Title: Carter v. Reynolds

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

Alice Reynolds was a non-professional, part-time employee who conducted detail work for auditors. At the time of the accident, Reynolds was employed by the accounting firm of Stevenes, Fluhr, Chismar, Alvino & Schechter, CPA (the firm). She was required to work in the firm s Neptune office, but she spent twenty-five to thirty percent of her time visiting clients off-site. There was no office car available to Reynolds, thus, she was required to use her own vehicle for travel. Reynolds was able to claim mileage and obtain travel reimbursement in accordance with Internal Revenue Service rates and rules. On the date of the accident, Reynolds spent the morning in the office and then traveled to Deal to a client location. Reynolds was on her way home from Deal when she had an accident with a vehicle driven by David Carter. Carter filed a Complaint against Reynolds and subsequently amended it to include the firm, alleging that Reynolds was an employee, servant, and/or agent of the firm when the accident occurred because she was in the scope of her employment. The firm filed a motion for summary judgment and Carter filed a cross-motion. The trial court granted the firm s motion, but on reconsideration ruled that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment and granted Carter s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to respondeat superior liability. The firm moved for leave to appeal. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court s grant of partial summary judgment to Carter, reasoning that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment. The firm moved for leave to appeal and the Supreme Court granted the motion. HELD: The firm is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Reynolds use of her personal automobile to advance her employer s business interests fell within the dual purpose, required-vehicle exception to the going and coming rule and placed her squarely both within the employment relationship and the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. 1. Although as a general rule of tort law, liability must be based on personal fault, the doctrine of respondeat superior recognizes a vicarious liability principle pursuant to which a master will be held liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servants or employees. To establish a master s liability under respondeat superior, a plaintiff must prove (1) that a master-servant relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the servant occurred within the scope of that employment. (Pp. 6-7) 2 Along with forty-four other states, New Jersey recognizes section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency as the touchstone for determining who is a servant: A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other s control or right to control. That determination is dependent on a number of factual matters set forth in the Restatement, incorporated into our model jury charge, and such other factors as may be reasonably considered in determining whether the employer has control or right to control the person employed. (Pp. 7-9) 3. Proof that the employer-employee relationship exists does not, in and of itself, create an inference that a given act done by the employee was within the scope of employment. In New Jersey, an employee s conduct falls within the scope of employment if (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and, (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. Restatement (Second) 228. 229 of the Restatement provides that to be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. The Restatement sets forth a number of factors that should be considered in determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment. (Pp. 9-13) 4. Generally, an employee who is going to or coming from his or her place of employment is not considered to be acting within the scope of employment. There are, however, exceptions to the going and coming rule. Respondeat superior has been held to apply to a situation involving commuting when: (1) the employee is engaged in a special errand or mission on the employer s behalf; (2) the employer requires the employee to drive his or her personal vehicle to work so that the vehicle may be used for work-related tasks; and (3) the employee is on-call. In addition, New Jersey has adopted the dual purpose exception, which covers cases in which, at the time of the employee s negligence, he or she can be said to be serving an interest of the employer along with a personal interest. (Pp. 13-17) 5. A master-servant relationship plainly existed between Reynolds and the firm. Because Reynolds spent one-third of her work time on the road visiting firm clients, was required by the firm to have her own car available for such activities, and actually was returning from a client visit at the time of the accident, she came within the required-vehicle exception to the going and coming rule. Moreover, driving a required vehicle satisfies the control and benefit elements of respondeat superior. Reynolds was returning home from an off-site visit and therefore had a dual purpose insofar as she was serving interests of both herself and the firm. (Pp. 17-20) 6. The Court rejects Carter s contention that Reynolds was on a special errand or mission for the firm when the accident occurred and declines to consider the broader enterprise liability theory that is the standard for respondeat superior in California. (Pp. 20-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins, stating that the Court s holding does not stand for the proposition that all types of employees who commute to work by personal vehicle, and who may be sent, via their own vehicle, on assignment from time to time, now commute every day to and from their regular workplace under the control of their employer. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in Justice LONG s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ALICE F. REYNOLDS, Defendant, and STEVENS, FLUHR, CHISMAR, ALVINO & SCHECHTER, C.P.A., Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 7, 2002 Decided February 19, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 345 N.J. Super. 67 (2001). Stephen R. Dumser argued the cause for appellant (Gercke, Dumser, Shoemaker & Sierzega, attorneys; Mr. Dumser and Ronald P. Sierzega, on the brief). Alan H. Sklarsky argued the cause for respondents (Tomar O'Brien Kaplan Jacoby & Graziano, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. In this appeal, we are called on to determine whether the doctrine of respondeat superior may be invoked to hold an employer vicariously liable for the tort of an employee. More particularly, we have been asked to decide whether the automobile negligence of an employee, who was required by her employer to use her personal car on mandatory client visits, subjected the employer to liability for an accident when the employee was on her way home from a client s location. Applying well-established principles of our law, we have concluded that it does. With respect to billing, on the days Reynolds traveled from her home to the client, she would begin billing when she arrived at the client s destination. On the days that she went directly home after meeting with a client, she would stop billing when she left the client, not when she actually arrived at home. If she had to return to the office after meeting with a client, she would bill for her travel time to the firm. On the day in question, Reynolds spent the morning at the firm, and then traveled to Deal to a client location. Reynolds spent the remainder of the day working in Deal. She testified that she was reimbursed for the mileage from Deal to Neptune, but that she was not paid wages for her travel time. At approximately 4:29 p.m., when Reynolds was traveling from Deal to her home, the accident occurred. On November 3, 1997, Carter filed an automobile negligence action against Reynolds. Later, Carter filed an amended complaint adding the firm as a defendant, alleging that Reynolds was an employee, servant, and/or agent of the firm when the accident occurred because she was in the scope of her employment. The firm filed a motion for summary judgment and Carter filed a cross-motion. The trial court granted the firm s motion, leaving Reynolds as the sole defendant in the case. On Carter s motion for reconsideration based on new precedent, the trial court determined that Reynolds was, in fact, acting within the scope of her employment when she struck him and thus, granted Carter s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to respondeat superior liability. The firm moved for leave to appeal the interlocutory order, which motion was granted. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court s grant of partial summary judgment to Carter, reasoning that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment, thus making the firm liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Carter, supra, 345 N.J. Super. at 77. The firm then moved before us for leave to appeal, which motion we granted. 172 N.J. 170 (2002). We now affirm. III In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of facts, among others, are considered: the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; the skill required in the particular occupation; whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; the length of time for which the person is employed; the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and whether the principal is or is not in business. [Restatement (Second) of Agency 220 (1958).] Our model jury charge regarding the definition of a servant is identical to Restatement section 220 with the addition of one line: [S]uch other factors as may be reasonably considered in determining whether the employer has control or right to control the person employed. Model Jury Charges (Civil) 4.22(A) (June 1979) (emphasis added). As that charge intimates, control by the master over the servant is the essence of the master-servant relationship on which the doctrine of respondeat superior is based. Wright, supra, 169 N.J. at 436 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Keeton, supra, 70 at 501 ( The traditional definition of a servant is that he is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another, whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled, or is subject to a right of control, by the other. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). [Keeton, supra, 70 at 502; see Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 169 (1982) ( The scope of employment standard, concededly imprecise, is a formula designed to delineate generally which unauthorized acts of the servant can be charged to the master. (citation omitted)).] Some factors that courts have considered when assessing the scope of employment include: the nature of the employment, the duties of the employee, whether the accident occurred in the course of fulfilling some job-related function, or whether it occurred during a trip personal to the employee. Christopher Vaeth, J.D., Annotation, Employer s Liability for Negligence of Employee in Driving His or Her Own Automobile, 27 A.L.R.5th 174, 174 (1995). In New Jersey, as in most other states, See footnote 2 scope of employment is subject to analysis under Restatement sections 228 and 229, which provide in relevant part that an employee s conduct falls within the scope of employment if: it is of the kind he is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, . . . . (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. [Restatement (Second) of Agency 228 (1958).] Restatement section 229 provides: To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. (2) In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment, the following matters of fact are to be considered: whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants; the time, place and purpose of the act; the previous relations between the master and the servant; the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant; whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done; the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by the master to the servant; the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and whether or not the act is seriously criminal. [Id. 229; see Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting that New Jersey follows Restatement approach to scope of employment analysis and applying same); Di Cosala, supra, 91 N.J. at 169 (using Restatement principles to guide scope of employment analysis).] [Ibid.] See also O Toole v. Carr, - N.J. - (2003) (recognizing required-vehicle exception). That is the backdrop for our inquiry. [Carberry v. State, Div. of State Police, 279 N.J. Super. 114, 120 (App. Div.) (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen s Compensation 16.11 at 4-204 (1990)), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 94 (1995).] The special aspect of the exception requires, at the very least, that the employee perform an act outside the ordinary confines of his or her job description at the behest of the employer. That standard simply does not apply in the circumstances here presented. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ALICE F. REYNOLDS, Defendant, and STEVENS, FLUHR, CHISMAR, ALVINO & SCHECHTER, C.P.A., Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ LaVECCHIA, J., concurring. I am able to join in the judgment of the Court and its narrow holding that applies the required-vehicle exception to the going and-coming rule and imposes liability on this employer under a respondeat superior theory. Importantly, the Court eschews any reliance on the broad enterprise liability theory that is the standard for respondeat superior in California. Ante at ____; see also O Toole v. Carr, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2002) (slip op. at 5). The Court wisely declines to adopt a standard that effectively abandons consideration of employer control in the context of employee automobile accidents. I have no hesitation in agreeing with the Court s assessment here that the employer exercised control and derived benefit from requiring its employee to have her motor vehicle at work that day and sending her, in that vehicle, to an alternate site to perform duties. Her employer thus must bear vicarious liability for the accident that occurred on her way home from that assignment. This was not the employee's typical end-of-workday commute home from her regular worksite; it was a return home from assigned off-site work duties. In that setting, the cessation of workday duties did not signal the end of the employer s control and derived benefit from the condition of employment that required the use of her vehicle in promotion of the employer's interest. That said, fairly read, the Court's opinion does not stand for the proposition that every invocation of the required-vehicle exception shall subject an employer to liability for an automobile accident occurring during an employee's commutation. It surely has not been, and is not as a result of this decision, the law of this Court that all types of employees who commute to work by personal vehicle, and who may be sent, via their own vehicle, on assignment from time to time, now commute every day to and from their regular workplace "under the control" of their employer. The Court has never considered such a broadly sweeping application of the required-vehicle exception to the going-and-coming rule. The societal cost and benefit of such an across-the-board application of the required-vehicle exception to all employees who may have to commute to work by their own motor vehicle and who may have to use their vehicle occasionally in work-related business would require careful scrutiny, but not today and not on these facts. Because that question is left for another day, I am able to join in the Court's disposition. Justice Verniero joins in this opinion. NO. A-104 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court DAVID CARTER and DONNA CARTER, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ALICE F. REYNOLDS, Defendant, And STEVENS, FLUHR, CHISMAR, ALVINO & SCHECHTER, C.P.A., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED February 19, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY