Title: State v. Lake Circuit Court

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

292 N.E.2d 596 (1973)
STATE of Indiana, On the Relation of Mato Bicanic, Petitioner,
v.
LAKE CIRCUIT COURT et al., Respondents, Attorney General of Indiana, Intervening Respondent.
No. 472S44.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
February 16, 1973.
*597 Saul I. Ruman, Hammond, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Mark Peden, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an original action for a writ of mandate against the Lake Circuit Court, its Judge, and the defendant party in the court below.
The relator (plaintiff below) brought suit against the respondent (defendant below) in Lake Circuit Court for personal injuries. After plaintiff-relator filed his complaint, the defendant-respondent moved for an automatic change of venue from Lake County pursuant to TR. 76, IC 1971, 34-5-1-1. The rule provides as follows:
The circuit court granted the change of venue. The plaintiff-relator then moved to strike the defendant-respondent's motion, which the court subsequently overruled.
Relator has requested this Court to review the constitutionality and fairness of *598 the automatic change of venue provision in TR. 76. Relator contends that the granting of a change of venue without requiring a showing of good cause denies a plaintiff his constitutional right to a trial by jury of his peers and also denies a plaintiff free access to the courts by adding unjustified financial burdens.
Whether a writ of mandate or prohibition should be issued rests largely in the discretion of this Court. State ex rel. Nineteenth Hole, Inc. v. Marion Superior Court (1963), 243 Ind. 604, 189 N.E.2d 421; State ex rel. Sluss v. Appellate Court of Indiana (1938), 214 Ind. 686, 17 N.E.2d 824. However, we do not operate in a vacuum; the extent of our discretion is limited by previous judicial interpretations and by statutory law.
The legislature has prescribed the following guidelines respecting the issuance of extraordinary writs:
We have consistently held that a writ of mandate is an extraordinary remedy not to be employed in lieu of an appeal but rather should only be applied where there is "a clear legal duty to act" and where the lower court fails to perform such a duty. State ex rel. Kleffman v. Bartholomew Circuit Court, Rogers, Special Judge (1964), 245 Ind. 539, 200 N.E.2d 878 (concurring opinion); State ex rel. Hashfield v. Warrick Circuit Ct. (1961), 242 Ind. 318, 178 N.E.2d 734; State ex rel. Rans v. Fulton Circuit Ct. (1960), 240 Ind. 288, 164 N.E.2d 111; State ex rel. Botkin v. Delaware Circuit Ct. (1960), 240 Ind. 261, 162 N.E.2d 611. In the case at bar the trial court was under a duty to act, i.e., to grant a change of venue without any showing of cause, and it so acted. A relator will not be able to avail himself of mandamus in order to compel a lower court to rule contrary to "specific statutory authority". State ex rel. City of Indianapolis, etc. v. Dowling, Judge etc. (1965), 247 Ind. 390, 216 N.E.2d 351; State ex rel. Thompson v. Wheaton (1923), 193 Ind. 30, 138 N.E. 820. The trial court in the instant case, acted in strict accordance with TR. 76. Although a Supreme Court adopted trial rule is not a statute, it has the same binding force as any formally promulgated statute. The Supreme Court has the inherent power to create rules of procedure and that right has been recognized by the Indiana General Assembly. (Acts of 1937, ch. 91, § 1, p. 459). Therefore, to issue a writ of mandate in the case at bar would, in effect, be compelling the trial judge to contravene "specific statutory authority." This Court refuses to be a party to any such judicial fiat.
*599 Our Rules of Procedure for Original Actions  Including Writs of Mandate and Prohibition, enunciate the policy respecting original actions:
In the instant case, a writ of mandate is clearly an improper remedy. Relator seeks to compel the trial court to disregard a properly promulated and duly adopted trial rule because it allegedly over-reaches the boundaries of constitutionality. Such questions must be resolved through the appellate process and not by mandate of this Court.
See also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 64 at 105-107.
For all the foregoing reasons it is ordered that the writ sought in this action be denied.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.