Title: Carrasquillo v. Hampden County District Courts

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12777 
 
FREDDIE CARRASQUILLO, JR., & others1  vs.  HAMPDEN COUNTY 
DISTRICT COURTS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 7, 2019. - March 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Separation of powers, 
Judiciary.  Committee for Public Counsel Services.  
Attorney at Law, Compensation.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 14, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for the petitioners. 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Jessica Lewis also present) for Hampden 
County Lawyers for Justice. 
 
Timothy J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
respondents. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, was present but did not argue. 
                                                          
 
 
1 All other similarly situated criminal defendants in 
Hampden County. 
2 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
K. Neil Austin, Stephen Stich, & David Siegel for Boston 
Bar Association. 
 
Shane T. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Hampden District. 
 
Donna Patalano & Stephanie Ainbinder, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The right to counsel is one of the most 
fundamental principles in our criminal justice system.  
Individuals who are charged with offenses for which they face 
imprisonment if convicted are constitutionally entitled to 
representation by defense counsel at public expense if they 
cannot afford to retain their own attorney.  The government of 
the Commonwealth therefore has a constitutional obligation to 
ensure that there is an adequate supply of publicly funded 
defense attorneys available to represent eligible indigent 
criminal defendants.  See G. L. c. 211D, §§ 2B, 5.  In this 
case, we consider once again how courts should proceed when it 
appears that the government has failed to meet that obligation. 
 
The petitioners challenge an order dated June 12, 2019 
(June 12 order), issued by the First Justice of the Springfield 
Division of the District Court Department (Springfield District 
Court), that required the attorney in charge of the Springfield 
office of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) "to 
provide counsel to Courtroom I in the Springfield District Court 
every day who shall accept appointments in all cases as ordered 
3 
 
by the Court to represent clients at arraignment[s], bail 
hearings, hearings pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35, and any other 
matter that the Court deems necessary."  The First Justice 
issued this order in response to a shortage of available defense 
attorneys that left many indigent criminal defendants in the 
Springfield District Court without counsel. 
Indigent criminal defendants in the Springfield District 
Court and other Hampden County courts are represented either by 
staff attorneys employed by CPCS in its public defender division 
(PDD), or by certified private defense attorneys, also known as 
"bar advocates," provided by Hampden County Lawyers for Justice 
(HCLJ) under a contract with CPCS.  CPCS staff attorneys and 
HCLJ bar advocates are responsible for covering "duty days" in 
the Hampden County courts, during which they are assigned to a 
particular court for the day, represent indigent individuals at 
arraignment, and ordinarily accept assignment of those 
individuals' cases.  Due to a shortage of available private 
attorneys, however, it has been increasingly difficult for HCLJ 
to find enough bar advocates who are willing and able to cover 
HCLJ's allotted share of duty days in the Springfield District 
Court's criminal session over the last two years.  Consequently, 
beginning in 2018, CPCS staff attorneys in the Springfield PDD 
office stepped in to cover more duty days and take substantially 
4 
 
more cases in the Springfield District Court than they had taken 
previously. 
 
Due to the volume of additional cases, the attorney in 
charge of the Springfield PDD office and CPCS's deputy chief 
counsel determined in June 2019 that the staff attorneys in the 
Springfield PDD office had exceeded their caseload capacity and 
they could not provide effective assistance to any additional 
clients.  Accordingly, on June 11, the attorney in charge 
informed the First Justice of the Springfield District Court 
that CPCS staff attorneys in the Springfield PDD office could 
not handle any more duty days in that court. 
 
In response, the First Justice issued the June 12 order.  
CPCS then filed an emergency petition in the single justice 
session of this court (the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk 
County or county court) pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking 
to vacate the June 12 order, and later moved to vacate the 
Springfield District Court's subsequent appointments of PDD 
staff attorneys as defense counsel under the June 12 order.2  The 
                                                          
 
 
2 The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) initially 
filed the petition on behalf of the attorney in charge of the 
Springfield public defender division (PDD) office.  CPCS 
subsequently amended the caption to list the petitioners as 
Freddie Carrasquillo, Jr. (one of the unrepresented indigent 
defendants for whom the Springfield Division of the District 
Court Department appointed counsel from the Springfield PDD 
office), and all other similarly situated defendants in Hampden 
County. 
5 
 
single justice reserved and reported the matter for our 
consideration. 
 
We recognize that the First Justice was taking emergency 
action that he deemed necessary under the circumstances to 
protect indigent defendants' constitutional rights to counsel 
and to avoid halting proceedings in new criminal cases in the 
Springfield District Court.  We conclude, however, that the June 
12 order and the court's subsequent appointments of CPCS staff 
attorneys in the Springfield PDD office under that order were 
invalid.  The June 12 order and subsequent appointments of CPCS 
staff attorneys improperly infringed upon CPCS's statutory 
authority to control assignments and to limit caseloads for its 
staff attorneys under G. L. c. 211D because the order and the 
appointments overrode CPCS's determination that the staff 
attorneys in its Springfield office had already reached their 
caseload capacity and could not accept any more cases, without 
any contrary findings by the court that put in doubt the 
validity of that determination.  We also note our concern that, 
to the extent such an order may require CPCS staff attorneys to 
accept more appointments than they can reasonably handle, it 
risks interfering with their ethical obligations under the 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing their 
6 
 
clients, and thereby threatens to undermine the very right to 
counsel that the order seeks to protect. 
 
In Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 
Mass. 228, 246-249 (2004), where we faced a similar problem in 
Hampden County sixteen years ago, we established a protocol to 
protect the rights of indigent defendants when a shortage of 
available attorneys interferes with the prompt appointment of 
defense counsel to represent those defendants.  In the present 
case, while it would have been preferable for the First Justice 
or CPCS to take steps to invoke that protocol once the shortage 
of available defense counsel became apparent, we recognize that 
that task was nearly impossible because we did not specify how 
to do so in Lavallee.  As such, in this opinion we outline a 
process through which CPCS, or the regional administrative 
justice (RAJ) who oversees a court affected by such a shortage, 
may seek to trigger the Lavallee protocol by filing a petition 
in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
 
We also discuss other proposals suggested by the parties 
and amici3 to remedy the shortage of available defense counsel in 
Hampden County.  We note in particular that the parties and most 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the Hampden District, by the district attorney for 
the Suffolk District, by the Boston Bar Association, and by 
Hampden County Lawyers for Justice and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
7 
 
of the amici appear to agree that the statutory hourly rates for 
bar advocates are too low and should be increased.  Although we 
frame this issue below, we defer to the Legislature's authority, 
as the governmental branch vested with the power to make laws 
and appropriate funds, to devise an appropriate solution. 
 
Finally, we call upon all members of the bar to consider 
stepping forward as a public service to assist in representing 
indigent defendants, as attorneys have done many times 
throughout our history. 
 
Background.  1.  Appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants in criminal proceedings.  Appointing counsel to 
represent indigent defendants in criminal proceedings has deep 
roots in Massachusetts history.  As early as the 1790s, this 
court began appointing defense counsel for defendants in capital 
cases tried before it, and in 1820 the Legislature authorized 
such appointments by statute.4  During most of the Nineteenth 
                                                          
 
 
4 See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303, 303 (1807) (noting 
that two attorneys had been "assigned by the Court as counsel 
for the prisoner"); St. 1820, c. 14, § 8 (authorizing Supreme 
Judicial Court to assign trial counsel to persons indicted and 
arraigned for capital offenses); Rogers, "A Sacred Duty":  Court 
Appointed Attorneys in Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780-1980, 
41 Am. J. Legal Hist. 440, 442-443 & n.6 (1997), citing N. Dane, 
General Abridgement and Digest of American Laws, VII:335, 210-
218 (1824); Rosenfeld, The Right to Counsel and Provision of 
Counsel for Indigents in Massachusetts:  The Hennessey Era, 74 
Mass. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1989).  The present-day version of the 
1820 statute can be found in G. L. c. 277, § 47. 
 
8 
 
Century, leading members of the Massachusetts bar accepted these 
appointments without compensation as a service to the community 
and the profession.5  In 1893 and 1911, however, after the 
Legislature transferred jurisdiction over capital cases to the 
Superior Court, it also authorized payment of reasonable 
compensation and expenses to court-appointed attorneys defending 
persons indicted for murder who were otherwise unable to procure 
counsel.6 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Judicial Court took 
several steps to make appointed defense counsel more broadly 
available to indigent defendants in noncapital cases, often 
anticipating later rulings by the United States Supreme Court.  
                                                          
 
 
5 See Rogers, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. at 443.  As the court 
described the process in an 1870 opinion: 
 
"When a prisoner has not obtained counsel, it is usual for 
the court to request some member of the bar to aid him; and 
we believe that no prisoner has been compelled to go to 
trial in a capital case without being ably and faithfully 
defended.  The members of the bar have been ready, so far 
as they reasonably could do so, to give their best services 
gratuitously, in aid of any prisoner who was unable to pay 
counsel." 
 
Clark, petitioner, 104 Mass. 537, 543 (1870). 
 
 
6 See St. 1893, c. 394, §§ 1, 2, currently codified as G. L. 
c. 277, §§ 55, 56.  See also St. 1911, c. 432, §§ 1, 2.  
Original jurisdiction over capital cases was transferred to the 
Superior Court by St. 1891, c. 379, § 1.  See discussion in 
Rogers, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. at 444-445, 449; Rosenfeld, 74 
Mass. L. Rev. at 148. 
9 
 
In a pair of decisions issued on the same day in 1957, we 
reversed convictions in two noncapital cases on the ground that 
the defendants' rights to a fair trial under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights had been violated because 
the defendants were not represented by counsel.7  In 1958 -- five 
years before the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
State criminal defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) -- we promulgated 
S.J.C. Rule 10, which required assignment of counsel in all 
noncapital felony cases in the Superior Court unless the 
defendant waived this right or was able to obtain counsel.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 10, 337 Mass. 813 (1958).8  The rule also affirmed 
"the inherent discretionary power of any court to appoint 
counsel" in any other case.  Id.  In 1964, we amended rule 10 to 
require assignment of counsel in any case where the defendant 
faced imprisonment, anticipating the standard announced by the 
                                                          
 
 
7 See Brown v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 476, 482 (1957) (lack 
of counsel in armed robbery case resulted in "an accretion of 
prejudicial happenings which added up to a failure to secure the 
fundamentals of a fair trial and hence to a violation of art. 
12"); Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 471, 475-476 (1957) 
(where defendant lacked sufficient intelligence to represent 
himself in kidnapping case, art. 12 required assignment of 
counsel to secure fundamentals of fair trial). 
 
 
8 S.J.C. Rule 10 was the precursor to current S.J.C. Rule 
3:10, as appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016). 
10 
 
Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).  
See S.J.C. Rule 10, as amended, 347 Mass. 809 (1964).  And in 
1967, we held that attorneys who are so appointed are also 
entitled to compensation.  See Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 
352 Mass. 719, 723-724 (1967) ("when the court assigns counsel 
for the defence in the cases of needy criminal defendants then 
counsel should be paid from the county treasury" pursuant to 
G. L. c. 213, § 8). 
 
The responsibility for meeting the increased demand for 
court-appointed defense counsel initially fell upon the newly 
established Massachusetts Defenders Committee, "the first 
Statewide publicly funded defender agency," and a "patchwork of 
county defender programs."  Deputy Chief Counsel for the Pub. 
Defender Div. of the Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Acting 
First Justice of the Lowell Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 477 
Mass. 178, 184 (2017) (Deputy Chief Counsel).  Unfortunately, 
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee was "[p]lagued by a 
shortage of resources" and therefore "unable to deliver on its 
mission to provide counsel to all indigent defendants eligible 
to receive the service."9  Id.  Meanwhile, the county defender 
                                                          
 
9 Despite these challenges, the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee laid the foundation for the future Committee for 
Public Counsel Services.  Many distinguished lawyers and judges, 
including members of this court, began their legal careers 
11 
 
programs lacked standards and supervision and provided 
inadequate representation.10 
 
In 1976, Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Edward 
Hennessey established a committee to recommend improvements in 
the indigent defender system.  Id. at 185 & n.4.  That committee 
expressed particular concern about the county defender programs' 
"primary focus on limiting costs" and their "lack [of] adequate 
supervision, training programs, staffing and control of 
caseloads."11  Based on the committee's recommendations, Chief 
Justice Hennessey advocated establishing a centrally 
administered and financed system for providing defense counsel 
to indigent defendants, with uniform standards and training.  
See id.  This eventually led the Legislature to create CPCS in 
1983.12 
 
2.  CPCS.  As provided in its authorizing statute, CPCS is 
responsible for "plan[ning], oversee[ing], and coordinat[ing] 
the delivery of criminal and certain noncriminal legal services 
                                                          
 
working with the Massachusetts Defenders Committee or its sister 
organization, the Roxbury Defenders Committee. 
 
 
10 Rosenfeld, 74 Mass. L. Rev. at 149. 
 
 
11 Committee on the Appointment of Competent Counsel for 
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the District and Municipal 
Courts, Interim Report to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, at 2 (Dec. 16, 1976). 
 
 
12 See Rosenfeld, 74 Mass. L. Rev. at 151; St. 1983, c. 673. 
12 
 
by salaried public counsel, bar advocate and other assigned 
counsel programs and private attorneys serving on a per case 
basis" on behalf of indigent criminal defendants and other 
litigants who are entitled to counsel.  G. L. c. 211D, § 1.  See 
G. L. c. 211D, § 5.  The statute also requires CPCS to establish 
standards for these legal services, including caseload 
limitations, and to monitor compliance with these standards.  
See G. L. c. 211D, §§ 9, 10.  CPCS's operations are primarily 
funded by annual appropriations by the Legislature, although it 
is also authorized to accept gifts and grants from other public 
or private sources.  See G. L. c. 211D, § 3; St. 2019, c. 41, 
§ 2, line item 0321-1500. 
 
CPCS is comprised of several divisions:  the PDD, a private 
counsel division, and three other divisions that provide 
representation to indigent parties in certain juvenile, family 
law, and mental health proceedings.13  See G. L. c. 211D, § 6.  
                                                          
 
 
13 Specifically, CPCS also has a youth advocacy division 
that provides staff and private attorneys to indigent juveniles 
in delinquency and youthful offender proceedings in the Juvenile 
Court and appellate courts; a children and family law division 
that provides staff and private attorneys to indigent children 
and parents in children and family law cases in the Juvenile 
Court and appellate courts; and a mental health litigation 
division that provides staff and private attorneys to indigent 
persons in civil commitment proceedings in the Boston Municipal 
Court, District Court, and appellate courts, and that also 
assigns private attorneys only in cases involving guardianships, 
substituted judgment proceedings, and cases involving the 
validation of health care proxies in the Probate and Family 
13 
 
The PDD provides salaried staff attorneys to represent indigent 
defendants in criminal proceedings in the Boston Municipal 
Court, District Court, Superior Court, and appellate courts.  
The PDD may not represent more than one defendant in any matter 
before any court on the same case or arising out of the same 
incident, or a defendant in any case in which there is a 
conflict of interest with any of its clients.  See G. L. 
c. 211D, § 6 (a).  The Legislature currently requires CPCS to 
"maintain a system in which not less than [twenty percent] of 
indigent clients shall be represented by public defenders."  St. 
2019, c. 41, § 2, line item 0321-1500. 
 
Through the private counsel division, CPCS also enters into 
contractual agreements with bar advocate groups and other 
organizations for the purpose of providing private defense 
                                                          
 
Court.  CPCS also provides other essential services to defense 
counsel and their clients through ancillary units.  The 
immigration impact unit assists defense attorneys in fulfilling 
their duty to advise noncitizen clients about the immigration 
consequences of the clients' criminal cases.  See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-369 (2010); https://www 
.publiccounsel.net/iiu [https://perma.cc/3DC2-ZEMR].  The drug 
lab crisis litigation unit advises persons convicted of drug 
offenses whose convictions may have been tainted by the 
misconduct of laboratory chemists Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Claudio, 484 Mass. 203 (2020); 
https://www.publiccounsel.net/dlclu/client-resources [https 
://perma.cc/6EDN-GJ4S]. The EdLaw Project, a partnership among 
CPCS's children and family division, its youth advocacy 
division, and the Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, 
provides training on education issues for juvenile justice and 
child welfare attorneys.  See https://www.publiccounsel.net 
/edlaw [https://perma.cc/A8A6-JCNL]. 
14 
 
attorneys to indigent persons who are not represented by PDD 
attorneys.  The Legislature has established hourly rates of 
compensation payable to private attorneys whom the private 
counsel division assigns to represent indigent persons.  See 
G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (a).  The statute also sets a billable hours 
cap at 1,650 hours annually for those attorneys assigned through 
the private counsel division, and only attorneys appointed in a 
homicide case may accept any new appointment or assignment after 
they have billed 1,350 hours in any fiscal year.  See G. L. 
c. 211D, § 11 (b), (c).  For fiscal year 2020, however, the 
Legislature authorized CPCS to waive these statutory caps and to 
allow private attorneys to bill up to 2,000 hours annually if 
CPCS determines that "(i) there is limited availability of 
qualified counsel in that practice area; (ii) there is limited 
availability of qualified counsel in a geographic area; or 
(iii) increasing the limit would improve efficiency and quality 
of service."  St. 2019, c. 41, § 68. 
 
In accord with the Legislative mandate in G. L. c. 211D, 
§ 9 (c), CPCS sets caseload limitations for both its PDD staff 
attorneys and the private bar advocates assigned to cases 
through the private counsel division.  According to CPCS, the 
caseload capacity for each staff attorney "is an individualized 
determination based on multiple factors, including but not 
limited to an attorney's experience, volume of cases, types and 
15 
 
severity of cases . . . , and other case-specific demands of 
those cases."  For private bar advocates, CPCS "has adopted a 
weighted system of caseload limits, with a particular weight for 
each type of case assignment and an absolute limit of 250 cases 
per year," according to its assigned counsel manual.14 
 
Rule 7 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that, on the day of a defendant's arraignment, if "the 
court finds that the defendant is indigent or indigent but able 
to contribute and has not knowingly waived the right to 
counsel," the court shall appoint CPCS to represent the 
defendant under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 
(2016).  Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 (b) (2), as appearing in 461 Mass. 
1501 (2012).  See G. L. c. 211D, § 5.  In Hampden County, CPCS 
endeavors to ensure that counsel are available for such 
appointments through a "duty day" system.  A duty day attorney 
is a PDD staff attorney or private bar advocate who covers a 
court session, represents indigent individuals at arraignment, 
and ordinarily accepts assignment of their cases.  In some 
instances, however, duty day attorneys may represent defendants 
for purposes of bail only, such as when there are too many 
arraignments that day or a case involves a felony within the 
                                                          
 
 
14 Committee for Public Counsel Services, Assigned Counsel 
Manual:  Policies and Procedures, at 5.16 (version 1.9, Jan. 1, 
2019), https://www.publiccounsel.net/wp-content/uploads/Assigned 
-Counsel-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6CT-94M3]. 
16 
 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court that the attorney 
is not certified to handle.  There may be multiple duty day 
attorneys assigned to courts with a high number of daily 
arraignments. 
 
3.  Shortage of defense counsel in the Springfield District 
Court and other Hampden County courts.  The Springfield PDD 
office represents indigent persons in criminal proceedings in 
the Divisions of the District Court and the Superior Court in 
Hampden County.  CPCS's private counsel division also contracts 
with HCLJ to provide additional private defense attorneys to 
represent indigent persons in the Hampden County courts.  The 
Springfield PDD office's staff attorneys and private defense 
attorneys provided through HCLJ are responsible for covering 
duty days in the Springfield District Court and other courts in 
Hampden County. 
 
According to the parties, because the Springfield District 
Court handles so many arraignments, it should, ideally, be 
covered by five duty day attorneys on Mondays or Tuesdays after 
holidays, and four duty day attorneys on the other days of the 
workweek.  This would require coverage for approximately eighty 
to nearly one hundred duty day slots per month.  The Springfield 
PDD office has ordinarily covered ten duty day slots per month 
in the Springfield District Court, leaving the remaining slots 
to be covered by HCLJ-supplied bar advocates. 
17 
 
 
According to HCLJ's bar advocate administrator, the number 
of duty day slots actually covered by bar advocates in the 
Springfield District Court has decreased significantly over the 
last three years, from 1,034 duty day slots (an average of 
eighty-six per month) in fiscal year 2016, to 992 duty day slots 
in fiscal year 2017, to 762 duty day slots in fiscal year 2018, 
and finally to only 442 duty day slots (an average of thirty-
seven per month) in fiscal year 2019.  This precipitous decline 
has made it increasingly difficult for HCLJ to provide the 
necessary duty day coverage, and consequently the Springfield 
PDD office has had to step in to make up the difference.  CPCS 
reports that the Springfield PDD office's District Court 
caseload rose from 2,161 cases in fiscal year 2018 to 2,942 
cases in fiscal year 2019 -- a thirty-six percent increase.  
Although this increase was partially offset by a decrease in the 
number of Superior Court cases handled by the Springfield PDD 
office at that time, the combined number of District and 
Superior Court cases in that office was still twenty percent 
higher in fiscal year 2019 than in the previous fiscal year, 
according to CPCS. 
 
From June through October 2018, there were a number of days 
when either no bar advocates or not enough bar advocates signed 
up to fill duty day slots in the Springfield District Court, and 
consequently it was a struggle to provide consistent coverage 
18 
 
even by three duty day attorneys.  From June through August 
2018, for example, there were seventeen court days during which 
only two duty day attorneys were scheduled, and sixteen court 
days covered by only one attorney.  To make up for these 
shortfalls, Springfield PDD staff attorneys covered additional 
duty day slots over and above the usual ten, and as a result 
they were assigned to handle additional cases. 
 
At a meeting on October 9, 2018, the attorney in charge of 
the Springfield PDD office informed the First Justice of the 
Springfield District Court that the staff attorneys' caseloads 
had exceeded their capacity.  Thereafter, the Springfield PDD 
office stopped taking duty days or accepting cases for the 
remainder of October and all of November 2018. 
 
From December 2018 through March 2019, Springfield PDD 
staff attorneys continued to maintain high caseloads and again 
started covering more than their usual ten duty days in the 
Springfield District Court.  By March 2019, CPCS determined that 
these attorneys could not take any more cases.  Because of the 
shortage of bar advocates, however, the Springfield PDD office 
continued to cover the arraignment session in the Springfield 
District Court, but it did so for purposes of bail only in 
March, April, and May 2019. 
 
Meanwhile, significant duty day coverage problems were also 
arising in the other Divisions of the District Court in Hampden 
19 
 
County (Hampden County District Courts).  As of June 13, 2019, 
there were several court days without any scheduled duty day 
attorney coverage in Chicopee (one day), Holyoke (five days), 
Palmer (eight days), and Westfield (nine days).  In addition, 
the number of District Court cases in Hampden County for which 
no defense counsel had been assigned was rising precipitously, 
jumping from twenty-three in May 2019, to 155 in June, to a high 
of 169 on July 3, according to HCLJ's bar advocate 
administrator.  As of June 13, five unrepresented defendants 
were in custody, and four of them had been held on bail for more 
than seven days without counsel, according to CPCS. 
 
In June 2019, the attorney in charge of the Springfield PDD 
office determined that the caseload of every staff attorney in 
that office exceeded his or her capacity.  After meeting with 
the staff attorneys, CPCS's deputy chief counsel agreed with 
this assessment and concluded that the office could no longer 
continue staffing the arraignment session in the Springfield 
District Court. 
 
Accordingly, on June 11, 2019, the attorney in charge and 
the supervising attorney of the Springfield PDD office met with 
the First Justice of the Springfield District Court and informed 
him that the Springfield PDD office could not handle any more 
duty days, even for purposes of bail only.  At that meeting, the 
First Justice gave the attorney in charge the June 12 order, 
20 
 
requiring him to provide counsel in the Springfield District 
Court "who shall accept appointment in all cases as ordered by 
the Court."  In a subsequent letter, the First Justice confirmed 
that he was ordering these appointments for all purposes, not 
just for bail only.  Between June 12 and June 28, the 
Springfield District Court assigned Springfield PDD staff 
attorneys, "under protest," to represent the defendants in 
approximately 113 criminal cases. 
 
On July 12, 2019, in an effort to encourage more duty day 
coverage in the Hampden County District Courts, CPCS instituted 
an emergency duty day rate of $424, i.e., fifty-three dollars 
per hour for eight hours of court time, for those attorneys 
willing and able to take a duty day and accept assignment of the 
cases arraigned that day.  By August 1, attorneys had stepped 
forward to cover an additional 241 duty day slots in the Hampden 
County District Courts, with 134 duty day slots filled by HCLJ 
attorneys and another 107 slots filled by out-of-county 
attorneys.  As a result, the number of unfilled duty day slots 
in the Hampden County District Courts through September 30 was 
greatly reduced.15 
                                                          
 
 
15 Since that time, CPCS has repeatedly extended the 
emergency duty day rate.  On January 27, 2020, CPCS reported 
that, as a result of its extension of the emergency duty day 
rate through the end of March 2020, most of the previously 
unfilled duty day slots in the Hampden County District Courts 
for February and March 2020 had been filled. 
21 
 
 
CPCS also gradually decreased the number of unassigned 
cases, including those cases assigned to the Springfield PDD 
office under protest, by recruiting attorneys from HCLJ, from 
out-of-county bar advocate programs, and from other CPCS staff 
offices.  As of August 1, 2019, there were eighty District Court 
defendants without counsel, and none of them was being held 
pretrial.  As of September 6, the Hampden County District Courts 
reported only three unrepresented defendants, and as of 
September 10, the cases initially assigned to the Springfield 
PDD office under protest all had separate counsel. 
 
