Title: GEORGE SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GEORGE SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 105162 P.3d 472Case Number: 05-297Decided: 07/11/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
GEORGE 
SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Pojman. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
     A jury convicted 
George Sanchez Hernandez of attempted second degree murder for cutting William 
George Johnson's throat with a knife.  
On appeal, Mr. Hernandez claims the district court erred when it 
instructed the jury that use of a deadly weapon raised mandatory presumptions of 
an intent to kill and malice.  He 
further claims prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor told the 
jury during closing argument that the presumptions were authorized by Wyoming law.  Finally, he claims other errors that 
occurred during the trial gave rise to cumulative error requiring 
reversal.

 
 
[¶2]  We hold the mandatory presumption 
instructions were improper and were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the language of the plain error 
analysis, the instructions deprived Mr. Hernandez of a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice. Therefore, we reverse Mr. Hernandez's 
conviction.

 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Hernandez 
states the issues as follows:

 
 

ISSUE 
I:

 
 
Whether 
the district court committed reversible error when it instructed the [jury] with 
two mandatory presumptions.

 
 

ISSUE 
II:

 
 
Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor misstated and misled the 
jury on the law.

 
 
ISSUE 
III:

 
 
Whether 
cumulative error occurred in appellant's trial.

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Was appellant prejudiced by Instructions 13 and 17 or the prosecutor's 
reference to them?

 
 
II.         
Does cumulative error exist in this case?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]  On November 3, 2004, Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Hernandez were at the home of Wayne and Diana Scheuerman in Worland, Wyoming.  
Lenna Chapa was also present.  
Testimony was presented at trial indicating all of those present were 
drinking alcohol throughout the day and were intoxicated.  

 
 
[¶5] 
Friction arose between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hernandez because of comments Mr. 
Hernandez was making about Mr. Johnson's girlfriend, Patty Nelson, who was not 
present.  Two or three times, Mr. 
Johnson rose from his chair, went over to Mr. Hernandez and "head-butted" 
him.  During one of the 
altercations, Mr. Johnson fell over and smashed a coffee table.  Ms. Scheuerman called the police and 
requested they come and remove Mr. Johnson from her home.  Mr. Scheuerman arrived home at the same 
time and took Mr. Johnson outside to calm him down.  When a police officer arrived, Mr. 
Scheuerman told him that Mr. Johnson could stay and he would address the issue 
with his wife.  

 
 
[¶6]  After the police officer left, Mr. 
Scheuerman and Mr. Johnson went back into the house and joined the others in the 
living room.  The testimony 
presented at trial varied as to what happened next.  Ms. Scheuerman testified Mr. Hernandez 
rose from the couch and approached Mr. Johnson, saying "I'm probably going to 
the pen, or I probably got a free ticket to the pen."  She testified she did not see a knife 
but the next thing she knew there was blood coming from Mr. Johnson's neck.  Mr. Johnson testified Mr. Hernandez 
approached him, he felt like he had been punched, and then he noticed blood on 
his hand.  He touched his neck and 
there was more blood.  Mr. 
Scheuerman testified that when he and Mr. Johnson came back into the house Mr. 
Johnson slapped Mr. Hernandez in the head or kicked him.  Then Mr. Johnson sat down and Mr. 
Hernandez rose, moved toward Mr. Johnson and "tried to hit him with a 
knife."  Mr. Scheuerman testified he 
did not actually see Mr. Hernandez cut Mr. Johnson's throat, but Mr. Johnson was 
not bleeding before and blood was dripping from his neck after Mr. Hernandez 
approached him.  

 
 
[¶7]   Ms. Chapa testified she had gone into the 
kitchen and did not see what happened but saw blood on Mr. Johnson's neck as she 
and Mr. Hernandez left the residence together.  Mr. Scheuerman told Mr. Johnson he 
needed to get him to the hospital and they left. At the hospital, a doctor 
performed surgery on Mr. Johnson's neck and carotid 
artery.

 
 
[¶8]  Emergency room personnel called the 
police and reported that Mr. Johnson had been stabbed.  Police went to the hospital and spoke 
with Mr. Johnson who indicated he had been stabbed by a Hispanic man named 
George at the Scheuerman residence.  
Police went to the home and spoke with Ms. Scheuerman.  They found Mr. Hernandez across the 
street and arrested him.  Later, 
they found a knife sheath on the floor in the living room next to where 
witnesses said Mr. Hernandez was sitting and a knife under magazines on a table 
nearby.  Mr. Hernandez was arrested 
and charged with attempted second degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2005).  

 
 
[¶9]  A jury trial was convened in district 
court in WashakieCounty on July 12, 
2005.  Mr. Hernandez's defense was 
that he was too intoxicated to form the specific intent necessary to support a 
conviction of attempted second degree murder.  Prior to submitting the case to the jury 
for deliberations, the district court instructed the jury on the applicable 
law.  Among the instructions given 
were an instruction on Mr. Hernandez's intoxication defense and instructions 
telling the jury that use of a deadly weapon gave rise to presumptions of intent 
to kill and malice.  In its closing 
argument, the State told the jury the presumptions were authorized by Wyoming law.  After deliberating for less than one 
hour, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Mr. Hernandez on the charge 
of attempted second degree murder.  
The district court sentenced Mr. Hernandez to twenty to twenty-two years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit for 324 days 
served.

      

DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                              
Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Hernandez claims plain error 
occurred when the district court gave the jury the following instructions 
proposed by the State:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 13

 
 
            
Use of [a] deadly weapon gives rise to [a] presumption of intent to 
kill.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 17

 
 
            
Use of [a] deadly weapon in a deadly and dangerous manner raises [a] 
presumption of malice.  

 
 
Mr. 
Hernandez asserts these instructions violated his due process rights because 
they contained mandatory presumptions telling the jury that if it found he used 
a deadly weapon it must find malice 
and intent, improperly relieving the State of its burden of proving every 
element of the crime charged.  
Defense counsel did not object to the proposed jury instructions about 
which Mr. Hernandez complains.  
Therefore, the plain error standard applies and Mr. Hernandez must 
show:  1) the claimed error clearly 
appears in the record; 2) the error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
in an obvious way; and 3) he was deprived of a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice.

 
 

[¶11]  It is established law in this Court and 
the United States Supreme Court that the State is required to prove every 
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and jury instructions 
containing any presumption that a reasonable juror may read as mandatory are 
prohibited.  Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 1224 
(Wyo. 1983); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1979).  In Sandstrom, the defendant was charged 
with deliberate homicide and the jury was instructed that 
"the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his 
voluntary acts."  The Court held the 
instruction violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the jurors may have 
interpreted it either as shifting the burden to the defendant to prove he did 
not intend to kill, or requiring them to find intent upon proof by the State 
that the defendant caused the victim's death.  Because either interpretation would have 
deprived the defendant of his right to due process, the Court held the 
instruction was unconstitutional and reversed the 
conviction.

 
 

[¶12]  In Krucheck, this Court was asked to decide 
whether an instruction nearly identical to Instruction No. 17, the presumption 
of malice instruction given in Mr. Hernandez's case, was improper.  We reversed the defendant's conviction, 
holding the trial court erred in giving the instruction without 
contemporaneously instructing the jury that the State must prove the existence 
of malice beyond a reasonable doubt.  
We held the failure to give the contemporaneous instruction violated 
W.R.E. 303(c) and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Krucheck, 671 P.2d  at 
1223-24.

 
 
[¶13]  Rule 303(c) provides:   

 
 
Whenever 
the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient 
evidence of the presumed fact but is not 
required to do so.  In addition, if the presumed fact 
establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the 
court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  We said in Krucheck, 671 P.2d  at 1223-24, that the rule required the trial court 
to explicitly tell the jury that the presumption was permissive, not mandatory, 
and that the existence of malice had to be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  "The intent of the rule is 
to tell the jury that they are not bound by the presumption and that it is 
therefore rebuttable."  Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 667-68 
(Wyo. 
1985).  

 
 
[¶14]  Citing Sandstrom, we also said in Krucheck, 671 P.2d at 
1224:

 
 
[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to "prove every element of a criminal 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt."  
This principle . . . prohibit[s] not only a mandatory presumption, but 
any presumption which a reasonable juror may read as mandatory.        

 
 
Because 
the instruction given in Krucheck did 
not tell the jury the presumption was permissive, we held it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  We said, 
"When a jury is authorized to make use of presumptions, it must be informed that 
it may refuse to use them."  
Id. at 1125. 

