Title: State v. Snow

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  July 29, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
COY RANDELL SNOW,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 99CR0872; CA A110840; SC S49504)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 4, 2003.
Ingrid A. Macfarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs was
David E. Groom, Acting Executive Director.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General. 
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the circuit court is reversed.
*Appeal from Josephine County Circuit Court, Gerald C. Neufeld, Judge. 179 Or App 222, 39 P3d 909 (2002).
KISTLER, J.
While a police officer was in hot pursuit, defendant
left his automobile behind and fled on foot.  The question that
this case presents is whether the officer could search
defendant's automobile without a warrant to determine defendant's identity.  The Court of Appeals held that the officer could do so, reasoning that the search fell within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Snow, 179 Or App 222, 39 P3d 909 (2002).  We affirm the Court of Appeals decision but on different grounds.
Just before noon on September 20, 1999, Deputy Sheriff
Randy Lucas was driving on Highland Avenue in Grants Pass.  A car turned onto Highland Avenue going the opposite direction.  Lucas noticed the car because it began accelerating quickly as it went the other way.  As Lucas explained, the car was "laying rubber" and continued to accelerate.  Defendant was driving, and Lucas was able to see defendant's face as he passed him.  Lucas did not recognize defendant, nor was he able to obtain any other information that would help him identify defendant.
Lucas turned his car around and activated his overhead
lights just as defendant's car turned off Highland Avenue onto
another street.  Lucas turned onto that street but lost sight of
defendant's car.  A pedestrian pointed in the direction that
defendant had gone, and Lucas continued in pursuit.  When Lucas
came to the next intersection, another citizen indicated that
defendant had gone west on A Street.  At the corner of A and
Dimmick streets, a third citizen told Lucas that he had seen
defendant's car go through a stop sign at 40 miles per hour or
faster and then turn into a parking lot on A Street.
Lucas pulled into the parking lot and saw defendant's
car "nosed up a little bit sideways into a parking spot."  At
that point, approximately one to two minutes had passed since
Lucas first saw defendant's car.  The hood of defendant's car was
hot, the car was unlocked, and defendant was nowhere to be found. 
Lucas and at least one other officer searched the immediate area
for defendant but could not find him.  An area resident told
Lucas that "a man had been there and ran through their apartment
complex" and that "this is the third time the man had been chased
by the cops."  Lucas testified that, as the officers were
"looking around * * * and trying to find * * * a place [where]
somebody could run and hide," he heard over his radio that a
woman had called in to report a man "dashing through her house."
At that point, the officers returned to defendant's
car.  Lucas ran a check on the license plate number and learned
that it belonged to a woman.  Lucas and the other officers then
searched the car "[t]o try and identify the person driving it." 
Doing so, Lucas reasoned, would "[g]ive us an address or a
location to go check * * * to help us locate the person."  He
also believed that knowing the person's identity would increase
officer safety because he might learn "what kind of person we're
dealing with."  Lucas testified, without contradiction, that it
would have taken three to four hours to get a warrant to search
the car.
Inside the car, Lucas found a shotgun underneath some
clothing on the rear seat floorboard.  Then he found a backpack
containing a checkbook.  Inside the checkbook, he found two
identification cards, one from Oregon and another from
California.  Both bore defendant's name and picture.  Lucas
recognized the picture as that of the man he had seen earlier
driving the car.  Later investigation revealed that defendant had a felony conviction. 
The police did not apprehend defendant that day.  They
arrested him later, and a grand jury indicted him for reckless
driving and being a felon in possession of a weapon.  Before
trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that the
officers had found in the car, asserting that the officers had
violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution when
they searched his car without a warrant.  Defendant did not
contend that the search had violated the federal constitution.
The trial court granted defendant's motion.  The court
reasoned that, even though Lucas had probable cause to arrest
defendant for reckless driving and eluding an officer, neither
the "automobile exception" nor the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement applied.  In determining
that no exigency existed, the trial court reasoned that the
eyewitness observations of defendant obviated the need to search
the car for identification.  It also observed that "the 'manhunt'
in this case lasted a very short time."  The court concluded
that, without a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement, the search of defendant's car violated Article I,
section 9.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
automobile exception applied.  179 Or App at 224.  We need
not decide whether the automobile exception applies in these
circumstances.  We hold instead that exigent circumstances
excused the need to obtain a warrant.
The governing principles are well established.  Under
Article I, section 9, "[w]arrantless entries and searches of
premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall
within one of the few specifically established and carefully
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v.
Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235, 759 P2d 1054 (1988).  One of those
exceptions is the emergency/exigent circumstances exception.
Id.  That exception requires both probable cause and an
exigency. Id.  Here, defendant does not dispute that the
officers had probable cause to believe that he had committed a
felony, (1) nor does he dispute that the officers had probable
cause to believe that they would find evidence of his identity in
his car.  Rather, defendant argues that no exigent circumstance
existed that justified the officers' failure to obtain a
warrant. (2)
On that point, this court has explained that "[a]n
exigent circumstance is a situation that requires police to act
swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property,
or to forestall a suspect's escape or the destruction of
evidence." State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126, 806 P2d 92
(1991).  Here, the officers sought "to forestall a suspect's
escape."  Defendant was fleeing from the police, and the
situation required the officers to act quickly to prevent his
escape. (3) See State v. Roberts, 249 Or 139, 143,
437 P2d 731 (1968) (holding alternatively that officers in hot
pursuit need not obtain warrant before searching car that
defendant left behind as he fled on foot).
This is not a case in which the officers' delay or
failure to pursue a suspect undercuts any claim of an exigency. 
See Bridewell, 306 Or at 236 (officers' delay in
searching for missing defendant "significantly dissipated any
possible exigency"); cf.  Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 US 740, 753, 104 S Ct 2091, 80 L Ed 2d 732 (1984)
(discounting state's hot pursuit argument "because there was no
immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene
of a crime").  Rather, throughout the relevant period, the
officers were continuing their pursuit of defendant.
To be sure, when Lucas found defendant's car, he and
another officer first searched the immediate area in an effort to
find defendant.  But the officers' graduated and appropriate
actions in searching the area around defendant's car before
searching the car for evidence of identity does not undercut the
state's claim of exigency. See Stevens, 311 Or at 130
(explaining that officers' actions in searching farm did not
undercut claim that exigent circumstances justified searching
defendant's house).  Finally, we note that the officers' search
was limited to the exigency that justified it. See
Stevens, 311 Or at 130 (stating limitation).  They
reasonably determined that evidence of defendant's name and
address could aid them in apprehending him and limited their
search of the car accordingly.
It would appear that the officers' search came squarely
within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. See Roberts, 249 Or at 143 (upholding
warrantless search in similar situation).  Defendant, however,
advances three arguments why no exigency existed here.  He notes,
as the trial court did, that two people had seen him as he fled. 
He contends that, given those eyewitnesses, the officers had no
need for additional identification.  An eyewitness's
identification of a fleeing suspect, even if accurate, conveys
only general information.  It does not carry with it the same
level of detailed information that a suspect's name and address
do.  The fact that other limited information about defendant was
available does not mean that the officers had no right to seek
more specific information that would help them apprehend
defendant.
Defendant also notes that the officers did not
apprehend him immediately after they obtained his identification. 
That proves, he contends, that obtaining his identification was
neither likely nor necessary to prevent his escape.  The fact
that obtaining defendant's identification did not result in his
immediate capture does not establish that the officers were not
justified in looking for it.  The proper focus is on the
reasonableness of the officers' actions at the time they took
them in response to the exigency, not on the results of those
actions. See State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 229, 709
P2d 225 (1985) (focusing on reasonableness of officer's belief
when he entered room, rather than results of entry).  Judged from
that perspective, the officers' decision to search for
identification to help apprehend defendant was lawful.
Defendant argues finally that, once the officers
learned that someone else owned the car, there was no need to
search the car for his identification.  He contends that the
officers should have called the owner to learn his identity. 
Defendant's argument assumes that the officers would have ready
access to the owner's telephone number, that the owner would have
been available if they had called her, and that she would have
cooperated with them if they had reached her.  Officers need not
exhaust every conceivable means, no matter how speculative, to
avoid a claim that no exigency existed. See State v.
Girard, 276 Or 511, 555 P2d 445 (1976) (explaining that, "[i]n
the exigencies of the moment, the officers could not reasonably
be expected to put fine weights in the scale in weighing the
chances of securing the house or of losing their quarry").  Here,
the need for immediate action to prevent defendant's escape
justified the officers' decision to search his car for
identification.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the circuit court is reversed.
1. See ORS 811.540(1)(b)(A) (defining elements of
eluding officer).  
2. In analyzing that issue, we accept the trial court's
findings of historical fact, which are supported by evidence in
the record. See State v. Matsen/Wilson, 287 Or 581,
585, 601 P2d 784 (1979) (stating standard of review).  The
question whether those findings establish either probable cause
or exigent circumstances presents a question of law. Id.
3. In contending that no exigency existed, defendant
argues that there was no danger that he would destroy evidence in
the car or pose a risk of danger to life or serious damage to
property.  While true, those arguments provide no reason to
question the officer's stated reason for searching the car -- to
forestall defendant's escape.