Title: Staruski v. Continental Telephone Co.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-474


Cynthia Staruski                             Supreme Court

      v.                                     On Appeal from
                                             Windsor Superior Court
Continental Telephone Co. of Vermont
                                             May Term, 1990


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Parker & Ankuda, P.C., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant

Allan R. Keyes of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-
  appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     MORSE, J.  This tort case presents an issue of first impression in this
state: May a person recover for wrongful invasion of privacy when her
employer, without her consent, runs an advertisement in publicly circulated
newspapers displaying her name and photograph and a text, falsely attributed
to her, that praises the employer?  The trial court ruled that she may not.
We disagree, and accordingly reverse and remand.
     In August 1985, Continental Telephone Company of Vermont (Contel) ran a
series of advertisements in Vermont newspapers featuring certain of its
employees.  Plaintiff, a sales and service representative at Contel's
office in Springfield, Vermont, was featured in one such ad.  The ad
included a photograph of the plaintiff smiling broadly, the words "Hi, I'm
Cindy Staruski" in large letters beside the photograph, and an accompanying
text, attributed with quotation marks to Ms. Staruski, describing her job
responsibilities and opining that "it has been exciting and reassuring to
know that Continental continues to expand its equipment and services to meet
its obligation to serve you." (FN1)  Upset by Contel's publication of her name
and likeness in this manner, plaintiff sued in tort for invasion of
privacy. (FN2)
     Three issues of relevance to this appeal were in dispute at trial.
First, contrary to plaintiff's testimony, Contel maintained that it had her
express or implied consent to publish the ad.  The trial judge, however,
ruled that plaintiff had not given consent, noting the absence of any
evidence that she saw the ad before publication or knew that it would
contain text attributed to her, and instructed the jury accordingly.
Second, the nature of the tort of invasion of privacy was disputed.
Concluding that publication of plaintiff's photograph, name and job
description, even without her consent, was permissible -- that is, not
tortious as a matter of law -- the trial court limited her evidence on
damages to those flowing from publication of the final paragraph of the
advertisement (referred to at trial as the "testimonial" section).  As to
that paragraph, the court instructed the jury that its publication without
consent was tortious as a matter of law.  Third, the question whether a
corporation may be liable for punitive damages in these circumstances was
contested.  The court allowed the jury to decide whether to award punitive
damages.
     The jury reached a verdict for plaintiff of $1,000 in compensatory
damages and $3,500 in punitive damages.  The trial judge, however, granted
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), on the
ground that plaintiff, not being famous, was unable to prove that her name
and identity had commercial value.  Plaintiff appeals from the JNOV and
additionally claims error in the court's ruling limiting the scope of
evidence on damages to those flowing only from the "testimonial" portion of
the ad.  Defendant in turn maintains that the JNOV is warranted and, in the
event the JNOV is reversed by this Court, also contests the punitive damages
and argues for a new trial on the grounds that the question of consent
should have gone to the jury and that the court erred in ruling that the
"testimonial" section constituted an invasion of privacy as a matter of
law. (FN3)
     We reverse the JNOV, find that both parties were prejudiced by trial
errors, and accordingly remand for a new trial.
                                    I.
     "Invasion of privacy" is a term applied to several distinct types of
harm.  See generally W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts { 117 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter Prosser and Keeton].  This lawsuit concerns one of these,
"the appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness."  Id. at 851.  The incidental use of a
person's name is not of course grounds for liability.  "It is only when [the
defendant] makes use of the name to pirate the plaintiff's identity for some
advantage of his own . . . that he becomes liable."  Id. at 852; see Moore
v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 272, 275 (5th Cir. 1987).
     Vermont has no statute providing a cause of action for invasion of
privacy and, to date, the tort has been recognized only obliquely in the
case law of this state.  In Lemnah v. American Breeders Service, Inc., 144
Vt. 568, 574,