Title: State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Dreyer

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  March 25, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of Justin Michael Dreyer,
a Child.

STATE OF OREGON ex rel JUVENILE
DEPARTMENT OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY,

	Respondent on Review,

	v.

JUSTIN MICHAEL DREYER,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 8807-81985; CA A94748; SC S44602)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 11, 1998.

	Peter Miller, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioner on review.

	Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Durham, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the juvenile court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	 Dale R. Koch, Judge.

	 149 Or App 775, 945 P2d 97 (1997).

    **Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.

		GILLETTE, J.

		We are asked in this juvenile court proceeding to
determine whether a juvenile court properly may dismiss a
delinquency petition after adjudicating the petition and finding
the youth to be within the court's jurisdiction, when the
petition alleges conduct that, under another statute, cannot be
expunged from the youth's juvenile record.  The Court of Appeals
held that a juvenile court could not do so.  State ex rel Juv.
Dept. v. Dreyer, 149 Or App 775, 945 P2d 97 (1997).  We conclude
that post-adjudication dismissal is permitted under those
circumstances and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
otherwise.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirm the juvenile court's order of dismissal.

		In 1994, a petition was filed in Multnomah County
Juvenile Court alleging that the youth was within the
jurisdiction of the court for having committed an act that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute sexual abuse in the third
degree, ORS 163.415.  After a hearing that ended with the youth's
admission to the facts alleged in the petition, the court found
the youth to be within its jurisdiction.  The court placed the
youth on formal probation for two years.

		Near the end of the probationary period, the youth
moved to dismiss the delinquency petition "in furtherance of
justice, and as may most appropriately serve the best interests
of the youth and the public."  He argued that he had accomplished
the goals that the court had set for him when it imposed
probation, that he presented a low risk of reoffending, and that
nothing would be gained by keeping the adjudication on his
record.  The county juvenile department opposed the motion,
arguing that dismissal would result in expunction of court
records of the youth's offense.  Such a result, the department
argued, would contravene the legislative intent expressed in ORS
429A.260(1)(d)(J) that adjudications like the one at issue --
finding that the youth had committed the equivalent of third
degree sexual abuse -- not be expunged.  

		After a hearing, the court concluded that it had
authority to dismiss the petition, that dismissal was in the best
interests of the youth and the community, and that, although the
effect of dismissal on expunction was "open to debate," it
intended its dismissal to "serve[ ] the purpose * * * as if [the
petition] had been dismissed prior to the time of trial." 
Consistent with that conclusion, the court issued an amended
order dismissing the petition "with prejudice and with the same
effect as if the petition had been dismissed prior to
adjudication."

		The state, which was the prosecuting party, appealed. 
It argued that the dismissal was unauthorized, because its
ultimate purpose and effect -- expunction of the court records of
the youth's offense -- is prohibited by ORS 419A.260(1)(d)(J). 
In that regard, the state noted that, under ORS 419A.260(1)(d)(J)
(xviii), an adjudication that is based on the juvenile equivalent
of third-degree sexual abuse (as was the youth's) cannot be
expunged.(1)  The state also noted 
that, in State ex rel Juv. Dept.
v. Alderson, 146 Or App 185, 189, 932 P2d 97 (1997), the Court of
Appeals had held that post-adjudication dismissal was
unauthorized under such circumstances.

		In a per curiam opinion citing Alderson, the Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded.  We understand the
reference to Alderson to signal the Court of Appeals' agreement
with the state's contention that dismissal was unauthorized,
because it was contrary to ORS 419A.260(1)(d)(J).  The youth now
seeks review of that decision by this court.

		The youth argues that juvenile courts have broad
authority to fashion alternative dispositions, including
authority to dismiss petitions after adjudication, even when the
result might be expunction of otherwise nonexpungeable records. 
The youth further argues that the state's concerns about
expunction are premature and never should have entered into the
Court of Appeals' calculus.  In that regard, the youth asserts
that expunction does not follow automatically from dismissal, but
can occur only after a separate expunction proceeding under ORS
419 A. 262.  The youth then argues that, until he applies for
expunction under that statute, any claim that the dismissal will
frustrate the expunction statute is premature. 

		In response, the state contends that the expunction
issue is ripe at this stage, because dismissal will permit the
youth to seek expunction and because the trial court clearly had
expunction in mind when it issued its order.  The state also
argues that the juvenile court lacked authority to dismiss the
delinquency petition after adjudicating the youth to be within
its jurisdiction.  

		The state's last argument is, in our view, the first
that we need to address:  If the juvenile court lacked authority
to issue any post-adjudication dismissal, then the potential
effect of such a dismissal on expunction is irrelevant.  We
begin, therefore, with this question:  Does a juvenile court have
authority to dismiss a delinquency petition after the court has
adjudicated it and has found the youth who is its subject to be
within the jurisdiction of the court?  

		The youth contends that juvenile courts do have such
authority.  He relies primarily on ORS 419C.261(2), which
authorizes a juvenile court to

"set aside or dismiss a petition filed under ORS
419C.005 in furtherance of justice after considering
the circumstances of the youth and the interests of the
state in the adjudication of the petition."

