
description of the sex acts and a picture she drew as 
explanation, Detective Borelli concluded that the sex acts 
involved penetration.  Ortiz was arrested on April 24, 2006. 
During an interview at the Arlington Police Station with 
Detective Borelli and another officer who acted as an 
interpreter, Ortiz was told, falsely, that the police had 
retrieved his DNA from the child’s person.  Ortiz’ explanation 
was that maybe the child had sex with him while he was drunk 
and asleep because he was often drunk on weekends. 
On April 27, 2006, after obtaining consent from the 
grandmother, detectives conducted a search of Ortiz’ Maryland 
residence.  In a garbage can, the detectives found a receipt 
for a vaginal cream product from a Washington, D.C. large-chain 
drugstore.  The receipt, dated October 7, 2005 at 5:06 p.m., 
bore the name, “Ms. Sebastian Ortiz.”  In addition, the 
detectives found two pornographic videotapes.  The evidence 
seized by the detectives corroborated the child’s earlier 
statements that she had viewed pornographic tapes and that 
Ortiz had put cream on her vagina. 
 
3
On June 19, 2006, a grand jury indicted Ortiz on two 
counts of rape of a female child under the age of thirteen 
occurring in Arlington County in violation of Code § 18.2-61.  
The first indictment originally encompassed the period from 
January 1, 2003 to May 31, 2003, but was amended during Ortiz’ 
case-in-chief, over his objection, to include the period from 
January 1, 2003 to May 31, 2004.  The second indictment 
originally included June 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003, but was 
also amended during Ortiz’ case-in-chief, over his objection, 
to include June 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. 
At trial, the child testified that Ortiz began to sexually 
abuse her when she was four or five years old and continued 
until she was eight, and that the acts of abuse took place in 
Ortiz’ former Arlington residence as well as at his current 
Maryland residence.  The child’s testimony included the 
following details: Ortiz put cream on her private parts, 
sprayed something from a bottle on her private part, put his 
penis in her front private part, and put something white that 
came out of his penis on her bellybutton.  The child further 
testified that Ortiz put “this baby oil thing” on his penis and 
sometimes when the child went to the bathroom afterwards 
“something red came out.”  Ortiz also showed her movies of 
“grownups doing something” without clothes on.  The evidence 
also included the child’s diary, wherein she wrote, “I wish my 
 
4
dad never do sex with me because I always feel [sic] to do S-E-
X with my dad.”  The child referred only to Ortiz as “dad.” 
The Commonwealth also introduced the results of a sexual 
assault nurse examination (SANE exam) conducted on the child.  
The SANE exam revealed a “notch” or sharp demarcation of the 
tissue that opened in the shape of a “V” at about four o’clock 
on the child’s hymen, which could have been consistent with 
penetration.  The conclusion of the SANE report was that the 
child’s genital findings were abnormal. 
Ortiz testified that he and the grandmother had taken care 
of the child since she was born, giving her “support and 
maintenance,” food, furniture, and clothing.  Additionally, 
Ortiz testified that when he picked up the child on Fridays, he 
always told the grandmother to go with him “so that [he] would 
not be accused of anything.”  When asked by the Commonwealth if 
Ortiz was ever alone with the child, he replied, “No.  I never 
was alone with her. . . . No, I was never alone with [the 
child].  I don’t know why you keep accusing me of that.” 
At the conclusion of Ortiz’ trial, the jury found Ortiz 
guilty of raping the child, in violation of Code § 18.2-61, in 
accordance with the amended second indictment covering the time 
frame of June 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005.  The jury’s 
sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment was imposed by the trial 
court as a final judgment.  Ortiz’ appeal to this Court 
 
