Title: League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: October 4, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LEAGUE OF OREGON CITIES,
BENTON COUNTY, CITY OF BEAVERTON,
CITY OF EUGENE, JUNCTION CITY,
CITY OF VENETA, BEV STEIN, VERA KATZ,
MULTNOMAH COUNTY, CITY OF PORTLAND,
and WASHINGTON COUNTY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
	v.
STATE OF OREGON,
JOHN KITZHABER, M.D., and BILL BRADBURY,
Defendants-Appellants,
	and
STUART MILLER,
Intervenor-Appellant.
AUDREY McCALL,
HECTOR MacPHERSON, MICHAEL E. SWAIM,
JAMES LEWIS, and MARK TIPPERMAN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
	v.
JOHN KITZHABER, M.D.,
BILL BRADBURY, and STATE OF OREGON,
Defendants-Appellants,
	and
STUART MILLER,
Intervenor-Appellant.
(CC 00C-20156, 00C-19871; CA A113789, A113790;
SC S48450 (Control), S48451)
(Consolidated for Briefing, Argument, and Decision)
	En Banc
	On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS
19.405.*
	Argued and submitted September 10, 2001.
	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for defendants-appellants.  With her on the briefs were
Stephanie Striffler, Special Counsel to the Attorney General,
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	John A. DiLorenzo, Jr., of Hagen Dye Hirschy & DiLorenzo,
P.C., Portland, argued the cause for intervenor-appellant.  With
him on the briefs were Aaron K. Stuckey, and Justin J. Burns,
Portland.
	William F. Gary, of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, P.C., Eugene,
argued the cause for respondents League of Oregon Cities, Benton
County, City of Beaverton, City of Eugene, Junction City, City of
Veneta, Bev Stein, Vera Katz, Multnomah County, City of Portland,
and Washington County.  With him on the briefs were Glenn Klein,
James E. Mountain, Jr., Susan D. Marmaduke, and Janice L. Mackey. 
Also on the briefs were Jeffrey L. Rogers, City Attorney, and 
Madelyn Wessel and Linda Meng, Chief Deputy City Attorneys,
Portland, and Thomas Sponsler, Multnomah County Attorney, and
Sandra N. Duffy, Deputy County Attorney, Portland.
	Thomas M. Christ, of Cosgrave, Vergeer & Kester, Portland,
filed the brief and argued the cause for respondents Audrey
McCall, Hector MacPherson, Michael E. Swaim, James Lewis, and
Mark Tipperman.  
	James E. Leuenberger, Lake Oswego, filed the brief for amici
curiae Don McIntire and Fred Hall.
	John M. Groen, of Groen Stephens & Klinge, LLP, Bellevue,
Washington, filed the brief for amici curiae Pacific Legal
Foundation and Home Builders Association of Metropolitan
Portland.  With him on the brief were Robin L. Rivett and
Benjamin C. Waggoner, of Pacific Legal Foundation, Bellevue,
Washington.
	Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Taxpayers United.
	Ross Day, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Frank
Eisenzimmer, U.S. Term Limits, and Oregonians for Fair Term
Limits.  
	David J. Hunnicutt, Tigard, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregonians in Action-Legal Center.
	Gerald P. Linder, Hillsboro, filed the brief for amicus
curiae The Association of Clean Water Agencies.  With him on the
brief were Edward J. Sullivan and William K. Kabeiseman, Preston
Gates & Ellis LLP, Portland, for amici curiae The American
Planning Association and The Association of Clean Water Agencies.
	Frederick A. Batson, of Gleaves Swearingen Larsen Potter
Scott & Smith LLP, Eugene, filed the brief for amici curiae Betty
Wiemers and Dorothy English.
	CARSON, C.J.
	The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
	Durham, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, and
filed an opinion.
    *Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge.
		CARSON, C.J.
		In these two consolidated proceedings, plaintiffs seek
to invalidate Ballot Measure 7 (2000), set out post, ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 25-26), an initiated amendment to the Oregon
Constitution that the voters approved at the 2000 general
election.  The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that Measure 7
was adopted in violation of the "separate-vote" requirement of
Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, also set out
post.  The trial court therefore declared Measure 7 to be invalid
and entered judgment accordingly.  The state (1) appealed to the
Court of Appeals, that court certified the appeals to this court,
and this court accepted certification.  We now hold, as did the
trial court, that Measure 7 was adopted in violation of the
separate-vote requirement set out in Article XVII, section 1,
and, therefore, is void in its entirety.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2000, the voters appear to have approved
Measure 7, (2) which, generally speaking, would have added to
Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution text requiring
governments to compensate private real property owners for the
cost of "restrict[ive]" regulations that reduce the value of
their real property.  On November 24, 2000, before the Secretary
of State had completed canvassing the votes on Measure 7, McCall
plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging that the measure was
invalid because it was adopted in violation of various provisions
of the Oregon Constitution, including Article XVII, section 1,
which sets out a separate-vote requirement for constitutional
amendments. (3)  In their complaint, McCall plaintiffs sought a
judicial declaration that Measure 7 was not validly adopted, and,
three days after filing their complaint, they moved for a
preliminary injunction preventing the Secretary of State from
canvassing the votes on the measure and preventing the Governor
from declaring whether the measure had passed.  League of Oregon
Cities (League) plaintiffs (4) filed their complaint on December 5,
2000, also before completion of canvassing, raising essentially
the same constitutional challenges as McCall plaintiffs and also
seeking a declaratory judgment; League plaintiffs simultaneously
moved for a preliminary injunction.  McCall plaintiffs, but not
League plaintiffs, also specifically sought recovery of attorney
fees.  In its answer to both complaints, the state asserted that
some or all plaintiffs lacked standing and that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both actions.
		In December 2000, the trial court consolidated the
actions and issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the
Secretary of State from canvassing the votes on Measure 7 and the
Governor from declaring or proclaiming the results of the
election.  In early January 2001, Miller (intervenor), originally
the chief petitioner of the initiative petition that ultimately
became Measure 7, moved to intervene in the consolidated actions,
and the trial court granted that motion.  In his answer,
intervenor contended, among other things, that the actions were
not ripe for adjudication and that all plaintiffs lacked
standing. 
		Shortly thereafter, all plaintiffs filed motions for
summary judgment, and the state and intervenor filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  At the summary judgment hearing,
intervenor submitted evidence that set out the official county
election results and demonstrated that Measure 7 had received
more than 53 percent of the vote. 
In February 2001, the trial court granted plaintiffs'
motions for summary judgment and denied the state's and
intervenor's cross-motions.  The court rejected the state's and
intervenor's arguments respecting jurisdiction, standing (except,
as noted, the argument concerning plaintiff League of Oregon
Cities), and ripeness, and also rejected most of plaintiffs'
constitutional arguments.  However, the court agreed with
plaintiffs that Measure 7 violated the separate-vote provision of
Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution and,
accordingly, was invalid.  The court later entered judgment in
both actions, declaring that the measure should not have been
submitted to the voters, had not become effective, and was not
part of the Oregon Constitution. (5)
		The state appealed.  The Court of Appeals certified the
appeals to this court.  This court accepted the certification and
consolidated the proceedings for purposes of appeal.
II.  JURISDICTION

		The state contended below that the trial court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs filed their
challenges to Measure 7 after the election, but before the
Secretary of State had completed the process of canvassing the
votes and certifying the measure.  The trial court disagreed and
assumed jurisdiction under ORS 28.010 to 28.160, the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA).  On appeal, the state and
intervenor argue that the trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction under the UDJA because another statute, ORS
250.044(1), provided plaintiffs with the exclusive method of
challenging a ballot measure after the election.  The state, but
not intervenor, alternatively argues that, even if ORS 250.044(1)
did not provide an exclusive method for plaintiffs' challenge, it
at least provided a more appropriate method for the challenges at
issue here.  For the reasons set out below, we disagree with both
contentions and hold that the trial court did not err in assuming
jurisdiction under the UDJA.
		ORS 28.010 provides, in part:
			"Courts * * * within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. * * *" 
Although a trial court has broad power to provide declaratory
relief, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 28.010 if
some other exclusive remedy exists.  Alto v. State Fire Marshal,
319 Or 382, 395, 876 P2d 774 (1994).  In addition, the trial
court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under ORS
28.010 if some more appropriate remedy exists.  Brooks v.
Dierker, 275 Or 619, 624, 552 P2d 553 (1976).		
		The state first argues that ORS 250.044(1) (6) is the type
of exclusive remedy addressed in Alto that prevents a trial court
from assuming jurisdiction under ORS 28.010.  As this court
explained in Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 605, 43 P3d 1094
(2002), decided after oral argument in this case, ORS 250.044(1)
is not "exclusive" in the manner that the state asserts.  That
statute does not concern all ballot measure challenges; rather,
it concerns only those ballot measure challenges brought on
constitutional grounds during the six-month period after the
Secretary of State certifies that the electors have adopted the
challenged measure.  Id.  As in Swett, plaintiffs here did not
file their challenges within that time period; consequently, ORS
250.044(1) does not apply to their actions.
		The state's alternative argument -- that ORS 250.044(1)
nonetheless would have provided a more appropriate avenue for
plaintiffs' challenges -- incorrectly assumes that ORS 250.044(1)
provides an independent basis for circuit court jurisdiction over
a ballot measure challenge.  In other words, the state argues
that, if plaintiffs had waited until after certification, ORS
250.044(1) itself would have conferred jurisdiction upon the
trial court over their ballot measure challenges and jurisdiction
under ORS 28.010 therefore would have been unnecessary.  However,
that argument is contrary to the explicit text of ORS 250.044(2),
which provides, in part:
		"An action under subsection (1) of this section
must be within the jurisdiction of circuit courts and
must present a justiciable controversy. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)  By its terms, subsection (2) of ORS 250.044
indicates that subsection (1) itself does not confer jurisdiction
over a ballot measure challenge.  Instead, as this court
explained in Swett, ORS 250.044(1) only sets out a list of three
requirements "respecting when and where a certain class of
ballot-measure challenges must be filed."  333 Or at 605. 
Therefore, even if plaintiffs had waited for the Secretary of
State's certification of Measure 7 to bring their challenge, they
nevertheless would have had to assert jurisdiction under the UDJA
(or another appropriate statute, if any).  For those reasons, we
reject the state's argument that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under ORS 28.010.
		Ordinarily, our discussion of jurisdiction would end at
this point, that is, with our conclusion that the trial court
properly assumed jurisdiction under a particular statutory
scheme.  However, because we conclude, as discussed below, that
only two McCall plaintiffs have standing under the UDJA, we must
consider the remaining McCall plaintiffs' alternative theory of
jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1), which concerns challenges to
actions by the Secretary of State. (7)  That consideration is
necessary, because, if the trial court had jurisdiction under ORS
246.910(1), then any McCall plaintiffs who do not have standing
under the UDJA would have the opportunity to assert standing
under ORS 246.910(1).  See Local No. 290 v. Dept. of Environ.
Quality, 323 Or 559, 565, 919 P2d 1168 (1996) (when ruling on
standing, court must focus upon wording of particular statute at
issue).  Accordingly, we now address McCall plaintiffs' argument
under ORS 246.910(1).  For the reasons set out below, we conclude
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction under that
statute.
		ORS 246.910(1) provides, in part:
		"A person adversely affected by any act or failure
to act by the Secretary of State * * * may appeal
therefrom to the circuit court for the county in which
the act or failure to act occurred * * *."
In their complaint, McCall plaintiffs specifically allege four
acts by the Secretary of State (or his predecessor) that
adversely affected them.  Three were "decisions that resulted in
Measure 7 appearing on the ballot[:] * * * accepting the proposed
petition, verifying that the petition contained the requisite
number of signatures, and certifying the measure for placement on
the ballot." (8)  The fourth, deciding to canvass and beginning to
canvass the votes for and against Measure 7, occurred after the
election and was in progress when plaintiffs filed their
actions. (9)  
		On appeal, the state does not address McCall
plaintiffs' challenge as a challenge to several distinct acts by
the Secretary of State as alleged in the complaint.  Instead, the
state characterizes McCall plaintiffs' challenge generally as a
challenge to the Secretary of State's initial constitutional
evaluation of the proposed initiative petition that ultimately
became Measure 7.  The state then argues that that challenge is
untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the Secretary
of State's certification of the ballot title, as required by
Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6, 725 P2d 886 (1986). (10) 
		McCall plaintiffs agree that the Secretary of State's
constitutional evaluation of the proposed initiative petition
that became Measure 7 is the "act" at the heart of this
challenge. (11)  McCall plaintiffs do not contend that they were
adversely affected by the Secretary of State's other acts set out
above; they also do not allege that any of those acts were
improper per se. (12)  Rather, they contend that they were adversely
affected by the acts identified in their complaint only insofar
as those acts were steps toward the implementation of a ballot
measure that, according to McCall plaintiffs, violates multiple
form-of-adoption requirements of the Oregon Constitution. 
		Despite their agreement that the Secretary of State's
constitutional evaluation of the proposed initiative petition
that became Measure 7 is the act truly at issue here, McCall
plaintiffs nevertheless argue that Ellis does not apply to their
challenge.  They argue that the 60-day deadline set out in Ellis
applies to only challenges under ORS 246.910(1) that seek to keep
a measure off the ballot, that is, to challenges brought before
the election.  Because they brought their challenge after the
election, McCall plaintiffs argue, they are not constrained by
the 60-day deadline.  		
		We disagree.  Respecting a challenge under ORS
246.910(1) to the Secretary of State's constitutional evaluation
of a proposed initiative measure, Ellis sets out a 60-day
deadline, following certification of a ballot title.  302 Or at
19.  As applicable to this case, that deadline expired in June
1999, 60 days after the Attorney General certified the ballot
title for the initiative petition that ultimately became Measure
7.  Consequently, the time for plaintiffs to have challenged the
Secretary of State's constitutional evaluation of Measure 7, the
underpinning of jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1) for purposes of
this case, long has passed.
		McCall plaintiffs argue, as noted above, that Ellis --
specifically, its 60-day deadline -- should apply to only 
challenges brought before the election.  That argument misses the
broader point, that is, that the very nature of their challenge
is a pre-election challenge to a pre-election Secretary of State
decision.  As this court explained in Ellis, 302 Or at 17:
"There is a season for each kind of challenge to the
Secretary of State's administration of election laws,
whether as to the ballot title, the signature gathering
process[,] or constitutional evaluation. * * * The
Secretary of State makes -- or fails to make -- the
constitutional decision at the outset. * * * Later
actions, such as acceptance of a ballot title from the
Attorney General, verification of signatures and
certification, do not call for [the Secretary of State]
to reassess the original constitutional evaluation that
is supposed to be the predicate for placing the entire
initiative machinery in operation.  It is either done
or not at this initial stage.  The period of reasonable
time commences then."
(Citations omitted.)  The fact that McCall plaintiffs filed their
action after the election does not save their challenge for
jurisdictional purposes under ORS 246.910(1):  The "season" for
their challenge occurred before the election, within 60 days
after the Attorney General certified the ballot title. (13)  We
conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear
McCall plaintiffs' challenge under ORS 246.910(1). (14) 
		III.  STANDING

A.	Legal Principles Respecting Standing
		Having determined that the trial court appropriately
assumed jurisdiction under the UDJA, we now turn to intervenor's
argument that no plaintiff in either action had standing to
challenge Measure 7 under that statutory scheme.  Although we
agree with intervenor respecting three McCall plaintiffs (McCall,
MacPherson, and Swaim) and two League plaintiffs (individual
plaintiffs Stein and Katz), we conclude that plaintiffs Lewis and
Tipperman, among McCall plaintiffs, and the remaining League
plaintiffs (local government plaintiffs) have standing to
challenge Measure 7. 
		The requirements for standing under the UDJA are set
out in ORS 28.020:
		"Any person * * * whose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a constitution,
statute, [or] municipal charter * * * may have
determined any question of construction or validity
arising under any such * * * constitution, statute,
[or] municipal charter * * * and obtain a declaration
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
Additionally, ORS 28.130 defines the word "person" as used in the
UDJA
		"* * * to mean any person, partnership, joint
stock company, unincorporated association or society,
or municipal or other corporation of any character
whatsoever."
Thus, to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that the
plaintiff is a "person" as defined in ORS 28.130 and that the
plaintiff's "rights, status or other legal relations are
affected" by the law or enactment at issue.  
		In identifying the requisite "[e]ffect[]" to establish
standing under ORS 28.020, this court has held that a plaintiff
must show some injury or other impact upon a legally recognized
interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application
or the validity of a law.  Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 380,
385, 760 P2d 846 (1988).  In addition, the plaintiff's showing of
that injury or other impact must not be "too speculative." 
Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 7, 588 P2d 1281
(1979).  
		With those requirements in mind, we turn to the
evidence of injury or other impact that plaintiffs offered before
the trial court.  Because we are reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from them in favor of the nonmoving parties -- in
this case, the state and intervenor.  Robinson v. Lamb's
Wilsonville Thriftway, 332 Or 453, 455, 31 P3d 421 (2001).  
B.  McCall Plaintiffs
		McCall plaintiffs' complaint included the following
allegations that are relevant to our discussion:
		"Plaintiffs are taxpayers and registered voters in
Oregon.  They voted in the November 7, 2000, general
election.  Some or all of them own land in areas that
are subject to regulations restricting the use of
private real property.
		"Plaintiffs Swaim and Lewis are the Mayors of
Salem and Jacksonville, respectively.  Their official
duties include deciding whether and how to enforce
regulations that affect the value and use of private
real property."		
McCall plaintiffs also attached, as "Exhibit A" of their
complaint, a copy of a page of the voters' pamphlet that included
the text of Measure 7, its accompanying ballot title, and a brief
estimate of financial impact.
		McCall plaintiffs argue that they all have standing as
landowners because they oppose the increased development that
Measure 7 would bring about.  However, on summary judgment,
McCall plaintiffs McCall, MacPherson, and Swaim rested upon the
allegations of their complaint, set out above, and failed to
allege or show that Measure 7 would lead to increased
development, how it would do so, and how, specifically, that
increased development would affect them as landowners.  The only
specific impact upon plaintiffs McCall, MacPherson, and Swaim as
landowners that we can discern from the text of Measure 7 is
that, generally speaking, landowners would be compensated for --
or arguably might avoid altogether -- certain governmental
regulations of their private property.  That impact is not
sufficient to establish standing under ORS 28.020, because it is
not sufficiently adverse, a quality that is central to the
question of standing in any context.  See People for Ethical
Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care, 312 Or 95, 101, 817 P2d 1299
(1991) (so stating). (15)
		By contrast, McCall plaintiffs Lewis and Tipperman
submitted uncontroverted affidavits in which they offered details
concerning how, specifically, Measure 7 would affect them. (16)  In
his affidavit, Lewis avers that (1) he is the Mayor of
Jacksonville and owns property there; (2) he has made efforts --
to date, successful -- to prevent the conditional use of forest
resource land outside Jacksonville as an aggregate mine; (3) he
has been named as a defendant in a federal complaint filed by the
owner of the forest resource land; (4) the forest resource
landowner alleged in her federal complaint that, under Measure 7,
she would be entitled to $50 million if Jackson County prevents
her from using her land as an aggregate mine; (5) as a result of
the litigation, Jacksonville is reconsidering its opposition to
the aggregate mine; and (6) if the forest resource landowner
succeeds in obtaining permission to mine her property, then the
value of real estate in Jacksonville, including his own, will
decrease. 
		Plaintiff Tipperman, a rancher who owns a large timber
and cattle ranch in Union County, avers as follows in his
affidavit:
	"In my opinion, if the county or state were to repeal
or 'waive' or otherwise not enforce land use law, to
avoid liability for compensation under Measure 7, some
surrounding and nearby parcels of land would be
developed for residential and possibly commercial use. 
That would diminish the value of my farm, because those
other uses and ranching are generally not compatible in
close proximity to one another.  Such development would
also interfere with my ability to continue ranching and
* * * would thus jeopardize a portion of my income. 
		"* * * * *
		"If Measure 7 is adopted, the value and utility of
[my] * * * ranch will be significantly diminished.     
* * * [R]ural residences and hobby farms * * * will
sprout on adjoining tracts of land, bringing dogs which
will harass the livestock and wildlife on the [r]anch,
and unending trespassing and poaching by my new found
neighbors and their friends.  There will be other
adverse consequences including reduction of stream
flows (which supply water for our livestock and fish)
which are already at precariously low levels during the
Summer and early Fall."
		Although the consequences that plaintiffs Lewis and
Tipperman anticipate are not certain to result from the
implementation of Measure 7, they are plausible, concrete
ramifications.  Both plaintiffs Lewis and Tipperman introduced
evidence that shows how Measure 7 would lead to increased
development and how, specifically, that increased development
would injure them.  Because plaintiffs Lewis and Tipperman
established that Measure 7 would affect their rights, status, or
legal relations, we conclude that they have standing to challenge
Measure 7 under ORS 28.020.
C.  League Plaintiffs  
		League plaintiffs' complaint sets out the following
allegations respecting standing:
	"Plaintiffs City of Eugene, City of Portland, Junction
City, City of Veneta, and City of Beaverton are
municipal corporations with home rule powers granted by
the Oregon Constitution.  Plaintiffs Multnomah County,
Benton County and Washington County are counties with
home rule powers granted by the Oregon Constitution. 
Plaintiffs * * * Stein and * * * Katz are citizens of
the State of Oregon, and electors and taxpayers."
League plaintiffs also attached the text of Measure 7, as well as
its accompanying ballot title and a brief estimate of financial
impact, as "Exhibit A" of their complaint.  The estimate of
financial impact provided:
		"Direct costs to the state are estimated to be
$1.6 billion per year.  Local government direct costs
are estimated to be $3.8 billion per year."
League plaintiffs did not submit affidavits in further support of
their standing under ORS 28.020; consequently, the allegations in
their complaint constituted the only material respecting standing
before the trial court on summary judgment.
		As to the League plaintiffs Stein and Katz, as with
McCall plaintiffs McCall, MacPherson, and Swaim, neither the
allegations in the complaint nor the attached exhibit
demonstrates how Measure 7 would affect them.  Accordingly, they
lack standing to bring this challenge. 
		The local government plaintiffs consist of municipal
corporation (city) plaintiffs and county plaintiffs.  In respect
of the city plaintiffs, the UDJA specifically treats municipal
(and all other) corporations as "persons" for purposes of the
act.  ORS 28.130.  Accordingly, a city, like any person, has
standing to bring an action under the UDJA if that city's
"rights, status or other legal relations are affected."  ORS
28.010.  In respect of the county plaintiffs, this court has
recognized that declaratory relief is available to counties under
the UDJA.  See Tillamook Co. v. State Board of Forestry, 302 Or
404, 416, 730 P2d 1214 (1986) (recognizing county's standing to
bring declaratory judgment action against state).  
		When we examine the text of Measure 7 (Exhibit A of
League plaintiffs' complaint), specifically, subsection (a), we
see that, because cities and counties are forms of "local
government" that "pass[] or enforce[] * * * regulation[s] that
restrict[] the use of private real property," Measure 7 will have
a fiscal impact upon any city or county each time that the city
or county chooses to regulate real property in a manner that
gives rise to a Measure 7 claim.  That impact -- officially
estimated as a cost of 3.8 billion dollars to local governments
generally -- is not abstract.  Thus, despite its few specific
allegations, League plaintiffs' complaint demonstrates that
Measure 7 will have a fiscal impact upon the local government
plaintiffs.  That impact is sufficient to show that Measure 7
will "affect[]" those plaintiffs' "legal relations" within the
meaning of ORS 28.020.  Accordingly, the local government
plaintiffs have standing to challenge Measure 7 under the UDJA. (17)
		IV.  RIPENESS

		The final issue that we must address before turning to
the merits is the ripeness of the controversy.  Intervenor argues
that the controversy is not ripe because the Secretary of State
has not yet completed canvassing the votes for and against
Measure 7, and the Governor has not yet proclaimed that the
measure has passed.  However, the record includes uncontroverted
evidence (the official county abstracts and the unofficial vote
tally) that shows that a majority of the voters approved Measure
7 at the November 2000 general election.  According to that
evidence, the Secretary of State's canvass of the votes will not
alter that result.  Under those circumstances, plaintiffs' (18)
challenge to Measure 7 is not premature, because the ultimate,
official result clearly can be forecasted.  See Brown v. Oregon
State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449, 648 P2d 1289 (1982) (ORS chapter 28
requires controversy that "involve[s] present facts as opposed to
a dispute which is based on future events of a hypothetical
nature" (emphasis added)); Hale v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. et al,
209 Or 99, 103-04, 302 P2d 1010 (1956) (request for declaratory
relief not ripe if contingent upon happening of event that cannot
be forecast and may never take place).  Accordingly, we conclude
that this controversy is ripe.  We now turn to the merits.
V.  ARTICLE XVII, SECTION I

A.	Legal Principles Respecting Article XVII, Section I, and
Parties' Contentions
		As noted earlier, the trial court concluded that
Measure 7 violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII,
section 1, which provides, in part:
"When two or more amendments shall be submitted * * *
to the voters of this state at the same election, they
shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be
voted on separately."
The trial court relied, in part, upon Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327
Or 250, 277, 289, 959 P2d 49 (1998), in which this court
concluded that, to determine whether a measure denominated as a
single amendment actually contained "two or more amendments" for
constitutional purposes, a court must determine "whether, if
adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the
constitution that are substantive and that are not closely
related."  This court recently reaffirmed that holding in Lehman
v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 242, 37 P3d 989 (2002).  
		The state and intervenor contend, at the outset, that
Measure 7 makes only one substantive "change" under the first
part of the Armatta inquiry and, consequently, that further
analysis under Article XVII, section 1, is unnecessary. 
Alternatively, the state and intervenor contend that, even if
Measure 7 makes more than one substantive change to the Oregon
Constitution, those changes are "closely related."  In response,
plaintiffs contend that the trial court correctly concluded that
Measure 7 contravened the separate-vote requirement because the
measure made multiple, substantive changes to the Oregon
Constitution that were not closely related.
B.  Changes Made by Measure 7
		We begin by addressing certain of the substantive
changes that plaintiffs contend that Measure 7 makes to the
Oregon Constitution.  As noted above, plaintiffs first contend
that, by its express terms, Measure 7 substantively changes
Article I, section 18.  The state and intervenor agree, as do we. 
The parties disagree, however, concerning the effect of Measure 7
upon other parts of the Oregon Constitution, including Article I,
section 8.  Below, we first briefly summarize the effect of
Measure 7 upon Article I, section 18, and then turn to the effect
that Measure 7 has upon Article I, section 8. (19)
	1.  	Article I, Section 18
		Article I, section 18, provides, in part:
	"Private property shall not be taken for public
use * * * without just compensation; nor except in the
case of the state, without such compensation first
assessed and tendered; provided, that the use of all
roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the
transportation of the raw products of mine or farm or
forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is
necessary to the development and welfare of the state
and is declared a public use." 
That provision requires payment of "just compensation" for a
variety of governmental actions that result in the "taking" of
private property for public use, including "regulatory" takings
by way of application or enforcement of regulations with certain
economic ramifications.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of
Forestry, 325 Or 185, 197-98, 935 P2d 411 (1997).
		Measure 7 explicitly amends Article I, section 18, as
follows:
"BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OREGON:
"THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OREGON IS AMENDED BY
ADDING THE FOLLOWING SUBSECTIONS TO SECTION 18 OF
ARTICLE I:
"(a)	If the state, a political subdivision of the
state, or a local government passes or enforces a
regulation that restricts the use of private real
property, and the restriction has the effect of
reducing the value of a property upon which the
restriction is imposed; the property owner shall
be paid just compensation equal to the reduction
in the fair market value of the property.
"(b)	For purposes of this section, adoption or
enforcement of historically and commonly
recognized nuisance laws shall not be deemed to
have caused a reduction in the value of a
property.  The phrase 'historically and commonly
recognized nuisance laws' shall be narrowly
construed in favor of a finding that just
compensation is required under this section.
"(c)	A regulating entity may impose, to the minimum
extent required, a regulation to implement a
requirement of federal law without payment of
compensation under this section.  Nothing in this
2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a
government regulation prohibiting the use of a
property for the purpose of selling pornography,
performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic
beverages or other controlled substances, or
operating a casino or gaming parlor.
"(d)	Compensation shall be due the property owner if
the regulation was adopted, first enforced or
applied after the current owner of the property
became the owner, and continues to apply to the
property 90 days after the owner applies for
compensation under this section.
"(e)	Definitions:  For purposes of this section,
'regulation' shall include any law, rule,
ordinance, resolution, goal, or other enforceable
enactment of government; 'real property' shall
include any structure built or sited on the
property, aggregate and other removable minerals,
and any forest product or other crop grown on the
property; 'reduction in the fair market value'
shall mean the difference in the fair market value
of the property before and after application of
the regulation, and shall include the net cost to
the landowner of an affirmative obligation to
protect, provide, or preserve wildlife habitat,
natural areas, wetlands, ecosystems, scenery, open
space, historical, archaeological or cultural
resources, or low income housing; and 'just
compensation' shall include, if a claim for
compensation is denied or not fully paid within 90
days of filing, reasonable attorney fees and
expenses necessary to collect the compensation.
"(f)	If any phrase, clause, or part of this section is
found to be invalid by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the remaining phrases, clauses and
parts shall remain in full force and effect."

(Emphasis added.)  As its text demonstrates, Measure 7 explicitly
changes Article I, section 18, in a number of ways.  Most
significantly, Article I, section 18, currently requires payment
of just compensation only when a property owner demonstrates that
a governmental regulation has "deprive[d] the owner of all
economically viable use of the property. * * * If the owner has
some substantial beneficial use of the property remaining, then
the owner fails to meet the test."  Boise Cascade Corp., 325 Or
at 197-98 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted;
emphasis added); see also Dodd v. Hood River County, 317 Or 172,
181-82, 855 P2d 608 (1993) (to same effect).  After amendment by
Measure 7, Article I, section 18, would require payment of just
compensation for any reduction in the value of private real
property resulting from the enforcement of a restrictive
regulation, even that which falls short of the standard set out
in Boise Cascade Corp. and Dodd.
		Although Measure 7 changes Article I, section 18, in
other ways, and although the parties disagree regarding the
extent and ramifications of such changes, we need not discuss
such changes here.  That is so, because we conclude below that
Measure 7 also implicitly changes Article I, section 8, in a
substantive way and that the explicit, substantive change to
Article I, section 18, discussed above, is not closely related to
the implicit change that Measure 7 makes to Article I, section 8. 
Accordingly, the number of other changes that Measure 7 makes to
Article I, section 18, has no bearing upon our decision in this
case.  See Swett, 333 Or at 607 (because court addressed two
substantive changes that were not closely related, unnecessary to
discuss other changes made by measure at issue). (20)  We turn to
our analysis of the effect of Measure 7 upon Article I, section
8.
 	2.	Article I, Section 8
		Plaintiffs contend that subsection (c) of Measure 7
changes Article I, section 8.  We address that argument by first
turning again to the text of Measure 7.
		As noted above, in subsection (a), Measure 7 requires
payment of just compensation for restrictive regulations that
reduce the value of private real property.  Subsection (c) of
Measure 7, however, creates the following exception to the just-compensation requirement set out in subsection (a): "Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require
compensation due to a government regulation prohibiting
the use of a property for the purpose of selling
pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic
beverages or other controlled substances, or operating
a casino or gaming parlor."
In other words, subsection (c) permits the state and local
governments not to pay a claim that otherwise would qualify under
subsection (a), if that claim is made in response to a regulation
that forbids using the subject property for one of the enumerated
purposes.  By its terms, then, subsection (c) permits the state
and local governments not to pay just compensation for
regulations that explicitly prohibit using property for those
purposes, even if such regulations reduce property value under
subsection (a).
		Plaintiffs contend that, because subsection (c) permits
the state or a local government not to pay just compensation to
private real property owners whose property decreases in value
because of a regulation prohibiting the use of property for,
among other uses, the purpose of selling pornography, Measure 7
changes the right of free expression currently guaranteed by
Article I, section 8.  The state and intervenor respond that
subsection (c) merely creates an exception to the right to just
compensation set out in subsection (a) and, viewed in that way,
does not change rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section
8.  Alternatively, intervenor contends that, if subsection (c)
does operate to prevent certain property owners from receiving
payment of just compensation, such a scheme never could be
enforced, because it would not be permitted under Article I,
section 8.  Therefore, in intervenor's view, Measure 7
effectively could not "change" Article I, section 8, because that
constitutional provision would prevent subsection (c) from
becoming effective in the first instance.  As explained below, we
agree with plaintiffs.
		Article I, section 8, in place since statehood,
provides, in part:
	"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever[.]"
As this court explained in City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or
174, 179, 759 P2d 242 (1988), Article I, section 8, "forbids the
enactment of a law directed in terms against any subject of
speech, writing, or printing," unless the communication in
question falls within "a well-established historical exception
that the constitutional guarantees demonstrably were not meant to
displace."   
		There is no suggestion in the text of Measure 7 that
the term "pornography" is used in other than its ordinary sense.
So understood, it is clear that pornography is one form of
"speech, writing, or printing."  Tidyman, 306 Or at 179. 
Further, this court has determined that restrictions upon
sexually explicit and obscene expression involving adults -- such
as many forms of pornography -- do not fit within any historical
exception.  State v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 523, 732 P2d 9 (1987). 
Therefore, the term "pornography," as used in subsection (c),
includes some forms of expression that, no matter how offensive
to many people, are protected under Article I, section 8.
		The state and intervenor do not quarrel with the
foregoing statement of Oregon constitutional law.  Neither do
they disagree that the use of property "for the purpose of
selling pornography," as described in subsection (c), implicates
the right of free expression.  Instead, as noted, the state and
intervenor argue that subsection (c) does not change that right
because it does not take away any benefit that property owners
who use their property to sell pornography currently enjoy.  That
is, such property owners would not be entitled to just
compensation for the type of regulation described in subsection
(c) today, and they would not be entitled to it under Measure 7. 
Therefore, according to the state and intervenor, Measure 7 would
not change those owners' right of free expression.
		The state's and intervenor's argument mistakenly
focuses upon whether property owners who use their property to
sell pornography actually would lose money under Measure 7.  That
is not the question.  The question is whether those owners would
experience any change in the constitutional right to free
expression to which they currently are entitled under Article I,
section 8.  We turn to that question now.
		As we have explained, as it currently operates, Article
I, section 8, prohibits the state or a local government from
enacting a law that is directed against the content of
constitutionally protected expression.  Tidyman, 306 Or at 179. 
Thus, the state or a local government may not enact a law that is
directed against the selling of pornography because it is
pornography.  Id.  However, the protection afforded by Article I,
section 8, does not end with the protection from regulations that
explicitly target expression.  As this court explained in City of
Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or 480, 491, 871 P2d 454 (1994), freedom of
expression as guaranteed by Article I, section 8, also means that
the state or a local government may not treat those who sell
expressive material "more restrictively" than those who sell
other merchandise.  Because Miller is crucial to understanding
the scope of the freedom of expression that Article I, section 8,
guarantees, we briefly discuss that case here.  
		Miller concerned a bookseller's challenge to a city
ordinance that prohibited the sale of most forms of merchandise
on city sidewalks, except (by license) the sale of "food,
beverages, flowers or balloons."  318 Or at 483.  On its face,
the ordinance targeted neither expression generally nor any
particular type of expression.  Stated differently, in the words
of Tidyman, 306 Or at 179, the ordinance was not explicitly
"directed in terms against any subject of speech."  However, the
ordinance operated to restrict the bookseller -- someone who sold
expressive material protected under Article I, section 8 -- to a
greater extent than it did those who sold food, beverages,
flowers, and balloons.  That restriction, this court held,
violated Article I, section 8.  The court explained:
"So long as the city chooses to make its sidewalks
available for some general commercial activity * * *,
it may not treat a vendor of expressive material more
restrictively than vendors of other merchandise * * *."
318 Or at 491 (emphasis in original). 
		Miller demonstrates that a governmental burden upon
free expression is one type of "restrain[t]" of expression that
Article I, section 8, prohibits.  It is equally clear under
Miller that a governmental enactment that allows some persons to
participate in a certain activity, but prohibits others engaged
in expression from participating in that same activity,
constitutes a prohibited burden upon expression. (21)  It follows
that a governmental scheme that requires payment to some persons,
but not others engaged in protected expression, also constitutes
a burden that Article I, section 8, prohibits.  For that reason,
today, if the state or a local government is required to offer a
benefit to some property owners, it may not, under Article I,
section 8, choose not to offer that same benefit to another
property owner because that latter owner engages in a particular
type of expressive activity. (22)  
		Under Measure 7, by contrast, the state and local
governments explicitly would be permitted to do just that, i.e.,
they could decline to pay just compensation under Article I,
section 18, to a property owner because that owner engages in a
particular type of expressive activity, namely, the sale of some
forms of pornography.  Stated differently, subsection (c)
operates to permit the state and local governments to choose not
to pay such a property owner, unless that owner were to change
the content of the expressive material sold on the property in
question -- essentially placing a price tag upon the property
owner's right of free expression.  Consequently, subsection (c)
changes -- indeed, limits -- the scope of the rights currently
guaranteed by Article I, section 8.  For that reason, we reject
the state's and intervenor's argument that subsection (c) does
not constitute a constitutional "change" for purposes of our
separate-vote analysis.  
		Intervenor also contends that, because regulations
directed toward constitutionally protected expression -- such as
those that, under subsection (c), would "prohibit[] the use of a
property for the purpose of selling pornography" -- are
impermissible under Article I, section 8, the exception to the
just-compensation requirement set out in subsection (c) never
could be enforced and, consequently, cannot be deemed a
constitutional "change" for purposes of Article XVII, section 1. 
Again, we disagree.
		We first note that, in Tidyman, 306 Or at 185, 188,
190-91, this court left open the possibility that a regulation
ostensibly directed against expression might pass constitutional
muster, provided that such a regulation in fact was directed
toward negative effects sought to be prevented and also specified
the harm that otherwise would arise if the regulation were not
adopted.  Consequently, although this court has not yet decided a
case involving such a regulation, it is possible that a
governmental entity, today, could craft a regulation that
"prohibit[s] the use of a property for the purpose of selling
pornography" without running afoul of Article I, section 8.
		That said, we disagree with intervenor's theory that a
constitutional change that never might be enforced is not a
"change" for separate-vote purposes.  Subsection (c), as of the
moment of its passage, carves out an explicit constitutional
exception to the protection that Article I, section 8, now
provides.  Stated differently, subsection (c) sets out a
circumstance, effective as of the effective date of Measure 7, in
which the state and local governments constitutionally must
provide a benefit to some property owners, but may decline to
offer it to other property owners who use their property to sell
a type of expressive material that is protected under Article I,
section 8.  Regardless of whether the state or a local government
ever chooses to take advantage of the exception set out in
subsection (c), that exception nevertheless is a "change" to the
scope of the rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8,
for purposes of our separate-vote analysis in this case.  See
generally, Lehman 333 Or at 243 n 8 (fact that one constitutional
change made by measure at issue was prohibited by U.S.
Constitution did not affect court's separate-vote analysis).  
		In sum, although the text of Measure 7 purports to
change only Article I, section 18, its inclusion of the exception
set out in subsection (c) nonetheless changes rights currently
guaranteed by Article I, section 8.  See generally, Coalition for
Equit. School Fund. v. State of Oregon, 311 Or 300, 309, 811 P2d
116 (1991) ("When a party argues that a general constitutional
provision forbids the state from doing something, the argument
may be answered by a later-adopted constitutional provision that
allows the state to do that very thing.").  For those reasons, we
conclude that, as written, Measure 7 substantively changes two
existing constitutional provisions:  Article I, section 18
(takings), and Article I, section 8 (freedom of expression).
C. 	Analysis of Measure 7 Under Article XVII, Section 1
		As noted above, our inquiry under Armatta, 327 Or at
277, is to determine whether Measure 7 makes "two or more
changes" to the Oregon Constitution that are "substantive" and
are not "closely related."  The foregoing analysis establishes
that Measure 7 makes at least two substantive changes to the
existing constitution, that is, a change to the requirements for
payment of just compensation to property owners under Article I,
section 18, and a separate change respecting laws restraining
expression under Article I, section 8.  We turn, then, to
application of Armatta's "closely related" prong.
		In Lehman, 333 Or at 246, this court offered a further
explanation as to application of the phrase "closely related"
from Armatta:
	"* * * First, we examine the relationship among
the constitutional provisions that the measure affects,
both explicitly and implicitly.  If the affected
provisions of the existing constitution themselves are
not related, then it is likely that changes to those
provisions will offend the separate-vote requirement. * * * [T]he fact that a proposed amendment asks the
people, in one vote, substantively to change multiple
provisions of the Oregon Constitution that are not
themselves related is one indication that the proposed
amendment might violate the separate-vote requirement.
	"Next, we must consider the constitutional changes
themselves. * * * If they are closely related, the
measure under consideration survives scrutiny under
Article XVII, section 1.  If they are not, it does
not."
Following that approach, we proceed to analyze the relationship
between the two existing constitutional provisions affected by
Measure 7, as well as the relationship between the substantive
constitutional changes that the measure effects.
		As to the constitutional provisions that Measure 7
affects -- Article I, section 18, and Article I, section 8 -- we
have no difficulty concluding that, other than their placement in
the Bill of Rights, those provisions bear no relation to each
other.  Article I, section 18, provides a right to "just
compensation" to private property owners whose property is taken
for public use.  Article I, section 8, by contrast, expressly
precludes, as to any person, any restriction upon the "free
expression of opinion," as well as upon "the right to speak,
write, or print freely on any subject whatever."  Those two
constitutional provisions involve "separate constitutional
rights, granted to different groups of persons."  Armatta, 327 Or
at 283.  That lack of relationship "is a strong indication that
those provisions are not 'related' for purposes of the separate-vote requirement."  Lehman, 333 Or at 246 n 9.
		Turning to the constitutional changes themselves, we 
conclude that the change that Measure 7 makes to Article I,
section 18, that is, an expanded just-compensation requirement
for restrictive regulations that reduce the value of private real
property, is not closely related to the change that it makes to
Article I, section 8, that is, creating an exception to the
historical requirement that laws cannot be treat those engaged in
expressive activity "more restrictively" than others not engaged
in expressive activity, Miller, 318 Or at 491.  The change to
Article I, section 18, generally concerns the ability of a real
property owner to obtain just compensation for enforcement of
certain regulations -- indeed, that change generally expands the
rights of property owners vis-à-vis the government in that
regard.  By contrast, the change that Measure 7 makes to Article
I, section 8, operates to limit the rights of certain property
owners, vis-à-vis other property owners, based upon the content
of the expressive material sold on their property.  More notably,
the change that Measure 7 makes to Article I, section 8, carves
out an exception to the fundamental principle that no law shall
restrict expression "on any subject whatever."  See Henry, 302 Or
at 515 (Article I, section 8, broadly covers "any expression of
opinion" on "any subject whatever," without exception).  By
incorporating both types of substantive changes that are not
closely related, Measure 7 makes "two or more amendments" to the
Oregon Constitution that the voters were required to have voted
upon separately.	
D.	Measure 7 is Invalid in its Entirety
		As this court explained in Armatta, 327 Or at 284, and
again in Lehman, 333 Or at 250-51, a proposed constitutional
amendment must be adopted in compliance with constitutional
requirements:
	"It is a long-standing principle of law that a
proposed constitutional amendment must be adopted in
compliance with the procedures set forth in the Oregon
Constitution:
"'The provisions of the constitution for its
own amendment are mandatory, and must be
strictly observed.  A failure in this respect
will be fatal to a proposed amendment,
notwithstanding it may have been submitted to
and ratified and approved by the people.  The
constitutional provisions are as binding upon
the people as upon the legislative assembly,
and the people cannot give legal effect to an
amendment which was submitted in disregard of
the limitations imposed by the constitution  
* * *. * * * If * * * an attempt is made to
amend an existing constitution, its every
requirement regarding its own amendment must
be substantially observed, and the omission
of any one will be fatal to the amendment. 
The constitution is the supreme law of the
land, binding upon all, and can no more be
disregarded in the manner of its own
amendment than in any other respect.  As long
as it remains, its provisions must be
observed.'"
Armatta, 327 Or at 284-85 (quoting Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or
118, 135-36, 74 P 710, on reh'g, 75 P 222 (1904)) (emphasis and
ellipses in Armatta).  Accordingly, because Measure 7 was not
adopted in compliance with the requirements of Article XVII,
section 1, we hold that it is void in its entirety.
VI.  ATTORNEY FEES

		Finally, we address the issue of attorney fees.  As
noted at the outset of this opinion, McCall plaintiffs, but not
League plaintiffs, specifically requested attorney fees in their
complaint.  After the trial court entered its ruling below, 
McCall plaintiffs petitioned for attorney fees, and the state
objected.  From our review of the record, it appears that the
trial court never ruled on plaintiffs' petition or on the state's
objection.  For that reason, and because the issue of attorney
fees further will involve consideration of our holding that only
plaintiffs Lewis and Tipperman sufficiently alleged standing in
the McCall case, we remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. 
VII. CONCLUSION

		In sum, we hold that (1) the trial court did not err in
assuming jurisdiction under the UDJA; (2) the trial court did not
have jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1); (3) plaintiffs Lewis,
Tipperman, and the local government League plaintiffs, but not
the remaining McCall plaintiffs or League plaintiffs, established
standing for purposes of the UDJA; (3) the controversy is ripe
for adjudication; (4) Measure 7 encompasses two amendments to the
Oregon Constitution in violation of Article XVII, section 1, and,
therefore, is void in its entirety, and (5) the case must be
remanded to the trial court. 
		The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
	DURHAM, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
	I write separately, because I do not agree with all the
majority's reasoning and conclusions.  Specifically, the majority
misconstrues ORS 246.910(1) in concluding that the trial court
had no jurisdiction under that statute to consider the claims of
the individual plaintiffs Audrey McCall, Hector MacPherson, and
Michael E. Swaim in the McCall case, and Vera Katz and Bev Stein
in the League of Oregon Cities case (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "individual plaintiffs").  For the reasons set
out below, ORS 246.910(1) supports the trial court's assumption
of jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs' claims.
OVERVIEW OF APPEAL REMEDY PROVIDED BY ORS 246.910
	ORS 246.910 provides:
		"(1) A person adversely affected by any act or
failure to act by the Secretary of State, a county
clerk, a city elections officer or any other county,
city or district official under any election law, or by
any order, rule, directive or instruction made by the
Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections
officer or any other county, city or district official
under any election law, may appeal therefrom to the
circuit court for the county in which the act or
failure to act occurred or in which the order, rule,
directive or instruction was made.
		"(2) Any party to the appeal proceedings in the
circuit court under subsection (1) of this section may
appeal from the decision of the circuit court to the
Court of Appeals.
		"(3) The circuit courts and Court of Appeals, in
their discretion, may give such precedence on their
dockets to appeals under this section as the
circumstances may require.
		"(4) The remedy provided in this section is
cumulative and does not exclude any other remedy
against any act or failure to act by the Secretary of
State, a county clerk, a city elections officer or any
other county, city or district official under any
election law or against any order, rule, directive or
instruction made by the Secretary of State, a county
clerk, a city elections officer or any other county,
city or district official under any election law."  
That statute provides a nonexclusive remedy, in the form of an
appeal to the circuit court, for virtually any conduct by the
Secretary of State, and an array of local election officials,
that falls short of the requirements of Oregon election law or
any official decision relating to elections made pursuant to
delegated authority.
	Subsection (1) of the statute identifies two broad
categories of conduct by election officials that an appeal may
challenge.  The first category is "any act or failure to act by
the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a city elections officer
or any other county, city or district official under any election
law * * *."  The second category is "any order, rule, directive
or instruction made by the Secretary of State, a county clerk, a
city elections officer or any other county, city or district
official under any election law * * *."
	Subsection (1) provides that, to bring an appeal, a
plaintiff must be "adversely affected by" conduct that falls into
either one or both of the categories described above.  In this
proceeding, all individual plaintiffs allege that they are either
"registered voters" or "electors."  Therefore, in challenging the
Secretary of State's conduct in advancing Measure 7 to a public
vote and in canvassing the ballots after the election on November
7, 2000, the individual plaintiffs satisfy the criterion that,
the majority agrees, confers standing to sue under ORS
246.910(1). ____ Or at ____ (slip op at 10 n 9) (citing Ellis v.
Roberts, 302 Or 6, 10-11, 725 P2d 886 (1986)).  I discuss the
individual plaintiffs' claims and the correct legal
interpretation of the statute in greater detail later in this
opinion.
	The appeal that ORS 246.910(1) provides is a
significant remedy.  By filing an appeal under that statute, a
registered voter can focus prompt judicial scrutiny on the
conduct of election officials to make certain that every action
or inaction of those officials complies in all respects with the
requirements of Oregon election law.
THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
	The issue is whether the individual plaintiffs'
complaints state facts that constitute a claim within the circuit
court's jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1).  The majority
acknowledges that the allegations in the McCall complaint refer
to four acts by the Secretary of State that contravene Oregon
election law:  (1) accepting the proposed petition; (2) verifying
that the petition contained the requisite number of signatures;
(3) certifying the measure for placement on the ballot; and (4)
after the election, deciding to canvas and beginning to canvass
the votes for and against Measure 7.  Id. at 9.  The allegations
in the League of Oregon Cities complaint substantively are
identical. (23) 
	The majority does not address the court's jurisdiction
under ORS 246.910(1) over the four acts, or failures to act, by
the Secretary of State that the complaints allege.  Instead, at
the state's suggestion, the majority adopts a reformation of the
complaints that leaves the allegations in a state that the
individual plaintiffs scarcely would recognize.  For example, the
majority states that, "McCall plaintiffs agree that the Secretary
of State's constitutional evaluation of the proposed initiative
petition that became Measure 7 is the 'act' at the heart of this
challenge."  Id. at 10-11. 
	The record contains no genuine agreement by the
individual plaintiffs to abandon reliance on three of the four
factual allegations on which they base their actions.  When
fairly read, the complaints contend that each of the Secretary of
State's four alleged acts or failures to act, from the earliest
to the most recent, contravenes Oregon election law because,
among other things, Measure 7 improperly presented multiple
constitutional changes to the voters but packaged them for a
single vote.  The individual plaintiffs did not waive their
complaints about the Secretary of State's more recent actions --
including the canvassing of the votes on Measure 7 after the
election -- merely because they also argued that the Secretary of
State never should have accepted the proposed petition in the
first place.  In my view, the majority errs in determining
jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1) by considering only one of the
Secretary of State's alleged acts or failures to act in violation
of Oregon election law.
	After effectively reforming the complaints and
concluding that, in reality, they challenge only the Secretary of
State's April 1999 initial evaluation of the proposed initiative,
the majority concludes, under Ellis, that the individual
plaintiffs' opportunity to challenge that act under ORS
246.910(1) expired in June 1999.  What the majority omits from
its analysis is a consideration of the text and context of ORS
246.910.  The sole case on which the majority relies, Ellis,
similarly failed to construe and apply ORS 246.910.  As the
following discussion demonstrates, unless this court is willing
to enforce the legislature's appeal remedy under ORS 246.910 as
the legislature intended, the public will suffer the loss of an
important protection against unauthorized conduct by elections
officials.
DETERMINING THE MEANING OF ORS 246.910
	The question whether ORS 246.910 authorized the trial
court to assume jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs'
complaints requires this court to determine the intention of the
legislature.  In making that inquiry, this court first examines
the text and context of the relevant statute.  Context includes
the provisions of other related statutes and case law that
construes the meaning of the statute at issue.  If those sources
disclose the clear meaning of the statute in question, this court
proceeds no further.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532, 964 P2d
1007 (1998).
	ORS 246.910(1) begins with the phrase "[a] person
adversely affected * * *."  That phrase describes those persons
with standing to seek the statutory appeal remedy, and, as we
already have seen, it includes persons, including the individual
plaintiffs, who are registered voters or electors.  Ellis, 302 Or
at 11.  Neither the majority nor any party questions that
proposition.
	ORS 246.910(1) then describes the two categories of
conduct that an adversely affected person may appeal.  As
pertinent to this case, the categories are (1) "any act or
failure to act by the Secretary of State * * * under any election
law" and (2) "any order, rule, directive or instruction made by
the Secretary of State * * * under any election law * * *."
	The word "any" appears four times in subsection (1). 
The ordinary meaning of that word is "one indifferently out of
more than two : * * * one, no matter what one : EVERY * * * : ALL
* * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 97 (unabridged ed
1993).
	Applying those definitions in this context, the scope
of the first category of appealable conduct in subsection (1) is
broad to the point of being without limit.  The phrase "any act
or failure to act" embraces every "thing done," "deed," or
"decision," id. at 20 (defining "act"), as well as every
"omission of performance of an action or task; * * * neglect of
an assigned, expected, or appropriate action * * * FAILING, LAPSE
* * * DEFICIENCY * * *."  Id. at 815 (defining "failure").  The
phrase "any act or failure to act" sweeps within its scope each
of the four acts or failures to act by the Secretary of State,
described above, that the individual plaintiffs allege as the
basis of their complaint.
	The second category of appealable conduct in subsection
(1) includes any "order" or "rule," two kinds of legal action
that the legislature has exposed to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), ORS 183.310 to 183.550.  See
ORS 183.400 (providing for  judicial determination of validity of
administrative rule); ORS 183.480-183.490 (providing for judicial
review of administrative orders).  However, the appeal remedy
under ORS 246.910(1) is broader in scope than judicial review
under the APA.  For example, the definition of "rule" in ORS
183.310(8) includes an agency "directive" if it is "of general
applicability" and "implements, interprets or prescribes law or
policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of
any agency[,]" but excludes certain "internal management
directives" that "do not substantially affect the interests of
the public" in relations between or within agencies.  The remedy
in ORS 246.910(1) extends to any "directive," as well as any
"instruction" of the Secretary of State under any election law. 
Moreover, the fact that the APA exposes "orders" and certain
"rules" to judicial review does not diminish the remedy of appeal
described in ORS 246.910(1), because ORS 246.910(4) provides that
the remedy of appeal is "cumulative" of any other remedy.  This
court drove home that point in OEA v. Roberts, 301 Or 236, 721
P2d 837 (1986), in which this court held that, because the
Secretary of State's conduct in approving a proposed initiative
for circulation was reviewable under ORS 246.910, the question
whether ORS 183.482 also afforded judicial review of the same
decision was moot.
	The foregoing discussion indicates that the text of ORS
246.910(1) clearly supports the view that the legislature
authorized the circuit court to review every official action by
the Secretary of State regarding Measure 7.  Thus, according to
the statutory text, every exercise of the Secretary of State's
official power over Measure 7 is subject to judicial review for
conformity with Oregon election laws, including those that
establish the scope of the Secretary of State's delegated
authority over initiative petitions.  Because that statute
exposes every act or failure to act to a statutory appeal, it is
unavailing to contend that a party's challenge to a recent
exercise of the Secretary of State's authority, such as the
canvassing of ballots, also could have been filed against some
earlier exercise of authority over the same initiative petition.
	This court's case law construing ORS 246.910(1)
confirms the legislature's intention to authorize the circuit
court to consider challenges to all actions or failures to act by
the Secretary of State under any election law.  In OEA v.
Roberts, 301 Or 228, 721 P2d 833 (1986), the plaintiffs brought
an action under ORS 246.910 to compel the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General not to process a proposed initiative
petition and to prevent the sponsors from circulating it.  The
plaintiffs contended that the Secretary of State had a duty to
determine before the election whether the proposed initiative
complied with the "one-subject" rule stated in Article IV,
section 1 (2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution.  Id. at 230.  The
Secretary of State argued that that duty arose only after the
election and that she had no duty, before the voters adopted an
initiative measure, to examine a proposed initiative for
compliance with the one-subject provision.  The court had left
that question open in an earlier case, State ex rel Fidanque v.
Paulus, 297 Or 711, 688 P2d 1303 (1984). 
	The court determined that the Secretary of State did
have a duty, before an election, to determine whether a proposed
initiative addressed only one subject.  The court also reviewed
the various decisions that the Secretary of State must make on a
proposed initiative in the months leading up to an election and
stated:  "The submission process thus contains several discrete
decisions by the Secretary, any one of which may be challenged." 
OEA, 301 Or at 234 (emphasis added).  See also State ex rel
Fidanque, 297 Or at 716 n 5 ("Therefore, in the submission
process, a series of decisions must be made.  As each decision is
made, it becomes susceptible to challenge.").  
		The court then turned to the question whether the
particular decision that the plaintiffs had challenged -- the
approval of the prospective petition for circulation -- was a
proper occasion for a challenge under the one-subject rule.  The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that a one-subject challenge at
that stage was proper because
		"'[i]t is this determination that provides the
first opportunity for the Secretary of State to
exercise her official power with respect to the
prospective petition.  If, as the Plaintiffs-Relators
contend, there is a constitutional duty to act, it
would arise at this time.  It is in approving a
prospective petition which did not comply with the
alleged requirements of Article IV, section 1, that the
Secretary of State's authority under the constitution
and statutes first would be exceeded and her duty
breached.'"
OEA, 301 Or at 234 (quoting State ex rel Fidanque, 297 Or at
715).
	The court's determination in OEA -- that the Secretary
of State's approval of a prospective petition was her first
action in arguable violation of her powers -- confirmed that the
plaintiffs, in contesting that action, had not brought their
challenge prematurely, as the defendants contended.  The
defendants' argument -- that the plaintiffs should have brought
their claim only after enactment of the measure -- was
unresponsive to the question whether the Secretary of State's
responsibility to apply the one-subject rule arose before the
election.  The plaintiffs' choice to contest the first exercise
of the Secretary of State's authority over the proposed
initiative was correct procedurally, because, as the court
stated, that decision was the first of "several discrete
decisions" by the Secretary of State in the submission process,
"any one of which may be challenged."  OEA, 301 Or at 234.
	The individual plaintiffs similarly argue that the
Oregon Constitution does not authorize the actions and
certifications that the Secretary of State has employed to
advance Measure 7 to a vote and to canvass the votes after the
election because they contend, among other things, that Measure 7
unlawfully makes multiple amendments to the constitution.  The
majority responds that Ellis declined to consider a similar form-of-adoption challenge to a pre-election certification of an
initiative petition.  The majority reasons that, because Ellis
announced a 60-day deadline for challenging the Secretary of
State's approval of a proposed initiative, and measured the
deadline from certification of the ballot title, the Ellis
deadline expired in this case in June 1999.  Because that theory
would restrict significantly the appeal remedy in ORS 246.910(1),
I examine Ellis in detail.
ELLIS v. ROBERTS
	Ellis was a challenge under ORS 246.910(1) by
registered voters to the Secretary of State's certification on
July 16, 1986, of Ballot Measure 11 (1986) for the November 1986,
ballot.  The plaintiffs commenced their appeal under ORS
246.910(1) on July 31, 1986, and argued that the Secretary of
State's certification was unauthorized because Measure 11
contained more than one subject.  Measure 11 purported to create
a homestead exemption from property taxes and also prohibited the
legislature from referring a sales tax to the people for a vote. 
The trial court dismissed the action on a theory of laches. 
Ellis, 302 Or at 10-11.
	On review, this court determined that the plaintiffs
satisfied the requirement in ORS 246.910(1) that they be
"adversely affected" because they were registered voters and the
statute permitted any registered voter to file an action.  Id. at
11.  The court also determined that the doctrine of laches had no
application to an action under ORS 246.910(1).  Id. at 12.  The
court distinguished the plaintiffs' statutory action from an
earlier case, Fidanque, a mandamus proceeding in which laches was
a pertinent defense.  Neither of those determinations in Ellis is
in controversy in this case.
	The Ellis opinion then did an odd thing.  The court
asked itself the following question:  "Should actions like the
present one be subject to some kind of 'reasonable time'
limitation on filing, in the absence of statutes imposing such
restraints?"  Id. at 13.  The court acknowledged what it
described as a "legislative vacuum" regarding a time limit on
filing appeals under ORS 246.910(1), because the legislature had
not enacted a time limit for the filing of an appeal under that
statute.  Responding to that legislative vacuum, the court
asserted that "we are required to provide some judicial framework
until the legislature provides a statutory one."  Id.  The court
never explained the source of such a requirement.  Turning to
Fidanque, the mandamus case, the court acknowledged that the
submission process required the Secretary of State to make a
series of decisions, that each decision was susceptible to
challenge, and that the first exercise of the Secretary of
State's authority occurred when she approved the proposed
initiative for circulation.  Id. at 15-16.  The court noted that
"eleventh hour challenges" might cause initiative proponents to
waste their resources in collecting signatures and might force
courts to "steamroll through the delicate legal issues to meet
the deadline for measures to be placed on the ballot."  Id. at 16
(quoting Fidanque, 297 Or at 718).  
	Proceeding from the foregoing reasoning, the court
announced that a "reasonable" time filing deadline should apply
to appeals under ORS 246.910(1).  The court continued by
announcing that "[t]here is a season for each kind of challenge
to the Secretary of State's administration of the election laws 
* * *."  Id. at 17.  The court then announced that, by looking at
the statutory appeal period allowed under the APA, the court
could determine that 60 days after approval of the ballot title
was a reasonable time period for filing a one-subject challenge
under ORS 246.910(1).  The court held that, because the Secretary
of State had approved the proposed initiative for circulation on
August 16, 1985, the "deadline" that the court created had
expired nine months before the plaintiffs had filed their action. 
The court then applied its newly announced deadline retroactively
to the plaintiffs' appeal and dismissed it.  Id. at 19.
	Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Ellis opinion
is that, due to the court's perception that the legislature had
failed to append a filing deadline to ORS 246.910, the court
believed that it was authorized by something inherent in the
court's judicial power -- a source of authority that the Ellis
opinion never made clear -- to manufacture a filing deadline for
a statutory appeal and to dismiss any appeal that a party had
filed after that deadline.  That reasoning reflects serious legal
error.
	For a very long time, Oregon law has condemned any
arrogation of the legislature's lawmaking power by a court,
including under the guise of statutory interpretation, as action
in excess of lawful judicial power.  In State ex rel Everding v.
Simon, 20 Or 365, 26 P 170 (1891), this court addressed the
meaning of an 1889 statute that amended an 1885 law that had
provided for the election and the term of office of the office of
Portland Police Commissioner.  The court observed that the 1889
statute had repealed the existing statutory provisions for an
election and the term of office.  The incumbent police
commissioner urged the court to recognize that the 1889 deletions
were unintentional and to "fill in" the absent election
procedures by interpretation.  This court stated:
		"This is a case, it would seem, where the
legislature has omitted by mistake or otherwise to make
the necessary provisions to carry out its intention,
but we cannot by construction supply these omissions. 
As was said by Davies, J., 'It is always competent for
the legislature to speak clearly and without
equivocation, and it is safer for the judicial
department to follow the plain and obvious meaning of
an act, rather than to speculate upon what might have
been the views of the legislature in the emergency
which may have arisen.  It is wiser and safer to leave
to the legislative department to supply a supposed or
actual casus omissus than to attempt to do so by
judicial construction.'  (People v. Woodruff, 32 N.Y. 364.)  Courts cannot supply omissions in legislation,
nor afford relief because they are supposed to exist. 
To adopt the language of Mr. Justice Woods, in Hobbs v.
McLean, 117 U.S. 579, 'when a provision is left out of
a statute, either by design or mistake of the
legislature, the courts have no power to supply it.  To
do so would be to legislate and not to construe.'"
Id. at 373-74.
	That passage in State ex rel Everding reflects current
Oregon law.  It is clear that the court in Ellis acted beyond the
scope of its legitimate judicial authority in fabricating a
filing deadline for an appeal under ORS 246.910(1).  The Ellis
court ignored the most fundamental precept of judicial review of
a statute:  That the responsibility for deciding matters of
policy -- such as whether a particular filing deadline
("reasonable" or otherwise) shall govern a statutory remedy --
rests exclusively with the legislature, not the court.  That is,
whether there is or should be a "season" for challenges permitted
by ORS 246.910(1) is solely a question for the legislature. (24)
	It might be possible to distinguish Ellis from the
present appeal, which challenges in part conduct by the Secretary
of State that occurred after the election.  Ellis stated that it
was placing a timeline requirement "on pre-election challenges of
this kind," and, as a consequence, the court declined to address
whether "a post election challenge of the kind that occurred in
Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or 462, 220 P2d 493[,] reh den[,] 221 P2d
575 (1950), still would be possible.  But see State ex rel
Fidanque v. Paulus, supra, 297 Or at 719."  Ellis, 302 Or at 19 n
5.  The passage of Fidanque that Ellis cited purported to justify
the application of laches in Fidanque in part on "the potential
availability of post-election challenge under [Oregon
Constitution] Article IV, section 20, should Ballot Measure 8
ultimately be approved * * *."  Fidanque, 297 Or at 719.
	The majority, however, has chosen to answer the
question that Ellis did not decide and has extended the Ellis
deadline to apply to challenges under ORS 246.910(1) to official
acts occurring both before and after an election.  The question,
therefore, is whether the court should treat Ellis as a case law
precedent and extend the Ellis deadline to challenges to post-election official actions.
	In determining whether this court should adhere to
Ellis as a precedent, we must look to the standards that this
court has established for determining whether a particular case
deserves that status.  Some of this court's decisions have
repeated what has come to be known as the rule of "prior
interpretation."  For example, in State v. King, 316 Or 437, 445-46, 852 P2d 190 (1993), this court stated:
	"When this court interprets a statute, the
interpretation becomes a part of the statute, subject
only to a revision by the legislature.  Having once
construed the same provisions of this statute, albeit
in a slightly different context, to have a particular
meaning, we will not now consider a contrary
interpretation."  (Citations omitted.)
	I have discussed elsewhere my concern that that
statement does not reflect Oregon law and is an unnecessarily
rigid deviation from the correct rule that governs this court's
adherence to case law precedent:  The rule of stare decisis. 
State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 638-44, 932 P2d
1145 (1997) (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  However, even the purported rule of prior interpretation
applies only when an earlier case has interpreted the statute
that the court is reviewing.  Ellis did not purport to interpret
ORS 246.910 or any other statute in creating the 60-day filing
deadline. (25)  The court fabricated the 60-day deadline because the
legislature supposedly had failed to establish any time limit for
filing appeals under ORS 246.910. (26)  In that context, the so-called rule of "prior interpretation" is inapplicable, because no
prior interpretation of a statute exists.
	Neither is the Ellis deadline entitled to deference
under the principle of stare decisis.  The court's unilateral
announcement of a time limit on a statutory appeal, and the
absence of support for the deadline in the text of ORS 246.910 or
any other contextual statute, undermine the legitimacy of Ellis
as a precedent.  If, indeed, the legislature chose, as the Ellis
court asserted, to impose no deadline on the opportunity of
registered voters under ORS 246.910 to challenge official acts or
failures to act under election laws, that policy choice deserves
respect and deference by this court, not a judicial veto. 
	Other aspects of the Ellis court's rationale indicate
that the act of manufacturing a deadline was not a valid exercise
of judicial power and that that act does not merit deference
under the doctrine of stare decisis.  For example, the Ellis
court's announced concern for the resources of petition
circulators is beside the point.  The court must assume instead
that the legislature took that concern into account in enacting
ORS 246.910(1).  It is obvious that the legislature was even more
concerned that Oregon registered voters should have a prompt and
effective method of challenging every unauthorized official act
or failure to act under Oregon election laws whenever such a
default might occur.
	The Ellis court's concern regarding the deleterious
effect of "eleventh-hour" appeals on the court's ability to
analyze sensitive questions before an approaching election
similarly is unfounded.  Nothing in ORS 246.910 requires any
court to decide an appeal under that statute before an election
or any other election-related event.  ORS 246.910(3) authorizes
"the circuit courts and Court of Appeals, in their discretion,"
to "give such precedence on their dockets to appeals under this
section as the circumstances may require."  I agree that that
subsection anticipates prompt judicial consideration and
determination of appeals under ORS 246.910(1).  However, the
Ellis court's notion that the courts are under pressure to decide
appeals under ORS 246.910(1) before elections goes well beyond
anything that the statute implies.  And, pressure of that sort
applied by the parties to an appeal, although understandable in
the context of pre-election appellate advocacy, in no way
justifies the judicial adoption of a nonstatutory deadline to
defeat all but the earliest challenges to assertedly unauthorized
official conduct.
	The purported pressure of an impending election is
absent, in any event, in this case, because plaintiffs filed
their appeal after the election.  The Ellis court's concern that
"eleventh-hour" appeals might place pressure on the courts to
decide important legal questions in haste is irrelevant when, as
here, the appeal asserts that the Secretary of State's allegedly
unauthorized conduct occurred or continued after the election.
	Finally, Ellis failed to analyze this court's previous
determinations in other cases discussed above that, under ORS
246.910, each of the Secretary of State's multiple actions and
decisions in the initiative process becomes subject to challenge
as it occurs.  Those earlier determinations contradict the Ellis
court's conclusion that, as a result of the court's creation of a
deadline, only the first exercise of the Secretary of State's
official power is subject to review under ORS 246.910.  Those
earlier statements from this court give full effect to the
wording of ORS 246.910 that "any act or failure to act" is
subject to appeal.  Ellis failed to analyze either those previous
statements from this court or the inconsistency between the
court's deadline and the statute's promise that any act or
failure to act by the Secretary of State under an election law is
subject to appeal.
	The rule of stare decisis does not require the court to
adhere to the Ellis deadline as a case law precedent.  The
foregoing concerns about the legal efficacy of the Ellis deadline
and the court's expressed reasoning in support of that deadline
lead me to conclude that the court should reconsider Ellis, not
broaden its application to govern all appeals under ORS 246.910.
	My review of the text of ORS 246.910, including the
statutory context and pertinent case law, indicates that each of
the Secretary of State's multiple actions in the initiative
process is subject to an appeal as it occurs, not only the first
act.  The trial court did not err in asserting jurisdiction over
the challenges of the individual plaintiffs to the Secretary of
State's actions regarding Measure 7.  I would affirm the trial
court's action in that regard.
CONCLUSION
	By extending the deadline created by the court in Ellis
to apply to all appeals filed under ORS 246.910(1), the majority
has undermined the appeal remedy provided in that statute.  No
longer may a registered voter bring a judicial challenge under
that statute to any act or failure to act by the Secretary of
State that allegedly exceeds his authority.  Instead, the
majority has twisted the legislature's scheme to confine such
challenges solely to the Secretary of State's first purported
exercise of authority. (27)  As this case illustrates, that window
of opportunity to file a challenge can expire many months or
years before the Secretary of State places the proposed measure
on the ballot, counts the votes, or certifies the measure's
passage or defeat in an election.  Once the court-made deadline
expires, no registered voter or other adversely affected citizen
may use ORS 246.910(1) to challenge a Secretary of State's later
exercises of authority to advance a proposed measure to the
ballot, despite a total absence of legal authority to do so and
regardless of the public costs at stake.
	The election law responsibilities of the Secretary of
State and other election officials are not simple. 
Constitutional requirements for lawmaking by initiative require
careful observance at all stages of the initiative process, not
only at the earliest.  The legislature designed the appeal remedy
in ORS 246.910(1) to permit an adversely affected citizen to
protest in court whenever any act or failure to act by an
election official falls short of legal requirements under
election laws.  The majority's result defeats, rather than
respects, the legislature's remedial scheme.  Although I concur
in the majority's disposition of the other claims under ORS
28.020, I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the individual
plaintiffs' claims under ORS 246.910(1).
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent
in part from the majority's decision.



1. 	Both actions name the State of Oregon, Governor
Kitzhaber, and Secretary of State Bradbury as defendants.  We
refer to all three defendants collectively as "the state"
throughout this opinion.

2. 	As explained below, although the Secretary of State has
not yet completed canvassing the votes on Measure 7, the official
county election results contained in the record demonstrate that
a majority of voters approved the measure.

3. 	McCall plaintiffs also contended that Measure 7 was
adopted in violation of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), which sets
out a "full-text" requirement for initiative petitions and a
"single-subject" requirement for laws and constitutional
amendments proposed by initiative petition, and Article XVII,
section 2, which sets out the process for adopting constitutional
revisions.  McCall plaintiffs later contended before the trial
court that submission of Measure 7 also violated ORS 251.195,
which sets out voters' pamphlet requirements for proposed
constitutional amendments, thereby also violating Article IV,
section 1(4)(b), which requires that initiatives be submitted
according to laws not inconsistent with that section.

4. 	The trial court concluded that all plaintiffs (in both
actions) except plaintiff League of Oregon Cities had standing
under ORS 28.020.  League plaintiffs, collectively, do not
challenge that conclusion on appeal; accordingly, future
references to "League plaintiffs" in this opinion do not include
plaintiff League of Oregon Cities. 

5. 	 The trial court also concluded that Measure 7 violated
the full-text requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d);
however, the court rejected plaintiffs' arguments respecting
single-subject and revision, and did not rule on McCall
plaintiffs' argument respecting submission according to election
laws.  
		On appeal, neither set of plaintiffs challenges the
trial court's conclusion respecting the single-subject
requirement.  All other matters pending before the trial court
discussed above, with the exception of attorney fees, have been
raised on appeal.  Because we resolve this case based upon the
separate-vote requirement, we do not address the remaining
constitutional issues.

6. 	ORS 250.044(1) provides, in part: 
	"An action that challenges the constitutionality
of a measure initiated by the people * * * must be
commenced in the Circuit Court for Marion County if:
	"(a) The action is filed by a plaintiff asserting
a claim for relief that challenges the
constitutionality of * * * an amendment to the Oregon
Constitution initiated by the people * * * under
section 1 (1) to (4), Article IV of the Oregon
Constitution;
	"(b) The action is commenced on or after the date
that the Secretary of State certifies that the
challenged measure has been adopted by the electors and
within 180 days after the effective date of the
measure; and
	"(c) The action may not be commenced in the Oregon
Tax Court."

7. 	We also conclude below that two League plaintiffs, Katz
and Stein, lack standing under ORS 28.020.  However, League
plaintiffs did not argue alternatively that the trial court had
jurisdiction under ORS 246.910(1).

8. 	We take judicial notice of the following facts:  (1)
Measure 7 began as Initiative Petition 46 (2000); (2) the
petition originally was filed with the Secretary of State on
March 10, 1999; (3) the Attorney General certified the ballot
title on April 9, 1999; (4) the Secretary of State approved the
proposed initiative for circulation on May 28, 1999; and (5) the
Secretary of State certified the ballot measure (as Measure 7) on
July 26, 2000.  See generally OEC 201(f) (judicial notice may be
taken "at any stage of the proceedings"); Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or
556, 559 n 1, 964 P2d 1023 (1998) (taking judicial notice of
earlier elections activity surrounding ballot measure at issue).

9. 	All McCall plaintiffs also alleged that they were
registered voters.  That allegation, together with those
plaintiffs' opposition to Measure 7, was sufficient to establish
that they were "person[s] adversely affected" by an action of the
Secretary of State, as ORS 246.910(1) requires.  See Ellis v.
Roberts, 302 Or 6, 10-11, 725 P2d 886 (1986) ("adversely
affected" requirement of ORS 246.910(1) means that any registered
voter can file action challenging Secretary of State election
ruling).  We contrast that requirement with ORS 28.020, discussed
below, which requires for purposes of the UDJA that a person's
"rights, status, or other legal relations" be affected "by a
constitution, statute, [or] municipal charter."

10. 	Intervenor generally argues that no challenge upon
these grounds may be brought under ORS 246.910(1) after the
general election.  Our discussion below, addressing the state's
similar, but more specific, argument, disposes of intervenor's
argument. 

11. 	At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for McCall
plaintiffs told the trial court that the issue was "whether or
not [Measure 7] was properly on the ballot."  
		This court has held that the Secretary of State has the
duty to examine an initiative petition for compliance with the
single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the
Oregon Constitution and to refuse to accept those that violate
the rule.  OEA v. Roberts, 301 Or 228, 235, 721 P2d 833 (1986).
The parties assume that, in addition to that duty, the Secretary
of State has the duty to examine an initiative petition for
compliance with other form-of-adoption requirements of the Oregon
Constitution, including the "full-text" requirement of Article
IV, section 1(d), the "separate-vote" requirement of Article
XVII, section 1, and the constitutional revision requirements of
Article XVII, section 2.  Because there is no dispute in this
case about the extent of the Secretary of State's duty to review
an initiative petition, we assume without deciding that that duty
includes the duty to review such a measure for compliance with
all other constitutional provisions at issue in this case. 

12. 	For example, McCall plaintiffs do not argue that the
Secretary of State was canvassing the votes improperly.  

13. 	Contrary to the assertion by the dissent, our holding
does not in any way restrict a voter's ability, under ORS
246.910(1), to challenge any act or failure to act by the
Secretary of State.  ___ Or at ___ (Durham, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (slip op at 12).  Neither do we
"confine such challenges solely to the Secretary of State's first
purported exercise of authority."  Id. at ___ (slip op at 23)
(emphasis in original).  A voter simply must bring a challenge to
the act at issue by the Secretary of State in a timely fashion in
relation to when the Secretary of State acted.  A voter may not
bring such a challenge under ORS 246.910(1) more than 18 months
later, as McCall plaintiffs did in this case.    

14. 	We note that, in State ex rel Keisling v. Norblad, 317
Or 615, 629, 860 P2d 241 (1993), this court referred to the type
of challenge at issue in Ellis as a "pre-election challenge to
the election process."  That description was accurate, but was
vulnerable to the interpretation that McCall plaintiffs give it
in this case:  Because Ellis concerned the timeliness of "pre-election" challenges only, "post-election" challenges do not have
any time constraints.  As discussed above, we reject that
argument.  Both the challenge at issue in Ellis and the challenge
at issue here are, at bottom, challenges to the Secretary of
State's pre-election constitutional evaluation of a proposed
initiative petition. 

15. 	McCall plaintiffs McCall, MacPherson, and Swaim also
argue that they have standing as taxpayers and as voters;
plaintiff Swaim further argues that he has standing as a "public
official" as described by the Court of Appeals in Multnomah
County v. Talbot, 56 Or App 235, 641 P2d 617 (1982), which
opinion this court adopted as its own, Multnomah County v.
Talbot, 294 Or 478, 657 P2d 684 (1983).  We decline to address
those arguments, other than to note our agreement with intervenor
that, according to this court's case law describing those
theories of standing, plaintiffs McCall, MacPherson, and Swaim
have failed to establish it.  See Hanson v. Mosser, 247 Or 1, 10-11, 427 P2d 97 (1967) (plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers,
because they alleged that unlawful expenditures of public funds
pursuant to questioned contract would increase their tax burden),
overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485, 488,
475 P2d 78 (1970); see also Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3,
188 Or 324, 328-29, 215 P2d 368 (1950) (plaintiffs had standing
as voters, because they alleged that polls had closed one hour
earlier than had been publicized, preventing one plaintiff from
voting, and because, at polling place, one plaintiff improperly
had been disqualified from voting).

16. McCall plaintiffs initially submitted both affidavits
to the trial court as evidence in support of their motion for a
preliminary injunction.  McCall plaintiffs specifically
incorporated that evidence in their pleadings on their motion for
summary judgment as evidence in support of that motion.

17. 	Intervenor also argues that all the local government
plaintiffs lack standing because they are "mere instrumentalities
of the state" and, therefore, may not "maintain an action against
the state to strike down an initiative passed by the voters of
the state."  He argues that a local government must have a
"proprietary interest" at stake before it may request relief
under the UDJA.  In support of that contention, intervenor relies
upon Tillamook Co., 302 Or 404.  In Tillamook Co., however, this
court specifically rejected the argument that intervenor makes
here, that is, that "local governments" do not have standing to
bring such challenges because they are "'mere instrumentalities
of the state.'"  Id. at 415.  This court instead focused upon
whether the county in that case had any "protected, recognizable"
interest that could be asserted against the state.  Id. at 416. 
We have engaged in a similar inquiry here and have concluded that
the local government plaintiffs have such an interest, which is
sufficient to establish standing under ORS 28.020.

18. 	In light of our conclusion that only plaintiffs Lewis
and Tipperman, among McCall plaintiffs, and the local government
plaintiffs, among League plaintiffs, sufficiently alleged
standing under ORS 28.020, we use the term "plaintiffs" to refer
to only those plaintiffs for the remainder of this opinion.

19. 	Plaintiffs further contend that Measure 7 changes
Article VI, section 10, Article XI, section 2, and Article IV,
section 1(5) (all regarding home-rule authority and related
initiative and referendum powers); Article XI, sections 7 and 10
(state and county debt limitations); Article XI, section 15(1)
(unfunded mandates); Article IV, section 1(1) (legislative
authority); Article VII (Amended), section 1 (judicial power);
Article III, section 1 (separation of powers); and Article I,
section 39, and Article XI, section 2 (local option).  In light
of our analysis respecting Article I, section 8, set out below,
we need not address plaintiffs' contentions that Measure 7 also
changes several other provisions of the Oregon Constitution.  See
Swett, 333 Or at 607 (following same approach).

20. 	We note that the trial court based its conclusion that
Measure 7 violated the separate-vote requirement primarily upon
its determination that Measure 7 made various changes to Article
I, section 18.  However, that court relied upon the Court of
Appeals' "necessar[y] impl[ication]" construct, set out in Dale
v. Keisling, 167 Or App 394, 401, 999 P2d 1229 (2000), for
determining whether a measure encompasses two or more amendments. 
This court later rejected that construct in Lehman, 333 Or at
241-42.  The trial court also relied upon an alternative "policy
choice" construct advocated by the state, which this court also
rejected in Lehman, id. at 242.

21. 	This court noted in Miller that such an enactment might
be permissible under Article I, section 8, if, in the context of
vendors of merchandise, it were accompanied by an explanation as
to how the sale of the nonexpressive material in question "meets
a special need or how the sale of the expressive material in
question gives rise to special problems reasonably justifying the
regulation of the vendor of expressive material differently and
more stringently than other vendors."  318 Or at 491.  No such
"justification" or "special problems" appear here.

22. 	We note that, in both Miller and Tidyman, this court
explained that such disparate treatment of persons engaged in
expression implicates Article I, section 8, rather than Article
I, section 20:
		"'We note at the outset that the obstacle to the
city's distinction [between 'adult' businesses and
other businesses] is not the constitutional guarantee
of equal privileges and immunities, Article I, section
20, but the guarantee of free expression, Article I,
section 8.  If free expression within that guarantee
were not involved, 'adult' businesses could not insist
that they must be treated exactly like any other
business, not, at least, without a showing of being
singled out for an impermissible motive.'"
Miller, 318 Or at 487 (quoting Tidyman, 306 Or at 182) (brackets
added in Miller; Tidyman footnotes omitted in Miller).

23. 	Because the facts alleged in the two complaints
substantively are identical, I address the sufficiency of the
complaints together.  The League of Oregon Cities complaint
ultimately requested a declaration, among other things, that
Measure 7 is not valid because it violated the separate-vote
requirement in Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution, see ORS 28.020 (describing court authority to grant
declaratory relief).  Notwithstanding that request for a
declaration of the invalidity of Measure 7, we determine the
sufficiency of a complaint by examining the allegations of the
complaint, not the labels used to characterize the claim.  Sheets
v. Knight, 308 Or 220, 232, 779 P2d 1000 (1989) ("While a claim
for relief may fail to plead a specific theory, it should not be
dismissed if it pleads a claim for relief under some theory, even
if it was not the one the plaintiff intended."  (Footnote
omitted.)).  Applying that rule here, the court may not reverse
the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction if the allegations
of the complaints are sufficient to plead a claim for relief
under some theory, including the claim identified in ORS
246.910(1).

24. 	Relying on Ellis, the court has announced a different
deadline of five days for filing a challenge under ORS 246.910
regarding a fiscal impact statement.  State ex rel Bunn v.
Roberts, 302 Or 72, 82, 726 P2d 925 (1986).  Also relying on
Ellis, the court has held that a petitioner may file a timely
challenge under ORS 246.910 by appealing within 60 days the
Secretary of State's certification of an initiative petition for
the ballot.  Crumpton v. Roberts, 310 Or 381, 390, 798 P2d 1100
(1990).  As in Ellis, neither of those decisions purports to find
a basis for those deadlines in the intention of the legislature. 
Crumpton also contradicts the court's conclusion here that a
petitioner may challenge only the Secretary of State's first
exercise of authority over an initiative petition, but the
majority does not explain away that contradiction.

25. 	The Ellis court did refer to one arguably analogous
deadline statute, ORS 183.484(2), which governs the appeal of an
"order in other than a contested case."  The court failed to
acknowledge that that purported analogy breaks down under
analysis, because ORS 246.910(1) applies more broadly to any act
or failure to act, not only to orders, and, under the court's
previous case law reviewed above, any of the Secretary of State's
various actions and decisions, once made, becomes subject to
review under ORS 246.910(1).

26. 	The Ellis court's assertion that a "legislative vacuum"
existed regarding filing deadlines might have been false, because
the court failed to determine the applicability of other
potentially relevant statutory deadlines.  Those include ORS
12.080, which concerns actions on a liability created by statute,
and ORS 30.275, which concerns actions against a public body
based on "tort," which ORS 30.260(8) defines in part to include
"the breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law," that
"results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the
law provides a civil right of action * * * for a protective
remedy."  The court must determine the applicability of those or
any other relevant period of limitations before it can assert
accurately that the legislature failed to limit the time for
filing an appeal under ORS 246.910.  Neither of the potentially
applicable deadlines cited above would bar the individual
plaintiffs' appeals in this case.

27. 	The majority in a footnote attempts to refute that
reading of its opinion, and asserts that the voters still have
the opportunity to file timely challenges to other, presumably
later, acts by the Secretary of State under ORS 246.910. ___ Or
at ___ n 13 (slip op at 13 n 13).  However, the majority cannot
square that statement with its dismissal of the complaints of the
individual plaintiffs here.  Those complaints allege in part that
the Secretary of State committed an unauthorized act --
canvassing the votes regarding Measure 7 -- less than 30 days
before the individual plaintiffs filed their complaints.  The
majority's explanation for why the individual plaintiffs'
complaints about that unauthorized act are not filed timely will
have to wait, unfortunately, for another case.