Title: Wells v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

288 So. 2d 860 (1974) Arthur Lee WELLS v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 47626. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 21, 1974. *861 Ramsey, Bodron & Thames, Paul Kelly Loyacono, Vicksburg, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. WALKER, Justice: The appellant, Arthur Lee Wells, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Warren County for the crime of burglary of an occupied dwelling and sentenced to ten years in the state penitentiary, and from that judgment, he prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. A detailed narration of the evidence presented to the jury is not necessary and only those facts which are relevant to the alleged errors will be discussed. The appellant first complains that the trial court improperly granted the State two continuances, one on July 24, 1972, and another on July 26, 1972, over the objection of the defendant who was thereafter tried at the next term of court on November 16, 1972. The thrust of appellant's argument is that the State failed to furnish the affidavit called for in Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-15-29 (1972). That section reads as follows: Where the requirements of section 99-15-29 are not strictly complied with, a denial of the continuance shall not be grounds for a reversal unless the Supreme Court shall be satisfied that injustice resulted therefrom. Dean v. State, 234 Miss. 376, 106 So. 2d 501 (1958). However the problem here is that the continuance was granted and the defendant has not cited any case nor are we able to find a case where a continuance was granted the State that this Court has held that failure to comply with section 99-15-29 was reversible error. Therefore, the error, if any, must be predicated upon the defendant being denied a speedy trial. In this regard, the record reflects that the defendant was indicted on December 2, 1971; that on January 28, 1972, a motion was made on his behalf by his attorney that he be sent *862 to the Mississippi State Hospital for a mental examination; that he was sent to the hospital and remained there until May, 1972, after which he was returned to the Warren County jail; that his case was set for trial at the next term of court on July 24, 1972; that due to the absence of a material witness said cause was continued on the State's motion until July 26; that on July 26 said cause was again continued on the State's motion due to the absence of the same material witness until November 16, 1972, at which time the defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced. In the case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) which upheld a conviction of a defendant who was not tried for five years after indictment, the Court, after rejecting the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial waives this right, and declining to specify any time period within which an accused must be offered a trial went on to say: There is nothing in the record to indicate that any evidence or any witness was available to appellant on July 24 or July 26, 1972, when the State's motion for a continuance was granted which was not available to him when he was tried on November 16, 1972. Further, the delay in being brought to trial was partially brought about by defendant's own motion in January of 1972 which resulted in his being sent to the Mississippi State Hospital for a mental examination. After the examination was completed in May, 1972, his case was set for trial at the next term of court which was in July, 1972. The case was then continued, over his objection, due to the absence of a material witness for the State, until the next succeeding term which was in November of 1972, at which time he was tried, convicted and sentenced. When the facts of this case are weighed with the criteria prescribed in the Barker case, supra, in mind, we are unable to say that appellant was deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial. The appellant next complains that he should have been released on his own recognizance from the time of the continuance on July 26 until his trial on November 16, 1972, as he was an indigent and unable to make a surety bond or post a cash bond in any amount. We have considered this contention and find it to be wholly without merit. The fixing of bail, whether it be in an amount certain or by recognizance, is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his judgment in that regard will not be disturbed unless there is a showing of manifest error or abuse of discretion. The appellant next complains that the manner in which the district attorney cross-examined the appellant with reference to prior convictions was improper. In this regard, while defendant was testifying in his own behalf, he was asked the following question by his own attorney: "... Have you ever been convicted of anything: Have you ever been in jail before?" To which he answered: "Yes, sir." Appellant's attorney did not pursue the questioning any further and did not ask appellant what crime or crimes or misdemeanors of which he had been convicted. Thereafter, when appellant was tendered to the State for cross-examination, the district attorney asked the following questions and several others similar in nature: In addition to the above questions, the district attorney asked appellant eleven other questions concerning crimes which he admitted that he had been convicted. Each of the district attorney's questions were similar in form to the above questions and each time that a question was asked, the appellant's attorney objected thereto. It is apparent in this instance that the district attorney was attempting to abide by the prior decisions of this Court where it has been held numerous times that evidence cannot be introduced to contradict a witness with reference to his convictions, unless he first denies them. Matthews v. State, 243 Miss. 568, 139 So. 2d 386 (1962). However, that does not mean that the prosecuting attorney may begin his cross-examination by asking whether the defendant denies that he was convicted of a particular crime on a particular date in a particular court. The defendant should first be given the opportunity to enumerate his prior convictions such as trespass, burglary, assault and battery or whatever they might be. In McElroy's Mississippi Evidence, section 130, pages 404-405 (1955), the rule is stated thusly: The appellant's contention in this regard is that once he had responded to his attorney that he had been convicted of a crime that he could not be cross-examined further on this point. This contention is without merit. The district attorney had the right to ask of what crimes appellant had been convicted. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 13-1-11, 13-1-13 (1972). The procedure which the district attorney used to obtain appellant's testimony with regard to prior convictions was error, but was not reversible error under the facts of this case. The proper procedure for the district attorney to have used was to simply ask appellant of what crimes or misdemeanors he had been convicted since appellant had already responded to his own attorney that he had been convicted of a crime. If he then failed to fully enumerate all of his prior convictions, then the district attorney could properly ask him, by way of refreshing his memory and to lay a predicate for impeachment, if he denied being convicted of a particular crime on a particular date in a particular court, but without going into the details of such crime or the punishment received. We would point out, however, that it is dangerous to ask such a question unless the State is ready to prove the prior conviction by competent evidence in the event that convictions are denied by defendant. Johns v. State, Miss., 255 So. 2d 322 (1971). The appellant next contends that the court erred in refusing to grant the following instruction: A similar instruction was condemned in Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 4 So. 2d 887 (1941) where Judge Alexander in an eloquent opinion said: In condemning the above instruction, we readopt the language of the Carr decision and would point out that the portion of the instruction which we have included in brackets, particularly the underlined portion thereof, is the type of phrases and vagaries condemned by Judge Alexander. Therefore, the instruction was properly refused. Finally the appellant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to grant one of his instructions with reference to "reasonable doubt." This is without merit since the jury was otherwise adequately instructed in this regard. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, INZER and BROOM, JJ., concur.