Title: Commonwealth v. Guardado

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13315 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS GUARDADO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2022. - April 13, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Probable cause.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, 
Right to bear arms, Burden of proof, Retroactivity of 
judicial holding.  Due Process of Law, Elements of criminal 
offense, Burden of proof.  Probable Cause.  Motor Vehicle, 
Firearms.  License.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Instructions to jury, Presumptions and burden of 
proof, Retroactivity of judicial holding.  Retroactivity of 
Judicial Holding. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 26, 2019. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. 
William Barrett, J., and the cases were tried before Paul D. 
Wilson, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Elaine Fronhofer for the defendant. 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Chauncey B. Wood, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 2019, Boston police officers searched the 
defendant's vehicle without a warrant after having received a 
tip from a confidential informant, and discovered in the glove 
compartment a loaded firearm and a large capacity magazine.  At 
the time of the search, the vehicle was parked in the parking 
lot of the business at which the defendant was employed. 
 
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of 
unlawfully carrying a firearm, unlawfully carrying a loaded 
firearm, unlawfully carrying ammunition, and unlawfully carrying 
a large capacity feeding device.  The statute under which the 
defendant was convicted, G. L. c 269, § 10, contains two 
exemptions that are relevant here.  First, it exempts anyone 
who, while in possession of a firearm, is present in or on his 
or her place of business.  Second, the statute exempts someone 
who has been issued a firearms license.  At the defendant's 
trial, the judge did not instruct the jury on either of these 
exemptions. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant argues that there was no 
probable cause to search the glove compartment of his vehicle 
and that the judge erred in not instructing the jury on the two 
statutory exemptions.  We conclude that there was probable cause 
3 
to search the glove compartment, because the search was in 
response to a tip that was provided by an informant who had 
demonstrated reliability and who had personal knowledge of the 
firearm.  We also conclude that there was no error in the 
judge's decision not to instruct on the place of business 
exemption, because the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that the parking lot where the vehicle was found was under the 
exclusive control of the business where the defendant worked. 
 
We agree, however, that the judge erred in not instructing 
the jury on the licensure exemption.  In the wake of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022), in which the Court 
held that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects an individual's right to carry a firearm in public, our 
existing precedent that licensure is an affirmative defense, and 
not an element of the offense the Commonwealth is required to 
prove, must be revisited.  See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 
787, 807 (2012).  Because possession of a firearm in public is 
constitutionally protected conduct, in order to convict a 
defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm, due process 
requires the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant did not have a valid firearms license.  Accordingly, 
the defendant's convictions of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
unlawful possession of a loaded firearm, and unlawful possession 
4 
of ammunition cannot stand.  Because there is no constitutional 
right to possess a large capacity magazine, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a large 
capacity feeding device.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 Mass. 
527, 540, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 276 (2018), quoting District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (right to bear 
arms "does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes").1 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Motion to suppress.  We recite the 
facts from the motion judge's findings, supplemented by other 
evidence in the record that supports the judge's conclusion and 
that was either explicitly or implicitly credited by the judge.  
See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 437-438 
(2015). 
On January 25, 2019, Lieutenant Mathew Pieroway of the 
Boston police department received information from a 
confidential informant, known as "Z," that an individual with 
the defendant's name was in possession of an unlicensed gun.  At 
that point in time, Z was a "card-carrying" informant, which 
meant that Z had assisted Boston police in an investigation 
within the previous six months.  In the prior year, information 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of the defendant. 
5 
provided by Z in one instance had resulted in the seizure of 
narcotics and an arrest for a drug-related offense, and in a 
separate matter, Z had provided information that led to the 
recovery of a firearm that was stored near a playground. 
 
Z informed Pieroway that the individual was in possession 
of a silver firearm and that the firearm was being stored in a 
black backpack in his vehicle.  Pieroway was aware, from prior 
conversations with Z, that the individual operated a green Honda 
Accord with a Maine registration plate.  Pieroway also knew the 
plate number.  Z told Pieroway that the individual would be 
driving in the area of Watertown, in such a vehicle, later that 
day.  Z also reported that the individual worked at a particular 
auto parts store, hereinafter referred to as "the Store." 
 
While driving toward Watertown, Pieroway contacted other 
members of his unit, as well as Watertown police Detective Mark 
Lewis, whom Pieroway knew from prior investigations and 
prosecutions.  Pieroway informed these officers that he had 
received information from a reliable informant that the 
defendant had a gun in his possession and that he would be in 
the Watertown area shortly. 
 
Within an hour of speaking to the informant, Pieroway 
located the defendant a short distance from a mall in Watertown.  
Pieroway watched the defendant pull into the parking lot of the 
Store, get out of the green Honda with the Maine license plate, 
6 
and enter the Store, where he appeared to be an employee.  Other 
officers, including Lewis, arrived soon thereafter and set up 
surveillance around the car and the Store.  While en route to 
Watertown, Lewis had had a license check conducted through 
Criminal Justice Information Services, which had revealed that 
the defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm, as well 
as a Criminal Offender Record Information check, which had 
indicated that the defendant had a prior firearm "incident" on 
his record.2 
 
At roughly 6:45 P.M., Pieroway observed the defendant leave 
the Store and walk towards his vehicle.  As the defendant was 
beginning to get into the vehicle, officers approached him, 
identified themselves, and asked him to move away from it.  They 
also gave the defendant the Miranda warnings.  Lewis searched 
the vehicle while the defendant stood with an officer to the 
rear of it.  Lewis was unable to locate either a gun or a black 
backpack in the vehicle.  The glove compartment, which was the 
only part of the interior that was not searched at that time, 
was locked.  Lewis then conducted a patfrisk of the defendant 
and found nothing other than the keys to the vehicle.  Lewis 
used the keys to open the glove compartment.  Inside was a 
 
 
2 By the time of the hearing on the defendant's motion to 
suppress, Lewis could not recall anything about the nature of 
the incident or whether it had resulted in a conviction. 
7 
silver Smith & Wesson nine millimeter firearm that was loaded 
with a fifteen-round magazine containing two rounds of 
ammunition.  Also inside was another fifteen-round magazine that 
was loaded with ten rounds of ammunition. 
 
When the defendant left the Store, Detective Sergeant John 
Claflin, one of the officers who had been surveilling the scene, 
was told to go into the Store to find out whether the defendant 
had left any personal belongings, in particular a black 
backpack, behind.  After entering the Store and having been 
directed to an employee storage area, Claflin saw a black 
backpack that was identified by a Store employee as belonging to 
the defendant.  Claflin picked up the backpack and could feel 
what he believed, on the basis of his experience and training, 
to be a gun storage box.  Claflin opened the backpack and found 
an empty gun storage box.  Claflin left the Store and saw the 
green Honda being searched; at that point, the defendant had not 
yet been pat frisked.3 
 
Once the gun and magazine were found, the defendant was 
placed under arrest.  Shortly thereafter, he said, "You got me 
 
3 John Claflin testified at the hearing that he did not 
think that the gun in the glove compartment had been found when 
he left the Store.  The defendant contests this statement and 
argues that it was not established at the hearing on his motion 
to suppress whether the backpack was searched prior to the 
discovery of the firearm.  This question of timing is not 
pertinent to our analysis. 
8 
for the gun.  It's a [nine millimeter] and there shouldn't be 
one in the chamber."  At the police station, the defendant again 
was given the Miranda warnings.  He agreed to talk to police and 
told them that he had purchased the firearm for $650 from 
someone in Quincy and that he had been in possession of the gun 
for "awhile." 
 
In June 2019, a grand jury issued indictments charging the 
defendant with one count of illegal possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); two counts of illegal possession of a 
large capacity feeding device, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); one count 
of illegal possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h); and 
one count of illegal possession of a loaded firearm, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n).4 
 
In December 2019, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
any evidence seized as a result of the search and seizure of his 
vehicle and person, on the grounds that he did not consent to a 
search of his person or of his automobile and the searches and 
seizure were in violation of his rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
4 Illegal possession of a loaded firearm, under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), is not an independent charge but, rather, 
"constitute[s] further punishment of a defendant who also [has] 
been convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a)."  See Commonwealth 
v. Tate, 490 Mass. 501, 520 (2022). 
9 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 
testimony was presented concerning the basis of Z's knowledge of 
the firearm.  The prosecutor asked Pieroway whether "Z had 
actually seen [the] silver firearm that he or she described to 
you?"  Pieroway responded that "Z had."  Defense counsel 
objected and asked, "Was the officer there when Z saw the 
firearm?  Did Z say he saw the firearm?."  The motion judge, who 
was not the trial judge, commented, "That's fair," and asked 
whether Pieroway had learned that Z had seen the firearm 
"through a conversation."  The prosecutor then asked Pieroway, 
"And how were you made aware that Z had seen the firearm?"  
Pieroway answered, "I had asked Z is the firearm real."  The 
prosecutor inquired, "And what was Z's response?"  Pieroway 
said, "Yes."  The judge ultimately denied the defendant's motion 
to suppress. 
 
b.  Trial.  A jury trial took place before a different 
Superior Court judge in June of 2021.  At trial, witnesses were 
questioned repeatedly regarding the nature of the parking lot in 
which the defendant's vehicle had been parked.  On cross-
examination of Lewis, defense counsel asked whether Lewis had 
seen the defendant assisting a customer in the parking lot.  
Lewis responded that other investigators had observed the 
defendant doing so.  At another point, defense counsel asked 
Lewis to confirm that the green Honda was not parked in the 
10 
parking lot of a nearby business across the street from the 
Store.  Lewis responded, "Well, it's not across the street, it's 
connected to that parking lot. . . .  There's no street 
that . . . intersect[s] . . . .  It's one park -- it's a parking 
complex."  Counsel then asked whether the vehicle was parked at 
"the [Store] parking spot."  Lewis responded, "Yes."  Similarly, 
during cross-examination of Pieroway, counsel asked whether the 
defendant had pulled into "a [Store] parking spot."  Pieroway 
responded that that was correct.  Boston police Officer Jason 
Nunez, another officer who had been at the scene, testified that 
the defendant's vehicle was parked in "the parking lot of the 
[Store]."  When the prosecutor asked Nunez whether it was a 
large parking lot, Nunez responded, "I'm not sure the exact 
amount of spaces but it's definitely -- [twenty] plus vehicles 
maybe." 
 
After the Commonwealth rested, the defendant moved for a 
required finding of not guilty on each of the charges.  On the 
first charge, illegal possession of a firearm, the defendant 
argued that the statute under which he had been charged 
contained an exemption for possession while "being present in or 
on his residence or place of business," G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) (1), and that the Commonwealth had proved only that he 
had possessed a firearm while "working at his place of business 
and on the property (i.e.[,] parking lot) of his place of 
11 
business."5  The prosecutor responded that the defendant did not 
have the firearm on his person while he was working, but, 
rather, it was in his vehicle, which "was not in the [Store] 
area, [nor was it] in [a Store] employee-only spot. . . .  
[S]everal witnesses testified it was a fairly large parking lot 
for lots of businesses."  The judge noted that he found the 
prosecutor's argument "persuasive," and denied the defendant's 
motion. 
 
In his closing argument, defense counsel said, "In terms of 
the first indictment, one of the things that [the prosecutor 
has] to prove is that [the firearm possession] was outside 
somebody's home or place of business."  During a sidebar 
following closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that defense 
counsel had misstated the law.  The judge agreed, stating, "I 
made a ruling on the [motion for a required finding of not 
guilty] that I don't think one can reasonably interpret the law 
to cover this factual situation, because the law about being on 
or in your business was not meant to apply under these facts."  
The prosecutor, however, did not object to the closing argument. 
 
After further discussion at sidebar, defense counsel told 
the judge that he had just re-read the model jury instructions 
on possession of a firearm without a license outside an 
 
5 The defendant's arguments with respect to the remaining 
charges are not relevant to any issue on appeal. 
12 
individual's home or business and that the instruction provided 
states that "if there is evidence that [the possession occurred 
in] the defendant's residence or place of business," then the 
judge should instruct the jury that an additional element of the 
crime is that "the [d]efendant possessed the firearm outside of 
his place of business."  Counsel said that he "did offer 
evidence that [the firearm possession] was [at the defendant's] 
place of business."  Accordingly, counsel argued that an 
instruction should be given to the jury.  The judge denied the 
request on the ground that it was untimely, because the jury 
were about to enter the court room to hear the final charge.  
The judge also noted that the statute did "not cover the factual 
situation before this jury, because the Legislature, in putting 
those words into the statute, did not intend to cover this 
situation of a . . . firearm in a locked glove box of a car 
parked in a parking lot, not in the business itself."  Defense 
counsel responded, "I just want to make clear that I did offer 
evidence through cross-examination that this was strictly [a 
Store] parking lot, and I think it was thoroughly covered that 
[the vehicle was in the defendant's] possession . . . .  It was 
in the glove box, for which the keys were found . . . [in] his 
possession.  That's his place of business.  I want to make that 
clear."  The judge stated, "Fair enough.  Noted."  In his final 
charge, the judge instructed: 
13 
"Indictment Number 1 charges [the defendant] with knowingly 
possessing a firearm unlawfully.  In order to prove the 
Defendant guilty of this offense the Commonwealth must 
prove the following three things beyond a reasonable doubt.  
First, that the Defendant possessed a firearm or that he 
had a firearm under his control in a vehicle.  Second, that 
what the Defendant possessed or had under his control in a 
vehicle met the legal definition of a firearm.  And third, 
that the Defendant knew he possessed a firearm or had a 
firearm under his control in a vehicle." 
 
 
Soon after the jury began deliberations, they submitted a 
note asking: 
"In their closing arguments, the Defense lawyer mentioned 
that firearm possession, Indictment Number 1, must meet the 
criteria of being 'outside a home or business.'  This is 
not indicated in your written instructions to us.  Can you 
please clarify if we need to consider this in our 
deliberations." 
 
Following a discussion, the attorneys and the judge came to an 
agreement on how the judge would respond to the question.  The 
judge had the jury return to the court room and explained, 
"Yes, the statute has an exemption in it . . . for having a 
weapon at home or at work.  However, earlier in this case, 
outside of your hearing, as a matter of law, I ruled that 
that exemption does not apply in this case.  It's not 
available to [the defendant].  And therefore that's why I 
didn't include anything about it in the instructions." 
 
The jury found the defendant not guilty of one count of illegal 
possession of a large capacity feeding device and guilty of all 
other counts.  The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, 
and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that police did not 
have probable cause to search the glove compartment of his 
14 
vehicle and, thus, the motion judge erred in denying his motion 
to suppress evidence seized as a result of the warrantless 
search of his vehicle and person.  The defendant also argues 
that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury on the 
place of business exemption.  In addition, the defendant 
maintains that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury 
that the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not have a firearms license when 
the firearm and magazine were discovered. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress.  "In reviewing the denial of a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's findings of fact 
absent clear error" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 
456 Mass. 385, 388 (2010).  In particular, we accord deference 
to "findings drawn partly or wholly from testimonial evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 (2018).  "We then 
conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Mubdi, supra. 
 
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 487 Mass. 602, 
606 (2021).  This presumption, however, may be surmounted "if 
the circumstances of the search fall within an established 
exception to the warrant requirement" (citation omitted).  Id.  
15 
"One of those exceptions, commonly known as 'the automobile 
exception,' applies to situations where the police have probable 
cause to believe that a motor vehicle parked in a public place 
and apparently capable of being moved contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dame, 
473 Mass. 524, 536, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016).  This 
exception exists because "the inherent mobility of automobiles 
creates an exigency that they, and the contraband there is 
probable cause to believe they contain, can quickly be moved 
away while a warrant is being sought."  Ortiz, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 123 (1997). 
 
To establish that a search falls within the automobile 
exception, "[t]he Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the 
existence of . . . probable cause to believe that the automobile 
contained contraband" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 47 (2008).  To meet this 
burden, the Commonwealth must establish that "the information 
possessed by police, at the time of the proposed warrantless 
search, provide[d] a substantial basis for the belief that there 
[was] a timely nexus or connection between criminal activity, a 
particular person or place to be searched, and particular 
evidence to be seized" (citation omitted).  Dame, 473 Mass. 
at 536-537.  Probable cause does not require an absence of 
uncertainty; rather, we ask whether a "reasonable and prudent" 
16 
person could have acted on such a belief.  See Commonwealth v. 
Agogo, 481 Mass. 633, 637 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 
407 Mass. 891, 895-896 (1990). 
 
i.  Aguilar-Spinelli test.  The defendant contends that the 
motion judge erred in allowing the confidential informant's tip 
to be used to establish probable cause.  An informant's tip may 
be used to establish probable cause only if the Commonwealth 
satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test.  Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 
Mass. 721, 729 (2012).  See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 
410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).  
This test requires the Commonwealth to "demonstrate some of the 
underlying circumstances from which (a) the informant gleaned 
his information (the 'basis of knowledge' test), and (b) the law 
enforcement officials could have concluded the informant was 
credible or reliable (the 'veracity' test)" (citation omitted).  
Tapia, supra.  "Both prongs must be separately considered and 
satisfied" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  According to 
the defendant, the Commonwealth failed to satisfy either prong 
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.  The Commonwealth maintains that 
both prongs were satisfied. 
 
The Commonwealth can satisfy the basis of knowledge prong 
by showing that "the information provided [by an informant] 
springs from [the] informant's firsthand observations or 
knowledge."  Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 618 (2019).  
17 
Here, the motion judge found that Z had told Pieroway that he 
had seen the firearm in the black backpack, and that that was 
the basis for his knowledge of the location of the firearm.  
This finding would be sufficient to satisfy the basis of 
knowledge prong, as it establishes that "the informant was 
reporting his own observation of the gun[] in question."  See 
Commonwealth v. Alfonso A., 438 Mass. 372, 374 (2003).  The 
defendant argues, however, that the judge's finding was clearly 
erroneous. 
 
According to the defendant, a reasonable fact finder could 
not have found, on the basis of Pieroway's testimony, that Z had 
had firsthand knowledge of the firearm in the backpack.  This is 
so, the defendant maintains, because Pieroway's later statement 
that Z told him the firearm was "real" supplanted Pieroway's 
earlier statement that Z had said he had seen the firearm.  The 
defendant argues, therefore, that the Commonwealth did not 
demonstrate how "the informant gleaned [the] information" that 
he reported to Pieroway.  See Tapia, 463 Mass. at 729. 
 
"A judge's finding is clearly erroneous only where there is 
no evidence to support it or where the reviewing court is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 215, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  
In reviewing the judge's findings, we recognize that "[t]he 
18 
determination of the weight and credibility of the testimony is 
the function and responsibility of the [motion] judge who saw 
the witnesses, and not this court" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 
Mass. 818 (2008).  Accordingly, a motion judge is "not required 
to discard testimony that appears to contain internal 
inconsistences, but may credit parts of a witness's testimony 
and disregard other potentially contradictory portions."  United 
States v. González-Vélez, 587 F.3d 494, 504 (1st Cir. 2009), 
quoting United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 204 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 979 (1999).  "The burden is on the 
appellant to show that a finding is clearly erroneous."  Pointer 
v. Castellani, 455 Mass. 537, 539 (2009). 
 
We conclude that the motion judge's findings here were not 
clearly erroneous.  Pieroway testified that after he was asked 
to clarify how he knew that Z had seen the firearm, Z had said 
the firearm was "real."  In this context, it was reasonable for 
the judge to infer that Z knew the firearm to be real because he 
had seen the firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 
295, 303 (2010) ("Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous" [citation omitted]).  There was no clear error in the 
judge's decision to draw such an inference.  See Colon, 449 
Mass. at 224 (no clear error where factual findings "were 
19 
supported by the evidence admitted or based on logical 
inferences drawn therefrom"). 
 
