Title: RUTTI, JR. v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RUTTI, JR. v. STATE2004 WY 133100 P.3d 394Case Number: 03-24Decided: 11/08/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                

 

JAMES 
P. RUTTI, JR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Lori L. Brand of Gay Woodhouse Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. 
Tibbets, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and 
Shannon Sheets, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Sheets.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
James 
Rutti appeals a Judgment and Sentence that resulted from Rutti's entry of two 
guilty pleas pursuant to a plea agreement.  
After Rutti entered his guilty pleas he filed a pro se motion to withdraw 
them.  After a hearing at which 
Rutti was represented by counsel, the trial court denied Rutti's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  On 
appeal, Rutti makes multiple claims of error.  First, Rutti was charged with sexual 
exploitation of a child under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2003)1 for delivering child 
pornography.  Rutti argues that § 
6-4-303(b)(iii) is facially overbroad and thus violates the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  
Next, Rutti claims he received legally ineffective assistance of counsel 
and at the least this Court should remand the case to the trial court for a 
hearing to develop the record regarding his ineffectiveness claim.  Rutti also claims the prosecutor engaged 
in misconduct and breached the plea agreement.  This Court finds that no remand for an 
evidentiary hearing is appropriate under the circumstances.  Finding no prejudicial error, we 
affirm.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Rutti 
states the issues as:

 

I.  Whether Appellant's conviction for 
violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-303(b)(iii) must be vacated because it is 
unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.

 

II.  Whether Appellant's Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of trial counsel was violated by trial counsel's 
deficient performance in defense of Appellant.

 

A.  Whether counsel Dion Custis 
appropriately advised Appellant to plead guilty to a charge previously found 
violative of the U.S. Constitution.

 

B.  Whether counsel Dion Custis 
appropriately advised Appellant to plead guilty in exchange for dismissal of a 
charge which Appellant had not committed as a matter of 
law.

 

C.  Whether counsel Marion Yoder 
appropriately advised Appellant and the trial court in regard to Appellant's 
motion to withdraw guilty plea prior to sentencing.

 

III.  Whether the district attorney committed 
prosecutorial misconduct by failing to bring jurisdictional issues to the 
attention of the trial court and by misrepresenting the facts to the trial court 
when arguing against Appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea prior to 
sentencing.

 

IV.  Whether the State breached the plea 
agreement with defendant by failing to dismiss two counts against him with 
prejudice.

 

V.  Whether the Wyoming Supreme Court's 
Calene hearing procedure, established to provide evidentiary record 
supplementation for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and its 
application by the Wyoming Supreme Court adequately protects Appellant's 
constitutional right to due process and/or his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.

 

The 
State essentially agrees with the issues as presented by 
Rutti.

 

 

FACTS2

 

[¶3]           
A 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent, posing as a fifteen year-old 
girl, "Candy," made contact with James Rutti in a chat room on the 
Internet.  During the course of 
their chat room exchange, Rutti forwarded a photograph of a preteen girl in a 
sexually explicit situation to the undercover agent.3  Allegedly, Rutti also suggested to 
"Candy" that they meet and engage in sexual activity.  Rutti was arrested at his home in 
Laramie.  During questioning, Rutti 
admitted to previously having sexual contact with another fifteen year-old girl 
who we will refer to as MA.  Rutti 
met MA in the chat room and then arranged to meet her in person in Cheyenne 
where sexual contact occurred.  

 

[¶4]           
An 
Information was filed in Laramie County against Rutti containing four 
counts.  Count I charged Rutti with 
sexual exploitation of a child by delivering child pornography pursuant to § 
6-4-303(b)(iii).  Count II charged 
Rutti with soliciting a minor pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-104 (LexisNexis 
2003)4 for his chat room contact with the 
DCI agent.  Counts III and IV 
charged Rutti with third-degree sexual assault for separate acts occurring 
during his sexual encounter with MA.5  

 

[¶5]           
Rutti 
was represented by the Public Defender's Office.  Eventually, Rutti accepted a plea 
bargain whereby he would plead guilty to one count of third degree sexual 
assault and one count of sexual exploitation of a child by delivering child 
pornography in exchange for the State dismissing the other two counts and 
standing silent at sentencing.  At a 
change of plea hearing, after satisfying the trial court that his pleas were 
knowing and voluntary, Rutti entered his two guilty pleas.  Both Rutti and the State supplied the 
factual bases for Rutti's respective guilty pleas at the change of plea 
hearing.  Soon after the hearing and 
the acceptance by the trial court of Rutti's two guilty pleas, the State 
dismissed the other two counts without prejudice.  

 

[¶6]           
Almost 
five months after the change of plea hearing, but prior to sentencing, Rutti 
filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  In the motion, Rutti alleged he was 
coerced by his defense counsel to enter the guilty pleas.  Rutti alleged that he always had wanted 
to go to trial.  His defense 
counsel, however, prior to Rutti's acceptance of the plea bargain, was 
unfamiliar with the facts and the law of the case and informed Rutti that he 
would not put on any sort of defense.  
Because of the attitude of defense counsel, Rutti alleged he felt 
compelled to accept the plea bargain.  
Rutti also alleged in his motion that he had a defense that he wanted to 
present, although Rutti did not specify the nature of that 
defense.