5
followed the Court of Appeals’ denial of his petition for 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
We will address each of Ortiz’ assignments of error in 
turn.  As each assignment of error reviewed on the merits is 
governed by the same standard of review, we set forth the 
standard to be applied throughout our analysis at the outset.  
We will apply an abuse of discretion standard upon our review 
of the following issues that Ortiz raises: (1) motion for 
continuance – see Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Department of 
Social Services, 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007); 
(2) competence of the child witness – see Mackall v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 253, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988); and 
(3) admissibility of certain evidence – see Gillespie v. 
Commonwealth, 272 Va. 753, 760, 636 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2006); see 
also Dagner v. Anderson, 274 Va. 678, 685, 651 S.E.2d 640, 644 
(2007). 
Appointment of Expert 
Ortiz filed pretrial motions asking the trial court to 
appoint Dr. Matthew H. Scullin as an expert witness and to 
permit Dr. Scullin to educate the jury on children’s 
suggestibility, suggestive interviewing techniques, and 
confirmatory bias, which Ortiz’ counsel described as the impact 
 
6
on a child when he or she is interviewed many times about the 
same thing.  Ortiz argued that the jury had insufficient 
knowledge about these phenomena. 
The trial court refused to appoint Dr. Scullin and denied 
Ortiz’ motion to call Dr. Scullin as an expert witness, 
holding, “I don’t think [this type of information is] beyond 
the realm of common experience of the jurors who are highly 
educated in this jurisdiction.”  At trial, the court denied 
Ortiz’ renewed motion to call Dr. Scullin. 
On appeal to this Court, Ortiz contends the Court of 
Appeals erred by ruling that he failed to show a particularized 
need for an expert witness and that the evidence did not show 
his need for an expert to present an adequate defense.  Ortiz 
argues that without expert assistance, he was denied the 
opportunity to fairly and fully cross-examine the 
Commonwealth’s witnesses.  Ortiz also argues that his expert 
witness would also have had the opportunity to educate the jury 
about Ortiz’ theory that he was falsely accused due to 
suggestive interviewing techniques that led to the child’s 
fabricated account of events. 
Ortiz’ assignment of error relates only to the trial 
court’s denial of his motion to appoint Dr. Scullin as an 
expert.  It does not relate to the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to permit Dr. Scullin to testify.  Only errors assigned 
 
7
in Ortiz’ petition for appeal will be noticed by this Court.  
Rule 5:17(c).  Ortiz has therefore waived his argument 
regarding the exclusion of Dr. Scullin’s testimony. 
The issue whether the trial court erred by refusing to 
appoint Dr. Scullin is moot based on the fact that Ortiz 
ultimately retained Dr. Scullin and had him review all of the 
interviews in this matter.  Ortiz’ retention of Dr. Scullin 
obviated any need for his appointment by the trial court.  
Further, Ortiz did not argue any prejudice regarding the amount 
of time he had to obtain the expert, nor did he request a 
continuance to provide additional time for his expert to 
prepare.  Thus, we will not consider this alleged error on 
appeal. 
Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes 
Ortiz assigns error to the Court of Appeals’ holding that 
evidence of other crimes or bad acts was admissible.  The other 
crimes or bad acts evidence consists of the child’s testimony 
about the ongoing abuse by Ortiz which continued into 2006, the 
two pornographic videotapes, and the drugstore receipt dated 
October 7, 2005 for a vaginal cream product.  The items of 
physical evidence were seized from Ortiz’ Maryland residence in 
April 2006.  Because this evidence was from a time period 
subsequent to the dates charged in the original indictments, 
Ortiz argues that evidence is irrelevant, is offered to show he 
 
8
had a propensity to commit the crime charged, and its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 
The Commonwealth argues the evidence was not offered to 
show Ortiz’ propensity to commit the crime charged.  Instead, 
the evidence proved the parties’ relationship and negated the 
possibility of accident or mistake.  Furthermore, the evidence 
corroborated the child’s account of the sexual abuse. 
As a general rule, evidence which shows or tends to show 
that the accused is guilty of other crimes and offenses at 
other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one 
charged in the indictment, is not admissible to show the 
accused’s commission of the particular crime charged.  
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 
805 (1970).  However, numerous exceptions to this rule 
authorize the admission of “bad acts” evidence.  Specifically, 
other crimes evidence is admissible when it “shows the conduct 
or attitude of the accused toward his victim[;] establishes the 
relationship between the parties[;] or negates the possibility 
of accident or mistake,” Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 76, 
278 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1981); or shows motive, method, intent, 
plan or scheme, or any other relevant element of the offense on 
trial.  Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 527, 323 S.E.2d 
572, 577 (1984). 
 
9
Evidence of subsequent sexual offenses committed by the 
accused against the same victim is also admissible if it 
complies with one of these exceptions.  Moore, 222 Va. at 76-
77, 278 S.E.2d at 825. 
[I]t is well settled that in a prosecution for 
incest, evidence of acts of incestuous 
intercourse between the parties other than those 
charged in the indictment or information, 
whether prior or subsequent thereto, is, if not 
too remote in point of time, admissible for the 
purpose of throwing light upon the relations of 
the parties and the incestuous disposition of 
the defendant toward the other party, and to 
corroborate the proof of the act relied upon for 
conviction . . . . The fact that some of the 
other offenses were remote in point of time from 
the act under investigation does not of itself 
render such evidence incompetent, where the acts 
were repeatedly done up to a comparatively 
recent period and were all apparently inspired 
by one purpose. 
 
Id. at 77, 278 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 
208 Va. 512, 516-17, 158 S.E.2d 663, 667 (1968)).  Evidence 
that falls into the enumerated exceptions must meet an 
additional requirement: its legitimate probative value must 
exceed its incidental prejudice to the defendant.  Guill v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 139, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491-92 (1998). 
The admissibility of the other crimes evidence at issue 
becomes apparent when we consider the extensive period of abuse 
alleged by the child against Ortiz.  Although the two 
indictments originally charged Ortiz with sexual abuse during a 
time period extending from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 
 
10
2003, the indictments were amended during the trial to conform 
to the evidence to encompass a time frame of January 1, 2003 
through December 31, 2005.  The evidence included the child’s 
testimony that she was abused by Ortiz continuously from when 
she was four or five years old until she was age eight.  The 
child was abused both at Ortiz’ former residence in Arlington, 
where he lived until 2005, and thereafter, at his new residence 
in Maryland. 
The child’s description of the sexual abuse she endured 
from Ortiz spanned from 2002 through 2006.  The disputed 
evidence was not offered merely to show Ortiz’ propensity to 
commit rape during the specific time period charged.  The 
evidence was relevant for one or more of the following 
purposes: to show the conduct or attitude of Ortiz toward the 
child, to prove motive or method of committing the rape, to 
prove an element of the crime charged, or to negate the 
possibility of accident or mistake.  See Scott, 228 Va. at 527, 
323 S.E.2d at 577; Moore, 222 Va. at 76, 278 S.E.2d at 824.  
Moreover, “[t]he responsibility for balancing the competing 
considerations of probative value and prejudice rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  The exercise of that 
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a 
clear abuse.”  Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 
S.E.2d 609, 617 (1990). 
 
11
Assuming, arguendo, that the pornographic material and 
vaginal cream, neither of which is illegal to possess, do 
constitute evidence of other crimes or bad acts under these 
facts, the real issue is whether evidence of Ortiz’ possession 
of these items is relevant to prove the commission of rape 
during the time period referenced in the amended indictments.  
“Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove, or is 
pertinent to, matters in issue.”  Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
253, 257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001). 
As the child did not reveal the sexual abuse until 2006, 
the investigation could not commence until that time.  Because 
Ortiz moved to Maryland approximately one year earlier, in 
2005, police detectives had to go to his Maryland residence to 
search for evidence that might corroborate the child’s 
statements. 
The child stated to Detective Borelli and again at trial 
that Ortiz showed her tapes of “grownups doing something” 
without clothes on and put cream on her private parts.  The 
grandmother, in an interview with Detective Borelli, denied 
purchasing the vaginal cream.  Evidence showed that Ortiz 
regularly picked the child up after school on Fridays, then 
took the grandmother to work in Washington, D.C. for her shift 
beginning at 5 or 6 p.m., after which he was alone with the 
child for several hours.  The drugstore receipt bearing the 
 
