Title: JAMES ALLEN ROESCH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES ALLEN ROESCH v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 141196 P.3d 795Case Number: Nos. S-08-0067, S-08-0068Decided: 12/02/2008NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JAMES 
ALLEN ROESCH,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Michael 
H. Reese, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda 
M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      James Allen 
Roesch claims the State violated his right to speedy sentencing when it failed 
to retrieve him from federal authorities so that it could sentence him within 
one year after he pleaded guilty to state charges.  We conclude the State presented 
sufficient facts and circumstances to excuse the delay and, consequently, 
affirm.      

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Roesch 
presents the following issue on appeal:

 
 
Whether 
the imposition of Defendant's sentences over one year after his guilty verdict 
violated his right to speedy sentencing under Rule 32 W.R.Cr.P. or the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1 § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.   

 
 
The 
State restates the issue as:  

 
 
Did 
impermissible delay occur in Appellant's sentencing, and did the district court 
therefore abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Appellant?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The 
underlying facts of this case are not in dispute.  Mr. Roesch pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, to one count of larceny and one count of aggravated 
burglary.  The charges were brought 
in separate cases in the state district court, but he was arraigned on those 
charges at the same time on February 6, 2006.  Sentencing was scheduled for May 1, 
2006.  In the meantime, Mr. Roesch 
was indicted in federal court on two counts of being a felon in possession of 
firearms.  Before he could be 
sentenced in state court, federal authorities took custody of Mr. Roesch 
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.     

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Roesch 
remained in federal custody until the federal charges were resolved on October 
19, 2007, at which point he was returned to state custody.  The state district court then held a 
hearing on a motion to dismiss sentencing filed by Mr. Roesch in June 2007 and 
denied it.  On December 3, 2007, the 
district court sentenced Mr. Roesch consistent with the plea agreement to serve 
8 to 10 years of imprisonment on the aggravated burglary charge and 4 to 5 years 
on the larceny charge.  The district 
court ordered his sentences to be served concurrent to one another and to his 
federal sentence.  Mr. Roesch 
appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Roesch 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of 
his right to a speedy sentencing.  
The district court has broad discretion in making sentencing 
decisions.  Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, ¶ 12, 44 P.3d 28, 33 (Wyo. 2002).  "This 
Court will not disturb a sentence on the ground of sentencing procedures absent 
a showing by the defendant of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct 
prejudicial to him, circumstances that manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct that offends the public sense of fair play."  Id., (citing Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1216 (Wyo. 
2000)).  Similarly, we have 
specifically stated that we review claims of violations of the right to speedy 
sentencing under the abuse of discretion standard.  Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, ¶ 14, 53 P.3d 551, 557 (Wyo. 2002).    

 
 
[¶6]      W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(1) directs that "[s]entence shall be imposed without unnecessary 
delay."  We recognized the right to 
a speedy sentencing in Yates v. State, 
792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990).  Considering the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure1 and concerns of fundamental 
fairness as dictated by constitutional due process guaranties, we 
stated:

 
 
We 
elect to hold that a delay in sentencing in excess of one calendar year from the 
date guilt is established, either by trial, whether to a jury or to the court, 
or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, is presumptively unreasonable.  A court may not pronounce sentence on a 
defendant after the expiration of such time, unless the record clearly 
establishes those facts and circumstances that excuse the delay, thus making 
later imposition of the sentence reasonable.  The State must bear the burden of 
establishing those facts and circumstances. . . . While we hold that the delay 
in excess of one year is presumptively unreasonable, we do not hold that the 
delay serves to deprive the district court of jurisdiction.  Rather, we hold that the delay exceeds 
the bounds of reason if it occurs beyond that date and, in the interest of 
fairness, due process of law, and expeditious handling of court matters, a court 
should be foreclosed from imposing sentence after the one year period of 
time.

 
 

Id. 
at 
191.2  See also, Daugherty, ¶¶ 33-44, 44 P.3d  at 38-40 
(applying Rule 32(c)(1)).   
   

 
 
[¶7]      We explained the 
rationale behind the rule as follows:

 
 
The 
rule that we espouse protects important rights of the convicted defendant.  It serves to prevent the possibility 
that a greater punishment than is deserved will be imposed because of subsequent 
conduct that results in a violation of the probation.  It also serves to ensure that any 
vagaries of memory will not interfere with the imposition of a sentence 
appropriate to the individual and the crime.  

 
 

Yates, 
792 
P.2d. at 192 (citations 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Roesch 
pleaded guilty to the state charges on February 6, 2006, and he was not 
sentenced until December 3, 2007.  
The delay between his guilty plea and sentencing was obviously more than 
one year; consequently, under Yates, 
the delay was presumptively unreasonable and the State was obligated to show 
facts and circumstances which excused the delay.  

 
 
[¶9]      The State claims 
the delay was reasonable because Mr. Roesch had been taken into custody by 
federal authorities pursuant to the writ.  
The State argues it was unable to regain custody of Mr. Roesch until his 
federal proceedings were completed and he contributed to the delay in those 
proceedings.  Mr. Roesch counters 
that the State retained custody and/or jurisdiction of him and he was simply "on 
loan" to, or "borrowed" by, the federal government.  He argues, therefore, that the State 
should have been able to retrieve him in order to sentence him in a timely 
fashion.  

 
 
[¶10]   A writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is used to bring a person who is a prisoner in another jurisdiction 
before a court for proceedings on pending charges.  See 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 6 (2008).  28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides general 
authority for federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus.  Although writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum are not specifically referenced in the federal statute, it is 
generally recognized that they are allowed under the statutory language which 
provides that prisoners may be brought before another court "to testify or for 
trial."  28 U.S.C. § 
2241(c)(5).  See also, 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 6 (2008).  The scope of the writ and the resulting 
relationship between state and federal authorities is not, however, spelled out 
in the statute.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Roesch claims that Brown v. Perrill, 28 F.3d 1073 
(10th  Cir. 1994) (on 
rehearing), supports his position that the State did not relinquish custody to 
federal authorities.  The Tenth 
Circuit stated that a transfer of a state prisoner to federal authorities 
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is "a matter of comity 
between the state and the federal government designed to accord [the defendant] 
expeditious administration of justice.'"  
Id. at 1074, 
quoting Hernandez v. United States 
Attorney General, 689 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1982).  "Comity" is "the informal and voluntary 
recognition by courts of one jurisdiction of the laws and judicial decisions of 
another."  Merriam-Webster's 
Dictionary of Law (1996).  The Brown court refused to adopt a per se 
rule as to when detention pursuant to a writ becomes custody.  Nevertheless, the court held that, under 
the facts of that case, a 19 month detention by federal authorities amounted to 
federal custody.   Brown, 28 F.3d  at 1075.   

 
 
[¶12]   Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361 
(9th Cir. 1991), also contains an interesting discussion on the issue 
of which jurisdiction has custody of a prisoner under a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum.  The Ninth Circuit 
stated, "[a]s a general rule, the first sovereign to arrest a defendant has 
priority of jurisdiction for trial, sentencing, and incarceration."  Id. 
at 1365.  However, according to Thomas, the language of the writ is one 
factor in determining which jurisdiction technically has custody.  Id. at 1365-66.  

 
 
[¶13]   While we find the distinction 
between custody, detention and/or "loan" of a defendant of some interest, that 
distinction does not strike us as dispositive as to the question of whether the 
State had a valid excuse for failing to retrieve Mr. Roesch in order to sentence 
him in a timely fashion.  Neither Brown nor Thomas addressed the issue in the 
context of speedy sentencing.    

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Roesch suggests that the State 
should have filed its own request for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, 
like it did in Spencer v. State, 2005 
WY 105, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 978, 980-81 (Wyo. 2005).  A careful reading of Spencer, however, reveals that the State 
was not successful in obtaining Spencer's presence for sentencing prior to the 
conclusion of his federal case:

 
 
On 
November 14, 2003, Spencer was scheduled to appear before the district court for 
sentencing.  However, at that time 
he was in the custody of federal authorities and not present for 
sentencing.  Sentencing was then 
rescheduled.  On December 9, 2003, 
Spencer again was to appear for sentencing.  Spencer had been brought to Casper for this 
proceeding, but was inexplicably transported back to Wheatland by federal 
authorities before it was convened.  
At this December 9, 2003 proceeding, it became evident that the district 
court would need to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum and such a 
writ was issued.  Apparently because 
of the difficulty of getting Spencer before the court for sentencing, the 
district court continued sentencing proceedings in this matter until after the 
federal proceedings were concluded.  

 
 

Id.   In 
addition, it is conceivable that, because a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum is a matter of comity between the federal and state authorities, 
the State could have petitioned the federal authorities for Mr. Roesch's return 
for purposes of sentencing.  This 
discussion is, however, theoretical and does not answer the question of whether 
the State had a valid excuse for the sentencing delay.      

[¶15]   The State argues that the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
7-15-101, et. seq. (LexisNexis 2007) 
prevented it from retrieving Mr. Roesch from federal authorities.3  It maintains that, if it had sought 
custody of Mr. Roesch prior to the conclusion of his federal proceedings the 
federal government would have refused its petition because such a transfer would 
have violated the anti-shuttling provisions of the IAD, resulting in dismissal 
of the federal charges.  The State's 
argument is not persuasive.  The IAD 
applies only when a prisoner is confined in one state under a term of 
imprisonment and there are pending charges in another state.  See, e.g., § 7-15-101, Article III(a); 
Article (IV)(a).  At the time the 
federal authorities took Mr. Roesch pursuant to the writ, he had not been 
sentenced on the state charges.  
Consequently, he was not serving a term of imprisonment and the IAD 
provisions did not apply.    

 
 
[¶16]   In order to answer the question of 
whether the delay was unreasonable in this case, we will examine the writ and 
the history of Mr. Roesch's federal detention.  The United States' 
petition for the writ stated:

 
 

1.                  
That 
[Mr. Roesch] is presently incarcerated in the LaramieCountyDetentionCenter, in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on State 
charges.

 
 

2.                  
That 
on March 22, 2006, an Indictment charging a violation of Felon in Possession of 
a Firearm, was filed against [Mr. Roesch] in the District of 
Wyoming.

 
 

3.                  
That 
a Federal detainer has been lodged against [Mr. Roesch] and Federal proceedings 
against [him] have not been commenced . . . except for the filing of the 
Indictment and arrest Warrant on March 22, 2006.

 
 

4.                  
That 
[Mr. Roesch] should be brought from the LaramieCountyDetentionCenter, Cheyenne, Wyoming, to this Court for an initial 
appearance and subsequent legal proceedings on these 
charges.

 
 
WHEREFORE, 
the Assistant United States Attorney prays that a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 
Prosequendum issue . . . .

 
 
The 
resulting order stated, in pertinent part:  

 
 
            
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issue out of the Court directing the 
production of the body of [Mr. Roesch] before this Court on or before May 1, 
2006, for further proceedings in this matter.

 
 
The 
writ, which was entered on April 24, 2006, directed production of Mr. Roesch 
consistent with the order.  Mr. 
Roesch appeared before the federal court for his initial appearance and 
arraignment on May 1, 2006.      

 
 
[¶17]   The State, apparently unaware that 
Mr. Roesch had been taken by the federal authorities, requested a sentencing 
hearing on June 30, 2006.  A 
handwritten note affixed to the request, presumably by someone in the clerk's or 
judge's office, stated that the federal authorities had taken custody of Mr. 
Roesch and he had not yet been returned.  
The sentencing was not scheduled at that time.   

 
 
[¶18]   At a hearing on July 6, 2006, the 
federal judge inquired about the status of Mr. Roesch's state court 
charges:

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
Is this your  is your client here on a writ?

            

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:     Yes, 
Your Honor.  He was being held in 
the LaramieCountyDetentionCenter for some state 
charges.

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
Was he scheduled to go to the penitentiary or was he staying there in 
LaramieCounty?

            

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:     Your Honor, 
at the time he was picked up by the marshals, he was scheduled for sentencing 
the day he was picked up, and he would have been sentenced to the penitentiary 
at that time. 

 
 
THE 
COURT:            
So we need to  we should have given the state court judge the 
opportunity to complete his sentencing?  
Did we frustrate the state judge in his ability to sentence this 
defendant?

 
 
[ASSISTANT 
U.S. ATTORNEY]:    Your Honor, my understanding is 
"no."  We waited until we had 
clearance from the state people before we actually brought the defendant 
over.  We did it with permission. 

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  But he still hasn't been 
sentenced.

 
 
[¶19]   The federal docket sheet shows that 
Mr. Roesch was subsequently ordered to be evaluated as to his mental and 
physical health.  In addition, 
despite having apparently entered into a plea agreement with the 
United 
States, Mr. Roesch  began filing numerous  motions, some pro se.  At a status conference on February 7, 
2007, the federal court judge ordered defense counsel to expedite the evaluation 
process so that a competency determination could be made.  In its minute entry, the federal court 
found "the delay in this case has been attributable to the defense, not 
plaintiff."      

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Roesch filed a pro se motion to dismiss his sentencing 
in state court on June 19, 2007, claiming that justice would not be frustrated 
by a dismissal because his federal sentence was to run concurrent with any 
sentence imposed by the state court and he was unlikely to survive either 
sentence.4  The State did not respond to his motion 
at that time, and the state district court did not rule on it until later.  

 
 
[¶21]   After ruling that Mr. Roesch was 
competent to stand trial, the federal court held a change of plea hearing on 
July 18, 2007, at which Mr. Roesch pleaded guilty to both counts of the 
indictment.  He was sentenced in 
federal court on October 19, 2007.  
The federal court docket sheet indicates that the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Ad Prosequendum was returned executed on April 28, 2006, and October 23, 
2007.    

 
 
[¶22]   Shortly after Mr. Roesch was 
sentenced in federal court, he was returned to state court and proceedings on 
his state charges resumed.  The 
State replied to Mr. Roesch's motion to dismiss sentencing, and the district 
court held a hearing on the motion.  
At the hearing, the prosecutor represented that she had kept up with Mr. 
Roesch's federal court status by e-mailing the Assistant U.S. Attorney.  The district court ultimately denied the 
motion to dismiss, and Mr. Roesch was finally sentenced on December 3, 
2007.    

 
 
[¶23]   We conclude that the State met its 
burden of presenting facts and circumstances to establish a valid excuse for the 
delay in sentencing Mr. Roesch and that reason is clear in the record.  The federal authorities lawfully took 
custody of Mr. Roesch pursuant to the writ.  There is no indication in the record 
that the federal government held him any longer than was allowed under the terms 
of the writ.  According to the 
federal court, the delays in Mr. Roesch's case were attributable to the 
defense.  Obviously, the federal 
court delays also caused a delay in sentencing Mr. Roesch in state court.  When delays in sentencing are caused by 
the defendant, we have held that they are excusable.  Schade, ¶ 15, 53 P.3d  at 558.  Once Mr. Roesch was back in state 
custody, the State acted with dispatch to conclude his sentencing.    

 
 
[¶24]   On a related note, the federal 
court's decision in United States v. 
Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 553-55 (6th Cir. 
2003) is instructive, although it involved a claim of violation of the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. The appellant claimed his right to a 
speedy trial was violated by a delay in bringing him to trial on federal 
charges.  The court concluded that 
the delay was justified because it was caused by the defendant's prosecution in 
state court. 

 
 
The 
first delay in this case was approximately fifteen and one-half months, and it 
spanned from July 28, 1998, when a federal grand jury returned an indictment, to 
November 9, 1999, when Schreane was sentenced in state court. This delay was due 
to the obvious need to allow the defendant to be prosecuted by the State without 
interference by the federal government. "When a defendant violates the laws of 
several different sovereigns, as was the case here, at least one sovereign, and 
perhaps more, will have to wait its turn at the prosecutorial turnstile."  
Grimmond, 137 F.3d  at 828. Customarily-although certainly not always-the 
jurisdiction with custody of the accused, in this case the State of Tennessee, is afforded 
the first opportunity to prosecute the defendant. This longstanding practice is 
rooted in the respect accorded to a custodial sovereign to resolve its criminal 
proceedings before relinquishing custody to another jurisdiction. This practice 
also can be understood in terms of the orderly and efficient prosecution of 
cases in our dual system of criminal justice.

