Title: WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. NEAL v. PETER D. BROPHY, by his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY ; PETER D. BROPHY, by his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. NEAL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. NEAL v. PETER D. BROPHY, by his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY ;  PETER D. BROPHY, by his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. NEAL2009 WY 132218 P.3d 948Case Number: No. S-08-0271, S-08-0272Decided: 11/03/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WERNER 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. 
NEAL,Appellants(Defendants),v.PETER D. BROPHY, by 
his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY, 
individually,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 
 PETER 
D. BROPHY, by his guardian and conservator, Kate Brophy, and KATE BROPHY, 
individually,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.WERNER 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nebraska corporation, and CHERYL R. 
NEAL,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants in Case No. 08-0271:

Patrick 
J. Murphy, Jason A. Neville, Ryan Schwartz of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming; Curtis B. Buchhammer of Buchhammer & Kehl, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument 
by Mr. Murphy.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees in Case No. 08-0271:

Gary 
J. Ceriani, Valeri S. Pappas of Davis & Ceriani, P.C., Denver, Colorado; L. 
Eric Lundgren of Lundgren Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Ceriani.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  A jury awarded Peter and Kate Brophy 
damages in the amount of $18,069,257 for injuries they sustained as a result of 
a collision between Mr. Brophy's vehicle and a semi-truck owned by Werner 
Enterprises, Inc. (Werner) and being driven by Werner employee, Cheryl R. 
Neal.  The district court entered 
judgment on the verdict and Werner appealed.  The Brophys filed a cross-appeal.   

 
 
[¶2]  In their appeal, Werner and Ms. Neal 
contend the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning the 
statutory presumption they claim is created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-222(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009); the Brophys' counsel violated a pretrial order by questioning 
Ms. Neal about falsification of drivers' logs; the district court erred in 
allowing a life-care planner to testify concerning the cost of Mr. Brophy's 
future care without supporting medical testimony; the Brophys' counsel 
improperly questioned Werner's accident re-constructionist about Werner's safety 
record and accident history; and the verdict was excessive and influenced by 
passion and prejudice.  In their 
cross-appeal, the Brophys ask this Court to address two evidentiary rulings only 
in the event that we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial on 
liability.  We affirm the 
judgment.  

 
 
STATEMENT 
OF THE ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  In their appeal, Werner and Ms. Neal 
state the issues for this Court's determination as follows: 

 
 
            
A. Did the district court commit prejudicial error when it refused to 
instruct the jury on the existence and effect of the statutory presumption, in 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-222(c), that Peter Brophy failed to grant the right of way to 
Cheryl Neal?

 
 
                        
1. After trial, did the district court correctly concede that it 
erred in refusing to instruct on the statutory 
presumption?

 
 
                        
2. When the admitted error is evaluated with the five factors this Court 
considers to evaluate whether the instructional error is prejudicial, do those 
five factors compel the conclusion there was prejudicial 
error?

 
 
                        
3. Is it prejudicial error to incorrectly instruct the jury on the 
parties' burdens of proof?

 
 
            
B. Did the Brophys' counsel commit prejudicial error when he violated the 
district court's in limine order by asking appellant Cheryl Neal if 
falsifying a driver's log is a very serious matter?

 
 
            
C. Without any claim for punitive damages or for Werner Trucking's 
independent negligence, did the Brophys' counsel commit further prejudicial 
error when he asked appellants' accident reconstruction expert about Werner 
Trucking's "safety record" and "history of accidents?"

 
 
            
D. Did the district court commit prejudicial error when it allowed the 
Brophys' life-care planner and economist to testify to Mr. Brophy's $10.9 
million to $11.9 million in future medical and attendant care expenses without 
any medical testimony of Mr. Brophy's (1) diagnosis, (2) prognosis, (3) 
necessity of future medical care, or (4) causal connection between such care and 
this accident?

 
 

            
E. Is this $18,069,257 verdict an excessive award appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion, prejudice, and the prejudicial errors 
identified above?

 
 
In 
response, the Brophys rephrase the same issues.

 
 
[¶4]  In their cross-appeal, the Brophys ask 
the Court to consider two evidentiary issues in the event we reverse the 
judgment and remand for a new trial on the liability issue:  Whether the district court erred in 
admitting evidence of Mr. Brophy's speed before the accident and excluding 
evidence of changes the Wyoming Department of Transportation made to the site 
after the accident.  Werner and Ms. 
Neal assert the district court properly exercised its discretion in both 
instances.  Because we affirm the 
judgment, we do not address these issues. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]  The accident giving rise to this case 
occurred at the I-25 interchange with I-80 in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  At the point where Werner's semi-truck 
and Mr. Brophy's vehicle came into contact, there were three southbound lanes on 
I-25a passing lane on the left, a through lane in the middle, and an 
acceleration/deceleration lane on the right for vehicles entering I-25 from I-80 
or exiting I-25 onto I-80.  At the 
time of the accident, there were two yield signs on the ramp for vehicles coming 
from I-80 onto southbound I-25.  

 
 
[¶6]  On July 25, 2006, Ms. Neal was driving 
Werner's semi-truck southbound in the through lane on I-25 approaching the I-25 
interchange with I-80.  At the same 
time Mr. Brophy was traveling westbound in his BMW on I-80.  Mr. Brophy exited I-80 and proceeded 
around the ramp of the cloverleaf toward southbound I-25 and into the 
acceleration/deceleration lane to the right of the through lane in which Ms. 
Neal was traveling.  The right front 
wheel of the semi-truck hit the left rear side of the BMW, causing the BMW to 
spin, skid backwards across the highway to the east and hit the guardrail before 
being broad-sided by another semi-truck traveling in the left passing lane.  Mr. Brophy suffered catastrophic 
injuries in the accident.

 
 
[¶7]  On March 8, 2007, Mrs. Brophy filed a 
complaint in which she alleged claims against Werner and Ms. Neal on behalf of 
her husband for negligence and on her own behalf for loss of consortium.  She also alleged a claim for vicarious 
liability against Werner.  Werner 
and Ms. Neal (hereafter referred to together as simply Werner) denied the claims 
and asserted that Mr. Brophy's negligence caused the accident.  

 
 
[¶8]  The case was tried to a jury for seven 
days in June of 2008.  The parties 
presented conflicting evidence concerning the location of the vehicles at the 
time they came into contact.  The 
Brophys presented evidence showing the semi-truck caused the accident by 
suddenly moving over into the acceleration/deceleration lane occupied by the BMW 
without signaling or keeping a proper lookout for other traffic, hitting the BMW 
and causing it to spin across the highway where it was hit by the other 
semi-truck.  Werner presented 
evidence that Mr. Brophy caused the accident by speeding up the ramp, ignoring 
the yield signs, crossing over into the through lane occupied by the semi-truck, 
and hitting the right front of the truck.  The jury returned a verdict for the 
Brophys and awarded damages in the amounts of $15,785,257 to Mr. Brophy and 
$2,284,000 to Mrs. Brophy.  Werner 
filed post-trial motions, which the district court denied.  The parties appealed to this Court.          

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.            
Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶9]  Werner contends the district court erred 
when it refused to give the following proposed 
instruction:

 
 
DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C

 
 
You 
are instructed that at the time of the event in question, that Wyoming's Uniform 
Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, at W.S. § 31-5-222(c), provided 
that:

 
 
The 
driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience to the sign slow 
down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for 
safety to stop, shall stop . . . at the point nearest the intersecting roadway 
where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway 
before entering it.  After slowing 
or stopping, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the 
intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the 
driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. . . 
.  If the driver is involved in a collision 
with . . . a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways, after driving 
past a yield sign without stopping, the collision shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence of his failure to yield the right-of-way.  (emphasis added.)  

