Title: State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-
5202.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO DEMOCRATIC PARTY v. BLACKWELL,  
SECY. OF STATE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell,  
111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202.] 
Original action for writ of mandamus to compel Secretary of State to inform 
electioneering-communications entity to comply with R.C. 3517.1011 by 
disclosing all contributors who gave $200 or more to fund political 
advertisements — Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive original 
jurisdiction to determine whether R.C. 3517.1011 and 3517.11 have 
been violated — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2006-1678 ─ Submitted September 25, 2006 ─ Decided October 3, 2006.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in mandamus to compel the 
Secretary of State to perform certain acts allegedly required by Ohio’s Campaign 
Finance Law.  Because we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to determine in an 
original action whether the specified campaign-finance-law provisions have been 
violated, we dismiss the cause. 
{¶ 2} On September 7, 2006, relator, Ohio Democratic Party, filed this 
action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Ohio Secretary of State J. 
Kenneth Blackwell, to (1) “inform Common Sense 2006 that its electioneering 
communication disclosure statements are inaccurate and incomplete, due to their 
failure, inter alia, to disclose the identities of Common Sense Ohio’s contributors” 
and (2) “require Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 to timely file a 
complete and accurate supplemental or amended electioneering communication 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
disclosure statement disclosing all information required by law (pursuant to R.C. 
3517.1011(D)(1) and (2)) regarding the contributors to Common Sense Ohio 
whose contributions were used to produce electioneering communications placed 
by Common Sense 2006.” 
{¶ 3} Relator claims that the Secretary failed to order Common Sense 
2006, an electioneering-communications entity, to comply 
with R.C. 
3517.1011(D), which requires persons and entities financing certain election 
advertisements to disclose all contributors whose contributions totaled $200 or 
more to fund those advertisements.  Relator alleges that Common Sense 2006, 
which engaged in campaign advertising regarding the 2006 gubernatorial 
campaign, erroneously listed Common Sense Ohio, an Ohio nonprofit 
corporation, as its only donor of the $1,537,000 that Common Sense 2006 
allegedly used to pay for the advertisements.  According to relator, Common 
Sense 2006 is required to disclose the identities of persons who contributed $200 
or more to Common Sense Ohio. 
{¶ 4} On September 12, 2006, we stayed discovery and the filing of 
merit briefs and evidence pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) and ordered the parties to 
brief the following jurisdictional issue: 
{¶ 5} “Does the court have jurisdiction in this expedited election case to 
issue a writ of mandamus in light of the fact that the Ohio Elections Commission 
has exclusive jurisdiction over acts and failures to act under R.C. 3517.151 and 
3517.153?  See State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 487, 700 N.E.2d 1232.”  111 Ohio St.3d 
1201, 2006-Ohio-4703, 854 N.E.2d 1081. 
{¶ 6} In accordance with our order, the parties filed briefs on this issue 
on September 19 and 22. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
jurisdictional question. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
Jurisdiction, In General 
{¶ 8} “ ‘Jurisdiction’ means ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power 
to adjudicate the case.’ ”  Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 
806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11, quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
(1998), 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210.  “Subject-matter 
jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its 
merits.”  Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 61 O.O.2d 335, 290 
N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “It is a ‘condition precedent to the 
court’s ability to hear the case.  If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any 
proclamation by that court is void.’ ”  Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 
806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 
Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002. 
Jurisdiction Over Acts or Failures to Act 
Under R.C. 3517.151(A) and 3517.153(A) 
{¶ 9} Relator’s mandamus claim is premised on its allegations that 
Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 are so interrelated that they 
constitute the same entity and that they thus violated R.C. 3517.1011 by filing an 
inaccurate and incomplete electioneering-communications disclosure statement by 
not listing the names of all contributors to Common Sense Ohio who donated 
$200 or more, money that was then passed to Common Sense 2006 to purchase 
television and radio advertisements concerning the 2006 gubernatorial race. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 3517.151(A) expressly provides that “complaints with respect 
to acts or failures to act under the sections listed in division (A) of section 
3517.153 of the Revised Code shall be filed with the Ohio elections commission.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3517.153(A) provides for filing a complaint with the 
commission for violations of R.C. 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18, 3517.20 
to 3517.22, 3599.03, or 3599.031. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 11} Relator complains about the following alleged violations of R.C. 
Chapter 3517:  (1) Common Sense 2006 violated R.C. 3517.1011(D) by not 
disclosing the identities of contributors who donated $200 or more of the 
$1,537,500 donated by Common Sense Ohio to fund the election advertising; (2) 
the Secretary violated R.C. 3517.11(B)(3)(a) by failing to notify Common Sense 
2006 that its electioneering-communications disclosure statement was incomplete 
and inaccurate; and (3) the Secretary violated R.C. 3517.1011(D)(3) by failing to 
require Common Sense 2006 to timely file a complete and accurate supplemental 
or amended electioneering-communications disclosure statement. 
{¶ 12} These claimed violations of the electioneering-communications-
disclosure-statement provisions of R.C. 3517.11 and 3517.1011 are within the 
specified sections listed in R.C. 3517.153(A), i.e., “sections 3517.08 to 3517.13.” 
{¶ 13} In construing these statutory provisions, the court’s paramount 
concern is legislative intent.  State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 
459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 23.  To determine this intent, we read 
words and phrases in context and in accordance with the rules of grammar and 
common usage.  State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-
Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 14} Relator asserts that under these provisions, it could not file a 
complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission against the Secretary because the 
commission’s jurisdiction is restricted to complaints against persons and entities 
who must comply with the election laws, not the public officials who must 
enforce the election laws.  R.C. 3517.151(A), however, broadly applies to 
complaints concerning “acts or failures to act” under the election provisions 
specified in R.C. 3517.153(A).  There is no limitation in these statutes that 
prevents any person from filing a complaint against public officials, including the 
Secretary, alleging that they violated the specified election provisions.  And we 
will not read an implied limitation into the statute.  As United States Supreme 
January Term, 2006 
5 
Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. previously observed in a unanimous 
opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, “the Supreme Court has consistently instructed that statutes written in 
broad, sweeping language should be given broad, sweeping application.”  
Consumer Electronics Assn. v. Fed. Communications Comm. (C.A.D.C.2003), 
347 F.3d 291, 298. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 3517.151(A) then confers exclusive jurisdiction over 
complaints with respect to acts or failures to act under the specified provisions on 
the Ohio Elections Commission:  these complaints “shall be filed with the Ohio 
elections commission.”  (Emphasis added.)  “ ‘[T]he word “shall” shall be 
construed as mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative 
intent that [it] receive a construction other than [its] ordinary usage.’ ”  (Brackets 
sic.)  Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 
522, 2003-Ohio-4358, 794 N.E.2d 56, ¶ 4, quoting Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy 
Dist. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 56 O.O.2d 58, 271 N.E.2d 834, paragraph one of 
the syllabus.  The “shall” in R.C. 3517.151(A) plainly requires mandatory 
construction. 
{¶ 16} Had the General Assembly intended to authorize other tribunals or 
courts to exercise the initial jurisdiction to consider “acts or failures to act under” 
the specified sections of R.C. Chapter 3517, it would have so provided, but it did 
not.  Instead, the General Assembly employed broad, sweeping language to confer 
the exclusive initial jurisdiction to consider these alleged violations on the Ohio 
Elections Commission.  Jurisdiction is conferred on courts in these matters only 
after the commission has rendered a final determination.  R.C. 3517.157(D) (“A 
party adversely affected by a final determination of the commission may appeal 
from the determination under section 119.12 of the Revised Code”). 
Taft-O’Connor ’98 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} This result is supported by precedent.  In State ex rel. Taft-
O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
487, 700 N.E.2d 1232, Friends of Fisher, a campaign committee for the 
November 3, 1998 gubernatorial election, had filed an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  Friends of 
Fisher sought a judgment declaring to be false and fraudulent a television 
commercial aired by Taft-O’Connor ’98, a campaign committee whose candidates 
were the opponents of the candidates supported by Friends of Fisher, and also 
requested an injunction prohibiting Taft-O’Connor ’98 and its candidates and 
agents from broadcasting the advertisement.  The common pleas court granted a 
temporary injunction, and Taft-O’Connor ’98 filed an action in this court for writs 
of mandamus and prohibition to vacate the injunction and dismiss the common 
pleas court case. 
{¶ 18} We granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the Ohio Elections 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in the common 
pleas court case because of R.C. 3517.151(A) and 3517.153(A): 
{¶ 19} “Relator contends, among other things, that Judge Connor had no 
jurisdiction to enter the restraining order in Friends of Fisher and has no 
jurisdiction to take any other action in that matter because the Ohio Elections 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in that litigation.  
We agree. 
{¶ 20} “The Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the claims of fraudulent and false statements raised by Friends of Fisher in the 
underlying action.  R.C. 3517.151(A) expressly provides that ‘complaints with 
respect to acts or failures to act under the sections listed in division A of section 
3517.153 of the Revised Code shall be filed with the Ohio elections commission * 
* *.’  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3517.153(A) provides for filing a complaint with 
the commission for violations of R.C. 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18, 
January Term, 2006 
7 
3517.20 to 3517.22, 3599.03, or 3599.031.  R.C. 3517.21(B)(10) forbids persons, 
during any campaign for nomination or election to public office, by means of 
television advertisement, to knowingly and with intent to affect the outcome of 
the campaign ‘[p]ost, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a 
false statement concerning a candidate, either knowing the same to be false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed 
to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.’ ” 
{¶ 21} “Additionally, actions for declaratory judgment and injunction are 
generally considered to be inappropriate where, as here, special statutory 
proceedings would be bypassed.  See, generally, State ex rel. Albright v. 
Delaware Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 572 N.E.2d 
1387, 1389.  By filing a declaratory judgment and injunction action in the 
common pleas court, plaintiff in Friends of Fisher bypassed the mandatory 
statutory procedure provided by R.C. Chapter 3517 for the filing of complaints 
with the Ohio Elections Commission.  Thus, in Friends of Fisher, the respondents 
had no jurisdiction to resolve matters committed to special statutory proceedings, 
the lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, and an extraordinary writ will 
therefore issue.”  Id. at 488-489, 700 N.E.2d 1232. 
{¶ 22} Subsequently, in State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 169, 171-172, 712 N.E.2d 742, a unanimous opinion, we cited Taft-
O’Connor ’98 in support of the statement “When the General Assembly intends to 
vest exclusive jurisdiction in a court or agency, it provides it by appropriate 
statutory language.” 
{¶ 23} Here, as in Taft-O’Connor ’98, the Ohio Elections Commission 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised concerning the electioneering-
communications-disclosure-statement provisions of R.C. 3517.1011 and 3517.11.  
Relator cannot bypass the special statutory procedures provided by R.C. Chapter 
3517 by filing a court action alleging violations of these provisions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Constitutional Jurisdiction in Mandamus 
{¶ 24} Relator asserts that even if R.C. 3517.151(A) and 3517.153(A) 
generally vest exclusive jurisdiction in the elections commission over claims 
alleging violations of the pertinent election statutes, these statutes do not bar this 
court’s constitutional jurisdiction in mandamus. 
{¶ 25} “Under Section 2(B)(1)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions, and 
pursuant to Section 2(B)(3), Article IV, ‘[n]o law shall be passed or rule made 
whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of 
the supreme court.’ ”  State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 
90 Ohio St.3d 55, 59, 734 N.E.2d 811.  “Statutes * * * ‘should not be construed as 
controlling the exercise of original jurisdiction in [extraordinary writ actions] 
constitutionally granted to courts of appeals and this court.’ ”  Id. at 60, 734 
N.E.2d 811, quoting State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 
593, 635 N.E.2d 26. 
{¶ 26} Relator relies on Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 
O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, and Wilke to support its claim that R.C. 
3517.151(A) and 3517.153(A) do not require the dismissal of this mandamus 
action for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow, however, these 
authorities are not controlling in this case. 
{¶ 27} First, Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution is 
inapplicable.  Section 2(B)(3) precludes any law or rule from preventing any 
person “from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.”  “Prior to 
1913, the Supreme Court had the discretion to decline to exercise its original 
jurisdiction over extraordinary writs.”  Hughes v. Scaffide (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 
85, 88-89, 7 O.O.3d 175, 372 N.E.2d 598; see, also, State ex rel. Werden v. 
Williams (1875), 26 Ohio St. 170.  “This court reasoned that, absent a showing of 
January Term, 2006 
9 
special circumstances, lower courts were more appropriate and convenient 
tribunals in which to determine whether extraordinary writs should issue.”  
Hughes, 53 Ohio St.2d at 89, 7 O.O.3d 175, 372 N.E.2d 598. 
{¶ 28} Under this rule, “an action in mandamus could not be filed 
originally in this court without the court’s permission, for the reason that ‘it can 
more speedily and conveniently be heard in the District Court.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 145, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 
N.E.2d 631, quoting Werden, 26 Ohio St. 170.  Parties seeking to file a mandamus 
action in the Supreme Court were thus required to seek leave to file the petition. 
State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch (1913), 87 Ohio St. 444, 445-446, 101 N.E. 352 
(application for leave to file mandamus action “is consonant with a practice long 
since established and consistently adhered to in this court to require leave to file 
petitions invoking the exercise of its original jurisdiction upon any of the subjects 
within that jurisdiction”). 
{¶ 29} The sentence now contained in Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution was proposed by the 1912 Constitutional Convention and was 
adopted by the Ohio electorate, effective January 1, 1913.  Pressley, 11 Ohio 
St.2d at 145, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631.  The debates at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1912 indicate that the intent of the delegate proposing the 
amendment was to end the Supreme Court’s practice of requiring leave of court 
before bringing an action for an extraordinary writ in the court: 
{¶ 30} “The supreme court has very little original jurisdiction.  It is fair to 
assume that the purpose in giving the supreme court this original jurisdiction was 
for the benefit of the litigant and not for the benefit of the court.  The supreme 
court has been laboring with congested dockets and for a number of years has 
required anyone seeking to invade the jurisdiction to first get the consent of the 
court to file his appeal.  The result has been in quo warranto and mandamus and 
other cases in which original jurisdiction is invoked, the court has required 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
suitors to go to the circuit court.  One result has been that in many cases brought 
by the attorney general he has been required to go to the circuit court of Franklin 
county.  This has, therefore, added largely to the work of this circuit, and after all 
it has not put on the supreme court any considerable amount of work because 
cases of that kind generally wind up in the court of final resort.  We have taken 
from the supreme court one-half or more of all its jurisdiction when we have 
secured a ratification of the Peck proposal, and that being so there is no longer 
any reason why the supreme court cannot exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon 
it by this amendment to the constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  2 Proceedings and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention (1912) 1831. 
{¶ 31} “From this it would appear that the purpose of the amendment was 
to end the procedural discretion then being exercised by the supreme court.”  
Note, Constitutional Law─Refusal to Take Jurisdiction on a Writ of Mandamus 
(1954), 15 Ohio St.L.J. 474, 476.  Consistent with this purpose, we held that our 
previous practice was invalid because the constitutional amendment to Section 2, 
Article IV “will not permit this court either to adopt or adhere to a rule which 
requires permission to invoke the exercise of its original jurisdiction.”  Toledo, 87 
Ohio St. at 449, 101 N.E. 352. 
{¶ 32} This case, however, has nothing to do with a rule by which this 
court or the General Assembly has given permission to this court to refuse to 
consider an otherwise viable original action in mandamus.  Therefore, the purpose 
of Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution is not contravened by 
vesting exclusive original jurisdiction over claims related to certain election 
provisions in the Ohio Elections Commission. 
{¶ 33} Second, Pressley is similarly distinguishable.  In that case, the 
court merely held that pursuant to Toledo, 87 Ohio St. 444, 101 N.E. 352, “it is 
now the settled law that it is not constitutionally permissible for this court to make 
a rule that it will not exercise jurisdiction in a mandamus action, filed originally in 
January Term, 2006 
11 
this court, on the ground that statutory mandamus is available in the Common 
Pleas Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  Pressley, 11 Ohio St.2d at 147, 40 O.O.2d 141, 
228 N.E.2d 631.  Such a rule would be comparable to the previous Supreme Court 
practice requiring that persons seek leave to invoke the original jurisdiction of the 
court in extraordinary-writ actions, which led to the 1913 amendment now found 
in Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution barring this practice.  
Again, no such rule or statute is at issue here. 
{¶ 34} Third, Wilke does not support relator’s contention.  The statute that 
we noted was constitutionally invalid under Sections 2(B)(1)(b) and 2(B)(3), 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution in Wilke recognized the right of a probate 
judge who disagreed with the amount appropriated for the court by the county 
board of commissioners to file a mandamus action, but improperly limited that 
right to a mandamus action in the court of appeals.  See R.C. 2101.11(B); Wilke, 
90 Ohio St.3d at 59-60, 734 N.E.2d 811.  In essence, this statute is comparable to 
the invalid court practice at issue in Toledo and the statute in Pressley, which, in 
effect, required persons to file writ actions in lower courts instead of in the 
Supreme Court.  Further, in Wilke, we emphasized that the specific claim there — 
to compel funding for the reasonable and necessary expenses of the common 
pleas court and its divisions — was one for which mandamus had previously been 
recognized to be appropriate.  Id. at 60, 734 N.E.2d 811.  More important, 
because the respondents in Wilke did not claim that R.C. 2101.11(B)(2) required 
that the judge file his mandamus action in the court of appeals rather than the 
Supreme Court, all of the discussion in that case cited by relator in support of its 
claim in this case is dicta.  See State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 142, 147, 684 N.E.2d 1228 (party in writ case erroneously relied on dicta 
from prior case, which was unnecessary to the court’s holding in that case). 
{¶ 35} Therefore, nothing in Sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(3), Article IV of 
the Ohio Constitution and cases like Wilke and Pressley construing those 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
provisions justifies holding that this court retains jurisdiction over the claimed 
violations of R.C. 3517.1011 and 3517.11 notwithstanding the elections 
commission’s exclusive original jurisdiction over these violations.  None of the 
cases cited by relator involve a situation comparable to that before the court, i.e., 
where a tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
claimed violations.  There is also no existing precedent recognizing mandamus as 
an appropriate remedy for these alleged violations. 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Prevents Judicial Intervention 
{¶ 36} At the time the pertinent provisions of R.C. 3517.1011 and 
3517.11 were enacted by the General Assembly, it appears that no comparable 
common-law rights existed.  The General Assembly thus created these rights and 
specified that complaints regarding all acts or failures to act under the specified 
provisions be filed with the Ohio Elections Commission, which is a bipartisan 
tribunal of seven members.  R.C. 3517.152. 
{¶ 37} “ ‘If the General Assembly has provided a remedy for the 
enforcement of a specific new right, a court may not on its own initiative apply 
another remedy it deems appropriate.’ ”  Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. 
Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 
169, 572 N.E.2d 87, quoting Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 
150, 155, 59 O.O. 212, 134 N.E.2d 371.  In other words, “[w]here the General 
Assembly by statute creates a new right and at the same time prescribes remedies 
or penalties for its violation, the courts may not intervene and create an additional 
remedy.”  Fletcher, 165 Ohio St. at 154, 59 O.O. 212, 134 N.E.2d 371. 
{¶ 38} More pertinently, we have held that courts that have general 
constitutional jurisdiction in mandamus, e.g., courts of appeals─see Section 
3(B)(1)(b), Article IV, Ohio Constitution─patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over mandamus claims concerning matters that are vested in the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of another tribunal.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Geauga 
January Term, 2006 
13 
Cty. Budget Comm. v. Court of Appeals for Geauga Cty. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 
110, 1 OBR 143, 438 N.E.2d 428 (granting writ of prohibition to prevent court of 
appeals from exercising original jurisdiction over mandamus action because 
Board of Tax Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a budget 
commission had improperly refused to certify a levy); cf. State ex rel. Weiss v. 
Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 470, 476, 605 N.E.2d 37 (noting that writ of 
mandamus will not issue to compel a classified employee’s reinstatement or back 
pay until there is a final determination made in an appeal from the State Personnel 
Board of Review, a local civil-service commission, or other quasi-judicial 
authority that the employee was wrongfully excluded from employment). 
{¶ 39} Similarly, we lack jurisdiction to consider relator’s claims alleging 
violations of campaign-finance law that are within the exclusive original 
jurisdiction of the elections commission. 
True Objective─Adequate Remedy 
{¶ 40} Relator argues that we should exercise jurisdiction over its 
mandamus claim because relief through the complaint procedure in the elections 
commission would be inadequate.  Mandamus is not available where there is an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  R.C. 2731.05; State ex rel. 
