Title: Schlegel v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

238 Ind. 374 (1958)
150 N.E.2d 563
SCHLEGEL
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,564.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 15, 1958.
Rehearing denied June 18, 1958.
*376 Clarence E. Benadum, of Muncie, and Orville A. Pursley, of Hartford City, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
BOBBITT, J.
Appellant was charged by indictment with murder in the second degree under Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 350, p. 584, being § 10-3404, Burns' 1956 Replacement, tried by jury, convicted as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison.
Three questions are here presented for our consideration.
First: Appellant asserts that there is no evidence to establish the corpus delicti.
The coroner of Blackford County, Indiana, where the alleged crime was committed, testified that he was called on May 2, 1956, to go to the J & K Gravel Pit, a mile south of Royerton, Indiana, on State Road 3, where he saw two men in a boat searching for something on the bottom of the gravel pit; that these men found a two-toned brown Chevrolet automobile in which were two bodies  a man clothed in overalls, jacket, and a pair of high top shoes, and a woman clothed in a nightgown; and that these bodies were taken to Ball Memorial Hospital at Muncie, Indiana, where they were identified by appellant as being the bodies of Darrel Spade and his wife, Mary Spade. This witness further testified that he was present when an autopsy was performed and that he observed a gunshot *377 wound behind the right ear on Darrel Spade's skull, and that there was something that smelled like burned gun powder and searing around the wound; and, further, that deceased's jacket had been perforated and his suspender on the left side severed.
A physician and pathologist at Ball Memorial Hospital at Muncie testified that he was requested to perform an autopsy on Darrel and Mary Spade, and that he found wounds on Darrel Spade's left shoulder and neck and that his death was caused by "a shot that traversed his neck."
We believe this evidence is sufficient to show that the crime charged in the indictment herein was actually committed by someone.
Second: Appellant further asserts that the verdict is contrary to law because the evidence was insufficient to show that the shooting was done purposely and maliciously.
"... intent and purpose to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to produce death" and malice may be inferred from the use of the shotgun which caused the death as charged in the indictment herein. Pitts v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 168, 170, 171, 23 N.E.2d 673; Myles v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 129, 133, 124 N.E.2d 205.
There is substantial evidence in the record from which the jury could have found that the mortal wound was inflicted upon the deceased Spade by a deadly weapon in the hands of appellant, and from this malice and intent could have been inferred.
Third: Appellant further asserts that at the time he fired the shots he had reasonable cause to believe that *378 he was in great danger of receiving bodily harm or losing his life, and that he shot appellant in self-defense.
If the verdict herein is supported by substantial evidence of probative value it will not be disturbed on appeal.
There is evidence in the record from which the jury could have found that appellant lived with Darrel and Mary Spade, his brother-in-law and sister, on their farm; that on the night of April 24, 1956 appellant returned to the farm about 9:30 P.M.; that when he backed into the farm yard he saw what he thought was the deceased Darrel Spade "striking at an object" on the ground which he later learned was his sister Mary; that appellant walked toward Spade yelling at him, whereupon the deceased started toward appellant "yelling," "You're next;" and that appellant started running toward the northwest corner of the barn. The deceased then "stopped what he was doing" and started after appellant, and as he (appellant) "rounded the northwest corner of the barn," the doors to the entrance to the corn crib were open and he dodged behind the corn sheller which was sitting in the entrance to the corn crib.
A State police detective testified, as a witness for the State, concerning a conversation which he had with appellant in the presence of a deputy sheriff at the Spade home on May 2, 1956, in pertinent part, as follows:
The deputy sheriff who was present during the conversation above mentioned also testified as a witness for the State concerning this conversation, in pertinent part, as follows:
Appellant testified, on cross-examination, relative to the circumstances covered by the conversation above mentioned, as follows:
When danger of death or great bodily harm ceases, the right of self-defense ceases with it. 1 Warren on Homicide (Permanent Edition), § 156, p. 754.
Even if the first shot had been fired in self-defense, the second would not have been if it were fired when not necessary for appellant to further defend himself. Bange v. State, supra (1958), 237 Ind. 422, 146 N.E.2d 811; Meurer v. The State (1891), 129 Ind. 587, 29 N.E. 392; Chestnut v. State (1900), 112 Ga. 366, 37 S.E. 384; Caughron v. State (1911), 99 Ark. 462, 139 S.W. 315.
Appellant cites Flick v. State (1935), 207 Ind. 473, 193 N.E. 603, in support of his assertion that he killed the deceased Spade in self-defense. Since it is not pointed out in appellant's brief wherein the case cited supports his position, we must assume that he is relying upon the rule as stated at pages 476, 477 of 207 Ind., as follows:
This correctly states the rule of self-defense in Indiana, and the rule as there stated was affirmed in substance by this court recently in Bange v. State, supra (1958), 237 Ind. 422, 146 N.E.2d 811, 812.
We must then determine whether the rule as stated in Flick v. State, supra, and Bange v. State, supra, applies to the facts as disclosed by the record in this case.
The jury was not compelled to believe appellant's testimony that he shot the deceased in self-defense; and under the circumstances here, it was for them to determine from all the evidence whether it was reasonably necessary for appellant to fire the shots at the deceased in defense of himself.
The jury might reasonably have found from the evidence as set out above, that appellant fired the first shot at a time when he believed he was in danger of great bodily harm. It likewise could have found that the second shot was not necessary to appellant's further defense of himself.
By appellant's own testimony he was pursuing the deceased at the time the second shot was fired. If, as the State police officer and the deputy sheriff testified, the deceased was felled by the first shot and appellant rushed at him and fired the second shot while deceased was lying on the ground, it would seem that the danger of death or great bodily harm to appellant, if any, had ceased with the firing of the first shot and the right of self-defense ceased with it. The evidence here is sufficient to sustain such conclusion by the jury.
*385 There is sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to sustain its verdict and it is not within our power to weigh the evidence or to say what testimony the jury should have believed.
The burden was upon appellant to show reversible error. This he has failed to do and the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Emmert, C.J., Landis, Achor and Arterburn, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 150 N.E.2d 563.