 
 
[¶10]  Werner contends the district court erred 
further when it gave the following instruction, which omitted the last part of § 
31-5-222(c):

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

VIOLATION 
OF STATUTE AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE

 
 
            
Violation of a statute is evidence of negligence.  If you determine that a party violated a 
statute and that the violation played a substantial part in bringing about the 
injury or damage, then you may consider that fact together with all the other 
facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not the party was 
at fault at the time of the occurrence.  
The following statutes of the State of Wyoming were in effect at the time 
of this accident:

. 
. . .

 
 

3)    
The 
driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience to the sign slow 
down to [a] speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for 
safety to stop, shall stop at the point nearest the intersection roadway where 
the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before 
entering it.  After slowing or 
stopping, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the 
intersection.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
31-5-222(c).

4)    
"Intersection" 
means the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining 
at any angle may come in conflict.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(xvii)(A).

5)    
"Right-of-Way" 
means the right of one (1) vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference 
to another vehicle approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed, and 
proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to 
the other.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-102(a)(xxxix). 

 
 
[¶11]  Werner contends the last part of § 
31-5-222(c) contained in its proposed instruction C was critical because it 
created a statutory presumption that Mr. Brophy failed to yield the right of way 
which shifted the burden to the Brophys to prove that he did not fail to 
yield.  The consequence of the 
district court's failure to give the instruction, Werner asserts, was that the 
jury was incorrectly instructed on the law and the burden of proof.  The Brophys respond that Werner failed 
to object to the district court's ruling on the proposed instructions as 
required by W.R.C.P. 51(b); therefore, Werner waived the claim concerning 
instructional error absent plain error.  
Specifically, they assert Werner did not object to the district court's 
proposed instruction on the ground that the statute created a presumption which 
shifted the burden of proof nor did Werner offer an instruction to that 
effect.    

 
 
[¶12] 
The record reflects the following events concerning the jury instructions.  Werner offered instruction  C along with its other proposed 
instructions prior to trial.  Werner 
also offered instructions reciting the statutory definitions of "intersection" 
and "right-of-way."  In addition, 
Werner offered an instruction defining "prima facie evidence" to mean "evidence 
that, unless rebutted, is sufficient on its face to establish a given fact 
relating to a party's claim or defense."  
Werner did not offer an instruction concerning statutory presumptions or 
the burden of proof.   

 
 
[¶13]  At the instruction conference, after 
hearing objections from the Brophys' counsel, the district court asked Werner's 
counsel if he objected to any of the court's proposed instructions.  Counsel responded affirmatively and 
objected to the court's instructions on comparative fault, causation and the 
burden of proof on the grounds that they did not make it clear that, in addition 
to proving that Werner's negligence caused the collision, the Brophys also had 
to prove the amount of their damages.  
Counsel made no other objection to the district court's burden of proof 
instruction.  Counsel then stated as 
follows:

 
 
            
Instruction No. 5, which is the instruction dealing with violations of 
the statutes, in particular, Subparagraph 3, deals with the issue of yielding, 
and I had tendered to the court Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction C, which 
was an excerpt of the applicable statute, 31-5-222, that contained information 
which the legislature advised if there is a collision and a yield sign, prima facie evidence is that the person 
with the yield sign is the one that essentially was at fault.  I think that needs to be inserted back 
in here so that the legislature's full intent is provided to the 
jury.

 

            
Again, I would tender . . . Defendant's Proposed Instruction 
C.

 
 
            
* * *  I think the jury is 
adequately instructed on the duties to yield from Paragraph 3 if the rest of 
that statute were contained in there.

 
 
Counsel 
for Werner objected to some additional proposed instructions not at issue here 
and then stated:  "[T]hat takes care 
of the objections that I have."  

 
 
[¶14]  The district court ruled that the 
instructions would be given as the court proposed them with the exception of one 
instruction not at issue on appeal.  
The district court then asked Werner's counsel if he wanted to offer any 
additional instructions.  Counsel 
responded, "Only what I had submitted, Your Honor, five days before trial, and . 
. . the one I'm primarily interested in is one of my proposed, C, which was the 
failure to yield statute that contained that last provision."  The district court reiterated its ruling 
that the instruction would be read to the jury as proposed.  

 
 
[¶15]  It is clear from the record that Werner 
objected to the omission from Instruction 5 of the last part of § 31-5-222 and 
offered an instruction in its place containing the omitted language.  In its objection, Werner stated the 
omitted language was necessary to inform the jury the legislature intended that 
when a collision occurs after a yield sign the collision is prima facie evidence that the person 
with the yield sign was "essentially at fault." Werner did not argue, however, 
that the omitted language created a statutory presumption or changed the burden 
of proof.  The question we must 
decide is whether Werner's objection was sufficient to preserve the issue it now 
raises on appeal, i.e., the district court erred in not instructing the jury 
that the last sentence of the statute created a presumption and changed the 
burden of proof on whether Mr. Brophy had failed to yield. 

 
 
[¶16]  In deciding whether the objection was 
sufficient, we look first to the language of Rule 51(b), which provides as 
follows:

 
 
(b) 
Further instructions;  objections.At the close of the 
evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the requests.  
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to their arguments to the jury.  
Before the argument of the case to the jury has begun, the court shall 
give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be necessary. . . . No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to 
and the grounds of the objection.  

 
 
(emphasis 
added)

 
 
[¶17]  Considering claimed error in instructing 
the jury, we have consistently held:

 
 
We 
consider only those claims of error relating to jury instructions in those cases 
where proper objections were raised.  
Unless the circumstances justify a finding of plain error, we do not 
consider claims of error in jury instructions to which no objections were 
made.  

 
 

Landsiedel 
v. Buffalo Properties, LLC, 
2005 WY 61, ¶ 13, 112 P.3d 610, 614 (Wyo. 2005), citing Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 510 (Wyo. 1990).  

 
 
[¶18]  We have said:

 
 
The 
spirit and purpose of the rule is designed to appraise and inform the trial 
court of the purpose of the instruction in order that the judge may make such 
corrections as he deems necessary before submitting the instructions to the 
jury.

 
 

Triton, 
800 P.2d  at 510, quoting Goggins v. 
Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wyo. 1985).  The rule requires counsel "to inform the 
district court of the nature of the contended error and the specific grounds of 
objection, so that the court may exercise judicial discretion in reconsidering 
the instruction to avoid error."  Rittierodt v. State Farm Ins. Co., 3 P.3d 841, 843 (Wyo. 2000), quoting Davis 
v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 843 (Wyo. 1990).  It is insufficient merely to state that 
the instruction is not complete or an accurate statement of the law.  Nish v. Schaefer, 2006 WY 85, ¶ 18, 138 P.3d 1134, 1131 (Wyo. 2006).  Even 
when the objection is that no instruction on a point of law should be given, in 
which case no alternative instruction is required, the objection must distinctly 
set out the matter objected to, along with meaningful, explanatory 
objections.  Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307, 1312 
(Wyo. 1975).

 
 
[¶19]  We applied these principles in Nish, ¶ 19, 138 P.3d  at 1141, to hold 
that the plaintiff's claim of instructional error would be reviewed only for 
plain error because, while he objected to the trial court's proposed instruction 
as an incorrect statement of the law, he did not offer an instruction correcting 
the claimed error.  See also Sunderman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 978 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Wyo. 1999).  
In Landsiedel, ¶ 16, 112 P.3d  
at 615, we likewise reviewed the claim of instructional error for plain error 
because, although the plaintiff had brought the legal issues implicated in the 
instructions to the trial court's attention in pre-trial submissions and 
proceedings, he did not object to the court's rulings on the instructions at the 
formal instruction conference or offer reasons at that time why the instructions 
were necessary.  See also Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 
715-16 (Wyo. 1993), concluding the party did not comply with Rule 51(d) by 
presenting a motion prior to trial asking for a particular instruction when he 
did not object to a contrary instruction during the instruction conference; Triton, 800 P.2d  at 510, holding that a 
"constructive objection" to an instruction in a pretrial memorandum and during 
an unrecorded instruction conference did not satisfy Rule 51. 

