Title: du Pont v. Forma-Pack

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., No. 99, 1997 Term
DISCOVERY — Attorney/Client Privilege — Work/Product Privilege — Neither
attorney/client privilege nor work/product privilege prevents discovery of documents
transmitted between a corporation’s in house legal department and a debt collection agency
hired to collect a corporate debt.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case # C-97-36415
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 99
September Term, 1997
________________________________________
E.I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.
v.
FORMA-PACK, INC.
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
 
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
Eldridge, Raker, & Wilner, JJ., dissent
________________________________________
      Filed:  October 8, 1998
Maryland Rule 8-207(a)(2) states: “Statement of case and facts.  Within 15 days after
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the filing of the joint election, the parties shall file with the Clerk four copies of an agreed
The issue in this case is whether the work product doctrine and/or the attorney-client
privilege protects from discovery documents that were transmitted between a creditor
corporation’s in-house legal department and an outside debt collection agency.  To be
protected, such documents must have been produced in anticipation of litigation or in
rendition of legal services.  The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County rejected both claims
of privilege in this case, finding that E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) failed to meet
its burden of proof as to the existence of any privilege.  We affirm the judgment of the trial
court denying DuPont’s motion for a protective order and hold that neither the work product
doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege protects the documents in question from discovery
by Forma-Pack, Inc. (Forma-Pack), as they were not produced in anticipation of litigation
or in rendition of legal services, but instead were produced for the purely business purpose
of debt collection.
I.  BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
denying a motion for a protective order filed by DuPont.  DuPont noted a timely appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals, and the order of the circuit court was stayed pending a decision
by the intermediate appellate court.  We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to
consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.
In accordance with Maryland Rule 8-207(a)(2),  the parties filed the following agreed
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statement of the case, including the essential facts, as prescribed by Rule 8-413(b)....”
statement of the case and facts:
“DuPont and Forma-Pack are parties to a lawsuit pending in the
Superior Court for the State of California in and for the County
of San Joaquin, entitled E. I. DuPont, Inc. v. Forma-Pack, Inc.,
Case No. 292630 (filed March 11, 1996) (the “California
Action”).  During the course of discovery in the California
Action, Forma-Pack had two deposition subpoenas duces tecum
issued by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and served
them on R. P. Ehrlich and his employer, Kaplan & Kaplan
[(Kaplan)].  Forma-Pack sought to take the depositions of, and
receive documents from, Mr. Ehrlich and Kaplan & Kaplan in
Anne Arundel County.  Kaplan & Kaplan is a collection agency
which had been retained by DuPont’s legal department in
November, 1992 to undertake collection efforts against Forma-
Pack and ultimately to retain a San Francisco attorney, Stanley
Peck, to file the underlying California Action against Forma-
Pack seeking collection of the alleged debt.
In response to Forma-Pack’s subpoenas, DuPont filed a
motion for protective order to prevent the disclosure of
communications and documents which it believes are protected
by the attorney/client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
Forma-Pack opposed DuPont’s motion maintaining that the
communications between DuPont’s attorneys and its collection
agents were not protected by either privilege.  Both parties filed
supplemental memoranda prior to the hearing before the trial
court, which occurred on August 7, 1997.
Along with its motion and memorandum, DuPont
submitted the affidavits of two DuPont employees which stated
that DuPont’s legal department did not typically receive
delinquent accounts, such as the Forma-Pack account, until after
the appropriate DuPont business unit had attempted to collect
the account....  Upon receipt of the Forma-Pack account,
DuPont’s legal department retained Kaplan & Kaplan to assist
in the collection of the account and, if necessary, to retain
counsel to file suit.  The affidavits submitted further stated that
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once the legal department received the Forma-Pack account,
DuPont presumed that litigation might be necessary (which in
fact it was) and that all communications with Kaplan & Kaplan
were intended to be privileged.  The privilege log submitted by
DuPont describes the pertinent documents, including two
internal Kaplan & Kaplan documents, as reflecting
communications between Kaplan & Kaplan and/or attorneys
involved in this litigation or the California Action.
As a result, DuPont argued that the collection of the
Forma-Pack account, once it was referred to DuPont’s legal
department, was a purely legal function, and that
communications made in the course of the engagement of
Kaplan & Kaplan to aid in its collection efforts w[ere] protected
by the attorney/client privilege.  DuPont also argued that the
documents and communications between its legal department
and Kaplan & Kaplan were protected by the work-product
doctrine because the communications were made in anticipation
of litigation.  DuPont also invited the court to conduct an in
camera inspection of the documents listed on the privilege log.
Forma-Pack disagreed with DuPont’s position.  Forma-
Pack maintained that the attempted collection of the disputed
debt in the underlying California Action was a business, not a
legal, activity.  Forma-Pack pointed out that DuPont’s attempts
to collect the disputed debt pre-dated the filing of the underlying
action by several years.  Forma-Pack also submitted the prior
deposition testimony of one of DuPont’s own affiants, Susan F.
Herr, who stated that, “[I]t may have been a business approach
on behalf of DuPont in the collection of the debt.”  Forma-Pack
maintained that this business approach to the collection of the
debt was directly at issue in the underlying litigation and an area
of inquiry to which Forma-Pack is entitled to discovery.
By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 13,
1997, the trial court denied DuPont’s motion for protective
order.  The court adopted Forma-Pack’s argument[,] ruling that
the attorney/client privilege did not apply because the collection
of a debt is a business function and not a legal function.  The
court also ruled that the work-product doctrine did not apply
because it believed that the work performed by Kaplan &
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Kaplan for DuPont was not done with the belief that there was
some possibility that litigation might result.”  (Footnotes and
internal citations omitted).
The issues before this Court are set forth in the trial judge’s opinion:
“In bringing this action, Dupont makes two arguments in
support of its Motion for a Protective Order.  First, Dupont
argues that Kaplan is an agent of Dupont’s legal department and
that any communication between the two is not discoverable
under the attorney-client privilege.  In addition, Dupont argues
that communications between Dupont and Kaplan in their
efforts to collect a debt from Forma-Pack are not discoverable
under the work-product doctrine.  The Court finds these
arguments unpersuasive and will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for the
reasons stated below.”
DuPont does not dispute that its arguments were correctly framed by the trial judge.
Forma-Pack maintains that the circuit court was correct in finding that the hiring of a
collection agency by a creditor corporation constitutes a business approach, not a legal
approach, to debt collection and that Kaplan is not DuPont’s agent for purposes of litigation.
As such, Forma-Pack argues that the communications between DuPont and Kaplan are not
shielded from discovery under either the work product doctrine or the attorney-client
privilege.  We are called upon to decide whether the trial judge was clearly erroneous in
finding, after a full evidentiary hearing, that DuPont failed to meet its burden of proof as to
the existence of either privilege and thus was not entitled to a protective order based on
privilege.  While there is no doubt that some of the documents might violate Kaplan’s
attorney-client privilege, in particular the items pertaining to communications between
Kaplan and its own attorney, the communications between Kaplan and DuPont are not
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privileged for the reasons stated infra, and it is only DuPont and not Kaplan that is claiming
these privileges.  Also important to our holding is that DuPont hired a non-lawyer company
to handle the debt collection matter, rather than an attorney or law firm, which leads us to
conclude that legal advice and assistance were not DuPont’s intent in retaining Kaplan.
II.  ANALYSIS
The current Maryland discovery rules are premised on a philosophy encouraging
liberal disclosure.  See Balto. Transit v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13, 174 A.2d 768, 771
(1961).  Indeed, the State’s discovery rules are deliberately designed to be broad,
comprehensive in scope and liberally construed.  Id.  In Kelch v. Mass Transit Adm., 287
Md. 223, 411 A.2d 449 (1980), this Court stated:
“[A]mong the basic objectives in providing for discovery is <to
require disclosure of facts by a party litigant to all of his
adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as possible, the
necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or
muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that give rise to the
litigation.’  Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55, 395 A.2d 126, 137
(1978).  Further, ‘[i]n order to accomplish the above purposes,
the discovery rules are to be liberally construed.’ *** Baltimore
Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 13-14, 174 A.2d 768, 771
(1961)....”
287 Md. at  229-30, 411 A.2d at 453.  See also Rubin v. Weissman, 59 Md. App. 392, 401,
475 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1984)(noting that “the discovery rules are to be liberally
construed”)(quoting Balto. Transit, 227 Md. at 13, 174 A.2d at 771); Barnes v. Lednum, 197
Md. 398, 406, 79 A.2d 520, 524 (1951)(stating that “[m]odern discovery statutes or rules are
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intended to facilitate discovery”). 
The main purposes to be served by allowing pretrial discovery of documents are “(i)
to acquire accurate and useful information with respect to testimony which is likely to be
presented by an opponent, (ii) to obtain information which appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and (iii) to use as an aid in cross-examining the
opponent’s witnesses.”  Kelch, 287 Md. at 231, 411 A.2d at 454.
In administering the discovery rules, trial judges “‘are vested with a reasonable, sound
discretion in applying them, which discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a
showing of its abuse.’”  Kelch, 287 Md. at 229, 411 A.2d at 453 (quoting Balto. Transit, 227
Md. at 13-14, 174 A.2d at 771 (footnote omitted)).  Moreover, the party who is resisting
discovery and is asserting a protective privilege bears the burden of establishing its existence
and applicability.  See Maxima v. 6933 Arlington Dev., 100 Md. App. 441, 456, 641 A.2d
977, 984 (1994); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11, 602 A.2d 1220,
1225 (1992).
With these principles in mind, particularly as they pertain to Md. Rule 2-402 and
Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 9-108,
infra, we now turn to our analysis of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege as they pertain to the case before us.  As we examine the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege, it is helpful to note the following distinctions between the two.
First, while they appear to embrace the same concepts of confidentiality and zealous
client advocacy, the work product doctrine is separate and distinct from the attorney-client
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privilege.  Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 446 n.2, 387 A.2d 779, 782 n.2 (1978).  The
attorney-client privilege as applied in judicial proceedings is narrowly construed, whereas
the work product doctrine is  broader in scope.  Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94,
96 (D. N.J. 1990).  Indeed, even though it is often referred to as a privilege, the work product
doctrine is not a privilege at all, but is “merely a requirement that very good cause be shown
if the disclosure is made in the course of a lawyer’s preparation of a case.”  City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Second, the work product doctrine is “historically and traditionally a privilege of the attorney
and not that of the client.”  Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 207 F. Supp.
771, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1962).  In contrast, it is the client who is the holder of the attorney-client
privilege.  Trupp v. Wolff, 24 Md. App. 588, 609, 335 A.2d 171, 184 (1975).  See also 5
LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 503.1, at 481-82 (1987)(footnotes omitted). 
A.  Work Product Doctrine 
The work product doctrine protects from discovery the work of an attorney done in
anticipation of litigation or in readiness for trial.  See Md. Rule 2-402(c)(full text found in
footnote 2, supra).  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in the seminal case of
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), has guided the work
product doctrine in both the state and federal courts.  When confronted with the work
product doctrine, courts must balance the need for efficient litigation through liberal
disclosure against the attorney’s responsibility to be a zealous and protective advocate for
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his or her client.  The Hickman Court acknowledged the tension of these competing interests
when it stated that “the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as
possible...,” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 506, 67 S.Ct. at 391, 91 L.Ed. at 460, while also noting
that “discovery ... has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”  329 U.S. at 507, 67 S.Ct. at 392,
91 L.Ed. at 460.
With the touchstone of the work product doctrine being that the materials must have
been created in preparation for trial, the Hickman Court also discussed two different types
of attorney work product, fact and opinion.  Regarding fact work product, the Court stated:
“No longer can the time-honored cry of <fishing expedition’
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent’s case.  Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.  To that
end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession.”  (Footnote omitted).
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507, 67 S.Ct. at 392, 91 L.Ed. at 460.
In discussing what has come to be called “opinion” work product, the Court stated that
the work product doctrine does not
“concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client’s case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect
an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories.”
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 392, 91 L.Ed. at 461.
Subsequent courts have refined the distinction between fact and opinion work product,
with both being generally protected and discoverable only in limited circumstances.  See In
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“Trial Preparation: Materials.  Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of
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this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including the
other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means.  In ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of a party concerning the litigation....”
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4  Cir. 1994).  Fact work product can only
th
be discovered when “substantial need” and “undue hardship” are shown, but opinion work
product is almost always completely protected from disclosure.  Id.  See also Md. Rule 2-
402(c).
The work product doctrine of Hickman is codified in Md. Rule 2-402(c):
“Trial Preparation--Materials.  Subject to the provisions of
sections (d) and (e) of this Rule, a party may obtain discovery
of documents or other tangible things prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party’s representative (including an attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the materials are discoverable under section (a) of this Rule and
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need for the
materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.  In ordering discovery of these
materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.”  (Emphasis
added).
Maryland Rule 2-402 (c) is almost identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).2
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See Shenk v. Berger, 86 Md. App. 498, 502, 587 A.2d 551, 553 (1991)(“Maryland looks to
corresponding federal rule for guidance in construing similar Maryland rule”)(citing
Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 308, 221 A.2d 342, 352 (1966)).  As with
Hickman and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the standard for determining if a
party can use Md. Rule 2-402(c) to shield his or her documents from discovery is whether
the materials were prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”  Determining “whether a document
or other tangible thing was ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial’ ... is essentially
a question of fact, which, if in dispute, is to be determined by the trial judge following an
evidentiary hearing.”  Kelch, 287 Md. at 228, 411 A.2d at 453.  See also Rubin, 59 Md. App.
at 402, 475 A.2d at 1240.  In addition, the party claiming the privilege bears the burden “‘to
substantiate its non-discovery assertion by a preponderance of the evidence....’”  Kelch, 287
Md. at 229, 411 A.2d at 453 (quoting Rule 422).  If the moving party is successful in its
claim, then the party seeking discovery can gain access to the communications by
demonstrating “substantial need” and “undue hardship.”  See Md. Rule 2-402(c).
In determining whether particular materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation,
courts examine whether or not they were created in the ordinary course of business.  APL
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 18 (D. Md. 1980).  The Advisory Committee
notes to the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules noted that “materials assembled in the
ordinary course of business or for nonlitigation purposes are not under the partial immunity
granted by [Rule 26] subsection(b)(3).”  Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation, 65
F.R.D. 26, 42 (D. Md. 1974).  In looking at whether the materials at issue were prepared in
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anticipation of litigation, the court in APL stated:
“‘Courts and commentators have offered a variety of formulas
for the necessary nexus between the creation of the material and
the prospect of litigation.  See, e.g., Home Insurance Co. v.
Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D.Ga. 1977) (must be a
“substantial probability that litigation will occur and that
commencement of such litigation is imminent”); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Sturgis), [412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa.
1976)] (threat of litigation must be “real and imminent”); Stix
Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 47
F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (prospect of litigation must be
“identifiable”); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26.63(2.-1), at 26-
349 (1970) (litigation must “reasonably have been anticipated or
apprehended”).’”
