Title: Attorney Grievance v. Garfield

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, No. 7, September Term, 2001.
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE–DISCIPLINARY ACTION–RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT–COMPETENCE–DILIGENCE–COMMUNICATION–DECLINING OR
TERMINATING REPRESENTATION–MISCONDUCT–The attorney neglected the cases
of six clients, which resulted in their cases being either dismissed for lack of prosecution or
barred by limitations.  This conduct violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 1.4(b), 1.16, and 8.4(d).  In determining the appropriate sanction, the Court considered
as mitigating factors the attorney’s lack of a dishonest or selfish motive, his remorse for his
actions, his cooperation with Bar Counsel, the existence of his drug addiction (which was
found to be the substantial cause of his professional misconduct), and his rehabilitative
efforts.  Aggravating considerations included his prior disciplinary offense, his substantial
experience in the practice of law, and the multiple offenses committed.  The Court
determined the appropriate sanction to be indefinite suspension with the right to reapply no
earlier than 30 days from the effective date of the suspension.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No.  7
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
      COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
CRAIG STEVEN GARFIELD
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
     Filed : May 6, 2002
1  The charges in this case were filed and processed below prior to 1 July 2001; thus,
we refer to the attorney grievance procedural rules in effect prior to that date.  The
applicable rule, 16-709(a), states that “[c]harges against an attorney shall be filed by the Bar
Counsel acting at direction of the Review Board.”
2  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-706(b)(1)(a), Respondent waived an Inquiry Panel
proceeding.  In oral argument before the Review Board, provided for in Md. Rule 16-
706(b)(3),  Respondent requested that the Board “remand the matter for an inquiry panel
proceeding for possible implementation of a program similar to the ‘diversionary program,’”
which was “established under the new Rules to take effect July 1, 2001.”  The Review Board
denied Respondent’s request and directed Bar Counsel to file charges against the
Respondent.  
3  Actually, Ms. Renee B. Johnson (Mr. Shands’s mother) engaged Respondent on
behalf of Mr. Shands, who was incarcerated at the time.  According to Bar Counsel’s
petition for disciplinary action, Ms. Johnson employed Respondent to represent her son in
a personal injury action. 
4  The aforementioned Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
Rule 1.1.  Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
(continued...)
1
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a)1, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney
Grievance Commission (Petitioner) and at the behest of the Review Board, filed with this
Court a petition for disciplinary action against Craig Steven Garfield, Esquire (Respondent).2
In the petition, Bar Counsel alleged violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct (MPRC) 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, and 8.4(d) in connection with Respondent’s
representation of Artinus Shands3, Darron C. Addison, Lillian Johnson, Samuel C. Veney,
Drucella Mann, Diane Postal, and Robert Yinger (the latter in two separate matters).4
4(...continued)
Rule 1.3.  Diligence.  
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.
Rule 1.4.  Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
Rule 1.16.  Declining or terminating representation.
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall
withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially
impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client;
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the
lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal
or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate
a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to
the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given
(continued...)
2
4(...continued)
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the
obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable
financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered
unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawl exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall
take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  The
lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.
Rule 8.4.  Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice; . . . .
5  Rule 16-709(b) provides that the “Court of Appeals by order may direct that the
charges be transmitted to and heard in any court and shall designate the judge or judges to
hear the charges and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record in the proceeding.”
6  Rule 16-711(a) mandates that “[a] written statement of the findings of facts and
(continued...)
3
This Court referred the matter to Judge John M. Glynn of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Md. Rules 16-709(b)5 and 16-711(a)6.  
6(...continued)
conclusions of law shall be filed in the record of the proceedings and copies sent to all
parties.”
7  Rule 16-711(b)(2) states that “[w]ithin 15 days after the filing of the record in the
Court of Appeals, the attorney or the Bar Counsel may file in the Court of Appeals
exceptions to the findings and conclusions and may make recommendations respecting the
disciplinary sanction to be imposed . . . .”
4
After an evidentiary hearing held on 24 September 2001, the hearing judge found by
clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16, and
8.4(d).  Petitioner, pursuant to Md. Rule 16-711(b)(2)7, filed with this Court exceptions to
the findings of facts and conclusions of law, and a recommendation for sanction (2 year
suspension and specific conditions for reinstatement).  Respondent filed a reply to
Petitioner’s exceptions and a recommendation for sanction (urging an unspecified “remedial
form of sanction,” though earlier he proposed a conditional public reprimand).
I.
From the evidentiary record below, the hearing judge, in a memorandum dated 11
October 2001, explained the following:
In his complaint, Bar Counsel contends that the
Respondent engaged in professional misconduct as defined by
Rule 16-701(k) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure in cases
involving: Renee B. Johnson [(for her son, Artinus Shands)],
Darr[o]n C. Addison, Lillian Johnson, Samuel C. Veney,
D[ruce]lla Mann, Diane Postal and Robert Yinger, in two (2)
separate matters.  At hearing, Bar Counsel voluntarily dismissed
the allegations with respect to Samuel C. Veney.  It should be
noted that the Mann, Postal, and Yinger cases were brought to
the attention of Bar Counsel voluntarily by Respondent.  All of
the matters which remain for consideration by the Court were
8  Because it is undisputed that Respondent’s “professional lapses” resulted in the
dismissal or barring of the seven cases involved in this matter, it is not necessary that we
describe all of the details of each case in particular.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 381, 773 A.2d 463, 466 (2001) (finding it unnecessary to
describe the details of an attorney’s thefts where she “freely acknowledged that on many
occasions over a period of time she misappropriated money”).  We note, however, that all
of the cases were civil in nature and involved personal injury claims, and, as the hearing
judge explained, were either dismissed for want of prosecution or barred by limitations.
Specifically, the cases of Ms. Johnson, Ms. Mann, and Mr. Addison suffered from
Respondent’s lack of prosecution, while the cases of Ms. Postal, Mr. Shands, and Mr.
Yinger were not filed within the appropriate limitations period.
5
civil matters.  It is undisputed that these cases were either
dismissed for want of prosecution or barred by limitations as a
result of Respondent’s professional lapses.[8]  During all
relevant periods, the Respondent did not maintain professional
liability insurance.
Bar Counsel alleges that Respondent behaved unethically
and unprofessionally in violations of the following Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rule 1.1  Competence
Rule 1.3  Diligence
Rule 1.4  Communication
Rule 1.16  Declining or Terminating
       Representation
Rule 8.4  Misconduct
By pleading, Respondent admits his violation of Rule 1.1
but adds that at all times he “would deny that he does not
possess the required legal knowledge or skill to competently
represent his clients.”
Respondent admits the alleged violation of Rule 1.3
regarding Diligence;
Respondent admits the alleged violation of Rule 1.4
regarding Communications; only with respect of sub[]section
9  Although Respondent contended that, as a matter of law, his actions did not violate
MRPC 1.4(b) or 1.16, the proceeding in the Circuit Court focused on Respondent’s
substance abuse, as that related to mitigation.  As counsel for Respondent explained to the
hearing judge, 
[t]he real issues here [(at the evidentiary hearing)] deal with
why this occurred or why the limitations were missed, why
[Respondent] didn’t show up in Court on a particular day.  The
reasons why that occurred is what’s important, as well as what
the sanction to be imposed is. . . .
. . . 
[F]or substance abuse to be given any credence in mitigating a
sanction, the substance abuse would have to be found to have
been the root cause of the underlying problem where the error
is.  And that’s what our case is about here today.
10  According to Dr. Davis’s curriculum vitae and testimony, he received his Ph.D.
in “Human Development.”  Dr. Davis, therefore, is a doctor of psychology, not psychiatry
(which requires medical training).
6
(a), but denies violating subparagraph (b) of the Rule;
Respondent admits violating Rule 8.4 regarding
Misconduct;
Respondent denies that he violated Rule 1.16 regarding
Declining or Terminating Representation.
Continuing, the hearing judge noted that “Respondent’s presentation focused on the
issue of mitigation,”9 and summarized his evidence:
[Respondent] called as witnesses, Richard E. Vincent, Director
of Lawyer Counseling for the Lawyer Assistance Committee of
the Bar; and Dr. John E. Davis, an expert in psychiatry[10] and
substance abuse.  He also testified on his own behalf regarding
his personal history with particular emphasis on his contention
that his abuse of cocaine was at the root of his professional
derelictions.
Both expert witnesses and Respondent contended that
7
the root cause of Respondent[’s] professional failures was his
drug abuse.  They emphasized that he cooperated fully with Bar
Counsel, apologized for his failings, and offered to make his
clients whole.
Richard Vincent contended that in cases involving drug
abuse, it is particularly important that a “hammer” continue to
hang over the head of the drug abuser to ensure continued
compliance with a program that requires the avoidance of drug
use.  Both witnesses stated that during the period of his
professional derelictions, the Respondent was struggling
through a very bad divorce, and for a time was involved in an
additional relationship which he found emotionally
overwhelming.
Likewise, they testified that they had worked extensively
with Respondent and that he had “embraced the recovery
program.”  He continues to be supervised by Dr. Davis to insure
that he not use illegal drugs and regularly attends therapy and
meetings of Narcotics Anonymous.
Dr. Davis believed that the Respondent’s use of drugs,
in the context of his family and social problems, created a
psychological state of extreme distractibility.  Dr. Davis
concluded that it was Respondent’s drug use that caused him to
miss various filing deadlines resulting in the dismissal of all
lawsuits in the cases alleged by Bar Counsel.  However, he
testified that since seeking drug treatment and acknowledging
his drug abuse problems which date back to the mid 90’s, he is
now handling only criminal cases.
Respondent’s defaults occurred principally between the
period of 1998 and 2000.  Earlier, he was functioning
effectively as an attorney.  Respondent emphasized that he feels
great remorse and hopes to compensate his former clients for
the consequences of his failures.  Also, he indicated that he was
amenable to supervision by another attorney, if he were
permitted to continue to practice law in the State of Maryland.
Based on the evidence presented and inferentially satisfied to a clear and convincing
8
standard, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent “violated the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct as alleged, with the exception of Rule 1.4(b) with respect to which,”
the hearing judge found “no specific evidence was offered.”  In addition, although
Respondent “challenged the allegations concerning Rule 1.16,” the judge found that “the
record support[ed] a finding that he violated th[at] rule.”  It was “plain” to the hearing judge,
“that [Respondent’s] continued representation of clients was impaired by the use of drugs,
thereby violating the rules of professional conduct.”  “Accordingly,” he found “Respondent
in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16, and 8.4[(d)].” 
The hearing judge went on to explain that “[t]he central issue in this case concern[ed]
whether the Respondent’s drug abuse was the root cause of subsequent professional
derelictions.”  On that issue, the hearing judge concluded that:
[t]he record clearly establishes, and the Court is persuaded by
[a] preponderance of the evidence, that for two decades Mr.
Garfield practiced criminal law successfully in the courts of the
State of Maryland and was regarded both by his fellow
practitioners and the Bench as an asset to the Bench, Bar and
Community.
. . . 
The Court is persuaded by a preponderance of the
evidence that Respondent’s professional failures were
substantially the result of drug abuse.  While he may have
struggled with his domestic and relationship problems, it was
his drug abuse that pushed him across the line which separates
those who struggle and succeed, if only barely, from those who
fail. . . .
Respondent’s expert witnesses and the testimony of
Respondent support these findings.  They are also supported by
the timing of Respondent[’]s failures which seem related to his
11  Standard 4.42 of the ABA Standards for imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted
in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, at 01:823, provides that
“[s]uspension is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform
services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or (b) a lawyer engages
(continued...)
9
most severe drug abuse, and by the nature of those failures,
which seem the product of his inability to focus on detailed
office responsibilities.  This is particularly true in those areas of
the law which he was the least experienced and expert.
The Court will not presume to speculate about exactly
how Respondent’s other struggles played into his addiction, and
how they all worked to undermine his professionalism.  It seems
plain on this record in this case, that but for drug abuse,
Respondent would have been an unlikely candidate for
professional discipline.  (Footnote omitted).
Respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing judges findings of fact or conclusions
of law.  On 29 October 2001, Respondent recommended a sanction of a public reprimand
subject to “continued drug therapy,” monitoring by Mr. Vincent’s office, limitation of his
practice to criminal law, and “supervision by an attorney subject to reporting requirements
to Bar Counsel.”  Petitioner, on 2 November 2001, filed with the Court exceptions
challenging the hearing judge’s finding that he was “‘persuaded by a preponderance of the
evidence that Respondent’s professional failures were substantially the result of drug
abuse.’”  According to Petitioner, the hearing judge’s findings “[we]re inconsistent with the
evidence from the Respondent’s own testimony and the testimony from Respondent’s own
expert.”  Based on Standard 4.42 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
Petitioner recommended a sanction of a two year suspension from the practice of law.11  On
11(...continued)
in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”
10
20 November 2001, Respondent filed a reply to Petitioner’s exceptions disagreeing “with
Petitioner’s claim that [the hearing judge’s] findings were inconsistent with the evidence,”
and suggesting “that a remedial form of sanction would be more appropriate.” 
II.
We recently explained in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Snyder,     Md.    ,    ,    
A.2d    ,     (2002) (Slip op. No. 9 at 9, 2000 Term), that “[a]s the Court of original and
complete jurisdiction for attorney disciplinary proceedings in Maryland, we conduct an
independent review of the record.”  (Citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345
Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997)).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Wallace,     Md.    ,    ,     A.2d    ,     (2002) (Slip op. No. 6 at 14, 2001 Term) (quoting
Garland).  “The hearing judge’s findings of fact will be accepted unless we determine that
they are clearly erroneous.”  Id.  (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sachse, 345 Md.
578, 589, 693 A.2d 806, 811 (1997) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Boyd, 333 Md.
298, 303, 635 A.2d 382, 384 (1994))).  As to “the hearing judge’s conclusions of law,
however, ‘our consideration is essentially de novo,’ as ‘the ultimate determination . . . as to
an attorney’s alleged misconduct is reserved for this Court.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 322, 786 A.2d 763, 768 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000);
12  Petitioner filed no exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent
violated MRPC 1.16, providing, in part, that a lawyer shall not represent a client or shall
withdraw from representation of a client if “the lawyer’s physical or mental condition
materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client . . . .”  We are left to assume,
therefore, that Petitioner does not dispute that Respondent’s condition impaired his ability
to represent clients, but rather focuses on whether Respondent’s addiction was the cause of
his “professional lapses,” which goes to the issue of mitigation.
11
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996)).  
The only exception in this matter was taken by Petitioner regarding the hearing
judge’s finding that Respondent’s “professional failures were substantially the result of drug
abuse.”  This exception relates to whether we should treat Respondent’s drug addiction as
a mitigating factor in our determination of the appropriate sanction for Respondent.12   
III.
When considering sanctions, it is well settled that: 
[t]he purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public
rather than to punish the erring attorney.  The public interest is
served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates
to members of this legal profession the type of conduct that will
not be tolerated.  By imposing such a sanction, this Court
fulfills its responsibility to insist upon the maintenance of the
integrity of the Bar and to prevent the transgression of an
individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.
Therefore, the public interest is served when sanctions designed
to effect general and specific deterrence are imposed on an
attorney who violates the disciplinary rules.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz,     Md.    ,    ,     A.2d    ,     (2002) (Slip op. No. 12
at 9, 2001 Term) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wallace,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at  
   (Slip op. at 15-16) (citations omitted)).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane,  
12
   Md.    ,    ,     A.2d    ,     (2002) (Slip op. No. 52 at 7-8, 2000 Term); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 405, 784 A.2d 516, 532-33 (2001); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 31-32, 762 A.2d 950, 966 (2000).  “‘Of course, what
the appropriate sanction for the particular misconduct is, in the public interest, generally
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case,’” Dunietz,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at  
  (Slip op. at 9) (citation omitted), and “tak[es] account of any particular aggravating or
mitigating factors.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 484, 671 A.2d
463, 481 (1996) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447, 635 A.2d
1315, 1318 (1994)).  
In this case, the hearing judge, based on evidence presented by Respondent, found
that Respondent’s professional failures “were substantially the result” of his drug abuse.
That finding is significant because we “have recognized addiction to drugs as a mitigating
factor when the addiction is ‘to a substantial degree responsible for the conduct of the
attorney.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mandel, 316 Md. 197, 201, 557 A.2d 1329,
1331 (1989).  Indeed, even in cases otherwise warranting disbarment, we have held that
“‘compelling extenuating circumstances,’” specifically, “serious and utterly debilitating
mental or physical health conditions,” including drug addiction, can justify a lesser sanction.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485
(2001).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490,
497 (1994) (“We have said that a sanction less severe than disbarment is not warranted
13  Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-710(d), factual findings “shall be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.”  As we explained in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James, 355 Md.
465, 483, 735 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1999), however,
“[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard of Rule [16-710(d)]
applies to the measure of proof imposed upon the Attorney
Grievance Commission in factual determinations essential to
establishing its case against the attorney.  It does not apply to
factual matters sought to be established by the attorney in
defense of the attorney’s position, including whether mitigating
circumstances have been shown.  As to this, the preponderance
of the evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.”
(Alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606,
589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)).
13
absent evidence that the addiction, to a substantial extent, was the responsible, precipitating
and root cause of the misappropriation.”).  Petitioner took exception to the hearing judge’s
finding on this matter, maintaining that his finding was “inconsistent” with Respondent’s
testimony and the testimony of Respondent’s expert.  We disagree.
As we explained at supra page 10, we review the factual findings of a hearing judge
under a clearly erroneous standard.  In determining whether the findings here meet that
standard,
we recognize that the judge “may elect to pick and chose which
evidence to rely upon” and that “an attorney in a disciplinary
proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of an
attorney’s position by the preponderance of evidence, including
whether mitigating circumstances existed at the time of the
alleged misconduct.”[13]
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hines, 366 Md. 277, 291, 783 A.2d 656, 664 (2001)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17-18, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152
14
(1999) (citation omitted)).  
In rendering his finding regarding Respondent’s substance abuse, the hearing judge
relied, in part, on the testimony of Dr. Davis (Respondent’s therapist and an expert in
psychology with a focus on substance abuse) and Mr. Vincent (director of the Lawyer
Assistance Program for the Maryland State Bar Association), both of whom emphatically
stated that, but for his addiction, Respondent would not have perpetrated the seven instances
of professional misconduct admitted to have occurred here.  In particular, when asked his
opinion “as to whether there was a connection” between Respondent’s substance abuse and
the misconduct “alleged in Bar Counsel’s petition,” Dr. Davis described it as “a one-to-one
correlation.”  According to Dr. Davis, 
[t]he connection is that once you begin to use these substances
and use them in large doses or use them regularly, it begins to
create changes in brain function.  And the changes that occur in
brain function are primarily distractibility so that when you’re
using these drugs, they have not only an acute effect, that is the
effect from the drug that’s in the blood stream, but they have a
post-acute effect.
. . . They injure the brain networks and the networks
don’t work right, and it takes a while for the body to heal and
repair these.  He gave a history of repeated use of these drugs,
of the cocaine to go up, the tranquilizers to come down so he
could sleep.
And that kind of up and down creates disruption of the
normal function of the brain pathways.  But the practical result
of that is that you spend an inordinate amount of time just kind
of controlling yourself and functioning.  And the niceties that
we normally look out [sic] that require higher brain function are
not working very well.  And when you’re hung over, you’re not
functioning very well in other aspects of your life.
. . .
15
. . . [H]e was not as attentive on his game under those
conditions as he would be normally, and so several of these
cases fell through the cracks, and it’s perfectly understandable.
In Dr. Davis’s opinion, “based on thirty years of experience,” “but for the substance abuse,
[Respondent] would not have had these problems.”  “[I]f you take the drug out of it,” Dr.
Davis explained, Respondent “would have been able to function.  When you add that and
you incapacitate him physically and mentally with the drugs and the substances and the acute
and post-acute effects of the drugs, then not many people could deal with that.  And he
couldn’t.”  
Likewise, Mr. Vincent testified that “at one time” Respondent’s failure to file
complaints and prosecute cases “didn’t happen in his practice.”  According to Mr. Vincent,
when he “looked for a cause” of Respondent’s professional problems, “substance abuse
reared its ugly head, and there it was.  These things didn’t happen earlier.”  Thus,
Respondent’s substance abuse was “the only cause” Mr. Vincent pin-pointed for the
professional failures.
Based on this testimony, it was not clearly erroneous for the hearing judge to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent’s drug addiction caused his
professional failures in the seven personal injury cases.  Respondent provided clear and
convincing evidence, through the testimony of his witnesses, that he suffered from a drug
addiction and that his escalating addiction caused him to violate the MRPC as charged.  We
overrule Petitioner’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding on that matter.
16
 
We turn to the determination of the appropriate sanction to impose for Respondent’s
violation of MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16, and 8.4(d).  Citing Standard 4.42 of the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, see supra note 11, Bar Counsel recommends that
Respondent be suspended for two years from the practice of law, that his reinstatement be
conditioned upon his submitting proof that each of his clients in the personal injury matters
“have been made whole or have otherwise had their losses satisfied,” and that, if reinstated,
he continue to be monitored “by the lawyer counseling committee of the Maryland State Bar
Association with quarterly reports to Bar Counsel for a period of two years subsequent to”
his reinstatement.  Respondent, we suppose, urges us to impose a public reprimand, subject
to his continued drug therapy, monitoring by the Lawyer Assistance Program for the
Maryland State Bar Association, a limitation his practice be confined to criminal law, and
supervision by an attorney subject to reporting requirements to Bar Counsel.
  
In determining the appropriate sanction in attorney grievance actions, we may
consider a number of mitigating factors, including:
absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.  
Thompson, 367 Md. at 330, 786 A.2d at 772-73 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
14    In cases warranting disbarment and those involving “intentional dishonesty,
misappropriation . . . , fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like,” we have
limited our consideration of “anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating
mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the ‘root cause’ of the
misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct
in accordance with the law and with the MPRC.”  Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773
A.2d at 485 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 594, 664 A.2d
854, 862 (1995) (“[A]bsent truly compelling circumstances, alcoholism will not be permitted
to mitigate where an attorney commits a violation of ethical or legal rules which would
ordinarily warrant disbarment.” (Footnote omitted))).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490, 497 (1994) (“We have said that a sanction
less severe than disbarment is not warranted absent evidence that the addiction, to a
substantial extent, was the responsible, precipitating and root cause of the
misappropriation.”).
17
Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001) (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 488-89,
671 A.2d at 483 (citations omitted))).  See also Standard 9.3 of the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional
Conduct, at 01:839-01:840.  In addition, “a less severe sanction than that ordinarily dictated
may be appropriate when an attorney is able to establish the existence of compelling
circumstances.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 588, 664 A.2d 854,
858 (1995).  As we explained at supra page 12, an attorney’s substance abuse may constitute
such a compelling circumstance, thereby mitigating the sanction in his or her case, provided
the addiction is found to be the cause of the attorney’s misconduct.14  See Williams, 335 Md.
at 474, 644 A.2d at 497; Mandel, 316 Md. at 201, 557 A.2d at 1331.  See also Standard
9.32(i) of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA/BNA
Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, at 01:839 (providing that chemical dependency,
18
including drug abuse, is a mitigating factor).  On the other hand, there are also aggravating
factors which we may consider in our determination of the appropriate sanction, including
the existence of “[p]rior disciplinary actions against an attorney” (Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Monfried,     Md.    ,    ,     A.2d    ,     (2002) (Slip Op. 53 at 30, Sept. Term
2000) (citing Myers, 333 Md. at 447, 635 A.2d at 1318)), the commission of “multiple
offenses” (Monfried,     Md. at     n.10,     A.2d at     n.10 (Slip Op. at 29 n.10) (citing
Standard 9.22 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA/BNA
Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, at 01:838-01:839)), and an attorney’s
“substantial experience in the practice of law.”  Id.
In recent attorney grievance cases involving client neglect, we have imposed a
number of different sanctions, ranging from disbarment (see, e.g., Dunietz,     Md. at    ,   
  A.2d at      (Slip op. at 12) (disbarring an attorney for client neglect where there were no
“circumstances to mitigate or extenuate his neglect” and he demonstrated “continuing
disregard for the attorney grievance process”); Wallace,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at     (Slip op.
at 19) (disbarring an attorney for client neglect, charging unreasonable fees, failing to
account for and return monies, and misrepresentations based on “the volume and severity
of the complaints” and his “failure to comply with Bar Counsel’s requests”)), to indefinite
suspension with the right to reapply after a specified period of time (see, e.g., Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 97-98, 753 A.2d 17, 39 (2000) (imposing an
 indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in 90 days on an attorney for failing to appear
19
in court for his client’s trial, failing to communicate with his clients, failing to file a motion,
failing to subpoena witnesses and obtain medical records, and making a false statement to
a juvenile client’s parents); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brugh, 353 Md. 475, 479, 727
A.2d 913, 915 (1999) (imposing an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in 60 days
on an attorney for neglecting and failing to communicate with three clients) (citing Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. David, 331 Md. 317, 323-24, 628 A.2d 178, 181 (1993) (finding that
an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in 6 months was an appropriate sanction
for client neglect in a number of cases where the attorney failed to cooperate with Bar
Counsel and, in one case, misappropriated funds))), to a public reprimand (see, e.g, Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 584-85, 745 A.2d 1045, 1053-54 (2000) (issuing
a public reprimand for an attorney’s client neglect and failure to communicate where the
attorney was “‘well respected’” and had remorse for her misconduct).  The application of
varying sanctions in cases involving client neglect can be explained by this Court’s appraisal
of the mitigating and aggravating factors in the individual cases.  Generally, if there are a
number of mitigating factors present, or an absence of aggravating factors, we are apt to find
that a less severe sanction will serve our stated purpose of protecting the public.  See, e.g.,
Tolar, 357 Md. at 585, 745 A.2d at 1053-54 (citing the attorney’s “remorse for her
misconduct” and holding that a public reprimand would “serve the purpose of protecting the
public just as well as a short suspension”); Brugh, 353 Md. at 479, 727 A.2d at 915 (finding
that an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in one year was not merited where the
20
attorney did not fail to cooperate with Bar Counsel and did not misappropriate funds).  In
cases involving the presence of highly aggravating factors, for instance where an attorney
avoids, ignores, or does not cooperate with Bar Counsel or misappropriates client funds, we
are more inclined to impose a more severe sanction than in those cases in which, for
example, the attorney was cooperative with Bar Counsel throughout the attorney grievance
process or did not misappropriate funds.  Compare Dunietz,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at     (Slip
op. at 12); Wallace,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at     (Slip op. at 19) with Brugh, 353 Md. at 479,
727 A.2d at 915.  See also Brugh, 353 Md. at 479, 727 A.2d at 915 (explaining that in
David, 331 Md. 317, 628 A.2d 178 (1993), a harsher sanction was imposed because “there
were two other aggravating circumstances,” specifically, “the lawyer failed to cooperate with
Bar Counsel, and, in one case, he received funds belonging to the client and failed to remit
them in a timely manner”).
There are both mitigating and aggravating factors in this case.  In Respondent’s favor,
there is no indication that he acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, he admittedly was
suffering from personal problems at the time of his violations, and he has displayed a great
deal of remorse for his actions.  In addition, Respondent has maintained a cooperative
attitude throughout these proceedings, evidenced, in part, by his voluntarily providing to Bar
Counsel the names of three additional clients whose cases he neglected, and has indicated
15  Prior to the evidentiary hearing in this case, Respondent, through his attorney,
notified the clients harmed by his neglect of the status of their cases, and requested that the
individuals “consult with another attorney regarding” their cases and “have that attorney
contact [Respondent] in hopes of working out a resolution.”  In his testimony at the
evidentiary hearing, Respondent agreed that his “clients have all been damaged by [his]
misdeeds,” and indicated that he felt “horrible about them” and hoped he could “resolve
these matters with them.”  At the time of oral argument, Respondent had been contacted by
three of his former clients and was involved in lawsuits brought by two of those clients as
a result of his professional malfeasance.
16  The record and the findings of the hearing judge reveal that at the time of the
evidentiary hearing, Respondent was under the weekly supervision of Dr. Davis, whom he
met with “to insure that he not use illegal drugs,” was regularly attending therapy sessions,
and was attending several meetings a week of Narcotics Anonymous.  The hearing judge,
in describing Respondent’s rehabilitative efforts, explained that both Dr. Davis and Mr.
Vincent “testified that they had worked extensively with Respondent and that he had
‘embraced the recovery program.’”  In addition, the hearing judge found that 
subsequent to his treatment for drug addiction, it was
established that Respondent has resumed his role as a highly
competent practitioner in the courts of this State.  He is clearly
committed to remain free of drugs.  Both expert witnesses in the
(continued...)
21
a desire to remediate the consequences of his neglect.15  Upon accepting the hearing judge’s
findings regarding Respondent’s drug addiction, see supra pages 13-15, the scope of
Respondent’s sanction is also mitigated by the existence of his addiction, which was found
to have caused his professional failures, and by his current effort to seek treatment for his
addiction.  We have “long recognized . . . that rehabilitative efforts by an attorney may
mitigate the severity of misconduct not warranting disbarment.”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 256, 739 A.2d 1, 5 (1999) (citing Kenney, 339 Md. at 588,
64 A.2d at 858-59).  In this case, Respondent has demonstrated an intention to rehabilitate
himself and is participating in a recovery program.16  
16(...continued)
case testified quite convincingly that, to the extent to which
anyone can be said to have an excellent chance of recovery
from drug abuse, such conclusion can be reached with respect
to Respondent. 
At oral argument, neither Petitioner or Respondent indicated that Respondent’s
treatment program had been altered or discontinued.  Our consideration of his rehabilitation
as a mitigating factor, therefore, assumes that Respondent continues participating actively
in pursuing his recovery.   
22
Regarding aggravating factors, the record reveals that on 1 September 1999,
Respondent received a private reprimand for failing to expunge two criminal records.  In
addition, Respondent has “substantial experience in the practice of law,” Monfried,     Md.
at     n.10,     A.2d at     n.10 (Slip Op. at 29 n.10) (citation omitted), and the violations at
issue here involve multiple offenses, specifically the violation of five of the MRPC in his
representation of six clients.
Considering all of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the appropriate
sanction to be imposed in this matter is an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in
thirty (30) days.  Due to the nature of Respondent’s offenses, his admitted inability to
perform his professional duties, and our obligation to impose a sanction which will “protect
the public” and “demonstrate[] to members of this legal profession the type of conduct that
will not be tolerated,” Dunietz,     Md. at    ,     A.2d at     (Slip op. No. 12 at 9) (citation
omitted), we are unwilling to accept Respondent’s recommended sanction of a public
reprimand.  At the same time, however, “[w]e are not unmindful of the benefits of returning
a rehabilitated attorney to the productive practice of law,” and recognize that we “could be
17  Members of the Bar and the judiciary submitted letters on Respondent’s behalf to
the Attorney Grievance Commission and described Respondent as an “asset to the legal
practice,” a “fine lawyer,” a “honorable member of the Bar,” and an “effective,”
“responsible,” “honest,” and “competent” attorney.
23
doing a disservice by forever barring” Respondent from “returning to the practice of law”
or by prolonging his absence to such an extent that it would be difficult for him to return.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 365, 624 A.2d 503, 514
(1993).
There was evidence adduced as to Respondent’s long and otherwise reputable
career.17  Coupled with his desire to fulfill his obligations to his former clients, we can see
also some benefit to the potential of his return as a rehabilitated attorney.  Our sanction,
therefore, takes cognizance of the particular circumstances in this case, but also gives due
regard to our obligation to protect the public, by ensuring that Respondent does not reenter
the practice of law until he demonstrates and provides relative assurance that he is capable
of doing so successfully.  In seeking reinstatement, attention should be given to the matters
underlying the various conditions proposed by the parties in their sanction recommendations
here.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
24
COMMISSION AGAINST CRAIG
S T E V E N  
G A R F I E L D ;
RESPONDENT’S 
SUSPENSION
SHALL COMMENCE THIRTY DAYS
FROM THE FILING OF THIS
OPINION