Title: Cortes v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev., Advance Opinion AY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ARTURO TORRES CORTES,
Appellant,

vs.
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a conviction of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to sell. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge.

Affirmed,
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Sharon G. Dickinson, Deputy Public

Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Carrie Morton, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

During a routine traffic stop, the police developed what the
district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger,
appellant Arturo Torres Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police
ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search,
which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a

M-A193P.

 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) he now appeals. Under Arizona
vJobnson, 555 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), if the finding of reasonable
suspicion is sound, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. On appeal,
Cortes urges us to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion
or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted
the Fourth Amendment in Johnson. Finding no basis for doing 0, we
affirm.
L

Cortes was riding in the front passenger seat of a car that
North Las Vegas Patrol Officer Arrendale stopped for not having a license
plate or temporary tag. It was dark and Arrendale was alone. As
Arrendale approached, he shone his flashlight into the car and saw two
‘occupants, the driver and Cortes, neither of whom was wearing a seatbelt.

Officer Kimberly Wadsworth arrived as back-up shortly after
Arrendale initiated the traffic stop. When she arrived, she walked to the
passenger side of the car while Arrendale addressed the driver. Both the
driver and Cortes seemed agitated to Wadsworth, and she saw a tool-knife
on Cortes's lap,’ which she told him to put out of reach on the floor.
Although Wadsworth asked Cortes to keep his hands visible, he did not
comply,

Arrendale asked the driver for her license and the car's
registration and insurance; he asked Cortes for identification so he could

1Officers Arrendale and Wadsworth described the knife as a Gerber-
or Swiss Army-type knife, with tools that fold out. The knife was not
recovered from Cortes’s person or in a later inventory search of the car.

soe 2
os

 
issue him a citation for the seatbelt violation. Cortes first said that he had
identification, then said he didn't. The driver produced her driver's license
and temporary registration for the ear. ‘The temporary registration was in
a third person's name and the driver had no proof of insurance,

Wadsworth alerted Arrendale to the tool-knife on the floor.
Arrendale as

 

ed the driver to get out of the car, separating her from
Cortes. The officers switched places so that Wadsworth, a female, could
address the female driver. When Arrendale crossed to the passenger side,
hhe saw Cortes reach toward a blue denim bag on the floor. By then, Cortes
had been told several times to keep his hands in his lap where they could
be seen. Cortes's conflicting answers about his identification concerned
Arrendale because he “didn’t know who Mr. [Cortes] was [or] what he was
capable of.” He also “didn’t know what was in the [denim] bag or if he was
trying to retrieve a weapon out of the bag.” ‘These facts, combined with
the pair’s unusual agitation, led Arrendale to order Cortes out of the car.
Cortes protested, demanding to know “Why?” and “What for?”

To Arrendale’s mind, when Cortes got out of the car, he did so
furtively, pressing his back against the doorjamb and keeping his hands
behind him. After several requests from Arrendale, Cortes turned and
faced the vehicle. He resisted Arrendale's attempts to conduct a patdown
search, so Arrendale handcuffed him. With Cortes fighting him and
yelling, Arrendale forced Cortes away from Wadsworth and the driver to
the rear of his patrol car. On reaching the patrol car, Arrendale resumed
his patdown search of Cortes and felt what he recognized as a
methamphetamine pipe. Cortes continued to struggle, shoving Arrendale.
Arrendale took him down to the ground and called for Wadsworth's help.

Together, they placed Cortes under arrest for obstructing an officer. In

 

 
the search incident to arrest that followed, the officers discovered, in
addition to the pipe, four bags containing what proved to be 3.3 grams of
methamphetamine and $628 in cash.

Bight days before trial, Cortes filed a motion to suppress the
pipe and drug evidence as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. He

based the motion on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, where

 

Arrendale testified and was cross-examined about the stop and frisk and

Cortes

 

arrest. The motion was argued on the opening day of trial.
Denying the motion, the district court made findings that both prongs of
the test in Arizona v, Johnson were met, to wit: “the first prong... was
‘met when the officer conducted [a] legitimate traffic stop because there
was no license plate on the car”; and “the second prong was met based on
Mr. Cortes’ behavior in reaching into the bag, his general demeanor, as
well as the fact I think most significantly that he had a knife, so the police
already knew that he was in possession of a weapon.” Based on this, “it
was certainly reasonable for the police to be concerned that there may be
additional weapons.”

‘The jury convicted Cortes of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to sell. He was sentenced to a suspended prison
term of 18 to 48 months and placed on 5 years’ probation,

u.

Cortes contends that the district court should have granted his
motion to suppress because the officers violated his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and its Nevada counterpart, Nev. Const. art. 1,
§ 18. The district court correctly rejected Cortes's federal constitutional
claim under Arizona v. Johnson. We also reject Cortes's argument that

 
the Nevada Constitution grants broader protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures in this context than does the Fourth Amendment,
A

We review de novo the district court's legal determination of
the constitutionality of a frisk but review its findings of fact for clear error,
Somee v, State, 124 Nev. 434, 441, 187 P.3d 152, 157-58 (2008). Cortes did
not request an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, which he
filed just days before trial. Nonetheless, Cortes faults the district court for
not sua sponte ordering an evidentiary hearing, citing State v, Ruscetta,
123 Nev. 299, 304, 163 P.3d 451, 455 (2007), and Somee, 124 Nev. at 441-
42, 187 P.3d at 157-58; for reasons not broached in the district court, he
urges us to discredit Arrendale’s and Wadworth’s testimony. But Cortes
did not contest the evidence below that supports the district court's
findings, and we cannot say they were clearly erroneous or plainly wrong.
Cortes did not have a right to an evidentiary hearing based solely on filing
‘4 motion to suppress, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
failing sua sponte to order one, especially since the motion to suppress was
filed fewer than 15 days before trial, see NRS 174.125(3)(a), (b); EDCR
3.20(a); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 173 (4th Cir, 1990)
(focusing on untimeliness of request for voluntariness hearing in
upholding trial court's refusal to hold a hearing), and neither asked for an

 

evidentiary hearing nor identified the disputed issues of material fact that
merited one, United States v. Curlin, 688 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir, 2011)
(District courts are required to conduct evidentiary hearings only when a
substantial claim is presented and there are disputed issues of material

fact that will affect the outcome of the motion {to suppress].”)

 

 
We turn then to the legal question: the constitutionality of the
stop and frisk. As the district court correctly held, Arizona v, Johnson
controls the Fourth Amendment analysis. In Johnson, “officers pulled
over an automobile after a license plate check revealed that the vehicle's
registration had been suspended for an insurance-related violation{,] a
civil infraction warranting a citation.” 555 U.S. at _, 129 8. Ct. at 784.
“While other officers dealt with the driver and front-seat passenger,
Officer Trevizo put some questions to Johnson, [a passenger] in the back
seat, then asked him to exit the vehicle and, when he did, Trevizo frisked
Johnson because his appearance and comments suggested he might be
armed, which proved to be the caso.” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.3, at 117 (4th ed. Supp.
2010). Assuming as the state court had that “Trevizo had reasonable
suspicion that Johnson was armed and dangerous,” a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the traffic stop and Johnson's frisk did not offend the
Fourth Amendment: “Officer Trevizo surely was not constitutionally
required to give Johnson an opportunity to depart the scene after he exited
the vehicle without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting
a dangerous person to get behind her.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at __ & n.2,
129 S. Ct. at 788 & n.2: id, at__, 129 S. Ct, at 786 (stressing that “traffic
stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers” (quoting
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983).

Johnson applies the two-pronged stop and frisk test in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 22-23 (1968), to passengers detained, along with the
driver, in a traffic-stop setting. The first prong of the Johnson/Terry test
requires a lawful traffic stop:

(In a traffiestop setting, the first Terry
condition—a lawful investigatory stop—is met

 

 

 
whenever it is lawful for police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into
a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in
addition, cause to believe any occupant of the
vehicle is involved in criminal activity.

Johnson, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 784. The second prong requires
reasonable suspicion that the person frisked may be armed and
dangerous: “To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a
traffic stop, . .. just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of
criminal activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the
person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.” Id,

Fitting the first prong of Johnson/Terry to the passenger, as
opposed to the driver, is awkward because “in a lawful traffic stop, ‘{tJhere
is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor
vehicular offense,’ but ‘there is no such reason to stop or detain the
passengers.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct, at 787 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413,
(1997). Nonetheless, “the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop
setting ‘stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a
speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime
might be uncovered during the stop"; a passenger's motivation “to employ
violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime... is every bit as great
as that of the driver.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414). Since “as a
practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop
of the vehicle,” id, (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14), the passenger is
deemed seized for Terry purposes “just as the driver is, ‘from the moment
[a car stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263
(2007)).

 

 
ane ae

 

Cortes does not contest the lawfulness of the traffic stop for no
license plate or visible temporary tag. Thus, the first prong of
dJohnson/Terry is met: Along with the driver, Cortes was legitimately
seized for the duration of the traffic stop.

The second Johnson/Terry prong focuses on the justification
for the frisk.? It asks whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion that
the driver and any passengers may be armed and dangerous. This “is a
fact-specific inquiry that looks at the totality of the circumstances in light,

of common sense and practicality.” United States v, Tinnie, 629 F.3d 749,
761 (7th Cir, 2011) (discussing Johnson) (internal quotation omitted)

"Mechanically, a traific-stop frisk normally involves the
intermediate step of the officer ordering the driver or passenger out of the
car, Johnson does not build this step into its Terry analysis because two
prior cases, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), hold that, having made a legitimate traffic
stop, a police officer can, without more, order the driver “to get out of the
vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures,” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 n.6, a
holding Wilson extends to passengers, 519 US. at 415, Justice Stevens
dissented in both Mimms and Wilson. In his view something more than
the fact of a legitimate traffic stop should be required to justify the
additional intrusion of an officer ordering a driver or passenger out of the
car. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 115-24 Gtevens, J., dissenting); Wilson, 519 U.S.
at 415-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's rule as
allowing an exit order where “there is not even a scintilla of evidence of
any potential risk to the police officer” but, in terms significant to this
case, noting: “Though the question is not before us, I am satisfied that—
under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio—if a police officer conducting a traffic
stop has an articulable suspicion of possible danger, the officer may order
Passengers to exit the vehicle as a defensive tactic without running afoul
of the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).

 

 
7

Reasonable suspicion is measured by an objective standard. See Asheroft
val-Kidd, 563 U.S. __, _, 181 8. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011),

In this case, the totality of the circumstances justified frisking
Cortes to protect the officers from the threat they r¥

 

sonably suspected he
posed to their safety. When Wadsworth arrived, Cortes had a knife in his
lap; the presence of a knife in plain view in a lawfully stopped car
contributes to reasonable suspicion that other weapons may be present,
making the person armed and dangerous even if the knife is moved out of
reach. United States v, Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 20-21 (D.C. Cir), cort,
denied, 662 US. __, 131 8, Ct. 93 (2010). Despite being repeatedly
asked, Cortes refused to keep his hands in plain view. See United States
v, Soares, 521 F.3d 117, 121 (1st Cir. 2008) (passenger's refusal to obey
“repeated orders to remain still and keep his hands in [officer's] view”
cited as part of the totality of circumstances justifying a patdown search).
After stating he had identification, Cortes contradicted himself and said
he didn’t; “evasive responses to police questions can help support
reasonable suspicion,” as can “contradictory answers to simple questions.”
‘Tinnie, 629 F.3d at 752. Cortes and the driver appeared unusually

 

‘Cortes's argument that the knife was not recovered and did not,
from its description, qualify as a “deadly weapon” as defined in NRS
202,320 is without merit, “A Terry investigation ... involves a police
investigation at close range, when the officer remains particularly
vulnerable... [and] must make a quick decision as to how to protect

 

himself and others from possible danger.’... Officer [Arrendale] did not
have time to perform a close inspection of (Cortes’s] . .. knife to determine
precisely how dangerous it was.” Vinton, 594 F.8d at 21 (ellipses in
original) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1052).

 
nervous and agitated to Arrendale and Wadsworth, both experienced
patrol officers. Id. (“Tinnie acted suspiciously by moving around nervously
as the officers approached the car"), Finally, when Cortes got out of the
car, he did so strangely, trying to conceal his hands and back from
Arrendale. See United States v, Burkett, 612 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.
2010) (upholding passenger frisk under Johnson based partly on furtive
movements and the guarded way the passenger got out of the car). Given
all this, common sense tells us that a reasonable officer confronting Cortes
at night during a traffic stop could reasonably suspect that Cortes was
armed and that a frisk was necessary to protect himself and his partner,
Cortes advances another Fourth Amendment argument, tied
to Arrendale’s request for identification. He contends that Nevada's
seatbelt statute, NRS 484D.495, is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad if it allows an officer to cite a passenger for a seatbelt violation
after the car is stopped on the side of the road when the officer did not
observe the seatbelt violation while the vehicle was moving. According to
Cortes, if NRS 484D.495 is unconstitutional in this respect, then
Arrendale’s request for identification pursuant to NRS 484A.730(1)
constituted an illegal search, making everything that followed the fruit of
that poisonous tree. This argument fails in several ways. To begin with,
we are not as troubled as Cortes by the constitutionality of NRS
484D.495(2) as applied to the facts of his case. While Arrendale may not
have seen Cortes without a seatbelt on before he stopped the car
(remember, it was dark), he saw him without one right afterward, making
it fair to infer that Cortes had not been wearing it moments earlier when

the car was still moving. Even if our instincts are wrong, moreover,

evidence seized in reliance on a statute later held to be unconstitutionally

 

 
ne Be

vague does not violate the Fourth Amendment or require suppression of
the evidence, See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S, 31, 39-40 (1979); see
also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. __, __, 181 S. Ct, 2419, 2423-24
(2011) (holding that evidence obtained in search conducted in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent is not subject to
exclusionary rule).

More fundamentally, Cortes’s argument proceeds from a

 

faulty premise. Arrendale's request that Cortes identify himself did not
constitute an additional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Compare
Johnson, 655 U.S. at _, 129 8. Ct. at 788 (‘An officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffie stop . .. do not convert
the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” (citing
Muebler v, Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005), which holds: “mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure’; “[elven when officers have no
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
questions of that individual [and] ask to examine the individual's
identification” (internal citations omitted))), with Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev. Humboldt Cty. 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)
(“[l]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by
the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”
{alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984))).

‘Thus, although it appears Arrendale had an independent
justification to ask for Cortes's identification, he did not need one “[sJo
long as the request did not ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
United States v, Fernandez, 600 F.3d 56, 62 (Ist Cir. 2010) (quoting
Johnson, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 788); accord United States v. Diaz

n

 
Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1152 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v, Rice, 483,
F.3d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (‘because passengers present a risk to
officer safety equal to the risk presented by the driver, an officer may ask
for identification from passengers and run background checks on them as
well” (internal citation omitted). Here, Cortes failed to show that
Arrendale’s request for identification measurably extended the duration of
the stop. See also 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6, at 184 (under Johnson, “an
officer with reasonable suspicion the passenger was armed and dangerous
would be under no obligation to terminate the passenger's seizure until a

frisk could be condueted”).*

 

B.
Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution uses almost
the same words as the Fourth Amendment does to prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although lacking textual or historical support,

 

“Cortes also argues that the traffic stop had been completed before
Arrendale frisked Cortes, making the evidence inadmissible. Cortes did
not make this argument below and the record does not support it.

5We acknowledge but reject Cortes’s further argument that
Arrendale’s use of handcuffs to control the frisk offended the Fourth
Amendment. See 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6, at 188 (“An otherwise valid frisk
is not objectionable because the suspect was first placed in handeutfs,”
though noting that handcuffing “is not always permissible” (citing id. §
9.2(d), at 190 n.107 (collecting illustrative cases))).

The Nevada Constitution employs slightly different punctuation
and capitalization conventions, reverses the phrase “search and seizuro” to
read “seizure and search,” and gives both the singular and plural versions
of the words “place,” “persons,” and “things” where the Fourth Amendment

does not. It also changes “Warrants” to “warrant.” Compare Nev. Const.
art. 1, § 18 with U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is hard to ascribe substantive
significance to these minor variations.

 

 
oe oe
mason

Cortes argues that, as a matter of policy, we should read the Nevada
Constitution as imposing a stricter test for traffic-stop frisks than Arizona
v.Johnson does. While federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not
dictate how a state supreme court interprets cognate provisions of its state
constitution, Virginia v. Moore, 658 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (‘States [are] free
to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the
Federal Constitution.” (citation and quotation omitted)); Osburn v, State,
118 Nev, 323, 326, 44 P.3d 523, 525 (2002) ("states are free to interpret
their own constitutional provisions as providing greater protections than
analogous federal provisions”), and we have in two instances imposed
stricter standards under Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution
than the Fourth Amendment demands, State v, Harnisch, 114 Nev. 225,
228-29, 954 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1998) (warrant clause); State v. Bavard, 119
Nev. 241, 247, 71 P.3d 498, 502 (2003) (custodial arrest for a non-jailable
offense), we do not find reason to adopt this divergent approach in the
Arizona v. Johnson context.

As a threshold matter, Cortes does not identify a
constitutional infirmity in Arizona_v. Johnson or offer a preferable rule.
Johnson's application of Terry frisk principles to the traffic-stop setting
makes legal and practical sense. It is true that the passenger may have
done nothing to justify the stop, making it harder to justify seizing the
passenger as distinct from the driver for the duration of the stop.
Nonetheless, we agree with Johnson that the need for officer safety in a
situation as volatile and fraught with risk as a traffic stop outweighs that
intrusion where, as here, reasonable suspicion develops during the stop
that the passenger may be armed and dangerous. Indeed, this court has
already so held, albeit applying the Fourth Amendment rather than the

13.

 

 
ne

Nevada Constitution. See Scott v. State, 110 Nev. 622, 680-31, 877 P.2d
503, 509 (1994) (upholding patdown search under Terry v, Ohio following
a traffic stop for a license plate violation that turned up a weapon).”
Cortes’s misgivings do not seem to stem so much from Johneon
is the two cases that precede it, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977), and Maryland v, Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). In Mimms and
Wilson the Supreme Court held that, for officer safety reasons, a lawful
traffic stop, in and of itself, justifies an order to the driver and passenger
to get out of the car. See supra note 2, Most states that have considered
the hard policy choices presented in Mimms and Wilson have endorsed
their holdings. See Com, v, Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 116, 124-30 App.
(Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting) (cataloguing state law on exit orders in
traffic stops). Their critics would require some showing of “danger before
compelling a driver [or passenger] to leave his motor vehicle,” id, at 111
(reasonable suspicion”); see Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J.,

 

"This court has historically applied Temy to search and seizure
challenges, State v, Lisenbee, 116 Nev. 1124, 1128-29, 13 P.3d 947, 950
(2000), including challenges involving traffic stops. See State v. Rincon,
122 Nev, 1170, 1173-75 & n.2, 147 P.3d 238, 235-37 & 2 (2006)
(addressing the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 18 jointly in
traffic-stop setting): Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 858, 865, 944 P.2d 762, 770
(1997) (applying the first prong of Terry in a traffic-stop setting). It has
also long drawn on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in interpreting
Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution. See, e.g, Osburn v.
State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (aligning Article 1, Section 18 with
Fourth Amendment cases on surveillance equipment); Howe v, State, 112
Nev. 458, 916 P.2d 153 (1996) (analyzing warrant exception for home
search); Dean v, Fogliani, 81 Nev. 541, 407 P.2d 580 (1965) (applying
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), to Article 1, Section 18
search and seizure standing challenge).

 

“4

 
es

dissenting) (“I am satisfied that—under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio—if
4 police officer conducting a traffic stop has an articulable suspicion of
possible danger, the officer may order passengers to exit the vehicle as a
defensive tactic without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.”
(citation omitted); State_v. Mai, 993 A.2d 1216, 1221 (NJ, 2010)
(requiring an intermediate showing—more than required to legitimate the
stop but less than Terry requires to frisk—of “specific and articulable facts
that would warrant heightened caution to justify ordering [a passenger] to
step out of a vehicle detained for a traffic violation” (quotation omitted).

But this case does not require us to weigh in on Mimms and
Wilson. While Cortes’
reasons for the frisk, Arrendale had reasonable suspicion of possible
danger before he asked Cortes to get out of the car. Thus, the exit order
and frisk that followed not only complied with Arizona v. Johnson, but
with even the staunchest critic's view of the rule that should have been
adopted in Mimms and Wilson. Constitutional questions should not be
decided “except when absolutely necessary to properly dispose of the
State v, Curler, 26 Nev. 347, 354, 67 P. 1075, 1076 (1902),
and we follow this rule here as to Cortes’s effort to engage us on Mimms
and Wilson.

