Title: Commonwealth v. Hicks

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 011728 
June 7, 2002 
 
KEVIN LAMONT HICKS 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The narrow issue that we consider in this appeal is 
whether a redevelopment and housing authority's trespass 
policy is overly broad and thereby violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
I. 
 
Kevin Lamont Hicks was charged with trespass in violation 
of Code § 18.2-119 and three violations of the conditions of 
suspended sentences imposed upon him for prior trespass 
convictions.  He was tried and convicted in the City of 
Richmond General District Court. 
 
Hicks appealed the convictions to the Circuit Court of 
the City of Richmond, and he filed a motion to dismiss the 
charges against him on the basis that a redevelopment and 
housing authority's trespass policy contravened the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States.  The circuit court denied the motion.  At the 
conclusion of a bench trial, Hicks was convicted of trespass 
and sentenced to 12 months in jail, which was suspended.  The 
circuit court also revoked Hicks' prior suspended sentences. 
 
Hicks appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.  A 
panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, Hicks v. 
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 561, 535 S.E.2d 678 (2000), but the 
Court of Appeals en banc disagreed with the panel and vacated 
Hicks' conviction because the redevelopment and housing 
authority's trespass policy contravened the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States.  Hicks v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 49, 52, 548 S.E.2d 
249, 251 (2001).  The Commonwealth appeals. 
II. 
 
The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (Housing 
Authority) is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia.  The Housing Authority owns and operates a housing 
development in the City of Richmond for low income residents 
known as Whitcomb Court.  The City of Richmond owned the 
streets located within Whitcomb Court. 
 
In an effort to eradicate illegal drug activity in 
Whitcomb Court, which was described as an "open-air drug 
market," the Housing Authority sought to deny access to its 
property to persons who did not have legitimate reasons to 
visit the housing development.  The majority of persons who 
 
2
had been arrested for drug crimes at the Whitcomb Court 
housing development were individuals who did not reside there. 
 
The Richmond City Council enacted an ordinance that 
"closed to public use and travel and abandoned as streets of 
the City of Richmond," streets in Whitcomb Court because those 
streets were "no longer needed for the public convenience."  
The City conveyed the streets by a recorded deed to the 
Housing Authority. 
 
The deed required that the Housing Authority "make 
provisions to give the appearance that the closed streets, 
particularly at the entrances, are no longer public streets 
and that they are in fact private streets."  The Housing 
Authority's employees affixed red and white signs to each 
apartment building in Whitcomb Court.  The signs are also 
located "every 100 feet" along the streets in Whitcomb Court 
and are "approximately 18 inches to almost 24 inches by about 
12 inches" in size.  The signs state: 
"NO TRESPASSING 
 
"PRIVATE PROPERTY 
 
"YOU ARE NOW ENTERING 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
STREETS OWNED 
BY RRHA. 
 
"UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS 
WILL BE SUBJECT TO 
ARREST AND PROSECUTION. 
 
 
3
"UNAUTHORIZED 
VEHICLES WILL BE TOWED 
AT OWNERS EXPENSE." 
 
 
The Housing Authority, in its capacity as owner of the 
private streets, authorized 
 
"each and every Richmond Police Department officer 
to serve notice, either orally or in writing, to any 
person who is found on Richmond Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority property when such person is not a 
resident, employee, or such person cannot 
demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose 
for being on the premises.  Such notice shall forbid 
the person from returning to the property.  Finally, 
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
authorizes Richmond Police Department officers to 
arrest any person for trespassing after such person, 
having been duly notified, either stays upon or 
returns to Richmond Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority property." 
 
 
As a part of the Housing Authority's unwritten policies, 
Gloria S. Rogers, the Housing Authority's housing manager for 
Whitcomb Court, was required to determine whether a person can 
demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose to use the 
Housing Authority's property.  Pursuant to these policies, 
individuals who sought access to the Housing Authority's 
property, including the streets, needed to obtain Rogers' 
permission for such access.  Rogers stated that if a person 
desired to disseminate materials or participate in an activity 
on the property, that person must obtain her authorization.  
Sometimes, she referred such request to a "community council" 
which met with "the Board and the residents."  She also 
 
4
testified that if an individual submitted a request to 
distribute flyers and the request was not "routine," she 
referred that request to the Housing Authority's director of 
housing operations for resolution.  The Housing Authority, 
however, has not promulgated any written policies or 
procedures that govern decisions regarding who may distribute 
materials or participate in activities on the Housing 
Authority's property. 
 
