Title: Matter of MLM

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of MLM1984 WY 52682 P.2d 982Case Number: C-83-6Decided: 05/25/1984In the Matter of Parental Rights of MLM, LFM and BDM.

MS, Appellant (Respondent), 

v. 

Robert KUCHERA, Director of the Department of Public Assistance and Social Services In and For CAMPBELL COUNTY, Appellee (Petitioner)

Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of 
Parental Rights of MLM, LFM and BDM.

MS, Appellant 
(Respondent), 

v. 

Robert KUCHERA, 
Director of the Department of Public Assistance and Social Services In and For 
CAMPBELLCOUNTY, Appellee 
(Petitioner)

Appeal from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, The Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, 
Judge. 

David A. Kinskey, Gillette, for Appellant.A.G. McClintock, 
Attorney, General; Allen C. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Laura L. 
Beard, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne; Jack Sundquist, Deputy County 
Attorney; and Francis E. Stevens, Guardian Ad Litem, Gillette, for Appellee. Before Rooney, C.J., Thomas, Rose, Brown, and 
Cardine, JJ. BROWN,  Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant appeals the 
trial court's termination of her parental rights to three daughters, MLM, LFM 
and BDM. The trial court's judgment followed a jury verdict which found that 
appellant had neglected her three children.

[¶2.]     Appellant has raised 
the following issues on appeal:

"A. Did the trial court err in 
admitting evidence of a prior neglect adjudication?"B. Did the trial 
court err in admitting evidence of 'abuse,' as defined by Wyoming law, where the natural parent was charged only 
with 'neglect,' as defined by Wyoming law?"C. Did the trial court 
err in failing to instruct the jury that parental rights cannot be terminated on 
the basis of conditions that are the ordinary [**2]  incidents of poverty?"D. Did the 
trial court err in failing to instruct the jury that parental rights cannot be 
terminated on the basis that a young child, or the child's home, are 
unclean?"E. Does the state bear the burden of making a reasonable, good 
faith and bona fide effort at rehabilitation?"F. Did the plans for 
rehabilitation afford adequate notice to the defendant of what behavior was 
expected of her and the consequences of her failure to comply?"G. Is 
there sufficient evidence to support the determination that the rehabilitative 
efforts of the authorized agency failed? " 

Issues C and D will be considered 
together, and issues E, F, and G will be combined.[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     Appellee, Campbell 
County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (hereinafter D-PASS) 
first contacted appellant and her family in September 1981. Mrs. Greer Hastings, 
principal caseworker for D-PASS, was assigned to the case and made numerous home 
visits and telephone calls during a fifteen month period. Mrs. Hastings, in her 
position, was principally concerned with providing services to families that 
included neglected and abused children. Between September 1981 and December 
1982 the three children were removed from appellant's home several times. 
Removal was either voluntary so that the children could be placed temporarily in 
foster care or was involuntary and the children were put in protective custody. 
After each removal the children were returned to appellant after her promise to 
correct certain deficiencies that were explained to her in detail. D-PASS 
workers and others found certain recurring problems and deficiencies with 
appellant and in her home: 1) inadequate heat, 2) hazards that endangered the 
children, 3) children were not receiving prescribed medicine, 4) bedwetting, 
lack of clean clothing, inadequate personal hygiene, 5) children's health 
problems, hunger and inappropriate behavior patterns, 6) physical mistreatment, 
and 7) generally, the children and the home were filthy and 
unkempt.[¶4.]     This is not merely a 
"dirty house" case; it is a case of three little girls living under conditions 
of squalor and neglect all their lives. D-PASS said, in effect, "enough is 
enough," and filed a petition for termination of parental 
rights.[¶4.]     The three girls were 
born in the State of Washington. MLM was born in 1974; LFM in 1976; 
and BDM in 1979. We do not have all the details of the conditions that 
existed in Washington, but generally, they were 
the same conditions as found in Wyoming.[¶4.]     We know in greater 
detail the circumstances of the children's welfare in Campbell County, Wyoming. Mrs. Hastings found three dogs and 
three cats in residence at appellant's home. On one visit she counted twenty 
piles of feces of various vintage in the hallways, bedroom and living room. 
Feces was detected on most home visits. The children and a dog drank out of the 
same water dipper; and the children found and ate remnants of food in junk cars 
on appellant's premises. Two of the children went to school hungry and begged 
for food; and they were given showers at school. They also went to school 
without warm clothes. They were given clothes from various sources, and these 
clothes ended up in soiled clothes piles in appellant's home. Besides incidents 
of wetting their pants at school, two children required some medical treatment 
at school, and were identified as having psychological problems. Additionally, 
appellant's home and her three girls were associated with a variety of strong 
odors, the smell of urine being predominate.[¶4.]     Caseworkers, nurses and 
others identified items and conditions in the home that they characterized as 
hazardous and dangerous to the health and safety of the children. One child was 
sleeping eighteen inches from a space heater with a pile of flammable material 
next to the heater. Food found in junk cars constituted a danger of bacteria and 
poison. Knives and medicine were accessible to the children. The caseworker 
noticed that there was no cover on the light switches or outlets, and exposed 
hot water pipes and aluminum siding with sharp edges also created a danger. 
These hazards were pointed out to appellant.[¶4.]     On December 7, 1982, 
appellee filed its petition to terminate the parental rights of appellant 
pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977, (Cum.Supp.1982).1 This statute 
provides:

"(a) The parent-child legal 
relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following is 
established by clear and convincing evidence:

* * * *"(iii) The child has 
been abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or 
mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family 
or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that 
the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with 
or returning to the parent."

 [¶5.]     Neglect is defined in § 
14-3-202(a)(vii), W.S.1977:

"'Neglect' means the failure or refusal 
by those responsible for the child's welfare to provide adequate care, 
maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any other care 
necessary for the child's well-being. * * * *"

[¶6.]     We have previously 
considered the requirements of § 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977, and 
stated:

"Thus we examine the evidence to 
ascertain if it clearly and convincingly establishes the facts: (1) that CP has 
failed or refused to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education 
or medical, surgical, or other care necessary for PP's well being; (2) that 
rehabilitative efforts by authorized agencies have been unsuccessful in 
correcting the situation; and (3) that PP's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to CP. * * * *" Matter of Parental 
Rights of PP, Wyo., 648 P.2d 512, 513 (1982). "Succinctly 
stated, parental rights cannot be terminated under § 14-2-309(a)(iii) unless 
there is the necessary quantum of proof to show 1) neglect, 2) a refusal or 
failure of rehabilitation, and 3) that the health and safety of the children 
will be in jeopardy if left with the offending  parent." Matter of SKJ 
and SLJ, Wyo., 673 P.2d 640, 644 
(1983).

I

[¶7.]     Appellant contends that 
the admission into evidence of an adjudication of prior neglect in the State of 
Washington 
regarding appellant's children was erroneous, irrelevant and prejudicial. 
Appellant objected to three orders of the Juvenile Department of the Superior 
Court of the State of Washington in and for Cowlitz County, and two reports by 
the Department of Social and Health Services (hereinafter D-SHS). In determining 
the relevance of evidence objected to, certain rules and prior case law must be 
considered:

"'Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence."All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Rule 402, 
W.R.E."Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, 
W.R.E."Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Rule 7.04, Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.

[¶8.]     Rule 61, Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, provides that an error in admitting evidence is not a ground 
for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for disturbing a 
judgment tent with substantial justice" and an error must be disregarded which 
"does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties."[¶8.]     A ruling of the trial 
court on the relevancy of evidence in termination of parental rights cases is 
"within its sound discretion and will be upheld absent the showing of a clear 
abuse of discretion." Matter of Parental Rights of SCN and NAN, 
Wyo., 659 P.2d 568, 521 (1983). The appellant has the burden to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion in the court's ruling. Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 
(1979). Considerable deference is accorded an admissibility ruling of a district 
court on appellate review if a legitimate and rational basis exists for the 
decision. Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023 
(1981).[¶8.]     Courts generally hold 
that evidence of prior neglect of the same children is relevant in dependency or 
parental rights termination proceedings. People v. D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11, 596 P.2d 747 (1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 987, 100 S. Ct. 515, 62 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979); In Interest of Adkins, Iowa, 298 N.W.2d 273 (1980); In re Mosier, 205 Neb. 340, 288 N.W.2d 22 (1980). The state must 
prove that less intrusive means of protecting a child have been attempted or are 
impractical before parental rights can be terminated. Matter 
of Parental Rights of PP, supra.[¶8.]     The showing of 
prejudice to exclude relevant evidence requires a demonstration that the 
"evidence had little or no probative value and that it was extremely 
inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury." Apodaca v. 
State, supra, at 1027. Evidence must be deemed unfair to be prejudicial. 
Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802 (1980). Questions regarding 
remoteness of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not 
be upset unless an abuse of discretion exists. Goodman v. State, 
Wyo., 601 P.2d 178 (1979).[¶8.]     The evidence from the 
State of Washington proceedings tends to show a 
long history of neglect similar to the allegations of neglect charged in 
Wyoming. This 
evidence also tends to show that the condition that prompted appellee's action 
was not transitory but existed for more than four years. The information 
from Washington shows the medical needs of the 
children and the care or lack of care provided by appellant. The records also 
show the rehabilitative efforts by the State of Washington and how appellant responded to 
these efforts.[¶8.]     The records from the 
Washington 
courts were relevant and properly received into evidence. Such evidence 
makes the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the termination of 
parental rights more probable than it would have been without the evidence, as 
required by Rule 401, W.R.E.

II

[¶9.]     In appellant's second 
assignment of error she states that the petition for termination of parental 
rights charged neglect and that the more definite statement filed by appellee 
set out only instances or conditions of neglect. At trial, however, she states 
evidence of abuse was admitted. Appellant complains that to admit such evidence 
without notice was prejudicial and contrary to the mandates of due process. We 
do not agree.[¶9.]     Several months before 
trial appellant made a motion to require appellee to make a more definite 
statement regarding the nature of the neglect charge, the manner in which the 
children were in serious jeopardy and the nature of the rehabilitative efforts 
by appellee. Appellee responded to this motion by alleging, among other things, 
that appellant had failed to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, 
medical care and that rehabilitative efforts had been unsuccessful. Ordinarily, 
a petition need not specify every piece of evidence offered in support of 
the petition. In Interest of F.H., N.D., 283 N.W.2d 202 
(1979).[¶9.]     The evidence objected 
to by appellant was a bruise on LFM, step-father's abuse of the children and 
spanking the children for wetting the bed. We agree with the trial court that 
often there is a thin line between abuse and neglect. If a child is bruised it 
is important to know if the bruise got there because of some dangerous condition 
that a parent failed or refused to correct. If a step-father or another person 
abuses a child, it is evidence of neglect if a mother does not take some action 
to stop the abuse or remove the child from an abusive environment. 
In re Tanya P., 120 Cal. App. 3d 66, 174 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1981); In re Lisa 
D, 81 Cal. App. 3d 192, 146 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1978); In Interest of Castro, 102 
Idaho 218, 628 P.2d 1052 (1981).

[¶10.]  Evidence was 
produced at trial that LFM and MLM had medical problems which may have caused 
the bed wetting. If a child has medical problems resulting in bed wetting, and 
inappropriate discipline is administered instead of indicated medical treatment, 
this would be evidence of neglect. However, spanking a child is not 
necessarily abusive and may very well be evidence that proper disciplinary 
measures are being taken to correct improper 
behavior.

[¶11.]  
We hold that admitting the evidence of a bruise, spanking and abuse by 
the step-father was not an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances here the 
evidence objected to tended to show a pattern of neglect. An act or incident may 
be evidence of both neglect and abuse, and that was the situation here. In any 
event, the evidence objected to was only a minor part of the total evidence 
produced showing neglect. Appellant had adequate opportunity, through 
cross-examination and witnesses of her own, to explain or contradict this 
evidence.

III

[¶12.]  
Appellant assigns as error the failure of the court to give two 
instructions:

"The law guarantees to each individual 
the right to his or her children. Parental rights cannot be terminated on the 
basis that the natural parents, because of low social or economic standing, 
cannot provide their children with all the advantages that more affluent, 
better-educated foster parents could provide.""The law requires that 
parental rights may not be terminated solely on the grounds of slovenliness in 
keeping a young child clean or the childs [sic] home in good order. This is true 
even where such uncleanliness might offend you personally and even though it 
might be characterized by you personally as neglect. Parental rights can be 
terminated only under the circumstances that I have previously outlined to 
you."

[¶13.]  
These refused instructions encompass some of the language used in DS 
and RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911, 917 (1980):

"* * * * It will not do for the State 
to fail to prove neglect but to argue that the natural parents, because of a low 
socio-economic standing, cannot provide the child with all the advantages that 
more affluent, better-educated foster parents could provide. * * * 
*" "* * * * Slovenliness in keeping a young child clean or his home 
in good order may offend many of us and may, by some, be characterized as 
neglect, but is not such neglect--assuming no serious health effect or risk--as 
will justify termination of parental rights." Id., at p. 919.

[¶14.]  
Appellant does not contend that the trial court did not adequately 
instruct the jury concerning what the state must prove to demonstrate neglect. 
She contends that the court must instruct the jury on conditions that do 
not constitute neglect.

