Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MICHELE ANN SOBCZAK OBETTS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MAY 1, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 115890  
MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
We granted leave in this case to consider whether  
firearms found in defendant’s home, upon execution by federal  
and state police officers of a federal search warrant, were  
properly excluded from evidence in a state prosecution. The  
firearms were suppressed on the ground that a copy of the  
affidavit in support of the search warrant was not provided,  
as required by statute, to defendant at the time the warrant  
was executed.  Because we are unable to conclude that the  
Legislature intended the exclusionary rule to apply to the  
  
 
procedural 
violation 
of 
Michigan’s 
statutory 
warrant  
requirements at issue in this case, we reverse.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Defendant 
and 
her 
husband, 
Timothy 
Obetts, 
were 
co-owners  
of Pro Temp One Incorporated,1 a Michigan corporation that  
provided skilled and semiskilled health care workers to  
hospitals, nursing homes, and private homes.  In May 1997, the  
Michigan Accident Fund, Pro Temp One’s worker’s compensation  
carrier, received a call on its fraud hotline indicating that  
defendant, Obetts, and Pro Temp One had misrepresented  
worker’s compensation employee classifications to the fund.  
After gathering information from associates and former  
employees of Pro Temp One, a fraud investigator from the fund  
contacted Michigan State Police Sergeant Jack Vanderwal, who  
initiated a criminal investigation. Vanderwal contacted the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation after determining that  
defendant and Obetts may have obtained bank loans by use of  
fraud in addition to defrauding the fund of worker’s  
compensation premiums.  
Special Agent David Smith of the FBI interviewed two  
former employees of Pro Temp One and a personal friend of  
defendant.2  On the basis of the information provided by these  
1Pro Temp One also conducted business as First Agency 
Professionals 
Incorporated 
and 
Agency 
Professionals  
Incorporated.  
2It appears from the record that the two former employees 
had been fired by defendant, and that at least one of them was 
(continued...)  
2  
three sources, Smith sought a federal search warrant to search  
the private residence of defendant and Obetts.  Smith’s  
affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to the  
three sources as “Source One,” “Source Two,” and “Source  
Three.”  On October 30, 1997, a federal magistrate issued the  
requested search warrant.3  The magistrate ordered that the  
affidavit in support of the warrant be sealed, apparently to  
protect the sources.  
On October 31, 1997, the federal search warrant was  
executed at the residence of defendant and Obetts by one or  
more FBI agents and one or more Michigan State Police  
officers.  While searching the basement of the home, two of  
the FBI agents came upon a locked safe.  The agents asked  
defendant about the contents of the safe, and she replied that  
it contained weapons. Defendant then unlocked the safe, and  
the agents seized two handguns from it.  In accordance with  
federal procedure, when the search was completed, defendant  
was given a copy of the search warrant and a tabulation of the  
items seized.  Notably, defendant was not provided with a copy  
of the sealed affidavit. Defendant was subsequently charged  
by the Kent County Prosecutor with possession of a firearm by  
2(...continued) 
involved in litigation with defendant.  
3The magistrate also issued a warrant to search the 
business premises of Pro Temp One.  This warrant was executed  
simultaneously with the warrant to search the private 
residence.  
3  
a person convicted of a felony.  MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6).4  
At defendant’s preliminary examination, defense counsel  
requested a copy of the affidavit in support of the search  
warrant.  The assistant prosecutor indicated that the federal  
magistrate would be petitioned to unseal the affidavit for  
purposes of the state proceedings. The district court judge  
presiding over the preliminary examination stated that he  
would bind defendant over for trial after defendant received  
a copy of the affidavit.  Within two weeks following the  
preliminary examination, the affidavit was unsealed and  
provided to defendant, and she was bound over for trial.  
Defendant moved to exclude the firearms from evidence on  
various grounds, including that the police did not comply with  
Michigan statutory requirements regarding warrant execution.  
Following two hearings on the motion to suppress, the trial  
court held that the motion had to be granted on the ground  
that defendant was not provided with a copy of the affidavit  
in support of the search warrant at the time of the search in  
contravention of MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4).  The trial court  
noted that the issuance and execution of the search warrant  
were “perfectly legitimate” under federal law. However, the  
court held that precedent from this Court required that  
evidence seized in the absence of full compliance with  
Michigan’s statutory warrant provisions be suppressed in a  
state prosecution.  Accordingly, the trial court entered an  
4Defendant was not charged with any federal offense or 
with worker’s compensation fraud as a result of the search.  
4  
 
 
 
order suppressing the firearms and dismissing the case.  
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.  238  
Mich App 495, 496-504; 606 NW2d 658 (1999).  In the lead  
opinion, Judge Hoekstra noted first that, pursuant to People  
v Paladino, 204 Mich App 505, 507-508; 516 NW2d 113 (1994), in  
a joint operation between the state and federal governments,  
state law governs the validity of a search warrant in state  
court proceedings.  Judge Hoekstra next opined that, although  
two panels of the Court of Appeals had recently held that a  
failure by law enforcement officers to comply with the  
statutory requirement to attach a copy of the affidavit to the  
copy of the warrant provided to the defendant does not require  
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant,5 those  
decisions conflicted with this Court’s holding in People v  
Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925).6  Judge Hoekstra  
concluded that, because Moten had not been overturned, the  
Court of Appeals was constrained to hold that, where a warrant  
relies on an attached affidavit for its statement of probable  
cause and that affidavit is not attached to the warrant as  
statutorily required, the evidence seized pursuant to the  
warrant is inadmissible.  However, Judge Hoekstra indicated  
5People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 99; 597 NW2d 194  
(1999); People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich App 669, 673; 
479 NW2d 359 (1991).  
6In Moten, this Court held that, where the face of the 
search warrant did not recite all the material facts alleged 
in 
the 
supporting 
affidavit as required by the then-applicable 
search warrant statute, the warrant was invalid, and the 
evidence seized pursuant thereto must be suppressed. Id. at  
174.  
5  
his disagreement with the Moten holding:  
While this particular statutory provision 
generally relates to a constitutional right, the 
specific portion of the statute requiring a  
recitation of the basis for probable cause or the 
attachment of the affidavit only barely relates to 
the substantive right the Legislature is seeking to 
protect. The requirement is more of a ministerial 
duty than a right.  Consequently, were I able, I 
would hold that defendant must show some prejudice 
before the trial court suppresses the evidence 
seized using a statutorily defective warrant.  In  
this case, for example, defendant was eventually 
afforded a chance to contest the basis for the  
warrant. I am unable to see how defendant was put 
at a disadvantage by being forced to delay her 
arguments until the parties obtained a copy of the 
federal affidavit. 
I think it is especially 
important that defendant be forced to show some 
level of prejudice given that the warrant met all 
the requirements of the federal warrant statute. 
Here, I find it necessary to exclude the evidence 
in question because the state warrant requirements 
differ from federal warrant requirements. Neither  
party 
has 
argued 
that 
the 
federal 
warrant  
requirements are unconstitutional, so it seems that 
I am forced to declare a search invalid because the  
ministerial duties associated with executing a 
federal warrant differ from those associated with  
executing a state warrant, a result I hope our 
Supreme Court will find equally unsettling. [238 
Mich App 503-504.]  
Judge Cavanagh concurred only in the result.  238 Mich App  
504.  
Judge Gage dissented, opining that the Court of Appeals  
decisions in People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90; 597 NW2d 194  
(1999), and People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich App 669;  
479 NW2d 359 (1991), controlled this case, and that this case  
was distinguishable from Moten. While the statute in effect  
at the time Moten was decided required that the search warrant  
itself contain a recitation of the affidavit’s statement of  
probable cause, Judge Gage noted, the current statute allows  
6  
 
 
 
 
instead the attachment of the affidavit to the search warrant.  
In light of this statutory amendment, Judge Gage stated she  
would hold that Moten was not controlling, and that  
suppression of the firearms in this case was not required  
because defendant had failed to demonstrate that she was  
prejudiced as a result of the “technical, nonconstitutional”  
statutory violation. 238 Mich App 504-508.  
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to  
appeal,7 and we now reverse.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling regarding a  
motion to suppress for clear error. People v Stevens (After  
Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (2000); People v  
Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).  However,  
questions of law relevant to the suppression issue are  
reviewed de novo. Stevens, supra at 631; see also People v  
Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998).  
Where violation of a state statute is involved,  
“‘[w]hether suppression is appropriate is a question of  
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
thus 
one 
of 
legislative 
intent.’”  
Stevens, supra at 644, quoting People v Wood, 450 Mich 399,  
408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (BOYLE, J., concurring). “‘Because  
our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices  
than those selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by  
examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative  
7462 Mich 912 (2000).  
7  
 
 
  
 
 
 
intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words  
expressed in the statute.’”  People v McIntire, 461 Mich 147,  
152; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), quoting 232 Mich App 119 (YOUNG,  
P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “‘When a  
statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or  
interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded.’”  
Stevens, supra at 644, quoting Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439  
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. STATUTORY WARRANT REQUIREMENTS  
In support of her motion to suppress the weapons,  
defendant contended that MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5)–by  
reference 
to 
MCL 
780.654; 
MSA 
28.1259(4)–required 
the 
officers  
executing the federal search warrant to provide her with a  
copy of the affidavit in support of the warrant. Because the  
officers provided only the warrant itself and not the  
affidavit, defendant argued that the search was defective and  
the handguns had to be suppressed. The trial court agreed.  
MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4) provides as follows:  
A search warrant shall be directed to the  
sheriff or any peace officer, commanding such 
officer to search the house, building or other  
location or place, where any property or other 
thing for which he is required to search is 
believed to be concealed.  Each warrant shall  
designate and describe the house or building or 
other location or place to be searched and the 
property or thing to be seized. The warrant shall  
also state the grounds or the probable or  
8  
 
reasonable cause for its issuance, or in lieu 
thereof, a copy of the affidavit may be attached 
thereto. [Emphasis supplied.]  
The requirement that the warrant be left at the scene or  
otherwise given to the premises owner is found in MCL 780.655;  
MSA 28.1259(5), which provides as follows in pertinent part:  
When an officer in the execution of a search  
warrant finds any property or seizes any of the 
other things for which a search warrant is allowed 
by this act, the officer, in the presence of the 
person from whose possession or premises the  
property or thing was taken, if present, or in the 
presence of at least 1 other person, shall make a 
complete and accurate tabulation of the property 
and things so seized. The officer taking property 
or other things under the warrant shall forthwith 
give to the person from whom or from whose premises 
the property was taken a copy of the warrant and 
shall give to the person a copy of the tabulation 
upon completion, or shall leave a copy of the 
warrant and tabulation at the place from which the 
property or thing was taken. [Emphasis supplied.][8]  
B. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
1. INTRODUCTION  
8We note that § 5 does not explicitly require that the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant, if attached to the 
warrant pursuant to § 4, be provided to the premises owner at 
the time of the seizure.  However, the prosecution concedes 
that § 5 was violated by the officers’ failure to provide 
defendant with a copy of the search warrant affidavit at the 
time the handguns were seized.  This is consistent with the  
holdings of the Court of Appeals in People v Chapin, 244 Mich  
App 196; ___ NW2d ___ (2000), and Garvin, supra (where the 
affidavit is attached to the warrant pursuant to § 4, the 
affidavit becomes part of the “warrant” that must be provided 
or left at the premises pursuant to § 5); but see Chapin,  
supra at 208 (HOOD, J., dissenting) (the plain language of § 
5 requires only that the search warrant itself be provided or 
left at the premises).  We agree with Chapin and Garvin and  
hold that, where an affidavit is attached to the warrant as 
permitted by § 4 in lieu of a statement of probable cause in 
the warrant itself, the affidavit is part of the “warrant” 
referred to in § 5.  
9  
 
 
The prosecution argues that, where the only defect in the  
search and seizure was a technical violation of Michigan’s  
statutory warrant requirements, and where there has been no  
violation of defendant’s constitutional rights under the  
Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule should not be  
applied.9 
 
Defendant–who 
makes 
no 
argument 
that 
her  
constitutional 
rights 
were 
violated 
by 
the 
officers’  
actions–contends that suppression of evidence is the proper  
remedy for a statutory violation of this kind, and that  
suppression is indeed required pursuant to this Court’s  
holding in Moten and its progeny. Because we conclude that  
Moten is distinguishable from the case at bar, and because we  
do not discern any legislative intent that the exclusionary  
rule be applied to a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5),  
we hold that suppression of the evidence in this case was not  
appropriate.  
2. PEOPLE V MOTEN 
    In a trilogy of prohibition-era cases, this Court  
suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants that  
were violative of the search warrant requirements set forth in  
§ 27 of Michigan’s “liquor law,” 1922 CL 7079(27), which  
9There is no federal counterpart to the Michigan 
statutory requirement that the search warrant state on its 
face the grounds or cause for its issuance or have the 
affidavit attached.  MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). See 18 USC  
3101 et seq.; FR Crim P 41(c). Defendant did not, and does 
not now, claim any deprivation of constitutional rights with 
respect to the procedure utilized by the federal magistrate in 
issuing the search warrant or in sealing the affidavit, or by 
the federal and state officers in executing the warrant.  
10  
 
 
 
 
 
provided in relevant part as follows:  
No warrant for search shall be issued until  
there has been filed with the magistrate an  
affidavit describing the house or place to be 
searched, the things to be searched for, and 
alleging substantially the offense in relation 
thereto, and that affiant believes, and has good 
cause to believe that such liquor is there  
concealed: Provided, however, That any description 
that will enable the officer to find the house or  
place to be searched shall be deemed sufficient. 
The warrant for search shall be directed to the  
proper officer and shall recite all of the material  
facts alleged in the affidavit, and describe the 
things to be searched for and the place to be  
searched.
 A warrant for search and seizure  
substantially in the following form shall be  
sufficient:  
“. . . Whereas there has been filed with the  
undersigned an affidavit (here set out the material  
facts alleged in the affidavit) . . . .” [Emphasis 
supplied.]  
In Moten, this Court held that § 27 of the liquor law had been  
violated where the search warrant did not contain a recitation  
of the facts alleged in the affidavit.  As a result of this  
statutory violation, the Moten Court held,  
[t]he warrant is invalid, and the evidence procured 
thereunder inadmissible. “With such evidence out, 
defendant should have been discharged.”  People v 
Knopka, 220 Mich 540 [190 NW 731 (1922)].[10]  
10The search warrant at issue in Knopka was held to be  
violative of both § 27 of the liquor law and the Michigan 
Constitution’s probable cause requirement, Const 1908, art 2, 
§ 10.  Id. at 545. 
The Knopka Court concluded: “It not  
appearing that the search warrant was issued upon the 
constitutional and statutory showing of probable cause, it 
must be held that the evidence procured by it was inadmissible 
and should have been suppressed and that, with such evidence 
out, defendant should have been discharged. See People v De 
La Mater, [213 Mich 167; 182 NW 57 (1921)]; People v Mayhew, 
[214 Mich 153; 182 NW 676 (1921)]; People v Halveksz, [215 
Mich 136; 183 NW 752 (1921)].”  Knopka, supra at 545. 
The  
cases cited by the Knopka Court as authority for suppressing 
(continued...)  
11  
 
 
The conviction must therefore be set aside and  
defendant discharged. [Moten, supra at 174.]  
In People v Bules, 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926), the  
search warrant suffered from the same deficiency as that in  
Moten: It failed to recite the facts set forth in the  
supporting affidavit as required by § 27 of the liquor law.  
Because the statute had been violated, this Court held, “[the]  
warrant was void on its face” and the evidence had to be  
suppressed:  
The mandate of the statute is clear, that the 
material facts alleged in the affidavit for the 
warrant shall be recited in the warrant, and the 
legislature even took the pains to set out a form, 
in which it directed the user to (“Here set out the 
material facts alleged in the affidavit”). . . . 
The law cannot be made plainer, and is but  
expressive of long time precedent established to 
prevent abuse. 
We deplore the carelessness  
evidenced here and so inexcusable if the statute  
was read, but we are bound to correct here such a 
palpable blunder.  The evidence seized on the so­
called search warrant should have been suppressed. 
[Bules, supra at 336.]  
Likewise, in People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915  
(1926), the search warrant failed to recite the material facts  
alleged in the affidavit, contrary to § 27 of the liquor law.  
Accordingly, this Court held, the warrant was “void,” and “the  
search [was] unlawful, a violation of [the defendant’s]  
constitutional right [Const 1908, art 2, § 10] that his house  
10(...continued) 
the evidence and dismissing the case (De La Mater, Mayhew, and 
Halveksz) 
concern 
searches 
that 
were 
held 
to 
be  
constitutionally deficient. 
Moten appears to be the first 
case of this Court requiring suppression of evidence as a 
remedy for a purely statutory search warrant defect, and it 
does not appear that the Court considered this distinction in 
reaching its decision.  
12  
 
 
shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Id.  
at 648 (emphasis supplied).  Thus, what had been characterized  
in Moten and Bules as a purely statutory imperfection was in  
Galnt characterized as being of constitutional magnitude.  
3. COURT OF APPEALS CASES APPLYING MOTEN  
In recent years, the Court of Appeals has addressed the  
Moten-Bules-Galnt trilogy in the context of Michigan’s modern  
search warrant statutes.11  In Pipok, supra, a federal search  
warrant was executed by state and federal officers.  The  
search warrant was issued pursuant to federal law, and it did  
not comply with Michigan’s requirement set forth in MCL  
780.654; MSA 28.1259(4) that a search warrant provide on its  
face or in an attached affidavit the grounds on which the  
warrant was issued. 
Relying on the Moten trilogy, the  
defendants contended that the noncompliance with § 4 rendered  
the search warrant invalid, and that the evidence seized  
pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed.  The panel,  
finding Moten to be distinguishable, held that the statutory  
violation12 did not require suppression of the evidence:  
11We note that the warrant statute at issue in Moten, 
Bules, and Galnt, § 27 of the liquor law, was not a precursor 
of 
Michigan’s 
current search warrant statutes, contrary to the 
assumptions of some members of the various Court of Appeals 
panels that have addressed Moten’s application to the current  
statutes.  Rather, general search warrant statutes existed 
contemporaneously with the warrant provision contained in the 
liquor law.  See, e.g., 1915 CL 15879-15883. 1915 CL 15881 is  
a precursor of the present-day MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4).  
12The Pipok panel stated, in dicta, that “when evidence 
(continued...)  
13  
 
 
  
 
The Moten Court . . . found the recital [of 
material facts alleged in the affidavit] to be an 
“essential requirement” of a valid warrant and held 
that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant lacking 
such a recital must be suppressed.  
Since the court’s decision in Moten, statutory 
law in this state has changed to permit a  
supporting affidavit to be attached to the warrant 
in place of stating the material facts, or grounds 
for issuance, on the warrant itself.  Again, the 
provision is designed to guarantee that a record of 
probable cause is established. The Legislature has 
apparently recognized that the affidavit alone is 
sufficient to establish a record of probable cause  
12(...continued) 
challenged in a state prosecution is obtained in a search 
involving the joint activity of state and federal officers, 
the search is scrutinized under state standards.”  Id. at 671.  
This proposition was reiterated by a different Court of 
Appeals panel, again in dicta, in Paladino, supra at 507-508  
(noting that “[t]his ruling was based on the need to preserve 
state court integrity and to govern the conduct of state 
officers”). The prosecution in the present case urges us to 
abrogate the Court of Appeals “joint activity” rule and to 
hold that Michigan’s statutory warrant requirements do not 
apply to a federal search warrant or to its execution by 
federal and state officers.  
Because we hold that the statutory violation at issue in 
this case does not require suppression of evidence in any 
event, we need not address the propriety of the “joint 
activity” 
rule 
enunciated 
by 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals. 
Nevertheless, 
we 
take this opportunity to note our disapproval 
of the dicta in Pipok and Paladino suggesting that state  
warrant requirements apply to joint federal and state  
execution of state warrants.  Michigan statutory provisions 
governing issuance and execution of search warrants, on their 
face, and as a matter of the legislative power of this state, 
address only search warrants (which are judicial orders) 
issued by judicial officers of Michigan.  See United States  
Const, art VI, cl 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .  
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”); Const 
1963, art 4, § 1 (“The legislative power of the State of  
Michigan 
is 
vested 
in 
a 
senate 
and 
a 
house 
of  
representatives”) (emphasis added).  The United States of  
America is a sovereign entity; it does not require officers to 
provide an affidavit underlying a federal warrant following 
execution.  
14  
 
 
 
 
 
and that it is not necessary to transcribe the 
material facts from the affidavit onto the warrant.  
[Id. at 672-673.]  
The Pipok panel noted that the federal magistrate’s  
determination of probable cause was based on an affidavit,  
that the defendants did not articulate any prejudice  
resulting from the noncompliance with § 4, and that the  
defendants were eventually provided with copies of the  
affidavit and given the opportunity to challenge the probable  
cause determination.  The panel thus concluded that “the  
failure of the warrant to state the grounds for issuance or  
to have the supporting affidavit attached did not abrogate  
the purpose of the statute and that the error was one of  
procedure not requiring suppression of the evidence.”  Id. at  
673.  
In Garvin, supra, the Court of Appeals again addressed  
a defendant’s contention that Moten required suppression of  
evidence, this time for a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA  
28.1259(5).
 Officers from the Pontiac Police Department  
executed a search warrant at defendant Garvin’s residence,  
seizing evidence implicating Garvin in a number of crimes.  
After completing the search of the house, the officers either  
provided a copy of the search warrant to Garvin or left it at  
his residence; however, the officers detached from the copy  
of the warrant provided to Garvin the affidavit in support of  
the warrant.  The trial court granted Garvin’s motion to  
suppress the seized evidence on the basis that § 5 had been  
violated by the officers’ failure to provide Garvin with a  
15  
 
 
    
 
copy of the affidavit.  
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the  
officers’ failure to provide Garvin with a copy of the  
affidavit did not require suppression of evidence seized  
pursuant to the warrant.  The panel noted that in Pipok,  
supra, the Court had refused to suppress evidence on the  
basis that § 4 had been violated, where there were no  
allegations that the search warrant was constitutionally  
defective or that the defendants had suffered any prejudice.  
Likewise, the Garvin panel concluded, suppression was not  
required as a remedy for a violation of § 5:  
[I]t follows [from Pipok] that the failure of 
the police to provide or leave a copy of the 
affidavit as part of the copy of the warrant does 
not provide a basis for suppression of evidence, 
because Garvin ultimately has the opportunity to 
challenge 
probable 
cause 
supporting 
the 
warrant 
and 
because the requirement is merely procedural.  
* * *  
We strongly agree with the pertinent holding 
by the Pipok Court.  It is one thing, under certain 
circumstances, to order the drastic remedy of 
suppressing 
highly 
relevant 
evidence 
to 
enforce 
the 
fundamental 
constitutional 
guarantees 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of US Const, Am 
IV and Const 1963, art 1, § 11.  It is quite 
another to extend the exclusionary rule to a 
technical deficiency, such as failing to provide or 
leave a copy of an affidavit in connection with the 
exercise of a reasonable search in which the law  
enforcement officers executing the search provide 
a copy of the search warrant itself, thereby 
providing 
notice 
that 
the 
search 
has 
been  
judicially authorized. [Id. at 99-101.]  
More recently, a panel of the Court of Appeals has  
retreated from the holding of Garvin that suppression is not  
required for a violation of § 5.  In People v Chapin, 244  
16  
 
 
 
 
 
Mich App 196; ___ NW2d ___ (2000), a search warrant was  
executed at the defendant’s home.  Upon completion of the  
search, a copy of the search warrant was left at the home.  
A copy of the affidavit was available; however, it was not  
left at the home, because the prosecutor had specifically  
requested that the officers not leave a copy of the  
affidavit.  The defendant moved for suppression of marijuana  
and other incriminating evidence seized, arguing that § 5 had  
been violated and that suppression was required pursuant to  
Moten.  
The Chapin majority, after determining that the  
statutory requirements of § 4 were “incorporated” within the  
provisions of § 5,13 held that the violation of § 5 required  
suppression of the seized evidence.  The majority opined  
that, although § 4 had been “amend[ed]” since the time Moten  
was decided,14  
[u]nder 
both 
versions 
of 
the 
statute, 
the  
requirement exists that the warrant, whether in the 
body of the warrant itself or by affidavit attached  
13The defendant in Chapin argued that, although § 5 
requires only that “a copy of the warrant” be provided to the 
person from whom or from whose premises property was taken, 
the “warrant” referred to in § 5 must include the affidavit if 
one is attached as permitted by § 4 (in lieu of a statement of 
probable cause in the warrant itself).  The Chapin majority 
agreed, citing Garvin, supra at 98-99. 
Judge Hood, 
dissenting, 
disagreed and would have held that, “[p]ursuant to 
the plain language of this statute, the officer is only 
required to leave a copy of the search warrant itself . . . .”  
Chapin, supra at 208 (emphasis supplied).  
14We note again that the liquor law search warrant 
provision at issue in Moten and its prohibition-era progeny  
was not a predecessor of MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). See n  
12.  
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
thereto, must state the grounds or the probable 
cause for its issuance.  
* * *  
Thus, despite recodification of the statute, 
[the holding in Garvin that, where a supporting 
affidavit is used in lieu of a statement of  
probable cause in the warrant pursuant to § 4, a 
copy of the affidavit becomes part of the “copy of 
the warrant” that must be provided to the defendant 
pursuant to § 5] is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in Moten, Bules, and Galnt  
that the material facts in support of the issuance 
of a search warrant must be included with the  
search warrant. [Id. at 201-203.]  
Moving on to the question of the proper remedy for a  
violation of § 5, the Chapin majority declined to follow the  
holdings of Garvin and Pipok that suppression was not  
required:  
[I]n Garvin the Court held that the failure of  
law enforcement officers to comply with the  
statutory requirement to attach a copy of the 
affidavit to the copy of the warrant provided or 
left does not require suppression of the evidence 
seized pursuant to the warrant because the  
requirement is merely procedural.  See also [Pipok,  
supra].  However, Garvin’s holding is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Moten, 
Galnt, and Bules that violation of the statutory 
requirement that the search warrant state the 
grounds or probable cause for issuance of the 
search warrant renders the warrant invalid and  
requires suppression of the evidence.  Because  
Moten, Galnt, and Bules remain good law, we must 
follow their precedent.  Thus, because officials 
left the warrant at defendant’s home without the  
supporting affidavit, and the warrant itself did 
not state the probable cause grounds, the circuit 
court properly suppressed the evidence.  See [238  
Mich App 498]. [Chapin, supra at 203-204.]  
Judge 
Hood 
dissented, 
opining 
that 
Moten 
was  
distinguishable because it addressed a statutory violation  
different from the violation at issue in Chapin:  
18  
 
 
 
 
 
Review of the statutes at issue reveals that  
Moten, supra, does not govern this case.  The issue  
in Moten involved the statutory requirements that 
must be contained within a search warrant, now 
codified at MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4).  The  
defendant in Moten never took issue with the  
delivery of the search warrant that was left at the 
home, but rather, took issue with the contents of 
the search warrant itself.  
* * *  
In the present case, MCL 780.654; MSA  
28.1259(4) provides that the search warrant must 
contain the basis of probable cause within the 
document or in lieu thereof, a copy of the 
affidavit may be attached thereto.  Defendant does  
not dispute that at one time, the two documents, 
the search warrant and the supporting affidavit, 
were both available. . . . [Rather,] [d]efendant’s 
controlling, some perceived conflict with prior 
challenge . . . involves 
28.1259(5). . . . 
MCL 780.655; MSA 
* * * 
Once it is accepted that Moten is not 
decisions of this Court either does not exist or is  
distinguishable.  First, it should be noted that 
[238 Mich App 495] is without precedential value 
because a majority of the judges concurred in the 
result only and did not concur in the rationale 
underlying the decision. . . . Additionally, the 
decision of [Pipok, supra] is not controlling 
because 
it 
involved 
the 
statutory 
interpretation 
of 
MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4), not the statute at 
issue here.  Instead, this case is factually in  
accordance with the decision of [Garvin, supra].  
Both cases address the issue of an alleged 
technical failure to comply with MCL 780.655; [MSA 
28.1259(5)], and the Garvin Court concluded that  
that failure did not require suppression of the 
evidence.  The Garvin decision was criticized and  
deemed wrongly decided for its failure to address 
the Moten decision. [238 Mich App] 502-503.  
However, as indicated, when the actual language of 
the statute addressed in Moten is traced, one 
concludes that the statute was recodified at MCL  
780.654; MSA 28.1259(4).  The issue before this  
panel and the Garvin Court [involves] MCL 780.655; 
MSA 28.1259(5), a statute not addressed by [the] 
Moten Court.  Accordingly, the precedent of Moten  
would not be disregarded in reaching this holding.  
19  
 
 
 
  
 
[Id. at 206-210.]  
4. APPLICATION OF MOTEN TO A VIOLATION OF § 5  
We agree with much of Judge Hood’s dissenting analysis  
in Chapin with respect to the precedential value of Moten and  
its progeny in the context of a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA  
28.1259(5). 
Moten, Bules, and Galnt did not address the  
statutory violation present in Chapin and in this case.  
Accordingly, these decisions are simply not controlling here.  
We first note that defendant in the case at bar makes no  
claim that § 4 was violated,15 that the search warrant itself  
was otherwise invalid, or that her constitutional rights were  
in any way violated by the issuance or execution of the  
search warrant.  Rather, her claim is that § 5 was violated  
because the officers failed to provide her with a copy of the  
affidavit at the time of the execution of the warrant. It is  
on this basis that defendant contends that the seized  
firearms must be suppressed.  
The statutory violation at issue in Moten, Bules, and  
Galnt is not comparable to the statutory violation at issue  
in the case at bar.  It is possible to analogize 1922 CL  
7079(27)–the liquor law search warrant provision at issue in  
Moten–to § 4 of the current statutory warrant scheme, because  
15Defendant has never claimed that the warrant itself was  
invalid; nor has she ever claimed that the original search 
warrant issued by the federal magistrate did not include an 
affixed copy of the affidavit.  Indeed, we note that the face  
of 
the 
search 
warrant 
states: 
“See 
attached  
affidavit–continued on the attached sheet and made a part  
hereof.” [Emphasis supplied.]  
20  
 
  
 
  
 
 
both those statutes pertain to the warrant form. Where the  
form of the warrant is deficient, the resulting search may be  
constitutionally defective.16 In contrast, § 5 of Michigan’s  
present statutory warrant scheme sets forth procedural  
requirements that are to be followed by the police during and  
after the execution of an otherwise facially valid search  
warrant.  A violation of § 5, therefore, does not render the  
warrant itself invalid, or the search unreasonable.  
We leave for another day the question of the proper  
remedy for a violation of the requirement of § 4 that the  
warrant either recite the probable cause grounds or, in lieu  
of 
such 
a 
recitation, 
incorporate 
the 
affidavit by  
attachment. Because Moten did not address a violation of a  
statutory prescription regarding procedural measures to be  
taken by the police in their execution of an otherwise valid  
search warrant, we find it to be inapposite to this case.  
5. LEGISLATIVE INTENT  
Having determined that Moten provides no guidance with  
respect to the issue before us–whether a technical violation  
of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) requires application of the  
16US Const, Am IV (“no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, . . . particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized”); Const 
1963, art 1, § 11 (“[n]o warrant to search any place or to 
seize any person or things shall issue without describing 
them”).  See, e.g., Galnt, supra (where search warrant did not 
recite the material facts alleged in the affidavit as required 
by § 27 of the liquor law, the warrant was “void” and, 
therefore, the search violated the defendant’s constitutional  
right under Const 1908, art 2, § 10, to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures).  
21  
  
 
exclusionary rule–we turn to the statute itself.  
We have recently had occasion to consider whether  
evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant  
must be excluded where the executing officers violated our  
“knock and announce” statute, MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6).17  
In Stevens, supra, we held that the Court of Appeals erred in  
holding that the exclusionary rule applied to a violation of  
§ 6, where the search was of proper scope under a valid  
warrant.18  We first noted that whether suppression is  
required for a violation of a statute is a question of  
statutory interpretation, and that our focus must be on  
legislative intent.  Id. at 644.  Finding that nothing in the  
language of the “knock and announce” statute indicated that  
the Legislature intended that the exclusionary rule be  
applied to a violation of the statute, we “decline[d] to  
infer such a legislative intent,” because “[t]o do otherwise  
would be an exercise of will rather than judgment.” Id. at  
645 (emphasis in original).  
17  
The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or 
any person assisting him, may break any outer or 
inner door or window of a house or building, or 
anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, 
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he 
is refused admittance, or when necessary to  
liberate himself or any person assisting him in 
execution of the warrant.  
18We also held in Stevens that the Fourth Amendment  
violation in that case did not require application of the 
exclusionary rule, primarily because of the lack of any causal 
connection between the constitutional knock and announce  
violation and the evidence seized. Stevens, supra at 635-643.  
As stated, defendant in this case makes no claim that her 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  
22  
 
  
  
 
In holding that suppression was not an appropriate  
remedy for the violation of “knock and announce” principles  
in Stevens, we noted that the exclusionary rule “is not meant  
to put the prosecution in a worse position than if the police  
officers’ improper conduct had not occurred, but, rather, it  
is to prevent the prosecutor from being in a better position  
because of that conduct.”  Id. at 640-641, citing Nix v  
Williams, 467 US 431, 443; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377  
(1984).  We additionally found persuasive the fact that the  
“knock and announce” requirement “does not control the  
execution of a valid search warrant; rather, it only delays  
entry.” Stevens, supra at 645. Where it was the authority  
of the valid search warrant that led to the discovery of the  
evidence, not the means of entry, there was simply no causal  
relationship between the violation and the seizing of the  
evidence.  Because the discovery of the evidence was  
independent of the officers’ failure to comply with the  
statutory “knock and announce” requirement, we found that  
suppression of the evidence was not warranted.  Id. at 646­
647.  
As in Stevens, we now hold that suppression of the  
evidence seized in this case is not an appropriate remedy for  
the statutory violation at issue.  Nothing in the language of  
§ 5 provides any basis to infer that it was the legislators’  
intent that the drastic remedy of exclusion be applied to a  
violation of the statute.  Furthermore, the exclusionary rule  
“‘forbids the use of direct and indirect evidence acquired  
23  
 
 
from governmental misconduct, such as evidence from an  
illegal police search.’” Stevens, supra at 636, quoting  
People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509; 556  
NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).  The  
requirements of § 5 are ministerial in nature, and do not in  
any way lead to the acquisition of evidence; rather, these  
requirements come into play only after evidence has been  
seized pursuant to a valid search warrant.  Because the  
exclusionary rule pertains to evidence that has been  
illegally seized, it would not be reasonable to conclude that  
the Legislature intended to apply the rule to a violation of  
the postseizure, administrative requirements of § 5.  Just as  
there was no causal relationship between the violation of the  
“knock and announce” statute and the seizing of the evidence  
at issue in Stevens, there is in the instant case no causal  
relationship between the officers’ failure to provide  
defendant with a copy of the search warrant affidavit and the  
seizure of the firearms.  
We note further that the deterrent purpose19 of the  
exclusionary rule would not be served by ordering suppression  
of the evidence in this case.  The officers were executing a  
valid federal warrant that complied with all federal  
requirements.  The federal magistrate had ordered that the  
19“‘The core rationale consistently advanced . . . for 
extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit 
of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly 
drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police 
from 
violations 
of 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
protections.’” 
Stevens, supra at 637, quoting Nix, supra at 442-443.  
24  
 
 
 
affidavit be sealed.  Defendant does not argue that this  
procedure violated her constitutional rights or that it ran  
afoul of any federal requirements concerning the validity of  
search warrants.  Defendant’s sole contention is that the  
failure to leave a copy of the affidavit at her residence or  
to otherwise “forthwith” provide her with the affidavit  
violated MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5).  The officers cannot be  
faulted for their inability to provide a copy of the  
affidavit, since the affidavit was under seal by direction of  
a federal magistrate. 
Because there was no police  
“misconduct” in this case, the deterrent purpose of the  
exclusionary rule would not be served by applying it under  
these circumstances.  Moreover, because the police would have  
recovered the weapons irrespective of the alleged statutory  
violation, suppression of the evidence in this case would  
“undermine the adversary system by putting the prosecution in  
a worse position” than if the violation of § 5 had not  
occurred. Stevens, supra at 637, citing Nix, supra at 447.  
Application 
of 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
would 
be  
particularly inappropriate in the case of a valid federal  
warrant.  Were we to use the exclusionary rule in this case  
to deter officers from "violating" a state warrant execution  
provision, we would effectively encourage officers to violate  
a federal magistrate's order sealing an affidavit.  While our  
statutes do not govern federal warrants, Michigan may, of  
course, prescribe its own rules for the admission or  
exclusion of evidence.  Our Legislature has not, however,  
25  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
expressed an intent to require suppression even when officers  
executing a Michigan search warrant violate § 5; it certainly  
has not mandated suppression when evidence was obtained  
through a valid federal warrant.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The police officers in this case were acting under a  
valid search warrant and within the scope of that warrant.  
Defendant’s constitutional rights were in no way infringed.  
There is no causal connection between the seizure of the  
firearms and the officers’ failure, after the execution of  
the warrant, to provide defendant with a copy of the search  
warrant affidavit.  
We are unable to discern any legislative intent that a  
violation of the technical requirements of MCL 780.655; MSA  
28.1259(5) result in the suppression of evidence obtained  
pursuant to a valid search warrant.  Moreover, such a result  
would be particularly unwarranted in the instant case, where  
there has been no police misconduct and where, therefore, the  
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be  
served.  We therefore hold that the trial court and the Court  
of Appeals erred in applying the exclusionary rule as a  
remedy for this statutory violation.  The evidence should not  
have been suppressed, and the case should not have been  
dismissed, for a violation of the procedural requirements of  
§ 5.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the  
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this  
26  
opinion.20  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and TAYLOR, 
and 
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
20We note that, in addition to the statutory violation, 
defendant raised before the trial court several other grounds 
in support of her motion to suppress evidence.  On remand, the 
trial court shall address any grounds raised in support of the 
motion to suppress that were not disposed of in the trial 
court’s oral opinion of September 9, 1998.  
27  
 
 
  
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 115980  
MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result, but write separately because I  
believe that the first step in resolving this matter is  
determining whether the state warrant requirements should be  
applied to a federal search warrant executed during a search  
conducted jointly by federal and state authorities.  In my  
opinion, the state warrant requirements should not apply in  
this situation, and People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich  
App 669, 671; 479 NW2d 359 (1991), was wrongly decided.1  
Because the state warrant requirements should not apply to  
these facts, the firearms found in defendant’s home should  
not have been suppressed.  
Because I would decline to apply the state warrant  
requirements to these facts, I express no opinion concerning  
1 
People v Paladino, 204 Mich App 505; 516 NW2d 113 
(1994), a case in which I participated at the Court of 
Appeals, cited the Pipok holding in its analysis. Pipok was  
binding authority on the Court of Appeals when Paladino was  
decided.  Thus, Paladino did not address whether Pipok was  
correctly decided.  
whether the exclusionary rule would apply to a procedural  
violation of the state requirements.  
2  
________________________________ 
 
  
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 115890  
MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
Because I disagree with the majority’s decision to admit  
the challenged evidence, I respectfully dissent.  I would  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and, further, I  
would not disavow the Court of Appeals decision in People v  
Chapin, 244 Mich App 196; _ NW2d _ (2001).  
First, I cannot agree that this Court’s decision in  
People v Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925), is not  
applicable to this case.  There, this Court had to decide  
whether evidence gathered under a warrant that did not recite  
the basis for its issuance, as required by statute, had to be  
excluded. Id. at 174. Analyzing this question, the Court  
quoted approvingly from United States v Kaplan, 286 F 963,  
968 (SD Ga, 1923), which stated that such warrant  
requirements ensure “that the accused may promptly know what  
 
 
 
 
 
is the accusation against him, upon what it is based . . . .”  
The Moten Court concluded that the warrant was not complete  
and in violation of the statute.  Thus, the Court concluded  
that the accused did not “promptly know” the accusation  
against him or its basis, and it excluded the evidence  
gathered under the warrant.  See Moten, supra at 173-174.  
The majority distinguishes Moten, concluding that Moten may  
require exclusion of evidence gathered under a warrant that  
does not have the proper statutory form, but does not require  
exclusion when the asserted statutory shortcoming deals only  
with 
the 
procedure 
of 
executing 
the 
warrant. 
It  
characterizes defendant’s complaint as only procedural, and  
not within Moten. See slip op at 26-27.  
However, the offered distinction does not account for  
the Moten Court’s reasoning. 
There, the warrant did not  
recite the basis for its issuance, depriving the defendant of  
notice of the reasons for the search, and this Court excluded  
the evidence.  In this case, even though the warrant may at  
some prior time have had an affidavit attached to it, see  
slip op at 25, n 15, when it was delivered to defendant, it  
did not. 
In fact, defendant was not informed of the  
affidavit’s contents until some four months after the search.  
Thus, defendant did not have notice of the reasons for the  
search; she could not “‘promptly know what [was] the  
accusation against [her], upon what it [was] based . . . .’”  
Moten, supra at 173, quoting Kaplan, supra. Regardless of  
whether the instant warrant ever had an affidavit reciting  
its basis, like the warrant that was delivered in Moten, the  
2  
 
 
 
 
 
instant warrant did not state its basis when it was delivered  
to defendant.  Like the defendant in Moten, then, the instant  
defendant should not have the evidence gathered under such a  
warrant admitted against her.  
Second, 
I 
fear 
that 
the 
majority’s 
search for  
legislative intent effectively upends the intent that is most  
clear.  Though MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) does not provide  
on its face for any remedy, it clearly indicates the  
Legislature’s policy of requiring officers to leave a copy of  
the warrant, which must recite the basis for its issuance,  
with the searched party or at the searched premises.  Under  
the decision in this case, however, there is no consequence  
for a failure to do so.1
 Further, under the majority’s  
reasoning, there would similarly be no consequence for a  
failure to tabulate the property seized, leave a copy of the  
tabulation with the searched party or at the searched  
premises, file that tabulation, or safely keep the property  
seized.2  Each of these requirements is ministerial in nature  
and occurs after the search, but each is required by this  
statute.  Although I would not anticipate police misconduct,3  
1 Notably, the majority has not relied on the search 
warrants act’s penalty provision, MCL 780.657; 28.1259(7), as 
it did, erroneously in my view, in People v Stevens (After 
Remand), 460 Mich 626, 641; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), as a reason 
not to apply the exclusionary rule in this case.  
2 Indeed, this Court has already indicated that police 
may destroy seized items without actually running afoul of 
this statute.  See People v Jagotka, 461 Mich 274, 279-280; 
622 NW2d 57 (1999); see also id. at 282-283 (CAVANAGH, J.,  
dissenting).  
3 Whatever the role of the federal actors in this case, 
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
even if officers did purposefully ignore this statute’s  
requirements, it apparently would make no difference.  Rather  
than leave the Legislature’s policy of requiring police to  
provide a warrant stating its basis so doubtful, I would  
exclude the challenged evidence to ensure that the policy is  
observed.  
In closing, in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 184, n 18;  
538 NW2d 380 (1995), this Court stated that excluding  
evidence as a remedy for a statutory violation was not a “new  
phenomenon.”
 It apparently has now become the old  
phenomenon, though, as the Court continues the trend it began  
in People v Stephens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 641; 597  
NW2d 53 (1999), and continues in this case, toward admitting  
evidence despite statutory violations.  In my view, this is  
an erroneous course, so I continue to be unable to join this  
trend.  I would exclude the challenged evidence, affirm the  
Court of Appeals, and would not disapprove of the Court of  
Appeals decision in Chapin, supra.  Therefore, I must  
respectfully dissent.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
3(...continued) 
the prosecution has conceded that state law applies.  
4