Title: WILLIAMS v MONT NAT BANK BOZEM

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12770 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1975 D. M. WILLIAMS, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - MONTANA N A T I O N A L BANK O F BOZEMAN, M O N T A N A , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. Bennett, Jr argued and Lyman Bennett, 1 1 1 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome argued, Boe eman, Montana Submitted: January 9, 1975 Decided : rflP,\' . = ' f 1, M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f entered i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n County, following a jury v e r d i c t , i n t h e sum of $6,840, and d e n i a l of a motion f o r new t r i a l . M r s . Rosa J. Williams, wife of p l a i n t i f f D . M. Williams, t e s t i f i e d t h a t on J u l y 1 9 , 1973, she w a s a t t h e i r r u r a l home when she saw a man coming up t h e walk. There was another man i n a c a r who d i d not g e t out. The man t o l d M r s . W i l l i a m s t h a t he heard they had been having some bad e l e c t r i c a l storms and t h a t he was with a lightening rod company; t h a t he heard she had been having a l i t t l e trouble with t h e lightening rod and wanted t o t a l k t o him. H e advised her t h a t she needed a new clamp on t h e lighten- ing rod and she authorized him t o put it on. M r s . Williams f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h e man talked f a s t and moved f a s t , moved h i s f e e t a l i t t l e , and kept edging off a s she talked t o him, which she considered unusual. The man advised her t h e clamp would be $1.26 and t h a t he had t o have a check so he could mail it i n t o t h e company. She secured her check book and a pen. The man s a i d he would f i l l i n t h e check f o r her and she gave him t h e check book. H e f i l l e d it i n by writing $1.26 i n f i g - ures and i n longhand, p u t t i n g a d a t e on it. H e advised her t h a t he would stamp t h e check with t h e company stamp. She looked t h e check over and it looked a l r i g h t t o her, although it was not as she would have w r i t t e n it. The check was w r i t t e n so t h a t t h e f i g u r e s were so f a r t o t h e r i g h t hand s i d e t h a t t h e r e was ample space t o w r i t e t h e a d d i t i o n a l f i g u r e s 684 t o t h e l e f t without any appearance of change. The words were w r i t t e n on t h e lower l i n e so c l o s e t o t h e word "Dollars" t h a t t h e r e was ample space t o w r i t e "Six thousand e i g h t hundred f o r t y " ahead of it without any appearance of a l t e r a t i o n . O n cross-examination, M r s . Williams t e s t i f i e d t h e individual d i d not introduce himself; d i d not give her a business card o r anything t o i d e n t i f y him; she did not check t h e work before paying; she gave t h e man her e n t i r e check book; and, he f i l l e d o u t t h e check while it was i n t h e check book. The teller who cashed t h e check a t defendant Montana National Bank, where p l a i n t i f f had an account, and with i t s predecessor s i n c e about 1918 o r 1919, t e s t i f i e d t h a t she went t o t h e journal and checked t h e funds t o see i f t h e r e was enough money i n t h e account. She a l s o checked t h e person's signature t o see i f t h e signature on t h e check and on t h e signature card a t t h e bank were t h e same; they were, so she cashed t h e check. Other witnesses t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e usual and reasonable com- mercial standards e x i s t i n g i n t h e defendant bank and other banks i n Bozeman. James Jordan, a deputy s h e r i f f , t e s t i f i e d and i d e n t i - f i e d a photographic copy of one sheet of an April 1 9 , 1973, bank protection b u l l e t i n . This witness f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d M r . Bruce E l l i s , president of t h e bank, had informed t h e city-county de- t e c t i v e team t h a t t h e method of operation used here was described i n t h e April 1973, bank protection b u l l e t i n . He f u r t h e r testi- f i e d t h a t E l l i s d i d not have a copy of t h e b u l l e t i n i n question and suggested checking with o t h e r banks. Although t h i s witness t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l b u l l e t i n from which t h e copy was made was not c i r c u l a t e d i n t h e Montana National Bank t o h i s knowledge, over defendant's objection t h e c o u r t admitted t h e e x h i b i t i n t o evidence. O n cross-examination Jordan t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was one of h i s d e t e c t i v e p a r t n e r s , who f i r s t brought up t h e b u l l e t i n matter t o M r . E l l i s . A t t h e conclusion of p l a i n t i f f ' s case, defendant moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and dismissal of t h e case which was denied. Bruce E l l i s t e s t i f i e d i n defendantts case t h a t he knew o f f i c e r Ron Green and he had m e t another o f f i c e r , whom he presumed w a s Jordan. These o f f i c e r s were conducting an in- v e s t i g a t i o n and they mentioned t o E l l i s t h a t they found t h e r e were o t h e r occurrences s i m i l a r t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n which had developed i n t h e s t a t e and they w e r e informed t h e r e was some kind of a notice on t h i s individual i n a bankers' b u l l e t i n . E l l i s s t a t e d t h e o f f i c e r s wanted t h e April 1973 bank. protection b u l l e t i n , but he was unable t o find it i n t h e bank and so ad- vised t h e o f f i c e r s . He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d he had no r e c o l l e c t i o n of ever seeing t h a t p a r t i c u l a r b u l l e t i n and t h a t i f a b u l l e t i n of t h a t type comes t o t h e bank, it is deposited on h i s desk, he reviews it, and passes it on t o t h e o t h e r o f f i c e r s and it goes on from t h e r e . Upon t h i s appeal defendant presents these issues: (1) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f negligent i n t h e manner i n which t h e check was executed? ( 2 ) Did such negligence c o n t r i b u t e a s a proximate cause t o t h e i n j u r y allegedly suffered by t h e p l a i n t i f f ? (3) Was t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant t h e v e r d i c t ? ( 4 ) W a s it e r r o r t o admit i n evidence t h e p h o t o s t a t i c copy of t h e b u l l e t i n over defendant's objection? (5) Was it e r r o r t o deny defendant's motion f o r a d i r - ected v e r d i c t ? (6) Was it e r r o r t o refuse t o submit t h e i s s u e of assump- t i o n of r i s k t o t h e jury? ( 7 ) Was it e r r o r t o refuse t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e provisions of t h e Uniform Commercial Code? (8) Did t h e c o u r t err i n denying t h e motion f o r a new t r i a l ? A s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s negligence, h i s wife and agent knew how t o write a check and signed t h e check i n question contrary t o t h e manner i n which she usually made o u t a check, according t o her own testimony. She knew t h e r e was plenty of space f o r i n s e r t i o n of l a r g e r amounts ahead of t h e f i g u r e s and words of amount i n t h e check and was a l s o negligent i n not requiring t h a t t h e payee's name be i n s e r t e d i n t h e check and i n making d e l i v e r y of t h e check under t h e circumstances. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t every person i s r e - sponsible f o r i n j u r y t o t h e person o r property of another, caused by want of ordinary c a r e o r s k i l l , (subject t o t h e defense of contributory negligence). When used i n these i n s t r u c t i o n s , negligence means want of such ordinary c a r e o r s k i l l . Such want of ordinary c a r e o r s k i l l e x i s t s when t h e r e is a f a i l u r e t o do t h a t which a reasonable and prudent person would o r d i n a r i l y have done under t h e circumstances of t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r doing what such person under t h e e x i s t i n g c i r - cumstances would not have done." This i n s t r u c t i o n conforms t h e 1969 decision i n Flansberg Montana Power Company, 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263, 257, where t h e Court s a i d : "Further, negligence imports such a want of a t t e n t i o n t o t h e nature o r probable consequences of t h e a c t o r omission a s a prudent man o r d i n a r i l y bestows i n a c t i n g i n h i s own concerns." Section 19-103 (16) , R.C.M. 1947, provides: "The words * * * 'negligence,' * * * and 'negligently' import a want of such a t t e n t i o n t o t h e nature o r probable consequences of t h e a c t o r omission a s a prudent man o r d i n a r i l y bestows i n a c t i n g i n h i s own concerns." Section 19-103(16), R.C.M. 1947, was r e l i e d upon i n Mang v. Eliasson, 153 Mont. 431, 435, 436, 458 P.2d 777, where t h e language of t h e quoted section was followed with t h i s language t h e Court : "In other words, negligence i s described a s con- duct which f a l l s below t h e standard established by law f o r t h e protection of o t h e r s a g a i n s t un- reasonable r i s k and necessarily involves t h e concepts of reasonableness and f o r e s e e a b i l i t y . " I n Mang, t h i s Court used t h i s language: "In t h e same vein, we quote with approval t h e following language from Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Volume 2 , a t page 929: "' * * * Negligence i s conduct involving an unreasonable r i s k of harm, and t h e test f o r de- termining whether a r i s k is unreasonable i s supplied by t h e following formula. The amount of caution "demanded of a person by an occasion is t h e r e s u l t a n t of t h r e e f a c t o r s : t h e l i k e l i - hood t h a t h i s conduct w i l l i n j u r e o t h e r s , taken with t h e seriousness of t h e i n j u r y i f it happens, and balanced a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t which he must s a c r i f i c e t o avoid t h e r i s k . " " ' I n s t r i k i n g t h i s balance--that is, i n weighing t h e likelihood of harm, t h e seriousness of t h e i n j u r y and t h e value of the i n t e r e s t t o be s a c r i - ficed--the law judges the a c t o r ' s conduct i n t h e l i g h t of t h e s i t u a t i o n a s it would have appeared t o t h e reasonable man i n h i s shoes a t t h e time of t h e a c t o r omission complained o f . Not what a c t u a l l y happened, but what t h e reasonably prudent person would then have foreseen a s l i k e l y t o happen, i s t h e key t o t h e question of reasonableness * * *.'Ir Under these d e f i n i t i o n s of negligence t h e jury could f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was negligent since he knew t h a t h i s wife had i n t h e p a s t signed checks prepared by o t h e r s and thereby authorized her t o do so, s i n c e he had done nothing t o s t o p her from t h i s pro- cedure. H i s wife should have foreseen t h a t t h e r e was a l i k e l i - hood of r a i s i n g t h e check when she l e f t it t h e way it had been w r i t t e n , permitting t h e placing of t h e f i g u r e s and t h e words so f a r t o t h e r i g h t so a s t o permit what occurred. I f t h e jury should f i n d p l a i n t i f f negligent, then it must determine whether such negligence contributed a s a proximate cause. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e proximate cause of an i n j u r y is t h a t which i n a n a t u r a l and con- tinuous sequence, unbroken by any new and inde- pendent cause, produces t h e i n j u r y , and without which it would not have occurred." Recently i n Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 1 6 2 Mont, 506, 512, 513 P.2d 268, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The test most generally employed i n determining causation is t h e 'but f o r ' test. Montana has adopted t h i s test i n numerous cases." The jury under t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n here could then d e t e r - mine t h e r e would have been no l o s s " b u t for" t h e negligence of M r s . W i l l i a m s , wife-agent of p l a i n t i f f , a s hereinbefore r e l a t e d . W e t u r n now t o t h e admission of t h e photostat of t h e bank b u l l e t i n . P l a i n t i f f a s s e r t s t h e reason f o r its introduc- t i o n was t o show a warning t o the defendant bank regarding t h e modus operandi of t h e man who obtained and cashed t h e check. I n our view, t h e foundation f o r i t s admission was i n s u f f i c i e n t and t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred i n admitting it i n t o evidence, p a r t i c u l a r l y here, where t h e r e is a f a c t u a l question a s t o whether o r not t h e face of t h e check was such a s t o cause t h e bank t o question i t s v a l i d i t y . The t e l l e r who cashed t h e check could not r e c a l l hav- ing seen t h e b u l l e t i n and upon being shown t h e photostat, she could not i d e n t i f y t h e individual depicted. W e do not disapprove custom and inferences a s contended by p l a i n t i f f but i n t h i s cause t h e insufficiency of t h e foundation does not support t h e i n f e r - ences attempted t o be drawn therefrom. A s regards t h e contentions w i t h respect t o assumption of r i s k , i n our opinion t h a t doctrine i s not applicable t o t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n here. A s t o t h e f a i l u r e of t h e c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e provisions of t h e Uniform Commercial Code, p l a i n t i f f contends t h e c o u r t could have i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury on t h e provisions of t h e Code, but it endeavored t o simplify t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and send t h e case t o t h e jury on a s t r a i g h t negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause s e t of i n s t r u c t i o n s . While t h i s may have appealed t o t h e court a s a s a t i s f a c - t o r y s o l u t i o n , it d i d deprive defendant of possible defenses based upon t h e provisions of t h e Uniform Commercial Code. A p a r t y has a r i g h t t o have i n s t r u c t i o n s given which a r e adaptable t o h i s theory of t h e case. Wollan v. Lord, 1 4 2 Mont. 4 9 8 , 385 P.2d 1 0 2 . Here p l a i n t i f f charged defendant was negligent i n cash- ing t h e check i n t h a t t h e bank breached i t s general o b l i g a t i o n t o handle p l a i n t i f f ' s account by a c t i n g contrary t o reasonable commercial standards. Surely then t h e bank should be allowed t o have t h e jury i n s t r u c t e d a s t o what reasonable commercial stand- a r d s a r e , as set f o r t h i n t h e Uniform Commercial Code. The judgment i s reversed and t h e cause remanded f o r new t r i a l . - * - - , - - - - , - - , A , , , - - - - - - - - - - - Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: i - t ............................. J u s t i c e s