Title: Turner v. Thiel

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MACKIE TURNER 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 002839 
November 2, 2001 
 
MARTIN A. THIEL, M.D., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 
Samuel T. Powell, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
abused its discretion by permitting the defendants to call as 
an expert witness an individual who plaintiff's counsel had 
previously retained to consult and review plaintiff's medical 
records. 
 
The plaintiff, Mackie Turner, filed a motion for judgment 
against Martin A. Thiel, M.D., Surgical Specialists, Inc., and 
Williamsburg Community Hospital, Inc., in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk.  The plaintiff alleged that Dr. Thiel, 
who was engaged in the practice of general medicine and 
surgery, breached the standard of care owed to him when Thiel 
performed a procedure on the plaintiff known as a 
transaxillary first rib resection.  The plaintiff also alleged 
that defendant Surgical Specialists is a professional 
corporation organized under the laws of Virginia and that 
Thiel was an employee, agent, or servant of Surgical 
Specialists, acting within the scope of his employment when he 
treated the plaintiff.  The plaintiff further alleged that 
Williamsburg Community Hospital breached certain duties owed 
to him. 
 
The defendants filed responsive pleadings and a motion to 
transfer venue to the Circuit Court of the City of 
Williamsburg and the County of James City.  The defendants' 
motion to change venue was granted and later, the plaintiff 
took a voluntary nonsuit of his action against Williamsburg 
Community Hospital. 
 
In accordance with a pretrial motion, the remaining 
parties designated their respective expert witnesses.  The 
defendants designated Dr. Richard J. Sanders as one of their 
expert witnesses.  The plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify 
Sanders.  The following facts were considered by the circuit 
court during a hearing to resolve the motion. 
 
Sanders is widely recognized as an expert in the medical 
community on the subject of thoracic outlet first rib 
resection surgery, the procedure that Thiel performed on the 
plaintiff.  Sanders has performed approximately 1,500 of these 
procedures and has written two books and 24 articles about 
this procedure. 
 
In December 1998, prior to filing a motion for judgment, 
plaintiff's counsel had a telephone conversation with Sanders 
and asked him to review the plaintiff's potential medical 
malpractice claim against Thiel.  Plaintiff's counsel provided 
 
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Sanders with a verbal synopsis of the facts relating to the 
plaintiff's care and treatment.  Sanders determined he had no 
conflict of interest and agreed to review any material that 
plaintiff's counsel would provide to him.  Plaintiff's counsel 
and Sanders also discussed fee arrangements, and Sanders 
forwarded by facsimile his curriculum vitae to plaintiff's 
counsel. 
 
Plaintiff's counsel forwarded to Sanders a letter dated 
December 16, 1998.  The letter, which consisted of two pages, 
summarized the plaintiff's potential claim against Thiel.  
Plaintiff's counsel specifically asked Sanders to "focus" on 
certain acts of possible medical negligence and issues 
relating to proximate causation.  Plaintiff's counsel enclosed 
plaintiff's medical records with the letter. 
 
Sanders reviewed the medical records as requested by 
plaintiff's counsel.  Sanders and plaintiff's counsel had a 
telephone conference on January 4, 1999, and Sanders discussed 
the care and treatment that Thiel had provided to the 
plaintiff.  Plaintiff's counsel discussed additional 
information with Sanders about the plaintiff's case, and 
plaintiff's counsel generated 12 pages of notes relating to 
the conversation.  At the conclusion of the conversation, 
Sanders informed plaintiff's counsel that he was not 
interested in serving as the plaintiff's expert witness.  
 
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Subsequently, Sanders mailed plaintiff's counsel a bill in the 
amount of $840.00 for two hours and 20 minutes for reviewing 
the medical records and participating in the telephone 
conference. 
 
Defendants' counsel contacted Sanders in August 1999 and 
was unaware that Sanders had previously consulted with 
plaintiff's counsel.  Sanders stated the following in a sworn 
affidavit which was submitted, without objection, to the 
circuit court.  Sanders was retained by the defendants in 
August 1999 to review medical records relating to the 
plaintiff's medical malpractice claim.  Sanders reviewed the 
records and agreed to serve as an expert witness on behalf of 
the defendants. 
 
Sanders had "no independent recollection of having 
reviewed this case for [plaintiff's counsel], nor [did he] 
recall the specifics of any [telephone] conversation with 
[plaintiff's counsel].  Based upon the recitations in the bill 
[that he submitted to plaintiff's counsel] showing a limited 
record review of 2 hours and the short duration of the billed 
phone call (20 minutes) it is [Sanders'] best supposition that 
the short phone call was simply a conversation where [he] 
declined to serve [as] an expert witness.  [He] destroyed the 
medical records provided by [plaintiff's counsel]." 
 
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Sanders also stated that he recorded two pages of notes 
contemporaneously with his review of the plaintiff's medical 
records, but his notes do not reflect any discussions with 
plaintiff's counsel regarding trial strategy or confidential 
communications.  Sanders did not prepare a written report, nor 
did he send any correspondence other than his bill to 
plaintiff's counsel. 
 
Sanders did "not recall having any conversations with 
[plaintiff's counsel] at any time concerning trial strategies 
or potential offensive or defensive positions."  Sanders 
stated that he "never agreed to serve as an expert" witness 
for the plaintiff and "to the best of [his] recollection [his] 
involvement with [plaintiff's counsel] was limited to a record 
review and advising him that I was not in a position to serve 
as an expert for his case."  Sanders also stated that he did 
"not recall any specifics of a limited 20 minute conversation 
over two years ago, [and he did] not possess any confidential 
information from this phone call that would inure to the 
benefit of either party." 
 
When defendants' counsel informed plaintiff's counsel 
that they intended to designate Sanders as their expert 
witness and that special travel arrangements had to be made to 
take his deposition de bene esse in Denver, Colorado prior to 
trial, plaintiff's counsel did not recognize Sanders' name.  
 
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Plaintiff's counsel did not recognize Sanders' name as someone 
with whom he may have spoken until after plaintiff's counsel 
checked his billing records. 
 
The circuit court denied the plaintiff's motion to 
disqualify Sanders, and the case proceeded to trial before a 
jury.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, 
and the circuit court entered a judgment confirming the 
verdict.  We awarded the plaintiff an appeal from that 
judgment, and the sole issue that we consider on appeal is 
whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied 
the motion to disqualify Sanders. 
 
Generally, the decision whether to disqualify an expert 
witness rests within the discretion of the circuit court.  We 
have not, however, considered the test that a circuit court 
must apply when determining whether to disqualify an expert 
witness who has previously been retained to consult with 
another party.  The majority of jurisdictions that have 
considered this issue have applied the following test:  Was it 
objectively reasonable for the first party who claims to have 
retained the expert witness to conclude that a confidential 
relationship existed between that party and the expert; and 
did the first party disclose any confidential or privileged 
information to the expert witness?  Koch Refining Co. v. 
Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 
 
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1996); Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175-76 (Colo. 1999); 
Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 903-04 (D.C. 1997).  
Additionally, the party seeking disqualification bears the 
burden of proving both elements of this test.  Id.
 
The plaintiff contends that we should adopt this test and 
that the application of this test would compel 
disqualification of Sanders.  Responding, the defendants also 
urge this Court to adopt the same test, but they assert that 
the plaintiff failed to establish that a confidential 
relationship existed between his counsel and Sanders.  
Additionally, the defendants argue that even if a confidential 
relationship existed, the plaintiff failed to establish that 
his counsel provided confidential information to Sanders.  The 
defendants state that "[t]here was no formal retainer 
agreement.  There [were] no work product memoranda, reports, 
or confidential correspondence exchanged between [plaintiff's 
counsel and Sanders]." 
 
We agree with the plaintiff and the defendants that this 
test is the appropriate test to be applied in this 
Commonwealth, and the circuit court used this test.  Applying 
this test, we hold that based upon the evidence of record, it 
was objectively reasonable for plaintiff's counsel to conclude 
that he had established a confidential relationship with 
Sanders.  As we have already stated, Sanders agreed with 
 
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plaintiff's counsel that Sanders would review the plaintiff's 
medical records for the express purpose of assisting the 
plaintiff with his medical malpractice claim against the 
defendants.  Sanders reviewed the plaintiff's medical records 
and forwarded plaintiff's counsel a bill and charged the 
plaintiff for "review and evaluation of records."  Sanders 
also had a telephone conversation with plaintiff's counsel and 
included in the bill a fee for "phone consult with attorney."  
Simply stated, Sanders reached an agreement with plaintiff's 
counsel whereby plaintiff's counsel provided information to 
Sanders, Sanders evaluated that information, and Sanders 
discussed his evaluation with plaintiff's counsel. 
 
We recognize that Sanders stated in his affidavit that he 
had "no independent recollection of having reviewed this case" 
and that he did not recall "the specifics of any [telephone] 
conversation" with the plaintiff's lawyer.  However, Sanders' 
lack of recollection is not relevant to the inquiry whether it 
was objectively reasonable for plaintiff's counsel to conclude 
that a confidential relationship existed. 
 
Next, we must consider whether plaintiff's counsel 
disclosed confidential or privileged information to Sanders.  
In this context, courts have concluded that the phrase 
"confidential information" includes discussion of:  a party's 
strategies in litigation, the kinds of experts that the 
 
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retaining party expected to employ, a party's views of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case, the role of each 
of the litigant's expert witnesses to be hired, anticipated 
defenses, counsel's theory of the case, and counsel's mental 
impressions.  Koch Refining Co., 85 F.3d at 1182; Mitchell, 
981 P.2d at 176-77. 
 
Upon our in camera review of the letter dated December 
16, 1998 that plaintiff's counsel forwarded to Sanders, we 
conclude that the letter contained confidential information 
because plaintiff's counsel revealed his mental impressions 
and trial strategies to Sanders.  While we recognize that the 
value of the information that plaintiff's counsel disclosed to 
Sanders may be debatable, that fact does not negate our 
conclusion that the letter contains the work product of 
plaintiff's counsel.  Thus, we conclude that plaintiff's 
counsel disclosed confidential information to Sanders. 
 
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to disqualify Sanders as an expert witness.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court, and we will remand this case for a new trial in which 
Sanders will not be permitted to testify as an expert witness. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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