Title: Commonwealth v. Camblin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11774 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KIRK P. CAMBLIN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 5, 2015. - June 12, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Evidence, 
Breathalyzer test, Scientific test. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Ayer Division of the 
District Court Department on April 28, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to exclude evidence as scientifically 
unreliable was considered by Mark A. Sullivan, J., and a motion 
for reconsideration was considered by him; and the case was 
tried before Peter J. Kilmartin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John Fennel for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Evan M. Levow, of New Jersey, & Gregory D. Oberhauser, for 
DUI Defense Lawyers Association, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In 2013, the defendant, Kirk P. Camblin, was 
convicted in the District Court of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of liquor (OUI) on theories that 
alcohol affected his ability to drive safely and that he 
operated the vehicle with a blood alcohol percentage of 0.08 or 
greater.1  Before trial, he, along with sixty-one other 
defendants in other OUI cases pending in the District Court, 
moved to exclude admission of breath test evidence derived from 
the use of a particular model of breathalyzer, the Alcotest 7110 
MK III-C (Alcotest), on the basis that errors in the Alcotest's 
source code as well as other deficiencies rendered the breath 
test results produced by the Alcotest unreliable.  The judge 
specially assigned to these cases denied the motion without a 
hearing, evidentiary or otherwise.  We conclude that because 
breath test evidence, at its core, is scientific evidence, the 
reliability of the Alcotest breath test result had to be 
established before evidence of it could be admitted, 
see Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994), and, in 
this case, a hearing on and substantive consideration of the 
defendant's challenges to that reliability were required.  
Because no such hearing was held and the Alcotest breath test 
result of 0.16 was before the jury as evidence, we vacate the 
 
1 The defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), second 
or subsequent offense. 
                     
3 
 
judge's order denying the motion to exclude the breathalyzer 
evidence, remand the case to the District Court for a hearing on 
that motion, and retain jurisdiction of the case.2 
 
Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury could have found 
them at trial.  At approximately 3 A.M. on April 27, 2008, State 
police Trooper Mark Roy was driving on Route 495 southbound when 
he saw an automobile parked off the highway's breakdown lane.  
The defendant was standing outside the automobile and urinating.  
Roy stopped his cruiser behind the vehicle and approached the 
defendant.  Once Roy was within five feet of him, Roy smelled an 
odor of alcohol.  Roy then asked the defendant a series of 
questions; in response, the defendant stated that he was on his 
way home to Melrose from a bar in Worcester, and that he had 
drunk four or five beers at the bar.  The defendant's speech was 
slurred.  In response to Roy's repeated requests for his 
registration, the defendant handed Roy two stacks of papers from 
his glove compartment without attempting to find the 
registration within the stacks.  Roy smelled alcohol each time 
the defendant moved his body to reach into the glove 
compartment.  Ultimately, Roy found the defendant's registration 
in the stacks of papers. 
 
2 No hearing, evidentiary or otherwise, was held on the 
motion to exclude the breathalyzer evidence.  Our review of the 
record on appeal suggests that an evidentiary hearing was likely 
necessary, but we leave this issue to be determined on remand. 
                     
4 
 
 
Roy then asked the defendant to perform three field 
sobriety tests.  The defendant performed each test poorly and, 
based on the these tests as well as the entirety of Roy's 
investigation of the defendant, Roy transported the defendant to 
the State police barracks in Leominster, where the defendant 
signed a consent form by which he agreed to submit to a breath 
test.  Roy, who was certified to administer the breath test, 
instructed the defendant regarding how to perform the test and, 
after multiple unsuccessful attempts to give a breath sample, 
the defendant eventually breathed a sufficient sample into the 
breathalyzer that indicated his blood alcohol content (BAC)3 was 
0.16.4 
 
The State police used an Alcotest 7110 MK III-C 
breathalyzer, manufactured by Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. 
(Draeger), to administer the breath test to the defendant.5  In 
February, 2008, approximately two months prior to the day of the 
 
3 Breath alcohol concentration is used to measure blood 
alcohol content (BAC) based on "Henry's Law," which is a 
principle stating that, at equilibrium, the concentration of 
alcohol in an individual's blood is directly proportional to the 
concentration of alcohol in the individual's breath.  See 
Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 350 (1987). 
 
 
4 State police Trooper Mark Roy testified at trial that 
there was no indication the breathalyzer machine was not working 
properly as he prepared the machine to administer the breath 
test to the defendant. 
 
 
5 By the time of trial in 2013, the State police had 
discontinued use of the Alcotest 7110 MK III-C (Alcotest) 
breathalyzer. 
                     
5 
 
defendant's arrest, the Commonwealth's office of alcohol testing 
(OAT) had certified the specific Alcotest machine used to 
administer the breath test to the defendant, and nine days 
before the defendant's breath test the State police trooper in 
charge of the machine had conducted a periodic test of the 
Alcotest machine that indicated it was producing accurate 
measurements.  Furthermore, the Alcotest machine itself 
conducted an "air blank test" to air out the machine prior to 
and in between each of the defendant's attempts to provide a 
breath sample; these tests measured no alcohol content, as 
expected.  The Alcotest also by itself ran a calibration test 
during the defendant's breath test.  The test uses a solution 
with known alcohol content, and for a valid test result, the 
Alcotest was required to produce a reading between 0.14 and 
0.16; the Alcotest's calibration reading of 0.15 fell within 
these parameters.6 
 
Procedural background.  On April 28, 2008, a complaint 
issued from the Ayer Division of the District Court Department 
(Ayer District Court) charging the defendant with operating a 
 
6 The defendant's sole challenge on appeal is to the 
accuracy and reliability of the Alcotest's breath test result in 
his case.  The defendant challenged the Alcotest's reliability 
in a pretrial motion in limine, but did not raise any specific 
issue about the reliability of the test at trial.  He did, 
however, object to the admission of his breath test result and 
admission of a record of the periodic test of the Alcotest 
conducted days prior to his breath test. 
 
                     
6 
 
motor vehicle with a percentage, by weight, of alcohol in his 
blood of 0.08 or greater, or while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, second offense, in violation of G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  In August, 2008, a judge in the 
District Court allowed the defendant's motion for discovery from 
the Commonwealth of the Alcotest's source code7 and his motion 
for leave to issue a subpoena for the same. 
 
After proceedings before a single justice of this court in 
a related case, Draeger disclosed the Alcotest's source code 
subject to a nondisclosure agreement.  Since then, two experts 
retained by the defendant received and examined the Alcotest's 
source code. 
 
In March, 2010, the Chief Justice of the District Court 
specially assigned to a judge of that court the defendant's case 
along with sixty-one other cases in which defendants charged 
with OUI challenged the reliability of the Alcotest's source 
code.  Pursuant to her authority under G. L. c. 218, § 43A, the 
Chief Justice authorized the specially assigned judge "to 
conduct hearings or other proceedings arising in these cases," 
including hearings pertaining generally to the reliability of 
the Alcotest. 
 
7 The source code is the code written to control the 
functioning of computer software. 
                     
7 
 
 
In June, 2010, the defendants in the consolidated cases 
filed a joint motion in limine to exclude the Alcotest results 
in each defendant's case as scientifically unreliable 
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 
and Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, and sought a hearing concerning the 
Alcotest's reliability in connection with the motion.  The 
defendants filed expert affidavits and reports contending that 
the Alcotest's source code contained thousands of errors, some 
of which could result in the production of unreliable results.  
The defendants also asserted, through the supporting affidavits 
and motions they had filed, that the Alcotest's results are 
unreliable because the device does not test exclusively for 
ethanol, the calibration tests performed do not operate to 
validate the accuracy of the Alcotest, and the Alcotest is based 
on an obsolete understanding of respiratory physiology.8  In 
support of its opposition to the defendants' motion, the 
Commonwealth filed affidavits and reports concerning the 
Alcotest's functioning and ability to accurately measure BAC. 
 
The motion judge denied the defendants' motion to exclude 
the Alcotest results as unreliable and declined to hold any 
 
8 The defendant does not pursue on appeal the claim that the 
Alcotest relies on an outmoded understanding of respiratory 
physiology. 
 
                     
8 
 
hearing on the motion, reasoning that a Daubert-Lanigan hearing9 
is inapplicable to the admissibility of the Alcotest results 
because they are admissible by statute.  See G. L. c. 90, §§ 24 
(1) (e), 24K.  The judge noted secondarily that, even if he were 
to consider the Alcotest's reliability, he was persuaded that a 
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, State v. Chun, 194 
N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825 (2008), effectively had 
concluded that the alleged defects in the Alcotest's source code 
did not render unreliable the Alcotest machines used in 
Massachusetts.  The judge did not address the defendants' 
argument that the Alcotest produces unreliable results in light 
of its failure to test a subject's breath solely for ethanol.  
The defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing that the 
admission of the Alcotest results without a hearing violated 
their constitutional rights to due process.  The judge denied 
this motion, reasoning that the issues raised by the defendants 
 
9 A hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 
Mass. 15 (1994), focuses on whether "the process or theory 
underlying a scientific expert's opinion lacks reliability" such 
that the opinion "should not reach the trier of fact."  Id. at 
26.  The "party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay 
an adequate foundation either by establishing general acceptance 
in the scientific community or by showing that the evidence is 
reliable or valid through an alternate means."  Canavan's Case, 
432 Mass. 304, 310 (2000).  The Daubert inquiry, however, 
"applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, 
but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other 
specialized' knowledge."  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
                     
9 
 
went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the 
Alcotest breath test results.  Thereafter, the defendants filed 
a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging the denial 
of the motion to exclude the Alcotest results; a single justice 
of this court denied relief. 
 
The defendant's case was tried in the Ayer District Court 
before a jury and a judge other than the motion judge.  During 
the trial, the defense presented no evidence on the reliability 
of the Alcotest or its breath test results (see note 5, supra).  
The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle 
with a blood alcohol percentage of 0.08 or greater as well as of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor.  
See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).10  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to the second offense portion of the complaint, and 
thereafter was sentenced to six months in a house of correction, 
suspended until January, 2015.  The defendant appealed, and we 
granted his application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant's overarching claim on appeal is 
that the motion judge abused his discretion, and committed an 
 
10 General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), first par., 
provides in relevant part:  "Whoever, upon any way or in any 
place to which the public has a right of access, or upon any way 
or in any place to which members of the public have access as 
invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle with a 
percentage, by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-
hundredths or greater, or while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor," shall be punished by a fine, imprisonment, 
or both. 
                     
10 
 
error of law, by declining to hold a hearing on the reliability 
of the Alcotest.  The defendant divides this argument into two 
parts.  First, he argues that the Alcotest's design is not based 
on infrared technology and, therefore, that an Alcotest result 
is not admissible under G. L. c. 90, §§ 24 (1) (e) and 24K.  We 
interpret his argument as asserting, at the very least, that a 
hearing was needed to determine the status of the Alcotest as an 
"infrared breath-testing device" as required by G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24K.  In the alternative, the defendant contends that even if 
the Alcotest is an infrared device such that its results are 
admissible by statute, the motion judge erred by failing to 
assess the Alcotest's reliability and admitting the defendant's 
Alcotest breath test result in evidence at trial because the 
Alcotest is a "new generation" breathalyzer using methods of 
measuring alcohol in a subject's breath different from previous 
machines that have been reviewed by our courts, and the 
Alcotest's flawed source code, its inability to test exclusively 
for ethanol, and the fact that its calibration test does not 
adequately measure the reliability of the device render the 
Alcotest unreliable.11  Finally, the defendant claims that the 
admission of the (in his view) unreliable Alcotest result 
 
11 The defendant further argues that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 
555 U.S. 825 (2008), did not address the flaws that he raises 
with respect to the Alcotest's reliability. 
                     
11 
 
without an assessment of its reliability violated his right to 
due process under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  We agree with the defendant that his challenge is 
to a new breathalyzer technology and is not insulated from 
challenge on grounds of reliability by virtue of G. L. c. 90, 
§§ 24 (1) (e) and 24K.  The defendant was entitled to raise a 
reliability challenge to the Alcotest, and in the circumstances 
of this case, was entitled to a so-called Daubert-Lanigan 
hearing with respect to at least some of the issues he raised.12 
 
1.  Statutory admissibility of Alcotest result.  The 
defendant first contends that the motion judge erred by failing 
to hold a hearing on the Alcotest's reliability given that, he 
asserts, the Alcotest "is not an infrared breath test," and 
therefore is not admissible under the governing statutes.   
 
General Laws c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), provides that in any OUI 
prosecution, "evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol 
in the defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as 
shown by . . . a chemical test or analysis of his breath, shall 
12 We find no merit in the Commonwealth's argument that the 
defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the Alcotest's 
reliability by neglecting to object to the admission of his 
Alcotest result or to raise the issue of the Alcotest's 
reliability at trial.  As indicated previously, the defendant 
did object at trial to the admission of his Alcotest result, and 
he objected to the admission of a record of a periodic test of 
the Alcotest on the specific ground that the Alcotest result was 
unreliable. 
                     
12 
 
be admissible and deemed relevant to the determination of the 
question of whether such defendant was at such time under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor."  Despite this broad language, 
the relevant statutes condition the evidentiary admission of 
breath test results on satisfaction of certain requirements.  Of 
relevance here is the requirement that a certified operator 
perform the breath test "using infrared breath-testing devices" 
according to methods approved by the Secretary of Public Safety 
(Secretary) in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary.  G. L. c. 90, § 24K.13,14 
 
13 General Laws c. 90, § 24K, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"Chemical analysis of the breath of a person charged 
with a violation of this chapter shall not be considered 
valid under the provisions of this chapter, unless such 
analysis has been performed by a certified operator, using 
infrared breath-testing devices according to methods 
approved by the secretary of public safety.  The secretary 
of public safety shall promulgate rules and regulations 
regarding satisfactory methods, techniques and criteria for 
the conduct of such tests, and shall establish a statewide 
training and certification program for all operators of 
such devices and a periodic certification program for such 
breath testing devices; provided, however, that the 
secretary may terminate or revoke such certification at his 
discretion. 
 
 
"Said regulations shall include, but shall not be 
limited to the following:  (a) that the chemical analysis 
of the breath of a person charged be performed by a 
certified operator using a certified infrared breath-
testing device in the following sequence:  (1) one adequate 
breath sample analysis; (2) one calibration standard 
analysis; (3) a second adequate breath sample analysis; (b) 
that no person shall perform such a test unless certified 
by the secretary of public safety; (c) that no breath 
                     
13 
 
 
Under these regulations, a breath test is admissible if, in 
addition to being conducted by a certified operator, it is 
administered using a "certified breath-testing device."  501 
Code Mass. Regs. § 2.03 (2006).15  OAT is responsible for keeping 
a list of approved breath test devices, 501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 2.38 (2006), and for certifying individual breath test devices 
annually.  501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.39-2.40 (2006).  The 
regulations specify that approved devices must appear on the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) list of 
conforming products,16 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.38, and reinforce 
that the device must use "infrared breath testing technology."  
501 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.38(5). 
testing device, mouthpiece or tube shall be cleaned with 
any substance containing alcohol." 
 
 
14 There are other statutory conditions that must be 
satisfied for admission, set out in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e):  
a breath test may only be performed with the defendant's 
consent; the test results must be made available to the 
defendant at his or her request; and the defendant must be 
"afforded a reasonable opportunity, at his request and at his 
expense, to have another such test or analysis made by a person 
or physician selected by him."  The defendant does not suggest 
that these conditions were not met in the present case. 
 
 
15 We cite to the regulations as they appeared when the 
defendant's offense occurred.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.00 
(2006). 
 
16 The Alcotest appeared on this list at the time of the 
defendant's offense. 
                                                                  
14 
 
 
The Alcotest uses an infrared light source as well as a 
detector of infrared light to measure BAC.17  If a subject's 
breath containing alcohol enters the Alcotest's chamber, the 
alcohol molecules absorb some of the infrared light from the 
source and, consequently, this portion of the infrared light 
does not reach the detector.  The Alcotest then determines the 
subject's BAC based on the amount of infrared light that reaches 
the detector as compared to the amount of such light originally 
emitted from the source.  In addition to the infrared mechanism, 
however, the Alcotest contains a separate testing mechanism, an 
electrochemical fuel cell (fuel cell), that creates an electric 
current in the presence of alcohol.18  For the Alcotest to 
produce an actual breath test result, the infrared and fuel cell 
readings must be in "tight agreement" with one another; if the 
two readings are not in agreement, the test aborts.  The 
 
 
17 Infrared radiation comprises the portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum that begins with wavelengths directly 
above the visible spectrum.  Different molecules absorb infrared 
radiation differently.  See Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 350 n.1 
(scientific basis "underlying infrared analysis of substances 
derives from" principle according to which "molecules absorb 
electromagnetic radiation, and only radiation of certain 
wavelengths will be absorbed by a molecule of any given 
compound"). 
 
 
18 Electrodes that comprise the electrochemical fuel cell 
(fuel cell) oxidize the alcohol in a subject's breath sample, 
creating an electric current.  The fuel cell's sensors then 
measure the extent of the electric current, which is 
proportional to the sample's alcohol content. 
                     
15 
 
defendant contends, therefore, that the Alcotest is not an 
"infrared breath-testing device" within the meaning of § 24K and 
the corresponding regulations because the infrared portion of 
the machine does not alone control whether the machine produces 
a valid measurement of BAC. 
 
We disagree.  Section 24K requires chemical analyses of 
breath to be performed using an infrared breath-testing device 
"according to methods approved by the" Secretary, as set out in 
the Secretary's regulations.  As previously indicated, the 
regulations, in turn, require that any device be approved by 
NHTSA, which the Alcotest is, and use "infrared breath testing 
technology" to measure BAC, which the Alcotest does.  That the 
Alcotest also employs the fuel cell to ensure the accuracy of 
the infrared measurement does not change the fact that it uses 
the required infrared technology.19  Moreover, in Massachusetts 
the Alcotest's infrared reading, rather than the fuel cell 
reading, is the only measurement used to report a subject's BAC 
when a valid test occurs.  This aspect of the defendant's 
challenge to the Alcotest fails. 
 
19 The defendant points to no statutory or regulatory 
requirement in effect at the time of his offense indicating that 
a breath test device was required exclusively to use infrared 
technology.  In fact, two years after the defendant's arrest the 
Secretary of Public Safety clarified the infrared requirement by 
stating expressly that it does not bar the use of "complementary 
technologies" to safeguard the accuracy of testing.  501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.05(4) (2010). 
                     
16 
 
 
The motion judge concluded, and the Commonwealth argues 
here, that where a breath-testing device meets the requirements 
of §§ 24 (1) (e) and 24K, and applicable regulations, a Daubert-
Lanigan inquiry into the reliability of the device is neither 
necessary nor appropriate because the Legislature has expressly 
deemed evidence of a breath test conducted through use of such a 
device admissible.  The defendant contends, however, that even 
if his breath test result is deemed admissible under the 
statute, and even though the scientific principle underlying the 
breathalyzer's premise may be generally accepted,20 the Alcotest 
presents a new methodology that is not immune from challenge as 
to the scientific and technological reliability of the process 
by which it measures and analyzes the quantity of alcohol in a 
person's breath and, as a consequence, the reliability of the 
breath test results that are offered in evidence.  Accordingly, 
he argues, the judge erred in declining to conduct a hearing to 
assess the Alcotest's reliability. 
 
The defendant's position has merit.  It has long been the 
case that where "evidence produced by a scientific theory or 
 
20 The scientific principle underlying a breathalyzer, known 
as Henry's Law, is the following:  "at any given temperature, 
the ratio between the concentration of alcohol in one's blood 
and that in the alveolar air in the lungs is a constant:  
2,100:1."  Smythe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 350 (citation omitted).  
See note 3, supra. 
 
                     
17 
 
process"21 is at issue, the judge plays an important gatekeeper 
role to evaluate and decide on its reliability as a threshold 
matter of admissibility.  See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010) ("the 
judge must make a preliminary assessment whether the theory or 
methodology underlying the proposed testimony is sufficiently 
reliable to reach the trier of fact").  The Alcotest is the 
first "dual-sensoric" breath test machine that analyzes a 
subject's breath by means of an infrared test and a fuel cell 
test, and neither this court nor the Appeals Court has 
considered the reliability of its source code.  We recognize 
that the "Legislature doubtless has the power to prescribe the 
rules of evidence and the methods of proof to be employed in 
trials in court."  Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 425 (1946).  
But the power to do so does not mean that the reliability of 
every type of evidence the Legislature may deem admissible, 
particularly in a criminal case, is automatically insulated from 
challenge and review on reliability grounds.  Cf. Commonwealth 
v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 742, 746-747 & n.9, cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 948 (2004) (discussing admissibility, at commitment trial 
of person accused of being sexually dangerous, of police report 
-- made admissible by statute -- containing hearsay evidence of 
prior offense:  "Unlike the confrontation clause, due process 
 
21 Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991). 
                     
18 
 
demands that evidence be reliable in substance, not that its 
reliability be evaluated in a particular manner.  That the focus 
on reliability may not accommodate a simple, predictable, 
bright-line rule does not alter the fact that reliability, not 
cross-examination, is the due process touchstone" [quotations 
and citations omitted]).22  Indeed, this court has indicated just 
the opposite in a case that dealt with a different type of 
breathalyzer device. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. 1, 14, 18-19 (1984), we 
held that the admissibility of test results, produced by a 
particular model of breathalyzer, the Smith & Wesson Model 900A, 
that had been discovered to be vulnerable to radio frequency 
interference (RFI) that could result in inaccurate readings, 
required "a demonstration to the judge of the accuracy of the 
 
22 We disagree with the Commonwealth that the case of 
Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280 (2004), should 
control the outcome here.  That case considered whether a judge 
was required to conduct a Daubert-Lanigan analysis of the 
reliability of testimony to be presented by qualified examiners, 
whose reports of and testimony about their examination, 
diagnosis, and opinions of a person accused of being sexually 
dangerous are made admissible by statute.  See Bradway, supra at 
283-284, 286; G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (c).  The Appeals Court 
concluded that requiring such a threshold judicial evaluation of 
the reliability of a qualified examiner's opinion testimony in 
every case would improperly "dismantle the statutory framework."  
Bradway, supra at 289.  Opinion testimony by a trained 
psychiatrist or psychologist concerning his or her evaluation 
and diagnosis of an individual's mental state and possible 
sexual dangerousness is a type of evidence that is grounded in 
recognized theories and principles and has long been deemed 
admissible.  See, e.g., id. at 288 n.12. 
                     
19 
 
particular [breathalyzer] unit at the time the test was 
performed."  The defendant in Neal did not challenge that the 
principles underlying breath testing machines were generally 
accepted by the scientific community, but instead argued that 
the discovery of that model's "susceptibility to RFI require[d] 
reconsideration of the admissibility of examination results" 
from the device.  Id. at 17.  Although § 24 (1) (e) at the time 
provided that breath test evidence was admissible and relevant 
to the issue of a defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence, see id. at 17 n.17, the court still 
directed that the Commonwealth must establish the reliability of 
the particular breath test in each case, in light of evidence 
that cast doubt on its accuracy.  Id. at 18-19.23 
 
23 The Commonwealth contends that Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 
Mass. 1 (1984), is inapposite because it was decided before the 
enactment of G. L. c. 90, § 24K, and regulations related to the 
maintenance and certification of breathalyzers and the lack of 
oversight of the device forced the court in Neal to demand proof 
that a particular breathalyzer was functioning appropriately at 
the time of a defendant's breath test.  The Commonwealth argues 
that by the time of the defendant's offense in this case, 
however, the statutory and regulatory framework ensured that the 
Alcotest's results were reliable.  The argument is not 
persuasive.  In its detailed consideration of the defendant's 
challenge to the scientific reliability of the breathalyzer at 
issue in Neal, the court never suggested that it was obliged to 
undertake this analysis of the merits of the challenge because 
the Legislature had failed to institute a certification and 
maintenance regime for such devices.  Rather, the court's 
analysis was premised on the recognition that breath test 
evidence, admissible by statute, plays a significant role in a 
prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of liquor, and due process principles require that a 
                     
20 
 
 
The Chief Justice of the District Court assigned the 
defendant's case and others to the motion judge for resolution 
of common issues concerning at least the reliability of the 
Alcotest's source code, and specifically authorized the motion 
judge to conduct hearings to that end.  As stated, we recognize 
"the reliability of the scientific principles underlying the use 
of breathalyzer evidence."  Commonwealth v. Durning, 406 Mass. 
485, 490 (1990).  In the circumstances here, however, where the 
applicable statutes and regulations do not provide specific 
standards relating to the source code of breathalyzers,24 and 
existing case law offers no guidance about the reliability of 
the Alcotest's methodology for measuring and analyzing the 
quantity of alcohol in a person's breath, the judge should have 
held a hearing to determine whether the source code and other 
challenged features of the Alcotest functioned in a manner that 
reliably produced accurate breath test results.  See Shanley, 
455 Mass. at 763 n.15 (although Daubert-Lanigan hearing "may not 
always be required where qualified expert testimony of the same 
defendant have the opportunity to challenge its accuracy and 
scientific reliability.  See id. at 8, 17-20.  Here, none of the 
statutory or regulatory requirements that currently govern 
breath test results relates to the aspects of the Alcotest's 
design and operation that the defendant challenges. 
 
24 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), on whose list of conforming products the Alcotest was 
required to appear for use in Massachusetts, see 501 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 2.38 (2006), does not analyze a breathalyzer's source 
code when determining whether it conforms to NHTSA's standards. 
 
                                                                  
21 
 
type and offered for the same purpose has been accepted as 
reliable in the past in Massachusetts appellate cases," this 
court has "not 'grandfathered' any particular theories or 
methods for all time").25 
 
2.  Reliability of Alcotest breath test results.  Given the 
motion judge's disposition of the defendant's motion in limine, 
he did not consider on their merits the defendant's specific 
challenges to the Alcotest's reliability, supported by and 
described in the expert witness affidavits and articles 
submitted by the defendant in support of his motion.  This was 
error.  The defendant was entitled to have the merits of his 
challenges considered and the reliability of the Alcotest breath 
test result established before the evidence of that test result 
could be admitted in evidence against him.  See Commonwealth 
v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 188 (1997). 
 
The question remains whether, despite the fact that the 
motion judge did not consider the merits of the defendant's 
challenges, the present record clearly establishes the 
25 The judge's second reason for declining to hold a hearing 
was that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Chun, 194 N.J. 54, 
already had considered and rejected a challenge to the 
reliability of the Alcotest.  Although the court in Chun did 
address the reliability of the Alcotest and of its source code 
in particular, see id. at 75, 121-131, it did not address all of 
the challenges the defendant in this case raises to the 
Alcotest's reliability.  For example, the court in Chun did not 
consider whether the Alcotest tests exclusively for ethanol or 
whether the Alcotest's calibration system fails to adequately 
measure the reliability of the device. 
                     
22 
 
reliability of the Alcotest.  We have carefully reviewed the 
defendant's submissions and the corresponding materials 
submitted by the Commonwealth in opposition to the defendant's 
motion in limine; we also have reviewed the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's decision in Chun, 194 N.J. 54.  The review leads us to 
conclude that on the paper record before us, without a hearing, 
it is not possible to determine that the defendant's challenges 
have no substantial basis and do not implicate the reliability 
of the Alcotest breath test evidence.  For this reason, we 
conclude that it is appropriate to vacate the judge's order 
denying the defendant's motion to exclude the Alcotest breath 
test evidence and remand this case to the District Court for the 
purpose of conducting such a hearing.  Cf. Commonwealth v. A 
Juvenile, 381 Mass. 727, 729 (1980) (remanding case to Juvenile 
Court for hearing on admissibility, on reliability grounds, of 
hypnotically aided testimony). 
 
On remand, a hearing on the Alcotest's reliability will be 
necessary.  In that connection, we add the following comments. 
a.  The primary reliability challenge raised by the 
defendant below was to the Alcotest source code.  In support of 
the motion in limine, the defendant retained a software 
engineer, Joel Cohen, to analyze the source code.  As stated in 
his affidavit, Cohen used an "industry standard code analysis 
tool" referred to as LINT, which revealed more than 7,000 errors 
23 
 
and 3,000 warning signals upon scanning the Alcotest's source 
code.  However, according to the report of Daniel Hestad, a 
source code analyst retained by the Commonwealth, scanning tools 
such as LINT, alone, are not conclusive as to errors within the 
source code because they are known to produce falsely positive 
results, and even a true error may not result in flawed software 
functionality due to the defect's location in the code.  Hestad 
also noted that it is to be expected that a source code as 
extensive as the Alcotest's would contain defects and coding 
errors.  Cohen's analysis focused on one particular category of 
significant error in the source code:  uninitialized variables.  
Hestad agreed that the use of uninitialized variables in the 
Alcotest's source code was an "unsafe coding practice."  He 
opined, however, that uninitialized variables did not appear in 
portions of the code that bear directly on the Alcotest's 
measurement of a subject's BAC, and that the Alcotest's 
requirement that a certified operator manually reset the device 
so as to remove values from previous tests suggests that it is 
"very unlikely" that an uninitialized variable would affect a 
BAC computation.  It may be that Hestad's opinion -- and the 
fact that Cohen did not point to a specific instance in which an 
uninitialized variable or other error would, with any degree of 
certainty, cause an unreliable BAC measurement -- will carry the 
day, and result in the rejection of the defendant's challenge to 
24 
 
the Alcotest source code.  See Neal, 392 Mass. at 21 (this court 
does "not require a demonstration of infallibility as a 
precondition to consideration of scientific evidence by a trier 
of fact").  But we are not able to assess the validity of the 
two experts' differing views on the basis of their competing 
affidavits alone, which underscores the value that a hearing 
would provide, and likely an evidentiary hearing.26 
 
b.  The defendant also claims that the Alcotest is not 
capable of testing exclusively for ethanol, which would or might 
render its breath test results invalid.  Donald J. Barry, Ph.D., 
an astronomer with a background in chemistry who was retained by 
the defendant, opined in an affidavit that the Alcotest is 
"sensitive" to the ethanol content of a subject's breath, but 
incapable of testing exclusively for ethanol.  He reasoned that 
the design of the Alcotest's infrared mechanism, which operates 
at a 9.5 micron wavelength to absorb alcohol, may result in an 
inability to accurately measure compounds "which absorb 
26 A hearing pursuant to Daubert and Lanigan need not always 
be an evidentiary hearing.  See Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 
100, 111 (2006); Commonwealth v. Addy, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 
838 (2011).  In a case where the documentary record, in 
conjunction with the arguments of the parties, allows for a 
reasoned determination of the evidence's reliability, an 
evidentiary hearing may not be necessary.  Cf. Vassallo v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 8-9, 12 (1998).  As stated 
previously, our review of the affidavits and other materials in 
the record suggests that an evidentiary hearing is likely 
necessary in this case, but we leave the decision whether to 
hold one to the District Court judge on remand. 
                     
25 
 
[infrared radiation] at 9.5 microns but not at adjacent 
wavelengths"; he notes that all "compounds with a carbon-oxygen 
bond display an infrared absorption in the 8-10 micron region" 
and, accordingly, methanol and ethanol absorb infrared radiation 
in this range, as do "acetone, acetic acid, acetaldehyde, ethyl 
acetate," and others.  In short, Barry asserted, the Alcotest's 
infrared testing design "cannot be used to distinguish between a 
detection of ethanol and interfering substances," and that the 
Alcotest's fuel cell is incapable of measuring ethanol to the 
exclusion of interfering substances. 
 
The Commonwealth counters that the applicable statutes and 
regulations do not explicitly require that a breathalyzer must 
test solely for ethanol.  It is true that G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) 
(e), deems generally admissible breath test evidence "of the 
percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the defendant's blood at 
the time of the alleged offense" (emphasis added).  However, we 
are hard pressed to conclude that the Legislature intended 
breathalyzers to test for substances other than ethanol.  
"Alcohol" is generally defined as "ethanol."  See Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 50 (2002) ("alcohol" is also 
called "ethanol"); American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 41 (2006) (same).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Smythe, 23 Mass. 
App. Ct. 348, 350 (1987) (describing different breathalyzer as 
being "designed to measure ethyl alcohol in the breath"). 
26 
 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that the Alcotest does test 
exclusively for ethanol, but the evidence in the record is 
unconvincing on this front.  The affidavit of Hansueli Ryser, a 
vice-president of Draeger, notes that infrared breathalyzers 
typically operate at wavelengths of 3.4 or 9.5 microns so that 
the radiation is absorbed by alcohol, and that the Alcotest's 
"9.5 micron wavelength is either non-susceptible to interfering 
substances or susceptible at only a fraction of what it is at 
3.4 microns."  Ryser then states: 
 
"I agree that the [infrared] system, by itself, is not 
specific to ethanol.  I also agree that the [fuel 
cell] is not specific to ethanol.  However, the 
[Alcotest] is the only dual-sensoric breath testing 
device combining both analytical technologies in one 
instrument where both sensors analyze the same breath 
specimen.  The [fuel cell] and [infrared] readings 
must be within tight agreement with each other.  
Otherwise the device flags the test as being tainted 
by an interfering substance and the test aborts.  
Thus, the [Alcotest] as a whole is ethanol specific." 
 
The logical leap that Ryser makes from the infrared system and 
fuel cell each not testing specifically for ethanol to the 
system as a whole being ethanol-specific is confusing, to say 
the least.  While there may be a reasonable scientific 
explanation for why Ryser's position is accurate, such an 
explanation is not apparent in the record.  On remand, a judge 
should consider whether the Alcotest is sufficiently ethanol-
specific such that its results are reliably untainted by 
interfering substances. 
27 
 
 
c.  The defendant contends that the Alcotest's calibration 
testing mechanism does not indicate adequately the Alcotest's 
ability to measure accurately an actual subject's BAC.  A report 
concerning the Alcotest's source code submitted as part of the 
defendant's evidentiary support for his motion in limine 
suggests that even though the Alcotest performs a calibration 
test against a solution with known alcohol content in the course 
of analyzing a subject's breath, such a calibration test does 
not assist in determining whether the Alcotest accurately 
assesses the subject's BAC because the Alcotest's source code 
"takes completely different paths (executes different 
instructions) for the calibration measurement than when it 
measures the subject's breath."  This is of relevance because 
G. L. c. 90, § 24K, requires that a "'calibration standard 
analysis[]' be performed" prior to the administration of a 
breathalyzer test "in order for [the] test to be valid."  Morris 
v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 861, 863 n.3 (1992).  "These 
simulations, using solutions with a known alcohol content, are 
designed to test the accuracy of the breathalyzer unit."  Id.  
The assertion in the defendant's report, which the Commonwealth 
did not rebut in its submission to the District Court or on 
appeal, suggests that the Alcotest's source code renders its 
calibration measurement ineffective to "test the accuracy" of 
28 
 
the Alcotest.  Accordingly, this challenge must be resolved on 
remand.27 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion to 
exclude evidence of the defendant's Alcotest breath test result 
is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In 
particular, a judge of the District Court is to conduct a 
hearing on the defendant's motion to exclude, and is to file 
with this court the judge's findings and rulings based on that 
hearing within ninety days of the date of the rescript. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
27 The Commonwealth argues on appeal that testing of the 
Alcotest conducted by the Commonwealth's office of alcohol 
testing (OAT) in the course of this litigation establishes that 
the device accurately measures BAC.  OAT's testing consisted 
primarily of the Alcotest analyzing samples with differing known 
alcohol content; a sequence consisted of "two breath samples and 
the analysis of a calibration standard."  The results of the 
testing sequences of each sample of known alcohol content appear 
to show that the Alcotest accurately measured the calibration 
standard in each sequence while also generally measuring the 
alcohol content of each sample accurately.  As part of the 
testing, OAT also dosed a volunteer with three alcoholic 
beverages, tested her BAC with the Alcotest and through a blood 
test, and found the results of each test to substantially agree 
(if anything, the breath test was lower).  However, given the 
defendant's assertion that the Alcotest's source code renders 
its calibration test ineffective toward determining whether the 
Alcotest reliably measures a subject's BAC, we are reluctant to 
rely on OAT's testing to resolve the defendant's challenge 
regarding the calibration mechanism without a better 
understanding than the present record permits us to gain.