Title: Hill v. Rice

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

505 So. 2d 382 (1987)
Richard O. HILL, Sr.
v.
W.C. RICE.
86-168.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 27, 1987.
George H. Howell of Howell, Sarto and Howell, Prattville, for appellant.
*383 J. Robert Faulk and Theron O. McDowell, Jr., Prattville, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal involves the question of whether a majority of the lot owners in a residential subdivision could remove the restrictive covenants which had been imposed upon the lots when the subdivision was initially platted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lot owner who was alleged to be in violation of the restrictive covenants, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm.
Appellant Richard O. Hill commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Autauga County, seeking a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction against W. C. Rice prohibiting him from violating restrictive covenants in the Forrest Hills subdivision in Autauga County.
The Forrest Hills Subdivision is located in a rural area in Autauga County outside the city limits of Prattville. It was developed in September 1961 by D. L. Yarbrough and Louise C. Yarbrough. In the course of developing the subdivision, the Yarbroughs imposed certain "protective covenants" on the lots. Three of these protective covenants are pertinent to this appeal, and are as follows:
At the time Hill purchased his undeveloped lots in 1985, there had been substantial violations of the covenants. In fact, Rice, the defendant below, had begun placing crosses on his lots (which is the violation complained of by Hill in this lawsuit) as early as 1979, and he has added to them periodically since that date. After Hill purchased lots one and two, but prior to the filing of this case, a majority of the owners of the lots in the subdivision executed a document which eliminated all protective covenants from the subdivision. This was done purportedly in accordance with the specific procedure set forth in the first protective covenant, which states that after January 1, 1980, a "majority of the then owners of the lots" in the subdivision could discontinue or change the covenants in whole or in part. Owners of ten of the twelve lots voted to eliminate the protective covenants. The document entitled "Elimination of Protective Covenants of Forrest Hills Subdivision" was signed May 9-13, 1985, and was filed of record in the office of the judge of probate of Autauga County on May 14, 1985.
After the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the trial court entered the following order:
Hill contends that covenant number one was effective at the time he bought his lot, because the restrictive covenants were to continue until January 1, 1980, and then to automatically continue for 10 years, unless discontinued or modified by vote of "the majority of the then owners of the lots." (Emphasis added.) Hill claims that because there was no election by a majority of the "then" owners, on or before January 1, 1980, the covenants were effective for an additional 10 years, and that the election of May 14, 1985, was ineffective to remove the restrictions.
The law is that where the language of a restriction is clear and unambiguous, it will be given its plain and manifest meaning. Tubbs v. Brandon, 374 So. 2d 1358 (Ala 1979); Laney v. Early, 292 Ala. 227, 292 So. 2d 103 (1974). It is also well settled that restrictions on the use of land are not favored in the law, and such restrictions are strictly construed in favor of the free use of such property. Springdale Gayfer's Store Co. v. D. H. Holmes Co., 281 Ala. 267, 201 So. 2d 855 (1957); Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala. 453, 186 So. 2d 915 (1966). This Court also stated in Springdale Gayfer's Store Co., supra:
281 Ala. 267, 277, 201 So. 2d 855, 865.
Applying these principles of law to the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that while the construction placed on the language of the covenants by Hill is one which could be reasonably made, we cannot say that the language is so clear and unambiguous that a majority of the lot owners could not remove the covenants as they did in this case. While it is clear that the restrictions were binding upon all parties and persons claiming under them until January 1, 1980, it is not clear that the intent of the covenants was that a majority of the owners could not agree to remove the restrictions after that date. Consequently, we cannot agree with Hill's contention that the restrictive covenants were automatically extended for 10 years after January 1, 1980, because a majority of the "then owners" of the lots had not agreed to eliminate or amend them. There is at least some doubt whether this is the meaning of the covenant. Therefore, we are constrained to apply the principle of law applicable to restrictive covenants that they are not favored in law and are strictly construed in favor of the free use of property; we, therefore, affirm the trial judge's judgment.
We have found no case in Alabama, and we have been cited to none, which holds that a covenant which reads as this one does, requires that the change of the restrictive *385 covenants be made on or before the date they are to expire. We did locate one case in which a majority of the lot owners in a subdivision attempted to remove the restrictions under a provision similar to the one here, but they sought to do it before the covenants were to expire. In White v. Lewis, 253 Ark. 476, 487 S.W.2d 615 (1972), the Court held that covenants restricting the use of land in a subdivision to residential purposes which were to be binding for 25 years after the date of their recordation, after which they could be automatically extended for successive periods of 10 years, unless an instrument signed by a majority of the property owners was filed in which they agreed to change the covenants in whole or in part, were valid and could not be amended prior to the end of the 25-year period by an agreement signed by a majority of the property owners in the subdivision. The restrictive covenants in that case read:
253 Ark., at 477, 487 S.W.2d, at 616.
Even in White v. Lewis there was a dissent by Justice Fogleman, who was of the opinion that a majority of the property owners could have changed or amended the covenants in whole or in part in that case within the 25-year period, or thereafter. The implication of the majority opinion in the Arkansas case is that had the agreement been made after the expiration of the 25-year period, the court would have reached a contrary conclusion.
We cannot agree with Hill's contention that the protective covenants could be eliminated or modified only every ten years. This interpretation of the first covenant would be inconsistent with this Court's policy that restrictions on the use of land are not favored and are strictly construed in favor of the free use of property. See, Springdale Gayfer's Store Co. v. D.H. Holmes Co., supra.
Because we have decided that the election agreement by the owners was effective when filed, and that the protective covenants were effectively eliminated, there is no need for this Court to address Hill's contention that the crosses, signs, and sheds on Rice's land were not part of the one single-family dwelling allowed by the fourth protective covenant.
The judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs in the result.