91 F.R.D. at 15 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3  Cir.
rd
1979)).
Other jurisdictions have ruled that the communication must have been prepared
“‘principally or exclusively to assist in anticipated or ongoing litigation.’”  Sackman v. Ligget
Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 366 (E.D. N.Y. 1996)(quoting Martin v. Valley Nat. Bank of
Arizona, 140 F.R.D. 291, 304 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) and U.S. v. Construction Products Research,
Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)).  See also Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chemicals,
Inc., 124 F.R.D. 511, 515 (D. Mass. 1989)(noting there must be a substantial probability of
litigation, a mere possibility is not enough); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596, 604 (8  Cir. 1977)(stating the “work product rule does not ... come into play merely
th
because there is a remote prospect of future litigation” (citation omitted)).
According to Wright and Miller, the test of whether documents were prepared in
anticipation of litigation is stated as follows:
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“Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and begin preparation prior
to the time suit is formally commenced.  Thus the test should be
whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual
situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said
to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation. But the converse of this is that even though litigation
is already in prospect, there is no work- product immunity for
documents prepared in the regular course of business rather
than for purposes of litigation.”  (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343-46
(1994).
 According to the Leonen court, the essence of all these various jurisdictions’ tests is
that for a document to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation, there must have been
a particular, identifiable claim or impending litigation.  135 F.R.D. at 97.  The court stated:
“[T]he mere fact that litigation does eventually occur[] does not by itself bring documents
within the ambit of the work-product doctrine.”  Id.  Accordingly, the court in Kramer v.
Raymond Corp. declared:  “The mere fact that a party finds itself in circumstances that may
lead to litigation, however, does not render all documents prepared with regard to those
circumstances protected work product.”  Civ. No. 90-5026, 1992 WL 122856, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. May 29, 1992)(emphasis added).
In Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995), the court found the document
in question to have been prepared in the ordinary course of business.  161 F.R.D. at 699.
The case involved a discovery request of a memorandum prepared by an IRS agent who was
conducting an administrative investigation of a shooting accident.  161 F.R.D. at 690.  In
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finding that the memorandum was properly discoverable, the court stated: “The work product
doctrine does not protect materials assembled in the ordinary course of business.  Rather, the
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the materials must be as an aid in ...
future litigation.”  Griffith, 161 F.R.D. at 698 (emphasis in original and added).  The court
further found that “[b]ecause the memorandum would have been generated whether or not
litigation was pending, it does not qualify as attorney work product.”  Griffith, 161 F.R.D.
at 699.
Similarly, the court in United States v. Young held that documents used to prepare a
taxpayer’s tax returns were “not covered [by the work product doctrine] because they were
not prepared in anticipation of litigation but rather in the ordinary course of business
pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation.”  Civil Action No. 6-70198, 1976 WL
1032, at *2 (E.D. Mich., S.D. May 5, 1976). 
As stated supra, in the instant case the burden is on DuPont, as the moving party, to
establish that the documents are protected from disclosure under the work product doctrine.
Once DuPont meets this burden, the burden then shifts to Forma-Pack to demonstrate
“substantial need” and “undue hardship.”  However, there was no need for this second step,
since Judge Loney properly found that DuPont failed to meet its burden of showing that the
documents in question were prepared in anticipation of litigation rather than in the ordinary
course of business.  His decision was reached after a full evidentiary hearing, and the fact
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“Action tried without a jury.  When an action has been tried without a jury, the
3
appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.  It will not set aside
the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
findings upon which it was based were not clearly erroneous.  See Md. Rule 8-131 (c).   In
3
his well-reasoned written decision, the trial judge wrote:
“In the present case, DuPont argues that the documents created
by Kaplan and subpoenaed by Forma-Pack are protected by the
work-product doctrine because once a delinquent account, like
the Forma-Pack account, is transferred to DuPont’s legal
department, it is presumed that litigation may be necessary.  The
Court finds this argument unpersuasive because debt collection,
of the type which Kaplan was engaged in, is a business practice
and not a legal practice.  The Court does not find that the debt
collection procedure conducted by Kaplan on behalf of DuPont
can be said to have been done in the belief that there was some
possibility that litigation may be the result.  As such, the Court
finds that the discovery Forma-Pack seeks is not protected under
the work-product doctrine because it is a business approach to
debt collection rather than a legal approach used in anticipation
of litigation.”  (Emphasis added). 
Judge Loney’s conclusion that a business approach to debt collection was used by
DuPont in the hiring of Kaplan, rather than a legal approach, is strongly supported by the
deposition of Susan F. Herr, the employee in DuPont’s legal department responsible for the
collection of the Forma-Pack account during the period in which most of the disputed
communications were generated.  Her deposition included the following:
“[Question:] So we’re in mid-1994 up to March of 1996, did
you handle the account collection for DuPont?
[Answer:] Yes.
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[Question:] Okay.  Did you authorize DuPont to commence
litigation against Forma-Pack?
[Answer:] In consultation with the business, it may have been a
business approach on behalf of DuPont in the collection of the
debt.”  (Emphasis added).  
Thus, it is clear from Ms. Herr’s deposition that DuPont’s own legal department
viewed the Forma-Pack collection matter as a business approach, rather than a legal approach
taken in anticipation of litigation.  As such, any documents generated between Kaplan and
DuPont would be materials created in the ordinary course of business and not in anticipation
of litigation.
From the foregoing, it is reasonable for Judge Loney to make the factual finding that
when DuPont hired a collection agency that was not authorized to practice law instead of an
attorney, the primary purpose was to collect a debt and not to litigate the matter.  This is
especially true in this case, where the communications between DuPont and Kaplan began
three years prior to the initiation of litigation to collect the debt.  The role of a collection
agency generally is to provide a business alternative for the collection of a debt, not to serve
as an agent for purposes of litigation, such as a paralegal or private investigator.
Consequently, any communications between the creditor corporation, DuPont, and the
collection agency, Kaplan, were properly determined to be not made in anticipation of
concrete or imminent litigation, but rather made for the express purpose of avoiding litigation
altogether.  Moreover, Judge Loney could also conclude that DuPont’s legal department was
not  intending to represent the corporation in any litigation that may arise if Kaplan was
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unsuccessful in its debt collection efforts.  As the record reflects, all the legal department did
was forward the matter to Kaplan.  DuPont did not even want to be involved in the decision
as to what law firm should represent the corporation should litigation ever become necessary.
Consequently, there is no basis for rejecting the factual findings that Kaplan was hired
to perform a business function, not a legal function, and that the communications between
DuPont and Kaplan were not in anticipation of litigation or for trial.  There was nothing
clearly erroneous in the decision by the trier of fact that DuPont simply failed to meet its
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the work product doctrine
shielded the documents in question from discovery by Forma-Pack.
B.  Attorney-Client Privilege
1.  The Privilege in General
The Supreme Court has recognized the attorney-client privilege as “the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”  Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584, 591 (1981).  In
Maryland, the privilege has been recognized as a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure
of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice.  Levitsky v. Prince George’s Co., 50 Md. App. 484, 491, 439 A.2d 600, 604
(1982).  In Harrison v. State, we essentially adopted Professor Wigmore’s definition of the
attorney-client privilege:
“‘(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a
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professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection [may] be waived.’”
276 Md. 122, 135, 345 A.2d 830, 838 (1975)(quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)(footnote omitted)).
The attorney-client privilege is codified in the Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.),
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 9-108, and states that “[a] person may not be
compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege.”   The party seeking the
protection of the privilege bears the burden of establishing its existence.  Maxima,100 Md.
App. at 456, 641 A.2d at 984; In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11, 602
A.2d at 1225.  Once the attorney-client privilege is invoked, the trial court decides as a matter
of law whether the requisite privilege relationship exists, and if it does, “whether or not any
such communication is privileged.”  Harrison, 276 Md. at 136, 345 A.2d at 838.  Because the
application of the attorney-client privilege withholds relevant information from the fact finder,
the privilege contains some limitations and should be narrowly construed.  Cf. Morris v. State,
4 Md. App. 252, 254-55, 242 A.2d 559, 561 (1968).  See also In re Criminal Investigation
No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11, 602 A.2d at 1225 (noting that the privilege is not absolute); In
Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4  Cir. 1984)(noting that the privilege
th
must be strictly construed);  Levitsky, 50 Md. App. at 494, 439 A.2d at 606(strict construction
of privilege is favored).
The court in Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation set out the dual requirement
-18-
for applicability of the attorney-client privilege when it stated:  “Only those attorney-client
communications pertaining to legal assistance and made with the intention of confidentiality
are within the ambit of the privilege.”  65 F.R.D. at 37 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
In discussing the “legal advice” prong of the attorney-client privilege, the court in Lanasa vs.
State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909), stated: “[T]o make the communications privileged,
they ... must relate to professional advice and to the subject-matter about which such advice
is sought.”  109 Md. at 617, 71 A. at 1074 (emphasis added).  See also Henson By and
Through Mawyer v. Wyeth Laboratories, 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987)(quoting  N.C.
Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power, 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 1986)(“[F]or
the privilege to apply, the client’s confidential communication <must be for the primary
purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business, advice.’”); Morris, 4 Md. App. at 255, 242
A.2d at 561 (quoting Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637, cert. den. 371 U.S. 951, 83
S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1962))(“[T]he privilege extends essentially only to the substance
of matters communicated to an attorney in professional confidence.”).
Regarding the “confidentiality” prong of the attorney-client privilege for a
communication to be confidential, it is essential that it not be intended for disclosure to third
persons.  United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4  Cir. 1984).  The United States
th
v. (Under Seal) court held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to a whole series of
corporate documents “because the communications revealed could not reasonably have been
expected to remain confidential.”  748 F.2d at 877.  In examining the items in question, the
court stated that several of the documents contained information that “would reasonably be
-19-
expected to be imparted to a third party.”  United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 877-78.
The court declared, “if a client communicates information to his attorney with the
understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that information ... will not
enjoy the privilege.”  United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 875.  See also Trupp, 24 Md.
App. at 609, 335 A.2d at 184 (holding that for the attorney-client privilege to apply, the
subject of communication must be confidential and not made in the presence of a third
person). 
Along with looking at whether the communications between the attorney and the client
were intended to be conveyed to a third party, thus destroying confidentiality, courts have also
looked at the role of the attorney at the time the communications were made to determine
whether they are confidential or not.  The United States v. (Under Seal) court noted “that the
existence of the attorney-client privilege does not alone raise a presumption of
confidentiality....  [W]e must look to the services which the attorney has been employed to
provide....”  748 F.2d at 875 (citations omitted).
While this Court has not specifically addressed whether collection efforts constitute
legal activity, some cases have indicated that the attempted recovery of a debt through a
collection agent, even if he or she is an attorney, is a business function and not a legal
function.  The court in In re Shapiro stated:  “Where the attorney acts as a business advisor
or collection agent ... the communications between him and his client are not protected by the
privilege.”  381 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1974)(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).  While
in the instant case, it is not the attorney (DuPont’s legal department) who is acting as a
-20-
collection agent, but instead Kaplan whom the corporation hired for this purpose, Shapiro is
illustrative in pointing out that many courts have held that debt collection activities do not fall
within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege.  See also In re Witness Before the Grand
Jury, 631 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D. Wis. 1985) and Young, Civil Action No. 6-70198, 1976 WL
1032, at *1 (quoting same language from Shapiro, 381 F. Supp. at 22).  Similarly, Kelly v.
Simon, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 888 (S.D. Cal. 1962), involved an attorney served with summonses to
produce certain documents of his clients, who were being investigated by the Internal
Revenue Service.  9 A.F.T.R.2d at 889.  In finding the documents not privileged, the court
stated that “[t]o the extent that respondent was acting as a business manager or rent collection
agent ... rather than as attorney, no privilege attaches.”  9 A.F.T.R.2d at 890 (emphasis
added). 
2.  The Privilege in the Corporate Setting
As early as 1915, the Supreme Court assumed that the attorney-client privilege applied
when the client is a corporation.  United States v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 236 U.S. 318, 35
S.Ct. 363, 59 L.Ed. 598 (1915)(defendant railroad company refused inspection of various
documents created by special agents of Interstate Commerce Commission, claiming
documents were privileged).  See also Supreme Court Standard 503(a), relating to the
attorney-client privilege, as cited in Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 605 (“A <client’ is a
person ... or corporation ... who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him.”  (Emphasis
-21-
added)).  In the landmark case of Upjohn, supra, the Court laid to rest any remaining doubts
that a corporation is entitled to claim the attorney-client privilege.  Confusion still exists,
however, regarding the scope of exactly which employees in a corporation may communicate
with corporate counsel, either in-house or out-of-house, and still retain protection under the
attorney-client privilege.  Over the years, several theories have emerged.
The first case to develop a specific test addressing the scope of protection in the
corporate setting was United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass. 1950).  The court essentially held that a confidential statement to counsel by any
officer or employee of the corporation might well be privileged.  United Shoe, 89 F. Supp.
at 358-59.  This broad theory of privilege in the corporate environment was severely curtailed
in Radiant Burners in which the court held: “[T]his personal privilege of the client must ...
be claimed only by natural individuals and not by mere corporate entities.”   207 F. Supp. at
773 (emphasis added).  The Radiant Burners court essentially eliminated the attorney-client
privilege for corporations. Later in Westinghouse Electric, supra, the “control group test” was
created.  210 F. Supp. at 483.  Under this test, the attorney-client privilege only protects
communications directed to or from employees in the control group, which is comprised of
those who play a substantial role in corporate decision-making.  Westinghouse, 210 F. Supp.
at 485. 
The Supreme Court in Upjohn rejected the control group test, finding it too narrow in
scope in that “it will frequently be employees beyond the control group ... who will possess
the information needed by the corporation’s lawyers.”  449 U.S. at 391, 101 S.Ct. at 683, 66
-22-
L.Ed. at 592.  The Court further stated that the control group test “frustrates the very purpose
of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of
the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”  Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 392, 101 S.Ct. at 684, 66 L.Ed. at 593.  Although the Court deliberately refrained from
defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting, its analysis reflects
factors found in the subject-matter test.  Amy L. Weiss, In-house Counsel Beware: Wearing
the Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 396-97
(1998).
The subject-matter test is set forth in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker as
follows:
“[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so
that his communication to the corporation’s attorney is privileged
where the employee makes the communication at the direction of
his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter
upon which the attorney’s advice is sought by the corporation
and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment.”
423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7  Cir. 1970).
th
 The Florida Supreme Court recently established a new test to determine the scope of
the attorney-client privilege as it applies to corporations.  See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1994).  That court  acknowledged that because a corporation
can only act through its agents, unlike a natural person, and because a corporation relies much
more heavily on its counsel for business advice than an individual, “it is likely that the <zone
-23-
“[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee’s communication if (1)
4
the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee
making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior
made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of
the communication is within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents.  We note, moreover, that the corporation has the burden
of showing that the communication in issue meets all of the above requirements.”
