Title: Langley v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Langley v. State Maryland, No. 51, September Term 2008
CRIMINAL LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS –  CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
– TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY – SITUATION THAT COMPRISES AN ON-GOING
EMERGENCY
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT
THE WITNESS AGAINST HIM WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED RECORDED
9-1-1 STATEMENTS, WHICH WERE SPOKEN AFTER THE ALLEGED
PERPETRATOR COMPLETED THE OFFENSE AND LEFT THE SCENE, DESPITE
THAT THE 9-1-1 CALLER DID NOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL, BECAUSE THE
RECORDED 9-1-1 STATEMENTS WERE OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE NON-
TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY SPOKEN DURING AN ON-GOING EMERGENCY.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 51
September Term, 2008
                                                                             
WILLIAM LANGLEY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., Greene, and Eldridge, JJ., Dissent.
                                                                             
Filed:   September 19, 2011
At the time we granted certiorari and heard oral argument here, this case presented an
emerging issue that plagued courts nationwide: determining whether the content of 9-1-1
telephone calls made following the apparent completion of a discrete crime or crimes is
considered “testimonial,” and thus inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), when offered without a live witness – the caller. 
The Supreme Court’s recent Michigan v. Bryant, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d
at 93 (2011), however, provides some clarity in what theretofore was a murky jurisprudential
crystal ball.  This case calls for a relatively straightforward application of Bryant.
William Langley (“Langley”) appeals from the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals, which affirmed the convictions entered against him in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City.  Pertinent to the present posture of this case, the panel of the intermediate
appellate court held that certain statements telephoned to police by an eye-witness to portions
of events related to a murder-robbery (1) describing an individual alleged to be Langley
exiting the crime scene; and (2) identifying features, such as color and license-plate number,
of an automobile that another witness at trial testified that Langley had access to, were not
“testimonial” within the contemplation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and thus
admissible.  For reasons to be explained more fully infra, we hold that applying Bryant to the
facts of the present case leads us to conclude that these statements were non-testimonial, and,
therefore, Langley’s confrontation rights were not impaired by their admission at his trial. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State’s case at trial demonstrated that, on the evening of 3 October 2005, Nae
Chun Pak, the owner of the Cherry Hill Carry-Out on Cherry Hill Road in Baltimore City,
was shot and killed in his store.  An employee of the store, who testified that Langley was
a regular customer of the store, identified Langley at trial as the assailant.  The employee
testified that he first saw Langley that evening at around 6:00pm, when he was arguing with
Pak at the security window in the store where customers order their food; apparently, Langley
was demanding a refund for a cheesesteak sandwich he purchased that was not to his liking. 
Pak obliged, and Langley left the store.  The employee testified further that Langley returned
less than an hour later.  Pak, with the store busy at the time, was taking orders from a line of
customers.  Langley pushed one customer aside, raised his arm, and fired one shot at Pak. 
The employee, having dove to the floor behind the counter, rose to assess the situation and
noticed Pak laying on the floor.
As Langley was leaving the store, one Herbert Stokes was waiting on the street in his
tow-truck for an acquaintance to get him a bottle of water from a store across the street from
the Cherry Hill Carry-Out.  After hearing a gunshot, Stokes saw people streaming out of the
Cherry Hill Carry-Out, one of whom he identified in the courtroom at trial as Langley.  He
witnessed Langley get in what he believed to be a white Oldsmobile and drive away. 
Subsequently, Stokes selected Langley’s photograph from a photo array as the person who
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“looked like the man” who came out of the store and got in the white car.1
Additional evidence about the presence of a white car and a description of the
assailant were recounted to a 9-1-1 dispatcher by another person, apparently a female located
outside the Carry-Out (who, for some unknown reason, was not produced to testify at trial). 
Over defense objection, a recording of the 9-1-1-tape recording was admitted into evidence
and played for the jury.  The following was heard on the recording:
9-1-1 Operator:
Baltimore City operator number 1316.
What would you like, [police], fire or
ambulance?
Caller:
I just want to give some information on a
shooting that just occurred at Cherry Hill
Shopping Center.
9-1-1 Operator:
Okay. Let me call the District for that. Let
me give you a District number because I
don’t have that information here.
Caller:
Go ahead. [Hurry up. It just happening.]2
9-1-1 Operator:
Are you – 
 Other evidence at trial linked Langley to the crime scene.  Following Langley’s
1
arrest, police recovered a .380 caliber round from Langley’s residence.  Ballistics testing of
a shell casing left at the scene determined that the .380 caliber round recovered from the
residence and the shell left at the scene had been chambered in the same gun.
 The original transcript of the trial did not include the bracketed portions of the
2
content of the call.  An unopposed motion to correct the record by adding the bracketed
words was filed in the Court of Special Appeals to make it part of the record.  That motion
was granted and no complaint about that action was made here.  We assume that the
bracketed statements were played for the jury and their omission was simply a transcription
oversight. 
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Caller:
I seen the guy get in the car. Will you give
me the number or not?
9-1-1 Operator:
Ma’am, you can – (phone rings)
Caller:
Hello?
9-1-1 Operator:
Ma’am, you just told me that you had to
give information not get information.
Caller:
I mean – 
9-1-1 Operator:
Where do you want to have the Officer
sent to?
Caller:
I don’t want them sent nowhere. They
already going out to the store.  But the guy,
I seen him get in the car. Tag number
MRG 908.
9-1-1 Operator:
Do you know what type of car it was?
Caller:
No, I don’t know the type of car. All I
know it’s white.
9-1-1 Operator:
Four door?
Caller:
Look like it might have been a four door. 
I did look at the tag number and it looked
like MRG 908.
9-1-1 Operator:
Do you know what he was wearing?
Caller:
No. Looked like jeans or something in a T-
shirt.
9-1-1 Operator:
T-shirt, was it dark or light?
Caller:
Kind of light. He didn’t have no mask, he
didn’t have no hat, he didn’t have nothing
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on.
9-1-1 Operator:
Was he a light-complected man?
Caller:
Kind of brown skinned. I didn’t know
what kind of car it was.
9-1-1 Operator:
Now, he was wearing a light top and he
was a brown complected man?
Caller:
Don’t quote me on the color.
9-1-1 Operator:
Yes, ma’am.
Caller:
I just will tell you about the tag because I
looked at it, MRG 908.
9-1-1 Operator:
Maryland tag?
Caller:
Yes, I believe so. I didn’t even look at that.
9-1-1 Operator:
What hundred block is that?
Caller:
It’s in the Cherry Hill Shopping Center. I
think that’s the 600 block.
9-1-1 Operator:
At Cherry Hill Road?
Caller:
Yes, Cherry Hill Road.
9-1-1 Operator:
Cherry Hill?
Caller:
Yes.
9-1-1 Operator:
Thank you.
The trial court admitted this portion of the tape, explaining that “[t]he whole tape from
the beginning up until after the tag number was given is an excited utterance and admissible.” 
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Ultimately, the jury convicted Langley of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the
commission of a crime of violence, and wearing or carrying a handgun.  The trial judge
imposed a sentence of life-imprisonment for murder, a consecutive twenty-year term for use
of a handgun, and a concurrent three-year term for wearing or carrying a handgun.
Langley noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The panel of the
intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, relying on Crawford and Davis, held
that the statements in the 9-1-1 tape were non-testimonial, explaining that the 9-1-1 call “was
for precisely . . . [the] purpose” “to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance.”  The Court of Special Appeals, in the alternative, explained that “[e]ven if . . .
the admission of the 911 tape were in error, however, we would be persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that such error was harmless.”
Langley filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Langley v.
State, 405 Md. 290, 950 A.2d 828 (2008), to consider the following questions:
1.
Did the admission of a recording of a 911 call violate
Petitioner’s right to confrontation where the call was
placed after the offense had been completed and where
the alleged perpetrator had left the scene and the caller
indicated that she was aware that the police had been
notified and were in the process of responding?
2.
Was the admission of the recording of the 911 call
harmless?
We hold that the statements in the 9-1-1 tape are non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause
purposes, and, thus, Langley’s confrontation rights were not infringed by the admission of
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the statements.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The flagship question presented in the present case queries whether certain statements
admitted at trial were admitted in violation of Respondent’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  This is a question of law,
which we review under a non-deferential standard of review.  See Snowden v. State, 156 Md.
App. 139, 143 n.4, 846 A.2d 36, 39 n.4 (2004), aff’d, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005) (“We
. . . apply the de novo standard of review to the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause
was violated in this case.” ).
ANALYSIS
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634, 980 A.2d 435, 441
(2009), provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.  This confrontation right “seeks to protect a defendant from the complexities of the legal
system and his or her lack of understanding of the law.”  Brye, 410 Md. at 634, 980 A.2d at
441.  Currently, regarding Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, “[o]ne question attracting
much attention is the status of statements made during 911 calls.”  Geetanjli Malhotra,
Resolving the Ambiguity Behind the Bright-Line Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington
on the Admissibility of 911 Calls in Evidence-Based Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 2006
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U. Ill. L. Rev.205, 215 (2006).
In order to understand properly the current state of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
as it relates to 9-1-1 calls, some context is required.  In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100
S. Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L. Ed 2d 597, 609 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of statements of an unavailable witness
where such statements “bear adequate indicia of reliability,” and that such reliability is
established where the “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or where it
bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nearly twenty-five years later, in Crawford, supra, the Supreme Court overruled
Roberts.  See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, __ U.S. __, __, _ S. Ct. __, __, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610,
636 (2011) (“In a pathmarking 2004 decision, Crawford . . . , we overruled Ohio v. Roberts
. . . .”).  In Crawford, Crawford was arrested for stabbing a man who tried allegedly to rape
Crawford’s wife.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38, 124 S. Ct. at 1357, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 184-85.  At
trial, because Crawford’s wife invoked the spousal privilege, the prosecution sought to admit
the wife’s tape-recorded statement made to the police describing the stabbing.  See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 40, 124 S. Ct. at 1357-58, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 185.  Importantly, in this statement,
contrary to Crawford’s version of the events, she testified that the victim had not drawn a
weapon before Crawford assaulted him.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39, 124 S. Ct. at 1357,
158 L. Ed. 2d at 185.  The trial court, relying on Roberts, supra, admitted the wife’s
statement, offering several reasons why it bore adequate indicia of trustworthiness. 
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40, 124 S. Ct. at 1358, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 186.  A jury convicted
Crawford of assault.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41, 124 S. Ct. at 1358, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 186. 
Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court upheld Crawford’s conviction, agreeing with the
trial court that the statement “bore guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41,
124 S. Ct. at 1358, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 186.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
“whether the State’s use of [Crawford’s wife]’s statement violated the Confrontation
Clause.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S. Ct. at 1359, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 187.
Explaining that Roberts’s reliability test was unpredictable and “demonstrated [a]
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude” and after exploring centuries of history relating to the use of ex parte statements as
evidence against the accused, the Supreme Court held that only with respect to “testimonial
evidence” does the “Sixth Amendment demand[] what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 68,
124 S. Ct. at 1371, 1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 203.  Although “leav[ing] for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’ the Supreme Court enumerated
nonetheless a number of “various formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements”:
“ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially”; “extrajudicial statements   
. . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”;
“statements that were made under circumstances which would
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lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193 (internal citations
omitted).  Applying these formulations to the facts before it, the Supreme Court explained
that “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to . . . police interrogations,”
and, because Crawford did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine his wife, reversed
the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S. Ct.
at 1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203.
Supplying the next piece of the puzzle, in Davis v. Washington (and its companion
case, Hammon v. Indiana), 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), the
Supreme Court undertook to “determine more precisely which police interrogations produce
testimony,” within the contemplation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Davis, 547
U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237.  In Davis, Davis’s former girlfriend
called 9-1-1 in the midst of a domestic disturbance with Davis.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 817, 126
S. Ct. at 2270-71, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 234.  During the call, she informed the dispatcher that
“[h]e’s here jumpin’ on me again,” and that “[h]e’s usin’ his fists,” and that Davis was the
assailant.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 817-18, 126 S. Ct. at 2271, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 234.  As the
conversation continued, the dispatcher was advised that Davis had “just r[un] out the door,”
departing in a car with another individual.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 818, 126 S. Ct. at 2271, 165
L. Ed. 2d at 234.  Ultimately, the State charged Davis with felony violation of a domestic no-
contact order.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 818, 126 S. Ct. at 2271, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235.  Because the
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former girlfriend did not appear at trial to testify, the trial court admitted a recording of her
conversation with the 9-1-1 dispatcher.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 819, 126 S. Ct. at 2271, 165 L.
Ed. 2d at 235. A jury convicted Davis of the charge, and the Supreme Court of Washington
concluded that the portion of the tape in which the former girlfriend identified Davis was
non-testimonial, and if other parts of the tape were testimonial, their admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 819, 126 S. Ct. at 2271-72, 165 L. Ed. 2d at
235.
