Title: DELACRUZ v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DELACRUZ v. STATE2000 WY 17310 P.3d 1131Case Number: 99-274Decided: 09/01/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CARLOS H. DELACRUZ, 
Appellant (Defendant),v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Park County The Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Faculty Director, and 
Dennis E. Ellis, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ. 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] In this 
appeal, the Appellant, Carlos H. Delacruz, who was convicted by a jury of 
possession of more than three grams of methamphetamine on October 23, 1998, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) (1998 Cum. Supp.), and delivery 
of methamphetamine on June 3, 1998, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) (Michie 1997), asserts that plain error occurred when the 
prosecutor in closing argument allegedly vouched for the credibility and 
truthfulness of the prosecution's main witness, a confidential informant, who 
testified about the June 3, 1998, event. Delacruz points specifically to the 
following instances:

1. As you, I'm sure, are 
aware, the state doesn't choose the witnesses. Those people who know the 
defendant and are around the defendant are the ones that the state must rely 
upon to prove their case. This includes the Raelene Hamptons and the Ronda Cards 
of this world. We take them as they are. We must accept them as witnesses even 
if they've been involved with methamphetamine. We must accept them as witnesses 
because they are the people who know what happened. They are the people who know 
the truth.

2. When you cast a play 
in hell, you don't get angels as actors. And that's what the state dealt with in 
this case.

3. Ms. Hampton took the - 
the witness stand. I submit to you that she was both credible and believable, 
not your typical drug user.

4. More than that is the 
question of what makes sense, the question of credibility, the question of why 
the state's witnesses would lie about what happened. Your common sense will tell 
you that, with respect to these charges and leading up to the offenses, they 
have no reason to come into this courtroom and orchestrate a 
lie.

[¶2] Delacruz 
contends that these remarks were "not just `inartful' statements," but rather 
"[t]he prosecution essentially was saying to the jury, I believe Ms. Hampton 
even though she has all of these flaws and there are these doubts, so you the 
jury should also believe her and ignore all of her flaws and any doubt as to her 
credibility and truthfulness."

[¶3] Having 
reviewed Delacruz's assertion by the application of the standard of plain 
error,1 in light of our cases addressing 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument,2 we hold that the prosecutor's 
remarks do not qualify as vouching for the credibility of the government's 
witness. Finding no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, we affirm 
Delacruz's convictions.

[¶4] Delacruz 
and the State agree that "[i]t is improper for the prosecuting attorney, even in 
responding to defense arguments, to personally vouch for the credibility of the 
State's witnesses." Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998) (citations 
omitted). About the first two statements of which Delacruz complains, we agree 
with the State's view that they simply express recognition that, as the evidence 
revealed, in a drug prosecution the government's witnesses usually are those 
persons who associate with the accused and who have substance abuse problems; 
these persons know what happened and what the truth is because, as the evidence 
revealed, they were eyewitnesses to the very criminal activity with which the 
accused is charged. About the third statement, Delacruz has failed to recite the 
more complete passage from which the isolated remark is plucked. Immediately 
following the isolated remark, the prosecutor explained the evidence from which 
the jury could draw the proper inference that Ms. Hampton was both credible and 
believable:

[¶5] Ms. Hampton 
took the - the witness stand. I submit to you that she was both credible and 
believable, not your typical drug user. I say that because she had an 
interesting background. She had an impressive educational background and an 
extensive work history, which included law enforcement. But she had a lot of 
things go wrong in her life. She doesn't make any excuses. She doesn't blame 
anyone. She just sat up on that witness stand and told you exactly what she had 
done.

[¶6] She had 
four family members die in approximately a year's time. She was depressed, and 
then she made a real serious attempt to kill herself. The wheels truly had 
fallen off for Ms. Hampton. After the suicide attempt, she tells you that she 
turned to methamphetamine in a significant way. She told you why she turned to 
methamphetamine. She had learned about it. She was depressed. After the suicide, 
she had 30 days to give herself some way to get herself back on her feet. Should 
she have done this? Of course not. Was it illegal? You bet it was. But she 
did.

[¶7] She wants 
out. She's getting pressure from those in the drug world. It was difficult for 
her to get out. She didn't want to live that way anymore. She wanted to be 
accepted by her family again. She knew she couldn't go cold turkey, so she began 
to drink alcohol. And then the DUI came.

[¶8] She then 
contacted - as believable as it may be, she contacted Agent Graham and wanted to 
assist. She had trained with him. And because she had done so much wrong, she 
now wanted to do so much right. And even after Agent Graham said, "Go to 
treatment, we'll see what happens," she still came back from treatment and 
wanted to rid the area of methamphetamine users and sever her ties to those 
people that she had significantly been associating with in the drug world. And 
that's what she did.

[¶9] In our 
judgment, the prosecuting attorney was properly offering the jury a way of 
viewing the significance of the evidence heard by the jury. To be sure, the 
record reveals that Ms. Hampton's testimony was just as the prosecuting attorney 
summarized it for the jury in the passage just quoted. That is the purpose of 
closing argument. Harper, 970 P.2d  at 403.

[¶10] About the 
last statement, we agree with the State that the prosecuting attorney is simply 
asking the jury to apply common sense to the evidence it had heard. Immediately 
before this particular passage, the prosecuting attorney had reminded the jury 
that the evidence revealed that Ms. Hampton was working with law enforcement 
with her goal being to get drugs from Delacruz and she had no interests other 
than that. The prosecuting attorney's remarks were proper.

[¶11] We affirm 
the judgment and sentence entered against Delacruz.

FOOTNOTES

1 "The plain 
error analysis that must be pursued in the absence of objection requires the 
party claiming error to demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, and resulting in the abridgment of 
a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice." Harper, 970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998).

2 "Plain 
error in closing argument must remain hard to find because otherwise the trial 
court becomes charged with an adversary responsibility to control argument even 
when objection is not taken by the opposing attorney." Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 385 (Wyo. 1992).