Title: Northeast Bank NA v. Crochere

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

Decided December 18, 1981. Berman, Simmons, Laskoff & Goldberg, P.A., John E. Sedgewick (orally), and Robert A. Laskoff, Lewiston, for plaintiff. Gauvreau & Thibeault, N. Paul Gauvreau and Daniel J. Murphy (orally), Lewiston, for defendant. Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK,[*] GODFREY, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ. *267 ROBERTS, Justice. After a long and procedurally complex history, this case reaches the Law Court with the controversy narrowed by the parties to one issue. That remaining issue is whether an order in a disclosure proceeding purporting to impose a lien on property not subject to attachment is void and thus open to collateral attack. The District Court apparently thought not, and therefore denied a motion to vacate the order. The Superior Court reversed. We in turn reverse the Superior Court and direct the entry of judgment affirming the District Court. Northeast Bank was a judgment creditor of Haleston Howard and Louise Crochere.[1] Following disclosure proceedings, the District Court, Lewiston, on March 24, 1978, purported to impose a lien on the potential award of damages in a personal injury action against a third party then pending in Superior Court, Kennebec County, in which Crochere was the plaintiff. Crochere did not appeal.[2] In January of 1979, after the tort claim was settled, Crochere filed a motion in District Court to vacate the lien order. After a hearing, the District Court denied the motion without explanation. Crochere appealed from a denial of the motion to vacate to the Superior Court, Androscoggin County. The Superior Court first determined that a personal injury claim not yet reduced to judgment fell within the common law exemption of 14 M.R.S.A. § 4151 to property subject to attachment.[3] Therefore, the potential recovery from that action could not be the subject of a lien under 14 M.R.S.A. § 3132.[4] Then, reasoning that the District Court lacked the power or authority to impose the lien, the Superior Court concluded that the lien order was void rather than voidable, so it was properly subject to collateral attack by motion to vacate. The Superior Court therefore ordered the lien order vacated. In the Law Court, for purposes of its appeal, Northeast Bank does not dispute the Superior Court's conclusion that the potential recovery of damages in a pending tort action was not properly subject to a lien order.[5] That concession limits the issue before us to whether the District Court's order imposing the lien was void or voidable. If void, the order was open to collateral attack by the motion to vacate and the Superior Court's decision was correct. If *268 voidable, the order could be challenged only on direct appeal.[6] In Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, Me., 290 A.2d 362 (1972), the Court recognized three exceptions to the general rule allowing attack on a judgment only by direct appeal: denial of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or adjudication of issues beyond the scope of those submitted for decision. Id. at 365-66. None of these exceptions applies here. The District Court had jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter, it adjudicated only the issues before it, and Crochere made no claim of deprivation of due process in relation to that adjudication.[7] The Superior Court incorrectly concluded that by improperly imposing the lien, the District Court acted beyond its powers, making its decision void. The District Court may have made an error of law by imposing the lien. The District Court, however, did not deprive itself of jurisdiction or act beyond its power by making an error: the court's power included the power to decide the issue incorrectly. Swift & Company v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 , 330, 48 S. Ct. 311, 316, 72 L. Ed. 587 (1927). Therefore, assuming it incorrectly entered the order, the District Court's order was voidable, not void. Maine National Bank v. Rush, Me., 388 A.2d 108 (1978); Vanasse v. Labrecque, Me., 381 A.2d 269 , 272 (1977). Because Crochere failed to appeal from the entry of that order, it became final upon expiration of the appeal period and was not subject to collateral attack by a motion to vacate. The entry will be: Judgment of the Superior Court reversed. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order affirming the judgment of the District Court. All concurring.