 

[¶7]           
Rutti's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was heard by the trial court.  Rutti was represented by different 
defense counsel at the hearing.  
Rutti was the only person to testify at the hearing.  Rutti testified that, within a couple of 
days after he entered the pleas, he told his prior defense attorney that he 
wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas and go to trial but his attorney refused to 
file a motion to withdraw the pleas.  
In response to questioning by the State, Rutti testified that he wasn't 
threatened in any way to accept the plea bargain but did so because "[t]here was 
no other choice, apparently."  The 
trial court denied the motion.  
Generally, Rutti was sentenced to a term of three to five years, 
suspended, on the count of sexual exploitation of a child by delivering child 
pornography and a term of four to seven years on the count of third degree 
sexual assault.

 

[¶8]           
After 
filing this appeal, Rutti filed two motions with this Court requesting this 
Court remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing limited to 
the issue of whether two of Rutti's defense counsels provided legally effective 
representation.  This Court denied 
both motions.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Constitutionality 
of § 6-4-303(b)(iii)

 

[¶9]           
Rutti's 
challenge to the facial validity of § 6-4-303(b)(iii) as overbroad and violative 
of the First Amendment presents an issue of law.  This Court reviews issues of law de 
novo.  Anderson v. Bommer, 
926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996).6

  

[¶10]      
Rutti 
claims that § 6-4-303 is overbroad and therefore facially unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  As an initial observation, we must 
emphasize that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty waives any antecedent 
non-jurisdictional defects in his conviction.  "A 
criminal defendant, by pleading guilty, admits all of the essential elements of 
the crime charged and thus waives all nonjurisdictional defenses."  Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 
1361 (Wyo. 1993).  While this leaves 
only narrowly proscribed issues open to appeal, this Court has previously 
accepted that challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which the 
criminal defendant was charged does qualify as a jurisdictional defense.  Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 
867 (Wyo. 1984) ("[a] criminal defendant does not, however, waive the right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the statute defining the crime to which he 
enters a plea of guilty by virtue of his plea"). 

 

[¶11]      
When 
analyzing an overbreadth challenge under the First 
Amendment:

 

The 
general rule is that one who alleges unconstitutionality bears a heavy burden 
and must clearly and exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable 
doubt.  Pauling v. Pauling, 
837 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Wyo.1992).  
However, that rule does not apply where a citizen's fundamental 
constitutional right, such as free speech, is involved.  The strong presumptions in favor of 
constitutionality are inverted, the burden then is on the governmental entity to 
justify the validity of the ordinance, and this Court has a duty to declare 
legislative enactments invalid if they transgress that constitutional provision. 

 

Miller 
v. City of Laramie, 
880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1994).  "The 
overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if 
a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the 
process."  Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1404, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 
(2002).  A statute is 
unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected 
expression. Id. at 244, 122 S. Ct.  at 1398-99.  If 
a statute is facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment it cannot be 
enforced in any part.  Because of 
the severity of the remedy, success of a First Amendment challenge to the facial 
overbreadth of a statute depends upon a finding that the statute's application 
to protected speech is substantial:

 

The 
First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule 
regarding the standards for facial challenges. See Members of City Council of 
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984). The showing that a law punishes a "substantial" amount of 
protected free speech, "judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973), suffices to invalidate all enforcement 
of that law, "until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation 
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally 
protected expression," id., at 613, 93 S. Ct. 2908. See also Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003); New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, n. 24, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 
(1982); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491, and n.7, 497, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1965). 

 

We 
have provided this expansive remedy out of concern that the threat of 
enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or "chill" constitutionally protected 
speech--especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions. See 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S. Ct. 826, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963). Many persons, rather than 
undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their 
rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from 
protected speech, Dombrowski, supra, at 486-487, 85 S. Ct. 
1116--harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. Overbreadth adjudication, by suspending 
all enforcement of an overinclusive law, reduces these social costs 
caused by the withholding of protected speech.

 

As 
we noted in Broadrick, however, there comes a point at which the chilling 
effect of an overbroad law, significant though it may be, cannot justify 
prohibiting all enforcement of that law--particularly a law that reflects 
"legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, 
constitutionally unprotected conduct." 413 U.S., at 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908. For 
there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine 
when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or 
especially to constitutionally unprotected conduct. To ensure that these costs 
do not swallow the social benefits of declaring a law "overbroad," we have 
insisted that a law's application to protected speech be 
"substantial," not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of 
the law's plainly legitimate applications, ibid., before applying the 
"strong medicine" of overbreadth invalidation, id., at 613, 93 S. Ct. 2908.

 

Virginia 
v. Hicks, 
539 U.S. 113, 118-120, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2196-97, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 
(2003).

 

[¶12]      
Rutti's 
sole argument is that § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally overbroad due to the 
application of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition.  In 
Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down two definitional 
terms of child pornography, sections 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) & (D), as 
overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.  535 U.S.  at 256, 258, 122 S. Ct.  at 
1405, 1406.  Essentially, the 
Supreme Court ruled that child pornography can only be regulated if it meets the 
definition of obscenity under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), or involves the use of an actual child as 
explained in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982).  The 
definitional sections struck down by the Supreme Court in Free Speech 
Coalition criminalized child pornography created through the use of 
"virtual" children, i.e., images of children generated through technology 
that do not depict an actual child.  

 

[¶13]      
Rutti 
argues that the definitional provisions found unconstitutional by the United 
States Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition are nearly identical to the 
corresponding definitional provisions in Wyoming's statute and therefore 
Wyoming's statute should be struck down as overbroad.  Rutti presents no argument specifically 
challenging the corresponding two definitional provisions in the Wyoming 
statute.  Rutti only argues that the 
entire statute is facially overbroad.  
Thus, this appeal presents this Court with no occasion to determine if 
any particular provision of § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally overbroad.  Since "[c]ourts will not pass upon 
constitutional questions unless necessary," Fristam v. City of Sheridan, 
66 Wyo. 143, 150, 206 P.2d 741, 743 (Wyo. 1949), our only concern in this appeal 
is with the Wyoming statute as a whole.  

 

[¶14]      
Striking 
down an entire statute as overbroad is a drastic remedy and is not favored.  Ochoa, 848 P.2d  at 1364 
("overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine' which should be utilized 
sparingly.")  Under federal law all 
other options should be attempted before declaring a statute 
void:

 

When 
a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it 
should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the 
statute is subject to such a limiting construction. Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 296, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932). Accord, e.g., 
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 92, 88 S. Ct. 722, 727, 19 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1968) (dictum); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 27, 88 S. Ct. 682, 
687, 19 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S. Ct. 543, 545, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 
348, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
Furthermore, if the federal statute is not subject to a narrowing construction 
and is impermissibly overbroad, it nevertheless should not be stricken down on 
its face; if it is severable, only the unconstitutional portion is to be 
invalidated. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S. Ct. 1400, 28 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971).  

A 
state court is also free to deal with a state statute in the same way. If the 
invalid reach of the law is cured, there is no longer reason for proscribing the 
statute's application to unprotected conduct. 

 

Ferber, 
458 U.S.  at 769 n.24, 102 S. Ct.  at 3361 n.24.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court 
did not strike down the entire federal statute at issue in Free Speech 
Coalition as facially overbroad.  
It only ruled on the two definitional sections that were the subject of 
the appeal in Free Speech Coalition.  In fact, the federal statute at issue in 
Free Speech Coalition is not facially invalid because it expressly is 
subject to a savings clause:

 

Congress 
explicitly wrote a severability provision that states that "if any provision of 
this Act, including . . . the definition of the child pornography . . . is held 
to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, including any other provision 
or section of the definition of the term child pornography, . . . shall not be 
affected thereby." CPPA, Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 8, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-31 
(1996). Therefore, the unconstitutionality of §§ 2256(8)(B), (D), does not 
preclude conviction under other provisions of the CPPA.

 

Jones 
v. United States, 
2004 LS 1013315, *9 n.5, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7997, *26 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); 
see also United States v. Kelly, 314 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (the 
federal statute "has a savings clause evidencing Congress' intent to make the 
statute severable").  

 

[¶15]      
Thus, 
contrary to Rutti's argument, the mere application of the Free Speech 
Coalition decision does not render § 6-4-303 void as facially overbroad 
under the First Amendment.  Rather, 
an independent analysis is required as to whether any sections of § 6-4-303 that 
might be unconstitutional can be severed from the statute.  Whether or not provisions of a statute 
are severable is a matter of state law.  
Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating, 2003 OK 110, 
¶13, 83 P.3d 835, ¶13 (Okla. 2003); see also Faternal Order of Police v. 
Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030-31 (D.N.D. 2003) (whether invalid 
portions of a state statute which is otherwise found constitutional are 
severable is a matter of state law).  
Rutti presents no argument regarding the severability of provisions of 
the Wyoming statute.  

 

[¶16]      
Despite 
the lack of argument by Rutti, we will continue the analysis and determine if, 
under Wyoming law, § 6-4-303 should be struck down in its entirety if certain 
definitional provisions were determined to be unconstitutional.  Section 6-4-303 does not contain a 
savings clause.  Generally, however, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(viii) (LexisNexis 2003) provides for the 
severability of statutory provisions that are determined to be invalid if the 
valid portions are sufficient in themselves to accomplish the purpose of the 
statute:

 

§ 
8-1-103. Rules of construction for statutes.

(a) 
The construction of all statutes of this state shall be by the following rules, 
unless that construction is plainly contrary to the intent of the 
legislature:

 

* 
* * *

(viii) 
If any provision of any act enacted by the Wyoming legislature or its 
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does 
not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of 
any such act are severable. 

 

Severability, 
then, is the general rule; and Rutti makes no argument that § 6-4-303 is 
indivisible.  

 

[¶17]      
As 
this Court reasoned on another occasion:

 

            
Appellant does not suggest that the act is indivisible, and there has 
been no showing that it is unconstitutional as a whole.  Furthermore, deletion of this section 
would not destroy the purposes of the act.  
Therefore, we find a constitutional encroachment only with respect to § 
7-242.5(a), supra.  See Holm v. 
State, Wyo., 404 P.2d 740, at 743-745.  
We further hold that the last sentence contained in § 7-242.5(a), supra, 
does not bear the taint which we find objectionable in the preceding portions of 
the section.  Since this portion of 
the section is a necessary part of the amended procedure in mental-illness or 
deficiency cases, it shall be retained.

 

Sanchez 
v. State, 
567 P.2d 270, 280 (Wyo. 1977).  The 
same reasoning applies to this appeal.  
One of the definitions of child pornography included in § 6-4-303 
requires the use of a real child.  
The statute therefore can be enforced even if all other definitional 
sections were severed from the statute.  
"[T]he several parts are [not] so interdependent that the main purpose of 
the law would fail by reason of the invalidity of a part."  McFarland v. City of Cheyenne, 48 
Wyo. 86, 99, 42 P.2d 413, 416 (Wyo. 1935).  
This Court determines that the provisions of § 6-4-303 that are the 
subject of Rutti's protests would be severable if they were found to be 
unconstitutional.  The 
constitutional portions of § 6-4-303 remain valid and enforceable.  Therefore, the statute generally is not 
facially overbroad.

 

[¶18]      
Rutti 
fleetingly alleges that § 6-4-303 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
him.  His only assertion supporting 
this argument is that if § 6-4-303 is not facially unconstitutional, then the 
Information charging him with sexual exploitation of a child by delivering child 
pornography was insufficient because it did not specify under which definition 
of child pornography Rutti was being charged.  Rutti cites no case authority supporting 
his position that alleged vagueness in an Information renders a statute 
unconstitutional as applied.  Given 
the lack of adequate cogent argument and the lack of any citation to pertinent 
authority, we decline to address Rutti's void for vagueness as applied 
argument.  

 

[¶19]      
We 
emphasize that Rutti has argued only that § 6-4-303 is facially overbroad.  He has presented no argument as to the 
constitutionality of any specific portion of § 6-4-303 so we do not consider the 
same in this appeal.  Our 
determination that § 6-4-303 is not facially overbroad ends our discussion.  We do note, however, that even the State 
concedes that the pertinent definitional language of the Wyoming statute is very 
similar to the corresponding language in the federal statute found 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Free Speech 
Coalition.  Although 
unconstitutional provisions of a statute are judicially severable if it were to 
become necessary, it is preferable if § 6-4-303 receives the urgent attention of 
the Wyoming Legislature.

 

 

Ineffective 
assistance of counsel

 

[¶20]      
Rutti's 
next issue alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of two of his 
defense counsels.  Rutti alleges 
that the record on appeal is insufficient for this Court to accurately determine 
whether his counsels effectively represented him and therefore this Court should 
remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.  The fact that this Court has already 
denied Rutti's motions for remand forms the basis for Rutti's fifth issue.  Thus, we will also treat Rutti's fifth 
issue within this analysis.

 

[¶21]      
With 
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel occurring prior to the 
defendant's guilty plea, the only ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims that survive Rutti's guilty pleas are claims directly related to the 
voluntariness of the pleas entered: 

 

[W]here 
a defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may challenge his subsequent 
conviction on appeal only with respect to matters which affect the voluntariness 
of his plea or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.  Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 
137-38 (Wyo. 1989).  When a guilty 
plea has been entered upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea 
may depend on the extent to which that advice comports with the constitutional 
guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel.  

 

Lower 
v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 348-49 (Wyo. 1990).7  See generally Wilson v. State, 
2003 WY 59, 68 P.3d 1181 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶22]      
In 
order to prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant bears the burden to establish both that counsel's performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance produced actual 
prejudice.  Daniel v. State, 
2003 WY 132, ¶36, 78 P.3d 205, ¶36 (Wyo. 2003); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).  The 
United States Supreme Court has accepted that the performance of defense counsel 
can be evaluated in broad terms:

 

The 
principal value of counsel to the accused in a criminal prosecution often does 
not lie in counsel's ability to recite a list of possible defenses in 
the abstract, nor in his ability, if time permitted, to amass a large quantum of 
factual data and inform the defendant of it. Counsel's concern is the faithful 
representation of the interest of his client, and such representation frequently 
involves highly practical considerations as well as specialized knowledge of the 
law. Often the interests of the accused are not advanced by challenges that 
would only delay the inevitable date of prosecution, see Brady v. United 
States, supra, 397 U.S.  at 751-752, 90 S. Ct.  at 1470-1471, or by 
contesting all guilt, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). A prospect of plea bargaining, the expectation or 
hope of a lesser sentence, or the convincing nature of the evidence against the 
accused are considerations that might well suggest the advisability of a guilty 
plea without elaborate consideration of whether pleas in abatement, such as 
unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures, might be factually 
supported.

 

Tollett 
v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258, 267-68, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 
(1973).

 

[¶23]      
To 
show prejudice, Rutti must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty, would have 
insisted on going to trial, and the results of the trial would have been more 
advantageous than the results of the plea agreement.  This Court has described the 
circumstances warranting allowing a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea because of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
length:

 

To 
warrant reversal on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant 
must demonstrate some deficiency in the representation received from his 
attorney.  Counsel must have failed, 
in light of all circumstances existing at the time of the challenged act or 
omission, to employ such judgment or to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney under like circumstances.  In addition, appellant must demonstrate 
that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of his case.  He must demonstrate the existence of a 
reasonable probability that, absent that deficiency, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.  
Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so serious as to undermine this court's 
confidence that the outcome was fair.  
Laing v. State, 746 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (Wyo. 1987); Gist v. 
State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 
145-47 (Wyo. 1986).

 

When 
an attorney has allegedly misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a 
guilty plea, a determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and 
forego the defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client.  That determination involves two 
interrelated questions:  whether, in 
the absence of counsel's error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent 
attorney concerning the plea would differ from that given; and whether, absent 
the error, the outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the 
client than the result of his plea.  
Hill [v. Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] at 59-60, 106 S. Ct. 
[366] at 370-71 [1985].  The 
defendant may also establish the necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances 
indicating that, in deciding whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special 
emphasis on the challenged aspect of his attorney's advice.  He must suggest to the reviewing court a 
plausible reason why, had his representation been as he claims it should have 
been, he would have chosen to forsake the benefits of his plea agreement for the 
risks of trial.  

 

Lower, 
786 P.2d  at 349-50.

 

[¶24]      
The 
Lower court specifically held that one of the elements of prejudice is 
"whether, absent the error, the outcome of a trial would have been more 
advantageous to the client than the result of his plea."  Id. The Lower court cited 
to Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), 
in support of this contention.  We 
recognize that this Court held in Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 
1999) that, under certain circumstances, "the defendant is not required to 
demonstrate a probability that the result of the trial would be different, but 
instead must only demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that he 
would not have entered the plea except for the presence of the errors made by 
counsel."  Id. at 469.  The Brock Court also cited to 
Hill to support its holding.   

 

[¶25]      
The 
Hill Court determined that a prejudice analysis was required in the 
context of withdrawing a guilty plea.  
Pursuant to Hill:

 

The 
second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether 
counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the 
plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, 
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. 

 

In 
many guilty plea cases, the "prejudice" inquiry will closely resemble the 
inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to 
convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of 
counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory 
evidence, the determination whether the error "prejudiced" the defendant by 
causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the 
likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his 
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large 
part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome 
of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to 
advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, 
the resolution of the "prejudice" inquiry will depend largely on whether the 
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. See, e.g., 
Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (CA7 1984) ("It is inconceivable to us 
. . . that [the defendant] would have gone to trial on a defense of 
intoxication, or that if he had done so he either would have been acquitted or, 
if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter sentence than he 
actually received").  As we 
explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, these 
predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be 
made objectively, without regard for the "idiosyncrasies of the particular 
decisionmaker."  Id., 466 
U.S., at 695, 104 S. Ct., at 2068.

 

Hill, 
474 U.S.  at 59-60, 106 S. Ct.  at 370-71 (footnote omitted).  Reading the entire passage, it is clear 
that the Hill Court was not lessening the prejudice requirements of 
Strickland, but rather simply suggesting ways the Strickland 
standard might apply to guilty plea situations.  If a defendant refuses to plead guilty, 
he ultimately must face trial.  
Thus, an objective showing of a reasonable probability that, but for the 
errors made by counsel, a defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain, 
ultimately rests on whether there is an objectively reasonable probability that 
the outcome at trial would have been more advantageous to the defendant.  Thus, in reality, Brock requires 
the same analysis as Lower.  
As Hill states, "the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."  Id. at 59, 106 S. Ct.  at 
370.

 

[¶26]      
If 
we conclude that a defendant fails to satisfy the prejudice prong, we need not 
address the performance of counsel prong:

Although 
we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to 
the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address 
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was 
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result 
of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to 
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often 
be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that 
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the 
entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.

 

Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 697, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.  
This Court, on prior occasions, has determined a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based upon only the prejudice prong.  For example, in Olsen v. State, 
2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 2003), we assumed that Olsen's counsel rendered 
deficient legal assistance but reasoned:

 

Despite 
the lack of record, we do not find that the assumption that counsel's 
performance was deficient leads to the conclusion that the defense was 
prejudiced.  To show that deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense, the defendant must demonstrate that, when 
the totality of the circumstances is considered, there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.

 

Id. 
at ¶81.

 

[¶27]      
Rutti 
has claimed that the record is insufficient to determine whether two of his 
defense counsels provided legally effective assistance.  Rutti presented two motions to this 
Court requesting we grant a partial remand in order for the trial court to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the issue.  
This Court denied both motions.  
An evidentiary hearing is only required when serious and specific 
allegations of legal ineffectiveness are sufficiently stated and documented to 
show a real and substantial issue.  
Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 687, 693 (Wyo. 1993).  A substantial issue regarding legal 
ineffective assistance of counsel only exists when serious and specific 
allegations are presented supporting both prongs of the Strickland test 
for ineffectiveness.  Calene 
presented allegations that, if true, would have supported both the performance 
and the prejudice prongs of Strickland.  Thus, the Calene Court remanded 
the case for the trial court to specifically determine, in the first instance, 
whether Calene could present sufficient evidence that his counsel was legally 
ineffective.

 

[¶28]      
The 
definitive problem with Rutti's ineffective assistance of counsel claims is that 
he has not presented any objectively plausible argument supporting the prejudice 
prong.  Rutti does not argue that 
"absent the error, the outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to 
the client than the result of his plea."  
In his affidavit submitted to this Court in support of his motion for 
partial remand, Rutti does not even make a claim that he would not have accepted 
the plea agreement had his counsel's performance been different, let alone that 
the ultimate outcome of the proceedings would have been more favorable to 
him.  While Rutti suggests errors, 
Rutti makes no allegation of specific prejudice in his affidavit.  Even in his brief, Rutti only presents 
conclusory allegations of prejudice.  

 

[¶29]      
Because 
Rutti has failed to present to this Court serious and specific allegations 
supporting both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffectiveness, there 
is no support for a remand.  The 
allegations Rutti has presented to this Court, even if true, simply do not 
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Further, because this case does not 
present even a close argument on whether a remand is required, we determine that 
it is not appropriate for this Court to use this appeal to analyze the remand 
procedure generally.  Thus, we will 
not further address Issue V as presented by Rutti.

