Title: State v. Bosworth

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

360 So. 2d 173 (1978) STATE of Louisiana, Respondent, v. Gerald A. BOSWORTH, Relator. No. 61492. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 19, 1978. *174 Robert Glass, Martzell & Montero, New Orleans, for defendant-relator. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norval J. Rhodes, Dist. Atty., James L. Alcock, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent. TATE, Justice. The issue involves whether the defendant is entitled to access to his pre-sentence investigation report before sentence is imposed. We granted certiorari, 354 So. 2d 1047 (1978), to review the trial court's failure to afford such access under the circumstances shown. The defendant Bosworth pleaded guilty to the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. La.R.S. 14:92(A)(7). He did so, after being fully informed by the trial judge that the penalty could be imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labor, as well as a fine of one thousand dollars. At the time the defendant pleaded guilty (August 24, 1977), the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation. La.C.Cr.P. art. 875. A pre-sentence investigation report makes recommendations to the court as to the rehabilitation potential of the defendant and as to whether or not he should be committed to a state penal facility or to a local rehabilitation center. La.R.S. 15:1132. When the defendant appeared for a sentencing hearing, he moved to continue the sentencing. He also moved for the production of the pre-sentence investigation report, in order to afford his counsel an opportunity to review any adverse information reflected by the pre-sentence investigation report. The defendant's counsel explains that, at the time the defendant pleaded guilty, the accused and his counsel believed that he substantially met the factors reflected by the legislative guidelines favoring suspension of sentence or probation instead of imprisonment. La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 (1977). However, immediately prior to the sentencing, they had received an intimation that the sentence to be imposed was to consist not only of imprisonment, but additionally of imprisonment at hard labor in the state correctional systemrather than a suspended sentence (or at most imprisonment without hard labor in the parish facility), such as might reasonably be expected to be the most severe sentence for an offense of the nature committed by an accused of good community and professional reputation and without record of previous delinquency or criminal activity, in an isolated episode during a period of emotional strain (as contrasted with an organized commercial exploitation of a young girl). They therefore *175 believed prejudicial or materially false information must have been contained in the pre-sentence investigation report and desired an opportunity for the defendant to deny or explain it. Where, in imposing a heavy sentence, the trial court relies upon pre-sentence information which is materially false or which furnishes invalid information, the defendant must be given an opportunity to deny or explain such substantially significant misinformation. State v. Segers, 357 So. 2d 1 (La.1978); State v. Underwood, 353 So. 2d 1013 (La.1977). See also: United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (CA 5, 1973). In Underwood, this court held that, in order to avoid an excessive sentence improperly resulting from materially false information, the accused has a right to access to such records, with the court (after an in camera examination) to withhold only such information which is relevant or which is not protected by confidentiality. La.R.S. 15:574.12 F (1975).[1] "Fundamental fairness to the defendant requires that the substance of all derogatory information which adversely affects his interest and which has not otherwise been disclosed in open court should be called to the attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others who are acting on his behalf." American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Standards and Alternatives, Standard 4.4(a) (1968).[2] In Underwood, it is true, an apparently excessive sentence was imposed under circumstances where, after the sentence, it was discovered that the pre-sentence investigation report had contained materially false and substantially prejudicial misinformation. Nevertheless, important due process and fairness values require the sentencing court to disclose data unknown to the defendant upon which the court relies in exercising its sentencing discretion (subject to excision by the trial court as indicated in footnote 2); these values arguably are perhaps better served if the defendant, prior to sentence as well as after it, is afforded an opportunity to deny or to explain prejudicial misinformation otherwise secret to the sentencing judge himself. See United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (CA 1, 1972). See also reference in State v. Segers, 357 So. 2d 1 (La. *176 1978) to principle expressed by Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977). For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to disclose the pre-sentence investigation report (after in camera inspection to delete any "communications obviously made in the confidence they would not be disclosed" or where "confidentiality is essential to future useful relations between the source and the recorder," La.R.S. 15:574.12 F(2), (3) (1975)[3]). We also note that no full scale evidentiary trial is required at the sentencing hearing at which the defendant is given an opportunity to deny or explain adverse information which is prejudicially false or misleading.[4] The matter is remanded to the district court, for future proceedings consistent with this opinion. ACCESS TO PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT ORDERED; CASE REMANDED. SANDERS, C. J., dissents and assigns reasons. MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 613, provides: The commentary to ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Standard 5.4, in part provides: SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting). The defendant in this case has not as yet been sentenced. The majority orders that the pre-sentence investigation report be disclosed to him after the deletion of the confidential material. In so doing, the majority fails to give effect to the controlling codal article. Article 877 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part: This article vests the disclosure of the report in the discretion of the trial judge. See Comment C, LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 877. In the present case, the trial judge has imposed no sentence, nor will his reasons for imposing a particular sentence be available until the time of sentencing. Moreover, the defendant has made no showing of an abuse of discretion. Hence, I would not disturb the ruling of the trial judge. For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent. MARCUS, Justice (dissenting). La.Code Crim.P. art. 877 provides: Prior to imposition of sentence, disclosure to the defendant of the factual contents and conclusions of any pre-sentence investigation report lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Disclosure of the sources of confidential information is prohibited. Unless the statutory provision set forth above is unconstitutional, the refusal of the trial judge, based upon his sound discretion, to disclose to the defendant, prior to imposition of sentence, information contained in a pre-sentence investigation report should not be disturbed by this court on review. We have held, in cases in which sentence had been imposed, that the defendant is entitled to access to the pre-sentence investigation report and to an opportunity to rebut any adverse information therein, if he has made a showing that the report contains materially and prejudicially false information. State v. Segers, 357 So. 2d 1 (La.1978); State v. Underwood, 353 So. 2d 1013 (La.1978). In my view, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from these cases. In the instant case, no sentence has as yet been imposed. Moreover, defendant has made no showing that the pre-sentence investigation report contains materially and prejudicially false information. Rather, he merely alleges having received an intimation that the sentence to be imposed will exceed that which he believes might reasonably be expected to be imposed in the instant case. I do not consider that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow defendant access to information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. [1] La.R.S. 15:574.12 F provides: "Whenever records covered by this Section are subpoenaed, the records shall be submitted to the appropriate court for a ruling as to whether the information should be turned over to the party who caused the subpoena to be issued. The court shall make this determination in camera. Should the court find: (1) That the information is not relevant to the proceedings, or (2) That the information was derived from communications which were obviously made in the confidence that they would not be disclosed, or (3) That confidentiality is essential to future useful relations between the source and the recorder of the information, the information shall be withheld." (Italics ours.) The statute does not prohibit such access under R.S. 15:574.12 F to the defendant himself. We are re-enforced in this view, because the statute affords access to the pre-sentence report for a wide variety of individuals, including the district attorney and law enforcement personnel (without court authorization), La. R.S. 15:574.12 B (1975), social service agencies or approved researchers, 15:574.12 D, and rehabilitation agencies or individuals, public or private, 15:574.12 E. [2] Standard 4.4(b) continues: "This principle should be implemented by requiring that the sentencing court permit the defendant's attorney, or the defendant himself if he has no attorney, to inspect the report. The prosecution should also be shown the report if it is shown to the defense. In extraordinary cases, the court should be permitted to except from disclosure parts of the report which are not relevant to a proper sentence, diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, or sources of information which have been obtained on a promise of confidentiality. In all cases where parts of the report are not disclosed under such authority, the court should be required to state for the record the reasons for its action and to inform the defendant and his attorney that information has not been disclosed. The action of the court in excepting information from disclosure should be subject to appellate review." [3] The pre-sentence investigation report was transmitted by the trial judge, sealed for our in camera inspection. None of the material found therein appears to be of an excisable nature. If the trial court is in doubt as to any particular informant, he may, before permitting disclosure, block out the name and identifying information concerned, but not the substance of the adverse information. [4] See State v. Underwood, 353 So. 2d 1013, 1018 (La. 1977). Cf. Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 613 (Nat.Conf.Com. Uniform State Laws, 1974) and ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Standard 5.5 (1968), Commentary, set forth in the appendix to this opinion.