Title: RICHARD LEE WYLAND V. CHERYL LYNN WYLAND, n/k/a CHERYL LYNN DUNIGAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD LEE WYLAND V. CHERYL LYNN WYLAND, n/k/a CHERYL LYNN DUNIGAN2006 WY 93138 P.3d 1165Case Number: 05-184Decided: 07/28/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RICHARD 
LEE WYLAND,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHERYL 
LYNN WYLAND, n/k/a CHERYL LYNN DUNIGAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
G. Pretty of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Donald 
A. Cole of Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard Wyland 
(Husband) and Cheryl Wyland (Wife) were divorced in 1999.  In the divorce decree, the district 
court awarded Wife a portion of Husband's military retirement benefits in 
dividing the parties' marital property.  
The district court later entered an amended qualified domestic relations 
order (QDRO) relative to these retirement benefits.  Husband appeals from that order, 
claiming that the order improperly modified the divorce decree.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The dispositive 
issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred by entering the Second 
Amended Qualified Domestic Relations Order.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
married in 1983, and were divorced in 1999.  The divorce decree1 provided that Wife was to receive 
"as her sole, separate and absolute property . . . one half of that portion of 
her husband's military retirement earned during the marriage, if entitled to 
such share and only should such military retirement be vested and paid to 
husband and only paid on a monthly basis as the Husband receives the same or in 
a proportionate present value amount should the husband opt for a lump sum 
payment from the military . . ." and Husband was to receive "as his sole, 
separate and absolute property . . . his military retirement, less the portion 
to which wife may be entitled . . . ."

 
 
[¶4]      In July 1999, 
Wife asked that the district court enter a QDRO "to implement the terms of" 
these provisions.  The district 
court filed an order styled as such on August 9, 1999.  Shortly thereafter, Wife asked the 
district court to enter an amended order to correct Husband's social security 
number.  The district court filed an 
Amended Qualified Domestic Relations Order on August 17, 1999 that included the 
correction.  It does not appear that 
Husband objected to, or appealed from, either of these orders.  

 
 
[¶5]      In January 2004, 
Wife petitioned the district court to "clarify" the amended QDRO because "the 
United States Air Force does not recognize the language in the Order and [Wife] 
has not been receiving her portion" of Husband's military retirement.2  She separately asked the district court 
to hold Husband in contempt because he had retired and thereafter "refused" to 
pay Wife any of the retirement benefits she was entitled to receive pursuant to 
the divorce decree.  Husband opposed 
both of these requests, which requests, as well as Husband's motion to modify 
custody as to the parties' oldest child, were referred to a circuit court judge 
for disposition.

 
 
[¶6]      In July 2004, the 
circuit court judge held Husband in contempt for not paying Wife her portion of 
Husband's military retirement benefits (though he did not order any particular 
sanction), denied Husband's motion to dismiss Wife's petition to clarify the 
amended QDRO, and agreed to modify custody as to the parties' oldest child.  The judge ultimately entered what was 
styled a Second Amended Qualified Domestic Relations Order on June 13, 
2005.  It appears that the only 
difference between this order and the first amended order is the following 
paragraph:

 
 
            
The former spouse/Alternate payee is awarded a percentage of the 
Participant's disposable military retired pay, to be computed by multiplying 50% 
times a fraction, the numerator of which is 185 months of marriage during the 
Participant's creditable military service, divided by the Participant's total 
number of months of creditable military service.

 
 
Husband 
now appeals from the Second Amended Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      On appeal, 
Husband argues that the district court "had no authority to enter a QDRO with 
which to effectuate the parties['] agreement as to the payment of the retirement 
funds."  He contends that the 
district court did not specify in the divorce decree that it would retain "the 
continuing jurisdiction to enter a valid QDRO," and that the district court did 
not have the authority to modify its division of the marital property "in order 
to make it easier for [Wife] to collect her retirement 
benefits."

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court provided, in dividing the parties' marital property, that Wife was to 
receive a portion of Husband's military retirement benefits under certain 
circumstances.  Indeed, "retirement 
funds, whether vested, nonvested, or not matured, are marital property divisible 
upon divorce.'"  Johnson v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 4, 7 
(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 
734 (Wyo. 
1987)).  Husband is generally 
correct that once the district court entered a judgment to that effect, it did 
not then retain the jurisdiction to modify its marital property division "based 
upon [a] change of circumstances."  
Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1992).  However, W.R.C.P. 60(a) provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
(a) Clerical mistakes.  Clerical mistakes 
in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders.  

 
 
We 
consider two factors in reviewing the application of this rule:  (1) whether the clarification of a 
judgment relates to a "clerical mistake"; and if so, (2) whether the order at 
issue "clarified or modified the original judgment."  Glover v. Crayk, 2005 WY 143, ¶ 9, 122 P.3d 955, 958 (Wyo. 2005).  Both 
"are questions of law, which we review de 
novo."  Id.  

 
 
[¶9]      We have said the 
following regarding the first factor:

 
 
W.R.C.P. 
60(a) is intended to correct clerical, not judicial, errors.  A clerical error is a mistake or 
omission of a mechanical nature apparent on the face of the record that prevents 
the judgment as entered from accurately reflecting the judgment that was 
rendered.  In addition, W.R.C.P. 
60(a) is designed to clarify, as well as to correct, and is properly invoked to 
dispel either patent or latent ambiguities in a judgment.

 
 

Elsasser 
v. Elsasser, 989 P.2d 106, 108 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations omitted).  In other words, a district court retains 
the authority, pursuant to Rule 60(a), "to clarify an ambiguous property 
settlement provision provided in the original decree in order to effectuate the 
provision."  Glover, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d  at 957; see also Elsasser, 989 P.2d  at 109 
(involving a divorce decree that was insufficient to meet federal statutory 
requirements for a QDRO and stating that the divorce decree could be clarified 
"by the addition of" a QDRO pursuant to Rule 60(a)).

 
 
[¶10]   Wife clearly sought to clarify and 
effectuate the divorce decree provision regarding Husband's military retirement 
benefits so that it met the statutory requirements of the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).3  Subsection (d) of that statute provides, 
in pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
            
(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order[4] . . . with respect to a division of 
property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable 
retired pay from a member to the . . . former spouse of the member, the 
Secretary shall make payments . . . from the disposable retired pay of the 
member to the . . . former spouse . . . with respect to a division of property, 
in the amount of disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the court 
order.   

 
 

See also 
Kelly v. Kelly, 2003 
WY 133, ¶¶ 6-8 and Appendix I, 78 P.3d 220, 222-31 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶11]   The United States Air Force was 
apparently unable to divide Husband's retirement benefits pursuant to the 
divorce decree without further guidance.  
Juxtaposition of the divorce decree, the first amended QDRO, and the 
second amended QDRO reveals that the divorce decree was ambiguous as to 
precisely how Wife's share of such benefits was to be calculated and required a 
formula, as well as some additional language and personal information, in order 
to effectuate the division of benefits.  
The divorce decree "obviously needed to be clarified" in that regard, and 
we have held that such a clarification related to a "clerical mistake" for 
purposes of Rule 60(a).  Glover, ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 122 P.3d  at 
957-58.  See generally also Wallop v. Wallop, 
2004 WY 46, ¶¶ 54-56, 88 P.3d 1022, 1036 (Wyo. 2004); Kelly, ¶¶ 6-10, 78 P.3d at 222-24; and 
Elsasser, 989 P.2d  at 
108-09.

