Title: People v. Henry

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 93602-Agenda 9-January 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								JASON HENRY, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 17, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether certain
statements made by the circuit court amounted to an acquittal, for
double jeopardy purposes, under the reasoning set forth in People
v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293 (1999).

BACKGROUND
	On September 3, 1996, defendant was charged in a juvenile
petition with the offense of involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS
5/9-3(a) (West 1996)). The petition alleged that defendant, who
was 16 years old at that time, was a delinquent minor in that on
September 2, 1996, he recklessly struck Curtis Hurlbut in the face,
causing him to fall and strike his head on a concrete sidewalk,
resulting in Hurlbut's death. Defendant, represented by the public
defender, pled guilty to the allegations in the petition. As part of
the plea agreement, the State agreed not to file any proceedings to
transfer this matter to the adult criminal court. The circuit court of
Madison County accepted defendant's guilty plea, adjudged
defendant a delinquent minor, and, on October 30, 1996,
committed defendant for an indeterminate period to the juvenile
division of the Department of Corrections.
	On November 13, 1996, defendant, represented by retained
counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his motion,
defendant alleged that he was not appraised of his rights in this
matter prior to agreeing to plead guilty, and that he made the plea
under duress due to the prosecutor's threats that he would be
charged with murder as an adult if he did not plead guilty. In
addition, defendant also alleged that the guilty plea was made
despite the fact that no autopsy report or death certificate had been
filed with respect to Hurlbut, which would allow defendant or his
counsel to make an informed decision as to how to proceed in this
matter. Finally, defendant further alleged that there were
conflicting witness statements with respect to the events leading
to Hurlbut's death, and that the evidence indicated that Hurlbut's
death was accidental and not intentional. On December 31, 1996,
the circuit court granted defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
	On January 8, 1997, the State filed a motion, pursuant to
section 5-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-4
(West 1996)), requesting that defendant be tried as an adult. The
circuit court granted the State's motion on January 22, 1997, and
transferred this matter to adult criminal court. On January 24,
1997, defendant was charged by information with the involuntary
manslaughter of Curtis Hurlbut. Defendant was charged for this
same offense by indictment on February 6, 1997. On March 9,
1998, the State filed an amended information, which, in addition
to involuntary manslaughter, charged defendant with the offense
of aggravated battery. Specifically, count II of the amended
information alleged that defendant committed aggravated battery
in that he committed a battery on a public way, being a public
sidewalk, by striking Hurlbut in the face, in violation of section
12-4(b)(8) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8)
(West 1996)).
	On March 10, 1998, defendant's jury trial commenced. The
State presented the testimony of two eyewitnesses who stated that
defendant, on a dare, struck Hurlbut in the face with a closed fist.
The witnesses further testified that at the time he was hit, Hurlbut
was standing on a grassy lawn. However, as a result of the impact,
Hurlbut fell backwards and struck his head on a concrete sidewalk.
The State also presented the testimony of a law enforcement
officer who arrived at the scene shortly after the incident. The
officer found Hurlbut, still alive, lying face up, bleeding from the
back of his head and his mouth. According to the officer, the lower
part of Hurlbut's body was located on the grassy lawn, while the
upper part of Hurlbut's body was on the sidewalk. Hurlbut was
taken by ambulance to a hospital, where he later died.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. According to
defendant, Hurlbut had previously made comments that made
defendant uneasy. According to defendant, on the date of
Hurlbut's death, Hurlbut approached defendant and defendant
became nervous. Defendant admitted striking Hurlbut and that
Hurlbut thereafter fell to the ground and hit his head on the
sidewalk. Defendant stated that Hurlbut's upper body-his
shoulders and head-were on the sidewalk, while the lower portion
of Hurlbut's body remained on the grassy lawn.
	At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved for a
directed verdict on both charged counts. With respect to the charge
of aggravated battery in count II, defense counsel argued that the
State had failed to prove that the victim was "on or about a public
way," as required by section 12-4(b)(8) of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West 1996)), in that the State
adduced no testimony that the battery was committed on the
sidewalk. Defense counsel argued that the evidence showed that
the victim was standing on the grass when he was hit, and that
when he landed he was lying partially on the sidewalk and
partially on the grass.
	The circuit court denied defendant's motion for directed
verdict as to the charge of involuntary manslaughter contained in
count I. However, as to the aggravated battery charge contained in
count II, the following colloquy occurred between the circuit court
judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel:
			"THE COURT: "[C]learly, based on the evidence of the
two eyewitnesses, even taking into account some
distinction that [one witness] made as to [Hurlbut's]
location being a little closer to the sidewalk, I don't
believe we have any evidence that [Hurlbut] was on or
about a public sidewalk, in that he was just simply up in
the yard when this happened. So I'm going to grant the
directed verdict as to Count II. Anything else while we are
still on the record?
			THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, I would ask for leave to
appeal that ruling and let it go up.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Does that mean a mistrial here
or-
			THE PROSECUTOR: That's your option at this point
in time whether you want to go on the other count or not,
but I intend to appeal it and would notify the Court that I
intend to appeal that.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, you can appeal Count II
and we'll just go ahead and-well-
			THE PROSECUTOR: Are you willing to sever them at
this time?
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, I'm not willing to sever
them at this time. This puts us in a precarious position. I
would ask for a moment or two recess to talk to my client.
			THE COURT: Sure.
(A recess was held)
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: For the record, Your Honor,
first of all, it would appear to me that, and the Court will
correct me if I'm wrong, but there is some good question
whether or not the granting of a directed verdict is an
appealable order. It certainly seems to me that it's a
finding by the court that the defendant is not guilty. It's
not a ruling on the-not a procedural ruling on the form of
the indictment or the sufficiency of the information, it's a
ruling that as a matter of law that the man is not guilty. So
the last time I checked not guilty's are not appealable. So
I don't think that, unless there is some case law that [the
prosecutor] has that says he can appeal it, he can't appeal
it.
			If the court is going to make a finding, however, that it
is appealable and allow the State to appeal that, then I
think that we have to ask for a mistrial because I don't
think its proper to have one jury hear part of this case and
the other jury hear part of this case when it's a case of
mandatory joinder of these charges. So we either got all or
nothing here, folks.
			THE PROSECUTOR: I would ask that you reserve
your ruling on the Motion for Directed Verdict until I can
get in the library over the lunch hour.
			THE COURT: Yes, reconsidering the arguments of
counsel, the Court will vacate its previous order. The
court will reserve the ruling on the Motion for Directed
Verdict relative to Count II."
	After a recess, the circuit court held a jury instruction
conference. At the request of defense counsel, the jury was
instructed not only on involuntary manslaughter and aggravated
battery, but also on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor
battery. Upon conclusion of the jury instruction conference, the
circuit court judge informed defense counsel that "in the interim,"
and in support of his argument that defendant's motion for a
directed verdict on the charge of aggravated battery should not be
granted, the prosecutor had provided the judge with a copy of a
decision of the appellate court in People v. Lowe, 202 Ill. App. 3d
648 (4th Dist. 1990). The Lowe court broadly defined the term
"about a public way," as used in the aggravated battery statute, to
mean " 'in the immediate neighborhood of; *** near' " a public
way. Lowe, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 653, quoting 1 C.J.S. About, at 329
(1985). The circuit court judge concluded that the facts of the
matter at bar fell within the definition of "about a public way" as
set forth in Lowe. Accordingly, the circuit court judge denied
defendant's motion for directed verdict on count II. In response,
defense counsel stated, "[v]ery well, Your Honor."
	Thereafter, the jury was called into the courtroom, the
prosecutor and defense counsel delivered closing arguments, and
the circuit court judge instructed the jury. The jury then retired for
deliberations at 2:24 p.m. At 7:20 p.m., the jury informed the
circuit court that the jurors were "hung." The circuit court denied
defense counsel's request for a mistrial and instead ruled that the
jury would be provided with additional instructions. The jury was
then brought into the courtroom. The jury foreperson indicated
that verdict forms were signed by all the jurors with respect to two
counts, and that the jury was only hung on a third count. The
specific counts were not identified for the record at that time. The
circuit court instructed the jurors to continue deliberations in an
effort to reach a verdict on the third count. Soon thereafter, the
jury sent a note to the judge stating that "we are still stuck on the
third proposition of the involuntary manslaughter charge. We are
having particular problems with what 'likely' and great bodily
harm means. Any light you may shed would be greatly
appreciated." The circuit court denied the request of defense
counsel to declare a hung jury and questioned the jury foreperson
in an attempt to discern the problem. Thereafter, the circuit court
sent additional instructions to the jurors, and the jury continued
deliberations.
	Finally, the jury returned to the courtroom and the foreperson
indicated that the jury remained unable to reach a verdict on the
involuntary manslaughter charge. The jury, however, returned
signed verdict forms finding defendant guilty of aggravated battery
and battery. At the request of defense counsel, the jury was polled
and then discharged. On March 20, 1998, eight days after the jury
returned its verdicts, the circuit court judge filed a docketing
statement in which he declared a mistrial on the involuntary
manslaughter charge on the basis that the jurors "indicated they
could not reach a verdict." The circuit court judge then entered
judgment on the verdict of guilty as to the charge of aggravated
battery. On May 28, 1998, after denying defendant's posttrial
motion and conducting a sentencing hearing, the circuit court
judge sentenced defendant on the aggravated battery conviction to
five years' imprisonment in the Department of Corrections. The
circuit court thereafter entered a written order, dated July 2, 1998,
directing the circuit clerk to prepare and file a written notice of
appeal on behalf of defendant. On July 9, 1998, the clerk filed a
written notice of appeal with the appellate court. In addition, the
Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent
defendant during the appeal.
	While defendant's appeal was pending in the appellate court,
defendant appeared with his retained counsel in the circuit court
on January 4, 1999. Defense counsel informed the court that
defendant had entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the
State on charges in a separate case, number 97-CF-229, as well as
on the charges that had already been adjudicated in the instant
cause. Cause number 97-CF-229 arose on September 3, 1996, the
same day that defendant had been arrested in the matter at bar.
Upon a search incident to his arrest, defendant was discovered in
the unlawful possession of cannabis and the unlawful possession
of a controlled substance. Pursuant to the negotiated plea
agreement, the State dismissed the charge of unlawful possession
of cannabis. In exchange, defendant agreed to plead guilty to the
unlawful possession of a controlled substance and a sentence of
three years' incarceration in the Department of Corrections, to run
concurrently with the sentences imposed in the instant matter. As
to the charges involved in the instant cause, defendant agreed to
plead guilty to both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated
battery for a sentence of imprisonment of four years on each
offense, to run concurrently. In addition, defendant agreed to
withdraw his appeal in the instant matter. As part of this
agreement, defendant was given credit for time already served. As
defendant had already served 553 days, defendant was left with 82
days to serve on the negotiated pleas. After conducting a hearing,
the circuit court entered a written order confirming the plea
agreement.
	Thereafter, the State filed in the appellate court a motion to
supplement the record on appeal with the January 4, 1999, order
entered by the circuit court confirming the plea agreement. In
addition, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's appeal in
accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant filed objections.
The appellate court ruled that the State's motions and defendant's
objections would be taken with the case. In addition, the appellate
court ordered the State to file a report of the January 4, 1999,
hearing on the plea agreement.
	The appellate court vacated defendant's conviction and
sentence for aggravated battery. The appellate court also entered
judgments of acquittal on the aggravated battery charge, in
addition to the charges of battery, and involuntary manslaughter.
329 Ill. App. 3d 397. In its opinion, the appellate court first
considered the State's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal under
the plea agreement. The appellate court held that with respect to
the charges at issue in the case at bar, the plea agreement
proceedings and the order entered thereupon were void ab initio
because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The
appellate court reasoned that once the notice of appeal had been
filed, the lower court had no jurisdiction over this matter, and,
therefore, any actions taken by it were null and void. In addition,
the appellate court held that the parties to an appeal cannot, by
agreement or otherwise, revest jurisdiction in the trial court when
jurisdiction lies in the appellate court.
	The appellate court also rejected the argument advanced by
the State that because the trial court had declared a mistrial on the
charge of involuntary manslaughter, and because defendant could
have been retried on that charge, the trial court retained
jurisdiction over at least that one charge. Thus, the State asserted,
the plea agreement with respect to the involuntary manslaughter
charge was not without circuit court jurisdiction and, therefore,
was not null and void. The appellate court held that defendant
could not have been retried on the charge of involuntary
manslaughter, for to have done so would have violated defendant's
constitutional protection against double jeopardy on two grounds.
First, defendant was convicted and sentenced by the circuit court
for aggravated battery, and the rule of "one-act, one-crime" would
prevent a conviction and sentence on the involuntary manslaughter
charge. For the single act of striking the victim in the face with his
hand, defendant was charged with two separate and distinct
offenses: aggravated battery on a public way and involuntary
manslaughter. The appellate court observed that although a
defendant may be prosecuted simultaneously for more than one
crime carved from a single physical act, a defendant cannot be
convicted and sentenced for more than one crime carved from a
single physical act. Accordingly, if multiple convictions are
entered for those crimes, judgment and sentence may only be
entered on the most serious offense. The appellate court concluded
that "[b]ecause defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and
was sentenced for that offense, he could not thereafter be
reprosecuted for the offense of involuntary manslaughter, an
offense based on the same physical act as the aggravated battery."
329 Ill. App. 3d at 404. Second, the appellate court held that where
the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery but
"remained silent" on the charge of involuntary manslaughter and
the trial court accepted the guilty verdict and discharged the jury,
the "silence" of the jury on the charge of involuntary manslaughter
is deemed to be an acquittal of that charge for the purposes of
double jeopardy. 329 Ill. App. 3d at 404.