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8  Cir. 1978).
th
of silence’ will be enlarged by virtue of the corporation’s continual contact with its legal
counsel.”  Deason, 632 So.2d at 1383 (citation omitted).  Concerned that a corporation could
“conduct its ordinary business through lawyers to hide its affairs from light of day,” Tri-State
Equip. v. United States, 77 A.F.T.R.2d 96-2198, 2199 (E.D. Cal. 1996), the Deason court
attempted to strike a balance between the competing interests of encouraging corporations to
seek legal advice so they can best comply with the laws against the real concern of companies
using their counsel to prevent discovery.  Deason, 632 So.2d at 1383.  See also Kelly, 9
A.F.T.R.2d at 890 (“If documents are not privileged in the hands of a client, the fact that they
are turned over to an attorney does not create a privilege.”).  
The Deason court combined the tests established in Harper & Row and Diversified
Industries  and arrived at the following criteria as to whether a corporation’s communications
4
are protected by the attorney-client privilege:
“(1) [T]he communication would not have been made but for the
contemplation of legal services; (2) the employee making the
communication did so at the direction of his or her corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request of the employee as
part of the corporation’s effort to secure legal advice or services;
(4) the content of the communication relates to the legal services
-24-
being rendered, and the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee’s duties; [and] (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.”
Deason, 632 So.2d at 1383.
Thus, it is clear that a corporation can be a client for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege; what is unclear is exactly how far this protection extends regarding the
corporation’s employees and agents.  While we decline to adopt a particular set of criteria for
the application of the privilege in the corporate context until we are required to do so, the
communications in the instant case are not protected under any of the tests.
3.  The Privilege as Applied to This Case
The first step in our analysis is to determine as a threshold issue whether an attorney-
client relationship is present in this case.  A key element of this determination is whether legal
advice was being sought by the client.  The second step, once an attorney-client relationship
is determined to exist, is to examine whether the communications between the attorney and
the client were confidential.  For the reasons stated infra, there is no need for us to reach this
second step in the instant case, as we find that no attorney-client relationship existed.
In clarifying the roles of the parties, we must keep in mind that the attorney is
DuPont’s in-house legal department, and it is invoking the privilege on behalf of its client,
DuPont the corporation.  Kaplan is the non-lawyer collection agency that the DuPont legal
department hired to collect the Forma-Pack debt, and DuPont is alleging that Kaplan is its
-25-
As Kaplan is not authorized to practice law, there is no possibility of DuPont’s legal
5
department claiming that it is the client and Kaplan is the attorney, via Peck as its subagent,
for purposes of establishing the attorney-client privilege.
agent for purposes of litigation (and that Peck is a subagent).  Peck is the attorney that
Kaplan, not DuPont, eventually hired to litigate the debt collection matter after Kaplan’s
efforts proved unsuccessful.   A final, critical fact is that Kaplan, the party from whom
5
discovery is being sought by Forma-Pack, is not asserting the attorney-client privilege; only
DuPont is asserting the privilege.
We affirm the trial judge’s decision that the communications between DuPont and
Kaplan are not protected from discovery under the attorney-client privilege, as no attorney-
client relationship existed.  When DuPont, the corporate client, consulted with its attorney,
the legal department, it was not doing so for legal advice regarding the Forma-Pack debt.
Instead, the client corporation was simply routing the debt collection matter to its legal
department, which in turn was to transmit it to an outside, non-lawyer collection agency.
According to Professor Lynn McLain:
“Communications [with in-house counsel] with regard to
business advice are unprotected.  When the attorney-client
privilege is invoked with regard to communications with in-house
counsel, the courts will look particularly closely at whether
counsel was providing business advice, rather than legal advice
or services.”
5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 503.9, at 493 (1987)(footnote omitted).
Thus, when DuPont hired Kaplan it was not for the purposes of instituting legal action;
instead, DuPont was consulting with Kaplan in a business capacity, for the typical business
-26-
purpose of collecting a debt.  While Kaplan may certainly have been DuPont’s agent for the
business purpose of collecting the debt, the collection agency was not hired as an agent for
purposes of litigation.  Nor can Kaplan’s role be analogized to that of an expert hired to assist
with litigation.  The case law clearly delineates several roles of the attorney, also applicable
to the attorney’s agent, that are generally not consistent with the rendering of professional
legal advice.  When the attorney, or his or her agent, is primarily acting as a collection agent
or business advisor or manager, there is no attorney-client relationship because no legal
advice is being sought or given.  Consequently, there can be no confidential privileged
communications between the parties when the attorney or his or her agent is acting in one of
these non-legal capacities.  Thus, because Kaplan was serving as a debt collection agent, in
a non-legal capacity, there is no attorney-client privilege claim that DuPont can make to
effectively shield the communications from discovery by Forma-Pack.  “[C]ommunications
are not privileged merely because an individual provides law-related services if the client
should have known the person was not authorized to practice law.”  2 CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 183, at 311 (2d ed. 1994)(footnote
omitted). 
In focusing on the specific documents at issue, DuPont has not in the trial court nor
in its brief on appeal contended that any individual document has some special reason for
being privileged beyond the arguments addressed by the trial judge.  DuPont chose to make
one argument lumping together all of the documents, with no document singled out as having
individualized reasons for being privileged not common to the entire class.  In essence,
-27-
DuPont’s argument was that all of the documents exchanged between it and Kaplan enjoyed
a privilege.  In addition, it is only DuPont’s and not Kaplan’s attorney-client privilege that is
being asserted, and the documents conveyed between DuPont and Kaplan are not protected
by DuPont’s attorney-client privilege because no attorney-client relationship as to DuPont,
the legal department, and Kaplan existed.  The trial judge properly found that DuPont failed
to meet its burden of proving a prima facie case that these communications were privileged
when he stated, “there was no evidence of communications between Dupont’s legal
department and Kaplan which would indicate that Dupont intended the communications
between itself and  Kaplan would be held in confidence.”   
In sum, Kaplan was hired by DuPont for a business purpose only, to collect a debt. 
In keeping with this finding, there is nothing clearly erroneous in the trial judge’s decision
that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the communications in this case.  The judge
dealt with the facts presented and the arguments made by counsel, and did so admirably.  We
agree with Judge Loney when he stated in his written decision that
“the communication between DuPont and Kaplan is no more
than a business approach used in an effort to collect a debt from
Forma-Pack.  As such, the Court finds that the communications
between DuPont and Kaplan and Kaplan’s agents which refer to
the attempts made in collecting a debt owed by Forma-Pack are
not protected from discovery pursuant to the attorney-client
privilege.”  (Emphasis added).
We might reach an entirely different conclusion if DuPont had initially sent the debt
collection matter to an attorney, rather than utilizing a non-lawyer collection agency’s
services, or if DuPont had intended to litigate the matter itself.  However, it is clear from the
-28-
record that DuPont wanted no part of any litigation effort.  Indeed, it was within Kaplan’s
sole discretion whether to litigate the matter or not.  If a private individual sent receivables
to a collection agency such as Kaplan, the attorney-client relationship would obviously not
apply.  DuPont, by using its legal department as a conduit through which to route various
communications, should not be given a greater privilege than a private client in a similar
situation.  Thus, we conclude that a corporation cannot shield materials from discovery, and
confer on them the cloak of confidentiality, simply by routing them through its legal counsel.
