Title: Heiss v. City of Casper Planningand Zoning Com'n

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Heiss v. City of Casper Planningand Zoning Com'n1997 WY 81941 P.2d 27Case Number: 96-146Decided: 06/19/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

SUSAN 
E. HEISS and WILLIAM N. HEISS,

Appellants(Petitioners), 

 

v. 

 

CITY OF CASPER PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION, 

 Appellee(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from istrict Court, Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 Susan E. Heiss and William N. Heiss, pro 
se.

 Representing 
Appellee:

 W. Jackson Stewart, Casper City Attorney, and Loyd E. 
Smith, Cheyenne.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellants Susan 
and William Heiss (Heisses) appeal the order affirming a conditional use permit 
granted by the City of Casper Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission). We 
reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the 
Commission.

 

[¶2]      The Heisses 
present the following issues:

 

A.        Whether the 
decision by the Casper Planning and Zoning Commission (the "Commission") in Case 
No. CU-95-006 (the "Case") was "supported by substantial evidence" when there 
was no evidence or testimony presented by the applicant in that 
case.

B.        Whether the 
Commission complied with the applicable provisions of the City of Casper Zoning 
Ordinance ("Ordinance") in making its decision in the 
case.

C.        Whether the 
grant of a conditional use permit in the Case effectively rezoned the subject 
property without complying with the provisions of the applicable zoning 
ordinances.

 

The Commission states the 
issues:

1. Whether the decision of the City of Casper 
Planning and Zoning Commission granting a Conditional Use Permit to allow an 
off-street parking lot in a R-4 Zone was supported by substantial 
evidence[.]

 

A. 
       
Whether the Planning and Zoning Commission complied with the applicable 
provisions of the City of Casper Zoning Ordinance in making its 
decision[.]

B.        Whether 
Appellants waived all issues concerning the conditional use except whether to 
locate a curb cut on Gannett Street[.]

2. Whether the grant of the Conditional Use Permit 
effectively rezoned the subject property[.]

 

FACTS

[¶3]      Luker Realty 
filed a petition for a conditional use permit to allow an off-street parking lot 
in a high density residential zone. The land adjoining the subject property to 
the north was zoned commercial highway business, and Luker Realty sought the 
conditional use permit to provide parking for development of that commercial 
lot. Access to the commercially zoned area exists to the north and east of the 
commercial lot. The petition proposed a curb cut on Gannett Street to provide 
for southern access to the commercial lot through the subject 
property.

 

[¶4]      Gannett Street 
runs on the south side of the subject property. South of Gannett, the property 
is zoned for single unit residences. The property lying to the west and to the 
east of the subject property is zoned for planned unit development and general 
business. Diagonally from the subject property, across a three-way intersection, 
is a neighborhood park.

 

[¶5]      The Commission is 
required to hold a public hearing on all conditional use permits, and all real 
property owners within a three hundred foot radius of the perimeter of the 
property in question must receive notice of the public hearing. The Heisses are 
real property owners within the three hundred foot radius 
perimeter.

 

[¶6]      The Commission 
received written comments. Betty Luker, president of Luker Realty, submitted a 
letter in support of the permit. Two groups of landowners submitted identical 
petitions, one signed by landowners within the three hundred foot radius and the 
other by landowners outside the three hundred foot radius. Both petitions 
premised their support of the permit on the condition, among others, that there 
be no curb cut on Gannett Street. Several landowners, including the Heisses, 
submitted additional written comments emphasizing the need to preclude the curb 
cut. Gary Freel, Casper's Zoning and Code Enforcement Officer, recommended 
approval of the conditional use permit, also with the condition to exclude the 
Gannett Street curb cut.

 

[¶7]      The Commission 
held the public hearing and subsequently issued its order, granting the 
conditional use permit and allowing the curb cut on Gannett Street. The Heisses 
petitioned the district court for review, and the court affirmed the order. This 
timely appeal follows.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard of 
Review

 

[¶8]      Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 12 provides for judicial review of agency actions. Rule 
12.09(a) limits the extent of review to determination of matters specified in 
W.S. 16-3-114(c). That statute requires reviewing courts to hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; [or]

* * * * * *

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii). We 
review the agency decision de novo, according no deference to the district 
court's decision. Campbell v. Dep't of 
Family Serv., 881 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 1994).

