Title: Whitlow v. Bruno's Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

567 So. 2d 1235 (1990)
Pamela Jean WHITLOW
v.
BRUNO'S, INC., et al.
89-378.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 13, 1990.
Rehearing Denied September 14, 1990.
*1236 Robert F. Prince and Jon M. Turner, Jr., of Prince, Turner & Nolen, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
John A. Owens and K. Scott Stapp of Phelps, Owens, Jenkins, Gibson & Fowler, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Pamela Jean Whitlow appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Bruno's, Inc., and its agents in a lawsuit charging Bruno's with malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, and assault. Because Whitlow makes no arguments in her brief regarding her claims for false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, or invasion of privacy, no discussion regarding those claims is necessary.
The underlying facts and proceedings in this case may be briefly stated. In November 1987, Pamela Jean Whitlow and a male friend entered the Bruno's grocery store located on McFarland Boulevard in Tuscaloosa. Ms. Whitlow went to the section of the store that rents taped movies for videocassette players. After deciding which videotaped movies to rent, Ms. Whitlow went to the video counter and showed the employee behind the counter her membership card. Ms. Whitlow then asked the employee if she could pay the videotape rental fee at the check-out counter along with her groceries. The employee consented, but only after Ms. Whitlow had signed a coded pink slip of paper assuming liability for the tapes. The employee instructed *1237 Ms. Whitlow to give the cashier the coded pink slip of paper when she checked out, so that the rental fee could be paid at that time. The employee then looked up Ms. Whitlow's membership application and gave her the two videotapes she had selected. Ms. Whitlow placed the two tapes into her shopping cart and completed her grocery shopping.
When Ms. Whitlow arrived at the check-out counter, she paid for her grocery items in cash but failed to pay for the two videotape rentals.[1] She went through the check-out line and exited the store, pushing the grocery cart. Michael Fike, the "front end" manager for Bruno's followed Ms. Whitlow outside and asked her if she had anything that belonged to Bruno's. Ms. Whitlow explained that she had merely forgotten about the tapes and asked Fike if she could pay the rental fee. Fike replied that the manager would have to make that decision. Fike then asked her to come back into the store. Ms. Whitlow was taken to an office inside the store, where she was questioned by Sidney Cannon, the manager on duty. The police were called shortly thereafter. Police Officers Baker and Thompson arrived and questioned Bruno's employees and Ms. Whitlow. After handcuffing Ms. Whitlow, the officers took her down to police headquarters. She was then transferred to the county jail and was eventually released on bond later that night.
On January 13, 1988, a preliminary hearing was held in the District Court of Tuscaloosa County, wherein the court found sufficient probable cause to bind Ms. Whitlow's case over to the Tuscaloosa County grand jury.
On January 29, 1988, Ms. Whitlow was indicted by the Tuscaloosa County grand jury for theft of two videocassette tapes. On August 19, 1988, she was tried in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, where she was found not guilty.
The issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that there was no substantial evidence of 1) malicious prosecution; 2) false imprisonment; 3) assault; and 4) misrepresentation.
Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P., requires that, in order to enter a summary judgment, the court determines that 1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and 2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The action in the present case was commenced after June 11, 1987; therefore, the applicable standard of review is the "substantial evidence rule." Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12 (Supp.1988).
The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case must prove each of the following elements: 1) that a prior judicial proceeding was instigated by the defendant 2) without probable cause and 3) with malice; 4) that that prior proceeding was terminated in the plaintiff's favor; and 5) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of that prior proceeding. Alabama Power Co. v. Neighbors, 402 So. 2d 958 (Ala.1981). The Neighbors Court further explained why such a heavy burden of proof is necessary in malicious prosecution cases:
Neighbors, supra, at 962.
It is almost platitudinous to restate the well-entrenched rule that in malicious prosecution cases the finding of an indictment by a grand jury, against a defendant in a prior judicial proceeding, constitutes prima facie evidence of the existence of probable cause. Lumpkin v. Cofield, 536 So. 2d 62 (Ala.1988). As further noted in Lumpkin, *1238 however, "[s]uch a prima facie defense can be overcome by a showing that the indictment `was induced by fraud, subornation, suppression of testimony, or other like misconduct of the party seeking the indictment'" Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
In support of her argument that Bruno's lacked probable cause, Ms. Whitlow states in her brief, in part, as follows:
Although this argument has a certain allure, we do not find the argument persuasive. As stated in this opinion, Ms. Whitlow asked the Bruno's employee who worked behind the counter at the video section of the store if she could pay the rental fee for the tapes at the check-out counter along with her groceries. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the membership contract between Ms. Whitlow and Bruno's is devoid of any language stating that the customer must pay the rental fee in advance, Ms. Whitlow, nevertheless, did agree to pay in advance. Therefore, Ms. Whitlow's failure to pay the rental fee for the tapes at the check-out counter supports a finding of probable cause. Having so found, we pretermit any discussion of the four remaining elements of malicious prosecution.
With respect to the false imprisonment issue, Code 1975, § 15-10-14(a) and (c), is dispositive:
A merchant, pursuant to § 15-10-14(a) and (c), is given the statutory right to detain *1239 a person if he has probable cause for suspecting that items from his store have been unlawfully taken. It must therefore be ascertained whether Bruno's had probable cause to detain Ms. Whitlow.
It is without dispute that Ms. Whitlow walked out of the Bruno's grocery store with two videotapes without first paying for them. Although Ms. Whitlow maintains that she mistakenly walked out of the store without first paying the rental fee, she nevertheless concedes that she walked out of Bruno's with the videotapes. Moreover, a preliminary hearing was held in the District Court of Tuscaloosa County, wherein that court found probable cause to bind Ms. Whitlow's case over to the Tuscaloosa County grand jury. Thereafter, Ms. Whitlow was indicted by the grand jury of Tuscaloosa County. After reviewing the record, we find it clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether probable cause existed to detain Ms. Whitlow. Goodwin v. Barry Miller Chevrolet, Inc., 543 So. 2d 1171 (Ala.1989). Thus, summary judgment was also proper on Ms. Whitlow's claim seeking damages for false imprisonment.
We next turn to the assault issue. At the outset, we should emphasize that § 15-10-14(a) and (c), supra, provide a merchant no defense to an assault charge made by a customer. Super X Drugs of Alabama, Inc. v. Martz, 51 Ala.App. 370, 286 So. 2d 47 (1973). Generally speaking, the question whether there is an assault depends more upon the apprehensions created in the mind of the person claiming to have been assaulted than upon the intentions of the alleged tort-feasor. See, generally, W. Prosser and P. Keeton, Law of Torts § 10 (5th ed.1984). In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala.App. 540, 150 So. 709, cert. denied, 227 Ala. 469, 150 So. 711 (1933), our Court of Appeals had this to say:
25 Ala.App. at 541-42, 150 So.  at 710.
Regarding the allegations of assault, Ms. Whitlow stated at her deposition as follows:
(Deposition of Pamela Jean Whitlow, pp. 49-50.)
(Deposition of Pamela Jean Whitlow, pp. 64-65.)
A simple reading of Ms. Whitlow's deposition testimony suggests that, under the circumstances, Ms. Whitlow did not possess a well founded fear of an imminent battery. In fact, Ms. Whitlow's deposition testimony is devoid of any allegations that she was ever threatened with physical harm. Thus, summary judgment was also proper on Ms. Whitlow's claim seeking damages for assault.
The final issue presented involves Ms. Whitlow's claim seeking damages for misrepresentation. Specifically, Ms. Whitlow seeks damages for deceit under Code 1975, §§ 6-5-103 and 6-5-104.
"§ 6-5-103. DeceitRight of action generally.
"§ 6-5-104. SameFraudulent deceit.
It should be emphasized that the burden of proof "rests upon the plaintiff to prove each of the foregoing elements. If a plaintiff fails to carry this burden with regard to any of those elements, a recovery cannot be had." Patel v. Hanna, 525 So. 2d 1359, 1360 (Ala.1988).
An action for deceit, under § 6-5-103 and § 6-5-104, results from either a willful or reckless misrepresentation or a suppression of material facts with an intent to mislead. Ms. Whitlow argues that the manager of Bruno's, Sidney Cannon, induced her into a confession of guilt. Ms. Whitlow's deposition testimony, regarding her claims of misrepresentation, reads as follows:
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, we are constrained to hold that the question of whether Cannon's statement constitutes a misrepresentation did not constitute a question of fact properly to be passed upon by a jury.
As we understand the plaintiff's misrepresentation claim, it is based on the following facts: that she was taken into the office because she left Bruno's without paying for the rental tapes; that she asked if she could pay for them and be released and the agent said: "Look, we know you have been stealing from us. If you just tell me the truth, I will let you get outI will let you leave. All I want you to do is to be truthful with me, and I will let you go." Then, says the plaintiff, she "told him what he wanted to hear so [she] could go"; that is, she admitting stealing the tapes, and she now claims that her admission was a lie.
It is obvious that at the time the alleged misrepresentation was made, the plaintiff had already admitted that she had left the store without paying for the tapes and the Bruno's agent had told her that she was suspected of stealing.
We affirm the summary judgment as to all of the claims.
AFFIRMED.
*1242 HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The rental fee for each tape was $2.00, plus tax.