The defendant also argues that, even if there were a basis 
of knowledge for the informant's tip, that basis was negated 
once police failed to find a backpack in the defendant's 
vehicle, at which point the informant's tip was proved 
inaccurate by the absence of a backpack.  See Mubdi, 456 Mass. 
at 397.  This argument misses the mark.  The Commonwealth can 
establish a basis of knowledge under the Aguilar-Spinelli test 
through two independent means.  First, an informant's basis of 
knowledge can be inferred if there was sufficient "independent 
police corroboration of the details of the informant's tip."  
Commonwealth v. Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 298 (1992).  Second, the 
informant's basis of knowledge can be established where it is 
"apparent that the informant was reporting his own observation."  
Alfonso A., 438 Mass. at 374.  Here, we rely on the motion 
judge's finding that the informant personally had observed the 
firearm in the defendant's backpack.  The basis of knowledge 
test therefore survives the police failure to corroborate 
certain details in the informant's tip.  See Tapia, 463 Mass. 
at 729 ("First-hand receipt of information through personal 
observation satisfies the basis of knowledge prong . . ." 
[citation omitted]). 
20 
 
The defendant also contends that the Commonwealth failed to 
satisfy the veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.  "To 
satisfy the veracity test, the Commonwealth needs to show either 
that the [informant] had a demonstrated history of 
reliability, . . . or the existence of circumstances assuring 
trustworthiness on the particular occasion of the information's 
being furnished" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 365 (2017).  A history of reliability 
can be demonstrated by a showing that "the informant provided 
accurate information in the past as to seizures, pending cases, 
convictions, or other such information which would indicate 
reliability."  Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994). 
 
We conclude that the Commonwealth satisfied the veracity 
prong.  Z's reliability was established by a previous instance 
in which Z supplied "information [that] led to the confiscation 
of illegal narcotics."  See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 463 Mass. 
353, 365 (2012).  The defendant argues that one such occasion is 
insufficient to satisfy the veracity test.6  To support this 
 
6 The motion judge found that the information Z provided to 
Boston police had resulted in two separate arrests.  The 
defendant argues that this was clear error because, in his 
testimony, Pieroway referred to only one arrest that was made on 
the basis of information provided by Z.  We agree.  Accordingly, 
we base our analysis on Pieroway's testimony in which he stated 
that Z's information led to a drug-related arrest, along with 
the seizure of narcotics and, separately, the recovery of a 
firearm near a playground.  The defendant further contends that 
 
21 
proposition, he points to Commonwealth v. Melendez, 407 Mass. 
53, 59 (1990), in which we stated that "[t]he fact that the 
informant gave information on one occasion in the past which led 
to the arrest of two individuals is insufficient to satisfy the 
veracity test."  In Melendez, however, the issue was not that 
the informant had only provided information on one occasion.  
Rather, the veracity test failed in that case because the fact 
of the arrests, without more, did not establish the accuracy of 
the information that had caused police to make those arrests.  
See Commonwealth v. Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43, 46 (1991) ("a 
clerk-magistrate [is] not entitled to infer from . . . a 
statement [that a prior tip led to arrests] that [the] prior tip 
had proved to be accurate").  Here, Z supplied information that 
led not only to an arrest for a drug-related offense, but also 
to the seizure of narcotics.  The seizure was sufficient proof 
that Z had "provided information in the past which has proved to 
be accurate."  See id. at 45. 
 
ii.  Probable cause to search the glove compartment.  The 
defendant argues that, even if Z's tip satisfied the Aguilar-
Spinelli test, it did not establish probable cause to search the 
 
the discovery of the firearm near the playground did not bolster 
Z's reliability, because no testimony was given as to whether 
the firearm was an instrument of unlawful activity.  Because we 
conclude that veracity is established here on the basis of the 
seizure of narcotics, we do not address this argument. 
22 
glove compartment of his vehicle.  According to the defendant, 
it would not have been reasonable for police to expect to find 
his backpack in the glove compartment. 
 
Where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, "the 
permissible scope of the search [is] not limitless."  Garden, 
451 Mass. at 50.  Rather, "a valid search is limited to 'any 
area, place, or container reasonably capable of containing the 
object of the search.'"  Id. at 51, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Signorine, 404 Mass. 400, 405 (1989).  Hence, in determining 
whether the warrantless search of a vehicle was lawful, we ask 
whether the search was restricted to the "part[s] of the vehicle 
where there [was] probable cause to believe the object may be 
found."  See Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 220 (2019). 
 
We begin by considering whether Lewis had probable cause to 
conduct his initial search of the vehicle.  Lewis was made 
aware, on the basis of a tip from a reliable informant with 
firsthand knowledge, that the defendant was in possession of a 
firearm that day.  See Cast, 407 Mass. at 897, 900-901.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Hart, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 167-168 
(2019) (no timely nexus between informant's observation of 
firearm and location to be searched because firearm was observed 
two months before search warrant application).  The informant 
had asserted that the firearm would be in the defendant's 
vehicle and had identified the make, model, and registration 
23 
plate of the vehicle.  See Cast, supra at 901-902, quoting 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 813 (1982) ("the police 
must have probable cause to believe a particular automobile 
contains contraband, not just probable cause regarding a 
specific container whose relationship to an automobile is 
'purely coincidental'").  Moreover, based on the license check 
he conducted prior to encountering the defendant, Lewis had 
reason to believe that the defendant did not have a license to 
carry a firearm.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 423 Mass. 
266, 269 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 
163-164 (1983) ("mere possession of a handgun [is] not 
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant was illegally carrying that gun").  Lewis therefore 
had sufficient basis to "warrant a prudent [person] in believing 
that the defendant had committed, or was committing, an offense" 
and that evidence of that offense would be found in the 
identified vehicle (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 383 (2015). 
 
Once Lewis failed to find the firearm during his initial 
search of the vehicle, there existed probable cause to search 
the glove compartment, where a firearm readily could be 
concealed.  "[I]f probable cause justifies the search of a 
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part 
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of 
24 
the search."  See Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 145 
(1990), quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.  Up to an hour had 
elapsed between the time that Z informed police of the existence 
of the firearm and when they located the defendant driving in 
Watertown.  The defendant therefore had had ample time to move 
any firearm in his possession to the glove compartment of his 
vehicle.  See Cast, 407 Mass. at 902 (probable cause existed to 
search entire vehicle because, after watching defendant place 
contraband in trunk of vehicle, agents "lost the defendant from 
their sight . . . for some six hours before he reappeared in 
view[,] . . . at any point during which [contraband] could have 
been placed elsewhere in the car").  Moreover, the defendant had 
parked his vehicle in a public lot outside his workplace.  Under 
such circumstances, it would have been reasonable to suspect 
that the defendant might have secured an unlawfully possessed 
firearm in a locked glove compartment in order to avoid its 
detection by passersby.  Contrast Garden, 451 Mass. at 51 ("The 
search of the [defendant's] trunk . . . exceeded the permissible 
scope of the search because [the officer] could not reasonably 
have believed that the source of the smell of burnt marijuana 
would be found in the trunk"). 
 
The defendant maintains that, when officers are apprised 
that a precise location within a vehicle contains contraband, 
they must limit their search of the vehicle to that location.  
25 
Because the informant's tip specified a particular location -- 
the defendant's backpack -- in which the firearm would be found, 
the defendant contends that the scope of a lawful search was 
limited to areas in which the backpack reasonably could be 
stored and that it would not have been reasonable to suspect 
that the backpack would be stored in the glove compartment.  
This argument, however, misconstrues our jurisprudence.  Where 
an informant's tip specifies a particular location within a 
vehicle in which contraband may be stored, that does not 
necessarily preclude the possibility that there is probable 
cause to search for the contraband in another part of the 
vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. Wunder, 407 Mass. 909, 913 (1990). 
 
Here, Lewis reasonably could have believed that the object 
of his search -- the silver firearm described by Z -- was 
located in the glove compartment.  See Cast, 407 Mass. at 896, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Alessio, 377 Mass. 76, 82 (1979) ("in 
determining whether probable cause exists . . . , '[r]easonable 
inferences and common knowledge are appropriate 
considerations'").  As discussed, there was probable cause to 
believe that the firearm was in the defendant's vehicle.  See 
Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624 (2008), quoting Cast, supra at 908 
("As a general matter, . . . the 'lawful warrantless search of a 
motor vehicle . . . extends to all containers, open or closed, 
found within").  The defendant had had ample opportunity to 
26 
transfer the firearm to the glove compartment, and reason to do 
so given the public location of the vehicle.  See Garden, 451 
Mass. at 50 (officer had probable cause to search glove 
compartment of vehicle because "any contraband hidden on the 
passengers' person[s] easily could have been transferred to a 
location in the passenger compartment when they were ordered to 
get out").  Accordingly, we conclude that Lewis had probable 
cause to search the glove compartment of the defendant's 
vehicle. 
 
iii.  Patfrisk.  The defendant argues that, even if there 
was probable cause to search the glove compartment, the firearm 
and magazine should have been excluded at trial because their 
discovery resulted from an unconstitutional patfrisk of his 
person.  We conclude that Lewis's search of the defendant's 
person was a lawful patfrisk and that, thus, the exclusionary 
rule did not prohibit the introduction of the firearm and 
magazine.  See Commonwealth v. Long, 476 Mass. 526, 535-536 
(2017). 
 
A patfrisk is a "'carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of [a] person[] . . . to discover weapons' for safety 
purposes."  Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 36 
(2020), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  "The only 
legitimate reason for an officer to subject a suspect to a 
patfrisk is to determine whether he or she has concealed weapons 
27 
on his or her person."  Torres-Pagan, supra at 39.  For this 
reason, a "patfrisk is permissible only where an officer has a 
'reasonable suspicion,' based on specific articulable facts, 
'that the suspect is [both] armed and dangerous.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Garner, 490 Mass. 90, 92 (2022), quoting Torres-Pagan, supra 
at 36. 
 
The motion judge found that Lewis conducted a patfrisk of 
the defendant because he was "in fear for his safety due to the 
potential presence of a gun."  The defendant points out that 
there was no testimony suggesting that Lewis feared for his 
safety when he conducted the patfrisk.  If an officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying an illegal 
firearm, however, that is a sufficient basis upon which to 
conclude that the person is armed and dangerous so as to justify 
a patfrisk.  See Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 371 
(2007). 
 
The defendant also argues that there was no basis to 
believe that he was carrying an unlicensed firearm on his 
person, because Z's tip indicated only that a firearm would be 
found in his vehicle.  See DePeiza, 449 Mass. at 374.  
Reasonable suspicion, however, may be grounded in "reasonable 
inferences" drawn from "specific, articulable facts" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 371.  As discussed, Lewis had probable cause 
to believe that the defendant was in unlawful possession of a 
28 
firearm.  Just as Lewis reasonably could have inferred, upon 
failing to find the firearm elsewhere in the vehicle, that it 
was in the glove compartment, he also reasonably could have 
inferred that the firearm instead was located on the defendant's 
person.  See Gouse, 461 Mass. at 793 ("When the firearm [that 
the police had been warned the defendant likely carried] was not 
found on the defendant's person, police appropriately concluded 
that it was likely located in the automobile"). 
 
Moreover, Lewis was justified in removing the set of keys 
from the defendant's person and using them to unlock the glove 
compartment.  In order to "dispel reasonable suspicions that the 
stopped suspect may be armed with a weapon," an officer may 
retrieve from the suspect any "hard object" that could be a 
"potential weapon."  See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 Mass. 62, 
68-69 (2003).  We previously have held that it is "self-evident" 
that keys constitute a hard object that may be seized as a 
potential weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 
608 (2003).  Lewis therefore was justified in retrieving the 
defendant's keys as a means of disarming him.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 396 (2004).  In addition, because 
there was probable cause to believe that the firearm was in the 
glove compartment, Lewis also was justified in using the keys, 
once retrieved, to gain access to the interior of the glove 
compartment.  Contrast Blevines, supra at 609-610 (police were 
29 
not permitted to use keys seized from defendant during patfrisk 
to unlock his vehicle because there "was no evidence that the 
police had any basis for suspecting that any contraband . . . 
would be found in the automobile"). 
 
b.  Instruction on place of business exemption.  The 
defendant contends that the trial judge should have instructed 
the jury that, to convict the defendant, the Commonwealth had to 
prove that he was not in or on his place of business when the 
firearm and magazine were discovered.  This is because, the 
defendant argues, whether he was in or on his place of business 
at the time the firearm was seized was a question for the jury.  
"Trial judges have considerable discretion in framing jury 
instructions . . ." (quotation and citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688 (2015).  "Instructions 
that convey the proper legal standard, particularly when 
tracking model jury instructions, are deemed correct."  Green, 
petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 629 (2016). 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 10 (a), "makes it an offense to 
'knowingly' possess a firearm outside of one's residence or 
place of business without also having a license to carry a 
firearm."  Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 588 (2011), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012).  We have held that this 
language exempts an individual from the requirement of obtaining 
a firearms license if the location of the individual's firearm 
30 
is restricted to his or her residence or place of business.  See 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 780 (2019).  "We treat 
the existence of a statutory exemption as equivalent to an 
affirmative defense."  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 484 Mass. 53, 67 
(2020). 
 
While the Commonwealth carries the burden of proving each 
element of a charged crime, it "has no burden of disproving an 
affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence 
supporting such defense."  Commonwealth v. Cabral, 443 Mass. 
171, 179 (2005).  If a defendant raises a defense that is 
"supported by sufficient evidence," however, the defendant is 
"entitled to have a jury instruction" on that defense.  Id.  
Where a judge does not instruct the jury on an affirmative 
defense, the judge errs "if the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant, provided support for the 
affirmative defense."  Kelly, 484 Mass. at 67. 
 
The defendant does not ask us to upend our established 
precedent that the place of business exemption is an affirmative 
defense, and we discern no compelling reason to do so.  Here, 
therefore, the judge erred in not instructing on the place of 
business exemption only if sufficient evidence was introduced 
that the defendant was in or on his place of business when the 
firearm was discovered.  See Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 377 Mass. 
453, 459-460 (1979) (if no evidence is provided that defendant 
31 
was "within the limits of his property or residence at the time 
of the alleged offense . . . , it should be presumed that none 
existed").7 
 
To determine whether sufficient evidence was introduced 
that the defendant was in or on his place of business, we first 
must delineate the extent of the "place of business" exemption, 
which we have not yet been required to address.  We start by 
examining the related exemption for place of residence, which we 
previously have addressed.  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 
Mass. 195, 214 (2005).  We have understood the residence 
exemption in accordance with the Legislature's intent to balance 
an individual's interest in self-defense and the public's 
interest in crime deterrence and public safety.  See 
Commonwealth v. Seay, 376 Mass. 735, 741-743 (1978).  With these 
differing interests in mind, we have reasoned that "[t]he 
interest of an apartment dweller in defending him[- or 
her]self . . . is clearly attenuated when he [or she] passes his 
[or her] doorway to enter a common area offering easy retreat."  
 
7 The model jury instructions on possession of a firearm 
without a license outside an individual's home or business state 
that, "[i]f there is evidence that [the firearm possession] was 
in the defendant's residence or place of business," the judge 
should instruct that one element of illegal possession of a 
firearm is that "the defendant possessed the firearm outside of 
his (her) residence or place of business."  See Instruction 
7.600 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the 
District Court (rev. Jan. 2013). 
32 
Id. at 742-743.  Accordingly, "[w]e have defined the term 
'residence' to include" only those areas "over which the 
[individual] retains exclusive control."  Commonwealth v. Coren, 
437 Mass. 723, 734 (2002).  The residence exemption, therefore, 
does not apply where a defendant possesses or controls a firearm 
in the "[p]ublic streets, sidewalks, [or] common areas [of an 
apartment building] to which occupants of multiple dwellings 
have access."  Id.  Moreover, if a defendant's firearm is stored 
within his or her vehicle, the residence exemption applies only 
if the vehicle is located within or on the defendant's 
residence.  See Harris, 481 Mass. at 780. 
 
This reasoning "applies with equal force to the exemption 
for a person's place of business."  See Commonwealth v. Belding, 
42 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 438 (1997).  An individual has an 
interest in protecting his or her place of business, but that 
interest is attenuated when the individual enters an area that 
is not within the exclusive control of that business.  See id.  
See also Prince George's County v. Blue, 206 Md. App. 608, 621 
(2012), aff'd, 434 Md. 681 (2013) ("The display of a weapon by a 
security guard indoors could halt violence by unarmed patrons 
inside the establishment.  However, drawing a handgun to chase a 
malefactor across a parking lot, where he or she may have a 
weapon hidden in a car, invites possible battlefield-type 
carnage").  Accordingly, given the Legislature's intent to 
33 
"protect the public from the potential danger incident to the 
unlawful possession of [firearms]," a firearm located within a 
parking lot falls within the place of business exemption only if 
the parking lot is within the exclusive control of the business.  
See Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 396 Mass. 840, 842-843 (1986).  See 
also Sherrod v. State, 484 So. 2d 1279, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1986) (residence exception to firearm statute was 
inapplicable to individual who carried concealed weapon in "the 
parking lot of a multiple unit apartment dwelling"); Blue, supra 
at 623 (place of business exemption is limited to "the interior 
of the business establishment"); Bryant v. State, 508 S.W.2d 
103, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (residence exception in firearm 
statute was inapplicable to resident "with a pistol in his hand 
in a parking lot shared by other occupants of the apartment 
complex"). 
 
Applying the exclusive control standard here, we conclude 
that the defendant did not introduce sufficient evidence at 
trial to support an affirmative defense that the firearm was in 
or on his place of business.  See Anderson, 445 Mass. at 214.  
Although officers testified that the vehicle was located in the 
parking lot of the Store, none of this testimony supports a 
determination that this parking lot was under the Store's 
34 
exclusive control.8  See Bryant, 508 S.W.2d at 104 (parking lot 
was not within defendant's premises because "parking spaces were 
not assigned to tenants and a tenant used whatever space was 
available").  To the contrary, testimony was introduced that 
suggested the parking lot was not within the exclusive control 
of the defendant's employer.  During cross-examination of Lewis, 
he indicated that the parking lot in front of the Store was part 
of a larger parking complex.  No evidence was presented to 
indicate that the Store's section of the parking complex was 
cordoned off, marked with signage, or under the Store's control 
in any sense.  See Sherrod, 484 So. 2d at 1281 (quoting Florida 
Attorney General's advisory opinion stating that exception did 
not apply to "a large parking lot which serves an entire 
shopping area"). 
 
The defendant also argues that, because Pieroway testified 
that he had observed the defendant carrying out his job duties 
while in the parking lot, the parking lot was his "place of 
business."  "Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 
Mass. 630, 633 (2018).  "Where the plain language [of a statute] 
 
8 Given this, we need not reach the defendant's argument 
that the "residence or place of business" exemption also extends 
to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m) and (n). 
35 
is unclear or ambiguous, we strive to discern the legislative 
intent in enacting [it] 'from all its parts and from the subject 
matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as 
to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense.'"  Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 
192 (2019), quoting Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477 
(2008).  Here, the Legislature cannot have intended that one's 
"place of business" be anywhere that one conducts business 
activities.  The residence or place of business exemption 
restricts an individual's unlicensed possession of a firearm to 
areas where the firearm poses a lesser degree of risk to the 
public.  See Seay, 376 Mass. at 742.  "[T]he rule for which 
[the] defendant contends," however, "would permit one to wander 
[armed with a firearm] about [public areas] inhabited by 
hundreds of persons simply because" one is engaged in a business 
activity (citation omitted).  See id.  Moreover, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) (4), and G. L. c. 140, § 129C (l), (o), provide that 
certain individuals are exempt from firearms licensure 
requirements if they possess a firearm in the course of 
particular business activities.  The defendant's reading of the 
statutory language would render this provision entirely 
superfluous, as it would exempt any individuals who are engaged 
in business activities, contrary to our long-standing canon of 
statutory construction that a statute "must be construed so that 
36 
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012). 
 
Because no evidence was introduced at trial to support a 
determination that the firearm was located in or on the 
defendant's place of business, the defendant was not entitled to 
an instruction on the place of business exemption.9 
 
c.  Instruction on exemption for possession of license.  
The defendant also argues that his convictions should be 
reversed because the jury were not instructed that, to find him 
guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, the Commonwealth had 
to prove that he did not have a firearms license.  Although he 
did not seek such an instruction at trial, the defendant now 
contends that the absence of one violated his rights to due 
process and his rights under the Second Amendment. 
 
