Title: Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Const. Co

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Weston County Hosp. Joint Powers Bd. v. Westates Const. Co1992 WY 150841 P.2d 841Case Number: 90-99Decided: 11/20/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

WESTON 
COUNTYHOSPITAL JOINT 
POWERS BOARD, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

WESTATES 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 Raymond B. 
Hunkins, Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellant.

Joseph 
E. Hallock, Banks, Johnson, Wolfe & Hallock, Gillette, and John J. Delaney, 
Banks, Johnson, Johnson, Colbath & Huffman, Rapid City, S.D., for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1.]     The set of questions 
that the court must determine in resolving this appeal is:

1. 
Whether a joint powers board, created pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming 
Joint Powers Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 16-1-102 to -109 (1990), is a "political 
subdivision" as to which the requirements of Article 16, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming must be met before a bill, claim, account 
or demand can be audited, allowed, or paid?

2. 
Whether a joint powers board is a "governmental entity" so that a claimant must 
satisfy the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113 (1988)?

3. 
Whether, assuming that a joint powers board is a "political subdivision" or a 
"governmental entity," the record demonstrates satisfaction of the 
constitutional or statutory requirements?

The 
trial court ruled that the joint powers board was not a "political subdivision;" 
there had been no violation of the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113 (1988) 
because the conduct of arbitration proceedings was a condition precedent to the 
accrual of any claim; the requirements of § 1-39-113 were substantially 
satisfied; and the award of the arbitrators should be confirmed. Consistently 
with the trial court, we hold that a joint powers board is not a "political 
subdivision;" a joint powers board is a "governmental entity" and the provisions 
of § 1-39-113 must be satisfied; in the circumstances of this case in which the 
action was instituted by the joint powers board, a waiver of compliance with the 
notice requirements must be acknowledged; and the award of the arbitrators 
appropriately and correctly was confirmed. We affirm the decision of the trial 
court.

 [¶2.]     Weston County Hospital 
Joint Powers Board (Board), as appellant, frames these issues for this 
appeal:

I. 
Whether the district court had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award on a 
claim against a Wyoming governmental entity where the claimant 
neglected and refused to comply with the requisite procedures mandated by the 
Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act?

II. 
Whether the district court erred in confirming an arbitration award against a 
Wyoming public 
entity where the claimant failed to provide documentation sufficient for the 
public entity to examine the claim by means of a constitutionally contemplated 
and court-ordered audit?

III. 
Whether the district court erred in confirming an arbitration award which 
contained manifest mistakes of, and disregard for, Wyoming law, resulting in 
an award which exceeded the arbitration panel's powers?

IV. 
Whether the district court erred in failing to modify the arbitration award to 
incorporate the installment payment provisions of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act?

Westates 
Construction Company (Westates), as appellee and the defendant in the court 
below, sets forth this statement of the issues:

I. 
Whether the district court had jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award in 
favor of a contractor and against a joint powers board?

A. 
Whether compliance with Article 16, Section 7, of the Wyoming Constitution, 
pertaining to political subdivisions, is a prerequisite to the arbitration of a 
contractor's claim against a hospital joint powers board?

B. 
Whether the 1984 Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101, et seq., 
prohibits arbitration of damage claims between a contractor and a joint powers 
board even though contract documents prepared by the joint powers board require 
arbitration to resolve such claims?

C. 
Whether Westates' claims were timely filed?

II. 
Whether the district court erred in confirming the arbitration 
award?

III. 
Whether the district court erred in refusing to modify the award to incorporate 
the installment provisions of the Governmental Claims Act?

 [¶3.]     The Board was created 
pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
16-1-102 to -109 (1990), by the towns of Upton 
and Newcastle together with WestonCounty. There is no dispute that these 
three entities all are "political subdivisions." Westates, a privately owned 
Wyoming corporation, in August of 1984, entered into an agreement with the Board 
pursuant to which Westates was to construct a public hospital in Newcastle. The 
contract, which was drafted by the Board, provided that Westates was to pursue 
any and all disputes arising from the contract through arbitration proceedings 
before being allowed access to the courts.

 [¶4.]     The hospital 
construction project was substantially completed in May of 1986 and, in October 
of that year, Westates sought additional compensation of $682,369.59. Westates 
presented its claim for this amount in an unverified and unsigned letter that 
was sent by its attorney to a member of the Board. The claim for additional 
compensation was refused, and Westates, pursuant to the agreement, sought 
arbitration through the American Arbitration Association.

