Title: People v. Davis

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99363-Agenda 9-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
WAYNE A. DAVIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Wayne A. Davis, was charged in an indictment
with first degree murder. He was subsequently convicted by a jury of
the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, a Class 3
felony. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3(d)(1) (West 2000). At sentencing, the
circuit court of Kane County found that the victim, defendant's son,
was a "family or household member" as defined in section 112A-3 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3)
(West 2000)). Based on this finding, pursuant to section 9-3(f) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West
2000)), the court determined that defendant's offense was elevated
from a Class 3 to a Class 2 felony with a maximum available penalty
of 14 years' imprisonment. The circuit court imposed a 10-year
sentence.
	On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his right to due
process of law had been violated because the indictment charging him
with first degree murder did not allege that the victim was a family
member. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that
defendant had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the
omission in the indictment caused him prejudice in the preparation of
his defense. 352 Ill. App. 3d 570. We granted defendant's petition for
leave to appeal and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	In April 2002, a Kane County grand jury returned an amended
indictment charging defendant with five alternative counts of first
degree murder arising out of the death of seven-week-old Anthony
Davis. Four of the counts were nol-prossed by the State prior to trial.
The remaining count charged that, in violation of section 9-1(a)(2) of
the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2000)), defendant
"made contact with Anthony Davis, a child under 12 years of age,
knowing such act created a strong probability of great bodily harm to
Anthony Davis thereby causing the death of Anthony Davis." The
count did not allege that Anthony Davis was related to defendant or
that he was a member of defendant's household.
	At trial, the State produced evidence, including medical testimony
and defendant's written statement that he had shaken the victim,
which tended to show that defendant caused Anthony's death.
Defendant contested the State's medical evidence and also contended,
through his own testimony, that his admission that he had shaken
Anthony was the product of improper police pressure. Anthony's
relation to defendant, however, was not in dispute. Anthony's mother,
testifying initially as a witness for the State, stated that defendant was
Anthony's father. Defendant, in his testimony, repeatedly stated that
Anthony was his son. In addition, counsel for both parties referred to
Anthony as defendant's son throughout the trial.
	At the close of evidence, the circuit court asked defendant
whether he wanted the jury to be instructed on the lesser-included
offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court explained to defendant
that involuntary manslaughter was a Class 3 felony and that the prison
sentence, if one were given, would be not less than two and not more
than five years. After consulting with his attorney, defendant agreed
to the instruction. A few moments later, however, the circuit court
corrected itself and informed defendant that since the victim was a
member of defendant's family, the lesser offense was in fact a Class 2
felony and that the maximum possible prison sentence was 14 years.
See 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 2000). The following exchange then
took place:
			"The Court: *** Do you understand that these are the
penalties for involuntary manslaughter?
			The Defendant: Yes, I do.
			The Court: Does this change your decision to ask for this
instruction?
			The Defendant: No, it does not."
	Thereafter, the jury was instructed on the charges of first degree
murder and involuntary manslaughter. The instructions made no
reference to the victim's status as a family or household member. On
January 21, 2003, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of involuntary
manslaughter.
	In his posttrial motion and during his sentencing hearing,
defendant argued, among other things, that under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), he
could not be given an enhanced sentence under section 9-3(f) of the
Criminal Code because the jury had not found that Anthony was a
member of defendant's family or household beyond a reasonable
doubt. The State, in response, cited to this court's decision in People
v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and contended that any error in
failing to instruct the jury as to whether Anthony was a family or
household member was harmless. The circuit court agreed. The court
noted that "[t]he evidence that the victim was the Defendant's son
was uncontested and overwhelming" and that "[n]o properly
instructed Jury could have found otherwise." The circuit court
sentenced defendant to 10 years' imprisonment.
	On appeal, defendant again contended that he could not receive
an enhanced sentence under section 9-3(f) of the Criminal Code
because the jury had not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Anthony was a member of defendant's family or household. The
appellate court rejected this argument. Relying, like the circuit court,
on Thurow, the appellate court held that any error in failing to instruct
the jury on this issue was harmless. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 573-74.
	The defendant also argued, for the first time on appeal, that the
omission from the indictment of any allegation that Anthony was a
member of defendant's family or household violated his right to due
process of law. The appellate court rejected this argument as well.
Citing to People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29-30 (1976), the appellate
court held that, when a defendant challenges a charging instrument for
the first time on appeal, the defendant must show that the deficient
instrument prejudiced the preparation of his defense in order to merit
reversal. In this case, the appellate court held, defendant had failed to
show prejudice. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 573. In so holding, the appellate
court expressly declined to follow People v. DeBord, 344 Ill. App. 3d
321 (2003), wherein the appellate court concluded, under facts similar
to this case, that the failure to allege in the charging instrument that
the victim was a family or household member was plain error.
DeBord, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 326.


ANALYSIS
	At the outset, we note what is not at issue in this case. Defendant
does not contend in this appeal that his sixth amendment rights under
Apprendi were violated when the circuit court, rather than the jury,
found that Anthony was a member of defendant's family. Nor does
defendant contest the appellate court's conclusion that any error that
occurred when the circuit court failed to instruct the jury on the family
or household member question was harmless under Thurow.
	As defendant states, "this is not 'an Apprendi case.' " Instead,
according to defendant, "it is a case in which this Court is asked to
follow settled law that a person cannot be convicted of a crime not
charged." Defendant does not dispute that the involuntary
manslaughter instructions that the jury received in this case were, in
themselves, proper, and that he may receive a Class 3 felony sentence.
Defendant emphasizes, however, that a finding that the victim of
involuntary manslaughter is a family or household member elevates
the offense from a Class 3 to a Class 2 felony. From this, defendant
argues that the family or household member finding is an "element" of
involuntary manslaughter of a family member, an "entirely different"
offense from "simple" involuntary manslaughter. Defendant further
maintains that, because the family or household member status of the
victim was an element of an offense that was not alleged in the
indictment, he was convicted of "a Class 2 felony he was never, ever
charged with." Citing to this court's statement in People v. Baldwin,
199 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2002), that "[g]enerally, a defendant cannot be
convicted of an offense that was never alleged," defendant argues that
his sentence should be vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit
court for resentencing as a Class 3 felony.
	We need not decide whether, as defendant argues, the family or
household member finding is an "element" of a separate, involuntary
manslaughter offense that should have been included in the indictment.
Even if defendant is correct that the indictment should have alleged
that Anthony was defendant's son, reversal of defendant's sentence is
unwarranted because, as the appellate court below concluded,
defendant has failed to show that the preparation of his defense was
prejudiced by that omission.
	As this court has noted, "the timing of a challenge to the
indictment 'has been considered significant in determining whether a
defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction on that ground.' "
People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79, 86 (2005), quoting People v.
Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 257 (1996).
		" 'When an indictment or information is attacked for the first
time on appeal, it is sufficient that the indictment or
information "apprised the accused of the precise offense
charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and
allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future
prosecution arising out of the same conduct." ' People v.
Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1991) quoting People v.
Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 (1976). In other words, the
question on appeal is 'whether the defect in the information
or indictment prejudiced the defendant in preparing his
defense.' Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d  at 448." People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 375-76 (2002).
See also Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d  at 86-88 (to prevail in a challenge to
an indictment that is raised for the first time on appeal, the defendant
must show prejudice in the preparation of her defense); People v.
Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 562 (2005) (same).
	In this case, defendant challenged his indictment for the first time
on appeal. Cf. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1 (defendant's objection to the
charging instrument raised in a posttrial motion). To prevail in his
challenge, therefore, defendant must show prejudice in the preparation
of his defense. Defendant has not met this standard. In his brief to this
court, defendant states only that "had experienced defense counsel
been advised from the outset that the particular element [Anthony's
status as a family member] was in issue, he could have adjusted his
trial strategy accordingly." However, defendant does not identify
what, in fact, he could have done differently. Anthony's mother
testified as a witness for the State that the victim was defendant's son.
Nothing of record indicates that defendant could have refuted this
testimony. To the contrary, defendant himself testified that Anthony
was his son. Moreover, during argument on defendant's posttrial
motion, the circuit court asked defense counsel whether he could
point to "any evidence that would put in controversy whether the
defendant was the father of the victim." Defense counsel stated that
he could not.
	Further, defendant cannot claim that the alleged deficiency in the
indictment affected his decision to have the jury instructed on the
lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. As noted, before
defendant chose to have the jury instructed on the lesser offense, the
circuit court accurately informed defendant of the penalty he faced,
given that Anthony was his son. Armed with this knowledge,
defendant freely elected to have the jury instructed. Given these facts,
we conclude that, even assuming it was error to omit the family or
household member allegation from the indictment, defendant failed to
suffer any prejudice in the preparation of his defense.
	Defendant cites to DeBord, which held, under facts similar to this
case, that the failure to include the family or household member
allegation in an indictment was plain error. The DeBord court
concluded that "if defendant was convicted of an uncharged offense
that was not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense, his due
process rights were violated and the error was so prejudicial that it
denied him a fair trial." DeBord, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 326. Notably,
however, DeBord does not cite to Gilmore or its progeny. Nor does
the DeBord court explain how the omission from the indictment of the
family or household member allegation was prejudicial to the
preparation of the defendant's defense, as this court's decisions
require. Accordingly, we do not find DeBord persuasive. To the
extent that DeBord is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.