 
 
[¶15]  As in Krucheck, neither the malice instruction 
nor any other instruction told the jury in Mr. Hernandez's case that the 
presumption was not mandatory and it could refuse to apply it.  The malice instruction clearly violated 
W.R.E. 303(b) and the Fourteenth Amendment.  The intent instruction likewise 
authorized the jury to make use of the presumption but failed to inform the jury 
it was not required to do so.  
Therefore, the intent instruction violated W.R.E. 303(b) and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  

 
 
[¶16]  Given the clearly established law, the 
State concedes Mr. Hernandez has satisfied the first two elements of the plain 
error standard because the claimed error appears clearly in the record and the 
district court violated a clear rule of law in giving the instructions.  The State contends, however, that Mr. 
Hernandez cannot show the instructions deprived him of a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice.  

 
 

[¶17] 
This Court has not previously addressed the material prejudice part of the plain 
error test in a case involving a jury instruction containing an unconstitutional 
mandatory presumption.  In Krucheck, the defendant objected to the 
instruction and so we did not apply the plain error test.  In Brooks, there was no objection because 
the jury instruction containing the alleged presumption was offered by the 
defense.  Additionally in Brooks, upon considering the instruction 
in its entirety we concluded there was no error because there was no possibility 
the jury could have believed it was required to make the presumption.  Brooks, 706 P.2d  at 668.  In Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 
2000) and Ellison v. State, 3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 2000), we likewise concluded the instructions were not erroneous 
because they did not create mandatory presumptions.  

 
 

[¶18]  Looking to federal cases, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has said the analysis is the same under either 
plain or harmless errorthe court must evaluate the effect of the error on the 
reliability of the jury verdict.1  United 
States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1055 (10th Cir. 1996).  That is, the error must be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of the evidence presented to determine 
whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is essentially the same test we 
applied in Krucheck, 671 P.2d  at 
1225, where we held the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was reasonable to conclude the 
jury may not have convicted the defendant of second degree murder if it had 
known the presumption was not mandatory. 

 
 
[¶19]  After this Court's decision in Krucheck, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403-04, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 114 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1991), in which it 
elaborated on the test for determining error in the context of jury instructions 
containing mandatory presumptions.  
The Court said:

 
 
            
To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find 
that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the 
issue in question, as revealed in the record.  Thus, to say that an instruction to 
apply an unconstitutional presumption did not contribute to the verdict is to 
make a judgment about the significance of the presumption to reasonable jurors, 
when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors 
independently of the presumption.

 
 
[¶20]  The process under Yates for arriving at a judgment about 
the presumption's significance to the jurors involves two steps.  First, the court asks what evidence the 
jury actually considered in reaching its verdict.  Id. 
at 404.  Second, the court weighs 
the probative force of that evidence against the probative force of the 
presumption standing alone.  
Id.

 
 
It will 
not be enough that the jury considered evidence from which it could have come to 
the verdict without reliance on the presumption.  Rather, the issue . . . is whether the 
jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption.  Since that inquiry cannot be a 
subjective one into the jurors' minds, a court must approach it by asking 
whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in 
accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the 
same in the absence of the presumption. It is only when the effect of the 
presumption is comparatively minimal to this degree that it can be said . . . 
that the presumption did not contribute to the verdict.

 
 

Id. at 
405-06.  As part of this analysis, 
it is crucial to ascertain from the trial court's instructions that the jurors, 
as reasonable persons, would have considered the entire trial record.  Id. 
at 406.  

 
 
[¶21]  Applying this test in Yates, the United State Supreme Court 
held that it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumption 
instructions had not contributed to the jury's finding of intent to kill.  In Yates, two men, Yates and Davis, were 
involved in the armed robbery of a store during which Davis killed the store proprietor's mother and then 
Davis was 
killed.  Yates was charged as an 
accomplice to murder as a result of the woman's death.  In order to find Yates guilty as an 
accomplice to murder, the State had to prove Davis intended to kill the woman.  The Court reviewed the record and 
determined:

 
 
The most 
that can be said with certainty was that [the woman] joined the struggle between 
Davis and [the proprietor] and was stabbed during the course of it.  She could have been killed inadvertently 
by Davis, and we 
cannot rule out that possibility beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
In sum, 
the evidentiary record simply is not clear on Davis' intent to kill the victim.  Without more, we could not infer beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the presumptions did not contribute to the jury's 
finding of Davis' intent to kill [the woman] and 
to the ensuing verdict of petitioner's guilt as Davis' accomplice.