	The appellate court then addressed the merits of defendant's
appeal. The appellate court held that the circuit court judge
unequivocally acquitted defendant of aggravated battery when the
judge granted a directed verdict on this charge in favor of
defendant, based upon the insufficiency of the State's evidence.
The appellate court further held that defendant's right not to be put
twice in jeopardy for the same offense was violated when the
judge reconsidered his grant of a directed finding in favor of
defendant, vacated that ruling, and subsequently sent the
aggravated battery charge to the jury. Although the appellate court
acknowledged that defendant had waived this issue in the lower
court, the court reviewed this contention under the plain error rule
on the basis that the alleged error affected defendant's substantial
right to be free from double jeopardy. The appellate court also
factually distinguished the matter at bar from this court's opinion
in People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293 (1999), on the basis that in
Williams the trial court did not actually grant the defendant's
motion for directed verdict but, rather, reserved ruling on the
motion until the State could present legal authority. The appellate
court observed that, in Williams, "[i]n the same breath with which
the trial court indicated that it would grant the defendant's motion
for directed verdict, and without interruption by counsel or by
recess, the trial judge also indicated that she was not ready to rule
on the motion and indicated that she would accept the submission
of legal authority. The parties at no time understood or proceeded
as if the trial court had, in fact, granted the defendant's motion for
directed verdict. When it ultimately denied the motion, the trial
court did not indicate that it was reconsidering or vacating the
grant of a directed verdict." 329 Ill. App. 3d at 406-07.
	In contrast, in the instant matter, the appellate court held that
the trial court clearly granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that
the battery occurred on or about a public way. "The prosecutor
immediately understood that the trial court had granted a directed
verdict in favor of defendant and indicated that he was going to
appeal the ruling. Had the trial court's ruling been equivocal, the
prosecutor would have continued his argument on the motion;
instead, the prosecutor indicated his intention to appeal. Both
attorneys then proceeded to argue about whether the appeal would
result in a mistrial of the other charges. A recess was taken, after
which the trial court 'vacated' the directed verdict and reserved its
ruling on defendant's motion. Both parties, as well as the trial
judge, understood that the court had, in fact, granted a directed
verdict of acquittal. Once granted, that verdict could not be
reconsidered or vacated, and defendant could not be prosecuted
further on the charge." 329 Ill. App. 3d at 407. The appellate court
concluded that the actions of the circuit court violated defendant's
right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant's conviction
and sentence for aggravated battery and entered a judgment of
acquittal on that charge.
	The appellate court also vacated defendant's conviction for
battery. The court reasoned that the acquittal of defendant by the
circuit court of the greater offense of aggravated battery
constitutes, for double jeopardy purposes, the acquittal of any
lesser-included offenses that could have been charged but were
not. Battery is a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery, and
the State did not charge defendant with battery, but it could have.
The appellate court concluded that "[i]n light of the trier of fact's
acquittal of defendant on the greater offense of aggravated battery,
a trial on the lesser-included, but uncharged, offense of battery was
barred." 329 Ill. App. 3d at 408. The appellate court thus entered
a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
	Finally, the appellate court vacated the conviction of
involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court concluded that the
jury's silence on that charge, coupled with the trial court's
acceptance of the guilty verdict on the charge of aggravated battery
and its discharge of the jury, amounted to an acquittal of the
involuntary manslaughter charge.
	This court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	At the outset, we note that the State does not contest the
appellate court's holding that the January 4, 1999, plea agreement
was void for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the State
argues only that the appellate court erred in holding that
defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated in
this case.
	Initially, the State maintains that the appellate court erred in
addressing defendant's assertion that the actions of the circuit
court judge had resulted in an acquittal of the aggravated battery
charge, and that defendant's subsequent conviction for aggravated
battery violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The State
correctly observes that this argument was procedurally defaulted
below. The record discloses that at the time the circuit court judge
ultimately decided to deny defendant's motion for directed verdict
on count II, defense counsel did not object. Rather, defense
counsel appeared to acquiesce in the ruling, stating, "[v]ery well,
Your Honor." In addition, defendant did not raise the double
jeopardy issue in his posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), however, this court may review an
argument not properly preserved in the circuit court if we conclude
that plain error affecting a substantial right has occurred. People
v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 326-27 (1998). For the reasons that
follow, we agree with the appellate court that defendant's
substantial right to be free from double jeopardy was violated in
the case at bar. We therefore excuse the procedural default.
	The State contends that the appellate court erred when it held
that the circuit court judge had unequivocally acquitted defendant
when the judge originally indicated that he would grant
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of
aggravated battery. According to the State, an examination of the
entire colloquy between the judge, the prosecutor, and defense
counsel reveals that "the trial judge invited further discussion on
the issue and did not make an unequivocal finding of not guilty."
The State focuses upon the fact that the judge never actually stated
that defendant was not guilty or was acquitted, and instead told the
parties that he was "going to grant the directed verdict" with
respect to the charge of aggravated battery. The State interprets the
judge's pronouncement as equivocal, indicating that the judge was
open to further argument on the aggravated battery issue. In
support of its position, the State attempts to analogize the facts in
the matter at bar to those present in our previous decision in
People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293 (1999), where we concluded
that because a defendant's motion for a directed finding of not
guilty was not unequivocally granted, his subsequent conviction
on that same charge did not place him in double jeopardy.
	Defendant counters that the appellate court correctly held that
the circuit court, without equivocation, granted a directed verdict
of acquittal in defendant's favor on the charge of aggravated
battery. Defendant therefore asserts that the facts in the matter at
bar are distinguishable from those present in Williams, and,
accordingly, a contrary result is warranted. Defendant further
contends that because the circuit court judge unequivocally
acquitted defendant of aggravated battery, the appellate court
correctly held that defendant's subsequent prosecution and
conviction on the aggravated battery charge violated the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We agree.
	The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. Similarly, article I, section 10, of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that no person shall "be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §10.(1) The prohibition against double jeopardy is animated by the
principle that " 'the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.' " People v.
Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999), quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204, 78 S. Ct. 221,
223 (1957). The prohibition against double jeopardy "protects
against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the
same offense." People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376-77 (1998);
see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 241, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1021 (1975).
	Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. See
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 650, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1353 (1977). Jeopardy
terminates when the jury arrives at a verdict, or when the trial
judge enters a final judgment of acquittal. See Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629, 631, 82 S. Ct. 671, 672
(1962). An acquittal triggers the bar against double jeopardy only
if the acquittal "actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.  at 571, 51 L. Ed. 2d  at 651, 97 S. Ct. 
at 1355; People ex rel. Daley v. Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d 301, 311 (1985).
The entry of a directed verdict in favor of a defendant is an
acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy when there was
insufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, some or all
of the essential elements of the crime. Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d  at 311-12.
	The question presented in the cause at bar is whether the
circuit court's oral granting of defendant's motion for directed
verdict on the charge of aggravated battery was an unequivocal
judgment of acquittal. If so, then we must determine if the
acquittal represented a "resolution" of some or all of the factual
elements of the aggravated battery offense. If so, then jeopardy
was terminated, and it was error for the circuit court to allow the
aggravated battery charge to be presented to the jury.
	Both parties at bar contend that our decision in People v.
Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293 (1999), controls the outcome of the
matter before us. In Williams, the defendant was charged with first
degree murder and armed robbery. At the close of the State's case
in chief, defendant moved for a directed finding of not guilty on all
charges. Following argument from both parties, the circuit court
judge found that the State did not present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case for the charges. Accordingly, the judge
stated, "I'm going to grant the motion for a directed finding and a
finding of not guilty" on both charges. After giving a further
explanation of the reasons for her ruling, the judge stated that if
the parties wished to provide her with additional authority, that she
would hold the ruling "in abeyance." Williams, 188 Ill. 2d  at 298.
The prosecutor requested that the judge hold in abeyance that
portion of the ruling which dealt with the armed robbery charge.
The circuit judge responded: " 'All right. There's a finding of not
guilty as to the charges of murder. As to the armed robbery charge,
I am more than willing to look at any authority.' " Williams, 188 Ill. 2d  at 299. The parties agreed with the circuit judge that the
matter would be held until the next day.
	The following day, the circuit court judge stated:
		" 'We were at the end of the trial yesterday, the [c]ourt
had ruled with respect to the [m]urder counts. There was
a question as to the armed robbery count. The [c]ourt
expressed its belief that, based upon the [c]ourt's findings
of the facts, the armed robbery charge would be
inappropriate, but we put it over to today's date for the
parties to supply any authority.' " Williams, 188 Ill. 2d  at
299.
The State presented the court with authority, and both parties
presented argument. The circuit court then denied the defendant's
motion for a finding of not guilty as to the armed robbery charge.
No further evidence was presented. Following closing arguments,
the circuit court found the defendant guilty of armed robbery, and
sentenced the defendant to a term of 17 years' imprisonment.
