Title: Narriman DiBiasi & Julia Brewer, as co-administratrixes of the Estate of Dominic DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Electric Membership Corp.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 1/11/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060848
_________________________
Narriman DiBiasi and Julia Brewer, as co-administratrixes of
the estate of Dominic DiBiasi
v.
Joe Wheeler Electric Membership Corp.
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court
(CV-05-279)
SEE, Justice.
This wrongful-death action was brought on behalf of
Dominic DiBiasi ("Dominic"), who was electrocuted when he
grabbed an uninsulated high-voltage transmission line hanging
over the roof of the house on which he was standing.  The
1060848
2
transmission 
line, 
owned 
by 
Hartselle 
Utilities 
("Hartselle"),
was attached to a utility pole owned by Joe Wheeler Electric
Membership Corp. ("Joe Wheeler").  Narriman DiBiasi, Dominic's
mother, and Julia Brewer, Dominic's common-law wife, as co-
administratrixes of Dominic's estate (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "DiBiasi"), filed a wrongful-death action
against both Hartselle and Joe Wheeler, alleging negligence
and wantonness on the part of both parties.   Joe Wheeler
moved for a summary judgment, arguing that its pole was not
defective and that Joe Wheeler owed no duty to Dominic.  The
trial court granted Joe Wheeler's motion and entered a
judgment in its favor, stating that "the plaintiffs' claims
set forth against [Joe Wheeler] in their original Complaint
and all amendments thereto are dismissed with prejudice."  The
summary judgment was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.
R. Civ. P.
DiBiasi now appeals, arguing that there is substantial
evidence indicating that Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic.
However, because DiBiasi makes no apparent argument in support
of her wantonness claim, it is waived, and, therefore, we do
not address it.  See Pardue v. Potter 632 So. 2d 470, 473
1060848
3
(Ala. 1994) ("Issues not argued in the appellant's brief are
waived." (citing Deutcsh v. Birmingham Post Co., 603 So. 2d
910 (Ala. 1992); Bogle v. Scheer, 512 So. 2d 1336 (Ala.
1987)).   We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 11, 2004, Dominic was residing with Alan and
Sherry Holt at 1607 Main Street West, Hartselle, Alabama, to
which Hartselle supplies the power.  On the morning of the
accident, he was working around the house when he and Alan
decided to climb onto the roof to inspect the gutters.  While
they were on the roof, the men saw two lines above the roof of
the Holts' house -- one line was 2 to 2.5 feet above the peak
of the roof, while the other was approximately 5 feet above
the peak of the roof.  The two men discussed attaching a
pulley to the lines and sliding down, in the belief that the
lines were support cables for the nearby utility poles.  It
appears that both men grabbed the lower of the two lines, a
neutral line, and determined that "it would probably hold
[them]."  Dominic was curious about the higher of the two
lines, and he grabbed it to determine whether it would hold
1060848
4
them; that line, however, was an uninsulated 7,200-volt
transmission line, and Dominic was killed when he grabbed it.
The line that electrocuted Dominic was an electric
transmission line owned by Hartselle that crossed the Holts'
house as it ran between two poles –- one owned by Hartselle
and the other owned by Joe Wheeler.  Hartselle attached its
line to Joe Wheeler's pole as part of a "joint-use" or "pole-
sharing" agreement.  The agreement allows the sharing of poles
for the transmission of power to the companies' respective
customers without the need to duplicate infrastructure. 
DiBiasi sued both Hartselle and Joe Wheeler, alleging
both negligence and wantonness.  The negligence and wantonness
claim against Joe Wheeler alleges as follows:
"a. Defendant Joe Wheeler failed to properly place
the utility pole on the south end of the residential
property 
located 
at 
1607 
Main 
Street 
West,
Hartselle, Alabama, and allowed the electric power
line in question to be in close proximity to the
house located at such address;
"b. Defendant Joe Wheeler failed to install a
utility pole on the south end of the residential
property 
located 
at 
1607 
Main 
Street 
West,
Hartselle, Alabama, which was sufficient in height
to allow for the proper clearance of the utility
line in question over the home located on such
property;
1060848
It appears that DiBiasi filed a second amended complaint
1
after Joe Wheeler moved for a summary judgment.  The second
amended complaint added an additional allegation against Joe
Wheeler:
"e. Defendant Joe Wheeler used, or allowed defendant
[Hartselle] to use, the Joe Wheeler electrical
utility pole located on the south end of the
residential property at 1607 Main Street West,
Hartselle, Alabama, to run a 7,200 volt, uninsulated
power line directly over the residence located on
such property in a manner which did not comply with
the minimum clearance safety standards of the
electrical utility industry and, thus, created or
allowed for the creation of a dangerous safety
hazard."
