Title: Hayes v. Henley

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/23/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2011
____________________
1100636
____________________
Reginald K. Hayes
v.
Jo Ann Henley, individually and as personal representative
of the estate of Earl Hoyt Henley
Appeal from Lowndes Circuit Court
(CV-10-39)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Reginald K. Hayes appeals from the dismissal by the
Lowndes Circuit Court of his action against Jo Ann Henley
("Henley"), both individually and in her capacity as the
1100636
2
personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband
Earl Hoyt Henley ("Hoyt"), for injuries Hayes sustained when
his automobile struck a horse on a highway.  We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.  
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On October 24, 2008, then 19-year-old Hayes was driving
his 1992 Mazda automobile on Alabama Highway 21 in Lowndes
County when his automobile struck a horse.  The horse rolled
onto the roof of the automobile and the roof collapsed,
breaking Hayes's neck and rendering him a quadriplegic.  
On October 20, 2010, Hayes filed in the Lowndes Circuit
Court 
a 
multicount 
complaint 
against 
Mazda 
and 
against 
Henley,
individually 
and 
in 
her 
capacity 
as 
the 
personal
representative of the estate of her husband Hoyt, who died
April 8, 2010 -- approximately a year and a half after the
accident.  Hayes alleged that the horse he struck belonged to
Hoyt and/or Henley and that Hoyt and/or Henley had allowed the
horse to roam onto Highway 21, thereby causing the accident.
As to Mazda, Hayes alleged that the automobile was defectively
designed and/or manufactured and that it was not crashworthy.
1100636
Hayes alleges that more than one horse was on Highway 21
1
at or about the time of the accident.
3
On December 2, 2010, Henley filed a motion to dismiss the
claims asserted against her as the personal representative of
Hoyt's estate, contending that Hayes had not alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
based on § 3-5-3, Ala. Code 1975.  On the same date, Henley
filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a
summary judgment as to the claims asserted against her in her
individual capacity.  Finally, Henley also filed an affidavit
in which she testified that she "did not personally,
individually or jointly own" any horses or pastures in Lowndes
County and that she "did not knowingly or willfully place any
livestock, including, but not limited to, horses on any
Alabama roadway and/or highway."   
1
Hayes filed oppositions to both motions.  Along with his
opposition to the motion to dismiss as to Henley individually,
Hayes's counsel filed a Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., affidavit
requesting a continuance in order to take Henley's deposition
concerning the issue of the ownership of the horse Hayes
struck with his automobile.
1100636
4
On February 2, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on
the two motions.  On February 7, 2011, the circuit court
entered two orders in which it granted Henley's motions and
dismissed the claims against Henley both in her individual
capacity and in her capacity as personal representative of
Hoyt's estate.  It does not appear that the circuit court
ruled upon Hayes's Rule 56(f) request for additional
discovery.
On the following day, February 8, 2011, Mazda filed,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a notice of removal of the
action to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama ("the federal district court").  Mazda
based the removal to federal court on diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
On March 1, 2011, Hayes filed a notice of appeal of the
circuit 
court's 
orders 
dismissing 
his 
claims 
against 
Henley 
in
her individual and representative capacities.  
On March 19, 2011, Hayes filed in the federal district
court a motion to remand the action to the Lowndes Circuit
Court.  Subsequently, Hayes and Mazda reached a settlement
concerning Hayes's claims against Mazda.  Accordingly, on
1100636
5
April 29, 2011, Hayes and Mazda filed a joint stipulation of
dismissal of the federal action with prejudice. On May 2,
2011, the federal district court entered an order dismissing
with prejudice the removed action and denying Hayes's motion
to remand the action to the circuit court as moot.  
II.  Analysis
We begin by noting that Henley has filed a motion to
dismiss Hayes's appeal in which she contends that this Court
lacks jurisdiction.  The premise for Henley's motion to
dismiss this appeal is, in essence, the notion that the claims
against Henley, though they had been dismissed by the Lowndes
Circuit Court before the removal of the action to the federal
district court, were somehow transferred with the action to
the federal district court when the notice of removal was
filed and that the federal court's eventual order dismissing
the action before it with prejudice put an end to the
litigation between Hayes and Henley.  We cannot accept the
notion, for which we can find no authority, that the federal
district court's eventual dismissal with prejudice of the
matter pending before it somehow served as a dismissal with
prejudice of Hayes's claims against Henley, a nondiverse
1100636
28 U.S.C. § 1332 states:  "(a) The district courts shall
2
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between –-
(1) citizens of different States."
6
defendant, claims that had been the subject of a dismissal
order entered by the circuit court before the removal of the
action to the federal district court -- an order without which
no removal could have occurred to begin with.  Acceptance of
Henley's view would require us to understand the federal
district court's order as assuming jurisdiction over Hayes's
claims against an Alabama citizen, Henley, and adjudicating
those claims on the merits, despite the fact that the presence
of those claims in the action removed to the federal court
would have defeated that court's diversity jurisdiction.   
2
Henley cites this Court's decision in Weinrib v. Duncan,
962 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. 2007), for the proposition that,
once a case is removed to federal court, a state trial court
is divested of jurisdiction.  Thus, reasons Henley, the claims
against Henley necessarily were removed to the federal
district court.  Weinrib, however, involved a question as to
whether a federal court's eventual dismissal of removed
federal claims, with respect to which it was exercising
1100636
As 
noted, in Weinrib, this Court stated that once removal
3
had occurred, the state trial court was divested of
"jurisdiction" over the underlying case; as authority the
Court cited the text of the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(d), which states that, after removal is effectuated,
the state court "shall proceed no further" unless and until
the case is remanded.  In Ex parte Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
707 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1997) (quoting Doerr v. Warner, 247
Minn. 98, 106, 76 N.W.2d 505, 512 (1956), adopted by this
Court in King v. Landrum, 370 So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1979)),
however, this Court stated:
 
"'It is well settled that jurisdiction once
7
federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
should be deemed an "automatic" remand of state-law claims
that did in fact travel with the removed federal claim to
federal court as statutorily permitted "supplemental" state-
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   That is not the
procedural posture of the case before us; unlike Weinrib, the
basis for removal jurisdiction in the present case is
diversity, and, in such a case, the federal court has no
"supplemental jurisdiction" over claims asserted against a
nondiverse defendant.  Moreover, unlike the claims asserted
against the nondiverse defendant in the present case, the
state-law claims at issue in Weinrib had not been dismissed by
the state court before the removal of the case to federal
court.   
3
1100636
acquired by a state court is continuous
though the case has been removed to the
United States District Court and later
remanded to the state court. The basic
correctness of this rule becomes at once
apparent if it is borne in mind that the
order removing an action to a Federal court
does not terminate the state court's
jurisdiction but merely stays or interrupts
proceedings 
in 
that 
court 
pending 
a
disposal of the action by the Federal
court.'"
The Court in Metropolitan Life also stated that, in adopting
the above-quoted language in King, the Court "implicitly
overruled an earlier line of cases holding that the proper
removal of an action from a state court to a federal court
immediately divests the state court of jurisdiction and
mak[es] the subsequent action by the state court coram non
judice."  Metropolitan Life, 707 So. 2d at 232. 
Because Weinrib is distinguishable from the present case
on the grounds explained in the text, it is not necessary for
purposes of resolving this case to consider further whether
our jurisdictional statement in Weinrib should be revisited.
Even if claims removed to a federal court are deemed to be
within the "jurisdiction" of that court to the exclusion of
the state court in which they originated, this principle could
have no application to the claims here, which, unlike those in
Weinrib, were dismissed by the state court prior to the
removal of the case and, furthermore, were claims against a
nondiverse defendant that, again unlike the claims in Weinrib,
could not be deemed to have been removed to the jurisdiction
of the federal court for adjudication on the merits without
defeating the jurisdiction of that court.
8
Although the federal district court here clearly could
not and did not consider the claims asserted against the
nondiverse defendant and dismissed by the Lowndes Circuit
1100636
9
Court to have been removed to it, a conclusion with which we
agree, a complete understanding of the nature and extent of
the case removed to and eventually dismissed with prejudice by
the federal district court and, as a corollary, this Court's
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
present 
appeal, 
requires 
some 
discussion
of the federal doctrine known as the "voluntary-involuntary
rule" pursuant to which it appears the federal district court
could have declined to exercise removal jurisdiction. 
"[T]he 
long-standing, 
judicially 
created
'voluntary-involuntary' rule ... is a rule developed
in diversity cases 'that if the resident defendant
was dismissed from the case by the voluntary act of
the plaintiff, the case became removable, but if the
dismissal was the result of either the defendant's
or the court's action against the wish of the
plaintiff, the case could not be removed.'  Weems v.
Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir.
1967), quoting Note, The Effect of Section 1446(b)
on the Non-Resident's Right to Remove, 115 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 264, 267 (1966)."
Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988)
(footnote omitted). 
 
"Behind the [voluntary-involuntary] rule is a notion
of finality that is essential to 'prevent removal to
a federal court when the nondiverse party was
eliminated by a state court order that might be
reversed on appeal.'  14 Wright, Miller & Cooper,
§ 3723.  See also Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380
F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967)."
1100636
The Insinga court also noted that "[w]hile the issue of
4
finality/appealability may be one concern underlying the
voluntary-involuntary rule, it is not the only one.  There
also appears to be a policy favoring a plaintiff's right,
absent fraudulent joinder, to determine the removability of
his case."  Insinga, 845 F.2d at 253.  See also Vogel v. Merck
& Co., 476 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (citing
several cases in support of the proposition that "[t]he
purpose of the [voluntary-involuntary] rule is to protect a
plaintiff's right to choose his or her forum").  
10
Barron v. Werner Enters., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219
(M.D. Ala. 2006).  
4
Federal 
courts 
have 
recognized 
that, 
without 
the
voluntary-involuntary rule, the circumstance that in fact
presents itself here -- a dismissed claim being subject to
reconsideration and appeal in a state court while the
remainder of the action is being litigated in federal court --
could occur.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the
former Fifth Circuit explained in Weems v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967):
"[The voluntary-involuntary rule] prevents removal
of those cases in which the issue of the resident
defendant's 
dismissal 
has 
not 
been 
finally
determined in the state courts.  This avoids the
duplication and expense which would result if a
resident defendant was dismissed on an appealable
ground, the nonresident was permitted to remove, and
the plaintiff then obtained a reversal of the
dismissal in the state appellate courts. On the
other hand, that danger does not arise where a
plaintiff voluntarily drops a resident defendant
1100636
11
since appeal then is not available, and the
elimination of the resident defendant from the case
is final."
(Emphasis added.)  As the federal court put it in Ennis v.
Queen Insurance Co. of America, 364 F. Supp. 964, 966 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973):
"The reason for the 'voluntary dismissal' rule is
based 
on 
judicial 
efficiency. 
The 
voluntary
dismissal of a resident defendant is not appealable.
Such a dismissal finally determines who are the
parties to the action in a state court proceeding
immediately prior to removal to a federal court. The
involuntary dismissal of a resident defendant,
however, 
is 
appealable. 
Thus, 
an 
involuntary
dismissal 
would 
involve 
the 
possibility 
of
duplication and expense of an appeal being heard in
state courts and the same proceeding being before
the federal courts at the same time, if such a case
could be removed to the federal courts."
(Emphasis added.)
In Barron v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the federal court
considered a case that, like this one, involved an effort to
remove an action to a federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction within a short time following the state trial
court's dismissal of claims against Alabama residents and
before the plaintiff had had an opportunity to ask the state
trial court to reconsider that dismissal.  The federal court
explained:
1100636
As one well known treatise has explained, the voluntary-
5
involuntary rule is based on a notion of finality that is
essential to "prevent[] removal to federal court when the non-
diverse party was eliminated by a state court order that might
be reversed on appeal," 14B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3723 (2009), obviously
referring to the possibility of a reversal on appeal in the
state-court system given that a federal court's assumption of
jurisdiction over a claim against a resident defendant would
defeat the diversity jurisdiction of that very court.  As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
observed in Insinga, 845 F.2d at 252-53:  "In most of the
instances in which the Supreme Court has employed the
voluntary-involuntary rule, it appears that the elimination of
the resident defendants was not final at the time the issue of
the propriety of removal was considered because the state
appellate process as to those defendants was not complete."
12
"[The nonresident defendant] cannot, with removal,
cut off [the Alabama plaintiff's] proper right to
ask the state trial court to reconsider ...
dismissal [of the Alabama defendants] and, failing
in that effort, to ask the state appellate courts,
including the Alabama Supreme Court, to review the
action 
of 
the 
trial 
court. 
In 
short, 
[the
nonresident defendant] cannot, by itself, foreclose
any state appellate review of the state trial
court's action."
462 F.  Supp.  2d at 1220 (emphasis added).5
Of course, it is not for this Court to determine whether
the federal district court should or should not have remanded
this case based on the voluntary-involuntary rule.  Our
discussion of that rule is merely for the purpose of
developing an understanding of the purpose and limitations of
the rule, and particularly the fact that the federal courts
1100636
Indeed, it would appear that the reason the federal
6
district court in fact saw no need to order a remand based on
the 
voluntary-involuntary 
rule 
but 
instead 
found 
it
appropriate to simply dismiss the action before it "with
prejudice" and 
simultaneously 
deny 
Hayes's 
motion to remand as
"moot" is that the settlement and dismissal of the claims
against Mazda happened so soon after removal (i.e., before the
federal district court had an opportunity to rule upon the
remand motion) and upon that dismissal the federal district
court did not consider there to be any other claims remaining
before it, thus making the motion for remand moot.  
13
that have developed and applied that rule understand it as a
rule that, if not applied, would lead to duplicative
litigation in federal courts in light of the fact that the
dismissed claims remain for reconsideration or appeal in the
state-court system.  The voluntary-involuntary rule was not
applied here, and, as a result, the claims against the
nondiverse defendant previously dismissed by the state court
did remain for reconsideration and appeal in the state-court
system.   We therefore proceed to consider the merits of
6
Hayes's appeal.  
The claims alleged by Hayes against Henley in this case
are subject to the restrictions imposed by Ala. Code 1975,
§ 3-5-3(a), which states:
"(a) The owner of such livestock or animal being
or running at large upon the premises of another or
upon the public lands, roads, highways or streets in
the State of Alabama shall be liable for all damages
1100636
14
done to crops, shade or fruit trees or ornamental
shrubs and flowers of any person, to be recovered
before 
any 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction;
provided, that the owner of any stock or animal
shall not be liable for any damages to any motor
vehicle or any occupant thereof suffered, caused by
or resulting from a collision with such stock or
other animal, unless it be proven that such owner
knowingly or wilfully put or placed such stock upon
such public highway, road or street where such
damages were occasioned."
(Emphasis added.)  "The duty to fence livestock does not
subject the owner to liability for damages or injuries to
occupants of motor vehicles resulting from collisions of the
vehicle with the livestock unless the owner knowingly or
wilfully puts the livestock on the road."  Carpenter v.
McDonald, 495 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1986).
"Our cases have consistently held that there is
no 
cause 
of 
action 
under 
§ 
3-5-3 
for 
a
plaintiff-motorist who is injured because his car
collided with livestock which had strayed onto a
highway through the negligence, gross negligence or
recklessness of its owner.  In Randle v. Payne, 39
Ala. App. 652, 107 So. 2d 907 (1958), where a bull
owner was being sued under Code 1940, Tit. 3, § 79,
(the predecessor of § 3-5-3) by the driver of a
truck that collided with the bull on Highway 11, the
Court of Appeals held:  'There must be proof to the
effect that the owner of the stock knowingly or
wilfully placed the stock upon the public highway.'
Randle, supra, 39 Ala. App. at 656, 107 So. 2d at
910.  In McGough v. Wilson, 273 Ala. 179, 137 So. 2d
43 
(1962), 
which 
case 
likewise 
involved 
the
collision of a motor vehicle and a bull on a public
highway, this court took note of the Randle decision
1100636
15
and stated:  '[I]ts majority opinion held, in
effect, that an owner of livestock is not liable in
damages to a motorist involved in a collision with
his livestock for negligence in permitting the stock
to be on the highway in view of the statute.'
McGough, supra, 273 Ala. at 182, 137 So. 2d at 45.
In McGough this court added:
"'Knowingly and willfully doing an act is
different from inadvertently doing the same
act, or permitting it to be done through
inadvertence or negligence.'
"McGough, supra, 273 Ala. at 183, 137 So. 2d at 46
(emphasis supplied).
"In reference to the two cases referred to
above, the Court of Civil Appeals in Carter v.
Alman, 46 Ala. App. 633, 247 So. 2d 676 (1971), a
factually similar case, stated:
"'These cases plainly state that for
recovery, a motorist must submit proof that
the owner of the feasant beast placed or
put it upon the highway with a "designed
set purpose, intention, or deliberation."
Evidence 
of 
negligence 
or 
gross
carelessness is not enough. There was no
evidence introduced by appellant in the
trial below with the slightest tendency to
indicate acts of such nature by appellee.'
"Carter v. Alman, 46 Ala. App. at 635, 247 So. 2d at
677 (emphasis supplied)."
Ex parte Jackson, 378 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Ala. 1979).
Hayes's complaint does not assert liability against
Henley in her individual capacity other than as an alleged
owner of the horse Hayes struck with his vehicle.  As noted,
1100636
16
Henley submitted an affidavit in which she testified that, at
the 
time 
of 
the 
accident, 
she 
"did 
not 
personally,
individually or jointly own" any horses or pastures in Lowndes
County.  Henley also averred that she "did not knowingly or
willfully place any livestock, including, but not limited to,
horses on any Alabama roadway and/or highway."  Rule 12(b),
Ala.  R.  Civ.  P., states:
"If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated
as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56 ...."
The record before us contains no evidence contradicting
the above-quoted averments in Henley's affidavit, and there is
no indication that the circuit court excluded these averments.
Nor does Hayes's brief to this Court make a cognizable
argument that the circuit court erred in ruling upon Henley's
motion without first allowing Hayes some further opportunity
to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f).  Accordingly, the
the circuit court's order disposing of Hayes's claims against
Henley in her individual capacity is due to be affirmed.  
1100636
17
We cannot reach the same conclusion, however, as to the
circuit court's disposition of all Hayes's claims against
Henley in her capacity as personal representative of Hoyt's
estate.  Unlike the evidence as to Henley, there is no
evidence in the record indicating that Hoyt was not the owner
of the horse in question, nor was there any evidence before
the circuit court as to the state of his knowledge regarding
the presence of the horses on the highway before the accident.
Thus, we must evaluate whether the circuit court, without the
aid of any "matter outside the pleading," correctly disposed
of the claims against Henley in her representative capacity,
i.e., 
whether 
the 
allegations 
of 
the 
complaint 
were
insufficient to state a claim under Alabama law.  See
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
The claim made in the complaint against Henley in her
representative capacity is based on the allegation that either
she, personally, or Hoyt was the owner of the horses at the
time of the accident.  In count V of the complaint, Hayes
specifically alleges that the owner of the horses "knowingly
and/or wilfully put or placed the horses on Highway 21 in
Lowndes County, Alabama."  This allegation comports with the
1100636
18
requirements of § 3-5-3(a), Ala. Code 1975.  "Under Rule 8,
Ala. R. Civ. P., a complaint is sufficient if it puts the
defendant on notice of the claims against him."  Bethel v.
Thorn, 757 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (Ala. 1999).  Moreover, "'"a
dismissal for failure to state a claim is properly granted
only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts entitling him to relief."'"  Boswell v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 643 So. 2d 580, 581 (Ala. 1994)
(quoting Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254, 255 (Ala. 1991),
quoting in turn Greene County Bd. of Educ. v. Bailey, 586
So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 1991)).  Given Hayes's allegations, it
is possible that he could prove a set of facts under which
Hoyt's estate is liable for Hayes's injuries.  Accordingly,
the 
dismissal 
of 
the 
claim 
against 
Henley 
in 
her
representative capacity for failure to state a claim was
error insofar as it concerned the allegations in count V of a
knowing and willful placement of the horses upon the highway.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's
order as to Hayes's allegation that Hoyt, as the owner of the
horses, knowingly and willfully placed them upon the highway.
In all other respects, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
1100636
19
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Bolin, and Main, JJ., concur.