Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Kodish

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-4090.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. KODISH. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Kodish, 110 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-4090.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Neglecting entrusted legal matter — Failure to 
cooperate in a disciplinary investigation — Conduct adversely reflecting 
on fitness to practice law — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Failure to promptly return unpaid 
fees — Failing to decline employment when personal interests may affect 
the exercise of professional judgment on a client’s behalf — Indefinite 
suspension. 
(No. 2005-1585 – Submitted January 25, 2006 — Decided August 23, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-100. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joan Allyn Kodish of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0013377, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1979.  
On November 2, 2004, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, charged respondent in 
an amended multicount complaint with professional misconduct.  A panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and made 
findings of misconduct, which the board adopted, and a recommendation, which 
the board modified. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} Respondent is the sole shareholder of the Law Offices of Joan 
Allyn Kodish, L.P.A., and practices principally in consumer bankruptcy law.  
From 1994 through 2002, respondent was involved in over 530 bankruptcy cases 
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as counsel for the debtor.  She also served as counsel for debtors or debtors-in-
possession in eight Chapter 11 cases. 
{¶ 3} Relator charged respondent with 12 counts of Disciplinary Rule 
violations for incidents occurring from 1998 through 2004 and a 13th count for 
respondent’s failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation in violation of 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  The panel and board dismissed the sixth count of the 
complaint, finding no clear and convincing evidence to support the alleged 
misconduct, and relator does not object to this determination.  The board also 
found that relator did not present clear and convincing evidence to support Count 
IV, which charged respondent with retaining unearned fees, or Count VII, which 
charged respondent with a conflict of interest arising from an intimate relationship 
with a client’s representative.  Relator does object to these findings and to the 
board’s failure to find more evidence, relative to Count XIII, of respondent’s 
failure to cooperate in the investigation of her misconduct. 
Count I - Martin 
{¶ 4} Theresa Martin paid respondent $900 in August 1999 to file a 
bankruptcy petition.  Respondent filed a Chapter 7 petition on Martin’s behalf.  
Martin wanted to keep her automobile from her creditors, so respondent told her 
to have the automobile appraised.  On November 29, 1999, respondent wrote to 
remind Martin to obtain an appraisal.  Martin did not obtain the appraisal until 
December 8, 1999. 
{¶ 5} In October 1999, however, the bankruptcy trustee moved for an 
order for Martin to turn over her vehicle or to pay the nonexempt value to the 
court, and respondent did not respond to the bankruptcy trustee’s motion.  On 
November 5, 1999, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion and ordered 
Martin to surrender the vehicle. 
{¶ 6} On December 3, 1999, the trustee filed a complaint to set aside the 
ordered discharge of Martin’s financial obligations, citing Martin’s failure to turn 
January Term, 2006 
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over the automobile or its value.  Respondent did not answer the complaint or 
otherwise appear on Martin’s behalf.  On February 18, 2000, the bankruptcy court 
entered a default judgment against Martin, denying her a discharge of her debts. 
{¶ 7} Martin had repeatedly telephoned respondent’s office before the 
default judgment was granted, but she was unable to reach her, and respondent 
did not return any of the calls.  Respondent did not testify at the hearing to explain 
her inaction.  Her attorney, however, argued that respondent was unable to help 
Martin because Martin waited too long before having her vehicle appraised.  
Respondent’s counsel maintained that without the appraisal, respondent could 
ethically do nothing for her client. 
{¶ 8} The board found one of the disciplinary violations charged against 
respondent in Count I.  Because respondent ignored her client’s efforts to 
communicate about the pending bankruptcy case, the board found that respondent 
had violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted 
legal matter). 
Count II – Wilkes 
{¶ 9} On July 18, 2001, respondent wrote a $1,400 check to Michael 
Wilkes from her Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") checking account.  
The check was returned for insufficient funds. 
{¶ 10} The board found one of the disciplinary violations charged against 
respondent in Count II.  By bouncing a check from her client trust account, the 
board found, respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law). 
Count III – Triangle Development 
{¶ 11} Among other violations, Count III alleged that respondent 
represented allied companies and individuals in separate bankruptcy cases, thus 
simultaneously representing clients with adverse interests without the clients’ 
informed consent, and that she also charged improper fees. 
