Title: Kavanaugh v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kavanaugh v. State1989 WY 55769 P.2d 908Case Number: 88-46, 88-47Decided: 02/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
HELEN 
KAVANAUGH, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
ROBERT 
MARKLAND, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 
 
Steven R. 
Czoschke, Gillette, for 
appellants.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The major issue 
presented in these combined appeals is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in imposing the sentences that it did upon Kavanaugh for aiding and 
abetting sexual assault in the second degree and upon Markland for committing 
sexual assault in the second degree. Additional questions are presented by the 
appellants who challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
convictions and assert that the district court erred in refusing to grant their 
respective motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We hold 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences, 
and we are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
convictions. We also are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the respective motions for new trial. We affirm the 
judgments and sentences of both appellants.

 
 

[¶2.]     In his brief as 
appellant, Robert Markland (Markland) asserts the following 
issues:

 
 
"I. THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PROBATION TO THE DEFENDANT AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF 
NOT LESS THAN TEN YEARS NOR MORE THAN LIFE IN THE WYOMING STATE 
PENITENTIARY.

 
 
"II. THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

 
 
"III. THERE 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL FOR THE JURY TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF VIOLATION OF W.S. SECTION 6-2-303(a)(ii)."

 
 
In her 
brief of appellant, Helen Kavanaugh (Kavanaugh) asserts identical issues except 
that her statutory reference in Issue III is to § 6-1-201, W.S. 1977, instead of 
§ 6-2-203(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. The State of Wyoming, as appellee, presented one brief 
responding to both appeals, and its articulation of the issues 
is:

 
 
"I. WHETHER 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING APPELLANTS TO TERMS OF 
IMPRISONMENT?

 
 
"II. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' MOTIONS FOR NEW 
TRIAL?

 
 
"III. 
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS FOR SECOND 
DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT AND AIDING AND ABETTING SECOND DEGREE 
ASSAULT?

 
 
"IV. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT CORROBORATION OF THE 
VICTIM'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT REQUIRED, AND WHETHER ANY SUCH ERROR WAS 
PREJUDICIAL?"

 
 

[¶3.]     We commence our review 
with a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence. It, of course, must be 
evaluated in the light of the charges upon which the appellants were convicted. 
Section 6-2-303, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), which Markland was convicted of 
violating provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
"(a) Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) The 
actor causes submission of the victim by any means that would prevent resistance 
by a victim of ordinary resolution; * * *."

 
 
Kavanaugh's 
conviction was for a violation of § 6-1-201, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), which 
provides, in that part applicable here:

 
 
"(a) A 
person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who 
counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is 
an accessory before the fact.

 
 
"(b) An 
accessory before the fact:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(iii) Upon 
conviction, is subject to the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by 
law for the punishment of the principal."

 
 
The jury 
was instructed that the elements of sexual assault in the second degree 
are:

 
 
"1. The 
defendant Robert Markland inflicted sexual intrusion on [the victim]; 
and,

 
 
"2. The 
defendant Robert Markland caused submission of [the victim] by any means that 
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; * * 
*."

 
 
With 
respect to the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting sexual assault in 
the second degree, the jury was instructed as follows:

 
 
"1. 
Offenses of sexual assault in the second degree were committed by Robert 
Markland; and

 
 
"2. The 
defendant Helen Kavanaugh knowingly and willfully counseled, encouraged, hired, 
commanded, or otherwise procured those offenses to be committed; * * 
*."

 
 

[¶4.]     In determining whether 
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, we apply the rule set 
forth in Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Wyo. 1986):

 
 
"`[T]his 
court is to examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to 
determine if there is sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict. Broom v. State, 
695 P.2d 640, 646 (Wyo. 1985).' Aden v. State, Wyo., 717 P.2d 326 (1986) at 
327."

 
 
This 
standard was followed in Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1987), and Aden v. State, 717 P.2d 326 (Wyo. 1986). See also 
Young v. State, 678 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1984); 
Harvey v. State, 596 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1979). In doing so, 
we do not weigh the evidence, and we do not re-examine the credibility of 
witnesses, even if there is only one crucial witness as in this case. Johnston. That function is 
assigned to the jurors who, because they can observe the demeanor and composure 
of the witnesses, are in the best position to evaluate credibility and resolve 
conflicts in the testimony. Righter v. State, 752 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston; Broom 
v. State, 695 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1985); Russell v. 
State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1978); Janski v. 
State, 538 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1975).

 
 

[¶5.]     The victim in this case 
was Kavanaugh's minor daughter, then age sixteen. Markland was forty years old 
and, at the time of the offense, was sharing a townhouse with Kavanaugh and her 
divorced sister. Kavanaugh had been living with Markland continuously for about 
twelve years. The victim had first come to live with them when she was about 
eight or nine years old. In October of 1986, she married, and she and her 
husband moved to Hawaii. In April of 1987, she sought 
permission to return to Gillette, and Markland and Kavanaugh agreed to that. 
Markland provided the funds for travel. He also paid for an abortion to 
terminate the victim's pregnancy.

 
 

[¶6.]     With respect to the 
events resulting in these convictions, the victim testified that, about June 11 
of 1987, Markland asked her to shower with him. She did so and, during their 
shower, he engaged in cunnilingus with her. This activity was consistent with 
the victim's acceptance of Markland's proposition that she should become his 
mistress and that he would furnish her a car if she did. After the shower 
incident, the victim advised Markland that she did not wish to continue the 
arrangement because she was not comfortable in doing so. Markland replied that 
her decision was okay, but she would not receive the car. Nevertheless, a few 
days later, after a struggle, Markland again engaged the victim in oral sex. 
That sexual activity resulted in vaginal intercourse between Markland and the 
victim. After this episode, the victim determined to leave the house, and she 
did so.

 
 

[¶7.]     About a month later, 
she went to the business premises which Kavanaugh and Markland used and 
confronted them about retrieving her clothing and other belongings from their 
house. Kavanaugh and Markland refused and told the victim that these items were 
being held as collateral for money which they had advanced to her. The victim 
became angry and went to a friend's house where she told the story of sexual 
activities involving both Markland and Kavanaugh. The authorities then were 
notified, and criminal proceedings were initiated against Kavanaugh and 
Markland.

 
 

[¶8.]     Markland denied the 
victim's allegations of sexual misconduct, and Kavanaugh denied any knowledge of 
any sexual contact. Their stance was that the victim had fabricated the story 
because she was not able to "get her way" and because they would not return her 
belongings. 

 
 

[¶9.]     At trial, evidence was 
introduced of a free sexual lifestyle prevailing in the household. That evidence 
disclosed that Markland and Kavanaugh frequently appeared nude around the house 
and often took showers together. The evidence also discloses that it was their 
custom to take nude photographs of each other, as well as other unclad 
acquaintances, and place them in the "family album." When the victim initially 
came to live with Markland and Kavanaugh, Markland required her to shower with 
him. Then nude photographs of her, often including one or the other of the 
appellants, also nude, appeared in the "family album." This sexual lifestyle 
continued as the victim matured, and her conduct and social development 
deteriorated so much that she was committed to the girl's school in Sheridan. After her 
release from the girl's school, she married an employee of Markland, and she and 
her husband went to live in Hawaii.

 
 

[¶10.]  The testimony of the victim was 
sufficient to establish the element of sexual intrusion with respect to the 
charge against Markland. The circumstances surrounding the lifestyle in the 
house justify the finding that the victim's submission was the product of means 
that would prevent resistance in a person of ordinary resolution. Those 
circumstances produced a distorted perception of proper parent-child relations, 
proper sexual conduct, and induced the victim to conclude that this was normal 
behavior. Expert psychological testimony established that the victim considered 
appellants' behavior as normal. Part of her confusion in establishing the dates 
of sexual misconduct was attributable to her inability to identify sexual 
misconduct. In addition, Markland was an authority figure who had, in effect, 
assumed the role of a stepfather for a number of years. The jury also was 
entitled to consider the offer of a material reward to become Markland's 
mistress. The submission to sexual acts with Markland under the circumstances 
was clearly the product of these events and circumstances, and the jury was 
entitled to find that a person of ordinary resolution would have been prevented 
from resisting Markland. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Markland's 
conviction.

 
 

[¶11.]  Turning then to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the case of Kavanaugh, the first element of that offense is 
established by Markland's conviction. With respect to the second element, the 
victim testified that Kavanaugh counseled and encouraged her to have sexual 
relations with Markland. She said things such as, "[W]ell, I don't care if you 
use Robert for a night" and if someone "had offered to buy [her] a car and 
everything else included if [she] would sleep with them a few times, [she] would 
jump at the chance." Kavanaugh explained other "advantages" of an intimate 
relationship with Markland by saying, "[W]ell, if you slept with Robert you . . 
. wouldn't have to worry about getting hurt or catching diseases like you would 
with some of these other people you've been sleeping around with." In addition, 
when hearing the victim struggling with Markland as she resisted his advances, 
Kavanaugh came downstairs and said to the victim, "[I]f I hear one more noise 
out of you, I am going to come back down here and kill you." This is clear 
evidence that Kavanaugh aided and abetted Markland in the commission of his 
crime.

 
 

[¶12.]  Furthermore, Kavanaugh admitted to seeing 
the victim holding Markland's penis in her hand. This manifests concrete 
knowledge of sexual contact between those two despite Kavanaugh's denial of such 
knowledge. When observing this event, Kavanaugh remained silent and allowed the 
conduct to persist. Her silence and her encouragement further manifest the 
second element of the offense of aiding and abetting sexual assault. The jury 
was entitled to accept the victim's testimony as probative, and it sustains the 
individual elements of the charge against Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh's conviction is 
supported by sufficient evidence.

 
 

[¶13.]  The "family album" was placed in 
evidence, as were certain pornographic movies, sexual toys, and sexual aids 
discovered by the police. These are not necessarily probative of sexual activity 
involving the victim. Other witnesses for the State had no direct knowledge of 
these events. Kavanaugh's sister's testimony was that she was not aware of any 
untoward behavior in the household. Thus, the proof of the appellants' crimes in 
this case must be found in the victim's testimony.

 
 

[¶14.]  Markland and Kavanaugh urge in their 
appeals that her testimony, without more, is not sufficient to sustain their 
convictions. They regard it as entirely unbelievable, and contend that this 
court must reach the same conclusion. They point to the fact that the victim was 
biased against them, inconsistent in her testimony, and appears essentially to 
be simply an ungrateful, spiteful child seeking revenge by lying about imaginary 
wrongs. They also point to the lack of any physical evidence and maintain 
correctly that the evidence is not sufficient without the victim's testimony. 
They argue that her testimony is totally fabricated and a "fairy 
tale."

 
 

[¶15.]  The appellants' arguments in this court 
are contrary to the standard by which we review the evidence. It is not our 
function to determine the victim's credibility or to weigh the evidence in the 
case. The jury that tried the case concluded that the victim was credible, and 
that conclusion determines the issue of credibility. The jury also was satisfied 
that the evidence established the elements of the offense, and there is no 
absence of evidence. The members of the jury resolved the conflicts in the 
testimony in favor of the State and against the defendants, which they were 
entitled to do. In accordance with the authority previously cited, we have no 
choice but to affirm the convictions despite appellants' arguments that the 
victim was not credible and, therefore, the evidence was 
insufficient.

 
 

[¶16.]  The appellants' claim of error relating 
to failure to grant their motions for a new trial is a tandem argument. Their 
motions were premised upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. The granting 
or denial of such a motion is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and its ruling will not be reversed in the absence of an affirmative 
showing that there was an abuse of discretion. Keser v. State, 737 P.2d 756 
(Wyo. 1987); Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531 
(Wyo. 1983); Siegert v. State, 634 P.2d 323 
(Wyo. 1981); Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 
(Wyo. 1967). 
Our review is limited to a consideration of any abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. The burden of demonstrating that abuse is upon the appellants. Siegert; 
Opie.

 
 

[¶17.]  Our rule is that the abuse of discretion 
is present only when four specific criteria have been established. These are: 
(1) the evidence has come to the movant's attention subsequent to the trial; (2) 
it was not "owing to the want of due diligence" that it was not discovered 
earlier; (3) the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a 
different verdict in a new trial; and (4) the evidence is not cumulative, that 
is, it does not speak to facts "in relation to which there was evidence at 
trial." Keser; Grable; Lansing v. State, 669 P.2d 923 (Wyo. 
1983); Opie. We will not identify any abuse of discretion in the refusal of the 
district court to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence 
unless the record establishes all four of these 
prerequisites.

 
 

[¶18.]  Markland and Kavanaugh contend that the 
victim's statements in a pre-sentence report differ so markedly from her trial 
testimony that they, in fact, constitute newly discovered evidence. They contend 
that some small inconsistencies in relating the sequence of events reflects 
adversely on the victim's credibility. We cannot agree with this position. These 
inconsistent statements of which the appellants complain are not direct quotes 
from the victim. They merely constitute paraphrases of her oral statements. It 
is also not clear whether they were made under oath. It is thus arguable whether 
they constitute competent evidence. If we assume, arguendo, that they do, these 
statements still do not satisfy all of the prerequisites.

 
 

[¶19.]  The appellants contend that this evidence 
came to their knowledge subsequent to trial. We accept the fact that the 
presentence report upon which appellants base their claim was not available 
prior to trial, but their position continuously was that the victim's testimony 
was not consistent. Some further evidence that the victim's credibility is 
destroyed because other information manifests additional inconsistencies cannot 
constitute "newly discovered evidence," particularly with that are no more 
significant than those asserted. This is simply more of the same proposition 
previously asserted. Much the same thing is true with respect to the second 
prerequisite and the appellants' claim that it was not "owing to want of due 
diligence" that the new evidence was not discovered sooner. The claimed 
"evidence" is cumulative instead of new. We conclude that the appellants have 
failed to present new evidence and, by definition, have failed to meet the 
burden of the first two prerequisites. Lansing; Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238 
(Wyo. 
1977).

 
 

[¶20.]  This conclusion makes it unnecessary to 
discuss the last two prerequisites, but we also note that newly discovered 
evidence must be so material that it is likely to produce a different verdict 
upon retrial, and it must not address facts developed at the trial. Lansing. The new evidence 
to which appellants point, relating only to the victim's inconsistency, fails 
both of these tests. This is simply a further attempt to impeach her which is 
not so material that it is likely to produce a different verdict upon retrial. 
Considering the extent to which the victim's credibility was tested at the 
trial, it becomes truly cumulative. Evidence "which only impeaches a witness or 
contradicts evidence produced at trial is not sufficient to grant a new trial." 
Salaz, 561 P.2d  at 243; Keser, 737 P.2d 756; John B. Roden, Jr., Inc. v. 
Davis, 460 P.2d 209 (Wyo. 1969). Our previous 
cases adequately dispose of the issue. The appellants have failed to establish 
the prerequisites for reaching a conclusion of abuse of discretion in refusing 
to grant a motion for a new trial.

 
 

[¶21.]  The last issue which the appellants 
present is abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing sentences. We 
cannot follow the appellants to their conclusion. Markland was sentenced to a 
term of not less than ten years nor more than life. Kavanaugh was sentenced to a 
term of not less than seven years nor more than life. In each instance, the 
sentence exceeds the minimum sentence permitted for the crimes of which these 
appellants were convicted, which is five years in both cases. The claim of 
appellants is that they should have been granted probation because they were 
both first offenders or, at the very least, they should have received minimum 
sentences if this court concludes that probation is inappropriate. Markland 
points to his honorable service in the military; his service as a police officer 
in the community; and his success in operating a business since 1980. Kavanaugh 
points to her service in the law enforcement field in the community and also to 
her participation in business affairs since 1980. The summary of their 
contentions is that these sentences are excessive and unreasonably harsh 
considering their prior untarnished backgrounds; the positions which they held 
in the community; and the contributions each made in community 
affairs.

 
 

[¶22.]  Most convicts consider their sentences 
harsh, and there is no guarantee to anyone of probation or a minimum sentence. 
These arguments, however, are not relevant in the context of an appeal. The 
function of imposing sentence is assigned to the trial judge. The record 
demonstrates that, in this case, the sentencing judge considered fully and 
carefully the information upon which the appellants rely. The rule is that we 
will not adjust a sentence in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion. See Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986); Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 79 
A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975).

 
 

[¶23.]  Recently, we reiterated the standard by 
which we review such claims:

 
 
"* * * In 
Shepard v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 904 (1986), we stated our long 
standing rule of law that this Court will review sentences for an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, each case must stand on its own peculiar facts, and the ultimate 
question is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. 
Id. In Mower 
v. State, Wyo., 750 P.2d 679 (1988), we further stated 
that the imposition of probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and we will not reverse the actions of that court unless there is a clear 
abuse of discretion." Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 579 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 
It is clear 
we look only for an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Chapman v. 
State, 728 P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶24.]  Addressing first their request for 
probation, probation is an act of grace and clemency, and the only right the 
appellants can claim is to have the trial court consider probation. Roose. The 
trial court did that in this instance. Probation was considered, and rejected, 
during the sentencing hearing. The degree to which consideration is given to 
probation must rest within the sentencing court's discretion. There are no 
pre-determined requirements. Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275 (Wyo. 1980). As this court 
recommended in Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1985), the sentencing judge set forth his 
reasons for rejecting probation for Markland and Kavanaugh in the record. The 
judge addressed the function of rehabilitation and explained that even though it 
is a linchpin of probation, it did not appear that it would be effective in this 
instance because Markland and Kavanaugh continued to deny any wrongdoing. The 
judge considered the question of danger to the public and stated that any other 
impressionable female could be at substantially the same risk if found in 
circumstances similar to those of this victim. He remarked that to believe 
otherwise "would be like saying the person who murders both of his parents is 
not likely to be again faced with that problem because he no longer has any 
parents to murder." He next alluded to the seriousness of the offense and 
explained that it would be significantly depreciated by probation instead of 
incarceration. Volz.

 
 

[¶25.]  Clearly, the district court concluded 
that a probationary sentence for Markland and Kavanaugh, considering the nature 
of their conduct and the assault, would be sending an inappropriate message to 
the remainder of society. Those comments alone would justify the denial of 
probation. The sentencing judge went on, however, to explain that these 
defendants needed to be punished, manifesting his consideration of the 
retributive function of criminal punishment. Finally, he explained that "it's 
necessary that punishment be imposed in these kinds of cases to deter others 
similarly situated in committing these kinds of crimes." Ventling v. State, 676 P.2d 573 (Wyo. 
1984). The trial court obviously considered probation, and that is all that the 
appellants have the right to claim. That right has been fully protected, and 
their claim of abuse of discretion is without merit.

 
 

[¶26.]  The further contention that the sentences 
were excessive and that Markland and Kavanaugh should have been given the 
minimum sentence are resolved with equal ease. The standard is the proper 
exercise of discretion by the trial court. "[T]his court will not set aside a 
sentence which is within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in 
the absence of a demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion." Roose, 753 P.2d  
at 579. The sentences imposed, seven years to life and ten years to life, 
clearly fall within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum sentence of 
not less than five years nor more than life. We need to consider only whether an 
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Martin, 720 P.2d 894; Hanson v. State, 590 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 
1979). Judicial discretion is a nebulous standard which flows from a composite 
of many factors. Martin. We have defined "abuse of discretion," in connection 
with sentence review, in this way:

 
 
"A court 
does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did." Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1983), reh. denied 
707 P.2d 153 (1985).

 
 
In the 
Wright case, we enumerated four purposes which the imposition of a criminal 
sentence serves. Those are: (1) rehabilitation; (2) punishment (specific 
deterrence and retribution); (3) example to others (general deterrence); and (4) 
removal from society (protection of the public). Later, the court reaffirmed 
those purposes in Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374(Wyo. 1984), in which we 
stated that no abuse of discretion would be found if the trial court had 
considered these purposes and "had applied them to the facts in a reasonable 
way." Robinson, 678 P.2d  at 377. The statements made by the sentencing judge 
with respect to probation relate to these four purposes and demonstrate that 
they were applied to the facts of this case in a reasonable way. There was no 
abuse of discretion with respect to the sentences. The court acted within the 
bounds of reason and certainly could have concluded as it 
did.

 
 

[¶27.]  In accordance with sound jurisprudence, 
we do not consider the question presented by the appellee relating to any error 
in the instruction that corroboration of the victim's testimony was not 
required. We perceive an effort to avoid a consideration of that question in a 
post-conviction petition, but we do not consider such presentations by an 
appellee in the absence of a cross-appeal, which the State could not bring in 
this instance. The approach sought by the State would result in an advisory 
opinion.

 
 

[¶28.]  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing the sentences it did, and there was sufficient evidence 
to sustain these convictions. No error occurred in the denial of the appellants' 
motions for a new trial. Markland's judgment and sentence and Kavanaugh's 
judgment and sentence are affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶29.]  With the exposure or cynicism of a life 
time in the private practice of law, I would have voted to acquit had I been a 
juror in this case. Likewise, had I been the trial judge, the severe doubts 
which are engendered about the quality of the testimony of the principal 
complainant would have engendered at least serious consideration of a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and more precisely for a new trial. In real world 
terms, this case accommodates the worst in all results and the totality of human 
tragedy is predictably not yet individually ordained.

 
 

[¶30.]  Perjury is an ugly word but only too 
prevalent a fact as any experienced trial attorney comes to know. In 
consideration of the motion for a new trial on the basis of W.R.C.P. 60(b) for 
newly discovered evidence, the complainant, at a minimum, should have been 
blessed with the undeniable virtue of a cross-examined hearing to explain her 
newly discovered testimony discrepancy.1 A validity reference test on the 
accuracy of her testimony would hardly reach beyond the first digit of a ten 
numbered scale. The problem with the denied hearing is that the trial judge can 
empirically not have the faintest knowledge whether or why she may have lied. 
The "inconsistencies" casually acknowledged by the majority reveal intrinsically 
that she did not tell the same story twice, more significantly, after trial 
testimony and then differently in her interview with the officer responsible for 
the presentence investigation report. Individually, I would believe that the 
parole officer with the responsibility for acquisition of knowledge for 
sentencing would be most realistically reliable to reflect the last stated 
version of the complaint made by the young lady in order to accommodate her 
clearly designed search for revenge. It is unfortunate that the majority now 
denies efficacy to her testimony discrepancies even though the last departure 
never received jury review exposure.

 
 

[¶31.]  The non-adjudicatorily defined pragmatism 
adopted by this court for evisceration of the newly discovered evidence concept 
of W.R.C.P. 60(b) accommodates devaluation to a lifeless cipher without 
substance in remedial character. What is so shocking to the sense of fairness 
and justice is that the price for substance in the remedy is only the 
opportunity for a proper hearing with cross-examination and comparison provided. 
Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1988) 
(Urbigkit, J., specially concurring); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 
(Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Keser 
v. State, 737 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). Cf. 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 1986) and 
Matter of Injury to Seevers, 720 P.2d 899 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶32.]  Lacking justice delivery system 
authorship as either a fact finding juror or a trial judge, my unquenchable 
antipathy to this case is derived from the obscenely extended sentences provided 
to the accused. I find fault not only in the intrinsic severity, but the maximum 
life time provision which constituted an abandonment of judicial responsibility 
to the executive department parole board.

 
 

[¶33.]  Under the circumstances of this case, 
even if I were to believe the young lady in totality, which I certainly do not, 
the sentences are intrusively excessive as related to comparable offenses. There 
is an excellent place for extended sentences such as life and one such deserving 
recipient after a short incarceration received $5,000 to speak to the Wyoming 
State Bar about events which, in venality and immorality, constituted the crime 
of this century as the Watergate rewards for criminality.

 
 

[¶34.]  Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1985); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983); and reasoned justice and provided due process 
cannot countenance these sentences. Contended integrity and asserted fairness 
need not constrain justice and wisdom. Cf. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 
(1986).

 
 

[¶35.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The cross-examination 
as "`[t]he age-old tool for ferreting out truth'" was most recently emphasized 
by Justice Stevens in Perry v. Leeke, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 594, 601 n. 7, 102 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1989) as quoting at length from United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 149-51 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Ladmer v. United States, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1427, 71 L. Ed. 2d 648, cert. denied 455 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1428, 71 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1982) and including a quotation from 5 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) "calling cross-examination, `the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth.'"