Title: Commonwealth v. Bin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12167 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER BIN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     May 11, 2018. - October 9, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  
Armed Home Invasion.  Cellular Telephone.  Evidence, Joint 
venturer, Business record.  Practice, Criminal, Question by 
jury, Instructions to jury, Verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 6, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
 
Jamie M. Charles, Assistant District Attorney (David M. 
Solet also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree, as a joint venturer, in the 
shooting death of Quintin Koehler on July 7, 2012, at his 
grandmother's house in Billerica.  The Commonwealth proceeded on 
a theory of felony-murder, with armed home invasion and 
2 
 
 
attempted armed robbery as the predicate felonies.  At trial, 
the Commonwealth argued that the defendant was one of four 
intruders who entered the victim's home intending to rob him of 
drugs and money, a struggle ensued, one of the other men fatally 
shot the victim, and all four intruders fled from the scene 
together with two others, who had remained in their vehicles.1 
 
In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence that he was present at the scene, 
knew that any of the alleged accomplices were armed, or shared 
any intent to commit either the armed home invasion or the 
robbery.  The defendant argues also that cell site location 
information (CSLI) evidence was introduced through an 
unqualified witness and should have been excluded.  In addition, 
the defendant maintains that the judge erred when, in response 
to a jury question, she did not instruct the jury, as defense 
counsel requested, that they were allowed to reach factually 
inconsistent verdicts.  Finally, the defendant asks this court 
to abolish the felony-murder rule, and also asks us to use our 
                     
 
1 The defendant was tried with a single codefendant, Gabriel 
Arias, the only one of the six alleged participants at the scene 
who had not then been indicted on a charge of murder in the 
first degree.  Arias was convicted of the sole offense of which 
he was indicted, intentionally misleading a police officer, in 
violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B.  In 2017, while he was serving 
a prison term of from five to seven years on that offense, Arias 
was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, armed 
home invasion, and conspiracy for his alleged role in this case; 
his trial on those indictments is pending. 
3 
 
 
extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
verdict of murder or to order a new trial.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the convictions and decline to exercise our 
authority to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.2 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts that the jury could have 
found, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), 
reserving some facts for later discussion of particular issues. 
 
The victim, Quintin Koehler, lived in Billerica in his 
grandmother's house.  He worked in landscaping, and also sold 
marijuana and other drugs from the house.  He had a roommate who 
was his partner in both enterprises. 
                     
 
2 In addition to murder in the first degree, the defendant 
was indicted on a charge of armed home invasion against Ryan 
Koehler and a charge of attempted armed robbery of Quintin 
Koehler.  In her final charge, the judge instructed the jury 
that the charge of attempted armed robbery applied to Quintin 
Koehler, and instructed on armed home invasion without 
specifying a victim.  The defendant was convicted of both 
felonies.  He was acquitted of charges of carrying a firearm 
without a license and possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card.  At sentencing, the convictions of armed 
home invasion and attempted armed robbery were vacated as 
duplicative.  See Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 513-514 
(2016), citing Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 558 
(2013).  Shortly thereafter, on the Commonwealth's motion, both 
felony convictions were reinstated.  While reinstatement of the 
conviction of armed home invasion, as to Ryan Koehler, was 
appropriate, the conviction of attempted armed robbery of 
Quintin Koehler properly should have been vacated as 
duplicative.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 81-82, 
cert. denied, 570 U.S. 907 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. 
Rasmusen, 444 Mass. 657, 666-667 (2005) (where felony-murder 
conviction is based on more than one felony, only one of 
underlying felonies is duplicative). 
4 
 
 
 
In March, 2012, the victim and his roommate began 
purchasing marijuana from Ashley Marshall, at a music studio in 
Lynn.3  They purchased marijuana in one- to four-pound increments 
and subsequently resold it in smaller quantities.  The roommate 
would coordinate purchases with Marshall through text messages, 
using coded language to establish the quantity and price of a 
purchase.  At one meeting at the music studio, the victim and 
his roommate saw a tall man with a shaved head who had a number 
of tattoos, including one on the back of his head that read, 
"LYNN, MASS."4 
 
In June, 2012, one of Marshall's friends, Adam Bradley, 
told her that he needed someone to rob, and inquired about the 
possibility of robbing the victim and his roommate.  At first, 
Marshall declined to help Bradley because the victim and his 
roommate were friends of her cousin.  On July 6, 2012, Bradley 
came to the music studio and reiterated that he wanted to rob 
the victim and his roommate.  After initially refusing, Marshall 
agreed to help.  Around 5 P.M., Marshall sent the victim's 
roommate several text messages asking if he wanted to purchase 
marijuana.  She was attempting to ascertain whether the roommate 
                     
 
3 Ashley Marshall testified at trial under a grant of 
immunity. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth introduced a booking photograph of Adam 
Bradley that showed a tattoo on the back of his head which 
reads, "LYNN, MASS."  Marshall also testified that Bradley had 
such a tattoo. 
5 
 
 
had cash in the house.5  The roommate, who had had reservations 
about dealing with Marshall and had not made any recent 
purchases from her, did not respond. 
 
