Title: Jones, Ronald v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
 
RONALD LEE JONES 
 
v.   Record No. 090727 
 
 
        OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                         January 15, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we review a defendant’s conviction for 
unreasonably refusing to submit to a blood or breath test after 
being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.  We 
decide 1) whether a court may consider a defendant’s refusal to 
participate in “field sobriety tests”1 as evidence in determining 
whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant 
for driving under the influence of alcohol; and 2) whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in determining that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the defendant 
on that charge. 
 
Ronald L. Jones was convicted in a jury trial in the 
Circuit Court of Stafford County of unreasonably refusing to 
submit to a breath or blood test, in violation of Code § 18.2-
268.2 (the refusal charge), after having been convicted within 
                     
1 As referenced in this opinion, the term “field sobriety 
tests” includes tests intended to assess a person’s ability to 
perform basic acts at the direction of a police officer, 
including acts involving walking, standing, physical balance, 
and recitation of various information. 
ten years of two prior offenses of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol.2  Jones was sentenced to serve 30 days in 
jail and was fined $2,500. 
 
Jones appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals and 
argued, in part, that the police did not have probable cause to 
arrest him for driving under the influence of alcohol, third 
offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and -270, and Code 
§ 18.2-10.3  Thus, Jones contended that his indictment for 
unreasonably refusing to submit to a blood or breath test should 
have been dismissed. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones’ conviction on the 
refusal charge in a published opinion.  Jones v. Commonwealth, 
51 Va. App. 730, 660 S.E.2d 343 (2008).  The Court held that the 
police had probable cause to arrest Jones based on his physical 
appearance, the odor of alcoholic beverages about his person, 
his argumentative demeanor, and his refusal to submit to any 
field sobriety tests.  Id. at 740-41, 660 S.E.2d at 348.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court further held that Jones’ 
refusal to perform the field sobriety tests was circumstantial 
evidence of his “consciousness of guilt.”  Id. at 738, 660 
                     
2 Jones was also indicted for driving under the influence, 
but the record does not include the disposition for that charge. 
3 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Jones also challenged 
whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, but 
that issue is not before us in this appeal. 
 
2 
 
S.E.2d at 346-47.  We awarded Jones an appeal from the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment. 
 
We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.  
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 37, 613 S.E.2d 398, 399 
(2005); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 
836, 837 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 486, 545 
S.E.2d 541, 543 (2001).  On the night of September 29, 2006, 
Sheriff’s Deputy Peter Nelson and several Stafford County police 
officers were investigating a burglary of a home.  The officers 
thought that the thief had fled on foot or as a passenger in a 
vehicle.  In an effort to apprehend the thief, the officers 
placed about eight police vehicles, with activated emergency 
lights, as a “perimeter” barrier near the site of the burglary. 
 
Nelson observed Jones drive slowly past the “perimeter” 
barrier twice.  Nelson, who was wearing his police uniform, 
testified that he “flagged down” Jones to ensure that the thief 
was not in the back of Jones’ vehicle, which had tinted windows.  
When Nelson approached Jones’ vehicle and began speaking with 
Jones, Nelson smelled a “strong odor” of alcoholic beverages 
coming from Jones’ vehicle. 
 
Nelson testified that when he asked Jones to step out of 
his vehicle, Jones complied.  Nelson stated that he smelled a 
strong odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from Jones’ person.  
 
3 
 
Jones denied that he had been drinking alcoholic beverages that 
night, and stated that the odor about his person was 
attributable to cough drops and incense. 
 
Nelson testified that Jones’ eyes appeared “a little 
glassy” and “a little red,” and that his speech was “a little 
bit” slurred.  Nelson also stated that Jones’ “articulation was 
very difficult,” and that Jones made “irrational” and 
inconsistent statements.  According to Nelson, Jones stated that 
he came to “help” Nelson, but that Nelson “was trying to hurt 
him.”  In addition, Jones was unable to tell Nelson the county 
in which Jones was stopped. 
 
Nelson testified that he repeatedly asked Jones to 
participate in field sobriety tests and told Jones, “If you are 
not intoxicated, prove to me you’re not intoxicated.”  Jones 
refused to participate in the tests, and repeatedly asked 
Nelson, “Why are you doing this to me?”  After speaking with 
Jones for a total period of about 15 minutes, Nelson arrested 
Jones for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
 
Nelson brought Jones before a magistrate, who informed 
Jones regarding the “implied consent” statute, Code § 18.2-
268.2, which required that Jones submit to a blood or breath 
test as a result of having operated a motor vehicle on a public 
highway.  Jones refused to take a test. 
 
4 
 
 
Before his trial on the refusal charge, Jones filed a 
motion to suppress arguing, in part, that Nelson lacked probable 
cause to arrest Jones for driving while intoxicated.  The 
circuit court denied Jones’ motion.  After a jury trial, the 
circuit court entered final judgment on the refusal charge in 
accordance with the jury verdict.  Jones appealed this 
conviction to the Court of Appeals. 
 
On appeal before this Court, Jones argues that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that a court may consider a defendant’s 
refusal to submit to field sobriety tests as evidence of that 
defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.”  Jones contends that 
because there is no legal requirement that a driver submit to a 
field sobriety test, and because a driver may have many innocent 
reasons for refusing to submit to such tests, the driver’s 
failure to do so is not evidence of a “consciousness of guilt.” 
 
Jones additionally argues that the police lacked probable 
cause to arrest him.  Thus, according to Jones, because he was 
arrested without probable cause, he was not required to submit 
to a blood or breath test and should not have been charged under 
Code § 18.2-268.2 for refusal to take such a test. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth contends that Jones’ refusal 
to perform any field sobriety tests is but one factor supporting 
the circuit court’s probable cause determination.  In support of 
the circuit court’s holding, the Commonwealth additionally 
 
5 
 
relies on Nelson’s testimony regarding Jones’ appearance, his 
speech, and the strong odor of alcoholic beverages about Jones’ 
person. 
 
Initially, we observe that our appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence of probable cause includes an issue 
of first impression.  We consider whether, and to what extent, a 
driver’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests may be 
considered by a court as a component factor in the arresting 
officer’s probable cause determination.  As part of this 
analysis, we also consider the Court of Appeals’ holding that 
such refusal by a driver constitutes evidence of the driver’s 
“consciousness of guilt.” 
 
In our jurisprudence, the term “consciousness of guilt” 
generally is applied to affirmative acts of falsehood or flight 
immediately following the commission of a crime, which tend to 
show a person’s guilty knowledge of, and participation in, a 
criminal act.  See, e.g., Turman v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 558, 
565, 667 S.E.2d 767, 770-71 (2008) (evidence of actual flight, 
but not mere departure from place where crime has been 
committed, may be considered with other evidence as tending to 
show defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Emmett v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 372, 569 S.E.2d 39, 45 (2002) 
(defendant’s inconsistent statements to police made after crime 
occurred concerning identity of murderer were relevant to show 
 
6 
 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Edmondson v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 388, 390, 448 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1994) (jury was properly 
instructed it could consider defendant’s use of false name 
immediately after burglary occurred, in context of other 
evidence in case, as evidence of his consciousness of guilt); 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 374, 157 S.E.2d 907, 910 
(1967) (defendant’s flight to avoid arrest was admissible to 
show consciousness of guilt in considering whether defendant 
committed burglary and attempted robbery); see also McMillan v. 
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 429, 432-33, 50 S.E.2d 428, 430 (1948) 
(evidence that defendant procured or attempted to procure 
absence of witness was admissible to show defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt). 
 
Such acts of flight from a crime scene, or of deceitful 
behavior immediately following the commission of a crime, are 
acts that generally cannot be explained in terms of innocent 
human behavior.  Thus, when a defendant affirmatively acts in 
such a manner, a court may consider those acts in the context of 
all the facts presented as evidence tending to show the 
defendant’s consciousness of guilt of the crime committed.  See 
Turman, 276 Va. at 565, 667 S.E.2d at 770-71; Emmett, 264 Va. at 
372, 569 S.E.2d at 45; Edmondson, 248 Va. at 390, 448 S.E.2d at 
637; Jones, 208 Va. at 374, 157 S.E.2d at 910. 
 
7 
 
 
A refusal to submit to field sobriety tests, however, can 
often be explained in terms of innocent human behavior.  Unlike 
instances of flight, the use of a false name, or other acts of 
deception, a driver refusing to submit to a field sobriety test 
has not undertaken affirmative action to deceive or to evade the 
police.  Moreover, there are numerous innocent reasons why a 
person may refuse to engage in tests that are not required by 
law, including that a person may be tired, may lack physical 
dexterity, may have a limited ability to speak the English 
language, or simply may be reluctant to submit to subjective 
assessments by a police officer.  Therefore, we conclude that a 
defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is not 
evidence of “consciousness of guilt,” and that the Court of 
Appeals erred in applying this principle in reviewing the 
evidence of probable cause in the present case.4 
                     
4 Relying on Artis v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 220, 191 S.E.2d 
190 (1972), the concurring opinion states that we held that a 
defendant’s refusal to try on a coat that contained betting 
slips in its pocket was admissible as evidence that the 
defendant tacitly admitted he was guilty of operating a lottery.  
However, the holding in Artis does not state that the evidence 
could be used as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of 
guilt.  Rather, we held that such evidence was a tacit admission 
that the defendant owned the coat.  Id. at 224-25, 191 S.E.2d at 
193-94.  Thus, the holding in Artis does not affect our 
conclusion that a defendant’s refusal to submit to field 
sobriety tests differs from a defendant’s affirmative act such 
as flight from the scene or deceitful behavior, which can be 
used as evidence tending the show the defendant’s consciousness 
of guilt of the crime committed. 
 
8 
 
 
Nevertheless, we recognize that a defendant’s refusal to 
submit to field sobriety tests may have some relevance in a 
police officer’s assessment of probable cause to arrest that 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol.  When 
other facts show a driver’s consumption of alcohol and the 
discernable effect of such consumption on the driver’s mental or 
physical state, the driver’s refusal to perform field sobriety 
tests is circumstantial evidence tending to show the driver’s 
awareness that his consumption of alcohol would affect his 
ability to perform such tests.  Accordingly, we hold that in 
determining whether a police officer had probable cause to 
arrest a defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
court may consider the driver’s refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests when such refusal is accompanied by evidence of 
the driver’s alcohol consumption and its discernable effect on 
the driver’s mental or physical state. 
 
We next consider whether the record before us supports the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment that the police had probable cause to 
arrest Jones for driving under the influence of alcohol.  We 
have stated that probable cause exists “ ‘when the facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he 
has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an 
offense has been or is being committed.’ ”  Buhrman v. 
 
9 
 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) 
(quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 
833, 836 (1981)); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 40, 639 
S.E.2d 217, 225 (2007); Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 106, 
496 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1998).  In determining whether a police 
officer had probable cause to arrest a defendant, a trial court 
must consider the totality of the facts and circumstances 
presented and what those facts and circumstances reasonably 
meant to a trained police officer.  Buhrman, 275 Va. at 505, 659 
S.E.2d at 327; Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419, 620 
S.E.2d 760, 762 (2005); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 
877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). 
 
In the present case, as stated above, Deputy Nelson 
testified that there was a strong odor of alcoholic beverages 
about Jones’ person, that his eyes appeared “a little glassy” 
and “a little red,” and that his speech was “a little bit” 
slurred.  Contrary to these observations, Jones attributed the 
odor about his person to cough drops and incense.  Jones also 
made the illogical comment that he came to “help” Nelson, but 
that Nelson “was trying to hurt him.”  Additionally, Jones did 
not know that he was driving in Stafford County at the time 
Nelson stopped him. 
 
In view of this evidence concerning Jones’ physical state 
and remarks to Nelson, Jones’ refusal to perform any field 
 
10 
 
sobriety tests was relevant evidence in the probable cause 
determination.  That other evidence concerning Jones’ physical 
and mental state rendered his refusal to perform any field 
sobriety tests circumstantial evidence tending to show an 
awareness that his consumption of alcohol would affect his 
ability to perform those tests. 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that the record supports 
the circuit court’s determination that Nelson had probable cause 
to arrest Jones for driving under the influence of alcohol.  
Accordingly, we further conclude that the Court of Appeals did 
not err in confirming the circuit court’s judgment.5 
 
For these reasons, we will vacate that portion of the Court 
of Appeals’ judgment holding that the refusal to submit to field 
sobriety tests is evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of 
guilt.  We will affirm the balance of the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment. 
                                      Affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   and vacated in part. 
 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, concurring. 
 
                     
5 We do not consider Jones’ contention at oral argument in 
this appeal that admission of evidence of his refusal to perform 
field sobriety tests violated his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Because Jones did not assign error in this Court on 
that basis, the issue is not properly before us.  See Rule 
5:17(C). 
 
11 
 
 
I concur in the judgment reached by the majority to affirm 
the Court of Appeals; however, I do not agree that a portion of 
the Court of Appeals opinion should be vacated. 
 
The majority opinion concludes “that a defendant’s refusal 
to submit to field sobriety tests is not evidence of 
‘consciousness of guilt,’ and that the Court of Appeals erred in 
applying this principle in reviewing the evidence of probable 
cause in the present case.”  The majority opinion also concludes 
that 
a defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety 
tests may have some relevance in a police 
officer’s assessment of probable cause to arrest 
that defendant for driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  When other facts show a driver’s 
consumption of alcohol and the discernable effect 
of such consumption on the driver’s mental or 
physical state, the driver’s refusal to perform 
field sobriety tests is circumstantial evidence 
tending to show the driver’s awareness that his 
consumption of alcohol would affect his ability 
to perform such tests.  Accordingly, we hold that 
in determining whether a police officer had 
probable cause to arrest a defendant for driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a court may 
consider the driver’s refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests when such refusal is accompanied 
by evidence of the driver’s alcohol consumption 
and its discernable effect on the driver’s mental 
or physical state. 
 
It is difficult to reconcile these two conclusions.  If a court 
is permitted to consider a driver’s refusal to perform field 
sobriety tests when such refusal is accompanied by some evidence 
of alcohol consumption, consideration of the refusal has to be 
 
12 
 
because it tends to show that the driver does not think he or 
she will successfully perform the test – a calculation that 
reflects consciousness of guilt for driving under the influence.  
 
A determination of probable cause focuses on two questions:  
is there probable cause that an offense has been committed and 
is there probable cause that the suspect committed the offense.  
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1972).  Here we have no 
issue regarding identity; we only have concern about whether an 
offense had been committed.  If the fact of refusal to perform 
field sobriety tests accompanied by evidence of alcohol 
consumption is not evidence of consciousness of guilt for the 
purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to 
conclude that an offense has been committed, then it is 
irrelevant and should not be considered for any purpose.  It 
seems inconsistent to me to permit consideration of refusal to 
perform field sobriety tests in conjunction with evidence of 
alcohol consumption for probable cause purposes and 
simultaneously declare that it is not evidence of consciousness 
of guilt.  If, as the majority states, “the driver’s refusal to 
perform field sobriety tests is circumstantial evidence tending 
to show the driver’s awareness that his consumption of alcohol 
would affect his ability to perform such tests,” it most likely 
is because the driver is concerned that his state of 
 
13 
 
intoxication may be in violation of the law.  This awareness is 
“consciousness of guilt.” 
 
The Court of Appeals’ opinion is replete with citations to 
the law of other states that permit their courts to consider 
evidence of refusal to perform sobriety tests as indicative of 
consciousness of guilt.  I will not repeat them here.  
Additionally, the majority attempts to distinguish the myriad of 
cases in our jurisprudence that permit the inference of 
consciousness of guilt from such acts as flight or falsehoods, 
by asserting that these examples are all affirmative acts while 
refusal to perform sobriety tests is not.  I do not find the 
attempted distinction to have substance.  Furthermore, it is not 
necessary.  In Artis v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 220, 191 S.E.2d 
190 (1972), we considered an analogous question.  In Artis, the 
defendant was charged with operating a “numbers racket or game.”  
Id. at 221, 191 S.E.2d at 191.  Upon execution of a search 
warrant upon premises where such gambling was suspected, police 
found the defendant and also found a coat on a chair near the 
defendant.  Id.  Of the five men visiting the premises when the 
police executed the search, only the defendant was not wearing a 
coat.  Id. at 221-22, 191 S.E.2d at 191.  Upon searching the 
coat pockets, police found evidence of betting slips.  Id. at 
222, 191 S.E.2d at 192.  When police requested Artis to put on 
the coat, obviously to see if it fit, Artis refused.  Id. at 
 
14 
 
222, 191 S.E.2d at 191.  On appeal, Artis complained, among 
other things, that it was error to admit evidence to the jury of 
his refusal to put on the coat.  We stated 
Neither do we find any error in the action of the 
court in permitting the Commonwealth to show that 
defendant refused to try on the coat in which the 
incriminating evidence was found.  The general 
rule which governs tacit admissions applies here. 
It is properly stated in Owens v. Commonwealth, 
186 Va. 689, 699, 43 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1947) where 
we said: 
 
“ ‘ . . . In order that the 
silence of one accused of crime 
following a statement of a fact tending 
to incriminate him may have the effect 
of a tacit admission, he must have 
heard the statement and have understood 
that he was being accused of complicity 
in a crime, the circumstances under 
which the statement was made must have 
been such as would afford him an 
opportunity to deny or object, and the 
statement must have been such, and made 
under such circumstances, as would 
naturally call for a reply.  The test 
is whether men similarly situated would 
have felt themselves called upon to 
deny the statements affecting them in 
the event they did not intend to 
express acquiescence by their failure 
to do so. * * * ’ ” See also Baughan v. 
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 28, 141 S.E.2d 
750 (1965). 
 
Id. at 224-25, 191 S.E.2d at 193. 
 
Of course there was nothing “affirmative” about Artis’ 
refusal.  Nonetheless, we permitted his refusal to put on the 
coat to be considered as a tacit admission of guilt at trial.  
Surely, if such a refusal could be used to prove consciousness 
 
15 
 
of guilt at trial as a tacit admission of guilt, the refusal in 
this case could be considered as consciousness of guilt for the 
purpose of determining probable cause. 
 
While I agree that the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed, I cannot join the majority’s determination 
to vacate a portion of the opinion. 
 
16