Title: DUBROWSKI v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING LIQUOR COMM'N

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DUBROWSKI v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING LIQUOR COMM'N2000 WY 531 P.3d 631Case Number: 98-212Decided: 03/23/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GEORGE A. DUBROWSKI, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING LIQUOR 
COMMISSION, JIM GERINGER, STAN SMITH, DIANA OHMAN, DAVE FERRARI, JUDY CATCHPOLE 
and JOHNNIE BURTON, in their official capacities as members or employees of the 
Wyoming Liquor Commission; and in their individual capacities, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Mitchell E. 
Osborn of Grant & Osborn, Cheyenne, WY, representing 
appellant.Richard Rideout of Law Offices of Richard Rideout, PC, 
Cheyenne, WY, representing appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROGERS, 
D.J.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] The Wyoming 
Liquor Commission (WLC) terminated, via a reduction in force, George Dubrowski 
from the position of Deputy Director of the WLC. After a review, the Personnel 
Review Board of the State of Wyoming (PRB) ruled that Dubrowski's termination 
was invalid and improper. However, by the time the PRB issued its ruling, the 
legislature had reorganized the WLC and eliminated the position of Deputy 
Director. Dubrowski filed this action against the WLC and various state 
officials claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the appellees on all claims, which we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] George 
Dubrowski (Dubrowski) presents the following issues for 
review:

1. Was there a material 
question of fact as to whether or not a "special relationship" existed between 
appellant and his employer, appellee, under Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994).

2. Did the lower court 
err in granting Summary Judgment against Plaintiff on his claim of breach of 
contract.

[¶3] Appellees 
(collectively the State) restate the issues:

1. Whether the district 
court erred in granting the Appellees' Motion For Summary Judgment on the 
Appellant's claim for breach of the duty of "good faith and fair 
dealing."

2. Whether the district 
court erred in granting the Appellees' Motion For Summary Judgment on the 
Appellant's breach of contract claim.

FACTS

[¶4] Dubrowski 
was employed by the Wyoming Liquor Commission (WLC) as its Deputy/Assistant 
Director commencing in May of 1990. In June of 1995, the director of the WLC 
terminated Dubrowski's employment. The following day, however, the WLC Board 
rescinded the termination for lack of good cause. The same month, Governor Jim 
Geringer appointed Johnnie Burton (Burton), the Director of the Department of 
Revenue, to act as Interim Director of the WLC, and the WLC Board instructed 
Burton to investigate and evaluate the operation and structure of the WLC with 
an eye toward reorganization. At the time, the WLC operated as an independent 
state agency, run by five elected officials acting as the WLC Board, including 
the governor who served as the president of the WLC Board.

[¶5] Following 
an evaluation, Burton determined that Dubrowski's position of deputy director 
was unnecessary. Burton notified Dubrowski that, as of July 28, 1995, he would 
be terminated as part of a reduction in force. Shortly thereafter, Dubrowski 
sought review of his termination with the Personnel Review Board of the State of 
Wyoming (PRB).

[¶6] In October 
of 1995, while Dubrowski's petition for review was pending before the PRB, 
Burton presented her conclusions and recommendations to the WLC Board. Included 
was a suggestion to eliminate the director and deputy director positions. The 
WLC Board approved the recommendations, and the following March, the Legislature 
reorganized the WLC, placing it within the Department of Revenue. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-2-106(a) (Lexis 1999). This reorganization included the elimination of 
the position of deputy director effective March 19, 1996. A new position was 
created entitled Division Administrator, which was to be filled by gubernatorial 
appointment.

[¶7] In the 
meantime, the PRB review process continued. After conducting an evidentiary 
hearing in May of 1996, the PRB issued its decision two months later. Finding 
the WLC and Burton failed to follow the State of Wyoming Personnel Rules 
governing reductions in force, the PRB concluded that Dubrowski's termination 
was improper and invalid. Therefore, the PRB "reversed" Dubrowski's termination. 
On November 22, 1996, the State issued a warrant in the amount of $25,517.27 
payable to Dubrowski, which the State avers fully compensated Dubrowski for the 
salary and benefits accrued from the date of his termination, July 28, 1995, 
until March 19, 1996, the date the Legislature eliminated the position of deputy 
director.

[¶8] Dubrowski 
filed this action against the WLC and various state officials claiming breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
defamation.1 The defendants (collectively the 
State) moved for summary judgment on all claims, which the district court 
granted. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶9] We accord 
no deference to the district court in our review of summary judgment. Archuleta 
v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1997). "Because we review a grant of 
summary judgment from the same perspective as the district court using the same 
factual materials and the same standards, a summary judgment may be affirmed on 
any legal ground appearing in the record." Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 
362 (Wyo. 1994). Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Andrews v. Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center, 974 P.2d 948, 949 
(Wyo. 1999).