4.  Proceedings below.  On June 14, 2019, CPCS filed an 
emergency petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, seeking to vacate the June 12 order that required the 
attorney in charge of the Springfield PDD office to provide 
defense counsel at the arraignment session of the Springfield 
District Court.  That same day, CPCS also appeared before the 
First Justice of the Springfield District Court and requested 
that he vacate the June 12 order, or stay it pending appellate 
review.  The First Justice denied those requests.  When the 
Springfield District Court proceeded to appoint Springfield PDD 
office attorneys as defense counsel, as discussed above, CPCS 
filed a motion before the single justice in the county court 
seeking to vacate these appointments. 
22 
 
 
On June 28, 2019, pursuant to the parties' agreement, the 
single justice in the county court entered an interim order 
superseding the June 12 order and adopting the Lavallee protocol 
in its stead.  On July 24, the single justice entered a further 
order reserving and reporting the entire case for consideration 
by this court. 
 
Discussion.16  1.  Right to appointed counsel in criminal 
proceedings and Lavallee.  The constitutional right to counsel 
in a criminal prosecution, guaranteed by art. 12 and the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, entails "the right of indigent 
defendants charged with serious crimes to have counsel appointed 
at public expense" (footnote omitted).  Commonwealth v. Porter, 
462 Mass. 724, 728 (2012).  See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-345; 
Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 234.  This right to appointed counsel is 
essential to ensuring fairness in our criminal justice system 
                                                          
 
 
16 The present case is arguably now moot, because the June 
12 order has been superseded by the Lavallee protocol under the 
single justice's interim order on June 28, 2019; because counsel 
has been assigned to the defendants in all the cases that were 
initially assigned to the Springfield PDD office "under 
protest"; and because it appears that the number of 
unrepresented defendants in Hampden County has been 
substantially reduced.  We nevertheless exercise our discretion 
to address the issues raised in this case because they are of 
singular public importance; they have been fully briefed and 
argued on both sides; they are very likely to arise again in 
similar factual circumstances; and appellate review may not be 
obtained in a future case before these recurring issues would 
again be moot. See Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 
782-784 (1984). 
23 
 
because it affords defendants, regardless of their financial 
circumstances, access to the legal assistance they need to 
assert all their other rights.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 654 (1984), quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State 
Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956) ("Of all the 
rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented 
by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his 
ability to assert any other rights he may have").  The 
"procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair 
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant 
stands equal before the law" would be of little value "if the 
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a 
lawyer to assist him," because "'[e]ven the intelligent and 
educated layman . . . lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense.'"  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-
345, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 
Because the assistance of counsel is so fundamental to the 
protection of a defendant's rights, the appointment and 
appearance of a defense attorney to represent an indigent person 
must take place as promptly as possible.  We explained why at 
length in Lavallee. 
First, because bail hearings under G. L. c. 276, §§ 57 and 
58, and preventive detention hearings under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, 
put a defendant's liberty at stake, the defendant has a due 
24 
 
process right under art. 12 to be represented by counsel at 
these pretrial proceedings.  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 234.  
"Neither a bail hearing nor a preventive detention hearing may 
proceed unless and until the defendant is represented by 
counsel."  Id. 
Second, "[t]here are myriad responsibilities that counsel 
may be required to undertake that must be completed long before 
trial if the defendant is to benefit meaningfully from his right 
to counsel under art. 12."  Id. at 235.  These responsibilities 
include interviewing the defendant, locating and interviewing 
other witnesses while their memories are still fresh, and 
preserving physical evidence.  Id.  They also include providing 
"assistance in making decisions about specific defenses and 
trial strategies, which may rise to the level of [a] 'critical 
stage' of the process."17  Id.  Without counsel, these 
"[c]ritical stage opportunities may pass without a defendant's 
knowledge, and even if they can be revisited, the opportunity to 
                                                          
 
17 "The Sixth Amendment and art. 12 provide criminal 
defendants the right to counsel at all 'critical stages' of the 
prosecution."  Commonwealth v. Neary-French, 475 Mass. 167, 170 
(2016).  The determination whether an event is a "'critical 
stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends . . . upon an 
analysis 'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's 
rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of 
counsel to help avoid that prejudice.'"  Coleman v. Alabama, 399 
U.S. 1, 9 (1970), quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
227 (1967). 
25 
 
develop them as fully had counsel been available may be 
impaired."  Id. at 236. 
 
For these reasons, the assignment and appearance of defense 
counsel should ordinarily occur at arraignment, as provided in 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 (b) (2) and (c) (1), as appearing in 461 
Mass. 1501 (2012), and S.J.C. Rule 3:10.  See Lavallee, 442 
Mass. at 236-237 (Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 [b] and [c] require 
appearance of counsel to be filed at arraignment, with some 
limited exceptions, to ensure assistance of counsel for pretrial 
investigation and critical stage decisions).  See also id. at 
234-235 ("right to trial counsel under art. 12 attaches at least 
by the time of arraignment").18  Significant delay after 
                                                          
 
 
18 Ideally, the attorney assigned to represent an indigent 
defendant at arraignment should continue that representation 
throughout the case.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 7 (c) (2), as 
appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012) (unless otherwise specified, 
filing of appearance by attorney "shall constitute a 
representation that the attorney shall represent the defendant 
for trial or plea"); American Bar Association, Eight Guidelines 
of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads, at 2 (Aug. 
2009) (ABA Guidelines), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam 
/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_
eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.pdf [https://perma.cc/H899-
7GT3] (listing, in Guideline 1, "[w]hether representation is 
continuously provided by the same lawyer from initial court 
appearance through trial, sentencing, or dismissal" as one 
standard for measuring "whether the performance obligations of 
lawyers who represent indigent clients are being fulfilled").  
Nevertheless, we recognize that, due to scheduling conflicts, 
varying workloads among available attorneys, and the need to 
assign more complex cases to attorneys who have the requisite 
experience and expertise, it may not always be practical for the 
lawyer who appears at arraignment to continue representing the 
26 
 
arraignment in the assignment and appearance of counsel for an 
indigent defendant endangers that defendant's right to counsel.  
See id. at 236-237. 
 
In Lavallee, we had to determine an appropriate remedy for 
a situation where a shortage of defense attorneys led to a 
significant delay in the assignment of counsel for a substantial 
number of defendants.  As in the present case, in 2004 there was 
a shortage of bar advocates willing to take cases in Hampden 
County, and, due to CPCS's own staffing and funding limitations, 
PDD staff attorneys could not fill the void.  Id. at 230-232.  
Consequently, on two successive days in May 2004, no bar 
advocates appeared in the Springfield District Court and many 
indigent defendants were arraigned and held on bail or subjected 
to preventive detention without the benefit of counsel.  Id. at 
232.  In response, the presiding judge assigned the chief 
counsel for CPCS to represent those defendants, and the 
following day, the judge denied the chief counsel's motions to 
assign the cases to private counsel at rates exceeding those 
approved by the Legislature.  Id. at 232-233. 
                                                          
 
client throughout an entire case.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
7 (c) (2) (authorizing court to permit appearance by attorney 
for limited time, and allowing attorney who files appearance on 
or before arraignment to withdraw within fourteen days if 
successor trial counsel files simultaneous appearance). 
27 
 
When the case came before us via petitions under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, filed by unrepresented defendants held in lieu of 
bail or in preventive detention, we held that the lack of 
representation deprived these petitioners of their right to 
counsel under art. 12, resulting in severe restrictions on their 
liberty and other constitutional interests.  Lavallee, 442 Mass. 
at 232.  We concluded that the presiding judge's case 
assignments to CPCS's chief counsel did not fulfill the 
defendants' rights to counsel, because no attorney had filed an 
appearance in any of these cases, and the "constitutional 
guarantee of the assistance of counsel 'cannot be satisfied by 
mere formal appointment.'"  Id. at 235, quoting Avery v. 
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).  See Lavallee, supra at 237.  
We also concluded that the petitioners were entitled to relief 
even without a specific showing of harm from the deprivation of 
counsel.  Since the petitioners were unrepresented, they could 
not be expected by themselves to assess and to demonstrate the 
seriousness of any harm to them.  Id. at 237-238.  Instead, we 
held that, "[b]ecause the petitioners are seeking redress for 
the ongoing violation of their fundamental constitutional right 
that affects the manner in which the criminal case against them 
will be prosecuted and defended, it is enough that they have 
shown a violation of that right that may likely result in 
irremediable harm if not corrected."  Id. at 238. 
28 
 
 
To remedy these constitutional violations, we crafted the 
Lavallee protocol.  First, we established presumptive time 
limits for the assignment of counsel.  We ruled that "an 
indigent defendant who is held in lieu of bail or under an order 
of preventive detention may not be held for more than seven days 
without counsel," and that "no defendant entitled to court-
appointed counsel may be required to wait more than forty-five 
days for counsel to file an appearance."  Id. at 246. 
Second, we outlined a system for implementing these time 
limits, subject to further refinements by the single justice 
after consultation with the relevant officials.  We ordered the 
clerk-magistrates of the Hampden County District Courts and 
Superior Court to compile weekly lists of all unrepresented 
criminal defendants and forward the lists to the RAJ for the 
Superior Court, the RAJ for the District Courts, the district 
attorney, the Attorney General, and the chief counsel for CPCS. 
Id. at 247.  We then provided that the Superior Court RAJ should 
schedule a prompt status hearing for each unrepresented 
defendant who had been held in pretrial detention for more than 
seven days, or whose case had been pending for more than forty-
five days.  Id. at 247-248.  If a defendant was still 
unrepresented as of the time of the hearing, and if the Superior 
Court RAJ determined both that CPCS had made a good faith effort 
to secure representation and that no counsel was willing and 
29 
 
available to represent that defendant, then the Superior Court 
RAJ was required to order the following:  (1) release on 
personal recognizance of any defendant held in lieu of bail or 
on preventive detention for more than seven days, subject to 
probationary conditions under G. L. c. 276, § 87, which could be 
ordered without the defendant's consent; and (2) dismissal of 
the charges without prejudice, until such time as counsel was 
made available, with respect to any defendant facing a felony 
charge for more than forty-five days without counsel, or a 
misdemeanor or municipal ordinance violation charge for more 
than forty-five days without counsel unless the judge had 
declared an intention not to impose a sentence of incarceration, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211D, § 2A (now G. L. c. 211D, § 2B).  See 
id. at 247-249.  This procedure balanced the constitutional 
rights of indigent defendants with due concern for public 
safety,19 by focusing first on obtaining counsel for 
unrepresented defendants, and authorizing release from pretrial 
detention, or dismissal of charges without prejudice, only as a 
last resort when all efforts to obtain counsel had failed. 
                                                          
 
 
19 We observed that, in fashioning the Lavallee protocol, 
"[o]ur duty [was] to remedy an ongoing violation of a 
fundamental constitutional right to counsel consistently with 
the government's legitimate right to protect the public's 
safety."  Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 
442 Mass. 228, 246 (2004). 
30 
 
With the Lavallee protocol in mind, we now turn to the June 
12 order and the subsequent appointments of PDD staff attorneys 
as counsel for indigent defendants pursuant to that order, which 
we conclude were invalid. 
 
2.  Review of June 12 order and subsequent appointments of 
CPCS staff attorneys as counsel.  We first acknowledge the 
bedrock principle that "courts of general jurisdiction under 
[our] Constitution have the inherent power to do whatever may be 
done under the general principles of jurisprudence to insure to 
the citizen a fair trial, whenever his life, liberty, property 
or character is at stake."  Crocker v. Justices of the Superior 
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 179 (1911).  Judges have inherent 
authority "to control and supervise personnel within the 
judicial system," including the "power . . . 'to control a 
court's own proceedings, the conduct of participants, the 
actions of officers of the court and the environment of the 
court'" (alteration omitted).  First Justice of the Bristol Div. 
of the Juvenile Court Dep't v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Bristol 
Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 397-398 (2003), 
quoting Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 404 Mass. 53, 57 (1989). 
We also appreciate the challenging circumstances that the 
First Justice faced when he issued the June 12 order.  He 
properly recognized that indigent defendants were entitled to 
31 
 
representation for bail and detention hearings and that their 
criminal cases could not proceed without timely appointment of 
defense counsel.  In the absence of any specified procedure 
enabling trial court judges to trigger the Lavallee protocol, he 
issued the June 12 order in an attempt to assure representation 
for indigent defendants, thereby permitting new criminal cases 
to continue, while setting the stage for appellate review of the 
situation. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the First Justice's June 12 
order was invalid and overstepped the bounds of his inherent 
powers because it infringed upon CPCS's statutory authority to 
control assignments and to limit caseloads for its staff 
attorneys under G. L. c. 211D.  For the same reason, we also 
conclude that subsequent assignments of cases to CPCS staff 
attorneys "under protest," pursuant to that order, were also 
invalid. 
 
a.  CPCS's statutory authority.  We have held that "CPCS 
has the sole authority under G. L. c. 211D for the assignment of 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants," and "a judge may not 
override that authority."  Deputy Chief Counsel, 477 Mass. at 
179.  General Laws c. 211D, § 5, provides that, after a judge 
determines that a defendant is indigent, the "justice or 
associate justice shall assign a case to [CPCS]" (emphasis 
added).  Considering this provision in the context of the entire 
32 
 
statutory scheme and the historical background that led to 
CPCS's creation, we have interpreted this language to mean that 
"[t]he judge's role is to determine indigency and to assign the 
case to CPCS," while "the role of CPCS is to assign the case to 
an attorney with responsibility to represent the defendant."  
Deputy Chief Counsel, supra at 186-187.  The judge's authority 
over the initial assignment of defense counsel for an indigent 
defendant ends once a case has been assigned to CPCS, and the 
judge does not assign a particular attorney.20  See id. at 187 
(holding that judge's authority to select attorney for drug 
court team "must give way to the clear statutory duty of CPCS to 
assign counsel"). 
Chapter 211D also requires and empowers CPCS to establish 
"specified caseload limitation levels" for the PDD, as well as 
the private counsel division, and to "monitor and evaluate 
compliance with the standards and the performance of counsel in 
its divisions in order to insure competent representation of 
defendants."  G. L. c. 211D, §§ 9 (c), 10.  Since the statute 
                                                          
 
 
20 We note that this separation of the judiciary from the 
process of selecting defense counsel for assignment is 
consistent with American Bar Association (ABA) guidelines.  "The 
ABA endorses complete independence of the defense function, in 
which the judiciary is [involved neither] in the selection of 
counsel nor in their supervision.  This call for independence 
applies to public defender programs, as well as to indigent 
defense programs that furnish private assigned counsel and legal 
representation through contracts."  (Footnotes omitted.)  ABA 
Guidelines, supra at 6, comment to Guideline 2. 
33 
 
expressly delegates this authority to CPCS, and CPCS has 
experience and expertise in managing the caseloads of its staff 
attorneys, CPCS's caseload limitations established pursuant to 
these statutory directives, as well as its resulting 
determinations as to whether individual staff attorneys have 
exceeded those limitations, are entitled to appropriate 
deference when supported by substantial evidence.21 
That is not to say that CPCS's caseload determinations are 
exempt from judicial scrutiny.22  This court, in the exercise of 
its supervisory authority over the administration of justice, 
has the power to review CPCS's decisions in that area.  See 
G. L. c. 211, § 3; First Justice of the Bristol Div. of the 
Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. at 397 ("The scope of inherent 
                                                          
 
 
21 See ABA Guidelines, supra at 13, comment to Guideline 7 
("When [public defense providers] file motions requesting that 
assignments be stopped and that withdrawals be permitted, their 
prayer for relief should be accorded substantial deference 
because [p]roviders are in the best position to assess the 
workloads of their lawyers").  Cf. Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 469 Mass. 553, 565 (2014) ("Because 
the Legislature delegated the authority to adopt performance 
standards to the department, we defer to its expertise . . .").  
Cf. also State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters, 
370 S.W.3d 592, 597, 602-603 (Mo. 2012) (holding that caseload 
protocol promulgated by State public defender commission 
pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority must be followed 
unless it is held invalid or inapplicable). 
 
