Title: Witherspoon v. City of Philadelphia (Concurring Opinion)

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

[J-203-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT JOHN WITHERSPOON, Appellant v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 15 E.D. Appeal Dkt. 1999 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 7/1/98, reargument denied 8/27/98 at No. 2320 C.D. 1997, affirming the Order entered on 7/30/97 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 498 September Term, 1996 Submitted: October 19, 1999 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: March 26, 2001 I concur in the result based upon the plaintiff’s failure to effectuate service upon the City of Philadelphia for a period of nine months. I agree with the dissent, however, that the lead opinion’s approach that “the process must be immediately and continually reissued until service is made” in order to toll the applicable period of limitations is unduly restrictive. Further, the dissenting opinion aptly points out that the legislative prescriptions for limitations periods are generally tied to the commencement of actions and not to service of process. Perhaps for this reason, many other jurisdictions, including the federal government, have relied upon rule-based mechanisms in order to encourage diligent prosecution of complaints once filed, without specifically modifying the tolling effect of the commencement of an action in relation to the applicable [J-203-99]- 2 limitations periods. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m);1 Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 998 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Nev. 2000). Thus, prior to incorporating a new and fairly rigorous paradigm into our decisional law, I would find it preferable to refer the matter to the Civil Procedural Rules Committee for consideration of the merits of more moderate, rule-based options. Mr. Justice Castille and Mr. Justice Nigro join this concurring opinion. 1 Rule 4(m) defines the time in which service of federal process must be achieved, as follows: If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.