12
name “Ms. Sebastian Ortiz” was dated October 7, 2005, a Friday, 
at 5:06 p.m., and originated from a Washington, D.C. store.  
Therefore, the purchase of the vaginal cream occurred during 
the time period encompassed by the amended indictment.  
“Circumstantial evidence . . . is offered to prove a fact not 
directly in issue, from which a fact in issue may reasonably be 
inferred.”  Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512, 578 
S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003).  This circumstantial evidence was 
sufficient to link Ortiz to the purchase of the vaginal cream 
and therefore, was corroborative of the child’s allegations 
about Ortiz’ use of cream during the commission of rape. 
Because the pornographic tapes and vaginal cream 
corroborated the child’s allegations, they were also relevant 
to negate the possibility of accident or mistake raised by 
Ortiz.  In Ortiz’ interview at the police station, he asserted 
to the detectives that the child might have had sex with him 
without his knowledge while he was drunk and asleep because he 
was often drunk on weekends. 
The evidence that Ortiz sexually abused the child for a 
period of time extending less than a year beyond the time frame 
alleged in the amended indictments was not so remote that it 
lacked significant probative value.  This evidence helped 
establish the relationship between the parties and the 
opportunity to commit the crime charged, and it negated the 
 
13
possibility of accident or mistake.  For these reasons, the 
Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the contested 
evidence. 
Victim’s Prior Allegations and the Rape Shield Statute 
Ortiz filed a pretrial motion seeking permission pursuant 
to Code § 18.2-67.7 to introduce evidence of the child’s 
alleged prior sexual conduct with a third person.  Ortiz 
contended that evidence of the child’s prior allegation would 
show she had a motive to fabricate that led her to change her 
story from accusing the third person to accusing Ortiz of rape. 
The chronology and nature of the allegations made by the 
child are significant.  The facts of this case began to unfold 
on March 16, 2006, when the child first disclosed to a forensic 
interviewer that Victor Manuel Paz-Castillo (Manuel), the live-
in boyfriend of the mother, had touched the child’s vaginal 
area.  Upon being interviewed, Manuel admitted to touching the 
child’s vaginal area, but explained he did not do so “in a bad 
way.”  Rather, Manuel claimed he touched the child while 
roughhousing and while tending to insect bites the child had 
suffered from a bad dust mite problem in their home.  Manuel 
was arrested on charges of aggravated sexual battery and 
incarcerated and thus, was removed from the home.  
Approximately one month later, the child reported Ortiz’ abuse 
 
14
to her mother.  The next day, April 19, 2006, Detective Borelli 
interviewed the child and concluded that the sex acts by Ortiz 
included penetration.  Ortiz was charged with rape and arrested 
on April 24, 2006. 
On June 1, 2006, the date of Ortiz’ preliminary hearing on 
the rape charge, the child told the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
prosecuting the case that her allegations against Manuel were 
not true.  In a subsequent interview, the child stated that 
Manuel had, in fact, touched her, just not “in a bad way.”  
Because the child’s last version of the events was consistent 
with Manuel’s statement, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the 
charge against Manuel. 
Ortiz argues that the child’s motive to fabricate was to 
appease her mother who was very upset by the child’s 
allegations against Manuel and his resultant arrest and removal 
from their home.  Thus, Ortiz asserts, the child shifted her 
allegations from Manuel to Ortiz. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s 
determination that Virginia’s Rape Shield Statute precluded 
Ortiz from introducing evidence of the child’s prior 
allegations against Manuel and that she later changed her story 
to suggest he did not touch her “in a bad way.”  The Court of 
Appeals relied upon our holding in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 
225 Va. 211, 301 S.E.2d 15 (1983), that the evidence of the 
 
15
child’s past sexual conduct was not admissible under the 
“motive to fabricate” provisions of Code § 18.2-67.7 (B) 
because there was not a “sufficient nexus” between the pattern 
of behavior and the charges against Ortiz.  Id. at 220, 301 
S.E.2d at 21. 
Code § 18.2-67.7(B) states, in pertinent part: 
 
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit 
the accused from presenting evidence relevant to 
show that the complaining witness had a motive 
to fabricate the charge against the accused. 
 
In Winfield, we held that the General Assembly’s enactment 
of Code § 18.2-67.7 was “intended to preclude evidence of 
general reputation or opinion of the unchaste character of the 
complaining witness” in criminal sexual assault cases.  225 Va. 
at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20.  Nevertheless, Code § 18.2-67.7 does 
render admissible evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct 
for limited purposes.1  Id. at 219, 301 S.E.2d at 20.  One such 
purpose is to show a victim’s motive to fabricate, which Ortiz 
asserts is applicable in this case.  We disagree. 
To be admissible under the “motive to fabricate” 
exception, the proffered evidence of sexual conduct must show a 
pattern of behavior by the victim that directly relates to the 
conduct charged in the case on trial.  Id. at 220, 301 S.E.2d 
                                                 
1 “[P]rior sexual conduct” is defined in Code § 18.2-
67.10(5) as “any sexual conduct on the part of the complaining 
witness which took place before the conclusion of the trial, 
 
16
at 21.  There must be a “sufficient nexus” to render such 
evidence relevant and probative of a motive to fabricate.  Id.  
The proffered evidence tended to show that the complaining 
witness in Winfield had a “distinctive pattern of past sexual 
conduct” wherein she extorted money by threat after acts of 
prostitution.  Id. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20. 
No such nexus exists here.  The child’s allegations 
against Manuel were unlike her allegations against Ortiz.  The 
child never alleged that Manuel had sexual intercourse with her 
and eventually explained that while Manuel did touch her 
vaginal area, he did not do so “in a bad way.”  In contrast, 
the child’s allegations against Ortiz exposed in graphic detail 
repeated acts of sexual intercourse that were painful and 
unrelated to playful roughhousing or tending to insect bites. 
Ortiz contends the mother influenced the child to recant 
her allegations against Manuel and falsely charge Ortiz so that 
Manuel would be released and allowed to return home.  This 
argument ignores the distinctive nature of the sexual abuse 
claimed.  The evidence does not support Ortiz’ argument that 
the child simply replaced Manuel’s name with that of Ortiz.  
Thus, evidence of the child’s allegations against Manuel was 
                                                                                                                                                           
excluding the conduct involved in the offense alleged under this 
article.”  
 
17
not at all probative of a motive to fabricate and was properly 
excluded under this argument. 
Ortiz argues in the alternative that he did not seek to 
introduce evidence of the child’s prior sexual conduct, but 
sought instead to introduce the child’s prior statements for 
impeachment purposes.2  In Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 
319, 321-22, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1988), the defendant was 
convicted of rape, sodomy, and inanimate object penetration of 
his daughter.  Citing Code § 18.2-67.7, the trial court 
excluded evidence of the daughter’s prior statements that she 
was pregnant, that her father and uncle raped her, that a boy 
had impregnated her, and that her grandfather sexually abused 
her.  The defendant sought to introduce this evidence for the 
limited purpose of attacking the daughter’s credibility.  This 
Court determined that the daughter’s pregnancy claims, made 
when she was 10 and 11 years old, were patently untrue and 
created a reasonable probability that her claims against her 
family members were also false.  We held that before a 
complaining witness’s prior accusations are admissible, a court 
                                                 
 
2 At trial, Ortiz’ arguments were based, in part, upon the 
holding of the Court of Appeals in Clifford v. Commonwealth, 48 
Va. App. 499, 633 S.E.2d 178 (2006).  However, after Ortiz’ 
trial had concluded, this Court reversed the judgment in 
Clifford, holding that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to 
find that the defendant waived the trial court’s alleged error.  
We directed the Court of Appeals to enter an order affirming the 
 
18
must make the threshold determination that a reasonable 
probability of falsity exists.  Id. at 325, 368 S.E.2d at 266.  
When determined by the court to be false, statements concerning 
sexual behavior are not “conduct” within the meaning of Code 
§ 18.2-67.7 and the rape shield statute is inapplicable.  Id. 
at 322, 368 S.E.2d at 264. 
Ortiz failed to make the threshold showing that there 
existed a reasonable probability that the child’s allegations 
against Manuel were false.  To the contrary, he argued that the 
child’s allegations were true and that Manuel, not Ortiz, 
caused her abnormal genital findings revealed by the SANE exam.  
Because Ortiz did not satisfy the requirements established in 
Clinebell to remove the child’s prior allegations from the 
protection of the rape shield statute, this evidence was 
properly deemed inadmissible. 
Victim’s Competency to Testify 
Ortiz contends the trial court erred in determining the 
child was competent to testify.  After questioning the child, 
the trial court stated, “this is obviously a very intelligent 
child, and I think she’s competent to testify.”  The Court of 
Appeals approved the trial court’s ruling that the evidence 
                                                                                                                                                           
trial court’s judgment.  Clifford v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 23, 
26, 645 S.E.2d 295, 297 (2007). 
 
