Title: Commonwealth v. Tuschall

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12151 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYLE TUSCHALL. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 9, 2016. - March 8, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause.  Search 
and Seizure, Emergency, Probable cause, Fruits of illegal 
search.  Probable Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 12, 2014. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Thomas 
P. Billings, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial 
Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by 
her to the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Randall F. Maas, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jessica LaClair for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a report of a "smell like drugs" 
emanating from the apartment of the defendant, police made two 
2 
 
 
warrantless entries into his apartment.  Based on observations 
of paraphernalia related to the manufacture of crystal 
methamphetamine, the police then obtained a warrant.  The 
defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with, among 
other things, drug related offenses. 
 
The defendant filed two motions in the Superior Court -- 
one to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of the 
search warrant and another to suppress statements he made to 
police following his arrest.  The judge granted both motions 
after an evidentiary hearing.  With respect to the first motion, 
the judge determined that no emergency justified the warrantless 
entries, without which the Commonwealth could not establish the 
probable cause necessary for the subsequent warrant.  Regarding 
the second motion, the judge concluded the defendant's 
statements to the police were the "fruit of" the defendant's 
unlawful arrest. 
 
The Commonwealth appealed from the judge's decision.  A 
single justice in the county court allowed the Commonwealth's 
application for interlocutory review and reported the matter to 
the Appeals Court.  We subsequently allowed the defendant's 
motion for direct appellate review.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  The motion judge made the following factual 
findings, which we accept absent clear error.  Commonwealth v. 
Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 209 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
3 
 
 
945 (2013).  We review de novo the judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts.  Commonwealth v. 
Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 624 (2008). 
 
On June 11, 2014, the Watertown police received a telephone 
call from the defendant's neighbor at a multifamily residential 
property.  The neighbor reported a "smell like drugs" coming 
from the defendant's apartment.  The police did not respond to 
the call until the next day, when a detective called the 
neighbor.  The neighbor complained that the odor was causing her 
to suffer headaches and was adversely affecting her dog.  She 
further described the odor as "skunky" and "minty."  She also 
stated that the windows of the neighbor's apartment were 
"sealed," and there was a bright light shining in one of the 
defendant's apartment's rooms.  The police did not visit the 
apartment on June 12. 
 
On June 13, 2014, two detectives traveled to the apartment 
building, where they met with the neighbor who had complained 
two days earlier.  The night before the detectives arrived, the 
neighbor spent the night elsewhere to avoid further exposure to 
the odor. 
 
When the detectives knocked on the defendant's door, no one 
answered.  The detectives could not see inside the defendant's 
apartment from the sidewalk because the windows were covered 
from inside the apartment.  Beneath a running air conditioner 
4 
 
 
extending from one of the apartment's windows, the detectives 
smelled a strong chemical odor. 
 
The complaining neighbor informed the detectives that two 
people, the defendant and his girl friend, lived in the 
apartment.  The two usually left the apartment together in the 
morning, but that morning, the neighbor had seen the defendant 
leave alone.  The detectives obtained the girl friend's cellular 
telephone number through the building's owner.  Unable to reach 
the girl friend on her cellular telephone, the detectives 
decided to enter the apartment to look for her. 
 
The building owner's son led the detectives through the 
basement to the door of the defendant's apartment.  The smell 
grew stronger in the basement.  One of the detectives felt a 
dry, scratchy sensation in his throat, and his eyes began to 
burn and water.  Before entering the apartment, the detectives 
identified themselves as police and said, "Is anyone home?"  
When no one responded, they entered. 
 
Inside the apartment, the detectives went room to room in 
search of the girl friend, calling her by name.  In the course 
of discovering that no one was present, one detective saw items 
he believed to be consistent with small-scale methamphetamine 
production.  The detectives did not open any containers or 
drawers.  Now concerned by the risk posed to other residents of 
the building, due to the volatile chemicals used in 
5 
 
 
methamphetamine production, the detectives contacted the fire 
department and a colleague, Detective Gutwill, who had more 
expertise with methamphetamine laboratories (lab). 
 
When Detective Gutwill arrived, he could not tell, by the 
smell alone, whether the source of the odor posed a danger.  He 
was, however, concerned that the odor was the result of the "one 
pot" method of methamphetamine manufacture, which presents a 
risk of explosion.  He donned a respirator and protective 
clothing and entered the apartment.  He found no evidence of a 
"one pot" manufacturing method and determined that there was no 
immediate risk of danger. 
 
