Title: McCray v. McCray

State: texas

Issuer: Texas Supreme Court

Document:

584 S.W.2d 279 (1979) Sonya A. McCRAY, Petitioner, v. George McCRAY, Jr., Respondent. No. B-8272. Supreme Court of Texas. June 27, 1979. *280 Duane T. Corley, Conroe, for petitioner. Crews & Field, James W. Steele and L. P. Tower, Conroe, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Sonya McCray brought this action against her former husband, George McCray, to enforce a contractual alimony agreement contained in a prior divorce decree. The trial court rendered summary judgment for Sonya, and George appealed. The court of civil appeals, with one justice dissenting, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for trial. 576 S.W.2d 669. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Paragraph 2 of the decree rendered in the original divorce proceeding provides: In rendering a summary judgment in favor of Sonya in this enforcement proceeding, the trial court stated: "[T]he Decree of Divorce between the Plaintiff and Defendant... constitutes a binding contract... and further is a final judgment not subject to attack and is entitled to full enforcement." Reversing the judgment, the court of civil appeals held that paragraph 2 of the divorce decree did not specifically order the payment of contractual alimony, but instead "merely approved" the parties' agreement. The court stated that such "recitals" have been held not to be an award of the court. 576 S.W.2d at 670-71. This holding conflicts with the opinions of this court in Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.1967), and Ex Parte Jones, *281 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370 (1962). In the Francis case we upheld a trial court judgment which "merely approved" the parties' contractual alimony agreement, and stated: 412 S.W.2d at 33 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the Jones case this court was called upon to interpret a community property settlement contained in a prior divorce decree. We stated: "This agreed judgment must be interpreted as if it were a contract between the parties and the interpretation thereof is governed by the laws relating to contracts, rather than laws relating to judgments." 358 S.W.2d at 375; accord, Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Civ.App.San Antonio 1971, no writ). Although rules relating to contract interpretation apply, an agreed judgment is accorded the same degree of finality and binding force as a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding. Pollard v. Steffens, 161 Tex. 594, 343 S.W.2d 234, 239 (1961); R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 17.22, at 109 (1971). The court of civil appeals therefore erred in interpreting the contractual alimony agreement according to the law of judgments and holding it unenforceable because it did not reside in the mandatory or decretal portions of the divorce decree. Such agreement is nonetheless enforceable as part of the prior decree if it appears in the recitals and is approved by the court. Pursuant to Rule 483, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the application for writ of error is granted, and without hearing oral argument, the judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.