Title: WILLIAM M. ADDISON and ARLENE N. ADDISION, husband and wife v. TESSA DALLAROSA-HANDRICH and DYLAN DALLAROSA-HANDRICH. Co-Administrators of the Estate of Eldom M. Handrich; and BRENT PRUNTY, Administrator of the Estate of Margaret R. Handrich

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIAM M. ADDISON and ARLENE N. ADDISION, husband and wife v. TESSA DALLAROSA-HANDRICH and DYLAN DALLAROSA-HANDRICH. Co-Administrators of the Estate of Eldom M. Handrich; and BRENT PRUNTY, Administrator of the Estate of Margaret R. Handrich2007 WY 110161 P.3d 1089Case Number: No. 06-274Decided: 07/17/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
WILLIAM 
M. ADDISON and ARLINE N. ADDISON, husband and wife,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
TESSA 
DALLAROSA-HANDRICH and DYLAN DALLAROSA-HANDRICH, Co-Administrators of the Estate 
of Eldon M. Handrich; and BRENT PRUNTY, Administrator of the Estate of Margaret 
R. Handrich,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Frank J. 
Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

M. 
Gregory Weisz of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.          

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  William M. and Arline N. Addison appeal 
from an order quieting title to 6.15 acres of land in Eldon M. and Margaret R. 
Handrich.1  The Addisons claim they acquired title to the land by adverse 
possession and the district court's order to the contrary was clearly 
erroneous.  We affirm.      

            

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  The issue for our determination is 
whether the district court properly quieted title to the disputed property in 
the Handrichs. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  The property in dispute is located in 
Albany County, Wyoming.  
From 1884 until the late 1980s, it was part of the Garton family cattle 
ranch.  In the late 1980s, Greg 
Garton decided to sell the ranch.  He sold it in three parcels.  Two of those parcels are now owned by 
the parties to this case. 

 
 
[¶4]  The Addisons purchased their parcel in 1987.  At that time, the parcel was enclosed by 
a single perimeter fence.  Mr. 
Addison considered the fence line to be the boundary line.   The Addisons planted and cultivated over 12,000 blue spruce 
trees on the property, many of them on the disputed 6.15 acres to the south of 
their property.  

 
 
[¶5]  In 1991, the Zeilers purchased the 
parcel south of the Addison parcel.  Ten years later, the Zeilers sold the 
parcel to the Handrichs.  A survey 
performed showed the true boundary was north of the existing fence. Between 2001 
and 2002 the Handrichs removed the fence and replaced it with a new buffalo 
fence located on the true boundary line.          

 
 
[¶6]  The Addisons filed a complaint in the 
AlbanyCounty district court 
seeking an order ejecting the Handrichs from the disputed acreage, quieting 
title to the 6.15 acres in them and awarding them damages for trees the 
Handrichs allegedly destroyed after they took possession of the land.  The Handrichs filed an answer and 
counterclaim in which they denied the Addisons' 
allegations and sought to have title to the property quieted in them.  

 
 
[¶7]  The case went to trial in district court 
without a jury on June 5 and 6, 2006, and, on June 14, 2006, the district court 
issued a decision letter ruling in favor of the Handrichs.  The district court concluded the 
Addisons had not met their burden of proving their claim of adverse possession 
because the fence was not a substantial enclosure and was a fence of convenience 
creating permissive use on the Addisons' part and there was no actual notice 
converting the Addisons' use from permissive to 
adverse.  The district court entered 
a final order and judgment consistent with its decision letter.    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]  We review a district court's decision 
following a bench trial according to the following 
standards:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 

Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  Further, with regard to the trial 
court's findings of fact,

 
 
[W]e 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. 

 
 

Id.  The district court's conclusions of law 
however are subject to our de novo 
standard of review.  Id.   

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

            
1.         
Adverse Possession by the Addisons

 
 
[¶9]  The Addisons claim that they acquired the 6.15 acres to the 
south of their property by adverse possession and the district court's 
conclusion to the contrary was clearly erroneous.  They assert the evidence was undisputed 
that they took possession of and occupied the 6.15 acres in 1987 and enjoyed 
actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the property 
until fourteen years later when, in 2001 and 2002, the Handrichs unilaterally 
removed the old fence and erected a new one on the legal boundary line.  The Addisons contend that they established their title by 
adverse possession years before the Handrichs purchased the adjoining 
property.  The Addisons claim the old fence was a substantial enclosure 
putting the Handrichs and their predecessors on notice of the adverse claim and 
was not a fence of convenience as the district court erroneously concluded. 

