Title: Commonwealth v. Wassilie

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12672 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SAM C. WASSILIE. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     April 2, 2019. - July 2, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Electronic Surveillance.  Privacy.  Constitutional Law, 
Vagueness of statute.  Statute, Construction.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 17, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J., and 
motions for postconviction relief were heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jeanne M. Kempthorne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Sam C. Wassilie, was convicted 
on ten indictments charging him with secretly videotaping, with 
his cellular telephone (cell phone), unsuspecting individual 
2 
 
 
adults who were nude or partially nude, in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 105 (b), first par. (paragraph one).1  He also was 
convicted on five indictments charging violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 105 (b), third par. (paragraph three), for secretly 
videotaping children during the same incident. 
The parties cross-appealed.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred when he upheld the defendant's convictions under 
paragraph one of the statute, ruling that the proper unit of 
prosecution was the individual victim rather than the episodes 
of videotaping.  The Commonwealth challenges the judge's 
posttrial decision declaring that paragraph three of the statute 
was unconstitutionally vague and vacating the defendant's 
convictions of videotaping the children. 
We conclude that the proper unit of prosecution under § 105 
(b), first par., is based on the individual victims.  We also 
conclude that § 105(b), third par., is not unconstitutionally 
vague.  However, because the judge did not include certain 
language from paragraph three in the instruction to the jury on 
the charges of videotaping the children, we remand three of the 
five indictments for a new trial. 
                     
 
1 The defendant was indicted on a total of twenty-two counts 
under G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b) (§ 105 [b]).  The Commonwealth 
filed a nolle prosequi as to seven of the indictments because 
some victims in the recording could not be identified. 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  We briefly recite the facts that the jury 
could have found at trial.  The defendant was arrested in New 
York for using his cell phone to record people secretly in a 
public bathroom in New York.  New York authorities secured a 
search warrant and discovered two recordings on the defendant's 
laptop, each approximately twenty minutes long that showed 
individuals using a different bathroom.  After some 
investigation, police deduced that the bathroom was located in 
Massachusetts at a recreational complex in Dalton.2 
At trial, the evidence showed that the bathroom was a 
unisex, one room bathroom, without any stalls.  A Dalton police 
officer testified that the bathroom was "just a toilet, a sink, 
paper towels . . . [it was] an open bathroom."  At the beginning 
of each of the recordings, the defendant is shown starting the 
recording, concealing the cell phone by wrapping it in paper 
towels, and then placing it across from the toilet on the floor.  
According to the officer, the defendant "set up [the cell phone] 
directly across from the toilet so you would have a clear view 
of the toilet."  In the first video, the defendant reentered the 
bathroom after approximately twenty minutes, adjusted the angle 
of the cell phone to a lower view, and restarted the recording.  
The police officer agreed that the angle of the recording device 
                     
 
2 The videos were recorded over the course of one day during 
a youth football game. 
4 
 
 
was positioned to capture images of "the parts of the body under 
[a person's] clothing."  Both videos depict genitalia of 
children and adults, male and female.  One segment of the 
recording captures an image under the skirt of a female child in 
a cheerleading outfit.  The recordings showed seventeen adults 
and five juveniles, not all identifiable, nude or partially 
nude, using the bathroom. 
2.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on 
twenty-two counts of violating § 105 (b).3  The jury convicted 
the defendant on a total of fifteen indictments charging a 
violation of § 105 (b):  ten charging a violation of paragraph 
one, and five charging a violation of paragraph three.  After 
trial, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgments on 
all indictments but one under paragraph one and to sentence him 
only on that one indictment.  He argued that the correct unit of 
prosecution was the episode of videotaping, not each individual 
                     
 
3 Prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss, which, after the judge denied the motion, the 
defendant appealed to a single justice of the county court.  The 
defendant argued that § 105 (b) did not allow for separate 
prosecutions as to each individual videotaped, and thus the 
charges were duplicative and violated the double jeopardy 
clause.  The single justice denied the appeal, which we 
affirmed, noting that because the defendant had not yet been 
convicted, no double jeopardy issues were present.  See Wassilie 
v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 1033, 1033-1034 (2017). 
 
 
At the start of his jury trial, the defendant again filed a 
motion to dismiss, which was denied. 
5 
 
 
victim who appeared in the recordings.  In denying that motion, 
the judge concluded that the proper unit of prosecution under 
paragraph one was based on the individual victims.  The 
defendant also filed a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty on the five indictments charging a violation of paragraph 
three.  In that motion, he argued that the "upskirting language" 
in paragraph three, forbidding surveillance "under or around" a 
"child's clothing," was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.  
After a hearing, the judge allowed that motion, concluding that 
the upskirting language in paragraph three made the statute 
unconstitutionally vague.  He dismissed the five indictments 
with prejudice. 
 
3.  Standard of review.  We review the judge's decisions on 
the defendant's postconviction motions for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 214-215 
(2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019).  We review any question of 
statutory interpretation de novo.  Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 
Mass. 54, 60 (2016). 
4.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory history.  For context, we 
discuss the history of § 105 (b).  In its original version, 
§ 105 (b) consisted of a sole paragraph that punished general 
"Peeping Tom" voyeurism.  See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 467 
Mass. 371, 380 (2014); St. 2008, c. 451, § 149.  At the time, 
§ 105 (b) stated: 
6 
 
 
"Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or 
electronically surveils another person who is nude or 
partially nude, with the intent to secretly conduct or hide 
such activity, when the other person in such place and 
circumstance would have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in not being so photographed, videotaped or electronically 
surveilled, and without that person's knowledge and 
consent, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of 
correction for not more than 2 1/2 years or by a fine of 
not more than $5,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment." 
 
In Robertson, 467 Mass. at 372-373, the defendant was 
charged under § 105 (b) for videotaping surreptitiously the 
clothed crotch areas of women seated across from him on the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) trolley.  We 
reversed the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss and 
concluded that § 105 (b) did not apply to photographing (or 
videotaping or electronically surveilling) persons who are fully 
clothed and, in particular, did not reach the type of upskirting 
that the defendant was charged with attempting to accomplish on 
the MBTA.  Id. at 380. 
In response to our decision in Robertson, the Legislature 
immediately amended § 105 (b) to insert two additional 
paragraphs to address the type of conduct that occurred in 
Robertson -- "namely, the surreptitious photographing or 
videotaping of a person's clothed private anatomy even when in 
public."  Commonwealth v. Nascimento, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 665, 666 
(2017).  See St. 2014, c. 43, § 2.  Paragraph three, which is 
the paragraph at issue in this case, states: 
7 
 
 
"Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or 
electronically surveils, with the intent to secretly 
conduct or hide such activity, the sexual or other intimate 
parts of a child under the age of [eighteen] under or 
around the child's clothing to view or attempt to view the 
child's sexual or other intimate parts when a reasonable 
person would believe that the person's sexual or other 
intimate parts would not be visible to the public shall be 
punished . . . ."  G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), third par. 
 
At the same time, the Legislature also inserted a definition of 
"sexual or other intimate parts" as "human genitals, buttocks, 
pubic area or female breast below a point immediately above the 
tip of the areola, whether naked or covered by clothing or 
undergarments" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 272, § 105 (a), as 
amended by St. 2014, c. 43, § 1. 
 
After § 105 (b) had been amended, the Appeals Court 
considered whether the amended version of § 105 (b) protected 
individuals in public places.  Nascimento, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 
665.  The defendant in that case was convicted under paragraph 
three of secretly videotaping two teenage girls under their 
dresses while they were traveling on a public ferry.  Id.  The 
Appeals Court reasoned that an individual does not lose all 
reasonable expectations of privacy in their covered sexual or 
intimate parts simply by being in public, and thus held that the 
amended statute applies "when a reasonable person would believe 
that the person's sexual or other intimate parts would not be 
visible to the public."  Id. at 667. 
8 
 
 
 
b.  Unit of prosecution under G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b).4  
"[A] unit of prosecution is a criminal act or course of conduct 
punishable at law."  Commonwealth v. Dykens, 473 Mass. 635, 640 
n.4 (2016).  In his decision on the defendant's motion, the 
judge concluded that the proper unit of prosecution in paragraph 
one was based on the number of victims.  In doing so, the judge 
distinguished this case from Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 
66, 67 (2014), where we concluded that under the structure of 
the statute, G. L. c. 272, § 29C, the appropriate unit of 
prosecution for possession of child pornography was not each 
photograph in a large, "single cache" of photographs, but the 
collection as a whole. 
 