 [¶5.]     Within a short time, 
the Board filed an action in the district court seeking to quash further 
proceedings. The Board contended that the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 to -120 (1988), inhibited the enforcement of 
the arbitration clause incorporated in the contract. The district court, after 
considering the arguments of the parties, ruled that the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act did not prevent enforcement of the arbitration clause and that 
arbitration was appropriate under the circumstances. The Board appealed that 
ruling to this court, but its appeal was dismissed in June of 1988 on the ground 
that the order of the district court was not a final order, as defined in 
Wyo.R.App.P. 1.05.

 [¶6.]     After dismissal of its 
appeal, the Board requested an audit of Westates' records. When Westates 
refused, the Board filed an "Application for Order Authorizing Conduct of an 
Audit" in the district court. The district court, in accordance with the 
stipulation presented by the parties, incorporated that request into an order, 
and the Board's independent auditor accomplished the audit. The end result of 
the audit was that all but $4,000 of the additional compensation demanded by 
Westates was rejected.

 [¶7.]     The arbitration 
proceedings were conducted in February and May of 1989. After its case-in-chief 
was completed, Westates presented a revised, and diminished, summary of its 
claim so as to conform it to the evidence. Immediately following the Board's 
argument in the arbitration proceedings, Westates adjusted the claim once again. 
The final product of the arbitration was an award of $99,905 in favor of 
Westates. Promptly thereafter, Westates filed its "Motion for Order Confirming 
Arbitration Award" with the district court. The Board, sometime later, filed its 
"Application to Vacate, Modify or Correct Arbitration Award." On March 1, 1990, 
the district court, after ruling that the Board was not a "political 
subdivision" and that Westates' claim first accrued when the American 
Arbitration Association entered its award, denied the Board's motion. The court 
entered a judgment for Westates in the amount determined by the arbitration. The 
Board has appealed from that order.

 [¶8.]     The major premise for 
the Board's argument is found in its contention that the district court was 
without jurisdiction to rule in the case because Westates had not followed the 
process established by Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 as it was required to do. 
Article 16, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides as 
follows:

     Payment of public 
money.

      No money shall be paid 
out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on warrant drawn 
by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political 
subdivision, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized 
statement in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with 
the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the same (emphasis 
added).

Concretely, 
the Board asserts that Westates had a duty to present a "full itemized statement 
in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury," to the Board's officer or 
officers, whose duty it was to audit the same in accordance with the 
requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, before proceeding to arbitration. The 
Board then contends that Westates is now foreclosed from any remedy by the 
inherent statute of limitations found in § 1-39-113, because more than two years 
have passed since the hospital project was completed, and no such document has 
been presented. Cf. Dee v. LaramieCounty, 666 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 1983) (court lacks 
jurisdiction in action against government entity when no claim has been filed 
pursuant to § 1-39-113). The Board couples to this argument a contention that 
the only effective forum in which Westates could have pursued its rejected claim 
was the district court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Weston County, 
and that any resolution offered by virtue of the arbitration proceedings was 
inefficacious because the arbitration award was confirmed by a court lacking 
jurisdiction. The concomitant of this argument is that the arbitration clause 
included in the contract, even though it was fully complied with, is not binding 
upon the Board.

 [¶9.]     The Board was 
established pursuant to the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 16-1-102 to 
-109 (1990), and, being neither the State nor a county, the Board must be a 
"political subdivision" in order to insist upon compliance with the requirements 
of the constitution. If the Board is not a "political subdivision," it must 
defend the confirmation of the arbitration upon some alternative 
ground.

 [¶10.]  The criteria for identifying a "political 
subdivision" are found in Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community 
Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, reh'rg denied, 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1978). 
There, we concluded that a "`political subdivision' must be an entity of the 
same kind or class as a county, city, township, town or school district," 
Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1112, and that it would be characterized by certain 
distinctive badges including a prescribed geographic area, a requirement for 
having officers duly elected by the inhabitants of that area at a public 
election, and a legal power to levy and collect taxes. Witzenburger. This is 
still the applicable test. While the list we have recited is not all-inclusive, 
any "body politic" not possessing at least these three basic attributes cannot 
be a "political subdivision." See Witzenburger.

 [¶11.]  After examining the Wyoming Joint Powers 
Act, we find that two of the Witzenburger criteria clearly cannot be ascribed to 
the Board. First: The Board will have no elected officials. All its members, 
including any member who may be assigned the role of an officer, must be 
appointed by the governing bodies of the participating agencies. Wyo. Stat. § 16-1-106(a), 
(b). In this instance, the participating agencies are the towns of Upton and Newcastle and 
WestonCounty. Second: The Board 
has no independent power to tax. Wyo. Stat. § 16-1-107. Further, although not 
proscribed by the Wyoming Joint Powers Act as are the other two requisite 
criteria, the record does not demonstrate any specific territorial or geographic 
boundaries within which the Board is contained or has the authority to function. 
Wyo. Stat. § 
16-1-101 to -109.

 [¶12.]  We hold that the Board does not comply 
with even the threshold criteria for identification as a "political 
subdivision," as articulated in Witzenburger, and we need not review the claims 
of the Board concerning the constitutional demands and Westates' alleged failure 
to meet those requirements. Wyo.Const. art. 16, § 7 does not apply in this 
instance. The Board's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
because of the failure to comply with those constitutional mandates, including 
those requiring itemization and certification under penalty of perjury, is 
without merit since the Board is not a "political 
subdivision."

 [¶13.]  The Board offers an alternative argument 
for identifying it as a "political subdivision." It cites Frank v. City of Cody, 
572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977), for the proposition, which certainly is sound, that 
nothing prohibits existing "political subdivisions from joining together as 
allowed by the Joint Powers Act." The argument the Board advances is that any 
such aggregate of "political subdivisions" inherently must be recognized as a 
"political subdivision." This sophisticated argument is an application of the 
adage that "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts." In addition, the 
further contention is that any separate body, board, or agency created by 
another entity or entities must be for all intents and purposes essentially the 
same as the entity or entities out of which it is formed. The conclusion then 
asserted is that the Board, no matter how it is formed, must be perceived as 
possessed of the cumulative powers, rights, and constitutional or statutory 
protection available to any of its individual constituents. Stated another way, 
the Board argues that any claim or demand directed to the Board is a claim or 
demand addressed to its participating agencies, of which one is a county and the 
other two are political subdivisions.

 [¶14.]  The fallacy in this contention is the 
assumption that, by the creation of a joint powers board, the participating 
entities in some manner merge so as to form a body that is essentially the 
equivalent of their individual identities. This is not the case. The 
participating entities, whatever they may be, do not merge. Instead, they simply 
agree to create and support a different and independently managed organization 
that exists and functions for their mutual benefit. In doing so, they do not 
surrender or delegate any of their individual rights and 
prerogatives.

 [¶15.]  In advancing this theory, the Board 
apparently ignores the fact that many, if not most, special purpose governmental 
agencies or bodies, such as the Board, are created specifically to establish a 
separate organization that, for whatever reasons, is independent of its 
participants. These new entities function to pool resources and establish a 
buffer isolating the participating entities. It follows that an attack on the 
new body is not an attack on the participating entities and, consequently, the 
only protections or powers it may need, or legally has, are those specifically 
identified in its enabling statute and other controlling authorities. The very 
existence of the Joint Powers Act, which defines a discrete entity that is 
independent of the participating entities, supports this resolution and is 
contrary to the contention of the Board. We hold that an independent "special 
purpose" body or unit created through an arrangement between other governmental 
entities, like a joint powers board, does not assume the collective 
characteristics, or the rights and responsibilities of the individual 
participants. A joint powers board is what the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, and 
other controlling authority, say it is, without more. It is not an entity that 
is possessed of the collective characteristics and powers of those entities that 
created it. A "governmental entity" that is formed by a coalition of "political 
subdivisions" is not another "political subdivision," unless it somehow is 
possessed of the criteria identified in Witzenburger. Perhaps this point is 
sufficiently emphasized by noting that Westates, in apparent recognition of this 
distinction, sought its remedy, not from the towns of Upton and Newcastle and 
WestonCounty which were the 
participating entities, but from the Board itself.

 [¶16.]  Another suggestion offered by the Board, 
is that a "governmental entity" and a "political subdivision" are equivalent 
concepts. Possibly, this contention is suggested by § 1-39-103(a)(i) and (ii). 
The first subparagraph defines governmental entities to include the State, the 
University of 
Wyoming, and any local 
government. The second subparagraph defines local government and includes joint 
powers boards, as well as all political subdivisions of the state among the 
numerous bodies identified. It is clear that, using the broad definition of a 
governmental entity, any political subdivision is a governmental entity. The 
inverse, however, is not true and a governmental entity does not necessarily 
constitute a political subdivision. Perhaps the best demonstration of that 
verity is that it would be unnecessary to include "political subdivision" in the 
definition of § 1-39-103(a)(ii) if any governmental entity were a political 
subdivision. A conclusion such as that suggested with respect to the 
qualification of a governmental entity as a political subdivision would rob the 
rationale of this court in Witzenburger of any efficacy.

