Title: Young v. King

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 78 
Docket: 
Cum-18-325 
Argued: 
February 6, 2019 
Decided: 
May 21, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Concurrence: 
JABAR, J., and SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
 
JASON YOUNG 
 
v. 
 
TONI M. KING 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Jason Young appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Portland, Cashman, J.) dismissing, for lack of standing, his complaint seeking to 
be determined a de facto parent of Toni M. King’s adopted child.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1891(2) (2018).  Young argues that the court abused its discretion in 
declining to hold a hearing to determine disputed facts and in concluding that 
King’s refusal to allow Young to adopt the child was dispositive of the issue of 
whether King understood, acknowledged, or accepted that, or behaved as 
though, Young was a parent to the child.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C) (2018).  
We clarify the process, vacate the judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The court stated in its judgment that, for purposes of its standing 
determination, it accepted the statements contained in the affidavits that Young 
submitted on the question of standing.1  Except where indicated otherwise, the 
following facts are drawn from those affidavits and from the procedural record. 
[¶3]  Young and King began dating in 2004.  In 2005, the couple 
purchased a house together in Limerick, and King, as a single prospective 
adoptive parent, applied to adopt a child through an adoption agency.  Young 
and King had decided to adopt together but were told by the adoption agency 
that although they would be identified as a couple in internal documents, his 
name could not be mentioned in international documents because many 
countries required potential adoptive parents to either be a single woman or 
an established married couple.  The plan, according to Young, was for him to 
adopt the child after King first adopted the child as a single parent.  
[¶4]  In 2007, King accepted a referral to adopt a six-month-old child from 
India.  In February 2008, the couple travelled to India to bring the child back to 
their home in Limerick.  King adopted the child in December 2008 but then told 
Young that she was not going to allow him to also adopt the child.  Nevertheless, 
                                         
1  As noted below, many of Young’s averments of material facts are sharply contradicted in King’s 
affidavits. 
 
3 
the three continued to live in their home until November 2011.  King agrees in 
her affidavit that, during that time, Young played with the child, cooked for the 
family, and transported the child to and from daycare.  Young avers that he was 
involved in raising the child in many other ways, including contributing to the 
child’s healthcare by paying for her chiropractic appointments out of pocket, to 
the child’s daycare by giving King a check every month to cover half of the costs, 
and to the child’s participation in certain activities by enrolling the child in 
gymnastics camp, inter alia. 
[¶5]  King at some point began dating a new partner, and in 
November 2011, she and the child moved into King’s new partner’s home, 
which is located approximately 150 miles from Limerick.  Young remained in 
the Limerick house and kept the child’s bedroom there intact, leaving most of 
her belongings, including her cat, at the house.  For several years following the 
move, the child generally spent every other weekend with Young at the 
Limerick house, as well as some time during school vacations and summers.  In 
March 2016, when the Limerick house was sold, Young purchased a new house 
that included a bedroom for the child.  By April 2018, Young’s opportunities for 
visitation with the child had become increasingly inconsistent, and he brought 
 
4 
a complaint for a determination of parentage, parental rights, and 
responsibilities. 
 
[¶6]  King moved to dismiss Young’s complaint for lack of standing to be 
determined a de facto parent.  Based on the filings, the court agreed and 
dismissed Young’s complaint for lack of standing.  The court found that because 
King did not allow Young to adopt the child and did not otherwise regard Young 
as the child’s father, Young failed to show that King understood, acknowledged, 
or accepted Young as a co-parent, and Young therefore lacked standing to seek 
an adjudication of de facto parenthood.  Young moved for reconsideration on 
the issue of standing and for a hearing, which the court denied, again finding 
that had King behaved as though Young were the child’s father she would have 
allowed him to become an adoptive parent.  Young appeals.  See 14 M.R.S. 
§ 1901(1) (2018); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2A. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Young argues that the court erred by determining that he failed to 
establish standing.  The court made its standing determination pursuant to the 
de facto parentage framework prescribed in the Maine Parentage Act (MPA), 
see 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2018).  “We examine the legal aspects of a court’s 
standing determination de novo and review for clear error the factual findings 
 
5 
underlying that determination.”  Lamkin v. Lamkin, 2018 ME 76, ¶ 10, 
186 A.3d 1276. 
 
[¶8]  Pursuant to the MPA, “a party who files a complaint to be 
adjudicated a de facto parent of a child must make an initial showing of standing 
that will determine whether the court will hold a plenary hearing on the 
ultimate question of whether that person is a de facto parent.”  Davis v. McGuire, 
2018 ME 72, ¶ 13, 186 A.3d 837; see 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2).  To demonstrate 
standing, the claimant must satisfy, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
statutory elements laid out in section 1891(3) of the MPA.  See Davis, 
2018 ME 72, ¶¶ 15, 26, 186 A.3d 837.  The standing determination is a 
multi-step process.  Id. ¶ 15. 
First, the claimant is required to file an affidavit along with the 
complaint, stating “specific facts” that track the elements of a 
de facto parenthood claim.  [19-A M.R.S.] § 1891(2)(A). Next, the 
adverse party may file a responsive affidavit along with a 
responsive pleading.  Id. § 1891(2)(B).  Finally, the court is to 
review the parties’ submissions and either make a determination 
based on the parties’ submissions whether the claimant has 
demonstrated standing, or, “in its sole discretion, if necessary and 
on an expedited basis, hold a hearing to determine disputed facts 
that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.”  Id. 
§ 1891(2)(C). 
 
Id.  The claimant has the burden to present persuasive evidence of the 
elements of standing—meaning that the proof must be by a 
 
6 
preponderance—“irrespective of whether the court adjudicates the issue 
based on the papers or on evidence presented at a hearing.”  Id. ¶¶ 19, 24, 
26.  The required elements are that 
 
A. The person has resided with the child for a significant period of 
 
time; 
B. The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; 
C. A bonded and dependent relationship has been established 
between the child and the person, the relationship was fostered or 
supported by another parent of the child and the person and the 
other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted that or 
behaved as though the person is a parent of the child; 
D. The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as 
a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; 
and 
E. The continuing relationship between the person and the child is 
in the best interest of the child. 
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A)-(E).2  In this case, the court founded its conclusion 
that Young lacked standing on its determination that Young could not show that 
King acknowledged that he was a parent because she did not allow him to adopt 
the child.  See id. § 1891(3)(C). 
                                         
2  In our decisions preceding enactment of the MPA “we held that, in order to establish the 
compelling state interest needed to justify governmental interference with a parent-child 
relationship, the [claimant] must prove the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances.’”  Davis v. 
McGuire, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 15 n.7, 186 A.3d 837.  We noted in Davis that because the statutory elements 
found in 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3) (2018) do not include this requirement, there remains a question as 
to “whether proof of the elements alone is a constitutionally adequate foundation for a de facto 
parenthood determination.”  Id.  As in Davis, we need not reach that question in this matter because 
the preliminary standing issue has not yet been properly determined.  See id. 
 
7 
[¶9]  On the facts presented, the court’s treatment of the single fact of 
King’s refusal to allow Young to adopt as dispositive in the standing analysis 
constitutes an error of law.  We have recognized that a legal parent can refuse 
to allow a claimant to adopt a child yet still consent to the parental role that the 
claimant has played in the child’s life.  For example, in Kilborn v. Carey, we 
reasoned that a legal parent “implicitly, if not explicitly, consented to and 
encouraged [a claimant]’s parental role” when the legal parent “admitted that 
he only saw his daughter twice over the course of four years, he was not there 
for many of her firsts, and he respected the role that [the claimant] played in 
her life during that time.”  2016 ME 78, ¶¶ 19-20, 140 A.3d 461 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Even though “he did not wish to allow the child to be adopted, 
he was not opposed to [the claimant] effectively serving as her father.”  Id. ¶ 20.  
We held that this evidence established that the legal parent intended for the 
claimant to be a parent to the child “despite [the legal parent]’s peripheral 
presence and objection to formal adoption.”  Id. ¶ 21. 
[¶10]  Although Young concedes that King did not allow him to adopt the 
child, that does not necessarily mean that she did not otherwise understand, 
acknowledge, or accept that “a bonded and dependent relationship has been 
established between” the child and Young, or behave as though Young was a 
 
8 
parent to the child.  19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C); see also American Law Institute, 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03, cmt. c (2002) (“Failure to 
adopt the child when it would have been possible is some evidence, although 
not dispositive, that the legal parent did not agree to the formation of the 
de facto parent relationship.”).  To determine whether Young presented 
persuasive evidence of the statutory requirements, the court was therefore 
required to review all of the facts proffered by the parties in their affidavits that 
were material to the issue of standing.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C). 
[¶11]  Given that many of the other facts material to the issue of standing 
were contested by the parties and that, if believed, Young’s version of the facts 
could have led to a finding that he had standing, the court should have held a 
hearing to determine those disputed facts.  As we have stated, the court acts 
within its discretion by declining to hold a hearing on standing when the 
assertions in the petitioner’s affidavits, even if accepted as true, could not 
support a conclusion that the petitioner has standing.  Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 26 
n.9, 186 A.3d 837.  This means that, as is true here, where the standing 
determination will rest on the resolution of material facts that the parties have 
disputed in their affidavits, a hearing will be necessary to allow the court to 
 
9 
hear from witnesses and evaluate evidence in order to adjudicate those 
contested facts.3 
[¶12]  Thus, although the decision of whether to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of standing is within the sole discretion of the court, see 
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C), the conflicting facts presented by the parties’ 
affidavits created bona fide issues of material fact relating to whether King 
“behaved as though [Young] is a parent of the child.”  Id. § 1891(3)(C).  Cf. 
In re Estate of Wright, 637 A.2d 106, 109 (Me. 1994) (stating that “the 
allowance of attorney fees and costs rests within the sole discretion of the 
Probate Court” and that “[t]he general standard of reviewing a Probate Court’s 
decision on a request for fees . . . is the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard” (quotation 
marks omitted)); Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 260 (Me. 1984) (“The decision 
whether to hold a hearing is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of 
discretion.”).  For example, Young claims in his affidavit that King allowed the 
child to call him “Dad” or “Daddy,” King purchased Father’s Day cards for the 
child to give to Young, and King allowed others in the community, such as the 
child’s daycare provider, to understand Young to be the child’s father.  See 
                                         
3  We emphasize that the mere existence of disputed facts in the affidavits of the parties is 
insufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing; the disputed facts must be necessary and material to 
the issue of standing before a hearing is convened pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C). 
 
10 
19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(A).  Resolution of these contested facts—and any other 
disputed facts material to the issue of standing—is necessary in this case. 
[¶13]  On remand, if, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the court 
concludes that Young has established standing, Young must still prove a 
de facto parent relationship by clear and convincing evidence at a plenary 
hearing, see id. § 1891(3); Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 26, 186 A.3d 837.4  Requiring a 
preliminary hearing on the issue of standing where, as here, material facts are 
contested appropriately balances our recognition that parental rights disputes 
can be heavily factbound and that “[t]he facts are often infused with nuances 
and coated with an emotional overlay,” Kinter v. Nichols, 1999 ME 11, ¶ 7, 
722 A.2d 1274, with our concern for infringement on the fundamental right to 
parent, see Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 14, 186 A.3d 837. 
                                         
4  The court may convene a single consolidated hearing addressing both standing and de facto 
parenthood after consideration of (1) the relative complexity of the factual issues of standing and de 
facto parenthood; (2) the time and expense involved in conducting separate hearings on those 
subjects; and (3) the benefits and burdens upon the parties—including the disruption, caused by the 
de facto parentage proceeding, of the legal parent’s constitutionally protected relationship with the 
child, see Davis, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 14, 186 A.3d 837—that would be presented by separate hearings as 
opposed to a single hearing that addresses both subjects. 
 
At such a consolidated hearing, the court must first adjudicate the question of standing by 
applying the preponderance standard of proof.  If standing is established, the court may then proceed 
to adjudicate the merits of the de facto parentage petition by applying the standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.  Competent evidence admitted in conjunction with the standing determination 
may be considered, to the extent that it is relevant, in the adjudication of the merits of the petition. 
 
11 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., with whom SAUFLEY, C.J., joins, concurring. 
 
 
[¶14]  We concur with the Court’s opinion remanding the case to the trial 
court, but we do not agree that it is necessary for the trial court to conduct a 
hearing on the issue of standing.  The record in this matter already establishes 
sufficient undisputed facts constituting prima facie evidence of standing and 
allow the court to reach the merits.  Requiring a full hearing on standing, on this 
record, will simply result in more costs for all parties. 
 
[¶15]  The de facto parentage section of the Maine Parentage Act (MPA) 
sets out the procedure that a court must follow when a person seeks to be 
adjudicated a de facto parent.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891 (2018).  The procedure 
begins with a determination of standing pursuant to § 1891(2)(A)-(D),5 which 
consists of a multi-step process. 
                                         
5  In order to establish standing pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2) (2018), the Legislature has 
enacted the following process: 
 
A. A person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent of a child shall file with the 
initial pleadings an affidavit alleging under oath specific facts to support the existence 
of a de facto parent relationship with the child as set forth in subsection 3.  The 
pleadings and affidavit must be served upon all parents and legal guardians of the 
child and any other party to the proceeding. 
 
12 
 
[¶16]  First the claimant is required to file an affidavit with the complaint 
seeking de facto parentage alleging under oath “specific facts” that track the 
elements of a de facto parent relationship.  Id. § 1891(2)(A).  Next, an adverse 
party may file a response to the putative de facto parent’s pleading and 
affidavit.  Id. § 1891(2)(B).  Then, pursuant to § 1891(2)(C), the court must 
review the parties’ submissions and determine whether the putative de facto 
parent has presented prima facie evidence of the requirements set forth in 
§ 1891(3)(A)-(E).6 
                                         
B. An adverse party, parent or legal guardian who files a pleading in response to the 
pleadings in paragraph A shall also file an affidavit in response, serving all parties to 
the proceeding with a copy. 
 
C. The court shall determine on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits under 
paragraphs A and B whether the person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent 
has presented prima facie evidence of the requirements set forth in subsection 3.  The 
court may in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited basis, hold a hearing 
to determine disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing. 
 
D. If the court’s determination under paragraph C is in the affirmative, the party 
claiming de facto parentage has standing to proceed to adjudication under subsection 
3. 
 
6  19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(A)-(E) sets forth the following requirement: 
[T]hat the person has fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, 
committed and responsible parental role in the child’s life.  Such a finding requires a 
determination by the court that: 
 
 
A: The person has resided with the child for a significant period of time; 
 
 
B: The person has engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; 
 
C: A bonded and dependent relationship has been established between the 
child and the person, the relationship was fostered or supported by another 
parent of the child and the person and the other parent have understood, 
 
13 
 
[¶17]  “Prima facie evidence requires only some evidence on every 
element of proof necessary to obtain the desired remedy [or judgment].”  
Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (quotation 
marks omitted); Cookson v. State, 2014 ME 24, ¶ 16, 86 A.3d 1186.  
“[P]rima facie proof is a low standard that does not depend on the reliability or 
the credibility of evidence, all of which may be considered at some later time in 
the process.”  Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 11, 143 A.3d 788 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, “prima facie evidence” requires only some evidence on every 
element of proof necessary to establish standing to seek a de facto parentage 
claim as set out in § 1891(3).   
 
[¶18]  If the presented evidence is uncontested, then the court must 
accept the evidence as true and determine whether the uncontested evidence 
constitutes prima facie evidence of the statutory elements laid out in § 1891(3) 
of the MPA.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C); see also Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, 
¶¶ 11-17, 143 A.3d 788; Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶¶ 33-35, 
                                         
acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as though the person is a parent 
of the child; 
 
D: The person has accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of 
the child without expectation of financial compensation; and 
 
E: The continuing relationship between the person and the child is in the best 
interest of the child. 
 
14 
41 A.3d 551.  If there are competing affidavits, then the court must determine 
whether there are undisputed facts contained within the competing affidavits 
that constitute prima facie evidence of the required elements under § 1891(3).  
See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(2)(C).  Absent undisputed facts that are sufficient to 
constitute prima facie evidence, the court must hold a hearing to consider the 
disputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of standing.  See 
Marie v. Renner, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 3-10, 946 A.2d 418 (holding that an 
evidentiary hearing was required before the trial court could rule on a motion 
to enforce); Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass’n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 28, 
775 A.2d 1166 (“The court erred in determining, without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues in dispute . . . .  We remand for 
such a hearing.”); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Me. 1987) (“The 
receipt of testimony is an essential aspect of a court’s hearing and resolving of 
legal disputes.”). 
 
[¶19]  Although the parties’ affidavits do contain disputed facts, they also 
contain many undisputed facts concerning the relationship between Young and 
the child.  The undisputed facts establish the following narrative: 
 
[¶20]  When King traveled to India to pick up her adopted daughter, 
Young traveled with her.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C).  Young signed a “father 
 
15 
figure” letter on paperwork associated with the adoption.  See id. 
§ 1891(3)(C)-(D).  Upon returning from India with the child, Young and King 
lived together in a jointly-owned house in Limerick, Maine.  See id. 
§ 1891(3)(A), (C).  During the three years in Limerick, when the parties lived 
together, Young took part in the child’s day-to-day caretaking duties, including 
sharing diaper changing duties with King, reading stories to the child before 
bedtime, frequently making meals for the family, helping the child with daily 
hygiene such as brushing her hair and teeth, and picking up the child from day 
care once a week—where he was listed as the child’s father.  See id. 
§ 1891(B)-(D).   
 
[¶21]  Between February 2008 and April 2011—the time when King left 
the household and moved to Hampden—the child called Young “Daddy” and 
sent Young cards from day care referring to him as her daddy.  See id. 
§ 1891(3)(C), (E).  The child continued to send Young Father’s Day and birthday 
cards as recently as January 13, 2018.  See id. § 1891(3)(C), (E).  
 
[¶22]  When King moved to Hampden with the child, who was 
5-years-old at the time, she and Young worked out a visitation schedule where 
Young would have visitation with the child every other weekend.  See id. 
§ 1891(3)(A)-(D).  Under this arrangement, Young traveled a distance of 
 
16 
approximately 150 miles each way to pick up the child on Thursday and drop 
her off on Sunday.  See id. § 1891(3)(A)-(D).  For the first four years of this 
visitation schedule, when the child was with Young on the weekends and during 
extended visits, the child lived in the same house and in the same bedroom 
where she had spent the first three years of her adopted life in Limerick.  Young 
had maintained the child’s bedroom and took care of the child’s cat following 
his split with King.  See id. § 1891(3)(B)-(D).  When Young moved to Portland 
following the sale of the Limerick house in 2016, he maintained a bedroom for 
the child and continued to care for her cat.  See id. § 1891(3)(B)-(D).  
[¶23]  The visitation scheduled continued religiously for seven years, see 
id. § 1891(3)(A)-(D), until King unilaterally stopped visitation in April 2018.  Up 
until April 2018, the child referred to Young as her father; in a birthday card 
sent from the child to Young on January 13, 2018, the child wrote: “Happy 
birthday to a dad I love and a dad I will always love and I will never stop loving 
you DaD because I LOVE YOU SO MUCH.”  See id. § 1891(C), (E).  
[¶24]  Notwithstanding the presence of disputed facts, the above 
narrative of undisputed facts constitute sufficient prima facie evidence of all of 
the elements contained in § 1891(3).  The focus must be on the relationship 
between Young and the child, not on the relationship between King and Young.  
 
17 
It is undisputed that Young, King, and the child lived together as a family in 
Limerick, and the child considered Young to be her father.  After King moved to 
Hampden with the child, this relationship continued.  The seven years of 
visitation present in this case is no different than the relationship that is 
commonplace with divorce cases.  There is no dispute that the child considered 
Young to be “Daddy” during those many years.  For these reasons, Young has 
presented prima facie evidence to establish standing to bring a de facto 
parentage claim. 
[¶25]  Standing is a preliminary hurdle that putative de facto parents 
must overcome to get their day in court where they must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence the elements pursuant to § 1891(3).  Under the statute, a 
finding of standing in no way establishes those elements; it is simply a 
gatekeeping function to ensure that only legitimate cases of de facto 
parenthood proceed.  After satisfying the standing requirement, the putative 
de facto parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence the necessary 
elements under § 1891(3). 
[¶26]  At this juncture of the case, the undisputed facts present a 
legitimate claim of de facto parentage.  There is no need for a hearing on this 
 
18 
preliminary matter.  We would remand for a hearing on the merits of Young’s 
petition for de facto parentage.  19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)-(4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy E. Robbins, Esq. (orally), South Portland, for appellant Jason Young 
 
Audrey B. Braccio, Esq. (orally), Pelletier & Faircloth LLC, Bangor, for appellee 
Toni M. King 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number FM-2018-445 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY