Title: Rosecky v. Schissel

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2166  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the Paternity of F. T. R.: 
 
David J. Rosecky, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Monica M. Schissel, 
          Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia  
 
JUDGE: 
Alan J. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there were briefs by Stephen 
W. Hayes and Anissa M. Boeckman and Grady, Hayes & Neary, LLC, 
Waukesha, with oral argument by Stephen Hayes.   
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Richard 
J. Auerbach and Auerbach & Porter, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Richard J. Auerbach.   
 
For the guardian ad litem, there was a brief by Todd J. 
Hepler, Lodi, and oral argument by Todd J. Hepler. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard E. Schoenbohm, 
Appleton, on behalf of the American Academy of Adoption 
Attorneys/American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Attorneys. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrea Lea Olmanson, 
Madison, on behalf of Concerned United Birthparents, Inc. 
  
 
 
 
2013 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2166 
(L.C. No. 
2010PA42PJ) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Paternity of F. T. R.: 
 
 
 
David J. Rosecky, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Monica M. Schissel, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Columbia County Circuit Court, 
Alan J. White, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This appeal is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2009-10).1  David and Marcia Rosecky (the 
Roseckys) entered into a Parentage Agreement (PA or the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
2 
 
agreement) with Monica and Cory Schissel (the Schissels) whereby 
the parties agreed that Monica Schissel (Monica) would become 
pregnant and carry a child for the Roseckys.  The agreement 
provided that "[the Roseckys] shall be the legal parents of 
[the] Child," that the "Child's best interests will be served by 
being in [the Roseckys'] legal custody and physical placement," 
and that "[t]he parties will cooperate fully in any parentage 
proceedings to determine [the Roseckys] as [the] [C]hild's legal 
parents, . . . including but not limited to termination of 
parental rights and adoption."  Monica became pregnant through 
artificial insemination using her egg and David Rosecky's 
(David) sperm.  On March 19, 2010, Monica gave birth to F.T.R.  
Shortly before F.T.R.'s birth, Monica informed the Roseckys she 
no longer wanted to give up her parental rights.  She further 
sought custody and placement of F.T.R.  David responded by 
seeking enforcement of the PA.  The Columbia County Circuit 
Court, Judge Alan J. White, determined that the PA was not 
enforceable, and after a trial, awarded sole custody of F.T.R. 
to David, primary placement to David, and secondary placement to 
Monica.  David appealed, seeking enforcement of the PA and sole 
custody and placement of F.T.R.  The court of appeals certified 
to this court the question of "whether an agreement for the 
traditional surrogacy and adoption of a child is enforceable."   
¶2 
We granted the court of appeals' certification and now 
reverse the order of the circuit court. 
¶3 
Aside 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
provisions in the PA at issue, we conclude a PA is a valid, 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
3 
 
enforceable contract unless enforcement is contrary to the best 
interests of the child.  While the traditional defenses to the 
enforcement of a contract could apply, none appear to render the 
entire PA in this case unenforceable.   
¶4 
We also conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by excluding the PA and rendering its 
custody and placement decision without consideration of the PA.  
We reverse the circuit court's determination that the PA is 
unenforceable and remand for a hearing on custody and placement, 
wherein the terms of the PA are enforced unless enforcement is 
contrary to the best interests of F.T.R. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Marcia and Monica were good friends for many years, 
having met in grade school.  Each participated in the other's 
wedding.  The Roseckys were godparents to the Schissels' 
youngest daughter.   
¶6 
In 2004, and again in 2008, Marcia was diagnosed with 
leukemia.  After receiving treatments, she is currently in good 
health and the doctors consider the leukemia "a nonissue."  
However, her eggs are no longer viable and she is unable to have 
biological children.   
¶7 
In 2004, and again in 2008, Monica offered to act as a 
surrogate for the Roseckys.  Monica testified that she wanted to 
help the Roseckys: "I was [Marcia's] friend.  I offered to do 
this. . . .  I orchestrated this whole thing.  This whole thing 
was my doing.  I offered.  I carried.  I said I would do it."  
In 2008, the Roseckys accepted Monica's offer.  The parties 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
4 
 
discussed using a donor egg, but decided to use Monica's egg 
because they could be sure of Monica's family history, there was 
a higher chance of having multiples using a donor egg, and 
Monica preferred to use her own egg.  Marcia expressed concern 
that Monica would have trouble giving up her biological child, 
but Monica reassured Marcia that she would allow the Roseckys to 
raise the child.   
¶8 
The parties had extensive conversations about the 
legal ramifications of the surrogacy before Monica became 
pregnant.  The parties discussed and agreed that Monica and the 
child would have no legal relationship, Monica would not have 
formal custody and placement of the child, Monica would see the 
child through informal social visits, and the Roseckys would 
raise the child.  Both parties retained counsel, and the 
attorneys reduced the agreement to writing.  The parties 
negotiated terms in the agreement, and sent revised drafts back 
and forth.  The parties acknowledge that the written agreement 
is an accurate reflection of the discussions they had before 
Monica became pregnant.  Monica became pregnant in June 2009 
through artificial insemination using her egg and David's sperm.   
¶9 
On November 7, 2009, the agreement was signed by David 
as the "father," and Marcia as the "mother."  On November 17, 
2009, the agreement was also signed by Monica as the "carrier," 
and Cory Schissel (Cory) as the "husband."  The attorneys for 
both parties also signed the agreement.   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
5 
 
¶10 Most importantly for this opinion, the PA contains the 
parties' agreement as to parentage, legal custody, and physical 
placement.2   
¶11 Cory and Monica have five children together.  Before 
Monica became pregnant with F.T.R., the Schissels did not intend 
to have any more children; to that end, Cory had a vasectomy.   
¶12 Toward the end of the pregnancy, the parties had a 
falling out.  It suffices to say that there were several events 
resulting in hurt feelings and lack of trust among the parties.  
In any event, shortly before F.T.R. was born, Monica reneged on 
the PA and refused to terminate her parental rights.  On March 
19, 2010, Monica gave birth to F.T.R. and allowed F.T.R. to go 
home with the Roseckys from the hospital.   
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶13 Shortly after F.T.R. was born, the Columbia County 
Circuit Court appointed the Roseckys as the temporary guardians 
                                                 
2 The 
agreement 
contains 
other 
provisions, 
including: 
Monica's consent to serve as a traditional surrogate; the 
procedure by which Monica would be inseminated; the Schissels' 
acknowledgement 
and 
assumption 
of 
risk; 
the 
Roseckys' 
acknowledgement 
and 
assumption 
of 
parental 
responsibility; 
medical supervision, counseling, and carrier conduct relating to 
the pregnancy; provisions for a medically-necessary abortion; 
Cory's waiver of rights and responsibilities; the Roseckys' 
agreement to pay enumerated expenses as a result of the 
pregnancy; the parties' agreement if the pregnancy were to 
result in a stillbirth or a miscarriage; the Schissels' 
agreement to maintain health insurance; contingencies if one or 
both of the Roseckys were to die; consequences of breach and 
procedures for notice; conclusive presumptions; acknowledgement 
of advice of counsel; severability; dispute resolution; and 
jurisdiction, venue, and controlling law. 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
6 
 
of F.T.R.3  On May 13, 2010, David filed a separate paternity 
action in the Waukesha County Circuit Court.  On August 2, 2010, 
Judge Lee S. Dreyfus Jr. adjudicated David to be the father of 
F.T.R. and transferred the remaining issues to Columbia County 
to be joined with the existing guardianship case.  On September 
30, 2010, Monica moved the circuit court for increased custody 
and placement of F.T.R.  David moved for specific performance of 
the PA, pointing to language in the PA that Monica had waived 
her right to custody and placement of F.T.R.   
¶14 The circuit court scheduled two hearings: one to 
determine interim custody and placement and one to determine the 
enforceability of the PA.  On November 18, 2010, the court held 
a hearing to determine custody and placement.  After hearing 
testimony from Monica, David, and Marcia, the court determined 
that it was in F.T.R.'s best interests to maintain the status 
quo: primary custody and placement with David and two hours of 
placement per month with Monica.  
¶15 The parties then briefed the enforceability of the PA.  
On February 8, 2011, the court held a hearing and determined 
that the PA was not enforceable.  It entered an order to that 
effect on the same date.  The court made several findings 
regarding the PA.  First, it found that "[t]he contract, on its 
face is clear and unambiguous."  Second, the court rejected 
                                                 
3 The appellate record does not contain original documents 
relating 
to 
the 
guardianship 
action 
in 
Columbia 
County.  
Documents in this record indicate that an order dated May 28, 
2010, granted Monica two hours of placement with F.T.R. per 
month.   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
7 
 
Monica's argument that the PA lacked consideration because she 
was already pregnant at the time the agreement was signed.  
Third, the court made additional findings about the PA: 
The parties are each represented by counsel, and 
were at the time the agreement was drawn.  The 
agreement itself covers virtually every eventuality 
which could possibly occur during the pregnancy. 
There is no claim here by [Monica] that she did 
not understand the contract when she signed it.  
Indeed, to a great extent, it appears it was her idea 
to act as a surrogate in the first instance. 
Had [Monica] gone through with the termination of 
her parental rights, this Court would have no problem 
upholding the agreement . . . .  
However, the court articulated the main issue as "whether the 
Court can, under these circumstances, force or require the 
mother to terminate her parental rights."  The court determined 
that it could not force or require Monica to terminate her 
parental rights because the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.41, 
governing voluntary consent to a termination of parental rights 
(TPR), were not met.  In the same vein, the court also refused 
to enforce the custody and placement provisions of the PA.  The 
court did not consider the severability clause of the PA.   
¶16 On February 16, 2011, in anticipation of the custody 
and placement trial, the court ordered Dr. Beth B. Huebner to 
complete a custody study to evaluate F.T.R.'s best interests.  
See Wis. Stat. § 767.405(14).  On February 18, 2011, the court 
entered 
an 
interim 
placement 
order 
giving 
David 
primary 
placement and Monica placement of F.T.R. for three hours every 
other Saturday.   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
8 
 
¶17 On April 6, 2011, Dr. Huebner filed her report.  Her 
ultimate recommendation was that David should have full custody 
and placement of F.T.R., and Monica should not have any 
placement.  On April 25, 2011, F.T.R.'s guardian ad litem, 
Krista E. Miller, filed her report, similarly concluding that 
David should have full custody and placement, and Monica should 
not have any placement.   
¶18 On July 5 and 6, 2011, the court held a trial to 
determine F.T.R.'s best interests with regard to custody and 
placement under Wis. Stat. § 767.41.  The court heard testimony 
from David, Marcia, Monica, Cory, Dr. Huebner, Dr. Kenneth H. 
Waldron (hired by the Roseckys to review Dr. Huebner's report), 
and Dr. Patrick T. Kane (hired by the Schissels to recommend 
possible steps to develop a healthy attachment between a parent 
and a child).   
¶19 Dr. Huebner testified that it was in F.T.R.'s best 
interests to have full custody and placement with the Roseckys.  
She testified that F.T.R. was attached to Marcia, and to 
displace that attachment could have disastrous consequences.  
She testified that placement with Monica would be harmful to 
F.T.R. because of Monica's desire to be his mother and to 
replace Marcia, which would be confusing for F.T.R.  Monica 
admitted that she referred to herself as "Mom" in interactions 
with F.T.R. and that she was "seeking to have placement that 
would allow me to act as his mother."  Dr. Huebner testified 
that the relationship between the Roseckys and the Schissels was 
essentially dead; a fact to which all of the parties agreed.  
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
9 
 
She testified that allowing Monica to have placement in the 
current situation——which Dr. Huebner characterized as "beyond 
high conflict" even though the parties did not swear or yell at 
each other——would have a negative effect on F.T.R.   
¶20 Dr. Waldron testified that Dr. Huebner did use the 
appropriate methodology in gathering data, making findings, and 
incorporating social science research in her report.  Further, 
Dr. Waldron testified about disrupted secure detachment——where a 
young child is separated from a caregiver to whom he or she has 
formed an attachment——and the consequences thereof, including 
depression, 
anxiety, 
mental 
health 
problems, 
behavioral 
problems, delinquency, trouble maintaining long-term friendships 
and relationships, and increased thoughts of suicide.   
¶21 Dr. Kane testified that a child can form more than one 
attachment, that a new attachment can be formed through a series 
of increased contacts, but that he did not interview the parties 
and did not have recommendations specific to this case.  Dr. 
Kane's discussion assumed that the contact was in the best 
interests of the child.  Dr. Kane also discussed that a hostile 
relationship between parents has negative effects on children, 
and that Monica's desire to be F.T.R.'s mother could result in 
anxiety and confusion for F.T.R.   
¶22 Marcia, David, Monica, and Cory all testified about 
the tense relationship between the families.  From the Roseckys' 
perspective, Monica offered to be a surrogate so the Roseckys 
could start a family, Monica was not abiding by the terms of the 
agreement, and the Roseckys agreed to use Monica's egg only 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
10 
 
after she reassured the Roseckys she could allow them to raise 
the child.  From the Schissels' perspective, Monica was being 
shut out and was not able to visit F.T.R. through social 
interactions as she had imagined.  A precise retelling of the 
testimony at trial is not necessary for the legal analysis, but 
it suffices to say that the parties testified about many 
instances of failed communication, hurt feelings, and tense 
interactions.   
¶23 During David's testimony, the court refused to admit 
the PA as an exhibit and stated that "it's not going to consider 
it."  David's attorney, Steven W. Hayes, argued that the PA 
contained a severability clause, that the court could sever any 
provisions that it found offensive, and that the PA was relevant 
to several factors in custody and placement under Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5).   
¶24 On August 25, 2011, the circuit court awarded sole 
custody and primary placement of F.T.R. to David and secondary 
placement to Monica.  The court awarded Monica six hours of 
placement every other weekend until F.T.R. turned two (March 
2012), and at that time, Monica was awarded an overnight stay 
from Friday evening until Saturday evening every other weekend.  
The court did not consider the PA in any way, but instead relied 
solely 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.41 
to 
determine 
custody 
and 
placement. 
 
The 
court 
reasoned 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.41(4)(b), both families were entitled to placement unless 
"the court finds that physical placement with a parent would 
endanger the child's physical, mental or emotional health."  By 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
11 
 
granting placement with Monica, the court rejected the expert 
testimony and the guardian ad litem's opinion that the tension 
between the parties and the separation from attachment figures 
could endanger F.T.R.'s mental or emotional health: "The 
possibility that difficulties may occur and that allowing the 
Schissels to play a role in the child's life is a risk.  But 
risks are a part of life."  The court rejected Dr. Huebner's 
opinion that this case was "beyond high conflict," because high 
conflict cases are those in which "the parties simply can't 
resist the temptation to do anything and everything to subvert, 
attack, demean and literally try to destroy the child's 
relationship with the other parent."  The court noted that the 
contact between the families was generally civil, that it hoped 
"cordial transitions can be accomplished and that cordiality may 
develop into friendly transitions," and that F.T.R. would have 
the benefit of five half siblings if Monica received placement.   
¶25 On September 13, 2011, David filed a notice of appeal 
of (1) the circuit court's February 8, 2011, ruling that the PA 
was unenforceable, and (2) the circuit court's August 25, 2011, 
order 
granting 
Monica 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement.  
Additionally, on September 13, 2011, David filed a motion to 
stay the circuit court's August 25, 2011, ruling on placement 
pending appeal.  On October 6, 2011, the court of appeals denied 
David's motion to stay pending appeal.   
¶26 The parties and the guardian ad litem filed briefs in 
the court of appeals.  On August 9, 2012, the court of appeals 
certified to this court the question of "whether an agreement 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
12 
 
for the traditional surrogacy and adoption of a child is 
enforceable."  The court noted that "Wisconsin currently does 
not 
have 
legislative 
or 
common 
law 
that 
addresses 
the 
enforceability of a surrogacy agreement."   
¶27 On September 27, 2012, we accepted the court of 
appeals' certification.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶28 The PA at issue is analyzed in terms of whether it is 
a valid, enforceable contract.  Where the material facts are 
undisputed, the existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  See Schlosser v. 
Allis-Chalmers 
Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 244, 271 N.W.2d 879 
(1978); VanHierden v. Swelstad, 2010 WI App 16, ¶11, 323 
Wis. 2d 267, 779 N.W.2d 441.     
¶29 As for the custody and placement issue, the circuit 
court typically has discretion to make a determination of what 
is in a child's best interests.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5); 
Jocius v. Jocius, 218 Wis. 2d 103, 110-11, 580 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting Koeller v. Koeller, 195 Wis. 2d 660, 663-64, 
536 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1995); Hollister v. Hollister, 173 
Wis. 2d 413, 416, 496 N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1992).  We will 
sustain the circuit court's discretionary determination unless 
it constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Lubinski v. 
Lubinski, 2008 WI App 151, ¶5, 314 Wis. 2d 395, 761 N.W.2d 676; 
Bohms v. Bohms, 144 Wis. 2d 490, 496, 424 N.W.2d 408 (1988); 
Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 554, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984).  
A reviewing court will sustain the circuit court's exercise of 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
13 
 
discretion if it examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, and came to a reasonable conclusion using a 
demonstrated and rational process.  See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 
414-15, 
320 
N.W.2d 175 
(1982); 
Bohms, 
144 
Wis. 2d at 496.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶30 Aside 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
provisions in the PA at issue, we conclude a PA is a valid, 
enforceable contract unless enforcement is contrary to the best 
interests of the child.  While the traditional defenses to the 
enforcement of a contract could apply, none appear to render the 
entire PA in this case unenforceable.4   
¶31 We also conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by excluding the PA and rendering its 
custody and placement decision without consideration of the PA.  
We reverse the circuit court's determination that the PA is 
unenforceable and remand for a hearing on custody and placement, 
wherein the terms of the PA are enforced unless enforcement is 
contrary to the best interests of F.T.R. 
¶32 Section 
IV. A. 
of 
this 
opinion 
discusses 
the 
background of surrogacy, Section IV. B. discusses whether the 
Wisconsin Statutes provide guidance to our analysis, Section 
                                                 
4 Even though the TPR provisions in the PA are not 
enforceable, the remaining portions of the PA can be enforced if 
severing the unenforceable portion does not defeat the primary 
purpose of the bargain.  See Simenstad v. Hagen, 22 Wis. 2d 653, 
662, 126 N.W.2d 529 (1964). 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
14 
 
IV. C. discusses the enforceability of the PA, and Section V. 
discusses the need for legislative action in this area.   
A. Background on Surrogacy 
¶33 Assisted reproductive technology (ART) has created 
ways 
for 
people 
to 
have 
children 
regardless 
of 
their 
reproductive 
capacity: 
"ART, 
in 
particular 
surrogacy 
arrangements, forces us to confront deeply held beliefs about 
what makes a 'mother' or a 'father,' . . . and perhaps most 
fundamentally, what makes a 'family.'"  Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's 
Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws 
and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449, 
450 (2009).   
¶34 In general terms, surrogacy "is the process by which a 
woman makes a choice to become pregnant and then carry to full 
term and deliver a baby who, she intends, will be raised by 
someone else."  Thomas J. Walsh, Wisconsin's Undeveloped 
Surrogacy Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, Mar. 2012, at 16.  See also 
Black's Law Dictionary 1458 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "surrogate 
mother" as "[a] woman who carries a child to term on behalf of 
another woman and then assigns her parental rights to that woman 
and the father").  This opinion will refer to the woman who 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
15 
 
carries the baby as the "surrogate."5  An "intended parent" is 
"an 
individual, 
married 
or 
unmarried, 
who 
manifests 
the 
intent . . . to be legally bound as the parent of a child 
resulting 
from 
assisted 
or 
collaborative 
reproduction."  
American 
Bar 
Association 
Model 
Act 
Governing 
Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ABA Model Act) § 102(19) (Feb. 2008).  
The Roseckys are the intended parents of F.T.R.   
¶35 There 
are 
two 
broad 
categories 
of 
surrogacies, 
traditional and gestational, but there are many permutations 
within those categories.  In a traditional surrogacy, the 
surrogate is the genetic mother of the child and is artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father or a sperm 
donor.  See Walsh, supra, at 16.  In a gestational surrogacy, 
the surrogate is not genetically related to the child; instead, 
"sperm is taken from the father (or from a donor) and an egg is 
taken from the mother (or from a donor), fertilization happens 
outside the womb (called in vitro fertilization), and the 
fertilized embryos are then implanted into the surrogate 
mother's uterus."  Id.  The case before the court involves a 
traditional surrogacy, as Monica was artificially inseminated 
with David's sperm.      
                                                 
5 There are several terms for the woman who carries the 
baby, 
including 
"surrogate," 
"gestational 
mother," 
or 
"gestational carrier."  See American Bar Association Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (ABA Model Act) 
§ 102(16) (Feb. 2008) (defining "gestational carrier" as "an 
adult woman, not an intended parent, who enters into a 
gestational agreement to bear a child, whether or not she has 
any genetic relationship to the resulting child").   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
16 
 
¶36 Parties contemplating a surrogacy will often enter 
into a surrogacy agreement.  Id. at 18.  This agreement 
typically outlines the parties' rights and responsibilities 
throughout the surrogacy process.  Common provisions include 
contemplated medical procedures, contingencies in case of 
medical 
complications, 
compensation, 
parental 
rights 
and 
responsibilities, choice of law, and the parties' intent.    
¶37 The ability to create a family using ART has seemingly 
outpaced legislative responses to the legal questions it 
presents, especially the determination of parentage.  See Mark 
Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems 
Proliferate, ABA Journal, Mar. 2011, at 54.  Historically, there 
have been no significant questions of maternity: the woman who 
gave birth to a child was the child's mother.  See Charles P. 
Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 Am. U. J. Gender 
Soc. Pol'y & L. 601, 605 (2009).  Indeed, Monica is the mother 
of F.T.R. and has the commensurate parental rights.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 48.02(13) (defining "parent" as "a biological parent, a 
husband who has consented to the artificial insemination of his 
wife [], or a parent by adoption").  Conversely, paternity could 
be established in multiple ways.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.89 
(paternity judgment); § 767.84(1m) (rebuttable presumption when 
genetic testing shows probability of paternity of 99 percent or 
greater); § 767.805 (voluntary acknowledgment of paternity); 
§ 891.41 (presumption of paternity based on marriage of the 
parties).  With surrogacy, relevant parties could include the 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
17 
 
genetic mother, genetic father, intended parents, the surrogate, 
and the surrogate's husband.   
¶38 The vast majority of states do not have statutory 
provisions addressing surrogacy.6  Many courts have encountered 
issues surrounding surrogacy, and the cases often involve ad hoc 
procedures attempting to effectuate the parties' intent by 
analyzing surrogacy issues under the state's statutes for TPR, 
adoption, custody and placement, and the like.  See generally 
Rachel M. Kane, Cause of Action for Determination of Status as 
Legal or Natural Parents of Children Borne by Surrogate or 
Gestational Carrier, 48 COA 2d 687 (Jun. 2011).  At oral 
argument, counsel for the Roseckys explained that surrogacy is a 
reality in Wisconsin and that Wisconsin attorneys attempt to 
effectuate the parties' intent in a surrogacy.  Clearly, when 
the parties follow the agreement and everything goes as planned, 
the court's involvement is quite limited.  For example, if the 
surrogate agrees to terminate her parental rights, the intended 
parents can adopt the child.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.41 (voluntary 
consent to TPR); Wis. Stat. § 48.82 (persons eligible to adopt a 
minor child); Wis. Stat. § 48.91 (if prerequisites are met, 
court shall grant adoption if it is in the best interests of the 
child).  A court will often adjudicate the intended biological 
                                                 
6 Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-By-
State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender 
Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449, 454-60 (2009) (state-by-
state survey of surrogacy laws); Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Academy of Adoption Attorneys & American Academy of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Attorneys, Appendix 001-012 (same).   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
18 
 
parent as the biological parent of a child, as David was 
adjudicated to be F.T.R.'s father.  The adjudicated parent may 
then seek custody and placement of the child.  Counsel for David 
also noted that some Wisconsin circuit courts have used Wis. 
Stat. § 69.14(1)(h) to make a determination of parentage for the 
intended mother and intended father.7  When the parties do not 
agree, however, the courts are forced to confront issues of the 
most difficult nature.  
¶39 Given this general background, we turn to Wisconsin 
law for guidance in answering whether the PA is enforceable.   
B. Wisconsin Law 
¶40 The Wisconsin Statutes do not provide a specific 
answer as to whether the PA is enforceable, and they do not 
contain a statement of public policy against enforcement.     
¶41 One statutory provision seems to contemplate some 
level of relief for intended parents: 
If the registrant of a birth certificate under 
this 
section 
is 
born 
to 
a 
surrogate 
mother, 
information about the surrogate mother shall be 
entered on the birth certificate and the information 
about the father shall be omitted from the birth 
certificate.  If a court determines parental rights 
over the registrant, the clerk of court shall report 
the court's determination to the state registrar 
. . . . Upon 
receipt 
of 
the 
report, 
the 
state 
registrar shall prepare and register a new birth 
                                                 
7 In this unique case neither of the common routes that 
David's attorney explained provided a complete remedy for the 
parties because the two biological parents were contesting 
custody 
and 
placement. 
 
Thus, 
the 
parties 
instituted 
guardianship and custody and placement proceedings.  See Wis. 
Stat. ch. 54; Wis. Stat. § 767.41(1)(b). 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
19 
 
certificate for the registrant under s. 69.15(6) and 
send a copy of the new certificate to the local 
registrar who filed the original certificate.  Upon 
receipt of the copy, the local registrar shall destroy 
his or her copy of the replaced certificate and file 
the new certificate. 
Wis. Stat. § 69.14(1)(h).  "Registrant" is defined as "the 
subject of a certificate or declaration which a local registrar 
has accepted for filing in the system of vital statistics."  
Wis. Stat. § 69.01(19).  This section seems to contemplate that 
a court may make a determination of parental rights to someone 
other than the "surrogate mother."  
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 891.40 provides that if certain 
procedures are followed when a woman is inseminated with sperm 
from a sperm donor, the woman's husband at the time of 
conception "shall be the natural father of a child conceived."  
Wis. Stat. § 891.40(1).  Further, the statute provides that the 
sperm donor "bears no liability for the support of the child and 
has no parental rights with regard to the child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 891.40(2).  
¶43 The 
Wisconsin Statutes also govern more typical 
custody and placement situations, but the statutes do not 
specifically contemplate the use of a surrogacy parenting 
agreement in the adjudication of custody and placement disputes.    
See Wis. Stat. ch. 767.  The statutes specify that a circuit 
court shall make custody and placement determinations in certain 
enumerated actions affecting the family.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(1)(b) 
(annulment, 
divorce, 
legal 
separation, 
adjudicated paternity, custody, compelled support, acknowledged 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
20 
 
paternity).  Surrogacy is not one of those enumerated actions.  
In a more typical custody and placement determination, where 
there is no PA, the court "shall consider all facts relevant to 
the best interest of the child."  Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5).  The 
statute enumerates 16 factors that the court shall consider.  
Id.  As the circuit court noted, many of the statutory factors 
are difficult to apply to the facts surrounding a surrogacy: 
One of the striking things to the court in this 
case 
is 
how 
many 
factors 
in 
§ 767.41 
don't 
apply. . . . The interaction of each parent has wholly 
been affected by [Monica's] relinquishment of the 
child and the orders of this court and earlier 
agreements of the parties.  The amount and quality of 
time with the parent.  Same analysis.  The child's 
adjustment to home.  Same analysis.  The need for 
regularly 
occurring 
and 
meaningful 
periods 
of 
placement.  So far, same analysis.  In many respects 
it doesn't quite seem to fit into the usual analysis 
in family court.  That is because of course this case 
is so unusual.   
¶44 Adoption and termination of parental rights are also 
governed by the Wisconsin Statutes, but do not appear to 
contemplate the issues surrounding a surrogacy.  Adoption is 
available when both of the parents are deceased, the parental 
rights of both parents have been terminated, the parental rights 
of one parent have been terminated and the stepparent seeks to 
adopt, or the parental rights of one parent have been terminated 
and the other parent is deceased.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.81.  
Parental rights can be terminated voluntarily, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.41, or involuntarily if grounds for the termination exist.  
See § 48.415 (grounds include abandonment, continuing need of 
protection or services, continuing parental disability, and 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
21 
 
abuse).  The TPR-and-adoption scheme does not provide relief for 
a party in Marcia's circumstance: she is the wife of the 
biological father, she currently has no parental rights over the 
child, the surrogate/egg donor refuses to voluntarily terminate 
her parental rights, and there are no facts in the record to 
indicate 
that 
there 
would 
be 
grounds 
to 
terminate 
the 
surrogate's parental rights.   
¶45 Further, 
adoption 
is 
distinctly 
different 
than 
surrogacy.  Adoption often occurs in circumstances where the 
parent cannot or will not care for the child.  Substantial court 
oversight is necessary in a voluntary-TPR-and-adoption scenario 
to ensure that the biological parents have consented to the TPR 
after being informed of the consequences thereof.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 48.41.  In contrast, surrogacies are planned, and the 
intended parents want the child and are willing and able to care 
for the child.  Additionally, the Wisconsin Statutes prohibit 
the proposed adoptive parents from making certain payments to 
the birth mother, for fear of causing undue influence or 
encouraging "baby-selling."  See Wis. Stat. § 48.913(4).  On the 
other hand, surrogacies may not present the same concerns for 
undue influence because the surrogate is often a good friend or 
family member of the intended parents, or, if the parties use a 
surrogacy agency, the surrogate is likely screened by the 
agency.  See Hansen, supra, at 56-57 (reporting that a reputable 
surrogacy agency screens surrogates and "manage[s] all of the 
medical, 
psychological, 
legal, 
financial, 
insurance, 
and 
administrative details that go along with such an arrangement").   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
22 
 
¶46 In this case, Monica was presumed to be the mother of 
F.T.R. because she gave birth to him, David was adjudicated as 
the father of F.T.R., the circuit court determined that the PA 
was unenforceable, and Monica is unwilling to voluntarily 
terminate her parental rights.  Under the current statutory 
schemes, Marcia is left without any parental rights unless and 
until Monica's parental rights are terminated and Marcia adopts 
F.T.R.: 
It is clear that the more complex surrogacy 
relationships do not easily fit into Wisconsin's 
statutory scheme.  The statutes do not refer to 
compensation of surrogate mothers or sperm and egg 
donors.  No provisions address the interests of the 
child 
created 
in 
this 
process 
or 
by 
in 
vitro 
fertilization. 
 Thus, parties seeking relief in 
Wisconsin courts are provided no guarantee that relief 
can be had.  Further, circuit court judges attempting 
to determine if relief is appropriate are given no 
guidance on how to apportion that relief. 
Walsh, supra, at 19.  Considering the facts of this case, none 
of the statutory schemes neatly answer the multiple legal issues 
presented.   
¶47 In summary, the Wisconsin Statutes do not provide a 
specific answer as to whether the PA is enforceable, and they do 
not contain a statement of public policy against enforcement.  
C. Enforceability of the PA 
¶48 Having determined that the Wisconsin Statutes do not 
provide a specific answer regarding the enforceability of the 
PA, we turn to contract law.  As such, we will analyze whether 
this contract satisfies the elements of a contract, and whether 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
23 
 
there are any defenses that render this contract unenforceable.  
First, however, we address the parties' arguments.   
1. Parties Arguments 
¶49 David makes several arguments as to why the PA should 
be enforceable.  First, David argues that the PA is enforceable 
under contract law and that public policy does not invalidate 
the PA.  Indeed, David argues that public policy supports the 
enforcement 
of 
the 
PA, 
as 
it 
provides 
stability 
and 
predictability for children and for parties to surrogacies.  
David looks to case law and statutes from other jurisdictions 
that have enforced surrogacy contracts or otherwise concluded 
that the intended parents are the legal parents of the child.  
David alternatively argues that the PA should be enforced under 
equitable estoppel because the Roseckys relied on Monica's 
representations that she would be able to separate herself from 
the child, and they would not have gone through with the 
surrogacy but for those representations.   
¶50 David further argues that the circuit court failed to 
consider the severability clause in the PA when addressing the 
TPR provisions.  The circuit court framed the issue of 
enforceability 
as 
"whether 
the 
court 
can, 
under 
these 
circumstances, force or require the mother to terminate her 
parental rights."  However, David argues that it is not 
necessary to terminate Monica's parental rights to effectuate 
the parties' overall intent——for the Roseckys to be the parents 
of F.T.R., with full custody and placement.  Therefore, any 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
24 
 
