Title: Wooten v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Jimmy Don WOOTEN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-975                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 16, 1996


1.   Criminal law -- procedures followed when Batson objection
     raised. -- The procedures to be followed when a Batson
     objection is raised are well established: first, the defendant
     must make a prima facie case that racial discrimination is the
     basis of a juror challenge; in the event the defendant makes
     a prima facie case, the State has the burden of showing that
     the challenge was not based upon race; only if the defendant
     makes a prima facie case and the State fails to give a
     racially neutral reason for the challenge is the court
     required to conduct a sensitive inquiry.

2.   Criminal law -- Batson objection -- establishment of prima
     facie case. -- A prima facie case may be established by:  (1)
     showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to
     an inference of discriminatory purpose, (2) demonstrating
     total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of blacks from
     the jury, or (3) showing a pattern of strikes, questions, or
     statements by a prosecuting attorney during voir dire; the
     standard of review for reversal of a trial court's Batson
     ruling is whether the court's findings are clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence. 

3.   Jury -- prosecution's use of peremptory challenge to remove
     only black prospective juror may establish prima facie case -
     - when issue of prima facie showing becomes moot. -- The
     prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only
     black prospective juror may establish a prima facie case;
     however, once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral
     explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court
     has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
     discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant
     had made a prima facie showing becomes moot; here, the
     prosecutor volunteered an explanation for the challenge, and
     the trial court made no specific ruling on whether a prima
     facie case was made.  

4.   Appeal & error -- argument not presented at trial -- argument
     cannot be raised on appeal. -- Where appellant did not present
     the argument to the trial court, it was not preserved for
     appeal; an appellant may not change his grounds for objection
     on appeal; the court does not address arguments made for the
     first time on appeal.  

5.   Statutes -- construction of -- effect given to intent of
     legislature. -- The basic rule of statutory construction is to
     give effect to the intent of the legislature, and when a
     statute is clear, it is given its plain meaning; legislative
     intent is gathered from the plain meaning of the language
     used.  

6.   Criminal law -- admission of victim-impact evidence --
     evidence properly admitted. -- Where Arkansas Code Annotated
      5-4-602(4) (Repl. 1993) clearly provided that evidence may
     be presented as to any matter relevant to punishment,
     including, but not limited to, victim-impact evidence, and
     required that the defendant and the state be accorded an
     opportunity to rebut such evidence, the statute, contrary to
     appellant's argument, did not provide that such evidence be
     limited to rebuttal; if the State chooses to permit the
     admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial argument
     on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar; a
     State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim
     and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is
     relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death
     penalty should be imposed.

7.   Constitutional law -- when trial court's ruling on in-court
     identification procedure will be reversed -- how determination
     is made. -- A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an
     in-court identification will not be reversed unless the ruling
     is clearly erroneous under the totality of the circumstances;
     in determining whether an in-court identification is
     admissible, the court looks first to whether the pretrial
     identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive or
     otherwise constitutionally suspect; it is the appellant's
     burden to show that the pretrial identification procedure was
     suspect; a pretrial identification violates the Due Process
     Clause when there are suggestive elements in the
     identification procedure that make it all but inevitable that
     the victim will identify one person as the culprit. 

8.   Constitutional law -- identification may be sufficiently
     reliable under totality of circumstances -- factors considered
     in determining reliability. -- Even when the identification
     process is impermissibly suggestive, the trial court may
     determine that under the totality of the circumstances the
     identification was sufficiently reliable for the matter to be
     submitted to the jury, and then it is for the jury to decide
     the weight the identification testimony should be given; in
     determining reliability, the following factors are considered:
     (1) the prior opportunity of the witness to observe the
     alleged act; (2) the accuracy of the prior description of the
     accused; (3) any identification of another person prior to the
     pretrial identification procedure; (4) the level of certainty
     demonstrated at the confrontation; (5) the failure of the
     witness to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6)
     the lapse of time between the alleged act and the pretrial
     identification procedure. 

9.   Constitutional law -- trial court concluded lineup was not
     suggestive -- no error found. -- Where the trial judge
     concluded that he did not see "much disparity at all" between
     the individuals placed in the lineup and "there's nothing to
     the Court that appears to be suggestive," the appellate court
     could not say that the trial court's ruling was clearly
     erroneous; there was nothing in the lineup that would direct
     a witness toward appellant as the assailant; an accused is not
     entitled to have a lineup in which all the participants are
     identical.

10.  Appeal & error -- no ruling made on motion to suppress in-
     court identification -- matter not subject to review. -- 
     Where, on appeal, appellant submitted that the in-court
     identification was not sufficiently reliable because there was
     no evidence presented as to the witnesses' degree of attention
     or their opportunity to view the assailant during the crime;
     however, appellant did not obtain a ruling on his motion to
     suppress the in-court identification; therefore, the point was
     not preserved on appeal; failure to obtain a ruling on an
     issue at the trial court level, including a constitutional
     issue, precludes review of the issue on appeal.  


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Gibbons Law Firm, P.A., by:  David L. Gibbons, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.
     Appellant Jimmy Don Wooten was convicted of capital murder,
criminal attempt to commit capital murder, and aggravated assault. 
Wooten was sentenced to death by lethal injection on the capital
murder charge, thirty years' imprisonment on the attempt to commit
capital murder charge, and six years' imprisonment on the
aggravated assault charge.  On appeal, he contends that the trial
court erred in (1) overruling his Batson objection during jury
selection, (2) in allowing victim-impact evidence during the
penalty phase of his trial, and (3) in failing to suppress
identification testimony. We find no error and affirm.
     On August 5, 1994, David LaSalle, Henry Teb Porter, and Molly
Porter were hiking on a forest trail near the Long Pool recreation
area in Pope County when they encountered appellant Jimmy Don
Wooten.  Wooten was riding a six-wheel all-terrain vehicle. At
trial,  Henry Porter testified that the group had three encounters
with Wooten before he attacked them and shot David LaSalle. 
LaSalle died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the head. 
Porter also testified that Wooten shot him in the shoulder,
forearm, and face, and that he was able to remove the key from
Wooten's all-terrain vehicle before Wooten chased him into the
woods.   Molly Porter, Henry Porter's daughter, testified that
Wooten shot LaSalle and shot her father and chased after him.
     On the day of the shooting, Wooten reported that an assailant
who looked just like him had stolen his six-wheel vehicle while he
was fishing near Long Pool and had shot at him using the .22
caliber pistol he had in the vehicle.  Wooten claimed that he later
found the vehicle with the gun abandoned by the side of the road
near his truck.  A .22 caliber bullet was recovered from David
LaSalle's body.  It was determined that Wooten's gun fired a spent
.22 caliber cartridge found at the location where LaSalle and
Porter were shot.  In addition, swimming trunks found at Wooten's
home matched Henry and Molly Porter's description of trunks worn by
the assailant.
     In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found Wooten guilty of
capital murder.  During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury
found one aggravating circumstance and concluded that it justified
beyond a reasonable doubt a sentence of death.
                       1.  Jury Selection
     Wooten first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the
state to remove the sole African-American from the jury panel by a
peremptory strike when she was otherwise qualified and unbiased and
not challenged for cause.  In Prowell v. State, 324 Ark. 335, 921 S.W.2d 585 (1996), we recently set forth the standard to be applied
in reviewing an objection based upon Batson v. Kentucky,