Title: STATE v BOYER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 83-185 IN THE SUPREPIE COURT OF T I I E STATE OF MONTANA 1984 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- RANDALL CLIFFORD BOYER, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Lake, The Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Brian J. Smith, Polson, Montana For Respondent : Eon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana John Frederick, County Attorney, Polson, Montana Submitted on Briefs: December 29, 1983 Decided: February 28, 1984 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. T h i s a p p e a l a r i s e s o u t of t h e c o n v i c t i o n of a p p e l l a n t on two c o u n t s of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t and one c o u n t of a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping. A j u r y r e t u r n e d a g u i l t y v e r d i c t on a l l c o u n t s i n t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Lake County. On A p r i l 25, 1980, t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and t h r e e f r i e n d s , Linda J e l l i s e n , Marge and Marianne C i o l k o s z began a n evening of d r i n k i n g and p a r t y i n g . A f t e r s t o p p i n g a t a "kegger" t h e y went t o a p a r t y a t a t r a i l e r i n E a s t Missoula, Montana. A p p e l l a n t a l s o a t t e n d e d t h i s p a r t y and m e t t h e p r o s e c u t r i x d u r i n g t h e evening. A p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e p a r t y w i t h some f r i e n d s and l a t e r j o i n e d a n o t h e r g r o u p of f r i e n d s . H e r e t u r n e d w i t h them t o t h e p a r t y i n E a s t Missoula. A p p e l l a n t brought t h e p r o s e c u t r i x back t o h i s f r i e n d ' s c a r and took h e r back t o Missoula. They t h e n stopped a t Pam G o l d e n ' s house where Pam and Judy S t e e l s t a y e d f o r t h e n i g h t . There, a p p e l l a n t f o n d l e d t h e p r o s e c u t r i x on t h e lawn o u t s i d e t h a t house. Testimony i n d i c a t e s t h e p r o s e c u t r i x screamed o r l o u d l y o b j e c t e d a t t h a t p o i n t , t h e r e b y c a u s i n g Pam Golden t o t e l l them t o be q u i e t . J i m B r u b a k e r t h e n d r o v e t h e a p p e l l a n t a n d t h e p r o s e c u t r i x from Missoula t o Arlee. Brubaker dropped them o f f a t a r e s i d e n c e o u t s i d e of Arlee. A p p e l l a n t took t h e p r o s e c u t r i x i n t o t h e house. A s he w a s t a l k i n g t o Thomas McDonald, a r e s i d e n t o f t h e house, t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t r i e d t o run away from t h e r e . The a p p e l l a n t c a u g h t up w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and took h e r i n t o a shed l o c a t e d on t h e p r o p e r t y and engaged i n s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e twice. P r o s e c u t r i x c l a i m s it was w i t h o u t consent. Brubaker, d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , went t o p i c k up a n o t h e r f r i e n d , Theodore Raymond. They r e t u r n e d t o t h e McDonald r e s i d e n c e and picked up t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and t h e a p p e l l a n t . They drove back t o Missoula e a r l y on A p r i l 26. During t h i s r e t u r n t r i p , t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , upon r e q u e s t , g a v e t h e a p p e l l a n t her a d d r e s s and phone number. Brubaker t h e n dropped t h e a p p e l l a n t o f f a t h i s r e s i d e n c e i n Missoula and l a t e r took t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t o t h e C i o l k o s z r e s i d e n c e . The p r o s e c u t r i x w e n t t o t h e p o l i c e a n d o b t a i n e d a r a p e examination a t S t . P a t r i c k H o s p i t a l . She a l s o r e c e i v e d t r e a t m e n t f o r i n j u r i e s s h e s u f f e r e d . A Lake County S h e r i f f ' s Deputy a r r e s t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t l a t e r t h a t day f o r p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n s . The S t a t e , a few d a y s l a t e r , charged him w i t h s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t and a g g r a v a t e d kidnapping. Following some d e l a y s , t r i a l was h e l d on November 1 7 , 1980. The a p p e l l a n t appealed h i s c o n v i c t i o n . H i s a t t o r n e y f a i l e d t o p e r f e c t t h e a p p e a l and l a t e r was d i s b a r r e d on u n r e l a t e d m a t t e r s . The c o u r t t h e n r e a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o new c o u n s e l . Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on a p p e a l : (1) Was t h e a p p e l l a n t d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ? ( 2 ) Did t h e a p p e l l a n t r e c e i v e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel? A p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s he was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . H e c l a i m s a 205-day d e l a y v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court a r t i c u l a t e d t h e t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g if t h e d e l a y d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i n Barker v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. T h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e v. F i f e (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 632 P.2d 712, 38 St.Rep. 1334, c i t e s many o t h e r Montana c a s e s t h a t u s e t h a t test. The t e s t examines f o u r f a c t o r s : ( 1 ) Length of d e l a y ; ( 2 ) r e a s o n f o r d e l a y ; ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f t h e r i g h t ; and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e a p p e l l a n t . The f i r s t f a c t o r t r i g g e r s t h e i n q u i r y i n t o t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e . The l o n g e r t h e d e l a y , t h e more l i k e l y t h e burden s h i f t s t o t h e S t a t e i n t h e " e x p l a i n i n g of t h e d e l a y and showing a b s e n c e of p r e j u d i c e . " S t a t e v. K e l l y (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 661 P.2d 26, 27, 40 St.Rep. 364, 365. I n S t a t e v. Freeman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 3 Mont. 334, 599 P.2d 368, t h i s C o u r t found 207 days t r i g g e r e d i n q u i r y i n t o t h e i s s u e . "Once t h e burden h a s s h i f t e d t o t h e S t a t e t o e x p l a i n t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y , t h e q u e s t i o n becomes, t o whom is t h e d e l a y t o be a t t r i b u t e d ? " Freeman, 183 Mont. a t 338, 599 P.2d a t 371. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e a p p e l l a n t caused a good p a r t o f t h e d e l a y . The S t a t e i n i t i a l l y i n c a r c e r a t e d t h e a p p e l l a n t f o r p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n s . Then, a few d a y s l a t e r , t h e S t a t e brought c h a r g e s f o r t h e above-named o f f e n s e s and a p p o i n t e d an a t t o r n e y on A p r i l 1 8 , 1980. On May 1 2 , 1980, a p p e l l a n t moved f o r and r e c e i v e d a s u b s t i t u t i o n o f c o u n s e l and r e q u e s t e d a d e l a y of t h e p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g . The c o u r t t h e n s e t May 1 9 , 1980 f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g . The c o u r t r e s c h e d u l e d t h a t h e a r i n g t o May 29, 1980, due t o t h e d e c l a r e d emergency caused by v o l c a n i c a s h t h a t f e l l a s a r e s u l t of t h e Mount. S t . H e l e n s ' e r u p t i o n . The S t a t e f i l e d an i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t c h a r g e on J u n e 4 and r e q u e s t e d a c o n t i n u a n c e f o r t h e arraignment until June 12. On July 25, appellant moved to depose some of the State's witnesses. The court requested these depositions be taken as soon as possible and allowed the State ten days following the completion to file criminal pretrial procedures. It ordered on August 13 that the deposers hold themselves available for examination. On September 17, the court postponed for one week a hearing to transfer the aggravated assault case to Lake County from Missoula County, because of appellant's counsel's absence. The court told the appellant that it would schedule trial in October if he thought there might be a speedy trial problem. Appellant declined to object at that time. The court scheduled the trial for November 17, 1980. On October 29, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for denial of speedy trial. This record clearly shows that the appellant caused part of the delay for the trial. The substitution of counsel caused a three-week delay by admission of the defendant. Another week delay occurred in September when appellant's counsel failed to appear at a hearing. The appellant's counsel further delayed the case by requesting depositions and then never deposed one witness. The State waited for the conclusion of depositions. Although this Court will not speculate on the amount of delay this caused, it certainly makes appellant accountable for much of the delay. Appellant contends the State Crime Lab completed its examinations only a day before the trial occurred. This demonstrates the State delayed prosecution until they obtained the results. The record fails to show a request by the State for more time to conduct lab results. While the State may have delayed testing the evidence, it did not delay the case for the purpose of testing the evidence. Appellant's argument fails to show the State delayed prosecution. Appellant asserts his incarceration demonstrates the prejudice resulting from the delay. While incarceration can demonstrate prejudice, that in itself does not necessarily prove prejudice. In State v. Shurtliff (Mont. 1980), 609 P.2d 303, 37 St.Rep. 713, this Court said that although defendant was incarcerated for approximately eleven months, the long period before trial was actually to his benefit, due to the added time to prepare a defense. This Court in Shurtliff, supra, found no speedy trial violation primarily because much of the delay was attributed to the appellant. Appellant asserts the delay caused the loss of a possible witness, Dr. Bowers, the physician who examined the prosecutrix, who refused to return to Montana for the trial. Appellant failed to show how the lack of her testimony caused prejudice to him. The nurse who assisted Dr. Bowers, testified about the rape examination and the condition of the prosecutrix. The State attempted to bring Dr. Bowers to the trial; however, she refused. The State decided against compulsory process and the appellant failed to require her attendance either. We fail to see how her lack of presence prejudiced the appellant's case. We therefore hold the appellant was not denied a speedy trial. The appellant next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel denying him of his constitutional right to counsel under Amendment XI, United States Constitution, and Article 11, section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution. He claims his counsel failed to conduct the necessary discovery, failed to properly prepare for trial, failed to explore plea bargaining possibilities, and failed to call witnesses in appellant's case-in-chief. Appellant admits deficiencies in the record to support his position, but he requests this Court to find either ineffective assistance of counsel or remand the case for a special evidentiary hearing. This Court reiterated in State v. Hendricks (Mont. 1983), 672 P.2d 20, 40 St.Rep. 1786, the test adopted in State v. Rose (Mont. 1980), 608 P.2d 1074, 37 St.Rep. 642: "Persons accused of crime are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel acting within the range competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." This Court futher stated in Hendricks, supra: "'In evaluating defense counsel's representation, it is not our function to second-guess trial tactics and the strategy.' LaValley, 661 P.2d at 872. We also noted that 'reasonably effective counsel does not mean that the defendant is constitutionally guaranteed such assistance of counsel as will necessarily result in his acquittal. ' LaValley, supra. 'Success is not the test of efficient counsel, frequently neither vigor, zeal, nor skill can overcome the truth.'" (Citations omitted.) 672 P.2d at 25, 40 St.Rep. at 1791. The record may indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. The following is just one indication of counsel's handling of the case: "I further relate to the Court, and I believe counsel would not deny that he was provided with investigatory reports by Officer Crego, a transcribed statement of the victim . . . a transcribed statement of a witness Linda Jellisen; and that in these reports the specific i t e m s o f e v i d e n c e w h i c h c o u n s e l now i n d i c a t e s he h a s n o t examined, were each and a l l l i s t e d a s t o t h e i r s e i z u r e and where t h e y were." The r e c o r d f u r t h e r shows c o u n s e l f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p e a l , y e t c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o p e r f e c t t h e a p p e a l . I n t h e meantime t h i s Court d i s b a r r e d c o u n s e l . The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s c o u n s e l g a v e a minimum o f a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c a s e , y e t f a i l s t o show c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t t h e a l l e g a t i o n s a r e t r u e . The r e c o r d a l s o shows d e f e n d a n t made a motion f o r a new t r i a l and t h e n f i l e d a motion t o a p p e a l s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . The c o u r t never r u l e d on t h e motion f o r new t r i a l . W e f i n d i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e from which t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h i s i s s u e . W e t h e r e f o r e remand t h i s t o D i s t r i c t Court f o r a n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g and a r u l i n g on t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l r e g a r d i n g t h e i s s u e o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . W e concur: 7 Chief J u s t i c e &#a r J u s t i c s