Title: State v. Schwind

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP141-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dennis L. Schwind, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 3, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 21, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Reddy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs and dissents, joined by A.W. 
BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Andrew R. Walter and Walter Law Offices LLC, Elkhorn. 
There was an oral argument by Andrew R. Walter.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
was Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, and Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general. There was an oral argument by Kevin M. LeRoy. 
 
 
2019 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP141-CR 
(L.C. 
No. 
2000CF407) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis L. Schwind, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 3, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished summary disposition order of the court of appeals,1 
which affirmed the circuit court's2 order denying Dennis L. 
Schwind's motion for early termination of probation.  Schwind 
asserts that the Wisconsin Constitution gives circuit courts the 
inherent authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation 
                                                 
1 State v. Schwind, No. 2017AP141-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2018). 
2 The Honorable David M. Reddy of Walworth County presided. 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
2 
 
for cause.  He argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d),3 which 
directs the circuit court that it may reduce or terminate a term 
of probation if six requirements are met, cannot restrict the 
court's inherent authority to reduce or terminate a term of 
probation for cause. 
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court does not have 
inherent 
authority 
to 
grant 
Schwind's 
motion 
for 
early 
termination of probation.  Inherent authority of courts consists 
of only those powers that are necessary for the judiciary to 
accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions and preserve 
its role as a coequal branch of government.  Probation is a 
statutory creation, and the power to reduce or terminate a term 
of probation is not necessary for courts to accomplish their 
constitutionally 
mandated 
functions. 
 
Therefore, 
Wisconsin 
courts do not have the inherent authority to reduce or terminate 
a period of probation.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 2001, Schwind pled guilty to first-degree sexual 
assault of a child, incest with a child, and engaging in 
repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child.  Additional 
counts of incest with a child and engaging in repeated acts of 
sexual assault with a child were dismissed but read-in at 
sentencing.  Schwind's guilty plea required him to register as a 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
3 
 
sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45, and the charges exposed 
him to a maximum sentence of over 100 years in prison.  The 
court accepted Schwind's guilty plea and imposed a 10-year 
prison sentence, but immediately stayed the sentence and placed 
him on probation for a term of 25 years.  The conditions of his 
probation included one year of jail time with work release 
privileges. 
¶4 
In 2002, Schwind violated the conditions of his 
probation.  He had physical contact with his victim, had sexual 
contact with an animal, had unsupervised contact with children, 
and failed a sex offender treatment program.  The State did not 
initiate probation revocation proceedings, but instead requested 
that he serve another one-year term in the Walworth County Jail.  
Schwind accepted the State's request and served another one-year 
jail term.  In 2014, after serving 13 years of his 25-year 
probation term, Schwind filed a motion for early termination of 
probation. 
¶5 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(3)(d) directs the circuit 
court in regard to how it may "modify a person's period of 
probation and discharge the person from probation" when six 
requirements are met: 
1.  The 
department 
petitions 
the 
court 
to 
discharge the person from probation. 
2.  The probationer has completed 50 percent of 
his or her period of probation. 
3.  The probationer has satisfied all conditions 
of probation that were set by the sentencing court. 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
4 
 
4.  The probationer has satisfied all rules and 
conditions 
of 
probation 
that 
were 
set 
by 
the 
department. 
5.  The probationer has fulfilled all financial 
obligations to his or her victims, the court, and the 
department, 
including 
the 
payment 
of 
any 
fine, 
forfeiture, fee or surcharge, or order of restitution. 
6.  The probationer is not required to register 
[as a sex offender]. 
Schwind did not, and could not, argue that he had satisfied all 
six of these requirements.  He therefore could not argue that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d) permitted the circuit court to reduce 
his probation term. 
¶6 
Schwind instead argued that his petition for early 
termination of probation relied on the circuit court's inherent 
authority.  He argued that notwithstanding the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d), circuit courts have the inherent 
authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation, and a 
statute passed by the legislature cannot take that away.  The 
State opposed the motion on the grounds that Schwind did not 
meet the requirements of § 973.09(3)(d), and therefore was not 
eligible for early termination of his probation. 
¶7 
The circuit court denied Schwind's motion in January 
2015.  In doing so, the circuit court expressed concern that 
"once you start utilizing some of those inherent powers, that's 
a slippery slope that this court is not willing to go down."  
However, the circuit court did not take a position on whether 
circuit 
courts 
have 
the 
inherent 
authority 
to 
terminate 
probation notwithstanding Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d).  Instead, 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
5 
 
the circuit court decided that even if it did have the inherent 
authority to terminate probation early, it would decline to 
exercise it in this case. 
¶8 
In 
May 
2016, 
Schwind 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, again arguing that the circuit court has the 
inherent authority to terminate probation early and should do so 
in his case.  The circuit court denied Schwind's motion.  This 
time, the circuit court held that it did not have the inherent 
authority to reduce a term of probation.  It pointed out that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(d) "lists six requirements that must be 
met in order for a circuit court to discharge a probationer," 
and explained that "these six requirements, which function as 
conditions precedent to a probationer discharge, would be 
meaningless 
if 
a 
circuit 
court 
had 
broad 
discretionary 
authority . . . to reduce the length of probation for cause." 
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
summary disposition order.  State v. Schwind, No. 2017AP141-CR, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2018).  The court of 
appeals did not decide whether circuit courts have the inherent 
authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation.  Id. at 4.  
Instead, the court of appeals relied on its previous decision in 
State v. Dowdy, 2010 WI App 158, 330 Wis. 2d 444, 792 N.W.2d 230 
(Dowdy I), aff'd, State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 
808 N.W.2d 691 (Dowdy II).   
¶10 In Dowdy I, the court of appeals "did not decide 
whether a circuit court possesses the inherent authority to 
reduce a defendant's probation period."  Schwind, No. 2017AP141-
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
6 
 
CR, unpublished order at 3 (citing Dowdy I, 330 Wis. 2d 444, 
¶31).  However, the court of appeals opined that if circuit 
courts were to have inherent authority to modify probation, it 
could be exercised only in the same limited situations in which 
a circuit court has the inherent authority to reduce a 
sentence:  clear mistake, a new factor, or undue harshness or 
unconscionability.  Schwind, No. 2017AP141-CR, unpublished order 
at 3 (citing Dowdy I, 330 Wis. 2d 444, ¶28).  The court of 
appeals decided that none of these limited circumstances existed 
in Schwind's case; therefore, there was no need actually to 
decide whether a court's inherent authority to reduce a criminal 
sentence applies to a probation order.  Schwind, No. 2017AP141-
CR, unpublished order at 4.  We granted Schwind's petition for 
review, and now affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶11 This case requires us to determine whether circuit 
courts have the inherent authority to reduce or terminate a term 
of probation.  "The issue of judicial authority is a question of 
law" that we review independently.  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, 
¶29, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350.   
B.  Inherent Authority of Courts 
¶12 The Wisconsin Constitution created a court system and 
expressly granted certain powers to Wisconsin's courts.  See 
Wis. Const. art. VII.  In addition to these expressly granted 
powers, our Constitution also grants courts "those [powers] that 
are 
necessary 
to 
enable 
courts 
to 
accomplish 
their 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
7 
 
constitutionally and legislatively mandated functions."  Henley, 
328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73 (citing State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane 
Cty. Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  The 
powers that are not expressly granted but are necessary for the 
courts to function as courts are found within the courts' 
inherent authority.  See, e.g., id. 
¶13 Inherent authority is implicit in the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  When the framers created the judiciary in Article 
VII, they "had in mind that governmental institution known to 
the common law possessing powers characterizing it as a court 
and distinguishing it from all other institutions."  In re 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).  For this 
reason, the creation of a court system necessarily includes the 
conferral 
of 
those 
inherent 
powers 
that 
"from 
time 
immemorial . . . have been conceded to courts because they are 
courts."  Barland v. Eau Claire Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 575 
N.W.2d 691 (1998).  Stated otherwise, the Wisconsin Constitution 
did not devise a new entity called a "court"; rather, by using 
the word "court," it was referring to the institution known as a 
court, together with the powers it was understood at common law 
to necessarily possess.  Therefore, we generally consider 
historical practices when determining whether a certain power is 
inherent in the judiciary.  See, e.g., id. at 592 (explaining 
that the inherent authority of the courts may "spring[] from 
historical custom"). 
¶14 Inherent authority of the court derives from the 
doctrine of separation of powers, and allows the judiciary to 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
8 
 
