Title: Gary K. Smith v. General Casualty Insurance Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 127 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1849 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Gary K. Smith,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
General Casualty Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Ronald A. Blain and Freight Systems, Inc., 
 
Defendants.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 411, 601 N.W.2d 844 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 19, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Skwierawski 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Andrew Mishlove and Law Offices of Andrew Mishlove, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Andrew Mishlove. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Jacqueline E. Frakes and Eiche & Frakes, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Jacqueline E. Frakes. 
 
2000 WI 127 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1849 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gary K. Smith, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
General Casualty Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Ronald A. Blain and Freight Systems, Inc.,  
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.    Petitioner Gary K. Smith 
(Smith) drove the last car hit in a three-vehicle collision.  
This collision, subsequently referred to as a chain reaction 
collision, was set into motion by a vehicle driven by an 
unidentified hit-and-run driver.  In a suit arising from the 
accident, Smith brought a claim against General Casualty Company 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
2 
of Wisconsin (General Casualty),1 demanding coverage under the 
uninsured motorist policy covering the vehicle operated by 
Smith. 
¶2 
Smith asserts that Wisconsin's uninsured motorist 
statute mandates coverage when an unidentified hit-and-run 
vehicle 
strikes 
an 
intermediate 
vehicle, 
propelling 
the 
intermediate vehicle into the insured.  We agree.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. (1993-94)2 requires uninsured motorist 
coverage when an "unidentified motor vehicle" is "involved in a 
hit-and-run accident."  We have interpreted the phrase "hit-and-
run" to contain a physical contact requirement.  Hayne v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 74, 339 N.W.2d 588 
(1983).  This physical contact requirement is satisfied in a 
chain reaction accident.  Because the elements of the statute 
are 
satisfied, 
coverage 
is 
required 
under 
§ 632.32(4).  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
In November 1993 Smith was driving a vehicle in the 
right-hand lane of Interstate 94, heading southbound.  A 
tractor-double trailer driven by Ronald A. Blain was traveling 
in the middle lane. According to Blain, his vehicle was struck 
                     
1 Defendant-Respondent General Casualty Company of Wisconsin 
was incorrectly designated General Casualty Insurance Company in 
the caption when the amended complaint was filed in circuit 
court.  
2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 version.  
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
3 
on the left steering tire, forcing his vehicle to the right, 
into the next lane of traffic and Smith's car.  A witness 
observing the accident testified that a dark-colored passenger 
car struck the left "steer tire" of the tractor-trailer cab.3 
¶4 
Smith brought an action in Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court against Blain and his employer, Freight Systems, Inc.  
Subsequently, and because Blain asserted that the accident was 
caused by an unknown hit-and-run driver, Smith amended his 
complaint to assert a claim for uninsured motorist coverage 
against General Casualty.  General Casualty provided insurance 
coverage for the vehicle Smith was driving at the time of the 
accident.   
¶5 
General Casualty moved for summary judgment, asserting 
that because there was no physical contact between the hit-and-
run vehicle and the insured vehicle, Smith was not entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage under the policy.  Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court Judge Michael J. Skwierawski granted the motion.  
Smith appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Smith v. 
General Casualty Ins. Co., 230 Wis. 2d 411, 601 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  Smith subsequently filed a petition for review, 
which was granted. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶6 
A circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment 
is a question of law, which this court reviews independently.  
                     
3 For 
the 
purposes 
of 
its 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment/declaratory judgment and for this review, General 
Casualty concedes the existence of the unidentified vehicle. 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
4 
Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶28, 
236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142.  In our review, this court 
utilizes 
the 
same 
methodology, 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) (1997-98), as employed by the circuit court and 
court of appeals.  Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 
110, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999).  Summary judgment is granted "if the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  A reviewing court will uphold a 
decision granting summary judgment "unless the record reveals 
that one or more genuine issues of material fact are in dispute 
or the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Strasser, 2000 WI 87 at ¶30. 
¶7 
Resolution of this summary judgment motion involves 
the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4).  Interpretation of 
a statute also presents a question of law, which we review de 
novo while benefiting from the analysis of the court of appeals 
and circuit court.  Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 15, 
¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162. 
ANALYSIS 
¶8 
The 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. mandates uninsured motorist coverage when an 
unidentified vehicle strikes a second vehicle, which in turn is 
propelled into the insured's vehicle.  More specifically, our 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
5 
inquiry is whether this chain reaction collision is a "hit" 
within the meaning of the statute.  
¶9 
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4) provides in relevant part: 
 
Required uninsured motorist and medical payments 
coverages.  Every policy of insurance subject to this 
section that insures with respect to any motor vehicle 
registered 
or 
principally 
garaged 
in 
this 
state 
against loss resulting from liability imposed by law 
for bodily injury or death suffered by any person 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a 
motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental 
thereto provisions approved by the commissioner: 
 
(a)  Uninsured motorists.  1.  For the protection 
of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles 
because 
of 
bodily 
injury, 
sickness 
or 
disease, 
including 
death 
resulting 
therefrom, 
in 
limits of at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per 
accident. 
 
