Title: State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm’n

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2313.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2313 
THE STATE EX REL. LACROIX, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2313.] 
Workers’ compensation—Permanent total disability—Evidence in the record 
supports the commission’s denial of compensation—Court of appeals’ 
judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed. 
(No. 2013-1902—Submitted March 24, 2015—Decided June 16, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 12AP-931,  
2013-Ohio-4881. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator/appellant, Sherwood Lacroix, appeals the judgment of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals denying his request for a writ of mandamus that 
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would require respondent/appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio to enter an 
order awarding him compensation for permanent total disability. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Lacroix was injured on September 7, 2003, while working for 
appellee GMRI, Inc., as a dishwasher/baker/maintenance worker.  He was 26 
years old.  His workers’ compensation claim was allowed for cervical/lumbar 
strain, head contusion, disc displacement, and postlaminectomy syndrome.  He 
has not worked since the injury occurred. 
{¶ 4} Lacroix applied for permanent-total-disability compensation in 2006 
and 2008.  The commission denied both applications on the basis that Lacroix was 
capable of working and not permanently and totally disabled. 
{¶ 5} Lacroix applied again in 2010, with a report from his treating 
physician, Timothy Morley, D.O.  Kiva Shtull, M.D., examined Lacroix on behalf 
of the employer.  He concluded that Lacroix was capable of full-time employment 
“in the sedentary category, in the seated position, with the following additional 
restrictions: 1) The ability to change positions as necessary; 2) No foot pedal 
operation with the lower extremities; 3) No exposure to vibratory forces.” 
{¶ 6} Mark A. Anderson performed a vocational assessment of Lacroix 
and concluded that no occupations existed that matched all of his restrictions.  
Craig Johnston, Ph.D., also performed a vocational assessment.  In his report, he 
identified the medical opinions submitted and concluded that “if one accepts the 
opinion of Dr. Shtull, then Mr. Lacroix is again capable of sedentary physical 
activity.”  Johnston examined Lacroix’s nonmedical disability factors and 
concluded that he remained capable of sustained remunerative employment. 
{¶ 7} Following a hearing, a staff hearing officer denied Lacroix’s 
application.  The hearing officer relied on the report of Dr. Shtull as evidence that 
Lacroix was medically capable of performing sedentary employment.  The 
January Term, 2015 
 
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hearing officer also reviewed all vocational evidence submitted, analyzed 
Lacroix’s nonmedical disability factors, and determined that he was vocationally 
capable of returning to work or going into a rehabilitation program. 
{¶ 8} Lacroix filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus.  He argued that 
the staff hearing officer abused his discretion when he relied on the vocational 
report of Dr. Johnston because the report was flawed. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals concluded that there was evidence in the record 
supporting the commission’s decision that Lacroix was medically and 
vocationally capable of sedentary employment.  The court noted that Lacroix did 
not challenge Dr. Shtull’s medical opinion and that the commission independently 
evaluated the nonmedical disability factors.  Thus, the appellate court concluded, 
despite any deficiencies in the Johnston report, the record nevertheless contained 
evidence to support the commission’s denial of benefits.  The court denied the 
writ. 
{¶ 10} Lacroix’s appeal as of right is before the court. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 11} Permanent total disability is “the inability to perform sustained 
remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.”  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1).  It can result from the injured worker’s medical 
conditions alone or in conjunction with other nonmedical disability or vocational 
factors.  State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm., 133 Ohio St.3d 244, 2012-Ohio-
4637, 977 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 8;  State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio 
St.3d 167, 509 N.E.2d 946 (1987). 
{¶ 12} To challenge the commission’s order denying permanent-total-
disability compensation, Lacroix must demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  State 
ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 176, 177, 677 
N.E.2d 338 (1997).  So long as there is some evidence in the record that supports 
the order, the commission does not abuse its discretion.  Id. 
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{¶ 13} Lacroix contends that the Johnston report was flawed because Dr. 
Johnston did not consider Dr. Shtull’s limitation that Lacroix must remain in a 
seated position, and Dr. Johnston listed potential jobs, such as security guard and 
cashier, that seemed impossible for a person who relied on a walker or 
wheelchair. 
{¶ 14} A vocational expert need not list all restrictions when referring to a 
medical report.  State ex rel. Arthur v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 
05AP-1018, 2006-Ohio-6776, ¶ 45 (vocational expert is afforded latitude in 
describing or summarizing a medical opinion).  Furthermore, the commission, as 
the exclusive evaluator of disability, is not required to accept vocational evidence, 
even if uncontroverted.  State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 266, 
270, 680 N.E.2d 1233 (1997).  The commission is the expert on vocational 
evidence and had the discretion to accept or reject all or some of the Johnston 
report.  Id. at 271; see also State ex rel. Culbert v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 11AP-172, 2012-Ohio-1217, ¶ 3.  Lacroix’s argument lacks merit. 
{¶ 15} Next, Lacroix contends that the commission abused its discretion 
by relying on Dr. Shtull’s report because it was contradictory.  Lacroix also 
contends that the commission failed to explain how the additional limitations set 
forth by Dr. Shtull correspond with the ability to perform work at the sedentary 
level. 
{¶ 16} It is undisputed that Lacroix did not raise these arguments in the 
appellate court.  See 2013-Ohio-4881, ¶ 8 and 31.  Consequently, they have been 
waived.  State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St.3d 91, 2014-Ohio-
84, 3 N.E.3d 1190, ¶ 14;  State ex rel. Rollins v. Indus. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 
319, 2005-Ohio-1827, 825 N.E.2d 1104, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 17} Lacroix was not entitled to mandamus relief, because there was 
evidence in the record to support the commission’s denial of permanent-total-
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disability compensation.  Therefore, Lacroix failed to establish that he was 
entitled to relief in mandamus. 
{¶ 18} Finally, both the claimant and the employer request oral argument.  
Neither party specifies why oral argument would be beneficial.  Oral argument in 
an appeal as of right is subject to the court’s discretion.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).  In 
exercising that discretion, we consider the parties’ briefs to be sufficient to 
resolve the issue raised.  We deny the requests for oral argument. 
{¶ 19} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
___________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Lacroix’s injuries are substantial enough that he is confined to a 
wheelchair, among other limitations.  Even so, one of the vocational experts, 
whose report provides the evidence that the commission relies upon to justify its 
conclusion, determined that Lacroix is capable of being a security guard.  That 
just isn’t plausible, and reliance on that report is misguided. 
{¶ 21} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Lawther, Jerald A. 
Schneiberg, and Stacy M. Callen, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., Melvin J. Davis, and Ronald Fresco, for appellee 
GMRI, Inc. 
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