Title: In re Estate of Dicksion

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DICKSION2011 OK 96Case Number: 107295Decided: 11/15/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VALATUS MERRAL DICKSION
THOMAS POWELL and KOLLEEN M. MAILLOUX, 
Appellants/Counter-Appellees,v.ARCHIE DICKSION, 
Appellee/Counter-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS DIVISION IV
Honorable John A. Blake, Trial Judge
¶0 The appellee/counter-appellant, Archie Dicksion (Dicksion/personal 
representative) filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of his 
brother in the District Court of Garvin County, Oklahoma. Subsequently, Thomas 
Powell (Powell/son) asserted that he was a pretermitted heir of the deceased. 
With the family's cooperation, DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests 
determined that Powell was the son of the decedent. The trial court determined 
that Powell was an unintentionally omitted child and entitled to his statutory 
share of the estate. Powell and his half-sister, the decedent's daughter, also 
challenged the admittance of the holographic will to probate and the personal 
representative's appointment. The motion for new trial was denied. Both Powell 
and the personal representative appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed 
and remanded. We granted certiorari to address the application of paternity 
testing to intestate and probate proceedings. We hold that: 1) under the facts 
presented, the objections to admission of the holographic will were not 
untimely; 2) the paternity statute, 84 O.S. 2001 §215, applies to intestate and 
probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment 
of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are 
intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a 
will. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;CAUSE AFFIRMED IN PART/REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Yasodhara M. Means, Norman, Oklahoma, for 
Appellants/Counter-Appellees.James W. Carlton, Jr., Brett Agee, Pauls 
Valley, Oklahoma, for Appellee/Counter-Appellant.Cameron L. Miller, Denton, 
Texas, Pro se.Jeanie Mendes, Wailuki, Hawaii, Interested Party.
KAUGER, J.,
¶1 The three dispositive issues presented by this appeal and counter-appeal 
are whether: 1) the objection to admission of the holographic will was timely;1 2) the paternity statute, 
84 O.S. 2001 §215,2 applies to intestate and 
probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §1223 prohibits the appointment of a business partner as 
personal representative when the will does not make any provisions for such an 
appointment. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, the objection to the 
admission of the holographic will was not untimely; 2) 84 O.S. 2001 §215 applies to intestate and 
probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment 
of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are 
intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a 
will. 
FACTS
¶2 On December 20, 2006, the appellee/counter-appellant, Archie M. Dicksion, 
(Dicksion/personal representative) filed a petition for the probate of the 
holographic will of his brother, Valatus Merral Dicksion, in the District Court 
of Garvin County, Oklahoma. The will was written in ink on four pages of heavily 
stained notebook paper. The provision naming his daughter as administrator of 
the estate was marked out. The will was partially dated and purportedly signed 
by the decedent.4 
¶3 On January 18, 2007, the will was admitted to probate and Dicksion was 
appointed personal representative of his brother's estate. According to the 
petition for probate, the heirs of the decedent consisted of a deceased wife, 
Estella G. Dicksion, and two adult daughters, Kolleen Mailloux of Los Angeles, 
California, and Kelli Laine, of Corona, California (Maillox/Laine). The petition 
does not mention the decedent's adult son, Thomas Powell of Shreveport, 
Louisiana (Powell/son). The son was born out of wedlock to Inex Wahlstrom and 
the decedent in California in 1952 and placed for adoption one year later.5 
¶4 On February 8, 2007, Mailloux, objected to any further proceedings until 
the proposed sale of certain real property had been appraised and the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the alleged holographic will had been 
fully and fairly litigated. On March 8, 2007, the trial court determined that 
the real property in question was not an asset of the estate, but rather 
belonged to Whispering Pines Ranch, L.L.C. as the record owner. Consequently, it 
determined that it had no jurisdiction over the sale of the real property. On 
March 9, 2007, the personal representative filed an application to determine 
heirs, noting that Powell alleged that he was the son of the decedent and 
entitled to his share of the estate. The application requested that the court 
make a determination as to whether the son was the legal heir of the deceased. 

¶5 On March 29, 2007, Powell filed the application for his share of the 
estate as an unintentionally omitted child alleging that he was the biological 
son of the deceased. DNA genetic testing was conducted and the tests determined 
that Powell was the son of the decedent. On July 3, 2007, at the hearing on 
Powell's application, the court granted the application finding that Powell was 
an pretermitted heir and entitled to his statutory share of the estate. 
¶6 On December 4, 2007, the personal representative filed a petition for an 
order allowing a final account of the estate, a determination of heirship, and a 
petition for final decree of distribution and discharge. On January 10, 2008, 
the appellants, Powell and Mailloux, filed objections to the final accounting 
and included a list of concerns regarding the estate and the transfer of various 
properties from the estate. 
¶7 At this stage of the proceeding, several continuances were granted, 
objections to a final accounting were filed by additional heirs and the heirs of 
the deceased's widow, and ultimately the trial court added Whispering Pines 
L.L.C. and the personal representatives as parties to the probate proceeding. 
Whispering Pines L.L.C., was owned in half by the decedent and his wife and half 
by the personal representative/brother. The trial court determined that the 
assets of the company were so intertwined with the estate assets that the 
company had to be included as a party to the proceedings.
¶8 By November 3, 2008, the objections had been overruled, the final 
accounting was approved for distribution according to the terms of the will, 
with the exception of Powell who was awarded his share as an unintentionally 
omitted heir. The final probate order was filed on December 9, 2008. Two days 
later, Powell asked for an extension of time and stay of the final accounting so 
that he could secure a new lawyer.
¶9 On December 29, 2008, Powell filed a motion for new trial pro se 
challenging the December 9, 2008, order. Subsequently, on January 20, 2008, 
Powell, through his new lawyer, filed an amended motion for new trial arguing 
that: 1) the accounting of the assets of the estate was erroneous; 2) the Court 
had never ruled on the objections to the holographic will; and 3) the personal 
representative, as a business partner of the decedent should not have been 
appointed as personal representative. 
¶10 On May 26, 2009, the motion for new trial was denied and an order 
reflecting the ruling was filed on June 8, 2009. On June 11, 2009, the trial 
court denied the personal representative's oral motion to tax Powell for 
additional attorney fees incurred by the estate. Instead, it allowed the 
Powell's attorney fees from his previous lawyer to be paid from Powell's share 
of the estate.
¶11 Powell appealed the trial court's denial of the new trial motion on July 
8, 2009, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error: 1) by 
admitting the holographic will; 2) by appointing the brother/partner as personal 
representative; and 3) in its valuation and distribution of the estate. Two days 
later, the personal representative filed a counter-appeal alleging that the 
trial court erred when it: 1) determined that Powell was an omitted heir; 2) 
awarded Powell a portion of the estate; and 3) awarded Powell attorney fees 
instead of imposing fees against Powell. 
¶12 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded both appeals for further 
proceedings, determining that trial court erred when it allowed post-death 
determination of paternity as a basis for inheritance. On September 8, 2010, 
Powell filed a petition for certiorari and we granted the petition on December 
14, 2010.
I.¶13 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE OBJECTION TO THE 
ADMISSION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WAS NOT UNTIMELY.
¶14 The personal representative argues that no timely objection to the 
admission of the holographic will was made because the document that the 
objection was contained in did not conform to the requirements of 
58 O.S. 2001 §61.6 The son insists that the 
objection was timely; but no evidentiary hearing was ever held regarding the 
will contest or the will's admission. 
¶15 We note at the outset that this is not a case in which an unintentionally 
omitted heir appeared and attempted to contest a will which had already been 
probated. Had this been the case, 58 O.S. 2001 §2427 which provides that if no person contests a will within 
60 days after a will has been admitted, the will is conclusive, would have 
prevented such a result. Rather, the pretermitted heir in the instant cause has 
been involved in this proceeding since the will was admitted to probate, and 
58 O.S. 2001 §61 8 sets forth the time 
limits and form of contesting an admitted will to probate. It is true the 
precise petition provided by §61 was not filed. However, the meaning and effect 
of an instrument filed in court depends on its contents and substance rather 
than on the form or title given it by the author.9 The legal effect of any 
court filed paper depends on its substance rather than its form.10 
¶16 In one of the Court's earliest cases, Ginn v. Knight, 
1924 OK 806 ¶4, 232 P. 936, an appeal was filed and the appellee 
moved to dismiss the appeal because the pleading which was the subject of the 
appeal was titled "motion of petition," when it was actually an application. 
However, the Court noted that the instrument was treated as a motion by the 
trial court throughout the proceedings. The Court held that "the nature of a 
pleading is not determined by the title given it by pleader, but by the 
subject-matter thereof."
¶17 Here, the document containing the objection was titled "Objection to 
Application for Sale of Real Estate" which was filed less than 90 days after the 
will was admitted. However, the objection was premised on the belief that the 
details and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will were such that 
the sale of estate property should be stayed until a further examination by the 
court could be made.11 A majority of the objection references the appellant's 
desire for a full examination of the will. The objection was not merely to the 
sale of estate property, but rather the sale of that property based on a 
potentially invalid will. Although the document was not titled as a petition to 
contest to the validity of the will and its admission to probate, the 
subject-matter shows that it was such and should have been treated accordingly. 
Nevertheless, to be clear, we reiterate that had the pretermitted heir attempted 
to claim an interest in the estate after probate been concluded the objection 
would have been untimely and the probate conclusive.
II.¶18 TITLE 84 O.S. 2001 §215 APPLIES TO INTESTATE AND 
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
¶19 The son argues that the probate court properly ordered and considered the 
DNA paternity test to determine that he was an heir. He also insists that the 
personal representative's challenge to the issue is waived because the personal 
representative agreed to and consented to the test. The personal representative 
argues that the probate court could not consider paternity testing in a probate 
proceeding and even if it could, the son did not establish that he was an heir 
entitled to inherit from the decedent.
¶20 Because we have determined that the challenge to the holographic will was 
not untimely, it is possible on remand that the will may be determined to be 
invalid and inadmissible. If this is the case, the matter will proceed under the 
intestate statutes. Consequently, we take this opportunity to address DNA 
testing as it applies to both intestate or probate proceedings.
¶21 The paternity of children born out of wedlock has been of concern since 
before statehood. Title 84 O.S. 1910 §215 was codified in 1910 and 
it remained the same as the territorial version of the law from 1890.12 The statute addressed inheritance by and from 
illegitimate children and provided:
Every illegitimate child is an heir of the person who in writing, signed in 
the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of 
such child; and in all cases is an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her 
estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had 
been born in wedlock; but he does not represent his father or mother by 
inheriting any part of the estate of his or her kindred, either lineal or 
collateral, unless before his death his parents shall have intermarried, and his 
father after such marriage, acknowledges him as his child, or adopts him into 
his family, in which case such child and all the legitimate children are 
considered brothers and sisters, and on the death of either of them, interstate, 
and without issue, the others inherit his estate, and are heirs, as hereinbefore 
provided, in like manner as if all the children had been legitimate; saving to 
the father and mother respectively, their rights in the estates of all the 
children in like manner as if all had been legitimate. The issue of all 
marriages null in law, or dissolved by divorce, are legitimate.
¶22 In 1940, the Court in Burns v. Lawson, 1940 OK 459, 107 P.2d 555, addressed the sufficiency of proof as 
required under this statute. In Burns, the alleged heir commenced an 
action to be declared the sole heir of Lawson. A written acknowledgment of 
paternity was alleged to have existed, but neither copy of the instrument nor 
any witness who saw Lawson sign it was produced. The trial court submitted the 
question to the jury as to whether Lawson signed, in the presence of a competent 
witness, an acknowledgment in writing that he was the father. The unanimous 
verdict was no, and it was affirmed on appeal.
¶23 Section 215 remained unaltered for over 60 years until 1977 when the 
Legislature amended, 84 O.S. Supp. 1977 §215 to provide:
For inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands in the same 
relation to his mother and her kindred, and she and her kindred to the child, as 
if that child had been born in wedlock. For like purposes, every such child 
stands in identical relation to his father and his kindred, and the latter and 
his kindred to the child, whenever: (a) the father, in writing, signed in the 
presence of a competent witness acknowledges himself to be the father of the 
child, (b) the father and mother intermarried subsequent to the child's birth, 
and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged the child as his own or 
adopted him into his family, (c) the father publicly acknowledged such child as 
his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, 
into his family and otherwise treating it as if it were a child born in wedlock, 
or (d) the father was judicially determined to be such in a paternity proceeding 
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
For all purposes, the issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by 
divorce, are deemed to have been born in wedlock.
¶24 In the Matter of Estate of 
King, 1990 OK 
138, 837 P.2d 463 we addressed the constitutionality of this version of the statute. The 
father in King was deceased and his will had been presented to probate 
when his alleged child filed an action for a determination of heirship. After 
reviewing several United States Supreme Court decisions on sister states' 
statutes, we held that §215 was constitutional.13 
¶25 The King Court discussed the burden of proof necessary for the 
child born out of wedlock to inherit by intestate succession. In addressing the 
burden of proof, the Court noted that one method for a child born out of wedlock 
to inherit from his father was if "there was a judicial determination of 
paternity before the death of the father." The statute does not have this 
requirement written into it -- nor has it ever had such language. The Court 
quoted the statute as having required a paternity determination before the 
death of the father when no such requirement has ever existed. 
¶26 In In the Matter of Estate of 
Gertrude Jo Geller, 1999 OK CIV APP 45, 980 P.2d 665, the Court of Civil Appeals was presented 
with the argument that §215(d) would authorize a paternity proceeding against 
the father despite the fact that the father was deceased. The Court of Civil 
Appeals noted that: 
[T]he court in King stated that section 215(d) requires 'a judicial 
determination of paternity before the death of the father.' 
1990 OK 138 at ¶12, 837 P.2d  at 467 
(emphasis added). We cannot agree with White's contention that the court's 
language is dicta. 
The Geller Court went on to hold that §215 "does not appear to 
contemplate post-death genetic testing, and the Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that it does not."
¶27 Here, the Court of Civil Appeals also expressly relied on King's 
erroneous language which added the requirement that paternity be determined 
prior to the father's death. The statute does not have such a requirement 
written into it and to the extent King and Geller suggests that it 
does -- they should be overruled and are hereby overruled. 
¶28 More than 30 years has passed since 1977, and §215 has not been updated. 
In the meantime the use of DNA testing has evolved exponentially. The Uniform 
Parentage Act, 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §§ 
7700-101 et seq., became effective in Oklahoma in 2006. The Act, expressly 
applies to parental determinations in this state. It states that all courts 
shall apply the law to determine parentage -- neither intestate nor probate 
proceedings are excluded from this requirement.14 Under the Act: 1) all children, whether born to parents 
who are married or not are treated the same;15 2) paternity testing applies for all purposes of 
establishing a parent-child relationship;16 and 3) paternity testing expressly includes DNA testing 
of deceased individuals.17 It is completely illogical to allow posthumous genetic 
DNA testing under the Uniform Parentage Act, but not to allow it in intestate 
and probate proceeding when the statute expressly allows an heir to prove 
heirship via paternity proceedings.
¶29 Section 215 merely requires a judicial determination of paternity. It 
does not limit that determination to paternity proceedings in which a parent is 
seeking child support or to any other proceeding in which paternity may be 
asserted. Rather, §215 is part of the probate code. The Legislature, when it 
updated §215 in 1977, must have known by the late 1970's that paternity testing 
had advanced since 1910, and would continue to advance. Clearly, the change in 
the statute was broad enough to encompass this evolution of paternity testing. 
Even if one were not inclined to overrule In the Matter 
of Estate of King, 1990 OK 138, 837 P.2d 463 and In the Matter 
of Estate of Gertrude Jo Geller, 
1999 OK CIV APP 45, 980 P.2d 665, the enactment of the 2006 Uniform 
Parentage Act has done so.
¶30 Courts have embraced DNA testing to determine heirship.18 Here, Powell alleged that he was the natural son of the 
decedent.19 His paternity was established with the use of DNA from 
his father's brother. If the Legislature decides to exclude intestate or probate 
proceedings from the current paternity testing laws, it may do so. Until then, 
posthumous paternity testing is expressly authorized by statute.20 The trial court's decision regarding his status as an 
unintentionally omitted child is affirmed.
III.
¶31 TITLE 58 O.S. 2001 §122 PROHIBITS THE APPOINTMENT 
OF A BUSINESS PARTNER AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ONLYWHEN THE 
PROCEEDINGS ARE INTESTATE OR WHEN THE BUSINESS PARTNER IS NOT NAMED PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE IN A WILL.
¶32 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §12221 provides, in pertinent part, that ". . . If the 
decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of his decease, the surviving 
partner must in no case be appointed administrator of his estate." The personal 
representative is the decedent's brother, who was also a business partner with 
the decedent in "Whispering Pines Ranch, L.L.C.," a limited liability 
corporation. According to an application filed by the personal representative, 
the decedent was "owner of a 50% interest in" Whispering Pines LLC. 
¶33 The will's only reference to an administrator and/or personal 
representative was to the decedent's daughter and it was crossed out. The 
business partner was not named anywhere in the will as the administrator and/or 
personal representative. Powell argues that because the personal representative 
was the decedent's business partner in the limited liability company, the trial 
court erred in appointing him to serve in that capacity. The personal 
representative contends that the statutory restrictions of 58 O.S. 2001 §12222 only preclude a business partner serving as personal 
representative when the decedent dies intestate, without a will. 
¶34 He also contends that his appointment should not be disturbed because the 
objection was untimely. Title 58 O.S. 2001 §104,23 the statute governing objections to letters 
testamentary, does not provide a time limit to file an objection.24 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §129 provides that objections 
to the administrator on the grounds of incompetency be filed within 30 days 
after the administrator has been appointed.25 
¶35 The objection here is based on the administrator's status as a business 
partner with the decedent. While there may be causes in which an objection 
should be considered untimely, this cause is not one of them. Probate 
proceedings are equitable in nature.26 Here: 1) the parties have been objecting to the 
admission of the will and to the circumstances surrounding its execution since 
February 8, 2007; and 2) the personal representative did not reveal his status 
as a 50% interest owner in Whispering Pines Ranch., LLC., at the time of his 
appointment, but rather about a month later of January 31, 2007, when he filed 
the Application for Order Approving Sale of Real Estate.27 
¶36 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §12228 has not been amended since 1961. Since that time, this 
Court's case law has recognized the applicability of 58 O.S. 2001 §12229 to persons who die intestate as well as persons who 
die with valid wills. For instance, in In the Matter of the Estate of 
Haden K. Scott, 1979 OK 139 ¶6, 604 P.2d 846, a case in which the deceased died leaving 
a will, the Court applied 58 O.S. 2001 §122 stating:
We take the clear mandate of these provisions to be that in the appointment 
of administrator with will annexed, necessitated because of the death of the 
named executor, the order of preference is governed by 58 O.S. 1971 §122. The right of the party 
best entitled to that appointment under § 122, as a matter of statutory law is 
mandatory, if otherwise competent, binding on the court and not a matter of 
discretion. (Citations omitted.)
¶37 Although Estate of Scott involved the death of an administrator 
named in the will, the concern was the absence of an administrator to serve as a 
personal representative. In the absence of a named administrator, the probate 
court must appoint a personal representative pursuant to the requirements of 
58 O.S. 2001 §122.30 Here, the will's only reference to an administrator 
and/or personal representative was crossed out. 
¶38 As was the case in Estate of Scott, there was an absence of 
administrator to serve as personal representative and the trial court should 
have relied on the provisions of 58 O.S. 2001 §122 in appointing a suitable 
personal representative.31 Nevertheless, because we have determined that the 
challenge to the holographic will was not untimely, it may be determined on 
remand to be invalid and inadmissable and the provisions of §122 would apply 
regardless. Pursuant to those provisions, decedent's brother, the business 
partner of Whispering Pines, L.L.C. should have been prohibited from serving as 
personal representative. The trial court erred when it appointed the decedent's 
business partner as the personal representative.
CONCLUSION
¶39 The pretermitted son of a decedent and his half sibling challenged the 
administration of a holographic will of their father by his brother and business 
partner who was appointed personal representative. After DNA testing confirmed 
the son's lineage, the trial court declared the son an unintentionally omitted 
heir and awarded him his statutory share. Nevertheless, the son filed a motion 
for new trial which was denied. Both the son and the personal representative 
appealed. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, the objections to 
admission of the holographic will were not untimely; 2) the paternity statute, 
84 O.S. 2001 §215, applies to intestate and 
probate proceedings; and 3) 58 O.S. 2001 §122 prohibits the appointment 
of a business partner as personal representative only when the proceedings are 
intestate or when the business partner is not named personal representative in a 
will. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION 
VACATED;CAUSE AFFIRMED IN PART/REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.32
KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, J.J., SUMMERS, S.J., concur.
TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, COMBS, J.J.,, dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1 The petition in error 
seeking review of the denial of the motion for a new trial was filed July 8, 
2009. Nearly 40 days later, the personal representative on the day that his 
response brief was due, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. On 
December 18, 2009, the Court deferred this issue to the decisional stage to be 
decided by the reviewing court. The cause was assigned to the Court of Civil 
Appeals and it issued an opinion on July 22, 2010, without deciding the 
timeliness issue. At this stage in the proceeding, and because the objection was 
made over a month after the appeal was brought, we decline to address the motion 
to dismiss, even though the appeal appears to be timely filed. 
2 Title 84 O.S. 2001 §215 provides:
For inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands in the same 
relation to his mother and her kindred, and she and her kindred to the child, as 
if that child had been born in wedlock. For like purposes, every such child 
stands in identical relation to his father and his kindred, and the latter and 
his kindred to the child, whenever: (a) the father, in writing, signed in the 
presence of a competent witness acknowledges himself to be the father of the 
child, (b) the father and mother intermarried subsequent to the child's birth, 
and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged the child as his own or 
adopted him into his family, (c) the father publicly acknowledged such child as 
his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, 
into his family and otherwise treating it as if it were a child born in wedlock, 
or (d) the father was judicially determined to be such in a paternity proceeding 
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
For all purposes, the issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by 
divorce, are deemed to have been born in wedlock. 
3 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §122 provides:
Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be granted to 
some one or more of the persons hereinafter mentioned, and they are respectively 
entitled thereto in the following order:
1. The surviving husband or wife, or some competent person whom he or she may 
request to have appointed.
2. The children.
3. The father or mother.
4. The brothers or sisters.
5. The grandchildren.
6. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
7. The creditors.
8. Any person legally competent.
If the decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of his decease, the 
surviving partner must in no case be appointed administrator of his estate. 
4 Title 84 O.S. 2001 §54 provides:
A holographic will is one that is entirely written, dated and signed by the 
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in 
or out of this State, and need not be witnessed.
In 1925, the Court held in In re Estate of 
Hail, 1923 OK 
689, ¶0, 235 P. 916, that when a holographic will offered for probate is contested on the 
sole ground that the day of the month is omitted from the date, but the will 
otherwise complies with the statute and there is no question of lack of mental 
capacity, undue influence, or duress involved, the omission of the day of the 
month from the date will not invalidate the will, and it will be admitted to 
probate. Here, the day was also omitted from the will, however, Hail 
would only be dispositive if the lack of day were the sole contest to the will's 
admission and it is not.
5 Knowledge of paternity was not an issue in the trial 
court because the court admitted the DNA testing without any objection from the 
family. The omitted heir and his half sibling in this cause are aligned. 
6 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §61 provides:
When a will has been admitted to probate, any person interested therein may 
at any time within three (3) months from the date the will was admitted to 
probate contest the same or the validity of the will. For that purpose he must 
file in the court in which the will was proved a sworn petition in writing 
containing his allegations, that evidence discovered since the probate of the 
will, the material facts of which must be set forth, shows:
1. That a will of a later date than the one proved by the decedent, revoking 
or changing the will, has been discovered, and is offered; or
2. That some jurisdictional fact was wanting in the probate; or
3. That the testator was not competent, free from duress, menace, fraud, or 
undue influence when the will allowed was made; or
4. That the will was not duly executed and attested. 
7 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §242 provides:
If no person within sixty (60) days after the will has been admitted to 
probate contests the same or the validity thereof, the probate of the will is 
conclusive. 
8 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §61, see note 6, supra. 
9 State ex rel. Dept. of 
Transportation v. Perdue, 2008 OK 103 ¶11, 204 P.3d 1279. 
10 State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12 ¶3, 87 P.3d 572; Hulsey v. Mid-America Preferred 
Ins. Co., 1989 OK 107 ¶8, 777 P.2d 932; Horizons, Inc. v. 
Keo Leasing Co., 1984 OK 24 ¶4, 681 P.2d 757; Amarex, Inc. v. 
Baker, 1982 OK 55 ¶18, 655 P.2d 1040; Boose v. Hanlin, 
1959 OK 166 ¶5, 346 P.2d 932. 
11 The appellant's Objection to Application for Sale of 
Real Estate, Record at p. 26, provides in pertinent part:
That said Kolleen Mailloux, objects to the Application for Order Approving 
Sale of Real Estate that was filed in this Court on January 31, 2007. Kolleen 
Mailloux requests that said sale not occur until such time as an appraisement of 
the decedent's real properties be conducted and presented to her review.
Further, Kolleen Mailloux, objects to any further proceedings being conducted 
in this case until such time as the Court fully examines the details and 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the alleged holographic will by the 
decedent. 
Wherefore, Kolleen Mailloux prays that this Court not approve the pending 
sale of the decedent's real property until such time as a valid, adequate 
appraisal has been performed and that the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the decedent's alleged holographic will have been fully and fairly 
litigated, and any other relief the Court may deem just or equitable.
12 St. 1890 §6895. 
13 In the Matter of 
Estate of King, 1990 OK 138, 837 P.2d 463, The Court said in ¶10 that:
Section 215 of title 84 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
federal Constitution. The statutory provisions in Lalli required a determination 
of paternity before the father's death. The United States Supreme Court held 
that those provisions did not violate the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Section 215 is less restrictive than the provisions upheld 
in Lalli. Further, section 215 meets the test articulated in the Trimble, Lalli, 
and Reed: Special burdens placed on children born out of wedlock as a 
prerequisite to taking from an alleged father's estate must be substantially 
related to a legitimate state interest. The orderly disposition of estates is a 
legitimate state interest which justifies "limitations on the time and the 
manner in which claims may be asserted." In the present case, since the father 
is dead, the special burdens placed on children for inheritance purposes under 
section 215 are acceptable for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Unlike the 
statutory provisions under attack in Trimble and Reed, section 215 does not 
unnecessarily exclude 'some significant categories of illegitimate children of 
intestate men [whose] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing 
the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property 
passing under intestacy laws.' As in Lalli, the statutory provision under attack 
here is substantially [837 P.2d 467] related to a legitimate state interest and 
does not violate the fourteenth amendment. (Citations omitted.)
14 Title 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §7700-103 provides:
A. The Uniform Parentage Act applies to determination of parentage in this 
state.
B. The court shall apply the law of this state to adjudicate the parent-child 
relationship. The applicable law does not depend on:
1. The place of birth of the child; or
2. The past or present residence of the child.
C. The Uniform Parentage Act does not create, enlarge, or diminish parental 
rights or duties under other laws
of this state.
D. The district or administrative courts are authorized to adjudicate 
parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act. 
15 Title 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §7700-202 provides:
A child born to parents who are not married to each other has the same rights 
under the law as a child born to parents who are married to each other. 
16 Title 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §7700-203 provides:
Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship 
established under the Uniform Parentage Act applies for all purposes, except as 
otherwise provided by the laws of this state. 
17 Title 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §7700-509 provides:
For good cause shown, the court may order genetic testing of a deceased 
individual. 
18 In re Estate of 
Williams, 891 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (N.Y. Sur. 2009)(Non-marital child 
entitled to DNA testing to determine if decedent was the child's father.); 
In re Estate of Kingury, 946 A.2d 389, 393 
(Me. 2008) (Claimant's request to probate court, for exhumation of testator's 
body for genetic testing to determine if claimant was testator's biological 
daughter did not constitute time-barred paternity action.); In re 
Michael R., 793 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (N.Y.Sur. 2004) (Recognizing 
acceptance of posthumous DNA testing results and clear and convincing evidence 
of paternity.); Ryan v. Rickman, 584 S.E.2d 502, 504 (W.Va. 2003) 
(DNA testing revealed child was entitled to share in intestate estate.). 
See also, Fort Dearbourn Life Ins. 
Co. v. Turner, 521 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (Posthumous 
paternity testing allowed to determine paternity of illegitimate child for life 
insurance policy.); Ashley v. Mattingly, 932 A.2d 757 (Md. App. 
2007) (Recognizing that estates and trusts statutes allow trial court discretion 
to order genetic testing if it is in the child's best interests.); In 
re Estate of Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Minn. 
2006) (Parentage Act must apply in its entirety to determine paternity for 
purposes of intestate succession.).
Kellog, Thomas, Determination of Heirship, 68 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 93 
(2002) §8 Use of scientific evidence to determine pedigree explains that modern 
courts permit scientific evidence such as genetic test results to be admitted as 
evidence of pedigree, a movement that has been building since the 1940's. 
19 The record indicates that Powell was born out of 
wedlock and subsequently adopted. Details regarding the adoption are not 
provided. Neither party takes issue with Powell's ability to be both adopted and 
an unintentionally omitted heir from his natural father. Estate of 
Flowers v. Clinkingbeard, 1993 OK 19, ¶10, 848 P.2d 1146 [Adopted children may not be eliminated as 
beneficiaries or devisees absent a clear and explicit expression to do so.]; 
Title 10 A O.S. Supp. 2009 §1-4-906 of the Oklahoma Children's Code provides in 
pertinent part:
A. The termination of parental rights terminates the parent-child 
relationship, including: 
1. The parent's right to the custody of the child;
2. The parent's right to visit the child; 
3. The parent's right to control the child's training and education; 
4. The necessity for the parent to consent to the adoption of the child; 
5. The parent's right to the earnings of the child; and
6. The parent's right to inherit from or through the child.
Provided, that nothing herein shall in any way affect the right of the child 
to inherit from the parent.. . .
See also, 10 O.S. 2001 §7505-6.5 which relieves natural parents of the 
ability to inherit from an adopted child through descent and distribution but 
has not provisions regarding the adopted child inheriting from the natural 
parent. 
20 Title 10 O.S. Supp. 2006 §7700-509 see note 17, supra. 
21 Title 58 O.S. 2001§122 see note 2, supra. 
22 Title 58 O.S. §122 see note 2, supra. 
23 Title 58 O.S. 2001§104 provides:
Any person interested in a will may file objections in writing, to granting 
letters testamentary to the persons named as executors , or any of them; and the 
objections must be heard and determined by the court. A petition may at the same 
time, be filed for letters of administration, with will annexed. 
24 In Dillow v. Campbell, 1969 OK 63 ¶6, 453 P.2d 710, the Court discussed 58 O.S. §104, but did not discuss any time limit for 
filing an objection to the appointment of a personal representative. 
25 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §129 provides:
Any person interested may contest the petition by filing written opposition 
thereto, on the ground of the incompetency of the applicant, or may, at any time 
within thirty (30) days after an administrator has been appointed, assert his 
own rights to the administration and pray that letters be issued to himself. In 
the latter case the contestant must file his petition in the court. The court 
thereof shall set a day for hearing the same and the contestant shall give 
written notice by mail, postage prepaid, to the known heirs and the original 
petitioner or administrator, if the appointment has been made, of said contest, 
and the time and place set for hearing the same, at least five (5) days before 
said hearing. 
26 In the Matter of 
Spears, 2008 OK 90, ¶8, 179 P.3d 1265; In re Estate 
of Holcomb, 2002 OK 90, ¶8, 63 P.3d 9; In re Estate 
of Wilder, 1976 OK 113, ¶7, 554 P.2d 783. 
27 The Objection to Application for Sale of Real Estate 
filed by the appellant Mailloux on February 8, 2007, provides in pertinent 
part:
. . .Furthermore, Kolleen Mailloux, objects to any further proceeding being 
conducted in this case until such time as the Court fully examines the details 
and circumstances surrounding the execution of the alleged holographic will by 
the decedent. 
Wherefore, Kolleen Maillous prays that this Court not approve the pending 
sale of the decedent's property until such time as a valid, adequate appraisal 
has been performed and that the circumstances surround the execution of the 
decedents alleged holographic will have been fully and fairly litigated, and any 
other relief the Court may deem just or equitable.
Pursuant to 58 O.S. 2001 
§389 when a partnership interest belongs to any estate, the trial judge is 
required to carefully inquire into the condition of the partnership affairs and 
to examine the surviving partner. 
28 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §122, see note 2, supra. 
29 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §122, see note 2, supra. 
30 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §122, see note 2, supra. In 
Sparks v. Steele, 1972 OK 127, 501 P.2d 1106 the Court noted that "[t]he right to 
appointment as administrator is a matter of statutory law, so appointment of the 
applicant best entitled under Section 122, if competent to serve as such, is 
mandatory, not discretionary with the court." 
31 Title 58 O.S. 2001 §122, see note 2, supra. 
32 Our disposition of this appeal renders the personal 
representative's motion for appeal related attorney fees and costs moot. 

WINCHESTER, J., with whom TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J. and COMBS, J. join, 
dissenting:
¶1 I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis, 
the majority opinion overrules In re King, 1990 OK 138, 837 P.2d 463, and In re Geller, 1999 OK CIV APP 45, 980 P.2d 665. King construed § 215(d) of title 
84.1 The statute provides in pertinent part that for 
inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands in identical relation 
to his father and his kindred, and the latter and his kindred to the child 
whenever "the father was judicially determined to be such in a paternity 
proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction." The majority opinion 
objects to the construction given § 215(d) by King, which holds there 
must be a judicial determination of paternity before the death of the father. 
The Court's opinion states and emphasizes in bold letters that "The statute does 
not have this requirement written into it--nor has it ever had such language."2 
¶2 Construing language in statutes and pronouncing what the law means 
constitutes the essential role of the judiciary in the American government 
system, and gives precedential effect to those decisions. This process makes the 
common law what it is. If a new court composed of different members were to 
overrule each pronouncement of a former court that the new court now finds 
objectionable, the common law could no longer be relied on to serve as guide to 
the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions. A new composition 
of a high court would result in lower courts closely examining established case 
law to determine if the new court would likely sustain or overrule that law 
based on potentially changed ideology within a new court.
¶3 In Lasiter v. Ferguson, 1920 OK 269, 192 P. 197, cert. den. 254 U.S. 651 
(1920), the Court made this observation about the principle of stare 
decisis: 
". . . [I]t is the duty of this court, on the principle of stare decisis, to 
adhere to such [prior judicial] decisions although the court may be of the 
belief . . . that such decisions are not sound, for when parties have acted upon 
decisions as settled law, and rights have been vested thereunder, their inherent 
correctness or incorrectness in the abstract is of less importance than that the 
rule of property so established should be constant and invariable." 

Lasiter, 1920 OK 
269, ¶ 8, 192 P.  at 199.
¶4 In 1990, the King Court construed § 215(d) to mean that a 
proceeding to determine paternity must take place before the death of the 
father. Since that time, the lower courts and the lawyers of this state have 
properly treated this pronouncement, in accordance with the tradition of common 
law, to be binding precedent. The Court of Civil Appeals in Geller 
properly followed that rule. Lawyers must have depended on this pronouncement in 
drafting wills, and lower courts in probate cases must have followed it in 
determining how and whether to exclude individuals purporting to be children, 
grandchildren, or heirs, but born out of wedlock. This new rule promulgated by 
the majority will certainly produce a re-drafting of wills in an attempt to 
exclude unknown and unknowable claimants as blood relations in probate 
cases.
¶5 The legislature has had over twenty years to amend § 215(d), if indeed 
those lawmakers had determined that the King court had misconstrued the 
intention of that branch of government. Failure to amend a statute after its 
judicial construction constitutes legislative acquiescence to that construction. 
R.R.Tway, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1995 OK 129, ¶ 13, 910 P.2d 972, 976. Over twenty legislative sessions 
have passed since the Supreme Court's decision in King and over ten 
sessions since the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in Geller, 
ample opportunity to change the settled construction of § 215(d), yet the 
legislature has not seen fit to do so. "Legislative silence, when it has the 
authority to speak may be considered as an understanding of legislative intent." 
Owings v. Pool Well Service, 1992 OK 159, ¶ 8, n. 10, 843 P.2d 380, 382, n. 10.
¶6 The Court of Civil Appeals in the cause now before us, held that a 
judicial determination of paternity after decedent's death based primarily on 
the testimony of the putative heir's biological mother and on the DNA results is 
not permitted as a basis for inheritance under § 215(d). It constitutes a 
post-death determination. This holding, based on King, properly reflects 
the current case law. A post-death determination leaves no opportunity for a man 
to defend against a DNA determination of parentage. Aside from men who conceive 
children outside of wedlock, there are men who are sperm donors, whose purpose 
is to provide an opportunity for children to childless couples. The Artificial 
Insemination statutes provide that the information is not open to the general 
public, 10 O.S.2001, § 
553, and that any child born as a result of the process shall be considered 
for all legal intents and purposes to be the naturally conceived legitimate 
child of the husband and wife, 10 O.S.2001, § 554. If the donor is not 
deceased, he may use these statutes as a defense, but if he is deceased, under 
the majority opinion, the DNA test could be used to prove parentage without a 
defense available to the true heirs, who may not be aware of the circumstances 
of conception. Today's rule opens the door for post-death claims by an unknown 
number of potential heirs. If sperm is frozen, it is possible for conception to 
occur after the death of the sperm donor. 
¶7 The majority opinion has overruled an established rule of law for the 
orderly disposition of property at death. The cases have not been overruled for 
extraordinary cause, only because the majority disagrees with the previous 
result. This new holding creates uncertainty for those planning the disposition 
of their estates, and those rightfully interested in those estates. The door is 
now left open for litigation resulting in the depleting of estate assets over 
claims by putative heirs seeking to prove the deceased is their father. These 
problems should be left to the legislature, which can craft a comprehensive 
solution, not this Court, which has unnecesarily created a problem that did not 
exist prior to this date.
FOOTNOTES
1 1977 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 
36, § 1, 84 O.S.2001, § 
215. 
2 Majority opinion, ¶ 25. 

COMBS, J., JOINED BY TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, J., 
DISSENTING:
¶1 I must respectfully dissent. The majority opinion authorizes a 
determination of paternity as a basis for intestate succession and inheritance, 
post-death, a position I cannot support.
¶2 Appellant Powell, sought a share of Decedent's estate, as an omitted heir, 
under 84 O.S. § 
132, claiming he was born out of wedlock to a woman who gave him up for 
adoption, and Decedent was his biological father. Subsequent to the decedent's 
death, and with the aid of DNA testing performed on the Decedent's surviving 
brother, Archie Dicksion, appellant established his theory of paternity. 
Appellant sought a share of Decedent's estate as an omitted heir. 
¶3 Pursuant to the provisions of 84 O.S. 2001, § 215, in order to establish 
his omitted-heir status, the appellant must successfully prove one of four 
methods. 
¶4 84 O.S. 2001, § 
215 provides in pertinent part:
For inheritance purposes, a child born out of wedlock stands . . . in 
identical relation to his father . . . , whenever: (a) the father, in writing, 
signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowledges himself to be the 
father of the child, (b) the father and mother intermarried subsequent to the 
child's birth, and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged the child as 
his own or adopted him into his family, (c) the father publicly acknowledged 
such child as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he 
is married, into his family and otherwise treating it as if it were a child in 
wedlock, or (d) the father was judicially determined to be such in a paternity 
proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction.
¶5 In Matter of Estate of King, 1990 OK 138, ¶12, 837 P.2d 463, 467, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Hodges, we held:
Section 215 provides . . . (4) there is a judicial determination of paternity 
before the death of the father . . . (Emphasis added.)
¶6 In the present matter, Powell seeks to establish his right to inherit 
under the fourth method, specifically with the use of DNA testing, conducted 
after the death of his alleged father.
In In the Matter of the Estate of Gertrude Jo Geller, 1999 OK CIV APP 45, ¶¶11-17 and 24, 
980 P.2d 665, 669-670, the Appellant, Holly White, sought to determine heirship 
by reason of a sexual encounter between her mother and Jay Myers, the son of the 
Gertrude Geller. Mr. Myers had predeceased his mother, Ms. Geller by some 
thirty-seven years. Ms. White sought to prove heirship by exhumation of her 
alleged father's body. The court stated with regard to Section 215(d):
As section 215 (d) is phrased-"the father was judicially determined to 
be such in a paternity proceeding . . ."-it does not appear to contemplate 
post-death genetic testing..." (Emphasis original.)
I agree with this interpretation.
¶7 The majority assert the Uniform Parentage Act, 10 O. S. Supp. 2006, §§ 
7700-101 et seq., which became effective in 2006, now specifically applies to 
paternity determinations in probate matters. The majority states it is illogical 
to allow posthumous genetic DNA testing under the Uniform Parentage Act, but not 
to allow it in probate actions in which the statute expressly allows an 
individual to prove heirship via paternity proceedings. What is illogical is the 
concept that a father would not have the opportunity to be heard in paternity 
proceedings, notwithstanding technology has advanced to such levels as to 
establish his relationship to a child born out of wedlock with a high degree of 
certainty. 
¶8 Our laws of succession allow him the opportunity to dispose of his assets 
in a knowing manner. See 84 O.S. § 41. The right to make a will includes the 
right to make it according to the testators own desires, subject only to 
statutory restrictions. Ward v. Cook, 1931 OK 575, 3 P2d. 728, 152 Okl. 234. This was the intent of the 
legislature in stating "the father was judicially determined to be such 
in a paternity proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis 
original.) If the parent-child relationship had been established prior to his 
death, the father could make disposition of his estate with the knowledge of the 
relationship. Section 215 applies to "omitted children" a putative father, once 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the father, would have the 
opportunity to provide for this child or disinherit the child in accordance with 
84 O.S. § 132.
¶9 The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a 
New York statute which provided for a procedure during the lifetime of the 
father to make an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding brought 
during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from birth of the 
child,1 addressed a similar issue in Lalli v. Lalli, 
439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
¶10 The United States Supreme Court addressed the greatest concern- how to 
achieve finality of a decree in any estate when there always exist the 
possibility, however remote, of a secret child born out of wedlock hidden in the 
buried past of a parent or an ancestor of a class of beneficiaries. Finality in 
a decree of distribution is essential, since title to real property passes under 
such decree.2 See, Lalli v. Lalli, supra.
¶11 The provisions of § 215(d) provide a requirement designed to ensure the 
accurate resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the potential for 
disruption of estate administration. Accuracy and finality in estate 
administration are enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum 
during the lifetime of the father. Fraudulent assertions of paternity will be 
much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where the proof is put before a 
court of law at a time when the putative father is available to respond, or to 
react to a judicial determination of paternity, rather than first brought to 
light when the distribution of the assets of an estate is hanging in the 
balance. 
¶12 A post-death determination of paternity based upon scientific testing, 
although likely accurate, does not afford the father the basic opportunity to be 
heard or to change his testamentary plans after a court of competent 
jurisdiction has made a determination of paternity. A child's right to inherit 
should not outweigh an individual's right to dispose of their property as they 
feel appropriate.
¶13 To follow the majority's interpretation there would be little if any 
finality to the distribution of ones estate if, through the advances of science, 
one could assert heirship and entitlement for years or decades after the death 
of the putative father. How would a putative father disinherit all "unknown 
issue?" The basic principles of due process would allow a man who has been 
determined to be a father at a paternity proceeding to make a disposition of his 
estate in light of a court's decision.
¶14 Without a determination of paternity, prior to the death of Valatus 
Merral Dicksion, Powell is not an heir and has no standing in the probate 
proceeding. A right to inherit property is granted solely by statute. Matter 
of Estate of Baxter, 1992 OK CIV APP 15, ¶17, 827 P.2d 184, 187. 
Succession to estates is strictly a matter of statutory regulation, which 
cannot be changed by courts. In Re Felgars's Estate, 1954 OK 193, ¶22, 272 P.2d 453, 456; Matter of Estate of Swartz, 
1994 OK CIV APP 
7, ¶3, 870 P.2d 179, 180.
¶15 I respectfully dissent. 
FOOTNOTES
1 N.Y. Est., Powers & 
Trusts Law § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967)
2 58 O.S. 2001, § 711.