Title: Dorchester Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miville

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13308 
 
DORCHESTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY  vs.  LEONARD MIVILLE & 
others.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     January 4, 2023. – March 16, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Insurance, Homeowner's insurance, Construction of policy, 
Insurer's obligation to defend, Coverage.  Declaratory 
Relief.  Words, "Physical abuse." 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 19, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Rosemary Connolly, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Ryan P. Gilday for Leonard Miville. 
John P. Graceffa (Lawrence M. Slotnick also present) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
1 Kim Brengle, Laurence Brengle, and William Brengle. 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Once again, we are presented with the question 
whether, under the terms of a homeowners' insurance policy, 
certain conduct by an insured constitutes "physical abuse" 
thereby precluding coverage under a policy exclusion exempting 
coverage for "[b]odily injury . . . arising out of sexual 
molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse."  
In Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 431, 439-440 
(2020) (Krusell), we concluded that the term "physical abuse" as 
used in an identical policy exclusion -- commonly referred to as 
the abuse and molestation exclusion -- was ambiguous.  
Interpreting the exclusion through the lens of an objectively 
reasonable insured, we concluded that "physical abuse" applies 
"to a limited subset of physically harmful treatment, where the 
treatment is characterized by an 'abusive' quality such as a 
misuse of power or, perhaps, conduct so extreme as to indicate 
an abuser's disposition towards inflicting pain and suffering."  
Id. at 446.  Because the conduct in that case –- a single push 
by the insured –- contained no such "abusive" quality, we held 
that the abuse and molestation exclusion did not preclude 
coverage.  Id. 
 
In this case, the insured, William Brengle, initiated an 
unprovoked attack on Leonard Miville by punching him in the head 
and repeatedly kicking him after he had fallen, causing Miville 
to sustain serious injuries.  In this action for declaratory 
3 
 
relief, Dorchester Mutual Insurance Company (Dorchester Mutual) 
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that, under the 
terms of a homeowners' insurance policy it issued to Brengle's 
parents, the abuse and molestation exclusion exempted coverage 
for claims arising out of the incident because the conduct 
constituted "physical abuse" under our holding in Krusell, 485 
Mass. at 446.  A judge in the Superior Court agreed and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Dorchester Mutual. 
 
We conclude that the term "physical abuse," in the context 
of the abuse and molestation exclusion, requires an imbalance or 
misuse of power attendant to the physically harmful conduct.  
Because the attack here was not achieved by capitalizing on or 
exploiting an imbalance of power, it does not fall within the 
meaning of "physical abuse" as it is used in the abuse and 
molestation exclusion.  Therefore, the abuse and molestation 
exclusion does not exempt coverage in these circumstances, and 
the summary judgment in favor of Dorchester Mutual on this basis 
is reversed. 
 
Background.  1.  Underlying incident.  The following facts 
are undisputed.  At approximately 5:45 A.M. on November 22, 
2016, Miville, age sixty-one, parked his truck outside the home 
of his girlfriend, Jennifer Barrett, to drive her to work.  When 
Barrett did not answer her telephone, Miville got out of his 
truck and walked to her front door.  Brengle, age thirty, lived 
4 
 
with his parents in the home next to Barrett's and was outside 
on his front porch when Miville arrived.  After receiving no 
response when he knocked on Barrett's front door, Miville stood 
on the sidewalk between the two homes looking up to Barrett's 
bedroom window.  Brengle stood on the side of his porch and 
yelled at Miville, "F you, what are you doing here?"  Miville 
responded that he was Barrett's boyfriend and that he and 
Brengle had met previously.  Brengle, however, continued yelling 
at Miville, ordering him to leave the area and calling him evil. 
Miville told Brengle to "keep it down" so he would not wake 
the neighbors.  Suddenly, Brengle jumped off the porch and 
punched Miville in the "left eye and cheek."  Miville fell to 
the ground, hitting his head on the sidewalk.  Brengle proceeded 
to kick Miville in the jaw, clavicle, and leg.  Miville recalled 
asking Brengle to stop, but at some point, he lost consciousness 
and next remembered awaking to the police asking him questions. 
Miville sustained serious injuries, including a fractured 
cheek and orbital bone.  Brengle was charged with assault and 
battery on a person sixty years of age or older, and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot) on a person 
age sixty or older; he later pleaded guilty to those charges. 
2.  The policy.  Dorchester Mutual issued a homeowners' 
insurance policy to Brengle's parents for the period of April 
25, 2016, through April 25, 2017.  The policy provided personal 
5 
 
liability coverage for claims "brought against an 'insured' for 
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' caused 
by an 'occurrence' to which this coverage applies."  "Insured" 
is defined by the policy as the policyholders and the "residents 
of [the policyholders'] household who are . . . relatives."2  
"Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, . . . which results, 
during the policy period, in:  . . . '[b]odily injury.'" 
The policy contained multiple exclusions from personal 
liability coverage, including the abuse and molestation 
exclusion, which excluded coverage for "'[b]odily injury' . . . 
arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or 
physical or mental abuse."  "Physical abuse" is not defined in 
the policy. 
3.  Prior proceedings.  After the incident, Miville sent a 
claim letter to Dorchester Mutual seeking coverage under 
Brengle's parents' homeowners' insurance policy for the injuries 
he sustained.  Dorchester Mutual denied coverage.  Thereafter, 
Miville commenced an action against Brengle and his parents, 
asserting claims of negligence and assault and battery against 
Brengle and negligent supervision claims against Brengle's 
parents. 
 
2 It is undisputed that Brengle was an insured under the 
policy. 
6 
 
 
Dorchester Mutual commenced this action seeking a judgment 
declaring that, under the terms of the policy, it had no duty to 
defend or indemnify Brengle or his parents for the personal 
injury claims brought against them by Miville.3  Dorchester 
Mutual filed the present motion for summary judgment, asserting 
that Brengle's conduct constituted "physical abuse" under the 
terms of the abuse and molestation exclusion.  Thus, Dorchester 
Mutual argued, Miville's injuries were not covered by the 
policy, and it had no duty to defend or indemnify Brengle or his 
parents.  The judge agreed and granted judgment in Dorchester 
Mutual's favor.  Miville appealed. 
 
In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 
23.0, a panel of the Appeals Court reversed, concluding that the 
incident did not amount to "physical abuse" under Krusell, 485 
Mass. at 446, because it lacked the necessary "'abusive' 
quality" and, therefore, fell outside the policy exclusion.  See 
Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brengle, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1133 
 
3 Dorchester Mutual's original complaint sought a 
declaration that coverage was barred for the claims against 
Brengle under two policy exclusions:  (1) the intentional acts 
exclusion and (2) the abuse and molestation exclusion.  
Dorchester Mutual subsequently amended its complaint to include 
Brengle's parents as defendants.  The amended complaint sought a 
declaration that coverage was precluded for the claims against 
Brengle's parents under the abuse and molestation exclusion.  On 
summary judgment, only the abuse and molestation exclusion was 
at issue.  We therefore express no opinion in this appeal on the 
applicability of the intentional acts exclusion to Miville's 
claims against Brengle. 
7 
 
(2022).  We allowed Dorchester Mutual's application for further 
appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "The standard of 
review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Krusell, 485 Mass. at 
435, quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 
117, 120 (1991).  "We review decisions allowing summary judgment 
de novo."  Krusell, supra. 
2.  Interpretation of insurance policies.  "The 
interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law."  
City Fuel Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 446 Mass. 
638, 640 (2006).  "Like all contracts, an insurance policy is to 
be construed according to the fair and reasonable meaning of its 
words."  Id.  We consider the language of an insurance policy as 
a whole, "without according special emphasis to any particular 
part over another," Surabian Realty Co. v. NGM Ins. Co., 462 
Mass. 715, 718 (2012), and where possible, giving meaning and 
effect to every word, see Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy v. 
Patel, 489 Mass. 549, 554 (2022) (Patel). 
"If free from ambiguity, an exclusionary clause, like all 
other provisions of an insurance contract, must be given its 
usual and ordinary meaning."  Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' 
8 
 
Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 281 (1997).  However, "[a]ny 
ambiguities in the language of an insurance contract are 
interpreted against the insurer who used them and in favor of 
the insured."  Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd's, London, 449 Mass. 621, 628 (2007).  "This rule of 
construction applies with particular force to exclusionary 
provisions."  Id., quoting Hakim, supra at 282. 
While "[a]n insured bears the initial burden of proving 
that the claimed loss falls within the coverage of the insurance 
policy," once that burden has been met, "the burden then shifts 
to the insurer to show that a separate exclusion to coverage is 
applicable to the particular circumstances of the case."  
Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 351 (2012).  "When in 
doubt as to the proper meaning of a term in an insurance policy, 
we 'consider what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the 
relevant policy language, would expect to be covered.'"  
Krusell, 485 Mass. at 437, quoting Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 460 Mass. 352, 362 (2011). 
3.  Interpretation of "physical abuse" in abuse and 
molestation exclusion.  In Krusell, 485 Mass. at 432-433, we 
were called to interpret the term "physical abuse," in an 
identical abuse and molestation exclusion, to determine whether 
the exclusion precluded coverage where a twenty-three year old 
9 
 
insured pushed a sixty-two year old man, causing the latter to 
fall and sustain serious, permanent injuries. 
Guided by our principles of interpretation, we first 
considered whether the words "physical abuse," as used together 
in the policy, were ambiguous.  Although it was clear that the 
term "physical" referred to "of or pertaining to the body," 
Krusell, 485 Mass. at 438, quoting Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 1461 (2003), the plain meaning of "abuse," 
and varying courts' interpretations of the term, revealed that 
it was susceptible to two diverging meanings:  the first, 
connoting "any conduct whatsoever that causes physical harm," 
and the second, contemplating "a subset of physically harmful 
conduct characterized by an 'abusive' quality, such as an 
imbalance of power."  Krusell, supra at 439.  See Citation Ins. 
Co. v. Gomez, 426 Mass. 379, 381 (1998) ("A term is ambiguous 
only if it is susceptible of more than one meaning and 
reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which meaning 
is the proper one"). 
Concluding that the term "physical abuse" was ambiguous, we 
turned to the insured's reasonable expectations as to coverage, 
looking specifically to the language of the policy, the history 
of abuse and molestation exclusions, and cases, statutes, and 
regulations in which conduct had or had not been characterized 
as "abuse."  Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440-446.  These sources led 
10 
 
us to conclude that "a reasonable insured would interpret 
'physical abuse' to apply only to a limited subset of physically 
harmful treatment, where the treatment is characterized by an 
'abusive' quality such as a misuse of power or, perhaps, conduct 
so extreme as to indicate an abuser's disposition towards 
inflicting pain and suffering."  Id. at 446. 
In this case, both parties agree that, because "physical 
abuse" is not defined by the policy, our conclusion in Krusell, 
485 Mass. at 446, as to how a reasonable insured would interpret 
"physical abuse" within the meaning of the abuse and molestation 
exclusion controls.  They disagree on the application of that 
interpretation to these facts. 
Miville argues that the incident here was not "physical 
abuse" because there was no power imbalance between Brengle and 
himself, and the incident was not "so extreme" as to reflect 
Brengle's disposition to inflict pain and suffering.  Krusell, 
485 Mass. at 446.  Dorchester Mutual, however, contends that the 
incident possessed both "abusive" qualities mentioned in 
Krusell, supra.  Specifically, Dorchester Mutual maintains that, 
because Brengle was thirty years old and Miville was over sixty 
years old at the time of the incident, this age difference 
coupled with Miville's "advancing years" demonstrated a physical 
power imbalance between the two.  Additionally, Dorchester 
Mutual argues that the incident was both violent and unprovoked, 
11 
 
such that Brengle's disposition to inflict pain and suffering 
can be inferred from his conduct. 
a.  Policy language.  In Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440-446, we 
considered an imbalance or misuse of power to be the 
distinguishing feature that transforms physically harmful 
conduct to "physical abuse."  Beginning with the language of the 
policy, we reasoned that an interpretation of "physical abuse" 
as any physically harmful conduct, as opposed to conduct with an 
abusive quality like a misuse of power, would render superfluous 
the terms "sexual molestation" and "corporal punishment," as 
both are forms of physically harmful conduct.  Id. at 440.  See 
Patel, 489 Mass. at 554 ("if possible, 'every word in a policy 
should be given meaning'" [citation omitted]).  Moreover, we 
observed that a broad interpretation of "physical abuse" 
seemingly would encompass accidental conduct causing physical 
harm, which would undermine the basic purpose of purchasing a 
homeowners' insurance policy.  See Krusell, supra.  See also 
Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240, 245 (1986) 
("Clearly, the manifest design of homeowners' insurance is to 
protect homeowners from risks associated with the home and 
activities related to the home"). 
Most persuasive of an interpretation requiring an element 
of power, however, is the term's location within the policy -- 
the primary source from which a reasonable insured would glean 
12 
 
its meaning.  Immediately preceding the term "physical abuse" in 
the abuse and molestation exclusion are the terms "sexual 
molestation" and "corporal punishment."  As we observed, 
"[w]ords are, at least in part, defined by the company they 
keep."  Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440.  Although "sexual 
molestation" and "corporal punishment" are not defined by the 
policy, both forms of conduct generally involve an imbalance or 
exploitation of power between the perpetrator and the victim.  
See Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
"molestation" as "[t]he act of making unwanted and indecent 
advances to or on someone, esp[ecially] for sexual 
gratification"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
510 (2002) (defining "corporal punishment" as "punishment 
administered by an adult [as a parent or a teacher] to the body 
of a child ranging in severity from a slap to a spanking").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1, 9, 10 n.3 (2015) 
(discussing corporal punishment in context of parent physically 
disciplining child); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 227 
(1986) ("sexual molestation" where doctor entered homes of young 
patients, injected them with Valium, and sexually assaulted them 
while they were "physically and mentally unable to express 
resistance"). 
While the term "physical abuse" divorced from context may 
be susceptible to multiple interpretations, under the 
13 
 
interpretive principle of noscitur a sociis, its meaning in the 
policy is limited by the terms it accompanies.4  See People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. 
Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 287 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 432 (2011) ("the canon of noscitur a 
sociis . . . counsels that 'ordinarily the coupling of words 
denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same 
general sense'"); Commonwealth v. Gallant, 453 Mass. 535, 542 
(2009), quoting H.J. Alperin & L.D. Shubow, Summary of Basic Law 
§ 19.10, at 846 (3d ed. 1996) ("The principle of noscitur a 
sociis . . . suggests 'that a word gains meaning from others 
with which it is associated'"); Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life 
Ins. Co., 13 Allen 308, 316 (1866), S.C., 99 Mass. 317 (1868) 
(applying maxim of noscitur a sociis to interpretation of 
insurance policy).  Thus, looking solely at the language of the 
policy, it appears evident that "physical abuse," like "sexual 
molestation" and "corporal punishment," refers to conduct 
achieved by capitalizing on or exploiting an imbalance of power. 
 
 
4 Noscitur a sociis means "it is known by its associates" 
(citation omitted).  People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 
287 (2017).  This canon of construction is a broader formulation 
of the canon of ejusdem generis, which means "of the same kind 
or class" (citation omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Gallant, 
453 Mass. 535, 542 (2009). 
14 
 
b.  History of abuse and molestation exclusion.  This more 
narrow interpretation of physical abuse requiring a power 
element is supported further by the context in which the abuse 
and molestation exclusion originated.  In the early 1980s, a 
surge of sexual abuse claims arose against clergy members within 
the Roman Catholic Church.  See Bartley, The Liability Insurance 
Regulation of Religious Institutions After the Catholic Church 
Sexual Abuse Scandal, 16 Conn. Ins. L.J. 505, 505-510 (2010).  
Litigation surrounding insurance coverage for these and other 
similar claims soon erupted.  See id. at 517-529.  See also 
Swisher & Mason, Liability Insurance Coverage for Clergy Sexual 
Abuse Claims, 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 355, 360, 368-375 (2010).  A 
majority of States, including Massachusetts, determined that 
sexual abuse claims brought against an accused abuser were not 
covered by the terms of an accused's liability policy that 
excluded coverage for expected or intended bodily injury.  See 
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 
398 n.6, 401-403 (1990), and cases cited ("intent to injure may 
be inferred from the intentional commission of an inherently 
injurious act such as forcible sexual abuse"). 
Many victims, then, also sought recovery from the 
organizations responsible for employing or supervising those 
accused of sexual abuse under theories of negligent supervision 
or negligent hiring.  See Krusell, 485 Mass. at 441, citing 
15 
 
Bartley, 16 Conn. Ins. L.J., at 517-518, 530.  "Because the 
basis for such claims was the negligent conduct of a third 
party, rather than the intentional conduct of the alleged 
abuser, existing policy exclusions for intentional acts were 
insufficient to shield insurers from coverage obligations."  
Krusell, supra.  It was against this backdrop that insurance 
companies included abuse and molestation exclusions in their 
policies. 
In 1987, the Insurance Services Office, Inc., promulgated 
the abuse and molestation exclusion as a form endorsement for 
insurers to include in their general liability policies as a 
means to preclude coverage for all claims arising out of abuse 
or molestation.  See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field, 670 F.3d 
93, 97 (1st Cir. 2012).  The exclusion was to be "used with 
'[o]rganizations that have care or custody of others -- schools, 
hospitals, nursing homes, day care centers, etc.'"  Id., quoting 
Harper vs. Gulf Ins. Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 01-CV-201-J (D. 
Wyo. Dec. 20, 2002).  See D.S. Malecki & D.D. Thamann, 
Commercial General Liability Coverage Guide 203 (11th ed. 2015) 
("This [abuse and molestation exclusion] endorsement is utilized 
by underwriters in those instances where the possibility of 
abuse and molestation is relatively high, such as day care 
centers, pre-school institutions, juvenile centers, and 
municipalities").  Relying on the abuse and molestation 
16 
 
exclusion, insurers repeatedly and successfully have fended off 
claims from "medical or therapeutic care providers, health care 
centers, summer camps, schools and preschools, job training 
programs, churches, and the like" facing allegations of 
negligence in allowing those in their care, custody, or control 
to have been abused or molested.  Valley Forge Ins. Co., supra 
at 98, and cases cited. 
In sum, the origin of the abuse and molestation exclusion 
is particularly telling.  In adopting this exclusion, insurers' 
"rationale was to shield themselves from liability for abuse or 
molestation claims where they unexpectedly could not rely upon 
the intentional acts exclusion to preclude coverage" due to 
theories by which these claims were brought as a result of the 
institutional nature in which they arose.5  Krusell, 485 Mass. at 
443. 
 
c.  Cases, statutes, and regulations.  Our review of cases, 
statutes, and regulations in Krusell, 485 Mass. 443-446, also 
 
5 In Krusell, we also noted a second set of circumstances in 
which the abuse and molestation exclusion is often relied on by 
insurers due to the inadequacy of the intentional acts 
exclusion:  specifically, "where a claim generally would be 
brought directly against an abuser, but the abuser is deemed 
incapable of intentional conduct by virtue of a mental disease 
or defect."  Krusell, 485 Mass. at 441-442.  "Even though, 
ordinarily, abuse is intentional conduct, in such a situation 
the abuser's inability to act with intent renders the 
intentional acts exclusion inapplicable."  Id. at 442.  Again, 
we do not address the applicability of the intentional acts 
exclusion to the conduct in this case.  See note 2, supra. 
17 
 
demonstrated that an element of power was key to physical abuse.  
We specifically noted that cases where insurers successfully 
have relied on the abuse and molestation exclusion to exempt 
coverage for "'physical abuse' generally involve[d] more than 
mere physical harm."6  Id. at 443 & 445 n.23.  By contrast, cases 
where the exclusion did not exempt coverage distinguished 
violent conduct lacking an exploitation of power from "physical 
abuse."  Id. at 444.  See, e.g., Riley v. Maison Orleans II, 
Inc., 829 So. 2d 479, 491 (La. Ct. App. 2002) ("Physical abuse, 
as opposed to simple assault, is generally the act of a person 
 
 
6 Although, in Krusell, we relied on Merrimack Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 117 Conn. App. 769, 772-773 (2009), and 
Miglino v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 3d 479, 481-
482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), as example cases where the 
conduct constituted "physical abuse" because the claims involved 
domestic violence, which we noted "often involves an imbalance 
of power," Krusell, 485 Mass. at 443-444, upon reflection, it is 
not clear that the conduct in those cases would fall within the 
interpretation we afford the term "physical abuse," as it is 
properly understood within the meaning of the abuse and 
molestation exclusion.  Rather, it appears that both 
jurisdictions interpret "physical abuse" more broadly than we 
do.  Indeed, we specifically recognized in Krusell, supra at 
439, that, contrary to our interpretation of the term, the court 
in Miglino, supra at 481, considered "physical abuse" to be any 
"physical . . . maltreatment."  Further, in Merrimack Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., supra at 773, the court's conclusion that the stabbing 
between romantic partners "clearly constituted physical abuse 
within the language of the policy" focused on the conduct 
involved, and not the imbalance of power.  And, as discussed 
infra, the Appellate Court of Connecticut later concluded in 
General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Okeke, 182 Conn. App. 83, 99, 101-103 
(2018), that a fifteen year old's act of stabbing his elderly 
neighbor was "physical abuse" within the meaning of the abuse 
and molestation exclusion, treating Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., as dispositive. 
18 
 
in control, dominance, or authority who misuses his [or her] 
position to harm or mistreat a person over whom he [or she] 
exercises such control.  The act of one nursing home resident 
attacking a fellow resident is not abuse because the element of 
control is lacking"). 
 
To be sure, in a footnote in Krusell, we acknowledged a 
second line of "cases where insurers successfully relied upon an 
abuse and molestation exclusion" to preclude coverage based on 
"conduct that implies that the abuser is cruel or inhumane, that 
is, disposed to inflict pain or suffering."  Krusell, 485 Mass. 
at 444 n.22, citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. American Cent. Ins. 
Co., 739 So. 2d 1078, 1080-1082 (Ala. 1999); General Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Okeke, 182 Conn. App. 83, 101-103 (2018) (Okeke).  This 
footnote apparently led to our statement in dicta that a 
reasonable insured would interpret "physical abuse" to apply to 
a limited subset of physically harmful conduct, "such as . . . 
perhaps, conduct so extreme as to indicate an abuser's 
disposition towards inflicting pain and suffering" (emphasis 
added).  Krusell, supra at 446. 
It is worthy of note, however, that in at least one of 
those cases, there was a discernible misuse of power in carrying 
out the "physical abuse."  In Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 
at 1080-1082, it was alleged that leaders of a fraternity forced 
a fraternity pledge to "dig a ditch and jump into it after it 
19 
 
had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and 
vomit"; receive "paddlings to his buttocks"; be "pushed and 
kicked, often into walls, pits, and trash cans"; and "'run[] the 
gauntlet,' during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit 
as they ran down a hallway and down a flight of stairs."  While 
an element of power was not as prominent in Okeke, 182 Conn. 
App. at 90, 100-101, where the conduct involved a fifteen year 
old insured attacking, beating, and stabbing his elderly female 
neighbor inside her residence, that court's interpretation of 
the term "physical abuse" expressly differs from our own.  
Contrary to our view, the court in Okeke concluded that the 
conduct there could not "plausibly be considered anything other 
than 'physical abuse,'" specifically rejecting the argument that 
the term "physical abuse," as used in an abuse and molestation 
exclusion, was ambiguous.  See id. 
Statutes and regulations in the Commonwealth confirm that 
the term "physical abuse" implies an imbalance or misuse of 
power.  Our review of those sources in Krusell revealed that 
"[t]he term routinely has been applied to conduct causing harm 
to a vulnerable type of victim, where the alleged abuser may be 
responsible for the vulnerable individual's care."  Krusell, 485 
Mass. at 445.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2) (abuse of 
elder); G. L. c. 265, § 23 (rape and abuse of child).  See also 
103 Code Mass. Regs § 491.13 (2017) (grievance process for abuse 
20 
 
of inmates in correctional facility); 105 Code Mass. Regs 
§ 155.003 (2017) (defining abuse of medical patients or 
residents in context of long-term care facilities); 118 Code 
Mass. Regs § 2.02 (2021) (defining abuse of persons with 
disabilities). 
We therefore clarify that, for conduct to constitute 
"physical abuse" as a reasonable insured would understand the 
term when reading the language of the abuse and molestation 
exclusion and the policy as a whole, the conduct must involve an 
imbalance or misuse of power in addition to being physically 
harmful.  Although we suggested in Krusell, 485 Mass. at 446, 
that perhaps there might be circumstances where the extremity of 
conduct may itself render physically harmful conduct "abusive," 
our examination of the policy language and other relevant 
sources leads us to conclude that a reasonable insured would 
interpret extreme physically harmful conduct to constitute 
"physical abuse" only where it also embraces a power component. 
d.  Application.  Here, although Brengle's attack on 
Miville was unprovoked and inexplicable, it did not involve an 
exploitation or misuse of power.  Dorchester Mutual's argument 
that, due to the thirty-one year age gap between Brengle and 
Miville and Miville's "advancing years," there was a physical 
power imbalance that rendered the attack "physical abuse" is 
unavailing.  Indeed, a starker age gap existed in Krusell, where 
21 
 
the insured was twenty-three years old and the victim was sixty-
two years old, and we had little trouble concluding that no 
"'abusive' quality" such as a "misuse of power" existed.  
Krusell, 485 Mass. at 433, 446.  As a result, a reasonable 
insured would not expect the abuse and molestation exclusion to 
preclude coverage for the incident here. 
Conclusion.  The summary judgment in favor of Dorchester 
Mutual is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.