Pursuant to the Housing Authority's unwritten policies, 
an individual who is not authorized to use the Housing 
Authority's property and does so is warned by the Richmond 
Police Department.  The Housing Authority forwards a letter to 
that individual informing him that he may not lawfully return 
to the property. 
 
On January 20, 1999, Richmond police officer James J. 
Laino, who was driving a police car on Bethel Street, observed 
Hicks, who was walking on a sidewalk on that street.  Bethel 
Street is one of the streets that the City conveyed to the 
Housing Authority and that street is located entirely within 
Whitcomb Court. 
 
Laino, who had known Hicks for about four years, 
approached him.  Laino knew that Hicks had been notified that 
he was barred from the Housing Authority's property.  Laino 
 
5
informed Hicks that he was "not supposed to be out here," and 
Laino issued a summons to Hicks for trespass. 
 
Rogers had also spoken with Hicks on two prior occasions 
and told him that he could not appear on the Housing 
Authority's property.  Hicks had been arrested on two prior 
occasions for trespass on the Housing Authority's property.  
On April 14, 1998, Hicks signed a letter that was hand 
delivered to him by Rogers.  The letter, which the parties 
describe as a barment notice, states in part: 
 
"This letter serves to inform you that 
effective immediately you are not welcome on 
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's 
Whitcomb Court or any Richmond Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority property.  This letter is an 
official notice informing you that you are not to 
trespass on RRHA property.  If you are seen or 
caught on the premises, you will be subject to 
arrest by the police." 
 
III. 
A. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that Hicks is not entitled to 
challenge the constitutional validity of the Housing 
Authority's practices or policies in the criminal prosecution 
for trespass.  The Commonwealth contends that Hicks instead 
was required to challenge the barment notice he received from 
the Housing Authority or the Housing Authority's policies and 
practices, presumably in a separate proceeding.  We disagree. 
 
6
 
In this case, Hicks has asserted a constitutional 
challenge to a conviction.  Hicks pled in a written pretrial 
motion that the Housing Authority's trespass procedures and 
policy violated the First Amendment.  At trial, Hicks argued 
that the Housing Authority's trespass procedures and policy 
were unconstitutional. 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's assertions, Hicks was not 
required to file a civil proceeding to challenge the Housing 
Authority's trespass policies and practices.  Rather, this 
defendant was entitled to challenge the validity of his 
conviction on the basis that the Housing Authority's practices 
and procedures contravened his constitutional rights.  We 
observe that in other contexts, we have permitted defendants 
to assert constitutional challenges to convictions in criminal 
prosecutions, see, e.g., Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 
333, 344-45, 551 S.E.2d 620, 628 (2001); McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489-90, 545 S.E.2d 541, 544-45 
(2001); Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 460-62, 544 S.E.2d 
299, 304-05 (2001); Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 321-
23, 541 S.E.2d 872, 882-83 (2001); Pitt v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 692, 695-96, 539 S.E.2d 77, 78-79 (2000).  We also note 
that the Supreme Court has permitted criminal defendants to 
assert constitutional challenges to various ordinances in 
 
7
criminal prosecutions.  See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
B. 
 
Hicks argued in the Court of Appeals, and he argues here, 
that the Housing Authority's trespass procedures are overly 
broad and, therefore, violate fundamental constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.  Responding, the 
Commonwealth contends that the Housing Authority's trespass 
policy is not overly broad.  The Commonwealth also asserts 
that a defendant who raises a facial constitutional challenge 
must demonstrate a substantial risk that the application of 
the challenged policy will result in suppression of protected 
speech. 
 
