Title: State ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1127.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1127 
THE STATE EX REL. TAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURT 
OF COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1127.] 
Prohibition—Petition for writ of prohibition failed because appellant had adequate 
remedy in ordinary course of law and failed to show that trial court had 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case—
Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed. 
(No. 2023-0788—Submitted February 6, 2024—Decided March 28, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 29735. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Gudonavon J. Taylor, filed a petition for a writ of 
prohibition in the Second District Court of Appeals against appellee, the 
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (“the trial court”).  Taylor argued 
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that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and sentence him for felony 
murder in 2010.  The Second District granted the trial court’s motion to dismiss, 
and Taylor appealed to this court as of right.  We affirm the Second District’s 
judgment dismissing Taylor’s petition. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Taylor is currently incarcerated at the Trumbull Correctional 
Institution.  In 2010, he was convicted in the trial court of murder and other crimes.  
He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 41 years to life.  On direct appeal 
to the Second District, his convictions and sentence were affirmed.  State v. Taylor, 
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2013-Ohio-186 (“Taylor I”).  Later, after granting 
Taylor’s application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) based on 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Second District again affirmed his 
convictions and sentence.  State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2014-
Ohio-3647, ¶ 4, 53 (“Taylor II”). 
{¶ 3} In this action, Taylor argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to convict him on and sentence him for one of his murder counts.  The 
nature of Taylor’s claim requires a review of the facts underlying his murder 
convictions.  Taylor relies on the facts as they are set out in Taylor I and Taylor II. 
{¶ 4} In 2007, Taylor shot and killed Jerod Bryson after an argument over 
drugs and money.  Taylor I at ¶ 6.  The evidence at trial established that Taylor shot 
Bryson at two separate locations.  Taylor II at ¶ 13.  He first shot Bryson several 
times in front of a house at 116 East Lincoln Street.  Id.  But Bryson got up and 
walked diagonally across the intersection to 238 Warren Street, where he fell down 
again.  Id.  Taylor followed Bryson and shot him several more times at almost point-
blank range.  Id.  The coroner testified that it was the shots near 238 Warren Street 
that killed Bryson.  Id. 
{¶ 5} Taylor was indicted and convicted on three counts of murder.  Count 
One charged him with purposely causing the death of Bryson in violation of R.C. 
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2903.02(A).  Counts Two and Four charged him with causing the death of Bryson 
as a proximate result of committing an offense of violence—felonious assault—in 
violation of R.C. 2903.02(B).  In addition, in Counts Three and Five, Taylor was 
charged with and convicted of felonious assault.  Count Three charged Taylor with 
knowingly causing physical harm to Bryson by means of a deadly weapon in 
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).  Count Five charged him with knowingly causing 
serious physical harm to Bryson in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).  He was also 
charged with and convicted of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited 
premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and of possessing a weapon while 
under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). 
{¶ 6} For purposes of sentencing Taylor for the murder, the state elected to 
proceed under Count Two (one of the felony-murder counts).  Accordingly, the trial 
court merged Counts One and Four into Count Two, and it sentenced Taylor to a 
prison term of 15 years to life.  The state also elected to proceed for purposes of 
sentencing under Count Three (felonious assault in violation of R.C. 
2903.11(A)(2)), and the trial court merged Count Five into Count Three and 
sentenced Taylor to a prison term of eight years for felonious assault.  The trial 
court sentenced Taylor to ten years for discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited 
premises, five years for possessing a weapon while under a disability, and three 
years for a firearm specification.  The trial court ordered Taylor to serve the 
sentences consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 41 years to life. 
{¶ 7} On direct appeal, Taylor argued that the trial court erred by not 
merging the murder and felonious-assault counts for purposes of sentencing.  
Taylor II, 2014-Ohio-3647, at ¶ 8.  He argued that both offenses were committed 
as part of a single course of conduct with a single animus.  Id.  The court of appeals 
disagreed, holding that “there were two separate shootings in two separate 
locations.”  Id. at ¶ 13.  According to the court of appeals, “the felonious assault 
occurred and was completed during the first non-fatal round of gunshots in front of 
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[the residence] located at 116 East Lincoln Street.”  Id.  The second round of 
gunshots, in front of 238 Warren Street, “ultimately brought about Bryson’s death.”  
Id.  The court of appeals concluded: “[T]he felonious assault was committed 
separately from and prior to the murder, and therefore, Taylor was properly 
convicted and sentenced for both of those offenses.”  Id. 
{¶ 8} In this case, Taylor seeks a writ of prohibition ordering the trial court 
to vacate his conviction for felony murder under Count Two on the grounds that 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him.  He argues that a 
conviction for felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) requires the commission of a 
predicate offense and that the predicate offense be the proximate cause of the 
victim’s death.  Taylor argues, however, that the felonious assault was not the 
proximate cause of Bryson’s death and that the “non-fatal” shooting that constituted 
the felonious assault was separate from the shooting that caused Bryson’s death.  
He thus argues that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on Count Two and that his 
conviction is void. 
{¶ 9} The Second District granted the trial court’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion 
to dismiss.  Taylor appealed to this court as of right and requests oral argument. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Oral argument 
{¶ 10} Taylor requests oral argument.  We deny that request.  We have 
discretion to grant oral argument in a direct appeal, S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A), and in 
exercising that discretion, we consider whether the case involves complex issues, a 
matter of great public importance, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict 
among courts of appeals, Boler v. Hill, 167 Ohio St.3d 557, 2022-Ohio-507, 195 
N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14.  This case does not involve any of these factors. 
 
 
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B.  The trial court’s sui juris argument 
{¶ 11} As an initial matter, the trial court argues that the judgment 
dismissing Taylor’s petition should be affirmed because the trial court is not sui 
juris and cannot be sued, see Malone v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 45 
Ohio St.2d 245, 248, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. 
Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973) 
(“ ‘Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own 
right’ ”).  As the trial court acknowledges, however, it did not raise this argument 
in the court of appeals.  Whether an entity is sui juris and may be sued is a question 
of capacity that may be waived.  State ex rel. School Choice Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati 
Pub. School Dist., 147 Ohio St.3d 256, 2016-Ohio-5026, 63 N.E.3d 1183, ¶ 10, fn. 
3.  The trial court has thus waived this argument. 
C.  The trial court’s jurisdiction to convict Taylor of and sentence him for felony 
murder 
{¶ 12} We review de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 152 Ohio St.3d 303, 
2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 10.  In conducting this review, we accept all factual 
allegations in the petition as true, and we will not affirm the dismissal unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts that would 
entitle him to relief.  Id. 
{¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Taylor must establish that the 
trial court exercised judicial power, that the trial court’s exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law.  See State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-
3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  However, if the trial court patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction, he need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  Id. 
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{¶ 14} Taylor argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and 
sentence him on Count Two (felony murder) because he could not have committed 
a predicate offense that was the proximate cause of his victim’s death.  See 
generally State v. Nolan, 141 Ohio St.3d 454, 2014-Ohio-4800, 25 N.E.3d 1016,  
¶ 8-9 (conviction for felony murder requires that a person intend to commit a 
predicate offense that is the proximate cause of another’s death).  Because Count 
Two was the murder count that his other murder counts were merged into, he argues 
that his sentence for murder should be “arrested.”  Taylor, however, could have 
raised his arguments on direct appeal, which constitutes an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Olmstead v. Forsthoefel, 163 
Ohio St.3d 25, 2020-Ohio-4951, 167 N.E.3d 944, ¶ 7 (an appeal is an adequate 
remedy to raise sentencing merger errors); State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry, 131 
Ohio St.3d 416, 2012-Ohio-1300, 965 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 2 (an appeal is an adequate 
remedy to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment or the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a conviction).  Thus, to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, 
Taylor must show that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on Count Two. 
{¶ 15} “[W]hen we have found that a court of common pleas patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly 
removed that jurisdiction.”  Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio 
St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9.  “Subject-matter jurisdiction 
refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular 
class or type of case.”  State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 
N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 16} Here, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to convict Taylor 
of and sentence him for murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B).  See Curtis v. 
Bunting, 149 Ohio St.3d 123, 2016-Ohio-7431, 73 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 8; see also R.C. 
2931.03 (“The court of common pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and 
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offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is 
vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas”).  Even if Taylor is correct 
that he could not have committed a predicate offense necessary for a conviction on 
Count Two, any error the trial court made in relation to that count would have been 
an error in the exercise of its subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Harper at ¶ 26 (once 
a court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to 
it, the decision on any question arising thereafter in the action is but the exercise of 
jurisdiction).  In other words, even if true, Taylor’s claims would not show that the 
trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and 
sentence him for felony murder under Count Two. 
{¶ 17} Because the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to convict and sentence Taylor, he is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 18} Taylor has not shown that the trial court patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and sentence him for felony murder.  Thus, he 
is not entitled to a writ of prohibition.  We therefore affirm the Second District 
Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Taylor’s petition.  We also deny Taylor’s 
request for oral argument. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Gudonavon J. Taylor, pro se. 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Thomas J. Brodbeck, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________