Title: Davenport v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SCOTT A. DAVENPORT v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2012 WY 6Case Number: S-11-0121Decided: 01/12/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
SCOTT 
A. DAVENPORT,Appellant (Petitioner/Claimant),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,Appellee 
(Respondent).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
George 
Santini of Ross, Ross & Santini, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kelly 
Roseberry, Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
KITE, 
Chief Justice.            

 
[¶1] 
In 2008-2009, Scott Davenport sought worker’s compensation benefits for medical 
care and surgery to fuse vertebrae in his lumbar spine.  The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division) denied benefits on the basis that his 2008-2009 
back problems were not caused by work related injuries he suffered in 1984 and 
1985.  After a contested case 
hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division’s 
denial of benefits, ruling that the procedure was necessitated by a preexisting 
congenital defect in Mr. Davenport’s lumbar spine and not his prior work related 
injuries.  Mr. Davenport petitioned 
for judicial review and the district court affirmed the OAH decision.  He then appealed to this Court claiming 
the OAH erred by failing to recognize that an aggravation of a preexisting 
congenital defect is compensable and misapplied the second compensable injury 
rule.     

 
[¶2]      We affirm.     
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      Mr. Davenport 
presents the following issues for this Court’s 
consideration:
 
1.    
Did 
the Hearing Officer err by not recognizing that a material aggravation of a 
preexisting or congenital condition is a compensable injury and that the delayed 
effects of such aggravation are also compensable?
 
2.    
Was 
the second compensable injury rule misapplied by the Hearing 
Officer?

The 
Division states the issue more generally:
 
Did 
substantial evidence support the OAH’s decision that Davenport failed to prove a 
causal connection between his 1984 and 1985 work injuries and his 2008 lumbar 
symptoms and bi-level fusion surgery?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]      Mr. Davenport has 
a long history of back problems.  In 
1984, he was employed by Carbon County Coal Company as an underground mechanic 
in its coal mine near Hanna, Wyoming, when he and another employee attempted to 
move a 500 pound hydraulic cylinder.  
The other employee dropped his end of the cylinder and Mr. Davenport 
injured his lower back while trying to continue to hold his end.  Mr. Davenport was evaluated by 
orthopedic surgeon, Robert Curnow, M.D., who ordered x-rays, which were normal, 
and diagnosed a lumbosacral sprain.  
Mr. Davenport returned to work a short time later.  The Division granted workers’ 
compensation benefits for that injury.    
 
[¶5]      On April 8, 1985, 
Mr. Davenport was at work for Carbon County Coal Company when he fell and 
injured his lower back again.  He 
was carrying an oxygen tank on his shoulder and walking in mud, when his feet 
became tangled in some wires.  
Imaging tests of Mr. Davenport’s lumbar spine showed a defect in the bone 
at L4, known as a pars defect.  Dr. 
Curnow stated in a letter to Mr. Davenport’s employer that the defect in his 
spine was “most likely congenital but has predisposed him to chronic back 
pain.”  Dr. Curnow did not believe 
that Mr. Davenport could continue to perform the heavy lifting required by his 
job unless he had surgery, so he recommended surgery or employment 
retraining.  Mr. Davenport chose to 
retrain as a welder.  Mr. Davenport 
continued to see Dr. Curnow for approximately two years.  At Mr. Davenport’s final appointment 
with Dr. Curnow in 1987, he was “progressing well,” was not doing any heavy 
lifting and was not on any medication.  
Mr. Davenport was awarded benefits for the 1985 injury; however, the 
Division did not make any benefit payments after March 31, 1989.     
 
[¶6]      Over the years, 
Mr. Davenport suffered several other injuries.  In 1992, he was injured when a chain hit 
him in the chest and leg.  He was 
also injured in 1995 when a pulley fell on his head while working as a 
welder.  He underwent neck surgery 
as a result of that injury.  In 
2001, Mr. Davenport had an ATV accident, where he landed on his right shoulder 
and back.  He did not report any 
specific low back or leg pain at that time.   
 
[¶7]      In 2004, Mr. 
Davenport was involved in a motor vehicle accident and again injured his 
back.  X-rays showed an “[a]bnormal 
appearance of the lumbar spine with Grade I spondylolisthesis L4 on L5 . . . 
.”  Spondylolisthesis is a 
misalignment of the lumbar vertebrae with one of the vertebrae (in this case L4) 
moving forward over the lower vertebrae (L5).  Spondylolisthesis occurs when a person 
has a pars defect, which allows the forward movement of the vertebrae.  The grade describes the amount of 
movement, with the alignment getting progressively worse from Grade I to Grade 
IV.    

 
[¶8]      In November 2008, 
Mr. Davenport went to see neurosurgeon Debra Steele, M.D. with a complaint of 
lower back pain.  Dr. Steele ordered 
tests which showed Mr. Davenport had a L4 pars defect with Grade II L4 on L5 
spondyloslisthesis.1  Dr. Steele recommended surgery, and Mr. 
Davenport requested workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that his surgery 
was a direct result of his 1984/1985 work related injuries.  The Division denied his claim and he 
requested a contested case hearing.  
Despite the denial of his claim, Dr. Steele performed fusion surgery on 
Mr. Davenport at L4, L5 and S1.   

 
[¶9]      At the hearing, 
the OAH reviewed Dr. Curnow’s medical records and deposition, which was taken as 
part of Mr. Davenport’s request for benefits from the 1985 injury; Dr. Steele’s 
medical records and deposition; medical records from various complaints and 
injuries between 1986 and 2008; and an independent medical examination (IME) 
performed by neurosurgeon Paul Williams, M.D.  Mr. Davenport and Dr. Williams testified 
at the contested case hearing.  The 
hearing examiner issued his decision, generally concluding that the evidence 
established Mr. Davenport’s  pars 
defect and spondolylisthesis were congenital, he had failed to prove his 2008 
back problems and 2009 surgery were the result of his 1984/1985 work related 
injuries and upholding the Division’s denial of benefits.  Mr. Davenport petitioned the district 
court for review of the OAH decision, and that court affirmed.  He then appealed to this Court.     
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   When considering an appeal from a 
district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we treat the 
case as if it had come directly from the administrative agency, without giving 
any deference to the district court’s decision.  Kenyon v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, ¶ 10, 247 P.3d 845, 848 (Wyo. 2011); 
Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 
2008). Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2011):
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;
(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;
(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;
(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.
 
[¶11]   Under § 16-3-114(c), we review the 
agency’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence standard.  Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bush 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 
179 (Wyo. 2005) (citation omitted).  
“'Findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence 
preserved in the record, we can discern a rational premise for those 
findings.’”  Kenyon, ¶ 11, 247 P.3d  at 849, quoting 
Bush, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d  at 179.      
 
[¶12]   With regard to an agency 
determination that the employee/claimant did not satisfy his burden of proof, we 
have said:
 
If 
the hearing examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his 
burden of proof, we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the agency’s decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole. If, in the course of its decision making 
process, the agency disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for 
doing so based upon determinations of credibility or other factors contained in 
the record, its decision will be sustainable under the substantial evidence 
test. Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether we 
agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude as 
it did, based on all the evidence before it.
 
Dale, 
¶ 
22, 188 P.3d  at 561 (citations omitted).  
“We 
review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo, and will affirm only if the 
agency’s conclusions are in accordance with the law.”  Kenyon, ¶ 13, 247 P.3d  at 849, quoting 
Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. 
Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010).  See also, Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 
561-62.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]   The hearing examiner’s decision 
stated:
 
This 
Office agrees with the Division.  
Davenport failed to prove his November 2008 low back symptoms which 
necessitated the 2009 fusion surgery were more probabl[y] than not causally 
connected to his 1984 and/or 1985 accidents and injuries at Carbon Coal.  Davenport needed to prove his pars 
defect and associated spondylolisthesis were caused by the trauma of his injury 
in 1985 and his expert, Dr. Steele, did not understand the mechanism of his 1985 
injury, which was essential to her opinion.  Furthermore, Dr. Curnow and Dr. Williams 
agreed that Davenport’s pars defect was more likely congenital. 

 
[¶14]   Although the issue was contested at 
the hearing, Mr. Davenport does not seem to challenge the hearing examiner’s 
finding that his pars defect and spondylolisthesis were congenital in 
nature.  In fact, there is 
substantial evidence to support that conclusion.  Dr. Curnow testified in a deposition in 
1986 that spondylolisthesis is typically congenital, meaning the patient is born 
with the defect.  The doctor wrote a 
letter to Mr. Davenport’s employer in 1985, after the second work related 
accident, and stated that Mr. Davenport’s condition was “most likely 
congenital.”  He also stated that 
the tests done after Mr. Davenport’s 1985 accident did not show an acute 
injury.  The physician who performed 
the IME, Dr. Williams, also stated that Mr. Davenport’s spondylolisthesis was 
congenital.  On the other hand, Dr. 
Steele, the surgeon who performed Mr. Davenport’s fusion surgery, testified that 
spondylothesis at the L4-L5 level is more often caused by trauma than a 
congenital defect, but she admitted that it is “hard to prove one way or the 
other.”  The hearing examiner, 
therefore, was faced with opposing expert opinions.  Under those circumstances, the hearing 
examiner had the
 
responsibility, 
as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign probative value, and 
ascribe the relevant weight given to the evidence presented. Clark v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Compensation Div., 934 P.2d 1269, 1271 
(Wyo.1997). The [agency] is in the best position to judge and weigh medical 
evidence and may disregard an expert opinion if it finds the opinion 
unreasonable or not adequately supported by the facts upon which the opinion is 
based. Id.; Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d 1233, 1238 
(Wyo.1996).
 
Spletzer 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers Safety & Comp. Div., 
2005 WY 90, ¶ 21, 116 P.3d 1103, 1112 (Wyo.2005). We do not re-weigh the 
evidence, but defer to the agency’s decision so long as it is based on relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as supporting that decision. 
Id., ¶ 22, 116 P.3d  at 1112.
 
Chavez 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2009 WY 46, ¶ 18, 204 P.3d 967, 971 (Wyo. 2009).  See also, Kenyon, ¶ 25, 247 P.3d  at 852.    
 
[¶15]   Mr. Davenport acknowledges that 
both Dr. Williams and Dr. Steele misunderstood the timing and nature of Mr. 
Davenport’s injuries in the 1980s.  
This was true because Mr. Davenport mistakenly told both of them that he 
was injured while carrying the 500 pound cylinder in 1985, when, in fact, that 
particular injury occurred in 1984 and quickly resolved.  Dr. Williams was provided with Dr. 
Curnow’s medical records prior to the hearing and was aware of Mr. Davenport’s 
erroneous report at the hearing.  
He, therefore, took that information into account in reaching his 
ultimate conclusions at the contested case hearing.  Mr. Davenport could not, however, locate 
Dr. Steele to have her reconsider her opinion in light of the correct 
information.      

 
[¶16]   On this record, the hearing 
examiner properly discounted Dr. Steele’s opinion that Mr. Davenport’s condition 
was caused by trauma and accepted Dr. Curnow’s and Dr. Williams’ opinions that 
his condition was congenital.  As 
such, the hearing examiner’s finding  
that Mr. Davenport’s injury was congenital rather than traumatic in 
nature is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.    
 
[¶17]   Apparently recognizing the validity 
of the OAH ruling, Mr. Davenport argues, instead, that his injuries and 
subsequent need for surgery were the result of a work related aggravation of 
that congenital defect.  He claims 
that the hearing examiner mistakenly failed to recognize that a material 
aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable and the delayed effects of 
an aggravation are also compensable under the second compensable injury 
rule.  
 
[¶18]   Preexisting conditions are excluded 
from the definition of compensable injury:
 
(xi) 
“Injury” means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging 
and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer’s business requires an employee’s presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. 
“Injury” does not include:
. 
. . .
(F) 
Any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer 
against whom a claim is made[.]
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 
[¶19]   An 
employee who has a pre-existing condition may still recover if his “employment 
aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce 
the death or disability for which compensation is sought.”  Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 14, 223 P.3d 559, 562 (Wyo. 2010), 
citing Lindbloom v. Teton Int’l, 684 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Wyo. 
1984) and Larson’s Workmen’s 
Compensation Law.  To establish the compensability 
of a preexisting condition, a claimant must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the work materially 
aggravated the condition.  Dutcher, ¶ 15, 223 P.3d  at 562; 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. v. Slaymaker, 
2007 WY 65, ¶ 14, 156 P.3d 977, 981-82 (Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶20]   The Division argues that Mr. 
Davenport did not raise the “aggravation of a preexisting injury” argument at 
the contested case hearing and, consequently, we should not address it.  The rule that a party cannot raise 
issues on appeal which were not argued below applies to administrative 
decisions.  See, e.g., Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 960 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Wyo. 1998).  We agree that Mr. Davenport did not 
expressly raise the issue in his disclosure statement, etc.; however, he did 
mention it in his closing argument at the hearing.  Although in some cases we would refuse 
to address the issue, we have stated that the hearing examiner “has an 
obligation to invoke and apply the rules of law that support a claimant’s theory 
of the case.”  Pino v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 996 P.2d 679, 687 (Wyo. 2000).  See also, Carabajal v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 119, ¶¶ 20-21, 119 P.3d 947, 954 (Wyo. 
2005).   
 
[¶21]   Under these circumstances, it is 
appropriate for us to consider Mr. Davenport’s argument that his 1984/1985 
injuries aggravated his preexisting congenital spinal defect.  However, in 
order to recover under this theory, he still had to establish his 2008-2009 back 
condition was a second compensable injury.  
The second compensable injury rule was described by this Court in 
Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. v. 
Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 9, 215 P.3d 277, 281 (Wyo. 2009) 
as:
 
            
Wyoming law has long recognized that a single incident at work can give 
rise to more than one compensable injury. See Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 
Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (1936). This principle, referred to as the second 
compensable injury rule, applies when “an initial compensable injury ripens into 
a condition requiring additional medical intervention.” Yenne-Tully v. State 
ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 
(Wyo.2000).
 
[¶22]   Whether the claim is for an initial 
injury or a second compensable injury, the claimant has the burden of proving “a 
causal connection exists between a work-related injury and the injury for which 
worker’s compensation benefits are being sought.”  Dale, ¶ 35, 188 P.3d  at 563.  
 
 
We 
have used a number of terms to describe the required causal connection between 
the first and second injuries including: “direct cause” (Pino v. State ex 
rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 996 P.2d 679, 684 (Wyo.2000); 
Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 
83, ¶ 12, 72 P.3d 799, 803 (Wyo.2003)); “caused by” (Casper Oil Co. v. 
Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 226 (Wyo.1995)); “causally related to” (Chavez v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2009 WY 46, ¶¶ 26–27, 
204 P.3d 967, 973–74 (Wyo.2009); Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp., 931 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo.1997)); “direct causal connection” (Alvarez v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 126, ¶ 17, 164 P.3d 548, 552 
(Wyo.2007)); “direct and natural result” (Stewart v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2007 WY 58, ¶ 12, 155 P.3d 198, 203 
(Wyo.2007) (quoting 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 10.10, at 10–2 
(2006))); “significant causal connection” and “predominant cause” 
(Yenne–Tully v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 
WY 90, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Wyo.2002)); “fairly be traced to” and “a 
contributing cause” (State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. v. 
Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 377 (Wyo.1997)). Regardless of the terminology used to 
describe the causal connection, the burden remains the same: the claimant must 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is more probable than not that 
the second injury was caused by the first.
 
Kaczmarek, 
¶ 11 n. 3, 215 P.3d  at 282 n. 3.  See also, Ball v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2010 WY 128, ¶ 24, 239 P.3d 621, 628 (Wyo. 2010).  Thus, in order to receive benefits, even 
under his theory of aggravation of a preexisting condition, Mr. Davenport was 
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition that 
gave rise to his need for surgery in 2009 was the result of the 1984 and 1985 
work related injuries.  

 
[¶23]   The OAH specifically 
concluded:
 
71. 
      . . . 
Davenport’s testimony that he experienced waxing and waning low back pain from 
1987 through 2008, was not supported by the evidence.  The medical records established 
Davenport did not seek treatment for any low back symptoms from the date he was 
last seen by Dr. Curnow in 1987 until his 2004 motor vehicle accident, which is 
a period of seventeen years.  Also, 
during that period of time, Davenport experienced at least three significant 
traumas, a chain to his chest and legs in 1992, a pulley dropped on his head in 
1995, and he was thrown from a four wheeler landing on his back in 2001, but 
after each incident there is no mention of low back pain or 
symptoms.
            
. . . . 
            
73.       
Accordingly, this Office finds and concludes Davenport failed to prove 
his November 2008 lumbar spine symptoms, which were treated by Dr. Steele in 
2008 and 2009, were second compensable injuries.  
 
[¶24]   The evidence presented at the 
contested case hearing established that Mr. Davenport was injured at work in 
1984 and 1985 and he had a pars defect in his lumbar spine, which was noted in 
1985.  The surgery in 2009 was 
performed to correct a movement in the spine (spondolylosthesis), which happened 
because he had a pars defect.  It 
was critical, therefore, for Mr. Davenport to show that the 1984/1985 injuries, 
rather than a natural progression of the congenital condition, ultimately 
resulted in that movement of the spine which required surgical 
intervention.  

 
[¶25]   
Kenyon provides guidance in resolving this case.  
Ms. Kenyon suffered a work related knee injury and underwent surgery 
to correct the injury.  She also had 
preexisting osteoarthritis in her knee.  
For eighteen months after the surgery to correct the work related injury, 
she did not seek medical treatment and led a fairly active lifestyle.   Later, she underwent knee 
replacement and requested workers’ compensation benefits under the second 
compensable injury rule.  Kenyon, ¶ 19, 247 P.3d  at 850-51.  The OAH accepted the Division’s expert’s 
opinion that she needed the knee replacement surgery because of her preexisting 
osteoarthritis and not the work related injury, due in part to the fact that the 
evidence indicated that she recovered fully after the work related injury and 
associated surgery.  We held that 
the OAH was justified in accepting the Division’s expert’s opinion and 
discounting her treating physician’s opinion to the contrary.  Id., ¶¶ 26-28, 247 P.3d  at 
852-54.
 
[¶26]   Although Mr. Davenport’s medical 
records demonstrated there had been significant movement of the L4 disc over the 
L5 disc in the years between the 1984/1985 injuries and the 2009 surgery, they 
did not establish that the work related injuries necessarily resulted in that 
movement.  Significantly, Mr. 
Davenport did not seek any treatment for low back pain from 1987, when he last 
saw Dr. Curnow, until after the 2004 motor vehicle accident.  During that time, he worked at various 
jobs, including automotive mechanic and welder.  That indicates, consistent with Dr. 
Williams’ opinion, that his back problems associated with the 1984 and 1985 work 
related accidents had resolved many years before the surgery.  Dr. Williams testified the movement of 
L4 over L5 that necessitated the surgery was the result of the natural aging 
process and progression of Mr. Davenport’s spondylolisthesis condition and the 
fact that he suffered the 1984/1985 work injuries did not result in the need for 
the surgery in 2009.  As we noted 
earlier, the hearing examiner adequately explained his rationale for accepting 
Dr. Williams’ opinion over Dr. Steele’s.  

 
[¶27]   Thus, even if we accept that Mr. 
Davenport suffered an aggravation of his preexisting congenital condition in 
1984/1985, that does not necessarily mean the aggravation caused the condition 
which required surgery in 2009.  Mr. 
Davenport was obligated to establish that causal connection by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  The evidence that 
Mr. Davenport worked at various jobs, was involved in several quite serious 
accidents and did not seek medical attention for his lower back for many years 
after the work related injuries, together with Dr. Williams’ opinions, supported 
the hearing examiner’s conclusion that Mr. Davenport did not meet his burden of 
proving that his 2008-2009 treatment was the result of his 1984/1985 work 
related injuries.  The OAH decision 
is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and is, therefore, 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.   
 
[¶28]   Affirmed.       

 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Dr. Steele’s records stated that Mr. Davenport had “L4 pars defects with 
Grade II L4 on L5 anterolisthesis.”  
Dr. Steele explained that anterolisthesis and spondylolisthesis are 
synonymous.