Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Sturgeon

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sturgeon, 111 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006-Ohio-5708.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL ET AL., v. STURGEON. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sturgeon,  
111 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006-Ohio-5708.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to 
practice law — Accepting employment if the exercise of professional 
judgment on behalf of a client may be affected by the lawyer’s personal 
interests — Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2006-1209 — Submitted August 8, 2006 — Decided November 15, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-017. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Edward Francis Sturgeon of Youngstown, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0033744, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1979. 
{¶ 2} On October 11, 2005, relators, Disciplinary Counsel and the 
Mahoning County Bar Association, filed an amended complaint charging 
respondent with professional misconduct.  Respondent filed an answer to the 
complaint, and a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline held a hearing on the complaint in December 2005.  The panel then 
prepared written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all 
of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
Count I 
{¶ 3} In March 2003, Stephanie Fisher visited respondent’s law office to 
discuss a child-custody matter.  Fisher had never met respondent before that 
appointment.  Early in the meeting, respondent asked Fisher to remove her jacket, 
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and she did so.  Respondent told her that she had a “nice figure” and said that she 
was “not as chunky” as he had first thought. 
{¶ 4} Respondent told Fisher that he would require a $2,500 retainer to 
begin working on her case.  Fisher said that she could pay $50, and she wrote a 
check for that amount.  Respondent then advised Fisher that $50 would not even 
cover the court costs that she would be required to pay. 
{¶ 5} Respondent asked Fisher if she would be willing to engage in oral 
sex.  Fisher said that she would.  Respondent moved Fisher’s shirt and bra to 
expose her breasts, and he fondled her breasts while she performed oral sex on 
him.  Afterwards, Fisher dressed herself and left respondent’s office. 
{¶ 6} Later in the evening, Fisher sought treatment at a medical center in 
Youngstown.  The following day, she reported the incident to the Youngstown 
Police Department, and she stopped payment on the $50 check that she had given 
to respondent. 
{¶ 7} After examining respondent’s actions, the board concluded that 
respondent had violated the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(6) 
(barring conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and 
5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from accepting employment if the exercise of 
professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or reasonably may be affected 
by the lawyer’s personal interests). 
Count II 
{¶ 8} In March 2004, Christine Killa visited respondent’s law office to 
discuss a child-custody matter.  Killa had never met respondent before that 
appointment.  They discussed Killa’s efforts to secure legal custody of her 
children, and respondent said that he was unsure whether he wanted to represent 
her.  Killa offered to pay $1,000 in cash, but respondent did not accept any 
payment from her at that time. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 9} Killa scheduled a second appointment with respondent for the 
following week.  The day before that second appointment, respondent left a voice-
mail message for Killa telling her that he had a scheduling conflict and wanted to 
meet at a location other than his office.  When Killa returned his call, respondent 
suggested that they meet at Killa’s home, and she agreed. 
{¶ 10} At the appointed time, respondent visited Killa’s home, and he 
stayed for about two hours.  The two of them discussed Killa’s concerns about the 
custody of her children, and during their discussion, Killa mentioned that her ex-
husband kept pornographic pictures around his house and on his computer.  Killa 
testified at respondent’s disciplinary hearing that respondent became excited 
when he learned that information, and he asked detailed questions about her ex-
husband’s sexual inclinations and habits. 
{¶ 11} Respondent then walked around Killa’s home, looking in all of her 
closets and underneath clothing.  Killa testified at respondent’s disciplinary 
hearing that she found this behavior “bizarre,” but she assumed that respondent 
was confirming whether the home was a suitable place for Killa’s children to live 
if she gained custody of them. 
{¶ 12} Respondent entered Killa’s bedroom, closed the blinds, and lay 
down on her bed.  He then patted the mattress and asked Killa to come over and 
lie down next to him.  Killa refused, and respondent then stood up, touched her 
buttocks and breasts, and tried to force her to kiss him.  Killa testified at the 
disciplinary hearing that she was “shocked and disgusted” by respondent’s 
behavior, and she ran out of the bedroom and down the stairs. 
{¶ 13} Respondent found Killa crying in her kitchen.  He told her that he 
did not understand what the big deal was, adding that he did this kind of thing all 
the time and had helped many women with their legal troubles in exchange for 
their having sex with him.  Killa explained at the disciplinary hearing that she did 
not want to have sex with respondent but did want legal help on the child-custody 
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issue that they had discussed.  Respondent told her that no one else would take her 
case.  Killa then offered respondent $1,000, and he went out to his car to get his 
receipt book.  When he returned, respondent made other lewd comments, such as 
“[y]ou have great breasts, can I see your tits?  If I win your case, can I get a peek 
at them?” 
{¶ 14} After respondent left Killa’s home that day, Killa called her 
parents and told them what had happened.  She later told the county bar 
association and Disciplinary Counsel as well. 
{¶ 15} The board concluded that by making inappropriate sexual 
comments, by touching Killa in an unwanted sexual manner, by using force to 
attempt to compel her to kiss him, and by soliciting sex in exchange for a reduced 
legal fee, respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1). 
Count III 
{¶ 16} In June 2003, Tosha McGee visited respondent’s law office to 
discuss a wage-garnishment matter.  Respondent told McGee that he would 
represent her if she would pay a legal fee of $300.  McGee gave respondent a 
$100 check and asked if she could pay the balance later.  Respondent agreed. 
{¶ 17} Respondent asked McGee, an African-American, if she had ever 
thought about dating a white man.  McGee said no, and respondent asked her why 
not.  Respondent asked McGee if she had “ever given head” or “ever sucked a 
dick.”  He also asked McGee, “[D]o you want to give me head?”  McGee 
answered no, and respondent asked her why not.  He then closed the door to his 
office where they were meeting. 
{¶ 18} Respondent next asked McGee if she wanted “to see it,” and he 
unzipped his pants, removed his penis, and asked whether McGee wanted to touch 
it.  McGee declined, looked away, and tried to move her chair.  Respondent then 
zipped his pants, returned to his chair behind his desk, and continued to discuss 
McGee’s case. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 19} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 
5-101(A)(1). 
Sanction 
{¶ 20} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  As 
aggravating factors, the board found that respondent had acted with a dishonest or 
selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, 
failed to cooperate fully in the disciplinary process, made false statements during 
the disciplinary process, failed to apologize or express remorse for his actions, 
and caused harm to vulnerable victims.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), 
(e), (f), (g), and (h). 
{¶ 21} Mitigating factors identified by the board included evidence as to 
respondent’s good character or reputation and his lack of any prior disciplinary 
record.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e).  The board noted that respondent 
has been diagnosed as suffering from a generalized anxiety disorder with schizoid 
and avoidant personality features, but the board found no evidence that this 
problem caused the episodes of sexual misconduct described above. 
{¶ 22} Relators recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law.  The panel and the board issued similar 
recommendations. 
{¶ 23} We have reviewed the board’s report and the record, and we find 
that respondent violated all of the provisions as described above.  We conclude, 
however, that a more severe sanction than the one recommended by the board is 
warranted.  Respondent must be permanently disbarred for his egregious 
professional misconduct. 
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{¶ 24} First, respondent’s actions were rude, offensive, and thoroughly 
unprofessional.  He used the attorney-client relationship to gratify his own sexual 
interests rather than focusing on the legal needs of his clients.  His crude behavior 
would not be acceptable in any social setting, and it was outrageously 
inappropriate in the midst of an attorney-client relationship.  Respondent preyed 
on women who were in vulnerable legal and financial circumstances, and he tried 
to seduce them for his own selfish gratification. 
{¶ 25} Second, lawyers must always exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice to their clients.  A lawyer who attempts to 
engage in a sexual relationship with a client – particularly when the client is 
clearly not interested in that kind of relationship – puts the lawyer’s own personal 
feelings ahead of the objectivity that must be the hallmark of any successful 
attorney-client relationship.  By repeatedly initiating sexual conduct with clients, 
respondent called into serious doubt his commitment to a profession in which the 
clients’ interests must always come first. 
{¶ 26} As we have explained, “ ‘ The attorney stands in a fiduciary 
relationship with the client and should exercise professional judgment “solely for 
the benefit of the client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.” 
[Wisconsin’s Rules of Professional Conduct 20.23(1).]  By making unsolicited 
sexual advances to a client, an attorney perverts the very essence of the lawyer-
client relationship.  Such egregious conduct most certainly warrants discipline.’ ”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004-Ohio-734, 804 N.E.2d 
423, ¶ 15, quoting In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson (1985), 124 
Wis.2d 466, 474-475, 369 N.W.2d 695. 
{¶ 27} Finally, respondent not only committed multiple outrageous sexual 
misdeeds with clients, but he also lied repeatedly during the disciplinary process.  
The panel was in a strong position to evaluate his credibility during two days of 
hearings on the relators’ disciplinary complaint, and that panel described him as 
January Term, 2006 
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“frequently evasive and argumentative.”  According to the panel, respondent lied 
under oath, engaged in a pattern of deception that was designed to disrupt the 
disciplinary process, and was even willing to blame and slander his clients “in the 
interest of self preservation.”  Respondent’s dishonesty about his misconduct and 
his willingness to blame his clients rather than accept responsibility for his own 
actions demonstrates that he is no longer fit to practice a profession grounded on 
candor, integrity, loyalty, and fairness. 
{¶ 28} “We have consistently disapproved of lawyers engaging in sexual 
conduct with clients where the sexual relationship arises from and occurs during 
the attorney-client relationship. A lawyer’s sexual involvement with a client has 
warranted a range of disciplinary measures depending on the relative impropriety 
of the situation, including actual suspension from the practice of law.”  Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-4090, 852 N.E.2d 160, ¶ 66. 
{¶ 29} As the panel concluded, the many aggravating factors in this case 
“outweigh if not overwhelm” the mitigating factors.  Because those factors tip so 
decidedly in favor of a more severe sanction, because respondent committed 
multiple offenses with multiple victims over the course of many months, and 
because he expressly tried to leverage his clients’ financial and legal 
vulnerabilities to gratify his own sexual desires and then lied under oath and 
blamed his victims to hide his wrongdoing, we conclude that respondent’s 
shameful and selfish misconduct warrants our most severe sanction. 
{¶ 30} Accordingly, respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 31} While I agree with the finding of misconduct in the majority 
opinion, I disagree as to the sanction.  The relators, the panel, and the board all 
recommended an indefinite suspension.  They had the best opportunity to judge 
respondent’s character and the possibility of his rehabilitation.  I would adopt 
their recommendations of indefinite suspension, coupled with professional 
therapy and written apologies to the victims.  The respondent may never satisfy 
the second condition for reinstatement of being able to rehabilitate himself, but 
apparently the relators, the panel, and the board felt he ought to be given that 
opportunity.  Disbarment denies respondent that chance forever.  While his 
conduct is despicable, and it is emotionally easy to justify disbarment, I believe 
disbarment is not objectively consistent with our cases involving more severe 
disciplinary conduct, although not of a sexual nature, in which we have given 
lawyers a second chance.  Therefore, I dissent as to the sanction. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator Disciplinary Counsel. 
 
Ronald E. Slipski and David C. Comstock Jr., for relator Mahoning 
County Bar Association. 
 
Mary Jane Stephens and John B. Juhasz, for respondent. 
______________________