To hold otherwise would greatly restrict the liberal underpinning of our discovery rules, at
least as they apply to corporations and would allow corporate entities to protect virtually all
communications from disclosure.  Corporations already have vast resources at their disposal
with which to defend themselves in litigation, and we see no reason to provide them with an
impenetrable shield that would afford them greater protection from discovery than that of an
individual client.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that neither
the work product doctrine nor the attorney-client privilege protects the communications
between DuPont and Kaplan from discovery by Forma-Pack.  Kaplan was not hired by
DuPont’s legal department to aid in preparing DuPont’s lawsuit against Forma-Pack, nor was
it hired as a litigation agent or expert to assist the attorney in providing its client with proper
legal advice.  Thus, the materials were not produced in anticipation of litigation or in
-29-
rendition of legal services, but instead were produced for the purely business purpose of debt
collection.
  
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
ANNE 
ARUNDEL
COUNTY AFFIRMED.   COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.
-30-
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.:
I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court because I believe the trial judge
applied the incorrect standard in determining whether the documents transmitted between
Dupont and Kaplan were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product
doctrine.  In my view, the trial judge erroneously applied a per se rule that a function
performed by a debt collection agent can never be a legal function, and thus can never be
protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.  Accordingly, I would
remand the matter to the circuit court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents
in accordance with the request made by Dupont to the trial judge, in order to determine
whether the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine protects the documents.
At the outset, it is important to note the scope of my disagreement with the majority.
Our basic dispute is factual, and surrounds the interpretation of the remarks of the trial judge.
For that reason, it is important to set out the Memorandum and Order of the trial court.  
     
“The determinative element establishing the cloak of privilege is
the presence of a confidential communication emanating from the
client.”  Levitsky v. Prince George’s Co., 50 Md. App. 484
(1982).  In Levitsky, the Court of Special Appeals held that “the
mere fact the expert may have communicated his opinion of
value to either the attorney or client does not make it a privileged
-1-
communication.”  Id. at 494 (citing State Highway Comm. v.
Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88 ([S.D.] 1966)).  In the present case, there
was no evidence of communication between DuPont’s legal
department and Kaplan which would indicate that DuPont
intended the communications between itself and Kaplan would
be held in confidence.  On the contrary, DuPont hired Kaplan in
an attempt to collect an outstanding debt owed by Forma-Pack.
This Court agrees with Forma-Pack when it finds that the
function of a collection agent is non-legal in nature and is no
more than a business approach designed to collect outstanding
debts.  Maryland had no case law directly on point which
addresses whether a collection agent’s communications with an
attorney may be undiscoverable pursuant to the attorney-client
privilege.  As a result, Forma-Pack cites several cases from other
jurisdictions in support of its argument.  In particular, Forma-
Pack cites Henson v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., which states that
“for the privilege to apply, the confidential communication must
be for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than
business advice.”  Henson, 118 F.R.D. 584 (W.D. Va. 1987)
(citing North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina
-2-
Power, 110 F.R.D. 511 (M.D.N.C. 1986)).  In addition, Forma-
Pack cites that “where an attorney is acting as a business advisor
or collections agent, . . . the communication between him and his
client are not protected by the privilege.”  In re Witness Before
the Grand Jury, 631 F.Supp. 32 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (quoting In re
Shapiro, 381 F.Supp. at 22) (N.D. Ill. 1974)).
This Court is persuaded by the arguments presented by
Forma-Pack in these cases because the Court believes that the
communication between DuPont and Kaplan is no more than a
business approach used in an effort to collect a debt from
Forma-Pack.  As such, the Court finds that the communications
between DuPont and Kaplan and Kaplan’s agents which refer to
the attempts made in collecting a debt owed by Forma-Pack are
not protected from discovery pursuant to the attorney-client
privilege.
[DuPont] also argues that the communications between
DuPont and Kaplan are protected by the work-product doctrine
. . . . 
*     *     *     *     *     *
-3-
DuPont argues that the documents created by Kaplan and
subpoenaed by Forma-Pack are protected by the work-product
doctrine because once a delinquent account . . . is transferred to
DuPont’s legal department, it is presumed that litigation may be
necessary.  The Court finds this argument unpersuasive because
debt collection, of the type which Kaplan was engaged in, is a
business practice and not a legal practice.  
(Emphasis added).
The majority finds that the trial judge, after a full evidentiary hearing, was not clearly
erroneous in finding that DuPont failed to meet its burden of proof as to the existence of any
privilege.  The majority  concludes that “it is reasonable for Judge Loney to make the factual
finding that when DuPont hired a collection agency that was not authorized to practice law
instead of an attorney, the primary purpose was to collect a debt and not to litigate the
matter.”  Maj. op. at 15.  The majority  reasons that “there is no basis for rejecting the factual
findings that Kaplan was hired to perform a business function, not a legal function, and that
the communications between DuPont and Kaplan were not in anticipation of litigation or for
trial.”  Maj. op. at 16.  
I do not believe that the trial judge conducted a full evidentiary hearing, nor did the
judge make the factual findings as set out by the majority.  Rather, I believe that the basis for
-4-
  The privilege log is set out in the Appendix.
1
  In support of its argument that debt collection is always primarily a business
2
activity, rather than a legal function, Forma-Pack relies upon In re Shapiro, 381 F.Supp. 21
(N.D. Ill. 1974).  Specifically, Forma-Pack cites the following passage:
the court’s ruling was that debt collection does not constitute legal activity.  The only possible
support for an argument that the trial court gave individualized consideration to the claims of
privilege by DuPont is the trial court’s statement, “[i]n the present case, there was no evidence
of communication between DuPont’s legal department and Kaplan which would indicate that
DuPont intended the communications between itself and Kaplan would be held in
confidence.”  Nonetheless, the circuit court appeared to base its decision on the premise that
neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine could ever shield
documents transmitted between an attorney and a collection agent hired on behalf of a client.
The fairest reading of both the emphasized language and the memorandum opinion as
a whole leads to the conclusion that the court applied a per se rule that a function performed
by a debt collection agent can never be a legal function, and thus can never be protected by
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.  This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that DuPont offered to allow the trial judge to conduct an in camera inspection of the
disputed documents, but the trial judge declined that request.   In applying this per se rule,
1
the trial court used the wrong legal standard.  Indeed, it appears as though the majority also
applies a per se standard that the attempted recovery of a debt through a collection agent, even
if the agent is an attorney, is a business function and not a legal function.  See Maj. op. at 20.2
-5-
[W]here the attorney acts as a business advisor or collection
agent, gives investment advice, or handles financial transactions
for his client, the communications between him and his client
are not protected by the privilege.
Id. at 22.  The majority finds Shapiro “illustrative in pointing out that many courts have held
that debt collection activities do not fall within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege.”
Maj. op. at 20.  The majority and Forma-Pack read this passage too broadly.  Shapiro does
not state that activity performed by a debt collection agent can never be legal activity; rather,
the quoted passage merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that activity motivated
solely or primarily by a business purpose, rather than to assist the attorney in the rendition
of legal services, is not entitled to protection.  Such a proposition is consistent with the scope
of the common law attorney-client privilege.
I am mindful that in discovery matters, the trial court has broad discretion which will
be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse.  This legal discretion, however, does “not include
the privilege of incorrect application of law . . . .”  Brown v. Superior Court,  Maricopa
County, 670 P.2d 725, 730 (Ariz.  1983); Koon v. United States,    U.S.    , 116 S.Ct.  2035,
135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law).     
