Title: STATE v ROGERS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14577 I N THE S U P = COURT O F THE STATE O F M3NTAN.A 1979 THE STATE: O F IXlNDNA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE D E P A R T C E N T O F H I G H m Y S O F THE STATE O F IalvBNA, Plaintiff and Appellant, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth Judicial ~istrict, Honorable Jack L. Green, J d g e presiding, and Honorable E . Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: M. G e n e ELatchy, Highway Legal Dept., H e l e n a , Montana For Respondent: W n e , Karlberg and Haddon, Missoula, P4xkana Kcch and Menna, Hamilton, Wntana . - - - . I - : 2 4 9 R Filed: Subnitted on briefs: M a y 31, 1979 - ~- 'J i- ' Decided : ? 1 9 B M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal i n an eminent domain proceeding by t h e S t a t e of Montana from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s granting of respondent's p e t i t i o n f o r f i n a l judgment and order f i x i n g c o s t s a s prayed f o r by respondent. Appellant f i l e d a complaint i n Ravalli County on March 23, 1978, seeking condemnation of respondent's property f o r purposes of constructing a public highway. O n A p r i l 3, respondent f i l e d an answer claiming $66,000 a s j u s t compen- s a t i o n f o r t h e taking of her property and f o r t h e deprecia- t i o n t h a t would accrue t o t h e property n o t taken. The D i s t r i c t Court then nominated and appointed t h r e e land value commissioners t o a s c e r t a i n t h e amount of compensation t o be paid. A f t e r a hearing on May 12, t h e commissioners f i l e d a r e p o r t with t h e c l e r k of c o u r t on June 6 a s s e s s i n g respon- d e n t ' s j u s t compensation a s $40,000, $9,100 of which w a s f o r t h e property taken and $30,900 of which was f o r t h e property n o t taken. A copy of t h e r e p o r t and n o t i c e of i t s e n t r y w e r e mailed t o t h e p a r t i e s by t h e c l e r k on June 6. O n August 3 , 58 days a f t e r t h e commissioners' assess- ment was f i l e d , a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal con- t e s t i n g t h e assessment. Respondent subsequently p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r judgment f o r t h e reason t h a t appel- l a n t had f a i l e d t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal within 30 days a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e of t h e n o t i c e of f i l i n g of t h e commis- s i o n e r s ' r e p o r t and a copy of t h a t r e p o r t . I n response, a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion requesting an order vacating t h e commissioners' r e p o r t of June 6. The D i s t r i c t Court, how- e v e r , denied a p p e l l a n t ' s motion and granted judgment i n favor of respondent on August 18. I n a s e p a r a t e proceeding t h e D i s t r i c t Court entered an order on September 18 allowing necessary c o s t s of t h e l i t i g a t i o n a s prayed f o r by respon- dent. Following t h e s e r u l i n g s , a p p e l l a n t ' s motions t o amend t h e c o u r t ' s findings, conclusions and o r d e r of August 31, and t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on September 18 with r e s p e c t t o c o s t s w e r e denied. A n appeal was f i l e d with t h i s Court on October 31. O n appeal w e consider t h e following two i s s u e s : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n determining t h a t a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o appeal from t h e land value comrnissioners' r e p o r t within t h e time provided by l a w , and hence, t h e c o u r t lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e appeal? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n f i n d i n g , a s necessary and reasonable expenses, a t t o r n e y f e e s which w e r e based upon a contingency f e e c o n t r a c t and a p p r a i s e r f e e s where t h e a p p r a i s e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e land commissioners' hearing? With r e s p e c t t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e s t a t u t o r y proce- dure f o r appealing a commissioners' assessment i n an eminent domain proceeding i s s t a t e d i n s e c t i o n 70-30-304, W A , and provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Appeal t o D i s t r i c t Court from Assessment of ~ommissioners. (1) A n appeal from any assess- ment made by t h e commissioners must be taken and prosecuted i n t h e c o u r t where t h e r e p o r t of s a i d commissioners i s f i l e d by any p a r t y i n t e r - ested. Such appeal must be taken w i t h i n t h e period of t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r t h e s e r v i c e upon a p p e l l a n t of t h e n o t i c e of t h e f i l i n g of t h e award . . ." Here, t h e commissioners' r e p o r t was mailed t o t h e p a r t i e s by t h e c l e r k of c o u r t on June 6. While t h e t h i r t y - day appeal period would have normally expired on J u l y 6 , a p p e l l a n t could have claimed extensions u n t i l J u l y 1 0 . I n computing t h e time period f o r purposes of appeal, t h e Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a three-day extension when a party receives service by mail and has the right to do some act, such as file an appeal, and an exten- sion when the last day of the period falls on a Sunday. Rules 6 (e) and 6 (a), M.R.Civ.P. Appellant, however, filed a notice of appeal on August 3, 58 days after the commissioners' assessment was filed. Appellant nevertheless maintains that the notice of appeal was timely because the time for appeal did not begin to run when the manner of service departed from the method of service prescribed by the statute. When the statute calls for service as "in the manner of a summons," appellant contends that service by mail will not suffice and that a departure from the prescribed method is a jurisdictional defect which cannot be waived. Appellant argues for a strict construction of section 70-30-303, MCA, which pro- vides : "Report of Commissioners. The report of commis- sioners shall be made on such forms as are pro- vided for their use by authority of the court. Such report must be filed . . . with the clerk of court and the Clerk must forthwith notify the parties that such report has been filed, with notice, together with a true copy of said report, must be served upon all the parties interested, in the same manner as a summons . . ." Respondent, in turn, places emphasis upon appellant's receiving actual notice of the comrnissioners~ report. We are referred to the findings of fact of the District Court where it was found that appellant received a copy of the commissioners' report and notice of its entry on June 8. Respondent also argues that this Court has implicitly held that the manner of service prescribed under the eminent domain statutes is a procedural defect which may be waived. State of Montana v . Helehan (1977), 171 Mont. 473, 559 P.2d 817. I n Helehan s e r v i c e of t h e commissioners' r e p o r t was made by mail and such s e r v i c e d i d n o t prevent t h e c o u r t from assuming j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e appeal. I n t h i s case, however, w e r e f r a i n from approving of methods of s e r v i c e which d e p a r t from prescribed s t a t u t o r y procedures. Nor do w e adopt respondent's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Helehan. W e simply hold t h a t where a p a r t y r e c e i v e s a c t u a l n o t i c e of t h e commissioners' r e p o r t i n an eminent domain proceeding and f a i l s to f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal within t h e t i m e provided by law, t h e c o u r t i s without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e appeal. Since t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t a p p e l l a n t received a c t u a l n o t i c e and admitted s e r v i c e on June 8 and t h a t find- i n g has n o t been shown t o be c l e a r l y erroneous, it s h a l l n o t be set aside. Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.; Farmer's S t a t e Bank v. Mobile Homes Unlimited (1979), Mon t . , 593 P.2d 734, 36 St.Rep. 792, 796. Accordingly, w e hold t h a t appel- l a n t ' s n o t i c e of appeal w a s n o t timely f i l e d and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e appeal. Appellant challenges t h e a p p r a i s e r ' s f e e upon two grounds--the n e c e s s i t y of t h e expense, and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a p p r a i s e r d i d n o t t e s t i f y a t t h e commission hearing. Appel- l a n t contends t h a t n o t c a l l i n g t h e a p p r a i s e r t o t e s t i f y a t t h e commission hearing deprived it of t h e r i g h t of cross- examination of t h e a p p r a i s e r . A t t h e c o s t hearing respondent produced proof of pay- ment of t h e a p p r a i s e r by a $1,400 c a s h i e r ' s check. he c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t it considered t h e employment of an ap- p r a i s e r a necessary a c t i o n by t h e landowner t o prepare her case, and t h a t t h e s t a t e should reasonably expect t h a t t h e landowners would look t o e x p e r t s i n order t o determine t h e i r damages by v i r t u e of t h e taking. ÿ he only testimony before t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o t h e reasonableness of t h e a p p r a i s e r ' s charges was produced by respondent. That testimony showed t h a t a charge of $175 p e r day f o r e i g h t days was reasonable and usual f o r t h e s e r v i c e s of a professional appraiser. The expense was n e c e s s a r i l y incurred by respondent and under s e c t i o n 70-30-306, MCA, w a s properly awarded here. With r e s p e c t t o t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s , t h e evidence shows t h a t t h e f i n a l o f f e r t o respondent from a p p e l l a n t was $7,800. Respondent entered i n t o a contingent f e e arrangement with her lawyers i n May 1977 f i x i n g t h e a t t o r n e y s ' compensation a t 30 percent of any recovery i n excess of $7,800. The r e t a i n e r c o n t r a c t provided t h a t any amount awarded respon- dent by t h e c o u r t a s a t t o r n e y f e e s would be a c r e d i t a g a i n s t t h e contingent fee. Testimony a t t h e c o s t hearing produced by respondent showed t h a t a 30 percent contingent f e e con- t r a c t i n eminent domain c a s e s , on t h e c a s e s e s t a b l i s h e d here, was reasonable, and perhaps lower than t h e usual one- t h i r d contingent f e e charged by some lawyers. I t was ad- mitted t h a t counsel f o r respondent were experienced p r a c t i - t i o n e r s i n eminent domain cases. It w a s a l s o shown t h a t $50 p e r hour was t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e f o r lawyers' s e r v i c e s i n t h e a r e a a t t h a t t i m e and t h a t i n t h i s case t h e a t t o r n e y s had logged a t o t a l of 80 hours of work, excluding t h e work f o r t h e c o s t hearing. Respondent claimed she was e n t i t l e d t o t h e amount of f e e s c a l c u l a t e d under t h e contingent f e e c o n t r a c t because she was obligated t o pay t h e same i n any event and because t h e contingent f e e was necessary and reasonable under t h e circumstances. Appellant objected, claiming t h a t any f e e i n excess of t h e hourly r a t e was contra t o s e c t i o n 70-30-306, MCA . Section 70-30-306, MCA, became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1977. The contingent f e e was agreed upon i n May 1977, before t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e . The D i s t r i c t Court decided t h a t s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e , which l i m i t s a t t o r n e y f e e s t o be recovered by condemnees t o customary hourly r a t e s f o r a t t o r - neys i n t h e county involved, became e f f e c t i v e a f t e r t h e contingent f e e c o n t r a c t was agreed t o , it would award t h e contingent f e e under t h e s t a t u t e which preceded s e c t i o n 70- 30-306, MCA. Accordingly, t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded $9,600 i n a t t o r n e y fees. Because t h e r e t a i n e r c o n t r a c t was agreed t o before s e c t i o n 70-30-306 came i n t o e f f e c t , t h i s case i s c o n t r o l l e d by S t a t e v. Olsen (1975), 166 Mont. 139, 531 P.2d 1330. I n Olsen t h i s Court approved a contingent f e e c o n t r a c t of 25 percent where proof of t h e reasonableness of t h e percentage was made a t t h e hearing, as necessary t o make t h e landowner whole under A r t i c l e 11, Section 29, 1972 Montana Constitu- t i o n . Here a p p e l l a n t o f f e r e d no evidence a s t o e i t h e r a reasonable hourly r a t e o r t h e reasonableness of 30 percent contingent f e e c o n t r a c t . The D i s t r i c t Court acted according t o t h e evidence before it and t h e p r e v a i l i n g law. Therefore, i t s determination of a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h i s case w i l l n o t be disturbed. Affirmed. W e concur: I / /j J u s t i c e s