Title: Myers v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

583 So. 2d 174 (1991) Timothy MYERS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 89-KP-1272. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 19, 1991. Timothy Myers, pro se. Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ. ROBERTSON, Justice, for the court: This case presents the perennially troublesome question of whether and when a felon convicted on a plea of guilty may secure post-conviction relief on grounds his lawyer's advice was so problematical that his plea was, in law, involuntary. Today we face the more limited question whether the prisoner's complaint in this regard is legally sufficient, such that it may not be dismissed on its face. We hold that the complaint passes this threshold test and reverse and remand for further proceedings. On December 8, 1987, the grand jury for the First Judicial District of Hinds County returned an indictment charging Timothy *175 Myers with the offense of aggravated assault.[1] Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) (Supp. 1987). The Circuit Court appointed Jeffrey Weill, a lawyer who has his office in Jackson, Mississippi, to represent Myers on this charge. On March 4, 1988, Myers petitioned the Court that he be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the indictment. The Circuit Court accepted the plea and on April 13, 1988, adjudged Myers guilty of aggravated assault and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On September 17, 1989, Myers filed in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, his complaint for post-conviction relief, alleging his guilty plea was involuntarily given. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(f) (Supp. 1989). He charges, inter alia, that in the course of the original criminal proceedings before the Circuit Court, his lawyer, Weill, advised Myers that, if he went to trial on the aggravated assault charge, he would likely receive a sentence of twenty-five years. More to the point, Myers says Weill told him that, if he entered a plea of guilty, the Court would sentence him to no more than twelve years. Myers' complaint is supported by the affidavit of his mother, Claudette Williams, who states, inter alia: Cynthia Woodall, Myers' sister, filed a supporting affidavit stating that she, too, was present when Myers was meeting with his attorney, Jeffrey Weill, and that in her presence, In his complaint, Myers charges further that, in preparation for the plea hearing, his lawyer advised him "that when the judge asked him a question he should respond Yes and not hesitate or go into long drawn answer." He says further that Weill provided him "with incorrect advice and information to induce ... [him] to plead guilty, misinformed ... [him] as to the possible sentence the court would impose ... [and] had ... [him] to lie to the court." On September 7, 1989, the Circuit Court entered an order reciting that: And thereupon, the Court dismissed Myers' complaint with prejudice. Myers now appeals to this Court. Our procedural posture is all important. Myers' complaint has been dismissed on its face, and, when this has happened and a prisoner appeals pro se, we employ special rules, familiar and well settled. We put the premises in Billiot v. State, 515 So. 2d 1234 (Miss. 1987): Billiot, 515 So. 2d at 1236-37. Beyond Billiot, we take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, see, e.g., Cain v. McKinnon, 552 So. 2d 91, 91 (Miss. 1989); McFadden v. State, 542 So. 2d 871, 874 (Miss. 1989); see Wilkinson v. Mercantile National Bank, 529 So. 2d 616, 618 (Miss. 1988); Knight v. Moore, 396 So. 2d 31, 34 (Miss. 1981) (quoting Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir.1971)), "well-pleaded" bearing the PCR Act's special definition. Where, as here, a prisoner is proceeding pro se, we take that fact into account and, in our discretion, credit not so well pleaded allegations, see Sanders v. State, 440 So. 2d 278, 283 n. 1 (Miss. 1983); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 654 (1972), to the end that a prisoner's meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully drafted. Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. 1990). In sum, the question before this Court is whether, on the papers and record before us, we can say with confidence that Myers will not be able to show that his plea was sufficiently involuntary that he may of right obtain vacation of the judgment of conviction entered thereon. Where a defendant's plea of guilty is coerced or otherwise involuntary, any *177 judgment of conviction entered thereon is subject to collateral attack. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). To be enforceable, a guilty plea must emanate from the accused's informed consent. See generally, Vittitoe v. State, 556 So. 2d 1062 (Miss. 1990). In a similar context in Sanders v. State, supra, we said: Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 283-84. We have held a plea legally involuntary where the court failed to advise the defendant of a statutorily mandated minimum sentence and where the defendant entered the plea thinking he was eligible for a probationary sentence. Vittitoe v. State, 556 So. 2d at 1065. We have gone further and recognized that mistaken advice of counsel may in some cases vitiate a guilty plea. In Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 1978), this Court stated: Baker, 358 So. 2d at 403. See Coleman v. State, 483 So. 2d 680, 684 (Miss. 1986); and Tiller v. State, 440 So. 2d 1001, 1006 (Miss. 1983). In Sanders we drew an important distinction. We there emphasized: Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 287. The relevant distinction is between a "generalized prediction" and a "firm representation" of such lesser sentence. Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 287, n. 6 (citing, by way of contrast, Hill v. State, 388 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1980), with Peete Rose, 381 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D.Tenn. 1974)). A post-conviction prisoner may find succor only in the latter. We apply these standards to Myers' complaint and supporting affidavits. When we do this, we find him charging that a firm representation was made. Myers' complaint which he presents under oath says Weill told him that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would receive a sentence of less than twelve years. While the "less than" feature of this advice falls into the realm of "mere expectation" or a "generalized prediction," the twelve-year cap may only be fairly characterized as a "firm representation." Myers' supporting affiants, his mother, Claudette Williams, and sister, Cynthia Woodall, are equally firm in their statements that Weill assured Myers he would not receive a sentence of "more than twelve years." Myers said that he relied upon this advice and entered *178 a plea of guilty, whereupon to his chagrin, the Circuit Court sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment, four years longer than the maximum he reasonably understood he might receive. Myers has provided evidentiary facts and conclusory allegations, and he has provided them in sworn form. His complaint meets the pleadings requisites of the PCR Act. Given our scope of review as articulated above, we must hold that Myers has stated a claim sufficient that the Circuit Court had no authority to dismiss it on its face. For these reasons, we may only hold that Myers' complaint states a claim for relief such that he is entitled to proceed past the pleading stage. Still, nothing said here should be taken to intimate any view on the merits, or even that Myers' claim may survive summary judgment; see Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-19(2) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 56, Miss.R.Civ.P.; only that Myers' complaint may not be dismissed on its face. Accordingly, the order of the Circuit Court of November 7, 1989, is vacated and reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate, not inconsistent with the law and this opinion. Several further observations seem appropriate. For one, we think what we said in Sanders bears reiteration: Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 286. Second, should Myers prevail in the end, all of the substantive relief he could possibly receive on remand is vacation of his conviction and reinstatement of his not guilty plea. The prosecution would then be free to put Myers to trial on the aggravated assault indictment and, upon conviction, demand the maximum sentence. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) (Supp. 1987). That sentence, of course, could well exceed not only twelve years, but sixteen years as well. Third, nothing said here precludes the possibility that Myers may have committed perjury, and should be prosecuted therefor. We say this in the context of the sworn representations he made before the Circuit Court incident to his original entry of a guilty plea to the effect that he had been promised nothing in the way of an agreed or a lenient sentence. This may well suggest that, either at his plea hearing, or in the complaint he presents today under oath, Myers has committed an indictable offense. See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 516 So. 2d 474, 477 (Miss. 1987); Sanders v. State, 440 So. 2d at 289 (R.N. Lee, J., specially concurring); Sanders v. State, 439 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Miss. 1983). REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, PITTMAN, and BANKS, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, P.J., concurs with separate specially concurring opinion joined by ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ. *179 McRAE, J., concurs with separate specially concurring opinion joined by HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, J. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, specially concurring: I concur in reversing, but am prompted to write to correct a mistake this Court began in Neal v. State, 525 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Miss. 1987); repeated in Billiot v. State, 515 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Miss. 1987), and cited with approval in the majority opinion. I offer my apology for the delay in expressing my misgivings. The mistake is to analogize the petition in a claim for relief under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9 to a civil complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a totally unnecessary exercise, and which can cause mischief. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(1), (2) gives a court all the guidelines it needs to evaluate such post-conviction relief motions: Rather than rest on this plainly worded section, Neal tells us: 525 So. 2d at 1280. Stanton & Associates, Inc., cited in Neal, 464 So. 2d at 505, fn. 5, informs the bench and bar: There was no need whatever to analogize a criminal post-conviction relief pleading under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9 to a complaint in a civil case. One can only wonder why it was done. By repeated cases the Federal courts have held that a motion to dismiss a civil complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) comes under the following criteria: While there may very well be similarities, close similarities, between the statutory guide for determining whether a post-conviction relief motion entitles the prisoner to a hearing and the Federal courts', and this Court's, guidelines under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, I do not know they are the same. There being no occasion to do so, until somebody shows me they are the same, I eschew such interpretation. Basically, my problem is the judicial attitude, or philosophy, behind this kind of interpretation. I do not place a citizen trying to state a claim for relief in one of our civil courts in the same category as a convicted felon in the penitentiary trying to write a petition or motion to get himself out. For my part, I see more reason for sympathetic judicial ear in the former instance than the latter. If the statutory language required such an interpretation, fine; but I do not think we should volunteer to do so on our own. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) states the criterion fully and fairly. I see no need for members of this Court to either expand on it or try to improve upon it. Let us occasionally leave well enough alone. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ., join this opinion. McRAE, Justice, specially concurring: I concur in reversing as to the results only. I feel that Myers had stated evidentiary facts and conclusionary allegations which would warrant further review by the Court, hence his complaint does state a claim for relief and he is entitled to proceed past the pleading stage. However, I would state further that nothing should be taken to intimate in any way my views on the merits of the case or that Myers may even survive Rule 56, Miss.R.Civ.P. I do not concur with the reasonings set forth by the majority; however, I do concur in the specially concurring opinion by Presiding Justice Hawkins. HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, J., join this opinion. [1] The indictment charged that on October 6, 1987, Myers recklessly and feloniously caused serious bodily injury to Olevia Leflore under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life by discharging a firearm in a reckless fashion, the projectile therefrom striking Olevia Leflore. [2] Neal v. State was decided September 23, 1987, and is reported in 525 So. 2d 1279 (Miss. 1987). Billiot came two months later, on November 25, 1987. Billiot was reported first, in 515 So. 2d 1234, because Neal was held on petition for rehearing, upon which the Court did not finally act until June 3, 1988.