Title: Daisey v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE DAISEY, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 279, 2015 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 1001009746 
§   
§   
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:   July 31, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   September 17, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of September 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Andre Daisey, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm 
the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Daisey’s 
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.  
(2) 
On April 20, 2010, Daisey pled guilty to Delivery of a Narcotic 
Schedule II Controlled Substance, Delivery of a Narcotic Schedule II Controlled 
2 
 
Substance (Opiates), and Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled 
Substances.  Daisey was sentenced as a habitual offender to a total of thirty-two 
years of Level V incarceration, with credit for time served, suspended after twelve 
years for decreasing levels of supervision.  Daisey did not file a direct appeal. 
(3) 
On April 27, 2015, Daisey filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief under Rule 61.  Daisey argued that his counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to: (i) investigate the report from the Office of Chief Medical Examiner 
(“OCME”); (ii) file a motion to suppress the OCME report; (iii) meet with Daisey 
to discuss an identification defense; and (iv) give him all of the evidence produced 
by the State.  Daisey also attached part of a brief that argued his convictions should 
be vacated because the State’s failure to disclose misconduct at the OCME was a 
violation of Brady v. Maryland.1  
(4) 
In an order dated May 4, 2015, the Superior Court summarily 
dismissed Daisey’s motion.  The Superior Court found that Daisey’s motion was 
untimely because it was filed more than four years after Daisey’s conviction 
became final2 and, even if the motion was not untimely, denial of the motion was 
                                                 
1 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment”). 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that motion for postconviction relief may not be filed 
more than one year after conviction becomes final).  Daisey’s conviction became final in July 
2010, but he did not file his motion for postconviction relief until April 2015. 
3 
 
appropriate because Daisey was bound by the admissions he made when he pled 
guilty.  This appeal followed.  
(5) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.3  The procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.4  In his 
opening brief, Daisey does not address the ineffective assistance of counsel or 
Brady v. Maryland claims he raised in his motion for postconviction relief.  An 
appellant must state the merits of an argument in his opening brief or that argument 
will be waived.5  He has therefore waived those claims and we will not consider 
them in this appeal. 
(6) 
Daisey appears to make two arguments on appeal.  First, he states that 
he was not completely aware of the extent of the OCME misconduct until the 
issuance of a June 2014 report.  Second, he attaches a brief filed in another appeal 
in which the Office of the Public Defender argued that the OCME misconduct 
rendered guilty pleas involuntary under Brady v. United States.6  As to the first 
argument, Daisey does not identify the misconduct he claims to have learned of for 
                                                 
3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
6 397 U.S. 742, 750-57 (1970) (holding “a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light 
of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate 
that the plea rested on a faulty premise” while recognizing that agents of the State may not 
produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will 
of the defendant). 
4 
 
the first time in the June 2014 report or where that information appears in his first 
motion for postconviction relief.  In fact, Daisey’s first motion for postconviction 
relief does not mention, cite, or refer to the June 2014 report. 
(7) 
As to the second argument, Daisey did not argue in the Superior Court 
that misconduct at the OCME rendered his guilty plea involuntary under Brady v. 
United States.  We will not consider this argument for the first time on appeal.7   
Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal, the Court concludes 
that the Superior Court did not err in dismissing Daisey’s untimely motion for 
postconviction relief. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
7 Supr. Ct. R. 8.  Even if the argument had been properly raised below and appropriate for 
consideration by this Court, the argument is foreclosed by our decision in Ira Brown v. State, 108 
A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015).