Title: State v. Baker

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

671 P.2d 152 (1983) STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey Dean BAKER, Defendant and Appellant. No. 18245. Supreme Court of Utah. September 21, 1983. *154 G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant. David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. DURHAM, Justice: The appellant, Jeffrey Dean Baker, appeals from a conviction of burglary, a third degree felony, and alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the offense of criminal trespass. Baker argues that criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, is a lesser included offense and that the court's refusal to instruct was prejudicial error. The evidence presented at trial showed that at approximately 2:30 a.m. on the morning of September 18, 1981, Baker climbed over a chain link fence enclosing one side of a gas station, broke a window and entered the building. The sounds made by the rattling fence and the breaking glass awakened the resident of an adjacent home, who called the police. The police arrived within five or ten minutes. The neighbor heard their voices and saw their flashlights as they inspected the exterior of the station. The owner of the gas station arrived approximately 30 minutes later and opened the building. Inside, the police and the owner found that a lock had been broken off of a desk drawer and that the drawer was open and the contents scattered. The officers and owner saw no one and discovered nothing missing or moved except the contents of the desk drawer. Outside, the owner identified Baker's pickup truck, which was parked beside the station. Baker had been an employee there for about a month, but had been fired three days earlier for failure to come to work. The owner then left, leaving the police officers to wait for a tow truck so that Baker's pickup truck could be impounded. Approximately one hour later the owner returned to open his business for the day. As he entered he heard a loud noise in a storage closet. The owner summoned the police officers, who were still outside, and together they opened the door into the storage closet. Inside, they found Baker concealed in a very small area behind the station's air compressor. He had removed dirty uniforms from a bin and had piled them over his body. The officers placed Baker under arrest. He was subsequently convicted of burglary. The only question before this Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass. A survey of Utah case law reveals two standards used by trial and appellate courts in determining when to instruct a jury regarding lesser included offenses. The first standard requires an analysis of the evidence offered at trial: State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811, 812 (1970) (emphasis added). Although this case was decided prior to the current statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402, which was enacted in 1973, it is not contrary to the statute and has been followed in many subsequent cases involving a variety of crimes. See, e.g., State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (1976) (defendant convicted of unlawful distribution of controlled substance); State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1353 (1977) (defendant convicted of first degree murder); State v. Hendricks, Utah, 596 P.2d 633, 634 (1979) (defendant convicted of burglary); State v. Howard, Utah, 597 P.2d 878, 880 (1979) (defendant charged with two counts of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter). The other standard frequently cited relies upon a comparison of the abstract statutory elements of the offenses. It states that "[t]he lesser offense must be a necessary *155 element of the greater offense and must of necessity be embraced within the legal definition of the greater offense and be a part thereof." State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 36, 33 P.2d 640, 645 (1934). This standard has also been followed in numerous cases. See, e.g., State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 198, 371 P.2d 27, 29 (1962) (charge of driving and injuring another while intoxicated); State v. Sunter, Utah, 550 P.2d 184, 185 (1976) (defendant convicted of attempted burglary); State v. Gandee, Utah, 587 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1978) (defendant convicted of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon). Even though the two standards are different, some cases refer to both. See e.g., State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 146, 499 P.2d 287, 288 (1972) (defendant convicted of indecent assault); State v. Hendricks, supra. This situation is not unique to Utah law. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 318 (D.C. Cir.1971) (footnotes omitted). The simultaneous use of these two standards in our jurisdiction has resulted in some confusion in the law on lesser included offenses. When considered in their original contexts, it becomes clear that these standards developed to protect different interests. The narrower standard, requiring a comparison of the statutory elements of the offenses in the abstract, is the older of the two standards. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2387, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This is the "necessarily included offense" standard which is found in Utah R.Crim.P. 21(e) (codified at U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-21(e)) (emphasis added): U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(5) also refers to necessarily included offenses: (Emphasis added.) The requirement that the lesser offense be necessarily included in the charged offense is for the protection of the defendant. United States v. Whitaker, supra, at 320 (citations omitted). The Court in that case quoted from a venerable Supreme Court decision: Id. at n. 17 (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10-13, 7 S. Ct. 781, 786-87, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1886)). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937). Just as a defendant is constitutionally protected from alterations in the indictment, he is similarly protected from instructions to the jury which might subject him to a conviction of a crime against which he has had no opportunity to defend. In discussing necessarily included offenses, the Supreme Court of Michigan summarized: People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 388, 236 N.W.2d 461, 464 (1975) (citations omitted). See also Utah Const. art. I., §§ 7, 12 & 13. Thus, when the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed lesser included offense, both the legal elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be included within the original charged offense. See U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(3)(a). In State v. Howell, supra, we stated that "there can be no unfairness to the defendant in giving a lesser included offense instruction because of a lack of notice or preparation since no element may be included in the lesser offense that is not included in the greater offense." Id. at 95. The offenses must be such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser. This ensures the defendant the notice and opportunity necessary to prepare his defense to both offenses: his defense against the greater will, of necessity, be a defense against the lesser also, with regard to both the law and the facts alleged. Thus, the "necessarily included offense" standard was correctly used by this Court in State v. Woolman, supra, State v. Brennan, supra, and State v. Howell, supra. All are cases in which the prosecution requested an instruction on a lesser included offense. The more restrictive standard was required to protect the defendant from having to defend against an offense not charged. Unfortunately, the Woolman standard has subsequently been cited on occasion by this Court as the general rule in cases where it was not the State but rather the defendant who requested the instruction on a lesser included offense. See, e.g., State v. Williams, Utah, 636 P.2d 1092 (1981); State v. Cross, 649 P.2d 72 (1982). We are now persuaded that the "necessarily included offense" standard should be limited to cases where the prosecution requests the instruction. The prosecution faces no loss of life or liberty at trial and is not constitutionally entitled to the same protections afforded the defendant. Different concerns are raised when the defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included offense. In Beck v. Alabama, supra, the Supreme Court stated: Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at 633, 100 S. Ct. at 2388. By having the jury instructed regarding a lesser included offense, the defendant is afforded the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard: Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1997-98, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court also warned of this risk in Beck v. Alabama: Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at 642, 100 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Jacobs v. State, Ala., 361 So. 2d 640, 651-52 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1034, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979)). Thus, where proof of an element of the crime is in dispute, the availability of the "third option" the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater or acquittal gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. In Keeble v. United States, the Supreme Court stopped short of declaring that the defendant's right to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court warned, however, that a construction of the statute under consideration in that case precluding lesser included offense instructions "would raise difficult constitutional questions." Keeble v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. at 213, 93 S. Ct. at 1998. See also Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S. Ct. at 2389. The Court went further in a recent case, stating that "Beck held that due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction." Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1982). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that if supported by evidence, "[t]he due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a trial judge to give a lesser included offense instruction... ." Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir.1982). This is not to say that the defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is absolute or unqualified. Neither is it correct "that the defendant's procedural right to an included offense instruction is based on some supposed notion of the jury's compassion or leniency." United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir.1980). These potential characteristics of jurors are "inherent in the jury system" but standing alone do not constitute "a permissible basis to justify such an instruction." Id. (quoting Kelly v. United States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir.1966) (cert. denied 388 U.S. 913, 87 S. Ct. 2127, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1355 (1967)). The defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is limited by the evidence presented at trial. This limitation requires the application of the evidence-based standard discussed earlier, which is the appropriate basis for determining whether to instruct a jury regarding a lesser included offense at the defendant's request. People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 563, 127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1955) (citations omitted). This evidence-based standard is widely recognized. In Beck v. Alabama, the Supreme Court noted that "[a]lthough the States vary in their descriptions of the quantum of proof necessary to give rise to a right to a lesser included offense instruction, they agree that it must be given when supported by the evidence." The Court then listed cases in 46 jurisdictions, including Utah. 447 U.S. at 636 n. 12, 100 S. Ct. at 2389 n. 12 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Gillian, supra). In Keeble v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court held that "it is now beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Id., 412 U.S. at 208, 93 S. Ct. at 1995 (emphasis added). See also Beck v. Alabama, supra. In Hopper v. Evans, supra, the Supreme Court emphasized that "due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction." Id., 456 U.S. at 611, 102 S. Ct. at 2053, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 373 (emphasis in original). In United States v. Johnson, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the "mechanical comparison of statutory elements," concluding that although such a comparison "may be appealing in its promise of certainty and intellectual purity, ... its artificiality is unresponsive to the underlying purposes of the lesser included offense doctrine... ." Id., 637 F.2d at 1238. The court noted: Id. at 1235 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit Court has also ruled: United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908, 916 (10th Cir.1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Accord United States v. Slater, 692 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.1982). Our statute incorporates this evidence-based standard by providing that: U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(4). The definitions of an "included offense" are contained in the preceding paragraph, § 76-1-402(3). That section contains three alternative definitions, only one of which, (3)(a), is at issue in this case. Paragraph (3)(a) says that an offense is included in a charged offense when "it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." The analysis of whether an offense is included for purposes of deciding whether to grant a defendant's request for a jury instruction must therefore begin with the proof of facts at trial. If the same facts tend to prove elements of more than one statutory offense, then the offenses are related under § 76-1-402. The application of § 76-1-402(3)(a) will thus require some reference to the statutory elements of the offenses involved in order to determine *159 whether given facts are "required to establish the commission of the offense charged." This requirement that there exist some overlap in the statutory elements of allegedly "included" offenses would prevent the argument that totally unrelated offenses could be deemed included simply because some of the evidence necessary to prove one crime was also necessary to prove the other. For example, evidence proving theft in a trial involving only a charge of first degree homicide would not make theft a lesser included offense under § 76-1-402(3)(a) because none of the statutory elements of theft and homicide overlap. However, where two offenses are related because some of their statutory elements overlap, and where the evidence at the trial of the greater offense includes proof of some or all of those overlapping elements, the lesser offense is an included offense under subsection (3)(a). Once it is established that an offense is included within the meaning of § 76-1-402(3), one more step is required before the trial court must instruct the jury regarding it. Under § 76-1-402(4), the court is obligated to instruct on the lesser offense only if the evidence offered provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." This standard does not require the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact. The court must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all jury instructions in any trial. When the elements of two offenses overlap as discussed in the previous paragraph, if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the defendant. This situation will often arise when the critical question is either the credibility of certain evidence or the determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of the evidence. By assessing the evidence and deciding whether any interpretation of it would, if believed by the jury, permit conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal of the greater, the court preserves the weighing of evidence for the jury but is still able to protect the weighing process from frivolous "red herrings." In the instant case, we do not believe that the evidence was ambiguous or subject to any alternative interpretation that required the court to instruct on a lesser offense. The defendant was found in the storage closet of a locked building. He did not deny breaking into the gas station or forcibly opening a locked desk. The only evidence presented by the defendant was the testimony of his friend, who testified that he and the defendant had been drinking together at a bar and that he observed symptoms of intoxication in the defendant's behavior. When the friend was cross-examined, he testified that the defendant was stopped by police while driving the friend home, that the police asked the defendant to get out of the truck, that they talked with him and smelled his breath but did not give him the field sobriety test, allowing him instead to get back into his truck and drive away. In closing argument, the defendant's counsel argued that either the defendant was too intoxicated to form the intent necessary under the burglary charge, or else that the defendant broke into the gas station for some unspecified reason other than to commit a theft or felony. The statutes setting out the crimes of burglary and criminal trespass are as follows: U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-202(1). U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-206(1) & (2). Because the defendant has not denied his unlawful entry, the only disputed factual issue is his intent. Intent must always be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The defendant argued at trial that his intoxication prevented him from forming the required intent. However, the only evidence of intoxication showed that the defendant was not seriously enough incapacitated by his drinking to cause the police to give him field sobriety tests. This is not a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant an instruction regarding the defendant's capacity to form an intent. Even if it were, the defendant's theory would not support the giving of an instruction on criminal trespass, an offense which itself requires a specific intent. The thrust of the defendant's evidence on intoxication was to negate any specific intent at all, not to prove the existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass. See State v. Hendricks, supra, at 634. Finally, the appellant also argues that the evidence of unlawfully entering, opening the desk and rifling its contents, and hiding under dirty uniforms in a storage closet would permit the jury to find that he did not intend to commit a theft because there was nothing missing in the gas station, and consequently an instruction on criminal trespass should have been given. As we have held, when the evidence is susceptible to alternative interpretations, the trial court is obligated to give a lesser included offense instruction if any of those alternative interpretations would provide both a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." § 76-1-402(4) (emphasis added). The appellant does not argue the second part of the statutory requirement. In his brief on appeal, he does not point to any evidence in the record which goes to the specific intent elements of the crime of criminal trespass. His sole argument on this issue is that "under these facts one reasonable theory would be that [he] did not have the intent to commit a theft when he unlawfully entered the building or remained in it." That argument goes only to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of burglary; it does not address the separate and distinct intent elements necessary for criminal trespass. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. STEWART, OAKS and HOWE, JJ., concur. HALL, C.J., concurs in the result.