Title: Doenz v. Garber

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Doenz v. Garber1983 WY 70665 P.2d 932Case Number: 83-31Case Number: 83-31Decided: 06/20/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
William J. DOENZ and Herbert A. Doenz, Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Victor GARBER and Phyllis 
M. Garber, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District Court,SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Frank C. 
Richter, Billings, 
Mont., signed the briefs and 
appeared in oral argument on behalf of 
appellants.

Rex O. Arney of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER*, THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     The genesis of this 
appeal is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellees) to quiet title in 3.01 
acres of land claimed by adverse possession as against defendants (appellants) 
for over ten years. The trial court, after making findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, entered judgment for the appellees but required them, at 
their expense, to replace the fence removed by appellants before appellees 
asserted their claim. Appellees do not appeal that part of the 
judgment.

[¶2.]     The issues, as 
presented by the appellants, are:

1. "Whether the appellees 
have been in actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the 
real property in question for a period of ten (10) years, which possession is 
hostile and under a claim of right or color of title."

2. "Whether the appellees 
have met the burden of proof as to each of the elements of adverse 
possession."

3. "Whether the court 
erred in its finding that the appellees have shown that the period of adverse 
possession was for the requisite ten (10) years."

4. "Whether the court 
erred by not requiring appellees to prove that any period of adverse possession 
by their predecessor should be tacked on to the period of adverse possession 
claimed by appellants."

5. "Whether the appellees 
possessed the requisite intent to assert an adverse claim against the true 
owners, the appellants."

6. "Whether appellees' 
failure to pay taxes weakened the claim of adverse possession sufficiently to 
disallow it."

7. "Whether appellees' 
acceptance of the movement of the fence indicates that they did not possess the 
land with the intent required in order to establish a claim of adverse 
possession."

8. "Whether the evidence 
supports the finding that the appellees did not agree to the movement of the 
fence by their acquiescence to the movement."

[¶3.]     Appellees frame the 
issues differently:

1. "Whether the trial 
court correctly held that the Garbers [appellees] established the necessary 
elements of adverse possession to the tract of land in 
dispute."

2. "Whether the trial 
court properly held that the Garbers [appellees] possessed the disputed tract 
for the statutory period of ten years."

3. "Whether the movement 
of fences by Doenz [appellants] onto the adversely possessed tract held by 
Garbers [appellees] defeated the adverse possession 
claim."

4. "Whether the trial 
court committed reversible error in excluding from its consideration the payment 
of property taxes by Doenz [appellants]."

 

We prefer the 
shorter version of appellees, but within our treatment on that basis will cover, 
as appropriate, points raised in appellants' statement of 
issues.

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶5.]     In order to more 
readily follow a narrative of the facts, a sketch of the fence location and 
disputed ground will be helpful:

[¶6.]     The appellees acquired 
the land marked Garber by warranty deed dated March 19, 1971, later recorded on 
December 30, 1971. They had leased the land up to that time since 1965. The 
fence in question served as part of an enclosure of about eighty acres used by 
appellees as a pasture. The east-west fence is about one half mile long and the 
north-south fence about one quarter mile long. The enclosed area, which was 
irrigated in part, was used to graze cattle and produce hay. The appellants, in 
connection with a transfer of title to lands between them, employed a surveyor 
to locate their lands on the ground. As a result of the survey the deed line 
established that the fence line which had been in place for some sixty years 
encroached upon the lands of appellants by some twenty to thirty feet. 
Appellants had never used the lands south and east of the old 
fence.

[¶7.]     Following trial, the 
district judge made findings of fact, paraphrased: that appellees had occupied 
said enclosure for more than ten years prior to the commencement of the legal 
proceedings; that between September 1981, and March 1982, appellants built a new 
fence on the true legal boundary and that there was disputed testimony that 
appellees' son, David Garber, had agreed to the relocation of the fence; and 
that appellees became aware of the fence relocation and did not object until the 
east-west portion of the fence was completed and the posts for the north-south 
fence had been put in. The court's conclusions of law are paraphrased: that 
appellees acquired fee simple ownership to the disputed tract by solely and 
exclusively possessing it for more than ten years and the possession was open, 
notorious, adverse and hostile to the appellants; that appellants had no claim 
in said tract of land; and that appellees were entitled to move the new fences 
back to their original fence lines at their own expense.

Other facts will 
be set out as necessary in disposition of the issues.

I

[¶8.]     Were the necessary 
elements of adverse possession present? The elements of adverse possession 
consist of actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of 
another's real property for the statutory period of ten years1 under a claim of right or color of 
title. Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. 
Fuss, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1129 (1982); Farella v. Rumney, Wyo., 649 P.2d 185 (1982); Shores v. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895 (1979); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 
A.L.R. 1 (1929). If the other elements exist, it is the policy of the law to 
give the adverse possessor a title when an action to recover lands is barred by 
the statute of limitations; the possessor is vested with a fully new and 
distinct title. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 
Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 136 A.L.R. 770, reh. denied 113 P.2d 963 (1941).

[¶9.]     There is no question 
but that appellees actually, openly, notoriously and exclusively occupied the 
land between the fence line and the deed line. They used it to graze cattle and 
for hay which was cut. It had never been so used by appellants, nor had any 
question about the boundary ever before been raised, though neighbors of 
appellees for many years.

II

[¶10.]  Did the appellees possess the disputed 
area for ten years? The appellants contend that while appellees received a deed 
to the lands on March 19, 1971, it was not recorded until December 30, 1971; so, 
therefore, adverse possession could not start until the latter date. Prior to 
the expiration of ten years after the recording, appellants had built their new 
fence on the east-west deed line, had downed the old fence, and the new posts 
were up on the north-south line. The survey was undertaken prior to March 1981. 
Appellants were informed of the discrepancy by the surveyor in March 1981. 
Appellants started new fence construction in September 1981, less than ten years 
after the deed was recorded. Appellants add to that the further fact that the 
court action, appellees' first recognizable objection, was not started until 
April 1982, after appellants claim they had stopped the ten-year continuity of 
appellees' possession by reentry. Appellants rely on § 34-1-120, W.S. 
1977:

"Every conveyance of real 
estate within this state, hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as 
required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent purchaser or 
purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real 
estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded."

Appellants' 
position is that there must be some notice to the owner that adverse possession 
has begun, citing McKnight v. 
Basilides, 19 Wn.2d 391, 143 P.2d 307 (1943), and that recording of the deed 
is the required notice. That case involved adverse possession as between 
co-tenants and also held that an ouster of one tenant-in-common by his co-tenant 
requires stronger and more convincing evidence than is necessary to sustain the 
ordinary claim of adverse possession. The court went on to recognize with 
respect to co-tenants a rule that there must be actual notice or the hostile 
character of possession must be so manifest, open, and notorious that notice is 
presumed. No recording statute was involved in McKnight. The case is not on 
point.

[¶11.]  In Near v. Casto, Wyo., 613 P.2d 577 
(1980), this court held that where the land under dispute was within the fence 
line of the adverse possession claimants who had exercised dominion over it by 
leasing for ranching and oil and gas and conducting their own ranching 
operations, and who believed they possessed the land to the fence line for more 
than ten years, all the essential elements of adverse possession were present. 
In Shores v. Lindsey, supra, this court recognized that pasturing of livestock 
during the grazing season is continuous dominion and control. The rule was 
reiterated in Farella v. Rumney, 
supra.

[¶12.]  The appellants have overlooked the 
language of the rule as being in the alternative, "color of title or claim of 
right." Appellants look only at the "color of title." A color-of-title situation 
would be one in which there was a void deed. Knight v. Boner, Wyo., 459 P.2d 205, 207 
(1969), defined "color of title" as an instrument which has a semblance or 
appearance of title but is not title in fact or law. However that may be, a 
claim of right is sufficient in this state for the purpose of initiating adverse 
possession; and a deed, even void on its face, is a color of title sufficient to 
constitute a claim of color of title. Bruch v. Benedict, 62 Wyo. 213, 165 P.2d 561 
(1946).

[¶13.]  Even though § 34-1-120, W.S. 1977, is a 
notice statute, it is intended to void another's conveyance of title to the same 
land. Appellees' deed did not convey to the fence line nor do appellants claim 
that it does. It, therefore, would not be any color of title since it did not 
embrace the occupied property. The deed to appellees coupled to the presence of 
the old fence plus use to the fence gave them a claim of right. Appellants are 
not subsequent purchasers within the statute. They have adjoined the fence for 
long over ten years. The presence of the fence and the continuous farming 
operations by appellees on the enclosed land put appellants on notice to make 
inquiry. Failure to record a deed does not render it void where prior to the 
conveyance subsequent purchasers are put on due inquiry and with reasonable 
investigation the existence of the deed could have been determined. Soppe v. Breed, Wyo., 504 P.2d 1077 
(1973). If on notice, appellants, even if under the statute, would not hold a 
role as purchasers in good faith because of their actual notice of appellees' 
possession.

III

[¶14.]  Did the construction of the new fence and 
removal of the old fence by appellants defeat the adverse possession claim? The 
appellees' first notice that appellants were asserting a claim to land south of 
the old fence was in September 1981, when they noticed fence posts along the 
deed line. Appellants never advised appellees what they were doing but had 
instructed the surveyor to advise appellees of the property line he had 
established. The surveyor did not do that until David Garber, appellees' son2, went to the surveyor's office in 
Sheridan with 
considerable concern to inquire about what was going on and then found out. 
Appellees consulted with their attorney. He advised moving with caution and 
watching developments until the matter could be adequately investigated and a 
position taken. On December 14, 1981, appellees met with one of the appellants, 
William Doenz, to object to movement of the fence to the deed line and attempt a 
peaceable settlement. Settlement efforts were tried again in January 1982, but 
failed; appellees were advised by appellants to go to court. By March 1982, 
appellees were fenced out of the disputed land. This litigation was initiated by 
filing of the complaint on April 23, 1982.

[¶15.]  While appellants contend David Garber 
expressed himself in such a way that the new fence line was approved, David 
Garber denied that he ever did, nor did he have authority to do so. The evidence 
supports his position. By finding in favor of appellees, the trial judge settled 
any conflict in the testimony.

[¶16.]  When specific findings of fact are made 
by the trial court on evidentiary matters, they are presumed correct; an 
appellate court will not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous or 
against the great weight of the evidence. The review standard recognizes that 
deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, and that a reviewing court will not set aside the 
court's findings merely because it might have reached a different result. The 
presumption of correctness can be overcome if the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a finding is mistaken. 
Shores v. Lindsey, supra. We are 
unconvinced that the trial judge's findings are mistaken. His conclusions of law 
are in accord with the law heretofore announced, so the exception to the rule of 
review which would invalidate the findings, if based upon a misconception of the 
law, would not apply. Shores v. 
Lindsey, supra.

[¶17.]  The movement of the fences such that for 
a short period of time the old fence was down and the new fence was in place on 
the deed line did not defeat the adverse possession claim on the ground that 
possession was not continuous to the time of filing of the complaint. This court 
in Bruch v. Benedict, supra, approved 
the rule that a temporary break or interruption, not of an unreasonable 
duration, does not destroy the continuity of the adverse claimant's possession, 
depending somewhat upon the intention of the adverse possessor as shown by the 
circumstances of the case.

[¶18.]  There was, as one of the surrounding 
circumstances, only about a month between the time of completion of the new 
fence and the filing of an action. The other facts and circumstances here show 
no intention to give up their adverse possession claim. This was adequately 
demonstrated by the remonstrances of appellees, and their attempts to negotiate 
a settlement. They entered in litigation as a last resort within a very short 
time. The claimants kept their "flags waving." Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 
supra; Bruch v. Benedict, supra. 
Appellees do not depend upon tacking - that is use by their predecessors in 
title. For a definition of tacking, see Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 
supra. We see no error.

The district 
judge's judgment that the expense of moving the fence off the deed line back to 
the old fence line was not appealed by appellees. A non-appealing party may not 
attack a judgment. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 
551 P.2d 687 (1976). Appellees do not express any disagreement with the trial 
judge in that regard.

IV

[¶19.]  Nonpayment of taxes on adversely 
possessed land, while a consideration, does not in itself destroy an adverse 
possession claim. Rutar Farms and 
Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, supra; Meyer 
v. Ellis, Wyo., 
411 P.2d 338 (1966). Nonpayment of taxes by the claimant is usually the case 
where use to a fence line rather than deed line is the primary basis of the 
claim. As pointed out in Meyer our Wyoming statute does not require payment of 
taxes in order to establish adverse possession as do some states. All the other 
facts and circumstances in the case now before us override any question of 
taxes. There was no error in that regard.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-3-103, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"An action for the 
recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can 
only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action 
accrues."

2 David Garber (not a 
party to this action) has no ownership interest in the lands involved. He 
performs some management functions in the ranching operation on the appellees' 
lands. The ranching operation is incorporated under the name of Garber Agra 
Business Incorporated, of which David is one of the directors. His authority is 
to buy and sell livestock, purchase machinery, and authorizes repairs, but he 
has no authority to make commitments as to the real 
estate.