Title: STATE, EX REL. v. Tucker

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

176 Kan. 192 (1954)
269 P.2d 447
THE STATE OF KANSAS, on the Relation of DONALD E. MARTIN, County Attorney of Wyandotte County, Kansas, Plaintiff,
v.
CLARK E. TUCKER, Mayor Commissioner; FRANCIS W. BLAKE, Commissioner of Boulevards, Parks and Streets; EARL B. SWARNER, Commissioner of Finance, Health and Public Property, Defendants.
No. 39,464

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1954.
Donald E. Martin, county attorney, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Donald A. Hardy, assistant county attorney, of Kansas City, was with him on the briefs for plaintiff.
C.W. Brenneisen, Jr., city attorney, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Joseph A. Lynch, William H. Towers, John J. Ziegelmeyer, and James J. Lysaught, all deputy city attorneys, of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for defendants.
*193 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
This original proceedings in quo warranto brought by the state questions the constitutionality of section 1, chapter 83, Laws 1953 (1953 Supp. G.S. 1949, 13-1024) which amended G.S. 1949, 13-1024. The section amended and the amending section are alike in part and differ in part. We print them here putting in parentheses the language omitted from G.S. 1949, 13-1024, and in italics the new language added by the amendment (section 1, chapter 83, Laws 1953) as follows:
It is evident the sole purpose of section 1, chapter 83, Laws 1953, was to make it unnecessary for any city of the first class in the state which has a population of more than 120,000 and less than 160,000 to have an election for the issuance of bonds for any general improvement purpose, unless a protest was filed with the city clerk within thirty days of five percent of the electors. There are twelve first-class cities in the state; only one of them, Wichita, with a population of 192,182, has a population in excess of 160,000. There is no likelihood its population will ever be decreased to less than 160,000. Kansas City, in 1953, had a population of 126,886. The next largest city in Kansas is Topeka which has a population of 82,734. In the twenty years prior to 1953 it has gained in population at the rate of approximately 1,000 per year. At that rate it would take it approximately thirty-seven years to have a population of 120,000. Each of the other cities of the first class has a population of less shall 35,000. So, the only city that would be affected by the second proviso of section 1, chapter 83, Laws 1953, would be Kansas City. The statute in question is attacked as being invalid under article 2, section 17, of our constitution, which reads:
A law of a general nature could have been framed for the issuance of bonds for all general municipal purposes for cities of the first class. In fact, this statute would have been so had it not been for the second proviso therein. We think the proviso inserted therein provides only for Kansas City just as definitely as though it had named that city. See, City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431. 4 Pac. 800. Had the statute named Kansas City alone as the city to which the proviso applied it would have been held void.
Counsel for defendant argues that heretofore this court has approved classifications of cities on the basis of population. This is true, but whatever ground is used to classify one or more cities from others must be upon some ground germane to the purpose of *195 the legislation. Here no reason is pleaded as to why Kansas City should have a different method of issuing its bonds than the other eleven cities of the first class. It seems clear the statute in question violates article 2, section 17, of our constitution.
The validity of the statute is also attacked as violating article 12, section 1, of our constitution, which reads:
It is well settled in this state that municipal corporations are corporations within the meaning of this section of our constitution. See, City of Wyandotte v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603, 607. If this is a special act attempting to confer corporate powers on the city of Kansas City it is invalid. We think it is.
Naturally, if the second proviso is bad the third proviso goes with it.
There is not much more necessary to be said about this case. We have examined all the authorities cited by counsel and many more but deem it unnecessary to prolong this opinion.
Judgment will be entered for the plaintiff.
SMITH, WEDELL and PARKER, JJ. dissenting.