Title: Anderson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 00-CR-2410
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 22
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
WENDELL DANIEL ANDERSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge, J. and Wilner, J., dissent
 ____________________________________________
Filed:   December 16, 2002
1Unless otherwise noted, all future references are to Md. Code Ann., Art. 27, §
35C(b) (2001 Supp.).
2In addition to the child abuse count (count 1), petitioner was convicted of third
degree sexual offense (count 2), attempted third degree sexual offense (count 3), fourth
degree sexual offense (count 4), and attempted fourth degree sexual offense (count 5).  The
Circuit Court merged counts 3 and 4 with count 2 and count 5 with count 1 for sentencing
purposes.
In this case, we must decide whether petitioner, a high school teacher, was a person
with responsibility for supervision of a child, within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Art.
27, § 35C(b) (2001 Supp.).1  We shall hold that under the circumstances presented herein,
the evidence was sufficient to establish that petitioner was a person having temporary
responsibility for the supervision of a child within the contemplation of the statute.
Wendell Daniel Anderson, petitioner, a high school teacher, was convicted of child
abuse and several related sexual offenses.2  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
convictions, Anderson v. State, 142 Md. App. 498, 790 A.2d 732 (2002), and we granted
Anderson’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Anderson v. State, 369 Md. 178, 798 A.2d 551
(2002).  We shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals.
I.  Background
The victim, a fourteen-year-old girl, was a ninth grade student at Kenwood High
School.  She met petitioner, a math teacher at the school, through one of her teachers, Ms.
Riggs.  The victim was not in any of petitioner’s classes or a participant in the
extracurricular activities he ran.  Petitioner would sometimes see her in the halls of the
2
school, however, and would come into Ms. Riggs’ classroom where the victim helped out
after school, occasionally helping the victim with math problems.  Petitioner also drove the
victim home from school two or three times.
At trial, petitioner testified that he knew the victim had developed a crush on him.
During the year, he talked to her about her relationships with boys, discussed with her his
own interest in a romantic relationship with Ms. Riggs, and criticized her for her provocative
choice of clothing.  Petitioner testified that when the victim confronted him about her
affections for him, he told her “sometime in the future there may be a chance, but right now
you are way too young.”
The sexual encounter between petitioner and the victim occurred on the last day of
the school year, when petitioner gave the victim a ride home from school.  Although he had
driven her home from school on prior occasions, the victim’s mother was unaware of this
practice.  The victim’s mother testified that she believed that her daughter either took the
bus, got a ride home from a friend, or called her for a ride.  She testified that she entrusted
Kenwood High School with the care of her daughter, but had never asked any of the teachers
explicitly to be responsible for her supervision after school.
The high school principal testified about the supervisory responsibilities of the
teachers.  She stated that all teachers “are given a set of five classes to teach and they are
expected to do hall duty, supervision hall duty between changes of classes.  They generally
get one hour a day and they are given chaperone duties after school.”  Asked about
3
responsibility for “[a]ny scenario on school campus,” the principal stated that all teachers
“are responsible to assure the safety of the students.”  On cross-examination, however, the
principal agreed that teachers have no responsibility for students they meet after the school
day ends, not in connection with an academic activity.
The evening before the last day of the school year, the victim phoned petitioner to ask
him for a ride home from school the following day.  The Court of Special Appeals
summarized the events of the following day as follows:
“On June 9, 2000, the last day of the school year, the school day
ended at noon.  That day, [the victim] ‘stayed after with Ms.
Riggs to help her with her room.’  While she was walking in the
hallway with Ms. Riggs and her daughter, whom Ms. Riggs had
brought to school that day, [petitioner] approached and invited
them to go to lunch with him.  They then left school property
with [petitioner], in his car, and had lunch at a nearby
McDonald's restaurant.  About a half hour later, all four of them
returned to school in [petitioner’s] car and [the victim] resumed
"help[ing] Ms. Riggs with her room and her daughter."  When
[petitioner] asked [the victim] if she wanted a ride home, she
accepted his offer.  Sometime after 2 p.m., [petitioner] and [the
victim] left the school in [petitioner’s] car.  While driving [the
victim] home, [petitioner] asked her if she wanted to play a
game of pool at his house; she replied that she did.  [Petitioner]
then drove [the victim] to his house.
Anderson, 142 Md. App. at 503-04 (footnote omitted).
In the course of the ensuing investigation, Baltimore County Police Detective Joseph
Donahue recorded a telephone conversation between petitioner and the victim.  According
to his testimony, he believed he was investigating a case of child abuse.  Pursuant to the
Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. Code (1998 Repl. Vol., 2000
4
Supp.), §§ 10-401 et seq., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the officer obtained
consent to record the conversation from the victim.  The officer did not obtain petitioner’s
consent to record the conversation, nor did he have a court order.  Prior to trial, petitioner
moved to suppress the taped recording of this conversation and to sever the child abuse
charge from the sexual offense charges.  Both of these motions were denied.
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore County and proceeded to trial
before the court.  He maintained that he could not be convicted of child abuse because he
did not have the requisite statutory responsibility for the care of a child.  He also denied any
sexual contact.  The trial judge found that petitioner fit within the statutory definition of
child abuse and believed the testimony of the victim.  He was convicted and sentenced to
a term of incarceration.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate
appellate court noted that the “principal issue presented by this appeal is whether consensual
sexual intercourse can constitute ‘child abuse’ under Maryland law.”  Judge Peter Krauser,
writing for an unanimous panel, noted:
“Because we find that a parent impliedly consents to a teacher
taking all reasonable measures to assure the safe return of his or
her child from school, including personally driving that child
home; because [petitioner] assumed that responsibility when he
agreed to drive the child home; because the events leading up
to this unfortunate occurrence were set in motion on school
property; and because, at the time of the offense, there had been
no temporal break in the teacher and student relationship that
existed between [petitioner] and the victim, we shall affirm
[petitioner’s] conviction for child abuse.”
5
Anderson, 142 Md. App. at 501, 790 A.2d at 734-35.  This Court granted Anderson’s
petition for writ of certiorari.  Anderson v. State, 369 Md. 178, 798 A.2d 551 (2002).
II.  Child Abuse
Petitioner contends before this Court that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
charge of child abuse because a necessary element under the statute was missing, namely,
that he was either a parent, household or family member or other person who has permanent
or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child.  Petitioner
acknowledges that a teacher is responsible for the supervision of a child at those times and
places where he or she is acting as a teacher and that when the teacher is at school or is with
a student off school premises for a school related activity, he “has responsibility for
supervision as part of his job.”  He recognizes that these circumstances would fit within the
notion of implied mutual consent between the parent and the school authorities.  He argues,
conversely, that when a teacher is with a student off school grounds, for a non-school related
activity, the implied consent rationale is inapplicable and that once a teacher is no longer
acting as a teacher, he or she does not have responsibility to supervise the student.  
Article 27, § 35C(b) states that “[a] parent or other person who has permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a child or a household or
family member who causes abuse to the child is guilty of a felony . . . .”  Whether a teacher
has responsibility for the supervision of a child, i.e., a student under eighteen years of age,
6
is a factual question, dependent upon the particular circumstances. 
It is uncontested that the act of sexual intercourse by an adult with a fourteen-year-old
girl qualifies as “abuse” under the statute.  Although petitioner was neither a parent nor
household or family member of the victim, the Circuit Court found that petitioner had
“responsibility for the supervision” of the victim at the time of the alleged misconduct.  The
Court of Special Appeals agreed, and held the evidence to be sufficient to support the
conviction.  We agree.
Petitioner contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for child
abuse.  The standard for determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 272, 696 A.2d 443, 452-53
(1997); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994).  Whether a person
has responsibility for the supervision of a minor child in contemplation of Art. 27, § 35C,
is a question of fact for the jury.  See Newman v. State, 65 Md. App. 85, 99, 499 A.2d 492
(1985).
The courts of this State have had several occasions to consider the class of persons
to whom the child abuse statute applies.  See e.g., Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 369 A.2d
1054 (1979); Bowers v. State, 282 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978); Tapscott v. State, 106
Md. App. 109, 664 A.2d 42 (1995); Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 578 A.2d 300
7
(1990); Newman, 65 Md. App. 85, 499 A.2d 492.  See also, 82 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. (1997).
In Pope, we addressed the statutory language of “responsibility for the supervision
of a child.”  Judge Orth, writing for the Court, pointed out that the phrase “responsibility for
the supervision” under § 35C is not limited solely to a person standing in loco parentis to a
child and may include others.  We said:  
“The child abuse statute speaks in terms of a person who ‘has’
responsibility for the supervision of a minor child.  It does not
prescribe how such responsibility attaches or what
‘responsibility’ and ‘supervision’ encompass.  A doubt or
ambiguity exists as to the exact reach of the statute’s provision
with respect to ‘has responsibility for the supervision of,’
justifying application of the principle that permits courts in such
circumstances to ascertain and give effect to the real intention
of the Legislature.  Bowers equates ‘permanent or temporary
care or custody’ with ‘in loco parentis,’ but ‘responsibility for
the supervision of’ is not bound by certain of the strictures
required for one to stand in place of or instead of the parent.” 
Id. at 322, 396 A.2d at 1063 (citations omitted).
Discussing the meaning of the word “responsibility,” we said: 
“‘Responsibility’ in its common and generally accepted
meaning denotes ‘accountability,’ and ‘supervision’ emphasizes
broad authority to oversee with the powers of direction and
decision. . . .  Absent a court order or award by some
appropriate proceeding pursuant to statutory authority, we think
it to be self-evident that responsibility for supervision of a
minor child may be obtained only upon the mutual consent,
expressed or implied, by the one legally charged with the care
of the child and by the one assuming responsibility.  In other
words, a parent may not impose responsibility for the
supervision of his or her minor child on a third person unless
that person accepts the responsibility, and a third person may
not assume such responsibility unless the parent grants it.”
8
Id. at 323-24, 369 A.2d 1063.  We went on to provide examples of persons who may come
within the ambit of the statute.  We said:
“So it is that a baby sitter temporarily has responsibility for the
supervision of a child.  The parents grant the responsibility for
the period they are not at home, and the sitter accepts it.  And it
is by mutual consent that a school teacher has responsibility for
the supervision of children in connection with his academic
duties.”
Id. at 324, 396 A.2d at 1063-64.  We concluded that:
“[O]nce responsibility for the supervision of a minor child has
been placed in a third person, it may be terminated unilaterally
by a parent by resuming responsibility, expressly or by conduct.
. . .  But, of course, the third person in whom responsibility has
been placed is not free to relinquish that responsibility without
the knowledge of the parent.”
Id., 396 A.2d at 1064.
Petitioner acknowledges that he had responsibility for the supervision of the victim,
by mutual consent, while they were at school or were involved in school related activities.
Relying on an opinion letter of the Attorney General, 82 Att’y Gen. Op. __ (1997) [Opinion
No. 97-017 (Aug. 19, 1997)], he argues, however, that outside of such academic duties,
there is no mutual consent. 
Petitioner argues that the mutual, implied consent which existed as a result of his
position as a teacher ended when he and the victim left the school and thus, as there was no
mutual consent that he drive the victim home, he did not have responsibility for her
supervision.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument, as do we.  We agree with
9
Judge Krauser’s analysis.  
“[The victim’s] mother may not have known that [petitioner]
had assumed the task of driving her home from school, but,
from that fact, it does not follow that she did not impliedly
consent to his doing so.  Indeed, it is absurd to suggest that
when a parent entrusts her child to a school that that parent does
not impliedly consent to any reasonable assistance that a teacher
may provide to assure the child’s return home from school.  In
other words, it may be reasonably assumed by both parent and
teacher that a parent impliedly consents to all reasonable
measures taken by a teacher to assure the safe return of the child
from school, including personally driving that child home. . . .
Once a teacher assumes the task of personally transporting a
child from school to home with the implied consent of the
parent, he or she also assumes the responsibility of supervising
that child. . . .  Finally, there was no temporal break in the
teacher and student relationship that existed between appellant
and the child.  Such a break, depending on its length and nature,
can interrupt the implied consent of the parent and dispel the
teacher’s duty to supervise.  Had appellant and [the victim] met,
for example, after they had parted, at a location unconnected
with Kenwood High School, we might have reached a different
result in this case.  But that is not the case here.  Indeed,
appellant’s offer to give the child a ride home was made on
school premises while the child was still under the supervision
of appellant.  And the trip home began on school premises,
where appellant and [the victim] got into his car.  From the
moment he extended his invitation until the time he and [the
victim] had sexual intercourse, she was never for long, if ever,
either out of his sight or, for that matter, out from under his
influence or control.  At bottom, a teacher-student relationship
is based on the student’s trust and acquiescence to her teacher’s
authority.  At no time was there a temporal break in that
relationship so that we might conclude the relationship inducing
both trust and acquiescence to authority have at least temporally
ended.”
Id. at 509-10, 790 A.2d at 739.
3As previously stated, the victim phoned petitioner the night before to ask for a ride
home.  Supra at 3.  Although the victim’s testimony is unclear on this point, petitioner
testified that on the following day, he sought out the victim at school and asked her if she
still needed a ride home.  Petitioner testified:
“I then went to Ms. Riggs’ room to see if [the victim] still
needed the ride. [Ms. Riggs and the victim] were not there.  I
wandered around the building for a while trying to find them.
10
Petitioner did not initiate the meeting with the victim at a park or shopping center
near the school.  Petitioner, as a teacher, met with the student during school hours and made
the plans to leave the school with her.  Petitioner had assisted the victim academically, and
acknowledged his responsibility for her supervision at school.  The principal of the school
acknowledged that for “[a]ny scenario on school campus, even if that teacher is not on hall
duty or even if that student is not a member of their class,” the teacher is responsible “to
assure the safety of the students.”  This was the understanding of the victim’s mother, who
entrusted her daughter to Kenwood High School.  She entrusted her not to a particular
teacher for a particular activity, but to the school as a whole for the entirety of the school
day.
The victim’s mother terminated the responsibility of the school, and by extension the
teachers, on the days she came to get her daughter or gave her daughter permission to ride
the bus.  On the day in question, however, the mother never resumed responsibility expressly
or by conduct.  Instead, the responsibility remained in the teacher who held it and voluntarily
extended it through his offer of transportation.  He took it upon himself to transport her
home from school and made those arrangements with her at school and during school hours.3
They were in an alcove on the first floor.  When I found them,
I said I am leaving now, do you still need a ride home. [The
victim] said yes.”
11
Petitioner’s “official” supervisory interactions with the victim that began at school, his
transportation of her that was initiated at school, and his sexual involvement with her
“together constituted an indivisible, ongoing relationship.”  Doe v. Taylor, 15 F.3d 443, 461
(5th Cir. 1994) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
Petitioner asserts that “at the time of the alleged sexual contact, Petitioner was not
with the child on school grounds or with the child off school grounds for an activity related
to academic or a school related extracurricular activity.”  It goes without saying that any
conduct that amounts to child abuse will never be an “academic activity.”  A teacher cannot
argue that his conduct is not child abuse because his seduction of a student was not
consented to by the parent.  It is the school related activity immediately connected to the
abuse, in this case the transportation of the student home from school, that provides the basis
of supervision.  Our view is consistent with the opinion expressed in the letter of the
Attorney General.  In the letter opinion, the Attorney General stated that 
“responsibility . . . could also exist when the parent consents to
the child’s accompanying the teacher off school premises.  In all
these situations, a jury could find, at the least, an implicit
mutual agreement to transfer ‘responsibility for supervision’ to
the teacher and the teacher’s acceptance of it.”
82 Att’y Gen. op. No. 97-017, at 111.
A similar issue was addressed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. Pasteur,
12
9 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).  A teacher was convicted of sexual offenses against two
students, one of which occurred after a school play, when the teacher offered to drive a
student home.  As in the case sub judice, the student accepted the ride and the teacher made
a detour to his own home.  Sexual contact occurred during the ride.  The defendant
challenged the evidence that there existed a custodial relationship between himself and the
two victims.  The court first described the scope of the student-teacher relationship:
“Teachers are undeniably charged with the ‘care and custody’
of students.  When parents send their child to school, they
entrust the teacher with that child’s well-being. . . . [A]
teacher’s duty of care and custody extends beyond the confines
on the schoolyard. . . .  By virtue of Defendant’s position, he
was able to exert influence upon [the victim], not only within
the confines of the school, but outside of it as well.”
Id. at 697.  The court concluded that not only was there evidence of a custodial position, but
that the conduct occurred “while Defendant and [the victim] were engaged in school related
activities.”  Id. at 698.
In this case, the Circuit Court found that petitioner’s conduct, both on and off school
grounds, was within the scope of his role as a teacher.  We hold that the evidence was
sufficient for the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was a person
who had responsibility for the supervision of a minor child as contemplated by Art. 27, §
35C.
