Title: Com. v. Bulovas

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

301 Pa. Superior Ct. 55 (1982) 446 A.2d 1332 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Edward J. BULOVAS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued December 9, 1981. Filed June 18, 1982. Reargument Denied August 24, 1982. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied December 3, 1982. *56 Burton A. Rose, Philadelphia, for appellant. Alan Sacks, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before SPAETH, MONTGOMERY and LIPEZ, JJ. MONTGOMERY, Judge: Appellant Edward Bulovas was convicted, following a jury trial, of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, criminal conspiracy and kidnapping. Following the denial of post-trial motions and sentencing, he filed a direct appeal. This court affirmed per curiam the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Bulovas, 251 Pa.Super. 592, 381 A.2d 892 (1977). Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by our Supreme Court on May 2, 1978. On December 12, 1978, Appellant filed a Petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 et seq. Following a hearing, the Honorable Edward J. Blake denied the requested relief, and Appellant filed the instant appeal. The incident for which Appellant was convicted began when his co-defendant John Horan abducted a sixteen-year *57 old girl at gunpoint. He dragged her into a car where Appellant was waiting. After driving to an isolated area, both men forced her to commit oral intercourse and raped her. Approximately four hours after the initial abduction, the victim was released. Horan was tried, convicted and sentenced prior to Appellant's arrest. Following his sentencing, Horan gave a statement to Detective Nicholas Bratsis, identifying Appellant as his co-defendant. Horan then testified against Appellant at his trial. The sole claim on this appeal is that Horan's testimony was induced by a Commonwealth promise to write a letter to the parole board verifying Horan's cooperation and that this "promise" had been concealed from the jury. We disagree and affirm. In the PCHA proceeding, Appellant had the burden of proving grounds for relief. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 494 Pa. 457, 431 A.2d 944 (1981); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 294 Pa.Super. 529, 440 A.2d 591 (1982). Assistant District Attorney Michael Stiles testified at the PCHA hearing that: Appellant's attorney testified that his recollection was hazy but that he did recall trying to obtain a commitment from the District Attorney's Office that would be of greater benefit to his client. N.T. 16-17. At most, this evidence establishes that the District Attorney's office might have agreed to confirm that Horan testified against Appellant, a fact which Horan could easily have made known to the parole board without any assistance whatever from the District Attorney's office. We agree *58 with the trial court that this evidence is insufficient to show that any promises or threats were made to Horan to induce his testimony against Appellant. Affirmed. SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion. SPAETH, Judge, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority that appellant's claim is without merit. On the contrary, I find it persuasive, and believe that we should reverse the order of the lower court and grant a new trial. Appellant's claim is that he was denied a fair trial because the jury was not told that an assistant district attorney had promised appellant's co-defendant, John Horan, to write a favorable letter to the parole board if he testified against appellant.[1] The lower court rejected appellant's claim, on the following reasoning: Although the majority subscribes to this reasoning, I cannot. First, the reasoning suggests that the lower court did not understand appellant's claim. If appellant were claiming that the quid pro quo for Horan's testimony was a promise to request a short sentence, then, to be sure, the fact that Horan had already been sentenced when he testified against appellant would be relevant. For then it could be said that Horan's testimony had not been induced by the promise. Since he had already received a long sentence, he would know, when he testified, that the assistant district attorney's promise had been worthless. But appellant does not claim that the quid pro quo was a promise to request a short sentence. He claims that the quid pro quo was a promise to send a favorable letter to the parole board. The fact that Horan had already been sentenced when he testified against appellant is therefore irrelevant. Since Horan had been sentenced, the assistant district attorney could not promise a short sentence. But he could promise a favorable letter, which might result in Horan's early release from prison. The issue is whether that promise induced Horan's testimony against appellant at trial. Second, the Commonwealth argues that appellant "presented no evidence that [the assistant district attorney] even wrote such a letter to the Parole Board . . . or that the Board ever received such a letter . . . ." Brief for Commonwealth *60 at 6. This argument equally misses the point, which is not whether the Commonwealth kept its promise to Horan but whether by making the promise it induced him to testify. Finally, appellant's claim is supported by the record. Indeed, I agree with appellant's statement in his brief that the conclusion of the lower court was in disregard of the testimony. Appellant's Brief at 13. At the hearing before the lower court it was uncontroverted that an assistant district attorney had met with Horan and had told him that if he testified against appellant, a favorable letter would be written to the parole board.[2] The assistant district attorney himself, Michael Stiles, who was then Chief of the Felony Jury Unit, testified that a meeting with Horan, his counsel, Richard DiMaio, and another assistant district attorney took place in his City Hall office, N.T. 1/3/80, 43, for the purpose of getting Horan to testify against appellant because Horan "was important to the case." Id. 48. Recounting his recollection of the meeting, Mr. Stiles said: Mr. Stiles's testimony was corroborated by Horan's counsel, Mr. DiMaio: On cross-examination Mr. DiMaio commented further on what he regarded as the assistant district attorney's implied threat that if Horan did not testify against appellant, an un favorable letter would be sent to the parole board: It is settled that due process is violated where an offer of leniency made in exchange for a witness's testimony is not made known to the jury. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), a co-defendant testified against his accomplice that he had not been made a promise in return for his testimony when in fact the prosecutor had offered to recommend reduction of his sentence. The Court there said: Similarly, our Supreme Court has held that due process requires that the Commonwealth disclose an offer of leniency made to a witness in exchange for his testimony. Commonwealth *64 v. Hallowell, 477 Pa. 232, 383 A.2d 909 (1978). When such an offer has been made but denied at trial, "rudimentary demands of justice dictate that a defendant's conviction be reversed and a new trial granted . . . ." Id., 477 Pa. at 238, 383 A.2d at 911. Accord, Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 219 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 280 A.2d 410 (1971) (prosecutor had duty to disclose offer of lenience made to accomplice, for knowledge of offer may affect jury's evaluation of credibility of witness). This principle is especially compelling where, as here, the witness's testimony is crucial to the Commonwealth's case. The record shows that without Horan's testimony, the only evidence linking appellant with the crime was the victim's uncertain identification of him. She had been unable to identify appellant with confidence at a line-up, at which she picked out appellant but said, "I don't know. Number 2 sort of looks like him. But I don't know." N.T. 9/20/76, 1.120 (testimony of victim); N.T. 9/22/76, 3.19 (testimony of officer at line-up). She had also been unable to identify appellant in a photo array a few months after the incident. N.T. 9/22/76, 3.44 (testimony of Detective Bratsis). Appellant's defense was that he had been wrongly identified, N.T. 9/22/76, 3.99 (closing argument of defense counsel), and in support of this defense there was evidence that Horan had a motive to lie, for his brother, who resembled appellant, had been involved with appellant's wife before her marriage to appellant. 9/21/76, 2.142-2.144. In response to appellant's defense, the prosecutor emphasized in her closing argument that Horan "had nothing to gain in this case," N.T. 9/22/76, 3.131, and that "he has already been sentenced, and he had already been serving that sentence, and in no way could his testimony here, in any way, affect that sentence, and, in fact, he was sentenced before he ever talked to Detective Bratsis, and his sentence was never changed by the Court." Id. 3.125. See also, id. 3.126, 3.127, 3.128, 3.131. This argument might not have been so persuasive if the jury had known of the Commonwealth's promise to Horan that if he testified against appellant, a favorable letter would be sent *65 to the parole board, perhaps resulting in his early release from prison. I should reverse and grant a new trial. [1] The Commonwealth argues that appellant has waived this claim for failing to present it on direct appeal or in his PCHA petition. I do not agree. Nothing in the record suggests that appellant knew of the Commonwealth's promise to Horan in time to raise the issue on direct appeal. It was the Commonwealth's duty to disclose this promise at trial. Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 219 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 280 A.2d 410 (1971). Not having done so, it is in no position to argue that appellant should be penalized for learning about the promise only afterwards. Also, contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion, the claim was raised in appellant's PCHA petition. Petition at 2. [2] At trial, Horan denied the fact that any promises had been made to him. N.T. 9/21/76, 2.104.