Title: People v. Wilson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LESTER HARLAND WILSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S189373 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF079858 
 
 
June 8, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.   
 
1 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
S189373 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
Defendant Lester Harland Wilson tortured and killed Uwe 
Durbin.  In the process, he kidnapped Uwe1 and his family 
members and raped the girlfriend of Uwe’s brother.  A jury 
convicted him in 2000 of first degree murder, two counts of 
forcible rape, and enhancements for personal use of a firearm.2  
Finding true special circumstances for committing murder 
during a kidnapping and intentional infliction of torture,3 it set 
the penalty at death.  On appeal, the guilt judgment was 
affirmed.  The sentence was reversed, however, because a juror 
was improperly discharged during penalty deliberations.  
(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758 (Wilson).) 
 
Following a retrial in 2010, defendant was again 
sentenced to death.  We affirm this judgment. 
 
1  
Because Uwe and his brother Mike share a surname, we 
refer to them by their given names to avoid confusion. 
2 
Penal 
Code 
sections 187, 
subdivision (a), 
261, 
subdivision (a)(2), 12022.5. 
3  
Penal Code sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(B) and 
(a)(18).  All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Prosecution’s Aggravating Evidence 
 
1. Underlying Offenses and Special Circumstances 
 
Uwe Durbin was struggling financially in 1997 and lived 
at the homes of various friends.  He stayed for a time with 
defendant and his wife, Barbara Phillips.4  
 
Defendant suspected Uwe had stolen his television.  On 
the morning of June 8, 1997, defendant and Phillips went 
looking for Uwe at his brother’s apartment.  When Mike Durbin 
opened the door, defendant put a gun to his head and pushed his 
way inside.  Phillips followed.  Mike’s girlfriend, Lisa R., was 
there, along with their infant son and Lisa’s two older children.  
Defendant demanded to know where “his stuff” was and where 
he could find Uwe.  Mike did not know what he was talking 
about and did not reply.  
 
Still pointing the gun at Mike’s head, defendant ordered 
the entire family to leave with him.  Defendant and Mike got 
into Mike’s car; Lisa and the children joined Phillips in her car.  
As Mike pulled out of the carport, Uwe walked up.  Defendant 
jumped out and confronted Uwe about the television.  After Uwe 
denied all knowledge of it, defendant forced him into the 
backseat of Mike’s car.  The two cars were driven to defendant’s 
house.  
 
Everyone assembled in the living room, where defendant 
and Phillips demanded that their property be returned.  When 
 
4  
Defendant and Phillips were tried together but with 
separate juries.  She was convicted of first degree murder with 
kidnapping and torture special circumstances and a gun use 
enhancement, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 770, fn. 1.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
Uwe maintained he had taken nothing, defendant shot him in 
the knee.  Mike rose from the couch but stopped when defendant 
pointed the gun at him.  Mike asked if his family could go 
upstairs, which defendant permitted.  He then ordered Uwe into 
a nearby bedroom.  There, defendant beat him with his fists and 
a pair of gloves filled with size D-cell batteries.  He struck Uwe 
50 to 100 times on his face and body, refusing to stop until Uwe 
finally told him where to find the television. 
 
Defendant bound Uwe’s hands and legs with duct tape 
then left with Mike to reclaim the television.  Retrieval efforts 
were unavailing.  Defendant returned to the house, gave the gun 
to Phillips, then left again, leaving Phillips to guard the family.  
Mike asked Phillips to let them go, but she responded angrily 
that they were all going to die. 
 
Defendant returned with three men.  He rolled plastic 
sheeting over the bedroom floor and all four men took turns 
beating Uwe, hitting him with steel weights and choking him 
with a chain.  After about an hour, the men emerged laughing.  
They were covered in Uwe’s blood and dripping with sweat.  One 
of the men said Uwe and Mike’s family all had to die.  Lisa and 
Mike begged to be released, promising to pay for the television 
or give the men anything they wanted.  When Mike offered his 
life in exchange for his children’s freedom, he was brought into 
the room with Uwe and bound to a chair with duct tape.  Blood 
and tissue covered the walls and floor.  Uwe had been so severely 
beaten that he was unrecognizable.  He was still breathing and 
occasionally moaned in pain.  The men resumed the beating, 
forcing Mike to watch.  At one point Uwe was forced to drink 
urine from a cup.  Defendant brought his pit bull into the room, 
and, when the dog would not attack Uwe, defendant became 
angry and beat the animal with his fists.  He choked Uwe with 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
the dog’s collar and burned parts of Uwe’s midsection with a 
blowtorch. Someone poured bleach over the wounds.  Beyond an 
occasional moan, Uwe no longer reacted to the torment.  
 
The men said they were going to let Lisa go and brought 
her and the baby into the room to say goodbye.  Lisa and the 
children left with Nicole Thompson, a friend of the men 
assaulting Uwe.  While Lisa and the children were held at 
Thompson’s house, defendant arrived.  He took Lisa and the 
baby to a nearby park but would not let the other children join 
them.  Telling Lisa she “needed to give him some assurance that 
[she] wasn’t going to say anything,” defendant raped her.  He 
said her family would be released but “Uwe wasn’t going to be 
leaving.”  They picked up Lisa’s older children and returned to 
defendant’s house.  There, defendant and Phillips argued about 
how to proceed.  Phillips did not want to let Mike’s family leave, 
but defendant protested, “ ‘Well, what are we going to do with 
all these bodies?’ ”  Lisa heard the sound of a blowtorch and Uwe 
screaming. 
 
Defendant sent Mike away with Phillips to look for a 
bicycle.  By that point, the other men had left, and defendant 
was alone in the house with Lisa and the children.  He raped 
Lisa a second time, then ordered her to help move Uwe’s body, 
which was wrapped in plastic.  Uwe was still alive but not fully 
conscious.  He proved too heavy for defendant and Lisa to drag 
into the garage.  As they struggled with the body, Mike and 
Phillips returned.  Mike helped defendant put Uwe in the 
backseat of defendant’s car.  Defendant and Phillips discussed 
burying Uwe in the desert and using lye to dissolve the body.  
 
Phillips ordered Lisa to clean up bloodstains in the house.  
Defendant and Phillips then drove away with Uwe, telling Mike 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
and his family to leave in their own car.  Mike and Lisa 
ultimately called the police.  
 
The next morning, Uwe’s body was found in a concrete 
drainage ditch along the 91 freeway.  There were bloodstains on 
a guardrail and a length of bloody, knotted rope lay near the 
road’s shoulder.  Four .380-caliber bullet casings and one intact 
bullet were found near the body.  
 
A search of defendant’s house revealed numerous blood 
smears and drippings, bloody gloves, a roll of plastic sheeting, 
and torn pieces of duct tape.  There was a hole in the drywall 
surrounded by blood and hair, with a bottle of bleach nearby.  A 
half-empty box of .380 bullets was found inside a purse.  Several 
pieces of bloody cloth and bits of duct tape were found in 
defendant’s car, along with seven live .380-caliber rounds in the 
glove box.  
 
An autopsy revealed that Uwe’s body was riddled with 
injuries.  He had sustained multiple blunt force injuries to his 
face, head, and body.  His ribs, skull, jaw, nose, and other facial 
bones were fractured.  Teeth that had been knocked out were 
found loose in his mouth.  A ligature mark on his neck was 
consistent with strangulation by a chain.  A shoe imprint on his 
back was consistent with “stomping.”  It was also possible he 
was burned.  Uwe had been shot in the head five times at close 
range.  A .380-caliber bullet was extracted from his knee.  
 
2. Victim Impact 
 
Mike and Lisa’s relationship did not survive the trauma of 
the incident.  Mike became angry and abusive, suffering 
nightmares and replaying the events in his mind.  Lisa’s life 
went into a “downhill spiral” and was never the same after the 
incident.  Even ten years later and after two and a half years of 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
counseling, she still had nightmares and was afraid of people.  
The children were also traumatized.  The oldest child was 
removed from the home because he had violent episodes and ran 
around the house stabbing things with a knife.  Mike missed 
Uwe, his only brother.  
 
Uwe’s mother, Helga Durbin-Axt, described his childhood 
in West Germany.  Uwe had an older sister and was especially 
close to his brother Mike.  The family often gathered for a meal 
on Sundays.  Uwe had been in the United States for a year and 
a half but had decided to move back to Germany.  His murder 
was very difficult for the family.  They flew his body home for 
burial, but Helga was not allowed to look at him.  Mike was very 
affected by the crimes, and Helga was raising his son Matthew.  
She missed Uwe terribly.  
 
3. Prior Crimes 
 
Katri K. met defendant soon after she came to the United 
States from Finland in 1992.  She was 21 years old.  Once they 
began dating, she lived with defendant and his mother.  Katri 
and defendant had violent arguments during which he 
assaulted her.  During one argument, he choked her into 
unconsciousness.  After another violent quarrel, defendant hit, 
raped, and sodomized her.  The next day, a friend took Katri to 
the hospital, where she was interviewed by police.  Katri 
eventually returned to Finland.  
 
In 1996, a couple reported that their car had been shot at 
by someone in another car.  Both identified defendant as the 
shooter, but neither was willing to so testify.   
B. Defense’s Mitigating Evidence 
 
Defendant presented extensive evidence of his difficult 
upbringing.  He was conceived when his mother, Marsha, was 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
raped at age 12 or 13 by a family friend.  His father eventually 
married Marsha, had another child with her, and moved the 
family from Indiana to Los Angeles.  Defendant’s father 
physically abused Marsha, who frequently ran away with the 
children.  Once, his father choked Marsha and said she would 
not live to see 18.  She eventually divorced him and married 
defendant’s stepfather, Michael Woodson.  
 
Woodson was a criminal and a drug addict.  He and 
Marsha made money from credit card fraud, sometimes 
enlisting defendant to help them.  There were guns and drugs 
in the house.  When defendant was 10 or 11 years old, Woodson 
began beating him with his fists.  He was once jailed for 
domestic violence.  When defendant was a teenager, Woodson 
was accused of murder.  He was tried three times and ultimately 
acquitted.  Defendant was interviewed by the police and had to 
testify at Woodson’s trial.  
 
During this period, Marsha frequently sent her children to 
Indiana to be cared for by their grandparents.  As a result, 
defendant attended ten different schools in Los Angeles and was 
placed in special education classes due to his behavioral 
problems and difficulty reading.  His third-grade teacher 
reported that he had 21 absences, was frequently late, and did 
not get along with adults or other children.  Defendant also had 
trouble at the school in Indiana.  He was nervous and fidgety 
because he was worried about his mother being abused in his 
absence.  
 
Several children, both relatives and foster children, lived 
with defendant in his grandparents’ home.  They were 
disciplined severely for even minor transgressions.  Defendant’s 
grandmother whipped the children with various implements 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
and sometimes locked them in a small furnace room.  One child 
was forced to sit in the hallway with a urine-soaked sheet over 
her head and had her hand held to the furnace flame.  Another 
was hit on the head with a butcher knife.  A third was forced to 
eat on the floor.  
 
A substantial amount of penalty phase testimony 
described the misdeeds of defendant’s biological father, Lester 
Wilson, Sr. (Wilson), although it is unclear how much time 
defendant spent with him.  Defendant and his sister were not 
allowed to visit their father but sometimes skipped school and 
went to his house.  During one visit, Wilson got defendant 
drunk, then tried to molest defendant’s sister.  Wilson sexually 
abused one of defendant’s half-sisters when she was 12 and 
violently raped her when she was 16.  He sexually abused 
another half-sister, took her along on a drive-by shooting, and 
once appeared to kill a man in front of her.  He later went to 
prison for murdering a woman who was pregnant with his child.  
Defendant’s half-sister testified that Wilson had picked her up 
and taken her to a McDonald’s while the woman lay dead in the 
car.  
 
Several family members expressed love for defendant and 
stayed in contact with him while he was in prison.  His 
grandmother frequently sent photos of defendant’s 15-year-old 
daughter, whom she was raising.  The daughter often wrote and 
visited defendant in jail and prison.  He advised her to stay in 
school, pursue a career, and not repeat his mistakes.  A half-
brother, 25 years younger than defendant, described happy 
moments and testified that defendant helped him with reading 
and homework, drove him to football practice, and attended his 
games.  Defendant continued to give him advice from jail, 
serving as a kind of surrogate father.  Similarly, a half-sister, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
more than 20 years defendant’s junior, frequently sought his 
advice about life, parenting, and relationships.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Double Jeopardy  
 
Defendant contends this penalty retrial violated state and 
federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  The 
claim is contrary to settled law.  Because defendant’s original 
death judgment was reversed for legal error, and the reversal 
was not the equivalent of an acquittal, double jeopardy 
principles do not bar retrial. 
 
1. Background 
 
Defendant’s first jury returned a death verdict.  On 
automatic appeal, he argued the trial court erroneously 
dismissed a juror during penalty phase deliberations.  We 
agreed and reversed the penalty verdict while upholding the 
guilt judgment.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 842.)  Briefly 
stated, the facts concerning the penalty reversal are as follows.5 
 
Juror No. 5 was the only juror in the previous trial who, 
like defendant, was African-American.  (Wilson, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 813.)  He joined the unanimous jury in convicting 
defendant on all counts in the guilt phase.  (Ibid.)  During 
penalty phase deliberations, Juror No. 5 had initially leaned 
toward the death penalty but later announced he had changed 
his mind and favored a life sentence.  (Id. at p. 814.)  He became 
the sole holdout for life imprisonment.  (Ibid.)  The next day, 
Juror No. 1 sent the court a note accusing Juror No. 5 of 
 
5  
At defendant’s request, we have taken judicial notice of all 
filings in his prior appeal (S089623) and a related habeas corpus 
proceeding (S152074).   
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
misconduct for considering facts not in evidence, discussing the 
case with a juror before deliberations, telling other jurors they 
could not understand his position because they were not Black, 
and refusing to follow the court’s instruction that death is a 
penalty worse than life imprisonment.  (Id. at pp. 815–816.)  
After discussing the note with counsel, the court examined each 
juror individually then made a detailed ruling.  (Id. at p. 816.) 
 
First, although Juror No. 5 had said in voir dire that he 
would ignore race in reaching a decision, the court recalled that 
the juror’s demeanor was evasive.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 817.)  Second, the court credited Juror No. 1’s account of 
hearing Juror No. 5 say, after Mike’s guilt phase testimony, 
“ ‘ “How can you hold someone responsible for their actions?” ’ ” 
and “ ‘ “This is what you expect when you have no authority 
figure.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  Third, the court found that Juror No. 5 made 
a 
number 
of 
statements 
during 
penalty 
deliberations 
referencing race and asserting other jurors could not 
understand evidence about defendant’s background because 
they were not Black.  (Id. at p. 818.)6  Finally, although Juror 
No. 5 may have made statements to the contrary, the court was 
satisfied that the juror could follow the instruction stating death 
is a worse punishment than life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  (Ibid.)  Based on its factual findings, the 
court concluded Juror No. 5 had concealed his racial views in 
voir dire, prejudged the penalty decision without evidentiary 
 
6  
Statements attributed to Juror No. 5 included, for 
example:  “ ‘ “Black people don’t admit being abused” ’ ”; 
“ ‘ “Black kids have a different relationship with their 
fathers” ’ ”; and, regarding evidence of defendant’s childhood 
abuse, “ ‘ “I know . . . more went on than we were shown.” ’ ”  
(Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 818.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
basis, and improperly considered race and racial stereotypes in 
violation of the instructions.  (Id. at pp. 819–820.)  It dismissed 
the juror for misconduct.  (Id. at p. 820.) 
 
The next day, Juror No. 5 was replaced by an alternate, 
Juror No. 17.  Shortly after deliberations resumed, the jury sent 
a note informing the court that the new juror “ ‘is unable to give 
the death penalty’ ” and “ ‘feels very strongly about this.’ ”  
When questioned, Juror No. 17 explained that his views on the 
death penalty had changed over the course of the trial.  He now 
realized his “conscience and the law conflict,” making it 
impossible for him to vote for the death penalty.  His view was 
based not on the circumstances of this particular case but on his 
strongly held religious beliefs.  He explained that he had 
weighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence but found 
himself incapable of imposing the death penalty due to feelings 
grounded in his Catholic faith.  The court found him 
disqualified, excused him, and replaced him with another 
alternate.  The next day, the jury returned a verdict fixing the 
penalty at death.  
 
We concluded the trial court erred in dismissing Juror 
No. 5.  The record did not establish that the juror had 
intentionally concealed information, and any unintentional 
concealment of his views did not render him unable to perform 
his duty as a juror.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 823–824.)  
“Juror No. 5’s particular view of the evidence, refracted through 
the prism of his own experience as an African-American man 
who had raised a son, showed neither a refusal to deliberate nor 
an inability to perform his duty as a juror to a demonstrable 
reality.”  (Id. at p. 824.)  Nor did the juror improperly rely on 
facts not in evidence.  Rather, he merely relied “on his life 
experiences to interpret the evidence presented.”  (Id. at p. 825.)  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
Interpreting evidence based on a juror’s own life experiences, we 
explained, is not misconduct in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial.  (Id. at pp. 830–831.)  Finally, the record demonstrated 
that Juror No. 5 could follow an instruction to treat death as the 
most severe penalty (id. at pp. 834–836) and did not establish 
that the juror had prejudged the penalty question (id. at 
pp. 840–841).  Although discharging Juror No. 5 did not affect 
the guilt verdict, it required reversal of the penalty judgment.  
(Id. at pp. 841–842.)  This disposition rendered it unnecessary 
for us to address defendant’s claim that the court also erred in 
dismissing Juror No. 17.  (Id. at p. 841, fn. 19.) 
 
After the remittitur issued, defendant filed a motion 
asserting that constitutional double jeopardy principles barred 
the prosecution from retrying the penalty phase.  The trial court 
denied the motion based on People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 1 (Hernandez), which it found to be controlling.  
 
2. Discussion 
 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)  
To the same effect, the California Constitution declares that 
“[p]ersons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same 
offense.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Although the California 
double jeopardy clause may provide greater protection than the 
Fifth Amendment in some circumstances (see, e.g., People v. 
Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 692), the California provision is 
generally interpreted consistently with its federal counterpart 
absent cogent reasons for a departure.  (See id. at pp. 686–687; 
People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 588 (Eroshevich).)  
We need not defer to federal decisions, however, when the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
United States Supreme Court has not yet decided the parallel 
question under the federal Constitution.  (See People v. Buza 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 686.) 
 
“At its core, the double jeopardy clause ‘protect[s] an 
individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and 
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.’  
(Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 
78 S.Ct. 221].)  The policy underlying the double jeopardy 
protection ‘is that the State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual . . . thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 
state of anxiety and insecurity.’  (Id. at p. 187.)”  (Eroshevich, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 588.) 
 
Whether double jeopardy principles bar a second 
prosecution depends on how the first trial ended.  “An acquittal 
is accorded special weight.”  (United States v. DiFrancesco 
(1980) 449 U.S. 117, 129 (DiFrancesco).)  “The constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a 
second trial following an acquittal” (Arizona v. Washington 
(1978) 434 U.S. 497, 503), because permitting a second trial, 
“however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present 
an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly 
superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that ‘even 
though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ”  (United States v. 
Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 91 (Scott).) 
 
The result may be different if the first trial ends in a 
conviction that is later overturned.  “It has long been settled . . . 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition against 
successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction 
set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of 
some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.”  (Lockhart 
v. Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 38 (Lockhart); see DiFrancesco, 
supra, 449 U.S. at p. 131; United States v. Jorn (1971) 400 U.S. 
470, 484 (Jorn).)  Two policy considerations underlie this rule.  
First, “society would pay too high a price ‘were every accused 
granted immunity from punishment because of any defect 
sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings 
leading to conviction.’ ”  (Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 40.)  
Second, requiring retrial after a reversal on appeal “is not the 
type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.”  (Ibid.; see Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 91.)  
California courts have identified an additional rationale:  “By 
seeking reversal of a judgment of conviction on appeal, ‘ “[i]n 
effect, [a defendant] assents to all the consequences legitimately 
following such reversal, and consents to be tried anew.” ’ ”  
(Eroshevich, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 591.)  If the appeal of a 
conviction is successful, “retrial simply ‘affords the defendant a 
second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment’ and does not 
violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.”  
(People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 274 (Hatch); see 
Lockhart, at p. 42.)  Permitting a retrial under these 
circumstances provides a defendant with the fair trial to which 
he is entitled, unaffected by the prejudicial error that tainted 
the original proceedings. 
 
A settled exception to this rule permitting retrial after a 
successful appeal occurs when a conviction has been reversed 
due to insufficiency of the evidence.  (DiFrancesco, supra, 449 
U.S. at p. 131; see Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16.)  
“When the evidence is legally insufficient, it means that ‘ “the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even 
been submitted to the jury.” ’ ”  (Eroshevich, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 591.)  But the high court has stressed that “a reversal based 
solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different 
implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal 
based on . . . ordinary ‘trial errors.’ ”  (Lockhart, supra, 488 U.S. 
at p. 40.)  “While the former is in effect a finding ‘that the 
government has failed to prove its case’ against the defendant, 
the latter ‘implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant,’ but is simply ‘a determination that [he] has 
been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in 
some fundamental respect.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
In Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1, we considered how 
these principles apply when a conviction has been reversed due 
to the improper discharge of a seated juror.  Near the end of 
Hernandez’s trial for child sexual abuse, a juror told the court 
she was “bothered” by the prosecutor’s tone in cross-examining 
a defense witness and believed the prosecutor and judge had 
been “smirking or making faces” during the witness’s testimony.  
(Id. at p. 4.)  She said she could be fair but expressed 
disappointment with “ ‘certain aspects’ of the trial.”  (Ibid.)  
Based on these remarks and the juror’s “ ‘body language,’ ” the 
trial court determined the juror could not be fair to the People 
and discharged her from the panel.  (Ibid.)  The juror was 
replaced with an alternate and Hernandez was convicted.  
(Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal reversed.  It concluded removing the 
juror was akin to granting an unnecessary mistrial, thus 
implicating double jeopardy principles.  (Id. at pp. 4–5; see 
Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 717.) 
 
We granted review and disagreed with the Court of 
Appeal’s double jeopardy holding.  (Hernandez, supra, 30 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Cal.4th at p. 6.)  Our analysis began with the general rule that 
“the double jeopardy guarantee imposes no limitation on the 
power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in having his 
conviction set aside on appeal on grounds other than 
insufficiency of evidence.”  (Ibid.)  If sufficient evidence exists to 
support a conviction, we noted, retrial does not oppress the 
defendant but provides a renewed opportunity for the defendant 
to obtain a fair trial free from error.  (Id. at p. 7; see Lockhart, 
supra, 488 U.S. at p. 42.)  Moreover, as the high court had 
observed in DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at page 131 and 
United States v. Tateo (1964) 377 U.S. 463, 466 (Tateo), “it would 
be a ‘ “high price indeed for society to pay” ’ if reversible trial 
errors resulted in immunity from punishment.”  (Hernandez, at 
p. 8.) 
 
Policy concerns raised by Hernandez and the Court of 
Appeal did not support a departure from this rule.  Cases 
discussing a defendant’s “ ‘valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal’ ” (Crist v. Bretz (1978) 437 
U.S. 28, 36 (Crist)) simply concerned the rule that jeopardy 
attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn (see id. at p. 35).  
Other cited cases considered the double jeopardy consequences 
of granting an unnecessary mistrial (see Stone v. Superior Court 
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 516, abrogated in part by Blueford v. 
Arkansas (2012) 566 U.S. 599).  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
at p. 8.)  The cited cases did not stand for the broad “proposition 
that [a] defendant becomes immune from further prosecution 
merely because one particular juror is improperly discharged, 
an alternate substituted, and an actual verdict duly entered.”  
(Ibid.)  An alternate juror is, after all, part of the same jury 
selected by the defendant.  (Id. at p. 9.)  Thus, even if it is 
unauthorized, substitution of a regular juror with an alternate 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
does not deprive the defendant of his chosen jury.  (Ibid.)  Nor 
were we persuaded that the discharge of Hernandez’s juror gave 
the prosecution “any concrete advantage” (ibid.), considering the 
juror’s assurances that she could be fair to both sides.  Finally, 
we discounted the Court of Appeal’s fear that, absent a bar to 
retrial, the discharge of jurors sympathetic to the defense 
“ ‘could become routine.’ ”  (Id. at p. 10.)  The concern was “both 
unrealistic and unfair,” we noted, because it presumed trial 
judges would concur in such discharges and expose their 
judgments to routine reversals.  (Ibid.) 
 
Accordingly, we held that “error in discharging a juror 
should be treated no differently from any other trial error leading 
to reversal on appeal, such as prejudicial instructional or 
evidentiary error or ordinary prosecutorial misconduct.”  
(Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 10, italics added.)  In view 
of the clear and settled law “that, as a general rule, errors other 
than insufficiency of evidence do not preclude retrial following 
reversal of conviction” (ibid.), we concluded double jeopardy 
principles did not bar retrial (id. at p. 11).  A concurrence by 
Justice Werdegar urged a narrow construction of this holding.  
She observed that the double jeopardy consequences of the error 
might have differed “had the trial court dismissed more than a 
single juror, had it not replaced the discharged juror with a 
sworn alternate, had the court reopened voir dire and permitted 
additional peremptory challenges, or had the court’s purpose in 
discharging the juror been to influence the verdict.”  (Id. at p. 13 
(conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) 
 
We have not previously addressed whether Hernandez 
applies to retrial following the improper discharge of a juror 
from the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Forty years before 
Hernandez, People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
disapproved in part in People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 
held that the erroneous dismissal of a juror during a capital 
trial’s penalty phase warranted reversal.  Although mindful of 
the time and expense a new penalty trial would likely involve, 
we remanded with specific directions that such a retrial be 
conducted.  (Hamilton at p. 138.)  The issue of double jeopardy 
was not raised or addressed, however.  More recently, People v. 
Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432 held that the improper removal 
of a juror during guilt phase deliberations of a capital trial 
warranted reversal of the entire judgment.  Citing Hernandez, 
this court held unanimously and unequivocally:  “There is no 
double jeopardy bar to retrial of the case” (id. at p. 454), under 
either the federal or state constitutions (id. at p. 460).  
 
We now make explicit what was implicit in Armstrong’s 
holding:  As a general rule, the erroneous discharge of a capital 
juror is no different from any other trial error warranting 
reversal of judgment, and double jeopardy protections impose no 
obstacle to retrial.  (See Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 10.)  
Unlike a reversal for insufficiency of the evidence, the erroneous 
removal of a single juror cannot be analogized to an acquittal.  
Retrial of the penalty phase after such an error does not place 
the defendant twice in jeopardy; rather, it provides a second 
opportunity for a trial free from prejudicial error.  (See Hatch, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 274.) 
 
Defendant urges us to depart from Hernandez, either in 
all capital cases or in his particular circumstances.  The 
arguments are unpersuasive. 
 
Defendant first broadly asserts Hernandez’s holding 
should not extend to penalty retrials.  His suggestion that 
double jeopardy protections apply with different or greater force 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
in capital cases is belied by United States Supreme Court 
precedent, however.  Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430, 
439 confirmed that the double jeopardy clause applies to capital-
sentencing proceedings that “have the hallmarks of the trial on 
guilt or innocence.”  In this context, a verdict of life 
imprisonment signifies that the jury has found that the 
predicate for imposing a death sentence has not been 
established.  “A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt is, of 
course, absolutely final.  The values that underlie this principle 
. . . are equally applicable when a jury has rejected the State’s 
claim that the defendant deserves to die.”  (Id. at p. 445.)  In that 
event, the jury’s rejection of the state’s case for the death penalty 
is the functional equivalent of an acquittal on the state’s 
separate charge that the death penalty is called for.  However, 
the double jeopardy bar to retrial applies only if the “first life 
sentence was an ‘acquittal’ based on findings sufficient to 
establish legal entitlement to the life sentence.”  (Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S. 101, 108 (Sattazahn).)  In 
Sattazahn, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 
accordance with a Pennsylvania statute requiring such a 
disposition when his jury deadlocked at the penalty phase.  (Id. 
at pp. 103–104.)  After his murder conviction was reversed on 
appeal, he was retried and sentenced to death.  (Id. at p. 105.)  
Sattazahn asserted double jeopardy precluded the imposition of 
this more severe sentence in the second trial, but the high court 
disagreed.  It stressed that “the touchstone for double-jeopardy 
protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there 
has been an ‘acquittal,’ ” and neither the first jury’s deadlock on 
penalty nor the trial judge’s entry of a life sentence in 
accordance with the Pennsylvania statute constituted an 
acquittal.  (Id. at p. 109.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
 
Here, defendant’s first penalty trial did not result in an 
acquittal or its equivalent.  He was sentenced to death.  When 
the death penalty has been imposed, reversal of that judgment 
on appeal generally does not bar retrial unless the reviewing 
court determines the evidence was “legally insufficient to justify 
imposition of the death penalty.”  (Poland v. Arizona (1986) 476 
U.S. 147, 157.)  Reversal of the penalty judgment in defendant’s 
first automatic appeal was not based on insufficient evidence.  
Instead, we reversed because of the erroneous excusal of a juror.  
(Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 841–842.)  That reversal was 
not the equivalent of an “acquittal” for double jeopardy 
purposes.  (See Poland, at p. 157.)  Because neither the jury nor 
this court “acquitted” defendant in his first trial, double 
jeopardy did not bar his retrial.  (See Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. 
at p. 109.) 
 
Ignoring these authorities or dismissing their relevance, 
defendant argues various policy and practical considerations 
counsel against extending Hernandez to penalty retrials.  He 
notes that cases limiting double jeopardy protections have 
typically stressed the high cost to society if trial errors could 
result in a defendant’s complete immunity from punishment.  
(See, e.g., DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 131; Hernandez, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 8.)  Barring penalty retrials would not 
allow capital defendants’ conduct to go unpunished, defendant 
observes, because they would still have to serve a life sentence.  
But it is settled that the law considers the death penalty to be a 
more severe punishment than life in prison.  (See Woodson v. 
North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 (Woodson); People v. 
Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 362.)  Under defendant’s broad 
notion of double jeopardy, any reversible trial error in the 
penalty phase would automatically render a defendant immune 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
from the death penalty.  This result finds no support in either 
California or federal law.  Some states, like Pennsylvania, 
prohibit a penalty retrial when the first jury cannot reach a 
verdict.  Of course, they are free to do so, but California has not 
adopted such a policy. 
 
Defendant also cites the practical impediments to penalty 
retrials, but these complaints suffer from the same shortcoming.  
Defendant observes that, due to delays inherent in the appellate 
process, penalty retrials will typically occur several years after 
the original trial.  Memories may fade; witnesses may become 
unavailable; evidence may be lost or destroyed.  Conversely, 
retrial gives the prosecution an opportunity to present “new or 
better evidence” in support of its position.  For example, 
defendant notes, a new forensic pathologist testified in his 
second penalty trial about signs that Uwe may have been 
burned with a blowtorch, contrary to expert testimony in the 
first trial.  Finally, defendant urges that barring penalty retrials 
would bring closure to victims and financial savings to the 
criminal justice system.  Yet these arguments apply to all 
retrials after reversal of a judgment on appeal.  There will 
always be a period of delay, and the resulting difficulties with 
witnesses and evidence are likely to impact the prosecution as 
well as the defense.  The defense also has the same opportunity 
as the prosecution to marshal new and favorable evidence.  And, 
while barring retrials would more expeditiously end criminal 
proceedings, these benefits have never been considered 
sufficient to make society pay the “high price” of reducing or 
eliminating a statutorily prescribed punishment due to trial 
errors.  (Tateo, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 466.) 
 
Defendant posits two additional reasons for distinguishing 
Hernandez.  Whereas the dismissed juror in Hernandez did not 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
obviously favor the defense and said she “was . . . ‘committed to 
being fair’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 10), Juror No. 5 
was the lone holdout for life imprisonment.  Defendant contends 
discharging him gave the prosecution a clear advantage.  That 
is so, and that is why the penalty verdict was reversed.  But the 
cases are indistinguishable on the point in question.  In each, 
the removal of a juror was prejudicial error, and the remedy was 
the same:  reversal, with a remand for a new trial. 
 
Additionally, defendant notes that only one juror was 
dismissed in Hernandez, whereas the trial court dismissed two 
jurors in his prior trial.  He attaches significance to this 
difference 
because 
Justice 
Werdegar’s 
concurrence 
in 
Hernandez stated the double jeopardy result might have been 
different if, inter alia, “the trial court [had] dismissed more than 
a single juror.”  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 13 (conc. 
opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  Read in context, however, it is clear this 
statement was meant to contrast the removal of a single juror 
with the more problematic situations in which multiple jurors 
are improperly discharged or an empaneled juror is replaced 
with someone from the venire rather than a sworn alternate.  
(See id. at pp. 12–13.)7  Here, as in Hernandez, the court 
dismissed a single juror and replaced him with a sworn 
 
7  
The concurrence posited that different scenarios might 
produce different double jeopardy consequences.  It observed:  
“Retrial would of course be prohibited if defendant’s entire 
chosen jury of 12 persons had been improperly discharged 
against his wishes.  Does the same rule apply if only a single 
juror is improperly discharged?”  (Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
at p. 12 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).)  While finding it 
unnecessary to make a global pronouncement, the concurrence 
went on to consider a circumstance in which the replacement 
juror was not drawn from among the sworn alternates.  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
alternate.  Almost immediately, that alternate, Juror No. 17, 
was dismissed for reasons unrelated to the dismissal of Juror 
No. 5.  The seat was then filled with another sworn alternate.  
Defendant spends considerable effort arguing that the discharge 
of Juror No. 17 was error, but we did not reach that question in 
defendant’s prior appeal and need not reach it now.  Even if the 
court had erred a second time in discharging Juror No. 17, the 
remedy would have been the same.  Defendant was entitled to 
reversal of the judgment, an outcome he received.  No authority 
suggests double jeopardy bars retrial if the trial court commits 
more than one reversible error.  Moreover, because “an alternate 
juror, even if improperly seated, is part of the same jury chosen 
by the defendant” (Hernandez, at p. 9), the substitution of a new 
alternate for Juror No. 17 did not deprive defendant of his 
“ ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal’ ” (Crist, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 36). 
 
Finally, defendant asserts double jeopardy protections 
barred retrial because “the trial court manipulated the penalty 
phase jury to ensure a death verdict.”  The court below impliedly 
rejected this claim when it denied defendant’s plea of once in 
jeopardy.  Substantial evidence supports that finding.  The court 
in defendant’s first trial undertook a careful and thorough 
inquiry of the entire panel before dismissing Juror No. 5 (see 
Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 816–822) and questioned Juror 
No. 17 at length before determining he was unqualified to serve 
for an unrelated reason (see ante, at pp. 11−12).  Assuming 
judicial misconduct of this nature could trigger a double 
jeopardy bar to retrial (see Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 485, fn. 12 
[reserving this possibility]), we defer to the trial court’s implied 
factual finding that no such misconduct occurred.  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
B. Due Process  
 
Defendant separately contends the penalty retrial violated 
due process because it failed to satisfy the heightened reliability 
required of capital cases.  (See Woodson, supra, 428 U.S. at 
p. 305.)  A similar claim was raised in Sattazahn, and the high 
court rejected it as “nothing more than [the] double-jeopardy 
claim in different clothing.”  (Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at 
p. 116.)  The same is true here. 
 
Defendant offers no support for his assertion that the 
penalty retrial deprived him of a fair opportunity to challenge 
the prosecution’s case or assert his own position that death was 
an inappropriate penalty in his particular circumstances.  
Defendant was aware of the prosecution’s strategy from the first 
trial; he was represented by the same attorney in both cases; he 
had adequate time to prepare; and he presented a robust 
mitigation defense through multiple witnesses. 
 
Rather than pointing to any deficiency in the retrial 
proceeding, defendant instead renews his complaint that the 
court in his first trial erred by dismissing the alternate (Juror 
No. 17) called to replace Juror No. 5.  But defendant “already 
has been afforded a new penalty phase trial free from such 
error,” and that is the judgment now before us.  (People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1207.)  As discussed, the 
discharge of Juror No. 17 did not deprive defendant of his chosen 
jury because the juror was replaced with another sworn 
alternate.  Attempting to shoehorn his facts into one of the 
possible double jeopardy exceptions noted in Justice Werdegar’s 
Hernandez concurrence, defendant claims the discharge of Juror 
No. 17 “was remarkably similar to reopening voir dire.”  (See 
Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 13 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
J.).)  But that assertion is belied by the facts.  The court did not 
reopen voir dire, nor did it grant or permit the use of any extra 
peremptory challenges.  It simply discharged a juror who found 
it “impossible” to impose the death penalty and seated another 
sworn alternate.  Any error the court may have made in 
discharging Juror No. 17 was remedied by our reversal of 
defendant’s first death judgment. 
 
Retrial of the penalty phase did not violate double 
jeopardy, and defendant has failed to support a due process 
claim.  Like the United States Supreme Court, “[w]e decline to 
use the Due Process Clause as a device for extending the double 
jeopardy protection to cases where it otherwise would not 
extend.”  (Dowling v. United States (1990) 493 U.S. 342, 354; see 
People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 244.) 
C. Counsel’s Conflict of Interest  
 
Defendant claims the court erred in failing to inquire 
about defense counsel’s conflict of interest upon learning that 
defendant had raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
a pending habeas corpus petition.  He also faults the court for 
failing to explore whether he wanted to obtain substitute 
counsel.  We conclude both claims lack merit on this record. 
 
Michael Belter represented defendant in his first trial.  A 
county agency that secures counsel for indigent defendants 
arranged for Belter to represent defendant in the retrial and 
sought his appointment.  The court observed it would be sensible 
for Belter to handle the case again, and the prosecution agreed 
it would be the most efficient way to proceed.  Advised of the 
impending appointment, defendant wanted to see Belter and 
requested a transfer to the Riverside jail to facilitate their 
meetings.  When the court asked if appointing Belter and 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
cocounsel Christopher Harmon would be agreeable to 
defendant, he responded, “Well, I can’t really say nothing ’til 
they show up.”  At the next hearing on January 9, 2009, the 
parties discussed scheduling a trial readiness conference.  The 
court asked if defendant had been able to meet with Belter, and 
defendant said, “Yes, actually, I have an objection to Mr. Belter.  
But since he’s not here, I really don’t want to raise it.”  The court 
responded that defendant could “take that up with counsel or 
wait until the next hearing.”  
 
Belter made his first appearance for defendant six weeks 
later, on February 20, 2009, at a trial readiness conference.  
Belter advised the court that defendant had filed a habeas 
corpus petition related to his first trial and that petition was 
pending in this court.  Belter wanted to meet with appellate and 
habeas counsel before proceeding further.  Defendant 
apparently attempted to speak at that point because the court 
interrupted itself to say:  “You need to talk to your attorney, sir, 
before you address the Court.”  The record does not indicate 
whether defendant spoke to Belter or cocounsel Harmon, but 
Belter next responded:  “Mr. Wilson — he’s conferred with me 
this morning.  He wants the Court to be aware that there are 
pending issues with respect to the guilt phase of his case, 
competency of trial counsel in that proceeding, and other issues.  
And those are in the habeas petition that is still pending before 
the Supreme Court.”  
 
At the next hearing, Belter noted that, although the 
penalty phase issues raised in defendant’s habeas corpus 
petition had been mooted by our decision reversing the penalty 
judgment, issues related to the guilt phase remained 
unresolved.  He was reluctant to proceed with trial before 
obtaining a decision on these claims.  After some discussion, the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
parties settled on a trial date in January 2010.  That date was 
later continued for various reasons, including to permit 
resolution of the pending habeas corpus petition.  Defendant’s 
petition raised 29 claims, four of which alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial.  The petition 
was denied on June 30, 2010.  Jury selection in defendant’s 
retrial began on October 13, 2010.  
 
Beyond his inchoate objection before Belter appeared on 
his behalf, defendant made no explicit request to discharge his 
attorney or to have a new attorney appointed.  He now contends 
the trial court was on notice that Belter had a conflict of interest 
and its failure to inquire about the conflict requires reversal.  We 
find no reversible error. 
 
“A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the 
assistance of counsel by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California 
Constitution.  This constitutional right includes the correlative 
right to representation free from any conflict of interest that 
undermines counsel’s loyalty to his or her client.  [Citations.]  ‘It 
has long been held that under both Constitutions, a defendant 
is deprived of his or her constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel in certain circumstances when, despite the physical 
presence of a defense attorney at trial, that attorney labored 
under a conflict of interest that compromised his or her loyalty 
to the defendant.’  [Citation.]  ‘As a general proposition, such 
conflicts “embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty 
to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his 
responsibilities to another client or a third person or his own 
interests.  [Citation.]” ’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 
417.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
 
“Under the federal Constitution, prejudice is presumed 
when counsel suffers from an actual conflict of interest.  (Cuyler 
v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335 [64 L.Ed.2d 333, 100 S.Ct. 
1708].)  This presumption arises, however, ‘only if the defendant 
demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting 
interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.” ’  (Strickland v. Washington 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052], 
quoting Cuyler, at p. 348.)  An actual conflict of interest means 
‘a conflict that affected counsel’s performance — as opposed to a 
mere theoretical division of loyalties.’  (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 
535 U.S. 162, 171 [152 L.Ed.2d 291, 122 S.Ct. 1237], italics 
omitted.)  Under the federal precedents, which we have also 
applied to claims of conflict of interest under the California 
Constitution, a defendant is required to show that counsel 
performed deficiently and a reasonable probability exists that, 
but for counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 254, 309–310.) 
 
When the trial court knows, or reasonably should know, of 
the possibility that defense counsel has a conflict of interest, it 
has a duty to inquire into the matter.  (Wood v. Georgia (1981) 
450 U.S. 261, 272; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836.)  
Defendant claims the court was put on notice about the 
possibility of a conflict because he voiced “an objection” to Belter 
at a pretrial hearing before Belter’s first appearance.  But 
defendant declined to pursue the matter further.  He did not 
specify what that objection was, or the basis for it.  There was 
no reason for the court to presume it had anything to do with a 
potential conflict of interest. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
 
Defendant also asserts the court should have become 
aware of a potential conflict because it was told defendant had 
a habeas corpus petition pending that alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims from his first trial.  We need not 
resolve whether the existence of pending ineffective assistance 
claims was sufficient to put the court on notice of a potential 
conflict.  Even assuming the court should have inquired about a 
potential conflict, defendant fails to show prejudice.  “ ‘When a 
defendant claims that a trial court’s inquiry into a potential 
conflict was inadequate, the defendant still must demonstrate 
the impact of the conflict on counsel’s performance.’  [Citations.]  
‘Absent a demonstration of prejudice, we will not remand to the 
trial court for further inquiry.’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 
49, 64; see People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1071.) 
 
To demonstrate a prejudicial conflict of interest, a 
defendant must show that defense counsel was burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s 
performance.  (Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 171; 
People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 435.)  “When determining 
whether counsel’s performance was ‘ “adversely affected” ’ by 
the purported conflict under this standard, we consider whether 
‘ “counsel ‘pulled his punches,’ i.e., whether counsel failed to 
represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there 
been no conflict.” ’ [Citation.]  This analysis will often turn on 
choices that a lawyer could have made, but did not make.  In 
order to determine whether those choices resulted from the 
alleged conflict of interest, we must analyze the record to 
determine whether a lawyer who did not face the same conflict 
would have made different choices as well as whether counsel’s 
choices were the product of tactical reasons rather than the 
alleged conflict of interest.”  (Perez, at pp. 435–436.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
 
Defendant posits only one way the alleged conflict may 
have affected Belter’s representation.  Noting that one habeas 
claim asserted counsel was ineffective in failing to present a 
defense based on cognitive deficits or other mental impairments, 
defendant suggests Belter may have avoided developing such 
mitigation evidence in the retrial because doing so “might be 
viewed as an admission of his ineffective assistance originally.”  
As noted, however, reversal of the penalty judgment had 
rendered moot all claims in the habeas corpus petition alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase. 
 
Moreover, the record on appeal does not support 
defendant’s speculation that Belter shaped his defense strategy 
to avoid an ineffective assistance finding.  Contrary to 
defendant’s assertion, the record indicates that Belter did 
pursue evidence supporting a neurological defense.  Early in the 
proceedings, Belter obtained an order for defendant to be 
examined by a neuropsychologist.  When testing could not be 
conducted because defendant was shackled, Belter obtained a 
second order requiring jail officials to use some other form of 
restraint so that defendant could be tested with his hands free.  
The results of that testing are not in the record, nor is there any 
other evidence to support defendant’s claim that Belter failed to 
present a neurological defense due to a conflict of interest.  We 
do not know the results of any neuropsychological examination, 
or what opinions the defense expert may have formed.  
Whatever those results, counsel may have reasonably decided to 
focus instead on defendant’s social history as evidence in 
mitigation.  As we noted in defendant’s prior appeal, “It is not 
the typical American family in which a child is conceived by his 
father’s rape of his mother when she was a preteen, the child’s 
father is convicted of rape and attempted murder and sent to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
prison, the child’s stepfather is similarly tried for murder, and 
the child’s stepfather beats the child to the point where the child 
suffers convulsions.”  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 830–831.)  
Counsel took steps to evaluate the question of cognitive deficits 
and presented extensive mitigation, including detailed evidence 
of defendant’s difficult childhood presented through 14 different 
witnesses, many of them family members.  The record does not 
support defendant’s assertion that counsel’s performance was 
impaired by a conflict of interest. 
 
In a related claim, defendant contends his unelaborated 
“objection” to Belter at the January 9 hearing was tantamount 
to a request for substitute counsel under People v. Marsden 
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.  He argues the court’s failure to inquire into 
this request was “reversible per se.”  On this record, the claim 
fails. 
 
“The legal principles governing a Marsden motion are well 
settled.”  (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572 
(Johnson).) 
 
If 
a 
defendant 
who 
asserts 
inadequate 
representation seeks to discharge appointed counsel and obtain 
a substitute attorney, the court must allow the defendant to 
explain the basis for this contention and to present specific 
instances of counsel’s inadequate performance.  (Ibid.)  For the 
duty to hold a Marsden hearing to be triggered, however, there 
must be “ ‘at least some clear indication by defendant,’ either 
personally or through his current counsel, that defendant ‘wants 
a substitute attorney.’ ”  (People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 
90; see People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8.)  
Equivocal statements of dissatisfaction do not suffice.  (See, e.g., 
People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1006.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
 
Defendant gave no clear indication he wanted a substitute 
attorney and never requested one.  After obtaining a transfer so 
that he could be housed closer to Belter, and before Belter made 
his first appearance, defendant said, “I have an objection to Mr. 
Belter,” but he explicitly declined to explain what his objection 
was or what remedy, if any, he sought.  The court responded that 
defendant could “take that up with counsel or wait until the next 
hearing.”  Defendant did not renew his objection to Belter at the 
next hearing, nor did he request substitute counsel at any time 
thereafter.   
 
Discussion of the pending habeas corpus petition, 
however, does make this a close call.  At defendant’s urging, 
Belter informed the court that the petition included unresolved 
ineffective assistance of counsel issues related to the guilt phase 
of trial.  Certainly one plausible reason for making the court 
aware of the pending claims involving Belter, especially in light 
of defendant’s earlier “objection,” would have been to articulate 
grounds for requesting new counsel.  Yet neither defendant nor 
Belter ever stated that defendant wanted substitute counsel, 
and we will not lightly assume that counsel violated his ethical 
and professional duties by failing to convey such a request by 
his client.  Under the circumstances, defendant’s bare statement 
that he had “an objection” does not constitute a clear indication 
that he wanted to obtain new counsel.  Expressions of 
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel that might be inferred 
here were not sufficient to trigger the court’s obligation to hold 
a Marsden hearing.  (See Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 572–
574.)  The burden is ultimately on the defendant to articulate 
his request.  The trial court has an obligation to make a clear 
record and give a defendant the necessary latitude to request 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
the remedy being sought.  At the same time, the court must take 
care not to interfere with the attorney-client relationship.   
 
Defendant contends he would have expressed a desire for 
new counsel at the February 20 hearing but the trial court 
prevented him from speaking.  Because the court was aware 
that he objected to Belter, defendant argues it was especially 
problematic for the court to admonish him that he was required 
to convey his comments through that very same attorney.  If the 
court had in fact silenced defendant, or required him to speak 
only through Belter, we might agree that his rights to due 
process and effective counsel were implicated.  However, the 
record does not bear out defendant’s claim.  Contrary to 
defendant’s assertion, the court did not tell him he could speak 
only through his attorney.  What the court said was:  “You need 
to talk to your attorney, sir, before you address the Court.”  This 
direction was consistent with the court’s advice to defendant at 
an earlier hearing.  In a discussion of supplies defendant wanted 
at the jail, the court asked, “Was there anything else, sir?” then 
added, “Talk to your attorney first, make sure you’re not going 
to say anything wrong.”  
 
Considering the precise words of the court’s admonition, 
we conclude the record does not support defendant’s assertion 
that the court prevented him from speaking up to object to his 
attorney.  She simply gave him the prudent direction to talk to 
counsel “before [he] address[ed] the Court.”  This statement left 
open defendant’s option to address the court directly after he 
had conferred with counsel.  The next statement on the record 
was Belter’s, however, explaining that defendant wanted the 
court to be aware there were pending habeas claims in the 
Supreme Court regarding “competency of trial counsel.”  After 
Belter complied with defendant’s request, defendant made no 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
further effort to address the court.  If the record had 
demonstrated that defendant was trying to make a Marsden 
motion and Belter elided or misrepresented defendant’s feelings 
in his statement to the court, this might be a different case.  But 
the factual basis for that conclusion does not appear here.  The 
record on appeal contains no evidence Belter misrepresented 
defendant’s feelings in his statement to the court, that 
defendant demonstrated any desire to speak further, or that he 
was 
prevented 
from 
raising 
the 
issue 
subsequently.  
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show the court committed 
reversible error. 
D. Challenges to Death Penalty Statute  
 
Defendant raises many challenges to the constitutionality 
of California’s death penalty statute but acknowledges that we 
have previously rejected them.  We decline his invitation to 
depart from our settled precedents, which hold: 
 
The class of offenders eligible for the death penalty under 
section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad.  (People v. Beck and 
Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 669 (Beck and Cruz); People v. Potts 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1060.)  California’s statutory special 
circumstances are not so numerous or expansive that they fail 
to perform their constitutionally required narrowing function.  
(People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 345 (Navarro); People 
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 837–838.) 
 
Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits aggravation based 
on the circumstances of the crime, does not result in arbitrary 
or capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (Navarro, supra, 
12 Cal.5th at p. 345; People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1013 
(Capers).)  The jury’s consideration of unadjudicated criminal 
conduct in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) does not 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
violate due process or constitutional prohibitions against cruel 
and unusual punishment.  (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
76, 113 (Morales); People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 954 
(Hoyt).) 
 
The capital jury’s penalty decision is normative rather 
than factual.  (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 670.)  For 
this reason, California’s death penalty scheme does not violate 
the federal Constitution for failing to require written findings 
(People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 455 (Rhoades)); 
unanimous findings as to the existence of aggravating factors or 
unadjudicated criminal activity (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
pp. 113–114); or findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of aggravating factors (other than section 190.3, factor 
(b) or (c) evidence), that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty (People v. Fayed 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 213 (Fayed); People v. Krebs (2019) 8 
Cal.5th 265, 350).  The high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
and Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92 do not alter these 
conclusions.  (Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 346; Capers, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1013–1014.) 
 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.  (Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 955; 
Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 455–456.)  To the extent 
defendant complains he was unconstitutionally denied intracase 
proportionality review, California provides such review upon 
request (see, e.g., People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 125; 
People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1287), but defendant 
raised no such claim in this appeal.  California’s capital 
sentencing scheme does not violate international norms of 
human decency or the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Suarez 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 189 (Suarez); Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th 
at p. 346.)  Nor does the death penalty law violate equal 
protection by providing different procedures for capital and 
noncapital defendants.  (Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 214; 
Rhoades, at p. 456.)   
 
Finally, “considering the arguments in combination, and 
viewing the death penalty law as a whole, it is not 
constitutionally defective. . . .  ‘California’s capital sentencing 
scheme as a whole provides adequate safeguards against the 
imposition of arbitrary or unreliable death judgments.’ ”  (People 
v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 426; see Suarez, supra, 10 
Cal.5th at p. 191.) 
E. Restitution Fine  
 
At the conclusion of defendant’s first trial, the probation 
department recommended a $10,000 felony restitution fine.  The 
court, however, imposed a lesser fine of $4,000.  Defendant did 
not object or offer evidence concerning his ability to pay, nor did 
he dispute the propriety of the fine in his first appeal.  After the 
penalty retrial, the court questioned whether the amount of 
restitution fines and fees needed to be revisited.  It expressed an 
inclination to simply adopt the previous orders fixing fines, fees, 
and restitution.  Defense counsel asked that the court “not order 
additional restitution” without a hearing.  When the subject was 
addressed at the next hearing, the prosecutor represented that 
defendant had been paying restitution pursuant to the original 
court order, and no additional costs had been submitted by the 
victims.  He recommended that the court impose no further 
restitution.  The court remarked, “Then I don’t think I need to 
revisit restitution,” and defense counsel responded, “Yes.”  
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
 
Defendant now contends that in setting the $4,000 
restitution fine, the court failed to take account of his ability to 
pay.  He asserts that there was an intervening change in 
Government Code section 13967, permitting consideration of 
ability to pay, and that he should benefit from this revision.  (See 
People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305.)  However, 
defendant’s argument rests on a factual error.  It is clear from 
the sentencing minutes and abstract of judgment that 
defendant’s restitution fine was imposed under Penal Code 
section 1202.4, 
not 
Government 
Code 
section 13967.  
Section 1202.4 required consideration of ability to pay at all 
relevant times in defendant’s case.  When defendant committed 
his crimes in 1997, when he was sentenced for them in 2000, and 
when he was resentenced in 2010, section 1202.4 required the 
court to impose a felony restitution fine between $200 and 
$10,000 and directed that it consider “any relevant factors,” 
including the defendant’s ability to pay, in setting the amount.  
(§ 1202.4, former subd. (d).) 
 
Defendant failed to raise an issue concerning his ability to 
pay at either sentencing proceeding.  The claim is therefore 
forfeited on appeal.  (People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356; 
People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1291; People v. Avila 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729.)  In any event, we may assume the 
trial court was aware of and fulfilled its statutory duty to 
consider ability to pay when setting the restitution fine.  (Evid. 
Code, § 664; see Williams, at p. 1291.)  Defendant identifies 
nothing in the record indicating the court breached its duty to 
consider ability to pay and has thus failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion.  (See Miracle, at p. 356; People v. Gamache (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 347, 409.)  Indeed, because the $4,000 fine was less 
than half the $10,000 recommended by the probation 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
department, it appears the court exercised its discretion in this 
regard, in light of the circumstances before it. 
F. Relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 
 
Defendant filed a supplemental brief shortly before oral 
argument asking this court to vacate his murder conviction 
because it may have been based on a felony-murder theory that 
was rejected by the Legislature in Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437).  We delayed submission of 
the case and received full briefing of the issue.  We now conclude 
defendant is not entitled to relief because any error brought 
about by retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437 is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
“Under the felony-murder doctrine as it existed at the time 
of [defendant’s] trial, ‘when the defendant or an accomplice 
kill[ed] someone during the commission, or attempted 
commission, of an inherently dangerous felony,’ the defendant 
could be found guilty of the crime of murder, without any 
showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely 
an intent to commit the underlying felony.’  (People v. Gonzalez 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 [142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 278 P.3d 
1242].)  Murders occurring during certain violent or serious 
felonies were of the first degree, while all others were of the 
second degree.  (Pen. Code, § 189, subds. (a), (b); Gonzalez, at 
p. 654.)”  (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 704 (Strong).)  
The law changed effective January 1, 2019, however, when the 
Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437.  With the goal of “more 
equitably sentenc[ing] offenders in accordance with their 
involvement in homicides” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (b)), 
Senate Bill 1437 significantly changed the scope of murder 
liability for defendants who did not actually kill or intend to kill 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
anyone, including those prosecuted on a felony-murder theory 
(see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (c)).8  As relevant here, the 
amended murder statute now limits felony-murder liability to:  
(1) “actual killer[s]” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); (2) those who, “with the 
intent to kill,” aided or abetted “the actual killer in the 
commission of murder in the first degree” (id., subd. (e)(2)); and 
(3) “major participant[s] in the underlying felony” who “acted 
with reckless indifference to human life” (id., subd. (e)(3)). 
 
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for 
those convicted of murder under prior law to seek retroactive 
relief.  (See § 1172.6; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 
pp. 708–709; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960.)  
Under section 1172.6,9 the process begins with the filing of a 
petition declaring that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be 
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to 
Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437.  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (a)(3).)  The trial court then reviews the petition to 
determine whether a prima facie showing has been made that 
the petitioner is entitled to relief.  (Id., subd. (c).)  “If the petition 
and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant 
is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.  
(See § 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, at pp. 970–972.)”  (Strong, at 
p. 708.)  Otherwise, the court must issue an order to show cause 
 
8  
The bill also altered murder liability under the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine.  (See People v. Gentile 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839 (Gentile).)  Those changes are not at 
issue here. 
9  
The 
relevant 
statute 
was 
originally 
codified 
in 
section 1170.95 but was later renumbered without substantive 
change.  (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 
at p. 708, fn. 2.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which 
the prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted 
murder” under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437 (id., 
subd. (d)(3)).  In addition to evidence admitted in the petitioner’s 
prior trial, both “[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also 
offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective 
burdens.”  (Ibid.)  “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden 
of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and 
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and 
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”  
(Ibid.) 
 
Because Senate Bill 1437 created this “specific mechanism 
for retroactive application of its ameliorative provisions” 
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853), we reasoned in Gentile 
that the section 1172.6 petition procedure was the sole avenue 
through which those convicted under prior law could obtain 
relief.  We held that changes to the murder statutes enacted by 
Senate Bill 1437 did not apply to nonfinal convictions on direct 
appeal.  (Gentile, at p. 859.)  The Legislature abrogated this 
holding the following year, however, by expressly authorizing 
challenges on appeal.  A newly added subdivision states:  “A 
person 
convicted 
of 
murder, 
attempted 
murder, 
or 
manslaughter whose conviction is not final may challenge on 
direct appeal the validity of that conviction based on the changes 
made to Sections 188 and 189 by Senate Bill 1437.”  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (g); see Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.) 
 
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder in 
February 2000.  Consistent with the law at that time, the jury 
instructions defined murder as the unlawful killing of a human 
being committed either with malice aforethought or during the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
commission or attempted commission of a felony, in this case 
kidnapping.  Based on this instruction, defendant contends his 
jury may have relied on a now-invalid theory of felony murder 
in voting to convict him.  He argues his murder conviction must 
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial of both guilt 
and, if applicable, penalty phases.  
 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
recent 
amendments 
to 
section 1172.6 give him a right to obtain relief on direct appeal 
rather than through the statute’s petition process.  (See 
§ 1172.6, subd. (g).)  Assuming his reading of the statute is 
correct, the issue is complicated here by the case’s procedural 
posture.  Section 1172.6, subdivision (g) permits a defendant 
“whose conviction is not final” to “challenge on direct appeal the 
validity of that conviction” based on changes to the murder 
statutes.  (Italics added.)  Nearly 15 years ago, we unanimously 
affirmed the judgment that defendant was guilty of Uwe’s 
murder.  (See Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 769, 841–842.)  
“Under our precedent and the high court’s, a judgment becomes 
final ‘ “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the 
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for 
certiorari ha[s] elapsed.” ’ ”  (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 
152, 162; see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5.)  
Accordingly, defendant’s murder conviction would appear to 
have become final no later than 2009, when the time expired for 
seeking certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.  (See 
People v. Vaughn (1973) 9 Cal.3d 321, 326, fn. 3.) 
 
We addressed the finality of a murder conviction under 
somewhat similar circumstances in People v. Jackson (1967) 67 
Cal.2d 96.  After this court affirmed Jackson’s death judgment 
on appeal, he obtained a reversal of the penalty judgment in a 
habeas corpus proceeding.  The penalty phase was retried and 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
Jackson again received the death penalty.  (Id. at pp. 97–98.)  
On appeal from that second judgment, Jackson, like defendant 
here, sought the benefit of an ameliorative change in the law.10  
We concluded the new rule, concerning admissibility of a 
defendant’s extrajudicial statements, could not be applied 
retroactively to Jackson’s guilt judgment because that judgment 
had long before become final.  (Jackson, at p. 98.)  We explained 
that when a penalty phase judgment alone is reversed, “the 
original judgment on the issue of guilt remains final during the 
retrial of the penalty issue and during all appellate proceedings 
reviewing the trial court’s decision on that issue.”  (Id. at p. 99; 
accord People v. Kemp (1974) 10 Cal.3d 611, 614.) 
 
Only a defendant whose conviction for murder, attempted 
murder, or manslaughter “is not final may challenge on direct 
appeal the validity of that conviction based on” changes to the 
murder statutes enacted by Senate Bill 1437.  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (g), italics added.)  Although Jackson concerned a death 
verdict reversed on habeas rather than on direct appeal, its 
reasoning would suggest that our 2008 affirmance of the guilt 
judgment rendered defendant’s murder conviction final.  
Defendant challenges this conclusion, however.  He argues the 
propriety of his death sentence, now under review, depends 
upon the validity of his first degree murder conviction.  The 
Attorney General does not dispute defendant’s view and 
assumes for purposes of this appeal that defendant may 
challenge his conviction under section 1172.6, subdivision (g) in 
this appeal from his sentence.  In light of the Attorney General’s 
position, we too will assume that the claim is properly presented 
 
10  
Jackson was decided about a year and a half after In re 
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
under section 1172.6, subdivision (g).  Nevertheless, we 
conclude defendant is not entitled to reversal because any 
retroactive error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).) 
 
When a court instructs on two theories of an offense, only 
one of which is legally valid, the problem is known as 
“alternative-theory error.”  (People v. Aledamat (2018) 8 Cal.5th 
1, 9 (Aledamat); see In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 567 
(Lopez).)  Defendant’s jury was instructed it could find him 
guilty of first degree murder based on either a premeditation 
and deliberation or a felony-murder analysis.  Of course, the jury 
could have concluded, consistent with premeditation and 
deliberation requirements, that defendant himself shot Uwe 
intending to kill him.  However, it is at least possible they were 
not sure whether defendant or Phillips fired the fatal shots.  In 
that case, the felony-murder theory would have come into play.  
The Attorney General concedes that, after Senate Bill 1437’s 
changes to section 189, felony murder can no longer be relied 
upon in this case, because it is possible that the jury based its 
verdict on felony murder as it was previously defined, rather 
than on premeditation and deliberation.  If it had done so, it 
could conceivably have concluded that defendant intended to 
kidnap Uwe but not that he intended to kill him.  Thus, the 
parties agree that Senate Bill 1437 created the possibility of 
alternative-theory error in this case retroactively.  (See People 
v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 592 (Glukhoy).) 
 
The Courts of Appeal have handled claims under 
section 1172.6, subdivision (g) by finding retroactive error and 
reviewing for harmlessness.  (See, e.g., Glukhoy, supra, 77 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 592–599; People v. Hola (2022) 77 
Cal.App.5th 362, 376–377 & fn. 14.)  Unlike trial court 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
proceedings on section 1172.6 resentencing petitions, parties on 
appeal are generally prevented from presenting new evidence to 
support their positions.  While a defendant can elect to forgo the 
presentation of new evidence by pursuing a section 1172.6, 
subdivision (g) claim on appeal, the prosecution has no such 
choice.  The filing of such a claim on appeal deprives the People 
of the statutorily conferred ability to submit additional evidence 
of the defendant’s liability on a still-valid theory.  (See § 1172.6, 
subd. (d); see also Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 855–856.)  
Any unfairness to the prosecution, however, is mitigated by the 
different remedies available in the two proceedings.  When an 
error asserted on appeal in a subdivision (g) claim is not 
harmless, the defendant is entitled only to retrial of the murder 
charge, not resentencing.  (See Hola, at pp. 376–377.) 
 
In view of the uncertainties in how section 1172.6, 
subdivision (g) should operate, the Attorney General suggests 
that we either issue a limited remand for the trial court to 
consider defendant’s claim or reject the claim without prejudice 
to defendant renewing it in a resentencing petition filed in the 
trial court.  Defendant, however, protests that newly added 
subdivision (g) gives him a right to have the claim resolved on 
appeal.  He contends he is entitled to reversal of the guilt and 
penalty judgments based on Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the 
law and that the error cannot be deemed harmless.  Considering 
defendant’s arguments, we assume without deciding that his 
claim of retroactive error may be raised on appeal and is subject 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
to a harmless error analysis.11  We conclude the error here was 
harmless.12 
 
Aledamat discussed the standard of prejudice applicable 
to alternative-theory error.  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 9.)  
It held that “no higher standard of review applies to alternative-
theory error than applies to other misdescriptions of the 
elements [of an offense].  The same beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard applies to all . . . .”  (Ibid.)  Under this standard, a 
conviction must be reversed unless a reviewing court, “after 
examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, . . . determines the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 13; see 
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
 
We recently elaborated on the reasonable doubt test, as 
applied to alternative-theory error, in Lopez.  We explained that 
“a reviewing court may hold the error harmless where it would 
be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the 
findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings 
that would support a valid theory of liability.  (Aledamat, supra, 
 
11  
Defendant repeatedly refers to the Chapman harmless 
error standard in his briefing.  In his supplemental reply brief, 
defendant also argues that, absent the now-invalid felony 
murder instruction, he would have offered additional evidence 
and cross-examined differently.  Insofar as he seeks to make an 
argument that the error is reversible per se, we decline to reach 
it.  We need not, and typically do not, address arguments raised 
for the first time in a reply brief.  This consideration is 
particularly weighty here, given that defendant did not file his 
supplemental reply brief until well after oral argument.  
12  
We would note, however, that a harmless error analysis 
on direct appeal is distinct from the superior court’s inquiry 
under section 1172.6, if a petition is filed there. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)”  (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 568.)  
Furthermore, “while ‘overwhelming’ evidence may demonstrate 
harmlessness, a court’s analysis of whether the evidence is 
‘overwhelming’ in this context is not as subjective or free-
ranging as that term might imply.”  (Ibid.)  Instead, the 
reviewing court has an obligation “to rigorously review the 
evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found the 
defendant guilty based on an invalid theory, and made the 
factual findings reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily 
have found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory as well.”  
(Ibid.)  Applying this standard, we conclude no reasonable jury 
that made the findings reflected in the verdicts from defendant’s 
initial trial could have failed to find the facts necessary to 
support liability under a valid theory of murder.  (See id. at 
p. 583; Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8.) 
 
As amended by Senate Bill 1437, a defendant is guilty of 
first degree felony murder if he is the “actual killer” (§ 189, 
subd. (e)(1)); if, “with the intent to kill,” he aids or abets “the 
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree” 
(id., subd. (e)(2)); or, if he was a “major participant in the 
underlying felony” and “acted with reckless indifference to 
human life” (id., subd. (e)(3)).  For purposes of our review here, 
we focus on the third prong only.  In addition to finding him 
guilty of first degree murder, defendant’s jury sustained special 
circumstance allegations for murder in the commission of a 
kidnapping and torture-murder.  It further found that 
defendant personally used a firearm in committing the murder.  
The question is whether it would have been impossible for a jury 
to make these findings without also finding that defendant was 
a major participant in the underlying felony of kidnapping and 
acted with reckless indifference to human life. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
 
Here, the jury found that Uwe’s murder was committed 
while defendant “was engaged in the commission of the crime of 
kidnapping.”  The jury was instructed that the kidnapping must 
not be “merely incidental to the commission of the murder.”  The 
jury also found that, in committing the murder, defendant 
personally used a handgun.  Defendant argues this finding on 
the firearm enhancement does not compel a conclusion that the 
jury found him to be the actual killer because the “elements of 
felony murder included the kidnapping, for which there was 
clear evidence that [he] used a firearm.”  Regardless of whether 
the jury found defendant to be “the actual killer” under 
section 189, subdivision (e)(1), trial evidence supporting these 
findings demonstrated that defendant forced Uwe into a car at 
gunpoint and drove him to his house.  (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 770.)  Defendant left him there tied up while he recruited 
three associates, saying he planned to kill Uwe.  (Id. at p. 771.)  
He later wrapped Uwe in plastic sheeting and placed him in his 
car along with a case of chemical drain cleaner, “which 
defendant said he planned to pour on Uwe’s body in order to 
dissolve it.”  (Id. at p. 773.)  Then he and Phillips drove off with 
Uwe.  (Ibid.)  In light of the jury’s verdicts and this evidence 
supporting them, it would have been impossible for the jury to 
have found that defendant engaged in kidnapping and used a 
firearm without also finding that defendant was a major 
participant in the kidnapping. 
 
The verdicts are also relevant to the second prong of 
section 189, subdivision (e)(3), which requires that the person 
“acted with reckless indifference to human life.”  Defendant’s 
jury sustained an allegation that Uwe’s murder “was intentional 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
and did involve the infliction of torture.”13  The jury was 
instructed that it could not sustain the torture special 
circumstance unless, in addition to finding the murder 
intentional, it found that defendant both “intended to” and “did 
in fact inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a 
living human being.”  (CALJIC No. 8.81.18.)14  The jury’s finding 
 
13  
The Attorney General concedes that this finding does not 
render defendant categorically ineligible for relief.  The torture 
special circumstance required a finding that “[t]he murder was 
intentional” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), but defendant’s jury was not 
instructed that it had to find defendant personally harbored an 
intent to kill.  Because defendant and Phillips were tried 
together, although to separate juries (see Wilson, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 770, fn. 1), it would have been possible for the jury 
to find the torture special circumstance true without agreeing 
that defendant, as opposed to Phillips, intended to kill Uwe.  
14  
There was a minor discrepancy in the written version of 
CALJIC No. 8.81.18 and the version read to the jury.  The trial 
court properly told the jury, in its oral instruction, that the 
special circumstance required a finding that “[t]he defendant 
intended 
to 
inflict 
extreme 
cruel 
physical 
pain 
and 
suffering. . . .”  (Italics added.)  In the written instruction, 
however, the word “the” was crossed out, and the required 
finding was described as:  “[A] defendant intended to inflict 
extreme cruel physical pain and suffering. . . .”  (Italics added.)  
We concluded this error in the written instruction was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt for four reasons.  (Wilson, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 804.)  “First, the court orally instructed the jury 
with the correct instruction. . . .  Second, there is no indication 
the jury was aware of the slight difference between the written 
and oral versions of the instructions, as it asked no questions 
about this point.  Third, the evidence was overwhelming that 
defendant beat, tortured and killed Uwe Durbin. . . .  Finally, 
considering the other elements of the torture instruction, which 
the jury necessarily found true — that the murder was 
intentional and defendant did in fact inflict cruel physical pain 
and suffering — it would have been impossible on these facts for 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
was supported by uncontroverted evidence establishing that, 
after kidnapping Uwe at gunpoint, defendant shot him in the 
kneecap, brutally beat and tortured him for hours, then drove 
him to a remote location where he was killed.  Any rational juror 
who found that defendant personally used a firearm in 
committing a kidnapping or homicide, and inflicted “extreme 
cruel physical pain and suffering” (CALJIC No. 8.81.18) upon 
the murder victim, would necessarily have found that defendant 
acted with reckless indifference to human life. 
 
We conclude it would have been impossible for the jury to 
make the findings reflected in its verdicts without concluding, 
at the very least, that defendant was a major participant in the 
felony kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to 
human life.  (See Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.)  As a 
result, we need not address the application of “actual killer” or 
aiding and abetting theories of liability.  Assuming defendant’s 
section 1172.6, subdivision (g) claim is properly before us in this 
appeal from a penalty retrial, any retroactive error from Senate 
Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
the jury to have found defendant did not intend to torture the 
victim.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Wilson 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  XX 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S189373 
Date Filed:  June 8, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Elisabeth Sichel 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Julie L. Garland and James William Bilderback II, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Holly Wilkens, Ronald A. Jakob, Alana Cohen 
Butler and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Patrick Morgan Ford 
Attorney at Law 
1901 First Avenue, Suite 400 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 236-0679 
 
Meredith S. White 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9069