Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12348 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TYRIEK BROWN. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 5, 2018. - May 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Evidence, Firearm.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by 
prosecutor.  Words, "Knowingly." 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 13, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before William F. Sullivan, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Deborah Bates Riordan (Theodore F. Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Erickson Resende, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The primary issue presented in this appeal is 
whether the Commonwealth is required to prove a defendant knows 
that a firearm in his or her possession is loaded in order to be 
2 
 
 
 
convicted of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n). 
 
After police officers discovered a loaded firearm in the 
rear console of a vehicle driven by the defendant, he was 
charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).1  The defendant appealed from 
his convictions, and the Appeals Court vacated the conviction of 
possession of a loaded firearm, after it concluded that G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), requires the Commonwealth to prove a 
defendant's knowledge that the firearm was loaded.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 287, 293 (2017).  
Because the defendant "could not have discerned whether the gun 
was loaded merely by looking at it," and the Commonwealth 
presented no evidence that the defendant had knowledge that the 
gun was loaded, the Appeals Court decided that there was "no 
basis on which a rational juror could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the gun was loaded."  
Id. at 293.  The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction of 
possession of a firearm without a license, concluding that the 
                     
 
1 Before trial, a separate charge of possession of 
ammunition without a firearms identification card was dismissed 
at the request of the Commonwealth.  The defendant was acquitted 
of possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, and 
pleaded guilty to operation of a motor vehicle without a valid 
license. 
3 
 
 
 
prosecutor's closing argument was not improper and that, even if 
it was, it did not result in a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Id. at 294.  We allowed both parties' applications 
for further appellate review. 
 
In its brief to this court, the Commonwealth contends that 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is merely a sentencing enhancement for 
the underlying offense of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  In this view, an additional element of 
knowledge that a firearm contains ammunition is not required to 
prove a violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  All that is 
required is knowledge of possession of a firearm.  The defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction of possession of a loaded firearm and the Appeals 
Court's determination that the prosecutor's closing argument did 
not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
We conclude that, to sustain a conviction under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant 
knew the firearm he or she possessed was loaded.  Because the 
Commonwealth presented no evidence in this case that could allow 
any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant knew the firearm was loaded, the conviction 
of possession of a loaded firearm without a license cannot 
stand.  Further, because we conclude that the Commonwealth's 
closing argument did not create a substantial risk of a 
4 
 
 
 
miscarriage of justice, we affirm the conviction of possession 
of a firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).2 
 
1.  Background.  As the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence of his knowledge that the firearm 
was loaded, we recite the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
677 (1979). 
 
On the morning of July 4, 2013, State police Trooper 
Matthew Moran stopped a vehicle the defendant was driving on 
Interstate Route 290 in Worcester for a defective rear brake 
light.  There were two passengers in the vehicle:  a male 
passenger, Horace Murphy, in the front passenger seat; and a 
female passenger, Joelene Cataquet, in the back seat.  Cataquet 
was asleep when the vehicle was stopped.  The defendant said 
that he was returning from his former girl friend's house in 
Worcester and was headed back to Boston.  He gave the trooper a 
Massachusetts identification card and a Massachusetts learner's 
permit.  Murphy produced a Georgia driver's license.  Moran 
determined through registry of motor vehicles records that both 
licenses were suspended in Massachusetts. 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Erickson 
Resende. 
5 
 
 
 
 
After a second trooper, Patrick Mahady, arrived in response 
to Moran's request for backup, the defendant was arrested for 
driving with a suspended license and was placed in Mahady's 
cruiser.  Moran then read the defendant the Miranda rights, and 
the defendant indicated that he understood those rights.  At 
that point, Moran determined that, because Cataquet did not have 
a driver's license, the vehicle would have to be towed from the 
highway, as none of the occupants legally could drive it.  In 
preparation for towing, Moran conducted an inventory search of 
the vehicle while the defendant was in Mahady's cruiser and the 
two passengers waited behind the vehicle near the guardrail.  
Moran discovered a handgun loaded with five rounds of ammunition 
in the console between the rear passenger seats.  After this 
discovery, Mahady arrested both passengers. 
 
On the drive to the State police barracks, the defendant 
initiated a conversation with Mahady, saying that he thought 
Murphy had a license to carry a firearm.  The defendant also 
said that he had gone to his former girl friend's house in 
Worcester that morning to pick up some clothing.  While he was 
there, the girl friend's sister began arguing with an unknown 
male and waving a firearm around.  The defendant said that he 
grabbed the gun from the woman and left the house.  When he 
returned to the vehicle, where Murphy and Cataquet were waiting, 
he handed the gun to Cataquet and said that they would get rid 
6 
 
 
 
of the gun later.  Upon their arrival at the barracks, Mahady 
was called to another incident and left the defendant with Moran 
without mentioning the conversation.  When Moran again advised 
the defendant of his Miranda rights, the defendant declined to 
speak with officers.  At trial, Mahady testified to the 
substance of the conversation in the cruiser. 
 
During booking, Cataquet gave a written statement, a 
redacted version of which was read in evidence by Mahady.3  As 
Mahady read it, the statement said, 
 
"It is my firearm.  I claim full responsibility for 
the firearm.  I took it out of my purse and slid it into 
the rear console because it made my purse heavy . . . . 
 
 
"I took a nap while we were riding on the highway, and 
the two men in front, [the defendant] and [Murphy], did not 
know at all that I was carrying a fully loaded clip firearm 
in the vehicle.  And when I woke up out of my nap, both the 
men were in handcuffs.  The officer asked me if it was 
mine.  I said no, but I was scared.  But most importantly, 
I can't let two men lose their freedom because I . . . had 
the firearm on the ride to the station.  I realized that, 
and that's why I'm writing this written statement.  I take 
responsibility for my actions.  The reasons I have a gun is 
because I was recently raped and felt the need to have a 
gun to protect myself.  Once again, I take full 
responsibility." 
 
 
There were no useable fingerprints on the firearm, the 
magazine, or the ammunition.  A forensic scientist was unable to 
obtain the serial number for use in tracing the owner of the 
                     
 
3 Cataquet's handwritten statement was introduced as a 
declaration against penal interest.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 804(b)(3) (2018).  The written form and its discussion of 
Miranda warnings were redacted before being given to the jury. 
7 
 
 
 
firearm.  The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm in a vehicle and unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm in a vehicle, and acquitted of possession of a firearm 
with a defaced serial number.4  The Appeals Court reversed the 
conviction of possession of a loaded firearm without a license 
and affirmed the conviction of possession of a firearm (in a 
vehicle) without a license to carry.  We allowed both parties' 
applications for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mens rea requirement for G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n).  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (a), defines the offense of 
possession of a firearm, not in an individual's home or 
business, without a license.  The statute is violated, inter 
alia, when an individual "knowingly has in his possession[,] or 
knowingly has under his control in a vehicle[,] a firearm, 
loaded or unloaded, . . . without either . . . being present in 
or on his residence or place of business . . .  or having in 
effect a license to carry firearms . . . ."  See Commonwealth v. 
Sann Than, 442 Mass. 748, 752 (2004). 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), provides a sentencing 
enhancement to the crime of unlicensed possession of a firearm 
                     
 
4 As mentioned, after trial on the firearms charges, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of operating a motor 
vehicle with a suspended license.  He does not appeal from that 
conviction, and it is not before us. 
8 
 
 
 
where an unlicensed firearm was loaded.5  It does not create a 
stand-alone offense; in order to be convicted under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), an individual must first have been convicted 
under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) or (c).  Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 
456 Mass. 411, 423-424 (2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 723 (2011).  See 
Commonwealth v. Dancy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 703, 705 (2016) ("We 
interpret the plain language of this section to require a 
finding that § 10[a] or § 10[c] has been violated before the 
penalty enhancement provision in § 10[n] can apply"). 
 
At the close of all the evidence in this case, the judge 
indicated that he would give the jury instruction for the charge 
of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm proposed by defense 
counsel.  Under the wording of that instruction, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that (1) the defendant 
possessed or had control over a firearm; (2) the weapon met the 
legal definition of a firearm; (3) the defendant knew that he 
possessed a firearm; and (4) ammunition was contained in the 
weapon or within the feeding device attached to the weapon.  The 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), provides, in its entirety: 
 
 
"Whoever violates paragraph (a) or paragraph (c), by 
means of a loaded firearm, loaded sawed off shotgun or 
loaded machine gun shall be further punished by 
imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 
[two and one-half] years, which sentence shall begin from 
and after the expiration of the sentence for the violation 
of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c)." 
9 
 
 
 
judge ultimately gave an instruction that combined language 
requested by the defendant and by the Commonwealth, and which 
mistakenly stated that five elements were required, while 
including only the four elements listed above.  During 
deliberations, the jury sent the judge the following question:  
"[O]ur instruction[] says there must be five elements, and we 
were only provided with four.  Does the defendant have to know 
whether the firearm was loaded, or just that he possessed it and 
it was loaded?"  The judge conferred with each attorney and 
ultimately decided, with the agreement of both attorneys, to 
explain that the word "five" had been a misprint and should have 
been "four," and then to read the version of the instruction 
that the defendant had requested as to the required elements of 
the offense. 
 
In his appeal to the Appeals Court, the defendant 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), arguing that the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that he knew the firearm was 
loaded.  Relying on our prior case law that unlawful possession 
of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h), is a lesser included 
offense of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and requires 
the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant knowingly possessed 
ammunition, the Appeals Court concluded that it was bound by the 
reasoning of Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 52-53 
10 
 
 
 
(2011), and adopted the defendant's argument.  See Brown, 91 
Mass. App. Ct. at 291-293; Johnson, supra at 53 (conviction of 
possession of unlicensed firearm requires knowledge that object 
possessed met definition of firearm, and possession of 
ammunition without firearms identification card requires 
knowledge that ammunition possessed met legal definition of 
ammunition; because "[a]ll of the required elements of unlawful 
possession of ammunition were encompassed by the elements of 
unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, . . . the former crime 
was a lesser included offense of the latter crime").  As the 
evidence here showed that the defendant "could not have 
discerned whether the gun was loaded merely by looking at it," 
and the Commonwealth presented no evidence that the defendant 
knew it was loaded, the Appeals Court concluded that there was 
"no basis on which a rational juror could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the gun was loaded" and 
set aside the verdict on that charge.  See Brown, supra at 293. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is 
merely a sentencing enhancement for which a separate element of 
mens rea is not required beyond that necessary to prove the 
underlying offense, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  See Commonwealth v. 
Rodriguez, 415 Mass. 447, 452-453 (1993) (in convicting 
defendant of trafficking instead of possession, Commonwealth 
need prove only quantity of drugs, not defendant's knowledge of 
11 
 
 
 
quantity); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 228-230 
(1992) (statute providing sentencing enhancement for drug-
dealing offense committed within 1,000 feet of school does not 
violate due process).  The Commonwealth suggests that G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), "is not totally void of any mens rea 
requirement," Alvarez, supra at 229, in that the Commonwealth 
must prove the intent of the underlying possessory offense.  
Because some provisions of the firearms statute explicitly 
include a mens rea requirement ("knowingly"), the Commonwealth 
maintains, the omission of any explicit language requiring 
knowledge in the words of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), must indicate 
that the Legislature intentionally omitted a knowledge 
requirement for enhanced sentencing under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n). 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative 
intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  
That said, "[w]e will not adopt a literal construction of a 
statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or 
unreasonable."  Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 
12 
 
 
 
Mass. 326, 336 (1982).  See Black's Law Dictionary 11-12 (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining "absurdity" as "being grossly unreasonable" 
and "[a]n interpretation that would lead to an unconscionable 
result, esp. one that . . . the drafters could not have 
intended").  We therefore interpret statutes "so as to render 
the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason and 
common sense."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006). 
 
The absence of any explicit language requiring knowledge in 
the enhancement provision of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is not 
dispositive.  We previously have concluded that other provisions 
of the firearms statute that do not explicitly contain a mens 
rea requirement, among them G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c) and (h), and 
previous versions of G. L. c. 269, § 10, implicitly require 
knowledge.  See Johnson, 461 Mass. at 53; Commonwealth v. 
O'Connell, 432 Mass. 657, 663 (2000) (requiring knowledge of 
possession, but not knowledge of barrel length, to be convicted 
of possession of sawed-off shotgun with barrel less than 
statutory minimum, G. L. c. 269, § 10 [c]); Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 916 (1976) (concluding that implicit 
knowledge requirement existed in previous version of G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 [a]); Commonwealth v. Boone, 356 Mass. 85, 87 
(1969) (concluding that knowledge requirement was implicit in 
former G. L. c. 269, § 10, predecessor to current G. L. c. 269, 
13 
 
 
 
§ 10 [a]).  With respect to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the 
Legislature ultimately revised the statutory language to include 
the element of "knowing" after our decision in Jackson, supra; 
it has not modified other provisions such as G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (c) or (h). 
 
We agree with the Appeals Court's analysis of our reasoning 
in Johnson, 461 Mass. at 53, concerning lesser included firearms 
offenses, and its implications in this case.  "Under our long-
standing rule derived from Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 
434 (1871), a lesser included offense is one whose elements are 
a subset of the elements of the charged offense. . . .  Thus, a 
lesser included offense is one which is necessarily accomplished 
on commission of the greater crime" (citation and quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 531 (2010).6  We 
                     
 
6 In Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 532 (2010), we 
noted that there are "rare circumstances where the purposes of 
our lesser included offense jurisprudence are not served by a 
strict application of the doctrine in a particular case."  This 
is not such a case.  "In general, the cases where we have 
diverged from a strict application of the . . . rule have 
involved instances where, although each offense contains an 
element that the other does not, the different element in the 
lesser included offense is routinely undisputed and was not in 
dispute in the particular case."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 426 Mass. 301, 304-305 (1997) (no dispute as to age of 
victims in convicting defendant of lesser included offense of 
indecent assault and battery on child under fourteen years of 
age); Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 683-684 (1978) 
(unauthorized use of motor vehicle is lesser included offense of 
larceny of motor vehicle where "use on a public way" is not 
 
14 
 
 
 
repeatedly have reaffirmed our holding in Johnson, 461 Mass. at 
52-53, that unlawful possession of ammunition is a lesser 
included offense of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm 
where the only ammunition at issue is contained in the firearm.  
See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 188-189 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Charles, 463 Mass. 1008, 1008 (2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1238 (2013); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 
Mass. 821, 828 n.7 (2012); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 
616, 632 n.17, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012).  Each element 
of the charge of unlawful possession of ammunition, therefore, 
must be an element of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.  
Because the Commonwealth is required to prove that a defendant 
knowingly possesses ammunition that meets the legal definition 
of ammunition, see Johnson, supra, we conclude that the 
Commonwealth also must prove the element of knowing that the 
firearm was loaded with ammunition in order to convict a 
defendant of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n). 
 
b.  Evidence of defendant's knowledge.  In reviewing a 
claim of insufficient evidence, we ask "whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
                                                                  
often contested in practice).  By contrast, knowledge whether 
the firearm was loaded was and is disputed here. 
15 
 
 
 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis in original).  
Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Here, we consider the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth's evidence as to the defendant's knowledge whether 
the firearm he possessed was loaded. 
 
We have observed that, in particular circumstances, a 
rational jury could infer that an individual who possessed a 
firearm was aware that it was loaded.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cassidy, 479 Mass. 527, 537 (2018).  "[K]nowledge can be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence, including any external 
indications signaling the nature of the weapon."  Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615 n.11 (1994) ("firing a fully 
automatic weapon would make the regulated characteristics of the 
weapon immediately apparent to its owner").  See Commonwealth v. 
Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 653 (2013) ("Proof of possession of 
[contraband] may be established by circumstantial evidence, and 
the inferences that can be drawn therefrom" [citation omitted]). 
 
In this case, however, it was not possible to discern 
merely by observation whether the pistol found in the 
defendant's vehicle was loaded; the magazine was inserted inside 
the handle and was not visible.  In addition, the Commonwealth 
did not present any evidence from which an inference could be 
drawn that the defendant was aware that the firearm was loaded.  
See Brown, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 293 & n.13 ("In its brief, the 
16 
 
 
 
Commonwealth defended the sufficiency of the evidence based only 
on its argument that it need not prove that the defendant knew 
that the gun was loaded.  When pressed on the issue at oral 
argument, the Commonwealth characterized any proof of such 
knowledge as 'thin'"). 
 
Accordingly, on the facts of this case, no rational trier 
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knew the firearm was loaded, and the conviction of 
possession of a loaded firearm without a license cannot stand. 
 
c.  Closing argument.  The defendant also challenges the 
propriety of certain portions of the prosecutor's closing 
argument in which he suggested that Cataquet might have been the 
defendant's "new" girl friend, and that, consequently, she had a 
motive to fabricate and might have given the statement about the 
gun in order to protect him. 
 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that this 
was "a case about confessions."  He urged the jury to credit 
Mahady's testimony concerning the defendant's statement about 
the gun, because he had no reason to lie, he did not "look" like 
he had been lying, and "his testimony makes sense."  By the same 
token, the prosecutor urged the jury to disbelieve Cataquet's 
written statement that the gun belonged to her and that the 
defendant was unaware that it was in the vehicle, as likely 
motivated by Cataquet's relationship with the defendant.  In 
17 
 
 
 
conjunction with that argument, the prosecutor emphasized 
inconsistencies in Cataquet's statement:  Cataquet told police 
that the firearm had a "fully loaded clip" and that she had 
removed it from her purse because it was too heavy, yet the 
magazine was "half full"7 and no purse was collected from 
Cataquet at booking.  The prosecutor then suggested that the 
defendant's relationship with his former girl friend must have 
ended recently, that Cataquet had remained in the vehicle when 
the defendant went to pick up clothes from his former girl 
friend's house "to avoid the ex," and that "it is certainly 
possible that Cataquet was covering for her boyfriend."  The 
prosecutor then ended his closing as he had begun, by saying, 
"It's that simple:  He said it was his gun.  And this isn't a 
case about accusations.  It's a case about confessions." 
 
The defendant contends that these suggested inferences were 
improper and that, as a result, a new trial is required.  
Because the defendant did not object to these remarks at trial, 
we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1016 (2016).  "The 
                     
 
7 The testimony of the ballistician was that there had been 
five bullets in the magazine, and one was fired during 
ballistics testing, so four new bullets and one spent projectile 
were introduced in evidence.  There was no evidence how much 
ammunition the magazine held, or how many bullets would have 
been required in order for it to be "half full," but the 
evidence did indicate that the magazine was not full. 
18 
 
 
 
substantial risk standard requires us to determine 'if we have a 
serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been 
different had the error not been made.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 
72 (2005).  The Appeals Court did not determine whether the 
suggested inferences were reasonable, because it concluded that 
any error would not have created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Brown, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 294 
("We are confident that the jury's verdict would not have been 
different had the prosecutor not raised the possibility that the 
two individuals were dating"). 
 
"Prosecutors must limit the scope of their arguments to 
facts in evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn 
from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Coren, 437 Mass. 723, 730 
(2002).  Nonetheless, "[t]he inferences . . . need only be 
reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or 
inescapable," Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 415 Mass. 715, 725 
(1993).  "In analyzing a claim of improper argument, the 
prosecutor's remarks must be viewed in light of the 'entire 
argument, as well as in light of the judge's instruction to the 
jury and the evidence at trial.'"  Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 
Mass. 427, 432 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 391 
Mass. 869, 885 (1984). 
19 
 
 
 
 
The prosecutor did not explicitly present the purported 
relationship as outright fact, arguing that "it is certainly 
possible" that the defendant and Cataquet were involved in a 
relationship, but the prosecutor did rely on this suggested 
inference.  The defendant contends that such an inference was 
unreasonable where there was no evidence that the two were 
involved in a romantic relationship, particularly as there was a 
third passenger in the vehicle and Cataquet was in the back 
seat. 
 
As the Commonwealth maintains, the suggested inference that 
the defendant and Cataquet were in a relationship did support a 
motive for lying, but, given the evidence introduced, the 
suggestion itself is, at best, a stretch.  There was no evidence 
to indicate that Cataquet and the defendant were involved in a 
romantic relationship, and we do not adopt the Commonwealth's 
suggestion that being a rear seat passenger in a vehicle the 
defendant was driving, with another passenger in the front seat, 
would suggest as much.  The inference that the defendant and 
Cataquet were involved in a romantic relationship so close that 
she would lie about having committed a crime in order to protect 
him went too far. 
 
Nonetheless, the discrepancies in Mahady's and Cataquet's 
statements were squarely before the jury, as was the lack of 
evidentiary support for Cataquet's statements.  In the 
20 
 
 
 
circumstances here, even if the challenged inference of a motive 
for a "coverup" was not reasonable, we conclude that there was 
no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the 
prosecutor's statements.  While the remarks should not have been 
made, the judge properly instructed the jury that closing 
arguments are not evidence and that they must "confine [their] 
consideration to the evidence and nothing but the evidence."  
See Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 154-155 (2017).  We 
are confident that the result of the trial would not have been 
different if the prosecutor had relied solely on the 
inconsistencies in Cataquet's statement in arguing that she was 
lying, and had not suggested that she and the defendant were 
involved in a relationship, or, indeed, had relied solely on 
Mahady's lack of a motive to lie in the course of his duty.  The 
prosecutor properly urged the jury, several times, to use their 
"common sense" in considering Cataquet's statement.  Whatever 
her motive for making it, the jury would not have drawn a 
different conclusion about the reliability of Cataquet's 
statement that she removed the gun from her purse (not found at 
the scene or at booking) because it was too heavy, and placed it 
in the rear seat console.  Because it would have made no 
difference in the result, the challenged statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument do not require a new trial. 
21 
 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The conviction of possession of a firearm 
without a license is affirmed.  The conviction of possession of 
a loaded firearm without a license is vacated and set aside, and 
judgment shall enter for the defendant on that indictment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.