"We do not normally consider on appeal issues that were not 
fairly raised below . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 
597, 618 n.12 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 173 (2007).  This rule, 
however, "is not without qualification.  We have excused the 
failure to raise a constitutional issue at trial . . . when the 
constitutional theory on which the defendant has relied was not 
 
9 Because we conclude that there was no error, we need not 
reach the Commonwealth's argument that the place of business 
exemption is applicable only where the individual is the owner 
or proprietor of the business. 
37 
sufficiently developed at the time of trial . . . to afford the 
defendant a genuine opportunity to raise his claim."  
Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123, 126 (1984).  This 
is known as the "clairvoyance exception."  See Commonwealth v. 
Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 830 (2009).  Here, the defendant's 
argument depends upon the United States Supreme Court's holding 
in Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122, in which the Court established the 
right to possess a firearm outside the home.  The defendant's 
trial took place in 2021, prior to the release of this decision.  
The defendant, therefore, did not have an adequate opportunity 
at the time of his trial to raise the present issue.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 54 n.13 (2011).  We 
therefore "conclude that the defendant is entitled" to our 
review of this issue.  See Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 422 Mass. 
261, 266-267 (1996). 
 
For each of the crimes of which the defendant was 
convicted -- illegal possession of a firearm, illegal possession 
of a large capacity feeding device, illegal possession of 
ammunition, and illegal possession of a loaded firearm -- the 
defendant would not have been in violation of the law if he had 
obtained a proper license to engage in the proscribed activity.  
See Cassidy, 479 Mass. at 532 (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [m]); Johnson, 
461 Mass. at 58 (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a], [h], [n]).  Under the 
current statutory regime, however, "licensure is an affirmative 
38 
defense, not an element of the crime."  Commonwealth v. Allen, 
474 Mass. 162, 174 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 
Mass. 131, 145 (2012).  General Laws c. 278, § 7, provides that 
"[a] defendant in a criminal prosecution, relying for his [or 
her] justification upon a license . . . shall prove the same; 
and, until so proved, the presumption shall be that [the 
defendant] is not authorized."  Accordingly, this court has held 
that, to convict a defendant under G. L. c. 269, § 10, "the 
Commonwealth does not need to present evidence to show that the 
defendant did not have a license or firearm identification 
card."  Colon, 449 Mass. at 226.  Rather, as is the case for the 
place of business exemption, "the burden [has been] on the 
defendant to come forward with . . . evidence" that he or she 
has a license to possess a firearm (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id.  Once the defendant does so, the burden then 
shifts to the Commonwealth "to persuade the trier of facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [license] does not exist."  
Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 769 (2013), quoting 
Gouse, 461 Mass. at 802. 
As discussed, States may place "on defendants the burden of 
proving affirmative defenses."  Gouse, 461 Mass. at 804, quoting 
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 341 (1993).  The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, "requires the 
Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense 
39 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 
805, 815 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), quoting In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  "Instructions to the jury 
that would lead them to believe otherwise are constitutional 
error."  Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 752 (2010).  
Hence, while an affirmative defense may "excuse[] conduct that 
would otherwise be punishable," it may not "controvert any of 
the elements of the offense itself."  Smith v. United States, 
568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013), quoting Dixon v. United States, 548 
U.S. 1, 6 (2006).  Otherwise put, "an affirmative defense may 
not, in operation, negate an element of the crime which the 
government is required to prove."  United States v. Johnson, 968 
F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964 (1992). 
 
Thus, to address the defendant's argument, we must 
determine whether, since the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122, the failure to obtain a 
valid firearms license is now an essential element of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  If so, the defendant's rights to due 
process were violated when the judge placed upon him the onus of 
presenting evidence of licensure, and we must reverse his 
convictions.  See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 650 (1990) 
(State cannot allocate burden of proof in way that "lessen[s] 
the State's burden to prove every element of the offense 
charged"); Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387, 398 (2002) ("A 
40 
criminal conviction cannot be affirmed on appeal where the jury 
were not instructed on the elements of the theory of the 
crime"). 
 
In answering this question, we cannot simply look to the 
plain statutory language.  If, through amending statutory 
language, the Legislature were able to determine which elements 
of a crime the Commonwealth would be required to prove, it 
"could undermine [due process] without effecting any substantive 
change in its law."  See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 
(1975).  Rather, we must engage in "an analysis that looks to 
the 'operation and effect of the law as applied and enforced by 
the [Commonwealth],' . . . and to the interests of both the 
[Commonwealth] and the defendant as affected by the allocation 
of the burden of proof."  Id. at 699, quoting St. Louis S.W. Ry. 
v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914). 
 
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Munoz, 384 Mass. 503, 503 
(1981), the defendant was convicted of operating an uninsured 
motor vehicle.  The judge had instructed the jury that "the 
defendant has the responsibility and the obligation of showing 
that, as a matter of fact, [the vehicle he was operating] was 
insured."  Id. at 505.  The Commonwealth argued that this 
instruction was correct, "because G. L. c. 278, § 7, which 
places the burden on the defendant to produce evidence of 
license or authority," implied that the defendant bore the 
41 
"burden of producing some evidence of automobile insurance."  
Id. at 506.  We concluded that G. L. c. 278, § 7, did not apply 
to the crime of operating an uninsured vehicle, as "noninsurance 
is an element, in fact, the central element of [such] a 
prosecution."  Id. at 507.  Accordingly, because "insurance is 
an element of the crime charged, not a mere license or 
authority[,] . . . the issue of insurance cannot be viewed as an 
affirmative defense and, [therefore], it cannot be removed from 
jury consideration."  Id. at 507.  Thus, obtaining a conviction 
required the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the vehicle was uninsured.  Id. at 508.  See Cabral, 443 
Mass. at 179 ("Because the absence of lawful authority or 
justification is an element of each of the crimes charged, the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each 
defendant acted without lawful authority or justification"). 
 
In Gouse, 461 Mass. at 801-802, we held that licensure is 
not an essential element of unlawful possession of a firearm.  
We reasoned, rather, that under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and 
G. L. c. 278, § 7, the "holding of a valid license brings the 
defendant within an exception to the general prohibition against 
carrying a firearm."  Id. at 802, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 
372 Mass. 403, 406 (1977).  That decision followed two United 
States Supreme Court decisions in which the Court ruled on the 
extent of the protections provided by the Second Amendment.  In 
42 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, the Court held that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to possess an operable firearm in 
the home.  Then, in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 
(2010), the Court held that the "Second Amendment Right is fully 
applicable to the States."  The defendant in Gouse, supra at 
801, argued that "the allocation of burdens under [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 7,] contravenes the [United States Supreme Court's] holdings 
[in] McDonald and Heller by permitting a presumption of 
criminality from constitutionally protected conduct -- the 
possession of a firearm."  We concluded that Heller and McDonald 
established only a "right 'to possess a handgun in the home for 
the purpose[] of self-defense.'"  Gouse, supra at 801, quoting 
McDonald, supra at 791.  The prohibition against possessing a 
firearm outside the home therefore "[did] not implicate this 
right."  Gouse, supra at 802.  Therefore, requiring that a 
defendant who was charged with unlawful possession outside the 
home "produce some evidence of a license at trial -- and 
recognizing a consequent presumption of unauthorized possession 
where [the defendant] fails to do so -- [did] not infringe on 
constitutionally protected conduct."  Id. 
 
Since our decision in Gouse, 461 Mass. at 807-808, the 
United States Supreme Court has determined that the Second 
Amendment right to possess a firearm applies outside the home.  
See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134.  In Bruen, supra at 2122, 2134, 
43 
the Court concluded that the Second Amendment's protection of 
"the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation" requires that one have a "right to carry handguns 
publicly" (citation omitted).  The Court reasoned that "the 
Second Amendment guarantees an 'individual right to possess and 
carry weapons in case of confrontation,' and confrontation can 
surely take place outside the home."  Id. at 2135, quoting 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 
In the wake of Bruen, this court's reasoning in Gouse, 461 
Mass. at 802, is no longer valid.  It is now incontrovertible 
that a general prohibition against carrying a firearm outside 
the home is unconstitutional.  See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2134.  
Because possession of a firearm outside the home is 
constitutionally protected conduct, it cannot, absent some 
extenuating factor, such as failure to comply with licensing 
requirements, be punished by the Commonwealth.  See id. at 2122-
2123.  Accordingly, the absence of a license is necessary to 
render a defendant's possession of a firearm "punishable."  See 
Smith, 568 U.S. at 110, quoting Dixon, 548 U.S. at 6. 
(affirmative defense does not negate element of crime where it 
"excuse[s] conduct that would otherwise be punishable").  It 
follows, then, that failure to obtain a license is a "fact 
necessary to constitute" the crime of unlawful possession of a 
44 
firearm.  See Smith, supra, quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
at 364. 
 
We therefore conclude that the absence of a license is an 
essential element of the offense of unlawful possession of a 
firearm pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  General Laws 
c. 278, § 7, which provides that licensure is an affirmative 
defense, is no longer applicable to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  See 
Munoz, 384 Mass. at 506, quoting Jones, 372 Mass. at 405 (G. L. 
c. 278, § 7, applies only "to situations where '[a]s [a] matter 
of statutory construction, the prohibition is general, the 
license is exceptional'").  Rather, to convict a defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, the Commonwealth must prove 
"as an element of the crime charged" that the defendant in fact 
failed to comply with the licensure requirements for possessing 
a firearm.  See Munoz, supra at 507. 
 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals employed similar 
reasoning in Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1239-1240 
(D.C. 2010), a case that was cited with approval in Gouse, 461 
Mass. at 802.  In that case, the defendant's conviction of 
unlawful possession of ammunition "was based solely on evidence 
that he possessed handgun ammunition in his home."  Herrington, 
supra at 1239.  Under the relevant statute, the defendant had 
the burden of establishing that he had complied with "valid 
registration and licensing requirements."  Id. at 1241-1242.  
45 
The court determined that the statute was unconstitutional under 
the due process clause and the Second Amendment, because 
"[w]here the Constitution -- in this case, the Second 
Amendment -- imposes substantive limits on what conduct may be 
defined as a crime, a [L]egislature may not circumvent those 
limits by enacting a statute that presumes criminality from 
constitutionally-protected conduct and puts the burden of 
persuasion on the accused to prove facts necessary to establish 
innocence."  Id. at 1244. 
 