III.  Suppression of Taped Conversation
13
We next turn to petitioner’s assertion that the Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the taped conversation was error.  Section 10-402(c)(2) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  
“[i]t is lawful under this subtitle for an investigative or law
enforcement officer acting in a criminal investigation . . . to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication in order to
provide evidence of the commission of the offenses of . . . child
abuse . . . where the person is a party to the communication or
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception.”
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 10-402(c)(2) (2001 Supp.).  
It is undisputed that the victim and her mother consented to the electronic monitoring
of the telephone call between petitioner and the victim.  Petitioner contends that the officer
knew or should have known that petitioner was not within the class of persons covered by
the child abuse statute and, therefore, the taping was illegal under Maryland law and should
have been suppressed.  He concludes that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in finding
that the officer, in good faith, believed he was investigating the crime of child abuse.
Petitioner’s primary argument is that the Circuit Court applied the wrong standard in
assessing whether the officer was acting in a criminal investigation of child abuse and that
the test is not whether the officer had a good faith belief that he was investigating child
abuse, but rather whether the officer had a reasonable basis for his suspicion that petitioner
had committed child abuse.
The officer clearly had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had committed
4We need not address the question of whether a standard of reasonable suspicion, or
good faith, is sufficient, because in this case we find that the officer had reasonable grounds
to believe he was investigating the crime of child abuse.  The Court of Special Appeals
noted that an interception is lawful so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to warrant
an investigation of one of the statutorily enumerated crimes.  See Anderson, 142 Md. App.
at 517, 790 A.2d at 743 (citing Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 104 Md.
App. 1, 24 n.21, 655 A.2d 1, 12 n.21 (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 342 Md. 363, 676
A.2d 65 (1996)).  See also, Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 424 N.E.2d 250, 255-56 (Mass. 1981)
(rejecting both good faith and probable cause standards, and stating that “[a]t the minimum,
the Commonwealth should be required to show that the decision to intercept was made on
the basis of a reasonable suspicion that interception would disclose or lead to evidence of
a designated offense”).  See generally, Eric H. Miller, Annotation, Permissible Warrantless
Surveillance, Under State Communications Interception Statute, by State or Local Law
Enforcement Officer or One Acting in Concert With Officer, 27 A.L.R. 4th 449 (1984 &
Supp. 1995). 
5Petitioner relies on Maryland Rule 4-253 for his argument that the court erred.  Rule
4-253(c) provides as follows:
 “If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder
for trial of counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court
may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order
separate trials of counts, charging documents, or defendants, or
grant any other relief as justice requires.” 
14
child abuse.4  His recording was lawful and the motion to suppress properly was denied.
IV.  Severance of Charges
Finally, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to sever the counts of
child abuse from the sexual offense charges.5  He argues that because he is not within the
class of persons who could have been convicted of child abuse, had the child abuse count
been severed for trial, and further, had he been found not guilty of child abuse, the tape
recording of the telephone conversation would not have been admissible at trial on the
15
sexual offense charges.
The Court of Special Appeals held that because Anderson’s conduct constituted child
abuse, his argument that he was wrongfully denied a severance was moot.  We agree.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Dissenting Opinion follows:
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
No. 00-CR-2410
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 22
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
WENDELL DANIEL ANDERSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.
in which Eldridge and Wilner, JJ. join  
Filed:    December 16, 2002
6Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Replacement Volume, 2001 Cum. Supp.) Article 27, §
35C (b) provides:
“Violation constitutes felony; penalty; sentencing. - (1) A parent or other
person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for
the supervision of a child or a household or family member who causes abuse
to the child is guilty of a felony....”
By 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26, this section was recodified as Maryland Code (2002) § 3-601 (b)
(1) of the Criminal Law Article.    There is no substantive difference between the
codifications.    We shall refer, in future, to Article 27, § 35C, as it was in effect when the
events giving rise to this appeal occurred.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the evidence is sufficient for the trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wendell Daniel Anderson, the petitioner, is
a person who had responsibility for the supervision of a minor child under the child abuse
statute.  I cannot agree with the majority’s overly broad application of the child abuse statute
and, consequently, it is my contention that the facts in the case sub judice do not establish
a sufficient nexus between the teacher and the student in order to hold that the teacher was
responsible for the supervision of the student.  
The fundamental issue in this case is whether, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957,
1998 Replacement Volume) Article 27, § 35C (b) of  the child abuse statute6, Wendell
Daniel Anderson, the petitioner, who was not the victim’s teacher, was nevertheless, by
virtue of being a teacher at the school she attended and agreeing to give her a ride home
from school, a person who had,  at the time the sexual activity occurred, “responsibility for
supervision of the child” alleged to have been abused.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County answered the question in the affirmative, finding that the petitioner did have
responsibility for supervision of the minor child victim.  
2
The Court of Special Appeals agreed  and, thus, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.  Anderson v. State, 142 Md. App. 498, 790 A.2d 732 (2002).   It held that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of implied consent by the victim’s mother to the
petitioner’s supervision of the victim and, therefore, child abuse.   Id. at 515, 790 A. 2d at
742.    In so holding, the intermediate appellate court determined that 
“there was a special relationship between the victim and her abuser: the
relationship of trust and responsibility that exists between student and teacher.
It is that relationship which induces parents to consent, expressly and
impliedly, to all reasonable actions taken by teachers to assure the safe return
of their children, including providing, if necessary, the means by which this
objective will be achieved.”
Id.  Rationalizing that holding, it stated that “there is no dispute that every teacher of
Kenwood High School had responsibility for supervising all of the students during and after
school hours, and that they had the implied consent of the parents to do so.”   Id. at 508, 790
A. 2d at 738.   From the premise that “mutual implied consent to supervise Cindy at school
existed by virtue of appellant's status as a teacher at Cindy's high school,” it concluded,
“[o]nce a teacher assumes the task of personally transporting a child from school to home
with the implied consent of the child's parent, he or she also assumes the responsibility of
supervising that child.”   Id. at 508-09, 790 A. 2d at 738-39.    That responsibility continues,
the court instructed, until the teacher is relieved by the parent or there has been a temporal
break in the teacher/student relationship, id. at 510-13, 790 A. 2d at 739-41, neither of which
occurred in the instant case.  
For the former, the Court of Special Appeals relied on our observation in Pope v.
3
State, 284 Md. 309, 324, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (1979), that once responsibility for the
supervision of a child has been assumed, a “third person ... is not free to relinquish that
responsibility without the knowledge of the parent .... and leave the children to their own
devices.”    As to the latter, the court opined, without citation of authority:
“[T]here was no temporal break in the teacher and student relationship that
existed between appellant and the child.  Such a break, depending on its length
and nature, can interrupt the implied consent of the parent and dispel the
teacher's duty to supervise.  Had appellant and Cindy met, for example, after
they had parted, at a location unconnected with Kenwood High School, we
might have reached a different result in this case.  But that is not the case here.
Indeed, appellant's offer to give the child a ride home was made on school
premises while the child was still under the supervision of appellant.  And the
trip home began on school premises, where appellant and Cindy got into his
car.  From the moment he extended his invitation until the time he and Cindy
had sexual intercourse, she was never for long, if ever, either out of his sight
or, for that matter, out from under his influence or control.  At bottom, a
teacher-student relationship is based on the student's trust and acquiescence to
her teacher's authority.  At no time was there a temporal break in that
relationship so that we might conclude the relationship inducing both trust and
acquiescence to authority had at least temporarily ended.”
142 Md. App. at 509-10, 790 A. 2d at 739.
Agreeing with the intermediate appellate court, the majority holds that  the petitioner
was properly charged and convicted of child abuse.   To reach that conclusion, in view of the
fact that the petitioner was not the victim’s teacher, it had to rationalize a basis on which to
conclude that he had responsibility for the victim’s supervision, impliedly agreed to by the
victim’s mother.  Critical to the majority’s  position, therefore, is the notion that the victim’s
mother “entrusted her [daughter] not to a particular teacher for a particular activity, but to
the school as a whole for the entirety of the school day,” see Anderson v. State, ___ Md. ___,
7The complete accuracy of this statement is undermined by the majority’s recognition
that “[t]he evening before the last day of the school year, the victim phoned petitioner to ask
him for a ride home from school the following day.”   ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___
(2002) [slip op. at 3]. 
4
___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (2002) [slip op. at 10], a premise advanced and supported by the
testimony of the principal.    Proceeding on this premise, after observing that the petitioner
previously had assisted the victim academically, and acknowledged his responsibility for her
supervision at school, the majority opines that, rather than do so at a park or shopping center
near the school, “[p]etitioner, as a teacher, met with the student during school hours and
made the plans to leave the school with her.”  Id.   It concludes, “it is the school related
activity immediately connected to the abuse, in this case the transportation of the student
home from school, that provides the basis of supervision.”  Id.  at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___[slip
op. at 11].   
The majority rejects any argument that the responsibility for supervision had been
terminated when the petitioner and the victim left school.    In that regard, the majority
asserts:
“On the day in question, however, the mother never resumed responsibility
expressly or by conduct.  Instead, the responsibility remained in the teacher
who held it and voluntarily extended it through his offer of transportation.  He
took it upon himself to transport her home from school and made those
arrangements with her at school and during school hours.[7]  Petitioner’s
‘official’ supervisory interactions with the victim that began at school, his
transportation of her that was initiated at school, and his sexual involvement
with her ‘together constituted an indivisible, ongoing relationship.”’
Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 10], quoting Doe v. Taylor, 15 F.3d 443, 461 (5th
8The context in which the quoted remark was made in Doe v. Taylor, 15 F.3d 443,
461 (5th Cir. 1994) bears no similarity at all to this case.   The full quote makes this point
quite clearly:
“The next inquiry is whether the deprivation of liberty occurred under color
of state law. I agree that it did. Stroud's official interactions with Doe and his
sexual involvement with her together constituted an indivisible, ongoing
relationship. The special attention Stroud gave Doe as her teacher afforded
him the opportunity to exert his influence. He levered his authority to press
upon Doe his sexual desires, while both on and off school grounds. He treated
Doe differently than he treated other members of his class. He gave her good
grades, required of her less work than other students, and allowed her to
behave as she liked in his classroom. This manipulative course was an abuse
of power conferred by the state. I am persuaded that Stroud acted under color
of state law. (Emphasis in original).
5
Cir. 1994) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).8
    
I.
The exact reach or limit of the phrase, “has responsibility for the supervision of,” is
the issue in this case, as it was in   Pope v. State,  284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979).   In
that case, this Court acknowledged that the child abuse statute addresses “a  person who ‘has’
responsibility for the supervision of a minor child [but] does not prescribe how such
responsibility attaches or what ‘responsibility’ and ‘supervision’ encompass,” and, thus, that
doubt or ambiguity exists as to the meaning of that phrase.   Id. at 322, 396 A.2d at 1063. 
In ascertaining and giving effect to the real intention of the Legislature, we focused on the
meaning of  “responsibility” and “supervision.”  Id. at 323, 396 A. 2d at 1063.    Noting that
common and generally accepted meaning of the former denotes “accountability” and that the
latter “emphasizes broad authority to oversee with the powers of direction and decision,” id.,
quoting  American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969); Webster's Third
6
New International Dictionary (1968), the Court concluded, characterizing it as self-evident:
“that responsibility for supervision of a minor child may be obtained only upon
the mutual consent, expressed or implied, by the one legally charged with the
care of the child and by the one assuming the responsibility.  In other words,
a parent may not impose  responsibility for the supervision of his or her minor
child on a third person unless that person accepts the responsibility, and a third
person may not assume such responsibility unless the parent grants it.”
Id. at 323-24, 396 A. 2d at 1063.    By way of example, we stated:
“So it is that a baby sitter temporarily has responsibility for the supervision of
a child; the parents grant the responsibility for the period they are not at home,
and the sitter accepts it.  And it is by mutual consent that a school teacher has
responsibility for the supervision of children in connection with his academic
duties.” 
Id. at 324, 396 A. 2d at 1063-64.    
We sounded a note of caution.  First, we noted that, while a third person’s
responsibility for the supervision of a minor child may be terminated unilaterally, by the
parent resuming the responsibility, expressly or by conduct, the third person in whom
responsibility has been placed may relinquish that responsibility only with the knowledge of
the parent.  Id. at 324, 396 A. 2d at 1064.   We illustrated the point by pointing out that “a
sitter may not simply walk away in the absence of the parents and leave the children to their
own devices.”  Id.   We were also concerned that “responsibility for the supervision” not be
interpreted without regard to the consent criteria or too broadly.    Thus, recognizing that the
law does not impose on any individual a legal obligation to care for, or look after,  the
welfare of a stranger, adult or child, without a special relationship,  we said:
“In the face of this status of the law we cannot reasonably conclude that the
7
Legislature, in bringing a person responsible for the supervision of a child
within the ambit of the child abuse law, intended that such responsibility attach
without the consent criteria we have set out.  Were it otherwise, the
consequences would go far beyond the legislative intent.  For example, a
person taking a lost child into his home to attempt to find its parents could be
said to be responsible for that child's supervision. Or a person who allows his
neighbor's children to play in his yard, keeping a watchful eye on their
activities to prevent them from falling into harm, could be held responsible for
the children's supervision. Or a person performing functions of a maternal
nature from concern for the welfare, comfort or health of a child, or protecting
it from danger because of a sense of moral obligation, may come within the
reach of the act.  In none of these situations would there be an intent to grant
or assume the responsibility contemplated by the child abuse statute, and it
would be incongruous indeed to subject such persons to possible criminal
prosecution.” 
Id. at 325, 396 A. 2d at 1064.
Our holding was applied by the Attorney General in responding to an inquiry from the
State’s Attorney for Montgomery County.  See 82 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 107 (1997).   The
question on which the Attorney General’s opinion was sought was “whether a teacher who
has sexual contact with a student after school hours and off the school premises may be
considered a person with ‘permanent or temporary custody or responsibility for supervision’
of the student and thus may be charged with child abuse under Article 27, §  35C of the
Maryland Code.”  The Attorney General opined:
“Article 27, §  35C applies, even after school hours or off the school premises,
to a teacher who has ‘custody or responsibility for supervision of the child.’ A
teacher may be considered responsible for the supervision of the student, and
therefore subject to Article 27, §  35C, if the teacher is with the student in
connection with an activity related to the school's academic extra-curricular
program or otherwise as a result of permission from the child's parents for the
child to accompany the teacher.  Article 27, §  35C does not apply, however,
if the teacher is with the student under circumstances unrelated to school
8
programs or parental permission. In other words, as §  35C is currently drafted
and applied by the courts, the fact that a teacher is with a student is alone
insufficient to satisfy the ‘custody or ... supervision’ component of the child
abuse law. 
82 Op. Atty. Gen., at 107.
The Attorney General  applied the mutual consent requirement enunciated in Pope and
thus determined  that  whether the sexual contact occurs on or off school premises is not
dispositive; rather it is whether “the parent has impliedly consented to transfer ‘responsibility
for supervision’ of the child to the teacher and the teacher has accepted that responsibility
‘in connection with [the teacher’s] academic duties,”  reviewing, in the process,  the other
Maryland cases either applying Pope or interpreting the applicable portion of the child abuse
statute.  82 Op. Atty. Gen., at 110, quoting, Pope, at 323, 396 A.2d 1063.  See Newman v.
State, 65 Md. App. 85, 99, 499 A.2d 492, 499 (1985) (evidence that the boyfriend of the
mother of the child for whom the victim babysat transported the victim to and from her
babysitting job, which  on several occasions  was done in his home, paid her for babysitting
and, from the victim's mother, that he “was to take care of [the victim] and insure her safety
to and from the house” sufficient to establish responsibility and supervision); Tapscott v.
State, 106 Md. App. 109, 141- 42, 664 A.2d 42, 58 (1995) (child's half-uncle could be found
“responsible for supervision” where  child's mother entrusted him with the child's care on
numerous occasions and considered him to be child's supervisor  whenever he and child were
together, and the half-uncle  agreed to pick the child up after work and spend the night at his
house);   Zaal v. State, 85 Md. App. 430, 436, 584 A.2d 119, 122 (1991), rev'd on other
9
grounds, 326 Md. 54, 602 A. 2d 1247 (1992) (“responsibility for supervision” inferable from
fact that victim's mother gave permission to the grandfather  for the child to accompany
grandfather and he took child from the home); Brackins v. State, 84 Md. App. 157, 164, 578
A.2d 300, 303-04 (1990) (stepfather could be charged with exploitation under the child abuse
statute where he was married to the victim's mother, resided in the same home, and was
responsible for the victim's care while the mother was working).
I agree with the Attorney General’s interpretation of Pope and his application of the
mutual consent test.    To establish the “responsibility for supervision” necessary to sustain
a conviction for child abuse, it is insufficient to prove that one of the parties engaging in the
prohibited conduct is a teacher and the other a student; “the fact that a teacher is with a
student is alone insufficient to satisfy the ‘custody or ... supervision’ component of the child
abuse law.”   82 Op. Atty. Gen., at. 107.  There must be a nexus between the teacher’s
profession and his or her interaction with the student.    Were it otherwise,  mere status, of
teacher and student, without regard to the nature or place of the interaction between them,
i.e., a special relationship, or evidence that the teacher accepted the responsibility, would be
enough to establish that  the  teacher had the requisite responsibility for supervision.    That,
of course, is inconsistent with the fact that the law does not impose any duty on a teacher, or
any other professional, to look after another when there is no special relationship requiring
that to be done.  See Pope, 284 Md. at 324, 396 A. 2d at 1064.  
This Court, in Pope, identified the required nexus.    Although articulated by way of
9Petitioner had assisted the victim academically, and acknowledged his responsibility
for her supervision at school.
10The majority detailed the extent of the petitioner’s relationship with the victim at
school: he “would sometimes see her in the halls of the school ... and would come into Ms.
Riggs’ classroom where the victim helped out after school, occasionally giving the victim
10
an example, rather than as the holding in that case, we expressly and deliberately focused on
the connection with the teacher’s academic duties as evidence of his or her consent to taking
responsibility for the supervision of children not his or her own.  Id. at 324, 396 A. 2d at
1063-64.    Had we intended the trigger to be something else, or broader, we easily could
have, and, I submit, would have, either explicitly said so or refrained from using the phrase,
“academic duties.” 9     The cases since Pope are consistent.    See Newman, Tapscott, Zaal,
and Brackins, all supra.    As we have seen, in each of them, there was more than a mere
relationship, familial or general, between the person found to be responsible and the victim,
there was, in fact, evidence that the person had indeed accepted the responsibility.
Accordingly, the Attorney General appropriately used the “academic duties” yardstick to
determine whether criminal liability attached for child abuse, wherever the conduct occurred,
on the school premises or off. 
There is no evidence in this case that supports the petitioner’s conviction of child
abuse.   In fact, the opposite is true, the undisputed evidence negates a finding of child abuse,
since that evidence does not establish the requirement of responsibility for supervision, as
prescribed by Article 27, § 35C (b) and defined by Pope.  It is undisputed, which the majority
acknowledges and concedes,10 that, although the petitioner was a teacher at the high school
help with math problems.  Petitioner also drove the victim home from school two or three
times.”   ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2002) [slip op. at 2]. Of course, these
interactions, even during the school day, do not add up to “academic duties.”   On the
contrary, they would seem to negate that characterization.   In any event, volunteering to
assist a student with math problems occasionally and driving her home two or three times
do not give rise to a future duty to look after that student.
11
that the victim attended, he did not teach her and she did not participate in any of the clubs
or other extracurricular activities in which the petitioner was involved.    It is also undisputed
that the day on which the sexual activities between the victim and the petitioner occurred was
the last day of school and, furthermore, that the sexual involvement occurred after 2:00 p.m.,
well after 12:30 p.m., when the school year ended.  The evidence was that the victim’s
mother neither asked the petitioner to drive her daughter home nor was aware that he would
be doing so.    Moreover, the victim’s mother testified that she never asked the petitioner to
be responsible for the supervision of her daughter either on the day when they engaged in
sexual relations or at any other time.    Indeed, and this is also undisputed, the victim did not
stay after school to assist the petitioner and she did not do so; rather she stayed after school
to assist another teacher and she, in fact, assisted that teacher.   The petitioner’s only
interaction with the victim at school that day was to invite her and the other teacher and her
daughter to lunch, drive them to a fast food establishment and back and to inquire of the
victim if she still needed a ride home.   This conduct was unrelated to the petitioner’s
academic duties.
As we have seen, the majority holds that the victim’s mother entrusted the victim to
12
the school as a whole and, thus, that any teacher at the high school has supervisory
responsibility with respect to any interactions with her on the school premises.    From that
premise, it reasons that if any one of the teachers undertakes to drive the victim home, that
teacher has  voluntarily extended that responsibility, with the result that the mother never
resumes responsibility expressly or by conduct.    
I reject the premise of the majority’s argument.    Simply because a parent sends a
child to school, thereby entrusting that child to the school, does not mean that every teacher
in that school has, or assumes, responsibility for supervision of that child.    Those with
whom the child interacts academically or in connection with school related activities - his or
her home room teacher, math teacher, english teacher or the advisors to clubs or athletic
groups to which he or she might belong - occupy that status, at the times of that interaction,
certainly and probably while the child is at school.    I am not at all sure that the other
teachers in the school, those with whom the child generally has no academic or school related
interactions, have, or assume, as a general matter, any such responsibility.    It may be, as the
principal testified, a teacher, under “[a]ny scenario on school campus, even if that teacher
is not on hall duty or even if that student is not a member of their class,” is responsible to
ensure the child’s safety, but that does not extend to any scenario off the school campus.
The principal also made this point, as the following colloquy demonstrates:
MR. HOOD:  Ms. Goldian, once the school day ends, and the teacher — if a
                       student is not seeing a teacher or if a student sees a teacher off
                       school grounds and it is not for an academic activity, it is not 
                         detention, it is not part of a club or a team, and the teacher sees
13
                      students off school grounds and not during school hours, that  
                      teacher does not have responsibility for that student, does he?
A [By Ms. Goldian, the principal]  No.
*     *     *     *
MR COX:    Redirect, if I may.
*     *     *     *
         In a hypothetical scenario, what if that teacher has removed that
                    student from school grounds?
 
A                I don’t know.   I  think it would determine why they were removed
                  from the school grounds. Did it have to do with school.  (sic)
 *     *     *     *
MR. HOOD: If it didn't have anything to do with school, then the teacher would
                     not have any responsibility, correct?
A               I think that’s correct.    I want to emphasize I think that’s correct.
This is consistent with the law, which does not impose on any individual any  legal obligation
to care for, or look after, the welfare of a stranger, adult or child, without a special
relationship.   Pope, 284 Md. at 324, 396 A. 2d at 1064.
Furthermore, the majority is simply wrong when it identifies the petitioner as the teacher
with the responsibility for supervision of the victim.   That responsibility rested with the
teacher for whose benefit the victim remained after school, the one she assisted in her room.
 It was that teacher in whom the responsibility for supervision would have continued in the
absence of its termination or resumption by the victim’s mother.    There simply were no
‘“official’ supervisory interactions with the victim that began at school.” ___ Md. at ___,
11The defendant was not charged with child abuse, which, under Missouri law also
applies to “those responsible for the care, custody, and control of the child,” defined, for that
purpose, as “those included but not limited to the parents or guardian of a child, other
members of the child's household, or those exercising supervision over a child for any part
of a twenty-four hour day.”  Id. at 697.
14
___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 10].   Driving students home or taking them to lunch with a
fellow teacher is not a part of a teacher’s academic duties and those were the only
responsibilities that the petitioner assumed on the day in question, on the school premises.
 Thus, the petitioner never had, or assumed, responsibility for the victim’s supervision and,
so, it could not have  remained with him or been extended by an offer to drive the victim
home.   The majority expands Pope  far beyond its intendment and, in the process, contrary
to the law, places additional responsibility on teachers to look after and care for children to
whom they have no academic or professional duty, simply because of their status.
The majority relies on State v. Pasteur, 9 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).   Rather
than support its position, that case actually supports the petitioner’s argument.   There, the
defendant was charged with, inter alia endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree,11
which for conviction, required proof that the defendant was a “person . . . otherwise charged
with the care and custody” of the child.   The defendant, a band teacher, argued “that a
teacher should not automatically be charged with the care and  custody of his students, absent
specific evidence of a special relationship between the parties, such as guardianship.”  Id.
at 697.    Interpreting the words “care and custody,” to refer to “supervision” or “immediate
charge and control exercised by a person or an authority,” id., quoting WEBSTER'S
15
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1967), the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had care and custody because he was the victim’s 
“band teacher, and as such, he held a confidential relationship with her....such a
relationship put him in a custodial position.  Further, the evidence showed that both
instances of misconduct occurred while Defendant and [the victim] were engaged
in school-related activities, once following a school play and once inside the school
after band practice.”
Id.  at 697-98.    By contrast, in this case, the petitioner was not the victim’s teacher and the
sexual misconduct occurred off school property and not while the petitioner and the victim
were engaged in school-related activities. 
The Missouri court’s point, reflected in that portion of its opinion quoted by the
majority, was well made.   But it was not  the importance of the generic “teacher” about
which it spoke, rather it was about the relationship that exists between a student, pupil and
his or her teacher.   This becomes quite clear when the entirety of the discussion is
reproduced:
“Teachers are undeniably charged with the ‘care and custody’ of students.
When parents send their child to school, they entrust the teacher with that
child's well-being. For nearly a century, courts have recognized this basic
principle. In  State v. Hesterly, 182 Mo. 16, 81 S.W. 624, 627 (Mo. 1904),
the court stated that ‘we can conceive of the creation of no higher trust
than that of parents confiding the care of their children to the teacher.’
The court further noted that a teacher's duty of care and custody extends
beyond the confines of the schoolyard. ‘The confidential relation of
teacher and pupil exists as well after the child reaches home as it does in
the schoolroom. . . . The evil intended to be prevented is the abuse of the
confidential relation, and that exists wherever they may be, and on all
occasions, as long as the relation of teacher and pupil is in existence.’  81
S.W. at 627.
In the instant case, the evidence indicated that Defendant was S.S.'s band
12The jury was instructed as follows:
“As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt:
“First, on or about the 19th day of November, and the 27th day
of November, 1997, in the County of Dunklin, State of
Missouri, the defendant touched the breast of [S.S.], and
“Second, that this conduct constituted sexual contact, and
“Third, that [S.S.] was less than seventeen years old, and
“Fourth, that the defendant acted knowingly in engaging in
sexual contact with [S.S.], a child less than seventeen years of
age, and
“Fifth, that defendant was a school teacher, and charged with the
care and custody of the child,
“Then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of endangering the
welfare of a child in the first degree.
“However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty
of that offense.”
State v. Pasteur, 9 S.W.3d 689, 696 n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).  (Emphasis in original).
16
teacher, and as such, he held a confidential relationship with her. By
virtue of Defendant's position, he was able to exert influence upon her,
not only within the confines of the school, but outside of it as well.
Section 568.045.1(2) seeks to protect children who are placed in the ‘care
and custody’ of any ‘person’ and as such, should be construed to include
teachers. The trial  court, therefore, did not err in submitting Instruction
No. 6 to the jury.” [12]
Id. at 697.
Another basis for the majority holding is that there was no temporal break in the
teacher and student relationship.   ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 9] (quoting
Anderson, 142 Md. App. at 509-10, 790 A. 2d at 739).    As I have previously explained, the
petitioner was not the victim’s teacher within the contemplation of the child abuse statute.
 Moreover and in addition, the petitioner’s response is worth noting:
17
“The Court [of Special Appeals] stated that it may have reached a
different result if the [petitioner] and [the victim] had parted and met at
a location unconnected with Kenwood High School....The same
student/teacher relationship or lack thereof existed whether they left
school together or met later. In either factual scenario, the [petitioner] was
not with the child in relation to his academic duties. Accordingly, the
implied consent for responsibility which must exist between the parent
and the [petitioner] is not present. There was insufficient evidence to
prove that the [petitioner] had responsibility for supervision of [the
victim].”
I dissent.  Judges Eldridge and Wilner join in the views expressed herein.