 
22 CPCS's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that CPCS's 
caseload determinations and good faith efforts to provide 
defense counsel for eligible defendants are subject to judicial 
review. 
34 
 
judicial authority reaches beyond traditional adjudicatory 
powers and encompasses [but is not limited to] the court's power 
to commit the fiscal resources of the Commonwealth and other 
governmental agencies necessary to ensure the proper operation 
of the courts . . .").  Indeed, one reason for establishing a 
procedure for triggering the Lavallee protocol, as discussed 
further below, is to create an orderly process for review of 
CPCS's caseload determinations, with findings and rulings made 
after an evidentiary hearing, if it becomes necessary in light 
of an apparent shortage of defense counsel. 
But in this case, the June 12 order was not based on any 
judicial review of CPCS's caseload determinations.  The attorney 
in charge of the Springfield PDD office and the deputy chief 
counsel of CPCS determined that the staff attorneys in that 
office had exceeded their caseload capacity and that, 
consequently, they could not accept any more cases in the 
Springfield District Court.  The First Justice did not make any 
findings that put in doubt the validity of that determination.  
Instead, while the First Justice's decision is understandable in 
light of the lack of appellate guidance and the urgency of the 
matter at hand, the June 12 order impermissibly overrode CPCS's 
decision, disregarding CPCS's statutory authority and obligation 
to control caseloads for its staff attorneys. 
35 
 
Further, insofar as the June 12 order required the attorney 
in charge of the Springfield PDD office to provide defense 
counsel for the Springfield District Court, it effectively 
compelled the attorneys under his direction in that office to 
appear and accept appointments, and thereby improperly 
interfered with CPCS's "sole and independent authority to assign 
counsel for indigent defendants."  Deputy Chief Counsel, 477 
Mass. at 187.  The Attorney General argues on behalf of the 
respondents that the June 12 order did not trespass on CPCS's 
authority to assign cases internally because it did not require 
a particular lawyer to handle a particular case.  But the June 
12 order had the effect of overriding CPCS's authority to 
control case assignments by requiring Springfield PDD staff 
attorneys to appear and accept additional appointments "as 
ordered by the Court," even though CPCS had already determined 
that they should not do so due to their existing caseloads, and 
even though the court had not made any findings showing that 
CPCS's decision was erroneous.  The June 12 order thereby 
exceeded the limits on judicial authority to assign defense 
counsel that we delineated in Deputy Chief Counsel, supra.23 
                                                          
 
 
23 The Attorney General also argues that the June 12 order 
was justified by G. L. c. 211D, § 6 (a) (iii), which provides 
that "notwithstanding any general or special law to the 
contrary, the [PDD] shall be assigned in any civil or criminal 
matter" that would otherwise be assigned to private counsel, 
36 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the June 12 order and 
subsequent appointments of CPCS staff attorneys pursuant to that 
order improperly infringed on CPCS's statutory authority to 
control assignments and set caseload limits for its staff 
attorneys.24 
                                                          
 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211D, § 6 (b), "if the chief counsel [for 
CPCS] determines in writing that insufficient numbers of 
qualified attorneys are available for assignment by the private 
counsel division."  In support of that proposition, the Attorney 
General cites a June 13, 2019 letter that the Chief Counsel of 
CPCS sent to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, describing 
the shortage of private bar advocates willing and able to take 
cases.  But this letter was sent after the June 12 order, as the 
Attorney General acknowledges, and it does not appear to have 
been intended to trigger the procedure outlined in G. L. 
c. 211D, § 6 (a) (iii).  Moreover, in the circumstances of this 
case, we decline to interpret this provision in a manner that is 
at odds with the other provisions of c. 211D regarding the power 
of CPCS to control case assignments and caseload levels for its 
attorneys.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 179 (2014), 
quoting Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp., Inc. v. Rate Setting 
Comm'n, 394 Mass. 233, 240 (1985) ("When the meaning of a 
statute is brought into question, a court properly should read 
other sections and should construe them together . . . so as to 
constitute an harmonious whole consistent with the legislative 
purpose"). 
 
 
24 We note that in Lavallee vs. Justices of the Hampden 
Superior Court, Supreme Judicial Court, Nos. SJ-2004-198 & SJ-
2004-199 (Suffolk County Aug. 9, 2004), the single justice 
vacated a judge's order on similar grounds, where the order 
required a CPCS staff attorney to file an appearance for certain 
defendants notwithstanding the attorney's representation that 
the number of cases assigned to attorneys in the Hampden County 
public counsel division office had reached the caseload limit 
established by CPCS.  The single justice observed that CPCS was 
authorized by the Legislature to establish caseload limits "to 
ensure quality representation for indigent criminal defendants," 
that CPCS was exercising its discretion in carrying out a 
legislative function, and that it was presumed to act in good 
faith in determining caseload limits. 
37 
 
 
b.  Ethical and constitutional concerns.  We also take this 
opportunity to discuss certain ethical and constitutional 
concerns that are implicated by the First Justice's June 12 
order.  To be clear, we do not hold that the June 12 order 
actually resulted in any ethical or constitutional violations.  
In her reservation and report, the single justice stated that, 
on the record before her, she was unable to determine 
definitively whether any defendant was being deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel, and we are in no better 
position to make such a determination.  But given the 
possibility that a shortage of defense counsel may recur in the 
future, we wish to point out the potential ethical and 
constitutional pitfalls that may result if CPCS staff attorneys 
are ordered to accept additional cases over and above the 
caseloads that they can reasonably handle. 
 
Under Rule 1.3 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, a lawyer must "act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 (2015).  Requiring defense attorneys 
to take on more clients than they can reasonably handle may 
impede their ability to meet this obligation.  Comment 2 to rule 
1.3 points out that a "lawyer's work load must be controlled so 
that each matter can be handled competently."  Id.  In addition, 
having too many clients and matters at once may create 
38 
 
concurrent conflicts of interest, implicating Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7, if attorneys are then forced to pick and choose between 
clients who will receive their limited time and attention, and 
others who will necessarily be neglected.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015).25  For these reasons, 
the American Bar Association's guidelines for public defense 
workloads specifically recommend that public defense providers 
"avoid[] excessive lawyer workloads and the adverse impact that 
such workloads have on providing quality legal representation to 
all clients."26 
 
Furthermore, the "right to counsel means the right to 
effective assistance of counsel."  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 235.  
Ordering assignment of additional cases to public defenders who 
are already carrying maximum caseloads risks making them 
ineffective, by hindering them from, among other 
                                                          
 
 
25 See also State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Defender Comm'n, 370 
S.W.3d at 608, quoting In re Edward S., 173 Cal. App. 4th 387, 
414 (2009) ("a conflict of interest is inevitably created when a 
public defender is compelled by his or her excessive caseload to 
choose between the rights of the various indigent defendants he 
or she is representing"); ABA Guidelines, supra at 5, comment to 
Guideline 1 ("an excessive number of cases [can] create a 
concurrent conflict of interest, as a lawyer is forced to choose 
among the interests of various clients, depriving at least some, 
if not all clients, of competent and diligent defense 
services"). 
 
 
26 ABA Guidelines, supra at 2, Guideline 1.  Of course, we 
recognize that an excessive workload may have an adverse impact 
on assistant district attorneys as well. 
39 
 
responsibilities, giving adequate attention to contesting 
pretrial detention if necessary, investigating their cases, 
making strategic decisions, filing pretrial motions, and 
preparing for trial, thereby defeating the very purpose of the 
right to counsel.  In effect, such a solution improperly shifts 
"the burden of a systemic lapse" in the public defender system 
to the very defendants the system was intended to protect, 
transgressing Lavallee's injunction that this burden "is not to 
be borne by defendants."  Id. at 246. 
 
3.  Triggering the Lavallee protocol.  Before setting out a 
procedure for triggering the Lavallee protocol in circumstances 
like those presented here, we emphasize first the importance of 
flexibility and cooperation among the courts, CPCS, and district 
attorneys in mitigating the effects of a shortage of available 
defense counsel whenever it arises.  Frequent communication, 
adjusting scheduling and staffing of court events when 
appropriate, improving efficiency of operations, and triaging 
cases to prioritize those involving the most serious charges and 
those where counsel are most urgently needed (e.g., cases where 
the defendants are in pretrial detention awaiting a hearing 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A), may help to manage the impact of a 
shortage of defense counsel before it becomes constitutionally 
intolerable.  The Lavallee protocol is strong medicine, 
involving a considerable administrative burden and the dismissal 
40 
 
of criminal charges and release of defendants who might 
otherwise be held pretrial.  It should therefore be preceded by 
strenuous and innovative collaborative efforts to find 
alternative solutions to a shortage of defense counsel whenever 
possible. 
 
When such efforts fail, and a substantial number of 
indigent defendants remain unrepresented27 due to a shortage of 
defense counsel, CPCS or the RAJ overseeing a court affected by 
the shortage may seek to trigger the Lavallee protocol by filing 
a petition requesting such relief in the single justice session 
of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  If filed by CPCS, the 
petition may be brought on behalf of the unrepresented 
defendants and name the courts affected by the shortage as 
respondents.  The petition may challenge a particular order 
                                                          
 
27 Because circumstances may vary from one situation to 
another, we are reluctant to set a specific number of 
unrepresented indigent defendants as a required threshold for 
filing the petition described herein.  The gravity of the 
situation may depend not only on the absolute number of 
unrepresented indigent defendants, but also on whether they are 
in pretrial detention and the seriousness of the charged 
offenses.  We note that the two single justice petitions in 
Lavallee were filed on behalf of a total of twenty-four 
defendants who were being held in pretrial detention without 
counsel, and that CPCS's chief counsel subsequently reported 
that fifty-eight indigent defendants with pending cases were 
unrepresented, with thirty-one held in custody.  Lavallee, 442 
Mass. at 230, 232 n.10.  In the present case, it has been 
reported that 155 defendants were unrepresented in June 2019 and 
five unrepresented defendants were being held in pretrial 
detention as of June 13, 2019. 
41 
 
issued by a trial court judge, as in this case, but it need not 
necessarily do so.28  If filed by a RAJ, the petition may name 
CPCS as respondent.  In either case, intervention by the 
district attorney may also be appropriate. 
 
The single justice may then handle the case directly, or 
transfer it to a trial court department for assignment to a 
judge serving in the region affected by the shortage of defense 
counsel for an evidentiary hearing to make factual findings and, 
if requested by the single justice, recommended rulings, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 4A.29  In either case, the single 
justice or trial court judge should conduct the evidentiary 
                                                          
 
 
28 "Where . . . a systemic issue affecting the proper 
administration of the judiciary has been presented, resolution 
of the issue by this court [pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3,] is 
appropriate and 'should not await some fortuitous opportunity of 
report or ordinary appeal.'"  Simmons v. Clerk-Magistrate of the 
Boston Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 57, 61 (2006), 
quoting A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552, 556 
(1980). 
 
 
29 See G. L. c. 211, § 4A ("The supreme judicial court or a 
justice thereof may transfer for partial or final disposition in 
any appropriate lower court any cause or matter which might 
otherwise be disposed of by a single justice, and said lower 
court shall thereupon have jurisdiction thereof, subject to 
appeal, and shall have such assistance from other departments or 
from the use of writs and process as the law provides shall be 
available to it or any other court with respect to like causes 
or matters . . .").  Ordinarily we would expect the Chief 
Justice of the trial court department to assign the matter to a 
judge who is familiar with the legal landscape in the region 
experiencing the shortage of defense counsel. 
42 
 
hearing30 promptly and make findings regarding the number of 
unrepresented indigent defendants; the length of time for which 
they have been unrepresented; the current caseloads of local 
CPCS staff attorneys and bar advocates; whether CPCS and the 
local bar advocate organization have engaged in good faith 
efforts to provide counsel for unrepresented indigent 
defendants; whether there is a shortage of available defense 
counsel and, if so, what has caused the shortage; how long the 
shortage has continued and is likely to continue; the prospects 
for remedying the problem; and such other issues as the single 
justice or the presiding judge may deem pertinent.  The ultimate 
decision whether to trigger the Lavallee protocol should then be 
made by the single justice, on the basis of the record, these 
findings, and any recommended rulings.  Specifically, the single 
justice must determine whether, despite good faith efforts by 
CPCS and the local bar advocate organization, there is an 
ongoing systemic violation of indigent criminal defendants' 
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel due to 
CPCS's incapacity to provide such assistance through its staff 
attorneys or through bar advocates.  See Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 
244 ("our powers of general superintendence require us to 
fashion an appropriate remedy" where there is a "continuing 
                                                          
 
 
30 The single justice or presiding judge may rely on 
affidavits or hear testimony as he or she deems appropriate. 
43 
 
constitutional violation suffered by indigent criminal 
defendants").  If the single justice determines that there is 
such an ongoing systemic violation, then an order imposing the 
Lavallee protocol is warranted. 
 
Finally, we note that nothing herein prohibits a judge in 
his or her court room session from deciding that ordering 
release of a defendant who has been held in pretrial detention 
without counsel, or ordering dismissal of the charges without 
prejudice where a defendant has been unrepresented, is 
constitutionally required in the particular circumstances of an 
individual case.  We emphasize, however, that the lapse of the 
time limits for appointment of counsel that we established in 
Lavallee does not automatically entitle defendants to release or 
dismissal of the charges,31 although it is a significant factor 
to be considered. 
                                                          
 
 
31 As noted, the Lavallee protocol does not authorize 
immediate release of an unrepresented defendant who has been 
held in pretrial detention for more than seven days, or 
dismissal of charges, without prejudice, against a defendant who 
has been unrepresented for more than forty-five days.  The 
remedies of release from pretrial detention or dismissal of 
charges only become available if, at the time of a subsequent 
status hearing before the regional administrative justice of the 
Superior Court, the defendant remains unrepresented and, despite 
the good faith efforts of CPCS, there is no attorney willing and 
available to represent the defendant.  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 
248.  We reiterate, however, that a judge in an individual 
session retains the power and the responsibility to determine 
whether there has been a constitutional violation in a 
particular case. 
44 
 
 
4.  Other remedies.  The Lavallee protocol is only a 
temporary remedy, and it is not a panacea for solving the 
underlying shortage of defense counsel.  To do that requires 
more systemic change.  Toward that end, the parties and certain 
amici have suggested and debated various proposals for 
increasing the supply of private bar advocates willing and 
available to take cases in Hampden County.  To the extent that 
these proposals involve disputed recommendations for changes in 
the internal operations of the Springfield District Court, the 
district attorney's office, and CPCS, we are not in a position 
to determine their merits, nor would we presume to impose them, 
based on the present record. 
There is, however, one remedy on which the parties and 
nearly all the amici appear to agree:  increasing the statutory 
rates of compensation for bar advocates.  They have identified 
low rates of compensation for bar advocates as a major factor in 
discouraging private attorneys from accepting court 
appointments, and they argue that increases are urgently needed 
to encourage greater participation.  We also note that the 
recent report of the Supreme Judicial Court Steering Committee 
on Lawyer Well-Being identified financial stress as a central 
issue affecting the well-being of privately assigned counsel, 
45 
 
and it recommended increasing their hourly rates to address this 
problem.32 
The bar advocate rates currently established by G. L. 
c. 211D, § 11, are fifty-three dollars per hour for District 
Court cases, sixty-eight dollars per hour for Superior Court 
nonhomicide cases, and one hundred dollars per hour for homicide 
cases.  Despite some increases in recent years,33 even today 
these rates still fall short of the rates proposed by a 
legislative commission created many years ago to study the 
provision of counsel to indigent persons in the wake of 
Lavallee.  In its April 2005 report, that commission "strongly 
recommend[ed]" that the hourly rates for private attorneys 
should be increased to fifty-five dollars per hour for District 
Court cases, seventy dollars per hour for Superior Court 
nonhomicide cases, and $110 per hour for murder cases by fiscal 
                                                          
 
32 See Supreme Judicial Court Steering Committee on Lawyer 
Well-Being, Report to the Justices, at 26 (July 15, 2019); id. 
at Appendix 3 (CPCS Subcommittee Report, at 1, 4). 
 
 
33 A 2005 amendment to G. L. c. 211D, § 11, established 
hourly rates for attorneys appointed by the private counsel 
division at fifty dollars for District Court cases, sixty 
dollars for Superior Court nonhomicide cases, and one hundred 
dollars for homicide cases.  See St. 2005, c. 54, § 2.  The 
hourly rates for District Court cases and Superior Court 
nonhomicide cases were respectively raised to their current 
levels by amendments that took effect in 2016 and 2018.  See St. 
2015, c. 46, §§ 119, 212; St. 2018, c. 154, §§ 49, 113. 
46 
 
year 2008.34  The gap between today's rates and the commission's 
recommended rates is even greater if the recommended rates are 
adjusted for inflation since the end of fiscal year 2008, which 
yields current recommended rates of sixty-five dollars per hour 
for District Court cases, eighty-two dollars per hour for 
Superior Court cases, and $129 per hour for murder cases.35  More 
recently, the May 2014 report of the Massachusetts Bar 
Association's Commission on Criminal Justice Attorney 
Compensation proposed adopting the hourly rate for Federal 
defenders in noncapital cases, which was $125 at the time, as a 
benchmark for bar advocate rates in Massachusetts.36 
Experience demonstrates that increases in compensation do 
remedy counsel shortages.  CPCS addressed the recent crisis in 
                                                          
 
 
34 Report of the Commission to Study the Provision of 
Counsel to Indigent Persons in Massachusetts, at 18-19 (Apr. 
2005), http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/cpcs_commreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SC6-AEXA]. 
 
 
35 Inflation-adjusted rates were determined by using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator, available 
at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=110&year1 
=200806&year2=201910 [https://perma.cc/5SLX-9AQN], to calculate 
the change in value of the commission's recommended rates from 
June 2008 to December 2019. 
 
 
36 Massachusetts Bar Association Commission on Criminal 
Justice Attorney Compensation, Doing Right by Those Who Labor 
for Justice, at 21 (May 2014).  The current hourly rate for 
Criminal Justice Act panel attorneys in Federal noncapital cases 
is $148.  See United States Courts, Defender Services, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services 
[https://perma.cc/7653-PJQX]. 
47 
 
Hampden County, in part, by instituting an emergency flat duty 
day rate of $424 for bar advocates serving in the Hampden County 
District Courts.  And in 2018, legislation authorizing CPCS to 
declare an emergency and raise the hourly rate from $55 to $75 
for private attorneys handling care and protection cases, see 
St. 2018, c. 24, § 8, reportedly remedied counsel shortages for 
those cases within one week of taking effect.37  The fact that 
CPCS was able to remedy these shortages effectively when given 
the tools to do so also underscores the value of having a 
centrally administered and financed system for providing defense 
counsel, as advocated by Chief Justice Hennessey. 
As we did in Lavallee, we defer to the Legislature "[a]s 
the representative branch in charge of making laws and 
appropriating funds" to determine the best approach to increase 
compensation rates for bar advocates.38  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 
                                                          
 
37 We note, however, that piecemeal regional or temporary 
solutions may not be sufficient to avoid future instability in 
providing counsel for indigent defendants.  For example, CPCS's 
emergency duty day rate in Hampden County reportedly drew some 
bar advocates away from Franklin and Hampshire Counties, and 
bred dissatisfaction among others over the disparity in rates.  
There is also evidence in the record of bar advocate shortages 
in Franklin County and Worcester County, in addition to Hampden 
County. 
 
 
38 We would be remiss if we did not at least make passing 
reference as well to how underpaid our State prosecutors and 
CPCS staff attorneys have been for many years.  The Governor's 
Commission to Study Compensation of Assistant District Attorneys 
and Staff Attorneys for the Committee for Public Counsel 
48 
 
243.  We understand that CPCS has discussed the shortage of bar 
advocates with the Legislature, and we are confident that the 
Legislature will take additional actions as necessary, 
"exercis[ing] prudence and flexibility in choosing among 
competing policy options to address the rights of indigent 
defendants to counsel."  Id. at 243-244.  While we have inherent 
power to ensure the proper operations of the courts and to 
protect them from impairment resulting from a lack of supporting 
personnel, O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of 
Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510 (1972), "this inherent power is a 
duty which must be borne responsibly," and "with due 
consideration for the prerogatives of the executive department 
and the Legislature, whenever exercise of an inherent judicial 
power would bring us near the sphere of another department," id. 
at 515-516. 
 
We take this opportunity, however, to point out that 
funding appointed counsel for indigent defendants has many 
important social benefits beyond the constitutional imperative 
                                                          
 
Services concluded in its 2014 Report that the starting salaries 
for assistant district attorneys and CPCS staff counsel in 
Massachusetts were lower than their counterparts in New York and 
in every other New England state, and more than $10,000 below 
the national median for similar entry level public criminal 
justice attorneys.  Id. at 6.  Fortunately, the Legislature has 
recently taken steps to address these disparities.  See St. 
2018, c. 154, § 2, line item 0321-1500; St. 2019, c. 41, § 2, 
line item 0340-6653. 
49 
 
of protecting the rights of the accused.  Appointment of defense 
counsel enhances the adversarial process by testing the 
prosecutor's case, and thereby increasing the likelihood that 
criminal proceedings will reach a result that is legally and 
factually correct.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012) 
("Defense counsel tests the prosecution's case to ensure that 
the proceedings serve the function of adjudicating guilt or 
innocence . . ."); Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 238, quoting Kimmelman 
v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) ("The absence of [defense] 
counsel for pretrial preparation 'puts at risk . . . the 
reliability of the adversarial testing process'"); Subilosky v. 
Commonwealth, 349 Mass. 484, 488 (1965) (applying Gideon right-
to-counsel rule retrospectively because criminal judgments 
obtained against defendant without counsel "lack[ed] 
reliability").  Thus, by increasing the accuracy of convictions, 
the appointment of defense counsel promotes public safety and 
public confidence in the criminal justice system, and helps to 
avoid not only the personal tragedy suffered by a defendant who 
is wrongly convicted, but also the related waste of government 
resources and the social costs incurred when an innocent person 
is incarcerated and removed from his or her family, community, 
and workplace. 
 
Furthermore, in protecting the rights of the accused, 
defense attorneys also help to ensure the integrity of our 
50 
 
justice system and to protect all of the Commonwealth's 
residents against the dangers of governmental misconduct or 
overreach.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 Mass. 566, 586 
(1989), S.C., 407 Mass. 617, 407 Mass. 629, and 408 Mass. 147 
(1990), (in carrying out his responsibilities, defense counsel 
"uncovered contemptible and disgusting misconduct by police 
officers" whose "criminal and reprehensible behavior intrudes on 
the constitutional rights of us all by undermining the integrity 
of our system of constitutional protections").  For example, 
when a defense attorney succeeds in suppressing evidence 
gathered in violation of the constitutional protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, it deters future misconduct 
and thereby protects the rights of the entire populace, not just 
the attorney's client.  See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796, 817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("a primary purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule [is] to ensure that all 
private citizens -- not just these petitioners -- have some 
meaningful protection against future violations of their 
rights"); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 578 (2015) 
("The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, 
the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in 
violation of rights protected by the Federal and State 
Constitutions").  And when the Commonwealth is vigorously held 
51 
 
to its burden of proof through zealous defense counsel, the 
quality of police investigations and prosecutions often improve 
both systemically and in the case at hand. 
In sum, by promoting the integrity and accuracy of the 
government's law enforcement operations, a robust public 
defender system not only protects the rights of indigent 
defendants, but also helps to increase public safety, to avoid 
the costs of wrongful convictions, and to protect the 
constitutional rights of all of the Commonwealth's residents.  
And where the public defender system fails to fulfill its 
mission due to inadequate funding, that failure not only 
undermines the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, but 
indirectly injures us all. 
Finally, we call upon all members of the bar to consider 
stepping forward to assist in representing indigent defendants, 
by undergoing training and certification to become bar 
advocates.  We applaud the lawyers who have already done so, but 
many more are needed.  Providing representation to persons of 
limited means is both a professional obligation for attorneys 
and an opportunity.  There has been concern in recent years over 
the disappearance of jury trials and the difficulty of finding 
52 
 
opportunities for new lawyers to gain court room experience.39  
Participating in bar advocate programs offers that experience.  
There is also a need for more attorneys to participate in the 
bar advocacy program.  As described above, for a century 
Massachusetts attorneys regularly represented indigent 
defendants without compensation in capital cases, as a service 
to the community and the profession.  A similar spirit of public 
service is needed now. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we hold that the June 
12 order and subsequent appointments of CPCS staff attorneys in 
the Springfield PDD office pursuant to that order were invalid.  
The case is remanded to the county court to determine whether a 
hearing is required concerning the current availability of 
defense counsel to represent indigent defendants in Hampden 
                                                          
 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 
n.11 (D. Mass. 2002) ("the American jury system is dying out -- 
more rapidly on the civil than on the criminal side of the 
courts and more rapidly in the federal than in the state courts 
-- but dying nonetheless"); Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing 
Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 67 (2006); 
Sims, A New Experience:  As Trials Diminish, New Lawyers Need 
Additional Options To Hone Courtroom Skills, Mass. Law. J., vol. 
25, no. 3, Jan./Feb. 2018, 1.  See also Sims, supra at 10, 
quoting Massachusetts Superior Court Policy Statement, adopted 
Dec. 1, 2017 ("In our current Superior Court docket, fewer cases 
go to trial than in the past, thereby reducing the opportunities 
for less experienced counsel to have an active role in a 
courtroom.  This is especially true in our civil docket.  
Without the chance to speak in a courtroom -- whether to argue a 
motion before a judge or to address a jury at trial -- future 
generations of litigators will be less equipped to represent 
their clients effectively and to advance in their profession"). 
53 
 
County and whether the Lavallee protocol imposed by the single 
justice is still required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.