In Hammon, police responded to the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon for a
reported domestic disturbance.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 819, 126 S. Ct. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at
235. Upon arrival, the police found Amy on the front porch appearing “somewhat
frightened.”  Id.  Police went inside the residence to speak with Hershel, who explained to
police that he and his wife had “been in an argument.”  Id.  By that point, Amy returned
inside and police interviewed her in a separate room regarding the incident.  See id.  She
signed a “battery affidavit,” on which she wrote that Hershel “shoved [her] down on the floor
into the broken glass,” and that he “[h]it [her] in the chest and threw [her] down.”  Davis, 547
U.S. at 820, 126 S. Ct. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235.  Amy did not appear to testify at trial. 
The prosecution called the officer who questioned her at the scene, whereupon the officer
authenticated the affidavit and recounted what Amy told him.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 820, 126
S. Ct. at 2272, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 236.  The trial judge found Hershel guilty of domestic battery
and violating his probation.  The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, explaining
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that Amy’s statement was not testimonial and that, if the affidavit was deemed testimonial
and thus admitted wrongly, its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Davis,
547 U.S. at 821, 126 S. Ct. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 235.  
In its opinion, the Supreme Court explained:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237.  Accordingly, Davis
established what courts and commentators alike refer to as the “primary purpose test.”  See,
e.g., Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1167, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 120 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778, 787 (Ark. 2008); Gregory M. O’Neil, Davis & Hammon: 
Redefining the Constitutional Right to Confrontation, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 511, 543 (2007).  In
distinguishing the statements in the consolidated Davis case – held to be non-testimonial –
from those in Crawford – held to be testimonial – the Supreme Court explained that, in
Davis, the declarant was “speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than
describ[ing] past events, that there was an ongoing emergency, [and] that the elicited
statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency . . . .”   Bryant, __
3
 In clarifying that it was not saying “that a conversation which begins as an
3
(continued...)
-12-
U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1154, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 106 (some quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, Davis stands for the proposition that “where . . . the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to respond to an ‘ongoing emergency,’ its purpose is not to create a record
for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at
__, 131 S. Ct. at 1155, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 107.  Ultimately, in the consolidated Davis case, the
Supreme Court held that the admitted statements were non-testimonial, explaining that the
9-1-1 “call was plainly a call for help against a bona fide physical threat” “necessary . . . to
resolve the present emergency, rather than to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in
the past.”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240 (emphasis
omitted).  In Hammon, on the other hand,  the Court held the statements testimonial and thus
(...continued)
3
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot . . . evolve into
testimonial statements,” the Court noted, in Davis, that “after the operator gained the
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 126 S. Ct. at
2277, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).  Understandably, because the Court in Davis suggested that the emergency ended
when the defendant left the scene of the crime, many courts read Davis as “narrowly
constru[ing] the context of the ‘ongoing emergency’ for purposes of its analysis.”  Saracoglu
v. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27640, at *27 (C.D. Cal. 27 January 2010).  As explained
more fully infra, however, after Bryant, the “ongoing emergency” concept is no longer
construed so narrowly.  See Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 110
(criticizing the Supreme Court of Michigan for “employ[ing] an unduly narrow
understanding of ‘ongoing emergency’ that Davis does not require”); Posting of Prof.
R i c h a r d  
D .  
F r i e d m a n  
t o  
T h e  
C o n f r o n t a t i o n  
B l o g ,
http://www.confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/03/preliminary-thoughts-on-bryant-
decision.html (2 March 2011, 00:42 EST) (noting that the court, in Bryant “takes the
‘primary purpose’ language of Davis and expands on it”).
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inadmissible, explaining that “[i]t is entirely clear from the circumstances that the
interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct . . . .”  Davis,
547 U.S. at 829, 126 S. Ct. at 2278, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 242 (emphasis added).  Although the
Court’s opinion in Davis “clarified the definition of ‘testimonial’ statements,” United States
v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2008), the Supreme Court did not
“attempt[] to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . . as either
testimonial or nontestimonial . . . .”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273, 165 L. Ed.
2d at 237.
Enter Bryant,  which sought to “further expla[i]n[] . . . the ‘ongoing emergency’
4
 At the time the present case was argued before us, Michigan v. Bryant, __ U.S. __,
4
131 S. Ct. 1143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011), had not yet been decided.  In the period between
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165
L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), and Bryant, two separate lines of cases developed in the state courts
regarding the testimonial nature vel non of 9-1-1 calls made following the completion of a
crime.  Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 75 (Mass. 2010) (“[T]he
statements in the 911 telephone call in which the victim identified the nature of the
emergency and described the shooter were not testimonial . . . .”) and Glover v. State, 678
S.E.2d 476, 478-79 (Ga. 2009) (holding that statements made in a 9-1-1 call were non-
testimonial where “the calls were made while the incident was still ongoing, the perpetrator
was at large, and the operator’s questions were intended to assist the police in meeting an
ongoing emergency”) with State v. Koslowski, 209 P.3d 479, 488 (Wash. 2009) (holding that
“the . . . fact that the suspects were at large and that [the] Sergeant . . . relayed the
information he learned from [the declarant] to officers in the field is not enough to show the
questions . . . were necessary to resolve a present emergency situation”) and People v.
Trevizo, 181 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that statements made in a 9-1-1
call were testimonial where “there was no immediate threat to the victim, [and] defendant
had left the scene”). Until Bryant, Langley could have hung his hat on the latter line of cases. 
With the filing of Bryant, however, the screws to that coat rack came loose.  See Philpot v.
State, 709 S.E.2d 831, 835 ( Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that Bryant “substantially alters and
(continued...)
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circumstance addressed in Davis.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1156, 179 L. Ed. 2d
at 108.  In Bryant, Michigan police officers responded to a dispatch that a man had been shot
in a gas station parking lot.  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1150, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 102. 
Upon arrival, the officers found the victim lying on the ground suffering from a gunshot
wound to his abdomen, “appear[ing] in great pain, and sp[ea]k[ing] with difficulty.”  Id. 
Further, 
[t]he police asked him what had happened, who had shot
him, and where the shooting had occurred. [The victim] stated
that “Rick” shot him at around 3 a.m.  He also indicated that he
had a conversation with Bryant, whom he recognized based on
his voice, through the back door of Bryant’s house. [The victim]
explained that when he turned to leave, he was shot through the
door and then drove to the gas station, where police found him.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The victim later died of his injuries
before trial.  Id.  At trial – occurring prior to Crawford and Davis – the police officers that
spoke with the victim at the scene testified as to the victim’s statements.  Id.  Ultimately,
Bryant was convicted of second-degree murder and related charges.  Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the statements were testimonial and – with
the victim unavailable and there being no prior opportunity for cross-examination by Bryant
– inadmissible, explaining that the circumstances “clearly indicate that the ‘primary purpose’
of the questioning was to establish the facts of an event that had already occurred; the
(...continued)
4
expands the framework for analyzing whether an out-of-court statement being challenged on
Confrontation Clause grounds is testimonial or nontestimonial in nature”).
