Title: Preble v. Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System of the State of Hawaii.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘#¢# FOR PUBLICATION in WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
00

 

 
  

DUANE PREBLE and MARION EVERSON,

E
wo. 26186 A
g
E
plaintiste-appellants, E

0256 WY 02 a33)s002

vs.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF
‘THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I, and EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I, Defendants-Appellees
(Civ. No, 2-1-0832)

 

Wo. 26292

 

DUANE PREBLE and MARION EVERSON,
Petitioners-Appellants-Appellants,

EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent -Appellant-Appellant,
and
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FMPLOYEES’ RETIRENENT SYSTEM
‘OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I,

‘Appellant Appellant.
(Civ. No. 03-1-1659)

No. 26186

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(Civ. Nos. 02-1-0832 and 03-1-1659)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE ALM, IN PLACE OF DUFFY, J., RECUSED

aad
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OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

In these consolidated appeals, the petitioners
appellants-appellants/plaintiffs-appellants Duane Preble and
Marion Everson hereinafter, collectively, “the Appellants”)
1 from: (1) the October 3, 2003 judgment of the circuit

 

app®
court of the first circuit, the Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall
presiding, in favor of the respondent-appellee-appellee/
defendant-appellee Employees’ Retirement System of the State of
Hawai'i (ERS), the appellee-appellee/defendant-appellee Board of
Trustees of the ERS (hereinafter, “the Board”), and the

defendant-appeliee David Shimabukuro [hereinafter, collectively,

 

“the Appellees}, and (2) the Novenber 18, 2003 judgment of the
circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth
Hifo presiding, in favor of the Board and the ERS.

on appeal, the Appellants contend that the circuit
court: (1) erred in dismissing No. 26292 on grounds of mootness;
and (2) erred in dismissing No. 26186 through misapplication of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine and in violation of their right
to a hearing.

For the reasons discussed infra in section I11.A.2, we
vacate the circuit court’s dismissal of Civ. No. 03-1-1659 (No.
26292) and remand with instructions to: (1) remand to the Board
for hearing and further factfinding for the limited purpose
discussed infra in section I11.A.2 and with due regard for the
change in the law highlighted therein; and (2) affirm the Board's
July 17, 2003 judgment in cther respects. For the reasons

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discussed infra in section III.B, we affirm the circuit court's
dismissal of Civ. No. 02-1-0832 (No. 26186).

1. BACKGROUND
On August 18, 1998, the Appellants, who are apparently
retired University of Hawai'i (UH) faculty members, tendered a
“complaint”! to the Board purporting to be a “class action”

against the ERS, alleging that the ERS miscalculated and

 

underpaid certain similarly situated UH professors’ pensions and
praying that the Board: (1) certify the proposed class; (2)
award the class members their recalculated pensions with
interest; and (3) award costs and attorney’s fees. The
Appellants endeavored to define the “class” as “all members of
{the ERS], except retired public school principals, vice
principals and teachers,” who, at the time of retirement, worked
less than a twelve-month year but whose monthly salary had been
apportioned uniformly throughout the year (the “earned summer
salary” method of computing retirement allowance, see Chun v. Bd.
of Trs, of the ERS, 87 Hawai'i 152, 185 n.2, 952 P.2d 1215, 1218
n.2 (1998) (“Chun 11”).

On January 11, 1999, the ERS administrator,
Shimabukuro, wrote to the Board “recommend[ing] that [it]: (1)
authorize the ERS staff to utilize the new ‘High 3’ [Average
Final Compensation (JAFC{)] computation methodology for all

 

 

+ the Appellants’ filing should have been designated a “petition
« . for a declaratory order,” and the “claimants” should have been styled
Spotitioners.”” Hewai's Adninietrative Rules §§ 6-20-8 to ~9(a) (1993).

3
 

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employees whose annual salaries are prorated over a 12-nonth
period, and (2) authorize retroactive adjustments to the retirees
from August 18, 1996,” which was presumably the same policy
change that the Appellants sought.

On February 8, 199, the Board met in executive session
“to consult with legal counsel regarding issues resulting from
and relating to Chun vi], (Bd. of Tre, of JERS”? and unanimously
adopted Shimabukuro’'s recommendations. (Emphasis added.)

on February 16, 2001, the Appellants submitted a motion
to the Board “for an order directing the [ERS] . . . to deduct
and pay from the common fund created in the above-captioned
matter of back retirement benefit increases and the share of
investment income earned thereon being moved for herein .
attorney's fees for the [Appellants]’ attorney.” According to
the Appellants, in Chun v. Bd, of Trs, of the ERS, 92 Hawai'i
432, 992 P.2d 127 (2000) (“Chun III”), this court “held that in

common fund cases(*] such as the instant case, attorney's fees

2 the Board does not, indscate to which of the
st refers. None of this court's four “Chun” opinions re.
the ERS's nathod of computing benefits, but the Board presumably refers here
to "Chun II," in which we dishissed the ERS's and the Board's appeal from the
Civcuit court’s reversal of a decision of the Board. See Chin v, Bd, of Tre.
fthe ERS, Civ, No, 95-1¢09 (Haw. 1at Cir. Mar. 11, 1596), appeal dismased,
B7 Hewai's 182, 177, 952 P.24 1215, 1240 (1998); Chun v. Bd. of Tre. of the
HBS, 106 Rawas't 436, 422, 106 P.34 339, 345 (2005) ("dnaemch a8 the
Stpeal waz Gisnissed, the circuit court's March 11, 1996 Judguent vensined the
final judgeent in the case.”)

 

     

   

 

+ this court has described the connon-benefit doctrine a=

folne of the earliest exceptions to the “American Rule[)]" . - -

[which *Iprovides that a private plaintiff, of hie. (or her)

attorney, whose efforts create, discover, increase(,) or preserve
(continued...

 

 
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ore evarded to the [petitioners] and their attorney since they
Prevailed in this matter and since a common fund, which in this
case constitutes the back retirement benefits and investment
income that will be paid thereon, is created by reason of said
On April 3, 2002, the Appellants filed a separate
action in the circuit court, captioned as Civil! No. 021-0032
The Appellants prayed for a writ of mandamus “requir (ing the
Appellees] to withhold, as attorney's fees, a percentage of the
Back xetirenent pay that (the class is] entitled to.” (Citing
Stun IL.) Furthermore, the Appellants alluded to the “futility
exception” to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
sea, edu, In ze Doe children, 105 Hawat's 38, 60, 93 p.3d 1145,
1167 (2004): “rt ie futile to have . . . (the Board) decide

fale] issue of attorney's fees because such a motion was filed

 

  

 

—____
(continued)
2,£0Pd £0 which others also have @ claim is entitied to recover
Exom_the fund the costs of his {or her) Litigation: ineassiey
attorneys" fees.
SUD ALL, 92 Mawas's at 439 6 n.7, 992 P20 at 136 6 0.7 (sone bracketed
Sginal and sone sided) (quoting Montat 64 Haw. 345,

material
3

    

21, 1327 (1862)) (noting that the doctFine sopl ten thee
he classic case in which a lunp sum recovery is effactes or bonecf of
but also te the case where the class action precucee Penasco

     

 

 

se Eallabie Golsseeie, te, sbsence Of a rue. scomon fund | "aoe ates Somme
i enc + 96 Hawas's 408, 449 n.67, 5b pee, Sah
eer (200ny>
cg , Bat gf8,fules of the cizcuit Courts Rule 1 ("Proceedings in
mandamus be classified under special procesdinge  ieeehinie
added.)

 

 
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+. over one year ago without [the Board) taking action on said

 

motion «
on May 21, 2002, the Appellees, in two separate
motions, moved to dismiss Civ. No. 02-1-0832 on the grounds that
primary jurisdiction over the question of fees rested with the
Board and that only this court has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of mandamus against a public officer. (Quoting Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 88-23 (1993)* ("The general administration and
the responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement
system... are vested in [the Board) . . . .”); Hawai'i
Administrative Rules (HAR) § 6-20-16(b) (1993) (“The presiding
officer shall have the following powers and duties: . . . (8) To

rule on motions «

 

Hawai"i Rules of Appellate Procedure
(HRAP) Rule 21(b) ("An application for a writ of mandamus
directed to a public officer shall be made by filing a petition
with the clerk of the suprene court... - [TJhe appellate
clerk shall . . . submit [the petition] to the supreme court for
a determination as to whether it will be entertained.")7 Chun ve
ERS, 73 Haw. 9, 12-14, 828 P.2d 260, 262-63 (2992) (“Chun I").
In its own motion, the Board further proposed that “any powers
the Board . . . may have to award attorney's fees would be
discretionary, not ministerial, and thus not subject to

mandamus.”

 

+ effective July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004, the legislature anended
RS § 28-23 in immsterial respects. Sez 2005'Haw. Sess. L. Act 58, $8 2 and
33 at 1ié-15, 1317 2002 Haw, Sees. L. Act 128, $§ 9 and 14 at 351, 360.

 

 

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Without a hearing, the circuit court granted the
Appellees’ motions on June 27, 2002 and, by means of its
October 3, 2003 judgment, dismissed Civ. No. 02-1-0832 without
prejudice.

on September 9, 2002 and June 9, 2003, the Board met in
executive session “to consult and discuss with legal counsel
regarding . . . [the present matter].”

According to the Board’s minutes, on July 14, 2003, it
“proceeded with . . . [Hawai'l Administrative Procedure Act)
proceedings” on the Appellants August 18, 1998 petition. On July
17, 2003, the Board filed its “final order,” finding and

 

concluding in relevant part
EINDINGS OF EACT_(pOS))

6." Gn'or about February 8, 1999, the Board (1)
authorized the ERS to utilize s new (AFC] methodology for
11 employees whose work year is less than s 12-nonth work

ir'bot whose salaries are prorated over # 12-nonth period
that deducted pay for the non-working Ronths 1a factored
Inco ‘the AFC calculation, and (2) authorized retroactive
Adjustments to retirees in said group... . The Board's
Gecision was based on... Chul Id), which’ upheld the

felireuit (elourt's Zeling That’ lump sum summer salary

payments of retired principals, vice-principals, and schoo)
Eeschers should be included in their AFC calculations. [The
Appellants)” instant petition] was not the catelyst for the
Bosrd’s decision:

SONCLUSIONS OF LAM(_{cousl)

2. ‘te Board does Tot have legai authority to certify
a class; as requested by [the Appellants], as there is no
legal authority that expressly allows (2) such
certification, of (2) for class action administrative
hearings to toke place. = =

'F. “the Board docs not have legal authority te award
attorney's fees and costs, including interest, - «= a8 no
ich authority exssts in the TRS or (HAR). Gi
Sduinistestive agencies have only the powers ex
Grented to then by the legislature, a¢ well 2s inplied or
[icidental powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out
their express powers. Courts disagree 25 to how much

 

y

 

 

 

  

  

 

    

 

  

 

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latitude aduinisteative agencies have with respect to
implied powers, but any reasonable doubts...» should be
vesolved ageinat the exercise of such authority. . +s

 

 

4 [The Board does not have legal authority to
entertain [the appellants’ February 16, 2001 mjotion . «'~
5." pue to tne Soarc's . . . February 8, 1999 decieion
to utilize a new AFC methodology |. , (the Appellants]
request... for the ERS to make proper and back benefits
is ie moot

 

payments to the aforesaia group of retire
(Quoting Medlev Investors, Ltd, v, Lewis, 465 So. 2d 1305, 1306
(Pla. 1985); Lyons v. Illinois Dep't of Rev., 452 N.£.2d 830, 834

(111. Ce. App. 1983); Pyro Mining Co, v. Kentucky Comm'n on Hunan
Rights, 678 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1984); Sullivan v, Pennsvlvania,

408 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1979); Seibert v. Clark, 619
A.2d 1108, 1111 (R.T, 1993)) (citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative
Lau § 62 (1994).) Accordingly, the Board dismissed the
Appellants’ August 18, 1998 petition and denied their February
16, 2001 motion. (Citing HAR § 6-20-10(1)(D) (1993).*)

On August 13, 2003, the Appellants appealed the Board’s
July 17, 2003 final decision and order to the circuit court (Civ.
No. 03-1-1659). The Appellants subdivided their statement of the

+ MAR § 6-20-10, entitled “Consideration of petition,” provides in
relevent part:

‘The [Bloard, within a reasonable tine after sutaission of #
petition for declaratory relief, shall
(2) Deny the petition where
TA) The question is speculative or purely hypothetical ang
Goes not involve an existing situation or one which may
Fessonably be expected to oecer in the near furure; or

 

  

 

ip} tne petition requests 2 ruling on a statutory provision
not administered by the board or the matter is not
Stherwise within the jurisdiction of the board; oF
(2) Set the petition for hearing before the board in
aecorcance with [HAR $§ 6-20-6 to “25 (1993). (concerning
Seclaratory orders) ].

 
 

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case into ten separate counts, but their numerous allegations
distill to two points of error: the Board erred in rendering its
final order without affording the Appellants (1) a hearing and
(2) an “opportunity to submit proposed [FOFs] and exceptions,”
thereby violating the due process clause of article 1, section 5
of the Hawai'i Constitution and HRS $§ 91-9 (1993), amended by
Act 76, § 2 (effective May 20, 2003), and 91-11 (1993).7
(Internal quotation signals omitted.)

on Septenber 4, 2003, the Board moved the circuit court
to dismiss the Appellants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. on
September 23, 2003, the ERS joined the Board’s motion. On
october 7, 2003, the Appellants filed memoranda in opposition.

on November 18, 2003, the circuit court (1) granted the
Board's September 4, 2003 motion and the ERS’s joinder “due to
nootness” and (2) entered judgment in favor of the Board and the
ERS and against the Appellants. (Citing Mong v. Bd, of Regents

 

> Article 1, section $ of the Hawai'i Constitution provides in
relevant part that (n}o person shall be deprived of... property without
Goe process of lew." HRS'§ 81-3, entitied “Contested cases; notices hearing:
Feccrds,” provides in relevant part that, “(a) (sJubject to. (HRS
§],$1-8.5( (concerning sediation in contested cases)], in any contested case,
ali parties shall be afforded sn opportunity for hearing after reasonable
notice.” HRS § $1711 provides in relevant part:

Exanination of evidence by agency. Khenever in a contested
case the officials of the agency who are to render the final
‘felon have not heard and examined 311 of the evidence, the
Secision, if adverse to a party to the proceeding cther than the
Sgeney itself, shell not be made until s proposal for decision
ry has Been served upen the parties, snd an opportunity has
etn’ afforded toe
and present argument
RS § 91-2(5) (2993) defines @ “contested cose” as "e proceeding in which the
Tegel rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law £0
bbe determined after an opportunity fer agency hearing.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

h party acversely affected to file exceptions

 

 

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Univ. of Havaii, 62 Haw, 391, 616 P.24 201 (1980).

On October 28, 2003 (No. 26186) and December 18, 2003
(No. 26292), the Appellants filed timely notices of appeal to
this court. On September 5, 2006, this court consolidated Nos.
26186 and 26292 under No. 26186.

TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Circuit Court’s Disposition Of An Appeal From An

Agency' Decision

“’Review of a decision made by the circuit court upon
its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal.. The
standard of review is one in which this court must determine
whether the circuit court was right or wrong in its decision,
applying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) [ (Supp.
2004),* see infra section 11.8]... .’” Korean Buddhist Dae
Won Sa Temple of Hawai'i v, Concerned Citizens of Pilolo, 107
Hawai'i 371, 381, 114 P.3d 113, 123 (2005) ("Korean Temple 111”)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of
Hawaii v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229, 983 P.2d 1315, 1327
(2998) (“Korean Temple 11*)).

+ the Board is an “agency” within the meaning of ERS § 91-1419)
(Supp, 200). eR, eager (Haw. App. 526,
528)" 6€3 F.2d 36, 641 T9e3)

 

+ egtective duly 1, 2006, the legislature amended HRS § 91-14 in
respects innaterial to the present matter. See 2004 Haw. Sess. Ly Act 202,
$56 ang 62 at 921, 948, snended by Act 94, $1 at 1 (2006), avaliable at
http://eapitol .naweii .gov/sessioncurrent /bille/nb2657_edl_.pa¥.

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B. Agency Decision
HRS § 91-14(] provides

(g) Upon review of the record the court ma
affirm the decision of the agency or remand the
ith instructions for further proceedings; or It may
Feverse or modify the decision and order if the
Substantial rights of the petitioners ay have been
prejudiced because the administrative (F0Fs], (COLs],
Gecisions, o: orders axe:
(1) tn violation of constitutional or statutory
provisionss oF
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or
juriediction of the agency; oF
(3) ade upon unlaweul procedures or
(a) Affectes by other error of law) or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on tne whole
Fecord; of
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
abuse of Giscretion or clearly unwarranted
exereiee of discretion

   

    

 

 

HRS § 81-2609)
Under HRS’ §"si-i4(g), (Cots)
a), @),

re reviewable under
tions regarding proces
nder subsection (3); [FOFs] are reviewable
sod an agency's exercise of discretion is
etlon (6

Sussel v. Civil Serv, Comm'n, 74 Haw. $99, 609, 851 P.2d 311, 317
(1993) (citing Qutdoor Circle v, Harold K.l, Castle Trust Estate,
4 Haw. App. 633, 638-39, 675 P.2d 784, 789 (1983)), quoted in,
e.0., Korean Temple III, 107 Hawai'i at 361, 114 P.3d at 123; Tam
w. Kaiser Permanente, 94 Hawai'i 487, 494, 17 P.3d 219, 226
(2001); Flor v. Holguin, 94 Hawai'i 70, 76, 9 P.3d 382, 368
(2000); Inte Gray Line Hawai'i, Ltd., 93 Hawai'i 45, 53, 995 P.2d
776, 784 (2000); Rotter v, Hawaii Newspaper Agency, 89 Hawai'i
411, 421-22, 974 P.2d $1, 61-62 (1999); Korean Temple I, 87
Hawai'i at 229, 953 P.2d at 1327.

 

   

   

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C. Grant Of Motion To Dismiss Complaint

We most . . . view a plaintife’s complaint in a Light most
favorable to him or her in order to determine whether the
allegations contained therein could warrant relief under any
Siternative theory. Bavelal avail), 66 haw.
[194.1 198, €58 P.2a [83,1 B86] (1983)], For this reason,

«our Consideration is strictly Linited to the
allegations of the complaint, and we must deem those
Gllegations to be true. Aut_v. Au), €3 Haw. (210,) 214, 626
Piz’ (173,) 1991" (a98i}).

 

 

 

Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 545, 852 P.2d 44, 52 (1993), quoted
in Keauhou Master Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Hawai'i, 104
Hawas's 214, 218, 87 P.3d 883, 687 (2004); In re Estate of
Rogers, 103 Hawai" 275, 280-81, 81 P.3d 1190, 1195-96 (2003).

IIT. DISCUSSION

A. No. 26292; Appeal From The Board's Order To The
Circuit Court

In their opening brief in No. 26292, the Appellants
contend that the circuit court erred in dismissing their appeal
as moot. In particular, the Appellants urge that the Board’s
February 8, 1999 decision did not resolve the question of their?
entitlenent to interest and fees. (Quoting Midkiff v. Kobavashs,
59 Haw, 299, 321 6 n.15, $07 P.2d 724, 738 6 n.15 (Haw. 1973); In
re 2003 & 2007 Ala Wai Blvd,, 85 Hawai'i 398, 407, 944 P.2d 1341,
1350 (App. 1997); In-xe Doe, 81 Hawai'i 91, 99, 912 P.2d 588, 596
(app. 1996).)

 

* Our research reveals no authority, directly or by analogy, for the
naintenance of a class action before the Scerd, of. Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure Rules 1 ("Scope of Roles"), 23(a)-(b) ("Class Actsone"), €1(3)
Capplicability"), ang, on appeal, the Appellants have abandoned their
purported representation of an entire class.

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In their answering briefs, the Board and the ERS insist
profusely that the Appellants’ appeal was and is moot. (Quoting
Pele Def, Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 69
n.10, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215 n.10 (1994).) (Citing Bush v. Hawaiian
Homes Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128, 133-34, 870 P.2d 1272, 1277-78
(1994); Chun I, 73 Haw. 9, 13, 828 P.2d 260, 262 (1992).)

 

‘The ERS adds in its answering brief that the
Appellants’ counsel is not entitled to fees on the merits
“[blecause there is no certified class and because there will be
no class certification in the future.” The ERS also seens to
argue that the Appellants were not personally aggrieved by the
Board’s failure to award fees to their attorney and, hence,

lacked standing to appeal." (Citing Collier v. Marshall, 977

 

8 The ERS also proposes that the Appellants’ notice of appeal to
this court, statement of jurisdiction, opening brief, and civil appeals.
Gocketing statenent were fatally defective, citing RAP Rules 3(c}(2)_ (~The

 

 

Rotice of appeal shall designate the judgment { or] order . . . and the court
Or agency sppealed from. A copy of the judgment or order shall be attached
Gn exhibit"), 12.1 ("(c) «+ + The statement of jurisdiction shall show the

‘grounds’ upon which the Juriediction of the Nawai's appellate courts is
Invoked tay": «= R copy of the order of judgment ‘shall be attached to
the statements"), 28{b) (3) (there shall be appended to the [opening] brief »
copy of the Judghent, . ... (FOFS] and (COLs], order, or decision

Felevent to any point on’ appeal, unless otherwise ordered by the court. "I, and
Beto) 4) (requiring "(a) concise statenent of the points of error.
Sterling] «ss, (Ji) where in the record the alleged error was objected to or
the manner in which the alleged error as brought to the attention of the
Court). (Citing Chun IIt, 92 Hawai'i st 448, 992 P.2d at 143 (2000); Acobe
Sten. Tése, ine,, 92 Fawei'l 1, 10, 986 P.2d 268, 297 (1999); Kawanata
Himes Tne. 4, United aor! Frods., 86 Hewai'i 214, 235, 248, 948 Pu2d 1055,
Tore, 108s (1597); antec, Inc, v. Waikiti Beachcomber inv. Go., 74 Haw. 83,
12s,’ 939 .2a 10, 31 (i980); inte Miler 6 Lieb Water Con, 68 Haw. 310, 312,
si’ p.2d 486, 487 (1902); Stewart Props. v. Brennan, € Haw. App. 431, 434-38,
S07 Pozd os, 608 (1993)) Lacuarye. Kavfets, s00 F.2d $43, 549 (9th Cir.
880); Bitney Bowes, Inc, v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1374-75 (@th Cir. 1983) )
re tae the EAS scone To say that the Appellente’ failure (1) to specity
thet they sppeal from the Eoare’s Joly 17, 2008 order, as well as the circuit
{continved.

        

 

 

 

 

  

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F.2d 93, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1992).)
‘The Board and the ERS further argue that the Board did
not jeopardize a “property interest” of the Appellants and that
neither the due process clause nor any statute nor the Board’s
own regulations entitle the Appellants to @ contested case
hearing. (Quoting Bush, 76 Hawai'i at 134-35, 870 P.2d at 1278-
79.) (Citing Bele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77
Hawas' 64, 68, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1994).) In fact, the Board
maintains, “HAR § 6-20-10[, see supra note 6,) expressly permits
the Board to deny an unadjudicable petition for declaratory
relief without first conducting a hearing.” (Emphasis omitted.)
HAR § 6-20-10, see supra note 6, implies that the Board
need not “[sJet [a] petition for hearing” where the petition
raises a “speculative or purely hypothetical” question or
“requests a ruling ona... matter... not... within the
jurisdiction of the [Bloard.” Compare HAR § 6-20-10(1) (A), (D)

 

MU. .continued)
court's Novenber 18, 2003 judgment, and (2) to affix the Board's July 17, 2003
order to their filings deprives this court of appellate jurisdiction and/or
Surprised the ERS with onenticspated references to proceedings before the
Board. This argument 4s absurd

our jurisdiction ver No. 26292, in contrast to the circuit court's
juriadiction over the Appellant's direct appeal from the Board, i conferred
by HRS § 641-1(a) (1993) ("Appeals shall be allowed in civil matters from all

s ‘to the supreme court

 

 

 

7; except a8 otherwise provided by laws || '*} \emphasis added) >
anended by 200¢ Haw. Sess. i. Act 202, $5 66 and 65 at 943, 948, amended by
Act 34, $1 at 1, available at http://capitol -hawals. gov/acsaioncurrent/bilis/
b2e97'cdi_.pat.’ Mincfui that the circuit court" judguent was the ruling to
be appealed to thir court, the Appellants attached the circuit court's
Jusgnent to, and referred te it in, their notice of appesl, opening brief, and
Stetenent of jurisaiction. The Board's order was not the sppealabie final
reling in {hig court ang, accordingly, we resect the ERS" proposition, which
would entice litigants to thicken their filings with unnecessary paper.

 

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with id. para. (2). HRS § 91-9, see supra note 7, provides, in
turn, for hearings in contested cases. Aguiar v, Hawaii Hous.
Auth, 55 Haw. 478, 496, 522 P.2d 1255, 1267 (1974). If either

 

statute or regulation guaranteed these Appellants a hearing and
denial of such a hearing was not harmless, the Appellants’ appeal.
to the circuit court was not moot. As a threshold matter, then,
we must decide whether the Appellants’ petition to the Board
presented a colorable and justiciable claim for costs, fees,
and/or interest.

1. Th ha 7

Inasmuch as an administrative agency’s powers are
Limited to those delegated to it by the legislature,” an agency
cannot exercise “general or conmon law powers,” City of Chicago
vs Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 357 N.£.2d 1154, 1155 (r11.
1976). 21G Ins, Co. v, Kauhane, 101 Hawai'i 311, 327-28, 67
P.3d 810, 826-27 (App. 2003) ("An administrative agency can only
wield powers expressly or implicitly granted to it by statute.
Implied powers are limited to those reasonably necessary to make
[an] express power effective.) (internal quotation signals

omitted); Friends of Nassau County, Inc, v. Nassau County, 752

 
   
    
 

2 we Yn (PUC), 67 P36 12
7 ‘and legislature “ha(d} not by
tment restricted {ene FOC] in the matcer of amarding
5," holding that “the PUC has the

snd costs") (emphasis added) (citing Colo.
fegulate the facilities, service and rates

situate of operating within the stat
in (ehe FUC)."))=

authority
Const. a
fand charg.
of colors

 

 

© We do not concern ourselves here with the scenario whereby parties
agreed to feen contractually or by stipulation.

as

as

 
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So. 2d 42, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
In City of Chicago, the Fair Employment Practices

Commission (FEPC) argued that a provision in Tllinois’s Fair

Employment Practices Act, 48 Ill. Rev. Stat. ¢ 858.01(c) (1973)

(repealed) (“The commissioner . . . , if he finds against the
respondent, shall issue . . . a recommended order requiring such
respondent . . . to take such. . . actions . . . as will

eliminate the effect of the practice complained of.”),
incorporated an implicit power of the Commission to award
attorney fees. 357 N.E.2d at 1155-56. The court noted the
Presumption in favor of the “American rule” and rejected the
FEPC's argument, “find[ing] no suggestion that the legislature
contemplated the award of attorney fees to the successful
complainant.” Id, at 1156; see also Trapp v. United States, 668
F.2d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that, “[w]here Congress
has spoken to authorize an award of attorney's fees, it has done
so in no uncertain terms” and “declin(ing] to infer from the
ambivalent language of” federal statute “authorizing .
‘corrective action’” a. . . grant of authority to avard
attorney’s fees); Cohn v. Dep‘t of Corr,, 895 P.2d 857, 859-60
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

Similarly, we find no statute or regulation that
authorizes fees or costs in the present matter. See also Brewer
ve Dep't of Corr, 531 So. 2d 978, 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Mander v. Concreform Co., Inc., 206 So. 2d 662, 664 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist, v. Dep't of

 

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Qnty, Affaire, 560 A.2d 935, 936 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)? Dail vs
S.D, Real Estate Comm'n, 257 N.W.2d 709, 714 (S.D. 1977); of.
Balsley v. N. Hunterdon Reo") itish Sch. Bd. of Educ., 542 A.2d
29, 33 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (where statutes “provide(d]
that‘. . . the prevailing party may be awarded a reasonable
attorney’s fee,’” and “that such actions may be brought in the
Division [of Civil Rights],” concluding that agency had authority
to grant fees). In fact, reading HRS ch. 88 (concerning pension
and retirement systems) as a whole, the express attorney's fees
and costs provision in HRS § 88-82 (Supp. 2004), concerning
appeals from the Board-appointed medical board (“If, in the event
of an appeal of a decision of the medical board, retirement
benefits are awarded to a member . . . , the member shall be
reimbursed reasonable attorney's fees together with any costs
payable by the system.”) (emphasis added), compared to the
silence of the remainder of the chapter, supports the inference
that the legislature did not intend to empower the Board to award
fees and/or costs in the present matter. See, @.a., Roxas va
Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 129, 969 P.2d 1209, 1247 (1998)
("(ilapressic unius est exclusio alterius
inclusion of a provision implies the exclusion of another

 

the express

. . 0") (emphasis in original).

Nor do the Appellants themselves suggest any authority
beyond the conmon-benefit doctrine, which this jurisdiction has
not applied to (1) administrative agencies, (2) awards of costs,

or (3) “elass-like” actions on behalf of numerous similarly

vv
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situated individuals where no “class,” in the Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 23!

In sum, we hold that the Board's failure to conduct a
hearing was at most harmless error with respect to the issue of
fees and costs. Concomitantly, the circuit court did not err by
effectively affirming the COLs of the Board with respect to fees

 

is ever certified.

 

 

and costs.

2. In Light of a subsequent change in the law, the

Board wi ot bo int

Effective January 1, 2004, the legislature enacted HRS
§ 88-74.5 (Supp. 2003), entitled “Finalizing of pensions,” which
affords interest to any retirant 1*whose pension is “finalized”
late, iie., “after the sixth calendar month following the month
of the retirant’s retirement.” See 2003 Haw. Sess. L. Act 134,
§§ 1 and 4 at 318-19. HRS § 88-74.5(a), amended by Act 169,
$$ 10 and 43 at 9, 88 (2006), available at
hetp://capitol hawaii .gov/sessioncurrent/bills/sb2273_cdl_.pd£,
provides in relevant part:

For pension benefits finalized after the aixth calendar

month following the month of the retirant’s retirement, an

interest payment’... shall be paid to the retirant.

Interest shall be caléulated on the difference between the

anount the retirant is entitled to receive from the

Fetirent's retirement date up to the day the payment is made

and the anoont the retirant vas paid. - -

Beginning Janoary 1, 2004, or the first day of the

seventh calendar month following the month of retirenent,
whichever is later, interest payments calculated as sinpie

 

 

 

 

M _HRCE Rule 23(c)(1) provides in relevant part: “As soon as
practicable after the conmencenent of an action brought as e class action, the
Court shall determine by order whether it is to be s0 naimitaines.””

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shall be prorated up to the date payment ss

 

“No law has any retrospective operation, unless
otherwise expressed or obviously intended.” HRS § 1-3 (1993).

We do not believe that HRS § 86-74.5 clearly manifests an intent
on the part of the legislature to retroactively award interest
for any period before January 1, 2004, Nevertheless, one who
retired before 2004 -- such as, allegedly, the Appellants -- may
qualify for interest under HRS § 88-74.5, though only on whatever
balance remained unpaid on “January 1, 2004, or the first day of
the seventh calendar month following the month of retirement,
whichever is later." The record on appeal does not indicate
whether the pensions of the Appellants or the alleged similarly
situated retirants have been “finalized” or whether they have
received any “payments.” Accordingly, the Appellants’
entitlenent to interest turns on unanswered questions of fact, to
wit, (1) whether their status as retirants is as they allege and
(2) whether any “payments” to which they were entitled were
overdue on or after January 1, 2004.

While it might have been more efficient and prudent for
the Board and the circuit court to respond to the impending
change in the law (the governor signed Act 134 on June 4, 2003,
s0¢ 2003 Haw. Sess. L, at 319), we can hardly consider it error
to decline to enforce a law that has not taken effect (yet). On
the other hand, for us to affirm the circuit court's
determination of moctness simply because the November 18, 2003
Judgment “beat” the sunrise of Act 134 by forty-four days would

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be needlessly technical. In light of today’s holding that the
Appellants might be entitled to interest, further Litigation is
virtually foreordained. Therefore, notwithstanding our
conclusion, supra in section ITI.A.1, that the Appellants Jacked
a viable basis for costs or fees, WAR § 6-20-10(2), see supra
note 6, entitles them to a hearing before the Board to establish
their eligibility, or lack thereof, for interest pursuant to HRS
§ 88-74.5(a).
B. No. 26186: Mandam on In The

In No. 26186, the Appellants assert: (1) that the
circuit court erred by dismissing their complaint without
conducting @ hearing; and (2) that the Board, rather than the
circuit court, had primary jurisdiction over the complaint." In
Light of our holding that the Appellants were not entitled to
attorney's fees, see supra section III.A.1, their underlying
complaint in Civ. No, 02-1-0832 could not “warrant relief under
any alternative theory,” see Bachr, 74 Haw. at 545, 852 P.2d at

52, and we conclude that the circuit court did not err in

dismissing it. See Aluminum Shake Roofing, Inc. v. Hiravasu, 110
1 At the ond of their argunent section, the Appellants protest that,

 

by relegating then to the primary Jurisdiction of the Beard, the circuit court
overlooked Hawaii's due process clause, under which the Board should be
Gisquelitiea due to alleged Biss. The Appellants denonstrete ro evidence of
Bias in the present record, but refer indirectly to the Boerd’s joinder in No.
25714, in which the Beard supposedly “adopt [ed Shinabukuro]’s argument that
there’ was no merit to the sotion for attorneys fees - 1 without having
matters.” However, the Appellants waived this point by not
their concise statement of the points of error. See Hawai't
Roles of Appellate Procedure Rele 28(b) (4). ‘Moreover, because che Appellants
had no visble claim to fees, see supra section I1I-a-i, we notice no plain

 

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Hawai'i 248, 256, 131 P.3d 1230, 1238 (2006) (quoting Taylor-Rice
vs State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 73, 979 P.2d 1086, 1099 (1999)) ("This

court may affirm a judgment of the [circuit] court on any ground

 

in the record which supports affirmance.'”)
Moreover, the Appellants’ direct appeal in No. 26292
during the pendency of their mandamus action obviated the

extraordinary renedy of mandamus:

 

    
  
 

 

(IA writ of mandamus... will not issue unless the
petitioner dencnstrates .. . a clear and indisputable right
Eo relief and. ss a lack of ot sdequately te}
Eedrees the wrong or obtsin the 7 (such
writs ; ss are. . (not) to serve as legal renedies in

Tieu'of norsal sppetiate procedure.”
Evang v. Takao, 74 Haw. 267, 279, 842 P.2d 255, 261 (1992)

(quoting Breiner v, Takao, 73 Haw. 499, 502, 835 P.2d 637, 640
(1992)), cited in Tanaka v, Nagata, 76 Hawai'i 32, 35, 868 P.2d
450, 453 (1994); Pelekai v. White, 75 Haw. 357, 362, 861 P.2d

1205, 1208 (1993); see also State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawai'i 409,
411, 70 P-3d 635, 637 (2003); State v. Kealaiki, 95 Hawai'i 309,
313 6 n.d, 22 P.3d S88, 592 6 n.4 (2001); Straub Clinic 6 Hosp.
v.Kochi, @1 Hawai'i 410, 414, 917 P.2d 1264, 1288 (1996).

The Board denied the Appellants’ petition on July 17,
2003, and the Appellants appealed to the circuit court on August
13, 2003. Concededly, the circuit court’s June 27, 2002 order
dismissing the mandamus action (Civ. No. 02-1-0832) predated the
Board’s July 17, 2003 order in what would becone Civ. No.
03-1-1659. Nonetheless, by the time of the circuit court's
october 3, 2003 final judgment in the mandamus case, the Board
had disposed of the petition, enabling the Appellants to pursue

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their direct appeal. Even assuming arquendo the Board had
subjected the Appellants to unreasonable delay, see HAR

§ 6-20-10, supra note 6 (providing for consideration of the
petition “within a reasonable time”), the Appellants could have

 

sought -- and did seek -- redress through “normal appellate
procedure” rather than mandamus.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of

civ. No. 02-1-0832.

Iv. coNcLUsTON

In Light of the foregoing analysis, we vacate the
circuit court’s dismissal of Civ. No. 03-1-1659 and remand with
instructions to: (1) remand to the Board for hearing and further
fact finding with respect to the Appellants’ eligibility, if any,
for interest pursuant to HRS § 68-74.5; and (2) affirm the
Board’s July 17, 2003 judgment in other respects. We affirm the
circuit court’s dismissal of Civ. No. 02-1-0832.

on the briets:
Charles K. Y. Kain,

for the petioners-appellants~ G
appellants/plaintitfe-appellants h

Duane Preble and Marion Everson .

Kevin P. #. Sumida, of eR enne—
Matsui Chung Sunida & Tsuchiyana, Duewe:

for the defendant appellee ate Co Neotel
David Shinabokoro, Administrator

ete Eas" Eee
Selendantcopvetiee ae
kissriy tect, SOSH

appellee-appellee/defendant-appellee
Board of Trustees of the ERS

 

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