Title: Punches v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Punches v. State1997 WY 108944 P.2d 1131Case Number: 96-139Decided: 09/03/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

JAMES EUGENE 
PUNCHES,  

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

 The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane M. Lozano, Assistant Appellate Counsel; 
Michael Dinnerstein, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Walter Eggers III, 
Student Director, and Joseph D. Richer, Student Intern, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General; 
Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Anthony P. Garcia and Susan E. Schell, 
Student Interns, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant James 
E. Punches appeals his conviction on one count of incest for which he was 
sentenced to three and one-half years to five years in prison. He claims 
inflammatory pretrial publicity and improperly admitted evidence deprived him of 
a fair trial.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Punches presents 
these issues for our review:

 

I. Did the trial court deprive the Appellant of his 
right to a fair trial by denying the Appellant's Motion to Change Venue, even 
though inflammatory pretrial publicity in the local papers had prejudiced the 
public against the Appellant? 

II. Did the trial court deprive the Appellant of his 
fundamental right to a trial by jury when it permitted expert opinion testimony 
that the complaining witness had been sexually assaulted and a further opinion 
as to the identity of the perpetrator?

III. Did the trial court deny the Appellant his right 
to a fair trial by ruling that the prosecution's principal witness was competent 
to testify even though he admitted he did not know what the truth 
was?

IV. Did the trial court improperly deny the Appellant 
his right to confront the prosecution's principal witness with evidence of that 
witness' dishonest character?

V. Did the trial court deny the Appellant his right 
to present evidence of his lawful character when it erroneously excluded 
evidence that the Appellant had no prior convictions or 
arrests?

VI. Did the trial court deprive the Appellant of his 
right to a fair trial by refusing to exclude evidence alleging prior bad acts 
and crimes by the Appellant with which the Appellant was never even 
charged?

The State rephrases these issues 
as:

I. Did the district court properly deny Appellant's 
motion for a change of venue?

II. Did the district court properly admit the 
testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Hansen?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion when 
it found the child victim competent to testify against his 
father?

IV. Did the district court properly exclude evidence 
of the victim's prior acts?

V. Did the district court properly limit Appellant's 
evidence of his lawful character?

VI. Did the district court properly admit evidence of 
Appellant's prior bad acts?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      On May 10, 1995, 
a passerby observed Punches having sexual intercourse with his nine-year-old son 
and later reported the incident to the police. After an initial investigation, 
the victim was placed in protective custody and eventually examined for sexual 
and physical abuse at Primary Children's Medical Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On May 17, 1995, Punches was charged with incest pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
6-4-402(a)(ii). There were newspaper articles about the incident, and Punches 
filed a motion for a change of venue. After a pretrial hearing, the motion was 
denied. Pretrial hearings were also conducted on motions to admit evidence of 
prior bad acts by the defendant and to rule on the competency of the victim as a 
witness.

 

[¶5]      In a jury trial, 
the passerby eyewitness and the victim testified about the sexual abuse on May 
10, and the child testified about numerous other incidents of sexual abuse 
against him by Punches. Physicians from Primary Children's Medical Center 
testified that the victim had physical injuries consistent with sexual abuse and 
had emotional problems consistent with severe sexual abuse over a period of 
time. Several professionals associated with the child's school also testified 
concerning multiple incidents of sexualized behavior that had been noted as 
possibly indicating sexual injury or trauma and described the victim's behavior 
on May 11, 1995, the day after the sexual abuse occurred, as destructive and 
"out of control." After a three day trial, the jury convicted Punches, and he 
was sentenced to three and one-half years to five years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary. This appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      In his first 
argument, Punches asserts that inflammatory pretrial publicity required a change 
of venue, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
one. In the alternative, he contends that the district court should have 
sequestered the jury during the proceedings. Before a jury was seated, newspaper 
articles ran which Punches asserts prejudiced the public and made it impossible 
to seat an impartial jury from Sweetwater County.

 

[¶7]      WYO. R.CRIM. P. 
21 provides the following about change of venue:

 

Rule 21. Transfer from the county for 
trial.

(a) Prejudice 
within county. - Upon timely motion of the defendant, the court shall 
transfer the proceeding as to that defendant to another county, but only if the 
court is satisfied that there exists within the county where the prosecution is 
pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot 
obtain a fair and impartial trial in that county.

 

[¶8]      In Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 
1986), this Court established a two-part test to determine whether a change of 
venue should be granted because of publicity: "First, the nature and extent of 
the publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a 
jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually 
appears during voir dire examination." Id. at 208. However, "there is no 
requirement that a juror be ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a 
case." Id. The defendant must 
demonstrate the existence of an opinion of guilty in the mind of the juror to 
raise a presumption of partiality. Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1289 
(Wyo. 1979).

 

[¶9]      The district 
court held a pretrial hearing on the motion to change venue and essentially 
concluded that the articles which had run were not likely to have been read by a 
sufficient number in the jury pool to prevent the impaneling of an impartial 
jury. During voir dire, those jurors who believed they had heard something of 
the case were questioned concerning the impact of the publicity on their 
partiality and stated they had not formed an opinion and would be able to render 
a verdict based on the evidence presented at trial. The decision to grant a 
change of venue is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not 
be overturned unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1121 
(Wyo. 1992); Collins, 589 P.2d  at 
1289. Nothing in the record indicates that the publicity had an effect on those 
who served on the jury, and we find no abuse of discretion. Armstrong, 826 P.2d  at 1122. Nor do we 
find the court abused its discretion in not sequestering the jury on its own 
motion. Collins, 589 P.2d  at 1291. 
Defense counsel did not request sequestration and concurred that the jury was 
not to be sequestered. Relying on Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), Punches claims the court was required to 
sequester the jury sua sponte because 
extensive publicity during the trial was highly prejudicial. As discussed in Collins, the Sheppard decision resulted from the 
"extremely inflammatory publicity" and the "atmosphere of a carnival" created by 
media attention causing the court to conclude that the guilt found was the 
verdict of a mob. Collins, 589 P.2d  
at 1290. Here, a few largely factual stories were run during the trial and, 
according to our ruling in Collins, 
these types of stories are not sufficient to warrant finding that the court 
should have sequestered the jury. Collins, 589 P.2d  at 
1291.

 

[¶10]   Punches next contends that the 
physician expert who testified that the victim's physical injuries were 
consistent with sexual abuse impermissibly testified as to his guilt. In Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 
1989), we held that a witness may not offer an opinion as to the guilt of the 
defendant and doing so is reversible error. Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68. In this case, 
Dr. Hansen, a pediatrician from Primary Children's Medical Center, testified as 
follows:

 

Q. In your opinion, Doctor, are the scars that were 
found on [victim's] anus corroborative of sexual abuse?

A. Yes, they are corroborative of sexual 
abuse.

Q. Why is that?

A. Well, that seems the most likely way they could 
[have] happened. I do not think they're from constipation, though it's not 
impossible. That pretty much leaves a traumatic accident; for instance, impaling 
yourself on fence posts, something like that. We have no history of that. We have a witnessed event. Two and two put 
together, I do believe that they're that way from sexual abuse and are 
corroborative of it.

(Emphasis supplied.) Punches 
contends that the emphasized portion is evidence the expert testified as to his 
guilt.

 

[¶11]   In Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010 (Wyo. 
1993), we said that, consistent with WYO. R. EVID. 702, expert testimony is 
admissible if helpful to the trier of fact. Id. at 1023. We said that expert 
testimony meeting the following avoids invading the province of the 
jury:

 

(1) the challenged testimony assists the jury in 
understanding some peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior and (2) the 
challenged testimony does not involve a comment on the credibility or 
truthfulness of the victim.

Betzle, 
847 P.2d  at 1023. Testifying that the injuries were consistent with sexual abuse 
is not directly expressing an opinion that there was sexual abuse, that the 
victim is telling the truth, or that the defendant was guilty of sexual abuse. 
We do not find error. Id. at 
1024.