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A.  Triangle and T.D.I. Fees 
{¶ 12} Triangle Development Inc. (“Triangle”) and T.D.I. Investment 
Group Partners, Inc. (“T.D.I.”) retained respondent in September 1999.  She 
agreed to represent both companies in pursuing Chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
{¶ 13} In anticipation of her filing the bankruptcy petitions, respondent 
received two $10,000 checks: one to represent Triangle, the other to represent 
T.D.I.  As part of her fee arrangement, respondent requested that Alfred E. 
Edwards III, a principal of both Triangle and T.D.I., personally guarantee 
payment of her fees.  Respondent eventually disclosed the $20,000 fee after filing 
the bankruptcies, but she apparently did not disclose Edward’s guarantee.  
Respondent did not deposit the $20,000 into her IOLTA account; however, the 
board found no evidence that she had not earned these amounts before payment. 
{¶ 14} Respondent filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions for Triangle and 
T.D.I. on September 28, 1999.  Respondent then traded Edwards the $10,000 
checks for $20,000 in cash.  A & A Quality Paving & Cement Co., L.L.C. (“A & 
A”), a company that Edwards had formed after Triangle’s and T.D.I.’s petitions 
were filed, made the $20,000 in cash available.  Respondent agreed to represent A 
& A and accepted a ten percent ownership interest in the company. 
B.  Montgomery Representation 
{¶ 15} On September 1, 2000, respondent filed the first of three separate 
bankruptcy proceedings she would pursue on behalf of Brenda Montgomery.  At 
that time, Montgomery had an ownership interest in Triangle and was listed as a 
creditor of the company.  Respondent, however, did not amend Triangle’s 
bankruptcy petition, in which Montgomery was named a codebtor, to disclose that 
she was also representing Montgomery in her bankruptcy proceedings. 
{¶ 16} On September 28, 2001, while still representing Montgomery in 
bankruptcy, respondent faxed a letter to Montgomery proposing a financial 
settlement as a means to resolve undisclosed disputes that arose during 
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5 
respondent’s representation.  The letter specified that the payments to 
Montgomery were contingent on her promise not to file a grievance claiming 
professional misconduct or to initiate any criminal prosecution.  The letter stated: 
{¶ 17} “After much soul searching, prayer, and recriminations against 
myself for the problems caused to you; I want peace and mutual respect between 
us. Therefore, below is an outline of a proposal to assist you in starting over. 
{¶ 18} “$350 per week for two years payable directly to you and for 
which you can have a promissory note. 
{¶ 19} “Within 30-45 days, you will receive a lump sum of $5,000.00; 
which sum will reduce the balance owed above. 
{¶ 20} “You will pay the Trustee and mortgage-holders on a regular basis 
from the above funds or other income. 
{¶ 21} “You will release, dismiss and/or not file or otherwise pursue any 
and all criminal complaints and/or bar association/Supreme Court complaints 
against me or my firm. 
{¶ 22} “Please understand that I cannot lawfully enter into an agreement 
unless and until we no longer have an attorney-client relationship.  However, 
there is another route to travel to make sure that you get your settlement and a 
successful Chapter 13 with me as your bankruptcy attorney.  I want to see the 
Chapter 13 move smoothly and be confirmed.  Therefore, I suggest that we 
complete the [Chapter 13] to confirmation together.  I will move the money into 
escrow each week as well as any lump sums.  Once the [Chapter 13] is confirmed, 
I will withdraw as counsel, we will sign the agreement and the funds will be 
released to you. 
{¶ 23} “This entire agreement and any discussions etc. related to it shall 
remain strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone.” 
C.  Lushion White Representation 
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{¶ 24} Respondent also represented Lushion White, another officer and a 
minority shareholder of Triangle.  On September 15, 2000, respondent filed a 
Chapter 13 voluntary bankruptcy petition on White’s behalf, but there was no 
evidence that she disclosed to the court in the Triangle bankruptcy that she was 
representing White.  Fifteen months later, respondent withdrew as White’s 
counsel. 
D.  Subsequent Events in the Triangle Bankruptcy Case 
{¶ 25} On April 17, 2001, the bankruptcy trustee moved to disqualify 
respondent as Triangle’s counsel, in part because of the conflicting interests at 
stake in representing both Triangle and Montgomery.  Respondent responded, 
advising the bankruptcy court that she had represented Montgomery between 
February 23, 2001, and mid-April 2001.  Respondent did not disclose that she had 
represented Montgomery in the earlier September 2000 bankruptcy filing or that 
she had been representing White since September 2000.  Respondent then filed a 
supplemental affidavit in the Triangle proceeding in which she acknowledged 
representing Montgomery in early 2001 but again failed to disclose that she had 
represented Montgomery and White since September 2000.  Not until November 
1, 2001, did respondent finally admit in the Triangle bankruptcy the extent to 
which she had represented both Montgomery and White. 
