Title: State v. George

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

223 Kan. 507 (1978)
575 P.2d 511
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
WAYMAN L. GEORGE, Appellant.
No. 48,562

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 25, 1978.
Stanley R. Juhnke, of Dinges, Gottschalk, Bolton & Juhnke, of Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Kenneth R. Heer, county attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is a direct appeal by the defendant, Wayman L. George, from his conviction for operating a vehicle while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of K.S.A. 8-1567 (now K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 8-1567). After conviction by a jury, George was sentenced to six months in jail, placed on probation, and given a restricted driver's license which permitted him to drive to and from work.
He raises but one point: that it was a violation of the physician-patient privilege, as set out in K.S.A. 60-427, to allow into evidence the testimony of Dr. Lester Donley. The parties have stipulated that George would not have been convicted without the doctor's testimony; thus if the admission of the testimony was error, it was reversible error.
Deputy Sheriff Kerns was the first witness for the state. He testified that he arrested George on the afternoon of July 10, 1975, and took him from the scene to the county jail. George admitted that he had ingested some "Old Charter" that afternoon, but refused to take a blood alcohol test, or the heel-to-toe or finger-to-nose tests. He told the officers that he had struck his head, and he asked them to call his physician, Dr. Donley. When the doctor arrived, the undersheriff brought George into the sheriff's office where Dr. Donley examined him in the presence of Kerns and Deputy Sheriff Maddox.
*508 After the doctor finished his examination, Kerns asked George if he would perform the heel-to-toe and finger-to-nose tests. George agreed to the tests if Dr. Donley would witness them. Kerns then proceeded to administer the tests, first by having George attempt to walk in a straight line by placing the heel to the toe, and next by having him attempt to touch the end of his nose while his eyes were closed. Kerns said that George had quite a problem in placing the heel to toe, and keeping his balance. He was wobbling as he walked. When George closed his eyes and attempted to touch the end of his nose, he fell back in a chair against the wall, and said that no one could do the test.
The state's second witness was Dr. Donley. He was asked what he did in examining the defendant, and what the results of that examination were. At this point defense counsel objected for the reason that the testimony would violate the patient-physician privilege, K.S.A. 60-427. The state contended that the information was not confidential since it was transmitted in the presence of the two officers, whose presence was not "reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information." The trial court overruled the objection.
The doctor then testified that he examined George's head and found no injuries; the pupils of his eyes were equal but he had difficulty in following movement precisely; his heart, blood pressure, and pulse were all within normal limits. Dr. Donley then described George's attempts to perform the heel-to-toe and finger-to-nose tests. In Dr. Donley's opinion, the symptoms he observed were not indicative of a blow to the head or a concussion; in his opinion, George was under the influence of alcohol.
K.S.A. 60-407 sets forth the general rule that:
An exception to this general rule is provided by K.S.A. 60-427 which reads as follows:
The purpose of the statute is to encourage persons needing medical aid to seek it without fear of betrayal, not to disqualify physicians as witnesses. The privilege, being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed, and should not be construed to apply to matters "not coming clearly within its provisions." State v. Townsend, 146 Kan. 982, 985, 73 P.2d 1124; and see, also, Armstrong v. Street Railway Co., 93 Kan. 493, 503, 144 Pac. 847; and Branch v. Wilkinson, 198 Neb. 649, 256 N.W.2d 307, 312 (1977).
Keeping in mind that the purpose of the statute is to encourage persons needing medical treatment to seek it, and the fact that the statute should be strictly construed, we must look at each of the elements necessary to establish the privilege.
There first must be a "patient," a "holder of the privilege," and a "physician." George complained that he had struck his head. A deputy sheriff testified that he had seen a place over George's eye, a bump or something, which looked like George had hit himself. George asked the officers to call his family doctor. Dr. Donley was then called, and he came to the jail and examined George. Dr. Donley was an osteopathic physician officing and practicing in Kingman. Clearly, George was a "patient" and "holder of the privilege" and Dr. Donley was a "physician" as those terms are used in the act.
We next consider whether there was a "confidential communication between physician and patient" as that phrase is defined within the act. There is no dispute but that Dr. Donley obtained information by examination of the patient. The dispute between the parties to this action arises in determining whether the information was transmitted "in confidence and by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it is transmitted."
Two law enforcement officers were present in the sheriff's office during the examination. Their presence was not necessary *511 for the transmission of the information or for the accomplishment of the purposes of the examination. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the information obtained by Dr. Donley in his examination of George was disclosed to the officers. The examination was visual, physical, and manual. The doctor did not testify as to any conversation between himself and the patient, nor did he indicate that George said anything during his examination. The doctor examined George's head and his eyes, and checked his heartbeat, blood pressure, and pulse. We conclude that the information which the doctor acquired from his examination of George was in confidence.
After the examination was concluded, the doctor observed the dexterity tests performed by George at the direction of the officers. Both the doctor and the officers were observing George; the doctor was witnessing the tests at George's request. The information he acquired from observing the test performances is not privileged; it was not a confidential communication between patient and physician.
Appellant directs our attention to two New York cases, People v. Decina, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 569-570, 2 N.Y.2d 133 (1956), and People v. Singer, 236 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1013-1014 (Suffolk Co. Ct. 1962). In the first case a guard was present in the doorway of a hospital room, and overheard the conversation between doctor and patient. In the second, the arresting officer and a second officer were present in the treatment room during the time the physician was treating the patient. In both instances the courts held that the communications were confidential and the privilege applied.
The presence of law enforcement officers at the time of examination and treatment of a prisoner by a physician does not necessarily require a holding that the information obtained by the physician during the examination is not confidential, or that the patient-physician privilege is waived. A patient who is in custody can hardly be expected to ask the arresting officers to leave the jail so that he may be alone with his physician. We hold that in the case before us there was a "confidential communication" between patient and physician, the defendant and his family physician, consisting of the information obtained by the physician during the examination. This information was not transmitted to or through the officers; it was perceived directly by Dr. Donley from his examination of the patient.
*512 The state suggests that the communication falls within the exception set forth in subparagraph (d) since this is an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the defense of the patient. Subsection (b) provides that the privilege obtains in civil actions and in misdemeanor prosecutions. There is no privilege under the statute in felony cases. George was charged with a misdemeanor; he entered a plea of not guilty; and at the time Dr. Donley's testimony was proffered, George had offered no evidence as to his physical condition. Judge Gard, in his Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, says:
Discussing the same section, Steven P. Flood, in his article, The Physician-Patient Privilege Under the New Code, 33 J.B.A.K. 100, 147, says:
We hold that the condition of the patient is not put in issue by a not guilty plea in a misdemeanor case. To hold otherwise would negate the obvious intention of the legislature to extend the privilege to prosecutions for misdemeanors. Subsection (d), in our judgment, is applicable in a misdemeanor case only after the patient has offered evidence of his mental or physical condition. This is in accord with the comments of Judge Gard and now Judge Flood.
*513 While the information acquired by Dr. Donley in observing the dexterity tests was not privileged, the information which he acquired through examination of the patient was within the statute and was privileged, and the trial court erred in admitting it over proper objection.
The judgment is reversed.
FROMME, J., dissenting.
The defendant was charged by the state with operating a vehicle while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In such case the physical condition of the defendant is in issue. The issue of defendant's physical condition is joined by the plea of not guilty. In the majority opinion it is said subsection (d) of K.S.A. 60-427 is applicable only after the patient has offered evidence of his physical condition. I do not read it that way. Subsection (d) provides there is no privilege under this section in an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the defense of the patient. Subsection (d) of the statute applies, in my opinion, and the testimony of the doctor as to defendant's physical condition was properly admitted. I would affirm this conviction.
McFARLAND, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.