Title: Grammer v. Grammer

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

80 So. 2d 457 (1955)
Dorothy M. GRAMMER, individually, and as Administratrix of the estate of William A. Grammer, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
Violet GRAMMER, Jay William Grammer, and Robert Grammer, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. Special Division B.
May 11, 1955.
*458 R.K. Bell and W.D. Bell, Miami, and Howard G. Livingston, Sebring, for appellant.
Paul E. Gringle and Charles Byron, Delray Beach, for appellees.
DREW, Chief Justice.
William Grammer married Violet Grammer in Detroit, Michigan, January 20, 1920. For about a year after the marriage they lived at 3650 Cass Street in Detroit. The next six years, during which a son was born, they lived at 1500 Taylor Street in said city. While living at the Taylor Street address, William left to seek, and did find, employment in New York. While the record is not entirely clear on the point, either shortly before or after William moved to New York, his wife and child moved in with her parents at the home owned by her brother at 5345 Harding Avenue. There is also some conflict as to whether between 1926 and 1931 William visited his wife at the Harding Street address. It is clear and undisputed, however, that they never lived together after 1931, and that he never corresponded with her or saw her from 1932 to the time of his death in Florida, some twenty years later. Nor did he see his son or hear from him  so he testified  during these years. The son, however, did testify that he saw his father in New York in 1945.
In 1948 William, because of bad health, moved to Florida. Some three years later, he instituted suit for a divorce from Violet in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County and secured a favorable final decree on August 10, 1951. Three months later William married Dorothy Margaret Anderson. They lived together as man and wife until the death of William on January 26, 1953.
The litigation now before us was commenced in July 1953 and was instituted by Violet and her son Jay, and Robert Grammer a son by a prior marriage, against Dorothy M. Grammer (the widow) individually, and as administratrix of William's estate.
The purpose of the litigation was to have set aside and declared void the decree of divorce of August 10, 1951 between William and Violet and to establish plaintiffs as the sole heirs of William. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs never learned of the decree under attack until February 1953. The charges of fraud set forth in the complaint as a basis for the relief prayed were that at and before the filing of the complaint and at all times thereafter Violet was residing at 5345 Harding Avenue in Detroit, but nevertheless, and for the purpose of deceiving the court and preventing Violet from learning of said suit and interposing a defense thereto  which she said she had  he falsely, fraudulently and corruptly alleged in the sworn complaint that he had "made diligent search and inquiry to discover the residence and post office address of the defendant, Violet Grammer, and that the residence and post office address of said defendant, and particularly as the same is known to plaintiff, is Harding Avenue, Detroit, Michigan. That the street number of the address of said defendant is unknown to plaintiff and despite the fact that plaintiff has made a diligent search and inquiry to discover more particularly the address of said defendant, plaintiff has been unable to obtain a more specific address."
Issues were made upon answer filed by the defendant, who is the appellant here, and the cause was tried before the lower court. The decree is short so we here quote the material portion.
The evidence before the lower court consisted of the testimony of Violet, the son Jay, and Jerrold Jacob, the attorney who represented William when he procured the divorce, together with the entire proceedings in the divorce litigation, including all the evidence received in the first suit.
We have heretofore quoted the allegations of the complaint relating to William's knowledge of the residence and post office address of Violet. The language of the sworn statement for constructive service is a clear compliance with the statutory requirements of section 48.04, F.S. 1951, F.S.A., and this fact is not questioned. That the notice to appear strictly complies with the statutory requirements as to substance, form, and the period of publication is not questioned. At the hearing before the Master a great deal was testified concerning the whereabouts of the defendant Violet. There is evidence of William's sister who then resided in Ann Arbor, Michigan, not far from Detroit, that she had not seen Violet since about 1928, and in answer to a direct question as to whether she knew Violet's address she stated that she did not know her address nor had she seen or heard from her in some twenty or twenty-five years. William testified in the divorce suit with reference to the matter as follows:
Mr. Jacob: Plaintiff offers in evidence a letter signed "Mabel" and addressed "Dear Bill", dated March 2, 1951, as plaintiff's exhibit No. 1.
The Special Master: Accepted in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. (Marked PX No. 1 and received.)
Moreover, after Mr. Jacob had concluded his examination of William the Special Master interrogated him on this subject as follows
The letter referred to in the testimony of William is dated March 2, 1951, approximately a month and one-half before the litigation was commenced and reads as follows:
On the basis of this and other evidence the Master recommended the entry of a decree of divorce and the Circuit Court entered such decree. Margaret thereafter entered into the marriage relation with William, living with him as his wife for nearly three years before his death. It was only after William's lips had been sealed in death and he had left an estate that she might share that Violet evidenced any interest whatever and this after more than twenty-two years of silence.
The testimony of the attorney Jacobs in the present suit establishes beyond any doubt that so far as the requirements, laid down by this court in McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 799, 804, 108 So. 820, 831, 832, 51 A.L.R. 731, were concerned the statutes providing for constructive service were complied with. In that case, in speaking of reasonable diligence, we said:
The only other evidence before the court in this litigation was that of Violet, and her son Jay. Violet testified concerning the relationship of the parties until 1931 or 1932, which are narrated in the forepart of this opinion. She testified that William visited her about every three weeks or so after she moved to 5345 Harding Avenue, which house was owned by her brother, one Joseph Colisimo. She admitted that she has never seen her husband, nor corresponded with him after 1932. She unequivocally stated that she last saw her husband June 6, 1932, at her home 5345 Harding Avenue. She testified that there was a telephone listed in her brothers name at 5345 Harding Avenue, New York, but there is nothing whatever in the record that even indicates that William remembered the name of her brother, or knew that the house was in his name. Moreover, it is highly improbable that after twenty years he would remember such street number.
The son, Jay, testified that his father left home when he was about six years old, at which time he was living at 5345 Harding Avenue, and that the only time he saw, or heard from his father since that time was in 1945 when he saw him in New York City.
The burden was on the plaintiffs in the court below, the appellees here, to establish the charges of fraud made against William in the procurement of the divorce by clear and convincing evidence, Dye v. Dolbeck, 114 Fla. 866, 154 So. 847, especially "where the party charged with the fraud is dead." Barnes v. Willis, 65 Fla. 363, 61 So. 828, 829. This is particularly true where inquiry was made and evidence taken in the question of diligent search in the proceedings for divorce, and where the court in that case passed upon said evidence and entered its decree based thereon. It is clear that the plaintiffs failed to carry this burden. Moreover, we think the record viewed as a whole shows not only that the husband acted in good faith in the proceedings but also that in the matter of diligent search and inquiry what was done by the husband and his attorney was more than sufficient to establish compliance with the minimum requirements of the law in that connection.
Reversed.
TERRELL, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.