Title: Ken v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VARO KEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 167Case Number: S-10-0103Decided: 12/22/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
VARO 
KEN,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Patricia 
L. Bennett, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Armitage.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
C.J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a concurring in part and 
dissenting in part opinion, in which VOIGT, J., joins; VOIGT, J., 
files a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, in which 
GOLDEN, J., joins.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Varo Ken of attempted 
first degree murder and aggravated assault.  He appealed, asserting defense counsel 
provided ineffective assistance in several ways, including that he failed to 
file a timely motion for new trial.  
Mr. Ken also contended the evidence presented to the jury was 
insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder.1  
 
[¶2]  After docketing Mr. Ken’s appeal, we 
remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on his claim 
that counsel was ineffective.  On 
remand, the parties stipulated that defense counsel failed to timely file 
post-trial motions for acquittal and new trial.  Following a hearing, the district court 
concluded Mr. Ken was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to timely file a motion 
for new trial because, had counsel timely filed the motion, the court would have 
granted it on the ground that the attempted first degree murder conviction was 
contrary to the weight of the evidence and may have resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice.     

 
[¶3]  Upon the district court’s entry of its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the case returned to this Court for 
consideration of the issues Mr. Ken presented in his appeal.  Addressing his second issue first, we 
hold that sufficient evidence was presented to support the attempted first 
degree murder conviction; therefore, Mr. Ken was not entitled to a judgment of 
acquittal.  Our holding on that 
issue leaves only the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel remaining.  We hold that Mr. Ken has satisfied his 
burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel.  Therefore, we reverse the attempted 
first degree murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on that 
charge.
 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶4]  Mr. Ken states the issues for this 
Court’s determination as follows:
 
I.  Whether the ineffective performance of 
trial counsel denied Ken his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel.
 
II.  Whether evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to support convictions of attempted first degree murder and 
aggravated assault.
 
The 
State rephrases the same issues.   

 
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]  On August 7, 2009, the Uinta County 
prosecutor filed an information charging Mr. Ken with attempted first degree 
murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a) (LexisNexis 2011) and § 
6-2-101(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2011) and aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) and (b) (LexisNexis 2011).  In the accompanying affidavit, Evanston 
police officer Douglas Matthews stated that on the evening of July 26, 2008, 
Rachel Garcia called 911 to report that a man had fired a gun at her, her five 
year old son and her fiancé, Lance Menard, in the parking lot of an apartment 
complex in Evanston, Wyoming.2  She provided dispatch with a description 
and the license plate number of the vehicle the suspect was driving when he left 
the scene.  The vehicle was licensed 
in the state of Utah and dispatch notified authorities there to locate and stop 
it.  
 
[¶6]  Meanwhile, Officer Matthews spoke with 
Ms. Garcia and Mr. Menard.  
According to his affidavit, they reported that they had pulled into a 
parking space next to the suspect’s vehicle.  Words were exchanged and Mr. Menard made 
a derogatory comment to the suspect.  
As he, Ms. Garcia and the child approached the entrance to the apartment 
complex, Mr. Menard heard the suspect yelling.  He turned and saw the suspect pointing a 
gun at him.  According to Officer 
Matthews, Mr. Menard and Ms. Garcia reported that the suspect fired four shots 
at them, got into his vehicle and drove away.  
 
[¶7]  Approximately forty minutes later, a 
Utah State Trooper stopped a vehicle matching the description Ms. Garcia had 
provided and took the two occupants into custody.  The driver was identified as Mr. Ken, 
the passenger as Anisa Chandavong.  
The trooper searched the vehicle and found a semi-automatic handgun.  
 
[¶8]  Officer Matthews interviewed Ms. 
Chandavong the following day.  
According to his affidavit, Ms. Chandavong told him that she and Mr. Ken 
were seated in the car in the parking lot when a truck pulled into the parking 
space next to them and some people got out.  Ms. Chandavong said Mr. Ken got out of 
the car because he thought the man was yelling at him.  She said she did not hear what was said 
or gunshots because she was wearing earphones.  She also said she did not see a gun 
until Mr. Ken got back in the car.  

 
[¶9]  Officer Matthews also interviewed Mr. 
Ken.  According to the officer’s 
affidavit, Mr. Ken said he and his girlfriend were arguing in his vehicle in the 
parking lot when a pickup pulled into the space next to them and several people 
got out.  He heard the man yell 
something and thought he was yelling at him.  He got out of the car, the man yelled 
something derogatory, and Mr. Ken got his gun.  He said that he fired a shot in the air 
and then walked toward the man.  
According to the affidavit, Mr. Ken told Officer Matthews that he pointed 
the gun directly at the man, heard Ms. Garcia scream that her child was in the 
line of fire, pointed the gun off to the right and fired again.  Mr. Ken said he then pointed the gun 
back at Mr. Menard and fired.  
Later, Officer Matthews found two spent shell casings, one in front and 
the other behind where Mr. Ken’s vehicle had been parked.  He also found a bullet hole in the 
screen door of the main floor apartment to the right of the building entrance 
and another bullet hole in the face plate of the apartment deck above the main 
floor apartment.  No other bullets 
or casings were found.  

 
[¶10]  The district court convened a jury trial 
on the charges against Mr. Ken.  On 
the second day of trial, defense counsel informed the district court that the 
prosecutor had that morning provided a report indicating Mr. Menard had pleaded 
guilty to battery in 2008 after an incident in which he was reported to have 
picked a fight in a bar with another customer.  At the point when defense counsel 
received the report, Mr. Menard had already testified.  Defense counsel argued that Mr. Menard’s 
prior involvement as the aggressor in an argument was relevant to Mr. Ken’s 
self-defense claim and asked for the opportunity to call him back to the witness 
stand and question him about the incident.  
The district court indicated there should be a hearing or an offer of 
proof.  The trial 
continued.
 
[¶11]  At the close of the State’s evidence, 
defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the attempted first degree 
murder charge, arguing there was insufficient evidence.  The district court denied the motion, 
concluding the evidence that Mr. Ken retrieved a firearm, pointed it at Mr. 
Menard and fired, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, created 
a reasonable inference that he intended to kill Mr. Menard.  Defense counsel then made an offer of 
proof concerning the newly disclosed report.  The district court reserved ruling on 
whether it would allow the defense to re-call Mr. Menard.    
 
[¶12]  The defense presented its case through 
the testimony of Ms. Chandavong.  
After her testimony, the defense rested.  The court excused the jury and asked 
defense counsel if he had intended to rest without a ruling on whether he would 
be allowed to re-call Mr. Menard.  
Defense counsel responded that he had intended to rest because it was too 
late to investigate the incident which had led to the battery charge against Mr. 
Menard.  The court advised the 
parties that it would allow the defense to re-call Mr. Menard.  Counsel reiterated that the defense 
rested.    

 
[¶13]  On February 4, 2010, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on both counts.  
The district court discharged the jury and immediately sentenced Mr. Ken 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the attempted first 
degree murder conviction and a concurrent term of two to six years for the 
aggravated assault conviction.  The 
district court entered a written judgment and sentence on February 23, 
2010.  
 
[¶14]  On March 3, 2010, twenty-seven days 
after the jury rendered its verdict and Mr. Ken was sentenced, defense counsel 
filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a new trial.  The district court denied the motion, 
finding that it was not filed in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 29(c), which requires 
motions for judgment of acquittal to be filed within ten days after a verdict is 
returned, or W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) requiring motions for new trial to be filed within 
fifteen days after a verdict.  Mr. 
Ken then appealed his conviction and the order denying his post-trial 
motions.  
 
[¶15]  After the appeal was docketed in this 
Court, Mr. Ken filed a motion for an order partially remanding the case to 
district court for a hearing pursuant to W.R.A.P. 21 on his claim that defense 
counsel performed ineffectively.3  Mr. Ken claimed counsel was ineffective 
in that he failed to request a continuance after learning of Mr. Menard’s prior 
history of provoking confrontation and arrest for battery; failed to adequately 
investigate Mr. Menard’s history; rested his case before the district court 
ruled on whether he would be allowed to re-call Mr. Menard; and failed to file 
timely post-trial motions for acquittal and new trial.  We granted the motion and ordered a 
remand.  
 
[¶16]  The district court convened a hearing 
and subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it 
concluded defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a 
continuance, adequately investigate, or wait for the district court’s ruling on 
re-calling Mr. Menard before resting.  
Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court found defense 
counsel failed to timely file motions for acquittal and new trial.  The district court concluded counsel’s 
performance was deficient because he failed to timely file the motions.  The district court concluded Mr. Ken was 
not prejudiced by the failure to timely file a motion for acquittal; however, it 
concluded he was prejudiced by the failure to timely file a motion for new trial 
because, had the motion been timely filed, he would have granted a new trial on 
the attempted first degree murder charge.  
The district court entered its findings and conclusions, and this Court 
resumed jurisdiction of the matter.  

 
 
DISCUSSION
 
 
1.    
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence
 
[¶17]  The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a 
second trial once a reviewing court has found the evidence presented in the 
first trial legally insufficient to support the conviction.  Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 17, 57 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 2002); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 
98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978).  
The only “just” remedy available upon such a finding is an order 
directing entry of a judgment of acquittal.  Id.  Thus, a finding that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict on the attempted 
first degree murder charge would fully resolve this case and we begin by 
considering that issue.  

 
[¶18]  The statutes under which Mr. Ken was 
charged provide in pertinent part as follows:
 
§ 
6-2-101. Murder in the first degree; ….
 
            
(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice … kills any human 
being is guilty of murder in the first degree.
 
§ 
6-1-301. Attempt; 
….
 
            
(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if:
(i) 
With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards commission of the crime.  A 
“substantial step” is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person’s intention to complete the commission of the crime[.]  
 
Therefore, 
in order to prove Mr. Ken attempted to commit first degree murder, the State had 
to prove he intended to kill Mr. Menard and took action strongly corroborative 
of the firmness of that intent.  The 
State also had to prove Mr. Ken did so purposely and with premeditated 
malice.
 
[¶19]  The following standards govern our 
review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim:
 
[W]e 
examine and accept as true the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences 
which can be drawn from it.  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant.  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably 
concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
 
Daves 
v. State, 
2011 WY 47, ¶ 30, 249 P.3d 250, 259 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
[¶20]  The State presented the testimony of 
three witnesses, Ms. Garcia, Mr. Menard and Mr. Lopez, that as they were walking 
away from Mr. Ken toward the apartment complex, he got the gun from his car, 
pointed it directly at them and began walking toward them.  They also testified that he pointed the 
gun at Mr. Menard and fired.  Mr. 
Menard testified unequivocally that Mr. Ken pointed the gun directly at him and 
fired twice while still pointing the gun at him.  
 
[¶21]  Mr. Ken admitted in the recorded 
interview that he was angry when he fired the gun.  Although the trial testimony varied as 
to exactly what Mr. Menard said to provoke Mr. Ken, Mr. Menard, Ms. Garcia and 
Mr. Lopez all testified that his comment was racial and derogatory.  Mr. Ken admitted that he aimed the gun 
at Mr. Menard.  Although the only 
bullet holes found were off to the right of where the testimony indicated Mr. 
Menard was standing, Officer Matthews testified based on his experience and 
training that a person’s state of mind can affect his accuracy with a 
handgun.  He testified that any time 
a person is upset or excited his adrenaline flows and affects fine motor skills 
such as sight and accuracy with a handgun.  

 
[¶22]  Accepting this evidence as true, and 
refraining from substituting our judgment for that of the jury, we conclude the 
jury reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Ken was angry, retrieved the gun 
and purposely aimed it at Mr. Menard.  
The jury also could reasonably have concluded that Mr. Ken fired the gun 
at Mr. Menard twice with the intent of killing him but, in the excitement of the 
moment, missed his target and hit the apartments off to the right of Mr. 
Menard.  
 
[¶23]  Arguing otherwise, Mr. Ken focuses on 
the words “purposely” and “premeditated malice” in the first degree murder 
statute.  Relying on the three-part 
test this Court adopted in Mattern v. 
State, 2007 WY 24, ¶ 30, 151 P.3d 1116, 1129 (Wyo. 2007) for 
evaluating on appeal whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain an 
attempted first degree murder conviction, Mr. Ken asserts his conviction must be 
overturned because there was insufficient evidence that he acted purposely or 
with premeditated malice.  The test 
we reiterated in Mattern is as 
follows: 
 
Evidence 
sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation “falls into 
three basic categories:  (1) facts 
about * * * what defendant did prior 
to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity 
directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing— what may 
be characterized as 'planning’ activity;  
(2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with 
the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a 'motive’ to kill the 
victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3) would 
* * * support an inference that the killing was the result of 'a pre-existing 
reflection’ and 'careful thought and weighing of considerations’ rather than 
'mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’;  (3) facts about the nature of the 
killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and 
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 
'preconceived design’ to take [the] victim’s life in a particular way for a 
'reason’ which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or 
(2).”  
 
Id., 
quoting People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 441, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988) (emphasis in 
original).
 
[¶24]  Mr. Ken asserts the evidence presented 
in his case failed to show any of the three categories of evidence described in 
Mattern.  He contends there was no evidence that 
he engaged in planning activity, no evidence that he had a prior relationship 
with Mr. Menard from which a motive to kill could be inferred, no evidence from 
which it could be inferred he attempted to kill Mr. Menard after careful thought 
or weighing the considerations and no evidence of a preconceived design to 
attempt to take Mr. Menard’s life in a particular way for a particular reason. 

 
[¶25]  We said in Mattern, ¶ 30, 151 P.3d  at 1129-30, that 
premeditation need not have existed for any given length of time before the 
act.  It is sufficient that it 
existed at the time of the act.  Id.  The intent and act may be as 
instantaneous as successive thoughts.  
Id.  The evidence that Mr. Ken responded to 
Mr. Menard with heated words and yelling, retrieved the loaded gun from his 
vehicle, pointed it at the group, walked toward them as they retreated to the 
building, shifted his aim to Mr. Menard and fired twice was sufficient to show 
that he “engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to 
result in, killing” Mr. Menard.  
Although there was no evidence that Mr. Ken and Mr. Menard had a 
relationship prior to being in the parking lot that day, the evidence that Mr. 
Menard made a racially derogatory comment, Mr. Ken was angry when he retrieved 
the gun and what followed was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference 
that he had a 'motive’ to kill Mr. Menard.  
His deliberate acts of retrieving the loaded gun from the car, walking 
toward Mr. Menard as he retreated, and shifting his aim to point the gun 
directly at Mr. Menard further supported an inference that he reflected on, 
carefully thought about and weighed the considerations of what he was about to 
do.  The State’s evidence also gave 
rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Ken retrieved the loaded gun from his 
vehicle, pointed it at Mr. Menard and fired twice in an intentional attempt to 
kill according to a preconceived design to take his life.  Sufficient evidence was presented from 
which the jury could have reasonably concluded Mr. Ken was guilty of attempted 
first degree murder.4   
 
 
2.    
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel
 
[¶26]  In his brief to this Court, Mr. Ken 
asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in several 
ways, including that his counsel failed to timely file a motion for new 
trial.  On this Court’s remand, the 
district court found after an evidentiary hearing that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient because he failed to timely file the new trial motion 
and Mr. Ken was prejudiced because had the motion been timely filed it would 
have granted it as to the attempted first degree murder charge. 
 
[¶27]  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
involve mixed questions of law and fact; consequently, our review is de novo.  Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 40, 253 P.3d 136, 147 (Wyo. 2011).  For Mr. Ken to prevail on his claim, he 
must first establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.  Id.  This requires a showing that counsel 
failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably 
competent attorney. Id., citing Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 18, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007). 
 Under the second prong of the 
ineffectiveness test, Mr. Ken must also demonstrate that counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense.  Id.  That is, he must show a reasonable 
probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome 
would have been different.  Id.  If he fails to make the required showing 
of either deficient performance or prejudice, his ineffectiveness claim must 
fail.   Id.
 
[¶28]  On remand, the parties stipulated that 
trial counsel’s motion for new trial was not filed within fifteen days of the 
verdict as required by W.R.Cr.P. 33.  
Citing U.S. 
v. Hilliard, 
392 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2004), the district 
court held trial counsel’s failure to timely file the motion constituted 
deficient performance.  In Hilliard, trial counsel failed to file a 
motion for new trial until forty-one days after the verdict.  The federal rules of criminal procedure 
required the motion to be filed within seven days of the verdict.  Considering the first prong of the 
ineffectiveness claim, the Court stated:
 
            
In determining whether counsel’s performance fell below a 
constitutionally-acceptable standard, courts must distinguish claims that 
involve deficient performance from those which reflect permissible trial 
strategy. Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. 
While “we presume counsel’s conduct to be within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys under like circumstances, . . . [w]hen the appellant shows 
that defense counsel 'failed to exercise the customary skills and diligence that 
a reasonably competent attorney would exhibit under similar 
circumstances,’ that presumption must fail.” [citation omitted; 
emphasis in original].   
 
The 
Court concluded:
 
In 
this case, there can be no serious argument that the performance of Hilliard’s 
lawyer was acceptable. He admitted in deposition testimony that he failed to 
timely file a motion for a new trial because he misapprehended the filing 
deadline.  Not 
filing a dispositive motion, particularly when directed to do so by the district 
court, is a classic dereliction of an attorney’s obligation to provide his 
client with the type of performance required by the Sixth Amendment. 
 
 
Hilliard, 
392 F.3d  at 986.
 
[¶29]  As in Hilliard, courts in other jurisdictions 
have found deficient performance where counsel failed to timely file a motion 
for new trial.  See, for example, Loubert v. State, 895 So. 2d 479, 481 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Dorsey v. 
State, 156 S.W.3d 825, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652, 657 
(Tenn. 2003).  We agree with these 
decisions.  The parties in the 
present case stipulated that defense counsel filed the motion for new trial 
after the time for filing such a motion had expired.  While a motion for new trial is not 
required in every case, in cases where one is filed it must be filed within the 
time permitted by the rules.  Not 
filing a new trial motion within the time permitted constitutes a failure 
to exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent 
attorney would exhibit under similar 
circumstances 
and is a dereliction of an attorney’s obligation to provide his client with the 
type of performance required by the Sixth Amendment.  
 
[¶30]  In Hilliard, after the jury rendered its 
verdict, the trial court reminded defense counsel to check the rules for the 
requirements and time frames for filing post-trial motions.  The district court in the present case 
gave no such reminder.  This factual 
difference does not change our determination that Mr. Ken’s counsel performed 
deficiently in failing to timely file the motion.  A reasonably competent attorney does not 
need reminding by the court of his obligation to timely file post-trial 
motions.  We turn to the second 
prong of the ineffectiveness test.
 
[¶31]  In addition to showing that trial 
counsel’s performance was deficient Mr. Ken must show a reasonable probability 
exists that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome would have been 
different.  In the context of the 
new trial motion, Mr. Ken must show a reasonable probability exists that if 
counsel had timely filed the motion, it would have been granted.  On this Court’s W.R.A.P. 21 remand, 
the 
district court found that if defense counsel had timely filed the motion, it 
would have granted Mr. Ken a new trial on the attempted first degree murder 
charge in the interest of justice pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(a).  It is in the context of this factual 
finding that we must determine whether Mr. Ken was prejudiced by counsel’s 
deficient performance.  We conclude 
that he was.  Had the motion been 
timely filed the district court would have granted it, the State would have had 
no means to challenge the order and Mr. Ken would have received a new trial on 
the attempted first degree murder charge.  
   
 
[¶32]  In 
Wyoming, the prosecution in a criminal case does not have the right of direct 
appeal.  Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Wyo. 1994). 
 Consequently, the State would have 
had no ability to appeal the entry of an order granting Mr. Ken a new 
trial.  The exclusive means 
available to the State to challenge an adverse ruling in a criminal case is by 
filing a bill of exceptions in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-102 and 
103 (LexisNexis 2011) or by filing a petition for writ of review pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 13.  State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 23, 88 P.3d 445, 453 (Wyo. 2004); Crozier, 882 P.2d  at 1236.   
 
[¶33]  Pursuant to §§ 7-12-102 and -104 
respectively, bills of exception are limited to decisions made “during the prosecution of a criminal 
case,” and any decision by this Court on a bill of exceptions governs similar 
and future cases but does not affect the judgment in the case in which the bill 
of exceptions was taken.  An order 
granting a new trial after a jury verdict is not a decision made during the 
prosecution of a criminal case. Even if it were and if, upon entry of the order 
in Mr. Ken’s case, the State had filed a bill of exceptions, any decision by 
this Court would have governed similar and future cases but would not have 
affected Mr. Ken’s right to a new trial.  
Writs of review are granted only when the State has no other adequate 
remedy, the issues presented are of constitutional magnitude and public 
importance, and it is clear that allowing the writ will not place the defendant 
in jeopardy for a second time.  Newman, ¶ 23, 88 P.3d  at 453.  Had the motion for a new trial been 
timely filed in this case, and had the district court granted it as it found on 
remand that it would have done, it is unlikely the State could have met the test 
for obtaining a writ of review. The State has not provided, nor have we found, 
any precedent in a criminal case for allowing a petition for writ of review of a 
trial court’s order granting a defendant a new trial on the basis of ineffective 
assistance.  An order granting a new 
trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance is simply not the sort of issue 
contemplated by W.R.A.P. 13.  
 
[¶34]  We hold that Mr. Ken received 
ineffective assistance of counsel and remand the case to the district court for 
entry of an order granting Mr. Ken a new trial on the attempted first degree 
murder charge.5
 
 
 
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which VOIGT, Justice, 
joins.
 
[¶35]   I agree with the Court’s holding 
that Mr. Ken is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the State 
presented sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s attempted first 
degree murder conviction.  However, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s 
decision that (1) Mr. Ken’s trial counsel performed deficiently by failing 
timely to file a post-verdict motion for new trial pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) 
on grounds that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence 
and a miscarriage of justice occurred, and (2) a reasonable possibility existed 
that, but for that deficient performance, the outcome would have been 
different.  I would affirm Mr. Ken’s 
conviction.
 
[¶36]   In the motion for remand under 
W.R.A.P. 21 filed in this Court, Mr. Ken identified trial counsel’s untimely 
filing of the post-verdict motions but did not state any W.R.Cr.P 33(a) 
grounds.  At the limited remand hearing, those grounds were not 
explored in any detail and no testimony was taken with respect to them.  
Although Mr. Ken’s trial counsel testified at that hearing, I find no 
questioning of him or testimony by him addressing why he did not timely file the 
motions.  On these matters, the record before this Court is blank.  I 
would have thought that Mr. Ken had the burden of proof on the issue in the 
remand hearing, and I think he failed to carry it at that hearing and, 
consequently, in this Court as well.  I acknowledge Hilliard cited 
by the Court for the proposition that trial counsel’s failure timely to file a 
post-verdict motion for new trial after 
having been instructed to do so by the trial court that expressed grave reservations about the 
verdict constitutes deficient performance.  392 F.3d 981, 984-86.  
But that is not this case, as the Court acknowledges.  That significant 
factual difference does not change the Court’s determination that Mr. Ken’s 
trial counsel’s failure constituted deficient performance, but I think it 
should.  Absent from both the trial court’s decision after the remand 
evidentiary hearing and this Court’s opinion is any consideration of whether a 
reasonable and prudent criminal defense counsel, under the same or similar facts and 
circumstances faced by Mr. Ken’s trial counsel, would surely have filed a 
post-verdict motion for new trial on W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) grounds.  Under the 
analysis required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and our precedent following that decision, we must 
keep in mind:
 
A 
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances 
of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in making 
the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance[.]
 
 
Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 689, 104 S. Ct.  at 2067.
 
[¶37]   Evaluating the reasonable trial 
counsel’s perspective when the jury returned Mr. Ken’s guilty verdict, I think 
counsel knew the evidence against Mr. Ken was the same strong evidence which 
this Court has recounted in paragraphs 20-22 of the opinion: an angry Mr. Ken 
purposely aimed a loaded gun at Mr. Menard and fired twice.  Reasonable 
trial counsel would have known that a W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) motion for a new trial (on 
grounds the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence and a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred) is granted only in exceptional 
circumstances and in the trial judge’s exercise of discretion.  See, 
e.g., 3 Charles Alan Wright, Sarah N. Welling, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 582 (4th ed. 2011); 
United States v. McClellon, 578 F.3d 846, 857 (8th Cir. 2009) (trial court may grant 
new trial under Rule 33 only if the evidence weighs so heavily against the 
verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; although the trial 
court has broad discretion to grant a new trial under that rule, it must 
exercise that discretion sparingly and with caution).  Given the State’s 
strong evidence at trial and the trial court’s silence when the jury’s verdict 
was returned, unlike in Hilliard, can 
it truly be said that Mr. Ken’s trial counsel’s failure timely to file the new 
trial motion was so serious as to conclude the trial cannot be relied upon as 
having produced a just result?  I cannot truly say so.  Under such 
circumstances, the reasonable trial counsel would know that the chances of 
having the trial court exercise its discretion in favor of that counsel’s Rule 
33(a) motion would be slim and none.  It would be the equivalent of 
football’s “Hail Mary pass” in the last second of the fourth quarter with the 
losing team on its own five-yard line.  I cannot accept the Court’s holding 
that the reasonable trial counsel’s failure to throw that desperation pass is 
deficient performance.  Turning 
briefly to prejudice, the second prong of the Strickland analysis, I do 
not find the Court’s extremely brief treatment of that issue satisfactory.  Actually, there is no analysis.  
 The Court states only that (1) at the remand hearing the trial court 
stated it would have granted the Rule 33(a) new trial motion had it been timely 
filed, and (2) “[w]e conclude that [Mr. Ken] was [prejudiced].”  But this 
is nothing more than hindsight, which Strickland rejects.  

 
[¶38]   Finally, I fail to see the purpose 
in the Court’s comments in paragraphs 32 and 33 of its opinion as no issues 
concerning those matters were presented in Mr. Ken’s 
appeal.
 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
 
[¶39]   I join in Justice Golden’s opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
I write separately with a few additional comments.
 
[¶40]   First, I agree with Justice Golden 
that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion for new 
trial.  There are two salient facts 
that should be the focus of this inquiry:  
First, as noted in the majority opinion, defense counsel’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal was denied because the district court believed there was 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the appellant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, 
the majority, in its own analysis of the State’s evidence, determines as 
follows:
 
[W]e 
conclude the jury reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Ken was angry, 
retrieved the gun and purposely aimed it at Mr. Menard.  The jury also could reasonably have 
concluded that Mr. ken fired the 
gun at Mr. Menard twice with the intent of killing him but, in the excitement of 
the moment, missed his target and hit the apartments off to the right of Mr. 
Menard.
 
See supra 
¶ 22.  Thus, the district court 
denied a motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict.  This court also believes the evidence was 
sufficient to convict.  Yet, this 
court finds trial counsel’s 
performance deficient for not filing a motion for new trial on the ground that 
the “weight” of the evidence was not sufficient to convict.  That is simply not reasonable.  Furthermore, use of the district court’s 
later comment that he would have granted the motion, as evidence of prejudice, 
is, as mentioned by Justice Golden, nothing but the use of hindsight.  Defense counsel did not have the benefit 
of that hindsight.
 
[¶41]   My additional concern here is the 
effect of W.R.Cr.P. 29 and 33 when the issue is sufficiency of the 
evidence.  W.R.Cr.P. 29 governs 
motions for judgment of acquittal, which motions should be granted “if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .”  W.R.Cr.P. 29(a).  It is significant, in light of the 
procedural history of the instant case, that the district court “of its own 
motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal” where the evidence is 
insufficient to convict.  Id.  The test to be applied, as we have said 
innumerable times, is whether, looking only at the State’s evidence, the 
district court can say that a rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, ¶ 47, 162 P.3d 497, 509 (Wyo. 2007); Mendoza v. State, 2007 WY 26, ¶ 3, 151 P.3d 1112, 1113 (Wyo. 2007); 
and Burkhardt v. State, 2005 WY 96, ¶ 9, 117 P.3d 1219, 1222-23 (Wyo. 
2005).  Most importantly, where “the 
State introduces evidence on its case-in-chief from which the jury may properly 
infer the essential elements of the crime, the State has then made out a 'prima 
facie case,’ impregnable against a motion for acquittal.”  Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690, 695 (Wyo. 1978).
 
[¶42]   Defense counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case.  The district court denied the motion 
because the district court found that the evidence, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support an inference of the 
intent necessary to support an attempted first-degree murder conviction.  Trial counsel did not timely move 
post-trial for a judgment of acquittal under W.R.Cr.P. 29.  Furthermore, the district court stated 
upon remand that it would not have granted a motion for judgment of acquittal, 
so the district court must have continued to believe that there was sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find guilt.  If that was not the district court’s 
belief, the district court should have entered a judgment of acquittal upon its 
own motion.
 
[¶43]   The significant difficulty in this 
scenario is that W.R.Cr.P. 33, if interpreted as the majority interprets it, 
allows a new trial to be granted “in the interest of justice,” when the trial 
court judge disagrees with the “weight” given the evidence by the jury.  Allowing the district court to reverse a 
jury verdict because the court disagrees with the weight of the evidence, where 
the court has already determined the evidence is sufficient to convict, violates 
the principle that jurors are the final arbiters of what weight to give to the 
evidence.  We have said, probably 
dozens of times, that courts are not to second-guess the jury and that courts 
are not to reweigh the evidence.  See, e.g., Lemus, 2007 WY 111, ¶ 47, 162 P.3d  at 509; 
Mendoza, 2007 WY 26, ¶ 3, 151 P.3d  at 1113; 
Burkhardt, 2005 WY 96, ¶ 9, 117 P.3d  at 1223; 
Leyo v. State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 16, 116 P.3d 1113, 1118 (Wyo. 2005); Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 41, 105 P.3d 1049, 1068 (Wyo. 2005); Mascarenas v. State, 2003 WY 124, ¶ 3, 76 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Wyo. 2003); Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358, 366 (Wyo. 1996); Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 578-79 (Wyo. 1994); 
and Mondello v. State, 843 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Wyo. 
1992).  In addition, we instruct the 
jury repeatedly that “it is the exclusive province of the Jury to weigh and 
consider all evidence . . . .”  Wyo. 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 1.01, 1.02 (2004); see also Wyo. Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction 6.01 (2004).  
Apparently, that is not true; the weight to be given the evidence is not 
the exclusive province of the jury.  
Rather, even where the trial court has determined the evidence sufficient 
to convict, the trial court may reverse the jury’s determination of guilt by 
reweighing the evidence.  That is 
not right.
 
[¶44]   The doctrine of stare decisis does not require Wyoming 
to follow those cases that allow the filing under F.R.Cr.P. 33 of a motion that 
merely contests the weight given to the evidence by the jury.  As noted above, the evidence is 
sufficient to support a guilty verdict if the evidence is sufficient for a 
quorum of reasonable jurors to have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based 
upon that evidence.  See, e.g., Schuler v. State, 2008 WY 47, ¶ 11, 181 P.3d 929, 932 (Wyo. 2008).  If the evidence passes that test, it 
cannot also “preponderate heavily against the verdict” and, therefore, require 
reversal.  See United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1985).  
Similarly, if the evidence “contradicts indisputable physical facts or 
law,” I fail to see how it is sufficient evidence upon which a jury could 
reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 470-71 (7th Cir. 1989).
 
