Title: STATE v McKENZIE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13011 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1978 THE STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Barney Reagan argued, Cut Bank, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Michael McCarter, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Douglas Anderson, County Attorney, argued, Conrad, Montana Submitted: March 13, 1978 Decided : jUN 1 !$re M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Duncan Peder McKenzie, Jr., was convicted of t h e crimes of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated kidnapping by jury v e r d i c t i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of Cascade County and t h e r e a f t e r was sentenced t o death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal by t h i s Court. S t a t e v. McKenzie, (1976), Mont. , 557 P.2d 1023, 33 St.Rep. 1043. Thereafter , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court granted c e r t i o r a r i , vacated t h i s C o u r t ' s judgment and remanded t h e cause t o us f o r f u r t h e r consideration i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York, (1977), 432 U . S . 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. This opinion c o n s t i t u t e s t h e judgment of t h i s Court following remand. The victim i n t h i s case was Lana Harding, a 23 year o l d r u r a l school teacher i n Pondera County, Montana. O n Tuesday morning, January 2 2 , 1974, she f a i l e d t o appear a t school. A t t h e Pioneer School teacherage where she l i v e d , t h e bed was found i n a dishevelled condition. The s h e r i f f of Pondera County was c a l l e d and o f f i c e r s w e r e dispatched t o t h e school, a r r i v i n g t h e r e mid-morning. I n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t day revealed: (1) A red t e n n i s shoe belonging t o Lana Barding j u s t o u t s i d e t h e school; (2) a drag t r a i l from the teacherage t o a nearby road; (3) blood near t h e end of t h e drag t r a i l ( l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s Lana's type and Rh f a c t o r ) ; and ( 4 ) a wristwatch belonging t o Lana i n t h e same a r e a a s t h e blood. Lana Harding was l a s t seen i n Conrad, Montana, some 13 m i l e s from t h e teacherage, on Monday, January 21, a t about 5:00 p.m. Defendant had r e c e n t l y moved i n t o t h e community and was working f o r t h e K & K Wholesale Seed Co. l o c a t e d approxi- mately t h r e e m i l e s from t h e Pioneer School teacherage. A day o r s o before January 21, he made arrangements t o buy a 1948 black Dodge pickup, recognizable t o most i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e a r e a because it had belonged t o one l o c a l owner f o r a long period of t i m e . On January 21, defendant had worked on t h e pickup a f t e r work. H e was seen l e a v i n g K & K Wholesale Seed Co. a t ap2roximately 6:45 p.m., heading toward h i s p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e ( n o t f a r from t h e teacherage) i n t h e black pickup. The pickup was seen about 7:00 p.m. about a m i l e from t h e teacherage. Approximately an hour later, around 8:00 p.m., defendant knocked on t h e door of t h e Pearson farm r e s i d e n c e , l o c a t e d a c r o s s t h e road from t h e teacherage. H e asked f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n s t a r t i n g h i s pickup. It was l a t e r determined t h e pickup was parked i n t h e road a t a p o i n t where t h e drag t r a i l ended and where t h e blood and watch w e r e found t h e following day. A t t h e Pearson r e s i d e n c e defendant asked d i r e c t i o n s t o h i s own r e s i d e n c e and c a l l e d h i s w i f e t o say he was coming home. Don Pearson p u l l e d t h e pickup, g o t it s t a r t e d , and noted defendant d i d n o t d r i v e on toward h i s p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h e pickup was seen being d r i v e n toward t h e d r i l l s i t e where Lana's body was found t h e following day. H e r body was found c l o t h e d only i n a s h i r t , sweater and b r a . It was draped over t h e tongue of a g r a i n d r i l l . She had been s e v e r e l y beaten about t h e head and body. The f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t who examined t h e body t e s t i f i e d t h e d e a t h blow had been d e l i v e r e d t o t h e head and l a i d open t h e r i g h t s i d e . A rope was t i e d around h e r neck; t h e r e was evidence she had been strangled; however, pressure had been released s o she d i d n o t d i e of strangulation. A c o i l of wire was entangled i n her h a i r , l a t e r shown t o have come from a r o l l of w i r e found i n t h e back of defendant's pickup. During t h e search f o r t h e body and t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e homicide, t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l i t e m s were found: (1) A p a i r of gloves, worn by defendant a t work, were found i n a f i e l d not f a r from where t h e body was discovered with human blood on them; (2) overshoes with Lana's type blood and b r a i n t i s s u e on them were found about a q u a r t e r of a m i l e away, and impressions from t h e s o l e s matched t h e heels of boots l a t e r taken from defendant's home; and ( 3 ) Lana's purse was found near t h e place where t h e overshoes were recovered. A s a r e s u l t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n by t h e s h e r i f f and h i s deputies, t h e county attorney, on Tuesday afternoon, January 22, f i l e d a complaint charging defendant with a s s a u l t before t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace. The county attorney a l s o obtained a warrant f o r t h e a r r e s t of defendant and a search warrant. Defendant was t h e r e a f t e r a r r e s t e d a t h i s home. The black Dodge pickup was seized and impounded. Human blood was found i n t h e bed of t h e pickup and on t h e springs; t h e back end of t h e pickup had been r e c e n t l y sprayed with black p a i n t ; t h e spray p a i n t was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d by F B I experts a s i d e n t i c a l t o a p a i n t brand named "Weekend" which was not a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Conrad, Pondera County, area. A can of t h e black spray p a i n t w a s found i n t h e cab of t h e pickup, and another was l a t e r found a t defendant's home. The following items w e r e found i n t h e back of t h e pickup: (1) A c o i l of wire, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s having been t h e source of t h e w i r e found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s h a i r ; (2) an exhaust manifold t h a t had been painted black; and ( 3 ) human blood of t h e same type and R h f a c t o r a s Lana's and b r a i n and c o r t i c a l t i s s u e were found on the manifold. D r . John P f a f f , who examined t h e v i c t i m ' s body and t h e manifold, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e manifold could have i n f l i c t e d t h e f a t a l blow. A t t h e d r i l l s i t e where the body was located, a piece of brass from a water pump was found. The p r i o r owner of the Dodge pickup t e s t i f i e d t h i s piece of b r a s s w a s i n t h e back of t h e pickup when defendant took possession of t h e pickup on January 19. Several co-workers a t t h e K & K Wholesale Seed Co. t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t defendant had s a i d on January 21 t h a t he broke i n every new v e h i c l e by engaging i n sexual intercourse i n each newly acquired vehicle. Several days before defendant had remarked t h a t he had had intercourse with country school teachers; t h a t they w e r e naive, he could teach them, and they were easy t o g e t . Defendant appealed from t h e judgment of conviction and sentence imposed. W e affirmed. S t a t e v. McKenzie, supra. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court, on c e r t i o r a r i , vacated t h i s Court's judgment and remanded t h e cause t o us f o r f u r t h e r consideration i n t h e l i g h t of Patterson v. New York, supra. W e have reconsidered t h e e n t i r e case, not only i n t h e l i g h t of Patterson, b u t a l s o on a l l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l appeal t o t h i s Court. This opinion c o n s t i t u t e s t h i s Court's judgment i n t h e e n t i r e case following remand. I n t h e i n t e r e s t of anorderly presentation of t h e speci- f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by defendant, w e reorganize and present them insofar a s possible i n chronological sequence. ~ l t h o u g h t h e r e i s some overlap, t h e i s s u e s on appeal generally f a l l i n t o four categories: (1) Those r e l a t i n g t o p r e t r i a l proceedings; ( 2 ) those involving t h e t r i a l i t s e l f ; ( 3 ) i s s u e s involving p o s t - t r i a l proceedings, including b u t n o t limited t o , imposition of t h e death sentence; and ( 4 ) i s s u e s f o r reconsideration a s remanded from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court . Defendant's s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on appeal a r e : 1. The issuance and execution of t h e a r r e s t and search warrants without probable cause, including a l l claims of e r r o r flowing therefrom. 2. Errors r e l a t i n g t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o p e r ~ n i t defendant t o change h i s p l e a and enforce a p l e a bargain. 3 . Denial of defendant's motions f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. 4. Permitting t h e f i l i n g of amended Informations a g a i n s t t h e defendant and matters r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o . 5. Denial of a speedy t r i a l t o defendant. 6. Denial of defendant's motions f o r a p r o t e c t i v e order and t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Montana s t a t u t e s r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o . 7 . Denying defendant t h e r i g h t t o v o i r d i r e t h e jury on l e g a l concepts r e l a t i n g t o defendant's mental s t a t e . 8. Permitting t h e S t a t e t o endorse 58 a d d i t i o n a l witnesses on t h e amended Information on t h e f i r s t day of t r i a l . 9. F a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e t o timely f u r n i s h defendant with statements of i t s witnesses. 1 0 . Improperly admitting i n evidence numerous S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s and denying admission i n evidence c e r t a i n proposed e x h i b i t s of defendant's. 11. Improperly i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. 12. Improper jury v e r d i c t forms. 13. Permitting audience recording of t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e jury. 1 4 . Undue i n t e r f e r e n c e and p a r t i s a n a t t i t u d e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t preventing an o r d e r l y and proper p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e case. 15. Insufficiency of t h e evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t . 16. Denial of defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l . 17. Errors i n t h e c o u r t ' s " f i n d i n g s , conclusions, sentence and order" r e s u l t i n g i n t h e imposition of t h e death sentence. 18. O n remand from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, t h e i s s u e is whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s improperly s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof of defendant's s t a t e of mind, an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e crimes charged, t o defendant i n v i o l a t i o n of due process under t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i - t u t i o n s . I n connection with t h e f i r s t i s s u e above, defendant contends: The a r r e s t and search warrants were not issued upon probable cause i n v i o l a t i o n of United S t a t e s and Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements; t h e f a c t s supporting probable cause were not made under o a t h o r a f f i r m a t i o n and reduced t o w r i t i n g i n v i o l a t i o n of Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements; t h e search warrant was e i t h e r issued a s o r converted i n t o a prohibited general search warrant; s e c t i o n 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s and Montana Constitutions; by reason thereof S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t s 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39 through 52, 83 through 100, and s u b l e t t e r e d e x h i b i t s bearing any of these numbers a r e inadmissible a s t h e products of an unlawful search and s e i z u r e ; and defendant's motions t o suppress and o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e s e e x h i b i t s should have been granted. W e d i s a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s contention t h e r e was no probable cause f o r t h e a r r e s t o r search warrant. This Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . G a r r i s v . Wilson, (1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 15, considered f e d e r a l c a s e law and t h e long standing r u l e i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n on probable cause f o r a r r e s t and s e a r c h warrants noting: "'We reach t h i s d e c i s i o n by a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e - - - following standards: only a p r o b a b i l i t y of - c r i m i n a l conduct need be shown.'" -- Far more was shown here. See: S t a t e v. T r o g l i a , (1971), 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143; S p i n e l l i v . United S t a t e s , (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S . C t . 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. Defendant argues t h e search warrants must f a l l on t h e b a s i s of f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e county a t t o r n e y t o swear o r a f f i r m and reduce t h e testimony t o w r i t i n g . H e relies on S t a t e ex rel. Townsend v. District Court, (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; and P e t i t i o n of Gray, (19701, 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. W e f i n d n e i t h e r c a s e f a c t u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e here. A r t i c l e 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , provides : " * * * N o warrant t o s e a r c h any p l a c e , o r s e i z e any person o r t h i n g s h a l l i s s u e * * * without probable cause, supported by o a t h o r affirma- t i o n reduced t o w r i t i n g . " I n Townsend nothing was reduced t o w r i t i n g . Here, t h e r e i s an a f f i d a v i t signed by t h e county a t t o r n e y and made a p a r t of both warrants. A t a later d a t e , defendant argues t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace f a i l e d t o follow t h e r i t u a l s of t h e swearing. County Attorney Nelson l a t e r t e s t i f i e d he asked t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace " i f he was sworn." Defendant argues t h e county a t t o r n e y made t h e a f f i d a v i t only on f a c t s obtained from J e r r y Hoover, a deputy s h e r i f f of Pondera County, who had been a t t h e scene of t h e crime a s p a r t of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g team. This is n o t a t r u e p i c t u r e of what took place before J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe a t t h e time t h e county a t t o r n e y gave t h e a f f i d a v i t and obtained t h e warrants. O n September 30, 1974, a hearing on t h e defendant's motion t o suppress was held before Judge Robert J. Nelson. Testifying were S h e r i f f Hamrnermeister, h i s deputy J e r r y Hoover, J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Robert Wolfe and County Attorney David H. Nelson. The arguments of defendant's counsel were d i r e c t e d t o t h e lack of probable cause f o r t h e issuance of t h e warrants. A summary of t h e testimony shows J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe t e s t i f i e d he customarily swears a l l witnesses though he d i d n o t r e c a l l swearing i n t h e county a t t o r n e y , he con- sidered him sworn. Deputy Hoover t e s t i f i e d he came i n t o town about 4:30 p.m. on January 22, 1974, with d i r e c t i o n s t o go t o t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e ; t h a t he helped t h e county a t t o r n e y prepare t h e a f f i d a v i t and he then went before J u s t i c e of t h e Peace Wolfe and gave sworn testimony i n support of t h e issuance of t h e warrants. County Attorney Nelson t e s t i f i e d he had been a t t h e scene with t h e s h e r i f f and h i s deputies during t h e afternoon and j u s t p r i o r t o h i s coming t o town t o g e t t h e warrants issued. A t t h e hearing, he s a i d i n answer t o a question a s t o what knowledge he had of t h e f a c t s : "A. Well, without looking a t t h e a f f i d a v i t now--I think t h e f i r s t paragraph o r two i s m y statement a s t o what I determined, t h a t she w a s missing and may have been t h e v i c t i m of f o u l play b u t of what nature w e d i d n ' t know a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , and t h a t she resided a t t h e teacherage." In a d d i t i o n , t h e county a t t o r n e y examined Deputy Hoover before t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace a s t o f a c t s he learned during t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Here, u n l i k e Gray, t h e r e was, i n e f f e c t , sworn testimony by t h e county a t t o r n e y and deputy s h e r i f f i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a f f i d a v i t , and t h e combination thereof e s t a b l i s h e d probable cause. The f a c t t h a t defendant had been parked a t t h e roadside near t h e school t h e n i g h t before had been e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Pearsons, who a s s i s t e d defendant i n g e t t i n g t h e truck moved. I t was t h e r e t h e v i c t i m ' s watch was found i n a pool of blood by t h e i n v e s t i - gating o f f i c e r s before going t o town t o g e t t h e warrants. See: Lindley v. S t a t e , (1956), Okl.Cr., 294 P.2d 851. This, i n our opinion i s a s u f f i c i e n t showing of probable cause t o i s s u e t h e warrants. Defendant next a t t a c k s t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of t h e search warrant, a l l e g i n g t h a t under t h e search warrant issued, a blanket s e i z u r e r e s u l t e d . Examination of t h e warrant indi- c a t e s t h a t both t h e house and t h e v e h i c l e were t o be searched. Though an e r r o r on t h e v i n t a g e of t h e black Dodge pickup (1950 i n s t e a d of 1948) appeared, t h a t is of l i t t l e s i g n i - ficance. S t a t e ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, (1972), 108 ~ r i z . 356, 498 P.2d 444. A l l p a r t i e s knew t h e pickup involved. A l l t h a t i s needed t o m e e t t h e requirements of s p e c i f i c i t y i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r with reasonable e f f o r t , can a s c e r t a i n t h e automobile intended t o be searched, and i t s owner, i f possible. Wangrow v. United S t a t e s , ( 8 t h C i r . 1968), 399 F.2d 106. Defendant c i t e s case a u t h o r i t y t h a t some seven c r i t e r i a are needed f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a motor vehicle-- owner, make, model, year, c o l o r , motor number and l i c e n s e number. Here, t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r t h e search warrant answers f i v e of t h e seven l i s t e d c r i t e r i a and it was s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c . Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, (1923), 200 Ky. 399, 255 S.W. 76; Hatley v. S t a t e , (1941), 72 0kl.Cr. 69, 113 P.2d 396. Defendant's argument t h a t t h e items seized were not covered by t h e language "any o t h e r contraband a r t i c l e s 1 ' i s without m e r i t . The language used comes within t h e r u l e of S t a t e v. Quigg, (1970), 155 Mont. 1 1 9 , 467 P.2d 692, where we held t h a t i t e m s o t h e r than those s p e c i f i c a l l y described i n t h e search warrant may be seized a s long a s a reasonable r e l a t i o n s h i p is demonstrated between t h e search authorized i n t h e warrant and s e i z u r e of t h e i t e m s not s p e c i f i c a l l y described t h e r e i n . Next we consider t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 95- 1 8 0 6 ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s : "The burden of proving t h a t t h e search and s e i z u r e were unlawful s h a l l be on t h e defendant." W e f i n d no m e r i t i n defendant's contention t h i s subsec- t i o n i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . W e note defendant c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y f o r h i s p o s i t i o n and t h e r e f o r e f a i l s t o overcome t h e presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . United S t a t e s v. Keleher, (1924), 55 App.D.C. 132, 2 F.2d 934, r e l i e d upon by defendant, i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s here. W e note t h a t Montana's s t a t u t e s e c t i o n 95-1806 ( f ) , R.C.M. 1947, i s patterned a f t e r Chapter 38, 8114-12(b), I11.Code of Criminal Procedure, which s t a t e s i n p a r t : "* * * The judge s h a l l r e c e i v e evidence on any i s s u e of f a c t necessary t o determine t h e motion and t h e burden of proving t h a t t h e search and s e i z u r e were unlawful s h a l l be on t h e defendant * * * . ' I Here, such a hearing was held by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and de- fendant f a i l e d i n h i s e f f o r t . People v. Normant, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 2 5 111.App.3d 536, 323 N.E.2d 553; S t a t e v. T r i t z , (1974), 164 Mont. 344, 522 P.2d 603. Defendant next s p e c i f i e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r a r i s i n g o u t of an a l l e g e d "plea bargain", an a l l e g e d breach thereof by t h e S t a t e , a r e f u s a l by t h e District Court t o s p e c i f i c a l l y enforce t h e terms thereof, and a r e f u s a l by t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o permit t h e defendant t o withdraw h i s p r i o r plea and s u b s t i t u t e a plea of g u i l t y i n conformity with t h e alleged plea bargain. I n substance t h e defendant contends t h a t a v a l i d and binding agreement was made on December 22, 1974, between t h e prosecutor and defense counsel, s u b j e c t t o approval by t h e t r i a l judge, t h a t defendant would plead g u i l t y t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated a s s a u l t and would receive sentences of 50 years and 20 years respectively t o be served concur- r e n t l y . Defendant claims t h a t on t h e following day counsel met with t h e t r i a l judge, who with some reluctance, agreed t o a l l aspects thereof (except t h a t he f e l t he could only give one 50 year sentence f o r both crimes) and set December 30 a s t h e d a t e f o r change of plea and e n t r y of judgment i n accordance with t h e agreement. A s a r e s u l t , according t o defendant, defense counsel agreed t o explain what problems they foresaw i n t h e prosecution of t h e S t a t e ' s case and what t h e defense p o s i t i o n would have been had t h e case gone t o t r i a l , a l l t o counteract anticipated public r e a c t i o n by t h e s h e r i f f and t h e family of t h e victim. O n December 28 t h e prosecutor advised defense counsel they would not perform t h e i r p a r t of t h e plea bargain agree- ment, according t o defense counsel. O n December 30 t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s plea and refused t o enforce t h e alleged plea bargaining agreement. The S t a t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, denies t h a t any plea bar- gaining agreement was entered i n t o on December 22, o r a t any o t h e r time. The S t a t e contends t h e i n i t i a t i o n and impetus f o r t h e plea bargaining discussions came from t h e defendant; t h a t throughout t h e discussions t h e S t a t e c o n s i s t e n t l y took t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t no plea bargain could be entered i n t o without t h e consent of t h e v i c t i m ' s family and t h e s h e r i f f ; and t h a t t h e only reason t h e S t a t e agreed t o meet with t h e t r i a l judge and defense counsel on December 23 was t h a t t h e prosecution was unable t o t r a v e l some 400 m i l e s t o see t h e v i c t i m ' s family u n t i l December 26. Because no consent could be obtained from t h e v i c t i m ' s family, no f u r t h e r plea bar- gaining discussions were held. The S t a t e a s s e r t s any g r a t u i t o u s information t h a t defense counsel believed they had imparted t o t h e S t a t e was e i t h e r already known t o the S t a t e o r of no s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e prosecution's case. This i s s u e t u r n s on t h e existence of t h e alleged plea bargaining agreement. The t r i a l judge accepted t h e S t a t e ' s version of t h e s i t u a t i o n and refused t o enforce t h e alleged agreement contended f o r by defendants. W e likewise accept t h e S t a t e ' s version. W e hold t h a t where, a s here, t h e existence of any plea bargaining agreement was disputed and t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t none was made, t h e r e is nothing t o enforce and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c t i o n s i n t h i s regard were c o r r e c t . A s w e understand it, t h e r e i s n e i t h e r contention nor proof of bad f a i t h by t h e S t a t e i n i t s discussions with defense counsel on a plea bargain o r i n i t s e f f o r t t o secure t h e approval of t h e s h e r i f f o r t h e v i c t i m ' s parents. Under these circumstances any statements of defense counsel con- cerning weaknesses i n t h e S t a t e ' s case o r defense p o s i t i o n s i n connection therewith w e r e g r a t u i t o u s and premature. I n any event, a t r i a l i s n o t a sporting c o n t e s t i n which t h e v e r d i c t t u r n s on nondisclosure of such matters. Discovery procedures a r e designed and operated t o remove t h i s element and had been extensively and exhaustively utilized at the time in question. Santobello v. New York, (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L Ed 2d 427, does not aid the defendant here as that case is clearly distinguishable on the facts and on the law. Defendant's next specification of error concerns the denial of his motions for substitution of the trial judge. He argues that he attempted to disqualify the trial judge for cause by motion and hearing on September 30, 1974, on the basis that the trial judge was a member of the Criminal Law Revision Commission that drafted Montana's present Criminal Code and submitted it to the legislature for enact- ment. He argues that he again attempted to disqualify the trial judge for cause on December 30, 1974, first, because the trial judge had acquired information during the plea bargaining process making it impossible for him to sit in an impartial manner, and second, because he was attempting to force his own "Preliminary Instructions to the Jury" over both prosecution and defense objections which indicated he had assumed an adversary stance and taken over prosecution of the case. We hold that the trial judge's membership on the Criminal Law Revision Commission did not per se constitute grounds for disqualification for cause. Canon 4 of the American Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics specifically permits this: "A Judge may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice." The draft of the revision of the Criminal Code by the commission was presented to the legislature for its consideration, approval, rejection or modification. Nor do we f i n d any ground f o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge f o r cause i n h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of information during the plea bargaining process, h i s d r a f t i n g of "Pre- liminary I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e Jury", o r any f a c t s o r proof t h a t he had assumed an adversary p o s i t i o n a t t r i a l i n taking over t h e prosecution of t h e case. The r u l e of United S t a t e s v. Grinnell Corp., (19661, 384 U.S. 563, 86 S . C t . 1698, 16 L Ed 2d 778, i s inapplicable t o e s t a b l i s h b i a s and prejudice. Here, whatever knowledge t h e t r i a l judge obtained was during t h e course of l e g a l proceedings i n t h e case and not from any outside source. A s long a s the t r i a l judge's "Preliminary I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e Jury" a r e a c o r r e c t statement of t h e law, it i s immaterial whether they are d r a f t e d by t h e judge o r given over t h e objections of one o r both adversary coun- sel. Such i s t h e case here f o r reasons h e r e a f t e r discussed. F i n a l l y , w e f i n d t h e record does not support defendant's contention t h e t r i a l judge assumed an adversary r o l e and took over t h e prosecution of t h e case. Defendant argues a s e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r u l i n g s permitting t h e S t a t e t o f i l e amended Informations a g a i n s t him. W e need only concern ourselves with t h e f i l i n g of t h e t h i r d amended Information a s it was t h i s Information on which defendant w a s ultimately t r i e d . The t h i r d amended Information conforms t o our opinion and d i r e c t i o n s i n S t a t e ex rel. McKenzie v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1974), 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1 2 1 1 . Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r i n t h e a f f i d a v i t , t h e Information, o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r u l i n g s i n per- mitting i t s f i l i n g . Defendant complains he w a s denied a speedy t r i a l , emphasizing a lapse of 350 days between a r r e s t and t r i a l . This delay cannot be considered per s e a v i o l a t i o n of defendant's r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . However, the length of t i m e between defendant's a r r e s t and t r i a l does s h i f t t h e burden of explaining t h e reason f o r t h e delay and showing absence of prejudice t o defendant upon t h e prosecution. F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t , (1974), 165 Mont. 382, 528 P.2d 1322; S t a t e v. Keller, (1976), Mont. , 553 P. 2d 1013, 33 St.Rep. 795. The S t a t e ' s explanation f o r t h e delay was defendant's several appearances i n t h i s Court, t h e d i f f i - c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from t h e defendant's r e f u s a l t o plead, and t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which arose because t h i s w a s t h e f i r s t homicide prosecuted under t h e new Montana Criminal Code and under t h e new c a p i t a l punishment scheme. Much of t h e time can i n f a i r n e s s be charged t o neither p a r t y , but it i s c l e a r t h a t it aided both p a r t i e s t o b e t t e r prepare f o r t r i a l , t h i s being a complex circumstantial case. Under those circum- stances, w e cannot see t h a t defendant w a s denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The S t a t e ' s explanation of t h e delay i s s a t i s f a c t o r y and shows t h a t defendant was not prejudiced by t h e length of t i m e between a r r e s t and t r i a l . Defendant contends t h e Montana provision f o r n o t i c e of mental d e f e c t o r disease and the mental d e f e c t o r d i s e a s e provisions i n t h e Code of Criminal Procedure, s e c t i o n s 95- 501 through 509 and s e c t i o n 95-1803(d), R.C.M. 1947, a r e unconstitutional. To challenge t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of these sections, defendant sought a p r o t e c t i v e order t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f from any waiver of r i g h t s were he t o give t h e n o t i c e required by t h e s e sections. The c o u r t denied t h e r e l i e f sought and held these sections t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and n o t v i o l a t i v e of t h e United S t a t e s o r Montana constitu- t i o n s . O n appeal, defendant maintains t h e c o u r t erred i n n o t holding these provisions unconstitutional. Defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments were previously answered by t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex r e l . Sikora v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1969), 154 Mont. 2 4 1 , 4 6 2 P.2d 897. Defendant's a t t a c k on t h e s e s t a t u t e s l o s e s much of its f o r c e when it i s recognized t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court promulgated, and Congress, a f t e r c a r e f u l consideration, approved Rule 12.2, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Notice of Defense Based upon Mental Condition, which i s nearly i d e n t i c a l t o t h e procedure attacked here. I t should be emphasized t h a t t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e is f o r n o t i c e , t o prevent sur- p r i s e , and t o e l i m i n a t e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a continuance of a t r i a l when t h e defense is r a i s e d . The f a c t of n o t i c e does n o t amount t o a p l e a , and it could n o t be used i n any way a s evidence i n a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . The provisions merely provide f o r advance n o t i c e of t h e i n t e n t t o r e l y on such defense s o t h a t t h e S t a t e may be prepared t o meet t h i s defense. Defendant claims prejudice because he was n o t allowed t o v o i r d i r e t h e jury on t h e s u b j e c t of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . This Court has previously s a i d t h a t where n o t i c e of a defense of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t is given, a r e f u s a l t o allow defendant t o v o i r d i r e t h e jury on t h i s defense con- s t i t u t e s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . S t a t e v. Olson, (1971), 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822. Here, defendant d i d not g i v e any notice. W e b e l i e v e defendant was properly n o t allowed t o v o i r d i r e t h e jury on mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a s he d i d n o t g i v e any n o t i c e of t h i s defense. Defendant a l s o a l l e g e s t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e names of 58 new witnesses t o t h e amended Information on t h e day of t r i a l was e r r o r . The p e r t i n e n t s e c t i o n of t h e Code of Criminal procedure is s e c t i o n 95-1803 ( a ) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, which reads: " ( a ) L i s t of Witnesses: " (1) For t h e purpose of notice only and t o pre- vent s u r p r i s e , t h e prosecution s h a l l f u r n i s h t o t h e defendant and f i l e with t h e c l e r k of the c o u r t a t t h e time of arraignment, a l i s t of t h e witnesses intended t o be c a l l e d by t h e prosecu- t i o n . The prosecution may, any t i m e a f t e r ar- raignment, add t o t h e l i s t t h e names of any ad- d i t i o n a l witnesses, upon a showing of good cause. The l i s t s h a l l include t h e names and addresses of t h e witnesses." The Revised Commission Comment on t h i s s e c t i o n points out: " S s L i o n 95-1503 (d) of Chapter 15 r e q u i r e s t h e s t a t e t o endorse t h e names of t h e w i t - nesses f o r t h e s t a t e on the indictment o r information. The motion under t h i s s e c t i o n permits t h e defendant t o g e t a l i s t a t any time, probably a f t e r arraignment and before t r i a l . Many t i m e s t h e s t a t e does n o t know before it f i l e s t h e indictment o r informa- t i o n a l l t h e witnesses it may c a l l . "Further, t h i s provision allows t h e addition of names not only p r i o r t o t r i a l , but a f t e r t h e t r i a l has commenced. A s t h e t r i a l progresses, t h e showing which is necessary t o e s t a b l i s h 'good cause' should be more s t r i n g e n t . A t any time, t h e judge may allow a continuance (sec- t i o n 95-1708) i f it should appear necessary i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e . " I n S t a t e v. Campbell, (1972), 160 Mont. 111, 500 P.2d 801, t h e person whose name was added was t h e victim of t h e a s s a u l t and t h e Court t h e r e found no s e r i o u s claim of sur- p r i s e and pointed o u t t h a t while defendant objected, he made no e f f o r t t o ask f o r a continuance. I n S t a t e v. Rozzell, (1971), 157 Mont. 443, 486 P.2d 877, t h e D i s t r i c t Court judge recognized t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e witnesses added would s u r p r i s e t h e defendant and offered t o continue t h e t r i a l u n t i l the defendant had had a chance t o interview a l l t h e new witnesses, b u t t h i s was refused. These cases c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e proper procedure where s u r p r i s e is claimed from t h e addition of new witnesses i s t o ask f o r a continuance s o t h a t defendant may prepare. I n t h e present case, defendant objected t o t h e addition of t h e witnesses based on s u r p r i s e and i n a b i l i t y t o prepare h i s defense, b u t never requested a continuance. The D i s t r i c t Court i n granting t h e S t a t e ' s request f o r t h e addition of t h e new witnesses cautioned: " * * * and i n granting t h i s motion, it must be understood before any of these witnesses is a l - lowed t o t e s t i f y , t h e defendant must be given an opportunity t o have h i s counsel t a l k with them, examine them * * *." The witnesses added were not p r e j u d i c i a l t o defendant. The addition of t h e names of t h e F B I agents d i d n o t s u r p r i s e defendant, as he knew t h e content of t h e i r testimony from r e p o r t s received several months e a r l i e r . The r e s t of t h e a d d i t i o n a l witnesses who were a c t u a l l y c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y were employees of Wright Chevrolet. These persons' testimony was a p a r t of t h e chain of possession of t h e evidence seized from the truck. The remainder of t h e witnesses whoses names w e r e added, but who were not c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y , w e r e named because they could, i f need be, corroborate the testimony of t h e already l i s t e d witnesses, l a y f u r t h e r foundation, o r t e s t i f y about t h e weather and temperature i n the area on t h e d a t e s i n question. I n i t s order t h e c o u r t was c a r e f u l t o provide defendant with protection a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e and t o ensure t h a t defendant was a b l e t o prepare f o r t h e testimony. Defendant was i n no way prejudiced by t h e addition of these witnesses. Before allowing t h e addition of t h e new witness names, t h e c o u r t examined t h e county attorney t o determine t h e reason f o r t h e addition of each new witness and t o f i n d o u t t h e nature of each of t h e witness' testimony i n t h e presence of defendant's counsel, s o t h a t defendant w a s apprised of t h e b a s i c nature of t h e testimony. Defendant contends t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o timely f u r n i s h him with statements of i t s witnesses. H e argues t h a t t h i s i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Sections 95-1801(d) (1) , (d) ( 2 ) and 95-1804 ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947, provide t h e basic discovery t o o l s . Section 95-1804(a), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "On motion of a defendant i n any criminal case made p r i o r t o t r i a l t h e c o u r t s h a l l order t h e s t a t e t o f u r n i s h t h e defendant with a copy of any w r i t t e n confession o r admission and a l i s t of t h e witnesses t o i t s making. I f t h e defendant has made an o r a l confession o r admission a l i s t of t h e witnesses t o i t s making s h a l l be furnished." This s e c t i o n by i t s mandatory language e n t i t l e s defendant, a s a matter of r i g h t upon motion, t o statements he made. I t requires no showing of good cause. Section 95-1801(d) ( l ) , provides: "Upon motion of e i t h e r party and upon showing of good cause, t h e c o u r t may i s s u e a subpoena p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l d i r e c t i n g any person o t h e r than t h e defendant t o produce books, statements, papers and o b j e c t s before t h e c o u r t a t a time p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l o r p r i o r t o t h e t i m e when they a r e t o be offered i n evidence and t h e c o u r t may, upon t h e i r production, permit the books, statements, papers o r o b j e c t s o r portions thereof t o be in- spected, copied, o r photographed by t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r attorneys." The Revised Commission Comment discussing t h i s s e c t i o n points out: "The discovery allowed under subsection (d) is a two-part mechanism f o r gathering information. Under paragraph (1) e i t h e r party may r e q u i r e a t h i r d person, other than the defendant, through t h e use of a subpoena (section 93-1501-3), t o produce c e r t a i n a r t i c l e s . The only r e s t r i c t i o n i s t h a t good cause must be shown. This allows what i s sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as a ' f i s h i n g expedition1--but only where t h i r d p a r t i e s a r e concerned. " Section 95-1801 (d) ( 2 ) , provides: "Upon motion of t h e defendant, within a rea- sonable t i m e before t r i a l , t h e c o u r t may, upon a showing of good cause, a t a t i m e and place designated by t h e c o u r t , order t h e prosecution t o produce p r i o r t o t r i a l f o r inspection, photo- graphing o r copying by t h e defendant, designated books, statements, papers, o r o b j e c t s obtained from t h e defendant o r others by the prosecution which a r e m a t e r i a l , r e l e v a n t and necessary t o t h e preparation of t h e defendant's case." The Revised Commission Comment discussing t h i s provision s t a t e s : "The second paragraph permits discovery by t h e defendant o r t h e prosecution with t h e a d d i t i o n a l requirement t h a t t h e o b j e c t desired must be 'material, r e l e v a n t and necessary t o t h e pre- paration of t h e case. ' " This comment i n d i c a t e s t h e showing necessary t o g e t access t o m a t e r i a l i n t h e hands of t h e prosecutor i s g r e a t e r than t h a t required t o g e t m a t e r i a l i n t h e hands of t h i r d p a r t i e s . Against t h i s background, and with t h e recognition t h a t i n most criminal cases i n Montana discovery i s conducted on a more informal b a s i s without r e s o r t t h e motion and hearing procedures o u t l i n d a b o v e , t h i s Court f i n d s t h e a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r based on a delay of approximately one week i n complying with t h e demand made by defendant a f t e r t r i a l had begun, t o be without m e r i t . Defendant claims he had made two p r i o r demands upon t h e county attorney f o r t h i s material. These demands were i n t h e form of l e t t e r s t o t h e county attorney. Defendant made a number of s p e c i f i c requests and then made a general request f o r "* * * copies of any documentary o r physical items which you w i l l r e l y on f o r proof of any f a c t * * *." The second l e t t e r expressed defense counsel's opinion t h a t t h e S t a t e was n o t going t o provide t h e requested information. This l e t t e r was dated August 2 0 , 1974. O n January 13, 1975, a f t e r t r i a l began, defendant f i l e d a demand and motion requesting t h a t a l l statements taken by t h e prosecution from a l l witnesses be turned over t o defendant and demanding immediate compliance. Any delay i n t h e prosecution's fur- nishing defendant with t h e m a t e r i a l requested i n h i s e a r l i e r l e t t e r s was waived by defendant's f a i l u r e t o f i l e a demand and motion f o r t h i s m a t e r i a l u n t i l a f t e r t r i a l had begun. Even though t h e demand and motion was n o t made "within a reasonable t i m e before t r i a l " , a s required under s e c t i o n 95-1801 (d) (2) , t h e c o u r t granted t h e motion saying: "Before a witness t a k e s t h e s t a n d , o t h e r than your foundation witnesses, t h a t you [ t h e S t a t e ] a r e proceeding with now, f u r n i s h them [defense counsel] with such copies a s you have t h a t a r e n o t your work product a s such, and before they [ t h e witness] t a k e t h e stand, he is going t o be given an opportunity t o t a l k with each witness, p a r t i c u l a r l y those t h a t have been endorsed j u s t t h e o t h e r day * * *." (Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.) The t i m e it took f o r t h e S t a t e t o g a t h e r , s o r t , and copy t h e requested m a t e r i a l during t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief was reasonable. The c o u r t prevented any p r e j u d i c e by allowing defendant t o interview t h e w i t - nesses p r i o r t o t h e i r taking the stand. W e note t h e S t a t e complied with t h e s p e c i f i c requests made by defendant i n t h e August letters, and t h e r e p o r t s received from t h e FBI and t h e autopsy r e p o r t w e r e forwarded t o defendant soon a f t e r they w e r e received and p r i o r t o t h e August requests. Defendant o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n photographs which w e r e introduced i n t o evidence a s being gruesome and inflammatory o r otherwise p r e j u d i c i a l . The b a s i c r u l e on photographic evidence i n Montana a s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Campbell, (1965), 146 Mont. 251, 261, 405 P.2d 978, 984, is: "* * * Photographs a r e admissible f o r t h e pur- pose of explaining and applying t h e evidence and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and jury i n under- standing t h e case. Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. When t h e purpose of an e x h i b i t is t o inflame t h e minds of t h e jury o r e x c i t e t h e f e e l i n g s r a t h e r than t o enlighten t h e jury a s t o any f a c t , it should be excluded. S t a t e v. Bischert, 131 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969 * * *." Here, t h e photographs i n question f a l l i n t o t h r e e categories: (1) Photographs of t h e body taken a t t h e " d r i l l s i t e " ; ( 2 ) autopsy photographs taken by t h e pathologist; and (3) a s i n g l e photograph of a can of spray p a i n t i n a s u i t c a s e . I n each instance these photographs meet the above test. They were r e l e v a n t , u s e f u l , and necessary i n explaining t h e evidence and a s s i s t i n g t h e c o u r t and jury i n understanding t h e case. (1) The photographs taken a t t h e site where t h e body was found w e r e used by t h e pathologist t o show creases i n t h e body which were n o t present a f t e r t h e body had been moved and which tended t o show how long t h e body had been a t t h e s i t e . ( 2 ) The autopsy photographs, taken i n c o l o r and then printed i n black and white, were used by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t t o show t h e nature of t h e wounds and explain the evidence which formed t h e b a s i s of h i s opinion a s t o the s i z e and configuration of t h e weapon which was used t o i n f l i c t t h e wounds. (3) The photograph of t h e can of spray p a i n t i n t h e s u i t c a s e was used t o show t h e defendant had i n h i s possession a type of p a i n t which was n o t a v a i l a b l e i n l o c a l s t o r e s . Defendant f i n d s prejudice from t h i s photograph i n t h e impli- c a t i o n of f l i g h t t h a t could a r i s e from t h e f a c t t h e p a i n t w a s i n a s u i t c a s e . However, defendant had been i n custody f o r some time p r i o r t o t h e t i m e these photographs w e r e taken. This alleged prejudice could have been e a s i l y ex- plained away i n cross-examination. There w a s no i n t e n t t o e x c i t e f e e l i n g s with t h i s photograph which w a s i n no way gruesome. It w a s properly admitted. Defendant a l s o o b j e c t s t h a t c e r t a i n expert opinion was allowed t o be given p r i o r t o t h e completion of t h e chain of possession of t h e evidence upon which t h i s opinion was based. This opinion evidence was given by F B I agents who were witnesses f o r t h e S t a t e . The judge allowed then t o give t h e i r opinion a s t o t h e evidence they had examined, which had n o t a s y e t been admitted i n evidence, because t h e r e was a p o r t i o n of t h e chain of possession which had n o t been e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s within t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o allow opinion t o be given, conditioned on t h e subsequent production and admission of t h e evidence which forms t h e b a s i s of t h e opinion. Risken v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1960), 137 Mont. 57, 350 P.2d 831; Graham v. Rolandson, (1967), 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263. The chain of possession of t h e evidence was l a t e r supplied. Thus no e r r o r was committed. Next defendant complains t h a t a number of h i s proposed e x h i b i t s were refused admission i n t o evidence. Our examination of t h e record r e v e a l s t h a t these e x h i b i t s were refused on t h e b a s i s of a lack of a proper foundation. The r u l e i s t h a t t h e determination of whether a proper foundation has been l a i d f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of e x h i b i t s i n t o evidence rests with t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and i t s determination w i l l n o t be overturned on appeal unless t h e r e i s a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Olsen, (1968), 152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926. I n t h i s case, w e cannot say t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t admitting defendant's e x h i b i t s i n t o evidence. Defendant's argument i s without m e r i t . Defendant contends t h e extensive preliminary i n s t r u c - t i o n s given by t h e c o u r t were erroneous, t h a t it was e r r o r t o give them p r i o r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of evidence, and t h a t t h e remaining i n s t r u c t i o n s given a f t e r t h e presentation of evidence were wrong. The preliminary i n s t r u c t i o n s were t h e usual i n s t r u c t i o n s given on t h e r o l e of t h e jury. I n a d d i t i o n , included were a number of i n s t r u c t i o n s which s e t o u t t h e elements of t h e various crimes of which defendant w a s accused, and set o u t s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of t e r m s used. Montana's criminal code i s w r i t t e n i n c l e a r p l a i n language which s e r v e s w e l l a s t h e b a s i s f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury. There was no e r r o r i n incorporating t h e e n t i r e Information i n t o t h e preliminary i n s t r u c t i o n s , f o r it too i s b a s i c a l l y i n s t a t u t o r y language merely i n s e r t i n g defendant's name and t h e v i c t i m ' s name i n t h e proper places and enumerating t h e weapons used. The language is n o t inflammatory b u t i s a s n e u t r a l a s language d e t a i l i n g t h e charges involved here can be. Examination of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n defining reasonable doubt and t h e burden of proof show proper statements of t h e l a w . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t language i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n which d e f i n e s t h e degree of proof necessary a s being t h a t which convinces t h e mind " t o a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e charge, no more and no l e s s " f a l l s i n t o t h e type of e r r o r found i n S t a t e v. Taylor, (1973), 163 Mont. 106, 515 P.2d 695. I n Taylor, t h e S t a t e ' s burden w a s defined using t h e phrase "only such proof a s may" which impliedly l i m i t s consideration of some of t h e evidence and which could be i n t e r p r e t e d t o l i m i t t h e burden of proof. Here, t h e nature of t h e s u b j e c t i v e judgment t o be made by t h e jurors i s s e t f o r t h , and t h e language "no more and no l e s s " merely empha- s i z e s t h e n a t u r e of t h e judgment and i n no way diminishes it. The Court f i n d s no e r r o r t o t h e p r e j u d i c e of defendant from t h e f a c t t h a t extensive preliminary i n s t r u c t i o n s were given p r i o r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of evidence i n t h e case. Defendant concedes t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947, gives t h e c o u r t t h e power t o vary t h e order of t r i a l set o u t i n s e c t i o n 95-1910, R.C.M. 1947, f o r good reasons. The p r e s e n t case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence. Some of the counts charged were complex and difficult to understand. For example, the second homicide count was a felony homicide which had as alternative felonies, sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. The aggravated assault alternative had alternate aggravating factors, serious bodily injury or bodily injury with a weapon, and a listing of alternative weapons, a rope or a heavy object. It was for good reason that the judge instructed the jury as to the basic elements of all the offenses charged, so the jury could have some understanding of the complex circumstantial evidence to be presented. In a less complex case which was not based only on circumstantial evidence, such preliminary instruc- tions might not be necessary and there would not be the re- quired good reasons for varying the usual order of the trial, but here it was acceptable to do so. One of the preliminary instructions to which defendant objects is the one defining torture. The instruction states: "Whoever purposely assaults another physically for the purpose of inflicting cruel suffering upon the person so assaulted for the particular purpose of enabling the assailant to either: "(a) extort anything from such person; "(b) or to persuade such person against his or her will, or " (c) to satisfy some other untoward pro- pensity of the assailant * * *." The term "untoward propensity" is defined in the same instruc- tion as meaning "any perverse, wrong, bad or corrupt inclina- tion or tendency." Defendant maintains that this instruction incorrectly defined torture. A number of California cases have adopted a similar definition of torture. People v. Daugherty, (1953), 40 Cal.2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, 917 states: "Murder is perpetrated by t o r t u r e 'when " t h e a s s a i l a n t ' s i n t e n t was t o cause c r u e l suf- f e r i n g on t h e p a r t of t h e o b j e c t of t h e a t - tack, e i t h e r f o r t h e purpose of revenge, e x t o r t i o n , persuasion o r t o s a t i s f y some o t h e r untoward propensity." People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51, 54; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 177, 163 P.2d 8.' People v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 561, 241 P.2d 224, 227." The language of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n proposed by defendant i s an e x a c t quotation from t h e opinion of an earlier Cali- f o r n i a case, People v. Heslen, (1945), 163 P.2d 2 1 , 27. See: 27 Cal.2d 520, 165 P.2d 250. That case d e a l t with t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o support a f i n d i n g of murder by t o r t u r e and while t h e r e i s no r e a l c o n f l i c t between t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s , the one given by t h e c o u r t is i n t h e general language which does n o t comment on t h e evidence, which breaks t h e elements down, and which sets t h e various purposes o u t i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i s a c l e a r e r and more under- standable statement of t h e law. The i n s t r u c t i o n given i s a proper one and c e r t a i n l y t h e b e t t e r of t h e two proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s . People v. Wiley, (1976), 18 Cal.3d 162, 133 The D i s t r i c t Court read 28 "Preliminary I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e Jury" p r i o r t o t r i a l . After t r i a l , t h e c o u r t read I n s t r u c t i o n s 29 through 53, denominated "Additional Instruc- t i o n s " . These i n s t r u c t i o n s d e t a i l e d t h e mental elements of each offense charged and i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury regarding how t h e s e elements could be i n f e r r e d o r presumed from proven f a c t s . The c o u r t a l s o defined d i r e c t evidence, circum- s t a n t i a l evidence, inferences and presumptions and added a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o evidence and credi- b i l i t y of witnesses. I n s t r u c t i o n 30 s t a t e d t h a t defendant is presumed sane, and I n s t r u c t i o n 53 d e t a i l e d t h e affirma- t i v e defense of d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . Defendant contends t h e use of s t a t u t o r y inferences and presumptions i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s was e r r o r and e f f e c t i v e l y s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t t o defendant. I n general, t h r e e s t a t u t o r y inferences and presumptions used i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e i n dispute. The presumptions t h a t an unlawful a c t was done with an unlawful i n t e n t , and t h a t a person intends t h e ordinary consequences of h i s voluntary a c t , w e r e included i n I n s t r u c t i o n s 33 ("Method of Proof Applicable t o t h e Offense of Deliberate Homicide"), 37 ("Methods of Proof Applicable t o Sexual I n t e r c o u r s e Without Consent") and 38 ("Methods of Proof Applicable t o t h e Of- fense of Aggravated A s s a u l t " ) . Section 93-1301-7 ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947. The inference i n a d e l i b e r a t e homicide of knowledge o r purpose from t h e f a c t t h e accused committed a homicide i n t h e absence of circumstances of excuse, j u s t i - f i c a t i o n o r m i t i g a t i o n appeared i n I n s t r u c t i o n 33. Section 95-3004 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. A s an example of how t h e s e inferences and presumptions w e r e explained t o t h e jury, I n s t r u c t i o n 33 (I) and (11) is s e t out: "Method of Proof Applicable -- t o t h e Offense o f - Deliberate Homicide "The mental s t a t e accompanying t h e voluntary a c t required f o r t h e offense of d e l i b e r a t e homi- c i d e being e i t h e r knowingly o r purposely and n o t r e q u i r i n g i n a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t t h e a c t be committed f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, proof of t h e mental s t a t e may be made by t h e use of e i t h e r inferences o r presumptions, o r by t h e use of both inferences and presumptions. " I . Proof of - Mental S t a t e - by Inference. " I f you f i n d from t h e evidence beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e defendant, on o r about January 21, 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, i n t h e commission of a voluntary act, caused t h e death of Lana Harding, you are permitted from t h a t f a c t alone t o deduce o r reason t h a t he d i d so e i t h e r knowingly o r purposely, i f no circum- stances of mitigation, excuse o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n appear i n t h e evidence. "You w i l l be i n s t r u c t e d on mitigation, excuse and j u s t i f i c a t i o n i f such i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e needed. "In addition t o t h e f a c t of death being v o l u n t a r i l y caused by t h e accused, you may, and a r e i n s t r u c t e d t o a l s o consider a l l t h e f a c t s and circumstances connected with s a i d death, t h a t have been proved i n t h e evidence i n determining whether o r not t h e defendant acted e i t h e r know- ingly o r purposely. "11. Proof - of Mental S t a t e & Presumptions. " ( 1 ) I f you f i n d beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t the defendant, on about January 2 1 , 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, v o l u n t a r i l y committed an i l l e g a l a c t on Lana Harding, such a s a s s a u l t i n g o r i n j u r i n g her, t h e l a w presumes t h a t an unlawful a c t w a s done with an unlawful i n t e n t ; t h a t is, t h e law expressly d i r e c t s you t o reason from such unlawful a c t t h a t t h e defendant acted with an unlawful in- t e n t , o r purpose. "This i s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption, which means it may be controverted and overcome by other evidence, b u t whether o r not a presump- t i o n , once it has come i n t o e f f e c t i s overcome, i s f o r t h e jury t o determine. " ( 2 ) The law a l s o presumes t h a t a person intends t h e ordinary consequence of h i s volun- t a r y a c t . "Therefore, i f you f i n d beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e defendant, on o r about January 2 1 , 1974, i n Pondera County, Montana, v o l u n t a r i l y and unlawfully assaulted o r injured Lana Harding, and i f you f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e death would r e s u l t a s t h e ordinary consequence of such an a s s a u l t o r i n j u r y , t h e l a w presumes t h a t , and expressly d i r e c t s you t o reason there- from t h a t t h e defendant intended t o cause s a i d death regardless of whether o r n o t he a c t u a l l y had such an i n t e n t o r purpose. "This a l s o i s a r e b u t t a b l e presumption capa- b l e of being controverted and overcome, but once it has come i n t o e f f e c t it i s f o r t h e jury t o determine whether o r not it has been rebutted." Defendant i n i t i a l l y argues t h a t Patterson v. New York, supra, and Mullaney v. Wilbur, (1975), 4 2 1 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L Ed 2d 508, stand f o r t h e proposition t h a t i n t e n t , a s a n element of t h e o f f e n s e , may never be estab- l i s h e d by t h e use of presumptions. W e d i s a g r e e . The Supreme Court noted i n Patterson: "Mullaney s u r e l y held t h a t a S t a t e must prove every i n g r e d i e n t of a n o f f e n s e beyond a rea- sonable doubt, and t h a t it may n o t s h i f t t h e burden of roof t o t h e defendant 1 ments of t h e o ~ h u s , an element of t h e o f f e n s e may n o t be presumed merely by proof of t h e remaining elements. Elements of t h e o f f e n s e may s t i l l be presumed o r i n f e r r e d , however, from proof of o t h e r f a c t s , i f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between such proved f a c t s and t h e f a c t s presumed comports with t h e due process standards announced i n Barnes v. United S t a t e s , (1973), 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L Ed 2d 380. See, S t a t e v . McBenge, (1978), Mont. , 574 P.2d 260, 35 St.Rep. 84, 91. The use of presumptions and i n f e r e n c e s w a s recognized i n a f o o t n o t e t o t h e m a j o r i t y opinion i n llullaney: "* * * Generally i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e t h e prose- c u t i o n bears both t h e production burden and t h e persuasion burden. I n some i n s t a n c e s , however, it i s aided by a presumption, see Davis v. United S t a t e s , 160 U.S. 469, 40 L Ed 499, 16 S C t 353 (1895) (presumption of s a n i t y ) , o r a permissible i n f e r e n c e , see United S t a t e s v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 1 3 L Ed 2d 658, 85 S C t 754 (1965) ( i n f e r e n c e of knowledge from presence a t a n i l l e g a l s t i l l ) . These procedural devices r e q u i r e ( i n t h e c a s e of a presumption) o r per- m i t ( i n t h e c a s e of a n i n f e r e n c e ) t h e trier of f a c t t o conclude t h a t t h e prosecution has m e t i t s burden of proof with r e s p e c t t o t h e pre- sumed o r i n f e r r e d f a c t by having s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d o t h e r f a c t s . Thus, i n e f f e c t they r e q u i r e t h e defendant t o p r e s e n t some evidence c o n t e s t i n g t h e otherwise presumed o r i n f e r r e d f a c t . See Barnes v. United S t a t e s , 412 U S 387, 846 n.11, 37 L Ed 2d 380, 93 S C t 2357 (1973). Since they s h i f t t h e production bur- den t o t h e defendant, t h e s e devices must s a t i s f y c e r t a i n due process requirements. See e.g., Barnes v . United S t a t e s , supra; Turner v. United S t a t e s , 396 U S 398, 24 L Ed 2d 610, 90 S C t 642 (1970). " I n each of t h e s e cases, however, t h e u l t i - mate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remained on t h e prosecution. * * *" 4 2 1 U.S. 703, n. 31. Our inquiry t h e r e f o r e i s twofold: (1) Whether t h e inferences and presumptions i n question s a t i s f y t h e due process standards announced i n Barnes; and ( 2 ) whether t h e cumulative e f f e c t of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s s h i f t e d t h e u l t i m a t e burden of persuasion on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t t o defendant. The Supreme Court i n Barnes considered t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e proven f a c t and t h e i n f e r r e d o r presumed f a c t t h a t i s required by due process and concluded: "* * * What has been e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c a s e s , however, i s a t l e a s t t h i s : t h a t i f a s t a t u t o r y inference submitted t o t h e jury a s s u f f i c i e n t t o support conviction s a t i s f i e s t h e reasonable doubt standard ( t h a t is, t h e evidence necessary t o invoke t h e inference i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r a r a t i o n a l juror t o f i n d t h e i n f e r r e d f a c t beyond a reasonable doubt) a s well as t h e more-likely- than-not standard, then it c l e a r l y accords with due process. " Barnes, 4 1 2 U.S. 843. The presumptions t h a t an unlawful a c t was done with unlawful i n t e n t , and t h a t a person intends t h e ordinary consequences of h i s voluntary a c t , have been a p a r t of Montana law s i n c e 1895. This Court has previously approved t h e use of t h e s e presumptions i n criminal cases on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t . S t a t e v. Caryl, (1975), 168 Mont. 4 1 4 , 426, 543 P.2d 389; S t a t e v. McLeod, (1957), 131 Mont. 478, 489, 311 P.2d 400, 407. See a l s o , S t a t e v. Jones, (1963), 143 Mont. 155, 181, 387 P.2d 913. The conclusions drawn through t h e use of t h e s e presumptions a r e generally f a i r and reasonable ways t o a s c e r t a i n i n t e n t , which, of course, can never be proved d i r e c t l y . The i n s t r u c t i o n s emphasized t h a t t h e "unlawful a c t " proven must have been voluntary. W e b e l i e v e a r a t i o n a l juror would f i n d beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t a voluntary, unlawful a c t was done with an unlawful i n t e n t , and with an i n t e n t t o cause i t s ordinary consequences. he inference of knowledge o r purpose i n a d e l i b e r a t e homicide from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e accused committed a homicide and t h a t t h e r e a r e no circumstances of excuse, j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r m i t i g a t i o n i s contained i n s e c t i o n 95-3004(2), R.C.M. 1947. his s t a t u t e was passed i n 1973, a t t h e same t i m e t h e criminal code introduced t h e mental elements of knowledge and purpose. I n order t o q u a l i f y f o r t h e i n s t r u c t e d inference t h a t defendant acted purposely o r knowingly, t h e S t a t e was s t i l l required t o prove: (1) A voluntary a c t ; (2) causing t h e death of t h e victim; and ( 3 ) absence of circumstances of excuse, j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r mitigation. The i n s t r u c t i o n empha- s i z e d t h e death must have been " v o l u n t a r i l y caused by t h e accused". This inference c l e a r l y comports with t h e "rea- sonable doubt" standard. Defendant argues t h e cumulative e f f e c t of these pre- sumptions and inferences s h i f t s t h e burden of proof on t h e i n t e n t i s s u e t o defendant. I t i s well e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t challenged jury i n s t r u c t i o n s must be viewed i n t h e context of t h e e n t i r e charge. Cupp v. Naughten, (1973), 4 1 4 U.S. 1 4 1 , 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L Ed 2d 368; S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976) I Mont. , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270, 1275; S t a t e v. Bosch, (1952), 125 Mont. 566, 574, 242 P.2d 477. Defendant argues t h e s e presumptions and inferences gave t h e jury t h e impression t h a t defendant must prove lack of i n t e n t . He f a i l s , however, t o consider t h a t t h e following countervailing i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a l s o given t o t h e jury: (1) That defendant denied every m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n i n every count by h i s p l e a , and t h e r e f o r e every m a t e r i a l a l l e g a - t i o n must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; ( 2 ) That defendant i s presumed t o be innocent, and h i s g u i l t must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; ( 3 ) ÿ hat t h e jury may not convict on p o s s i b i l i t i e s , conjecture o r s u r p r i s e , b u t only on evidence e s t a b l i s h i n g g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt; ( 4 ) The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e mental elements, "purposely" and "knowingly"; (5) A statement of t h e elements of t h e offenses charged, including t h e mental elements; (6) A re-emphasis ( i n t h e "Additional I n s t r u c t i o n s " ) of t h e mental s t a t e s required f o r each offense, and a re- emphasis of t h e requirement of a voluntary a c t ; and (7) Warnings t h a t t h e presumptions noted may never be used t o prove t h e p a r t i c u l a r purposes t h a t a r e elements of t h e offenses of d e l i b e r a t e homicide by means of t o r t u r e and aggravated kidnapping. When read i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s can only be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t t h e S t a t e had t h e burden of proving every element of t h e offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The use of t h e presumptions and inferences merely s e t f o r t h , i n t e r m s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with Montana law, how t h e S t a t e could meet t h i s burden by proof of o b j e c t i v e f a c t s . W e a r e aware of t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n i n Oregon t h a t t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e presumption of unlawful i n t e n t a r i s i n g from an unlawful a c t c o n s t i t u t e d an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s h i f t i n g of t h e burden of proof on t h e element of i n t e n t from t h e s t a t e t o defendant. S t a t e v. Anderson, (1978), O r . , 575 P.2d 677. However, w e r e j e c t t h e rea- soning of t h a t case. I n t h a t case, u n l i k e t h i s one, "* * * t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , taken as a whole, were n o t c l e a r on t h e i s s u e s of i n t e n t o r burden of proof." Anderson, 575 P.2d 679. H e r e , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on i n t e n t and burden of proof w e r e c l e a r and t h e jury was n o t misled by them. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s c a s e , even i f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s had erroneously s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof on t h e i s s u e of i n t e n t t o defendant, w e q u e s t i o n whether r e v e r s a l would be required. Such an e r r o r could n o t have a f f e c t e d t h e j u r y ' s determination t h a t it w a s defendant who caused t h e d e a t h of t h e victim. Evidence of t h e p e r p e t r a t o r ' s i n t e n t i s overwhelming. The evidence w e d e t a i l e d i n t h e beginning of t h i s opinion about t h e cause of d e a t h , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s behavior on t h e days p r i o r t o t h e a t t a c k , and t h e f a c t s and circumstances following t h e a t t a c k , a l l show t h a t defendant a c t e d "purposely" o r "knowingly". A p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . Robert Wetzler, t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e defense t h a t i f defendant d i d t h e a c t s charged i n t h e Informa- t i o n , he s u f f e r e d from such a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t t h a t he could n o t have a c t e d "purposely" o r "knowingly". This testimony must be considered i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t D r . W e t z l e r made no i n q u i r y i n t o d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s o r s t a t e m e n t s on t h e n i g h t of t h e a t t a c k o r t h e two days immediately preceding it, although he admitted t h a t such f a c t o r s could have some bearing upon d e f e n d a n t ' s mental c a p a c i t y when t h e o f f e n s e was committed. Another p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . M. F. Gracia, and a psychologist, D r . Edmund W. Shubat, both expressed t h e opinion t h a t defendant d i d have c a p a c i t y t o a c t "purposely" o r "knowingly". Furthermore, t a k i n g i n t o account a l l t h e evidence, w e a r e convinced beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t defendant a c t e d "purposely" o r "knowingly" and t h e r e f o r e , even i f t h e r e was any e r r o r i n t h e burden of proof, it was harmless. Chapman v. C a l i f o r n i a , (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 524, 828, 17 L Ed 2d 705. Defendant goes on t o claim e r r o r because h i s i n s t r u c - t i o n s were n o t given. This argument must f a i l . ~ e f e n d a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on mental s t a t e and mental d i s e a s e and d e f e c t m i s s t a t e t h e law, and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e elements of t h e crimes charged add an element t h a t i s n o t required. W e have c a r e f u l l y examined t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s and f i n d them proper. The c o u r t ' s i n g t r u c t i o n s a s a whole c o r r e c t l y s t a t e t h e law. The next argument defendant r a i s e s i s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t forms provided t o t h e jury d i d n o t cover a l l p o s s i b l e ver- d i c t s and t h a t they amount t o s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . Defendant submitted i n s t r u c t i o n s and v e r d i c t forms which covered t h e offenses of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and unlawful r e s t r a i n t . It i s c l e a r , as s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Gray, (1968), 152 Mont. 145, 153, 447 P.2d 475,479: "* * * 'The submission of a lower o f f e n s e is j u s t i f i e d only when t h e evidence on some b a s i s would support a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e defendant is innocent of t h e higher offense and g u i l t y of t h e lower.' * * *" See also: S t a t e v. McDonald, (1915), 51 Mont. 1, 149 P. 279; S t a t e v. Baugh, (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 779. 34 St.Rep. 1315. I n t h i s c a s e t h e r e was no such evidence and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and v e r d i c t forms on t h e l e s s e r offenses w e r e properly not given. Defendant claims e r r o r i n t h a t t h e v e r d i c t forms sub- t o mitted/the jury were s p e c i a l v e r d i c t s . H e argues t h a t Montana law does n o t allow f o r s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s by t h e jury . The jury was given general v e r d i c t s asking f o r a f i n d i n g of g u i l t y o r not g u i l t y on each count. The jury w a s t o make t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i n d i n g t h a t t h e element necessary f o r t h e imposition of t h e d e a t h penalty was present. Under those c i r c ~ m s t a n c e s , t h i s a d d i t i o n a l f a c t u a l finding does not f a l l i n t o t h e v i c e of a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t . I t does not r e q u i r e a f a c t determination which could be used t o undermine t h e general v e r d i c t . Thus, t h e v e r d i c t forms were permissible. Defendant claims p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r i n t h e c o u r t ' s permitting t h e audience t o tape record t h e S t a t e ' s closing argument t o t h e jury. He contends t h i s prejudiced h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . H i s argument i s t h a t t h e jury was influenced by t h e argument being recorded because t h e jury could believe, under those circumstances, t h e r e was something worth preserving. I n h i s b r i e f , defendant admits t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o h i b i t t h e recording of t h e argument v i o l a t e s no s t a t u t e . H e c i t e s no case l a w t h a t i s violated. He admits t h e Canons of J u d i c i a l Ethics, which have been adopted by t h i s Court, do not s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l with t h i s question. He does say t h a t t h e Code of J u d i c i a l Conduct p r o h i b i t s such recording. However, t h a t Code has n o t been adopted i n Montana. Thus, no l a w o r r u l e of t h i s Court was v i o l a t e d by t h e audience's tape recording t h e argument. A s t o defendant's argument t h a t it prejudiced h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l , we f i n d no m e r i t i n t h a t claim. The r u l e is t h a t before a judgment i n a criminal case w i l l be reversed, prejudice must be shown. S t a t e v. T o t t e r d e l l , (1959) , 135 Mont. 56, 336 P.2d 696. The defendant must demonstrate prejudice from t h e record. S t a t e v. Schleining, (1965), 146 Mont. 1, 4 0 3 P.2d 625. Defendant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by t h e recordings of t h e closing argument. H i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l was n e i t h e r denied nor invaded. Defendant a l l e g e s e r r o r because he had t o make an out- of-order presentation of h i s case-in-chief during t h e s t a t e ' s case-in-chief. The usual order of t r i a l may be departed from i n t h e proper case. Section 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947 s t a t e s : "When t h e s t a t e of t h e pleading r e q u i r e s it, o r i n any o t h e r case, f o r good reasons, and i n d i s c r e t i o n of t h e court, t h e order prescribed i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n may be departed from." W e note t h a t t h e a r t f u l phrase "good cause" i s not used, r a t h e r t h e r e must be "good reasons" f o r t h e departure of t h e usual order of t h e t r i a l . Defendant's d i f f i c u l t y arose from t h e f a c t t h e F B I agents who w e r e t o t e s t i f y i n t h i s case w e r e scheduled t o t e s t i f y i n s e v e r a l o t h e r cases i n other s t a t e s and t h e judge would not r e q u i r e them t o remain f o r t h e duration of t h e t r i a l , nearly t h r e e weeks, unless t h e r e was good reason t o keep them. The c o u r t requested defendant make an o f f e r of proof t o show why t h e s e persons should not be released from t h e i r subpoenas a f t e r defendant opened h i s case-in-chief. Defendant argued t h a t no reasonable o f f e r of proof could be made u n t i l the completion of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief. This may w e l l have been t r u e p r i o r t o enactment of t h e l i b e r a l discovery procedures i n t h e Code of Criminal Pro- cedure. I n the present case, however, defendant had examined t h e F B I reports; he had examined t h e physical evidence; and he had a l i s t of t h e proposed e x h i b i t s t h a t were t o be p u t i n t o evidence. I f t h e r e was some reason t o r e q u i r e t h e FBI agents t o remain, defendant would know it a t the time of t r i a l . N o showing of such need was made and the judge i n a proper exercise of h i s d i s c r e t i o n and f o r good reasons allowed t h e agents t o leave a f t e r they had t e s t i f i e d as p a r t of t h e defendant's case-in-chief, i n t h e middle of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief. Defendant f u r t h e r a l l e g e s e r r o r because h i s expert on mental d e f e c t o r disease was not allowed t o be present during t h e S t a t e ' s presentation of its r e b u t t a l experts on t h i s m a t t e r . E a r l i e r i n t h e t r i a l , defendant sought a r u l i n g from t h e c o u r t t h a t a l l witnesses be excluded from t h e courtroom when o t h e r witnesses w e r e t e s t i f y i n g . The c o u r t granted t h i s motion except t h e c o u r t s a i d t h a t t h e exclusionary r u l e d i d n o t extend t o r e b u t t a l witnesses. Defendant's e x p e r t was a witness i n h i s case-in-chief. A f t e r defendant r e s t e d , he sought permission from t h e c o u r t t o have t h i s e x p e r t p r e s e n t i n t h e courtroom d u r i n g t h e testimony of t h e S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t s . The c o u r t r e f u s e d t o g r a n t such permission. Defendant a l l e g e s t h i s was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n which prejudiced defendant. W e a r e unconviced t h e c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . Defendant's e x p e r t was a witness i n h i s c a s e t o whom t h e exclusionary r u l e a p p l i e d . The f a c t t h a t defendant wanted t o u s e him as a r e b u t t a l witness d i d n o t except him from t h e exclusionary r u l e defendant had asked t h e c o u r t t o invoke. Nor do w e see t h a t defendant was prejudiced by t h e c o u r t ' s a c t i o n . The S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t s ' testimony concerned t h e r e p o r t they had made on d e f e n d a n t ' s mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . These w e r e r e p o r t s t h a t t h e defense had been sup- p l i e d with, a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-505(5), R.C.M. 1947. The S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s f i n i s h e d a t t h e end of t h e day and d e f e n d a n t ' s r e b u t t a l began t h e n e x t day. There was t i m e then t o inform t h e defense e x p e r t of any a d d i t i o n a l informa- t i o n n o t i n t h e r e p o r t made by t h e s e e x p e r t s , and t o p r e p a r e r e b u t t a l testimony. Under those circumstances, defendant was n o t prejudiced. Defendant argues t h e evidence is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e v e r d i c t s rendered a g a i n s t him. H e s p e c i f i c a l l y argues t h a t t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s t h a t defendant committed d e l i b e r a t e homicide by t o r t u r e and t h a t a s a r e s u l t of her aggravated kidnapping, Lana Harding died. I n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k , (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605, t h i s Court set f o r t h i t s p o s i t i o n i n d e t e r - mining questions of s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence: "As t h i s Court has held many t i m e s over, t h e jury is t h e f a c t finding body i n our system of jurisprudence, and i t s d e c i s i o n is con- t r o l l i n g . The jury is f r e e t o consider a l l t h e evidence presented and t o pick and choose which of t h e witnesses it wishes t o believe. I f s u f f i c i e n t testimony was introduced, a s w e l l a s e x h i b i t s t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s find- i n g s , then its conclusion w i l l n o t be d i s - turbed unless it is apparent t h e r e was a c l e a r misunderstanding by t h e jury o r t h a t t h e r e was a misrepresentation made t o t h e jury. " I n t h i s case, t h e evidence presented t o t h e jury d i d n o t mislead them, nor was any of it ever misrepresented t o them. The evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e j u r y ' s finding t h a t Lana Harding w a s k i l l e d by means of t o r t u r e and t h a t she died as a r e s u l t of her aggravated kidnapping by defendant. The r u l e i s t h a t i f s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i s found t o support t h e v e r d i c t , it w i l l stand. S t a t e v. White, (1965), 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761; S t a t e v. Stoddard, (1966), 147 blont. 402, 4 1 2 P. 2d 827. Such i s t h e c a s e here. Defendant a l l e g e s e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l . He contends he was e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l due t o i n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence. He f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e c.umulation of e r r o r s committed i n h i s t r i a l denied him a f a i r t r i a l . Since we have held t h a t t h e evidence was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n defendant's conviction, w e f u r t h e r hold t h e c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n denying t h e motion f o r new t r i a l . W e f i n d no m e r i t i n defendant's argument on cumulative e r r o r , Since we have held t h a t no s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s w e r e committed, w e do not believe t h e d o c t r i n e of cumulative e r r o r applies. W e a r e unconvinced t h a t t h e concepts of "harmless error" and "cumulative e r r o r " a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d . "Harmless e r r o r " r e f e r s t o technical e r r o r s , which do not r e q u i r e reversal. S t a t e v. Gallagher, (1968), 151 Mont. 501, 445 P.2d 45. "Cumulative e r r o r " r e f e r s t o a number of e r r o r s which prejudice defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v. Meidinger, (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 502 P.2d 58. Having found t h a t no s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r s w e r e committed by t h e t r i a l court, w e hold t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of cumulative e r r o r does not apply and a new t r i a l w i l l not be ordered. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred by basing its judgment and sentence upon erroneous findings, conclu- sions, sentence and order. X e f u r t h e r argues t h e death penalty imposed a s a sentence by t h e t r i a l c o u r t is unconsti- t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and t h e 1972 Montana Constitution. A s t o t h e e r r o r s i n t h e c o u r t ' s findings, conclusion, sentence and order, t h e e r r o r s r e f e r r e d t o a r e e s s e n t i a l l y c l e r i c a l e r r o r s i n t h e body of t h a t document. A mistaken c i t a t i o n of subsection l e t t e r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-105, R.C.M. 1947, which was caused by t h e amendment which numbered t h e s e c t i o n , i s an example. This document is not i n e r r o r with r e s p e c t t o t h e f a c t u a l o r l e g a l b a s i s of its findings. his Court f i n d s no prejudice i n t h e c l e r i c a l e r r o r s . Defendant was sentenced t o death f o r h i s conviction of t h e offenses of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated kidnapping. This sentence was imposed by v i r t u e of sections 94-5-105 and 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947. A t t h e t i m e of t h e crimes, these s t a t u t e s reads "94-5-105. Sentence O f Death For Deliberate Homicide. " ( 1 ) When a defendant i s convicted of t h e offense of d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e c o u r t s h a l l impose a sentence of death i n t h e following circumstances, unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances: " ( a ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by a person serving a sentence of imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e prison; o r " ( b ) The defendant was previously convicted of another d e l i b e r a t e homicide; o r " ( c ) The v i c t i m of t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was a peace o f f i c e r k i l l e d while performing h i s duty; o r " ( d ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by means of t o r t u r e ; o r " ( e ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide w a s committed by a per- son lying i n w a i t o r ambush; o r " ( f ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed a s a p a r t of a scheme o r operation which, i f completed, would r e s u l t i n t h e death of more than one person." "94-5-304. Sentence of Death f o r Aggravated Kidnapping. "A Court s h a l l impose t h e sentence of death f o l - lowing conviction of aggravated kidnapping i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e criminal conduct unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances." These s e c t i o n s w e r e enacted i n 1973, and became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1 9 7 4 . I n 1974, s e c t i o n 94-5-304 w a s amended by Ch. 126, S 1 , Laws of 1974, t o read: " 94-5-304. Sentence of death f o r aggravated kidnapping. A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e sentence of death following conviction of aggravated kid- napping i f it f i n d s t h a t t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s t h e r e s u l t of t h e criminal conduct." This amendment d e l e t e d t h e phrase: "unless t h e r e a r e m i t i - gating circumstances." The amendment had an e f f e c t i v e d a t e of March 11, 1974. A t t h e time of t h e death of Lana Harding, t h i s amendment was n o t i n e f f e c t . Therefore, our a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s e death penalty s t a t u t e s w i l l concern them a s they e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e crimes involved i n t h i s case. he death penalty s t a t u t e s i n question here were adopted i n response t o Furman v. Georgia, (1972), 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L Ed 2d 346. In Furman, t h e Supreme Court reversed and vacated death sentences imposed on t h r e e de- fendants. I t was a per curiam opinion, with f i v e s e p a r a t e concurrences and f o u r s e p a r a t e d i s s e n t s . The f i v e concurring opinions each a s s e r t e d d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s f o r f i n d i n g t h e s t a t u t e s i n question u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e f a t a l flaw i n t h e d e a t h penalty, under t h e concurring opinions of Furman, w a s t h e absence of c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e sanction. The cumulation of majority opinions i n Furman l e d t o considerable confusion among t h e s e v e r a l s t a t e s ' l e g i s l a t u r e s which d e s i r e d t o r e t a i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v i a b l e death penalty, i.e., a death penalty t h a t was being imposed con- s i s t e n t l y and n o t a r b i t r a r i l y . I n some j u r i s d i c t i o n s Furman was read a s r e q u i r i n g a s t r i c t l y mandatory death sentence f o r c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of proven crimes. I n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s , Furman was read a s a t t a c k i n g unbridled d i s c r e t i o n r a t h e r than d i s c r e t i o n per s e . These s t a t e s passed s t a t u t e s t o c o n t r o l t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e sentencing a u t h o r i t y . These s t a t u t e s allowed t h e death penalty t o be imposed only when unmitigated aggravating circumstances were present. I n 1976, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court considered t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of mandatory death penalty s t a t u t e s . Woodson v. North Carolina, (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L Ed 2d 944. The s t a t u t e before t h e Court was North C a r o l i n a ' s death penalty s t a t u t e . I t provided a death sentence f o r a l l persons convicted of f i r s t degree murder. The Supreme Court held t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as v i o l a t i v e of t h e Eighth and Fourteenth ~rnendments. I n two l a t e r cases, t h e Supreme Court a l s o h e l d mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Coker v. Georgia, (1977), 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L Ed 2d 982; Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, (1977), 431 U.S. 633, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L Ed 2d 637. The problem w i t h mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s , according t o t h e Court, was : "* * * it i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e c a p i t a l sen- tencing d e c i s i o n allow f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whatever m i t i g a t i n g circumstances may be rele- v a n t t o e i t h e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n d e r o r par- t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . * * *" Harry Roberts, 431 U.S. 637. The d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s under a t t a c k i n t h e i n s t a n t case, s e c t i o n s 94-5-105 and 94-5-304, a s they e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e crimes, a r e n o t mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s . Thus, they can withstand s c r u t i n y under t h e d e c i s i o n s of Woodson, Coker, and Harry Roberts because they allow f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. Also i n 1976, t h e Supreme Court considered t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l i t y of t h o s e d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s t h a t c o n t r o l l e d t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e sentencing a u t h o r i t y . Unlike t h e i r mandatory c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e Court upheld t h e s e s t a t u t e s . Gregg v. Georgia, (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L Ed 2d 859; P r o f f i t t v. F l o r i d a , (1976), 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 4 9 L Ed 2d 913; and, J u r e k v. Texas, (1976), 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L Ed 2d 929. I n Gregg t h e Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Furman mandates t h a t where d i s c r e t i o n i s a£- forded a sentencing body on a m a t t e r s o grave as t h e determination of whether a human l i f e should be taken o r spared, t h a t d i s c r e t i o n must be s u i t a b l y d i r e c t e d and l i m i t e d s o a s t o minimize t h e r i s k of wholly a r b i t r a r y and capricous a c t i o n . " 428 U.S. 189. The Montana s t a t u t e s defendant c h a l l e n g e s a r e designed t o c o n t r o l t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e sentencing a u t h o r i t y . These s t a t u t e s a r e i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e ground between unbending mandatory death sentences and unbridled d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e imposition of t h e death penalty. I n i t s d e c i s i o n s of Gregg, Jurek and P r o f f i t t , t h e united S t a t e s Supreme Court seems t o have e s t a b l i s h e d t h r e e general criteria which a r e r e q u i s i t e t o a v a l i d death penalty s t a t u t o r y scheme. F i r s t , t h e r e must be a t l e a s t one s t a t u t o r y aggravating circumstance before a death sentence may be considered. Second, t h e defense must be afforded t h e opportunity t o bring before t h e sentencing body a t a s e p a r a t e sentencing hearing any m i t i g a t i n g circumstances r e l a t i n g t o t h e indi- v i d u a l defendant. Third, t h e r e must be a v a i l a b l e prompt j u d i c i a l review of t h e sentencing d e c i s i o n by a c o u r t of state-wide j u r i s d i c t i o n , providing a means t o promote t h e evenhanded, r a t i o n a l and c o n s i s t e n t imposition of death sentences under t h e law. Sections 94-5-105 and 94-5-304 s a t i s f y t h e f i r s t c r i - t e r i o n set f o r t h above. Under s e c t i o n 94-5-105, t h e death penalty cannot be imposed unless one of s i x aggravating circumstances i s found by t h e trier of f a c t t o e x i s t . Here, it was found t h a t defendant committed d e l i b e r a t e homicide by means of t o r t u r e . Section 94-5-105 (1) (d) , R.C.M. 1947. Under 94-5-304, t h e death sentence cannot be imposed unless it i s found t h e kidnap v i c t i m died a s a r e s u l t of t h e aggra- vated kidnapping. Such a f i n d i n g was made i n t h i s case by the jury. The second c r i t e r i o n , t h a t m i t i g a t i n g circumstances be reviewed a t a s e p a r a t e sentencing hearing, i s s a t i s f i e d by two s e p a r a t e s t a t u t o r y provisions: F i r s t , both death penalty s t a t u t e s provide t h a t t h e c o u r t " s h a l l " impose a sentence of death "unless t h e r e a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances". Defendant urges t h e "unless" c l a u s e may purport t o circumscribe t h e sentencing judge's authority, but there are no guiding standards nor sources of information provided for. This argument ignores the second statutory provision relevant here--that is, the presentence investigation report to be delivered to and considered by the sentencing court in felony cases. Section 95-2204, R.C.M. 1947, provides the report shall contain information respecting "the charac- teristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities of the defendant; his criminal record and social history; the circumstances of the offense; * * * and the harm to the victim, his immediate family, and the community." The report provides the sentencing authority with whatever circumstances may exist in mitigation of the defendant's conduct. Reading the two provisions together, the sentencing court is required to consider mitigating circumstances and is required to consider the presentence investigation report which must contain any matters relevant to mitigation. In addition, all sentencing courts are directed by section 95- 2201, R.C.M. 1947, to perform their sentencing functions "to the end that persons convicted of a crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs and potentialities". This mandates the imposition of sentences which are not disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Finally, the defendant is autho- rized to seek a hearing to present to the court his testimony and evidence in mitigation of punishment. Prompt judicial review of death sentences is provided for by appeal to this Court as well as review to the Sentence Review Division. This Court determines the legality of the sentence imposed, State v. Simtob, (1969), 154 Mont. 286, 462 p.2d 873, w h i l e t h e Sentence Review Division i s designed t o determine t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e sentence with re- s p e c t t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l offender and p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n s e . This s a t i s f i e s t h e t h i r d c r i t e r i a . Although Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme i s u n l i k e t h o s e approved by t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Gregg, P r o f f i t t , and J u r e k , w e see no s u b s t a n t i v e f a i l u r e of Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme t o comply w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards. Our system i s n e i t h e r wholly mandatory nor wholly d i s c r e t i o n a r y . There a r e p r e c i s e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e - ments f o r f i n d i n g aggravating and m i t i g a t i n g circumstances, and a procedure f o r f l u s h i n g o u t t h e f a c t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o such circumstances. There i s a p p e l l a t e review a t two l e v e l s , i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e sentence i s both l e g a l and p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e n a t u r e and c l a s s of c r i m e . I n s h o r t , w e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Montana s t a t u t o r y scheme i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e of t h e crimes h e r e i n , a f f o r d s defendant t h e procedural safeguards necessary t o p r o t e c t h i s s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s t o be sentenced without a r b i t r a r i n e s s o r c a p r i c e . Therefore, w e hold t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h e United S t a t e s c o n s i t u t i o n a l requirements. They a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on t h e i r f a c e and a s a p p l i e d t o t h i s defendant. Defendant n e x t contends t h a t s h i f t i n g t h e burden of proving i n s a n i t y t o t h e defendant o f f e n d s t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Defendant relies on t h e reasoning of a colorado c a s e , S t a t e ex rel. Juhan v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1968) I 165 Cola- 253, 439 P.2d 741. P r i o r t o Juhan, t h e colorado Supreme Court had always held t h e burden was on t h e s t a t e t o d i s p r o v e a properly r a i s e d defense of i n s a n i t y beyond a reasonable doubt. The l e g i s l a t u r e subsequently passed a s t a t u t e pur- porting t o s h i f t t h e burden t o defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court i n Juhan, i n a 3-2 d e c i s i o n , held its previous decisions were i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Colorado Constitution, and t h e r e f o r e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was powerless t o vary t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l i n g by l e g i s l a t i v e enactment. Defendant's reasoning i s s i m i l a r . In 1895, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held t h a t i n t h e f e d e r a l system, t h e burden was on t h e s t a t e t o disprove i n s a n i t y beyond a rea- sonable doubt. Davis v. United S t a t e s , (1895), 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.ed. 499. Three Montana cases de- cided s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r adopted t h e Davis r u l e f o r Montana. S t a t e v . Brooks, (1899), 23 Mont. 146, 57 P. 1038; S t a t e v. Peel, (1899), 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169; S t a t e v. Felker, (1903), 27 Mont. 451, 71 P. 668. The Montana L e g i s l a t u r e i n 1925 passed Ch. 87, Laws of 1925, imposing t h e burden on defendant t o prove h i s i n s a n i t y by a preponderance of t h e evidence. Thisbecame subsection 2 of former s e c t i o n 94-119, R.C.M. 1947. The p r e s e n t s t a t u t e , passed i n 1967, i s sec- t i o n 95-503, R.C.M. 1947. Thus, t h e burden has remained on t h e defendant s i n c e 1925. Montana cases s i n c e 1925 have r e l i e d upon t h e s t a t u t e and held t h e jury should be in- s t r u c t e d t h a t defendant must prove i n s a n i t y by a prepon- derance of t h e evidence. S t a t e v. V e t t e r e , (1926), 76 f/lont. 574, 248 P. 179. The main t h r u s t of defendant's argument i s t h a t t h e o l d Montana c a s e s w e r e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and could n o t be v a r i e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ; thus ~ o n t a n a ' s s t a t u t e s have v i o l a t e d t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Montana Constitution s i n c e 1925. The problem with t h i s argument i s t h a t it assumes Brooks, Peel, and Felker were based on t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Montana Constitution. There is no mention of t h e Montana Constitution i n any of them. They merely f o l - lowed t h e r u l e announced by t h e Supreme Court i n Davis. The Supreme Court i n Leland v . Oregon, (1952), 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1 0 0 2 , 96 L.ed 1302, noted t h a t Davis "obviously estab- l i s h e s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e , b u t only t h e r u l e t o be followed i n f e d e r a l courts." S i m i l a r l y , it i s apparent t h a t Brooks, Peel and Felker w e r e not e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e f o r Montana. J u s t a s Congress could conceivably change t h e f e d e r a l r u l e s e t f o r t h i n Davis, t h e Montana L e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y had t h e power t o change t h e r u l e announced i n t h e e a r l y Montana cases. O n remand from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, t h e i s s u e before t h i s Court i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c - t i o n on mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t h e burden of proof of s t a t e of mind t o defendant. The Supreme Court d i r e c t e d us t o reconsider our e a r l y d e c i s i o n i n t h i s case i n l i g h t of Patterson v. New York, (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. I n doing s o , w e w i l l examine t h e defense of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t a s it e x i s t s under Montana law and a s applied i n t h i s case. Evidence of a defendant's mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t is admissible i n Montana criminal t r i a l s f o r two s t a t u t o r y defenses. Section 95-501(a), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "A person i s n o t responsible f o r c r i m i n a l con- duct i f a t t h e time of such conduct a s a r e s u l t of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t he is unable e i t h e r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct o r t o conform h i s conduct t o t h e requirements of law." This s e c t i o n d e f i n e s Montana's " l e g a l i n s a n i t y " defense. Section 95-503(a), R.C.M. 1947, places upon t h e defendant t h e burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s l e g a l i n s a n i t y by a pre- ponderance of t h e evidence. Defendant concedes t h e S t a t e may a l l o c a t e t o t h e defendant t h e burden of proving h i s l e g a l i n s a n i t y without v i o l a t i n g t h e United S t a t e s Constitu- t i o n . P a t t e r s o n v. New York, supra; Rivera v. Delaware, (1976), 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L Ed 2d 160; Leland v. Oregon, supra. Defendant contends, however, t h a t t h e second criminal defense involving mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t h e burden t o defendant t o d i s - prove i n t e n t , an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e crime charged. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l e g a l i n s a n i t y defense which, i f proven, excludes a defendant's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an other- wise criminal a c t , evidence of a defendant's mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t i s a l s o admissible i n Montana criminal t r i a l s I' * * * whenever it i s r e l e v a n t t o prove t h a t t h e defendant d i d o r d i d n o t have a s t a t e of mind which i s an element of t h e offense." Section 95-502, R.C.M. 1947. This s e c t i o n i s a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e "diminished capacity" defense, under which a defendant may show t h a t he s u f f e r e d from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which, although i n s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h l e g a l i n s a n i t y a s a complete defense, made him incapable of forming t h e criminal i n t e n t defined by s t a t u t e a s an element of t h e crime charged. I n 1967, when s e c t i o n 95-502, R.C.M. 1947, was enacted by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e , homicide i n Montana was divided i n t o four c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , each r e q u i r i n g a d i f f e r e n t and s p e c i f i c mental s t a t e . The i n t e n t e l e a e n t of f i r s t degree murder was d e l i b e r a t i o n , premeditation and malice afore- thought, while t h a t of second degree murder w a s malice aforethought, without d e l i b e r a t i o n o r premeditation. Sec- t i o n 94-2503, R.C.M. 1947. S t a t e v . Brooks (1967), 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 91. Voluntary manslaughter c o n s i s t e d of any unlawful k i l l i n g , without malice, upon a sudden q u a r r e l o r h e a t of passion. S e c t i o n 94-2507(1), R.C.M. 1947. Involun- t a r y manslaughter, t h e f o u r t h c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of homicide under Montana c r i m i n a l law i n 1967, d i d n o t have c r i m i n a l i n t e n t a s a s t a t u t o r y element of t h e c r i m e ; t h e i s s u e , r a t h e r , was one of c r i m i n a l negligence. S e c t i o n 94-2507(2), R.C.M. 1947. S t a t e v. Souhrada, (1949), 122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792. The diminished c a p a c i t y defense was t r a d i t i o n a l l y used t o show t h a t , due t o mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t h e defendant was unable t o form t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t which was an element of a higher degree of an o f f e n s e such a s homicide, and t h a t a lesser degree of c r i m i n a l homicide, which lacked t h a t s p e c i f i c i n t e n t a s an element of t h e c r i m e , was i n f a c t committed. See, Anno. 22 ALR3d 1228, 1238-43 (1968). Thus, under Montana law i n e f f e c t when s e c t i o n 95-502, R.C.M. 1947, was enacted, evidence of a d e f e n d a n t ' s mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t was admissible t o prove o r disprove, f o r example, t h a t , although a defendant committed an unlawful k i l l i n g with malice aforethought, he had n o t t h e c a p a c i t y t o form t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t - - d e l i b e r a t i o n o r premeditation--which was an element of f i r s t degree murder. By January 1974, when Lana Harding was kidnapped and murdered, Montana had adopted i t s p r e s e n t c r i m i n a l code. The new code abolished a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s between f i r s t and second degree murder. Malice aforethought and premeditation a r e no longer elements of t h e c r i m i n a l homicide o f f e n s e . The i n t e n t element of t h e crime of homicide under p r e s e n t Montana law i s merely "purposely, knowingly, o r n e g l i g e n t l y " causing t h e d e a t h of another human being. S e c t i o n 94-5-101, R.C.M. 1947. There a r e t h r e e types of c r i m i n a l homicide. Defendant was charged w i t h , and convicted o f , d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a c r i m i n a l homicide committed purposely o r knowingly. S e c t i o n 94-5-102 (1) ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947. Mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a lesser o f f e n s e , a l s o r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e defendant commit t h e c r i m i n a l homicide purposely o r knowingly, b u t t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide be committed under t h e i n f l u - ence of extreme mental o r emotional stress f o r which t h e r e i s a reasonable excuse. S e c t i o n 94-5-103(1), R.C.M. 1947. The t h i r d type of c r i m i n a l homicide, n e g l i g e n t homicide, i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f a c t s shown a t t r i a l . Because t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of both d e l i b e r a t e homicide and m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide r e q u i r e proof by t h e S t a t e of t h e i d e n t i c a l mental element--purposely o r knowingly--there was no lesser degree of c r i m i n a l homicide of which defendant could have been convicted upon proof t h a t he was unable t o form t h e mental s t a t e r e q u i r e d i n d e l i b - e r a t e homicide. The S t a t e concludes t h a t , because a l l of t h e charges r e q u i r e d a showing of purposeful o r knowing conduct, t h e s e c t i o n 95-502 defense of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t negating t h e a b i l i t y t o form a purposeful o r knowing i n t e n t was a complete, r a t h e r than a p a r t i a l , defense and a s such merged w i t h t h e i n s a n i t y defense of s e c t i o n 95-501. W e do n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e diminished c a p a c i t y and i n s a n i t y defenses w e r e n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l . The p r e s c r i b e d mental s t a t e of "purposely o r knowinglyv a p p l i e s t o each element of t h e c r i m e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. S e c t i o n 94-2-103(1) and ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. To be g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e r e f o r e , one must e i t h e r have t h e purpose t o k i l l o r know t h a t it was highly probable t h a t h i s a c t i o n s would r e s u l t i n t h e death of another human being. While l e g a l i n s a n i t y would have completely exon- e r a t e d defendant from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s criminal con- duct, t h e diminished capacity defense could be used i n a criminal homicide case t o show, f o r example, " * * * t h a t although defendant knew t h e nature and q u a l i t y of t h e a c t ( t h e a s s a u l t * * *) and knew t h a t it was wrong" and s o w a s n o t i r r e s p o n s i b l e under t h e l e g a l i n s a n i t y t e s t , "he lacked mental capacity t o form t h e i n t e n t t o k i l l * * *". Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting t h e Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L . J . 959, 979-80 (1948). A defendant then, due t o mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t precluding him from forming t h e i n t e n t t o commit criminal homicide, might be found g u i l t y of t h e lesser included offense of aggravated a s s a u l t . See, S t a t e v. Booth, (1977), 30 0r.App. 351, 567 P.2d 559, Defendant maintains t h e S t a t e w a s required t o prove " * * * t h a t defendant had, and could have had, a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which i s an element of t h e offense", and t h a t by making diminished capacity an a f f i r m a t i v e defense, t h e t r i a l judge u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t e d t o defendant t h e burden of disproving an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e offenses charged. "* * * t h e Due Process Clause p r o t e c t s t h e accused a g a i n s t conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every f a c t neces- s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime with which he i s charged." I n r e Winship, (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S . C t . 1068, 25 L Ed 2d 368. W e must t h e r e f o r e analyze Montana's d e l i b e r a t e homicide s t a t u t e t o determine i f a defendant's lack of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , and h i s r e s u l t i n g a b i l i t y t o purposely o r know- i n g l y cause t h e death of another person, i s a f a c t necessary t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime charged. Patterson v. New York, supra. I n Montana, a person commits t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f he purposely o r knowingly causes t h e death of another human being. Sections 94-5-102 (1) ( a ) , 94-5-101 (1) , R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t u t o r i l y defined elements of t h e of- fense, each of which t h e S t a t e must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a r e t h e r e f o r e causing t h e death of another human being with t h e knowledge t h a t you a r e causing o r with t h e purpose t o cause t h e d e a t h of t h a t human being. A person a c t s "with knowledge" o r "knowingly" " * * * with r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of conduct described by a s t a t u t e defining an o f f e n s e when he i s aware t h a t it is highly probable t h a t such r e s u l t w i l l be caused by h i s conduct. * * *" Section 94-2-101(27), R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o prove t h e defendant does n o t s u f f e r from mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which would prevent t h e defendant from doing t h e a c t purposely o r knowingly. Because s a n i t y o r lack of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t is n o t an element included i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of any of t h e crimes charged a g a i n s t defendant, t h e S t a t e may r e l y upon t h e r e b u t t a b l e presumption t h a t t h e defendant was sane when t h e offense was committed. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L Ed 2d 508; s e e , P a t t e r s o n v. New York, 432 U.S. 212-216. The s a n i t y presumption i s a presumption which a l l t h e s t a t e s employ i n criminal trials. See, H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder - a s - a Criminal Defense, (1954), pp. 214-215, and cases c o l l e c t e d t h e r e i n ; Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. a t 799. Without a presumption t h a t every- one i s sane and capable of committing crimes, " * * * t h e government would always be under t h e n e c e s s i t y of adducing a f f i r m a t i v e evidence of t h e s a n i t y of t h e accused. But a requirement of t h a t c h a r a c t e r would s e r i o u s l y delay and embarrass t h e enforcement of t h e laws a g a i n s t crime, and i n most cases be unneccessary. * * *" Davis v. United S t a t e s , (1895), 160 U.S. 469, 486, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.ed. 499. The t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury defendant w a s presumed t o have been sane a t t h e t i m e t h e o f f e n s e s were committed. Defendant himself i n h i s requested i n s t r u c t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t "Every man i s presumed t o be sane, t h a t is, t o be without mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t * * * ." The presumption of s a n i t y d i d n o t s h i f t t o defendant t h e burden of disproving a f a c t necessary t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime charged. "* * * To recognize a t a l l a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance does n o t r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e t o prove i t s nonexistence i n each case i n which t h e f a c t i s p u t i n i s s u e * * * . " * * * Proof of t h e nonexistence of a l l a f f i r m a t i v e defenses has never been c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l l y required * * *." P a t t e r s o n v. New York, 432 U.S. 209, 210. The s e c t i o n 95-502,diminished capacity d e f e n s e , i s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense. Section 94-2-103(6), R.C.M. 1947. To r e b u t t h e presumptions of s a n i t y and c a p a b i l i t y of forming a purposeful o r knowing i n t e n t , a defendant may admit evi- dence r e l e v a n t t o " * * * prove t h a t he d i d n o t have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which i s an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e offense charged. I' Section 95-503 (b) (2) , R.C.M. 1947. These s e c t i o n s do n o t d e f i n e t h e standard of proof necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s a f f i r m a t i v e defense, and n e i t h e r s e c t i o n 95-502 nor s e c t i o n 95-503(b)(2) has been i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Court. W e hold t h a t , t o prove a s e c t i o n 95-502 defense, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t he lacked t h e a b i l i t y , due t o mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , t o form t h a t criminal mental s t a t e which is defined by s t a t u t e a s an element of t h e crime with which he i s charged. P l a c i n g on a defendant t h e burden of proving t h e diminished c a p a c i t y defense does n o t offend " * * * 'some p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e s o rooted i n t h e t r a d i t i o n s and con- s c i e n c e of our people a s t o be ranked as fundamental.' * * *" S p e i s e r v. Randall, (1958), 357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L Ed 2d 1460. Several j u r i s d i c t i o n s do n o t even allow diminished c a p a c i t y a s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense. See, S t a t e v. Doss, (1977), 116 Ariz. 156, 568 P.2d 1054; Bethea v. United S t a t e s , (App.D.C. 1976), 365 A.2d 64; c a s e s c o l - l e c t e d i n 22 ALR3d 1228, 1235-1238. Indeed, i n t h e s o l e opinion i n which t h e Supreme Court considered whether a t r i a l c o u r t must i n s t r u c t j u r o r s t h a t they should consider evidence of diminished c a p a c i t y , t h e Court held t h a t t h i s was a m a t t e r of p e c u l i a r l y l o c a l concern e n t r u s t e d t o t h e l o c a l c o u r t s . "* * * For t h i s Court t o f o r c e t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia t o adopt such a [diminished c a p a c i t y ] requirement f o r c r i m i n a l trials would involve a fundamental change i n t h e common law theory of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " F i s h e r v. United S t a t e s , (1946), 328 U.S. 463, 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318. 90 L.ed. 1382. (Bracketed m a t e r i a l added.) Because p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n a s t o s u b t l e g r a d a t i o n s of mental impairment i s highly s u b j e c t i v e and n o t w i t h i n t h e common experience of t h e layman j u r o r , t h e S t a t e may i n f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e a defendant t o convince t h e jury of h i s diminished c a p a c i t y by a preponderance of t h e evidence. The f a c t t h a t p s y c h i a t r y is a developing and, a t pre- s e n t , i n e x a c t s c i e n c e has long been noted by t h e c o u r t s . See, Greenwood v. United S t a t e s , (1956), 350 U.S. 366, 76 S.Ct. 410, 100 L.ed. 412; Warhlich v. Arizona, ( 9 t h C i r . 1973), 479 F.2d 1137; Bethea v. United S t a t e s , supra. "The science of psychiatry i s a t most an educated guess a s t o t h e c e r t a i n t y of human behavior, which cannot be predicted with any absoluteness. * * *" People v. Del Guidice, (1973), 345 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344. I n r e j e c t i n g t h e diminished capacity defense, c o u r t s have a l s o compared diminished capacity with o t h e r defenses and noted : " * * * u n l i k e t h e notion of p a r t i a l o r r e l a t i v e i n s a n i t y , conditions such a s i n t o x i - c a t i o n , medication, epilepsy, infancy, o r s e n i l i t y a r e , i n varying degrees, s u s c e p t i b l e t o q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o r o b j e c t i v e demonstration, and t o l a y understanding. * * *" Bethea v. United S t a t e s , 365 A.2d 88. See, Wahlrich v. Arizona, supra; S t a t e v. Doss, supra. The myriad problems with allowing t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of p s y c h i a t r i c testimony t o determine criminal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e discussed i n Ennis & Litwack, Pyschiatry and t h e Pre- -- sumption - of Expertise: Flipping Coins i n t h e Courtroom, 62 -- Cal. L.Rev. 693, 737 (1974). Despite t h e p o t e n t i a l problems of proof i n allowing t h e diminished capacity a f f i r m a t i v e defense, and d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a s t a t e very l i k e l y is n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y re- quired t o even allow diminished capacity a s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense, Montana does allow t h e defense. While t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e was w i l l i n g t o recognize diminished capacity: " * * * a s an exculpatory * * * circumstance a f f e c t i n g t h e degree of c u l p a b i l i t y * * * it was w i l l i n g t o do s o only i f t h e f a c t s making o u t t h e defense were e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e de- fendant with s u f f i c i e n t c e r t a i n t y . The S t a t e was i t s e l f unwilling t o undertake t o e s t a b l i s h t h e absence of those f a c t s beyond reasonable doubt, perhaps f e a r i n g t h a t proof would be t o o d i f f i c u l t and t h a t too many persons de- serving treatment a s murderers would escape t h a t punishment i f t h e evidence need merely r a i s e a reasonable doubt about t h e defend- a n t ' s [diminished capacity] . * * *" P a t t e r s o n v. New York, 432 U . S . 207. I n t h i s case, t h e S t a t e meticulously proved t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated kidnap- ping crimes beyond any reasonable doubt, based on a l l t h e evidence including t h e evidence of defendant's a l l e g e d mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . The S t a t e , c o n s i s t e n t with t h e Leland and Rivera cases, could then c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e f u s e t o s u s t a i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e defense of diminished capacity unless defendant proved t h a t defense by a preponderance of t h e evidence. The i n s t r u c t i o n s given by t h e c o u r t c l e a r l y required t h e S t a t e t o prove every element of t h e offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt and more than gave defendant t h e b e n e f i t of Montana law on t h e diminished capacity defense burden of proof. I n I n s t r u c t i o n 53 t h e j u r o r s were t o l d t h a t , before considering t h e diminished capacity defense, they were t o " * * * f i r s t determine from t h e evidence i n t h e case beyond a reasonable doubt whether t h e defendant d i d do t h e a c t s charged a g a i n s t him i n t h e Information." The c o u r t s e p a r a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t t o f i n d defendant g u i l t y of any of t h e offenses charged, they must f i r s t f i n d t h a t defendant " * * * committed t h e a c t o r a c t s charged v o l u n t a r i l y , while having with regard t o each element con- tained i n t h e law defining t h e offense one of t h e mental s t a t e s contained i n t h e s a i d d e f i n i t i o n " . ( I n s t r u c t i o n 2 9 . ) The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t only i f it found beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t defendant d i d any of t h e a c t s charged a g a i n s t him i n t h e Information should they then consider "whether o r n o t he could have had t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e f o r t h e a c t o r a c t s which you have found he committed." ( I n s t r u c t i o n 53.) ~ l t h o u g h t h e c o u r t i n I n s t r u c t i o n 53 i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o defendant's burden of proof f o r h i s l e g a l in- s a n i t y defense, nowhere i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f d i d t h e c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t t h e jury a s t o what burden of proof defendant had t o s a t i s f y t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he could n o t form a mental s t a t e of "purposely" o r "knowingly" due t o mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ( t h e diminished capacity defense). It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , however, t h a t "* * * a s i n g l e i n s t r u c - t i o n i s n o t viewed i n a r t i f i c i a l i s o l a t i o n , b u t must be viewed i n t h e context of t h e o v e r a l l charge." Cupp v. Naughten, (1973), 4 1 4 U.S. 1 4 1 , 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L Ed 2d 368. I f a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s considered a s a whole f a i r l y and accurately p r e s e n t t h e c a s e t o t h e jury, t h e f a c t t h a t one i n s t r u c t i o n , standing alone, i s n o t a s f u l l a s it might have been is n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . S t a t e v. Brooks, (1967), 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 91. I n s t r u c t i o n 1 i n t h i s case made t h e jury aware of t h i s r u l e of law. " * * * you a r e t o consider a l l of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole, and a r e t o regard each i n t h e l i g h t of a l l t h e o t h e r s . " The i n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h i s case, when considered a s a whole, imposed a more l e n i e n t burden of proof on defendant than Montana law provided, because t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s impressed upon t h e jury t h a t defendant had s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d h i s diminished capacity defense i f , a f t e r considering a l l t h e evidence i n t h e case, t h e jurors e n t e r t a i n e d a reasonable doubt as t o whether defendant suffered from mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which prevented him from forming a purposeful o r knowing s t a t e of mind with r e s p e c t t o t h e offenses charged. "A person t o be g u i l t y of any of t h e offensescharged i n any of t h e seven counts charged i n t h e Information must have committed t h e a c t o r a c t s charged v o l u n t a r i l y , while having with regard t o each element contained i n t h e law d e f i n i n g t h e offense one of t h e mental s t a t e s contained i n s a i d d e f i n i t i o n . " ( I n s t r u c t i o n 29) "* * * I n order t o convict t h e defendant of t h e offense charged i n any of s a i d counts a l l of the m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s contained i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r count must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt * * *." ( I n s t r u c t i o n 6 ) "Reasonable doubt i s * * * t h a t s t a t e of t h e case which, a f t e r t h e e n t i r e comparison and consideration of a l l t h e evidence, leaves t h e minds of t h e jurors i n t h a t condition t h a t they cannot say they f e e l an abiding conviction t o a moral c e r t a i n t y of t h e t r u t h of t h e charge." ( I n s t r u c t i o n 7 ) The i n s t r u c t i o n s which were given t o t h e jury i n t h i s case not only protected defendant within t h e ambit of Montana law, but indeed posited a more l i b e r a l burden of proof than t h a t t o which defendant was e n t i t l e d . Not only d i d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s not s h i f t t o defendant t h e burden of disproving any element of t h e offenses charged, but t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , when read together, a l s o required defendant t o e s t a b l i s h h i s diminished capacity merely by r a i s i n g a reasonable doubt, r a t h e r than by proof by a preponderance of t h e evidence. I n summary, w e have examined a l l t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by defendant and f i n d no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e have f u r t h e r considered t h i s case i n l i g h t of Patterson v. New York, supra, i n accordance with t h e mandate of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court on remand, and f i n d no e r r o r . The judgment of conviction and t h e sentence of death a r e affirmed. %A Chief J ft s t i c e W e Concur: I d i s s e n t and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n d i s s e n t s h o r t l y . J u s t i c e