 
 
[¶12]   We also fail to see how the second 
amended QDRO modified, rather than clarified, the divorce decree in the instant 
case.  The divorce decree 
essentially provided that Wife was to receive her portion of Husband's 
retirement benefits as such benefits became payable to Husband.5  Based on our review of the record, the 
only meaningful substantive difference between the divorce decree and the second 
amended QDRO is the formula used to calculate Wife's share of Husband's 
benefits.  Husband does not claim on 
appeal that this formula is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the divorce 
decree.  It remains unclear from 
Husband's argument how any of the other language or information contained in the 
second amended QDRO (presumably included to meet the requirements of the USFSPA) 
otherwise modified the divorce decree.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court judge erred in entering 
the second amended QDRO. 

 
 
[¶13]   Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Stipulated Decree of Divorce, filed in January 1999, incorporated the terms of a 
Property Settlement and Child Custody Agreement the parties filed in November 
1998.

 
 

2Based on 
our review of the record in the instant case, we will treat this as a motion to 
clarify the divorce decree pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(a).  See Glover v. Crayk, 2005 WY 143, ¶¶ 
6-8, 122 P.3d 955, 957 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

3Husband 
claims that we made it clear, "by implication," in Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶¶ 51-53, 
88 P.3d 1022, 1035-36 (Wyo. 2004), that a "QDRO can only be given if the proper 
[f]ederal [s]tatute was implicated."  
In Wallop, ¶¶ 48, 51-52, 88 P.3d  at 1034-35, the district court awarded the wife a portion of the husband's 
federal civil service retirement benefits and ordered that a QDRO should be 
prepared in accordance with the applicable federal regulations.  On appeal, the husband argued that a 
QDRO was not applicable to civil service retirement benefits.  Id., ¶ 51, 88 P.3d  at 1035.  We noted that the 
term "QDRO" is "an ERISA-created term" (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.), 
that ERISA did not apply to federal civil service retirement benefits, and that 
"QDROs are not acceptable to affect CSRS benefits unless the correct terminology 
is used."  Id., ¶ 52, 88 P.3d  at 1035.  We concluded that the 
applicable rules nevertheless allowed an order to be labeled as a QDRO if the 
order expressly stated that it was written in conformity with the applicable 
substantive non-ERISA regulations.  
Id., ¶ 52, 88 P.3d  at 1035-36.  The divorce decree 
in Wallop provided that it should be 
governed by the applicable non-ERISA federal statutes and regulations and we 
held that "while the district court did order that Wife's counsel prepare a 
QDRO, it appropriately specified that any such QDRO be drafted within OPM's 
rules and regulations as required."  
Id., ¶ 53, 88 P.3d  at 1036.

 
 
In the 
instant case, while the order at issue was labeled a QDRO, the order 
specifically stated that it "intended to qualify under the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1408 et seq., with all provisions to be 
interpreted to make the Decree qualify."  
Husband does not offer any cogent argument regarding how this statement, 
and the other language contained in the second amended QDRO, failed to implicate 
the proper federal statute.

 
 

410 
U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

 
 
(2) The 
term "court order" means a final decree of divorce . . . issued by a court . . . 
which

           
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that 
court;

           
(B) provides for

                       
. . . 

                       
(iii) division of property . . .; and 

           
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the 
payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable 
retired pay, from the disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse or former 
spouse of that member.

 
 

5In his 
appellate brief, Husband states that the divorce decree "required" Wife to rely 
on Husband to forward Wife her portion of the retirement benefits.  However, the divorce decree provides 
that Wife's share of such benefits is to be paid to Wife "on a monthly basis as 
[Husband] receives the same or in a proportionate present value amount should 
[Husband] opt for a lump sum payment from the military."  This provision certainly does not 
"require" Wife to receive her share of the benefits from Husband any more than 
it precludes her from receiving her share of the benefits directly from the 
military (to the extent permitted by the USFSPA).  Indeed, in some cases, a former spouse 
must rely on both methods to receive the retirement benefits to which he or she 
is entitled.     See Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 
1993).  Husband has not demonstrated 
that the second amended QDRO is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the divorce 
decree in this respect.