Title: Harmon v. Commissioner of Correction

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12876 
SJC-12895 
 
RAYMOND HARMON  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. 
 
BRIAN RACINE  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2020. - May 19, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Parole.  Commissioner of Correction.  Pretrial Detention.  
Regulation.  Moot Question.  Imprisonment, Parole.  
Practice, Civil, Moot case, Action in nature of certiorari. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 8, 2019. 
 
Following transfer to the Superior Court Department, a 
motion to dismiss was considered by Robert L. Ullmann, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 23, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J. 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for Raymond Harmon & another. 
 
1 Department of Correction; superintendent, Massachusetts 
Correctional Institute, Norfolk. 
2 
 
Richard E. Gordon (Bradley A. Sultan also present) for 
Commissioner of Correction & others. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Mark H. Bluver for John Stote. 
David Milton & Michael J. Horrell for Prisoners' Legal 
Services of Massachusetts. 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for Dennis Daye. 
Edward B. Gaffney for Damien Lockhart. 
Sharon L. Sullivan-Puccini for James Carver. 
Valerie A. DePalma for Kenneth Junier. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The plaintiffs in these cases were prisoners 
at Commonwealth correctional facilities who applied for release 
under the medical parole statute, G. L. c. 127, § 119A.  Both of 
their petitions were denied by the Commissioner of Correction 
(commissioner).  Raymond Harmon sought judicial review of the 
commissioner's decision, but died while his case was pending in 
the Superior Court; his attorney then commenced an appeal in the 
Appeals Court.  Brian Racine requested, because of his worsening 
health, that the commissioner reconsider her decision; he passed 
away four days after the commissioner denied this request. 
 
We allowed Harmon's motion for direct appellate review.  At 
approximately the same time, Racine's attorney filed a complaint 
in the nature of certiorari in the county court, and the single 
justice then reported the case to this court to address three 
questions.  The questions were, first, whether the death of a 
prisoner renders judicial proceedings stemming from a denial of 
a petition for medical parole moot; second, whether the 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction (DOC) to 
3 
 
implement the medical parole statute allow a prisoner whose 
request has been denied to submit a subsequent petition; and, 
third, whether the medical parole statute applies only to 
committed offenders or also is applicable to pretrial detainees.2 
 
For the reasons to be discussed, we conclude that claims 
for a writ of certiorari due to the denial of a petition for 
medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, become moot on the 
death of the petitioner.  In particular circumstances, however, 
where the proceedings raise an issue that is of public 
importance, worthy of decision by an appellate court, and is 
capable of repetition yet evading review, a court may in its 
discretion choose to decide the case.  Further, because the 
regulation restricting the ability of prisoners to file a 
subsequent petition for medical parole after one has been 
denied, 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.14(4) (2019), conflicts with 
the language of the medical parole statute and the legislative 
intent, it is void.  In addition, while G. L. c. 127, § 119A, 
applies only to committed offenders serving a sentence, 
detainees awaiting trial may seek release due to a terminal 
illness or physical or mental incapacity by moving for a 
modification of bail. 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Prisoners' 
Legal Services of Massachusetts, John Stote, Dennis Daye, Damien 
Lockhart, James Carver, and Kenneth Junier. 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory provisions.  The medical 
parole statute was enacted in 2018 to allow for the release of 
prisoners who are terminally ill or permanently incapacitated.  
See generally Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 
14 (2020).  The process prescribed by the statute begins when a 
petition for release on medical parole is submitted by or on 
behalf of a prisoner to the superintendent of the prison in 
which the individual is incarcerated.  See G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (c) (1).  Within twenty-one days of receiving a petition, 
the superintendent "shall review the petition and develop a 
recommendation as to the release of the prisoner."  Id.  The 
superintendent then "shall" transmit the petition and a 
recommendation on whether it should be granted to the 
commissioner, along with a medical parole plan, a medical 
diagnosis, and an assessment of the risk of violence by the 
prisoner if he or she were to be released to the community.  Id. 
 