Vaughn Industries, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 109 Ohio St.3d 482, 2006-
Ohio-2994, 849 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 18.  In order to constitute an adequate remedy, the 
alternative must be complete, beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. Smith v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 106 Ohio St.3d 151, 2005-Ohio-4103, 
832 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 41} Relator’s contention fails because of our manifest lack of 
jurisdiction due to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the elections commission.  
See Geauga Cty. Budget Comm., 1 Ohio St.3d at 113, 1 OBR 143, 438 N.E.2d 
428 (case in which the court concluded that the “availability of an adequate 
remedy at law is of no consequence in light of the [court of appeals’] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction” to proceed in mandamus because the subject 
matter was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Board of Tax 
Appeals). 
{¶ 42} Moreover, it is evident that the true objective of relator’s 
mandamus action is to obtain disclosure of the Common Sense Ohio contributors’ 
identities.  See State ex rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 
844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 41-42 (court looks beyond terms of mandamus claim in order 
to determine real objects sought); see, also, State ex rel. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002-Ohio-5312, 776 N.E.2d 92, 
¶ 21 (casting allegations in common pleas court case to sound in tort or contract is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on court when claim is one that the Public 
Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve). 
{¶ 43} Relator requests the writ to compel the Secretary to inform 
Common Sense 2006 that its electioneering-communications disclosure statement 
is inaccurate and incomplete and to require Common Sense 2006 and Common 
Sense Ohio to timely file a complete and accurate statement or an amended 
statement.  But the ultimate legal relief that relator seeks is the disclosure of the 
names of individual contributors of $200 or more to Common Sense Ohio. 
{¶ 44} It is readily apparent from their motion to quash subpoenas filed in 
this case that even if we were to order the requested writ to compel the Secretary 
to order them to file a corrected statement, Common Sense 2006 and Common 
Sense Ohio would not disclose the donors’ names because of their claim that R.C. 
3517.1011 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to them because it 
impinges on their First Amendment right of political speech.  Cf. McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm. (1995), 514 U.S. 334, 348, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 
426 (“Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more than 
the provision of additional information that may either buttress or undermine the 
January Term, 2006 
15 
argument in a document, we think the identity of the speaker is no different from 
other components of the document’s content that the author is free to include or 
exclude.  * * * The simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant 
information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or 
disclosures she would otherwise omit”). 
{¶ 45} As relator itself acknowledges, if Common Sense Ohio and 
Common Sense 2006 refuse the Secretary’s order for them to file a complete 
electioneering-communications disclosure statement, the Secretary would then 
have a duty to file a complaint against these entities in the elections commission.  
R.C. 3517.11(C)(1). 
{¶ 46} Under these circumstances, the requested writ would place relator 
in no better position than it would have been in had it simply filed a complaint 
against Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 with the elections 
commission itself pursuant to R.C. 3517.151(A) and 3517.153(A).  Consequently, 
this remedy would be as complete, beneficial, and speedy as if we had granted the 
requested writ.  State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 
450, 663 N.E.2d 639 (mandamus would not lie to compel respondent agency 
director to report alleged criminal violations to law-enforcement officials because 
relator-employee could himself report these alleged violations to the same 
officials). 
{¶ 47} Therefore, assuming disclosure of contributor names is indeed 
relator’s ultimate goal, its mandamus claim is not appropriate because issuance of 
the writ will not achieve that goal.  It is well established that “ ‘[m]andamus will 
not issue to compel a vain act.’ ”  State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible 
Dev. v. Talarico, 106 Ohio St.3d 481, 2005-Ohio-5061, 836 N.E.2d 529, ¶ 17, 
quoting State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 
N.E.2d 812, ¶ 38. 
Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶ 48} Because the General Assembly has vested the exclusive original 
jurisdiction over complaints concerning acts or failures to act under R.C. 
3517.1011 and 3517.11 in the Ohio Elections Commission, courts lack 
jurisdiction to consider claims alleging such acts or failures to act, regardless of 
whether the action is in declaratory judgment and injunction or in mandamus.  In 
other words, the General Assembly has established the rights and duties as 
specified in these election provisions, and in these circumstances, it has further 
chosen to confer the Ohio Elections Commission with the exclusive original 
jurisdiction to determine whether there has been a violation of those provisions. 
{¶ 49} This decision does not limit or otherwise affect this court’s general 
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction in mandamus.  We simply hold that, based 
on the plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 3517.151 and 3517.153, and 
consistent with our precedent in Taft-O’Connor ’98, 83 Ohio St.3d 487, 700 
N.E.2d 1232, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to consider relator’s claim 
alleging violations of R.C. 3517.1011 and 3517.11, and, therefore, we dismiss the 
cause. 
{¶ 50} We refrain from addressing the merits of relator’s claim in 
accordance with the court’s general rule that “ ‘we will not issue advisory 
opinions, [a rule that] applies equally to election cases.’ ”  State ex rel. Essig v. 
Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 34, quoting 
State ex rel. Barletta v. Fersch, 99 Ohio St.3d 295, 2003-Ohio-3629, 791 N.E.2d 
452, ¶ 22.  This conclusion is also consistent with the “ ‘cardinal principal of 
judicial restraint — if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to 
decide more.’ ”  State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 
262, 2005-Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 34, quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. 
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 
799 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).  The pending motions to 
quash and to remove this case from the expedited-election docket are moot. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
Cause dismissed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., concur in judgment. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 51} I dissent from the majority’s determination that the complaint in 
this mandamus case must be dismissed.  Rather, the Ohio Elections Commission 
does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations raised, and this court 
does have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain this action. 
{¶ 52} A majority of this court in State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. 
Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 487, 488, 700 
N.E.2d 1232, did state within its brief opinion that “[t]he Ohio Elections 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims of fraudulent and false 
statements raised * * * in the underlying action.”  However, this case is 
distinguishable from Taft-O’Connor ’98. 
{¶ 53} In Taft-O’Connor ’98, this court issued a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a trial court judge from entertaining an action for declaratory judgment 
and injunction when the subject of the complaint filed in the trial court involved 
the content of a certain political television commercial.  The specific action that 
was filed in the trial court was based on the allegation that the television ad was 
false and fraudulent.  In granting the writ of prohibition, this court determined that 
under the circumstances, the allegation was so manifestly appropriate for 
determination by the Ohio Elections Commission that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to consider it. 
{¶ 54} This case, in contrast, does not involve any allegations regarding 
the truthfulness or falsity of a campaign ad.  This case seeks to compel the 
Secretary of State to perform his statutory duties regarding the alleged failure to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
disclose the identity of contributors.  Although the Ohio Elections Commission 
may be a possible alternative venue in which relator may seek relief, that body 
does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over the allegations raised in the 
complaint before this court in this situation, for two main reasons. 
{¶ 55} Unlike the majority, I would first hold that the statutory scheme 
within R.C. Chapter 3517 does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the elections 
commission to adjudicate relator’s complaint.  For that reason, I would proceed to 
reach a second conclusion, which is that under these facts, the potential remedy 
available through the elections commission would not be an adequate one.  
Consequently, this court should retain jurisdiction over this case. 
{¶ 56} Nothing in the statutory scheme involving the elections 
commission expressly indicates that the elections commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to handle all election complaints.  See Taft-O’Connor ’98, 83 Ohio 
St.3d at 489, 700 N.E.2d 1232 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in judgment only).  In light 
of Section 2(B)(1)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which provides for this 
court’s original jurisdiction over writs of mandamus, we should not interpret 
statutes limiting this court’s mandamus jurisdiction more broadly than necessary.  
The majority’s determination that the elections commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the allegations of the complaint also implicates Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which ensures that all injured parties “have 
remedy by due course of law.”  See Taft-O’Connor ’98, 83 Ohio St.3d at 489, 700 
N.E.2d 1232 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in judgment only).  The majority decision 
stretches the effect of the statutory scheme beyond its appropriate reach. 
{¶ 57} In order for a writ of mandamus to issue, three criteria must be 
met.  The relator must establish a clear legal right to the relief requested, there 
must be a corresponding clear legal duty on the respondent to take the action 
sought by the relator, and the relator must not have an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel Union Cty. Veterans Serv. Comm. v. 