	On appeal, the defendant asserted that the circuit court
unequivocally granted his motion for a finding of not guilty on the
armed robbery charge. This court rejected the defendant's
argument, and held that, under the specific facts presented, the
circuit court did not unequivocally grant defendant's motion for a
directed finding of not guilty as to the armed robbery charge. We
stressed that a review of the "entire response" of the trial judge
was warranted. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d  at 301-02. We observed that
shortly after informing the parties that she would grant the
defendant's motion, the circuit court judge indicated that she was
not yet prepared to rule by stating that she would hold the ruling
"in abeyance" if the parties wished to provide her with legal
authority. Upon the State's request to hold the portion of the ruling
relating to the armed robbery charge in abeyance, the circuit court
judge remarked that she needed to review legal authority on this
issue, that she welcomed submissions of authority by the parties,
and that she was unsure at that point whether a finding of not
guilty on the armed robbery charge would be legally supportable.
Upon these specific facts, we concluded that "the record as a
whole" disclosed that the circuit court judge had expressed to the
parties that she would postpone ruling on the defendant's motion
for a finding of not guilty on the armed robbery charge until she
had an opportunity to review pertinent legal authorities. Williams,
188 Ill. 2d  at 301-02.
	We agree with the appellate court below that our decision in
Williams is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar. Our
careful review of the entire record in the cause before us reveals
that, unlike in Williams, the circuit court judge here unequivocally
acquitted defendant of aggravated battery. In the instant matter, the
circuit court judge stated that because the prosecution failed to
present evidence that the victim was "on or about a public
sidewalk" as required under the aggravated battery statute, "I'm
going to grant the directed verdict as to count II." Unlike in
Williams, where the trial judge stated that she would grant the
defendant's motion, but also invited the parties to submit legal
authority and stated that she would be "happy to look at [the legal
authority] if you want me to hold [the ruling] in abeyance," the
circuit court judge in the matter at bar neither indicated
willingness to examine authority with respect to the aggravated
battery charge, nor offered to postpone the ruling until the parties
had an opportunity to present legal authority. Rather, after
directing the verdict on the aggravated battery charge in favor of
defendant, the circuit court judge asked the parties the general
question if there was "[a]nything else while we are still on the
record?" In answer to this query, the prosecutor requested that he
be given "leave to appeal that ruling." Thereafter, the prosecutor
and defense counsel debated whether the court's ruling directing
a verdict in defendant's favor was appealable. Defense counsel
requested a recess to speak to his client, and, when the parties
returned on the record, they continued to debate the propriety of
appealing the court's ruling. The record reveals that the circuit
court judge, as well as the parties, acted in accordance with the
belief that the circuit judge had granted defendant's motion for a
directed verdict as to the charge of aggravated battery. The
discussions held after the ruling was made focused solely upon the
propriety and the procedure of appealing the court's ruling. Unlike
in Williams, where the parties and the court debated the elements
of the charge and the sufficiency of the evidence, neither the
parties nor the court in the matter before us discussed any issues
with respect to the elements of aggravated battery nor the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravated battery
charge.
	Towards the end of the debate on the appealability of the
court's ruling, the prosecutor requested that the circuit court judge
"reserve ruling" on defendant's motion until the prosecutor could
"get in the library over the lunch hour." At this point, the circuit
court judge stated that, "reconsidering the arguments of counsel,
the court will vacate its previous order." The circuit judge further
stated that he would "reserve the ruling on the motion for directed
verdict relative to count II." Our conclusion that the circuit court
judge unequivocally granted defendant's motion for a not-guilty
finding is strengthened by the above-quoted statements of the
circuit court judge. Indeed, the judge's statements provide clear
indication that defendant's motion was granted: the judge states
that upon "reconsidering the arguments of counsel" he will
"vacate" his "previous order." It was only after another recess, and
after conducting the jury instruction conference, that the circuit
court judge stated that "in the interim" the State had provided him
with a case defining the term "about a public way" as used in the
aggravated battery statute, and that, based upon that definition, he
was denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on count II.
	We conclude that, under the specific facts presented in the
matter at bar, the circuit court judge unequivocally granted
defendant's motion for a directed finding on the aggravated battery
charge. In turn, we conclude that the acquittal represented a
resolution of "some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged." Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.  at 571, 51 L. Ed. 2d 
at 651, 97 S. Ct.  at 1355; Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d  at 311. Therefore, it
was improper for the circuit court judge to reconsider and vacate
his ruling acquitting defendant of aggravated battery. As we
observed in Williams, "reconsideration and vacation of an order
directing a verdict of not guilty exposes a criminal defendant to
further proceedings for resolving the factual elements of the
offense in violation of double jeopardy principles." Williams, 188 Ill. 2d  at 301, citing People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 179 (1990).
Accordingly, the principles of double jeopardy barred the
aggravated battery charge from being presented to the jury.
Therefore, defendant's subsequent conviction for armed robbery
violates double jeopardy.
	"The double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying
a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the
evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict."
People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1990); see also Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).(2)
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court on this
issue. Defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated battery
was properly vacated and a judgment of acquittal was properly
entered on the aggravated battery charge.
	We further agree with the appellate court that, as a result of
defendant's acquittal on the charge of aggravated battery,
defendant's conviction for the lesser-included offense of
misdemeanor battery cannot stand. " '[T]he acquittal of a
defendant on an indictment for an offense which includes lesser
offenses, operates also as an acquittal, and as a bar to any
subsequent prosecution, of all included lesser offenses of which he
might have been convicted on the indictment charging the higher
offense.' " People v. Knaff, 196 Ill. 2d 460, 471 (2001), quoting
People v. Harrison, 395 Ill. 463, 466 (1946). Accordingly,
defendant's conviction for misdemeanor battery was properly
vacated and a judgment of acquittal was properly entered by the
appellate court.
	The State next contends that the appellate court erred when it
entered an acquittal for the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
Before addressing this issue, it is important to define the
relationship between the charges of involuntary manslaughter and
aggravated battery lodged against the defendant in this case.
	As noted, defendant struck the victim with a single blow to
the face, causing the victim to fall backwards and strike his head
on the sidewalk. The victim then died as a result of the head injury
he sustained. Accordingly, the charges of involuntary
manslaughter and aggravated battery were both carved from the
defendant's single act of striking the victim in the face. As a
consequence, these two charges were subject to compulsory
joinder under section 3-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720
ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 2000)). Moreover, based on "one-act, one-crime" principles first recognized by this court in People v. King,
66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977), because precisely the same physical act
formed the basis for the two separate offenses charged, defendant
could be prosecuted for each offense, but only one conviction and
sentence could be imposed. People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77
(1988); H. Eisenberg, Multiple Punishments for the "Same
Offense" in Illinois, 11 S. Ill. U. L.J. 217, 236-37 (1987). Thus,
had this court reinstated defendant's conviction for aggravated
battery, there would be no need to consider the correctness of the
appellate court's judgment of acquittal entered on the charge of
involuntary manslaughter. Based on "one-act, one-crime"
principles, the State would have no need to prosecute defendant
again on the charge of involuntary manslaughter because the
conviction and sentence for aggravated battery would have acted
as a bar to any conviction and sentence for involuntary
manslaughter.
	It may be noted, however, that the "one-act[,] one-crime rule
has never been viewed as a rule of constitutional dimension."
People v. Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d 129, 155 (1994) (Cook, J.,
specially concurring), citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932). As
stated, the prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
multiple punishments for the same offense. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d  at
376-77. Thus, where, as here, the same act constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, but each offense requires
proof of an additional fact not required to prove the other offense,
the two offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes.
People v. Totten, 118 Ill. 2d 124, 138 (1987). Accordingly, neither
conviction nor acquittal for the offense of aggravated battery
would preclude defendant's subsequent prosecution for the offense
of involuntary manslaughter based on double jeopardy principles.
	We now turn to the merits of the State's appeal on the
question of whether the trial court erred when it entered a
judgment of acquittal on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
The appellate court, adopting the defendant's reasoning, held that
an acquittal on the charge of involuntary manslaughter was
implied by the jury's "silence" on that charge. Citing People v.
Conley, 187 Ill. App. 3d 234 (1989), the appellate court ruled that
the trial court's acceptance of the jury's verdicts on aggravated
battery and battery and its discharge of the jury must be interpreted
as an implied acquittal on the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
	We disagree with the appellate court's representation of the
facts and, therefore, must reject its conclusion. Simply stated, the
jury was not "silent" as to the charge of involuntary manslaughter.
Rather, the jury explicitly informed the court that it was unable to
reach a unanimous decision with regard to the charge of
involuntary manslaughter. As a result, the trial court declared a
mistrial as to that charge.
	It is well settled that a trial court may declare a mistrial if a
jury is unable to reach a verdict and that principles of double
jeopardy will not bar subsequent prosecution by the State on the
same charges. See, e.g., People v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 310
(1999), citing People v. Cole, 91 Ill. 2d 172, 175 (1982). We find,
therefore, that the jury's failure to render a verdict on the charge
of involuntary manslaughter in this case did not constitute an
implied acquittal. The appellate court erred when it so held.


CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's
judgment vacating defendant's conviction and sentence for
aggravated battery and entering a judgment of acquittal on that
charge. We also affirm the appellate court's judgment vacating
defendant's conviction for misdemeanor battery. We reverse the
appellate court's entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of
involuntary manslaughter. The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	Although I join in today's opinion, I write separately in order
to make several observations.
	In People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 179 (1990), this court,
relying on both state and federal case law, noted that the
reconsideration and vacation of a oral grant of a motion to direct
a verdict violated the double jeopardy clauses of both the state and
federal constitutions. More recently, we iterated this rule in People
v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (1999), stating that
"reconsideration and vacation of an order directing a verdict of not
guilty exposes a criminal defendant to further proceedings for
resolving the factual elements of the offense in violation of double
jeopardy principles." We reaffirm this rule in today's opinion. Slip
op. at 17.
	I note, however, that our conclusion that "reconsideration and
vacation of an order directing a verdict of not guilty exposes a
criminal defendant to further proceedings for resolving the factual
elements of the offense in violation of double jeopardy principles"
appears to be in conflict with decisions from federal courts which
have addressed similar factual circumstances. For example, in
United States v. Washington, 48 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1995), the district
court orally granted the defendant's motion for acquittal at the
close of the government's case in chief. The judge did not enter
judgment, however, and the trial continued with the defense
calling its first witness. The court then adjourned the proceedings
for a lunch break, during which time the judge reconsidered the
oral grant of acquittal. After lunch, the judge reversed the order
outside the presence of the jury. The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's reversal, stating that "[a]n oral grant of a motion for
acquittal is 'no more than an interlocutory order' which the court
has 'inherent power to reconsider and modify *** prior to the
entry of judgment.' " Washington, 48 F.3d  at 79, quoting United
States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2000) (same);
United States v. Baggett, 251 F.3d 1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that an oral grant of a directed finding does not terminate
jeopardy inasmuch as a court is free to change its mind prior to the
entry of judgment).
	My review of these federal authorities reveals that the federal
courts have grounded their decisions on the same case law from
the United States Supreme Court that this court relied upon in both
Mink and Williams. Nevertheless, the federal courts do not appear
to bar reconsideration of an oral grant of a motion for a directed
finding as strictly as our court. In Washington, for example, it is
clear that the district court did not "allow[ ] but then den[y] the
motion for a directed verdict 'virtually with the same breath,' "
such that it could be said that the defendant was never actually
acquitted (People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 303 (1999), quoting
with approval People v. Vilt, 119 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835 (1983))
because after the oral motion had been granted, the trial continued
with the defendant's case in chief. The reconsideration came later
when the district court had adjourned the proceedings for lunch.
Thus, federal case law seems to suggest that the reconsideration of
an oral grant of a motion for a directed finding may not be
repugnant to the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution.
	That the federal courts appear to reach a conclusion different
from ours on a given issue is of no moment in most cases. See,
e.g., People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 293-94 (1989)
(explaining that decisions of lower federal courts on questions of
constitutional law are not binding on state courts). In this case,
however, I believe the difference in outcomes is noteworthy
because we have repeatedly stressed that our own state
constitutional double jeopardy clause is to be considered in the
same manner as the double jeopardy clause of the federal
constitution. See In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1997); People v.
Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138 (1993). I note that there is nothing in our
opinions in Williams and Mink that suggests that the analyses
employed in those cases were the result of a decision to view the
double jeopardy clause contained in the Illinois Constitution more
comprehensively than that contained in the fifth amendment.
	The result we reach in today's decision is predicated on the
analysis contained in our opinion in Williams. This is in
accordance with the views of the parties, both of whom have
maintained throughout this appeal that the outcome in this case is
controlled solely by Williams. The parties have not cited to this
court any federal cases nor do they argue that the analysis in
Williams is flawed and should be revisited. Accordingly, the
question of whether this court has interpreted the double jeopardy
clause properly in light of the clause's construction by the federal
courts is not before us. I believe that the difference between our
case law and that of the federal courts, along with the reasons for
it, is deserving of this court's future consideration. Because the
parties have not raised this issue in the present case, I limit my
discussion here to noting the divergence of opinion that appears to
exist on this double jeopardy question. In so doing, I offer no
opinion as to what impact, if any, federal double jeopardy
decisions would have on the outcome in the case at bar.
	 
	 
1.      1The statutory form of this rule is set forth in section 3-4(a)(1) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 1996)), which
provides that
			"(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly
prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if
the former prosecution:
				(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a
determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
a conviction[.]"

2.      2In contrast, if a conviction is reversed because of trial error, rather
than for evidentiary insufficiency, the double jeopardy clause does not
preclude a defendant's retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978); Mink, 141 Ill. 2d  at 173.