 

Id. 
at 
554-55.  Although Schreane involved the more common 
situation where prosecution in a second jurisdiction must wait until the 
original jurisdiction has finalized its criminal prosecution of a defendant, 
that case properly recognized that a defendant, not the government, should bear 
the burden of the delay when he violates the laws of multiple jurisdictions.5  

 
 
[¶25]   Based on the entire course of 
proceedings here, we conclude that the State has offered sufficient facts and 
circumstances to explain the delay and it was not unreasonable for the district 
court to sentence Mr. Roesch after he was returned by federal authorities.  This case is very different from the 
circumstances where we ruled that the sentences were void because the district 
court violated the defendants' rights to a speedy sentencing.  In Yates, 792 P.2d  at 190-92, the district 
court had attempted to use a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302 (Michie 1987) sentence 
deferral on one of several counts and, accordingly, had delayed the imposition 
of sentence on the deferred count for more than a decade.  Applying the newly adopted rule, this Court concluded that the district 
court's decision to suspend imposition of sentence for more than ten years was 
unreasonable.  Id.  
In Daugherty, ¶ 35, 44 P.3d  at 39, the district court deferred sentencing on one of two counts for an 
undetermined amount of time, without stating its reasons for doing so.  After revoking Daugherty's probation on 
the first count, the district court proceeded to sentence him on the second 
count.  The sentencing took place 
three years after guilt had been established.  Id. 
¶ 41, 44 P.3d  at 40.  We ruled that 
the delay was unreasonable.  
Id. ¶ 44, 44 P.3d  at 40-41.  

 
 
[¶26]   Because the sentences in Yates and Daugherty were imposed after the 
defendants engaged in subsequent bad conduct, this Court was concerned that 
their due process rights had been violated because they were subjected to 
greater punishment than if they had been sentenced in a timely fashion.  As we stated earlier, the purpose of the 
rule requiring timely sentencing is to prevent the possibility that a greater 
punishment than is deserved will be imposed based upon conduct occurring after 
the finding of guilt but prior to sentencing.  The rule requiring speedy sentencing 
also ensures that memory problems will not improperly affect the 
sentencing.  The sentences in this 
case were consistent with the plea agreement.  Thus, there is no concern that Mr. 
Roesch's state sentences were affected by the delay.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by sentencing Mr. Roesch for his state crimes or by denying his 
motion to dismiss sentencing.

 
 
[¶27]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time 
Yates was decided, the applicable 
rule was set out in W.R.Cr.P. 33 and stated, in relevant part, "[s]entence shall 
be imposed without unreasonable delay."  
Yates, 792 P.2d  at 190.  Since then, the rules have been modified 
and W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1) currently governs timely sentencing.  The parties do not argue there is any 
relevant difference between the former and current rules.  

 
 

2Mr. Roesch 
suggests that the constitutional right to a speedy trial set out in the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyoming Constitution Art. 1, § 
10 protects an accused's right to speedy sentencing.  He indicates that perhaps the test set 
out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), should apply to his 
situation.  However, he limits his 
argument and analysis to the principles espoused in Yates and its progeny and does not 
provide a cogent argument as to how the Barker factors should apply here.   In the absence of more detailed 
briefing, we are not persuaded we should modify our test for speedy 
sentencing.  

 
 

3Mr. Roesch 
argued, in the district court, that the IAD applied to his case.  He does not, however, present an 
appellate argument based upon the IAD.  

 
 

4Mr. Roesch 
had apparently been diagnosed with advanced cancer of the thyroid and his 
prognosis was not good.    

 
 

5Obviously, 
as recognized by the federal judge, it is preferable if the second jurisdiction 
(in this case the federal government) waits until the first jurisdiction (the 
state government) has concluded its proceedings before taking custody of the 
defendant.