Title: People v. Cuadrado

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96879-Agenda 6-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
DAMARIS CUADRADO, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 21, 2005. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Damaris Cuadrado, was convicted in the circuit court
of Cook County for solicitation of murder for hire (720 ILCS
5/8-1.2(a) (West 2002)). She appealed, and the appellate court held,
inter alia: (1) when a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment is
raised during trial, after the close of the State's case and denial of a
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, an indictment will stand if
it is specific enough to apprise the defendant to allow preparation of
a defense; (2) the State's substitution of the word "procured" for the
word "solicited" in the indictment did not impede defendant's ability
to prepare a defense; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction; and (4) defendant was not deprived of the right to
confront a State's witness. 341 Ill. App. 3d 703. We allowed
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and
now affirm the appellate court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
	Defendant was indicted for solicitation of murder for hire
because, with the requisite intent, she allegedly solicited Benjamin
Jimenez to commit first degree murder for money. The evidence at
trial showed defendant offered to pay Jimenez $10,000 to murder her
husband. Jimenez told defendant he would look into it, and the two
agreed to meet again. Jimenez recorded their second meeting and
asked for confirmation that defendant wanted her husband killed, not
just beaten. Defendant replied she wanted her husband "gone" and
"out of the picture." Jimenez told her he had not found anyone to
commit the murder, but he would continue to look.
	At a later meeting, defendant inquired whether Jimenez had found
anyone to kill her husband. Jimenez said he had not. Sometime later,
defendant paged Jimenez and told him she no longer needed his
services because she had someone else murder her husband. At that
point, Jimenez told defendant he had recorded their previous
conversation and would give the tape to the police unless she paid him
some money. Defendant responded that she needed some time to get
the money. Eventually, defendant paid Jimenez a total of $4,000, and
then told him she would meet him one more time to give him another
payment.
	Subsequently, defendant arranged to have her boyfriend, Darryl
Mitchell, shoot Jimenez. As a result of that attack, Jimenez was
paralyzed and remains in a wheelchair. After being shot, Jimenez
initially maintained he had been injured by members of a street gang.
Jimenez later identified the shooter as Mitchell from a photo array and
from a lineup.
	At trial, Jimenez's mother, Teresa, testified she called police at
her son's request. Jimenez had stated to her that defendant had
arranged his shooting and he wanted to prevent her from "getting
away with this." Teresa testified she had listened to the conversation
taped by her son but at that time did not recognize the female voice on
the tape. Later, after the police became involved and Teresa
participated in a confidential overhear of a telephone call between
Jimenez and defendant, Teresa identified defendant's voice as the one
on the tape. Additionally, Teresa overheard defendant being
questioned at the police station and again identified defendant's voice
as the one on the tape and in the confidential overhear.
	Defendant was convicted and appealed, raising three main claims:
(1) the sufficiency of the indictment; (2) the sufficiency of the
evidence; and (3) a violation of her constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against her. The appellate court affirmed. 341 Ill. App. 3d
703.
	The appellate court held that defendant was not prejudiced by the
State's substitution of the word "solicit" for the word "procure" in the
indictment. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 714. The court also determined that
sufficient evidence existed for a rational trier of fact to find that
defendant "procured" Jimenez to commit first degree murder pursuant
to an agreement for money. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 716. Finally, the court
held that defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not
violated by her inability to see the entire face of witness Jimenez due
to the placement of his wheelchair in the courtroom. 341 Ill. App. 3d
at 717. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a).
	Before this court, defendant renews her challenges to: (1) the
sufficiency of the indictment; (2) the jury instructions substituting the
word "solicit" for the word "procure"; (3) the positioning of Jimenez's
wheelchair at trial; and (4) the admission of Teresa Jimenez's hearsay
testimony because it denied defendant's rights to due process, a fair
trial, and to confront the witnesses against her. Although raised in the
appellate court, defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence in this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Indictment 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment 
because it failed to allege an element of the crime, namely, procurement of an individual to commit murder. The relevant statutory provision 
states:
			"Solicitation of Murder for Hire. (a) A person commits
solicitation of murder for hire when, with the intent that the
offense of first degree murder be committed, he procures
another to commit that offense pursuant to any contract,
agreement, understanding, command or request for money or
anything of value." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a)
(West 2002).
	Defendant's indictment provided, in relevant part:
			"Damaris Cuadrado *** committed the offense of
solicitation of murder for hire in that [she], with the intent
that the offense of first degree murder be committed, to wit:
that Edgardo Cuadrado be killed, solicited Benjamin Jimenez
to commit said offense of first degree murder, pursuant to an
agreement or contract for money." (Emphasis added.)
	A comparison of the statutory provision and the charging
instrument reveals the word "procures" in the statute was replaced in
the indictment by the word "solicited." Defendant argues that because
the essential element of "procurement" was not included in the
indictment she was not properly charged and, pursuant to People v.
Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d 95 (1996), the indictment should have been
dismissed. The State counters that Scott was wrongly decided because
it misapplied this court's decision in People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245
(1996).
	In Scott, the defendant was ticketed for disorderly conduct and
with resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and the case proceeded
to bench trial. Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 97-98. After the State
presented its case in chief, the defendant filed a motion seeking a
directed finding on the disorderly conduct charge. In his motion,
defendant claimed the State had failed to allege a statutory offense
because the ticket did not specify the applicable subsection of the
disorderly conduct statute and the nature and elements of the offense.
Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 98. The trial court concluded the defendant
had waived that claim when he proceeded to trial on the ticket rather
than requesting a more specific formal information, bill of particulars,
or verified complaint. The defendant was later convicted of both
charges. Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 98.
	The appellate court reversed the disorderly conduct conviction,
reasoning, in relevant part, that due process is implicated when a
charging instrument fails to state a valid offense. Under those
circumstances, the defective charge could be attacked at any time.
Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 98, citing People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321 (1996). According to the appellate court, "[s]uch a challenge
to a complaint may be made before or during the trial-even at [the]
end of the State's case." Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 98-99.
	The Scott court then noted that when the sufficiency of a criminal
complaint is challenged the court must determine whether there is
strict compliance with the requirements of section 111-3(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West
2000)). See also Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 99, citing Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245. That section requires the charge to be in writing, to name the
charged offense and the statutory provision allegedly violated, and to
set forth the nature and elements of the charged offense. 725 ILCS
5/111-3(a) (West 2000).
	Turning to the merits of the defendant's challenge to the charging
instrument, the Scott court agreed that the instrument was fatally
defective under the strict compliance standard of section 111-3(a).
Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 99. While the instrument named the offense
and the general statute, it failed to cite the appropriate subsection and
to allege the specific nature and elements of the offense with any
particularity. Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 99-100.
	According to the State, we should reject Scott because that court
reached its conclusion based on an erroneous reading of Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245. In Benitez, two days into trial, the defendant learned that
the original indictment had not named him as a defendant and had not
alleged the correct victim. Thus, the original indictment had not
properly charged defendant with any offense. Rather than following
the proper procedures for obtaining an amended indictment, however,
the State simply prepared its own corrected indictment that was
signed by neither the State's Attorney nor the grand jury foreperson.
Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 246-47. Both the trial court and the appellate
court treated the amended indictment as valid, finding that it "properly
charged and informed [the defendant] of the nature and elements of
the charges." Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 250. Accordingly, the lower
courts concluded the indictment was not subject to attack as void.
Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 250. This court reversed.
	In relevant part, this court reasoned:
		"It is undisputed that the State did not return the initial,
endorsed indictment to the grand jury for correction. Nor did
the State file a motion to amend the initial indictment in the
circuit court pursuant to section 111-5. Rather, the State
arrogated for itself the power to amend the indictment as it
saw fit. Secretaries in the State's Attorney's office prepared
the second indictment to replace the first indictment. The
second indictment added two new defendants and changed
the name of a victim. We cannot sanction such a practice.
Assistant State's Attorneys and their staff do not have the
authority to amend grand jury indictments at will.
Accordingly, we find that the second indictment was not valid
as to the present defendant. Because the initial indictment
failed to name defendant and the second indictment was not
valid, defendant was never properly charged with any
offense." Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 255.
	In reversing the appellate and trial courts, we noted that the
timing of a challenge to the indictment "has been considered
significant in determining whether a defendant is entitled to reversal
of his conviction on that ground." Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 257. Under
the relevant case law and statutory provisions, posttrial motions
attacking the sufficiency of an indictment are subject to a prejudice
standard. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 257. Applying this standard, the
charging instrument is sufficient if it " 'apprised the accused of the
precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his
defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future
prosecutions arising out of the same conduct.' " Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 
at 257, quoting People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 (1976); see also
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 116-2 (as amended by Pub. Act
86-391, §1, eff. August 30, 1989).
	If the charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion to
dismiss, the Gilmore rule requiring a showing of prejudice does not
apply, and the proper remedy is dismissal. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 258,
citing People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1991). We
acknowledged in Benitez that the factual scenario before the court did
not fit neatly into either category because the defendant challenged the
indictment two days into trial. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 259. We then
held that, "under the unique circumstances of [the] case, [the]
defendant [was] not required to show that he sustained prejudice to
warrant reversal of his convictions." Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 259.
	Based on this analysis, the State argues that the Scott court erred
by relying on this court's decision in Benitez because Benitez was
based primarily on the existence of prosecutorial malfeasance. In other
words, the State maintains that the guiding force behind treating the
midtrial challenge to the indictment in Benitez in the same manner as
a pretrial challenge was the misbehavior of the prosecution in that
case. We agree and overrule the portion of Scott indicating the
applicable standard for a midtrial challenge to an indictment. See
Scott, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 99. Scott was erroneously founded on our
decision in Benitez, a factually unique case. Benitez represents an
exception to our general requirement of prejudice when an indictment
is challenged after the commencement of trial. Our holding in Benitez
clearly relied in large part upon the prosecution's misconduct. Due to
that misconduct, the defendant was denied an opportunity to object to
the deficiencies in the indictment before trial because he was only
apprised of the State's improprieties after the trial had begun.
	In marked contrast, defendant in this case had ample opportunity
before trial to object to the indictment. The indictment properly cited
the charged offense (720 ILCS 5/8-1.2 (West 1994)). Its only
deficiency was the substitution of the word "solicited" for the word
"procured" used in the statutory section defining solicitation of
murder for hire (720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a) (West 2002)). We disagree with
the State that the substitution is irrelevant and that the two terms are
interchangeable. We do agree with the State, however, that defendant
was not prejudiced by the substitution. Prior to filing her motion to
dismiss the indictment, defendant filed and argued a motion for a
directed finding, alleging the State's case in chief failed to prove that
she "procured" Jimenez to murder her husband. This motion
establishes that defendant was aware of the State's need to prove
procurement. We cannot say the error in the indictment inhibited
defendant in the preparation of her defense. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice.

B. Jury Instructions
	In a related issue, defendant claims the jury was improperly
instructed on an uncharged offense. Specifically, defendant contends
the instruction defining solicitation of murder for hire (Illinois Pattern
Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 6.01B (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter IPI
Criminal 3d)) and the issues instruction for solicitation of murder for
hire (IPI Criminal 3d No. 6.02B) should not have been given because
both of these instructions use the word "procure" when the indictment
used the word "solicited." According to defendant, the variance
between the language in the indictment and the instructions given to
the jury violated her due process rights.
	The State argues defendant waived this issue. A review of the
record confirms the State's argument. In her objection to IPI Criminal
3d No. 6.01B and IPI Criminal 3d No. 6.02B, defendant only claimed
that the instructions did not include the definition of intent for first
degree murder. She did not object to the addition of the word
"procure." This court has held that a specific objection waives all
other unspecified grounds. People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407
(1984). Moreover, defendant did not raise this issue in her posttrial
motion. Accordingly, defendant's argument has been waived. See
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988).

C. Confrontation of Witness
	Defendant next contends that her constitutional rights to
confrontation (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) and
a fair trial (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2) were
violated when Benjamin Jimenez, who was wheelchair-bound, was
allowed to testify before the jury from a position that somewhat
limited defendant's observation of Jimenez. The State maintains the
trial court permitted defendant to relocate within the courtroom to
obtain a better view of the witness and, therefore, her constitutional
rights were not abridged. We agree.
	While the confrontation clause represents a preference for face-to-face confrontation, that preference " 'must occasionally give way
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.' "
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 681, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165 (1990), quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, 39 L. Ed. 409, 411, 15 S. Ct. 337, 340 (1895). As noted by
the State and demonstrated by the record, the trial court informed the
defense no less than six times that they were free to move if they
wished. Since defendant was given permission to move to a better
vantage point within the courtroom, her dissatisfaction with Jimenez's
positioning is a result of her own inaction. The physical
accommodations necessary to allow Jimenez to testify were consistent
with the confrontation clause.

D. Admission of Testimony
	Finally, defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted a
portion of Teresa Jimenez's testimony concerning a conversation she
had with Jimenez shortly after he was shot. Teresa testified that
Jimenez told her:
		"I need to confess the truth. That recording, the lady that you
heard in the recording, she had this done to me and I don't
want her getting away with this. *** I need to confess the
truth before she gets away with this."
According to defendant, her right to confront the witnesses against
her (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) was denied
and due process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§2) was violated by the improper introduction of Jimenez's prior
consistent statement.
	Generally, statements made prior to trial for the purpose of
corroborating trial testimony are inadmissible. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 70 (1999). An exception to this rule applies when it is
suggested that the witness had recently fabricated the testimony or
had a motive to testify falsely, and the prior statement was made
before the motive to fabricate arose. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 70. Here,
the admission of Teresa's testimony was proper because, on cross-examination, defendant suggested recent fabrication by Jimenez by
eliciting testimony that in the first few days after Jimenez was shot, he
lied to his mother about what happened and said he was the victim of
a gang-related shooting. In addition, defense counsel questioned
Jimenez about his decision to contact a lawyer regarding a potential
civil suit against defendant to compensate Jimenez for his injuries.
Those questions attempted to show recent fabrication and a motive to
lie on the part of Jimenez. While defendant contends Jimenez's
apparent motive to lie to his mother was to excuse his acts of
extortion, Teresa's testimony concerning her son's statements actually
indicates Jimenez wanted to ensure that defendant would not escape
culpability for her actions. The trial court did not err by admitting
Jimenez's prior consistent statement because that testimony is
admissible under the exception to the general bar on such statements.

CONCLUSION
	When the sufficiency of a criminal indictment is challenged during
trial the court must determine whether the defendant was prejudiced
by the defect. If defendant has not been prejudiced, the indictment
may stand. If prejudice is established, however, the indictment must
be dismissed.
	The circumstances in this case establish that defendant was not
prejudiced and was sufficiently apprised of the charges against her to
prepare a defense. We also find no merit to the other issues raised on
appeal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.