Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jay Andrew Felli

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 58 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1333-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jay Andrew Felli, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jay Andrew Felli,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FELLI 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).  
CROOKS, J., joins the concurrence.  
 
CONCUR/DISSENT 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Terry E. 
Johnson, Heidi M. Biasi and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry. E. Johnson. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe, Krohn, Pope, McCarthy, Haas & Robinson, 
LLP, Edgerton, and oral argument by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
2005 WI 58 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1333-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jay Andrew Felli, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jay Andrew Felli,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
May 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Jay Andrew Felli has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of three 
months. 
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We also 
agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Felli 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
2 
 
engaged in professional misconduct.  We conclude, however, that 
the appropriate discipline for the misconduct is a public 
reprimand rather than a suspension of his license to practice 
law.  We agree with the referee that the costs of the 
proceedings should be assessed against Attorney Felli.1 
¶3 
Attorney Felli was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1994 and practices in Brookfield.  In 1998 he 
received a private reprimand for failure to timely pay his 
Wisconsin State Bar dues.  He has not been the subject of any 
other previous discipline. 
¶4 
In May 2003, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
filed a complaint alleging that Attorney Felli engaged in 
professional misconduct with respect to his representation of 
three clients.  The OLR's complaint alleged 11 counts of 
misconduct.  Kathleen Callan Brady was appointed referee in the 
matter.  Three days of hearings were held in early 2004.  On 
June 7, 2004, the referee filed her report and recommendation in 
which she concluded that the OLR had proven three out of the 11 
counts of misconduct alleged in its complaint.  The OLR had 
sought a one-year suspension of Attorney Felli's license.  As 
noted above, the referee recommended a three-month suspension. 
¶5 
The majority of the counts of misconduct alleged in 
the OLR's complaint involved his representation of S.R., a woman 
who retained Attorney Felli in a divorce action filed by her 
                                                 
1 The total costs assessment in this matter, as of February 
24, 2005, is $22,171.60. 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
3 
 
husband, J.R., in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  The couple 
had been married for 20 years but had lived apart for five.  The 
divorce was quite amicable.  The primary issue of concern was 
S.R.'s need for continuing health insurance coverage after the 
divorce.  S.R. had a history of severe asthma that required 
frequent and costly medical treatment.  Both she and her husband 
wanted to find a way for her to continue her insurance coverage.  
During their marriage S.R. had insurance coverage through her 
husband's union plan, but that coverage would end if they were 
divorced.  While S.R. could possibly rely on the Consolidated 
Omnibus 
Budget 
Reconciliation 
Act 
(COBRA) 
to 
temporarily 
maintain her insurance coverage for an additional 18 months to 
three years after the divorce, COBRA was not a viable option for 
her because the cost would be prohibitive and she would unlikely 
be able to afford the premiums. 
¶6 
The attorneys for both parties tried to resolve the 
insurance coverage issue by holding open the divorce case on the 
trial court's docket for three years, at which time S.R. would 
be 65 years old and eligible for Medicare.  When counsel 
broached the idea with the judge, the judge told the attorneys 
he would not allow the case to linger on his docket for so long.  
The judge suggested that the parties could agree to terminate 
the divorce proceeding, put together another proposed marital 
settlement agreement, and let that agreement be the agreement 
used in the future divorce action to be filed when S.R. turned 
65 and could qualify for Medicare. 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
A preliminary agreement was reached whereby S.R.'s 
husband would keep his pension, but would continue to insure 
S.R. until she turned 65.  The agreement provided that the 
divorce would be voluntarily dismissed until S.R. turned 65 and 
qualified for Medicare.  Attorney Felli drew up a proposed 
marital settlement agreement which he sent to Attorney Stanley 
Lind, counsel for S.R.'s husband, sometime before December 18, 
2000.  The trial court had set December 18, 2000 as the date on 
which the divorce case would be administratively dismissed if it 
were not voluntarily dismissed pursuant to a settlement before 
that date.   
¶8 
Attorney Felli said he believed that S.R.'s husband 
would sign the agreement before the dismissal date and that 
Attorney Lind would then file a motion to dismiss the case so 
that no one would have to appear at the administrative dismissal 
hearing on December 18, 2000.  However, S.R.'s husband never 
signed the marital settlement agreement, so Attorney Lind did 
not file a motion to dismiss.  At the December 18, 2000 
dismissal hearing, neither Attorney Felli nor S.R. appeared.  
Although Attorney Felli knew about the court date, he said he 
did not believe an appearance was necessary because the parties 
had negotiated a settlement.  Attorney Lind appeared at the 
dismissal hearing and explained to the court that while a 
settlement had been reached, his client had not yet executed the 
agreement.  The trial court dismissed the divorce case, as had 
been expected, on Attorney Lind's motion.   
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Following the termination of her insurance benefits 
through S.R.'s husband's coverage, S.R. was able to get Title 
XIX coverage.  Attorney Richard Podell, a family law expert who 
testified at the hearing before the referee in this matter, said 
that S.R. was not damaged by the failure to get a marital 
settlement agreement executed before the divorce action was 
dismissed.  Attorney Podell said the fact S.R.'s husband did not 
sign the agreement before the dismissal actually benefited S.R. 
as it enhanced the chance that the agreement would be enforced 
as a valid postnuptial agreement.   
¶10 The referee concluded that by failing to appear at the 
December 18, 2000 divorce hearing, Attorney Felli violated SCR 
20:1.3.2   
¶11 In response to the OLR's investigation, Attorney Felli 
forwarded correspondence he had allegedly sent to S.R.  One of 
the items forwarded to the OLR was a letter dated December 1, 
2000, in which Attorney Felli advised S.R. that Attorney Lind 
had told Attorney Felli he had signed the stipulated marital 
property agreement and forwarded it to S.R.'s husband.  The 
referee concluded that the letter was inconsistent with Attorney 
Lind's deposition testimony which was that Attorney Felli sent 
Attorney Lind the marital property agreement on December 14, 
2000. 
 
The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Felli 
made 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client."   
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
6 
 
misrepresentations to the OLR with respect to the letter, in 
violation of SCR 22.03(6).3   
¶12 The referee found that the OLR did not prove by clear, 
convincing and satisfactory evidence any of the violations set 
forth in the remaining counts of its complaint with respect to 
the handling of S.R.'s case.4   
¶13 The OLR's complaint also alleged three counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Felli's representation of 
C.K., who retained Attorney Felli to apply for Title XIX 
benefits on behalf of her father, H.K.  C.K. was advised by 
Attorney Felli that his legal fees would be $1500 for the 
preparation of all paperwork and attendance at the application 
hearing.  C.K. paid Attorney Felli $1500 in advance.  At the 
time Attorney Felli was retained, H.K. was in a nursing home 
facility and Medicare was paying for the cost of his stay, but 
it was possible that his Medicare coverage would terminate.   
¶14 On September 28, 2000, Attorney Felli faxed the first 
page of the Title XIX application to the Milwaukee County 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.03(6) provides: "(6) In the course of the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful 
failure 
to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance."   
4 The OLR's complaint also alleged that Attorney Felli 
failed to provide competent representation to a client, failed 
to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter 
and 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information, and failed to return an advance payment of a fee 
that had not been earned. 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
7 
 
Department of Human Services.  On October 3, 2000, the Milwaukee 
County caseworker sent Attorney Felli a form entitled "Request 
for Verification Letter" asking for verification of information 
concerning the application.  The form set a deadline for 
submission of the information of October 17, 2000.  Attorney 
Felli called the caseworker and left a voicemail message 
indicating that the letter was erroneous and that Title XIX 
provisions allowed for a 30-day application process.  Attorney 
Felli requested a meeting to review the application with a 
caseworker, and a meeting was scheduled for October 24, 2000. 
¶15 On October 18, 2000, C.K. called Attorney Felli and 
advised that her father's Medicare benefits were being cut off 
that day.  Attorney Felli told C.K. he would try to expedite the 
Title XIX application process.  H.K. died the following day.  
C.K. called Attorney Felli's office after her father's death and 
left a voicemail message informing Attorney Felli of her 
father's death and saying the hearing was unnecessary.   
¶16 The referee found that Attorney Felli willfully failed 
to turn over to the OLR a November 11, 2000 letter addressed to 
the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services saying 
that Attorney Felli was enclosing the Title XIX benefits 
application and confirming a Title XIX interview scheduled in 
the matter for November 19, 2000.  Attorney Felli testified at 
the hearing before the referee that he personally typed the 
letter in question but could not recall exactly when he did so 
and his best estimate was that he typed it sometime in October 
2000.  Attorney Felli testified he never intended to represent 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
8 
 
to the OLR that the letter accurately reflected a letter he had 
sent to the Department of Health and Family Services in the H.K. 
matter, and he testified it was not possible the letter was 
generated on November 11, 2000 because he was out of the state 
on that date.   
¶17 Attorney Felli admitted that he could not explain why 
the letter was in H.K.'s file or why it was dated November 11, 
2000.  He offered the theory that he may have pulled up a letter 
in the H.K. matter on his computer and revised it to send to the 
department on a different Title XIX case he was handling, 
changing the date but forgetting to change the client's name.  
The referee concluded that by misrepresenting the nature and 
extent of his contacts with the Department of Health and Family 
Services to the OLR staff and to OLR district committee 
investigators, Attorney Felli violated SCR 22.03(6).5   
¶18 The OLR's complaint had also alleged two counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Felli's handling of a matter 
for a third client.  The referee found that the OLR failed to 
present clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to support 
either of its claims of misconduct regarding this client.  The 
OLR did not appeal from the referee's report and recommendation.   
¶19 Attorney Felli appealed, arguing that the OLR failed 
to offer clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that he 
                                                 
5 The OLR found there was no clear, convincing and 
satisfactory evidence to support the OLR's allegations on the 
other two counts alleged in the complaint which were failing to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client and failing to refund an unearned fee. 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
9 
 
committed any violations of supreme court rules.  With respect 
to his representation of S.R., Attorney Felli admits that in 
hindsight he should have appeared at the December 18, 2000 
hearing, but he says at the time he did not believe an 
appearance was necessary because the parties had negotiated a 
settlement.  Attorney Felli points out that Attorney Podell, his 
expert witness, characterized S.R. as better served by having 
the divorce action dismissed since she remained married and 
therefore insured through her husband's union coverage. 
¶20 With respect to the December 1, 2000 letter, Attorney 
Felli says Attorney Lind's memory was at times sketchy, and 
Attorney Felli asserts Attorney Lind was mistaken about a number 
of matters.  Attorney Felli argues that while the OLR based its 
claim that he fraudulently created the letter and that it was 
never sent to S.R. on the fact that S.R. did not have a copy of 
the letter in her files, by her own admission S.R.'s house was 
disorganized.  Attorney Felli also asserts the OLR found no 
evidence 
suggesting 
that 
Attorney 
Felli 
fraudulently 
manufactured the December 1, 2000 letter during the course of 
the OLR's investigation. 
¶21 With respect to the November 11, 2000 letter addressed 
to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services found 
in the H.K. file, Attorney Felli says it is impossible to know 
why the letter was dated November 11, 2000, but that there is no 
proof he made any willful misrepresentations to the OLR when he 
produced the letter and instead he asserts he discharged his 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
10 
 
obligation to provide the OLR with all documents referencing or 
otherwise pertaining to the H.K. case.   
¶22 Attorney Felli argues that the referee's conclusions 
of law with respect to the three counts on which he was found to 
have engaged in misconduct should be reversed.  In the 
alternative, he argues that in the event the court does find 
that he engaged in misconduct, the referee's recommendation for 
a three-month suspension of his license to practice law is 
excessive and a lesser discipline should be imposed. 
¶23 The OLR argues that it did sustain its burden of proof 
regarding the three counts of professional misconduct found 
proven by the referee.  The OLR also asserts that the 
seriousness of the misconduct warrants a suspension of Attorney 
Felli's license to practice law. 
¶24 A referee's findings of fact are to be affirmed unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2000 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  The record supports the referee's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and we adopt them.   
¶25 Although this court takes into account the referee's 
recommendation as to appropriate discipline, it does not accord 
the referee's recommendation any conclusive or great weight, and 
it is this court's responsibility to determine the appropriate 
discipline to be imposed for an attorney's misconduct.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  The lawyer regulation system in 
this state has been established to, among other things, "protect 
the public from misconduct by persons practicing law in 
Wisconsin."  See Preamble to SCR Chapter 21.  In imposing 
discipline for professional misconduct, this court considers 
several factors including: (1) the seriousness, nature and 
extent of the misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed to 
protect the public, the court, and the legal system from 
repetition of the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the 
need 
to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
committing 
similar 
misconduct.  Carroll, 248 Wis. 2d 662, ¶40.   
¶26 Under all the circumstances of this case, including 
the fact that this is the first time Attorney Felli has been 
disciplined for professional misconduct, the fact that the 
referee specifically found that Attorney Felli did represent 
S.R.'s interest and that S.R. was not damaged by Attorney 
Felli's representation, we conclude a public reprimand is the 
appropriate sanction to be imposed. 
¶27 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney Jay Andrew Felli is 
publicly 
reprimanded 
for 
his 
professional 
misconduct 
as 
determined in this matter. 
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Jay Andrew Felli pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, provided that if 
the costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay those costs within 
No. 
2003AP1333-D   
 
12 
 
that time, the license of Attorney Jay Andrew Felli to practice 
law in Wisconsin shall be suspended until further order of the 
court. 
 
No.  2003AP1333-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶29 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
My 
concurrence in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 
2005 WI 37, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 376, provides context 
and perspective regarding costs in disciplinary proceedings and 
also stands as a concurrence in the present case.  See also In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 367 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Backes, 2005 WI 59, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
¶30 Keith Sellen, Director of the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation, has filed an administrative rules petition proposing 
certain 
changes 
to 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
relating 
to 
assessment of costs.  The court will hear the petition in the 
fall of this year.  See Rules Petition 05-01, In the Matter of 
the Petition for Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 22.0001(3) 
Relating to Cost Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System 
(Jan. 18, 2005).   
¶31 Until the court decides the petition, I would continue 
the court's practice of generally assessing full costs. 
¶32 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1333-D.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). I join the court's decision and order as to 
the discipline imposed in this action.  I write separately 
because I disagree with the court that full costs should be 
imposed in this case.  For the reasons stated in my concurring 
in part, dissenting in part, opinions in In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 694 
N.W.2d 367, and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Backes, 
2005 WI 59, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, because Attorney 
Felli was absolved of any misconduct in the matter involving a 
third unnamed client, see per curiam op., ¶18, I would not 
assess any costs for the two counts associated with that matter.  
I would adopt a "substantially related" test for violations that 
were not established by Office of Lawyer Regulation ("OLR") 
before assessing costs on counts for which there was no proof.  
Costs should not be assessed against an attorney in unrelated, 
unsuccessful 
counts 
where 
no 
misconduct 
has 
been 
found 
concerning a particular client.  Such an assessment simply does 
not support the purposes underlying the factors we consider in 
determining the appropriate level of discipline where misconduct 
has occurred but in unrelated matters.   
¶34 I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of 
the court's opinion that assesses full costs against Attorney 
Felli.  I concur with the remainder of the decision. 
¶35 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion.   
No.  2003AP1333-D.lbb 
 
2 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1333-D.lbb 
 
 
 
1