[¶15.]  
The instructions offered by appellant and refused by the court instruct 
what not to consider. In a parental rights termination case there might be 
numerous things the jury should not consider. Focusing on a few would tend to 
confuse the jury or leave the impression that anything else could be considered. 
On the other hand, a complete list of things not to consider would be almost 
impossible to compile. When the court instructs the jury on what must be proved, 
it is implied that other matters are not to be considered. We believe the jury 
understands that. In DS, supra, we were not concerned with instructions 
nor failure to give instructions. In that case we set out standards and then 
reviewed the evidence to see if those standards had been met. The excerpts 
quoted from DS above were some of those standards.

[¶16.]  
In the ordinary parental rights termination case consideration is given 
to a combination of factors, incidents and conditions that demonstrate the 
neglect required to justify termination of rights. Rarely do we find a single 
condition or incident that standing alone would justify termination. 
Neglect is usually manifested by numerous incidents and conditions extending 
over a considerable length of time. We believe that a rule requiring the trial 
court to instruct the jury on conditions or incidents that should not be 
considered neglect would be impractical, confusing and inappropriate. The trial 
court is not obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long as the 
jury is adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that case. 
Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981).

[¶17.]  
The trial court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 4 what the state 
must prove, and that the proof must be by clear and convincing evidence that 
appellant neglected her children. This instruction comports with the 
requirements set out in In Matter of Parental Rights of PP, supra. 
Instruction No. 8 defined neglect in the language of § 14-3-202(a)(vii), 
W.S.1977. Nothing was said in this instruction about slovenliness being related 
to neglect.

[¶18.]  
The first instruction proffered by appellant is particularly 
inappropriate. The state did not try to show or argue that the children would be 
better off with more affluent and better educated foster parents. 
The instruction offered by appellant would tend to negative something that 
was never an issue and focus the jury's attention on a 
non-issue.

[¶19.]  
We hold that the jury was properly instructed and that the two 
instructions proffered by appellant were properly refused.

IV

[¶20.]  
The final assignment of error relates to the rehabilitative efforts of an 
authorized agency. According to § 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977, before parental rights can be terminated it must be shown, 
among other things, that "* * * * efforts by an authorized agency or mental 
health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the 
family has refused rehabilitative treatment. * * * *"

[¶21.]  
Between November 1976 and September 1978 the State of Washington D-SHS received 
seven complaints concerning lack of proper care of appellant's two older 
children. The agency responded to these complaints and made a report to the 
juvenile court on September 14, 1978. The report reflected that the caseworker 
had found the complaints to be substantiated. The caseworker required that the 
children be taken to a doctor for medical attention, and suggested to appellant 
that she seek help from a teaching homemaker.  The agency devised a plan to 
correct the deficiencies in the home and to improve appellant's parenting 
skills. The following agency services were offered:

"1. A teaching homemaker to help with 
organization of housework, child care, and nutrition;"2. Availability of 
a caseworker for counseling, or referral to outside agencies, as 
needed;"3. Parenting classes offered by the Child Protective Services 
social worker;"4. Day care for LFM and MLM."

Appellant agreed to accept the services 
offered by the agency and to try to improve. After a time appellant and the 
natural father of the children refused to allow visits by anyone from the 
agency.

[¶22.]  
On October 27, 1978, a petition alleging neglect was presented to the 
Juvenile Department of the Superior Court of the State of Washington. LFM and MLM 
were declared by the court to be dependent children. The court found that 
appellant was deficient in parenting skills and standards of nutrition and 
sanitation necessary to maintain the children's health, that there was a 
manifest danger and that the children would suffer further neglect if they were 
not removed from the home. The court awarded custody of LFM and MLM to 
D-SHS for placement in a foster home.

[¶23.]  
The Washington agency again reported to the court 
on March 28, 1979. The report showed some improvement since the September 14, 
1978, report. The agency again set out goals and a plan to accomplish these 
goals. In a hearing before the court on April 3, 1979, the court found that the 
basic problems still existed to some extent. One of the children was returned to 
the physical custody of appellant. Under the supervision of D-SHS, appellant was 
ordered to continue with the plans set up by the agency.

[¶24.]  
Appellant's case was again before the Washington court on September 27, 1979, for 
review. The court found that neither parent had attended parenting classes as 
ordered. The order of the court that followed was substantially the same as the 
April order, and custody remained with D-SHS. In the court's order dated October 
7, 1980, it was ordered that "dependency on LFM and MLM be dismissed." However, 
the order further stated that "This matter be reviewed on March 26, 1981, at 
1:30 p.m." Appellant came to Wyoming in May 
1981 and we do not know if her case was ever reviewed by the Washington court as 
ordered.

[¶25.]  
Beginning in September, 1981,  employees of Campbell County D-PASS 
commenced visits and telephone calls to appellant's home. D-PASS and other 
agencies made innumerable contacts with appellant and her family in the next 
several months. Mrs. Hastings, the caseworker, made thirteen visits to 
appellant's home in a two-month period. The public health nurse made a total of 
nine visits to appellant's home in 15 months. The school nurse had contact with 
the two older girls almost daily during school. Mrs. Hastings discussed cleaning 
up appellant's house and warned her that the children would become sick if this 
were not done.

[¶26.]  
D-PASS also referred appellant to public assistance which included an 
energy program, a food stamp program, aid to dependent children program, 
emergency closet  for low-income 
families, and medical programs. She was also referred to low-income housing, 
mental health and public health nurse services, other health facilities, and was 
offered homemaker services and parenting classes. People's Project (a community 
project involving counseling and consulting) was made available. D-PASS set out 
in writing goals and plans to accomplish these goals. These plans were dated 
April 7, 1982,  and August 24, 1982. Appellant's response to the written 
plans, counseling, advice and other help was generally to ignore 
them.

[¶27.]  
On a visit November 3, 1981, appellant refused to allow the caseworker to 
enter her home and did not respond to another offer to furnish homemaker 
services. On this visit the caseworker learned that the children were searching 
through junk cars on the premises, and were eating remnants of food they found 
in the cars. The caseworker warned of the hazards of eating this old food. 
Appellant's response was that she knew of the danger but the children liked to 
play in the old cars.

[¶28.]  
Frequently appellant would not let the caseworker or nurses in her home, 
or refused to open the door. Eventually appellant consented to homemaker 
services, and signed up for a parenting class. She only attended two out of six 
classes in a six-week period. Appellant cancelled numerous appointments or 
failed to show up, and she forgot about doctor's appointments. Every contact 
with appellant, in her home or at the D-PASS office, she was admonished to clean 
up the filth in her home and was cautioned about health and safety problems. 
Ultimately, appellant refused to work with any CampbellCounty agency.

[¶29.]  
Dr. Clare Haynes, a developmental psychologist, stated that the children 
had suffered severe neglect from birth. She was of the opinion that if the 
children were returned to their mother, "There may be irreversible damage 
because they have been neglected in terms of health hazards, nutrition, 
supervision and protection, stimulation opportunities for development in every 
level."

[¶30.]  
It is clear that the Washington D-SHS and the Washington court exerted 
considerable effort to rehabilitate appellant from 1976 to 1981. D-PASS and 
other Wyoming 
agencies made concerted efforts to rehabilitate appellant from September 1981 to 
December 1982. All the efforts of Washington 
and Wyoming 
failed, mainly because appellant refused to be 
rehabilitated.

[¶31.]  
Throughout appellant's brief she argues sufficiency of the evidence, even 
though this issue was not raised as such. She refers us to evidence favorable to 
her and excludes much of the unfavorable evidence. Appellant has ignored the 
standard of review, which is well-known:

"'* * * * We will examine the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the appellee and will resolve all conflicts in 
evidence for the appellee.  [Citation.] We will assume the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely 
evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may fairly be 
drawn from it. [Citations.]'" Matter of Parental Rights of PP, supra, at 
p. 514.

 [¶32.]  
Considering our standard of review we hold that appellee produced 
overwhelming evidence that the children of appellant had been neglected, that 
efforts by authorized agencies to rehabilitate appellant had been unsuccessful 
and that the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by 
returning them to her.

[¶33.]  
We recognize the fundamental right of parents to care for, educate, and 
associate with their children. A child has a fundamental right to live in an 
environment free from filth, health hazards and danger. A child has the right to 
be properly nourished and educated, and receive necessary medical attention. 
When the rights of a parent and the rights of a child are on a collision course, 
the rights of the parent must yield. The appropriate state agency need not wait 
for a catastrophic event to occur before it takes 
action.

[¶34.]  
The courts have carefully guarded the rights of parents. Our statutes and 
case law place a heavy burden on the state if parental rights are to be 
terminated. State agencies are not in business to ferret out parents who have 
deficiencies to the end that their children be taken away. To the contrary, 
state agencies are in business to protect and assist dependent children, and to 
rehabilitate parents who have deficient parenting skills. It is only in extreme 
cases that state agencies seek to terminate parental rights, such as appellee 
did in CampbellCounty. The jury was 
justified in returning a verdict that resulted in terminating appellant's 
parental rights.

[¶35.]  
Affirmed. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 The petition also asks that the 
parental rights of the natural father be terminated under § 14-2-309(a)(i), 
W.S.1977. He did not answer the petition nor did he appear, and default was 
entered.