Title: Denley v. Mutual of Omaha

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

445 P.2d 505 (1968)
Richard J. DENLEY, Respondent,
v.
MUTUAL OF OMAHA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.
Argued and Submitted September 6, 1968.
Decided October 2, 1968.
*506 Curtis W. Cutsforth, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were King, Miller, Anderson, Nash & Yerke, Portland.
John C. Anicker, Jr., Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Jack, Goodwin & Anicker and Glenn R. Jack, Oregon City.
Before PERRY, C.J., and McALLISTER, O'CONNELL, DENECKE and MENGLER, JJ.
MENGLER, Justice (Pro Tempore).
This is an action at law brought to recover for "confining total loss of time" benefits allegedly accrued under an insurance policy issued by defendant. The case was tried before a jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $8,530. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
The question presented on appeal is did the trial court err in the following particulars: (1) In denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the testimony; (2) In permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint during the course of the trial; and (3) In failing to give two of defendant's requested instructions.
The basic facts giving rise to the action are: In July 1964, plaintiff, age 53, was hospitalized for an acute thrombophlebitis of the legs, which is commonly described as a clotting of the veins of the legs. The plaintiff was discharged from the hospital to home care on August 24, 1964. Plaintiff was the insured under a policy issued by defendant, which, as it is pertinent here, provided in part as follows:
Courts have adopted various theories in resolving controversies arising out of continuous confinement provisions. This court has construed the continuous confinement *507 clause as describing the nature and extent of an insured's illness, or disability, rather than to prescribe or set out the limitations upon the conduct of an insured.
In Purcell v. Wash. Fid. Nat. Ins. Co., 146 Or. 475, 498, 30 P.2d 742 (1934), Mr. Justice Rossman wrote:
This test, or theory, has been followed by courts in other jurisdictions.
See earlier cases cited in Annotation, 29 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1953).
A directed verdict requires that there is a complete absence of proof on some essential issue, or that there is no conflict in the testimony and it is susceptible of only one construction. The court must view the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff and give him every favorable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. Young v. Crown Zellerbach, 244 Or. 251, 417 P.2d 394 (1966).
We need, therefore, to determine whether there was any substantial evidence to prove that plaintiff's illness was a confining one or was commonly regarded as such.
The only medical testimony was given by David C. Grimwood, M.D., who was called by the plaintiff and on direct examination testified, in part, as follows:
Upon cross-examination Dr. Grimwood testified, in part, as follows:
The plaintiff's medical evidence shows that plaintiff's illness was disabling and that he was unemployable, but that the nature and extent of the illness was not of such as to require confinement to the home. Plaintiff's physician testified that he did not prescribe home confinement; that the plaintiff was ambulatory and was able to be up and around; that he was able to drive a car; and that the physician made no house calls. The only inference to be drawn from the plaintiff's medical testimony is that the decision to remain at home was that of the plaintiff and was not upon advice of the doctor, nor, in the doctor's opinion, necessitated by the illness.
To allow recovery under these facts would in effect require us to construe the continuous confinement provision to permit recovery if it were shown that insured had an illness which rendered him unemployable and that he chose to remain substantially house confined despite medical advice to the contrary. We cannot so liberalize the construction of continuous house confinement provisions.
The plaintiff not having produced any substantial evidence sufficient to establish continuous confinement by his illness, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter judgment for the defendant.
Reversed with instructions.