Title: People v. Ovieda

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIE OVIEDA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S247235 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B277860 
 
Santa Barbara County Superior Court 
1476460 
 
 
August 12, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
S247235 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
In People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, the lead opinion 
of this court articulated a “community caretaking” exception to 
the warrant requirement for government entry into a private 
residence, suggesting that “circumstances short of a perceived 
emergency may justify a warrantless entry” into a home.  (Id. 
at p. 473 (lead opn. of Brown, J.).)  Under United States 
Supreme Court authority, a warrantless home entry is 
unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement, like exigent circumstances, which 
includes the need to render emergency aid.  We conclude that 
an entry for reasons short of a perceived emergency, or similar 
exigency, fails to satisfy the relevant constitutional standard.  
We disapprove the lead opinion in People v. Ray, supra, 21 
Cal.4th 464 to the extent it conflicts with the views expressed 
here.   
I.  BACKGROUND1 
On June 17, 2015, officers were dispatched to defendant’s 
home in Santa Barbara after family members reported he was 
suicidal and had access to a gun.  Five officers responded and 
set up a perimeter.  They learned defendant was inside with 
two friends, Trevor Case and his wife, Amber Woellert.  
                                        
1  
The facts are taken from the hearing on defendant’s 
suppression motion.  (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
Defendant’s family was not at the scene and his roommate was 
out of town.  Officers were able to contact Case, who came out 
to speak with them.   
Case related that the three had been in defendant’s room 
when defendant began talking about suicide, which he had 
attempted before.  Defendant reached for a pistol near the bed, 
but Case and Woellert were able to disarm him.  Defendant 
then tried to grab a gun from the bedroom closet and was again 
restrained.  Woellert remained with defendant while Case 
collected the handgun, two rifles, and ammunition and put 
them in the garage.   
Remaining with the officers, Case called Woellert.  She 
emerged with defendant, who was placed in handcuffs and 
searched.  Case was very emotional and so concerned about 
defendant that he had alerted defendant’s family members, 
prompting their call to police.  Officers Corbett and Bruce 
entered the home to do a “protective sweep to secure the 
premises” and make sure there was no one else inside who 
might be armed, injured, or in need of aid.   
Officer Corbett testified that, based on his experience, 
each situation is different and requires consideration of 
multiple possible factors, though “safety of persons is 
paramount.”  He and Bruce were “unsure if all parties were 
accounted for,” did not have a clear picture of what had caused 
the situation, and “felt duty bound to secure the premises and 
make sure there were no people inside that were injured or in 
need of assistance.”   
The two officers entered with guns drawn because 
“[t]here was talk of multiple weapons in the house” and the 
situation was “emotional and dynamic.”  They moved slowly 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
through the house, checking rooms and closets where people in 
need of help might be found.  Corbett had no intent to search 
for criminal conduct and had “no reason to believe any other 
criminal activity was afoot.”   
After entry and during the sweep, Corbett noted “an 
overwhelmingly strong odor of marijuana” and numerous items 
related to “marijuana cultivation and concentrated cannabis 
production.”  He also saw ammunition, a gun case, scales, and 
a large industrial drying oven with ducts leading to the garage.  
On cross-examination, Corbett acknowledged that Case had 
said the guns had been taken away from defendant and that 
only he, Woellert, and defendant had been in the house.  Case 
never said that any domestic violence was involved or that 
anyone else was inside.  Corbett had no information that there 
were any other people in the home.   
Officer Garcia also testified and largely confirmed 
Corbett’s testimony.  Garcia spoke to Case once he came 
outside.  Case was distraught and tearful during the 
conversation.  Brought outside by Woellert, defendant was 
searched and handcuffed.  He denied being suicidal or having 
any guns.  The on-scene officers collectively decided to conduct 
a safety sweep.  On cross-examination, Garcia conceded that 
officers had no “specific information that led [them] to believe 
somebody else was inside.”  They were told that defendant’s 
roommate was in Washington State.  Case did not know if 
there were other guns in the house beside those he had taken 
to the garage.   
More officers were called to the scene.  No search 
warrant was ever obtained.  Ultimately, large quantities of 
guns, ammunition, and drug-producing equipment were 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
removed from the house and garage.  The recovered weaponry 
included a submachine gun and a rifle with a long-range scope.   
Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled 
substance, importing an assault weapon, and possessing a 
silencer and short-barreled rifle.2  He moved to suppress the 
evidence found in his home.  At the suppression hearing, 
neither officer testified that they had asked defendant’s 
permission to enter to check for others or that they questioned 
the veracity of Case and Woellert.  They mentioned no noise or 
movement in the house or garage creating concern that others 
might be inside or that anything was amiss there.  They were 
not asked what, if anything, they intended to do with 
defendant or whether he would have been allowed to return to 
the residence.  They did not rely on that possibility to justify 
the need for the protective sweep.  The prosecution based its 
case on the community caretaking exception, not on exigent 
circumstances.  The court denied the motion.  It accepted the 
officers’ testimony regarding “what they knew, what they were 
concerned about and what they didn’t know.”  The court 
reasoned the officers were not required to accept Case’s word 
that he had removed the firearms and noted they would be 
“subject to criticism” if something untoward had occurred 
because they did not conduct a sweep for others who might 
pose a danger or need assistance.   
After pleading guilty to the manufacturing count and to 
possession of an assault weapon,3 defendant was placed on 
                                        
2  
See Health and Safety Code section 11379.6, subdivision 
(a); Penal Code sections 30600, subdivision (a), 33410, 33210.   
3  
Penal Code section 30605, subdivision (a).   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
probation.  A divided Court of Appeal upheld the search under 
the community caretaking exception.  (People v. Ovieda (2018) 
19 Cal.App.5th 614, 619-623, review granted Apr. 25, 2018, 
S247235.)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Warrant Requirement and the Exigent 
Circumstances Exception 
Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; 
Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)  “In California, issues relating to the 
suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches 
and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional 
standards.”  (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 605 
(Troyer).)  “ ‘[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is “reasonableness.” ’ ”  (Riley v. California (2014) 
573 U.S. 373, 381; People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 
1213.)  “[T]he ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.’ ”  (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585 
(Payton); see People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 919.)  
“[I]t is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.’ ”  (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 
385, 390 (Mincey); see Riley, at p. 382.)  “The burden is on the 
People to establish an exception applies.”  (Macabeo, at p. 
1213.)  “ ‘ “ ‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, 
express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.  
In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we 
exercise our independent judgment.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1212.)   
“ ‘A 
long-recognized 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement exists when “exigent circumstances” make 
necessary the conduct of a warrantless search.’ ”  (People v. 
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.)  The term “exigent 
circumstances” describes “ ‘ “an emergency situation requiring 
swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious 
damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a 
suspect or destruction of evidence.  There is no ready litmus 
test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in 
each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be 
measured by the facts known to the officers.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  The 
high court has recognized that exigent circumstances may exist 
where there is probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed but “an emergency leaves police insufficient time to 
seek a warrant.”  (Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) __ U.S. __, 
__ [136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173].)  It has also found exigency when an 
entry or search appears reasonably necessary to render 
emergency aid, whether or not a crime might be involved.  “We 
do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency 
situations.  Numerous state and federal cases have recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from 
making 
warrantless 
entries 
and 
searches 
when 
they 
reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate 
aid. . . .  ‘The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious 
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal 
absent an exigency or emergency.’  [Citation.]  And the police 
may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course 
of their legitimate emergency activities.”  (Mincey, supra, 437 
U.S. at pp. 392-393, fns. omitted.)  “Accordingly, law 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to 
render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to 
protect an occupant from imminent injury.”  (Brigham City v. 
Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 (Brigham City).)   
Thus, the exigent circumstances exception applies to 
situations requiring prompt police action.  These situations 
may arise when officers are responding to or investigating 
criminal activity and when there is a need for emergency aid, 
even if unrelated to criminal conduct.  Examples of exigent 
circumstances in prior cases include “ ‘hot pursuit’ ” of a fleeing 
suspect (United States v. Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42-43); 
preventing the imminent destruction of evidence (see Kentucky 
v. King (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 460); fighting a fire (Michigan v. 
Tyler (1978) 436 U.S. 499, 509); intervening in a physical 
altercation or crime in progress, or providing emergency help 
(see Brigham City, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 406-407; see also 
Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 48-49).  Lower federal 
courts have also recognized that a warrantless entry in 
response to an actively suicidal person may be justified to 
prevent injury.  “[T]he threat an individual poses to himself 
may create an exigency that makes the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless entry is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  (Rice v. 
ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 2014) 770 F.3d 1122, 1131; see 
also Fitzgerald v. Santoro (7th Cir. 2013) 707 F.3d 725, 732; 
Roberts v. Spielman (11th Cir. 2011) 643 F.3d 899, 905-906; 
Hancock v. Dodson (6th Cir. 1992) 958 F.2d 1367, 1375-1376.)   
If the officers here were lawfully inside defendant’s 
home, they could seize contraband in plain sight.  (See 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 464-465 
(Coolidge); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
366, 375.)  They could also rely on what they had seen to 
secure a warrant to conduct a more extensive search.  (See 
Michigan v. Clifford (1984) 464 U.S. 287, 294 (Clifford).)  This 
case turns on whether the initial entry of Officers Corbett and 
Bruce was lawful.   
This case does not fall into any recognized scenario 
describing exigent circumstances, and the Attorney General 
does not argue otherwise.4  Nor does the Attorney General rely 
on the need for a “protective sweep.”  While it was undisputed 
that defendant was suicidal when officers arrived at his home, 
he subsequently came outside and was restrained.  The officers 
cited concerns that unknown persons might be in the house, 
and that there may have been victims or loaded firearms 
inside.  While these concerns are obviously important, the 
People elicited no testimony to show the officers reasonably 
believed they were actually in play.   
“ ‘As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer’s 
conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to 
him at the moment of the search or seizure which would 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate.  [Citation.]  And in determining 
whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given 
not to his unparticularized suspicions or “hunches,” but to the 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 
facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be 
able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he 
concluded that his action was necessary.’ ”  (People v. Duncan 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 91, 97-98 (Duncan).)   
                                        
4  
The People took the same position in the Court of Appeal.   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
Here, the officers pointed to no such facts.  If they 
existed, the prosecution failed to elicit them.  Indeed, the facts 
in the record point to the contrary.  The officers responded to a 
dispatch that defendant was suicidal.  Case, defendant’s friend, 
told officers that he, his wife, and defendant were the only 
people in the house and that defendant had been disarmed.  All 
three were outside before the officers entered.  Although 
officers were not required to take Case at his word, the only 
immediate danger reported was that defendant might harm 
himself.  But, before the entry, defendant was in handcuffs and 
under police control.  There were no reports that shots had 
been fired, that defendant had threatened anyone else, or that 
there were any victims inside the house.  (Compare with 
Tamborino v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 919, 922-924; 
People v. Stamper (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 301, 304-306 
(Stamper).)  The officers mentioned no sounds or possible 
movement in the house or any suspicious behavior by 
defendant or his friends during the initial interaction.  
Further, possession of legal firearms in a home is generally 
lawful (see District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 
576-635), and their presence in an apparently empty home 
does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances.  
There was no indication that firearms were accessible to others 
or that they posed a threat to officers or the public.  The People 
cite no authority, and we have found none, where an exigency 
was found to exist based on facts similar to those here.   
B.  Community Caretaking 
Even in the absence of exigency, both the trial court and 
the Court of Appeal majority concluded the warrantless entry 
here was justified under the so-called “community caretaking” 
exception.  We begin our discussion with People v. Ray, supra, 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
21 Cal.4th 464 (Ray), where the lead opinion of this court 
recognized a nonemergency community caretaking exception 
permitting residential entry.  For the reasons discussed below, 
we conclude no such exception exists and that the Ray lead 
opinion was wrong to create one.  As we discuss in further 
detail, the United States Supreme Court has articulated the 
concept of community caretaking, but only in the context of 
vehicle searches.   
1.  Ray 
In Ray, someone called police and reported that a 
neighbor’s front door “ ‘has been open all day and it’s all a 
shambles inside.’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 468 (lead opn. 
of Brown, J.).)  Officers responded and confirmed that the door 
was open and “ ‘the front room appeared to be ransacked as if 
someone went through it.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Officers knocked and 
announced their presence but received no reply.  They then 
entered “to conduct a security check ‘to see if anyone inside 
might be injured, disabled, or unable to obtain help.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
The house was empty, but officers found drugs and cash in 
plain view.  They left and obtained a search warrant.  (Id. at 
pp. 468-469.)   
The lead opinion garnered three votes to amplify the 
community caretaking exception.  It drew a distinction 
between exigent circumstances and community caretaking.  An 
exigent circumstances analysis is appropriate, it said, when 
officers “ ‘are searching for evidence or perpetrators of a 
crime.’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 471 (lead opn. of Brown, 
J.).)  For the exception to apply, officers must (1) have probable 
cause for a search or seizure; and (2) show that, because of the 
circumstances, there is no time to obtain a warrant.  (Ibid.)  
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
The community caretaking exception, the lead opinion 
maintained, applies when officers are not involved in crime 
solving, but are, instead, providing some kind of aid unrelated 
to criminal investigation.  (Ibid.)   
The lead opinion then asserted that the community 
caretaking exception arises in two situations:  entry to render 
emergency aid and entry to preserve life or property.  While 
conceptually these situations seem to substantially overlap, 
the lead opinion analyzed them under different standards.  
When relying on the need to render emergency aid, the People 
must demonstrate “specific, articulable facts indicating the 
need for ‘ “swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or 
serious damage to property.” ’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 
472 (lead opn. of Brown, J.).)  The lead opinion concluded the 
People failed to do so on the record before it.  Accordingly, it 
rejected reliance on the need to render emergency aid.  (Id. at 
p. 473.)   
However, the lead opinion held that a different facet of 
community caretaking, requiring a less stringent showing, 
could justify the entry.  It pronounced:  “Under the community 
caretaking exception, circumstances short of a perceived 
emergency may justify a warrantless entry, including the 
protection of property, as ‘where the police reasonably believe 
that 
the 
premises have 
recently 
been or are being 
burglarized.’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 473 (lead opn. of 
Brown, J.), italics added.)  According to the lead opinion, under 
the less demanding aspect of the community caretaking 
exception, the question is:  “Given the known facts, would a 
prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in 
the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking 
functions?”  (Id. at p. 477.)   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
The lead opinion concluded, “The facts before us precisely 
illustrate one facet of law enforcement’s community caretaking 
functions.”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 478 (lead opn. of 
Brown, J.).)  It reasoned that “[w]hile the facts known to the 
officers may not have established exigent circumstances or the 
apparent need to render emergency aid, they warranted 
further inquiry to resolve the possibility someone inside 
required assistance or property needed protection.  In such 
circumstances, ‘entering the premises was the only practical 
means of determining whether there was anyone inside in need 
of assistance [or property in need of protection].’ ”  (Ibid.)   
As noted, the lead opinion did not garner a majority.  
Neither its holding nor its reasoning constitutes binding 
precedent.  A separate three-justice concurrence agreed in the 
result that the entry was proper.  It did not embrace the lead 
opinion’s lesser community caretaking rationale.  Instead, it 
urged that, under an exigency analysis, entry was permitted.  
“ ‘We have defined “exigent circumstances” to include “an 
emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent 
imminent danger to life or serious damage to property. . . .”  
[Citation.]  The action must be “prompted by the motive of 
preserving life or property and [must] reasonably appear[] to 
the actor to be necessary for that purpose.” ’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 
Cal.4th at p. 481 (conc. opn. of George, C. J.), quoting Duncan, 
supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 97.)  The concurring justices determined 
that the facts in Ray supported a warrantless entry without 
the need to expand available warrant exceptions.  “Exigent 
circumstances existed, because the officers had reasonable 
cause to believe a burglary was in progress, or that a burglary 
had been committed and there might be persons inside the 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
residence in need of assistance.”  (Ray, at p. 482 (conc. opn. of 
George, C. J.).)   
The lone dissent “firmly reject[ed] the suggestion that we 
should create a broad new exception to the Fourth Amendment 
protection against warrantless searches, permitting police 
officers to enter a residence, even when there is no immediate 
threat to its occupants, merely as part of their ‘community 
caretaking functions.’  Such an exception threatens to swallow 
the rule that absent a showing of true necessity, the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to security and privacy in 
one’s home must prevail.  I strongly disagree with the 
assumption that the warrantless search of a residence, under 
nonexigent circumstances, can be justified on the paternalistic 
premise that ‘We’re from the government and we’re here to 
help you.’ ”  (Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 482 (dis. opn. of 
Mosk, J.).)  The dissent concluded that “[t]he circumstances did 
not warrant a reasonable belief that entry was necessary to 
preserve life or property.  To the extent that the officers 
believed they were called upon to perform a community 
caretaking function, it would have sufficed to shut the door.”  
(Id. at p. 487.)   
2.  Roberts, Hill, and California Authorities 
In recognizing a community caretaking exception, the 
lead opinion discerned support in People v. Roberts (1956) 47 
Cal.2d 374 (Roberts) and People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731 
(Hill).  (See Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 473-474 (lead opn. of 
Brown, J.).)  In Roberts, a car potentially involved in a 
commercial burglary was registered to a woman living in a San 
Francisco apartment.  The apartment manager told officers 
that the defendant “also lived in the same apartment and that 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
he had not worked often and was sickly.”  (Roberts, at p. 376.)  
Officers knocked on the door and received no response but 
“heard several moans or groans that sounded as if a person in 
the apartment [was] in distress, and the manager let them into 
the apartment at their request.”  (Ibid.)  Officers found no one 
but discovered a radio stolen in the burglary.  Based on this 
observation, they obtained a search warrant.   
Roberts upheld the entry.  The court initially noted the 
trial judge “found that the officers reasonably believed that 
someone inside the apartment was in distress and in need of 
assistance and that they entered for the purpose of giving aid.”  
(Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 377.)  While cautioning that 
“[t]he privilege to enter to render aid does not, of course, justify 
a search of the premises for some other purpose” (id. at p. 378), 
the Roberts court held that, once inside, police could seize 
stolen items in plain view, reasoning:  “The trial court found on 
substantial evidence that the entry was lawful for the purpose 
of rendering aid, hence the officers were justified in entering 
each room of the apartment to look for someone in distress.  
The radio was in plain sight, and it fitted the general 
description of property known by the officers to be stolen.  
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no reason in law 
or common sense why one of the officers could not pick up the 
radio and examine it for the purpose of dispelling or confirming 
his suspicions.”  (Id. at p. 380.)  Plain view observations made 
from a position in which officers otherwise have a right to be do 
not “constitute a search.”  (Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 
43.)   
In Hill, two men arrived at a house to buy drugs.  Inside, 
they were accosted by two assailants.  One of the two men was 
shot and taken by a witness to a hospital where he died.  The 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
assailants fled.  (Hill, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 740.)  Officers 
were sent to the scene and received no response when they 
announced their presence.  They entered the house and found 
evidence related to the shooting in plain view.  Although 
rejecting the claim that the entry was justified by “the ‘hot 
pursuit’ doctrine,” Hill upheld the search because “the 
circumstances were sufficiently ‘exigent’ so as to justify an 
immediate entry and search of the premises,” relying on 
Roberts.  (Id. at p. 754.)  Hill reasoned:  “[W]e note that 
immediately after the police learned of the shooting on Juanita 
Street officers were dispatched to investigate.  They knew only 
that a shooting had very recently occurred and that one person 
suffering from serious wounds had been brought to a hospital.  
The officers found fresh bloodstains on the fence and porch of 
the Juanita Street murder site and on an automobile parked 
outside.  They also observed through a porch window what 
appeared to be bloodstains on the floor inside the house.  
Although only one casualty had thus far been reported, others 
may have been injured and may have been abandoned on the 
premises.  There was no response when the officers knocked 
and announced themselves, and entering the premises was the 
only practical means of determining whether there was anyone 
inside in need of assistance.  If there was, the delay incidental 
to obtaining a search warrant could have resulted in the 
unnecessary loss of life.  Under the circumstances it was 
reasonable for the officers to believe that the shooting may 
have resulted in other casualties in addition to that reported to 
the police and that an immediate entry was necessary to 
render aid to anyone in distress.  The People, therefore, have 
borne their burden of demonstrating the existence of 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
circumstances which justify the warrantless entry of the 
Juanita Street residence.”  (Id. at p. 755.)   
The line between a mere hunch and a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts can be a fine one, but such 
a line does exist.  If all that is required is the possibility that 
someone in some house might require aid, any officer on patrol 
might urge that people in homes often need help and the officer 
entered to make sure assistance was not required.  As Justice 
Perren observed in his dissent below:  “Ignorance of a fact, 
without more, does not raise a suspicion of its existence.”  
(People v. Ovieda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 629 (dis. opn. of 
Perren, J.), review granted.)  Roberts and Hill are examples of 
the kind of articulable facts that can support a reasonable 
suspicion of the need to enter to deal with an emergency.   
The Ray lead opinion failed to acknowledge that, while 
Roberts and Hill did involve entries to render potential aid, 
they both involved emergency situations based on articulable 
facts.  Neither case suggested that warrantless entry to render 
nonemergency aid would be justified.  As the Roberts court 
observed, “Necessity often justifies an action which would 
otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is 
[undertaken to preserve] life or property and reasonably 
appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.”  
(Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 377, italics added.)  Similarly, 
Hill concluded an exigency existed “and that an immediate 
entry was necessary to render aid to anyone in distress.”  (Hill, 
supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 755, italics added.)  The presence of 
necessity emphasized by both cases is incompatible with the 
nonemergency entry condoned by the Ray lead opinion.  (See 
Horack v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 720, 726; People v. 
Soldoff (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.)   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
Aside from the Court of Appeal below, no published 
California case after Ray has applied the concept of community 
caretaking outside the context of a vehicle inventory.  At least 
two cases have concluded that no substantial evidence existed 
to support a community caretaking search.  People v. Madrid 
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050 held the doctrine did not justify a 
traffic stop where police believed a passenger may have been 
ill.  (Id. at pp. 1057-1060.)  People v. Morton (2003) 114 
Cal.App.4th 1039 held the belief that there had been a 
“ ‘marijuana rip off’ ” at a residence was unsupported by 
substantial evidence and a warrantless entry was not excused.  
(Id. at pp. 1048-1049; see also People v. Camacho (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 824, 837, fn. 4.)   
The need to render emergency aid is a well-recognized 
part of the exigent circumstances exception.  But it has always 
required that articulable facts support a reasonable belief that 
an emergency exists.  The Ray lead opinion, having found no 
such facts were established, created a less demanding 
exception.  It purported to permit a warrantless entry if some 
kind of police assistance might be rendered but the need was 
merely hypothetical.   
The Ray lead opinion’s diluted exception was not 
supported by our prior jurisprudence.  The circumstances it 
describes 
as 
community 
caretaking 
do 
not 
involve 
nonemergency situations at all.  Rather, it describes situations 
that could be emergencies but lack sufficient articulable facts 
to reasonably suggest an emergency exists.  It suggested that 
entry was justified “to resolve the possibility someone inside 
required assistance or property needed protection.”  (Ray, 
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 478 (lead opn. of Brown, J.), italics 
added.)  If officers had articulated facts to believe someone 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
inside needed immediate aid or that a crime was ongoing, they 
could enter based on those exigent circumstances.  The lead 
opinion’s suggestion that an entry is justified to explore the 
possibility that those facts exist dilutes the appropriate 
standard for exigency.  Indeed, such a suggestion is 
inconsistent with our later clarification in Troyer, supra, 51 
Cal.4th 599 that, although police do not “need ‘ironclad proof of 
“a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the 
emergency aid exception,’ ” (id. at p. 602), officers must possess 
“an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant 
was seriously injured or threatened with such injury” (id. at p. 
607).  The line falls between the mere inchoate possibility that 
an emergency could exist and the officer’s articulation of facts 
that make it reasonable, even if uncertain, to believe an 
emergency does exist.   
The officers here surmised that there may have been 
others in the house who required aid or posed a threat if 
allowed access to unsecured firearms.  Those could be exigent 
circumstances justifying warrantless entry, but the objective 
facts that elevate speculation to reasonable suspicion were not 
present or were not articulated at the suppression hearing.  
(Cf. Troyer, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 607; People v. Pou (2017) 11 
Cal.App.5th 143, 151-152; Stamper, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 305-306.)   
Further, even though the officers here could not 
articulate facts pointing to an emergency, they were not 
without recourse.  If officers reasonably believed that 
defendant was a danger to himself or others due to a mental 
disorder, they could have temporarily taken him into custody 
for a mental health evaluation.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5150, 
subd. (a), 5260; see People v. Triplett (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
283, 286-288.)  If they had done so, they could have obtained a 
warrant for the seizure of defendant’s firearms.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1524, subd. (a)(10); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 8102, subd. (a).)   
3.  United States Supreme Court Precedent 
Scant high court precedent supports Ray’s lead opinion.  
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has never applied 
the concept of a community caretaking search outside the 
context of an automobile inventory.  In Cady v. Dombrowski 
(1973) 413 U.S. 433 (Cady), Dombrowski was an off-duty 
policeman involved in a single-car accident.  He was arrested 
for drunk driving and taken to a hospital, while his car was 
towed to a local garage.  Dombrowski was required to carry his 
service revolver at all times but did not have it with him when 
arrested.5  An officer who went to the garage to search for the 
gun saw blood and other evidence in the car that linked 
Dombrowski to a murder.  (Cady, at pp. 435-439.)   
In upholding the search, Cady took great pains to 
distinguish between home and vehicle searches.  “Because of 
the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also 
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become 
disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the 
extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be 
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or 
office. . . .  Local police officers, unlike federal officers, 
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no 
                                        
5  
Dombrowski was a Chicago police officer and “[t]he 
Wisconsin policemen believed that Chicago police officers were 
required by regulation to carry their service revolvers at all 
times.”  (Cady, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 436.)   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a 
better term, may be described as community caretaking 
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute.”  (Cady, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 441.)  The court 
observed, “The constitutional difference between searches of 
and seizures from houses and similar structures and from 
vehicles stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter 
and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal contact 
with automobiles will bring local officials in ‘plain view’ of 
evidence, 
fruits, 
or 
instrumentalities 
of 
a 
crime, 
or 
contraband.”  (Id. at p. 442.)  Cady emphasized that “police had 
exercised a form of custody or control over” the car (id. at pp. 
442-443), and “the search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver 
was ‘standard procedure in [that police] department,’ to protect 
the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into 
untrained or perhaps malicious hands” (id. at p. 443).   
Cady concluded the search was reasonable under the 
circumstances:  “The Court’s previous recognition of the 
distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places leads 
us to conclude that the type of caretaking ‘search’ conducted 
here of a vehicle that was neither in the custody nor on the 
premises of its owner, and that had been placed where it was 
by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely 
because a warrant had not been obtained. . . .  Where, as here, 
the trunk of an automobile, which the officer reasonably 
believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by 
vandals, we hold that the search was not ‘unreasonable’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  
(Cady, supra, 413 U.S. at pp. 447-448.)  The high court later 
applied Cady’s reasoning to uphold inventory searches of 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
impounded cars and containers in them.  (See Colorado v. 
Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 374-376 (Bertine); South Dakota v. 
Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 367-376 (Opperman); see also 
Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 60-62.)   
Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized 
exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency 
community caretaking functions, much less apply such an 
exception to the search of homes.  Cady did not suggest that a 
community caretaking rationale alone could justify the search 
there.  Instead, the court emphasized that police had taken 
constructive possession of the car in question and searched it 
pursuant to a standardized procedure.  (Cady, supra, 413 U.S. 
at pp. 442-443.)  Cady and the other cases all involved searches 
of vehicles in police custody.  The caretaking function entailed 
only the securing of items in those vehicles.   
None of the rationales justifying the results in Cady and 
subsequent cases apply here.  This search involved a home, 
“where privacy expectations are most heightened.”  (California 
v. Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 213.)  The Fourth Amendment 
“reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves 
should be free from arbitrary government interference,” and 
“the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has 
stressed ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home 
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of 
the Republic.’ ”  (Oliver v. United States (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 
178.)  The court has repeatedly acknowledged that vehicles and 
homes are afforded different levels of constitutional protection.  
(See Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 372; Opperman, supra, 428 
U.S. at p. 367; Cady, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 442; see also 
Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 48; Carroll v. United 
States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153.)   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
Outside of the inventory search context, the high court 
has taken a dim view of warrantless entries in the absence of 
exigency.  In Mincey, the court rejected a blanket murder scene 
exception to the warrant requirement.  It acknowledged that 
“when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may 
make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there 
are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises.”  
(Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 392.)  Yet, Mincey reasoned that 
“a warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the 
exigencies which justify its initiation,’ [citation] and it simply 
cannot be contended that this search was justified by any 
emergency threatening life or limb.  All the persons in Mincey’s 
apartment had been located before the investigating homicide 
officers arrived there and began their search.  And a four-day 
search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up 
carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate 
concerns that justify an emergency search.”  (Id. at p. 393; see 
Flippo v. West Virginia (1999) 528 U.S. 11, 14.)  Similarly, the 
court has observed that “[a] burning building of course creates 
an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to 
fight the blaze.  Moreover, . . . once in the building, officials 
need no warrant to remain for ‘a reasonable time to investigate 
the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished.’  [Citation.]  
Where, however, reasonable expectations of privacy remain in 
the fire-damaged property, additional investigations begun 
after the fire has been extinguished and fire and police officials 
have left the scene, generally must be made pursuant to a 
warrant or the identification of some new exigency.”  (Clifford, 
supra, 464 U.S. at p. 293, fn. omitted.)   
These cases establish that an emergency might initially 
justify a warrantless entry or search.  But once that exigency 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
has abated and the premises vacated, a subsequent 
warrantless entry or search is not justified.  This approach is 
consistent with the high court’s well-established principle “that 
searches and seizures inside a man’s house without warrant 
are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number 
of well defined ‘exigent circumstances.’ ”  (Coolidge, supra, 403 
U.S. at pp. 477-478.)  In Payton, supra, 445 U.S. 573, the court 
noted:  “In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and 
to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a 
firm line at the entrance to the house.  Absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.”  (Id. at p. 590.)  High court decisions “have 
emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
‘few in number and carefully delineated,’ [citation] and that 
the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to 
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless 
searches or arrests.  Indeed, the Court has recognized only a 
few such emergency conditions . . . .”  (Welsh v. Wisconsin 
(1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750.)   
The Attorney General urges at length that the officers 
here were not motivated by a desire to investigate crime but, 
rather, to ensure public safety or render aid to potential 
victims.  However, the United States Supreme Court has made 
clear that an officer’s subjective intent plays no role in the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry.  “An action is ‘reasonable’ under 
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s 
state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
justify [the] action.’  [Citation.]  The officer’s subjective 
motivation is irrelevant.”  (Brigham City, supra,  547 U.S. at p. 
404; see also Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813.)  
The officers here may well have acted with the very best of 
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
intentions.  But just as an officer’s venial motives will 
generally not undermine an otherwise valid search, a benign 
intent cannot save an invalid one.   
The Attorney General likens the present search to a 
home safety inspection and relies on Camara v. Municipal 
Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523.  The argument falters at the 
threshold.  Unlike Camara, the entry and search here were not 
“routine periodic inspections” (id. at pp. 535-536), nor did they 
“have a long history of judicial and public acceptance” because 
“the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be 
prevented or abated” (id. at p. 537).  Administrative safety 
inspections and similar entries are quite different from an 
entry by police officers with guns drawn.  Further, even 
Camara required a warrant be secured if a person refused the 
inspectors access, unless a prompt entry was required by an 
emergency situation.  (Id. at pp. 538-540.)  Camara neither 
supports the Attorney General’s argument nor the reasoning of 
the Ray lead opinion.   
In sum, the community caretaking exception asserted in 
the absence of exigency is not one of the carefully delineated 
exceptions to the residential warrant requirement recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court.  To date, that court has 
only recognized community caretaking searches in the context 
of vehicle impound procedures.   
PEOPLE v. OVIEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.  The matter 
is remanded with directions that the case be returned to the 
trial court to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and 
the court enter an order granting defendant’s suppression 
motion.   
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Ovieda 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 19 Cal.App.5th 614 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S247235 
Date Filed: August 12, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Barbara 
Judge: Jean M. Dandona 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Peter Bibring and Ian M. Kysel for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, Deputy 
State Solicitor General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Andrew S. Pruitt and David Glassman, Deputy Attorneys 
General, and Geoffrey H. Wright, Associate Deputy State Solicitor General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth K. Horowitz 
Law Office of Elizabeth K. Horowitz, Inc. 
5272 South Lewis Avenue, Suite 256 
Tulsa, OK 74105 
(424) 543-4710 
 
Ian M. Kyse 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California 
1313 West Eight Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 977-5295 
 
Geoffrey H. Wright 
Associate Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3921