 

[¶30]      
Rutti's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal must fail for the same reason 
Rutti's motions for partial remand failed.  
Even if we assume, for the sake of further discussion, that Rutti's 
counsels did not function as reasonably competent attorneys under like 
circumstances, the record extant discloses no prejudice as required pursuant to 
Strickland and its progeny.  
On appeal, Rutti's arguments relating to prejudice in accepting the plea 
bargain are based on the fact that he believes he has legal defenses to Counts I 
and II.  Even if he does, and his 
defense counsels were completely ignorant of these legal defenses,8 Rutti would still face Counts III 
and IV, the two counts of third degree sexual assault.  Each count of third degree sexual 
assault carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years.  Rutti admitted he committed the two acts 
of third degree sexual assault.  The 
victim, MA, corroborated Rutti's admission in interviews MA gave to law 
enforcement officers.  

 

[¶31]      
Rutti 
makes absolutely no argument that the outcome of a trial would have produced a 
more advantageous result than the plea agreement.  Indeed, given Rutti's admission and MA's 
statements, there is little doubt that Rutti would have been convicted on both 
counts of third degree sexual assault had he gone to trial.  Instead, a package deal was negotiated 
in which the State agreed to drop one of the counts of third degree sexual 
assault, one count of soliciting a minor (carrying a maximum penalty of five 
years) and stand silent at sentencing in return for Rutti's plea of guilty to 
only one count of third degree sexual assault and one count of sexual 
exploitation of a child (carrying a maximum penalty of twelve years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(c) (LexisNexis 
2003).  The result of the plea 
agreement was extremely advantageous to Rutti.  

 

[¶32]      
Under 
the totality of the circumstances, Rutti has not met his burden of demonstrating 
the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the alleged deficiencies 
of his defense counsels, the result of the proceedings would have been more 
favorable to him.  This Court has 
confidence that the outcome was more than fair to Rutti and that the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process was not undermined by defense counsels' 
respective performances.  Whatever 
the actual conduct of Rutti's defense counsels may have been, Rutti suffered no 
prejudice and actually benefited from a very advantageous plea agreement.  Ultimately, Rutti, when given the 
opportunity at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, presented 
no objective, plausible reason why he would have made a strategic decision to 
reject the proffered plea agreement and take his chances at trial.9  We therefore reject Rutti's claim that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel at any point in the lower court 
proceedings.

 

 

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 

[¶33]      
Rutti 
complains of several instances of what he alleges amount to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Rutti failed to make a 
contemporaneous objection to any of the alleged instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The review of this 
Court, therefore, is limited to review for plain error pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
52(b). 

 

Plain 
error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) 
there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him.  

 

Sandy 
v. State, 
870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 1994).  The 
burden of proving plain error rests with the criminal defendant.  "It is the defendant rather than the 
Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most 
cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the 
defendant shows that the error was prejudicial."  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); see also Scheikofsky 
v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Wyo. 1981) ("To show plain error, appellant 
has to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law and has to show 
that she has been materially prejudiced by that violation.").  Our review for plain error is 
discretionary. "In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, 
appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice 
errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if 
they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings."  United 
States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392, 80 L. Ed. 555 
(1936); see generally Manes v. State, 2004 WY 33, ¶8, 86 P.3d 1274, ¶8 
(Wyo. 2004).  Rutti has not provided 
a plain error analysis for his claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct.

 

[¶34]      
Rutti's 
first claim of prosecutorial misconduct consists of statements made by the 
prosecutor at Rutti's hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The record clearly reflects that the 
prosecutor did make statements regarding Rutti's activities that were factually 
incorrect.  In remarking on how 
strong the case against Rutti was, the prosecutor stated that Rutti had set up 
an in-person meeting with the DCI agent and had shown up at the designated 
meeting place.  Rutti never 
personally met with the DCI agent pursuant to their internet chats.  Rutti did, however, meet with MA.  

 

[¶35]      
The 
only rule of law Rutti claims was violated was ABA standards that state that a 
prosecutor should never knowingly misrepresent evidence to the court.  We need not decide whether there is a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law at issue, because even if there is, Rutti has 
not proven that such a rule was violated.  
The record does not reflect that the prosecutor made these factually 
incorrect remarks knowingly.  It may 
have been a simple mistake with regards to the actual facts of Rutti's 
conduct.  We do not mean to imply 
that this Court condones any attorney appearing before a court unprepared and 
not cognizant of the facts of the case before the court.  We only hold that, under the specific 
facts of this case, we do not interpret the prosecutor's misrepresentation of 
the facts as violating a clear and unequivocal rule of law as argued by 
Rutti.

 

[¶36]      
Even 
without regard to the prosecutor's mens rea, however, Rutti still cannot prove 
prejudice.  There certainly was no 
prejudice at the hearing on Rutti's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because 
the State finished its presentation with the comment that the State had no 
objection to the trial court allowing Rutti to withdraw his guilty plea.  The only allegation of prejudice put 
forth by Rutti in his appellate brief is that the judge stated a similar mistake 
of fact during the sentencing hearing.  
As Rutti's brief concedes, however, later in the sentencing hearing the 
trial court made it clear that it was referring to the count involving MA, not 
the DCI agent, thus signifying that the judge knew the correct facts.  Rutti admitted he came to Cheyenne and 
had sexual contact with MA.  The 
semantical mistake made by the trial court in its recitation of the facts was in 
no way material to the sentence ultimately received by 
Rutti.

 

[¶37]      
Rutti's 
other claim of prosecutorial misconduct is that the prosecutor did not inform 
the trial court that two counts in the Information did not constitute 
crimes.  Rutti argues that neither 
the sexual exploitation of a child by delivery of child pornography charge nor 
the solicitation of a minor charge are legally supportable.  We disagree.  Rutti's argument regarding the sexual 
exploitation of a child by delivery of child pornography count has already been 
discussed.  The statute upon which 
this count is based is not facially overbroad.  Thus, Rutti's allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct with respect to this charge is 
unsupported.

 

[¶38]      
Rutti 
also claims that it is legally impossible for him to have violated § 14-3-104 
(solicitation of a minor) under the facts of this case.  Rutti argues that, since the DCI agent 
was not a minor, he legally could not have violated the statute.  We need not decide the issue because, 
even if Rutti is correct in this assertion, Rutti is only partially 
correct.  While it might not be 
possible to convict Rutti of actually violating the statute since he did not, in 
fact, solicit a "minor," he allegedly did attempt to solicit a minor.  Legal impossibility is not a defense to 
attempt.  Under Wyoming law, a 
person is guilty of attempting to commit a crime if "[h]e intentionally engages 
in conduct which would constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been 
as the person believes them to be."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  Rutti allegedly believed he was chatting 
with a minor.  As such, he could be 
prosecuted for attempted solicitation of a minor.  See generally Cashatt v. State, 
873 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("A person is guilty of an 
attempted child solicitation if the evidence demonstrates that he had a specific 
intent to commit the substantive offense and under the circumstances as he 
believed them to be took actions to consummate the substantive offense, even 
though circumstances unknown to him made completion of the substantive offense 
impossible, and the fact that the receiver of the luring' communications was an 
adult undercover agent posing as a child is irrelevant to the culpability of the 
sender of the communications for attempting to lure a child to commit an illegal 
sexual act.")

 

[¶39]      
Further, 
Rutti admitted to soliciting MA during the course of their Internet chat.  The Information could have been amended 
to charge attempted solicitation and a legally supportable count of solicitation 
could have been added.  So, while 
the prosecutor may have been mistaken in charging Rutti with solicitation of a 
minor with regard to Rutti's contact with the DCI agent, there was no prejudice 
to Rutti because his conduct did support an attempt charge as well as a 
solicitation charge with regard to MA.  
See generally Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1155 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (state allowed to amend Information to charge attempted 
solicitation as versus solicitation when "victim" of internet solicitation was 
adult undercover law enforcement agent).  
Any mistakes as alleged by Rutti do not amount to plain 
error.

 
Breach 
of Plea Agreement by the State

 

[¶40]      
Rutti 
argues that the State breached the plea agreement by dismissing two counts 
against him without prejudice.  The 
plea agreement was entered in open court on May 20, 2002.  One term of the plea agreement was that, 
in return for Rutti pleading guilty to two counts of the Information, the State 
would dismiss the other two counts.  
The record is silent on whether the dismissals were to be with or without 
prejudice.  On May 23, the trial 
court dismissed two counts of the Information without prejudice as requested by 
the State.  On appeal, Rutti argues 
that the plea agreement required the counts be dismissed with prejudice and that 
the State breached the plea agreement by having the counts dismissed without 
prejudice.  Rutti never presented 
this argument to the trial court.  

 

[¶41]      
Rutti's 
first hurdle, then, is to prove plain error.  Once again, "[p]lain error will not be 
assigned unless: (1) the record clearly reflects the incidents urged as error; 
(2) appellant is able to demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law; and (3) it is shown that a substantial right of the appellant was 
materially abridged."  Seymour v. 
State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1997).  
In his appellate brief Rutti makes no argument that this issue meets any 
of the criteria of plain error.  We 
determine that no plain error exists.

 

[¶42]      
"When 
a plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by 
the State, that promise must be fulfilled.  
Whether the prosecutor has violated the plea agreement is a question that 
is reviewed de novo."  Herrera v. 
State, 2003 WY 25, ¶8, 64 P.3d 724, ¶8 (Wyo. 2003).  A plea agreement is a contract between 
the defendant and the State and thus general principles of contract law apply to 
the agreement.  "When determining 
whether a breach of the plea agreement has occurred we:  (1) examine the nature of the promise; 
and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered."  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶11, 
69 P.3d 407, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

 

[¶43]      
Rutti 
has not shown that the State has breached any material term of the plea 
agreement.  The nature of the 
promise made is not clear from the record.  
All the record reflects is that the State agreed to dismiss two 
counts.  There is no mention of 
whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice.  The State did dismiss the two relevant 
counts.  Rutti did not complain 
about the manner in which the counts were dismissed until this appeal, almost 
two years after the counts were dismissed.

 

[¶44]      
Even 
if this Court assumes that an intended material term of the plea agreement was 
for the State to dismiss the counts with prejudice, both the nature of the 
promise and the reasonable understanding of the promise to dismiss the counts 
would be that Rutti would not be subject to any further criminal proceedings on 
the dismissed counts.  While it 
would be better practice for the State to request dismissal with prejudice, it 
would not necessarily be required.  
What would be required is that the State not refile the dismissed counts 
against Rutti or threaten Rutti that it will refile the counts to gain an 
impermissible advantage.  Rutti has 
not alleged that the State threatened him in any manner with the reinstatement 
of the dismissed counts.  See 
generally People v. Soto, 233 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) 
(failure to immediately dismiss charges as agreed to in a plea agreement might 
result in impermissible chilling of appellate rights).

 

[¶45]      
Pursuant 
to general contract law, under these circumstances, refiling the dismissed 
counts arguably might constitute a breach of the plea agreement.  Under these facts, however, this Court 
will not elevate form over substance.  
The State did not breach the plea agreement by requesting the trial court 
dismiss the relevant charges without prejudice.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶46]      
Rutti 
has not presented sufficient evidence to support any of his claims of 
error.  The application of the 
decision of the United Stated Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition does not render § 6-4-303 facially overbroad.  The plea agreement Rutti accepted was 
extremely favorable for him, countering any suggestion that he was prejudiced by 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Finally, while the prosecutor might not have conducted this prosecution 
perfectly, we perceive no prejudicial error as claimed by Rutti.  Rutti's conviction and sentence are 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1§ 6-4-303. Sexual exploitation of children; penalties; 
definitions.

(a) As used in this section:

(i) "Child" means a person under the age of eighteen (18) 
years;

(ii) "Child pornography" means any visual depiction, including any 
photograph, film, video, picture, computer or computer-generated image or 
picture, whether or not made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other 
means, of explicit sexual conduct, where:

            
(A) The production of the visual depiction involves the use of a child 
engaging in explicit sexual conduct;

            
(B) The visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a child engaging in 
explicit sexual conduct;

            
(C) The visual depiction has been created, adapted or modified to appear 
that a child is engaging in explicit sexual conduct; 
or

            
(D) The visual depiction is advertised, promoted, described or 
distributed in a manner that conveys the impression that the material is, or 
contains, a visual depiction of a child engaging in explicit sexual 
conduct.

            
(iii) "Explicit sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, 
between persons of the same or opposite sex, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic 
or masochistic abuse or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of 
any person;

            
(iv) "Visual depiction" means developed and undeveloped film and 
videotape, and data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is 
capable of conversion into a visual image.

 

(b) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child if, for any 
purpose, he knowingly:

            
(i) Causes, induces, entices, coerces or permits a child to engage in, or 
be used for, the making of child pornography;

            
(ii) Causes, induces, entices or coerces a child to engage in, or be used 
for, any explicit sexual conduct;

            
(iii) Manufactures, generates, creates, receives, distributes, 
reproduces, delivers or possesses with the intent to deliver, including through 
digital or electronic means, whether or not by computer, any child 
pornography;

            
(iv) Possesses child pornography, . . . .

 

2Rutti includes facts from an affidavit attached to appellate documents 
and from a cassette recording of his preliminary hearing.  Neither of these sources are part of the 
record on appeal.  This Court has 
disregarded any facts proposed by Rutti that are not reflected in the official 
record on appeal. 

 

3During his change of plea hearing the State offered this statement 
regarding the photograph as the factual basis to support Rutti's guilty plea 
under § 6-4-303(b)(iii).  Rutti, 
through his defense counsel, accepted that the State could prove the facts as 
alleged in this statement.

 

4§ 14-3-104. Soliciting to engage in illicit sexual relations; 
penalty.

            
Except under circumstance constituting sexual assault in the first, 
second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, anyone who 
solicits, procures or knowingly encourages anyone under the age of sixteen (16) 
years to engage in illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion as defined in 
W.S. 6-2-301 is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for 
a term not more than five (5) years. 

 

5§ 6-2-304. Sexual assault in the third 
degree.

(a) An actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under 
circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first or second 
degree:

            
(i) The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) 
years[.]

 

6Because the constitutionality of the statute was not raised below, the 
parties argue in their respective briefs over whether this Court should apply a 
plain error standard of review to this constitutional question.  Generally, "[t]he assertion of a 
constitutional ground of error will not avoid the application of" the plain 
error doctrine.  Hampton v. 
State, 558 P.2d 504, 508 (Wyo. 1977).  
Under the circumstances of this appeal, however, no error analysis is 
necessary since if this Court determines that § 6-4-303 is facially overbroad 
and therefore violative of the First Amendment the result is that the statute 
becomes unenforceable.

 

7To the extent Rutti requested this Court remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing relating to his counsels' alleged deficiencies in not 
pursuing a possible motion to suppress his confession or pursuing Rutti's right 
to a speedy trial, such issues were waived by Rutti's guilty plea.  "[A] counseled plea of guilty is an 
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it 
quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most 
cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of 
punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those 
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction 
if factual guilt is validly established."  
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 242 n.2, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975).  See 
generally Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1992) (examples of 
nonjurisdictional defects waived by a guilty plea include use of inadmissible 
evidence (claim of unlawful search and seizure, claim of unlawfully obtained 
statements); and claim of violation of the right to speedy 
trial).

 

8As various discussions elsewhere in this opinion suggest, however, it is 
doubtful that defense counsels performed deficiently on the legal issues raised 
by Rutti as issues of ineffectiveness in his appellate 
brief.

 

9Rutti testified at his change of plea hearing that he wanted to go to 
trial on all four counts even though he knew he might lose at trial.  Rutti testified that he wanted to prove 
his legal innocence.  While this 
statement might arguably apply to Counts I and II of the Information, it has no 
application to Counts III and IV, and therefore does not objectively support any 
prejudice in accepting the package plea agreement.