Title: State v. Hughes

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ELVIS HUGHES
No. 59A00
(Filed 21 December 2000)
Search and Seizure--investigatory stop--anonymous informant--insufficient indicia of
reliability
The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory stop of the taxi that defendant was
riding in based on information the police received from an anonymous tip giving a physical
description of a dark-skinned Jamaican whose name and clothing description could not be
recalled, who was going to North Topsail Beach, who sometimes came to Jacksonville on
weekends before dark, who sometimes took a taxi, who sometimes carried an overnight bag, and
who might be arriving on the 5:30 p.m. bus, because: (1) the detective had never spoken with the
informant and knew nothing about the informant other than the captain’s claim that the
informant was a confidential and reliable informant; (2) there was no indication that the
informant had been previously used and had given accurate information or that his statement was
against his penal interest; (3) there was no indicia of reliability when the only evidence showing
that the identity of this informant was known is the captain’s conclusory statement that the
informant was confidential and reliable; (4) the information provided by the tip did not contain
the range of details required to sufficiently predict defendant’s specific future actions and could
be associated with many travelers; and (5) the police did not have reasonable suspicion resulting
from their subsequent corroboration.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 136 N.C. App. 286, 524
S.E.2d 70 (1999), reversing and remanding an order entered by
Ragan, J., on 10 December 1998 in Superior Court, Onslow County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 12 September 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Edward G. Bailey and Lee E. Britt for defendant-appellant.
Clifford Clendenin O’Hale & Jones, LLP, by Walter L. Jones;
and Seth H. Jaffee, Counsel, on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, amicus
curiae.
FREEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal as of right based on a dissent from the
Court of Appeals below, reversing the trial court’s decision in a
controlled substance case to grant defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence.  We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, and we
thus reverse that opinion.
On the morning of 13 March 1998, Detective Imhoff of the
Jacksonville Police Department was sitting in the office of
Captain Matthews of the Onslow County Sheriff’s Department when
Matthews received a phone call.  At the call’s conclusion,
Matthews told Imhoff that he had been talking to a confidential,
reliable informant who said that an individual nicknamed “Markie”
would be arriving that day in Jacksonville by way of a bus coming
from New York City, possibly the 5:30 p.m. bus.  “Markie” was
described as “a dark-skinned Jamaican from New York who weighs
over three hundred pounds and is approximately six foot, one inch
tall or taller, between twenty or thirty years of age[,] . . .
who would be clean cut with a short haircut and wearing baggy
pants,” and who would have marijuana and powdered cocaine in his
possession.  The informant also indicated that Markie “sometimes”
came to Jacksonville on weekends before it got dark, that he
“sometimes” took a taxi from the bus station, that he “sometimes”
carried an overnight bag, and that he would be headed to North
Topsail Beach.
Later in the day, Detective Imhoff relayed this information
by telephone to Detective Bryan of the Jacksonville Police
Department and told him to go to the bus station, as the
individual might be early.  However, at the suppression hearing,
Detective Bryan could not recall whether he had been given a
description of defendant’s clothing, nor could he recall whether
he had ever been given the suspect’s name.  Detective Bryan
further testified that he did not know what time defendant would
arrive in Jacksonville or on which bus, only that he was coming
in that afternoon.
When Detective Bryan and his partner, Detective McAvoy,
reached the station, one bus from New York had already arrived,
but a bus coming from Rocky Mount was scheduled to arrive around
3:50 p.m.  Detective Bryan testified he knew that Rocky Mount was
a transfer point between New York and Jacksonville, as were some
other cities.  When the bus arrived, it pulled in with its door
facing away from the officers, blocking their view of the
arriving passengers so that they could not see whether defendant
stepped off of the bus.  Detective Bryan testified, however, that
defendant was not in the parking lot before the bus arrived and
that he had stepped from behind the bus after it arrived. 
According to Detective Bryan, defendant matched the exact
description he had been given and was carrying an overnight bag.  
Defendant immediately stepped into a taxi and headed down
Highway 17 South, toward an area called the Triangle, where
Highway 17 splits in two directions--towards Wilmington and
Topsail Beach, North Carolina, or towards Richlands, North
Carolina.  A person must pass through the Triangle before it can
be determined in which of these directions he or she is going. 
However, the officers stopped defendant’s taxi before it reached
the Triangle area.
Upon stopping the taxi, Detective Bryan informed defendant
that he was a police officer and explained why he had stopped the
taxi.  He then asked defendant if he would consent to a search,
and defendant agreed.  Detective Bryan conducted a pat-down
search of defendant’s person and searched the area of the taxicab
where defendant had been sitting and the small bag defendant was
carrying.  After these searches, Detective Bryan asked defendant
to remove his shoes, revealing marijuana in the toes of each
shoe.  A later search at the police station revealed bags
containing cocaine in the tongues of the shoes.  Defendant was
charged with possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine,
possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana,
manufacturing cocaine, and manufacturing marijuana.
The question raised here on appeal is whether the evidence
seized from defendant was legally obtained.  The determination of
the legality of the stop, and subsequent search, is partly
dependant on the reliability of the information relied on by
arresting officers in making the stop.  In order to determine the
reliability of the information received, we must first determine
whether the information received by the officers was obtained
from an anonymous informant or a confidential and reliable
informant.
The two-pronged test for probable cause to search formulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and later refined in Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), set forth
the requirements for obtaining a search warrant based on
information supplied by a reliable informant.  This test
required, first, that the affidavit must contain sufficient
information that would allow a magistrate to understand how the
informant obtained the information and, second, that the
affidavit must establish the reliability of the informant. 
Reliability could be established by showing that the informant
had been used previously and had given reliable information, that
the information given was against the informant’s penal interest,
that the informant demonstrated personal knowledge by giving
clear and precise details in the tip, or that the informant was a
member of a reliable group such as the clergy.
The Court later abandoned this test in favor of the
“totality of the circumstances” test established in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).  Under this test,
the “basis of knowledge” and “reliability” or “veracity” prongs
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test are still relevant, but instead of
being independent of each other, they are “closely intertwined
issues,” where “a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing
as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”  Id.
at 233, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 545.
This Court adopted the reasoning of Gates in State v.
Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).  In applying the
test used in Gates, this Court also found the principles
underlying Aguilar and Spinelli, mainly that evidence is needed
to show indicia of reliability, to be important components in
determining the totality of the circumstances.
Turning to the case before us, the evidence shows that
Detective Imhoff had never spoken with the informant and knew
nothing about the informant other than Captain Matthews’ claim
that he was a confidential and reliable informant.  There was no
indication that the informant had been previously used and had
given accurate information or that his statement was against his
penal interest nor, as will be discussed later, was there any
other indication of reliability.  Some objective proof as to why
this informant was reliable and credible, other than just Captain
Matthews’ assertion passed to Detective Imhoff, and by him to
Detectives Bryan and McAvoy, must support Detectives Bryan and
McAvoy’s decision to conduct a search.  To hold otherwise would
be to ignore the protections contained in the Fourth Amendment.
The State argues that this was a case of declaration against
penal interest because, first, by his statement to Detective
Imhoff, Captain Matthews indicated that he knew the informant,
and second, since giving a false report to the police is a
misdemeanor, the informant risked criminal charges if his
information was not truthful.  We are not persuaded by this
argument, and we conclude that, under the circumstances, the
burden of reliability was not met.  Captain Matthews never
testified at the suppression hearing, nor did he give any
indication to Detective Imhoff or anyone else as to how he knew
this informant or why this informant was reliable.  The only
evidence showing that the identity of this informant was known is
Captain Matthews’ conclusory statement that the informant was
confidential and reliable.
