Title: The People v. Julio Borrell

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 61  
The People &c.,
            Respondent-Appellant,
        v. 
Julio Borrell, Also Known as 
Julio Cesar Borrell,
            Appellant-Respondent.
Robert C. Newman, for appellant-respondent.
Edward D. Saslaw, for respondent-appellant.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Before us, by leave of a Judge of this Court, are appeals
from an Appellate Division order granting defendant's petition
for a writ of error coram nobis.  The petition alleges that
defendant, on consolidated appeals from two judgments convicting
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No. 61
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him of robbery and related crimes, was not afforded effective
assistance of counsel.  Although the Appellate Division made no
express finding as to the manner in which defendant's appellate
representation had been deficient, it would appear that it
faulted counsel for failing to raise the issue of whether
consecutive sentences had been properly imposed with respect to
two counts of a fourteen-count Queens County indictment, both of
which counts charged defendant with first degree robbery based on
events which transpired in close succession during the armed
robbery of a bar and its patrons on May 14, 1994.  The Court's
decision, however, said no more upon the issue than that the
sentences on the two counts should have been concurrent since the
underlying convictions arose from the same transaction (49 AD3d
890, 892-893 [2d Dept 2008]).  But the dispositive question on
this coram nobis application was not whether the consecutive
sentence had been in error, but whether the failure of appellate
counsel to raise the issue of the sentence’s legality deprived
defendant of the advocacy to which he was constitutionally
entitled. 
It is well settled that criminal defendants are entitled 
under both the Federal and State Constitutions to effective
assistance of appellate counsel (see People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277,
281-282 [2004]).  In Stultz, we held that the "meaningful
representation" standard, announced in People v Baldi in the
context of evaluating the constitutional adequacy of trial
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No. 61
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representation (54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]), applies as well to
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (see
Stultz, 2 NY3d at 284), and that appellate counsel provides
meaningful representation when he or she displays "a competent
grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure, supported by
appropriate authority and argument" (id. at 285).
The essential inquiry in assessing the constitutional
adequacy of appellate representation is, then, not whether a
better result might have been achieved, but whether, viewed
objectively, counsel's actions are consistent with those of a
reasonably competent appellate attorney (see People v
Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799 [1985]).  To be meaningful,
appellate representation need not be perfect, and representation
may be meaningful even where appellate lawyers have failed to
brief potentially meritorious issues (see Stultz, 2 NY3d at 285). 
We have recognized that this standard is not stringent --
that it is in fact "undemanding" (see People v Turner, 5 NY3d
476, 482 [2005]) -- and, in applying it, we have often tolerated
errors by counsel where the overall representation was
nonetheless capable of characterization as "meaningful" (see e.g.
People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184 [1994]).  While there are rare cases
in which a single substantial error is sufficiently "’egregious
and prejudicial’ as to deprive a defendant of his constitutional
right" to effective representation (Turner, 5 NY3d at 480), this
is not such a case. 
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No. 61
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In Turner, our determination that coram nobis relief was
appropriate turned upon appellate counsel's failure to argue that
trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise a "clear-
cut and completely dispositive" statute of limitations defense
(id. at 481).  Here, by contrast, the argument not made depends
upon an analysis of a complex, continuous transaction and the
overlapping elements of the nine counts on which defendant was
ultimately convicted.  The argument is by no means so "clear-cut"
that it "should have been apparent to any reasonable appellate
counsel" (id. at 483).  
Nor is the consequence of appellate counsel's failure to
make the sentencing argument clear, even at this late juncture. 
While we have no occasion to reach the merits of the argument on
this appeal, we note that it has to this point been considered by
the Appellate Division twice in the coram nobis context with
evidently differing outcomes (compare 39 AD3d 871 [2d Dept 2007]
with 49 AD3d 890 [2d Dept 2008]), and has been advanced
unsuccessfully on a CPL 440.20 motion from which, apparently, no
appeal was taken.  Although this peculiar and tortuous history is
not dispositive of the argument's ultimate merit, it is
indicative of its far from clear prospects.  Counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise an issue of such uncertain
efficacy on the appeal. 
