Title: VERNIER v. VERNIER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VERNIER v. VERNIER2004 WY 7792 P.3d 825Case Number: 03-115Decided: 06/29/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

GILBERT 
PAUL VERNIER,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

AGNES 
MARIE VERNIER,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Gilbert Paul Vernier, Pro Se.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Dorothy A. Regis, Buffalo, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      The appellant, 
Gilbert Paul Vernier, was incarcerated in Colorado when his wife filed for 
divorce.  The divorce was granted, 
and the appellant now claims that the district court erred in dividing the 
parties' property and in not allowing him the requisite thirty days to answer 
the complaint.  We 
affirm.

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
presents two issues for our review:

 

1.         
Was the division of marital property equitable?

 

2.         
Were the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure violated?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The appellee, 
Agnes Marie Vernier, filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on March 28, 
2003.  When she filed the complaint, 
her husband, the appellant, was incarcerated at Crowley Correctional Facility in 
Olney Springs, Colorado.  He was 
personally served there with a copy of the complaint and summons on March 31, 
2003.  The appellee filed an 
Application for Entry of Default on April 24, 2003, accompanied by supporting 
affidavits, and on May 7, 2003, after the appellant failed to plead or otherwise 
defend, the Clerk of the District Court entered a default.  Despite the entry of default, the matter 
was heard on May 20, 2003, with the appellant appearing pro se by 
telephone.  The district court 
ultimately granted the divorce and divided the parties' property and debts.  The appellant filed a notice of appeal 
on June 9, 2003.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶4]      The appellant 
first claims that the district court's property division was inequitable.  He contends that a "review of the record 
will convinced [sic] this Court that the trial judge did not 
carefully and conscientiously considered [sic] all of the factors that 
should have entered into the deliberations and subsequent decision pursuant to 
the division of property."  
(Emphasis in original.)

 

[¶5]      We note, at the 
outset, that the appellant failed to provide this Court a transcript of the 
proceeding pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.02,1 or a statement of the evidence as 
allowed by W.R.A.P. 3.03.2  The appellant has the burden of 
providing this Court a complete record.  
Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 18, 30 P.3d 542, 547 (Wyo. 
2001); 
Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616, 617 (Wyo. 1993).  Without a sufficient record, we must 
""accept the trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the 
issues which pertain to the evidence.'"'"  Smith v. Smith, 2003 WY 
87, ¶ 11, 72 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting 
Williams v. Dietz, 999 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 2000) and Weiss v. 
Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by 
White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003)).  "In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings."  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo. 1995).  Where a proper record is not provided, 
an appeal may be dismissed or review may be limited to those issues not 
requiring inspection of the record.  
Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

[¶6]      The division of 
marital property is within the sound discretion of the district court.  Sweat v. 
Sweat, 2003 WY 
82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).  "Without 
either a transcript or an approved statement of the hearing we cannot assume 
that the court's findings were unsupported.  We cannot find an abuse of 
discretion.'"  Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d at 664 (quoting Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 
1986)).  Accordingly, we will affirm the property 
distribution set out in the divorce decree.

 

[¶7]      
The 
appellant next requests that we nullify the district court's order, arguing that 
"Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedures were violated by the [appellee] . . .."  While the appellant does not specify 
which rules were violated, he claims that the "[a]ppellee failed to wait the 
required 30 days before filing an Application For Entry of Default and 
Request for Setting."  (Emphasis in 
original.)  From this statement, we 
presume that the appellant is arguing that a default was entered, pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 55,3 before the thirty-day time period 
allowed by W.R.C.P. 12(a).4

 

[¶8]      The record 
clearly demonstrates that the appellant was allowed more than the required 
thirty days to respond, which he did not do.  The appellant was served on March 31, 
2003, and on May 7, 2003, thirty-seven days later, the clerk of the district 
court entered the appellant's default.  
Furthermore, the matter does not appear to have been treated as a 
default.  A hearing was held in 
which the appellant participated.  We find no procedural 
violation.

 

[¶9]      As a final 
matter, the appellee requests that we "award her attorney's fees for the 
necessity of responding to Appellant's meritless appeal."  Such a sanction, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05, is not generally available where, as here, a discretionary ruling is 
challenged.  Dorsett v. 
Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Wyo. 2003).  We acknowledge that we have departed 
from this rule in the past. See Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 
(Wyo. 2000); 
Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 
1245 (Wyo. 1999); 
and Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d  at 
664.  However, we find that although the 
appellant failed to meet the burden of providing a sufficient record, he 
generally presented cogent argument and cited pertinent legal authority in 
support of his claims of error.  
Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, ¶ 31, 79 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Amen, 
Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997)); 
Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 1993).  We 
deny the appellee's request for attorney's fees.

 

[¶10]   The district court's decision is 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1W.R.A.P. 3.02(b) 
provides:

 

In 
all cases other than criminal and juvenile matters, if the proceedings in the 
trial court were stenographically reported by an official court reporter, 
appellant shall, contemporaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal, file 
and serve on appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which 
appellant intends to include in the record and unless the entire transcript is 
to be included, a statement of the issues appellant intends to present on 
appeal. If an appellant intends to assert on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by the evidence or contrary to the evidence, appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. If appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to 
be necessary appellee shall, within 15 days after service of the designation of 
the partial transcript by appellant, order such parts from the reporter or 
procure an order from the trial court directing appellant to do so. At the time 
of ordering, a party must make arrangements satisfactory to the reporter for 
payment of the cost of the transcript.

2W.R.A.P. 
3.03 provides:

 

If 
no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means including appellant's recollection. 
The statement shall be served on appellee, who may serve objections or propose 
amendments within 15 days after service. The statement and any objections or 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and 
approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the trial 
court in the record on appeal.

3W.R.C.P. 
55(a) provides:

 

Entry. 
 When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is 
made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's 
default.

 

4W.R.C.P. 
12(a) provides, in pertinent part:

 

When 
Presented.  
A defendant shall serve an answer within 20 days after the service of the 
summons and complaint upon that defendant, or if service be made without the 
state, or by publication, within 30 days after such service or 
within 30 days after the last day of publication . . ..

 

(Emphasis 
added.)