Title: State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5283.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5283 
THE STATE EX REL. DEWINE, APPELLEE, v. COURT OF CLAIMS  
OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5283.] 
The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the attorney general 
granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with an award 
of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime. 
(No. 2010-1837—Submitted May 10, 2011—Decided October 18, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 09AP-863, 190 Ohio App.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4437. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the attorney general 
granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with an award 
of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The question we address in this appeal is whether the Court of 
Claims of Ohio has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of the 
attorney general granting or denying an award of attorney fees for preparing an 
application for reparations on behalf of a claimant.  In this case, the Court of 
Claims assumed jurisdiction over a decision of the attorney general awarding 
attorney fees.  Subsequently, the attorney general obtained both a writ of 
mandamus directing the Court of Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the 
appeal and a writ of prohibition ordering the Court of Claims to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction over similar appeals from other attorney general decisions 
on attorney fees made pursuant to R.C. 2743.65. 
{¶ 2} The Court of Claims now appeals as of right to this court, 
contending that it has jurisdiction over all matters related to appeals from 
decisions of the attorney general regarding awards of reparations, including 
awards or denials of attorney fees. 
{¶ 3} The Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the 
attorney general granting or denying payment of attorney fees in connection with 
an award of reparations filed on behalf of a victim of a crime.  Therefore, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} Attorney Jack Carney-DeBord submitted attorney-fee applications to 
the Ohio Attorney General requesting a total of $1,563.75 for representing Joseph 
Fletcher in connection with Fletcher’s application for crime-victim reparations.  
Pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 2743.65(A)(2), the attorney general made a 
maximum final award of $1,020 to Carney-DeBord. 
{¶ 5} After the attorney general denied a request for reconsideration, 
Carney-DeBord appealed the award of attorney fees to the Court of Claims.  The 
attorney general moved to dismiss that appeal, asserting that the court lacked 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
jurisdiction to act, but a Court of Claims panel of commissioners denied that 
motion and affirmed the $1,020 attorney fee awarded by the attorney general.  In 
re Fletcher (Feb. 9, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006-20836.  The attorney general then 
appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and on 
review of that appeal, a judge of the Court of Claims affirmed the decision of the 
panel, concluding that pursuant to R.C. 2743.53(A) and 2743.55(A), the Court of 
Claims had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the attorney general’s award of 
attorney fees.  In re Fletcher (July 2, 2009), Ct.Cl. No. V2006-20836. 
{¶ 6} The attorney general then sought both a writ of mandamus to compel 
the Court of Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction and a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of Claims from 
reviewing similar appeals from other decisions of the attorney general granting or 
denying requests for attorney fees filed pursuant to R.C. 2743.65. 
{¶ 7} The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued the requested writs, 
holding that the Victims of Crime Act provides no authority for the Court of 
Claims to review a decision of the attorney general granting or denying payment 
of attorney fees for preparing a claim for crime-victim reparations and explaining 
that the attorney general’s decision in this regard is final pursuant to R.C. 
2743.65. 
{¶ 8} The Court of Claims now appeals to this court as of right, 
contending that R.C. 2743.53(A), part of the Victims of Crime Act, vests it with 
appellate jurisdiction over all matters related to appeals from decisions of the 
attorney general’s award of reparations, including decisions granting or denying 
payment of attorney fees.  The court also maintains that the General Assembly did 
not expressly state that the attorney general’s decision on attorney fees is final 
and not appealable, and it further asserts that because the fees are paid from the 
reparations fund, they are a form of reparations.  Thus, the Court of Claims 
believes it has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a decision of the attorney 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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general granting or denying payment of attorney fees for preparing an application 
for reparations on behalf of a claimant. 
{¶ 9} In response, the attorney general argues that because the Court of 
Claims is a statutorily created court, it may exercise only the jurisdiction 
specifically conferred upon it by the General Assembly and therefore its appellate 
jurisdiction may not be implied but must be expressly provided by statute.  
According to the attorney general, the statute authorizing the payment of fees to 
an attorney for assisting a claimant in applying for reparations does not also 
authorize a right to appeal an award of those fees to the Court of Claims.  The 
attorney general further maintains that Carney-DeBord cannot be considered a 
claimant appealing an award of reparations, because the statutes expressly 
distinguish between the claimant and the attorney representing the claimant and 
because the fees charged by an attorney for preparing a claim are excluded by 
statute from an award of reparations.  For these reasons, the attorney general 
contends that the Court of Claims patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal in this case and that the court of appeals properly granted the 
writs in this case. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we are called upon to decide whether the Court of 
Claims has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the attorney general’s decisions 
granting or denying payment of fees to attorneys for seeking awards of 
reparations on behalf of victims of crime. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 11} The Victims of Crime Act establishes a reparations fund in the state 
treasury to compensate persons for economic loss resulting from criminally 
injurious conduct.  See R.C. 2743.191.  Further,  R.C. 2743.52(A) directs the 
attorney general to “make awards of reparations for economic loss arising from 
criminally injurious conduct, if satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the requirements for an award of reparations have been met.” 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 12} The act authorizes an appeal from decisions of the attorney general 
in connection with awards of reparations, providing in R.C. 2743.52(B), “A court 
of claims panel of commissioners or a judge of the court of claims has appellate 
jurisdiction to order awards of reparations for economic loss arising from 
criminally injurious conduct * * *.” 
{¶ 13} Specifically, R.C. 2743.61(B) provides that “[a] claimant may 
appeal an award of reparations, the amount of an award of reparations, or the 
denial of a claim for an award of reparations that is made by a final decision of 
the attorney general after any reconsideration.”  (Emphasis added.)  No other 
provision of the act, however, establishes a right to appeal from a decision of the 
attorney general. 
{¶ 14} The questions presented in this case therefore are, who may qualify 
as a claimant as that term is used in R.C. 2743.61(B) and what is the nature of the 
relationship between R.C. 2743.61 and R.C. 2743.65?  In interpreting a statute, 
our duty is to ascertain the legislative intent as manifested in the words of the 
statute.  Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 
N.E.2d 872, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 15} The General Assembly has defined the term “claimant” in R.C. 
2743.51(A) to mean a person who claims an award of reparations as a victim of a 
crime, a dependent of a deceased victim, a third person who assumes the legal 
obligations of a victim, a person who is authorized to act on behalf of any of the 
above, or the estate of a deceased victim.  The Court of Claims urges that because 
attorneys are authorized to act on behalf of victims of crime, they are claimants as 
defined in R.C. 2743.51(A), but they are not. 
Fees Are Not Reparations 
{¶ 16} The fees charged by an attorney in preparing a claim for 
reparations are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations. While the 
Victims of Crime Act directs the attorney general to make an award of reparations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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to the claimant for economic loss, R.C. 2743.52(A), the term “economic loss” is 
defined in R.C. 2743.51(E) and (F)(4) to include only the attorney fees “incurred 
to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other order to 
physically separate a victim from an offender, if the attorney has not received 
payment under section 2743.65 of the Revised Code for assisting a claimant with 
an application for an award of reparations.”  The General Assembly, however, did 
not include within the definition of “economic loss” attorney fees for assisting a 
claimant to apply for an award of reparations, and therefore attorney fees for 
preparing such a claim are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2743.71(B)(3) further clarifies that “[a]n attorney who 
represents an applicant for an award of reparations cannot charge the applicant for 
the services rendered in relation to that representation but is required to apply to 
the attorney general for payment for the representation.”  Thus, an attorney who 
requests these types of fees is not seeking reimbursement for the victim’s 
economic loss on behalf of the claimant, but rather is requesting payment from the 
reparations fund for services the attorney rendered. 
{¶ 18} As a further indication that it did not intend attorney fees to be part 
of an award of reparations, the General Assembly provided a separate statute, 
R.C. 2743.65, to compensate attorneys who represent claimants.  In this section, 
the legislature distinguished between claimants and attorneys representing 
claimants.  It states: “The attorney general shall determine, and the state shall pay, 
in accordance with this section attorney's fees, commensurate with services 
rendered, to the attorney representing a claimant under sections 2743.51 to 
2743.72 of the Revised Code.  The attorney shall submit on an application form 
an itemized fee bill at the rate of sixty dollars per hour upon receipt of the final 
decision on the claim.”  The statute also establishes maximum amounts that may 
be paid for particular services rendered and authorizes the attorney general to 
determine the amount of attorney fees allowed in each case. 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims 
{¶ 19} The Court of Claims is a statutorily created court.  See R.C. 
2743.03.  In State ex rel. Johnson v. Perry Cty. Court (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 
54, 495 N.E.2d 16, in which this court considered whether county courts have 
jurisdiction through inherent power or by statute to punish contempt, we 
explained that “[a] court created by statute * * * has only limited jurisdiction, and 
may exercise only such powers as are directly conferred by legislative action.” 
{¶ 20} Further, we held in Truman v. Walton (1899), 59 Ohio St. 517, 525, 
53 N.E. 57, that “[t]he court held by a village mayor is of limited jurisdiction. His 
power to try persons accused of violating village ordinances or the criminal laws 
of the state is only such as has been conferred by statute. If such jurisdiction has 
not been thus created, it does not exist.” See also Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. 
Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 7 
(“municipal courts are statutorily created, R.C. 1901.01, and their subject-matter 
jurisdiction is set by statute”). 
{¶ 21} Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited by 
statute and specifically confined to the powers conferred by the legislature. 
{¶ 22} In contrast to R.C. 2743.52(B) and 2743.61(B), which expressly 
confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear appeals from 
decisions granting or denying awards of reparations to claimants, the General 
Assembly, in enacting R.C. 2743.65, did not confer appellate jurisdiction on the 
Court of Claims to hear appeals from decisions of the attorney general granting or 
denying payment of fees to attorneys for seeking reparations on behalf of 
claimants.  Thus, no statutory authorization exists for the Court of Claims to 
consider such appeals, and as it is a court of limited jurisdiction, it can exercise 
only the authority specifically conferred on it by statute. 
{¶ 23} Thus, the Victims of Crime Act distinguishes between a claimant 
who alleges entitlement to an award of reparations and an attorney who requests 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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attorney fees for submitting a claimant’s application for reparations.  An attorney 
who requests fees from the attorney general for preparing a claimant’s application 
for reparations is not a claimant for purposes of R.C. 2743.61(B) and cannot 
appeal to the Court of Claims on that basis. Although the legislature has provided 
for a claimant to have the right to appeal to the Court of Claims from an award of 
reparations, it has not similarly provided for an attorney seeking payment of legal 
fees for representing such a claimant to also have the right to appeal to the Court 
of Claims from a decision of the attorney general granting or denying an award of 
attorney fees.  And because the Victims of Crime Act does not provide the right to 
appeal from an attorney-fee decision of the attorney general or confer jurisdiction 
on the Court of Claims to hear such an appeal, the court has no jurisdiction to 
review such an award. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} The Court of Claims of Ohio lacks jurisdiction to consider appeals 
from decisions of the attorney general granting or denying attorney fees for 
seeking reparations on behalf of a victim of crime.  Accordingly, the appellate 
court properly issued writs of mandamus and prohibition compelling the Court of 
Claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal and prohibiting the Court of 
Claims from hearing similar appeals from decisions of the attorney general on 
attorney-fee applications in the future.  For these reasons, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
Attorneys as Claimants to Recover Fees 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 25} As the majority opinion notes, the dispositive issue is whether the 
Victims of Crime Act authorizes the Court of Claims to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over the attorney general’s grant or denial of a request for attorney 
fees associated with representing an applicant for crime-victim reparations.  R.C. 
2743.61(B) authorizes a claimant to appeal “the denial of a claim for an award of 
reparations that is made by a final decision of the attorney general after any 
reconsideration.” 
{¶ 26} The term “claimant,” as used in R.C.2743.51 to 2743.72, means 
certain persons claiming an award of reparations under the Victims of Crime Act, 
including “[a] person who is authorized to act on behalf of any [such] person.”  
R.C. 2743.51(A)(1)(d) and (2)(d).  For R.C. Chapter 2743, the term “claim for an 
award of reparations” or “claim” means “a claim for an award of reparations 
made under sections 2743.51 to 2743.72 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2743.01(C).  
R.C. 2743.65, which is within the sections specified for the definitional terms 
“claimant” and “claim for an award of reparations,” authorizes an attorney 
representing a crime-victims-reparations claimant to request attorney fees. 
{¶ 27} Based on the above referenced statutes, it is clear that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that the Court of Claims lacked appellate jurisdiction 
over the attorney general’s final decision on Carney-DeBord’s requests for 
attorney fees in a crime-victim-reparations matter.  R.C. 2743.61(B) authorizes an 
appeal to the Court of Claims by a “claimant” from “the denial of a claim for an 
award of reparations that is made by a final decision of the attorney general after 
any reconsideration.”  An attorney who represents an applicant for crime-victim 
reparations is a “claimant” because the attorney “is authorized to act on behalf of” 
the applicant.  R.C. 2743.51(A)(1)(d) and (2)(d).  And the attorney’s appeal from 
the denial of a request for attorney fees for the representation of the applicant is 
the denial of a “claim for an award of reparations” because an attorney-fee 
awarded under R.C. 2743.65 is “an award made under sections 2743.51 to 
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2743.72 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 2743.01(C).  Finally, the denial of the 
attorney’s claim is made final by a determination of the attorney general after any 
reconsideration.  R.C. 2743.65(C)(2). 
{¶ 28} Despite the unambiguous language of these provisions, the 
majority opinion concludes that fees charged by an attorney in preparing a claim 
are not recoverable as part of an award of reparations because of R.C. 
2743.51(F)(4).  That conclusion is based on a misinterpretation of R.C. 
2743.51(F)(4). 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2743.52(A) authorizes reparations for “economic loss,” which 
consists of “allowable expenses,” R.C. 2743.51(E).  And allowable expenses 
include “reasonable charges incurred for reasonably needed * * * services.”  R.C. 
2743.51(F)(1).  This definition is broad enough to encompass attorney fees 
incurred 
in 
securing 
crime-victim 
reparations. 
 
Furthermore, 
R.C. 
2743.51(F)(4)(b) provides that “ ‘[a]llowable expense’ includes attorney’s fees * 
* * incurred to successfully obtain a restraining order, custody order, or other 
order to physically separate a victim from an offender” in certain circumstances.  
By using the phrase “ ‘allowable expense’ includes,” it is clear that the General 
Assembly was not setting forth an exhaustive list.  See Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 154, 2010-Ohio-4992, 937 N.E.2d 109, ¶ 15 
(holding that by using the phrase “owner includes” in R.C. 323.151(A)(2), the 
General Assembly intended a nonexhaustive list). 
{¶ 30} Therefore, R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) does not provide that attorney fees 
are allowable expenses only if the attorney has not received payment under R.C. 
2743.65.  Rather, R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) establishes limits on attorney fees 
considered to be allowable expenses for fees incurred for successfully obtaining a 
restraining order, custody order, or other order to physically separate a victim 
from an offender.  Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, R.C. 
2743.51(F)(4) does not restrict attorney fees recoverable as part of an award of 
January Term, 2011 
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reparations to the types of legal assistance specified therein.  And if the General 
Assembly had so intended, it would have used language specifying such. 
{¶ 31} The plain language of the applicable provisions justified the Court 
of Claims’ exercise of appellate jurisdiction over Carney-DeBord’s appeal.  
Because these provisions are unambiguous, we must apply them rather than 
construe them.  State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 25. 
Final and Appealable Order 
{¶ 32} The court of appeals also determined that because R.C. 
2743.65(C)(2) specifies that the attorney general’s decision on an attorney’s 
request for fees is “final” but does not also specify that it is appealable, no appeal 
from such a decision to the Court of Claims is available.  For the following 
reasons, that determination is incorrect. 
{¶ 33} In Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 127 
Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710, 940 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11, we held that a decision 
of the Ohio Department of Education denying a church’s application to sponsor 
community schools in Ohio because it was not an education-oriented entity was 
appealable notwithstanding a statutory provision specifying that the department’s 
determination was final.  We observed that “[h]ad the General Assembly intended 
that the department’s determination of whether an entity is education-oriented not 
be subject to administrative appeal, it could have * * * specif[ied] that the 
department’s decision is final and not subject to appeal,” as it had done in various 
other statutory provisions.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 34} Similarly, the General Assembly did not specify that the attorney 
general’s attorney-fee decisions made under R.C. 2743.65 are not subject to 
appeal.  To the contrary, R.C. 2743.61 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court 
of Claims over attorneys’ claims for fees for their representation of crime-victim-
reparations applicants.  Moreover, although a specific statute generally prevails 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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over a general statute if they cannot be reconciled so as to give effect to both, see 
Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 
522, ¶ 31 and 32, “[w]e should not * * * seek out a conflict where none exists,”  
Brookwood at ¶ 10.  Here, as detailed previously, the language of the applicable 
provisions can be read to give effect to all of them, including R.C. 2743.61 and 
2743.65.  The fact that the attorney general’s attorney-fee decision is final 
pursuant to R.C. 2743.65(C)(2) is consistent with the authorization in R.C. 
2743.61(B) for the Court of Claims to exercise appellate jurisdiction over “the 
denial of a claim for an award of reparations that is made by a final decision of 
the attorney general after any reconsideration.” 
{¶ 35} Even though Brookwood is squarely on point with respect to 
whether the determination in this case is appealable, neither the attorney general 
nor the majority opinion mentions it. 
{¶ 36} R.C. 2743.53(A) provides that “[a] court of claims panel of 
commissioners shall hear and determine all matters relating to appeals from 
decisions of the attorney general pursuant to sections 2743.51 to 2743.72 of the 
Revised Code.”  The attorney-fee appeals to the Court of Claims in this case and 
in similar cases are authorized by R.C. 2743.61 and 2743.65.  Furthermore, under 
R.C. 2743.53(A), the Court of Claims may hear and determine all matters related 
to the appeals. 
{¶ 37} This conclusion is supported by the principle that “statutes 
providing for appeals should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of appeal.”  
Waltco Truck Equip. Co. v. Tallmadge Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 41, 42, 531 N.E.2d 685. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Court of Claims 
properly exercised appellate jurisdiction over Carney-DeBord’s appeal and that 
the attorney general established neither a clear legal right to vacation of the 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
court’s decision and dismissal of the appeal nor a corresponding clear legal duty 
on the part of the court to perform these requested acts.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 39} Moreover, the attorney general cannot establish that the exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Claims in these cases is unauthorized by 
law.  To the contrary, the court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction is authorized 
by R.C. 2743.61.  Therefore, the court of appeals also erred in granting the writ of 
prohibition. 
{¶ 40} The attorney general failed to establish his entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus and prohibition.  The Court of Claims 
properly exercised appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the attorney 
general’s attorney-fee decision in the crime-victim-reparations case.  Therefore, 
the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed and the writs should be 
denied.  I dissent. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Elise Porter, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
 
Aaron D. Epstein and Damian W. Sikora, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
appellant. 
______________________