Title: State ex rel Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. OHIO AFL-CIO ET AL. v. VOINOVICH, GOVERNOR, ET AL. 
THE STATE EX REL. GELTZER v. VOINOVICH, GOVERNOR, ET AL. 
THE STATE EX REL. UNITED AUTO AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF 
AMERICA ET AL. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich (1994) 69 Ohio St.3d 225.] 
Constitutional law — General Assembly — Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 — Violation of 
one-subject rule remedied, how — Legislative Act valid under three-
consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II, Ohio Constitution, 
when. 
(Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060 — Submitted Dec. 15, 1993 — Decided 
April 8, 1994.) 
IN MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION and QUO WARRANTO. 
 
H.B. No. 107 was introduced in the House of Representatives (“the House”) 
on February 4, 1993 as a four-page bill to make biennial appropriations for the 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  A companion bill that would provide biennial 
appropriations for the Industrial Commission, H.B. No. 106, was introduced in the 
House the same day. 
 
Subsequently, the House forwarded both bills to the House Finance and 
Appropriations Committee for review. 
 
The House Finance and Appropriations Committee’s review of these bills 
lasted four months.  On June 3, 1993, the committee reported back to the House a 
substitute version of H.B. No. 107.  Along with the original appropriations 
provisions, the bill now contained several amendments to numerous substantive 
sections of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with workers’ compensation.  The full 
House considered Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 on June 9, 1993.  Three amendments 
were added to the bill from the floor, and the amended bill was voted on and 
passed as amended. 
 
2
 
The Senate received Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 from the House and introduced it 
on June 10, 1993.  Five days later, on June 15, 1993, the Senate referred the bill to 
the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee. 
 
On June 22, 1993 the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee jointly 
considered Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, H.B. No. 106 (the Industrial Commission 
appropriations bill), and S.B. No. 152 (a bill which made several substantive 
changes to the workers’ compensation system).  Following numerous amendments 
to each bill, the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee incorporated the language 
of H.B. No. 106 and Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 into S.B. No. 152 and subsequently 
incorporated the provisions of S.B. No. 152 into Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. 
 
The next day, June 23, 1993, the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee 
reported Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 back to the Senate and recommended its passage.  
As reported back, the substitute bill included appropriation provisions for the 
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the Industrial Commission, as well as 
nonappropriation provisions that amended substantive sections of the Ohio Revised 
Code dealing with workers’ compensation.  Later that day, after an additional six 
amendments were approved on the Senate floor, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was passed 
by the full Senate. 
 
The version of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 considered and adopted by the Senate 
was returned to the House which, on June 29, 1993, refused to concur.  
Nevertheless, the Senate insisted on its amendments and asked for a conference 
committee.  Consequently, three members from each chamber were appointed to 
meet, consider the bill and resolve the disputed issues. 
 
On July 20, 1993, the conference committee issued a report recommending 
the version passed by the Senate along with certain additional amendments made 
by the conference committee.  Later that day, both the House and the Senate voted 
 
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on and passed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 as it was agreed to in the conference 
committee. 
 
On July 21, 1993, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was sent to the Governor, who 
signed the bill into law after exercising a line-item veto.1 
 
The final version of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 abolished the five-member 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, created a new three-member Industrial 
Commission, substantially amended the workers’ compensation law, and made 
appropriations for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the new commission.  
Appropriations for the biennium took effect under the Act when the Governor 
signed the bill on July 21, 1993. Most other provisions in the Act were to take 
effect on October 20, 1993. 
 
On October 15, 1993, relators filed the following three original actions in 
this court, all of which make various challenges to the constitutionality of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. 
No. 93-2057 
 
Case No. 93-2057 is an original action in mandamus and prohibition filed by 
the Ohio AFL-CIO, a citizen taxpayer, and a board member of a regional board of 
review.  Relators seek a writ of mandamus (1) ordering the Governor to take no 
action under the new law and to appoint no new commissioners, (2) ordering the 
State Auditor and Treasurer not to withhold the pay of the old commissioners and 
the regional board members, and (3) severing the appropriations provisions from 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 and declaring the nonappropriations provisions 
unconstitutional and void. Relators seek a writ of prohibition preventing the new 
commissioners from acting or hearing cases as the Industrial Commission. 
No. 93-2059 
 
Case No. 93-2059 is an original action in mandamus and quo warranto filed 
by the public member of the former Industrial Commission. Relator asks this court 
 
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to (1) find that the abolishment of his term as commissioner deprived him of his 
position in violation of his right to due process of law under the state and federal 
Constitutions, and (2) find that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 is void because it violates 
the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution. Relator seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor not to 
proceed to implement the new law and to grant relator certain salary increases.  
Relator also seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the State Auditor and Treasurer 
to continue paying relator his salary.  Finally, relator seeks an order that relator is 
the rightful public member of the Industrial Commission. 
No. 93-2060 
 
In case No. 93-2060, the United Auto Aerospace & Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America and several members of the General Assembly filed an 
original action in mandamus against the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, the 
Industrial Commission and the Attorney General.  Relators seek a writ of 
mandamus compelling the bureau and the commission not to implement the non-
appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, but rather to continue 
processing workers’ compensation claims under the old law. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Marc J. Jaffy and Stewart R. Jaffy, 
Columbus, for relators in case No. 93-2057. 
 
Rishel, Myers & Kopech and James R. Rishel, Columbus, for relator in case 
No. 93-2059. 
 
Esther S. Weissman Co., L.P.A., and Esther S. Weissman, Cleveland, for 
relator in case No. 93-2060. 
 
Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, 
Andrew S. Bergman and James M. Harrison, Assisstant Attorneys Geneneral, for 
respondents in case Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060. 
 
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Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Kathleen M. Trafford, Special 
Counsel, for intervening respondent Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation in 
case No. 93-2060. 
 
Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, urging granting of 
writ for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers in case No. 93-2057. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, John C. Elam and Robert N. Webner, 
urging denial of writ for amici curiae, Ohio manufacturers Association, Ohio Self-
Insurers Association, Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business, Ohio Farm Bureau 
Federation, Ohio Business Roundtable and Council of Smaller Enterprises in case 
Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060. 
__________________ 
 
WRIGHT, J.  These three cases challenge the constitutionality of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 of the 120th Ohio General Assembly. The cases present the 
following constitutional issues: (1) whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the one- 
subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution; (2) whether the 
bill violates the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution; (3) whether the bill denies the citizens of this state their right to 
a referendum under Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution; and (4) whether 
abolishing the old Industrial Commission and creating a new one deprives the 
former commission members of their positions without due process of law and 
violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Case No. 93-2059 
presents the further question of whether the Governor violated former R.C. 
4121.02(E) by failing to grant relator Geltzer an annual salary increase of five 
percent. 
I 
 
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In their first proposition of law relators in case No. 93-2057 argue that 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 contains more than one subject and therefore violates the 
one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  Relators 
argue that the bill contains seven different subjects: appropriations for the Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation, appropriations for the Industrial Commission, 
structural changes to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, structural changes to 
the Industrial Commission, changes to the substantive provisions of the workers’ 
compensation law, the creation of a new employment intentional tort, and the 
creation of a child labor exemption for the entertainment industry. 
 
We agree that the provisions creating a new employment intentional tort and 
the provisions related to the child labor exemption violate the one-subject rule. The 
provisions related to the remaining five topics, however, are all directed at the 
same subject, workers’ compensation, and therefore do not violate the one-subject 
rule. 
 
Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides: 
 
“No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly 
expressed in its title. * * *” 
 
This court has held that Section 15(D), Article II is directory rather than 
mandatory.  State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 11 OBR 436, 
464 N.E.2d 153.  “There is no question that by holding that the one-subject rule is 
directory and not mandatory, judicial interference with legislative action is 
reduced.”  Id. at 144, 11 OBR at 439, 464 N.E.2d at 156.  However, although we 
are most reluctant to interfere in the legislative process, we will not “abdicate [our] 
duty to enforce the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. at 144, 11 OBR at 439, 464 N.E.2d at 
157.  Accordingly, we will hold enactments invalid under Section 15(D), Article II 
whenever there is a “manifestly gross and fraudulent violation” of this provision of 
the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at syllabus.  But “[t]he mere fact that a bill embraces 
 
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more than one topic is not fatal, as long as a common purpose or relationship 
exists between the topics.” (Emphasis added.)  Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. 
Commrs. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 OBR 1, 5, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580. 
 
The bill at issue in this case funds the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
and the Industrial Commission, contains provisions that structurally change those 
administrative bodies, and amends the procedural and substantive law underlying 
the compensation of injured workers.  We cannot conclude these provisions are so 
unrelated that they constitute a “manifestly gross and fraudulent violation” of the 
one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.  Although the provisions embrace more 
than a singular topic, they do have a common purpose: to amend and reform the 
laws governing the compensation of injured workers and to fund the two agencies 
that are charged with administering those laws.  And they all have a clear common 
relationship, namely workers’ compensation. 
 
Relators nevertheless assert that the appropriation aspects of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 bear no relation to the rest of the bill.  We disagree.  In Dix, supra, the 
relator contended that the addition of an appropriation provision to a bill which 
abolished the Ohio Development Financing Commission and which transferred the 
duties to the Director of Development violated the one-subject rule.  We held 
otherwise, stating that “the one-subject provision is not directed at plurality but at 
disunity in subject matter * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 11 Ohio St.3d at 146, 11 
OBR at 440-441, 464 N.E.2d at 158.  The appropriation is “simply the means by 
which the act is carried out, and the inclusion of such an appropriation does not 
destroy the singleness of the subject * * *.”  Id. at 146, 11 OBR at 441, 464 N.E.2d 
at 158.  As stated by Professor Ruud, “[t]here seems to be no serious contention 
that an appropriation is in itself a second subject; therefore, an act may, for 
example, establish an agency, set out the regulatory program, and make an 
 
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appropriation for the agency without violating the one-subject rule.”  Ruud, “No 
Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject” (1958), 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 441. 
 
We see no reason to depart from our holding in Dix and declare that the 
appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 destroy the unity of the bill.  
The inclusion in the bill of such provisions simply allows the other provisions of 
the bill to be implemented. 
 
We have previously stated, however, that intentional torts are completely 
unrelated to workers’ compensation and the employment relationship.  In Brady v. 
Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, we held that 
“[w]hile [a] cause of action [alleging a workplace intentional tort] contemplates 
redress of tortious conduct that occurs during the course of employment, an 
intentional tort alleged in this context necessarily occurs outside the employment 
relationship.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Under our decision in Brady, 
the intentional tort provision under newly enacted R.C. 2745.01 is not and cannot 
be related to the common purpose of the bill, and we therefore hold that such 
provision violates Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Likewise, we determine that the provisions creating an exemption for the 
employment of minors violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  
The provisions amend R.C. 4109.06 by adding the language that R.C. Chapter 
4109 does not apply to a minor participating as an actor in a movie or in radio or 
television productions.  In a broad sense this exemption addresses the area of 
employment, an area also addressed by the workers’ compensation laws.  
However, the purpose, in part, behind Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was not to generally 
amend laws that relate to employment but to specifically amend the workers’ 
compensation laws.  The child labor exemption does not in any way touch upon the 
laws related to workers’ compensation.  We therefore find that the inclusion of the 
 
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child labor exemption in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was an actionable violation of the 
one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Having found that the intentional tort and child labor exemption provisions 
of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, 
we sever those portions from the bill.  State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770.  The remaining 
provisions of the bill do not violate Section 15(D), Article II and pursuant to our 
decision in Hinkle we save those provisions.  We therefore grant relators’ request 
for a writ of mandamus on the issue of whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the 
one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution only as the request relates to the 
intentional tort and child labor exemption provisions of the bill.  We deny all other 
requests for a writ of mandamus and prohibition on this issue. 
II 
 
Relators in all three cases argue that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was enacted in 
violation of the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution.  That section states in relevant part: 
 
“Every bill shall be considered by each house on three different days, unless 
two-thirds of the members elected to the house in which it is pending suspend this 
requirement, and every individual consideration of a bill or action suspending the 
requirement shall be recorded in the journal of the respective house.  No bill may 
be passed until the bill has been reproduced and distributed to members of the 
house in which it is pending and every amendment been made available upon a 
member’s request.” 
 
Relators’ principal argument is that the Senate Commerce and Labor 
Committee “vitally altered” the bill by incorporating the provisions of H.B. No. 
106 (biennial appropriations for the Industrial Commission) and S.B. No. 152 (a 
bill substantially restructuring the workers’ compensation system) into 
 
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Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107.  They contend that the substitute bill should have received 
three more considerations from each chamber because it was wholly changed. 
 
Relators in case No. 93-2060 further maintain that the conference committee 
which met to resolve the differences between each chamber’s version of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 again “vitally altered” the bill, which thereafter received 
only one consideration in each chamber. 
 
Respondents counter these arguments by indicating that the legislative 
journals reflect that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 did indeed receive the mandatory three 
considerations from each legislative body.  Moreover, they assert that neither the 
Senate Commerce and Labor Committee nor the conference committee “vitally 
altered” the bill and that at all times there was a common relationship and purpose 
between the amendments and the original bill. 
 
This court has interpreted the Ohio Constitution’s three-consideration rule 
on several previous occasions.  In Miller v. State (1854), 3 Ohio St. 475, 484, the 
court held that as long as the legislative journals reveal a bill was passed, and there 
is nothing in the journals to show that the bill was not read as the Constitution 
requires, then a presumption of compliance arises and the presumption cannot be 
rebutted with proof.  Hence, the court in subsequent cases viewed the three-
consideration language to be directory and not mandatory.  Compliance with the 
rule was a matter of enforcement for the General Assembly and not for the 
judiciary. 
 
In 1973 the Ohio Constitution was amended and the language “and every 
individual consideration of a bill or action suspending the requirement shall be 
recorded in the journal of the respective house” was added to the original three-
consideration provision.  “Thus, by constitutional mandate, there now exists an 
inherently reliable immediate source by which the legislature’s compliance may be 
 
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readily ascertained without any undue judicial interference.”  Hoover, supra, 19 
Ohio St.3d at 4, 19 OBR at 3, 482 N.E.2d at 578. 
 
As a result of the 1973 amendment, the Hoover court found the holding in 
Miller no longer controlling.  Rather, in Hoover, the court stated that “where it can 
be proven that the bill in question was not considered the required three times, the 
consequent enactment is void and without legal effect.”  Id. at 3, 19 OBR at 2-3, 
482 N.E.2d at 578.  The court went on to hold that “[w]here the Ohio Constitution 
mandates that a recordation be made in the legislative journals reflecting that a 
particular step in the enactment process has been taken, the absence of entries to 
that effect renders an enactment invalid.”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
Relators essentially ask us to extend the holding in Hoover to the cases 
before us, analogizing the facts of that case to those of the cases under 
consideration here. We decline to extend our holding because Hoover is factually 
distinguishable from the present cases. 
 
In Hoover, the court considered a bill that was introduced in the Senate and 
originally pertained to criminal non-support.  It received some minor amendments, 
was read three times in the Senate, passed there, and was then sent to the House of 
Representatives.  In the House Judiciary Committee the amended bill was 
completely stripped of its existing language and in its place was substituted a bill 
“completely different in content” from the one passed by the Senate.  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id., 19 Ohio St.3d at 5, 19 OBR at 5, 482 N.E.2d at 579.  Instead of the 
subject of criminal non-support the bill now pertained to “the financing, 
acquisition and construction of hospital and health care facilities for the use of non-
profit entities.”  Id.  The bill was subsequently enacted into law. 
 
As stated above, the court modified the holding in Miller and thereby 
provided the plaintiff in Hoover with a cause of action and allowed him to offer 
evidence that the legislative journal did not reflect “the requisite three 
 
12
considerations in each house * * * in the form in which it was eventually enacted.” 
Id., 19 Ohio St.3d at 5, 19 OBR at 4, 482 N.E.2d at 579.  Thus, as a result of 
Hoover the three-consideration language of Section 15(C), Article II is no longer 
directory but is instead mandatory. 
 
We did not, however, abandon Miller in its entirety.  The court in Hoover 
went on to adopt Miller’s reasoning that “amendments which do not vitally alter 
the substance of a bill do not trigger a requirement for three considerations anew of 
such amended bill.”  (Emphasis added.)  Hoover, supra, 19 Ohio St.3d at 5, 19 
OBR at 4, 482 N.E.2d at 579.  See, also, ComTech Systems, Inc. v. Limbach 
(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 96, 570 N.E.2d 1089. 
 
Thus, this court, in considering the validity of a legislative enactment, no 
longer shows complete deference to the legislative journals with respect to the 
issue of compliance with the three-consideration requirement.  The facts in Hoover 
demonstrate a bill that was in fact “wholly changed.”  We feel that a more 
demanding constitutional test is one that examines whether a bill was “vitally 
altered,” departing entirely from a consistent theme.  We therefore hold that a 
legislative Act is valid if the requisite entries are made in the legislative journals 
and there is no indication that the subject matter of the original bill was “vitally 
altered” such that there is no longer a common purpose or relationship between the 
original bill and the bill as amended. 
 
On their face, the journals indicate three readings of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
in both chambers, albeit the final version was reread just once in each. 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was in fact substantially amended at every step in the 
proceedings.  In the House, the committee reviewing the bill added several 
substantive amendments to original appropriations provisions, and three more 
amendments were made from the floor.  In the Senate, the Senate Commerce and 
Labor Committee incorporated the provisions from a related appropriations bill 
 
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and a bill that significantly revised the underlying substantive law sections.2  Six 
additional amendments were approved on the Senate floor.  Then, Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 was substantially amended once again in the conference committee to 
which it was referred before finally being passed by both houses. 
 
The difference between a valid bill that is heavily amended, however, and an 
invalid one that is “vitally altered,” as relators would have us interpret the phrase, 
is one of degree.  Section 15(A), Article II of the Ohio Constitution reserves to 
each house the right to freely alter, amend or reject bills introduced by either.3  
This court would be setting dangerous and impracticable precedent if it undertook 
a duty to police any such difference of degree. 
 
Instead, we must look to the underlying purpose of the three- consideration 
provision.  As articulated by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Hoover, 
“the purpose of the ‘three reading’ rule is to prevent hasty action and to lessen the 
danger of ill-advised amendment at the last moment.  The rule provides time for 
more publicity and greater discussion and affords each legislator an opportunity to 
study the proposed legislation, communicate with his or her constituents, note the 
comments of the press and become sensitive to public opinion.”  Id., 19 Ohio St.3d 
at 8, 19 OBR at 7, 482 N.E.2d at 582 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
Unlike the situation in Hoover where the entire contents of the original bill 
were removed and replaced by a totally unrelated subject, we are dealing here with 
a bill that has been heavily amended and yet retains its common purpose to modify 
the workers’ compensation laws.  Furthermore, both houses deliberated upon 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 and its amendments for several months.  Hearings were held 
and the issues were openly debated.  The Governor stimulated the debate by 
announcing in the press that he would veto any appropriations bill that did not also 
substantially reform the underlying workers’ compensation system.  It would be 
 
14
difficult to characterize this activity as “hasty action” that precipitated “ill-advised 
amendment at the last moment.” 
 
Based on the foregoing, we decline to extend the Hoover analysis to the bill 
before us and declare the bill unconstitutional. To do otherwise would place this 
court in the position of directly policing every detail of the legislative amendment 
process when bills are passed containing a consistent theme. 
 
Accordingly, we deny relators’ requests for a writ of mandamus on the issue 
of whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the three-consideration provision of 
Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
III 
 
Relators in case No. 93-2057 argue in their second proposition of law that 
the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 unconstitutionally deprived the citizens of 
Ohio of their right of referendum.  We agree, and in so doing overrule our decision 
in State ex rel. Riffe v. Brown (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 149, 5 O.O.3d 125, 365 
N.E.2d 876. 
 
Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution reserves to the people of this 
state the power of referendum, a power which serves as a check on the General 
Assembly by permitting laws or parts of laws passed by that body to be submitted 
to the voters for approval or rejection. Section 1, Article II provides in part: 
 
“[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose to the general 
assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same 
at the polls on a referendum vote as hereinafter provided. They also reserve the 
power to adopt or reject any law, section of any law or any item in any law 
appropriating money passed by the general assembly, except as hereinafter 
provided * * *.” 
Section 1c, Article II of the Ohio Constitution further describes the power of 
referendum: 
 
15
 
“[T]he signatures of six per centum of the electors shall be required upon a 
petition to order the submission to the electors of the state for their approval or 
rejection, of any law, section of any law or any item in any law appropriating 
money passed by the general assembly.  No law passed by the general assembly 
shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by the governor in 
the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided.  When a petition, 
signed by six per centum of the electors of the state and verified as herein 
provided, shall have been filed with the secretary of state within ninety days after 
any law shall have been filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state, 
ordering that such law, section of such law or any item in such law appropriating 
money be submitted to the electors of the state for their approval or rejection, the 
secretary of state shall submit to the electors of the state for their approval or 
rejection such law, section or item, in the manner herein provided, at the next 
succeeding regular or general election in any year occurring subsequent to sixty 
days after the filing of such petition, and no such law, section or item shall go into 
effect until and unless approved by a majority of those voting upon the same.  If, 
however, a referendum petition is filed against any such section or item, the 
remainder of the law shall not thereby be prevented or delayed from going into 
effect.” 
 
The power of referendum, however, is not absolute.  Section 1d, Article II of 
the Ohio Constitution limits the power of referendum by providing that certain 
laws are not subject to referendum: 
 
“Laws providing for tax levies, appropriations for the current expenses of 
the state government and state institutions, and emergency laws necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into 
immediate effect. * * *  The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to 
the referendum.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
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The court in Riffe addressed the right of referendum in a case similar to the 
cases before us today.  In Riffe, Sections 1 and 2 of the bill altered the substantive 
law related to voting and election procedures; and Section 5 provided an 
appropriation for the current expenses of the Secretary of State. After the bill was 
filed in the office of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State, in his 
acknowledgement of the filing, indicated that Section 5—the appropriation 
provision—was effective on the date the Governor had signed the bill.  The 
Secretary of State also indicated, however, that Sections 1 through 4 would not 
become effective until ninety days after the date on which the bill had been filed in 
the Secretary of State’s office, thereby giving the citizens of Ohio an opportunity 
to submit a petition for a referendum on those sections. 
 
Relators in Riffe filed a complaint against respondent, the Secretary of State, 
seeking an order from this court granting writs of mandamus and prohibition 
directing the Secretary of State to give immediate effect to the entire bill. 
 
The court granted relators’ request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the 
entire bill took immediate effect because one part of the bill contained an 
appropriation for the current expenses of the state government, a provision that 
pursuant to Section 1d, Article II of the Ohio Constitution takes effect immediately 
and is not subject to a referendum.  The court reasoned that because part of the bill 
contained such a provision, the remaining parts of the bill, which otherwise would 
be subject to a referendum, “must necessarily share [the] constitutionally imposed 
disability.”  Riffe, supra, 51 Ohio St.2d at 154, 5 O.O.3d at 128, 365 N.E.2d at 
879-880. 
 
Chief Justice O’Neill and Justices Herbert and Paul W. Brown dissented.  In 
his dissent, Chief Justice O’Neill stated that “[t]he language of Section 1c [Article 
II] providing that ‘such law, section of such law or any item in such law 
appropriating money be submitted to the electors of the state for their approval or 
 
17
rejection * * *’ establishes unequivocally that an Act need not necessarily have a 
single effective date.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 163, 5 O.O.3d at 133, 365 N.E.2d 
at 884.  He further stated that “[i]n all previous cases involving Section 1d 
exceptions this court has recognized that the right of referendum attaches to each 
section of the law not specifically falling within Section 1d.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id. at 164, 5 O.O.3d at 133, 365 N.E.2d at 884-885. 
 
We find the reasoning of Chief Justice O’Neill compelling and agree with 
him that the decision in Riffe “emasculate[s] the constitutional right of electors of 
Ohio to a referendum.”  Id. at 162, 5 O.O.3d at 132, 365 N.E.2d at 883.  We 
therefore overrule our decision in Riffe and adopt the holding proposed by Chief 
Justice O’Neill, which states: 
 
“Any section of a law which changes the permanent law of the state is 
subject to referendum under the powers reserved to the people by Section 1 of 
Article II, even though the law also contains a section providing for an 
appropriation for the current expenses of the state government and state institutions 
which under Section 1d, Article II, becomes immediately effective.”  Id., 51 Ohio 
St.2d at 167, 5 O.O.3d at 135, 365 N.E.2d at 886. 
 
We are mindful that in the case before us today the General Assembly did 
provide for a ninety-day delay before the nonappropriation provisions of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 would take effect. Our decision in Riffe, however, appears 
to have foreclosed any meaningful opportunity for the citizens of this state to 
circulate a petition for a referendum on Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. We therefore stay 
the nonappropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 for a period of ninety 
days from the date of this decision.  During this ninety-day period, relators may 
undertake to submit to the Secretary of State a petition for a referendum on the 
provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 that change the permanent law of the state.  Of 
course, no referendum is available for the provisions appropriating money for the 
 
18
current expenses of the state government. Thus, we grant relators’ request for a 
writ of mandamus on the issue of whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the right 
of referendum under Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
IV 
 
Relators in case No. 93-2057 argue that by abolishing the existing Industrial 
Commission and establishing a new commission, the legislature (1) engaged in an 
impermissible subterfuge, and (2) violated the doctrine of separation of powers by 
interfering with the authority of a quasi-judicial body.  Relator in case No. 93-2059 
adds that the legislation deprived the members of the old commission of their 
employment in violation of their right to due process of law under the federal and 
state Constitutions.  We disagree with each of these assertions, and therefore deny 
relators’ requests for writs of mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto with 
respect to these issues. 
 
Relators argue that the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was a subterfuge 
because it was done “solely for the purpose of replacing the current members [of 
the Industrial Commission] with new ones.”  To support their contention, relators 
cite a court of appeals decision from this state which defined “subterfuge” in the 
civil service context as follows: 
 
“The test of subterfuge in the abolishment of a position is: if another is 
employed to perform substantially identical service, either under the same or a 
different title, the purported abolishment is a subterfuge; if another is not so 
employed, the position has been legally abolished and it is not a subterfuge.”  State 
ex rel. Dahmen v. Youngstown (1973), 40 Ohio App.2d 166, 69 O.O.2d 171, 318 
N.E.2d 433, paragraph four of the headnotes. 
 
Relators argue that the General Assembly did not abolish the Industrial 
Commission but instead simply removed the members from the commission and 
replaced them with new members, who were to perform the same tasks. 
 
19
 
We do not agree that the General Assembly engaged in a subterfuge under 
either the test proposed by relators or any other test.  The enactment of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 does not simply replace the former members of the 
Industrial Commission with new members but instead creates a new commission 
that is substantially different from the old. 
 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 reduces the number of members of the Industrial 
Commission from five to three and changes the procedure by which the members 
are selected. Before the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 the Governor had 
broad authority under R.C. 4121.02 to appoint members to the Industrial 
Commission without any restriction imposed by an outside body.  Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 changes the selection process by limiting the Governor’s powers of 
appointment. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 enacts a new statute, R.C. 4121.04, which 
creates a ten-member Industrial Commission Nominating Committee composed of 
representatives of employers, labor and the public.  The nominating committee, 
eight of whose members are appointed by the Governor from lists submitted by the 
Ohio Federation of Labor and representatives of Ohio industry, makes 
recommendations to the Governor for the appointment of members to the 
commission. Under newly enacted R.C. 4121.02(D), the Governor must then 
appoint commission members from those individuals recommended by the 
nominating committee. 
 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 also changes the powers and duties of the Industrial 
Commission.  The bill amends R.C. 4121.121 by transferring from the Industrial 
Commission to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation the authority to process 
applications for final settlements of claims or benefits in cases that involve state 
fund employees and employers.  The bill amends R.C. 4121.35 by transferring 
from the commission to the bureau the authority to establish specific safety codes. 
Under amended R.C. 4123.417, the commission no longer has authority over the 
 
20
Disabled Workers’ Relief Fund.  These are but three of the changes made.  
Relators in case No. 93-2060 summarize the extent of the changes to the 
commission by stating that “the Conference Bill sharply limits the responsibilities 
of the Industrial Commission of Ohio * * *.” 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the General Assembly’s purpose in 
enacting Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was to do more than simply replace the members 
of the Industrial Commission with new members.  Accordingly, relators’ argument 
that the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was a subterfuge is without merit. 
 
Relators further maintain that the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, citing in support of 
their contention Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), 295 U.S. 602, 55 
S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611.  Relators argue that “[p]ermitting the legislature to 
terminate and recreate a commission such as the Industrial Commission gives the 
legislature a ‘coercive influence’ which ‘threatens the independence of a 
commission, * * *’ ” quoting Humphrey’s Executor, supra, at 630, 55 S.Ct. at 875, 
79 L.Ed. at 1620. Relators conclude that allowing the legislature to have such 
power interferes with the commission’s ability to make fair and impartial 
decisions. 
 
We find relators’ reliance on Humphrey’s Executor misplaced.  In 
Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of Congress to 
create a quasi-judicial agency, the Federal Trade Commission, and to limit the 
removal of its members by the President for cause.  Humphrey’s Executor 
establishes the authority of the Congress to limit the power of the executive branch 
to remove members from a quasi-judicial agency created by Congress.  The case 
does not stand for the broad proposition that an agency, once created, must be free 
from any interference in its decisionmaking (assuming, of course, that the mere act 
of restructuring a commission would somehow interfere with its decisionmaking 
 
21
ability). Nor does the case limit the power of Congress—and, by analogy, the 
General Assembly—to restructure an agency it has created. 
 
Moreover, Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution expressly grants to 
the General Assembly the power to pass, inter alia, laws establishing a state fund 
for workers’ compensation cases, laws related to the administration of those funds, 
and laws establishing a board to oversee the workers’ compensation system. And 
Section 27, Article II of the Ohio Constitution grants authority to the General 
Assembly to establish the manner in which members of state offices are appointed. 
Given these grants of authority, we fail to see how the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 amounts to either an unconstitutional “coercive influence” by the General 
Assembly over the Industrial Commission or an unconstitutional encroachment on 
the authority of the executive branch.4 
 
Finally, relator in case No. 93-2059 argues that the commission members 
have a property interest in their employment and that the General Assembly cannot 
take that interest from them except by due process of law. Relator contends that, as 
public officials, the commission members have a property interest in their position 
similar to the property interest held by classified civil servants in their 
employment. 
 
We hold that relator’s due process argument is totally without merit on the 
authority of our decisions in State ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson (1944), 142 Ohio St. 
496, 27 O.O. 415, 52 N.E.2d 980, and State ex rel. Trago v. Evans (1957), 166 
Ohio St. 269, 2 O.O.2d 109, 141 N.E.2d 665.  In Herbert, we defined “public 
office” as “a charge or trust conferred by public authority for a public purpose, 
with independent and continuing duties, involving in their performance the 
exercise of some portion of the sovereign power.”  Id., 142 Ohio St. at 501, 27 
O.O. at 417, 52 N.E.2d at 983.  In Trago, we held that “[p]ublic offices are held 
 
22
neither by grant nor contract, and no person has a vested interest or private right of 
property in them.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
The Industrial Commission exercises sovereign state power by virtue of its 
authority to exercise the quasi-judicial function of adjudicating claims. Under 
former R.C. 4121.03(F), the commission “is responsible for the adjudication of 
claims * * *.” Under newly enacted R.C. 4123.511(E), the commission has 
authority to hear appeals of cases. Because they exercise sovereign power in this 
regard, the members of the commission hold a public office, an office which 
pursuant to our decision in Trago, supra, confers upon them no property right. As a 
result, we find that the 1993 enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 does not deprive 
any member of the former Industrial Commission of his right to due process of 
law. 
 
We deny all requests for writs of mandamus and prohibition on the issues 
addressed in Part IV of this opinion. 
V 
 
In case No. 93-2059 relator asserts that the Governor violated his duty under 
former R.C. 4121.02(E) by failing to grant relator an annual salary increase of five 
percent.  Appointed as the public member of the Industrial Commission, relator has 
received no increase in salary since his appointment was effective on July 1, 1991.  
He seeks a writ of mandamus to compel payment of two five-percent salary 
increases. 
 
Former R.C. 4121.02(E) directed the Governor to grant each member of the 
commission “an annual salary increase based upon the average salary increases of 
other department directors for that year, not to exceed five per cent per year.”  143 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3265.  Because the average of all salary increases given to 
directors in 1993 exceeded five percent, relator asserts he is entitled to the 
maximum five percent permitted under former R.C. 4121.02(E). 
 
23
 
While respondents concede relator’s right to a salary increase, they argue 
that the use of mandamus to obtain this relief is improper. Respondents assert that 
where relator could bring an action at law, such as an action for money damages, 
mandamus cannot be employed as a substitute, citing Maloney v. Sacks (1962), 173 
Ohio St. 237, 19 O.O.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 268. 
 
The general rule stated in Maloney, however, does not apply to public 
employees. Rather, in State ex rel. Fenske v. McGovern (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 129, 
11 OBR 426, 464 N.E.2d 525, paragraph three of the syllabus, this court held that 
“[t]he ministerial act of making payment of money due a public employee may be 
compelled by mandamus where the public employee has a clear legal right to 
payment of the compensation and the respondent public officer has a clear legal 
duty to perform the ministerial task of making such payment.” 
 
Thus we find in this case that mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel 
payment of the salary increase to which relator is entitled. 
 
We therefore grant relator’s request for a writ of mandamus on the issue of 
whether he is entitled to receive a salary increase. 
VI 
 
All other requests for writs of mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto that 
are not specifically granted in this opinion are denied. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur separately. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
A.W. SWEENEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents in part and concurs in part. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
The item vetoed is not in dispute here. 
 
24
 
2. 
We give no effect to relators’ suggestion that the fact that the bill was 
sent to the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee instead of the Senate Finance 
Committee indicates bad faith on the Senate’s part. 
 
3. 
Section 15(A), Article II states in part:  “ Bills may originate in either 
house, but may be altered, amended, or rejected in the other.” 
 
4. 
See, also, Thornton v. Duffy (1918), 99 Ohio St. 120, 124 N.E. 54, in 
which we held that “[t]he enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Law * * * 
did not exhaust the authority conferred upon the generaal asembly of Ohio by 
Section 35 of Article II of the Constitution.  On the contrary, it has the power to 
amend or repeal all or any portion thereof at any time it deems proper.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I reluctantly concur with the majority.  I write 
separately to, in part, explain my position and to, in part, respond to the dissents.  
The majority finds that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 “ * * * violates the one-subject rule 
of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, but the violation is remedied 
by the severance of the child labor exemption provision of R.C. 4109.06 and the 
workplace intentional tort provision of R.C. 2745.01 from the bill * * *.” 
(Emphasis added.)  What is the majority’s justification for proceeding in this 
manner?  The answer is found in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 580 N.E.2d 767. 
 
In Hinkle, we considered the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 200.  The 
allegation made in Hinkle was that the bill violated the one-subject rule which 
prohibits disunity of subjects.  The bill in question contained matters pertaining to 
the state judicial system (creating new courts, new judgeships, etc.) and a provision 
defining the term “residence district” in the liquor control law for the purpose of 
exercising the local option privilege.  In finding that the bill violated the one-
 
25
subject rule, the majority, in Hinkle, found that “[t]o say that laws relating to the 
state judiciary and local option have elections in common is akin to saying that 
securities laws and drug trafficking penalties have sales in common—the 
connection is merely coincidental.”  Id. at 148, 580 N.E.2d at 770. 
 
The majority, in Hinkle, up to that point, was correct and, further, was 
correct when it quoted from State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 
145, 11 OBR 436, 440, 464 N.E.2d 153, 157, that “ ‘ * * * [a]n absence of 
common purpose or relationship between specific topics in an act and when there 
are no discernible practical, rational or legitimate reasons for combining * * * 
provisions in one act * * * [strongly suggest] that the provisions were combined 
for tactical reasons, i.e., logrolling. Inasmuch as this was the very evil the one-
subject rule was designed to prevent, an act which contains such unrelated 
provisions must necessarily be held to be invalid in order to effectuate the purposes 
of the rule.’ ” 
 
The majority, in Hinkle, was still correct when it said that “Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 200 falls within this language [Dix language] and, therefore, violates Section 
15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution * * *.”  Id., 62 Ohio St.3d at 149, 580 
N.E.2d at 770.  But the majority, in Hinkle, did not stop there.  It added, “ * * * to 
the extent that the bill incorporates Section 7.  Accordingly, we sever the offending 
portion of the bill * * *.”  Id.  For this new constitutional reconstruction, the 
majority, in Hinkle, then cited Livingston v. Clawson (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 173, 2 
OBR 189, 440 N.E.2d 1383, and continued, “ * * * to cure the defect and save the 
portions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 200 other than Section 7 which do relate to a single 
subject.”  Id.  The fact is, however, that Livingston had nothing to do with Section 
15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
I dissented in Hinkle, stating, in part, that “[t]he majority should remember 
that this opinion [Hinkle ] will be the basis upon which bills that violate the one-
 
26
subject rule will be judged in the future.  It will be a race to this court by parties 
seeking to uphold their portion of a bill while asking us to find another portion of 
the bill unconstitutional, when the one-subject rule is violated. Who is to choose 
the more favored provision(s)?  Why the Justices, of course. How can there be any 
certainty or reliability when such a procedure is followed?” (Emphasis added.) 
Hinkle, 62 Ohio St.3d at 153, 580 N.E.2d at 773. 
 
Today’s decision carries out that prediction and confirms that fear.  As my 
dissent in Hinkle went on to say, “ * * * how does the majority know which part of 
the Act is defective?  The Act is a promulgation of the General Assembly in 
package form.  Can we break into the package and excise what we perceive (or 
want to be) the offending part?”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
In Hinkle, the majority answered that it could decide which parts of an 
offending Act should be saved even though Dix, supra, very clearly said that “ * * 
* an act which contains such unrelated provisions must necessarily be held to be 
invalid in order to effectuate the purposes of the rule.”  (Emphasis added.)  Dix, 11 
Ohio St.3d at 145, 11 OBR at 440, 464 N.E.2d at 157. Note, Dix says the Act—not 
just part of the Act—must be held to be invalid. 
 
Notwithstanding all this, the majority, in Hinkle, exercised its power 
(judicial legislation?) and found severability to be the order of the day.  Hinkle was 
bad law when it was decided—and it is bad law now.  But it is the law and it must 
be followed until overruled.  I am prepared to do just that—overrule Hinkle. 
 
Not surprisingly, the dissents make only a passing reference to Hinkle.  The 
rambling dissent, authored by my valued colleague Justice A.W. Sweeney, who, 
incidentally, concurred in Hinkle, now seems to disapprove of Hinkle when, in his 
dissent, he states that he now believes that “ * * * it makes abundantly more sense 
for this court to reevaluate the wisdom of Hinkle, supra, and admit error * * *.”  
This apparent deathbed conversion is welcome but, obviously, falls far short of 
 
27
voting to overrule Hinkle.  If Justice A.W. Sweeney wants to overrule Hinkle and, 
thereby, prevent any “excising” of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, then I agree, but he 
should recognize that such an action then invalidates the entire Act including the 
appropriation provisions.  Under existing law, he cannot have it both ways. 
 
Justice Sweeney then cites Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 
19 Ohio St.3d 1, 19 OBR 1, 482 N.E.2d 575, and says that “ * * * Hoover * * * 
undoubtedly compels that the entire legislation be invalidated * * *.” Given 
Hinkle, Hoover, of course, stands for no such proposition! 
 
Hoover, in major part, deals with the “three-reading” rule of Section 15(C ), 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  See Hoover syllabus.  Where Hoover deals 
with Section 15(D ), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, the one-subject rule, it 
does so in language inapposite to Justice A.W. Sweeney’s statement about Hoover.  
Hoover, supra, 19 Ohio St.3d at 6, 19 OBR at 5, 482 N.E.2d at 580, says, “[a]s we 
emphasized in Dix, every presumption in favor of the enactment’s validity should 
be indulged.  The mere fact that a bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal, as 
long as a common purpose or relationship exists between the topics.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Neither dissent, of course, points out how the Act in question, “excised” in 
part by the majority, now contains more than one topic nor does either dissent set 
forth how the remainder of the Act fails in “a common purpose or relationship * * 
* between * * * topics.”  Justice A.W. Sweeney concurred in Hoover and if he says 
the case stands for the proposition that “the entire legislation be invalidated[,]” 
then he should realize that the entire law has to go—not just everything but the 
appropriation provisions. 
 
Moving to the dissent of Justice Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., I immediately 
recognize that my friend and valued colleague was not a member of this court 
when Hinkle was decided.  That does not lessen the fact, however, that Hinkle is 
 
28
the law on a question which is a subject of his dissent and should, I believe, be 
followed unless and until it is overruled. 
 
In his dissent, Justice Francis E. Sweeney, Sr. accuses the majority of “ * * * 
wishful thinking, not reasoned analysis.” To support this conclusion, Justice 
Sweeney makes three points. 
 
First, the dissent argues violation of the one-subject rule.  I have responded 
to this argument, supra.  Additionally, with reference to the “logrolling” argument, 
“logrolling” by the General Assembly is not constitutionally forbidden in all cases 
by Section 15(D), Article II. The General Assembly, and properly so, engages in 
“logrolling” much of the time.  The only “logrolling” that is constitutionally 
proscribed is that which results in an Act violating the one subject rule of Section 
15(D), Article II. Given the Act as now “excised” by the majority pursuant to the 
law of Hinkle, there is now not more than one subject and thus no prohibited 
“logrolling.” 
 
Second, Justice Sweeney argues that “ * * * there is no necessary or logical 
relationship between the substantive provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 and the 
nature and amounts of the appropriations for the bureau provided in that 
legislation.”  It is his thesis that combining an appropriation measure with 
substantive provisions of law also brings about a violation of the one-subject rule.  
Again, no case law is cited for this proposition.  I believe the case law and learned 
legal commentary are to the contrary. 
 
Justice Sweeney cites Dix, supra, and Professor Ruud’s article, “No Law 
Shall Embrace More Than One Subject” (1958), 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389. What Dix, 
supra, 11 Ohio St.3d at 146, 11 OBR at 441, 464 N.E.2d at 158, really said was 
that “[t]he appropriation in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 227 funds directly the operations of 
programs, agencies, and matters described elsewhere in the bill. * * * The 
appropriation is simply the means by which the act is carried out, and the inclusion 
 
29
of such an appropriation does not destroy the singleness of the subject and the 
one-subject rule is not violated.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
Obviously, the foregoing does not support the position taken by the dissents.  
Neither does Professor Ruud. In the article, the professor said, “[t]here seems to be 
no serious contention that an appropriation is in itself a second subject; therefore, 
an act may, for example, establish an agency, set out the regulatory program, and 
make an appropriation for the agency without violating the one-subject rule.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Ruud, supra, at 441. Thus, it is clear that combining an 
appropriation measure with substantive provisions of law does not violate the one-
subject rule. 
 
Third, Justice Sweeney persuasively argues that the Act, as passed, violated 
the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution. Considering all the machinations that went into enacting this 
legislation, Justice Sweeney may be right. Unfortunately, the law does not support 
his position and that, again, may be the reason none is cited. I have reviewed the 
pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the journal of the Senate, the journal of the 
House of Representatives and the case law. 
A. The Constitution—Section 15(C), Article II 
 
Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio Constitution states, in part, that 
“[e]very bill shall be considered by each house on three different days, unless two-
thirds of the members elected to the house in which it is pending suspend this 
requirement, and every individual consideration of a bill or action suspending the 
requirement shall be recorded in the journal of the respective house * * *.” 
 
The Journal of the Senate of June 23, 1993, reflects that “Sub.H.B. No. 107 
* * * relative to the workers’ compensation laws and to make appropriations for 
the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for the 
biennium beginning July 1, 1993, and ending June 30, 1995 was considered the 
 
30
third time.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Journal of the House of Representatives of 
June 9, 1993, reflects that: “Sub.H.B. No. 107—Representative Sweeney. To 
amend sections 109.84 * * * and to repeal sections 4123.441 and 4141.48 of the 
Revised Code relative to the Workers’ Compensation Laws and to make 
appropriations for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for the biennium 
beginning July 1, 1993, and ending June 30, 1995, was taken up for consideration 
the third time.”  (Emphasis added.)  The journals of both houses could not be more 
clear as to what was considered and how many times the subject matter was 
considered! 
B. The Constitution—Section 15(E), Article II 
 
Section 15(E), Article II of the Ohio Constitution states that “[e]very bill 
which has passed both houses of the general assembly shall be signed by the 
presiding officer of each house to certify that the procedural requirements for 
passage have been met and shall be presented forthwith to the governor for his 
approval.” The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House 
appear on the bill in question and meet this certification requirement. 
C. The Case Law 
 
As to the signatures of the presiding officers of both houses and the effect of 
those signatures, this court in Maloney v. Rhodes (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 319, 74 
O.O.2d 499, 345 N.E.2d 407, paragraph three of the syllabus, said: “A law enacted 
by the passage of a bill by both Houses of the General Assembly by the required 
majority vote and signed by the Governor (Section 16, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution) is constitutionally invalid where it does not contain the signatures of 
the presiding officers of both the House and the Senate ‘to certify that the 
procedural requirements for passage have been met.’ Section 15(E), Article II, 
Ohio Constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, it follows that where the bill is 
 
31
properly signed by the presiding officers of each house, the bill is constitutionally 
valid in complying with all the procedural requirements for passage. 
 
Further, in Hoover, supra, 19 Ohio St.3d at 4, 19 OBR at 3, 482 N.E.2d at 
578, in reference to Section 15(C), we said that, “[t]hus, by constitutional mandate, 
there now exists an inherently reliable immediate source [the journals] by which 
the legislature’s compliance may be readily ascertained without any undue judicial 
interference. As a result of the new provision, there is no need to look anywhere 
but at the journals to determine whether the proper procedure has been followed.”  
(Emphasis added.)  There can be no question in this case that the journals of both 
houses say Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was given consideration three times.  Also, in 
State ex rel. Herron v. Smith (1886), 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N.E. 447, paragraph one of 
the syllabus, this court held that the authenticity of a House journal cannot be 
impeached by parol evidence. 
 
Additionally, in ComTech Systems, Inc. v. Limbach (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 
96, 100, 570 N.E.2d 1089, 1093-1094, we said “ * * * that the court need look only 
at the journals to determine whether the proper procedure [re three-consideration 
rule] had been followed.  This has long been the rule in Ohio. * * * Thus, if the 
legislative journal records that the legislative body considered the bill on three 
different days, the legislative body did so.”  This pronouncement could not be 
more clear.  Justice A.W. Sweeney concurred in ComTech Systems. 
 
Whether or not I might, on the merit question, like to come to some other 
conclusion is not the issue.  The law is clear and unless and until a majority of this 
court are prepared to overrule Hinkle, all the law on this subject mandates that we 
find that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, as excised by the majority and including a 
referendum provision, is not unconstitutional.  Given our oath to uphold the 
Constitution and to follow the law, I do not see how any other conclusion can be 
 
32
reached.  I would hope that all interests would want and expect us in every case to 
follow the law wherever it leads. 
 
Finally, it should be remembered that this case only decides the procedure of 
enactment. The merits (or demerits) of the legislation can still be brought before 
this court as actual or perceived wrongs occur. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, I must concur in the majority opinion. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring.  I concur in the majority opinion, 
but with strong reservations. The manner in which the provisions of S.B. No. 152 
were united with those of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 is extremely questionable 
legislative activity. It is not, however, the role of this court to function as the 
Supreme General Assembly. 
 
It cannot be said that appropriations for the workers’ compensation system 
and provisions for the operation of that system involve more than one subject—
both are concerned with the workers’ compensation system of Ohio. However, it is 
clear that the subjects of intentional tort and child labor encompass additional 
subjects outside the workers’ compensation area and therefore cannot be included 
without violating the one-subject rule. 
 
In State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 580 N.E.2d 767, this court provided the authority to sever violating 
portions of an Act while holding the remaining portions constitutional, so that the 
Act as “cured” is in compliance with the one-subject rule. We are constrained to 
follow Hinkle until it is overruled. 
 
My primary reservation pertains to the three-reading requirement, but after 
the violation of the one-subject rule has been cured by following Hinkle, the record 
evinces that the three-reading requirement has also been met.  Since we are not 
 
33
dealing with the merits or substance of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, I reservedly concur 
with the majority and concur in the well-reasoned concurring opinion of Justice 
Douglas. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  “There are more things in heaven and earth, 
Horatio,/Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Hamlet, Act I, Scene v, 166. 
Indeed, the relators and this court merely scratch the surface in discussing the 
constitutional implications of the passage of this piece of legislation.  All of our 
naive nitpicking only obscures the true affront to the Constitution that workers’ 
compensation legislation historically represents. 
I 
 
The majority opinion does effectively and pragmatically resolve the 
legitimate constitutional concerns raised by relators.  My only quarrel with the 
majority opinion is its citation of State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770, to support the 
severing of the intentional tort and child labor provisions from the bill. 
 
The present case and its factual context—rather than Hinkle—should set the 
standard for severability.  This case is clear—Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was always 
principally about the structural reform of Ohio’s workers’ compensation system.  
The unrelated “add-ons” are easy to identify. Hinkle, on the other hand, expects 
members of this court to be wiser than Solomon—to determine, whenever a bill 
has more than one subject, which portion of the bill is worthy of salvation.  Direct 
personal knowledge tells me that this court severed the wrong portion of the bill in 
Hinkle—the unrelated legislative “add-ons” are what the court kept intact. To 
continue to follow Hinkle is to enter into judicial quicksand, and engage in the 
folly of believing that we can divine the most deserving of the legislature’s actions. 
 
34
Therefore, I would have held that this case sets the high water mark for severability 
cases. Only in cases this plain—and there will not be many—should this court save 
portions of multi-subject bills. 
II 
 
The true affront to the Constitution in this area of the law has historically 
been and continues to be not in how many readings the bill is given or how many 
things are attached to it, but in how the legislation is created.  The legislative 
process has never flourished in this area.  Workers’ compensation legislation is 
historically brokered legislation, designed and agreed upon by interested parties, 
and not by the one hundred thirty-two elected representatives who make up the 
General Assembly.  Once appropriately blessed, the legislation suddenly descends 
from on high, and the vast majority of legislators respond with an unquestioning 
acceptance, as if they had personally been handed the Ten Commandments by 
Moses himself. 
 
The offshoot of this flawed process is our flawed workers’ compensation 
system.  It is not the result of the legislature working its will over time, but is 
instead the result of the changing wills of the most powerful interested parties.  
Legislators who would have valuable, incisive input simply lie down and accept 
the brokered result. 
 
While these inner workings never appear in the legislative journals, they are 
far more insidious and damaging than the claimed violations of the Constitution in 
this case. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I concur in the 
majority opinion, except that I believe there exists a sufficient common purpose or 
relationship between the child labor exemption provision of R.C. 4109.06, the 
 
35
workplace intentional tort provision of R.C. 2745.01 and the balance of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. Therefore, these provisions should also be upheld. 
 
The majority concedes that the child actor exemption and the law of 
workers’ compensation share a common theme of employment, but the majority 
narrowly construes Section 15, Article II of the Ohio Constitution to prohibit the 
inclusion of the provisions in the same legislation. The commonality of the 
subjects goes beyond mere compensation for injuries; the subjects also have a 
shared purpose of employment safety. I would not construe the one-subject rule so 
strictly in this context. 
 
As to workplace intentional torts, I do not believe the inclusion of this 
provision in legislation altering workers’ compensation laws is constitutionally 
infirm. In the present context, our inquiry is not narrowly confined to a 
determination of whether an intentional tort arises out of any employment 
relationship, but whether there is a sufficient nexus between the two to ascribe a 
common purpose or relationship to them. I believe such a relationship exists.  Both 
address the compensation of injured workers—one by statute and one by common 
law. An action sounding in intentional tort represents an exception to the 
exclusivity rule of workers’ compensation. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489.  The parameters of a workplace 
intentional tort are directly set by the law of workers’ compensation. One is an 
outgrowth of the other. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s opinion, except to the 
extent that it strikes the aforementioned provisions from Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. 
__________________ 
 
A.W. SWEENEY, J., concurring and dissenting.  In my view, the 1993 
enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 clearly violates the one-subject rule of the 
Ohio Constitution, and the majority seriously errs in arbitrarily upholding portions 
 
36
of that legislation since the General Assembly’s attempt at “logrolling” constituted 
what was plainly a gross violation of the one-subject rule.  While our prior decision 
in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 
149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770, appears to permit severing “the offending portion of the 
bill,” the instant cause amply illustrates the malleability as well as the 
undesirability of such a standard.  Notwithstanding the fact that Hinkle ultimately 
held that the entire legislation violated the one-subject rule, id., 62 Ohio St.3d at 
151, 580 N.E.2d at 771, the severability language within that opinion creates 
uncertainty and promotes arbitrary and uneven enforcement of Section 15(D), 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  The majority’s attempt to rationalize its 
judicial craftsmanship is unpersuasive and thus leads me to conclude that the 
severability aspect of Hinkle must be rejected in favor of the unmistakable standard 
adopted by this court in State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 11 
OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153. 
 
In this vein, unlike the concurring opinion of my esteemed colleague, Justice 
Andy Douglas, I believe it makes abundantly more sense for this court to 
reevaluate the wisdom of Hinkle, supra, and admit error by overruling it, than to 
essentially embrace all sides of the issue by decrying Hinkle as “bad law” in one 
breath and then join the majority opinion which uses the same “bad law” as the 
ratio decidendi for its holding.  The methodology employed by the concurring 
opinion is akin to assailing the evils of alcohol over a few shots of whiskey.  If the 
concurring opinion truly believes Hinkle should be overruled, I believe a clear 
reading of all the concurring and dissenting opinions in the cause sub judice 
indicates there is adequate support for such a result.  Unfortunately, the 
undercurrent of all the concurring opinions seems to imply that the severability 
aspect of Hinkle should be kept alive only until the “preferred portions” of 
 
37
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 survive the compelling constitutional attack raised by 
relators herein. 
 
I am also befuddled as to why my learned colleague chooses to equivocate 
from his prior stand in Hinkle, supra, by refusing to dissent to the instant holding.  
I am disappointed that he fails to dissent from the “bad law” generated by the 
majority opinion, when in the past he has been a tireless advocate for what he 
believes and never hesitated to dissent when he felt the majority reasoning was 
faulty or embraced “bad law.” See, e.g., Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990), 50 Ohio 
St.3d 243, 247, 553 N.E.2d 658, 662 (underinsured motorist coverage); Rocky 
River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 196, 209, 530 N.E.2d 1, 
12 (Collective Bargaining Act); Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co. (1988), 36 
Ohio St.3d 149, 155, 522 N.E.2d 464, 470 (employer intentional tort); Crawford v. 
Euclid Natl. Bank (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 135, 143, 19 OBR 341, 347, 483 N.E.2d 
1168, 1174 (malicious prosecution). 
 
In any event, given the magnitude of the General Assembly’s violation of 
the one-subject rule, our prior decision in Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. 
(1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 OBR 1, 5, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580, undoubtedly 
compels that the entire legislation be invalidated: “ * * * where there is a blatant 
disunity between topics and no rational reason for their combination can be 
discerned, it may be inferred that the bill is a result of log-rolling—the practice by 
which several matters are consolidated in a single bill for the purpose of obtaining 
passage for proposals which would never achieve a majority if voted on separately.  
This is the very practice which Section 15(D) was designed to prevent.”  
Unfortunately, the majority and concurring opinions conveniently ignore this 
passage from Hoover, which follows and tempers the quotation reproduced and 
highlighted in both opinions. 
 
38
 
For these reasons, and for the cogent reasoning articulated by Justice Francis 
E. Sweeney, Sr. in his opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, I would 
grant all of the requested writs. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.  
While I join in the majority’s decision in Part V of its opinion that relator in case 
No. 93-2059 is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel his right to a salary 
increase, I agree with little else.  Because I believe that the 1993 enactment of 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 is unconstitutional, I vigorously dissent from the bulk of the 
majority’s opinion. 
 
Philosophically, the majority’s posture and my position are basically the 
same.  The majority readily concedes that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the one-
subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution and the right to a 
referendum as guaranteed by Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
However, in crafting its remedy, the majority picks and chooses those parts of the 
bill which it wants to keep.  In discarding only two minor provisions, the 
majority’s endeavor to salvage what it admits is an unconstitutional legislative Act 
is untenable.  Because I believe that all the non-appropriations provisions violate 
the one-subject rule, and the right to a referendum, and that these measures were 
added at the last minute and then logrolled through both chambers, I cannot join in 
the majority’s decision announced today. 
 
To really understand what is happening here, it is necessary to stress the 
facts, many of which were left out of the majority’s opinion. 
 
H.B. No. 107 was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives on 
February 4, 1993. H.B. No. 107, as introduced, was a four-page appropriations bill 
for the current operating expenses for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for 
the biennium beginning July 1, 1993, and ending June 30, 1995.  The companion 
 
39
bill, H.B. No. 106, provided the biennium funding for the Industrial Commission.  
Since the bills were appropriations measures, they were sent to the Finance and 
Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives for consideration.  
When it was reported out of the Finance and Appropriations Committee, Sub.H.B. 
No. 107 contained a few additional changes.  This bill was never considered by the 
House’s Commerce and Labor Committee because there were no significant 
changes to the workers’ compensation system. On June 9, 1993, the House passed 
the substitute bill, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107. The next day, this bill was introduced in 
the Ohio Senate. 
 
On June 15, 1993, the Senate referred Sub.H.B. No. 107 and Sub.H.B. No. 
106 to its Committee on Commerce and Labor instead of to its Finance Committee.  
The Commerce and Labor Committee had been considering S.B. No. 152, which 
made extensive and radical changes in the workers’ compensation system and 
procedures.  Although the Commerce and Labor Committee had conducted several 
hearings on this bill, it was going nowhere. However, because Governor Voinovich 
had announced that he would veto any budget bill which did not include 
meaningful reform of the workers’ compensation law and the budgets for the 
bureau and commission were due to expire on June 30, 1993, Senate leadership 
made the decision to amend Sub.H.B. No. 107 to incorporate reform measures 
contained within S.B. No. 152. 
 
Thus, on June 23, 1993, the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor 
reported back Sub.H.B. No. 107.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 as passed by the Senate 
contained not only the appropriations measures as passed by the House, but now 
also contained the body of S.B. No. 152 (and Sub.H.B. No. 106). 
 
When the bill was reported back to it, the House refused to concur with the 
Senate amendments. The Senate insisted on its version and, as a result, according 
to the legislative process, the bill was sent to a Conference Committee. 
 
40
 
The Conference Committee made another set of additions to the bill. 
However, the appropriations measures remained unchanged from the original 
version. Hours after the Conference Committee revised the bill, both the Senate 
and the House passed it. 
 
Thus, what started as a simple appropriations bill, now contained massive 
substantive law changes to the workers’ compensation system. The magnitude of 
the changes by the legislation is demonstrated by the Legislative Services 
Commission Comparison of Current and Prior Workers’ Compensation Law and 
Provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. 107. It takes twenty pages to list the changes made by 
the bill. The majority’s admission that the final version “substantially amended the 
workers’ compensation law” is truly an understatement. 
In effect, the bill transforms the structure of the workers’ compensation 
administration and delivery system. It limits the authority of the Industrial 
Commission and transfers many of its powers to the Administrator of the Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation (“bureau”). It eliminates the regional boards of reviews 
and revamps the entire hearing and appeals procedures. 
 
The bill limits the rights of injured workers to choose their own doctors, and 
changes the entire health care delivery system. It provides incentives for prolonged 
employer resistance to determinations in favor of injured workers by requiring 
injured workers to pay back awards that are reversed on appeal out of any 
subsequent claim payments. 
 
The bill makes numerous other major substantive changes to the workers’ 
compensation system and to other areas of the law.  These changes include the 
privatization of the rehabilitation program and a definition of and standard of proof 
for intentional tort actions. 
 
Thus, what began as a simple appropriations bill, saddled now with major 
workers’ compensation reform, became law when Governor Voinovich signed the 
 
41
bill after exercising a line-item veto.  With the addition of these facts, it becomes 
harder to reconcile the majority’s results with established case law. I believe what 
occurred here is a classic example of the “logrolling” forbidden by the one-subject 
rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
In Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 
OBR 1, 5, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580, this court explained the purpose of the one- 
subject rule and the test by which it is to be enforced: 
 
“Under this court’s recent holding in State ex rel. Dix, v. Celeste (1984), 11 
Ohio St.3d 141 [11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153], a ‘manifestly gross and fraudulent 
violation’ of the one-subject rule contained in Section 15(D) will invalidate an 
enactment. * * *  As we emphasized in Dix, every presumption in favor of the 
enactment’s validity should be indulged.  The mere fact that a bill embraces more 
than one topic is not fatal, as long as a common purpose or relationship exists 
between the topics.  However, where there is a blatant disunity between topics and 
no rational reason for their combination can be discerned, it may be inferred that 
the bill is a result of log-rolling—the practice by which several matters are 
consolidated in a single bill for the purpose of obtaining passage for proposals 
which would never achieve a majority if voted on separately.  This is the very 
practice which Section 15(D) was designed to prevent.” 
 
In finding no violation of the one-subject rule after the offending provisions 
of the child labor exemption and the workplace intentional tort were severed, the 
majority concludes that there was no need to sever the appropriations bill from the 
substantive workers’ compensation reform bill because appropriations provide a 
sufficient unity of topics to satisfy Section 15(D).  The majority states, “[a]lthough 
the provisions embrace more than a singular topic, they do have a common 
purpose: to amend and reform the laws governing the compensation of injured 
workers and to fund the two agencies that are charged with administering those 
 
42
laws.  And they all have a clear common relationship, namely, workers’ 
compensation.”  This is wishful thinking, not reasoned analysis. 
 
In support of its holding, the majority relies on Dix, supra, and the 
commentary of Professor Ruud.  Dix is easily distinguished and Professor Ruud’s 
analysis is supportive of my position that there is a violation of the one-subject 
rule. 
 
In Dix, it is clear that the General Assembly acted to comprehensively 
restructure a variety of economic development programs.  In order to accomplish 
this objective, the General Assembly abolished one office, and at the same time 
created distinctly different offices.  Because that legislation involved the creation 
of new departments within the state government, it was clearly necessary that 
funds be appropriated for their operation.  Under those circumstances, this court 
concluded: “[a]n examination of the bill demonstrates that the appropriation * * * 
is simply the means by which the act is carried out,”  Dix, supra, 11 Ohio St.3d at 
146, 11 OBR at 441, 464 N.E.2d at 158. Upon these facts, this court found no 
violation of the one-subject rule. 
 
However, here, contrary to the majority’s position, there is no necessary or 
logical relationship between the substantive provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
and the nature and amounts of the appropriations for the bureau provided in that 
legislation.  If the purpose of combining the appropriations acts with substantive 
legislation was to assure that appropriations were adjusted as necessary to take into 
account the fiscal ramifications of substantive changes, it is extremely difficult to 
account for the fact, as conceded by the parties, that no adjustments whatsoever 
were made in the appropriations for the bureau. 
 
The only logical conclusion is that the appropriations in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
107 do not relate to the substantive or procedural workers’ compensation law. For 
 
43
this reason, its provisions are not “incident to the single subject of the bill.” Dix, 11 
Ohio St.3d at 146, 11 OBR at 441, 464 N.E.2d at 158. 
 
The one-subject rule exists to prevent riders from being attached to bills that 
are popular and so certain of adoption that the rider will secure adoption not on its 
own merits, but on the merits of the measure to which it is attached.  Ruud, “No 
Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject” (1958), 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 391. A 
budget bill is susceptible to being weighed down with riders because “[i]t is a 
necessary and often popular bill which is certain of passage.”  Ruud at 413. 
 
Here the budget was due to expire on June 30, 1993.  Without passage of the 
appropriations, the bureau and commission would have been unable to operate.  
Moreover, the General Assembly knew that Governor Voinovich would veto any 
budget bill not containing substantive reform. 
 
In State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770, this court held that where a legislative 
enactment violates the one-subject rule, the offending portion of the enactment 
may be severed.  Although I have reservations about the holding in Hinkle, I 
believe that in applying Hinkle and severing the intentional tort and child labor 
exemption provisions, the majority did not go far enough.  I believe all the non-
appropriations provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. 107, not just the intentional tort and the 
child labor exemption provisions, flagrantly contravene the one-subject rule and 
must be declared null and void. I would sever all these non-appropriations 
provisions and leave intact the appropriations package. 
 
I also take issue with the majority’s conclusion that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
does not violate the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of 
the Ohio Constitution.  Considering the facts as set forth in this dissent, i.e., 
grafting a second subject matter onto an appropriations bill, it stretches the 
 
44
imagination to hold that the original bill was not “vitally alter[ed].”  See Hoover, 
19 Ohio St.3d at 5, 19 OBR at 4, 482 N.E.2d at 579. 
 
The majority defines “vitally altered” as “departing entirely from a 
consistent theme.” Assuming without deciding that this is a proper definition, even 
a cursory examination of the facts reveals that this substantive workers’ 
compensation reform bill is a departure from a simple budget measure. 
 
Moreover, this is just not my opinion.  As averred to by State Senator Burch 
in his affidavit attached to the relators’ brief, “[t]here is no question that the 
version of H.B. 107 passed by the Senate vitally altered the version which the 
House had passed.” These bills were treated separately and given separate 
consideration, until they were “logrolled” into one. 
 
Because the House Journal reflects that the House considered the “vitally 
altered” conference bill only once, the three-consideration requirement was not 
satisfied. 
 
As my colleague Justice Douglas recognized in his Hoover concurrence, the 
enforcement of the three-consideration rule “safeguard[s] the rights and 
opportunities of the citizens of Ohio to participate in the legislative process. 
Specifically, the purpose of the ‘three reading’ rule is to prevent hasty action and to 
lessen the danger of ill-advised amendment at the last moment. The rule provides 
time for more publicity and greater discussion and affords each legislator an 
opportunity to study the proposed legislation, communicate with his or her 
constituents, note the comments of the press and become sensitive to public 
opinion.”  Hoover, 19 Ohio St.3d at 8, 19 OBR at 7, 482 N.E.2d at 582.  What 
occurred here falls far short of achieving the purpose of the three-consideration 
rule. 
 
Finally, the majority recognizes the enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 
unconstitutionally deprived the voters of their right of referendum.  Yet, instead of 
 
45
severing the non-appropriations matters to cure this constitutional infirmity, as 
precedent dictates, the majority again attempts a compromise by overruling State 
ex rel. Riffe v. Brown (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 149, 5 O.O.3d 125, 365 N.E.2d 876. 
This remedy is too little, too late. 
 
It is clear from the legislative history, that S.B. No. 152, the bill which 
engaged in massive reform, did not receive separate consideration.  This bill was 
added to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 at the last minute and then logrolled through both 
chambers.  The riders should be found to be a nullity, not representing any policy 
of the state of Ohio.  I believe the policy of this state should be that enunciated in 
the original H.B. No. 107 and in Sub.H.B. No. 106, the appropriations package, 
without the substantive amendments added by the Senate and the Conference 
Committee. 
 
I suspect the majority knows the real score, but it fails in its attempt to 
rectify an untenable situation.  Its haphazard compromise in severing certain 
provisions and overruling precedent is insufficient.  Because I believe this is a 
classic example of “logrolling” which prevented the House of Representatives 
from participating in the restructuring of the workers’ compensation system, I 
cannot join in the majority’s decision in Parts I, II, III, and IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would grant all writs.