Title: BELL v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BELL v. STATE2000 WY 5994 P.2d 947Case Number: 98-359, 98-360Decided: 01/13/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
LAWRENCE R. BELL, Appellant (Defendant),  v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeals from the District Court of 
Uinta County, The Honorable John D. Troughton, Judge.          
   
Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program; L. Kirk 
Nurmi, Student Director of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Katina Francis 
and Julia Tyson, Student Interns for the Wyoming Defender Aid Program, 
representing appellant.Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, representing 
appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN 
& HILL, JJ.         

MACY, Justice.
[¶1] Appellant Lawrence Bell appeals from two orders entered in two separate 
cases. The first order sentenced Bell to serve not less than five nor more than 
ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary after a jury found him guilty of 
conspiring to commit aggravated burglary. The second order, which was entered 
after a jury convicted Bell of one count of third-degree sexual assault and two 
counts of interference with the custody of a minor, sentenced Bell to serve 
terms in the Wyoming State Penitentiary of not less than nine nor more than 
fifteen years for the third-degree sexual assault conviction and of not less 
than three nor more than five years for each interference with the custody of a 
minor conviction. All the sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3] Bell presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the District Court err in refusing to permit Paul Skog to withdraw as 
counsel for Mr. Bell in both cases, when there was ample evidence of a complete 
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship; and was Skog's performance as 
counsel so deficient as to violate Mr. Bell's right to the effective assistance 
of counsel? 
2. Did the District Court err in making comments to the jury during 
deliberations which impermissibly coerced the jury into reaching a verdict in 
violation of Mr. Bell's sixth amendment rights?
3. Did the District Court err in failing to sever the third degree sexual 
assault charges against Mr. Bell from the interference with custody charges, 
when the charges were based on unrelated incidents, and joinder prevented Mr. 
Bell from effectively presenting a defense on the custodial interference 
charges?
4. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to hear impermissible 
evidence of Mr. Bell's prior bad acts which impermissibly suggested that he had 
a propensity to sexually assault young women?
5. Did the District Court err in permitting Mr. Bell to be twice convicted 
and punished for the single continuous act of allegedly taking [the victim] to 
Utah and keeping her there?
FACTS
[¶4] A. Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Burglary Case
[¶5] On September 22, 1996, Bell, Jeanette Price, and Earl Nowatney devised a 
plan to burglarize Bell's brother's home. Bell was familiar with the house. He 
instructed the others on the best way to gain entry and on where to find the 
targeted items. The next morning, Nowatney and Price broke into the back door 
and took several jewelry boxes along with the jewelry inside, four guns, a 
blanket, and a violin. Bell accompanied Nowatney and Price but remained 
outside.
[¶6] Bell's brother subsequently became suspicious that Bell was involved 
with the burglary of his home after finding a blanket that was taken during the 
burglary at their mother's home. He also found some pawn shop slips. The brother 
visited one of the pawn shops and discovered one of his stolen guns. He was also 
informed that another one of his guns had been at the pawn shop but had recently 
been sold. When Bell learned that his brother knew he had been involved in the 
burglary, Bell disclosed where the remaining items were hidden.
[¶7] Bell was charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. The 
information also accused Bell of being a habitual offender. The trial court 
appointed counsel to represent Bell and later appointed another attorney to 
second-chair in the case. The case went to trial, and the jury found Bell guilty 
of conspiring to commit aggravated burglary. Bell appeals to this Court.
[¶8] B. Third-Degree Sexual Assault & Interference with Custody Case
[¶9] Bell met the victim in 1997 when Bell agreed to hire the victim and her 
friend to help him deliver telephone books around the Evanston community. At the 
time, Bell was thirty-two, the victim was fifteen, and her friend was fourteen 
years old. The victim's friend worked for Bell only one day in part because she 
was uncomfortable with sexual comments that Bell had made to her throughout the 
day. After work, Bell and the victim routinely drove to Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
buy drugs, telling her parents that they had worked late.
[¶10] After one of their trips to Salt Lake City, Bell and the victim had 
their first sexual encounter. These encounters continued over the course of the 
next few weeks. During this time, the victim was not getting along with her 
father, and she decided to run away with Bell. On September 4, 1997, she climbed 
out of her bedroom window. She met Bell, who was waiting for her near her house, 
and they drove to Salt Lake City. The couple quickly ran out of the $480 they 
had withdrawn from the victim's savings account, and the victim started 
prostituting herself. The victim testified that Bell taught her how to be a 
prostitute and supplied her with a false identity and social security number in 
case she was stopped by the police.
[¶11] Bell periodically returned to Evanston to visit his mother. During 
these visits, the victim hid in the brush next to the Wasatch Road exit outside 
of Evanston and waited for Bell to return. During one such visit, Bell was 
confronted by the police and the victim's parents who demanded to know where the 
victim was. Bell told them that he did not know. The victim's parents testified 
that Bell also said that there was nothing they could do about it even if he did 
know where she was.
[¶12] On October 4, 1997, the victim and Bell were arrested in Salt Lake City 
for prostitution and for procuring prostitution respectively. Once the victim's 
true identity was discovered, Utah authorities learned that she had been 
reported missing from Evanston.
[¶13] An information was filed in Wyoming, charging Bell with two counts of 
third-degree sexual assault and with two counts of custodial interference with a 
minor. He was appointed counsel and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. He 
filed a motion to sever the two counts of third-degree sexual assault from the 
two counts of custodial interference. The trial court denied the motion, finding 
that the alleged acts were all part of the same transaction or occurrence. Bell 
also filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of other bad acts, 
specifically evidence regarding Bell's advances toward the victim's friend. The 
trial court reserved its ruling until the time of trial but opined that the 
evidence seemed to be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. A trial was held, 
and the jury found Bell guilty of one count of third-degree sexual assault and 
of two counts of custodial interference. It acquitted him of one count of 
third-degree sexual assault. Bell appeals to this Court.
DISCUSSION
I. Appointed Counsel
[¶14] The same defense attorney was appointed to represent Bell in both 
cases. Bell contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to allow 
counsel to withdraw when communications between them broke down, arguing that 
such denials resulted in his inability to receive effective assistance of 
counsel in both of his cases. The state counters that, although there may have 
been dissension between Bell and his attorney that resulted in some lack of 
communication, this lack of communication was remedied by the appointment of a 
second-chair counsel in both cases to assist with communications and with trial 
preparations.
[¶15] A. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
[¶16] We review the refusal to appoint substitute counsel under the abuse of 
discretion standard:
While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint substitute 
counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of discretion is 
shown. A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel 
is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is 
to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would 
conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other 
good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective 
assistance.
Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo. 
1978).
[¶17] Bell's counsel was working on both the aggravated burglary and the 
sexual assault/custodial interference cases simultaneously. At Bell's request, 
his counsel filed motions to withdraw as counsel in both cases as a result of 
their differing opinions regarding the case strategies and because of their 
inability to communicate with one another. The trial court held hearings on each 
motion during which time it considered each of Bell's complaints and quizzed his 
attorney on what he had been doing on the cases. The trial court determined that 
Bell's counsel was effectively handling the cases. The trial court denied both 
motions but did agree to appoint co-counsel and continue the trials in both 
cases.
[¶18] The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment does 
not guarantee a meaningful relationship with appointed defense counsel. Morris 
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983). 6 "[T]he purpose of 
providing assistance of counsel "is simply to ensure that criminal defendants 
receive a fair trial," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, "the 
appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's 
relationship with his lawyer as such." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n. 21 (1984).
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).
[¶19] After reviewing Bell's arguments in conjunction with the record, we are 
unable to find any reason that would constitute good cause to order a substitute 
counsel. We agree with the trial court's explanation that: "[Y]ou don't have to 
like [your counsel] and [your counsel] doesn't have to like you. Personalities 
are not the test, Mr. Bell. The test is whether you have an effective, legal 
counsel representing you." The trial court provided Bell with the assistance of 
two capable attorneys in both of his cases which was certainly more than what is 
required.
[¶20] B. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
[¶21] Bell complains that, as a result of the trial court's refusal to allow 
his counsel to withdraw, he was denied effective assistance of counsel in both 
of his cases. Specifically, he makes the following arguments: that his counsel 
failed to recognize or attempt to remedy significant problems with the charges 
against him; that his counsel failed to perform minimal legal research to rebut 
the state's assertion that a habitual criminal allegation was appropriate; that 
his counsel failed to conduct adequate investigations; and that his counsel made 
serious trial errors by not cross-examining a witness in the burglary case and 
by allowing leading questions of the victim and failing to object to the 
victim's friend's testimony in the sexual assault/custodial interference case. 
The state responds that, although Bell points to various factors in claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to demonstrate how any of them 
rendered his representation defective or how they prejudiced the outcome of his 
trials.
[¶22] To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant 
must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 
1998). We begin this analysis with the strong presumption that counsel's 
representation was adequate and reasonable and, therefore, effective. Cureton v. 
State, 950 P.2d 544, 546 (Wyo. 
1997).
[¶23] We have reviewed the relevant portions of the record and conclude that 
Bell's attorney's performance was not deficient. Most of what Bell complains 
about occurred during the pretrial stages and was sorted out before the trials 
ever began. Additionally, Bell has totally failed to demonstrate how any of the 
perceived incompetencies prejudiced the outcomes of his trials. In fact, at the 
conclusion of the trial in the aggravated burglary case, the trial court 
conducted a fairly in-depth examination of Bell to determine whether Bell was 
satisfied with the representation he received from his counsel. Bell assured the 
judge that, although he was initially concerned with his representation, he was 
ultimately satisfied with his counsel's performance, and we see nothing in his 
brief to convince us that he should have answered that inquiry differently.
II. Comments to Jury
[¶24] Bell complains about the comments that the trial judge made to the jury 
during its deliberations in the sexual assault/custodial interference case, 
claiming that they coerced the jury into reaching a verdict. Statements made by 
a judge to a jury that appears to be having trouble reaching a unanimous 
decision must not be coercive. Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1201 (Wyo. 
1977). "Communications from a judge to a jury are coercive when they possess the 
substantial propensity of prying minority jurors loose from beliefs they 
honestly have, constitute an undue intrusion into the jury's province and dilute 
the requirement of unanimity." Id.
[¶25] The remarks that Bell takes issue with occurred at 8:44 p.m. and are 
set out in context:
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and Gentlemen, I called you back into court 
because you've been in deliberations now eight and a half hours. Actually, eight 
hours and forty-five minutes. Apparently, you are having difficulty reaching a 
decision. I don't want to know how you're divided, but I need to know if you 
are, in fact, divided.
Who is the foreman of the Jury? You are, Mr. [Juror]?
[JUROR]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. And the Jury is divided, I take it?
[JUROR]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Foreman, is there any probability that the Jury will 
come to an agreement?
[JUROR]: Tonight, your Honor? Not tonight. We have come to an agreement on 
one count. The other three, we're still - still hammering out. (Long pause.)
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, once a case has been submitted to the Jury, 
the Jury cannot separate. That means that you can't go home unless you reach a 
verdict or unless you are discharged. There have been no accommodations made for 
overnight - for an overnight stay for the Jury. No sleeping accommodations have 
been arranged for you. (Pause.)
I tell you that, Mr. Foreman, because your answer to my question - (pause) - 
was that you'd - when I asked you if there was any probability of you agreeing, 
you answered not tonight.
[JUROR]: If you could shed some light on some issues, it would be 
possible.
THE COURT: Pardon?
[JUROR]: If you could shed some light on some issues, it would be possible to 
come to an agreement on a verdict. (Pause.)
[¶26] The judge then asked the jury to write its question down, stating:
Okay. And we'll try to answer it. Now, I do not intend to tell the Clerk or 
the Bailiffs to start finding motel rooms. I do not intend to tell the Clerk or 
the Bailiffs to find more Bailiffs to stand guard over you folks while you are 
in the motel room.
Those arrangements were not made because I don't think that anybody in this 
lawsuit thought that it would require overnight accommodations before the Jury 
could reach a verdict in this case and so none of those arrangements were made. 
And, you know, I've only had a couple of cases in eighteen years on the bench 
where we made overnight accommodations for a jury. In both of those cases, that 
was after several weeks of trial. So I just want you folks to know that.
Put it in writing. We'll try to answer it. But if you're not going to resolve 
this case, I'm not going to keep you up all night. I'm not going to keep you 
away from home all night.
Now, I'm not threatening you. I'm not trying to put any pressure on you. I'm 
just trying to make you understand that - that there will come a point this 
evening when enough is enough.
All right. Take them out.
[¶27] The jury did write down its question which the judge answered:
As a result of the discussions that the Court had with the Jury, the Jury has 
sent the following written note to the Court. It reads as follows: "Instruction 
No. 16, Part No. 7, what is the definition of "intended to commit a criminal 
offense'? What is the definition of "intent'?"
[¶28] In response, the Court has taken the Black's Law Dictionary . . . and 
abstracted the following definitions and instructions: "intent," hyphen, 
"design, resolve, or determination with which a person acts. A state of mind in 
which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course of 
action."
"Intend. To design, resolve, propose. To plan for and expect a certain 
result. Commit. To perpetrate, as a crime."
"If a person intended to commit a criminal offense, then that person planned 
for and expected to perpetrate a crime, one, against another person; or, two, 
with another person."
[¶29] The jury was given this explanation at approximately 9:50 p.m., and it 
returned with a verdict at 11:18 p.m.
[¶30] Bell contends that the judge's comments that no overnight 
accommodations had been made indicated that he was unduly anxious to conclude 
the case, pressured the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time, 
and coerced it into coming to a final decision. The state counters that the 
judge was merely trying to assure the jurors that he was neither going to keep 
them deliberating all night nor going to sequester them away from their families 
when he instructed them that, if they could not come to a decision soon, he was 
prepared to discharge them from their duty.
[¶31] We agree that, if we consider only the isolated comments that Bell 
plucked out of the judge's discourse, it would appear that the judge was 
pressuring the jury to come to a decision. When viewed in context, however, it 
is clear that the judge was merely informing the jury that he was not going to 
require it to deliberate much longer. Indeed, he even emphasized that he was not 
trying to pressure it into reaching a verdict. Furthermore, we are not convinced 
that the jury deliberated for an unreasonable amount of time. In fact, that 
appears to be precisely what the judge was trying to prevent when he interrupted 
the deliberating jury.
[¶32] Bell also claims that the judge should have given an "Allen" 
instruction to temper his comments and to remind the jurors that the verdict 
must reflect the views of them all. He points to the quickness that the jury 
returned with its verdict after the comments from the judge to support his 
argument that the judge's comments pried some jurors loose from their strongly 
held beliefs. The state responds that the jury instructions adequately conveyed 
that the "verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror"; "[i]n the 
course of your deliberation, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views 
[which] does not mean that any juror is required to yield an honest conviction 
after consultation and deliberation"; and "[y]ou should weigh all the evidence 
in the case and if you are not convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find him not guilty."
[¶33] We agree that the instructions adequately covered the directive to the 
jurors that they must stand firm on their honestly held convictions and that 
they must vote in accordance with them. We conclude that, when viewed in 
context, the judge's remarks did not "possess the substantial propensity of 
prying minority jurors loose from beliefs they honestly ha[d], constitute an 
undue intrusion into the jury's province [or] dilute the requirement of 
unanimity." Smith, 564 P.2d  at 1201.
[¶34] Bell also complains about the response that the judge gave to the 
jury's question. He criticizes the last sentence: "[I]f a person intended to 
commit a criminal offense, then that person planned for and expected to 
perpetrate a crime, one, against another person; or, two, with another person." 
He claims that this sentence too closely mirrored the elements of two of the 
charges the state had to prove that, if the victim left with Bell of her own 
volition, "the Defendant intended to commit a criminal offense with or against 
her." Bell asserts that this sentence unduly intruded into the province of the 
jury because it conveyed the suggestion that the judge had concluded that Bell 
"planned for and expected to perpetrate a crime, one, against [the victim], or, 
two, with [her]." He also contends that this diluted the unanimity requirement 
because the judge substituted his own opinion for that of each individual juror. 
We disagree.
[¶35] Despite Bell's convoluted attempt at providing an argument to support 
this proposition, we simply cannot fathom how Bell believes the sentence at 
issue conveyed the suggestion that the judge had concluded that Bell had planned 
for and expected to perpetrate a crime against or with the victim. The language 
of the sentence is phrased in as unbiased fashion as possible. If the jurors 
believed the intent element was present, they would vote to convict; if they 
found that the intent element was lacking, they would vote to acquit. Nothing 
within the definition suggested to the jury what its decision should have been, 
and we decline to find error in its submission to the jury.
III. Denial of Bell''s Motion to Sever
[¶36] Bell next asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to 
sever the sexual assault charges from the custodial interference charges. He 
claims that, as a result of the improper joinder, he was unable to raise an 
affirmative defense available by statute to the custodial interference charges 
because doing so would have opened the door to other bad acts evidence which 
would prejudice the jury on the sexual assault charges.
[¶37] W.R.Cr.P. 14 provides that a court may allow separate trials of charges 
if it appears that either the defendant or the state is prejudiced by joinder of 
the offenses. Given the discretionary nature of the rule, the decision not to 
separate the charges "`will be reviewed under our traditional 
abuse-of-discretion standards.'" Black v. State, 869 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 484 (Wyo. 
1983)). A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Bruckner v. State, 972 P.2d 141, 142 (Wyo. 
1999).
[¶38] W.R.Cr.P. 8(a) governs the joining of charges:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
citation, indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or 
similar character or are based on the same act or transaction, or on two or more 
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan.
[¶39] Joinder is proper absent compelling reasons for severance. Bishop v. 
State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219 (1985). "Joint trials serve the public interest by expediting the 
administration of justice, reducing docket congestion, conserving judicial time 
as well as that of jurors along with avoiding the recall of witnesses to 
duplicate their performances." Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Wyo. 
1977).
[¶40] Bell contends that the charges were improperly joined because they were 
not based on the same act or transaction nor part of a common scheme or plan as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 8(a). He maintains that the events underlying the various 
charges occurred over the span of about a week and that they were distinct in 
time and place and had nothing to do with one another. The state argues that the 
acts alleged in all four counts did involve a common scheme or course of 
conduct: to have continuing sexual relations with the victim. We agree with the 
state.
[¶41] Bell was engaged in a sexual relationship with the victim. That 
relationship very quickly intensified to the point where Bell helped the victim 
run away from home and then obstructed her safe return. Bell's plan, scheme, or 
course of conduct was obviously to continue his relationship with the victim, 
and the fact that the separate charges span a few days does not concern us. The 
offenses were similar in character and so related as to constitute parts of a 
common scheme or plan as contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 8(a).
[¶42] Bell insists that, even if the counts were properly joined under 
W.R.Cr.P. 8(a), the trials should have been separated under W.R.Cr.P. 14 because 
of the prejudicial risks a single trial posed to him. He claims that he was 
prejudiced because he was unable to avail himself of the affirmative defense to 
the custodial interference charges that the victim left or did not return at her 
own instigation and that he lacked the necessary intent to commit a criminal 
offense with or against a child. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-204 (LEXIS 1999). He 
argues that he was not able to assert this affirmative defense because, if he 
had, the state would have been able to present evidence that he had engaged in 
sexual relations with the victim while they were in Utah as rebuttal evidence 
which would not have been admissible in a trial on just the sexual assault 
charges. The state points out that this claim must be analyzed by balancing the 
potential prejudice against the judicial economies created by the joinder. 
Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Wyo. 
1989); Lee v. State, 653 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Wyo. 
1982).
[¶43] This Court considers two factors in balancing these competing factors 
to determine whether the joinder improperly prejudiced a defendant:
The first is whether the evidence relating to the similar offenses charged 
would be admissible in a separate trial of each offense. If the evidence would 
be admissible, there is no prejudice. If the evidence would not be admissible in 
separate trials, the trial court should then determine whether the evidence of 
each crime is "simple and distinct." Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Stated differently, the second consideration is 
whether the evidence relating to the separate offenses would be so complicated 
that the jury could not reasonably be expected to separate them and evaluate the 
evidence properly and individually on each separate charge.
Dorador, 768 P.2d  at 1052 (citation omitted).
[¶44] Bell offers the bold and unsupported assertion that the evidence 
regarding the sexual relationship that existed while the couple was in Utah 
would not have been admissible in a trial on the sexual assault charges because 
it would create the improper inference that he had a propensity to have sexual 
relations with the victim. Without stepping on the trial court's discretionary 
powers, we do not agree with Bell that the Utah evidence would necessarily be 
inadmissible in a trial on just the sexual assault charges.
[¶45] This Court has previously held that, "in the context of sexual 
offenses[,] other similar acts may be admitted if they involved the victim in 
the charged offense." Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Wyo. 
1979). Additionally, in cases involving sexual abuse of minors, this Court "has 
generally sustained convictions where evidence of uncharged misconduct was 
admitted under W.R.E. 404(b) to demonstrate a relevant course of conduct between 
the perpetrator and the victim or to show the motive of the perpetrator for 
committing the action questioned." Jackson v. State, 891 P.2d 70, 75 (Wyo. 
1995).
[¶46] Even if the trial court found in its discretion the evidence 
inadmissible, the case was simple and uncomplicated. We are not concerned that 
the case was so "complicated that the jury could not reasonably be expected to 
separate [the charges] and evaluate the evidence properly and individually on 
each separate charge." Dorador, 768 P.2d  at 1052. We must assume that the jury 
followed the trial court's instruction that "[e]ach count, and the evidence 
pertaining to it, should be considered separately by the jury." Dobbins v. 
State, 483 P.2d 255, 259 (Wyo. 
1971).
IV. Other Bad Acts Evidence
[¶47] Bell next claims that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of 
Bell's other bad acts in the sexual assault/custodial interference case. The 
state argues that the evidence regarding Bell's sexual advances toward the 
victim's fourteen-year-old friend was probative of Bell's motivation to have sex 
with underage girls.
[¶48] The trial court held a pretrial hearing wherein it considered the 
admissibility of this evidence. The trial court found that the evidence was 
relevant and that its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice 
but reserved its ruling until the trial. At trial, the victim's friend testified 
that she stopped working for Bell because she suffered an injury and because he 
"was making sexual comments and sexual suggestions and stuff towards [her]." The 
prosecutor asked, "Larry Bell was?" and the victim answered, "Yes." Defense 
counsel then objected. The trial court overruled the objection, but no further 
testimony on the matter was elicited.
[¶49] Bell contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct 
procedure for admitting other bad acts evidence. W.R.E. 404(b) governs the 
admissibility of other bad acts evidence:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
[¶50] In Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 
1997), this Court considered the argument that the trial court failed to follow 
the correct procedure by neglecting to articulate its reasons for finding that 
the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect of such 
evidence. We held that the trial court's finding that, "although the evidence 
was obviously prejudicial to Appellant, it was not unfairly prejudicial and that 
the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice" 
was sufficient. Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 738. We find this holding appropriate in the 
case at bar. We also emphasize that, in this case, the trial court reserved its 
ruling until the time of trial and that the defense failed to make a timely 
triggering objection.
[¶51] Bell argues that the testimony was not relevant because his motivation 
was not at issue. The state points out that Bell's defense to the sexual assault 
charges was that he did not know the victim's age, suggesting that he was 
motivated only by acceptable sexual desires for a woman capable of legally 
consenting. We agree with the state. His motive was relevant, and the evidence 
was admissible for that reason.
[¶52] Bell also asserts that the purpose for which the evidence was offered 
was improper, insisting that, although the state claims it was offered to prove 
motive, it actually only suggests the impermissible inference that Bell had the 
propensity to act in a particular fashion. We disagree. The evidence displayed a 
motive by demonstrating a common style of misconduct to achieve sexual 
gratification and showed that Bell was not concerned about the age of his sexual 
partners.
[¶53] Bell next asserts a confusing argument about how the evidence from the 
victim's friend was unduly prejudicial because of the victim's inability to 
remember the exact dates the sexual encounters occurred. We are at a loss to see 
the connection Bell attempts to make by asserting this argument. Suffice it to 
say that we disagree.
V. Duplicative Custodial Interference Charges & 
Sentences
[¶54] In Bell's final claim of error, he asserts that the trial court 
violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy when it refused to 
dismiss the second custodial interference charge. The state counters that Bell 
did not raise this argument to the trial court and that it, therefore, should 
not be considered by this Court.
[¶55] We generally will not consider issues which are raised for the first 
time on appeal unless they are jurisdictional issues or issues of such a 
fundamental nature that they must be considered. WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 
1998). A criminal defendant waives the defense of double jeopardy if he does not 
present a double jeopardy argument to the trial court. Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 
1999). We, therefore, are unable to decide the merits of this claim.
[¶56] Affirmed.