Title: In re Morris

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  March 5, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re:

Complaint as to the Conduct of

GRETCHEN R. MORRIS,

	Accused.

(OSB 94-11; SC S43700)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.

	Argued and submitted April 29, 1997.

	Jacob Tanzer, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for the accused.

	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Graber, Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 120 days, commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

	*Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.

		PER CURIAM

		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (the Bar) charges the accused with violating the
following disciplinary rules (DRs) and statute:

		1.  DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

		2.  DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice);

		3.  DR 7-102(A)(5) (in lawyer's representation of a
client, knowingly making a false statement of law or fact);

		4.  DR 5-105(E) (representing multiple current clients
when such representation would result in an actual or likely
conflict); and 

		5.  ORS 9.527(4) (willful deceit or misconduct).

		A trial panel found the accused guilty of violating all
the foregoing rules and the statute.  It imposed a suspension of
nine months.  The accused seeks review of that decision in this
court, arguing that she is not guilty of the charged violations
and that, even if she were guilty of any violations, the sanction
is too severe.  The Bar also seeks review, arguing that the
seriousness of the accused's misconduct calls for a suspension of
at least one year.  

		For the reasons that follow, we find the accused guilty
of the charges of engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, DR 1-102(A)(3);  knowingly
making a false representation, DR 7-102(A)(5); conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(4); and
of knowingly representing multiple clients whose positions
potentially were adverse, DR 5-105(E).  With respect to those
offenses, we suspend the accused from the practice of law for 120
days.

		The parties entered into a factual stipulation that was
received by the trial panel.  Based on that stipulation and on
the other evidence heard by the trial panel, we find the
following facts to have been proved by clear and convincing
evidence:(1)

		Claire E. Whiteman died intestate in Benton County on
September 5, 1989, leaving as his heirs a daughter, June Powell,
sons Richard Whiteman and Clare N. Whiteman, and the children of
a deceased son.  Powell retained the accused to petition for
Powell's appointment as personal representative of the estate. 
Powell was appointed, and letters of administration issued. 
Heirs Richard Whiteman and Clare N. Whiteman retained a Portland
lawyer, Francis Harrington, to represent them with respect to
their interests in the estate.  Powell did not get along with her
brothers, which made her service as personal representative
difficult.  

		The difficulties among the siblings led to several
legal proceedings.  On December 27, 1989, Harrington filed a
petition to remove Powell as personal representative.  On
December 29, 1989, Harrington filed objections to the prospective
sale of certain real property that Powell claimed as her own, but
that her brothers claimed belonged to the estate.  On April 3,
1990, Harrington filed objections to the purchase of estate
personal property by Powell without the consent of all interested
parties.  Finally, on August 23, 1990, Harrington filed a
petition for imposition of a trust on assets under Powell's
control that had been owned by the decedent at the time of his
death.  

		The accused associated the Corvallis law firm of Ringo
and Stuber as co-counsel for the personal representative with
respect to the trial of the foregoing issues.  After that trial,
the probate judge rendered an oral decision with respect to the
petition for removal of Powell as personal representative:

		"I do feel that [it] would be best if Mrs. Powell
did not continue as the personal representative and
that a successor personal representative bring the
estate to a closing.  I would have no problem with [the
accused], you know, continuing as the attorney of the 
	-- of the estate, but that would end up being a
decision of the successor personal representative 
	* * *."

		Although the probate court had suggested that it wished
to have a successor personal representative appointed, the matter
languished for some time.  The court did not appoint a successor
until February 1992, when it issued its written findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order removing Powell as personal
representative and appointing Donald Michael as successor
personal representative.  During 1991, the accused continued to
represent Powell as personal representative in connection with
estate matters, such as the sale of estate assets, accounting for
estate income, and the like.

		After Michael was informed by letter of his
appointment, he met personally with the judge, who outlined
Michael's duties and discussed whom Michael might select as his
lawyer.  The judge suggested that Michael consider selecting the
accused because of her familiarity with the estate.  

Following a meeting with the accused, Michael selected her to
serve as his lawyer in his capacity as successor personal
representative.

		The outstanding estate matters were concluded by the
end of 1992.  On November 21, 1992, the accused received a letter
from Powell seeking compensation from the estate for her services
as personal representative.  In that letter, Powell stated that
she wanted to "submit a bill to the estate to be reimbursed for
my attorney fees for allegations brought against me while I was
personal representative for the estate in the amount of
$20,562.80" -- the amount that Powell personally had paid to
Ringo and Stuber with respect to their representation of her on
the various matters raised by her brothers.

		In response to Powell's November 21, 1992, letter, the
accused prepared an affidavit in support of Powell's request for
personal representative's fees for the period during which Powell
had held that position.  The accused also prepared for Powell a
second set of documents, consisting of a request for
reimbursement of the Ringo and Stuber fees, supported by a
separate affidavit.  Powell executed both affidavits.  On March
2, 1993, the accused prepared a motion regarding Powell's request
for reimbursement of attorney fees, together with the pertinent
supporting affidavit.  The accused served Michael, Harrington,
Ringo, and the heirs with that motion.  The accused did not call
the matter to Michael's attention, however.  At no time after
receiving Powell's November 1992 letter did the accused directly
discuss Powell's request for reimbursement of attorney fees with
Michael.

		Before March 2, 1993, the accused already had completed
a final account and petition for a decree of final distribution. 
She mailed both documents to Michael, who resided in West Linn. 
As required by ORS 116.083, Michael verified the final account by
signing it before a notary on March 3, 1993.  He returned the
documents to the accused with a cover letter dated March 5, 1993;
they were received in the accused's office on March 8, 1993.

		After she had received the executed final account and
petition for decree for final distribution from Michael, the
accused realized that the final account made no reference to the
unresolved issue of Powell's request for reimbursement of
attorney fees.  She concluded that some reference to that issue
needed to be included in the final account.  She also determined
that she had underestimated her own attorney fees.  

		On March 9 or 10, 1993, the accused had her secretary,
Marge Bromley, make certain changes to the second page of the
final account.  Those changes included altering in part the
format of certain information, as well as a change in the amount
sought for her own attorney fees.  In addition to those changes,
the accused had inserted on page 3 of the final account, which
listed "remaining expenses of administration which should be paid
out of the estate," the following entry:  "claim-June Powell
(reimb. of atty. fees) $20,562.80."  A conforming adjustment was
made to the "total" of such expenses, from "$18,005.75" to
"$38,568.55."

		Bromley pointed out to the accused that the final
account already had been signed.  The accused told Bromley that
she would speak to Michael about it.  The accused telephoned
Michael on March 10, 1993, concerning her underestimate of her
own fee and requested and obtained Michael's approval to increase
her attorney fee.  She did not mention the Powell petition for
reimbursement; she did not obtain approval for the change in the
final account respecting that issue.  

		There is no direct evidence as to what, if anything,
the accused told Bromley after filing the altered document with
the probate court.  However, the altered final account and
petition for decree of final distribution, together with an
affidavit of mailing, a notice for filing objections to the final
account and petition for distribution, and a revised affidavit of
attorney fees, were mailed to the probate court for filing on
that day -- March 10, 1993.  All the documents but the final
account were signed by the accused on that same day.

		A file copy of the revised final account also was
mailed to Michael, who did not read it, but put it in his file. 
Michael also received, but did not read, a cover letter from
Bromley that was sent to him with an application for a release of
Oregon income taxes.  Bromley's letter included the following
postscript:  "[W]e did make a change in the Final Account (after
you sent it back to us) to include June Powell's reimbursement of
attorney fees.  ([S]ee pg. 3 of account)."

		After receiving the March 2, 1993, motion regarding
Powell's request for reimbursement of the Ringo and Stuber
attorney fees, which the accused had prepared, Harrington filed
objections to allowance of the final account and petition for
final distribution.  He contended that the Ringo and Stuber
attorney fee was Powell's personal expense and, therefore, not
properly chargeable to the estate.  The accused had expected
Harrington to make that objection.  The accused then contacted
Ringo, did legal research, and prepared notes on how to establish
at the forthcoming hearing that the attorney fee that Powell paid
to Ringo and Stuber was reasonable.  All those efforts were
designed to benefit Powell.

		A hearing on the objections to the final account was
held on June 9, 1993.  At that hearing, the accused appeared for
the estate, and Harrington appeared for the objectors.  However,
the accused also filed a trial memorandum on behalf of Powell.

		Harrington called Michael as a witness on behalf of the
objectors.  Michael identified a copy of the final account that
he had signed.  It became clear that there was a discrepancy
between that account and the one that the accused had filed with
the court (and to which Harrington's clients had objected).  The
accused could not then explain the discrepancy.  When the
discrepancy was called to Michael's attention, the accused
stipulated that Michael had received a copy of the final account
that did not include Powell's claim for attorney fees.

		Michael testified at the hearing that he did not intend
to approve the reimbursement to Powell of the Ringo and Stuber
attorney fee, because that transaction had occurred before he was
involved in the estate and he would not approve such an
expenditure without knowing its background or history.  He did
not have such information.

		The accused then questioned Michael.  She apologized to
Michael "for what obviously was a lack of communication."  She
also said that she did not have any correspondence file with her
at the hearing and that she could not, at that moment, explain
what had happened.  The accused stated that she understood that
Michael's objection was that he did not have any information
about the merits of Powell's claim.  Michael answered, "Not at
all."  When the accused asked Michael whether he might have
allowed the claim if he received the information and found it to
be satisfactory, he answered, "I probably would not have."  When
the accused invited him to explain, Michael said that he had had
another encounter with a lawyer from the Ringo and Stuber firm in
connection with the case and that his feelings toward the firm
were not warm.

		After hearing the testimony, the probate judge said
that he thought that Michael's position on Powell's claim for
attorney fees was similar to the court's own position, i.e., the
court doubted whether it would be appropriate for a personal
representative to charge the estate for attorney fees when the
issues with respect to which those fees were paid involved
Powell's personal claim to certain property.  The judge recalled
that the parties and he had discussed those attorney fees in the
past and had left to the final account the determination whether
Powell was entitled to any reimbursement for them.  The judge
then took the matter under advisement.

		On July 26, 1993, the probate court denied Powell's
claim for reimbursement of the Ringo and Stuber attorney fees. 
The accused thereafter completed a revised final account and
petitioned for a decree of final distribution, which was granted. 
The estate was closed.

		We turn to the charges as to which the trial panel
found the accused guilty.  

		It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.  DR 1-102(A)(3).  It also is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to knowingly make a false statement of
fact in representation of a client.  DR 7-102(A)(5).  Further,
this court may sanction a lawyer if the lawyer engages in willful
deceit or misconduct in the legal profession.  ORS 9.527(4).  

		The trial panel found that, by directing her legal
assistant to alter a final account that already had been signed
and notarized, and then filing it with the probate court, the
accused misrepresented to the court and to the adverse parties,
on whom she served the final account, that the personal
representative had approved that document.  The panel opined:

	"It is not necessary that the Accused must have acted
with intent to injure or defraud because no such intent
is required[,] so long as the accused lawyer knew that
the alteration and filing as altered [were] not
authorized.  In re Booth, 303 Or [643,] 652[, 740 P2d
785 (1987)]."

		We understand the trial panel to mean that, in order to
be guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS
9.527(4), the accused must have acted at least with a knowing
state of mind.  With respect to DR 1-102(A)(3) and 7-102(A)(5),
that formulation is correct.  See DR 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting
knowing false statements); In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 198, __ P2d
__ (1997) (stating that DR 1-102(A)(3) "requires, at the least,
that a lawyer knowingly engage in a misrepresentation" (emphasis
in original).  However, it is apparent from the text of ORS
9.527(4), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in "willful
deceit or misconduct in the legal profession," that a lawyer must
act intentionally or willfully to be subject to discipline under
that statute.  

		For the reasons that follow, we agree with the trial
panel that the timing of the events surrounding the filing of the
altered final account establishes that the accused knew that she
was filing an altered and misleading document with the court:  

		By virtue of her substantial expertise in the area of
probate law, the accused knew that, under ORS 116.093(1), she
must file the Affidavit and the Notice either contemporaneously
with or after the filing of the final account.  Given the fact
that the accused had spoken to Michael about revising the final
account the very day that it was filed, she could not have
believed either that the final account already had been filed or
that it had been re-executed by Michael.  Moreover, inasmuch as
the accused had never discussed with Michael the issue of
Powell's claim for reimbursement of her attorney fees, it is not
possible that the accused mistakenly thought that she had
discussed the matter in her telephone call with him that day.  

		The accused asserts that she never saw the final
account again, after she gave it to Bromley for revisions.  That
may be so, but it is not the point.  In the light of the timing
of the revisions, the phone call, and the filing of the dated
Affidavit and Notice (both of which she signed), the accused had
to know that she was filing a false final account with the court. 
We find by clear and convincing evidence that the accused is
guilty of knowing conduct involving misrepresentation, in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-102(A)(5).  We do not find,
however, that the accused's misconduct violated ORS 9.527(4).(2)  

		It follows from the foregoing that the accused also is
guilty of violating DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
That rule is violated whenever a lawyer's wrongful conduct has
the potential to cause harm either to the procedural functioning
of a judicial proceeding or to the substantive interest of a
party to that proceeding.  In re Claussen, 322 Or 466, 482, 909
P2d 862 (1996).  The accused argues here again that opposition to
Powell's claim for reimbursement was longstanding and well known
to the accused and to the probate court.  Under those
circumstances, she reasons, there was no chance that the
misrepresentation would go unnoticed during the course of the
judicial proceeding and, therefore, the potential for prejudice
either to the procedural functioning of the proceeding or to the
substantive interests of any parties to that proceeding was
minimal.  That argument does not adequately recognize the
potential harm that the accused's actions could have caused,
however.  We find the accused guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice, DR 1-102(A)(4).

		We turn to the charge that the accused represented
multiple clients in circumstances in which the interests of those
clients was in conflict.  The Bar alleges that the accused
violated DR 5-105(E), which provides that, with an exception not
pertinent here, a lawyer shall not represent multiple current
clients in a matter, when such representation would result in an
actual or likely conflict.  On March 2, 1993, the accused filed a
motion and an affidavit in support of the personal
representative's request for reimbursement of attorney fees that
she had prepared on behalf of Powell, requesting reimbursement
for the $20,562.80 that Powell had paid attorney Ringo and
Stuber.  The accused styled herself "Attorney for Personal
Representative" on the certificate of mailing.  The accused did
not discuss with Michael her current efforts on behalf of Powell. 
		The accused then proceeded to represent Powell during
the hearing on objections and submitted two trial memoranda on
Powell's behalf.  She questioned Michael during the course of the
hearing in a manner that was designed to further Powell's claim
at the expense of Michael's assessment of the estate's interest
in the matter.  As the trial panel recognized, "Michael ended up
on the witness stand without any attorney representing him."

		In choosing to assist Powell in pursuing a claim
against the estate for attorney fees, while at the same time
continuing to be responsible for representing Michael, the
personal representative, the accused had an actual current
conflict of interest.  We find by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused is guilty of violating DR 5-105(E). 

		We turn to the issue of sanction.  This court looks to
the ABA Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (ABA
Standards) for guidance in setting an appropriate sanction in a
lawyer discipline case.  In re Jeffery, 321 Or 360, 374, 898 P2d
752 (1995).  Under the ABA Standards, this court addresses the
duty violated, the mental state involved, the injury (if any)
that resulted, and any aggravating or mitigating factors.  Id.;
ABA Standard 3.0.

		In the present case, the accused violated the duty of
candor owed to Michael by altering a document, the accuracy of
which Michael already had verified before a notary, without
obtaining Michael's consent to make that alteration, and by
filing that document.  See ABA Standard 4.6 (discussing that
duty).  The accused's misconduct in filing the altered final
account created the potential for substantial injury to her
client, Michael, and to the court.  Michael was put at risk of
liability to the other heirs for approving a reimbursement claim
that he did not believe was properly reimbursable by the estate,
and there was a risk, albeit a smaller one, that the court would
be misled by the deceptive final account. 

		The accused also violated her duty to the legal system
by filing the misleading document.  See ABA Standard 6.1
(discussing that duty).  Additionally, by simultaneously
representing both Michael and Powell, the accused violated the
duty owed to each of her clients to avoid conflicts of interest,
thereby assuring each the complete advocacy to which that client
was entitled.  The accused's simultaneous representation of both
clients created a substantial risk that one or both would not be
represented fully.  See ABA Standard 4.3 (discussing that duty).

		The accused acted knowingly with respect to each of the
violations found herein.  ABA Standards at 7 (defining
"knowledge" as the "conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
objective" to achieve a particular result).

		The accused caused harm to the administration of
justice by creating circumstances requiring an ancillary inquiry
with respect to what her client had agreed to in the final
account.  She caused potential harm to her client, because her
client, Michael, could have been personally liable for improperly
distributing assets of the estate.  See ORS 116.063(3)(g)
(personal representatives may be liable for certain
administrative acts that cause loss to the estate).  She also
caused harm to Michael through her divided loyalty.

		At this point, and without consideration of aggravating
or mitigating factors, the ABA Standards provide that a
suspension would be appropriate.  See ABA Standard 4.62
(suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a
client and causes injury or potential injury to that client); ABA
Standard 6.12 (suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that
a false document is being submitted to the court and takes no
remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party
in the legal proceeding); ABA Standard 4.32 (suspension is
appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest, does
not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client).  We
turn to the aggravating and mitigating factors.  

		We find two aggravating factors: ABA Standard 9.22(d)
(multiple offenses); and ABA Standard 9.22(i) (substantial
experience in the practice of law).  Mitigating factors are the
absence of a prior disciplinary record (ABA Standard 9.32(a)), a
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings (ABA
Standard 9.32(e)), and good character or reputation (ABA Standard
9.32(g)).  The record, particularly that portion pertaining to
the accused's character and reputation, causes us to conclude
that the mitigating factors significantly outweigh the
aggravating factors.  

		The remaining consideration is this court's case law. 
See Jeffery, 321 Or at 375-76 (illustrating progression in
analysis).  This court recently considered the appropriate
sanction when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in Jones.  That
case involved a lawyer who had his client sign bankruptcy
documents in blank and, notwithstanding the existence of perjury
clauses on those documents, completed and filed them with the
Bankruptcy Court on behalf of his client.  We held in that case
that, without consideration of the aggravating factor of the
accused's prior disciplinary record, a 45-day suspension was
appropriate.  Jones, 326 Or at 202.  

		Addressing the appropriate sanction for a conflict of
interest violation, this court previously has held that a single
"violation of the conflicts rule * * * would justify a 30-day
suspension."  In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164, 734 P2d 877 (1987).

		In the present case, the accused is guilty of a number
of violations, including the violation of the conflict of
interest rules.  That violation was both obvious and serious. 
The accused filed two memoranda on behalf of her former client,
Powell, and then engaged in questioning her current client,
Michael, all with the aim of securing a benefit for Powell to
which Michael had not agreed.  The accused's actions in this case
thus are more serious than those referred to in Hockett.  

		The trial panel described the accused's behavior as
"inexplicable."  That term is apt.  But our difficulty in
understanding why the accused did what she did does not alter the
fact that she is guilty of several significant violations of the
disciplinary rules.  After considering all the factors involved,
we conclude that an appropriate sanction is a 120-day suspension. 
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 120 days commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

1. 	Our recitation of the facts is borrowed in major
respects from the trial panel's opinion.

2. 	We find that the accused acted knowingly, because the
Bar did not prove that the accused intended to deceive the court
or the other parties to the litigation.  The previous history of
the administration of the estate showed that it was virtually
certain that Powell's claim for reimbursement for her attorney
fees was going to be contested by the other heirs.  The accused
thus could not have believed that the filing of an altered
document would go unnoticed.