Title: Walsh v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12648 
 
JOSEPH WALSH & another1  vs.  COMMONWEALTH 
(and a consolidated case2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2019. - September 2, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Bail.  Constitutional Law, Preventive 
detention.  Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 30 and November 7, 2018. 
 
 
The cases were reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
Darren T. Griffis for Mateusz Dymon. 
Merritt Schnipper (Robert Hennessy also present) for Joseph 
Walsh. 
Ellyn H. Lazar Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Shira Diner & Ryan M. Schiff, for Massachusetts Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Committee for Public Counsel Services, intervener. 
 
2 Mateusz Dymon & another vs. Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In these consolidated cases we address issues 
reported by a single justice of this court concerning the 
pretrial detention of the petitioning codefendants, Joseph Walsh 
and Mateusz Dymon (defendants).  At the defendants' arraignments 
on September 20, 2018, in the Superior Court in Worcester County 
on charges relating to a home invasion,3 the Commonwealth moved 
for each of them to be detained before trial due to their 
alleged dangerousness, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Both 
defendants were found to be indigent and were therefore entitled 
to appointed counsel for their § 58A hearings.  See G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (4); S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as appearing in 475 Mass. 
1301 (2016).  Due to a shortage of available defense attorneys, 
however, there was a delay in the assignment of counsel for the 
defendants.  Consequently, their § 58A hearings were continued 
until October 16, 2018, while the defendants were held without 
bail, so that they could be represented by counsel.  When the 
§ 58A hearings took place, with the defendants' counsel present, 
the hearing judge set bail in the amount of $7,500 cash for 
Walsh and $5,000 cash for Dymon.  Neither defendant was able to 
post the required amount, and both were held in lieu of bail. 
                                                          
 
3 The defendants were indicted on charges of breaking and 
entering in the daytime, with the intent to commit a felony, 
placing a person in fear, G. L. c. 266, § 17; larceny in a 
building, G. L. c. 266, § 20; vandalism, G. L. c. 266, § 126A; 
and possession of burglarious tools, G. L. c. 266, § 49. 
3 
 
Both defendants then filed petitions in the county court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  They argued that they were 
entitled to release because their pretrial detention without 
counsel for more than seven days violated the standards we 
established for timely appointment of defense counsel for 
indigent criminal defendants in Lavallee v. Justices in the 
Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228 (2004).  The single 
justice reported the defendants' Lavallee claims to the full 
court for resolution.4 
We hold that the delay in providing counsel to the 
defendants does not entitle them to release from pretrial 
detention under Lavallee.  Lavallee established a protocol to 
secure representation for indigent defendants in the face of a 
systemic shortage of available defense attorneys, carefully 
balancing protection of those defendants' constitutional rights 
to counsel with the need to ensure public safety.  Although 
Lavallee created a presumptive seven-day limit on an indigent 
defendant's pretrial detention without counsel, id. at 246, it 
authorized release of an unrepresented defendant from pretrial 
detention only as a last resort if, at a status hearing before 
the regional administrative justice (RAJ) of the Superior Court, 
the defendant was still unrepresented and the RAJ determined 
                                                          
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
that, despite the good faith efforts of the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (CPCS), there was still no counsel willing and 
available to represent the defendant, id. at 247-248.  Lavallee 
did not create an automatic right to release from pretrial 
detention for any indigent defendant held more than seven days 
without counsel, and we decline to create such a right in these 
cases. 
There may be individual cases where, based on all the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case, a judge determines 
that it is necessary and appropriate to release an indigent 
defendant who has been held in pretrial detention without 
counsel.  Our ruling here is not intended to foreclose that 
possibility.  But the defendants in the cases before us have not 
presented such an individualized argument, and their release now 
would not serve any remedial purpose in any event. 
The defendants also argued in their petitions before the 
single justice that, when the Superior Court hearing judge set 
bail in amounts that they could not afford to post, resulting in 
their long-term detention, he violated the standards for bail 
determinations set out in Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691 
(2017), and in G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  With regard to these 
claims, the single justice reported certain questions concerning 
(1) the level of analysis and detail that a judge must provide 
in findings to satisfy the due process requirements that we 
5 
 
established in Brangan when bail is set in an amount that a 
defendant cannot afford; and (2) what differences, if any, there 
might be in the requirements for bail determinations under G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, and under the bail statutes, G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 
and 58. 
In response to the first Brangan question, we hold that a 
judge5 should provide sufficient information to enable the 
parties and the appellate courts to recognize that the judge has 
undertaken the analysis required by our holding in Brangan and 
its codification in the bail statutes.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. 
at 707 (when imposing bail amount that will likely result in 
defendant's long-term detention, judge must address why no 
alternative, less restrictive financial or nonfinancial 
conditions will suffice to assure defendant's presence at future 
court proceedings); G. L. c. 276, §§ 57, 58, as amended through 
St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 168, 172.  To assist judges in this process, 
we have set out infra a series of steps for them to consider 
before imposing a bail that a defendant likely cannot afford to 
post.6 
                                                          
 
5 For simplicity, we use the term "judge" here as a 
shorthand reference that includes the range of judicial officers 
who are authorized to set bail under G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 58.  
See Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 693 n.3 (2017). 
 
6 Nothing herein should be interpreted as in any way 
revoking or superseding the special procedures and standards 
6 
 
We reject, however, the defendants' proposals for 
additionally requiring a full evidentiary hearing and proof by 
clear and convincing evidence before a defendant may be held on 
unaffordable bail.  Given the large number of bail hearings that 
must be conducted under tight time constraints in the 
Commonwealth's courts, and the limited evidence available to 
judges in bail hearings, these additional procedural 
requirements are impractical and would unduly interfere with the 
government's interest in the efficient and economical 
administration of justice.  We therefore continue to adhere to 
the standards that we endorsed in Querubin v. Commonwealth, 440 
Mass. 108, 118-120 (2003), where we held that a full-blown 
evidentiary hearing is not needed or required to determine the 
amount of bail that will reasonably assure a defendant's 
presence at trial, and that preponderance of the evidence is the 
appropriate standard of proof.  Finally, we hold that, when 
proceeding under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, as under G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 57 and 58, a judge may set bail in an amount beyond what a 
defendant can afford to assure a defendant's appearance at 
future court proceedings, but not to detain the defendant based 
on the defendant's dangerousness.  In doing so, however, the 
                                                          
 
that we established for setting bail and conducting bail reviews 
during the COVID-19 pandemic in Committee for Pub. Counsel 
Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431 
(2020), S.C., 484 Mass. 1029 (2020). 
7 
 
judge should also meet the same constitutional due process 
requirements that we established in Brangan. 
 
Background.  1.  Assignment of counsel for indigent 
defendants in Worcester County.  CPCS is statutorily responsible 
for providing defense counsel for eligible defendants who cannot 
afford to retain their own counsel in criminal proceedings in 
the Massachusetts State courts.  See G. L. c. 211D, §§ 1, 2B, 5.  
CPCS provides representation through both a public defender 
division (PDD) and a private counsel division.  See G. L. 
c. 211D, § 6.  Attorneys in the PDD are salaried staff attorneys 
employed by CPCS.  See G. L. c. 211D, §§ 1, 6 (a).  The private 
counsel division contracts with local organizations to supply 
private defense attorneys, also known as bar advocates, to 
represent indigent defendants who are not represented by CPCS 
staff attorneys.  See G. L. c. 211D, § 6 (b).  Both CPCS staff 
attorneys and private bar advocates must meet certain benchmarks 
and performance standards before they can represent a defendant 
beyond arraignment in a felony case. 
 
