Title: NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc., et al. v. Soren Carlsen, Misc. No. 11, September Term, 
2013 
 
FINDER’S FEE ACT – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – OTHER SPECIALTY – 
Court of Appeals held that alleged violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975, 2013 
Repl. Vol.) § 12-805(d) (which is part of Maryland Finder’s Fee Act) is not “other 
specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJP”) § 5-
102(a)(6) (which is twelve-year statute of limitations), and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101 
(which is default three-year statute of limitations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. No. 11 
 
September Term, 2013 
______________________________________ 
 
NVR MORTGAGE FINANCE, INC., ET AL. 
 
v. 
 
SOREN CARLSEN 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Harrell 
Battaglia 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: July 21, 2014 
 
United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland 
Civil No. WDQ-12-1524  
 
Argued: June 4, 2014 
 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“the federal court”) 
certified to this Court the following question of law: “Is [an alleged violation of] the 
Maryland Finder’s Fee Act [(“the FFA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975, 2013 Repl. 
Vol.) (“CL”) §§ 12-801 to 12-809,] a[n] ‘[other] specialty’ . . . under [Md. Code Ann., 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) (“CJP”)] § 5-102(a)(6)[, which is a twelve-year 
statute of limitations]?”  
Because this case involves only CL § 12-805(d), we reformulate the certified 
question of law1 as follows: “Is an alleged violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law (1975, 
2013 Repl. Vol.) § 12-805(d) an ‘other specialty’ under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 5-102(a)(6), which is a twelve-year statute of 
limitations?” 
We answer the reformulated certified question of law “no” and hold that that an 
alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), 
and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the default three-year statute of limitations. 
BACKGROUND 
 
In the certification order, the federal court stated the following facts,2 which we 
summarize. 
 
In 2004, Soren Carlsen (“Carlsen”), Appellee, and NVR, Inc., Appellant, entered 
into a contract under which NVR, Inc. would build a home for Carlsen, who would use 
                                              
1This Court “may reformulate a question of law certified to it.”  CJP § 12-604. 
2Where another court certifies a question of law to this Court, this Court “accept[s] 
the statement of facts” in the certification order.  Lewis v. Waletzky, 422 Md. 647, 651 
n.2, 31 A.3d 123, 125 n.2 (2011) (citations omitted). 
- 2 - 
NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. (“NVR Mortgage”), Appellant,3 to obtain financing for the 
home.  Carlsen applied for a mortgage from NVR Mortgage, but Carlsen and NVR 
Mortgage did not close on the mortgage.  Afterward, Carlsen used NVR Mortgage to 
apply for a mortgage from C&F Mortgage Corporation.  In 2005, Carlsen and C&F 
Mortgage Corporation closed on the mortgage, and Carlsen paid NVR Mortgage a broker 
fee.  
 
More than three but fewer than twelve years later, in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County, Carlsen sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (together, “NVR”), for 
allegedly violating CL § 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Carlsen and 
similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages.4 
NVR removed this case to the federal court, in which NVR moved to certify a question of 
law to this Court.  The federal court granted the motion to certify and stayed proceedings 
in the federal court pending this Court’s response.  
DISCUSSION 
 
NVR contends that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than 
having been created solely by CL § 12-805(d).  Alternatively, NVR argues that the 
                                              
3For purposes of proceedings in this Court, the federal court designated NVR, Inc. 
and NVR Mortgage as “Appellants” and Carlsen as “Appellee.”  
4Specifically, Carlsen alleged that NVR failed to disclose: (1) the finder’s fee in a 
separate written agreement; (2) the terms of the proposed broker agreement before NVR 
undertook to assist him in obtaining a loan; and (3) the amount of the finder’s fee.   
- 3 - 
General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) not to be an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), as the General Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 (which 
is the default three-year statute of limitations) in 1973, and enacted CL § 12-805(d) in 
1979.  Alternatively, NVR asserts that, here, the alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is 
not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because Carlsen does not seek damages 
that are liquidated, fixed, or readily ascertainable by applying clear statutory criteria.  
 
Carlsen responds that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced is created solely by CL § 12-805(d), rather than 
existing as a matter of common law.  Carlsen contends that the General Assembly 
intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6), as, during the General Assembly’s 2012 Regular Session, the House Economic 
Matters Committee gave an unfavorable report to House Bill 674, which would have 
added a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA.  Carlsen argues that, here, the alleged 
violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because he 
seeks damages that are readily ascertainable by applying clear statutory criteria.   
 
Unabridged, CL § 12-805(d) (which is part of the FFA) states: 
(1) A finder’s fee may not be charged unless it is pursuant to a written 
agreement between the mortgage broker and the borrower which is separate 
and distinct from any other document. 
(2) The terms of the proposed agreement shall: 
(i) Be disclosed to the borrower before the mortgage broker 
undertakes to assist the borrower in obtaining a loan or advance of money; 
(ii) Specify the amount of the finder’s fee; and 
(iii) Contain a representation by the mortgage broker that the 
mortgage broker is acting as a mortgage broker and not as a lender in the 
- 4 - 
transaction. 
(3) A copy of the agreement, dated and signed by the mortgage broker and 
the borrower, shall be provided to the borrower within 10 business days 
after the date the loan application is completed. 
 
“Any mortgage broker who violates any provision of [the FFA] shall forfeit to the 
borrower the greater of: (1) Three times the amount of the finder’s fee collected; or (2) 
The sum of $500.”  CL § 12-807 (paragraph breaks omitted).  The FFA does not contain 
a statute of limitations. 
 
CJP § 5-101 provides: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from 
the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of 
time within which an action shall be commenced.”  CJP § 5-102(a) states: “An action on 
one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action 
accrues . . . (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public 
officer’s bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other 
specialty.”  (Paragraph breaks omitted).5 
Whether an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP 
§ 5-102(a)(6) is the basis of the reformulated certified question of law.  CJP § 5-102(a)(6) 
is a “‘relatively narrow catchall[.]’”  AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 
417 Md. 386, 399, 10 A.3d 745, 753 (2010) (quoting Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 
Md. 51, 70, 972 A.2d 864, 875 (2009)).  An alleged violation of a statute is an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) if and only if: 
                                              
5In 2014, the General Assembly amended CJP § 5-102(c).  See 2014 Md. Laws 
Ch. 592.  The amendment to CJP § 5-102(c) does not affect this case. 
- 5 - 
(1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right sought to be enforced is 
created or imposed solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not 
otherwise exist as a matter of common law; (2) the remedy pursued in the 
action is authorized solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not 
otherwise exist under the common law; and (3) if the action is one for civil 
damages or recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages are 
liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory criteria, are readily 
ascertainable. 
 
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d  at 750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 
972 A.2d at 875). 
 
In Crowder, 409 Md. at 55, 70-72, 972 A.2d at 867, 875-76, this Court held that 
certain alleged violations of the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (“the SMLL”), 
CL §§ 12-401 to 12-415, were “other specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).  This Court 
stated: 
(1) the duties, obligations, prohibitions, and rights sought to be enforced by 
the plaintiffs [were] created and imposed solely by the SMLL, (2) the 
remedy pursued—forfeiture of all interest and unlawfully assessed fees, or, 
in the class action cases, forfeiture of three times the amount of interest 
charged—[was] authorized solely by the SMLL, and (3) . . . those amounts 
[were] readily ascertainable. 
 
Id. at 72, 972 A.2d at 876 (footnote omitted). 
 
By contrast, in AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 398, 10 A.3d at 746, 752, this 
Court held that an alleged violation of the Maryland Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(“the MTCPA”), CL §§ 14-3201 to 14-3202, is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA, a plaintiff can 
seek actual damages instead of liquidated damages.  In dicta, this Court observed that 
“the common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversion” “addressed” both the 
duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA and the 
- 6 - 
remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA.  Id. at 400, 10 A.3d 
at 753. 
 
Here, we conclude that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 
12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than 
having been created solely by CL § 12-805(d).  A mortgage broker owes to a borrower a 
common law duty to “disclose . . . all facts or information which may be relevant or 
material in influencing the judgment or action of the [borrower] in the matter.”  St. Paul 
at Chase Corp. v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 215-16, 278 A.2d 12, 24, cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971) (citations omitted).6  Under CL § 12-805(d), a mortgage 
broker must disclose to a borrower in a prescribed manner a finder’s fee’s existence, 
which is information that may be relevant in influencing the borrower’s judgment in the 
matter.  An alleged violation of a statute is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) where, in an action for an alleged violation of the statute, “the duty . . . sought 
to be enforced . . . exist[s] as a matter of common law[,]” rather than having been 
“created . . . solely by the statute[.]”  AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d at 
750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875)); see also AGV Sports Grp., 417 
Md. at 389, 400, 10 A.3d at 746, 753 (This Court held that an alleged violation of the 
MTCPA is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and observed that “the 
                                              
6In St. Paul at Chase, 262 Md. at 215-16, 201, 278 A.2d at 24, 17, although this 
Court stated that “a real estate broker” owes such a duty, this Court applied that duty to 
the defendant, which was “a mortgage broker.” 
- 7 - 
common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversion” “addressed” both the duty 
sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA and the remedy 
pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the MTCPA.).7  Accordingly, an alleged 
violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and thus 
is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the default three-year statute of limitations.8 
 
We reject Carlsen’s contention that an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an 
                                              
7An alleged violation of a statute is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) where, in an action for an alleged violation of the statute, “damages are [not] 
liquidated, fixed, or” “readily ascertainable” “by applying clear statutory criteria[.]”  
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395-96, 10 A.3d at 750 (quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 
972 A.2d at 875). 
Here, it is unclear whether Carlsen seeks readily ascertainable damages.  In the 
complaint, Carlsen alleged that NVR “collected, directly or indirectly, at least 
[]$7,782.48 in illegal and undisclosed fees from [Carlsen], and may have collected 
additional illegal fees.”  In the certification order, the federal court stated that, despite a 
“significant amount of discovery[,]” “Carlsen states that he cannot yet . . . determine the 
amount of finder’s fees he has paid until additional discovery is completed.”  Similarly, 
in his brief, Carlsen stated: “[B]ecause of the state of discovery in this case,” Carlsen 
“had not obtained a definitive answer to what indirect amounts . . . NVR received in 
connection with brokering” his mortgage.  At oral argument, however, Carlsen’s counsel 
conceded that Carlsen “may not be entitled to [indirect] damages.”  Thus, as this case 
illustrates, damages based on a finder’s fee that a broker allegedly indirectly imposed 
may not be readily ascertainable in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d). 
 Moreover, it is unclear whether, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-
805(d), CL § 12-807(1), like similar statutes which provide for treble damages, caps 
damages at “[t]hree times the amount of the finder’s fee collected[.]”  CL § 12-807(1) 
does not state whether treble damages constitute the sole remedy.  This Court has not 
addressed whether treble damages are the sole remedy for a violation of CL § 12-805(d).  
Cf. Stevenson v. Branch Banking & Trust Corp., 159 Md. App. 620, 659, 861 A.2d 735, 
758 (2004) (Writing for the Court of Special Appeals, the Honorable Sally D. Adkins 
explained that “the treble damages provision of [the Maryland Wage Payment and 
Collection Law] caps an employee’s award at three times the unpaid wage.”). 
8Although we acknowledge that CL § 12-805(d)’s purpose is to protect borrowers, 
a court cannot create an “equitable exception” to a statute of limitations.  Anderson v. 
United States, 427 Md. 99, 120, 46 A.3d 426, 438 (2012) (citation omitted). 
- 8 - 
“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, in an action for an alleged violation of 
CL § 12-805(d), the duty sought to be enforced is created solely by CL § 12-805(d), 
rather than existing as a matter of common law.  Carlsen points out that, for example, 
under CL § 12-805(d)(1), a mortgage broker must disclose a finder’s fee’s existence in a 
“written agreement[.]”  CL § 12-805(d) did not create a statutory duty for mortgage 
brokers; instead, CL § 12-805(d) prescribed the manner in which a mortgage broker must 
fulfill the mortgage broker’s common law duty to the borrower to “disclose [certain] facts 
or information which may be relevant or material in influencing the judgment or action of 
the [borrower] in the matter.”  St. Paul at Chase, 262 Md. at 215-16, 278 A.2d at 24 
(citations omitted).  The duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation 
of a statute exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by 
the statute, where the statute prescribes the manner in which a common law duty must be 
fulfilled.  See AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 400, 10 A.3d at 746, 753 (This Court 
held that an alleged violation of the MTCPA is not an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6), and observed that “the common law actions of trespass to chattel and 
conversion” “addressed” both the duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged 
violation of the MTCPA and the remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of 
the MTCPA, which prescribes the manner in which telemarketers must fulfill common 
law duties.).  As NVR points out, if we accepted Carlsen’s contention, then an alleged 
violation of any statute that supplements the common law in any superficial way would 
be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), which would no longer be a “‘relatively 
narrow catchall[.]’”  AGV Sports Grp., id. at 399, 10 A.3d at 753 (quoting Crowder, 409 
- 9 - 
Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875). 
 
