Title: YVON UTSEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. V "Oixprrxrr-r C~aurf of 2006-SC-000298-MR ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE NOS . 04-CR-000593 AND 05-CR-001691 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : NOVEMBER 1, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED YVON UTSEY APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE A circuit court jury convicted Yvon Utsey of first-degree assault and first-degree criminal abuse of his former girlfriend's disabled son . The trial court sentenced Utsey to twenty-five years' imprisonment. He makes two principal arguments on appeal . First, the trial court erred by improperly admitting prior bad acts evidence regarding his gambling, his yelling at the victim, the victim's fear of him, and absence of injuries to the victim after Utsey moved out of the home . Second, the trial court improperly precluded him from offering evidence that his girlfriend's other son had been suspended from school for fighting-evidence which he claimed was key to his defense that the other son was the perpetrator . Finding no reversible error, we affirm . I . FACTS . Utsey stayed in the home of his girlfriend, Tammy Morton, and her two sons, A .D . and A.S . A.D., who was then thirteen years old, was autistic . A.D . could not speak and was physically inactive . A.S., who was then ten years old, had recently moved back into his mother's home after being sent to live with his father for a few months following suspension from school . One afternoon after school, A.S . called his mother at work to tell her that A.D. was lying in bed and was having difficulty breathing. She told him to have Utsey to check on A.D. She also checked on A.D. herself when she returned home from work later that evening. The next day, the school personnel observed that A.D . was not acting normally- in fact, he was acting much differently than the day before. For instance, he walked to his school bus rather than run as he usually did . His facial coloring looked different, and he stumbled and walked slowly when going into school. As the day progressed, A.D . seemed to have difficulty sitting . He showed little appetite for flood and started shivering. School personnel suspected that he might have the flu, which was going around the school at the time . They let him lie down and took him to the bathroom when he became nauseated. At one point, they noticed that he flinched when touched. After noticing several severe bruises on A.D., they called police and Emergency Medical Services . While waiting to be taken to the hospital, A.D.'s condition continued to decline; and his breathing became labored. A.D. was admitted to a hospital for treatment. Examination revealed several severe bruises, a serious laceration to his liver, rib fractures, and a collapsed lung . The collapsed lung caused his breathing difficulties, and a chest tube was inserted to relieve pressure . Hospital personnel determined that blunt force trauma had caused his injuries, and an investigation ensued . A.D.'s mother, Tammy Morton, later testified that Utsey arrived at the hospital when A .D . was admitted for treatment . She stated that Utsey was limping badly . He told Morton that he had a spider bite on his foot and that he had struck his foot on a table . A nurse also testified to seeing Utsey limping with a badly swollen toe . When Utsey sought treatment a few days later, he told the doctor he had banged his toe a few days before . The doctor later testified to Utsey's having a badly swollen toe, which made the doctor suspect dislocation or fracture . An X-ray of Utsey's toe revealed a dorsal dislocation with the front joint of the toe . The doctor stated that significant force was required to cause such a dislocation and in response to a question from the Commonwealth, expressed an opinion that severely kicking a child could cause such a dislocation . Morton later testified to A .D .'s turning away from and refusing to look at Utsey when Utsey entered the hospital room . Morton interpreted this as evidence that A.D . feared Utsey. She also testified that Utsey had asked her to lie for him about his being at the house with the children . The investigating detective later testified concerning his interactions with Utsey . He also reported Utsey telling him that a spider bit his foot and that Utsey had some trouble consistently recalling the details of what happened around the time of A.D .'s injuries . Utsey did inform the detective that he watched Morton's children while she worked, including the days preceding A.D.'s hospitalization . Utsey told the detective that the injuries must have occurred while A.D . was at school or was with someone else . Morton and A .S . were also interviewed by authorities . Utsey was indicted for first-degree assault, first-degree criminal abuse, and for being a second-degree persistent felony offender . A jury found him guilty of first-degree assault and first-degree criminal abuse . Utsey pleaded guilty to the PFO charge and agreed to the sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and the plea agreement, imposing the agreed-upon sentence of twenty-five years . Utsey then filed this timely appeal. ll . ANALYSIS . A. No Reversible Error in Trial Court's Handling of Morton's Testimony . Utsey claims that "Tammy Morton's testimony was replete with prejudicial, inadmissible evidence." In particular, he finds fault with the trial court's allowing her testimony regarding Utsey's gambling, Utsey's yelling at A.D., A.D.'s fear of Utsey, and A.D.'s suffering no more injuries after Utsey left the home . Utsey claims that each ruling alone amounts to reversible error and that the combined effect of these rulings amounts to a violation of rights to due process and a fair trial . 