Nor was this a statement against penal interest.  Being held
accountable for a false statement to the police necessarily
requires that an individual’s identity is known.  Here, the
record contains no evidence that the informant’s identity was
known to the officers directly involved in the arrest.  Captain
Matthews’ conclusory statement, which was third-hand hearsay by
the time Detectives Bryan and McAvoy relied on it, is
insufficient indicia of reliability.  Furthermore, making a false
statement to the police, standing alone, is not against an
individual’s penal interest because doing so is not a crime.  To
be charged with the crime of making a false report to law
enforcement agencies or officers, the evidence must show that the
person willfully made a false or misleading statement to a law
enforcement agency or officer for the purpose of interfering with
the law enforcement agency or hindering or obstructing the
officer in the performance of his duties.  N.C.G.S. § 14-225
(1994)(emphasis added).  We do not have any evidence before us
indicating that all of these elements were or would have been
fulfilled.
Without more than the evidence presented, we cannot say
there was sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant use of the
confidential and reliable informant standard.  Accordingly, we
analyze the anonymous tip standard in evaluating this case.
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990),
the United States Supreme Court concluded that an anonymous tip
could, under the totality of the circumstances, be sufficiently
reliable to pass constitutional muster.  Id. at 332, 110 L. Ed.
2d at 310.  In White, a case described by the Court as “close,”
the anonymous caller indicated that an individual, Vanessa White,
would have in her possession an ounce of cocaine in a brown
attaché case.  During the call, the informant told the police the
precise apartment building and apartment number from which White
would be leaving and the particular time she would leave, and
also gave detailed information as to White’s car and her final
destination, Dobey’s Motel.  The police then observed White leave
the specified apartment building, get into the car described in
detail by the informant, and take the most direct route to the
motel before they finally stopped White just short of her
destination.  Id. at 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d 306-07.
The Court in White emphasized, first, that the Aguilar and
Spinelli standards for determining an informant’s veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge were important factors to
consider in the context of an anonymous informant, as they were
when involving a confidential, reliable informant.  The Court
stated that although an anonymous tip by itself rarely
demonstrated the needed reliability, the tip combined with
corroboration by the police could show indicia of reliability
that would be sufficient to meet this burden.  “‘Some tips,
completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either
warrant no police response or require further investigation
before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.’”  Id.
at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617-18 (1972)).
Second, the Court emphasized the importance that, “as in
Gates, ‘the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating
not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the
time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
ordinarily not easily predicted.’”  Id. at 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d at
310 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 552). 
Particularly significant was the fact that the informant in White
was able to describe in detail not only existing facts such as
Williams’ car and apartment, but that the informant was able to
predict Williams’ future behavior, indicating “a special
familiarity with respondent’s affairs.”  Id.  “When significant
aspects of the caller’s predictions were verified, there was
reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also
that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the
stop.”  Id.  The Court, in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 146 L.
Ed. 2d 254 (2000), recently reiterated the importance of an
informant’s ability to predict the future behavior of the
suspect.  In that case, officers searched a young black male
based on an anonymous tip stating that a young black male would
be standing at a particular bus stop, wearing a plaid shirt and
carrying a gun.  The Court found that, aside from the tip, the
officers had no independent reason to suspect J.L. of any
wrongdoing, as he was just standing at the bus stop doing nothing
in particular to indicate criminal activity.  The Court also
found that the tip itself completely lacked any prediction of
future behavior and stressed its finding in White, that “[o]nly
after police observation showed that the informant had accurately
predicted the woman’s movements . . . did it become reasonable to
think the tipster had inside knowledge about the suspect.”  Id.
at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260.
Third, the White Court articulated the differences between
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, finding that in meeting
the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, the Aguilar-Spinelli
factors were required to a lesser degree.  White, 496 U.S. at
329-31, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308-09.  In so finding, however, the
Court did not diminish the need for indicia of reliability,
finding instead that “if a tip has a relatively low degree of
reliability, more information will be required to establish the
requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip
were more reliable.”  Id. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309.
The case before us also involves the investigatory stop of
an automobile, as defendant’s taxi was stopped en route.  Terry
v. Ohio and its progeny have taught us that in order to conduct a
warrantless, investigatory stop, an officer must have reasonable
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  392 U.S. 1, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An anonymous tip can provide reasonable
suspicion as long as it exhibits sufficient indicia of
reliability.  J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260; White,
496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309.  As previously stated, a
tip that is somewhat lacking in reliability may still provide a
basis for reasonable suspicion if it is buttressed by sufficient
police corroboration.  J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at
260 (“there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably
corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to
provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop’”)
(quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 306).
What is crucial to the determination of whether the
anonymous tip in the instant case was sufficiently reliable to
create reasonable suspicion justifying the stop was the
information known to the officer before the stop was made.  J.L.,
529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260 (“The reasonableness of
official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew
before they conducted their search.”).  In the context of an
anonymous tip, this means that a tip must have sufficient indicia
of reliability, and if it does not, then there must be sufficient
police corroboration of the tip before the stop may be made. 
White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308 (“This is not to say
that an anonymous caller could never provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary for a Terry stop”; however, most tips require
something more, like police corroboration, before obtaining the
level needed for reasonable suspicion.).  If reasonable suspicion
for the stop exists before the stop is made, there is no
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In examining the case before us, our review is limited.  It
is the trial judge’s responsibility to make findings of fact that
are supported by the evidence, and then to derive conclusions of
law based on those findings of fact.  State v. Cooke, 306 N.C.
132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).  Where the evidence
presented supports the trial judge’s findings of fact, these
findings are binding on appeal.  Id. (“[T]he scope of appellate
review . . . is strictly limited to determining whether the trial
judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal,
and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s
ultimate conclusions of law.”).  This deference is afforded the
trial judge because he is in the best position to weigh the
evidence, given that he has heard all of the testimony and
observed the demeanor of the witnesses.  As we said in State v.
Smith, “[w]here the evidence is conflicting, . . . the judge must
resolve the conflict.  He sees the witnesses, observes their
demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable
position, he is given the responsibility of discovering the
truth.  The appellate court is much less favored because it sees
only a cold, written record.”  278 N.C. 36, 41, 178 S.E.2d 597,
601, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934, 29 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1971).  The
trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable
on appeal.
As stated earlier, an anonymous tip can form the basis of
reasonable suspicion as long as there is sufficient indicia of
reliability either from the tip alone or after police
corroboration.  The reasonable suspicion must arise from the
officer’s knowledge prior to the time of the stop.  In this case,
a review of the facts shows that Detectives Bryan and McAvoy had
a physical description of a dark skinned Jamaican whose name and
clothing description could not be recalled, who was going to
North Topsail Beach, who “sometimes” came to Jacksonville on
weekends before dark, who “sometimes” took a taxi, and who
“sometimes” carried an overnight bag.  The only other information
the officers had was that defendant might be arriving on the 5:30
p.m. bus.
We conclude that, on its own, this tip is not sufficient to
create a reasonable suspicion.  Unlike the tip in White, wherein
the informant gave specific details regarding White’s apartment
building (including the specific apartment number), her car
(including the fact that the right taillight lens would be
broken), the particular time she would be leaving, and her
specific destination within the community, the informant here
gave comparatively vague information.  For instance, the
informant here described the suspect’s pants as “baggy” without
giving any indication as to what color they were or any other
information as to the rest of the suspect’s clothing.  The
informant was vague regarding the time of the suspect’s arrival--
“possibly” the 5:30 p.m. bus--and did not specify where defendant
would have the drugs in his possession.  Although the informant’s
description of “Markie” himself was more detailed, this
description alone is not enough, as it could be attributed to any
number of travelers.
Even more important for purposes of its reliability, the
information provided did not contain the “range of details”
required by White and Gates to sufficiently predict defendant’s
specific future action, but was instead peppered with
uncertainties and generalities.  The tipster stated that “Markie”
“sometimes” came to Jacksonville on weekends, “sometimes” took a
taxi from the bus station, “sometimes” carried an overnight bag,
and would be headed to North Topsail Beach.  As well as being
vague, these statements are broad enough to be applied to many of
the bus station patrons.  It is highly likely that any number of
weekend travelers to Jacksonville, where a large military base is
located, would take a bus; that they might bring an overnight
bag; and that unless they had someone pick them up from the
station, they would take a taxi to their final destination, which
could include North Topsail Beach.   Because we find that the tip
taken as a whole was insufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion, we next look to see if it was made sufficient by
independent police corroboration.
It appears from the record that the only items of the
informant’s statement actually confirmed by the officers before
the stop were that they saw a man meeting the suspect’s
description come from around a bus that had arrived in
Jacksonville at approximately 3:50 p.m., that he was carrying an
overnight bag, and that he left the station by taxi.  Without
more, these details are insufficient corroboration because they
could apply to many individuals.  Furthermore, the officers did
not see defendant get off the bus, and the bus arrived an hour
and a half earlier than the tipster had predicted.
Likewise, reasonable suspicion does not arise merely from
the fact that the individual met the description given to the
officers.  As the Court stated in J.L.,
[a]n accurate description of a subject’s readily
observable location and appearance is of course
reliable in this limited sense:  It will help the
police correctly identify the person whom the tipster
means to accuse.  Such a tip, however, does not show
that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal
activity.  The reasonable suspicion here at issue
requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a
determinate person.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261.  Here, before
stopping the taxi, the officers did not seek to establish the
reliability of the assertion of illegality.  They did not confirm
the suspect’s name, the fact that he was Jamaican, or whether the
bus from Rocky Mount had originated in New York City.  Moreover,
because the officers stopped the taxi before it reached the
Triangle area, they failed to corroborate whether the individual
might be headed to North Topsail Beach, as the informant had
stated, or to Wilmington, Richlands, Kinston, or some other
destination.
The State argues that, as in White, defendant here was “at
least headed in that general direction.”  This is simply not
enough detail in an anonymous tip situation to support the
reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion.  Unlike White, where
the suspect had taken the most direct route to a specific
destination, Dobey’s Motel, and was stopped just short of the
motel on the road where the motel was located, White, 496 U.S. at
327, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 307; the suspect here was approximately
twenty miles from his supposed general destination of North
Topsail Beach and was stopped before it could even be determined
which of several directions he would take.  Whereas White was
considered a “close case,” the case before us is not.  J.L., 529
U.S. at 271, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260 (“Although the Court held that
the suspicion in White became reasonable after police
surveillance, we regarded the case as borderline. . . .  We
accordingly classified White as a ‘close case.’”).  Instead, this
case is more akin to J.L., in which the Court found that, under
the totality of the circumstances, there was not enough
information to amount to reasonable suspicion.  Here, the trial
judge found in his conclusions of law that, given the “totality
of the circumstances,” the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion resulting from either the tip itself or their
subsequent corroboration, and that the tip could be associated
with many travelers.  Finding that the officers acted without the
requisite reasonable suspicion, the trial judge concluded that
their actions were in violation of the Fourth Amendment and held
the evidence inadmissible.
Our review of the transcript indicates that the trial
judge’s findings of fact, made by a seasoned trial judge who
observed the State’s witnesses and their demeanor, are amply
supported by the evidence and that his conclusions of law are in
accord with both the findings of fact and current Fourth
Amendment case law.  As the anonymous tip and police
corroboration in this case do not approach the level required in
White to be a “close case,” we conclude that defendant’s Fourth
Amendment protections were violated.  We therefore reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and uphold the trial court’s
order allowing defendant’s motion to suppress.
REVERSED.