Title: TPJ v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TPJ v. STATE2003 WY 4966 P.3d 710Case Number: C-01-3Decided: 04/16/2003Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

TPJ, 
a minor,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the Juvenile Court of Fremont County

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Tari L. 
Elam, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
Juvenile Court of the Ninth Judicial District adjudicated TPJ, age 16, to be 
delinquent following his admission of committing numerous acts of burglary.  Following the adjudication hearing, at a 
later restitution hearing the juvenile court ordered TPJ to pay a total of 
$1,964.59 as restitution to the victims of his delinquent acts of burglary.  The restitution amount included $41.59 
as the cost of a car alarm which one of TPJ's victims purchased and installed in 
her car after TPJ's burglary of her car and $300.72 as the cost of repair to a 
garage door allegedly damaged during TPJ's burglary of another victim's 
residence.  TPJ challenged these 
particular costs at the restitution hearing and renews that challenge on 
appeal.  As for the cost of the car 
alarm, TPJ asserts that it is not authorized under the statutory language "any 
damage or loss caused by the child's wrongful act."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-247(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  As for the cost 
of the garage door repair, TPJ asserts that the State failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he damaged the garage 
door.

 

[¶2]           
Although 
the State counters TPJ's challenge on its merits, it first contends that TPJ's 
notice of appeal is both defective and untimely filed.  As we shall explain below, we hold that 
TPJ's appeal is neither defective nor untimely; the relevant statutory provision 
of the Juvenile Justice Act does not authorize an award of restitution for the 
cost of the car alarm purchased and installed by the victim of a delinquent act 
after the commission of that act; the State's evidentiary standard as to 
restitution under that relevant statutory provision is a preponderance standard; 
and, applying that evidentiary standard, the State's proof as to restitution for 
the garage door repair satisfied that standard.  Consequently, we affirm the order of 
restitution with respect to the cost of the garage door repair and reverse the 
order of restitution with respect to the cost of the car 
alarm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
TPJ 
presents the following issue for our review:

 

I.  Did the district court abuse its 
discretion by ordering the appellant to pay restitution for a car alarm and 
alleged damage to a garage door?

 

The 
State contends that two issues are present in this appeal:

 

1.  Does the defective and untimely notice 
of appeal deprive this court of jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal?

 

2. 
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in ordering appellant to pay 
restitution for the cost of a car alarm and for damage done to a garage 
door?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
The 
initial hearing upon the specific allegations in the delinquency petition filed 
by the county and prosecuting attorney, as authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-6-226, was held March 29, 2001.  TPJ admitted committing numerous acts of 
burglary, including those involving the Brent Galles residence, where a garage 
door was allegedly damaged, and a car owned by Barbara Smith, who later 
purchased a car alarm, and provided a factual basis to support his 
admissions.  Following TPJ's 
admission, the juvenile court broached the subject of disposition. 

  

[¶5]           
The 
State expressed hesitancy in proceeding in the initial hearing with disposition 
because it had "no idea what the restitutional figure is."  The juvenile court then expressed the 
desire to proceed with disposition without having the restitution amounts, 
subject to TPJ's and his counsel's consent to proceed and subject to the State's 
supplying those amounts to TPJ and his counsel within twenty days.  The juvenile court required TPJ and his 
counsel to make written objections, if any, within fifteen days after the State 
supplied the amounts to them.  All 
agreed to the juvenile court's proposed procedure.  

 

[¶6]           
The 
juvenile court then received the State's recommendation for disposition and 
comments about that recommendation from others present, including TPJ and his 
counsel.  The juvenile probation 
coordinator, Teri Van Etten, who had prepared the dispositional report, TPJ's 
mother and grandmother, and TPJ's uncle were also present. Next, the juvenile 
court announced its disposition which included, among other matters, TPJ's 
placement at the Wyoming Boy's School for an indeterminate period of time.  

  

[¶7]           
Before 
adjourning the hearing, the juvenile court instructed Ms. Van Etten to acquire 
and deliver the restitution information to the county attorney.  Following the initial hearing, the 
juvenile court entered on April 2, 2001, the Order Following Initial Hearing, 
approved as to form by the county attorney, TPJ's counsel, and Ms. Van Etten, 
which order expressly included a provision addressing the court's requirement 
with respect to the restitution information. 