In Worcester County, CPCS contracts with Bar Advocates of 
Worcester County, Inc., to provide private counsel for indigent 
defendants.  The Worcester PDD office and the bar advocate 
program are responsible for covering arraignment sessions and 
accepting appointments in criminal cases in the Worcester County 
courts. 
8 
 
 
Although the number of bar advocates in Worcester County 
certified to handle Superior Court cases has not significantly 
diminished in recent years, these attorneys are taking fewer 
Superior Court cases than they did in the past.7  As a result, 
there have been delays in the appointment of counsel, especially 
in cases where the Commonwealth has moved to detain a defendant 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Finding bar advocates who are 
willing to accept appointment in a case involving a § 58A 
hearing can be particularly challenging because these hearings 
require intense preparation within a short time frame.8 
 
2.  Proceedings below.  The charges against the defendants 
arise out of their alleged participation in a home invasion in 
the town of Douglas on July 25, 2018.  The defendants were 
                                                          
 
7 Of fifty-six bar advocates certified to take Superior 
Court cases during the period from July 1 to December 31, 2018, 
one attorney dropped off the panel, eleven attorneys took no 
Superior Court cases, nine took only one or two cases, and 
thirty-three took between three and five cases.  Evidence in the 
record suggests that bar advocates have reduced their 
participation for a variety of reasons, including overwork, the 
low rate of compensation, and the availability of more lucrative 
opportunities in private practice. 
 
8 The difficulty has been exacerbated by a significant 
increase in the number of § 58A hearings in the Superior Court 
in Worcester County, more than doubling from fifty-four in 2016 
to 111 in 2018.  During the period from July 1 to December 31, 
2018, it took an average of four days after a request was 
submitted to the bar advocate program administrator to assign a 
Superior Court certified bar advocate to a defendant, and an 
average of five days after the request to assign a Superior 
Court certified bar advocate to a defendant who was scheduled 
for a § 58A hearing. 
9 
 
initially arraigned in the Uxbridge Division of the District 
Court Department on July 27, 2018, where they were represented 
by bar advocates certified to practice in the District Court, 
but not in the Superior Court.  The Commonwealth moved to have 
the defendants detained before trial due to their alleged 
dangerousness, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  Both defendants 
were represented by their appointed counsel at § 58A hearings in 
the District Court on August 3, 2018, and after those hearings, 
the defendants were found to be dangerous and held without bail. 
On September 20, 2018, the defendants were arraigned in the 
Superior Court in Worcester County on grand jury indictments 
charging them with breaking and entering in the daytime with the 
intent to commit a felony, putting a person in fear, G. L. 
c. 266, § 17, and related charges.  Both defendants were again 
found to be indigent, and Superior Court certified bar advocates 
were appointed to represent them, but only for that day.  The 
Commonwealth again moved for both defendants to be detained 
pending trial under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and a hearing on those 
motions was scheduled for October 5, 2018.  In the meantime, the 
defendants continued to be held without bail. 
 
On October 5, 2018, counsel for the Commonwealth appeared 
for the § 58A hearings, ready to proceed, but no defense counsel 
appeared on behalf of either defendant.  No attorney had been 
appointed to represent Dymon, and although a bar advocate had 
10 
 
filed an appearance to represent Walsh on October 1, 2018, that 
attorney was not present at the October 5 hearing due to a 
miscommunication about the hearing date.  The presiding judge 
then ordered the appointment of another bar advocate to 
represent Walsh and the attorney in charge of the Worcester CPCS 
office to represent Dymon.  In response, the CPCS attorney in 
charge filed a motion to decline acceptance of the appointment 
and to release Dymon.  She stated in the motion that neither she 
nor any of the other PDD attorneys in the Worcester CPCS office 
could take his case because they were either at their maximum 
caseloads or unqualified to handle Superior Court cases, and 
therefore they could not provide Dymon with constitutionally 
effective counsel.  The bar advocate assigned to represent Walsh 
joined in that motion and similarly argued that he was too busy 
to take Walsh's case.  The presiding judge denied the motion but 
allowed defense counsel to postpone the § 58A hearings so that 
they would have time to prepare. 
 
On October 16, 2018, the defendants, both of whom were 
represented by new counsel, objected to their § 58A hearings 
going forward, arguing that their constitutional and statutory 
rights had been violated by their pretrial detention for more 
than seven days without counsel and without a hearing.  The 
hearing judge concluded, however, that there had been good cause 
for the continuances of the § 58A hearings to October 16, 2018.  
11 
 
With regard to the Commonwealth's motion to hold the defendants 
in pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, the hearing 
judge concluded that the defendants did not need to be held and 
that certain conditions of release would reasonably assure the 
safety of the community.  He set bail at $7,500 for Walsh and 
$5,000 for Dymon.  Although the hearing judge recognized that 
these bail amounts might be greater than the amounts that the 
defendants could pay, he concluded that these amounts were 
necessary, in light of the defendants' criminal histories and 
the seriousness of the charges, to assure their appearances at 
future proceedings.  The hearing judge also set other conditions 
on the defendants' release, including home confinement with a 
global positioning system ankle bracelet.  Neither defendant was 
able to post the required bail, so both defendants remained in 
detention. 
 
The defendants then filed petitions in the county court 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging their pretrial detention.  
Following a hearing, the single justice issued a decision on 
December 7, 2018, in which he reserved and reported two sets of 
issues for our consideration.  He reported the defendants' 
Lavallee claims to the full court, so that we could "decide 
whether these defendants and others like them are held 
unconstitutionally . . . in circumstances like this, and, if so, 
12 
 
what remedy or remedies are appropriate."9  The single justice 
also reported certain legal questions concerning (1) the level 
of detail and analysis required by our decision in Brangan, 477 
Mass. 691, when a judge sets a cash bail that the defendant 
cannot afford; and (2) what differences, if any, there might be 
in the requirements for a judge's bail determination under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, as was the case in Brangan, and a bail 
determination made in the context of a dangerousness hearing 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.10 
Discussion.  1.  Lavallee claims.  In Lavallee, where we 
addressed issues arising out of a similar shortage of defense 
counsel in Hampden County in 2004, we established a protocol to 
protect the rights of indigent defendants when a lack of 
                                                          
 
 
9 To assist the court in addressing the defendants' claims, 
the single justice asked the parties to provide further factual 
information on various topics relating to the assignment of 
counsel for indigent defendants in Worcester County, especially 
in cases involving hearings under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  The 
single justice subsequently granted the Commonwealth's motion to 
remand the case to the Superior Court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing and make factual findings on these topics. 
 
