Title: Mathey v. Mathey

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

179 Kan. 284 (1956)
294 P.2d 202
EMMA MATHEY, nee OLSON, Appellant,
v.
CHARLES H. MATHEY, Appellee.
No. 39,984

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 29, 1956.
W.K. Thompson, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Walter T. Chaney, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
U.S. Weary, of Junction City, argued the cause, and Robert K. Weary, of Junction City, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is an action by a divorced wife against her former husband to vacate and set aside a property division made in the divorce action on the ground of fraud.
The appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer to the petition.
The basic question is concerned with whether the fraud pleaded is intrinsic or extrinsic, and whether it affords grounds to vacate or modify the judgment within the meaning of the statute, G.S. 1949, 60-3007, Fourth.
On February 23, 1953, plaintiff (who also was plaintiff in the divorce action) was granted a divorce. She appealed from that part of the decree pertaining to the division of property. Defendant did not appeal. The judgment was affirmed by this court in Mathey v. Mathey, 175 Kan. 446, 264 P.2d 1058. Feeling aggrieved by our decision, plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing. After studious consideration of all points raised, a rehearing was denied in Mathey v. Mathey, 175 Kan. 733, 267 P.2d 516.
On February 18, 1955, within the two-year period provided by G.S. 1949, 60-3008, plaintiff filed the instant action under G.S. 1949, 60-3007, Fourth, which reads:
..............
Omitting formal parts, the petition alleges:
"II.
"III.
"IV.
"V.
The prayer is that the property division portion of the divorce decree be vacated and set aside; that the fraudulently undisclosed personal property be determined, and that the court make a fair and equitable division thereof between the parties.
Defendant filed a demurrer to this petition on the ground it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the reason that:
*287 The demurrer was sustained on the ground mentioned, and plaintiff has appealed.
The statute (G.S. 1949, 60-3007, Fourth) under which this action was brought does not distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. It has been held many times, however, that the fraud relied on must be extrinsic as distinguished from intrinsic, and that the fraud which will authorize a court to vacate a judgment in an action brought for that purpose must be extrinsic or collateral to the matter involved in the former action and sufficient to justify the conclusion that but for such fraud the result would have been different. (Plaster Co. v. Blue Rapids Township, 81 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1079, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1237; Garrett v. Minard, 82 Kan. 338, 108 Pac. 80; Putnam v. Putnam, 126 Kan. 479, 268 Pac. 797; Stafford v. Stafford, 163 Kan. 162, 181 P.2d 491, and Lowry v. Lowry, 174 Kan. 526, 256 P.2d 869.) See also 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 372, b, (2), p. 738, where it is said that, generally speaking, equitable relief against a judgment may be granted for extrinsic fraud but not for intrinsic fraud, and that the fraud which will afford ground for equitable relief must be extrinsic, extraneous or collateral to the matters or issues tried in the action in which the judgment was rendered, and that relief on the ground of fraud cannot be predicated on matters or issues which actually were or which with due diligence could have been presented and adjudicated in the original proceedings.
For a still further discussion of the subject reference is made to the lengthy annotation found at 88 A.L.R. 1201.
This necessarily leads to a discussion of what is meant by intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
In the Plaster Co. case, supra, it was said:
In Potts v. West, 124 Kan. 815, 817, 262 Pac. 569, it was held that extrinsic fraud is fraud which prevents a fair presentation of the controversy to the court, and that intrinsic fraud is fraud which relates to a fair determination of the controversy by the court.
In the Putnam case, supra, it was said that by extrinsic fraud is meant some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy, and that fraud is intrinsic and included in the judgment where it relates to questions that were in conflict and which were necessary for the court to determine.
In Eaton v. Koontz, 138 Kan. 267, 272, 25 P.2d 351, it was said that extrinsic fraud consists in preventing fair presentation of issues, and that intrinsic fraud relates to fair determination of issues.
In the Stafford case, supra, acts by defendant which caused plaintiff not to be in court at the time of a divorce hearing were held to constitute extrinsic fraud  that is, they prevented a fair presentation of issues to the court.
In the Lowry case, supra, it was held that concealment of the fact a decree of divorce between the parties had been entered in another state amounted to extrinsic fraud because but for such concealment the Kansas court would have been aware that it was without jurisdiction of the subject matter.
In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 178 Kan. 97, 283 P.2d 405, it was held that the fraud practiced, being of such a nature, and being calculated to prevent defendant from appearing in court and contesting the original action even though she had proper pleadings on file, constituted extrinsic fraud.
See also Shuckrow v. Maloney, 148 Kan. 403, 409, 83 P.2d 118, and Prideaux v. Prideaux, 169 Kan. 644, 649, 650, 220 P.2d 538, for further discussion of the subject.
In 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, § 5, p. 757, appears the following statement:
*289 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 654, p. 230, defines the terms as follows:
Generally speaking, the giving of false testimony, that is, perjury, standing alone and unaccompanied by other acts of a collateral nature, is held to constitute intrinsic fraud and ordinarily affords no ground for vacating a judgment.
In Bleakley v. Barclay, 75 Kan. 462, 89 Pac. 906, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 230, it was held:
This rule was followed in the Plaster Co. case, supra, in which it was held:
In Littlefield v. Paynter, 111 Kan. 201, 206 Pac. 1114, it was held:
In the Putnam case, supra, the rule was thus stated:
31 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 662, p. 236, states:
To the same effect is 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 374, p. 745, where it is said that according to the great weight of authority, perjury, unaccompanied by any extrinsic or collateral fraud, ordinarily does not constitute ground for equitable relief against a judgment inasmuch as perjury or false swearing is a species of intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud.
Despite the difficulty often encountered in making a practical application of the distinction between the two types of fraud, it is clear from the foregoing authorities that, generally speaking, "extrinsic fraud" relates to acts which prevent a fair presentation of a controversy, and that "intrinsic fraud" relates to acts which prevent a fair determination of the issues once a court has a controversy before it. It is equally clear that perjury, standing alone, is held to constitute intrinsic fraud and ordinarily affords no ground for vacating a judgment. The reason for the last mentioned rule is that there must be an end to litigation, and where a party has had his day in court and knows what the issues are he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury at the time  otherwise litigation would be interminable. The rule is well stated in Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, cited with approval by this court in the Plaster Co. case, supra, and discussed in the annotation at 88 A.L.R. 1201 (1207 and 1208):
Applying all that has been said to the record before us, what disposition is to be made of this case?
Plaintiff contends that she alleges fraud on the court and herself resulting from defendant's failure to disclose and reveal the total assets of the parties which were known only to and controlled by him. Conceding this to be true, nevertheless, stripping paragraph IV of the petition of excess verbiage, there can be no doubt but that defendant is charged with testifying falsely concerning the amount and nature of personal property then owned by him or them jointly. In other words, he is charged with perjury. He is not charged with any acts which, under the authorities cited, constitute extrinsic fraud.
Perjury, standing alone, being intrinsic fraud, is an insufficient ground to vacate the judgment under the mentioned statute, and the demurrer to the petition was properly sustained.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
HARVEY, C.J., not participating.