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‘primary purpose’ was not to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1151, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 103 (quoting People v. Bryant, 768
N.W.2d 65, 71 (Mich. 2009)).  Rather, explained the state supreme court, the victim’s
“primary purpose in making these statements to the police . . . was . . . to tell the police who
had committed the crime against him, where the crime had been committed, and where the
police could find the criminal,” noting that the officers’ actions did not suggest that they
perceived an ongoing emergency at the scene of the crime.  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct.
at 1151, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 103 (quoting People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 71). Because Davis
“arose in the domestic violence context, that was the situation [the Court] had immediately
in mind,” the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
confront for the first time circumstances in which the “ongoing
emergency” discussed in Davis extends beyond an initial victim
to a potential threat to the responding police and the public at
large.  This new context requires [the Court] to provide
additional clarification with regard to what Davis meant by . . .
‘an ongoing emergency.’”
Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1156, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 108 (some quotation marks
omitted).
The Court, through Justice Sotomayor, explained that “the existence of an ‘ongoing
emergency’ at the time of an encounter between an individual and the police is among the
most important circumstances informing the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation,” because
an emergency “focuses the participants on something other than proving past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Bryant, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 1157,
-16-
179 L. Ed. 2d at 109 (some internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  The Court
explained that, in Davis, it did not “define the outer bounds of ‘ongoing emergency,’” and
that whether an emergency exists is a “highly context-dependent inquiry.” Bryant, __ U.S.
at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 110.  For instance, because Davis involved a
domestic dispute, the Court “focused only on the threat to the victims and assessed the
ongoing emergency from the perspective of whether there was a continuing threat to them.”
Id.  (emphasis omitted).  The Court continued:
Domestic violence cases . . . often have a narrower zone
of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety. 
An assessment of whether an emergency that threatens the
police and public is ongoing cannot narrowly focus on whether
the threat solely to the first victim has been neutralized because
the threat to the first responders and public may continue.
Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 110; see Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131
S. Ct. at 1163, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 116 (“[T]he scope of an emergency in terms of its threat to
individuals other than the initial assailant and victim will often depend on the type of dispute
involved.”).  Thus, except in domestic disputes with similar facts as those with which the
Court in Davis dealt, a court may not hold that an emergency is no longer ongoing merely
because the alleged assailant has fled the scene of the crime. 
Related to the type of crime as a relevant factor in determining whether an emergency
is “ongoing,” explains the Court in Bryant, is “the type of weapon employed.”  Bryant, __
U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 11 (emphasis added); see id. (criticizing the
Supreme Court of Michigan for “rel[ying] on Davis and Hammon, in which the assailants
-17-
used their fists, as controlling the scope of the emergency [in Bryant], which involved the use
of a gun”).  That is, in Davis, being a domestic dispute involving fists only, there was less
concern that the assailant remained a threat to responding officers or the public at large after
he left the scene of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 681, at
*10 (Mass. 29 July 2011) (holding as “testimonial” statements made in a 9-1-1 call where
“there was no suggestion . . . that her boy friend was armed with a dangerous weapon, or that
her boy friend posed any risk to the public at large”).  The same, obviously, cannot be said
of an unknown shooter, as in the present case.   See Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1158,
5
179 L. Ed. 2d at 111 (quoting United States as Amicus Curiae in Bryant, at 20) (“An
emergency posed by an unknown shooter who remains at large does not automatically abate
just because the police can provide security to his first victim.”); Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131
S. Ct. at 1164, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 117 (“An emergency does not last only for the time between
when the assailant pulls the trigger and the bullet hits the victim.”); see also Guevara v.
Adams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49905, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 25 March 2011) (post-Bryant case
holding statements from a non-victim caller to a 9-1-1 dispatcher to be non-testimonial,
where the dispatcher’s questions were “posed in response to a report of a violent event” (a
stabbing), and that the “initial questions focused on ascertaining the location of the incident
 That is, in a case where a shooting just occurred and the shooter is at large, because
5
of the potential continuing threat to responding authorities and the public at large, the
information relayed from the caller to the 9-1-1 dispatcher relates to a present event, and does
not involve “possibly criminal past conduct . . . .”  Davis, 547 U.S. at 829, 126 S. Ct. at 2278,
165 L. Ed. 2d at 242 (emphasis added).
-18-
and the victim, and the identity of the assailant”); Philpot v. State, 709 S.E.2d 831, 839 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2011) (post-Bryant case holding that a victim’s statements to a responding officer
following a burglary were non-testimonial, where, “by the time the officer arrived, it could
have reasonably been presumed . . . that the burglar, who had just left the scene of the crime
armed with a knife, was still in the immediate vicinity”).
In the present case, an individual walked into the carry-out store and killed the store’s
owner with a gunshot to the head.  The caller relayed to the 9-1-1 dispatcher that a shooting
had “just occurred.” (Emphasis added.).   After waiting for the 9-1-1 dispatcher to give the
6
caller another number to call, the caller exclaims, “Hurry up.  It just happening.”  The caller
informs the dispatcher that he had “seen the guy” and that he knew the color and the tag
number of the getaway vehicle, and approximately what the assailant was wearing.  The facts
of this case, then, are similar to those with which the Supreme Court in Bryant dealt, as both
involve assailants inflicting wounds with a firearm, and the declarant relaying identifying
information to law enforcement personnel.   After Bryant, it is of little matter that the
7
purpose of the call was not to stop the immediate shooting or get medial assistance; all that
 The dissent’s argument, which relies on Davis alone, that the 9-1-1 caller’s
6
statements were testimonial because they occurred after the shooting is unpersuasive.  The
declarant in Bryant made his statements to the police 25 minutes after he was shot as well
as described prior events in the past tense.  Michigan v. Bryant, __ U.S. __,  131 S. Ct. 1143,
1166, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93, 118–19 (2011).
 The Supreme Court in Davis explained that 9-1-1 operators “may at least be agents
7
of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers,” and therefore
“consider[ed] their acts to be acts of the police” for purposes of that opinion.  Davis, 547
U.S. at 823 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238 n.2.  We do the same. 
-19-
matters for purposes of the “ongoing emergency” analysis is that the caller in the present case
was reporting a shooting that was “just happening,” and that the shooter was fleeing, thus
remaining potentially a threat to responding authorities and the public at large.8
Bryant clarified, however, that its emphasis on the existence of an “ongoing
emergency” “should not be taken to imply that the existence vel non of an ongoing
emergency is dispositive of the testimonial inquiry.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at
1160, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 112.  Another factor, the Court explained, “is the importance of
informality in an encounter between a victim and police.”  Id.  In explaining that this “prong”
weighed in favor of a finding that the statements were non-testimonial, the Court explained
that “[t]his situation is more similar . . . to the informal, harried 911 call in Davis than to the
structured, station-house interview in Crawford.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1166,
179 L. Ed. 2d at 119.  We consider the 9-1-1 call in the present case to be “harried,”  with
9
 We foresee an argument that the 9-1-1 call in the present case is not associated with
8
a call seeking police assistance, as the only information the caller relates concerns the
identification of the alleged shooter – i.e, his car tag number and his physical appearance.
Perhaps such identifying information is not associated with a call seeking police assistance
to help the shot victim, but it is certainly information that is associated with a call seeking
police assistance to help capture the fleeing suspect who remains a potential threat to
responding authorities and the public at large.  After Bryant, the “ongoing emergency”
analysis focuses on the latter, not the former.
 Even assuming the 9-1-1 caller was not “frantic” (or “harried” as Bryant describes),
9
as the dissent argues, the trial court determined that the statements were at least excited
utterances, and therefore justifiably reliable.  See Michigan v. Bryant, __ U.S. __,  131 S. Ct.
1143, 1157, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 (2011) (“[T]he prospect of fabrication in statements given
for the primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency is presumably significantly diminished
[because] the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the
(continued...)
-20-
the caller telling the dispatcher to “[h]urry up,” and saying “[h]ello?” when apparently the
dispatcher remained silent for a period of time.  That is, we believe that a review of “the
statements and actions of both the declarant and [dispatcher] provide objective evidence,”
Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 112, that the caller’s statements
in the present case are non-testimonial.
Our recent, pre-Bryant, opinion in State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 965 A.2d 75 (2009),
is not to the contrary.  In Lucas, Anne Arundel County police officers responded to a
“[d]omestic call.”  Lucas, 407 Md. at 309, 965 A.2d at 77.  Upon arriving at the residence,
the officers interviewed the victim at length.  See Lucas, 407 Md. at 309-10, 965 A.2d at 77. 
At trial, one of the officers agreed that his “purpose in speaking with [the victim] or knocking
on the door and speaking with the occupants was to conduct an investigation” and that he
was “there to gather information.”  Lucas, 407 Md. at 310, 965 A.2d at 77.  We held that the
statements, in which the victim gave details about the domestic dispute and identified her
attacker, were testimonial, considering they indicated a “primary purpose to ‘establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’ and not to ‘enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’” Lucas, 407 Md. at 323-24, 965 A.2d at 85
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273, 2274, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237).
The facts in Lucas are distinguishable readily from the facts in the present case and
(...continued)
9
crucible of cross-examination.  This logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance
exception in hearsay law.”).
-21-
from those with which the Supreme Court dealt in Bryant.  Unlike the present case and
Bryant, Lucas involved a domestic dispute between the victim and her male friend.  See
Lucas, 407 Md. at 309, 965 A.2d at 77.  Further, the weapon employed in Lucas was the
assailant’s fists and feet, not a firearm, as in the present case and in Bryant.  See id. 
Considering the type of crime and the nature of the weapon employed, we were correct in
Lucas to hold that there was no “ongoing emergency,” and, thus, that the statements to the
police officers were testimonial.  Importantly, in Lucas, we said that the circumstances in that
case “are distinct from those in which officers encountered victims with apparent severe
injuries requiring immediate medical attention and/or where an assailant had not yet been
located.”  Lucas, 407 Md. at 324, 965 A.2d at 86 (emphasis added).  Of course, in the present
case, the caller was reporting a shooting (which suggests potentially “apparent severe injuries
requiring immediate medical attention”) and the assailant had not yet been located. 
Accordingly, any reliance on Lucas is misplaced.
Like Bryant, in the present case, “at no point during the questioning did either [the
caller] or the police [dispatcher] know the location of the shooter.”   Bryant, __ U.S. at __,
10
131 S. Ct. at 1164, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 117.  Further, like Bryant, “[n]othing [the caller] said to
the police [dispatcher] indicated that the cause of the shooting was a purely private dispute
 We recognize, like the Supreme Court, that “none of this suggests that an
10
emergency is ongoing in every place or even just surrounding the victim for the entire time
that the perpetrator of a violent crime is on the loose.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at
1159, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
-22-
or that the threat from the shooter had ended.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1163, 179
L. Ed. 2d at 116.  Nor should this Court review a purported ongoing emergency with the
benefit of hindsight; statements must be reviewed objectively—at the time they were
made—as to whether a reasonable person would believe there was an emergency, “even if
that belief is later proved incorrect.”  Bryant, __ U.S. at __ n.8,  131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.8, 179
L. Ed. 2d at 109 n.8.  Accordingly, we classify the caller’s statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher
in the present case as “the exact type of questions necessary to allow the police to ‘“assess
the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim”’ and
to the public,” Bryant, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1166, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 118 (quoting Davis,
547 U.S. at 832, 126 S. Ct. at 2279, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed.
2d 292, 303 (2004))), and hold that the statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause
and, thus, are admissible. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE
PETITIONER.
-23-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 51
September Term, 2008
_________________________________________
WILLIAM LANGLEY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
          Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned)
                  JJ.
__________________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Eldridge, J., which 
   Bell, C.J.,  and Greene, J., join.
_________________________________________
Filed: September 19, 2011
I dissent. The United States Supreme Court, in overturning Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), and establishing new guidelines for
the admission of out-of-court statements, set forth in its opinions several criteria to be
used to determine whether the primary purpose of those statements is testimonial or
not.  The majority opinion ignores most of these criteria and focuses almost exclusively
on the single issue of whether the telephone call was made during an ongoing
emergency.  Because the shooter in this case had left the scene of the crime,  and no
longer posed an immediate threat to individuals in the vicinity or to police, there was
not an ongoing emergency at the time the 911 call was made. Moreover, even if there
was an ongoing emergency, the majority opinion fails to properly apply all of the
criteria explained in the Supreme Court’s evolving line of cases regarding testimonial
statements.  A correct analysis of all the criteria shows that the caller’s statements in
this case were clearly testimonial and should not have been admitted into evidence
without allowing the defense to cross-examine the caller.  
I.
The main issue of contention in this case arose when the State sought to
introduce into evidence a recorded 911 call that had been the subject of a pre-trial
motion in limine by defense counsel.  Defense counsel argued that admitting the 911
recording violated the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment and Article 21
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the caller was not present at the trial. 
-2-
As the caller’s identity was unknown, defense counsel contended that the tape of the
911 call “places [the defense] in an awkward position simply because [the caller] is not
subject to any cross-examination.”  The State countered defense arguments by pointing
out that
“[T]he Confrontation Clause says that the defense should have an
opportunity...to cross-examine those who bear witness against
them....[T]he purpose of making a 911 call is not to bear witness, but to
provide information...through the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule....”
Over defense counsel objections, the 911 tape was held to be admissible. The
trial judge decided that admitting the 911 recording did not trigger the protections of
the Confrontation Clause because the call
“was simply an ordinary citizen giving information as to the suspect or
suspects, or possible suspects, during a startling event and...I find that the
information was non-testimonial hearsay.” 
The information on the tape was used to link the license plate number of the getaway
car to a vehicle driven by the defendant on the day of the shooting.
Langley was convicted of murder in the first degree, use of a handgun in the
commission of a felony, and wearing or carrying a handgun.  He appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment and Article 21 rights
of confrontation had been violated by the admission of the recorded 911 call.  The
Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed, holding that the 911
recording was non-testimonial and was not subject to the restrictions of the
Confrontation Clauses.  Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
-3-
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), and
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed.2d 224 (2006), the
intermediate appellate court decided that the statements made on the 911 recording
were not “‘designed primarily to establish or prove some past fact,’” but, instead, that
the call had been made “‘to resolve the present emergency’ by catching the fleeing
felon.”  Alternatively, the Court of Special Appeals  held that, “if, arguendo, the
admission of the 911 tape were in error,” the “error was harmless.” The appellate court
vacated the defendant’s conviction for wearing or carrying a handgun, holding that it
merged into the greater handgun offense.
Langley filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which was granted.
In his petition, Langley did not contest the ruling by the trial court and the Court of
Special Appeals that the caller’s statements in the 911 call constituted an “excited
utterance” and are therefore admissible under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2).  Rather,
1
Langley limited his question before this Court to whether the admission of the 911 call
violated the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.  He also
challenged the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling on harmless error.
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2) states that:
1
“The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
***
(b) Other exceptions.
***
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”
-4-
II.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to state
proceedings by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...be confronted with the witnesses
against him....”  Similarly, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights mandates
“[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to...be confronted with the
witnesses against him;[and]...to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath....” 
Langley contended that the admission of the recorded 911 call, without  subjecting the
caller to cross-examination, violated his rights to confront a witness.
As briefly explained in the majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court
considered the permissibility of “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from
trial” in Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369, 158 L. Ed.
2d at 197.  The Supreme Court traced the right to confront one’s accusers back to
Roman times and examined how that right had been shaped by English common law
and practices in the early American Colonies.  This historical review led to the
following conclusion (541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197):
“Our cases have...remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: 
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted
only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 
The Crawford Court, however, distinguished between “testimonial” statements, which
are subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, and “nontestimonial”
statements, which may be admitted into evidence if they fall within one of the hearsay
-5-
exceptions.  The Court later explained that “the testimonial character of the
statement...separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations
upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Davis v.
Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at 821, 126 S. Ct. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237.  
The Court declined to define comprehensively “testimonial” statements, but
explained that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192.  The
Court offered a representative list of statements that exemplified the “testimonial”
class, stating (541 U.S. at 50-51, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193, internal
quotation marks omitted): 
“Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements
exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,...[as
well as] extrajudicial statements...contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions...[and] statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial....These formulations all share
a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause’s coverage
at various levels of abstraction around it.  Regardless of the precise
articulation, some statements qualify under any definition – for example,
ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.”
The Court in Crawford reviewed a recording of police officials interrogating a
defendant’s wife. The wife did not testify at her husband’s trial due to the marital
privilege, so the prosecution sought to introduce the tape of her interrogation instead. 
-6-
The Court held that the recording constituted a “testimonial” statement and, therefore,
could not be admitted into evidence without subjecting the wife to cross-examination. 
As this Court observed in State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 78, 867 A.2d 314, 322 (2005),
the Crawford opinion “fundamentally altered...Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.” 
The Crawford opinion commenced the Supreme Court’s foray into distinguishing
between testimonial and non-testimonial statements, but the case left many questions
unanswered regarding the criteria used to determine if a statement is “testimonial.”
The Supreme Court next addressed this distinction in Davis v. Washington,
supra, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224.  The Supreme Court in Davis
reviewed two trials where witnesses’ out-of-court statements were admitted.  One of
those trials involved a recorded 911 call, and the Court considered whether the
statements contained in the 911 recording qualified as nontestimonial statements that
could be admitted without subjecting the caller to defense questioning. The Supreme
Court examined the content of the call to determine its admissibility.  The 911 call in
Davis commenced with a woman telling the operator that she is being attacked by her
boyfriend and that “‘[h]e’s here jumpin’ on me again’” and “‘usin’ his fists.’” After
giving the 911 operator her attacker’s name and answering a few questions, the caller
stated that “‘[h]e’s runnin’ now’” and explained that her attacker had “‘just r[un] out
the door’” and was leaving in a car with someone else.   The police arrived “within four
minutes of the 911 call” and noted the “‘fresh injuries on her forearm and her face’”
and her “‘frantic efforts’” to leave the residence.  Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S.
-7-
at 817-818, 126 S. Ct. at 2271, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 234-235.
The Supreme Court in Davis held that the statements contained in the 911
recording were “nontestimonial” and therefore properly admitted as evidence,
explaining (547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-2274, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237):
“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
The Court acknowledged that the “inquiries of a police operator in the course of a 911
call are an interrogation in one sense,” but clarified that the interrogation aspect of the
inquiries alone was not enough to mandate that all 911 recordings are testimonial. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 823, 126 S. Ct. at 2274, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238.  The Court
distinguished 911 calls from other sorts of interrogation because 911 calls are
“ordinarily not designed primarily to ‘establis[h] or prov[e]’ some past fact, but to
describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 827,
126 S. Ct. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240.
To demonstrate the difference between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements, the Davis opinion contrasted the police interrogation recording at issue in
Crawford with the 911 call in Davis, explaining which aspects made the Crawford
recording testimonial and the Davis 911 call nontestimonial.  The Court stated that, in
Davis, the caller was “speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather
-8-
than ‘describ[ing] past events.’” Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276, 165 L. Ed.
2d at 240 (emphasis in original).  The testimonial statements in Crawford took place
“hours after” the criminal incident as compared to the 911 call, which dealt with an
“ongoing emergency.”   The Court pointed out that the 911 call in Davis was “a call for
help against a bona fide physical threat” rather than a “narrative report of a crime
absent any imminent danger.” Ibid.  Moreover, the 911 operator’s questions sought “to
resolve the present emergency, rather than to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened
in the past.” Ibid.  Finally, the Court compared the “level of formality” between the two
recordings, noting that the wife in Crawford calmly answered the police questions,
while the 911 caller in Davis gave “frantic answers” from a setting that was “not
tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.” 547 U.S.
at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2277, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240.  As indicated in Davis, and as later
summarized by this Court in State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 323, 965 A.2d 75, 85 (2009),
formality may also include details such as the interview’s location, the declarant’s
spatial distance from the defendant, the police official’s use of the declarant’s replies,
and whether the statements are deliberately recounted in response to interrogation.  The
Supreme Court captured the essence of these guidelines by noting:  “No ‘witness’ goes
into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.” 547 U.S. at 828, 126 S.Ct. at 2277,
165 L.Ed.2d at 241.
The Davis Court highlighted four factors in determining whether a statement is
testimonial or nontestimonial. First, the timing of the statement in relation to the
-9-
incident is important. Nontestimonial statements are made while events are actually
happening, while testimonial statements occur after the incident. Nontestimonial
statements relate to an ongoing emergency and are not a simple reporting of past
incidents. Additionally, a nontestimonial statement seeks help to resolve a present crisis
while a testimonial statement recounts or explains a past event or gives details
regarding a crime that has occurred.  The formality of the statement is also a factor in
determining whether a statement is testimonial or not. A nontestimonial statement is
often made in a frantic state lacking tranquility, while calm answers are more a
hallmark of testimonial statements. Despite describing these criteria in great detail, the
Davis Court asserted that it was not “attempting to produce an exhaustive classification
of all conceivable statements – or even all conceivable statements in response to police
interrogation – as either testimonial or nontestimonial.” Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at 822,
126 S. Ct. at 2273, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237. 2
The Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 179
L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011), recently clarified some of the criteria discussed in the Davis case. 
Bryant involved statements made by a fatally wounded gunshot victim in response to
police questioning that occurred when the police first arrived at the scene of the crime. 
The Court held that the statements were nontestimonial.  The Supreme Court in Bryant
cautioned that courts should be careful not to construe Davis as having “decided more
than it did” and thus should be wary of “employ[ing] an unduly narrow understanding
For a comprehensive review of the Crawford and Davis decisions, see Judge Adkins’s opinion 
2
for this Court in State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 965 A.2d 75 (2009).
-10-
of ‘ongoing emergency’ that Davis does not require.” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.
at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 110.  The Bryant Court observed that, “whether an emergency
exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry.”  Ibid.  Furthermore, a
court’s inquiry should be objective.  The Bryant opinion explained that (562 U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. at 1156, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 109)
“the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the
individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the
individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the
encounter occurred.”
The Bryant Court repeated the holding of Davis that “the ultimate inquiry is whether
the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet [the]
ongoing emergency.’”Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1165, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 117,
quoting Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 224.  
3
The principal question before this Court is not, as the majority opinion portrays
it, whether the statements made in the 911 call occurred during an ongoing emergency.
If that were the test, recordings of all 911 calls would be admissible, as 911 is for
emergencies only.  Rather, the question is whether those statements are testimonial or
Reading the majority opinion could lead one to believe that the Court, in Bryant, moved away
3
from the “primary purpose” test.  The majority states that “[a]fter Bryant, it is of little matter that the
purpose of the call was not to stop the immediate shooting or get medical assistance....” The majority
opinion overlooks the simple fact that, as the name of the test suggests, the purpose of the 911 call
is the primary concern and “ultimate inquiry” of courts in determining whether the statements are
testimonial or not. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 112 (“whether an
ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor”). The Bryant Court explicitly followed the “primary
purpose” test and explained that its opinion sought only to “provide additional clarification with
regard to what Davis meant by ‘the primary purpose...’” test.  Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at
1156, 179 L.Ed.2d at 108, quoting Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d
at 224.
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not.  Applying the factors utilized by the Supreme Court, I believe that the recording
in the present case consisted of testimonial statements and, as such, should not have
been admitted without making the caller available for questioning by the defense.
This Court should first examine the amount of time between the reported
incident and the recorded statements.  The timing of the 911 call in the present case
strongly suggests that the statements are testimonial. Although the record does not
show the amount of time lapsed between the 911 call and the shooting, the caller begins
by telling the 911 operator that she wants “to give some information on a shooting that
just occurred.”  In short, the caller is giving information about a past event.  The caller
urges the operator to “[h]urry up” because the incident is “just happening.”   The
caller’s urgency, however, does not relate to stopping the shooting or getting medical
assistance, but instead relates to the fact that the caller has seen the apparent shooter
get into his car and objectively believes that the perpetrator may successfully escape. 
The timing in Davis contrasts sharply with the present case.  In Davis, the caller tells
the operator that she is being beaten, her attacker is still in the home, and only after ten
responses does she report that her attacker is leaving.  It is clear that the caller in the
case at bar is not describing the shooting as it is actually happening, and she is not
facing the same immediacy of events faced by the speakers in Davis and Bryant.  The
caller was describing past events. 
The existence of an “ongoing emergency” is closely related to the timing of the
statements.  The Supreme Court in Bryant explained that “whether an emergency exists
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and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry.” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.
at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 110.  In Bryant, the statements were made by the victim while
the victim was suffering from a gunshot wound.  In Davis, the attacker was still in the
home with the caller when she dialed 911 and reported that he was beating her. In the
present case, the caller, notably not a victim of the shooting, called after the attack had
occurred and reported that she had seen the apparent shooter get into a car.  The alleged
perpetrator had already fled the scene of the shooting, the police were on their way, and
the caller contacted 911 only to report information about the flight of the apparent
shooter.  At the time of her 911 call, the emergency was not ongoing; it had concluded.
The majority opinion, dramatically and without reason, expands the holding of
Bryant to conclude that “except in domestic disputes” with facts similar to Davis, “a
court may not hold that an emergency is no longer ongoing” because the alleged
perpetrator has fled.  No such language is found in Bryant.  The Bryant opinion does
not limit the holding of Davis to domestic disputes and, in fact, declares that an
emergency is not ongoing when, as in the present case, a perpetrator “flees with little
prospect of posing a threat to the public.” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1159, 179
L. Ed. 2d at 112.  Although the majority opinion attempts to portray the facts in this
case as similar to Bryant, where the police did not know if the shooter remained in the
area or continue to pose a threat, the police in this case knew that the shooter had left
the scene and was no longer a threat to the police or the public at the scene.
Moreover, the majority opinion argues on the one hand that there is an ongoing
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emergency any time a shooter is at large, but, on the other hand, concedes in footnote
8 that an emergency is not ongoing simply because a suspect has not yet been caught. 
According to the majority’s reasoning, a witness could see a suspect the following day,
call 911 “seeking police assistance to help capture the fleeing suspect,” and such a call
would qualify as an “ongoing emergency.”
Another element of a nontestimonial statement is that such statements seek help
to resolve a present crisis.  The caller in the present case did not call 911 to request
police or any other assistance.  The caller did not tell the operator any information
concerning the shooting, such as the specific shop in which the shooting took place,
how many people, if any, were shot, if there were any injuries, or what instigated the
shooting.  The only information the caller relates concerns the identification of the
alleged shooter – his car tag number and his physical appearance.  All of this
information is typically testimonial and is not associated with a call seeking police
assistance.  A starkly different situation was presented in Bryant where the police
encountered a wounded victim in a parking lot and asked him “‘what had happened,
who had shot him, and where the shooting occured.’” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct.
at 1166, 179 L.Ed.2d at 118.  Not only were these questions not asked by the 911
operator in the present case, but the information relayed by the caller barely touches on
these topics and certainly does not hold the same importance in resolving an ongoing
emergency.  The majority opinion asserts that, in the present case, the caller said
nothing to indicate that the “‘threat from the shooter had ended.’”  I find it impossible
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to assume anything less from the caller’s statements that she had seen the shooter get
into a car and flee the scene. The operator did not even ask if medical assistance was
required and merely asked questions later used to identify the shooter. 
When asked by the operator where the police should be sent, the caller replies
that police are not needed and redirects the questioning by telling the operator that she
is calling to report details of the getaway vehicle, stating:
“I don’t want [the police] sent nowhere. They already going out to the
store. But the guy, I seen him get in the car. Tag number MRG 908.”
A hallmark of a testimonial statement is the declarant’s desire to give details regarding
a crime that has occurred in the past. Where statements are “‘neither a cry for help nor
the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening
situation’...they [are] testimonial.” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1155, 179 L. Ed.
2d at 107.  The caller in the present case continued to give a detailed description of the
car that the apparent shooter left in, repeating three times the tag number she had
noticed. The purpose of her 911 call was emphasized throughout the recording; she was
calling to give information to assist the police in apprehending the suspect, not to
request assistance.
The formality and tone of the call may denote whether the caller’s intent is
testimonial or not.  The Supreme Court noted that the answers to the questions posed
in Crawford were calmly given, but the tenor of the 911 call in Davis was “frantic,” and 
the caller was in an environment that was “not tranquil” and not even safe.  In Bryant,
nontestimonial statements were made by a victim suffering a mortal injury “in an
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exposed, public area, before emergency medical services arrived, and in a disorganized
fashion.” Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1148, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 100.  While the
transcript in the present case does not reveal the location of the caller, there is no
evidence that she was present in the Carry-Out store at the time of the shooting or ever
in an unsafe environment.  
Naturally, there is an excited tone to the 911 call in the case at bar, but
objectively that excited tone is not as “frantic” as a woman calling 911 to request help
because she is being attacked or a wounded victim telling police who shot him while
waiting for medical assistance in a parking lot.  The Court of Special Appeals attributed
the caller’s anxiety to the hope that the police would be able to catch a fleeing felon,
and this is an appropriate assumption. The caller was not a victim of the shooting, did
not request police assistance, and there are no objective indications that she was ever
in danger.
Finally, the Supreme Court stated in Bryant (562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1159,
179 L. Ed. 2d at 111):
“The medical condition of the victim is important to the primary purpose
inquiry to the extent that it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have
any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood
that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial one.”
The nontestimonial statements in both Davis and Bryant were made by victims of an
ongoing crime, while the statements in this case were made by a spectator, seemingly
uninvolved with the crime except for her description of the vehicle used by the apparent
shooter to leave the scene.  This is not to say that only victims may make
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nontestimonial statements, but a review of those cases where 911 calls have been
determined to be nontestimonial shows that many of them are calls made by the victims
themselves, or at least individuals in some way seriously involved in the criminal
incident.  See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007); Smith v.
United States, 947 A.2d 1131 (D.C. 2008); Commonwealth v. Galicia, 447 Mass. 737,
857 N.E.2d 463 (2006); State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. 2007); State v. Camarena,
344 Or. 28, 176 P.3d 380 (2008).
Recently, this Court employed criteria similar to the Davis factors in determining
whether statements made to the police were testimonial or not.  In State v. Lucas,
supra, 407 Md. 307, 965 A.2d 75, the Court considered statements made by a domestic
violence victim when police officers encountered her at the entrance to her apartment.
The Court determined that the “emergency had ended” by the time the police met the
victim at the door of her apartment and that “[a] reasonable listener would recognize
that the [victim’s] emergency had ceased.” 407 Md. at 324, 965 A.2d at 85-86.  The
Court also took into consideration the fact that the victim “spoke of past events” and
she was “no longer under any apparent imminent danger when she spoke” to the police. 
407 Md. at 324, 965 A.2d at 85-86. As such, the victim’s responses to the police
officers were testimonial and could not be admitted without making her available for
cross-examination.  Despite the fact that the victim was “visibly upset and exhibited
injuries,” this Court  noted that the police officers did not call for emergency medical
assistance.  The Court concluded that the “circumstances of [the police officer’s]
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interrogation objectively indicate a primary purpose to ‘establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution’ and not to ‘enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency.’” State v. Lucas, 407 Md. at 325, 323-324, 965 A.2d
at 86, 85.  The same is true in the present case.
When the criteria applied in Davis, Bryant, and Lucas are applied to the case at
bar, it is clear that the 911 recording played to the jury at Langley’s trial was
testimonial.  Unlike the 911 call the Supreme Court deemed nontestimonial in Davis,
where the “primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency,” the 911 recording in the instant case served only to provide a “‘weaker
substitute for live testimony’ at trial.” 547 U.S. at 828, 126 S. Ct. at 2277, 165 L. Ed.
2d at 240-241.  The State in this case virtually admitted as much, stating in pre-trial
argument, against the defense’s motion in limine, as follows: 
“The only reason the State would want to use it is to get in the license
place number that someone who witnesses the shooting calls and gives to
the Police as the event is taking place, as the Defendant is getting in his
car and as he is leaving.”
The call was not eliciting help, but rather was used by the State in place of live
testimony.
Moreover, the 911 caller’s statements in the present case were intended to be a
“‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact’” rather than a call for immediate assistance to the scene of a crime.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The caller herself evinced the knowledge that her statements would
-18-
be used as an affirmation of fact in subsequent investigations, telling the operator,
when she was unsure of her answer, “don’t quote me...” on certain parts of her
identification information.  Objectively viewed, the primary purpose of the exchange
between the caller and the 911 operator in the present case was not to enable police
assistance in the midst of an ongoing emergency.  The caller was simply a witness
calling after the crime occurred to provide information for use in the shooter’s
apprehension and eventual trial.  Her statements were therefore testimonial.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
direct that court to remand the case for a new trial.  
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene join in this dissent.