Title: State Commission v. Talbot County

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Talbot County Detention Center,
September Term 2001, No. 122
[Employment / Labor Law –Issuance of Temporary Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Article
49B, Section 4 for Interference with the Commission’s Investigation:   Held: Injunctive relief
may be granted when the Commission demonstrates that such relief is necessary to prevent
irreparable harm, which may include preventing interference with the investigative process.
The Circuit Court of Talbot County erred in denying injunctive relief to the Commission for
the Detention Center’s disruption of the preliminary investigation.  The Circuit Court’s order
denying injunctive relief is reversed; case remanded with instructions to issue an  injunction
to enjoin the Detention Center from interfering with the Commission’s statutorily sanctioned
preliminary investigation by insisting on being present at confidential witness interviews and
demanding that those interviews be transcribed.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 122
September Term, 2001
STATE OF MARYLAND
COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RELATIONS
v.
TALBOT COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   July 23, 2002
1
The enforcement powers of the Maryland Human Relations Commission are provided
in Article 49B, Section 10, which states: 
Investigation; 
findings; 
agreement 
for 
elimination 
of
discrimination; appeals 
(a) After the filing of any complaint the Executive Director shall
consider the complaint and shall refer it to the Commission's
staff for prompt investigation and ascertainment of the facts.
The results of the investigation shall be made as written
findings. A copy of the findings shall be furnished to the
complainant and to the person, firm, association, partnership or
corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “respondent”), against
whom or which the complaint is made. 
(b) If the finding is that there is probable cause for believing a
discriminatory act has been or is being committed within the
scope of any of these subtitles, the Commission's staff
immediately shall endeavor to eliminate the discrimination by
This Court must determine whether a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to
grant  injunctive relief to the Maryland Commission on Human Relations from interference
with its administrative investigation into two employment discrimination complaints filed
against the Talbot County Detention Center, and if so, whether  injunctive relief should have
been granted in this case.  We answer in the affirmative to both questions.  
I.
Background
The Maryland Commission on Human Relations (“Commission”) is an independent
agency charged with investigating complaints of discrimination in employment, housing and
public accommodations under Article 49B of the Maryland Code and bringing legal and
equitable actions pertaining to those violations.  See Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art.
49B, §10.1  Two verified complaints of employment discrimination were filed with the
conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and shall forward a
written copy of the findings of any investigation of a real estate
broker, associate real estate broker, or real estate salesperson to
the State Real Estate Commission. 
(c) If an agreement is reached for the elimination of the
discrimination as a result of the conference, conciliation and
persuasion the agreement shall be reduced to writing and signed
by the respondent, and an order shall be entered by the
Commission setting forth the terms of the agreement. The
Commission shall not enter an order at this stage of the
proceedings unless it is based upon a written agreement. If no
such agreement can be reached, a finding to that effect shall be
made and reduced to writing with copies furnished to the
complainant and to the respondent. 
(d) A denial of the request for reconsideration of a finding of no
probable cause by the Commission is a final order appealable to
the circuit court as provided in § 10-222 of the State
Government Article of this Code provided that the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. 
2
The Commission’s authority to investigate a complaint is triggered when the
complaint satisfies certain requirements outlined in Section 9A of Article 49B:  
(a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged
discrimination prohibited by any section of this article may
make, sign and file with the Human Relations Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”) a complaint in
writing under oath. The complaint shall state the name and
address of the person, firm, association, partnership,
corporation, State agency, department or board alleged to have
committed the act of discrimination together with the particulars
thereof; and the complaint also shall contain such other
information as may be required from time to time by the
Commission.  A complaint must be filed within six months from
the date of the occurrence alleged to be a violation of this
-2-
Commission against the Talbot County Detention Center (“Detention Center”).2  One
article.  A complaint filed with the federal or with a local human
relations commission within six months from the date of
occurrence shall be deemed to have complied with the
provisions of this section. 
(b) Whenever the Commission has received reliable information
from any individual or individuals that any person has been
engaged or is engaged in any discriminatory practice within the
scope of this article, and after a preliminary investigation by the
Commission’s 
staff 
authorized 
by 
the 
Chairman 
or
Vice-Chairman it is satisfied that said information warrants the
filing of a complaint, the Commission, on its own motion, and
by action of not less than three commissioners, may issue a
complaint in its name in the same manner as if the complaint
had been filed by an individual. 
-3-
complainant alleged that he had been subject to race and gender discrimination in the
workplace, the Talbot County Detention Center, and another alleged that she had been
sexually harassed in the same workplace.  
In accordance with statutory obligations, the Executive Director referred the
complaints to the Commission staff to investigate and ascertain facts surrounding the
allegations. See Art. 49B, §10.  As part of its investigation, the Commission conducted, or
attempted to conduct, numerous interviews of employees of the Detention Center.  According
to the Commission, however, these interviews were seriously impeded by the Detention
Center’s interference, namely, its efforts to discourage nonparty witnesses (other employees)
from participating in the interviews and its insistence on appearing at confidential interviews
of witnesses.  
As a result, on June 29, 2001, the Commission sought  injunctive relief in the Circuit
3
The Code of Maryland Regulations, Title 14, subtitle 3 provides, in relevant part: 
C. Conduct of Investigation. 
(1) Fact-Finding Conference. The Executive Director or
designee may require that the complainant and respondent
appear at a fact-finding conference . . . 
***
(2) Request for Information. 
(a) The Executive Director or designee shall require the
respondent to promptly provide answers to requests for
information, which will be used to assist in determining the
-4-
Court for Talbot County to stop the Detention Center from obstructing the Commission’s
investigation of employment discrimination.  The Commission’s petition for  injunctive relief
sought to
prohibit [the Detention Center] and [its] agents from appearing
at confidential witness interviews, or influencing witness
testimony with regard to the instant investigation into allegations
of employment discrimination, and from contacting Commission
investigative staff, except as required by the investigation, and
that the injunction remain in effect until the completion of the
administrative proceedings, and that [the Detention Center] post
notices in the workplace, as approved by the Commission,
setting forth the State’s anti-discrimination law, including a
statement that it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against
one who files, or participates as a witness in, a complaint of
discrimination, . . . 
The Detention Center, in its response dated July 3, 2001, asserted that the Circuit
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition for Temporary Injunctive Relief.
The Detention Center further alleged that the Commission’s authority to investigate was
limited to the investigative mechanisms set forth in Title 14, Subtitle 3 of the Code of
Maryland Regulations.3  Specifically, the Detention Center argued that the Commission is
merits of the allegations contained in the complaint. 
***
(3) Interrogatories--Content and Response. 
(a) The investigator may, upon authorization of the Executive
Director or designee, serve interrogatories on a respondent by
registered or certified mail or by personal service. 
***
(4) Interrogatories--Default Procedure. 
(a) If, after a respondent has been served with duly authorized
interrogatories together with a notice of the consequences of the
failure to answer them, the respondent fails either to answer the
interrogatories or to file a motion to strike or exceptions to the
interrogatories within the time specified, the Executive Director
or designee shall serve or cause to be served upon the
respondent the following notice: “Notice is hereby given that a
complaint has been served upon you alleging that you have
violated Article 49B, Annotated Code of Maryland. Pursuant to
this Commission’s authority under Article 49B, interrogatories
have been served upon you. These interrogatories have not been
answered. Your failure to answer fully the interrogatories under
oath within 5 days may result in the entry of a default in the
matter of this complaint. This default order may include the
following sanctions: 
(i) An admission that the interrogatories, if answered, would
have established facts consistent with the claim of the
complainant; 
(ii) A waiver of your right to have this Commission conduct
further investigation, find whether there is probable cause, make
conciliation efforts, or hold a hearing allowing the presentation
of any and all defenses to the complaint which you might have
otherwise raised. In order to avoid a default from occurring, you
must answer fully the interrogatories on or before the 5th day
following the date of your receipt of this notice.” 
***
(5) Investigatory Subpoena. 
(a) If completion of an investigation requires the issuance of a
subpoena, the investigator may, upon the written authorization
of the Executive Director or designee, issue a subpoena to
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compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, or a
subpoena to compel the production of books, papers, records,
and documents relevant or necessary to this investigation.
Service of this subpoena shall be made in accordance with
Article 49B, Annotated Code of Maryland. . . . 
(b) Upon failure by the person subpoenaed to appear, to produce
these records, documents, papers, or books, or all of these, the
Executive Director or designee may apply to the circuit court in
the county having jurisdiction or to the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City for an order requiring the attendance and
testimony of the person subpoenaed, or the production of the
requested records, documents, papers, books, or both.
-6-
only allowed to: (1) require a fact-finding conference; (2) require the respondent to promptly
provide answers to requests for information; (3) serve interrogatories on a respondent; and
(4)  issue subpoenas, if necessary, to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or
the production of documents.  See COMAR 14.03.01.04.  With respect to the latter, the
Detention Center claimed that the use of the word “testimony” indicated that the
Commission’s  interviews of the witnesses should be formal recorded proceedings, and thus
the Commission had no authority to conduct interviews confidentially and in the absence of
a representative from the Detention Center.
On August 17, 2001, the Circuit Court heard oral argument on the Commission’s
petition and, ruling from the bench, denied the Commission injunctive relief.  In so ruling,
the Circuit Court stated, 
[w]hat you are asking the Court to do is to tell counsel or anyone
not to go to your office and this is your office, you have control
over it. . . . if this is your investigation then you can conduct it
in your own office, on your own terms. And I don’t see why the
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Court has to get involved in this.  You also asked me to prevent
. . . [the Detention Center] or their agents from contacting the
Commission’s investigation staff. . . .
***
but that is not this Court’s function to step in here and tell them
not to call your office. . . . you haven’t even filed a complaint
against the Detention Center.  You don’t even know at this time
that there is a reason to do that, you haven’t held a hearing.  So
it seems to me that what you are asking the Court to do is not
what was intended by granting the Court this authority.  
***
And . . . the other thing is you want to prevent the agents of the
Detention Center from contacting or influencing witness
testimony.. . .that is not the purpose of this statutory provision.
. . it seems to me you have a right to conduct an investigation
under the law.  And how you do that at this stage is not the
Court’s interest. . . . So the Court will deny the requested
injunction. 
(emphasis added).  It is unclear from the Circuit Court’s verbal ruling whether its denial of
the  injunction was based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as was initially proffered
by the Detention Center, or whether the denial itself was an exercise of the Circuit Court’s
discretion.  The parties have proceeded on the assumption that the court’s denial of injunctive
relief was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Our discussion will address this premise
as well as the propriety of the Circuit Court’s denial of the injunction based on the merits of
this case. 
The Commission appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of the  injunction to the Court
of Special Appeals, and this Court ordered, on its own initiative, that a writ of certiorari be
issued to consider whether the Circuit Court’s conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law.
II.
Standard of Review 
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Generally, appellate courts review a trial court’s determination to grant or deny
injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion because trial courts, sitting as courts of equity, are
granted broad discretionary authority to issue equitable relief.  See J. L. Matthews, Inc. v.
Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 368 Md. 71, 93, 792 A.2d 288, 301
(2002).  See El Bey v. Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., 362 Md. 339, 354-55, 765 A.2d 132, 140
(2001)(stating that while normally a trial court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “no such deference [is given] when we find ‘an
obvious error in the application of the principles of equity’”)(quoting Western Md. Dairy,
Inc.  v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 244, 23 A.2d 660, 665 (1941)); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake
Community Ass'n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394, 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000). When injunctive relief
is provided by statute, however, a court’s decision to issue injunctive relief is no longer
rooted in traditional principles of equity; rather, it is based upon the statutory guidelines.  See
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497, 121 S. Ct. 1711,
1721, 149 L. Ed. 2d 722, 736 (2001)(“a court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the judgment
of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.’ . . . A district court cannot, for example,
override Congress’ policy choice, articulated in a statute as to what behavior should be
prohibited.”)(internal citations omitted); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313,
102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91, 99 (1982)(stating that “Congress may intervene and
guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion.”) )(emphasis added); United States v.
Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2001).  Rather than relying on the
-9-
broader notions in equity, our Legislature provided explicit guidelines within which a court
must exercise its authority to issue an injunction; thus, it is these criteria to which we look
when determining whether the court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief was
appropriate.
We digress momentarily to note that the degree of discretionary authority a court
maintains when considering injunctions sought pursuant to, and authorized by, a specific
statute is a novel question, not explored by this Court to date.  Federal jurisdictions, including
the United States Supreme Court, have had the opportunity to consider the inherent
differences that exist when a court is asked to issue injunctive relief under its equitable
powers versus when the court entertains requests for injunctive relief pursuant to a specific
statute and have outlined some considerations for determining whether equitable powers are
usurped by statutory mandates.  On one end of the spectrum, in Tennessee Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
Congress, in the Endangered Species Act, clearly circumscribed the courts’ jurisdiction in
equity because the statute contained a blanket prohibition against “jeopardiz[ing] the
continued existence of endangered species;” thus, upon a concession that the Tellico Dam
would destroy the snail darter, the court was required to issue an injunction.  Id. at 193-95,
98 S. Ct. 2301-02, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 146-47.
  
In other  cases, however, the Supreme Court has refused to find that other statutes
spawned an absolute duty upon courts to issue injunctive relief.  Most recently, in United
-10-
States v. Oakland Cannibus Buyers Co-op., supra, the Supreme Court emphasized that its
ruling in Hill, i.e. that the District Court lacked discretion to deny an injunction, was based
solely on the fact that an injunction in that case was the “only means of ensuring compliance”
with the statute and the “order of priorities” established by Congress would otherwise be
“deprived of effect.”  Oakland Cannibus Buyers Co-op., 532 U.S. at 496-97, 121 S. Ct. 1721,
149 L. Ed. 2d at 735-36.  See also Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.at 313, 102 S. Ct. at 1803,  72
L. Ed. 2d at 99 (stating that while “Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise
of the courts’ discretion, . . . we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart
from established principles [of equitable jurisdiction]”)(internal quotations omitted).  As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Romero-Barcelo, supra, “[t]he grant of jurisdiction to ensure
compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant
an injunction for every violation of law.”  456 U.S. at 313, 102 S. Ct. at 1803, 72 L. Ed. 2d
at 99. 
In the case sub judice, we are not presented with requests to enjoin actions which
violate the law; rather we are presented with requests to enjoin actions which arguably
impede the Commission from performing a lawful task, i.e. conducting an uninhibited
investigation, actions for which irreparable harm must be evidenced.  Section 4 of Article
49B grants the Commission the power to bring a civil action for injunctive relief, outlines
when and where such action can be brought, and further establishes the criteria under which
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an injunction may be sought and granted, i.e. “to preserve the status of the parties or to
prevent irreparable harm.”  While Section 4 does not expressly eliminate the circuit court’s
discretionary authority or expressly create an automatic injunction, it does, in a sense,
“narrow” the circuit court’s discretionary authority by replacing the considerations in equity
with the statutory criteria: the Commission need only establish a reasonable necessity for an
injunction “to preserve the status of the parties or prevent irreparable harm.”  Art. 49B, §4.
Again, while the statute in question may confine the judicial discretion, it does not
altogether eliminate it.  In United States Postal Service v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804 (3rd Cir.
1972), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed an injunction by the district court
even though the district court did not apply traditional equitable standards.  The Third Circuit
held that the statute under which the injunction was sought clearly circumscribed the
traditional equitable discretion that courts possess in granting injunctive relief.  See Beamish,
466 F.2d at 806.  The statute provided that “the United States district court . . . shall . . . upon
a showing of probable cause to believe [that 39 U.S.C. §3005] is being violated, enter a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction . . .”  Id.  (quoting 39 U.S.C. §3007).
The critical difference between the statute in Beamish and the statute before us today is that
the Beamish provision spoke directly to the judiciary concerning its authority, or rather its
duty, to issue an injunction upon a showing of probable cause.  Conversely, in Article 49B,
Section 4, the Legislature authorizes the Commission to bring action for injunctive relief
when reasonably necessary to prevent irreparable harm or preserve the status of the parties.
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While the Legislature establishes statutory guidelines for the issuance of injunctive relief, it
does not directly eliminate a court’s discretion by mandating a certain outcome.  Thus, we
shall consider the propriety of the court’s decision to deny injunctive relief with the
understanding that the court’s equitable discretion is limited to the extent that the Legislature
articulated the applicable guildelines for injunctive relief.
III.
Discussion
Maryland’s anti-discrimination laws are embodied in Article 49B of the Maryland
Code, as is the Commission’s investigatory and enforcement authority with respect to the
anti-discrimination legislation.  The Commission’s comprehensive investigatory powers
include the authority to hold investigatory hearings for fact finding, file civil actions for
injunctive relief, receive and issue complaints alleging discrimination, conduct investigations
into discrimination complaints, endeavor to reach conciliation between the parties, and
initiate and pursue litigation to enforce compliance.  See Md. Code, Art. 49B, §§ 3, 4, 9A,
10, 11, 12; Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 631, 672 A.2d 608, 613 (1996)(citing
Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co., 86 Md. App. 533, 545, 587
A.2d 569, 574 (1991); rev'd on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607 A.2d 8 (1992)); Gutwein
v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 564-65, 325 A.2d 740, 741 (1974).  The
Commission’s enforcement powers, then, cover the gamut, from investigation to
commencement and pursuit of litigation.  
A.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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As noted, the Commission’s powers include the power to bring a civil action to obtain
an injunction pursuant to Section 4 of Article 49B.  Section 4 states:
At any time after a complaint has been filed, if the Commission
believes that appropriate civil action is necessary to preserve the
status of the parties or to prevent irreparable harm from the
time the complaint is filed until the time of its final disposition,
the Commission may bring action to obtain a temporary
injunction. The action shall be brought in the circuit court for
the county where the place of public accommodation which is
the subject of the alleged discrimination is located, or where the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred, or
where the dwelling which is the subject of the alleged
discrimination is located.
Md. Code, Art. 49B, §4 (emphasis added).   Section 4 clearly provides a circuit court with
statutory jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief at any time after a complaint has been filed
with the Commission.  Thus, a circuit court’s authority to entertain actions for injunctive
relief and issue appropriate orders while discrimination complaints are pending before the
Commission is absolute and unmistakable.  Any conclusion to the contrary by the Circuit
Court is erroneous.
The Circuit Court also claimed that it had no authority to instruct counsel for the
Detention Center not to appear at witness interviews and not to contact witnesses or
investigative agents.  The Circuit Court further commented that the Commission “[hasn’t]
even filed a complaint against the Detention Center . . . [it doesn’t] even know at this time
that there is a reason to do that, [it hasn’t] held a hearing.”   The Circuit Court erred in basing
its ruling on the fact that the Commission had not filed a complaint against the Detention
4
Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: 
Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may
appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case
by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final
judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special,
limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the
right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the
defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of
sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has
accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.
5
Rule 8-604(e) provides that “[i]n reversing or modifying a judgment in whole or in
part, the Court may enter an appropriate judgment directly or may order the lower court to
do so.”  Md. Rule 8-604(e)(2002).  
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Center; the Circuit Court’s authority to review claims for injunctive relief is triggered upon
a filing of a complaint with the Commission, not upon the Commission’s filing of a
complaint against the employer.  See Md. Code, Art. 49B, §4.  The Circuit Court did have
jurisdiction to issue an injunction, an injunction that might specifically instruct the Detention
Center not to appear at interviews and not to contact witnesses, and generally speaking, to
prevent the frustration of an investigation by the Commission.  
With subject matter jurisdiction of the Circuit Court confirmed, we pause to note this
Court’s authority under Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 4 to
review final judgments of the circuit courts, including judgments denying a request for
injunctive relief, and our authority, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-604(e),5 to order the
issuance of injunctive relief.  Therefore, we will review the propriety of the Commission’s
request for injunctive relief, the Detention Center’s counter-arguments, and the Circuit
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Court’s ruling and, where appropriate, order the issuance of an injunction as requested by the
Commission.
B.
Investigative Mechanisms of the Commission
Prior to determining the propriety of injunctive relief, however, we shall pause to
discuss a few procedural arguments raised by the Detention Center concerning the methods
by which the Commission is authorized the conduct its preliminary investigations into
employment discrimination claims.  The Detention Center alleges that the Commission is
limited to the formal investigative mechanisms described in the Code of Maryland
Regulations.   Specifically, the Detention Center argues that because COMAR
14.03.01.04(5)(a) provides that a subpoena may “compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses,” the fact-finding interviews of witnesses must be recorded and taken under oath.
COMAR 14.03.01.04(5)(a).  The use of the word “testimony,” according to the Detention
Center, indicates that a subpoenaed witness must be interviewed formally, i.e. under oath or
affirmation, and the interview must be recorded and transcribed.  
We disagree with the Detention Center’s suppositions.  Most significantly, the
statutory authority provided the Commission by Article 49B, Section 10 is not restricted by
the subsequently enacted regulations concerning the Commission’s subpoena authority;
rather, the regulations provide a more thorough description of the investigative tools that may
be utilized by the Commission and the proper procedures for employing these tools.  That
COMAR contemplates the Commission’s ability to 
utilize a subpoena during its investigation
6
The Detention Center also argued that the Commission’s action for  injunctive relief
was, itself, invalid because if the Detention Center were, in fact, frustrating the investigation,
then Article 49B, Section 11 provides the Commission a method to enforce its investigative
authority, i.e. the Commission could issue a subpoena.  See Banach v. State Comm’n on
Human Relations, 277 Md. 502, 512-13, 356 A.2d 242, 249 (1976) (holding that the
Commission has the authority to issue subpoenas in its preliminary investigation).  The
Detention Center’s assertion is without merit.  While a subpoena could certainly compel
resistant witnesses to come forward or compel the Detention Center, itself, to produce
documents, a subpoena  would not have the legal authority to prevent the representatives of
the Detention Center from appearing at the confidential interviews.  Only an injunction, such
as the one the Commission attempted to obtain, could have prevented the frustration of the
investigation.  Again, this is not an issue of subpoena enforcement.  The subpoenaed
witnesses arrived and were willing to testify; the Commission objected to interviewing these
witnesses because of presence of third party, an agent of the Detention Center, in violation
of confidentiality requirements and the undue influence these agents potentially could have
on the investigation process.  Thus, the subpoena, itself, was honored, but the interview was
disrupted by an (unsubpoenaed) third party.  
The Detention Center alternatively challenges the validity of the issuance of a
subpoena in the first place by arguing that the issuance of a subpoena was improper because
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does not mean that the investigatory and fact-finding powers of the Commission are limited
to eliciting  information  from subpoenaed witnesses or documents; the provisions in
COMAR regarding the Commission’s investigatory process are not exclusive.  
The Commission has the ability, as one of its many investigatory tools, to use a
subpoena to compel the attendance or testimony of witnesses or the production of documents.
Again, that this is a permissible  tool, does not mean that it is the only tool.  In fact, subpoena
use is qualified by the premise that “if completion of an investigation requires the issuance
of a subpoena. . .”  Thus, it is implied that the Commission’s attempts at acquiring the
information without a subpoena have failed, which is, in turn, indicative of the Commission’s
inherent ability to gather such information absent a subpoena.6
there was no showing that the subpoenas were necessary to complete the investigation.
Because the  County Attorney was not representing the witnesses, the Detention Center has
no standing to challenge the issuance of these subpoenas.
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The Detention Center further argues that Section 10 was enacted to protect employers
from unwarranted or frivolous complaints by requiring a preliminary investigation before the
employer can be subject to a Commission complaint.  The Detention Center claims that
because the investigatory process is for its benefit, the Detention Center was entitled to be
present during the interviews and to ensure that testimony was taken properly, i.e. recorded
and transcribed.  Again, we find no merit in this assertion.  While the investigative process
may, in part, protect an employer from frivolous claims, it was never intended to provide an
impenetrable shield through which no investigation could be  completed in confidence and
without undue influence or intimidation by the employer accused of violating the statute.
The Legislature did not mandate that the preliminary investigation must be conducted
through formal transcribed interviews where both the witness and the accused are privy to
the questioning process; to the contrary, Section 13 of Article 49B indicates that the
Legislature intended to keep the investigations confidential, to the extent feasible.  As such,
we refuse to find that the Detention Center’s presence was required at the witness interviews
during the preliminary investigation; nor do we conclude that the statute and regulations
require recording and/or transcription of the interviews.  
C.
The Propriety of Injunctive Relief
We turn now to the pivotal issue in this case, i.e. whether the Commission’s request
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for injunctive relief pursuant to Article 49B, Section 4, should have been granted by the
Circuit Court.  While the title of Section 4, i.e. “[p]ower to bring civil actions for temporary
injunction,” would seemingly allude that such an injunction is interlocutory or preliminary
in nature, in reality, this statutory injunction shares more of the characteristics of a permanent
injunction.  As we reiterated in Bey v. Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., 362 Md. 339, 765 A.2d
132 (2001):
A permanent injunction is, as its names indicates, “an injunction
final or permanent in its nature granted after a determination of
the merits of the action.” But a permanent injunction is not
“permanent” in the sense that it must invariably last indefinitely.
Rather, it “is one granted by the judgment which finally disposes
of the injunction suit.” The difference between an interlocutory
injunction and a permanent injunction turns on “whether there
has been a determination on the merits of the claim. If that
determination has been made, then the injunction may be final;
if not, it is interlocutory.” 
Id. at 354, 765 A.2d at 140 (quoting Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass'n, Inc., 361
Md. 371, 395, 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000)(internal citations omitted)).  The statutory
injunction authorized by Section 4 is one which may finally dispose of the injunction suit,
although its length may only be for the duration of the investigation, as in the case sub judice.
Therefore, the factors traditionally required to obtain an interlocutory or preliminary
injunction in equity, i.e.  (1)  the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2)
the “balance of convenience” determined by whether greater injury would be done to the
defendant by granting the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) whether the
plaintiff  will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public
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interest, see J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 83 n.8, 792 A.2d at 294-95 n.8 (quoting Fogle
v. H & G Rest., Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455-56, 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995)); Department of
Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05, 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984), are largely
inapplicable when reviewing the propriety of a statutorily authorized injunction.  See
Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 47 (explaining that court’s usual role of
chancery is not appropriate where Congress has provided guidelines for assessing the
propriety of a statutory injunction); Gov't of the Virgin Islands, Dept of Conservation v.
Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 714 F.2d 283, 286 (3rd Cir. 1983)(holding that, contrary to
injunctions in equity, no showing of irreparable harm was required under the Air Pollution
Control and Coastal Zone Management Acts); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640
F.2d 255, 259-60 (10th Cir. 1981)(discussing the several federal statutes under which a
showing of irreparable harm, a requirement under a court’s equitable jurisdiction, is not
required for injunctive relief); Beamish, 466 F.2d at 806 (stating that the standard for
determining the propriety of injunctive relief was restricted by the provision which required
only a  probable cause showing of a statutory violation); see also Fogle, 337 Md.at 456, 654
A.2d at 457 (stating that when considering circumstances where injunctive relief implicitly
affects a governmental interest, “the court is not bound by the strict requirements of
traditional equity as developed in private litigation” and the courts “may, and frequently do,
go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than
they are accustomed to go only when private interest are involved”)(internal quotations and
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citations omitted).  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated:
The function of a court in deciding whether to issue an
injunction authorized by a statute . . .  to enforce and implement
Congressional policy is a different one from that of the court
when weighing claims of two private litigants.  This is not to say
that the [statutory] violation . . .  automatically requires a district
court to issue an injunction. The essence of equity jurisdiction
is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon
the necessities of the particular case.  However, the fact that a
federal statute is being enforced by the agency charged with that
duty may alter the burden of proof of a particular element
necessary to obtain injunctive relief.  Once Congress, exercising
its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a
given area, it is for the courts to enforce them when asked. 
United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174-75 (9th Cir.
1987)(internal citations omitted).  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in United States v. Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., supra, discussed the different
roles a court must play in terms of considering an injunction under statute or in equity and
explained: 
The role a court plays in deciding whether to grant a statutory
injunction is different than the one it plays when it weighs the
equitable claims of two private parties in a suit seeking
injunctive relief. This is so because a court asked to order a
statutory injunction must reconcile two sets of competing
concerns. Courts asked to issue an injunction must ordinarily
assume the role of a court of chancery -- a role that requires
them to determine whether the equities of the case favor, and
whether the public interest would be served by, the granting of
injunctive relief. But in the context of statutory injunctions, the
court's freedom to make an independent assessment of the
equities and the public interest is circumscribed to the extent
that Congress has already made such assessments. 
7
The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Massachusetts Water Rest. Auth.
largely involved the court’s examination of  the language of the statutory provision in
question, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §300g-3(b), which provides, in relevant
part: “[t]he [EPA] Administrator may bring a civil action . . . to require compliance with [the
Solid Waste Disposal Act], . . . . The court may enter . . . such judgment as protection of
public health may require . . . .”  See 42 U.S.C. §300g-3(b).  The First Circuit concluded that
the Legislature’s use of the word may in “the critical passage of the SWDA’s judicial
enforcement subsection” indicated that it intended that courts retain some degree of
discretion.  See Massachusetts Water Rest. Auth., 256 F.3d at 51-53 (discussing the
implications from the use of the word “may” and concluding that equitable discretion is
preserved in the courts as a result). 
Contrary to the SWDA provision, Section 4 of Article 49B does not utilize the term
“may” when discussing the court’s discretion; in fact, Section 4 does not refer to the court’s
authority  whatsoever, except to note the proper venue in which the action for injunctive
relief should be brought.  While we do not believe that this omission should equate to a
mandatory injunction upon the Commission’s request, see id. at 48 (stating that “if Congress
wishes to circumscribe these equitable powers, it must do so with clarity”), we do believe it
indicates that, so long as the Commission establishes a reasonable necessity “to preserve the
status of the parties or to prevent irreparable harm,” the injunctive relief should be granted.
Md. Code, Art. 49B, §4.
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256 F.3d at 47 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).7 
Because the traditional factors in equity are largely inapplicable to a court’s
determination regarding a statutory injunction, and to our review on appeal, we are instead
guided by the explicit language of the Legislature which provides that “if the Commission
believes that appropriate civil action is necessary to . . . prevent irreparable harm . . . the
Commission may bring action to obtain a temporary injunction.”  Md. Code, Art. 49B, §4.
The purpose of Section 4 was to “provid[e] . . . the Human Relations Commission [the ability
to] seek certain types of court relief in certain cases . . . .”  See 1975 Md. Laws, ch. 419, §1.
In providing for the occasions in which the Commission may seek injunctive relief, the
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Legislature implicitly established a standard for courts reviewing these requests for injunctive
relief; namely, that so long as the Commission satisfies the court that a reasonable  necessity
exists to preserve the status of the parties or prevent irreparable harm, the requested
injunction should be granted.  See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d
473, 479 (2nd Cir. 1995)(stating that “a railroad seeking statutorily authorized injunctive relief
. . . is not governed by . . . equitable criteria . . . a railroad need only demonstrate that there
is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the [Railroad Revitalization Act and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976] has occurred or is about to occur”)(internal quotations and
citations omitted)(emphasis added); United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir.
1987) (explaining that for statutory injunctions, “the moving party need only show that there
is a reasonable likelihood of future violations in order to obtain relief”)(quoting S.E.C. v.
Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th Cir. 1982)(emphasis added)). 
In considering whether injunctive relief is reasonably necessary, it is important to first
understand the utility of an injunction, in general, and that which was contemplated by the
Legislature in its use of “irreparable harm.”  “An injunction is a writ framed according to the
circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to justice,
or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience.”  Bey, 362 Md.
at 353, 765 A.2d at 139 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  In providing the
Commission the ability to seek, and the circuit courts the ability to grant, injunctive relief,
the Legislature clearly hoped to remedy circumstances that otherwise could result in
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inequitable or unjust results.  
While case law concerning the issuance of injunctive relief in this State predominately
involves a non-statutory injunction, the purpose for issuance of an injunction under statutory
authority is similar.  As we stated in Bey: 
The very function of an injunction is to furnish preventative
relief against irreparable mischief or injury, and the remedy will
not be awarded where it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that the injury complained of is not of such character.  Suitors
may not resort to a court of equity to restrain acts, actual or
threatened, merely because they are illegal or transcend
constitutional powers, unless it is apparent that irremediable
injury will result. The mere assertion that apprehended acts will
inflict irreparable injury is not enough. The complaining party
must allege and prove facts from which the court can reasonably
infer that such would be the result. 
Id. at 354, 765 A.2d at 139 (quoting Coster v. Dep't of Personnel, 36 Md. App. 523, 373
A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (1977))(emphasis added).  The general function of an injunction in
equity, as articulated above, i.e. to furnish preventative relief against irreparable mischief or
injury, is markedly similar to the language utilized by the Legislature in Section 4, i.e. to
prevent irreparable harm.  
Irreparable harm is a pliant term adaptable to the unique circumstances which an
individual case might present.  We explained that, 
an injury is irreparable, within the law of injunctions, where it
is of such a character that a fair and reasonable redress may not
be had in a court of law, so that to refuse the injunction would
be a denial of justice--in other words, where, from the nature of
the act, or from the circumstances surrounding the person
injured, or from the financial condition of the person committing
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it, it cannot be readily, adequately, and completely compensated
for with money. 
Bey, 362 Md. at 356, 765 A.2d at 140 (quoting Coster v. Dep’t of Personnel, 36 Md. App.
523, 526, 373 A.2d 1287, 1290 (1977))(emphasis added).  So long as the seeker of injunctive
relief, (in this case, the Commission, pursuant to Section 4), establishes that there exists some
reasonable basis for its belief that an injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm, i.e.
that the actions of the Detention Center would, if not prevented, cause a denial of justice, see
id., the  statutory injunction should be granted.  See Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1148.
We pause to reiterate that which the Commission specifically sought, as is ascertained
from its petition for injunctive relief and the arguments at the subsequent hearing regarding
the petition.  It is clear that the Commission sought to prohibit agents from the Detention
Center from appearing at confidential witness interviews and insisting that the interviews be
recorded and transcribed.  The Commission also noted its desire to “prohibit the Detention
Center from contacting Commission staff, except as required” and “require the Detention
Center to post notices in the workplace setting forth the State’s anti-discrimination laws.”
Evidence was not presented in the record, however, which would allow this Court to
determine whether injunctive relief may be appropriate in these circumstances.  See State
Comm’n on Human Relations v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 348 Md. 413, 417, 704 A.2d 445, 447
(explaining that an appellate court may examine the propriety of a court’s grant or denial of
injunctive relief only when the parties have had the opportunity to present evidence on the
issues of injunctive relief).  Therefore, our analysis will be directed towards the request to
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enjoin the Detention Center from appearing at confidential witness interviews and insisting
that the interviews be recorded and transcribed.  Should the Commission desire the injunction
to extend to these alternative requests, it must, on remand, present additional evidence before
the Circuit Court to establish the reasonableness of its belief that an injunction concerning
these requests is necessary to prevent irreparable harm.
The Commission’s request, i.e. to prevent the Detention Center from hindering its
investigation into complaints of discrimination by insisting on being present and recording
and transcribing confidential interviews, is temperate and reasonable.  The public has an
interest in ensuring unfettered investigations of illegal company practices, particularly when
civil rights are at issue.  Accordingly, the Legislature has given the Commission broad
authority to conduct such investigations; the Commission has statutory authority to begin a
preliminary fact-finding process once a verified complaint is received.  The rights of the
accused, in this case the Detention Center, are not encumbered by this preliminary
investigation; it will have full opportunity to view and contest the evidence gathered, and
present its own, if after the preliminary investigation, the Commission decides to file a formal
legal complaint.  
The Commission’s belief that it will suffer irreparable injury is not unreasonable or
without basis.   Absent an injunction, the Detention Center’s practice of interfering with the
investigation by, as the evidence in the record suggests, insisting on being present at witness
interviews and by demanding that those interviews be recorded and transcribed may continue,
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and will likely have the effect of intimidating or influencing witnesses and frustrating the
truth-seeking and confidential nature of the investigative process.  Furthermore, greater
injury would result from the refusal of the injunction than in the granting of it, as ordering
the Detention Center to refrain from disrupting the interviews and other aspects of the
investigation does not inconvenience the Detention Center, particularly when it has no
statutory right to be involved at this preliminary stage of the investigative process.  See e.g.
Rowe v. C & P Tel. Co., 56 Md. App. 23, 30, 466 A.2d 538, 542 (1983)(stating that under
the balance of convenience test, the benefits to the complainant must equal or outweigh any
harm which the other party might incur should an injunction be granted).  
The Commission presented adequate evidence to support its belief that irreparable
harm in the absence of injunctive relief would occur.  The Legislature’s interest in preventing
and proscribing employment discrimination is beyond dispute.  Pursuant to that interest, the
Legislature explicitly provided the Commission the ability to seek an injunction when prompt
judicial action is necessary to carry out its purpose and that of the anti-discrimination
legislation of Article 49B.  Logically speaking, without an unimpeded fact-finding process,
the Commission would be precluded from gathering the type of evidence that would normally
be necessary to file a bill of complaint, and hence, the enforcement authority of the
Commission would be inherently limited.  
The Detention Center argues that the requirements for this statutory injunctive relief
– to preserve the status of the parties or to prevent irreparable harm – do not exist in this case,
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and therefore, the court lacks the authority to issue an injunction as a matter of law.  The
Detention Center bases its argument largely on the fact that the complainants’ employment
continued without interruption after the complaint had been filed with the commission;
neither of the complainants was terminated, suspended, demoted, or reduced in pay.  As such,
according to the Detention Center, the status of the parties had not changed and an injunction
would be unwarranted.  
In so arguing, the Detention Center cites State Comm’n on Human Relations v.
Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 125, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976), as authority for
its proposition that the employment of a complainant must somehow be adversely impacted
before an injunction could be issued.  Notwithstanding that Amecom is distinguishable
because it involved an alleged disruption of the “status of the parties,” the Detention Center
misapplies the Amecom holding in an attempt to narrow the scope of injunctive relief
available pursuant to Section 4.  In examining Section 4, it is true that “in creating an
interlocutory remedy available without a determination on the merits establishing a
preexisting right, the Legislature has created, in effect, a new substantive right” with respect
to an employee’s right to be free from discrimination in employment. Amecom, 278 Md. at
126, 360 A.2d at 5.  The protection of this substantive right, however, is not to the exclusion
of other possible purposes for which Section 4 may be implemented. 
The Commission’s pursuit of an unfettered, uninterrupted, and comprehensive
preliminary investigation, if hindered or disrupted by the Detention Center’s actions, would
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constitute a denial of justice, particularly because the comprehensive and ubiquitous nature
of our State’s anti-discrimination legislation suggests both the Legislature’s goals and the
indispensable nature of tools of enforcement it afforded the Commission, such as the
injunctive relief provided in Section 4.  See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 632, 672 A.2d at 613-14
(“Section 14 [of Article 49B] is one of at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and
one constitutional amendment in  Maryland that prohibits discrimination based on sex in
certain circumstances. Together these provisions provide strong evidence of a legislative
intent to end discrimination based on sex in Maryland.”).
The aforementioned analysis leads this Court to conclude that injunctive relief,
pursuant to Article 49B, Section 4, should have been granted to the Commission to enjoin
the Detention Center’s practice of interference with its preliminary investigation into
employment discrimination complaints by insisting on being present and transcribing the
confidential witness interviews.  Injunctive relief may be granted when the investigation is
so hindered by a party as to cause irreparable harm to the investigative process as a whole,
and with respect to this case, the Circuit Court erred in denying injunctive relief to the
Commission for the Detention Center’s disruption of the preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, we hereby reverse the Circuit Court’s order and remand the case to that court
with instructions to issue an injunction to enjoin the Detention Center from interfering with
the Commission’s statutorily sanctioned preliminary investigation by insisting on being
present at confidential witness interviews and demanding that those interviews be transcribed
-29-
for the duration of its preliminary investigation and for any other proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.  
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TALBOT
COUNTY’S DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF IS REVERSED AND THE CASE IS
REMANDED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN
INJUNCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE.