Title: People v. Bryant

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE,  
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CLYDELL BRYANT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S259956 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B271300 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
GA094777 
 
 
July 29, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a concurring opinion.  
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
S259956 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
The 2011 Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; 
Realignment Act or Act) provides for a period of mandatory 
supervision following service of a county jail sentence for eligible 
defendants.  Here we consider how to assess the validity of a 
challenged condition of such a release.  We conclude that such 
discretionary conditions are to be evaluated for reasonableness 
on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in People v. Lent 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Late on August 24, 2014, police officers responded to a 
disturbing the peace call outside a housing complex.  The officers 
arrived to find a number of people gathered around two cars in 
the parking lot.  Clydell Bryant and his girlfriend, Lamaine 
Jones, were smoking marijuana in the car of Jones’s mother.  A 
search of the vehicle revealed a loaded, semi-automatic handgun 
under the seat Bryant had occupied.  The gun was not registered 
and bore DNA matching that of Bryant.   
Bryant was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a 
vehicle, along with related findings.  (Pen. Code,1 § 25400, 
subds. (a)(1) & (c)(6).)  The court imposed a split sentence 
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
(§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)), calling for two years in the county jail, 
with the last 364 days to be served at large on mandatory 
supervision.  Over Bryant’s objection, the court imposed the 
following condition:  “Defendant is to submit to search of any 
electronic device either in his possession[,] including cell 
phone[,] and/or any device in his place of residence.  Any search 
by probation is limited to defendant[’]s text messages, emails, 
and photos on such devices.”  (Capitalization omitted.)   
Bryant challenged the search condition as unreasonable 
under the Lent test.  (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481.)  After the 
Court of Appeal agreed and struck the condition (People v. 
Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, 406 (Bryant I)), we granted 
the People’s petition for review (Bryant I, S241937; rev. granted 
June 28, 2017) and held the case pending our decision in In re 
Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.).  We subsequently 
directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its decision and 
reconsider the issue in light of Ricardo P.  The Court of Appeal 
again struck the search condition as unreasonable (People v. 
Bryant (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 839, 848, 850 (Bryant II)), and 
again we granted review.          
II.  DISCUSSION 
California employs a multi-level approach to the 
classification of crimes and their punishment, denoting offenses 
as felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions.  (§ 16.)  Very 
generally, and subject to specific legislative provisions, before 
the Realignment Act, felonies were punishable by death or 
imprisonment in the state prison.  Misdemeanors were subject 
to a county jail sentence and infractions could not result in 
confinement.  (See Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
760, 765 [summarizing former law].)  Some offenses could be 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
punished as either felonies or misdemeanors.  (See People v. 
Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789.)2  Both before and after 
Realignment, except as prohibited by statute, a person convicted 
of a felony may be placed on probation with imposition or 
execution of a state prison sentence suspended, and be made 
subject to a variety of conditions, including a county jail 
sentence.  (See generally §§ 1203.1, subds. (a), (j), 1203.02, 
1203.097, 1203.1ab, 1203.1g.)  A person sentenced to state 
prison may be released on parole, which may also entail 
conditions that are required by statute or imposed at the 
discretion of the Board of Parole Hearings.  (See generally 
§§ 3053–3053.8, 3067, subd. (b)(3).) 
The Realignment Act significantly revamped California’s 
penal system by creating two new categories of postrelease 
supervision:  mandatory supervision upon release from jail and 
postrelease community supervision (PRCS) following service of 
a prison term.  The Act shifts responsibility for the 
incarceration, rehabilitation, and postrelease supervision of 
some felons from the state prison system to local jails and 
probation departments.  (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 450; § 1170, subd. 
(h)(1), (2), (5)(A) & (B); Wofford v. Superior Court (2014) 230 
Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032.)  For eligible felony offenders, the trial 
court must generally impose a split local sentence with 
execution of a portion of the term suspended and the defendant 
released from jail under terms of “mandatory supervision.”  
(§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B); see also id., subd. (h)(5)(A).)  
Significantly, the court need not suspend part of the 
incarceration term if it finds that, in the interest of justice, such 
 
2  
Payment of fines or fees may also be imposed following a 
conviction.  We do not discuss that aspect of sentencing here. 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
suspension is not appropriate.  (Id., subd. (h)(5)(A).)  While on 
mandatory supervision, the offender is supervised by the 
probation department “in accordance with the terms, conditions, 
and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on 
probation . . . .”  (Id., subd. (h)(5)(B).)  The Postrelease 
Community Supervision Act of 2011 (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 479) 
created PRCS as an alternative to parole for nonserious, 
nonviolent felonies.  Qualifying offenders serving a felony prison 
sentence are to be released to the supervision of a county agency 
rather than the state’s Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation.  (§§ 3450–3451; People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 
Cal.App.4th 393, 399.)  Both mandatory supervision and PRCS 
are new categories of supervision distinct from both probation 
and parole.  Their distinct status gives rise to the question here.   
The Realignment Act does not speak directly to how the 
validity of mandatory supervision conditions are to be assessed.  
To resolve defendant’s challenge the Court of Appeal looked to 
the Lent test, which historically governed conditions of 
probation.  (Bryant II, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 843–844, 
849.)  Applying Lent and Ricardo P., the latter of which involved 
an electronics search condition of juvenile probation, the Court 
of Appeal invalidated Bryant’s search condition imposed in the 
context of mandatory supervision.  (Bryant II, at pp. 843–850.)  
We 
conclude 
that 
Lent’s 
case-by-case 
analysis 
for 
reasonableness should be employed in this new context.  A 
review of the statutory provisions governing mandatory 
supervision reveals a scheme similar to that governing 
probationers with respect to the conditions of release.  The 
balance of interests between effective supervision and an 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
individual’s privacy concerns does not substantially differ 
between probation and mandatory supervision settings.3 
A.  Standards Governing Probation Conditions 
Section 1203.1, subdivision (j) authorizes the trial court to 
impose conditions of probation to achieve a variety of goals, 
including reforming and rehabilitating the probationer and 
protecting public safety.  In order to effectuate the requirement 
that probation conditions be “reasonable” (ibid.), Lent 
articulated a now-familiar three part test:  “A condition of 
probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no 
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) 
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires 
or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 
criminality . . . .’ ”  (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486, quoting 
People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627.)  Lent 
contemplates a case-by-case assessment taking into account the 
relationship between the offender’s crime, the terms of the 
challenged condition, and its relation to the probationer’s future 
criminality.  A condition will not be invalidated as unreasonable 
unless all three of Lent’s criteria are satisfied.  (People v. Olguin 
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) 
 
3  
This case does not involve the Legislature’s authority to 
statutorily mandate general conditions of supervision, as it has 
done for probationers (see, e.g., §§ 1203.02, 1203.097, 1203.1ab, 
1203.1g, 1203.1j), parolees (see, e.g. §§ 3053.2–3053.8, 3067, 
subd. (b)(3)), and persons on PRCS (see, e.g., § 3453, subds. (b)–
(t)).  Those statutory provisions are subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.  (See In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035–1036; 
In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1264–1265, 1282–1283 & fn. 
10.)  By contrast, the Legislature did not mandate any generally 
required provisions for release on mandatory supervision, 
leaving those determinations to trial court discretion. 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
The trial court has broad discretion to fashion conditions 
of probation (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120), 
and we review an imposed condition for abuse of discretion 
(People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403).  “[A] reviewing court 
will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular 
condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that 
choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.”  
(Ibid.)         
We applied the Lent test to an electronics search provision 
imposed as a condition of juvenile probation in Ricardo P., 
supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113.  There, the minor had been declared a 
ward of the court for committing two residential burglaries.  He 
challenged a probation condition requiring that he submit to a 
warrantless search of his electronic devices and provide 
passwords for accounts accessible through them.  (Id. at pp. 
1116–1117.)  It was uncontested that the condition was 
unrelated to the burglaries and did not involve otherwise 
criminal conduct.  (Id. at p. 1119.)  Focusing on Lent’s third 
prong, we concluded that the condition was not reasonably 
related to future criminality because there was “no indication 
that Ricardo had used or will use electronic devices in 
connection with drugs or any illegal activity.”  (Id. at p. 1116.)  
Thus, the condition failed under Lent. 
Ricardo P. explained that the test of reasonableness 
involves a balancing of factors.  “Lent’s third prong requires 
more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between 
the probation condition and preventing future criminality.” 
(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121.)  Specifically, a 
probation condition cannot be justified solely on the basis that 
it enhances the effective supervision of the probationer without 
regard for the burden it places on the probationer.  (Id. at pp. 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
1122, 1125.)  Rather, the “requirement that a probation 
condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ 
contemplates a degree of proportionality” between the burden 
imposed by the condition and the legitimate interests the 
condition serves.  (Id. at p. 1122.)  We concluded that “[s]uch 
proportionality [was] lacking” based on the record.  (Ibid.)  
Ricardo P.’s electronics search condition “impose[d] a very heavy 
burden on privacy with a very limited justification.”  (Id. at p. 
1124.)  “[N]othing in the record suggest[ed] that Ricardo ha[d] 
ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with 
criminal conduct.”  (Id. at p. 1122.)  Because the burden imposed 
on Ricardo’s privacy was “substantially disproportionate to the 
countervailing interests of furthering his rehabilitation and 
protecting society” (id. at p. 1119), and because the first two Lent 
criteria were also satisfied, the condition was held invalid (id. at 
p. 1124).  We cautioned, however, that “[o]ur holding does not 
categorically invalidate electronics search conditions.  In certain 
cases, the [defendant’s] offense or personal history may provide 
the . . . court with a sufficient factual basis from which it can 
determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional 
means of deterring the [defendant] from future criminality.”  
(Id. at pp. 1128–1129.) 
B. Standards Governing Conditions of Mandatory 
Supervision  
In determining how conditions of the new mandatory 
supervision status are to be assessed, we begin with the 
statutory language.  (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 
211.)  The Realignment Act defined “ ‘mandatory supervision,’ ” 
as “the portion of a defendant’s sentenced term during which 
time he or she is supervised by the county probation officer 
pursuant to” section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B).  (§ 19.9.)  A split 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
sentence of local jail time followed by a period of mandatory 
supervision is a hybrid sentence, distinct from both probation 
and parole.  An earlier version of the Act provided for a split 
sentence comprised of “a period of county jail time and a period 
of mandatory probation.”  (Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 27, italics 
added.)  But the designation of probation was replaced with a 
reference to “mandatory” supervision “by the county probation 
officer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and procedures 
generally applicable to persons placed on probation.”  (Stats. 
2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 12.)  A subsequent 
amendment clarified that “[t]he portion of a defendant’s 
sentenced term during which time he or she is supervised by the 
county probation officer pursuant to this subparagraph shall be 
known as mandatory supervision” and it specifically defined the 
term “ ‘mandatory supervision’ ” in section 19.9.  (Stats. 2012, 
ch. 43, §§ 14, 27.)  This legislative history “suggests that the 
Legislature did not intend probation and mandatory supervision 
to be interchangeable or otherwise identical in all respects.”  
(People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 766 
(Ghebretensae).)   
Nonetheless, the conditions of mandatory supervision 
resemble those of probation in that they are ordered by a judge 
at the time of sentencing and involve an individualized exercise 
of discretion based on the particular case.4  Notably, unlike 
 
4  
See section 1170.3, subdivision (a)(6) (directing the 
Judicial Council to adopt guidelines for a trial court’s decision 
to, among other things, “determine the appropriate period and 
conditions of mandatory supervision”); California Rules of 
Court, rule 4.415(c) (establishing factors to be considered when 
a trial court imposes conditions of mandatory supervision); 
 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
other forms of supervision, the Legislature did not mandate any 
generally required provisions for release on mandatory 
supervision.  Lent’s case-specific evaluation is particularly 
appropriate to review of a trial court’s order with regard to a 
given defendant on mandatory supervision.  Its test supplies a 
framework for assessing whether conditions of supervision for 
that defendant are “fitting and proper to the end that justice 
may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach 
of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that 
breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and 
rehabilitation of the [defendant].”  (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) 
The Realignment Act also provides that “the defendant 
shall be supervised by the county probation officer in accordance 
with the terms, conditions, and procedures generally applicable 
to persons placed on probation, for the remaining unserved 
portion of the sentence imposed by the court.”  (§ 1170, subd. 
(h)(5)(B).)  Focusing on the language “shall be supervised” 
(ibid.), some appellate courts have interpreted this provision to 
apply to “the county probation officer’s supervision, not the trial 
court’s authority” (People v. Rahbari (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 
185, 
195 
(Rahbari); 
accord, 
Ghebretensae, 
supra, 
222 
Cal.App.4th at p. 764).  They reason that the provision “pertains 
to the nature and manner of supervision by the probation officer 
over the defendant — in other words, the nature and manner of 
the supervision itself.”  (Ghebretensae, at p. 764; accord, 
 
Couzens & Bigelow, Felony Sentencing After Realignment (May 
2017) 
at 
page 
17 
[as of July 29, 2021].  All 
Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number and case number at . 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
Rahbari, at p. 195.)  The People advance a similar argument 
here.  We do not read the statutory language so narrowly.  The 
manner of supervision necessarily depends on the scope or 
substance of the terms and conditions imposed.  In that sense it 
is the terms and conditions of release that define what is being 
supervised and how supervision will be conducted.  Accordingly, 
this statutory language further supports the conclusion that the 
terms and conditions of mandatory supervision, like those of 
probation, are subject to the Lent test.5 
The Legislature also amended several statutes dealing 
with 
probation 
to 
incorporate 
persons 
on 
mandatory 
supervision.  (See, e.g., §§ 1203.3, as amended by Stats. 2012, 
ch. 43, § 31 [modification of terms and conditions], 1203.2, as 
amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30 [revocation]; see also 
Rahbari, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.)  These amendments 
suggest that, in general, the conditions of probation and 
mandatory supervision are now intended to be handled in the 
same way.6 
Additional support appears in the Legislature’s codified 
findings and declarations accompanying the Realignment Act.  
 
5  
We disapprove of language in People v. Rahbari, supra, 
232 Cal.App.4th at page 195 and People v. Ghebretensae, supra, 
222 Cal.App.4th at page 764 to the extent it conflicts with this 
opinion. 
6  
Of course, every general rule is subject to exceptions.  For 
example, Rahbari, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pages 193–194 
held that victim restitution orders for persons on mandatory 
supervision are limited to losses caused by the criminal conduct 
for which the defendant was convicted (§ 1202.4), not the 
broader provisions for restitution governing persons on 
probation (§ 1203.1).  We need not consider these nuances in 
resolving the narrow issue here.    
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
(See Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 914, 925.)  These findings and declarations explain that 
mandatory supervision was designed to apply to low-level felony 
offenders who are specifically permitted to avoid prison and 
instead be incarcerated in the county jail.  Section 17.5 of the 
Penal Code, enacted as part of the Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, 
§ 229), reflects an intent to reduce recidivism and improve 
public safety by creating a tiered system of incarceration and 
release (§ 17.5, subd. (a)(1)–(5)).  Under the statutory 
amendments, “[p]arole applies to high-level offenders, i.e., third 
strikers, high-risk sex offenders, and persons imprisoned for 
serious or violent felonies or who have a severe mental disorder 
and committed specified crimes.  (§ 3451, subd. (b).)  All other 
. . . persons [released from prison] are placed on [PRCS]. (§ 3451, 
subd. (a).)”  (People v. Armogeda (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 428, 
434.)  Those subject to a split term of incarceration in county jail 
followed by mandatory supervision are considered lower level 
offenders compared with those on parole or PRCS.  The 
Legislature specifically concluded that these offenders do not 
warrant incarceration in state prison.  (§§ 17.5, 1170, subd. 
(h)(1).)  Instead, they more closely resemble probationers for 
purposes of assessing the conditions of supervision required for 
their successful rehabilitation and societal reintegration.  
C.  The People’s Counterarguments 
The People counter that the status of mandatory 
supervision justifies an electronics search clause for all those so 
released.  Thus, they argue a case-by-case review under Lent is 
inappropriate.  They urge that these individuals have been 
found unsuitable for probation.  Like parolees, they are 
sentenced to a period of incarceration and are deemed to be 
under continued custody during the supervisory period.  The 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
People’s analogy to parolees in this context is misplaced.  It fails 
to acknowledge that mandatory supervision is a new status, 
reserved for those considered inappropriate for a state prison 
commitment before parole release. 
It is true that courts have noted the similarities between 
mandatory supervision and parole for some purposes.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422–1423 
(Fandinola); People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 
762–763 (Martinez).)  Fandinola, for example, considered 
whether a person on mandatory supervision should pay a 
probation supervision fee under former section 1203.1b, which 
“unambiguously applie[d] to cases ‘in which a defendant is 
granted 
probation 
or 
given 
a 
conditional 
sentence.’ ”  
(Fandinola, at p. 1422, quoting former § 1203.1b, subd. (a).)  The 
court declined to extend the probation fee to the new status of 
mandatory supervision.  It observed that “a county jail 
commitment followed by mandatory supervision imposed under 
section 1170, subdivision (h), is akin to a state prison 
commitment; it is not a grant of probation or a conditional 
sentence.”  (Fandinola, at p. 1422.)7  The provisions of section 
667.5, subd. (d) governing enhancements for prior prison terms 
offer another example.  That section provides, “[T]he defendant 
shall be deemed to remain in prison custody for an offense until 
the official discharge from custody, including any period of 
mandatory supervision, or until release on parole or postrelease 
community supervision . . . .”  And the Legislature expressly 
 
7  
The Legislature has since amended section 1203.1b, 
subdivision (a) to provide that offenders placed on mandatory 
supervision may be ordered to pay costs to the probation 
department.  (Stats. 2014, ch. 468, § 1.)   
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
amended the statute governing parole revocation fines to 
include mandatory supervision revocation fines.  (§ 1202.45, 
subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 762, § 1.) 
But the fact that mandatory supervision tracks parole for 
some purposes does not mean that it does so for all purposes.  
Fandinola dealt with the imposition of costs that are now 
directly regulated by statute.  Statutes regulating fines and 
enhancements for prior prison terms do not involve conditions 
of release.  Nor do they speak to the degree of risk or potential 
for recidivism posed by people on mandatory supervision.  Those 
questions are more squarely addressed by the Legislative 
findings and declarations accompanying the Realignment Act 
and the express provisions of section 1170, subdivision (h)(1).  As 
discussed above, those provisions reflect the Legislature’s 
determination 
that 
defendants 
eligible 
for 
mandatory 
supervision are lower-level offenders who do not warrant a state 
prison commitment.  (§§ 17.5, 1170, subd. (h)(1).)   
The Court of Appeal in Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 
759 reached the opposite conclusion that “the validity of the 
terms of supervised release [are to be analyzed] under standards 
analogous to the conditions or parallel to those applied to terms 
of parole.”  (Id. at p. 763.)  In doing so, it cited Fandinola for the 
proposition that “ ‘the Legislature has decided a county jail 
commitment followed by mandatory supervision . . . , is akin to 
a state prison commitment; it is not a grant of probation or a 
conditional sentence.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Fandinola, supra, 221 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.)  As noted, Fandinola drew parallels 
between mandatory supervision and parole in a different 
context.  Martinez did not discuss the provisions of section 17.5, 
which squarely address legislative intent.  Even so, Martinez 
ultimately applied the Lent test to assess the challenge to a 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
mandatory supervision condition under the theory that “[t]he 
validity and reasonableness of parole conditions is analyzed 
under the same standard as that developed for probation 
conditions.”  (Martinez, at p. 764.)  We likewise employ the Lent 
test, but for different reasons.  We disapprove of language in 
People v. Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at page 763 to the 
extent it conflicts with this opinion.           
The People rely heavily on People v. Burgener (1986) 41 
Cal.3d 505 (Burgener), which held that “a warrantless search 
condition is a reasonable term in any parole of a convicted felon 
from state prison.”  (Id. at p. 532, italics added.)8  They argue by 
analogy that the reduced privacy expectations of persons on 
mandatory supervision, and the state’s overwhelming interest 
in supervising them, mean that an electronics search condition 
is per se reasonable for those offenders.  Burgener does not 
sweep as broadly as they urge.  Upon his release from parole, 
Burgener signed a “ ‘notice and conditions of parole’ ” that 
stated: “ ‘You and your residence and any property under your 
control may be searched without a warrant by any agent of the 
Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.’ ”  
(Burgener, at p. 528, fn. 10.)9  During a warrantless search of 
 
8  
The People urge that conditions of mandatory supervision 
are subject to review for reasonableness under the standard 
articulated in Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 532–534, and 
to review for overbreadth if the condition implicates a 
defendant’s constitutional rights (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 875, 890).     
9  
At that time, California Code of Regulations, title 15, 
section 2511 provided for such notice to all parolees.  (Register 
77, No. 44 (Oct. 29, 1977) p. 273.)  The Legislature subsequently 
enacted section 3067, which provides that all parolees are 
 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Burgener’s apartment, officers found evidence linking him to a 
homicide.  On appeal, he challenged the search on Fourth 
Amendment grounds and also argued that the parole search 
condition was improper.  (Burgener, at pp. 528–532.)  The 
Burgener court recognized that “parole conditions, like 
conditions of probation, must be reasonable [because] parolees 
retain 
constitutional 
protection 
against 
arbitrary 
and 
oppressive official action.”  (Id., at p. 532; accord In re Taylor, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1038 & fn. 8.)  However, the court 
concluded that “[t]he distinction between felony parole and 
probation justifies the inclusion of the parole search condition in 
all parole agreements.”  (Burgener, at p. 532.)  Parolees have 
been sentenced to prison because of the risk they pose to society, 
based on the seriousness of their conduct and offense history.  
(Id. at p. 533.)  This increased risk, and a greater need to closely 
supervise their reintegration into the community, justified a 
conclusion that the condition was “per se . . . related to future 
criminality” and thus a “reasonable condition of parole.”  
(Ibid.)10 
As explained, we reject the People’s premise that, in this 
context, those on mandatory supervision are similar in status to 
those on parole, a premise key to their reliance on Burgener.  
Moreover, Burgener’s holding is limited to the conclusion that a 
 
“subject to search or seizure by a probation or parole officer or 
other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or 
without a search warrant or with or without cause.”  (Id., subd. 
(b)(3), former subd. (a), added by Stats. 1996, ch. 868, § 2, p. 
4656.)  
10  
Burgener’s holding that a parole search must be justified 
by reasonable suspicion (41 Cal.3d at p. 535) was later overruled 
in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753 (Reyes). 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
warrantless search of a parolee’s property or residence, then 
mandated by the California Code of Regulations and now 
imposed by statute (see ante, fn. 9), is per se reasonable.  
Burgener did not hold that courts have authority to mandate any 
other condition for all parolees, or for all individuals in any other 
category of supervision.  Generally, it is the Legislature’s role to 
require, by statutory mandate, uniform conditions for release 
from confinement.  As noted, the Legislature has done so for 
parolees, probationers, and persons on PRCS, but not for those 
on mandatory supervision.  (See ante, fn. 3.)  Finally, Burgener 
did not involve an electronics search condition.  When it comes 
to electronics searches we, and the United States Supreme 
Court, have recognized that the degree of intrusion posed by 
sweeping access to such devices is great in light of their 
“ ‘immense storage capacity’ ” and the highly personal nature of 
the information stored on them.  (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 1123, quoting Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 393.)  
The fact that the Legislature has never required a general 
electronics search condition for any level of postcustodial release 
demonstrates that such searches are different from many 
others.  In short, the People’s interpretation of Burgener is 
overbroad.  Burgener’s holding related only to the category of 
parolees and to the single provision for a warrantless search of 
property and residence.  The People attempt to apply its holding 
to the different status of mandatory supervision and to a 
significantly more intrusive electronics search condition.  We 
decline to embrace such an expansion.          
The People further note that, like parole, mandatory 
supervision may not be refused when selected by the trial court.  
(§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)  This mandatory aspect may bear on 
whether conditions can be justified on a consent rationale, a 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
question we do not consider here.  (See Samson v. California 
(2006) 547 U.S. 843, 852, fn. 3; Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 
749; People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608.)  But it does not 
otherwise speak to the degree of risk posed by those given a split 
sentence.  The People further argue that imposition of a split 
sentence “does not reflect any discretionary determination by a 
trial court” that a defendant should not serve the entire jail term 
in custody.  They overlook the fact that the provision of a default 
split sentence reflects the Legislature’s determination that these 
low-level felony offenders need not necessarily remain in 
custody for their entire sentence.  Moreover, the trial court 
exercises its statutorily conferred discretion by choosing to 
impose a split sentence, rather than departing from the default 
approach based on the circumstances of the particular case.  
(See § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(A).) 
Finally, the People contend that, “[e]ven if a more 
individualized inquiry beyond Bryant’s status as an offender on 
mandatory supervision were required, the circumstances here 
justify the condition, taking into account his lesser expectation 
of privacy and the closer monitoring that is warranted in the 
mandatory supervision context.”  The People’s attempt to recast 
their argument fails because it continues to resist evaluation of 
the search condition based on Bryant’s offense and history.  The 
People do point to those particular factors to support a split 
sentence.  They then return to the premise that an electronics 
search condition is categorically reasonable for anyone who 
receives such a sentence.  Ultimately, this approach is 
indistinguishable from an argument that Bryant’s status as an 
offender on mandatory supervision is alone sufficient to justify 
the condition.    
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
The argument runs counter to Ricardo P.’s holding that 
conditions of supervision may not be imposed based on “an 
abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation 
condition and preventing future criminality.”  (Ricardo P., 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121.)  The People fail to persuade that all 
defendants on mandatory supervision are inherently more 
prone to recidivism, justifying a lesser showing to impose a 
condition.  Further, the Lent test does take into account the 
seriousness of the offense.  The first Lent factor considers the 
relationship between the supervision condition and the 
defendant’s crime, and the third factor forbids conditions that 
are not reasonably related to future criminality, balancing the 
condition’s burden with the legitimate interest it serves.  (See 
Ricardo P., at p. 1122; Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)  These 
aspects of the Lent test sufficiently account for the seriousness 
of both offense and offender.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Legislature has expressly determined 
that low-level felony offenders will benefit from “community-
based corrections programs and evidence-based practices” to 
“facilitate their reintegration back into society.”  (§ 17.5, subd. 
(a)(4)–(5).)  Employing the Lent test to assess mandatory 
supervision conditions best implements the Legislature’s stated 
goals.  The trial court retains broad discretion to fashion these 
conditions subject to review for abuse of that discretion. 
As in the probation context, imposing an electronics 
search condition for those on mandatory supervision requires 
the court to balance the need for meaningful supervision and 
rehabilitation with the burden imposed by the condition.  There 
may, indeed, be valid reasons for such a condition, but they must 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
be supported by information in the record relating the condition 
to the defendant’s criminal conduct or personal history.  
(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1120–1123.) 
Here, the Court of Appeal struck the electronics search 
condition “[b]ecause of the significant burden imposed on 
Bryant’s privacy interest and the absence of any information in 
the record to connect the condition with the goal of preventing 
future criminality . . . .”  (Bryant II, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 
847.)  The People did not seek review of the case-specific 
outcome here.  Instead, they framed the issue for review as one 
of law involving the test for evaluating all mandatory 
supervision conditions.  In their briefing they state:  “As the 
People conceded in the Court of Appeal, Bryant’s electronics 
search condition would be invalid if assessed under the rubric of 
Ricardo P., meaning it would be invalid if assessed in the same 
way as a probation condition.”  We accept that concession and 
do not review the Court of Appeal’s determination as to the 
condition imposed on Bryant.  We emphasize, however, as we 
did in Ricardo P., that this case-specific outcome should not be 
read to “categorically invalidate electronics search conditions.  
In certain cases, the [defendant’s] offense or personal history 
may provide the . . . court with a sufficient factual basis from 
which it can determine that an electronics search condition is a 
proportional means of deterring the [defendant] from future 
criminality.”  (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129.)        
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
IV.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
S259956 
 
Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that discretionary 
conditions of mandatory supervision are reviewed under the test 
set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481.  I agree, too, that 
a mandatory supervision condition that allows for a search of an 
individual’s electronic devices is not per se reasonable in all 
cases.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14–18.)  And I agree that we 
need not review the particular condition imposed here in light 
of the Attorney General’s concession.  (Id. at p. 19.)  I write 
separately to offer three observations regarding what I view as 
the narrow scope of the majority opinion in this case.  
First, the majority repeatedly states that an analysis 
under Lent involves a “case-by-case” review concerning the 
reasonableness of a condition of supervision.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 1, 4, 5.)  As I noted in In re Ricardo P., we have previously 
held that certain probation conditions are reasonable under 
Lent “simply by reference to the offense of conviction, without 
any additional case-specific balancing of benefits and burdens.”  
(In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1114, 1134 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.) (Ricardo P.); see, e.g., People v. Olguin 
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380–381, People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 
759, 764; see also People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 532–
533 [search condition of parolee is per se reasonable].)  I agree 
that electronics search conditions imposed in the course of 
mandatory supervision do not fall into this category of 
conditions that are reasonable per se.  However, I do not 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
2 
understand our opinion today to disapprove of the principle 
articulated in Olguin and Mason.  Nor do I understand our 
opinion to foreclose the possibility that certain conditions of 
mandatory supervision may be considered per se reasonable.   
Second, the majority rejects the People’s assertion that 
mandatory supervision conditions should be treated like parole 
conditions, noting in part that “[t]he People fail to persuade that 
all defendants on mandatory supervision are inherently more 
prone to recidivism, justifying a lesser showing to impose a 
condition.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  I agree that Lent applies 
to conditions of mandatory supervision, but I do not perceive the 
majority to be stating that probation and mandatory supervision 
are so alike that a probation condition that fails under Lent will 
necessarily fail in the context of mandatory supervision as well.   
As the majority recognizes, mandatory supervision is 
“distinct” from probation and parole.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.)  
Probation is “an act of grace or clemency” (People v. Moran 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402, citing People v. Anderson (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 19, 32) that is “generally reserved for convicted 
criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal 
risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation” (People v. 
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120).  It is “neither 
‘punishment’ (see [Pen. Code,] § 15) nor a criminal ‘judgment’ 
(see [Pen. Code,] § 1445).”  (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
1081, 1092.)  Mandatory supervision, on the other hand, is 
imposed only when a court has determined that probation is not 
appropriate.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 1170, subd. (h), 1203; People v. 
Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422.)   
Thus, 
although 
individuals 
subject 
to 
mandatory 
supervision “are considered lower level offenders compared with 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
3 
those on parole or [postrelease community supervision]” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 11), they are more serious offenders than those 
granted probation.  The case before us does not require that we 
articulate how these distinctions between probation and 
mandatory supervision may impact the propriety of certain 
supervision conditions under Lent or from a constitutional 
perspective, and I do not understand our opinion as reaching 
those issues outside the specific context presented here.   
Third, the majority notes “that the degree of intrusion 
posed by sweeping access to [electronic] devices is great in light 
of their ‘ “immense storage capacity” ’ and the highly personal 
nature of the information stored on them.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 16, quoting Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123, quoting in 
turn Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 393.)  But not all 
electronics search conditions are alike.  The degree of intrusion 
posed by an electronics search condition necessarily depends on 
the precise contours of the condition at issue.  A condition 
allowing law enforcement unfettered access to all electronic 
devices at any time of the day or night as was at issue in Ricardo 
P. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123) is quite different from 
a condition tailored to specific data on a particular electronic 
device.  Furthermore, I remain of the view that concerns 
regarding the burden imposed by such a condition can 
commonly be “adequately addressed by placing appropriate 
limits on the ability of [law enforcement] to access [an 
individual’s electronic devices], whether through the selective 
provision of passwords or other measures.”  (Ricardo P., supra, 
7 Cal.5th at pp. 1139–1140 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, 
C. J.).)  When an “electronics search condition [is] susceptible to 
such tailoring,” concerns about the scope of such a condition 
would be “better addressed through a separate overbreadth 
PEOPLE v. BRYANT 
Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., concurring 
4 
analysis.”  (Id. at p. 1140 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, 
C. J.).)            
In short, I agree with the majority’s principal conclusions 
even though I remain of the view that the recent expansion of 
Lent at the expense of the overbreadth doctrine is misguided and 
in some respects counterproductive.  (See Ricardo P., supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 1138 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.).)  
With the foregoing understanding of the majority opinion, I 
concur. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Bryant 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  XX 42 Cal.App.5th 839 
Review Granted (unpublished)   
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S259956 
Date Filed:  July 29, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior     
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Michael Villalobos    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
David Greifinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael 
R. Johnsen, Zee Rodriguez and Andrew S. Pruitt, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
David Greifinger 
Law Offices of David R. Greifinger 
15515 W. Sunset Blvd., No. 214 
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272 
(424) 330-0193 
 
Zee Rodriguez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6124