Title: DANIEL LEE STRAUB V PHILLIP MICHAEL COLLETTE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2004  
RICHARD ADAM KREINER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124120 
ROBERT OAKLAND FISCHER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
DANIEL LEE STRAUB, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124757 
PHILLIP MICHAEL COLLETTE and 
TERESA M. HEIL-WYLIE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
In these consolidated cases, we granted leave to 
appeal to consider whether plaintiffs satisfy the “serious 
impairment of body function” threshold set by the no-fault 
insurance act in order to be able to maintain an action for 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
noneconomic tort damages. 
See MCL 500.3135(1). 
The trial 
courts granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition, 
concluding that neither plaintiff has suffered a “serious 
impairment of body function.” 
The Court of Appeals 
reversed.1
 Because we conclude that plaintiffs do not 
satisfy 
the 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function” 
threshold, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals 
and reinstate the trial courts’ orders granting summary 
disposition for defendants. 
I. Origin and Development of the No-Fault Act 
Before 1973, actions seeking damages for injuries 
resulting from motor vehicle related accidents proceeded, 
for 
the 
most 
part, 
pursuant 
to 
common-law 
accident 
principles in Michigan’s courts. 
However, with the 
enactment of the no-fault act, 1972 PA 294, effective 
October 1, 1973, the Legislature abolished tort liability 
generally in motor vehicle accident cases and replaced it 
with a regime that established that a person injured in 
such 
an 
accident 
is 
entitled 
to 
certain 
economic 
compensation from his own insurance company regardless of 
1 Straub v Collette, 254 Mich App 454; 657 NW2d 178
(2002), vacated and remanded 468 Mich 920 (2003), (On
Remand), 258 Mich App 456; 670 NW2d 725 (2003). 
Kreiner v 
Fischer, 251 Mich App 513; 651 NW2d 433 (2002), vacated and
remanded, 468 Mich 885 (2003), (On Remand), 256 Mich App
680; 671 NW2d 95 (2003). 
2  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
fault. 
Similarly, the injured person’s insurance company 
is responsible for all expenses incurred for medical care, 
recovery, and rehabilitation as long as the service, 
product, or accommodation is reasonably necessary and the 
charge is reasonable. 
MCL 500.3107(1)(a). 
There is no 
monetary limit on such expenses, and this entitlement can 
last for the person’s lifetime. 
An injured person is also 
entitled to recover from his own insurance company up to 
three years of earnings loss, i.e., loss of income from 
work that the person would have performed if he had not 
been injured. 
MCL 500.3107(1)(b).2  An injured person can 
also recover from his own insurance company up to twenty 
dollars a day for up to three years in “replacement” 
expenses, i.e., expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining 
ordinary and necessary services that the injured person 
would otherwise have performed. MCL 500.3107(1)(c). 
In exchange for the payment of these no-fault economic 
loss benefits from one’s own insurance company, the 
Legislature limited an injured person’s ability to sue a 
2 There is a cap on the amount recoverable in a thirty­
day period, which cap is adjusted annually for changes in
the cost of living. We are advised that the work loss cap
for accidents occurring between October 2002 and September
2003 was $4,070. 
An injured person may file a tort claim
against the party at fault seeking to recover excess 
economic losses (wage losses and replacement expenses
beyond the daily, monthly, and yearly maximum amounts).
MCL 500.3135(3)(c). 
3  
 
 
                                                 
negligent operator or owner of a motor vehicle for bodily 
injuries. 
In particular, the Legislature significantly 
limited the injured person’s ability to sue a third party 
for noneconomic damages, e.g., pain and suffering. No tort 
suit against a third party for noneconomic damages is 
permitted unless the injured person “has suffered death, 
serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious 
disfigurement.”3  MCL 500.3135(1). 
Following enactment of the no-fault act, Governor 
Milliken requested of this Court an advisory opinion 
regarding the act’s constitutionality. 
We issued such an 
opinion in Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 
294, 389 Mich 441; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), holding that the 
significant wording of the statute—“serious impairment of 
body 
function” 
and 
“permanent 
serious 
disfigurement”— 
provided standards sufficient for legal interpretation. We 
also held that the fact-finding related to these standards 
was within the province of the jury rather than a judge. 
This Court next addressed the no fault act in Shavers 
v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). 
We 
held that the act was a proper exercise of the police power 
3 It is also the case that a party is foreclosed from 
recovery of noneconomic loss if the person is more than
fifty percent at fault, MCL 500.3135(2)(b) and (4)(a), or
if 
the 
person 
was 
operating 
his 
own 
vehicle 
while 
uninsured, MCL 500.3135(2)(c). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and that the legislative scheme did not offend either the 
due process or equal protection guarantees of the Michigan 
Constitution. 
We did, however, find the rate-making 
procedure of the act unconstitutional and allowed the 
Legislature eighteen months to correct it. 
As our 
subsequent order in Shavers demonstrates, the Legislature 
did correct it through 1979 PA 145 and 1979 PA 147. 
412 
Mich 1105 (1982). 
We also discussed in Shavers the 
compromise rationale of the act: 
The goal of the no-fault insurance system
was to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents
assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for 
certain economic losses. The Legislature believed
this goal could be most effectively achieved 
through a system of compulsory insurance, whereby
every Michigan motorist would be required to 
purchase no-fault insurance or be unable to 
operate a motor vehicle legally in this state. 
Under this system victims of motor vehicle 
accidents would receive insurance benefits for 
their injuries as a substitute for their common­
law remedy in tort. 
. . . The act's personal injury protection
insurance scheme, with its comprehensive and 
expeditious benefit system, reasonably relates to
the evidence advanced at trial that under the 
tort 
liability 
system 
the 
doctrine 
of 
contributory negligence denied benefits to a high
percentage of motor vehicle accident victims,
minor injuries were over-compensated, serious 
injuries 
were 
undercompensated, 
long 
payment
delays were commonplace, the court system was
overburdened, and those with low income and 
little education suffered discrimination. 
[402
Mich 578-579.][4] 
4 We later discussed this compromise concept further in
Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483, 500; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
Six years later, after the phrase “serious impairment 
of body function” and other phrases in the act, such as 
“permanent serious disfigurement,” had been placed before 
juries as questions of fact pursuant to the 1976 advisory 
opinion, this Court in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 
330 NW2d 22 (1982), retrenched on whether these were issues 
for the jury. 
In Cassidy we held that opinions requested 
under Const 1963 art 3, § 8 are only advisory and not 
precedential and that revisiting the issue was advisable 
where the Court had before it actual adverse parties to an 
existing controversy. 
The Cassidy Court again reiterated 
the general understanding this Court had of the no-fault 
act—namely that it was a compromise encompassing the notion 
of a certain recovery for economic loss in return for 
where we quoted from 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance,
§ 340, p 1068: 
“It has been said of one such plan that the
practical effect of the adoption of personal
injury protection insurance is to afford the 
citizen the security of prompt and certain 
recovery to a fixed amount of the most salient
elements of his out-of-pocket expenses * * *. In 
return for this he surrenders the possibly
minimal 
damages 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering
recoverable in cases not marked by serious 
economic loss or objective indicia of grave
injury, and also surrenders the outside chance
that through a generous settlement or a liberal
award by a judge or jury in such a case he may be
able to reap a monetary windfall out of his
misfortune.” 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
reduced tort suit opportunities for noneconomic loss. 
The 
Court said: 
At least two reasons are evident concerning
why 
the 
Legislature 
limited 
recovery 
for 
noneconomic loss, both of which relate to the
economic viability of the system. First, there
was the problem of the overcompensation of minor
injuries. 
Second, there were the problems
incident to the excessive litigation of motor
vehicle accident cases. Regarding the second 
problem, if noneconomic losses were always to be
a matter subject to adjudication under the act,
the goal of reducing motor vehicle accident 
litigation 
would 
likely 
be 
illusory. 
The 
combination of the costs of continuing litigation
and 
continuing 
overcompensation 
for 
minor 
injuries 
could 
easily 
threaten 
the 
economic 
viability, or at least desirability, of providing
so many benefits without regard to fault. If
every case is subject to the potential of 
litigation on the question of noneconomic loss,
for 
which 
recovery 
is 
still 
predicated 
on 
negligence, perhaps little has been gained by
granting 
benefits 
for 
economic 
loss 
without 
regard to fault. [Cassidy, supra at 500.] 
Further, the Court rejected its Advisory Opinion 
conclusion that juries should find facts and held that 
trial judges were to decide, as a matter of law, whether 
the plaintiff had suffered a serious impairment of body 
function when there was no factual dispute about the nature 
and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, or when there was a 
dispute, but it was not material to the determination 
whether the plaintiff had suffered a serious impairment of 
body function. 
Next, the Court held, without reference to 
textual support but in an apparent effort to effectuate the 
7  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
“goal of reducing motor vehicle accident litigation,” that 
to 
satisfy 
the 
“serious 
impairment” 
threshold, 
an 
“important” body function must be impaired, that the injury 
must be an “objectively manifested injury”, and that the 
injury must have an effect “on the person’s general ability 
to live a normal life.” Id. at 505.5  The Court, in reading 
this language into the act, clearly intended its holding to 
assist in making the compromise at the heart of the no­
fault act viable. 
This judicially created formula, or 
5 The Cassidy Court stated: 
. . .impairment of body function is better
understood 
as 
referring 
to 
important 
body
functions. 
. . . We believe that the Legislature
intended an objective standard that looks to the
effect of an injury on the person's general 
ability to live a normal life. . . . 
Another significant aspect of the phrase
"serious impairment of body function" is that it
demonstrates the legislative intent to predicate
recovery for noneconomic loss on objectively
manifested 
injuries. 
Recovery 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering is not predicated on serious pain and
suffering, but on injuries that affect the 
functioning of the body. . . . 
* * * 
. . . we conclude that an injury need not be
permanent 
to 
be 
serious. 
Permanency 
is,
nevertheless, relevant. (Two injuries identical
except that one is permanent do differ in 
seriousness.) [Id. at 504-506.] 
8  
 
