Title: State v. Corn

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

223 Kan. 583 (1978)
575 P.2d 1308
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DAVID A. CORN, Appellant.
No. 49,094

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 25, 1978.
Alan L. Rupe, of Holland & Rupe, of Russell, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Larry D. Ehrlich, county attorney, argued the cause and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is a direct appeal from conviction by a jury of aggravated kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3421) and rape (K.S.A. 21-3502).
William Griffith, Steven Corn, Sheryl Hutchison, and the defendant, David Corn, went to the home of the victim, Barbara Pitt, shortly after midnight, August 27, 1976. Barbara Pitt was working until midnight that evening. The group consumed alcoholic *584 beverages. After about an hour, Steven and Sheryl left. Thereafter, the defendant and Barbara repeatedly embraced. While the couple were so occupied, William removed Barbara's wallet from her purse. The two men left. Shortly thereafter Barbara discovered the theft of her billfold, and went to Sheryl's house to talk to her about it. She was unable to rouse anyone at Sheryl's house and returned home. Meanwhile, David and William had returned to Barbara's home. William remained in the car. Barbara confronted David in the driveway about the stolen billfold. They argued on the driveway and then went inside the house. David denied taking the wallet and he and Barbara searched her house for it. David became angry and struck Barbara with a soft drink bottle and his fists. David then told her he intended to have sex with her and that he would kill her if she did not cooperate. Barbara's clothes were removed. David was physically unable to complete the sexual act and Barbara laughed at him and ridiculed him for his lack of sexual prowess. David struck Barbara in the face, gagged her, and tied her hands together. He wrapped a blanket around her nude body, took her by the arm and walked to his car where she was placed in the trunk.
David drove to an isolated area outside of town, opened the trunk, and told Barbara to put the blanket on the ground. David had sexual intercourse with Barbara and then told William it was his turn. William had sexual intercourse with her and then David had intercourse with her a second time. David told her to get back into the trunk. She asked not to be put back into the trunk and she was allowed to get into the back seat. Barbara was concerned about the theft of her money as she had promised to give her daughter money for doughnuts in the morning. She was given two dollars by William. Barbara was returned to her home after she told David she would not call the police. Before he left, David told her not to call the police and that she had better cooperate next time he was in town. (She lived in Russell and he lived in Wichita.) Barbara called the police upon being returned to her home and both William and David were charged with aggravated kidnapping, rape, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and theft. Through plea negotiations, William pled guilty to rape with the balance of the charges being dismissed as to him, and testified for the state at David's trial. The defendant herein was tried on all counts except the theft charge which was dismissed on motion of *585 the state at the beginning of the trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of rape and aggravated kidnapping and not guilty of aggravated battery and aggravated assault.
The defendant's first claim of error is the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Barbara Pitt and William Griffith. The claim as to Barbara Pitt will be dealt with first.
K.S.A. 60-447a(1) provides:
The trial court permitted the defendant to depose Barbara Pitt prior to trial. In her deposition Barbara recounted her past sexual activities with almost photographic detail. The witness was further questioned as to movies seen and books read that involved the portrayal of explicit sexual acts. In the deposition no stones were left unturned and no furrows were left unplowed on this subject. Barbara was thirty years old at the time her one hundred and forty-eight page deposition was taken and had led an active life. The reason for all of this dredging into past activities was that the defendant was trying to establish that Barbara liked "kinky" sex and that, accordingly, she was not really an unwilling participant in the events of the night in question. The deposition does not support defendant's theory as to Barbara's willing participation. The trial court did not permit such latitude in the cross-examination of Barbara at the trial, but let the defense *586 establish that she had had a variety of prior sexual experiences. We find there was no abuse of discretion in the limiting of the cross-examination of Barbara Pitt.
We turn now to the limitation placed on the defense as to the witness William Griffith. In his opening statement defense counsel said:
"....
The cross-examination of William Griffith by defense counsel on this subject was as follows:
A. "You mean previously 
A. "Yes.
MR. EHRLICH: "Object, your Honor.
A. "I knew what I was charged with and what 
Q. "And you pled guilty to rape?
A. "Yes, I did."
Counsel for the defendant continued on re-cross examination of the accomplice, William Griffith, with the following question:
A. "Yes, I realize that."
Immediately after the examination of William Griffith a recess *587 was held and a hearing was held in the court's chambers with the following comments being made relative to the reference to the penalty and sentence involved herein:
MR. RUPE: "Okay.
THE COURT: "I don't think it's proper.
MR. RUPE: "Okay."
Later on in the trial the defendant indicated he desired to call William Griffith as a defense witness. The following conversation was had in chambers:
The credibility of an accomplice or informant is subject to attack. Great leeway should be accorded the defense in establishing such a witness' subjective reason for testifying. (United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 [10th Cir.1972].)
In State v. Wheeler, 215 Kan. 94, 523 P.2d 722, the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to question a witness as to whether he had made a deal with the attorney general's office to avoid prosecution. In Wheeler we said:
In the case at hand the defense counsel did get the point to the jury that the witness who had been charged as a co-defendant had resolved his case through plea bargaining. The information that defendant had thereby avoided risk of conviction of the most serious charge was also before the jury. We hold that the limitation on the cross-examination was improper, but that under the totality of the circumstances of this case it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant's next claim of error is that the trial court erred in not granting defendant a new trial as the evidence was insufficient for a conviction of rape.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether the evidence is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the state. (State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32, 563 P.2d 999.) We have carefully reviewed the record and find there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of rape.
The defendant's next claim of error is that the trial court erred in not granting the defendant a new trial on the grounds that evidence outside the scope of the bill of particulars was admitted and that an improper instruction was given to the jury on the element of force required in the rape charge.
The defendant requested and received a bill of particulars. K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 22-3201(5) provides:
The purpose of a bill of particulars was discussed in State v. Frames, 213 Kan. 113, 515 P.2d 751:
*589 The defendant contends the state went outside the bill of particulars in presenting evidence that, in the rape, the victim's resistance was overcome by force and fear while the bill of particulars mentions only force. K.S.A. 21-3502 states the woman's resistance must be overcome by force or fear. The defendant has little cause to complain. The amended bill of particulars incorporated all statements made by Barbara Pitt. The defendant had adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged and was not prejudiced by the slight variance. It should be noted that instruction No. 5 required the state to prove the victim's resistance was overcome by both force and fear. The variance did not diminish the state's burden of proof, it increased it. The state had to prove not only force, but fear as well.
The jury sent the following question to the court:
The record shows the following occurred relative to the answer to be given:
"MR. RUPE: Number 5.
"THE COURT: Well 
"MR. EHRLICH: I'll have to agree.
"MR. RUPE: I'm not [sic]
"THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that.
"Do you object to that?
"Now, you can note your objection if you want to.
The above citation is included as the state contends the defendant did not object to the answer. On appeal the defendant is arguing that the answer went outside the scope of the bill of particulars and permitted the jury to look to the aggravated battery charge to support the force element of the rape charge. The answer given by the court does not actually answer the precise question posed by the jury. However the defense counsel did not lodge an objection to the final answer. We hold, under the totality of the circumstances, that this point is without merit.
The defendant's next claim of error is the failure of the trial court to instruct on the lesser included offense of kidnapping.
Kidnapping is defined in K.S.A. 21-3420 as follows:
"(a) For ransom, or as a shield or hostage; or
Aggravated kidnapping is defined in K.S.A. 21-3421 as follows:
*591 The trial court has an affirmative duty to instruct on lesser included offenses whether or not requested to do so by the accused, but the duty arises only where there is at least some evidence on which the jury might convict of the lesser offense. Failure to instruct on some lesser degree of a crime is not grounds for reversal if the evidence at trial excludes a theory of guilt on the lesser offense. (State v. Wright, 221 Kan. 132, 557 P.2d 1267.) Bodily harm to the victim is the additional element elevating kidnapping to aggravated kidnapping.
In the case at hand, the beating of Barbara Pitt occurred prior to her transportation. The state relies on the rape of the victim as the requisite bodily harm to the victim. Rape supplies the element of bodily harm necessary to make a kidnapping aggravated kidnapping. (State v. Ponds and Garrett, 218 Kan. 416, Syl. 8, 543 P.2d 967.)
Identity is not an issue in the case. The party, the argument over the wallet, the beating of Barbara Pitt by the defendant, the attempted intercourse in the house, the taking her to the car, the ride to the country in the trunk, the two acts of sexual intercourse in the country, and the return of Barbara to the house are admitted by the defendant. The defendant contends the acts in the country were not rape as the victim was not unwilling, although he did not testify she orally agreed to anything. At most it can be said that he testified that at first she did not resist and that later she enjoyed herself. His testimony is not as strong in support of the point on appeal as his counsel would suggest in his brief.
As previously stated, failure to instruct on a lesser offense is not error unless there is some evidence on which the jury might reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser offense. In the posture of the case presented to the jury, the defendant could not have been convicted of aggravated kidnapping unless the jury found Barbara Pitt had been raped after being taken from her home. The jury found that the rape had occurred in convicting the defendant of the crime of rape. Accordingly, the only way the defendant could have been found guilty of kidnapping as opposed to aggravated kidnapping would be if the jury did not find a rape had occurred. We hold that it was improper not to instruct on kidnapping as a lesser included offense as there was some evidence on which a jury could have reasonably convicted the defendant of that offense. However, we do not find the failure to *592 instruct on kidnapping to be prejudicial error under the totality of the circumstances of this case which circumstances include the finding of guilty on the rape charge which would negate any possibility of the jury finding the defendant guilty of kidnapping rather than aggravated kidnapping. An unusual circumstance is present in this case in that if this court were to find the failure to instruct on kidnapping was reversible error, then on retrial the defendant would not be entitled to the kidnapping instruction as the bodily harm element of aggravated kidnapping has already been determined by the conviction of rape in the former trial.
The defendant's final claim of error is that the trial court invaded the province of the jury and thereby violated defendant's constitutional rights. The basis for this claim of error is that the jury sent a note to the court that it had reached verdicts on three of the counts but could not agree on the fourth. The jury was brought back into court in the presence of counsel. The record reflects the following:
"MR. KELLER: Yes.
"MR. KELLER: That's correct.
"MR. KELLER: No.
"MR. KELLER: Ten to two.
"MR. KELLER: No, your Honor, we're at a standstill.
"(Jury foreman responded.)
"THE COURT: Counsel, approach the bench.
The trial judge then talked to the jury about taking a break and then continuing their deliberations.
The foreman volunteered the numerical split on the count on which they could not agree. The court did not try to coerce the jury into a unanimous verdict as was done in Berger v. United States, 62 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.1932). We hold this did not constitute reversible error.
After the jury was sent on recess, the trial court examined the materials and told counsel what the verdicts they agreed on were. This turned out to be inaccurate. However, defense counsel relayed this information on to his client. This conduct by the trial court was highly improper and is not condoned by this court. However, it in no way affected the outcome of the trial and, accordingly, is not reversible error.
All points having been carefully considered, the judgment is affirmed.
HOLMES, J., dissenting.