Title: STATE EX REL THELEN v MISSOULA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No, 13192 I N T H E S U P K E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 STATE ex r e l . , JOE R. THELEN and G. BARBARA THELEN, husband and wife, Relators, C I T Y OF MISSOUTA, through i t s City Council, ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record : For Relators : J u l i o K. Morales argued, Missoula, Montana Fred C. Root and Victor F. Val-genti, Missoula, Montana Victor F. Valgenti argued, Missoula, Montana ttor .Amicus Curiae: Thomas Mahan argued, Helena, Montana Submitted : October 29, 1975 fJEC - 8 !$)", Decided : M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . This is an o r i g i n a l proceeding brought by property owners of the c i t y of Missoula praying t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t of prohibi- t i o n issue directing the c i t y of Missoula t o r e s t r a i n from further interference i n t h e s a l e of t h e i r residence and i n the establish- ment of a home f o r the developmentally disabled i n a one-family r e s i d e n t i a l zone. Relators a r e residents of the c i t y of Missoula and owners under a contract f o r deed of a residence i n t h a t c i t y . The property i s located i n a zone c l a s s i f i e d by the c i t y a s R - I , one-family r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i c t . The zoning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a s s e t f o r t h i n section 32.93 of the code of the c i t y of Missoula, allows uses I I of the premises a s follows: Any use permitted i n RR-I". Such uses a r e s e t out i n section 32-9.8 of t h e code of t h e c i t y of Misscula as: (a) One-family dwelling. (b) Parks and Playgrounds. The applicable d e f i n i t i o n of "family" i s contained i n section 32-2 of t h e code of t h e c i t y of Missoula, and provides: 11 One o r more persons r e l a t e d by blood, adoption, o r marriage, exclusive of household servants, l i v i n g and cooking together a s a single housekeeping u n i t , o r not more than two persons though not r e l a t e d by blood, adoption o r marriage, l i v i n g and cooking together a s a single housekeeping u n i t s h a l l be deemed t o consti- t u t e a family. I I Relators desire t o s e l l t h e i r residence and received an o f f e r from t h e Missoula Developmentally Disabled Community Homes Council, a nonprofit organization, which intends t o use the home f o r not more than 8 developmentally disabled persons. Because the property was located i n an R - I area, the matter was taken before the Missoula c i t y council t o see what action it would take i n view of the f a c t t h a t the Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1974 amended T i t l e 11, C i t i e s and Towns, Chapter 27, Building Regulations-Zoning Commission sections providing f o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t i e s . Sections 11-2702.1 and 11-2702.2, R.C.M. 1947, now exempt homes f o r the developmentally disabled from the provisions of l o c a l zoning ordin- ances. They provide: "11-2702.1. Community r e s i d e n t i a l facility--defined. I Community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y ' means (1) a group, f o s t e r , o r other home s p e c i f i c a l l y provided a s a place of residence f o r developmentally disabled o r handicapped persons who do not require nursing care, o r (2) a d i s t r i c t youth guidance home established pursuant t o section 10-1103, o r (3) a halfway house operated i n ac- cordance with regulations of the department of health and environmental sciences f o r the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of alcoholics o r drug dependent persons. 11 "11-2702.2. Foster, boarding homes, community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t i e s considered r e s i d e n t i a l . A f o s t e r o r boarding home operated under the provision of sections 10-520 through 10-523, o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y serving eight (8) o r fewer persons, i s considered a r e s i d e n t i a l use of property f o r purposes of zoning i f the home provides care on a twenty-four (24) hour a day basis. 11 The homes a r e a permitted use i n a l l r e s i d e n t i a l zones, including, but not limited t o , r e s i d e n t i a l zones f o r single-family dwellings. Nothing i n t h i s paragraph s h a l l be construed t o prohibit a c i t y o r county from requiring a conditional use permit i n order t o maintain a home pursuant t o the provisions of t h i s paragraph; provided such home is licensed by the department of health and environ- mental sciences and the department of s o c i a l and rehabili- t a t i o n services. Any safety o r sanitary regulation of the department o r any other agency of the s t a t e o r p o l i t i c a l subdivision thereof which i s not applicable t o r e s i d e n t i a l occupancies i n general may not be applied t o a community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t y serving eight (8) o r fewer persons. 11 Hearings were held before a special committee of the c i t y council and the council. Both proponents and opponents f o r allowing the s a l e t o the nonprofit group were represented. The f i n a l action by the c i t y council directed the c i t y attorney t o f i l e an action t e s t i n g t h e amendments t o the s t a t e zoning law exempting homes f o r the developmentally disabled. The consensus of the c i t y council was t h a t while it did not oppose laudable objectives of the l e g i s l a t i o n , the purpose of the law s u i t was t o challenge t h e s t a t e ' s taking over c i t y zoning; zoning under t h e law theretofore had been a locally controlled function t h a t should be l e f t a t the local level. Thereafter the city of Missoula filed an action against relators entitled City of Missoula vs. Joe R. Thelen and Barbara G. Thelen, his wife, and Susan K . Browder, seeking an order to permanently enjoin and prohibit relators, their successors and assigns, from residence use of said premises by more than one family. In addition, the city filed a lis pendens notice preventing the consummation of the sale by relators, as well as preventing the future use of the home as a group home for the developmentally disabled. Three issues are pertinent in this proceeding: 1 . Are relators entitled to have this Court assume original jurisdiction in this cause? 2 . Are relators exempt from the city zoning power, classification and definition of a one-family residence district? 3 . Are sections 11-2702.2, 71-2001, 71-2004, 71-2401 through 71-2414, and 80-2607 through 80-2610, R.C.M. 1947, relating to establishment, operation and appropriation for group home facili- ties constitutional within the purview of the United States Consti- tution and the 1972 Montana Constitution? For the purposes of this opinion we will combine the first two issues. Relators argue that recourse to the district court and subsequent appellate channels will not afford them ade- quate relief in that the final disposition of the issue presented by their petition affects the validity of the buy-sell agreement entered into between relators and the Missoula Developmentally Disabled Community Homes Council; that the city has repeatedly stated it intended to bring the issue to this Court to establish judicial precedent; and that reaching a supreme court decision through appellate channels will unreasonably delay the sale of the residence, the construction of a new residence planned by relators with proceeds of the sale,and the eventual use of the residence as a group residence within the statutes of this state. Respondent city argues that relators are attempting to short circuit the district court process and this Court is asked to act in a vacuum, alleging that relators who now claim urgency, have made no effort to bring the matter to trial in the district court and have thereby denied this Court a factual determination that could be properly disposed of by this Court on appeal. Respondent cites and relies on this court's holding in State ex rel. Kober & Kyriss v. District Court, 147 Mont. 116, 117, 410 P.2d 945, where this Court held: I t In view of the provisions of the Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure for the expeditious handling of appeals we are not inclined to issue writs of supervisory control as a method of short cut appeal, ex- cept under the most extenuating circumstances which we need not attempt to catalog. In this cause no such circum- stances appear. I t Looking to the quoted language, we ask what, if any, are the extenuating circumstances here that would warrant intervention of this Court at this time? First, relators, with their buy-sell agreement, are unable to sell their property due to the law suit filed by respondent city and the lis pendens notice. Second, a zoning regulation of respondent city that has been neutralized by an act of the legislature. Third, the provisions of Article XII, Section 3 ( 3 ) , 1972 Montana Constitution which provides: "The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative ser- vices as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have need for the aid of society. I I We find such extenuating circumstances warrant this Court's intervention in this cause. While we recognize respondent city's arguments as to the desirability of maintaining local government control of zoning regulations in its city, there is no question that the power of the legislature over the city in this matter is supreme. The legis- lature can give the cities of this state the power to regulate through zoning commissions, and the legislature can take it away. ~es~ondent's remedy lies not in this Court, but in the legislature. This Court in State v . Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 274, 47 P.2d 624, said: 11* * * The powers granted to a municipal corporation are of two classes. he first including those which are legislative, public or governmental, and import sovereignty; the second are those which are proprietary or quasi private, conferred, for the private advantage of the inhabitants and of the City itself as a legal person. ' [Citing cases] * * * "As to the first class of powers of a city enumerated above, the power of the legislature is supreme except as limited by express constitutional prohibitions * *." This Court in State ex rel. Griffin v . City of Butte, 151 Mont. 546, 548, 445 P.2d 739, quoting from Leischner v . Knight, (City of ~illings), 135 Mont. 109, 112, 337 P.2d 359, said: "'1t is well-settled law in this state that cities have only those powers granted them by statute or which are necessarily implied as adjuncts to powers granted by statute. This court has repeatedly stated that "unless a power is vested in the municipality by express law [or by necessary implication therefrom], the presumption is against the exercise by the city of any such power. I I State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority V . City of Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318, 328, 100 P.2d 915, 921."' In the instant case, while respondent city may well have acted within the power granted it by the legislature in adopting t I its one-family" criteria for zoning, that power was modified by later legislative language and respondent city should have revised its zoning regulations to meet the legislative requirements. That the legislature has power to modify or withdraw various powers given a municipality has long been recognized in Montana. This Court noted in Stephens v . City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, "There is no principle of law better established than that a city has no power, except such as is conferred upon it by legislative grant, either directly or by necessary implication. [Citations] Resting as it does upon legislative grants the legislative branch of the government may, at its pleasure, modify or withdraw the t power so granted. It may, if it chooses, repeal any charter, or any law under which municipalities may be created, and destroy any munici a1 corporation at its will and pleasure. [Citation]. PI ~ o n t a n a ' s l e g i s l a t u r e having determined t h a t t h e consti- t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of the developmentally disabled t o l i v e and develop within our community s t r u c t u r e a s a family u n i t , r a t h e r than t h a t they be segregated i n isolated i n s t i t u t i o n s , i s paramount t o the zoning regulations of any c i t y it becomes our duty t o recognize and implement such l e g i s l a t i v e action. Respondent c i t y argues t h a t a recent opinion of t h e United States Supreme Court, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L ed 2d 797, 804, affirms the consti- t u t i o n a l i t y of an ordinance defining T'family" which i s f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes i d e n t i c a l t o t h e provisions of section 32-2 of t h e Missoula c i t y code defining "family". W e do not so view it. Village of Belle Terre is an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and i s unrelated t o s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t i s focused on the carrying out of new constitutional mandates. There, the c i t y of Belle Terre had an ordinance similar t o iss sou la's r e s t r i c t i n g land use t o one-family dwellings and prohibiting t h e occupancy of a dwelling by more than two unrelated persons a s a "family". P l a i n t i f f s i n t h a t case, the owners of a house, were charged with violating the ordinance due t o the f a c t t h a t three of s i x college students rented t h e house. P l a i n t i f f s argued t h a t the ordinance violated equal protection r i g h t s and r i g h t s of association, t r a v e l and privacy. The d i s t r i c t court upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the ordinance, the c i r c u i t court reversed, and the United States Supreme Court i n an opinion authored by 14r. J u s t i c e Douglas, reversed the c i r c u i t court. Elr. J u s t i c e Douglas gave a s the Court's reasons f o r finding t h e ordinance constitutional t h e f a c t t h a t the ordinance (a) was not aimed a t transients and thus did not v i o l a t e any r i g h t of i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l , (b) involved no procedural d i s p a r i t y i n f l i c t e d on some but not on others, (c) involved no fundamental constitutional r i g h t , such a s the r i g h t of association and privacy, and (d) w a s reasonable and bore a r a t i o n a l relationship t o a permissible s t a t e objective, thus not violative of equal protection. Viewing our f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case, we find the Village of Belle Terre case in- applicable p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c r i t e r i a of the opinion s e t f o r t h under (c) . Here, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e adopted a new policy a s applied t o the developmentally disabled i n an e f f o r t t o implement a new constitutional mandate, and i n so doing it was furthering a per- missible s t a t e objective. M r . J u s t i c e Douglas noted i n Village of Belle Terre t h a t every l i n e drawn by a l e g i s l a t u r e leaves something out t h a t might well have been included, but notes, however, t h a t t h a t exercise of discretion i s a l e g i s l a t i v e , not a j u d i c i a l , function. J u s t i c e Douglas then quotes t h e language of M r . J u s t i c e Holmes i n h i s dissenting opinion i n Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 11 I When a l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n is determined, a s no one doubts t h a t it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, o r any other extremes, a point has t o be fixed o r a l i n e has t o be drawn, o r gradually picked out by successive decisions, t o mark where the change takes place. Looked a t by i t s e l f without regard t o the necessity behind it t h e l i n e o r point seems arbi- trary. It might a s w e l l o r nearly a s well be a l i t t l e more t o one side o r the other. But when it is seen t h a t a l i n e o r point there must be, and t h a t there is no mathe- matical o r l o g i c a l way of fixing it precisely, t h e decision of the l e g i s l a t u r e must be accepted unless we can say t h a t it is very wide of any reasonable mark."' Under the f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t case, we uphold the legis- l a t i v e a c t s providing f o r community r e s i d e n t i a l f a c i l i t i e s f o r developmentally disabled i n a l l r e s i d e n t i a l zones, including, but not limited t o , r e s i d e n t i a l zones f o r one-family dwellings. L e t the w r i t issue. Attorney fees a r e set i n t h e amount Justices.