Here, as stated, the jury convicted the defendant of 
unlawful possession of a firearm without being instructed that, 
to do so, they must have determined that the defendant did not 
have a firearms license.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 
1, 10 (1999) ("improperly omitting an element from the 
jury . . . precludes the jury from making a finding on the 
actual element of the offense" [emphasis in original]).  As a 
result, the defendant was convicted of a crime solely on the 
ground that he had engaged in the constitutionally protected 
conduct of possessing a firearm in public.  This violated the 
defendant's rights to due process and rights under the Second 
Amendment.  See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54 (1996), 
citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's due process 
rights were not violated because the Second Amendment does not 
46 
prevent the States from imposing licensing requirements on the 
possession of firearms.  See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, 
J., concurring) ("Our holding decides nothing about who may 
lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met 
to buy a gun").  The Second Amendment certainly does not 
"imperil every law regulating firearms."  See Powell, 459 Mass. 
at 586, quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786.  The issue we 
confront here, however, is the burden of proof that must 
accompany such laws.  The Commonwealth may impose licensing 
requirements upon the possession of firearms, but in enforcing 
those requirements, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a defendant failed to comply with them.  See Herrington, 6 A.3d 
at 1245. 
 
The Commonwealth also points to our language in 
Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 460 Mass. 723, 727 (2011), where we 
said that "[n]othing in the McDonald and Heller decisions has 
altered or abrogated the state of the law concerning the 
statutory presumption set forth in G. L. c. 278, § 7."  The 
Commonwealth asserts that, if McDonald and Heller did not alter 
the state of the law concerning the burden of proof regarding 
proper licensure, then Bruen does not either.  In Loadholt, 
supra at 726-727, however, we stated that we would "not address 
the defendant's claims that . . . G. L. c. 278, § 7, creates an 
unconstitutional presumption," because "[t]he defendant did not 
47 
raise these arguments at trial or in his original brief on 
direct appeal" (footnote omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Mathews, 
450 Mass. 858, 871 (2008) (discounting dicta as precedent). 
 
In addition, we cannot abandon the requirement that the 
Commonwealth prove each essential element of a crime simply 
because obtaining a conviction would be "a heavy burden for the 
prosecution to satisfy."  See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701.  In 
Gouse, 461 Mass. at 806, we noted that it would be a "daunting 
task" for the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a defendant had no such license.  We reasoned that, "[o]n 
the other hand, placing the onus on the defendant to produce 
some evidence at trial that he was licensed to carry a firearm 
would involve the very simple task of produc[ing] that slip of 
paper indicating [such authorization]" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Id.  As we indicated, however, this reasoning is not 
applicable where the Second Amendment requires that licensure is 
an essential element of the crime.  See id. at 801-802.  The 
Commonwealth's burden of proving the essential element of a 
crime "cannot be altered because of any difficulty the 
Commonwealth may have in proving [the element] as compared to 
the relative ease with which the defendant could prove [its 
negative]."  See Munoz, 384 Mass. at 509-510. 
 
The defendant argues that licensure is also an essential 
element of the crime of unlawful possession of ammunition under 
48 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).  We agree.  In Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 
the United States Supreme Court concluded that a requirement 
that firearms kept in the home "be rendered and kept inoperable 
at all times" violated the Second Amendment, because the 
requirement made it "impossible for citizens to use [their 
firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense."  A 
general prohibition on ammunition similarly would render it 
impossible for citizens to use their firearms for purposes of 
self-defense; in the absence of ammunition, a firearm is 
effectively inoperable.  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 179-180 (1939) (citing Seventeenth Century commentary on 
gun use in America that "[t]he possession of arms also implied 
the possession of ammunition").  See, e.g., Association of N.J. 
Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 116 
(3d Cir. 2018), quoting Jackson v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576 
U.S. 1013 (2015) ("Regulations that eliminate 'a person's 
ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it 
impossible to use firearms for their core purpose'"); Jackson, 
supra, quoting Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 
2011) ("'the right to possess firearms for protection implies a 
corresponding right' to obtain the bullets necessary to use 
them"); Herrington 6 A.3d at 1243 ("from the Court's reasoning 
[in Heller], it logically follows that the right to keep and 
49 
bear arms extends to the possession of handgun ammunition").  
Because a general prohibition on ammunition would violate the 
Second Amendment, the reasoning that we have applied to G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), must apply as well to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).  
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's rights under the 
Second Amendment and his rights to due process were violated 
when he was convicted of unlawfully possessing ammunition 
although the jury were not instructed that licensure is an 
essential element of the crime. 
 
Nonetheless, we decline the defendant's suggestion that we 
extend this holding to the crime of unlawful possession of a 
large capacity feeding device.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  We 
previously have held that G. L. c. 140, § 131M, a statute that 
proscribes possession of large capacity feeding devices, "is not 
prohibited by the Second Amendment, because the right [to bear 
arms] 'does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.'"  Cassidy, 479 Mass. 
at 540, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.  See Worman v. Healey, 
922 F.3d 26, 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
109 (2020) ("Massachusetts law proscribing the sale, transfer, 
and possession of certain semiautomatic assault weapons and 
large-capacity magazines" does not violate Second Amendment).  
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant was not entitled to 
50 
an instruction that licensure is an essential element of 
unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device. 
 
Finally, we conclude that our holding here should not be 
applied retroactively to convictions that became final prior to 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 
at 2122.  "The retroactivity of a constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure turns on whether the rule is 'new' or 'old.'"  
See Commonwealth v. Perry, 489 Mass. 436, 463 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass. 450, 457 (2020).  A case 
"announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became 
final" (emphasis in original).  Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 
296, 301 (1990), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 
(1989).  The rule we announce today is dictated by the Court's 
decision in Bruen.  Accordingly, our holding applies 
prospectively and to those cases that were active or pending on 
direct review as of the date of the issuance of that decision.  
See Perry, supra at 464. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's convictions on the 
indictments charging unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful 
possession of ammunition, and unlawful possession of a loaded 
firearm are vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for entry of judgments of not guilty on those 
indictments.  The defendant's conviction on the indictment 
51 
charging unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.
LOWY, J. (concurring, with whom Georges, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court's reasoning and its conclusion that, in 
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), a 
defendant's lack of a valid firearms license must be treated as 
an essential element of the offense of unlawful possession of a 
firearm pursuant to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt as part of its 
case-in-chief. 
I write separately to address certain evidentiary issues 
concerning the admissibility of firearms licensing records that 
will likely arise in pending and future cases as a result of 
this ruling.  I recognize that the issues I discuss here have 
not been directly addressed in the record or the arguments in 
this case; nor have the issues been vetted by the full court.  
Accordingly, everything that I suggest will need to be tested 
and refined in the crucible of future litigation or rulemaking.  
Nevertheless, given the high volume of cases involving charges 
for unlicensed possession of a firearm or ammunition that are 
handled by our courts,1 I venture these suggestions to offer some 
guidance. 
 
1 According to data published by the Trial Court's 
Department of Research and Planning, in fiscal year 2022, over 
6,000 charges for carrying a firearm without a license, carrying 
 
2 
In general, as I explain in further detail infra, properly 
authenticated firearms licensing records that have been made and 
kept in the normal course of an agency's affairs should 
ordinarily be admissible under the official records and business 
records exceptions to the rule against hearsay.  The admission 
of these records should not ordinarily violate a defendant's 
rights under confrontation clause2 of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because such records were not "made 
with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 815 (2021).  Indeed, 
depending on how the records are kept, and the witness's level 
of familiarity with the records, it may well be that the absence 
of the defendant's name from such records would constitute prima 
facie evidence of a lack of a license. 
 
a loaded firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm 
or ammunition without a firearm identification card, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10, were filed in the District 
Court and Boston Municipal Court, and over 2,400 such 
indictments were returned in the Superior Court.  See https: 
//public.tableau.com/app/profile/drap4687/viz/MassachusettsTrial
CourtChargesDashboard/AllCharges [https://perma.cc/25AT-JY2V]. 
 
2 See Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . ."); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009) (Sixth 
Amendment applies to States via Fourteenth Amendment of United 
States Constitution).  See also art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights ("every subject shall have a right . . . 
to meet the witnesses against him face to face"). 
3 
Agency certificates or affidavits stating that there is no 
record of a firearms license issued to a defendant, unlike 
agency lists, are more problematic.  Although such certificates 
of the nonexistence of an official record are admissible under 
an exception to the rule against hearsay, their admission at 
trial without a testifying witness from the agency responsible 
for keeping such records, and who is familiar with how the 
records are kept, made, and stored, will likely be deemed a 
violation of a defendant's rights under the confrontation 
clause. 
1.  Records of firearms licensing.  "In Massachusetts, 
local police departments are responsible for the issuance of 
firearms licenses to individuals who reside or have a place of 
business within the jurisdiction."  Commonwealth v. Adams, 482 
Mass. 514, 531 (2019).3  Local police departments are required to 
 
3 "Most licenses are issued by municipal police departments.  
The State Police issues Gun Club Licenses and is also 
responsible for Licenses to Carry for active and retired 
troopers.  The Firearms Records Bureau issues non-resident 
licenses and resident alien permits."  Executive Office of 
Public Safety and Security, Data About Firearms Licensing and 
Transactions, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/data-about-
firearms-licensing-and-transactions [https://perma.cc/L7SE 
-FFJK].  See G. L. c. 140, § 121 (defining "licensing authority" 
as "the chief of police or the board or officer having control 
of the police in a city or town, or persons authorized by 
them"); G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) ("Any person residing or having 
a place of business within the jurisdiction of the licensing 
authority . . . may submit to the licensing authority an 
application for a firearm identification card, or renewal of the 
 
4 
make certain records regarding firearms licenses and to forward 
copies of applications, issued licenses, and notices of 
revocation and suspension to the Department of Criminal Justice 
Information Services, where those records are collected by the 
firearms records bureau.4 
 
same . . ."); G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) ("A person residing or 
having a place of business within the jurisdiction of the 
licensing authority . . . may submit to the licensing authority 
or the colonel of state police an application for a license to 
carry firearms, or renewal of the same"). 
 
4 See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 805 (2012) 
(local police departments required to record all issued licenses 
and notify Department of Criminal Justice Information Services); 
G. L. c. 140, § 129B (4) ("Notices of revocation and suspension 
shall be forwarded to the commissioner of the department of 
criminal justice information services and the commissioner of 
probation and shall be included in the criminal justice 
information system"); G. L. c. 140, § 129B (13) ("Upon issuance 
of a firearm identification card under this section, the 
licensing authority shall forward a copy of such approved 
application and card to the executive director of the criminal 
history systems board . . ."); G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f) ("Notices 
of revocation and suspension shall be forwarded to the 
commissioner of the department of criminal justice information 
services and the commissioner of probation and shall be included 
in the criminal justice information system"); G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131 (n) ("Upon issuance of a license to carry or possess 
firearms under this section, the licensing authority shall 
forward a copy of such approved application and license to the 
commissioner of the department of criminal justice information 
services . . ."); Municipal Records Retention Schedule (updated 
Sept. 1, 2022), at 89, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/arc/arcpdf 
/Municipal_Retention_Schedule_20220901.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/C9TT-7N53] (providing for retention by municipalities of 
firearm identification cards and license to carry applications 
until superseded); Executive Office of Public Safety and 
Security, Data about Firearms Licensing and Transactions, 
https://www.mass.gov/info-details/data-about-firearms-licensing-
and-transactions#license-applications-&-active-licenses 
 
5 
 
2.  Admissibility under exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay.  If properly authenticated, firearms licensing records 
like those described supra would likely qualify for admission 
under the "official records" exception to the rule against 
hearsay.  See G. L. c. 233, § 76; Mass. R. Crim. P. 40 (a), 378 
Mass. 917 (1979); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(8)(A) (2022).  The 
Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 40 (a) define "official 
records" as "including records of any governmental entity, . . . 
and more particularly as 'all documents prepared by public 
officials pursuant to a duty imposed by law or required by the 
nature of their offices'" (citation omitted). 
Firearms licensing records may also be admissible under the 
business records exception to the rule against hearsay, where 
the records have been made in good faith in the regular course 
of business before the beginning of the proceeding in which they 
are offered and it was the regular course of the agency to make 
such records at the time of the transaction or within a 
reasonable time thereafter.  See G. L. c. 233, § 78; 
 
[https://perma.cc/MS43-M2XW] ("The Firearms Records Bureau is 
the Commonwealth's repository for all firearms license and 
transaction data. . . .  Massachusetts's electronic license 
check system . . . is updated by police departments, which 
process license applications and update license statuses, and by 
firearms dealers, who enter records of their transactions"); 
Firearms Records Bur. v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 168 n.2 (2013) 
(firearms records bureau is part of Department of Criminal 
Justice Information Services). 
6 
Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 39-42, cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 330 (2017) (ten-print fingerprint cards made by police 
were properly admissible under business records exception); id. 
at 47 (Lowy, J., concurring); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A). 
The exceptions to the rule against hearsay and the rules of 
criminal procedure also permit the absence of a firearms license 
in the defendant's name to be shown by an authenticated written 
statement from the legal custodian of the firearms licensing 
records, or a deputy, that after diligent search, no record 
could be found of a valid firearms license issued in the name of 
the defendant at the time of the offense.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
40 (b), 378 Mass. 917 (1979) (properly authenticated "written 
statement that after diligent search no record or entry of a 
specified tenor is found to exist in the records designated by 
the statement . . . is admissible as evidence that the records 
contain no such record or entry"); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(10) 
("certification under [§] 902 . . . that a diligent search 
failed to disclose a public record or statement is admissible in 
evidence if the testimony or certification is offered to prove 
that [A] the record or statement does not exist, or [B] a matter 
did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a 
record or statement for a matter of that kind"); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 902(b) ("An official record kept within the Commonwealth, or 
an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be 
7 
evidenced . . . by a copy attested by the officer having legal 
custody of the record, or by that officer's deputy").5 
Finally, I note that under the exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay, witness testimony may also suffice to show the 
absence of an official record, such as the record of a firearms 
license, as provided in Mass. G. Evid. § 803(10).  Care should 
be taken in relying on such testimony alone for at least two 
reasons:  (1) there must be an adequate foundation for the 
witness's testimony explaining his or her sufficient familiarity 
with how the record was created, maintained, and accessed; and 
(2) insofar as the witness testifies as to the contents of 
computer-stored records, those records may constitute hearsay.  
See Commonwealth v. Royal, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 169-173 (2016) 
(State police trooper's testimony that he checked motor vehicle 
 
5 Technically, a statement as to the nonexistence of an 
agency record is not hearsay, because it does not involve an 
out-of-court assertion: 
 
"As a general rule, silence is not classified as hearsay.  
Logically, therefore, the absence of an entry in a public 
record should not be considered hearsay when offered for 
that purpose, and should be admissible over a hearsay 
objection as a basis to infer that the event did not occur 
or the condition did not exist." 
 
5 C.S. Fishman & A. Toomey McKenna, Jones on Evidence § 34:54 
(7th ed. 2023).  Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion, the 
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence treated testimony or 
certifications concerning the nonexistence of a public record as 
an exception to the rule against hearsay, see id., and the 
Massachusetts Guide to Evidence has taken the same approach. 
8 
registry database and defendant's license was listed as 
suspended was inadmissible hearsay because such records were 
computer-stored, but "the Commonwealth could have proved the 
element of license suspension without implicating the rule 
against hearsay if it had introduced a properly certified copy 
of a registry driving history record showing that the 
defendant's license had been suspended"). 
3.  Admissibility under confrontation clause.  The fact 
that a firearms licensing record, or a certificate attesting to 
the nonexistence of such a record, may be admissible under 
exceptions to the rule against hearsay does not suffice to show 
that the record or certificate of its nonexistence can also meet 
the distinct requirements of the confrontation clause in a 
criminal case.  See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 
585 n.4, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 865 (2013) ("There is an 
important distinction between satisfying the mandates of common-
law evidentiary rules and satisfying the mandates of the 
confrontation clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.  
In criminal cases, out-of-court statements are only admissible 
if they satisfy both; failure to satisfy either the applicable 
rules of evidence or the Federal and State Constitutions will 
result in the exclusion of evidence"). 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner's rights 
9 
under the confrontation clause were violated where sworn written 
certificates from State laboratory analysts, describing the 
substance seized from the petitioner as cocaine, were admitted 
in lieu of live testimony at the petitioner's trial on charges 
of cocaine distribution and trafficking.  See id. at 308-311, 
329.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned: 
"Business and public records are generally admissible 
absent confrontation not because they qualify under an 
exception to the hearsay rules, but because -- having been 
created for the administration of an entity's affairs and 
not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at 
trial -- they are not testimonial.  Whether or not they 
qualify as business or official records, the analysts' 
statements here -- prepared specifically for use at 
petitioner's trial -- were testimony against petitioner, 
and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment." 
 
Id. at 324.  Thus, the critical question, for purposes of 
determining whether admission of an agency record violates the 
confrontation clause, is whether the record was created in the 
normal course of the agency's affairs, or whether it is 
"testimonial," that is, whether it was created for the purpose 
of proving some fact at trial. 
It is also noteworthy that the Melendez-Diaz Court cited a 
line of cases where "the prosecution sought to admit in[] 
evidence a clerk's certificate attesting to the fact that the 
clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed 
to find it."  Id. at 323.  In those cases, the Court indicated, 
the clerk's statement was testimonial in effect because it 
10 
"would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose 
guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the 
clerk searched," and consequently "the clerk was . . . subject 
to confrontation."  Id.6 
 
In accord with Melendez-Diaz, this court has held that the 
admission of documents at trial that were made contemporaneously 
with the underlying event in the regular course of a business's 
or an agency's affairs does not violate the confrontation clause 
because such documents are not testimonial.  See, e.g., Fulgiam, 
477 Mass. at 43 (admission of ten-print fingerprint cards made 
by State police did not violate confrontation clause); 
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 552 (2011) 
(admission of passenger manifest and ticket inquiry made by 
airline did not violate confrontation clause). 
 
But where a document is subsequently created by an agency 
to establish a fact at trial, this court has held that it is 
testimonial and its admission violates the confrontation clause, 
even though the document is based on preexisting agency records.  
For example, in Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 460 Mass. 1 (2011), 
 
6 Later that year, the Supreme Court also vacated a decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
which had held that a clerk's certificate as to the nonexistence 
of a record was not testimonial, and remanded the case "for 
further consideration in light of Melendez-Diaz."  See United 
States v. Norwood, 555 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded, 558 U.S. 983 (2009).  See also United States v. 
Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (on remand). 
11 
where the defendant had been charged with driving after his 
license had been revoked, this court held that the admission of 
a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles created after 
the defendant's arrest and attesting that a notice of license 
revocation had been mailed to the defendant violated the 
confrontation clause where it was presented at the defendant's 
trial to prove that he had received notice of the revocation 
without any other testimony from the registry.  See id. at 2-3.  
The court noted that the actual notice of the defendant's 
license revocation constituted a business record that had been 
made and kept in the ordinary course of the registry's affairs, 
but it did not show that the notice actually had been mailed on 
the date when it was created.  See id. at 10.  If the registry 
had made a contemporaneous record of the mailing as part of the 
administration of its regular business affairs, then it would 
have been properly admissible at the defendant's trial.  But the 
registry certificate that was presented at trial was dated two 
years later, three months before the trial.  The court therefore 
concluded that it had been created for the purpose of 
establishing an essential fact at trial and did not constitute a 
nontestimonial business record.  See id. 
Since Melendez-Diaz, this court has not had occasion to 
consider whether admission of a certificate as to the 
nonexistence of a record would violate the confrontation clause, 
12 
but a number of other courts have.  Most pertinently for 
purposes here, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that, 
where a defendant was tried on various gun charges, his 
confrontation right was violated by the admission of an 
affidavit from a nontestifying witness attesting that a search 
of the State's firearm registry database produced no evidence 
that a handgun permit had been issued to the defendant.  See 
State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 263-264, 272-274 (2021).  The 
court observed that, although the underlying firearm license 
database was not itself testimonial in character, the creation 
of a document attesting to a search of that database for the 
purpose of prosecuting the defendant was.  Id. at 272.  The 
defendant's confrontation right was violated because, "[w]ith 
only the affidavit, and with no opportunity to question the 
officer knowledgeable about how the search of the database was 
performed, [the defendant] could not explore whether the officer 
used the correct date of birth, name, or other identifying 
information such as a [S]ocial [S]ecurity number in order to 
generate a correct search of the database, and what information 
that search produced."  Id. at 272.  Other courts have similarly 
held since Melendez-Diaz that the confrontation clause is 
violated by the admission in a criminal trial of an affidavit 
attesting to the nonexistence of a record without testimony from 
13 
a witness.7  This case law indicates that admission of an 
affidavit stating that a diligent search of the firearms records 
did not disclose any record in the name of a defendant would 
likely violate the confrontation clause if presented without 
testimony from a witness. 
Instead, to meet the requirements of the confrontation 
clause, the Commonwealth would likely have to present a witness 
who actually undertook a search of the firearms licensing 
records and determined that the defendant lacked a license.  As 
 
7 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Gumbs, 426 Fed. 
Appx. 90, 93–94 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1125 
(2012) (lower court erred in admitting certificate as to 
nonexistence of gun license without affording defendant 
opportunity to confront person who prepared certificate); United 
States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1154 (2011) (overruling prior 
decisions that had held that certificates of nonexistence of 
records were not testimonial because those decisions were 
inconsistent with Melendez-Diaz); United States v. Martinez-
Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 586-587 (5th Cir. 2010) (admission of 
certificate of nonexistence of record, which indicated that 
defendant had not received consent to reenter United States, 
violated defendant's confrontation right where no testimony was 
presented from analyst who conducted records search); Tabaka v. 
District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173, 175-176 (D.C. 2009) 
(department of motor vehicles certificate that its records 
revealed no evidence of operator's permit having been issued to 
appellant was testimonial and therefore inadmissible over 
objection without corresponding testimony by official who had 
performed search); Washington v. State, 18 So. 3d 1221, 1223-
1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (certificate of contractor's 
nonlicensure was testimonial, and its admission violated his 
confrontation rights); State v. Jasper, 174 Wash. 2d 96, 113-116 
(2012) ("A substantial majority of courts have held since 
Melendez-Diaz that clerk certifications attesting to the 
nonexistence of a public record are testimonial statements 
subject to confrontation"; citing cases and following suit). 
14 
the court pointed out in Carrion, the confrontation clause was 
violated in that case because the defendant was not given an 
"opportunity to question the officer knowledgeable about how the 
search of the database was performed."  Carrion, 249 N.J. at 
272.  See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661-663 (2011) 
(surrogate testimony by analyst who did not actually perform 
blood alcohol test did not meet requirements of confrontation 
clause); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 376-377 (2017) 
(evidence that deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] profile extracted 
from crime scene matched defendant's DNA in national database 
was improperly admitted hearsay because those responsible for 
conducting database testing did not testify and were not subject 
to cross-examination).8 
 
8 This is not to say, however, that the testifying witness 
must necessarily be the same person who conducted the original 
search of the firearms licensing records that led to the charge 
against the defendant.  See United States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51, 
59 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 930 (2013), citing 
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 666, 674 ("In part IV of the Supreme 
Court's Bullcoming opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, 
Justice Ginsburg observed that the [S]tate could have avoided a 
Sixth Amendment violation when it realized that the original 
scientist was unavailable to testify 'by asking [the testifying 
analyst] to retest the sample, and then testify to the results 
of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not 
conduct or observe.' . . .  Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito, in dissent, 
concluded that testimony from a knowledgeable lab representative 
is sufficient under the Sixth Amendment. . . .  Thus, it appears 
that six justices would find no Sixth Amendment violation when a 
second analyst retests evidence and testifies at trial about her 
conclusions about her independent examination"). 
15 
For example, testimony from a representative from the 
firearms records bureau or a police officer, who is familiar 
with the firearms licensing records and how they are kept, and 
who undertook a search of those records and did not find a 
license in the defendant's name, might well meet the 
requirements of the confrontation clause.  Whether such a 
witness is qualified to testify about the search is a 
preliminary question for the trial judge to decide.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 104(a). 
On the other hand, the admission of properly authenticated 
copies of preexisting firearms licensing records that were made 
and kept in the ordinary course of business would not violate 
the confrontation clause, because they are not testimonial.  
Such records might be used, for example, to show that a 
defendant's name did not appear in the record, that a 
defendant's firearms license application was denied, or that the 
license was suspended or revoked, or that it expired. 
It is also conceivable, depending on how the records are 
compiled, or may be compiled in the future in response to this 
court's decision today, that a copy of an excerpted alphabetical 
list of firearms licenses might reveal the absence of a license 
held by a defendant.  Moreover, depending on how such records 
are complied, such a list may constitute prima facie evidence 
that the defendant is not licensed to carry a firearm. 
16 
In a criminal case in the Commonwealth, "[p]rima facie 
evidence means that proof of the first fact [(basic fact)] 
permits, but does not require, the fact finder, in the absence 
of competing evidence, to find that the second fact [(resultant 
fact)] is true beyond a reasonable doubt."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 302.  " Where there is contrary evidence, the first fact 
continues to constitute some evidence of the fact to be proved, 
remaining throughout the trial probative on issues to which it 
is relevant."  Id.  Put another way, "[i]n criminal cases, when 
evidence 'A' is prima facie evidence of fact 'B,' then, in the 
absence of competing evidence, the fact finder is permitted but 
not required to find 'B' beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577, 581 (2006).  "The 
designation of prima facie evidence in this context is 
'structurally the same as' a 'permissive inference'" that 
"satisfies the Commonwealth's burden of production as to one or 
more elements of a crime."  Commonwealth v. Littles, 477 Mass. 
382, 386 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 
293-293 (1975).  I recognize that most, if not all, prima facie 
designations in the criminal context in the Commonwealth are a 
creation of statute.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 302(c) note.9  And of 
 
9 "There are numerous statutes that designate certain 
evidence as having prima facie effect.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 22C, 
§ 39 (certificate of chemical analysis of narcotics); G. L. 
 
17 
course, the Legislature is free to enact such a statute in the 
context of firearm licenses, if it so chooses.  As such, in the 
context of charges relating to unlicensed firearms, it is 
conceivable that, depending on how records are complied, an 
excerpted alphabetical list of firearms licenses that did not 
contain a defendant's name may well constitute prima facie 
evidence that would "permit[] but not require[ a jury] to find 
[the defendant to be unlicensed] beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Maloney, supra. 
4.  Notice-and-demand procedure.  In Melendez-Diaz, 557 
U.S. at 326, the Supreme Court also noted that many States have 
adopted "notice-and-demand statutes," which "require the 
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to 
use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which the 
defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to 
the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance 
live at trial," or otherwise forfeit that right.  The Court made 
clear that these statutes do not violate the defendant's rights, 
because "[t]he defendant always has the burden of raising his 
Confrontation Clause objection," and "notice-and-demand statutes 
 
c. 46, § 19 (birth, marriage, or death certificate); G. L. 
c. 90, [§ 24 (4)] (court record of a prior conviction if 
accompanied by other documentation); G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (report 
of inspector in housing court); G. L. c. 233, § 79F (certificate 
of public way); G. L. c. 269, § 11C (firearm with obliterated 
serial number)."  Mass. G. Evid. § 302(c) note. 
18 
simply govern the time within which he must do so" (emphases in 
original).  Id. at 327. 
In 2013, rule 803(10) of the Federal Rules of Evidence was 
amended to "incorporate[], with minor variations, a 'notice-and-
demand' procedure that was approved by the Melendez-Diaz Court."  
2013 Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 803.  The amended 
rule provides that the rule against hearsay does not exclude a 
certification that a diligent search failed to disclose a public 
record or statement if, among other prerequisites, "in a 
criminal case, a prosecutor who intends to offer a certification 
provides written notice of that intent at least [fourteen] days 
before trial, and the defendant does not object in writing 
within [seven] days of receiving the notice -- unless the court 
sets a different time for the notice or the objection."  Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(10)(B). 
Similarly, in Carrion, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted 
a practice of requiring a defendant to inform the judge and the 
prosecution of a demand to have the State produce an appropriate 
witness to testify to a search of the State firearms permit 
database.  Failure to make such a demand waives the defendant's 
confrontation right.  See Carrion, 249 N.J. at 273-274.  The 
court said that this practice would address the State's "valid 
administrative concern" that "[r]equiring in-person testimony by 
the person who conducted a search of firearm registry records 
19 
that yielded no results under a defendant's name for a gun 
permit -- in every firearm possession prosecution -- could be 
burdensome and could lead to administrative inconvenience and 
waste of resources."  Id. at 273. 
I suggest that courts handling prosecutions for possession 
of a firearm without a license should consider adopting a 
procedure similar to that in Fed. R. Evid. 803(10)(B) as a 
discovery order and in the filing of pretrial conference 
reports.  This would provide an orderly and uniform procedure 
for determining whether the Commonwealth may rely on a 
certificate that there is no firearms license in the name of the 
defendant, and give the prosecution sufficient time to secure a 
testifying witness if the defendant objects.10  This procedure 
might also serve to mitigate, to some extent, the burden on the 
Commonwealth that would otherwise result if it were required to 
produce a testifying witness in every trial involving a charge 
of unlicensed possession of a firearm. 
 
10 Of course, it may well be that the Commonwealth, 
nonetheless, calls witnesses who have reviewed the records, and 
offers documents in which the defendant's name does not appear, 
in recognition of its burden of persuasion.  And it may well be 
that defendants prefer admission of a certificate of the 
nonexistence of a record to testimony from witnesses and 
documentation better to advance their arguments as to reasonable 
doubt.