1 . No Reversible Error in Admission of Testimonv About Legal Gambling . The Commonwealth asked Morton on direct examination how Utsey interacted with A.D . Rather than answering the question, Morton volunteered that Utsey enjoyed gambling at Caesar's Casino . Defense counsel objected, alleging that this was improper character evidence, and requested a curative admonition . The Commonwealth countered that since gambling at Caesar's was a legal activity, the testimony was not improper "bad acts" or character evidence and further stated that it did not intend to develop any further testimony about gambling . The trial court determined that an admonition was unnecessary . During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Morton's ability to remember if Utsey was limping two days before A.D.'s injuries were discovered . Morton replied that she did remember that Utsey was "fine" on that day because that was the day that Utsey emptied her bank account by using her ATM card at Caesar's Casino . Utsey did not object or move to strike her response and did not request a curative admonition. Utsey argues that this testimony had an unduly prejudicial effect and, thus, that his conviction must be reversed as a result . We disagree . The issue of possible error in the admission of Morton's testimony on direct examination that Utsey liked to gamble at Caesar's was preserved by objection and request for curative admonition . But we doubt that this testimony was improper bad acts or character evidence since this particular gambling activity is legal . And we find no error in the trial court's denial of the request for a curative admonition . In view of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, any possible error in admitting this unsolicited testimony of casino gambling without an admonition was harmless.' Morton's testimony on cross-examination concerning Utsey's emptying .her bank account by using her ATM card at Caesar's was more likely to have had a prejudicial effect because it suggested a "bad act" of financial irresponsibility and possibly Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.24 ; Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 103(a) . During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Morton if Utsey ever became angry with the children . Morton replied in the affirmative, stating that she had heard him "holler at the kids." Utsey objected and argued to the trial court that the Commonwealth had failed to provide notice under KRE 404(c)6 that it would seek to introduce evidence that Utsey yelled at the children . The trial court initially sustained dishonesty .' But this issue was unpreserved by an objection for an unresponsive answer, a motion to strike the testimony, or a request for a curative admonition . In fact, Utsey does not explicitly request relief based on this testimony by itself but states that this amplified the testimony about his gambling, making the gambling testimony more prejudicial . Even if he had directly requested relief for the testimony concerning the bank account, we would find no palpable error3 here . In light of the strong circumstantial evidence of guilt,4 any error in the admission of testimony concerning Utsey's gambling-even the combination of Morton's testimony on direct and cross- examination-was -harmless .5 2. NoError in Admission of TestimonT.of Yelling . Morton did not indicate whether Utsey had her permission or was otherwise authorized to use her ATM card . RCr 10.26 . This evidence included the physical evidence of A.D.'s injuries, Utsey's own injury apparently occurring within a similar time frame and his lack of consistent explanation for it, the possibility that Utsey's injury could have been incurred while kicking a child, Utsey's access to A.D . without others present within a short time of the discovery of A.D.'s injuries, and Morton's testimony that Utsey asked her to lie about him being in the house with the children . RCr 9.24 . KRE 404(b) prohibits the admission of "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . . ." although evidences of such acts may be admissible for other purposes . KRE 404(c) requires that the Commonwealth "shall give reasonable pretrial notice to the defendant of its intention to offer" evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" pursuant to KRE 404(b) . the objection . The Commonwealth argued, however, that yelling was not really a "bad act" since many people yelled at their children and that Utsey's yelling was relevant to showing how Utsey interacted with A.D . The trial court then overruled the objection, stating that Morton could describe the relationship between Utsey and A.D . Morton then testified that Utsey yelled at A.D . about keeping the television on day and night. Utsey contends that this evidence of yelling at the children, especially his yelling at A.D., was improperly admitted for the purpose of attacking Utsey's character and "to show action in conformity therewith ." But we are not willing to classify evidence of yelling as improper "bad acts" evidence since yelling is not generally considered illegal or immoral conduct. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that this testimony was relevant to show the relationship between Utsey and A.D . In particular, this evidence was relevant to demonstrate the general attitude, including any ill will, of Utsey toward the child.' Utsey further complains that "the trial court failed to conduct a KRE 4038 balancing test[.]" But any error in failing to conduct such a balancing test regarding Morton's statement about Utsey's yelling was harmless, especially in light of its relevance to showing Utsey's relationship with A.D . and the lack of undue prejudice created by these few isolated remarks about yelling . Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997) (holding that child's previous injuries, even though not directly linked to defendant, were "relevant to demonstrate the animus of Parker towards the child and to show absence of accident or mistake.") The relevant definitions of "animus" include "[i]ll will," "animosity," and "[i]ntention ." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). KRE 403 provides that : "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." s 10 3. No Reversible Error in Admitting Testimony that A.D . Feared_ Utsev . During cross-examination of Morton, defense counsel asked her a question aimed at identifying when A.S . returned to her home following his stay with his father . Rather than answering the question as posed, Morton blurted out that A.S . "didn't do it" and that A .D . was not afraid of A .S . ; but, rather, A.D . was afraid of Utsey . Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, stating as his basis that the answer was non- responsive to his question, was not documented anywhere in discovery,9 and was prejudicial . The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating that the testimony was not "mistrial material." As cross-examination continued, defense counsel asked Morton about A.D .'s time at the hospital . Morton then described how A.D . tried to turn and face away from Utsey when Utsey entered the hospital room, proving to her that A.D . feared Utsey. Utsey did not object to Morton's answer . Utsey now contends that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after Morton interjected that A.S . "didn't do it" and that A.D . was not afraid of A.S . but was afraid of Utsey . We find no error in the trial court's denial of the mistrial motion . A mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be granted if the circumstances present a "manifest necessity" for it.'° The testimony presented simply did not create a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial . Surely it came as no surprise to the jury at that point that Utsey contends to have been surprised that Morton would claim that A.D . was afraid of him because of her statement provided in discovery that he "spends a lot of time with her kids and is very good with" A.D . But since evidence of A.D.'s fearing Utsey is not technically evidence, of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" by Utsey, there was no requirement that the Commonwealth give prior notice of its intent to show A.D.'s fear under KRE 404(c) . Commonwealth v. Scott , 12 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2000). 12 Morton did not believe that A.S . was the perpetrator . Furthermore, A .D .'s fear of Utsey-or given his inability to speak for himself about his feelings, his action that suggested a fear of Utsey-was relevant since the identity of the attacker was at issue." And in light of the other evidence adduced at trial, any error in the admission of Morton's opinions that A.D . feared Utsey was harmless; 12 and there was no manifest necessity to grant a mistrial . RCr 9.24. 4. Evidence of No Further Injuries to A.D . After Utsey Left Properly Admitted . During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Morton if A .D . had suffered any other injuries after Utsey moved out of the house . Morton replied, "No." Defense counsel objected, arguing lack of relevance, and moved for a mistrial . The Commonwealth responded that the evidence was relevant to show that the abuse stopped after Utsey left and to disprove Utsey's assertion-presented in his opening statementthat A.S . had actually committed the crime . The trial court denied the mistrial motion . According to Utsey, evidence that A.D . suffered no further injuries after he was taken to the hospital was irrelevant and did not aid the jury in identifying the perpetrator . Utsey also argues that the evidence was equally consistent with the theory that ten year-old A.S . realized that he might be caught if he harmed A .D . again . The real Partin v. Commonwealth , 918 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky . 1996) (witnesses' testimony in murder case that victim expressed fear of defendant was relevant and properly admissible) . See also Parker , 952 S.W.2d at 213-14 ("There was testimony that the child cried excessively when he was in the custody of Parker and seemed to be afraid of him" ; thus, the jury could properly infer that defendant had previously harmed child .) prejudice in the testimony, Utsey argued, was that the testimony led the jury to speculate that Utsey had harmed A.D . on earlier occasions . We find no merit in these arguments . Contrary to Utsey's assertion, we can find no reason to believe that the jury would assume that other acts of abuse occurred during Utsey's cohabitation with Morton. After all, Morton was only asked whether A.D . suffered any further injuries after Utsey moved out of the house following A.D.'s hospitalization . Furthermore, this evidence was clearly relevant in light of Utsey's assertion that A.S . was the actual perpetrator . We agree with the Commonwealth that whether or not the injuries continued was relevant because Utsey asserted at trial that someone who continually stayed with A.D.-even after the injuries that gave rise to the hospitalization-caused these injuries . Based on this evidence of no further injuries occurring after Utsey's departure, the jury could reasonably infer that it was less likely that someone continuing to live with A .D.-such as A.S.-was the perpetrator . So this evidence was relevant and properly admissible . Naturally, Utsey was free to argue that this evidence simply showed that A .S . had "wised up and realized he might be caught if he harmed A.D . again," too ; but Utsey's alternate interpretation would not make the evidence at issue irrelevant . The evidence was relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it nor in denying Utsey's motion for a mistrial . 5. Overall Effect of Morton's Testimony Did Not Violate Utsey's Rights . Utsey contends that the overall effect of Morton's testimony on the gambling, yelling, A .D.'s apparent fear of him, and A.D.'s lack of other injuries after Utsey left had a combined cumulative effect of depriving Utsey of his rights to due process and a fair 1 0 trial . We disagree . All of this evidence, except that of gambling, was relevant to showing his relationship with A.D . and to proving the identity of the perpetrator . Furthermore, he clearly suffered no undue prejudice from the admission of any of this evidence, including that of gambling-which was of little to no consequence in light of the other evidence-and he clearly was not entitled to a mistrial. B . No Error in Precludin g Utsey From Introducing Evidence that A.S . was Suspended From School for Fighting . Utsey contends that he was further deprived of his constitutional rights because the trial court did not allow him to ask Morton why A.S . had been suspended from school in the past . According to Utsey, this evidence was key to presenting his defense that A .S . was the actual perpetrator. The investigating detective's report, which was provided in discovery, stated in a section entitled "Second Interview with Natural Mother" that : Her other son, [A.S.] has had behavioral problems at school . He has been suspended for attitude, being disrespectful to teachers, and fighting in school approximately three years ago. We note that this is the police detective's recollection of his second interview with Morton rather than a taped or written statement from her. Possibly, the detective may have misunderstood or incorrectly recalled what Morton said . For instance, it mentions a suspension of "approximately three years ago," which more likely refers to a suspension occurring approximately three months before the investigation commenced . Also, the reference to "fighting" could refer to either verbal arguments or to actual physical violence . On the first day of trial, defense counsel asked the trial court to get a copy of A .S .'s juvenile court files and to review them in chambers to see if they contained any relevant evidence . In particular, defense counsel argued that any information that A.S . was suspended for fighting would be relevant to the case at hand . The trial court agreed to this request, but its review found nothing relating to any suspensions in the court records . The next day, when Morton was asked on direct examination whether A .S . had been living with his father before returning to live with Morton, Morton replied in the affirmative and volunteered the explanation that A.S . had to live with his father for a while due to an agreement that he would do so if he was suspended from school . On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Morton why A.S . had been suspended from school . The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the reason for the suspension was irrelevant . During the bench conference, Morton, who apparently overheard the bench conference from her vantage point on the witness stand, related something to the effect that A.S . had not been suspended for fighting at school . Defense counsel then argued that he was entitled to impeach her using her statement to the detective that contained the statement about fighting . The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection, finding that the suspension was irrelevant and forbidding defense counsel from inquiring further about the suspension in front of the jury. Defense counsel then questioned Morton by avowal about the reasons for suspension . On avowal, Morton testified that A.S . had been suspended for disrespectful behavior but not for fighting . She did not recall telling the detective that A.S . had been suspended for fighting . Defense counsel did not confront her with any oral or written statement that she made or with the detective's report of her second interview, which stated that A.S . had been suspended for fighting . Nor does Utsey draw our attention to any part of the trial in which the detective's report indicating that A .S . had been suspended for fighting was admitted into evidence or the detective was questioned about this report . Utsey argues that evidence of A.S . being suspended for fighting was relevant and should have been admitted . We need not determine whether such evidence would have been relevant because Utsey has failed to cite any evidence admitted at trial or on avowal to this effect . Apparently, there may have been a conflict regarding the reason for suspension in the investigating detective's report and with Morton's testimony on the stand . But the only evidence presented to the trial court on this matter was Morton's testimony on avowal in which she unequivocally stated that A.S . was not suspended for fighting and that she did not recall telling the detective that he was suspended for fighting . The detective's report, which was apparently never introduced at trial or presented on avowal, was not in evidence. Since Utsey was given the opportunity to explain the reason for the suspension on avowal and failed to present any proof on avowal that the suspension was due to fighting, he simply is not entitled to relief on this ground . III . CONCLUSION . For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed . All sitting . Lambert, CJ ; Abramson, Cunningham, Minton, Schroder, and Scott, JJ ., concur . Noble, J ., concurs in the result but disagrees with the majority's statement of the harmless error rule . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Daniel T. Goyette Louisville Metro Public Defender 200 Advocacy Plaza 719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 Elizabeth B . McMahon Assistant Public Defender Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender 200 Advocacy Plaza 717-719 West Jefferson Street Louisville, KY 40202 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Kenneth Wayne Riggs Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601