Title: Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Centric Corp. v. Drake Bldg. Corp.1986 WY 189726 P.2d 1047Case Number: 85-50Decided: 10/17/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CENTRIC CORPORATION, a 
Colorado 
corporation, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

DRAKE BUILDING 
CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation, Appellee (Defendant), 
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., and Kaiser, Inc. (Defendants).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

J.N. Murdock, 
Reeves & Murdock, Casper, for appellant.

Daniel M. Fowler 
and Colin C. Campbell, Wood, Ris & Hames, P.C., Denver, Colo., and John D. 
Rossetti, Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti, Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., ROONEY* and BROWN, JJ., and GUTHRIE and RAPER, JJ., 
Retired.

* Retired November 30, 
1985

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The most intriguing 
question presented in this case is the proposition advanced by the appellee, 
Drake Building Corporation, to support the decision of the district court that 
the Wyoming 
statutes providing for contribution among joint tortfeasors constitute an 
exclusive remedy which forecloses a buyer of goods from pursuing remedies under 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Other questions presented by the parties encompass 
the existence of and pleading of warranty theories by Centric Corporation; 
whether there exists a binding and final adjudication of these claims; and 
whether Centric's right to recover for warranties is barred by the provisions of 
§ 30-1-131, W.S. 1977.

[¶2.]     This case arises out of 
the same factual situation involved in Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral 
Explorations Company, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 (1985), and the underlying facts are 
outlined in the court's opinion in that case. The action initially was brought 
by the owners of the Sweetwater Uranium Mill to recover damages arising from a 
fire in one of the structures erected for the mill. Centric Corporation, 
pursuant to a subcontract with the firm that had agreed to furnish engineering, 
procurement and construction services for the mill, agreed to furnish 
pre-engineered, metal buildings to house the mill facilities and equipment. The 
specifications required that these buildings be lined with fiberglass panels 
which, according to the specifications, were to be fire resistant. Centric 
Corporation purchased the buildings and the liner panels from Kirby Building 
Systems through Drake Building Corporation, a franchisee of Kirby. A fire 
destroyed the building after the fiberglass liner panels caught fire from a 
spark from a welder. The owners then filed an action against a number of firms 
involved in the construction of the building including Centric Corporation and 
Drake Building Corporation. The damages which resulted from the fire were found 
by the jury to be $8,392,216.90. The defendants cross-claimed against one 
another, and prior to trial the district court ruled that the main action would 
proceed only on a negligence theory. It was the trial court's view that 
negligence essentially encompassed the alternative theories of breach of 
warranty, breach of contract, and strict liability of tort asserted by the 
plaintiffs.

[¶3.]     Centric and Drake moved 
for summary judgment on their respective cross-claims against one another. The 
court did not rule on the motions until after the case of the plaintiffs had 
proceeded to trial on the negligence theory. In that action, Drake was found to 
be 35% negligent, and Centric was found to be 20% negligent. The result of that 
case was affirmed in Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral Explorations Company, 
supra. Because Drake had settled with the plaintiffs in accordance with the 
provisions of the contribution among joint tortfeasors statute, it was not 
responsible for any contribution to the negligence judgment obtained by the 
plaintiffs. While the appeal from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict was 
pending in this court and the record was present here the district judge ordered 
the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective summary judgment 
motions on the cross-claims.

[¶4.]     The district court then 
ruled that there were no claims for contribution from parties who had settled 
for common-law indemnity or for contractual indemnity. The district judge noted 
that he could not determine from the record whether contract and breach of 
warranty claims had been pleaded by Centric against Drake, but he recognized 
that Drake relied upon the prior ruling of the court to the effect that warranty 
claims were subsumed by the negligence claim. The court thereupon entered a 
summary judgment in favor of Drake with respect to Centric's cross-claim. 
Centric has appealed from the summary judgment.

[¶5.]     In its brief in chief, 
Centric presents the following issues for the court to 
determine:

"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT CENTRIC HAD NO CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS FOR BREACH 
OF WARRANTY

"A. The Contract Existing 
Between Drake Building and Centric Established An Express Warranty And Implied 
Warranties Which Were Breached When Drake Building Delivered To Centric 
Fiberglass Panels That Did Not Meet Or Conform To The Specifications Of A Fire 
Retardant Found in Section 8.2.1 Of The Specifications.

"B. The Contributory 
Negligence of Centric Does Not Prevent A Recovery By Centric Under The 
Wyoming 
Uniform Commercial Code.

"C. Centric's Right of 
Recovery Against DrakeBuilding Under the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code Is Not Barred By The 
Provisions of Section 30-1-131 Of the Wyoming Statutes.

"D. Centric's Cross-claim 
Was Not Adjudicated By The Trial Court's Order of January 13, 1984, Or, 
Alternatively, If Such Adjudication Occurred, The Trial Court Erred As A Matter 
Of Law.

"E. DrakeBuilding Should Not Have Been Surprised By 
The Claims for Breach of Warranties As The Pleadings Were Adequate To Put The 
Appellee On Notice Of Such Claims.

"II. THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING DRAKEBUILDING'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTAS TO CENTRIC'S CLAIM FOR 
INDEMNITY

"A. The Finding Of The 
Jury In The Underlying Case That Centric Was Negligent Does Not Preclude Centric 
From Recovery Against DrakeBuilding For 
Indemnity.

"B. The Provisions of 
Section 30-1-131 Are Inapplicable And Do Not Otherwise Affect The Right Of 
Centric To Recover Against DrakeBuilding."

Drake in its 
brief of appellee states the issues to be:

"II. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT CENTRIC HAD NO WARRANTY CLAIMS

"A. Centric's Warranty 
Claims are Barred Under The Wyoming Contribution Act.

"B. Warranty Claims Were 
Properly Dismissed on the Factual Record Before the Court.

"III. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENTON 
CENTRIC'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY

"A. Centric's Claim for 
Common Law Indemnity is Barred By The Court's Finding of Centric's Active 
Negligence.

"B. Centric's Indemnity 
Claim is Barred By the Provisions of W.S., § 30-1-131 
(1977).

"C. Centric May Not 
Assert a Claim for Partial Common Law Indemnity."

In its reply 
brief, Centric argues:

"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING DRAKEBUILDING'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH REGARD TO CENTRIC'S WARRANTY CLAIMS AS THERE EXISTED 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT

"A. The Specifications 
Required That the Provisions of Section 8.2.1 Be Met, Drake Building Was Aware 
of Such Specifications and Understood that Compliance was Required Under the 
Contract.

"B. Centric Bargained For 
Compliance With the Specifications, Including Those Contained in Section 
8.2.1.

"II. SETTLEMENT UNDER 
SECTION 1-1-113(a)(ii), W.S., 1977, DOES NOT BAR CENTRIC'S WARRANTY CLAIMS 
GRANTED UNDER THE WYOMING UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE"

We are satisfied 
that the only issues to be addressed are:

I. Did Centric 
appropriately plead warranty and contract theories against 
Drake?

II. Is Centric foreclosed 
from its claim for breach of warranty by virtue of the statutes relating to 
contribution among tortfeasors?

III. Is Centric 
foreclosed by the provisions of § 30-1-131, W.S. 1977?1

 

[¶6.]     In the pleadings we 
find the following language encompassed in Centric's cross-claim against 
Drake:

"* * * Claims have been 
asserted against Centric Corporation in the above-captioned matter and without 
admitting the allegations directed against Centric therein, such allegations are 
incorporated herein. * * *

"* * * Centric realleges 
all the allegations contained above and further alleges:

"1. Drake Building 
Corporation is in the business of selling building materials. If it is 
determined that the material incorporated in Plaintiff's building was defective 
or failed to conform to the aforementioned specifications, then Drake, was 
negligent in failing to properly arrange for the ordering and shipping of 
materials to the job site which would conform to such specifications or would 
otherwise not be defective.

"2. Drake Building 
Corporation entered into a contract with Centric, on or about January 24, 1978 
wherein it agreed to furnish certain buildings to the job site which would 
comply with the specifications, aforementioned. If the material shipped was 
defective or otherwise failed to meet such specifications, then Drake Building 
Corporation breached this agreement.

"3. If it is determined 
that materials furnished were defective or failed to conform to the 
specifications, then such failure is due to the negligence and breach of 
contract of Drake.

"WHEREFORE, Centric seeks 
contribution and indemnification, including attorney's fees from Drake Building 
Corporation, and such other and further relief deemed 
appropriate."

[¶7.]     We conclude that these 
allegations are sufficient within the requirements of Rule 8, W.R.C.P., to place 
them in issue in the case. Among the provisions found in Rule 8, W.R.C.P., as 
they have been construed by the court, are the following:

(1) Rule 8(a)(1), only 
requires a cross-claim to contain, "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

(2) Rule 8(a)(2), 
provides that a demand for relief shall be included.

(3) Rule 8(e)(1), 
provides that: "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and 
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required." See Guggenmos 
v. Tom Searl-Frank McCue, Inc., Wyo., 481 P.2d 48, 51 (1971) ("technical forms 
of pleading no longer have a place in our practice * * *"). Accord, Harris v. 
Grizzle, Wyo., 
599 P.2d 580, 583 (1979).

(4) Rule 8(e)(2), allows 
claims to be stated alternately or hypothetically. See also Rule 8(a), 
(alternative relief may be demanded).

(5) Rule 8(f), provides 
that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice" and we 
have held that pleadings are to be liberally construed to do justice. Sump v. 
City of Sheridan, Wyo., 358 P.2d 637, reh. denied, 359 P.2d 1008 
(1961); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company of Hartford, Connecticut, 
Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1980).

[¶8.]     This court, in 
determining whether a pleading meets the specificity standard of Rule 8(a)(2), 
asks only whether the pleading gives fair notice. Guggenmos v. Tom Searl-Frank 
McCue, Inc., supra, 481 P.2d  at 51; Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company of Hartford Connecticut, supra, 608 P.2d  at 1302. The pleader need only 
plead the operative facts to give notice. Harris v. Grizzle, supra, 599 P.2d  at 
583; Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company [¶8.]   of Hartford, Connecticut, supra, 
608 P.2d  at 1302.

[¶9.]     Rule 10(c), W.R.C.P., 
provides: 

"(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. - 
Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the 
same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion. A copy of any written 
instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes."

The adoption by 
reference clearly is permissible under these rules in accordance with 
interpretations of the identical provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1326 
(1969). With the provisions of both Rules 8 and 10, W.R.C.P., in mind we have no 
equivocation in stating that Centric's pleadings properly put in issue its 
claims against Drake for breach of contract and its breach of warranty theories. 
We hold that the district court erred in making any determination that the 
cross-claim did not state a claim for a breach of contract or 
warranty.

[¶10.]  The trial court, however, concluded that 
its earlier ruling which merged all claims of plaintiff into the negligence 
theory disposed of this issue so far as Centric and Drake are concerned. We do 
not agree that the record demonstrates that the earlier ruling achieved that 
result, and we note that the district court did not have the record before it 
when it held that the earlier ruling also applied to Centric. We also have in 
mind the provisions of Rule 42, W.R.C.P., pursuant to which the court may order 
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, et cetera. We conclude the parties 
were justified in believing that a separation for trial was the disposition made 
by the district court of the cross-claims in this instance and that those claims 
were not disposed of in the ruling with respect to the theories of the 
plaintiffs.

[¶11.]  It also appears that the district court 
concluded that Drake and Kirby had not warranted the panels as fire resistant 
and further that it disposed of that claim in part because of no privity of 
contract between the original plaintiffs and Kirby. Apparently the same 
reasoning was invoked in the dispute between Drake and Centric, but the record 
is clear that Drake did contract to furnish the prefabricated buildings to 
Centric including the liner panels. That contract incorporated the 
specifications of the general contractor on behalf of the owner for fire 
retardant liner panels, and there was an express warranty that the materials 
provided would conform to the specifications. See Albin Elevator Company v. 
Pavlica, Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982). Drake under the circumstances expressly 
warranted that the goods would conform to the description, which was a part of 
the basis of the bargain. Section 34-21-230(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. The fact that 
Centric accepted the panels does not inhibit other remedies for nonconformity, § 
34-21-270(b), W.S. 1977, although Centric could not then reject the materials. 
Section 34-21-270(c)(i), W.S. 1977, places a burden upon Centric to notify Drake 
within a reasonable time after it discovered the nonconformity, and it then is 
permitted to recover for the nonconformity the difference between the value of 
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as 
warranted as well as incidental and consequential damages in a proper case. 
Section 34-21-293, W.S. 1977.

[¶12.]  We must view the evidence in this case in 
the light most favorable to Centric, the party opposing Drake's motion for 
summary judgment. Noonan v. Texaco Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986); Reno 
Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company, Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981); DeHerrera 
v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979). In so doing 
we find that genuine issues of material fact exist (at least as to whether the 
specifications were a part of the basis of the bargain between Centric and Drake 
resulting in an express warranty, as to the existence of any implied warranty, 
as to any other breach of the contract, and if any of these exist, as to the 
damages attributable to any breach of contract or warranty) which inhibit the 
entry of a summary judgment for Drake. See Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121 (1984). It was error for the trial court to grant Drake's motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that there were no contractual warranties or 
obligations owed to Centric. 

[¶13.]  We are satisfied that the provisions of 
the statute relating to contribution among joint tortfeasors, § 1-1-113(a)(ii), 
W.S. 1977, do not inhibit the contractual remedy of Centric in this instance. 
Centric's remedies for breach of contract and breach of express and implied 
warranty arise under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 34-21-293 
and 34-21-294, W.S. 1977. The contribution statutes and the Uniform Commercial 
Code have a different purpose and cannot be related in the way asserted in this 
instance by Drake. Contribution applies only in tort. Loh v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 422 A.2d 16, 47 Md. App. 110 (1980); Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press 
Co., 273 F. Supp. 363 (D.R.I. 1967); Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. 
Heyl & Patterson Inc., 261 Pa. Super. 1359, 395 A.2d 1359 (1978). See also 
cases collected at 12 U.L.A. 73, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 
1; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1107, § 2 (1977). Contribution was designed to solve 
those situations in which several parties without any other relationship find 
themselves responsible for personal or property damages to another person or 
persons. It was adopted to ease the strict requirements of common-law indemnity 
and to avoid an earlier rule prohibiting contribution. The provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, on the other hand, were adopted to solve contractual 
disputes between buyers and sellers of goods.

[¶14.]  There is no question that as a joint 
tortfeasor Centric could not seek contribution against Drake, but as a party to 
a contract its remedies are not inhibited by the statute providing for 
contribution among joint tortfeasors. In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Maddux Well Service, Wyo., 586 P.2d 1220 (1978), we criticized an attempt to set 
up a similar dilemma and confuse the law of tort and the law of indemnity when 
we addressed the issue of whether Maddux was entitled to summary judgment on Pan 
American's third-party complaint on the ground that Pan American was not liable 
to the original party with whom Pan American had settled. We noted the 
independent obligations between the parties. In Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725 (1979), we also recognized that in a building contract situation a breach of 
an implied warranty can be presented as a theory of recovery as well as a tort 
action and appropriate findings can be made on each claim.

[¶15.]  We acknowledge that in an action to 
recover its damages pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, Centric is charged 
with the burden of showing that its damages were "proximately resulting" from 
Drake's breach of warranty. A number of courts, however, have indicated that the 
purchaser's negligence is no defense to a breach of warranty claim. United 
States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1012 (5th Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Mobil Oil 
Corporation, 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); Refinery Equipment v. Wickett Refining 
Co., 158 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1947); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 
214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281, 293 (1974); R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement 
Products Corp., 232 Pa. Super. 242, 336 A.2d 397, 406 (1975); Signal Oil & 
Gas Company v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Sup.Ct. 1978); 
Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Company, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 602 S.W.2d 282 (1980), citing Holm v. Hansen, Iowa, 248 N.W.2d 503 (1976). It may 
well be, however, that the recovery of consequential damages will be limited by 
demonstrating negligence on the part of the purchaser. The issue will be whether 
the proximate cause of those damages was the breach of contract by the seller or 
the negligence of the buyer.

[¶16.]  We address as the last issue the claim 
that § 30-1-131, W.S. 1977, forecloses any claim for indemnity by Centric. It 
must be recognized first of all that Centric did not assert a claim for 
indemnity so far as the issues in its appeal are concerned. The claim is only 
characterized as one in indemnity by Drake so that the provisions of § 30-1-131, 
et seq., W.S. 1977, may be asserted as a defense. It is clear from the record 
that the contract upon which Centric relies is not one which indemnifies Centric 
against the consequences of its own negligence. See Cities Service Company v. 
Northern Production Co. Inc., Wyo., 705 P.2d 321 (1985). As we have set forth 
above the provisions of the sales section of the Uniform Commercial Code must be 
separated from the tort concepts. A claim of defense arising out of tort 
concepts, such as indemnity, is not available where the claim of the plaintiff 
is premised upon contract. See Signal Oil & Gas Company v. Universal 
Products, Texas, supra; and Cline v. Sawyer, supra. We for this reason do not 
need to reach the question of whether this particular structure would come 
within the definitions of § 30-1-132, W.S. 1977.

[¶17.]  We conclude that the district court did 
err in granting Drake's motion for summary judgment against Centric, and that 
the summary judgment entered in this case must be reversed so that the parties 
can resolve their contractual dispute in an appropriate 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 30-1-131, W.S. 
1977, provides as follows:

"(a) All agreements, 
covenants or promises contained in, collateral to or affecting any agreement 
pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral, which 
purport to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages 
for:

"(i) Death or bodily 
injury to persons;

"(ii) Injury to property; 
or

"(iii) Any other loss, 
damage, or expense arising under either (i) or (ii) from:

"(A) The sole or 
concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the 
indemnitee or any independent contractor who is directly responsible to such 
indemnitee; or

"(B) From any accident 
which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision 
of the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the indemnitee or in 
accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee or employees or 
representatives of the indemnitee, are against public policy and are void and 
unenforceable to the extent that such contract of indemnity by its terms 
purports to relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own 
negligence. This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance 
contract or any benefit conferred by the Worker's Compensation Law [§§ 27-12-101 
to 27-12-805] of this state."

ROONEY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶18.]  Generally, I agree with that said in the 
majority opinion, but I believe that there said must be carried forward a little 
further.

[¶19.]  I agree that the cross-claim stated a 
claim for relief. There may be some question as to whether or not the claim for 
relief was proper for a cross-claim - i.e., whether or not it arose out of the 
transaction or occurrence which was the subject matter of the original action as 
required by Rule 13(g), W.R.C.P.1 But that question is moot since if 
the cross-claim were dismissed for that reason, it would have been refiled as a 
complaint in an original action, and the same issues here presented would have 
been before the court.

[¶20.]  Upon trial of the cross-claim, damages 
should be limited to the difference between the cost of the goods delivered and 
that of the goods ordered. The cross-claim is an action for breach of warranty 
involved in a sale of goods by Drake Building Corporation to Centric 
Corporation. The measure of damages for such breach is set forth in § 34-21-293, 
W.S. 1977:

"(a) Where the buyer has 
accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of section 2-607 [§ 
34-21-270(c)]) he may recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender the 
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as 
determined in any manner which is reasonable.

"(b) The measure of 
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of 
acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have 
had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate 
damages of a different amount.

"(c) In a proper case any 
incidental and consequential damages under the next section [§ 34-21-294] may 
also be recovered."

The "next 
section," § 34-21-294, W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) Incidental damages 
resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in 
inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully 
rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in 
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the 
delay or other breach.

"(b) Consequential 
damages resulting from the seller's breach include:

"(i) Any loss resulting 
from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the 
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise; and

"(ii) Injury to person or 
property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty."

[¶21.]  In addition to the difference between the 
cost of the goods delivered and that of the goods ordered, the only potential 
for damages in this case for breach of warranty would be consequential damages. 
The majority opinion properly notes the requirement for a showing that the 
damages under the Uniform Commercial Code were "proximately resulting" from the 
breach of warranty and that they would be limited by the negligence of Centric 
Corporation. It is also true that where negligence results in a breach of 
warranty,

"* * * a cause of action 
ex contractu and a tortious action premised on negligence, or both, are 
available to the contractee. [Citations.]" Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725, 
732 (1979).

[¶22.]  However, a double recovery should not be 
allowed. Reynolds v. Tice, Wyo., 595 P.2d 1318 (1979); Western National Bank of 
Casper v. Harrison, Wyo., 577 P.2d 635 (1978). The negligence 
aspect of the case was litigated and settled in Kirby Building Systems v. 
Mineral Explorations Company, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 (1985). This negligence aspect 
resolved those issues involving consequential or other types of damages set out 
in §§ 34-21-293 and 34-21-294; that is, damages other than those measured by the 
difference between the value of the goods when accepted and the value the goods 
would have had if they would have been as warranted. As noted in the majority 
opinion, the statute relating to contribution among joint tort-feasors did not 
apply to contract actions.2 The statute was part of the 
allocation of damages in tort actions - in this case it was pertinent to the 
negligence claim.

[¶23.]  Drake Building Corporation responded to 
the injured party for its share of the damages resulting from its negligence. 
Whether this payment was a result of settlement or a satisfaction of judgment is 
immaterial. It should not have to pay again. The statutory provision against contribution 
by Drake Building Corporation should not be subject to avoidance by a joinder of 
a contract claim with the original negligence claim. Centric Corporation 
should not have two bites of the apple.

[¶24.]  The same results from recognizing that 
the finding of negligence on Centric Corporation's part (and on the part of 
other parties, including Drake Building Corporation) in the Kirby case amounts 
to a factual finding of an intervening cause - i.e., no proximate cause and 
unforeseeability with respect to the warranty and its breach, either of which 
would bar Centric Corporation's recovery for consequential damages on the breach 
of warranty claim. See §§ 3 and 4 of the extensive Annotation: Buyer's 
Incidental and Consequential Damages from Seller's Breach under UCC § 2-715, 96 
A.L.R.3d 299 (1979) in these respects.

[¶25.]  In returning the case for trial, I would 
direct the trial court to limit any damages to the difference between the cost 
of the goods delivered and the cost of the goods ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 13(g), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"A pleading may state as 
a cross-claim any claim by one (1) party against a co-party arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original 
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the 
subject matter of the original action. * * *"

2 Subsequent to the 
opinion in Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral Explorations Company, the 
legislature amended the contribution among joint tort-feasors statute as 
suggested in my dissent, which was joined in by Justice Brown. Thus, the 
inequity there noted was removed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶26.]  I feel compelled to present a different 
point of view from that expressed by Justice Rooney, Retired, in his special 
concurring opinion. The measure of damages is not addressed in the majority 
opinion because it is not an issue in this case. Apparently Justice Rooney and I 
agree as to what I perceive to be the general rule. A buyer who becomes liable 
to his customers as a result of the seller's breach of contract with respect to 
the goods sold can recover damages for that liability from its seller pursuant 
to the Uniform Commercial Code provisions providing for consequential damages (§ 
34-21-294, W.S. 1977). See Louis DeGidio Oil and Gas Burner Sales and Service v. 
Ace Engineering Company, Inc., 302 Minn. 19, 225 N.W.2d 217 (1974); the cases 
collected at § 14[a] Annot., 96 A.L.R.3d 299 (1979); and White & Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 10.4, p. 392 (2d Ed. 1980). I am convinced, however, 
that the trial court should be cautious in pursuing Justice Rooney's advice. 

[¶27.]  In Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral 
Explorations Company, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 (1985), we noted that the 
jury found Drake Building Corporation to be 35% negligent. It is interesting to 
note that Centric Corporation was only 20% negligent. While my mathematical 
computations are always subject to correction, the jury verdict of $8,392,216.90 
reduced by the percentage attributable to the fault of the plaintiff of 
$419,610.85 leaves a balance of $7,972,606.05. Thirty-five percent of that is 
$2,790,412.12. That was the liability which Drake disposed of in compromising 
the negligence claim against it for the sum of $250,000. I do not understand how 
we can really say that Drake Building Corporation should not have to pay again. 
They haven't paid the first time yet.

[¶28.]  In his special concurring opinion, 
Justice Rooney's thesis is that consequential damages arising out of a contract 
claim under the Uniform Commercial Code are controlled by the contribution 
provisions in our statutes pertaining to negligence actions. I am not satisfied 
that necessarily is true, and I would urge the trial court, with the assistance 
of briefs by counsel, to give the matter careful consideration if it must be 
addressed.

[¶29.]  In Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment 
Co., 797 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986) that court reversed a determination by the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming which had held, in 
effect, that a plaintiff who was found to be more negligent than a defendant as 
the jury applied our comparative negligence statute could not recover for a 
breach of warranty claim. The United States Court of Appeals held that the 
degree of the injury proximately resulting from the breach of warranty might be 
controlled by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff but 
that the balance of his claim was recoverable. The result in Sheldon v. Unit Rig 
& Equipment Co., supra, is like that of Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971), and Signal Oil & Gas v. Universal 
Oil Products, Tex., 572 S.W.2d 320 (1978). I perceive those authorities to be 
analogous to the situation presented in this case.

[¶30.]  If a negligent buyer is not foreclosed 
from breach of warranty recovery even though his negligence, as compared, may 
have exceeded that of the seller then a party in the position of Centric 
Corporation would not be foreclosed by the contribution statute from recovering 
its consequential damages attributable to its own conduct in the context of 
proximate cause. A fact finder might use the comparative negligence 
determination in resolving the proximate cause question, but I am not persuaded 
that it would be bound to do so.

[¶31.]  To reiterate, this issue was not before 
the court for decision in this case, but it seems to me a careful investigation 
is justified before adopting the views set forth in Justice Rooney's special 
concurrence.