 
 
                                                 
gloss, in fact became the central inquiry for a court to 
resolve when a plaintiff alleged that the tort threshold 
for a third-party tort suit had been met. 
Yet, four years after Cassidy was decided, and 
interestingly after four new justices joined the Court, in 
DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 50-58; 398 NW2d 896 
(1986)6, the Court overruled Cassidy in several particulars 
as to how the “serious impairment” issue should be 
interpreted and applied. First, the Court found no textual 
authority for the notion that “serious impairment” was not 
to be decided as a matter of law and overruled Cassidy in 
that regard. 
Next, DiFranco, using a textualist approach, 
rejected the Cassidy requirement that an “important” body 
function had to be impaired, concluding that there was no 
such requirement in the statutory language. 
Id. at 39. 
Similarly, 
DiFranco 
rejected 
the 
Cassidy 
“objectively 
manifested injury” requirement—as it had been subsequently 
construed in Williams v Payne, 131 Mich App 403; 346 NW2d 
564 (1984), to not include objectively manifested symptoms— 
6 The Cassidy majority opinion was signed by Justices
Fitzgerald, Williams, Ryan, Coleman, and Levin.  Justice 
Kavanagh concurred in part and dissented in part. 
Justice 
Riley did not participate. 
The DiFranco majority opinion
was signed by four new justices: Cavanagh, Brickley, Boyle,
and Archer. 
Justices Williams, Levin, and Riley concurred
in part and dissented in part. Justices Williams and Riley
complained that the majority was overruling Cassidy only
four years after it was decided. 
9  
 
 
 
on the basis that it had proved to be an almost 
insurmountable obstacle to recovery of noneconomic damages 
in soft-tissue injury cases. 
DiFranco, supra at 40, 73. 
Indeed, the Court believed that, as interpreted, this 
requirement was limiting recovery only to catastrophically 
injured persons. 
Id. at 45. 
Next, DiFranco discarded the 
“general ability to live a normal life” test because, as 
the Court characterized it, there is no such thing as “a 
normal life.” 
Moreover, the Court believed that this 
standard was flawed because of the practical, if debatable, 
proposition that it had proved an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to recovery of noneconomic damages. 
Id. at 39, 
66. 
Having dispatched the bulk of the Cassidy standards, 
the DiFranco Court held that the phrase “serious impairment 
of body function” involved two inquiries: (1) “What body 
function, 
if 
any, 
was 
impaired 
because 
of 
injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle accident?” and (2) “Was the 
impairment serious?” 
Id. at 39, 67. 
Next, the Court 
readopted the old Advisory Opinion rule that the serious 
impairment issue was to be decided by a jury whenever 
reasonable minds could differ on the issue even if there 
were no material factual dispute about the nature or extent 
of the injuries. 
Id. at 38. 
Finally, DiFranco said that 
10  
 
 
 
the jury should consider such factors as “the extent of the 
impairment, the particular body function impaired, the 
length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment 
required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant 
factors.” Id. at 39-40, 69-70. 
This resolution produced sufficient dissatisfaction to 
the extent that eventually, in 1995, a bill was placed 
before the Legislature to reform the 1972 act. As enacted, 
the bill was 2 ½ pages long. The relevant goal of the 1995 
bill was “to modify tort liability arising out of certain 
accidents.” 
Notably, the bill amended only § 3135 of the 
voluminous 1972 act. As passed and signed by the Governor, 
the amendment required courts to decide the “serious 
impairment of body function” issue if “[t]here is no 
factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the 
person’s injuries,” or if there is a factual dispute, but 
it is not material to the determination whether the person 
has suffered a serious impairment of body function. 
MCL 
500.3135(2)(a)(i), (ii). 
Second, “serious impairment of 
body function” was defined as 
an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.
[MCL 500.3135(7).] 
This means then that pursuant to the Legislature’s 
directives 
embodied 
in 
the 
1995 
amendment, 
“serious 
11  
 
 
  
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
impairment 
of 
body 
function” 
contains 
the 
following 
components: an objectively manifested impairment, of an 
important body function, and that affects the person’s 
general 
ability 
to 
lead 
his 
or 
her 
normal 
life.7 
Furthermore, courts, not juries, should decide these 
issues.8 
Plaintiffs and their proponents argue that after 1995 
it is only necessary to show that there has been an 
impairment of an important body function that, in some way, 
7 While Cassidy, supra at 505, required an evaluation 
of the effect of an injury on the person’s general ability
to live “a normal life,” the DiFranco Court concluded that 
it was impossible to objectively determine what “a normal
life” is, asserting: “there is no such thing as ‘a normal
life.’” 
DiFranco, supra at 66. 
Apparently cognizant of
this comment, and attempting to reconcile the incongruity
that DiFranco had pointed out, the Legislature, in the 1995
act, requires that the impairment affect “the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” (Emphasis
added.) 
It is then clear that, harkening to the DiFranco 
Court’s guidance that there is no objectively “normal 
life,” the Legislature modified the entirely objective 
Cassidy standard to a partially objective and partially
subjective inquiry. 
Thus, what is 
“normal” is to be 
determined subjectively on the basis of the plaintiff’s own
life and not the life of some objective third party.
However, once that is fixed as the base, it is to be
objectively determined whether the impairment in fact 
affects the plaintiff’s “general ability to lead” that
life. 
8 As should be evident, and as previous panels of the
Court of Appeals have noted, the most uncomplicated reading
of the 1995 amendment is that the Legislature largely
rejected DiFranco in favor of Cassidy. 
See, e.g., Jackson 
v Nelson, 252 Mich App 643, 649-650; 654 NW2d 604 (2002),
and Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 248; 631 NW2d 760
(2001). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
influences, touches or otherwise affects the plaintiff’s 
lifestyle, regardless of degree. 
If some effect has been 
demonstrated, the new legislative test is satisfied, 
regardless of the extent of the effect. (Emphasis added).9 
Defendants and their amicis, on the other hand, 
contend that a plaintiff must demonstrate not simply that 
some aspect of his life has been affected, but that 
generally he is no longer able to lead his normal life. 
II. Facts and Proceedings Below 
A. Straub v Collette 
Daniel Straub injured three fingers on his nondominant 
hand when his motorcycle collided with an automobile on 
September 19, 1999. 
He suffered a broken bone in his 
little finger and injured tendons in his ring and middle 
fingers. 
Straub underwent outpatient surgery on September 
23, 1999, to repair the tendons. 
No medical treatment was 
required for the broken bone. He wore a cast for about one 
month following surgery to assist the healing of the 
tendons. 
He also took prescription pain medication for 
about two weeks following the surgery and completed a 
physical therapy program. 
About two months following the surgery, Straub’s 
doctor noted that Straub’s injuries were healing nicely. 
9 Sinas & Ransom, The 1995 no-fault tort threshold: A 
statutory hybrid, 76 Mich Bar J 76 (1997). 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
Around the same time, Straub returned to work as a cable 
lineman for a cable television company, initially working 
twenty to twenty-five hours a week, but returning to full­
time work about three weeks later, on December 14, 1999. 
He testified at his deposition that since returning to 
work, he was able to perform all his job duties, but 
sometimes with discomfort. 
In addition, he testified that 
until late December 1999, he had difficulty doing household 
chores, such as washing dishes, doing yard work, and making 
property repairs. 
He was also unable to operate his 
archery shop during the hunting season in the fall of 1999. 
Operating his shop required him to repair bows, make 
arrows, and process deer meat. 
In mid-January 2000, 
however, he was able to resume playing bass guitar in a 
band that performed on weekends. 
By the time of Straub’s 
deposition, he could perform all the activities in which he 
had engaged before the accident, although he was still 
unable to completely straighten his middle finger. 
He was 
also still unable to completely close his left hand, which 
decreased his grip strength. 
Straub filed an action in circuit court to recover 
noneconomic damages under the no-fault act. 
The trial 
court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, 
finding that Straub’s injuries relate only to “extrinsic” 
14  
 