Our task is to examine the entire record to determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's findings. We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner if his 
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993). In reviewing questions 
of law, however, we do not defer to the agency's decision. If the conclusion of 
law is in accordance with law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992).

 

Substantial 
Evidence

 

[¶9]      The Heisses 
contend that substantial evidence does not exist to support the Commission's 
decision to grant the conditional use permit with a curb cut on Gannett Street. 
The Commission's decision is embodied in its Findings of Fact No. 6, which 
states:

The proposed use of this residential site (R-4), for 
off-street parking purposes, is considered consistent with the spirit and intent 
of the Zoning Ordinance, and the Commission further finds that the proposed use 
will not substantially impair the appropriate use of neighboring property 
because the parking lot will be buffered from the residential area and only a 
portion of the traffic to and from the lot will access through the residential 
area of this neighborhood, thereby producing only minimal additional 
traffic.

 

[¶10]   The only evidence we found in the 
record which supports the Commission's decision is a letter from the applicant, 
Betty Luker, who was not present at the hearing, and the following comments made 
by Commission members:

Rudkin: * * * I have a couple of points. * * * 
[T]hose two squares to the north of the parking lot will perhaps contain 
buildings and that will break up the distance that the gentleman was talking 
about. That also will create a little bit of a problem, as far as that parking 
lot is concerned, because all of the traffic that goes in and out of that 
parking lot will funnel through between those two establishments in the future, 
if they exist. Seems to me that this might create a bottleneck without a curb 
cut on Gannett Street.

 

Jarvis: It's already a bottleneck. * * * Well the 
turn into the Safeway parking is already a bottleneck the way it is. I think 
with two more businesses in the area, we need another way to get out. I can 
understand the concern about adding more traffic on Gannett, but I can also see 
the way the traffic flows you can't expect them to 
dead-end.

 

Barrett: Members of the Commission, I might add the 
cut you see at Key bank, the curb cut there, will possibly be utilized when we 
actually have a site plan for the restaurant.

 

Jarvis: Without a site plan, we are at a great 
disadvantage.

 

Barrett: Also, the curb cut on Gannett primarily 
would be for the residents that live in that area. People accessing the site are 
not going to utilize that.

 

Crowd says - we don't want it.

 

Barrett: If you look at the configuration of it[,] 
that is representative if you look at the traffic flow out of there. But the two 
cuts in the primary secondary curb cut would probably be utilized if it's a 
restaurant, by the one at Key Bank, which is a shared access 
there.

 

The Commission's speculation 
just prior to the decision reflects the inherent problems in reaching a decision 
without sufficient material evidence:

Rudkin: Assuming you'd have an apartment in there, 
how would you get into and out of it?

 

Zukin: You'd have a curb cut, but you'd have a 
different kind of traffic going in and out of there. You'd have a different view 
from the other side of the street.

 

Sasser: Yes. But you'd still have possibly the same 
amount of traffic, cause I mean the apartments could generate as much traffic 
flow as anything else.

 

Audience: No way!

* 
* * * * *

Zukin: I think there's a difference between looking 
down on a parking lot and looking down on an apartment complex or condominiums. 
Is there any other discussion to this amending motion? This motion then is to 
amend the original motion and allow a curb cut on Gannett. Janet, would you call 
the roll please? [Motion passes four to two.]

 

We have previously stated that it is essential to 
surviving judicial review that the record of a contested agency action contain 
such factual findings as would permit a court to follow the agency's reasoning 
from the evidentiary facts on record to its eventual legal conclusions. 
Similarly, we have held that a contested case hearing must provide, and the 
record of that proceeding must document, information sufficient to the making of 
a reasonable decision. Absent such information, the agency decision must be set 
aside as arbitrary.

Jackson v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation 
Div., 786 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1990) 
(citations omitted); see also Mekss v. 
Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 201 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶11]   The Commission argues its decision 
is supported by evidence of the characteristics of the surrounding properties, 
Doug Barrett's recommendation from the planning and development staff and the 
minutes and transcript from the hearing. Although we agree that the 
characteristics of the surrounding properties are relevant, we find the record 
contains no evidentiary facts to support the Commission's finding that granting 
the permit with the curb cut on Gannett Street will "produc[e] only minimal 
additional traffic." Finding of Fact No. 6.

 

[¶12]   In asserting that its discussions 
at the hearing constitute substantial evidence, the Commission cites School Dist. No. 9 v. Dist. Boundary 
Bd., 351 P.2d 106, 113 (Wyo. 1960), for the proposition that an agency can 
draw on its own knowledge and staff reports in reaching its decision. The only 
staff recommendation in the record, however, is Gary Freel's report, and it does 
not support the Commission's Finding of Fact No. 6 because it advised the 
Commission to approve the conditional use permit without allowing a curb cut on 
Gannett Street. His report reflects that the evidence of the surrounding 
property use, namely the residential neighborhood on the other side of Gannett 
Street, warranted exclusion of the curb cut.

 

[¶13]   As for the hearing transcript, the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), § 16-3-107(r), expressly requires 
that "[f]indings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and matters 
officially noticed." Administrative agencies possess the same ability as courts 
to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Application of Campbell County, 731 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Wyo. 1987). The WAPA makes clear that in order for an agency to 
effectively take official notice, it must inform the parties and give them an 
opportunity to respond. Section 16-3-108(d) of the WAPA prescribes 
that:

Notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts. 
In addition notice may be taken of technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge or information, data and material included within 
the agency's files. The parties shall be notified either before or during the 
hearing or after the hearing but before the agency decision of material facts 
noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts 
noticed.

See also Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Oil 
& Gas Conservation Comm'n, 809 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1991). Here, nothing in the record indicates that the 
Commission was taking official notice of the traffic situation in the 
area.

 

[¶14]   Even if the Commission had 
officially noticed facts regarding the traffic in that area, judicial notice is 
improper in this situation for two reasons. First, an evidentiary basis must 
exist in the record before an agency can take judicial notice of an adjudicative 
fact. In Nuspl, we said that to evaluate the propriety of taking judicial 
notice, "[t]he question always to be answered is whether the court has in fact 
embodied in its findings or opinion an adjudicative fact not found in or 
supported by the formal evidence in the case * * *." Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo. 
1986) (quoting Louisell and Mueller, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 58, at 449 (1977)). Cf. Hansen v. Mr. D's Food Center, 827 P.2d 371, 374 (Wyo. 1992) ("an administrative agency may take judicial notice of 
materials in their files if that is, in fact, done on the record"). The 
Commission's discussion of the traffic in the area was neither based on 
cognizable facts in the formal evidence of the case nor on technical or 
scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge. Thus, the Commission 
could not have officially noticed the information it cites as support for its 
decision.

 

[¶15]   Second, the possible impact of 
granting a conditional use permit on traffic in an area is not the type of 
adjudicative fact of which a trial court or administrative agency should take 
judicial notice. Cf. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 761 P.2d 995, 998 (Wyo. 1988) (holding 
erroneous the application of judicial notice of a land value). Wyoming Rule of 
Evidence 201(b) limits the type of adjudicative fact of which a court may take 
judicial notice:

 

Kinds of facts. - A judicially noticed fact must be 
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.

 

The impact of granting a 
conditional use permit on traffic is neither readily determined by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned, nor is it a fact 
generally known within the jurisdiction. It would, therefore, be an improper 
adjudicative fact for judicial notice.

 

[¶16]   The reason an agency must create a 
record of material and substantial evidence is, "so that a reviewing court can 
determine whether such factual development occurred or whether, instead, the 
agency's actions were based on unwarranted or undeclared assumptions." Jackson v. State ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Div., 786 P.2d  at 877. We hold that the Commission's Finding of 
Fact No. 6 is based on unwarranted assumptions; and we, therefore, set the 
agency's decision aside as unsupported by substantial evidence. 

 

Compliance 
with the Ordinance

 

[¶17]   The Heisses assert the Commission's 
decision is arbitrary because the Commission did not consider all relevant 
factors required by Casper Zoning Ordinance 17.12.240. This issue is closely 
related to the first issue because failure to consider relevant factors is 
indicative that the Commission lacked substantial evidence. Subsections (G) and 
(H) prescribe the factors the Commission must consider in deciding whether to 
issue a conditional use permit:

(G) No conditional use permit shall be granted unless 
the commission finds:

1. 
The conditional use is consistent with the spirit, purpose, and intent of this 
title; will not substantially impair the appropriate use of neighboring 
property; and will serve the public need, convenience, and 
welfare;

2. 
The conditional use is designed to be compatible with adjacent land uses and the 
area of its location.

(H) In making its findings, the commission shall 
consider any relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following, if 
applicable to the proposed use:

1. Area and height to be occupied by buildings or 
other structures;

2. 
Density for the proposed use in terms of units per acre and the number of 
offices, employees, occupants, or all three;

3. Volume of business in terms of the number of 
customers per day;

4. 
Increased traffic congestion or hazard caused by the use which may be over and 
above normal traffic for the area, as determined by the city engineer and 
planning director;

5. 
Location of use with respect to the same or similar uses within a three hundred 
foot radius of the perimeter of the described property;

6. 
Any other criteria affecting public health, safety, and welfare, as provided for 
by written rules of the commission.

 

[¶18]   At the time of the hearing, neither 
the Commission nor the applicant knew what type of business would occupy the 
adjoining property. The six factors enumerated in the ordinance reflect a 
legislative intent that the Commission's decision be based on specific 
information like the type of use (factor 5), the volume of business (factor 3) 
and its impact on the traffic in the area (factor 4).

 

[¶19]   In this case, the applicant did not 
submit evidence regarding traffic and the Commission did not solicit a 
determination by the city engineer and planning director to support the curb cut 
on Gannett Street. The record reflects that traffic considerations were 
"applicable to the proposed use" because the Heisses and others presented 
considerable evidence in opposition to the curb cut based on traffic concerns.1 We have previously held that "[a]n 
agency action is arbitrary or capricious if it is not based on a consideration 
of the relevant factors." Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 1330-31 (Wyo. 1979); see also 
Knight v. Environmental Quality Council, 805 P.2d 268, 273 (Wyo. 1991). Thus, in 
failing to consider a determination "by the city engineer and planning director" 
as prescribed by subsection (H)(4) of the ordinance, we hold as a matter of law 
that the Commission acted arbitrarily.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   The Commission's decision was not 
in accordance with law, and Finding of Fact No. 6 is unsupported by substantial 
evidence. We reverse the district court's order and remand the case to the 
district court with instructions to remand to the Commission. As we are 
remanding for a new hearing, we decline to reach other issues presented in this 
appeal.

 

[¶21]   Reversed and 
remanded.

 

Footnotes

1 For example, appellant Bill Heiss 
testified at the hearing that:

This street has 
a jog in it right here. If you come around this corner and you want to turn on 
to Gannett or continue on this way, you cannot see beyond this point until 
you've gotten quite a ways down the street. I mean there is a real safety issue 
here. This one shows it more clearly, that other one wasn't an accurate plat. 
When you turn off this street you can't see this point until you get to the 
corner by Key Bank, and there are many people who are turning off of Wyoming 
Boulevard onto Shannon who almost get hit here. We've had several accidents at 
this point because they turn here before they can see the length of Gannett 
Street and so we think it's imperative that the recommendation of no access and 
no curb cut be followed because there is a real safety issue, besides the high 
rate of speed used going down these streets. The visual aspect of being able to 
see here is really important.