 

[¶8]           
In 
April 2001, the county attorney timely provided TPJ's counsel with the required 
restitution information which included each victim's name and address, property 
lost or damaged and the amounts sought in restitution for each victim.  TPJ's counsel timely objected in writing 
to certain items contained therein.  
Not until August 3, 2001, however, did the county attorney move in 
writing for a restitution hearing to resolve TPJ's objections. The juvenile 
court scheduled that hearing for August 22, 2001.  The hearing took place as scheduled. At 
the hearing, the juvenile court took evidence and heard argument from counsel 
concerning Barbara Smith's purchase and installation of a car alarm and the 
estimated cost of Brent Galles' garage door repair. 

  

[¶9]           
At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court announced its decision, 
ordering TPJ to pay a total of $1,964.59 as restitution, which included the 
amounts of $41.59 as the cost of the car alarm and $300.72 as the cost of garage 
door repair.  This appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶10]      
Our 
standard of review of restitution orders is limited to a search for procedural 
error or a clear abuse of discretion.  
Alcarez v. State, 2002 WY 57, ¶5, 44 P.3d 68, ¶5 (Wyo. 2002).  We will not find an abuse of discretion 
if sufficient evidence shows a reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  Id.  "Judicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Id.

 

[¶11]      
TPJ's 
first issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, and we look first 
to finding the answer in the language of these provisions.  "Determining the lawmakers' intent is 
our primary focus when we interpret statutes.  Initially, we make an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe together all parts of the statutes in pari materia, giving 
effect to each word, clause, and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous.  We will not construe 
statutes in a manner which renders any portion meaningless or produces absurd 
results."  In re WJH, 2001 WY 
54, ¶7, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).  

 

[¶12]      
In 
considering his second issue, we see that in his reply brief, TPJ agrees with 
the State that in criminal cases we review whether the amount of restitution was 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence and that burden of proof should be 
applied in juvenile restitution cases.  
We agree and hold that is the burden of proof by which we review whether 
sufficient evidence proved the amount of damages to the garage door.  See Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 493 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶13]      
The 
State's issue that the appeal was untimely is a jurisdictional challenge.   To invoke appellate jurisdiction, 
appeals must be filed no later than thirty days after the district court enters 
its final order.   In re 
Interest of BW, 12 P.3d 675, 677 (Wyo. 2000); W.R.A.P. 2.01.  The timely filing of a notice of appeal 
is jurisdictional.  Holmquist v. 
State, 902 P.2d 217 (Wyo. 1995).  
"A late filing of an appeal results in an incurable jurisdictional 
defect, leaving this Court with no authority to resolve the case."  Id. at 217-18.  

The 
Appeal Is Neither Defective Nor Untimely

 

[¶14]      
The 
juvenile court's Order Following Restitutional Hearing was entered September 4, 
2001.  One week later, on September 
11, 2001, TPJ's counsel filed a notice of appeal giving notice of the intention 
to appeal the "Judgment and Sentence of the Court rendered on the 
22nd day of August, 2001, by the Honorable Nancy Guthrie, District 
Judge, Ninth Judicial District." 

 

[¶15]      
Accompanying 
this notice was a copy of the juvenile court's order following the restitutional 
hearing referenced above. The appellate proceeding progressed in normal course, 
with the parties submitting the case to this Court on written briefs.  As earlier mentioned, although the State 
in its brief counters on the merits TPJ's enumerated errors with respect to the 
restitution ordered for Smith's car alarm and Galles' garage door repair, the 
State first contends that TPJ's notice of appeal is defective and untimely 
filed.  If the State's contentions 
are correct, the State reasons, then this Court lacks jurisdiction over this 
appeal.

 

[¶16]      
The 
State's contention that the notice of appeal is defective proceeds on two 
bases.  First, focusing on the 
wording in the notice of appeal that references "the Judgment and Sentence of 
the court rendered on" August 22, 2001, the State asserts "[t]here is no 
judgment and sentence in juvenile cases. . . . Accordingly, there was no 
judgment and sentence in this case to appeal from."  Second, although conceding that "the 
tenor of [TPJ's appellate brief] . . . strongly indicates that it 
was the Order Following Restitutional Hearing which he wished to contest in this 
Court," the State condemns TPJ's notice of appeal for "fail[ing] to identify the 
juvenile court's Order Following Restitutional Hearing, which was entered 
September 4, 2001."

 

[¶17]      
TPJ's 
reply brief addresses the State's contention that the notice of appeal is 
defective.  TPJ correctly points out 
that an express provision of the Juvenile Justice Act authorizes a juvenile to 
appeal "any final order, judgment or decree of the juvenile 
court . . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. §14-6-233 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Identifying the crux of the 
State's contention to be that "TPJ's counsel did not correctly type the name of 
the hearing and order" in the notice of appeal, TPJ asserts that his counsel 
correctly identified in the notice of appeal the object of the appeal as the 
juvenile court's order rendered August 22, 2001, and also attached to that 
notice of appeal a copy of that juvenile court's order following restitutional 
hearing.  Asserting that it is clear 
what TPJ was appealing, TPJ protests that for one to conclude otherwise is to 
put form over substance.  We agree 
with TPJ's position and hold that the notice of appeal is not 
defective.

 

[¶18]      
The 
State's contention that the notice of appeal is untimely filed relies upon In 
re Interest of BW, 12 P.3d 675 (Wyo. 2000), which the State contends is 
controlling.  According to the 
State, in BW, as here, the juvenile court left open the amount of 
restitution when it entered the dispositional order and the juvenile did not 
appeal the dispositional order.  In 
BW, according to the State, the juvenile court fixed the amount of 
restitution three years later; BW appealed, and this Court held that the appeal 
was untimely, and dismissed the appeal.  
Id. at 677.

 

[¶19]      
TPJ 
addresses the untimeliness issues in his reply brief.  Confronting the State's reliance on 
BW, TPJ distinguishes the facts in that case from the facts in his 
case.  He correctly points out that 
in BW, unlike in his case, in the initial hearing the juvenile court in 
fact ordered restitution in an amount to be determined after the victim of BW's 
sexual assault had received counseling and medical care.  Id.  We also note that in BW, unlike 
here, BW's legal contention was that the juvenile court lacked statutory 
authority to delay setting restitution.  
Id. at 676.  We find 
that TPJ's analysis of BW is correct.  In that case, we found that, unlike 
here, the juvenile court in the dispositional phase had "entered an open-ended 
restitution order from which no appeal had been taken."  Id. at 677.  Here, in contrast to BW, the 
juvenile court, with the consent of both the State and TPJ and his counsel, 
reserved the restitutional order to a later time.  When the juvenile court later held the 
restitution hearing and entered its final order on restitution, TPJ timely 
appealed that final order.  W.R.A.P. 
2.01.  We hold that TPJ's notice of 
appeal is timely.

 

 

The 
Applicable Statutory Provision Does Not Permit Restitution For Car 
Alarm

 

[¶20]      
We 
now turn to TPJ's contention that the cost of Smith's car alarm, which she 
purchased and installed after he burglarized her car, is not authorized under 
the statutory language "any damage or loss caused by the child's wrongful 
act."  § 14-6-247(a)(v).  The relevant part of that statute 
provides:

 

(a) 
For a child at any sanction level, the juvenile court may:

 

            
* * * *

            
(v) Require the child and his parents or guardian to make restitution for 
any damage or loss caused by the child's wrongful act, except that the 
liability of the parent or guardian shall not exceed the limit established by 
W.S. 14-2-203[.]

 

Id. 
(emphasis 
added).

 

[¶21]      
TPJ 
contends that the statutory language does not cover a victim's post-wrongful act 
purchase of a car alarm to be installed to prevent future car burglaries and not 
to replace an existing car alarm that was damaged or stolen during the 
commission of the juvenile's wrongful act in question.  He contends that Smith's car was not 
equipped with a car alarm at the time of TPJ's wrongful act of burglarizing her 
car and TPJ did not damage or steal a car alarm in Smith's car when he committed 
the wrongful act of burglarizing Smith's car.

 

[¶22]      
TPJ 
asserts that the facts of his case most resemble the facts in Alcarez v. 
State, 2002 WY 57, 44 P.3d 68 (Wyo. 2002).  There the victim store owner purchased a 
surveillance camera system because someone was stealing money from the store 
during hours when it was closed and the system identified Alcaraz as the 
thief.  Id. at 70.  This Court reversed the district court's 
restitution order which ordered Alcaraz to pay for the system and remanded with 
directions that the district court make a reasonable apportionment of the system 
cost between Alcaraz and the store owner.  
Id. at 73.  This Court 
reasoned that Alcaraz should not pay for the system, but only a reasonable 
proportion, because the store owner realized future benefits from the system, 
beyond those benefits realized by apprehending Alcaraz.  Id.  TPJ says Smith will realize no benefits 
from the car alarm associated with his apprehension because he was apprehended 
without her having a car alarm; but Smith will realize future benefits from the 
car alarm in the form of preventing/thwarting possible future car break-ins by 
other burglars.

 

[¶23]      
According 
to the State, TPJ misconceives the nature of the loss suffered by Barbara Smith 
as a direct consequence of TPJ's actions, and the State argues that although 
Smith bought the car alarm after TPJ's wrongful act, she bought it because that 
wrongful act made Smith insecure and afraid that her car would be broken into 
again.  Therefore, reasons the 
State, her fear, which motivated her to buy the car alarm, was a direct result 
of TPJ's wrongful act; his wrongful act caused her fear, and to alleviate it, 
she bought the alarm, and the juvenile court properly considered that buying the 
car alarm was equivalent to "damage or loss" under the statute.  

 

[¶24]      
The 
juvenile court held that TPJ's wrongful act was "the direct cause for [Smith's] 
purchasing a car alarm," relying on Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 764 
(Wyo. 1992), a criminal burglary case in which the defendant paid restitution 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 for the victim's expense in changing locks to 
her residence which the defendant had earlier burglarized.  The State contends that an evident 
analogy exists between Dreiman and TPJ's juvenile case:  in each case the victim's fear caused by 
the defendant's criminal act motivated the victim to incur expense.  

 

[¶25]      
The 
State correctly states that proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act are not 
criminal, but are special proceedings.  
BW, 12 P.3d  at 677.  
The proceedings are equitable and not punitive to accomplish the purpose 
of providing "treatment, training and rehabilitation" for children, and to 
"provide for the care, the protection and the wholesome moral, mental and 
physical development of children coming within its provisions."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-201(c)(ii)(C) and 
(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001); see also WJH,¶¶9, 10.  Accordingly, statutes providing for the 
care and discipline of juvenile delinquents are generally entitled to a liberal 
effect and a practical construction in favor of the child's welfare.   WJH,¶¶7, 8.  The plain language of the statute, 
however, still controls our search for the legislative intent when it used the 
term "restitution for any damage or loss caused by the child's wrongful 
act."  
Id.

 

[¶26]      
Plainly, 
the statute limits the amount of restitution to the damages or losses caused by 
the juvenile's wrongful act and does not expressly extend to reimbursement of 
security devices added by the victim after the commission of the crime that will 
benefit the victim in the future.  
In Alcarez, we determined that restitution should be ordered to 
compensate for legally recognized losses that directly resulted from the 
criminal act.  Alcarez, ¶14. 
To comply with this rule in that case, the district court was required to 
distinguish between those damages that would compensate the victim for monetary 
losses and the benefits that would continue to inure to the victim and, thus, 
could not be subject to restitution lest the victim gain a windfall.  Id.  By requiring there to be a direct 
causal connection between the juvenile's criminal act and the damages or losses 
incurred, we see that the car alarm was purchased after TPJ's burglary not 
because he stole or damaged one from the car, but for the future benefit to the 
victim of preventing other burglaries.  
Using Alcarez' analysis, we hold that the car alarm purchase was 
not caused by TPJ's criminal act, and we hold that the juvenile court abused its 
discretion in ordering restitution for reimbursement to Ms. Smith for the car 
alarm.

 

 

The 
Damage to the Garage Door Was Proved by Sufficient 
Evidence

 

[¶27]      
TPJ 
contends that the only evidence presented to the juvenile court was hearsay 
testimony by Irene Martinez, the victim/witness coordinator, that Mr. Galles had 
told her that the damage was not present before he and his family left for the 
weekend.  The State contends that 
the juvenile court had TPJ's admissions that he and a friend had broken into the 
garage and evidence showing that it was likely that whoever broke into the 
garage had damaged the door, and the juvenile court found TPJ and his friend 
jointly and severally liable for the damages caused by their burglaries.  An estimate for repairing the door was 
presented to the juvenile court, and based on the circumstantial evidence, the 
juvenile court had sufficient evidence to find that TPJ had damaged the door 
during the burglary in the amount shown by the repair estimate and did not abuse 
its discretion in ordering restitution.  
We agree with this assessment and hold that the juvenile court did not 
abuse its discretion.

 

[¶28]      
We 
affirm the order of restitution with respect for the cost of the garage door 
repair and reverse the order of restitution with respect to the cost of the car 
alarm.