Title: The Florida Bar v. James Edmund Baker

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC96980
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
JAMES EDMUND BAKER,
Respondent.
[January 31, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
James Edmund Baker.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
Baker and his ex-wife Ellen owned a home in Dade County (the home) as
tenants by the entirety.  They lived in New York until approximately April 1997,
when Baker relocated to Fort Myers for employment as an attorney for the Lee
County School Board.  Ellen remained in New York.  The couple subsequently had
marital problems, and Ellen obtained a restraining order against Baker.
In April 1997, the home became subject to foreclosure, and Baker decided to
1. A FIRPTA affidavit is a sworn statement relating to Internal Revenue
Service regulations on the sale of real property.
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sell it.  Baker located a buyer in July 1997 and executed a contract to sell the home. 
Baker then retained attorney Larry Parks to represent him in the closing.  Prior to
closing, Baker signed Ellen’s name to several legal documents relating to the sale,
including a warranty deed, a power of attorney, a bill of sale, and a Foreign
Investor in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) affidavit.1  The referee found that
Ellen did not consent to Baker’s signing of her name.
Baker also asked his secretary, Marnell Keller, to notarize the forged
signatures.  The referee found that Baker never disclosed that he had signed the
documents and that he led Keller to believe that Ellen had simply forgotten to have
her signature notarized.  Keller unlawfully notarized two of the forged signatures.
Baker then sent the documents to Parks, who used them in the July 14, 1997,
closing for sale of the home.  Baker did not inform Parks that Baker had signed
Ellen’s name on the documents, nor did he tell Parks that the documents had been
unlawfully notarized.  The home was sold for a net gain of approximately $29,000,
and Baker deposited $20,000 of the proceeds into his personal account.  Ellen had
no access to the deposited proceeds and received no notice that the home had
been sold or that the deposit had been made.  Baker claims that the immediate sale
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of the home was to avoid foreclosure and that the proceeds from the sale of the
home were only used to pay marital debt.  These claims are not contested by the
Bar.
On July 16, 1997, Ellen received blank closing documents and a note from
Baker indicating that a buyer had been found for the home.  The note requested that
Ellen sign and return the blank paperwork.  When contacted, Baker refused to give
Ellen any details regarding the sale, and Ellen therefore refused to sign the blank
paperwork.  Ellen learned of the sale of the home in March of 1998.  The referee
found that the evidence did not support Baker’s claims that Ellen knew about and
consented to the sale of the home or that she concocted her version of the facts in
order to gain an advantage in a custody battle for Baker and Ellen’s children.
In his final report, the referee recommended that Baker be found guilty of
violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another), 4-8.4(b) (a lawyer shall not
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects), and  4-8.4(c) (a lawyer
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).  The referee recommended disbarment for a minimum period of
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five years.  While Baker has no prior disciplinary history, the referee emphasized
that the fraudulent acts committed are major violations, including three forgeries of
legally significant documents, which are crimes prosecutable as felonies.  The
referee also noted that Baker deceived Ellen, caused Keller to unlawfully notarize
documents, and caused Parks to close a real estate deal using fraudulent
documents.  In recommending discipline, the referee considered Baker’s personal
history and his lack of a disciplinary record as mitigation.  The referee also noted in
the findings of fact that, at the time of Baker’s alleged misconduct, Baker and Ellen
were involved in a bitter divorce.
Baker has petitioned this Court to review the referee’s findings of fact,
conclusions of guilt, and recommendation of discipline.  Baker argues that he had a
due process right to a separate discipline hearing, that the referee’s findings of fact
are not supported by the record and do not support the conclusions of guilt, and
that the recommended discipline is too harsh.  We find that Baker’s due process
rights were not violated and affirm the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of
guilt.  We decline, however, to follow the referee’s recommendation of discipline
and instead suspend Baker for ninety-one days.
Baker’s first argument is that the referee violated Baker’s due process rights
by not giving Baker a separate disciplinary hearing.  Due process in Bar disciplinary
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proceedings requires that an accused attorney be given a full opportunity to explain
the circumstances of an alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation
regarding any possible sanction.  See Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975,
979 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 1987).  Baker
had numerous opportunities to fully explain the circumstances of the alleged
offenses and to offer testimony in mitigation.
At the disciplinary hearing, Baker’s counsel stated that since Baker’s
testimony was fully elicited by the Bar’s case-in-chief and Baker’s counsel was able
to introduce all exhibits, Baker would rest his case without calling any witnesses. 
The proceeding moved to closing arguments, and the referee stated that he wanted
to hear arguments from both sides regarding discipline.  Bar counsel reminded the
referee that proceedings could be bifurcated for purposes of conducting a
mitigation hearing, but the referee decided this was unnecessary.  Baker made no
objection or indication to the referee that Baker needed more time to present
additional evidence.  At the conclusion of closing arguments, Baker’s counsel
voluntarily declined the opportunity to submit proposed findings to the court.
Separate hearings regarding disciplinary sanctions are not required as long as
an accused attorney receives fair notice of the charges faced.  See Florida Bar v.
Weed, 559 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (no error when referee refused Weed’s
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request to present mitigating evidence after, rather than prior to, determination of
guilt or innocence); see also Florida Bar v. Vernell, 721 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla.
1998).  Baker was on notice before the final hearing of a possible disbarment
sanction.  The complaint served on Baker clearly specified the charges being
brought against him, including fraud, criminal acts of forgery, and multiple
misrepresentations.  The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
authorize disbarment for such conduct.  See, e.g., Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs.
5.11 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer engages in intentional conduct involving
dishonesty).  The Bar also specifically requested a disbarment sanction during its
closing argument.  Baker could have requested an opportunity to present additional
evidence at a future hearing but instead went on with closing arguments specifically
stating, “This does not warrant disbarment.”
Baker, knowing the charges brought against him, was afforded opportunities
to explain the circumstances involving his alleged misconduct and to offer
mitigation regarding potential sanctions.  There is no due process violation where
Baker failed to avail himself fully of these opportunities.  See Florida Bar v. Daniel,
626 So. 2d 178, 183 (Fla. 1993) (“Daniel clearly was afforded an opportunity to be
heard; the fact that he voluntarily chose not to take advantage of that opportunity
does not offend due process.”).  Thus, Baker was given due process and was not
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entitled to a separate hearing regarding disciplinary sanctions.  
Baker’s second
claim is that the referee’s findings of fact are not supported by the record and do
not support the referee’s findings of guilt.  To succeed in challenging the referee’s
findings of fact, Baker must establish that there is a lack of evidence in the record
to support such findings or that the record clearly contradicts the referee’s
conclusions.  See Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 978.  Baker has not met this burden.
This Court has stated that, “[t]he referee is in a unique position to assess the
credibility of witnesses, and [the referee’s] judgment regarding credibility should
not be overturned absent clear and convincing evidence that [the referee’s]
judgment is incorrect.”  Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla.
1999) (quoting Florida Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991)).  The
referee in the instant case weighed the credibility of Baker’s testimony and, where
evidence conflicted, chose to credit the testimony of other witnesses over Baker’s
testimony.  After reviewing the record, we find that the evidence supports the
referee’s judgment.
Baker alleges that the referee’s finding that Ellen did not know that the home
had been sold is not supported by the record.  Ellen, however, testified that Baker
never informed her that a buyer had been found.  Baker also criticizes the referee’s
finding that Baker led Keller to believe that Ellen had simply forgotten to have her
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signature notarized.  Keller testified that when she informed Baker that Ellen had not
notarized her signature, Baker replied, “Can you please do that for me?”  Baker
made no attempt to clarify that Ellen had not signed the document.  The referee
justifiably relied on Keller’s testimony in finding Baker’s failure to clarify the
situation tantamount to actively leading Keller to believe that Ellen had simply
forgotten to have her signature notarized.  Additionally, Baker argues that the
referee relied on a letter purportedly mailed by Baker to Ellen.  Baker testified that
he did not recall sending a letter, and therefore the letter was not authentic. 
However, Ellen testified that the letter was mailed to her with the blank closing
documents.  The referee, who is not bound by technical rules of evidence, admitted
the letter.  See Florida Bar v. Vannier, 498 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1986).  Ellen’s
testimony provides a sufficient predicate for the referee’s decision to admit the
letter.  Baker has not established that the referee’s factual findings lack support
from the record evidence.  See Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 978.
The referee’s recommendations of guilt are also supported by the record. 
See Florida Bar v. Pellegrini, 714 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1998) (“A referee's findings
of fact regarding guilt are presumed correct and should be upheld unless clearly
erroneous or without support in the record.”).  In concluding that Baker violated
rule 4-8.4(a), (b), and (c), the referee found that Baker, without Ellen’s
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authorization, forged Ellen’s name.  The referee also found that Baker perpetuated
this fraud by having Keller notarize the unlawfully signed documents and by
submitting the documents to Parks for use in a real estate closing.  There is support
in the record for these findings.  The referee’s findings of fact and
recommendations of guilt are approved.
Baker’s final argument is that the referee’s recommendation of discipline is
too severe.  The referee recommended that Baker be disbarred for a minimum
period of five years.  This Court’s scope of review when reviewing a referee’s
recommended discipline is broader than when reviewing a referee’s findings of fact
and conclusions of guilt.  See Florida Bar v. Centurion, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S344,
S345 (Fla. May 4, 2000) (“With regards to attorney discipline, it is ultimately this
Court’s task to determine the appropriate sanction; however, a referee’s
recommendation will be followed if reasonably supported by existing case law.”). 
Disbarment is an extreme sanction that is reserved for the most egregious
misconduct.  See Florida Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. 1999). 
Although the misconduct in this case constitutes serious ethical violations, we
conclude that the referee’s recommendation of discipline is too severe and not
proportionate to discipline which this Court has approved in a similar circumstance.
The referee cited Florida Bar v. Kickliter, 559 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 1990),
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in support of the disbarment recommendation.  In Kickliter, this Court held that
disbarment period was warranted for an attorney who had forged his client’s
signature on a will when the client died without signing.  See id. at 1123-24.  The
attorney had two of his employees witness the forgery, and the attorney notarized
the document.  See id. at 1123.  The attorney then submitted the will for probate. 
See id.  Despite substantial mitigation, this Court found that the attorney
“committed a fraud on the court and allowed it to continue until exposed through
criminal proceedings.”  Id. at 1124.
While Baker forged several legal documents, he did not commit a fraud on
the court.  Moreover, importantly, Baker’s alleged misconduct was not connected
to his law practice, while the attorney in Kickliter forged a client’s signature and
used that forgery in the representation of the client.  Although lawyers may be
disciplined for conduct that is not related to the practice of law, this Court has
recognized that misconduct not connected with the practice of law is to be
evaluated differently and may warrant less severe sanctions than misconduct
committed in the course of the practice of law.  See Florida Bar v. Corbin, 540 So.
2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1989) (finding mitigation where an attorney’s “misconduct did
not involve the practice of law nor actual breach of a professional responsibility to
litigants or clients.”).
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We find that the instant case more closely resembles Florida Bar v. Rose,
607 So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. 1992), than Kickliter.  In Rose, an attorney forged his ex-
wife’s signature on client agreement forms, stock certificates, and checks more
than two years after the divorce was final.  See id. at 394.  The attorney sought the
proceeds from the forged documents for his own account.  See id. at 394-95.  The
attorney contended that his ex-wife had consented to his signing her name on other
accounts, and therefore he presumed this consent remained in effect.  See id. at
395.  This Court imposed a thirty-day suspension, approving the referee’s finding
that the attorney was guilty of conduct involving misrepresentation.  See id.
In the instant case, Baker forged Ellen’s signature on several legal documents
and caused others to perpetuate the forgeries by notarizing or witnessing the
signatures.  While Baker implicated others in the fraudulent scheme, Baker has
contended, and the Bar has not refuted, that the home was sold so that a mortgage
foreclosure could be avoided and so that marital debt could be paid.  Thus, Baker
did not seek the proceeds from the sale of the home for his own personal gain.
While we emphasize that Baker’s violations are serious, in that his conduct
was dishonest and unlawful, we find the ultimate sanction of disbarment is not
warranted.  Our decision in Rose approved a thirty-day suspension for similar
conduct.  See id.  We conclude, however, that a thirty-day suspension is
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insufficient given the fact that Baker’s violations have corrupted a notary and
affected a title to real property and the negotiation of a check.  Although Baker did
not utilize the forged documents for personal gain, the referee found that Baker
committed three criminally punishable forgeries on legal documents, caused his
secretary to unlawfully notarize two of the forgeries, caused two other employees
to witness the forgeries, and submitted the forged documents to an attorney for use
in a real estate closing.   Therefore, we suspend Baker for ninety-one days.  This is
severe discipline because Baker will be required to demonstrate proof of
rehabilitation in order to achieve reinstatement.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(e).
 We impose this discipline because we expect members of The Florida Bar to
conduct their personal business affairs with honesty and in accordance with the
law.  See Florida Bar v. Hosner, 520 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1988).
James Edmund Baker is hereby suspended from the practice of law for
ninety-one days and must successfully complete a Professionalism Enhancement
Program prior to reinstatement.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from
the filing of this opinion so that Baker can close out his practice and protect the
interests of existing clients.  If Baker notifies this Court in writing that he is no
longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this
Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Baker shall
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accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is
completed.  We note that grievance proceedings are unrelated to other court
actions or domestic proceedings and that the present judgment is not to be used as
a remedy in any unrelated action.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650
Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from James
Edmund Baker in the amount of $2,178.17, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result only.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Director of
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen Christopher
Whalen, Assistant Staff Counsel, Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant
Joseph A. Corsmeier of Tew, Barnes & Atkinson, L.L.P., Clearwater, Florida,
for Respondent