 

[¶12]   Punches argues that he was denied a 
fair trial because the district court allowed the victim to testify when the 
victim was not competent. He points to isolated statements that the victim made 
and contends they demonstrate the victim did not understand the obligation to 
tell the truth and lacked an independent recollection of Punches' acts of sexual 
abuse. The determination of a child's competency to testify is committed to the 
trial court's discretion, and that determination will not be disturbed unless 
shown to be clearly erroneous. Trujillo 
v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 579 (Wyo. 1994). The trial court's findings are 
given considerable deference because that court is in the best position to judge 
the demeanor, truth and veracity of a witness. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 880 (Wyo. 
1987).

 

[¶13]   WYO. R. EVID. 601 provides that 
"[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules." A person is generally competent to testify if he can understand, 
receive, remember and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of 
the oath taken before testifying. Larsen 
v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984). "Intelligence, not age, is the 
guiding criteria in determining the competency of a witness." Baum, 745 P.2d  at 879. In a pretrial 
hearing, the district court applied the required five part test to determine the 
victim's competency:

 

(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the 
truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the 
occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression 
of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the 
occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; 
and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about 
it.

Larsen, 
686 P.2d  at 585.

 

[¶14]   The complete record of the victim's 
testimony shows that he was competent to testify. He defined truth and oaths, 
explained the consequences of violating an oath to tell the truth, gave examples 
of truths and lies and described several incidents of sexual abuse with specific 
detail. When asked about his life at the time of the sexual abuse, he remembered 
where he had lived, gone to school, who his teachers were, classmates names, his 
counselor and the decor of the apartment. He did say that an investigating 
officer had taught him anatomy terms, and he contradicted himself on occasion, 
but this goes to the weight of the evidence and not competency to testify. Smizer v. State, 752 P.2d 406, 408 (Wyo. 
1988); Trujillo, 880 P.2d  at 579. 
Given his entire testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that he had sufficient memory for an independent recollection of 
what had happened to him and in ultimately determining he was competent to 
testify.

 

[¶15]   Punches next contends that the 
district court improperly excluded evidence of the victim's arrest for 
shoplifting which he offered to impeach the victim's credibility and to show the 
victim had a motive to testify falsely in retaliation against his father who had 
punished him. Because the arrest did not result in a juvenile adjudication or 
conviction, he asserts the evidence was admissible under WYO. R. EVID. 608 (b) 
and 404.

 

[¶16]   The right of an accused to confront 
the witnesses against him is protected by the Sixth Amendment. Amin v. State, 686 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 
1984). The right to effective cross-examination incorporated in the 
confrontation right is equally protected. Id. The extent to which a witness may be 
cross-examined is a matter to be determined by the trial court in the exercise 
of its sound discretion. Id. The 
admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 204 (Wyo. 
1994). On review, the trial court's evidentiary rulings are given considerable 
deference and are not disturbed and will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse 
of discretion is established. Vit v. 
State, 909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo. 1996).

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

[¶17]   WYO. R. EVID. 404 
states:

 

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.

(a) Character 
evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of Accused. - Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same;

(2) Character of Victim. - Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness 
of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor;

(3) Character of Witness. - Evidence of the character 
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.

 

[¶18]   The admissibility of evidence 
offered under Rule 404 is subject to a test which includes a determination of 
whether the evidence will be introduced for a proper purpose. Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354, 357 
(Wyo. 1996). Punches offered the shoplifting arrest evidence to show that the 
victim's punishment for the shoplifting incident might have made the victim 
angry and created a motive to falsify. As the State points out, the defense 
never established any basis for linking the shoplifting incident, which had 
occurred in March 1994, to a motive to falsify incest charges over a year later, 
in May of 1995. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
the defense had not established that the shoplifting was a prior act that shows 
motive.

 

[¶19]   Punches argues that under Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1993), 
evidence of shoplifting charges is admissible against a witness. In Taul, the defendant's parents were 
called by the defense as character witnesses. As the mother testified on direct 
about the law-abiding nature of her son, she mentioned a shoplifting incident. 
This Court held that the prosecution's cross-examination questions about the 
incident were proper because the defendant had opened the door and inquiry was 
proper as to the basis of the mother's belief that her son was not the type of 
person who would commit an armed robbery. Taul, 862 P.2d  at 654-55. It is 
incorrect to say that Taul ruled that 
a shoplifting incident was admissible against a witness. The admissibility of 
specific incidents of conduct is controlled by WYO. R. EVID. 608, which 
states:

 

(b) Specific 
instances of conduct. - Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for 
the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They 
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning 
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

 

[¶20]   In Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 
1988), we stated that the purpose of Rule 608(b) is to prevent a party from 
using extrinsic evidence of specific conduct in order to establish character or 
disposition to be untruthful. Gist, 
766 P.2d  at 1151. Gist decided that the prior drug use of a key prosecution 
witness was not admissible when offered for this purpose, but was admissible to 
refute a statement the witness had made on direct examination concerning a 
substantive point. Gist, 766 P.2d  at 
1152. In this case, the court decided that the shoplifting evidence did not 
address whether or not the victim was telling the truth in this matter and was, 
therefore, not admissible under Rule 608(b). The record supports this 
conclusion, and there was not an abuse of discretion.

 

[¶21]   Because Punches' next argument also 
concerns the admissibility of evidence, our standard of review is the same. 
Punches proposed to introduce evidence of his law-abiding character by 
presenting evidence that he had no prior convictions or arrests as permitted by 
WYO. R. EVID. 405. WYO. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) provides that a criminal defendant 
has a right to present evidence of a pertinent trait of his character and WYO. 
R. EVID. 405 sets forth the methods for proving character:

 

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.

(a) Character 
evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of Accused. - Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same;

* 
* * *

Rule 405. Methods of proving 
character.

(a) Reputation 
or opinion. - In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct.

(b) Specific 
instances of conduct. - In cases in which character or a trait of character 
of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or is in 
issue under Rule 404(a)(2), proof may also be made of specific instances of his 
conduct.

 

[¶22]   The State challenged the evidence 
on grounds of relevancy and after a hearing on the matter, the court ruled that 
Punches' evidence would be limited to showing that he had no arrests or 
convictions for offenses similar to that involved in this case, specifically, 
sexual offenses or physical assault. During trial, Punches had two witnesses 
testify about specific instances of his conduct. He now contends it was 
prejudicial not to permit him to show the jury that he had no arrests or 
convictions of any kind because of the prior bad act evidence which had been 
admitted against him. Because the rule permits only pertinent evidence and the 
terms relevant and pertinent are synonymous, it was within the trial court's 
discretion to limit Punches' evidence in the matter that it did, and we find no 
error. See State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 
1, 40-42, 298 P.2d 349, 363-64 (Wyo. 1956).

 

[¶23]   Finally, Punches contends that 
evidence of prior bad acts was improperly admitted and denied him a fair trial. 
The trial court allowed evidence that Punches hit the victim and called him a 
variety of profane names and allowed evidence of sexual abuse by Punches against 
the victim. During a pretrial hearing conducted according to Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1993), 
the State offered four pieces of evidence to show preparation, course of 
conduct, plan and absence of mistake, proof of motive and proof of the identity 
of the person who committed the acts. The trial court determined the two pieces 
just described were probative, showing that Punches would commit acts of 
violence and sexual abuse toward his own child.

 

[¶24]   Punches complains that the trial 
court just recited a list of possible purposes of the evidence in violation of 
this Court's rule that the trial court determine if the evidence is offered for 
a proper purpose as required by Vigil v. 
State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1996). The record shows that the trial court 
determined these were all purposes of the evidence and not just possibilities. 
The record supports the decision and shows the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the evidence.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶25]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion, and Punches was not deprived of a fair trial because of inflammatory 
pretrial publicity or a failure to sequester the jury. The admission of evidence 
in this trial was proper, and the conviction and sentence are 
affirmed.