Title: Eagan v. Calhoun

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

James K. Eagan, Guardian of the Property and Next Friend of Laura M. Calhoun and Kevin
v. Calhoun, Minors v. John C. Calhoun
Parent-child immunity: doctrine does not bar wrongful death action filed by child against
parent based on the murder or voluntary manslaughter by that parent of the child’s other
parent.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 109
September Term, 1996
__________________________________________
JAMES K. EAGAN, GUARDIAN OF THE
PROPERTY AND NEXT FRIEND OF
LAURA M. CALHOUN AND
KEVIN J. CALHOUN, MINORS
v.
JOHN C. CALHOUN
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
Wilner,
   JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
__________________________________________
Filed:    August 26, 1997
This case constitutes another assault on the doctrine of parent-child immunity,
adopted into the Maryland law in Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930)
and, with but limited exceptions, retained consistently since then.  See, most recently, Renko
v. McLean, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (September Term, 1996, No. 77, Opinion filed July
30, 1997).  Here, however, the claimant shall have a measure of success.  We shall hold that
the doctrine does not bar a wrongful death action filed on behalf of an unemancipated minor
child against the child’s parent when the action is based on the murder or voluntary
manslaughter by that parent of the child’s other parent.
I.  BACKGROUND
A.  The Immunity Doctrine And Its Exceptions
We have traced the nature and history of the parent-child immunity doctrine on
several occasions recently and need not do so again, in any significant detail, in this case.
See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650
A.2d 252 (1994), and Renko v. McLean, supra. The doctrine was judicially created as a
precept of common law.  In Frye v. Frye, supra, we stated its basis as being the protection
of family integrity and harmony and of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the
child, and we posited that the doctrine “enhances the public policy in that it subserves the
repose of families and the best interests of society by preserving the peace and harmony of
society and of the families composing society.”  Frye, 305 Md. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831.  In
Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255, we noted three other policy
justifications for the doctrine:  preservation of parental discipline and control, prevention of
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fraud and collusion, and the threat that litigation between parents and children would deplete
family resources.
As we further observed in Warren:
“In the years since Schneider, we have deviated from the basic
doctrine in only three instances.  First, a minor child who has
suffered harm from cruel, inhuman, or outrageous conduct at the
hands of a parent may bring suit for monetary damages.
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).  Second, an
emancipated child may sue his parent in tort for claims arising
after the child reaches the age of majority.  Waltzinger v.
Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957).  Finally, a child
may sue the business partner of his parent for negligence
committed in the operation of the parent’s partnership.
Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947
(1988).”
Id.
That is the current state of the Maryland law.  Subject to those three exceptions, the
doctrine of parent-child immunity continues to exist in this State.  Renko v. McLean, supra.
The exception at issue here is the one recognized in Mahnke v. Moore.
Mahnke v. Moore was an unusual case.  A minor child, by her grandfather, filed suit
against her father’s estate for “personal injuries caused by atrocious acts committed by her
father in her presence.”  197 Md. at 63, 77 A.2d at 923. The child alleged that, in her
presence, her father shot her mother in the head with a shotgun, that he kept the child in the
home with the dead body for six days, and that he then drove the child to his home in New
Jersey where, in her presence, he shot and killed himself with a shotgun, causing his blood
to spatter on her face and clothing.  Those acts, she averred, caused her to suffer shock,
mental anguish, and nervous and physical injuries.  Relying on the doctrine of parent-child
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immunity, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
We reversed.  We noted that, at common law, there was no legal impediment to tort
actions by children against their parents and that the immunity doctrine originated with an
1891 Mississippi case, Hewlett v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), holding that a minor child
could not maintain an action in tort against his parent for wrongful confinement in an insane
asylum.  The Mississippi court cited no authority for that proposition and drew no distinction
in its broad grant of immunity between acts of negligence due to an error in judgment and
wilful, wanton, and malicious acts.  We observed that, despite its shaky foundation, the
broad doctrine was accepted by a number of other States, including Maryland, although New
Hampshire, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 910 (N.H. 1930) put a limit on it, declaring
that “[t]he father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daughter ought not to be heard
to plead his parenthood and the peace of the home as answers to an action seeking
compensation for the wrong.”  That case, we noted, was cited by this Court in Schneider v.
Schneider, supra, 160 Md. at 22, 152 A. at 499.
In Mahnke, we essentially adopted the view of the New Hampshire court that,
although the doctrine was useful within the bounds of a normal parent-child relationship, it
had no rational justification where that foundation did not exist.  We acknowledged that
parental authority needed to be maintained and that a child should forgo a recovery of
damages “if such recovery would unduly impair discipline and destroy the harmony of the
family.”  197 Md. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.  Thus, we confirmed that “[o]rdinarily, the parent
is not liable for damages to the child for a failure to perform a parental duty, or for excessive
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punishment of the child not maliciously inflicted, or for negligent disrepair of the home
provided by the father.”  Id.  Those acts, we said, “grow out of and pertain to the relation of
parent and child.”  Id.  But, we added:
“[W]hen, as in this case, the parent is guilty of acts which show
complete abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving
him immunity from suit by the child, on the ground that
discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot logically be
applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his
parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from
suit.  Justice demands that a minor child shall have a right of
action against a parent for injuries resulting from cruel and
inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs.”
Id.
In that particular case, we held that “there can be no basis for the contention that the
daughter’s suit against her father’s estate would be contrary to public policy, for the simple
reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to be preserved.”
Id.
The question before us is whether the peg represented by this case can fit into that
hole.
B.  Factual And Procedural History
On May 13, 1992, John Calhoun  kicked a ladder on which his wife, Gladys, was
standing as she cleaned a gutter on the roof of their home, causing her to fall to her death.
There was more than ample evidence establishing that John’s conduct was wilful and
deliberate.   After observing Gladys fall to the ground, in an obviously helpless condition,
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John, who had CPR training, did nothing to help her, either directly or by calling for
assistance.  Instead, he let her lie there, unattended, for about ten hours.  He went about other
business, picked up his two children, Laura and Kevin, from school, took them to a softball
game and out to dinner, denied that he knew where their mother was, and kept them away
from the back of the house where he knew her body was lying.  It was not until late that night
that his nephew who had come to the home to help search for Gladys, discovered the body.
John disclaimed any knowledge of how she came to be lying there.   There was evidence that
Gladys did not die instantly from the fall but survived for some period of time; there was also
some evidence, sharply contested by John, that her fatal injury may have come from blows
inflicted with a blunt instrument rather than from the fall itself.
In three interviews with the police, John maintained that he was not at home when
Gladys fell and was unaware that she had fallen.  On June 6, 1992, however, after the police
confronted John with their knowledge that he was having an affair with another woman and
that he wanted a divorce from Gladys but was concerned about the financial implications of
a divorce,  John confessed to having caused his wife’s death, stating that, after a sharp
exchange with her, he “got mad and kicked the right foot of the ladder and the ladder twisted
slightly.”  Following an autopsy, the medical examiner opined that Gladys died of head
injuries sustained in a fall from the ladder and that the manner of death was homicide. 
On the basis of this and other evidence, John was charged with second degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and reckless endangerment.  On March 11, 1993, he entered into
a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and, on June 24,
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1993, he was sentenced to prison for five years.  In anticipation of his incarceration, John
placed  Laura and Kevin in the temporary care of family friends, and, on April 13, 1993, he
approved a consent order by the Circuit Court for Howard County awarding temporary
custody of the children to that couple.
Laura was eleven and Kevin was nine when their mother was killed.  In September,
1993, the court appointed James Eagan as guardian of the children’s property.  On February
10, 1994, Eagan, in his capacity as guardian, filed this action against John, asserting that,
“[a]s a direct result of [John’s] wrongful acts which caused the death of their Mother, [Laura]
and [Kevin] have suffered and will continue to suffer pecuniary loss, mental anguish,
emotional pain and suffering, and the loss of the society, companionship, comfort,
protection, care, training, guidance and love of their Mother” and seeking, for each child, $10
million in damages.
 In an amended answer to the complaint, John averred that the children’s claim was
barred by the doctrine of parent-child immunity.  He contended that the doctrine applied to
wrongful death actions and that such an action could not be brought against a father
predicated on the death of the children’s mother.  In an effort to meet that defense and with
an eye on this Court’s decision in Mahnke v. Moore, Eagan filed an amended complaint
adding the alternative assertions that John’s conduct was (1) intentional, outrageous,
intolerable, without legal justification or excuse, influenced by hatred or spite, and performed
in order to deliberately injure or cause damage to Gladys, or (2) so reckless, wanton or wilful
as to be tantamount to an intentional disregard of Gladys’s rights.
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John pressed his immunity defense through two motions for summary judgment and
through motions for judgment made at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case and at the end
of the entire case.  Those motions were denied upon a finding that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient facts to place the case within the exception to the immunity doctrine set forth in
Mahnke v. Moore.
The court submitted a three-part verdict sheet for the jury to consider.  The first
question asked whether, on the claim that John committed a wrongful act that caused
Gladys’s death, the jury found for Laura and Kevin or for John.  If the verdict on that issue
was for the children, which it was, the jury was instructed to answer the second question.
That asked whether, with respect to the claim that John’s wrongful act was atrocious, showed
a complete abandonment of the parental relation, was intentional, wilful, or malicious, the
jury found for the children or for John.  The jury declined to answer that question, leaving
the space blank.  The third question, which was to be answered only if the jury found for the
children in question one or questions one and two, asked for the jury’s assessment of
damages.  The jury awarded a total of $2,360,000, broken down as follows: (1) economic
damages to Laura:  $70,000; (2) economic damages to Kevin:  $90,000; (3) compensation
to Laura for mental anguish, emotional pain, loss of society, companionship, comfort,
protection, parental care, attention, advice, counsel, training, and guidance:  $1 million; (4)
compensation to Kevin for similar loss:  $1 million; (5) compensation to Laura for education
that she reasonably expected would be paid by Gladys:  $100,000; and (6) similar
compensation to Kevin:  $100,000.
-8-
Concerned about the jury’s failure to respond to the second question, Eagan asked that
it be resubmitted in separate parts.  John, who had objected to the question initially, objected
to its resubmission.  The court agreed with John, ruling that, once the jury found in favor of
the children on question one, they could award damages without answering question two.
John appealed the judgments against him to the Court of Special Appeals, which
reversed  and remanded the case for a new trial.  Calhoun v. Eagan, 111 Md. App. 362, 681
A.2d 609 (1996).  The appellate court considered four issues, all in the context of whether
John was entitled to the protection of parent-child immunity. The court first addressed
Eagan’s claim that the immunity doctrine did not apply to a wrongful death action.  His
argument was that the children’s action derived from the action that Gladys would have had
if she had survived and that, as her action would not have been barred, theirs was not.  The
court rejected that argument, concluding that a wrongful death action under Maryland Code,
§§ 3-902 and 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was a personal one
possessed by the survivors for their own losses.   The impediment emanating from the parent-
child immunity doctrine therefore applied to them. The court then discussed the nature of the
exception to the immunity doctrine laid out in Mahnke v. Moore, focusing on John’s
argument that he never intended by his conduct to abandon the children or his parental
relationship with them.  The court found no merit in that argument either, concluding that
the issue was not whether John subjectively intended to abandon his parental relationship
with Laura and Kevin but whether his conduct was sufficiently egregious to have that effect.
 The last two issues overlapped.  Against John’s argument that the trial court should
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have granted his motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the evidence, the court
held that the evidence was legally sufficient to show that he had deliberately killed Gladys
and that it also, therefore, sufficed “to generate an issue as to the applicability of the Mahnke
exception.”  111 Md. App. at 398, 681 A.2d at 626.  What led to the reversal was the court’s
conclusion that, given the contradictory evidence as to whether John’s conduct was wanton
and malicious, the issue of whether Mahnke applied was for the jury to determine and that
its failure to answer the second question on the verdict sheet required the declaration of a
mistrial.  It is on that point that we part company with the Court of Special Appeals.
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Abrogation Of Doctrine
Eagan first asks that we abrogate entirely the doctrine of parent-child immunity, as
so many other States have done.  As indicated, we just declined that invitation in Renko v.
McLean and shall not renege on that declination here.
B.  Application To Wrongful Death Action
Eagan next presses his argument that the doctrine does not apply because the
children’s action derives from that of their mother, who would not have been barred from
suing her husband had she lived.  That, too, we reject.  A wrongful death action, unlike a
survivor’s action that may be filed by a personal representative, is not derivative in the sense
asserted.  See Stewart v. United Electric Light and Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49
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(1906); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled on
other grounds by Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633, recons. denied,
325 Md. 665, 602 A.2d 1182 (1992).  While certainly based on the death of another person,
it is not brought in a derivative or representative capacity to recover for a loss or injury
suffered by that person but, rather, is brought by a spouse, parent, or child, or a secondary
beneficiary who was wholly dependent on the decedent, to recover damages for his or her
own loss accruing from the decedent’s death.  United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620
A.2d 905 (1993).  
It follows from the fact that the action is a personal one to the claimant that the
claimant is ordinarily subject to any defense that is applicable to him or her, whether or not
it would have been applicable to the decedent.  Thus, the fact that Gladys would not have
been barred by any doctrine of parent-child immunity from suing John does not relieve Laura
and Kevin of that impediment.  See Heyman v. Gordon, 190 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1963) (child’s
wrongful death action against his father for the death of his mother barred by parent-child
immunity), overruled in part by France v. A.P.A. Transport Co., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970)
(abrogating parent-child immunity for motor torts); Durham v. Durham, 85 So. 2d 807 (Miss.
1956) (parent-child immunity prohibited a minor’s wrongful death action against her father
for the death of her mother), overruled in part by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss.
1992) (abolishing parent-child immunity for motor torts); Strong v. Strong, 267 P.2d 240
(Nev.), reh’g denied, 269 P.2d 265 (1954) (common law doctrine of parent-child immunity
barred an action by a child’s guardian ad litem against the child’s mother for the wrongful
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death of the child’s father), overruled in part by Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev.
1974) (abrogating parent-child immunity).  As Maryland continues to recognize the parent-
child immunity doctrine and as Eagan stands in the stead of Laura and Kevin, he labors
under the disability of that doctrine.
C.  The Mahnke Exception
Although, as we have indicated, Mahnke v. Moore presented some most unusual and
egregious conduct, the underpinning of our decision was not limited to those facts.  We have
identified four bases for the immunity doctrine:  the preservation of peace and harmony of
the family, the preservation of parental control and discretion, the prevention of collusion
and fraud, and averting a depletion of family resources that litigation between parents and
children might cause.  When the conduct giving rise to the action is of such a nature to have,
itself, destroyed the family harmony and significantly eroded any realistic prospect of
parental control and discretion, and there is no indication of fraud or collusion or the risk of
depleting resources that otherwise would be devoted to the family unit, there is no longer any
justification for the immunity and therefore no logical or public policy reason to apply it.
Those circumstances do not necessarily arise merely because  culpable conduct causes
the death of a family member, and we therefore, expressly, do not extend the Mahnke v.
Moore exception to every wrongful death case.  Tragic deaths often arise from acts of
negligence or excessive, but non-wilful, behavior on the part of family members —
automobile accidents, carelessness in the home, for example — and, although such tragedies
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may well put a serious strain on some of the family relationships, they do not generally
destroy a parent-child relationship.  A parent who negligently causes the death of his or her
spouse or of a child can still maintain a parent-child relationship; the family, even in its grief,
can survive.  Thus, the mere fact that death is the consequence of the conduct is not a reason
to discard the doctrine.
When the death is occasioned by murder or voluntary manslaughter, however, any
remaining relationships are far more likely to be sufficiently shattered to be beyond further
impairment by a lawsuit.  The blow is not just the death itself, or even the hard fact that it
was caused by the other parent, but rather that the killing was intentional and not the product
of mere carelessness.  Added to the psychological trauma of that are the likely collateral
consequences of such criminal behavior.  The evidence in this case demonstrates the point.
When this suit was filed, there was no longer a family unit; Gladys was dead, John was in
prison, and Laura and Kevin were in the legal and physical custody of another couple.  John
had no ability to exercise any parental discretion or control; because he was in prison,
guardians had been appointed of the persons and the property of the children.  The personal
relationships between John and the children had soured to the point that there was little
contact between them; John wrote to them from prison, but they did not respond.  Certainly,
there was no indication of any fraud of collusion between John and his children, and there
was no evidence that resources that otherwise would have been devoted to the family unit
would be depleted by the lawsuit.  Indeed, John testified that his resources had been depleted
in defending the criminal charge.  In short, the underpinnings of the immunity doctrine no
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longer existed.
John argues that he has not abandoned the parental relation with his children, noting
that he cared for them for a time after Gladys’s death, made arrangements for their care
during his incarceration, and hopes to be reunited with them after his release.  He further
asserts that, because he hopes to be reunited with his children, their suit against him “would
unduly impair discipline and destroy the harmony of the family.”  He maintains that the
policies underlying parent-child immunity will be preserved by its application in this case.
It may be that, at some time in the future, John and his children will reconcile and
reform a family unit.  That is not the point, however.  Although we cited the relevant facts
in this case in support of our more general belief, our view of the matter is that, when a
wrongful death action is predicated on a murder or voluntary manslaughter, the immunity
should not apply as a matter of law.  Application of the doctrine in such a case does not
depend on the particular underlying circumstances, which, in their details, will likely vary
from case to case.  The murder or voluntary manslaughter of a spouse or child by a parent
necessarily constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment, not just of the person killed but of the
other family members as well.  For purposes of the immunity doctrine, even if not for other
purposes, it also constitutes an abandonment of the parental relationship and of the broader
family harmony, and, as a matter of judicial and legal policy, it should not bar a wrongful
death action by the remaining family members otherwise entitled to bring such an action.
This policy is consistent with the “slayer’s rule” that we have adopted in order to
preclude persons guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter from profiting from their
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conduct by claiming inheritances and insurance proceeds otherwise payable only because of
the victim’s death.  That rule, developed in three cases — Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505,
165 A. 470 (1933), Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1959), and Schifanelli v.
Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974) — was summarized in Ford v. Ford, 307 Md.
105, 512 A.2d 389 (1986), essentially as follows:  (1) a person who kills another may not
share in the distribution of the decedent’s estate, either as an heir or as a beneficiary under
a will, and may not, as a beneficiary, collect the proceeds under an insurance policy on the
decedent’s life “when the homicide is felonious and intentional,” and (2) the person may
share in the distribution and may collect life insurance proceeds “when the homicide is
unintentional even though it is the result of such gross negligence as would render the killer
criminally guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”  Id. at 111-12, 512 A.2d at 392.  That is
precisely the standard we hold applicable to the defense of parent-child immunity in a
wrongful death action.  Not only, for the reasons we cited above, does it mesh neatly with
the function of the immunity doctrine, but it conforms as well with the broader public policy
underlying the slayer’s rule — that a person who commits a felonious and intentional killing
should not benefit from that conduct.
 In addition to recounting the substance of the slayer’s rule, Ford v. Ford laid out the
procedure for implementing it.  We noted there that the disposition of a criminal proceeding
“is not conclusive of the character of the homicide or of the criminal agency of the putative
killer in a civil proceeding concerning entitlement to assets of the decedent.”  Id. at 112, 512
A.2d at 392-93.  Rather, the determination of “whether the alleged killer was the criminal
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agent and whether the homicide was intentional and felonious or unintentional is a function
within the ambit of the civil proceeding.”  Id., 512 A.2d at 393.  That view is consistent with
the law generally. A criminal conviction is not conclusive of the facts behind it in a
subsequent civil proceeding, and, indeed, the conviction is ordinarily not even admissible in
the civil action as evidence of the underlying facts.  Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 137,
586 A.2d 15, 17 (1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 450, 463 A.2d 822,
825 (1983); Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 196, 218 A.2d 184, 190 (1966).  
Under this approach, the critical issue, as to liability, to be resolved in this case was
whether John’s conduct causing Gladys’s death was intentional, so as to constitute at least
voluntary manslaughter.  There was no dispute that he caused her death; the only issue was
his mental state.  The question put to the jury, unfortunately, was not merely whether his
conduct was intentional, but whether his acts were “atrocious, show a complete abandonment
of the parental relation, were intentional, were willful and were malicious.”  That asked too
much of the jury, for, if the killing was intentional, the atrociousness of it and its effect as
an abandonment of the parental relation would follow as a matter of law.  As we indicated,
Eagan asked that the court resubmit the question in its constituent parts, which would have
allowed the jury to determine whether the killing was intentional but, over John’s objection,
the court refused that request.
Ordinarily, on disputed evidence, it would be a jury question whether the killing of
Gladys was an intentional act on John’s part, and, because of John’s testimony, we would
be required to direct that the case be remanded for a new trial on that issue.  Here, however,
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we are spared that task.  First, there was evidence that John had entered a plea of guilty to
manslaughter, which constituted a judicial admission that he killed Gladys and that his act
of killing her constituted voluntary manslaughter.  See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
276 Md. 396, 403, 347 A.2d 842, 847 (1975); Briggeman v. Albert, supra, 322 Md. at 135,
586 A.2d at 16.  That admission was not conclusive, of course, and was subject to rebuttal.
More significantly, however, in support of his motion for summary judgment, John placed
into the record, as an exhibit to his affidavit describing his close feelings toward his children
and all that he had done for them following Gladys’s death, a memorandum of law filed by
his attorney in a collateral proceeding dealing with the guardianship of Laura and Kevin.
That memorandum addressed specifically the nature of John’s interest in the erstwhile
marital home, which had been held by him and Gladys as tenants by the entireties, and, in
it, he took the position that, because of the “slayer’s rule,” he held the half interest that
devolved to him by reason of Gladys’s death in trust for his children.  After discussing in
some detail the “slayer’s rule,” including an awareness that, if the killing of Gladys was
intentional, he would be unable to take title to her undivided half interest in the property, he
conceded that he was, indeed, subject to that rule and that, as a result, he could not share in
the distribution of her estate or collect any proceeds of insurance on her life and would hold
her former half interest in the marital property as trustee for his children.  Through counsel,
he concluded the memorandum with the following statement:
“In the case of JOHN C. CALHOUN, the death of GLADYS
ESTHER CALHOUN was homicide, homicide was voluntary
manslaughter, Mr. Calhoun was the criminal agent, he was not
adjudicated insane by the court.  He was convicted of voluntary
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manslaughter and incarcerated.  The elements are prima facie
within the ambit of the slayer’s rule.”
(Emphasis in original.)
Maryland has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel by admission, derived from the
rule laid down by the English Court of Exchequer in Cave v. Mills, 7 H. & W. 927 that  “[a]
man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold, to claim at one time and deny at another.”
See Edes v. Garey, 46 Md. 24, 41 (1877); see also Hall v. McCann, 51 Md. 345, 351 (1879);
Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md. 118, 132 (1895); Stone v. Stone, 230 Md. 248, 253, 186 A.2d
590, 593 (1962); Wilson Brothers v. Cooey, 251 Md. 350, 359, 247 A.2d 395, 400 (1968);
Van Royen v. Lacey, 266 Md. 649, 651-52, 296 A.2d 426, 427-28 (1972).  In Stone v. Stone
and Wilson Brothers v. Cooey, supra, we adopted the statement of that principle set forth in
19 AM. JUR. Estoppel § 50 (1939), now found in 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 68,
at 694-95 (1966):
“Generally speaking, a party will not be permitted to maintain
inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter
which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one
previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was
chargeable with, full knowledge of the facts, and another will be
prejudiced by his action.”
In the memorandum filed by his attorney in connection with the guardianship matter,
John acknowledged that his conduct constituted voluntary manslaughter and was therefore
intentional.  John was obviously aware of that memorandum, as he attached a copy of it to
his own affidavit filed in this case.  Having thus conceded that the killing of Gladys was an
act of voluntary manslaughter, John is estopped from taking any contrary position in this
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case.  At the very least, the force of that estoppel allows the plea of guilty to stand unrebutted
and thus to establish that the killing was a voluntary manslaughter.  Accordingly, the Mahnke
v. Moore exception applies as a matter of law, and, as the circuit court concluded, the failure
of the jury to answer the second question on the verdict sheet is without consequence.  We
shall therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with
directions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
AFFIRM
JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT; COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT