Title: Ex parte Angela McClintock et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: December 1, 2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
_________________________
1160782
_________________________
Ex parte Angela McClintock et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  K.H., as parent and next friend of
T.H., a minor; and
T.H., as parent and next friend of
K.W., a deceased minor
v.
Angela McClintock et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-14-900844)
WISE, Justice.
1160782
Angela McClintock, Stephanie Streeter, and Christa
Devaughn (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
petitioners"), all of whom are employees of the Jefferson
County Department of Human Resources ("JCDHR") and defendants
below, petitioned for a writ of mandamus requesting that this
Court direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary
judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 30, 2011, T.H. was charged with third-degree
domestic violence when S.W., T.H.'s mother, filed charges
against her for striking a sibling in the face.  On December
21, 2011, T.H. gave birth to K.W.  On December 23, 2011, while
T.H. was still in the hospital, T.H.'s grandmother reported to
JCDHR that she had concerns that T.H. would not be able to
care for her new baby, that T.H. had left her father's home,
and that T.H. had a history of running away.  After conducting
an investigation, JCDHR allowed T.H. to be discharged from the
hospital to the home of K.M., T.H.'s second cousin.  
On December 27, 2011, a social worker with JCDHR
contacted K.M. to schedule a home visit.  At that time, K.M.
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advised the social worker that T.H. had left with K.W. shortly
after arriving at her house.  She also indicated that she
thought that T.H. and K.W. were living with K.W.'s father.
On December 29, 2011, K.H., T.H.'s father, filed a
dependency complaint, seeking custody of K.W.  In his
complaint, he alleged:
"[T.H.] is a 15-year old who think[s] she is grown,
she do[es] not want to follow rules.  She is real
disrespectful, t[o]ward me, and she do[es] not want
to do anything I say.  She is so out of control, and
says I, can't tell her what to do, because she [is]
grown; so that's why I need legal help, before she
get[s] hurt or hurt[s] her baby.  Also mother 15
gave birth to a baby boy on 12-21-2011 and ran away
and left baby unattendent [sic]."
On January 4, 2012, K.H. filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, stating that he had "found [T.H.] and her infant
baby boy and now have them in my care, and if for any reason
she run[s] away, I am to contact Det. Thomas."  
On January 20, 2012, Devaughn filed a dependency
complaint as to T.H. and a request for a pickup order for K.W. 
She alleged that T.H., who was a minor, was not living with
her custodian, K.H.; that K.H. was being investigated for
abandonment; that T.H. had a history of running away; and that
T.H. had not shown that she could responsibly care for K.W. 
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K.W. was picked up and placed in the foster home of Dennis
Gilmer on that same date.  
K.W. died on February 24, 2012, while in foster care.  At
the time of K.W.'s death, McClintock was the director of
JCDHR; Streeter was an assistant director of child welfare for
JCDHR; 
and 
Devaughn 
was 
a 
child-abuse 
and 
neglect
investigative worker for JCDHR.  
On February 21, 2014, K.H. and T.H. filed a complaint in
the Jefferson Circuit Court against the petitioners, Brandon
Hardin, Dennis Gilmer, and JCDHR.1  They stated claims of
wrongful death of a minor, negligence, wantonness, and
negligent/wanton training and supervision.  K.H. and T.H.
alleged 
that 
the 
petitioners had 
negligently, wantonly, 
and/or
recklessly removed K.W. from T.H.'s custody; that they had
negligently, wantonly, and/or recklessly placed him in
Gilmer's care; and that they had 
negligently, wantonly, and/or
recklessly failed to properly train, instruct, and supervise
Gilmer.  They also alleged that Gilmer had negligently,
wantonly, or recklessly allowed K.W. to be placed face-down on
1It appears that the claims against Hardin, Gilmer, and
JCDHR were dismissed.
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a sheet that was allegedly too large for the mattress in his
crib and that, as a result, K.W. had suffered fatal injuries. 
On August 29, 2016, the petitioners filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  They argued that they were entitled to
immunity on several bases, including an assertion that they
were entitled to State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  On March 9, 2017, K.H.
and T.H. filed a motion in opposition to the petitioners'
motion.  
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion for a
summary judgment.2  On February 20, 2017, it denied the
motion.  This petition followed. 
Standard of Review
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion for summary
judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000).  A writ
of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when there is:  '(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' 
2No party has provided a transcript of the hearing for
this Court's review.  
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Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)."
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003).  Also,
"whether review of the denial of a summary-judgment
motion is by a petition for a writ of mandamus or by
permissive appeal, the appellate court's standard of
review remains the same.  If there is a genuine
issue as to any material fact on the question
whether the movant is entitled to immunity, then the
moving party is not entitled to a summary judgment. 
Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In determining whether
there is a material fact on the question whether the
movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial
and appellate, must view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the
nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences
from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, considering only the
evidence before the trial court at the time it
denied the motion for a summary judgment.  Ex parte
Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)."
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).
Discussion
The petitioners argue that the trial court erroneously
denied their motion for a summary judgment.  Specifically,
they contend that they presented evidence indicating that they
were "discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by
statute, rule, or regulation" at the time of the actions
challenged in this case.  The petitioners also assert that
K.H. and T.H. failed to satisfy their burden of establishing
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that one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity applies to
this case.  Therefore, the petitioners argue, they are
entitled to State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex 
parte Cranman,
supra.
In Ex parte Cranman, the rule governing State-agent
immunity was restated as follows:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil liability
in his or her personal capacity when the conduct
made the basis of the claim against the agent is
based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in
the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"(a) making administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) 
hiring, 
firing,
transferring, 
assigning, 
or
supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
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"(4) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) 
exercising 
judgment 
in 
the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; 
or
"(2) 
when 
the 
State 
agent 
acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law."
792 So. 2d at 405.  Even though Cranman was a plurality
decision, its restatement of the law as to State-agent
immunity was later adopted by this Court in Ex parte Butts,
775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).  "Once it is determined that
State-agent 
immunity 
applies, 
State-agent 
immunity 
is 
withheld
upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully,
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maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her
authority.  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405."  Ex parte Bitel, 45
So. 3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala. 2010).  Also, 
"[t]his 
Court 
has 
established 
a
'burden-shifting' process when a party raises the
defense of State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v.
Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In
order to claim State-agent immunity, a State agent
bears 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
the
plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would
entitle the State agent to immunity.  Giambrone, 874
So. 2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709
(Ala. 2002).  If the State agent makes such a
showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
show 
that 
the 
State 
agent 
acted 
willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond
his or her authority.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at
1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721
So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  'A State agent acts
beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he
or she "fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to
detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated
on a checklist."'  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052
(quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala.
2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). 
"One of the ways in which a plaintiff can show that
a State agent acted beyond his or her authority is
by proffering evidence that the State agent failed
'"to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or
regulations, such as those stated on a checklist."' 
Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d [173,] 178
[(Ala. 2000)])."
Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 3d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 2008).
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The petitioners assert that they are entitled to State-
agent immunity based on category (3) in Cranman --
"discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by
statute, rule, or regulation," 792 So. 2d at 405.  K.H. and
T.H. do not refute this assertion in their response to this
Court.  We agree with the petitioners and hold that they
satisfied their burden of establishing that they were entitled
to State-agent immunity based on Ex parte Cranman.
Because the petitioners established that they were
entitled to State-agent immunity, the burden then shifted to
K.H. and T.H. to establish that "'one of the two categories of
exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is
applicable.'"  Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 293
(Ala. 2012)(quoting Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d at 1282). 
After the petitioners presented evidence showing that they
would be entitled to State-agent immunity, K.H. and T.H.
argued that the petitioners "acted beyond their authority and
failed to discharge their duties pursuant to the mandatory
rules and regulations of the Alabama Department of Human
Resources which did not leave room for them to exercise any
discretionary or professional judgment regarding the removal
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and placement of [K.W.]."  Specifically, they contended that
the petitioners violated the allegedly mandatory relative-
placement policy of the Alabama Department of Human Resources
("DHR") and failed to ensure that Gilmer complied with the
requirements set forth in DHR's "Minimum Standards for Foster
Family Homes."  
With regard to the relative-placement policy, K.H. and
T.H. cited DHR's "Out-of-Home Care Policies and Procedures"
guidelines for choosing the least restrictive setting for the
placement of children.  The portion of the guidelines upon
which K.H. and T.H. rely states, in relevant part:
"When out-of-home care becomes necessary,
children should be placed in the least restrictive
setting.  This means the most family-like setting
that can provide the environment and services needed
to serve the child's best interest and special
needs.  Relative placement should always be given
first consideration after which foster family care,
group home care, and institutional care, are to be
considered in that order."  
Although they cited the guidelines regarding relative
placements and made general allegations that the petitioners
failed to consider T.H.'s grandmother, G.C., and her father,
K.H., as relative placements for K.W., K.H. and T.H. did not
present any actual evidence to support those allegations.
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Also, with regard to the foster-family-home policies,
K.H. and T.H. cited to DHR's "Minimum Standards for Foster
Family Homes" guidelines for physical care of children.  The
portions of the guidelines upon which they rely state:
"If infants will be placed in the home, the
additional guidelines must be followed:
"(1) Clean, tight fitting crib sheets shall
be provided as frequently as needed.
"(2) An infant shall sleep alone in a crib
until age 18 months.  It is strongly
recommended the infant be placed on his or
her side or back or as recommended by a
pediatrician."
K.H. and T.H. asserted:
"Viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to [K.H. and T.H.], a trier-of-fact could reasonably
conclude that Defendants McClintock, Streeter and
Devaughn allowed [K.W.] to be placed into a foster
home without first properly training, instructing or
supervising their staff and/or the foster care
providers on the Minimum Standards for Foster Family
Homes, which resulted in [K.W.] being placed
face-down on a sheet too large for his crib's
mattress, 
thereby 
posing 
the 
potential 
for
suffocation."
Again, although they cited the guidelines for care of children
by foster families and made general allegations about the
petitioners' actions and/or inactions, K.H. and T.H. did not
present any evidence to support those allegations.  
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K.H. and T.H. did not present any evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the petitioners "'failed "'to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as
those stated on a checklist,'"'" Ex parte City of Montgomery,
99 So. 3d at 294 (quoting other cases), or acted willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. 
Because K.H. and T.H. did not demonstrate that one of the
exceptions to State-agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman
applies under the facts of this case, the petitioners are
entitled to State-agent immunity.  See Ex parte Jefferson Cty.
Dep't of Human Res., 63 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. 2010). 
Conclusion
 
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the
petitioners have established that they have a clear legal
right to a summary judgment in their favor based on State-
agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman.  Accordingly, we grant
the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court
to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion for a
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summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment for the
petitioners.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Main, Bryan, and Sellers, JJ., 
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Parker and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
The third category of Cranman immunity applies to the
discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation,
but only "insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation
prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State
agent performs the duties in that manner."  Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000).  By its terms, this condition
does not appear to be applicable in this case.  I do believe,
however, that the actions for which the petitioners are
allegedly liable involve the exercise by those individual
petitioners of discretion in a quintessentially State
function.  I therefore concur in the result.
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).  
The decision in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405
(Ala. 2000), provides that State agents are immune from civil
liability when the conduct made the basis of the claim against
them is based upon the agents' "discharging duties imposed on
a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation,
insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs
the duties in that manner."  (Emphasis added.)  Although the
petition for the writ of mandamus indicates that the State
agents in this case were exercising discretion or judgment and
that they were discharging duties imposed by statutes, rules,
or regulations, the petition does not convince me that those
statutes, rules, or regulations prescribed "the manner for
performing" those duties and that the petitioners were
discharging those duties "in that manner."  The petition does
not demonstrate that the burden shifted to K.H. and T.H. to
show that an exception to Ex parte Cranman applies; therefore,
I respectfully dissent.  
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