 
 
[¶20]  In Loya v. Wyo. Partners of Jackson Hole, 
Inc., 2004 WY 123, ¶ 16, 99 P.3d 972, 978-79 (Wyo. 2004), we applied Rule 
51(d) to decline to consider at all a claim of error involving a special verdict 
form when the party offered no objection in district court.  We said:

 
 
            
We do not think it harsh or unreasonable to require a litigant, when an 
opportunity is afforded during the trial, to timely bring a matter such as this 
to the attention of the trial court in order that it might be corrected, and 
failing to do this he shall not be heard here to complain. . . .  Mr. Loya's failure to object is fatal to 
his appeal.  A careful reading of 
the special verdict form would have alerted Mr. Loya to the possibility of the 
jury making no findings on Mr. Schuler's individual liability for breach of 
contract.  The parties are held 
accountable for creating and acquiescing to an inartfully drafted jury verdict 
form.  

 
 
            
We are not unsympathetic to Mr. Loya's dilemma.  However, the matter of waiver is 
grounded, among other things, on the proposition that jury trials are 
time-consuming and costly proceedings, and while litigants are entitled to a 
fair trial, they have responsibilities to assist the trial court in bringing 
about such a result. Mr. Loya provides us with no authority that would allow us 
to alter the district court's judgment, which is founded upon the jury's 
specific findings.

. 
. . .

Having 
not properly preserved the issue before the district court, Mr. Loya is 
foreclosed from raising objections to the verdict form on appeal.  

 
 
[¶21]  In contrast, in Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 30, 30 P.3d 547, 555 (Wyo. 2001), we reviewed a claim of instructional error even 
though the party claiming error on appeal had not objected in district 
court.  We did so, however, because 
another party had objected to the instruction which we concluded satisfied Rule 
51(b).  That is, by virtue of the 
other party's objection, the trial court was fully informed of the nature and 
specific grounds of the asserted error and had the opportunity to reconsider 
and, if necessary, modify the instructions in order to avoid error.  In Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel 
& Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Wyo. 1992), 
we reviewed a claim of instructional error where an oral objection was made but 
no alternative instruction was offered, concluding that the oral objection 
satisfied Rule 51(b) because it distinctly stated the objectionable matter and 
grounds for the objection.  

 
 
[¶22]  None of these cases involved the precise 
issue we are presented with here, where Werner offered its own instruction and 
objected to the court's proposed instruction but did not fully explain the 
grounds for the objection or offer alternative instructions addressing the 
statutory presumption and burden of proof.  
The case most analogous to the present one is City of Cheyenne v. Simpson, 787 P.2d 580 (Wyo. 1990).  The Simpsons sued 
the City for damages caused to their building by a truck bearing the City's 
logo.  The jury instruction at issue 
read as follows:

 
 
The 
presence of the seal or logo for the City of Cheyenne on a vehicle raises a 
presumption that the vehicle is owned by the City of Cheyenne, and that the 
driver of the vehicle is an employee of the City of Cheyenne acting within the 
scope of his employment.  In order 
to rebut the presumption, the City of Cheyenne has the burden of proving that it 
did not own the vehicle or the driver was not an employee of the 
City.

 
 

Id. 
at 582.  The City objected because 
in other cases where a similar presumption instruction had been given the 
driver's identity was known and the issue was whether he was acting as an agent 
of the employer.  The City objected 
to giving the instruction where the driver was not named as a party and his 
identity was not known on the ground that the instruction did not accurately 
state the law.  Finding that the 
City's objection amounted "to nothing more than a naked claim that the 
instruction [wa]s not complete or an accurate statement of the law," this Court 
concluded the objection did not meet the Rule 51(b) requirements.  Id.  The City asked this Court to review the 
instruction for plain error, arguing the district court should have instructed 
the jury that the City could rebut the presumption raised by the logo by showing 
the driver was not acting in the scope of employment, a new argument that the 
City conceded it had not presented to the trial court.  We reviewed the issue for plain error, 
and found none.  Id. at 583.   

 
 
[¶23]  As in Simpson, the argument Werner presents on 
appeal to this Court was not presented to the district court during the trial. 
Werner did not argue at trial, or offer an instruction stating, that the statute 
created a presumption that shifted the burden of proof.  Consequently, the district court was not 
fully informed of the nature and specific grounds of the asserted error and did 
not have the opportunity to reconsider and, if necessary, modify the 
instructions in order to avoid error.  
Under these circumstances, the spirit and purpose behind Rule 51(b) were 
not met.  Davis, 802 P.2d  at 843.  Werner's objection was not sufficient to 
preserve the arguments it presented later in its post-trial motion and this 
appeal.

 
 

[¶24]  We turn to the question of whether 
Werner's failure to present an adequate objection in the district court is fatal 
to the issue, or whether we will review it for plain error.  Late 
in his argument before this Court, Werner's appellate counsel stated that this 
is a plain error issue, effectively conceding that trial counsel's objection did 
not preserve the statutory presumption issue and that our review is not for 
abuse of discretion as it would have been had a proper objection been made.  Counsel's concession that this is a 
plain error case does not automatically entitle Werner to review.  We 
have said:

 
 
[A]pplication 
of the plain-error doctrine must be exercised cautiously only in exceptional 
circumstances and must not be applied unless its denial would seriously affect 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

 
 

Triton, 
800 P.2d  at 511 (citation omitted).  
We also have said:

 
 
It 
is the duty of the attorneys in each case to determine which legally acceptable 
instruction best presents the client's case.  Neither the judge, nor the appellate 
court, has the appropriate perspective to make such a decision.  Even if they did understand the case 
better than the attorney presenting it, their role prohibits them from urging 
one instruction over another providing both are legally sound.  Thus, unless an instruction can be said 
to have plainly caused a fundamental prejudice to the defendant's legal rights, 
we will not overturn it on appeal unless it was objected to during the trial and 
a proper instruction was offered in its place.

 
 

Id. 
at 512 (citation omitted).     

 
 
[¶25]  The record is clear that Werner objected 
to Instruction No. 5 and offered proposed Instruction C.  Thus, this is not a case, like Loya, ¶ 15, 99 P.3d  at 978, where no 
objection was made and we declined to consider the issue even for plain 
error.  However, as in Simpson, the argument Werner presented 
post trial was not presented to the district court during the trial.  In accordance with this precedent, we 
proceed with the plain error analysis.1  

 
 
[¶26]  To establish plain error, Werner must 
show:  the record clearly reflects 
the jury was not instructed concerning the last part of § 31-5-222(c); the fact 
that the jury was not so instructed transgressed a clear rule of law; the error 
affected Werner's substantial right; and the error materially prejudiced 
Werner.  Nish, ¶ 18, 138 P.3d  at 1141.    

 
 
[¶27] 
 Werner has met the first 
requirement of the plain error testthe record clearly reflects that the 
district court did not instruct the jury on the last part of the statute.  Whether Werner can meet the second 
requirement for plain error is not so easily determined.  In its post-trial motion and before this 
Court, Werner contended that the law is clear that statutes making the fact of a 
collision prima facie evidence of a 
failure to yield create a presumption that can be overcome only by evidence 
countering the presumption.  Werner 
further contended that the law is clear that a jury must be instructed on a 
presumption created by a statute that uses the phrase "prima facie evidence."  Werner cites Hildebrand v. Chicago, B.&Q.R.R., 45 
Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1933); Worth 
v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1935); O'Neal v. State, 498 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 
1972); and Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999), as support for these assertions. 

 
 
[¶28]  In Hildebrand, the Court considered whether 
Wyo. Rev. St. § 38-236 (1931) created a statutory presumption.  The statute provided that a plaintiff in 
an action to recover for cattle killed on a railroad company's tracks made out a 
prima facie case by proving the loss 
of his cattle.  The Court construed 
the statute to mean that when the fact of injury was shown "it shall be prima facie evidence, or it shall be 
presumed as a matter of law, that the railroad company is liable, or that it has 
been so negligent in the performance of its duty so as to entitle the plaintiff 
to recover, unless such prima facie 
evidence or presumption is rebutted."  
Hildebrand, 17 P.2d  at 
653.  The Court discussed cases from 
other jurisdictions in which courts considered whether juries should be 
instructed concerning statutory presumptions, including cases holding that 
juries should not be so instructed but are to decide cases based upon the 
evidence.  No instructional error 
was claimed in Hildebrand, however, 
so the Court did not reach the question.  
Thus, Hildebrand does not 
support Werner's contention that the law is clearly established that a jury must 
be instructed on a statutory presumption.     

 
 
[¶29]  In Worth, wife brought an alienation of 
affection case against her in-laws.  
On appeal, the Court considered whether the trial court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury that the law presumed a parent's counsel to his or her son 
was given in good faith and the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that it was 
not.  The Court held that the 
requested instruction, or the fundamental ideas contained therein, should have 
been given to the jury.  Worth, 49 P.2d  at 656.  However, the Court reached that result 
only after noting that the practice of instructing juries concerning 
presumptions had been questioned and was considered improper in negligence cases 
when conflicting evidence was presented.  
Id. at 651.  Additionally, the Court expressly 
limited its holding in Worth "to the 
exact presumption" before it and declined to decide that the failure to give the 
instruction required reversal. Id. at 
655-56.  Like Hildebrand, Worth does not support Werner's 
contention that the law is clearly established that a jury must be instructed in 
a negligence case concerning any statutory presumptions.    

 
 
[¶30]  O'Neal and Huff were criminal cases in which the 
defendants were convicted of check fraud.  
Those cases involved statutory language to the effect that proof that the 
defendant did not have an account or did not have sufficient funds in the 
account was prima facie evidence that 
he intended to defraud.  In O'Neal, the Court said the statute at 
issue created a presumption which was rebutted, thereby losing its probative 
force, by evidence that the defendant had disclosed at the time she delivered 
the check that she did not have sufficient funds to pay it.  The Court reversed the conviction 
because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of intent to 
defraud.  O'Neal, 498 P.2d  at 1236.    There was no discussion concerning 
whether the jury was or should have been instructed concerning the 
presumption.

 
 
[¶31]  Huff similarly does not provide support 
for Werner's assertion.  The issue 
there was whether a jury instruction included a permissive inference, in which 
case it was appropriate, or a mandatory presumption, which would have violated 
due process.  The Court concluded 
the instruction contained a permissive inference because it did not tell the 
jury that it had to find intent to defraud from the State's evidence that the 
defendant failed to pay the checks after receiving notice of nonpayment; rather, 
the instruction told the jury it could consider the evidence of failure to pay 
as evidence of intent.  Huff, 992 P.2d  at 1075.  Considering the permissive inference 
instruction along with all of the other instructions, the Court concluded the 
jury was properly instructed concerning the applicable law.  Id.       

 
 
[¶32]  In addition to the above Wyoming cases, 
Werner also cites Christopher B. Mueller, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions in 
Civil Cases:  Comparing the Federal 
Rule 301 with Uniform Rule 301, XII Land & Water L. Rev. 219 
(1977).  In particular, Werner cites 
to Professor Mueller's discussion of the "reformist" theory of presumptions 
under which the jury is instructed that it should find the presumed fact unless 
it believes by a preponderance of the evidence that the presumed fact is 
untrue.  Id. at 220.  Professor Mueller compares the 
"reformist" theory and the "traditional" theory, in which the jury is not 
instructed on a presumption when the party contesting the presumed fact produces 
sufficient evidence contradicting it to overcome the presumption.  Id.  Although Professor Mueller advocates for 
the "reformist" theory, his article reflects considerable disagreement 
concerning the appropriateness of instructing the jury concerning 
presumptions.  Id. at 221.  Rather than supporting Werner's 
contention that the district court transgressed a clear rule of law in failing 
to instruct the jury concerning any presumption created by the last sentence of 
§ 31-5-222(c), Professor Mueller's article demonstrates that the law relating to 
jury instructions on statutory presumptions is not clear.  Moreover, in his article, Professor 
Mueller is careful to note that whether a presumption instruction will be given 
depends upon whether one is properly requested in accordance with Rule 51.  Id. at 284.  Nowhere does he suggest that it is 
error, plain or otherwise, for a trial court not to give a presumption 
instruction when no party has requested it.  

 
 
[¶33]  In its reply brief, Werner argues that 
W.R.E. 301 is dispositive of this issue.2  The rule provides as 
follows:

 
 
Rule 
301.  Presumptions in general in 
civil actions and proceedings.

 
 
     (a)  Effect. In all civil actions and 
proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of 
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its 
existence.

 
 
Werner 
contends Rule 301 constitutes the clear rule of law necessary for a showing of 
plain error.  

 
 

[¶34]  Courts that have addressed the issue 
disagree about whether juries should be instructed on presumptions under Uniform 
Rule 301.  See Smith v. Angell, 830 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Idaho 1992), holding it was reversible error to instruct the 
jury that the law presumed the deceased was exercising ordinary care; Schultz v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. 2006), reversing an appellate court holding that it was reversible 
error to give a jury instruction on a presumption; Hanson v. Roe, 373 N.W.2d 366, 371 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985), the trial court properly concluded the jury should not be 
instructed on the presumption of due care; Armstrong v. West Texas Rig Co., 
339  S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1960), finding no error in trial court's refusal to instruct jury regarding 
presumption. While 
Rule 301 addresses the effect of a presumption on the burden of proof, it does 
not establish that the district court was required on its own initiative to 
instruct the jury that § 31-5-222(c) created a presumption that Mr. Brophy 
failed to yield, thereby shifting the burden to the Brophys to prove that he did 
yield.3  Not only is the law not clearly 
established on that issue, it also is not clear that such an instruction would 
have been appropriate under the particular facts of this case.  

 
 
[¶35]  The parties hotly contested before and 
during the trial whether the statute applied at all to this interchange where, 
the Brophys contended, there was no "intersection or junction of roadways" and 
traffic instead "merged" onto I-25.  
Even if the statute did apply to this interchange, the parties contested 
whether Mr. Brophy was required to yield to all traffic in any lane on I-25, or 
only traffic traveling in the acceleration/deceleration lane or signaling the 
intent to move into that lane.  The 
Brophys contended, and presented evidence supporting the contention, that Mr. 
Brophy was not at fault because the acceleration/deceleration lane was empty 
when he approached it, the Werner truck was in the through lane, he acted 
appropriately in moving into the empty lane, Ms. Neal did not signal or 
otherwise indicate that she intended to change lanes and, without keeping a 
proper lookout, she suddenly changed lanes and hit his vehicle.  The conflicting contentions and evidence 
presented factual questions for the jury to decide, and an instruction requiring 
a finding that Mr. Brophy had failed to yield because the collision occurred 
arguably would not have been appropriate.  

 
 
[¶36]  We previously have noted that it is easy 
to "become lost in the trees' of presumptions and shifting burdens of proof, 
and lose sight of the forest'  the sufficiency of the evidence . . . ."  Lincoln County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Cook, 
2002 WY 23, ¶ 48, 39 P.3d 1076, 1089 (Wyo. 2002).  A presumption is merely a "required 
conclusion in the absence of explanation."  
Id., quoting Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 
(Wyo. 1995).     

 
 
            
A presumption is not a magic elixir that imbues its holder with an 
exalted level of protection against an evidentiary attack.  A presumption simply means that in the 
absence of any other evidence to the contrary, the fact presumed is 
conclusive.  If, however, there is 
sufficient evidence to the contrary, then it becomes a question of weight and 
credibility for the trier of fact.  

 
 

Id. 

 
 
[¶37] 
Had there been no evidence that Mr. Brophy exercised due care and that Ms. Neal 
did not, Mr. Brophy's failure to yield would have been conclusively presumed by 
the fact that the collision occurred.  However, the Brophys presented evidence 
that Mr. Brophy exercised due care under the circumstances and so the question 
of ultimate fault for the collision was one of weight and credibility for the 
jury.  The question was really 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.  Hillard, 888 P.2d  at 1260.  Assuming the evidence in favor of the 
Brophys to be true, leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented 
by Werner, and affording the Brophys every favorable inference that may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from the evidence, Landsiedel, ¶ 5, 112 P.3d  at 612, we 
conclude sufficient evidence was presented to support the verdict.  

 
 
[¶38]  Caitlin King, the passenger in the left 
rear seat of Mr. Brophy's vehicle, testified that she had no sense that Mr. 
Brophy was going too fast up the ramp as they approached I-25 and, based upon 
what she saw and felt, she believed he was in control of the car.  She further testified that when they 
came off the ramp onto I-25, they were in the acceleration/deceleration lane and 
never left that lane.  She testified 
she had no doubt that the Werner truck came into the lane they were in and hit 
them.   

 
 
[¶39]  Enda Mangan, the passenger in the front 
seat of the BMW, testified they were in the furthest right lane when he heard 
what sounded like a truck picking up speed and trying to get into the lane 
behind them.  James Wilson, the 
driver of the semi-truck that broad-sided Mr. Brophy's car, testified that he 
came up behind the Werner truck in the through lane at about 55 miles per hour, 
it was slowing down, he did not know what it was intending to do and he pulled 
over into the left lane to pass it.  
He did not know whether the Werner truck stayed in the through lane or 
not, but as he passed it the BMW was suddenly directly in front of him.     

 
 
[¶40]  The Brophys also presented the testimony 
of two experts, Ronald Hensen, an accident re-constructionist, and Charles 
Roush, a safety consultant.  Mr. 
Hensen testified that based upon his review of materials concerning the 
collision, he concluded that the BMW was in the acceleration/deceleration lane 
and the Werner truck was partially in the same lane when the two collided.  He also testified that in his opinion, 
based upon his investigation, the Werner truck hit the BMW rather than the other 
way round.  Mr. Roush testified 
based upon his review of materials relating to the collision that Ms. Neal did 
not act in accordance with the standard of care of professional drivers if she 
remained in the through lane past the start of the deceleration lane and then 
suddenly, without signaling, moved into the deceleration lane just in time to 
make the exit.       

 
 
[¶41]  In addition to these witnesses, 
testimony from Werner's own witnesses raised questions about Werner's version of 
events.  Wyoming Highway Patrol 
Trooper Jeremy Beck, who responded to and investigated the collision, testified 
that Ms. Neal told him at the scene that she was in the 
acceleration/deceleration lane when the BMW hit her.  Based in part upon Ms. Neal's 
statements, Trooper Beck testified that he concluded the point of impact was in 
the acceleration/deceleration lane and that Mr. Brophy failed to yield.  He further testified that if Ms. Neal 
testified at trial that she was completely in the through lane when the impact 
occurred, that would not be consistent with what he saw or understood her to say 
at the scene.  As predicted during 
the Trooper's testimony, Ms. Neal testified that she was in the through lane, 
never left that lane and was in that lane when the BMW ran into her.  She testified that at no time was she in 
or did she start to move into the acceleration/deceleration lane and Trooper 
Beck must have misunderstood her.  
These conflicting versions from Werner's witnesses as to where its 
semi-truck was when the impact occurred created factual questions for the jury 
to decide.  Trooper Beck's testimony 
that he concluded Mr. Brophy failed to yield based in part on statements Ms. 
Neal denied having made left it to the jury to decide whom to believe.  From the testimony, the jury could have 
decided Trooper Beck's conclusions were not credible, or it could have decided 
that Ms. Neal had changed her story.

 
 
[¶42]  Trooper Beck also testified that 
vehicles traveling up the ramp to enter I-25 had a duty to yield to all traffic 
in the southbound lanes of I-25.  
However, responding to questions by the Brophys' counsel, he testified 
that if a vehicle traveling up the ramp toward I-25 had an empty 
acceleration/deceleration lane ahead of it and other vehicles traveling south in 
the through lane were not signaling the intent to move into the empty lane, then 
a reasonable motorist traveling up the ramp could move into the 
acceleration/deceleration lane.  
Werner's accident reconstructionist also testified that the collision 
could have occurred either as described by Ms. Neal or as described by the 
Brophys' witnesses, depending upon "who you believe."  From this testimony, the jury reasonably 
could have decided that Mr. Brophy was not at fault.  

 
 
[¶43] 
Werner points out that in ruling on the post-trial motions, the district court 
concluded that it should have instructed the jury on the entirety of § 
31-5-222(c), that the statute created a presumption and how to apply the 
presumption.  For the reasons 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, we do not agree with that conclusion. 
 However, we are in agreement with 
the district court's conclusion that instructing the jury that the statute 
created a presumption likely would not have changed the outcome.  As the district court 
stated:

 
 
The 
jury's attribution of 100% fault to defendants means that it found, necessarily, 
that Brophy in the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, had no traffic 
to which he should yield or that his failure to yield did not cause the 
accident.  Even defendants' expert, 
in the end, agreed that the accident could have happened either way, depending 
on whether one believed the driver of the truck or some of the other 
witnesses.

 
 
A 
further point is that the presumption would be that Brophy failed to yield, not that his failure caused the 
accident.  The cause was the central 
factual issue for the jury.  It is 
doubtful that an instruction on the presumption would have altered the outcome, 
in light of all of the evidence.

 
 
[¶44]  Reviewing the claimed instructional 
error for plain error, we conclude Werner has not established that the district 
court transgressed a clear rule of law when it declined to instruct the jury on 
its own initiative that § 31-5-222(c) created a statutory presumption that Mr. 
Brophy had failed to yield and shifted the burden to the Brophys to show that he 
did yield.  We further conclude that 
under the particular facts presented in this case, such an instruction may not 
have been appropriate; the question of fault was a factual one for the jury to 
decide based upon its assessment of the evidence presented and the witness' 
credibility.  Additionally, we 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  

 
 

2.         
Questioning Ms. Neal Concerning Falsification of Driver's 
Log

 
 
[¶45]  Werner contends the Brophys' counsel 
committed prejudicial error when he asked Ms. Neal on cross-examination whether 
falsification of drivers' electronic logs was a serious matter.  Werner asserts that the question 
violated the district court's pre-trial order prohibiting any mention of log 
falsification during the trial.  Werner argues the question caused the 
jury to believe that Ms. Neal falsified her logs and there was no way for the 
defense or the district court to cure the resulting 
prejudice.

 
 
[¶46]  The Brophys assert the question 
concerning the logs was not prejudicial because the jury was instructed to 
decide the case on the basis of the evidence and that attorney questions were 
not evidence and should be disregarded if they implied facts not supported by 
the evidence.  The Brophys further 
contend that even if the question caused some prejudice, Werner waived the 
argument because it did not object or seek a cautionary instruction at the 
time.  Finally, the Brophys assert 
the question was not improper.

 
 
[¶47]  Prior to trial, Werner filed a motion 
seeking an order prohibiting, among other evidence, Mr. Roush, the Brophys' 
safety consultant, from testifying that Ms. Neal falsified her logs.  After hearing argument, the district 
court entered an order granting the motion.  At trial, on cross-examination of Ms. 
Neal, the following exchange occurred:

 
 

Q.    
You 
agree with me that there were federal regulations that limit the number of hours 
professional truck drivers can drive?

A.    
Absolutely.

Q.    
These 
are designed to avoid immediate fatigue and cumulative 
fatigue?

A.    
Correct.

Q.     
And 
you agree with me that at Werner you keep track of your on-duty time and 
off-duty time and driving time be it an electronic log?

A.    
That 
is correct, yes, sir.

Q.    And am I correct that falsifying that log 
is a very serious matter?

A.    
Falsifying 
any log in the trucking industry is a very serious matter.  Just happens to be a lot more difficult 
with an electronic log.  I don't 
know of any way to do it.

Q.    
You 
can simply 

                  
[Defense counsel]:  Your 
Honor, I hate to interrupt.  May we 
approach?

                  
The Court:  I'll sustain the 
objection.  I know what it 
is.

 
 
[¶48]  The first difficulty with Werner's 
assertions is that it does not appear from the record that the motion in limine 
included questions directed to or testimony elicited from Ms. Neal.  The only defense motion in limine 
contained in the record before this Court sought an order precluding Mr. Roush 
from testifying that in his opinion Ms. Neal falsified her logs.  Consistent with the motion, defense 
counsel argued at the motion hearing that Mr. Roush's opinions concerning Ms. 
Neal's alleged falsification of logs should not be allowed.  The order granting the motion states only 
that Werner's motion concerning Mr. Roush is granted.4    

 
 
[¶49]  Moreover, the Brophys' counsel sought to 
clarify the district court's ruling concerning the logs the first day of trial 
when he asked whether "any evidence whatsoever" about the logs was prohibited, 
"both on the day of the collision and in the 30 days immediately 
preceding."  The district court 
responded that the 24-hour log history was admissible but the 30-day log was 
not.  There is nothing in the record 
prior to trial indicating the district court intended the order to preclude any 
and all references to log falsification.  
Given that Werner did not seek preclusion of testimony concerning log 
falsification from witnesses other than Mr. Roush, the Brophys' counsel did not 
violate the court's order in his questioning of Ms. Neal.    

 
 
3.         
Questioning Expert Witness About Werner's Safety Record and Accident 
History

 
 
[¶50]  During cross-examination of Werner's 
accident reconstruction expert, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 

Q.    
Did 
you as part of your investigation, sir, look into Werner's safety record the 
number of accidents its trucks have been involved in?

[Defense 
counsel]:  I'm going to object, Your 
Honor.  That's 
irrelevant.

The 
Court:  
Sustained.

Q.    
You 
did look up the specifications for Mr. Brophy's car, 
right?

A.    
Yes, 
sir.

 
 
[¶51]  Werner contends that evidence of its 
safety records and prior accidents was irrelevant and inadmissible and the 
Brophys' counsel asked the question knowing it was improper in order to 
prejudice the jury against the trucking company.  The Brophys respond that asking an 
expert witness what information he considered as part of his investigation is 
perfectly proper.  Even if it were 
not proper, they assert, there was no prejudice because the question was phrased 
broadly, Werner promptly objected, the court sustained the objection and counsel 
moved on to other matters.   

 
 
[¶52]  Our review of this issue is governed by 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, which provides as follows:

 
 
Rule 
9.04.  Harmless 
error.

 
 
     Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded by the reviewing court.

 
 
Werner 
has the burden of establishing it was prejudiced by the claimed error.  Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1973).  

 
 
[¶53]  Having carefully reviewed the entire 
record, we conclude the question by the Brophys' counsel caused no 
prejudice.  In the context of the 
entire trial, we are not persuaded the question prejudiced the jury against 
Werner.  The Brophys are correct 
that counsel phrased the question broadly as an inquiry into what information 
the expert considered, Werner objected promptly, the court sustained the 
objection and counsel moved on to other matters.        
       

 
 
 
 
4.         
Testimony Concerning Future Medical and Attendant Care 
Expenses

 
 
[¶54]  Werner next contends the district court 
erred when it allowed the Brophys' life-care planner, Jack Dahlberg, to testify 
as to Mr. Brophy's future medical and attendant care damages without supporting 
medical testimony.5  Werner asserts that it did not stipulate 
to, and the Brophys presented no medical evidence concerning, the permanency or 
expected duration of Mr. Brophy's injuries and condition.  Without such evidence, Werner contends, 
Mr. Dahlberg's testimony lacked foundation and the verdict cannot 
stand.

 
 
[¶55]  The Brophys respond that Werner conceded 
Mr. Brophy's injuries were serious and permanent.  Even without that concession, the 
Brophys assert, there was substantial evidence as to the permanency of the 
injuries.  The Brophys further 
assert that physician testimony was not required because Mr. Brophy's need for 
care was obvious; therefore, the district court properly allowed their life-care 
planner to testify concerning future care.

 
 
[¶56] 
Decisions to admit or reject expert testimony are entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the district court. Betzle 
v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 1993).  The party challenging the ruling has the 
burden of proving an abuse of discretion.  
Wolf v. Allen, 2008 WY 136, ¶ 
4, 196 P.3d 775, 776 (Wyo. 2008).  
The ultimate issue is whether the district court's decision was 
reasonable.  Id.    

 
 
[¶57]  There is no question Werner conceded 
that Mr. Brophy suffered serious injuries in the accident, including a severe 
brain injury that left him unable to testify at trial.  There is also no question that Werner 
stipulated to the Brophys' medical bills, which totaled $992,557.81.  The record does not reflect, however, 
that Werner made any express concession concerning the permanency of Mr. 
Brophy's injuries.  

 
 
[¶58]  In their pre-trial memorandum, the 
Brophys designated Mr. Dahlberg as a rehabilitation specialist to testify in 
accordance with the report he prepared as to Mr. Brophy's life-care needs for 
the rest of his life.  It does not 
appear from the record that Werner filed any pre-trial motion to preclude or 
limit Mr. Dahlberg's testimony.  The 
record likewise reflects that no objection was made at trial prior to Mr. 
Dahlberg's testimony.  Mr. Dahlberg 
testified that he received a master's degree in vocational rehabilitation 
counseling in 1977, worked for ten years as a rehabilitation counselor at a 
rehabilitation facility specializing in adult spinal cord and brain injuries, 
and had been in private practice in life-care planning, case management and 
consulting since the 1980s.  He 
testified that he is a member of the Brain Injury Association and the American 
Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, has written articles on the subject of 
life-care plans and has testified many times in state and federal courts as an 
expert in the field of life-care planning.  

 
 
[¶59]  Mr. Dahlberg also testified that in 
formulating his opinions and report, he reviewed Mr. Brophy's medical records, 
consulted with Mr. Brophy's neurologist and interviewed and observed the 
Brophys.  He testified that it is 
customary in the course of preparing a life-care plan to rely on the 
evaluations, opinions and reports of other health care professionals.  He testified without objection that 
based upon the information he obtained, he understood that Mr. Brophy sustained 
a severe traumatic brain injury in the collision, leaving him with significant 
physical and cognitive deficits.  
Mr. Dahlberg testified based upon the records and his observations and 
consultations that Mr. Brophy is "severely limited," and "cannot care for 
himself, cannot walk by himself, is non-communicative."  He testified that Mr. Brophy appears to 
attend to and understand some of what goes on around him, although the level of 
his understanding is unknown because he cannot speak.  Mr. Dahlberg testified without 
objection, that Mr. Brophy is unable to get up, walk or move without assistance 
from others, is largely confined to his bed, a wheelchair or a recliner and is 
dependent on others to take care of "all of his needs from bathing, feeding, 
dressing, toileting, any and all needs."  
Mr. Dahlberg also testified without objection that generally, by roughly 
two years post injury, people have stabilized and benefited from rehabilitation 
as much they are going to and in his opinion, given the level of Mr. Brophy's 
injury, he was not likely to benefit from further rehabilitation or 
therapy.        

 
 
[¶60]  Mr. Dahlberg went on to testify that on 
the basis of the information he reviewed, he prepared a life-care plan outlining 
Mr. Brophy's likely future needs in the areas of medication, disposable 
supplies, durable medical equipment, physician contacts, therapy contacts, 
attendant care, psychological counseling, case management and home 
modifications.  He also estimated 
the cost of these items.  Mr. 
Dahlberg testified that he included the future cost of seizure medication in his 
report because the neurologist had indicated Mr. Brophy would likely have 
seizures later in life.  

 
 
[¶61] 
Werner objected to Mr. Dahlberg's testimony at this point on the grounds that it 
lacked foundation and was hearsay.  
Werner argued that Mr. Dahlberg was not a medical doctor and, while he 
could testify as to the medications Mr. Brophy likely would need and how much 
they would cost, he should not be permitted to testify as to what the 
neurologist said or the medical reason for the medication.  The district court ruled that Mr. 
Dahlberg would be allowed to testify that he relied on medical reports, records 
and consultations in preparing his report and as to the opinions he reached 
about the care Mr. Brophy would require in the future.  However, the district court precluded 
Mr. Dahlberg from testifying concerning the contents of the medical reports and 
statements made to him by the neurologist.    

 
 
[¶62]  Based upon the court's ruling, Mr. 
Dahlberg testified that in his opinion Mr. Brophy's future needs would include 
two anticonvulsant medications, diapers, wipes, incontinence pads, antibiotic 
soap, pillows for the prevention of bed sores, bed rails, a shower chair, a 
wheelchair and van, medical appointments, home health care, family counseling, a 
case manager and home modifications.  Mr. Dahlberg also testified as to the 
cost of these items.  Counsel for 
the Brophys sought to admit a written summary of Mr. Dahlberg's testimony and 
Werner objected again on the basis of foundation.  The district court overruled the 
objection and admitted the summary.  
Mr. Dahlberg testified that in his opinion the estimated annual cost of 
caring for Mr. Brophy would be approximately $240,000.        

 
 
[¶63]  The record reflects that much of Mr. 
Dahlberg's testimony was presented without objection.  When Werner did object, the objection 
was in response to Mr. Dahlberg's testimony concerning the neurologist's 
statements to him about the care Mr. Brophy likely would need later in 
life.  Werner sought a ruling from 
the court that Mr. Dahlberg not be allowed to testify about what the doctor said 
to him or what was in the records he reviewed.  The district court ruled that Mr. 
Dahlberg could give his opinions about the care Mr. Brophy would require in the 
future and in doing so could testify as to what materials he considered but 
would not be allowed to testify as to the content of those materials. Werner now 
contends more broadly that it was error for the district court to allow Mr. 
Dahlberg to testify as to Mr. Brophy's future needs without medical testimony 
concerning his diagnosis, prognosis, need for future medical care and the causal 
connection between such care and the collision.  

 
 
[¶64]  W.R.E. 703 provides as 
follows:

 
 
Rule 
703.  Bases of opinion testimony by 
experts.

 
 
     The facts or data in 
the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.    

 
 
[¶65]   Pursuant to this rule, out-of-court 
statements made by a third party may be allowed for the limited purpose of 
showing the basis of an expert's opinion, so long as other experts in the field 
would reasonably rely on similar evidence.  
Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 927 (Wyo. 1999).  Accordingly, 
in Griswold, we upheld the district 
court's ruling allowing an expert witness to testify concerning statements made 
to him by a psychologist about sexual assault victims.  We said:

 
 
Dr. 
Sirotnak's testimony concerning Dr. Kelly's statements about TM and AO was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but was relevant because it 
established a basis for his expert opinion that AO and TM were victims of sexual 
abuse.  Dr. Sirotnak testified that 
it was routine practice for members of the multi-disciplinary team to rely on 
each other's information.  Based on 
the purpose and use of the testimony, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it admitted Dr. Sirotnak's testimony into 
evidence.

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶66]  As in Griswold, Mr. Dahlberg's statements 
about the information he relied upon were not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted, but were relevant because they established a basis for his 
expert opinion about the care Mr. Brophy likely would need in the future.  Like the expert in Griswold, Mr. Dahlberg testified that it 
was customary in preparing a life-care plan to rely on the evaluations, opinions 
and reports of other health care professionals.  Through this testimony, the Brophys 
established a proper foundation for Mr. Dahlberg's opinions and we find no abuse 
of discretion in the district court's ruling allowing the testimony.  

 
 
[¶67]  Our holding is consistent with that of 
other authorities that have addressed the issue.  For example, 2-12 Damages in Tort 
Actions, 12.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2009) states: 

 

 In 
order to warrant jury consideration of permanent injury the plaintiff must prove 
that the injury sustained has in fact resulted in disabilities which are 
incurable. The standard of proof employed is either that of reasonable certainty 
or reasonable probability, depending upon the jurisdiction. The jury may not be 
left to guess or speculate as to the prognosis of the plaintiff's condition. 
Medical testimony may be employed to prove the permanency of the plaintiff's 
illness or injury. Expert testimony is not required, 
however, unless the plaintiff's injury is subjective and the jury, as laymen, 
cannot infer with reasonable certainty or probability that the condition is 
permanent.

 
 
[¶68]  In addition to Mr. Dahlberg's testimony, 
the Brophys presented other evidence from which the jury could infer with a 
reasonable probability that Mr. Brophy's injuries were permanent and he likely 
would need care for the rest of his life.  
The discharge summary from the Cheyenne hospital stated that Mr. Brophy 
had "a devastating closed head injury" which left him unable to speak or move 
his right hand and leg.  The summary 
further reflected that a neurosurgeon immediately performed a craniotomy.  Because Mr. Brophy also had pulmonary 
failure, doctors performed a tracheostomy.  
Mrs. Brophy testified that he underwent a spinal fusion at the C4-C5 
level as well.  

 
 
[¶69]  Additionally, Mrs. Brophy testified that 
nearly two years after the accident, Mr. Brophy was unable to walk without 
assistance and used a wheelchair, had to be kept upright to prevent him from 
aspirating, required a feeding tube for supplemental nutrition and medications, 
had a suction pump to keep his right lung clear, wore diapers, and needed to be 
checked on every couple of hours throughout the day and night.  She also testified that he was unable to 
dress himself, bathe, brush his teeth, go to the bathroom, or feed himself.  In addition to Mrs. Brophy's testimony, 
the Brophys presented a video of Mr. Brophy that showed rehabilitation workers 
working with him to move his right leg and to eat.  From the evidence presented, the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that Mr. Brophy's injuries were permanent.         

 
 
5.         
Excessive Verdict  

 
 
[¶70]  Werner's final claim is that the verdict 
was excessive and the result of passion and prejudice.  Werner contends the evidence showed only 
that the Brophys incurred nearly $1,000,000 in medical bills and there was no 
evidence to prove that future medical care would be necessary or was causally 
connected to the accident.  
Therefore, Werner asserts, the verdict must have been based upon improper 
evidence, passion or prejudice against Werner, stirred by the prejudicial 
statements of the Brophys' counsel. 

 
 
[¶71]  Many years ago, in Valdez v. Glenn, 79 Wyo. 53, 330 P.2d 309, 312 (Wyo. 1958), this Court was presented with a similar claim.  The Court said:

 
 
 
 
[Appellant's] 
theme that the verdict and judgment were the result of passion and prejudice 
brought about by improper conduct of defendants and their attorney and illegal 
evidence admitted by the court is but a reiteration of the claims that questions 
asked by defense counsel in cross-examining plaintiff and rulings of the court 
respecting evidence constituted reversible error.  Notwithstanding this, and the fact that 
we have already considered those questions, we have made a careful search of the 
record to ascertain if it discloses any conduct on the part of defense counsel 
which was calculated to arouse passions or to inspire prejudice.  The result of that effort was 
negative.  When we found the 
evidence properly given the jury was sufficient to sustain their verdict, we 
rejected any suggestion that it was motivated by passion or prejudice.  A verdict and judgment adverse to a 
party neither indicates an improper emotional reaction on the part of a jury nor 
that it entertained any bias or prejudice against the unsuccessful party.  It has been said, "Passion' means moved 
by feelings or emotions, or may include sympathy as a moving influence without 
conscious violation of duty."  
"Prejudice' includes the forming of an opinion without due knowledge or 
examination."  [citations omitted] . 
. . .  The verdict in this case has 
not been brought within either of these definitions.

            

[¶72]  As in Valdez, we have found no reversible 
error in the district court's rulings or the conduct of the Brophys' 
counsel.  We also are not persuaded 
that passion or prejudice caused the jury's verdict.  The Brophys presented substantial 
evidence from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that as Mr. Brophy 
approached I-25, the acceleration/deceleration lane was empty and the Werner 
truck was traveling in the through lane with no apparent intent to move into the 
acceleration/deceleration lane.  The 
Brophys also presented evidence from which the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that Ms. Neal entered the acceleration/deceleration lane suddenly, 
without signaling or keeping a proper lookout, hit Mr. Brophy's vehicle and 
caused it to spin across the highway where it was broad-sided by another 
semi-truck.  

 
 
[¶73]  The jury awarded Mr. Brophy total 
damages of $15,785,257.  It was 
undisputed that his medical bills totaled nearly $1,000,000.  Mr. Brophy was thirty-two years old at 
the time of the collision.  Mr. 
Dahlberg estimated that it would cost nearly $8,000,000 to care for Mr. Brophy 
over his life-time.  The Brophys' 
economist, Dr. Patricia Pacey, testified that the Brophys had between $1,417,400 
and $2,047,400 in lost income as a result of Mr. Brophy's inability to work due 
to his injuries.  Totaling the 
Brophys' medical bills, costs of future care and lost income, the evidence 
supported a verdict of between $10,852,757 and $11,482,757.  

 
 
[¶74]  In addition to these damages, Mr. Brophy 
sought damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and 
disability.  Over Werner's 
objection, the district court instructed the jury that it could award such 
damages in an amount that would fairly compensate Mr. Brophy.  It is apparent from the figures set 
forth in the paragraph above that the jury awarded Mr. Brophy between $4,303,500 
and $4,933,500 for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and 
disability.  Werner claimed then, as 
it claims now, that no evidence was presented supporting this amount of damages 
because no evidence was presented showing that Mr. Brophy experienced pain and 
suffering at the time of trial or would experience it in the 
future.

 
 
[¶75] 
The amount to be assessed for damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of 
personal injuries is a matter within the sound discretion of the trier of 
fact.  Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, 
620 P.2d 549, 555 (Wyo. 1980).  When 
there is substantial evidence to support an award, we do not disturb the 
findings made by the fact finder unless the award is so excessive and 
unreasonable as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.  Id. at 559; Vivion v. Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 26 
(Wyo. 1973).  

 
 
[¶76]  The evidence was undisputed that, among 
other injuries, Mr. Brophy sustained a devastating brain injury as a result of 
the collision.  From the medical 
procedures, rehabilitation and other treatment he endured in the two years 
before trial, the jury was capable of inferring that Mr. Brophy experienced 
considerable pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.  It also was undisputed that two years 
later, he still was unable to walk without assistance, could speak only a few 
words, and could not perform even the most basic tasks of personal care.  From a man whom his wife described as a 
workaholic who also made time to go on vacation with his family once or twice a 
year, enjoy sports such as soccer, curling, bike riding and tennis, do most of 
the day to day cooking for his family, take care of the house and yard and spend 
time socializing with his wife and friends and playing with his kids, Mr. Brophy 
became entirely dependent on others for nearly every aspect of his care, and 
could not effectively communicate, earn a living or do any of the things he 
previously did for his wife, children and himself.  

 
 
[¶77]  This Court has said:    

 
 
No 
witness can testify as to a per diem value for pain and suffering.  There is no fixed standard or formula 
for measurement of the exact amount that might be fixed as reasonable 
compensation.  Pain and suffering 
are not dealt with as a commodity in the marketplace.  The law entrusts the matter, as it does 
many other things, to the common sense and good judgment of the jury.  

 
 

Henman 
v. Klinger, 
409 P.2d 631, 634 (Wyo. 1966).  

 
 
[¶78]  This Court has also 
said:

 
 
The 
pain and suffering for which compensation may be allowed is such as is incident 
to the injury.  The future pain to 
be considered is such as is incident to the duration of the injury complained 
of.  The duration of the injury 
includes the future inconvenience, the loss of time and earning capacity, the 
impairment of the enjoyment of life, and the physical pain and mental anguish 
arising out of such a situation.  
The future duration of a personal injury and of the suffering arising 
therefrom is often a question of mere opinion, based to a greater or a less 
extent upon speculation, and submitted to the jury upon conflicting 
evidence.  

 
 

Mahoney 
v. Pearce, 
38 Wyo. 151, 265 P. 446, 449 (Wyo. 1928).

 
 
[¶79]  Werner is correct that there was no 
testimony that Mr. Brophy continues to have pain.  However, the matter of whether he 
continued to suffer was appropriately entrusted to the jury, as were the matters 
of his loss of enjoyment of life and disability.  In the context of a claim for loss of 
enjoyment of life, we have said that mobility "is the right to be a normal human 
being."  Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 
1980).  There is no question 
evidence was presented to support Mr. Brophy's diminished capacity to enjoy 
life, inability to participate in activities he previously enjoyed, deprivation 
of pleasure, discomfort, and inability to be the human being he was before the 
injury.  From the evidence 
presented, the jury was capable of inferring that Mr. Brophy experienced 
considerable pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and disability.  We cannot say the award was so excessive 
and unreasonable as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the 
jury.  We hold that the jury acted 
within the bounds of its discretion in awarding damages to Mr. Brophy.6  

 
 
[¶80]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We apply the plain error standard because a proper objection was not 
made.  However, as discussed below 
in paragraph 35, we are not persuaded that the district court committed error, 
plain or otherwise, in declining to give the instruction.  Even under the abuse of discretion 
standard applicable when proper objection is made we would conclude the district 
court's decision not to give the instruction was reasonable.  In light of the conflicting evidence 
presented and the uncertainty among courts and legal scholars as to whether 
juries ought to be instructed on presumptions in negligence cases where the 
evidence is conflicting, the district court acted reasonably in rejecting the 
instruction.  Under either a plain 
error or abuse of discretion analysis, the result would be the 
same.

 
 

2Although Werner did not address Rule 301 in its opening brief to this 
Court, it did cite the rule to the district court in support of its post-trial 
motion.

 
 

3The only Wyoming case addressing Rule 301 is Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson 
& Shotwell, 743 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1987), in which the jury was instructed 
that a rebuttable presumption exists that mail delivery occurs when it is 
properly addressed, stamped and mailed which presumption could be rebutted by a 
showing that the mail was not delivered, but that a denial of receipt did not 
overcome the presumption.  We 
concluded the instruction did not accurately state the law because an 
uncorroborated statement of non-receipt was evidence for the jury to consider 
along with the presumption in deciding the factual question of whether delivery 
occurred.  We held, however, that 
the error was waived because no alternative instruction was offered.  Thus, Condict provides no assistance with the 
issues we are faced with here.

 
 

4Werner's motion in limine sought the preclusion of testimony by the 
Brophys' transportation experts on several matters.  The order granted the motion except as 
to the experts' opinions concerning the duty to yield.  The order indicated the latter testimony 
might be admitted depending on the other evidence 
presented.

 
 

5In its statement of the issue, Werner also alleges error in the district 
court's ruling allowing the Brophys' economist to testify concerning Mr. 
Brophy's future medical and attendant care expenses without supporting medical 
testimony.  However, Werner presents 
no argument concerning the economist's testimony and we decline to address the 
issue.

 
 

6Werner makes no argument and cites no authority challenging the loss of 
consortium damages awarded to Mrs. Brophy.  
Therefore, we do not address those damages.