Title: Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 16  
Docket: 
Cum-16-28 
Argued:  
September 15, 2016 
Decided: 
January 26, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF MERRILL P. ROBBINS 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF CUMBERLAND et al. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins appeals from a judgment of the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Mills, J.) affirming the Town of 
Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination that the Town’s 
proposed development is permitted within the Low Density Residential district 
as a “municipal use.”1  Because the plain language of the Cumberland Zoning 
Ordinance supports the Board’s interpretation, we affirm.  
                                         
1  We agree with the Superior Court’s assessment that the operative decision from which this 
appeal arises is the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ decision because the Board acted “as both fact 
finder and decision maker.”  Peregrine Developers, LLC v. Town of Orono, 2004 ME 95, ¶ 9, 854 A.2d 
216.  (quotation marks omitted).   
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 2014, the Town of Cumberland purchased property located in 
Cumberland known as the Broad Cove Reserve.  The property is located in the 
Low Density Residential district (LDR zone).  In the spring of 2015, the Town 
submitted to the Cumberland Planning Board an application for site plan 
review for a proposed development involving the Broad Cove Reserve 
property.  In its application, the Town stated that the purpose of the 
development was “to provide low-impact passive recreation along the Casco 
Bay shoreline for the residents of Cumberland.”  Specifically, the Town 
endeavored to create public access walking trails, construct a parking lot, and 
relocate an existing bathhouse.  
[¶3]  On July 16, 2015, the Cumberland Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) 
determined that the Town’s proposed use was permitted in the LDR zone as a 
“municipal use,” a designation defined in the ordinance.  Cumberland, Me., 
Zoning Ordinance § 315-4 (Mar. 26, 2012).  The CEO submitted his comments 
to the Planning Board, and after a public hearing, the Board approved the 
Town’s application.  The Estate, which owns land abutting the Broad Cove 
Reserve property, subsequently appealed the CEO’s decision, arguing that the 
Town’s development constituted an “outdoor recreational facility,” and was 
 
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thus prohibited in the LDR zone under the terms of the ordinance.  The Board 
of Adjustment and Appeals agreed with the CEO’s interpretation and 
determined that the Town’s proposed facility was permissible within the LDR 
zone as a “municipal use.”  The Estate subsequently appealed to the Superior 
Court, and the court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the 
ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination that 
the Town’s proposed use of the Broad Cove Reserve property was a “municipal 
use,” and was thus permissible within the LDR zone.  The Estate appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶4]  On appeal, the parties do not dispute the description or the physical 
characteristics of the Town’s proposed facility, nor do they contest its proper 
characterization under the ordinance as an “outdoor recreational facility.”  
Rather, they offer competing interpretations of the zoning ordinance, 
specifically with regard to how it is applied to the Town’s proposed facility.  The 
interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, and we review the 
relevant portions of the Town of Cumberland Zoning Ordinance de novo.  
Kittery Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 10, 856 A.2d 1183.   
 
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B. 
The Town of Cumberland Zoning Ordinance 
 
[¶5]  The Estate argues that because the Town’s proposed facility may be 
characterized as either a “municipal use” or an “outdoor recreational facility,” 
and because a “municipal use,” but not an “outdoor recreational facility,” is 
permitted in the LDR zone, the relevant provisions of the ordinance are in 
conflict.  Further, the Estate argues that because of this asserted conflict, we 
must look beyond the plain language of the ordinance to interpret the 
conflicting provisions.  And because the provisions here cannot be harmonized, 
the Estate argues, we must conclude that the Town’s facility is an “outdoor 
recreational facility,” and is thus prohibited in the LDR zone.  
 
[¶6]  The Town, on the other hand, contends that the language of the 
ordinance is clear and unambiguous, and that we need not look past the text of 
the ordinance itself to interpret the relevant provisions.  Alternatively, the 
Town argues, if the provisions here are in conflict, they may be harmonized in 
a way that permits the Town’s proposed development.   
 
[¶7]  We interpret the Town of Cumberland Zoning Ordinance de novo 
and “look first to the plain meaning of the terms of the ordinance to give effect 
to the legislative intent.”  Lane Constr. Corp. v. Town of Washington, 2007 ME 31, 
¶ 7, 916 A.2d 973.  “[I]f the meaning of the . . . ordinance is clear, we need not 
 
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look beyond the words themselves.”  Wister v. Town of Mt. Desert, 2009 ME 66, 
¶ 17, 974 A.2d 903.  
 
[¶8]  The Town of Cumberland Zoning Ordinance defines a “municipal 
use” as “[a]ny use or building maintained by the Town of Cumberland.” 
Cumberland, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 315-4 (Mar. 26, 2012).  It defines an 
“outdoor recreational facility,” in pertinent part, as 
[a] place designed and equipped primarily for the conduct of 
nonmotorized outdoor sports, leisure-time activities, and other 
customary and usual recreational activities, excluding boat 
launching facilities, amusement parks, and campgrounds.  
 
Id.  “Municipal uses” are permitted within the LDR zone, whereas “outdoor 
recreational facilities” are not.  Id. § 315-7.  
 
[¶9]  The language of the ordinance is clear and unambiguous.  It provides 
that “any use” by the Town of Cumberland qualifies as a “municipal use,” and 
that these uses are permitted in the LDR zone.  Id. §§ 315-4, 315-7.  There are 
no carveouts or exceptions, though some uses that are “municipal” are defined 
elsewhere in the ordinance.  The Estate’s argument, if accepted, would have us 
interpret the ordinance as limiting permissible “municipal uses” in the LDR 
zone to only those uses that are otherwise explicitly permitted within the zone.  
Such an interpretation would not only require us to read additional language 
 
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into the provision, it would also have the effect of limiting the Town’s ability to 
operate municipal facilities throughout the Town’s various zones. 
 
[¶10]  Because the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance 
is unambiguous, we affirm the court’s judgment that in turn affirmed the Board 
of Adjustment and Appeals’ decision allowing the Town’s proposed facility 
within the LDR zone.2  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scott D. Anderson, Esq. (orally), and Juliet T. Browne, Esq., Verrill Dana, LLP, 
Portland, for appellant Estate of Merrill P. Robbins 
 
Natalie L. Burns, Esq. (orally) and Alyssa C. Tibbetts, Esq., Jensen Baird 
Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellee Town of Cumberland 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2015-35 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
 
                                         
2  Because we conclude that the language of the ordinance is clear and unambiguous, we do not 
reach the Estate’s argument regarding harmonization of the provisions.