This is particularly the case in light of defendant's
failure “to demonstrate the absence of [any] strategic or other
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No. 61
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legitimate explanations" for a decision not to brief the issue
(see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]).  Appellate
counsel could have made the tactical choice to forego raising the
sentencing issue to concentrate his efforts on the other issues
(see Turner, 5 NY3d at 485).  Notably, appellate counsel was
assigned on the appeal to challenge not one, but two judgments of
conviction against defendant, each based on a separate incident
and each convicting defendant of numerous crimes.  Counsel
briefed six issues, among them that defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized from his apartment and vehicle had been
erroneously denied, that defendant's wife should not have been
permitted to testify against him, and that defendant should not
have been compelled to appear for an in-court identification
procedure.  These points were supported with appropriate
authority and were, in part, successful in obtaining relief:
convictions against defendant on seven counts were reversed upon
the argued ground that certain inculpatory evidence had been
unlawfully seized and should have been suppressed.  Given the
breadth and substantiality of the issues raised on the
consolidated appeal, we cannot say that there could have been no
legitimate explanation for counsel to forego raising the
sentencing issue (cf. id.).
While it may ultimately be determined that defendant should
have been sentenced concurrently, as he now contends, and that
the representation at issue would have been more efficacious had
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No. 61
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the issue been raised on the appeal, the relevant and, indeed,
dispositive threshold issue on this coram nobis application is
not whether defendant’s representation could have been better but
whether it was, on the whole, constitutionally adequate.  This
less exacting standard was met by counsel on the appeal.  
Accordingly, on the People's appeal, the order of the
Appellate Division should be reversed and the defendant's
application for a writ of error coram nobis should be denied. 
Defendant's appeal should be dismissed as academic.  
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People v Julio Cesar Borrell
No. 61 
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.  Although the Appellate
Division may not have expressly stated its reason for granting
defendant's application for a writ of coram nobis, the court's
order reveals that, at the very least, it viewed appellate
counsel as ineffective for failing to challenge the propriety of
defendant's sentences.  Indeed, the court explicitly held that
the sentences on two counts should not have run consecutively
since the underlying convictions arose from the same transaction. 
In my view, it cannot be said that it was error for the court to
grant defendant's application on this ground, as appellate courts
routinely grant coram nobis applications when appellate counsel
fails to raise an issue on direct appeal that the court concludes
may have merit (see e.g. People v Griffin, 59 AD3d 1106 [4th Dept
2009]; People v Rivera, 52 AD3d 1290 [4th Dept 2008]; People v
Johnson, 43 AD3d 1453 [4th Dept 2007]; People v Antoniou,861
NYS2d 598 [3d Dept 2008]; People v Smith, 21 AD3d 599 [3d Dept
2005]).  We should not discourage this practice.
While in People v Turner, we held that it is a "rare"
occasion where a single failing amounts to ineffective assistance
of counsel, there is no basis for finding that the alleged error
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No. 061
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here is not such a case.  Notably, had appellate counsel
successfully raised the sentencing error, the result may have led
to a reduction in defendant's incarceration time.  Additionally,
a review of the record reveals that appellate counsel's
performance, viewed in its totality, was less than meaningful. 
Appellate counsel's brief, which as noted by the majority was for
two separate felony indictments and convictions (maj opn at 5),
was only thirty-seven pages long.  Contrary to the majority's
view (maj opn at 5-6), I don't think it can be said that
appellate counsel strategically decided to forego briefing the
sentencing issue to instead brief others as there was ample
opportunity for appellate counsel to raise all of the issues. 
Furthermore, although appellate counsel prevailed on two of the
issues raised in the brief, those issues were only in respect to
one of the two judgments of conviction and importantly, did not
pertain to the convictions at issue on this appeal.  Finally,
despite the multiple convictions involved and severity of the
prison term faced by defendant, appellate counsel chose to submit
and not to argue before the tribunal. Collectively, these errors,
in my view, could justify an appellate court granting a writ of
error coram nobis as the court did here.   
Although I believe the Appellate Division was correct
in granting defendant's application, in my view, the court erred
in the relief it then granted.  The court modified defendant's
sentence by correcting the alleged sentencing error but went
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No. 061
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further and modified the sentence by directing that the
concurrent sentences imposed on two counts run consecutively to
the sentences imposed on the remaining counts of that indictment. 
What is most troubling is that the Appellate Division was without
authority to alter the validly imposed portion of defendant's
sentence(see People v Yannicelli, 40 NY2d 598, 602  [1976]).  The
proper remedy for the matter was to assign new counsel and
consider the appeal de novo (see People v Vasquez, 70 NY2d 1
[1986]; People v Casiano, 67 NY2d 906 [1986]).
Consequently, on the People's appeal, I would affirm,
and on the defendant's appeal, I would reverse and remit to the
Appellate Division for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
On the People's appeal, order reversed and defendant's
application for a writ of error coram nobis denied.  Defendant's
appeal dismissed as academic.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Judge
Pigott dissents and votes to affirm on the People's appeal and
reverse and remit to the Appellate Division on the defendant's
appeal in an opinion.
Decided May 5, 2009