Cortes next directs us to State v, Harnisch, 114 Nev. 225, 228.
29, 954 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1998), and State v. Bayard, 119 Nev. 241, 247, 71
P.3d 498, 502 (2003), as support for his argument that Nevada should
reject Johnson on state constitutional grounds. But neither case applies.
Harnisch involves the Warrants Clause (in Nevada, “warrant clause,” see

guarded exit from the car contributed to the

 

 

particular case

 

supra note 6) and holds, in a departure from Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, see California _v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985), that

15,

 

 
“probable cause and exigent circumstances are both necessary to validate
a warrantless automobile search.” Harnisch, 114 Nev. at 228, 954 P.2d at
1182-83, Bayard grows out of a single, deeply divided Supreme Court
decision, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 632 U.S. 318, 354-55 (2001), that found no
Fourth Amendment violation in a custodial arrest provoked by nothing
more than a non-jailable seatbelt offense. Citing the discretionary arrest
provision of NRS 484.795 (renumbered NRS 484A.730)—which provides
an officer with discretion to arrest for citable traffic violations—Bavard
holds both as a matter of state statutory and constitutional law, Nev.
Const. art. 1, § 18, that the exercise of discretion to effect a custodial
arrest for a non-jailable offense must be reasonable. 119 Nev. at 247,
TIP.3d at 502. The extent to which Bayard is statutorily based was
demonstrated a year later in Morgan v, State, 120 Nev. 219, 88 P.3d 837
(2004), where a custodial arrest for a non-jailable offense was upheld
because authorized by NRS 484.795(1) (now NRS 484A.730(1)) (providing
for arrest for a minor traffic offense when “the person does not furnish
satisfactory evidence of identity” or there are “reasonable and probable
grounds to believe the person” will not appear in court).

‘The departures from Fourth Amendment law in Harnisch and
Bayard do not justify rejecting Johnson's application of Terry to traffic-
stop frisks. Neither case involved the emergency police-safety concerns
that underlie Terry. Terry's two-prong test reflects a constitutional
analysis premised on “swift [police] action” based on “on-the-spot”
observations that, for practical reasons, cannot be subject to the
traditional warrant procedure. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. In Harnisch, the
police conduct at issue was subject to analysis under the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada

“_ 16
ane a

 
a

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 

Constitution while Terry and, by extension, Johnson, interpret the
“general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
preceding the Warrant Clause. Terry, 92 U.S. at 20. Bayard involved a
custodial arrest, not Terry principles, and a unique combination of
statutory and constitutional analysis not applicable here. ‘Thus, our
singular interpretation of Nevada Constitution Article 1, Section 18 in
Haxnisch and Bayard has no bearing in the Johnson/Terry setting.
&

Cortes's remaining claims of testimonial, evidentiary, and
instructional errors fail, The district court did not abuse its considerable
discretion in recognizing Arrendale’s tostimony as permissible lay opinion
DeChant v. State, 116 Nev. 918, 924, 10 P.8a 108, 112 (2000), nor do we
discern any comment by him suggesting that Cortes had a prior criminal
history, see Manning v, Warden, 99 Nev. 82, 86, 659 P.2d 847, 849-50
(1983). Cortes did not object to the assertedly improper comment on his
right to remain silent, and plain error does not appear given that Cortes
waived his right to remain silent, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __,
180 8. Ct, 2250, 2262 (2010), and did not clearly reinvoke this right.
‘See United States v, Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
‘And the foundation laid by the State as to the chain of custody of the
physical evidence satisfied Burns v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 533, 534-35, 554 P.2d
257, 258 (1976); Cortes's objections go to the weight, not the admissibility,
of this evidence. See Hughes v. State, 116 Nev. 975, 981, 12 P.3d 948, 952
(2000). Finally, the errors Cortes asserts in connection with the jury
instructions either were not preserved by objection or proffer, see
Etcheverry v. State, 107 Nev. 782, 784-85, 821 P.2d 350, 351 (1991)
(regarding Instructions 9 and 14 in the underlying case), fail when
considered in light of the instructions as a whole, Tanksley v, State, 113

7

 
Nev. 844, 849, 944 P.2d 240, 243 (1997) (Instruction 4), or involve
instructions that were substantively correct (Instructions 12 and 15),
improperly duplicative, see Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765, 121 P.3d
592, 596 (2005); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 96-97, 645 P.2d 1155, 1155-56
(1976), or not supported by the evidence. Thus, the district court did not

abuse its broad discretion in settling the jury instructions, Jas y,
State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
We therefore affirm.