5
"c. Defendant Joe Wheeler failed to properly
construct, install, or erect an electric power pole
on the south end of the residential property located
at 1607 Main Street West, Hartselle, Alabama, and,
thus, allowed for the power line in question to be
hung or run in a manner that did not comply with the
minimum clearance construction standards of the
electrical industry for such lines; and
"d. Defendant Joe Wheeler failed to properly
maintain and inspect the electric power pole located
on the south end of the residential property at 1607
Main Street West, Hartselle, Alabama, and thereby
allowed for a dangerous condition to be created by
the line in question being in close proximity to the
house located on such property."   
1
Joe Wheeler argued in its motion for a summary judgment
that it "had no duty to inspect, maintain, or supervise the
power lines of another company, Hartselle."  Joe Wheeler
further argued that "[n]o evidence exists that [it] had any
1060848
6
notice of a dangerous condition in the [Hartselle] lines and
no evidence exists that Joe Wheeler was required to or was
expected to inspect the power lines servicing another utility
company's customer."  DiBiasi responded, arguing, among other
things, that, 
"even if Joe Wheeler was under no duty to inspect
the power line that caused [Dominic]'s death, once
Joe Wheeler became aware that the power line
improperly and hazardously ran from its pole
directly over a residence, this created a duty in
Joe Wheeler to take appropriate action.  The failure
of Joe Wheeler to take any action once armed with
this knowledge properly creates liability."
The trial court granted Joe Wheeler's summary-judgment
motion, finding as follows:
"Under the facts set forth in the record ... Joe
Wheeler owed no duty to ... Dominic, to inspect
electric transmission lines that were attached to
its utility pole ... that were owned, installed,
controlled 
and 
maintained 
exclusively 
by
[Hartselle].  The plaintiffs have failed to produce
substantial evidence ... that Joe Wheeler had
knowledge or reason to know that [Hartselle]'s
electric transmission lines were too close to the
roof of the house occupied by [Dominic] ....  This
Court understands that certain of its conclusions
disregard opinions expressed by [DiBiasi]'s expert
in 
his 
affidavit. 
 
That 
is 
so 
because 
the
disregarded opinions are not based on substantial
evidence or on specific electric code provisions,
accepted 
utility 
industry 
standards 
or 
legal
authorities, and that would require the Court to
engage in conjecture about unproven facts or
impermissibly draw inferences from assumed facts or
1060848
In response to Joe Wheeler's summary-judgment motion,
2
DiBiasi attached the affidavit of her expert witness, John C.
Frost.  In June 2006, Joe Wheeler moved to strike Frost's
affidavit "on the grounds that [the opinions] are based upon
conjecture and speculation. 'Evidence which affords nothing
more than speculation, conjecture, or guess is wholly
insufficient to warrant submission of a case to the jury.'"
(Quoting Thompson v. Lee, 439 So. 2d 113, 116 (Ala. 1983).)
Although the trial court appears to have disregarded the
opinions found in the affidavit, the record does not indicate
that the affidavit was actually stricken.
7
from other inferences for which there is no
evidentiary support."2
DiBiasi now appeals, arguing that the trial court
improperly granted Joe Wheeler's summary-judgment motion
because, DiBiasi says, she produced substantial evidence
showing that Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic that it
breached, resulting in his death. 
Issues
DiBiasi argues that the trial court improperly entered a
summary judgment for Joe Wheeler because, she says, (1)
DiBiasi presented evidence indicating that Joe Wheeler knew or
should have known that its pole was being used to create an
unreasonably dangerous condition and, therefore, it owed a
duty to Dominic to require the removal of the dangerous
condition, and (2) DiBiasi presented substantial evidence from
which a jury could reasonably infer that Joe Wheeler knew or
1060848
8
should have known that its utility pole was being used to run
an uninsulated transmission line over the Holt residence in a
manner that created an unreasonably dangerous hazard.
