Title: STATE EX REL IRON BEAR v DIST CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12405 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA P e t i t i o n e r , DISTRICT C O U R T OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , I N AND F O R T H E C O U N T Y OF ROOSEVELT AND T H E H O N O R A B L E M. JAMES SORTE, D i s t r i c t Judge, Respondents. PROCEEDING : Coun.se1 of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Robert L. LaRoche argued, Wolf Point, Montana. For Respondents : James McCann, County Attorney, Wolf Point, Montana. John T. McDennott argued, Missoula, Montana Amicus Curiae Hen. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. William Jensen argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Submitted : December 21, 1972 Decided : MAY - 2 1 9 n Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an original proceeding wherein petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing respondent district court to take jurisdiction and determine the merits of a divorce action filed by petitioner in that court. Amicus Curiae briefs were filed by the Attorney General of the state of Montana,District Court Judge R. D. McPhillips, and the United States ~ttorney's office. John T. McDermott of the University of Montana Law School filed a brief on behalf of the respondent district court of the fifteenth judicial district, county of Roosevelt, and Hon. M. James Sorte, Judge. Petitioner Mary Iron Bear filed a divorce action against Harry Iron Bear in October 1971, Both petitioner and her husband are enrolled members of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes and have resided within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation since their marriage in April 1954, which marriage was solemnized under state law, Harry Iron Bear was personally served with process on the reservation in October 1971. Subse- quently, on November 6, 1972, his default was entered by the clerk of the respondent district court. Petitioner then applied for judgment by default, On November 10, 1972, on its own motion, respondent dis- trict court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order dismissing the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court based its decision on the conclu- sion th.at a certain 1938 tribal enactment purporting to cede jurisdiction over divorce matters to the state of Montana, was invalid. It relied specifically on three cases to deslare the tribal enactment invalid: Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2 d 507; Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P,2d 2133; Blackwolf v . District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293. The 1938 Enactment by the executive board of the Assini- boine-Sioux Tribe reads i n pertinent part: 'I* * * no marriage o r divorce of any member of t h i s Reservation shall be valid o r have any force or effect unless entered into or granted or decreed i n accordance with the laws of the State of Montana * * *.It This Enactment bears the signatures of the Chairman and Secretary of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation Executive Board, and the recommended approval of Superintendent John G, Hunter. Respondent court noted i n i t s findings of fact that the Fort Peck Indian Reservation Tribal Court has interpreted the language above cited as ceding jurisdiction over divorce matters t o the s t a t e of Montana. Since 1938 the Tribal Court has granted no divorces, while the respondent d i s t r i c t court has granted hundreds t o members of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribe and other Indians residing within the exteribr boundaries of the Fort Peck Reservation. Here, two issues are involved which we combine for dis- cussion inasmuch a s both go t o the jurisdiction of s t a t e courts over domestic relations of enrolled Indians on the Fort Peck Resew vation. The original issuer D o s t a t e courts have jurisdiction over divorce actions brought by an Indian p l a i n t i f f against an Indian defendant, both enrolled members of Fort Peck Tribes and residing on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation? The second issue: Did the action of the respondent d i s t r i c t court i n t h i s cause violate the Indian p l a i n t i f f ' s rights t o the equal protection of the law? W e answer both issues in the affirmative. Some twenty years ago t h i s Court i n Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont, 24, 243 P.2d 317, held that the courts of t h i s s t a t e are open to our Indian citizens. Later, in State ex r e l . Kennerly v, District Court, 154 Mont, 488, 493, 466 P.2d 85, the Court said: I1 Indians resident in Montana, whether they be full blood or partial blood, allotted or unallotted, domiciled on the reservation or off of it, of one tribe or another, or whatever their status, are citi- zens of the State of Montana, They are entitled to the protection of our laws, * * * 11 The state cannot disenfranchise an Indian person nor can that Indian person disenfranchise the state simply by being an Indian person or by living within the external boundaries of an Indian reservation. Thus, our courts are open to Indian persons. They use the courts of this state for many things--divorces, contracts, torts, inheritance, and the entire spectrum of legal matters, Clearly, they are entitled to so do, See Bonnet v . Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317." Kennerly was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, 4 0 0 U.S, 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2d 507, but it is important to note that the United States Supreme Court action was based on other grounds, Bonnet is still the law of this state. As Mr. Justice Angstman noted in Bonnet, Montzna is not unique in holding that Indian citizens have the full use of their state courts: Bem-Way-Bin-Ness v . Eshelby, 87 Minn. 108, 91 N,W. 291; Holden v . Lynn, 30 Okl, 663, 120 P, 246; Phillips v, Rey- nolds, 79 Neb, 626, 113 N . W . 234; Martinez v, Martinez, 49 MOM, 83, 157 P.2d 484; Red Hawk v. Joines, 129 Ore. 620, 278 P. 572; Missouri Pac, Ry, Co, w. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S . W . 19, 41 Am, Jur.2~3, Indians, 520; 42 C.J.S. Indians, 58, The right of an individual Indian citizen to sue or be sued in the courts of this land was recognized by the United States Supreme Court recently in Poafpybitty v, Skelly Oil Co., 390 U . S . 365, 88 Sect, 982, 19 L ed 2d 1238, 1243, where it said: "Nor does the existence of the Government's power to sue affect the rights of the indivi- I dual Indian. A restricted Indian is not with- out capacity to sue or to be sued with respect to his affairs, including his restricted property * * * Both the Act of April 12, 1926 and the decision * * * in Heckman v . United States * * * recognize capacity in a restricted Indian to sue or defend actions in his own behalf subject only to the right of the Government to intervene."' Two United States Supreme Court cases, Worchester v . Georgia, 31 U,S, ( 6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and Williams v, Lee, 358 U.S, 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, 254, (1959), define the power of Indian tribal governments and the authority of the Congress of the United States as it concerns the jurisdiction question. As we noted in Bonnet, this state and other states have long held that an Indian has the same rights as are accorded any other person t o invoke the jurisdiction of the s t a t e courts t o protect h i s rights in matters not affecting the federal government, The propriety of legal actions by Indians against non- Indians i n the s t a t e courts has been recognized and approved by the United States Supreme Court i n Williams. There the court speaking of the powers of s t a t e s on Indian reservations l a i d down the t e s t : " ~ s s e n t i a l l y , absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the s t a t e action infringed on the right of reservation Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be ruled by them." Using t h i s t e s t t o judge jurisdiction in the instant case, we f i r s t examine the two essential elements s e t forth by the t e s t : 1. Whether there i s a governing Act of Congress? 2, Does s t a t e action infringe on the right of the Fort Peck t r i b e t o make t h e i r own laws and be ruled by them? A s t o element No. 1, we note that the Montana Enabling Act imposed the requirement of what i s normally referred t o as a "disclaimer" provision concerning the Indian population of the state. W e adopted the disclaimer with identical language i n Qrdinance No, 1, Sec.2, Constitution of Montana. W e have never before been required t o rule directly on t h i s provision's impact on c i v i l jurisdiction, Other s t a t e s have similar disclaimer pro- visions and have ruled on them, W e w i l l consider some of the cited cases. ~ o n t a n a 's Enabling Act reads in pertinent part: "$4. * * * And said conventions s h a l l provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said states: * * * "second. That the people inhabiting said proposed s t a t e s do agree and declare that they forever dis- claim a l l right and t i t l e t o the unappropriated pub- l i c lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and t o a l l lands lying wi.thin said l i m i t s owned o r held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that u n t i l the t i t l e thereto s h a l l have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject t o the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States * * *." This disclaimer of a r i g h t and t i t l e t o Indian lands i s a disclaimer of a proprietary i n t e r e s t therein and control thereof, and not a disclaimer of governmental control, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S e c t . 562, 7 L ed 2d 573,583; Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M, 562, 417 P,2d 51; County of Beltrami v . County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N,W.2d 25; State v. Daniel- son, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689; Fournier v. Roed, (N.D, 1968), 161 N,W,2d 458; Sangre De Cristo Dev,Corp,, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323, A s noted above, here petitioner does not seek t o a s s e r t any proprietary authority over lands of the Indian, but rather, governmental authority. Mast western s t a t e s with the exception of South Dakota, Smith v, Temple, 82 S,D, 650, 152 N.W.2d 547, seem t o hold t h a t the disclaimer provision i s not applicable where the issue does not concern Indian lands; we believe the cases a r e persuasive and w e so hold. Having so held, we now decide j u s t what i s the nature of t h a t s t a t e jurisdiction. I n Williams and Organized Village of Kake, the United States Supreme Court stated: - "* * * even on reservations s t a t e laws m a y be applied t o Indians, unless such applicatian would i n t e r f e r e with reservation s e l f -government o r i m - pair a r i g h t granted or resewed by federal law," 7 L ed 2d 583.. W e recognize t h a t Public Law 280 of the 1953 Congress (67 Stat. 588) and the Civil Rights A c t of 1968 (82 S t a t , 78, 25 U,S.C.A. $ 5 1321-1326) concerned jurisdictional problems on Indian reservations, but we concern ourselves with what e f f e c t , i f any, those a c t s have on preexisting s t a t e jurisdiction. In Organized Village of Kake, a post-Public Law 280 case, the court made t h i s statement: "* * * 'absolute' federal jurisdiction i s not invariably exclusive jurisdiction, " 7 L ed 2d 579. It would appear from t h i s statement t h a t even a f t e r Public Law 280, s t a t e s had some jurisdiction. Several s t a t e s have considered t h i s question and found some preexisting jurisdiction remained . . a f t e r Public Law 280. Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P,2d 1002; Vermil.lion v, Spotted Elk, (N.D. 19571, 85 N.W.2d In Montana, the s t a t e asstuned jurisdiction a f t e r Public Law 280 on only one reservation, Flathead. It has not acted con- cerning the other s i x Montana reservations and it still retains jurisdiction over arezs of the law where there i s neither a governing Act of Congress nor an infringement with reservation self-government. The 1938 Enactment of the Assiniboine-Sioux tribes, which preexists by some years both Public Law 280 (1953) and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, i s not changed by those acts. The d i s t r i c t court's finding t o the contrary based on Kennerly, Deernose, and Blackwolf i s i n error, Kennerly did not consider the jurisdiction remaining i n the s t a t e a f t e r federal action or t r i b a l assumption of government, rather it emphasized the procedural aspects for t r i b a l consent for jurisdiction. The guide lines are s e t down i n Willi.ams and as long as the s t a t e does not violate those guide lines and does not attempt t o exercise jurisdiction over areas of the law where there is e i t h e r a governing Act of Congress or an infringement on reserva- tion self-government, it may continue t o exercise jurisdiction, With the above in mind, does the s t a t e of Montana have jurisdiction over divorce actions brought by an Indian plaintiff against an Indian defendant, both residing on an Indian resewa- tion? W e cannot find any Act of Congress o r the executive branch of the federal government, nor are we cited any by amicus, setting forth who has jurisdiction over divorce on an Indian reservation. The Bureau of Indian Affairs regulations provide law and order codes but leave t o the authorities of each t r i b e t o define what constitutes divorce, 25 C.F.R., 5 11.28, There are no federal limitations on the s t a t e ' s jurisdiction over divorce, -. . . i A n examination of the 1938 Tribal Enactment indicates the intent was t o do away with t r i b a l jurisdiction over marriages and divorces and t o rely on the laws of the s t a t e of Montana. W e can find no interference with reservation self-government by the s t a t e of Montana here. Article 111, Sec, 6 of the Montana Constitution provides: I l Courts of justice shall be open t o every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character; and that right and justice s h a l l be administered without sale, denial or delay. I f Section 83-102, R.C.M. 1947, concerning jurisdiction, provides : "The sovereignty and jurisdiction of t h i s s t a t e extend t o a l l places within i t s boundaries, as established by the constitution, excepting such places as are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States * * *.It Here, it was stipulated and agreed, and the d i s t r i c t court found, that plaintiff Mary Iron Bear and her husband are resident citizens of the s t a t e of Montana and had been for some years be- fore the f i l i n g of t h i s action. Applying the test of jurisdic- tion set forth i n Williams, we find no exclusive control by the United States government nor an interference with t r i b a l self- government, therefore the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying access t o the s t a t e court i n seeking a divorce, In two recent cases, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, No, 71-738, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4451, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, No. 71-834, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4457, the United States Supreme Court considered: (1) the jurisdiction of a s t a t e t o impose taxes on a tribal-owned enterprise located outside the l i m i t s of a reservation, Mescalero; and (2) the jurisdiction of a s t a t e t o impose a tax on the income of a t r i b a l member residing on a reservation whose income is wholly derived from reservation sources, McClanahan, In Mescalero, the Supreme Court held that the s t a t e of N e w Mexico could impose a nondiscriminatory gross receipts tax on a tribal-owned enterprise located outside the l i m i t s of a reserva- tion, but that the s t a t e could not tax personalty which has merged with r e a l t y exempt under 25 U.S.C. 465. In McClanahan, the Supreme Court held that the s t a t e of Arizona has no jurisdiction t o impose a tax on the income of Navajo Indians residing on the Navajo Reservation and whose income is wholly derived from reser- vation sources. A s a preface t o i t s discussion of the authority of the s t a t e over t r i b a l enterprises outside reservation boundaries in Mescalero, the court said: "At the outset, we reject--as did the s t a t e court-- the broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for a l l purposes and that the State i s therefore prohibited from en- forcing i t s revenue laws against any t r i b a l enterprise ' [wlhether the enterprise i s located on or off t r i b a l 1 land. Generalizations on t h i s subject have become mission of Arizona, ante, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 6 0 7 L 7 3 (1960). The upshot has been the repeated statements of t h i s Court t o the effect that even an reservations s t a t e laws may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government o r would impair a right ranted or reserved b federal law, Organized Village f f Kake, supra, a t 753 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (19 N e w York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U,S, 496, 499 (1946) Draper v, United States, 164 U.S, 240 (1896). Even so, i n the special area of s t a t e taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction o r other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands o r Indian income from a c t i v i t i e carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, ante 9 - lays to rest any doubt i n t h i s respect by holding that such taxation i s not permi-ssible absent congressional consent ." 41 L,W, a t 4452, (Emphasis supplied), The court thus, i n Mescalero, reiterated the proposition that the t e s t a s t o the application of s t a t e laws on reservations i s whether: (1) such application would interfere with reservation self-government, or (2) whether such a p ~ l ~ c a t i a n would impair a right preempted by federal law. The s t a t e thus has residual jur- isdiction i n areas where the federal l a w has not preempted s t a t e a c t i v i t y and the tribes have determined not t o exercise jurisdic- tion, In McClanahan the court indicated t h a t the t e s t f o r de- termining jurisdiction i s now whether the federal t r e a t i e s o r scatutes have preempted s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n using Indian sovereignty as a "backdrop against which the applicable t r e a t i e s and federal s t a t u t e s must be read." The court i n McClanahan determined t h a t based on the relevant t r e a t i e s between the Navajos and the federal government and federal s t a t u t e s applying i n t e r a l i a t o the Navajos, the s t a t e of Arizona has no jurisdiction t o impose a tax on the income of Navajo Indians residing on t h e Navaja reservation and receiving income derived whozly from reservation sources. Based on t h e holding i n McClanahan, t h a t t h e determination of jurisdiction i s made by examining federal s t a t u e s f o r pre- emption and federal t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s f o r the sovereignty of the t r i b e , the residual jurisdiction of the s t a t e over divorces on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation remains valid. There i s no federal l e g i s l a t i o n concerning the power t o grant o r deny divorces i n Tribal Court. Unlike t h e power t o tax, which i s inherent i n sovereignty, the power t o terminate a mar- riage contract i s not one which w i l l i n t e r f e r e with t r i b a l sover- eignty. Because the power t o grant a divorce has not been pre- empted by the federal government and does not i n t e r f e r e with reservation self-government (especially since the power granted t o the s t a t e i s merely residual) there i s j u r i s d i c t i o n and the d i s t r i c t court i s required t o exercise t h a t jurisdiction. Before a d i s t r i c t court can assume jurisdiction i n any matter submitted t o i t , it must find subject matter jurisdiction by determining: (1) whether the federal t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s applicable have preempted s t e t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ; (2) whether the exercise of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n would i n t e r f e r e with reservation self-government; and (3) whether the Tribal Court i s currently exercising jurisdiction o r has exercised jurisdiction in such a manner a s t o preempt s t a t e jurisdiction. This Court by this opinion has determined the district court has jurisdiction and petitioner's prayer for relief is granted, The trial court is directed to assume jurisdiction and determine the merits of the divorce action. Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell specially concurring: I concur in the result, but in my view the rationale of the majority opinion is flawed. In my opinion this will lead to no end of difficulties in future Indian jurisdictional cases that may come before this Court. The majority opinion is predicated on the jurisdictional test set forth in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, i.e. whether state action infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. The Williams test was subsequently applied in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L ed 2d 573. In one of the latest cases discussing the Williams test, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that this test was useful in situations involving the rights of Indians and non-Indians where both the Tribe and the state could fairly claim jurisdi- tion. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, No. 71-834, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4457. In McClanahan the court said: "It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involvinq non-Indians. See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962). In these situations, both the Tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective juris- dictions. The ~illiams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its-interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected." In the instant case, the situation is entirely different, This case involves the respective rights of two reservation Indians in a divorce case in a mutually acceptable forum with no assertion of antagonistic jurisdictional interests between the tribe, the state, the two Indians, or the federal government. The Williams test simply has no application to this situation and its continued indiscriminate application to all Indian juris- dictional questions in this Court is a mistake. Continued ad- herence to the Williams test has previously resulted in rever- sals in the judgments of this Court. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2d 507. The controlling consideration in this case, in my opinion, is whether the federal government has preempted the field of divorce leaving the tribal government powerless in this area. See McClanahan, pages 8-11 for rationale. Having been cited no relevant treaties or statutes of preemption and having found none, I conclude that residual power and jurisdiction in divorce cases remains in the tribe which ceded such residual jurisdiction to state courts in 1938. For Montana to deny two reservation Indians the use of its state courts in a dkvorce case under such circumstances would amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws to our Indian citizens. I concur in the result of the majority on the foregoing basis. Associate Justice