Title: Bowman v. Wintergreen Property Owners Assoc.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 15th day of 
September, 1995. 
 
 
Norton Bowman, 
Appellant, 
 
  against  
Record No. 941911 
 
 
 
Circuit Court No. 125CH93003286-00 
 
Wintergreen Property Owners Association, Inc., 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the 
Circuit Court of Nelson County on the 12th day of 
August, 1994. 
 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the 
judgment appealed from.  Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.  
The appellant shall pay to the appellee thirty dollars damages. 
 
 
JUSTICE WHITING, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KEENAN join, 
concurring in part, and dissenting in part. 
 
 
Unlike the majority, which decides this case without stating 
the facts or giving a reason for its decision, I think there was 
error in the chancellor's judgment and I believe that some 
explanation should be given to the litigants.  Accordingly, I find 
it necessary to state the facts in order to explain my reasons for 
dissenting to a part of the majority's order. 
 
This appeal arises from Norton Bowman's display of certain 
articles of personal property outside his house in the Wintergreen 
Resort residential subdivision (Wintergreen) in Nelson County.  
The display in question included three cow skulls, two pairs of 
cow horns, three neon signs reading "Aspen," "Key West," and 
"Margaritaville," and a bar and murals attached to the outside of 
Bowman's residence.  Also, either on the outside deck of his house 
or in his yard, Bowman displayed a lighted Christmas tree 
silhouette, the statues of two deer, five pastel, beach-style 
umbrellas, eight lighted wicker deer structures, seven lighted 
artificial 
cactus 
and 
palm 
plants, 
eight 
wooden 
figures 
representing cowboys and Indians, two lighted pink flamingos, and 
two wooden owls. 
 
Wintergreen 
Property 
Owners 
Association, 
Inc. 
(the 
association) sued Bowman to enjoin his display of these and other 
articles without its permission or approval as violations of the 
following Wintergreen restrictive covenants:
1
 
1.  No building, fence or other structure shall be 
erected, placed or altered nor shall a building permit 
for such improvement be applied for on any property in 
Wintergreen until the proposed building plans and 
specifications, 
showing 
floor 
plans, 
the 
front 
elevation, exterior color or finish, a plot plan 
detailing the proposed location of such building or 
structure, drives and parking areas, a landscape plan, a 
pollution control plan . . . and the construction 
schedule shall have been filed with and approved in 
writing by [the association], its successors or assigns. 
 Refusal of approval of plans, location or specification 
may be based by [the association] upon any ground, 
including purely aesthetic conditions, which in the sole 
and uncontrolled discretion of [the association] shall 
seem sufficient.  No alteration in the exterior 
appearance of any building or structure shall be made 
without like approval by [the association]. . . . 
 
 
5.  No signs shall be erected or maintained on any 
property by anyone including, but not limited to, the 
owner, a realtor, a contractor or subcontractor, except 
with the written permission of [the association] or 
except as may be required by legal proceedings.  If such 
permission is granted, [the association] reserves the 
right to restrict size, color and content of such signs. 
                     
    
1The association is the successor to the developer which 
imposed these restrictions. 
 Residential property identification and like signs not 
exceeding a combined total of more than one (1) square 
foot may be erected without the written permission of 
[the association]. 
 
 
6.  It shall be the responsibility of each property 
owner and tenant to prevent the development of any 
unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of buildings or 
grounds on such property.  No outside burning of wood, 
leaves, trash, garbage or other refuse shall be 
permitted on any Property. 
 
 
Following an ore tenus hearing, the chancellor agreed with 
the association's construction of the restrictive covenants 
regarding the above articles and required Bowman to remove them 
unless he obtained association approval.  Bowman appeals.
2
 
The controlling principles are set forth in Friedberg v. 
Riverpoint Bldg. Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 239 S.E.2d 106, 110 
(1977), as follows: 
 
 
Valid covenants restricting the free use of land, 
although widely used, are not favored and must be 
strictly construed and the burden is on the party 
seeking to enforce them to demonstrate that they are 
applicable to the acts of which he complains. . . .  
Substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved against 
the restrictions and in favor of the free use of 
property. . . . 
 
 
 
But if it is apparent from a reading of the whole 
instrument that the restrictions carry a certain meaning 
by definite and necessary implication, then the thing 
denied may be said to be clearly forbidden, as if the 
language used had been in positive terms of express 
inhibition. . . . (Citations omitted). 
 
 
Bowman argues that his neon signs did not require association 
approval under the provisions of restriction 5 because they were 
not "advertisement[s]" but a "display of neon art," reflecting 
                     
    
2The 
association 
has 
not 
assigned 
cross 
error 
to 
the  
chancellor's judgment that Bowman did not violate the restrictive 
covenants in locating a hot tub and twelve globe lights outside 
his residence. 
places he had visited and the signs were intended to be 
illuminated only during his occupancy of the premises.  I agree 
with the association that the plain language of restriction 5 
specifically covers Bowman's sign display even if it could be 
considered "neon art."   Thus, I would affirm that part of the 
chancellor's opinion. 
 
Turning to restriction 1, particularly its language that 
"[n]o alteration in the exterior appearance of any building or 
structure 
shall 
be 
made 
without 
like 
approval 
by 
[the 
association]," I disagree with Bowman's claim that, as used in 
this sentence, the word "alteration" limits association approval 
to those changes that are structural modifications of the exterior 
of any building or structure.  Instead, I agree with the 
association's contention that, consistent with the context of this 
sentence and the remaining language of restriction 1, the word 
"alteration clearly encompasses any change or alteration in the 
exterior of Bowman's residential structure."  The requirement of 
association approval of building plans and specifications, front 
elevations, and exterior colors and finishes in the first sentence 
of restriction 1 makes it plain that a similar approval is 
required for an alteration or change in the exterior appearance of 
any residence by the attachment of personal property thereto.  
Hence, I agree that association approval was required for those 
items of display attached to Bowman's house. 
 
However, I disagree with the association's contention that 
Bowman's display of the other personal property in his yard and on 
the deck of his residence was subject to restriction 1.  The 
chancellor held that these objects "come within the terms of the 
[restriction 1]" because they "alter the exterior appearance of 
the structure" and, thus, their display requires association 
approval.  On the contrary, I would hold that Bowman's yard 
display was not an alteration in the appearance of his residential 
structure requiring association approval, but an alteration in the 
appearance of his yard, clearly not subject to such approval. 
 
Nor do I agree with the association's contention that a 
prohibition of "alteration[s] in the exterior appearance of any 
building or structure" unambiguously requires association approval 
of Bowman's placement of pastel umbrellas and other personal 
property on the deck of his residence.  If restriction 1 is 
unambiguous, there is no need for construction and we simply apply 
the language as written.  Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
248 Va. 432, 435-36, 448 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1994).  Yet, instead of 
applying the restriction as written, the association construes "no 
alteration in" to mean "no items which alter."  And even this 
"amended" language needs further construction to permit the 
conclusion that nothing may be displayed on the residence or its 
deck without association approval, although not attached to either 
the residence or the deck.  Thus, the association itself 
demonstrates that the language is ambiguous and merely advances 
one construction of that language. 
 
I 
think 
a 
better 
construction 
of 
this 
provision 
of 
restriction 1 is that association approval is limited to those 
articles which are attached to the residence or deck and thus 
alter the appearance of the structure.  This construction is 
reinforced when this provision is considered in context with the 
earlier provisions in restriction 1 requiring association approval 
for the construction of buildings, fences, structures, drives, 
parking areas, landscape plans, and pollution control plans. In 
any event, any doubt or ambiguity in the scope of any restrictive 
covenant is to be resolved against the restriction and in favor of 
the free use of property.  Williams v. Brooks, 238 Va. 224, 228, 
383 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989); Friedberg, 218 Va. at 665, 239 S.E.2d 
at 110.  Hence, I think the chancellor erred in requiring 
association permission for Bowman's display of the articles of 
personal property that were simply placed on the deck of his 
residential structure.   
 
Next, I consider the chancellor's alternative ground for 
enjoining Bowman's display.  The chancellor also held that 
Bowman's display was an "unsightly condition" "in relation to the 
general appearance and scheme of development at Wintergreen," and 
hence a violation of restriction 6.  Although the chancellor gave 
no further explanation for his ruling, the association claims the 
following additional language from the restrictive covenants 
supports his holding:  "The primary purpose of these covenants and 
restrictions and the foremost consideration in the origin of same 
has been the creation of a community which is aesthetically 
pleasing and functionally convenient."   
 
However, the specific purpose of restriction 6 is "to prevent 
the development of any unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of 
buildings or grounds."  I do not think that this language can be 
converted into a restriction against the creation of a display 
some people may consider aesthetically displeasing.  In extending 
the scope of the restriction beyond its clear purpose, I think 
that the chancellor read the word "unsightly" out of context for 
the reasons which follow. 
 
First, I consider that the purpose of restriction 6 is "to 
prevent neglect in the subdivision by requiring lot owners to take 
action "to prevent the development of any unclean, unsightly or 
unkept conditions."  Stated another way, restriction 6 is aimed at 
a lot owner's neglect or failure to act in maintaining his 
property. 
 
On the other hand, an aesthetically displeasing display 
usually is the result of some affirmative act; it does not occur 
by neglect.  It is not usually regarded as a "condition[]," which, 
in relation to an inanimate object, usually alludes to the state 
of its cleanliness or repair.  And the language of restriction 1 
requiring association approval of "the proposed building plans and 
specifications," a "plot plan," a "landscaping plan," and a 
"pollution control plan," and subjecting such approval to "purely 
aesthetic conditions," demonstrates a familiarity, not only with 
the difference between a neglected property and one that is 
aesthetically displeasing, but also with the method of subjecting 
certain parts of the lot owner's property to the aesthetic 
judgment of the association. 
 
My second reason for concluding that the chancellor read the 
word "unsightly" out of context is that the enumeration of 
"unclean," "unkept," and "unsightly" as common modifiers of the 
word "conditions" requires that the three modifiers be construed 
consistently with each other under the well-established maxim of 
noscitur a sociis.  Under this maxim, "when general and specific 
words are grouped, the general words are limited by the specific 
and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those things identified by the specific words."  Martin v. 
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 302, 295 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1982).  Or, 
as stated by another authority, "[t]he meaning of a word is or may 
be known from the accompanying words.  Under the doctrine of 
'noscitur a sociis', the meaning of questionable or doubtful words 
or phrases . . . may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of 
other words or phrases associated with it."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1060 (6th ed. 1990).   
 
And, as pertinent to the prevention of "the development of 
any unclean, unsightly or unkept conditions of buildings or 
grounds," "unclean" is defined as "dirty, filthy," Webster's New 
International Dictionary 2485 (3rd ed. 1986) and "unkept" is 
defined as "neglected."  Id. at 2502.  Accordingly, I do not think 
that one can define "unsightly," in the context of these 
restrictions, as an "aesthetically displeasing" display.   
 
 
In sum, and consistent with Friedberg and Williams, I read 
the word "unsightly" in harmony with the remaining language of 
restrictions 1 and 6.  Thus, I would construe restriction 6 as 
dealing solely with a lot owner's responsibility to keep his 
buildings and grounds in good condition.  And the evidence is 
uncontradicted that Bowman was doing so. 
 
Finally, I do not agree with the association's contention 
that restriction 6, considered in context with all the other 
restrictive covenants, "carr[ies] a certain meaning by definite 
and necessary implication," Friedberg, 218 Va. at 665, 239 S.E.2d 
at 110, that association approval is required for such a display 
of articles outside Bowman's house.  Indeed, a review of the other 
restrictive covenants indicates otherwise. 
 
When the author of the restrictive covenants intended to 
restrict a lot owner's use of the lot itself, specific language 
was employed to require that (1) the association approve building, 
plot, landscaping, and pollution control plans, as noted above, 
(2) lot owners not park or maintain any "vehicle of any type other 
than conventional automobiles, jeeps and pickup trucks" on their 
lots, 
(3) 
"[t]opographic 
and 
vegetation 
characteristics 
of 
properties within Wintergreen shall not be altered by removal, 
reduction, cutting, excavation or any other means without the 
prior written approval of the [association]," (4) "[n]o trees, 
shrubs or other vegetation may be removed without the written 
approval of the [association]," (5) individual landscaping plans 
of lots adjacent to the golf fairway and the ski slopes "shall be 
in general conformity with the overall landscaping pattern" for 
the golf course and ski slopes and subject to association 
approval.   
 
Applying the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius articulated in Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 127, 418 
S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992), I think that the enumeration of the 
instances of association approval of a lot owner's use of the lot 
excludes any implication that association approval is required for 
the display of unattached personal property outside of its 
buildings or structures.  Therefore, I infer that if the developer 
had intended to impose this restriction upon the lot owners, it 
would have been specific in doing so, just as it had been in these 
other instances.  
 
Accordingly, I would enter a final judgment affirming those 
parts of the final judgment that required association approval of 
the neon signs and the articles attached to the building and 
reversing those parts that required Bowman to remove the specified 
items of personal property from his deck and yard. 
 
This order shall be certified to the said circuit court and 
shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
                            A Copy, 
 
                               Teste: 
 
 
 
                                     David B. Beach, 
                                     Clerk