Title: OROSCO v. SCHABRON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

OROSCO v. SCHABRON2000 WY 1589 P.3d 264Case Number: 99-244Decided: 07/27/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
VECENTA OROSCO AND 
CANDICE RAE OROSCO, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),v. GREGORY 
SCHABRON, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

Representing 
Appellants: Carrie Hesco and E. 
James Burke of Burke, Woodard & O'Donnell, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.Representing Appellee: Kay Lynn Bestol of Sundahi, Powers, 
Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 2000. 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] This case 
calls upon the Court to determine if the circumstances surrounding a shortfall 
in representation by counsel oblige a district court to accord relief, pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 60 (b), from a dismissal of an action with prejudice. Vecenta Orosco 
and Candice Orosco (the Oroscos) brought an action against Gregory Schabron 
(Schabron) to recover for personal injuries they sustained in an automobile 
collision. After efforts by Schabron to obtain discovery from the Oroscos, which 
elicited no response from counsel, Schabron sought and obtained an Order on 
Motion to Compel. That order warned the Oroscos of sanctions, including 
dismissal, if they did not "respond in full to Defendant's discovery requests by 
March 12, 1999[.]" The Oroscos did not respond, Schabron filed a Motion for 
Sanctions, and the district court entered an Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice.1 The Oroscos apparently knew nothing 
of the discovery efforts, and only learned about the situation when their case 
was dismissed. They engaged other counsel who filed a Motion for Relief from 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, invoking the provisions of W.R.C.P. 60 (b). 
After receiving memoranda from counsel and conducting a hearing, the district 
court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice. We have scrutinized the record, seeking some premise 
that would persuade this Court that the district court committed an abuse of 
discretion, but we have found none. The Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Relief from Order of Dismissal with Prejudice is affirmed.

[¶2] The Brief 
of Appellant, filed on behalf of the Oroscos, states the issue in this 
way:

I. Did the District Court 
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Plaintiffs' Rule 60 (b) motion to set 
aside the dismissal with prejudice of their personal injury action despite 
undisputed evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney suffered from a disorder which 
caused him to neglect their case and ignore court orders without knowledge or 
fault of Plaintiffs.

[¶3] The 
Appellee Brief, filed for Schabron, frames the issue as:

[¶4] After the 
trial judge dismissed the case for failure to obey discovery orders, the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants moved for relief from the dismissal under Rule 60 (b)(6), 
based on their chosen attorney's undiagnosed emotional incapacity to fulfill his 
obligations to the Court and the parties. They presented their attorney's 
unsupported, self-serving, inconsistent affidavit to support their claim of 
incapacity. Did the Court abuse its discretion when it refused to grant 
extraordinary Rule 60 (b) relief on this basis?

[¶5] We draw 
upon the facts articulated by the district court in its decision letter dated 
July 19, 1999. The district court reported the material facts in the following 
fashion:

[¶6] This is a 
personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident on August 13, 1994. 
Plaintiffs apparently retained counsel [name omitted] a few months after the 
accident and on August 12, 1998, one day before the expiration of the Statute of 
Limitations, suit was filed. An Answer was duly filed and written discovery 
undertaken by Defendant.

[¶7] A 
scheduling conference was conducted with the Court on January 7, 1999 with 
counsel present. It was noted at that time that discovery had been propounded to 
Plaintiffs but that no responses had been provided. Counsel for Plaintiffs was 
advised informally to respond to the discovery promptly. On February 3, 1999 
Defendant filed a Motion to Compel. Responses to Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production were by then more than two months overdue. The matter 
was set for hearing on February 19, 1999, and a Notice of Setting was sent to 
[counsel for plaintiffs] on February 5, 1999. Hearing was conducted as per the 
notice on February 19, 1999. [Counsel for plaintiffs] made no appearance on 
behalf of Plaintiffs.

[¶8] On February 
22, 1999 the Court entered its order on Defendant's Motion to Compel. The Order 
provided that Plaintiffs should respond to the discovery on or before March 12, 
1999 and that the Court would entertain a Motion for Sanctions, including 
dismissal, if Plaintiffs failed to comply. A copy was duly forwarded to [counsel 
for plaintiffs] on the same day.

[¶9] On March 
17, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiffs had not complied 
with the Court's Order of February 22, 1999. A Notice of Service was also filed 
in which Plaintiffs were provided ten (10) days to object to the Defendant's 
request for dismissal of the action. Both documents were duly served on [counsel 
for plaintiffs]. No objection was forthcoming, and on April 15, 1999 the Court 
entered its Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs 
thereafter retained new counsel [new counsel for plaintiffs]. (The Court notes 
that [original counsel for plaintiffs] has never asked or been permitted to 
withdraw as counsel of record in this matter.)

[¶10] [New 
counsel for plaintiffs] filed a Motion for Relief from Order of Dismissal on May 
28, 1999 pursuant to Rule 60 (b), W.R.C.P. In essence, Plaintiffs assert that 
they were unaware of any discovery problems; that they had not been asked to 
provide any discovery materials by [original counsel for plaintiffs]; that 
[original counsel for plaintiffs] had repeatedly advised them that the case was 
proceeding normally; and that they were unaware that the case might be dismissed 
until after the fact. Also included with the Motion was an Affidavit by 
[original counsel for plaintiffs] in which he asserts that, in effect, he 
suffers from an undiagnosed physical malady which makes it difficult or 
impossible for him to comply with "strict guidelines." He apparently never 
advised Plaintiffs of his condition, suggested they retain other counsel or 
advised them of pending discovery or motions. Defendant asserts that none of 
this is his fault; that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the orders of the Court 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure; and that the case was dismissed only after 
repeated warnings and opportunities to comply. They assert Plaintiffs' remedy 
now lies against [original counsel for plaintiffs], not 
Defendant.

[¶11] The 
Oroscos appealed from the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order 
of Dismissal with Prejudice, which they described as the final judgment of the 
district court. Clearly, the Oroscos recognized that the time for appeal from 
the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice expired on May 16, 1999, and no 
appropriate motion was filed that would toll the thirty day period for filing 
the notice of appeal. W.R.A.P. 2.01 and 2.02.

[¶12] In 
pertinent part, W.R.C.P. 60 (b) provides:

On motion, and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; * * * (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.

[¶13] We have 
stated, with respect to our review of a denial of a motion submitted pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 60 (b):

[¶14] We review 
the ruling of a trial court on motions presented pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60 
(b)(1) and (6) only for an abuse of discretion. Vanasse [v. Ramsey], 847 P.2d 
[993] at 996 [(Wyo. 1993)]; Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 (Wyo. 1992); 
U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121, 126-27 (Wyo. 1983). 
Essentially the resolution of such motions is left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, as defined in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986):

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."

[¶15] Lee v. 
Sage Creek Refining Co., 947 P.2d 791, 798 (Wyo. 1997). We have recognized that 
in order to be entitled to relief under W.R.C.P. 60 (b), the party seeking 
relief must demonstrate (1) a lack of culpable conduct; (2) a meritorious claim; 
and (8) a lack of prejudice to the appellee. Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
998 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301-02 (Wyo. 1992)). 
It is clear from the tenor of the decision letter from the district judge that 
he was aware of the equitable concerns surrounding the matter before the court, 
and that the district judge had carefully considered the 
law.

[¶16] The 
Oroscos contend that they have demonstrated all three of the Vanasse factors. 
They assert that there was no culpable conduct relating to the failure to 
respond to Schabron's discovery requests because the lack of diligence on the 
part of their attorney was attributable to severe personal, physical and 
psychological problems. They also point out that the attorney did not inform 
them of the discovery requests or the Motion to Compel, misled them, and assured 
them that their case was progressing in an appropriate manner. They contend that 
the circumstances clearly demonstrate a meritorious claim, and that there is no 
demonstration of any prejudice to Schabron.

[¶17] Schabron 
asserts that the Oroscos have not satisfied any of the Vanasse factors. He 
contends that the affidavit from the original attorney is insufficient to 
support a claim of incapacity, and that the Oroscos must assume responsibility 
for the action, or inaction, of the attorney whom they chose as their 
agent.

[¶18] The 
district court correctly ruled that Wyoming requires the demonstration of an 
exceptional circumstance specified in W.R.C.P. 60 (b) in order to have a 
judgment vacated. Sanford v. Arjay Oil Co., 686 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1984). The 
district court considered the prospect for relief under W.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1) 
because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, and denied 
relief after considering all of the circumstances and the policy of holding 
clients accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys (Link v. 
Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962)). In 
Link the Supreme Court of the United States stated, "[p]etitioner voluntarily 
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid 
the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent." Link, 
370 U.S.  at 633-34, 82 S. Ct. 1386. This Court has recognized that the 
relationship between an attorney and a client is that of principal and agent. 
Stricker v. Frauendienst 669 P.2d 520, 522 (Wyo. 1983). After reviewing the 
circumstances, the district court correctly ruled that the Oroscos had not 
demonstrated any excusable neglect, nor mistake, inadvertence or 
surprise.

[¶19] This Court 
has recognized that, "[r]elief is available under Rule 60 (b)(6) when the 
personal problems or psychological disorders of an attorney cause him to neglect 
a case to the extent that a default or summary judgment is entered against the 
unsuspecting client." Sanford, 686 P.2d  at 571. The year after Sanford was 
decided, we were represented with an analogous problem in Hochhalter v. Great 
Western Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1985). In that case, Hochhalter 
requested relief from a default judgment under W.R.C.P. 60 (b), alleging that 
the negligence of his attorney was due to personal and psychological problems. 
Hochhalter, 708 P.2d  at 668. Hochhalter filed, in support of this claim, his 
affidavit in which he stated that the attorney had separated from his wife and 
relocated his practice. Id. at 669. We held that "bare statements are 
insufficient to justify relief under Rule 60 (b)(6), and we cannot hold that 
refusing to grant relief under the rule in reliance upon this scanty evidence is 
sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court." Hochhalter, 
708 P.2d  at 669. We continued by ruling that the gross negligence of counsel was 
not sufficient to support a claim under W.R.C.P. 60 (b), and 
stated:

"There is certainly no 
merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his 
counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner 
voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he 
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely 
selected agent. Any other notion would he wholly inconsistent with our system of 
representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of 
his lawyer agent and is considered to have 'notice of all facts, notice of which 
can be charged upon the attorney.' * * *"

[¶20] 
Hochhalter, 708 P.2d  at 670 (quoting Link, 370 U.S.  at 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 
1386).

[¶21] The 
Oroscos argue, in an attempt to distinguish the facts in this case from 
Hochhalter, that Hochhalter had only his own affidavit for support, while they 
have submitted the affidavit of their attorney. The district court when 
presented with the same argument, identified the issue as being whether the 
statements of the attorney in his affidavit provided sufficient evidence to 
justify granting the W.R.C.P. 60 (b)(6) motion. The district judge noted that 
the affidavit recited an undiagnosed physical/psychological condition and did 
not furnish the names of any treating physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
or letters or affidavits from them. The district judge pointed out that the 
affidavit did not state what medication had been prescribed and offered no 
prognosis. The district judge treated that affidavit as simply a form of bare 
assertion like that propounded in Hochhalter. The district court gave careful 
consideration to the specific problem, and we discern no abuse of discretion in 
the ruling made that the affidavit by the attorney was no more adequate than the 
affidavit of the party in Hochhalter.

[¶22] We hold 
that the record presented by the Oroscos is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
absence of culpable conduct on their part. Clearly, the attorney was responsible 
for the circumstances that resulted in the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, 
but we also have ruled that parties are bound by the conduct of their agents 
under such circumstances. The result is that the Oroscos must be held 
accountable for the attorney's actions or his failure to act. They are unable to 
satisfy the first element of the test articulated in Vanasse, and the failure to 
satisfy any of those elements forecloses reliance upon W.R.C.P. 60 (b). The 
denial of relief under these circumstances cannot be said to constitute an abuse 
of discretion by the district court.

[¶23] The Order 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from Order of Dismissal with Prejudice is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 While its 
impact may be draconian in some instances, such as this, W.R.C.P. 37 (b)(2)(C) 
specifically provides a sanction of dismissal in this 
language:

(2) 
Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. - If a party * * * fails to obey 
an order to provide or permit discovery, * * * the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just and among 
others the following:

(C) 
An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient 
party[.]