Relying on observations from the two warrantless entries, 
the police obtained a search warrant.  The defendant arrived 
while the police were executing the warrant.  He was arrested 
and transported to the Watertown police station. 
 
While in custody at the police station, the defendant was 
questioned by the police.  The police informed him of the 
Miranda rights, including the right to have an attorney present 
and rights pursuant to Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 
56-57 (1996).  He waived his Miranda and Rosario rights, agreed 
to speak with the police, and made some incriminating 
statements. 
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred 
in granting both motions to suppress.  As to the first motion, 
6 
 
 
the Commonwealth argues that both searches were lawful under the 
emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  With regard to the second motion, the Commonwealth 
argues that the defendant's statements to the police should not 
have been suppressed, because they were not the fruit of 
unlawful searches.  In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues 
that, even if the searches were unlawful, the defendant's 
statements were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful 
conduct to escape the reach of the exclusionary rule. 
 
1.  The warrantless searches.  Under the Fourth Amendment 
and art. 14, a search of an individual's home must be 
reasonable.  A search conducted without a warrant is 
presumptively unreasonable.  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398, 403 (2006).  Warrantless searches may be justifiable, 
however, if the circumstances of the search fall within an 
established exception to the warrant requirement.  Under the 
exclusionary rule, evidence seized pursuant to an unreasonable 
search generally will be suppressed.  See J.A. Grasso, Jr. & 
C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 20-
2[a] (2017). 
 
One such exception to the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 is 
the "emergency aid exception."  Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 
Mass. 746, 749, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 224 (2014).  To meet 
7 
 
 
the requirements of the exception, there must be "objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency exists . . . 
[and] the conduct of the police following the entry must be 
reasonable under the circumstances" (citation omitted).  Id. at 
750. 
 
The emergency aid exception applies in two circumstances 
relevant to this case.  First, a warrantless search is 
reasonable when law enforcement possess an objectively 
reasonable basis to conclude that "prompt intervention is 
necessary to prevent a threatened fire, explosion, or other 
destructive accident."  Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. 
App. Ct. 714, 723 (1995).  See Commonwealth v. Marchione, 384 
Mass. 8, 11-12 (1981) (entry reasonable to prevent potential 
explosion from volatile liquids stored near incendiary device).  
Second, the emergency aid exception "permits the police to enter 
a home without a warrant when they have an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that there may be someone inside who 
is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm."  
Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 819 (2009). 
 
A police officer's "'subjective motivation [for entry] is 
irrelevant.'"  Entwistle, 463 Mass. at 214, quoting Brigham 
City, 547 U.S. at 404.  The emergency aid exception does not 
require that police have probable cause that a crime has been 
committed, because the purpose of the entry is to prevent harm 
8 
 
 
stemming from a dangerous condition, not to investigate criminal 
activity.  See Duncan, 467 Mass. at 750 (2014).1 
 
a.  The initial entry.  The Commonwealth suggests that the 
initial entry was justified due to the danger posed by the fumes 
to the residents in the building and to the defendant's girl 
friend, whom the police were concerned might be inside the 
apartment. 
 
Prior to the first entry, there was no objectively 
reasonable basis upon which to conclude that residents of the 
building faced an "imminent threat of death or serious injury"  
due to the effects of the fumes, or that the fumes constituted a 
danger comparable to that of a "fire, explosion, or other 
destructive accident."  DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 723.  
Indeed, two days had elapsed before the police responded to the 
initial complaint.2  Moreover, unpleasant as the smell may have 
been, the discomfort described by the neighbor did not suggest 
the existence of an emergency situation requiring immediate 
intervention.  When she first met the police two days after 
                                                          
 
1 This is in contrast to the broader "exigent circumstances" 
exception.  Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry 
exist where the police have probable cause of criminal activity, 
but where the time required to obtain a warrant would defeat the 
purposes of the search -- such as when delay would result in the 
destruction of evidence.  See Duncan, 467 Mass. at 750-751 & 
n.4. 
2 The police certainly could have advised the neighbor to 
contact her landlord regarding a nuisance claim, or the 
Department of Public Health or the fire department to address 
the odor. 
9 
 
 
making her initial complaint, the neighbor said that she had 
slept elsewhere to avoid the smell, and that she had seen the 
defendant leave his apartment, in apparently fine health despite 
his presumably longer exposure to the fumes at a closer 
proximity.  Apart from the complaining neighbor's headache, 
there were no reports of illness or negative health consequences 
stemming from the smell, and no clear indication that the 
smell's potency had increased since the neighbor's initial 
report.3 
 
The ill effects produced by the fumes are a stark contrast 
to the discernible danger recognized as justifying emergency 
intervention in other cases.  See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 
(warrantless entry was justified where police observed ongoing 
violence in home); Marchione, 384 Mass. at 11-12 (1981) 
(warrantless entry justified by landlord's report that large 
quantity of volatile and explosive liquids surrounded incendiary 
device); Commonwealth v. Cantelli, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 165-
166 (2013) ("explosive levels" of natural gas filled defendant's 
apartment prior to entry). 
                                                          
 
3 At oral argument, the Commonwealth argued that the danger 
from the chemical odor increased over the course of the three 
days, based on the nature of the complaining neighbor's 
statements on each of those days.  This may have been a 
permissible inference from the neighbor's statements, but it is 
not a necessary one and the judge made no such finding.  Even if 
true, however, it was apparent that exposure to the smell had 
not caused sufficiently negative health consequences to justify 
entry into the defendant's apartment on an emergency basis. 
10 
 
 
 
Prior to the first search, the police also lacked an 
objectively reasonable basis to conclude that any condition 
inside the defendant's apartment posed a risk of explosion.  
Even if a reasonable belief that methamphetamine is actively 
being manufactured inside an apartment justifies a warrantless 
entry, based on the dangers inherent to the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, the police lacked a reasonable basis prior to 
the first search to believe that the apartment contained a 
methamphetamine lab.  Contrast Marchione, 384 Mass. at 11-12; 
Cantelli, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 165-166.  The complaining 
neighbor vaguely characterized the odor as a "smell like drugs."  
One of the officers described it as akin to "nail polish,"  
which does not in and of itself indicate the presence of a drug 
lab.  Contrast United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 886 
(9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Brigham City, 547 
U.S. at 402, 404 (tenants in immediate proximity of apartment 
emitting strong chemical odor and officer saw man in kitchen 
with large pot on floor); People v. Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d 91, 95-96 
& n.1 (1986) (police lawfully entered in response to ongoing 
burglary and observed evidence indicating active manufacture of 
methamphetamine); Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 933-934, 937-
938 (Ind. 2006) (police specifically identified odor as ether, 
which is highly flammable; smell was strong enough to be 
detectable in two- or three-block area; and infant was inside 
11 
 
 
apartment from which odor was emanating); State v. Simmons, 714 
N.W.2d 264, 269, 273 (Iowa 2006) (before entry, which was 
permissible, officer who could not identify odor contacted 
expert officer who ascertained smell of anhydrous ammonia, used 
in manufacture of methamphetamine); State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 
710, 714 (Tenn. 2008) (officer with high degree of expertise 
"could smell what [he] knew to be a meth[amphetamine] lab" and 
heard glass breaking and voices inside apartment). 
 
The police also lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that 
the girl friend was inside the apartment and was injured or in 
danger of imminent harm.  The police could not reach the girl 
friend by cellular telephone and there was no answer from the 
apartment when they knocked.  The only indication that the girl 
friend may have been in the apartment was speculative, anecdotal 
evidence from the complaining neighbor that the defendant and 
his girl friend typically left together in the morning, but the 
defendant left alone on that particular morning.  The police 
made no effort to contact the girl friend's employer or her 
family, and made only a few attempts to contact her by cellular 
telephone before entry. 
 
These circumstances fall short of those in which we have 
determined there was an objectively reasonable basis 
establishing the existence of an emergency.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 415, 422-423, 426 
12 
 
 
(2009), the Commonwealth met its burden to justify warrantless 
entry into an apartment where a victim, whose last known 
location was inside that apartment, had not been seen for 
multiple days.  The resident of that apartment had a history of 
abusing the victim.  Id. at 422-423.  Before entry, the police 
spoke to the victim's mother and the victim's sister, neither of 
whom had had any contact with the victim in the days leading up 
to the warrantless entry.  Id.   The victim had missed a visit 
with her children, scheduled through the Department of Social 
Services, and the victim's automobile was parked outside the 
defendant's apartment.  Id. at 422, 424.  See Entwistle, 463 
Mass. at 210, 215-216 (warrantless entry reasonable where 
potential victim had been out of contact for two days, her dog 
could be heard barking inside house, and she had 
uncharacteristically missed multiple appointments); Peters, 453 
Mass. at 823-824 (warrantless search reasonable following report 
of audible domestic disturbance in which gunshot was heard and 
individual subsequently fled scene). 
 
b.  The second entry.  The proposed justification for the 
second warrantless entry rests on observations of drug 
paraphernalia made during the first entry.  The Commonwealth 
argues that, because they observed evidence that methamphetamine 
had been manufactured inside the apartment, and the manufacture 
of methamphetamine involves the use of volatile chemicals 
13 
 
 
susceptible to explosion, the second entry was justified to 
ascertain the extent of the danger.  Even setting aside the fact 
that this information was obtained solely as the result of an 
unlawful search, the observations of police during the first 
entry did not form an objectively reasonable basis to conclude 
that there was an imminent danger of explosion.4 
 
The observations during the first search did not reasonably 
support the conclusion that methamphetamine was being or 
recently had been manufactured, or that the particular fumes to 
which they were exposed were highly combustible.  The only 
additional information obtained by police during the first entry 
was that it appeared possible that methamphetamine had been 
manufactured at some point inside the apartment.  The police 
knew that the fumes had been emanating from the defendant's 
apartment for at least two days before the entries.  Prior to 
the second entry, the police lacked an objectively reasonable 
basis to conclude that the contents of the defendant's apartment 
posed an imminent danger of death or serious injury.5  Contrast 
                                                          
 
4 Because we conclude that the first search did not 
establish a reasonable basis to support the existence of an 
emergency, we need not decide whether the discovery of an 
emergency during an unlawful search would constitute an 
intervening event, limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule. 
 
5 The parties dispute whether the police must have an 
objectively reasonable basis to conclude that there is active 
methamphetamine production in a home to justify a warrantless 
entry, or whether the danger posed by fumes from a previous 
14 
 
 
Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 886 (entry justified when officer saw man 
in kitchen with large pot on floor); Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d at 95-96 
(entry justified where police observed active heat lamp, 
suggesting possibility of active drug making); Cantelli, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. at 165-166 (warrantless entry justified to shut 
off natural gas, known by officers to be highly explosive, where 
resident repeatedly flooded apartment with gas). 
 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 form a bedrock 
protection of an individual's hearth and home.  The 
inviolability of the home may be constitutionally pierced 
without a warrant, but only within narrowly proscribed 
circumstances.  See DiGeronimo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 721, 
quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) ("the 
few exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn'").  The facts 
of this case, as carefully determined by the motion judge, 
established that at the time of the first entry, there was a 
smell that had adversely affected a neighbor and her pet -- a 
smell that had persisted for days before the police took action 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
production of methamphetamine may be sufficient.  We decide only 
that, based on the judge's factual findings in this case, the 
police lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the 
condition of the defendant's apartment posed an imminent danger 
of death or serious injury or that prompt intervention was 
necessary to prevent a destructive accident.  Whether such a 
danger may exist in the absence of active drug manufacturing is 
a question we need not resolve.  As was the case before the 
first warrantless entry, the police still could have directed 
the complaining neighbor to her landlord, the fire department, 
or the Department of Public Health to address the fumes. 
15 
 
 
-- and the presence of paraphernalia an officer believed to be 
consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.  These facts 
alone are insufficient to form an objectively reasonable belief 
in an emergency situation that justifies warrantless entry. 
 
2.  The defendant's statements.  The judge permissibly 
suppressed the defendant's statements as the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" of the unlawful searches.  His inculpatory 
statements resulting from that arrest must be suppressed unless 
the State proves "that confession was 'an act of free will 
[sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful 
invasion.'"  Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632-633 (2003) (per 
curiam), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 
(1963). 
 
In determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden of 
showing that the defendant's statements were sufficiently 
attenuated from the Commonwealth's unlawful conduct, we consider 
(1) whether the defendant was informed of his rights; (2) the 
proximity in time of the arrest and his inculpatory statements; 
(3) any intervening circumstances; and (4) the degree of 
official misconduct.  Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 633, citing Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975).  We also consider the 
extent to which excluding the evidence would deter future 
official misconduct.  See Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 
16 
 
 
444, 452-453 (2005), citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). 
 
The balance of the factors in this case is a close call, 
but favors the defendant.  The police read the defendant his 
Miranda rights and there was no misconduct during the interview 
itself.  However, for the reasons stated above, the warrantless 
entries were unlawful.  The defendant made his statements 
roughly twenty-one hours after his arrest, during which time he 
was continuously in police custody.  No intervening 
circumstances further attenuated the defendant's statements from 
his arrest, which was a direct result of the unlawful searches.  
We conclude that the negative effects of the unlawful searches 
were not "'so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.'"  Damiano, 444 
Mass. at 453, quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Order allowing motions to 
suppress affirmed.