The defendant contends that the judge erred and that the 
correct unit of prosecution is the episode of recording, rather 
than the number of victims whose privacy was violated by the 
recording.  He argues that if each victim was a unit of 
prosecution it would lead to an unreasonable result and violate 
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution as well as Massachusetts common law. 
                     
 
4 The defendant raises the unit of prosecution argument 
specifically in context of the first paragraph of § 105 (b).  
Because we conclude that the third paragraph of § 105 (b) is not 
unconstitutionally vague, we address the unit of prosecution 
argument regarding the entirety of § 105 (b). 
9 
 
 
 
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Massachusetts common law preclude 
the imposition of multiple punishments for the commission of a 
single crime.  Rollins, 470 Mass. at 70.  We have defined 
"multiple punishments" as "those in excess of what a Legislature 
intended to be the punishment for a particular offense" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  Therefore, where, as 
here, the defendant is convicted multiple times under the same 
statute, we ask what the "unit of prosecution" is that "the 
Legislature intended as the punishable act for violations" of 
§ 105 (b).  Dykens, 473 Mass. at 640; Commonwealth v. Horne, 466 
Mass. 440, 449-450 (2013). 
 
In order to "determine the appropriate 'unit of 
prosecution', we 'look to the language and purpose of the 
statute[], to see whether [it] speak[s] directly to the issue of 
the appropriate unit of prosecution.'"  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 
472 Mass. 260, 268 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 
Mass. App. Ct. 281, 286 (2011).  If it does not, then we proceed 
to identify that unit, while cognizant that any ambiguity that 
arises in the process must be resolved against turning a single 
transaction into multiple offenses.  Dykens, 473 Mass. at 640.  
Where a single statute is involved, we must decide "whether two 
[or more] discrete offenses were proved under that statute 
10 
 
 
rather than a single continuing offense" (citation omitted).  
Traylor, supra. 
 
In deciding whether certain conduct constitutes a single 
offense or multiple offenses, we "do not simply count the number 
of discrete acts."  Freundel v. United States, 146 A.3d 375, 379 
(D.C. 2016).  See generally, Traylor, 472 Mass. at 268-269.  Put 
another way, "there is no [categorical] rule that a single act 
can support only a single conviction; multiple punishments are 
permissible even where multiple charges are the product of a 
single act."  Freundel, supra. 
 
Instead, our case law has established two broad categories 
of statutes.  Traylor, 472 Mass. at 268.  One category is 
focused upon the prevention of violence or physical injury to 
others.  Id.  In this category, we have held that "'[w]henever a 
single criminal transaction gives rise to crimes of violence 
which are committed against several victims, then multiple 
indictments (and punishments)' for the crime against each victim 
'are appropriate.'"  Id. quoting Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 
Mass. 20, 31 (1985).  Thus, for example, multiple convictions 
have been upheld where a single shot killed a woman and her 
fetus; a robber took money from two employees; and two deaths 
resulted from motor vehicle accident.  See Traylor, supra, 
collecting cases. 
11 
 
 
The other category of statutes is directed at "punishing 
the defendant for conduct offensive to society, as distinct from 
punishing the defendant for the effect of that conduct on 
particular victims" (citation omitted).  Id. at 268-269.  An 
example of this category are statutes criminalizing possession 
of child pornography.  See. e.g., Rollins, 470 Mass. at 73.  In 
Rollins, we concluded that the appropriate unit of prosecution 
for possessing child pornography was not each photograph in a 
large single cache of photographs but, rather, the collection as 
a whole.  Id. at 67.  "Accordingly, we reject[ed] the 
Commonwealth's victim-based approach to determining the 
appropriate unit of prosecution for possession of child 
pornography, concluding instead that a conduct-based approach 
[was] more in keeping with the broad intent of the statute and 
the tiered punishment framework that it erect[ed]."  Id. at 73. 
However, there are certainly other crimes that do not fit 
squarely within either broad category.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Casbohm, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 613, 618 (2018), the 
Appeals Court distinguished the crime of posing a child for the 
production of pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29A (a) and (b), from 
the crime of possession of child pornography that we held was 
conduct offensive to society in Rollins.  The Appeals Court 
concluded that the unit of prosecution for posing a child for 
the production of child pornography punishes behavior that 
12 
 
 
victimizes a specific person, even though the statute itself was 
not focused on the prevention of physical injury.  Casbohm, 
supra.  See generally Dykens, 473 Mass. at 637 & n.1, 641 (three 
attempts to burglarize same residence on or about same date not 
duplicative because unit of prosecution for attempted burglary 
is any act toward commission of substantive crimes). 
With this framework in place, we first look to what unit of 
prosecution the Legislature intended in § 105 (b).  Although the 
defendant focuses his argument on paragraph one, we consider the 
unit of prosecution for the entire statute.  See note 4, supra.  
Like the Casbohm case, the conduct in this case does not fit 
squarely within one of the two broad categories described in the 
Traylor case, and we conclude that the Legislature intended the 
proper unit of prosecution to be based on the number of victims. 
The defendant argues that the plain language of the statute 
punishes the physical act of recording.  Paragraph one states in 
part: 
"Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or 
electronically surveils another person who is nude or 
partially nude, with the intent to secretly conduct or hide 
such activity, when the other person in such place and 
circumstance would have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in not being so photographed, videotaped or electronically 
surveilled, and without that person's knowledge and 
consent, shall be punished . . . ." 
 
 
Paragraph one addresses the conduct that affects a single 
person:  "another person"; "other person"; "that person."  
13 
 
 
Similarly, the second and third paragraphs, which were added to 
the statute following Robertson, also address conduct toward an 
individual person.  Paragraph three states: 
"Whoever willfully photographs, videotapes or 
electronically surveils, with the intent to secretly 
conduct or hide such activity, the sexual or other intimate 
parts of a child under the age of [eighteen] under or 
around the child's clothing to view or attempt to view the 
child's sexual or other intimate parts when a reasonable 
person would believe that the person's sexual or other 
intimate parts would not be visible to the public shall be 
punished . . . ."5 
 
 
Although not dispositive, the statute's singular language 
and reference, first and foremost, to "another person," "a 
person," or "a child" indicates that the aim of the Legislature 
was to protect individual adults and children from having their 
privacy violated.  Cf. Rollins, 470 Mass. at 71. 
Furthermore, when § 105 (b) is read as a whole, the 
language of the statute conveys the legislative purpose to 
protect individual privacy, adding weight to our conclusion that 
the correct unit of prosecution is the victim, not the conduct.  
The first paragraph's language addresses whether the victim is 
clothed or unclothed; whether the individual would have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and whether the individual 
has consented to the conduct.  The second and third paragraphs 
                     
5 The second paragraph of § 105 (b) has identical language 
to the third paragraph, but replaces reference to a "child" with 
a "person."  G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), second par. 
14 
 
 
address whether the recording is focused on the individual's 
sexual or intimate parts and whether a reasonable person would 
believe that an individual's sexual or intimate parts would not 
be visible to the public.  The statute's focus is on the nature 
of the violation of an individual's privacy.  Criminalizing the 
photographing, videotaping, or electronic surveillance of the 
victim effectuates the statute's purpose -- to protect the 
victim's privacy and to penalize the invasion of that privacy. 
The legislative history of § 105 (b) reinforces the plain 
meaning of the statute's language.  In amending § 105(b), the 
Legislature stated in the preamble that statute's purpose was to 
"strengthen forthwith the laws relative to the expectation of 
privacy of one's person."  Preamble, St. 2014, c. 43.  See 
Flanagan, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 461 ("We presume that when the 
Legislature enacts a statute it is aware of the prior state of 
the law as explicated by the decisions of the court" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
The defendant's arguments analogizing this case to the 
Rollins case are unpersuasive.  In Rollins, we found the 
language of the statute ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution 
and so looked primarily to legislative history to determine the 
correct unit.  Rollins, 470 Mass. at 71-72.  Citing the 
historical and statutory notes to the enactment of the 
possession of child pornography statute, G. L. c. 272, § 29C, we 
15 
 
 
noted that the Legislature intended to protect the welfare of 
children and society as a whole, and thus the statute was 
intended to punish conduct offensive to society, rather than to 
individual victims.  Id. at 72-73, discussing St. 1997, c. 181, 
§ 1 (6).  In contrast, regarding § 105 (b), the Legislature 
clearly intended to "strengthen forthwith the laws relative to 
the expectation of privacy of one's person."  Preamble, St. 
2014, c. 43. 
 
The Court of Appeals of Washington has addressed the unit 
of prosecution question in a "Peeping Tom" statute similar to 
§ 105 (b).  In State v. Diaz-Flores, 148 Wash. App. 911, 917 
(2009), the defendant was convicted of two counts under the 
State's voyeurism statute for secretly viewing two people having 
sexual intercourse.  As with our Legislature's response to the 
Robertson decision, the Washington voyeurism statute also was 
amended following a decision of the Washington Supreme Court 
that held that the language of the statute did not reach 
unlawful upskirting photography.  See State v. Glas, 47 Wash. 2d 
410, 414 (2002).  The Washington Legislature amended the statute 
to focus on the victim's reasonable expectation of privacy 
regardless of whether the victim was in a public or private 
place.  Relying on the words "another person" in the statute, 
the court concluded that the proper unit of prosecution was each 
person whose privacy was violated, "not just the course of 
16 
 
 
conduct."  Diaz-Flores, supra at 917-918.  See also Freundel, 
146 A.3d at 381-382 (relying in part on statute's use of "an 
individual" and "the individual" to conclude unit of prosecution 
of voyeurism statute was each victim). 
 
The defendant's arguments analogizing this case to 
Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20 (1985), does not compel a 
different result.  In Donovan, we held that the defendants' 
conduct of creating a fake night deposit box outside a bank 
constituted one charge of larceny, for a single larcenous 
scheme, not seven charges for each individual who deposited 
money into the fake box.  Id. at 21.  The court in Donovan, 
however, limited its holding to the crime of larceny and there 
is no reason to extend that holding to this case where it is 
clear that the Legislature has intended to protect each victim. 
Under the defendant's interpretation of § 105 (b), once he 
unlawfully recorded one victim, all future voyeuristic 
recording, even of different victims with different recordings 
and at different times, would not be separately punishable as 
long as the recordings were part of a single endeavor.  This 
interpretation would yield an absurd result for multiple 
reasons.  See Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  The 
first paragraph of § 105 (b) punishes anyone who willfully 
photographs, videotapes, or electronically surveils another 
person who is nude or partially nude.  What if, instead of 
17 
 
 
creating two recordings totaling roughly forty minutes of 
footage depicting twenty individuals, the defendant hid in a 
locker room and took twenty still pictures of different 
individuals over the course of forty minutes?  We would be hard 
pressed to interpret that conduct as a single endeavor.  A 
violation of the statute, whether it be by a continuous 
recording of multiple victims or still images of multiple 
victims, should be treated the same.  That the defendant only 
made two video recordings does not save him from prosecution for 
the numerous victims that he captured.  See Freundel, 146 A.3d 
at 380-384 (unit of prosecution rested on separate victims under 
District of Columbia voyeurism statute where defendant 
videotaped fifty-two women with hidden video cameras in rooms 
where they undressed). 
The defendant also advances several other unpersuasive 
arguments.  The defendant argues that because the statute is 
placed in G. L. c. 272, prohibiting "Crimes against Chastity, 
Morality, Decency, and Good Order," such placement is indicative 
of the Legislature's intent to punish conduct offensive to 
society, not to an individual victim.  He also argues that § 105 
(b) does not denote a crime of violence and, so, the unit of 
prosecution should be the conduct not the victim.  See Traylor, 
472 Mass. at 268 ("'whenever a single criminal transaction gives 
rise to crimes of violence which are committed against several 
18 
 
 
victims, then multiple indictments [and punishments]' for the 
crime against each victim 'are appropriate'" [citation 
omitted]).  As discussed supra, the specific language of the 
statute, with its focus on separate individuals (who, if they 
are adults, must give consent to be surveilled), shows that the 
intent of § 105 (b) is to protect individual privacy. 
Finally, the defendant invokes the rule of lenity, which 
operates to preclude multiple convictions under the same statute 
that are based on the same act if it is unclear whether the 
Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments.  Dykens, 
473 Mass. at 640.  Because we do not conclude that the statute 
is ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution, the rule of lenity 
does not apply. 
 
b.  "Upskirting" language in G. L. c. 272, § 105(b), third 
par.  During the charge conference at the defendant's trial, the 
judge declined to adopt the defendant's or the Commonwealth's 
proposed jury instructions.  The judge stated that he had 
decided to "reengineer[] the statute to fit what [he] believe[d] 
[was] common sense."  In doing so, he redacted what he called 
the "upskirting" language of paragraph three in the jury charge, 
i.e., language that forbids surveillance "under and around the 
child's clothing" because, as he stated in his written decision 
on the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, 
"there simply was no upskirting conduct in this case; there were 
19 
 
 
no clothes pushed aside nor was the camera skillfully placed to 
view under the clothes."6 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred when he 
allowed the defendant's postconviction motion for a required 
finding of not guilty and concluded that paragraph three was 
unconstitutionally vague because he did "not know how to 
integrate the upskirting language into the statute so that the 
elements of the crime [were] reasonably apparent."  In addition, 
the Commonwealth contends that the judge improperly decided the 
motion because there was sufficient evidence of the crime, as 
instructed, for the jury to reasonably find the essential 
elements of paragraph three.  The defendant argues that any 
ambiguity in paragraph three must be resolved in his favor under 
the rule of lenity.  Moreover, he contends that the motion for a 
required finding of not guilty was properly decided because the 
plain language and history of paragraph three refers to 
"upskirting" and, because there was no evidence of that action, 
there was insufficient evidence to convict.  We conclude that 
paragraph three is not unconstitutionally vague. 
                     
 
6 We have reviewed the two videos in their entirety.  We 
give no deference to the judge's findings in his postverdict 
memorandum regarding the contents of the videos.  We stand in 
the same position as the judge, and reach our own conclusion 
unaffected by his findings.  Commonwealth v. Santana, 477 Mass. 
610, 616 (2017). 
20 
 
 
 
i.  Interpretation of phrase "under and around" in G. L. 
c. 272, § 105 (b), third par.  "A fundamental tenet of statutory 
interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect 
consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."  
Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  "[W]here the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to the legislative intent" (citation omitted).  Sharris v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass 586, 594 (2018).  "That said, we will not 
adopt a literal construction of a statute if the consequences of 
doing so are 'absurd or unreasonable,' such that it could not be 
what the Legislature intended."  Ciani, 481 Mass. at 178.  
"Where the draftsmanship of a statute is faulty or lacks 
precision, it is our duty to give [it] a reasonable 
construction" (citation omitted).  Capone v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Fitchburg, 389 Mass. 617, 622 (1983).  Where "the 
statutory language [could] plausibly be found to be ambiguous, 
the rule of lenity requires the defendant be given the benefit 
of the ambiguity" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mattier 
(No. 2), 474 Mass. 261, 267 (2016).  However, our principal 
objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in a way that is consonant with sound reason and 
common sense.  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 633-634 
(2018). 
21 
 
 
 
As discussed supra, by amending § 105 (b) as it did, the 
Legislature aimed to encompass the upskirting conduct of the 
defendant in Robertson, 470 Mass. at 371-372, that the initial 
statute did not address.  See Sullivan, 435 Mass. at 360.  The 
Legislature also amended the statute to define the phrase 
"sexual or other intimate parts" that are protected under the 
amended statute as including "whether naked or covered by 
clothing or undergarments."  G. L. c. 272, § 105 (a), (b), 
inserted by St. 2014, c. 43, §§ 1, 2.  We interpret that 
language to mean that if someone positions a camera in a way 
that views or attempts to view "under or around" a child's 
clothing, that person can be convicted of the offense even if 
clothing or undergarments protect a view of the child's "sexual 
or other intimate parts." 
We conclude that the judge erred when he interpreted the 
statute to mean that "if the defendant only attempts to view 
under or around a child's clothing, it would by definition 
exclude the requirement that he was successful in electronically 
surveil[ling] the sexual or other intimate parts of a child."  
Compounding that error, the judge redacted the phrase "under or 
around" from the jury instructions in an attempt to "reconcile 
the language in the statute." 
The phrase "under or around" is not defined by § 105 (a); 
however, applying the familiar rule of statutory construction 
22 
 
