Title: Ana Maria Cardona v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1366
____________
ANA MARIA CARDONA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 11, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Ana Maria Cardona appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We conclude that we are compelled
to reverse and that a new trial is required because the State committed a Brady1
violation by failing to disclose material criminal investigation reports of the State's
extensive interviews with Olivia Gonzalez-Mendoza ("Gonzalez"), Cardona's
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codefendant and the State's key witness against Cardona. 
BACKGROUND   
Cardona and codefendant Gonzalez were charged with first-degree murder
and aggravated child abuse for the death of Cardona's three-year-old son, Lazaro
Figueroa, after Lazaro's battered body was found in the bushes of a Miami Beach
residence on November 2, 1990.  See Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 361 (Fla.
1994).  On February 14, 1992, Gonzalez changed her previously entered not guilty
pleas to guilty in exchange for a reduced charge of second-degree murder pursuant
to a plea arrangement in which Gonzalez agreed to testify against Cardona. 
The critical issue in this case was whether Gonzalez, rather than Cardona,
was the prime perpetrator of the escalating abuse that culminated in the child's
death.  At trial, the State's strategy, based on Gonzalez's testimony, was to paint
Cardona as the more culpable defendant.  The withheld reports of the interviews,
which were generated before Gonzalez's plea agreement with the State, contradicted
her subsequent trial testimony in certain material points.  Had the reports been given
to the defense, they could have seriously undermined Gonzalez's credibility,
Gonzalez's version of events, and the State's portrayal of Cardona as the more
culpable defendant.  
The jury found Cardona guilty and recommended death by a vote of eight to
2.  The trial court found two statutory mitigators, including the "under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," mitigator, based on
Cardona's "fall from riches to rags" and daily cocaine use (the court failed to
explicitly announce the weight attached), and the impaired "ability to conform her
conduct to the requirements of law," mitigator, based upon her cocaine use (little
weight).  The trial court also found three nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) Cardona did
not meet her biological father until she was twelve; (2) Cardona claimed that she
was raped when she was eleven but her mother and father did not believe her; and
(3) a guardian ad litem for Cardona's other two children recommended that a life
sentence would be in the surviving children's best interest (the trial court failed to
explicitly announce the weight attached).  See id. 
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four without knowing of the significant contradictions in Gonzalez's initial version
of the crime that she gave to the State.  Gonzalez was not only the key State
witness but the only witness to the escalating abuse the State claimed Cardona
committed against the child.  The trial court found only one aggravator, that the
murder was committed in a "heinous, atrocious or cruel" ("HAC") manner.  See id.
at 363.  However, the trial court gave this aggravator "overwhelming and enormous
weight" because of the "long period of time over which this baby was subject to
torture, abuse, pain, and suffering." Id.2  Because of the weight assigned to the
HAC aggravator and the facts in the record detailing the extensive suffering of the
victim, the trial court found that the single aggravator outweighed the mitigators, see
id., and sentenced Cardona to death without knowing of the significant
contradictions in Gonzalez's initial version of the crime regarding the escalating
3.  These claims include: (1) Cardona was denied access to public records;
(2) no adversarial testing occurred due to (a) the cumulative effects of ineffective
assistance of counsel; (b) the withholding of exculpatory or impeachment material;
(c) newly discovered evidence; and (d) improper ruling of the trial court; (3) the
State withheld exculpatory evidence and presented false evidence, which rendered
defense counsel ineffective; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty
phase; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases due to
the failure to provide background information to the mental health consultant; (6)
Cardona was incompetent for trial; (7) the prosecution made comments, asked
questions, and requested instructions, which were given by the trial court, that
diluted the sentencing jury's sense of responsibility, and defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object; (8) Florida's statute setting forth the aggravating
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pattern of abuse.  On direct appeal, this Court concluded that the death sentence
was proportionate because our review of the record led us to "agree with the trial
court that, in light of the extended period of time little Lazaro was subjected to the
torturous abuse leading to his death, the ultimate sentence is warranted in this case." 
Id. at 365.  We also rejected Cardona's claim regarding the relative culpability of
Gonzalez because "the record in this case supports the trial court's finding that
Cardona was the more culpable of the two defendants" and "[t]hus disparate
treatment is justified."  Id.  On direct appeal, this Court did not have the benefit of
the significant contradictory version of events that Gonzalez earlier gave to State
investigators. 
Cardona timely filed a motion for postconviction relief and filed an amended
motion raising thirteen claims.3  A Huff4 hearing was held, at which the trial court
circumstances is facially vague and overbroad; (9) Cardona was denied effective
assistance of counsel in pursuing her postconviction remedies because of the rules
prohibiting Cardona's counsel from interviewing jurors to determine if constitutional
error was present; (10) execution by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment;
(11) Cardona is innocent of the death penalty; (12) the trial court's sentencing order
does not reflect an independent weighing or reasoned judgment; and (13) Cardona
is insane to be executed.         
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
5.  These claims include:  (1) Cardona's intellectual capacity; (2) defense
counsel's failure to present defense witnesses to testify concerning intoxication and
battered spouse syndrome; (3) defense counsel's failure to cross-examine Dr.
Merry Haber; (4) defense counsel's failure to present testimony related to the
polygraph examinations; (5) alleged Brady violations concerning Cardona's waiver
of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the State's
accommodations to Elizabeth Pastor, who testified on behalf of the prosecution;
(6) defense counsel's failure to seek change of venue; and (7) defense counsel's
failure to present evidence pertaining to the "Abbott Avenue" defense.
6.  The issues raised in this appeal are: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel
during the guilt phase, including:  (a) Brady violation concerning Gonzalez's three
interviews and the proffer letter from Gonzalez's attorney, (b) violation of Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), as to Gonzalez's testimony, (c) Brady violation
regarding Dr. Hyma, (d) Brady violation regarding Elizabeth Pastor, (e) failure to
adequately cross-examine Dr. Haber, (f) failure to call the Slatterys, (g) failure to
rebut battered spouse evidence, (h) failure to present the "Abbott Avenue" defense,
(i) failure to seek to move venue, (j) failure to object to the prosecutor's
inflammatory statements made in closing argument; (2) ineffective assistance of
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granted an evidentiary hearing on seven claims,5 and summarily denied the
remaining claims.  After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on the
remaining claims.  Cardona now appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction
relief, raising nineteen issues for this Court's review.6 
counsel during the penalty phase, including:  (a) failure to present evidence of
Gonzalez's involvement, (b) improper use of mental health experts, (c) failure to
present the Abbott Avenue evidence, (d) failure to introduce Gonzalez's polygraph
results, (e) failure to object to constitutional error, (3) Cardona was denied access
to public records; (4) Cardona was incompetent at the time of trial; (5) Cardona is
insane to be executed; and (6) Cardona is innocent of the death penalty. 
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Because we conclude that Cardona's claim of a Brady violation is
dispositive, we focus our analysis on that claim only.  Cardona's Brady claim is
based upon the State's failure to disclose three typed criminal investigation reports
and a proffer letter from Gonzalez's attorney to the State outlining the substance of
what Gonzalez was prepared to testify to at Cardona's trial.  The typed criminal
investigation reports were generated as a result of three interviews between the
State's investigators and Gonzalez on September 19, 24, and 30, 1991.  Both the
reports and the proffer letter were generated before the State accepted an agreement
that Gonzalez would plead guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree murder in
exchange for Gonzalez's testimony at Cardona's trial.   
Following an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusions:
As to defense counsel's contention that Brady material was
withheld by not providing counsel with the investigators' reports from
the State Attorney's Office, it is abundantly clear to this Court that
those reports would have assisted defense counsel in impeaching
Olivia Gonzalez Mendoza, but that she was sufficiently impeached to a
7.   In preparation for using Gonzalez as a State's witness, State investigators
had Gonzalez submit to a polygraph examination conducted by George and Brian
Slattery.  Although these statements were not used in the State's case, defense
counsel was able to use these statements to impeach Gonzalez to the extent they
contradicted her trial testimony.
8.  In its order, the trial court failed to provide a basis for its ruling on the
claim as to the proffer letter.  Because we conclude that a Brady violation occurred
by the State's failure to disclose the typed criminal investigation reports, we do not
reach the issue as to whether the nondisclosure of the proffer letter also constituted
a Brady violation. 
-7-
point where they needed not even call the polygraph examiners[7] to
impeach her testimony.  Thus, the testimony of the prior co-defendant
was not necessary to obtain the defendant's conviction.  Thus there
was no prejudice to the defendant by failing to produce the 2 reports,
or the proffer letter from Gonzalez Mendoza's attorney.
There was no reasonable probability that any omitted evidence
would have changed the conclusion of this jury.[8] 
(Emphasis supplied.)
ANALYSIS
In Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001), we quoted with
approval from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263 (1999), where the Court summarized the important constitutional
principles arising from the State's failure to disclose material evidence to the
defendant:
In Brady, this Court held "that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
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punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."  We have since held that the duty to disclose such
evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the
accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as
well as exculpatory evidence. . . . In order to comply with Brady,
therefore, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in this case, including the police." 
These cases, together with earlier cases condemning the
knowing use of perjured testimony, illustrate the special role played by
the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. 
Within the federal system, for example, we have said that the United
States Attorney is "the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done." 
Id. at 280-81 (citations and footnote omitted).  The principle necessitating reversal
when the State fails to disclose to the defense material favorable evidence was
espoused in Brady itself:
The principle . . . is not punishment of society for misdeeds of
a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.  Society
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. . . .  A prosecution that withholds evidence
on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to
exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice . . . .
373 U.S. at 87-88.  Therefore, as stated in Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 376-77, errors
-9-
involving the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady raise issues of
constitutional magnitude.
In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove:  
[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued. 
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).  Thus, not every instance where the State withholds
favorable evidence will rise to the level of a Brady violation necessitating the
granting of a new trial, but only those where there is a determination that the
favorable evidence that was withheld resulted in prejudice.  The determination of
whether a Brady violation has occurred is subject to independent appellate review. 
See Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 377; Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.  
With respect to the typed criminal investigation reports, there is no question
that the first two prongs of Brady are satisfied.  With regard to the first prong, the
trial court found that the withheld materials would have assisted in the impeachment
of Gonzalez.  Thus, there is no question that the evidence is favorable, which
satisfies the first prong of Brady.  As to the second prong, the State does not
dispute that it should have but failed to turn over the reports from the interviews
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with Gonzalez.  Thus, the second prong of Brady is satisfied.
We next conduct an independent review of the third prong of Brady; that is
whether Cardona was prejudiced by the nondisclosure or withholding of this
favorable evidence.  See Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 377; Way, 760 So. 2d at 913.  For
Brady purposes, "the defendant must establish that the defense was prejudiced by
the State's suppression of evidence, in other words, that the evidence was material. 
See Way, 760 So. 2d at 912-13.  As we explained in Way, "[a] showing of
materiality 'does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of
the suppressed evidence would have ultimately resulted in the defendant's
acquittal.'"  760 So. 2d at 913 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995)).  Rather, as the United States Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether,
after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's
conclusions.  Rather, the question is whether "the favorable evidence
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."  
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435) (citations omitted). 
Further, the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence must be considered when
determining materiality.  See Way, 760 So. 2d at 913 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436
& n.10).  "It is the net effect of the evidence that must be assessed."  Way, 760 So.
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2d at 913 (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)); see Kyles, 514
U.S. at 436 & n.10.
The State argues that any impeachment by the defense through the withheld
evidence would have been cumulative to the impeachment of Gonzalez at trial. 
Thus, because the State asserts that any impeachment would have been cumulative,
the State argues it was not material and Cardona cannot satisfy the prejudice prong
of Brady.  Specifically, the State asserts that Gonzalez already was impeached with
respect to her bias as a State's witness when defense counsel elicited testimony that
Gonzalez "did not have to worry about the death penalty anymore" because of her
plea.  However, the fact that a witness is impeached on other matters does not
necessarily render the additional impeachment cumulative.  See United States v.
Rivera Pedin, 861 F.2d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1988) ("We acknowledge that Ream's
credibility had been eroded due to the testimony the defense elicited from him on
cross-examination.  The disclosure of Ream's conversation with Miller, however,
would not have been merely repetitious, reinforcing a fact that the jury already
knew; instead, 'the truth would have introduced a new source of potential bias.'")
(quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986)).
We turn to an analysis of the significance of this impeachment, noting that
Gonzalez was a crucial witness for the State.  Gonzalez was the most important
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witness to testify as to which of the two defendants was the more culpable, and to
the escalating abuse the State claimed Cardona committed against Lazaro. 
Gonzalez was the only witness who testified to the significant events of the day
preceding Lazaro's death and the day of Lazaro's death. 
We conclude that the reports of the undisclosed interviews contain material
inconsistencies on several key points not addressed at trial that could have
seriously undermined Gonzalez's credibility.  Specifically, the reports of the
undisclosed interviews contradicted Gonzalez's trial testimony in four ways that
could have been used as powerful impeachment of Gonzalez at trial:  (1) the
description of the events of the day before Lazaro died; (2) the description of the
events of the day Lazaro died; (3) the details of the abuse described; and (4) the
date when Gonzalez last abused Lazaro.
First, with regard to the events of October 31, 1990, the day before Lazaro
died, at trial Gonzalez described a specific incident on the "last day of October"
when Cardona "got pissed off and she hit [Lazaro] with a bat over the head"
because Lazaro was slow in taking off his diapers.  Gonzalez stated that Cardona
struck Lazaro with such force that "[a] hole was opened up in his head.  His head
was cracked."  Gonzalez explained that the wound "started bleeding and bleeding
and bleeding, and then I put mercury on it and I applied a plastic band."  This
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incident occurred "like six or seven in the evening."   We relied on this testimony in
detailing the facts on direct appeal of the day before Lazaro died:
According to Gonzalez-Mendoza, on the last day of October 1990,
Cardona severely beat Lazaro with a baseball bat. After splitting the
child's head open, Cardona locked the little boy in the closet where he
had been confined for the last two months.
Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 362.
The report of the September 19, 1991, interview of Gonzalez regarding this
same night materially contradicts her trial testimony by specifically stating that on
the last day of October nothing unusual had occurred:
Ms. Gonzalez reports that on October 31, 1991 [sic], she
worked from 1 P.M. to 7 P.M. at the factory (this information was
verified).  Ms. Gonzalez reports that she arrived home at
approximately 8 P.M.  Ms. Gonzalez reports that she came straight
home because she promised the kids to take them out for Halloween
(trick or treating).
According to Ms. Gonzalez, when she arrived home from work,
everything was as usual.  Taimi and Juanito were getting dressed to go out
for Halloween.  She noticed that Lazaro was in the closet gagged and bound
but had no noticeable injuries.  Ms. Gonzalez reports that she did not notice
anything unusual because Lazaro was always tied in the closet.
When Taimi, Juanito, and Olivia returned home, Ana Cardona,
who had stayed home, was in bed watching television and Lazaro was
still in the closet (as usual).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Gonzalez was never impeached with regard to the October 31, 1990, incident
graphically detailed by Gonzalez at trial and relied on by this Court in its discussion
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of the facts on direct appeal.  See Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 362.  Cardona could not
impeach Gonzalez because she did not have the inconsistent description of the
events contained in the interviews.  The significant contradiction is that Gonzalez
initially stated in the interview that October 31, 1990, was a usual day and that
Lazaro had no noticeable injuries.  However, after meeting with the prosecutors,
Gonzalez testified that on October 31, 1990, Cardona struck Lazaro with such
force that "[a] hole was opened up in his head.  His head was cracked."
Gonzalez's trial testimony regarding October 31, 1990, also is contrary to the
report of her September 30, 1991, interview with State investigators, which states: 
“According to Ms. Gonzalez, the last time she remembers seeing Ms. Cardona
hitting Lazaro with the wooden bat was approximately a week before his death.” 
Moreover, as to Lazaro's massive head wound, the same report states:  "Ms.
Gonzalez stated that Ms. Cardona beat Lazaro with the bat very badly about a
month before his death.  According to Ms. Gonzalez, Cardona lacerated Lazaro's
head and broke his arm."  (Emphasis supplied.)  October 31 was the day before
Lazaro's death, not a week or a month before.  Given the State's themes that
towards the end of Lazaro's life the injuries were inflicted by Cardona, and that
Gonzalez's participation in the abuse was minimal, the impeachment based on these
interview reports would have been valuable.
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The second way that the interview reports contradict Gonzalez's trial
testimony was with regard to Gonzalez's description of the day Lazaro died.  At
trial, Gonzalez provided the following description of that day:
GONZALEZ:
I came home from work.  I opened up the door to the
closet to see the boy, and he started screaming because
his mother was coming behind me, he was frightened of
her.
STATE:
Was his mouth taped?
GONZALEZ:
No, at that moment it was not. I confronted him
with the bat.  I told him I was going to hit him if he
did not shut up, but the mother, the defendant,
grabbed it from my hand and stayed with it.
When I thought, that she was going to put tape
over his mouth and put him in the closet again.  I
went to bathe.  When I came out of the bathroom,
she told me, "I believe I killed him."  I went
running, looking for him.  He was lying down in the
closet, looking up, with a piece of paper in his
mouth.  I tried to revive him.  I grabbed alcohol,
water, I poured water and alcohol over his head.  I
tried to pick him up, but no, it didn't do anything. 
He stayed immobile.  That's when she took him,
got him dressed, put tape around the Pampers,
wrapped him in a bedspread, told me that we had
to dump him.  I told her about taking him to the
hospital or something.  She told me whether I was
crazy or was I a snitch.  She went out first to see
whether there was anyone out there.  I was terrified
and frightened.  I had never think such a thing.  I
got frightened by her, by the attitude she had.  And
I climbed in the car with her, I drove off, drove and
drove.  I don't know.  I did not know of any fixed
place to go to.  I went toward the beach.  I drove
by Alton Road, and by one of those houses on
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Alton Road.  She told me to stop.  She took the
child out of the bedspread.  It fell to the ground. 
She picked him up with her hands and she left with
him.  I stayed with the hand over the steering wheel
like this.  I don't know.  I don't know where she
placed him.  That was all.
We relied on this testimony in reciting the facts regarding the day of Lazaro's death
on direct appeal:
The next day, Gonzalez-Mendoza opened the closet door and
attempted to quiet Lazaro by frightening him with the bat.  When
Lazaro began to scream at the sight of his mother, Cardona grabbed
the bat from Gonzalez-Mendoza.  Gonzalez-Mendoza then left the
room.  When she returned, Cardona told her that Cardona believed
she had killed Lazaro.  After dressing the child, the two women took
Lazaro to a Miami Beach residence and abandoned him in some
bushes, where he was later found.
When Cardona learned that the child's body had been found she and 
Gonzalez-Mendoza fled to the Orlando area and then to St. Cloud,
where they were later arrested.  Cardona told police various stories
about what had happened to Lazaro.  Finally, Cardona claimed that the
child had fallen off the bed and injured himself.  When she couldn't
revive him, she took the boy to a Miami Beach residence and left him
on a doorstep so the people who owned the house could help him. 
Gonzalez-Mendoza concurred in each of the stories.
Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 362.
This trial testimony differs significantly from Gonzalez's previous statements
in the interviews on several points.  First, the report of the 
September 19, 1991, interview states that Gonzalez reported that she arrived home
from work to find Cardona screaming, "He fell off the bed!"  Second, the report of
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that same interview does not indicate that Gonzalez went to take a bath, but rather,
it indicates that she found that Lazaro was dead immediately after seeing Cardona. 
Third, the report of that interview does not indicate that Gonzalez ever tried to
revive Lazaro.  Fourth, the report of that interview states that Gonzalez reported
that she and Cardona accidentally ended up at a hospital while driving around
looking for a place to dump Lazaro.  However, at trial, Gonzalez testified that
before they got in the car with Lazaro's body, Gonzalez suggested taking Lazaro to
a hospital for treatment.     
Gonzalez was the only witness who testified as to the events of that day. 
Thus, impeachment of her inconsistencies with regard to the facts of the day's
events would have been valuable to the defense.  Particularly valuable would have
been impeachment of Gonzalez's testimony that she was taking a bath while the
alleged fatal blow was inflicted, that she tried to revive Lazaro, and that she
suggested taking Lazaro to the hospital.  This testimony contradicted Gonzalez's
earlier statements in the interviews, and supported the State's themes that Cardona
inflicted the fatal blow, that Gonzalez was a minor participant in the abuse, that
Gonzalez participated only because she was a "battered spouse," whose abuse of
Lazaro pleased Cardona, and that Gonzalez had far more remorse than Cardona.
Gonzalez was never impeached with most of the details regarding this
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contradictory testimony of the events of the day Lazaro died because Cardona had
no information available with which to impeach Gonzalez on these points.  
Although the jury was made aware through the State's direct examination that when
Gonzalez was apprehended she originally lied by telling the police that the child
suffered the fatal blow when he jumped off the bed, at trial Gonzalez explained her
reasons for lying to the police as follows:
STATE:
Why were you lying to Detective Schiaffo?
GONZALEZ:
To say that what [Cardona] told me to say.
STATE:
Why?
GONZALEZ:
I was scared that she would have said it was me
because she was going to say it was me, that she
was always going to accuse me.  This is why I
tried to defend her there.
However, the reason for lying to the police that Gonzalez gave to the jury at trial no
longer existed at the time of Gonzalez's undisclosed interviews with the State. 
Thus, Gonzalez could not have given that same reason to explain the inconsistency
between the undisclosed interview reports and the trial testimony had the defense
been given the opportunity to cross-examine Gonzalez with the undisclosed report.
The third way the interview reports differ from the trial testimony is that in
her trial testimony, Gonzalez provided graphic detail to the jury about types of
abuse she observed Cardona inflict on Lazaro.  Once again, on direct appeal we
relied on many of these details provided at trial by Gonzalez:
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During an eighteen-month period that began after the children were
returned to her, Cardona beat, choked, starved, confined, emotionally
abused and systematically tortured Lazaro. The child spent much of
the time tied to a bed, left in a bathtub with the hot or cold water
running, or locked in a closet. To avoid changing Lazaro's diaper for
as long as possible, Cardona would wrap duct tape around the child's
diaper to hold in the excrement.
Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 362.
In contrast to these details, the report of the interview of September 19,
1991, states only:  
According to Ms. Gonzalez, Lazaro Figueroa was emotionally and
physically abused on a daily basis by both Ana Cardona and herself. 
Since the abuse occurred so often, [Gonzalez] stated she could not be
specific on times dates and locations.
  
The report of the September 30, 1991, interview states:  
Ms. Gonzalez reports that the first time she remembers hitting Lazaro
was during the time that Ms. Gonzalez and Ms. Cardona were living in
the hotels.  However, Ms. Gonzalez does not remember what hotel
they were living in, nor a specific incident when she hit Lazaro, or why
she hit him. 
Gonzalez's lack of recollection in the interviews is in marked contrast to her graphic
descriptions for the jury of specific instances of abuse at every location where she
and Cardona ever lived.  Her admission in the interviews that she and Cardona
abused the boy on a daily basis also is contrary to her protestations at trial that she
did not abuse the boy as much as Cardona.
9  The medical examiner's testimony that Lazaro's death cannot be attributed
to any particular instance of abuse does not render evidence that Gonzalez may
have delivered the fatal blow meaningless.  First, it appears that the medical
examiner, Dr. Hyma, originally advised that "the cause of death was from trauma to
the head further being a massive ceribal [sic] Hematoma to the front left lobe
extending to the top of the skull."  Second, one of the State's themes was that
Cardona inflicted all the abuse in the couple of months before Lazaro's death,
including the fatal blow by the baseball bat.     
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The fourth way in which the interview reports contradict the trial testimony is
with respect to when Gonzalez herself last abused Lazaro.9  At trial, on her redirect
examination, Gonzalez expressly disavowed striking Lazaro with the bat in the
months before his death:
STATE:
You hit Lazaro in the head with a bat?
GONZALEZ:
No.
STATE:
During all those months prior to his death?
GONZALEZ:
No.
STATE:
Do you know who did?
GONZALEZ:
Yes.
STATE:
Who did?
GONZALEZ:
[Cardona] did.
The State's position at trial was that although Gonzalez participated in the abuse of
Lazaro, she did so at the behest of Cardona.  In closing argument, the State
emphasized that Gonzalez was not involved in the abuse in the last two months:
However, Olivia Gonzalez came in here and told you what her
participation was.  Defense counsel says to you, "Oh well, you
admitted to hitting him with a bat; right?"  Yes she did.  She admitted
to you, "Yes I did hit him with a bat," but she has told you, "I did not
-21-
hit him in the last couple months of his life." 
(Emphasis supplied.)  
The State's theory that Gonzalez did not hit Lazaro with the bat in the last
couple of months leading up to Lazaro's death is contradicted by the report of the
September 19, 1991, interview of Gonzalez, which states: 
Ms. Gonzalez reports that while they were living at 5976 S.W. 3rd
Street, approximately one month before Lazaro's death, Ms. Gonzalez
remembers having hit Lazaro with the wooden bat.  According to Ms.
Gonzalez, Ms. Cardona let Lazaro out of the closet.  Ms. Gonzalez
reports that she was "on drugs" and Lazaro started to bother her.  Ms.
Gonzalez was not able to be more specific; however, she recalls that
she hit him with the bat.  According to Ms. Gonzalez she does not
remember in what part of Lazaro's body she hit him or how many
times she struck him.  After Ms. Gonzalez beat Lazaro with the bat,
Ms. Cardona "Tied him up again, and threw him in the closet."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Because the State withheld these statements, the prosecutor was free to
buttress Gonzalez's claim that she did not hit Lazaro in the last few months of his
life.  The key feature of the defense was that Lazaro's ultimate death was from head
trauma caused by Gonzalez hitting him with the bat.  Even the prosecutor conceded
at the evidentiary hearing that "[t]he issue, the big issue was who hit Lazaro in the
head with a baseball bat."  The State's position at trial, supported solely by
Gonzalez's testimony, was that it was Cardona who beat Lazaro with the bat while
-22-
Gonzalez "went to bathe."  
The State points to the record of the direct appeal in which defense counsel
already impeached Gonzalez on this point.  In preparation for using Gonzalez as a
State's witness, State investigators had Gonzalez submit to a polygraph examination
conducted by George and Brian Slattery.  In that examination, Gonzalez made
admissions that could not come into evidence, but with which defense counsel did
impeach Gonzalez:
DEFENSE:
You admitted to Brian Slattery on October 2nd that
you hit Lazaro with a bat; correct?
GONZALEZ:
Under pressure.
DEFENSE:
And you advised that you could have–that Lazaro
could have died after you hit him; correct?
GONZALEZ:
No, I did not admit that.
DEFENSE:
You didn't admit that?
GONZALEZ:
No.
DEFENSE:
Would you like to look at the statement you gave
Mr. Slattery?
GONZALEZ:
I don't want to see it.
DEFENSE:
But you're sure you didn't say that?
GONZALEZ:
No, I've never admitted that I killed the child.
DEFENSE:
You never told Mr. Slattery that you could have
caused Lazaro's death by hitting him with the bat?
GONZALEZ:
No.
DEFENSE:
You never admitted to Mr. Slattery after you hit
Lazaro he went motionless?
GONZALEZ:
No.  I don't recall.
DEFENSE:
Do you not recall or are you denying that you ever
made those statements.
GONZALEZ:
I don't recall, under pressure I made many
statements.
-23-
DEFENSE:
Isn't it a fact that after you made these statements
to Mr. Slattery, he asked you if you felt
comfortable saying those things?
GONZALEZ:
Yes.
Although the State is correct that Gonzalez already was impeached to some
extent on this issue, Gonzalez testified to her excuse, that she "was under pressure,
I didn't know what I was saying.  I was frightened."  Moreover, on redirect, the
prosecution elicited from Gonzalez that Gonzalez was nervous because she did not
believe that the Slatterys were "always working in [her] best interest."  However, the
report of the September 30, 1991, interview indicates that Gonzalez freely admitted,
without the "fear" and "pressure" she testified to having felt from the Slatterys, that
one month before Lazaro's death Gonzalez "remembers having hit Lazaro with the
wooden bat" but could not be specific as to "what part of Lazaro's body she hit
him or how many times she struck him."  Thus, the suppressed report would have
provided further impeachment of Gonzalez by, at least, rebutting Gonzalez's excuse
that she made the alleged admission "under pressure." 
Given the nature of the impeachment that would have been available to the
defense, it also is important to the consideration of the Brady claim that Gonzalez
was not just another witness for the State--Gonzalez was the State's critical witness,
both in establishing Cardona's guilt on first-degree murder and in establishing HAC,
-24-
the sole aggravator found by the trial court in the penalty phase.  At the guilt phase,
the prosecutor argued that Cardona "participated in a greater amount of the abuse
than Olivia Gonzalez did.  That's the reason why, if the State needed witnesses and
we have to choose between a rock and a hard place, that's why Olivia Gonzalez
was brought before you as a witness.  Olivia Gonzalez came in here and told you
what happened."   The importance of Gonzalez to the State's case was made even
clearer during the prosecutor's closing argument at the penalty phase:
Where would you--where would we be without her?  Where
would we?
What would be known about this case had Olivia Gonzalez not
testified?
There would have been a very large hole in the case that three
months where this defendant, where this defendant binds and gags her
child and puts him in this closet.
If Olivia Gonzalez was not here to tell you where Lazaro
Figueroa was there would be no way to show that this defendant
bound and gagged her own child and left him in this closet.
As defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, once Gonzalez became the
State's witness, the "best strategy in the case in terms of the physical evidence . . .
was going to be to indicate to the jury that Ms. Gonzalez was, in fact, the person
who had caused the death of the child."  Gonzalez became a "[v]ery significant"
witness for the State.  Kassier explained his strategy for his cross-examination of
Gonzalez:  
10.  The State introduced testimony to show that Gonzalez had a dependent
personality.  However, one of the areas in which Cardona now claims her trial
attorneys were deficient was in failing to question this assumption through cross-
examination involving prior acts of misconduct.  Cardona points to police reports
filed before Gonzalez met Cardona documenting assault and battery charges.  In
one such report, Gonzalez was charged with "attacking and striking" her mother. 
In another, she was charged with aggravated assault involving a prior female lover. 
Finally, in an incident three months before she met Cardona, she was again arrested
for battery on another female companion when she "got aggravated and started
beating [victim] with hands and striking [victim's] head on floor."  Because of our
resolution on the Brady issue, we do not reach the question of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness as to this issue.
-25-
[M]y first objective was to make sure that the jury understood that she
had ultimately admitted and, in fact, testified at deposition that she had
administered one or two blows that, according to the Medical
Examiner, was, in fact, fatal blows.  I felt that was the most critical
piece of evidence I had to get from her.
I wanted also to establish to the jury she had lied in the past
when it was convenient for her.  She was every bit as much facing the
possibility of the death penalty at the time that she took her plea with
the State.
And I was basically trying to challenge her credibility as to any
point where she tried to absolve herself of guilt or shift the blame for
the child's death on to Ms. Cardona.
 At trial, Gonzalez minimized her own role in any abuse leading up to
Lazaro's death and claimed she participated only to "please" Cardona with whom
she was "romantically involved."  Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 361.10  Indeed, the
testimony of other witnesses as to the ongoing abuse and mistreatment of Lazaro
implicated Gonzalez to a greater extent than suggested by the State's theory.  Thus,
-26-
the importance of impeaching Gonzalez with statements that she made to the
prosecution before trial rests on what would have been Cardona's ability to further
her theory that Gonzalez inflicted the fatal blow, or at least substantially participated
in the abuse towards the end of Lazaro's life.
Finally, critical to the issue of Gonzalez's credibility as a witness at trial, and
thereby important to our materiality consideration, the contradictions between
Gonzalez's pretrial statements to the prosecutors and her testimony at trial after
meeting with the prosecutors suggests coaching by the State of its most important
witness.  Coaching is suggested because the testimony that was altered between the
time of Gonzalez's three interviews and the trial parallels the State's themes at trial--
that Cardona was the primary abuser and Gonzalez participated to a much lesser
extent, and only to the extent that she was a "battered spouse" seeking Cardona's
approval, that Cardona inflicted the fatal wounds, and that Gonzalez attempted to
help Lazaro on the day of his death and Cardona did not. 
When a particular witness is crucial to the State's case, evidence of coaching
is especially material to that witness's credibility.  See Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 384. 
The defense could have used evidence of Gonzalez's changed story to further fuel
its cross-examination of Gonzalez that the details of Gonzalez's story were the
product of coaching.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 443 (stating that the implication of
-27-
coaching "would have fueled a withering cross-examination, destroying confidence
in [the witness's] story").  The implication of coaching would have added a new
source of bias for the jury to consider when weighing Gonzalez's credibility and
testimony.  See Rivera Pedin, 861 F.2d at 1530; Brown, 785 F.2d at 1466.
The trial court concluded that the third prong of Brady was not met because
Cardona was "sufficiently impeached."  However, as discussed above, the
availability of the three interviews would have provided additional valuable
impeachment of Gonzalez's testimony.  The inconsistent versions of critical events
"would not have been merely repetitious, reinforcing a fact that the jury already
knew; instead, 'the truth would have introduced a new source of potential bias.'" 
Rivera Pedin, 861 F.2d at 1530.  The contradictory versions of significant events,
particularly in light of the implication of witness coaching, is qualitatively different
from the matters on which Gonzalez was impeached.  
The trial court concluded that Gonzalez's testimony was "not necessary to
obtain the defendant's conviction," and thus there was no prejudice.  However, the
key to a finding of prejudice is whether the withheld evidence undermines our
confidence in the result of the guilt and penalty phases.  We conclude that the
additional impeachment in this case does exactly this because it casts doubt on the
veracity of Gonzalez's accounts of the history of abuse by Cardona and the events
-28-
immediately preceding Lazaro's death.  By withholding the interviews, which the
State conducted for the alleged purpose of determining how Gonzalez would testify
at trial, the State was then free to elicit testimony from Gonzalez at trial that
contradicted Gonzalez's original statements in the interviews.  The State then could
use these themes (which also contradicted Gonzalez's original statements in the
interviews) in its closing argument.    
Because of the State's reliance on Gonzalez as its key witness, both to obtain
its conviction of first-degree murder and to argue for the death penalty, we
conclude that impeaching Gonzalez as to these material inconsistencies could have
further undermined Gonzalez's credibility before the jury, and thus bolstered the
defense's contention that Gonzalez, and not Cardona, was the primary actor in the
abuse and death of Lazaro.  In turn, the jury's assessment of the relative culpability
of Gonzalez and Cardona could have affected its decision on whether to return a
second-degree, rather than a first-degree, murder conviction. 
If the jury had disbelieved Gonzalez, this could have affected not only the
jury's evaluation of guilt, but also its recommendation of death.  Even without this
devastating impeachment evidence, the vote was only eight to four in favor of
death.  Further, the trial court's assessment of the weight to be given to HAC in
relation to the mitigators could have been affected by serious doubt as to
-29-
Gonzalez's veracity.  
Finally, this Court's own proportionality review relied heavily on Gonzalez's
version of the events as presented at trial without the substantial impeachment
presented by the undisclosed interviews:
We have compared this case to other death penalty cases to ensure
that death is proportionately warranted.  This review leads us to agree
with the trial court that, in light of the extended period of time little
Lazaro was subjected to the torturous abuse leading to his death, the
ultimate sentence is warranted in this case.
Cardona, 641 So. 2d at 365.  
For all these reasons, we hold that "the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the
confidence in the verdict."  Way, 760 So. 2d at 913 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at
290).  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
I do not agree with reversing the conviction and sentence in this case.  My
-30-
first observation from carefully reading the trial transcript of this trial, which
consists of the testimony of fifty-four witnesses, is that the trial judge made a
particularly conscientious effort to try this case in a fair way.  Secondly, in this
case, I believe it is a real advantage in evaluating prejudice that the trial judge was
the same as the postconviction judge.  Having been present to evaluate the witness
Gonzalez in person reinforces the trial judge’s finding on this prejudice issue.
Moreover, I conclude from a thorough reading of the record that there was
clearly competent, substantial evidence to support the following finding by the trial
judge in his sentencing order dated April 1, 1992:
[E]vidence presented in this case showed the victim was subjected to
approximately 18 months of torture during his young life. . . .  The
medical evidence showed that massive abuse occurred including an
unhealed fracture of an arm, skull fractures with underlying subdural
and subarachnoid hematomas one arm that had been immobilized in
which the muscles had been literally turned to bone as a result of
multiple repeated trauma.  His two front upper teeth were missing as a
result of blunt trauma.  Evidence of internal injuries after autopsy
indicated blunt traumas which went back many months prior to the
victim’s death.  The medical evidence of child abuse by the Dade
County Medical Examiner was described as the worst he had ever
seen in his medical experience.  In addition this 3 year old child
weighed 18 pounds at the time of death.  The introduced medical
records available showed at approximately 11 months of age he
weighed 20 pounds . . . . 
The evidence indicated that the victim had suffered more than
child abuse and was actually tortured during 18 months preceding his
death. . . .  Medical evidence indicated that the victim was kept in bed
for such long periods of time that he developed bed sores, particularly
-31-
on one side of his head.  The evidence showed a slow methodical
torture which defendant knew would ultimately cause death, sooner or
later. . . .
The medical examiner, Dr. Hyma, testified that based upon the
physical injuries of the victim that excruciating pain was inflicted on
this child over a long period of time. . . .
This victim was alternatively [bound], gagged and tortured as
well as being starved to death.  The photographs of the child taken at
the location where the body was found show an undernourished child,
one leg much larger than the other, multiple visible bruises, bloody
areas of the head and facial area, soiled diapers, and other physical
signs of recent child abuse.
In addition to these findings, my reading of the record is that what this trial
developed was a long, sordid, and wretched tale of a cruel, torturous, lingering
murder act, which more accurately can be said to have culminated rather than
occurred on the day this child finally stopped breathing.  The fact that this was
such a long, tortuous ordeal, as found by the trial court and supported by the
record, belies the significance of what the majority holds would have been the basis
for prejudicial impeachment.
The record evidence is that the defendant had for a period of time lived with
the victim child’s father in an upscale apartment on Miami Beach.  The defendant
had three other children, two of whom lived with her in the apartment provided by
the child victim’s father.  The father was murdered in an apparent illicit drug
episode.  The defendant was the recipient of $100,000 or more following the death
-32-
but had to move out of the apartment.  The defendant regularly used cocaine and
soon spent the money she had received.  Thereafter, the defendant began leaving
the children with various acquaintances and was gone for weeks at a time.  One of
these acquaintances, when she could not reach the defendant, called the police, and
the children were turned over to the State’s family services agencies.  However, the
defendant did ultimately return, petitioned the dependency court for return of the
children to her, and the children were returned to her.  After the children were
returned to the defendant, the defendant and the children moved from place to
place in Dade County.  There were numerous witnesses who testified as to the
maltreatment of this youngest child, to whom the defendant was apparently
particularly cruel for a long period of time.
Approximately 18 months before the child victim’s ultimate death, defendant,
while visiting a discotheque in Miami Beach, developed a relationship with
Gonzalez.  Gonzalez had a job and began paying for the support of the defendant
and the children.  Cocaine usage increased and turned into crack cocaine usage. 
Witnesses testified as to the deteriorating look of the child victim.
Following the child victim’s death, the child’s body was deposited in the
bushes in front of a home in Miami Beach.  The defendant, Gonzalez, and the other
two children then left Miami and moved to St. Cloud, Florida, near Orlando.  Soon
-33-
thereafter, law enforcement was able to identify the defendant as the child’s mother
and to trace defendant to St. Cloud.  When law enforcement located defendant, she
gave them a statement in which she said that the child had stopped breathing after
falling from a bed.
Based upon the evidence in the trial record and this trial judge’s findings, I
disagree with the majority’s statements that, “The critical issue in this case was
whether Gonzalez, rather than Cardona, was the prime perpetrator of the escalating
abuse that culminated in the child’s death.  At trial, the State’s strategy, based on
Gonzalez’s testimony, was to paint Cardona as the more culpable defendant.”
Majority op. at 2.  My reading of the record is that the evidence was that this
defendant was the child victim’s mother, that the defendant first abandoned this
child and then abused this child, and that the defendant was the constant prime
abuser.  This was not in reality a trial about relative culpability.  This was a trial
about a mother who tortured a child over a long period of time, resulting in the
child’s death.
Thus, I disagree with the majority’s characterization that what is claimed to
be Brady material involved “significant[ly] contradictory” versions of events.  The
four ways that the majority says that the material could have been used as
impeachment all involve the last day of the torture.  I conclude that the majority
-34-
misses the point of the evidence and the trial judge’s findings, which was that this
death was a result of a slow torture and that, as I said before, the last day was a
culmination–not an occurrence.
What the majority points to as significant bases for contradictions in the
reports are not direct contradictions of statements previously made by Gonzalez of
her trial testimony.  What the majority points to are, in actuality, negative inferences
from reports of what Gonzalez said.  These reports would even have been very
difficult to use in effective impeachment, and the negative inferences, in comparison
to the testimony about the mother’s cocaine use and the long-deteriorating
condition of her child, are not all that significant.  
For example, whether Gonzalez was reported to have said that she was
taking a “bath” has no import in this total picture.  In respect to the report of the
September 30, 1991, interview referred to by the majority, majority op. at 20, I fail
to see the direct contradiction or again how that report would have been effectively
used at trial.  At the trial, Gonzalez admitted that she also beat the child victim with
a belt and a bat.  Gonzalez admitted to herself hitting the child once a day while
being at various hotels but stated the defendant hit the victim more often.
Additionally, Gonzalez was deposed for over seven hours before trial after
her plea.  She admitted that she had not told the truth early in the investigation. 
-35-
Gonzalez was subjected to a wide ranging and effective cross-examination at trial. 
In that examination was the following at page 2972 of the transcript:
Q.  Seems to me, Ms. Gonzales, you already admitted under
oath, if anything your violence against Lazaro Figueroa got worse.
A.  Yes.
Q.  It escalated, didn’t it.
A.  Could you repeat the question, please?
Q.  Your use of violence and abuse of Lazaro Figueroa
escalated, didn’t it?
A.  Yes.
Q.  The longer your relationship went on the more he bothered
you?
A.  Yes.
Thereafter, in great detail, Ms. Gonzalez’s beating of the child was brought out.
I concurred in reversing Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373, 384 (Fla. 2001),
because in that case there was a Brady violation which caused prejudice.  But here
there was not.  It is important that this Court’s application of Brady not be so rote
that we require a new trial in cases in which the information not disclosed would not
have made a significant difference in the outcome of the trial.
Based upon the entirety of the trial court record heard by the trial judge in the
courtroom, I clearly believe it to be reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that
there was not prejudice to the extent that would require a new trial under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
HARDING and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
-36-
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,
David L. Tobin, Judge - Case No. 90-48092B
Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Rodriguez, Sandra Jaggard, and
Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee