Title: JEFFREY L. CHIPPEWA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEFFREY L. CHIPPEWA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 11126 P.3d 129Case Number: 05-96Decided: 01/19/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JEFFREY 
L. CHIPPEWA,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jeffrey L. 
Chippewa entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder.  In this appeal, Chippewa challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's order requiring him 
to pay restitution in the amount of $6,136.  Finding that Chippewa waived this claim 
at sentencing, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Chippewa raises 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Whether 
the district court erred when it ordered restitution over defense counsel's 
objection.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 26, 2004, 
Chippewa and his brother, Marshall Chippewa, got into a fight with William 
"Jevon" Antelope.  During the 
fracas, Chippewa retrieved a knife from his pocket and stabbed Antelope once in 
the chest.  Antelope died shortly 
thereafter of his injuries.   

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Chippewa with a single count of second degree murder.  Chippewa later entered into a plea 
agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charge in 
exchange for a prison sentence of 240 to 267 months.  The plea agreement also provided that 
Chippewa would pay restitution in an amount to be determined at sentencing.  Pursuant to that agreement, Chippewa 
entered a plea of guilty to the second degree murder charge on November 12, 
2004.  Before accepting Chippewa's 
plea, the district court discussed the terms of the plea agreement and the 
consequences of his guilty plea, and twice advised Chippewa that he could be 
ordered to pay restitution.    

 
 
[¶5]      The Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSI) ordered by the district court showed that three 
parties had requested restitution: 1) Velma Rhodes (Antelope's mother) requested 
$3,618 for burial expenses and related costs; 2) the Northern Arapahoe Tribal 
Enrollment Department requested $1,518 for expenses it paid for Antelope's 
burial; and 3) the Wind Dancer Funeral Home requested $1,000 for expenses 
related to Antelope's burial.  The 
amount of the three requests totaled $6,136.  At sentencing, the following colloquy 
took place regarding the requested restitution:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  [Defense Counsel], let me 
ask you this:  Do you have any 
quarrel with the restitution amount?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I had 
discussed that with the victim witness coordinator this morning.  I'm still not absolutely certain that 
all of that should be included in the restitution.  My argument basically is that Mr. 
Chippewa does not have any ability to repay that restitution in any event.  And I would ask the Court not to impose 
it on those grounds.

 
 
I have 
no quarrel with the Hudson Funeral Home.  
They have provided an itemized statement, and that was in the amount of 
$1118 dollars [sic].  And the 
concerns that I have were for some payments requested by Wind Dancer Funeral 
Home, and those were apparently $1,000 for loans to people with the tribe.  And then there was a $400 grant.  The victim witness coordinator tells me 
that those monies were used for various items in connection with the 
funeral.  So I don't know whether 
they really qualify as restitution or not.

 
 
But in 
any event, we would request the Court not impose that restitution, simply 
because there's not going to be any ability to pay it.  And so that's -- that's where we are 
with the restitution.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
If he is 
able to work at the penitentiary, he'll be making a minimal amount of 
money.  And I don't know how much 
they pay down there, but it's an additional burden.

 
 
He's 20 
years old now, and he will be in his 30s before he gets out down there.  It will be a very long time, and with 
this charge, and I think he will probably -- he's not going to be making more 
than the minimum, at least to start with.  
So I think he's going to be hard-pressed to make any restitution in any 
event in this matter.  

 
 
The 
district court ordered Chippewa to pay the restitution amount set forth in the 
PSI and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Chippewa 
challenges the propriety of the restitution order.  Chippewa's complaint concerns the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the amount of restitution ordered by the 
district court.  We decline to 
consider Chippewa's claim because we find that he waived his right to contest 
the restitution award.

 
 
[¶7]      This Court has 
held that, when a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agrees in a plea agreement 
to pay restitution, and then fails to object at sentencing to the restitution 
amount, he waives his right to challenge on appeal the factual basis of the 
restitution award.  Meerscheidt v.State, 931 P.2d 220, 
225-26 (Wyo. 
1997); see also Penner v. State, 2003 
WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047-48 (Wyo. 2003); Merkison v. State, 996 P.2d 1138, 1141 
(Wyo. 2000).  In this case, there is 
no doubt Chippewa voluntarily agreed to pay restitution as part of his plea 
agreement with the State.  The 
record reveals that, contrary to his contention on appeal, Chippewa did not 
cogently object to the requested restitution amount during his sentencing 
hearing.  Although Chippewa briefly 
expressed uncertainty as to whether certain specified items qualified as 
restitution, he presented no specific argument challenging the appropriateness 
of those items.  Instead, Chippewa 
simply argued that he had no ability to pay restitution, regardless of the 
amount.  The amount of restitution, 
therefore, was never properly placed before the district court at sentencing.1  Under the circumstances, we hold that 
Chippewa waived his right to challenge in this appeal the factual basis 
supporting the district court's restitution award.

 
 
[¶8]      Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Because the 
issue was not properly presented below, we could also refuse to consider the 
merits of Chippewa's claim under our longstanding rule that we will not consider 
an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless it is jurisdictional or 
fundamental in nature.  The amount 
of restitution is not a jurisdictional or fundamental issue which requires our 
review.  Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, ¶ 19, 110 P.3d 892, 897 (Wyo. 2005).