 
10 Apart from reporting these legal questions, the single 
justice retained jurisdiction over the defendants' conditions of 
release claims, which he remanded to the Superior Court hearing 
judge for a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind 
the bail amounts and other conditions of release that the 
hearing judge set for the defendants.  Upon receiving that 
explanation from the hearing judge, the single justice denied 
the defendants' conditions of release claims.  The defendants' 
appeals from that ruling are currently pending before this court 
in separate dockets. 
13 
 
available defense attorneys interferes with the prompt 
appointment of counsel.  We ordered the clerk-magistrates of the 
Superior Court in Hampden County and the Hampden County 
divisions of the District Court to compile a weekly list of all 
unrepresented criminal defendants and forward it to the RAJs for 
the Superior Court and the District Court divisions, the 
district attorney, the Attorney General, and the chief counsel 
for CPCS.  We then provided that the Superior Court RAJ should 
schedule a prompt status hearing for each unrepresented 
defendant who had been held for more than seven days, or whose 
case had been pending for more than forty-five days.  If the 
defendant was still unrepresented as of the time of the hearing, 
and if the Superior Court RAJ determined that CPCS had made a 
good faith effort to secure representation and that no counsel 
was willing and available to represent a defendant, then the 
Superior Court RAJ was required to order (1) release on personal 
recognizance of any defendant held in lieu of bail or on 
preventive detention for more than seven days, subject to 
probationary conditions under G. L. c. 276, § 87, which could be 
ordered without the defendant's consent; and (2) dismissal of 
the charges without prejudice, until such time as counsel was 
made available, with respect to any defendant facing a felony 
charge for more than forty-five days without counsel, or a 
misdemeanor or municipal ordinance violation charge for more 
14 
 
than forty-five days without counsel, unless a judge had 
declared an intention to impose no sentence of incarceration 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211D, § 2A.  See Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 
247-249. 
The defendants in the present cases urge us to extend 
Lavallee by adopting a universal rule that (a) any indigent 
defendants who are detained pending a § 58A hearing, or held on 
cash bail, for whom counsel has not been appointed within seven 
days after their detention commenced, should be ordered 
released; and (b) any indigent defendants who have been released 
before trial on personal recognizance or after posting a cash 
bail, for whom counsel has not been appointed within forty-five 
days after their arraignment, should have their cases dismissed 
without prejudice.  We decline to do so. 
We recognize that Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246, established a 
presumptive seven-day limit on the pretrial detention of an 
unrepresented indigent defendant, and a presumptive forty-five-
day limit on the pendency of charges against an unrepresented 
indigent defendant.  But there were sound reasons why the 
protocol we established in Lavallee did not directly authorize 
trial judges to automatically release unrepresented indigent 
defendants on the basis of those standards.  We noted in our 
opinion that we shared the district attorney's concern about 
releasing or dismissing cases against persons who were charged 
15 
 
with serious offenses, see id. at 244-245, and observed that it 
was "[o]ur duty . . . to remedy an ongoing violation of a 
fundamental constitutional right to counsel consistently with 
the government's legitimate right to protect the public's 
safety," id. at 246. 
Toward that end, the Lavallee protocol broadly disseminated 
information about unrepresented defendants, allowed additional 
time to secure counsel for them before they were released or 
their charges were dismissed, and authorized the Superior Court 
RAJ to impose probationary conditions on defendants without 
their consent if they were released from pretrial detention.  By 
requiring the clerk-magistrates to send lists of unrepresented 
defendants to the district attorney, Attorney General, chief 
counsel for CPCS, and the RAJs, we created a system for tracking 
the impact of the shortage of defense counsel and ensured that 
officials with significant oversight responsibility in the 
criminal justice system were aware of the problem and could take 
appropriate steps to correct it or mitigate its effects.  By 
providing a status hearing before the Superior Court RAJ, we 
created a final opportunity for CPCS to secure counsel for 
unrepresented defendants and, to the extent necessary, to triage 
assignments so as to provide counsel to those accused of the 
most serious crimes.  By empowering the Superior Court RAJ to 
release unrepresented defendants from pretrial detention or to 
16 
 
dismiss charges against them, we ensured that those decisions 
would be made with consistency and with knowledge of their 
collective impact on the criminal justice system.  And by 
granting the Superior Court RAJ, as part of the Lavallee 
protocol, the extraordinary power to impose probationary 
conditions on defendants without their consent if they were 
released from pretrial detention, we enabled the RAJ to take 
steps to supervise their release. 
The Lavallee protocol thus promoted a systemic, coordinated 
response to the shortage of defense counsel that could 
appropriately balance the rights of indigent defendants with the 
protection of public safety.  The benefits of the Lavallee 
protocol would be lost if we required trial court judges in all 
cases to release any indigent defendant who has been detained 
without counsel for more than seven days, or to dismiss the 
charges against any indigent defendant who has been 
unrepresented for more than forty-five days.  We also note that 
we have now adopted a procedure for promptly determining whether 
invocation of the Lavallee protocol is necessary when a 
substantial number of indigent defendants are unrepresented due 
to a shortage of defense counsel.  See Carrasquillo v. Hampden 
County Dist. Courts, 484 Mass. 367, 389-391 (2020). 
Our ruling here is not intended to prevent judges from 
deciding in an individual case, based on all the facts and 
17 
 
circumstances of that case, that it is necessary and appropriate 
to release an indigent defendant who has been held in pretrial 
detention without counsel, or to dismiss the charges without 
prejudice against an indigent defendant who has been 
unrepresented.  In an individual case, the lapse of the time 
limits we established in Lavallee is a significant factor to be 
considered by the judge, but it does not automatically entitle 
the defendant to release or dismissal of charges.  See 
Carrasquillo, 484 Mass. at 391 & n.31. 
In the cases before us, however, the defendants have not 
argued for their release based on particular aspects of their 
situations apart from their proposed general rule that 
unrepresented indigent defendants should be automatically 
released from pretrial detention if they are held without 
counsel for more than seven days.  Moreover, no remedial purpose 
would be served by ordering their release now. 
Lavallee's provision for release of defendants held in 
pretrial detention for more than seven days without counsel was 
intended to address two issues:  (a) the unfairness of 
subjecting unrepresented defendants to a deprivation of liberty 
through bail hearings or § 58A hearings, see Lavallee, 442 Mass. 
at 233-234; and (b) the prejudice to unrepresented defendants' 
pretrial preparation that results when they are "held in lieu of 
bail or under an order of preventive detention," and are 
18 
 
consequently "virtually powerless to obtain a lawyer on their 
own or to begin working on their own defense," id. at 236.  
Here, in contrast with the petitioning defendants in Lavallee, 
see id. at 230, 232, the defendants were represented at their 
§ 58A hearings in both the District Court and the Superior 
Court, so there was no violation of their right to counsel at 
that stage.  And because the defendants have been represented by 
counsel ever since their § 58A hearings in the Superior Court, 
there is no reason to release them now to enable them to obtain 
a lawyer or to facilitate their own pretrial preparation.  See 
id. at 248 (authorizing release of unrepresented defendant from 
pretrial detention only if, at time of status hearing before 
RAJ, "there is still no counsel willing and available to 
represent [the] defendant").  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
delay in providing counsel to the defendants does not entitle 
them to release from pretrial detention under Lavallee. 
2.  Brangan questions.  In Brangan, 477 Mass. at 697-700, 
we held that a judge must consider a defendant's financial 
resources as a factor when setting a bail amount.  We further 
concluded that, although setting unaffordable bail is not 
necessarily unconstitutional, see id. at 700-702, "where a judge 
sets bail in an amount so far beyond a defendant's ability to 
pay that it is likely to result in long-term pretrial detention, 
it is the functional equivalent of an order for pretrial 
19 
 
detention, and the judge's decision must be evaluated in light 
of the same due process requirements applicable to such a 
deprivation of liberty," id. at 705.  Among other requirements, 
we held that, 
"where, based on a defendant's credible representations and 
any other evidence before the judge, it appears that the 
defendant lacks the financial resources to post the amount 
of bail set by the judge, such that it will likely result 
in the defendant's long-term pretrial detention, the judge 
must provide findings of fact and a statement of reasons 
for the bail decision, either in writing or orally on the 
record.  The statement must confirm the judge's 
consideration of the defendant's financial resources, 
explain how the bail amount was calculated, and state why, 
notwithstanding the fact that the bail amount will likely 
result in the defendant's detention, the defendant's risk 
of flight is so great that no alternative, less restrictive 
financial or nonfinancial conditions will suffice to assure 
his or her presence at future court proceedings."  
(Footnotes omitted.) 
 
Id. at 707. 
 
Here, the single justice posed the following questions 
seeking further guidance concerning the findings of fact and 
statement of reasons required by Brangan: 
1.  "Can, and should, the full court provide any further 
guidance, beyond what it has already said in Brangan, for 
trial court judges, the bar, and single justices of this 
court as to the level of analysis and detail that must be 
reflected in the judge's statement when a judge sets an 
unaffordable cash bail?  Must the judge itemize the 
defendant's resources, articulate a detailed factor-by-
factor analysis as to why the amount of the bail is 
nevertheless appropriate, and specify each less restrictive 
alternative that has been considered and why each has been 
rejected -- or is it sufficient that the judge's statement 
indicates in a more general way the judge's consideration 
of the relevant factors and the animating rationale for his 
20 
 
or her determination?  In short, what level of detail is 
required for the statement?" 
 
2.  "What differences, if any, might there be in the 
requirement for a judge's bail determination (and the 
statement of reasons he or she must provide) under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, as was the case in Brangan, and a 
bail determination made in the context of a dangerousness 
hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, as we have here?  
For example, may a judge set a cash bail that a defendant 
cannot post under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3)?" 
 
 
a.  Application of procedural due process balancing test.  
The single justice's first question concerning "the level of 
analysis and detail that must be reflected in the judge's 
statement" when setting an unaffordable bail is fundamentally a 
question about the degree of procedural due process that a 
defendant must receive.  Therefore, in answering this question, 
we "must balance the interests of the individual affected, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests and the 
government's interest in the efficient and economic 
administration of its affairs."  Josh J. v. Commonwealth, 478 
Mass. 716, 722 (2018), quoting Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 
Mass. 121, 131 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). 
 
i.  Interests of the defendant.  Whenever bail is set in an 
amount that a defendant cannot afford to post, that defendant 
faces a total deprivation of liberty, a fundamental right, 
through pretrial detention.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 702-703, 
705.  Although this deprivation of liberty is only "temporary" -
- until a trial takes place, the defendant pleads guilty, or the 
21 
 
case is dismissed -- it can nevertheless be lengthy.  In 
Brangan, the defendant had been held on bail he could not afford 
for more than three and one-half years when we issued our 
decision.  See id. at 693.  In the present consolidated cases, 
the defendants have been held on bail since October 16, 2018. 
This temporary deprivation of liberty can have severe and 
long-lasting collateral consequences.  The United States Supreme 
Court has aptly catalogued some of the negative effects of 
pretrial detention: 
"The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental 
impact on the individual.  It often means loss of a job; it 
disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.  Most jails 
offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. 
The time spent in jail is simply dead time.  Moreover, if a 
defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to 
gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare 
his defense.  Imposing those consequences on anyone who has 
not yet been convicted is serious.  It is especially 
unfortunate to impose them on those persons who are 
ultimately found to be innocent."  (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-533 (1972).  See Brangan, 477 
Mass. at 709 n.23 ("Pretrial detention disrupts a defendant's 
employment and family relationships, with often tragic 
consequences"). 
 
ii.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  In considering the 
risk that a bail decision will erroneously deprive a defendant 
of liberty when it is unnecessary to assure the defendant's 
future appearance in court, we recognize that bail decisions 
often involve difficult judgment calls made under challenging 
22 
 
circumstances.  Judges making bail decisions must carefully 
balance the defendant's liberty interest against the 
government's interest in assuring the defendant's return to 
court, taking into account a range of statutory factors.  They 
usually have to make these decisions based only on the limited 
information about the defendant that they can glean from the 
representations of counsel, a police report, a court activity 
record information (CARI) report, a warrant management system 
report, and the indigency intake form filled out by the 
defendant with the help of a probation officer to determine 
whether a defendant is eligible for a court-appointed attorney.  
And judges must often make bail decisions quickly, while 
handling a crowded docket.  Especially under these 
circumstances, determining whether bail is necessary and, if so, 
in what amount, can be a challenging task in many cases. 
In theory, the risk that a defendant will be erroneously 
deprived of liberty in the bail-setting context can take two 
forms.  First, the judge may overestimate the amount of bail 
that a defendant can reasonably afford.  As a result, the judge 
may set a bail amount that is not necessarily intended to result 
in pretrial detention, but in fact has that effect.  Second, the 
judge may overestimate the amount of bail that is necessary to 
reasonably assure a defendant's presence at future proceedings, 
choosing an amount that is more than a defendant can afford when 
23 
 
in fact an affordable amount, or other nonfinancial conditions 
of release, would suffice.  But in actual practice in a 
particular case, it can be difficult to draw these distinctions.  
And given the discretionary nature of bail decisions and the 
many factors that judges may consider in reaching those 
decisions, it is hard to assess in the aggregate whether bail 
decisions are "correct" or "incorrect" and how often persons are 
erroneously held on bail. 
According to recent Trial Court data for cases arraigned 
and disposed of in the District Court and Boston Municipal Court 
during the seventeen months after our decision in Brangan, 
defendants were released on personal recognizance or with 
nonfinancial conditions in the overwhelming majority of cases -– 
80.2 percent.11  Defendants were held without bail in a very 
small percentage of these cases –- 3.7 percent.12  Bail was set 
in the remaining 16.1 percent of cases, with defendants being 
released on bail in 9.2 percent of all cases and held on bail in 
6.9 percent of all cases.13  The cohort of persons held on bail 
                                                          
 
 
11 Massachusetts Trial Court, Department of Research and 
Planning, Pre-Trial Release Decisions:  Pre and Post Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, at 1-2 (May 7, 2019) (Pre-Trial Release 
Decisions), https://www.mass.gov/doc/pretrial-release-
decisions/download [https://perma.cc/7TVJ-URG8]. 
 
 
12 Pre-Trial Release Decisions, supra at 2. 
 
 
13 Pre-Trial Release Decisions, supra at 2. 
24 
 
is thus relatively small when considered as a percentage of all 
cases.  But it looms larger when considered as a percentage of 
those cases where bail was set.  During the seventeen months 
after our decision in Brangan, defendants were held on bail in 
42.7 percent of the cases where bail was imposed as a condition 
of release in the District and Boston Municipal Courts.14  If 
pretrial detention is the outcome in more than two out of every 
five cases where bail is set, then it appears that too often one 
of bail's purposes -- "preserv[ing] the liberty of the accused" 
pending trial -- is not being achieved.  Brangan, 477 Mass. at 
692. 
 
iii.  Government interests.  The government has a 
legitimate and compelling interest in assuring that persons 
charged with criminal offenses return to court and appear at 
trial.  See Querubin, 440 Mass. at 112-116.  The government also 
has an important interest in ensuring that bail decisions are 
made efficiently and economically.  The volume of bail hearings 
is enormous.  According to Trial Court data, more than 150,000 
criminal cases were arraigned and disposed of in the District 
and Boston Municipal Courts during the seventeen months after 
our decision in Brangan.  Persons were released on bail or held 
subject to bail in approximately sixteen percent of those cases 
                                                          
 
 
14 Pre-Trial Release Decisions, supra at 3. 
25 
 
-- a total of more than 24,000 cases.15  Adopting procedural 
requirements for bail hearings that are too onerous could wreak 
havoc with the efficient processing of these cases. 
b.  Steps to be considered in setting bail.  Taking into 
account the fundamental liberty interests at stake, the serious 
collateral consequences of pretrial detention for defendants and 
their families, and the significant percentage of bail orders 
that result in pretrial detention, we conclude that some 
clarification of the necessary procedural protection would be 
useful to ensure that the due process requirements we 
established in Brangan are effective.  But any procedures we 
adopt must not unduly burden the efficient and economical 
administration of justice.  Accordingly, we seek to steer a 
middle course.  On the one hand, we conclude that when a judge 
sets a bail that a defendant cannot afford to post, the judge 
must do more than articulate the animating rationale for that 
determination and indicate in a general way that he or she has 
considered the relevant factors.  But neither do we require the 
judge to articulate a detailed factor-by-factor analysis as to 
why the amount of the bail is appropriate, or to specify each 
less restrictive alternative that has been considered and why 
each has been rejected.  Rather, we hold that a judge need only 
                                                          
 
 
15 See Pre-Trial Release Decisions, supra at 1-2. 
26 
 
provide sufficient information to enable the parties and the 
appellate courts to recognize that the judge has undertaken the 
analysis required by our holding in Brangan and its codification 
in the bail statutes.  Cf. Pinney v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 
1003, 1005-1006 (2020) (where defendant was charged with murder 
in first degree and judge imposed $250,000 cash bail that 
defendant could not afford, judge's findings and reasons were 
sufficient to satisfy due process where it was clear from record 
that judge considered relevant factors and engaged in required 
individualized bail determination); A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 
480 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2018) ("where a bail determination is 
likely to lead to pretrial detention, a judge making that 
determination . . . must make findings . . . demonstrat[ing] 
that [he or she] has engaged in fair and meaningful 
consideration of reasonable alternatives relevant to the 
circumstances of the case such that a reviewing court can be 
satisfied that the requirements detailed in Brangan have been 
met").  The judge's statement need not be lengthy, and it may be 
written or oral, as long as it is on the record and provides 
this information.  See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 708.  To assist 
judges in undertaking this analysis, we set out a series of 
steps for them to consider before imposing a bail that a 
defendant cannot afford. 
27 
 
i.  Policy of limiting pretrial restrictions on liberty.  
As a general principle, decisions about pretrial release and 
detention should be governed by "the Commonwealth's policy of 
limiting pretrial restrictions on liberty."  Commonwealth v. 
Perito, 417 Mass. 674, 678 (1994).  "[D]efendants should be 
burdened with the fewest restrictions on their pretrial liberty 
that will adequately assure their presence at trial."  Id., 
quoting Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 6, Mass. Ann. 
Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 94 (Law. Coop. 1979).  The 
roots of this policy reach back to Massachusetts's earliest days 
as a colony, as expressed in The Body of Liberties (1641):  "No 
mans person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any Authority 
whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him thereto, If he can 
put in sufficient securitie, bayle or mainprise, for his 
appearance . . . ."  Brangan, 477 Mass. at 692. 
The policy of limiting pretrial restrictions on liberty is 
based in part on constitutional principles.  Because liberty and 
freedom from physical restraint are fundamental rights protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, the "strict scrutiny" test of substantive due process 
requires that governmental restraints on liberty must be 
narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
28 
 
739, 746 (1987); Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594-595 
(2018); Josh J., 478 Mass. at 721; Brangan, 477 Mass. at 702-
703.16  Further, "[e]ven where government action survives 
substantive due process scrutiny, procedural due process 
protections require that the governmental action be implemented 
in a fair manner."  Josh J., supra at 722, citing Paquette, 440 
Mass. at 131.  Accordingly, we have observed that the 
government's legitimate and compelling interest in assuring a 
defendant's presence at trial can justify pretrial detention 
"only 'in carefully circumscribed circumstances and subject to 
quite demanding procedures.'"  Brangan, supra at 705, quoting 
Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 790 (1996).17 
ii.  Presumption of release on personal recognizance.  In 
accord with the Commonwealth's policy of limiting pretrial 
restrictions on liberty, the "preferred disposition" under our 
                                                          
 
16 We have sometimes added to this test the further 
requirement that the challenged statute or other government 
restriction must "be the least restrictive means available to 
vindicate" the government's interest.  Sharris, 480 Mass. at 
598, quoting Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 35 (2009). 
 
17 For example, in Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667 
(1993), we held that 1992 amendments to G. L. c. 276, § 58, 
which allowed judges to consider a defendant's dangerousness in 
setting bail, did not meet the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they "essentially grant[ed] the 
judicial officer unbridled discretion to determine whether an 
arrested individual is dangerous" and lacked adequate procedures 
"'designed to further the accuracy' of the judicial officer's 
determination."  Id. at 682, quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751. 
29 
 
"detailed general bail statute," G. L. c. 276, § 58, is release 
on personal recognizance without surety.  Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
428 Mass. 860, 865 (1999).  See G. L. c. 276, § 58 (providing 
that judge or other authorized officer "shall admit such person 
to bail on his [or her] personal recognizance without surety 
unless said justice . . . determines, in the exercise of his [or 
her] discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person before the court").18  "Our 
                                                          
 
 
18 Although the same language does not appear in G. L. 
c. 276, § 57, which governs bail proceedings in the Superior 
Court, see Brangan, 477 Mass. at 697, we have previously 
indicated that the presumption of release on personal 
recognizance is equally applicable under § 57.  See Commonwealth 
v. Hampe, 419 Mass. 514, 518 n.3 (1995) (citing G. L. c. 276, 
§ 57, as well as § 58, in stating that "[a] person under arrest 
has a right to a hearing on admission to bail with a presumption 
of release on personal recognizance").  We also note that § 57 
provides that "[a]ll persons authorized to take bail under this 
section shall be governed by the rules established by the 
supreme judicial or superior court."  Moreover, the Superior 
Court's own rules (albeit for persons authorized to take bail 
out of court) provide that "[a]ny person charged with an offense 
other than an offense punishable by death, or for any offense on 
which a warrant of arrest has been issued by the Superior Court, 
is required by law to be released on his personal recognizance 
pending trial unless the person setting the terms of release 
determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a 
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
as required."  Rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Court 
Governing Persons Authorized to Admit to Bail Out of Court 
(2014).  See also Trial Court Guidelines for Pretrial Conditions 
of Release, at 1 (Nov. 2016) ("the legal presumption for all 
criminal charges excluding capital cases is that an individual 
will be released on personal recognizance").  To the extent that 
dictum in Serna v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1003, 1003 n.1 
(2002), may suggest that release on personal recognizance 
30 
 
Legislature intended § 58 to protect the rights of the defendant 
by establishing a presumption that he or she will be admitted to 
bail on personal recognizance without surety . . . ."  Delaney 
v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 490, 495 (1993). 
The presumption that the defendant is entitled to release 
on personal recognizance without surety may be rebutted, 
however, by a history of prior court defaults19 or evidence that 
the defendant poses a flight risk, or the other factors listed 
in the bail statutes: 
"the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the 
potential penalty the person faces, the person's family 
ties, financial resources and financial ability to give 
bail, employment record and history of mental illness, his 
[or her] reputation and the length of residence in the 
community, his [or her] record of convictions, if any, any 
illegal drug distribution or present drug dependency, any 
flight to avoid prosecution or fraudulent use of an alias 
or false identification, any failure to appear at any court 
proceeding to answer to an offense, whether the person is 
on bail pending adjudication of a prior charge, whether the 
acts alleged involve abuse . . . , whether the person has 
any history of [abuse prevention] orders issued against him 
[or her] . . . , whether he [or she] is on probation, 
                                                          
 
without surety is not available under G. L. c. 276, § 57, we 
reject it. 
 
19 We note, however, that not all defaults necessarily 
indicate a willful failure to appear.  A special commission 
established by the Legislature recently recommended developing a 
system for differentiating between "no show" defaults and 
defaults entered due to a defendant's late appearance the same 
day, failure to pay a fine on time, or missing a court date 
because he or she was being held in another county.  See Final 
Report of the Special Commission to Evaluate Policies and 
Procedures Related to the Current Bail System, at 20 (Dec. 31, 
2019), https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2020/01/0102 
_bail-reform-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR3X-Q3FW]. 
31 
 
parole, or other release pending completion of sentence for 
any conviction, and whether he [or she] is on release 
pending sentence or appeal for any conviction." 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58.  See G. L. c. 276, § 57. 
iii.  Nonfinancial conditions of release.  If the 
Commonwealth rebuts the presumption of release on personal 
recognizance, the judge should consider whether there are 
nonfinancial conditions of release that will adequately assure 
the defendant's appearance before the court.  As we noted in 
Brangan, 477 Mass. at 709 n.23, "[r]esearch indicates that 
alternatives to cash bail and secured bonds, such as unsecured 
bonds, pretrial supervision, and court notification systems, may 
be just as effective in assuring that a defendant appears at 
future court proceedings." 
The judge may impose nonfinancial conditions of release 
that are related to the nature of the charges or the goal of 
assuring the defendant's return to court, or both, under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58.  If the judge "determines it to be 
necessary, the defendant may be ordered to abide by specified 
restrictions on personal associations or conduct including, but 
not limited to, avoiding all contact with an alleged victim of 
the crime and any potential witness or witnesses who may testify 
concerning the offense, as a condition of release."  G. L. 
c. 276, § 58.  Or, where the defendant has been charged with 
certain crimes involving domestic abuse, the judge "may impose 
32 
 
conditions on a person's release in order to ensure the 
appearance of the person before the court and the safety of the 
alleged victim, any other individual or the community."  Id.  
See G. L. c. 276, § 57; G. L. c. 276, § 42A. 
For our purposes here, it is particularly important to note 
that the Legislature has established several nonfinancial 
alternatives to bail.  For example, the court may order the 
defendant to participate in a pretrial services program at the 
office of community corrections (OCC), in lieu of bail or as a 
condition of release consistent with G. L. c. 276, §§ 57, 58, 
and 58A, pursuant to G. L. c. 211F, § 3A.20  With the defendant's 
consent, the court may also order the defendant to participate 
in a treatment program offered by OCC in lieu of bail or as a 
condition of release.21  In addition, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 87, the court may place the defendant on pretrial conditions 
                                                          
 
20 "Participation in a pretrial services program 
[administered by the office of community corrections] may be 
ordered by the court, in lieu of bail or as a condition of 
release consistent with [G. L. c. 276, §§ 57, 58, and 58A]. The 
court may dictate the duration and conditions of the pretrial 
services program."  G. L. c. 211F, § 3A (a), inserted by 
St. 2018, c. 72, § 12.  See G. L. c. 211F, § 1, as amended 
through St. 2018, c. 72, § 8. 
 
21 "Participation in a community corrections program 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 211F] may be ordered by the court, in lieu 
of bail, or as a condition of release; provided, however, that 
the defendant shall consent to such participation."  G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57, 58, 58A, as amended through St. 2018, c. 69, 
§§ 169, 173, 175. 
33 
 
of release that are supervised by the probation service if the 
defendant consents.22  The probation service has also begun a 
pretrial services initiative that includes the use of text 
messaging to remind defendants of court dates, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 99G. 
iv.  Setting bail.  If the judge determines that 
nonfinancial conditions of release are inadequate and that bail 
is necessary to assure the defendant's appearance before the 
court, then the judge must consider the defendant's financial 
resources in setting the amount of bail.  See G. L. c. 276, § 57 
("bail shall be set in an amount no higher than what would 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person before the court 
after taking into account the person's financial resources"); 
G. L. c. 276, § 58 (same); Brangan, 477 Mass. at 698-700 
(discussing common-law and constitutional principles that 
mandate consideration of a defendant's financial resources in 
setting bail). 
                                                          
 
22 See Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 762-763 
(2020) (distinguishing between pretrial probation under G. L. 
c. 276, § 87, and pretrial conditions of release that are 
supervised by probation service under § 87).  Of course, the 
court also has the power to impose nonfinancial conditions of 
release pursuant to G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, as discussed 
supra.  Unlike pretrial conditions of release under § 87, 
conditions of release under §§ 57 and 58 may be ordered without 
the defendant's consent, except when the court orders 
participation in a community corrections treatment program.  See 
note 21, supra. 
34 
 
To the extent possible, the judge should try to determine 
what amount the defendant can reasonably afford to post.  As an 
initial step, the judge can simply ask the defendant or defense 
counsel how much the defendant can reasonably afford to post.  
See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 707 n.21 (referencing "what a 
defendant represents that he can pay" as baseline for 
establishing amount that defendant can reasonably afford).  But 
the judge is not bound by this representation, of course, and 
may independently decide how much the defendant can reasonably 
afford to post based upon the probation service report, which 
determines whether a defendant qualifies as indigent for court-
appointed counsel, and any other evidence before the court.  See 
id. ("The judge also is not bound by a defendant's 
representation as to what bail he can reasonably afford, and may 
indicate that she is not convinced, based on the record, that 
the defendant cannot post bail in the amount set by the judge"); 
id. at 707 n.20 ("consideration of a defendant's financial 
resources may be facilitated by reviewing the report prepared by 
the probation department to determine whether a defendant 
qualifies as indigent for court-appointed counsel"); Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 7 (a) (3) and 7 (b) (2), as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 
(2012); S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 5 (a), as appearing in 475 Mass. 
1301 (2016); G. L. c. 211D, § 2A (a)-(c).  In deciding how much 
bail the defendant can afford, as in calculating a defendant's 
35 
 
ability to pay restitution, the judge should consider "the 
financial resources of the defendant, including income and net 
assets, and the defendant's financial obligations, including the 
amount necessary to meet minimum basic human needs such as food, 
shelter, and clothing for the defendant and his or her 
dependents."  Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 126 (2016). 
We recognize that it will often be difficult to ascertain 
the amount of bail that a defendant can reasonably afford given 
the limited information available to the court and, in some 
cases, the possibility that the defendant may have unstated or 
illegal sources of income.  But it is worthwhile for the judge 
to try to determine this amount, to the extent it is possible, 
so that the judge will be aware of whether the bail ultimately 
imposed will likely result in the defendant's pretrial 
detention. 
The judge should then determine the amount of bail that is 
necessary to assure the defendant's appearance.  This amount may 
be more than what the defendant can reasonably afford.  See 
G. L. c. 276, § 57 ("a higher than affordable bail may be set if 
neither alternative nonfinancial conditions nor a bail amount 
which the person could likely afford would adequately assure the 
person's appearance before the court"); G. L. c. 276, § 58 
(same); Brangan, 477 Mass. at 701 ("Bail that is beyond a 
defendant's reach is not prohibited").  But if the judge sets 
36 
 
bail in an amount that is more than the defendant can afford, 
the judge must also 
"provide written or orally recorded findings of fact and a 
statement of reasons as to why, under the relevant 
circumstances, neither alternative nonfinancial conditions 
nor a bail amount that the person can afford will 
reasonably assure his or her appearance before the court, 
and further, must explain how the bail amount was 
calculated after taking the person's financial resources 
into account and why the commonwealth's interest in bail or 
a financial obligation outweighs the potential adverse 
impact on the person, their immediate family or dependents 
resulting from pretrial detention." 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58, as amended through St. 2018, c. 69, § 172.  
See G. L. c. 276, § 57, as amended through St. 2018, c. 69, 
§ 168.  A judge may satisfy this requirement by reviewing, 
either in writing or orally on the record, the particular 
circumstances and factors that have led the judge to conclude 
that the presumption of release on personal recognizance has 
been rebutted, that nonfinancial conditions and a lesser bail 
amount would be inadequate, and that the Commonwealth's interest 
in this bail amount outweighs the potential adverse impact of 
pretrial detention on the defendant and his or her immediate 
family or dependents.23  Cf. Pinney, 484 Mass. at 1004, 1004-1006 
                                                          
 
23 For example, an oral statement on the record such as the 
following is more than sufficient: 
 
"Taking into account the presumption of recognizance that 
has been rebutted in this case and the conditions of bail 
that I will impose, I will impose a bail of $____ cash.  
After a review of the defendant intake sheet and the 
37 
 
(judge's findings and reasons for imposing bail that defendant 
could not afford satisfied due process, where defendant was 
charged with murder in first degree and judge weighed, among 
other factors, defendant's risk of flight, previous record, 
finances, work history, and family circumstances, as well as 
nature of charges and strength of Commonwealth's case); A 
Juvenile, 480 Mass. at 1014-1015 (judges provided sufficient 
detail to demonstrate that there was no abuse of discretion in 
setting bail that juvenile could not afford where judges noted 
that juvenile was in default and had essentially fled from 
custody when he was arrested on new charges, and that there was 
no reasonable alternative to bail).  In accord with the statute, 
the judge should also explain, at least in general terms, how 
the bail amount was determined. 
                                                          
 
proffer of the defendant through counsel and the argument 
of counsel, I find that the defendant cannot reasonably 
afford to make that bail.  Recognizing that the defendant's 
financial ability to make bail and the defendant's 
financial conditions are factors I must consider in setting 
bail based on the nature and circumstances of this charge 
of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, 
and the defendant's alleged attempts to coerce and 
manipulate this alleged victim not to disclose the 
defendant's alleged misconduct, the fact that the defendant 
has eight appearance defaults on six separate charges, his 
violations of chapter 209A restraining orders, which like a 
posted bail, are orders of the court, the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, and that the defendant has numerous 
other prior convictions, including an escape, and 
convictions for drug distribution, I find that the need for 
this bail amount exceeds the adverse impact on the 
defendant and his family." 
38 
 
 
c.  Other proposed procedural protections.  The defendants 
further propose that we should adopt additional procedural 
protections before a court can impose an unaffordable bail on a 
defendant.  They argue that we should require a full evidentiary 
hearing, at which the defendant has the right to testify, to 
present witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses, as is 
required when the Commonwealth moves to have a defendant held 
for dangerousness under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  The defendants 
also urge us to adopt "clear and convincing evidence" as the 
appropriate standard of proof for the statutory findings that a 
judge must make before imposing an unaffordable bail.  See G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57, 58.  We decline to adopt these additional 
requirements, based on principles of stare decisis and our 
concern that these requirements would place unrealistic burdens 
on judges. 
 
In Querubin, where we considered the due process 
requirements that should apply when a defendant is held without 
bail due to a risk of flight, we adopted due process standards 
that conflict with the defendants' proposals.  We concluded that 
a "full-blown evidentiary hearing that includes the right to 
present and cross-examine witnesses is not needed or required" 
for a bail proceeding, even where the defendant is held without 
bail, although "such a hearing, or some variation, may be held 
in the discretion of the judge when the circumstances of a 
39 
 
particular case warrant."  Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118.  We also 
held that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate 
standard for determining whether a defendant poses a flight risk 
and whether any condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure the defendant's appearance, following Federal 
decisions under the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142.  See id. at 119-120.  More recently, we considered the 
standards for bail decisions when a defendant has been charged 
with murder in the first degree, and we followed Querubin in 
holding that, in such a case, a full evidentiary hearing is not 
required and that pretrial detention without bail is appropriate 
where the judge concludes, based on a preponderance of the 
evidence, that it is necessary to assure the defendant's 
appearance at future court proceedings.  Vasquez v. 
Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747, 748, 758 (2019).  Given that we 
concluded in these cases that a nonevidentiary hearing and proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence are sufficient safeguards 
even where a defendant is being held without bail to assure his 
future appearance, it would be incongruous for us to embrace a 
higher standard where a defendant's pretrial detention results 
from the imposition of an unaffordable bail. 
 
"Adherence to the principle of stare decisis provides 
continuity and predictability in the law . . . ."  Commonwealth 
v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 694 (2018), quoting Stonehill College v. 
40 
 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562, 
cert. denied sub nom. Wilfret Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004).  We 
acknowledge that "the principle is not absolute," Ruiz, supra, 
quoting Stonehill College, supra, and that "[t]he force of stare 
decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning procedural rules 
that implicate fundamental constitutional provisions," Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
473 Mass. 297, 301 (2015), quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013).  But neither should we upset settled 
law unless "the benefits of so doing outweigh the values 
underlying stare decisis."  Ruiz, supra at 694-695, quoting 
Stonehill College, supra.  Here, we conclude that the benefits 
of adopting the additional procedural protections proposed by 
the defendants are insufficient to outweigh the values 
underlying stare decisis. 
Given the nature of the evidence that is typically 
presented at a bail hearing, and existing procedural 
protections, requiring a full evidentiary hearing in every 
single case where the court is contemplating imposing a bail 
that the defendant may be unable to afford would not add a 
significant benefit.  As we observed in Querubin, 440 Mass. at 
118, in most bail proceedings, 
41 
 
"[t]he necessary determination can be adequately presented 
and decided based on documents (e.g., police reports, 
witness statements, letters from employers and others, and 
probation records) and the representations of counsel." 
 
The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at a 
bail hearing, see Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 234, and counsel should 
be given the opportunity to address (1) the defendant's CARI 
report, including especially the nature of any defaults; (2) the 
police report, or the prosecution's version of the offense; and 
(3) the defendant's ability to pay and his or her risk of flight 
or otherwise failing to return to court. 
The time constraints on bail hearings would make it 
impractical to require a full-blown evidentiary hearing, 
comparable to that required under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, before a 
court can set a bail that a defendant may be unable to pay.  
Indeed, there is a certain irony about the defendants' 
contention that bail hearings should be more like § 58A 
hearings, given the challenges that CPCS has already encountered 
in providing defense counsel coverage for the steeply increasing 
number of § 58A hearings in Worcester County, as the defendants 
themselves experienced.  To be sure, lack of resources cannot 
justify forgoing constitutional safeguards where they are 
necessary.  But since the balancing test bids us to consider the 
government's interest in efficient and economic administration, 
it is appropriate to consider the burden on existing resources 
42 
 
that a full evidentiary hearing would impose if it were required 
in every case where the court is contemplating a potentially 
unaffordable bail.  Judges always have the option of holding an 
evidentiary hearing, or some variation, if they conclude that it 
is warranted by the circumstances in a particular case.  See 
Querubin, 440 Mass. at 118.  We need not require more. 
For similar reasons, we also adhere to preponderance of the 
evidence as the appropriate standard for bail hearings, even 
where the court imposes an unaffordable bail.  As we have 
discussed supra, the evidence available to judges at bail 
hearings is typically relatively limited.  Under those 
circumstances, asking judges to determine whether their 
conclusions are supported by clear and convincing evidence, 
instead of a preponderance of the evidence, is not realistic and 
would not improve the fact-finding process. 
 
d.  Differences between bail determinations under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, and under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  i.  
Whether § 58A prohibits setting unaffordable bail to assure a 
defendant's appearance.  We now turn to the single justice's 
second Brangan question, concerning differences in setting bail 
under the bail statutes, G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 58, and under 
the dangerousness statute, G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  We begin with 
his particular query as to whether a judge may set a cash bail 
that a defendant cannot post under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
43 
 
Subsection 58A (2), which lists various conditions of 
release that a judge may impose, states that "[t]he judicial 
officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the 
pretrial detention of the person."  Subsection 58A (3) further 
states: 
"A justice may not impose a financial condition under this 
section that results in the pretrial detention of the 
person.  Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as 
limiting the imposition of a financial condition upon the 
person to reasonably assure his appearance before the 
courts." 
 
The defendants contend that, in the context of a § 58A hearing, 
these provisions flatly prohibit imposing a bail amount that a 
defendant cannot afford to post, resulting in a defendant's 
pretrial detention, under any circumstances.  We disagree. 
 
We have addressed this issue twice before, in Mendonza, 423 
Mass. 771, and in Brangan, 477 Mass. 691.  In Mendonza, supra at 
774, we interpreted the foregoing provisions in § 58A to mean 
that "[t]he judge is precluded from imposing a financial 
condition that results in pretrial detention in order to assure 
the safety of other persons, although financial conditions 
having that effect are not precluded for the purpose of assuring 
his appearance before the court."  We reached the same 
conclusion in Brangan, where we cited legislative history 
related to the Federal Bail Reform Act, the model for § 58A, 
which stated that the purpose of similar language in 18 U.S.C. 
44 
 
§ 3142(c)(2) "is to preclude the sub rosa use of money bond to 
detain dangerous defendants," and "its application does not 
necessarily require the release of a person who says he is 
unable to meet a financial condition of release which the judge 
has determined is the only form of conditional release that will 
assure the person's future appearance."  Brangan, supra at 701 
n.15, quoting Sen. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (1994).  We also noted 
that, based on that legislative history, the Federal courts have 
similarly rejected the argument that defendants are necessarily 
entitled to an affordable bail under the Federal Bail Reform 
Act.  See Brangan, supra.  See also, e.g., United States v. 
Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388 (1st Cir. 1985) (Federal Bail 
Reform Act provision stating that "[t]he judicial officer may 
not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial 
detention of the person" does not foreclose detention where 
defendant cannot afford to post bail amount set by judicial 
officer and no other set of conditions is sufficient to 
guarantee defendant's appearance). 
The Legislature has amended § 58A several times since our 
decisions in Mendonza and Brangan, but has not made any changes 
to alter or clarify the language at issue here.  See St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 125; St. 2014, c. 260, §§ 33-38; St. 2014, c. 284, 
45 
 
§ 97; St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 174–176; St. 2018, c. 219, § 30.  We 
therefore conclude that our interpretation of that language is 
consistent with the legislative intent, and we see no reason to 
depart from that interpretation.  See Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 383 (2019) ("Where, as 
here, the Legislature . . . repeatedly has amended the statute 
without changing the language at issue, we presume that it has 
adopted the construction of the statute upon which Massachusetts 
courts . . . have relied"). 
 
ii.  Differences in setting bail under G. L. c. 276, §§ 57, 
58, and 58A.  Considering more generally the single justice's 
question about differences in setting bail under G. L. c. 276, 
§§ 57 and 58, and under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, there are of course 
significant differences among these statutes.  Section 58A 
establishes a procedure under which the Commonwealth may move 
for defendants who have been charged with certain serious 
offenses to be detained pretrial, or released on conditions, due 
to their dangerousness.  The focus of the hearing under § 58A is 
therefore on the defendant's dangerousness, see Mendonza, 423 
Mass. at 788, and the defendant is appropriately entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing at which he "shall be afforded an 
opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross–examine 
witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present 
information," G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4).  Consequently, in 
46 
 
contrast with §§ 57 and 58, bail may only be imposed under § 58A 
after a full evidentiary hearing.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (2) 
(providing that "upon the motion of the commonwealth, the 
judicial officer shall hold a hearing pursuant to subsection 
[4]," after which judicial officer may "issue an order that, 
pending trial, the individual shall . . . be . . . released on 
conditions of release as set forth herein"). 
But the procedural requirements that we have established 
here and in Brangan are equally applicable to bail 
determinations under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, because these 
requirements are based on the constitutional demands of due 
process.  Accordingly, in a § 58A hearing where, in addition to 
considering the defendant's dangerousness, the judge is 
contemplating imposing a bail that a defendant cannot afford to 
post to assure the defendant's appearance, the judge should also 
provide sufficient information to enable the parties and the 
appellate courts to recognize that the judge has undertaken the 
analysis required by our holding in Brangan. 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the delay in providing 
counsel to the defendants does not entitle them to release from 
pretrial detention under Lavallee.  In response to the single 
justice's Brangan questions, we hold that a judge should provide 
sufficient information to enable the parties and the appellate 
courts to recognize that the judge has undertaken the analysis 
47 
 
required by our holding in Brangan and its codification in the 
bail statutes before imposing a bail that is beyond what a 
defendant can reasonably afford.  The consolidated cases are 
remanded to the single justice for entry of orders denying the 
defendants' petitions for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, with 
regard to the claims that they have asserted under Lavallee.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
24 The defendants' appeals from the single justice's denial 
of their claims under Brangan are still pending before this 
court in other dockets.  See note 10, supra.