January Term, 2006 
19 
Parrott, 108 Ohio St.3d 302, 2006-Ohio-92, 843 N.E.2d 750, ¶ 8.  The majority’s 
holding that the Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
allegations in relator’s complaint is tantamount to holding that the third criterion 
is not met in the circumstances of this case. 
{¶ 58} For a particular remedy to be adequate, it must be “complete, 
beneficial, and speedy.”  State ex rel. Arnett v. Winemiller (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 
255, 259, 685 N.E.2d 1219.  If a particular remedy is not sufficiently speedy or 
sufficiently complete, it is not adequate.  Id. 
{¶ 59} “[T]he elections commission is in many circumstances unable to 
provide a meaningful remedy to a candidate who suffers substantial, irreparable 
injury as the result of election law violations, especially when the injury occurs 
close to the election date.  * * * 
{¶ 60} “* * * [W]hen certain, substantial, and irreparable harm is 
imminent as the result of an election law violation, that jurisdiction may not 
provide a constitutionally adequate remedy.”  Taft-O’Connor ’98, 83 Ohio St.3d 
at 490, 700 N.E.2d 1232 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in judgment only).  Based on past 
experience, that observation rings especially true in this case. 
{¶ 61} In the 2000 election season, the group Citizens for a Strong Ohio 
ran questionable ads seeking to influence the results of the election and refused to 
reveal the identity of its donors.  Complaints against the group were filed with the 
Ohio Elections Commission, but the group was able to extend the process of 
resolving the complaints for years through various maneuvers, including filing 
appeals.  In Ohio Elections Comm. v. Ohio Chamber of Commerce & Citizens for 
a Strong Ohio, 158 Ohio App.3d 557, 2004-Ohio-5253, 817 N.E.2d 447, the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals upheld a ruling that Citizens for a Strong Ohio 
was required to reveal the donors who had funded the ads that ran in 2000.  It was 
not until January 2005, more than four years after the 2000 election, that the 
group finally released its list of donors.  For an article about the case and a link to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
the donors list, see http://www.cleveland.com/newslogs/plaindealer/index.ssf?/ 
mtlogs/cleve_plaindealer/archives/2005_01.html (entry for January 28, 2005). 
{¶ 62} If anything was definitively established by that experience, it was 
that the Ohio Elections Commission is absolutely unable to provide speedy and 
effective relief in some situations.  According to the majority, the complaint in 
this case involves a similar situation and is relegated to the Ohio Elections 
Commission.  It may suffer the same fate.  The Ohio Elections Commission will 
not be able to definitively resolve this case on the merits before the election.  The 
remedy available through the commission would be so untimely that it comes 
close to being illusory. 
{¶ 63} For all the foregoing reasons, I would not dismiss the cause, but 
would retain jurisdiction over relator’s mandamus claim.  Further, I would deny 
the pending motions to quash, would deny respondent’s recent motion to remove 
this case from the expedited-elections calendar, and would set a schedule for the 
submission of briefs and evidence. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 64} I write separately in dissent to state my view that the Ohio 
Democratic Party has properly filed its mandamus action in this court.  Section 
2(B)(1)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides that the Supreme Court 
has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions, and Section 2(B)(3), Article IV 
specifies that “[n]o law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be 
prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” 
{¶ 65} To obtain a writ of mandamus, a party is required to demonstrate a 
clear legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the 
governmental actor requested to perform the acts, and the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
January Term, 2006 
21 
Court of Common Pleas, 106 Ohio St.3d 151, 2005-Ohio-4103, 832 N.E.2d 1206, 
¶ 13.  In my view, the Ohio Democratic Party should have an opportunity to 
demonstrate its entitlement to a writ of mandamus and to establish its compliance 
with the standard for obtaining a writ. 
{¶ 66} Accordingly, I would afford the parties an opportunity to brief the 
issues before the court and consider the matter on its merits.  Therefore, I dissent. 
____________________ 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Scott E. North, Kathleen M. 
Trafford, Ralph F. Gildehaus III, Julie L. Atchison, and L. Bradfield Hughes, for 
relator. 
 
Langdon & Hartman, L.L.C., David R. Langdon, Curt C. Hartman, and 
Joshua B. Bolinger; Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Sharon A. Jennings and 
Richard N. Coglianese, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
______________________