Title: Adams v. Lang

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

553 So. 2d 89 (1989)
Gale ADAMS and Nick Armstrong
v.
John LANG.
88-492.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 8, 1989.
Rehearing Denied November 3, 1989.
*90 Wilbor J. Hust, Jr., of Zeanah, Hust, Summerford, Davis & Frazier, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
Charles E. Pearson and Robert F. Prince of Prince, McGuire & Coogler, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
James H. Seale III, Greensboro, for amicus curiae West Alabama Catfish Producers Ass'n.
KENNEDY, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Gale Adams and Nick Armstrong, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, John Lang. We affirm.
The issue is whether the law of nuisance or the "reasonable use" rule pertaining to ground water or percolating water applies to the facts of this case.
The facts as found by the trial court in its order dated September 7, 1988, are adopted in toto:
In August 1988, Adams and Armstrong sued Lang, requesting a temporary injunction, a permanent injunction, and damages. The trial court found that Adams and Armstrong suffered injury as a proximate result of Lang's pumping and, based on the law of nuisance, issued a preliminary injunction to prohibit Lang from pumping on a daily basis. However, on the motion of the defendant, the court discharged the injunction on October 28, 1988, finding that the law of nuisance was not applicable to the facts, because Lang's use of the water was "beneficial" to the use of his own land. The plaintiffs appeal from the subsequent summary judgment in favor of Lang.
Adams and Armstrong argue that Lang is liable under the law of nuisance. We disagree. This case involves a competitive use of ground water or percolating water, to which the "American rule" of "reasonable use" applies. The "reasonable use" rule was enunciated in Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936) (Sloss I), and Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 236 Ala. 173, 181 So. 276 (1938) (Sloss II).[1]
The Court in Sloss I stated:
231 Ala. 511, 518, 165 So. 764, 770.
As explained in Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala.1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 857 (1979), pp. 256-57):
"`As between persons using the water on the underlying land, the American rule made no apportionment among users and gave no protection to their wells and springs. If the water was withdrawn for the purpose of making a beneficial use of or on the land from which it was taken, no liability was incurred for resulting harm to an adjoining landowner.'"
If an interference with the plaintiff's use of a spring on its land is caused by conduct of the defendant not involving a competing use of water, but involving a use in which the effect on the subterranean water is *92 only "incidental" to the defendant's use of its land, then the rule of "reasonable use" applies insofar as the proprietary "beneficial" use of the water, rather than the land, is concerned. Where the concern is the proprietary use of land, in which the water is only incidentally affected, the "reasonable use" rule does not apply. Henderson, supra, at 902. In the latter case, a defendant is subject to liability under the law of nuisance for interference with a plaintiff's use of water, "either for (1) an intentional invasion when his conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case, or (2) an unintentional invasion when his conduct was negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous." Henderson, supra, at 903; Labruzzo v. Atlantic Dredging & Constr. Co., 54 So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla.1951); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 849, §§ 822-40.
"[W]here a defendant diverts ground water from adjoining land as an incident to his use of his own land, and does not utilize the water itself, traditional nuisance law is more appropriately applied than rules governing competing uses of percolating waters." Henderson, supra, at 902. In this case, we are dealing with a "`problem involving a proprietary competition over the water itself'" where there is a "`conflict ... between the respective rights of persons to make competing proprietary uses of subterranean waters to which they [all] have access.'" Henderson, supra, at 902 (quoting Labruzzo, supra, at 675). Applying the "reasonable use" rule, we conclude that the water was withdrawn for the purpose of making a beneficial use (catfish farming) of the water on Lang's land from which it was taken. Therefore, no liability was incurred for the resulting harm to the adjoining landowners, Adams and Armstrong.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
[1]  We note that Sloss I and Sloss II were overruled by this Court in Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala.1980). Henderson invalidated the rule in Sloss I and Sloss II and applied the law of nuisance to a case involving the interference with a plaintiff's use (for consumption or subterranean support) of ground water by a defendant's diversion of that water incidental to some use of his own land. However, in this case, we are concerned with a beneficial use of the water to the defendant's land, rather than an incidental use as in Henderson.