Title: ANTOINETTE HODGES V. LEWIS & LEWIS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANTOINETTE HODGES V. LEWIS & LEWIS2005 WY 134121 P.3d 138Case Number: 04-265Decided: 10/14/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ANTOINETTE 
HODGES,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
LEWIS 
& LEWIS, INC.,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena James, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
 Robert J. Reese, Green River, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Clark D. Stith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith, P.C., 
Rock Springs, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Antoinette Hodges 
appeals from the district court's order dismissing her personal injury case 
against Lewis & Lewis, Inc. (Lewis).  
After a bench trial, the district court found Ms. Hodges was not 
entitled, under Wyoming's comparative negligence statute, to 
recover for her injuries because she was more than fifty percent (50%) at 
fault.  Earlier in the case, Lewis 
had missed a deadline for responding to Ms. Hodges' requests for admission, 
resulting in admissions under W.R.C.P. 36(a) of the matters contained in the 
requests.  One of the requests asked 
Lewis to admit that Ms. Hodges did not contribute to her injuries.  Prior to the trial, the district court 
allowed Lewis to amend its admissions in order to deny the request.  Ms. Hodges claims that the district 
court erred by granting Lewis' request to amend or withdraw the admissions and 
allowing it to respond to the requests. 

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Lewis to respond to 
Ms. Hodges' requests for admission and, therefore, affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Hodges offers 
the following issues for our consideration:

 
 

ISSUE 
ONE.   Did the District Court have 
discretion to grant a "renewed" motion filed more than two (2) months after it 
was deemed denied by Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure?

 
 

ISSUE 
TWO.  Did the District Court have discretion 
to extend Appellee's time to file a "renewed" motion fifty-two (52) days after 
the time to serve papers allowed by Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure?

 
 

ISSUE 
THREE.  Did the District Court err when it 
considered issues of comparative fault against Appellant after, under the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellee was deemed to have admitted that 
Appellant "did not contribute to her injuries . . ."?

 
 
Lewis 
responds with an extensive list of issues:

 
 

1.                  
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in granting Appellee Lewis and Lewis, 
Inc.'s ("Lewis and Lewis") second discovery motion filed on June 17, 
2004;

 
 
2.         
Whether Appellant Antoinette Hodges ("Hodges") is entitled to a second 
trial to have admissions deemed admitted as evidence, when counsel for Appellant 
Hodges did not seek to have any such alleged admissions entered as evidence 
during the first trial;

 
 

3.                  
Whether 
Appellant Hodges, who appeals from an order on a motion determined within 28 
days of its filing, may rely on W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), which provides that a motion 
not determined within 90 days is deemed denied;

 
 

4.                  
Whether 
Appellant Antoinette Hodges has waived any argument based on the law of the case 
doctrine by failing to raise that issue both in the district court and in this 
Court;

 
 

5.                  
Even if 
Appellant Hodges has not waived the law of the case doctrine, whether the 
doctrine would apply to prevent the proper filing of the second discovery 
motion;

 
 

6.                  
Whether 
W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), the deemed denied rule, trumps a district court's inherent 
power to issue rulings on discovery motions;

 
 

7.                  
Whether 
the granting of Appellant Hodges' appeal would violate due process; 
and

 
 

8.                  
Assuming 
arguendo that the district court 
abused its discretion in granting Appellee Lewis and Lewis' second discovery 
motion, whether the trial court's final order dismissing Hodges' complaint was 
clearly erroneous. 

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      For the purposes 
of this appeal, the underlying facts of the case are not disputed.  Ms. Hodges worked as a traffic flagger 
on a highway construction project in Farson. Lewis was the asphalt paving 
contractor on the job, and Craig Cruz was employed by Lewis as a truck 
driver.  On June 25, 2002, Mr. 
Cruz's truck ran over Ms. Hodges' right foot while making a turn at the 
intersection where she was stationed.  

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Hodges filed 
a complaint against Lewis, alleging that Mr. Cruz was negligent when he ran over 
her foot.  On November 26, 2003, Ms. 
Hodges served discovery requests, including requests for admission, upon 
Lewis.  Request for Admission No. 26 
is at the heart of this appeal and it stated:  "Admit that Plaintiff did not contribute 
to her injuries on June 25, 2002."  
Lewis' counsel failed to respond to the requests for admission within 
thirty days, as required by W.R.C.P. 36.  

 
 
[¶6]      Lewis' counsel 
realized his oversight on January 6, 2004, and immediately contacted Ms. Hodges' 
attorney.  Lewis' attorney requested 
an extension of time to respond to the discovery requests, but Ms. Hodges' 
attorney refused to allow Lewis more time to respond to the requests for 
admission.  Nevertheless, Lewis did 
respond to the requests for admission on January 6, 2004.  With regard to Request for Admission No. 
26, Lewis provided the following response:  
"Denied.  This request is not 
a proper request for an admission of fact but is rather a legal conclusion that 
Defendant has previously denied and asserted as an affirmative defense."  Lewis also filed a Motion for Extension 
of Time to Respond to Discovery or, In the Alternative to Amend or Withdraw 
Responses Under W.R.C.P. 36(b) on January 12, 2004. 

 
 
[¶7]      A hearing on 
Lewis' motion, together with a scheduling conference, was set for February 18, 
2004.  The scheduling conference 
took place; however, although the reason is not clear from the record, Lewis' 
motion apparently was not heard that day.  
Lewis subsequently filed a Renewed Motion for Extension of Time to 
Respond to Discovery or, In the Alternative, to Amend or Withdraw Responses 
Under W.R.C.P. 36(b), or, In the Alternative, Motion of Defendant under Rules 
60(a) and 60(b) to Grant Such Extension or Allow Such Amendment. 

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court held a hearing on Lewis' renewed motion and, on July 8, 2004, granted it. 
 The district court ordered Lewis to 
respond to Ms. Hodges' requests by July 14, 2004, and, in accordance with that 
order, Lewis served Ms. Hodges with its responses.  Ms. Hodges filed a motion requesting a 
continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin July 20, 2004.  She claimed that, in light of the 
district court's ruling allowing Lewis to amend its admissions, she needed more 
time to prepare for trial on the liability issue.  The district court granted the 
continuance.  

 
 
[¶9]      On October 26 and 
27, 2004, the district court held a bench trial on Ms. Hodges' negligence 
claim.  The district court 
subsequently entered an order finding in favor of Lewis and dismissing Ms. 
Hodges' complaint with prejudice.  
The district court attributed more than fifty percent (50%) of the fault 
in the accident to Ms. Hodges and ruled, therefore, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-109(b) (LexisNexis 2005), she could not recover for her injuries.  Ms. Hodges filed a timely notice of 
appeal.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The parties present numerous issues 
for our review, but they all concern the same matter  whether the district 
court erred by allowing Lewis to amend its admissions to deny Request for 
Admission No. 26.  W.R.C.P. 36 
governs requests for admissions and states in pertinent 
part:

 
 
      (a) Request for admission.  A party may 
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of 
the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 
26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or 
of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents 
described in the request. . . . 

 
 
. . . 
The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or 
within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written 
answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the 
party's attorney . . . .

 
 
* * * 

 
 
  (b) Effect of admission.  Any matter 
admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.  Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 
governing amendment of a pretrial order,1 the court may permit withdrawal or 
amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or 
defense on the merits.  Any 
admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending 
action only and is not an admission for any other purpose nor may it be used 
against the party in any other proceeding.

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
36 (footnote added).  Rule 36 is 
identical to F.R.C.P. 36.  
Consequently, federal court interpretations of their rule are highly 
persuasive when we interpret our corresponding rule.  Grove v. Pfister, 2005 WY 51, ¶ 9, 110 P.2d 275, 279 (Wyo. 2005).  See 
also, Peters v. West Park Hospital, 
2003 WY 117, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 821, 823 (Wyo. 2003);  Caldwell v. Cummings, 2001 WY 106, ¶ 10, 
33 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001). 

 
 
[¶11]   District courts have broad 
discretion to manage pretrial discovery matters.  McCulloh v. Drake, 2005 WY 18, ¶ 16, 105 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Wyo. 2005).  We, 
therefore, review the district court's decision on a motion to withdraw or amend 
admissions under Rule 36(b) by applying the abuse of discretion standard.  Raiser v. UtahCounty, 409 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 
(10th Cir. 2005).  See 
also, Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918, n1 (Wyo. 1989) (recognizing a court's broad 
discretion in determining whether a party should be allowed to withdraw an 
admission under Rule 36(b)).  An 
abuse of discretion occurs when a court:

 
 
"[a]cts 
in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  An 
abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court 
under the circumstances."  

 
 

Landsiedel 
v. Buffalo Properties, LLC, 2005 WY 
61, ¶ 23, 112 P.3d 610, 616 (Wyo. 2005) quoting Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 43, 93 P.3d 222, 235 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 
[¶12]   In order to satisfy the first prong 
of the two-part test for withdrawing or amending admissions under W.R.C.P. 
36(b), the moving party must show that the presentation of the merits of the 
case will be subserved by allowing the withdrawal or amendment.   The purpose of Rule 36 is "to 
expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that 
will not be disputed at trial."  Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002) quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2252 (2d ed. 
1994).  The first factor of the Rule 
36(b) test emphasizes the importance of having actions resolved on the merits 
rather than as a result of a technical error.  Raiser, 409 F.3d  at 1246; Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1266.  This requirement is satisfied when it is 
shown that upholding the admissions would practically eliminate any presentation 
of the merits of the case.  
Id.  Thus, there is a distinct preference in 
the rule for ascertaining the truth and deciding the case on its merits.  Perez, 297 F.3d  at 
1266.

 
 
[¶13]   Applying the first part of the test 
to this case, we conclude that allowing Lewis to amend its response to Request 
for Admission No. 26 which stated that Ms. Hodges did not contribute to her 
injuries subserved the presentation of the merits of the controversy.  Lewis had filed an answer denying Ms. 
Hodges' claim that it was negligent and expressly stating, in an affirmative 
defense, that Ms. Hodges was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault for her 
injuries.  If the admission had been 
allowed to stand, it would have essentially decided the breach-of-duty element 
of Ms. Hodges' negligence action.  
Permitting the parties to present evidence on the fault issue advanced 
the search for the truth and promoted a correct legal ruling.  As we stated in Emmett Ranch, Inc. v. Goldmark Engineering, 
Inc., 908 P.2d 941, 945 (Wyo. 1995), requests for admission under Rule 36 
are not intended to resolve ultimate legal matters.  See also, Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1268.    The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit phrased it well:

 
 
. . . 
[W]hen a party uses the rule to establish uncontested 
facts and to narrow the issues for trial, then the rule functions properly. When 
a party like Perez, however, uses the rule to harass the other side or, as in 
this case, with the wild-eyed hope that the other side will fail to answer and 
therefore admit essential elements (that the party has already denied in its 
answer), the rule's time-saving function ceases; the rule instead becomes a 
weapon, dragging out the litigation and wasting valuable 
resources.

 
 

Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1268.  

 
 
[¶14]   The second part of the Rule 36(b) 
test requires the party seeking to have the admissions upheld to show it would 
be prejudiced by withdrawal or amendment of the admissions.  "The prejudice contemplated by Rule 
36(b) is not simply that a party who obtained the admission now has to convince 
the jury of its truth."  Bergemann v. United 
States, 820 F.2d 1117, 1121 
(10th Cir. 1987).  
Instead, the party seeking to have the admissions enforced must show that 
it will have difficulty proving its case as a result of the withdrawal of the 
admissions.  For example, prejudice 
may be established if key witnesses are unavailable to testify about the matter 
which was initially admitted under Rule 36.  The amount of time the party seeking to 
uphold the admission has relied upon it may also be important to determining 
whether that party would be prejudiced by withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission.  Smith v. First National Bank, 837 F.2d 1575, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 1988) quoting Brook Village North Assoc. v. General Elec. 
Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1982).  

 
 
[¶15]   Ms. Hodges did not establish that 
she would suffer the prejudice required by the rule.  Allowing Lewis to withdraw its admission 
simply replaced the burden of proof upon the plaintiff  where, in the pursuit 
of truth, it belonged.  Ms. Hodges 
did not rely on the admission for a substantial period of time.  The requests were served on November 26, 
2003.  Taking into account the three 
days allowed for mailing under W.R.C.P. 6(d), Lewis' responses were due on 
December 29, 2003.  Lewis' counsel 
realized his oversight on January 6, 2004, and immediately contacted Ms. Hodges' 
attorney and asked for an extension of time.  When Ms. Hodges' attorney refused to 
allow Lewis additional time to respond to the requests for admission, Lewis 
immediately responded to the requests and filed its first motion for extension 
of time or, in the alternative, amendment or withdrawal of the admissions, on 
January 12, 2004.  Moreover, the 
district court remedied any prejudice which inured to Ms. Hodges as a result of 
relying on the admission when it granted her request for a continuance of the 
trial to allow her additional time to prepare.  

 
 
[¶16]   Of course, no party should ignore 
deadlines imposed by the court rules, and the district court has the inherent 
power to enforce the rules by imposing sanctions.  See, Raiser, 409 F.3d  at 1246.  However, "more than a failure to meet 
deadlines is required to deny a party relief from an admission." Id.  
The "court's focus must be on the effect upon the litigation and 
prejudice to the resisting party rather than on the moving party's excuses for 
an erroneous admission.'"  Kirtley v. Sovereign Life Insurance Company 
of California 
(In re Durability, Inc.), 212 F.3d 551, 556 (10th Cir. 2000) 
quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Prusia, 18 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 
1994).  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it provided Lewis with the opportunity to respond to 
Ms. Hodges' requests for admission.

 
 
[¶17]   Ms. Hodges argues that the district 
court did not have discretion to grant Lewis' motion when it did so in July 2004 
because Lewis' original motion, which was filed on January 12, 2004, had been 
deemed denied under W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  
That rule, which has no federal counterpart, states in relevant 
part:  "A motion not determined 
within 90 days after filing shall be deemed denied.  A party whose motion has been deemed 
denied shall have 10 days after the effective date of such denial to serve such 
pleadings or other papers, if any, as may be required or permitted."  W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2).  

 
 
[¶18]   Ms. Hodges argues that, because the 
district court did not rule on Lewis' January 12, 2004, motion for extension of 
time within 90 days after it was filed, it was deemed denied.  We have no quarrel with that reasoning 
and agree that the motion was deemed denied after the 90 day period 
expired.  That does not, however, 
resolve the question in this case because the district court did not rule on 
Lewis' original motion for extension of time but, instead, granted Lewis' 
renewed motion.  

 
 
[¶19]   Ms. Hodges claims that Lewis' 
renewed motion was untimely and the district court did not have the authority to 
consider it.  She argues that, under 
Rule 6(c)(2), Lewis was required to file a motion for reconsideration within ten 
days after its original motion was deemed denied and, failing that, it was 
prohibited from filing a renewed motion.  
Ms. Hodges relies upon our ruling in Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 
2004 WY 93, 95 P.3d 796 (Wyo. 2004) as authority for her contention that the 
district court did not have the authority to revisit the issue.  

 
 
[¶20]   Ms. Hodges' reliance upon Paxton is misplaced.  In that case, we considered the 
interplay of several court rules in determining when a notice of appeal must be 
filed under the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court.  Paxton, ¶ 4.   Paxton filed several post-trial motions, 
including a motion for a new trial, after a jury awarded Brannaman compensatory 
damages for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Id., ¶ 1.  The day after the post-trial motions 
were filed, the district court entered a judgment on the jury verdict.  Id., ¶ 3.  The court subsequently set a hearing for 
Paxton's post-trial motions on a date more than 90 days after they were 
filed.  Id.  
Following the hearing, the district court denied the post-trial 
motions and Paxton appealed.  
Id.  
The notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the post trial 
motions were deemed denied and, accordingly, we ruled that the notice of appeal 
was untimely.  Id., ¶¶ 3, 
18.  We stated:  

 
 
The 
whole point of a "deemed denied" provision is that the judgment automatically 
becomes final and appealable upon passage of the specified period.  Therefore, an appeal that is not filed 
within thirty days after the post-trial motions are deemed denied is 
untimely.   

            

Id., ¶ 
18.  

 
 
[¶21]   The difference between the Paxton case and the case at bar is 
obvious.  In Paxton, the "deemed denied" rule applied 
to a final judgment; conversely, in this case, the "deemed denied" rule simply 
applied to an interlocutory discovery motion.  The case law is replete with instances 
where renewed discovery motions are considered.  See e.g., McCulloh, ¶ 8; State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colley, 
871 P.2d 191, 193 (Wyo. 1994).  

 
 
[¶22]   Rule 6(c)(2) does not expressly 
prohibit the filing of a renewed motion after a discovery motion has been deemed 
denied.  Furthermore, we do not 
agree with Ms. Hodges' assertion that the last sentence of Rule 6(c)(2) requires 
that a renewed motion must be filed within ten days after the original motion is 
deemed denied.  That provision does 
not dictate, or even speak to, when a party may file a renewed motion.  

 
 
[¶23]   Ms. Hodges does not provide any 
authority for her interpretation of Rule 6(c)(2), and we cannot locate any case 
law where the rule was applied in that manner.  See First Southwestern Financial Services v. 
Laird, 882 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Wyo. 1994) (holding that Rule 6(c)(2) did not 
require the Lairds to file an answer within ten days after their motion to 
dismiss was deemed denied).  Indeed, 
Ms. Hodges' interpretation of the rule defies logic.  Applying Ms. Hodges' rationale, a 
district court would have discretion to consider a renewed motion which the 
district court had expressly denied in a prior order but it would not have 
discretion to reconsider a motion that was deemed denied by operation of law 
under Rule 6 because it did not rule on the motion within 90 days after it was 
filed.  Such an interpretation would 
not further the interests of justice or the purposes of the rules of civil 
procedure.  See W.R.C.P. 1.  

 
 
[¶24]   In sum, we conclude that the 
district court had the power to consider Lewis' renewed motion.  Moreover, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by allowing Lewis to amend its responses to Ms. Hodges' 
requests for admission in order to deny the matters which had been admitted by 
operation of law under Rule 36(a).

 
 
[¶25]   Affirmed.  

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Under 
Rule 16, once an admission is incorporated into a pretrial order, it may be 
modified only to prevent manifest injustice.  Kirtley v. Sovereign Life Insurance Company 
of California 
(In re Durability, Inc.), 212 F.3d 551, 556 (10th Cir. 2000).