Title: American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

681 So. 2d 1337 (1996)
AMERICAN LEGION POST NUMBER 57
v.
Regenia LEAHEY.
1930990.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 12, 1996.
James J. Bushnell, Jr. of Gleissner, Bowron, Bushnell & Henderson, Birmingham, Forrest S. Latta and W. Pemble DeLashmet of Pierce, Carr & Alford, P.C., Mobile, for Appellant.
Lee A. Rudolph and Earl P. Underwood, Jr. of Underwood & Rudolph, Anniston, for Appellee.
Richard S. Manley of Manley, Traeger & Perry, Demopolis, J. Mark Hart and Sally A. Broatch of Spain, Gillon, Grooms, Blan & Nettles, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Ass'n in support of appellant.
Andrew T. Citrin and David G. Wirtes, Jr. of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, Mobile, for Amicus Curiae Alabama Trial Lawyers Ass'n in support of appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
This interlocutory appeal comes from an order holding unconstitutional Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-45, which would allow the defendant in this personal injury action to introduce evidence that the plaintiff received from a collateral source payments for her medical or hospital expenses. Regenia Leahey was injured when she slipped and fell on the premises of American Legion Post Number 57 ("American Legion"); she brought an action against American Legion, alleging that it had negligently or wantonly caused her injuries. Leahey filed a motion to declare § 12-21-45 unconstitutional, and she served a copy of the motion on the attorney general of the State of Alabama. The attorney general acknowledged *1338 service of the motion and waived further notice or participation in the action.[1] After proceedings on the motion, the circuit court entered an order granting it, and, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., stated that the order involved a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would be beneficial as provided in the rule. This Court granted American Legion's petition for permission to appeal, pursuant to Rule 5.
Against the constitutionality of § 12-21-45, Leahey argued, and the circuit court agreed, that it violates: the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by Ala. Const.1901, § 11; the right to a remedy and to access to the courts as guaranteed by § 13; the constitutional guaranties of equal protection, see §§ 1, 6, and 22, and due process, §§ 6 and 13; and the principle of separation of powers as preserved by §§ 42 and 43.
The collateral source rule has been summarized as follows:
22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 566 (1988) (citations omitted).
This Court first articulated the collateral source rule in Long v. Kansas City, M. & B. *1339 R.R., 170 Ala. 635, 641-42, 54 So. 62, 63-64 (1910):
This Court has consistently held that collateral source evidence is inadmissible. See, e.g., Gribble v. Cox,, 349 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala.1977); Carlisle v. Miller, 275 Ala. 440, 444, 155 So. 2d 689, 691 (1963); Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 289, 154 So. 2d 297, 299-300 (1963); Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 385, 199 So. 537, 538 (1940).
The leading treatise on the law of evidence in Alabama analyzes this rule as being analogous to the rule that evidence of a defendant's liability insurance is not admissible, a point that is significant in light of the fact that § 12-21-45 does not purport to make evidence of the defendant's insurance admissible:
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 189.04(2) (4th ed.1991) (citations omitted).
The legislature, in 1979, eight years before it enacted § 12-21-45, enacted a statute abrogating *1340 the collateral source rule in product liability actions. That statute, now § 6-5-522, Ala.Code 1975, reads, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) Thus, in the 1979 act, the legislature used language that at least gives some guidance as to the purpose for which the collateral source evidence is to be admitted.[2] Any such language is noticeably missing from § 12-21-45, the statute now being challenged. Compare Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-545, by which the legislature, at the same time[3] it enacted the provision codified at § 12-21-45, enacted for medical malpractice actions a provision almost identical[4] to § 12-21-45, also omitting any reference to the effect of the evidence on an award of damages.
This Court has addressed § 6-5-522 once, in Hammond v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 436 So. 2d 842 (Ala.1983), noting that no constitutional challenge had been made, holding that the circuit court had not misconstrued it, and remarking that any error in construction would have been harmless anyway because the jury had returned a verdict for the defendant on the question of liability:
436 So. 2d  at 844. Thus, even in noting that no constitutional challenge had been made to § 6-5-522, the Court stated that that section implicated §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution, which this Court has held to guarantee the right to equal protection of the laws. See Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.1995).
This Court has addressed § 12-21-45 once, in Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So. 2d 1320, 1325 (Ala.1993), holding that the circuit court "did not err in refusing Senn's requested jury charges on the collateral source rule," because the collateral source rule "was abrogated by Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-45." No constitutional challenge to § 12-21-45 was raised in Senn.[5] This Court has not addressed § 6-5-545. Thus, the constitutional arguments against the legislative efforts to modify or abolish the collateral source rule are presented here for the first time.
Federal courts sitting in Alabama have addressed these statutes and, in some of the cases addressing these statutes the federal *1341 courts have addressed the question of the validity of these statutes under the United States Constitution. The federal courts have reached conflicting results. Bradford v. Bruno's, Inc., 41 F.3d 625 (11th Cir.1995); Craig v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 866 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.Ala.1993), affirmed, 38 F.3d 573 (11th Cir.1994); Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D.Ala.1992); Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 786 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.Ala.1992). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Bradford that § 12-21-45 provides a substantive rule of law to be applied in federal courts, thereby presumably overruling the district courts' holdings in Craig and Killian that § 12-21-45 provides only an evidentiary rule that does not apply in a federal court, although the affirmance of Craig leaves a possible conflict between the opinion of the three-judge panel in Bradford and that of the three-judge panel in Craig. Bradford expressly notes that no constitutional issue was raised, however, and characterizes as "dictum" Judge Guin's alternative holding in Craig that § 12-21-45 is unconstitutional. 41 F.3d  at 626, fn. **.
Nevertheless, Judge Guin's analysis in Craig is the most pertinent writing from the federal courts on the constitutionality of § 12-21-45, and we therefore reproduce portions of it here:
866 F. Supp.  at 1373.
See also Judge Acker's pointed criticism in Killian of § 12-21-45, including the following:
792 F. Supp.  at 1219-21.
In light of these two lengthy and strong criticisms of § 12-21-45, the passing remark by the trial court in Richards that "it will not find Ala.Code [(1975),] §§ 6-5-522 and 12-21-45, which abolish the collateral source rule, unconstitutional," 786 F. Supp.  at 966, does not carry much weight.
In Bradford, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled the holdings of both Craig and Killianthat § 12-21-45 provides a rule of procedure that is not to be applied in federal courts. The Bradford holding is based on the fact that the Eleventh Circuit "held in Southern v. Plumb Tools, a Division of O'Ames Corp., 696 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.1983), that Alabama's common law collateral source rule was substantive law to be applied by federal courts in diversity cases." 41 F.2d  at 626. The Bradford court also wrote: "[Southern] instructs us in this case because § 12-21-45, which is Alabama's statutory modification of its common law collateral source rule, is as much substantive law as was the common law rule it modified." 41 F.2d  at 626. We respectfully note that the Court of Appeals does not seem to have considered the fact, so well expressed by Judges Acker and Guin, that while § 12-21-45 explicitly purports to change the law on the admissibility of collateral source evidence, it gives no guidance as *1343 to the effect that evidence is to have on the law of damages. Thus, while we agree that the collateral source rule as a whole is a rule of substantive law, we also agree with Judges Acker and Guin that the partial abrogation of it only as to admissibility of evidence affects only the procedural component of the collateral source rule, not its substantive component.
In support of her motion to have § 12-21-45 declared unconstitutional, Leahey filed a copy of a brief supporting a similar motion that had been filed in Scott v. Rheem Mfg. Co., CV92-854, Circuit Court of Baldwin County, and a copy of the circuit court's January 1994 order granting the motion in Scott. In granting Leahey's motion, the circuit court referred to the Scott v. Rheem Mfg. brief as presenting a "substantially correct interpretation of prevailing U.S. and Alabama constitutional law in regard to the instant question" and stated that, while the court was not "in total agreement with every point argued in said brief," the brief was "basically adopted by the Court by reference." Many of the authorities discussed herein are cited in the Scott v. Rheem Mfg. brief and are addressed in the briefs of the appellant and the brief of amicus curiae Alabama Trial Lawyers Association. In addition to studying the arguments in these synoptic briefs, we have studied the briefs of the appellee and the brief of amicus curiae Alabama Defense Lawyers Association, and we have independently researched the question.
Other states have enacted statutes affecting the collateral source rule, and the courts of several of those states have ruled on the constitutionality of the enactments. The statutory provisions, as well as the state constitutional provisions under which they are reviewed, vary considerably, so we may draw analogies to those cases only by paying careful attention to these differences. On this point, the briefs of the parties and the amici have been especially helpful.
In Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, Inc., 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991), the Supreme Court of Georgia considered a statute that provided:
261 Ga. at 41-42, 402 S.E.2d  at 269-70, fn. 1, quoting OCGA § 51-12-1(b). The court discussed the basis for the collateral source rule, referring to collateral source evidence as having an "infectiously prejudicial effect," 261 Ga. at 43, 402 S.E.2d  at 270, and held that the statute violated the state constitution in two respects. First, the court held that the first sentence of Art. I, § I, Para. II, of the Georgia Constitution of 1983"Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete"provides protection over and above that given by the second sentence, which guarantees equal protection of the laws. The court then held that OCGA § 51-12-1(b) violated that first sentence:
261 Ga. at 45-46, 402 S.E.2d  at 272 (citation omitted; bracketed material in original).
Thus, while insisting that the constitutional provision at issue provided protection somehow greater than, or different from, the protection against deprivation of equal protection of the laws, the Supreme Court of Georgia held the Georgia statute abolishing the collateral source rule unconstitutional, based on a rationale that is difficult to distinguish from an equal protection analysis. Moreover, the court in footnote four also held that the statute violated due process:
261 Ga. at 45, 402 S.E.2d  at 272, fn. 4 (citation omitted). Substitute "Alabama" for "Georgia" and "§ 12-21-45" for the Georgia citation, and this exact statement could be made in this opinion.
In Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1325 (Fla.1981), the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute that invalidated, in actions arising from automobile collisions, not only the collateral source rule but also the subrogation rights of the plaintiff's insurer. The decision was based on the fact that the Florida legislature had enacted "no-fault" provisions designed to reduce legal actions among persons involved in automobile collisions, see 403 So. 2d  at 1329. Furthermore, the court had earlier held that evidence of a defendant's liability insurance was admissible, see 403 So. 2d  at 1330. Thus, Florida law on the subject is so different from Alabama's that Purdy presents little that is informative on the question before us.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a Minnesota statute allowing a defendant, after a jury has returned a verdict for the plaintiff, to file a motion for "determination of collateral sources," whereupon the court "shall reduce the award" by
Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 331, fn. 4 (Minn.1990), quoting Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1986). The court addressed an equal protection argument and found the statute to be rationally related to the "legitimate purpose[s]" of "prevent[ing] double recoveries by plaintiffs," 453 N.W.2d  at 331, and "reduc[ing] tort liability insurance premiums," id., at 332.
In Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980), the Supreme Court of Iowa, over a strong dissent, upheld a statute abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases, overturning the trial court's holding that the statute violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of the laws. We find the dissent much better reasoned in its detailed showing that the statute arbitrarily classified medical malpractice tortfeasors differently from other tortfeasors, malpractice victims differently from other plaintiffs, and malpractice plaintiffs with insurance differently from self-insured malpractice plaintiffs. The dissent quoted very persuasively from American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1980).[6] Because the equal protection issues pertinent to the medical malpractice statutes are not present here, we will not discuss those Iowa and California opinions in detail. We note the following pertinent point in Chief Justice Reynoldson's dissent in Rudolph:
293 N.W.2d  at 564 (Reynoldson, C.J., dissenting).
Furthermore, we agree with Chief Justice Reynoldson's criticism of the majority's failure to offer an in-depth analysis:
Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d  at 562 (Reynoldson, C.J., dissenting).
Abolition of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions has also been upheld in Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977), and Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S. Ct. 214, 88 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1985).
Abolition of the collateral source rule in actions against municipalities has been upheld by intermediate courts in Murray v. Nicol, 224 N.J.Super. 303, 540 A.2d 239 (1988), and Germantown Savings Bank v. City of Philadelphia, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 508, 512 A.2d 756 (1986), aff'd, 517 Pa. 313, 535 A.2d 1052 (1988).
Kentucky's abolition of the collateral source rule was upheld in Edwards v. Land, 851 S.W.2d 484 (Ky.App.1992), cert. denied, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.1993). However, that decision was overruled, and the court held that the Kentucky statute violated the principle of separation of powers. O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky.1995).
Three aspects of the operation of § 12-21-45 weigh heavily against the argument that the statute is constitutional. First and foremost, § 12-21-45 declares that collateral source evidence "shall be admissible as competent evidence," but it does not declare what that evidence is competent to prove. The statute does not purport to change the law of damages or to declare what effect the jury may give to the collateral source evidence. If it is intended to give the jury the option of reducing the amount of proven medical and hospital expenses by the amount of the collateral source paymentas indeed it must be intended, if it does anything other than to declare irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence to be "competent" evidence is it then intended to require the jury so to reduce its award? If so, why does it not say so? Was the legislature apprehensive that such a requirement would violate § 11? However, if the jury is not required to reduce the award by the amount of the collateral source payment, does the statute completely leave to the jury's discretion whether to award the full amount of the proven hospital and medical expenses, to award only the difference between those expenses and the plaintiff's collateral reimbursement, or to award some amount in between? If this is the intent, it seems that the legislature has given the jury unbridled discretion in the award of compensatory damages.
Under either construction of the statute (i.e., whether it provides for a required setoff or for a discretionary setoff), a grave problem arises regarding the subrogation rights of the plaintiff's subrogeeordinarily an insurer, for insurance is the most typical case in which the plaintiff will receive collateral source payments, and most insurance policies give subrogation rights to the insurer. Although the plaintiff is allowed to prove his insurer's subrogation rights and his cost in obtaining the insurance, there is no provision in the act requiringor even suggesting that the jury is to award the full medical and hospital expense to the plaintiff simply because a subrogee is entitled to recover. On the contrary, the jury is perhaps less likely to award the full amount to the plaintiff if it knows that the bulk of the award will be paid to an insurer. The jury could improperly *1346 reach such a result either because of an irrational bias against insurers or because of a rational conclusion that the insurer has contracted to pay benefits such as the expenses at issue for the consideration of the premiums paid and therefore is the party most appropriate to bear the loss.[7]
The latter point raises another significant problem: a jury will be informed under § 12-21-45 that the plaintiff is insured, but will not be informed that the defendant is insured. The very fact that the fact of the plaintiff's insurance is introduced into evidence but no mention is made of insurance for the defendant may lead the jury to assume that the defendant has none and to improperly base a verdict on that assumption.
Thus, these three pointsthe apparent attempt to change the law of evidence without expressing the effect on the law of damages, the prejudicial effect on the subrogation rights of a plaintiff's insurer, and the admission into evidence of the fact that the plaintiff is insured without a concomitant admission of evidence that the defendant is insuredpresent serious problems to the constitutionality of the statute.
The Court in Baader v. State, 201 Ala. 76, 77-78, 77 So. 370, 371-72 (1917), stated:
(Emphasis added.) This list of limitations on the legislative power to affect the right to trial by jury has been held in later cases[8] to be unduly narrow, but even within the terms of this list § 12-21-45 violates § 11. The legislative attempt to allow introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's insurance without allowing introduction of evidence of the defendant's insurance overturns the careful balance that courts have always observed, whereby neither party's insurance or indemnification is admissible, because of its tendency to bias the jury, to "lead[] away from impartiality."
The statute also violates the guaranty of equal protection, because it allows evidence of the plaintiff's insurance coverage but not of the defendant's. It denies equal protection because it serves to diminish awards to plaintiffs with insurance, even if their insurer is subrogated to the recovery, but provides no diminution in awards to wealthier plaintiffs who are self-insured. This is the point made in Denton when the Georgia Supreme Court says, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial [or the damages] a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 261 Ga. at 45, 402 S.E.2d  at 272. Section 12-21-45 also violates the equal protection rights of plaintiffs with injuries that require expenditures for medical or hospital treatments, as opposed to those with only property damagethe section does not make collateral source payments for damage to property admissible.
Section 6 of the Alabama Constitution has been held to guarantee due process of law in civil as well as criminal cases. Pike v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 263 Ala. 59, 81 So. 2d 254 (1955) (as extended on application for rehearing); Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of Environmental Mgmt., 437 So. 2d 82 (Ala.1983). "The courts have found that this right is violated when a statute or regulation is unduly vague, unreasonable, *1347 or overbroad." Ross Neely, 437 So. 2d  at 84; Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So. 2d 208, 215 (Ala.1988).
We also agree with the point implied in Killian that the statute violates the due process guaranty by stating that collateral source evidence is "competent" without stating what it is competent to prove or what effect its admission will have. One approach to resolving this problem would be to hold simply that § 12-21-45 does not affect the law of damages, but only the law of evidence. Under such an approach, a court reviewing a verdict on a motion for new trial to determine whether the verdict was inadequate would simply apply the law as to special damages and set the verdict aside if the verdict was significantly below the undisputed amount of medical and hospital expenses. A jury is not free to disregard undisputed evidence of special damages and award an amount inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for injuries proximately caused by the defendant's negligence or other wrongful conduct. Thompson v. Cooper, 551 So. 2d 1030 (Ala.1989); Ex parte Patterson, 459 So. 2d 883 (Ala.1984); McCain v. Redman Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 809 (Ala.1980); Cocke v. Edwards, 215 Ala. 8, 108 So. 857 (1926); Roland v. Krazy Glue, Inc., 342 So. 2d 383 (Ala.Civ.App.1977). Such a construction would effectively eviscerate § 12-21-45 and worsen its confusing effect because it would decidedly make the "competent" collateral source evidence immaterial, prejudicial, and confusing to the jury. In such an application, the statute would violate the plaintiff's right under §§ 6 and 13 of the Constitution to a remedy by due process of law.
On the other hand, if the Court were to attempt to save the statute by holding that it gives the jury discretion whether to reduce its award by the amount of the collateral source recovery or some portion thereof, a due process violation would arise from a different direction: the standardless submission to the jury of a complaint for compensatory damages. This violation is made more obvious by the fact that medical and hospital damages are special damages.
Finally, if the Court were to try to save the statute by reading it to require the jury to reduce its award by the amount of the collateral source payment, except to the extent that the plaintiff is required to reimburse the collateral payor, then § 12-21-45 would still violate the due process guaranty because of its introduction of evidence that the plaintiff is insured without allowing evidence that the defendant is insured, thereby inherently undermining the fairness of the proceeding. This reading would violate not only the plaintiff's right to due process, but also the right of the plaintiff's insurer not to be deprived of its contractual subrogation rights without due process of law, because, as explained above, the lopsided introduction of insurance evidence would tend to cause the jury not to require the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff's insurer for an indemnity that the insurer has contracted to provide and for which it has received premiums.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court correctly held that § 12-21-45 is unconstitutional. The order declaring the statute unconstitutional is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
SHORES, KENNEDY, INGRAM, and COOK, JJ., concur.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent from the holding that Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-45, violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, § 11. See Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 903-14 (Ala.1993) (Houston, J., dissenting); Ex parte Giles, 632 So. 2d 577, 587-89 (Ala.1993) (Houston, J., concurring in the result), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2694, 129 L. Ed. 2d 825 (1994); Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., dissenting), cert. denied, U.S. (1996); Ex parte Jackson, 672 So. 2d 810 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 606-07, 21 So. 2d 827 (1945); and Amendment 328, § 6.11, Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
I dissent from the holding that Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-45, violates the "phantom" *1348 equal protection clause in the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 592 So. 2d 156, 174-77 (Ala.1991) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Smith v. Schulte, supra (Houston, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion states:
681 So. 2d  at 1338.
Apparently, the majority opinion affirms on the basis that § 12-21-45 violates "the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by Ala. Const.1901, § 11" and "the constitutional guaranties of equal protection, see §§ 1, 6, and 22."
In my opinion, § 12-21-45 is not unconstitutional for any of the reasons offered by Leahey.
Section 6 of the Constitution relates to rights in criminal prosecutions ("That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to ..."). Section 12-21-45 has nothing to do with criminal prosecutions. Due process, which is guaranteed in civil trials by § 13 of the Constitution ("that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law"), guarantees a person notice,[9] a hearing according to that notice, and a judgment entered in accordance with the notice and hearing,[10]Ex parte Rice, 265 Ala. 454, 92 So. 2d 16 (1957), and restricts the legislature from making unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive modifications of fundamental rights. Thompson v. Wiik, Reimer & Sweet, 391 So. 2d 1016 (Ala.1980). I fail to see how § 12-21-45 violates the due process guaranty.
No remedy that Leahey had was curtailed after the injury had occurred and the right of action vested. Therefore, there was no violation of the right-to-a-remedy portion of § 13. Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942).
Likewise, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-45, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine (§§ 42 and 43) of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. See Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 606-07, 21 So. 2d 827 (1945).
Amendment 328, § 6.11, Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
In my opinion, the legislature had the power to enact § 12-21-45. Whether it was expedient or wise for the legislature to enact this statute is not the judiciary's concern. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9-10, 18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944).
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, J., concur.
[1]  See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-227; Terry v. City of Decatur, 601 So. 2d 949 (Ala.1992); Wallace v. State, 507 So. 2d 466 (Ala.1987); Barger v. Barger, 410 So. 2d 17 (Ala.1982).
[2]  Note also that for product liability actions, if the collateral source payor is subrogated to the plaintiff's recovery, § 6-5-524 renders all of the evidence on the subject inadmissible, just as under the common law collateral source rule. This provision also starkly contrasts with § 12-21-45.
[3]  Section 12-21-45 derives from Act No. 87-187, Ala. Acts 1987, whereas § 6-5-545 derives from Act No. 87-189, Ala. Acts 1987.
[4]  Identical except that § 12-21-45(a) begins, "In all civil actions," whereas § 6-5-545(a) begins, "In all actions," meaning all medical liability actions, to which § 6-5-545 is limited.
[5]  This Court has made passing references to § 12-21-45 in Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d 1012, (Ala.1993); Star Freight, Inc. v. Sheffield, 587 So. 2d 946, 959, fn. 7 (Ala.1991) (§ 12-21-45 "may apply" in cases filed after June 11, 1987); and Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772, 775, fn. 5 (Ala.1990). The Court of Civil Appeals once declined to address a constitutional challenge to § 12-21-45 because the plaintiff had not served the attorney general. Roszell v. Martin, 591 So. 2d 511, 516-17 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991).
[6]  The judgment of the California Court of Appeals in American Bank & Trust Co. was affirmed, but its holding of constitutionality was overturned in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 (1984).
[7]  The latter basis for a verdict omitting the subrogated amount would be improper, though perhaps rational, for several reasons: one, the insurer's calculation of the risk presumably factors in the possibility of subrogation; two, a conclusion that the plaintiff's insurer is the best party to bear the risk overlooks the fault of the defendant, which is the proper basis for assigning responsibility for the loss; and three, the jury would be basing its conclusion on the incomplete information indicating that the plaintiff is insured, without having the information indicating that the defendant is insured, as explained in the following paragraph of text.
[8]  See, generally, Clark v. Container Corp. of America, Inc., 589 So. 2d 184, 198-99 (Ala.1991) (Adams, J., concurring in the result); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995).
[9]  See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996), discussing "notice" as a component of due process under the United States Constitution.
[10]  "[A]ll courts shall be open" (§ 13, Constitution) to assure such hearing and resolution.