Title: In Re Estate of Shields

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

224 Kan. 604 (1978)
584 P.2d 139
In the Matter of the Estate of Robert Dean Shields, Deceased;
MICHAEL B. SHIELDS, Administrator, and PATRICIA LYNN KNIGHT, Appellees,
v.
VICTORIA ANN SHIELDS, Appellant.
No. 48,770

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed September 14, 1978.
Michael G. Coash, of Bond, Bond & Coash, of El Dorado, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
James F. Richey, of Rumsey & Richey, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellees.
Amici Curiae briefs were filed by Robert D. Hecht and Robert E. Keeshan, of Scott, Quinlan & Hecht, of Topeka; Robert A. McClure and Michael W. Merriam, of Colmery, McClure, Funk, Letourneau & Entz, of Topeka; and Linda D. Elrod and John F. Kuether, of Washburn University, of Topeka.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This case is before the court on a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The original action in the trial court was for a determination of the distribution of the property of Robert Dean Shields, who died intestate of gunshot wounds inflicted by his wife, Victoria Ann Shields. Victoria was convicted of feloniously killing her husband. Victoria and Robert owned both real and personal property as joint tenants. The two children of the couple claim that by reason of K.S.A. 59-513, Victoria has no interest in any property in which Robert had an interest, including the property held in joint tenancy. Victoria claims she is the owner of one-half of the joint tenancy property and that if she is deprived of that ownership by K.S.A. 59-513, the statute contravenes Section 12 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution.
The district court adopted the position of the children and held that Victoria succeeded to no interest in the joint tenancy property. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and held:
We have carefully reviewed the record, including excellent briefs of the parties and amici curiae, and adhere to the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, the decision of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the views set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
McFARLAND, J., dissenting:
England's Prime Minister Disraeli remarked that if a person loves the law or sausage, then he shouldn't watch either being made. This is all the more true when bad law is being made. I believe the majority opinion is making some bad law.
K.S.A. 59-513 clearly divests the surviving joint tenant of all interest in joint tenancy property upon conviction of the felonious slaying of the deceased joint tenant. The majority opinion concludes that this loss of interest in joint tenancy property is a forfeiture in contravention of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution. I strongly disagree.
"Forfeiture of estate" following a conviction is separate and apart from the term "forfeiture" as used in modern contract law. The majority opinion, in effect, makes the two terms synonymous. In order to understand the difference in the terms, it is necessary to trace the development in English common law of "forfeiture of estate." A somewhat oversimplified statement on the subject appears in 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 616, p. 566, as follows:
A rather comprehensive study of forfeiture of this matter appears in Reppy, "The Slayer's Bounty  History of Problem in Anglo-American Law," 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 229 (1942), wherein it is stated:
There is little to be gained by tracing English law over the centuries to show how forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood were modified and, in some respects, made less harsh. However, it is interesting to note that the system of attainder with its accompanying forfeiture was a basic part of English law and was a difficult issue for compromise when England and Scotland were merged since these concepts were alien to the Scottish law. It is sufficient to say that gradually the list of offenses for which attainder applied was reduced and the effects thereof were softened. Forfeiture for all but high treason came to be for a given period of time, usually a year and a day. The Crown was specifically permitted to commit waste during forfeiture. In fact, the King, at one period of time, had the right to penalize felons by *607 deliberate waste such as pulling down their houses, destroying their gardens, cutting down their woods, etc. The basis for this harsh rule goes clear back to biblical days and was a part of Roman law.
It should be remembered that nationalism is a comparatively recent concept and in earlier times drastic measures were necessary to keep loosely knit kingdoms intact. The harsh measures of forfeiting, in essence, the rights of one's descendants, was valuable in maintaining loyalty to the government. As stated in 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *382:
In passing, it should be noted that an extensive discussion of attainder and forfeiture appears in the Blackstone Commentaries, but in the interest of brevity, this material is summarized. It is sufficient to say that the English continued to modify the severe effects of the doctrine with the passage of various laws. The list of crimes where forfeiture was allowed was reduced. But forfeiture remained until 1870 with the passage of the Forfeiture Act of 1870 (33 & 34 Vict., c. 23). Reppy, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. at p. 244, traces the development of the doctrine in the United States as follows:
The time frame is important to be noted, then. In 1859 the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution was enacted. Section 12 of the Bill of Rights provided:
In 1972 the Section was amended to delete the phrase "corruption of blood or." At the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, it is important to note that attainder with its accompanying forfeiture was a part of the common law applicable to the new state. The Federal Constitution prohibited forfeiture only in matters of treason. Therefore, the prohibition against corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate upon conviction performed the valuable services of eliminating from the common law of the state these harsh penalties and prohibiting any future revival of same. The fact that corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate were linked together in their abolition clearly shows the desire to eliminate two of the three parts of attainder, leaving only civil death.
The concept of a felon forfeiting everything he owns to the government as a penalty for his crime is so alien to modern jurisprudence that it is difficult to realize that it was a part of our law in comparatively recent times. Nevertheless, it is forfeiture of estate to the government as a fine or penalty that is forbidden by Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
Taken in context of the time of its passage and the part of the common law which it was abolishing, it is clear that K.S.A. 59-513 is not in contravention of the constitutional prohibition. The statute in question does not authorize any forfeiture of the estate to the government upon conviction. Vestiges of the old common law have been enacted and have been upheld as far as in rem forfeitures of specific contraband items or instruments used in crimes.
37 C.J.S., Forfeitures § 1, pp. 4-5, states:
The majority opinion confuses forfeiture to the government with forfeitures between private individuals in civil proceedings. The case before us is a civil action and the abolition of forfeiture of estate contained in the Bill of Rights is wholly inapplicable. In disputes between parties, such as the case at hand, one forfeits some right due to some act or omission on one's part. For example, failure to pay the contract price as specified can result in a forfeiture in the interest in land one is purchasing. By Kansas law, one spouse cannot will away from the other spouse more than one-half of his or her real estate without consent (K.S.A. 59-602). If the deceased does will away more than one-half of his or her real estate, the surviving spouse may elect to take under laws of intestate succession rather than by will. If the surviving spouse is convicted of feloniously slaying the deceased spouse, he or she "forfeits" his or her rights to inherit anything pursuant to K.S.A. 59-513. Likewise, under K.S.A. 59-513, a person convicted of feloniously slaying another "forfeits" all beneficiary rights to life insurance on the deceased regardless of the fact the slayer may have paid all premiums thereon. I see no distinction between these "forfeitures" of contract rights and those pertaining to joint tenancy.
The fact that a partition action could have been run on joint tenancy property during the lifetime of the joint tenants does not mean that the slayer has a vested interest in one-half of the property. The slayer has extinguished the deceased's option to partition the property. Death by any means other than at the hands of the other joint tenant divests the deceased of any interest in the jointly held property.
*610 Under the majority opinion, a judge, in a divorce action, could award joint tenancy property to the wife at 5:00 p.m., and the husband could reacquire half of the property at 5:15 p.m. by killing the wife so long as the entry of judgment had not been made. The majority opinion, in essence, authorizes "out-of-court partition actions" maintained by the use of a gun. In joint tenancy, the survivor receives all. That is a part of the contract of the parties. K.S.A. 59-513 simply adds another condition. That is, if you survive, you inherit all providing you are not the survivor due to your own felonious act of taking the life of the other joint tenant. Little time needs to be spent on the proposition that it is in the best interest of public policy to discourage citizens of the state from killing other citizens of the state. That no man shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong is a basic tenet of our system of jurisprudence.
The major part of the majority opinion is concerned with what is "most equitable" to the slayer. I have great difficulty applying equity to the situation at hand. The property is not being divided by a partition action and cannot be because one joint tenant has killed the other. The legal maxims, that "to seek equity one must do equity," "clean hands," etc., seem outrageously inappropriate. Victoria Shields murdered her husband and now seeks equity? I cannot comprehend how she could be coming to the court with clean hands. One wonders what the majority will think is most "equitable" in a situation where the remainderman feloniously slays the life tenant.
The issue before the court is relatively simple. I believe that the Bill of Rights, for reasons heretofore stated, does not prohibit the legislature from divesting a surviving joint tenant of any interest in joint tenancy property when the death of the decedent was feloniously caused by the surviving joint tenant. The reason for such a law is well-founded in public policy. The legislature had the power to enact K.S.A. 59-513 and it is not for this court to question the wisdom of the legislature in so doing. The law can be supported amply on grounds of public policy. Granted, in some individual cases it may be harsh but that in no way affects its validity. All degrees of felonious killing, under the statute, are treated in the same manner. Therefore, premeditated murder is treated the same as involuntary manslaughter. The fact that the *611 result might be harsh in some cases does not invalidate the law. For example, take a "May-December" marriage. Usually, December has the money. Assume that May married December for the money and coldly, calculatedly, and premeditatedly murders December. The operation of the law is very fair and just. Suppose, on the other hand, that December finds out about the plan before it is perpetrated, argues with May in a drunken rage, and unintentionally kills her. December is then divested of all interest in joint tenancy property as a result of being convicted of involuntary manslaughter. December will then lose all interest in joint-tenancy property which was his alone prior to the marriage. The result is very harsh to December. No law or interpretation thereof can be fair in both circumstances. But it is not up to this court to determine the wisdom of legislation.
It is rather ironic that in the first Kansas case on the slayer's bounty issue, McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906), this court refused to disinherit a husband who killed his wife because the legislature had not provided authority for such action. The result of this decision was the first Kansas statute limiting the right of a convicted killer to inherit (L. 1907, ch. 193, § 1). In Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), the history of K.S.A. 59-513 was considered and the court held that its enactment was a reaction to McAllister, stating:
In Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918), aff'd on rehearing, 104 Kan. 689, 180 Pac. 811 (1919), this court said of the statute:
In In re Estate of Foster, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d 855 (1958), the joint tenant husband was convicted of a felonious killing of his wife. The statute in effect at the time stated:
*612 The court found that because joint tenancy property passed as of the moment of death and was not a part of the estate, the statute was inapplicable. The language of the case is particularly interesting, as follows:
In re Estate of Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967), involved a murder-suicide factual situation. Obviously, in such circumstances, no conviction is possible. The apparent slayer received the property. This court held:
The majority finds that the legislature responded to the results of Foster and Pyke when it enacted the present K.S.A. 59-513 which prohibits the taking of any interest in joint tenancy property by a joint tenant convicted of slaying the deceased joint tenant and which brings the murder-suicide situation into the simultaneous death provisions of K.S.A. 58-701 to 58-705, inclusive. It is ironic that, in Foster, this court said it could not divest a surviving joint tenant of interest in the property because the legislature had pre-empted the field and had not enacted a statute to that effect. The legislature then enacted precisely such a statute. Now the majority holds the legislature could not enact such a statute because it is violative of the Bill of Rights.
The language of K.S.A. 59-513 is clear and it does not violate Section 12 of the Bill of Rights.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court.