 
 

Yates, 500 U.S.  at 411.        

 
 

[¶22]  Applying the Yates test to the error in Mr. 
Hernandez's case, we begin by asking what evidence 
the jury considered in reaching its verdict.  We presume the jury 
considered the following testimony:  
there had been friction between Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Johnson throughout 
the day and Mr. Johnson had physically assaulted Mr. Hernandez two or three 
times.  When Mr. Johnson came back 
into the room after the coffee table altercation, Mr. Hernandez rose from his 
chair and crossed the room toward him.  
As Mr. Hernandez approached Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hernandez had a knife and 
said something to the effect that he would be going to the penitentiary.  Immediately after Mr. Hernandez 
approached him, Mr. Johnson began bleeding from his throat and Mr. Scheuerman 
quickly determined he needed to take Mr. Johnson to the emergency room.  The emergency room doctor testified that 
Mr. Johnson had a laceration from his ear down through his neck to the bottom of 
his throat that almost completely severed the carotid artery, one of the main 
arteries to the brainan injury which would have left Mr. Johnson dead in less 
than an hour without medical attention.  
Mr. Hernandez had been drinking throughout the day, and when police 
arrested him an hour or so after the incident, he was intoxicated to the point 
that his speech was slurred and he staggered as he was placed in handcuffs.  

 

[¶23]  Turning to the second part of the Yates test, we weigh the probative force 
of the evidence against the probative force of the presumption standing 
alone.  The question we ask is:  was the 
force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the 
instructions so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the 
presumption?  Yates, 500 U.S.  at 
405.  In answering this question we 
must 
ascertain whether the trial court instructed the jurors to consider the entire 
trial record in reaching a verdict.  
Id. at 406.  We consider the jury instructions as a 
whole without singling out individual instructions or parts of 
instructions.  Ellison, 3 P.3d  at 
849.

 
 
[¶24] 
Prior to submitting the case to the jury for deliberations, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it was tasked with weighing and considering all of the 
evidence presented.  The court also 
instructed the jury that at all times in the proceedings the State had the 
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each 
element of the offense.  The court 
instructed the jury that if it found a reasonable doubt upon any single element 
of the charged crime, it had to find the defendant not guilty.    

 
 
[¶25]  Concerning the charged offense of 
attempted second degree murder, the court instructed the jury that it should 
find Mr. Hernandez guilty if it found that, with the intent to commit second 
degree murder, he did any act which was a substantial step toward committing the 
crime of second degree murder.  The 
jury also was instructed that a person who purposely and maliciously, but 
without premeditation, kills a human being is guilty of second degree 
murder.  With these instructions, 
the jury was again admonished that if it found from the evidence that any of the 
elements were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it should find the defendant 
not guilty.   

 
 
[¶26] 
The jury was also instructed that an attempt is an effort or endeavor to 
accomplish a crime, involving more than preparation or planning, which if not 
prevented would have resulted in consummation of the act attempted.  The jury was instructed on the meaning 
of deadly weapon and that use of one gives rise to a presumption of intent to 
kill and malice.  Finally, the court 
instructed the jury that it was not to single out any individual instruction but 
to consider all of the instructions together, regarding each in light of the 
others.     

 
 

[¶27]  We conclude that the 
force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the 
court's instructions was not so overwhelming to leave it beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the verdict would have been the same without the presumptions.  Given the evidence, the most that can be 
said with certainty is that Mr. Hernandez assaulted Mr. Johnson with a deadly 
weapon and caused serious injury.  
The evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hernandez 
had the specific intent to kill Mr. Johnson.  We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury would have convicted Mr. Hernandez of attempted second 
degree murder in the absence of instructions that the jurors could have 
understood required them to find malice and intent from the fact that Mr. 
Hernandez used a deadly weapon.  
Stated in terms of the plain error analysis, Mr. Hernandez has shown the 
error in giving the instructions deprived him of his right to due process 
resulting in material prejudice.   

 
 
[¶28]  Our conclusion is strongly influenced by 
another factor requiring discussion.  
As mentioned above, Mr. Hernandez's defense focused on proving that he 
was too intoxicated to form the intent to commit attempted second degree murder 
or attempted voluntary manslaughter.  The jury was instructed on this defense 
as follows:

 
 
            
Evidence has been introduced tending to show that at the time the crime . 
. . was allegedly committed, the defendant was suffering from self-induced 
intoxication.

 
 
Self-induced 
intoxication is a defense to the crime of attempted second degree murder and 
attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant was intoxicated to such a 
degree that he was unable to formulate the intention to commit the felony of 
attempted second degree murder or attempted voluntary 
manslaughter.

 
 
 * * *

Accordingly, 
if you find that the defendant . . . was suffering from self-induced 
intoxication to such a degree that there is a reasonable doubt in your minds 
whether the defendant possessed the mental ability to form the intention to 
commit the felony of attempted second degree murder, or attempted voluntary 
manslaughter, then you should find the defendant not guilty . . . 
.

 
 
The 
difficulty with the mandatory presumption instructions is that they told the 
jury it must find intent and malice if it found Mr. Hernandez used a deadly 
weapon.  If the jurors followed 
those instructions, they may have concluded they had to disregard the theory of 
defense instruction.  

 
 
[¶29] 
Due process requires the trial court to give a correct instruction to the jury 
that details the defendant's theory of the case when the theory is supported by 
competent evidence and is recognized by statute or case law.  Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 117, ¶ 15, 51 P.3d 214, 219 (Wyo. 2002).  This 
Court has recognized that intoxication is a defense to a specific intent 
crime.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d 975, 984-85 (Wyo. 2002).   An "attempt" is a "specific intent" 
crime.  Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2002).  Thus, 
Mr. Hernandez was entitled to have the jury instructed on this theory that he 
was too intoxicated to form the intent to commit the offense of attempted second 
degree murder if there was competent evidence to support the 
theory.

 
 
[¶30] 
The testimony was that all of those present at the Scheuerman home were drinking 
throughout the day.  Ms. Chapa 
testified that she and Mr. Hernandez arrived at the Scheuerman house 
mid-morning.  She testified Mr. 
Hernandez had been drinking before they got there and continued to drink 
throughout the day.  She testified 
that she saw Mr. Hernandez drink somewhere between six and twelve beers and that 
he was "pretty buzzed" by the time they left.  Ms. Scheuerman testified that Mr. 
Hernandez was drunk.  Sergeant Tom 
Brase of the Worland Police Department testified that when he arrested Mr. 
Hernandez, he was "inebriated to the point it was causing him to stagger, slur 
his speech.  He was drunk."  Sergeant Brase testified that he had to 
hold the handcuffs he had placed on Mr. Hernandez to steady him in order to get 
him into the patrol car.

 
 
[¶31]  Despite competent evidence of his 
intoxication, we do not know whether the jurors considered Mr. Hernandez's 
theory of defense in light of the instructions telling them they were required 
to find malice and intent if they found Mr. Hernandez used a deadly weapon. 
 Thus, the instructions potentially 
deprived Mr. Hernandez of his defense.  
Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the error in giving the 
mandatory presumption instructions, without also instructing the jury that it 
was not required to find the presumptions, was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
2.         
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶32]  Mr. Hernandez also claims the prosecutor 
committed misconduct when he incorrectly told the jury during his closing 
argument that this Court has held that use of a deadly weapon raises the 
presumption of intent and malice.  
No objection was made to the prosecutor's remarks; therefore, we review 
them for plain error.  The State 
responds by asserting that the prosecutor's remarks did not constitute 
misconduct because they were phrased in permissive, rather than mandatory, 
language.

 
 
[¶33]  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
made the following statements:

 
 
[T]he 
Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that you can make certain presumptions based on 
the actions of someone.  They stated 
that use of a deadly weapon, clearly a knife is a deadly weapon, it can  you 
all know that a knife can kill someone, and it's reasonable to assume that Mr. 
Hernandez knew that if he cut somebody's throat that he could very well kill 
them.  And in this case he came 
very, very, very close, within a half hour of actually killing Mr. 
Johnson.

 
 
But the 
use of a deadly weapon gives rise to the presumption of the intent to kill. So I 
think you can presume that Mr. Hernandez, by using a knife on Mr. Johnson's 
throat, intended to kill him.

 
 
* * 
*

And also 
in determining malice, the Supreme Court in the State of Wyoming has also said 
that you can use another presumption to determine if malice was present, and 
that is the use of a deadly weapon, which we have in this case, the use of a 
knife, in a deadly and dangerous manner raises a presumption of malice.  So if someone uses a deadly weapon in a 
deadly and dangerous manner you can find malice . . . .

 

[¶34]  Whether or not the prosecutor's remarks 
were stated in permissive language, the instructions themselves told the jurors 
that they were required to find the presumptions upon finding Mr. Hernandez used 
a deadly weapon.  Plain error 
occurred in giving the instructions and it was plain error for the prosecutor to 
argue them.  

  

3.                  
Cumulative 
Error

 
 
[¶35]  Mr. Hernandez asserts other errors 
occurred at trial that, when combined with the error in the jury instructions 
and the prosecutor's closing remarks, constituted cumulative error depriving him 
of a fair trial.  Our holding that 
it was plain error to give the mandatory presumption instructions is 
determinative of the appeal.  
However, we address Mr. Hernandez's cumulative error claim because 
retrial is a possibility and these same questions may arise 
again.

 
 
[¶36]   Mr. Hernandez's cumulative error 
argument is based on three additional alleged errors:  first, a police officer called by the 
State commented during his testimony on Mr. Hernandez's right to remain silent; 
second, the trial court admitted into evidence a knife that was not connected by 
forensic testing to the stabbing; and, third, the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury on the elements of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter.  We address each of 
these alleged errors separately.

 
 
[¶37]  The State called Sergeant Brase to 
testify about his involvement in the investigation after receiving the report 
from the hospital that Mr. Johnson had been stabbed.  On redirect, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 

Q.    
Sergeant, 
when you dealt with Mr. Hernandez was he rational?  

A.     
He knew 
that he was being placed under arrest, yes.

Q.    
He knew 
what was going on? 

A.     
Yes, he 
invoked his Miranda rights when I advised him of his Miranda, and he said he 
didn't want to talk to me, wanted to remain silent. 

Q.  Nothing further.

 
 
Defense 
counsel did not object to the testimony.  
This exchange followed defense counsel's cross-examination of Sergeant 
Brase during which counsel attempted to show that Mr. Hernandez was intoxicated 
to a degree that he was staggering and slurring his speech when Sergeant Brase 
arrested him an hour after the stabbing.        

 
 
[¶38]  In addressing claims of improper comment 
on the right to silence, we evaluate the entire context in which the statements 
were made and consider whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, 
emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, or attempted to exploit the 
issue in any way.  Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 664, 667-68 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
A 
prosecutor does not "comment" on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence 
where he does not attempt to use the silence to the state's advantage, where he 
does not argue to the jury that the silence was evidence of guilt or an 
admission of guilt, and where the defendant does not show any prejudice.  Material prejudice is shown only where 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the evidence or prosecutorial comment had not been 
allowed.   

 
 

Id., ¶ 14, 
78 P.3d  at 668 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶39]  From the entire context in which 
Sergeant Brase's testimony was given, it is clear the prosecutor's question was 
not improper.  He was attempting to 
establish only that Mr. Hernandez appeared to be sufficiently sober to 
understand what was happening at the time of his arrest to refute the 
intoxication defense.  When Sergeant 
Brase responded with the comment that Mr. Hernandez invoked his Miranda rights 
and wanted to remain silent, the prosecutor ceased his questioning.  He did not mention Sergeant Brase's 
comment in closing argument.  Mr. 
Hernandez has failed to show material prejudice resulted from the comment.  

 
 
[¶40]  After Mr. Hernandez's arrest, police 
offers obtained a search warrant and searched the Scheuerman residence.  They found a knife under some magazines 
on an end table next to the couch in the living room.  During the trial, the trial court 
admitted the knife into evidence over defense counsel's objection that there had 
been no showing that it was connected to the alleged stabbing other than the 
fact that it was found in the home where the stabbing occurred.  Mr. Hernandez claims the trial court 
erred in admitting the knife. 

 
 
[¶41]  Rulings on the admission of evidence are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).  In 
order to successfully challenge such a ruling on appeal, an appellant must show 
that the trial court abused its discretion.  Id.  We give 
a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence considerable deference 
and will not disturb such a ruling as long as a legitimate basis exists for the 
ruling.  Id.  

 
 
[¶42]  The knife which is the basis of Mr. 
Hernandez's claim of error was found by police during their search of the 
Scheuerman home.  Officer Brad 
Horath testified it was found on an end table in the vicinity of where Mr. 
Hernandez was sitting in the living room where the stabbing occurred.  Defense counsel objected to its 
admission on relevance grounds.

 
 
[¶43]  Relevant evidence is evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less than it would be without the 
evidence.  W.R.E. Rule 401.  All relevant evidence is 
admissible.  W.R.E. Rule 402.  Relevant evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  W.R.E. Rule 403.

 
 
[¶44]  The only basis for defense counsel's 
objection was that there was nothing connecting the knife to the stabbing other 
than the location where it was found.  
Presumably, the trial court found the location of the knife in the living 
room of the home where the stabbing occurred sufficient to make it 
relevant.  We defer to the trial 
court and will not disturb its ruling because we conclude a legitimate basis 
existed for the ruling.  Officer 
Horath's testimony that there was no blood on the knife, no testing for 
fingerprints was performed and there was nothing connecting the knife to the 
injuries suffered by Mr. Johnson was fertile ground for cross-examination; his 
testimony was not, however, grounds for excluding the knife on the basis of 
relevancy.

 
 
[¶45]  Mr. Hernandez's final claim of error is 
that the jury was not instructed on the elements of the lesser included offense 
of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  
Although defense counsel offered an elements instruction, he did not 
object when the trial court failed to give the proposed instruction.  Therefore, we review his claim for plain 
error. 

 
 
[¶46]  In Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 
(Wyo. 1983), 
the defendant was charged with and convicted of second degree murder.  He claimed plain error occurred because 
the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of the lesser 
included offense of involuntary manslaughter.  Specifically, the court's instruction 
incorrectly suggested that intent was an element of the lesser included 
offense.  We stated:  "It is difficult to see how a deficient 
instruction on a lesser offense upon which there was no conviction could be 
plain error."  Id. at 892.   We also said:

 
 
The 
court instructed the jury on the statute and elements of second degree murder, 
and defined purposely, maliciously and premeditation, words which appear in the 
second degree murder statute.  The 
court also instructed the jury that if it did not find appellant guilty of 
second degree murder, it must proceed to determine guilt or innocence of any 
lesser included offense, one of which is involuntary manslaughter.  In this case, then, the jury did not 
consider involuntary manslaughter, nor did it need to read the instructions 
pertaining to that lesser included offense . . . .

 
 
            
Appellant has alleged instructional error on something that the jury did 
not consider or need to consider.  
There is no merit in this assignment of error.

 
 

Id.   

 
 
[¶47]  As in Cutbirth, the jury in Mr. Hernandez's 
case was instructed on the statute and elements of second degree murder.  The trial court also instructed the jury 
that if it did not find Mr. Hernandez guilty of second degree murder, it could 
find him guilty of the lesser offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Because the jury determined that Mr. 
Hernandez was guilty of attempted second degree murder, it did not consider the 
lesser offense.  Mr. Hernandez has 
not shown he was materially prejudiced by the instruction.  In the event of a re-trial, however, the 
lesser included offense instruction should include the elements the jury must 
find in order to convict on the attempted voluntary manslaughter 
charge.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶48]  The trial court erred when it instructed 
the jury that use of a deadly weapon raises a presumption of malice and intent 
to kill without also instructing the jury it was not required to find the 
presumptions and the State still had to prove intent and malice beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We are 
unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted 
Mr. Hernandez of attempted second degree murder in the absence of the erroneous 
instructions.  The error affected 
Mr. Hernandez's substantial right and resulted in material prejudice.  Therefore, we reverse his conviction and 
remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This is not 
to suggest there is no difference between plain and harmless error. As the Court 
stated in United States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1055 (10th Cir. 1996), one important difference is 
that the State has the burden of proving harmless error, while the defendant has 
the burden of proving plain error.