2.  In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" 
also includes: 
 
 . . .  
 
b.  An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a 
hit-and-run accident. 
If the statute mandates coverage in this case, then the terms of 
the insurance policy need not be examined.  Theis, 2000 WI 15 at 
¶10.   
¶10 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., hit-and-run 
accidents are included within the statutorily mandated uninsured 
motor vehicle coverage.  A hit-and-run occurs when three 
elements are satisfied:  (1) there is an unidentified motor 
vehicle; (2) the unidentified vehicle is involved in a hit; and 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
6 
(3) the unidentified motor vehicle "runs" from the scene of the 
accident.  Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶¶14-16.  
¶11 We have previously held that the phrase hit-and-run in 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. unambiguously "includes a physical 
contact element."  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 79.  In the instant 
case, we must consider whether the physical contact element is 
satisfied when an unidentified vehicle hits a second vehicle, 
and that vehicle is pushed into the insured vehicle.  Our 
primary 
objective 
here, 
as 
in 
all 
cases 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, is to effectuate the legislature's intent in 
enacting § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  To discern this intent, we begin by 
examining the language of the statue itself.   
¶12 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
defines 
an 
uninsured motor vehicle as "an unidentified" vehicle "involved 
in a hit and run accident."  The use of the word "involved" does 
not strike us as a word that should be narrowly applied only to 
a hit-and-run accident involving a direct hit to the insured 
vehicle.  Here, the unidentified vehicle was clearly "involved": 
it 
precipitated 
the 
accident 
through 
contact 
with 
the 
intermediate vehicle.   
¶13 The language of the statute points to the conclusion 
that coverage is mandated in this case.  However, Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. does not specifically define the phrase "hit-
and-run," and accordingly we have construed the statute on a 
case-by-case basis.  Therefore, we turn next to an examination 
of prior cases interpreting this law.  
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
7 
¶14 Cases interpreting Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. fall 
generally into two categories.  The first category of cases is 
the "miss-and-run" series, including Hayne, Amidzich v. Charter 
Oak Fire Insurance Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969), 
and Wegner v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., 173 Wis. 2d 118, 
496 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992).  The second category of cases 
involve flying objects or auto parts, such as Theis and Dehnel 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 231 Wis. 2d 14, 
604 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1999).  Although both lines of cases 
are factually distinct from the instant controversy, these 
decisions help guide our conclusion. 
¶15 The first line of cases, the miss-and-run series, is 
instructive for two reasons.  First, it is from these cases that 
the physical contact requirement arose.  The foundation for this 
interpretation was laid in Amidzich, in which this court 
construed the definition of "hit-and-run" in the uninsured 
motorist clause of an automobile liability insurance policy.  
The policy extended coverage to damages caused by a "hit-and-
run" automobile, which it defined as a vehicle "'which causes 
bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of 
such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the 
insured is occupying at the time of the accident.'"  Amidzich, 
44 Wis. 2d at 48. 
¶16 In Amidzich, the policyholder was injured when her 
automobile was forced off the road by an unidentified vehicle; 
no striking or actual collision occurred.  Id.  This court 
concluded that the phrase "physical contact" in the policy's 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
8 
definition of hit-and-run vehicle required that "there be an 
actual striking between the 'hit-and-run automobile' and the 
insured's vehicle, at least in a situation where only two 
vehicles are involved."  Id. at 51. 
¶17 Second, the miss-and-run cases are instructive because 
following our decision in Amidzich, the legislature modified 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32 to include an unidentified vehicle involved 
in a hit-and-run accident within the definition of required 
uninsured motorist coverage.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 84.  In 
reviewing the legislative history of § 632.32(4) in Hayne, we 
wrote that the legislature is presumed to have acted with full 
knowledge 
of 
the 
court's 
discussion 
of 
"hit-and-run" 
in 
Amidzich.  Id. at 84.  However, the two-vehicle miss-and-run 
situation in Amidzich represented only one obvious type of hit-
and-run accident.  As we noted in Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 80 n.7, 
and repeated in Theis:   
 
The Legislative Council Note [in ch. 102, Laws of 
1979] adopted by the legislature explains that '[a] 
precise definition of hit-and-run is not necessary for 
in the rare case where a question arises, the court 
can draw the line.'  The legislature apparently 
recognized 
that a 
vast 
variety 
of unpredictable 
scenarios can give rise to claims for uninsured 
motorist coverage.    
Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶18 (footnote omitted). 
¶18 General 
Casualty 
points 
out 
that 
in 
Hayne 
we 
determined that by adopting the hit-and-run statutory provision 
the legislature was "simply incorporating a category of coverage 
into the statute that most standard policies already contained" 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
9 
and that the standard policy provision defining "hit-and-run" 
included a physical contact requirement.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 
83, 84.  However, as Judge Fine aptly noted in his dissent to 
the court of appeals' decision in this case: 
 
Hayne tells us that the legislature was aware of 
insurance-industry language that limited uninsured-
motorist coverage for hit-and-run accidents to those 
situations where the unidentified motor vehicle causes 
bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical 
contact of such vehicle with the insured.  Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that by not adopting the industry 
language, 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
encompass 
situations where, as here, the unidentified motor 
vehicle makes physical contact with any of the 
vehicles involved in a multi-vehicle accident. 
Smith, 230 Wis. 2d at 420 (Fine, J. dissenting) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  
¶19 The Hayne decision presented a miss-and-run, as was 
the case in Amidzich.  In Hayne, the driver of the insured 
vehicle swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle, lost control of 
his vehicle, and the vehicle overturned.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 
69.  We concluded that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. did not 
require uninsured motorist coverage because there was no 
physical contact under the circumstances of the case.  Id. at 
74.   
¶20 Similarly, there was no physical contact by the 
unidentified motorist in Wegner.  As General Casualty points 
out, the Wegner case presents a factual situation more analogous 
to the case at hand.  The insured vehicle was traveling in the 
far right lane of a three-lane stretch of highway.  A gray car 
in the far left lane swerved into the path of a van in the 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
10
center lane, causing the van to swerve into the path of the 
insured's vehicle.  The insured vehicle was forced off the 
highway.  Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 121.  The litigants disputed 
whether the van struck the insured vehicle.  Id.  However, it 
was undisputed that there was no other contact between these 
motor vehicles.  Id.  Wegner argued that the unidentified gray 
car was an uninsured vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
 Id. 
at 
124. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
did 
not 
require 
coverage 
because 
the 
unidentified car that precipitated the events in Wegner was not 
involved with the physical contact.  Id. at 127.   
¶21 However Wegner is again a miss-and-run case while in 
the instant case there was a contact; the unidentified vehicle 
had contact with the intermediate vehicle, which in turn had 
contact with the insured vehicle.  The miss-and-run cases do not 
foreclose interpreting Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) as mandating 
coverage in this case. 
¶22 While the miss-and-run cases establish the physical 
contact requirement, the second line of cases presents examples 
of where the court was required to consider whether that 
requirement was satisfied.  In Dehnel, a chunk of ice fell off 
an unidentified semitrailer, breaking the insured vehicle's 
windshield and causing injury to the driver.  Dehnel, 231 
Wis. 2d at 15.  The court of appeals wrote that the type of 
physical contact required under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. is 
"'a touching between the vehicles.'"  Id. at 22 (quoting Hayne, 
115 Wis. 2d at 78).  The court of appeals rejected an 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
11
interpretation of hit-and-run that would mandate coverage where 
"extraneous objects," those which are not even an integral part 
of the unidentified vehicle, come into contact with the insured 
vehicle.  Id.  As a result, the court found that no hit-and-run 
occurred for which insurance coverage under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
was mandated. 
¶23 This court found the facts presented in Dehnel to be 
significantly distinct from the facts presented in Theis.  
Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶¶25-26.  In Theis a detached piece of an 
unidentified motor vehicle was propelled into the insured's 
vehicle by an unidentified vehicle.  Id. at ¶2.  The piece of 
unidentified motor vehicle came from either the unidentified 
motor vehicle that propelled it into the insured's vehicle or 
from yet another unidentified vehicle.  Id. at ¶11.  After 
reviewing Dehnel, Wegner, Hayne and Amidzich, we summarized the 
law on hit-and-run for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) as 
requiring "physical contact between an insured's motor vehicle 
and an unidentified motor vehicle" but not barring a finding of 
"'physical contact' between the insured's motor vehicle and a 
part of an unidentified motor vehicle."  Theis, 2000 WI 15 at 
¶26. Our opinion in Theis did not address a chain reaction 
collision.   
¶24 In Theis, we determined that the language of the 
statute, the legislative history, and the cases interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) did not compel a result on the law.  Id. 
at ¶27.  We therefore turned to a consideration of the public 
policy issues undergirding underinsured motorist coverage.  This 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
12
method 
of 
analysis 
is 
equally 
applicable 
here. 
 
When 
interpreting an ambiguous statute, we seek to discern the intent 
of the legislature and the policy behind the statute.  State v. 
Hopkins, 
168 
Wis. 2d 
802, 
815, 
484 
N.W.2d 
549 
(1992).  
Accordingly, we turn next to an analysis of the policy concerns 
at issue here. 
¶25 One public policy concern is of primary relevance to 
our analysis, that of preventing fraud.  The physical contact 
element unambiguously included in the term "hit-and-run" in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. prevents fraudulent claims from being 
brought by an insured driver who is involved in an accident of 
his or her own making.  Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶30 n.10.  Under 
the circumstances of this case, when physical contact has been 
applied by an unidentified motor vehicle to an intermediate 
motor vehicle and then transmitted through to the insured's 
vehicle, and where this physical contact may be confirmed in 
such a way as to provide safeguards against fraud, this purpose 
for the physical contact requirement is satisfied. 
¶26 An additional policy concern is that the purpose of 
the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage in Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) "is to compensate an injured person who is 
the victim of an uninsured motorist's negligence to the same 
extent as if the uninsured motorist were insured."  Theis, 2000 
WI 15 at ¶28.  Here, if the vehicle that negligently started the 
chain reaction collision had been identified and was insured, 
Smith could have recovered under that policy.  Thus, by 
interpreting the statute to mandate coverage in the present 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
13
case, Smith would be compensated "to the same extent as if the 
uninsured motorist was insured."  Id.   
¶27 Finally, the parties, citing Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶29, 
assert that an additional public policy issue which should be 
considered 
is 
that 
of 
honoring 
the 
reasonable 
coverage 
expectations of the insured.  Smith argues that a reasonable 
individual would expect coverage under the facts of this case.  
General Casualty asserts that no reasonable insured could read 
its policy as providing coverage unless a hit occurs between the 
unidentified vehicle and the insured.4  The public policy purpose 
                     
4 The policy issued by General Casualty provides in 
relevant part: 
 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
 
A.  We will pay damages which an "insured" is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
"uninsured motor vehicle" because of "bodily injury:"  
1.  Sustained by an "insured;" and 
2.  Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages 
must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of 
the "uninsured motor vehicle." . . .  
 
B.  "Insured" as used in this Part means: 
 
1.  You or any "family member." 
2. Any other person "occupying" "your covered 
auto."  
 . . .  
 
C. "Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor 
vehicle or trailer of any type: 
 . . .  
3.  Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator 
or owner cannot be identified and which hits: 
 
 
a.  you or any "family member;" 
b. a vehicle which you or any "family 
member" are "occupying;" or 
 
 
c.  "your covered auto."  
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
14
of honoring the reasonable expectations of the insured is 
applied 
when 
the 
language 
of 
an 
insurance 
contract 
is 
interpreted and construed.  Kremers-Urban Co. v. American 
Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).  
The 
question 
to 
be 
decided 
here, 
however, 
is 
not 
the 
construction of the policy, but what the law requires.  Thus, 
the reasonable expectation of the insured regarding the language 
of the policy is not relevant to our analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
¶28 In summary, the public policy concern of preventing 
fraudulent claims will be appropriately satisfied when an 
unidentified driver is involved in the type of collision that 
occurred in this case.  In addition, the policy of the uninsured 
motorist statute, to provide compensation to the same extent as 
if the uninsured motorist were insured, is satisfied if coverage 
is mandated.  Accordingly, based upon these policy concerns and 
the language 
of the statute, we 
conclude 
that when an 
unidentified driver is involved in a chain reaction collision, 
the 
physical 
contact 
requirement 
for 
a 
"hit-and-run" 
is 
satisfied 
and 
coverage 
is 
mandated 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  As a result, Smith's complaint does set 
forth a claim against General Casualty under the statute, and 
therefore, summary judgment was not proper.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No. 
98-1849 
 
 
1