 [¶17.]  We turn then to the argument that 
Westates was required to comply with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act since 
the Board clearly is a governmental entity within the definition found in § 
1-39-103(a)(i). The Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides that no suit may be 
maintained against either the state or its various governmental components, 
including any and all "governmental entities," without the consent and direction 
of the legislature. Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 8; Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1979); Retail Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. 
University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884 (1975); Hjorth Royalty Company 
v. Trustees of University of 
Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9 
(1924). Such consent must be formalized by statute, the mechanism by which our 
legislature articulates policy. Worthington. In 1979, the legislature adopted 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, which permits suits against the state if 
certain explicitly stated conditions have been complied with. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-102(a). 
Because this statute abrogates common law, it is to be strictly construed. 
Reliance Insurance Company v. Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc., 713 P.2d 766 
(Wyo. 
1986).

 [¶18.]  The argument of the Board on this issue, 
focusing upon § 1-39-113, is that Westates' claim accrued in May of 1986, when 
the hospital construction project had been substantially completed, and it 
follows that any claim made by Westates should have been presented within two 
years of that date. Claims presented subsequent to the cut-off date, the Board 
argues, are a nullity and of no effect. The district court ruled to the 
contrary, relying upon the agreement entered into by the parties. It held that 
no claim existed in this instance until the results of the arbitration, a 
contractual condition precedent, demonstrated either an entitlement or rejection 
of Westates' claim. We agree with the ruling of the district court. See Westates 
Construction Company v. City of Cheyenne, 775 P.2d 502 (Wyo. 1989); Brasel & Sims 
Construction Company v. State 
Highway Commission, 655 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 
1982).

 [¶19.]  The pertinent statute provides, in part, 
as follows:

     Claims procedure.

      (a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(ii) 
The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the 
two (2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-113 
(Supp. 1992).

Neither 
this provision nor any other provision of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
prohibits or encourages arbitration as a device for resolving disputes between 
governmental entities and those parties with whom they contract or otherwise do 
business. See Hot Springs School District No. 1 
v. Strube Construction Company, 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986); American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing 
Authority, 562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977). Although not explicitly mentioned 
in the statute, "[a]rbitration is favored by public policy in this court," 
Hot Springs, 715 P.2d  at 547, since it does provide a means for inexpensive and expeditious 
resolution of various claims and controversies without the need for resort to a 
formal tribunal and its rigid adherence to rules of law. Jackson State Bank v. 
Homar, 837 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1992); Hot Springs; T & M Properties v. ZVFK Architects and 
Planners, 661 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of 
Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 1977). Consistently, 
our predilection, especially when the parties have agreed to arbitration as they 
did in this case, is to uphold the results of arbitration if we can determine 
any legal or equitable way so to do. Northern Supply; Oil, Chemical & Atomic 
Workers Union, Local 2-230 v. Great Lakes 
Carbon Corporation, 376 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1962).

 [¶20.]  Ultimately, as the district court wisely 
perceived, resolution of this issue hinges completely upon the date when 
Westates' claim accrued. If it accrued in May of 1986, as the Board contends, it 
is untimely, and it is not in a form prescribed by the statute. The result 
should be dismissal as a matter of law. See Dee, 666 P.2d 957. On the other hand, if the Westates' 
claim first accrued upon completion of the arbitration proceedings in May of 
1989, Westates' filing would be timely, and the only remaining concern would be 
questions with respect to the form of the claim. The claim is found in this 
record in the motion to confirm arbitration presented to the district court, and 
the question would be whether that motion manifests sufficient compliance with 
the Act under the unique circumstances of this case.

 [¶21.]  We conclude that the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act, although providing the exclusive means for resolving existing claims 
against government entities, does not serve to negate contractual provisions 
moving toward a similar goal. We hold that the best, and perhaps the only, way 
to reconcile these provisions is to regard a claim against a governmental entity 
as not having accrued until all contractual terms creating a condition precedent 
have been exhausted, as the district court did. See Westates. Then, and not 
before, the explicit directives of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act will 
control. Consequently, we hold that Westates' claim against the Board accrued 
upon completion of the arbitration in May of 1989.

 [¶22.]  Our resolution of this issue also 
responds to the contention of the Board that the case was not heard in a proper 
forum since, by the district court's confirmation of arbitration, the 
controversy actually was resolved in the district court subsequent to the 
compliance by the parties with the contractual condition specifying arbitration. 
The district court, contrary to the arguments of the Board, did have 
jurisdiction over the matter because Westates' claim was filed in a timely 
manner. In so holding, we recognize, and we agree with the Board, that the 
American Arbitration Association lacks jurisdiction to enter a binding award 
against a governmental entity. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988). For 
that reason, it was essential that Westates seek confirmation of the award from 
the district court as it did. The lack of authority on the part of the 
arbitrators to enter a binding award had no effect on the jurisdiction of the 
district court. The claim was properly presented by Westates' motion, and the 
district court had the power to rule.

 [¶23.]  As we have indicated, the necessity of a 
claim raises the question whether Westates' motion to confirm arbitration, filed 
by it in the district court, was a sufficient claim in the format required by 
the statute to procedurally comply with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. If 
it was not, even though Westates' motion was timely, the district court still 
would be without jurisdiction to rule on it. The district court, after 
considering the issue, concluded that Westates' motion sufficiently complied 
with the statutory requirements. We agree with this 
ruling.

 [¶24.]  The statute requires that an accrued 
claim must be presented to the governmental entity as an itemized statement in 
writing. Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-113. Normally, the proper procedure for the presentation of such a 
claim would be to first submit the arbitration results to the Board for 
satisfaction, instead of immediately seeking relief directly from the district 
court. In most instances, a failure to proceed in this manner, that is 
presenting the arbitration result as a claim in accordance with the statutes, 
could be fatal to any remedy. This case is different, however, because the Board 
initiated this action in the district court well before Westates' claim had 
accrued, and the Board then participated in the arbitration proceedings. Since 
this case is different from the normal one, we agree that the Board, by its 
actions in the lower court, waived its right to any procedural defenses 
regarding notice that it otherwise normally could assert.

 [¶25.]  In so deciding, we hold that the Board 
had adequate notice of the claim and that the law does not require Westates, or 
any other claimant similarly situated, to engage in the futile act of providing 
further documentation under such circumstances. A contrary result would indeed 
elevate form over substance. Westates sufficiently complied with the 
Governmental Claims Act under the circumstances of this case. We add a caveat to 
the members of the Wyoming Bar, however. Our holding in this case is not to be 
broadly construed as an invitation to avoid strict adherence to the terms of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. In this regard, we also recognize that 
Westates' unverified and unsigned letter to a member of the Board would have 
complied with the statute, which simply requires the presentation to the entity 
of an itemized statement in writing, had there been an accrued claim at the time 
that the letter was submitted to the member of the Board.

 [¶26.]  In its second issue, the Board questions 
the action of the district court in confirming an arbitration award where 
Westates failed to provide documentation sufficient to allow the Board to 
examine the claim by means of a "constitutionally contemplated and court-ordered 
audit." We fail to discern the relevance of this issue or how it might affect 
the outcome of this appeal. We already have tested the constitutional 
applications of Wyo.Const. art. 16, § 7, holding that they do not apply in this 
case. We would be remiss if we then endeavored to stretch those requirements to 
encompass concerns over the district court's order with respect to an audit. 
Even if we assume that the record would support Westates' alleged failure in 
this regard, the Board does not cite authority nor provide cogent legal argument 
to explain why such a failure would justify either a reversal or any other 
remedy in this case. Lacking such assistance, we conclude we should not consider 
the matter further. See Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal Savings & Loan, 792 P.2d 631 (Wyo. 1990); Burg v. Ruby Drilling 
Co., 783 P.2d 144 (Wyo. 1989).

 [¶27.]  The district court based its award on its 
confirmation of the results of the arbitration, not on the results of any audit. 
This renders the audit of little consequence, as the Board had ample opportunity 
to contest the accuracy of Westates' claim in the course of the arbitration 
proceedings. In addition, the proper procedure for the Board to have followed, 
if it was not satisfied with Westates' submission of documents, was a motion to 
compel in the district court. The record demonstrates no such motion, and we 
will not entertain this matter which is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Matter of Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 
1989); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981); Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 
1978).

 [¶28.]  The foregoing resolution of the first two 
issues asserted by the Board makes it unnecessary for us to address separately 
the Board's third issue. The question raised there, in its broadest form, is 
whether the district court erred in confirming an award that contained manifest 
errors of Wyoming law and exceeded the power of the 
arbitration panel. As we have set forth in our discussion, we do not find the 
errors of law alluded to, and the question of whether the panel of the American 
Arbitration Association acted in excess of its powers is of no consequence 
because it was the district court, not the arbitration panel, that actually 
entered the order awarding compensation in this case. In addition, it is clear 
that Westates adequately complied with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
notwithstanding the contrary contentions offered by the 
Board.

 [¶29.]  The final issue asserted by the Board 
concerns the failure of the district court to modify the results of the 
arbitration so as to incorporate the "payment by installment" provisions of the 
Governmental Claims Act. In its decision letter, the district court did not 
address this issue directly and, instead, entered judgment for immediate payment 
of the entire amount of the award. The Board asserts that this must be error. 
The pertinent statutory provision is:

     (c) In addition to the 
procurement of insurance under subsection (b) of this section a local 
governmental entity may:

* * * * 
* *

     (iv) Pay the judgment 
or settlement, with interest thereon, in not to exceed ten (10) annual 
installments in cases of undue hardship and levy not to exceed one (1) mill per 
year on the assessed value of the governmental entity for such purpose * * 
*."

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-118(c)(iv) (1988).

 [¶30.]  The essential argument by the Board in 
its brief is that the statute creates an option for the governmental entity 
pursuant to which, at its election, it may proceed to satisfy a judgment 
rendered against it in annual installments. The Board then notes the following 
testimony from its treasurer and chief fiscal officer and asserts its claim of 
hardship is justified by the testimony:

That it 
would be an undue hardship on the Weston County Hospital Joint Powers Board to 
pay any judgment, but that the hardship would be substantially lessened if the 
Joint Powers Board were permitted to pay any judgment in ten annual payments as 
provided for in § 1-39-118.

 The 
Board contends that this court, because the statutory conditions allegedly had 
been met and the Board is electing to exercise its option, should order payment 
of the judgment in ten annual payments, although with interest to Westates. We 
do not agree with this contention.

 [¶31.]  The issue of annual payments was 
presented to the district court, and the result of that presentation was that 
the district court responded by awarding the amount in full to Westates. The 
only conclusion we can draw is that the district court was not satisfied this 
was a case of undue hardship, and we will presume the district court did not 
find any undue hardship. That determination is one within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and we will not overturn the finding on the issue in the 
absence of evidence of clear abuse of the court's discretion. The burden of 
providing that proof is assigned to the Board in this case, and the self-serving 
conclusion it offers as evidence, since it incorporates no facts whatsoever, 
does not meet that goal. In this situation, the district court has not acted in 
a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason and certainly could reasonably 
conclude as it did. Dynan, 792 P.2d 631, 640. The order for payment in full will 
not be amended.

 [¶32.]  In summary, we hold the district court 
had jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award in this instance and did not 
err in doing so. Westates did not have to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements, and the requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act were 
satisfied. The decision of the district court, including the provision for 
payment in full, is affirmed.

CARDINE and URBIGKIT, JJ., file dissenting 
opinions.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶33.]  I dissent from the analysis used by the 
majority in reaching the conclusion that the Weston County Hospital Joint Powers 
Board is not a "political subdivision" as contemplated by Art. 16 § 7 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution. I object for several reasons. First, the majority misinterprets 
Witzenburger. Second, reliance on Witzenburger alone is improper due to 
important factual differences in this case. Third, the test adopted by the 
majority will defeat the clear purpose of this section of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 [¶34.]  In its cursory treatment of the 
applicable law concerning the constitutional definition for "political 
subdivision," the majority states:

     The criteria for 
identifying a "political subdivision" are found in Witzenburger v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, reh'rg denied, 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1978). There, we concluded that a "`political subdivision' must be an 
entity of the same kind or class as a county, city, township, town or school 
district," Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1112, and that it would be characterized by 
certain distinctive badges including a prescribed geographic area, a requirement 
for having officers duly elected by the inhabitants of that area at a public 
election, and a legal power to levy and collect taxes. Witzenburger. This is 
still the applicable test. While the list we have recited is not all-inclusive, 
any "body politic" not possessing at 
least these three basic attributes cannot be a "political subdivision." See 
Witzenburger.

Maj. 
op. at 846 (emphasis added). Witzenburger did not establish a black letter rule 
as the majority concludes. Instead, what we said in Witzenburger 
was:

We do 
not hold that the legislature cannot create a political subdivision but if it 
does, it must have those attributes of a political subdivision, within the 
contemplation of the Wyoming Constitution, such as we have 
outlined.

Witzenburger, 
575 P.2d  at 1114. The "attributes" outlined in Witzenburger are not as clear and 
constrained as the majority suggests. We said:

Each 
[political subdivision] has a geographic area smaller than the state, each is 
organized with officers elected by its inhabitants to carry on a governmental 
function, having a local purpose and provision is made for the levy and 
assessment of taxes to finance those purposes.

Witzenburger, 
575 P.2d  at 1113. We gathered this list of attributes after scrutinizing our 
constitutional history and surveying precedent from other jurisdictions. 
Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1111-12. The test announced by the majority does not 
accurately portray and follow the general approach utilized by the Witzenburger 
court.

 [¶35.]  In addition, Witzenburger differs 
factually from this case. The sections at issue in Witzenburger were §§ 1 and 2 
of Article 16, not § 7. Witzenburger involved the Wyoming Community Development 
Authority (WCDA) which was not formed under the Joint Powers Act. Unlike the 
WDCA, the Weston County Hospital Joint Powers Board does possess some of the 
characteristics outlined by Justice Raper in Witzenburger. The board encompasses 
a geographic area smaller than the state (WestonCounty), and it is organized to carry on a 
governmental function and a local purpose (providing accessible modern health 
care facilities). Although I agree that Witzenburger does offer guidance on the 
issue, by itself, it is not determinative.

 [¶36.]  In this particular case, the majority's 
analysis may not eviscerate the purpose of Art. 16 § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution; but, in the future, I fear it will. The purpose, providing 
opportunity to inspect all claims against the State so as to prevent wasting 
public funds in useless litigation, is settled. The test adopted today will 
allow claims to be brought without sufficient warning against certain 
quasi-public entities who are not termed a "political subdivision" but who are 
essentially publicly funded.

 [¶37.]  Because the majority relies solely upon a 
test which it incorrectly elicits from Witzenburger and hastily resolves an 
issue of constitutional interpretation, I must dissent from the majority's 
analysis of "political subdivision" and the conclusion based upon that 
analysis.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶38.]  The centerpiece for this decision 
envisions that when two admitted governmental subdivisions join together to 
operate an area hospital employing public resources for the citizens of the 
area, the resulting entity will no longer constitute a political subdivision. 
This is significant because the constitution of the state and the statutes 
enacted by the legislature provide protection to citizens who become responsible 
for the incurrence of obligations by governmental entities created for their 
benefit.

 [¶39.]  Leaving aside the advantages for the 
contractor who built the public facilities and the loss of control for the 
citizens through operation of the joint powers entity, I cannot find, in this 
circumstance, any justification for differentiating a political subdivision 
(each of the partners) from a governmental entity (the entity used for their 
combined public service). A governmental subdivision implies a defined 
territorial entity. This is clearly the result in the creation of a joint powers 
board when the two admitted political subdivisions join to perform a common 
interest public service. The entity will likely accrue financial 
responsibilities obligatory upon all of the citizens within the totality of 
their geographical area of responsibility. Residents, to get the service, will 
be required to provide the necessary funding to pay operational and 
constructional obligations.

 [¶40.]  I fail to perceive why hospital 
operations conducted under the purview of a joint powers board should not be 
accorded the same contracting protection for the citizens who are ultimately 
responsible as will be the case if the activity is separately operated by only 
one of them. There is no question that the county of Weston, exclusive of the towns of Upton and Newcastle, Wyoming, when combined with their territory, 
defines a specific taxpayer and political entity geographic territory and, 
equivalently, a statutorily-defined political subdivision to conduct a 
governmental function. The resulting hospital service is impressed with the 
public interest.

 [¶41.]  We should not misunderstand what this 
decision does. It accords to the citizens and taxpayers of local communities 
reduced protection from the conduct of any governmental activity through the 
usage of a joint powers board. I fail to see any providence or persuasion that 
the legislature intended to reduce protection for the citizenry by authorization 
of the creation of joint power districts. Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100 (Wyo. 1978) cannot provide a justification for 
this diminution of citizenry protection from their governmental entity 
incurrence of obligations. Such legislative history as might be available would 
reflect that the active, anguished and continued legislative opposition to the 
entity envisioned in the litigation discussed in Witzenburger found its views 
authenticated by the reversal decision of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

 [¶42.]  Constitutional rejection by this court of 
the open ended opportunity to incur liabilities ultimately chargeable to 
taxpayers considered in Witzenburger forcefully denies use of that precedent to 
approve this decision. I would find Witzenburger philosophically determinative 
that combining governmental entities into a joint powers board should not reduce 
protection for the citizens. Overtly, a joint powers board has a prescribed 
geographical area constituent of the totality of its contributors. The statute 
requires officers whose election is accommodated by action of the constituent 
partners. We should not kid ourselves that joint power boards have no authority 
to levy and collect taxes, albeit perhaps indirectly, since the responsibilities 
assumed by the participating governmental parties will ratchet down upon the 
citizens of their respective areas if the entity fails in 
operation.

