Title: Commonwealth v. Mcfarlane

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13430 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENZEL MCFARLANE. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 11, 2023. - January 23, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.1 
 
 
Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory.  Practice, 
Criminal, New trial, Disclosure of evidence, District 
attorney.  District Attorney.  Police Officer. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division 
of the District Court Department on July 10, 2017. 
 
The case was tried before Robert S. Murphy, Jr., J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on August 19, 2020, was heard by 
him. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Laurence J. Cohen for the defendant. 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another. 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
Patrick Hanley (Elizabeth K. Keeley also present) for State 
Police Association of Massachusetts. 
 
1 Justice Cypher participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored her concurrence prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Berkshire District & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
John P. Zanini & Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Plymouth District & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On February 11, 2020, the defendant, Denzel 
Mcfarlane, was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 
other related charges by a jury in the Springfield Division of 
the District Court Department.2  Ten days later, Officer Daniel 
Moynahan of the Springfield police department, who had arrested 
and testified against the defendant, was found civilly liable 
for false arrest and false imprisonment in an unrelated lawsuit.  
See Bradley vs. Cicero, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 3:18-cv-30039-MGM 
(D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2020). 
Upon learning of this civil lawsuit and verdict against 
Moynahan from an online news publication, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial, asserting that the existence of the 
lawsuit against Moynahan, still pending at the time of trial, 
was exculpatory information that the Commonwealth should have 
disclosed to the defense, but failed to do so.  The District 
Court judge who had presided over the defendant's trial denied 
his motion.  The Appeals Court agreed that a new trial was 
 
2 The defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of 
ammunition and improper storage of a firearm. 
3 
 
unwarranted and affirmed the denial.  Both parties then filed 
applications for further appellate review, which we granted. 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
existence of a pending civil lawsuit against a police officer 
must be disclosed by a prosecutor as exculpatory evidence.  We 
answer that question in the negative.  Until a finding of 
liability has been made, a pending civil lawsuit constitutes an 
unsubstantiated allegation of police misconduct that does not 
tend to negate the guilt of a defendant.  We therefore affirm 
the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Finally, as in Graham v. District Attorney for the Hampden 
Dist., 493 Mass.     (2023), also released today, we address the 
parameters of the prosecutorial duty of inquiry.  Although a 
prosecutor has no duty to inquire into pending civil lawsuits 
against a prosecution team member, we conclude that the duty of 
inquiry does require that prosecutors inquire about the 
existence of any findings of civil liability related to the 
performance of a police officer's duties.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  On review of a judge's denial 
of a defendant's motion for a new trial, "[w]e recite the 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts; the State Police Association 
of Massachusetts; and the district attorneys for the Plymouth, 
Berkshire, Bristol, Cape and Islands, eastern, Norfolk, 
northwestern, and middle districts. 
4 
 
relevant facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented by the 
record."  Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 243 
(2022), S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023). 
i.  Officers' version.  On the afternoon of July 7, 2017, 
Moynahan and Officer Brian Phillips were on patrol when they 
noticed a black Infiniti G37.  After entering the Infiniti's 
license plate number into the cruiser's mobile data terminal, 
the officers learned that the license plate was registered to a 
different vehicle and that the registration had previously been 
revoked for lack of insurance.  Both officers observed the 
defendant park the vehicle, exit, and approach the front bumper, 
leaving the driver's side door open.  The officers could also 
see a female passenger sitting in the front seat and at least 
one child sitting in the back seat.4 
After activating the cruiser's emergency lights and pulling 
up to the Infiniti, Phillips got out of his cruiser and 
approached the defendant, while Moynahan approached the 
passenger's side of the Infiniti.  Phillips asked the defendant 
for his driver's license, which he did not have.  Phillips then 
brought the defendant toward the rear of the vehicle to question 
him further.  While walking past the open driver's side door, 
 
4 It is unclear how many children were in the Infiniti.  At 
trial, the officers testified that they observed one toddler in 
the back seat, while the defendant and the female passenger 
testified that there were two children in the back of the car. 
5 
 
Phillips observed a firearm lodged between the driver's seat and 
the center console.  When asked by Phillips if he had a license 
to carry the firearm, the defendant stated that he did not.  
Phillips then arrested the defendant, placing him in the cruiser 
in handcuffs. 
After Phillips informed Moynahan of the presence of the 
firearm, Moynahan ordered the female passenger out of the 
vehicle and placed her in handcuffs.  Moynahan testified that, 
upon witnessing this, the defendant yelled from the back of the 
police cruiser, "She has nothing to do with it. It's not hers."5  
Moynahan then uncuffed the female passenger.  After the police 
photographed the firearm inside the Infiniti, Moynahan removed 
the firearm and secured it, emptying nine bullets from the 
magazine.  The officers permitted the other occupants of the car 
to leave and transported the defendant to the police station.  
During the booking procedure, the defendant stated that the 
firearm had been loaded with four bullets. 
ii.  Defendant's version.  The defendant testified to a 
different version of events at trial in several respects.  Most 
notably, the defendant testified that he had no knowledge of the 
firearm, having just purchased the Infiniti from a third party 
shortly before his arrest.  The defendant also claimed that he 
 
5 Phillips similarly testified that the defendant shouted, 
"It's mine, not hers.  Let her go." 
6 
 
had stepped out of his new vehicle to fix its splash guard when 
Phillips suddenly approached him, grabbed and handcuffed him, 
and placed him in the back of the cruiser.  Phillips then 
returned to the cruiser, holding a firearm, and asked the 
defendant why he did not tell Phillips about it.  The defendant 
denied witnessing the female passenger being placed in 
handcuffs, and he likewise denied that he yelled any statement 
about the firearm from the back of the cruiser.  Lastly, 
although the defendant acknowledged that he had stated, while 
being booked, that the firearm was loaded with four bullets, he 
explained that he had been informed by Moynahan of this fact 
when Moynahan, having disassembled the firearm in the police 
cruiser, mentioned the presence of four bullets. 
iii.  Civil lawsuit.  In March 2018, a civil lawsuit was 
brought against Moynahan by Daniel Bradley, who had been 
arrested during a motor vehicle stop in Springfield by Moynahan 
and two other officers.  In his action, Bradley asserted various 
constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims against 
Moynahan, including unlawful seizure and arrest, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, excessive force, assault and 
battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  On February 21, 
2020, Moynahan was found liable for false arrest and false 
7 
 
imprisonment.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant learned about 
this lawsuit from an online publication. 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was arraigned at the 
Springfield Division of the District Court Department on July 
10, 2017.  He was charged with eight counts, including unlawful 
possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); unlawful 
possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and improper 
storage of a firearm, G. L. c. 140, § 131L.6  The defendant's 
trial began in February 2020.  On February 11, the jury found 
the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
unlawful possession of ammunition, and improper storage of a 
firearm. 
In August 2020, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, asserting that the allegations against Moynahan in the 
civil lawsuit -- and indeed the lawsuit's very existence -- 
constituted exculpatory evidence requiring disclosure by the 
Commonwealth.  On July 2, 2021, after a nonevidentiary hearing, 
the District Court judge who had presided at the defendant's 
 
6 On February 7, 2020, the prosecutor entered nolle 
prosequis with respect to the other five counts:  operation of 
an uninsured motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 34J; operation of an 
unregistered motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 9; operation of a 
motor vehicle without a valid inspection sticker, G. L. c. 90, 
§ 20; operation of a motor vehicle with a revoked license as a 
habitual traffic offender, G. L. c. 90, § 23; and attaching a 
number plate assigned to another vehicle to conceal 
identification, G. L. c. 90, § 23. 
8 
 
trial issued a written decision denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
The defendant timely appealed from his convictions and from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  The Appeals Court 
affirmed the defendant's convictions and the order denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mcfarlane, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 264, 277 (2023).  In May 2023, we 
granted the parties' applications for further appellate review 
limited to the issues raised in connection with the denial of 
the defendant's motion for a new trial.7 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion for a new trial.  In denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial, the motion judge 
concluded that the then-pending civil lawsuit against Moynahan 
"was not Brady material" that the prosecutor was obligated to 
disclose, reasoning that the prosecutor was not aware of the 
 
7 An order from a single justice of this court also 
permitted the parties in this case to brief whether the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial based on failure to 
instruct the jury on the issue of licensure under Commonwealth 
v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690-693, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023).  
We review for whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 492 Mass. 396, 401 (2023).  
Here, Phillips offered uncontested testimony that the defendant 
admitted he did not possess a license to carry a firearm.  See 
id. (when officer testifies to lack of license and there is 
"nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant disputed 
this testimony, or that the officer's credibility was in 
question," failure to instruct is harmless beyond reasonable 
doubt).  Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant is not 
entitled to a new trial on this basis. 
9 
 
lawsuit's existence, the lawsuit was neither requested by the 
defendant nor related to his case, and the lawsuit could have 
been discovered by defense counsel through independent 
investigation given that it was not impounded.  See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  The judge further reasoned 
that the lawsuit would not have been admissible at the 
defendant's trial to impeach Moynahan but that, even assuming 
that it would have been admissible and that the prosecutor had 
been obligated to disclose it, the defendant would not have 
suffered any prejudice because it "would have functioned only as 
impeachment evidence in a case where the testimony of Moynahan 
was duplicated by, and less essential than, the untainted 
testimony of Phillips." 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge erred 
in denying his motion for a new trial, as the Commonwealth's 
failure to disclose the pending civil lawsuit against Moynahan 
violated the prosecutor's duty of disclosure.  "The decision to 
deny a motion for a new trial lies within the sound discretion 
of the judge and will not be reversed unless it is manifestly 
unjust or the trial was infected with prejudicial constitutional 
error."  Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 803 (2011). 
"To obtain a new trial on the basis of nondisclosed 
exculpatory evidence, a defendant must establish (1) that 'the 
evidence [was] in the possession, custody, or control of the 
10 
 
prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's control'; (2) 
'that the evidence is exculpatory'; and (3) 'prejudice'" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 
380 (2017).  Setting aside the motion judge's determination on 
the first and third factors, we examine the second:  whether the 
existence of a pending civil lawsuit against a member of the 
prosecution team, Moynahan, tended to exculpate the defendant.  
See id.  See also Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. 641, 649 (2020). 
 
"To prevail on a claim that the prosecution failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence, the defendant must first prove 
that the evidence was, in fact, exculpatory."  Commonwealth v. 
Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 679 (2003).  Exculpatory evidence is "not 
a narrow term" here, but rather includes all evidence that tends 
to negate the guilt of the accused.  Id., quoting Commonwealth 
v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 595, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977).  
This includes evidence that "provides some significant aid to 
the defendant's case, whether it furnishes corroboration of the 
defendant's story, calls into question a material, although not 
indispensable, element of the prosecution's version of events, 
or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution witness."  
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 647, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978). 
11 
 
While our conception of exculpatory evidence is rightfully 
broad, it is not boundless.  The civil lawsuit at issue here 
exceeds those bounds.  By virtue of being both (1) civil, rather 
than criminal, and (2) pending, rather than fully adjudicated, 
pending civil lawsuits are not exculpatory and are not subject 
to automatic disclosure requirements.  See Graham, 493 Mass. 
at    . 
We reach this conclusion for several reasons.  Most 
notably, the civil pleading stage only requires "factual 
'allegations plausibly suggesting'" an entitlement to relief.  
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), 
quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).  
Therefore, until there is a finding of liability, a pending 
civil lawsuit may well be without merit.  Moreover, the standard 
for the initiation of a civil lawsuit is lower than the 
corresponding standard and procedures for the initiation of a 
criminal prosecution.  See W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 
120, at 893 (5th ed. 1984) (less needed to justify bringing 
civil suit versus criminal prosecution).  See also Commonwealth 
v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313 (2002) (defendant may move 
to dismiss criminal complaint issued by magistrate for lack of 
probable cause); Lataille v. District Court of E. Hampden, 366 
Mass. 525, 532 (1974) (grand jury serve "dual function of 
determining whether there is probable cause to believe a crime 
12 
 
has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded 
criminal prosecutions").  As a result of these distinctions, 
pending civil lawsuits would most accurately constitute 
unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct and not exculpatory 
information.  See United States Department of Justice, Justice 
Manual, tit. 9-5.100(6) (updated Jan. 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/NKL2-YZ2J] (Justice Manual) ("Allegations that 
cannot be substantiated . . . generally are not considered to be 
potential impeachment information"). 
Here, even assuming Moynahan was a key prosecution witness, 
the defendant would not have been able to meaningfully challenge 
his testimony with what, at the time, amounted to 
unsubstantiated allegations of police misconduct.  Therefore, 
the then-pending civil lawsuit did not tend to negate the 
defendant's guilt, and the defendant's motion for a new trial, 
predicated on the Commonwealth's failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, was rightfully denied.  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 
380, citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19, 21 (2011) 
(information must be proved exculpatory). 
b.  The duty of inquiry and findings of civil liability.  
In affirming the denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial in this case, we caution that our ruling today is not 
intended to signal to prosecutors that they may abstain from 
inquiring into findings of civil liability.  We take this 
13 
 
opportunity to provide guidance, in conjunction with our 
decision in Graham, on the scope of a prosecutor's duty of 
inquiry.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 823-824 
(1998) ("duty to inquire" about exculpatory information is 
essential to performance of prosecutor's discovery obligations).  
More specifically, we conclude that findings of civil liability, 
unlike pending civil lawsuits, fall within the scope of the duty 
of inquiry. 
The duty of inquiry reinforces the duty of disclosure:  
because the prosecution must disclose all evidence in the 
possession, custody, or control of the prosecution team that 
"tend[s] to" exculpate defendants, the prosecution also must 
inquire about the existence of such evidence among members of 
the prosecution team.  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. at 649.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 
444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  See also Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 
85, 95 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 
(1999) ("It is well established that the Commonwealth has a duty 
to learn of and disclose to a defendant any exculpatory evidence 
that is 'held by agents of the prosecution team'").  Just as 
"the ultimate admissibility of the information is not 
determinative" of a prosecutor's disclosure obligations, 
admissibility is likewise not determinative of a prosecutor's 
14 
 
obligation to inquire.  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 
supra at 653.8  The two duties are inextricably connected. 
"'Reasonableness' is the only limitation on the 
prosecutor's duty of inquiry."  Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 
434, 440-441 (2010).  Reasonableness is an objective standard -- 
"a prosecutor's belief that no inquiry is necessary or required 
in the circumstances of a particular case, based only on the 
prosecutor's assumption that he [or she] already has all of the 
items and information subject to discovery, does not comport" 
with the duty of inquiry.  Id. at 440.  Rather, to satisfy the 
duty of reasonable inquiry, prosecutors are duty-bound to ask 
other members of the prosecution team whether "all discoverable 
materials relating to a particular case have been given to the 
Commonwealth" and, subsequently, the defendant.  Id. at 441 (by 
failing to do so, prosecutor "plainly knew" he did not make 
reasonable inquiry).  See Martin, 427 Mass. at 824 (duty of 
reasonable inquiry "extend[s] to information in possession of a 
person who has participated in the investigation or evaluation 
 
8 We stated, in Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. at 653, that "[exculpatory] information should be 
disclosed [even] to  unrelated defendants so that the trial 
judge may rule on its admissibility if the defendant were to 
seek its admission."  In other words, a trial judge cannot rule 
on the admissibility of impeachment evidence if unaware of its 
existence.  See id.  Prosecutors who engage in the analysis 
suggested by Justice Lowy's concurrence when fulfilling their 
duties of inquiry and disclosure proceed at their peril. 
15 
 
of the case and has reported to the prosecutor's office 
concerning the case").  See also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 
Mass. 680, 702 (1979) ("prosecutor has no duty to investigate 
every possible source of exculpatory information on behalf of 
the defendants," only those in possession of prosecution team).  
The burden of the duty of inquiry rests solely with the 
prosecution. 
In short, the scope of the duty of inquiry is driven by 
what "tend[s] to exculpate" the defendant, Matter of a Grand 
Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 649, and demands that 
prosecutors ask all members of their prosecution team for "all 
discoverable materials" related to the defendant's case, Frith, 
458 Mass. at 441.  Because the purpose of our discovery rules is 
to promote judicial efficiency and prevent trial by ambush, "it 
is appropriate to take a comprehensive view" of a prosecutor's 
investigative obligations.  Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 
220, 224 (2023). 
A bright-line rule is necessary to guide disclosure and 
inquiry requirements related to civil lawsuits.  Therefore, we 
conclude that findings of civil liability made against 
prosecution team members in the performance of their official 
duties are subject to automatic disclosure and fall within the 
duty of inquiry.  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. at 649. 
16 
 
A finding of civil liability is different from a pending 
civil lawsuit, which, as noted supra, has a lower threshold than 
criminal prosecutions and can be brought by various private 
parties with varying motives.  In contrast, an adjudicated 
finding of civil liability is the result of judicial process, 
where evidence has been weighed, arguments heard, and a decision 
rendered.  See Graham, 493 Mass. at     (prosecutor cannot, 
"consistent with their obligation to disclose exculpatory 
information," decide not to disclose judicial finding that 
officer's statements were not credible).  See also Justice 
Manual, supra at tit. 9-5.100(5)(c)(iv) (including "prior 
findings by a judge" within potential impeachment information).  
Cf. id. at tit. 9-5.100(6) (excluding "unsubstantiated" 
allegations of misconduct from potential impeachment 
information).  Therefore, findings of civil liability can have 
exculpatory value, while pending civil lawsuits cannot. 
That is not to say that any finding of civil liability may 
be exculpatory simply because it was made against an individual 
who also happens to be a member of the prosecution team; 
instead, the finding of civil liability must be related to the 
performance of that member's official duties.  See Matter of a 
Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 652 (in deciding whether 
to allow impeachment of police officer witness with prior 
misconduct, judge may consider "whether the prior misconduct is 
17 
 
probative of how the officer conducts police investigations").  
Given that civil lawsuits can be brought by various private 
litigants for a wide range of reasons, this consideration will 
assist in distinguishing civil suits related solely to a police 
officer's personal life from those relevant to his or her police 
work.  See id., citing Lopes, 478 Mass. at 606. 
Here, had the finding of civil liability been made before 
or during the defendant's trial, it would have fallen within the 
scope of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure and, therefore, his 
or her duty of inquiry.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (4), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004); Frith, 458 Mass. at 436 n.4 
(Commonwealth's duty of disclosure "continues throughout 
trial").  The misconduct alleged in the lawsuit was related 
directly to Moynahan's performance as a police officer.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 Mass. at 653.  
Moynahan was sued and found liable for false imprisonment and 
false arrest, among other allegations, and the defendant 
claimed, in defense, that the gun had been tampered with or, in 
other words, that he was falsely arrested by Moynahan.  See 
Ellison, 376 Mass. at 20.  With these conflicting narratives 
regarding how the arrest transpired, the defendant's conviction 
relied on Moynahan's testimony and, therefore, on Moynahan's 
credibility.  See Murray, 461 Mass. at 22.  Because the finding 
of civil liability could have been used to impeach Moynahan and 
18 
 
was known to a member of the prosecution team, it potentially 
would have been discoverable under Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, supra at 649, and subject to the duty of inquiry 
under Frith, supra at 441. 
Nonetheless, as explained supra, because the civil lawsuit 
was only pending at the time of trial, it did not mandate 
disclosure.  We recognize that, had the defendant's trial 
occurred a short while later, or if the findings against 
Moynahan had occurred a short while earlier, the prosecutor 
would have been obligated to inquire into and disclose the 
findings made against Moynahan.  However, "[w]henever the law 
draws a line there will be cases very near each other on 
opposite sides."  United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 
(1930). 
3.  Conclusion.  As the civil lawsuit against Moynahan was 
pending at the time of the defendant's trial, it constituted an 
unsubstantiated allegation of misconduct that did not tend to 
negate the defendant's guilt, and the prosecutor therefore had 
no duty to inquire into or disclose the lawsuit as exculpatory 
evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the motion judge's denial of 
the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
LOWY, J. (concurring, with whom Cypher, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that a prosecutor has no duty to inquire of 
prosecution team members whether they are facing any pending 
civil allegations.  I write separately to address how the 
ultimate admissibility of information, although certainly not 
dispositive of a prosecutor's obligation to inquire about that 
information, nonetheless helps inform the contours of a 
prosecutor's duty of inquiry. 
"[T]he ultimate admissibility of the information is not 
determinative of the prosecutor's Brady obligation to disclose 
it," and neither is the ultimate admissibility of the 
information determinative of the prosecutor's Brady obligation 
to inquire of it.  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 485 
Mass. 641, 653 (2020) (Matter of Grand Jury).  See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Certainly, a much broader 
array of evidence than just what is admissible is both 
discoverable and within the scope of a prosecutor's duty of 
inquiry.  See Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 531 (1999). 
The ultimate admissibility of the information, however, is 
not wholly divorced from the prosecutor's Brady obligation to 
inquire of it.  Rather, the ultimate admissibility of the 
information provides valuable insight into the reasonableness of 
the prosecutor's duty of inquiry.  Indeed, in Matter of Grand 
Jury, 485 Mass. at 652, our analysis of what constituted 
 
2 
exculpatory evidence was inextricably intertwined with a 
discussion of the law of evidence as it related to the 
admissibility of certain impeachment evidence.  The court here 
also seems to recognize that admissibility informs, but is not 
dispositive of, questions of what constitutes exculpatory 
evidence and of the reach of the prosecutor's duty of inquiry.  
See ante at     (implicitly looking to relevance and 
admissibility in holding that finding of civil liability against 
police officer must be related to officer's performance of his 
or her official duties, and not his or her personal life, to be 
discoverable); id. at     (concluding that "[b]ecause the 
finding of civil liability could have been used to impeach 
Moynahan . . . , it potentially would have been . . . subject to 
the duty of inquiry"). 
I embrace the point we made in Matter of Grand Jury, 485 
Mass. at 650, that a determination whether to disclose 
exculpatory information, being forward-looking, is distinct from 
a determination whether a failure to disclose exculpatory 
information deprived a defendant of a fair trial, which is a 
backward-looking analysis.  That being said, courts look closely 
to admissibility in determining whether a failure to disclose 
exculpatory information deprived a defendant of a fair trial, 
indicating that questions of admissibility of evidence help 
inform questions of the scope of the duty of inquiry and the 
 
3 
duty of disclosure.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 
633 (2000) ("To justify granting a new trial, the motion judge 
must find that there was a substantial risk that the jury would 
have reached a different conclusion had the 'newly discovered' 
evidence been admitted at trial" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 413 (1992). 
Where the analytical gap between what information is sought 
and what information might be admitted in evidence is so great, 
the improbability of the former leading to the latter provides 
some limitation on the scope of the duty of inquiry.  Although 
the duty of inquiry is significantly broader than simply whether 
a particular type of evidence would be admissible at trial, and 
although the admissibility of evidence is never determinative of 
the duty of inquiry, the ultimate admissibility of evidence can 
be a helpful tool when assessing the reasonableness of a 
prosecutor's duty of inquiry into the existence of that kind of 
evidence.  The more unrelated to the investigation, arrest, and 
prosecution of a defendant that an unproven contention of 
misconduct against a police officer on the prosecution team is, 
the greater the risk of obligating a prosecutor to search for 
evidence unlikely to have any effect on the underlying case.  
See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (per curiam) 
(holding State's failure to disclose witness's failed polygraph 
test did not violate Brady in light of fact that "polygraph 
 
4 
results were inadmissible under state law, even for impeachment 
purposes," and it was "mere speculation" as to how disclosure 
might have led to otherwise admissible evidence); Hoke v. 
Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 & n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1048 (1996), citing Wood, supra (holding no violation 
of Brady where prosecution failed to disclose witness interviews 
that would likely have been inadmissible at trial and were, 
therefore, "as a matter of law, 'immaterial' for Brady 
purposes"). 
The ultimate admissibility of evidence is neither the 
touchstone nor even a requirement of what constitutes 
exculpatory evidence.  Nonetheless, determining what constitutes 
exculpatory evidence must take place with at least some 
recognition of the law of evidence to be applied at trial.  
Otherwise, the principle of reasonableness as a limitation on 
the duty of inquiry would prove elusive.  The more difficult the 
boundaries of the prosecutor's duty to inquire are to gauge, the 
more all those touched by investigation and prosecution of crime 
–- criminal defendants, victims, police witnesses, and 
prosecutors –- will be adversely affected. 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that, in 
the limited context of this case, the prosecutor had no duty to 
inquire as to the unrelated, pending civil lawsuit because it 
was not exculpatory evidence.  I write separately, however, to 
propose an end to the Bohannon rule, as outlined in Commonwealth 
v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90 (1978) (Bohannon I), S.C., 385 Mass. 
733 (1982) (Bohannon II) (collectively, Bohannon).1 
 
Typically, "specific instances of misconduct showing the 
witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness's credibility."  Mass. G. 
Evid. § 608(b) (2023).  Despite this bar, Massachusetts has 
"chiseled a narrow exception" into the general rule, allowing 
evidence of prior false rape allegations to impeach a witness's 
credibility because, in special circumstances, "the interest of 
justice forbids strict application of the [general] rule."  
Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 151 (1993), citing 
 
1 The Commonwealth raised Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 
Mass. 90 (1978) (Bohannon I), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982) 
(Bohannon II) (collectively, Bohannon), both in its brief and 
during oral argument. 
 
2 
Bohannon I, 376 Mass. at 94.2,3  Rooted in the misogynist belief 
that women are prone to lying about sexual assault, 
admissibility of evidence of prior false allegations pursuant to 
Bohannon required a showing that "the witness was the victim in 
the case on trial, her consent was the central issue, she was 
the only Commonwealth witness on that issue, her testimony was 
inconsistent and confused, and there was a basis in independent 
third-party records for concluding that the prior accusations of 
the same type of crime had been made and were false."  
Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 379 Mass. 166, 169 (1979), citing 
 
2 The second exception to the general bar proscribing 
admission of specific instances of misconduct is the allowance 
of specific instances of a police officer's false statements in 
prior, unrelated matters if the officer's credibility is a 
critical issue at trial.  See Matter of a Grand Jury 
Investigation, 485 Mass. 641, 651-652 (2020). 
 
3 Besides Massachusetts, only three other States have 
provisions that specifically allow evidence of prior false 
accusations to be admitted:  New Jersey, Virginia, and Rhode 
Island.  Altantulkhuur, A Second Rape:  Testing Victim 
Credibility Through Prior False Accusations, U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1091, 1144-1146 (2018).  The remainder of the States generally 
prohibit both inquiry into prior specific instances of 
misconduct on cross-examination and extrinsic evidence, allow 
inquiry on cross-examination but not extrinsic evidence, or 
allow both inquiry on cross-examination and extrinsic evidence 
to attack or support the victim's character for truthfulness.  
Id. at 1116-1117.  Unlike Massachusetts's § 608(b), Rule 608(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a party on cross-
examination of a witness to inquire into specific instances of 
prior conduct if probative of the witness's character for 
truthfulness, although except for criminal convictions under 
Fed. R. Evid. 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove 
specific instances of misconduct.  Compare Fed. R. Evid. 608 
with Mass. G. Evid. § 608(b). 
 
3 
Bohannon I, supra at 95.  See Althouse, The Lying Woman, the 
Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence 
Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 914, 965 (1994) (explaining that in 
Bohannon, "[o]nce again, our attention is drawn to the 
victimized man and the untrustworthy woman"). 
 
In Bohannon I, the victim, who had an intelligence quotient 
of sixty-three, provided inconsistent testimony that the 
defendant and codefendant may or may not have raped her on the 
night in question.  Bohannon I, 376 Mass. at 91.  To impeach her 
credibility, defense counsel sought to cross-examine the victim 
about whether she made prior accusations that other men had 
raped her, and, as an offer of proof, referenced hospital 
records that suggested that the complainant had made "a number 
of unsubstantiated, and apparently false, accusations of rape."  
Id. at 92-93.  Concluding that the proffered evidence, if 
believed, would have had a significant impact on the sole issue 
of consent, the court reversed the convictions to allow the 
proposed questions to be asked at a new trial.  Id. at 95.  The 
court further explicated that the decision did not implicate the 
rape shield statute, G. L. c. 233, § 21B, because the proposed 
questions dealt with prior allegations of rape and were "in no 
way sought to elicit a response concerning the complainant's 
prior sexual activity or reputation for chastity."  Bohannon I, 
supra.  Notably, on appeal after remand, the court discerned no 
 
4 
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's exclusion of the 
hospital records because, although Bohannon I allowed extrinsic 
evidence to prove prior false allegations of rape, the hospital 
records at issue were inadmissible unreliable hearsay given that 
they were "extremely sketchy, vague, inaccurate as to where the 
information came from, contained hearsay piled upon hearsay," 
and were not related to the victim's diagnosis or treatment.  
Bohannon II, 385 Mass. at 750. 
 
While the Bohannon rule has only appeared in a limited 
number of published rape and sexual assault cases, see Bohannon 
and Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 332 (1994), the 
problematic origin of the rule requires that the court reexamine 
whether to continue its use.  Although the Bohannon court 
indicated that the decision should not "be viewed as indicating 
any adherence to that 'part of a legal tradition, established by 
men, that the complaining woman in a rape case is fair game for 
character assassination in open court,'" it is difficult to 
distinguish the holding from the continuing belief that women 
lie about rape and sexual assault so thus have a character for 
untruthfulness.  Bohannon I, 376 Mass. at 95, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 613-614 (1975) 
(Braucher, J., dissenting).  The foundation of the rule was 
premised on the belief that a rape allegation had been 
 
5 
concocted; however, in Bohannon, the alleged falsity of the 
victim's prior allegation was never established. 
 
According to the rule, there must be "a factual basis from 
independent third party records for concluding that the prior 
accusations of rape had, in fact, been made and were, in fact, 
untrue," Bohannon I, 376 Mass. at 95; however, "falsity" is a 
complicated aspect to prove.  It is especially complicated when 
the allegation alleged to be false is a past allegation.  See 
id.  In order to demonstrate falsity, courts have relied on a 
victim's recantation of the alleged accusation made against an 
alleged perpetrator.  See Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 
310 & n.27 (2014); Nichols, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 335.  However, 
a rape or sexual assault victim may recant for a myriad of 
reasons other than untruthfulness, including "threats made by 
the perpetrator, denial, shame, embarrassment, self-blame, not 
wanting to relive the trauma, and avoiding a lengthy trial or 
public exposure."  Altantulkhuur, A Second Rape:  Testing Victim 
Credibility Through Prior False Accusations, U. Ill. L. Rev. 
1091, 1094 (2018).  That the rule allows a recantation to be 
admitted in a subsequent trial to discredit and undermine the 
victim's credibility risks further traumatizing the victim.  Id. 
 
Further, where a victim does not recant, falsity can likely 
only be proved by delving into the victim's past sexual 
encounters.  Courts must reconcile a defendant's right to 
 
6 
confront his accuser and present a full defense with the 
important principle that irrelevant or misleading evidence 
should not be admitted.  The rules of evidence should not be 
used, in effect, as a second assault, subjecting the witness to 
rehash sexual experiences on the witness stand.  Exposure in 
court of prior sexual experiences is protected by the rape 
shield law.  See G. L. c. 233, § 21B; Mass. G. Evid. § 412.  
Given the wealth of knowledge we have about trauma responses and 
the many reasons victims recant or may provide inconsistent 
testimony, there is no reason that this should not also fall 
within the rape shield law.4 
 
4 It is often the case that rape and sexual assault victims 
who have "credibility" issues have been victimized throughout 
their lives, which makes them appear unstable or present 
themselves in a manner contrary to what the jury may believe as 
typical of an assault survivor.  See Cole, She's Crazy (to Think 
We'll Believe Her):  Credibility Discounting of Women with 
Mental Illness in the Era of #MeToo, 22 Geo. J. Gender & L. 173, 
174-175 (2020); Lave, The Prosecutor's Duty to "Imperfect" Rape 
Victims, 49 Tex. Tech L. Rev, 219, 230-231 (2016); Schafran, 
Maiming the Soul:  Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the 
Nonviolent Rapist, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 439, 448 (1993). 
 
WENDLANDT, J. (concurring, with whom Kafker, J., joins).  I 
agree that a bright line rule is helpful to guide prosecutors as 
to their duty to disclose civil lawsuits.  I write separately 
because I do not share the Commonwealth's view (which the court 
apparently endorses) that civil lawsuits necessarily are 
unsubstantiated until a finding of liability.  When a civil 
action is commenced, counsel must certify that the allegations 
therein have a basis in fact after reasonable investigation.  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010) 
(attorney signature certifies "that to the best of the 
attorney's knowledge, information, and belief there is good 
ground to support [the pleading]"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3) (in 
presented pleading, attorney certifies that "the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation").  The 
allegations in the complaint must plausibly suggest a right to 
relief, and in the case of a claim of fraud, the particularity 
requirement must be met.1  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
 
1 To the extent the claim is frivolous, a cross claim for, 
inter alia, abuse of process could be brought; such a cross 
claim should survive a special motion to dismiss.  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H (motion to dismiss claim based on petitioning 
activity should be denied where petitioning activity "was devoid 
of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law" 
and "moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding 
party"). 
 
2 
678 (2009) ("a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face" [quotation and citation omitted]); Mass. R. Civ. P. 
9 (b), 365 Mass. 751 (1974) ("all averments of fraud . . . shall 
be stated with particularity"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud . . .").  See also DeWolfe 
v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 798 n.8 (2013) (fraud 
claim not pleaded with sufficient particularity where no facts 
alleged that defendant knew that representations were false). 
 
Significantly, a claim against a police officer in the 
scope of her official capacity often must overcome a motion, 
usually filed early in the litigation, on the basis that the 
officer's actions were protected by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.  See Lynch v. Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 635 (2019) ("we 
have noted the importance of determining immunity issues early 
if immunity is to serve one of its primary purposes:  to protect 
public officials from harassing litigation" [quotations and 
citation omitted]).  And where the claim nonetheless survives a 
defense of qualified immunity, it often must overcome a motion 
for summary judgment.  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 826 
(1974).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  At that stage of the civil 
litigation, the plaintiffs cannot rest on mere allegations; they 
must come forward with specific admissible evidence that, if 
 
3 
believed, would permit a verdict in their favor on the claim.  
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e) (in response to motion for summary 
judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial").  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (parties must "cit[e] to 
particular parts of materials in the record" to show genuine 
dispute of material fact). 
 
Nonetheless, I join the court because a line is helpful and 
because the defendant readily could access publicly available 
information regarding a pending civil action against the 
officers that are part of the prosecution team.