Title: In re Contested Election of Mallory

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

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426Nev. Advance Opinion f[
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONTESTED No, 57312
ELECTION OF ARTHUR E. MALLORY
FOR THE OFFICE OF DISTRICT

ATTORNEY OF CHURCHILL COUNTY. FILED
JOHN O'CONNOR,
Appellant, aus 09 2012

ARTHUR E. MALLORY, «.
Respondent.

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition to set

aside the election of the Churchill County District Attorney. Tenth

Judicial District Court, Churchill County; Leon Aberasturi, Judge.
Affirmed,

Jones Vargas and Bradley S. Schrager, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Bisenberg, Reno; Thomas L.
Stockard, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Craig B. Mingay, Deputy
District Attorney, Churehill County,

for Respondent.

Neil A. Rombardo, District Attorney, Carson City,

for Amici Curiae Nevada Association of Counties and Nevada District
Attorneys Association,

Jim ©. Shirley, District Attorney, Pershing County,

for Amici Curiae Pershing County; and Celeste Hamilton, Pershing
County Assessor.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

J2-A504)

 

 
OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, J.:

In this appeal, we address the narrow question of whether the
office of district attorney is a state office for the purpose of determining
whether district attorneys are subject to term limits under the “state
office” portion of Article 15, Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution.
Reviewing the Constitution as a whole, our resolution of this inquiry is
controlled by Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution, which plainly
declares district attorneys to be “county officers.” Because Article 4,

 

Section 32 identifies district attorneys as county officers, it follows that
the office of district attorney cannot be considered a “state office” for term-
limits purposes, and thus, district attorneys are not subject to term limits
under the “state office” portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's order denying appellant's petition to set aside
respondent's election to a fourth consecutive term as the Churchill County
District Attorney.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Arthur E. Mallory is Churchill County's district
attorney. Mallory was first elected to this office in 1998 and was elected to
a fourth consecutive four-year term of office in the 2010 general election.
Only voters in Churchill County vote for the office of Churehill County
District Attorney. Appellant John O'Connor is an elector and registered
voter within Churchill County.

Following Mallory’s most recent reelection, O'Connor timely

filed in district court a proper person petition seeking to set aside

 

 
 

Mallory’s victory.! To support his petition, O'Connor cited to two Nevada
election statutes, NRS 293.407(1) and NRS 293.410(2)(b). Under NRS
293.407(1), a registered voter in the proper political subdivision may
challenge the election of “any candidate,” except for the office of United
States Senate or House of Representatives. NRS 293.410(2)(b) provides a
basis upon which a challenge may be brought: “That a person who has
been declared elected to an office was not at the time of election eligible to
that office.” O'Connor further argued in his petition that Mallory was not
eligible to serve a fourth term as district attorney because Article 15
Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution limits district attorneys’ duration
of service to no more than 12 years. Mallory opposed the petition,
contending that the constitutional term-limits provision did not apply to
district attorneys. The district court ultimately entered an order denying
O'Connor's petition to remove Mallory as district attorney. This appeal
followed*
DISCUSSIO!

Standard of review

‘This court reviews questions of constitutional interpretation
de novo. Lawrence v, Clark County, 127 Nev. __, _, 264 P.3d 606, 608,
(2011). When interpreting a constitutional provision, we first look to the

language itself and will give effect to its plain meaning, unless the

10n appeal, this court determined that the appointment of pro bono
counsel to represent O'Connor would assist the court in resolving the
issues presented. Thus, after the district court proceeding, O'Connor was,
appointed pro bono counsel.

#The Nevada Association of Counties, the Nevada District Attorneys
Association, Pershing County, and the Pershing County Assessor were
granted permission to file amici curiae briefs in this matter.

 
 

provision is ambiguous. Secretary of State v, Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 590, 188
P.3d 1112, 1119-20 (2008). A constitutional provision is considered
ambiguous when it is capable of at least two reasonable yet inconsistent
interpretations. Id, at 590, 188 P.3d at 1120, When courts engage in
constitutional interpretation, the document should be reviewed as a whole
in order to ascertain the meaning of any particular provision. Killgrove v.
Morriss, 39 Nev. 224, 226-27, 156 P. 686, 687 (1916).
‘Nevada's Constitution

Under Nevada's Constitution, individuals elected to a “state
office” or a “local governing body” may only serve for 12 years, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise:

No person may be elected to any state office or
local governing body who has served in that office,
or at the expiration of his current term if he is 80
serving will have served, 12 years or more, unless
the permissible number of terms or duration of
service is otherwise specified in this Constitution.

Nev. Const. art. 15, § 8(2). This constitutional provision does not act as a
wholesale implementation of term limits on all nonjudicial elected
governmental officials.® Instead, Article 15, Section 3(2) sets forth two
separate and distinct categories of public officials who are subject to term
limits: those elected to a state office and those elected to a local governing
body.

 

On appeal, O'Connor contends that under Article 15, Section
3(2), Mallory is barred from holding the office of district attorney because

the office of district attorney is a “state office,” and thus, subject to term

3Article 15, Section 3(2)'8 term-limit provision does not apply to
judicial officers. Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 584-85, 188
P.3d 1112, 1115-16 (2008).

 
limits.4 Mallory disagrees, arguing that in Secretary of State v. Burk, 124
Nev. at 591 n.38, 188 P.3d at 1120 n.38, this court held that state offices,
for the purposes of Article 15, Section 3(2), are those defined by NRS
293.109 and that are subject to elections held statewide or within a
subdivision of the state greater than the county. The distriet court
determined that this court's decision in Burk foreclosed the possibility
that a district attorney serves in a “state office,” and thus, rejected
O'Connor's assertion that district attorneys are subject to term limits
under Article 15, Section 3(2). The district court found further support for
this conclusion in the fact that Article 4, Section 32 of the Nevada
Constitution specifically labels district attorneys as “county officers.”
Article 4, Section 32 of the Nevada Constitution addresses the
Legislature's authority to provide for and abolish certain county offices.
More specifically, this section provides, in relevant part, that “[tJhe
Legislature shall have power to increase, diminish, consolidate or abolish
the following county officers: County Clerks, County Recorders, Auditors,
Sheriffs, District Attorneys and Public Administrators.” Nev. Const. art.
4, § 32. The plain language of Article 4, Section 32 clearly declares that
district attorneys are county officers. And because the Nevada
Constitution plainly identifies district attorneys as county officers, it
necessarily follows that the office of district attorney cannot, be considered
a “state office,” and therefore, district attorneys are not subject to term

limits under the “state office” portion of Article 16, Section 3(2).

 

“O'Connor does not challenge Mallory’s service under the “local
governing body” language of Article 15, Section 3(2), and thus, we will not
address that language in this opinion,

gone 5

 

 

 

 
=

Both Mallory and the district court are correct that this court's
decision in Burk sets forth the generally applicable test for determining
whether an elected official is subject to term limits under the “state office”
portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). 124 Nev. at 691 n.38, 188 P.3d at 1120
n.38, Under Burk, a determination of whether an elected office is
considered a “state office” for term-limits purposes turns on whether the
office is included in the list of state officers set forth in NRS 293.1098 or is
subject to election by the electors of the entire state or of a subdivision
larger than a county. Id. (citing Van Arsdell v. Shumway, 798 P.2d 1298,
1301 (Ariz, 1990) (noting that the term state office refers to “any other
office for which the electors of the entire state or subdivision of the state
greater than a county are entitled to vote’). But “the Nevada
Constitution is the organic and fundamental law of this state,” Nevadans
for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 948, 142 P.3d 339, 351 (2006), and it is
well established that when courts interpret constitutional provisions, they
should review the document as a whole to ascertain the meaning of a
particular provision. Killgrove, 39 Nev. at 226-27, 156 P. at 687. Where,
as here, the Nevada Constitution specifically sets forth the nature of a
particular office—in this case declaring, in Article 4, Section 32, that the
office of district attorney is a county office—this court will necessarily look
first to the Constitution to determine whether that office falls under the

 

SNRS 293.109 identifies, for the purposes of Nevada's statutory
scheme for elections, that “state officer” refers to the following positions:
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state
controller, attorney general, supreme court justice, district court judge,
state senator, state assemblyperson, University of Nevada regent, or State
Board of Education member.

 

 
“state office” portion of Article 15, Section 3(2), and thus, resorting to the
Burk analysis becomes unnecessary.
CONCLUSION

Under Article 4, Section 32 of Nevada's Constitution, district
attorneys are county officers, and therefore, the office of district attorney
is not subject the term-limits provision of Article 15, Section 3(2). As a
result, we affirm the district court's denial of O'Connor's challenge to
Mallory’s reelection §

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“Having considered O'Connor's remaining arguments as to why the
office of district attorney should be considered a “state office” for the
purpose of Article 15, Section 3(2), we conclude that they lack merit. In
addition, during our resolution of this appeal, this court directed the
parties to address supplemental issues. In light of the basis upon which
we resolve this appeal, these additional issues need not be reached.