Title: In re Emma C.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 7 
Docket: 
And-17-361 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 11, 2018 
Decided: 
January 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE EMMA C. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The father of Emma C. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Lewiston, Lawrence, J.) terminating his parental rights to 
eleven-year-old Emma pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and 
(B)(2)(a), (b)(ii)-(iv) (2017).1  He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as 
to unfitness as well as the court’s finding and discretionary determination that 
termination was in the child’s best interest.  Additionally, the father contends 
that the court should have ordered a permanency guardianship instead of 
terminating his parental rights.  We affirm the judgment because the evidence 
supports 
both 
the 
court’s 
factual 
findings 
and 
its 
discretionary 
determinations.   
                                         
1  The mother’s parental rights were terminated in a separate proceeding in March of 2017, and 
she is not a party to this appeal.   
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Competent record evidence supports the court’s findings, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the father is unwilling or unable to take 
responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet 
her needs; that the father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and 
reunify with the child; that the father abandoned the child; and that 
termination of the father’s parental rights, as opposed to a permanency 
guardianship, is in the child’s best interest.  These findings and discretionary 
determinations are based on the following supported findings of fact:  
The Department filed a Petition For Child Protection Order 
regarding [the child] on April 29, 2016. . . .  Around that time, [the 
permanency caseworker for the Department] tried to contact [the 
father] at the phone number he provided to the Department, but it 
did not work.  [She] then tried to serve [him] with the Petition at 
the residence stated on his license, but there was nobody there.  
[She] left her card at the residence, but never heard from [him].  
Nevertheless, [he] showed up for the summary preliminary 
hearing on the preliminary protection order on May 9, 2016, and 
waived his right to the hearing.  While at the court, [he] asked for 
a meeting to discuss visitation with [the child] and that meeting 
was set for the next morning.  On May 10, 2016, [the permanency 
caseworker], the [guardian ad litem (GAL)] and [the father’s 
attorney] were present for the meeting on visitation, however, 
[the father] failed to appear.  Shortly after missing the May 10th 
meeting, having agreed to leave [the child] in the Department’s 
custody, [the father] moved to Florida without telling the 
Department that he was doing so.  
 
 
3 
. . . According to [the permanency caseworker], in a May 9th 
interview, [the child] told her that [the father] rarely ever had 
contact with her; maybe five times in the preceding five years 
according to memory.  During that interview, [the child] appeared 
to be very anxious about seeing [the father] due [to] having little 
contact with him in the preceding five years.  After pausing to 
consider the prospect of seeing [her father], [the child] told [the 
permanency caseworker] that she did not want to have contact 
with him. . . .  
 
. . . A Jeopardy Order as to [the father] was granted on 
July 11, 2016, after [the father] failed to appear for the hearing.  
Jeopardy as to [the father] was due to the risk to [the child] for 
serious physical harm, serious emotional harm and/or serious 
neglect based on his substance abuse and inability to protect her 
from the jeopardy posed by [her mother] ([the child] was exposed 
to drug use and paraphernalia by her mother and [the father] was 
not aware of or did not take any steps to protect [the child] from 
[the mother’s] behaviors) and his lack of a relationship with [the 
child].  [The father’s] criminal history, including domestic violence 
assault, also raised issues of concern in regard to [the child]. . . .  
 
[The father] testified that he currently is residing in 
. . . Florida, in a hotel. . . .  He has not had any contact with [the 
child] since April of 2016. . . .  [The father] acknowledged that 
because he was a transient when this matter began, he was unable 
to fight for custody of [the child].  He also acknowledged that he 
had not fought for custody of [her] even though she was in the 
Department’s custody because [she] had been placed with [the 
foster parents] and he understood that [the foster mother] was a 
good mother.  When [the father] failed to appear at the judicial 
review conducted on December 15, 2016, the court issued a cease 
reunification order for him due to his lack of involvement with the 
Department, the court proceedings in this case, the required 
services and contact with [the child].  
 
 
4 
. . . .   
 
. . . While [the father] is willing to let [the child] remain with 
[the foster family], he does not agree to the termination of his 
parental rights to [the child].  Consequently, [the father] wants the 
court to create a permanency guardianship for [the child] with the 
[foster parents].  The court notes, however, that it has been over a 
year since [the father] has had any contact with [the child]. . . .  
 
. . . [The father’s] plan to remain in Florida and attempt 
reunification with [the child] twice a month does not impress the 
court as being either well conceived or really committed to 
meeting [the child’s] needs in a timely fashion.  
 
[The second permanency caseworker] testified that the 
[foster parents] have been very involved with [the child].  [The 
foster mother] is [related to the child] and [the child] often stayed 
with the [foster family] prior to being placed with them by the 
Department.  According to [the caseworker], [the child] is doing 
great and thriving in [their] home; they are very involved in [the 
child’s] activities and her schooling.  [The foster mother] testified 
that initially [the child] was shy, reserved and parentified when 
the Department placed her with them.  [The foster mother] 
observed that [the child] is more outgoing and relaxed – now she 
is “just being a kid.”  [The foster mother] added that as the 
placement has gone on, [the child] fits into their family, she feels 
like one of the [foster parents’] kids and she is treated as that way.  
[The foster mother] specifically testified that [the child] does not 
ask about [the father] and does not want contact with him. . . .  
 
. . . The [GAL] does not support the creation of a 
permanency guardianship in this case as it poses too much 
uncertainty about [the father] returning some day to assert his 
role as [the child’s] father.  The [GAL] recommends that [the 
father’s] parental rights be terminated . . . .  She believes that 
termination of [the father’s] parental rights is in [the child’s] best 
interest.  The [GAL] testified that [the child] is at an age where she 
needs the permanency and stability of living in a family that she 
 
5 
knows, a family in which she fits in, a family that loves her and a 
family that is committed to her.  
 
(Footnotes omitted.)   
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶3]  Here, the court’s unfitness findings that the father is either 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time that is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, that the child has been 
abandoned by the father, and that the father has failed to make a good faith 
effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child are all supported by sufficient 
evidence.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv). Particularly, the father’s 
unannounced move to Florida, his intention to remain there for the 
foreseeable future, and his failure to even visit with the child show that he is 
unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child in the time that she 
needs and that he has abandoned her.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-A)(A)-(C), 
(E)-(F), 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)-(iii) (2017).   
[¶4]  The evidence is also sufficient to support a finding that 
termination is in the child’s best interest, and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in terminating the father’s parental rights instead of ordering a 
permanency guardianship because, as the GAL testified, the child is at an age 
where stability and permanency within a family unit that has demonstrated 
 
6 
its commitment to her is of the utmost importance.  See In re Haylie W., 
2017 ME 157, ¶ 4, 167 A.3d 576.  Because a permanency guardianship could 
undermine that stability for the child, see id.; see also 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C(3), 
(6) (2017), who will soon be entering her teenage years, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in terminating the father’s parental rights.  See In re 
Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶¶ 12-13, 154 A.3d 1199.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Charest, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2016-29 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY