Title: Crump v. PC Food Markets

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 86-354
 
 
Charles Crump, Sr.                           Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal From
     v.                                      Windsor Superior Court
 
 
P & C Food Markets, Inc.                     May Term, 1988
 
 
Alan W. Cheever, J.
 
Plante, Richards, Hanley & Gerety, P.C., White River Junction, for
  plaintiff-appellee
 
Robert S. DiPalma of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for
  defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck and Dooley, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.), and
          Keyser, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
 
 
     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff on grounds of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  We affirm.
     The present action arose after defendant dismissed plaintiff as an
employee in August 1983.  Plaintiff had been employed by defendant for
eighteen years and held the position of head receiver for dry goods at
defendant's Vermont distribution center at the time of his dismissal.
Plaintiff's dismissal followed an incident in which he placed some rejected
merchandise on an outgoing truck, intending to pick it up later for his
personal use.
     One of plaintiff's responsibilities was to reject merchandise delivered
to the facility if it was either damaged or had not been ordered by defend-
ant.  Truckers would at times refuse to take rejected merchandise back onto
their trucks, and would leave it at the distribution center, where it was
either salvaged and placed in inventory, or given to the employees to take
home for their own use.  The incident which triggered plaintiff's dismissal
involved two rejected cases of merchandise, one of breakfast cereal and one
of toaster pastries.  Defendant had no obligation to pay for these rejected
cases. The independent trucker to whom they were returned declined to re-
ceive them back onto her truck and remove them.  Instead, she offered them
to plaintiff, after asking if he had any grandchildren, and he accepted
them.  Plaintiff offered to share them with some fellow employees and then
placed them by his desk to take them home.
     At trial, plaintiff argued that once the merchandise was rejected and
returned to the independent trucker, it became the trucker's property who in
turn could give it to him.  Therefore, plaintiff's later removal of it from
defendant's premises was not theft.  Defendant contended that it did not
allow employees to remove merchandise delivered to its facility in that
manner, or to receive gratuities from customers or distributors, and that
even if defendant never paid for the merchandise, any such removal consti-
tuted theft.
     Defendant's evidence showed, and plaintiff admitted, that he had
failed to follow defendant's prescribed procedures for such rejected
merchandise in two respects.  First, plaintiff did not place the rejected
merchandise in defendant's salvage area for it to be packaged for resale or
distribution among the warehouse employees; second, plaintiff failed to
obtain a gate pass from either of two supervisors, but instead, in their
absence, issued one himself.  Plaintiff did not deny that he violated
company procedures for accepting gifts of unwanted merchandise from
independent truckers.  But the basis of plaintiff's defamation claim was
that defendant wrongly characterized him as a thief.  Plaintiff argued that
because the trucker gave the rejected merchandise to the plaintiff, his
acceptance and removal of it without following the prescribed company
procedures could not have constituted theft.
     Plaintiff's evidence showed that he was called a thief at a meeting
held at the distribution center a few days after the incident, and that in
two written reports prepared subsequent to that meeting, he was character-
ized as a problem employee and his actions were referred to as employee
theft.  Three representatives of defendant participated in that meeting: the
director of transportation and warehousing; a loss prevention specialist;
and the director of loss prevention and safety from defendant's Syracuse
office.  Written reports submitted as exhibits at trial were prepared about
a month and a half after the meeting by the loss prevention specialist who
had attended the meeting, and by another loss prevention specialist who had
originated the investigation and then had gone on vacation.  These reports
were distributed by their authors to the two directors who had attended the
meeting and to three other representatives of defendant: the vice-president
who was the general manager of defendant's New England Division, defendant's
director of employee relations, and the director of store operations in
defendant's New England division.  There was disputed evidence that a report
was also made orally to the security manager for the trucking firm whose
driver had taken the merchandise out of defendant's facility, and that the
incident was discussed with the driver and another employee of that trucking
firm.  Plaintiff also presented evidence on the effect of the incident on
his social life, his health, his personal and family life, and his reputa-
tion in the community.
     The basis for plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was the nature of the meeting and the manner in which he was fired:
that the meeting was called without prior notice to him; that it went on for
three hours without an opportunity for him to have lunch at his normal time;
that he was badgered by repeated requests to sign a statement, and to add
material to the statement he had already signed; that he feared that his
failure to sign a statement would adversely affect the driver of the out-
going truck; that directly after this meeting he was told to "clean out his
desk"; and that he was fired summarily after eighteen years of service.
     Plaintiff brought the present action seeking damages for defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful employment practices
and breach of contract.  As plaintiff is black and was 57 at the time of his
dismissal, his count for unlawful employment practices included claims of
discrimination on the basis of age and race, as well as termination without
cause.  Before trial, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of termination without cause and denied the motion
with respect to intentional infliction of emotional distress and employment
discrimination on the basis of age and race.  The trial court partially
granted defendant's summary judgment motion as to the defamation count,
ruling that the testimony given by defendant's employees at plaintiff's
unemployment compensation hearing was absolutely privileged.
     At trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's case, but did not renew the motion until after the charge to the
jury, just before the jury left to deliberate.  The motion was denied at
both times.  The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and awarded him
$19,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive damages for each claim.
Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alter-
native, for a new trial. The court denied defendant's motions and the
present appeal followed.
                                 I. Waiver
     Plaintiff argues that defendant should be precluded from raising any of
its points on appeal because defendant failed to renew its motion for dir-
ected verdict at the close of all the evidence, which is a prerequisite for
making a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  See Lemnah v.
American Breeders Service, Inc., 144 Vt. 568, 571,