We are unpersuaded by Carlsen’s reliance on Crowder, 409 Md. at 68, 972 A.2d at 
874 (“If the statute imposes an obligation, and gives a special remedy therefor, which 
otherwise could not be pursued, but at the same time a remedy for the same matter exists 
at common law independently of the statute, and the statute does not take away the 
common law remedy, the bar of the statute [of limitations] is effectual when the 
common-law duty or liability is pursued, but is not applicable when the special statutory 
remedy is employed.”  (Alteration in original) (citation omitted)) for the contention that 
an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) 
even if, in an action for an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d), the duty sought to be 
enforced exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by CL 
§ 12-805(d).  An alleged violation of a statute is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6) only if the statute creates both “the duty . . . sought to be enforced” in an action 
for an alleged violation of the statute and “the remedy pursued in [an] action” for an 
alleged violation of the statute.  AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 395, 10 A.3d at 750 
(quoting Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875); see also Crowder, 409 Md. at 73, 
972 A.2d at 877 (This Court held that certain alleged violations of the SMLL were “other 
specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) only insofar as the plaintiffs sought the statutory 
remedy of civil penalties instead of the common law remedy of having the loans declared 
void or voidable.). 
 
We are unpersuaded by Carlsen’s reliance on Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
274 F.R.D. 525, 553 (D. Md. 2011), in which the federal court held that an alleged 
- 10 - 
violation of the FFA is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).  Although the 
federal court stated that “[t]he [FFA] meets [the Crowder, 409 Md. at 70, 972 A.2d at 
875] requirements[,]” Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553 (quoting Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 n.4 (D. Md. 2009)), the federal court did not address 
whether, in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA, the duty sought to be enforced 
exists as a matter of common law, rather than having been created solely by the FFA.  In 
Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553, the federal court stated that, in a previously issued 
memorandum opinion, it had “addressed” the defendants’ contention that “the fees 
proscribed and recoverable under the FFA are also recoverable under common law claims 
of unjust enrichment and for restitution[.]”  In Minter, id. at 553, the federal court 
addressed only the remedy pursued in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA, not 
the duty sought to be enforced in an action for an alleged violation of the FFA.  Thus, we 
decline to adopt Minter’s reasoning insofar as it applies to CL § 12-805(d).9 
Carlsen points out that, during the General Assembly’s 2012 Regular Session (i.e., 
after the federal court issued Minter, 274 F.R.D. 525), members of the General Assembly 
sponsored House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451, which would have added a three-year 
statute of limitations to the FFA.  The House Economic Matters Committee gave an 
                                              
9Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 551, 551 n.31, was an action for alleged violations of both 
CL § 12-805(d) and CL § 12-804(e) (“A mortgage broker may not charge a finder’s fee 
in any transaction in which the mortgage broker or an owner, part owner, partner, 
director, officer, or employee of the mortgage broker is the lender or an owner, part 
owner, partner, director, officer, or employee of the lender.”).  As noted above, this case 
involves only CL § 12-805(d).  Thus, we do not address whether an alleged violation of 
any part of the FFA other than CL § 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6). 
- 11 - 
unfavorable report to House Bill 674, which its sponsors withdrew.  Thus, Carlsen 
contends, the General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an 
“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).   
We disagree.  Because a bill might fail “for a myriad of [] reasons[,]” the bill’s 
failure “is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining [the General 
Assembly’s] intent[.]”  City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 
329, 910 A.2d 406, 424 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
principle is especially true here, as the record indicates that House Bill 674 and Senate 
Bill 451 failed primarily because they would have amended the FFA to allow finder’s 
fees for “table funding.”  “A ‘table-funded’ transaction is a closing at which a loan is 
funded by a contemporaneous advance of loan funds and an assignment of the loan to the 
person advancing the funds.”  Petry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 597 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 
(D. Md. 2009) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marshall v. 
James B. Nutter & Co., 816 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. Md. 2011) (A “table-funded” 
transaction is one in which an individual advances funds to a broker, who, in turn, makes 
the loan and then, upon closing, immediately assigns the loan to the individual, the actual 
funding party.). 
House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451 were entitled: “Credit Regulation - Finder’s 
Fees - Table-Funded Loans.”  House Bill 674’s and Senate Bill 451’s purpose paragraphs 
stated: 
FOR the purpose of altering the definitions of “finder’s fee”, “lender”, and 
“mortgage broker” for purposes of certain provisions of law governing 
finder’s fees charged by mortgage brokers to clarify that, in a table-funded 
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mortgage loan transaction, fees charged by the person named as the lender 
in certain documents evidencing the loan indebtedness are not considered 
finder’s fees; establishing a certain statute of limitations; defining a certain 
term; providing for the application of this Act; and generally relating to 
finder’s fees.  
 
Opposition to House Bill 674 was primarily based on amending the FFA to allow 
finder’s fees for table funding, not adding a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA.  
Carlsen directs our attention to seven letters in which stakeholders urged the House 
Economic Matters Committee to give an unfavorable report to House Bill 674.  In all 
seven letters, stakeholders opposed House Bill 674 on the ground that House Bill 674 
would have amended the FFA to allow finder’s fees for table funding.  However, in fewer 
than half of the seven letters did stakeholders also oppose House Bill 674 on the ground 
that House Bill 674 would have added a three-year statute of limitations to the FFA.  In 
most of the seven letters, stakeholders—including the Consumer Protection Division of 
the Office of the Attorney General and a law firm that identified itself as plaintiffs’ 
counsel in Bradley Petry, et al. v. Prosperity Mortgage Co., et al., which, at one point, 
was consolidated into Minter, 274 F.R.D. at 553, in which the federal court held that an 
alleged violation of the FFA is an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6)—did not 
even mention that House Bill 674 would have added a three-year statute of limitations to 
the FFA.  Thus, the failure of House Bill 674 and Senate Bill 451 does not indicate that 
the General Assembly intended an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) to be an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). 
Indeed, there is evidence that the General Assembly intended an alleged violation 
of CL § 12-805(d) not to be an “other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).  The General 
- 13 - 
Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 (which is the default three-year statute of limitations) in 
1973, and enacted CL § 12-805(d) in 1979.  CJP § 5-101’s predecessor—Md. Code Ann., 
Art. 57 § 1 (1957)—listed multiple causes of action with a three-year limitations period. 
By contrast, CJP § 5-101 is “a blanket three-year provision, with exceptions for other 
limitations[.]”  Revisor’s Note, CJP § 5-101; see also Governor’s Commission to Revise 
the Annotated Code, Commission Report No. 3F to the General Assembly of Maryland, 
at 40 (July 16, 1973) (CJP § 5-101 “is a blanket three[-]year limitation covering all civil 
causes of action for which no other limitation is specifically provided.”); Greene Tree 
Home Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453, 461 n.1, 749 A.2d 806, 
810 n.1 (2000) (CJP § 5-101 is “a ‘catch all’ for actions based on statutes that internally 
did not provide a period of limitations.”).  Thus, in enacting statutes after enacting CJP § 
5-101, the General Assembly has been aware that, generally, CJP § 5-101 applies to 
alleged violations of statutes that, like the FFA, do not contain statutes of limitations. 
It is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly intended CJP § 5-101 to 
generally apply to alleged violations of statutes that the General Assembly enacted after 
enacting CJP § 5-101, whereas CJP § 5-102(a)(6) (which is the statute of limitations for 
“other specialt[ies]”) would apply only to alleged violations of statutes that the General 
Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101.  Such an inference would comport 
with this Court’s holdings in this and every other case in which this Court has considered 
CJP § 5-102(a)(6) after the General Assembly enacted CJP § 5-101 in 1973.  Compare 
AGV Sports Grp., 417 Md. at 389, 10 A.3d at 746 (This Court held that an alleged 
violation of the MTCPA—which the General Assembly enacted in 2004—is not an 
- 14 - 
“other specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).) with Crowder, 409 Md. at 55, 70-72, 972 
A.2d at 867, 875-76 (This Court held that certain alleged violations of the SMLL—which 
the General Assembly enacted in 1967—were “other specialt[ies]” under CJP § 5-
102(a)(6).).10 
 
For the above reasons, an alleged violation of CL § 12-805(d) is not an “other 
specialty” under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to CJP § 5-101, which is the 
default three-year statute of limitations.  Accordingly, we answer the reformulated 
certified question of law “no.” 
 
REFORMULATED CERTIFIED QUESTION OF 
LAW ANSWERED.  COSTS TO BE DIVIDED 
EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
                                              
10In Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, 358 Md. at 455, 461 n.1, 749 A.2d at 807, 
810 n.1, this Court held that certain alleged violations of the Maryland Consumer 
Protection Act, CL §§ 13-101 to 13-501—whose private remedy provision the General 
Assembly enacted in 1973 before enacting CJP § 5-101—were not “other specialt[ies]” 
under CJP § 5-102(a)(6).  This Court’s holding in Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, id. 
at 455, 749 A.2d at 807, gives rise to the inference that, although the General Assembly 
intended CJP § 5-102(a)(6) to apply only to alleged violations of statutes that the General 
Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101, the General Assembly did not 
necessarily intend CJP § 5-102(a)(6) to apply to alleged violations of all statutes that the 
General Assembly had enacted before enacting CJP § 5-101.