Title: KEM Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Materi

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

247 N.W.2d 668 (1976) KEM ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leo G. MATERI and Melonia T. Materi, Defendants-Appellants. Civ. No. 9258. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 30, 1976. *670 Wheeler, Wolf, Wefald & Peterson, Bismarck, for defendants and appellants; argued by Albert A. Wolf, Bismarck. Robert Chesrown, Linton, and Bair, Brown & Kautzmann, Mandan, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Bruce B. Bair, Jr., Mandan. PAULSON, Judge. This is an appeal by the defendants [hereinafter the Materis] from the judgment of the District Court of Emmons County dated January 23, 1976, in an eminent domain action, and from the order of said court dated April 2, 1976, denying the motion of the Materis to amend the findings or in the alternative for a new trial. This action was commenced by KEM Electric Cooperative, Inc., a domestic corporation [hereinafter KEM Electric], under the power of eminent domain, to impose an easement over a 25-foot wide, 2½-mile long strip of the Materis' property to construct, operate, and maintain a 41,600-volt electric power transmission line. The only issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that the taking of the easement was necessary. Section 32-15-05, N.D.C.C., provides: The Materis contend that KEM Electric failed to establish that the taking was necessary, pursuant to § 32-15-05(2), N.D.C.C. The Materis contend that KEM Electric could have erected the proposed transmission line on an existing easement owned by KEM Electric that runs parallel to and approximately 51 to 80 feet south of the proposed transmission line. They contend that the proposed 41,600-volt transmission line could be strung on the same poles which presently support the 7,200-volt distribution line located on the existing easement which KEM Electric had previously secured from the Materis. The Materis presented no evidence at the trial challenging the necessity of the taking, but, rather, rely solely on their assertion that KEM Electric failed in its burden of proof to establish a prima facie case showing the necessity of the taking as required by § 32-15-05(2), N.D.C.C. In Otter Tail Power Company v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D.1958), in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the syllabus, this court held: *671 In Malme, supra, 92 N.W.2d at 521, this court stated: For recent discussion of the above, see 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 4.11; 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 89(3), 90, 91. In the instant case, the parties stipulated that the engineers employed in the project would not be required to testify. The only witness called to testify at the trial was George W. Cornog, the general manager of KEM Electric. Mr. Cornog testified that several alternate routes for the transmission line were considered, but that each was rejected for various reasons, including: access difficulty, interference with existing power lines, and interference with existing telephone lines. When asked on direct examination why the proposed transmission line was placed 125 feet from the section line, Mr. Cornog testified: When asked on cross-examination what factors were considered in making the determination not to combine the present distribution line and the proposed transmission line, Mr. Cornog testified: The Materis contend that such a showing of customer convenience in uninterrupted electric service and KEM Electric convenience and safety in construction and maintenance, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case showing necessity for the taking, as required by § 32-15-05(2), N.D. C.C. No testimony was introduced on behalf of the Materis to establish either that another site would have been better or that it would have been just as feasible to have placed both the 7,200-volt distribution line and the 41,600-volt transmission line on the same poles. This court notes preliminarily the sense in which we use the concept of KEM Electric's establishing a prima facie case. In Husbands v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 1139 (E.D.Penn. 1975), that court noted that: It is the first sense of prima facie case which is applicable to the instant case. KEM Electric has produced evidence sufficient to render reasonable a conclusion in favor of the allegation it assertsthat the taking is necessarythus allowing KEM Electric to submit its case to the fact finder, the district court judge, on the issue of necessity. The record supports the trial court's findings that KEM Electric did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and that such taking was compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private injury. Further, the record is without evidence to the contrary. In Berry-Iverson Co. of North Dakota v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, 129 (N.D.1976), we stated: Furthermore, in Berry Iverson, supra at 129, this court quoted with approval from Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975), paragraph 4 of the syllabus, wherein this court held: We decline to set aside the trial court's findings relative to the issue of necessity. The judgment of the district court and the order denying the Materis' motion to amend findings or in the alternative for a new trial are affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, VOGEL and SAND, JJ., concur.