Title: ESCHENBURG v ESCHENBURG

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 1.3260 I N THE SUPREME COUIIT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 19 7 6 BETTY GUNN ESCHENBUKG, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - EMIL P. ESCHENBURG, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Small, Cummins, Hatch and Gregory Jackson, Helena, Montana Gregory Jackson argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hughes, Bennett, Cain, Kellner and Sullivan, Helena, Montana S t u a r t L. Kellner argued, Helena, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald Smith appeared, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: October 26, 1976 M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , L e w i s and Clark County, following a t r i a l t o t h e c o u r t , s i t t i n g without a jury. This appeal s t e m s from t h e g r a n t i n g of an a b s o l u t e divorce t o both p a r t i e s on t h e grounds of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f - ferences, t h e property d i v i s i o n , and an award of alimony t o p l a i n t i f f ; The divorce per se is not a t i s s u e , only t h e property d i v i s i o n and alimony award a r e questioned by p l a i n t i f f . A t t h e t i m e of t r i a l t h e p a r t i e s had been married t h i r t y - two years, t h e i r four c h i l d r e n had reached majority with one daughter still l i v i n g with p l a i n t i f f , and they had acquired t h e following property: A residence i n Helena, Montana, with a mortgage thereon; A residence i n V i r g i n i a , with a mortgage thereon; Stocks and s e c u r i t i e s ; Paid up l i f e insurance p o l i c i e s (amounting t o $50,000) ; Personal property and household goods; Two automobiles ( a Scout and an Oldsmobile); and Two unimproved l o t s i n Virginia. Their r e l a t i v e g r o s s incomes a t t h i s t i m e w e r e : Defendant: $2,00O/month - Army pension, $l,OOO/month - real estate salesman $350/month - r e n t a l income $3,35O/month - Total P l a i n t i f f : $475/month - Secretary. During t h e f i r s t 27 years of t h e i r marriage defendant was a career Army o f f i c e r , obtaining t h e rank of Brigadier General a t t h e time of h i s r e t i r e m e n t , and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h r e e extended f o r e i g n t o u r s of duty i n World War 11, Korea, and Vietnam. Throughout t h i s t i m e , defendant s o l e l y contributed f i n a n c i a l l y t o t h e marriage. P l a i n t i f f married defendant before f i n i s h i n g c o l l e g e and throughout t h e marriage managed t h e household, r a i s e d t h e i r four c h i l d r e n (such r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s handled alone during de- f e n d a n t ' s foreign t o u r s of d u t y ) , e n t e r t a i n e d a t s o c i a l functions, worked i n t h e Army wivesr a u x i l i a r i e s , n u r s e r i e s , Red Cross r e l i e f , and a s a voluntary h o s p i t a l aide. She gained t h e s e c r e t a r i a l employment, mentioned above, a f t e r t h e commencement of t h i s a c t i o n . The complaint o r i g i n a l l y a l l e g e d mental c r u e l t y , but was l a t e r amended, a l l e g i n g i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s . Plain- t i f f and defendant were t h e only witnesses t o t e s t i f y a t t r i a l . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted an a b s o l u t e divorce t o both p a r t i e s , awarded p l a i n t i f f alimony of $500/month, and divided t h e property, s u b j e c t t o any indebtedness thereon, a s follows: To t h e p l a i n t i f f : The r e s i d e n t i a l property i n Helena, Montana. The household goods and furnishings. The 1972 Scout automobile. To t h e defendant: The r e s i d e n t i a l property i n Virginia. The two unimproved l o t s i n Virginia. The 1969 Oldsmobile automobile. The stocks and s e c u r i t i e s w e r e t o be divided i n kind, o r i f d e s i r e d , sold on t h e market with t h e proceeds so divided. This d i v i s i o n was t o be one half t o each p a r t y of t h e remainder, a f t e r allowing f o r t h e c r e d i t s of each p a r t y found by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n making t h e e n t i r e property d i v i s i o n . Defendant was a l s o d i r e c t e d t o name t h e p l a i n t i f f ir- revocably a s beneficiary t o $25,000 of t h e paid up insurance. Each p a r t y was t o pay h i s o r her own c o u r t c o s t s and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . The defendant r a i s e s four i s s u e s : (1) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n its property - 3 - d i v i s i o n and alimony award? ( 2 ) Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s Army pension was a proper b a s i s f o r t h e alimony award? (3) Whether a f i n d i n g of f a u l t on t h e p a r t of defendant is necessary t o allow a n alimony award f o r p l a i n t i f f ? ( 4 ) Whether t h e a p p l i c a b l e alimony s t a t u t e is a n un- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l form of sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ? It i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t has f a r reaching d i s c r e t i o n i n r e s o l v i n g property d i v i s i o n s and its judgment w i l l n o t be a l t e r e d u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d 591; Francke v. Francke, 161 Mont. 98, 504 P.2d 990; Roe v. Roe, Mont. I The d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s contribu- t i o n s i n t h i s 32 year long marriage w e r e t h e r a i s i n g of t h e 4 c h i l d r e n , managing t h e household, e n t e r t a i n i n g a t s o c i a l a c t i v i - ties and volunteering h e r s e r v i c e s t o o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d t o d e f e n d a n t ' s career. Furthermore, a l a r g e m a j o r i t y of t h i s w a s performed a l o n e while defendant was away from home pursuing t h a t c a r e e r . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t even though t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s d i f f e r e d i n kind, they w e r e of equal weight t o t h e f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of defendant. Defendant argues t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t c r e d i t him enough f o r h i s f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . How- ever, w e f i n d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s i n complete accord with t h e modern t r e n d of Cook, Francke, and Roe t o consider more - than f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a marriage when d i v i d i n g t h e property s i n c e marriage i s much more than a business r e l a t i o n s h i p . W e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment which a f f e c t s an equal property d i v i s i o n based upon equal c o n t r i b u t i o n s by each p a r t y . A s s t a t e d i n Cook, t h i s does not make Montana a community property s t a t e . Each c a s e depends upon its own f a c t s and circumstances and t h i s case warranted an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n . Nor w a s it an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o a r r i v e a t a value of its own choosing a s t o t h e resi- d e n t i a l property, applying its own i n f l a t i o n value t o t h e pur- chase p r i c e and not t h a t o f f e r e d by defendant. Defendant a l s o argues t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t improperly valued t h e household goods and t h e Virginia l o t s . W e do not agree. There was c o n f l i c t i n g testimony on each and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t resolved t h i s by giv- ing t h e household goods t o p l a i n t i f f and t h e l o t s t o defendant. This w a s an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n . A s f o r t h e alimony, n e i t h e r p a r t y d i s a g r e e s t h a t such an award depends upon balancing t h e f i n a n c i a l needs of one p a r t y and t h e f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o pay of t h e o t h e r . Whether o r not defendant caused p l a i n t i f f t o q u i t c o l l e g e , it is undisputed t h a t she d i d not f i n i s h c o l l e g e and had l i m i t e d vocational s k i l l s . A t t h e time of t r i a l p l a i n t i f f had only a f i x e d n e t income of $375 per month from a s e c r e t a r i a l p o s i t i o n while i n c u r r i n g fixed monthly l i v i n g expenses, exclusive of any house payment, of $650. A t t h e same t i m e , defendant had n e t monthly income of $1,300 from h i s Army pension and an average monthly income of $1,000 a s a r e a l e s t a t e salesman. I n l i g h t of t h e s e f a c t s w e f i n d no abuse by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n awarding $500 per month alimony t o p l a i n t i f f . Defendant argues t h a t h i s Army pension i s n o t property j o i n t l y acquired during t h e marriage and a s such is n o t s u b j e c t t o d i v i s i o n whereby p l a i n t i f f received a portion. What defend- a n t f a i l s t o comprehend i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t made no property d i v i s i o n of t h e pension b u t d i r e c t e d defendant t o pay $500 per month alimony from t h e pension o r " i n l i e u thereof from any earnings he may a c q u i r e i n excess of s a i d r e t i r e m e n t . " Without addressing whether t h i s pension is j o i n t l y acquired property s u b j e c t t o property d i v i s i o n , t h e pension is a source of income t o defendant which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t properly con- s i d e r e d i n f i x i n g h i s f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o pay alimony a s r e l a t e d t o t h e f i n a n c i a l needs of p l a i n t i f f . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s award of alimony i s n o t based upon f a u l t by t h e defendant. A s defendant concedes, t h i s Court has held t h a t it i s proper t o award alimony when an a b s o l u t e d i v o r c e has been granted t o both p a r t i e s a s was t h e case here. Burns 7 v. Burns, 145 Mont. 1,/400 P.2d 642; Stenberg v. Stenberg, 161 Mont. 164, 505 P.2d 110. A s s t a t e d i n Burns: " * * * The b a s i s f o r l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e payment of alimony i s t h e g r a n t i n g of a d i v o r c e a g a i n s t t h e person required t o pay it, R.C.M. 1947, B 21-139. * * *" The defendant seeks t o have u s ignore t h i s language be- cause t h e divorce was n o t granted upon one of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f a u l t grounds, b u t on t h e ground of " i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s " . W e r e j e c t h i s argument. The i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s approach was e s t a b l i s h e d t o base d i v o r c e upon t h e r e a l i s t i c notion t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y t o a broken marriage i s t o t a l l y t o blame. By removing t h e f a u l t concept, highly emotional courtroom c o n f r o n t a t i o n s can be replaced by a more r a t i o n a l approach t o t h e d i v o r c e process and avoids a s much unnecessary psychological and emotional stress t o t h e p a r t i e s a s p o s s i b l e . Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, i n Burns is equally a p p l i c a b l e here. A s long as t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t entered t h e d i v o r c e a g a i n s t both p a r t i e s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t properly awarded alimony t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o c r e a t e t h e i l l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n whereby a p a r t y must elect t o seek a divorce on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f a u l t grounds and be e l g i b l e f o r alimony, o r waive alimony by proceeding under t h e modern and enlightened i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s approach. The f i n a l i s s u e regarding t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, is not properly before t h i s Court and w e d e c l i n e t o consider it because defendant has f a i l e d t o comply with Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P. Clontz v. Clontz, 166 Mont. 206, 531 P.2d 1003; Grant v. Grant, 166 Mont. 229, 531 P.2d 1007. The defendant f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appeal i n t h i s a c t i o n October 1 0 , 1975. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t record was f i l e d on Feb- ruary 2, 1976. Notice of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge was n o t f i l e d u n t i l September 2, 1976, t h e same d a t e as t h e f i l i n g of h i s r e p l y b r i e f . This does n o t comply with t h e n o t i c e i n w r i t - ing of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge a s required by Rule 38, M.R. App.Civ.P. The judgment W e concur: / J u s t i c e s Chief J u s t i c e ~ d n . Jack Shanstrom, D i s t r i c t ~ u d ~ e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . h u s t i c e Wesley Castles. e /"