The record in this case suggests at least one category of documents which might be
privileged.  Specifically, Kaplan retained an attorney, Stanley Peck, on behalf of DuPont to
file the pending court action in the State of California against Forma-Pack.  Communications
between DuPont and Kaplan, involving that subject, might well be protected by the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine.  See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2317, at 619
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (“[T]he attorney’s agent is also the client’s subagent and is acting
as such for the client.”) (footnote omitted).
-6-
Although not specifically suggested by the record in this case, other categories of
information might be entitled to protection as the subject of communications between a debt
collection agent and either an attorney or a client.  For instance, as previously discussed, a
letter from the agent in direct response to a query by the attorney, if made in anticipation of
litigation, might be subject to the work product doctrine.  Courts have identified other
categories of information which might be protected by either the attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine.  These categories of information include communications involving:
the strength or weakness of a specific claim, see Spectrum Systems Int’l v. Chemical Bank,
581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991); the value of a  legal claim and the fees and expenses that
may be incurred in its defense, see Simon v. G. D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 406 (8  Cir.
th
1987) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917, 108 S.Ct. 268, 98 L.Ed.2d 225
(1987); and, possible legal strategies for a client to adopt, as well as a prediction about the
likely outcome of litigation.  See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2  Cir.
nd
1998).  It follows that the trial court erred in concluding that no communication between
DuPont and Kaplan could be protected by either the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine.
In my view, focusing on a facile checklist of “approved” occupations with whom an
attorney may safely communicate will not accurately resolve DuPont’s claim of attorney-
client privilege.  Instead, under the relevant case law, the proper focus in determining
privilege between a lawyer and an agent is on the content and purpose of those
communications made during the course of the agency.
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Of course, as a threshold matter, the attorney-client privilege applies to an agent only
if an agency relationship exists between the attorney and the agent on behalf of the client, or
if an agency relationship exists between the client and the agent which involves the attorney.
Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 265 (R.I. 1995); see MCLAIN, supra, § 503.1, at 482 n.7
(“‘A “representative of the lawyer” is one employed by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the
rendition of professional services.’”) (quoting UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(4)).  Courts have found
an agency relationship to exist “when three elements coalesce: (1) the principal must manifest
that the agent will act for him (2) the agent must accept the undertaking and (3) the parties
must agree that the principal will be in control of the undertaking.”  Rosati, 660 A.2d at 265.
As to the case-specific determination of whether the privilege extends to communications
between attorney or client, and the agent hired on behalf of the client, the proper focus is not
on the mere existence of an agency relationship or on whether communications passed to or
from the agent.  See United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4  Cir. 1984), appeal
th
after remand, 757 F.2d 600 (4  Cir. 1985).  The proper focus is whether the purpose of the
th
communications was to aid the attorney in providing legal representation to the client.  See
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S  FEDERAL EVIDENCE §503.12[4][a], at 503-25 (2nd
ed. 1998) (recognizing that communications between either agent and client or agent and
attorney may be privileged, so long as the purpose of the communication is “to assist the
attorney in the attorney’s rendition of legal services”) (footnote omitted).
Courts have recognized circumstances in which the attorney-client privilege extends
to communications between an attorney and an agent hired on behalf of a client.  For instance,
-8-
in United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2  Cir. 1961), the United States Court of
nd
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that information communicated to an accountant,
when the accountant had been employed by a law firm to explain a complicated tax scenario,
would be protected by the privilege if the information communicated was reasonably related
to rendering proper representation.  It was clear that such advice aided the attorney in
representing the client.  Similarly, in In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4  Cir. 1997), cert. denied
th
sub nom., McGraw v. Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc.,    U.S.    , 118 S.Ct. 689, 139 L.Ed.2d 635
(1998), the court recognized that the attorney-client privilege extended to communications
between an attorney and an agent retained to perform the rudimentary task of conducting an
initial factual investigation so that the attorney could more effectively “‘sift[] through the facts
with an eye to the legally relevant.’”  Id. at 601 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 390-91, 101 S.Ct. 677, 683, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)).
In determining whether the work product doctrine extends to litigation materials
prepared by a party’s agent, the relevant inquiry is whether the party asserting the privilege
has demonstrated that the primary purpose for the preparation of the materials was in
anticipation of litigation.  Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 791, 481 A.2d 221,
237 (1984); see United States v. Bornstein, 977 F.2d 112, 117 (4  Cir. 1992); State ex rel.
th
United Hosp. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199, 212 (W.Va. 1997).  The gravamen of this inquiry
focuses upon the “causal relationship between the anticipated litigation and the creation of
the document, rather than a requirement that the litigation-causing events have already
occurred.”  United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995).  The Supreme Court
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of Iowa persuasively has observed:
“Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and begin preparation prior
to the time suit is formally commenced.  Thus the test should be
whether, in the light of the nature of the document and the factual
situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said
to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of
litigation . . . .”  [8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 198-99 (1970).]  It does not matter
that the investigation is routine.  Even a routine investigation
may be made in anticipation of litigation.  Thus a document
prepared in the regular course of business may be prepared in
anticipation of litigation when the party’s business is to prepare
for litigation.
Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Iowa 1983) (internal citations partially omitted).
Other courts have identified instances when a function performed by an agent, on
behalf of a client, resulted in the creation of materials in anticipation of litigation.  For
example, a physician’s letter was held to be protected work product when the letter was in
response to a direct request by an attorney as to the cause of the client’s physical ailment.
Sprague v. Office of Workers’ Comp., 688 F.2d 862, 868-70 (1  Cir. 1982).  In United States
st
v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2  Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
nd
Circuit addressed the protection from discovery of a study, prepared for an attorney, assessing
the likely results of a business transaction which, if it occurred, was expected to result in
litigation.  The court held that the study was protected from discovery if prepared in
anticipation of expected litigation.  Id. at 1195.  The Second Circuit reasoned that the study
contained the mental impressions of the agent who prepared the study for the attorney:
[The study] proposed possible legal theories or strategies for [the
client] to adopt in response, recommended preferred methods of
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structuring the transaction, and made predictions about the likely
outcome of litigation.
Id. at 1195.  The Adlman court focused upon the nexus between the anticipated litigation and
the creation of the materials; the court also focused upon the protection of the mental
impressions of an agent generated in anticipation of litigation for an attorney on behalf of a
client.
I would have the trial court apply these principles in determining whether the
communications between DuPont and Kaplan are in fact protected by either the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine.  I believe that this is an inquiry for the trial court
to make in the first instance.  In this regard, I agree with the observation of the Court of
Appeals of New York that:
[W]hether a particular document is or is not protected is
necessarily a fact-specific determination, most often requiring in
camera review.
Spectrum Systems Int’l, 581 N.E.2d at 1060 (internal citation omitted); see Couser v. State,
282 Md. 125, 136, 383 A.2d 389, 395 (1978) (noting that whether the work product doctrine
protects data included within prosecutor’s jury dossier would seem to depend upon the nature
and substance of the information), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 156
(1978).  In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-98, 101 S.Ct. 677, 686, 66
L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), the United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a “case-
by-case” determination of evidentiary privilege.  Other courts similarly have recognized the
importance of an individualized assessment of the contents of a relevant document in response
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to a colorable claim of privilege.  In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 608 (4  Cir. 1997), cert. denied
th
sub nom. McGraw v. Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc.,    U.S.    , 118 S.Ct. 689, 139 L.Ed.2d 635
(1998); In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. White, 970
F.2d 328, 334-35 (7  Cir. 1992); Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 335-36
th
(N.J. 1997); State ex rel. United Hosp. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199, 211 (W.Va. 1997); Bartlett
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 999 (R.I. 1988); accord J. LYNCH, JR. &
R. BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.3(b), at 507 (1993); 8 C. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2035, at 484-86 (2  ed. 1994).
nd
Had the trial court performed an in camera review of the documents as requested by
DuPont, the court may well have found that some or all of the documents were privileged.
The majority states that “it is clear from Ms. Herr’s deposition that DuPont’s own legal
department viewed the Forma-Pack collection matter as a business approach, rather than a
legal approach taken in anticipation of litigation,” and concludes that “any documents
generated between Kaplan and DuPont would be materials created in the ordinary course of
business and not in anticipation of litigation.”  Maj. op. at 15.  The majority views Ms. Herr’s
deposition in isolation and ignores her affidavit.  The affidavit of Ms. Herr, along with that
of  DuPont legal assistant Glenn Wiltsee, established that the communications with Kaplan
& Kaplan were made with the expectation of confidentiality and in anticipation of litigation.
Ms. Herr averred, inter alia, in her affidavit:
4.  Once an account is sent to the legal department for collection,
it is presumed that litigation may be necessary to collect the debt.
-12-
  An in camera inspection is not required of every document in every case in which
3
a colorable claim of privilege has been raised.  Ordinarily, such decisions are within the
sound discretion of the trial court.  Whereas here, however, when a party has established a
prima facie claim of privilege, based in part on a sufficiently detailed privilege log, and the
materials for which the claims of privilege are made are relatively few in number, an in
camera inspection by the trial court would not be unduly burdensome.  As reflected in the
privilege log reproduced in the Appendix, DuPont’s claims of privilege extended only to
sixteen documents, generally one or two pages in length.
*              *              *             *             *
8.  At all times in dealing with collection agencies such as
Kaplan & Kaplan, I expect that all communications between
myself or anyone else at Dupont’s legal department and the
collection agency are confidential since the collection agency
assists the legal department in the collection of the account and,
if necessary, facilitates the institution of a lawsuit.
9.  I believed that all communications which I had with Kaplan
& Kaplan concerning the Forma-Pack account were confidential.
The affidavit of Glenn Wiltsee was essentially the same as the affidavit of Susan Herr.  In
addition, the privilege log reveals that numerous communications were made either to
facilitate the filing of the litigation in California or were made after litigation had begun.  
In sum, I would hold that the trial court erred in concluding that materials transmitted
between a debt collection agent and an attorney or a client can never be protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.  I emphasize that I do not advocate a
holding that any of the documents are in fact protected.  I would remand the matter to the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for the purpose of conducting an in camera inspection
of the documents that DuPont claims are protected.   See United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr.
3
Co., 839 F.2d 958 (3  Cir. 1988) (remanding for an in camera inspection of disputed
rd
-13-
documents after trial court applied wrong legal standard to claims of privilege).
Finally, I would  note that an individual document may contain both privileged and
non-privileged subject matter.  Under those circumstances, the trial court should order
redaction of the privileged information, and permit discovery of the remaining non-privileged
contents of the document.  United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 878.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  Judge Eldridge and Judge Wilner have authorized
me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.
-14-
APPENDIX
In support of its claims of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, DuPont
introduced the following privilege log:
Document Description
Letter from Rodney S. Bonds to Charles Hirsch
dated May 29, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
Rodney S. Bonds, Manager, Kaplan & Kaplan,
Inc., Manager Legal Dept.
Identity and Position of Recipients
DuPont attorney Mr. Charles Hirsch,
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-1
Document Description
Computer record
Identity and Position of Author
Kaplan & Kaplan Internal
Identity and Position of Recipients
Internal
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-2
Document Description
Facsimile from Bonds to Hirsch dated 5/8/97
Identity and Position of Author 
Rodney S. Bonds, Manager, Kaplan & Kaplan,
Manager Legal Department
Identity and Position of Recipients
DuPont attorney Mr. Charles Hirsch, Ballard,
Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-3
Document Description
Letter from Edward J. Friedman to Mr. Rodney Bonds
dated April 22, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
Kaplan & Kaplan attorney Edward J. Friedman,
Weinstock, Stevan, Harris & Friedman, P.A.
Identity and Position of Recipients
Mr. Rodney Bonds, Kaplan & Kaplan, Manager
Legal Dept.
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-4
-15-
Document Description
Letter from Edward J. Friedman to Mr. Rodney Bonds
dated April 16, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
Kaplan & Kaplan attorney Edward J. Friedman,
Weinstock, Stevan, Harris & Friedman, P.A.
Identity and Position of Recipients
Mr. Rodney Bonds, Kaplan & Kaplan, Manager
Legal Dept.
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-5
Document Description
Letter from Brian L. Cella to Kaplan & Kaplan dated
March 21, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
DuPont attorney, Brian L. Cella, Glynn, Cella &
Lange
Identity and Position of Recipients
Kaplan & Kaplan
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-6
Document Description
Facsimile from Rodney Bonds to Bob Lange dated
February 14, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
Rodney Bonds, Kaplan & Kaplan, Manager Legal
Dept.
Identity and Position of Recipients
DuPont attorney Robert J. Lange, Esq., Glynn,
Cella & Lange
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-7
Document Description
Letter from Robert J. Lange to Mr. Rodney Bonds dated
February 4, 1997
Identity and Position of Author
DuPont attorney Robert J. Lange, Glynn, Cella &
Lange
Identity and Position of Recipients
Rodney Bonds, Kaplan & Kaplan, Manager Legal
Dept.
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/ Work Product
Exhibit A-8
Document Description
Facsimile from Jim Mullins to DuPont Legal dated June
19, 1996
Identity and Position of Author
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative
Identity and Position of Recipients
Faye Vaughn, DuPont Legal
Privilege Claimed
Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product
-16-
Exhibit A-9
Document Description
Letter from Stanley Peck addressed to Jim Mullins dated
June 19, 1996
Identity and Position of Author
DuPont attorney Stanley Peck
Identity and Position of Recipients
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative
Privilege Claimed 
Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-10
Document Description
Letter from Jim Mullins to Susan Herr dated March 23,
1996 forwarding DuPont Counsel Stanley Peck Progress
Report of 3/15/96
Identity and Position of Author
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative, Stanley Peck, DuPont counsel
Identity and Position of Recipients
Ms. Susan Herr, DuPont Legal
Privilege Claimed 
Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-11
Document Description
Letter from Jim Mullins to Stanley Peck dated February
22, 1996
Identity and Position of Author
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative
Identity and Position of Recipients
DuPont attorney Stanley Peck
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-12
Document Description
Letter from Stanley Peck to Jim Mullins dated May 31,
1996
Identity and Position of Author
DuPont attorney Stanley Peck
Identity and Position of Recipients
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-13
Document Description
Letter from Jim Mullins to Stanley Peck dated September
27, 1995
Identity and Position of Author
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative
Identity and Position of Recipients
DuPont attorney Stanley Peck
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
-17-
Exhibit A-14
Document Description
Memo from Jim Mullins to Susan Herr date June 23, 1995
attaching 6/14/95, 9/23/95 correspondence from DuPont
attorney Stanley Peck and 8/29/94 collection letter to
Forma-Pack
Identity and Position of Author
Jim 
Mullins, 
Kaplan 
& 
Kaplan, 
Legal
Representative, DuPont attorney Stanley Peck
Identity and Position of Recipients
Susan Herr, DuPont Legal
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product
Exhibit A-15
Document Description
8/94 Internal Kaplan & Kaplan “Request for Legal Action
Form”
Identity and Position of Author
Kaplan & Kaplan
Identity and Position of Recipients
Internal
Privilege Claimed
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product