Standard of Review
A summary judgment is appropriate only if the trial court
finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Once a movant makes a prima facie
showing that those two conditions are satisfied, the burden
then shifts to the nonmovant to produce "substantial evidence"
that creates a genuine issue of material fact.  Ex parte CSX
Transp., Inc., 938 So. 2d 959, 961 (Ala. 2006).  "Evidence is
'substantial' if it is of 'such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved.'" Ex parte CSX Transp., 938 So. 2d at 961 (quoting
West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989)); § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.  "'"If
the nonmovant [assuming the nonmovant has the burden of proof
at trial] cannot produce sufficient evidence to prove each
element of its claim, the movant is entitled to a summary
1060848
9
judgment, for a trial would be useless."'"  Prowell v.
Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 949 So. 2d 117, 128 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909
(Ala. 1999), quoting in turn and approving language from
Justice Houston's special writing in Berner v. Caldwell, 543
So. 2d 686, 691 (Houston, J., concurring specially)).
On appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment de novo.
Ex parte Essary, [Ms. 1060458, Nov. 2, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___,
___ (Ala. 2007).  In doing so, we apply the same standard of
review as did the trial court.  Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d
462, 465 (Ala. 1997).  "'"Our review is subject to the caveat
that we must review the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against
the movant."'"  Ex parte CSX Transp., 938 So. 2d at 962
(quoting Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 833 (Ala.
2001), quoting in turn Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742
So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999)); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie,
Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1990).  Finally, this Court
does not afford any presumption of correctness to the trial
court's ruling on questions of law or its conclusion as to the
appropriate legal standard to be applied.  Ex parte CSX
1060848
10
Transp., 938 So. 2d at 962 (citing Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d
1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997)).
Analysis
DiBiasi argued at trial, and she now argues on appeal,
that Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic.  DiBiasi first argues
that because Joe Wheeler is a utility, the duty it owed
Dominic was a "'high and exacting'" duty because Joe Wheeler
was supplying "'the very dangerous agency' of electricity."
DiBiasi's brief at 26.  DiBiasi also argues that Joe Wheeler
owed a duty to Dominic because it knew or should have known of
the danger created by the low-hanging uninsulated transmission
lines that crossed over the Holt residence and, therefore,
that Joe Wheeler had a duty to require that Hartselle remove
"the dangerous condition."  DiBiasi's brief at 3.  We
conclude, however, that Joe Wheeler did not owe Dominic a duty
of care and that Joe Wheeler was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. 
In a negligence action the plaintiff must prove (1) that
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the
defendant breached that duty; (3) that the plaintiff suffered
a loss or injury; and (4) that the defendant's breach was the
1060848
11
actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss or injury.
Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw, 661 So. 2d 236, 238 (Ala. 1995).
"'It is settled that for one to maintain a negligence action
the defendant must have been subject to a legal duty,'"
Thompson v. Mindis Metals, Inc., 692 So. 2d 805, 807 (Ala.
1997) (quoting Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 915 (Ala.
1990)), because "where there is no duty, there can be no
negligence."  City of Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 681,
65 So. 2d 160, 165 (1953).  "'In Alabama, the existence of a
duty is a strictly legal question to be determined by the
court.'"  Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d
933, 937 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887,
891-92 (Ala. 2004)).  The entry of a summary judgment for Joe
Wheeler indicates that the trial court concluded that Joe
Wheeler did not owe Dominic a duty; however, the existence of
a duty is strictly a legal question and, under our standard of
review, this Court does not afford the trial court's
conclusions of law any presumption of correctness.  Therefore,
the strictly legal question this Court must answer is whether
Joe Wheeler owed a duty to Dominic.
A. Did Joe Wheeler owe Dominic a "high and exacting"
duty?
1060848
12
DiBiasi first argues that, as a company that supplies
electric power, Joe Wheeler's duty of care "extends to the
safeguarding of everyone in person or property, at places
where he or it may rightfully be."  DiBiasi's brief at 29
(citing Alabama Power Co. v. Matthews, 226 Ala. 614, 147 So.
889 (1933)).  She further urges that Joe Wheeler owed Dominic
a "high and exacting" duty because Joe Wheeler is "in the
business of supplying 'the very dangerous agency' of
electricity."  DiBiasi's brief at 26 (citing Bloom v. City of
Cullman, 197 Ala. 490, 73 So. 85 (1916).  
Joe Wheeler responds that "each of the Alabama cases
cited by [DiBiasi] deals with the defendant utility company's
failure to eliminate a defect in a power line that it owned.
Moreover, each of these cases dealt with electricity supplied
by the defendant."  Joe Wheeler's brief at 34.  Joe Wheeler's
argument is well-taken.  The authority on which DiBiasi relies
is distinguishable.  See Alabama Power Co. v. Emens, 228 Ala.
466, 473, 153 So. 729, 734 (1934) ("Where, in the case at bar,
a 
person 
engaged 
in 
the 
business 
of 
generating 
and
distributing electricity for domestic and other uses also
sells and engages to install electrical equipment in the
1060848
13
residence of one of its patrons, and supply its current
therefor for domestic use, it must exercise the care of a
reasonably prudent man skilled in the practice and art of
installing such equipment ....  [T]he obligation assumed and
the duty arising out of such circumstances are not unlike that
resting upon a physician or surgeon ...."); Matthews, 226 Ala.
at 615, 147 So. at 889-90 ("Plaintiff's evidence tended to
show that defendant [electric company] maintained and operated
a transmission line ... carrying a current of 44,000 volts;
... that a current of electricity, thus diverted from the
line, killed the mule instantly."); Bloom, 197 Ala. at 497, 73
So. at 88 ("The degree of care resting upon the municipality,
with respect to the means of transmitting its electric current
over public thoroughfares was high and exacting, commensurate
with the very dangerous agency it was employing in lighting
its streets.").  See also Alabama Power Co. v. Cantrell, 507
So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Ala. 1986) ("'"The duty of an electric
company, in conveying a current of high potential, to exercise
commensurate care under the circumstances, requires it to
insulate its wires ...."'" (quoting Alabama Power Co. v.
1060848
14
Brooks, 479 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Ala. 1985), quoting in turn
Bush v. Alabama Power Co., 457 So. 2d 350, 353 (Ala. 1984)).
Joe Wheeler may have a "high and exacting" duty when it
is supplying electricity over its own transmission lines;
however, that question is not presented here.  It is
undisputed that Joe Wheeler merely supplied the pole to which
Hartselle's transmission line was affixed and that it neither
owned nor installed the power lines at issue and did not
supply the power resulting in the death of Dominic.
Therefore, we conclude that Joe Wheeler did not, in this
instance, owe Dominic the "high and exacting duty" DiBiasi
asserts it owed him.
B.  Was Joe Wheeler's knowledge of the alleged dangerous
condition created by the transmission line sufficient to
impose a duty on Joe Wheeler?
DiBiasi argues that Joe Wheeler's duty to Dominic arose
because, she argues, Joe Wheeler knew or should have known
that the low-hanging uninsulated transmission line created an
unreasonably 
dangerous condition and that 
Joe Wheeler
therefore had a duty to require Hartselle to remedy the
condition.  DiBiasi's brief at 29.  Joe Wheeler argues that
imposing a duty on it solely on the basis of knowledge "is
1060848
15
contrary to well-established law in Alabama."  Joe Wheeler's
brief at 37.
"'In determining whether a duty exists in a given
situation, however, courts should consider a number of
factors, including public policy, social considerations, and
foreseeability.  The key factor is whether the injury was
foreseeable by the defendant.'"  Patrick v. Union State Bank,
681 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Smitherman v.
McCafferty, 622 So. 2d 322, 324 (Ala. 1993)).  In addition to
foreseeability, Alabama courts look to a number of factors to
determine whether a duty exists, including "'(1) the nature of
the defendant's activity; (2) the relationship between the
parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm threatened.'"
Taylor, 892 So. 2d at 892 (quoting Morgan v. South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 114 (Ala. 1985)).
DiBiasi argues that "once [Joe Wheeler] had actual or
constructive knowledge of the deadly hazard, it had a duty to
require the removal of the hazard," and she asserts that
"notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition can give rise to
a duty of care."  DiBiasi's brief at 29 (citing Cantrell, 507
So. 2d at 1297 ("'"The duty of an electric company, in
1060848
DiBiasi argues, in her reply brief, that Joe Wheeler's
3
"failure to ensure that the attachment of the line does not
directly create such [a] hazard, is an affirmative act which
creates the risk that third parties might be injured.  Under
these circumstances, Joe Wheeler has a duty to third parties
who may be injured as a result."  DiBiasi's reply brief at 8-
9.  DiBiasi is correct that "[i]n a variety of circumstances,
this Court has recognized a duty to foreseeable third parties,
16
conveying 
a 
current 
of 
high 
potential, 
to 
exercise
commensurate care under the circumstances, requires it to
insulate its wires, and to use reasonable care to keep the
same insulated wherever it may reasonably be anticipated that
persons, pursuing business or pleasure, may come in contact
therewith."'" (quoting Brooks, 479 So. 2d at 1172, quoting in
turn Bush, 457 So. 2d at 353))). 
The holding of Cantrell is not as broad as DiBiasi
posits.  Cantrell imposes a specific duty on utilities to
insulate their own lines, in specific circumstances, whenever
it is reasonably anticipated that people may come into contact
with those lines.  507 So. 2d at 1297.  Although the duty
imposed on the utility companies in Cantrell is triggered when
the utility company is aware that individuals may come in
contact with its lines, Cantrell does not stand for the
proposition that notice of a dangerous condition alone is
sufficient to give rise to a duty of care.   Further, none of
3
1060848
based on a general 'obligation imposed in tort to act
reasonably.'"  Taylor, 892 So. 2d at 893 (quoting Berkel & Co.
Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 502
(Ala. 1984) (citing cases)).  DiBiasi makes this argument and
cites this authority for the first time in her reply brief.
Arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are not
properly before this Court.  See The Dunes of GP, L.L.C. v.
Bradford, 966 So. 2d 924 (Ala. 2007) (noting the "settled rule
that this Court does not address issues raised for the first
time in a reply brief" (citing Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334,
341 (Ala. 2002))).  We therefore do not address the argument.
17
the other cases cited by DiBiasi support her position.  See
Bush v. Alabama Power Co., 457 So. 2d at 353-54 (holding
Alabama Power Company to the same standard established in
Cantrell); Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565,
576-77, 675 A.2d 209, 214 (1996) ("The existence of actual
knowledge of an unsafe condition can be extremely important in
considering the fairness in imposing a duty of care.");
Dominic v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 606 So. 2d 555, 559 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that "[w]hile we agree with [Wal-mart]
that there is no statutory or jurisprudential requirement that
Wal-Mart chain or lock the carts kept outside the store, this
fact does not preclude the imposition of a duty on Wal-Mart
not to create an unreasonable risk of harm with its shopping
carts to motorists using the adjacent streets.  Actual or
constructive knowledge of a risk or injury gives rise to a
1060848
18
duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious
consequences resulting from the risk," but noting that
"whether a legal duty is owed by one party to another depends
upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the
relationship of the parties ...."); Andrade v. Ellefson, 391
N.W.2d 836, 841 (Minn. 1986) ("Actual knowledge of a dangerous
condition tends to impose a special duty to do something about
that condition.  Actual knowledge, not mere constructive
knowledge, is required."); cf. Alabama Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 855 So. 2d 1016, 1021-22, 1025 (Ala. 2003) (noting
that "'"[i]t is the general rule in Alabama that absent
special relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty
to protect another from criminal acts of a third party"'"
(quoting Hail v. Regency Terrace Owners Ass'n, 782 So. 2d
1271, 1274 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn Moye v. A.G. Gaston
Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1372 (Ala. 1986)), and holding
that "state correctional officers owe a general duty to the
public, not a duty to a specific person, to maintain custody
of inmates").
Although it may be true that foreseeability is a key
factor in determining whether a duty exists in a particular
1060848
19
circumstance, and knowledge of a dangerous condition may
establish foreseeability, Alabama caselaw does not hold that
knowledge, by itself, is sufficient to impose a duty.  
"The rule which seems to have emerged from the
decisions in the United States is that there will be
liability in tort whenever misperformance [of a
contract] involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk
of harm to the interests of the plaintiff or where
there would be liability for performance without the
contract.  More simply stated, we must determine
whether there is a legal duty sufficient to support
an action for negligence.  For that determination,
three primary considerations are important: (1) the
nature 
of 
the 
defendant's 
activity; 
(2) 
the
relationship between the parties; and (3) the type
of injury or harm threatened."
Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d at 114.
Apart from premises liability, Alabama law does not
support imposing a duty of care on a party based solely on
that party's knowledge of the existence of a dangerous
condition.  Therefore, we hold that, even if Joe Wheeler knew,
or should have known, of a dangerous condition, this alone is
an insufficient basis on which to impose a duty of care on Joe
Wheeler.
C.  Do the Morgan factors support imposing a duty on Joe
Wheeler?
Finally, 
DiBiasi 
argues 
that, 
under 
the 
factors
identified in Morgan, supra, Joe Wheeler owed a duty to
1060848
20
Dominic.  Assuming, without holding, that DiBiasi could
establish that Joe Wheeler could have foreseen that an
individual would be electrocuted by a low-hanging transmission
line owned by Hartselle and attached to Joe Wheeler's pole,
none of the other Morgan factors support imposing a duty on
Joe Wheeler.
1.  The nature of Joe Wheeler's activities
DiBiasi argues that the nature of Joe Wheeler's activity,
which it characterizes as the "generation and transmission of
high powered electrical current to the public," is "hazardous
and replete with danger requiring extreme caution."  DiBiasi's
brief at 27-28.  Joe Wheeler notes that there was no such
activity on its part and that its only activity "was to allow
[Hartselle] to connect its line to a Joe Wheeler pole."  We
recognize that, generally speaking, Joe Wheeler is in the
business of generating and transmitting electricity; however,
even viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most
favorable to DiBiasi, the nonmovant, in this instance Joe
Wheeler's only involvement in Dominic's death was that it had
at some point allowed Hartselle to connect its line to a
utility pole owned by Joe Wheeler. 
1060848
21
2.  The relationship between the parties
DiBiasi argues that the relationship between Dominic and
Joe Wheeler was that "of a member of the community with an
electrical co-op which has placed its instrumentalities of
service into the community."  DiBiasi's brief at 28.  DiBiasi
argues that the duty owed by Joe Wheeler "extends to the
safeguarding of everyone, in person or property, at places
where he or it may rightfully be."  DiBiasi's reply brief at
11 (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Matthews, supra).  As noted
previously, Matthews involved the presence of high-voltage
transmission lines and their proximity to people and property.
See Matthews, supra.  Matthews is concerned with the danger
arising from such lines, wherever they are located.  However,
the discussion in Matthews appears to be directed to those who
maintain or operate the lines; it does not address what
relationship, if any, exists between the general public and
the owner of a utility pole.  DiBiasi admits that Hartselle
supplied the electricity to the Holt household and that it was
Hartselle's transmission line that caused Dominic's death.
DiBiasi's brief at 5 ("It is undisputed that the high-voltage
line that caused the death of [Dominic] was owned by
1060848
22
[Hartselle].").  Aside from the fact that that transmission
line was attached to a pole owned by Joe Wheeler, there is no
apparent relationship between Dominic and Joe Wheeler.
3.  The type of injury or harm threatened
Finally, DiBiasi argues that "the type of injury or harm
threatened was grave (i.e., death or severe injury by
electrocution)." DiBiasi's brief at 28. In her reply brief,
DiBiasi 
argues 
that 
"the circumstances presented here
obviously involve a high potential for severe personal injury
or death."  DiBiasi's reply brief at 11.  DiBiasi does not,
however, address how Joe Wheeler's act of allowing another
utility company to use its pole involved such a potential.  In
fact, DiBiasi does not allege that Joe Wheeler's act alone
contributed to Dominic's death.  Instead, DiBiasi argues that
"[t]he combined actions of [Hartselle] and Joe Wheeler placed
uninsulated high voltage transmission lines within just a few
feet of the roof line of a private residence."  DiBiasi's
reply brief at 11.  DiBiasi's arguments are premised on the
transmission of electricity; DiBiasi has not addressed the
type of injury or harm that was threatened by Joe Wheeler's
act of supplying a utility pole.
1060848
23
Even assuming that Dominic's injuries were foreseeable,
we conclude that none of the other Morgan factors support the
existence of "a legal duty [owed by Joe Wheeler] sufficient to
support an action for negligence."  Morgan, 466 So. 2d at 114.
Therefore, based on our review and application of the Morgan
factors, we hold that Joe Wheeler did not owe a duty of care
to Dominic.
Conclusion
We conclude that Joe Wheeler did not owe a duty of care
to Dominic and that Joe Wheeler was entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.  Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of
Joe Wheeler is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.