Title: Sanders v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Ellen M. O’Connor 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
George P. Sherman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1304-CR-242 
 
ERVING SANDERS, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G14-1101-FD-6488 
The Honorable Jose Salinas, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1205-CR-361 
_________________________________ 
 
June 25, 2013 
 
Dickson, Chief Justice. 
 
 
The defendant, facing charges of Possession of Cocaine, a class D felony, has brought 
this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
following a traffic stop.  Concluding that the motion should have been granted, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed.  Sanders v. State, 981 N.E.2d 616, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).  We granted transfer 
and now affirm the trial court.   
 
 
In the late afternoon of January 28, 2011, the defendant was driving a 1991 Chevrolet 
Suburban vehicle with tinted rear side and back windows when an Indianapolis Metropolitan Po-
Jun 25 2013, 8:52 am
 
 
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lice Department officer initiated a traffic stop.  Approaching the driver's side window, the officer 
directed the defendant to roll down the window and informed him of the reason for the stop—his 
belief that the tinted windows were so dark as to constitute a traffic infraction.  At this time, the 
officer smelled marijuana.  The officer asked the defendant about the smell, to which the defend-
ant replied that he had "just smoked a joint."1  The officer then returned to his patrol car to verify 
the defendant's driver's license and request backup.  When an assisting officer arrived at the sce-
ne, the officer requested that the defendant step out of the car, conducted a search of the defend-
ant's person, and retrieved a plastic bag containing a white substance.  When the officer ques-
tioned the defendant about the substance, asking if it was heroin, the defendant replied in the 
negative, stating that it was cocaine.  At that point, the officer placed the defendant under arrest 
and took him into custody.  Several photographs of the vehicle were taken by an evidence tech-
nician roughly one hour after the initial stop; these photographs were admitted in evidence at the 
subsequent evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
On January 28, 2011, the State charged the defendant with class D felony Possession of 
Cocaine.  On May 4, 2011, the defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, claiming that the evidence 
obtained by the officer's search was "a result of illegal actions by the police officers involved," 
most notably, "the lack of probable cause to stop" the defendant and to search his person.  Mo-
tion to Suppress, Appellant's App'x at 24.  The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the motion 
on May 4 and June 1, 2011.  In July 2011, the defendant filed, and the trial court granted, a mo-
tion to allow an expert to view the automobile to measure the tint of the windows, which was 
found to be legally within the statutorily defined limits.  Notwithstanding these findings, the 
court ultimately denied the defendant's motion, finding that an officer's good faith subjective be-
lief of violation of a traffic law is enough to justify the initial stop, even if it is later found that 
the traffic law has not in fact been violated. 
 
 
On interlocutory appeal, claiming violation of the Fourth Amendment,2 U.S. Const. 
amend. IV, the defendant asserted that the officer's "subjective interpretation of identity and tint 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant disputes this fact, claiming that the officer asked, "do you smoke marijuana?" and 
the defendant replied "No."  Appellant's Br. at 5. 
 
2 The defendant makes no Indiana constitutional claims, relying wholly on the United States Con-
stitution. 
 
 
3 
did not justify his traffic stop of [the defendant's] Chevy Suburban, which objectively complied 
with Indiana's Window Tint Statute.  His mistaken application of the statute did not justify a 
good faith exception to uphold the stop . . . ."  Appellant's Br. at 8.  The Court of Appeals, agree-
ing with the defendant, reversed the ruling of the trial court, finding that there was no "objective-
ly justifiable reason for the stop of the vehicle."  Sanders, 981 N.E.2d at 623.  We granted trans-
fer, thereby automatically vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind. Appellate Rule 
58(A), and thus consider this appeal anew. 
 
 
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to review of 
other sufficiency issues.  Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 1997).  There must be sub-
stantial evidence of probative value in the record to support the ruling of the trial court.  Id.  We 
do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial 
court's ruling.  Id.  We review de novo the determination of reasonable suspicion for a warrant-
less search.  Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2005) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 
517 U.S. 690, 694–700, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1660–64, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 917–21 (1996)). 
 
 
The defendant's primary argument is that the initial traffic stop made by the officer was 
unjustified because the officer's belief that the window tint on the defendant's rear side and back 
windows violated the Indiana Window Tint Statute3 was later invalidated through inspection of 
the vehicle by the defendant's expert.  Because the tint objectively complied with the Window 
Tint Statute, the defendant argues, the officer's "subjective interpretation of identity and tint did 
not justify his traffic stop."  Appellant's Br. at 8 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the defendant 
                                                 
 
3 Indiana Code Section 9-19-19-4(c) provides: 
 
A person may not drive a motor vehicle that has a: 
(1) windshield; 
(2) side wing; 
(3) side window that is part of a front door; or 
(4) rear back window; 
that is covered by or treated with sunscreening material or is tinted to the extent or manufactured 
in a way that the occupants of the vehicle cannot be easily identified or recognized through that 
window from outside the vehicle.  However, it is a defense if the sunscreening material applied to 
those windows has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than twenty-five percent 
(25%) as measured on the nonfilm side and light transmittance of at least thirty percent (30%) in 
the visible light range. 
 
 
 
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claims, any evidence seized through the subsequent search of the defendant's person is the prod-
uct of a pretextual investigatory stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
so that they may "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.  This protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1689, 6 L. Ed. 2d. 1081, 1087 (1961).  The Fourth 
Amendment generally prohibits a warrantless search unless a valid exception to the warrant re-
quirement exists.  Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (1998).  Probable cause is a recognized 
exception.  Id. (citing Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. 1987)).  Further, a traffic stop 
and limited search is permissible where an officer has at least reasonable suspicion that a traffic 
law, or other law, has been violated.  Id.; see also Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 
2009). 
 
 
The Indiana Window Tint Statute prohibits operation of a motor vehicle that has win-
dows tinted in such a way that "the occupants of the vehicle cannot be easily identified or recog-
nized through [those] window[s] from outside the vehicle."  Ind. Code § 9-19-19-4(c).  It is an 
affirmative defense if the solar reflectance of visible light is not more than 25% and the light 
transmittance is at least than 30%.  Id.  Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop of 
the defendant's vehicle based on his perception that the tint of the vehicle's windows was so dark 
that he could not "clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside."  Tr. at 6.  However, the de-
fendant's expert later testified that the tinted windows had a light transmittance of 38%, id. at 80, 
within the legal range.  Such proof of compliance with the Window Tint Statute undoubtedly re-
lieves the defendant of any liability for a window tint violation.  However, it does not serve to 
vitiate the legality of the traffic stop.  The officer's belief, based on the fact that he could not 
"clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside," id. at 6, that the window tint violated the 
Window Tint Statute, coupled with the fact that the actual tint closely borders the statutory limit, 
leads us to conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop.  Consider-
ing this testimony in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, as we must, the evidence 
clearly supports the ruling of the trial court. 
 
 
 
5 
 
The defendant also contends that the initial traffic stop was invalid under Indiana Code 
Section 34-28-5-3, which authorizes a law enforcement officer to detain an individual for a lim-
ited time if the officer "believes in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or ordi-
nance violation."  Ind. Code. § 34-28-5-3.  The defendant argues that the officer's belief that the 
defendant had committed a violation of the Window Tint Statute was not in good faith because, 
after subsequent testing, the defendant's window tint was found to be in compliance with the 
statute.  Appellant's Br. at 10 (citing Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 
("[A]n officer's mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith.  
Such discretion is not constitutionally permissible.")).  We disagree.  In Ransom, an individual 
was driving along a narrow street when he encountered an approaching police vehicle.  Recog-
nizing that both vehicles could not pass simultaneously, the driver put his vehicle in reverse and 
backed around the corner.  The officer stopped the driver's vehicle for "operating in reverse," and 
subsequently discovered a handgun.  The court found that "operating in reverse" was an infrac-
tion which did not exist at law and that the driver's behavior was not in violation of the reckless 
driving statute or any other state law.  Thus, the court held, the officer "did not have an objec-
tively justifiable reason for stopping [the driver]," and the traffic stop was not lawful.  Ransom, 
741 N.E.2d at 422. 
 
 
This case is easily distinguished from Ransom because here, the apparent infraction for 
which the defendant's vehicle was initially stopped does in fact exist at law.  Although the officer 
was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a 
good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory infraction had occurred and thus we are unable to 
say that the traffic stop was not lawful. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We hold that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the tint on the windows of the de-
fendant's vehicle was in violation of the Window Tint Statute such that the initial stop was justi-
fied.  At the initial stop, the officer smelled marijuana, which provided probable cause to search 
the defendant's person.  The search of the defendant's person revealed a bag of cocaine, the evi-
dence at issue in this case.  Because the evidence was obtained as a result of a fully justified and 
 
 
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legal search, the trial court was correct in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.  We here-
by affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
 
Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.