Title: In re Disqualification of Eyster

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF EYSTER. 
MIKLOVIC v. K. DEAN SHIRA CONSTRUCTION. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 
2004-Ohio-7350.] 
Judges — Affidavit of disqualification — Disqualification denied, when. 
(No. 04-AP-094 — Decided September 27, 2004.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Knox County Court of Common Pleas, 
case No. 02-BR-120452. 
____________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
Attorney James L. Major — on behalf of the plaintiffs — has filed 
an affidavit with the Clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking the 
disqualification of Judge Otho Eyster from acting on any further proceedings in 
case No. 02-BR-120452 in the Court of Common Pleas of Knox County. 
{¶2} 
Affiant Major alleges that Judge Eyster held a lengthy ex parte 
discussion with one of the defendants recently and suggests that the judge is now 
biased against the plaintiffs.  Affiant also faults the judge for failing to issue 
rulings on motions that he views as critical to the case. 
{¶3} 
I find no basis for ordering the disqualification of Judge Eyster.  
First, the affidavit is untimely.  Under R.C. 2701.03(B), an affidavit of 
disqualification must be filed “not less than seven calendar days before the day on 
which the next hearing” in the case is scheduled.  The affidavit against Judge 
Eyster was filed by  affiant the day before the case was scheduled for trial.  I have 
explained in other cases that the statutory filing deadline can be set aside “only 
when compliance with the provision is impossible.”  In re Disqualification of 
Leskovyansky (1999), 88 Ohio St.3d 1210, 723 N.E.2d 1099.  In this case, affiant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
does not indicate in the affidavit when the alleged ex parte conversation occurred.  
He claims that the conversation took place “[p]reviously,” but I cannot tell what 
that term means in relation to the seven-day filing deadline in the statute.  I 
presume that if the incident happened during the seven-day period before the 
scheduled start of the trial, the affidavit would have said so expressly.  In any 
event, affiant bears the burden of showing that he has complied with the statutory 
filing deadline, and affiant has not met that burden. 
{¶4} 
As for the judge’s alleged failure to provide timely rulings on 
motions, that concern is not one that can be addressed through an affidavit of 
disqualification.  An affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest 
matters of substantive or procedural law.”  In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 
Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4.  A judge’s action — or 
inaction — on a motion for a continuance “is within the sound discretion of the 
judge and is not, by itself, evidence of bias or prejudice.”  In re Disqualification 
of Pontious (2001), 94 Ohio St.3d 1235, 1236, 763 N.E.2d 603. 
{¶5} 
And even if an affidavit of disqualification were a proper device 
for challenging a judge’s alleged tardiness in ruling on pretrial motions, the facts 
of this case present particularly weak support for affiant’s claim of bias.  He filed 
the motions in the trial court on September 22, 2004, and now alleges five days 
later in this court that the judge must be removed from the case for failing to act 
on those motions more quickly.  Far from proving bias or prejudice on the judge’s 
part, the affidavit in fact “appears to have been filed solely to obtain a delay” of 
the trial.  In re Disqualification of Spahr (1987), 36 Ohio St.3d 603, 522 N.E.2d 
457. 
{¶6} 
For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case shall proceed before Judge Eyster. 
____________________