Title: Commonwealth v. Ramos

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11680 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ALEX RAMOS. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 4, 2014. - February 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, 
C.J., 
Spina, 
Cordy, 
Botsford, 
Duffly, 
Lenk, 
& 
Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Receiving stolen motor vehicle.  Receiving Stolen 
Goods.  Search and Seizure, Exigent circumstances.  Practice, 
Criminal, Motion to suppress.  Evidence, Telephone 
conversation.  Telephone. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department 
on May 2, 2007. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Howard J. 
Whitehead, J., and the case was tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
The 
Supreme 
Judicial 
Court 
on 
its 
own 
initiative 
transferred 
the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Todd C. Pomerleau for the defendant. 
 
Quentin Weld, Assistant District Attorney (Elin H. Graydon, 
Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was indicted on a charge of receiving 
a 
stolen 
motor 
vehicle, 
G. L. 
c. 266, 
§ 28; 
a 
codefendant 
was 
indicted 
on 
charges 
of 
receiving 
a 
stolen 
motor 
vehicle 
and 
of 
receiving 
stolen 
 
 
2 
property with a value exceeding $250.  The defendant sought to 
suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his 
garage.  A Superior Court judge, who was not the trial judge, denied 
the 
motion, 
concluding 
that 
the 
warrantless 
search 
of 
the 
defendant's 
garage 
was 
permissible 
due 
to 
exigent 
circumstances, 
and 
also 
that 
the 
search was permissible under what he termed an "accomplice sweep" 
exception to the warrant requirement, a concept that has not been 
adopted in the Commonwealth.  Following a joint trial, a Superior 
Court 
jury 
convicted 
the 
defendant 
and 
acquitted 
the 
codefendant.  The 
defendant appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our 
own motion. 
 
On 
appeal, 
the 
defendant 
claims 
error 
in 
the 
denial 
of 
his 
motion 
to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of his 
garage, and the admission in evidence of inculpatory statements made 
during 
recorded 
telephone 
conversations 
between 
the 
defendant 
and 
the 
codefendant.  Additionally, the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  
We conclude that there was no error in the denial of the defendant's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
because 
police 
entry 
into 
the 
garage 
was 
justified 
based on exigent circumstances, there was no error in the admission 
of recordings of the jailhouse telephone calls, and the evidence was 
sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. 
 
Evidence at trial.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
 
 
3 
found, reserving additional facts for our discussion of the issues.  
On 
the 
morning 
of 
April 
8, 
2007, 
Derek 
Lam 
noticed 
that 
his 
blue 
Honda 
Civic 
automobile 
was 
missing 
from 
the 
driveway 
of 
his 
fiancée's 
house 
in Natick.  He contacted police to have the LoJack transmitter1 in 
the vehicle activated.  Officer Robert Avery of the Lynn police 
department was on patrol in his police cruiser when, shortly after 
noon, 
he 
received 
a 
LoJack 
signal.  Other 
officers 
used 
their 
LoJack 
units to assist him in pinpointing the location of the signal, a 
detached garage behind a house located at the corner of Gardiner and 
Florence 
Streets 
in 
Lynn.  The 
house 
fronted 
on 
Gardiner 
Street, 
and 
the two-bay garage doors opened onto Florence Street.  The yard 
between the house and the garage was enclosed by a stockade fence.  
Along the Florence Street side of the yard, the fence ran from the 
garage to the back of the house; on the other side of the yard, a 
stockade fence ran from Gardiner Street to Florence Street along the 
property line between the defendant's house and the house next door. 
                                                 
 
1 Officers Robert Avery and Josh Hilton of the Lynn police 
department testified that the LoJack motor vehicle recovery system 
assists 
police 
in 
locating 
a 
stolen 
vehicle.  When 
a 
vehicle 
equipped 
with a LoJack system is stolen, police activate the LoJack signal; 
a police vehicle equipped with a receiver will receive the signal 
if the two vehicles are in close proximity.  The LoJack unit in the 
cruiser has a small display screen that shows the strength of the 
signal and a directional grid indicating the general direction of 
the stolen vehicle in relation to the cruiser.  The receiver emits 
a beeping noise that increases in volume as the cruiser approaches 
the stolen vehicle. 
 
 
4 
 
Avery parked his cruiser on Florence Street near the two-bay 
garage doors.  When he got out of his cruiser, he could hear noises, 
like metal tools being used, coming from behind one of the garage 
doors.  One of the overhead garage doors was open about three inches 
at 
the 
bottom.  Avery 
approached 
the 
garage 
door 
and, 
after 
knocking 
and 
announcing 
"Lynn 
Police," 
he 
could 
hear 
the 
sound 
of 
tools 
dropping 
and people running.  Avery saw three men run from the back of the 
garage 
and 
through 
the 
back 
yard 
to 
the 
rear 
porch 
of 
the 
house; 
they 
were 
taken 
into 
custody 
immediately.  After 
surrounding 
the 
property 
and obtaining a search warrant, officers found the defendant hiding 
inside the house.  Police found the blue Honda Civic inside the 
garage, where the defendant, the codefendant, and two other men had 
been stripping its engine and various other parts. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant 
moved 
to 
suppress 
all 
evidence 
found 
during 
the 
warrantless 
search, and all evidence seized and statements made following 
execution of a warrant obtained as a result of that search.2  After 
conducting 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
over 
two 
days 
at 
which 
three 
members 
of 
the 
Lynn 
police 
department 
testified, 
a 
Superior 
Court 
judge 
denied 
the motion.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, "we 
accept 
the 
judge's 
subsidiary 
findings 
of 
fact 
absent 
clear 
error 
'but 
                                                 
 
2 On appeal, the defendant does not pursue any claim regarding 
statements he made to police after his arrest. 
 
 
5 
conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 214, 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 
440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
a.  Evidence at motion hearing.  We recite the facts found by 
the 
motion 
judge, 
supplemented 
by 
additional, 
undisputed 
facts 
where 
they do not detract from the judge's ultimate findings and were 
implicitly 
credited 
by 
the 
judge.  See 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Isaiah 
I., 
448 
Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), and cases cited 
(court "may supplement judge's findings of fact if the evidence is 
uncontroverted and undisputed and where the judge explicitly or 
implicitly credited the witness's testimony"). 
 
On April 8, 2007, Avery detected a LoJack signal while driving 
his 
cruiser 
on 
Park 
Lane 
Avenue 
in 
Lynn.  He 
confirmed 
the 
signal 
with 
a police dispatcher and was informed that the signal was coming from 
a Honda Civic reported stolen in Natick.  Avery followed the signal 
to 
a 
location 
at 
the 
corner 
of 
Florence 
and 
Gardiner 
Streets 
in 
Lynn.  
The house at that address fronted on Gardiner Street.  The doors to 
a two-bay detached garage located behind the house opened onto 
Florence Street.  Avery parked his police cruiser in the middle of 
Florence 
Street, 
near 
the 
garage 
bay 
doors.  The 
garage 
was 
separated 
from the house by a yard which was surrounded by a stockade fence. 
 
Officer Josh Hilton of the Lynn police department, who also had 
 
 
6 
followed the LoJack signal, arrived at about the same time as Avery.  
Hilton parked his cruiser, walked over to the fence, and looked over 
it to see if the Honda Civic was inside the yard.  He saw three 
automobile doors and other motor vehicle parts in the yard, but did 
not see an automobile.  Hilton broadcast this information over his 
police 
radio.  Hilton 
and 
Avery 
learned 
from 
another 
officer 
who 
heard 
Hilton's broadcast that the defendant lived at the Gardiner Street 
address; he was under investigation for running a "chop-shop"3; he 
previously 
had 
pleaded 
guilty 
to 
charges 
related 
to 
the 
theft 
of 
motor 
vehicles and stripping parts from 
stolen vehicles; and a resident of 
Chelsea 
whose 
vehicle 
had 
been 
stolen 
had 
located 
the 
vehicle's 
engine 
at the Gardiner Street address.  Based on this, the officers were 
advised that the Gardiner Street address might be a "chop shop." 
 
Avery approached the garage bay door, where he could hear the 
sound of metal tools and what sounded to him like work being done on 
automobiles.  He knocked on the door and announced, "Lynn Police."  
At that point, Avery heard tools being dropped and people running.  
He told Hilton what he had heard; Hilton looked over the fence and 
saw 
two 
people 
running 
out 
of 
the 
garage 
toward 
the 
house.  Avery 
also 
                                                 
 
3 Officer 
Steven 
Withrow 
of 
the 
Lynn 
police 
department 
testified 
that a "chop shop" is a "building or garage" where vehicles, stolen 
or otherwise, "are brought [and] stripped of their parts."  See 
United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1517 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) 
("'chop 
shop' 
operation 
involves 
dismantling 
stolen 
automobiles 
and 
selling their parts"). 
 
 
7 
looked 
over 
the 
fence 
and 
saw 
three 
men 
running 
out 
of 
a 
regular 
door 
at 
the 
back 
of 
the 
garage, 
into 
the 
yard, 
and 
toward 
the 
house.  When 
Avery ran around to the driveway side of the house, he saw only two 
men. 
 
By that time, a third officer had arrived.  The officers 
persuaded 
the 
two 
men 
to 
stop 
running 
and 
to 
jump 
over 
the 
fence, 
where 
the officers placed the men in handcuffs "for officer safety."  A 
neighbor 
signaled 
to 
the 
officers 
that 
a 
third 
person 
was 
hiding 
under 
a large pile of trash bags on the porch.  Avery and Hilton entered 
the 
yard.  Hilton 
located 
the 
codefendant, 
Warlin 
Santiago, 
under 
the 
pile of trash bags, and noted that his hands were covered in black 
grease.  Avery then walked through the yard, back to the garage door 
from which the men had emerged, and looked inside.  Avery could see 
a stripped, blue Honda Civic; he entered the garage, looked at the 
vehicle identification number (VIN), and confirmed that the VIN was 
that of the stolen vehicle the officers had been tracking. 
 
After other officers arrived, police secured the area by 
surrounding the property while they sought a search warrant for the 
garage 
and 
the 
house; 
they 
believed 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
inside 
the 
house.  The warrant was obtained a 
few hours later and the defendant 
was arrested after he was found hiding inside the house. 
 
b.  Justification for warrantless entry.  The defendant 
contends 
that 
the 
warrantless 
search 
of 
the 
garage 
violated 
his 
rights 
 
 
8 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
art. 
14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  "In the absence of 
a warrant, two conditions must be met in order for a nonconsensual 
entry to be valid:  there must be probable cause and there must be 
exigent 
circumstances" 
(footnote 
omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. 
DeJesus, 
439 Mass. 616, 619 (2003).  The defendant does not challenge the 
judge's finding that "the police had probable cause to believe that 
the stolen car was in the garage, was being dismantled and that the 
people fleeing were involved in the theft and dismantling."  The 
defendant 
argues, 
however, 
that 
the 
warrantless 
entry 
into 
the 
garage 
was not justified by exigent circumstances, because there were no 
exigent circumstances, and that the motion judge's reliance on the 
"accomplice 
sweep" 
exception 
was 
erroneous, 
because 
no 
such 
exception 
has been adopted in Massachusetts. 
 
The Fourth Amendment requires that "all searches and seizures 
must be reasonable," and that "a warrant may not be issued unless 
probable 
cause 
is 
properly 
established 
and 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
authorized 
search is set out 
with particularity."  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 
1849, 1856 (2011).  Generally, a warrant must be secured before a 
search is conducted, and warrantless searches "are presumptively 
unreasonable."  Id.  Because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is reasonableness, however, "the warrant requirement is subject to 
certain 
reasonable 
exceptions."  Id., 
citing 
Brigham 
City 
v. 
Stuart, 
 
 
9 
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).  Although "searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," id., this 
presumption may be overcome when "'the exigencies of the situation' 
make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."  
Kentucky 
v. 
King, 
supra, 
quoting 
Mincey 
v. 
Arizona, 
437 
U.S. 
385, 
394 
(1978). 
 
"Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are 
a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth which 
bears the burden of proof."  Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 
456 (1981).  Among the exigencies providing justification for a 
warrantless entry into a home is an officer's reasonable belief that 
the entry is necessary to prevent 
"the potential loss or destruction 
of evidence."  Commonwealth v. DeJesus, supra at 620.  See 
Commonwealth v. Molina, 439 Mass. 206, 209 (2003); Commonwealth v. 
Huffman, 
385 
Mass. 
122, 
125 
(1982).  "[W]hether 
an 
exigency 
existed, 
and whether the response of the police was reasonable and therefore 
lawful, are matters to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it 
could 
appear 
to 
the 
officers 
at 
the 
time, 
not 
as 
it 
may 
seem 
to 
a 
scholar 
after 
the 
event 
with 
the 
benefit 
of 
leisured 
retrospective 
analysis."  
Commonwealth v. Young, supra. 
 
Here, 
two 
officers 
used 
LoJack 
receivers 
to 
identify 
the 
garage 
as 
the 
probable 
location 
of 
the 
stolen 
vehicle.  They 
knew 
by 
the 
time 
 
 
10 
they 
had 
arrived 
at 
the 
garage 
that 
it 
was 
suspected 
of 
being 
a 
"chop 
shop" 
where 
stolen 
vehicles 
would 
be 
dismantled 
and 
their 
VIN 
numbers 
destroyed.  Avery heard the sounds of ratchets and wrenches from 
inside the garage, and after he knocked and announced his presence, 
he heard the sound of tools being dropped and people yelling.  The 
officers 
did 
not 
know 
how 
many 
people 
were 
inside 
the 
garage.  Before 
searching the garage, they had learned that the defendant, who lived 
at that address and who had been involved in previous motor vehicle 
thefts, was not among the men apprehended in the yard.  One of the 
men who had been apprehended initially had attempted to conceal 
himself from police and was found hiding under a pile of trash bags.  
The rapidly unfolding events occurred at a point when only three 
officers 
were 
on 
the 
scene, 
although 
others 
continued 
to 
arrive.4  In 
these circumstances, it would have been objectively reasonable for 
an officer to believe that he needed to enter the garage and conduct 
a limited search in order to prevent further destruction of the 
vehicle, 
or 
the 
removal 
of 
the 
stolen 
vehicle's 
parts, 
license 
plate, 
                                                 
 
4 The 
defendant 
suggests 
that 
"[t]here 
were 
approximately 
seven 
to 
eight 
officers 
on 
the 
scene" 
by 
this 
point.  Avery 
testified 
that 
he was not certain if there were four officers in the yard by the 
time the three fleeing men had been captured and he turned his 
attention to the garage.  Officers continued to arrive as events 
unfolded, and Hilton testified that, at some point, there were at 
least 
seven 
or 
eight 
officers 
present, 
four 
of 
them 
in 
the 
yard.  The 
judge made no finding as to the number of officers who ultimately 
arrived on the scene. 
 
 
11 
or 
VIN 
number, 
by 
any 
individual 
who 
might 
have 
remained 
in 
the 
garage.  
Cf. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Grundy, 
859 
A.2d 
485, 
488-489 
(Pa. 
Super. 
Ct. 
2004) 
(probable cause and exigent circumstances existed where police 
officers followed LoJack signal to garage suspected of being "chop 
shop" and, upon arrival, heard sound of power saw).  "If the police 
had taken the time to first seek a warrant," they reasonably could 
have believed that "the [vehicle] would have been in parts and junk 
by the time they got back . . . [because] a car can be disassembled 
in a matter of minutes."  Id. 
 
The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
even 
if 
there 
were 
a 
risk 
that 
evidence 
would be destroyed when the officers first arrived, the exigency had 
been extinguished by the time Avery knocked and announced his 
presence, 
because 
it 
could 
be 
inferred 
from 
the 
sounds 
of 
running 
that 
anyone who had been inside had fled the premises.  We do not agree 
that a reasonable police officer was required to have relied on such 
an inference.  At that point, it was not clear how many individuals 
were involved in the activities inside the garage, or whether any of 
them had remained to destroy or remove evidence that might provide 
a link to the stolen vehicle.  An officer reasonably could have 
believed 
that 
evidence, 
including 
license 
plates 
or 
VIN 
number 
plates, 
was being destroyed, or that such identifying information or other 
evidence such as automobile parts was being removed from the garage 
through the partially open bay doors that faced away from the yard 
 
 
12 
where police were actively engaged in apprehending other suspects. 
 
There were also other factors present that reasonably may be 
considered in determining whether an exigency justifies an entry, 
among them "a clear demonstration of probable cause, strong reason 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
suspect 
was 
in 
the 
dwelling, 
and 
a 
likelihood 
that 
the suspect would escape if not apprehended."  See Commonwealth v. 
Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 227 (1992).  Here, the officers 
had probable cause to believe that a chop shop operation was being 
conducted 
in 
the 
defendant's 
garage 
that 
involved 
the 
disassembly 
of 
stolen motor vehicles.  Because the defendant, who lived at the 
address and previously had pleaded guilty to charges of stealing a 
motor vehicle, was not among the men who had been apprehended in his 
yard, the officers had reason to believe that he might still be in 
the garage destroying evidence.  As the garage bay doors faced away 
from the yard and the house and onto the street, the defendant had 
a route of escape if he was not apprehended.  The judge made no 
finding, 
and 
the 
record 
does 
not 
show 
clearly, 
that 
at 
the 
time 
Avery 
made his entry into the garage, there were officers who were not 
engaged in securing the residence or detaining the other three 
suspects, who would have been available to secure the garage while 
a warrant was obtained. 
 
The warrantless entry into the garage was therefore justified 
by 
reason 
of 
exigency.  Once 
inside, 
Avery's 
observation 
of 
the 
blue 
 
 
13 
Honda, 
the 
license 
plate 
on 
its 
seat, 
and 
the 
VIN 
number 
plate 
numbers, 
permitted him "on that basis to make a selective seizure."  
Commonwealth 
v. 
Young, 
supra 
at 
459.  Accordingly, 
there 
was 
no 
error 
in the judge's decision to deny the motion to suppress.5 
 
2.  Jailhouse telephone calls.  The defendant maintains that 
the admission in evidence of two recorded telephone conversations 
between himself and Santiago, his codefendant, while the defendant 
was in custody awaiting trial, denied him a fair trial as guaranteed 
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
art. 
12 
of 
the 
Massachusetts 
Declaration 
of 
Rights.  
We do not agree. 
 
On 
cross-examination, 
Santiago 
stated 
that 
he 
had 
never 
met 
the 
defendant before the day they were arrested, he had not seen the 
defendant in the garage, and he first spoke with the defendant while 
they 
were 
both 
in 
custody 
as 
a 
result 
of 
that 
incident.  The 
prosecutor 
asked if Santiago was angry at Jorge Orozco, one of the men caught 
running out of the garage, who testified under a plea agreement 
providing that, in return for his cooperation, he would receive no 
                                                 
 
5 Because we conclude that exigent 
circumstances justified the 
warrantless search, we need not address the issue of the so-called 
"accomplice sweep" exception to searches conducted without a 
warrant.  We note that the United States Supreme Court has not 
adopted such an exception, and there appears to be no consensus as 
to the precise scope of such an exception in other States that have 
considered it in some form.  See 3 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 6.4(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
 
 
14 
jail time.  Santiago replied, "a little, yes."  The prosecutor then 
inquired about a 
number of statements Santiago made to the defendant 
during recorded jailhouse telephone calls, after Santiago had been 
released 
on 
bail.  Santiago 
denied 
having 
made 
any 
of 
the 
statements, 
including, inter alia, calling Orozco a "snitch"; saying that the 
defendant 
had 
told 
Santiago 
to 
say 
Orozco 
would 
pay 
him 
to 
remove 
the 
engine; saying that Santiago told the defendant to "bring [Orozco] 
some 
money"; 
and 
that 
the 
defendant 
told 
Santiago 
to 
"[s]ink 
[Orozco] 
so that [he] can't get out [of it]." 
 
The 
prosecutor 
then 
told 
the 
judge 
that 
she 
intended 
to 
introduce 
recordings of the two jailhouse calls between Santiago and the 
defendant to impeach Santiago.  The defendant's counsel requested a 
mistrial, stating first that he had only just "got wind that there's 
a possibility, yesterday, that some jail tapes are coming into 
evidence."  Counsel added that, after examining the only computer 
disk he had, he determined that it did not contain copies of the 
recorded calls.  The prosecutor noted that the Commonwealth had 
provided a copy of a compact disk of the jailhouse calls during 
discovery, two years before trial, to which counsel 
replied that, if 
the disk had been supplied, he no longer had it.  The judge then 
inquired as to counsel's grounds for seeking a mistrial.  Counsel 
first replied that the evidence was being introduced due to a 
codefendant 
testifying 
at 
trial, 
and 
that 
he 
would 
have 
filed 
a 
motion 
 
 
15 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644 (1982) (Moran), had 
he been aware that the prosecution intended to introduce that 
evidence.  He 
also 
argued 
that 
allowing 
the 
Commonwealth 
to 
introduce 
the 
jailhouse 
calls 
would 
create 
a 
disparity 
with 
his 
motion 
to 
exclude 
uncharged criminal acts, which had been allowed.  The judge allowed 
the prosecutor to introduce the recorded statements. 
 
The defendant maintains that the admission of inculpatory 
statements he made during the recorded telephone calls was improper 
under 
Bruton 
v. 
United 
States, 
391 
U.S. 
123 
(1968) 
(Bruton), 
and 
Moran, 
supra at 655, and that a new trial is therefore required.  Neither 
case, however, is applicable here.  In Bruton, supra at 126, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the admission in a joint 
trial 
of 
a 
nontestifying 
codefendant's 
inculpatory 
statement 
violated 
the defendant's right to confrontation.  Here, as in Moran, supra, 
the codefendant testified, so there was no denial of the defendant's 
right to confrontation.  Instead, the court determined in that case 
that severance of the defendants' joint trial was necessary because 
the 
defendants 
put 
forth 
mutually 
antagonistic 
defenses.  Id. 
at 
659 
("The only realistic escape for either defendant was to blame the 
other").  "Such 
'mutual 
antagonism' 
only 
exists 
where 
the 
acceptance 
of 
one 
party's 
defense 
will 
preclude 
the 
acquittal 
of 
the 
other."  Id. 
at 657. 
 
Here, 
by 
contrast, 
the 
defendant's 
and 
Santiago's 
defenses 
were 
 
 
16 
not mutually inconsistent.  Both the defendant and his codefendant 
relied on a defense that they were being framed and that Orozco 
fabricated 
his 
testimony 
implicating 
each 
of 
them.  They 
both 
argued 
that Orozco's statements were false, and that Orozco was not 
believable because he was testifying in exchange for no jail time, 
and that his testimony had changed over time.  In addition, the 
defendant 
argued 
that 
he 
was 
not 
present 
in 
the 
garage, 
and 
therefore 
could not have been in possession of the stolen vehicle.  Santiago 
also argued that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. 
 
In Moran, supra at 652, the codefendant's defense implied that 
the defendant had committed the crime alone.  There, accepting the 
codefendant's defense would have precluded the acquittal of the 
defendant.  See id. at 659.  Acceptance of Santiago's defense, 
however, would not have precluded acquittal of the defendant.  
Indeed, acceptance of Santiago's defense could have led to the 
conclusion that the defendant, too, should be acquitted, because 
Orozco was lying about both of their actions.  The fact that the 
defendant 
was 
convicted 
while 
Santiago 
was 
acquitted 
does 
not 
render 
their defenses antagonistic.  Santiago's acquittal and the 
defendant's conviction shows that the jury credited Santiago's 
defense 
that 
he 
did 
not 
know 
the 
vehicle 
was 
stolen, 
and 
did 
not 
credit 
the 
shared 
defense 
that 
Orozco 
was 
fabricating 
his 
testimony.  In 
sum, 
there 
was 
no 
error 
in 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
recorded 
jailhouse 
telephone 
 
 
17 
calls. 
 
3.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant's motions for 
a required finding of not guilty, presented at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all the evidence, were 
denied.  On 
appeal, 
the 
defendant 
continues 
to 
press 
his 
argument 
that 
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it 
did not establish that he possessed the stolen motor vehicle. 
 