preserve its role as a coequal branch of government.  "The 
Wisconsin 
[C]onstitution 
creates 
three 
separate 
coordinate 
branches of government, no branch subordinate to the other, no 
branch to arrogate to itself control over the other except as is 
provided by the constitution, and no branch to exercise the 
power committed by the constitution to another."  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 13 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 
N.W.2d 703 (1982)).  For this reason, issues regarding the scope 
of inherent authority carry separation of powers concerns, as 
defining the inherent authority of courts either too narrowly or 
too broadly has the potential to do harm to the separation of 
powers among the branches of government.  If the inherent 
authority of courts is defined too broadly, we risk infringing 
upon the authority of the legislative or executive branches by 
replacing their policy preferences with our own.  See, e.g., 
Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶75 (cautioning courts against invoking 
inherent authority "to do whatever they think is 'fair' at any 
given point in time.").  If defined too narrowly, however, we 
risk 
impeding 
the 
judiciary's 
ability 
to 
carry 
out 
its 
constitutionally mandated functions by giving away portions of 
our inherent authority to the other branches of government. 
¶15 Recognizing the need for caution in this area, we are 
careful to invoke inherent authority if, but only if, invocation 
is necessary to "maintain [the courts'] dignity, transact their 
business, [and] accomplish the purposes of their existence."  
Id., ¶73 (citations omitted).  In other words, "[a] power is 
inherent when it 'is one without which a court cannot properly 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
9 
 
function.'"  Id. (citing State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 
580, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980)). 
¶16 With these concerns in mind, "Wisconsin courts have 
generally exercised inherent authority in three areas:  (1) to 
guard against actions that would impair the powers or efficacy 
of the courts or judicial system; (2) to regulate the bench and 
bar; and (3) to ensure the efficient and effective functioning 
of the court, and to fairly administer justice."  Henley, 328 
Wis. 2d 544, ¶73 (citing City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 
Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999)).  Inherent authority 
exercised in all of these areas is necessary to enable the 
judiciary to carry out its constitutionally mandated functions 
as a coequal branch of government.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 16. 
¶17 The first area in which courts have exercised inherent 
authority involves the internal operations of a court.  Davis, 
226 Wis. 2d at 749.  For example, courts have exercised their 
inherent authority to prevent the unilateral removal of judicial 
assistants pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 
Barland, 216 Wis. 2d at 566, and to refuse facilities that were 
inadequate to carry out a court's business.  Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 
at 749 (citing In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 119-20, 134 N.W. 
490 (1912)).  This authority is necessary to preserve the 
efficacy of the court system and allow courts to carry out their 
constitutional duties. 
¶18 The second area, regulating the bench and bar, 
includes the inherent authority to discipline members of the 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
10 
 
bar, State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 103, 
454 N.W.2d 770 (1990), and to resolve disputes regarding 
representation of a client.  Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶12, 
382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878.  The inherent authority to 
regulate the bench and bar is necessary to preserve the 
judiciary's ability to perform its constitutional duties as a 
coequal branch of government. 
¶19 The third area in which courts have exercised inherent 
authority, and the area most relevant to this case, involves 
"ensuring that the court functions efficiently and effectively 
to provide the fair administration of justice."  Davis, 226 
Wis. 2d at 749-50 (citation omitted).  For example, courts have 
the inherent authority to hold a person in contempt for failing 
to appear, Smith v. Burns, 65 Wis. 2d 638, 645, 223 N.W.2d 562 
(1974), to appoint counsel for indigent parties in a child in 
need of protective services (CHIPS) proceeding, Joni B. v. 
State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996), and "to correct 
clerical errors at any time."  State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, 
¶17, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857.  Without the ability to 
exercise inherent authority in this area, courts would not 
perform their constitutionally mandated functions.  In all three 
of 
these 
areas, 
courts 
exercise 
inherent 
authority 
when 
necessary to allow them to function as courts. 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
11 
 
C.  Sentencing and Probation 
¶20 We have previously recognized that sentencing is a 
constitutionally 
shared 
power 
among 
three 
branches 
of 
government, and that courts have the inherent authority to 
modify criminal sentences within certain narrowly defined 
limits.  State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 
N.W.2d 828; see also Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101, 175 
N.W.2d 625 (1970), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 523, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).  Schwind 
attempts to widen the scope of this aspect of inherent authority 
by framing it as the power to modify criminal dispositions more 
generally, thereby adding reduction and termination of probation 
to the judiciary's inherent authority.  The problem with this 
framing is that the judiciary's power to sentence and its power 
to order probation are distinct powers that come from different 
sources.  The judiciary's sentencing power existed at common law 
and is a part of the Wisconsin Constitution; the power to impose 
probation, 
on 
the 
other 
hand, 
is 
a 
statutory 
creation.  
Probation, as opposed to sentencing, was not incorporated into 
the Wisconsin Constitution as a power of the judiciary and it is 
not necessary for the judiciary to perform its constitutionally 
mandated functions. 
¶21 Sentencing in Wisconsin is an area of shared power 
among the three branches, as the inherent authority of courts to 
impose criminal sentences existed at common law prior to the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution.  "It is the function of 
the legislature to prescribe the penalty and the manner of its 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
12 
 
enforcement; the function of the courts to impose the penalty; 
while it is the function of the executive to grant paroles and 
pardons."  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999); see also State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 769, 482 
N.W.2d 883 (1992) (explaining that at common law, Wisconsin 
courts "possessed the inherent and discretionary power to punish 
violations of law in the absence of a statute prescribing the 
punishment.").  The judiciary's power at common law went even 
further than simply sentencing those convicted of violating 
criminal statutes; in some cases, courts could punish offenders 
for "[c]ommon-law crimes" in the absence of any violation of a 
criminal statute.  See id.   
¶22 Sentencing 
was 
therefore 
understood 
to 
be 
a 
constitutionally shared power among the three branches in 1848, 
when the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified.  See id.  The 
inherent 
authority 
to 
sentence 
a 
convicted 
criminal 
was 
therefore implicitly included in the Wisconsin Constitution by 
the creation of a "court" system.  See, e.g., Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 
at 518 (explaining that by creating "courts," the Wisconsin 
Constitution created the "governmental institution known to the 
common law possessing powers characterizing it as a court and 
distinguishing it from all other institutions."). 
¶23 Probation, on the other hand, is a newer concept.  It 
is not something Wisconsin courts had the power to do at common 
law, but is instead a statutory creation.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Zabel v. Milwaukee Cty. Mun. Ct., 179 Wis. 195, 201, 190 
N.W. 121 (1923) (the legislature's passage of a probation 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
13 
 
statute in 1909 "confer[red] a new power upon the court——the 
power to suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation."); Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648 ("[A] court 
could not place a defendant on probation" in the absence of a 
statute authorizing it to do so.).  
¶24 Probation is a possible disposition for an individual 
who has been convicted of a crime.  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a); 
see also id. at 647.  It is not a sentence; it is an alternative 
to sentencing.  Id. at 648.  Probation can be understood as 
"supervised, conditional freedom." Neil P. Cohen, The Law of 
Probation and Parole § 1:2 (2d ed.).  In lieu of imposing a 
criminal 
sentence, 
the 
legislature 
has 
chosen 
to 
allow 
sentencing courts to either withhold sentencing, or impose a 
sentence but stay its execution, and instead release the 
individual into the community subject to "any conditions which 
appear to be reasonable and appropriate" to the court.4   Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).   
¶25 We have recognized that "[p]robation is a privilege 
extended to a convict by the grace of the state.  It is not a 
right."  State ex rel. Greer v. Wiedenhoeft, 2014 WI 19, ¶39, 
353 Wis. 2d 307, 845 N.W.2d 373; see also Edwards v. State, 74 
Wis. 2d 79, 83, 246 N.W.2d 109 (1976) ("Probation is not a 
matter of right, rather it is a privilege.").  "The dual goals 
                                                 
4 Reasonable and appropriate conditions of probation may, in 
the court's discretion, include a period of confinement not to 
exceed one year.  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4)(a). 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
14 
 
of probation are 'the rehabilitation of those convicted of crime 
and the protection of the state and community interest.'"  State 
v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 554, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984) 
(citation omitted).  By authorizing courts to give probation in 
lieu of a criminal sentence, the legislature gave the courts a 
new power to extend the mercy of the state when it decides that 
"supervised, conditional freedom" will best rehabilitate a 
defendant while adequately protecting the interests of the state 
and the community. 
¶26 In Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 647, we said probation is 
"within powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary."  
However, this general statement must be understood in context.  
As mentioned earlier, it is the role of the legislature to 
prescribe penalties, whereas it is the role of the judiciary to 
impose penalties within the legislature's prescribed range.  For 
this reason, we recognized in Horn that "the legislature has 
constitutional authority to offer probation as an alternative to 
sentencing," and that "[w]ithout such statutory authority, a 
court could not place a defendant on probation."  Id. at 648. 
¶27 Therefore, while sentencing and probation have both 
been described as shared powers with the legislature, the source 
of the judiciary's power in these two areas is different.  
Sentencing is a shared power because it comes within the 
inherent authority of the judiciary, implicit in the Wisconsin 
Constitution due to its incorporation of common law as it 
existed in 1848.  Given this deeply rooted historical practice, 
we have recognized that courts have inherent authority to modify 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
15 
 
sentences within certain narrowly defined limits.  See Harbor, 
333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶35 (citing State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 
546, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983)). 
¶28 In contrast, probation is a shared power not because 
it is a common-law judicial power that was incorporated into the 
Wisconsin Constitution, but only because the legislature chose 
to permit it.  While courts had the power to impose sentences at 
common law even in the absence of a legislatively created 
sentencing range, Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 769, courts have never 
had 
the 
power 
to 
impose 
probation 
without 
statutory 
authorization.  The legislature could eliminate probation 
completely if it saw fit, Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648, because 
probation "was unknown to Wisconsin law" prior to its statutory 
creation in 1909.  Drinkwater v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 60, 68-69, 
230 N.W.2d 126 (1975).  Probation therefore could not have been 
incorporated into the Wisconsin Constitution as a power that 
"from time immemorial has been conceded to courts because they 
are courts," and is not necessary for courts to perform their 
constitutionally mandated functions. 
¶29 This conclusion is confirmed because reducing a term 
of probation does not fit within any of the three areas in which 
courts 
have 
traditionally 
exercised 
inherent 
authority.  
Regarding the first area, reducing or terminating a period of 
probation does not guard against any action that would impair 
the efficacy of the court system.  As mentioned earlier, this 
area involves the court's internal operations, which has 
included the inherent authority to prevent the unilateral 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
16 
 
removal of judicial assistants.  See Barland, 216 Wis. 2d at 
566.  Reducing a probation term does not guard against actions 
that would impair the efficacy of the courts.  Second, the power 
to reduce a probation term is not related to regulating the 
bench and bar.  
¶30 Third, the power to reduce probation terms is not 
necessary to ensure "the efficient and effective functioning of 
the court," or "to fairly administer justice."  Henley, 328 
Wis. 2d 544, ¶73.  As mentioned earlier, the powers exercised in 
this area, such as appointing counsel to indigent parties or 
correcting clerical errors,5 are necessary to enable the court to 
effectively and efficiently resolve the disputes before it.  In 
contrast, the power to reduce a term of probation can come into 
existence only after the circuit court has resolved the matter 
before it.  A court that has placed a defendant on probation has 
                                                 
5 Our conclusion that courts do not have the inherent power 
to reduce or terminate a term of probation does not mean that 
courts are unable to correct clerical errors in judgments of 
probation.  As we have previously explained, "the law is clear 
that a court has the power to correct clerical errors at any 
time."  State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, ¶17, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 
N.W.2d 857.  Correcting a clerical error in a judgment does not 
constitute a modification of that judgment; rather, it is simply 
a correction of the record to reflect the judgment the circuit 
court actually rendered.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. State, 88 Wis. 
166, 174, 59 N.W. 588 (1894) ("the court has power, after the 
term, to correct a mistake in the entry of its judgment, so as 
to 
make 
the 
record 
conform 
to 
the 
judgment 
actually 
pronounced"); accord, Prihoda, 239 Wis. 2d 244, ¶17 n.9.  For 
this reason, courts have always had, and continue to have, the 
inherent 
authority 
to 
correct 
clerical 
errors 
in 
their 
judgments. 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
17 
 
either chosen to withhold sentencing, or has chosen to impose a 
sentence and stay its execution.  Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  In 
either case, "[t]he adversary system has terminated and the 
administrative process, vested in the executive branch of the 
government, directed to the correctional and rehabilitative 
processes 
of 
the 
parole 
and 
probation 
system 
has 
been 
substituted in its place."  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 650. 
¶31 Likewise, the power to reduce or terminate a term of 
probation is not necessary to fairly administer justice.  As 
mentioned earlier, "[p]robation is a privilege extended to a 
convict by the grace of the state.  It is not a right."  
Wiedenhoeft, 353 Wis. 2d 307, ¶39.  This said, while the power 
to reduce a criminal sentence in limited circumstances is 
necessary for courts to fairly administer justice, the same is 
not true of the power to reduce probation.  An individual who 
has been erroneously sentenced based on the circuit court's 
ignorance of a new factor has been unjustly given a greater 
punishment than he is due.  In contrast, an individual placed on 
probation is already receiving the discretionary privilege of 
the State's mercy, and cannot similarly argue that the failure 
to extend him more mercy is a failure to fairly administer 
justice. 
¶32 The legislature has the power to completely eliminate 
the availability of probation without infringing upon the 
courts' constitutional duty to fairly administer justice.  It 
follows that the legislature may place reasonable limits on the 
availability of probation without interfering with the fair 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
18 
 
administration of justice.  "The fair administration of justice 
is not a license for courts, unconstrained by express statutory 
authority, to do whatever they think is 'fair' at any given 
point in time."  Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶75.   
¶33 For these reasons, we conclude that courts do not have 
the inherent authority to reduce a term of probation.  In doing 
so, we continue construing the judiciary's inherent authority 
narrowly.  See id., ¶74 n.28 ("early cases invoked inherent 
authority more often because the procedural rules governing 
courts were somewhere between non-existent and non-exhaustive.  
See generally Thomas O. Main, Judicial Discretion to Condition, 
79 Temp. L. Rev. 1075, 1111–15 (2006) (noting generally that the 
scope of a court's inherent authority is inversely related to 
the breadth of procedural statutes and rules the court is 
subject to).  As federal and state courts became subject to more 
comprehensive 
rules 
[], 
the 
need 
for 
inherent 
authority 
lessened."). 
¶34 In this case, Schwind's petition for early termination 
of probation is not based on the circuit court's statutory 
authority to discharge him from probation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(3)(d).  It is undisputed that he has failed to satisfy 
at least three of the statutory requirements under this 
section.  That is, the department of corrections did not 
petition the court to discharge him from probation; he violated 
the conditions of his probation; and he is required to register 
as a sex offender under Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  He has instead 
asked the circuit court to use its inherent authority to 
No. 
2017AP141-CR   
 
19 
 
terminate his probation early.  As we have concluded, however, 
circuit courts have no such power.  Section 973.09 provides the 
sole basis for a circuit court's power to reduce or terminate a 
term of probation.  Because probation was created by statute and 
Schwind cannot meet the requirements of § 973.09(3)(d), the 
circuit court has no power to terminate his probation. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 We conclude that the circuit court does not have the 
power to grant Schwind's motion for early termination of 
probation.  Inherent authority of courts consists of only those 
powers that are necessary for the judiciary to accomplish its 
constitutionally mandated functions and preserve its role as a 
coequal branch of government.  Probation is a statutory 
creation, and the power to reduce or terminate a term of 
probation is not necessary for courts to accomplish their 
constitutionally 
mandated 
functions. 
 
Therefore, 
Wisconsin 
courts do not have the inherent authority to reduce or terminate 
a period of probation.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶36 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation 
before oral argument.   
 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶37 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  The questions before this court are 
twofold:  (1) May a circuit court reduce a term of probation as 
an exercise of its inherent authority to efficiently and 
effectively function and to administer justice fairly?  And, if 
so, (2) What limitations should be placed on a circuit court's 
inherent authority to reduce a term of probation?  The majority 
opinion makes the sweeping conclusion that circuit courts have 
no inherent authority over probation because it is a statutory 
creation.  I respectfully disagree.  I conclude that a circuit 
court may reduce a term of probation as an exercise of its 
inherent authority to efficiently and effectively function and 
to administer justice fairly.  I further conclude that the 
exercise of a circuit court's inherent authority should be 
circumscribed by the goals of probation:  rehabilitating the 
defendant and protecting the public.   
 
I. 
A circuit court may reduce a term of probation as 
an exercise of its inherent authority to ensure 
the court functions efficiently and effectively 
and administers justice fairly.   
¶38 Our jurisprudence defines the inherent authority of a 
circuit court as the power that is "necessary to enable courts 
to accomplish their constitutionally and legislatively mandated 
functions."  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶73, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 
787 N.W.2d 350 (citing State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  In 
other words, inherent authority is authority without which the 
court cannot function.  Relevant to this case, circuit courts 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
have exercised inherent authority "to ensure the efficient and 
effective functioning of the court, and to fairly administer 
justice."  Henley, 328 Wis. 2d 544, ¶73.   
¶39 Within its function to administer justice, circuit 
courts are called upon to impose a disposition when sentencing 
persons convicted of crimes, whether that disposition results in 
a "sentence" of confinement or the imposition of a term of 
probation.  See State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647-48, 594 
N.W.2d 772 (1999) (reasoning that probation "is so closely 
related to sentencing as a possible criminal disposition" and 
that it falls within the shared powers of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches).  Courts impose probation to 
further the goals of rehabilitating the defendant and protecting 
society without placing the defendant in prison.  See State v. 
Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 68, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  To accomplish 
these goals, circuit courts are empowered by Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(a) to fashion the terms of probation to meet the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.  State v. Hays, 173 
Wis. 2d 439, 445, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992).   
¶40 This court has held that inherent within the probation 
statute is a circuit court's continuing power to modify 
probationary terms to effectuate the goals of rehabilitation of 
the defendant and protection of society.1  State v. Sepulveda, 
                                                 
1 According to the majority opinion's reasoning, the circuit 
court may for cause modify the terms of probation to discontinue 
all probationary services pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), 
yet has no inherent authority to reduce the term of probation.  
This leads to an absurd result. 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
119 Wis. 2d 546, 554, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984).  We have upheld the 
exercise of a circuit court's authority to modify the conditions 
of probation where the intent of probation is frustrated by a 
court-ordered condition not being met.  Id. at 556; see also 
Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 69.  It is necessary, therefore, that 
circuit courts also have the inherent authority to reduce a term 
of probation once the intent of probation is satisfied.   
¶41 The majority opinion concludes that a circuit court 
has no inherent authority to reduce a term of probation for the 
following reasons:  (1) probation is a statutory creation and 
therefore only the statute provides the parameters of how it may 
be imposed; (2) the source of the circuit court's inherent 
authority to impose probation or a sentence comes from the way 
in which those dispositions were imposed at common law; and (3) 
probation already confers upon an individual "the discretionary 
privilege of the State's mercy" such that no other mercy should 
be granted.  Majority op., ¶31.  I address each argument in 
turn.   
¶42 First and foremost, a statute cannot limit the circuit 
court's inherent authority.  The issue of whether a circuit 
court has the statutory authority to reduce a term of probation 
was already decided by this court in State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, 
¶4, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 N.W.2d 691 (Dowdy II).  The unanswered 
question in Dowdy II was whether the circuit court has inherent 
authority to reduce a term of probation, the question now before 
us.  To the extent that Wis. Stat. § 973.09 denominates the 
disposition of probation, it is no different than other 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
dispositions enacted by the legislature, leaving to the courts 
the function of imposing those dispositions.  See Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d at 646.  While the majority opinion points to the fact 
that probation is within the powers that the courts share with 
the legislature, the fact that this power is shared does not 
diminish the circuit court's authority to accomplish its 
constitutionally and legislatively mandated functions and to 
exercise its inherent authority in doing so.  See id. at 643 
("Each branch, separate but co-equal, is not subordinate to 
another, no branch to arrogate to itself control the other.")  
¶43 Second, the majority distinguishes the circuit court's 
inherent authority to reduce a sentence from that of probation 
based upon an assumption that only sentencing existed at common 
law.  Although the genesis of our modern adult probation system 
was approved by the governor in 1909 and codified at Chapter 541 
of the Wisconsin Laws of 1909, there are historical analogues to 
modern day probation.  See Edwin C. Conrad, Commentaries on the 
Wisconsin Law of Probation, 29 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 
449 (1938-1939) (commenting that despite the lack of power, 
prior to the enactment of the present probation law, Wisconsin 
courts had repeatedly suspended sentences in order to give a 
defendant a chance to improve his or her behavior).  Probation 
as a dispositional alternative is thus not necessarily, as the 
majority assumes, a "newer concept."  Majority op., ¶23.   
¶44 Moreover, the common law authority of a court to 
modify a sentence was extremely limited and could only be 
exercised during the court's term, as defined by statute, and 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
before the sentence had commenced.  Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 
93, 105, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 523, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).  In 
Hayes, this court held that the circuit court's inherent 
authority to amend, modify, and correct a judgment of sentence 
extends beyond the authority to do so at common law.  Hayes, 46 
Wis. 2d at 101.  Likewise, the circuit court's authority to 
reduce a term of probation should not be constricted by the 
common law imposition of that disposition.  
¶45 Finally, the majority concludes that a circuit court's 
ability to reduce a term of probation is not necessary to fairly 
administer justice because a probationer has already used up 
their allotment of mercy granted by the State by being placed on 
probation in the first place.  Based on this reasoning, the 
majority would thus deny the circuit court inherent authority to 
reduce a term of probation even where a similarly situated 
individual seeking sentencing modification would be entitled to 
a sentence modification.  For example, a person serving a prison 
sentence who cooperates with law enforcement may be entitled to 
a sentence modification whereas a probationer who cooperates 
would not.  Likewise, applying the majority's reasoning, if the 
circuit court relied upon incorrect information at sentencing, a 
defendant sentenced to jail or prison would be entitled to a 
sentence modification whereas a defendant placed on probation 
would not.  This is far from administering justice.  I therefore 
dissent and conclude that a circuit court may reduce a term of 
probation 
as 
an 
exercise 
of 
its 
inherent 
authority 
to 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
efficiently and effectively function and to administer justice 
fairly.   
 
II. 
The exercise of the circuit court's inherent 
authority to reduce a term of probation should be 
circumscribed by the dual purposes of probation:  
rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of 
the public. 
¶46 The inherent authority of a circuit court to reduce a 
term of probation must be limited to only the power necessary to 
ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the court and 
the fair administration of justice.  The State argues, and the 
court of appeals agreed, that if this court recognizes a circuit 
court's inherent authority to reduce a term of probation, the 
circuit court should use the same criteria as a court evaluating 
a request to modify a sentence.  State v. Dowdy, 2010 WI App 
158, ¶31, 330 Wis. 2d 444, 792 N.W.2d 230 (Dowdy I).  To prevail 
on a motion to modify a sentence, a defendant must show either:  
a clear mistake or illegality, identification of a new factor, 
or undue harshness or unconscionability.  Id., ¶28.  A new 
factor is defined as one the circuit court could not or did not 
consider at sentencing but should now consider in order to 
fulfill the purpose of the original sentence.  State v. 
Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶14, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524, 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 
Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828.   
¶47 Because 
sentencing 
and 
probation 
serve 
different 
purposes, constraining a circuit court's authority to reduce a 
term of probation in the same way that it modifies a sentence is 
an attempt to put a square peg in a round hole.  There are four 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
main purposes of sentencing:  deterrence, rehabilitation, 
retribution, and segregation.  Dowdy II, 338 Wis. 2d 565, ¶97 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  Finality after sentencing is 
crucial 
to 
assure 
that 
the 
purposes 
of 
retribution 
and 
deterrence are met.  Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶21; State v. 
Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶96, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749.  The 
goal of sentence reduction is thus backward-looking in order to 
correct unjust sentences.  See State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 8-
9, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997).  A circuit court's consideration of 
rehabilitation as a reason to modify a sentence interferes with 
finality and payment of the debt a defendant owes to society and 
is therefore not a "new factor" for purposes of sentence 
modification.  Id. at 7; see also Jones v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 62, 
72, 233 N.W.2d 441 (1975); State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 
477, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).   
¶48 In 
contrast, 
probation 
is 
forward-looking 
and 
therefore a defendant's actions post-sentencing necessarily 
inform any modification.  The purpose of probation is to 
"protect the public from criminal conduct and to help the 
probationer become a useful member of society."  Wagner v. 
State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 77, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979).  Once 
rehabilitation is achieved, the purposes of probation are served 
and its term should end.  Because of the differing purposes of 
sentencing 
and 
probation, 
constraining 
a 
circuit 
court's 
authority to reduce probation in the same way that it modifies a 
sentence would not further the purposes of probation and would 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
provide no meaningful ability for a defendant to seek a 
reduction in the term of probation.   
¶49 Schwind argues that, similar to the circuit court's 
ability to modify the terms and conditions of probation, a 
circuit court's inherent authority to reduce a term of probation 
should be circumscribed by the "for cause" standard.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) ("Prior to the expiration of any probation 
period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation 
for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions 
thereof.")  "[F]or cause," however, must be defined narrowly to 
provide guidance to the circuit court and limit the potential 
for abuse.  See Dowdy I, 330 Wis. 2d 444, ¶27 (noting that a 
circuit court's inherent authority is "limited").  A requirement 
that a defendant show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
goals of probation have been met adequately circumscribes a 
circuit court's inherent authority to reduce a term of probation 
and furthers the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts and 
the fair administration of justice.   
¶50 As of June 30, 2018, 66,196 people were on community 
supervision in the state of Wisconsin.  See Division of 
Community Corrections, Wis. DOC, 2018 A Year in Review (Dec 
2018), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/DCCYearIn 
Review.pdf.  Over 32 million dollars was spent in 2018 alone to 
purchase 
products 
or 
services 
for 
the 
benefit 
of 
these 
individuals.  Id.  Once the dual goals of probation are met, it 
is not only in the interest of each individual defendant, but 
also in the interest of society, to reduce a defendant's term of 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
probation thereby freeing up precious resources to better serve 
others in our community.   
¶51 If the inherent authority of the courts is defined too 
narrowly, "we risk impeding the judiciary's ability to carry out 
its constitutionally mandated functions by giving away portions 
of our inherent authority to the other branches of government."  
Majority op., ¶14.  The majority eliminates a circuit court's 
inherent authority to reduce a term of probation and, in so 
doing, gives away necessary power of the court to administer 
justice fairly.  I conclude that in order to efficiently and 
effectively function and to fairly administer justice, a circuit 
court has the inherent authority to reduce a term of probation 
where a defendant has been rehabilitated and therefore the goals 
of the probation disposition have been achieved.  
¶52 Lastly, I concur in part in affirming the circuit 
court's decision.  The circuit court stated that even if it had 
the inherent authority to reduce Schwind's term of probation, 
early termination of probation was not warranted in this case.  
In making this determination, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  Therefore, I concur with 
the majority opinion in affirming the circuit court's decision 
to deny Schwind's motion to reduce his term of probation.   
¶53 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence/dissent. 
No.  2017AP141-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1