DISCUSSION

Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing

[¶10] Wyoming 
recognizes a limited tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Andrews, 974 P.2d  at 949-50. In Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994), we held that all contracts of 
employment contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A breach 
of this covenant is actionable when a special relationship of trust and reliance 
exists between the employer and employee. Id. at 221; Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 
927 P.2d 706, 712 (Wyo. 1996). "Trust and reliance may be found by the existence 
of separate consideration, common law, statutory rights, or rights accruing with 
longevity of service." Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221; Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712. The 
existence of a special relationship is a question of fact and is to be decided 
by the trier of fact unless reasonable minds could not differ. Jewell v. North 
Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 139 (Wyo. 1998). Since Wilder, in only one 
case, Jewell, did we conclude that the employee had presented evidence 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment based on this cause of action. 
Id.

[¶11] Comparing 
Dubrowski's case with Jewell and other like cases, it is clear that reasonable 
minds could not differ and that a special relationship does not exist. Although 
we have never determined exactly what length of service is sufficient to 
establish a special relationship, in Wilder, we found Wilder's three years of 
service was insufficient to establish a special relationship. 868 P.2d  at 222. 
While the special relationship is not subject to simple quantitative analysis, 
Dubrowski's claim of longevity as a five-year employee is dubious. See Sears v. 
Amoco Production Co., 967 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31 (D.Wyo. 1997) (seventeen years 
of employment, by itself or in combination with other contentions, insufficient 
to create special relationship); but see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied 
Covenant: Anachronism or Augur? 20 Seton Hall L.Rev. 683, 704 (1990) ("while 
five years appears to be sufficient, it is not clear what qualifies as long 
service.")

[¶12] Even 
assuming that Dubrowski's length of service is sufficient to establish a special 
relationship, his claim cannot stand on this fact alone.

[¶13] Usually, 
the special relationship giving employees an action on the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing stems from a long term employment relationship 
coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the 
employee, e.g., benefits or commissions. The duration of an employment 
relationship over a period of years is not sufficient, alone, to give rise to a 
special relationship.

[¶14] Garcia v. 
UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996) (citations 
omitted).

[¶15] To support 
his claim, Dubrowski contends he was terminated in order to deprive him of his 
right not to be discharged without cause under the state personnel rules. In 
addition, he claims that he was discharged in order to avoid payment of 
additional retirement benefits, past and future lost wages, and other fringe 
benefits including sick leave, as well as medical insurance. Dubrowski does not 
assert that he was terminated to avoid payment of commissions or benefits 
already earned, or to avoid payment of benefits scheduled to vest or arise in 
the near future. Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co. Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 626-627, (Wyo. 
2000). The benefits recited by Dubrowski are the normal benefits that accrue to 
a state employee, and none of the evils this cause of action was meant to remedy 
is present. Most importantly, we do not perceive the States' action in this 
instance to constitute "conduct [that] goes well beyond the bounds of ordinary 
liability for breach of contract." Id. at 11 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 
732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987)).

[¶16] Because we 
base our decision on the merits of Dubrowski's claim, we need not determine if 
the State is immune from suit premised on this cause of action. Summary judgment 
on this cause of action is affirmed.

Breach of 
Contract

[¶17] The State 
agrees that it was bound by the PRB's decision and that Dubrowski's termination 
via the reduction in force was improper. The parties disagree, however, about 
whether Dubrowski has been sufficiently compensated for the wrongful 
termination. The State argues that payment of Dubrowski's salary and benefits 
for the period between his July 28, 1995 termination and the March 19, 1996 
elimination of his position constitutes full compensation. We 
agree.

[¶18] The 
legislature eliminated Dubrowski's position during reorganization of the WLC. 
Thus, after March 19, 1996, Dubrowski had no claim to employment with the State. 
His cause of action after that date, if any, would lie against the legislature 
for eliminating his position, which the doctrine of legislative immunity would 
govern. See Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 
266 (Wyo. 1988); Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1978). Therefore, because Dubrowski can claim no contract 
rights for the period after March 19, 1996, the only question is whether he was 
adequately compensated for the period from his improper termination on July 28, 
1995, until the time his position was eliminated.

[¶19] Included 
in the record is a copy of a warrant issued by the State payable to Dubrowski in 
the amount of $25,517.27, which the State argues fully compensated Dubrowski for 
his salary between the date he was improperly terminated and the date his 
position was eliminated by the legislature.2 While it is difficult to tell from 
the face of the warrant precisely what the payment was intended to cover, 
Dubrowski, in a pretrial memorandum, asserted that the State paid his salary for 
this time period. Despite this, Dubrowski "does not concede" the amount was 
adequate compensation. However,

[t]he measure of damages 
for breach of contract is that which would place plaintiff in the same position 
as he would have been had the contract been performed, less proper deductions. 
In a suit for breach of an employment contract, then, the damages are the amount 
of compensation agreed upon for the remainder of the period involved less the 
amount which the employee earned or with reasonable diligence could have earned 
from other employment.

[¶20] Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo. 1981) (citations 
omitted). Dubrowski provides no explanation of how full payment of his salary 
and benefits does not remedy his damages. Applying the foregoing standard, 
Dubrowski has been paid his damages, and summary judgment was therefore 
appropriate.

[¶21] The 
decision of the district court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Dubrowski does not 
pursue the defamation claim on appeal.

2 The State did not plead 
accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense. W.R.C.P. 8(c); Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34.1-3-311 (Lexis 1999).