Title: Weiss v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95458-Agenda 29-September 2003.
MARK WEISS, Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, 							
Appellee, v. WATERHOUSE SECURITIES, INC., Appellant.
Opinion filed January 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Waterhouse Securities, Inc., appeals the judgment of
the appellate court affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's
order on Waterhouse Securities' motion to strike plaintiff Mark Weiss'
class action allegations and compel arbitration. Weiss has filed a motion
to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
	Accordingly, there are two central issues in this case: whether we
have jurisdiction to hear Waterhouse Securities' interlocutory appeal, and,
if so, whether the appellate court correctly held that Weiss' class action
allegations are sufficient as a matter of law to survive Waterhouse
Securities' motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, we deny Weiss'
motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	In October 1998, Weiss opened a "webBroker" account with
Waterhouse Securities, a discount securities brokerage company. With
this account and Waterhouse Securities' help, he hoped to trade securities
on his personal computer, by telephone, or through an assigned broker.
The Waterhouse Securities "Account Agreement Booklet" governing
Weiss' account contained an arbitration clause, which provided in part:
		"I agree that any controversy relating to any of my accounts or
any agreement that I have with [Waterhouse Securities] will be
submitted to arbitration conducted only under the provisions of
the Constitution and Rules of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. [NYSE] or pursuant to the code of the Arbitration of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. [NASD] ***
No person shall bring a putative or certified class action to
arbitration, nor seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration
agreement against any person who has initiated in court a
putative class action, or who is a member of a putative class who
has not opted out of the class with respect to any claims
encompassed by the putative class action until: (i) the class
certification is denied; or (ii) the class is decertified; or (iii) the
customer is excluded from the class by the court."(1)
	Weiss soon encountered problems accessing his account, both online
and by telephone. On January 19, 1999, he filed a "Class Action
Complaint" against Waterhouse Securities on behalf of more than 1.5
million of its customers, asserting claims for violation of the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
(West 2002)), breach of contract, and fraud. On February 18, 1999,
Waterhouse Securities removed the cause to federal court, but the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois remanded the
cause back to the Cook County circuit court. More than six months later,
on August 31, 1999, Waterhouse Securities filed a motion to dismiss
under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002)) in lieu of an answer. Waterhouse Securities
contended that the agreement with Weiss disclosed the possibility that he
might experience interruptions or delays in accessing his account,
disclaimed any liability for damages incurred from such service
interruptions or delays, and contained a choice of law provision which
barred his claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. The trial court denied this
motion on April 14, 2000.
	On April 10, 2000, Waterhouse Securities responded to Weiss'
initial interrogatories and production requests. Waterhouse Securities
responses included "GENERAL OBJECTIONS" to Weiss' initial
discovery efforts as
		"premature, unreasonable, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and
seeking potentially unnecessary and wasteful discovery to the
extent: (a) that they seek documents and/or information prior to
the disposition of Waterhouse's pending motion to dismiss this
action; (b) that they seek documents and/or information
regarding the merits of [Weiss'] claims and the claims of the
purported 'class' prior to the disposition of a motion for class
certification; and (c) that such discovery may be improper and/or
impermissible under the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act, 710
ILCS 5/1 et seq., and the parties' agreement to arbitrate this
dispute, in the event that both the motion to dismiss and motion
for class certification are denied."
Waterhouse Securities individually objected to 8 of Weiss' 10
interrogatories. It responded to interrogatories regarding potential fact and
opinion witnesses by indicating that it had not determined what witnesses
to call at trial and would supplement its answers in due time.
	Waterhouse Securities also objected to 37 of Weiss' 39 production
requests, stating that it would produce only "all responsive non-privileged
documents" relating to Weiss himself. On April 25, 2000, Weiss' attorney
sent Waterhouse Securities' attorney a Supreme Court Rule 201(k) letter
(see 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k)) attempting to resolve this discovery dispute.
Waterhouse Securities' attorney responded to this letter on May 5, 2000,
repeating and detailing Waterhouse Securities' objections to Weiss'
discovery efforts and signaling its intention to file a motion to strike the
class allegations and compel arbitration.
	On May 18, 2000, Waterhouse Securities filed such a motion,
specifically asking the trial court for "an Order striking the class allegations
from the Complaint pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801 [(West 2002)] and
compelling plaintiff's individual claims to arbitration." Waterhouse
Securities argued that Weiss' class action claims could not be certified
because common issues of fact and law do not predominate and,
therefore, asked that Weiss' individual claims be sent to arbitration,
pursuant to the agreement. Waterhouse Securities conceded that the
motion to compel was contingent on the trial court granting the motion to
strike. While this motion was being briefed, Weiss filed a motion to
compel discovery on August 30, 2000. Waterhouse Securities responded
to this motion on November 8, 2000, reiterating its objections to Weiss'
discovery efforts as an "enormous burden." The motion to compel remains
pending.
	On January 30, 2001, the trial court decided Waterhouse Securities'
motion to strike and compel. The trial court's order opened by noting,
"This matter is before the Court on Defendant WATERHOUSE
SECURITIES, INC.'s Motion to Strike Class Allegations," omitting any
reference to the arbitration request. The order then stated that "common
questions of law and fact predominate over questions involving individual
class members so that the class allegations as set forth by [Weiss] are
sufficient as a matter of law." The order closed by holding, "it is hereby
ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that Defendant's Motion to
Strike Class Allegations and Compel Arbitration is DENIED."
(Emphasis added.)
	Waterhouse Securities appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
307(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)), which allows interlocutory appeals
of orders denying injunctive relief. Waterhouse Securities claimed that
because the trial court's order denied a motion to compel arbitration, that
order was appealable under Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 268,
271 (1983). In an unpublished order, the appellate court disputed
Waterhouse Securities' characterization of the trial court's order. The
appellate court stated that Waterhouse Securities had, in effect, filed two
separate motions: a motion to dismiss Weiss' class action allegations under
section 2-615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS
5/2-615(a) (West 2002)) and a motion to compel arbitration of his
individual claims:
		"Given the nature of Waterhouse's motion, the court was initially
forced to consider the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's class action
allegations. The court did that and, upon finding the class
allegations adequate, denied Waterhouse's request to compel
arbitration. Hence, the court's order constitutes two distinct
rulings-one ruling denying Waterhouse's request for dismissal
under section 2-615 and another ruling denying Waterhouse's
motion to compel arbitration." No. 1-01-0680 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction over the trial court's
order denying the first motion because that order was interlocutory and
not appealable. The appellate court, however, decided that it had
jurisdiction over the second motion under Rule 307(a)(1). Because none
of the arbitration conditions in the agreement had been met, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's order denying Waterhouse Securities'
motion to compel arbitration.
	Waterhouse Securities appealed to this court. We denied its petition
for leave to appeal, but vacated the appellate court's order, directing that
court "to reconsider its judgment, including the propriety of the trial court's
order denying defendant's motion to strike class allegations." See Weiss
v. Waterhouse Securities, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d 632 (2002) (supervisory
order).
	On remand, the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. 335 Ill. App. 3d 875. As an initial matter, the court addressed
its jurisdiction and repeated its statements that, essentially, Waterhouse
Securities filed two motions-a motion to strike and a motion to
compel-and that, consequently, the trial court made two rulings. The court
concluded, however, "While an order denying a motion for dismissal is not
a final and appealable determination but, rather, is interlocutory in nature
[citations], we nonetheless have jurisdiction to review the circuit court's
denial of Waterhouse's motion to strike because that motion was a
necessary and attendant part of the court's refusal to compel arbitration."
335 Ill. App. 3d at 881.
	On the merits, the appellate court noted that Illinois law is "not clear"
about the extent to which a putative class action plaintiff must plead the
requirements in section 2-801. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 882. The court
concluded:
			"[A] representative plaintiff is not required to allege all the
details necessary to establish that his class action is maintainable
pursuant to section 2-801 in bringing a claim or claims as a class
action. Rather, the plaintiff need only allege a viable individual
cause of action, indicate that the claim is being brought as a class
action lawsuit, and contain factual allegations that are broad
enough in scope to establish the possible existence of a class
action suit as contemplated by section 2-801. If there is no
possibility that a claim can be maintained as a class action, then
dismissal of the class action allegations is proper pursuant to
section 2-615. On the other hand, if there is any possibility that
a class action can be maintained for some members of a class,
dismissal under section 2-615 is not warranted.
			In determining whether a complaint brought as a class action
is legally sufficient under section 2-615, the circuit court should
not inquire into whether the factual allegations establish the
statutory prerequisites for maintaining a class action litigation.
Whether the statutory prerequisites for a class action exists [sic]
in a case should be decided only when the issue of certification
is specifically raised before the circuit court. *** A motion for
certification and a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 are not
the same thing and involve separate and distinct inquiries." 335
Ill. App. 3d at 883-84.
	The court held that Weiss' complaint sufficiently stated a class action:
"The complaint alleges that plaintiff and a number of other Waterhouse
customers shared difficulties in using Waterhouse's trading services during
the class period. Taking the complaint's allegations as true ***, the
possibility that plaintiff's claims can be maintained as a class action cannot
be ruled out." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 884. The court, however, expressed no
opinion on whether the complaint would survive a certification hearing.
335 Ill. App. 3d at 884-85.
	Turning to Waterhouse Securities' "second" motion, the motion to
compel, the appellate court stated, "the issue of certification was never
properly before the circuit court." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 886. None of the
conditions triggering arbitration had occurred; thus, "[t]he issue of whether
plaintiff's individual claims should be compelled to arbitration, therefore,
was not ripe for the circuit court's determination and, accordingly, the
court's decision denying Waterhouse's motion to compel was premature."
335 Ill. App. 3d at 886. The court affirmed that portion of the trial court's
order denying Waterhouse Securities' motion to dismiss and reversed
those portions of the order finding common questions predominated and
denying its motion to compel. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 886.
	Waterhouse Securities again appealed to this court, and we granted
its second petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We
granted the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America leave
to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of Waterhouse Securities. See
155 Ill. 2d R. 345. Weiss filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. We took this motion with the case.

ANALYSIS
	Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, we must initially
decide Weiss' motion to dismiss. Weiss argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the trial court's order denying Waterhouse
Securities' motion to strike because that was an unappealable
interlocutory order. Weiss further argues that this court lacks jurisdiction
to review the issues raised by Waterhouse Securities' motion to compel
because the trial court never ruled on that motion. According to Weiss, the
court's order was limited to the motion to strike. Even if the court had
ruled on the motion to compel, Weiss contends, Waterhouse Securities
cannot bootstrap an unappealable interlocutory order onto the admittedly
appealable interlocutory order on the motion to compel.
	Waterhouse Securities answers that this jurisdictional issue was
raised by Weiss in response to Waterhouse Securities' first petition for
leave to appeal, and thus was previously considered by this court in its
supervisory order to the appellate court. According to Waterhouse
Securities, this court's order essentially conferred jurisdiction, and this
ruling has become the law of the case. Further, Waterhouse Securities
argues that the validity of the trial court's ruling on the motion to compel
depended upon the validity of its ruling on the motion to strike.
	We agree with Waterhouse Securities. By ordering the appellate
court to review the propriety of the trial court's order denying the motion
to strike, we decided that the appellate court had jurisdiction. Our earlier
decision is now the law of the case. See People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (2002). Additionally, the appellate court was right: the decisions
on the motion to strike and the motion to compel were intertwined. That
is, the validity of any order on the motion to strike class allegations
determined the validity of any order on the motion to compel arbitration,
and the order denying the motion to compel arbitration was appealable
under Rule 307(a)(1). See Notaro, 98 Ill. 2d  at 271; Federal Signal
Corp. v. SLC Technologies, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1105 (2001).
	Waterhouse Securities could have chosen a procedurally cleaner
route by filing only a motion to strike. If that motion were granted,
Waterhouse Securities then could have filed a separate motion to compel
arbitration. If the motion to strike were denied, Waterhouse Securities
then could have sought a finding under Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R.
304(a)), making an interlocutory order appealable, or pursued a certified-question appeal under Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308; see, e.g., McCarthy
v. La Salle National Bank & Trust Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 628 (1992);
Elder v. Coronet Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 733 (1990)). The
route Waterhouse Securities followed, however, was not improper. We
need not force a litigant to file two motions when the ruling on the motion
to compel would be a foregone conclusion after the ruling on the motion
to strike. We turn to the merits of this interlocutory appeal.
	Waterhouse Securities contends that the appellate court erred in
concluding that the trial court should not inquire whether the plaintiff's
complaint establishes the statutory class action prerequisites. Waterhouse
Securities asserts in its brief, "No court-other than the Appellate Court in
this case-has ever held that a motion to strike class allegations pursuant
to Sections 2-615 and 2-801 was somehow procedurally improper."
Waterhouse Securities, however, ignores the fact that its motion to strike
and dismiss refers only to section 2-801, which provides the prerequisites
for class certification; it does not refer to section 2-615(a), or to section
2 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/2 (West 2002)
("Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration")). More importantly,
Waterhouse Securities misreads the appellate court's opinion. The
appellate court never held that defendants can no longer file motions to
strike class allegations. In fact, as Weiss correctly notes, the appellate
court acknowledged that class action allegations may properly be
dismissed "[i]f there is no possibility that a claim can be maintained as a
class action." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 883. This holding is consistent with
longstanding precedent.
	Though the class action statute itself does not require the plaintiff to
plead facts establishing the class action prerequisites (Arriola v. Time
Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 303, 307 (1998)), "Illinois courts have
consistently recognized that a class action complaint should be dismissed
at the pleading stage if the complaint fails to meet the statutory
requirements for class certification" (Bruemmer v. Compaq Computer
Corp., 329 Ill. App. 3d 755, 764 (2002), citing McCabe v. Burgess, 75 Ill. 2d 457, 466-67 (1979)). Notably, in our first opinion construing the
statutory class action provisions, we held that, in reviewing the dismissal
of a class action, "we shall measure this action in terms of the [class-action] statute." Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320,
337 (1977); accord Barliant v. Follett Corp., 74 Ill. 2d 226, 232
(1978) ("The question, then, is whether in the instant case the [statutory]
prerequisites *** for the maintenance of a class action, are met"); Elder,
201 Ill. App. 3d at 755 (holding that the plaintiff's complaint failed to
allege sufficiently "the prerequisites needed to maintain a class action
under section 2-801"); Blake v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 918, 921 (1988); Scott v. Ambassador
Insurance Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 184, 185 (1981) ("The sole issue, as
stated by the parties, is whether the four prerequisites to a class action
were sufficiently set forth *** to withstand a motion to dismiss"); Saldana
v. American Mutual Corp., 97 Ill. App. 3d 334, 337 (1981); Morrissy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 757-58 (1979); see also Hagerty
v. General Motors Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 52, 59 (1974) ("the circuit court
was correct in striking the class action allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint"); Goetz v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 62 Ill. App. 3d 233,
235 (1978) ("The sole issue for our consideration is whether plaintiffs'
amended complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support the maintenance
of a class action"); see generally L. Tornquist, Roadmap to Illinois Class
Actions, 5 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 45, 65-66 (1974) ("The complaint must
contain a plain and concise statement of the cause of action and should
affirmatively allege facts which indicate that the representative party has a
right to maintain the class action and that he filed the action on behalf of all
members of the class described in the pleading"). That much is clear.
What is less clear is, as the appellate court put it, "[t]he extent to which
a plaintiff asserting a claim as a class action must plead the statutory
requirements listed in section 2-801." (Emphasis added.) 335 Ill. App. 3d
at 882. In other words, how much must a putative class representative
plead regarding these statutory requirements in order to survive a motion
to strike?
	As we have stated time and again, "Illinois is a fact-pleading
jurisdiction." Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (2003). That is,
a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim within a legally
recognized cause of action. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344
(1997); Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1986); see Gonzalez v.
Thorek Hospital & Medical Center, 143 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (1991)
(observing that a plaintiff must allege facts "necessary to recover" in order
to state a cause of action). When that cause of action is also a class action,
the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring the claim within the statutory
prerequisites for a class action. Section 2-801, "Prerequisites for the
maintenance of a class action," provides:
			"An action may be maintained as a class action in any court
of this State and a party may sue or be sued as a representative
party of the class only if the court finds:
			(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.
			(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class,
which common questions predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.
			(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class.
			(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." 735 ILCS 5/2-801
(West 2002).
	Here, the parties agree that the only statutory prerequisite at issue is
section 2-801(2). The parties dispute whether Weiss' complaint
sufficiently alleges that common questions of fact or law predominate over
individual questions. Quoting Key v. Jewel Cos., 176 Ill. App. 3d 91, 94-95 (1988), Waterhouse Securities asserts "the test for whether common
questions predominate is 'whether the successful adjudication of the
plaintiffs' claim will establish a right to recovery in the class members.' "
According to Waterhouse Securities, Weiss' complaint fails this test
because even if he establishes his individual claims, he does not necessarily
establish claims for all class members because the class undoubtedly
includes customers who never attempted to execute trades during service
interruptions or delays, as well as customers who may have benefitted
from their inability to execute trades, customers who had other means of
executing trades through other accounts, customers who had subsequent
opportunities to execute their contemplated trades at the same or better
prices, and customers whose access problems were not caused by
Waterhouse Securities.
	This "successful adjudication" test certainly applies to cases arising
in the class certification context, and some courts have employed it in the
context of motions to strike class allegations. See, e.g., McCarthy, 230
Ill. App. 3d at 634; Scott, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 187; Morrissy, 76 Ill. App.
3d at 762; Goetz, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 236; Barton Chemical Corp. v.
Hertz Corp., 52 Ill. App. 3d 214, 217 (1977). But applying this test in
both contexts is problematic because motions to certify a class and
motions to strike class allegations serve very different purposes. "The
appropriate way to determine whether to certify a class is by a motion for
class certification." Enzenbacher v. Browning-Ferris Industries of
Illinois, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1084 (2002). The appropriate way
to determine whether to strike insufficient class action allegations is by a
motion to dismiss under section 2-615(a). The former motion is typically
brought by a putative class action plaintiff, who asks the court, based on
evidentiary materials adduced through discovery, to find that the case can
proceed as a class action. The latter motion is typically brought by a
defendant, who asks the court, based on the face of the complaint, to
dismiss the plaintiff's class action allegations as legally insufficient. The
showing that Weiss must make in seeking class certification is
correspondingly higher than the showing he must make to withstand a
motion to strike class allegations. Unlike the class action prerequisites at
certification, here they are not a matter of proof, but a matter of pleading.
	This distinction affects the standard of review on appeal. A
certification decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (see McCabe,
75 Ill. 2d at 464); a dismissal is reviewed de novo (see Oliveira v.
Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 147-48 (2002)). As the appellate court
correctly observed, "If a motion to dismiss class allegations under section
2-615 is allowed to raise the matter of certification, a reviewing court,
upon review of the circuit court's certification decision, will be required to
engage in an independent determination of the certification elements,
despite the statutory directive that such a determination be vested with the
circuit court." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 884.
	To the extent that "establish" means "prove" (see Black's Law
Dictionary 566 (7th ed. 1999)) as opposed to "allege," the appellate court
was correct when it said the trial court should not inquire whether the
putative class action plaintiff's complaint establishes the statutory class
action prerequisites. The plaintiff's complaint simply must contain
allegations which implicate, or bring the complaint within, these
prerequisites. It is enough that the factual allegations are sufficiently broad
in scope to plead the possible existence of a class action claim under
section 2-801. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 883. Against this background, we
examine the allegations of Weiss' complaint de novo.
	Weiss alleged that, in promotional materials and advertisements,
Waterhouse Securities solicited customers to open low commission
securities trading accounts, which they could access instantly through their
computers, telephones, or branch office brokers 24 hours a day.
Beginning January 2, 1999, Weiss charged, he and his fellow customers
repeatedly tried, but "were unable to access their accounts to purchase
and sell securities through their personal computers" and "could not
purchase or sell securities through their assigned brokers, as their attempts
to reach their brokers by telephone were met with repeated busy signals
or excessive hold times." As a result, Weiss and his fellow customers
purportedly "have been unable to purchase and sell securities and take
advantage of changing conditions in the market" and "were not even
certain at various times as to what securities positions they held in the
market because of lack of confirmations." When Waterhouse Securities
made its representations regarding 24-hour instant access, Weiss claimed,
it knew or should have known that it lacked "sufficient equipment or
personnel to make good on its promises." Weiss and his fellow customers
relied on these representations to their detriment; they would not have
opened accounts if they had known the truth about Waterhouse
Securities' services.
	According to Weiss,
			"There are questions of fact and law common to the Class
which predominate over any individual questions affecting any
individual Class members. These questions include:
				a. Whether Waterhouse breached its contract with its
customers by failing to provide customers: (i) access to their
Trading Accounts and the ability to purchase and sell
securities through their personal computers; and (ii) access to
their assigned brokers by telephone during the Class Period.
				b. Whether Waterhouse breached its covenant of good
faith and fair dealing with its customers by failing to provide
customers: (i) access to their Trading Accounts and the ability
to purchase and sell securities through their personal
computers; and (ii) access to their assigned brokers by
telephone during the Class Period.
				c. Whether Waterhouse has acted deceptively or unfairly
and engaged in deceptive trade practices in soliciting
customers and selling its services, including Trading Accounts,
to those customers.
				d. Whether Waterhouse has engaged in violations of the
consumer fraud laws of Illinois and other states.
				e. Whether members of the Class have been damaged by
the inability of Waterhouse to allow members of the Class to
purchase and sell securities and/or to confirm securities trades
during the Class Period."
	We agree with the appellate court that the possibility Weiss can
maintain these claims as a class action "cannot be ruled out." 335 Ill. App.
3d at 884. The allegations of the complaint indicate that common issues
of fact or law may predominate. Clearly, despite his allegation that he
"brings this action individually and on behalf of defendant's customers who
had brokerage accounts with defendant," Weiss represents only those
Waterhouse Securities customers who sought to purchase securities, sell
securities, or confirm either securities purchases or sales. For these
customers, the operative facts are identical. Waterhouse Securities
promised 24-hour instant account access; class members accepted this
promise by opening accounts governed by the same agreement;
Waterhouse Securities broke this promise when it experienced service
interruptions and delays during the class period; and class members
suffered damages when these interruptions and delays prevented them
from accessing their accounts to trade securities or to verify their market
positions. These allegations are sufficient to bring Weiss' complaint within
section 2-801(2).
	We acknowledge that Waterhouse Securities raises valid concerns
about this class action. Similar concerns were recently addressed in a
similar case, Hoang v. E*Trade Group, Inc., 151 Ohio App. 3d 363,
784 N.E.2d 151 (2003). In Hoang, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting certification to a class of
investors who encountered account access problems with their securities
broker's online services. Hoang, 151 Ohio App. 3d at 365, 784 N.E.2d 
at 152. The court of appeals reasoned that, because the impact of these
problems would have to be determined for each attempted trade, "liability
as to each individual plaintiff's claims cannot be ascertained on a classwide
basis in a single adjudication." Hoang, 151 Ohio App. 3d at 371, 784 N.E.2d  at 157. However persuasive Hoang seems, it is inapposite here.
Unlike the issue in Hoang, the issue in the case before us is not whether
the trial court abused its discretion in granting class certification, but
whether the trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion to strike
the plaintiff's class action allegations. Waterhouse Securities is correct that
class certification is improper where individual questions of fact
predominate, but, we repeat, this case has not reached the class
certification stage. Waterhouse Securities is free to pursue such arguments
on remand.
	
CONCLUSION
 	For the reasons that we have discussed, we deny Weiss' motion to
dismiss and affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which remanded
the cause for further proceedings.
Motion denied;
appellate court judgment affirmed.
1.            
            
         
     NYSE Rule 600(d)(iii) and NASD Code Rule 10301(d)(3) similarly prohibit a party from asking a court to compel 
arbitration until these same three prerequisites are met. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide Rs. 600(d)(iii)(A) through (d)(iii)(C), at 4311-12 (CCH 
1999); Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. Man. Rs. 10301(d)(3)(A) through (d)(3)(C), at 7571 (CCH 2002).