Title: Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11856 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW A. MOGELINSKI. 
 
 
 
Franklin-Hampshire.     September 8, 2015. - November 13, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction, Delinquent child.  Jurisdiction, 
Juvenile Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Transfer 
hearing.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Transfer hearing, Nolle prosequi.  Youthful 
Offender Act.  Delinquent Child. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Franklin and 
Hampshire Counties Division of the Juvenile Court Department on 
February 4, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith J. Phillips, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
John T. Ouderkirk, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this case, we address an issue precipitated by 
our decision in Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627 (2013) 
2 
 
(Mogelinski I).  There, we decided, among other things, that the 
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over youthful offender 
indictments, G. L. c. 119, § 54, that issued after the 
defendant's eighteenth birthday, notwithstanding the prior 
existence of timely filed delinquency complaints, involving much 
the same facts, on which nolle prosequi was subsequently 
entered.  In the wake of our decision, the youthful offender 
indictments were dismissed.  The Commonwealth thereafter filed, 
in the Juvenile Court, a delinquency complaint essentially 
identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered 
in order to seek a transfer hearing.  See G. L., c. 119, § 72A.  
The question before us is whether the Juvenile Court has 
jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed 
complaint.  We conclude that it does. 
 
1.  Background and prior proceedings.  On May 10, 2011, 
delinquency complaints were filed against the defendant alleging 
two counts of rape of a child under sixteen, G. L. c. 265, § 23, 
and three counts of indecent assault and battery of a child 
under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  The defendant was then 
less than two weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday.1 
                     
 
1 In 2013, after Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627 
(2013) (Mogelinski I), was argued, the Governor signed St. 2013, 
c. 84, "An act expanding juvenile jurisdiction," which amended 
various provisions of G. L. c. 119.  The act confers 
jurisdiction on the Juvenile Court over cases where the alleged 
offense was committed up to the point of a defendant's 
3 
 
 
A summons issued on May 11, 2011, ordering the defendant to 
appear in the Juvenile Court on May 31, 2011.  Between the date 
the summons issued and the date of the court appearance, the 
defendant turned eighteen.  The defendant appeared in Juvenile 
Court on May 31, 2011, and was duly arraigned on the delinquency 
complaints. 
 
In December, 2011, the Commonwealth sought youthful 
offender indictments against the defendant pursuant to G. L. 
c. 119, § 54, on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the 
subject of the complaints, i.e., those offenses alleged to have 
occurred after the defendant had turned fourteen.  The basis of 
the May, 2011, complaints was the defendant's alleged sexual 
abuse of the victim over a seven-year period, from August, 2001, 
until December, 2008, when the defendant was between eight and 
fifteen years old.  The December, 2011, youthful offender 
indictments alleged that the offenses occurred between May 23, 
2007, and December 31, 2008, when the defendant was between 
fourteen and fifteen years old.  See Mogelinski I, supra at 642 
n.9.  The Commonwealth sought the indictments, which would have 
kept proceedings in the Juvenile Court, prior to our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798, 801-806 (2012) (Nanny), 
                                                                  
eighteenth, rather than seventeenth, birthday.  As in 
Mogelinski I, we analyze the case under the statutory scheme as 
it existed at the relevant times prior to this amendment.  See 
id. at 630, 631 nn.3,4. 
4 
 
clarifying that such youthful offender indictments could not be 
returned after a defendant's eighteenth birthday. 
 
After the indictments were returned on December 5, 2011, 
the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the 
delinquency complaints.  The defendant then moved unsuccessfully 
to dismiss the indictments, arguing that the Juvenile Court had 
no jurisdiction to proceed on indictments issued after his 
eighteenth birthday.  On reported questions following the denial 
of that motion, we concluded in Mogelinski I, supra at 646, that 
the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over youthful 
offender indictments returned after the defendant's eighteenth 
birthday, notwithstanding the prior existence of timely filed 
juvenile delinquency complaints, brought on much the same facts, 
on which nolle prosequi previously entered.  The youthful 
offender indictments were thereafter dismissed. 
 
In January, 2014, acting pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, 
the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the Juvenile Court 
against the then twenty year old defendant.  Like the 2011 
juvenile delinquency complaints, the 2014 complaint charged the 
defendant with two counts of rape of a child under sixteen, 
G. L. c. 265, § 23, and three counts of indecent assault and 
battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
Before arraignment, a Juvenile Court judge granted the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
5 
 
jurisdiction, essentially on the basis that the defendant's 
prior apprehension on the 2011 complaints precludes compliance 
with one of the prerequisites for proceeding under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A, i.e., that the defendant "is not apprehended until after 
his . . . eighteenth birthday."  The Commonwealth appealed, and 
we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that the judge 
did not have authority to dismiss the complaint before the 
defendant's arraignment, and that the Juvenile Court in fact had 
jurisdiction over the defendant to proceed on the 2014 
complaint.  We consider each claim in turn. 
 
a.  Dismissal prior to arraignment.  In Commonwealth v. 
Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575 (2013) (Humberto H.), we held 
that,  
 
"[w]here, as here, a juvenile files a motion to 
dismiss a complaint before arraignment based on the absence 
of probable cause, and where a judge, after reviewing the 
'four corners' of the complaint application, concludes that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the motion is 
meritorious, a judge does not abuse his discretion in 
deciding to hear and rule on that motion before arraignment 
to protect the child from the potential adverse 
consequences of a [Court Activity Record Information 
database] record." 
 
The Commonwealth urges us to limit the motions to dismiss that 
permissibly may be heard by a Juvenile Court judge before 
arraignment to those based on the absence of probable cause.  
However, given our analysis in Humberto H., supra, we discern no 
6 
 
good reason to preclude the judge from exercising discretion 
where, as here, the judge determines that there is no 
jurisdiction based on the record before her. 
 
b.  Availability of a transfer hearing.  The Juvenile Court 
is a court of limited jurisdiction, which "has no . . . 
authority in the absence of a specific statutory authorization." 
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 406 Mass. 31, 34 (1989).  As we said 
in Mogelinski I, supra at 630-631, 
 
"In general, the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over 
children between the ages of seven and seventeen who are 
alleged to have committed an offense (other than murder) 
prior to their seventeenth birthday.  G. L. c. 119, 
§§ 52, 74.  The Juvenile Court also retains jurisdiction 
over children who turn eighteen while their cases are 
pending, in order to adjudicate 'all remands and retrials 
following appeals from their cases, or during continuances 
or probation, or after their cases have been placed on 
file, or for any other proceeding arising out of their 
cases.'  G. L. c. 119, § 72 (a) (where proceeding commenced 
via delinquency complaint).  G. L. c. 119, § 72 (b) (where 
proceeding commenced via youthful offender indictment)." 
(Footnote omitted.) 
 
 
However, 
 
 
"[w]hile proceedings under either a delinquency 
complaint or a youthful offender indictment presuppose that 
an individual is under the age of eighteen when the 
proceeding is commenced, the Commonwealth is not precluded 
from prosecuting individuals who are 'apprehended' after 
their eighteenth birthdays for offenses committed prior to 
turning seventeen.  See G. L. c. 119, § 72A."  (Footnote 
omitted.) 
 
Mogelinski I, supra at 632. 
7 
 
 
Pursuant to the version of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, at issue in 
this case,2 all defendants who meet two statutory predicates 
(commission of offense prior to seventeenth birthday and 
apprehension after eighteenth birthday) are to be afforded the 
protections of a transfer hearing.  See Mogelinski I, supra at 
644-645.  There is no dispute as to the first statutory 
predicate.  The question before us as to the Juvenile Court's 
jurisdiction over the 2014 complaint rests on whether the second 
predicate was met, i.e., whether the defendant was "not 
apprehended until after his eighteenth birthday."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A. 
 
In Mogelinski I, supra at 634-635, we held for purposes of 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 72 and 72A, that apprehension occurs upon 
commencement of process, provided the defendant is available to 
                     
 
2 The pre-2013 version of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, provided in 
relevant part: 
 
 
"If a person commits an offense or violation prior to 
his seventeenth birthday, and is not apprehended until 
after his eighteenth birthday, the [Juvenile Court], after 
a hearing, shall determine whether there is probable cause 
to believe that said person committed the offense charged, 
and shall, in its discretion, either order that the person 
be discharged, if satisfied that such discharge is 
consistent with the protection of the public; or, if the 
court is of the opinion that the interests of the public 
require that such person be tried for such offense or 
violation instead of being discharged, the court shall 
dismiss the delinquency complaint and cause a criminal 
complaint to be issued.  The case shall thereafter proceed 
according to the usual course of criminal proceedings 
. . . ." 
 
8 
 
the court.3  Commencement of process is in this context 
ordinarily achieved by the issuance of a summons, which serves 
as a notification of the pending charges.  Mogelinski I, supra 
at 635.  Insofar as G. L. c. 119, § 72A, required that the 
defendant not be "apprehended until after his eighteenth 
birthday," and the defendant here was summonsed on the 2014 
complaint when he was twenty years old, the second statutory 
predicate would appear to be satisfied.  The defendant, however, 
maintains that his apprehension in 2011 on identical complaints 
where nolle prosequi have been entered precludes the 
apprehension contemplated by G. L. c. 119, § 72A, either because 
that section contemplated that the first apprehension on the 
charged offenses occur only after the defendant has turned 
eighteen, or because the 2014 complaint is in reality a 
continuation of the 2011 complaints on which apprehension 
occurred before his eighteenth birthday.  For the reasons that 
follow, neither contention is correct, and we conclude that the 
Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over the 2014 complaint. 
 
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
                     
 
3 This definition departs from the colloquial use of 
"apprehend," in which "the word . . . ordinarily is used to 
indicate a physical arrest."  Mogelinski I, supra at 634.  The 
ordinary use, however, "is inapt in the juvenile setting, given 
that the statute discourages the use of arrest warrants and 
instead directs courts to issue summonses in the vast majority 
of cases."  Id. 
9 
 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 129 (2015), 
quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  "[T]he 
meaning of a statute . . . must, in the first instance, be 
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that 
is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms."  Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 
202, 208 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 347 
(2010). 
 
The plain language of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, requires a 
transfer hearing where a defendant is "not apprehended until 
after his eighteenth birthday."  G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  The 
statute contains no language even suggesting that the adult 
apprehension, i.e., summons, must be the first and only 
apprehension on the offense charged.  See Commonwealth v. One 
1980 Volvo Automobile, 388 Mass. 1014, 1015-1016 (1983) ("We are 
not free simply to add language to a statute for the purpose of 
interpreting the statute according to the Legislature's 
perceived objectives" [quotation, alterations, and citation 
omitted]). 
10 
 
 
Indeed, in Mogelinski I, supra at 643, we recognized that 
more than one apprehension had taken place with respect to the 
2011 complaints and youthful offender indictments, which charged 
the same offenses but involved different time frames.  We went 
on to say that a transfer hearing is the exclusive means of 
proceeding against a defendant apprehended after his eighteenth 
birthday.  Id.  This is true, we said, even if the defendant had 
been previously apprehended before turning eighteen on 
complaints rooted in the same facts: 
 
"The statute clearly prescribes that a specific 
procedure, the transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A, take place when a defendant who is over the age of 
eighteen is apprehended, and makes no provision that the 
time of apprehension on [the new charges] relates back to 
the time of apprehension on [the earlier] complaint." 
 
Id.  Also, albeit only in dicta, both the court and the 
dissenting justices contemplated that a transfer hearing would 
be available in the defendant's case.  See id. at 638; id. at 
650 (Gants, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
court observed that, if the youthful offender indictments in 
question were determined to be invalid, as they were, the 
Commonwealth would be able to proceed "in such circumstances 
only by the filing of a delinquency complaint, followed by a 
transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A."  Id. at 638. 
 
The defendant, however, maintains that there was in reality 
no apprehension on the 2014 complaint because the complaint, 
11 
 
being merely a continuation or revival of the 2011 complaints, 
has no independent status.  His "apprehension" in reality 
happened in 2011, when he was underage.  This contention relies 
on the assumption that the 2011 complaints -- and the 
apprehension they occasioned -- were not extinguished when the 
Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on them in 2011 and 2012 
after youthful offender indictments were returned.  The 
defendant maintains in this regard that entry of nolle prosequi 
merely "puts those charges to sleep," but does not extinguish 
them in the same way a dismissal would. 
 
This argument fails since, under our jurisprudence, entry 
of nolle prosequi is the equivalent of a dismissal.  See Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 16, 378 Mass. 885 (1978) (in rule governing 
"dismissal by the prosecution," section on "entry of a nolle 
prosequi").  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359 Mass. 332, 
335 (1971) (describing entry of nolle prosequi as "a dismissal 
[that] is made with the approval of the Commonwealth [in which] 
the judge in effect merely concurs in a recommendation of the 
prosecution which is exercising its authority as part of the 
[e]xecutive [b]ranch of government"); Commonwealth v. Aldrich, 
21 Mass. App. Ct. 221, 224-225 (1985) (equating "dismissal" and 
"nolle prosequi" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Miranda, 415 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1993) (holding 
that entry of nolle prosequi dismisses charges, rather than 
12 
 
merely making them dormant, such that prosecution can reinstate 
charges only by filing them anew, and may not simply revive 
them).4  For this reason, we observed in Mogelinski I, supra 
at 639, and reiterate here, that when "nolle prosequi is . . . 
entered on a complaint," that "complaint is extinguished."  Any 
subsequent indictment or complaint, even on the same facts, 
"opens a new case," id., which requires a new and independent 
apprehension.5 
                     
 
4 Commonwealth v. Deheny, 466 Mass. 723 (2014) (Deheny), is 
not to the contrary.  In that case, "we recognize[d] a relevant 
distinction between a judicial dismissal and an entry of a nolle 
prosequi.  A nolle prosequi is a strategic decision by the 
Commonwealth to cease pursuing charges.  Its entry is thus an 
affirmative exercise of a prosecutorial tool to discontinue 
prosecution. . . . In contrast, a judicial dismissal, even one 
without prejudice, signals that the Commonwealth has not met its 
prosecutorial burden." (Citation omitted.)  Id. at 734.  This 
distinction, however, relates only to whether the dismissal was 
initiated by the prosecution or by the judge, relevant in Deheny 
to determine responsibility in connection with a speedy trial 
analysis, and does not speak to the legal effects of dismissals 
and entries of nolle prosequi. 
 
5 We hasten to add, however, that the Commonwealth's power 
to recharge a defendant after it had earlier entered nolle 
prosequi on identical charges is by no means unlimited.  The 
Commonwealth may not delay a proceeding in a juvenile matter 
merely so that it may recharge a defendant after he or she has 
turned eighteen, and then seek a transfer hearing.  This would 
violate the Commonwealth's obligation to act in good faith.  See 
Mogelinski I, supra at 646 & n.11 (noting that, where 
Commonwealth waits until after defendant's eighteenth birthday 
and seeks transfer hearing, "it bears the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of bad faith or inexcusable delay in 
failing to obtain a timely youthful offender indictment" or 
juvenile delinquency charge). 
 
13 
 
 
We are confirmed in our view that, given its raison d'être, 
G. L. c. 119, § 72A, confers jurisdiction in circumstances 
where, as here, a defendant otherwise would face no possibility 
of prosecution for the offenses in question.  The transfer 
procedure "was created to address the circumstance in which a 
juvenile offender has 'aged out' of the Juvenile Court's 
jurisdiction."  Nanny, supra at 806.  "We will not impose an 
overly narrow or artificial construction on a statute that would 
frustrate a grant of jurisdiction that the Legislature clearly 
intended."  Commonwealth v. Porges, 460 Mass. 525, 532 (2011) 
(Porges).  See Nanny, supra at 805 (noting that, "[h]ad the 
Legislature intended to eliminate the requirement of a § 72A 
transfer hearing" in particular context, "it could have done so" 
explicitly when it rewrote statute in 1996). 
 
In such circumstances, the transfer hearing serves a dual 
purpose.  On the one hand, it protects the public by ensuring 
                                                                  
 
Moreover, if jeopardy had attached on the first set of 
charges, or if the charges were dismissed with prejudice, the 
prosecution could not recharge the defendant.  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 16 (b), 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
421 Mass. 272, 277 (1995) (discussing circumstances in which 
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate).  Furthermore, when a 
defendant has pleaded guilty to certain charges in consideration 
of dismissal of other charges, the prosecutor may not refile the 
dismissed charges.  Commonwealth v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 448 
(1969).  Additionally, when the Commonwealth recharges a 
defendant, the prosecution must go through all the procedures 
for the filing of new charges and may not, for example, revive 
charges at a moment's notice and send them immediately to trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 415 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1993). 
14 
 
that a defendant will not "fall 'between the cracks' and be free 
from prosecution where [he] is apprehended after his eighteenth 
birthday."  Mogelinski I, supra at 647, quoting Porges, supra at 
531.  On the other hand, the transfer procedure protects the 
defendant by allowing a Juvenile Court judge to dismiss the 
charges if the judge finds them unsupported by probable cause or 
if the judge is "satisfied that [discharging the defendant] is 
consistent with the protection of the public."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A. 
 
Here, without a transfer hearing, the defendant would face 
no possibility of prosecution for the charged offenses in either 
adult court or Juvenile Court.  This is the very result that the 
transfer law seeks to avoid.  Our construction, by contrast, 
furthers the legislative purpose of ensuring that this defendant 
does not "fall 'between the cracks.'"  Porges, supra at 531.  
This does not mean that the defendant will or should be tried as 
an adult.  It means only that there is a "possibility of 
criminal consequences [if the] Juvenile Court judge [determines] 
that the interests of the public require the [defendant] to be 
tried for the offense rather than discharged."  Id. at 532. 
 
Finally, we made reference in Mogelinski I to this case as 
being among "that narrow set of cases where the Commonwealth 
wishes to proceed against an individual who is just shy of the 
Juvenile Court's jurisdictional age limit."  Mogelinski I, supra 
15 
 
at 646.  Given the clarification of the relevant statutes 
provided in Mogelinski I, Nanny, Porges, and here, we anticipate 
that, going forward, situations like this will be quite rare.  
This is particularly so in light of the Commonwealth's burden to 
demonstrate the absence of bad faith or inexcusable delay in 
failing to obtain a timely juvenile delinquency complaint or 
youthful offender indictment, which would cause the proceedings 
to remain in the Juvenile Court.  See Mogelinski I, supra at 646 
n.11.  We note that, while the defendant asserts without 
explanation that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith in filing 
the 2014 complaint, we discern no support in the record for any 
suggestion that the Commonwealth delayed filing the 2014 
complaint in order to prosecute the defendant in adult court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed.