Title: Harris v. Liston

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Harris v. Liston, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 1999-Ohio-159.] 
 
 
 
 
 
HARRIS ET AL., APPELLEES, v. LISTON ET AL.; JACKSON ROAD COMPANY, 
APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Harris v. Liston (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 203.] 
Torts — Injury or damage to real property — Four-year statute of limitations set 
forth in R.C. 2305.09(D) applicable — Negligence action against developer-
vendor of real property for damage to the real property accrues and four-
year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.09(D) commences to run, when. 
1. 
Tort actions for injury or damage to real property are subject to the four-year 
statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).  (NCR Corp. v. U.S. 
Mineral Products Co. [1995], 72 Ohio St.3d 269, 649 N.E.2d 175, construed 
and followed.) 
2. 
A negligence action against a developer-vendor of real property for damage 
to the property accrues and the four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 
2305.09(D) commences to run when it is first discovered, or through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence it should have been discovered, that there is 
damage to the property. 
(No. 98-1338 — Submitted May 26, 1999 — Decided August 25, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72244. 
 
This appeal arises from the purchase of a home located at 55 East Juniper 
Lane, Moreland Hills, Ohio.  In 1984, appellant Jackson Road Company 
(“Jackson”) conveyed Sublot 3 in Jackson Road Subdivision No. 1 (now 55 East 
Juniper Lane) to Kenneth J. Fisher.  At the time of the conveyance, the lot was 
undeveloped except for the construction and paving of East Juniper Lane and the 
construction of utility lines and sewer and water mains in the subdivision.  The 
development work had been completed by independent contractors for Jackson, 
and it had been inspected and approved by the appropriate Moreland Hills agents. 
 
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The lot was eventually purchased by Elaine Liston.  In 1985, Elaine and her 
husband constructed an approximately six-thousand-square-foot home on the lot.  
From the time the Listons moved into the home in 1985 they were aware that a 
“water situation” existed on the property.  Drainage tiles were installed by the 
Listons, and, during certain times of the year, there was standing water on the real 
property. 
 
Thereafter, in 1992, appellees Dr. Frederick D. Harris and his wife, Bernice, 
purchased the home.  After purchasing the home, appellees became aware of the 
standing-water problem, and they also noticed that numerous problems existed 
with the home itself.  According to Dr. Harris, prior to the purchase, he had viewed 
the yard when it was snow-covered, and, consequently, he had not been aware, nor 
had he been informed, that water problems existed.  In a letter dated August 12, 
1992, Dr. Harris notified the Listons of the problems associated with the home and 
the yard, and he requested that they contact him for a “mutual and amicable 
resolution.”  In a written response, Elaine discussed the problems outlined by Dr. 
Harris and stated that they were not her responsibility. 
 
On October 28, 1993, appellees filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas, naming as defendants the Listons, Jackson, and others.  
The claims against Jackson were predicated on negligence.  Appellees claimed that 
Jackson had been negligent in failing to design and construct an adequate water-
management system for the subdivision and that Jackson’s negligence had created 
a nuisance. 
 
Subsequently, appellees entered into settlement agreements with, and/or 
dismissed claims against, many of the defendants.  Also, on November 20, 1996, 
the trial court, without explanation, granted summary judgment in favor of Jackson 
and others.  The case then proceeded to trial against the Listons. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees for breach of contract and 
 
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for fraud.  Thereafter, with respect to the finding of fraud, the trial court granted a 
motion by the Listons for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The court 
ultimately entered judgment in favor of appellees and against the Listons in the 
amount of $319,000 plus costs. 
 
Appellees appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, claiming that the 
trial court erred in granting the Listons’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and that the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Jackson.  
In addition, the Listons filed a cross-appeal.  Subsequently, appellees and the 
Listons entered into a settlement agreement.  Thus, the only issue before the court 
of appeals was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Jackson. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in part, reversed 
it in part, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  Specifically, the court 
of appeals held that appellees’ negligence claims against Jackson had been timely 
filed within the four-year statute of limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D) 
and that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to “whether the design 
and implementation of the subdivision’s excess water management system [were] 
inadequate, whether that system, or lack of it, proximately caused the problem 
complained of, and whether the annoyance and inconvenience of the accumulated 
water in the Harrises’ backyard after a heavy rain or snow melt [are] of such a 
magnitude as to constitute a nuisance.” 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Linton & Hirshman and  Robert F. Linton, Jr.; Janis L. Small, for appellees. 
 
Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, L.L.P., Forrest Norman III and 
William H. Baughman, Jr., for appellant. 
 
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__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Appellees’ negligence claims against Jackson are governed by 
R.C. 2305.09(D), which sets forth a general limitations period for tort actions not 
specifically covered by other statutory sections.  Specifically, R.C. 2305.09(D) 
requires that claims predicated on damage to real property “be brought within four 
years after the cause thereof accrued.”  See Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, 
Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 23 O.O.3d 346, 433 N.E.2d 147, paragraph one of 
the syllabus; and NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
269, 271, 649 N.E.2d 175, 176-177, citing Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. 
Crosby Valve & Gage Co. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 397, 627 N.E.2d 552. 
 
The court of appeals concluded that appellees’ negligence claims against 
Jackson accrued after appellees took possession of the residence in 1992 and 
discovered the latent damage to the real property.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
held that because appellees filed their lawsuit in 1993, the suit was brought “well 
within the four-year statute of limitations.” 
 
Appellees agree with the conclusions reached by the court of appeals and 
propose that negligence claims predicated on injury or damage to real property 
accrue “when the individual plaintiff suffers an injury, not some other individual.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Jackson, on the other hand, suggests that it is the injury or damage 
to the real property itself that is the defining event that triggers the running of the 
statute of limitations.  In this regard, Jackson asserts that, because known water 
problems existed on the property as early as 1985, and because the lawsuit was not 
commenced by appellees until 1993, the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 
2305.09(D) acts as a bar to appellees’ claims. 
 
Generally, a cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful act is 
committed.  O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 87, 4 OBR 
335, 337, 447 N.E.2d 727, 730; and Collins v. Sotka (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 
 
5 
507, 692 N.E.2d 581, 582, citing Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. (1982), 1 Ohio 
St.3d 79, 1 OBR 117, 437 N.E.2d 1194.  However, in situations where the 
wrongful act does not immediately result in injury or damage, strict application of 
the general rule can lead to an unjust result.  Thus, to provide for a more equitable 
solution, this court, in accordance with its judicial authority, see O’Stricker v. Jim 
Walter Corp., paragraph one of the syllabus,1 has applied a discovery rule in 
numerous situations.  See, also, Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d at 510, 692 N.E.2d 
at 584 (discovery rule adopted “to prevent inequities that occur when a statute of 
limitations is rigidly followed”). 
 
In Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 61 O.O.2d 430, 
290 N.E.2d 916, this court established a discovery rule for medical malpractice 
claims.  See, also, Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 
111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438; Frysinger v. Leech (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 
512 N.E.2d 337; Hershberger v. Akron City Hosp. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 1, 516 
N.E.2d 204; and Allenius v. Thomas (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 538 N.E.2d 93.  
Additionally, in Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 210, 5 OBR 
453, 450 N.E.2d 684; Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
385, 528 N.E.2d 941; and Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold (1989), 43 Ohio 
St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398, a discovery rule has been applied to legal malpractice 
actions. 
 
Further, this court has adopted a discovery rule in several other situations.  
See, e.g., Burr v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 69, 23 OBR 
200, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (wrongful adoption); Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989), 
46 Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206 (fraud or conversion); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & 
Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140 (DES-related claims); Browning v. 
Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 613 N.E.2d 993 (negligent credentialing of a 
physician); O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (exposure to asbestos); Liddell v. SCA 
 
6 
Services of Ohio, Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 6, 635 N.E.2d 1233 (exposure to toxic 
chlorine gas); Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870 (sexual 
abuse of children); and Collins v. Sotka (wrongful death). 
 
In Velotta v. Leo Petronzio Landscaping, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 376, 23 O.O.3d 
346, 433 N.E.2d 147, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that “[w]hen 
negligence does not immediately result in damages, a cause of action for damages 
arising from negligent construction does not accrue until actual injury or damage 
ensues.”  In Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 198, 551 
N.E.2d 938, 943, overruled on other grounds in Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425,2 the court stated that “for purposes of the four-
year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D),  * * * [t]he Velotta holding 
is not a ‘discovery rule.’ ”  The court stated further that “construction cases deal 
with the delayed occurrence of damages, not with the ‘discovery’ of injury.  The 
Velotta decision is concerned solely with accrual of a cause of action for purposes 
of a statute of limitations, not with discovery of injury or damages which have 
already occurred.”  Id. 
 
However, the above holdings in Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. have been 
subsequently overruled by this court.  In NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 
this court determined that R.C. 2305.09(D) applies to situations where a party is 
seeking recovery for injury or damage to real property and that a “discovery rule is 
appropriate for accrual of such a cause of action.”  Id., 72 Ohio St.3d at 271, 649 
N.E.2d at 176-177.  Additionally, the court noted that a discovery rule has been 
applied in medical malpractice cases and that “the underlying rationale also fits 
with latent property-damage actions.”  Id., 72 Ohio St.3d at 271, 649 N.E.2d at 
177.  Further, a “discovery rule is invoked in situations where the injury 
complained of may not manifest itself immediately and, therefore, fairness 
necessitates allowing the assertion of a claim when discovery of the injury occurs 
 
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beyond the statute of limitations.”  Id. 
 
As in NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., we believe that a discovery 
rule is applicable here.  In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the 
underlying rationale for statutes of limitations,3 and we have also considered the 
interests and equities involved.  Accordingly, we reaffirm that tort actions for 
injury or damage to real property are subject to the four-year statute of limitations 
set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).  In addition, we hold that a negligence action against 
a developer-vendor of real property for damage to the property accrues and the 
four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.09(D) commences to run when it is 
first discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence it should have been 
discovered, that there is damage to the property. 
 
Here, from the time the Listons moved into the home in 1985, they were 
aware that standing water existed on the property and that the land did not drain 
properly.  Thus, since the damage occurred at least as early as 1985, the time of the 
initial discovery by a purchaser that a problem existed regarding the property, 
appellees’ negligence claims, including their claim that Jackson’s negligence 
created a nuisance thereon, are time-barred.  The initial discovery of the problem 
occurred more than four years before appellees commenced their lawsuit. 
 
Appellees contend that to deny them the right to pursue their negligence 
claims against Jackson would violate Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, which sets forth that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law.”  However, under the particular facts of this case, we disagree 
with appellees’ contention.  Here, a drainage problem allegedly caused by Jackson 
was known to the Listons before the sale to appellees.  If appellees had been fully 
informed of the problems they most likely would not have purchased the home or 
they might have negotiated a price that reflected the problems.  Of course, if the 
 
8 
Listons had not been aware of the problems associated with the property, and 
appellees thereafter purchased the home, appellees’ negligence claims against 
Jackson would not have accrued, in accordance with R.C. 2305.09(D), until 
appellees actually discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the damage to the property.  However, that is not what 
occurred here. 
 
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly entered by the trial court in 
favor of Jackson.  Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER and WALSH, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
JAMES E. WALSH, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
In O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 OBR 335, 447 
N.E.2d 727, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held, “Absent legislative definition, 
it is left to the judiciary to determine when a cause ‘arose’ for purposes of statutes 
of limitations.” 
2. 
In Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, we specifically overruled Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. 
Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938, and held that “R.C. 2305.131, a 
statute of repose, violates the right to a remedy guaranteed by Section 16, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution, and is, thus, unconstitutional.” 
3. 
In O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d at 88, 4 OBR at 339, 447 
N.E.2d at 731, this court noted that “[t]he rationale underlying statutes of 
limitations is fourfold: to ensure fairness to defendant; to encourage prompt 
 
9 
prosecution of causes of action; to suppress stale and fraudulent claims; and to 
avoid the inconvenience engendered by delay, specifically the difficulties of proof 
present in older cases.”