Title: Ex Parte Conaway

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

767 So. 2d 1117 (2000)
Ex parte Fred CONAWAY and Mattie Conaway.
(Re Fred Conaway and Mattie Conaway v. Minnie Norris Nickles, a/k/a Minnie Norris; Harmon O. Wilson; and Belview Real Estate Company, Inc.)
1971902.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 7, 2000.
Rehearing Denied February 18, 2000.
*1118 Fred Conaway, petitioner, pro se.
Submitted on petitioner's brief only.
PER CURIAM.
Fred Conaway and Mattie Conaway sued Minnie Norris Nickles, Harmon O. Wilson, and Belview Real Estate Company ("Belview") for specific performance of a real-estate sales contract. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants, on the basis that the contract was void for lack of mutual assent. The Conaways appealed. This Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, without an opinion, but with a written dissent. Conaway v. Nickles, 767 So. 2d 1116 (Ala. Civ.App.1998). We granted certiorari review. We reverse and remand.
Nickles owned a house located at 4850 Johns Road in Bessemer. She contracted with Belview and its agent, Wilson, to sell that house. The Conaways decided to buy it. They, along with Nickles and Belview, through its agent Wilson, signed a standard-form contract, captioned "General Residential Sales Contract," to which the following provisions had been added:
A dispute later arose over the approximately $7,000 earmarked for repairs. As a result of the dispute, Wilson refused to close the sale. The Conaways sued for specific performance of the contract.
In entering the summary judgment for the defendants, the court wrote:
In its no-opinion memorandum affirmance, the Court of Civil Appeals cited City of Montgomery v. Maull, 344 So. 2d 492 (Ala.1977). Judge Crawley, dissenting from the affirmance, stated that although the contract was ambiguous, it should not be held void for ambiguity or lack of mutual assent. He wrote:
767 So. 2d  at 1117 (Crawley, J., dissenting).
We agree with Judge Crawley. An ambiguity in a contract does not automatically make the contract void. Once the trial court determines that a contract is ambiguous, it is for the jury to determine the true meaning of the contract. Decker v. Marshall-DeKalb Elec. Coop., 659 So. 2d 926 (Ala.1995); Rivers v. Oakwood College, 442 So. 2d 74, 76 (Ala.1983). This Court has stated:
McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 585 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala.1991). (Quoted with approval in Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First Amfed Corp., 607 So. 2d 184, 186 (Ala.1992)).
Because the terms of the contract were not so ambiguous that "construction becomes futile" (Heyman Cohen & Sons, cited in Judge Crawley's dissent, supra), the trial judge should not have entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, SEE, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
LYONS, J., concurs specially.
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
The language presenting the ambiguity does not present a hopeless indefiniteness leading to the futility of construction that Justice Cardozo condemned in Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370 (1921) (cited by Judge Crawley in his dissent). The Conaways contend that the provision stating that the seller is not required to make repairs means that the seller has no responsibility for overseeing performance of any contract for repairs. This construction is not unreasonable. Thus, this case presents a jury question.