Title: HORTON v. STATE

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

Horton v. State1988 WY 138764 P.2d 674Case Number: 87-185Decided: 11/15/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
RAYMOND ESTEL HORTON, JR., APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, Gerald M. Gallivan, Wyoming Public Defender Aid 
Program, Thomas B. Quinn, Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael W. Schafer, Student Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J.,* 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The only question 
presented by this appeal is whether the admission of testimony from a physician 
treating a shooting victim in a hospital emergency room that included statements 
of the victim concerning the identity of his assailant constitutes reversible 
error. The hearsay statement was offered by the prosecuting attorney under Rule 
803(4), W.R.E., relating to statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. The trial court admitted the testimony, which did not specifically 
identify the defendant, invoking res gestae as a basis for admission. We hold 
that the admission of this testimony did not constitute an abuse of the 
discretion afforded a trial court with respect to rulings on the evidence. The 
judgment and sentence is affirmed.

[¶2.]     The appellant, Raymond 
Horton, sets forth the following issues:

"I. Whether certain 
testimony by Dr. Brungardt was hearsay not reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis 
or treatment. "A. Whether Dr. Brungardt's testimony in violation of Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence 803(4) was harmless error.

"II. Whether Dr. 
Brungardt's statements as to fault were admissible under the theory of res 
gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule."

The State of 
Wyoming, as 
appellee, offers this version of the issues:

"I. Whether the trial 
court erred in admitting into evidence Dr. Brungardt's testimony regarding the 
victim's statements.

"II. Whether any error in 
admitting the victim's out-of-court statements to the doctor was 
harmless."

[¶3.]     Horton was convicted of 
the attempted first-degree murder of Mark Piper in violation of §§ 6-2-101(a) 
and 6-1-301, W.S. 1977 (1983 Repl.).1 The material facts that resulted in 
Horton's conviction are set forth in the testimony of the victim. The victim, 
Horton, and a third person went to Horton's house after driving around and 
consuming a six pack of beer. When they arrived, the third person and Horton 
remained in the car while the victim went inside the house and sat down to watch 
television with a fourth man. Horton then came into the house, pointed a .22 
caliber pistol at the victim, and said, "Come on, punk. We are going for a ride 
out in the country. We are going to talk." The man who had been in the house 
objected to what Horton was doing and pointed out that someone could get hurt. 
Horton then called the victim a foul name, pointed the pistol at the victim's 
head, cocked the trigger, and then said, "I am serious." The victim stood up and 
began to walk toward the door with Horton following him and pointing the pistol 
at the back of the victim's head. As he opened the front door, the victim 
decided he would attempt to escape by running out the door and around the side 
of the house. This effort was not successful and, as he was running toward the 
road, he was shot in the back.

[¶4.]     After he was shot, the 
victim tried to shout for help, but he could not due to the fact that his mouth 
was congested with blood. He did look back toward the house and saw Horton 
pointing the gun at him. Horton then placed the gun in his pants and walked up 
to the victim, stating that he should finish the job right there. A neighbor 
passed by at about that time. She testified that she saw a man lying on the 
ground and that Horton approached him while calling to someone in the house to 
assist in carrying the man into the house. She asked Horton what had happened, 
and Horton replied that he had lit a fire-cracker and "the guy freaked out." She 
did see a man come out of the house to help Horton carry the victim back into 
the house. With respect to these latter events, the victim also testified that 
Horton called to the man who had originally been in the house to help him drag 
the victim inside. That man came outside, and the two of them took the victim 
inside. The victim then told Horton to either take him to the hospital or go 
ahead and kill him. The other man decided that it was necessary to take the 
victim to the hospital and, after some discussion, Horton agreed. On the way to 
the hospital, Horton insisted that the victim promise not to tell who had shot 
him. The victim, still in fear for his life, agreed that he would not say that 
Horton had shot him.

[¶5.]     The only other witness 
for the prosecution was the physician who saw the victim in the emergency room 
at the hospital. She was called as the first witness for the State, and her 
testimony incorporated the following facts. Horton and another man brought the 
victim in on the day of the shooting. Hospital records note the time as 5:35 
P.M. The victim was coughing up blood, and an examination disclosed an obvious 
bullet wound with entry in the upper right portion of his back. X-rays were 
taken, and they disclosed that the bullet had lodged in the victim's left lung 
with some fragments located around the spinal column. After stabilizing the 
victim's breathing, the doctor conducted a more thorough examination and 
discovered that the victim was paralyzed from the waist down. In discussing the 
victim's condition, the doctor said, among other things:

"He did become rather 
shocky in the emergency room.

* * * * * 
*

"[H]e was beginning to 
get unstable in the emergency room. The pressure was dropping. He was becoming 
quite pale and sweaty, * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"He was oriented but 
scared and panicky, * * *."

[¶6.]     Following the 
description of the examination of the victim, the X-rays that disclosed the 
location of the bullet, and the condition of the victim, the prosecuting 
attorney asked the doctor if, during the course of her treatment, she had asked 
the victim what happened to him. The doctor replied that she had, and defense 
counsel then interposed an objection which was overruled. The doctor then 
testified:

"Yes, I did. Like I said, 
after I made sure that he was breathing on his own and his heart was beating and 
he was in no immediate danger of dying right there, I asked him what had 
happened, and he said that he had been shot in the back, and I said who did it, 
and he said he was standing out in front -"

At this 
juncture, defense counsel again objected, arguing that the rest of the statement 
would not be pertinent with respect to medical treatment. This objection also 
was overruled, and the trial court stated:

"THE COURT: It is part of 
res gestae, though, isn't it?

"[Defense Counsel]: I 
think the only exception would be as to medical tests, and there is 
-

"THE COURT: How about 
history? Overruled. Go ahead, doctor, you may answer."

The treating physician 
then testified:

"A: He told me that he 
had been standing out in front, outdoors in the yard, talking to a man named 
Mike Hernandez, and that he turned around and walked back into the house, and he 
was shot in the back. And I asked him who did it, just because that is part of 
the history, and he didn't answer right away, and then finally after - there 
were two men that brought him in and were hovering over him all the time, 
slapping him, telling him, `Don't die! Don't die on me!' And they were getting 
in my way. When they disappeared, after they left -

* * * * * 
*

"He told me he turned to 
walk back in the house, and a friend of Mike's shot him in the back, and that's 
all I remember him telling me. I couldn't get any more details, and, frankly, I 
wasn't looking for more details. I wanted to know what had happened, where it 
had happened, because being outdoors or indoors makes a difference. If it had 
been outdoors which was in December, which was cold, then I had other things to 
worry about, like his cold exposure, how long he was left out there, those kind 
of things, and, like I said, the two men that had brought him in, and they 
brought him in by private vehicle, and they dragged him down the hallway, which 
that certainly is not what we wanted to have done. We would have preferred him 
to be put on a cart at the door of the emergency room. They dragged him down the 
hallway and put him on the cart."

[¶7.]     The essential issue is 
found in Horton's claim that prejudicial error occurred in the admission of the 
treating physician's testimony concerning the victim's statement relating to who 
had shot him. We afford deference to the discretion of the trial court with 
respect to rulings on the admission of evidence, and we will not reverse because 
of a ruling admitting evidence unless there was an abuse of discretion. 
Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 1986); 
Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986). See 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 29 at 196-200 (1977). If there is a legitimate basis for the decision 
of the trial court, and it did not act in an unreasonable way, we will sustain 
its ruling. Noetzelmann v. State, supra; Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242 
(Wyo. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985).

[¶8.]     The conclusion to be 
drawn from the record is that the trial court found the hearsay admissible as a 
statement reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment and also as 
part of the res gestae. In its brief and argument, the State contends that 
admissibility is also sustained as an excited utterance. See Rule 803(2), W.R.E. 
Excited utterance is the correct premise for admitting this evidence and, at the 
time it was received at the trial, the court's ruling was 
correct.

[¶9.]     While the concepts that 
traditionally were labeled as "res gestae" are still present in the law of 
evidence, the phrase itself no longer is present under the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence. Given the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, it probably is 
more helpful for courts and counsel to address evidentiary issues in the 
language of those rules. The State of Wyoming correctly perceives that the concept 
which would fit the trial judge's label of "res gestae" is that of an excited 
utterance. Rule 803, W.R.E., expresses that concept in this 
way:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Excited utterance. - A statement 
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under 
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; * * 
*."

[¶10.]  Professor Wigmore has commented on the 
res gestae exception to the hearsay rule in this way:

"The exposition of this 
exception might well be approached with the feeling akin to despair. There has 
been such a confounding of ideas, and such a profuse and indiscriminate use of 
the shibboleth res gestae, that it is difficult to disentangle the real basis of 
principle involved. On the one hand, to repeat without comment the often 
meaningless and unhelpful language of the courts is to shirk the duty of the 
expositor of the law as it is. On the other hand, to discriminate between the 
principles genuinely involved is to risk the reproach of representing as law 
that which the courts do not concede. The expositor of the law can only endeavor 
to avoid impalement upon either horn of the dilemma; relying, in any event, upon 
the plain language of those courts which have sought to recognize the exception 
in its real character, and calling to mind the frank concession long ago made by 
Chief Justice Beasley: `I think I may safely say that there are few problems in 
the law of evidence more unsolved than what things are to be embraced in those 
occurrences that were designated in the law as the res gestae.'" (Footnote 
omitted.) VI J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1745 at 191-192 (Chadborne rev. 
1976).

According to 
Louisell & Mueller, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, from which the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence are drawn, res gestae has been subsumed within the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule found in Rule 803, such as excited utterances, 
statements describing mental or physical conditions, and statements for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment. 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 438 at 485 n. 68 (1980). As we have indicated above, we are in accord 
with the courts that have declared that the term "res gestae" should be 
eliminated from the language of the law of evidence because it is no longer 
useful and tends only to confuse the reasoning with respect to why a given 
hearsay statement should be admissible. See Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Company, 
Inc., 188 U.S. App.D.C. 180, 578 F.2d 422, 48 
A.L.R.Fed. 442 (1978); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); 
Nuttall v. Reading Company, 235 F.2d 546 (3rd Cir. 1956); United States v. 
Matot, 146 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1944).

[¶11.]  In this instance, the trial court invoked 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule when it referred to res 
gestae. In three cases, this court has considered that particular exception. 
Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1987); 
Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126 (Wyo. 1985); 
Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984). See also Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1986), Thomas, C.J., dissenting. In 
Clarke v. Vandermeer, supra, we referred to five factors that were discussed in 
Matter of GP, supra, and applied them in determining whether evidence was 
properly admitted under the excited utterance exception. The factors 
are:

"1. The nature of the 
startling event;

"2. The declarant's 
physical manifestation of excitement;

"3. The declarant's 
age;

"4. The lapse of time 
between the event and the hearsay statement; and

"5. Whether the statement 
was made in response to an inquiry." Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d  at 
927.

In this 
instance, factors one, two, and four would support the admissibility of the 
hearsay declaration while factor three appears neutral. Only factor five 
presents a problem with respect to admissibility.

[¶12.]  These factors are useful in evaluating 
the admissibility of proffered evidence, but the ultimate inquiry must be 
whether the "declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was 
spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and 
deliberation." Matter of GP, 679 P.2d  at 1003 (quoting United 
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 55 
A.L.R. Fed. 664 (8th Cir. 1980); cert. denied 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S. Ct. 1709, 68 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1981)); Kelly v. State, supra. The rule itself 
requires that the statement relate to a startling event or condition and be made 
while "the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition * * *." Other courts have had little difficulty applying this rule 
with respect to trauma victims. E.g., Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 
715 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S. Ct. 980, 79 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1984); 
People v. Franklin, 683 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1984); Rhiner v. City of Clive, 373 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1985); State v. Roy, 214 Neb. 204, 333 N.W.2d 398 
(1983).

[¶13.]  In this instance, there is no question 
about the presence of the startling event as required by Rule 803(2), W.R.E. At 
the time the trial court made the ruling, the only information it had was that 
given by the emergency room physician which described the declarant as having 
become "rather shocky," "unstable," "quite pale and sweaty," and "scared and 
panicky." There was then no information before the court relating to the 
victim's agreement to protect Horton, and nothing suggests that the victim was 
any different from other victims of trauma. The record supported a conclusion, 
properly reached within the scope of the discretion of the trial court, that the 
victim was "under the stress of excitement caused by the event * * *." This case 
fits neatly within the summary offered in 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 439 at 495-498 (1980):

"* * * [T]wo categories 
of cases which time and again generate statements received as excited utterances 
are worth special note. They are the cases of violent criminal assault, where 
statements by the victim implicating the accused are usually received, and cases 
of accidents resulting in physical injury, where statements by the injured party 
describing the occurrence are likewise usually received." (Footnotes 
omitted.)

Because the 
statements to the emergency room physician were properly admitted as an excited 
utterance, we hold there was no error as claimed by 
Horton.

[¶14.]  The admissibility of this testimony is 
justified under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and we 
could refrain from any discussion of the admissibility of the testimony as a 
statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. In that respect, 
Rule 803, W.R.E., provides, in pertinent part:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* * * * * 
*

"(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment. - Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or 
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment; * * 
*."

In prior cases, 
we have afforded ample discretion to the trial court to determine whether a 
proper foundation has been presented to permit the admission of hearsay under 
this exception. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S. Ct. 3539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1984). Our decisions are in accord with the 
suggestion stated in 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 444 at 
598 (1980), that the pertinency standard should be generously construed. Goldade 
v. State, supra. Even under a rule of broad discretion, however, there are 
hearsay statements which cannot be admitted under this 
exception:

"But the pertinency 
standard does impose a true limit. Embellishments attributing fault are not 
reasonably pertinent. The fact the declarant believes that the injury only 
happened because defendant ran a red light, or omitted certain safety 
precautions, or imposed unreasonable demands in a working situation are 
immaterial, so far as diagnosis or treatment is concerned, and fall outside the 
instant exception. So do statements suggesting that an injury was deliberately 
inflicted." (Footnotes omitted.) 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 444 at 603-605.

This general 
statement was accepted in Goldade v. State, supra, but we observed that there is 
an exception if an appropriate foundation is presented which demonstrates that 
identity is pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment. See United States v. 
Denoyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987). Compare United 
States v. 
Iron Shell, supra. For another general proposition, see 4 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 804(4) at 143-151 (1987). In this instance, it is 
difficult to discern any foundation that would permit the trial court to 
conclude that identity was pertinent to the diagnosis or treatment. The 
testimony, however, did not result in an identification of Horton by the hearsay 
declarant. Consequently, we cannot ascribe any error to the admissibility of 
this testimony on the premise that it should not have been admitted because the 
statement ascribing fault was not "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment."

[¶15.]  We suggest to the trial courts that, in 
weighing the admissibility of the testimony proffered under the exception for 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, it is important 
to have foundation testimony with respect to the pertinency of the information 
that is as complete as possible. In this regard, another concept suggested in 4 
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 444 at 601 is 
apt:

"The pertinency standard 
should be construed broadly enough to reach facts which would naturally be 
recited in a good-faith effort to provide needed information. If a patient, for 
example, tells a treating physician that he first felt pain while pulling some 
heavy pipes at work, the fact that diagnosis and treatment would have been the 
same if the patient had simply told the doctor that he stooped down and pulled 
on a heavy object should make no difference. Nothing is gained in terms of 
protecting the jury from untrustworthy evidence by applying Rule 803(4) so 
stringently as to require exclusion of details naturally included in an honest 
to-the-point effort to describe what happened."

The hearsay 
declaration in this instance, if it had to be scrutinized exclusively under Rule 
803(4), W.R.E., might well fall within this proposition. Certainly, no 
justification can be found for a conclusion that it was erroneous to admit it 
under the excited utterance exception because it so clearly was not admissible 
as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment.

[¶16.]  The ruling on the admission of this 
evidence by the trial court was not erroneous, and the judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-2-101(a), W.S. 
1977 (1983 Repl.), provides:

"Whoever purposely and 
with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest or 
kidnapping, or by administering poison or causing the same to be done, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the first degree."

Section 6-1-301, 
W.S. 1977 (1983 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if:

"(i) With the intent to 
commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission 
of the crime. A `substantial step' is conduct which is strongly corroborative of 
the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime; 
* * *."