Title: Vit v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Vit v. State1996 WY 1909 P.2d 953Case Number: 94-288Decided: 01/05/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
  

Michael Lee VIT, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court, Campbell County, 
Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Dan Davis, Gillette, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Mary Beth Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
for Appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The major issue 
in this case related to the constitutionality of the Wyoming stalking statute, 
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). After the appeal was filed, the 
constitutionality of the Wyoming statute was resolved in Luplow v. State; 
Jennings v. Currier, 897 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). The remaining issues address 
trial errors including the admission of statements made by Michael Lee Vit (Vit) 
to a psychologist; the admissibility of other statements made by Vit; error in 
excluding testimony relating to statements made by Vit to a neighbor explaining 
Vit's mood on a particular occasion; the absence of a certification of 
familiarity by a different judge; and limitations upon voir dire examination of 
the jury panel. We discern no reversible error in any of the contentions made by 
Vit, and the judgment of the trial court and the separately-entered sentence are 
affirmed.

[¶2]      In the 
Appellant's Brief, the issues presented for review are recited 
as:

1. Is Wyoming's 
Stalking Statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad?

 

2. Did the trial 
court err by denying the defendant's first motion in limine concerning the 
relevancy of statements made by the defendant to a psychologist revealing 
thoughts of violence?

3. Did the trial 
court err by denying the defendant's first motion in limine having to do with 
the privileged status of communications made to a psychologist during 
counseling?

4. Did the trial 
court err by denying the defendant's second motion in limine concerning the 
relevance of Kimi Manor's testimony concerning the defendant's speculative 
statement that he may have killed Jeanie Vincent had he not "found the 
lord?"

5. Did the trial 
court err when it did not allow the testimony of the neighbor of the victim that 
while the stalking incidents were allegedly going on, he gave the defendant a 
ride home early in the morning, and the defendant was in a very good mood 
because as the defendant explained to the man, he had just spent the night with 
his girl friend, and he thought he could patch things up, and other similar 
proposed evidentiary errors?

6. Did the new 
court err in not certifying familiarity with the case upon taking over the 
trial?

7. With regard to 
voir dire, may a party poll each juror for his answer to questions asked of the 
panel? 

8. Do the above 
errors of the trial court, singly or together warrant 
reversal?

In the Brief of Appellee, this statement of 
the issues appears:

I. Whether W.S. §§ 
6-2-506 et. seq. is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?

II. Whether the 
procedure followed during voir dire was proper?

III. Whether the 
trial court properly ruled on evidentiary issues?

[¶3]      In accordance 
with our usual approach, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State. As is frequently true in stalking cases, a personal relationship existed 
between Vit and the victim. They dated from the middle of 1991 until May of 1993 
and, during part of that time, the victim rented a room in her home to Vit. In 
May, because Vit's "moods kept getting worse," the victim decided to terminate 
the relationship. Not long after, Vit moved out of the victim's home, but he did 
not take the termination of the relationship well. On September 14, 1993, around 
11:00 p.m., Vit went to the victim's home and pounded on the door. She went to 
her bedroom window, opened it, and asked him to leave. Vit told her he was not 
leaving unless she let him in and talked to him. The victim then called 911 for 
assistance. During the phone call, Vit drove his car closer to her house yelling 
that he would drive right through her house if she did not let him in. He broke 
the glass out of her bedroom window and left.

[¶4]      As a result of 
the September incident, Vit was charged with property destruction, trespassing, 
driving under the influence, driving under suspension, and eluding a police 
officer. He was released on bail, and one of the conditions of bail was that he 
have no contact with the victim. A few days later, he went to the victim's house 
with a card and some money he owed her. He apologized for the trouble he had 
caused and left. Several days later, he again went to the victim's residence and 
pushed her living room window out of the track, trying to effect entry. The 
victim's daughter called the police. About a week after that, Vit went to the 
victim's place of employment, seeking to talk to her. She told him he was not 
supposed to be there, and he left after asking her not to call the 
police.

[¶5]      Vit was sentenced 
to a term of 120 days in the county jail after he pleaded guilty to charges of 
criminal trespass and property destruction. All but sixty days of that sentence 
was suspended, and he was placed on probation for six months. One of the 
conditions of probation was that Vit not have any contact, direct or indirect, 
with the victim. Vit was released from the county jail about December 10, 
1993.

[¶6]      Two days later, 
he went to the victim's residence, and she warned him he was not supposed to be 
there. He left but, about a week later, he came to the victim's residence with 
Christmas gifts for her and her daughter. He spoke briefly with the victim, 
delivered the gifts and left. He then called the victim on December 26, 1993. He 
apparently was feeling sorry for himself because he had a lousy Christmas, and 
he accused the victim of being at a bar with her new "blond boyfriend." That 
comment led the victim to believe Vit had been following her, and she told him 
to desist. That made Vit angry, and the conversation turned into an argument in 
which Vit began yelling and screaming at the victim. She hung 
up.

[¶7]      The next day, the 
victim tried to telephone her mother and found her phone was dead. Her son 
stopped by shortly after she made that discovery, and she told him about the 
phone. When her son checked the lines, he found they had been pulled out, and 
the junction box was missing. That caused immediate concern to the victim who 
assumed Vit had been the one who pulled out the telephone lines. She asked her 
son to go to her mother's home to contact the telephone company and have the 
phone fixed.

[¶8]      When the victim's 
son returned from that errand, an officer of the sheriff's department was 
arriving at the victim's house. Vit had called a friend the night before and 
advised the friend he had pulled out the victim's phone lines and was afraid of 
what he might do. He stayed that night with the friend and the friend's wife. 
When the friend dropped him off the next day, Vit was headed toward the victim's 
house, and the friend contacted the sheriff's office, concerned Vit might do 
something violent to the victim. The officer had come to the victim's home to 
communicate that information.

[¶9]      There was no 
contact by Vit on December 27 but, on December 28, he did appear and was lurking 
around the victim's house, peering in the windows. The victim and her son had 
ordered a pizza, and the delivery person saw Vit hiding behind the playhouse in 
the yard. The victim had seen a shadow just before and had asked her son to call 
the emergency phone number. She asked the pizza delivery person if he had seen 
anyone, and he said he had. He was aware that she was very frightened, but he 
left because he had left his car running. Sheriff's deputies responded to the 
emergency phone call from the victim's son, and Vit ran away. He was 
apprehended, arrested, and charged with felony stalking because he was in 
violation of his probation.

[¶10]   Vit was convicted, after a trial to 
a jury, and he was sentenced to a term of not less than fifteen, nor more than 
sixty, months in the state penitentiary with credit for 208 days previously 
served. Vit has appealed from that conviction and 
sentence.

[¶11]   In his brief, Vit initially 
contends that WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506 is unconstitutional because it is both vague 
and overbroad. That question was definitively resolved in Luplow, 897 P.2d 463. 
We discover that, subsequent to that decision, courts in other jurisdictions 
have continued to uphold such statutes. Appellate courts in Illinois, Michigan, 
Montana and Ohio have uphold the stalking statutes of those respective states. 
People v. Bailey; People v. Coyne, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. 1995); People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App.3d 1016, 208 Ill.Dec. 515, 649 N.E.2d 571 (1995); People v. White, 212 Mich. App. 298, 536 N.W.2d 876 (1995); 
State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14 (Mont. 1995); State v. Dario, No. C-940844, 1995 WL 
553322 (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 20, 1995). The appellate courts in Alabama and 
Florida have followed their previous cases ruling the stalking statutes in those 
states to be constitutional. Ivey v. State, No. CR-93-0659, 1995 WL 664637, ___ 
So.2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App., Nov. 9, 1995); State v. Randall, No. CR-94-1058, 
1995 WL 576993, ___ So.2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App., Sept. 29, 1995); Williams v. 
State, 658 So. 2d 665 (Fla.Ct.App. 1995); State v. Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d 185 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1995). The United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut has refused to enjoin the enforcement of the Connecticut statute, 
noting the plaintiff failed to establish the likelihood of success in 
establishing that the Connecticut statute was either overbroad or void for 
vagueness. Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F. Supp. 1527 (D.Conn. 1994). Vit's claim 
of unconstitutionality of the stalking statute is without 
merit.

[¶12]   Vit then contends he was prejudiced 
by erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial judge. In his issues, those are 
identified as the inadmissibility of statements made by Vit to a mental health 
therapist because of irrelevancy and privilege; the relevance of the testimony 
of the victim's cousin about Vit's statement to the effect that, "he [Vit] would 
have killed [the victim] if he had not found the Lord"; and the refusal by the 
trial court to receive into evidence proper testimony by a neighbor of the 
victim that, during the course of these incidents, he gave Vit a ride home early 
in the morning, and Vit was in a good mood because he had spent the night with 
his girlfriend and thought he could patch things up. In argument, Vit broadens 
this claim of error to include a statement by Vit to another witness that he had 
suggested he might commit suicide before the September incident, and the 
testimony of his friend that he was contemplating killing himself and perhaps 
taking the life of the victim and her daughter.

[¶13]   As the State appropriately points 
out, the law in Wyoming is that evidentiary rulings are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal without 
demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334 
(Wyo. 1995); Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1995); Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1995); Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1995); Jackson v. 
State, 891 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1995); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793 (Wyo. 1995); 
Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1992). In Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980), we noted no abuse of discretion can be found unless the 
court conducts itself in a way that exceeds the bounds of reason. In Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), we defined judicial discretion in this 
way:

Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

Vit has the burden of demonstrating an abuse 
of discretion. Armstrong. We also recognize that:

Our consideration 
of the issue is premised upon our well-established rule that decisions of the 
trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal. Hopkinson v. 
State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982).

Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 343 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶14]   The friend with whom Vit spent the 
night of December 26, after he had ripped out the victim's phone lines was 
concerned about what else he was capable of doing. The following morning, that 
friend was so concerned about the potential for violence that he discussed these 
matters with the police. As a result of Vit's dialogue with a police officer on 
December 27, 1993, Vit was taken to a counselor at the local mental health 
clinic. That counselor is a licensed mental health therapist. Vit was agitated 
during their interview and specifically said, among other things, "I may do 
something to [the victim] this time but this time I'm going to make them kill 
me."1 

 

[¶15]   Before trial, Vit addressed the 
admissibility of testimony from the counselor in two separate motions in limine. 
In both motions, he raised the claim of privilege as found in WYO. STAT. § 
33-27-123 (Supp. 1993), and in his first motion he also objected that this 
testimony lacked probative value, asserting, "[t]he crime of stalking has to do 
with the acts of surveilling [sic] or harassing, and confidential statements to 
counselors do not harass and do not result in surveillance." In addition, this 
issue was addressed in connection with a motion by the counselor to quash the 
subpoena that was served. In his brief, Vit argues the information was not 
communicated to the victim by him, and he was not aware it had been communicated 
by anyone else. For this reason, he contends the threats were not relevant to 
the stalking charge. In his second motion, he argued the exception found in WYO. 
STAT. § 33-27-123(a)(iv) is inapplicable. The trial court ruled against Vit, 
concluding the testimony was relevant to identity and to the intent element of 
the crime. We are satisfied this evidence clearly was 
relevant.

[¶16]   As to the claim of privilege with 
respect to the communications to the counselor, that is governed by WYO. STAT. § 
33-27-123(a)(iv) (Supp. 1993), which provides in pertinent part: 

(a) In judicial 
proceedings, whether civil, criminal, or juvenile, in legislative and 
administrative proceedings, and in proceedings preliminary and ancillary 
thereto, a patient or client, or his guardian or personal representative, may 
refuse to disclose or prevent the disclosure of confidential information, 
including information contained in administrative records, communicated to a 
person licensed or otherwise authorized to practice under this act, or to 
persons reasonably believed by the patient or client to be so licensed, and 
their agents, for the purpose of diagnosis, evaluation or treatment of any 
mental or emotional condition or disorder. The psychologist or school 
psychologist shall not disclose any information communicated as described above 
in the absence of an express waiver of the privilege except in the following 
circumstances:

* * 
* * * *

(iv) Where an 
immediate threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim is 
disclosed to the psychologist or school psychologist * * 
*.

Vit argues his communication was not 
appropriately disclosed because the counselor testified she left the 
determination of the nature of the threat up to law enforcement. It is clear, 
however, she was referring to the ability of law enforcement officers to obtain 
a temporary involuntary commitment if an individual poses a threat to himself or 
others. See WYO. STAT. § 25-10-109 (1990). The fact that the therapist did not 
seek the involuntary commitment does not avoid statutory exception, which 
permits the disclosure under the circumstances. This disclosure was excepted 
from the confidentiality provisions of the statute. The notes made by the 
therapist are clear: "At this time this therapist felt that he could be a threat 
to himself or others particularly [the victim]."

[¶17]   In still another motion in limine, 
Vit attacked the testimony of the victim's cousin. He 
asserted:

The Defendant 
requests that this testimony be suppressed as it is not relevant. First of all 
it is not probative. The crime of stalking has to do with the acts of 
surveilling [sic] or harassing. Speculative statements about what might have 
happened at some past time do not harass and do not result in surveillance. On 
the other hand, the language is very prejudicial to the Defendant. Not probative 
and very prejudicial clearly results in the matter not being 
relevant.

The trial court ruled against Vit, and 
properly so, because the testimony of this witness was probative with respect to 
Vit's criminal intent and, to a degree, constitutes an admission by Vit of his 
culpability. Vit's other claims of error attributable to the admission of 
evidence that he had uttered threats to take his own life also are without 
merit.

[¶18]   We also conclude there was no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court in excluding certain evidence. Vit wanted to 
prove the victim's ex-husband had been released from prison about the time the 
victim broke off the relationship with Vit. The record is clear, however, that 
Vit was unable to establish an appropriate foundation for this evidence. In 
fact, an analysis of Vit's argument reveals that the defense perceived 
justification for Vit's conduct if he were in "anguish over another man," and 
that may have "been the source of his anguish and emotional out-bursts, and not 
a desire to hurt the victim." This is simply motivation, not justification, and 
hardly demonstrates relevancy. It would simply be an effort to divert the jury 
from the issues in the case before it.

[¶19]   With respect to the effort to 
introduce Vit's statements to his neighbor that he had spent the night with the 
victim on Christmas of 1993, the State's objection ultimately was sustained on 
the basis that the prejudicial effect of Vit's claim he had slept with the 
victim the night before outweighed the probative value of such testimony. The 
witness already had noted Vit was in a good mood. Again, we see no abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge in making this ruling.

[¶20]   After the jury was selected, but 
before any evidence was produced, the other district judge in the Sixth Judicial 
District was called to preside at the trial because of the sudden death of the 
mother of the district judge to whom the case had been assigned initially. Vit 
did object to the substitution, but no reasons were given. Vit does not 
articulate any prejudice attributable to the substitution, other than 
speculation that he might have received more favorable rulings on the 
introduction of evidence from the judge originally assigned. Relying upon 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 63, he argues the substitute judge failed to certify familiarity 
with the case before taking over the trial. The pertinent rule is WYO.R.CRIM.P. 
25(a) (emphasis added):

(a) During trial. - 
If by reason of death, sickness or other disability, the judge before whom a 
jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge 
regularly sitting in or assigned to the court, upon certifying familiarity with 
the record of the trial, may proceed with and finish the 
trial.

The trial judge stated on the record 
(emphasis added):

THE COURT: Okay. 
Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Terry O'Brien. I'm the other district judge in 
the district. You know Judge Price.

I think maybe you 
were told by the bailiffs, but Judge Price's mother died last night. And so he 
was until [sic] able to or he wanted to leave immediately to go to the funeral. 
She lived in Arizona.

And I was attending 
a meeting in Casper. I got down there about 8:15, just in time to get a call to 
come back.

I've since 
visited with the attorneys, reviewed the file, and was briefed by Judge Price 
with respect to the case. So I'm ready to take over 
now.

[¶21]   We have not discovered, nor have we 
been referred to, any prescribed form for making the certification required by 
WYO.R.CRIM.P. 25(a). We hold that the remarks by the substitute judge, while 
they could have been stated in a more formal manner or in a separate document, 
constitute an adequate certification under the rule. The requirement of the rule 
is one of familiarity, not one of form. We are satisfied this record discloses 
sufficient familiarity by the successor judge to proceed with the trial. Vit was 
not prejudiced by the substitution and, in the absence of prejudice, any 
possible error would be harmless.

[¶22]   In another claim of error, Vit 
contends the trial court erroneously ruled he could not poll each juror for an 
individual answer to questions asked of the panel. WYO.R.CRIM.P. 24(c) (emphasis 
added) governs the examination of jurors in a criminal 
case:

(c) Examination of 
jurors. - After the jury panel is qualified the attorneys or a pro se defendant, 
shall be entitled to conduct the examination of prospective jurors, but such 
examination shall be under the supervision and control of the judge, and the 
judge may conduct such further examination as the judge deems proper. The judge 
may assume the examination if counsel or a pro se defendant fail to follow this 
rule. If the judge assumes the examination, the judge may permit counsel or a 
pro se defendant to submit questions in writing. The examination shall be on the 
record.

(1) The only 
purpose of the examination is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and 
impartially hear the evidence and render a just verdict.

(2) The court shall 
not permit counsel or a pro se defendant to attempt to precondition prospective 
jurors to a particular result, comment on the personal lives and families of the 
parties or their attorneys, nor question jurors concerning the pleadings, the 
law, the meaning of words, or the comfort of jurors.

(3) In voir dire 
examination counsel or a pro se defendant shall not:

(A) Ask 
questions of an individual juror that can be asked of the panel or a group of 
jurors collectively;

(B) Ask questions 
answered in a juror questionnaire except to explain an 
answer;

(C) Repeat a 
question asked and answered;

(D) Instruct the 
jury on the law or argue the case;

(E) Ask a juror 
what the juror's verdict might be under any hypothetical 
circumstance.

In Wyoming, the purpose of voir dire is to 
seek to establish grounds for challenge for cause; assess any individual bias as 
to each member of the panel; and to arrive at a determination of the potential 
jurors' ability to decide a case fairly. Herdt; Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 
(Wyo. 1986), confirmed on reh'g, 731 P.2d 558 (1987); Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1985); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984); Hopkinson v. State, 
632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1976). It is clear from our cases 
that the process is one of jury selection, not jury 
indoctrination.

[¶23]   In accordance with the rule, voir 
dire is subject to the supervision and control of the trial judge. The rulings 
of the trial judge are given deference within the permissible bounds. The 
authority of the trial court is discretionary and "[t]he only inhibition 
regarding the discretion of the trial court is that it must be exercised subject 
to the essential demands of fairness." Jahnke, 682 P.2d  at 999. Our examination 
of this record persuades us that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court regarding voir dire. Even though, WYO.R.CRIM.P. 24(c) states, in pertinent 
part, "counsel shall not * * * [a]sk questions of an individual juror that can 
be asked of the panel or a group of jurors collectively," Vit complains of the 
trial court's rulings with respect to his effort to seek individual responses 
from jurors. He contends, when questions were asked that would call for an 
affirmative response, he did not discern all members of the jury had responded 
and, since he was not able to seek their individual responses, he was prevented 
from ascertaining bias or prejudice. Our examination of the record persuades us 
counsel was afforded ample opportunity to question the members of the jury 
panel, and no error occurred.

[¶24]   Vit is actually complaining of a 
ruling of the trial court in a pre-trial hearing. The pertinent comments and 
rulings were:

THE COURT: * * * 
but I want to make it clear that I want counsel to comply with Rule 24(c) and in 
particular the requirements that counsel shall not ask questions of an 
individual juror that can be asked of the panel or a group of jurors 
collectively. * * *

And the reason I 
want to reiterate that rule is that part of the letter that you wrote indicated 
that you had reviewed the rule, and some of the language in it indicated that 
you were going to individually ask each juror questions. * * 
*

[VIT'S COUNSEL]: 
Can I ask how the court would rule if we ask a question that applies to 
everyone, then go out and get each person's answer? We can do 
that?

THE COURT: If it's 
appropriate. * * *

It is clear from the record that, during 
voir dire, counsel was not prevented from questioning any individual juror in 
any instance. The claim of error based upon the announced intention of the court 
to enforce the rule with no subsequent prejudicial ruling borders on the 
specious.

[¶25]   Vit asserts cumulative error. Since 
we have been unable to discern any error in the proceedings, it is obvious 
accumulation has no stature in this case.

[¶26]   The Judgment Upon Jury Conviction 
and the Sentence entered in the trial court are affirmed.

Footnotes

1 The mental health therapist testified by reading 
from the Emergency Contact Note of her session with Vit, which was the State's 
Exhibit 1:

Summary of Contact: This therapist saw Mr. 
Vit as a CI referral from law enforcement. He was escorted here and transported 
by law enforcement. He was extremely adgitated [sic] due to recent no contact as 
court ordered by court on assault and battery involving his girlfriend [the 
victim]. He admits to violation recently of the no contact and threatens he will 
continue to violate it and may do bodily harm to [the victim]. He has a tendency 
to blame others for incidents which have occurred (loss of business - auto body, 
- loss of vehicle - loss of income - loss of 
companionship.)

During the interview he threatened "I may do 
something to [the victim] this time but this time I'm going to make them kill 
me" (Them referred to as law-enforcement.) "Whatever I have to do I'll do" 
"Whatever is going to happen is going to happen" "I'm very angry and its 
probably going to blow" "I may shoot someone" "I don't care anymore." Michael 
ended the session by walking out of the room & building. He was extremely 
angry that there was not a quick fix.

I immediately called law enforcement ([name 
of officer]) and reported the above statements. He said he would be calling the 
S.O. to notify them. At this time this therapist felt that he could be a threat 
to himself or others particularly [the victim].

[Signature of 
therapist]