 
that instructs us to give the words their usual and accepted 
meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with the 
statutory purpose, there is nothing to reconcile in the statute.  
Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 357 (2015). 
"Around" means "to avoid or get past:  on or to another 
side of."  Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 68 (11th ed. 
2007).  "Under" means "in or into a position below or beneath 
something."  Id. at 1363.  We interpret the language "under or 
around" to mean that a recording device was placed in a way that 
the photographs or recordings showed images below or beneath the 
child's clothing or on the "other," or under, side of the 
child's clothing -- a view that would otherwise not be visible 
but for the focus or angle of the recording device.  Using the 
plain meaning of the words "under and around" accomplishes the 
Legislature's intent. 
 
Although upskirting generally refers to the practice of 
taking unwanted pictures up a woman's skirt or dress, see 
Robertson, 467 Mass. at 371 n.1, paragraph three does not use 
that phrase.  Thus, the phrase "under or around" could include 
images up a child's skirt or shorts, down a child's blouse, or 
up a shirt, as well as any camera angle that could give a view 
of a child's sexual or other intimate parts that would otherwise 
not be readily visible.  The recording device may be stationary, 
as it was here, aimed in such a way as to gain a view of private 
23 
 
 
parts of the body even though a person is clothed.  The 
recording device also may be manipulated to achieve a certain 
focus under or around a layer of clothing.  Indeed, that is 
similar conduct to what occurred in Robertson, supra at 372, and 
in Nascimento, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 665.  This interpretation of 
the language "under or around" is consonant with sound reason, 
common sense, and the aim of the Legislature in response to 
Robertson.  See Curran, 478 Mass. at 633-634. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's contention, our interpretation 
of paragraph three does not render paragraph one superfluous.  
Much of the two recordings in question constitutes conduct that 
falls squarely within paragraph one, but not paragraph three.  
Several of the children depicted in the video are partially 
naked while using the bathroom without cover of their intimate 
parts.  Although their sexual parts are visible, the low camera 
angle does not portray a view under or around clothing.  
Conversely, several children are clothed and, because of the 
recording device angle, the recording depicts footage up a 
child's dress and below two children's shirts.  Thus, in cases 
where a child is recorded nude or partially nude with their 
sexual or intimate parts readily exposed it cannot be said that 
recording was taken under or around a layer of clothing.  That 
conduct would strictly be an offense under paragraph one.  
However, in cases where the camera is placed in such a position 
24 
 
 
to view under or around a child's clothing to view the child's 
intimate parts, that conduct falls squarely within paragraph 
three. 
 
Perhaps the facts of this case contributed to the confusion 
surrounding the application of paragraph three.  For example, if 
the recording device had been positioned in the same manner, 
perhaps concealed by books or newspapers in a library or a 
classroom, there is no question that if the camera captured 
images of someone's sexual or intimate parts up a dress, down a 
blouse, or around a tank top, that conduct would be an offense 
under paragraph three.  Because the camera is in a bathroom and 
captures partially naked individuals, it is hard to recognize 
immediately that this conduct can fall within paragraph three.  
During the charge conference, the confusion between the parties 
and the judge affected the judge's decision on how to charge the 
jury.  The fact that the parties and the judge disagreed on the 
proper construction of paragraph three, however, does not 
necessarily establish an ambiguity.  See Home Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 599, 602 (2005). 
One might think that the secret recording of a naked child 
-- conduct falling within the scope of paragraph one -- should 
be punished more severely than the secret recording of a child 
under or around their clothing -- conduct falling within the 
scope of paragraph three.  In the wake of Robertson, whether by 
25 
 
 
design or inadvertence, the Legislature did not amend paragraph 
one to provide for a greater sentence enhancement for the 
recording of children in the nude.  The question of how 
defendants are to be sentenced under § 105 (b) is for the 
Legislature to decide, not the court. 
 
In sum, we conclude that paragraph three of § 105 (b) is 
constitutional.  "Criminal statutes must be sufficiently 
specific so as to give fair notice as to what conduct is 
forbidden."  Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983).  
A statute lacks the required specificity where a person of 
average intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.  
Crawford, 430 Mass. at 689.  However, unspecific statutory 
language "may nonetheless be sufficiently definite because of 
judicial construction, common law meaning, or the statutory 
history of particular terms' . . . and such a statute may be 
rendered 'constitutionally definite by giving it a reasonable 
construction'" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 
Mass. 492, 499–500 (2003).  In this case, based on the history 
of § 105 (b), the aim of the Legislature following our decision 
in Robertson, and the plain meaning of the language "under or 
around," we conclude that a person of average intelligence would 
comprehend what conduct the statute prohibits.  See St. Louis, 
473 Mass. at 356. 
26 
 
 
ii.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The Commonwealth 
contends that there was sufficient evidence of the crime, as 
instructed, for the jury reasonably to find the essential 
elements of paragraph three on all five indictments.  Although 
the evidence was sufficient for three indictments under 
paragraph three, the jury instruction was incorrect; therefore, 
a retrial is required on three indictments. 
 
At trial, the evidence showed that the defendant's cell 
phone was placed on the ground "directly across from the toilet 
so [there was] a clear view of the toilet."  After the first 
twenty minutes of recording, the defendant reentered the 
bathroom to manipulate the camera to a lower angle, seemingly to 
get a better view of the individuals preparing to use and using 
the toilet.  A police officer testified that the angle of the 
cell phone was positioned to capture the parts of the body under 
a person's clothing.  Moreover, at one point in the recording, 
the camera view is focused up a young girl's cheerleading skirt.  
On two other occasions, the camera view shows the private parts 
of two young girls, under their shirts, while they are sitting 
on the toilet. 
 
When instructing the jury on the indictments under 
paragraph three, the judge redacted the "under and around" 
language.  He instructed: 
27 
 
 
"In order to prove the defendant's guilt of this crime, the 
Commonwealth must prove the following four elements to you 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  First element, that the 
defendant willfully photographed, videotaped, or 
electronically surveilled.  Second element, the sexual or 
other intimate parts of a child under the age of 18.  Third 
element, that the defendant did so with the intent to 
secretly conduct or hide his photographing activities.  And 
the fourth element, that the defendant conducted such 
activities when a reasonable person would believe that the 
person's sexual or other intimate parts would not be 
visible to the public." 
 
We conclude that the language "under or around" is an essential 
element of the offense under paragraph three.7  We further 
conclude that, if properly instructed, there is sufficient 
evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty of three of the 
indictments under paragraph three:  one against the young girl 
in the cheerleading skirt, indictment no. 2015-078-20, and one 
each against the two young girls sitting on the toilet whose 
intimate parts are visible under their shirts, indictment nos. 
2015-078-19 and 2015-078-21.  Therefore, we reverse the judge's 
order vacating the five indictments under paragraph three and 
remand three indictments, as explained supra, under paragraph 
three for a new trial where the jury can be properly instructed 
                     
 
7 The elements of the offense are:  (1) the defendant 
willfully photographed, videotaped or electronically surveilled, 
(2) with the intent to secretly conduct or hide his 
photographing activity, (3) the intimate parts of a child, (4) 
under or around the child's clothing to view or attempt to view 
the child's intimate parts, (5) when a reasonable person would 
believe that person's intimate parts would not be visible to the 
public. 
28 
 
 
on the elements of the offense.  An explanation of the elements 
of the crime, as set forth in note 7, supra, should suffice to 
explain the crime to the jury. 
 
As to the other two indictments under paragraph three, 
indictment nos. 2015-078-18 and 2015-078-22, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there 
is insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find 
all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  Although the recordings of 
these two victims might establish the elements of paragraph one, 
they do not depict the children's intimate parts under or around 
an article of clothing.  In particular, regarding indictment no. 
2015-078-18, the view of the child's intimate part was obvious 
and not dependent on the focus or the angle of the recording 
device. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's 
postconviction motion to be sentenced on one indictment under 
G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), first par., is affirmed.  The order 
vacating the defendant's convictions on the five indictments 
under G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b), third par., is reversed and 
remanded for a new trial on the three indictments identified 
supra.  The two other indictments under that paragraph are 
dismissed without prejudice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.