Title: ESLINGER v RINGSBY TRUCK LINES I

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-149 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA VANESSA ESLINGER and LANETTE ESLINGER, individually and as Co-Personal Representatives of Estate of Walter and Clare Eslinger, Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS. RINGSBY TRUCK LINES, INC., and STATE OF MONTANA, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula Hon. James Wheelis, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Morrison Law Offices, Missoula, Montana Carey Matovich argued and Joan Jonkel argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary Graham argued, and Paul Meismer argued, Missoula, Montana J. Michael Young, Dept. of Administration, Helena, Montana Submitted: September 18, 1981 Decided : W ~ V 1 2 198f Filed: K'OV 1 r f g m Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is a wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n i n which p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from a f i n a l judgment and d e n i a l of t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , f o l l o w i n g a j u r y v e r d i c t which found p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent 100 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t and d e f e n d a n t s Ringsby Truck L i n e s and t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o be f r e e of any n e g l i g e n c e . P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l a s t o Ringsby Truck Lines only. Walter and C l a i r e E s l i n g e r were k i l l e d when a t r u c k belonging t o Ringsby Truck Lines c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e E s l i n g e r automobile. The t r u c k was d r i v e n by an employee, Howard S k i l e s . The a c c i d e n t occurred a t 12:15 p.m., January 1 8 , 1978, on Highway 93 a t R a v a l l i , Montana. The roadway was snow covered and s l i c k ; t h e temperature was between 20 and 2 5 d e g r e e s F a h r e n h e i t . The c o l l i s i o n occur red near t h e T- j u n c t i o n formed by U.S. Highway 93 and Montana Highway 200. Highway 93 is s t r a i g h t and r e l a t i v e l y f l a t through R a v a l l i b u t changes a s t h e highway proceeds n o r t h up R a v a l l i H i l l . The Bison Cafe is l o c a t e d on Highway 93, d i r e c t l y a d j a c e n t t o t h e a c c i d e n t s i t e . S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s were i n t h e c a f e and t e s t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g t h e a c c i d e n t . Walter E s l i n g e r was d r i v i n g h i s 1967 C h e v r o l e t down R a v a l l i H i l l i n t h e southbound l a n e of U . S . Highway 93. C l a i r e E s l i n g e r was h i s p a s s e n g e r . A t t h e same t i m e , Howard S k i l e s was d r i v i n g a 1973 Mack t r a i l e r - t r a c t o r combination i n t h e northbound l a n e of Highway 93. A s t h e C h e v r o l e t came down t h e h i l l and c r o s s e d t h e j u n c t i o n , snow-packed r u t s a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n caused t h e c a r t o f i s h t a i l . The p a r t i e s d i f f e r s h a r p l y from t h i s p o i n t i n t h e i r t h e o r i e s of t h e subsequent events. Appellants claimed Eslinger regained control; however, the driver of the Ringsby truck abruptly locked his brakes and lost control of his vehicle. The trailer jack- knifed and the truck skidded across the centerline into the southbound lane and the Eslinger vehicle. According to appellants, the direct and proximate cause of the collision and the wrongful deaths of the Eslingers was the negligence of the truck driver in failing to (1) keep a proper lookout; (2) maintain reasonable control of the truck; (3) yield one half of the roadway; and (4) operate at a reasonable speed. Respondent Ringsby claimed that Eslinger lost control of his vehicle at the intersection and skidded head-on into the truck's proper lane. An integral part of Ringsby's theory was the emergency created for the Ringsby driver when Eslinger 's vehicle began to fishtail. Ringsby claimed the momentary application of the truck's brakes was an appropriate response to a perilous situation. The emergency instruction given was therefore proper. Howard Skiles, the truck driver, did not appear at trial. His testimony was entered by deposition. Several witnesses testified that the Eslinger vehicle was fishtailing prior to the accident. The truck driver's testimony by deposition of his perceptions and actions is relevant to the use of the sudden emergency doctrine. Driver Skiles testified he was familiar with the road and aware of the icy, unsanded conditions. He further testified: "Q. Could you pinpoint for us just how far away the vehicle was when you first saw it? A. Well, no, I can't. "Q. Could you estimate it perhaps in car lengths? A. Not really. I seen him cominq down t h e h i l l b e f o r e h e e v e r g o t t o t h e ........................ ' u n c t i o n . I d i d n ' t p a y t h a t much a t t e n t i o n i o him u n t i l he got-within one h u n d r e d y a r d s of me. [Emphasis added.] "Q. So was he on t h e s t r a i g h t a w a y when you f i r s t began t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o him? A. Yes. "Q. How long is your r i g ? Could you e s t i m a t e t h a t ? A . I t is approximately s i x t y - e i g h t f e e t o v e r a l l . "Q. Does t h a t i n c l u d e both t r a i l e r s ? A. Yes. "Q. Could you d e s c r i b e t h e v e h i c l e t h a t you saw coming i n t h e southbound l a n e ? A. I t was a -- I t w a s n ' t no new c a r b u t it w a s n ' t no r e a l o l d one e i t h e r . "Q. Was it a l a r g e c a r o r a s m a l l c a r ? A. I t w a s n ' t n e i t h e r . I t was about a medium- s i z e c a r . "Q. And t h e c o l o r ? A. Blue, I b e l i e v e . "Q. When you f i r s t p e r c e i v e d t h e c a r and f i r s t n o t i c e d it, it was on t h e s t r a i g h t a w a y ? A. Yes. "Q. Could you t h e n d e s c r i b e f o r u s what happened n e x t ? A. He j u s t -- when I f i r s t r e a l l y n o t i c e d him, he was coming q u i t e f a i r l y f a s t . "Q. Could you e s t i m a t e h i s speed? A. No, I wouldn't even t r y because he was coming r i g h t s t r a i g h t a t me b u t h e ' s coming f a s t and t h a t ' s -- I ' m n o t h e r e t o e s t i m a t e speeds anyway. "Q. Did you t e s t i f y what your speed was a t t h i s time? A. Yes. "Q. How f a s t was t h a t a g a i n ? A. About twenty-f i v e . "Q. Was t h e o t h e r c a r a t a comparable r a t e of speed would you say? A. A l o t f a s t e r I would s a y b u t how much f a s t e r I wouldn't know. "Q. So t h e c a r is coming s t r a i g h t down t h e southbound l a n e towards you and t h e n what happens? A. E e went a c r o s s t h e j u n c t i o n t h e r e where t h i s compact snow and i c e is r u t t y , g o t r u t s i n it kind o f , and when he g o t p a s t , when he c r o s s e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , he s t a r t e d t o go l i k e t h a t ( i n d i c a t i n g ) . "Q. Is he on t h e s t r a i g h t w a y a t t h i s time? A. Yes . ' I The v e h i c l e s s u b s e q u e n t l y c o l l i d e d a t t h e l e f t f r o n t bumper of t h e t r u c k and t h e l e f t f r o n t door of t h e c a r . S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h e y heard two impacts up t o f i v e seconds a p a r t . The o n l y evidence of c o l l i s i o n d e b r i s was f o u n d i n t h e s o u t h b o u n d ( E s l i n g e r ' s ) l a n e , t h u s s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e r e p o r t and testimony of t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l o f f i c e r t h a t t h e p o i n t of impact was i n t h e southbound l a n e . Ringsby c l a i m s t h a t t h e d e b r i s was from t h e second c o l l i s i o n and t h a t t h e f i r s t c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d i n t h e northbound l a n e . I t c l a i m s t h a t s i n c e i n v e s t i g a t o r s were delayed approximately one hour, t r a f f i c i n t h e northbound l a n e around t h e a c c i d e n t d e s t r o y e d t h e p h y s i c a l evidence of t h e f i r s t c o l l i s i o n . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Whether t h e g i v i n g of a sudden emergency i n s t r u c - t i o n was e r r o n e o u s under t h e f a c t s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , o r whether such an i n s t r u c t i o n should be g i v e n under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 2 . Whether t h e a l l e g e d p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r t a k e n by a highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r was p r o p e r l y r e j e c t e d by t h e c o u r t . The i s s u e of t h e emergency i n s t r u c t i o n f i r s t concerns t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n and s e c o n d a r i l y t h e g i v i n g o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y i n s t r u c t i o n on y i e l d i n g one-half of t h e roadway. The given sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n , I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 8 , is a s follows: "A sudden emergency e x i s t s when t h e d r i v e r of a motor v e h i c l e is suddenly p l a c e d i n a p o s i t i o n o f imminent p e r i l , g r e a t m e n t a l stress, or danger, which situation has not been brought about by his own negligence, - but in which instant action is necessary to avoid a threatened danger. But the driver must use that care which the ordinary prudent person w o u l d exercise under like or similar .................................... circumstances. One suddenly confronted with a peril through no fault of his own, who in attempting to escape does not choose the best or safest way should not be held negligent because of such choice, unless it was so hazardous that an ordinary prudent person would not have made [it] under similar circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellants claim the District Court further erred by giving the sudden emergency instruction together with the following instruction on yielding one-half of the roadway. Instruction No. 9 provided: "Under the statutes of the State of Montana, the operator of a motor vehicle is obligated to yield one half of the roadway to oncoming traffic. If the operator of a motor vehicle fails to yield one-half of the roadway and collides with the vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction in its lane of traffic, then the operator of the vehicle failinq to -- --- yield one half of the roadway is negligent." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellants contend the two instructions, not being compatible, confused the jury and, thus, prevented a fair trial. Presser v. Anderson (1965), 146 Mont. 396, 407 P.2d $fi A41; Adami v. Murphy (1945). 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150. Appellants further contend that the - sudden emergency instruction is an exceEtion to the general rule that ...................... ------------ violation of a safety statute is negligence per se. Lyndes v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177, 589 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 185; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369, 492 P.2d 926. Appellants contend further that the sudden emergency doctrine has a limited application. In the instant case, the evidence did not present an "emergency" situation as envisioned by the doctrine. The slippery highway was foreseeable; therefore, the doctrine is unavailable. Boge v. Jack Link Truck Line, Inc. (Iowa Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App. 355, 499 P.2d 68, and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App. 602, 563 P.2d 1322, and that their theory of the accident (Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency situation) was supported by the evidence presented. Therefore, respondent was entitled to present its theory to the jury by proper instruction. Locker v. Sammons Trucking Company (1974), 10 Wash.App. 899, 520 P.2d 939. The appellants' theory of preexisting negligence by Skiles is not sufficient for excluding a sudden emergency situation. Barbieri v. Jennings (1976), 90 N.M. 83, 559 P.2d 1210. The "emergency" situation was the fishtailing of appellants' car and not the slippery condition of the road. Drivers need not anticipate all events. Erickson v. Perrett (1976), 169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074. Respondent contends none of the authority cited by appellants address the emergency of an oncoming car in the wrong lane. The doctrine of sudden emergency was first adopted in Montana in the case of Peabody v. Northern Pac. Railway Co. (1927), 80 Mont. 492, 497, 261 P. 261, 262: "The rule as stated in the authorities generally is that: "'One who, in a sudden emergency, acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of time in which to form a judgment omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence. Such . . . act or omission . . . may be called a mistake, but not carelessness.' (Citations omitted.)" The sudden emergency doctrine has been recently criticized, and its application limited in a recent decision of this Court. In Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29, 572 P.2d 183, we stated: "While we do not reject the concept of sudden emergency, we emphasize that it has limited application in the law of negligence, and trial courts should be very cautious in instructing the jury on sudden emergency. In Finley v. Wiley, 103 N.J.Super. 95, 246 A.2d 715 (1968), the court criticized the sudden emergency rule: "'Further we entertain grave doubt whether a sudden emergency charge should ever be given in an ordinary automobile accident case. ..................... T h e r e i s a m o d e r n v i e w t h a t i t i s ----------_---------------------- argumentative, unnecessary, _ and confusing, and should be eliminated . . . I1 I . . . defendant was faced with no more than an everyday traffic ~ r o b l e m for which he ------- -- --------- -- - should have been prepared. - ------------------ T h e ordinary rules of negligence were a ~ ~ l i c a b l e and ----_--_--- -- _---------- -------- afforded a sufficient g a u g e by which to ---_-----------_- -- --- appraise his conduct.' "Further, this Court in Erickson v. Perrett, 169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074, 33 St.Rep. 109 (1976) cited Prosser on Torts, 4th ed., p. 170, with approval as to the limited application of the rule: "'A further qualification [to the sudden emergency ruie] which must be made is that some "emergencies" must be anticipated, and the actor must be prepared to meet them when he engages -- in an activity in whrch they are likely to arise. Thus under present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles in the highway . . . I (Bracketed material added.)" 572 P.2d at 191. (Emphasis supplied.) Professor Prosser's complete discussion of the emergency doctrine defines an emergency as a "sudden or unexpected event or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action." Prosser on Torts, 4th ed., at 169. Other limitations not quoted in Kudrna, supra, are: "There are, however, a number of limitations which have hedged the 'emergency' rule. It does not mean that any different standard i s to be applied in the emergency. The conduct -- required is still that of a reasonable man under the circumstances, as they would appear to one who was using proper care, and the --------- emergency is only one of the circumstances. -- An objective standard must still be applied, and the actor's own judgment or impulse is still not the sole criterion. He may still be found to be negligent if, notwithstandinq the emergency, his acts are found to be ----- --- .......................... unreasonable. The 'emergency doctrine' is - - applied only where the situation which arises is sudden and unexpected, and such as to ------------------ - - - - -- deprive the actor of reasonable opportunity for deliberation and considered decision. -------- Furthermore, it obviously cannot serve to excuse the actor when the emergency has been created through his own negligence, since he cannot be permitted to shield himself behind a situation resulting from his own fault. It is, however, not the conduct after the emergency has arisen which is not excused, but the prior negligence; and where the question is one of the last clear chance, the defendant may still not be liable." (Emphasis supplied.) (Footnotes omitted.) Prosser, supra, at 169. Before an instruction on the doctrine of sudden emergency is given, the evidence should be sufficient to support a finding that: (1) the claimed emergency actually or apparently existed; (2) the perilous situation was not created or contributed to by the person confronted; (3) alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were open to such person or there was an opportunity to take some action to avert the threatened casualty; and (4) the action or course taken was such as would or might have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence in the same or similar situation. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961). The limited application of the sudden emergency doctrine in automobile cases and the reasons therefor are stated in Kudrna. In the instant case, assuming the "emergency" relied upon by respondent that preceded the accident was the fishtailing of the Eslinger vehicle, the evidence cannot be said to preclude the concurrent negligence of the truck driver Skiles, who testified, ". . . I didn't pay that much attention to him until he got within one hundred yards of me." "This Court has recognized the doctrine of sudden emergency, but a party asserting sudden emergency cannot obtain the benefit of that rule where the emergency itself has been created [or contributed to] by the actor's own negligent or other tortious conduct." Kudrna, 572 P.2d at 189. (The bracketed language reflects the broader rule of other jurisdictions which denotes consideration of comparative negligence principles.) Further, the doctrine's requirement that the actor be deprived of "reasonable opportunity for deliberation," is doubtful here. The driver of the truck did not "pay that much attention to him [Eslinger] until he got within one hundred yards." The road was snow-covered and slick. Assuming, as respondent argues, that the collision occurred in the northbound lane, its driver was not confronted with a decision precipitated by an emergency. The time between his recognition of the Eslinger vehicle and the collision precluded a decision by him, and, therefore, the doctrine cannot be applied. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Ringsby ( e . , adopting its theory of the case) refutes Ringsby's claim of the propriety of the instruction. Under the doctrine when an actor who, forced by exigencies, makes less than the optimal decision, the trier of fact should not necessarily find negligence but rather consider the e m e r g e n c y a n d , a c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e a c t o r ' s c o n d u c t . . A s s t a t e d by t h i s Court, t h e emergency d o c t r i n e is a r e i t e r a t i o n of t h e r e a s o n a b l e man s t a n d a r d . However, i f no a l t e r n a t i v e s were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e t r u c k d r i v e r , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , a g a i n , was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e . There was no c l a i m h e r e of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of conduct f a c i n g t h e t r u c k d r i v e r f o l l o w i n g h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e emergency. C o n s i d e r a t i o n being g i v e n t o a l l t h e f a c t s i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o respondent, w e must a g r e e w i t h a p p e l l a n t s t h a t t h e g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 18 was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . The sudden emergency d o c t r i n e admonition c o n t a i n e d i n Kudrna, s u p r a , is we11 t a k e n , and now, i n view of t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n ' s a d o p t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e , w e would a t t h i s time admonish t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n n o t be g i v e n i n an o r d i n a r y automobile a c c i d e n t c a s e . I t is unnecessary and confusing. The o r d i n a r y r u l e s of n e g l i g e n c e a r e a p p l i c a b l e and a f f o r d a s u f f i c i e n t gauge by which t o a p p r a i s e conduct. T h i s does n o t c r e a t e a d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d o r d i m i n i s h t h e e x i s t i n g s t a n d a r d t o be a p p l i e d i n an emergency. The conduct r e q u i r e d is s t i l l t h a t of a r e a s o n a b l e man under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h e y would appear t o one u s i n g proper c a r e . The emergency is o n l y one of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Ringsby d e v o t e s a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of its argument t o s u p p o r t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t an emergency i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t i n h e r e n t l y c o n f l i c t w i t h a n i n s t r u c t i o n on v i o l a t i o n of a s a f e t y s t a t u t e . Hood v. Williamson, s u p r a ; NeSmith v . Bowden, s u p r a . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n is supported by Montana c a s e law a s w e l l : "The D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n concluding t h a t v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e c o n s t i t u t e d n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of law. I t is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i n v o l u n t a r y v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t e i n an emergency due t o circumstances beyond t h e a c t o r ' s c o n t r o l d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e n e g l i g e n c e p e r s e . Duchesneau v. Mack Truck, I n c . ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 158 Mont. 369, 3 7 7 , 492 P.2d 926, 930." Lyndes v. S c o f i e l d , s u p r a , 589 P.2d a t 1004. While t h e combination of an emergency and n e g l i g e n c e p e r s e i n s t r u c t i o n is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e r r o r , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i v e i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l is a somewhat d i f f e r e n t l e g a l i s s u e ; i .e., whether t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d j u s t i f i e d a c c e p t a n c e of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a s a m a t t e r of law. The a p p e l l a n t s f i n a l l y contend t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o a l l o w i n t r o d u c t i o n of a s t a t e m e n t g i v e n by d r i v e r S k i l e s t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t was p r e j u d i c i a l and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . The evidence was o f f e r e d a s e x t r i n s i c evidence of a p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t . A t t r i a l , t h e E s l i n g e r s planned t o impeach S k i l e s ' c o n t e n t i o n , made i n h i s deposed t e s t i m o n y , t h a t he had n o t l o s t c o n t r o l . ~n h i s testimony, s k i l e s s a i d : " I s t a r t e d t o p u l l t o t h e r i g h t and I h i t m y b r a k e s and I seen t h a t w a s n ' t t h e r i g h t t h i n g t o do s o I g o t r i g h t back o f f them and t h e v e h i c l e s t a r t e d t o l o c k up." The excluded s t a t e m e n t made t o t h e p a t r o l o f f i c e r : " I t h e n tapped m y brakes and saw m y v e h i c l e was s t a r t i n g t o s k i d , s o I a c c e l e r a t e d i n an a t t e m ~ t t o r e g a i n c o n t r o l o f m y v e h i c l e . " ----- --- - (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) A l t h o u g h t h e o f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t was e x c l u d e d , t h e o f f i c e r was allowed t o t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h S k i l e s . "Q. With r e s p e c t t o Howard S k i l e s , t h e d r i v e r of t h e Ringsby t r u c k , d i d you i n t e r - view him immediately a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t ? A. Approximately two h o u r s a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . "Q. T h i s was i n S t . I g n a t i u s , was i t ? A. Y e s , s i r . "Q. He was t a k e n t h e r e , I b e l i e v e , f o r medical a t t e n t i o n , and you interviewed him a t t h a t time? A. Yes, I d i d . "Q. Did he t e l l you t h a t when t h e E s l i n g e r c a r came o f f t h e h i l l it f i s h t a i l e d , and t h a t he h i t h i s brakes? A . Yes, he d i d . "Q. Did he t e l l you t h a t t h e n t h e t r a i l e r on h i s t r u c k s t a r t e d t o come around on him? A. Yes, he d i d . "Q. Did he t e l l you t h a t he l o s t c o n t r o l of h i s t r u c k ? A . Y e s . he d i d . " ( E m ~ h a s i s suw- , & & p l i e d . ) The testimony of t h e p a t r o l o f f i c e r provided substan- t i a l l y t h e same evidence a s t h e excluded s t a t e m e n t and t h e e x c l u s i o n of t h e e x h i b i t was harmless e r r o r . Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P. T h i s is probably more t r u e i n t h i s cause because t h e d r i v e r was n o t p r e s e n t i n c o u r t and a l l testimony was by d e p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r , ". . . e r r o r cannot be p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e e x c l u s i o n of evidence a t one s t a g e of a t r i a l , i f t h e same evidence is admitted t h e r e a f t e r . " S t a t e v. American Bank & T r u s t Co. ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 75 Mont. 369, 384, 243 P. 1093, 1098. See a l s o K r a f t v. P a t t y n ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 572, 342 P.2d 1063. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d , and t h e c a u s e is remanded f o r a new t r i a l . J u s t i c e W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e L ' J u s t i c e s Hon&rable John M. McCarvel , ~ i s y r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, J r . M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring: I agree t h a t t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n should n o t have been given, t h a t it was p r e j u d i c i a l , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t a new t r i a l should be granted. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t it i s t i m e f o r t h e demise of t h e sudden-emergency i n s t r u c t i o n i n any s i t u a t i o n . General i n s t r u c t i o n s on negligence are f u l l y capable of properly i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. I want t o emphasize, however, a f a c t o r t h a t has n o t been mentioned i n t h e majority opinion--the defendant argued t h e sudden emergency t o t h e jury and t h e r e f o r e t h e defendant i s not now i n a p o s i t i o n t o contend t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was harmless. A t t h e p r e t r i a l hearing, t h e p l a i n t i f f s had no i d e a t h a t t h e defendant would r e l y on a sudden emergency as a t l e a s t one of t h e t h e o r i e s exonerating it from l i a b i l i t y . This theory was f i r s t presented by t h e defendant a t t h e end of t h e case during t h e settlement of i n s t r u c t i o n s . The i n s t r u c t i o n was given over t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' objection. Although it was n o t argued i n t h e b r i e f s , t h e defendant truck l i n e s argued a t t h e hearing of t h i s appeal, t h a t , i n any event, t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was harmless e r r o r . This argument w a s based on t h e underlying contention t h a t each s i d e approached t h e case knowing t h a t t h e case would t u r n on which of t h e v e h i c l e s was on t h e wrong s i d e of t h e road a t t h e t i m e of impact. I f t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' v e h i c l e w a s i n t h e northbound l a n e of t h e defendant's truck, t h e defendant truck l i n e s would p r e v a i l . But i f t h e defendant's t r u c k w a s i n t h e southbound lane of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t h e t i m e of t h e impact, t h e p l a i n t i f f s would p r e v a i l . For t h i s reason, t h e defendant truck l i n e s argued t h a t t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was harmless e r r o r because t h e jury must have found t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' v e h i c l e was i n t h e northbound lane of t h e defendant's t r u c k a t t h e time of impact. But during t h e f i n a l arguments t o t h e jury, defendant's counsel d i d not downgrade t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and e f f e c t of t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n . Rather, he emphasized t o t h e jury t h a t it would probably be a v i t a l a i d i n helping t h e jury reach a decision. Counsel used t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n as follows i n h i s f i n a l argument: ". . . There has been no testimony by anyone i n t h i s c a s e t h a t t h a t truck w a s t r a v e l i n g anything o t h e r than a slow, c a r e f u l speed u n t i l a sudden emergency. I ' m going t o ask t h a t you - - ---- go t o t h e jury and read t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on - - - - - - - sudden emergency, because I ' m not going to t a l k about it. You read it, and you apply t h a t --- -- i n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s case." (Empha - . -- --- sis added. ) Although defense counsel d i d not again mention t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e e n t i r e c a s e based on t h e deposition of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r read i n t o evidence, and i n p a r t read again t o t h e jury by defense counsel i n f i n a l argument, was t h a t t h e conduct of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r should be judged by t h e f a c t t h a t he took a c t i o n i n an emergency s i t u a t i o n . Obviously t h e defense wanted t h e jury t o judge t h e truck d r i v e r ' s conduct based f i r s t on t h e f a c t t h a t he had responded t o an emergency s i t u a t i o n . W e do not, of course, know how t h e jury reached its v e r d i c t . But t h e jury could have decided t h a t t h e t r u c k w a s i n t h e wrong l a n e of t r a f f i c a t t h e t i m e of impact, b u t a l s o t h a t t h e defendant should n o t be held l i a b l e because t h e t r u c k d r i v e r had responded t o an emergency s i t u a t i o n and i n s o doing he could n o t c o n t r o l t h e movement of h i s t r u c k a f t e r he applied h i s brakes. O r it i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a p a r t of t h e jury decided t h e case on t h e theory t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' vehicle was in the wrong lane of traffic but that the remainder of the jurors needed for a verdict, based their decision on an emergency situation justifying the truck driver being in the wrong lane of traffic at the time of impact. They could have based their decision on the sudden emergency instruction. Under these circumstances, I cannot accept the defendant truck line's argument that the instruction, if error, was harmless. M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber dissenting: I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . The majority opinion s e t s f o r t h t h e f u l l t e x t of Instruc- t i o n No. 18, which i s t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n given i n t h i s case. It should be noted t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s a d u p l i c a t e of t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n given i n Dawe v. Dalley (1972), 161 Mont. 73, 504 P.2d 982. I n t h e Dawe case, t h e Dalley c a r had followed t h e Dawe v e h i c l e f o r approximately three-quarters of a mile up t h e north s i d e of Boulder H i l l on Highway 91 i n J e f f e r s o n County. The Dawe c a r was observed t o have d i f f i c u l t y negotiating t h e h i l l and was f i s h t a i l i n g . When t h e c a r s t a r t e d down t h e south s i d e , they were t r a v e l i n g no f a s t e r than 15 m i l e s per hour, with Dalley t e s t i f y i n g he w a s t r y i n g t o keep 50-75 f e e t behind t h e Dawe vehicle. Upon reaching a sharp curve t h e Dawe v e h i c l e went o u t of c o n t r o l with f r o n t wheels c o l l i d i n g with a snowbank and t h e r e a r end s l i d i n g around. A t t h i s p o i n t Dalley t r i e d t o t u r n t o t h e l e f t b u t was unable t o do so because of oncoming t r a f f i c . H e then applied brakes and s l i d i n t o t h e Dawe vehicle. Based upon these f a c t s , t h i s Court i n a unanimous d e c i s i o n agreed t h a t it was proper t o g i v e t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n . The Court s t a t e d : "'We a r e a l s o of t h e opinion t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury with reference t o t h e emergency doctrine. An i n s t r u c t i o n on t h i s theory should always be given where it i s c o n s i s t e n t with the theory of one of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e a c t i o n and where t h e evidence submitted by such p a r t y would s u s t a i n a finding t h a t he had been confronted with a sudden p e r i l o r emer- gency and acted under i t s s t r e s s . ' " 161 Mont. a t 76, 504 P.2d a t 984. The Court f u r t h e r quoted from t h e Montana r u l e s s t a t e d i n Peabody v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1927), 80 Mont. 492, " ' I f t h e evidence i n t h i s case w e r e s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant a reasonable conclusion t h a t a t t h e time i n question t h e defendant . . . was confronted with a "sudden emergency," o r t h a t " t h e r e was want of t i m e i n which t o form a judgment", under t h e circumstances, a s they appeared t o him, - the c o u r t should have given t h e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s . ' Emphasis supplied." - 161 Mont. a t 76, 504 P.2d a t 984. A t t h e time of t h e t r i a l of t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e holding i n Dawe had n o t been modified o r overturned. N o s p e c i f i c reference i s made t o t h i s case i n t h e majority opinion. The majority opinion makes an extensive reference t o t h e Kudrna case. It should be noted t h a t t h e quoted p o r t i o n s of t h a t case a r e e s s e n t i a l l y d i c t a . I n Kudrna t h i s Court found t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of sudden emergency could n o t be applied because t h e truck d r i v e r had c r e a t e d h i s own emergency by h i s own negligent a c t s . Following t h e quotation from Kudrna and Prosser t h e majority opinion r e f e r s t o the annotation i n 80 ALR 2d 1 and p o i n t s o u t t h a t before t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on the d o c t r i n e of sudden emergency i s given, t h e evidence should be s u f f i c i e n t t o support a finding t h a t (1) t h e claimed emergency a c t u a l l y o r apparently e x i s t e d ; ( 2 ) t h e apparent s i t u a t i o n was n o t c r e a t e d o r contributed t o by t h e person confronted; ( 3 ) a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n i n meeting t h e emergency w e r e open t o such person o r t h e r e was an opportunity t o take some a c t i o n t o a v e r t t h e threatened c a s u a l t y ; ( 4 ) t h e a c t i o n o r course taken was such a s would o r might have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n . The majority then seeks t o apply t h e f a c t s t o the foregoing r u l e s and a r r i v e s a t a conclusion t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was improper. W e r e s p e c t f u l l y submit t h a t t h e r e has been a f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of the majority t o accurately analyze t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t case. The evidence on t h e p o i n t of impact of t h e v e h i c l e s i s i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t . The majority opinion makes reference t o t h e evidence of c o l l i s i o n d e b r i s i n t h e southbound lane of t r a f f i c and t h e testimony of t h e highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r t h a t t h e p o i n t of impact was i n t h e southbound lane, t h a t being t h e lane of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r . That evidence i s c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t and i s unfavorable t o t h e defendant. However, i t should be noted t h a t t h e r e i s extensive evidence c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e patrolman's conclusion a s t o the p o i n t of impact. I n a s i m i l a r manner, t h e r e is extensive testimony which p o s i t i v e l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' car made two complete s p i n s on t h e i c y highway, f i s h t a i l e d back and f o r t h , and s l i d sideways a c r o s s from its own l a n e of t r a f f i c i n t o t h e lane of t r a f f i c of t h e northbound truck, c o l l i d i n g with t h e truck i n t h e northbound l a n e of t r a f f i c . The a c c i d e n t occurred i n t h e town of Ravalli i n an a r e a posted f o r 4 5 m i l e s per hour t r a v e l . The evidence i n d i c a t e s t h e truck was d r i v i n g north a t 25-35 m i l e s per hour and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r w a s d r i v i n g south down Ravalli H i l l a t a speed of 35 m i l e s per hour o r possibly f a s t e r . That evidence shows t h a t t h e sudden emergency so f a r as t h e truck d r i v e r w a s concerned was t h e s l i d i n g sideways a c r o s s i n t o h i s t r a f f i c l a n e of the Eslinger c a r . Mark F i t c h , 4 0 years of age, with 2 2 years of d r i v i n g experience, was seated i n t h e Bison Cafe, which i s next t o t h e highway and a d j a c e n t t o t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n . Key p a r t s of M r . F i t c h ' s testimony a r e : "A. W e l l , t h e c a r (Eslinger c a r ) was headed south, corning o f f of Ravalli H i l l , and when it g o t c l o s e t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of 200 a t t h e f o o t of t h e h i l l , it seemed t o s t a r t f i s h t a i l i n g o u t of c o n t r o l and s t a r t e d two clockwise s p i n s still heading south. "Q. H o w f a s t was the blue c a r (Eslinger c a r ) t r a v e l i n g a s it approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n heading toward Thompson F a l l s ? "A. I would guess between t h i r t y - t h i r t y - f i v e miles an hour. "Q. You i n d i c a t e d t h a t it s t a r t e d t o f i s h t a i l ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? "A. Yes. "Q. Can you t e l l the jury i n your own words what your conception of a f i s h t a i l i n g maneuver i s ? "A. The back end t r y i n g t o pass t h e f r o n t end. "Q. What d i d you do when you saw it attempting t o f i s h t a i l ? "A. Well, I watched it go i n t o a couple of clockwise s p i n s , and then I immediately looked south, because m y wife was supposed t o m e e t m e . "Q. W h y i s it t h a t you looked south? "A. She d r i v e s a Chevrolet Chevette, and I was concerned she may be t h e next c a r i n l i n e . "Q. Based upon your twenty-two years of driv- i n g experience, was t h e blue c a r i n c o n t r o l a s it proceeded from t h e Thompson F a l l s i n t e r - s e c t i o n southerly? "A. No. "Q. A s you looked southerly towards t h e d i r e c t i o n t o which you thought your wife was approaching, d i d you have t h e opportunity t o see any o t h e r vehicle? "A. Y e s , t h e r e was a truck approaching headed north . "Q. Could you t e l l , based upon your observa- t i o n of t h a t truck a t t h a t p l a c e and time, how f a s t it was t r a v e l i n g ? "A. I would guess approximately t h i r t y - t h i r t y - f i v e m i l e s an hour. "Q. A t t h e t i m e you saw t h e t r u c k , which l a n e of t r a f f i c w a s it i n , the r i g h t lane. Excuse me, s t r i k e t h a t . "Was it i n t h e northbound l a n e o r the south- bound lane? "A. I t was i n t h e northbound lane. "Q. Had you driven t h a t p a r t i c u l a r roadway before? "A. Many times. "Q. Were you f a m i l i a r with where the snow berms were on t h e s i d e and where t h e center- l i n e was underneath t h e snowpack? "A. Yes. "Q. A s t h e truck proceeded f u r t h e r n o r t h e r l y , d i d it s t a y i n t h e northbound lane? "A. Yes, it did. "Q. M r . F i t c h , I ' l l ask some more s p e c i f i c questions l a t e r , b u t w i l l you t e l l t h i s jury i n your own words e x a c t l y what you saw as t h e truck and t h e c a r approached each o t h e r . "A. J u s t a l i t t l e b i t south of what used t o be t h e Texaco s t a t i o n t h e r e t h e truck w a s i n t h e northbound lane, and t h e c a r seemed t o be s t a r t i n g i n t o another s p i n and was s i t t i n g crossways i n t h e northbound lane, a t which time t h e truck contacted it a t about the passenger o r t h e d r i v e r ' s door, which would be t h e l e f t s i d e , with t h e l e f t f r o n t corner of t h e v e h i c l e , truck, and proceeded t o shove it back up t h e highway, I would guess a hundred - hundred and f i f t y f e e t . F i r s t c o n t a c t the truck immediately -- t h e t r a c t o r jackknifed, made c o n t a c t about a hundred f e e t - a hundred f i f t y f e e t up t h e road, a t which time it h i t t h e r i g h t s i d e of the truck, still h i t t i n g t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e of t h e c a r , shoving it o f f t o t h e w e s t of t h e highway, and t h e t r a i l e r then continued t o s p i n around and s l i d e o f f t o t h e w e s t s i d e of t h e highway. "Q. M r . F i t c h , when t h e f i r s t c o n t a c t was made between t h e c a r and t h e truck, was t h e truck i n t h e northbound l a n e o r i n t h e south- bound lane? "A. W a s i n t h e northbound lane. "Q. When t h e c a r f i r s t made c o n t a c t with t h e truck, was it i n the northbound lane o r i n t h e southbound lane? "A. Mostly i n t h e northbound lane. "Q. Was t h e c a r a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n time with i t s nose headed south, o r was it sideways? "A. A l i t t l e sideways, s t i l l primarily headed south. "Q. Did you, from where you w e r e seated, hear these various impacts t h a t took place? "A. Yes, I did. "Q. Did you hear t h e f i r s t impact when you s a w it take place? "A. Y e s . "Q. Approximately how many seconds elapsed before t h e second impact took place? "A. Five, t h r e e , four, f i v e seconds, very s h o r t period of t i m e . "Q. Approximately f i v e seconds? "A. Approximately. "Q. Can you describe t o t h e jury what happened t o t h e c a r a t t h e time of t h e f i r s t impact? "A. Y e s , it was shoved back up t h e highway, t h a t would be north, which it went a l i t t l e b i t t o t h e southbound lane, and on the second impact then it took place i n t h e southbound lane. " V i r g i n i a B u t l e r , who had l i v e d i n t h e Ravalli a r e a f o r 37 years and been d r i v i n g a c a r f o r 20 years, a l s o t e s t i f i e d . She a l s o was seated next t o a window i n t h e Bison Cafe, d i r e c t l y opposite t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n . She t e s t i f i e d a t length a s t o her observations of both vehicles. She confirmed t h a t t h e Eslinger c a r was going v i r t u a l l y sideways on t h e highway. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t the c a r was t r a v e l i n g f a s t e r than t h e truck. She f u r t h e r confirmed t h a t the truck was i n i t s c o r r e c t lane, t h a t being the northbound lane, and t h a t j u s t p r i o r t o t h e impact, t h e c a r was i n t h e wrong lane, t h a t being the northbound lane a s w e l l . She a l s o confirmed t h a t she heard two loud noises, with t h e second noise being s e v e r a l seconds a f t e r t h e f i r s t . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e truck ended up swerving around a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n and i t s e l f heading south. Howard S k i l e s , d r i v e r of t h e truck t e s t i f i e d a s mentioned i n t h e majority opinion. H e t e s t i f i e d t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of brakes on t h e truck and t r a i l e r , which r e s u l t e d i n a s l i d i n g o r locking, a f t e r which he released such brakes. I t was t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of brakes which t h e defendant contends was t h e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e truck d r i v e r which was j u s t i f i e d because of the sudden emergency. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t S k i l e s t e s t i f i e d : "A. I s t a r t e d t o p u l l t o t h e r i g h t and I h i t m y brakes and I seen t h a t wasn' t t h e r i g h t thing t o do so I g o t r i g h t back o f f them and t h e v e h i c l e s t a r t e d t o lock up. " Q . What happened when you h i t your brakes? "A. It s t a r t e d t o lock up. "Q. And what occurred when it s t a r t e d t o lock up? "A. I t s t a r t e d t o s l i d e and I immediately l e t o f f . "Q. What d i r e c t i o n d i d it start t o s l i d e ? "A. J u s t down t h e street. "Q. Was it going s t r a i g h t ? "A. F a i r l y s t r a i g h t , yes. "Q. I n what p o s i t i o n was t h e t r a i l e r a t t h i s point? "A. I t was behind m e . "Q. Did t h e t r a i l e r s t a r t t o come forward? "A. N o , I l e t o f f on t h e brakes before they had a chance. I j u s t b a r e l y tapped them. "Q. You tapped t h e brakes, you f e l t t h e v e h i c l e lock up -- I think t h a t ' s the t e r m you used -- and s l i d e . You went i n t o a skid. "A. S t a r t e d t o . "Q. Then what happened? "A. I l e t o f f t h e brakes, looked back and he s t a r t e d t o f i s h t a i l and he turned about half sideways and he was coming r i g h t a t me. "Q. Where was your v e h i c l e a t t h i s time and t h i s i s j u s t before t h e impact? "A. W e l l , t h e r e i s no way f o r m e t o r e a l l y -- The v e h i c l e i t s e l f , mine w a s -- I t was w e l l over i n m y l a n e a t t h e time of impact. " Q . Your v e h i c l e was i n t h e northbound l a n e a t t h e time of t h e impact? "A. Y e s . "Q. Did it ever s l i d e over t o t h e southbound lane? "A. That s t r e e t is plowed r e a l wide r i g h t there. That must be over seventy f e e t of street r i g h t t h e r e b u t it was way over on m y s i d e . "Q. Did you ever c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e ? "A. NO." O f f i c e r Magone d i d t e s t i f y a s follows with regard t o t h e p o i n t of impact: "Q. Is t h e r e any question i n your mind, o f f i c e r , about where t h e impact of t h i s a c c i d e n t occurred? "A. NO, sir. "Q. And it occurred, a s you s a i d , i n t h e south- bound lane, c l o s e t o t h e w e s t edge, I think you s a i d of t h e a s p h a l t ? "A. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o t e l l e x a c t l y where t h e edge of t h e lane w a s , b u t it w a s on t h e west s i d e , yes, i n t h e southbound lane; kind of hard t o t e l l r i g h t where t h e lane i s t h e r e due t o t h e snow cover, b u t from t h e c e n t e r l i n e over t o t h i s p o i n t we would p u t it on t h e edge of t h e lane." Reviewing t h e evidence i n the l i g h t most favorable t o t h e defendant, a s required, we would hold t h a t the f i n d i n g s required under t h e annotation from 80 A L R 2d. 1, c i t e d i n t h e majority opinion have been m e t : 1) The claimed emergency which a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d was t h e s l i d i n g of t h e Eslinger c a r sideways i n t o t h e t r u c k ' s l a n e of t r a f f i c . 2 ) The p e r i l o u s s i t u a t i o n was n o t c r e a t e d by t h e truck d r i v e r - t h e truck d r i v e r t e s t i f i e d " I seen him coming down t h e h i l l before he ever g o t t o t h e junction. I didn' t pay t h a t much a t t e n t i o n t o him u n t i l he g o t within 1 0 0 yards of me." The majority has suggested t h i s i s an i n d i c a t i o n of negligence. That cannot be implied where t h e evidence shows t h a t he was d r i v i n g a t 25-35 m i l e s per hour. Note t h e r e i s no o t h e r evidence showing negligence on t h e p a r t of t h e truck d r i v e r with t h e exception of t h e reference t o t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n by t h e evidence of t h e highway patrolman. 3) A l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n i n meeting t h e emergency were open t o t h e truck d r i v e r - c l e a r l y it made sense f o r him t o t u r n r i g h t and apply t h e brakes a s he did. 4 ) The a c t i o n taken w a s such a s might have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s - t h i s seems t o have been an e n t i r e l y appropriate course of a c t i o n t o be taken by a reasonably prudent person. While t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e brakes d i d cause some locking and possibly s l i d i n g , t h e immediate r e l e a s e of t h e brakes allowed t h e truck and t r a i l e r s t o remain i n t h e proper lane. Our case i s d i r e c t l y comparable t o Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash. App. 355, 499 P.2d 68. I n t h e Hood case, t h e r e was a head-on c o l l i s i o n where t h e occupants of t h e v e h i c l e s were both k i l l e d and t h e r e was c o n f l i c t i n g evidence concerning the lane i n which the c o l l i s i o n occurred. With regard t o t h e emergency i n s t r u c t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n here given, the c o u r t s t a t e d : "An emergency i n s t r u c t i o n i s properly applied on behalf of t h e d r i v e r of a c a r on i t s own s i d e of the road, when confront- ed with a c a r on the wrong s i d e of t h e road. [ C i t a t i o n omitted. I There was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o j u s t i f y giving t h e emergency i n s t r u c - t i o n on behalf of both p l a i n t i f f and defendant." 499 P.2d a t 72. I n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e emergency i n s t r u c t i o n could be applicable t o both t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' and defendant's s i d e of t h e case. The p l a i n t i f f s could have argued t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e brakes, locking of t h e wheels, and s l i d i n g of t h e truck was an emergency which required a response on t h e p a r t of t h e Eslingers. O n t h e o t h e r hand, a s argued by t h e defendant, t h e sideways s l i d i n g of t h e Eslinger v e h i c l e i n t o the wrong t r a f f i c l a n e c l e a r l y required an emergency response by t h e truck d r i v e r . W e f i n d t h a t both p l a i n t i f f s and defendant were represented by very competent counsel, and presented a l l of t h e evidence a v a i l a b l e i n behalf of each s i d e . There w e r e s t r i k i n g c o n f l i c t s i n the evidence. After due consideration, t h e jury found t h a t t h e negligence of t h e Eslingers w a s 100% of t h e cause of t h e accident, and t h a t t h e r e was no negligence on t h e p a r t of t h e truck d r i v e r . W e would a f f i r m t h e judgment of t h e lower court. W e concur i n the above d i s s e n t : Chief J u s t i c e