19
failed to show the child lacked intelligence or a sense of 
moral and legal responsibility. 
Ortiz argues there was clear evidence that the child had 
been strongly influenced by the mother.  Ortiz contends that 
the child’s recantation of the charge against Manuel indicates 
that she was unable to recollect and communicate events.  Ortiz 
also claims numerous alleged inconsistencies in the interviews 
with authorities as proof that the child had no consciousness 
of the duty to speak the truth. 
The competency of a child as a witness to a 
great extent rests in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge whose decision will not be 
disturbed unless the error is manifest.  It is 
the duty of the trial judge to determine such 
competency after a careful examination of the 
child.  In deciding the question the judge must 
consider the child’s age, his intelligence or 
lack of intelligence, and his sense of moral and 
legal responsibility. 
 
Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 153, 487 S.E.2d 224, 227 
(1997) (quoting Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 619, 79 S.E.2d 
652, 657 (1954)).  It is the trial judge’s duty to determine 
the competency of a child witness after “a careful examination 
of the child.”  Id. 
While being questioned by the trial court during a 
competency hearing, the then nine-year-old child explained the 
difference between the truth and a lie.  She stated that she 
thought she would get in trouble if she told a lie in court, 
 
20
and that no one had told her what to say on the witness stand.  
Defense counsel also questioned the child during the hearing, 
and the child said she did not practice her testimony with her 
mother, she had never lied to the prosecutor or the detectives, 
and that it was better to tell the truth than to lie. 
After a careful examination, the trial court concluded 
that the child possessed a “sense of moral responsibility, the 
mental capacity to observe events that happened and [the] 
ability to testify about those events, the ability to remember 
the events, [and] the ability to make intelligen[t] answers 
vis-à-vis the truth.”  In finding the child competent to 
testify, the trial court acknowledged that Ortiz’ contentions 
that the child had been unduly influenced by her mother and had 
rehearsed her story were matters affecting the weight of her 
testimony, not her competency as a witness.  The trial judge 
stated that the jury “can weigh the testimony of this child as 
they do any other witness” and that he would so instruct the 
jury.  Based on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
the child to testify. 
Amendment of Indictment and Denial of 
Continuance After Amendment of Indictments 
 
After the conclusion of its case-in-chief and prior to the 
conclusion of Ortiz’ case, the Commonwealth made a motion to 
 
21
amend the indictments to conform the allegations in the 
indictments to the evidence presented.  The impact of the 
amendments was to cover an additional period of time from 
January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005.  In support of the 
motion, the Commonwealth’s Attorney argued, 
[t]he evidence has always been that [the child] 
said this happened between the time that she was 
five and the time that she was eight.  And now 
we have corroborating evidence to establish how 
long [Ortiz] was, in fact, in Arlington County.  
That’s what the allegations are.  And that’s 
always been the evidence.  And as counsel knows, 
also, the dates when a child is under the age of 
13, that the dates are not an element of the 
offense.  It’s not as if there was an alibi 
defense. 
 
When granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the 
indictments to cover, in total, the period from January 1, 2003 
to December 31, 2005, the trial court held that “the statute 
allows you to do it.”  In response, defense counsel conceded, 
“I agree, Your Honor, but I also think that some of the cases 
discuss about the timeliness.  So if it’s new evidence or 
extending the evidence, then I should get a little bit of time 
to prepare to defend that.”  Defense counsel likewise conceded 
that 
[the amendment] doesn’t change the charge, 
granted.  But my preparation for my client’s 
defense was activity in 2003. . . . I would 
actually move for a continuance so that I can get 
time to prepare for that. . . . It doesn’t change 
the charge itself, but I think my remedy at that 
 
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point would be that I should at least be given 
some continuance time. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-231: 
[I]f there shall appear to be any variance 
between the allegations [in the indictment] and 
the evidence offered in proof thereof, the court 
may permit amendment of such indictment . . . at 
any time before the jury returns a verdict 
. . . , provided the amendment does not change 
the nature or character of the offense charged. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
The concessions by Ortiz’ counsel operated as a waiver and 
therefore, are fatal to his argument that the trial court 
erroneously granted the amendment to the indictment on which he 
was found guilty.  Ortiz did not contend the amendment changed 
the nature or character of the offense charged.  To the 
contrary, Ortiz agreed with the trial court that the offense 
charged remained unchanged and Code § 19.2-231 authorized the 
amendment of the indictment. 
We now address whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying Ortiz’ motion for a continuance following 
amendment to the indictment.  Code § 19.2-231 further provides 
that “if the court finds that such amendment operates as a 
surprise to the accused, he shall be entitled, upon request, to 
a continuance of the case for a reasonable time.”  As noted at 
 
23
the outset, the standard of review governing this issue is 
well-settled in Virginia. 
The decision to grant a motion for a continuance 
is within the sound discretion of the circuit 
court and must be considered in view of the 
circumstances unique to each case.  The circuit 
court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance 
will be rejected on appeal only upon a showing 
of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice 
to the movant. 
 
Haugen, 274 Va. at 34, 645 S.E.2d at 265.  Ortiz has failed to 
prove that the amendment to the indictment operated as a 
surprise or that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion 
for a continuance. 
Ortiz asserts the requisite surprise arose from the 
expansion of the time frame he had to defend against to 
encompass January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005.  However, the 
Commonwealth made its motion to amend the indictment after it 
had concluded its case-in-chief, and Ortiz was aware of all of 
the evidence against him.  Ortiz already knew he would have to 
defend against evidence seized from his residence in 2006, 
including the drugstore receipt dated October 7, 2005, and 
statements made by the child about what happened to her up to 
2006, as this evidence formed the basis of his motion in 
limine, which was denied by the trial court before the trial 
commenced.  Clearly, the element of surprise was lacking. 
 
24
Ortiz “made no showing of a specific need for additional 
investigation to prepare . . . a defense.”  Mackall, 236 Va. at 
249, 372 S.E.2d at 765.  Nor did he “suggest to the trial court 
that there was testimony of witnesses, or evidence in any other 
form, which he could secure if a continuance was granted.”  
Parish v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 627, 632, 145 S.E.2d 192, 195 
(1965).  Ortiz did not assert prejudice with the requisite 
specificity nor did he ask the trial court to make such a 
finding under Code § 19.2-231.  Mere reference to a need for 
more time to prepare is insufficient to show that a continuance 
was improperly denied.  Thus, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that Ortiz was not prejudiced by the trial court’s 
denial of his motion for a continuance. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Lastly, Ortiz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain his conviction.  We will not address this assignment 
of error, as Ortiz failed to preserve his objection for 
appellate review.  Ortiz moved to strike the evidence at the 
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, but did not renew his 
motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence.  The 
Court of Appeals held that Ortiz’ failure to renew his motion 
to strike operated as a waiver of his objection to the 
sufficiency of the evidence under Day v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 
App. 1078, 1079, 407 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1991).  Ortiz did not ask 
 
25
 
26
the Court of Appeals to invoke the “good cause” exception 
pursuant to Rule 5A:18. 
On appeal to this Court, Ortiz states in his assignment of 
error that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred by holding that 
evidence was sufficient to overcome [his] motion to strike the 
evidence.”  The Court of Appeals made no such ruling, but 
rather held that Ortiz’ argument regarding the sufficiency of 
the evidence was procedurally defaulted.  Ortiz has not 
assigned error to the Court of Appeals’ default ruling.  When 
an appeal is taken from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
only assignments of error relating to questions presented in, 
or actions taken by, the Court of Appeals will be considered by 
this Court.  Rule 5:17(c). 
Because the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of 
Ortiz’ argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and 
because Ortiz has not assigned error to the Court of Appeals’ 
failure to do so, Ortiz has waived his objection to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  We decline to invoke the “good 
cause” or “ends of justice” exceptions to Rule 5:25, having 
been provided no reason to do so. 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.