Title: WILLIAM L. BARNES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIAM L. BARNES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 6174 P.3d 732Case Number: 06-285, 06-286Decided: 01/23/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

WILLIAM 
L. BARNES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David Willms, Assistant 
Attorney General; Kristen Dolan, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Dolan. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  William L. Barnes pled no contest to 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, but reserved his right to appeal 
the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to 
police before his arrest.  He claims 
the statements were inadmissible because he made them while in custody but 
without having been given Miranda 
warnings.  We affirm the district 
court's order denying the suppression motion.

 
 
[¶2]  In a consolidated appeal, Mr. Barnes 
claims the district court erred in concluding he was not entitled to credit for 
time served while he was awaiting disposition of the possession charge and 
another unrelated charge.  The 
district court declined to give him credit for time served because he had 
violated the conditions of his parole in yet another matter and was incarcerated 
partly because he was awaiting a parole revocation hearing.  We hold Mr. Barnes was entitled to 
credit for the time he served between his arrest and sentencing.  We reverse the district court's sentence 
and remand for correction of the judgment and sentence in accordance with this 
opinion.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]   Mr. Barnes states the issues as 
follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the 
statements given to police regarding his use and possession of an illegal drug 
when the statements were solicited by a police detective while appellant was in 
custody and prior to him receiving a Miranda style 
warning?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err when it directed that appellant not be given any 
credit for the time served as he was on parole, and then forwarded its decision 
to the Parole Board?

 
 
The 
State claims the district court properly denied Mr. Barnes' motion to suppress 
and declined to give him credit for time served while awaiting a parole 
revocation hearing. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  On January 11, 2006, Detective James 
Eddy of the Cheyenne Police Department saw a vehicle without registration 
traveling westbound on Nationway in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Detective Eddy approached the vehicle in his unmarked patrol car.  He observed Mr. Barnes, who was driving 
the vehicle, and a passenger.  They 
looked at Detective Eddy several times and then the passenger slumped down in 
the seat.  The detective activated 
his lights and siren and, after he had sounded the siren twice, the vehicle 
pulled over.  As Detective Eddy 
stopped the patrol car to inquire about the vehicle registration, Mr. Barnes got 
out of the vehicle and ran.  
Detective Eddy yelled for him to stop but Mr. Barnes did not 
respond.  Detective Eddy returned to 
his vehicle and pursued Mr. Barnes into an alley.  He left the patrol car and went after 
Mr. Barnes on foot, apprehending him a few blocks away.

 
 
[¶5]  Detective Eddy tackled Mr. Barnes to the 
ground and told him to put his hands behind his back.  Instead, Mr. Barnes put his hands in his 
pants pockets.  He appeared to be 
trying to remove something.  
Detective Eddy managed to get Mr. Barnes' hands out of his pockets and 
placed him in handcuffs.  He sat Mr. 
Barnes up and, as he did so, he noticed several baggies containing white powder 
on the ground.  He asked Mr. Barnes 
if the powder was methamphetamine.  Mr. Barnes stated the baggies were not 
his property.  The detective 
searched Mr. Barnes and in his pocket found a spoon and a needle of the type 
commonly used for shooting methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶6]  Mr. Barnes began complaining of 
shortness of breath and dizziness.  
Detective Eddy asked him how much of the powder he had ingested.  Mr. Barnes responded that 
methamphetamine was his drug of choice and the powder in the baggies was 
cocaine.  Detective Eddy asked him 
why he had the substance if he had not been using it.  Mr. Barnes stated, "Why do you 
think?  If I'm not using it, what do 
you think I'm doing with it?"  The 
officer asked him what he meant and Mr. Barnes responded that he intended to 
sell the cocaine.  Detective Eddy 
placed him under arrest and took him to the detention center.  

 
 
[¶7]  At the detention center, Mr. Barnes 
complained of chest pains.  
Detective Eddy transported him to the hospital where he was treated and 
released.  Back at the detention 
center, Mr. Barnes was charged with possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine.  Detective Eddy 
subsequently weighed and tested the substance in the baggie, which proved to be 
cocaine, and Mr. Barnes was also charged with misdemeanor possession of cocaine. 

 
 
[¶8]  Prior to trial, Mr. Barnes filed a 
motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Eddy prior to his 
arrest.  He claimed that he was in 
custody (i.e. Detective Eddy chased him down, tackled him to the ground and 
placed him in handcuffs) when he made the statements; therefore, Detective Eddy 
was required to give him Miranda 
warnings prior to questioning him.  
The State argued Mr. Barnes' statements were not made during a custodial 
interrogation which is a condition precedent to the Miranda warning requirement.  Under the circumstances that existed at 
the time, the State asserted, the seizure was best characterized as a Terry stop, in which an officer may 
question a detainee sufficiently to determine his identity and information 
confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions without first giving Miranda warnings. 

 
 
[¶9]  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion.  The court agreed 
with the State that Detective Eddy's questions were more analogous to a Terry stop than a custodial 
interrogation and did not, therefore, violate the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Additionally, 
the court concluded the detective's questions were in response to Mr. Barnes' 
medical complaints and were necessary for his health and safety.  

 
 

[¶10]  Prior to the court's ruling on the 
motion to suppress, the State moved for and the district court granted a 
dismissal of count II, misdemeanor possession of cocaine.  Mr. Barnes pleaded no contest to the 
remaining charge of possession with intent to deliver and the district court 
sentenced him to four to five years imprisonment.  The district court refused to give Mr. 
Barnes credit for time served, reasoning that at the time of his arrest for 
possession with intent to deliver, he was on parole and his subsequent 
incarceration was due in part to the parole violation.  The district court ordered the sentence 
to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed for the parole violation 
and another crime with which Mr. Barnes was charged after his arrest for 
possession with intent to deliver.  
Subsequently, Mr. Barnes filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in 
which he argued that he was entitled to credit for 285 days served from his 
arrest on January 11, 2006, through his sentencing on October 23, 2006, because 
his detention during that time was a result solely of his inability to post 
bond.  It is 
not apparent from the record whether the district court ruled on the motion. 
                 

         

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]  The standards for reviewing a district 
court order denying a motion to suppress have been often 
repeated:

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  We will not 
disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when it is 
shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Factual findings made by a trial court 
considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  

 
 

Negrette 
v. State, 2007 
WY 88, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo. 2007).  A sentence that does not include proper 
credit for pre-sentence incarceration is illegal.  Doolittle v. State, 2007 WY 52, ¶ 18, 
154 P.3d 350, 356 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
determination of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, which we 
review de novo.  Id., ¶ 9, 154 P.3d  at 354.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

            
1.         
Order Denying Motion to Suppress Statements

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Barnes contends that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the statements he 
made to Detective Eddy because he made them during custodial interrogation 
without having been advised of his Miranda rights. He further asserts that 
the circumstances existing at the time he made the statements did not fall under 
any of the exceptions, including the public safety exception, which would 
relieve Detective Eddy of his obligation to give the Miranda warnings.  The State argues that the district court 
properly denied the suppression motion because, first, Mr. Barnes made the 
statements during a valid investigatory stop, not a custodial interrogation, and 
second, Detective Eddy's questions were prompted by Mr. Barnes' medical 
complaints and fell within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement. We begin by 
considering whether Mr. Barnes made the statements during an investigatory stop 
or in the course of a custodial interrogation.        

 
 

                        
a.         
Investigatory Stop v. Custodial 
Interrogation

 
 
[¶13]  In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 
86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Court established the rule that to 
be admissible in evidence any statement given by a suspect during custodial 
interrogation must be preceded by four warnings:  a suspect has the right to remain 
silent; anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney; and, if he cannot afford an attorney, one 
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.  Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 19, 121 P.3d 127, 135 (Wyo. 2005), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1106, 
122 S. Ct. 2315, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1069 
(2002).  Statements made by a 
suspect during custodial interrogation after these advisements are given are 
admissible.  Id.  Statements made in response to police 
questioning after a suspect is in custody are generally inadmissible if these 
advisements have not been given.  
Id.

 
 
 
 
[¶14]  Custodial interrogation means 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.  Jelle v. State, 2005 WY 111, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 403, 408 (Wyo. 2005).  In 
resolving the custodial status of a suspect we consider "whether a reasonable 
man in [the suspect's] position would have considered himself to be in police 
custody."  Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 31, 120 P.3d 980, 988 (Wyo. 2005).  General 
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime is not "custodial 
interrogation," nor are statements volunteered freely without compelling 
influences.  Id.  We consider the totality of the 
circumstances when determining whether a suspect was in custody when 
questioned.  Id.  Several factors are relevant to the 
determination:

 
 
Among 
these are:  (1) whether a suspect is 
questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings;  (2) the number of police officers 
present;  (3) the degree of physical 
restraint and whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal 
arrest;  and (4) the duration and 
character of the interrogation.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel 
and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure 
§ 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999); see 
also Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 
335.  The nature of the 
interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the 
interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the 
interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be 
temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest may 
be important factors as well.  Wunder, 705 P.2d at 335;  J.F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of 
Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal 
Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R. 3d 565 
(1970).  No one factor alone will 
necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors 
will be relevant to a given case.  

 
 

Jelle, ¶ 14, 
119 P.3d  at 408.  Citing these 
factors, Mr. Barnes emphasizes the degree of physical restraint Detective Eddy 
used and argues it was comparable to a formal arrest.  

            

[¶15]  As stated in Jelle, no one factor necessarily 
establishes custody for Miranda 
purposes.  Rather, the totality of 
the circumstances must be considered.  
In Mr. Barnes' case, the questioning occurred in a neutral setting, only 
one officer was present and it appears from the record that the questioning 
lasted only a few moments.  These 
factors would suggest that Mr. Barnes was not in custody for Miranda purposes.   

  

 
 
[¶16]  The difficulty arises from the fact that 
Mr. Barnes had been forcibly taken to the ground and placed in handcuffs when he 
was asked about the substance in the bags.  
Custody requires only that an accused be deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way.  Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 15, 114 P.3d 1252, 1260 (Wyo. 2005).  There 
is no question Mr. Barnes had been deprived of his freedom of action in a 
significant way.  It seems likely 
that a reasonable person in Mr. Barnes' position would have considered himself 
to be in police custody. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we 
conclude Mr. Barnes was in custody at the time Detective Eddy questioned him 
about the substance in the bags.  
That conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. 

 
 

                        
b.         
The Public Safety Exception to Miranda   

 
 
[¶17]  In denying Mr. Barnes' suppression 
motion, the district court also concluded that the detective's questions were 
justified by the public safety exception to Miranda recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).  
In that case, the Court held admissible a statement made by a suspect in 
response to police questioning before Miranda warnings were given.  Rather than focusing on the question of 
whether the suspect made the statements during custodial interrogation, the 
Court focused instead on whether public safety considerations justified officer 
questioning of a suspect without first giving Miranda warnings.  

 
 
[¶18]  In Quarles, a woman told police that she 
had been raped and the man who did it had just entered a supermarket with a 
gun.  An officer observed a man 
matching the victim's description of the suspect inside the supermarket, pursued 
him with his gun drawn and ordered him to stop and put his hands over his 
head.  The officer frisked the 
suspect and found an empty shoulder holster.  After handcuffing him, the officer asked 
the suspect where the gun was.  He 
responded, "The gun is over there," and pointed to some empty cartons.  The officer retrieved a revolver from 
one of the cartons.  

 
 
[¶19]  The defendant moved to suppress his 
statement, claiming the question violated his Fifth Amendment guarantee against 
compulsory self-incrimination and Miranda.  On the facts before it, the Court held 
there was a public safety exception to the Miranda requirement.  The Court stated: 

 
 
In a 
kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where 
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of 
the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today should not be 
made to depend on post hoc findings 
at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting 
officer.  Undoubtedly most police 
officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of 
different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives  their own safety, the 
safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating 
evidence from the suspect.

 
 
Whatever 
the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe 
that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in 
all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably 
prompted by a concern for the public safety.        

 
 

Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 656.  The Court made it clear that the 
exception undoubtedly extends to officers' questions necessary to secure their 
own safety.  Id. at 659.  This Court relied on Quarles in Mackrill v. State, 2004 WY 170, ¶ 14, 
100 P.3d 361, 365-368 (Wyo. 2004).  Mr. Mackrill was in the company of Chad 
Schaub when Mr. Schaub was apprehended by law enforcement on an arrest warrant 
for possession of pipe bombs and drugs and for questioning in connection with an 
attempted murder.  Mr. Schaub was 
considered armed and dangerous.  As 
Mr. Schaub and Mr. Mackrill were getting into Mr. Mackrill's truck, officers 
ordered them to the ground and handcuffed them.  Mr. Mackrill was lying on the ground in 
handcuffs when one of the officers asked him whether he had any weapons.  He responded that he had two 
knives.  Another officer asked him 
if there were any weapons or contraband in his vehicle.  Mr. Mackrill replied that he had a gun 
and a clip in his truck.  When 
officers retrieved the gun from the truck, they found marijuana.  

 
 
[¶20]  Mr. Mackrill was charged with possession 
of marijuana with intent to deliver.  
He moved to suppress the statements he made before his arrest, arguing 
that he was handcuffed, was not free to leave the scene, and had not received 
the Miranda advisements at the time 
he made the statements in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.  This Court upheld the district court's 
order denying the motion on the ground that the officer's questions were 
reasonably related to officer and public safety and Miranda warnings were not required. Mackrill, like Quarles, relied exclusively on the 
officer and public safety exception and did not consider the investigatory 
stop/custodial interrogation distinction in holding that Miranda warnings were not required.     

 

[¶21]  In the present case, the district court 
held Mr. Barnes' statements admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda.  

 
 
The 
Detective saw a substance that appeared to be an illegal drug and [Mr. Barnes] 
began complaining of dizziness.  
Detective Eddy's questioning about the substance that came out of [Mr. 
Barnes'] pocket was done in response to a medical emergency.  It was necessary for the officer to 
inquire as to what the substance was and how much [Mr. Barnes] ingested.  Therefore, it was not necessary for 
Detective Eddy to Mirandize [Mr. 
Barnes] before inquiring about his use of the substance.

 
 
[¶22]  We agree.  Once Mr. Barnes began complaining of 
dizziness and shortness of breath, Detective Eddy's questions were necessary to 
protect Mr. Barnes from harm.  Given 
Mr. Barnes' unusual and suspicious behavior, the spoon and needles found in his 
pocket, and his complaints of dizziness and shortness of breath, Detective Eddy 
had every reason to believe Mr. Barnes was under the influence of and possibly 
suffering from a drug overdose.  It 
was objectively reasonable under the circumstances for Detective Eddy to ask Mr. 
Barnes how much of the white powder he had taken.  The district court correctly concluded 
Mr. Barnes' response to the question to the effect that he was a methamphetamine 
user, not a cocaine user, was admissible. 

 
 
[¶23]  Under the totality of the circumstances, 
Mr. Barnes' response also reasonably led the detective to inquire further.  To borrow language from Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 656, "in a 
kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting" Detective Eddy, "where 
spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of 
the day," it was reasonable for him to doubt the truth of Mr. Barnes' response 
and attempt to discern what he had ingested.  The white powder, the spoon and needle, 
and the complaints of dizziness and shortness of breath required Detective Eddy 
to obtain what information he could about Mr. Barnes' drug usage.  To have ignored the factors suggesting a 
possible medical emergency and proceed with an arrest and Miranda warnings could have jeopardized 
Mr. Barnes' health and safety.  
Under these particular circumstances, we are not willing to say in 
hindsight that Detective Eddy's action in questioning him before arresting him 
and without Miranda warnings was 
unreasonable.

 
 

            
2.         
Denial of Credit for Time Served 

 
 
[¶24]  At the time of his arrest on January 11, 
2006, for possession with intent to deliver, Mr. Barnes was on parole from a 
sentence imposed on a prior conviction.1  On February 17, 2006, while in jail, he 
was also charged with felony larceny, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-402(a), (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  
The latter charge was unrelated to either his January 11, 2006, arrest or 
the earlier conviction for which he was on parole.  As a consequence of his 2006 arrests, 
the Board of Parole for the State of Wyoming (parole board) apparently placed an 
administrative hold on Mr. Barnes while he was in jail awaiting disposition of 
the 2006 charges, meaning that he was not to be released from jail pending a 
parole revocation hearing.  However, 
the record does not reflect the date the administrative hold was imposed.   

 
 
[¶25] 
Mr. Barnes appeared in district court for sentencing on the two 2006 convictions 
on October 9, 2006.  At that 
hearing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences of four to five years 
for the larceny and possession with intent to deliver convictions.  The district court entered a judgment 
and sentence in the two cases on October 26, 2006.  The judgments and sentences stated:  

 
 
IT IS 
FUTHER ORDERED that WILLIAM L. BARNES shall be given no credit against the 
minimum and maximum sentences for time served in the Laramie County Detention 
Facility awaiting disposition of this matter, as he was on parole under Laramie 
County District Court Docket 26-631 at the time of his arrest.    

 
 
The 
district court also ordered that the terms of confinement imposed be served 
concurrent with any sentence imposed for the parole 
violation.

 
 
[¶26]  On November 27, 2006, the parole board 
held a parole revocation hearing.  
On December 1, 2006, the parole board entered an order revoking Mr. 
Barnes' parole.  The parole board 
ordered that Mr. Barnes "not be credited with 1 year, 6 months and 2 days of the 
time during which he was released until he was taken into custody on October 23, 
2006."    

 
 
[¶27]  Mr. Barnes claims the failure to give 
him credit for the time he served after his arrest on January 11, 2006, until 
his sentence was imposed on October 23, 2006, was illegal.  He presents three alternative arguments 
to support his claim.  At the very 
least, he contends, the district court was required to give him credit for the 
time he served between his arrest and the date the parole board imposed the 
administrative hold because that period of confinement was due solely to his 
inability to post bond.  Given that 
the record does not reflect when the hold was imposed and this Court cannot 
consider matters upon which the record is silent, he asserts, credit is required 
alternatively for all of the time served between his January arrest and October 
sentencing.  Mr. Barnes further 
argues that even if this Court were somehow to determine when the administrative 
hold was imposed, he is entitled to credit for post-sentence confinement against 
the original charge for which he received parole. 

 
 
[¶28]  The State responds that credit for time 
served is appropriate only when the confinement is due solely to the defendant's 
inability to post bond.  Gomez v. State, 2004 WY 15, ¶ 13, 85 P.3d 417, 420 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
State argues that Mr. Barnes was not entitled to credit for time served because 
his confinement was not due solely to his inability to post bond but rather to 
the administrative hold imposed as a result of his parole violations.  The State points out that the district 
court indicated at the sentencing hearing that it would give credit for the time 
Mr. Barnes served between his January 2006 arrest and imposition of the 
administrative hold.  The State then 
asks this Court to assume from the fact that no credit for time served was given 
that the district court determined the administrative hold was imposed 
immediately upon Mr. Barnes' January 2006 arrest.  Alternatively, the State asks this Court 
to remand the case for purposes of determining when the administrative hold was 
imposed and, if necessary, correcting the sentence to reflect any credit 
due.                       

 
 

[¶29]   It is well established that a 
defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in pre-sentence confinement 
against both the minimum and maximum sentence if he was unable to post bond for 
the offense of which he was convicted.  
Doolittle, ¶ 18, 154 P.3d  at 
356.  A 
defendant is not, however, entitled to such credit when his confinement would 
have continued despite his ability to post bond.  Gomez, ¶ 13, 85 P.3d  at 420.  A 
sentence that does not include proper credit for pre-sentence incarceration is 
illegal.  Doolittle, ¶ 18, 154 P.3d  at 356.  An illegal sentence is one which exceeds 
statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, 
or otherwise violates the constitution or the law.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶30]  The difficulty with what happened in Mr. 
Barnes' case is that neither the district court nor the parole board gave him 
credit for the time he served between his January 2006 arrest and October 2006 
sentencing.  The result is that he 
was confined for 285 days more than was authorized by any of the statutes under 
which he was sentenced.  At one 
proceeding or the othereither the district court sentencing hearing or the 
parole board revocation proceedingcredit had to be given for the time Mr. 
Barnes spent in jail between his arrest and his sentencing.  Had the parole board given him credit 
for that period of confinement in its revocation order, we would uphold the 
district court's sentence.  See Segnitz v. State, 7 P.3d 49, 52 (Wyo. 
2000).  The parole board's failure 
to do so resulted in an unlawful sentence because he was not awarded credit for 
time served. To cure the error, we reverse the sentence and remand to the 
district court with instructions to give Mr. Barnes credit for the time he 
served between his arrest and his sentencing.     

 
 
[¶31] 
 The district court's order denying 
the suppression motion is affirmed.  
However, the case is remanded for correction of the judgment and sentence 
consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Mr. Barnes 
was charged with felony burglary in 2000.   He was sentenced to incarceration 
for a term of 2 ½ to 10 years.  In 
January of 2005, he was released on parole.