Title: GRANITE SPRINGS RETREAT ASSOCIATION, INC. V. ART and KAY MANNING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GRANITE SPRINGS RETREAT ASSOCIATION, INC. V. ART and KAY MANNING2006 WY 60133 P.3d 1005Case Number: 05-149Decided: 05/12/2006
APRIL TERM, 
A.D. 2006

 
 
GRANITE SPRINGS 
RETREAT ASSOCIATION, INC.,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
ART and KAY 
MANNING,

 
 
Respondents.

 
 
Original 
Proceeding

Petition for Writ of 
Review

The Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, 
Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

Julie Nye Tiedeken, of Tiedeken 
& Scoggin, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Respondents:

Arthur L. and Katherine L. Manning, 
pro se, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]       Granite 
Springs Retreat Association, Inc. (Granite Springs) brought a small claims 
action in circuit court seeking to collect homeowner's association dues in the 
amount of $265.44 from Mr. and Mrs. Manning.  Although the case began as a simple 
collection action, the order ultimately entered by the circuit court reflects 
that it evolved into a determination regarding the validity and application of 
restrictive covenants pertaining to real property.  This issue implicates title to real 
property and deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004), the case should have been certified to the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]       Granite 
Springs presents the following issue for review:

 
 
Does the Circuit Court have 
exclusive jurisdiction of a case in which the prayer for recovery of money does 
not exceed seven thousand dollars in which the Court must decide if the 
Defendant's real property is subject to restrictive 
covenants?

 
 
Mr. Manning restates the issue 
as:

 
 
Does the circuit court have subject 
matter jurisdiction to encumber title to real property?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       Granite 
Springs is a homeowner's association which assesses yearly dues against the 
owners of the lots in its subdivision for maintenance of roads, common areas, 
and for other expenses.  Mr. and 
Mrs. Manning own a lot within the subdivision.  On September 28, 2004, Granite Springs 
filed a complaint in the circuit court of LaramieCounty seeking money damages in the amount 
of $265.44 for dues owed by Mr. and Mrs. Manning.  The Mannings defended the action by 
claiming the restrictive covenants did not apply to their tract of land.  After reviewing all of the evidence, the 
circuit court entered its Judgment.  
The court stated:

 
 
The facts as established during the 
hearing were:

 
 

1.             
Art and 
Kay Manning own a tract in a subdivision known as Granite Springs Retreat, 
hereinafter referred to as Granite Springs, located west of Cheyenne, Laramie 
County, Wyoming.

2.             
Granite 
Springs was created by two separate recorded plats known as:  1) Granite Springs Retreat, first filing, 
which contained tracts one through eight; and Granite Springs Retreat, Second Filing, 
which contained tracts nine th[r]ough sixty-three.

3.             
Lorenz 
Ranch, Inc. originally owned the land that formed Granite 
Springs.

4.             
Lorenz 
Ranch, Inc. conveyed the First Filing I to Deward Miller on August 16, 1976, and 
the plat was filed on October 1, 1976.

5.             
On 
October 4, 1976, a Declaration of Protective Covenants was recorded, for the 
Granite Springs subdivision.  
[Plaintiff's Exhibit 2].  The 
Protective Covenants did not describe the land restricted and there was no 
mention if the land restricted was limited to the land in the first filing or 
included land in a subsequent filing.

6.             
Granite 
Springs Retreat by Deward Miller executed these Covenants.  [Plaintiff's Exhibit 2].  The Covenants provided in part that a 
homeowner's association could be formed if desired by the residents.  This association would allow the 
homeowners to assess dues to the tract owners in order to provide for road 
maintenance, snow removal, insurance, maintenance of common areas, and other 
costs of maintaining the subdivision.  
The covenants further provided that if an association was formed all 
owners agreed to become members and to be subject to a dues 
assessment.

7.             
After the 
filing of the Covenants, Miller recorded a warranty deed for the land . . . in 
the second filing on March 23, 1977.  
[Plaintiff's Exhibit 5].

8.             
Lorenz 
Ranch, Inc., and Deward Miller were involved in a business relationship during 
the time of the filing of both plats and the filing of the covenants.  Deward Miller filed more than one plat 
with the Laramie County Planning Department before he was the record owner of 
the land in question.

9.             
Members 
of both the families of the owners of the Lorenz Ranch, Inc., and the Deward 
Miller agreed that Deward Miller had an equitable interest in the land of the 
second filing at the time the covenants were recorded.  This evidence was 
uncontroverted.

10.         
On 
September 15, 1977, Miller transferred all of the property within the First and Second Filings, with the exception of 
one parcel of land transferred three days later to Happy Jack Stable and Lounge, 
Inc. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 7].

11.         
Miller 
attempted to amend the Covenants by recording an Amended Declaration of 
Protective Covenants, for the purpose of designating tracts four and five for 
commercial use on February 23, 1978, after he had divested himself of all 
interest in the land.  [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7].

12.         
Granite 
Springs homeowners established the Granite Springs Retreat Association, . . . 
(the Association) on September 1, 1987.  
[Plaintiff's Exhibit 7].

13.         
The 
Association assesses dues.  The 
defendants are the only members of the Association who have not paid their dues 
to date.

14.         
The 
Defendant[s] purchased the land subject to any and all restrictions, 
reservations, covenants and easements of record on April 26, 1990.  [Plaintiff's Exhibit 
5].

15.         
The 
Defendant[s] paid the Association dues from 1990 until July 1, 2002.  The Defendant[s] owe the Association 
dues for July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003 in the amount of $100.00 and a 12% 
penalty of $12.00.  They also owe 
dues and penalties for the period of July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004 in the 
amount of $153.44.  [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1].

16.         
Even 
though there were no covenants filed in the index at the Laramie County Clerk's 
Office on Defendant's property, the Defendant[s] were given a copy of the 
covenants when they purchased the property.

17.         
Art 
Manning, one of the Defendants, had been active in the homeowners Association by 
serving on the Board, serving as the President of the Association and attending 
meetings.

18.         
The 
Defendants stopped paying homeowner Association dues after a series of court 
actions confused the issue of whether covenants were on the land they had 
purchased.  

19.         
In 1993, 
a Notice [of] Contract for Deed was filed, indicating that Happy Jack Stable and 
Lounge was selling tract five of the Second Filing to Bobby and Bridget 
Wallace.  Two years later, the 
Wallaces filed their own Notice of Contract for Deed indicating that they were 
selling to Millheiser and Barroni.  
Millheiser and Barroni brought a declaratory judgment action and an 
action for damages, against the Wallaces and the Association, because they 
entered into the transaction with the understanding that there was no 
restriction on commercial use of tract five because of the amended 
covenants.  The District Court 
entered a summary judgment in favor of Millheiser and Barroni ordering that the 
Amended Covenants were void because they were filed after Miller had conveyed 
all of his interest in the property and therefore he could not amend the 
covenants.  Millheiser, et. al. v. Wallace, et. al., 
Docket No. 148-238, entered May 20, 1999.  [Defendant's Exhibit 
A].

20.         
Happy 
Jack Stable & Lounge, Inc. sued the Association to reform the covenants and 
the Court relying on its ruling in Millheiser, et. al. v. Wallace, et. al., 
supra, granted the Association's motion for summary judgment and 
subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration.  In the motion for reconsideration, Happy 
Jack Stable & Lounge, Inc., argued that the covenants did not restrict the 
land in the second filing.  The 
District Court denied the motion to reconsider without comment.  Happy Jack Stable & Lounge, Inc. v. 
Granite Springs Retreat Association, Inc., Docket 156 No. 559, entered June 
19, 2001, and July 10, 2001.  
[Defendant's Exhibit B].

21.         
Another 
landowner in Filing 2 failed to pay his homeowner's Association dues and sued in 
small claims court to avoid payment.  
Reynolds v. Lombardi, et. al., Docket #SC-0309-0027.  This court found that the covenant[s] 
were valid and enforceable and awarded the Association the outstanding 
dues.  [Plaintiff's Exhibit 6].  The judgment was affirmed in District 
Court.  Reynolds v. Lombardi, Docket No. 
163-008, entered March 23, 2004.  
[Plaintiff's Exhibit 7].  The 
Courts found the following:

Upon review of the record and 
briefs of the parties this court finds that the prior summary judgment did not 
void the Original Covenants, only the Amended Covenants and, therefore, Reynolds 
was still subject to the Association's dues.

      In his reply 
brief, Reynolds modified his argument to state that because the Original 
covenants were filed prior to the Second 
Filing, and his tract was part of the Second Filing, the Original Covenants 
could not apply to his property or any of the tracts on the Second Filing.  Although an interesting issue, this is a 
new argument that was not raised below.  
Matters raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.  Yates v. Yates, 81 P.3d 184, 188 (Wyo. 
2003) (citations omitted).  

22.         
The only 
legal or factual issue is whether the covenants filed prior to the time that the 
person, Deward Miller, filing the covenants having a warranty deed for the 
Defendant's land binds the Defendants.

23.         
The two 
District Court opinions that dealt with Miller's attempt to amend the covenants 
after he had conveyed all interest in the land are not applicable to the issue 
in the case.  Those two decisions 
were related to the amended covenants only and not to the original 
covenants.  Happy Jack Stable & Lounge, Inc. v. 
Granite Springs Retreat Association, Inc., Docket 156 No. 559, entered June 
19, 2001, and July 10, 2001.  
[Defendant's Exhibit B]; Millheiser, et. al. v. Wallace, et. al., 
Docket No. 148-238, entered May 20, 1999. [Defendant's Exhibit 
A].

24.         
The 
Supreme Court decision dealt with the rescission of the contract for sale of 
land for commercial purposes, the decision upheld the determination that the 
covenants had not been amended to allow for commercial use.  In fact the rescission was allowed 
because the original covenants did not allow commercial use.  Millheiser v. Wallace, 2001 WY 40, 21 P.3d 752 (Wyo. 2001).

25.         
Likewise 
in Reynolds v. Lombardi, Docket No. 
163-008, entered March 23, 2004, [Plaintiff's Exhibit 7] the District Court 
declined to deal with the issue in this case because it had not been originally 
litigated.

26.         
Restrictive covenants are 
contractual.  Hutchison v. Hill, 3 P.3d 242 (Wyo. 
2000); McClain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 474 (Wyo. 1997), McLain 
v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 38, 40 (Wyo. 1995).  Restrictive Covenants act as an 
equitable servitude and are enforceable in equity.  Streets v. J.M.Land 
& Developing Co., 898 P.2d 377, 379 (Wyo. 1995).  A good explanation is contained in 20 
Am. Jur. 2d Covenants §43:

                  
The[re] is considerable authority to the effect that such a covenant 
creates what is familiarly know[n] as equitable easements of servitude, passing 
with a conveyance of the land and enforceable against subsequent grantees with 
notice.

27.         
A helpful 
decision was announced in Streets v. J.M. 
Land & Developing Co., supra.  There the Supreme Court found that 
restrictive covenants could be enforced against a subsequent purchaser with 
notice if an owner of an equitable title imposes the restrictive 
covenants.

28.         
Streets v. J.M. Land & 
Developing Co., supra is directly on point.  There is uncontroverted evidence that 
Miller had an equitable interest in the land when he filed the covenants.  The Defendants had full notice of the 
covenants.  Therefore as the Court 
found in Streets v. J.M. Land & 
Developing Co., supra at 380:  
"The only prerequisite to enforcement should be the notice to the 
subsequent owner of the restrictions coupled with the requisite intent on the 
part of the seller that those covenants would be binding upon subsequent 
purchasers with notice."

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that a Judgment shall be granted in favor of the Plaintiff against 
the Defendant in the amount of $265.44, and service fees of $15.00 and the 
filing fee of $10.00 for a total judgment of $290.44.

 
 
The Mannings appealed this judgment 
to the district court.  The district 
court determined that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128 (LexisNexis 2003) does not 
contain a provision which vests jurisdiction in the circuit court to determine 
the effect of restrictive covenants on title and, therefore, the circuit court 
exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction.  
It vacated the judgment entered against the Mannings.  Granite Springs filed a petition for 
writ of review, which we granted.  
  

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶4]       
Jurisdictional questions are reviewed de novo pursuant to this Court's 
inherent power and our duty to address jurisdictional defects on appeal.  Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 494 
(Wyo. 
1998).  "If a lower court acts 
without jurisdiction, this court will notice the defect and have jurisdiction on 
appeal, not on the merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of 
the lower court in maintaining the suit."  
Id.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]       Granite 
Springs requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision.  It contends that the district court 
erred in finding that the judgment exceeded the scope of the circuit court's 
subject matter jurisdiction.

 
 
[S]ubject matter jurisdiction refers 
to the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the 
proceedings in question belong. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is so 
fundamental that it cannot be waived, can be raised on the court's own motion, 
and can be raised at any time, even on appeal. This court has repeatedly 
emphasized the implications of this precept:

It is fundamental, if not 
axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision or order having any 
effect in any case or matter, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is essential to the exercise of judicial power. Unless the court 
has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, and any decision, judgment, 
or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any 
purpose. Subject matter jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over the person, is not 
a subject of judicial discretion. There is a difference, however, because the 
lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived, but lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be. Subject matter jurisdiction either exists or it does not 
and, before proceeding to a disposition on the merits, a court should be 
satisfied that it does have the requisite jurisdiction.

 
 

Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1119-1120 
(Wyo. 1998) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  

 
 
[¶6]       Article 5, 
Section 1, of the Wyoming Constitution vests the judicial power of the state "in 
a supreme court, district courts, and such subordinate courts as the legislature 
may, by general law, establish and ordain from time to time."  Id.  District courts have general original 
jurisdiction in all cases "in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law 
vested exclusively in some other court."  
Joslyn v. Professional Realty, 
622 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Art. 5, § 10, Wyoming 
Constitution).  Circuit courts have 
exclusive original civil jurisdiction for "[a]n action where the prayer for 
recovery is an amount not exceeding seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00), 
exclusive of court costs[.]"  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a)(i).1  

[¶7]       Granite 
Springs relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-128(a)(i) to support its position that 
the circuit court had exclusive original civil jurisdiction in this case because 
its prayer for relief was $265.44.  
Granite Springs contends that for purposes of jurisdiction, it is 
irrelevant that the Mannings claimed the restrictive covenants did not apply to 
their property.  It asserts that 
neither the Constitution of the State of Wyoming nor any provision of Wyoming 
statutes provide that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions 
where there is an issue concerning the title to real estate or the effect of 
restrictive covenants on title to real estate.  Although Granite Springs recognizes 
statutory sections, e.g. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-4-108 (LexisNexis 2003),2 which previously prevented 
county courts and justices of the peace from hearing actions in which the title 
to real estate comes into question, it claims that there is no similar provision 
requiring circuit courts to certify the case to district court.  Thus, Granite Springs concludes that 
"the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to consider matters which involve issues 
which pertain directly or indirectly to title and/or boundaries of land so long 
as the prayer for recovery does not exceed seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00)." 

 
 
[¶8]       Granite 
Springs is correct in its assertion that prior to March 3, 2004, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-21-102 applied only to the justice of the peace courts.  However, effective March 3, 2004, the 
legislature revised that provision to read as follows:

 
 
            
If it appears from the pleadings or the evidence of either party at the 
trial of any case in circuit court 
that the title or boundaries to lands are in question, the judge shall 
immediately make an entry thereof in the docket, cease all further proceedings, 
and certify to the district court of the county a transcript of all entries made 
in the docket relating to the case in the same manner and within the same time 
as upon appeal. The case shall then be conducted in the district court as though 
appealed to the district court for trial de novo, except that no bond as on 
appeal or payment of costs in the circuit court is required for the transfer to 
the district court.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).  
This statute was in effect when Granite Springs filed its complaint.  Under this statutory provision, the 
circuit court was required to certify the case to the district court if the 
title to the Mannings' property was in question. 

 
 
[¶9]       Whether a 
determination of the validity of restrictive covenants calls title into question 
as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 is a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  When interpreting 
statutes:

We look first to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. A 
statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons 
are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. 
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and 
subject to varying interpretations. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous 
is a matter of law to be determined by the court. 

When a statute is sufficiently 
clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Instead, 
our inquiry revolves around the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection. In doing so, we view the 
statute as a whole in order to ascertain its intent and general purpose and also 
the meaning of each part. We give effect to every word, clause and sentence and 
construe all components of a statute in pari materia.

 
 

Carrillo v. State (In re 
Carrillo), 2005 WY 
31, ¶ 5, 107 P.3d 786, 788-89 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶10]     In framing its issue 
and in its opening brief, Granite Springs did not dispute that questions of 
title include issues of whether a property is bound by restrictive 
covenants.  Rather, its argument 
focused on the premise that circuit courts are not required to certify a case to 
district court once title to the property is in question.   Belatedly, in its reply brief, 
Granite Springs contended that the circuit court's "decision in no way affected 
the title to the Manning's land."  
Granite Springs provided no analysis or citation to legal authority in 
support of its assertion. 

 
 
[¶11]     Generally, title is 
"[t]he coincidence of all the elements that constitute the fullest legal right 
to control and dispose of property or a claim."  The AmericanHeritageCollege Dictionary 1444 (4th 
ed. 2004).  Stated another way, 
title is "[t]he aggregate evidence that gives rise to a legal right of 
possession or control."  Id.  Restrictive covenants limit permissible 
uses of land and are considered a cloud on title.  See Restatement (Third) of Prop.:  Servitudes § 1.3 (2000); Roger A. 
Cunningham et al., The Law of 
Property § 8.13, at 467 (2nd ed. 1993) (stating covenants are a 
cloud upon title).  See also 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Etc. § 280 (1995) ("A court 
may cancel a restrictive covenant as a cloud on title . . . .").  A cloud on title is defined as "[a]n 
outstanding claim or encumbrance which, if valid, would affect or impair the 
title of the owner . . . ."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 255 (6th ed. 1990).  "Since covenants impose restrictions 
upon use and enjoyment of the burdened land, they are burdens or clouds upon 
title.  In theory they make title 
less marketable, against the law's long bias in favor of unencumbered, 
marketable title."  Roger A. 
Cunningham et al., The Law of 
Property § 8.13, at 467 (2nd ed. 
1993).

 
 
[¶12]     In this action, Granite 
Springs sought to enforce the covenant that permits the assessment of 
homeowner's association dues.  This 
is one of several covenants contained in the Declaration of Protective 
Covenants.  The other covenants 
restrict, inter alia, the type, size 
and location of any dwellings built and the types of vehicles that may be parked 
or stored along the subdivision streets.  
The covenants prohibit certain types of commercial business trade from 
being conducted within the subdivision, the discharging of firearms, and they 
require that outdoor clothes drying be conducted in the yard away from the 
street.  Permission must also be 
obtained from the Architectural Control Committee before clearing or killing any 
trees.  These covenants, if found 
applicable to the Mannings' lot, would place restrictions on the Mannings' right 
to use, control, and enjoy their property.  
Accordingly, we conclude Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 encompasses questions 
concerning the validity of restrictive covenants because, if applicable, the 
covenants would affect or impair the title of the owner.  

 
 
[¶13]     At trial, the Mannings 
claimed that the restrictive covenants did not apply to their tract of 
land.  The defense asserted by the 
Mannings raised a question of title as contemplated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-21-102.  At that point, the 
circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this matter 
and the case should have been certified to the district court pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102.  We affirm 
that portion of the district court's order setting aside the circuit court's 
judgment.  We remand this matter to 
the district court for remand to the circuit court.  The circuit court shall certify this 
case to the district court in accordance with the statute.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The full text of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-9-128 (LexisNexis 2003) provides as follows:

 
 
(a) Each circuit court has exclusive 
original civil jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state 
for:

 (i) An action where the 
prayer for recovery is an amount not exceeding seven thousand dollars 
($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs;

(ii) Actions to recover specific 
personal property the value of which does not exceed seven thousand dollars 
($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs and shall be prosecuted in accordance with 
W.S. 1-15-301 through 1-15-306;

(iii) Actions to foreclose or 
enforce a lien on or security interest in personal property perfected under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, W.S. 34.1-1-101 through 34.1-10-104, when the amount 
claimed on the lien or security interest does not exceed seven thousand dollars 
($7,000.00), exclusive of court costs;

(iv) Actions for small claims as 
provided by W.S. 1-21-201 through 1-21-205;

(v) Actions for forcible entry or 
detainer as provided by W.S. 1-21-1001 through 1-21-1016;

(vi) Actions to foreclose and 
enforce the following statutory liens only, when the amount claimed on the lien 
does not exceed seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) exclusive of court 
costs:     

(A) Construction liens as provided 
by W.S. 29-2-101 through 29-2-109 [29-2-101 through 
29-2-111];

(B) Liens for labor and materials as 
provided by W.S. 29-4-101 and 29-4-102;

(C) Liens for labor and services as 
provided by W.S. 29-5-101 through 29-5-106 and 29-7-101 through 29-7-202; 
and

(D) Liens for taxes as provided by 
W.S. 39-15-108(d) and 39-16-108(d).

(vii) Actions to dispose of an abandoned 
vehicle as provided by W.S. 31-13-112(e), regardless of the value of the 
abandoned vehicle.

(b) The circuit court may issue 
writs of attachment or garnishment as provided by W.S. 1-15-101 through 1-15-212 
and 1-15-401 through 1-15-511, and may issue judgment, execution and stay of 
execution, and order the sale of the property seized under execution as provided 
by W.S. 1-19-101 through 1-19-108 and 1-21-401 through 1-21-703. A writ of 
execution issuing from a circuit court shall be in the form and subject to the 
provisions of W.S. 1-17-308.

(c) The judge may submit to 
arbitration any civil matter pending in circuit court, upon agreement of the 
parties as provided by W.S. 1-21-801 through 1-21-804, or upon application of 
either party showing an arbitration agreement and refusal of the opposing party 
to arbitrate as provided by W.S. 1-36-101 through 
1-36-119.

(d) The provisions of W.S. 5-1-107 
pertaining to the exercise of personal jurisdiction apply in the circuit courts. 

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 (LexisNexis 2003) (amended by 
Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 1) provided:

 
 
   If it appears from the pleadings 
or the evidence of either party at the trial of any case in justice court that 
the title or boundaries to lands are in question, the justice shall immediately 
make an entry thereof in the docket, cease all further proceedings, and certify 
to the district court of the county a transcript of all entries made in the 
docket relating to the case in the same manner and within the same time as upon 
appeal. . . .

  

See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-4-108 (LexisNexis 2003) (repealed 
by Laws 2004, ch. 42, § 2) which stated, "Justices of the peace shall not have 
cognizance of any action in which the boundaries of, or the title to real estate 
shall come into question."