[¶45]   We ought to make sense, not 
nonsense, of the law.  W.R.Cr.P. 
33(a) uses the phrase “in the interest of justice”, but that phrase should not 
give the trial judge license to reweigh the evidence.6  If the evidence was not sufficient for 
the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court should have 
entered a judgment of acquittal, upon its own motion if necessary.  If the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the district court has no 
business reversing that verdict and ordering a new trial based upon its own 
reweighing of the evidence.  I would 
hold that a new trial motion under W.R.Cr.P. 33 cannot be based upon sufficiency 
of the evidence, or the weight given to evidence that has been found 
sufficient.
 
[¶46]   I am curious as to what will happen 
in the new trial in the instant case if the State produces exactly the same 
evidence that it produced in the first trial.  Inasmuch as that evidence has been 
determined to be sufficient for the case to be submitted to the jury, and 
therefore “impregnable” against a motion for judgment of acquittal, the district 
court must submit the case to the jury.  
If the jury again convicts, is the district court free once again to 
reweigh that evidence and grant yet another new trial?
 
[¶47]   One additional point:  I am concerned that the majority’s 
discussion of the State’s inability directly to appeal in a criminal case will 
now be indelibly inserted into the concept of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Apparently, because the 
State cannot appeal to challenge the granting of a new trial motion, counsel 
will always be ineffective if he or she does not appeal from such a denial, or 
from the denial of any other motion which the State cannot appeal.  Conversely, if the State could directly 
appeal the granting of a new trial, would that mean defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such 
motion?  I agree with Justice Golden 
that this entire discussion should be omitted from the majority opinion.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES
1In his issue statement, Mr. Ken also challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the aggravated assault conviction.  However, he presents no argument as to 
that charge and focuses instead exclusively on the attempted first degree murder 
conviction.  We, therefore, do not 
address the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravated assault.  
 
2Although not mentioned in the affidavit, Ms. Garcia’s eighteen-year-old 
brother, Daniel Lopez, was also present.    

3W.R.A.P. 
21 allows a defendant after his appeal is docketed in this Court to request a 
remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Subparagraph (d) of Rule 21 provides that “Deadlines for filing of briefs 
shall be stayed upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule until 
further order of the appellate court.”  
Rule 21 thereafter provides in relevant part:
 
(e) 
Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as 
necessary to enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
* * *   The trial court 
shall enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 
claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by 
appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand.  Errors claimed to have been made during 
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under 
the same standards as the review of errors in other 
appeals.
(f) 
At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the 
trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare and file the record 
of supplemental proceedings as required by these rules.  The clerk of the trial court shall 
notify the clerk of the appellate court when the record of these proceedings is 
complete and provide a copy of the order on remand.
(g) 
Upon receipt of the notification from the trial court that the record of the 
proceedings is complete, the clerk of the appellate court shall notify the 
parties of the new briefing schedule.
 
 
4On remand, the district court viewed the evidence similarly when it ruled 
that Mr. Ken was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to timely file a 
post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal because, had the motion been timely 
filed, it would have been denied.  
The district court said:
 
There is evidence to support the State’s view of Attempted First Degree 
Murder:  the Defendant returned to 
his vehicle and armed himself with a firearm and [Mr. Menard] testified that the 
gun was pointed at him when the first shot was fired.  Viewing this evidence in the 
government’s favor, giving all reasonable inferences to the government, and 
leaving the Defendant’s evidence out, the motion to acquit was denied.  Had [defense counsel] timely renewed 
this motion it would have again been denied for the same 
reasons.
 
The standard the district court applies in considering a motion for 
judgment of acquittal is essentially the same test we apply in considering the 
sufficiency of the evidence.     

5While the double jeopardy clause bars 
re-trial after a reversal based upon the prosecution’s failure to produce 
sufficient evidence to prove its case, re-trial is not barred when the trial 
court concludes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.  Tibbs v. 
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 102 S. Ct. 2211, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982); U.S. v. Lossiah, 271 Fed. Appx. 
721, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6285 (10th Cir. 2008); Peak v. Acuna, 50 P.3d 833, 835 (Ariz. 
2002).  
6Beyond that, because we 
do not know what weight the jury assigned to any particular piece of evidence, 
we do not even know if the trial court judge is “weighing” any particular piece 
of evidence differently than did the jury.  
What is really happening is that the trial court judge is saying that, in 
looking at all the evidence, he or she does not agree with the jury’s 
verdict.  Stated differently, what 
the trial court judge is saying is that “this evidence was sufficient for you to 
convict, but you should not have convicted.”