Title: JIMMY DALE COLLETT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . JIMMY DALE COLLETT sixprPxrrt (~Vurf of 31 2008-SC-000309-MR RENDERED : JUNE 25, 2009 NO.TTfl ~Ptt$Ll ON APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE HON . JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE NO . 07-CR-00256 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING := nIL Ioq~ ( 4~a _b _aD.e-. APPELLANT Appellant, Jimmy Dale Collett, was convicted by a Bell Circuit Court jury of second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, KRS 218A.1413, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender, KRS 532.080(3) . Four these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to five (5) years imprisonment for the trafficking conviction enhanced to twenty (20) years for the persistent felony offender conviction . Appellant now appeals his convictions as a matter of right. Ky . Const. §110 . Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) limiting his ability to cross-examine one of the Commonwealth's witnesses ; (2) denying his motion for a directed verdict on the drug trafficking charge ; and (3) denying his request to instruct the jury on facilitation and complicity as lesser-included offenses of the drug trafficking charge . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction . In June 2007, Elisha Posey agreed to work as an informant in an investigation of Appellant who was suspected of illegally selling controlled substances . Posey had recently been charged with shoplifting and was promised that charge would be dismissed if she cooperated as an informant. On June 20, 2007, Posey met with a Bell County Sheriff's Department deputy who outfitted her with hidden video/audio equipment and gave her twenty dollars to buy drugs from Appellant. After contacting Appellant about buying the drugs, Posey drove to Appellant's house . Once there, Posey rode with Appellant to another house where prescription pain pills were available . The video/audio equipment on Posey recorded the transactions and conversations that followed . At the supplier's house, and while still inside Appellant's vehicle, Posey can be heard telling Appellant, "Twenty, give me two." Shortly thereafter the supplier approached the vehicle and asked Appellant, "You wanting those bigguns?" Appellant replied, "Yeah." Posey testified that Appellant received two generic Lorcet 10 pills from the supplier and placed them in his car's cup holder . Appellant and Posey then returned to Appellant's home where he gave Posey the pills along with a plastic baggie in return for twenty dollars. Based on this evidence Appellant was indicted for and later convicted of second- degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender . 1 . THE TRIAL JUDGE'S LIMITATION ON POSEY'S CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS APPROPRIATE Appellant first argues that the trial court placed improper limits on his cross-examination of Posey by preventing his efforts to "paint a more accurate portrait of Posey's drug issues." During cross-examination, Appellant's counsel asked Posey if she intended to sell the items that she was accused of shoplifting for drug money. The Commonwealth immediately objected to the question's relevancy. The trialjudge sustained the Commonwealth's objection and barred further questions about Posey's motives for shoplifting . The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's right to paint a "reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation." Davenport v. Commonwealth , 177 S.W.3d 763, 768-769 (Ky. 2005) . However: [t]rial courts retain broad discretion to regulate cross-examination. `Defendants cannot run rough-shod, doing precisely as they please, simply because cross-examination is underway . So long as a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries .' Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332, 342 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v . Maddox, 955 S.W .2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997)) . On appeal, a trial judge's ruling concerning the limits of cross-examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion . Davenport, 177 S.W .3d at 772 . In this matter, we cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion by preventing Appellant from further cross-examination of Posey on her shoplifting charge . Prior to the question, Appellant thoroughly cross-examined Posey about her prior felony conviction, drug use, and agreement with the Commonwealth to act as an informant against Appellant in exchange for dismissal of her shoplifting charge. The jury was able to observe Posey's demeanor during trial, evaluate her credibility, and weigh her testimony accordingly. We believe that Appellant was given an adequate opportunity to present to the jury Posey's "veracity, bias and motivation ." See Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 342. Further, the reason why Posey shoplifted was immaterial to Appellant's trial and its introduction may have confused the jury . KRE 403 . Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not violate Appellant's right of confrontation by limiting Appellant's cross- examination of Posey. 11 . THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RULING ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS CORRECT Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to find him guilty of second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance . As such, Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. We disagree . On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, reserving to the jury all questions of credibility and weight of the evidence . Commonwealth v . Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) . "On appellate review., the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Id . KRS 218.1413(1)(a) provides in relevant part, "[a] person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the second-degree when . . . [h]e knowingly and unlawfully traffics in . . . a controlled substance classified in Schedule III." KRS 218A.010(40) defines "trafficking" distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance ." In this matter, adequate evidence was presented for ajury to find Appellant guilty of second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. The evidence presented indicated that Posey called Appellant in order to obtain pain pills, that Appellant agreed to take her to someone who had prescription pain pills and that once there, Appellant received two pills from the supplier . Further, on the videotape of the transaction, Posey can clearly be heard telling Appellant, "twenty, give me two", before the supplier approached Appellant's vehicle . Appellant can also be heard on the videotape telling Posey that the pills she received are what "everybody gets." Finally, Posey testified that when they returned to Appellant's house, he gave her the pills and a plastic baggie in return for twenty dollars . We find that under these circumstances and the evidence as a whole, a reasonable juror could find that Appellant distributed, dispensed, sold, or "to manufacture, transferred a controlled substance to Posey in violation of KRS 218A. 1413(1)(a) . Therefore, the trialjudge did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the second-degree trafficking charge . III . APELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON FACILIATION OR COMPLICITY Appellant last argues that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on complicity, KRS 502.020(1), and/or facilitation, KRS 506.080(1), as a defense to trafficking in a controlled substance, KRS 218A.14131413(1)(a) . Appellant preserved this issue by tendering instructions on complicity and facilitation to the trial court. RCr 9.54(2) . We note, and Appellant does not argue otherwise, that complicity and facilitation are not lesser-included offenses of trafficking. See Houston v. Commonwealth , 975 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky. 1998) . If they were, an instruction would have been required if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could have a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt on the trafficking charge, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of facilitation or complicity . Id . ; Commonwealth v . Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Ky. 1999) . Appellant does assert, however, that he was entitled to an instruction on facilitation and/or complicity because, though not lesser-included offenses, they are "lesser" offenses that could serve as a defense to the trafficking charge in that finding him guilty of facilitation and/or complicity would preclude a finding of guilt on the trafficking charge. We disagree . Appellant relies on Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 549 (Ky. 1988), for the proposition that "where the evidence is such that the jury could come to any of several conclusions, the trial court is required to submit the instructions on the various alternatives", regardless of whether it is a lesser- included offense of the crime charged . However, in Hudson v. Commonwealth , 202 S.W.3d 17, 21-22 (Ky.2006), we departed from Sanborn "to the extent that it requires alternate theory instructions as to uncharged crimes whenever the evidence suggests the existence of such crimes." Instead, we held that "[a]n instruction on a separate, uncharged, but `lesser' crime - in other words, an alternative theory of the crime - is required only when a guilty verdict as to the alternative crime would amount to a defense to the charged crime, i .e., when being guilty of both crimes is mutually exclusive ." Id . Facilitation is a lesser included offense of complicity, and requires the same elements, except that the state of mind for its commission is less culpable . Houston , 975 S.W .2d at 930. For the commission of both, the defendant acts with the knowledge that the principal is committing or intends to commit a crime. Complicity, however, requires that the defendant intend that the crime be committed while facilitation does not require such intent and, in fact, the defendant is "wholly indifferent" as to whether the principal actually completes the crime . Id. ; Thompkins v . Commonwealth , 54 S.W .3d 147, 150 (Ky. 2001) . Because trafficking requires that the defendant himself commit the crime, Appellant is correct in that if he was found guilty of facilitation he could not have been found guilty of trafficking. Thus, under Hudson , we agree that a facilitation instruction would be appropriate as a lesser uncharged crime. 202 S.W .3d at 21-22 . Here, however, Appellant's theory is not supported by the evidence . Houston, 975 S.W.2d at 929 ; See Smith v. Commonwealth , 599 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Ky.1980) (a trial court is not required to give instructions on a theory not within the framework of the evidence presented at trial) . Notably, the video/audio ta0e of the transaction is clear evidence that Appellant did more than simply provide Posey with the means and/or opportunity to purchase prescription pills. KRS 506.080(1) . When Posey asked Appellant if she could buy prescription pills from him, Appellant drove her to his supplier's house. Once there, Appellant can be heard transacting with the supplier for the pills and thereafter Appellant gave the pills to Posey with a plastic bag in exchange for twenty dollars. Given this evidence, we find ajury could not reasonably conclude that Appellant was "wholly indifferent" to the sale of the prescription pills and that Appellant's theory in support of an instruction on facilitation is not supported by the evidence. Thompkins,_54 S.W .3d at 150 ; Houston, 975 S.W.2d at 929 . An instruction on facilitation was, therefore, not warranted. Like facilitation, complicity requires that another party commit the crime. KRS 502.020(1) ; Thompkins ,_54 S.W .3d at 150 . Because trafficking requires that the defendant himself commit the crime, if Appellant were found guilty of complicity he could not be found guilty of trafficking. See Hudson , 202 S.W.3d at 21-22 . However, for the same reasons that we find Appellant was not entitled to an instruction on facilitation, we find Appellant was not entitled to an instruction on complicity - such a theory is not supported by the evidence. See Houston, 975 S.W.2d at 929 . Under the evidence presented, one could not reasonably conclude that Appellant, rather than trafficking in a controlled substance, had merely assisted another in the commission of the offense of trafficking in a controlled substance . We therefore affirm the judgment of the Bell Circuit Court. All sitting. All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Shelly R . Fears Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1133 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Stephen Bryant Humphress Assistant Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204