Within forty-five days of receiving the petition and 
recommendation, the commissioner in turn "shall issue a written 
decision" as to whether "a prisoner is terminally ill or 
permanently incapacitated such that if the prisoner is released 
the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating 
the law and that the release will not be incompatible with the 
welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e).  If these 
conditions are met, "the prisoner shall be released on medical 
5 
 
parole," on terms and conditions imposed by the parole board.  
Id. 
 
The statute further provides that a "prisoner, sheriff or 
superintendent aggrieved by a decision denying or granting 
medical parole" may seek relief in the nature of a writ of 
certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  See G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (g). 
 
b.  Plaintiffs' submissions to the DOC.  The facts are 
drawn from the parties' statement of agreed facts, supplemented 
occasionally by other undisputed facts in the record. 
 
i.  Harmon.  In 1987, Harmon was convicted of murder in the 
first degree and armed robbery and sentenced to the statutorily 
mandated term of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.  See Commonwealth v. Harmon, 410 Mass. 425, 426 (1991).  
In February 2019, he filed a petition seeking medical parole.3  
Although he was an inmate assigned to a maximum security 
facility, at the time of filing he was receiving medical care 
for pancreatic cancer in the locked wing of Lemuel Shattuck 
Hospital; his petition requested that he be "moved to the free 
 
 
3 The initial petition submitted by Harmon's attorney on 
February 19, 2019, prior to our decision in Buckman v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14 (2020), was deemed 
incomplete because it did not include a release plan.  On March 
13, 2019, Harmon's attorney submitted a second document, 
entitled "Ray Harmon Compassionate Release Plan."  A nurse 
practitioner also filed a separate petition. 
6 
 
side" of the facility.  As of early March 2019, his cancer had 
not been eradicated, but he had declined to continue with 
chemotherapy and was refusing artificial nutrition.  His body 
weight was ninety-six pounds. 
 
On March 13, 2019, the superintendent of the facility where 
Harmon was assigned recommended to the commissioner that 
Harmon's petition be denied.  On April 1, 2019, after a hearing 
at which relatives of Harmon's victim testified, the 
commissioner denied the petition; she concluded that, although 
Harmon was terminally ill, he continued to pose a risk to public 
safety.  On April 8, 2019, Harmon filed a petition for 
certiorari in the county court; a single justice ordered the 
petition transferred to the Superior Court.  On May 6, 2019, 
Harmon passed away, and, shortly thereafter, a Superior Court 
judge dismissed the case as moot.  Harmon's attorney then 
appealed on his behalf, and we allowed her petition for direct 
appellate review. 
 
ii.  Racine.  Racine was convicted in 2011 of indecent 
assault and battery on a child under fourteen (subsequent 
offense).  He was sentenced to from fifteen to twenty-five years 
in prison.  During trial and throughout his incarceration, 
Racine was facing pending charges on 2009 indictments for rape 
of a child by force, assault to rape, and indecent assault and 
battery on a child. 
7 
 
 
On November 15, 2018, Racine filed a petition for medical 
parole on the ground that he was suffering from heart failure.  
On December 5, the superintendent of the prison where Racine was 
incarcerated recommended against his release.  On January 18, 
2019, the commissioner denied the petition, stating that there 
was insufficient evidence that Racine was terminally ill or 
permanently incapacitated, as required by the medical parole 
statute. 
 
In August and September of 2019, Racine's attorney wrote to 
the superintendent of the facility where Racine was incarcerated 
to explain that Racine's health was deteriorating.  In the first 
letter, received on August 19, 2019, the attorney expressed 
concern that there "appears to be no time assigned to the making 
of a medical parole plan for inmates who apply for 
reconsideration due to deteriorating health," and requested that 
the superintendent "advise" the attorney of the superintendent's 
"time frame."  The second letter, received on September 16, 
2019, was styled as a "second petition" for release and 
requested that the superintendent forward a recommendation with 
supporting materials to the commissioner within twenty-one days 
"per statute."  Clinical examinations in August and September 
confirmed that Racine's condition indeed was declining. 
 
On December 18, 2019, the commissioner denied Racine's 
request for reconsideration.  She stated that, while she was 
8 
 
persuaded by the medical experts that Racine had less than 
eighteen months to live, she was not convinced that he would not 
be a threat to public safety if released.  The commissioner 
referred to Racine's still-pending indictments and noted, 
"Resolution of these pending criminal charges must occur before 
I can make a determination as to Mr. Racine's eligibility and 
suitability for release on medical parole." 
 
Racine passed away on December 22, 2019.  The next day, his 
attorney filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the county 
court.  The single justice reserved and reported the matter to 
the full court.  She asked the parties, in addition to any other 
issues they cared to raise, to address the following three 
questions: 
"1.  Whether, where the [commissioner] has denied a 
prisoner's petition for medical parole made pursuant to 
G. L. c. 127, § 119A, and where the prisoner seeks judicial 
review of the decision pursuant to [G. L. c. 127, 
§ 119A (g)], the prisoner's death renders the judicial 
proceedings moot. 
 
"2.  Whether [501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.14(4)], and 103 DOC 
§ 603.11, which provide that where the [c]ommissioner has 
denied a prisoner's petition for medical parole the 
prisoner may seek reconsideration if he or she suffers a 
material decline in health, preclude a prisoner from 
submitting a new petition for medical parole rather than a 
request for reconsideration. 
 
"3.  Whether G. L. c. 127, § 119A, applies only to 
committed offenders serving a sentence of imprisonment or 
whether it also applies to individuals held in pretrial 
custody." 
 
9 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  We answer in turn each of the questions 
reported by the single justice. 
 
a.  Mootness.  "It is the general rule that courts decide 
only actual controversies" and that "normally we do not decide 
moot cases."  Matter of Sturtz, 410 Mass. 58, 59 (1991), and 
cases cited.  Generally, an issue is moot when the parties 
"would no longer be personally affected by the resulting 
decision."  Commonwealth v. Walters, 479 Mass. 277, 280 (2018).  
That undoubtedly is the case here.  Both plaintiffs are now 
dead:  Harmon passed away after his petition for a writ of 
certiorari had been filed, but before his case had been decided, 
while Racine died after the denial of his request for 
reconsideration but before his action for a writ of certiorari 
was filed in any court.  Neither can be personally affected any 
longer by a judicial decision in their pending cases. 
 
Courts at times may decide questions in moot cases where 
the harms involved concern issues of public importance, and are 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review," because the "life 
expectancy" of the dispute is shorter than the time typically 
required to obtain a judicial decision (citation omitted).  See 
Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 783 (1984).  "An issue 
apt to evade review is one which tends to arise only in 
circumstances that create a substantial likelihood of mootness 
prior to completion of the appellate process."  First Nat'l Bank 
10 
 
of Boston v. Haufler, 377 Mass. 209, 211 (1979).  That, too, 
certainly applies in the context of medical parole, where the 
metaphor of "life expectancy" may be all too apt in dealing with 
petitions by prisoners who often are in the final stages of 
terminal illness. 
 
We previously have exercised our discretion to decide moot 
claims even where they became moot as a result of the death of 
the party who originally filed the action, see, e.g., Noe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 
Mass. 195, 196 n.1 (2018), and indeed reviewing courts may 
conclude that there is a need to exercise their discretion to 
consider specific medical parole cases where a petitioner has 
died.  Nonetheless, while we do so here, not every medical 
parole case where the petitioner has died may merit such review.  
Compare Vazquez v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 
Norfolk, 484 Mass. 1058, 1058-1059 (2020) (concluding that 
single justice did not abuse her discretion in dismissing 
petition for medical release as moot because petitioner had been 
released by time case was placed before single justice with 
argument that issues were capable of repetition yet evading 
review). 
 
b.  Multiple petitions for medical parole.  The medical 
parole statute gives the DOC authority to "promulgate rules and 
regulations necessary for the enforcement and administration" of 
11 
 
the statute.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (h).  The Executive 
Office of Public Safety and Security, which oversees the DOC, 
accordingly has adopted regulations, including the following 
language referenced by the single justice, codified at 501 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 17.14(4) (with substantially identical language at 
103 DOC § 603.11): 
"No subsequent petitions may be submitted following the 
[c]ommissioner's denial of medical parole, unless the 
prisoner experiences a significant and material decline in 
medical condition.  Should such a decline occur, the 
[c]ommissioner may simply reconsider his or her previous 
decision on the petition without requiring a new petition 
to be submitted." 
 
The single justice asked the court to consider whether this 
language would "preclude a prisoner from submitting a new 
petition for medical parole rather than a request for 
reconsideration."  Thus, we must confront a question -- the 
legality of the regulation -- that we explicitly declined to 
reach in Buckman, 484 Mass. at 32. 
 
"Duly promulgated regulations of an administrative agency 
are presumptively valid . . . ."  Pepin v. Division of Fisheries 
& Wildlife, 467 Mass. 210, 221 (2014).  "[R]egulations are not 
to be declared void unless their provisions cannot by any 
reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the 
legislative mandate."  Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional 
Assistance, 424 Mass. 610, 613 (1997), quoting Berrios v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 595 (1992).  
12 
 
Nonetheless, "[a]n agency regulation that is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute and its underlying purpose may be 
rejected by the courts."  Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional 
Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 646 (2000). 
 
In evaluating the legality of an agency's regulations, we 
employ a two-step test.  Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 
444 Mass. 627, 632–633 (2005).  First, we examine the statutory 
language.  "If we conclude that a statute is unambiguous, we 
will reject any interpretation by an agency that does not give 
effect to the Legislative intent . . . ."  Franklin Office Park 
Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
466 Mass. 454, 460 (2013).  If the language of the statute 
proves ambiguous or incomplete, on the other hand, we inquire 
whether there is any way to reconcile the regulation with the 
legislative mandate, giving due deference to the agency's 
expertise.  Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals 
Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 759 (2010).  " [P]rinciples of deference, 
however, are not principles of abdication," Nuclear Metals, Inc. 
v. Low–Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 196, 211 
(1995), and if such reconciliation is not possible, the 
regulation will be invalidated, see Smith, 431 Mass. at 646. 
 
Here, we need reach only the first step, as the 
regulation's restriction of the right to submit a new petition 
to cases in which a prisoner has experienced "a significant and 
13 
 
material decline in medical condition" is contrary to the plain 
meaning of the medical parole statute.  See 501 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 17.14(4).  The broad, mandatory language of the statute, 
according to which the "superintendent of a correctional 
facility shall consider a prisoner for medical parole upon a 
written petition" by certain specified parties (emphasis added), 
G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c) (1), does not permit the DOC to impose 
a rule precluding consideration of most subsequent petitions 
and, in particular, those submitted for any reason other than a 
serious decline in health. 
 
The regulation also is contrary to the purpose of the 
statute, which we identified in Buckman, 484 Mass. at 21-22, as 
dual, both to reduce significant health care expenditures for 
aging and ill prisoners who are unlikely to reoffend and to show 
compassion to sick and disabled prisoners.  Given this 
legislative purpose, the statute should be interpreted so as to 
favor the expeditious granting of medical parole whenever the 
statutory criteria are met. 
 
We note that it is reasonable, and compatible with the 
statutory purpose, for the DOC to seek to reduce its 
administrative burden by offering the use of a streamlined 
procedure for reconsideration in cases where a prior decision 
has been issued and only certain discrete factors have changed 
or are disputed.  In any event, if a prisoner elects to request 
14 
 
reconsideration rather than submitting a new petition, it is 
vital that the DOC act on the request in a timely manner, at a 
minimum within the sixty-six day window established by the 
medical parole statute for final decisions by the commissioner 
on full petitions. 
 
In its brief, the DOC agrees that requests for 
reconsideration should be subject to the statutory timeline, and 
states that it has proposed new regulations to that effect.  
This salutary intention, however, apparently was formed only 
after the commissioner had decided Racine's request for 
reconsideration, where, notwithstanding his worsening health and 
frequent inquiries by his counsel, no decision was issued on the 
request for reconsideration for at least ninety-three days.  
This inexplicable delay effectively eliminated Racine's 
opportunity to seek judicial review before his death, four days 
after the denial.4 
 
 
4 Stringent application of the sixty-six day deadline to 
requests for reconsideration makes it important to decide when 
such a request has been made.  In Buckman, 484 Mass. at 26, we 
stated with respect to initial petitions that "the Legislature 
intended to make the petition process as accessible as possible" 
and therefore that "[a]s long as the petition is written and is 
unambiguously a petition for medical parole for a particular 
prisoner, signed by a person authorized to make such a petition, 
the superintendent must accept and review the petition upon its 
receipt."  The same applies to requests for reconsideration.  
The period of ninety-three days mentioned supra was calculated 
starting from the second letter, received on September 16, 2019, 
from Racine's attorney, as her first letter, received on August 
19, 2019, was equivocal as to whether it was a new petition or a 
15 
 
 
c.  Pretrial detainees.  The last question reported by the 
single justice asks whether the medical parole statute applies 
only to committed offenders serving a sentence of incarceration, 
or also to individuals who are being held in custody before 
trial.  The question is applicable to Racine's circumstances to 
the extent that the commissioner apparently viewed Racine's 
long-pending indictments, for which cash bail previously had 
been set, as preventing her from making a determination on his 
"eligibility and suitability for release on medical parole."  
This question arises in large part due to the use of the 
ambiguous word "prisoner" throughout the medical parole statute. 
 
To resolve this question, we turn first to the plain 
language of the statute.  "[A] statute must be interpreted 
according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all 
its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of 
its framers may be effectuated."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
 
request for reconsideration of the denial of Racine's first 
petition. 
16 
 
 
Where the statutory language is "clear and unambiguous and 
leads to a workable result, we need look no further."  Local 
589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth., 392 Mass. 407, 415 (1984).  For terms that are not 
"technical," we construe statutory words and phrases in their 
"common and approved usage."  Id., quoting United States Jaycees 
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594, 
601 (1984).  If the plain language is ambiguous, however, we 
turn to extrinsic sources, and other sections of the statute, to 
resolve the legislative intent.  See Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass 155, 
162 (2010). 
 
General Laws c. 127, § 119A (b), provides, in relevant 
part, "[n]otwithstanding any general or special law to the 
contrary, a prisoner may be eligible for medical parole due to a 
terminal illness or permanent incapacitation."  The ambit of the 
term "prisoner" for purposes of medical parole is not defined 
elsewhere in this section, nor in the definitions section, G. L. 
c. 127, § 1, nor in any of the other statutory provisions.  See 
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018) ("When the 
meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is 
questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts 
of the statute; otherwise the different sections of the same 
statute might be so construed as to be repugnant, and the 
17 
 
intention of the [L]egislature might be defeated" [citation 
omitted]).  Indeed, certain portions of the general definitions 
in G. L. c. 125, § 1, which are applicable throughout the 
chapter, tend to exacerbate the ambiguity of the word 
"prisoner."  General Laws c. 125, § 1 (m), defines a "prisoner" 
as "a committed offender and such other person as is placed in 
custody in a correctional facility in accordance with law."  
Although we have held that this definition includes those 
"awaiting trial," we also have declined to employ that 
understanding where "the context otherwise requires."  
Commonwealth v. Gillis, 448 Mass. 354, 358-359 (2007), quoting 
G. L. c. 125, § 1 (applying narrower definition of "prisoner" in 
interpreting statute allowing confinement of sexually dangerous 
persons).  Accordingly, we consider which meaning the 
Legislature intended in the context of medical parole. 
 
The most important term in the medical parole statute, 
which appears far and away the most frequently, is not 
"prisoner" but, rather, "parole."  The ordinary meaning of 
"parole" is the "conditional release of a prisoner from 
imprisonment before the full sentence has been served."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1345 (11th ed. 2019).  The Legislature's use of 
the term "parole" suggests that the medical parole statute 
should be read as applying to the same prisoners eligible for 
ordinary parole.  Indeed, we have said that G. L. c. 127, "is 
18 
 
primarily, if not exclusively, devoted to sentenced prisoners."  
McNeil v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 818, 823 (1994).  
The language of the medical parole statute makes the connection 
to ordinary parole explicit where it mandates that a "prisoner 
granted release under this section shall be under the 
jurisdiction, supervision and control of the parole board, as if 
the prisoner had been paroled pursuant to [G. L. c. 127, 
§ 130]."  G. L. c. 127, § 119A (f).5 
 
The object that the Legislature sought to accomplish in 
enacting the medical parole statute is not frustrated by 
limiting its application to committed offenders.  The 
Legislature apparently was concerned by an aging prison 
population whose only recourse for release was an executive 
clemency process that "proved to be almost invariably an 
exercise in futility."  See Buckman, 484 Mass. at 20.  Those 
held in pretrial detention who develop terminal or debilitating 
medical issues, by contrast, have another avenue by which to 
seek relief, namely a request for reconsideration of bail or a 
petition for review of a denial of bail.  See G. L. c. 276, 
 
 
5 The understanding that pretrial detainees are not eligible 
for medical parole also is codified in the governing 
regulations, which define "prisoner" as "[a] committed offender 
serving a sentence.  Persons who are awaiting trial and persons 
civilly committed pursuant to [G. L.] c. 123A shall not be 
deemed prisoners for purposes of 501 [Code Mass. Regs. 
§§] 17.00."  501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.02 (2019). 
19 
 
§ 58.  See, e.g., Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747, 748-
749 (2019); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 706-710 
(2017). 
 
Finally, we note that G. L. c. 127, § 119A (b), contains 
the opening language "[n]otwithstanding any general or special 
law to the contrary."  That phrase commonly is employed by the 
Legislature when it intends "to displace or supersede related 
provisions in all other statutes."  See Camargo's Case, 479 
Mass. 492, 498 (2018).  In the medical parole statute, this 
language ostensibly operates to establish possible eligibility 
for medical parole for all offenders serving sentences of 
incarceration.  Prisoners, such as Racine, who have been 
convicted and sentenced on certain charges, while still facing 
other pending charges, thus might be eligible for medical parole 
even if they would be required to undertake a parallel 
proceeding under the bail statute to ensure their release on 
bail on the pending charges. 
 
Although the commissioner therefore was incorrect in 
assuming that Racine's pending charges barred her from granting 
his request for medical parole, she properly could have 
considered the unadjudicated criminal charges as a factor in 
making a determination whether Racine would "live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that the release [would] 
not be incompatible with the welfare of society."  G. L. c. 127, 
20 
 
§ 119A (e).  It is not clear from her decision whether she 
indeed considered the pending charges also for this proper 
purpose. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as 
follows: 
 
1.  The death of a prisoner renders judicial proceedings 
stemming from the denial of a petition for medical parole moot.  
In those unusual circumstances where the proceedings raise an 
issue that is of public importance, and is capable of repetition 
yet evading review, a court nonetheless may use its 
discretionary authority to decide the case. 
 
2.  To the extent that the DOC's regulations limit the 
ability of prisoners to submit subsequent petitions for medical 
parole after one has been denied or not acted upon, the 
regulations are incompatible with the statute and thus void.  In 
particular, 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.14(4) is inconsistent with 
the statutory language and purpose, and, accordingly, is void. 
 
3.  The medical parole statute, G. L. c. 127, § 119A, 
applies only to committed offenders serving a sentence, and not 
to pretrial detainees, who may seek modification of bail based 
on changed circumstances in the event that they are suffering 
from a terminal illness or physical or mental incapacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.