Title: Pendelton v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pendelton v. State1998 WY 116966 P.2d 951Case Number: 97-102Decided: 09/23/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Andre 
Nigel PENDELTON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Hot Springs County, 
Gary P. Hartman, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Diane M. Lozano, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and James Kaste, Student Intern., for 
Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

TAYLOR, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant claims the evidence used to convict 
him of burglary was obtained through a pretextual search. He now appeals the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress this evidence. Finding that 
the police officers' actions were clearly proper, and the district court's 
denial of suppression correct, we affirm.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Andre 
Pendelton (Pendelton), presents this issue for review:

 

ISSUE I

 

The pretextual search of the appellant's home 
violated his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Art. I § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 

Appellee, State of Wyoming, states the issue as 
follows:

 

Was the application for and execution of the search 
warrant to search appellant's apartment for controlled substances and 
paraphernalia a mere ruse to permit officers to search for evidence of 
burglary?

 

                      
                       II. 
FACTS

 

[¶3] On December 30, 1995, 
police were notified that the glass on the front door at Friedl's Fashions in 
Thermopolis, Wyoming was broken, and it appeared to be a burglary. Officer 
Magelky was one of the officers investigating the report. After arriving at the 
scene, Officer Magelky walked through the store with the owner, who identified 
items he believed to have been taken. Until May 1996, efforts to find the 
perpetrator were unsuccessful.

 

[¶4] On May 8, 1996, 
Pendelton's recently rejected girlfriend informed Officer Magelky that Pendelton 
had broken into Friedl's, and that he had drugs in his home. Officer Magelky 
attempted to get a warrant to search Pendelton's home for evidence of the 
burglary, but a warrant was denied.

 

[¶5] During the same time 
period, Officer Raymond was interviewing another informant providing a "wide 
array of information related to drugs." During this interview, the informant 
told Officer Raymond that Pendelton was supplying drugs to a juvenile female. 
Knowing of the additional information supplied by Pendelton's former girlfriend, 
and that Pendelton intended to move to Lander, Wyoming on May 12, 1996, Officer 
Raymond immediately sought and received a warrant to search Pendelton and his 
home for drugs.

 

[¶6] On May 10, 1996 at 
about 6:00 p.m., Officers Raymond and Magelky, along with other law enforcement 
personnel, went to Pendelton's home, knocked on the door, and announced their 
presence. After explaining the search warrant to both Pendelton and his mother, 
in whose home Pendelton resided, the officers began the search. While Officer 
Raymond was searching a cardboard box found in Pendelton's bedroom, he 
discovered clothing tags bearing Friedl identification. He showed these items to 
Officer Magelky, who confirmed that they might be evidence of the burglary. The 
search produced evidence of drug use as well as further evidence of the burglary.

 

[¶7] Pendelton was arrested 
and charged with felony burglary, Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301 (1997), and misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance, Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) (1997). Prior to 
trial, Pendelton filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the burglary. After 
an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied. A two-day jury trial culminated 
in convictions on both counts.  
Pendelton was sentenced to a term of five to eight years in the 
penitentiary for burglary, and one year probation for possession, to be 
completed after he served his prison term. This timely appeal 
followed.

 

                                   
   III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶8] Motions to suppress 
evidence involve both questions of fact and law. As to questions of fact, we 
defer to the district court's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. Brown v. 
State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1997); Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1194 
(Wyo. 1997). The ultimate issue of law, whether the search or seizure was 
unreasonable in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. Brown, 
944 P.2d at 1170-71; Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 1194; Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 
807 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 
1994)).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] Pendelton contends the 
request for a warrant to search his home for drugs was purely pretextual. As 
factual support for this allegation, Pendelton presents his suspicions that when 
Officer Magelky was unable to obtain the warrant to search for evidence of a 
burglary, he "took advantage" of Officer Raymond's warrant "and turned the 
search warrant for drugs into a general search warrant rummaging through the 
Appellant's apartment for evidence of the Friedl burglary." These suspicions are 
based solely on Officer Magelky's frank admission that he, personally, expected 
to find evidence of the burglary in Pendelton's home. We need only look to 
Wyoming law to dispose of this 
claim.

 

[¶10] Pendelton relies on 
our holding in Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wyo. 1987). In Brown, 738 P.2d  at 1096, evidence discovered during a protective sweep of a woman's home 
incident to her arrest on a minor traffic citation was held inadmissible because 
it was gained by "a ruse" and the search was solely "for the purpose of 
gathering evidence to permit charging another crime." We also 
stated:

 

A 
pretext search occurs when officers depart from routine procedure and engage in 
arrest and search activity which "would not have been undertaken but for [an] 
'underlying intent or motivation' which, standing alone, could not supply a 
lawful basis for the police conduct."

 

Id. at 1095 (quoting 1 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.4(3) at 93 (2nd ed. 1987)) (emphasis in 
original).

 

[¶11] In this case, the 
facts clearly fall outside the "but for" test articulated in Brown, 738 P.2d  at 
1095. Two separate informants told police officers that Pendelton possessed 
drugs. One of those informants (not his "jilted" girlfriend, as suggested by 
Pendelton) told police that Pendelton was providing drugs to a minor. With this 
information, Officer Raymond was certainly justified, if not compelled, to take 
official action. There was no departure from routine 
procedure.

 

[¶12] Moreover, standing 
alone, there was clearly a lawful basis for the conduct of the officers. 
Pendelton does not contest the fact that probable cause supported the search 
warrant obtained by Officer Raymond. Neither does Pendelton claim that the 
officers searched any areas other than those places within the scope of the 
warrant. When an officer lawfully occupies a vantage point from which he can 
observe possible evidence in plain view, there is no unconstitutional search. 
McDermott v. State, 870 P.2d 339, 343 (Wyo. 1994). The probable cause test for a 
plain view seizure is: " ' "The items observed must appear to the officer to be 
possible evidence" ' " of a crime. Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Wyo. 
1995) overruled in Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692 (Wyo. 1995) as to holding 
the seizure of evidence requires exigent circumstances (quoting Kish v. State, 
642 P.2d 453, 456 (Wyo. 1982) and McCutcheon v. State, 604 P.2d 537, 540 (Wyo. 
1979)). The discovery of the evidence need not be inadvertent, nor is it 
necessary to show exigent circumstances to subject evidence to a warrantless 
seizure. Jones, 902 P.2d  at 692; McDermott, 870 P.2d  at 
344.

 

[¶13] Here, Officer Raymond, 
who was not part of the burglary investigation, made the initial discovery of 
possible evidence of the burglary while searching for drugs in a cardboard box 
located in Pendelton's bedroom. He immediately verified his suspicion with 
Officer Magelky, who had sufficient knowledge to ascertain whether the items 
were related to the Friedl burglary. See Kish, 642 P.2d  at 456 (probable cause 
to seize four pair of boots based on knowledge from burglary investigation 
report). The remainder of the burglary 
evidence was discovered while searching only places where drugs or paraphernalia 
may be found. In short, the initial seizure of the evidence relating to the 
burglary was lawful. Pendelton's claim is completely without 
merit.

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶14] The officers did not 
depart from routine procedure in the search of Pendelton's home. Neither is 
there evidence that the officers' search of Pendelton's home for drugs was 
motivated only by an intent to find evidence of another crime. The officers were 
lawfully searching the premises pursuant to a valid warrant. The district 
court's denial of Pendelton's motion to suppress is 
affirmed.