 
 
[¶10]  The Handrichs claim the district court 
properly concluded the fence was one of convenience, meaning the Addisons' use of the 6.15 acres was permissive rather than 
adverse.  They further assert there 
was no actual or implied notice of a hostile claim by the Addisons until 1999, which falls short of the ten year 
period required for adverse possession.   They contend the Addisons cannot show the district court's determination 
was clearly erroneous as they must do in order to succeed on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶11]  Reviewing the factors necessary to 
establish adverse possession, we have said:

 
 
            
In order to establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show 
actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of another's 
property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.  Possession must be for the statutory 
period, ten years.  When there is no 
clear showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the 
statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner 
thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse possession; and the burden 
shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession.  However, if a claimant's use of the 
property is shown to be permissive, then he cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession.

 
 

Gillett 
v. White, 2007 
WY 44, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d 911, 915 (Wyo. 2007) (citation omitted).  

 
 
[¶12] 
Addressing the concepts of substantial enclosures and fences of convenience, we 
have said:  

 
 
In some 
circumstances, enclosing land within a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" 
of adverse possession. However, a fence kept simply for convenience has no 
effect upon the true boundary between tracts of land because, unlike a boundary 
fence, a fence of convenience gives rise to permissive use and permissive use 
will not support a claim for adverse possession.  Ordinarily, the question of whether a 
fence is one of convenience or delineates a boundary is one of fact.   

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶13]  This Court has applied these principles 
in several cases including Gillett in 
which we affirmed a summary judgment order quieting title to disputed property 
in the Whites.  We held Ms. 
Gillett's evidence that the fence was one of convenience was not sufficient for 
summary judgment purposes to rebut the presumption of adverse possession 
established by the Whites.  In Gillett, the Whites established the 
presumption of adverse possession by presenting evidence that the fence 
separating their property from the Gillett property was in place when the Whites 
purchased the property seventeen years before the quiet title action.  The Whites also showed that when their 
predecessors in interest purchased the property, they and the prior owner agreed 
the fence line represented the boundary between the two parcels.  The Whites showed that they had 
cultivated, seeded, harrowed and used the strip of land for grazing since they 
purchased the land in 1988.  It was 
undisputed the strip of land lay inside the fence line on the Whites' side of 
the fence as it had since at least 1983.   

 
 
[¶14]  To rebut the presumption of adverse 
possession, Ms. Gillett submitted an affidavit stating her belief that the 
original owner erected the fence as one of convenience and he and subsequent 
owners of the neighboring property left it where it was for economic 
reasons.  We held that Ms. Gillett's 
unsubstantiated beliefs were not sufficient to rebut the presumption of adverse 
possession or meet her burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed on her claim that the fence was one of convenience. 

 
 
[¶15]  In Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo. 2002), we affirmed the district court's determination after a bench 
trial that the fence at issue was a substantial enclosure sufficient to put the 
record owner on notice of the adverse possessor's claim.  We said the term "substantial enclosure" 
means "the land adversely claimed is enclosed in a manner that puts the title 
owner on notice of the adjoining landowners' adverse claim of ownership and the 
extent of that claim."  Id., ¶ 12, 55 P.3d  at 1271.  We held the district 
court's finding was not clearly erroneous given the evidence that the fence ran 
in a straight line on relatively flat ground that gradually increased in 
elevation from north to south indicating it followed the true boundary line; the 
party claiming adverse possession had used the property for grazing since 1957; 
and all of the parties believed the fence was on the true boundary until a 
survey was performed in 1997.

 
 
[¶16]  In Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119 (Wyo. 
2000), we reversed an order granting summary judgment to an adverse possessor, 
concluding genuine issues of material fact existed for trial on the question of 
whether the fence was one of convenience.  
Evidence was presented that the legal boundary between the properties was 
in the middle of the river and the disputed fence was south of the 
boundary.  The prior owner of the 
southern property indicated the fence was placed south of the boundary to keep 
cattle out of the river.  As water 
was diverted from the river, land emerged and the owner of the northern property 
used the disputed parcel as pasture.  
The owner to the south knew this but did not mind because he considered 
the swampy land to be of little value.  
Citing the rule that the question of whether a fence is a boundary fence 
or one of convenience is generally a factual one, we remanded the case for 
trial.

 
 
[¶17]  In Lake v. Severson, 993 P.2d 309 
(Wyo. 1999), 
we affirmed a district court order following a bench trial finding that a fence 
was one of convenience.  We 
concluded the following evidence supported the district court's finding: both 
land owners knew the fence was not located on the true boundary; the owner did 
not move the fence because the land between it and the true boundary was not 
suitable for farming; and the adverse possessor used the land up to the fence 
for grazing because it was cheaper than building a new fence along the true 
boundary.  Based upon this evidence, 
the district court found, and we agreed, that the use was permissive.  Id. 
at 312.               

 
 
[¶18]  In Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 
(Wyo. 1999), 
we affirmed the district court's determination after a bench trial that the 
fence at issue was one of convenience.  
There, the disputed 7.3 acres of land was enclosed inside a fence with 
land owned by Rawsel Turner.  
Id. at 304. 
 Rawsel built the fence soon after 
he received a patent for the land in 1915.  
In 1929, his son, Deloss, received a patent for the land south of his 
father's property.  Sixty-three 
years later, in 1992, a surveyor discovered the fence that Rawsel built was not 
on the legal boundary separating the properties.  Id. 
at 305.  Deloss Turner's successors 
in interest began building a fence on the legal boundary, such that the 7.3 
acres would be enclosed with their property.  Rawsel's successors instituted an action 
claiming ownership of the 7.3 acres by adverse possession or, alternatively, the 
doctrine of recognition and acquiescence.   

 
 
[¶19]  The district court concluded from the 
manner in which the fence was constructed and the way it and the disputed 
property had been treated that the fence was not intended to serve as a boundary 
fence.  Id. at 307.  Important to the district court's 
determination were:  the fact that 
the fence appeared to have been made by someone walking along stringing barbed 
wire from tree to tree and placing fence posts when trees or bushes were not 
available; the irregular course of the fence; and the lack of any indication 
that the fence was intended to mark or follow a section line.  Id. 
at 306.  Additionally, the district 
court considered testimony of family members that they had been told the fence 
was not on the property line and was used to separate Rawsel's and Deloss's 
cattle.  Based upon these factors, 
we held the district court's finding that the fence was one of convenience was 
not clearly erroneous.  Id. at 
307.

 
 
[¶20]  In the present case, the Handrichs 
presented evidence showing that the fence was in poor shape and in places 
consisted only of posts and no wire, leaving the disputed parcel accessible to 
cattle from the property to the south.  
Thus, unlike in Davis, the 
disputed parcel was not enclosed in a manner putting the Handrichs on notice of 
the adverse claim.  The Handrichs 
further presented evidence that the fence did not follow a straight section line 
but followed the topography of the area, zig-zagging around the bottom of a 
rough, rocky hill, rather than going in a straight line over the hill.  Again, this evidence contrasts with 
Davis where the 
fence ran in a straight line on relatively flat ground, indicating it followed 
the true boundary line. 

 
 
[¶21]  Evidence was also presented in the 
present case showing that originally the fence separated two pastures, both 
owned by Garton Ranches.  The 
pasture to the south was used for calving and when the calves reached a certain 
age they were moved to the north pasture.  
This evidence clearly showed that for the first one hundred years of its 
existence the fence was not intended to delineate a boundary line between 
properties.  Although Mr. Garton 
testified that he assumed the fence was on the boundary line between Section 23 
to the north and Section 26 to the south and did not know until two days before 
trial that his assumption was incorrect, the evidence showing the gaps in and 
irregular course of the fence and the lack of any indication that the fence was 
intended to mark or follow a section line was, as in Kimball, sufficient to support the 
district court's conclusion that the fence was one of convenience.  

 
 
      2.         
Recognition and 
Acquiescence

 
 
[¶22]   In its decision letter, the 
district court also addressed the Addisons' 
claim that the fence was converted to a boundary fence under the doctrine of 
recognition and acquiescence when the Gartons sold them the land in 1987.  The doctrine has been said to apply 
where the true boundary line is uncertain or disputed and the respective 
property owners recognize and acquiesce in a different boundary line and occupy 
the land on either side of that line as though it was their land for at least 
ten years under facts and circumstances equivalent to an express agreement.  Kimball, 993 P.2d  at 308.  The district court found the doctrine 
inapplicable to the Addisons' claim, concluding the true boundary between 
Sections 23 and 26 was not disputed or necessarily uncertain, and the assumption 
the fence followed that boundary was incorrect..  Additionally, the district court 
concluded even if the Gartons could be said to have acquiesced in or agreed to 
the old fence as marking the boundary, their successors, the Zeilers, did 
not.

 
 
[¶23]  We hold that the district court's 
conclusions were not clearly erroneous.  
Moreover, in Kimball, we 
said:  "[The district court's] 
finding [that the fence was one of convenience] precludes both the adverse 
possession claim as well as the claim that the boundary had been altered by 
recognition and acquiescence."  
Id. at 309. 
 This same reasoning applies 
here.  Our holding that the district 
court's finding that the fence was one of convenience was not clearly erroneous 
precludes the Addisons' claim of recognition 
and acquiescence. 

 
 
[¶24]  We affirm the district court's order 
quieting title to the disputed parcel in the Handrichs.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Eldon and 
Margaret Handrich died in a boating accident after this appeal was filed.  By order of this Court dated March 27, 
2007, Tessa Dallarosa-Handrich and Dylan Dallarosa-Handrich, co-administrators 
of the Estate of Eldon Handrich, and Brent Prunty, Administrator of the Estate 
of Margaret Handrich, were substituted as parties.  We refer to them collectively as the 
Handrichs.