The First Amendment states in part that "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."  The 
Supreme Court has stated that this "freedom is among the 
fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action; and 
municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute 
state action."  Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 
(1958); accord Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 
(1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 
 
8
U.S. 784, 794 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 
368 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that in the context of a First 
Amendment challenge, a litigant may challenge government 
action granting government officials standardless discretion 
even if that government action as applied to the litigant is 
constitutionally permissible.  For example, the Supreme Court 
stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting 
Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999): 
 
"The traditional rule is that 'a person to whom 
a statute may constitutionally be applied may not 
challenge that statute on the ground that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others 
in situations not before the Court.'  New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (citing Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 
 
"Prototypical exceptions to this traditional 
rule are First Amendment challenges to statutes 
based on First Amendment overbreadth.  'At least 
when statutes regulate or proscribe speech . . . the 
transcendent value to all society of 
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to 
justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes 
with no requirement that the person making the 
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite 
narrow specificity." '  Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 
518, 520-521 (1972) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 
380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).  'This is deemed 
necessary because persons whose expression is 
constitutionally protected may well refrain from 
exercising their right for fear of criminal 
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of 
application to protected expression.'  Gooding v. 
Wilson, [405 U.S.] at 520-521.  See also Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)." 
 
 
9
The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the overbreadth 
doctrine is "strong medicine" and this doctrine should be 
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort."  Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 613. 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly 
invalidated government policies that facially vested officials 
with broad and unfettered discretion to regulate speech.  See, 
e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 
(1969) (invalidating ordinance requiring marchers to seek 
permission from mayor); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 
(1951) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting public worship 
without a permit from police commissioner); Saia v. New York, 
334 U.S. 558, 559-61 (1948) (invalidating ordinance that 
required operators of sound trucks to obtain permission from 
police chief). 
 
The Supreme Court stated in City of Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1988): 
"[A] law or policy permitting communication in a 
certain manner for some but not for others raises 
the specter of content and viewpoint censorship.  
This danger is at its zenith when the determination 
of who may speak and who may not is left to the 
unbridled discretion of a government official.  [W]e 
have often and uniformly held that such statutes or 
policies impose censorship on the public or the 
press, and hence are unconstitutional, because 
without standards governing the exercise of 
discretion, a government official may decide who may 
speak and who may not based upon the content of the 
speech or viewpoint of the speaker.  E.g., Cox v. 
 
10
Louisiana, 379 U.S. [536], 557 [(1965)]; Staub, 355 
U.S. at 322.  Therefore, even if the government may 
constitutionally impose content-neutral prohibitions 
on a particular manner of speech, it may not 
condition that speech on obtaining a license or 
permit from a government official in that official's 
boundless discretion.  It bears repeating that '[i]n 
the area of freedom of expression it is well 
established that one has standing to challenge a 
statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad 
licensing discretion to an administrative office, 
whether . . . his conduct could be proscribed by a 
properly drawn statute, and whether . . . he applied 
for a license.'  Freedman [v. Maryland], 380 U.S. 
[51], 56 [(1965)]." 
 
 
In Lakewood, the Supreme Court applied these principles 
and invalidated a city ordinance that permitted a mayor to 
grant or deny a permit to a publisher who desired to place a 
news rack on a sidewalk.  The ordinance placed no limits on 
the mayor's discretion to grant or deny the requested permit.  
The Supreme Court stated that this lack of limitations upon an 
official's discretion "renders the guarantee against 
censorship little more than a high sounding ideal."  486 U.S. 
at 769-70. 
 
In Staub, supra, the Supreme Court invalidated an 
ordinance that permitted a mayor and a city council to grant 
or deny a permit to a labor union allowing it to solicit 
members based upon the "effects upon the general welfare of 
citizens of the City of Baxley."  The Court stated: 
"These criteria are without semblance of definitive 
standards or other controlling guides governing the 
action of the Mayor and Council in granting or 
 
11
withholding a permit.  Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland,  
340 U.S. 268, 271-273 [(1951)].  It is thus plain 
that they act in this respect in their uncontrolled 
discretion. 
 
"It is settled by a long line of recent 
decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, 
like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of 
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees 
contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official 
– as by requiring a permit or license which may be 
granted or withheld in the discretion of such 
official – is an unconstitutional censorship or 
prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those 
freedoms." 
 
355 U.S. at 322.  And, in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 
163-64 (1939), the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance 
that banned "communication of any views or the advocacy of any 
cause from door to door" without a written permit from the 
chief of police.  The Court held that the ordinance was a 
restraint upon First Amendment rights and stated that the 
ordinance "strikes at the very heart of the constitutional 
guarantees."  Id. at 164. 
 
We also observe that in Lovell, supra, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a city ordinance that prohibited the distribution 
of circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any 
kind without first obtaining written permission from the city 
manager of the City of Griffin.  Alma Lovell, who was 
convicted for violation of this criminal ordinance and 
sentenced to imprisonment, asserted that the ordinance was 
facially invalid.  The Court observed: 
 
12
 
"We think that the ordinance is invalid on its 
face.  Whatever the motive which induced its 
adoption, its character is such that it strikes at 
the very foundation of the freedom of the press by 
subjecting it to license and censorship.  The 
struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily 
directed against the power of the licensor.  It was 
against that power that John Milton directed his 
assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed 
Printing.'  And the liberty of the press became 
initially a right to publish 'without a license what 
formerly could be published only with one.'  While 
this freedom from previous restraint upon 
publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the 
guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that 
restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of 
the constitutional provision. . . .  Legislation of 
the type of the ordinance in question would restore 
the system of license and censorship in its baldest 
form." 
 
303 U.S. at 451-52 (footnote omitted). 
 
Applying the principles established by the Supreme Court, 
we hold that the Housing Authority's trespass policy is 
invalid because it is overly broad and it infringes upon First 
Amendment protections.  Even though the Housing Authority's 
trespass policy, which is written in part and unwritten in 
part, is designed to punish activities that are not protected 
by the First Amendment, the policy also prohibits speech and 
conduct that are clearly protected by the First Amendment.  
Also, we note that Hicks is entitled to assert a facial 
constitutional challenge to the Housing Authority's trespass 
policy even though a portion of that policy is unwritten.  To 
hold otherwise would permit the government to violate a 
 
13
citizen's First Amendment protections by simply refusing to 
memorialize unconstitutional policies in a written document.  
We observe that the United States Supreme Court and the 
various United States Courts of Appeals have permitted 
litigants to assert First Amendment facial challenges to 
unwritten government policies.  See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U.S. at 271-73 (unwritten practice of issuance of licenses to 
use a public park for meetings); Wells v. City & County of 
Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1150-51 (10th Cir.); cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 469 (2001) (unwritten policy that banned 
unattended holiday displays); Lebron v. AMTRAK, 69 F.3d 650, 
659, amended by 89 F.3d 39, 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (unwritten 
policy that banned political advertisements); Tipton v. 
University of Hawaii, 15 F.3d 922, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(unwritten policy "as manifested in the University's 
application of its written policy"); Sentinel Communications 
Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1197-99 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(unwritten scheme for regulating the placement of newspaper 
racks). 
 
Rogers, the Housing Authority's housing manager for 
Whitcomb Court, testified that the Housing Authority has not 
implemented written procedures or guidelines concerning the 
enforcement of the trespass policy.  The Housing Authority has 
not implemented any guidelines that delineate how an 
 
14
individual may obtain permission to use the property.  Even 
though "authorized" persons may use the Housing Authority's 
property, Rogers, in the exercise of her unfettered 
discretion, is the government official who determines whether 
an individual is authorized. 
 
Rogers also has unfettered discretion to determine who 
can distribute literature at the Whitcomb Court housing 
development and, pursuant to the Housing Authority's unwritten 
trespass policy, a non-resident of Whitcomb Court can only 
distribute such literature if that non-resident obtains 
authorization from Rogers.  Rogers testified that she will 
permit non-residents to distribute material only if she is 
"used to seeing" the material.  Rogers testified as follows: 
 
"Question:  If an organization wanted to use 
the privatized street or sidewalk in a housing 
community in order to hold some sort of 
demonstration, in order to walk back and forth with 
signs in support of some sort of political position, 
would they be permitted on the property if they were 
nonresidents? 
 
 
"Answer:  They could get permission first.  And 
I would say, again, I need it in writing to see the 
nature or whatever.  They need permission first to 
be on the property. 
 
 
"Question:  Are you in a position – does your 
position enable you to tell people – to give people 
permission to come on and picket or demonstrate on 
housing community property? 
 
 
"Answer:  I'm not sure what you're asking.  To 
picket?  I've had people to call to pass out flyers, 
 
15
and asked to have church services.  And these are 
things I'm used to. 
 
"As far as picketing and stuff, I never had 
that so I'm not familiar with it. 
 
 
"Question:  Let's talk about what you're used 
to. 
 
 
"Answer:  Okay. 
 
 
"Question:  With situations such as those, 
people wanting to pass out flyers for example, or 
hold church related meetings, do they have to come 
to you for permission? 
 
 
"Answer:  Yes. 
 
 
"Question:  Then do you give permission? 
 
 
"Answer:  Depending on the circumstances, 
sometimes it's granted, yes. 
 
 
"Question:  Sometimes you do and sometimes you 
don't? 
 
 
"Answer:  Correct." 
 
 
Based upon the record before this Court, Rogers has the 
unfettered discretion to determine not only who has a right to 
speak on the Housing Authority's property, but she may 
prohibit speech that she finds personally distasteful or 
offensive even though such speech may be protected by the 
First Amendment.  She may even prohibit speech that is 
political or religious in nature.  However, a citizen's First 
Amendment rights cannot be predicated upon the unfettered 
discretion of a government official. 
 
16
 
We recognize that the Court of Appeals decided this case 
on the basis that the Housing Authority's private streets 
constitute a public forum and that the Housing Authority's 
efforts to regulate speech in that forum contravene the First 
Amendment.  In view of our limited holding, we need not 
resolve this issue and, thus, we will vacate that portion of 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will reserve 
consideration of this issue for another day.  Also, we need 
not, and we do not, express any views regarding the litigants' 
remaining contentions. 
IV. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on 
the narrow basis that the Housing Authority's trespass policy 
is overly broad and that Hicks may assert this issue in this 
criminal prosecution.  
Affirmed in part, 
vacated in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
Today, the majority holds that the trespass policy of the 
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (the Authority) 
is “overly broad and . . . infringes upon First Amendment 
protections” because the Authority’s housing manager, 
according to the majority, has “unfettered discretion” to 
 
17
determine whether an individual is authorized to be on the 
Authority’s property.  The majority reaches this issue by 
allowing the defendant to make a facial challenge to the 
Authority’s trespass policy.  I do not believe that such a 
challenge is permissible in this case. 
 
A facial challenge to a statute, or in this case, to the 
trespass policy, can proceed under two different doctrines.  
“First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial 
invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First 
Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law 
are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”  City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 615 (1973)).  Under the second doctrine, even if a 
statute is not overbroad (i.e., it “does not reach a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”), 
“it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish 
standards for the police and public that are sufficient to 
guard against the arbitrary  deprivation of liberty 
interests.”  Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 
(1983)). 
The majority utilizes the overbreadth doctrine to find 
the trespass policy unconstitutional on its face.  Explaining 
the defendant’s standing, the majority states that, “in the 
 
18
context of a First Amendment challenge, a litigant may 
challenge government action granting government officials 
standardless discretion even if that government action as 
applied to the litigant is constitutionally permissible.”  The 
majority intertwines its examination of the standing issue and 
its substantive analysis of the trespass policy, and in doing 
so, uses its view that the trespass policy grants unfettered 
discretion to the housing manager to decide who can come onto 
the Authority’s property to support its conclusion that the 
defendant has standing to make a facial challenge.  In other 
words, the majority does not separate the question of standing 
from its substantive First Amendment ruling. 
To support this finding of unfettered discretion and thus 
standing, the majority relies upon a line of cases involving 
prior restraints upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.  
Each of the cases cited by the majority addressed a statute 
requiring a license or permit to engage in First Amendment 
activity.  See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988) (invalidating 
ordinance requiring publishers to obtain permit from mayor for 
placing newsracks on sidewalk); Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (invalidating ordinance 
requiring marchers to seek permission from city commission); 
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 (1958) 
 
19
(invalidating ordinance requiring labor unions to seek permit 
from mayor and city council for solicitation of members); Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951) (invalidating 
ordinance prohibiting public worship without permit from 
police commissioner); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 
(1948) (invalidating ordinance that required operators of 
loud-speakers and amplifiers to obtain permission from police 
chief); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1939) 
(invalidating ordinance that banned distribution of literature 
without written permit from chief of police); Lovell v. City 
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (invalidating 
ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature without first 
obtaining written permission from city manager). 
Because the Authority’s trespass policy does not directly 
regulate activity protected by the First Amendment, but 
instead limits access to government property, I conclude that 
these cases are not persuasive authority to justify the 
defendant’s facial challenge to the trespass policy.  In using 
these cases, the majority also assumes that the trespass 
policy regulates pure speech instead of conduct.  This 
approach allows a facial challenge in this case without 
directly addressing the admonition of the Supreme Court of the 
United States that “overbreadth scrutiny has been limited with 
 
20
respect to conduct-related regulation.”  New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 766 (1982) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601). 
 
“The traditional rule is that a person to whom a [policy] 
may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that 
[policy] on the ground that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the 
Court.”  Id. at 767 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610).  One 
exception to this principle is in the arena of First Amendment 
overbreadth.  Id. at 768.  However, “[b]ecause of the wide-
reaching effects of striking down a statute[, or trespass 
policy as in this case,] on its face at the request of one 
whose own conduct may be punished despite the First 
Amendment,” the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine has been 
recognized as “strong medicine” and is employed “with 
hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’ ”  Id. at 769 
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).  As explained in 
Broadrick: 
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to [the] 
traditional rules of practice and . . . its function, a 
limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise 
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to 
sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that 
conduct – even if expressive – falls within the scope of 
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate 
state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls 
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. 
 
413 U.S. at 615.  Thus, the Court has held that “where conduct 
and not merely speech is involved, . . . the overbreadth of a 
 
21
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged 
in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770  (quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Authority’s trespass policy is found in the 
“Authorization” given to the Richmond Police Department to 
enforce the trespass laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia upon 
the Authority’s public housing property.  An individual may be 
banned from the Authority’s property if that individual “is 
not a resident, employee, or such person cannot demonstrate a 
legitimate business or social purpose for being on the 
premises.”  After receiving either written or oral notice that 
he or she cannot return to the Authority’s property, that 
person may then be arrested for trespass if he or she “either 
stays upon or returns” to the Authority’s property. 
 
By its terms, this policy is directed at conduct, namely 
trespassing, and not pure speech.  Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 559, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Standing, patrolling, or marching back 
and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct 
can be regulated or prohibited.”); Local 391 v. City of Rocky 
Mount, 672 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (picketing is a 
hybrid of speech and conduct).  The policy is not aimed at 
censoring particular groups or viewpoints, or prohibiting 
individuals from distributing leaflets on the property.  Nor 
 
22
is it intended to prevent individuals from associating with 
friends or family who live in Whitcomb Court.  Instead, it 
seeks to regulate the criminal act of trespassing that 
violates Code § 18.2-119.  In other words, the policy’s 
legitimate sweep prohibits trespassing, an activity that is 
not protected by the First Amendment. 
 
Because the trespass policy regulates conduct and not 
pure speech, I conclude that it must be “substantially 
overbroad” before it can be attacked through a facial 
challenge, and that whatever overbreadth may exist in the 
policy does not meet the threshold of “substantial 
overbreadth.”  “The concept of ‘substantial overbreadth’ is 
not readily reduced to an exact definition[, but] . . . the 
mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible 
applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it 
susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”  Members of City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984).  
Instead, this is “the paradigmatic case of a [policy] whose 
legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible 
applications.”  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.  “[W]hatever 
overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case 
analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, 
assertedly, may not be applied.”  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-
16.  Thus, I find that the defendant does not have standing to 
 
23
assert a facial challenge to the Authority’s trespass policy 
under the “overbreadth doctrine.” 
 
Nor do I believe that the defendant can make a facial 
challenge to the trespass policy under the “vagueness” 
doctrine.  “A [defendant] who engages in some conduct that is 
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law 
as applied to the conduct of others.  A court should therefore 
examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law.”  Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 
(1982); accord Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); but 
see Morales, 527 U.S. at 55.  The defendant’s conduct when he 
was arrested for trespass clearly violated both the trespass 
policy and Code § 18.2-119.  He had been previously banned 
from Whitcomb Court and had been given written notice that he 
was not to trespass on the Authority’s property.  
Nevertheless, he entered upon the property on the day in 
question.  There can be no question that this conduct was 
clearly proscribed. 
 
Thus, I conclude that the defendant may only challenge 
the trespass policy as it was applied to him.  Before turning 
to that issue, I am compelled to point out that, if a facial 
challenge is to be allowed in this case, it should be analyzed 
under the framework established by the Supreme Court for 
 
24
deciding when an individual’s First Amendment rights have been 
violated by a denial of access to government property.  See 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990). 
“[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court has adopted a forum analysis 
as a means of determining when the Government’s interest in 
limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose 
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property 
for other purposes.”  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. 
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).  The first inquiry in this 
analysis is whether the particular activity at issue is speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  Id. at 797.  If it is, the 
nature of the forum must then be identified, “because the 
extent to which the Government may limit access depends on 
whether the forum is public or nonpublic.”  Id.  “[T]he First 
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because 
it is owned or controlled by the government.”  United States 
Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 
114, 129 (1981).  The final inquiry is whether the 
“justifications for exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy 
the requisite standard.”  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.  The 
defendant agrees that this analytical framework applies in 
this case, as reflected by his statement on brief that, “[i]n 
determining whether [the Authority’s trespass policy] is 
 
25
permissible, this Court must first define the areas affected 
by the regulation.” 
 
Returning to the issue regarding the constitutionality of 
the trespass policy as applied to the defendant, I find that 
the only constitutional right that the defendant could have 
been asserting when he entered upon the Authority’s property 
for the purpose of bringing diapers to his son was his right 
of association under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Board of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 
544 (1987) (constitutional protection afforded to freedom of 
association in two distinct areas:  freedom to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate or private relationships, and 
freedom to associate for purpose of engaging in protected 
speech or religious activities).  Although the defendant 
argues that his conviction for trespassing violated his First 
Amendment rights of speech and association, and his Fourteenth 
Amendment right of intimate association, he was not engaged in 
speech or expressive association on the day in question.  
Thus, I conclude that the defendant’s claim must be analyzed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First 
Amendment.  See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 406-07 (6th 
Cir. 2001).  Consequently, it is not necessary to engage in a 
forum analysis, as the Court of Appeals did.  As I previously 
explained, the first step in that analysis is whether the 
 
26
particular activity at issue is speech protected by the First 
Amendment.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797.  When it is not, as in 
this case, then it is not necessary to determine the nature of 
the forum. 
 
In determining whether the Authority’s trespass policy 
impermissibly infringes upon the defendant’s freedom of 
association under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary to 
decide first whether the defendant’s asserted purpose for 
being on the Authority’s property, i.e., to take diapers to 
his child, involved the exercise of a fundamental right.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of privacy 
that includes the freedom to enter into and maintain certain 
intimate relationships.  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (constitutional protection of 
marriage); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 
684-85 (1977) (right to choose whether to bear children); 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) 
(right to cohabitate with certain family members); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (parents’ 
right to send children to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (parents’ right to have children 
instructed in foreign language).  However, the Court has not 
characterized the provision of diapers or visitation with 
family members as the exercise of fundamental rights.  See 
 
27
Thompson, 250 F.3d at 407.  Therefore, the trespass policy as 
applied to the defendant must be judged under the rational 
basis test.  See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) 
(when legislation does not burden a fundamental right, it will 
be upheld “so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end”).  Under that standard of review, the trespass 
policy need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose, and the Court cannot “sit as a 
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations.”  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 319 (1993) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)). 
I conclude that the Authority’s trespass policy passes 
constitutional muster under this test.  The undisputed purpose 
of the policy is to create a safe, drug-free environment for 
the residents of Whitcomb Court.  It cannot be questioned, in 
my view, that the prevention of crime in public housing is a 
legitimate governmental goal.  See Department of Hous. & Urban 
Dev. v. Rucker, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 1232 (2002) 
(recognizing “reign of terror” imposed by criminal activity in 
public housing).  The policy of banning individuals who are 
not residents or employees of the Authority, or who cannot 
demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for coming 
onto the premises, is rationally related to, and advances, the 
 
28
legitimate governmental goal of preventing crime in public 
housing.  Charging individuals with trespass when they enter 
upon the Authority’s property after having been banned, as in 
the case of the defendant, also advances that goal.  It must 
be remembered that the defendant is challenging his conviction 
for trespass in this appeal, not his barment from the 
Authority’s property. 
 
Based on the record in this case and for the stated 
reasons, I conclude that the defendant’s arrest and conviction 
for trespassing did not violate his right of association 
afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the 
defendant’s conviction.*
 
Because I agree with section III(A) of the majority 
opinion, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
                     
* On brief, the defendant asserts a freedom to “loiter” 
based on a statement in a portion of Morales in which three 
justices joined, 527 U.S. at 53.  He did not raise this 
specific argument before the trial court and is, therefore, 
precluded from doing so on appeal.  See Rule 5:25. 
 
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