Marshall used an Internet Web site to direct Bradley to the 
victim's house.  She also drew a layout of the inside of the 
house on a piece of notebook paper.  Before leaving, Bradley 
asked Marshall if he needed to bring weapons; Marshall said that 
he did not, because the victim and his roommate were "little 
kids" who would not offer any resistance.  Bradley returned to 
the studio later that evening and made a number of telephone 
calls.  Shortly thereafter, approximately twenty Asian men 
arrived at the studio.  Before they left, Bradley showed them 
the Web site with directions to the victim's house.  After 
telephoning Marshall repeatedly throughout the night of July 6 
to July 7, 2012, Bradley arrived at the music studio on the 
morning of July 7, 2012; Marshall testified that he appeared to 
be "frantic." 
 
The Commonwealth's theory at trial was that Bradley was 
assisted in the attempted armed robbery by the defendant, Steven 
Touch, Jason Estabrook, Gabriel Arias, and Sophan Keo.6  The 
                     
 
5 A search of the victim's house after his death revealed a 
large quantity of cash and marijuana. 
 
6 Evidence at trial suggested that the defendant, Bradley, 
Touch, Arias, and Keo were associated with the Bloods gang in 
Lynn.  The judge instructed the jury that they were not to 
6 
 
 
victim's brother, Ryan Koehler,7 who had been present at the 
scene and had attempted to force the armed intruders out of the 
house in the minutes before his brother was shot, described some 
of the assailants in detail, but was able to give only a vague 
description of others.  Forensic evidence at the scene, medical 
records, and statements by Marshall tied some of the men to the 
scene.  As evidence of the joint enterprise involving all of the 
men, the Commonwealth relied heavily on surveillance video 
footage of two white automobiles that seemed to be acting in 
concert for approximately one hour before, and immediately 
after, the shooting, and extensive evidence of cellular 
telephone calls among the men, as well as CSLI showing a pattern 
of movement of all of their cellular telephones toward and away 
from the victim's Billerica home at the time of the shooting. 
 
Keo owned a white Honda Civic with distinctive blue after- 
market headlights.  Touch regularly used his girl friend's white 
Toyota Corolla with her permission.   
                                                                  
consider the evidence "to infer anything about [the] defendant's 
character or general propensity to commit a crime.  The only 
purpose for which any evidence concerning alleged gang 
affiliation may be considered by . . . the jury is on the 
limited issue of what the Commonwealth claims may have been a 
particular defendant's state of mind at a particular time either 
to form a motive for the offenses charged in this case, or to 
participate in a joint venture or criminal enterprise." 
 
 
7 Because they share a last name, we refer to the victim's 
brother, Ryan Koehler, by his first name. 
7 
 
 
 
At 2:51 A.M. on July 7, 2012, an officer of the Billerica 
police department, who was on routine patrol, entered the 
license plate of Keo's vehicle in the police computer system.  
Surveillance footage taken by a camera at a Billerica 
convenience store on Route 3A, near the victim's home, shows 
that at 3:19 A.M. and 3:33 A.M., a Honda Civic drove past the 
store.  At 3:25 A.M. and 3:33 A.M., a Toyota Corolla drove past 
the store.  At 3:38 A.M., both vehicles entered a parking lot 
across the street from the convenience store, in view of the 
surveillance camera, and each vehicle extinguished its lights.  
At 3:40 A.M., both vehicles' lights were turned on, and they 
left the parking lot eleven seconds apart. 
 
During this time, there were repeated calls among cellular 
telephones registered to, or used by, the defendant and the 
other five men; although none of the alleged accomplices lived 
in Billerica, the calls connected to towers in the Billerica 
area, heading toward the victim's house.  Evidence of the cell 
towers that were accessed, the times and duration of the calls, 
and the locations of the cell towers on a map relative to the 
victim's house was introduced by a State police trooper who was 
a member of its technical surveillance unit, as well as a member 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's cellular analysis 
survey team. 
8 
 
 
 
According to the CSLI records, a telephone registered to 
the defendant traveled from Revere to Billerica during the 
period immediately prior to the shooting.  On July 7, 2012, the 
defendant's cellular telephone activated a cellular tower in 
Revere at 1:41 A.M., a cellular tower in Burlington at 2:43 A.M. 
and 2:45 A.M., and a cellular tower in Billerica at 2:46 A.M., 
2:47 A.M., 3:34 A.M., 3:37 A.M., 3:38 A.M., 3:44 A.M., and 
3:46 A.M.  A cellular telephone associated with Bradley 
activated a cellular tower in Lynn at 1:14 A.M, a cellular tower 
near Wakefield at 2:31 A.M, and a cellular tower in Bedford at 
3:50 A.M.8  Between 1:33 A.M. and 3:37 A.M., the defendant's 
telephone connected with Keo's telephone three times.  During 
the early morning hours of July 7, it also connected with a 
telephone associated with Touch five times, and received two 
text messages from that number,9 and connected with Arias's 
telephone four times. 
 
At approximately 3:50 A.M. on July 7, 2012, the victim and 
his brother, Ryan, were watching a movie in the victim's bedroom 
when they heard loud noises from the kitchen.  The brothers ran 
into the kitchen to investigate and discovered three men, each 
                     
 
8 The telephone number was registered to JMB Construction, a 
company owned by Jane and Michael Bradley.  The address of JMB 
Construction address was the same as the address on Adam 
Bradley's driver's license. 
 
 
9 This cellular telephone number was registered to Christina 
Danh, who testified that she paid for Touch's telephone service. 
9 
 
 
with a firearm, standing near the door.  Ryan described one man 
as being blonde with blue eyes, wearing a grey bandana and a 
hat, and holding a semiautomatic weapon.10  Ryan testified at 
trial that he was focused on this man as he entered the kitchen, 
following his brother, because the man was pointing the weapon 
at him.  Ryan was able to describe the other two men only as 
wearing dark clothing; he said that he did not know their 
height, age, or race.11  The first man told the victim to "get 
down on the ground."  The victim responded that the men should 
"take the fake ass BB guns and . . . shove them up their candy 
ass and get the fuck out of the house."  The blonde intruder 
then racked the firearm.12  The victim instructed Ryan to get a 
sword from the victim's bedroom.  Before Ryan could do so, the 
victim armed himself with a tea kettle from the top of the 
stove, and Ryan grabbed a frying pan. 
Ryan then noticed a fourth man, who was larger and heavier, 
wearing a red T-shirt, black shorts with a blue stripe, and 
                     
 
10 The Commonwealth introduced evidence from a social media 
Web site that contained an image of Bradley wearing a grey 
bandana. 
 
 
11 On cross-examination, after his memory was refreshed by 
reviewing his grand jury testimony, Ryan testified that he had 
said at that time that the third man was "white" and had dark 
hair, but that he had no present memory of the man's appearance. 
 
 
12 Ryan testified that he understood the differences between 
an automatic and a semiautomatic weapon, and that he knew the 
weapon was a semiautomatic. 
10 
 
 
black sneakers, near the refrigerator.  When the man ran at the 
victim, Ryan tackled him to the ground and the victim used the 
tea kettle to hit him in the head "with everything he had."  As 
the brothers were trying to push the man toward the door, three 
shots rang out and the victim slumped to the floor.  While Ryan 
attempted to put pressure on the wound, the intruders fled 
through the broken kitchen door.13  The victim was taken to the 
hospital, where he died of a gunshot wound to the head. 
 
Neither the cellular telephone of the defendant nor the 
cellular telephones of the other alleged accomplices registered 
any activity between 3:50 A.M. and 3:53 A.M.  At 3:53 A.M., the 
cellular telephone associated with Bradley contacted the 
telephone associated with Touch and activated a cellular tower 
in Burlington.  At 3:59 A.M., the telephone associated with 
Bradley called the defendant's cellular telephone.  During this 
call, the defendant's telephone activated a cellular tower in 
Burlington, and Bradley's telephone activated a cellular tower 
in Woburn.  Beginning at 5:15 A.M, the defendant's cellular 
telephone activated a tower in Lowell, the city listed on his 
                     
 
13 Evidence was presented at trial that Ryan told the first 
responding officers that there were three intruders, two of whom 
had been armed, and that he repeated that assertion during an 
interview with investigators on July 8, 2012.  During direct 
examination, Ryan testified that there had been four intruders, 
three standing together and one he saw later.  On re-direct 
examination, he was presented, and read portions of, his grand 
jury testimony, in which he described four intruders; this 
testimony was allowed to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. 
11 
 
 
driver's license, multiple times; one of these calls, at 
6:20 A.M, was to Touch's telephone. 
 
At around 5:20 A.M., Estabrook drove to the North Shore 
Medical Center seeking treatment for a head injury, shoulder 
pain, and back pain.14  He reported that he had been in a fight 
and that "they hit me with a tea kettle to the head."  He was 
wearing a red shirt, black shorts, and black high-top sneakers.15 
 
Investigating officers recovered two hats at the victim's 
house that had not been present during the evening before the 
shooting, when family members and friends had stopped by to see 
Ryan, who had been away for six months at a residential 
treatment facility.  One hat, a navy blue Boston Red Sox 
baseball cap, was found on the porch just outside the kitchen 
door.  The other, a black and red Chicago Bulls baseball cap, 
was found in the area between the kitchen and the laundry room.  
The major deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile on the headband of 
the Red Sox cap was consistent with the defendant's DNA; the 
contributors to the minor profile could not be identified.  The 
frequency of the major profile was approximately 1 in 59.07 
billion in the Caucasian population, 1 in 81.9 billion in the 
                     
14 A still image from surveillance footage from the hospital 
parking lot shows a motor vehicle, consistent with the vehicle 
operated by Touch, at 5:12 A.M. 
 
 
15 This clothing is consistent with Ryan's description of 
the clothing worn by the fourth man in the victim's kitchen. 
12 
 
 
African-American population, 1 in 92.94 billion in the Hispanic 
population, and 1 in 211.2 billion in the Asian population.16  
The band of the Bulls cap contained a primary DNA profile 
consistent with the DNA profile of an individual police 
concluded had not been present at the scene, because he had a 
curfew that required him to be in his house at night, and was 
being monitored by a GPS bracelet, which did not register a 
violation on July 7, 2012.  A secondary profile found on the 
headband was not associated with any of the suspects. 
 
Later on the morning of July 7, 2012, one of the victim's 
neighbors found a pair of rubber gloves on a side street 
adjacent to his house that he had not noticed the previous day.  
He telephoned the police; officers responded and retrieved the 
gloves.  Forensic testing of the gloves was undertaken at the 
State police crime laboratory.  The major DNA profile on the 
gloves matched the DNA profile of Adam Bradley.  Analysts at the 
crime laboratory also found gunshot primer particles on the 
gloves, which allowed a forensic scientist to conclude that the 
person who wore the gloves either had handled a firearm or had 
been in close proximity to a firearm. 
 
2.  Defendant's theory of the case.  The defendant argued 
that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence that he 
had been present at the scene.  His strategy for doing this was 
                     
 
16 The defendant is Asian. 
13 
 
 
to question the credibility and reliability of much of the 
Commonwealth's evidence.  The defendant extensively cross-
examined Ryan and impeached him with evidence of his prior 
convictions of, inter alia, armed home invasion (with a shotgun) 
and causing serious bodily injury.  To further the suggestion 
that Ryan's testimony was unreliable, defense counsel called a 
State police trooper who testified that, when he arrived at the 
scene at approximately 4:30 A.M., he was given the descriptions 
of three suspects that Ryan had provided when officers first 
arrived.  Additionally, during an extended interview on July 8, 
2012, Ryan told officers that he had seen the blonde-haired 
intruder holding a gun and two other men.  The State police 
trooper also testified that, during the interview on July 8, 
2012, Ryan described the noise from the kitchen as the sound of 
a door being knocked down.  In his closing argument, the 
defendant highlighted that this statement was inconsistent with 
Ryan's grand jury testimony that he thought the sound was the 
family dog knocking something over.  The defendant suggested 
that Ryan's testimony was unreliable and that his feelings of 
guilt at heading toward the sound rather than telephoning police 
or hiding, thus resulting in his brother's death, had caused his 
story to change. 
 
The defendant also challenged the forensic evidence found 
at the scene.  He argued that the Red Sox baseball cap with the 
14 
 
 
defendant's DNA could have been borrowed or stolen, and did 
nothing to establish the defendant's presence at the scene, just 
as the Bulls cap found in the laundry room near the back door 
contained the DNA of an individual who the Commonwealth 
acknowledged had not been present at the time of the incident. 
 
Additionally, in cross-examining the Commonwealth's expert 
witness on CSLI and during his closing argument, the defendant 
advanced a theory that three or four vehicles must have been 
used, and argued that the Commonwealth's theory that only two 
vehicles had been used was not consistent with the most likely 
interpretation of the telephone calls as having been made 
between people who were in different vehicles, rather than 
between those who were in the same vehicle.17  Based on the calls 
placed between various cellular telephones, defense counsel thus 
argued that only certain individuals would have been in vehicles 
together, and, accordingly, at least a third vehicle must have 
been used, with likely a fourth as well. 
 
3.  Discussion.  In this appeal, the defendant argues, as 
he did in the Superior Court, that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that he was present at the scene, that he 
possessed a firearm or knew that any of the intruders had a 
                     
 
17 Adam Bradley and Jason Estabrook have been convicted of 
murder in the first degree and related offenses.  Steven Touch 
and Sophan Keo are currently awaiting trial on indictments of 
murder in the first degree and other related offenses. 
15 
 
 
firearm, or that he intended to commit any crime.  The defendant 
also argues that the admission of the CSLI evidence requires a 
new trial, because the records were not self-explanatory and the 
State police trooper who testified about them was not a 
representative of the cellular telephone provider and was not 
otherwise qualified to explain them.  In addition, the defendant 
challenges the judge's decision not to instruct the jury, in 
response to their question, "if we find the defendant guilty of 
one or more of the underl[ying] felonies, can we still find him 
not guilty of felony murder?" that they could reach factually 
inconsistent verdicts.  He also asks this court to exercise our 
extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him 
relief. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  In determining whether 
the Commonwealth met its burden of proof to establish each 
element of the offense charged, we apply the familiar Latimore 
standard.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678.  "[The] question 
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. at 677, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  Although a conviction may be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence, and inferences drawn need 
only be reasonable, not inescapable, see Commonwealth v. Rakes, 
16 
 
 
478 Mass. 22, 32, 45 (2017), a "conviction may not rest on the 
piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture and 
speculation."  Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), 
citing Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 339–343 (2004). 
 
As the defendant was convicted as a joint venturer, "we 
must determine whether the evidence showed that he knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime charged, alone or 
with others, with the intent required for the offense."  Rakes, 
478 Mass. at 32.  See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 
467-468 (2009).  Under the theory of felony-murder, "[o]nce a 
defendant participates in the underlying felony, with the intent 
or shared intent to commit that felony, he or she becomes liable 
for a death that 'followed naturally and probably from the 
carrying out of the joint enterprise.'"  Commonwealth v. Morin, 
478 Mass. 415, 421 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 
Mass. 303, 307 (2013).  "[I]t is no defen[s]e for the associates 
engaged with others in the commission of a robbery, that they 
did not intend to take life in its perpetration, or that they 
forbade their companions to kill."  Morin, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387, 392 (1926). 
 
Evidence before the jury could have allowed them to 
conclude that Bradley, with the assistance of Marshall, formed a 
plan to rob the victim and his roommate, and enlisted others in 
the enterprise.  Bradley requested Marshall's help in setting up 
17 
 
 
a robbery of the victim and his roommate, and Marshall then sent 
text messages to the roommate purportedly offering to sell 
marijuana.  Bradley made telephone calls from Marshall's studio 
in Lynn, after which Marshall testified that she saw a number of 
Asian men arrive and that Bradley showed them the location of 
the victim's house using an Internet Web site.  Two white 
automobiles -- one that looked to be a vehicle registered to 
Keo, and one that appeared to be a vehicle registered to Touch's 
girl friend, but routinely used by Touch -- headed to Billerica 
in a close procession, stopped briefly at a parking lot, then 
drove together towards the victim's house; their movements were 
captured on surveillance footage from a security camera at a 
convenience store near the crime scene.  CSLI records 
established that telephones associated with the defendant, 
Bradley, Touch, Keo, and Arias repeatedly activated cellular 
towers near Billerica in the minutes before and after the 
shooting; the telephones all traveled toward Billerica prior to 
the shooting, and traveled away from Billerica in the minutes 
after the shooting.  Four men, three of whom were armed, broke 
down the door and entered the victim's home, where the victim 
was shot and killed. 
 
While the defendant challenged Ryan's testimony as to 
whether there were three or four men present in the victim's 
kitchen, the primary focus of the trial, and particularly this 
18 
 
 
appeal, was whether the defendant knowingly participated in the 
armed home invasion that resulted in the victim's death. 
 
With respect to the defendant's knowing participation in a 
plan to rob the victim and his roommate, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence that a baseball cap with the defendant's DNA 
on the inner band was found immediately outside the door through 
which the intruders gained access to the kitchen, as well as 
evidence that the defendant's telephone traveled from Revere to 
Burlington and then to Billerica in the hours before the 
shooting, that the telephone activated cellular towers in 
Billerica minutes before the incident, and that it then traveled 
away from Billerica in the minutes after the victim was shot.  
Additionally, evidence of the defendant's possible state of mind 
at the time of the armed home invasion and shooting was 
introduced through evidence of his lengthy affiliation with most 
of the other alleged accomplices, some of whom he had known 
since childhood, and all but one of whom were described in trial 
testimony as being members of the Bloods gang. 
 
Taken together, the evidence at trial would have allowed a 
jury to conclude that the defendant was one of the four men in 
the kitchen at the time of the shooting, and that he was armed 
with a firearm.  See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 701-
702 (2003) (defendant's fingerprint in home, in conjunction with 
testimony that print was "fairly fresh" and evidence that 
19 
 
 
defendant had been excluded from residence for one week prior to 
killing, was sufficient evidence of her presence).  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 256-258 (1996) (evidence 
that defendant's fingerprint was on mask found at scene of armed 
home invasion did not, alone, establish defendant's presence). 
 
To prove the underlying felony of armed home invasion, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant or other 
joint venturers "'knowingly enter[ed] the dwelling place of 
another'; 'knowing or having reason to know that one or more 
persons are present within'; 'while armed with a dangerous 
weapon'; and 'use[d] force or threaten[ed] the imminent use of 
force upon any person within such dwelling place whether or not 
injury occur[red], or intentionally cause[d] any injury to any 
person within such dwelling place.'"  See Commonwealth v. 
Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 747 (2004), quoting G. L. c. 265, § 18C.  
For both armed home invasion and attempted armed robbery, the 
Commonwealth must prove either that the defendant was armed or 
that he knew that his joint venturers were armed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 812 (2017). 
 
The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
that he was armed or knew that any of the intruders were armed, 
or that he shared their intent to commit an armed offense.  We 
do not agree.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, the jury reasonably could have determined 
20 
 
 
that the defendant was one of the men in possession of a firearm 
in the kitchen of the victim's home.  Ryan testified that three 
of the intruders were armed.18  The unarmed intruder was the 
fourth man, who was hit with a tea kettle.  Based on Estabrook's 
medical records at the emergency room, including a statement 
that he had been struck by a tea kettle during a fight, and 
images from the hospital surveillance camera that showed him 
wearing clothing consistent with Ryan's description, the jury 
reasonably could have concluded that this unarmed man was 
Estabrook, who reported to medical personnel the unusual 
instrument that had been used during the fight.  Given the 
permissible inference that Keo and Touch, the fifth and sixth 
men, had remained with their vehicles, the jury reasonably could 
have inferred that the defendant was in the kitchen and was 
armed with a firearm.19 
                     
 
18 The defendant called a police witness who testified that 
Ryan informed him that he saw two firearms in the kitchen, 
rather than three.  Ryan testified that there were three armed 
men, and that the fourth man, who was hit by the tea kettle, was 
unarmed.  We resolve this inconsistency in favor of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
19 While Marshall testified that she told Bradley that he 
did not need to bring firearms, the defendant was not present 
when Marshall made this remark.  In any event, Bradley 
disregarded that suggestion and brought a firearm with him to 
the victim's house.  His decision to carry a weapon suggests 
that Bradley did not tell the other intruders that they were 
robbing "little kids" who were unlikely to offer resistance.  
Regardless, the testimony was clear that three of the four 
intruders in the victim's kitchen were carrying firearms. 
21 
 
 
 
b.  CSLI records.  The defendant contends that the CSLI 
records were not properly admitted because they were not self-
explanatory and the Commonwealth did not offer a qualified 
witness to explain them.  He argues that a "[company] 
representative or other qualified individual needed to explain 
those records to the jury.  The person used by the Commonwealth 
. . . was not so qualified.  Whereas the verdicts relied on that 
improperly admitted evidence, the defendant's convictions must 
be reversed." 
 
It is well established that CSLI records are business 
records.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 722 n.22 
(2016), citing Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 232 
(2014); United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 119 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 599 (2015).  A "record [that] 
was made in good faith in the regular course of business" may be 
admissible, in the judge's discretion, notwithstanding that it 
is hearsay.  G. L. c. 233, § 78.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) 
(2018). 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 78, a trial judge has 
discretion to require a party offering a business record to call 
as a witness a "person who made the entry, writing or record 
offered or the original or any other entry, writing, document or 
account from which the entry, writing or record offered or the 
facts therein stated were transcribed or taken, or who has 
22 
 
 
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entry, writing or 
record offered."  Here, the judge consulted with counsel at 
sidebar before the telephone records were introduced, and asked 
the defendant if he had any objection.  The defendant renewed 
the objection he had made in his motion to suppress, which had 
been denied prior to trial, that the records should not be 
admitted due to the administrative subpoena that had been used 
to obtain them.  The judge then inquired whether the defendant 
"ha[d] any objection with regard to the authenticity of these 
records."  The defendant did not.  Because the defendant did not 
object to the admission of the CSLI as an unauthenticated 
business record when prompted by the judge at sidebar, we review 
the judge's determination for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 
20, 27, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017). 
 
The cellular telephone records contain an affidavit of the 
keeper of the records certifying that they are true and 
complete, and there is no evidence or allegation to the 
contrary.  The records are clearly relevant and central to the 
Commonwealth's case, and were described in depth by the State 
police trooper after he was accepted as an expert witness 
following an extensive voir dire.  We conclude that the judge 
did not abuse her discretion in allowing the introduction of the 
CSLI as business records. 
23 
 
 
 
Even where evidence may be relevant and otherwise 
admissible, a trial judge has discretion to exclude it if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of 
confusion.  Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2018).  See Commonwealth v. 
Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 25 (1996) ("When prejudice, including 
confusion of the jury, is possible, the judge must weigh the 
probative value of the evidence against such danger").  "The 
trial judge [is] best situated to assess the extent to which 
[business records] might have been confusing to the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 860 (2018). 
 
The judge conducted a voir dire hearing at which she 
herself posed certain questions to the State police trooper who 
later testified about the CSLI.  The trooper also was questioned 
extensively by the defendant's and his codefendant's counsel.  
He testified to having received training from State and Federal 
agencies, including a Department of Defense contractor, on the 
uses of CSLI and how to obtain it.  The trooper also said that 
he served as a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
cellular analysis survey team.  The judge concluded that the 
trooper was qualified as an expert in the area of CSLI.  The 
trooper then testified as an expert and explained to the jury 
how cellular telephones interact with cellular towers, the 
manner in which cellular telephone service providers produce 
24 
 
 
records, and how the defendant's service provider created 
"basically [an] Excel spreadsheet[]" with relevant information. 
 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth never elicited 
that the trooper was trained by the defendant's service provider 
on how to interpret that company's records.  In addition to his 
years of professional experience and training, however, and 
consistent with his testimony that he previously had worked with 
similar records, the trooper discussed and explained differences 
between the records of multiple different service providers, 
including the defendant's.  This testimony supported the judge's 
conclusion that the trooper was a qualified expert, and was 
familiar with the defendant's service provider's particular 
format.20 
 
Furthermore, the defendant relies on Dabney, 478 Mass. at 
859, in support of his argument that the judge should have 
excluded the CSLI as more prejudicial than probative, given the 
absence of testimony from an employee of the cellular service 
                     
 
20 To support his contention that a qualified individual is 
needed to "decipher" the CSLI, the defendant cites two cases 
from other jurisdictions.  In Blue Coast, Inc. v. Suarez Corp. 
Indus., 870 A.2d 995, 1007 (R.I. 2005), there was no witness to 
introduce the records, and in Horner v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 
Commw. 59, 65-66 (1987), the witness who offered to introduce 
graphical records had received only a one-day training session 
on the records, "ten to fifteen years" before the case, and had 
not worked with the records in ten years.  These cases are 
factually distinct from the instant case, however, given that 
the Commonwealth in this case called a witness with relevant 
training and ongoing experience to explain the records. 
25 
 
 
provider.  In that case, the court determined that there was no 
error in a Superior Court judge's discretionary ruling limiting 
cross-examination of a witness concerning an invoice from a 
particular Web site on the ground that the business record would 
confuse the jury, absent an explanation from an employee of that 
company, because the witness had no ability to explain the 
meaning of certain information listed on the invoices.  Id. at 
859-860.  Here, the State police trooper was able to do what the 
witness in Dabney was not:  he coherently explained the service 
provider's records and differentiated the terms that provider 
used to designate specific items from the terms used by other 
cellular telephone service providers.  In these circumstances, 
we discern no error in the judge's discretionary determination 
that the records were not unduly prejudicial. 
 
The defendant also challenges the admission of charts 
created by the trooper from the CSLI records, on the ground that 
the jury might have been confused and believed that the charts 
were the actual CSLI data proffered by the service provider.  
The witness made clear, however, that he had created some of the 
reports that were presented to the jury, and that he had placed 
certain information pertaining to certain calls on a map using a 
specific computer program to do so.  Additionally, the entire 
set of CSLI records, which contained the data that was the basis 
of the trooper's testimony and his summary, was introduced by 
26 
 
 
the Commonwealth through the deputy police chief who had 
obtained the records from the service provider.  The judge did 
not abuse her discretion in allowing introduction of the 
witness's reports and charts summarizing the CSLI reports.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 825 (2010) ("Summaries of 
testimony are admissible, provided that the underlying records 
have been admitted in evidence and that the summaries accurately 
reflect the records"); Mass. G. Evid. § 1006 (2018). 
 
c.  Jury instruction on inconsistent verdicts.  The 
defendant argues that the judge improperly failed to inform the 
jury, in response to their question, that they could return 
factually inconsistent verdicts.  We review the judge's response 
for an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 
Mass. 484, 488 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 
792, 807 n.11 (1996) ("The proper response to a jury question 
must remain within the discretion of the trial judge, who has 
observed the evidence and the jury firsthand and can tailor 
supplemental instructions accordingly"). 
 
During deliberations, the jury asked the following:  "if we 
find the defendant guilty of one or more of the underl[ying] 
felonies, can we still find him not guilty of felony murder?"  
The prosecutor argued that the answer to the question was "no," 
and asked the judge to reinstruct the jury not to consider the 
consequences of their verdict.  At first, the defendant agreed 
27 
 
 
that "the correct legal answer" is "no."  The judge declined to 
answer the question "no."  She reasoned that this answer would 
have foreclosed the possibility of an acquittal based on the 
Commonwealth's failure to prove that the killing did not occur 
during the commission of the predicate felonies. 
 
The judge responded to the question by reinstructing the 
jury on felony-murder, explaining: 
 
"If the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly 
participated in and shared the intent required for 
either or both of the charged felonies, armed home 
invasion of Ryan Koehler or attempted armed robbery of 
Quintin Koehler as I have defined those offenses for 
you, and the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the death occurred during the 
commission of the felony or felonies, then the 
Commonwealth has proved the offense of felony murder." 
 
 
The defendant, after the jury resumed deliberations, asked 
the judge to reinstruct the jury, "[I]f the question deals with 
can you find the defendant guilty, not guilty of the murder and 
still find him guilty of indictments two [armed home invasion] 
and three [attempted armed robbery], the answer is yes."  The 
judge declined to give this instruction. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the jury were 
inquiring about their ability to render a factually inconsistent 
verdict, and that the judge's answer on felony-murder was 
nonresponsive.  It is undisputed that juries do have the 
authority to render factually inconsistent verdicts, which 
28 
 
 
allows juries to "compromise and to act out of leniency."  See 
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 33 (1984), citing 
United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).  That the jury has the power to 
return inconsistent verdicts, however, does not give the 
defendant the right to a jury instruction informing the jury of 
their authority to do so.  See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 
Mass. 783, 812 (1977) (Quirico, J., concurring), abrogated on 
other grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002).  
We decline the defendant's invitation to require a judge to 
inform the jury that they may disregard the law as it has been 
explained to them.  The judge properly instructed the jury 
during her final charge that "[i]t is your duty as jurors to 
accept the law as I state it to you."  Their power to disregard 
her instruction does not mean "that the trial judge must inform 
them of the existence of that power and instruct them on what 
factors they may or must consider when they are contemplating 
the return of a verdict other than one required on the facts 
found by them and the law applicable thereto."  Dickerson, supra 
(Quirico, J., concurring).  See United States v. Moran-Toala, 
726 F.3d 334, 343 (2d Cir. 2013) (trial judge erred in 
instructing jury that it was permissible to render inconsistent 
verdicts). 
29 
 
 
 
d.  Felony-murder.  The defendant urges this court to 
abolish the common-law doctrine of felony-murder because, inter 
alia, it is inconsistent with jurisprudence on mens rea 
generally in criminal cases.  In Brown, 477 Mass. at 823, we 
declined to abolish entirely the felony-murder rule.21  Instead, 
we prospectively narrowed the application of that rule to 
eliminate felony-murder as an independent theory of liability.  
See id. at 825, 832-833 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  As a result, 
a defendant no longer may be convicted of murder absent proof of 
one of the three prongs of malice.  Id.  The defendant does not 
argue that Brown was wrongly decided, nor does he provide any 
reason for the court to revisit its decision in that case, and 
we decline to do so. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
carefully reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no reason to order a new trial 
or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgments of murder in the first 
degree and armed home invasion are affirmed.  The judgment of 
attempted armed robbery is vacated and set aside, and the matter 
                     
 
21 The defendant's initial brief was filed before this 
court's decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 823 
(2017).  While his reply brief was filed after that decision, 
the reply brief does not address the court's holding in Brown. 
30 
 
 
is remanded to the Superior Court, where that conviction shall 
be dismissed as duplicative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.