Title: Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3264.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3264 
ESTATE OF HEINTZELMAN, APPELLEE, ET AL., v. AIR EXPERTS, INC.;  
AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3264.] 
R.C. 3929.06 — Postjudgment supplemental complaint brought by successful 
plaintiff against tortfeasor’s insurer — Previous declaratory judgment 
obtained by insurer declaring that insurer has no duty to indemnify 
insured is binding on plaintiff only if declaratory judgment action was 
initiated by insured or if plaintiff participated in declaratory judgment 
action. 
(No. 2008-2173 — Submitted September 2, 2009 — Decided July 15, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, No. 07CAE090045, 
2008-Ohio-4883. 
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PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether a declaratory 
judgment obtained in an action initiated by an insurer, holding that the insurer has 
no duty to indemnify its insured for injuries caused to a third party, is binding 
upon that third party in a separate action brought against the insurer pursuant to 
R.C. 3929.06.  We hold that the declaratory judgment between the insured and 
insurer is binding upon the plaintiff in an R.C. 3929.06 action only if the 
declaratory judgment action was initiated by the insured or if the plaintiff 
participated in the declaratory judgment action. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} According to the complaint, Jeffrey and Margaret Heintzelman 
hired Martel Heating & Cooling (“Martel”) to install an attic air conditioner in 
their home in August 1999.  The air conditioner malfunctioned; Martel returned to 
the home several times to attempt to address problems, but was unsuccessful in 
resolving them.  In 2001, having learned that Martel was no longer in business, 
the Heintzelmans hired Air Experts, Inc., to repair the air conditioner, but the 
problems continued.  On July 15, 2002, Jeffrey entered the attic to assess the 
damage caused by water leaking from the air conditioner.  He was electrocuted 
when he came into contact with an unprotected electrical outlet Martel had 
installed. 
{¶ 3} Litigation ensued.  On December 10, 2002, Jeffrey’s estate and 
Margaret Heintzelman (collectively, “the Heintzelmans”) filed a complaint 
against Martel and Air Experts, alleging wrongful death and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.  When the air conditioner was originally installed, Thomas 
Martel, d.b.a. Martel Heating & Cooling, was a named insured under a 
commercial insurance policy issued by appellant, American Family Insurance 
January Term, 2010 
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Company (“American Family”).  American Family retained counsel to defend 
Martel in the Heintzelman case. 
{¶ 4} On December 4, 2003, while the Heintzelman case was pending, 
American Family filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Martel, 
seeking a declaration that it had no duty to provide coverage for Martel for any 
award in the Heintzelman case.  The declaratory judgment action was not 
assigned to the same judge hearing the Heintzelman case. 
{¶ 5} Martel never filed an answer in the declaratory judgment suit, 
because, Thomas Martel claims, American Family advised against it.  American 
Family did not join the Heintzelmans as parties, nor did the Heintzelmans seek to 
intervene.  Indeed, the Heintzelmans claim that they were unaware that the 
American Family suit had even been filed until well after it was resolved.  
American Family obtained a default judgment against Martel on March 10, 2004.  
According to Thomas Martel, American Family told him that the default 
judgment would have no effect on him. 
{¶ 6} The Heintzelmans’ case proceeded to trial, and on March 7, 2005, 
the jury returned a verdict against Martel and in favor of the estate on its 
wrongful-death claim for $1,014,186 and in favor of Margaret Heintzelman for 
$2,650,000 on her emotional-distress claim.  The award to Margaret was 
eventually overturned on a separate appeal; the award to the estate was sustained. 
Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc., Delaware App. No. 2005-CAPE-08-
0054, 2006-Ohio-4832. 
{¶ 7} On May 10, 2005, pursuant to R.C. 3929.06, which allows 
successful plaintiffs to file postjudgment suits against a tortfeasor’s insurer, the 
Heintzelmans filed a supplemental complaint against American Family, alleging 
that Martel’s policy provided coverage for their injuries.  On October 6, 2005, 
American Family filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
Heintzelmans were bound by the default judgment rendered in the declaratory 
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judgment action between American Family and Martel.  On August 6, 2007, the 
trial court granted American Family’s summary judgment motion, holding that 
pursuant to R.C. 3929.06, the Heintzelmans were bound by the declaratory 
judgment even though they were not parties to the action. 
{¶ 8} The Heintzelmans appealed.  On September 24, 2008, the 
Delaware County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.  
Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc., App. No. 07CAE090045, 2008-Ohio-
4883.  It held that under R.C. 2721.12(B), 2721.02(C), and 3929.06(C)(2), a 
declaratory judgment relating to insurance coverage is binding upon an insured’s 
judgment creditor only if the insured initiated the declaratory judgment action.  
Since American Family initiated the declaratory judgment action, the court held 
that the judgment was not binding on the Heintzelmans. 
{¶ 9} American Family appealed.  The cause is before this court upon 
the acceptance of a discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 10} Together, R.C. 2721.02, 2721.12, and 3929.06 establish the rules 
for insurance-coverage declaratory judgment actions involving injured parties, 
tortfeasors, and tortfeasors’ insurers.  Those statutes set forth who may bring an 
action, when it may be brought, and what effect prior judgments between a 
tortfeasor and his or her insurer have on plaintiffs. 
R.C. 3929.06 
{¶ 11} The Heintzelmans filed their supplemental complaint pursuant to 
R.C. 3929.06, which allows plaintiffs who are awarded damages at trial to file a 
posttrial, supplemental complaint against the judgment debtor’s insurer to recover 
damages covered under the judgment debtor’s insurance policy.  R.C. 
3929.06(A)(1) establishes that the plaintiff “is entitled as judgment creditor to 
have an amount up to the remaining limit of liability coverage provided in the 
judgment debtor's policy of liability insurance applied to the satisfaction of the 
January Term, 2010 
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final judgment.”  Pursuant to R.C. 3929.06(A)(2), if the judgment debtor’s insurer 
has not paid the judgment creditor within 30 days of the entry of final judgment, 
“the judgment creditor may file in the court that entered the final judgment a 
supplemental complaint against the insurer seeking the entry of a judgment 
ordering the insurer to pay the judgment creditor the requisite amount.”  R.C. 
3929.06(C)(1) allows the insurer to assert against the judgment creditor any 
coverage defenses it could assert in a declaratory judgment action between the 
insured and the insurer.  Thus, if there is no coverage under the terms of the 
policy for the judgment debtor’s liability, the insurer can raise those defenses 
against the judgment creditor. 
{¶ 12} This case specifically involves R.C. 3929.06(C)(2), which 
addresses the effect of a declaratory judgment on a supplemental complaint filed 
pursuant to R.C. 3929.06(A)(2).  R.C. 3929.06(C)(2) states that if prior to the 
judgment creditor’s filing of a supplemental complaint, the insured commences a 
declaratory judgment action to determine whether the policy covers the injuries 
suffered by the judgment creditor and caused by the insured, the final judgment as 
to the coverage issue is binding upon the judgment creditor. The statute reads: 
{¶ 13} “If, prior to the judgment creditor's commencement of the civil 
action against the insurer in accordance with divisions (A)(2) and (B) of this 
section, the holder of the policy commences a declaratory judgment action or 
proceeding under Chapter 2721 of the Revised Code against the insurer for a 
determination as to whether the policy's coverage provisions extend to the injury, 
death, or loss to person or property underlying the judgment creditor's judgment, 
and if the court involved in that action or proceeding enters a final judgment with 
respect to the policy's coverage or noncoverage of that injury, death, or loss, that 
final judgment shall be deemed to have binding legal effect upon the judgment 
creditor for purposes of the judgment creditor's civil action against the insurer 
under divisions (A)(2) and (B) of this section.  This division shall apply 
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notwithstanding any contrary common law principles of res judicata or adjunct 
principles of collateral estoppel.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 14} American Family argues that the default judgment it won in the 
declaratory judgment action it filed against Martel should be binding against the 
Heintzelmans.  However, R.C. 3929.06(C)(2) unequivocally states that the 
declaratory judgment is binding on a judgment creditor when the judgment 
derives from an action that “the holder of the policy commences * * * against the 
insurer.”  The statute notably does not refer to an action “between” the insured 
and insurer; instead, it refers only to an action commenced by the holder of the 
policy against the insurer. 
{¶ 15} Our first duty in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the 
statute is clear and unambiguous. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, 
Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 52, 2006-Ohio-6498, 858 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 15.  “ ‘[W]here the 
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to 
enforce the statute as written, making neither additions to the statute nor 
subtractions therefrom.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Hubbard v. Canton City School 
Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 3929.06(C)(2) unambiguously limits the binding effect a 
declaratory judgment action between an insured and an insurer to those instances 
in which the declaratory judgment action was filed by the policyholder.  To 
expand that binding effect to judgments from actions initiated by insurers would 
require us to add language to R.C. 3929.06(C).  That we cannot do. 
{¶ 17} Since R.C. 3929.06 is unambiguous, “we need not interpret it; we 
must simply apply it.” State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 
N.E.2d 471, ¶ 13.  Applying the statute to this case, we find that the declaratory 
judgment granted in American Family’s action against its insured, Martel, has no 
preclusive effect on the Heintzelmans. 
R.C. Chapter 2721 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 18} An analysis under R.C. Chapter 2721, which establishes Ohio’s 
declaratory judgment scheme, yields the same result.  R.C. 2721.02(B) and (C) 
reiterate much of what is contained in R.C. 3929.06.  Pursuant to R.C. 
2721.02(B), a plaintiff may not file a declaratory judgment action against a 
tortfeasor’s insurer until there is a final judgment in the separate action 
establishing the tortfeasor’s liability.  The first paragraph of R.C. 2721.02(C) 
virtually mirrors R.C. 3929.06(C)(1), establishing that when a judgment creditor 
files a declaratory judgment action against a judgment debtor’s insurer, “the 
insurer has and may assert as an affirmative defense against the judgment creditor 
any coverage defenses that the insurer possesses and could assert against the 
holder of the policy in an action or proceeding under this chapter between the 
holder and the insurer.”  That is, exclusions under the policy between the insurer 
and insured would also apply against a judgment creditor. 
{¶ 19} The second paragraph of R.C. 2721.02(C) echoes R.C. 
3929.06(C)(2), stating that if the “holder of the policy” commences a declaratory 
judgment action before the judgment creditor, “a final judgment with respect to 
the policy’s coverage or noncoverage of [the] injury, death, or loss * * * shall be 
deemed to also have binding legal effect upon the judgment creditor for purposes 
of the judgment creditor’s action or proceeding for declaratory relief against the 
insurer.”  Again, as in R.C. 3929.06(C)(2), the judgment is binding only if the 
policyholder brings the suit. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 2721.12(A) discusses necessary parties in declaratory 
judgment actions.  It states that every person who has or claims to have an interest 
affected by the declaratory judgment action must be made a party to the 
declaratory judgment action and that “a declaration shall not prejudice the rights 
of persons who are not made parties to the action or proceeding.”  Under that 
language, a plaintiff with a claim against an insured would seem to be a necessary 
party in a declaratory judgment action in which the insurer denies coverage.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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However, R.C. 2721.12(B) excepts certain judgment creditors from the purview 
of R.C. 2721.12(A). 
{¶ 21} Pursuant to R.C. 2721.12(B), a declaratory judgment in an action 
between an insurer and an insured will have “the binding legal effect described in 
division (C)(2) of section 3929.06 of the Revised Code.”  As we have already 
concluded, that “binding legal effect” applies to declaratory judgments brought by 
a policyholder, not by an insurer. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2721.12(B) also excepts from the protection of R.C. 
2721.12(A) assignees seeking rights under an insured’s policy.  There is a notable 
difference between R.C. 2721.12(B)’s treatment of assignees and its treatment of 
judgment creditors.  In removing assignees seeking rights under an insured’s 
policy from the protection of division (A), R.C. 2721.12(B) does not refer to R.C. 
3929.06(C).  Instead, R.C. 2721.12(B) states that the judgment resulting from an 
action between an insurer and insured has a “binding legal effect upon any person 
who seeks coverage as an assignee of the insured’s rights under the policy in 
relation to the injury, death, or loss involved.  This division applies whether or not 
an assignee is made a party to the action or proceeding for declaratory relief and 
notwithstanding any contrary common law principles of res judicata or adjunct 
principles of collateral estoppel.” 
{¶ 23} For assignees, the judgment in a case between an insured and 
insurer is binding regardless of whether the action was filed by an insured or an 
insurer.  For a judgment creditor, however, the judgment is binding only if it 
comports with R.C. 3929.06(C).  That is, the judgment would be binding if the 
policyholder brought the claim. 
{¶ 24} Of course, pursuant to R.C. 2721.12(A), if the judgment creditor 
had been made a party to the action between the insurer and insured, that action 
would be binding on the judgment creditor.  Although R.C. 3929.06 and 2721.02 
prevent a plaintiff from filing a claim against a defendant’s insurer until after the 
January Term, 2010 
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plaintiff successfully prosecutes its claim against the defendant, there is no such 
restriction on insurers joining potential judgment creditors. 
{¶ 25} Since American Family initiated the declaratory judgment action 
and did not include the Heintzelmans as parties, neither R.C. 2721.02 nor 2721.12 
precludes the Heintzelmans from filing their supplemental complaint in this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 26} Pursuant to the statutory scheme set forth in R.C. 3929.06, 
2721.02, and 2721.12, a declaratory judgment action between an insured and 
insurer seeking a declaration on the applicability of coverage for injuries to a 
plaintiff caused by the insured is binding upon that plaintiff only if the declaratory 
judgment action is initiated by the insured or if the plaintiff is joined as a party in 
the declaratory judgment action.  Here, American Family did not join the 
Heintzelmans as parties in its declaratory judgment action.  Therefore, that 
judgment is not binding upon the Heintzelmans.  Pursuant to R.C. 2721.02(C) and 
3929.06(C)(1), American Family may still assert against the Heintzelmans any 
coverage defenses that arise from the terms of Martel’s policy. 
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
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Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., Charles Cooper Jr., and Rex H. Elliott, for 
appellee. 
Curry, Roby & Mulvey Co., L.L.C., and Bruce A. Curry, for appellant. 
Freund, Freeze & Arnold and Shawn M. Blatt, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
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Law Offices of Daniel R. Mordarski, L.L.C., and Daniel R. Mordarski, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Thomas Martel. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Justice. 
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