Title: Vermont v. Russell

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 36













State v. Russell (2009-232)
 
2011 VT 36
 
[Filed 11-Apr-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 36
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2009-232
 
NOVEMBER TERM, 2010
 
State of Vermont 
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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     v.
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District Court of Vermont, 
 
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Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit
 
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Elliot Russell
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DOCKET NO. 1406-12-07
  Bncr
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Defendant appeals his jury conviction for aggravated assault, arguing:
(1) it was error to admit certain correspondence he sent while incarcerated
because its content was irrelevant and prejudicial; (2) the evidence presented
was not sufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty; and (3) the court's
denial of his request for a jury charge on the lesser offense of simple assault
was in error.  We affirm.[1]
¶ 2.            
This case arose from a December 10, 2007 incident at the Redd Rascal Pub
in Bennington where defendant was drinking with a group of companions,
including Henry Dummeyer.  The victim and his friend, Felix Rivera, were
also drinking in the pub.  Defendant and Dummeyer were smoking
outside the pub when Dummeyer's girlfriend, Sonja Glennon, told them that the
victim had made an upsetting comment directed at her.  Glennon testified
that she knew the victim from high school.  The victim and Rivera exited
the bar and were walking away down the street when Dummeyer shouted for the two
to come back.  Rivera and the victim stopped but did not return, so
Dummeyer and defendant began walking toward them.  When Dummeyer and
defendant reached the men Dummeyer began yelling about the victim's behavior toward
his girlfriend.  As they were exchanging angry words back and forth,
defendant and the victim became engaged in a physical altercation. 
¶ 3.            
The two men soon separated, and Rivera saw the victim holding his
stomach and defendant with a knife in his hand.  Rivera described it as
having "a hook blade."  According to Rivera, defendant then came after him
with the knife.  The victim came to Rivera's aid, kicking defendant out of
the way, at which point defendant left the scene.  Then Dummeyer began
physically attacking the victim who tried to fight back while exclaiming "I've
been stabbed."  At some point Dummeyer too left the scene.  Rivera
contacted emergency services while driving the victim to the hospital, and
indicated the victim had started the fight.  At the hospital, doctors
treated the victim for injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen, consistent
with stab wounds. 
¶ 4.            
Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted second-degree murder
under 13 V.S.A. § 2301, one count of aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. §
1024(a)(2), and one count of attempted aggravated
assault, also under § 1024(a)(2).  At the close of evidence defendant
requested the jury be instructed that simple assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a)(2) is a lesser included offense of the aggravated assault
charge, but his request was denied.  
¶ 5.            
Aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2)
requires specific intent to harm.  State v. Blakeney,
137 Vt. 495, 501, 408 A.2d 636, 640 (1979).  To that end, the State
sought to introduce certain letters defendant wrote before the altercation in
which he threatened the victim.  During the summer of 2007, while
incarcerated for an unrelated crime, defendant routinely corresponded with
Allison Pelletier.  In her letters, Pelletier would sometimes complain
about her ex-boyfriend, the victim.  In his replies, defendant told
Pelletier to stay away from the victim.  Defendant also threatened the
victim in several of these letters, stating: "I will fuck [the victim] up,"
"[the victim] will get his ass beat sooner or later," and "[i]n due time, [the
victim] will get his."  Defendant moved to exclude these letters, arguing
that they were irrelevant and prejudicial because both the victim and defendant
claimed not to have recognized each other during the fight.  Over
defendant's objections, the court allowed portions of the letters to be read at
trial.  The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault, and
defendant appealed. 
¶ 6.            
Defendant argues that admitting his letters to Pelletier was error
because their content was irrelevant and prejudicial.  We apply a
deferential standard of review to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and
will reverse its decision "only when there has been an abuse of discretion that
resulted in prejudice."  State v. Desautels, 2006 VT 84, ¶ 12, 180
Vt. 189, 908 A.2d 463.  " Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."  V.R.E. 401. 
"The test of relevancy is thus not whether the evidence makes the proposition
for which it is offered more probable than competing propositions, but rather
whether the evidence has any tendency to establish (or refute) the
proposition."  Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 401 (emphasis added).  
¶ 7.            
The letters were admitted to establish the proposition that defendant
had motive and intent to harm the victim.  The fact that defendant wrote
letters in which he threatened the victim has a "tendency to establish" this
proposition, but defendant argues that the State has failed to prove defendant
knew the victim's identity by sight, and thus the letters are nevertheless
irrelevant.  
¶ 8.            
When determining relevancy, we allow "great latitude" in the admission
of "circumstantial evidentiary facts," and "everything that tends to connect
the supposed evidentiary fact with the factum probandum, is
admissible to prove that fact."  Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 401 (quoting State
v. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 426, 68 A. 652, 654 (1908)).  The State provided
several pieces of circumstantial evidence that support the inference that
defendant knew the victim's identity the night of the incident.  Glennon,
who directed defendant towards the victim the night of the fight, knew the
victim's identity.  Furthermore, Pelletier testified that she believed
defendant and the victim had met, and defendant had told her "he knew who [the]
victim was."  When viewed in light of this circumstantial evidence, it
cannot be said that the letters failed to have any tendency to establish the
proposition that defendant intended to do the victim harm.  We thus find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that the letters were
relevant.
¶ 9.            
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  V.R.E. 403.  However, one disputing an evidentiary
ruling under this section "must overcome a very deferential standard of
review."  State v. Lee, 2005 VT 99, ¶ 11, 178 Vt. 420, 886 A.2d 378.  "Rule 403 rulings are highly
discretionary, even more so when they refuse to exclude evidence because the
rule provides that the danger of unfair prejudice must substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence."  Id. (quotations
omitted).  Thus, "[a]bsent an abuse of discretion, in which the court
either totally withholds or exercises its discretion on clearly untenable or
unreasonable grounds, the trial court's evidentiary ruling stands on
appeal."  Id. (quotation omitted).
¶ 10.         The
letters were the only evidence tending to show defendant intended to harm the
victim before the incident.  They were thus highly probative. 
Defendant claims the letters are prejudicial because they show he had a motive
to harm the victim other than in self-defense or in response to the victim's
comments to Glennon.  However, the pertinent inquiry is whether the
evidence is unfairly prejudicial. "Evidence tending to inculpate the
defendant always carries with it some prejudice.  Rule 403 excludes only
unfairly prejudicial evidence if such prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value.  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose
or effect is to provoke horror or punish the defendant, or to appeal to the
jury's sympathies."  State v. Kelley, 163 Vt.
325, 329, 664 A.2d 708, 711 (1995) (citations omitted).  Here, the
proposition for which the letters were offered was to prove that defendant had
a motive to harm the victim beyond the events of that night.  The fact
that this created the possibility that the jury might infer defendant had an
independent motive to harm the victim does not show the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, merely that it was highly relevant.  We
find the judge struck the appropriate balance when weighing the letters'
potential prejudice with their probative value and thus find no abuse of
discretion.
¶ 11.         Defendant
next contends that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to
prove him guilty of aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2), and thus, defendant should be acquitted.  The
inquiry on review of a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether "the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State and excluding
any modifying evidence, fairly and reasonably tends to convince a reasonable
trier of fact that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 307, 648 A.2d 632, 641 (1994)
(quotations omitted).  "[A] judgment of acquittal is proper only if
the prosecution has failed to put forth any evidence to substantiate a
jury verdict."  State v. Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226, 734 A.2d 524,
527 (1999) (emphasis added).  
¶ 12.         "A
person is guilty of aggravated assault if [he] attempts to cause or purposely
or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon."  13
V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2).  The victim, Rivera, and two
other witnesses all testified to having seen defendant and the victim in a
physical altercation.  Through Rivera's testimony, the State presented
evidence that defendant had attacked the victim with a deadly weapon.
 Rivera saw defendant holding a knife with a "hook blade" immediately
after defendant's altercation with the victim.  The victim himself
testified that defendant was the only one who was close enough to have stabbed
him.  Further, the State presented evidence that while defendant initially
told detectives he did not have a knife, he later
admitted that he did in fact have a "hooked" knife on him during the
fight.  Another witness, Melissa Barker, likewise testified she had seen
defendant with a knife that evening.  
¶ 13.         Viewing
this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find it would fairly
and reasonably convince the trier of fact that defendant was guilty of
aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.  It cannot be said that the
State here "failed to put forth any evidence to substantiate [the] jury
verdict," and thus a judgment of acquittal is not warranted.  Couture,
169 Vt. at 226, 734 A.2d  at 527 (emphasis added).
¶ 14.         In
defendant's final argument, he claims that the court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault was a reversible
error.  "A party appealing a jury charge has the burden of establishing
that the charge was both clearly erroneous and prejudicial."  Knapp v. State, 168 Vt. 590, 591, 729 A.2d 719, 720 (1998)
(mem.).
¶ 15.         At
trial, the judge instructed the jury on aggravated assault, which required the
State to prove that: (1) defendant; (2) purposely or knowingly caused; (3)
bodily injury to the victim; (4) with a deadly weapon.  13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2).  Defendant argues the judge erred in denying his
request for an instruction on simple assault as a lesser included offense
pursuant 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a)(2).  To be found
guilty of simple assault a defendant must have: (1) negligently caused; (2)
bodily injury to the victim; (3) with a deadly weapon.  Id. §
1023(a)(2).  A crime is a lesser included offense
of a crime "if it is composed of some, but not all, elements of the greater
offense and does not have any element not included in the greater
offense."  State v. Forbes, 147 Vt. 612, 616-17,
523 A.2d 1232, 1235 (1987).  All elements of simple assault under §
1023(a)(2) and aggravated assault under § 1024(a) are
identical except for the level of intent required: negligence versus purposely
or knowingly.  The negligence element required for simple assault is
subsumed within the purpose and knowledge requirements of aggravated assault,
see State v. Bolio, 159 Vt. 250, 253-54, 617 A.2d 885, 887 (1992) ("When
the State establishe[s] the higher culpable mental state of specific intent, it
necessarily establishe[s] the lower state of recklessness or negligence."), and
therefore simple assault contains no element not included in aggravated
assault.  Thus defendant is correct that simple assault under 13 V.S.A. §
1023(a)(2) is a lesser included offense of aggravated
assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2).[2]
¶ 16.         We
have held that "[a] defendant is entitled to jury instructions on a lesser
offense than that which is charged if the elements of the lesser offense must
necessarily be included in the greater offense."  Bolio, 159 Vt. at
252, 617 A.2d  at 886.  However, this entitlement
is not absolute.  An instruction of a lesser included offense is proper
only when the evidence reasonably supports such an instruction.  See,
e.g., 13 V.S.A. § 14; State v. Wright, 154 Vt. 512, 518-19, 581 A.2d 720, 724-25 (1989) (upholding denial of manslaughter instruction because facts
supported finding of either felony murder or no homicide at all).
¶ 17.         In
the present case, we are unconvinced that the evidence reasonably supported an
instruction on simple assault.  Defendant drew a knife on an unarmed man
at close range, aimed the weapon at several vital areas, stabbing the victim
above the eye, in the abdomen, and puncturing the lung.  It was not
disputed that the knife was a deadly weapon.  Under these circumstances,
the evidence did not reasonably support an instruction on simple assault, a
crime based in negligence.  The trial court's determination was therefore
proper.
           
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

[1]  Defendant's motion to strike a portion
of the State's brief filed September 29, 2010, is dismissed as moot because we
come to our conclusion without reliance on facts contained solely within the
disputed portion.
[2]  We note that this finding applies only
to the sections discussed here, 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a)(2) and 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(2).  We do not find that
every manner of simple assault is necessarily a lesser included offense of
every manner of aggravated assault; it will depend upon the section(s)
charged.