Title: Peter Renzo v. State Dept. of Agriculture Untimely tort claim

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No.  36672 
 
 
PETER RENZO, dba S.A.B.R.E. 
FOUNDATION, INC. 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent. 
_____________________________________ 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
 
 
          Boise, August  2010 Term  
 
          2010 Opinion No. 103 
 
          Filed: October 5, 2010 
 
          Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bingham County.  Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court granting summary judgment to defendant is   
affirmed. 
 
Nick L. Nielson, Pocatello, attorney for appellant. 
 
Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for 
respondents.  Timothy Hopkins argued. 
________________________________________ 
 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This lawsuit stems from an attempt by Peter Renzo, who was doing business as 
S.A.B.R.E. Foundation, Inc. (“S.A.B.R.E.”), to bring Siberian tigers and other big cats (herein 
cumulatively referred to as “tigers”) into the State of Idaho.  The Foundation is allegedly 
dedicated to repopulating Siberian tigers and educating the general public about them.   
In 2007, Renzo sought to bring the tigers into Idaho.  S.A.B.R.E. had a facility in Nevada, 
but needed to find a new location because their premises were being sold.  Renzo had allegedly 
obtained investors and sought to construct a fifty-acre tiger habitat, a residence, a restaurant, a 
veterinary hospital, and a sixty-room hotel.  The project was expected to cost $8,000,000.  
 
2 
There are two separate permits at issue in this case, a possession permit and a propagation 
permit.  Renzo applied for the former, a deleterious exotic animal possession permit, with the 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture (the “Department”) on October 9, 2007.  While Renzo 
thereafter requested the issuance of a propagation permit, no application for a propagation permit 
was ever filed.   
On October 17, 2007, Dr. Greg Ledbetter, the Administrator of the Division of Animal 
Industries of the Department, wrote a letter to Renzo regarding the possession permit, clearly 
stating that all tigers had to be spayed or neutered before the possession application could be 
approved.  The letter was not a denial of the possession permit but rather, it was essentially a 
conditional grant.  It contained conditions that had to be satisfied for the permit to be issued, 
namely, that the tigers be spayed and neutered.  It stated: 
Before ISDA can finalize your application, the following conditions must be met: 
. . . 2) Provide documentation from an accredited veterinarian that all female 
tigers proposed to be moved into Idaho have been spayed prior to shipment. 3) 
Provide documentation from an accredited veterinarian that all male tigers 
proposed to be moved into Idaho have been neutered prior to shipment.  
 
On November 2, 2007, Renzo’s attorney, Nick Nielson, sent a letter to Dr. Ledbetter 
which acknowledged the October 17 letter’s requirement that the tigers be spayed or neutered, 
stating that “[i]t is my understanding from your October 17 letter that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation 
must spay and/or neuter all of its tigers prior to shipment.”  The November 2 letter also 
acknowledged that Becky Harris, Renzo’s administrative assistant, had engaged in a 
conversation with Dr. Ledbetter some time before the letter was written in which Dr. Ledbetter 
“indicated that breeding permits were only given to zoos.”  Mr. Nielson’s letter confirmed that 
Renzo had knowledge that “[w]hen asked if [Dr. Ledbetter] would provide a denial of the request 
for a breeding permit in writing, [Dr. Ledbetter] indicated that the October 17 letter was 
sufficient and there was no need for further discussion.”  On November 16, 2007, Dr. Ledbetter 
sent  a letter to Mr. Nielson that acknowledged “[t]he State of Idaho will not issue a Propagation 
Permit to your client.”  However, a propagation permit was never correctly applied for by Renzo, 
and therefore there was never an actual denial of a propagation permit application but rather only 
a statement of intent to deny any such permit.  
On December 14, 2007, Renzo filed a petition for judicial review challenging the 
Department’s decision to require sterilization of the tigers and the Department’s refusal to issue a 
 
3 
propagation permit.  On April 24, 2008, the district court issued an order and judgment that the 
decision of the Department be set aside in its entirety and that the Department “shall, within a 
reasonable amount of time, adopt criteria and/or rules for which possession and propagation 
permits are issued and apply these rules and criteria fairly to Petitioner’s application.”  The court 
based its ruling upon the finding that the Department’s “decision was made in the absence of any 
specific criteria promulgated by the Department for awarding propagation permits.”  The court 
also found that the Department’s decision exceeded statutory authority, was made upon unlawful 
procedure, was arbitrary and capricious, and prejudiced Renzo’s substantial rights. 
Renzo filed a notice of tort claim on May 14, 2008, and a complaint on October 6, 2008.  
In his complaint, Renzo prayed for monetary damages claiming that the Department breached its 
duty to exercise ordinary care by refusing to grant possession and propagation permits without a 
basis in law or fact.  Renzo also claimed that the Department acted maliciously and/or recklessly, 
willfully and wantonly, and/or with gross negligence.  Lastly, Renzo claimed that the 
Department intentionally interfered with his prospective economic advantage.  The Department 
filed a motion to dismiss on January 6, 2009, which the court converted into a motion for 
summary judgment.  On May 27, 2009, the district court entered an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Department.  The court entered a final judgment that same day.  Renzo 
filed a notice of appeal with this Court on July 7, 2009. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether Renzo’s notice of tort claim was untimely under I.C. § 6-905. 
2. 
Whether Renzo raised a material issue of fact concerning the malice requirement under 
I.C. § 6-904(1).   
3. 
Whether the Department is entitled to immunity under I.C. § 6-904B(3). 
4. 
Whether Renzo failed to raise an issue of material fact regarding the claim of intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage.   
5. 
Whether the Department owed a duty to Renzo because of the economic loss rule. 
6. 
Whether the decision of the district court was contrary to federal law. 
7. 
Whether the Department is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under I.C. § 6-
918A. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is the same standard as that 
used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.  Sorensen v. Saint 
 
4 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 758, 118 P.3d 86, 90 (2005) (citing Tolley v. 
THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 259, 92 P.3d 503, 509 (2004)).  Summary judgment is proper when “the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of 
the non-moving party.  Sorensen, 141 Idaho at 758, 118 P.3d at 90 (citing Tolley, 140 Idaho at 
259, 92 P.3d at 509). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Renzo’s Notice of Tort Claim Was Untimely Under Idaho Code § 6-905.   
The district court found that Renzo’s notice of tort claim was untimely and that therefore 
summary judgment for the Department was proper.  Tort claims against government entities and 
their employees are covered by the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.C. §§ 6-901 to 6-929.  Idaho 
Code § 6-905 provides:  
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all claims 
against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the employee within 
the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the 
secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim 
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later. 
A claimant is not required to know all the facts and details of a claim to have notice.  Mitchell v. 
Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 423, 942 P.2d 544, 547 (1997).  “Knowledge of facts 
which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry” triggers the 180 day period.  
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987).   
When finding the claim to be untimely, the district court drew analogies between this 
case and Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 169–70, 59 
P.3d 971, 974–75 (2002).  In doing so, the court found that Renzo had been put on notice on 
October 17, 2007, when he received a letter indicating that the tigers must be spayed or neutered 
before a permit would be granted.  The district court took note of the fact that the Department 
sent a second letter on November 16, 2007, but found that letter to simply reiterate the 
Department’s original position made clear on October 17. 
Renzo claims that the notice of tort claim was timely as it was submitted within 180 days 
of November 16, 2007, the date Renzo contends he was put on notice.  Renzo argues that 
Magnuson Properties Partnership is distinguishable from this case and is not controlling.  
Unlike Magnuson Properties Partnership, where the plaintiff received an unequivocal denial of 
 
5 
a single request, Renzo contends that there were two separate requests and denials in this case.  
The Department’s letter dated October 17, 2007, Renzo contends, was a denial in direct response 
to Renzo’s application for a possession permit.  Renzo asserts that because he did not inquire 
about a propagation permit until he received the Department’s letter requiring that the tigers be 
spayed or neutered on October 17, 2007, he did not have knowledge of the potential denial of 
that permit at that time.  Renzo contends that he did not receive knowledge of the “denial” of the 
propagation permit until November 16, 2007, when the Department provided a written letter 
reiterating that a propagation permit would not be issued.  Renzo states that it is therefore 
unreasonable to find that he knew about the wrongful denial of the propagation permit on 
October 17, 2007, before the permit was requested.    
We affirm the finding of the district court that Renzo’s notice of tort claim was untimely.  
Renzo had knowledge of facts by October 17, 2007 that would put a reasonably prudent person 
on notice that a possession permit for the tigers would not be granted without satisfaction of the 
conditions stated in the October 17, 2007 letter, including that the tigers be spayed and neutered.  
Moreover, since it is axiomatic that sterilized tigers cannot propagate, Renzo clearly had 
knowledge by October 17, 2007, or at the latest by November 2, 2007, that he would not get a 
propagation permit, even though he had not at that time even applied for such a permit.  Since he 
did not file the notice of tort claim until May 14, 2008, at least 194 days later, his notice was 
clearly not timely.  
Magnuson Properties Partnership demonstrates how the timeliness requirement in I.C. § 
6-905 is to be applied.  In Magnuson Properties Partnership, the plaintiff, a general contractor, 
submitted a statement of reimbursable costs to the local municipality for work he had performed.  
138 Idaho at 168, 59 P.3d at 973.  Though the plaintiff alleged that a city official had told him 
that he would be reimbursed, on May 13, 1996, the city sent a letter denying the existence of any 
agreement and denying the reimbursement request.  Id.  On November 11, 1996, after repeated 
attempts to obtain reimbursement, the municipality reiterated its position.  Id. at 167–68, 59 P.3d 
at 973–74.  After a claim was brought for the wrongful denial of the reimbursement request, this 
Court found that the city’s letter dated May 13, 1996, would have given a reasonable and prudent 
person knowledge of facts of the alleged wrongful act.  Id. at 170, 59 P.3d at 975.  This Court 
found that consequently the plaintiff’s notice of claim dated February 18, 1997, was untimely 
because it was not filed within the 180 day statutorily prescribed period.  Id.   
 
6 
In this case, like in Magnuson Properties Partnership, the letter of October 17 and the 
letter of November 2 each provided Renzo with knowledge of the alleged wrongful acts that 
would put a reasonably prudent person on notice.  The Department’s October 17, 2007 letter 
required that the tigers be spayed or neutered in order to receive a possession permit, and put 
Renzo on notice that the possession permit would not be granted unless that condition was met.  
Renzo was not willing to spay or neuter his tigers.  Because Renzo never applied for a 
propagation permit, the October 17 letter was not a denial of a propagation permit, however, the 
letter would certainly put a reasonably prudent person on notice that a propagation permit would 
not be issued to Renzo, as it would be impossible for tigers to propagate once sterilized.  Again, 
Renzo was not willing to spay or neuter the tigers.   
The November 2 letter further indicates that Renzo had notice.  Renzo’s attorney Mr. 
Nielson acknowledges in the letter that Renzo’s assistant, Becky Harris, had spoken with Dr. 
Ledbetter, and that Renzo understood that “breeding permits were only given to zoos” and that 
“[w]hen asked if [Dr. Ledbetter] would provide a denial of the request for a breeding permit in 
writing, [Dr. Ledbetter] indicated that the October 17 letter was sufficient and there was no need 
for further discussion.”  It is clear that Renzo’s assistant Becky Harris spoke with Ledbetter at 
some point before November 2, and that she communicated the information to Renzo.  Thus, 
because Becky Harris and Renzo knew at least by November 2 that no permit would be issued 
unless the tigers were spayed and neutered, Renzo had notice by that time of the alleged 
wrongful act.   
Further, like in Magnuson Properties Partnership, the letter dated November 16, 2007, 
simply reiterated the Department’s earlier position that the tigers must be spayed or neutered 
before any possession permit was issued. The November 16 letter’s statement that “[t]he State of 
Idaho will not issue a Propagation Permit to your client” simply confirmed what Renzo was 
already on notice of by November 2 at the latest, that the requirement that the tigers be spayed or 
neutered would prevent the issuance of any propagation permit.  Therefore, because Renzo’s 
notice of claim was filed over 180 days from the latest possible date of notice, November 2, it 
was untimely, and we affirm the decision of the district court to grant summary judgment to the 
Department on these grounds.  
Because the issue of timeliness is dispositive, we do not reach the remaining issues raised 
on appeal.  
 
7 
B. 
We Decline to Award Attorney Fees on Appeal to the Department Under Idaho 
Code § 6-918A. 
The Department claims that it should be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal under 
I.C. § 6-918A because Renzo simply asked this Court to second-guess the trial court’s decision.  
To do so, the Department contends, was in bad faith.   
This Court does not award attorney fees and costs to the Department pursuant to I.C. § 6-
918A.  Under that statute, attorney fees may be awarded upon “a showing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of 
bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.”  I.C. § 6-918A.  
“Bad faith is defined as dishonesty in belief or purpose.”  Cordova v. Bonneville Cnty. Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774, 780 (2007) (citing Cobbley v. Challis, 143 Idaho 
130, 135, 139 P.3d 732, 737 (2006)).  The Department has not directed this Court to an instance 
of dishonesty in belief or purpose on the part of Renzo.  Moreover, while Renzo may have asked 
this Court to second-guess the findings of the trial court, the Department has not provided 
authority or argument demonstrating how such action was dishonest or made in bad faith.   
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the district court’s finding that Renzo’s 
notice of tort claim was untimely and thus affirms the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Department.  This Court declines to award attorney fees on appeal to the Department under I.C. 
§ 6-918A.  Costs to the Department.  
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, and HORTON, CONCUR.