Title: State v. Miller

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

129 N.W.2d 356 (1964) STATE of North Dakota, Appellant, v. Gordon N. MILLER, Defendant and Respondent. Cr. 320. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 1, 1964. *358 Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, Vernon R. Pederson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, and Richard B. Thomas, State's Atty., Minot, for appellant. Joseph P. Stevens, Minot, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal by the State of North Dakota from an order of the district court which set aside the conviction of the defendant and ordered his discharge. By a criminal information dated August 30, 1963, the defendant, Gordon N. Miller, was charged with having committed the crime of misrepresentation in an application for a hunting license, in violation of Section 20-03-35 of the North Dakota Century Code. Said statute reads as follows: The pertinent parts of the information read as follows: On September 17, 1963, the defendant was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, waived trial by jury, and asked that the trial be postponed until December. The proceedings were accordingly recessed. When the case was again called on February 11, 1964, counsel for the defendant objected to further proceedings, on the ground that Section 20-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code was unconstitutional for the *359 reason that it did not treat all citizens and residents of North Dakota equally. The statute in 1963 read as follows: The governor, in his order or proclamation, may provide for the number of big game permits or licenses to be issued for the taking of each species and the manner in which such permits or licenses shall be issued for the big game only. When a limited number of big game licenses are issued by lottery and the number of applicants is greater than the number of licenses to be issued, any applicant who is successful in obtaining such a license shall not be eligible to apply for a license to hunt the same species of big game for the four ensuing lottery years, except that owner operators or operators, living within the boundaries of the legal open area shall be entitled to purchase one such license for each farmstead unit in each consecutive season. By 1963 any person who has been an applicant for license in four successive lottery seasons and who shall not have been successful in any such lottery, shall be eligible to receive a license upon application therefor without having such application included in the lottery." N.Dak. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 191. (The 1963 session of the Legislature amended the afore described statute to repeal the last sentence of the statute, the repeal to be effective July 1, 1964. N.Dak. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 199.) In overruling this objection the court indicated that the defendant could raise the constitutionality of the statute by a motion in arrest of judgment at the close of the case. Upon trial of the case the court found the defendant guilty, but on submission of a written motion in arrest of judgment following said finding, the court set aside the conviction and discharged the defendant. The material portion of the motion read as follows: *360 In deciding this motion, the court said: Before we analyze the specific constitutional questions in this case, a review of basic principles which apply in considering the constitutionality of a statute is in order. In a decision rendered in 1915 this court said: *361 Later, in a decision written by the same author, this court said: In the instant case the State's basic contention is that the district court erred in concluding that Section 20-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code is unconstitutional because it creates an arbitrary classification, contrary to Section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution. This court on numerous occasions has held that Section 20 of our constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from making classifications, providing the classifications are reasonable. In the case of Figenskau v. McCoy, supra, this court was considering a statute wherein the Legislature defined commercial freighting to mean the carriage of things other than passengers for hire, which statute provided further: The statute contained a number of exceptions, some of which, it was contended, rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court first considered an exemption which provided that commercial freighting "shall not include hauling done for farmers in transporting agricultural products to or from market, nor shall this include anyone hauling farm products to or from a railroad station in his farming territory. * *" N.Dak.Sess.Laws 1935, ch. 181, sec. 1. In finding this provision constitutional, the court said: The next exemption provided: "This act shall not apply to retailers engaged in delivering only gas and gas products from the bulk station directly to the farmer." In considering this exemption, the court said: This court will take judicial notice of such matters of common knowledge and science as may be known to all men of ordinary understanding and intelligence. N.D.C.C. Sec. 31-10-02(84). It will also take judicial notice of such contemporaneous history as led up to and probably induced the passage of a law. N.D.C.C. Sec. 31-10-02(77). That big game, especially the pronghorn or antelope, was in danger of becoming *364 extinct and, to survive, needed protective legislation, was obvious as early as 1898: In the instant case there is no contention that the Legislature lacked authority generally to enact legislation for the protection of big game. The contention is, rather, that the legislation violates the constitution of the State in that it grants privileges and immunities to a class of citizens designated as "owner operators" and "operators" that it does not grant to the defendant, and that for this reason it is unconstitutional. As we have seen, merely because a statute distinguishes between citizens or classes of citizens does not make it unconstitutional. If a classification is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of a law which is otherwise within the province of the Legislature to enact, the classification will not render the law repugnant to the Constitution. This statute must be considered in light of the great and urgent need of legislation for protection and conservation of our big game and in light of the important part that our farmers and ranchers have in protecting and preserving the game. The Legislature could very reasonably have found that big game could not be preserved and conserved without the cooperation of those upon whose lands the game found its food and shelter and reared its young. The privilege of receiving an annual big game license accorded the owner operators or operators of the farmstead units residing within the legal open areas where the game lives was undoubtedly intended as an inducement to farm and ranch operators to cooperate in the preservation and conservation of the game for the benefit of all the people of the state. This can hardly be said to be an arbitrary classification or one discriminatory to the defendant. As conservation practices necessitated the restriction of the big game harvest each year, it was not unreasonable for the Legislature to grant the operators a preferred status in receiving big game licenses. The contention that the statute fails for indefiniteness will now be considered. As neither the defendant nor the State has placed sufficient importance on this contention to support it with argument or authority in written brief or in oral argument in this court, and as the trial court merely referred to it casually, as noted, we deem it a contention of lesser importance. In the instant case it is enough to say that the meaning of the terms "owner operators" and "operators," although not specifically defined in the statute, is clear when read in the context of the entire statute. Only the resident operators of farmstead units of such type or nature as provides the habitat for big game are eligible for the license preference. Any other construction would make the classification unreasonable and arbitrary. The statute therefore does not fail for reason of indefiniteness. The judgment of the district court setting aside the conviction and discharging the defendant is therefore reversed, with instructions that the district court render judgment in conformity with this opinion. MORRIS, C. J., and BURKE and TEIGEN, JJ., concur. STRUTZ, J., did not participate.