Title: Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Malynn

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Malynn, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1293.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1293 
MEDINA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MALYNN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Malynn,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1293.] 
Attorney misconduct, including neglecting several client matters and engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty—Two-year suspension with six months 
stayed on condition. 
(No. 2011-1428—Submitted October 5, 2011—Decided March 28, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-012. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Steven Reynolds Malynn of Medina, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0067339, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996.  
We imposed an attorney-registration suspension in November 2011, for his failure 
to register for the 2011 to 2013 biennium.  In re Attorney Registration Suspension 
of Malynn, 130 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2011-Ohio-5627, 956 N.E.2d 310.  And on 
January Term, 2012 
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December 29, 2011, the Commission on Continuing Legal Education issued an 
order suspending Malynn for failing to comply with the continuing-legal-
education requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  Both suspensions remain in effect.  In 
re Continuing Legal Edn. Suspension of Malynn, 130 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2011-
Ohio-6770, 959 N.E.2d 2. 
{¶ 2} In a February 2009 one-count complaint, relator, Medina County 
Bar Association, charged Malynn with failing to preserve the identity of client 
funds, failing to maintain a client trust account, engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and failing to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation.  On June 30, 2009, relator moved for default, based 
upon Malynn’s failure to answer the complaint. 
{¶ 3} Relator filed an amended complaint in December 2009, charging 
Malynn with two additional counts of misconduct.  In March, April, and 
September 2010, the secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline notified relator that Malynn was in default and instructed relator to 
move for default judgment.  But on October 27, 2010, Stephen J. Brown entered 
an appearance as counsel for Malynn and sought leave to respond.  Thereafter, 
relator filed a second amended complaint, charging Malynn with five counts of 
misconduct.  Malynn answered the complaint, and the matter finally proceeded to 
a panel hearing on June 6, 2011. 
{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s report and recommends that we 
suspend Malynn for two years, with six months stayed, based upon findings that 
he failed to preserve the identity of client funds, failed to reasonably communicate 
with a client, engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, neglected three client matters, and failed to cooperate in 
multiple disciplinary investigations. 
{¶ 5} With minor exceptions, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, and we suspend Malynn from the practice of law in Ohio for two 
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years, with six months stayed on the condition that he commit no further 
misconduct.  We condition his reinstatement upon his completing a mental-health 
evaluation and following all resulting treatment recommendations and his 
submitting a statement from a qualified health-care professional that he is 
competent to return to the ethical, professional practice of law. 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 6} In 2006, Malynn left his employer to start his own firm, and one of 
his clients at the firm, Anthony Imburgia, elected to maintain his representation.  
In the summer of 2006, Imburgia executed a fee agreement and gave Malynn a 
$5,000 retainer, which Malynn later admitted having deposited in his operating 
account, not a client trust account.  The board found that Imburgia terminated the 
representation in March 2007, due to Malynn’s failure to communicate with him, 
and requested a bill for the services provided and a refund of the unearned portion 
of his retainer.  Malynn sent an invoice, dated June 1, 2007, and a check for $345 
drawn on his operating account.  The client disputed both the amount of work that 
Malynn claimed to have done on his behalf and the corresponding portion of the 
retainer that had been kept.  When Imburgia first attempted to negotiate the check, 
it was returned for insufficient funds. 
{¶ 7} Based upon an erroneous finding that Malynn received the retainer 
in March 2007, the board found that Malynn’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 
(requiring a lawyer to preserve the identity of client funds and property), rather 
than DR 9-102 (also requiring a lawyer to preserve the identity of client funds and 
property) as charged in relator’s complaint.1  Because the evidence demonstrates 
                                                 
1  Relator charged Malynn with misconduct pursuant to applicable rules for acts occurring before 
and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
superseded the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
 
 
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4 
 
that Imburgia paid the retainer in August 2006 and discharged Malynn after 
February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we find 
that Malynn’s conduct violated both DR 9-102 and Prof.Cond.R. 1.15, though we 
treat the conduct as a single ethical violation.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1.  We 
agree with the board that relator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that Malynn engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation with respect to this count and therefore dismiss the alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(C). 
Count Two 
{¶ 8} Traci Rabb retained Malynn to represent her in an employment-
discrimination matter in 2008.  She paid a $3,000 retainer and agreed that Malynn 
would receive a 30 percent contingent fee.  Malynn filed suit on Rabb’s behalf, 
but did little else.  Rather than comply with a court order compelling him to 
provide requested discovery, he dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant 
to Civ.R. 41(A) on October 22, 2008.  He ignored numerous e-mails from Rabb 
requesting a status update on the matter, including one seeking information about 
the scheduling of depositions.  In an Internet search, Rabb discovered that her 
case had been dismissed six months earlier, and she sent Malynn an e-mail stating 
that she had never authorized the dismissal.  Based on Rabb’s e-mails, the board 
rejected Malynn’s claim that Rabb had consented to the dismissal.  Malynn also 
testified that he had returned Rabb’s $3,000 retainer, but on cross-examination, he 
conceded that he had only done so after Rabb obtained a $3,000 default judgment 
against him in small-claims court. 
{¶ 9} The board found that Malynn’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 
1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required), 1.4(a)(2) 
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5 
 
(requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a 
lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 
1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with reasonable 
requests for information from the client), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  
But the board recommends that we dismiss for insufficient evidence the charge 
alleging a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 
representation to a client).2  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct 
and dismiss the charge alleging a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1. 
Count Three 
{¶ 10} In May 2009, a client filed a grievance against Malynn.  Malynn 
did not respond to relator’s letters of inquiry, but the investigator eventually spoke 
with him by phone.  Relator reached the conclusion that no misconduct had 
occurred in Malynn’s representation of the grievant, but charged him with 
violating Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation).  The board recommends that we dismiss the charge because relator 
did have a conversation with Malynn and thereafter determined that the 
underlying grievance had no merit.  We adopt the board’s findings and hereby 
dismiss the charge alleging a violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) with respect to this 
count. 
 
 
                                                 
2  In its written closing argument, relator alleges additional violations in this count, as well as in 
counts four and five, that it did not charge in its complaint.  Citing Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Simecek, 83 Ohio St.3d 320, 699 N.E.2d 933 (1998) (holding that due process prevents us from 
finding disciplinary violations that have not been charged in the complaint), the board 
recommends dismissing those alleged violations, even though it finds that some were proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.  We agree with the board’s analysis regarding these alleged 
violations and, therefore, do not address them. 
January Term, 2012 
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Counts Four and Five 
{¶ 11} The allegations in count four relate to Malynn’s handling of two 
legal matters for his clients Robert Estes (“Estes”) and Estes Hauling Service, Inc. 
(“EHS”).  In the first matter, Malynn filed a breach-of-contract action on behalf of 
Estes.  After the defendant filed for bankruptcy protection, Malynn told Estes that 
he would file an objection to the bankruptcy on the ground of fraud, but he failed 
to do so.  In the second matter, Malynn’s failure to file an answer in an action 
filed against EHS resulted in a $31,000 default judgment against the company. 
{¶ 12} Count five arises from Malynn’s representation of Lisa 
Constantino, who wanted him to file an action against her financial broker for 
churning her mutual funds to create commissions.  Constantino paid a $3,000 
retainer and gave Malynn a $1,425 check for the filing fee, but had to replace the 
check for the filing fee on two separate occasions because Malynn had apparently 
misplaced it.  Malynn failed to handle the matter in a timely manner and missed 
the statute-of-limitations deadline.  Although relator had not charged Malynn with 
any violations related to the handling of Constantino’s retainer, the board found 
that he initially testified that he refunded the retainer from his client trust account 
but acknowledged on cross-examination that the refund had been paid from his 
general operating account. 
{¶ 13} The board found that relator had proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that Malynn had failed to act with reasonable diligence as required by 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 in his representation of Estes and EHS in count four and 
Constantino in count five, but recommends that we dismiss the charges alleging 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 based upon insufficiency of the evidence.  We 
adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to these counts. 
Failure to Cooperate 
{¶ 14} Despite Malynn’s cooperation in the later stages of this 
proceeding, the board finds that his failure to answer both the complaint and the 
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first amended complaint clearly and convincingly demonstrates his violation of 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  We agree. 
Sanction 
{¶ 15} In imposing a sanction for attorney misconduct, we consider the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  
As aggravating factors, the board found that Malynn had committed multiple 
offenses; failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, narrowly avoiding a 
default judgment; attempted to deceive the panel at his disciplinary hearing with 
several half-truths; and caused harm to vulnerable clients by depriving them of the 
opportunity to have their cases heard.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), (e), (f), 
and (h).  We agree and also find that he engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c). 
{¶ 16} The board found only two mitigating factors present—the absence 
of a prior disciplinary record (though he has since been suspended for a 
registration violation) and his good character, as demonstrated by his twenty-
three-year career in the United States Marine Corps.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a) and (e).  Although Malynn claims that his diagnosed anxiety disorder 
contributed to his misconduct and should be considered as a mitigating factor, the 
board found that he failed to satisfy all of the criteria necessary for such 
consideration because he did not demonstrate that his mental disability 
contributed to cause his misconduct,  that he had had a sustained period of 
successful treatment, or that a qualified health-care professional had issued a 
prognosis that he would be able to return to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  To the contrary, 
the letter submitted by his doctor stated that there is “no evidence of any thought 
disorder that would interfere with his professional judgment,” and a representative 
from Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) testified that he had managed 
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only partial compliance with his OLAP contract.  We agree with the board’s 
findings regarding mitigating factors. 
{¶ 17} Relator argued in favor of a two-year suspension with the second 
year stayed on conditions.  Malynn, on the other hand, argued that a sanction no 
greater than a six-month stayed suspension is appropriate.  The board, however, 
recommends a two-year suspension with six months stayed as the appropriate 
sanction for Malynn’s misconduct.  Neither party has objected to the board’s 
recommendation. 
{¶ 18} In support of its recommended sanction, the board cites Akron Bar 
Assn. v. Dismuke, 128 Ohio St.3d 408, 2011-Ohio-1444, 945 N.E.2d 507, in 
which we imposed a two-year suspension with the second year stayed on 
conditions for an attorney who had neglected two client matters, failed to 
reasonably communicate with those clients, failed to preserve the identity of one 
client’s funds and promptly deliver funds that the client was entitled to receive, 
failed to timely register with this court and keep the court apprised of his current 
address, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation.  Id. at 
¶ 4-7, 15.  Like Malynn, Dismuke claimed that he suffered from a mental 
condition but failed to demonstrate that his condition qualified as a mitigating 
factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  Id. at ¶ 10.  The 
board, however, found that Malynn’s conduct was more egregious than that of 
Dismuke because he neglected several client matters and engaged in conduct that 
involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Therefore, it concluded 
that the greater sanction of a two-year suspension with only six months stayed 
was the appropriate sanction for Malynn’s misconduct.  We agree with the 
board’s analysis. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Steven Reynolds Malynn is suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the final six months of the suspension 
stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct.  If Malynn fails to 
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comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the 
full two-year suspension.  In applying for reinstatement, Malynn must submit 
evidence that he completed a mental-health evaluation and followed all resulting 
treatment recommendations and must provide proof to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that he is competent to return to the ethical, professional 
practice of law.  Costs are taxed to Malynn. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
The Bailey Law Firm, Steve C. Bailey, Beau A. Schultz, and William E. 
Steiger, for relator. 
Stephen J. Brown, for respondent. 
______________________