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding, we 
consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found 
the 
essential 
elements 
of 
the 
crime 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). 
 
The offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle requires the 
Commonwealth 
establish 
that 
(1) 
the 
motor 
vehicle 
was 
stolen; 
(2) 
the 
defendant 
received 
the 
motor 
vehicle; 
and 
(3) 
the 
defendant 
knew 
that 
the motor vehicle was stolen.  See G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).6  
                                                 
6 General Laws c. 266, § 28 (a), provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
"Whoever steals a motor vehicle or trailer, whoever 
maliciously damages a motor vehicle or trailer, whoever buys, 
receives, possesses, conceals, or obtains control of a motor 
vehicle or trailer, knowing or having reason to know the same 
to have been stolen, or whoever takes a motor vehicle without 
the authority of the owner and steals from it any of its parts 
or accessories, shall be punished . . . . 
 
 
 
18 
"'Receiving' 
[stolen 
property] 
means 
acquiring 
possession" 
or 
control 
of it.  Commonwealth v. Cromwell, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 662, 666 n.6 
(2002), quoting American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries § 223.6 (1985).  See Commonwealth v. Aponte, 71 Mass. 
App. Ct. 758, 760 (2008).  "[P]ossession need not be exclusive.  It 
may 
be 
joint 
and 
constructive, 
and 
it 
may 
be 
proven 
by 
circumstantial 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Namey, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 98 n.7 
(2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 257 
(2000).  "Actual and constructive possession, however, require 
'knowledge 
plus 
ability 
and 
intention 
to 
control.'"  Commonwealth 
v. 
Namey, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 
530, 532 (2000). 
 
The defendant argues, in reliance on Commonwealth v. Campbell, 
60 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 (2003), that his mere presence in the 
vicinity of the stolen vehicle was not sufficient to establish that 
he 
possessed 
it, 
given 
the 
absence 
of 
evidence 
indicating 
how 
and 
for 
how long he had been associated with the vehicle.  In that case, the 
Appeals Court held that a defendant's presence without more did not 
prove possession.  Contrary to the defendant's arguments, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
"Evidence 
that 
an 
identifying 
number 
or 
numbers 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle . . . or part thereof has been intentionally and 
maliciously removed, defaced, altered, changed, destroyed, 
obliterated, or mutilated, shall be prima facie evidence that 
the 
defendant 
knew 
or 
had 
reason 
to 
know 
that 
the 
motor 
vehicle, 
or trailer or part thereof had been stolen." 
 
 
19 
circumstances in this case are very different.  Here, beyond mere 
presence in the vicinity of the vehicle, there was substantial 
additional evidence from which a jury could conclude that the 
defendant had possession of the stolen vehicle. 
 
The jury could have found that the blue Honda Civic was located 
at the defendant's residence when 
police knocked on the garage door.  
Orozco testified that the defendant, Santiago, and a third man, who 
was a mutual friend of Orozco and the defendant, were all inside the 
garage 
stripping 
the 
vehicle 
of 
its 
engine 
and 
various 
parts 
when 
the 
officer knocked.  The defendant had called Orozco to ask him to 
deliver 
a 
jack 
and 
to 
help 
remove 
an 
engine 
from 
a 
motor 
vehicle; 
Orozco 
drove to the garage, and brought the jack that the defendant had 
requested.  At 
the 
defendant's 
direction, 
Orozco 
began 
disconnecting 
the engine inside a blue Honda, and removing bolts from the hood so 
it would be easier to take out the engine.  At the same time, other 
men were removing the doors and other parts from the vehicle.  The 
defendant told the men to "look for the LoJack."  Just before the 
police arrived, Orozco had used the jack to lift up the vehicle so 
that 
the 
engine 
could 
be 
removed 
from 
underneath, 
and 
all 
of 
the 
men, 
including the defendant, were pulling the engine from the vehicle.  
Orozco heard the squeal of tires outside the garage doors; the 
defendant yelled, "Five-O!" and ran out the back door leading to the 
yard and the house, and the others followed.  There was no error in 
 
 
20 
the denial of the motions for a required finding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.