The youth further argues that the existence of such authority is
evident from various legislative and judicial statements of
policy to the effect that juvenile courts are to be accorded wide
latitude in order to achieve what is best for the youth and the
community.  The youth notes that the Juvenile Code's policy
statement provides that the code should be "liberally construed
to the end that a child coming within the jurisdiction of the
court may receive such care, guidance, treatment and control as
will lead to the child's welfare and the protection of the
community."  ORS 419A.002(2).  The youth claims to find the same
policy of flexibility in this court's opinions in State ex rel
Juv. Dept. v. Reynolds, 317 Or 560, 857 P2d 842 (1993), and State
v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 486 P2d 567 (1971). 

		The state denies that the youth can draw any authority
to dismiss after adjudication from either source.  With respect
to ORS 419C.261(2), the state argues that it is clear that the
legislature had only pre-adjudication dismissals in mind.  That
fact, the state argues, can be gleaned from the requirement that
juvenile courts consider "the state's interest in adjudication of
the petition" ­- an interest that, according to the state, does
not exist after adjudication has occurred.  The state also points
out that, although earlier versions of the dismissal statute
expressly provided for dismissal "at any stage of the
proceeding," that clause is absent from the present version.(2) 
Ultimately, the state concludes, those textual and contextual
clues establish that, in enacting the present version of ORS
419C.261(2), the legislature intended to authorize only pre-adjudication dismissals.

		The scope of the authority conferred by ORS 419C.261(2)
is a matter of statutory construction, to be analyzed according
to the framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under that
framework, we begin by examining the text and context of the
statute, id. at 610-11, including the two items that the state
identifies as significant.  Although we agree that those items
lend some support to the state's suggestion that ORS 419C.261(2)
speaks to only pre-adjudication dismissals, that support is not
so strong as to be dispositive.  What is dispositive is another
piece of contextual evidence -- ORS 419C.005(4) -- a statute
that, in our view, undermines the state's position.  

		ORS 419C.005(4) appears in the same chapter as ORS
419C.261(2) and provides, in part:

	"The court's wardship over a person found to be
within the court' jurisdiction under this section or
ORS 419C.067 continues, and the person is subject to
the court's jurisdiction, until one of the following
occurs:

	"(a) The court dismisses a petition filed under
this chapter or waives the case under ORS 419C.340."

Although ORS 419C.005(4) does not itself grant juvenile courts
the authority to dismiss a delinquency petition after
adjudication, the statute establishes that the legislature
contemplated that petitions might be dismissed at that stage.  To
the extent that ORS 419C.261(2) is ambiguous with respect to the
issue of when the court may dismiss petitions, ORS 419C.005(4)
resolves that ambiguity in favor of the youth's position, viz.,
that dismissal may occur even after the subject of the petition
is found to be within the jurisdiction of the court.

		Having concluded that post-adjudication dismissals of
delinquency petitions are authorized, we now must consider
whether the dismissal in this case was authorized.  The state 
contends that it is not, because the legislature intended to
preclude such an order's ultimate effect, i.e., expunction of
records of juvenile adjudications that, under ORS
419A.260(1)(d)(J), are nonexpungeable.  In that regard, the state
places particular emphasis on the fact that the juvenile court
dismissed the petition "with the same effect as if [it] had been
dismissed prior to adjudication."  The state contends that, 

"if the dismissal genuinely has the same effect as
dismissal 'prior to adjudication,' youth can argue that
no adjudication ever occurred and that he was not found
to have committed the equivalent of third-degree sexual
abuse.  If that argument is correct, the effect of the
dismissal is expunction, and the juvenile court
exceeded its authority by issuing the order."

		In making that argument, the state appears to assume
that the "same effect" wording of the juvenile court's order is
an integral part of the order that accurately reflects the
order's legal effect.  We, however, are not persuaded that that
wording achieves that consequence.  

		Although, initially, the inclusion of that wording
shows an intention on the part of the juvenile court to enter an
order "nunc pro tunc," the order is not -- indeed, cannot be --
an order of that kind.  Nunc pro tunc orders are a manifestation
of the inherent power of a court to make its record speak the
truth, that is, to correct clerical errors at a later time so
that the record reflects what actually occurred at an earlier
time.  See, e.g., Mullinax and Mullinax, 292 Or 416, 424, 639 P2d
628 (1982) (describing court's inherent authority to correct
clerical errors).  The juvenile court's "same effect" wording in
the present case does not serve that purpose:  Nothing in the
record before this court suggests that the juvenile court
dismissed the petition before adjudication. 

		It might be argued that the inclusion of the "same
effect" wording evinces an intent on the juvenile court's part to
set aside its prior adjudication -- a result that is authorized
under ORS 419C.610, which grants juvenile courts authority to
modify or set aside any order.(3)

  However, on its face, the
dismissal order does not purport to modify or set aside the prior
adjudication finding the youth to be within the court's
jurisdiction or, for that matter, any other order in the
proceeding.    Moreover, the record shows that the juvenile court
was satisfied that its decision finding the youth to be within
its jurisdiction was correct -- at least at the time when it was
made.  Ultimately, then, the order's "same effect" wording must
be taken at face value -- as conveying the juvenile court's
intent that its dismissal of the petition have a retroactive
effect that ordinarily it would not have.

		However, the juvenile court lacked authority to give
its dismissal order such an effect.  There is no reason to
believe that a juvenile court's authority under ORS 419C.261(2)
to set aside or dismiss petitions includes that power.  Nor, as
we have discussed, can the wording in the order be justified as
an exercise of the juvenile court's inherent error-correcting
authority.  See Gillespie v. Kononen, 310 Or 272, 276 n 7, 797
P2d 361 (1990) (nunc pro tunc order "is effective only when it
records a previously omitted truth -- it does not create, but
only speaks what has been done.").  Ultimately, then, to the
extent that wording in the order purports to give the dismissal
retroactive effect, it cannot do so.   

		That does not mean, however, that the dismissal order
is a nullity.  The order has significance independent of its
"same effect" wording and, to the extent that the part of the
order that dismisses the petition is authorized (as it appears to
be under ORS 419C.261(2)), it should be given effect.(4)		

		Having concluded that the dismissal itself was
authorized, but that it does not have retroactive effect, we
return to the central issue in this case:  Does the dismissal
contravene the legislative intent expressed in ORS
419A.260(1)(d)(J)?  Put somewhat differently:  Does the dismissal
in this case have an effect that the legislature intended to
preclude?   

		To the extent that the state's concerns about the
dismissal having such an effect arise out of the juvenile court's
"same effect" wording, those concerns are resolved by the
foregoing discussion.  Once that wording is denied a present
legal effect, it becomes evident that the state's concern is too
attenuated to justify the result reached by the Court of Appeals. 
For example, as the youth points out, all the youth's juvenile
records will remain intact until the youth applies for expunction
under ORS 419 A. 262.  Neither is the result of such an application
a foregone conclusion:  Under the statute, if and when the youth
applies for expunction, then the state must be notified of the
application and must be given an opportunity to present its
arguments against expunction at that time.  ORS 419A.262(10),
(11), and (12).(5)

		We do not deny that the youth may invoke the expunction
process and may argue, in the course of that process, that,
because the petition underlying his adjudication was dismissed,
he has not been "found * * * to be within the jurisdiction of the
court" for an act that amounted to third-degree sexual assault. 

However, the fact that dismissal makes that argument possible in
a later proceeding is no reason to disallow the dismissal ab
initio.  Dismissal, even post-adjudication dismissal, is within a
juvenile court's statutory powers.  A court's exercise of its
power to dismiss should not be set aside in its entirety on the
basis of a future effect that the dismissal might or might not
have -- particularly when there will be an opportunity for the
state to challenge that effect itself in a later proceeding. 

		The ruling at issue in this case has real and immediate
salutary effects for the youth beyond the possibility of invoking
expunction in the future.  Under those circumstances, it makes
sense to allow the dismissal to stand (thereby permitting the
youth to enjoy its other benefits) and to require the state to
reserve its present argument, unless and until the youth seeks to
have his juvenile records expunged.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

1. 	ORS 419 A. 262 provides for expunction of juvenile court
records upon application of the person who is the subject of the
record if, after a hearing on the matter, the juvenile court
makes certain required findings.  ORS 419A.260(1)(d) defines
"record" for purposes of ORS 419 A. 262.  ORS 419A.260(1)(d)(J)
(xviii) excludes from that term (and, therefore, from the range
of materials that may be expunged):

	"(J) Any records in cases under ORS 419C.005 in
which a juvenile court found a person to be within the
jurisdiction of the court based upon the person's
commission of an act which if done by an adult would
constitute one of the following offenses:

	"* * * * *

	"(xviii) Sexual abuse in the third degree under
ORS 163.415."   

2. 	Until 1995, the Juvenile Code expressly provided that a
juvenile court "may dismiss [a delinquency] petition at any stage
of the proceedings."  See, e.g., ORS 419.482(5) (1991); Or Laws
1993, ch 33, § 196(4).

3. 	ORS 419C.610 states:

		"Except as provided in ORS 419C.613, the court may
modify or set aside any order made by it upon such
notice and with such hearing as the court may direct."

4. 	Moreover, although the juvenile court may have intended
that the dismissal would have the specified effect, there is
nothing in the record or the order itself to suggest that the
court would have ruled otherwise on the youth's motion if such an
effect clearly was precluded.

5. 	ORS 419A.262(10) provides that notice of any
application for expunction most be given to "the district
attorney of the county in which the expunction proceeding is
commenced and the district attorney of each county in which the
record sought to be expunged is kept.  Under ORS 419A.262(11),
those district attorneys have 30 days to give written notice of
any objections.  If such objections are filed, the court cannot
enter an expunction order without first holding a hearing on the
matter.  ORS 419A.262(12)(a).