Title: Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. v. Rheaume

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 131 
Docket: 
Ken-15-234 
Argued: 
February 10, 2016 
Decided: 
August 16, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
DRILLING & BLASTING ROCK SPECIALISTS, INC. 
 
v. 
 
PAUL RHEAUME 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Drilling & Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc., (DBRS) appeals from a 
summary judgment entered in favor of Paul Rheaume in the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Mullen, J.) on Rheaume’s statute of limitations defense to 
DBRS’s complaint for intentional and negligent misrepresentation.  Viewing 
the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to DBRS, we 
conclude that the record reflects a factual dispute regarding the 
commencement of the limitations period applicable to the intentional 
misrepresentation claim.  We therefore vacate the summary judgment in part 
and remand for adjudication of this factual issue.  With respect to the 
negligent misrepresentation claim, we discern no dispute of material fact and 
2 
conclude that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in 
Rheaume’s favor.  We accordingly affirm the judgment in part.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are established by the parties’ statements of 
material fact and the evidence referred to therein, are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonprevailing party, and are undisputed unless otherwise 
noted.  See Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466. 
 
[¶3]  Rheaume owned T.W. Dick Company, Inc., (TWD) from 1995 to 
2009.  On March 9, 2006, Rheaume, acting as president of TWD, executed and 
delivered a promissory note and mortgage to Robert McKee in consideration 
for McKee conveying to TWD a parcel of real property located on Brunswick 
Avenue in Gardiner.  McKee’s mortgage on the Brunswick Avenue property 
was recorded in the Kennebec County Registry of Deeds the following day.  
[¶4]  In May 2006, two months after TWD acquired the Brunswick 
Avenue property, Rheaume contacted DBRS’s president, Timothy Purington, 
to ask whether DBRS might be interested in purchasing the Brunswick Avenue 
property from TWD.  In August 2006, TWD conveyed the Brunswick Avenue 
property to DBRS by a warranty deed that did not mention the outstanding 
mortgage to McKee and represented that the property was free of all 
3 
encumbrances.  At the same time, Timothy Purington, acting as president of 
DBRS, executed and delivered a promissory note and mortgage to TWD in 
consideration for the conveyance by TWD. 
[¶5]  Rheaume did not tell anyone associated with DBRS that McKee 
held a first mortgage on the property or that TWD was obligated to make 
payments on the note held by McKee for a period of fifteen years.  TWD was 
represented by counsel in the transaction and paid for a title search of the 
Brunswick Avenue property prior to the closing, but did not disclose the 
results of any title search to DBRS.   
[¶6]  At the closing, DBRS was not represented by counsel, and Timothy 
Purington, as president of DBRS, signed a “Notice of Representation,” agreeing 
that if DBRS had “any legal questions” regarding the sale of the property it 
“should discuss them with independent counsel.”  DBRS relied upon the 
representations contained in the warranty deed with respect to the absence of 
encumbrances on the Brunswick Avenue property.  It would not have gone 
through with the transaction if it had known that McKee held a first mortgage 
on the property. 
4 
[¶7]  According to Rheaume, DBRS contacted him about one week after 
the sale and requested a “bill of sale” from McKee.  DBRS denies this 
statement, and asserts that it did not learn of the McKee mortgage until 2013.   
[¶8]  At some point after DBRS acquired the Brunswick Avenue 
property, TWD defaulted on the promissory note and mortgage held by McKee 
and McKee sought to foreclose on the property now owned by DBRS.  DBRS 
asserts that it has been frustrated in its plan to use the Brunswick Avenue 
property for storage, and has incurred damages as a result of the McKee 
mortgage and foreclosure. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
[¶9]  In October 2013, DBRS filed a complaint against Rheaume and 
TWD, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for negligent and 
intentional misrepresentation regarding the representation of the absence of 
encumbrances on the Brunswick Avenue property.  In August 2014, after a 
hearing on damages, the court entered a judgment against TWD, awarding 
DBRS damages in the amount of $180,925, plus interest and costs.  The 
judgment did not resolve DBRS’s claims against Rheaume. 
 
[¶10]  In October 2014, Rheaume moved for summary judgment, 
contending that DBRS could not establish the elements of its claims and that 
5 
those claims were barred by the six-year limitations period generally 
applicable to civil actions.  See 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2015).  In opposition, DBRS 
argued that its misrepresentation claims were not subject to the general civil 
limitations period prescribed by section 752, but were instead governed by an 
extended limitations period for claims grounded in fraud, which tolls the 
limitations period until “6 years after the person entitled [to such an action] 
discovers that he has just cause of action.”  14 M.R.S. § 859 (2015).  DBRS 
argued that the extended limitations period of section 859 would have 
commenced in 2013—when it first discovered McKee’s mortgage on the 
Brunswick Avenue property—and not at the time of the transaction in 2006, 
because it had relied upon the warranty deed’s free-of-encumbrance clause 
and had no duty to investigate whether the property was encumbered.   
 
[¶11]  Rheaume replied that section 859 was inapplicable to DBRS’s 
negligent misrepresentation claim because that claim was not “grounded in 
fraud.”  Rheaume also argued that, even if the extended limitations period of 
section 859 applied to DBRS’s claims, that period would not have been tolled 
by operation of the statutory discovery rule.  Quoting Kobritz v. Severance, 
2007 ME 3, ¶ 13, 912 A.2d 1237, Rheaume asserted that the “limitations 
[period] begins to run, pursuant to section 859, when the existence of the 
6 
cause of action or fraud . . . should have been discovered by the plaintiff in the 
exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence.”  (Quotation marks omitted.)  
Rheaume further asserted that DBRS would have discovered the McKee 
mortgage if it had searched the registry at the time of the sale, and that DBRS’s 
failure to search the registry rendered its claims untimely as a matter of law. 
 
[¶12]  In April 2015, the court entered a summary judgment in 
Rheaume’s favor, concluding that DBRS’s negligent misrepresentation claim 
was time-barred by the limitations period of section 752, and that its 
intentional misrepresentation claim was time-barred by the limitations period 
of section 859.  DBRS appealed to us.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2015). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶13]  The question presented is whether the trial court erred in 
entering summary judgment based on Rheaume’s statute of limitations 
defense to DBRS’s claims that Rheaume should be held personally liable for 
intentionally 
and 
negligently 
misrepresenting 
that 
there 
were 
no 
encumbrances on the Brunswick Avenue property.  
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
[¶14]  We review the entry of a summary judgment de novo, viewing 
the evidence and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in 
7 
the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the 
summary judgment record supports the conclusion that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 2003 ME 11, ¶ 15, 819 A.2d 
1014.  “We will vacate a summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact or [if] the trial court committed a legal error.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  “We will affirm the judgment if the record reflects that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Francis v. Stinson, 2000 ME 173, ¶ 37, 760 A.2d 209 (quotation 
marks omitted).  “A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome 
of the suit, and a genuine issue of material fact exists when a fact-finder must 
choose between competing versions of the truth, even if one party’s version 
appears more credible or persuasive.”  Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17, 
92 A.3d 1154 (quotation marks omitted).  
[¶15]  When a defendant asserts in a motion for summary judgment the 
affirmative defense of the expiration of a limitations period, the defendant 
bears the burden of assembling a record of undisputed facts demonstrating 
that the plaintiff’s action is time-barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 31, 26 A.3d 806.  To survive a 
8 
limitations defense raised at summary judgment and proceed to adjudication 
of the facts, a plaintiff, either with or without statements of additional 
material fact, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2), bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the summary judgment record generates a factual dispute about the running 
of the limitations period, see Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2006 ME 32, 
¶ 10, 893 A.2d 1011.  “When the plaintiff fails to set forth facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial on a statute of limitations defense, summary 
judgment may be granted on the ground that the applicable statute of 
limitations has run.”  Id. 
[¶16]  Which limitations period applies to a given claim is a matter of 
statutory construction, reviewed de novo.  See Dowling v. Salewski, 2007 ME 
78, ¶ 10, 926 A.2d 193.  Whether a claim is barred by the applicable 
limitations period is a question of law, McKinnon v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
2009 ME 69, ¶ 9, 977 A.2d 420, but whether a plaintiff has exercised sufficient 
diligence to avoid a finding that it “should have discovered” the cause of action 
earlier for purposes of determining when the limitations period on a fraud 
claim commenced is “ordinarily . . . a question of fact,” Kobritz, 2007 ME 3, 
¶ 16, 912 A.2d 1237.    
9 
B. 
The Timeliness of DBRS’s Intentional Misrepresentation Claim 
 
[¶17]  The statute of limitations applicable to actions for fraud and 
fraudulent concealment provides as follows: 
If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals 
the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is 
committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may 
be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person 
entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action, except 
as provided in section 3580.1 
 
14 M.R.S. § 859.  The parties stipulate, and we agree, that section 859 
prescribes the limitations period that applies to DBRS’s intentional 
misrepresentation claim because that claim is a variant of a cause of action for 
fraud,2 which action will lie where a person 
(1) makes a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) with 
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is 
true or false (4) for the purpose of inducing another to act or to 
refrain from acting in reliance on it, and (5) the other person 
justifiably relies on the representation as true and acts upon it to 
the damage of the plaintiff.  
 
