Title: In re Adoption of P.A.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Adoption of P.A.C., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3351.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3351 
IN RE ADOPTION OF P.A.C. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Adoption of P.A.C., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3351.] 
When an issue concerning parenting of a minor is pending in the juvenile court, a 
probate court must refrain from proceeding with the adoption of that child 
— The determination of a parent-child relationship in the juvenile court 
proceeding must be given effect in the stayed adoption proceeding. 
(No. 2009-1757 — Submitted May 25, 2010 — Decided July 22, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-081149, 
184 Ohio App.3d 88, 2009-Ohio-4492. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In In re Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-
4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, this court stated, "The issue presented for our review is 
whether a probate court must refrain from proceeding with the adoption of a child 
when an issue concerning the parenting of that child is pending in the juvenile 
court.  We hold that, in such circumstances, the probate court must defer to the 
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juvenile court and refrain from addressing the matter until adjudication in the 
juvenile court."  Id. at ¶ 8.  We consider our holding in Pushcar to be dispositive 
of the issue before us and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} In July 2005, while married to Jeremy Tuttle, Susan Tuttle 
("Tuttle") gave birth to P.A.C.  Although Jeremy Tuttle was listed as P.A.C.'s 
father on her birth certificate, he is not her biological father.  A DNA test 
conducted in August 2005 determined that appellant, Gary D. Otten, is P.A.C.'s 
biological father. 
{¶ 3} In January 2007, Otten filed a complaint for allocation of parental 
rights in juvenile court in Clermont County.  Shortly thereafter, Tuttle filed a 
parentage action against Otten.  These cases were consolidated, and a hearing was 
set for March 26, 2007, but was continued at Tuttle's request.  Tuttle, who was 
divorced from Jeremy Tuttle in November 2005, married appellee, Kevin Michael 
Crooks, on April 13, 2007.  On April 20, 2007, Crooks filed a petition to adopt 
P.A.C. in probate court in Hamilton County. 
{¶ 4} The probate court stayed the adoption proceedings pending a 
determination in the parentage action.  The juvenile court determined that Otten 
was the biological father of P.A.C.  The probate court lifted its stay, determined 
that a parent, Otten, did not consent to the adoption, as required by R.C. 3107.06, 
and dismissed Crooks's adoption petition.  On appeal, the court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that Otten's failure to register with the Putative Father 
Registry was dispositive.  We accepted Otten's discretionary appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} "[T]he right of a natural parent to the care and custody of his 
children is one of the most precious and fundamental in law."  In re Adoption of 
Masa (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 164, 23 OBR 330, 492 N.E.2d 140, citing 
Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.  
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Santosky has been characterized as "requiring a clear and convincing evidence 
standard for termination of parental rights because the parent's interest is 
fundamental but the State has no legitimate interest in termination unless the 
parent is unfit, and finding that the State's interest in finding the best home for the 
child does not arise until the parent has been found unfit."  Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dept. of Health (1990), 497 U.S. 261, 319, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 6} "Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance 
of natural family ties.”  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
Because adoption terminates fundamental rights of the natural parents, "we have 
held that '* * * [a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to 
adoption] must be strictly construed so as to protect the right of natural parents to 
raise and nurture their children.' "  In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 165, 
quoting In re Schoeppner (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24, 75 O.O.2d 12, 345 N.E.2d 
608.  With "a family association so undeniably important * * * at stake," we 
approach the case before us "mindful of the gravity" of the circumstances and the 
long-term impact on all the concerned parties.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996), 519 U.S. 
102, 117, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473.  We turn now to our most recent 
pronouncement in this important and contentious area of the law. 
In re Adoption of Pushcar 
{¶ 7} In Pushcar, the child's mother married a man who was not the 
biological father of the child, and that man attempted to adopt the child.  110 Ohio 
St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647.  The natural father, who had not yet 
been determined to be the father, opposed the adoption, and the issue was whether 
his consent was necessary.  We concluded that that father could not be shown to 
have failed to communicate with or failed to support his child for one year 
pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A) until one year had elapsed from the time his 
paternity was established.  Id. at ¶ 14.  An integral part of our analysis was our 
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holding that the probate court could not proceed with the adoption while "an issue 
concerning the parenting of that child is pending in the juvenile court."  Id. at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 8} Although the case involved a relatively narrow issue, our holding 
was more general, as memorialized in the syllabus:  "When an issue concerning 
parenting of a minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court must refrain 
from proceeding with the adoption of that child."  It is clear that we did not intend 
our holding or analysis to be restricted to parenting issues implicated by R.C. 
3107.07(A).  Rather, our use of general language shows that we intended the 
holding to apply to all parenting issues pending in a juvenile court. 
Application of Pushcar 
{¶ 9} We consider it beyond dispute that when a man files an action for 
allocation of parental rights supported by a DNA test that declaims the probability 
that he is the father to be 99.99995 percent and when the mother of the child files 
an action to determine parentage claiming that that man is the father of the child, 
"an issue concerning parenting of a minor is pending."  Accordingly, the probate 
court properly stayed the adoption proceedings before it. 
{¶ 10} The probate judge in this case correctly determined that we would 
not have required the stay in Pushcar if it were to have no effect.  The judge 
stated: 
{¶ 11} "[T]he Supreme Court [in Pushcar] did not strictly construe the 
statutory requirement that, to be considered a 'father' under RC 3107.06(B)(3), 
paternity must have been established prior to the date the adoption petition was 
filed. 
{¶ 12} "This is apparent because, despite the fact that the paternity action 
was pending in Pushcar when the adoption petition was filed, and thus, paternity 
was not established prior to the filing of the adoption petition, the Supreme Court 
did not find that it was too late for the paternity action to render the man 
contesting the adoption a 'father' under RC 3107.06(B)(3)."  (Emphases sic.) 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 13} Based on this analysis, the probate judge concluded as follows: 
"Pushcar applies to the instant case; * * * under Pushcar, this Court was required 
to refrain from proceeding with the adoption petition until the Clermont County 
Juvenile Court's adjudication of the parentage action; * * * this Court should give 
effect to the Clermont County Juvenile Court's determination of the existence of a 
parent-child relationship; and that given said determination of paternity, Mr. 
Otten's status is that of 'father.' "  We conclude that the probate judge properly 
applied Pushcar. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 14} The probate judge did not err.  We reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 15} I write separately to emphasize that appellate courts in Ohio must 
adhere to App.R. 11.2(C)(1), which requires that an appellate court expedite an 
appeal from an order granting or denying adoption or the termination of parental 
rights.  In this case, oral argument in the court of appeals was set for May 6, 2009, 
and the court’s judgment was not journalized until September 2, 2009 – almost 
four months later, despite the rule’s requirement that “[t]he court shall enter 
judgment within thirty days of * * * the oral argument, * * * unless compelling 
reasons in the interest of justice require a longer time.”  App.R. 11.2(C)(5).  This 
appeal was pending in the appellate court for a period of ten months from the 
initial filing of the notice of appeal on November 10, 2008, until the judgment 
entry on September 2, 2009. 
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{¶ 16} App.R. 11.2(A) requires appellate courts to accelerate and 
prioritize these appeals at all stages.  While these cases are pending, the children 
whose lives are at issue lack a sense of permanency.  They may be forging a bond 
that will be difficult to disrupt should a court require the child’s placement to 
change.  In a case such as this one, a court should be ever cognizant of the 
timeliness of its docket. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} Before a child can be adopted, R.C. 3107.06 requires that certain 
persons and entities consent to the adoption.  These persons include the mother of 
the child, the father of the child, and, if applicable, the putative father of the child.  
R.C. 3107.06.  R.C. 3107.01(H) defines “putative father”1 and R.C. 3107.06(B) 
defines “father”2 for the purposes of the adoption statutes. 
                                                 
1.   {¶ a}  A “putative father” is defined as a man, who may be a child’s father and to whom all of 
the following apply:  
{¶ b} “(1)  He is not married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s conception or 
birth;  
{¶ c} “(2)  He has not adopted the child; 
{¶ d} “(3)  He has not been determined, prior to the date a petition to adopt the child is filed, 
to have a parent and child relationship with the child by a court proceeding pursuant to sections 
3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code [parentage statutes], a court proceeding in another state, 
an administrative agency proceeding pursuant to sections 3111.38 to 3111.54 of the Revised Code 
[administrative-determination-of-paternity statutes], or an administrative agency proceeding in 
another state; 
{¶ e} “(4)  He has not acknowledged paternity of the child pursuant to sections 3111.21 to 
3111.35 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3107.01(H).   
 
2.   {¶ a}  A “father” is a man to whom any of the following apply:   
{¶ b} “(1)  The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the mother; 
{¶ c} “(2)  The minor is his child by adoption; 
{¶ d} “(3)  Prior to the date the petition was filed, it was determined by a court proceeding 
pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code [parentage statutes], a court 
proceeding in another state, an administrative proceeding pursuant to sections 3111.38 to 3111.54 
of the Revised Code [administrative-determination-of-paternity statutes], or an administrative 
proceeding in another state that he has a parent and child relationship with the minor; 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 18} Although consent is generally required from the persons 
enumerated in R.C. 3107.06, R.C. 3107.07 sets forth exceptions to the consent 
requirements.  R.C. 3107.07(A) allows a court to find parental consent 
unnecessary when the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more 
than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and 
support of the minor for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the 
filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the 
petitioner. 
{¶ 19} Under R.C. 3107.07(B)(1), a putative father’s consent is 
unnecessary when he fails to register as the minor’s putative father with the 
Putative Father Registry not later than 30 days after the minor’s birth.  R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2) states that a putative father’s consent is not required when the court 
finds, after proper service of notice and hearing, that the putative father (1) is not 
the father of the minor, (2) has willfully abandoned or failed to care for and 
support the minor, or (3) has willfully abandoned the mother of the minor during 
her pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor or the minor’s 
placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs first. 
{¶ 20} In the case before us, the primary issue is whether appellant Gary 
Otten’s consent to the adoption is required.  It is undisputed that Otten failed to 
register with the Putative Father Registry.  Accordingly, application of R.C. 
3107.07(B)(1) to Otten would serve to render his consent unnecessary. 
{¶ 21} In order to avoid application of R.C. 3107.07(B)(1), Otten seeks to 
change his status in the adoption proceeding from putative father to father after 
the adoption petition has been filed.  Otten contends that if a judicial proceeding 
to establish paternity has been filed in juvenile court prior to the filing of an 
                                                                                                                                     
{¶ e} “(4)  He acknowledged paternity of the child and that acknowledgment has become final 
pursuant to section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  
R.C. 3107.06(B). 
 
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adoption petition in probate court, the adoption proceeding must be stayed until 
the paternity proceedings are completed.  Otten further contends that the juvenile 
court’s paternity determination must be used by the probate court to determine the 
status and rights of the respective parties in the adoption proceeding.  In the case 
of Otten, this would require the probate court to apply the more stringent 
exception to consent to adoption contained in R.C. 3107.07(A) and avoid 
application of R.C. 3107.07(B)(1). 
{¶ 22} The majority agrees with Otten and holds that the adoption 
proceedings must be stayed pending completion of the juvenile court paternity 
proceedings, that the juvenile court’s finding of paternity must be recognized by 
the probate court, and that Otten’s new status as “father” rather than “putative 
father” requires that the probate court apply the consent-to-adoption exception 
contained in R.C. 3107.07(A).  In so holding, the majority fails to apply the 
unambiguous language of the relevant adoption statutes, erroneously relies on In 
re Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, 
and contravenes the express adoption policy established by the General 
Assembly. 
Statutory language 
{¶ 23} The majority’s opinion ignores the unambiguous statutory 
language that requires that participants’ status be determined at the time an 
adoption petition is filed. 
{¶ 24} The definition of “putative father” specifically provides that a man 
is a putative father if “[h]e has not been determined, prior to the date a petition to 
adopt the child is filed, to have a parent and child relationship” with the child 
through a court or administrative proceeding.  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
3107.01(H).  Similarly, the definition of “father” under R.C. 3107.06(B)(3) 
provides that to establish a parent-child relationship through court or 
administrative proceedings, the court or administrative determination must be 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
completed “[p]rior to the date the [adoption] petition was filed.”  In other words, 
when an adoption petition is filed, the statutes require the status of the parties 
involved to be ascertained at that time. 
{¶ 25} The statutes are absolutely clear that the child may be adopted 
without a putative father’s consent when he fails to register with the Putative 
Father Registry or to establish a parent-child relationship through one of the 
judicial or administrative means set forth in R.C. 3107.06(B) before the adoption 
petition is filed.  Nothing in the adoption statutes provides for a stay of the 
adoption proceedings to allow for the filing of or completion of pending actions to 
establish paternity. 
Pushcar 
{¶ 26} The majority relies upon this court’s previous decision in In re 
Adoption of Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, to 
support its holding in this case.  But the majority’s reliance on Pushcar is 
misplaced. 
{¶ 27} Pushcar addressed the need for a stay of adoption proceedings 
when the party petitioning for adoption relies on R.C. 3107.07(A) to divest a 
father of his parental rights.  This court held that in order for the R.C. 3107.07(A) 
exception to consent to apply, the petitioner must prove paternity, and a stay of 
the adoption proceeding was necessary to allow for the juvenile court to complete 
the proceedings to establish paternity.  The adoption petition in this case did not 
allege that Otten’s consent was not required under R.C. 3107.07(A), but instead 
asserted that Otten’s consent was unnecessary based upon R.C. 3107.07(B).  
Therefore, there is no need to establish paternity for the purposes of R.C. 
3107.07(A) and the reasoning of Pushcar is inapplicable to the facts currently 
before the court. 
{¶ 28} More importantly, Pushcar failed to address the relevant statutory 
language of the adoption statutes regarding the time at which a participant’s status 
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is determined and was based in large part upon this court’s decision in In re 
Adoption of Sunderhaus (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 127, 585 N.E.2d 418, which was 
decided prior to the creation of the Putative Father Registry and the enactment of 
the accompanying amendments to the adoption statutes. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 419, 
146 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4660.  In Sunderhaus, this court found that the ability of 
a court to dispense with the consent requirement under R.C. 3107.07(A) is 
dependent upon the establishment of a parent-child relationship and that 
establishing the parent-child relationship requires a judicial ascertainment of 
paternity.  Id. at 130. 
{¶ 29} This analysis is consistent with the statutory scheme in place at the 
time.3  At the time Sunderhaus was decided by this court, the only statutorily 
available method for an unwed natural father to establish a parent-child 
relationship was through a judicial proceeding.  By relying on Sunderhaus, 
Pushcar failed to recognize that new, alternative statutory methods existed for an 
unwed biological father to establish a parent-child relationship in addition to a 
judicial determination. 
{¶ 30} The Pushcar majority’s reliance on Sunderhaus is further called 
into question given the unclear nature of the facts of Pushcar.  Pushcar’s facts 
suggest that the natural father already had an established parent-child relationship 
prior to the filing of the juvenile court proceedings.  Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 
2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647 at ¶1, 4.  It is also unclear in Pushcar whether 
the juvenile court proceeding was initiated to establish a parent-child relationship 
judicially or to enforce the natural father’s visitation rights based upon his 
established parent-child relationship.  Id. 
                                                 
3.  At the time, R.C. 3107.06 provided that a father’s consent to adoption was required “if the 
minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the mother, if the minor is his child 
by adoption, or if the minor has been established to be his child by a court proceeding.”  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 790, 142 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5323, 5333. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 31} Because the analysis of Pushcar fails to address the relevant 
statutory provisions, relies upon Sunderhaus, and is based on factual 
circumstances that are unclear from the opinion, I find that Pushcar’s holding is 
of limited value and should not be extended beyond the R.C. 3107.07(A) context. 
The General Assembly’s adoption policy 
{¶ 32} The majority’s holding is also contrary to the public policy clearly 
expressed in the current adoption statutes.  Justice Cupp’s dissent correctly sets 
forth the legislative history and objectives of the 1996 amendments to Ohio’s 
adoption statutes. 
{¶ 33} The express legislative direction contained within the adoption 
statutes requires determination of the status of the participants at the time the 
adoption petition is filed.  This advances the goals of the 1996 amendments to the 
adoption statutes by avoiding the delays inherent in allowing ancillary litigation 
regarding status to complete before considering the adoption petition. While the 
majority may disagree with the statutory scheme and its potentially harsh result in 
these circumstances, it is not this court’s place to disregard clear statutory 
language to come to a result that the majority finds more equitable in this case.  
This court should respect the policy decisions made by the General Assembly in 
enacting the amended adoption statutes and apply the statutory language as 
written. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 34} Otten failed to register with the Putative Father Registry and also 
failed to establish a parent-child relationship before the adoption petition was 
filed.  Therefore, Otten is a putative father for the purposes of the adoption 
proceedings and the consent-to-adoption exception set forth in R.C. 
3107.07(B)(1) applies to him.  Staying the probate court’s adoption proceedings 
for a juvenile court proceeding to establish paternity is inappropriate in light of 
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the clear directive of the adoption statutes and unnecessarily delays adoption 
proceedings contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. 
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the First 
District Court of Appeals. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} I respectfully dissent based on the statutes as currently written; 
however, I do not agree with Chief Justice Brown that In re Adoption of Pushcar, 
110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, has no application here. 
{¶ 37} A “putative father” is “a man, including one under age eighteen, 
who may be a child’s father and to whom all of the following apply:  
{¶ 38} “(1) He is not married to the child’s mother at the time of the 
child’s conception or birth;  
{¶ 39} “(2) He has not adopted the child; 
{¶ 40} “(3) He has not been determined, prior to the date a petition to 
adopt the child is filed, to have a parent and child relationship with the child by a 
court proceeding pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code, a 
court proceeding in another state, an administrative agency proceeding pursuant 
to sections 3111.38 to 3111.54 of the Revised Code, or an administrative agency 
proceeding in another state; 
{¶ 41} “(4) He has not acknowledged paternity of the child pursuant to 
sections 3111.21 to 3111.35 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
3107.01(H). 
{¶ 42} A putative father’s consent to an adoption of a minor child is 
required unless (1) he has failed to register as the minor’s putative father with the 
Putative Father Registry established under R.C. 3107.062 not later than 30 days 
after the minor’s birth or (2) he has willfully abandoned or failed to care for and 
support the minor or willfully abandoned the mother of the minor during her 
January Term, 2010 
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pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or the minor’s 
placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs first.  R.C. 3107.06(C) 
and 3107.07(B). 
{¶ 43} Although Otten filed a parentage action to determine whether he 
had a parent-child relationship with P.A.C., that action had not concluded when 
the adoption petition was filed.  Therefore, under the plain language of R.C. 
3107.01(H), Otten remains within the definition of “putative father” and his 
consent is not required, because he failed to timely register as a putative father.  
R.C. 3107.07(B)(1). 
{¶ 44} Although Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 
N.E.2d 647, requires that the adoption proceedings be stayed during the juvenile 
court proceeding, that does not change the fact that Otten’s consent is not 
required.  Even though the stay allowed the juvenile court to determine that Otten 
is P.A.C.’s father, R.C. 3107.06(B) states that a father’s consent to the adoption 
must be obtained only if the father satisfies one of the following: 
{¶ 45} “(1) The minor was conceived or born while the father was 
married to the mother; 
{¶ 46} “(2) The minor is his child by adoption; 
{¶ 47} “(3) Prior to the date the petition was filed, it was determined by a 
court proceeding pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code, a 
court proceeding in another state, an administrative agency proceeding pursuant 
to sections 3111.38 to 3111.54 of the Revised Code, or an administrative agency 
proceeding in another state that he has a parent and child relationship with the 
minor; 
{¶ 48} “(4) He acknowledged paternity of the child and that 
acknowledgment has become final pursuant to section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 
3111.821 of the Revised Code.” 
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{¶ 49} Again, because Otten’s parentage was not determined prior to the 
filing of the adoption petition, his consent as a father is not required under R.C. 
3107.06(B). 
{¶ 50} This does not mean, however, that Pushcar has no application 
here.  Before an adoption petition may be granted, the probate court must 
determine whether the adoption is in the best interest of the minor.  R.C. 
3107.14(C).  Knowing who the biological father is may affect this decision.  
Therefore, a Pushcar stay of the adoption proceeding to allow a previously filed 
parentage action to conclude is not futile.  Even if a putative father’s consent is 
not required, the ultimate issue is what is in the best interest of the minor.  The 
fact that consent is not required is not a fait accompli as to whether the petition 
should be granted. 
{¶ 51} For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the First 
District Court of Appeals. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 52} Our role with regard to statutory interpretation is to apply clear and 
unambiguous statutes as written and to engage in no further interpretation.  State 
ex rel. Burrows v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 519.  It 
is our duty to enforce a statute as written and to not add or subtract language from 
the statute, In re Adoption of Holcomb (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 366, 18 OBR 
419, 481 N.E.2d 613.  And I agree with Chief Justice Brown’s analysis regarding 
the plain and unambiguous requirements of the statutes applicable to this matter. 
{¶ 53} In this case, appellant’s consent to the adoption is not required, 
because he failed to register on the Putative Father Registry and he failed to have 
determined by a court or administrative proceeding prior to the date the adoption 
petition was filed that he is the biological father or that he had a parent-child 
relationship with the child.  R.C. 3107.06(B), 3107.01(H), and 3107.07(B)(1).  In 
January Term, 2010 
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other words, when an adoption petition is filed, the statutes require the status of 
the parties involved to be ascertained at that time.  At first glance the result may 
seem unfair as to appellant. On further reflection, however, it is clear that the 
legislature intended consequences when a putative father fails to take the proper 
steps to establish a parent-child relationship.  Thus, the statutes are clear that 
when a putative father so defaults, the child may be adopted without the putative 
father’s consent.  R.C. 3107.061. 
{¶ 54} I also agree with Justice Lanzinger’s conclusion that the holding in 
In re Pushcar, 110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, should be 
applied herein.  The Pushcar syllabus plainly states that “[w]hen an issue 
concerning parenting of a minor is pending in the juvenile court, a probate court 
must refrain from proceeding with the adoption of that child.”  Id.  Clearly, the 
stay required by Pushcar applies to this case. 
{¶ 55} The majority’s application of Pushcar to this case, however, takes 
the Pushcar holding too far by permitting a party’s consent-to-adoption status to 
change even after the adoption petition has been filed, in clear contradiction of 
the language of the statute.  Expanding Pushcar in this way amounts essentially 
to judicially waiving the requirement that any determination that a man is the 
natural father – for purposes of the adoption proceeding – be made prior to the 
time the adoption petition is filed with the probate court.  R.C. 3107.07(B) and 
3107.01(H).  This extension of Pushcar is contrary to both the General 
Assembly’s clear statutory directives and to the public policy clearly expressed in 
the adoption statutes.  That the biological-parent determination must be made 
before an adoption petition is filed in order to legally fix the necessity of 
obtaining that person’s consent to the adoption, is a mandatory statutory 
requirement (which the majority seems intent on judicially writing out of the 
statute).  The majority’s decision today serves only to undermine the effectiveness 
of the Putative Father Registry and to upend Ohio’s orderly adoption process. 
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{¶ 56} Ohio’s adoption laws were amended in 1996 to streamline the 
adoption process.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 419, 146 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4660.  This 
statutory enactment had among its primary objectives the establishment of 
statewide standards for adopting a child and the reduction of the time necessary to 
finalize an adoption from what was often four years before the statutory change, 
to between nine and 24 months under the current framework.  64 Ohio Report No. 
215, Gongwer News Service, Inc. (Nov. 9, 1995) 6.  Another objective of the 
legislation was to prevent children from being forcibly removed from their 
adoptive families after a biological father belatedly exercised parental rights.  64 
Ohio Report No. 198, Gongwer News Service, Inc. (Oct. 17, 1995) 1. 
{¶ 57} To achieve these goals while also upholding the rights of the 
natural parents, the child, and the adoptive parents, the General Assembly created 
the Putative Father Registry and other options for putative fathers to maintain 
consent-to-adoption rights.  Legislative Service Commission Final Bill Analysis, 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 419, 121st General Assembly; 65 Ohio Report No. 56, 
Gongwer News Service, Inc. (Mar. 21, 1996) 6; In re Adoption of Zschach (1996), 
75 Ohio St.3d 648, 651-652, 665 N.E.2d 1070.  After holding open hearings, 
inviting input from the public and adoption advocates, and reviewing adoption 
policy, the General Assembly enacted statutes requiring putative fathers to 
promptly demonstrate their commitment to meeting the responsibilities of 
parenthood.  R.C. 3107.061, 3107.062, and 3107.07(B)(1); Zschach, 75 Ohio 
St.3d at 651-652, 665 N.E.2d 1070.  The United States Supreme Court has also 
sanctioned the use of putative-father registries as mechanisms to facilitate the 
adoption process.  Lehr v. Robinson (1983), 463 U.S. 248, 263-264, 266-268, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614. 
{¶ 58} As this court has previously observed, the “goal of the adoption 
statutes is to protect the best interests of children.  In cases where adoption is 
necessary, this is best accomplished by providing the child with a permanent and 
January Term, 2010 
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stable home, and ensuring that the adoption process is completed in an 
expeditious manner.”  (Citation omitted.)  Zschach at 651.  The express legislative 
direction contained within the adoption statutes that requires the status of the 
biological father to be determined at the time the adoption petition is filed is one 
that the legislature has determined advances this goal. 
{¶ 59} In contrast, the majority’s application of In re Pushcar to the case 
now before us is in direct contravention of the clearly expressed requirements of 
the statute.  Without the benefit of the input available to the legislature on the 
benefits or detriments of any aspect of adoption policy, the majority of this court 
nullifies the express and specific language of the statutes and overrides the 
legislature’s articulated policy decisions, substituting its own.  The 1996 revisions 
to the adoption statutes were designed to provide more predictability and certainty 
in the adoption process, with due regard to the rights of the biological parents, and 
are consistent with the goal of expeditiously moving children through the 
adoption process into permanent and stable homes.  The court’s decision today is 
inconsistent with those objectives and calls into question the viability of any 
adoption currently in process.  In the end, the result of the majority opinion is to 
excuse appellant’s failure to promptly protect his consent-to-adoption rights by 
demonstrating his commitment to meeting the responsibilities of parenthood in 
the manner provided by the applicable statutes, and leaves the child in legal 
limbo. 
{¶ 60} Appellant failed to register with the Putative Father Registry and 
also failed to establish before the adoption petition was filed that he had a parent-
child relationship with the child.  The decision by the majority to sanction the 
procedure that stays the probate court’s adoption proceedings to allow appellant’s 
consent-to-adoption status to change is not authorized by the adoption statutes and 
is inappropriate in light of the clear directive of those statutes. 
{¶ 61} I must respectfully dissent from this court’s holding. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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_________________ 
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Kenneth J. Cahill, for appellant, 
Gary D. Otten. 
Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for appellee, Kevin 
Crooks. 
Erik L. Smith, urging reversal as a pro se amicus curiae. 
Susan Garner Eisenman and Mary Beck, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae American Academy of Adoption Attorneys. 
______________________