Title: Warner Jackson v. John T. Benson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 14 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
97-0270 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell Harris, 
The Reverend Andrew Kennedy, Rabbi Isaac 
Serotta, Ceil  Ann Libber, Father Thomas J. 
Mueller, Reverend John N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, 
Colleen Beaman, Mary Morris, Penny Morse, 
Kathleen Jones and Philip Jones,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, 
Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong 
Yang, Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and 
Jeanine Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, by 
its President, M. Charles Howard, Michael 
Lengyel, Donald Lucier, Tracy Adams, Milwaukee 
Public Schools Administrators and Supervisors 
Council, Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl 
A. Gobel, People for the American Way, by its 
Executive Vice President and Legal Director, 
Elliott M. Minceberg, John Drew, Susan Endress, 
Richard Riley, Jeanette Robertson, Vincent 
Knox, Bertha Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert 
Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Department of Public Instruction 
and James E. Doyle,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
2
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela Gray, 
Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson, George 
Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye Henry, Reigne 
Barrett, Valerie Barrett, Candice Williams, 
Senton Williams, Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants, 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar Gonzalez, 
Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate Helsper, Blong 
Yang, Gail Crockett, Yolanda Lassiter and 
Jeanine Knox,  
 
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners. 
__________________________________ 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney, Lois Parker, 
on behalf of herself and her minor child, 
Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D. Scott, on behalf of 
himself and his minor children, Deresia C.A. 
Scott and Desmond L.J. Scott, Constance J. 
Cherry, on behalf of herself and her minor 
children, Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, 
and William A. Branch,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official 
capacity,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION TO VACATE DECISION 
Reported at:  218 Wis.2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(1998-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 19, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
   
 
COUNTY: 
   
 
JUDGE: 
   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J. concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
WILCOX and BRADLEY, J.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
 
2002 WI 14 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  97-0270  
(L.C. No. 
95 CV 1982, 95 CV 1997, 96 CV 1889) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Warner Jackson, Jennifer Evans, Wendell  
Harris, The Reverend Andrew Kennedy,  
Rabbi Isaac Serotta, Ceil Ann Libber,  
Father Thomas J. Mueller, Reverend John  
N. Gregg, Diane Brewer, Colleen Beaman,  
Mary Morris, Penny Morse, Kathleen Jones  
and Philip Jones,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
FILED 
 
FEB 19, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
97-0270 
 
2
 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee Teachers' Education  
Association, by its President, M. Charles  
Howard, Michael Lengyel, Donald Lucier,  
Tracy Adams, Milwaukee Public Schools  
Administrators and Supervisors Council,  
Inc., by its Executive Director, Carl A.  
Gobel, People for the American Way, by  
its Executive Vice President and Legal  
Director, Elliott M. Minceberg, John  
Drew, Susan Endress, Richard Riley,  
Jeanette Robertson, Vincent Knox, Bertha  
Zamudio, James Johnson, Robert Ullman and  
Sally F. Mills,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction, Department of Public  
Instruction and James E. Doyle,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Marquelle Miller, Cynthia Miller, Angela  
Gray, Zachery Gray, Shon Richardson,  
George Richardson, Latrisha Henry, Faye  
Henry, Reigne Barrett, Valerie Barrett,  
Candice Williams, Senton Williams,  
Clintrai Giles, Sharon Giles,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants, 
 
Parents For School Choice, Pilar  
Gonzalez, Dinah Cooley, Julie Vogel, Kate  
Helsper, Blong Yang, Gail Crockett,  
Yolanda Lassiter and Jeanine Knox,  
 
          Intervenors-Defendants- 
          Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
97-0270 
 
3
National Association for the Advancement  
of Colored People, Felmers O. Chaney,  
Lois Parker, on behalf of herself and her  
minor child, Rashaan Hobbs, Derrick D.  
Scott, on behalf of himself and his minor  
children, Deresia C.A. Scott and Desmond  
L.J. Scott, Constance J. Cherry, on  
behalf of herself and her minor children,  
Monique J. Branch, Monica S. Branch, and  
William A. Branch,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
John T. Benson, Superintendent of Public  
Instruction of Wisconsin, in his official  
capacity,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
MOTION to vacate decision of June 10, 1998.   Dismissed; 
matter remanded to the Dane County Circuit Court.    
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   Four 
of 
the 
twenty-nine 
plaintiffs-
respondents1 in Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 
602 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998), move this court 
to vacate its decision of June 10, 1998, upholding the 
constitutionality of the state's amended Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP).  As grounds for their motion, the four 
respondents assert that they recently received new information 
that this court's decision was rendered by an improperly 
                                                 
1 Carl A. Gobel, Warner Jackson, Father Thomas J. Mueller, 
and Wendell Harris. 
No. 
97-0270   
 
4 
 
constituted panel because of the participation of a justice 
disqualified by law.  The respondents seek to reinforce their 
motion by noting that the school choice issue is currently 
pending before the United States Supreme Court on a similar 
constitutional challenge to an Ohio school choice program.  See 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. 
granted, 533 U.S. ___ (No. 00-1571).  Oral argument in Zelman is 
scheduled for February 20, 2002.  The respondents assert that at 
least three parties to this court's decision in Jackson v. 
Benson who support school choice have submitted amicus briefs to 
the United States Supreme Court and are likely to have cited 
Jackson v. Benson as persuasive authority.   
¶2 
We dismiss the respondents' motion because it is 
untimely and frivolous as a matter of law.  More than 1300 days 
have passed since this court issued its decision in Jackson v. 
Benson.  More importantly, more than 600 days have passed since 
the information advanced by respondents in support of their 
disqualification claim2 became publicly known.  Inasmuch as 
                                                 
2 Respondents contend that Justice Jon P. Wilcox was 
disqualified under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) and (3) (1999-2000), 
which provides: 
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
(a) When a judge is related to any party or counsel 
thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of 
kinship. 
(b) When a judge is a party or a material witness, 
except that a judge need not disqualify himself or 
herself if the judge determines that any pleading 
No. 
97-0270   
 
5 
 
motions such as this constitute an attack on the integrity of 
this court's decisions, they must be brought promptly.  This one 
was not.  Respondents' inordinate and unexplained delay in 
raising 
the 
disqualification 
issue 
in 
a 
timely 
fashion 
constitutes a waiver of whatever objections they may have had in 
this regard and lead us to the conclusion that the motion to 
vacate is frivolous.   
                                                                                                                                                             
purporting to make him or her a party is false, sham 
or frivolous. 
(c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to any 
party in the same action or proceeding. 
(d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal 
instrument or paper whose validity or construction is 
at issue. 
(e) When a judge of an appellate court previously 
handled the action or proceeding while judge of an 
inferior court. 
(f) When a judge has a significant financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the matter.  Such 
interest does not occur solely by the judge being a 
member of a political or taxing body that is a party. 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he 
or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in 
an impartial manner. 
(3) Any disqualification that may occur under sub. (2) 
may be waived by agreement of all parties and the 
judge after full and complete disclosure on the record 
of the factors creating such disqualification.  
All 
subsequent statutory 
references to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 
1999-2000 
volumes 
unless 
otherwise 
indicated. 
 
No. 
97-0270   
 
6 
 
I 
¶3 
We set forth the significant facts surrounding Jackson 
v. Benson and respondents' claims that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
should not have participated in the decision.   
¶4 
 The constitutionality of the amended MPCP has been 
before this court on two occasions.  In 1996 this court heard 
argument in an original action.  On March 29, 1996, this court 
split three-three over the constitutionality of the amended 
MPCP, with Justice Wilcox voting to uphold it.  State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714, 720, 546 N.W.2d 140 
(1996).  The case was remanded to Dane County Circuit Court, 
which later found the statute unconstitutional.   
¶5 
On April 1, 1997, Justice Wilcox won a ten-year term 
on this court, defeating Milwaukee attorney Walter Kelly by a 
margin of 185,437 votes.3  On April 3, 1997, two days after the 
election, there was a press report that an anonymous group of 
individuals had spent an estimated $135,000 to print and mail as 
many as 450,000 postcards to support Justice Wilcox's election.4  
In April 1997 Mark Block, the campaign manager for the Justice 
Wilcox for Justice Campaign (JWJC), admitted to the public that 
he had been contacted in January and March by the group that 
sent the postcards, but he did not identify the group.  The 
                                                 
3 The vote totals were 476,900 for Justice Wilcox and 
291,463 for Attorney Kelly.  State of Wisconsin Blue Book at 870 
(1997-98). 
4 Cary Segall, Expense for Wilcox Goes Unreported, WISCONSIN 
STATE JOURNAL, April 3, 1997.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
7 
 
names of the persons who gave the money were not revealed at 
that time, nor was it revealed that the donors were school 
choice proponents. 
¶6 
On June 16, 1997, an organization called The Wisconsin 
Coalition for Voter Participation (WCVP) was identified as the 
group that coordinated the postcard mailing.  On July 30, 1997, 
the State Elections Board voted unanimously to investigate the 
anonymous mass mailing.  The investigation ultimately revealed 
that WCVP made disbursements and incurred obligations of 
approximately $200,000 on mailings and telephone calls to 
targeted voters.  
¶7 
On August 22, 1997, the court of appeals, in a two-one 
decision, affirmed an order of the circuit court for Dane 
county, Paul B. Higginbotham, Judge, finding the amended MPCP 
unconstitutional.  Jackson v. Benson, 213 Wis. 2d 1, 570 N.W.2d 
407 (Ct. App. 1997).  The majority of the court of appeals 
concluded that the amended MPCP was invalid under Article I, 
Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution because it directed 
payments of money from the state treasury for the benefit of 
religious seminaries.  This court granted the state's petition 
for review on October 14, 1997.  In late December 1997 the WCVP 
filed a lawsuit seeking to halt the investigation into possible 
ties between the group and the Wilcox campaign. 
¶8 
This court heard oral argument in Jackson v. Benson on 
March 4, 1998.  The court issued its decision on June 10, 1998.  
Justice Steinmetz authored the majority opinion reversing the 
court of appeals.  Justices Wilcox, Geske, and Crooks joined the 
No. 
97-0270   
 
8 
 
majority opinion.  Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch 
dissented.  Justice Bradley did not participate.  On June 26, 
1998, intervenors/respondents Parents For School Choice, et al., 
filed a motion for clarification of the opinion, so that for a 
time a post-decision motion was pending before this court.5  The 
motion was subsequently withdrawn.  On November 9, 1998, the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 
¶9 
In November 1999 the court of appeals allowed the 
State Elections Board to proceed in its investigation of the 
connection between the WCVP mailing and the Wilcox campaign, 
affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the WCVP's lawsuit to 
halt the investigation and have the mailing declared legal.  
Coalition for Voter Participation v. Elections Bd., 231 Wis. 2d 
670, 605 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 231 Wis. 2d 
377, 607 N.W.2d 293 (1999).   
¶10 On 
March 
22, 
2000, 
the 
State 
Elections 
Board 
unanimously adopted the following motion: 
MOTION: TO EXPRESS THE SENSE OF THE ELECTIONS BOARD 
THAT JUSTICE JON WILCOX DID NOTHING ILLEGAL AND WAS 
NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
OF HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT, THE ELECTION FOR WHICH WAS HELD IN 
APRIL 1997; . . .  
                                                 
5 The respondents did not file any post-decision motion at 
this time.  
No. 
97-0270   
 
9 
 
¶11 In the spring of 2000 the identities of the persons 
who contributed to the WCVP became publicly known.6 
¶12 On March 20, 2001, the civil action brought by the 
State Elections Board against the JWJC and campaign manager Mark 
Block ended with a monetary settlement, stipulation, and order 
for dismissal.  In a statement attached to the stipulation, 
Justice Wilcox stated: 
Last March the State Elections Board stated that it 
was the sense of the Board that I did nothing illegal 
and was not personally responsible for any illegal 
activities of my campaign.  However, the Board's 
investigation has implicated my campaign manager and 
others in violations of the state's campaign finance 
law.  I choose not to contest this.  I acknowledge 
that I had a responsibility for the conduct of 
campaign staff.  Therefore, as the candidate, I am 
funding my campaign committee so that the committee 
can pay a monetary penalty to settle this matter.  
¶13 On January 9, 2002, respondents filed their motion to 
vacate the Jackson v. Benson decision, claiming that the facts 
set forth above demonstrate that Justice Wilcox was disqualified 
by law from participating in the case.  
¶14 The general rule is that, after remittitur, the 
supreme court has no jurisdiction to vacate or modify its 
judgment.  Ott v. Boring, 131 Wis. 472, 110 N.W. 824 (1907).  
Where a justice who participated in a case was disqualified by 
law the court's judgment in that case is void.  Case v. Hoffman, 
                                                 
6 Cary Segall and Andy Hall, Big, Out-of-State Donors 
Weighed In For Court Case, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, March 19, 2000; 
Cary Segall and Andy Hall, Wilcox Backers Revealed, GOP School-
Choice Supporters Funded Secret Effort, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, 
April 20, 2000.   
No. 
97-0270   
 
10 
 
100 Wis. 314, 72 N.W. 390, reh'g granted 74 N.W. 220 (1898).  We 
have previously stated, "[a]n attack on the validity of a 
judgment of the state's highest court on the ground of a 
member's disqualification by law for an apparent inability to 
act impartially is not, nor can we conceive of it ever being, a 
'routine matter.'"  State v. American TV & Appliance, 151 
Wis. 2d 175, 192, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989).  We have also said, 
however, that it behooves the court in the defense of its own 
legitimacy and of its integrity to consider a party's claim that 
a decision may be void because a justice should not have 
participated in the case.  City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 
190 Wis. 2d 510, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995).   
¶15 The chronology of events in this case demonstrates 
that the respondents were on notice by the spring of 2000 as to 
the identity of the donors to WCVP and their support of the 
school choice issue.  Instead of bringing their motion at that 
time, the respondents remained silent for almost another two 
years, raising their disqualification objection on the eve of 
the United States Supreme Court's oral argument in another case 
raising the issue of the constitutionality of a private school 
voucher program.   
¶16 Although respondents claim "it was not until a few 
months ago that information was made public casting a shadow on 
the 1997 supreme court election and highlighting the role of 
money in that election from the advocates for the defendants in 
a pending case," the record amply demonstrates that all 
information arguably pertinent to any disqualification issue in 
No. 
97-0270   
 
11 
 
the case was publicly known by the spring of 2000.  By failing 
to raise the issue in a timely fashion, respondents waived 
whatever objections they may have had to Justice Wilcox's 
participation in the court's decision.  
¶17 We came to a similar conclusion in City of Edgerton.  
In that case Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc., (ES&G) moved to 
vacate this court's decision or, in the alternative, moved for a 
rehearing in the matter.  Edgerton Sand & Gravel, Inc., argued 
that Justice Geske improperly participated in the case.  At the 
outset of oral argument, Justice Geske stated on the record that 
the previous night she noted for the first time that one of the 
companies listed in the appendix to an amicus brief was St. Paul 
Companies, the employer of Justice Geske's husband.  Justice 
Geske stated she did not believe that fact presented any 
conflict and it would not influence her.  She informed the 
parties that if anyone had any objections to her sitting on the 
case, she would appreciate hearing from them by letter by the 
end of the week.   
¶18 No objection was raised by any of the parties until a 
non-party, Kenosha Auto Transport (KAT), raised the question of 
Justice Geske's participation in a proposed amicus brief KAT 
tendered to the court in support of a motion for reconsideration 
filed over seven months later.  The motion to file an amicus 
brief was denied and the movants' request to seek Justice 
Geske's disqualification was dismissed.  More than two months 
later ES&G filed a motion to vacate the decision, arguing that 
Justice Geske was disqualified under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) and 
No. 
97-0270   
 
12 
 
(3) from participating in the original decision and asking for 
the vacation of the decision or, in the alternative, for 
rehearing without Justice Geske's participation.  Edgerton Sand 
& Gravel, Inc., argued that Justice Geske's disclosure about her 
connection with St. Paul Companies had been incomplete.  
¶19 The Edgerton court noted that the disqualification 
statute provides that any disqualification "may be waived by 
agreement of all parties and the judge after full and complete 
disclosure 
on 
the 
record 
of 
factors 
creating 
the 
disqualification."  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(3).  The Edgerton court 
found it significant that ES&G did not argue that Justice 
Geske's disclosure and her setting of a time limit to object or 
to waive objection to her participation in the case was not a 
proper procedural framework for the waiver of disqualification.  
Instead, 
ES&G 
argued 
Justice 
Geske's 
disclosure 
was 
not 
sufficient 
and 
did 
not 
constitute 
a 
"full 
and 
complete 
disclosure."  The Edgerton court said: 
We conclude that under the circumstances of this case 
the disclosure made by Justice Geske was sufficient——
that all the facts necessary for counsel to determine 
whether to assert or waive any disqualification were 
either disclosed or were readily obtainable of record 
prior to the "weekend deadline" suggested by Justice 
Geske.  Following that disclosure, if ES&G had been 
concerned, 
it 
could 
have 
examined 
the 
financial 
disclosures Justice Geske had filed with the Ethics 
Board and if those disclosures did not satisfy ES&G in 
respect to Justice Geske's financial ties to St. Paul 
Companies, it could have asked for more information 
from her or could have advised her "by the end of the 
week" that it objected to her participation. 
No. 
97-0270   
 
13 
 
If ES&G's counsel examined the public record, it 
apparently 
did 
not 
deem 
the 
information 
in 
it 
sufficient to pursue the disqualification issue.  Now, 
however, 
ES&G's 
substituted 
counsel 
asserts 
that 
Justice Geske's disqualification was required on the 
basis of inferences it makes from that information.  
Clearly, ES&G waived any possible disqualification by 
not acting by the "end of the week" and for one year 
following oral argument.   
Even after the court's decision on June 16, 1994——
after learning that Justice Geske was the scrivener 
for the court——ES&G's counsel did not raise the 
question of Justice Geske's qualification to sit but 
asserted in its reconsideration motion only that the 
court had failed to follow what counsel considered 
controlling law.  Despite the fact that ES&G had been 
served with a copy of KAT's proposed amicus motion and 
brief raising the disqualification issue, it did not 
join in KAT's motion or express to the court in its 
motion for reconsideration on the merits any position 
in respect to disqualification.   
Hence, we conclude that on at least two discrete 
occasions, ES&G's counsel failed to make any objection 
to Justice Geske's participation.  These successive 
waivers in themselves bar ES&G from asserting its 
motion for vacatur at this time, months after it could 
have informed itself of the facts on which its motion 
is based and made any concern known to the court.   
Id. at 518-19.   
¶20 The same analysis applies with even greater force in 
this case.  Although there was no judicial disclosure here, the 
basic facts upon which the respondents now rely in raising the 
issue of Justice Wilcox's participation were readily available 
as of the spring of 2000.  Yet respondents did not raise the 
disqualification issue at that time; indeed, their inaction 
continued for almost another two years. 
¶21 Not until January 9, 2002, twenty-one months after the 
identity of the donors to WCVP became publicly known, did 
No. 
97-0270   
 
14 
 
respondents file a motion to vacate the decision.  Respondents' 
delay in bringing the motion mandates a finding of waiver.  
Although respondents claim the motion was filed in January of 
2002 because of "new information," this court has searched the 
entire record and found nothing "new."  Instead, all of the 
facts arguably pertinent to the disqualification claim were well 
known in the spring of 2000.   
¶22 The respondents' inordinate delay in filing the motion 
to vacate mocks the fundamental and vital principle of finality, 
which is essential to the operation of a society governed by 
law.  See Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith, 80 Wis. 2d 332, 342, 
259 N.W.2d 515 (1977).  Motions such as this, having the 
potential to undermine the public's trust and confidence in the 
legitimacy of this court's decisions and the integrity and 
impartiality of this court as an institution, are very serious 
indeed, and, accordingly, must be raised in a timely fashion. 
II 
¶23 The State of Wisconsin and Marquelle Miller, et al., 
ask this court to assess reasonable attorney fees and costs 
against 
respondents 
and 
their 
counsel 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.25(3).7  We agree that the extraordinary 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. §  809.25(3) provides: 
(3) Frivolous appeals. (a) If an appeal or cross-
appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the 
court shall award to the successful party costs, fees 
and reasonable attorney fees under this section.  A 
motion for costs, fees and attorney fees under this 
subsection shall be filed no later than the filing of 
No. 
97-0270   
 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the respondent's brief, or if a cross-appeal is filed, 
the cross-respondent's brief.  
(b) The costs, fees and attorney fees awarded under 
par. (a) may be assessed fully against the appellant 
or cross-appellant or the attorney representing the 
appellant or cross-appellant or may be assessed so 
that the appellant or cross-appellant and the attorney 
each pay a portion of the costs, fees and attorney 
fees. 
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be 
frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one or 
more of the following: 
The 
appeal 
or 
cross-appeal 
was 
filed, 
used 
or 
continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of 
harassing or maliciously injuring another. 
The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have 
known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any 
reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. 
Although the state and Marquelle Miller seek costs and 
attorneys fees under § 809.25(3), we note that § 802.05(1)(a) 
provides, in pertinent part,  
 . . . The 
signature 
of 
an 
attorney 
or 
party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to 
the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, 
information 
and 
belief, 
formed 
after 
reasonable 
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law; and that the pleading, 
motion or other paper is not used for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.  
 . . . If the court determines that an attorney or 
party failed to read or make the determinations 
required under this subsection before signing any 
petition, motion or other paper, the court may, upon 
motion 
or 
upon 
its 
own 
initiative, 
impose 
an 
appropriate sanction on the person who signed the 
No. 
97-0270   
 
16 
 
untimeliness of the motion to vacate justifies a finding of 
frivolousness.  The fact that the motion was filed a mere six 
weeks before the scheduled oral argument of another state-funded 
private school voucher case in the United States Supreme Court 
calls the timing of and motives behind the respondents' motion 
into question. 
¶24 We conclude that the motion to vacate, coming as it 
did almost two years after the public disclosure of the 
information pertinent to the respondents' claims and shortly 
before oral argument in the United States Supreme Court, was 
filed in bad faith, for improper purpose, to undermine the 
public's confidence in the legitimacy of this court's decision 
and the integrity of this court as an institution. The 
seriousness of a motion of this sort is not an excuse for 
tardiness in bringing it; to the contrary, the gravity of this 
type of motion compels that it be timely brought to ensure a 
prompt resolution.  The only reasonable inference that can be 
                                                                                                                                                             
pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented 
party, or on both.  The sanction may include an order 
to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable 
expenses incurred by that party because of the filing 
of the pleading, motion or other paper, including 
reasonable attorney fees.   
Section 809.84 provides: [a]n appeal to the court is 
governed by the rules of civil procedure as to all matters not 
covered by these rules unless the circumstances of the appeal or 
the context of the rule of civil procedures requires a contrary 
result.  
We thus consider the state's and Marquelle Miller's motions 
under both §§ 802.05(1)(a) and 809.25(3).  
No. 
97-0270   
 
17 
 
drawn from the inordinate untimeliness and suspect timing of 
this motion is that it was brought in bad faith for improper 
purpose.  Any other conclusion would seriously undermine the 
concept of frivolousness.  We grant the motions of the state and 
Marquelle Miller, et. al., for an award of reasonable attorney 
fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion to vacate.  
We remand the matter to the Dane County Circuit Court for a 
determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees and 
costs.  
¶25 JON P. WILCOX and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, JJ., did not 
participate.  
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
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¶26 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring in 
part, dissenting in part).  I join only Part I of the court's 
opinion.  I do not join Part II of the opinion remanding the 
matter to the Dane County Circuit Court to determine the amount 
of reasonable attorney fees and costs for a frivolous action.  
This proceeding ought to end now.   
 
 
No.  97-0270.ssa 
 
 
 
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