Title: Greub v. Frith

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Greub v. Frith1986 WY 84717 P.2d 323Case Number: 85-216Decided: 04/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jean 
GREUB, and Josie Schreibeis, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

W.B. 
(Pete) FRITH, Loal R. Lorenzen and Debbie S. Rice, Board ofCountyCommissioners, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Michael K. 
Shoumaker of Shoumaker & Murphy, Sheridan, for appellants.

Thomas C. 
Wilson, County and Prosecuting Atty. for SheridanCounty, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from an action by appellants as employees of SheridanCounty, against appellees CountyCommissioners of SheridanCounty (hereinafter the county) to collect 
additional pay. The action commenced after the employees were required to work 
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. instead of the previous 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
schedule. Both parties moved for summary judgment, stating there were no genuine 
issues of material fact. After a hearing the district court granted summary 
judgment for the county.

[¶2.]     Appellants raise the 
following issues:

"1. Should the appellants 
be paid additional sums for the extra 20 hours per month that they have been 
forced to work since January 7, 1985?

"2. Should Sheridan County be 
estopped from raising statutory and contract violations as 
defenses?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellants are 
employees of the CountyAssessor for Sheridan County, Wyoming. Apparently appellants were only 
required to work from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. until January 3, 1985, when James 
Stresky, the CountyAssessor, circulated a memorandum which 
stated in part:

"Beginning Monday, 
January 7, 1985, our workday will commence at 8:00 a.m. There will be no 
compensatory time for this one hour.

"There will be no 
reading, working of crossword puzzles, or writing of personal letters during 
working hours."

[¶5.]     Appellants subsequently 
filed a grievance with their supervisor, James Stresky, seeking compensation for 
the additional hour of work. Stresky denied the request and 
stated:

"Since pay is based on 
hours worked, employees are now 
working 40 hours per week instead of 35, and their pay scale is based on a 
40-hour week."

Next, appellants 
filed their grievance with the county which also denied the request. The county 
stated in its decision letter:

"I regret to inform you 
that I, following an investigation of your grievance filed on February 5, 1985, 
am denying the grievance based on the following:

"1) Chapter 12, Section 
5A of the Sheridan County Personnel Policy states: `An employee's working hours 
shall be determined by the department head or elected official directly 
responsible for that employee. Employees are expected to abide by the working 
hours set by that individual.'"

[¶6.]     Appellants then brought 
the present action in district court. As noted above, both parties moved for 
summary judgment agreeing there were no genuine issues of material fact. After a 
hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees 
finding, inter alia:

"1. The Court finds that 
the defendants are bound by the terms of the personnel policy adopted by 
Sheridan County in 1980; the Court bases this decision upon the case of Mobil 
Coal Producing, Inc., a Delaware corporation, v. Dale Parks, decided by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming via opinion dated August 13, 1985 being 
case number 84-262 [704 P.2d 702]. Although such case did not concern county 
employees, it did concern a personnel policy which governed the employment of 
individuals and would seem, to this Court, to apply in this case as 
well.

"2. The Court further 
finds that the plaintiffs were employed as full-time employees, that they 
enjoyed all the benefits of full-time employees as opposed to part-time 
employees, that they were paid as full-time employees for eight (8) hours work 
per day, but were simply not required prior to January 7, 1985 to work a full 
eight (8) hour day."

[¶7.]     In their first issue 
appellants ask whether they should be paid additional money for the extra twenty 
hours per month they are now required to work. In their second issue appellants 
ask whether the county should be estopped from raising statutory and contract 
violations as a defense. We will consider both issues 
together.

[¶8.]     The trial court found 
that the county was bound by the terms of the "Personnel Policies and Procedures 
Manual for Sheridan County, 
Wyoming," adopted May 6, 1980. As 
noted above, Chapter 12, Section 5A of the manual states that "An employee's 
working hours shall be determined by the department head or elected official 
directly responsible for that employee." Nevertheless, appellants contend the 
new working schedule violates Chapter 9, Section 2B, which requires an 
adjustment in pay for a change in hours worked.

[¶9.]     In the summary judgment 
the trial court cited the case of Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 
Wyo., 704 P.2d 702 (1985). In that case we upheld the trial court's determination that the 
employer had violated the terms of its personnel handbook in its discharge of an 
employee. We recognized that in some instances an employer's personnel manual 
may constitute an employment contract. We need not address that issue here, 
since the basis of our decision is that state law is controlling over a county 
personnel manual. Furthermore, we need not decide whether county commissioners 
have the authority to adopt a personnel manual which controls the offices of 
other elected officials.

[¶10.]  Appellants were initially employed as 
full-time employees. The law is clear in this state that full-time employment 
constitutes an eight-hour day and forty-hour week:

"The period of employment 
of state and county employees is eight (8) hours per day and forty (40) hours 
per week which constitute a lawful day's and week's work respectively." § 
27-5-101(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement).

[¶11.]  Since state law requires a full-time 
employee to work forty hours per week, appellants, in order to prevail, must 
show that they worked part-time for part-time pay. They have failed to do this. 
In their affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment, appellants 
merely state that they were hired to work from nine to five, and that nothing 
was said about working eight hours per day. Apparently neither was anything said 
about working seven hours per day. Appellants do not say they were part-time 
employees.

[¶12.]  We do not know if the nine to five 
schedule alleged by appellants contemplated that they would work through the 
lunch period, or whether it was contemplated they take time off. In practice, 
appellants apparently took time off for lunch since they refer to the paid lunch 
hour as the "benevolent county theory."

[¶13.]  Appellants do not contend that they were 
paid less than full-time employees, nor do they claim they did not receive the 
emoluments of office due a full-time employee. Appellants' counsel made a veiled 
suggestion in argument that appellants were, perhaps, part-time employees since 
they only worked seven hours per day. We do not give any weight to this 
argument, and question appellants' motive to be classified as part-time 
employees. Part-time employees do not enjoy all the emoluments which full-time 
employees receive. Appellants have failed to demonstrate that they were 
part-time employees and were thus hired to work only part-time.1

[¶14.]  Appellants complain that they should be 
paid additional compensation for the extra five hours per week they are now 
required to work. But appellants forget they were not hired to work part-time; 
rather, they were hired, compensated, and received the benefits of full-time 
employees. Certainly appellants are not contending that they were over-paid as 
full-time employees when they only worked thirty-five hours per week. Arguably, 
under our ruling, appellants should be required to pay back the past 
compensation they received in excess of the hours they were required to work. 
However, that issue is not before us. All that has really occurred is that the 
taxpayers are finally receiving the work that they have been paying for - that 
is, a forty-hour work week from appellants.

[¶15.]  Appellants also contend the county should 
be estopped from asserting that appellants were not full-time employees when 
they worked thirty-five hours a week. We recently held in Big Piney Oil and Gas 
Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 
1986), that estoppel would not be invoked against a government or public agency 
functioning in its official capacity. We stated:

"Equitable estoppel 
should not be invoked against a government or public agency functioning in its 
government capacity, except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be 
invoked where it would serve to defeat the effective operation of a policy 
adopted to protect the public. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 138 (1964). * * 
*"

[¶16.]  The county has not argued that appellants 
were not full-time employees when they worked a thirty-five hour week. The 
county merely states that the thirty-five hour work week was due to the leniency 
of the department head; the county still considered appellants full-time 
employees. The county is merely enforcing § 27-5-101(a), which requires 
full-time public employees to work eight hours a day. Appellants' estoppel 
argument is without merit.

[¶17.]  Inasmuch as both parties agreed there 
were no genuine issues of material fact, we find summary judgment was proper in 
this case.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 At the summary judgment 
hearing, the county attorney referred to the benefits received by full-time 
employees, such as appellants. This was not refuted by 
appellants.