Title: Martin v. Alley Const., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Martin v. Alley Const., Inc.1995 WY 177904 P.2d 828Case Number: 95-25Decided: 10/23/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

Joel Patrick MARTIN, 
Personal Representative of the

 Estate of Joel Irskin Martin, deceased, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

ALLEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
and Patrick Alley, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Glen H. Johnson 
of Johnson Huffman, P.C., Rapid City, South Dakota; James L. Edwards of Stevens, 
Edwards & Hallock, P.C., Gillette, for appellant.

Daniel E. 
Ashmore, Mark J. Connot of Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, Rapid City, 
South Dakota; J. Stan Wolfe, Gillette, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal we 
determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in a 
co-employee, culpable negligence1 case. 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Joel Patrick 
Martin2 raises these issues:

Did the District Court 
err in concluding that material fact issues do not exist?

Did the District Court 
improperly apply the law of comparative negligence in this culpable negligence 
case?

[¶4]      Patrick Alley3 summarizes the issue 
thus:

Did the district court 
properly grant summary judgment as to the issue of Patrick Alley's alleged 
culpable negligence?

[¶5]      During the early 
months of 1992, Alley was constructing an 80' x 180' metal building in Gillette. 
On March 3, 1992, the metal siding had been completed and about 60% of the 
roofing insulation and metal roof skin had been installed. The insulation was 
made of four-inch thick fiberglass with a vinyl white covering and was installed 
in rolls that ran from eave to eave over the top of the building. At the time of 
this accident, the peak of the roof was only covered with the fiberglass 
insulation until the roofing was sufficiently complete so that the ridge cap 
could be installed. The "gap" at the peak of the roof was approximately twelve 
to eighteen inches wide and may have been wider in some areas. In addition, the 
last six to eight inches of the roof, just before the "gap," was not secure and 
could buckle under the weight of a man.

[¶6]      On March 3, 1992, 
Martin showed up at the work site to see if day-work was available (one of 
Alley's employees told him such work might be available). Because of the 
possibility of windy conditions, Alley needed extra men to help with the roofing 
and to do other tasks as the metal sheets were being installed.4 Martin was directed to come up on 
the roof. He was wearing cowboy boots. The pitch of the roof on the building was 
very gradual. Alley testified he told and demonstrated to Martin where to step 
and where not to step, directing him to stay away from the insulation "gap." 
Martin was walking somewhat behind and to the left of Alley as they moved across 
the roof. Alley looked over at Martin as they crossed the "gap" and saw him go 
through the roof. Martin fell approximately twenty-eight feet to the concrete 
pad which formed the floor of the metal building. Martin had been on the roof 
less than ten minutes in all.

[¶7]      On January 14, 
1994, suit was filed alleging Martin's injuries resulted from Alley's culpable 
negligence. Alley answered Martin had already received worker's compensation 
benefits and he had not been culpably negligent in the circumstances leading to 
Martin's fall.5 Alley filed a motion for summary 
judgment which was granted by the district court.

[¶8]      Martin contends 
the district court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of material 
fact and Alley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martin's theory is 
this: Alley was exercising direct supervisory control over Martin at the time of 
the accident and could have prevented the fall; Alley knew the metal had an oily 
surface, was slippery and that Martin should have been instructed not to wear 
cowboy boots; Alley did not take the time to properly instruct Martin about 
where or how to step, that the edge of the metal roof near the insulation might 
buckle under his weight, and the insulation "gap" was a serious danger. He also 
contends Alley was more concerned with telling him where not to step, because of 
possible damage to the roof, than with the potential danger to 
Martin.

[¶9]      Martin maintains, 
whereas Alley and Alley's foreman on this job testified in deposition and 
affidavit that Martin had been instructed how to safely walk across the roof, 
other employees contradicted that testimony, thus creating a genuine issue of 
material fact. He refers to the deposition of Bobby Hart as supporting that 
proposition but Hart stated in his deposition Alley specifically instructed 
Martin where to walk and that "whatever you do, don't step in the middle." 
Martin also refers to the deposition of Corbin Moudy, another employee on this 
job. Moudy testified he really did not hear the conversation in any significant 
detail, but he did observe Alley showing Martin where to step and saying "that's 
where you step" (pointing to the purlins6). Another point made by Martin in 
his brief is Martin was not told he should not step on the metal near the "gap" 
because it could give way and the oil-coated metal was very slippery. Although 
no one really saw exactly what happened, it appeared Martin stepped on the edge 
of the metal roofing because it was bent at the location where he fell through 
the insulation material. Martin also contends there is a dispute as to whether, 
when he fell through the roof, he was carrying, or dragging, or helping Alley 
carry a piece of metal sheeting. Alley related Martin was not carrying, nor 
helping to carry, a piece of metal but that he was taking Martin to the north 
side of the roof to show him how to apply adhesive stripping which went between 
the insulation and the metal sheeting. The only evidence to the contrary is a 
supposition that Martin was carrying a piece of metal because there was one 
lying on the roof near the spot where he fell through.

[¶10]   Continuing, Martin contends it 
would have been better and safer to have placed the ridge cap over the "gap" as 
the construction project went along, thus reducing the hazard to workers such as 
Martin. However, the only evidence in the record, other than Martin's 
speculation, was to the effect that placing the ridge cap on as the last task in 
finishing the roof was standard practice and not a safety hazard so long as 
employees followed directions not to step on or near it. The reason the ridge 
cap was placed last was because it had to be on straight and that determination 
could not be made until all the other metal sheeting for the roof was in 
place.

[¶11]   Martin also points to a total lack 
of safety training or safety meetings as an element of his claim of culpable 
neglect. The record does reflect no formal training was accomplished by Alley 
and, of course, the only training of any sort Martin received was the few 
minutes of directions given by Alley just before Martin fell through the 
roof.

[¶12]   Finally, Martin contends Alley 
should have noted Martin was wearing cowboy boots, that cowboys boots would 
present a significant hazard on the roof, and Alley should not have allowed 
Martin to go to work wearing cowboy boots.

[¶13]   Our standard of review in cases 
such as this is well-delineated. Summary judgment is proper only when there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. We review a summary judgment in the same light as 
the district court, using the same materials and same standards. We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion 
and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record. Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 1995) 
(quoting Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 342 (Wyo. 1989)); Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 681 (Wyo. 1992). While summary judgment is seldom appropriate in 
simple negligence cases, culpable negligence involves more than unreasonable 
conduct; it involves willfulness and when a party fails to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact on this element, summary judgment is appropriate. Calkins v. 
Boydston, 796 P.2d 452, 454 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶14]   At the next level of review 
standards, we have defined "culpable negligence" as acts which are intentional, 
unreasonable and taken in disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to 
make it probable injury will follow and, further, it involves an extreme 
departure from ordinary care in a situation where a high degree of danger is 
apparent. Thoughtless, heedless, or inadvertent acts do not constitute culpable 
negligence, nor do mere errors in judgment or simple inattention. Mistakes in 
judgment resulting from inexperience, excitement, confusion, or inattention 
likewise do not constitute culpable negligence. McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Wyo. 1995); Throckmartin, 893 P.2d at 714-15; Morris, 837 P.2d  at 
682; Calkins, 796 P.2d  at 454-55 (and see cases summarized therein).

[¶15]   Here, Martin contends Alley failed 
to show him how to safely work on the roof. The evidence of record is 
uncontradicted that Alley showed Martin how to cautiously move about the roof so 
as to avoid the only significant hazard he had to face - falling through the 
insulation. On this factor, it cannot be concluded Alley acted with culpable 
negligence, though it may have been an error in judgment to expect Martin to 
"catch on" so quickly.7 Martin contends Alley should have 
put the ridge cap on as the work went along, so as to avoid the safety hazard 
which took Martin's life. There is no evidence in the record to suggest anything 
more than that such a procedure would have been "preferable" or "more safe" than 
the procedure which was used and which was standard practice according to the 
testimony in the record. On this factor we cannot conclude there is evidence 
from which it might be inferred Alley was culpably negligent, or for that matter 
negligent in any sense. Martin contends more safety training should have been 
provided to Martin. Alley was not cited for any safety violations in this 
matter, except for his failure to have reported the accident within the time 
required by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. More training 
would, no doubt, have been of significant benefit. However, it cannot be 
concluded on the record that such failing on Alley's part rises to the level so 
as to infer Alley acted with willful disregard for Martin's safety in the face 
of an obvious danger. On this factor we cannot conclude there is evidence Alley 
was culpably negligent. Martin contends Alley should not have allowed Martin to 
work in cowboy boots. There is no evidence in the record this circumstance was a 
safety hazard under the working conditions present the day Martin was injured. 
Certainly, however, we cannot conclude from this circumstance that Alley was 
culpably negligent in that regard.

[¶16]   Finally, there is in Martin's brief 
a suggestion that cumulatively the circumstances outlined above constituted 
culpable neglect. Having reviewed our rather extensive jurisprudence with regard 
to culpable negligence,8 we conclude that, taken as a whole, 
the record does not contain evidence from which it could be inferred by a fact 
finder that Alley's actions were willful or he knew of a hazard which was likely 
to produce injury to Martin. Certainly, it cannot be gainsaid that there were 
hazards associated with the sort of work Martin hired on to perform. It is 
evident from this record those are the hazards of that sort of work under most 
usual conditions. That is the very purpose of the worker's compensation benefits 
which Martin did receive. The purpose of damages in the culpable neglect arena 
is to deter willful carelessness which is doubtlessly destined to produce injury 
to an employee. Objectively viewed, no evidence in this record suggests that 
remedy is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, though, of course, 
we are mindful of the serious consequences this accident had for Martin and his 
family.

[¶17]   Martin also contends the district 
court improperly applied the law of comparative negligence in this culpable 
negligence case. In its order granting summary judgment to Alley, the district 
court stated, "That knowledge and appreciation of the danger, if based on common 
sense, is attributed to both the employee and employer. This danger on the roof 
should have been known to both parties, especially when Joel Martin was told 
where to step and where not to step on the roof." It is evident from the record 
as a whole the district court applied the jurisprudence of culpable negligence 
in deciding the case, just as we have done in this appeal. The reference to what 
sounds like "comparative negligence" is, perhaps, faulty and imprecise, but it 
can constitute nothing more than harmless error under the circumstances of this 
case. WYO.R.APP.P. 9.04.

[¶18]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.

Footnotes

1 See Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1993).

2 Joel Irskin Martin died 
of injuries suffered in the course and scope of his employment. Joel Patrick 
Martin, the deceased's son, serves as his personal representative in this 
litigation. For convenience and clarity, we will use "Martin" when referring to 
the decedent, as well as to his personal representative.

3 Martin's complaint also 
included a claim against Alley Construction, Inc. That claim is not pursued in 
this appeal and, of course, it could not be under the theory of co-employee, 
culpable negligence. No other theory was pursued below or in this appeal. See 
McKennan v. Wyoming Sawmills, Inc., 816 P.2d 1303 (Wyo. 1991).

4 Alley hired many 
employees in this manner, i.e., for day-work. On the day of the accident at 
least three of the other eight employees working that day had been hired that 
same way. Alley generally required new employees to have some experience on oil 
rigs, metal buildings, or pole barns. The employee who told Martin day-work 
might be available represented to Alley that Martin had experience assembling 
pole barns.

5 The thrust of Martin's 
complaint was really that Martin had not been an employee of Alley Construction, 
i.e., no agreement Martin would be employed had been consummated before he fell. 
The district court determined Martin was an employee and that decision is not a 
subject of this appeal. However, the district court resolved the remaining 
issues in the case on the basis of the culpable negligence claim and that was 
Alley's principal defense to this lawsuit.

6 Purlins are horizontal 
members in a roof supported on the principals and supporting the common rafters. 
The location of the purlins was noticeable from the roof because the metal roof 
sheeting was screwed down to the purlins, i.e., the screws which held the metal 
sheets to the purlins marked the route where it was safe to walk.

7 Alley testified in 
deposition that, although he had been in the business of constructing such metal 
buildings for many years (approximately 15), he had never had anyone fall 
through the roof as Martin did.

8 See generally Morris v. 
Smith, 837 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1992), and Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989). 
Those cases are instances in which detailed analysis differentiated between 
co-employee actions which create genuine issues of material fact and those which 
do not.