 
considerations such as playing guitar and processing deer 
meat, and thus did not meet the threshold of “serious 
impairment of body function.” MCL 500.3135(7). 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, between 
the date of the accident and mid-January 2000, Straub’s 
injuries affected his “general ability to lead his normal 
life,” and, thus, Straub satisfied the serious impairment 
threshold. 
Straub v Collette, 254 Mich App 454, 459; 697 
NW2d 178 (2002). The Court reasoned that Straub was unable 
to play bass guitar in his band for approximately four 
months after the accident and that, before the accident, he 
performed almost every weekend and practiced several times 
each week. 
It also concluded that four months was a 
significant amount of time during which Straub was unable 
to play the guitar. The panel further reasoned that Straub 
was unable to engage in full-time employment for about 
three months. 
The Court concluded that, for a limited 
amount of time, Straub’s injuries affected his general 
ability to lead his normal life, “particularly his ability 
to perform musically and to work.” Id. 
Thereafter, defendants filed an application for leave 
to appeal in this Court. 
On June 12, 2003, this Court 
entered an order vacating the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
consideration in light of this Court’s order in Kreiner v 
Fischer, 468 Mich 885 (2003). 
Straub v Collette, 468 Mich 
920 (2003). 
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed. 
Straub v Collette (On Remand), 258 Mich App 456; 670 MW2d 
725 (2003). 
The Court again concluded that Straub’s 
injuries affected his ability to play the guitar and to 
work. The Court determined that Straub’s injuries affected 
his ability to perform household tasks and to operate his 
archery shop. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
Straub’s injuries affected his ability to lead his normal 
life, “given the work and tasks that he performed before 
the accident . . . .” Id. at 463. We subsequently granted 
leave to appeal. 469 Mich 948 (2003). 
B. Kreiner v Fischer 
On November 28, 1997, plaintiff Kreiner was injured in 
an automobile accident. 
Four days after the accident he 
visited his family doctor, complaining of pain in his lower 
back, right hip, and right leg. 
The doctor ordered x-rays 
and cortisone injections for pain. Kreiner returned to his 
doctor three days later and complained that the pain was 
persisting. 
The doctor administered another cortisone 
injection 
and 
prescribed 
physical 
therapy 
and 
pain 
medication. 
16  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
When Kreiner complained that his pain continued six 
weeks after the accident, his doctor referred him to a 
neurologist, 
Karim 
Fram, 
M.D., 
who 
conducted 
an 
electromyography (EMG)10 that revealed mild nerve irritation 
to the right fourth lumbar (L4) nerve root in Kreiner’s 
back and degenerative disc disease with spondylolisthesis.11 
Dr. Fram prescribed Motrin for pain along with a muscle 
relaxant, and instructed Kreiner to perform certain back 
and muscle strengthening exercises at home. 
Kreiner returned to Dr. Fram in May 1998 complaining 
of pain radiating from the back of his right thigh and 
right calf, which pain was aggravated by bending over and 
either sitting or standing for any length of time. 
Dr. 
Fram prescribed pain medication and a continued program of 
back and muscle strengthening exercises. 
In August 1998, 
after Kreiner returned and complained of constant lower 
back pain aggravated by climbing, bending over, pushing, 
and pulling, Dr. Fram prescribed a three-week physical 
10 EMG testing is a process by which impairment to
nerves in the arms and hands may be verified objectively.
It involves measuring and analyzing the responses of 
muscles 
to 
stimulation 
by 
electricity. 
Dorland's 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (28th ed, 1994), p 537. 
11 Spondylolisthesis is the "forward movement of the
body of one of the lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra
below it . . . ." 
Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th ed,
1995), p 1656. 
17  
 
 
 
therapy course. In October 1998, Dr. Fram again prescribed 
an anti-inflammatory medication and home exercises. 
Dr. Fram’s notes reveal that plaintiff visited him in 
August 1999 for a follow-up examination. 
At that time, 
Kreiner was still complaining of continuous pain in his 
lower back and of right leg pain radiating to the lower 
extremities on the right side. Standing, lifting, climbing 
a ladder, and staying in one position for a long time 
tended to aggravate the pain. 
Dr. Fram advised Kreiner to 
continue the home exercises, to use a back support during 
daily activity, to avoid lifting objects over fifteen 
pounds, and to refrain from excessive bending or twisting. 
Dr. Fram also prescribed a mild muscle relaxant. 
Kreiner 
subsequently stopped treating with any physician and 
stopped taking medications. 
Before and after the accident, Kreiner worked as a 
self-employed carpenter and construction worker performing 
home remodeling, such as building decks, doing electrical 
work, and performing plumbing, siding, and some mechanical 
work. 
After the accident, he could no longer work eight­
hour days as he had previously. He was forced to limit his 
workday to only six hours. Kreiner said he was also unable 
to stand on a ladder longer than twenty minutes at a time, 
could no longer perform roofing work, and was unable to 
18  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
lift anything over eighty pounds.12  He also could no longer 
walk more than half a mile without resting and could no 
longer hunt rabbits. 
He could, however, continue to hunt 
deer. 
In October 1998, Kreiner filed a complaint against 
Fischer, seeking noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135. 
The trial court granted Fischer’s motion for summary 
disposition, finding that Kreiner failed to satisfy the 
“serious impairment of body function” threshold. The trial 
court stated in part: 
While somewhat restricted, the Plaintiff in
this case is able to engage in lifting, bending,
twisting, and standing that is required by his
job. 
Furthermore, he continues to engage in his
favorite recreational activity which is hunting. 
Based on these facts, Plaintiff is hard­
pressed to show how his alleged impairment is
serious enough to affect his normal life. 
Further, the Court finds that under the 
factors enumerated in Harris [v Lemicex, 152 Mich
App 149; 393 NW2d 559 (1986)], the claimed injury
is not serious. 
Here, Plaintiff’s treatment is
limited to wearing a back support garment and
taking muscle relaxants and painkillers. 
He has 
not been actually physically disabled at any
time, 
and 
the 
duration 
of 
his 
injury 
is 
intermittent. 
Finally, his own doctor has stated that 
there is a chance that the damaged root will heal
completely. 
12 Despite his limitations, Kreiner’s tax returns 
revealed that 1998 was his highest income-earning year,
including several years before the injuries occurred. 
19  
 
 
 
For these reasons, the Court finds as a
matter of law the impairments for which Plaintiff
claims he suffers from do not impinge in any real
sense in his ability to lead a normal life.
Therefore, he is not entitled to maintain this
action in tort against the Defendant under the 
No-Fault Statute, MCL 500.3135(1). 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
decision. Kreiner v Fischer, 251 Mich App 513; 651 NW2d 95 
(2002). The Court determined that the trial court erred by 
finding that Kreiner’s impairment was not “serious enough” 
because MCL 500.3135(7) does not require a showing of 
seriousness. 
Kreiner, supra at 518. 
The panel remanded 
for a jury trial because Fischer disputed Kreiner’s claims 
regarding his limitations on working and hunting. 
The 
Court stated, however, that if Kreiner’s claims were not in 
dispute, it would hold that Kreiner satisfied the serious 
impairment of body function threshold and that he would be 
entitled to summary disposition on that issue. 
The Court 
of Appeals directed the trial court to grant summary 
disposition to Kreiner if the trial court determined that 
there are no material factual disputes with respect to 
Kreiner’s claims regarding the effect of his injury on his 
ability to work. 
On appeal, this Court peremptorily vacated the Court 
of 
Appeals 
decision 
and 
remanded 
for 
consideration 
regarding 
“whether 
plaintiff’s 
impairment 
affects 
his 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
general ability to lead his normal life.” 
468 Mich 885 
(2003). This Court’s order stated: 
The 
issue 
here 
is 
whether 
plaintiff
satisfies 
the 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body
function” threshold set by the no-fault insurance
act in order to be able to maintain an action for 
noneconomic tort damages. 
See MCL 500.3135(1).
The 
no-fault 
act, 
MCL 
500.3135(7), 
defines 
“serious impairment of body function” as “an 
objectively manifested impairment of an important
body function that affects the person’s general
ability to lead his or her normal life.” 
The 
circuit court granted defendant’s motion for 
summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff’s
impairment is not “serious enough” to meet the
tort threshold. 
The Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding that plaintiff is not required to show
that 
his 
impairment 
“seriously” 
affects 
his 
ability to lead his normal life in order to meet
the tort threshold. 
The Court of Appeals then
concluded that, if the facts as alleged by 
plaintiff are true, his impairment has affected
his general ability to lead his normal life. 
In 
our judgment, both the circuit court and the
Court of Appeals erred. 
Although a serious 
effect is not required, any effect does not 
suffice either. 
Instead, the effect must be on
one’s general ability to lead his normal life.
Because the Supreme Court believes that neither
of the lower courts accurately addressed this
issue, the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for it to consider whether plaintiff’s
impairment affects his general ability to lead
his normal life. 
[468 Mich 885 (2003)(emphasis
in original).] 
On remand, the same panel of the Court of Appeals 
again reversed the trial court’s decision. 
Kreiner v 
Fischer (On Remand), 256 Mich App 680; 671 NW2d 95 (2003). 
The Court of Appeals stated that this Court’s order did not 
change in any significant manner the panel’s analysis in 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
its previous opinion. The panel reiterated a large portion 
of its previous analysis because this Court had vacated the 
prior opinion. 
The Court of Appeals then agreed with this 
Court’s order that, under MCL 500.3135(7), just any effect 
on a person’s general ability to lead a normal life will 
not satisfy the statutory threshold. 
Rather, the injury 
must affect one’s general ability to lead his normal life. 
Although the panel stated that its previous opinion had 
addressed this issue, it further opined that “one’s general 
ability to lead his or her normal life can be affected by 
an injury that impacts the person’s ability to work at a 
job, where the job plays a significant role in that 
individual’s normal life, such as in the case at bar.” Id. 
at 
688. 
The 
Court 
further 
opined 
that 
Kreiner’s 
limitations “if true, indicate that plaintiff suffered a 
serious impairment of body function under § 3135.” Id. at 
689. We subsequently granted leave to appeal. 469 Mich 948 
(2003). 
III. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of 
summary disposition. 
American Federation of State, Co & 
Muni Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 
(2003). Similarly, questions of statutory interpretation 
22  
 
 
 
are reviewed de novo. 
In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 
NW2d 164 (1999). 
IV. Analysis 
In construing statutes we examine the language the 
Legislature has used. 
That language is the best indicator 
of the Legislature’s intent. 
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare 
Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). 
MCL 500.3135(1) provides: 
A person remains subject to tort liability
for noneconomic loss caused by his or her 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
only if the injured person has suffered death, 
serious impairment of body function, or permanent
serious disfigure-ment. 
The issue in these consolidated cases is whether 
plaintiffs have suffered a “serious impairment of body 
function.” 
MCL 500.3135(7) defines “serious impairment of 
body function” as 
an 
objectively 
manifested 
impairment 
of 
an 
important body function that affects the person's
general ability to lead his or her normal life. 
The specific issue in these consolidated cases is 
whether 
plaintiffs’ 
impairments 
affect 
their 
general 
ability to lead their normal lives. 
In order to be able to maintain an action for 
noneconomic tort damages under the no-fault act, the 
“objectively manifested impairment of an important body 
function” that the plaintiff has suffered must affect his 
23  
 
 
  
“general ability” to lead his normal life. 
Determining 
whether the impairment affects a plaintiff’s “general 
ability” to lead his normal life requires considering 
whether the plaintiff is “generally able” to lead his 
normal life. 
If he is generally able to do so, then his 
general ability to lead his normal life has not been 
affected by the impairment. 
Random 
House 
Webster’s 
College 
Dictionary 
(1991) 
defines “general” as “considering or dealing with broad, 
universal, or important aspects.” 
“In general” is defined 
as “with respect to the entirety; as a whole.” 
Id. 
“Generally” is defined as “with respect to the larger part; 
for the most part.” 
Id. 
Webster's New International 
Dictionary defines “general” as “the whole; the total; that 
which comprehends or relates to all, or the chief part; a 
general proposition, fact, principle, etc.;—opposed to 
particular; that is, opposed to special.” 
Accordingly, 
determining whether a plaintiff is “generally able” to lead 
his normal life requires considering whether the plaintiff 
is, “for the most part” able to lead his normal life. 
In addition, to “lead” one’s normal life contemplates 
more than a minor interruption in life. 
To “lead” means, 
among other things, “to conduct or bring in a particular 
24  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
course.”13
 Given this meaning, the objectively manifested 
impairment of an important body function must affect the 
course of a person’s life. 
Accordingly, the effect of the 
impairment on the course of a plaintiff’s entire normal 
life must be considered. 
Although some aspects of a 
plaintiff’s entire normal life may be interrupted by the 
impairment, if, despite those impingements, the course or 
trajectory of the plaintiff’s normal life has not been 
affected, then the plaintiff’s “general ability” to lead 
his normal life has not been affected and he does not meet 
the “serious impairment of body function” threshold.14 
The starting point in analyzing whether an impairment 
affects a person’s “general” i.e., overall, ability to lead 
his normal life should be identifying how his life has been 
affected, by how much, and for how long. 
Specific 
activities should be examined with an understanding that 
not all activities have the same significance in a person’s 
overall life. Also, minor changes in how a person performs 
13 Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2001). 
14 As we stated in Kreiner, 468 Mich at 885: 
Although a serious effect is not required,
any effect does not suffice either. Instead, the
effect must be on one’s general ability to lead
his normal life. (Emphasis in original). 
25  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
a specific activity may not change the fact that the person 
may still “generally” be able to perform that activity. 
From all the above we deduce several principles that a 
court must consider in determining whether a plaintiff who 
alleges a “serious impairment of body function” as a result 
of a motor vehicle accident meets the statutory threshold 
for third-party tort recovery. 
The following multi-step 
process is meant to provide the lower courts with a basic 
framework for separating out those plaintiffs who meet the 
statutory threshold from those who do not. 
First, a court must determine that there is no factual 
dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s 
injuries; or if there is a factual dispute, that it is not 
material to the determination whether the person has 
suffered a serious impairment of body function. If a court 
so concludes, it may continue to the next step. But, if a 
court determines there are factual disputes concerning the 
nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries that are 
material to determining whether the plaintiff has suffered 
a serious impairment of body function, the court may not 
decide the issue as a matter of law. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i) 
and (ii).15 
15 MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) creates a special rule for
closed head injuries by providing that a question of fact
for the jury is created if a licensed allopathic or 
26  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Second, if a court can decide the issue as a matter of 
law, it must next determine if an “important body function” 
of the plaintiff has been impaired. 
It is insufficient if 
the 
impairment 
is 
of 
an 
unimportant 
body 
function. 
Correspondingly, it is also insufficient if an important 
body function has been injured but not impaired. 
If a 
court finds that an important body function has in fact 
been impaired, it must then determine if the impairment is 
objectively manifested. Subjective complaints that are not 
medically documented are insufficient. 
If a court finds that an important body function has 
been impaired, and that the impairment is objectively 
manifested, it then must determine if the impairment 
affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead his or her 
normal life. 
In determining whether the course of 
plaintiff’s normal life has been affected, a court should 
engage in a multifaceted inquiry, comparing the plaintiff’s 
life before and after the accident as well as the 
significance of any affected aspects on the course of 
plaintiff’s overall life. 
Once this is identified, the 
court must engage in an objective analysis regarding 
whether any difference between plaintiff’s pre- and post­
osteopathic physician who regularly diagnoses or treats
closed head injuries testifies under oath that there may be
a serious neurological injury. 
27  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
accident lifestyle has actually affected the plaintiff’s 
“general ability” to conduct the course of his life. 
Merely “any effect” on the plaintiff’s life is insufficient 
because a de minimus effect would not, as objectively 
viewed, affect the plaintiff’s “general ability” to lead 
his life.16 
The following nonexhaustive list of objective factors 
may be of assistance in evaluating whether the plaintiff’s 
“general ability” to conduct the course of his normal life 
has been affected: (a) the nature and extent of the 
impairment, (b) the type and length of treatment required, 
(c) the duration of the impairment, (d) the extent of any 
residual impairment17, and (e) the prognosis for eventual 
recovery.18
 This list of factors is not meant to be 
16 Contrary to the dissent, we do not require that 
"every aspect of a person's life must be affected in order
to satisfy the tort threshold." 
Post at 22. Rather, in a
quite distinct proposition, we merely require that the
whole life be considered in determining what satisfies this
threshold, 
i.e., 
whether 
an 
impairment 
"affects 
the 
person's general ability to lead his or her normal life."
17 Self-imposed restrictions, as opposed to physician­
imposed restrictions, based on real or perceived pain do
not establish this point. 
18 See DiFranco, supra at 67-70; Hermann v Haney, 98
Mich App 445; 296 NW2d 278 (1980). The dissent argues that
these factors have no bases in the statutory text. Post at 
14-15. 
The statutory text provides that “an objectively
manifested impairment of an important body function that
affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her
normal life” is a “serious impairment of body function.” 
28  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
exclusive nor are any of the individual factors meant to be 
dispositive by themselves. 
For example, that the duration 
of the impairment is short does not necessarily preclude a 
finding of a “serious impairment of body function.” On the 
other hand, that the duration of the impairment is long 
does not necessarily mandate a finding of a “serious 
impairment of body function.” 
Instead, in order to 
determine whether one has suffered a “serious impairment of 
body function,” the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered, and the ultimate question that must be answered 
is whether the impairment “affects the person’s general 
ability to conduct the course of his or her normal life.”19 
V. Application to Straub 
We are satisfied that there is no material factual 
dispute regarding the nature and extent of Straub’s 
MCL 500.3135(7). 
Does the dissent really believe that an
impairment lasting only a few moments has the same effect
on a person’s “general ability to lead his or her normal
life” as an impairment lasting several years or that an
impairment requiring annual treatment has the same effect
on a person’s “general ability to lead his or her normal
life” as an impairment requiring daily treatment? 
19 We agree with the dissent that the “serious 
impairment of body function” inquiry must “proceed[] on a
case-by-case basis because the statute requires inherently
fact-specific and circumstantial determinations.” 
Post at 
10. 
Whether an impairment that precludes a person from
throwing a ninety-five miles-an-hour fastball is a “serious
impairment of body function” may depend on whether the
person is a professional baseball player or an accountant
who likes to play catch with his son every once in a while. 
29  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
injuries. 
Thus, it is proper to determine whether he 
sustained a serious impairment of body function as a matter 
of law. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i). 
First, 
we 
find 
that 
Straub’s 
injuries 
to 
his 
nondominant hand (a closed fracture, open wounds, tendon 
injuries to two fingers, and a quarter-size wound on the 
palm) constituted an impairment of an important body 
function that was objectively manifested. 
Thus, the issue is whether the impairment affected his 
general ability to live his life. 
In determining whether 
Straub’s general, overall ability to lead his preaccident 
life was affected, we consider his functional abilities and 
activities. 
A 
necessary 
part 
of 
this 
analysis 
is 
determining how long and how pervasively his activities and 
abilities were affected. 
While an injury need not be 
permanent, it must be of sufficient duration to affect the 
course of a plaintiff’s life. The primary focus of the 
Court of Appeals was on the work Straub missed, even while 
initially acknowledging it was a “relatively limited time.” 
254 Mich App 459. 
Straub did not work for eight weeks.20 
Over the next three weeks, Straub worked twenty to twenty­
five hours a week at his primary job as a cable lineman. 
This time frame coincided with the deer hunting season. 
20 His doctor had authorized him to return to work two 
weeks earlier than he did. 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because Straub had been advised not to use his left hand, 
he did not operate his shop or process deer for that 
season. 
The Court of Appeals considered an additional month of 
work “disability” because Straub did not return to his 
weekend job as a bass guitar player until mid-January 2000. 
Straub estimated that over a four-month period he had to 
miss fifteen to twenty club dates. 
Straub’s treatment consisted of having his wounds 
sutured, wearing a cast, and taking antibiotics and pain 
medication. 
Four days after the accident, outpatient 
surgery was performed on the fingers and palm. The 
treatment was not significant or long-term. 
Within two 
months, the fracture and surgical wounds had healed. There 
were two sessions of physical therapy. 
At that point, 
Straub discontinued all medical treatment. 
Plaintiff 
estimated he was ninety-nine percent back to normal by mid-
January 
2000. 
Given 
that 
Straub’s 
injury 
was 
not 
extensive, 
recuperation 
was 
short, 
unremarkable, 
and 
virtually complete, and the effect of the injury on body 
function was not pervasive, we conclude that Straub’s 
general ability to live his normal life was not affected. 
There is no medical evidence that Straub has any residual 
impairment or that the course of Straub’s life has been 
31  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
affected. 
The temporary limitations Straub experienced do 
not satisfy the statutory prerequisites. 
Considered 
against the backdrop of his preimpairment life and the 
limited nature and extent of his injuries, we conclude that 
Straub’s postimpairment life is not so different that his 
“general ability” to lead his normal life has been 
affected. 
Because the course of Straub’s normal life has 
not been affected, he failed to satisfy the “serious 
impairment of body function” threshold for recovery of 
noneconomic damages. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary disposition for defendants in Straub’s 
lawsuit. 
VI. Application to Kreiner 
We are satisfied that there is no factual dispute that 
is material to the determination whether Kreiner suffered a 
serious impairment of body function.21
 Thus, it is 
appropriate to determine as a matter of law whether he 
experienced a serious impairment of body function. 
MCL 
500.3135(2)(a)(ii). 
21 Although there is a factual dispute concerning the
nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries, this dispute is
not material to the determination whether plaintiff has
suffered a “serious impairment of body function” because 
even assuming that all plaintiff’s allegations concerning
the nature and extent of his injuries are true, we conclude
that plaintiff has still not suffered a “serious impairment
of body function.” 
32  
 
 
 
 
First, we find that Kreiner’s medically documented 
injuries to his lower back, right hip, and right leg 
constitute an impairment of an important body function that 
was objectively manifested. 
Thus, the issue is whether the impairment affected his 
general ability to lead his life. 
We find that Kreiner’s 
impairment did not affect his overall or broad ability to 
conduct the course of his normal life. 
In fact, his life 
after the accident was not significantly different than it 
was before the accident. 
He continued working as a self­
employed carpenter and construction worker and was still 
able to perform all the work that he did before, with the 
possible exception of roofing work. 
His injuries did not 
cause him to miss one day of work. 
Kreiner states that he can no longer stand on a ladder 
for longer than twenty minutes, can no longer lift anything 
over eighty pounds, and was forced to limit his workday to 
six hours because he can no longer work eight-hour days. 
Kreiner does not contend, however, that these limitations 
prevent him from performing his job. 
He also has 
difficulty walking more than a half mile without resting 
and can no longer hunt rabbits, although he continues to 
hunt deer. 
33  
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
 
Looking at Kreiner’s life as a whole, before and after 
the accident, and the nature and extent of his injuries, we 
conclude that his impairment did not affect his overall 
ability to conduct the course of his normal life.22  While 
he cannot work to full capacity, he is generally able to 
lead his normal life. 
A negative effect on a particular 
aspect of an injured person’s life is not sufficient in 
itself to meet the tort threshold, as long as the injured 
person is still generally able to lead his normal life. 
Considered against the backdrop of his preimpairment life, 
Kreiner’s postimpairment life is not so different that his 
“general ability” to conduct the course of his normal life 
has been affected.23 
Because 
Kreiner 
failed 
to 
establish 
that 
his 
impairment affected his general ability to conduct the 
22 As the trial court noted, plaintiff, while somewhat
restricted, 
is 
able 
to 
engage 
in 
lifting, 
bending,
twisting, and standing as required by his job. 
23 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, we are not
concluding that Kreiner would have to show that he is
unable to work at all in order to show that he has suffered 
a “serious impairment of body function.” 
Post at 20. 
Instead, we are simply concluding that, although plaintiff
has suffered an impairment that does have an effect on his
ability to work, it is not a “serious impairment of body
function,” as defined by the Legislature, because plaintiff
is “generally able” to work and the course of his normal
life is otherwise unaffected. 
We disagree with the 
dissent’s suggestion that any effect on one’s ability to
work is sufficient to establish a “serious impairment of
body function.” 
34  
 
 
course of his normal life, he did not satisfy the “serious 
impairment of body function” threshold for recovery of 
noneconomic damages. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary disposition of Kreiner’s lawsuit. 
VII. Response to the dissent 
It must be pointed out that the dissent’s approach 
leads to the rather dismaying conclusion that the intent of 
the Legislature in 1995 was, in effect, to pull down the 
no-fault temple and produce an auto insurance catastrophe 
for the state’s drivers. 
That is, the dissent concludes 
that the 1995 amendment, despite no words to this effect, 
was designed, as the thrust of his argument makes clear, to 
undermine the great compromise (no-fault benefits in return 
for limited tort remedies) that all previous Supreme Court 
decisions have recognized as existing in the no-fault 
legislation and that is an indispensable requirement to 
make no-fault viable. 
We decline to join him in this 
calculated exercise predicated on what we believe is a 
studied ignorance of what the Legislature intended. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In both of the cases before us the trial courts 
granted summary disposition for defendants because the 
courts determined that plaintiffs had not established a 
serious impairment of a body function. 
The respective 
35  
 
 
 
 
panels of the Court of Appeals, however, reversed. 
We 
reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals because we 
conclude that the trial courts properly determined that 
plaintiffs did not establish a serious impairment of body 
function. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
Straub. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in 
Kreiner. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
RICHARD ADAM KREINER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124120 
ROBERT OAKLAND FISCHER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
DANIEL LEE STRAUB, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124757 
PHILLIP MICHAEL COLLETTE and 
TERESA M. HEIL-WYLIE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
In these cases, this Court is called upon to interpret 
MCL 500.3135. 
Because I disagree with the majority’s 
construction of MCL 500.3135(7) and the result reached in 
these cases, I must respectfully dissent. 
Accordingly, I 
would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of 
law, which this Court reviews de novo. 
In re MCI Telecom 
Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
“The 
primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the intent of the Legislature.” 
Id. at 411. 
To this 
end, this Court abides by the governing principle that the 
first step in determining the Legislature’s intent is to 
examine the language of the statute itself. 
Id. 
“If the 
statute is unambiguous on its face, the Legislature will be 
presumed to have intended the meaning expressed, and 
judicial construction is neither required nor permissible.” 
Id. 
II. MCL 500.3135 
MCL 500.3135(1) unambiguously states that “[a] person 
remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss 
caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a 
motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered 
death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent 
serious disfigurement.” 
MCL 500.3135(2) provides in 
pertinent part: 
For a cause of action for damages pursuant
to subsection (1) filed on or after July 26,
1996, all of the following apply: 
(a) The issues of whether an injured person
has suffered serious impairment of body function 
2  
 
 
or permanent serious disfigurement are questions
of law for the court if the court finds either of 
the following: 
(i) There is no factual dispute concerning
the nature and extent of the person’s injuries. 
(ii) There is a factual dispute concerning
the nature and extent of the person’s injuries,
but 
the 
dispute 
is 
not 
material 
to 
the 
determination as to whether the person has 
suffered a serious impairment of body function or
permanent serious disfigurement. 
Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of 
§ 3135(2), the trial court determines, as a question of 
law, whether a particular plaintiff has satisfied the tort 
threshold under two enumerated circumstances. 
Namely, (1) 
where 
there 
is 
no 
factual 
dispute 
concerning 
the 
plaintiff’s injuries, or (2) where there is a factual 
dispute concerning the plaintiff’s injuries, but the 
dispute is not material or outcome determinative regarding 
whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body 
function or permanent serious disfigurement. 
The question becomes, however, who decides whether a 
particular plaintiff has satisfied the tort threshold where 
there is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent 
of the plaintiff’s injuries and such a dispute is material 
or outcome determinative with respect to the serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function 
or 
permanent 
serious 
disfigurement issue. 
The most natural reading of the 
statute suggests that in such a situation, a question of 
3  
 
 
 
fact is presented for the jury and the jury decides whether 
the plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body 
function or permanent serious disfigurement. 
Important to the resolution of these cases is the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function.” 
MCL 500.3135(7) unambiguously states, “As used 
in this section, ‘serious impairment of body function’ 
means an objectively manifested impairment of an important 
body function that affects the person’s general ability to 
lead his or her normal life.” The Legislature’s definition 
necessarily contains three elements. 
A serious impairment 
of 
body 
function 
is 
(1) 
an 
objectively 
manifested 
impairment, (2) of an important body function, (3) that 
affects the person’s general ability to lead his normal 
life. 
All three requirements must be satisfied and, thus, 
a thorough review of each requirement is necessary. 
A. Objectively Manifested 
The clear import of the “objectively manifested” 
requirement is that the impairment must be observable or 
identifiable in order for the impairment to satisfy the 
first prong of the legislative definition. 
“Objective” 
means “1. Of or having to do with a material object as 
distinguished from a mental concept. 
2. Having actual 
existence or reality. 
3. a. Uninfluenced by emotion, 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
surmise, or personal prejudice. 
b. Based on observable 
phenomena; presented factually . . . .” 
The American 
Heritage 
Dictionary, 
Second 
College 
Edition 
(1982). 
Further, “manifest” means “[c]learly apparent to the sight 
or understanding . . . . To show or demonstrate plainly; 
reveal . . . .” Id. Thus, the first prong of the serious 
impairment of body function analysis is, effectively, an 
objective inquiry. 
B. Of an Important Body Function 
Once 
it 
is 
determined 
that 
the 
impairment 
is 
objectively manifested, the trial court or jury must then 
decide whether an important body function is impaired. 
“Important” means “[m]arked by or having great value, 
significance, or consequence. . . .” 
Id.
 Importance or 
value is necessarily a subjective inquiry—what may be 
important to one individual may not be as important or 
valuable to another. 
As such, the Legislature plainly 
intended the second prong of the analysis to be subjective 
in nature, in contrast to the first prong.1  Thus, the “of 
an important body function” analysis does not lend itself 
1 Although it may be appropriate for a court to engage
in a so-called objective analysis of the “important body
function” prong, such an analysis is still undertaken with
the goal of ascertaining the subjective importance that a
particular plaintiff places on that body function. 
5  
 
 
 
 
to any judicial line drawing, and the utilization of 
nonexhaustive factors is unwarranted. 
For example, suppose a person is injured in a motor 
vehicle accident and, as result, the person is unable to 
fully manipulate her pinky finger to some degree. 
To an 
“average” person, the ability to fully extend or bend her 
pinky finger may not be important. 
But suppose the person 
injured in the motor vehicle accident is Roger Clemens (and 
he loses the zip on his fastball), or B. B. King (and he 
can no longer play guitar in the same fashion), or Annika 
Sorenstam (and she loses the distance on her drives). 
For 
these individuals, the ability to manipulate their pinky 
finger is important. 
Therefore, the unambiguous language 
of MCL 500.3135(7) does not lend itself to any bright-line 
rule and the analysis of this prong must proceed on a case­
by-case basis. 
C. That Affects the Person’s General Ability to Lead
His or Her Normal Life 
Central to the resolution of these cases is the proper 
interpretation of the third prong of the Legislature’s 
definition of “serious impairment of body function.” 
“Affect” means “[t]o have an influence on; bring about a 
change 
in.” 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary, 
supra. 
“General” means: 
6  
 
 
 
 
1. 
Relating 
to, 
concerned 
with, 
or 
applicable to the whole or every member of a
class or category. 2. Affecting or characteristic
of the majority of those involved; prevalent: a 
general discontent. 
3. Being usually the case;
true or applicable in most instances but not all.
4. a. Not limited in scope, area, or application:
as a general rule. b. Not limited to one class of 
things: general studies. 
[Id. (emphasis in 
original).] 
“Able” means “having sufficient power, skill, or 
resources to accomplish an object [sic, objective].” 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
 
(accessed June 21, 2004). 
Thus, the Legislature requires 
that the impairment have an influence on most, but not all, 
of the person’s capacity “to lead his or her normal life.” 
The last phrase in the statutory definition of 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function” 
inevitably 
contemplates a subjective inquiry. 
The phrase “his or her 
normal life” requires a court to compare a particular 
plaintiff’s life before and after the impairment. Further, 
a person’s “normal” life is unavoidably relative and, thus, 
inherently subjective. 
Because such an endeavor proceeds 
on a case-by-case basis and each particular plaintiff’s 
ability 
to 
lead 
his 
own 
normal 
life 
is 
uniquely 
individualized, the third prong is not amenable to any 
bright-line rule or set of nonexhaustive factors. 
In sum, the third prong of the serious impairment of 
body function analysis requires a reviewing court to 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
compare the plaintiff’s pre- and post-accident life and 
determine whether the impairment has an influence on most, 
but not all, of the plaintiff’s capacities to lead his 
preaccident lifestyle.2 
III. The Legislature’s Stated Test 
On the basis of the foregoing, the unambiguous statute 
sets forth the following test. 
The first step in the 
serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function 
analysis 
is 
to 
determine whether there is a factual dispute concerning the 
nature and extent of the person’s injuries and, if there is 
a factual dispute, whether the dispute is material to the 
serious impairment of body function issue. 
If there is no factual dispute concerning the nature 
and extent of the person’s injuries, a question of law is 
presented for the trial court. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i). 
If there is a factual dispute concerning the nature 
and extent of the person’s injuries, but the dispute is not 
material to adjudging whether the person has suffered a 
2 Similar to the second prong, the third prong of the
analysis is inherently subjective in nature. While a court 
may engage in a so-called objective analysis to determine
whether the impairment affects the person’s general ability
to lead his normal life, this endeavor is made with the
understanding that a person’s subjective normal life is the
relevant frame of reference. 
8  
 
 
 
 
serious impairment of body function, a question of law is 
presented for the trial court. MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii). 
If there is a factual dispute concerning the nature 
and extent of the person’s injuries and the dispute is 
material to adjudging whether the person has suffered a 
serious impairment of body function, a question of fact is 
presented for the jury. 
Once this initial determination is made, the second 
step is to decide whether the Legislature’s statutory 
definition has been fulfilled. 
Under the plain and 
unambiguous language of MCL 500.3135(7), the serious 
impairment of body function threshold is satisfied where 
the impairment is (1) an objectively manifested impairment 
(observable and indentifable), (2) of an important body 
function (a body function that the particular plaintiff 
deems valuable), (3) that affects the person’s general 
ability to lead his normal life (influences most, but not 
necessarily all, of the particular plaintiff’s capacity to 
lead his own unique preaccident lifestyle). 
The Legislature’s statutory definition does not lend 
itself 
to 
any 
bright-line 
rule 
or 
imposition 
of 
nonexhaustive list of factors. 
Instead, the “serious 
impairment of body function” inquiry proceeds on a case-by­
case basis because the statute requires inherently fact­
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
specific 
and 
circumstantial 
determinations. 
The 
Legislature recognized that what is important to one is not 
important to all, a brief impairment may be devastating 
whereas a near permanent impairment may have little effect. 
The Legislature avoided drawing lines in the sand and so 
must we. 
IV. Application of the Legislature’s Stated Test 
A. Straub v Collette 
Because there is no factual dispute regarding the 
nature and extent of plaintiff Straub’s injuries, the 
existence of a serious impairment of body function is 
determined as a matter of law. 
MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i). 
There is little debate that Straub’s injuries to his hand 
were observable and identifiable. 
Straub sustained a 
closed left fifth metacarpal fracture, as well as open 
wounds and tendon injuries to his middle and ring fingers. 
Thus, Straub’s impairment was objectively manifested and, 
therefore, the first prong of the statutory definition is 
satisfied. 
The second prong of the serious impairment of body 
function analysis is satisfied where the impairment is to a 
body function that Straub considers valuable. According to 
Straub’s testimony, the injury to his hand was to an 
important body function. 
Straub relied on the use of his 
10  
 
 
 
hand to work as a cable lineman, play guitar in his band, 
operate his bow shop during deer season, and perform 
household and personal tasks. 
Thus, because Straub’s use 
of his hand was related to important body functions, the 
second prong of MCL 500.3135(7) is satisfied. 
Central to the resolution of this case is whether the 
third prong of the serious impairment analysis has been 
met; namely, whether the injury to his hand affected 
Straub’s general ability to lead his normal life. 
Under 
the undisputed facts in this case, I believe that Straub’s 
injury had an influence on most, but not all, of Straub’s 
capacity to lead his unique preaccident lifestyle. 
Straub was able to work as a cable lineman before the 
motor vehicle accident, but could not perform that work 
following the accident. Further, before the injury, Straub 
played in a band that practiced three or four times a week 
and played at clubs almost every weekend. 
After the 
accident, Straub could not play his guitar. 
Before the 
accident, Straub would operate his bow shop during deer 
season, but, as a result of the motor vehicle accident, he 
could not operate his shop during the 1999 season. 
Finally, Straub had difficulty performing household tasks 
in the same manner as he did before the accident. As such, 
the impairment to Straub’s hand had an influence on most, 
11  
 
 
 
 
but not all, of his capacity to lead his preaccident 
lifestyle. 
Therefore, under the plain and unambiguous 
language of MCL 500.3135(7), Straub has satisfied the tort 
threshold and I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
The majority reaches a contrary conclusion because it 
imposes 
additional 
requirements 
on 
Straub 
that 
the 
Legislature never envisioned. 
The majority places great 
weight on the fact that 
Straub’s 
injury 
was 
not 
extensive,
recuperation 
was 
short, 
unremarkable, 
and 
virtually complete, and the effect of the injury
on body function was not pervasive . . . . There 
is no medical evidence that Straub has any
residual 
impairment 
or 
that 
the 
course 
of 
Straub’s life has been affected. 
The temporary
limitations Straub experienced do not satisfy the
statutory prerequisites. 
[Ante at 32 (emphasis
added).] 
However, the clear language of MCL 500.3135(7) does 
not make any express or implicit mention of time or 
temporal considerations. 
As noted above, under the no­
fault act, a person may remain subject to tort liability if 
the injured person suffered death, permanent serious 
disfigurement, or serious impairment of body function. MCL 
500.3135(1). 
Unlike 
death 
or 
permanent 
serious 
disfigurement, the serious impairment of body function 
threshold does not suggest any sort of temporal limitation. 
Further, 
the 
plain 
and 
unambiguous 
language 
of 
the 
12  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
statutory 
definition 
of 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function” does not set forth any quantum of time the judge 
or jury must find dispositive when determining whether a 
serious 
impairment 
of 
body 
function 
has 
occurred. 
Therefore, the duration of the impairment is not an 
appropriate inquiry. 
The 
majority 
noticeably 
departs 
from 
accepted 
principles of statutory interpretation when it concludes 
that certain temporal factors should be considered when 
evaluating whether the serious impairment of body function 
threshold has been met. 
For example, the majority reasons 
that “the type and length of treatment required,” “the 
duration of the impairment,” “the extent of any residual 
impairment,” and “the prognosis for eventual recovery” are 
relevant factors to consider when making the threshold 
determination.3 
Ante at 28. Unlike the majority, however, 
I do not find any support for these considerations in the 
unambiguous language of MCL 500.3135(7). 
Moreover, the majority disregards the principles of 
statutory interpretation that it claims to follow. 
For 
example, in construing the term “lead” in convenient 
3 Curiously, the majority finds support for these 
factors in Hermann v Haney, 98 Mich App 445; 296 NW2d 278
(1980), and DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896
(1986). 
13  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
isolation, the majority states, “To ‘lead’ means, among 
other things, ‘to conduct or bring in a particular 
course.’. 
. 
. 
Given 
this 
meaning, 
the 
objectively 
manifested impairment of an important body function must 
affect the course of a person’s life. 
Accordingly, the 
affect of the impairment on the course of a plaintiff’s 
entire normal life must be considered.” 
Ante at 25 
(citation omitted and emphasis added). 
Additionally, the 
majority further asserts that the impairment “must be of 
sufficient duration to affect the course of a plaintiff’s 
life.” 
Id. at 31. 
In what is best described as tortured 
logic, the majority has seen fit to impose a temporal 
requirement teetering on the brink of permanency into the 
unambiguous statute. 
Because the statute does not define 
“serious impairment of body function” with respect to 
permanency, or any temporal factor for that matter, the 
majority impermissibly adds additional requirements not 
found in the text of MCL 500.3135(7).4 
4 The majority poses the following question which I
believe is indicative of the difference between the 
majority and the dissent in this case: 
Does the dissent really believe that an 
impairment lasting only a few moments has the
same effect on a person’s “general ability to
lead his or her normal life” as an impairment 
14  
 
 
                                                 
It is evident that the amount of time Straub was 
injured drives the majority’s result. 
A fair reading of 
the majority opinion seems to indicate that if Straub’s 
injuries were of a more permanent nature, the majority may 
be 
inclined 
to 
find 
that 
the 
requirements 
of 
MCL 
500.3135(7) have been met. 
As mentioned above, however, 
unlike death or permanent serious disfigurement, nothing in 
the plain text of MCL 500.3135(7) suggests that the 
Legislature intended temporal limitations or permanency be 
considered when making the “serious impairment of body 
function” determination. Therefore, the majority errs when 
it reads additional language into the plain text of MCL 
500.3135(7). 
lasting several years or that an impairment
requiring annual treatment has the same effect on
a person’s “general ability to lead his or her
normal life” as an impairment requiring daily
treatment? [Ante at 29 n 18.] 
In response, I must note that the statutory threshold
is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and under the 
majority’s rationale none of the majority’s hypothetical
plaintiffs is likely to meet the threshold. 
The majority
would effortlessly conclude that interrupting several years
out of, for example, forty is a minor interruption. 
This 
is precisely the reason why this Court should avoid reading
additional 
temporal 
requirements 
into 
the 
unambiguous
statute. 
Moreover, my interpretation of MCL 500.3135(7) is not
based on what I believe or hope. Rather, my interpretation
is based on how the unambiguous statute is written and,
unlike the majority, not how I personally believe the
statute should be written. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
While this roughly four-month serious impairment of 
body function may appear to be at odds with the stated 
purpose of the no-fault act, any trepidation over such a 
policy concern is best left to the Legislature. 
Because 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
speak 
in 
terms 
of 
“residual 
impairment,” “recuperation,” or “permanency,” this Court 
should avoid reading those requirements into the plain and 
unambiguous text of the statute. 
B. Kreiner v Fischer 
Because there is a factual dispute concerning the 
nature and extent of plaintiff Kreiner’s injuries and such 
a dispute is material to the serious impairment of body 
function issue, a question of fact is presented. 
Kreiner 
is a self-employed construction worker and carpenter. 
Additionally, Kreiner engages in recreational hunting. 
After the motor vehicle accident, Kreiner claimed he could 
no longer work eight-hour days, was unable to stand on a 
ladder longer than twenty minutes, could no longer perform 
general roofing work, was unable to lift heavy items, could 
no longer walk more than one-half mile, and could no longer 
hunt rabbits. 
Defendant attempted to submit videotapes to the trial 
court that allegedly demonstrate that Kreiner’s injuries do 
not affect his life to the degree that Kreiner claims. 
16  
 
 
 
Additionally, in its brief to this Court, defendant argues 
that these videotapes show Kreiner climbing up and down 
extension ladders, driving nails, tearing off siding, 
reaching, lifting, and crawling on a roof. 
In initially 
remanding this case, the Court of Appeals directed the 
trial court to consider the admissibility of the videotape 
offered by defendant to determine whether there are 
material issues of fact regarding Kreiner’s claims relative 
to the effects of his injuries. 
Kreiner v Fischer, 251 
Mich App 513, 519; 651 NW2d 433 (2002), vacated and 
remanded 468 Mich 885 (2003). 
Thus, there is a factual 
dispute that is material to the serious impairment of body 
function issue because if the effects of Kreiner’s injuries 
were undisputed, the requirements of MCL 500.3135(7) would 
be satisfied. 
Kreiner’s injuries were observable and identifiable. 
The injury to Kreiner’s back was observable and verified by 
magnetic 
resonance 
imaging 
and 
electromyography 
examinations. 
Because 
the 
injury 
was 
objectively 
manifested, 
the 
first 
prong 
of 
MCL 
500.3135(7) 
is 
satisfied. 
The second prong of the serious impairment of 
body function analysis is also satisfied because the 
impairment was to a body function that Kreiner deems 
valuable. 
According to Kreiner’s testimony, the injury to 
17  
 
 
 
 
his back was to an important body function. Kreiner relied 
on the use of his back to sustain his livelihood as a 
construction worker and carpenter. Thus, the central issue 
for this Court to resolve is whether Kreiner’s injury 
affected his general ability to lead his normal life. 
The third prong of the statutory definition of 
“serious impairment of body function” is satisfied if the 
impairment has an influence on most, but not all, of 
Kreiner’s capacity to lead his preaccident lifestyle. 
In 
resolving this issue, I find the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals on remand to be persuasive. 
We find that one’s general ability to lead
his or her normal life can be affected by an
injury that impacts the person’s ability to work
at a job, where the job plays a significant role
in that individual’s normal life, such as in the
case at bar. Employment or one’s livelihood, for
a 
vast 
majority 
of 
people, 
constitutes 
an 
extremely important and major part of a person’s
life. Whether it be wrong or right, our worth as
individuals in society is often measured by our
employment. 
Losing the ability to work can be
devastating; employment, regardless of income 
issues, is important to a sense of purpose and
feeling of vitality. 
For those working a 
standard forty-hour work week, a quarter of their
lifetime before retirement is devoted to time 
spent on the job. 
An injury affecting one’s
employment and ability to work, under the right
factual 
circumstances, 
can 
be 
equated 
to 
affecting the person’s general ability to lead
his or her normal life. 
For many, life in
general revolves around a job and work. It would 
be illogical to conclude that where a person
loses the ability to work because of an injury
resulting from a motor-vehicle collision, after 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
being gainfully employed, the person’s life after
the accident, in general, would be unaffected.
[Kreiner v Fischer (On Remand), 256 Mich App 680,
688-689; 671 NW2d 95 (2003).] 
Moreover, 
the 
panel 
noted, 
“Here, 
there 
was 
documentary evidence presented by plaintiff that his 
ability to walk, undertake certain physical movements, and 
engage in recreational hunting was limited by the injury. 
These limitations along with plaintiff’s alleged employment 
limitations, if true, indicate that plaintiff suffered a 
serious impairment of body function under § 3135.” 
Id. at 
689. 
Under the circumstances presented in this case, I 
would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because 
if Kreiner’s claims are true, his injuries had an influence 
on most, but not all, of his capacity to lead his 
preaccident lifestyle. 
Additionally, because there is a 
factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of 
Kreiner’s injuries and such a dispute is material with 
respect to MCL 500.3135(7), I would likewise remand this 
case to the trial court. 
In support of its conclusion that Kreiner did not 
satisfy MCL 500.3135(7), the majority places great weight 
on the notion that Kreiner’s life was “not significantly 
different than it was before the accident.” 
Ante at 33. 
Specifically, the majority posits Kreiner “was still able 
to perform all the work that he did before, with the 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
possible exception of roofing work. 
His injuries did not 
cause him to miss one day of work.” 
Id. 
However, the 
majority also acknowledges that Kreiner “cannot work to 
full capacity . . . .” 
Id. at 34. In an effort to 
reconcile this doublespeak, the majority then concludes 
that Kreiner’s work was simply a “particular aspect” of his 
life and that Kreiner’s “postimpairment life [was] not so 
different . . . .” Id. at 35. 
Implicit in the majority’s rationale is the idea that 
a person has not suffered a serious impairment of body 
function unless that person is absolutely precluded from 
engaging in their particular preaccident lifestyle and the 
impairment lasts the length of the person’s life. 
Stated 
differently, it is not enough that Kreiner can only 
function at seventy-five percent of his preaccident work 
ability, because the majority would conclude that Kreiner 
must not be able to work at all.5
 It is not enough that 
Kreiner is limited in his lifting, bending, twisting, and 
5 The majority notes that “[d]espite his limitations,
Kreiner’s tax returns revealed that 1998 was his highest
income-earning year, including several years before the
injuries occurred.” 
Id. at 19 n 12. 
However, such an
assertion ignores the idea that Kreiner claims to have been
working at seventy-five percent of his preaccident ability.
If Kreiner’s claims are true, Kreiner may have earned
twenty-five percent more that year. 
Thus, I do not find
Kreiner’s 1998 tax returns dispositive. 
20  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
standing, because the majority would conclude that Kreiner 
must not be able to lift, bend, twist, and stand at all.6 
The majority would conclude that it is not enough that 
Kreiner cannot hunt rabbits, because Kreiner can hunt deer. 
The majority would conclude that it is not enough that 
Kreiner can no longer walk one-half mile, because Kreiner 
can still walk. 
Such an all-or-nothing approach is not supported by 
the unambiguous text of the statute. 
Moreover, it is 
evident that the indivisible sum of the affected lifestyle 
activities mentioned above leads to the logical conclusion 
that Kreiner’s injuries had an influence on most, but not 
all, of his capacity to lead his preaccident life. 
It is 
equally evident that the majority uses the facts of the 
Kreiner 
case 
to 
effectively 
create 
a 
more 
rigorous 
threshold 
requirement 
than 
that 
mandated 
by 
the 
Legislature. 
Despite the majority’s assertions to the contrary, its 
application of its stated test in Kreiner demonstrates that 
it believes that every aspect of a person’s life must be 
affected in order to satisfy the tort threshold, and the 
6 As noted by the Court of Appeals, “injuries affecting
the ability to work, by their very nature, often place
physical limitations on numerous aspects of a person’s
life.” Kreiner (On Remand), supra at 689. 
21  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
effects must last the course of the plaintiff’s entire 
normal life. 
For example, the majority concludes that the 
term “general” in MCL 500.3135(7) means “entire,” “whole,” 
and “for the most part.” See Ante at 24. Remarkably, the 
majority then determines that 
whether a plaintiff is “generally able” to lead
his normal life requires considering whether the
plaintiff is, “for the most part” able to lead
his normal life. 
* * * 
[T]he effect of the impairment on the course
of a plaintiff’s entire normal life must be 
considered. 
Although 
some 
aspects 
of 
a 
plaintiff’s entire normal life may be interrupted
by 
the 
impairment, 
if, 
despite 
those 
inpingements, the course or trajectory of the
plaintiff’s normal life has not been affected,
then the plaintiff’s “general ability” to lead
his normal life has not been affected and he does 
not 
meet 
the 
“serious 
impairment 
of 
body
function” threshold. 
[Id. at 25 (emphasis
added).] 
The majority further states, “we merely require that the 
whole life be considered in determining what satisfies 
[the] threshold . . . .” Id. at 28 n 16 (emphasis added). 
The term “general” as used in MCL 500.3135(7) does 
not, as the majority asserts, modify the phrase “to lead 
his or her normal life.” 
Rather, “general” modifies the 
term “ability.”7
 In a disingenuous sleight of hand, the 
7 Again, MCL 500.3135(7) defines “serious impairment of
body function” as “an objectively manifested impairment of 
22  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
majority attempts to create a more difficult test than that 
required by the Legislature. 
MCL 500.3135(7) does not 
require that the impairment affect every aspect of the 
course of a person’s “entire” or normal life. 
Similarly, in its attempt to effectively raise the 
statutory threshold, the majority’s actual application of 
its test seeks to revive Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 
330 NW2d 22 (1982), in full. 
In Cassidy, this Court 
previously held that the “serious impairment of body 
function” threshold was satisfied where the injury affects 
“the person’s general ability to live a normal life.” 
Id. 
at 505 (emphasis added). Later, in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 
Mich 32, 66; 398 NW2d 896 (1986), this Court found that 
standard flawed because “there is no such thing as ‘a 
normal life.’” (Emphasis added.) In 1995, the Legislature 
amended the no-fault act and set forth its own definition 
of “serious impairment of body function.” 
The majority claims that in 1995 the Legislature was 
“[a]pparently 
cognizant” 
of 
the 
DiFranco 
Court’s 
repudiation of Cassidy’s “a normal life” standard. Ante at 
12 n 7. The majority further states: 
[T]he Legislature, in the 1995 act, requires
that the impairment affect “the person’s general 
an important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.” 
23  
 
 
 
 
ability 
to 
lead 
his 
or 
her 
normal 
life.” 
(Emphasis added). 
It is then clear that,
harkening to the DiFranco Court’s guidance that
there is no objectively “normal life,” the 
Legislature 
modified 
the 
entirely 
objective
Cassidy standard to a partially objective and
partially subjective inquiry. [Id.] 
In construing MCL 500.3135(7), the majority then concludes 
that the statute requires a comparison of the person’s pre-
and post-accident lifestyle. 
However, the majority merely pays lip service to its 
own construction and fails to actually compare Kreiner’s 
pre- and post-accident life. Kreiner framed the effects of 
his impairment in terms of the limitations he experienced 
at work, hunting rabbits, lifting and twisting, and walking 
more than one-half mile. 
Kreiner convincingly argued that 
these particular aspects were the indivisible sum of his 
normal life. 
The majority, however, simply concludes that 
these particular aspects of Kreiner’s “life as a whole” are 
insufficient to meet the threshold. 
Implicit in the 
majority’s actual application of its test is the conclusion 
that “a normal life” cannot consist solely of work, hunting 
rabbits, lifting and twisting, and walking more than one­
half mile. 
Yet, MCL 500.3135(7) requires the impairment 
affect the plaintiff’s normal life, not what the majority 
infers to be “a normal life.” 
Kreiner’s normal life 
apparently consisted of working, hunting rabbits, lifting 
24  
 
 
 
 
and twisting, and walking one-half mile and, thus, he 
satisfied the statutory threshold. 
In my opinion, the 
majority’s actual application of its test is merely a 
subtle method of returning to the now refuted Cassidy  “a 
normal life” standard in order to fashion what it believes 
to be a more difficult legislative definition. 
The plain and unambiguous language set forth by the 
Legislature simply requires that the impairment affect a 
person’s general ability to lead his normal life. 
Unlike 
the majority, I prefer to simply apply MCL 500.3135(7) as 
written and leave any unresolved policy concerns in the 
hands of the Legislature. 
V. Response to the Response to the Dissent 
I am cognizant of the overall purpose of the no-fault 
scheme. 
Further, I am aware that my view may be perceived 
as an invitation to increased litigation; but this is the 
logical byproduct of the unambiguous words chosen by the 
Legislature. 
Any apparent tension between the act’s 
overall purpose and the Legislature’s unambiguous statutory 
definition is best addressed by the Legislature itself. 
The majority suggests that my approach is sacrilegious 
to the “no-fault temple” and is an exercise predicated on 
“studied ignorance.” Ante at 35. While admittedly unaware 
that I was required to worship the no-fault insurance gods, 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I believe that my “studied ignorance” is more properly 
labeled as “judicial restraint.” 
If ignorance comes from 
applying this unambiguous statute as written and not 
substituting my own view for that of the Legislature, I 
must say that ignorance is bliss. 
If so-called wisdom 
comes from rewriting this unambiguous statute to comport 
with my own preference on how the statute should be written 
and applied, in this instance I must choose “ignorance.” 
Today’s decision serves as a chilling reminder that 
activism 
comes 
in 
all 
guises, 
including 
so-called 
textualism. 
VI. Conclusion 
Under accepted principles of statutory interpretation, 
a plain and unambiguous statute should speak for itself. 
We should not casually read anything into an unambiguous 
statute that is not within the manifest intent of the 
Legislature as derived from the words of the statute. 
Because the majority departs from this premise, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
Rather, I would apply MCL 500.3135 
as unambiguously written and, thus, affirm the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
26