Sherbert v. Remmel, 2006 ME 116, ¶ 4 n.3, 908 A.2d 622 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
                                         
1  Title 14 M.R.S. § 3580 (2015) concerns fraudulent transfers and is inapplicable here.  
 
2  See Goody v. Md. Cas. Co., 25 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Idaho 1933) (“A false and fraudulent 
representation, by one who assumed to have personal knowledge, to the purchaser of real estate 
that there is no encumbrance thereon, and upon which representation the purchaser relies, and 
acts to his injury, will sustain an action for the tort . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)).  
10 
 
[¶18]  Even before Maine separated from Massachusetts to assume 
independent statehood, the common law afforded an extended limitations 
period for actions sounding in fraud.  See First Mass. Tpk. Corp. v. Field, 3 Mass. 
(3 Tyng) 201, 207 (1807).  The Maine Legislature first codified an extended 
limitations period for fraud claims in 1841.  See Appeal of Deake, 80 Me. 50, 56, 
12 A. 790 (1888) (discussing R.S. ch. 146, § 18 (1841)).  That early statute 
contained a discovery rule nearly identical to the discovery rule of 
section 859.  Compare R.S. ch. 146, § 18, with 14 M.R.S. § 859.  Pursuant to the 
text of section 859, a six-year time-bar begins to run on a fraud claim when 
the plaintiff “discovers” the claim.  14 M.R.S. § 859.  This discovery rule exists 
to protect a plaintiff from the injustice of a time-bar that begins to run while a 
claim remains undiscoverable.  Kobritz, 2007 ME 3, ¶ 13, 912 A.2d 1237.   
[¶19]  We have long interpreted this discovery rule as a provision that 
prevents the commencement of the limitations period until “the existence of 
the cause of action or fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by 
the plaintiff in the exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence.”  Westman 
v. Armitage, 215 A.2d 919, 922 (Me. 1966) (citing Penobscot R.R. Co. v. Mayo, 
67 Me. 470, 473 (1878); Appeal of Deake, 80 Me. at 56, 12 A. 790).  In this case, 
DBRS asks us to abandon the requirement of due diligence imposed on a 
11 
plaintiff who wishes to reap the benefits of section 859, characterizing the due 
diligence requirement as a “vestige of contributory negligence” that conflicts 
with a plaintiff’s burden of proving the justifiable reliance element of a fraud 
claim in a manner that is both “illogical and inequitable.”  We reject DBRS’s 
assertion that the due diligence burden is either illogical or inequitable, and 
we decline its invitation to overrule our longstanding precedents. 
[¶20]  To establish the justifiable reliance element of a fraud claim, a 
plaintiff need not investigate the truth or falsity of the representation at issue 
unless the plaintiff “knows that the statement is false or the falsity is 
obvious.”3  Francis, 2000 ME 173, ¶ 39, 760 A.2d 209.  A failure to 
investigate—in the absence of knowledge or obvious falsity—is justified “not 
only when an investigation would involve an expenditure of effort and money 
out of proportion to the magnitude of the transaction, but also when it could 
be made without any considerable trouble or expense.”  Letellier v. Small, 
400 A.2d 371, 375 (1979) (quotation marks omitted).  The policy behind the 
justifiable reliance element reflects fundamental principles of tort culpability, 
which assign greater blame to one who intentionally or recklessly makes a 
                                         
3  Although a plaintiff’s contributory negligence was once a bar to recovery in an action for fraud, 
see Crossman v. Bacon & Robinson Co., 119 Me. 105, 109, 109 A. 487 (1920), Maine law has long 
recognized that a plaintiff’s negligence is no defense to a defendant’s fraud, see Letellier v. Small, 
400 A.2d 371, 375 (1979). 
12 
false representation than to one who negligently relies on such a 
representation.  See id.  
[¶21]  Just as the elements of a fraud claim are defined by reference to 
principles of tort law, the contours of the extended statute of limitations 
applicable to a fraud claim reflect a balance between competing limitations 
purposes in the context of an action for fraud.   
[¶22]  To the extent that due diligence requires action by the plaintiff 
that would not be required for the justifiable reliance element of a fraud claim 
(which may not require any action on the plaintiff’s part), any distinction is 
fully justified by the principles of tort and equity at play.  We therefore uphold 
the due diligence doctrine and apply it to the facts of this case below. 
1. 
Summary Judgment on the Issue of Due Diligence 
 
[¶23]  DBRS contends that the evidence compels a conclusion that it 
exercised due diligence sufficient to prevent the commencement of the 
limitations period until the time that it actually discovered the 
misrepresentation in the warranty deed because it was entitled to rely upon 
the deed and had no reason to disbelieve the representations in it.  In the 
alternative, DBRS argues that the summary judgment record establishes a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether it acted reasonably by relying 
13 
on the warranty deed.  Rheaume responds that there is no dispute that the 
limitations period began to run at the time of the transaction in 2006, when 
DBRS failed to exercise due diligence by checking the registry to verify the 
representations in the warranty deed. 
 
[¶24]  “Whether a party has exercised due diligence as required to toll 
the statute of limitations in cases of fraud is ordinarily considered to be a 
question of fact.”  Kobritz, 2007 ME 3, ¶ 16, 912 A.2d 1237.  However, when 
uncontroverted evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference of 
opinion as to whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence and indisputably 
demonstrates that the plaintiff should have discovered the fraud, the issue 
may be resolved at summary judgment as a matter of law.  See Klehr v. A.O. 
Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 235 (8th Cir. 1996); Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 
847 F.2d 1505, 1509-10 (11th Cir. 1988); Kramas v. Sec. Gas & Oil, Inc., 
672 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
[¶25]  In Kobritz, we considered the meaning of “due diligence” in the 
context of a fraudulent conveyance of land when the conveyance had been 
recorded in the registry of deeds.  2007 ME 3, ¶ 14, 912 A.2d 1237.  There, 
recognizing that the issue of due diligence is a factual question, and noting 
14 
that there were disputed issues of material fact, we vacated a summary 
judgment.  Id. ¶ 25. 
[¶26]  The case of Westman, 215 A.2d 919, presents another example of 
the difficulty of deciding the issue of due diligence as a matter of law.  In that 
case a creditor claimed that he had been defrauded by a recorded conveyance 
of the debtor’s assets and the debtor asserted that the creditor’s complaint 
was time-barred.  Id. at 920.  In vacating a summary judgment entered in the 
debtor’s favor, we expressed the view that “recordation of a fraudulent 
conveyance will not alone suffice to give constructive notice of the fraud such 
as will start the running of the statute of limitations.”  Id. at 922.  We indicated 
that a creditor should not be affirmatively tasked with the burden of 
examining public records for a debtor’s fraud unless a circumstance had 
transpired which would place a reasonable creditor on inquiry notice that a 
fraud might have occurred.  Id.   
[¶27]  Many other courts employ the same concept of inquiry notice 
that we used in Westman to define the standard of diligence that is sufficient 
to prevent the commencement of the limitations period on a fraud claim.  See, 
e.g., Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(“The . . . standard of due diligence requires reasonable investigation of the 
15 
possibility of misrepresentation once an individual has been placed on inquiry 
notice of wrongdoing.”); L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
566 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1978) (“One will not be charged with knowledge of 
fraud merely because he has had the opportunity or power to investigate the 
fraud; he must be cognizant of facts that would have caused an ordinary, 
reasonable person to investigate.”).  The First Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated that a plaintiff’s duty of due diligence is triggered by storm warnings of 
the possibility of fraud.  Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123, 128 
(1st Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶28]  This case involves allegations that the seller of real property 
defrauded a purchaser by misrepresenting that the property was free of 
encumbrances.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Kobritz and Westman, the plaintiff here 
could have discovered the misrepresentation in the deed by checking the 
registry once, at the time of the property sale, or at any time thereafter.  
Central recording systems have long provided a simple, well-understood 
method of organizing and maintaining searchable documents to determine 
whether title to property is clear.  The purpose of the registry, however, is to 
protect bona fide purchasers for value from unrecorded property interests, 
not to protect those who engage in fraud or to invalidate the interest of a 
16 
party to a property transaction vis-à-vis the other party to that transaction.  
Letellier, 400 A.2d at 376 n.4; 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 
§ 82.01[3] (Michael Allan Wolf, ed. 2005).  The doctrine of constructive notice 
that applies in the law of real property does not transfer to the field of tort law 
to “shield a defendant from liability for fraudulent misrepresentation,” 
Letellier, 400 A.2d at 376 n.4, or to otherwise start the limitations period 
running on the time for bringing a fraud claim as a matter of law. 
[¶29]  Though searching the registry is arguably the most basic form of 
diligence that could be undertaken by a purchaser in a property transaction, 
when a warranty deed has been given in which the owner warrants against all 
encumbrances, a failure to conduct a title search at the registry will not, as a 
matter of law, constitute a failure to exercise due diligence for purposes of 
preventing the commencement of the limitations period on a fraud claim.  
Whether a plaintiff exercised due diligence depends on the factual 
circumstances of a given case, and remains a question of fact even when the 
fraud at issue involves misrepresentations in a warranty deed to real 
property.  Such a factual issue may be resolved at summary judgment only 
when the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences, viewed in the light most 
17 
favorable to the nonprevailing party, leave no room for a reasonable 
difference of opinion.  
[¶30]  When viewed in the light most favorable to DBRS, the record in 
this case permits conflicting inferences as to whether DBRS should, in the 
exercise of due diligence, have discovered the fraud within six years of its 
occurrence.  The McKee mortgage was recorded in the Kennebec County 
registry before DBRS acquired the property, and DBRS’s transaction with 
TWD was a property transfer from a seller that was represented by counsel to 
a buyer that was not represented by counsel.  Based on these facts, a 
fact-finder could rationally infer that a reasonably prudent property 
purchaser would verify the accuracy of the representations in the seller’s 
warranty deed.  However, the record contains no indication that DBRS was on 
notice of any facts that would necessarily have caused a reasonable purchaser 
to undertake an independent investigation, and therefore a fact-finder could 
infer that DBRS acted reasonably by relying upon the warranty deed.  
Pursuant to its negotiations with TWD, DBRS obtained a warranty that the 
property was free of encumbrances, and thereby obtained an enforceable 
assurance that the property was not encumbered.  The record does not 
establish that DBRS was aware of any facts that would necessarily have 
18 
caused a reasonable purchaser to doubt the accuracy of the representations 
made by Rheaume and set forth in the deed.  
[¶31]  In light of these conflicting inferences, we conclude that the 
record establishes a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether DBRS 
exercised diligence sufficient to prevent the commencement of the limitations 
period of section 859.  The question of whether receipt of a 
free-of-encumbrances representation in a warranty deed is sufficient to 
satisfy the duty of due diligence and prevent the commencement of the 
limitations period on a fraud claim is a factual issue that should be decided by 
a jury.  We therefore vacate the summary judgment on DBRS’s intentional 
misrepresentation claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
C. 
The Timeliness of DBRS’s Negligent Misrepresentation Claim 
 
[¶32]  The second issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
summary judgment record establishes that Rheaume is entitled to judgment 
on his statute of limitations defense to DBRS’s claim for negligent 
misrepresentation.  DBRS argues that the trial court committed an error of 
law in concluding that its negligent misrepresentation claim is time-barred by 
19 
the limitations period of section 752, and does not benefit from the extended 
limitations period of section 859.  We disagree.   
[¶33]  The plain language of section 859 extends only to causes of action 
sounding in fraud or fraudulent concealment.4  14 M.R.S. § 859.  As noted in 
the preceding discussion, fraud is defined in part as a false representation of 
material fact made with knowledge of the representation’s falsity or in 
reckless disregard of the representation’s truth or falsity.  See Barr v. Dyke, 
2012 ME 108, ¶ 16, 49 A.3d 1280.  By contrast, a negligent misrepresentation 
claim does not require proof of intentional or reckless fault and thus does not 
sound in fraud.  See Chapman v. Rideout, 568 A.2d 829, 830 (Me. 1990) 
(explaining that a misrepresentation will be actionable pursuant to a theory of 
negligent misrepresentation if the defendant “fails to exercise reasonable care 
or competence in obtaining or communicating the information”) (quotation 
marks omitted).  For this reason, such a claim does not benefit from the 
extended statute of limitations set forth in section 859. 
                                         
4  In its appellate brief, DBRS concedes that its claims are not based upon allegations of 
fraudulent concealment. 
20 
The entry is: 
Summary 
judgment 
on 
the 
negligent 
misrepresentation claim affirmed.  Summary 
judgment on the intentional misrepresentation 
claim 
vacated. 
 
Remanded 
for 
further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
David M. Lipman, Esq., and Peter B. Bickerman, Esq., 
Lipman, Katz & McKee, P.A., Augusta, for appellant Drilling 
and Blasting Rock Specialists, Inc. 
 
James A. Billings, Esq., and Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., McKee 
Billings, P.A., Augusta, for appellee Paul Rheaume 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Peter B. Bickerman, Esq., for appellant Drilling and Blasting 
Rock Specialists, Inc. 
 
Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., for appellee Paul Rheaume 
 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-276 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY