Title: State v. Winn

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, CROSS-APPELLANT, v. WINN, CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059.] 
Criminal law — Allied offenses of similar import — R.C. 2941.25 — The crime of 
kidnapping, defined by R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and the crime of aggravated 
robbery, defined by R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), are allied offenses of similar 
import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. 
(No. 2007-1842 — Submitted September 30, 2008 — Decided March 17, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
No. 21710, 173 Ohio App.3d 202, 2007-Ohio-4327. 
–––––––––––––––––– 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The crime of kidnapping, defined by R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and the crime of 
aggravated robbery, defined by R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), are allied offenses of 
similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. 
–––––––––––––––––– 
LANZINGER, J. 
I 
{¶ 1} This appeal asks us to once again determine whether two separate 
crimes are considered allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25.  
For the following reasons, we hold that the crimes of kidnapping (R.C. 
2905.01(A)(2)) and aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)) are allied offenses. 
II 
{¶ 2} Defendant, Davon Winn, with two accomplices, entered the 
apartment of the victim of his crimes using a pry bar.  One of the men entered 
brandishing a gun, which he pointed at the victim while ordering her to return to 
her bedroom.  The man had her lie on the bed and cover her face with a pillow.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
He pushed the gun against her head through the pillow and demanded money.  
The apartment was ransacked until the police arrived. 
{¶ 3} A neighbor called the police after he heard banging on the victim’s 
apartment door and, through his peephole, saw the men prying open the door.  
Realizing the police had arrived, the three men hid their two guns, gloves, a mask, 
and the pry bar in the apartment.  When police ordered the men out of the 
apartment, Winn’s two accomplices complied, but he stayed behind until the 
police entered the apartment to arrest him. 
{¶ 4} Winn was convicted by jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary, and kidnapping, with each including a firearm specification, and three 
counts of tampering with evidence.  The trial court sentenced him to ten years in 
prison, which included separate seven-year sentences for the aggravated robbery 
and kidnapping convictions, to be served concurrently.  Upon Winn’s appeal of 
his convictions and sentence, the court of appeals held that kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery are allied offenses of similar import and that the convictions 
must be merged.  State v. Winn, 173 Ohio App.3d 202, 2007-Ohio-4327, 877 
N.E.2d 1020, ¶ 34.  The court therefore vacated the separate sentence on the 
kidnapping conviction.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 5} We accepted the discretionary cross-appeal of the cross-appellant, 
state of Ohio, on two propositions of law: (1) “Any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of cumulative punishments imposed for multiple offenses under 
Ohio’s multiple count statute must end when the statutory elements of the 
offenses, compared in the abstract, do not correspond to such a degree that the 
commission of one offense will necessarily result in the commission of the other” 
and (2) “Ohio’s multiple count statute offers no protection from cumulative 
punishments for aggravated robbery and kidnapping because they are not allied 
offenses of similar import.”  Because these propositions are related, we consider 
both together. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
III 
{¶ 6} As the court discussed in State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 
635, 710 N.E.2d 699, whether cumulative punishments for two separate offenses 
stemming from the same conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause is 
determined by the legislative intent found in R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count 
statute.  The statute “ ‘is a clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent to 
permit cumulative sentencing for the commission of certain offenses,’ ” which 
“precludes an ‘unconstitutional’ label.”  Id. at 635-636, quoting State v. 
Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 10 OBR 352, 461 N.E.2d 892, fn. 1. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2941.25 provides: 
{¶ 8} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 
convicted of only one. 
{¶ 9} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses 
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to 
each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and 
the defendant may be convicted of all of them.” 
{¶ 10} We have said that the application of this statute involves a two-
tiered analysis.  State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 
149, ¶ 18, citing State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 
N.E.2d 181, ¶ 14.  “ ‘In the first step, the elements of the two crimes are 
compared.  If the elements of the offenses correspond to such a degree that the 
commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other, the crimes are 
allied offenses of similar import and the court must then proceed to the second 
step.  In the second step, the defendant’s conduct is reviewed to determine 
whether the defendant can be convicted of both offenses.  If the court finds either 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for 
each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.) 
Id. at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816.  
The state’s propositions of law do not challenge the appellate court’s 
determination that Winn did not have a separate animus for the kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery, so we need not address that issue. 
{¶ 11} In Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 637-638, 710 N.E.2d 699, we held that 
the first step for determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar 
import requires comparing the statutory elements in the abstract, rather than 
comparing the offenses as charged in a particular indictment.  Recently, however, 
we cautioned that the Rance test had been mistakenly applied in a narrow way by 
several courts: “[N]owhere does Rance mandate that the elements of compared 
offenses must exactly align for the offenses to be allied offenses of similar import 
under R.C. 2941.25(A).  To interpret Rance as requiring a strict textual 
comparison would mean that only where all the elements of the compared 
offenses coincide exactly will the offenses be considered allied offenses of similar 
import under R.C. 2941.25(A).”  (Emphasis sic.) Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 12} We rejected a “strict textual comparison” and stated, “Instead, if, 
in comparing the elements of the offenses in the abstract, the offenses are so 
similar that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission 
of the other, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import.” Id. at ¶ 26.  
Cabrales explained that elements need not be identical for offenses to be allied. 
{¶ 13} Turning to the elements of the offenses involved in this case, R.C. 
2905.01 defines kidnapping as follows: 
{¶ 14} “(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, * * * shall remove 
another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of 
the other person, for any of the following purposes: 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 15} “* * * 
{¶ 16} “(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 
thereafter.” 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2911.01 defines aggravated robbery as follows: 
{¶ 18} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as 
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after 
the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: 
{¶ 19} “(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or 
under the offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate 
that the offender possesses it, or use it. 
{¶ 20} “* * * ” 
{¶ 21} In essence, the elements to be compared in the abstract are the 
restraint, by force, threat, or deception, of the liberty of another to “facilitate the 
commission of any felony” (kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)) and having “a 
deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control 
and either display[ing] the weapon, brandish[ing] it, indicat[ing] that the offender 
possesses it, or us[ing] it” in attempting to commit or committing a theft offense 
(aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1)).  It is difficult to see how the presence 
of a weapon that has been shown or used, or whose possession has been made 
known to the victim during the commission of a theft offense, does not also 
forcibly restrain the liberty of another.  These two offenses are “so similar that the 
commission of one offense will necessarily result in commission of the other.”  
Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  They meet the test for allied offenses as it was refined by Cabrales. 
{¶ 22} Holding that kidnapping and aggravated robbery are allied offenses 
is also in keeping with 30 years of precedent.  State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio 
St.2d 126, 130, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, has been considered authority 
for the proposition that kidnapping and robbery are allied offenses of similar 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
import.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 198, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 
264, fn. 29 (pre-Rance case, citing Logan for proposition that “implicit within 
every robbery (and aggravated robbery) is a kidnapping”); State v. Fears (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 715 N.E.2d 136 (kidnapping specification merges with 
aggravated-robbery specification unless the offenses were committed with a 
separate animus); State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 
31, ¶ 204, citing Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 198, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, fn. 
29 (“kidnapping is implicit within every aggravated robbery”); Cabrales, 118 
Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E. 2d 181, at ¶ 18, 25. 
{¶ 23} In Logan, this court concluded: “It is clear from the plain language 
of the statute that no movement is required to constitute the offense of 
kidnapping; restraint of the victim by force, threat, or deception is sufficient.  
Thus, implicit within every forcible rape (R.C. 2907.02[A][1]) is a kidnapping.  
The same may be said of robbery (R.C. 2911.02), and, under certain 
circumstances, of felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11).” 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 130, 14 
O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345. 
{¶ 24} Nor are we persuaded by the state’s purse-snatcher or shoplifter 
scenarios.  These examples lapse into the strict textual comparison that this court 
rejected in Cabrales. We would be hard pressed to find any offenses allied if we 
had to find that there is no conceivable situation in which one crime can be 
committed without the other. 
IV 
{¶ 25} When analyzed in the abstract, the crime of kidnapping, defined by 
R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and the crime of aggravated robbery, defined by R.C. 
2911.01(A)(1), are allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25.  
The appellate court properly merged Winn’s kidnapping conviction into his 
aggravated-robbery conviction and vacated the separate sentence imposed on the 
kidnapping charge.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
January Term, 2009 
7 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
I 
{¶ 26} Because 
I 
believe the majority improperly applies the 
jurisprudence we have developed for determining whether two offenses are allied 
offenses of similar import, I respectfully dissent.  After accurately laying out the 
test we have developed in State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 636, 710 
N.E.2d 699, and State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 
N.E.2d 181, the majority misapplies the test to create an unworkable standard. 
II 
{¶ 27} The test for determining allied offenses, as announced in Cabrales, 
and restated by the majority, is “if, in comparing the elements of the offenses in 
the abstract, the offenses are so similar that the commission of one offense will 
necessarily result in commission of the other, then the offenses are allied offenses 
of similar import.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-
1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 26.  It is apparent that committing a kidnapping does not 
necessarily result in an aggravated robbery, because the act of kidnapping can be 
committed without attempting to commit or committing a theft offense, as 
required for aggravated robbery.  The reverse question is more complicated – 
whether one can commit an aggravated robbery without necessarily committing a 
kidnapping. 
{¶ 28} The assertion that in committing a robbery one must restrain the 
liberty of the victim long enough to perform the theft, thereby committing the 
offense of kidnapping, may seem reasonable, but it is not always the case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 29} There are a number of instances in which an aggravated robbery 
can be committed without a kidnapping being committed: e.g. (1) a pickpocket 
points a gun at the victim, but the victim does not know it, and therefore suffers 
no restraint of his liberty, (2) a purse-snatcher, with a gun in hand, simply grabs 
the purse and runs without restricting the victim’s freedom, and, (3) altering the 
facts of this case, the defendant and his accomplices enter the apartment while the 
victim is still sleeping, and the gunman merely points the gun at the victim in case 
she awakes as the others ransack the apartment.  These hypothetical but likely 
examples demonstrate that one does not necessarily commit a kidnapping when 
committing an aggravated robbery. 
{¶ 30} The majority, in reaching the opposite conclusion, merely restates 
the pertinent elements of kidnapping and aggravated robbery and then concludes 
that “[i]t is difficult to see how the presence of a weapon that has been shown or 
used, or whose possession has been made known to the victim during the 
commission of a theft offense, does not also forcibly restrain the liberty of 
another.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 21.  Any of the above hypotheticals, however, 
demonstrate how such a situation is entirely plausible.  Any circumstance in 
which the offender displays his weapon but the victim does not see it could result 
in the commission of an aggravated robbery but not a kidnapping. 
{¶ 31} The majority seems to acknowledge that there are circumstances in 
which an aggravated robbery can be committed without a kidnapping by citing the 
state’s examples of the purse-snatcher and the shoplifter.  The examples are 
quickly dismissed, however, as “laps[ing] into the strict textual comparison that 
this court rejected in Cabrales.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 24.  This is a misreading of 
Cabrales.  The strict textual-comparison method that we rejected is just what its 
name implies, a comparison of the statutory text of two offenses, which are 
deemed to be allied only if the text is found to be identical.  We noted that 
“[o]ther than identical offenses, we cannot envision any two offenses whose 
January Term, 2009 
9 
elements align exactly.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-
Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 22.  In that case, we also provided the example 
of the allied offenses of theft and receiving stolen property.  See id. at ¶ 25, citing 
State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087, 817 N.E.2d 845.  A strict 
textual comparison would find the elements not to be identical, and therefore the 
crimes not to be allied offenses.  Id.  But one cannot logically commit theft 
without also receiving stolen property, so the commission of one offense 
necessarily results in commission of the other, making them allied offenses of 
similar import.  Id.  This is not the case for kidnapping and aggravated robbery, as 
the previous examples illustrate. 
{¶ 32} The majority’s dismissal of the state’s examples ultimately 
amounts to a rewriting of the Cabrales test, which draws its effect from the word 
“necessarily.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Necessarily is defined as “1) 
by or of necessity; as a matter of compulsion or requirement; 2) as a necessary, 
logical, or inevitable result.”  Random House Dictionary (2d Ed.1987) 1283.  If 
there are evident examples of how aggravated robbery can be committed without 
a kidnapping, then the former does not inevitably result in the latter. 
{¶ 33} Instead of requiring that the commission of one offense necessarily 
results in the commission of the other, the majority requires that the commission 
of one offense probably results in the commission of the other.  According to this 
new standard, if the commission of one offense is, to some uncertain degree, 
likely to also result in the commission of another offense, then the two are 
considered allied offenses of similar import.  The unworkability of this standard is 
apparent.  Trial courts will have little guidance in determining when two offenses 
are similar enough that they should be merged as allied offenses. 
{¶ 34} If a court determines that there are situations where offense A can 
be committed without committing offense B, it will then have to determine how 
common those situations are in comparison to cases where committing offense A 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
does result in committing offense B.  Even if courts are able to make such a 
determination, which would be inherently imprecise, the majority decision here 
would then require those courts to compare that relative likelihood to a 
benchmark that is left undefined.  This is a far cry from “ ‘producing “clear legal 
lines capable of application in particular cases.” ’ ”  Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 15, quoting Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d at 636, 
710 N.E.2d 699, quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 U.S. 
137, 148, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238. 
III 
{¶ 35} The majority claims that “[w]e would be hard pressed to find any 
offenses allied if we had to find that there is no conceivable situation in which one 
crime can be committed without the other.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 24.  I disagree.  
While this test, which I believe is the proper formulation of the Cabrales test, may 
restrict allied offenses to more limited circumstances than the majority would 
prefer, it does not reduce the set of allied offenses to nil.  Our precedent proves 
this to be true. 
{¶ 36} First, as noted above, Cabrales cites the example of Yarbrough, 
104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087, 817 N.E.2d 845, where we held that theft and 
receiving stolen property are allied offenses.  Second, in State v. Donald (1979), 
57 Ohio St.2d 73, 74-75, 11 O.O.3d 242, 386 N.E.2d 1341, we held that 
kidnapping, under R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), and rape, under former R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1), now R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), are allied offenses.  It is impossible to 
commit a rape, defined as engaging in sexual conduct with another by force or 
threat of force, without also committing kidnapping, defined as restraining the 
liberty of another by force, threat, or deception, to engage in sexual activity.  Id. 
{¶ 37} Finally, in Cabrales itself, we held that “trafficking in a controlled 
substance under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and possession of that same controlled 
substance under R.C. 2925.11(A) are allied offenses of similar import because 
January Term, 2009 
11 
commission of the first offense necessarily results in commission of the second.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 30.  
We reasoned that “[i]n order to ship a controlled substance, deliver it, distribute it, 
or prepare it for shipping, etc. [as required for trafficking], the offender must 
‘hav[e] control over’ it.  R.C. 2925.01(K) (defining ‘possession’).”  Id.  By having 
control over a substance, the offender is guilty of possession.  See id. 
{¶ 38} In each of these three cases, the pair of crimes involved are allied 
offenses of similar import because it is logically impossible to commit one 
without committing the other; “there is no conceivable situation in which one 
crime can be committed without the other.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 24.  Any 
concern the majority may have for how narrow this test may be does not change 
the fact that this is what we held in Cabrales. 
{¶ 39} I concede that there is a legitimate concern that this strict 
interpretation of the Cabrales test could lead to absurd results in some cases.  This 
is why we developed the preemptive exception in State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 37, holding that resort to the two-
tiered test developed in Rance and the subsequent opinions is unnecessary “when 
the legislature’s intent is clear from the language of the statute.”  In Brown, this 
led us to hold that separate convictions for aggravated assault under two different 
subdivisions of the same statute violated R.C. 2941.25, even though each form of 
the offense could be committed without necessarily committing the other form, 
because the General Assembly did not intend for the convictions to be separately 
punishable.  Id. at ¶ 39-40.  The subdivisions addressed “two different forms of 
the same offense, in each of which the legislature manifested its intent to serve the 
same interest – preventing physical harm to persons.”  Id. at ¶ 39. 
{¶ 40} The Brown exception does not, however, decide the issue before us 
because the intent of the General Assembly is not clear from the language of the 
statutes.  In this case, we are presented with two different offenses under different 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
statutory sections.  The kidnapping statute serves the interest of protecting the 
physical liberty of persons, while the aggravated-robbery statute protects personal 
property.  We must therefore apply the two-tiered analysis. 
IV 
{¶ 41} Finally, the majority also argues that 30 years of precedent favors a 
holding that kidnapping and aggravated robbery are allied offenses.  The cases 
cited by the majority do not control our decision.  The primary authority cited, 
State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, is not 
persuasive.  First, Logan was decided in 1979, 20 years before we established the 
two-tiered analysis for allied offenses in Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 
699.  Second, the court’s discussion of robbery and kidnapping was dicta in the 
opinion because the facts of the case involved the offenses of rape and 
kidnapping, and the statements in the opinion regarding robbery and kidnapping 
were made in the context of the court’s analysis of animus.  Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 
at 131-132, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  The court did not engage in an 
abstract analysis of the actual elements of each offense, as we have since 
expressly required in Rance and Cabrales.  See Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 
2008-Ohio-1625, 886 N.E.2d 181, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Rance, 85 
Ohio St.3d at 637-638, 710 N.E.2d 699. 
{¶ 42} The other cases cited by the majority also are not controlling.  Our 
opinions in State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 198, 15 OBR 311, 473 
N.E.2d 264, fn. 29; State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 715 N.E.2d 
136; and State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 204, 
all simply repeat the conclusory statement first made in Logan, that “implicit 
within every robbery (and aggravated robbery) is a kidnapping.”  Jenkins at 198, 
citing Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 130, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  This court 
has never before performed a considered analysis of the elements of kidnapping 
and aggravated robbery to determine whether they are allied offenses of similar 
January Term, 2009 
13 
import.  It is not apparent, moreover, that the question of whether the offenses 
were allied offenses was before the court in any of the three cases.  There is no 
indication that the state challenged the notion that implicit within every robbery is 
a kidnapping.  In Fears and Davis, at least, the briefs of the state failed to argue 
the point.  Instead, the court considered only the issue of whether a separate 
animus existed for each offense. 
{¶ 43} Because our precedent does not firmly decide the issue before us, 
we cannot rely on it for authority. 
V 
{¶ 44} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that 
kidnapping and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of similar import, 
because aggravated robbery can be committed without necessarily committing 
kidnapping. 
 
O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jill 
R. Sink, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for cross-appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 
Public Defender, for cross-appellee. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
and Todd A. Nist, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney 
General of Ohio. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County 
Public Defender. 
______________________