Title: State v. John Allen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 106 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2555-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John Allen,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  267 Wis. 2d 961, 671 N.W.2d 717 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 28, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Michael J. Backes, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael J. 
Backes. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the case was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 106 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 02-2555-CR    
(L.C. No. 
01 CF 755) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
John Allen   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   John Allen petitions for 
review of an unpublished court of appeals decision that affirmed 
an order of the circuit court, Milwaukee County, M. Joseph 
Donald, presiding, denying Allen's postconviction motion without 
a hearing.  In his postconviction motion, Allen claimed he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel.  He also requested an 
order for postconviction discovery and an in camera review of 
certain records. 
¶2 
We conclude that in order to secure a hearing on a 
postconviction motion, Allen must have provided sufficient 
material facts——e.g., who, what, where, when, why, and how——
that, if true, would entitle him to the relief he seeks.  
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
2 
 
Because Allen failed to do so, and because the record also 
conclusively demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief, we 
conclude the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied Allen's motion without a hearing. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On February 9, 2001, the State charged Allen with two 
counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and two counts 
of second-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1) and (2) (1995-96).1  The charges arose from 
separate incidents with four separate girls, Kelyanna A., 
Tekiara B., Shalisia B., and Erica J.  Tekiara B. and Shalisia 
B. are Allen's stepdaughters.  At the time of the alleged 
assaults, the girls lived with Allen and their mother, Lynn 
Allen.  Several years after she allegedly was assaulted by 
Allen, Shalisia wrote a letter to Patricia B., her stepmother, 
in which she accused Allen of sexual assault.  Patricia B. told 
her husband, Bobby B., who is the girls' biological father, and 
Bobby B. informed the police. 
¶4 
All four of the girls testified at trial.  Both 
Tekiara and Shalisia testified that they were assaulted by Allen 
five to six years earlier.  Tekiara testified that she was happy 
living with her mother, who at that time was also living with 
Allen, her husband; however, Shalisia testified that she wanted 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise noted.  One of the charges of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child later was amended to 
first-degree sexual assault of a child to reflect the testimony 
at trial. 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
3 
 
to live with her father, Bobby B., and would "do anything" to 
make that happen.  She said that the reason she wanted to live 
with her father was because Allen sexually assaulted her. 
¶5 
The only two defense witnesses were Bobby B., the 
girls' biological father, and Allen.  Allen asserted that the 
alleged assaults did not happen, and suggested the girls were 
conspiring to falsely accuse him.  He testified that Kelyanna 
was angry with him because he would not let Shalisia associate 
with Kelyanna anymore because Kelyanna, who was older than 
Shalisia, was dating boys and staying out late.  He testified 
that he believed that Tekiara and Shalisia were angry with him 
and were falsely accusing him of sexual assault because he 
punished them for not washing the dishes.  He also testified 
that Shalisia wanted to go live with her father, Bobby B.   
¶6 
Bobby B. testified that there was pending litigation 
regarding the placement of Shalisia, but denied that he intended 
to accuse Allen of sexual assault to make it easier for him to 
get placement.  He further denied that he told either Shalisia 
or Tekiara to tell the police that Allen sexually assaulted 
them; he testified he told the girls to tell only the truth.  
Allen's trial counsel questioned Bobby B. about a letter he 
supposedly had written to the police about the alleged sexual 
assaults.  Bobby B. denied ever writing a letter, and no such 
letter was ever produced.   
¶7 
The jury found Allen guilty of the assaults against 
Kelyanna, Tekiara and Shalisia, and acquitted him of the alleged 
assault against Erica J.  Allen was sentenced to an aggregate of 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
4 
 
50 years in prison.  Allen filed a postconviction motion 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, requesting a new 
trial in the interest of justice, and requesting postconviction 
discovery and an in camera review of all records of Milwaukee 
County's Sensitive Crime Unit regarding any allegations made by 
Bobby B.  In support of his motion for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Allen raised three issues:  trial counsel's failure to 
be prepared to examine Bobby B.; his failure to call Lynn Allen 
as a witness; and his failure to submit what Allen characterized 
as a "Shiffra2 motion" regarding an in camera review of 
potentially exculpatory evidence.    
¶8 
The circuit court denied Allen's motion without a 
Machner3 hearing.  The court of appeals, in a per curiam 
decision, affirmed.  Allen petitioned this court for review.  He 
argued the circuit court erred in denying his motion because he 
had alleged specific instances of deficient performance that 
were prejudicial, as is required by State v. Bentley, 201 
Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  We granted review to clarify 
the Bentley standard. 
                                                 
2 State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
3 Where an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
raised, trial counsel must be informed and his or her presence 
is required at any hearing in which counsel's conduct is 
challenged.  State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 
905 (Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
5 
 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶9 
Whether a defendant's postconviction motion alleges 
sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to a hearing for the 
relief requested is a mixed standard of review.  First, we 
determine whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient 
material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to 
relief.  This is a question of law that we review de novo.  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309-10.  If the motion raises such 
facts, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  Id. 
at 310; Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972).  However, if the motion does not raise facts sufficient 
to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion to grant or deny a hearing.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 
310-11; Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98.  We require the circuit 
court "to form its independent judgment after a review of the 
record and pleadings and to support its decision by written 
opinion."  Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 498.  See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 318-19 (quoting the same).  We review a circuit court's 
discretionary decisions under the deferential erroneous exercise 
of discretion standard.  In re the Commitment of Franklin, 2004 
WI 38, ¶6, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 677 N.W.2d 276; Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 
at 311.     
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
6 
 
B. 
Pretrial and Postconviction Motions 
¶10 A defendant may make pretrial and postconviction 
motions.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 971.31 (2001-02) (permitting 
motions before trial whenever the general issue in the motion 
can be determined without trial); Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2001-02) 
(allowing for the filing postconviction motions to vacate, set 
aside or correct a sentence).  At a minimum, a motion, whether 
made 
pretrial 
or 
postconviction, 
must 
"[s]tate 
with 
particularity the [factual and legal] grounds for the motion," 
Wis. Stat. § 971.30(2)(c) (2001-02), and must provide a "good 
faith argument" that the relevant law entitles the movant to 
relief, Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) (2001-02).4  Not all motions 
require evidentiary hearings.  See 9 Wiseman, Chiarkas and 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 11.5 (1996).  However, where an evidentiary hearing is 
requested, one is not automatically granted.  The court "does 
not have to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion just because 
a party asks for one."  State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 589 
N.W.2d 9 (1999) (quoting United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 
1071 (7th Cir. 1990)).  We have defined sufficiency standards 
that must be met for both pretrial and postconviction motions 
before a hearing is granted.   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.05 is a rule of civil procedure; 
however, it applies to motion practice in criminal proceedings.  
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) (2001-02).   
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
7 
 
1. 
Pretrial motions 
¶11 When a motion is made before trial, the defendant 
likely has not fully developed the factual and legal issues 
involved in his or her case.  Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 13; State v. 
Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520, 532-33, 558 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996).  
As well, the defendant has the whole criminal process before him 
or her, and may make a motion at a later date.  Therefore, even 
if the motion on its face does not allege facts to entitle the 
defendant to relief, a defendant generally is allowed an 
opportunity to develop the factual record.  Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 
at 18; Garner, 207 Wis. 2d at 533-535.  This safeguard protects 
a defendant's due process rights.  Velez, 224 Wis. 2d at 14.  We 
do not need to delve further into the sufficiency standard for 
pretrial motions as that issue is not directly before us today.5  
We raise it only to point out that once the criminal process has 
been completed and the defendant convicted and sentenced, the 
reasons that support a lesser sufficiency standard for pretrial 
motions are no longer compelling, and instead, we must consider 
the strong policy that favors finality.  Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (calling the principle of finality 
"essential to the operation of our criminal justice system"); 
State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, ¶75, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 
(quoting Teague).  Therefore, the sufficiency standard for 
postconviction motions requires more from a defendant.   
                                                 
5 State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999), 
contains a comprehensive discussion and application of the 
pretrial motion sufficiency standard. 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
8 
 
2. 
Postconviction motions, the Bentley standard 
¶12 As we stated earlier, the circuit court must hold a 
hearing when the defendant has made a legally sufficient 
postconviction motion, and has the discretion to grant or deny 
an evidentiary hearing even when the postconviction motion is 
legally insufficient.  See supra, ¶9.  The circuit court may 
deny a postconviction motion for a hearing if all the facts 
alleged in the motion, assuming them to be true, do not entitle 
the movant to relief;6 if one or more key factual allegations in 
the motion are conclusory; or if the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to relief.  
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310-11; Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98.  
See supra, ¶9.  We discuss below what makes a postconviction 
motion legally sufficient, and examine the sufficiency of 
Allen's postconviction motion.  
¶13 In this case, we address the sufficiency of a 
postconviction motion requesting an evidentiary hearing in the 
context of a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, 
as that is the claim that is now before us; however, we stress 
that 
the 
standard 
we 
announce 
today 
applies 
to 
other 
postconviction motions in which an evidentiary hearing is 
requested.  Requiring a movant to state sufficient material 
facts that, if true, would entitle the movant to relief is not a 
                                                 
6 If the facts in the motion are assumed to be true, yet 
seem to be questionable in their believability, the circuit 
court must hold a hearing.  State v. Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, 
¶34, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207 (stating that when 
credibility is an issue, it is best resolved by live testimony).     
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
9 
 
new standard; the principles we set forth below have been 
applied to postconviction motions for many years.  We do note, 
however, that in motions filed pursuant to State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 Wis. 2d 12 (1986), regarding  plea 
withdrawal, the requisite standard is explained in State v. 
Hampton, 2004 WI 107,  ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
Furthermore, the requirements we explain herein also may not 
apply in the same way to other types of motions where the movant 
has a right to a hearing.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 973.20 
(addressing restitution hearings). 
¶14 A hearing on a postconviction motion is required only 
when the movant states sufficient material facts that, if true, 
would entitle the defendant to relief.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 
310; State v. Washington, 176 Wis. 2d 205, 215, 500 N.W.2d 331 
(Ct. App. 1993).  "The mere assertion of a claim of 'manifest 
injustice,' in this case the ineffective assistance of counsel, 
does not entitle a defendant to the granting of relief . . . ."  
Washington, 176 Wis. 2d at 214.      
¶15 It has been said repeatedly that a postconviction 
motion for relief requires more than conclusory allegations.  
Despite the repetitive theme that such motions require the 
allegation of sufficient material facts that, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, many defendants continue to 
file insufficient postconviction motions.  See, e.g., Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d at 316-18; Smith v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 373, 379-82, 
210 N.W.2d 678 (1973); State v. Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d 45, 48-52, 
538 N.W.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
10 
 
346, 360-61, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994); Washington, 176 
Wis. 2d at 214-16.  However, the circuit court may order the 
defendant to submit more specific evidence regarding his motion.  
See Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d at 48.   
¶16 In Bentley, the defendant pled guilty to one count of 
felony 
murder 
and 
one 
count 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, each as party to a crime.  The court sentenced Bentley 
to concurrent terms of 35 years in prison for the felony murder 
charge and to a mandatory life term for the first-degree 
homicide charge.  Bentley's parole eligibility date was set for 
45 years from the date of sentencing.  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 
306-07.  Bentley filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and requested a hearing because he claimed he had 
been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.  Bentley's 
motion alleged that "his pleas were not voluntary or informed 
because his trial counsel erroneously advised him that his 
minimum parole eligibility date would be 11 years and 5 months."  
Id. at 307.  The court denied his motion without a hearing and 
we affirmed.  Id. at 319.  We concluded that Bentley's 
allegation that he pled guilty due to misinformation by counsel 
was "merely conclusory."  Id. at 318.  Further, we concluded the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
denying 
a 
hearing 
after 
its 
examination 
of 
the 
record 
conclusively showed that Bentley was not entitled to relief.  
Id. at 319. 
¶17 The defendant in Smith pled guilty to two counts of 
armed robbery.  His postconviction motion alleged that his 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
11 
 
guilty plea and some admissions he made were coerced.  His 
motion was denied without a hearing.  Smith, 60 Wis. 2d at 375-
77. 
 
We 
determined 
that 
Smith's 
"bare-bones" 
allegation 
regarding coercion was nothing more than a conclusory statement.  
Smith, however, claimed that the flesh of the motion was the 
statement of a co-defendant who said he thought the defendant 
was "under a great deal of pressure" at the time of the arrest.  
We concluded that a single statement by a co-defendant did not 
constitute sufficient material facts to entitle Smith to relief.  
Id. at 380-81. 
¶18 In Saunders, a postconviction hearing was held on 
Saunders' ineffective assistance of counsel claim; however, 
neither Saunders nor trial counsel was present.  Appellate 
counsel appeared and requested Saunders' presence at the 
hearing.  That request, along with the postconviction motion, 
was denied.  Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d at 47-49.  The circuit court 
held that Saunders had failed to provide anything more than 
conclusory allegations in his motion, and therefore, his 
presence at a hearing was not required.  Id. at 48.  Saunders' 
motion alleged these four instances of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel:   
(1) [T]hat trial counsel failed to properly counsel 
the defendant regarding his testimony at trial; (2) 
that trial counsel failed to properly interview the 
defendant regarding his version of the facts of the 
case; (3) that trial counsel failed to call witnesses 
to testify at defendant's trial as requested by the 
defendant; and (4) that trial counsel failed to make 
sufficient objections to the introduction of evidence 
and testimony to preserve the objections. 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
12 
 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Saunders claimed his 
allegations, though general, were specific enough to raise a 
question of fact.  The court of appeals disagreed, noting that 
Saunders' allegations were his subjective opinion and that he 
failed to elaborate on how counsel failed and how that failure 
prejudiced him.  "In sum, there is no historical basis alleged——
there is nothing from which the trial court could have gained a 
sense of what is really true."  Id. at 52 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
¶19 Toliver, who was convicted of first-degree sexual 
assault as a party to a crime, filed a postconviction motion 
alleging, among other things, that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel.  The circuit court denied his motion 
without a hearing.  Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d at 352-54.  Toliver 
advanced his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his 
"Motion for Resentencing or Sentence Modification."  That motion 
provided:    
5) If trial counsel's failure to object to the 
breach [of the plea agreement] at the time of 
sentencing constitutes a waiver of the issue, Mr. 
Toliver requests resentencing on the grounds that he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 361.  Toliver presented no material facts to support his 
postconviction motion, and the court of appeals concluded that 
Toliver was not entitled to a hearing.  Id.  
¶20 In Washington, the defendant pled guilty to several 
charges.  He later filed a postconviction motion alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Washington, 176 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
13 
 
207.  In his motion, Washington requested an order allowing him 
to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel on 
the following grounds: 
[T]hat the attorney representing the defendant at the 
time of the plea, . . ., failed to keep him fully 
apprised of the events transpiring within his case, 
failed to completely review all of the necessary 
discovery material and other factual matters involved 
in the determination of the plea, failed to completely 
and fully investigate any and all matters which would 
be of importance in determining whether motions should 
be brought prior to the trial, whether the trial 
should proceed, and failing to completely investigate 
all matters which would be of importance in allowing 
the defendant to make a determination as to whether to 
proceed with a guilty plea, or continue to trial. 
Id. at 212.  The court of appeals concluded that this motion was 
"replete with conclusory allegations," and contained no material 
facts entitling Washington to relief.  Id. at 215. 
¶21 There is a clear theme running through these and other 
similar cases.  As we said in Bentley, the motion must include 
facts that "allow the reviewing court to meaningfully assess 
[the defendant's] claim." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314.  For 
example, an insufficient statement that does not allow the court 
to meaningfully assess a defendant's claim might be an assertion 
that trial counsel did not adequately prepare for trial.  This 
assertion is the defendant's opinion only, and it does not 
allege a factual basis for the opinion.  On the other hand, a 
defendant's assertion that trial counsel failed to adequately 
prepare for trial because counsel did not review all the police 
reports and one police report contained exculpatory information 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
14 
 
that counsel did not put into evidence, alleges a factual basis 
for the assertion.  See Saunders, 196 Wis. 2d at 51-52. 
¶22 In addition, facts that allow a reviewing court to 
meaningfully assess a defendant's claim are those facts that are 
material to the issue presented to the court.  A "material fact" 
is:  "[a] fact that is significant or essential to the issue or 
matter at hand."  Black's Law Dictionary 611 (7th ed. 1999).  In 
this case, they would be facts material to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  If a defendant's sole 
contention is that trial counsel failed to object to the 
admission of certain evidence and that failure was deficient and 
prejudicial, the fact that one of the witnesses on the witness 
list was not called during trial is not material to the 
defendant's allegation, if that witness would not have testified 
as to why the admitted evidence against the defendant was not 
credible.  However, that same fact, of a witness who was not 
called, would be material if the defendant's contention is that 
at trial the witness was crucial to the defense because that 
witness would have provided testimony supporting the defendant's 
version of his or her whereabouts on the night of the crime.   
¶23 As an assistance to defendants and their counsel, we 
propose that postconviction motions sufficient to meet the 
Bentley standard7 allege the five "w's" and one "h"; that is, 
who, what, where, when, why, and how.  A motion that alleges, 
                                                 
7 That is, the motion must raise sufficient facts, which, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief.  State v. Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).   
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
15 
 
within the four corners of the document itself, the kind of 
material factual objectivity we describe above will necessarily 
include sufficient material facts for reviewing courts to 
meaningfully assess a defendant's claim. 
¶24 Perhaps a hypothetical example will help to explain:  
A postconviction motion that alleges counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to call as a witness the defendant's neighbor 
who, the defendant alleges, could provide exculpatory testimony 
because the neighbor saw the defendant and her boyfriend at a 
restaurant on the night of the crime still fails to meet the 
Bentley standard because it fails to include sufficient material 
facts.  The defendant simply concludes that the failure to call 
this witness was deficient performance that was prejudicial, 
because she was found guilty.  However, she does not explain any 
more than that.  Her neighbor may have seen her with her 
boyfriend at a restaurant on the night of the crime, but she has 
failed to explain how and why this matters.  On the other hand, 
the defendant has satisfied the Bentley standard if her 
postconviction motion alleges as follows: 
The defendant alleges she was deprived effective 
assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed 
to call as a witness, Bill Johnson, whose testimony 
would support the defendant's testimony that she was 
dining and going to the movies with her boyfriend at 
10:00 p.m. on the night of June 1, 2002, when Sally's 
Hair Salon was burglarized.   
The 
defendant 
told 
trial 
counsel 
that 
her 
neighbor, Bill Johnson, entered a restaurant around 
7:00 p.m. while the defendant and her boyfriend were 
dining, and that on the way to be seated, Mr. Johnson 
stopped at defendant's table and talked with the 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
16 
 
couple.  The defendant told trial counsel that 
following dinner she and her boyfriend saw Mr. Johnson 
at the movie theater while they waited in line to buy 
tickets for a 9:15 p.m. movie.  The defendant informed 
her trial counsel that three movies were scheduled to 
start between 9:00 p.m. and 9:15 p.m., the time during 
which the defendant and her boyfriend were in the 
theater lobby and saw Mr. Johnson.  The defendant 
further alleges that she gave trial counsel her 
receipt from the restaurant.   
This failure to call Mr. Johnson as a witness was 
deficient and prejudicial to the defendant as there is 
a reasonable probability that she would not have been 
convicted of stealing hair products from Sally's Hair 
Salon had Mr. Johnson testified.        
This motion contains sufficient material facts——i.e., the name 
of the witness (who), the reason the witness is important (why, 
how), and facts that can be proven (what, where, when)——that 
clearly satisfy the Bentley standard, and would entitle a 
defendant to a hearing. 
¶25 With the foregoing standard in mind, we turn now to 
Allen's postconviction motion.   
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
17 
 
C. 
Allen's Postconviction Motion 
 
1. 
Ineffective assistance, standards 
¶26 Allen's postconviction motion is centered on his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.8  We follow a two-part test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. 
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).  A 
defendant must prove both that his or her attorney's performance 
was 
deficient 
and 
that 
the 
deficient 
performance 
was 
prejudicial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 
at 127.  We have determined that an attorney's performance is 
deficient if the attorney "made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment."  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  The defendant must also show the 
performance was prejudicial, which is defined as "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  State v. Guerard, 2004 
WI 85, ¶43, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___(citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694).  "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. 
(quotations omitted).  A movant must prevail on both parts of 
the test to be afforded relief.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.   
                                                 
8 Allen 
has 
not 
pursued 
on 
appeal 
his 
request 
for 
postconviction discovery; therefore, we do not address that 
issue.  Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. R/A Adver., Inc., 102 Wis. 2d 
305, 306 n.1, 306 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1981).     
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
18 
 
2. 
Allegations in Allen's postconviction motion 
¶27 Allen's postconviction motion claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel alleged his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to be prepared to examine Bobby B.; failing to call 
Lynn Allen as a witness;9 and failing to submit a motion 
requesting the in camera inspection of potentially exculpatory 
evidence.  The court of appeals categorized these areas 
generally as allegations that counsel did not adequately 
investigate or prepare for trial, a claim that Allen furthers in 
his briefs to this court.  However, we will review only the 
allegations 
contained 
in 
the 
four 
corners 
of 
Allen's 
postconviction motion, and not any additional allegations that 
are contained in Allen's brief.  Allen's motion contains the 
following: 
[T]here were no pretrial motions brought forward by 
the defense prior to trial.  Also,  . . . information 
was provided to counsel by Mr. Allen with respect to 
witnesses, and Mr. Allen claims that there was no 
trial preparation and only one visit with him prior to 
trial. 
The defense put forward on behalf of Mr. Allen 
consisted 
of 
the 
cross-examination 
of 
those who 
accused him and the calling of two witnesses, a Bobby 
[B.], the father of two of the victims, and the 
defendant, himself. 
The testimony of Mr. [B.] (Exhibit B, transcript 
of May 1, 2001) was contentious and defense counsel 
was left with his answers when there was a denial that 
                                                 
9 Allen has not pursued on appeal his claim that counsel was 
deficient for failing to call Lynn Allen as a witness; 
therefore, we deem that issue waived and do not address it.  
Reiman, 102 Wis. 2d at 306 n.1. 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
19 
 
Mr. [B.] had written a letter to the Sensitive Crime 
Unit of Milwaukee County as to how his daughters were 
being treated in their then household.  Counsel had 
not thought to discover whether the letter existed and 
certainly did not obtain a copy of it. 
The testimony of the defendant was nothing more 
than 
denials 
of 
the 
allegations, 
with 
vague 
assumptions as to why the victims would be lying. 
No credible evidence was put forward with respect 
to any motive for the victims to fabricate the 
allegations. 
The theory of the defense, therefore, was a mere 
denial 
of 
the 
allegations 
with 
innuendo 
and 
speculation as to why there might be a motive to 
fabricate, 
unsubstantiated 
by 
any 
evidence, 
whatsoever. 
Further, Mr. Allen claims that there was no 
effort, in any way, to seek to substantiate said 
evidence and present it to the jury. 
 
 
a. 
Failure to prepare to examine Bobby B. 
¶28 Allen's first allegation is that his trial counsel 
failed to prepare to examine the first defense witness, Bobby B.  
The motion summarizes the exchange between Bobby B. and defense 
counsel regarding the letter Allen alleges Bobby B. sent to 
Milwaukee County's Sensitive Crimes Unit.  The motion asserts 
that because trial counsel had failed to produce the letter, he 
was left with Bobby B.'s testimony, in which Bobby B. denied 
writing such a letter.  "The fumbling of the Bobby [B.] 
examination would logically have a great impact on the jury as 
[it] prepared to evaluate the defense to the allegations.  . . .  
Counsel was left looking foolish with respect to his first 
witness . . . ."   
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
20 
 
¶29 Though replete with information, the motion contains 
conclusory allegations and lacks sufficient material facts that 
Bentley requires.  Allen's allegations that trial counsel did 
not do any trial preparation and "had not thought to discover 
whether the letter existed" are conclusions he does not support 
with material facts.  Allen's focus on the letter seems to 
derive from his conclusion that Bobby B. and his former wife, 
Lynn Allen, are engaged in a placement dispute over Shalisia, 
and that Bobby B., in an effort to ensure Shalisia's placement 
with him, wrote a letter to Milwaukee County's Sensitive Crimes 
Unit alleging that Allen sexually assaulted Shalisia and 
Tekiara.  However, Allen has not alleged sufficient material 
facts to support his conclusion that such a letter actually 
exists.  He must provide some reason, some fact, that supports 
the existence of the letter, otherwise his assertion is 
conclusory.  For example, he does not allege that Shalisia or 
Tekiara or his wife or some other person saw the letter or 
simply told him that Bobby B. wrote a letter reporting the 
alleged 
sexual 
assaults. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
Allen's 
postconviction motion on the alleged failure of counsel to 
adequately 
prepare 
to 
examine 
Bobby 
B. 
does 
not 
allege 
sufficient material facts that, if proven, would entitle him to 
relief.  
b. 
Failure to call other witnesses 
¶30 Allen's motion also contains a vague reference about 
trial counsel's failure to contact or call other witnesses.  
This allegation is wholly unsupported.  Allen makes no attempt 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
21 
 
to explain who the witnesses are, what the witnesses would say, 
how they know it, or why it is relevant to his defense.  
Further, the record conclusively shows that Allen is not 
entitled to the relief he requests.  See Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 
496 (stating, "[W]here the record sufficiently refutes the 
allegations raised by the defendant in the motion, no hearing is 
required").  Allen complained during a transfer hearing before 
Judge John DiMotto, the original circuit court judge, and then 
later at the start of trial before Judge Donald, that his lawyer 
was not allowing him to call certain witnesses on his behalf, 
nor investigating his claims of exculpatory evidence.  At both 
court appearances, trial counsel informed the court that the 
witnesses Allen wanted to call did not have any relevant 
information, and that all leads had been investigated and did 
not amount to anything.    
 
 
c. 
Failure to file a "Shiffra motion" 
¶31 State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 499 N.W.2d 719 
(Ct. App. 1993), and its progeny, see, e.g., State v. Green, 
2002 WI 68, ¶34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, and State v. 
Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶7, 248 Wis. 2d 396, 636 N.W.2d 481, 
allow a defendant to request an in camera review of privileged 
or confidential records upon a preliminary good-faith showing of 
"a specific factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood 
that the records contain relevant information necessary to a 
determination of guilt or innocence and [are] not merely 
cumulative to other evidence available to the defendant."  
Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶34.  Shiffra and Green deal with 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
22 
 
privileged or confidential records.  In both the Shiffra and 
Green cases, the defendants were charged with sexual crimes, and 
in both cases, both defendants sought an in camera review of the 
alleged victim's counseling records.  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶9; Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 603.  In Navarro, the defendant 
requested 
confidential 
department 
of 
corrections 
records 
relating 
to 
the 
alleged 
victim, 
a 
correctional 
officer.  
Navarro, 248 Wis. 2d 396, ¶¶3-4.  Allen does not request review 
of the victims' privileged or confidential records.  Therefore, 
his motion is not a "Shiffra motion."  
¶32 Instead, Allen's motion contends that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion for an in 
camera review of other court documents containing what he 
alleges to be potentially exculpatory evidence.  Allen asserted 
that it became apparent that defense counsel was going to 
attempt to introduce evidence of Bobby B.'s conviction for 
sexual assault, and evidence of the placement dispute between 
Bobby B. and Lynn Allen.  Prior to the start of trial, the 
circuit court ruled that defense counsel could not reference 
Bobby B.'s sexual assault conviction or the placement dispute in 
his opening statement.  As a result, defense counsel waived his 
opening statement.  Allen claims that because trial counsel did 
not make a pre-trial motion for review of "any related court 
proceedings, prosecutions, affidavits, or any form of evidence, 
whatsoever," the defense was unable to rebut the State's 
argument that the only defense Allen had was speculation.  Allen 
submits that this failure to establish whether any evidence 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
23 
 
actually existed left the circuit court and Allen "adrift" and 
denied him a fair trial. 
¶33 As with his first alleged failure of trial counsel, 
Allen provides many facts, but no material facts.  Allen does 
not list what records actually exist or whether they are 
privileged, and he asserts no facts explaining why any such 
records may be relevant.  He simply sets forth a general list of 
documents that he asserts potentially could contain information 
that he guesses is out there.  Further, Allen provides only his 
opinion 
that 
the 
records 
he 
seeks 
contain 
relevant 
or 
exculpatory information; this is not a fact.  There is no 
factual basis to believe that Bobby B. encouraged his daughters 
to concoct sexual assault charges against Allen in order to aid 
his placement dispute with their mother.  Furthermore, it is 
just as likely that any records on the placement dispute bear 
out Shalisia's testimony:  that she wanted to live with her 
father primarily because of the assaults she experienced at the 
hands of her stepfather.  Further, any conviction Bobby B. may 
have for sexual assault of a child was held not to be admissible 
and therefore, would have been of no use to Allen's defense.    
¶34 We conclude that Allen again has failed to raise 
sufficient material facts that would entitle him to the relief 
he seeks; therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in denying his motion without a hearing.   
3. 
New trial in the interest of justice 
¶35 Finally, Allen argued that he was entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice because the real controversy 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
24 
 
was not tried and there was a miscarriage of justice.  Because 
we conclude that none of Allen's other claims has merit, we 
decline to order a new trial.  See Mentek v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 
799, 809, 238 N.W.2d 752 (1976) (indicating that the court would 
not order a new trial because it found defendant's earlier 
arguments without substance and "[a]dding them together [to 
claim that justice was not served] adds nothing.  Zero plus zero 
equals zero").    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶36 We conclude that in order to secure a hearing on a 
postconviction motion, Allen must have provided sufficient 
material facts——e.g., who, what, where, when, why, and how——
that, if true, would entitle him to the relief he seeks.  
Because Allen failed to do so, and because the record also 
conclusively demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief, we 
conclude the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion when it denied Allen's motion without a hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
All work on this opinion was completed on or before June 
30, 2004.  Justice Diane S. Sykes resigned on July 4, 2004. 
 
No. 
02-2555-CR 
   
 
 
 
1