offending portion of the PA can be severed, and the remaining 
portions can be used to enforce the parties' intent.   
¶51 Finally, David argues that, at the very least, the PA 
should have been received into evidence and considered as a 
factor in custody and placement.  David argues that the PA is 
relevant to several factors under Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5)(am), 
especially subdivision 1. because the PA is evidence of the 
"wishes of the child's parent or parents" or is a "legal custody 
or physical placement proposal submitted to the court."   
¶52 F.T.R.'s guardian ad litem on appeal, Todd J. Hepler, 
argues that, absent some showing of unconscionability, a 
surrogacy contract should be presumptively enforceable as long 
as it is in the best interests of the child.  The guardian ad 
litem argues that the best way to promote stability and 
predictability is to presumptively enforce surrogacy agreements:  
In 
the 
case 
of 
a 
last-minute 
surrogacy 
repudiation, once a child is born, the parties will be 
forced [to] instigate an immediate whirlwind of 
litigation concerning placement and custody of the 
child and the newborn's first days, weeks, months and 
years of life will be clouded by the atmosphere of 
tension, anxiety and angst incumbent with bitter 
litigation of this sort.  
The guardian ad litem looks to the legislature's pronouncement 
that "instability and impermanence in family relationships are 
contrary to the welfare of children."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a). 
¶53 Monica looks to a myriad of Wisconsin Statutes and 
cases to conclude that the PA cannot be enforceable.  She argues 
that the PA violates Wis. Stat. § 48.913, which prohibits 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
25 
 
certain payments in an adoption, because the PA provides illegal 
payments to Monica and Cory.  She argues that parents cannot 
contract to create parental rights8 and that custody and 
placement agreements are not binding on the parties until they 
are approved by a court.9  Wis. Stat. § 767.34(1) (requiring 
court approval to stipulations for "legal custody and physical 
placement" in "an annulment, divorce, or legal separation").  
Monica further argues that her refusal to follow through with 
the PA precludes its enforcement.  See Hottenroth v. Hetsko, 
2006 WI App 249, ¶13, 298 Wis. 2d 200, 727 N.W.2d 38 (parties to 
a divorce "are free to withdraw from a stipulation until it is 
incorporated into the divorce judgment") (internal quotation 
omitted).  She argues that custody and placement orders cannot 
be "fixe[d]" such that there can be no modification of the order 
in the future and cannot be contingent on a future event.  See 
Jocius, 218 Wis. 2d at 118 ("[T]he statute permitting a trial 
                                                 
8 See Sporleder v. Hermes, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 
(1991), overruled by Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 690-91, 
533 N.W.2d 419 (1995).  Though the contract in Holtzman did not 
attempt to transfer custody, the court stated that "[n]othing in 
ch. 767 expressly prohibits contracts relating to visitation" 
and that "public policy considerations do not prohibit a court 
from relying on its equitable powers to grant visitation apart 
from [sec. 767.41] on the basis of a co-parenting agreement 
between a biological parent and another when visitation is in a 
child's best interest.  We overrule any language in [Sporleder] 
to the contrary."  193 Wis. 2d at 690-91.     
9 By its terms, Wis. Stat. § 767.34 is applicable only to 
actions for "an annulment, divorce, or legal separation."  
Monica argues that the requirement in § 767.34——that a court 
approve the parties' stipulation as to custody and placement——is 
applicable to paternity actions by § 767.89(3)(b).   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
26 
 
court to deny a parent physical placement does not permit the 
trial court to make a prospective order prohibiting a parent 
from requesting a change in physical placement in the future."); 
Culligan v. Cindric, 2003 WI App 180, ¶13, 266 Wis. 2d 534, 669 
N.W.2d 175 ("It is well settled that a circuit court lacks the 
statutory authority at divorce to order a change of physical 
placement that is both prospective and contingent on the 
occurrence of some anticipated event.").   
¶54 Monica 
argues 
that 
the 
PA 
violates 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am) because it precludes a court from considering 
all statutory factors in a custody and placement determination.  
Monica argues that enforcement of the PA violates Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(4)(b), which provides that a court can preclude 
placement with a parent only after a hearing and after 
determining that the placement would "endanger the child's 
physical, mental or emotional health."  Finally, Monica argues 
that blind enforcement of the PA violates the overarching 
principle of custody and placement determinations, that the 
child's best interests must dictate any agreement or order.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5) ("[T]he court shall consider all facts 
relevant to the best interest of the child.").   
2. Contract Law 
¶55 Aside 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
provisions, we conclude the PA is a valid, enforceable contract 
unless enforcement is contrary to the best interests of the 
F.T.R.  While the traditional defenses to the enforcement of a 
contract apply, none have been presented to render the PA 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
27 
 
unenforceable.  We do not accept David's argument that the PA is 
wholly enforceable.  In fact, the portions of the PA calling for 
the termination of Monica's parental rights are unenforceable.  
We also do not accept Monica's assertion that the PA is wholly 
unenforceable.  The main problem with Monica's arguments is that 
they are based on law that was never intended to govern the 
various issues presented in a surrogacy.  The law does not 
specifically 
address 
the 
legal 
issues 
presented 
in 
this 
surrogacy dispute.   
¶56 Despite this being a unique contract, we turn to 
contract law for guidance.  "Wisconsin courts have long 
recognized the importance of freedom of contract and have 
endeavored to protect the right to contract."  Watts v. Watts, 
137 Wis. 2d 506, 521, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987).  A founding 
principle of freedom of contract is that "individuals should 
have the power to govern their own affairs without governmental 
interference."  Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 211, 321 
N.W.2d 173 
(1982). 
 
Courts 
protect 
parties' 
"justifiable 
expectations and the security of transactions" by "ensuring that 
the promises will be performed."  Id.  
¶57 The elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, and 
consideration.  See Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 189 
Wis. 2d 237, 247, 525 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994); Michael B. 
Apfeld et al., Contract Law in Wisconsin § 2.1 (3d ed. 2012).  
Defenses 
to 
the 
enforcement 
of 
a 
contract 
include 
misrepresentation, mistake, illegality, unconscionability, void 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
28 
 
against public policy, duress, undue influence, and incapacity.  
See Apfeld et al., supra, at ch. 3.   
¶58 Even if a contract contains an illegal provision, 
"Wisconsin has long accepted that a portion of a contract may be 
severable."  Markwardt v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 200, 
¶30, 296 Wis. 2d 512, 724 N.W.2d 669.  A severability clause, 
though 
not 
controlling, 
is 
entitled 
to 
great 
weight 
in 
determining if the remaining portions of a contract are 
severable.  See Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 10, 
24, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).  If a 
contract contains an illegal clause, the remaining portions of 
the contract can be enforced if severing the illegal portions 
does not defeat the primary purpose of the bargain.  See 
Simenstad v. Hagen, 22 Wis. 2d 653, 662, 126 N.W.2d 529 (1964); 
Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶¶15, 18, 245 Wis. 2d 632, 629 
N.W.2d 277.  
¶59 In this case, there is no question that the PA 
contains the essential elements of a contract.  Monica made an 
offer to the Roseckys that she would act as a surrogate.  The 
Roseckys accepted Monica's offer.  Consideration was provided.     
¶60 The unique nature of this contract, however, cannot be 
understated.10  Creating a child is not something that one can 
                                                 
10 The guardian ad litem's brief summarizes why surrogacies 
are so unique: 
[T]his case exists at the intersection of several 
distinct and historically different areas of law and 
stands at the crossroads of ever-evolving artificial 
reproduction technology.   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
29 
 
decide to do one day and decide not to do the next.  Typical 
damages cannot make one whole.  Nonetheless, this is a contract 
and we conclude that it is largely enforceable.  
¶61  Specifically, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
interests 
supporting enforcement of the PA are more compelling than the 
interests 
against 
enforcement. 
 
Enforcement 
of 
surrogacy 
agreements 
promotes 
stability 
and 
permanence 
in 
family 
relationships because it allows the intended parents to plan for 
the arrival of their child, reinforces the expectations of all 
parties to the agreement, and reduces contentious litigation 
that could drag on for the first several years of the child's 
life.   
¶62 We do not hold this opinion alone; the legislature has 
manifested its intent in the children's code, wherein it 
concluded that the best interests of the child are always 
paramount.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.01.  See also § 767.41(5) 
(stating that in custody and placement determinations, the court 
considers "all facts relevant to the best interest of the 
child"); § 54.15(1) (stating that in selection of a guardian for 
a proposed ward, the "best interests of the proposed ward shall 
control"); § 938.01(2)(f) (stating that in the Juvenile Justice 
Code, the court considers "each juvenile's best interest" in 
responding to "a juvenile offender's needs for care and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The most critical fact that distinguishes this 
case from others is that [F.T.R.] was created so that 
the Roseckys could have a child of their own.  This 
crucial fact distinguishes this case from an adoption, 
third-party placement, paternity or divorce case. 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
30 
 
treatment").  Furthermore, the legislature has legislated that 
"instability and impermanence in family relationships are 
contrary to the welfare of children."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a). 
¶63 According to the expert testimony in this case, social 
science research also supports the conclusion that permanency 
and stability promote child welfare, whereas being exposed to 
contentious family relationships, an inevitable consequence of 
litigation, is harmful.  As Dr. Waldron testified: "[O]ut of 
over 2,000 studies that have been done . . . where there are 
separate caregivers, . . . in every single one . . . the higher 
the level of tension and conflict, the more detrimental it is to 
kids. . . . [T]hat is the number one predictor for child 
adjustment over time, [] whether or not there's tension and 
conflict between caregivers."  Dr. Huebner also testified that, 
according to research, the tension between the Roseckys and 
Schissels could be harmful to F.T.R.   
¶64 We find no public policy statement contrary to the 
enforcement of the PA in the Wisconsin Statutes or in Wisconsin 
cases.11 
                                                 
11 To support their public policy arguments, the Roseckys, 
the Schissels, and the guardian ad litem point to cases and 
statutes from other jurisdictions.  While it is true that many 
other jurisdictions have examined surrogacy issues, there is no 
clear majority rule: 
The vast majority of states are silent or near 
silent on the issues of whether, when, and how 
surrogacy 
agreements 
are 
enforceable, 
void, 
or 
voidable.  Of those states that do have laws on the 
books regarding such agreements, the responses range 
from relying heavily on the Uniform Parentage Act or 
party intent to outright bans or even criminalization 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
31 
 
¶65 The portions of the PA requiring Monica to terminate 
her parental rights, however, are not enforceable under the 
language of the existing statutes.  The PA stated that "[t]he 
parties will cooperate fully in any parentage proceedings to 
determine [the Roseckys] as [C]hild's legal parents, or in any 
other similar legal proceedings, including but not limited to 
termination of parental rights and adoption."  It further 
stated: 
The parties intend to participate voluntarily in 
any legal proceedings necessary to have [the Roseckys] 
determined to be Child's legal parents . . . . It is 
the intent of the parties that regardless of any 
circumstances that may arise in the future, both 
                                                                                                                                                             
of surrogacy.  In many of the states that are 'silent' 
on surrogacy, bills have been shot back-and-forth 
through the legislature but come to naught. 
Hofman, supra, at 454.  See also Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy 
Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA Journal, 
Mar. 2011, at 55;  Thomas J. Walsh, Wisconsin's Undeveloped 
Surrogacy Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, Mar. 2012, at 20.  Case law in 
this area is similarly scattered.  See, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 
12 A.3d 783, 793 (Conn. 2011) (concluding that Connecticut 
Statute, which governs birth certificates when birth is subject 
to a surrogacy agreement, "allows an intended parent who is a 
party to a valid [surrogacy] agreement to become a parent 
without first adopting the children, without respect to that 
intended 
parent's 
genetic 
relationship 
to 
the 
children" 
(emphasis omitted)); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 
1993) (concluding that when the intended mother/egg donor and 
the gestational carrier had equal claims to maternity under 
California law, "she who intended to procreate the child——that 
is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that 
she intended to raise as her own——is the natural mother under 
California law"); Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 
(N.J. 1988) (concluding that enforcement of a traditional 
surrogacy 
agreement 
violated various statements of public 
policy). 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
32 
 
[Marcia] and [David] shall be the legal parents of 
Child.  The parties agree to sign all necessary 
documents and attend any scheduled court hearings 
either prior to or after Child's birth to achieve 
these goals. 
As the circuit court correctly noted, the portions of the PA 
requiring a voluntary TPR do not comply with the procedural 
safeguards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.41 because Monica would 
not consent to the TPR and there is no legal basis for 
involuntary termination.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  As a result, 
the TPR provisions of the PA are unenforceable.  That fact, 
however, does not end the analysis.   
¶66 We further conclude that the offending TPR provisions 
in the PA can be severed from the remainder of the contract 
without defeating the primary purpose of the agreement.  The PA 
addresses severability: 
In the event any of the provisions of this 
Agreement are deemed to be invalid or unenforceable, 
such provisions will be deemed severable from the 
remainder of this Agreement and will not cause the 
invalidity or unenforceability of the remainder of 
this Agreement.  Consistent with the provisions of 
this paragraph, if any provision is deemed invalid due 
to its scope or breadth, such provision will be deemed 
valid to the extent of the scope or breadth permitted 
by law.    
Though a severability clause itself is not controlling, it is 
entitled to great weight in determining whether the remainder of 
a contract is enforceable.  See Town of Clearfield, 150 Wis. 2d 
at 24.  The primary purpose of this agreement is to ensure that 
the Roseckys will be the parents of F.T.R. and will have custody 
and placement.  The PA contains provisions for custody and 
placement: "The parties believe strongly that Child's best 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
33 
 
interests will be served by being in [the Roseckys'] legal 
custody and physical placement, as it is necessary for Child to 
regard [the Roseckys] as the sole legal parents and [the 
Roseckys'] home as the sole parental home."  The purpose of the 
PA can be carried out, after severing the TPR portions, by 
enforcing the custody and placement provisions of the PA.  See 
Simenstad, 22 Wis. 2d at 662.   
¶67 As to the remaining portions of the PA, the current 
court record does not support any defense to the enforcement of 
the contract so as to render it unenforceable.  There are no 
facts in the record to indicate, nor does Monica argue, that the 
contract should be void or voidable due to misrepresentation, 
mistake, duress, undue influence, or incapacity.  See Apfeld et 
al., supra, ch. 3.  Instead, the facts in the record appear to 
establish that the contract was entered into voluntarily and was 
well-planned, negotiated, and carefully executed.  The circuit 
court made findings about the PA: 
The 
contract, 
on 
its 
face, 
is 
clear 
and 
unambiguous. . . .    
The parties are each represented by counsel, and 
were at the time the agreement was drawn.  The 
agreement itself covers virtually every eventuality 
which could possibly occur during the pregnancy. 
There is no claim here by [Monica] that she did 
not understand the contract when she signed it.  
Indeed, to a great extent, it appears it was her idea 
to act as a surrogate in the first instance. 
Had [Monica] gone through with the termination of 
her parental rights, this Court would have no problem 
upholding the agreement . . . .  
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
34 
 
Monica offered, not once but twice, to act as a surrogate for 
the Roseckys.  Both the Roseckys and the Schissels had 
independent counsel, who assisted in drafting and revising the 
parties' agreement.  The parties negotiated the terms of the 
agreement.  When the Roseckys raised concerns about using 
Monica's egg, for fear that she would not be able to separate 
herself from the child, Monica reassured the Roseckys that she 
could separate herself from the child.  Monica testified that 
she understood all of the terms of the contract and that she 
simply changed her mind as to the terms.   
¶68 Instead of arguing that the contract is void due to 
duress, mistake, or similar reasons, Monica argues that the PA 
is void as against public policy.  The essence of Monica's 
public policy argument is that a contract cannot cut off a 
biological parent from his or her child, and any contract that 
purports to do so violates a myriad of cases and statutes 
relating to divorce, custody, placement, adoption, and similar 
areas.  A contract will not be enforced if it violates public 
policy.  Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 521.  A court may declare a 
contract void on public policy grounds only if it determines, 
after weighing the interests, that the interests in enforcing 
the contract are clearly outweighed by the interests in 
upholding 
the 
policy 
that 
the 
contract 
violates. 
 
Id.; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981).  Public policy 
may be expressed by a statute, regulation, or judicial opinion.  
See N. States Power Co. v. Nat'l Gas Co., Inc., 2000 WI App 30, 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
35 
 
¶8, 232 Wis. 2d 541, 606 N.W.2d 613.  For the reasons stated 
above, we reject Monica's public policy arguments. 
¶69 In summary, though the TPR portions of the PA cannot 
be enforced under Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the 
remainder of the PA is an enforceable contract.  No Wisconsin 
Statute or case contains a specific statement of public policy 
contrary to the enforcement of this PA.  We conclude that 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements promotes stability and 
permanence in family relationships because it allows the 
intended parents to plan for the arrival of their child, 
reinforces the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and 
reduces contentious litigation that could drag on for the first 
several years of the child's life.  Aside from the termination 
of parental rights provisions in the PA at issue, the PA is a 
valid, enforceable contract unless enforcement is contrary to 
the best interests of F.T.R.  We turn to consider the circuit 
court action concerning custody and placement.   
3. Application  
¶70 The 
circuit 
court 
awarded 
primary 
custody 
and 
placement to David and secondary placement to Monica.  It did 
so, however, without consideration of the PA.  We conclude that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
excluding the PA and rendering its custody and placement 
decision without consideration of the PA.   
¶71 In custody and placement determinations, the circuit 
court has discretion to make a determination of what is in a 
child's best interests.  See Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5); Jocius, 218 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
36 
 
Wis. 2d at 110-11; Hollister, 173 Wis. 2d at 416.  We will 
sustain the circuit court's discretionary determination unless 
it constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See 
Lubinsky, 314 Wis. 2d 395, ¶5; Bohms, 144 Wis. 2d at 497.   
¶72 Because 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
PA 
is 
a 
valid, 
enforceable contract, the circuit court's exclusion of the PA 
and decision to render a custody and placement order without 
consideration of the PA constituted an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.12  Id., at 496.  We therefore reverse the circuit 
court's order and remand for a determination of custody and 
placement consistent with this opinion.   
V. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
                                                 
12 The PA contains several provisions on the custody and 
placement of the child: 
[The Roseckys] will have physical placement of Child 
immediately upon Child's birth . . . . [The Schissels] 
waive any and all claims to . . . custody, visitation, 
and physical placement of Child . . . . The parties 
believe strongly that Child's best interests will be 
served by being in [the Roseckys'] legal custody and 
physical placement, as it is necessary for Child to 
regard [the Roseckys] as the sole legal parents and 
[the Roseckys'] home as the sole parental home.   
. . . . 
. . .It is in Child's best interests that legal 
custody be with [the Roseckys] immediately upon 
Child's birth, with no child support to be paid by 
[the Schissels], that physical placement be with [the 
Roseckys] upon Child's release from the hospital, and 
that placement or visitation with [the Schissels] be 
denied, as the parties agree that Child should view 
[the Roseckys] as the sole legal parents and [the 
Roseckys'] home as the sole parental home. 
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
37 
 
¶73 We respectfully urge the legislature to consider 
enacting 
legislation 
regarding 
surrogacy.13 
 
Surrogacy 
is 
currently a reality in our Wisconsin court system.  Legislation 
could "address surrogacy agreements to ensure that when the 
surrogacy process is used, the courts and the parties understand 
the expectations and limitations under Wisconsin law."14  Walsh, 
supra, at 56.   
VI. CONCLUSION  
¶74 Aside 
from 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
provisions in the PA at issue, we conclude a PA is a valid, 
enforceable contract unless enforcement is contrary to the best 
interests of the child.  While the traditional defenses to the 
enforcement of a contract could apply, none appear to render the 
entire PA in this case unenforceable.   
¶75 We also conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by excluding the PA and rendering its 
custody and placement decision without consideration of the PA.  
                                                 
13 Assisted reproductive technology has turned "the science 
of making babies into a $3 billion-a-year industry."  Hansen, 
supra, at 54.  Though reliable data is scarce on the number of 
surrogacies that occur every year, one account estimates that 
about 22,000 babies have been born using surrogacy in the United 
States since the mid-1970s.  Id.  Anecdotal evidence from 
attorneys practicing in this area suggests that the number may 
be much higher.  Id. (noting a California surrogacy attorney's 
account that her office handles about 150 surrogacies a year). 
14 See, e.g., Raftopol, 12 A.3d at 801-03 (calling for 
legislative guidance and listing a myriad of legal issues 
presented by surrogacy); ABA Model Act (Feb. 2008); Uniform 
Parentage Act (2002); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 47/1-47/75 
(West 2012) ("Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act").   
No. 
2011AP2166   
 
38 
 
We reverse the circuit court's determination that the PA is 
unenforceable and remand for a hearing on custody and placement, 
wherein the terms of the PA are enforced unless enforcement is 
contrary to the best interests of F.T.R.   
By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶76 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring)  I too 
would remand the matter to the circuit court.  I would, however, 
instruct the circuit court to follow the legislative directive 
in Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5)(am) for deciding the legal custody and 
physical placement dispute in the present case.  
¶77 I do not join the majority opinion because I disagree 
with the majority opinion's authorization of people to contract 
out of the State's traditional, statutory oversight role in the 
protection of children.  
¶78 Courts should not sacrifice statutes or public policy 
considerations on the altar of freedom of contract: 
There are, in a civilized society, some things that 
money cannot buy.  In America, we decided long ago 
that merely because conduct purchased by money was 
"voluntary" did not mean that it was good or beyond 
regulation and prohibition.1 
¶79 I write separately for two reasons:  
¶80 First, although I conclude that surrogacy contracts 
are not per se void as a matter of law in Wisconsin, I caution 
that the provisions of these contracts demand a court's careful 
attention.  Courts must be alert to the terms of a surrogacy 
contract no matter how the parties title the contract.  In the 
present case, the parties decided to call the surrogacy contract 
a "Parentage Agreement."   
¶81 A surrogacy contract is no less than a contract that 
governs 
bodily 
intrusions, 
the 
use 
of 
human 
bodies 
for 
                                                 
1 Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (citing 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).   
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
2 
 
altruistic or commercial gain, the creation of a child, and the 
legal custody and physical placement of a child once it is born.   
¶82 Such 
agreements 
are 
not 
standard 
run-of-the-mill 
contracts subject merely to the usual offer, acceptance, and 
consideration analysis.  See majority op., ¶¶57, 59.  Standard 
contract defenses and remedies are a starting point, but may not 
be sufficient.  Surrogacy contracts, in whole or in part, are by 
their subject matter likely to collide with statutes and raise 
numerous public policy issues (some addressed directly by 
statute, others not) and questions of unconscionability.  The 
majority opinion takes a carefree attitude toward public policy 
considerations, seemingly declaring all surrogacy agreements 
valid.2  
                                                 
2 The majority opinion seems to vacillate in reaching its 
conclusion.  At times it appears to state that the enforcement 
of the Parentage Agreement in the present case is not contrary 
to statutes, case law, or public policy.  At other times, the 
majority opinion reads more broadly to state that the public 
policy of Wisconsin supports surrogacy agreements in general and 
that no Wisconsin statute or case contains a specific statement 
of public policy contrary to surrogacy agreements.     
Under either interpretation, the majority opinion does not 
address the numerous public policy issues regarding the validity 
of this agreement and surrogacy agreements in general, including 
the following:  must the agreement be in writing; should 
compensated agreements be allowed and what are the limits on 
compensation; should the availability of surrogacy be limited to 
married couples or to infertile intended parents; should the age 
of any party be limited; should a spouse be required either to 
consent or to be made a party to the contract; must each 
individual involved be represented by counsel; should the State 
require that information about each individual's legal rights be 
provided; 
what 
provisions 
are 
valid 
regarding 
who 
makes 
decisions about health care and termination of the pregnancy; 
how and when may the agreement be terminated; and must any party 
to the agreement be given the opportunity to change his or her 
mind before or after the birth of the child?    
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶83 Public policy considerations regarding a surrogacy 
contract may differ depending on the nature of the dispute.  In 
the present case the dispute centers on the paternity, the 
custody, and the physical placement of a child born of 
alternative reproductive methods with a surrogacy agreement 
among friends.  See ¶¶104-112, infra.  Although the biological 
parents "contractually" agreed in the present case that the 
child's best interests would be served if the surrogate mother 
did not have custody and physical placement, the surrogate 
mother has refused to abide by the terms of the contract.  
Majority op., ¶¶12, 72 n.12 
¶84 Different legal and public policy issues may arise in 
different disputes and under different contract provisions.  
Different 
issues 
may 
arise 
when 
gestational 
surrogacy 
agreements, rather than traditional surrogacy agreements, are 
implicated.  In all surrogacy contracts, public policy issues 
are in the forefront.3   
¶85 Second, I write because the present case arose as a 
petition 
by 
David 
Rosecky 
for 
paternity 
requesting 
a 
determination of the legal custody and physical placement of the 
named child.  The majority opinion ignores the posture of the 
                                                 
3 Policy decisions to be made in validating or voiding 
surrogacy agreements appear in the case law and statutes of 
other states and nations.  See, e.g., Unif. Parentage Act Art. 
8, 9B U.L.A. 360 (2000) (gestational agreement); American Bar 
Association, 
Model 
Act 
Governing 
Assisted 
Reproductive 
Technology 
(2008), 
available 
at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf 
(last visited June 28, 2013). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
4 
 
case and mischaracterizes the instant case as simply a contract 
dispute.  Majority op., ¶¶28, 48, 55-60, 66-69.  
¶86 All three actions brought by David Rosecky, the 
biological 
father——for 
paternity, 
custody, 
and 
physical 
placement——are, 
under 
the 
plain 
text 
of 
the 
statutes, 
categorized as "actions affecting the family," and as such are 
governed by Chapter 767.  See ¶¶104-112, infra.  The legislative 
standard established in Chapter 767 for legal custody and 
physical placement of a child directs courts to "consider all 
facts relevant to the best interest of the child."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am) (emphasis added).  Indeed, the legislature has 
enumerated 16 factors that may be relevant for a court's 
consideration in determining the best interest of a child, 
including agreements by a parent.  
¶87 The majority opinion ignores the statutes and creates 
its own standard for deciding the legal custody and physical 
placement of the child.  The guiding principle for legal custody 
and physical placement when a surrogacy agreement is implicated, 
according to the majority opinion, will be the custody and 
placement provisions set forth in the surrogacy contract unless 
enforcement of the contract is "contrary to the best interests 
of the child."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 4, 30, 31, 55, 69, 74, 75.   
¶88 The majority opinion departs from the legislative 
mandate.  Yet the majority opinion does not explain why a child 
born of alternative reproductive methods should have different 
rights and be treated differently under the custody and 
placement statutes than any other child.     
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
5 
 
I 
¶89 The question whether to enforce surrogacy contracts is 
a matter of first impression for this court, but not for 
legislatures and courts of other states and nations and not for 
legal commentators and scholars.  In the last three years alone, 
over 180 law journal articles have been published addressing 
surrogacy contracts.   
¶90 Nonetheless, the majority opinion has no hesitancy in 
declaring that public policy supports the enforcement of such 
contracts. Majority op., ¶¶64, 69.  Yet the validity of 
surrogacy contracts, in whole or in part, is at this very time 
being debated across the globe.   
¶91 Other states and nations are, at best, divided over 
whether to enforce such contracts because of the difficult 
public policy issues they present.  A recent law review article 
summarized the various approaches to surrogacy contracts from 
state to state as follows:   
There is no clear majority approach to surrogacy. 
There is not even a clear plurality approach. Some 
states permit and enforce a wide range of surrogacy 
contracts.  Some enforce only a limited subset of such 
contracts.  Many states have no law on the subject or 
refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts.  Three states 
not only refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts, but 
impose civil or criminal penalties on those arranging 
and entering into surrogacy contracts.4 
                                                 
4 Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other 
Means If Necessary:  The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce 
Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61 DePaul L. Rev. 799, 800 
(2012).  See generally Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 801-804 
n.35-46 (Conn. 2011) (collecting statutes and cases).  See 
majority op., ¶64 n.11. 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶92 Beyond the fact that there is no clear majority 
approach to surrogacy among the states that have acted, many 
states still have said virtually nothing on the topic.5  Among 
those 
that 
have 
acted, 
the 
legislative 
approach 
varies 
significantly from state to state.6       
¶93 Several state legislatures ban traditional surrogacy 
contracts, while others permit traditional surrogacy contracts 
under certain circumstances.  Some states differentiate between 
traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts.  In some states 
in which no statutes cover surrogacy contracts, courts have held 
                                                 
5 7 Williston on Contracts § 16.22 Surrogacy Agreements (4th 
ed. 2012).  See also Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's 
Maybe:"  A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their 
Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449 (2009). 
6 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-10A-34(c) (2013); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 25-218 (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-201(b) (West 
2013); D.C. Code § 16-402 (2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 63.212-
.213, § 742.15 (West 2011); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-20-1-1 to -3 
(West 2013); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 47/1 to /75 (West 
2010); Iowa Code Ann. § 710.11 (West 2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 199.590(4) (West 2012); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2713 (2012); 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 722.851-.863 (West 2013); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 25-21,200 (2012); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.045 (West 
2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 168-B:1 to B:32 (2013); N.Y. Dom. 
Rel. Law §§ 121-124 (McKinney 2010); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-18-
05, -08 (2011); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 160.751-.763 (Vernon 
2013); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (West 2012); Va. 
Code Ann. §§ 20-156 to -165 (West 2012); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 26.26.210-.260 (West 2013).  
See also 7 Williston on Contracts § 16.22 n.12 (4th ed. 
2012) (Surrogacy Agreements); Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of 
Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 
Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 353, Appendix 1 (2010-2011).  See 
generally Raftopol, 12 A.3d at 801-804 n.35-46 (collecting 
statutes and cases). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
7 
 
surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy.7   
¶94 Law review articles have tracked the status of 
surrogacy contracts around the world.8  Only a limited number of 
nations have explicitly addressed surrogacy by statute or 
through court 
rulings.9  Several countries have rejected 
movements to permit surrogacy within their countries.  Some 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 
1998); Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
8 See, e.g., Daniel Gruenbaum, Foreign Surrogate Motherhood:  
Mater Semper Certa Erat, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 475 (2012); Ailis L. 
Burpee, Note, Momma Drama:  A Study of How Canada's National 
Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia's Independent 
State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 305, 
309 (2008-2009); Austin Caster, Note, Don't Split the Baby:  How 
the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and 
Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 
10 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 477 (2010-2011); Sarah Mortazavi, Note, 
It Takes a Village to Make a Child:  Creating Guidelines for 
International Surrogacy, 100 Geo. L.J. 2249 (2012); Sasha N. 
Swoveland, Note, Surrogacy and Insurance:  The Call for 
Statutory Reform in Ohio, 26 J.L. & Health 143 (2013). 
9 For example, the United Kingdom, one of the more common 
surrogacy centers, has a uniform surrogacy law that employs an 
independent ethics committee to evaluate surrogacy requests on a 
case-by-case basis and recognizes parents through parental 
orders.  Parental rights are based on the welfare of the child.  
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (U.K.) 
(amended 
2008), 
available 
at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/1990/37/contents/enacted (last visited June 28, 2013).  
See Mortazavi, supra note 8, at 2270-71. 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
8 
 
countries that recognize surrogacy have legalized altruistic 
surrogacy but not commercial surrogacy.10       
¶95 These 
conflicting 
approaches 
have 
transnational 
implications, one result being that some American states with 
less restrictive or no laws on the issue have become interstate 
and international medical surrogacy tourism destinations.  It is 
estimated that over 1,400 babies are born in the United States 
each year for international parents with the assistance of a 
surrogate, sometimes American, sometimes foreign.11   
¶96 Thus, the present case is significant for people in 
Wisconsin and around the world.   
                                                 
10 In a commercial surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate and 
often a third party stand to gain financially from the birth of 
the child.  In contrast, an altruistic surrogacy arrangement may 
involve payment to the surrogate to cover expenses associated 
with the pregnancy and birth, but neither she nor a third party 
is paid a fee for the service itself.  See Burpee, supra note 8, 
at 309. 
For the Canadian law, see Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 
S.C. 
2004, 
c. 
2 
(Can.), 
available 
at 
http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/A-13.4.pdf (last visited June 28, 2013). 
11 Swoveland, supra note 8, at 164. 
The United States is second only to India in providing 
surrogates.  India, with no law on the issue, permits both 
commercial and altruistic surrogacy arrangements and has become 
a popular medical surrogacy tourism destination for couples 
seeking lower-cost surrogacy arrangements without being mired in 
red tape.  Mortazavi, supra note 8, at 2271-72; Kathleen Parker, 
Editorial, Surrogacy Exposed, Wis. State J., May 26, 2013, at 
E3.  See also Emanuella Grinberg, The highs and lows of foreign 
surrogacy, 
CNN 
Living 
(Mar. 
29, 
2012) 
available 
at 
http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/03/29/living/sacred-thread-foreign-
surrogacy/ (last visited June 28, 2013). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶97 As I see it, many public policy issues involving the 
traditional surrogate, the biological father, and the child may 
be at stake in a legal custody and physical placement dispute in 
which a surrogacy contract is implicated.12  Surrogacy contracts 
by their very nature focus on the interests of the signatories 
and the signatories' views of what is in the best interest of 
the child at the time the contract is executed.  See majority 
op., ¶1.  A court must view the legal custody and physical 
placement of a child, irrespective of the means of reproduction, 
through a wider lens, with emphasis on the best interest of the 
child, including the legal and constitutional rights of the 
child, at the time of the court proceedings.   
¶98 The 
public policy implications of a traditional 
surrogacy contract when the legal custody and physical placement 
of an existing child are at issue, as in the present case, 
include:  
• 
Public policy against baby-buying;13    
                                                 
12 For example, a dispute may arise when the surrogate or 
the intended parents seek an abortion.  See Elizabeth Cohen, 
Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN Health (Mar. 6, 
2013), 
available 
at 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/ 
surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html (last visited June 28, 
2013)  (Medical tests showed an abnormality of the fetus.  The 
agreement entered into in the State of Connecticut authorized 
the intended parents to determine whether an abortion would be 
performed; the surrogate refused an abortion and moved to a 
state that appeared to have laws more favorable to the 
surrogate's position.). 
13 In the first surrogacy case in the country, the New 
Jersey Court declared:  
We have found that our present laws do not permit the 
surrogacy contract used in this case.  Nowhere, 
however, do we find any legal prohibition against 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
10 
 
• 
Public policy against the exploitation of women;14 
• 
Statutes and case law relating to adoption, including 
terms of consent,15 termination of parental rights,16  
and the payment of funds;17 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
surrogacy 
when 
the 
surrogate 
mother 
volunteers, 
without any payment, to act as a surrogate and is 
given the right to change her mind and to assert her 
parental rights.  Moreover, the Legislature remains 
free to deal with this most sensitive issue as it sees 
fit, subject only to constitutional constraints.   
Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1264. 
Wisconsin statutes regulate payments regarding children.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 48.913 (allowing certain payments by 
proposed adoptive parents to birth parent); Wis. Stat. § 948.24 
(criminalizing payments for child placement and services not 
explicitly authorized by statute).  See majority op., ¶¶45, 53. 
14 The Michigan court of appeals explained the compelling 
state interests in prohibiting surrogacy contracts as follows: 
(1) preventing children from becoming mere commodities; (2) 
protecting the best interests of the child, because surrogacy 
arrangements focus solely on the parents' interests and desires; 
and (3) preventing the exploitation of women.  Doe v. Attorney 
Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
For a discussion of the advertising directed at prospective 
surrogates, the fees paid to them, the third parties who benefit 
from arranging surrogacy contracts, and the potential for 
exploiting poor women, see Kathleen Parker, Editorial, Surrogacy 
Exposed, Wis. State J., May 26, 2013, at E3 ("[W]e haven't 
scraped the surface of the metaphysical, spiritual, emotional, 
[and] 
psychological 
issues" 
that 
accompany 
the 
surrogacy 
business.). 
A simple Google search of "Wisconsin Surrogacy" turns up 
advertisements offering up to $50,000 for women to serve as 
surrogates.  
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
11 
 
• 
Statutes and case law governing legal custody and 
physical placement focusing on the best interests of 
the child.18 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Wisconsin 
has 
stringent 
requirements 
for 
voluntary 
consent to terminate parental rights that require a parent to 
appear in court or provide written consent in the presence of a 
judge, embassy, or consulate official.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.41.  
In adoption situations, a mother can withdraw her consent even 
after agreeing to give her child up for adoption.  Matter of 
Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 619, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980). 
16 Indeed the majority opinion strikes down a provision of 
the Parentage Agreement regarding the termination of parental 
rights on the ground that the Agreement violates Wisconsin 
statutes.  Majority op., ¶65. 
Other states have also declared surrogacy contracts or 
parts thereof invalid because they conflict with legislation 
governing adoption and the termination of parental rights, the 
public policy embodied in the statutes, and case law.  See Baby 
M., 537 A.2d at 1242-44. 
The California court of appeals refused to give effect to 
the terms of a traditional surrogacy agreement, holding that 
"enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract by itself is 
incompatible with the parentage and adoption statutes already on 
the books."  Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95.   
Compare these decisions refusing to enforce traditional 
surrogacy contracts with court decisions approving gestational 
surrogacy arrangements.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776 (Cal. 1993); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011); 
J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007).  
17 In New York, a surrogacy agreement was declared void and 
unenforceable because it violated the statutory prohibition 
against acceptance of compensation in exchange for the surrender 
of a child for adoption.  Matter of Adoption of Paul, 550 
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1990).  New York has since banned surrogacy 
contracts by statute.  N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 122-123 (McKinney 
2010). 
18 Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶99 In my opinion, when faced with a dispute relating to 
legal custody and physical placement of a child, a circuit court 
must carefully scrutinize the surrogacy contract to ensure that 
the contract does not contravene public policy.  I do not join 
the 
majority's 
overly 
broad 
holding 
that 
"a 
[Parentage 
Agreement] is a valid, enforceable contract unless enforcement 
is contrary to the best interests of the child."  Majority op., 
¶3 (emphasis added).    
II 
¶100 I turn now to the second issue, namely what rule of 
law the circuit court should apply to decide the legal custody 
and physical placement of the child in the present case.   
¶101 The majority opinion creates its own law, instructing 
circuit courts to enforce the Parentage Agreement unless 
enforcement is contrary to the best interests of the child.  
Majority op., ¶¶3, 4, 30, 31, 55, 69, 74, 75.19   
¶102 In contrast with the majority opinion, I would 
instruct the circuit court to adhere to the legislature's 
directions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am). 
 
This 
statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that no 
private surrogacy agreement concerning the custody of a child 
can be conclusive, because a judge must decide what is in best 
interest of child.  R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). 
19 The phrase "contrary to the best interest of the child" 
is not entirely new to Wisconsin statutes.  None of the statutes 
using the phrase applies to the present case.  The legislature 
seems to have given guidance to the courts in these statutes 
regarding what is contrary to the best interests of the child.  
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.365(2g)(b)3., 
48.977(2)(f), 
767.41(2)d)1., 767.80(2), 938.18(6) ("contrary to the best 
interests of the juvenile"). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
13 
 
explicitly governs a circuit court's determination of legal 
custody and physical placement of a child.   
¶103 The majority opinion deviates from the statute by 
boldly but erroneously asserting that this action is not an 
"action affecting the family."  Majority op., ¶43.   
¶104 On 
the 
contrary, 
the 
present 
case 
is, 
without 
question, "an action affecting the family" and is governed by 
Chapter 767 of the statutes.   
¶105 The statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.001, defines "action 
affecting the family" to mean an action to determine paternity, 
a custody action, and an action concerning physical placement, 
in addition to other actions.20  David Rosecky, the biological 
father (and not the husband of the biological mother) brought 
the instant case as a paternity action.  A paternity action 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.001, "Definitions," provides in 
relevant part: 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Action affecting the family" means any of the 
following actions: 
. . . . 
(e) Custody. 
. . . . 
(k) 
Concerning 
periods of physical placement or 
visitation rights to children, including an action to 
prohibit a move with or the removal of a child under 
s. 767.481(3)(c). 
. . . . 
(L) To determine paternity. 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
14 
 
protects a biological father's rights associated with the 
parentage of a child.  
¶106 David Rosecky had to have a court determination of 
paternity.  The Wisconsin statutes create a presumption that the 
husband of the birth mother (not David Rosecky) is the 
biological father of the child.   
¶107 According to the statutes, a husband is presumed to be 
the father of a child when the child is born during wedlock.21  
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 891.41 provides as follows: 
891.41. Presumption of paternity based on marriage of 
the parties. 
(1) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a 
child if any of the following applies: 
(a) He and the child's natural mother are or have been 
married to each other and the child is conceived or 
born after marriage and before the granting of a 
decree of legal separation, annulment or divorce 
between the parties. 
(b) He and the child's natural mother were married to 
each other after the child was born but he and the 
child's natural mother had a relationship with one 
another during the period of time within which the 
child was conceived and no other man has been 
adjudicated to be the father or presumed to be the 
father of the child under par. (a). 
(2) In a legal action or proceeding, a presumption 
under sub. (1) is rebutted by results of a genetic 
test, as defined in s. 767.001 (1m), that show that a 
man other than the man presumed to be the father under 
sub. (1) is not excluded as the father of the child 
and that the statistical probability of the man's 
parentage is 99.0% or higher, even if the man presumed 
to be the father under sub. (1) is unavailable to 
submit to genetic tests, as defined in s. 767.001 
(1m). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
15 
 
Furthermore, another statute provides that when a woman is 
artificially inseminated with semen donated by a man who is not 
her husband, the husband is deemed the natural father of the 
child (and the donor has no rights regarding the child).22  
Several cases implicating these statutes have come to Wisconsin 
                                                 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 891.40 provides as follows:  
891.40.  Artificial insemination 
(1) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician 
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is 
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man 
not her husband, the husband of the mother at the time 
of the conception of the child shall be the natural 
father of a child conceived.  The husband's consent 
must be in writing and signed by him and his wife.  
The physician shall certify their signatures and the 
date of the insemination, and shall file the husband's 
consent with the department of health services, where 
it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file 
except as provided in s. 46.03(7)(bm).  However, the 
physician's failure to file the consent form does not 
affect the legal status of father and child.  All 
papers and records pertaining to the insemination, 
whether part of the permanent record of a court or of 
a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, 
may be inspected only upon an order of the court for 
good cause shown. 
(2) The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a 
woman other than the donor's wife is not the natural 
father of a child conceived, bears no liability for 
the support of the child and has no parental rights 
with regard to the child. 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
16 
 
appellate courts to determine the paternity of a child born 
during a marriage.23   
¶108 David Rosecky's paternity petition asked the circuit 
court to determine that David Rosecky is the father of the child 
for all legal purposes, to direct the section of Vital 
Statistics for the State of Wisconsin to identify David Rosecky 
as the birth father of the child,24 and to determine that David 
Rosecky shall have legal custody and physical placement of the 
child.   
¶109 After the paternity action was filed, and as part of 
the paternity action, the parties stipulated that David Rosecky 
is the father of the child and that the surrogate mother's 
husband shall be excluded as the father of the child.   
¶110 In a paternity action, a circuit court may decide 
legal custody and physical placement of the named child.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.41(1)(b) provides that in rendering a 
judgment of paternity, "the court shall make provisions as it 
deems just and reasonable concerning the legal custody and 
physical placement of any minor child of the parties . . . " 
(emphasis added).  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.41(1) provides, inter 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, 270 
Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630 (husband filed for divorce seeking 
custody of child; wife counterclaimed challenging husband's 
paternity); In re Paternity of T.R.B., 160 Wis. 2d 840, 467 
N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1991) (single man filed paternity claim to 
child born to another man's wife); Strawser v. Strawser, 126 
Wis. 2d 485, 377 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1985) (on divorce, husband 
challenged paternity of children born during marriage). 
24 Birth certificates may be changed by the state registrar 
of vital statistics.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 69.01(24), 69.15(1).   
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
17 
 
alia, that "the question of a child's custody may be determined 
as an incident of any action affecting the family . . . ." 
¶111 Accordingly, 
Chapter 
767, 
which 
governs 
"actions 
affecting the family," governs the present case for at least 
three distinct reasons; the present case involves three actions 
affecting 
the 
family: 
custody, 
physical 
placement, 
and 
paternity.  Majority op., ¶13-14.  The Parentage Agreement 
itself supports the conclusion that the present case involves an 
action affecting the family, as the Agreement specifically 
includes "the parties' agreements as to parentage, legal 
custody, and physical placement."  Majority op., ¶10.  
¶112 Under Chapter 767, the legislature has directed that 
"in determining legal custody and periods of physical placement, 
the court shall consider all facts relevant to the best interest 
of the child (emphasis added)."  Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5)(am).  
"Child" is statutorily defined to mean an individual who has not 
attained 18 years of age.25  The individual whose paternity, 
custody, and placement are the subject of the present case has 
not attained 18 years of age.  The statutes governing paternity, 
legal custody, and placement govern all children; they do not 
differentiate among children on the basis of the reproductive 
methods used.  The majority opinion should not do so either.    
¶113 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.41(5)(am) has enumerated 16 
facts relevant in determining the best interest of the child.  
For purposes of analysis, these factors "can be grouped into 
four broad categories . . .: (1) factors that analyze the wishes 
                                                 
25 Wis. Stat. §§ 822.02(2); 767.01(2m).  
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
18 
 
of the parents and the child; (2) factors that analyze the 
stability and consistency of the parents' relationship with the 
child; (3) factors that focus on the physical and mental health 
of the parties and the children; and (4) factors that look at 
the behaviors of each party."26  
¶114 Section 767.41(5)(am) provides as follows: 
Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5) Factors in custody and physical 
placement 
determinations. (am) . . . in determining 
legal custody and periods of physical placement, the 
court shall consider all facts relevant to the best 
interest of the child. The court may not prefer one 
parent or potential custodian over the other on the 
basis of the sex or race of the parent or potential 
custodian. . . . [T]he 
court 
shall 
consider 
the 
following factors in making its determination: 
1. The wishes of the child's parent or parents, as 
shown by any stipulation between the parties, any 
proposed parenting plan or any legal custody or 
physical placement proposal submitted to the court at 
trial. 
2. The wishes of the child, which may be communicated 
by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem 
or other appropriate professional. 
3. The interaction and interrelationship of the child 
with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any 
other person who may significantly affect the child's 
best interest. 
4. The amount and quality of time that each parent has 
spent with the child in the past, any necessary 
changes to the parents' custodial roles and any 
reasonable life-style changes that a parent proposes 
to make to be able to spend time with the child in the 
future. 
                                                 
26 Thomas J. Walsh, In the Interest of A Child: A 
Comparative Look at the Treatment of Children Under Wisconsin 
and Minnesota Custody Statutes, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 929, 944 (2001-
2002) (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
19 
 
5. The child's adjustment to the home, school, 
religion and community. 
6. The age of the child and the child's developmental 
and educational needs at different ages. 
7. Whether the mental or physical health of a party, 
minor child, or other person living in a proposed 
custodial household negatively affects the child's 
intellectual, physical, or emotional well-being. 
8. The need for regularly occurring and meaningful 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
to 
provide 
predictability and stability for the child. 
9. The availability of public or private child care 
services. 
10. The cooperation and communication between the 
parties and whether either party unreasonably refuses 
to cooperate or communicate with the other party. 
11. Whether each party can support the other party's 
relationship with the child, including encouraging and 
facilitating frequent and continuing contact with the 
child, or whether one party is likely to unreasonably 
interfere with the child's continuing relationship 
with the other party. 
12. Whether there is evidence that a party engaged in 
abuse, as defined in s. 813.122(1)(a), of the child, 
as defined in s. 48.02(2). 
12m. Whether any of the following has a criminal 
record and whether there is evidence that any of the 
following has engaged in abuse, as defined in s. 
813.122(1)(a), of the child or any other child or 
neglected the child or any other child: 
a. A person with whom a parent of the child has a 
dating relationship, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(ag). 
b. A person who resides, has resided, or will reside 
regularly or intermittently in a proposed custodial 
household. 
13. Whether there is evidence of interspousal battery 
as described under s. 940.19 or 940.20(1m) or domestic 
abuse as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
20 
 
14. Whether either party has or had a significant 
problem with alcohol or drug abuse. 
15. 
The 
reports of appropriate professionals if 
admitted into evidence. 
16. Such other factors as the court may in each 
individual case determine to be relevant. 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶115 No one factor enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5) is 
necessarily determinative of custody, and the same combination 
of factors does not necessarily call for an identical answer in 
two different cases.27     
¶116 Significant 
for 
the 
present 
case 
is 
that 
the 
legislature has explicitly instructed a circuit court how to 
address agreements between parents and any legal or custody 
proposal submitted to the court.  The legislature envisaged 
agreements and proposals, and the legislature has directed 
courts to consider "the wishes of the child's parent or parents, 
as shown by any stipulation between the parties, any proposed 
parenting plan or any legal custody or physical placement 
proposal submitted to the court at trial."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am)1.  The legislature did not direct the courts to 
rubber stamp the proposal or order specific performance of an 
agreement relating to custody and physical placement, as David 
Rosecky requests.  Majority op., ¶13.  
¶117 I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit 
court in the present case erroneously exercised its discretion 
                                                 
27 King v. King (King II), 29 Wis. 2d 586, 590-91, 139 
N.W.2d 635 (1966).  
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
21 
 
by refusing to consider the Parentage Agreement.  I think such 
consideration is required by Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5).   
¶118 The majority opinion, however, does not require a 
circuit court to consider the other relevant enumerated factors 
in § 767.41(5) to determine the best interest of the child.  
Instead the majority opinion states a new rule: A circuit court 
is bound by a surrogacy contract "unless enforcement is contrary 
to the best interests of the child."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 4, 30, 
31, 55, 69, 74, 75. 
¶119 The majority opinion errs as a matter of law by not 
adhering to the statutory standard set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5).  The majority opinion errs as a matter of law by 
placing the surrogacy contract above, and to the exclusion of, 
all other factors the legislature has enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am) and above the best interest of the child.   
¶120 The best interest of the child is an organizing 
principle of Wisconsin family law.  See majority op., ¶62.  
According to our case law, "The legislature has clearly and 
repeatedly expressed the policy that courts are to act in the 
best interest of children."28  "The polestar [in a custody 
dispute] is the best interests of the children."29   
¶121 The legislature has made clear that "[t]he child's 
best interests transcend an agreement or stipulation of the 
                                                 
28 Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 682, 533 N.W.2d 419 
(1995). 
29 Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 148, 254 N.W.2d 198 
(1977). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
22 
 
parties."30  This court has long recognized that "the controlling 
question [in custody disputes] is not what the parties agreed to 
but what is in the best interest of the child."31  Our court has 
further explained the statutory relationship of an agreement of 
parties and the child's best interest as follows:   
While parents may stipulate as to custody, the 
agreement should not be approved by the court unless 
it insures and promotes the best interest of the 
children. . . . A 
contract 
between 
parents 
[in 
a 
custody dispute] should be given serious consideration 
by the court as it normally expresses what may be best 
for the child, nevertheless it does not bind the court 
or preclude a modification of a decree based thereon.32   
¶122 Although the majority opinion mentions Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5) and the best interest of the child standard in 
passing, see majority op, ¶62, it does not rely on § 767.41(5) 
or the best interest of the child standard.  Rather, it decides, 
for purposes of all surrogacy contracts, for all children, for 
all persons, and for all circumstances, that "the interests 
supporting enforcement of the [Parentage Agreement] are more 
compelling than the interests against enforcement."  Majority 
op., ¶61.  The majority opinion adopts its own formulation of a 
rule for determining custody and placement that directs circuit 
courts to follow the contract unless "contrary to the best 
                                                 
30 Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶72, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 
N.W.2d 85 (quoting Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis. 2d 690, 695, 
462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
31 King v. King (King I), 25 Wis. 2d 550, 555, 131 
N.W.2d 357 (1964). 
32 King I, 25 Wis. 2d at 555 (citing William T. Nelson, 
Divorce and Annulment § 15.21 at 268 (2d ed. rev. 1961); Miner 
v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 103. N.W.2d 4 (1960)). 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
23 
 
interests of the child," without explanation, discussion, or 
direction to the courts on how the rule should be applied.  
Majority op., ¶¶3, 75.  See also ¶¶4, 30, 31, 55, 69, 74.33    
¶123 So why doesn't the majority opinion adhere to Wis. 
Stat. § 767.41(5) in the present case?  This is a mandatory 
(shall) statute that is directly on point.   
¶124 The majority opinion explains that "surrogacy is not 
one of those enumerated" actions affecting the family, majority 
op., ¶43; surrogacy agreements are not explicitly addressed in 
Chapter 767 or in Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5); a surrogacy agreement 
does not present a typical custody case; "the law does not 
specifically 
address 
the 
legal 
issues 
presented 
in 
this 
surrogacy dispute," majority op., ¶55; and that some of the 
statutory factors enumerated in § 767.41(5) are difficult to 
apply.  Majority op., ¶¶43, 44, 45, 55.34    
¶125 This reasoning in the majority opinion justifying its 
disregarding Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5) is confusing, contradictory, 
and unpersuasive.  
                                                 
33 The guardian ad litem argued that the surrogacy contract 
should be presumptively enforceable as long as it is in the best 
interest of the child.  See majority op., ¶52. 
34 Presumably, the 16 factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5)(am) will have different levels of importance in each 
custody 
and 
physical 
placement 
case. 
 
Is 
the 
majority 
instructing us to ignore all of them because some or even many 
are "difficult to apply to the facts" of the specific case?  See 
majority op., ¶43.  Still, in ¶71, the majority points out that 
circuit 
courts 
have 
discretion 
to 
follow 
§ 767.41(5) 
to 
determine what is in the child's best interests.  How can ¶43 
and ¶71 be reconciled? 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶126 The present case is a paternity, child custody, and 
physical placement action; thus, it is "an action affecting the 
family" expressly governed by Chapter 767, including Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41(5).  The legislature has explicitly and in plain 
language directed courts how to address these actions, including 
parties' agreements about custody and placement.        
¶127 Simply because the words "surrogacy contract" or 
"Parentage Agreement" do not appear in Chapter 767 or Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.41 (5)(am) does not mean, as the majority opinion reasons, 
that the statute does not apply to legal custody and physical 
placement 
disputes 
that 
implicate 
a 
surrogacy 
contract.  
Majority op., ¶43.  The legislature is aware of alternative 
methods of reproduction and surrogacy, see majority op., ¶¶41, 
42, 
and 
has 
not 
excluded 
surrogacy 
agreements 
from 
the 
application of Chapter 767 or § 767.41(5).  Rather, the 
legislature explicitly anticipated that courts should consider 
parental agreements, without restricting such agreements to the 
reproductive method used or the title of the agreement.  
¶128 If a surrogacy contract should be treated differently 
than any other type of agreement, the legislature has not 
instructed the courts to take this distinction into account in 
exercising discretion under Wis. Stat. § 767.41(5). 
¶129 Absent specific statutory instructions that provide a 
different procedure for adjudicating legal custody and physical 
placement disputes when an alternative reproductive method and a 
surrogacy contract are implicated, the circuit courts of this 
state are, in my opinion, bound to follow the legislative 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
25 
 
directions for adjudicating legal custody and physical placement 
for all children set forth in Wis. Stat. § 767.41.   
¶130 The plain text of the current statutes applies to the 
present case.  Any change in the law and the procedure regarding 
actions 
involving 
paternity, 
legal 
custody, 
and 
physical 
placement of a child when an alternative reproductive method and 
a surrogacy contract are implicated should not be undertaken by 
this court.  Any change is a task best left to the legislature. 
¶131 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶132 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2011AP2166.ssa 
 
 
 
1