Title: MORAST v AUBLE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12522 I N T H E SUPRENE C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1974 E L D O R A M O R A S T , L Y N N L L O Y D M O R A S T and VICKY LORRAINE M O R A S T , by t h e i r next friend, E L D O R A M O R A S T , P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, DELAINE A. AUBLE, Special Administratrix of the Estate of George Charles Becker, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Seventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable L. C. Gulbrandson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Roland V. Colgrove argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent : Habedank, Cumming 6 Best, Sidney, Montana Jacque W. Best argued, Sidney, Montana Submitted: January 18, 1974 Decided: 2) 7 igN .l-f7p " 7 rf')f4 Filed. ; 4 r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s Eldora Morast (wife), Lynn Lloyd Morast (son), and Vicky Lorraine Morast (daughter) brought t h i s action t o r e - zover damages a r i s i n g out of the death of Lloyd Morast. The 3 i s t r i c t c o u r t of Oawson County entered summary judgment i n favor of defendant Delaine A. Auble, Special Administratrix of the Esiate of George Charles Becker, deceased. O n September 18, 1966, a c o l l i s i o n occurred between a heavy t r u c k driven by Lloyd Morast and a 1966 Buick sedan driven by George Becker, k i l l i n g both men. Becker, h i s wife, and son were craveling e a s t on Montana Highway 200s (formerly 2BS), a two lane asphalt highway. Lloyd Morast was hauling gravel on a service road which i n t e r s e c t s Highway 200s approximately ten miles west of Glendive, Montana. Because of trucks crossing the road, highway signs warning motorists t o reduce speed had been placed on Highway 200s before t h e e a s t and west entrances t o the i n t e r - section with the gravel service road. The c o l l i s i o n occurred near he center of the intersection, the front end of the truck s t r i k i n g broadside on the l e f t side of the Buick. The record shows t h a t the insurance c a r r i e r of Lloyd ~ o r a s t ' s ei~iployer made a f u l l settlement with the survivors of George Beclcer for a l l claims a r i s i n g out of h i s death and f o r i n j u r i e s they themselves sustained. Under Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., defendant served on p l a i n t i f f s the following request f o r admissions dated May 29, 1970: 1. That the truck driven by p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent, Lloyd Morast, struck t h e automobile driven by defendant's decedent, George C. Becker. 2. That the truck driven by p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent, Lloyd Xorast, did not stop before entering Highway No. 200s immediately prior t o the c o l l i s i o n described i n p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint. 3. That Highway 200s a t the time and place of the c o l l i s i o n was a through highway. Plaintiffs filed these responses to defendant's request for admissions February 16, 1971: 1 . "ANSWER: Plaintiff cannot truthfully admit or deny Request No. 1 as the operator of the truck, Lloyd Morast, was killed in the collision and plaintiff knows of no witnesses to the actual collision." 2. "ANSWER: Plaintiff cannot truthfully admit or deny Request No. 2 as the operator of the truck, Lloyd Morast, was killed in the collision and plaintiff knows of no witnesses to the actual collision." 3 . "ANSWER: NO. I ! Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., to strike plaintiffs' response to the request for admissions and adjudge the facts admitted. The district court granted that motion, stating: "The Court notes that the response filed by plaintiff was filed approximately eight and one-half months after the original requests were filed. he Court also notes that at the pre-trial conference in this case on January 11, 1971, defense counsel noted that no response had been filed and that this was pointed out to plaintiff's attorney. If The record reveals that plaintiff's response was not filed until February 16, 1971." From the order of the district court striking the response and deeming facts admitted, and from the order granting summary judgment, plaintiffs appeal assigning two issues: ( 1 ) Whether the district court erred in granting the motion to strike the response and deem facts admitted. ( 2 ) Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. Concerning issue ( I ) , Rule 36, I 4 . R . C i v . P . provides: " ( a ) REQUEST FOR ADMISSION. After commencement of an action a party may serve upon any other pa~ty, who has been served with process or who has appeared, a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuine- ness of any relevant documents described and exhibited with the request, or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be served with the request unless copies have al- ready been furnished. Each of the matters of which an admission is.requested shall be deemed admitted unless, w i t @ % period designated in the request, not less than 20 days after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission either ( 1 ) a sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or ( 2 ) written objections Jn the ground that some or all of the requested adnis- sions are privileged or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in wl~ole or in part, together with a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest uracticable time. If written objections to a part of the request are made, the remainder of the request shall be answered within the period designated in the request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that party deny only a part or a qualification of a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny only the remainder. " ( b ) EFFECT OF ADMISSION. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of he pending action only and neither constitutes an ad- mission by him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding. I I Plaintiffs contend the quoted request for admissions by defendant dealt with "central issues1' and hence was improper, relying on Pickens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., (C.A.5th 1969), 413 F.2d 1390, and other federal cases with similar holdings. The rule of Pickens, generally speaking, was that a litigant was permitted to ignore requests for admissions which concerned central issues and were in good faith deemed controverted. k 1970 amendment to Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P., clarified its provisions to preclude the application given it by Pickens. Although Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., has not been amended since its en- actment in 1961 and remains practically identical to the pre-1970 Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P., this Court has never followed the rationale of Pickens. Daniels v . Paddock, 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740; Naegeli v . Daniels, 145 Mont. 323, 4 0 0 P.2d 896. The rationale of Pickens is criticized in 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 52256: "It is true that prior to 1970 a majority of the [federal] cases in point held that requests about controversial or disputable facts were improper, although other cases were to the contrary, and it seems fair to say that the cases refusing to allow these requests relied in large measure on authorities that did not support that proposition. On principle, however, this should not have been regarded as a valid ground for objection. To hold that a request was ob- jectionable if it went to disputed facts was far too confining, since it often could not be determined, when a request was served, whether a particular fact was in truth disputed. Thus a party might avoid an answer, simply because a fact was disputable, though he no in- tention of disputing it. This was contrary to the purpose of the rule, which was and is to eliminate from contro- versy matters that will not be disputed." See also: 4A. ~oore's Federal Practice $36.04[8], for an analogous criticism. Plaintiffs also contend the district court erred in refusing to permit the late filing of their response, citing various federal cases in which late filing was allowed under Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P, However, in no case cited did a federal court find that a litigant may file a late response as a matter of right. In Montana, as under federal rules, the granting of a request for late filing of a response under Rule 36 is a matter resting within the discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. Daniels v. Paddock, supra. In light of the fact the instant case involves an eight and one-half month delay in filing with an intervening admonition during pretrial conference, plus the fact that the names of an eyewitness and an investigating highway patrolman were furnished to plaintiffs through answers to their interrogatories, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in striking the response and deeming the requested facts admitted. Concerning issue (2)--whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant--8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil $ 2264, states: "Admissions obtained by use of Rule 36 may show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and justify the entry of summary judgment under Rule 56." The district court properly considered the admissions in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. These facts, together with the record which includes on the scene photographs taken by the investigating highway patrolman, conclusively estab- lish causal negligence on the part of Lloyd Morast. Section 32-2172, R.C.M. 1947; Pachek v. Norton Concrete Company, 160 b i o n t . 5i6, 499 P.2d 766. Under Montana law, plaintiffs' decedent's con- sributory negligence bars plaintiffs' recovery. This finding negates the materiality of any factual issue concerning defendant's decedent's negligence. The judgment is affirmed. J / ' Justice We Concur: Chief ust tire