Title: Doss v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Doss v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5678.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5678 
DOSS, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Doss v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5678.] 
(No. 2012-0162—Submitted September 26, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. One who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under R.C. 
2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a 
preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state 
for wrongful imprisonment. 
2. A trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to   R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) 
may not find that the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned based solely on 
an appellate court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to 
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insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a 
new trial. 
______________________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not  entitled to summary 
judgment that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” eligible to sue the state 
for compensation pursuant to R.C. 2743.48  based solely on the appellate court’s 
decision to reverse and vacate his conviction and order his immediate release 
from prison. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of 
rape and one count of kidnapping.  He was classified as a sexually oriented 
offender, sentenced to four years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and a 
fine. 
{¶ 3} On appeal, Doss challenged his rape and kidnapping convictions on 
several grounds, including a challenge to the evidence that the alleged victim’s 
ability to consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical condition 
and that Doss knew of that substantial impairment.  The Eighth District, in a two-
to-one decision, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the other party’s capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss 
knew (or had reason to know) of the substantial impairment.  State v. Doss, 8th 
Dist. No. 88443, 2007-Ohio-6483 (“Doss I”). 
{¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and 
the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449 (“Doss 
II”).  The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence 
showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim’s ability to 
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consent was substantially impaired.  Id. at ¶21-23.  The court vacated the 
convictions and ordered Doss discharged from prison. 
{¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we 
declined review.  State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 
N.E.2d 1025.  After his release, Doss filed an action for  declaratory judgment 
pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 
seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment.  On July 2, 
2010, he filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the decision in Doss II.  
The motion, which contained no attachments or exhibits, was two and a half 
pages long and cited only the appellate judgment in Doss II as a basis for finding 
eligibility.  The state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the 
transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were issues of fact and 
arguing that Doss had failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
{¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss’s motion for summary judgment for the 
following reason:  “The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff 
Doss’s conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to 
mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was 
convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.” 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet 
another two-to-one decision.  Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429 
(“Doss III”). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had 
revealed that Doss’s statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim’s 
mental condition and that the state had presented no evidence that Doss knew, or 
should have known, that the alleged victim’s ability to resist or consent was 
substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication.  Id. at ¶ 15. The court of 
appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court’s entry of 
summary judgment. 
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{¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated, 
 
Our holding in [Doss II] does not mean that Doss is innocent – 
merely that, based upon the evidence the state presented, Doss’s 
guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably 
should not have known of the victim’s incapacity. 
 
Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state’s propositions of law:  
(1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant 
summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court 
finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and 
(2) “Under R.C. 2743.48 an inmate must prove actual innocence by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which is a separate and distinct legal standard 
than whether [sic] the evidence in a criminal case is sufficient to convict a person 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See Doss v. State, 131 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2012-Ohio-
1501, 964 N.E.2d 439. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 10} The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to 
compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned.  The first step is an 
action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of 
wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to 
recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-
4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The wrongful-
imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was added to the Revised Code in 1986 by 
Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil actions against the state, for specified 
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monetary amounts, in the Court of Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned 
individuals.”  141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351.  The statute was designed to replace 
the former practice of compensating those wrongfully imprisoned by ad hoc 
moral-claims legislation.  Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 
(1989).  Under the statutory scheme, a claimant must be determined to be a 
“wrongfully imprisoned individual” by the court of common pleas before being 
permitted to file for compensation against the state of Ohio in the Court of 
Claims. R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48(B)(2); Griffith v. Cleveland, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
The Wrongful-Imprisonment Statute 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2743.48 provides: 
 
(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the 
Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an 
individual who satisfies each of the following: 
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section 
of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the 
violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony. 
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead 
guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser included offense by the 
court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was 
found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony. 
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite 
term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the 
offense of which the individual was found guilty. 
(4) The individual's conviction was vacated, dismissed, or 
reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or 
will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and 
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no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be 
brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village 
solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation 
against the individual for any act associated with that conviction. 
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual's 
release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the 
county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the 
charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was 
not committed by the individual or was not committed by any 
person. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} Thus, a plaintiff in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must 
first prove that he or she is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual.” In this case, 
proof of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (4) is undisputed.  Doss was 
convicted of a felony to which he did not plead guilty, he was sentenced to a 
prison term, his conviction was vacated upon appeal, and he is not subject to 
further charges.  The fifth factor of  R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of 
two ways: (1)  subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment,  “an error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release” or (2) 
the charged offense (and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the 
individual or no crime was committed at all (actual innocence).  R.C. 
2743.48(A)(5). 
{¶ 13} This court’s decision in Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 
N.E.2d 962, precludes a claimant from relying solely on a judgment of acquittal to 
establish actual innocence.  In Walden, the state appealed determinations of 
wrongful imprisonment for two individuals.  One of them, Linda Walden, had 
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been acquitted of murder.  When she sought a determination that she had been 
wrongfully imprisoned, the trial court granted summary judgment in her favor, 
reasoning that the judgment of acquittal precluded the state from contesting her 
innocence.  The state’s appeal was consolidated with its appeal in the case of 
Nathaniel Ellis.  Ellis had been convicted of felonious assault, but the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.  On retrial, Ellis was acquitted by 
a general verdict, after which he sought a determination that he was a wrongfully 
imprisoned individual.  The trial court held that Ellis was entitled to 
compensation.  In nearly identical opinions released on the same day, the court of 
appeals held that the two defendants were entitled to compensation for wrongful 
imprisonment. 
{¶ 14} In construing a former version of R.C. 2743.48(A), we held that 
when a person claiming compensation for wrongful imprisonment has obtained a 
judgment of acquittal, that judgment is not to be given preclusive effect, because 
an acquittal is a determination that the state has not met its burden of proof.  It is 
not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent. For this reason, a claimant 
advancing a wrongful-imprisonment claim “must affirmatively prove her 
innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 52. We explained that in 
enacting the statute,   the “General Assembly intended that the court of common 
pleas actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who 
have merely avoided criminal liability.”  Id.  Even though the statute examined in 
Walden was an earlier version of  R.C. 2743.48, the Walden holding is still 
applicable. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 
1157, ¶ 30.  R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) requires an affirmative showing of innocence 
beyond proof of an  acquittal. 
{¶ 15} When a court vacates or reverses a criminal conviction based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, the court is saying that the state has not proven the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not saying that innocence 
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has been proven.  Thus, reversal on insufficiency of the evidence does not 
automatically mean that the defendant was wrongfully imprisoned.  Chandler v. 
State, 95 Ohio App.3d 142, 641 N.E.2d 1382 (8th Dist.1994).  If the legislature 
had intended to compensate all persons whose convictions are reversed based on 
insufficient evidence, it could have explicitly stated this in R.C. 2743.48.  See 
Ratcliff v. State, 94 Ohio App.3d 179, 182, 640 N.E.2d 560 (4th Dist.1994). 
{¶ 16} In this case, Doss argues that the vacation of his convictions and 
discharge from prison are proof of his actual innocence.  In contrast, the state 
asserts that R.C. 2743.48 establishes a civil rather than a criminal action and that 
in contrast with the burden of proof in a criminal trial, the wrongful-imprisonment 
statute places the burden of proof on the defendant to affirmatively show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she was actually innocent of the charged 
offense, including all lesser included offenses.  A judgment of acquittal is not 
enough.  The state contends that in support of his action for declaratory judgment, 
Doss did not provide the trial court with any additional evidence to prove that the 
other party consented, or that he did not know and could not reasonably have 
known of any impairment of her ability to consent, or any other proof of his actual 
innocence of the charge of rape and all lesser included offenses.  The trial and 
appellate courts, therefore, granted Doss a preliminary determination of eligibility 
for compensation without the required affirmative proof of his actual innocence. 
{¶ 17} The differing burdens of proof explain why a vacation of Doss’s 
conviction does not prove his innocence.  The appellate court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the state failed to 
prove Doss’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  But that ruling does not answer 
the question whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
did not know, or could not reasonably have known, of the alleged victim’s 
incapacity.  See Ratcliff v. State at 182 (evidence insufficient to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily prove innocence by a 
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preponderance of the evidence).  Preponderance of the evidence is a distinct legal 
standard from beyond a reasonable doubt.  By not requiring more of Doss, the 
lower courts contravened the mandate of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by dispensing with 
the additional requirement of affirmative proof that the criminal action was not 
committed by him or by any person.  Even though Doss’s successful appeal may 
have provided some support for his claim of wrongful imprisonment, it is not 
enough.  He carried the burden of proof to affirmatively establish his innocence 
under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5).  State ex rel. Tubbs-Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 
72, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). 
Proof Offered to Support Summary Judgment  
{¶ 18} To analyze whether Doss affirmatively established his innocence 
by a preponderance of the evidence, we must examine the evidence that he 
submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment.  To prevail on the 
motion, he must have demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that reasonable 
minds, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
can come to only one conclusion, which is  adverse to the nonmoving party.  
Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 
481, ¶ 29.  Appellate review is de novo.  Id. 
{¶ 19} The record shows that Doss filed his motion for summary judgment 
relying solely on the Eighth District’s decision in Doss II.  And the trial court 
granted summary judgment on that basis alone.  Specifically, the trial court stated: 
 
“The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff  
Doss’s conviction and order his immediate release can only be 
interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the 
charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was 
committed by plaintiff  Doss, or both.” 
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(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} This conclusion was incorrect. The trial court relied solely on the 
court of appeals’ reversal and vacation of the conviction to hold that Doss was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  It did not require a hearing or additional 
evidence.  It simply cited the court of appeals’ holding that the state had not 
offered sufficient evidence to prove Doss’s convictions.  And in affirming the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment, the Eighth District correctly acknowledged 
Walden’s rule that an acquittal does not necessarily establish actual innocence, but 
then applied the rule incorrectly.  Despite the jury’s verdict of guilt and without 
any evidence from Doss, the majority held that the record showed insufficient 
evidence of the alleged victim’s substantial impairment.  Thus, the judgment of 
the trial court that found Doss to be eligible for compensation and the appellate 
court’s judgment affirming that finding were not based upon an affirmative 
showing of actual innocence.  They were based on a dearth of evidence of guilt.  
Both courts relieved Doss of his statutory obligation to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he did not commit the charged offense, including all lesser 
included offenses, an obligation that must be fulfilled before he is allowed to 
claim the status of one who was “wrongfully imprisoned.” 
{¶ 21} To show actual innocence under the wrongful-imprisonment 
statute, Doss must prove that “the charged offense, including all lesser-included 
offenses, either was not committed by [him] or was not committed by any 
person." R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). This court has emphasized that this standard is not 
satisfied by an acquittal or a finding of legal insufficiency of the evidence.  
Walden, 47 Ohio St.3d at 52, 547 N.E.2d 962.  The General Assembly requires a 
showing of innocence to be made affirmatively and adjudicated de novo before a 
claimant can be found to be eligible for compensation in a wrongful-
imprisonment action. 
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III. Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Not every person who is released from prison because of a 
successful appeal is entitled to compensation.  The legislature set forth a 
procedure for claimants like Doss to follow in R.C. 2743.48, so that the common 
pleas court could actively separate demonstrably innocent persons who have been 
wrongfully imprisoned from persons who have merely avoided criminal liability. 
We hold that one who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under 
R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance 
of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful 
imprisonment. We also hold that a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence 
pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully 
imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony 
conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a 
remand for a new trial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________________ 
 
Mancino, Mancino & Mancino and Paul Mancino Jr., for appellee. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitor; and William D. Mason, 
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
___________________________