E.  Financial Assistance to A&A and Family Originals 
{¶ 26} While serving as counsel to A & A, respondent loaned the 
company approximately $60,000.  She also paid bills totaling between $5,000 and 
$10,000 for Family Originals Publishing Company, Inc., another company with 
which Edwards was involved, while representing A & A. 
{¶ 27} The board found that respondent had committed four of the 
disciplinary violations charged in Count III.  Because she consciously tried to 
limit her exposure for ethical, criminal, and civil misconduct in Montgomery’s 
case, the board found respondent in violation of DR l-102(A)(5) (prohibiting 
January Term, 2006 
7 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6), and 6-
102 (prohibiting a lawyer from attempting to limit his or her liability to a client 
for personal malpractice).  Because respondent had not disclosed her multiple 
representations to the bankruptcy court, the board found that respondent had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, 
or misrepresentation). 
Count IV – Pate 
{¶ 28} In 2002, Carlton Pate consulted respondent’s paralegal about 
engaging respondent to represent his son in bankruptcy.  The paralegal advised 
Pate that respondent required $500 before she would work for his son.  Pate paid 
respondent $100 toward the $500 fee but hired other counsel before paying the 
balance.  When Pate requested a refund of the $100, respondent claimed that she 
had earned the fee and refused to return any money to Pate. 
{¶ 29} Relator alleged in Count IV that respondent’s failure to return 
Pate’s $100 violated DR 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to promptly return funds 
a client is entitled to receive).  The board did not find this misconduct. 
Count V – Muffley 
{¶ 30} In March 2002, respondent filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 
on Stacy Charles Muffley’s behalf.  At that time, Muffley owned a vehicle the 
value of which exceeded the amount of the debtor’s permitted exemption.  
Respondent negotiated an agreement with the bankruptcy trustee that permitted 
Muffley to purchase the equity in his vehicle for $2,728 with payments to be 
made over a period of six months. 
{¶ 31} Muffley did not make the required payments.  In October 2002, the 
bankruptcy trustee moved for an order requiring Muffley to surrender the vehicle 
or pay the nonexempt value.  Muffley telephoned respondent’s office more than 
20 times to discuss the situation.  He was unable to reach respondent, and she did 
not return his calls.  Respondent did not respond to the trustee’s motion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} Muffley neither paid for nor surrendered his car, and in December 
2002, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint to set aside the discharge of his 
financial obligations.  Respondent failed to answer the complaint, and the 
bankruptcy trustee filed a motion for default judgment.  Shortly before a hearing 
on the motion for default judgment, Muffley advised the bankruptcy court that he 
had been unable to contact respondent.  Muffley later appeared at the hearing and, 
acting on his own behalf, resolved the issues related to his vehicle. 
{¶ 33} The board found one of the disciplinary violations charged against 
respondent in Count V.  Because respondent had ignored her client’s efforts to 
communicate about the pending bankruptcy case, the board found that respondent 
had violated DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Count VII – Relationship with the Client’s Representative 
{¶ 34} Relator alleged in Count VII that while representing Triangle and 
T.D.I., respondent engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with Edwards, the 
clients’ representative and a principal of both corporations.  Respondent admitted 
the relationship, but the board found insufficient evidence to prove violations of 
DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer, except with client consent 
after full disclosure, from accepting employment where the lawyer’s and client’s 
interests may reasonably conflict and compromise the lawyer’s independent 
judgment on the client’s behalf). 
Count VIII – Boyles 
{¶ 35} In March 2000, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
on Susan Boyles’s behalf.  The bankruptcy plan called for Boyles to make a 
monthly payment of $350 to the trustee for 60 months.  Boyles made the 
payments as required. 
{¶ 36} In 2003, Boyles attempted to contact respondent about the amount 
necessary to complete her compliance with the reorganization plan.  Boyles 
testified that she called respondent’s office three to four times a day, every 
January Term, 2006 
9 
weekday, for almost four months trying to get the payoff figure.  She was able to 
talk to respondent only three or four times during that period and never did 
discover the payoff amount from respondent. 
{¶ 37} Boyles eventually found the payoff amount by calling the 
bankruptcy court directly.  Boyles had estimated that she owed $3,000 and was 
astonished to learn that the payoff amount was approximately $16,000.  Someone 
in respondent’s office then contacted Boyles and told her that the payoff amount 
was $14,000.  Boyles ultimately engaged another attorney and paid approximately 
$15,000 to fulfill the reorganization plan.  Respondent never explained the 
discrepancy. 
{¶ 38} The board found one of the allegations charged against respondent 
in Count VIII.  Because respondent had ignored her client’s efforts to 
communicate about the pending bankruptcy case, the board found that respondent 
had violated DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Count IX – The Lees 
{¶ 39} In April 2001, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
on behalf of Peyton and Lorie Lee.  The petition was dismissed in August 2001 
due to a lack of funding for the debt-reorganization plan.  In September 2001, 
respondent moved to reinstate the debt-reorganization plan, and the bankruptcy 
court granted her motion.  The plan provided that the Lees would make their 
home-mortgage payments directly to the lender rather than through the 
bankruptcy trustee.  Respondent told the Lees to send the monthly mortgage 
payments to their mortgage company’s counsel. 
{¶ 40} The Lees followed respondent’s instructions and in early 2002 
began sending certified checks monthly by mail to their lender’s counsel.  These 
checks were not always mailed on time, causing the Lees to incur other additional 
charges and making the amount of their checks insufficient to pay the accrued 
penalties. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 41} In late 2002 or early 2003, Peyton realized that some of the 
mortgage checks had not cleared his bank.  He began calling respondent daily to 
find out why.  Respondent did not return Peyton’s calls.  In October 2002, the 
Peytons wrote respondent to ask why the checks were missing.  In May 2003, 
Peyton learned that the lender’s counsel had returned the mortgage checks to 
respondent, and someone in her office had inexplicably placed the unredeemed 
checks in the Lees’ file. 
{¶ 42} In September 2002, the bankruptcy court granted the Lees’ lender 
final relief from the automatic stay, and the lender filed a complaint against the 
Lees to foreclose on their mortgage.  As of the panel hearing, the lender’s 
complaint was pending before the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. 
{¶ 43} The board found one of the disciplinary violations alleged in Count 
IX. Because respondent ignored her clients’ efforts to communicate about their 
pending bankruptcy case, the board found respondent in violation of DR 6-
101(A)(3). 
Count X – Freeman 
{¶ 44} In April 1998, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
on behalf of Connie Freeman.  The debt-reorganization plan was originally 
funded through deductions by Freeman’s employer.  In October 2000, however, 
Freeman changed jobs and needed to change the wage order.  She telephoned 
respondent several times and visited her office on one occasion, but she was never 
able to speak with respondent.  On her own initiative, Freeman began making the 
required payments directly to the trustee. 
{¶ 45} In 2003, when Freeman thought that she was about to complete her 
compliance with the reorganization plan, Freeman called the bankruptcy court to 
see when she would make her last payment.  Freeman learned that after making 
payments for 60 months, she still had another 38 months to go.  Freeman called 
January Term, 2006 
11 
respondent’s office again after this discovery, but respondent still did not return 
her calls. 
{¶ 46} Freeman finally went to see respondent in January or February 
2003.  When they met, respondent told Freeman that the information given to 
Freeman by the bankruptcy court was a mistake, that there was nothing to worry 
about, and that respondent would take care of everything.  In April 2003, the 
bankruptcy court notified respondent and Freeman that Freeman had not 
completed the terms of her reorganization plan in the time allotted by law and that 
her case would be dismissed.  Freeman immediately called respondent’s office 
about the notice.  On respondent’s instruction, Freeman faxed the notice to 
respondent and called right back.  She received no answer except the answering 
machine, although she kept calling for about one hour. 
{¶ 47} The board found one of the disciplinary violations alleged in Count 
X.  Because respondent did not attend to her client’s request for assistance, the 
board found respondent in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Count XI – Buffington 
{¶ 48} In October 2003, respondent filed a Chapter 7 voluntary 
bankruptcy petition on Andrea Buffington’s behalf.  Buffington told respondent 
that she was involved in a lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident.  
Respondent did not disclose the lawsuit in the bankruptcy petition.  In November 
2003, Buffington revealed the accident and lawsuit under examination by the 
bankruptcy trustee. 
{¶ 49} In February 2004, respondent filed an amended statement of 
financial affairs in the Buffington bankruptcy, claiming an exemption of $5,000 
of the proceeds from the pending lawsuit.  The trustee objected to the claim, and 
respondent did not oppose the objection.  The bankruptcy court sustained the 
objection, and Buffington’s $4,200 share of the settlement proceeds from the 
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lawsuit were consequently paid to the trustee, not to Buffington under an 
exemption. 
{¶ 50} Buffington called respondent’s office every day for three weeks 
and left voice mail messages asking respondent to call her about the settlement 
proceeds.  Respondent did not return any of the calls. 
{¶ 51} The board found one of the disciplinary violations charged in 
Count XI.  Because respondent had ignored her client’s efforts to communicate 
with her, the board found respondent in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Count XII – Early Mae White 
{¶ 52} In December 2003, respondent filed a Chapter 7 voluntary 
bankruptcy petition for Early Mae White.  In March 2004, one of White’s 
creditors, Town and Country Investments, Inc., moved for relief from the 
automatic stay.  Respondent did not oppose the creditor’s motion, nor did she 
appear at the hearing on the motion, and Town and Country was granted relief 
from the automatic stay.  White repeatedly telephoned respondent’s office and left 
messages, attempting to understand why her debt was not discharged, but 
respondent did not return her calls. 
{¶ 53} The board found one of the disciplinary violations alleged in Count 
XII.  Because respondent ignored her client’s requests for assistance, the board 
found a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). 
Count XIII – Lack of Cooperation 
{¶ 54} On May 2, 2003, relator asked respondent for a written response to 
the Freeman grievance but did not receive a reply.  Relator directed a second 
letter of inquiry to respondent on May 19, 2003, and again did not receive a reply.  
The board found that respondent had thereby violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 55} In recommending a sanction for these instances of misconduct, the 
board weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in Section 10 of the 
January Term, 2006 
13 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  
In mitigation, the board found that respondent had no prior record of professional 
discipline.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). 
{¶ 56} The weight of respondent’s prior unblemished record, however, 
was offset by many aggravating factors.  The board found that respondent had 
acted out of self-interest in trying to exonerate herself from any possible liability 
to Brenda Montgomery.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  Respondent also engaged 
in a pattern of neglect involving numerous clients and committed multiple 
offenses.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  Moreover, although she eventually 
retained counsel and defended herself appropriately, respondent initially ignored 
relator’s investigatory efforts, an aggravating factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(e). 
{¶ 57} In addition, because respondent did not testify at the panel hearing 
and her counsel argued that she had no power to help those clients who had not 
followed her instructions, the board found that respondent had not acknowledged 
her wrongdoing.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g).  The board noted, however, that 
respondent had stipulated to most of the facts underlying the charged misconduct. 
{¶ 58} The board further found as an aggravating factor that respondent 
had left her vulnerable bankruptcy clients adrift in their financial distress.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h).  As examples, the board cited the Lees’ potential loss of 
their home to foreclosure proceedings, Boyles’s inability to sell her condominium 
after her failed bankruptcy proceedings, and the fact that Buffington did not 
receive the settlement proceeds from her lawsuit. 
{¶ 59} As to other mitigating factors, the board did not find that restitution 
was warranted despite some evidence to the contrary.  Also, despite some 
evidence to the contrary, the board did not find that respondent’s conduct resulted 
from mental illness or chemical dependency, or that respondent’s character-
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reference letters established her good reputation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(i) and (2)(e) and (g). 
{¶ 60} Relator advocated permanent disbarment.  In the alternative, 
relator proposed that respondent’s license to practice law be indefinitely 
suspended with reinstatement, if any, to be subject to conditions, including a two-
year monitored probation.  Respondent proposed a public reprimand. 
{¶ 61} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for one year, with the entire suspension stayed, provided that 
during the stayed suspension (1) respondent commit no further misconduct, (2) 
she complete a course of continuing legal education on law-office management, 
and (3) her practice be monitored by an attorney appointed by relator.  The board 
modified the panel’s recommendation, citing the “number of violations and the 
consequent harm to her clients.”  The board recommended that respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with six months stayed upon the 
conditions contained in the panel report. 
Review 
{¶ 62} Respondent does not object to the board’s findings of misconduct 
or its recommended sanction.  Relator, however, objects to both, arguing that the 
board overlooked evidence of misconduct relative to Counts IV, VII, and XIII.  
Relator also argues that respondent’s misconduct warrants either indefinite 
suspension or disbarment. 
{¶ 63} On review, we find that clear and convincing evidence establishes 
respondent’s violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 6-
101(A)(3), and 6-102, as found by the board.  We therefore adopt the board’s 
findings as to those violations.  For the reasons that follow, we also find that 
relator’s objections are well taken. 
{¶ 64} As to Count IV, the evidence established that respondent's 
paralegal told Pate that respondent would not work until Pate paid the quoted 
January Term, 2006 
15 
$500 fee and that Pate did not pay the full fee.  Respondent has offered nothing to 
suggest that she acted contrary to her agent’s representation by earning any part of 
the $100 fee.  We therefore find that respondent violated DR 9-102(B)(4). 
{¶ 65} With respect to Count VII, respondent engaged in a consensual 
sexual relationship with Edwards, the clients’ representative and a principal of 
both corporations, while representing Triangle and T.D.I.  Respondent admitted 
the relationship, but the board found insufficient evidence to prove violations of 
DR 1-102(A)(6) and 5-101(A)(1).  We disagree. 
{¶ 66} We have consistently disapproved of lawyers engaging in sexual 
conduct with clients where the sexual relationship arises from and occurs during 
the attorney-client relationship.  A lawyer’s sexual involvement with a client has 
warranted a range of disciplinary measures depending on the relative impropriety 
of the situation, including actual suspension from the practice of law.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-1062, 843 
N.E.2d 765.  Where an affair is legal and consensual and has not compromised 
client interests, however, we generally impose a public reprimand.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Moore, 101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004-Ohio-734, 804 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 12, 
citing Disciplinary Counsel v. DePietro (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 391, 643 N.E.2d 
1145; Disciplinary Counsel v. Paxton (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 163, 610 N.E.2d 979; 
and Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 265, 559 N.E.2d 1359. 
{¶ 67} The relationship between respondent and her client apparently 
arose after she agreed to become counsel for Triangle and T.D.I., but relator has 
not shown that respondent’s clients were damaged by the relationship.  Even so, 
respondent’s involvement with Edwards violated DR 5-101(A)(1) and DR 1-
102(A)(6). 
{¶ 68} As to Count XIII, the board found that respondent had failed to 
cooperate during the investigation of the Freeman grievance.  Relator insists that 
respondent is also accountable on charges that she did not cooperate in the 
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investigations of the Wilkes, Muffley, and Pate grievances.  We agree, inasmuch 
as the parties stipulated or respondent conceded that she repeatedly did not 
respond to letters or telephone calls inquiring about these clients’ allegations.  
Respondent therefore committed multiple violations of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
The Appropriate Sanction 
{¶ 69} We have consistently held that unless mitigating circumstances 
dictate a lesser sanction, neglect of legal matters and the failure to cooperate in an 
ensuing disciplinary investigation warrant an indefinite suspension from the 
practice of law.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Torian, 106 Ohio St.3d 14, 2005-Ohio-
3216, 829 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 17, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Treneff, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 336, 2004-Ohio-6562, 819 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 16.  Accord Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Tyack, 107 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-5833, 836 N.E.2d 568; Cincinnati Bar 
Assn. v. Kieft (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 429, 763 N.E.2d 1167; and Cleveland Bar 
Assn. v. Judge (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 331, 763 N.E.2d 114.  No sufficiently 
extenuating circumstances are present here. 
{¶ 70} Respondent neglected clients’ bankruptcy cases and compounded 
her misdeeds by ignoring relator’s disciplinary inquiries.  She also persisted in 
representing bankruptcy clients with competing interests and without the requisite 
notice to the bankruptcy court, had an affair with a client’s representative during 
bankruptcy proceedings, failed to properly maintain funds in her client trust 
account, refused to account for a bankruptcy client’s fee, and negotiated with a 
bankruptcy client to limit her liability for professional misconduct.  This chronic 
indifference to her clients’ interests belies the character references she presented 
and her heretofore unblemished career.  Moreover, respondent’s failure to prove 
any further mitigating factors and her failure to show appreciation for the breadth 
of her transgressions support the sanction we ordinarily impose for misconduct of 
this magnitude. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
{¶ 71} For these reasons, respondent is indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
O'Donnell, J., dissenting. 
{¶72} I respectfully dissent.  In this case, I would follow the 
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, 
impose a one-year suspension with six months stayed, and require appropriate 
mental-health counseling for the respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P., and Darrell A. Clay; and Squire, Sanders & 
Dempsey, L.L.P., and Colin R. Jennings, for relator. 
 
Law Offices of Lester S. Potash and Lester S. Potash, for respondent. 
______________________