 [¶43.]  The anguish and concern reflected by the 
three-to-two majority in Witzenburger and, in particular, the comments of Chief 
Justice Guthrie, do not lead us further in this review than to recognize that 
the judgment award countenanced by this decision constitutes a debt imposed upon 
each citizen of the constituent joint powers partners in their operation of an 
indispensable hospital. The debt appropriately considered by Chief Justice 
Guthrie in Witzenburger is no less a debt than is now created for the citizen 
users of the hospital by this decision.

 [¶44.]  The question with which we are presented 
is not whether the state legislature can create obligations that are not those 
of the state, Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1115, but whether the citizens of this 
state in 1889, by adoption of the Wyoming Constitution, provided a debt 
incurrence escape for modernized forms of entities used to provide general 
governmental services. Without regard for the new form selected for the 
operational entity, the taxpayer will, in one way or another, be assessed the 
responsibility to pay. Certainly, the very learned persons who joined together 
to write the Wyoming Constitution, or even the amendment permitted by a vote of 
the citizenry in 1970, contemplated no process where public funds and their use 
or misuse might be excepted from the requirement to "be audited, allowed or paid 
until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty of 
perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to 
audit the same." Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7. If plain meaning 
means anything, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1991), those drafters intended certain unescapable 
responsibilities for the expenditures of public funds. Surely no one would 
dispute that joint powers boards encompass anything but a governmental operation 
in the utilization of public funds.

 [¶45.]  The result in this majority's decision is 
not particularly earth shaking in dollar amount. The pathway narrowing the 
constitutional protection afforded to our citizens is, however, of concern. We 
only invite ingenious ways to escape constitutional responsibility for the 
protection and preservation of our joint public assets.

 [¶46.]  In disagreement that this entity does not 
fall within the constitutional limitations and criteria for public protection, 
as does other governmental bodies, I respectfully dissent. The hospital 
management district, which is the subject matter of this litigation, should be 
accorded no different statutory or constitutional perspective regarding 
protection to the public interest than was afforded the State Highway Commission 
in Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933), 
or the University of Wyoming in Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. 
Bell, 662 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1983) and Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 
(Wyo. 1975). Frankly, it will take something more than a casual mathematician or 
perhaps a computer-controlled political scientist to assess among the two score 
or more separately defined political entities which districts constitute and are 
controlled by the constitution as political subdivisions and which are 
constitutionally excepted governmental entities.

 [¶47.]  I also do not agree with this majority's 
treatment of the clearly defined installment right of payment of the 
governmental entity. Somehow we make this a non-debt until it comes time to 
require taxpayer contribution. It was accurately recognized by appellant in its 
brief that "[t]he purpose of the constitutional provision is to protect 
governmental entities from improper or unsupported charges. Houtz v. Board of 
Commissioners, 11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840 
(1902)."

 [¶48.]  It is interesting to recognize, as we 
pursue this issue of governmental responsibility and citizenry protection, that 
the contractor states in his brief:

However, 
the confirmed award will not be financed by the Board, but rather by three 
distinct political entities with general taxing authority. Paying a share of an 
award of $100,000.00 is not likely to impose an "undue" hardship on any one of 
them. There is no evidence whatsoever that the payment of the award would 
require those entities to impose a "one mill" levy for even one year, much less 
ten.[1]

 [¶49.]  Without any question, a governmental 
entity as defined and protected by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-101 through § 1-39-120 (1988 & Supp. 1992), includes "joint 
powers boards." Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-103(a)(ii). It seems incomprehensible, since 
the Governmental Claims Act is obviously defined to include this entity, that we 
now reject usage of the installment payment provision of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-118(c)(iv).

 [¶50.]  Consequently, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Once we leave the 
broad classifications of the state, the University of Wyoming, the State Highway 
Commission, the Game and Fish Commission, etc. and descend into the definable 
but not so certain geographical area excluding legislative districting of the 
county, the municipality, and the school or college district, we can then 
proceed into the weed and pest control districts and the sewer and water 
districts and down into the separate or joint governmental entities which 
provide hospital, recreational, water, and a considerable variety of additional 
community-operated public services. I think we simply fall into a hole and pull 
the top in after us when we attempt to define a governmental entity under joint 
power authorization to be something different than a governmental subdivision in 
order to foreclose regulations by payment and indebtedness limitations 
established in variant ways for the basic law of the state in the Wyoming 
Constitution.