Title: In re Roberts

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 1/2/03 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
) 
In re LARRY H. ROBERTS 
) 
on Habeas Corpus 
) 
S071835 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Petitioner Larry H. Roberts was sentenced to death for the August 17, 1980, 
murder with special circumstances of fellow prison inmate Charles Gardner.  We 
affirmed the judgment on automatic appeal.  (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
271.) 
On July 7, 1998, petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, raising numerous claims.  We issued an order to show cause why relief 
should not be granted on the grounds that the prosecutor knowingly offered 
perjured testimony and that petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel failed to properly impeach prosecution witnesses with 
evidence that a prison gate, through which petitioner allegedly had passed after the 
murder, had been locked.  After receiving respondent’s return, we appointed a 
referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  As explained more fully below, the 
referee found that three prosecution witnesses testified falsely at trial, but the 
prosecution did not attempt to induce this false testimony and defense counsel was 
not ineffective in failing to present exculpatory evidence regarding the prison gate. 
After considering the record on appeal, the evidence presented at the habeas 
corpus evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the referee, we deny the petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
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FACTS 
1. The Trial 
Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of the first degree murders 
(Pen. Code, § 187)1 of Gardner and Albert Patch, a correctional officer at 
California Medical Facility, Vacaville, where petitioner and Gardner were 
inmates, with the special circumstances that petitioner previously had been 
convicted of first degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), that he had committed 
multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and that he had killed Gardner by means 
of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).  Petitioner also was convicted of 
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182), assault by a life prisoner resulting in death 
(§ 4500), and possession of a weapon by an inmate (§ 4502).  He was sentenced to 
death for murdering Gardner and violating section 4500, and to life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole for murdering Patch.  On appeal, we reversed 
petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Patch and set aside the multiple-murder 
special circumstance, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.  (People v. Roberts, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 294.) 
The evidence admitted at trial showed that on August 17, 1980, Gardner 
was stabbed repeatedly as he walked down a prison corridor.  The prosecution 
sought to prove petitioner killed Gardner as part of a gang dispute.  It offered 
evidence to support two scenarios: that petitioner and fellow inmate Archie 
Menefield killed Gardner as part of a conflict among members of the Black 
Guerrilla Family (BGF), a prison gang, or that petitioner stabbed Gardner because 
Gardner had insulted him in the prison yard. 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
3
Inmate Raybon Long, a BGF member, testified that petitioner was a 
lieutenant in the BGF and Ruben Williams was the leader.  Williams had disputes 
with many BGF members, including petitioner, over administration of the gang’s 
Vacaville chapter.  Long overheard petitioner tell Williams to surrender control of 
the BGF at Vacaville.  Williams refused.  Later, a day before Gardner’s killing, he 
again heard petitioner, in front of Menefield and Gardner, order Williams to 
surrender authority, threatening to kill him if he did not.  Petitioner also threatened 
Gardner, who sided with Williams, saying:  “Well, if you gonna ride with him, 
you gonna die with him.” 
Another inmate, Leslie H. Rooks, testified for the prosecution that the day 
before the killings Gardner had cursed petitioner.  Petitioner reacted angrily, and 
asked Rooks for a knife, telling him that he was going to kill Gardner.  Petitioner 
also told Rooks that he was going to kill Williams because he was mishandling his 
command of the Vacaville BGF.  Rooks testified that petitioner was carrying a 
knife on the morning of the killings. 
Early on the morning of the killings, inmate Robert Hayes was working 
with petitioner in the prison’s medical clinic.  Petitioner asked Hayes whether 
alcohol could remove fingerprints and if another disinfectant would remove blood.  
Petitioner tried to telephone Menefield from the clinic, but was told that he would 
not be released from his cell until 7:30 a.m.  Petitioner examined an Ace bandage, 
said it was unsuitable, and asked if there was any paper tape—a type of white tape 
thinner than adhesive tape and easier to remove.  When Hayes looked in the 
clinic’s back room, petitioner was using the tape to wrap a prison-made knife.  
Hayes told petitioner that he thought he had settled his accounts with Gardner, but 
petitioner replied, “I can’t let that punk get away with this disrespecting me,” or 
similar words.  Petitioner then left the clinic. 
 
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Long testified that, on the morning of the killings, petitioner roused 
Menefield from bed and told him to hurry up because Williams was on the first 
floor.  He also asked for someone to collect the knives after they were done with 
the killing.  Petitioner and Menefield then left to go to the first floor. 
Long, Hayes, and inmate Ryland T. Cade testified that they saw petitioner 
stab Gardner with a prison-made “shank” or knife as Gardner walked down the 
corridor on the first floor.  When Gardner tried to fight back, Menefield grabbed 
Gardner and held him down so that petitioner could continue to stab him.  
Petitioner then dropped the knife and ran upstairs, followed by Menefield. 
Rooks was on the third floor when the alarm sounded following the 
stabbings.  He obtained permission to go to petitioner’s cell and found him there, 
dressed in his underwear and possibly a bathrobe.  The prosecution introduced 
evidence in rebuttal “that an agile person could run from the first floor to certain 
key locations in seconds and walk briskly to [petitioner]’s cell in less than one 
minute, and that [petitioner] could have done so unseen.”  (People v. Roberts, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 296.) 
After the incident, Cade and petitioner were both confined in the 
segregation wing.  Cade had been sent there for fighting with another inmate and 
petitioner was being held as a suspect in the killing.  Petitioner told Cade that he 
had stabbed Gardner and then had run to the third floor.  Petitioner said that he 
murdered Gardner because of Gardner’s desire to leave the BGF and because he 
believed Gardner might kill another inmate, Donald Hand. 
Inmate Richard Yacotis testified that he too had been confined in the 
segregation wing with petitioner and Menefield after the killings.  Menefield 
stopped by petitioner’s cell on his way back from a shower, and the two discussed 
the crimes.  Yacotis watched, using a mirror, and was close enough to overhear the 
conversation.  Petitioner asked Menefield, “Why didn’t you pick up the knife?”  
 
5
Menefield replied, “Because I was running right behind you up the stairs.”  Then 
Menefield added, “If push comes to shove, I will take the rap.” 
Not all of the evidence pointed to petitioner’s guilt.  Inmate David Calvin, 
Jr., although a prosecution witness, testified he saw Menefield  stab Gardner.  A 
second inmate, whom Calvin could not identify, made stabbing motions toward 
Gardner during the attack, but Calvin stated that petitioner had left the area before 
the stabbing began.  Inmate Norman Goodwin also testified for the prosecution 
that Menefield stabbed Gardner. 
Petitioner sought to discredit the testimony of Cade, Long, Rooks, Yacotis,  
and Hayes, noting they had a motive to lie because they had received benefits 
from the state, and they had been housed together at the Chino state prison, but 
each witness denied that he had discussed his testimony with the others.  On cross-
examination, Cade admitted that he had lied at the preliminary hearing to avoid 
revealing Long’s presence on the first floor.  He admitted not telling the whole 
truth in early interviews with investigators, stating that, for reasons of safety, he 
wanted to tell them little and be left alone.  And he admitted disliking and being 
contemptuous of petitioner. 
Cade conceded that he had asked for an accelerated parole date and was 
told that the request could not be honored.  He received $40 from the state.  But he 
denied having received any other favors. 
Yacotis stated on cross-examination that he had overheard Long tell Calvin 
that the two had to get their stories straight in order to obtain their freedom, and 
that Long and Calvin had discussed, in counsel’s words, “ how they were going to 
send some other inmates to the gas chamber.” 
Inmate Arthur Gibens (spelled “Givens” at the reference hearing ) testified 
for the defense that prior to trial, Long told him “[t]hat he really didn’t know what 
 
6
had happened and he had been recruited to say certain things . . . .”  Long also said 
that he had not been present when the stabbing occurred. 
Long acknowledged on direct examination that he might later receive a 
reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony.  He also testified that the 
prosecution’s investigator had paid $30 to $40 into his prison account to 
compensate him for money lost while he was in protective custody and, hence, 
unable to work.  And he was given a choice of facilities, albeit limited, in which to 
remain incarcerated, evidently for his safety. 
Long admitted on cross-examination that he lied at the preliminary hearing 
when he testified that he did not see petitioner run to the third floor.  And he was 
impeached on discrepancies between various details of his preliminary hearing 
testimony (and prior statements to investigators) and his testimony at trial. 
Rooks acknowledged that the prosecution had written a letter to the parole 
board on his behalf, paid $30 into his trust account, and taken steps to ensure his 
safety.  Rooks misbehaved while at the Chino state prison and wrote a letter to the 
prosecutor, Charles Kirk, demanding relief and threatening not to testify in 
petitioner’s case if his demand was not met.  Kirk went to Chino and discussed the 
matter with officials, but sided with them; as a result, Rooks was confined under 
harsher conditions.  Called on rebuttal, Rooks stated he was testifying against 
petitioner because petitioner had issued an order to have Rooks killed. 
Hayes stated that he had testified falsely at the preliminary hearing about 
his interactions with petitioner in the medical clinic and had falsely stated that he 
did not see petitioner stab Gardner.  At the time of the preliminary hearing, Hayes 
was on parole, but he was back in prison at the time of trial.  He explained that he 
wanted to avoid involvement in the incident at the time of the hearing because he 
had just been paroled and was afraid of the BGF, but that he later changed his 
mind because he had problems outside the prison with the BGF; namely, that he 
 
7
was believed to have broken the convict’s code of silence by testifying at the 
hearing. 
2. The Petition and Its Exhibits 
In 1995, Long recanted important parts of his testimony, asserting that 
petitioner did not stab Gardner and he was never aware of any plan to kill 
Williams or Gardner.  Long also changed his testimony that petitioner had 
threatened Gardner the day before Gardner was killed, stating instead that it was 
Gardner who had threatened to kill petitioner.  According to Long, Hayes did not 
witness and could not have witnessed the stabbing and had said, while imprisoned 
at the Chino state prison, that he was going to lie that he had witnessed the 
stabbing in exchange for benefits. 
Long further declared:  “I lied on the witness stand at the trial about nearly 
everything I testified to regarding Larry Roberts.  The prosecution’s investigators 
who questioned me made it clear to me that Roberts and Menefield were their 
targets and that they wanted me to say that Roberts wanted to kill Gardner and 
Ruben Williams, that he stabbed Gardner, and that he ran to the third floor.  That 
is eventually what I testified to, and it was false.”  He testified falsely against 
petitioner not only to please the authorities but also because he had heard a rumor 
that petitioner had ordered him to be killed, which made him angry.  He, Calvin, 
Rooks, Hayes, and Cade were imprisoned together after the crimes, spoke 
constantly about the crimes, and were encouraged by the prosecution to coach 
each other “to ‘get the story straight,’ and we did try to do that.  But the story was 
so basically untrue that we had a difficult time getting the facts together.”  He and 
other witnesses received monetary and other benefits for their favorable testimony.  
In sum, Long declared that “I lied under oath.  Cade lied.  Hayes lied.  We were all 
rewarded for our lies. . . .  I have lived with this shame for 15 years and I am 
happy to get this off my chest . . . .” 
 
8
In 1999, however, Long recanted parts of his 1995 declaration.  In an 
affidavit executed following a meeting at Soledad State Prison with prosecutors 
and other state officials, Long declared: “What I said during the course of my 
testimony during the trial was the truth.  Larry Roberts stabbed Charles Gardner.”  
He stated that he lied in his 1995 declaration because one of petitioner’s counsel in 
the present proceeding, Robert Bloom, left him with the “impression” in 1995 that 
petitioner had been removed from the condemned row at San Quentin State 
Prison.  “If Roberts was off death row, I believed . . . my life was in danger.  I 
believed that I could protect my life by signing a declaration saying that I was 
forced to lie at Roberts’s trial.” 
Yacotis also recanted important parts of his testimony.  On March 10, 1995, 
at Folsom State Prison, he signed a declaration in which he averred that in 1982 he 
was incarcerated at the Chino state prison along with Long and Calvin.  Long told 
him the prosecution was going to give him $2,000, a new identity, and dental 
work, and that he expected to be released from prison two weeks after he testified 
at petitioner’s trial.  Long also said that he would “do anything to get out of 
prison.”  And Calvin told Yacotis that “Long had agreed with the Attorney 
General to be a prosecution witness if he could get the same deal (release from 
prison, money, a new identity) as Calvin.” 
Yacotis stated that the defense had subpoenaed him to testify at trial after 
he sent them a letter that described plotting by Calvin to frame petitioner.  As 
Yacotis was waiting to testify, he spoke to Prosecutor Kirk, investigators  
Lieutenant Thomas Hartman of the California Department of Corrections, and 
William Bennett, supervising investigator for the California Department of Justice.  
According to Yacotis, Bennett or Hartman told Yacotis:  “ ‘We can make it easy 
for you or hard for you.’  They told me they wanted to ‘flip’ me (influence me to 
become a prosecution witness).  [¶]  . . .  Kirk told me that if I testified for the 
 
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defense, ‘You’re going to let [Roberts] get away with’ Patch’s murder.  [¶]  
During this interview Kirk, Bennett, and Hartman asked me to testify that . . . 
when I was in [the segregation wing] in 1981 . . . I overheard Roberts say to 
Menefield, ‘Why didn’t you pick up the knife?’  This was false, and I made it 
clear to them that it was false, but they did not care.”  He did this because he was 
young and scared.  He refused to speak to petitioner’s counsel and instead was 
called as a prosecution witness “to give the false testimony regarding . . . the 
knife. . . .  In fact, Roberts never once spoke about the case in my presence in [the 
segregation wing], and I told this to the prosecution team.”  Moreover, because 
they were suspected crime partners, petitioner and Menefield were not even on the 
same floor in the segregation wing. 
Rooks also recanted his testimony in significant part.  He executed a 
declaration on March 16, 1995, at Mule Creek State Prison.  He averred that he 
never saw petitioner with a knife on the day of the killings or the night before; he 
was talking with petitioner on the third floor at the moment the alarm sounded; 
and petitioner did ask him for a knife the day before the killings, telling him that 
Gardner had threatened him, but Rooks did not give him one, nor did Rooks 
witness any argument between Gardner and petitioner the day before the killings.  
He did not aver that the prosecution knew that his testimony was false, or that 
investigators or prosecutors coerced him into testifying. 
Another inmate, George Frederick Payne, supplied petitioner with an 
affidavit from prison on February 24, 1995.  He averred that soon after the killings 
he was interviewed by prison investigators.  “I specifically recall that Officer 
Horton was encouraging me to lie about having seen Larry Roberts run up the 
stairs to the third floor.  I did not see Roberts at all that morning . . . .  Horton told 
me that ‘. . . if you saw Zoom [petitioner] running up the stairs, it will be 
beneficial to you.’  [¶]  Horton also wanted me to say that Roberts and Gardner 
 
10
were involved in an ongoing argument.  I was not aware of any such argument, 
and I told this to Horton.” 
Payne also averred:  “Mr. Kirk tried to get me to testify that I saw Roberts 
running up the stairs.  When I told Mr. Kirk that I had not seen Roberts, he 
continued to try.  Mr. Kirk did not specify just what he would do for me, but he 
made it clear that he would do something to help me.” 
3. The Reference Hearing and the Referee’s Findings 
On August 18, 1999, we issued an order to show cause “why the relief 
prayed for should not be granted on the ground that (1) the prosecutor 
knowingly offered perjured testimony by other inmates against petitioner; or 
(2) petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel when counsel 
failed to impeach prosecution witnesses with evidence from Peter DuQuesnay 
[a prison guard] that the east grille gate to the third floor at the California 
Medical Facility, Vacaville, was kept locked at all times; or on both grounds.” 
On March 16, 2000, we directed the referee to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to make findings on several enumerated questions.2  The reference 
hearing was held before Solano County Superior Court Judge Franklin R. Taft. 
                                             
 
2  
We directed the referee to make findings on the following questions: 
“1.  What, if any, testimony did the prosecutor at petitioner’s trial induce, 
or attempt to induce, from inmate witnesses?  And if any, from which inmates?  
Did the inmate witnesses discuss their testimony among themselves before trial?  
Did the inmate witnesses’ trial testimony vary from what they actually saw or 
heard?  And specifically in addition (but without necessarily limiting the findings 
of fact to answering the following questions): 
“a. 
Did Raybon Long hear petitioner discuss Gardner’s stabbing before 
it occurred?  Did Long see petitioner stab Gardner?  Did Long see petitioner run to 
the third floor after stabbing Gardner? 
“b. 
Did Richard Yacotis hear petitioner discussing the stabbing 
afterward?  What is the truth of the claims made in Yacotis’s purported August 12, 
1982, letter to defense counsel? 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
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Long, who testified at trial that he saw petitioner stab Gardner, but later 
recanted that testimony, and then recanted his recantation, was called as 
petitioner’s witness but stated that, affected by the illicit use of drugs, he 
remembered little of what had happened 20 years before.  On the advice of his 
counsel, he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify. 
Cade reaffirmed his trial testimony that he saw petitioner stab Gardner.  He 
acknowledged that he, Long and Hayes had discussed the case before trial when 
they were incarcerated in the same unit, but denied they had “compared stories.”  
Rather, Cade stated they all were nervous and reluctant to testify and just gave 
each other “moral support.” 
Yacotis, who testified at trial that, after the crimes, he heard petitioner 
discuss the killings with Menefield, but later recanted that testimony, stood by his 
recantation, testifying that Long and the other inmate witnesses conspired to win 
benefits for themselves in exchange for false testimony at petitioner’s trial and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
“c. 
Did the trial testimony of Ryland T. Cade, Robert Hayes, or David 
Calvin, Jr., vary from what they actually saw or heard? 
“d. 
Did Leslie H. Rooks see petitioner carrying a knife just before the 
stabbing?  After the stabbing, when and where did Rooks first see petitioner? 
“e. 
Were attempts made to persuade George Frederick Payne to testify 
falsely at the trial? 
 
“2.  What evidence was available to defense counsel that the east grille gate 
on the third floor at the California Medical Facility, Vacaville, was locked or open 
at the time of the stabbing?  What additional evidence, if any, would further 
investigation have produced on this point?  What circumstances would have 
weighed against investigating the existence of or presenting any such evidence?  
What evidence rebutting any such evidence would have been available to the 
prosecution following its own investigation?  Was the east grille gate open or 
locked at the time of the stabbing?  If it was locked, could plaintiff nonetheless 
have gone up the stairs and to his cell immediately after the stabbing?” 
 
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reasserting that the prosecutor and his investigators had exhorted him to testify 
falsely at trial.  Yacotis stated that the conversation he described at trial between 
petitioner and Menefield in the segregation unit in 1980, in which one asked the 
other, “Why didn’t you pick up the knife?” never occurred.  Yacotis reiterated that 
petitioner and Menefield were not housed near each other in the segregation wing. 
Ruben Lavert Howard, an inmate at the Chino state prison, testified at the 
reference hearing that he had heard Long, Rooks, and Calvin discuss petitioner’s 
case.  Regarding the stabbings, “one of them said that Larry didn’t do it, but he 
was in the hallway and another guy said something about, ‘I’m going to try to get 
a date out of it,’ ” meaning a parole date.  “They . . . said that Larry was in the 
hallway and that he didn’t have nothing to do with the actual . . . crime . . . .” 
Howard testified that Rooks, Calvin, and Long all said petitioner did not 
commit the crime and was being framed.  Long later repeated that assertion.  
Howard further testified that he alerted his or petitioner’s family to the 
conspirators’ plans and asked them to tell the defense lawyers, but nothing 
happened as a result of whatever efforts, if any, they undertook. 
Arthur Givens (spelled “Gibens” at trial) testified that at Chino State 
Prison, Long told him some people were trying to align their story about the 
Gardner stabbing to win release from prison, and he was scared the jury would 
find out they were lying. 
Calvin reaffirmed his trial testimony that he saw Menefield and another 
unidentified prisoner, but not petitioner, stab Gardner.  He also testified that after 
the incident, he was in a segregation wing cell adjoining petitioner’s cell for six 
months, and petitioner never discussed the incident there.  Calvin testified that he 
was doing “short time” at the time of the stabbings—he was due for parole in one 
and one-half years—so the investigators had little to offer him as an inducement in 
exchange for his testimony. 
 
13
As regards prosecutorial misconduct, Payne testified that Horton told him 
that it would be worthwhile monetarily if he would testify petitioner ran to the 
third floor.  Similarly, Kirk offered Payne money to testify that he saw petitioner 
and Menefield running up the stairs and down the hall.  Payne refused.  Payne 
further testified that the third floor grille gate was “mostly locked,” but added that 
he “rarely went up to the third floor.”  On cross-examination, Payne stated that 
Kirk may not have explicitly offered him money for his testimony, but offered him 
some type of assistance or benefit in exchange for his testimony. 
The referee found “[t]here was no believable evidence that there was an 
attempt by Kirk or the investigators to induce false testimony” and “that defense 
counsel did not overlook any potential evidence that would have tended to show 
that the grille gate was locked at the time of the stabbings.”  The referee further 
found “that the third floor east grille gate was in fact open at the time of the 
stabbings.”   Petitioner excepts to these findings.  
The referee found that Long, Rooks, and Calvin had discussed the case 
while housed together at Chino State Prison, but concluded that Rooks and Calvin 
had not fabricated their trial testimony.  With reference to Long, the referee stated 
that “[b]ased on the conflicting 1995 and 1999 declarations” and the 
circumstances that Long “was given money and better prison housing, with 
representations that Kirk would appear at his parole hearing with favorable 
recommendations,” “your Referee can only find that Long’s trial testimony should 
not be treated as believable.” 
The referee found Yacotis’s testimony recanting his trial testimony 
“believable,” stating:  “The Referee is aware that recantations should be viewed 
with suspicion.  However, Yacotis had served his time and had been released.  He 
believed that should he ever find himself back in prison, his recantation of the trial 
testimony would cause difficulty with the authorities.  He appeared to the Referee 
 
14
to be sincere.  He had nothing to gain by recanting the trial testimony.”  The 
referee found specifically that “Yacotis did not overhear the conversation between 
Petitioner and Menefield.” 
The referee acknowledged that “Cade’s general account of the stabbing 
itself remained consistent although it varied from time to time regarding details of 
where Cade and other witnesses were located at the time of the stabbing.”  The 
referee further found, however, that “Cade’s testimony at the Reference hearing 
was evasive and often at variance with prior testimony” and noted that this court 
had concluded in the automatic appeal “that Cade’s trial testimony was thoroughly 
impeached.”  The referee stated:  “From the above, the Referee finds that Cade’s 
trial testimony was not truthful and varied from what he actually heard or saw.” 
The referee noted that “Hayes is reported to be deceased and did not 
testify” at the reference hearing.  The referee found that nothing was presented 
“that would indicate that Hayes’ trial testimony was false.”  Petitioner excepts to 
this finding.  Similarly, the referee found that “[n]othing was presented at the 
Reference hearing to suggest that Calvin’s testimony varied from what he saw or 
heard . . . .”  The referee also found the trial testimony of Rooks “to be credible.”  
Petitioner excepts to this finding. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Presentation of Evidence Known to be Perjured 
“A judgment of conviction based on testimony known by representatives of 
the state to be perjured deprives the defendant of due process of law [citations] and 
may be attacked on habeas corpus [citations].  In making such an attack, however, 
petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that perjured 
testimony was adduced at his trial, that representatives of the state knew that it 
was perjured [citations], and that such testimony may have affected the outcome 
of the trial [citations].”  (In re Imbler (1963) 60 Cal.2d 554, 560.) 
 
15
“We emphasize that, because petitioner seeks to overturn a final judgment 
in a collateral attack, he bears the burden of proof.  [Citation.]  ‘ “For purposes of 
collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the 
conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning 
them.  Society’s interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands . . . .” ’  
[Citations.]”  (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 710.) 
In the present case, the referee found that “[t]here was no believable 
evidence that there was an attempt by Kirk or the investigators to induce false 
testimony.”  Petitioner excepts to this finding.  “ ‘The referee’s findings of fact, 
though not binding on the court, are given great weight when supported by 
substantial evidence.  The deference accorded factual findings derives from the 
fact that the referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and 
their manner of testifying.’ [Citations.]”  (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 
109.)  For the reasons that follow, we adopt the referee’s finding and conclude that 
petitioner has failed to show the prosecution knowingly presented perjured 
testimony. 
The referee found that the inmate witnesses expected and received some 
favorable treatment as a result of testifying for the prosecution.  They were 
transferred to a prison facility that they preferred and were given small amounts of 
money.  Yet the referee found, and the record before us supports the conclusion, 
that the prosecution did not promise the inmates specific rewards in exchange for 
testifying and the small amounts of money that were deposited into their prison 
accounts only recompensed them for the amounts they lost while they were in 
protective custody and hence were unable to work. 
Although the referee concluded that three prosecution witnesses (Long, 
Yacotis, and Cade) gave false testimony at trial, the referee did not find that the 
prosecution knowingly presented false evidence.  We agree.  Although, as 
 
16
explained below, we do not adopt all of the referee’s findings that prosecution 
witnesses testified falsely, we agree that petitioner has failed to show that the 
prosecution knowingly presented false evidence. 
 
False Testimony 
Following the reference hearing, petitioner argued for the first time that his 
conviction should be reversed because it was based upon false testimony.  The 
Attorney General objects, asserting that the petition did not allege such a claim, no 
order to show cause issued on that claim, and granting relief on this claim would 
deprive the Attorney General of the right to file a return.  We need not decide this 
point, because we find petitioner’s claim lacks merit. 
Section 1473, subdivision (b)(1) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may 
be prosecuted if “[f]alse evidence that is substantially material or probative on the 
issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial 
relating to his incarceration . . . .”  False evidence is “substantially material or 
probative” (ibid.) “if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, had it not been 
introduced, the result would have been different.  [Citation.]”  (In re Sassounian 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 546.)  The requisite “reasonable probability” is a chance 
great enough, under the totality of the circumstances, to undermine our confidence 
in the outcome.  (Ibid.)  The petitioner is not required to show that the prosecution 
knew or should have known that the testimony was false.  (§ 1473, subd. (c); 
People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 830.) 
The referee found that Long’s trial testimony that he saw petitioner stab 
Gardner “should not be treated as believable.”  The Attorney General excepts to 
this finding.  This finding is not entitled to the “great weight” usually accorded to 
a referee’s findings of fact, because Long invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination and did not testify at the reference hearing.  As noted above, “ ‘[t]he 
deference accorded factual findings derives from the fact that the referee had the 
 
17
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of 
testifying.’ [Citations.]”  (In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th 97, 109.)  The referee 
had little opportunity to observe Long’s demeanor and manner of testifying.  
Rather, the referee’s conclusion that Long’s trial testimony should not be believed 
was based upon Long’s conflicting declarations and the inducements provided by 
the prosecution.3  We are in as good a position as the referee to assess the effect of 
these factors, and we reach a different conclusion. 
It has long been recognized that “the offer of a witness, after trial, to retract 
his sworn testimony is to be viewed with suspicion.”  (In re Weber (1974) 11 
Cal.3d 703, 722; see also People v. Minnick (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1481; 
People v. McGaughran (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 6, 17 [“It has been repeatedly held 
that where a witness who has testified at a trial makes an affidavit that such 
testimony is false, little credence ordinarily can be placed in the affidavit . . . .”].)  
It is true that Long’s inconsistent statements lessen his credibility.  (People 
v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 431, fn. 10 [“Even if the recantation of the 
trial testimony was not reliable, these events cast some doubt on the credibility of 
Spencer as a witness.”].)  Because Long has made inconsistent declarations, it is 
clear that he has lied at some point.  It is not clear, however, that it was Long’s 
                                             
 
3  
The dissent counters that although the referee did not hear Long testify, he 
did hear the testimony of inmates Howard, Givens, and Yacotis.  (Dis. opn., post, 
at pp. 5-6.)  That is true, but the jury that found petitioner guilty also had heard the 
testimony of Givens and Yacotis.  Givens testified at trial, as he did at the 
reference hearing, that Long stated he was not present at the stabbing.  Yacotis 
testified at both the trial and the reference hearing that he overheard Long tell 
Calvin they had to “get their stories straight” so they could obtain their freedom by 
sending “some other inmates to the gas chamber.”  Howard did not testify at trial, 
but his testimony at the reference hearing that he heard Long state that petitioner 
had nothing to do with the stabbing was cumulative to the testimony of Givens 
and Yacotis. 
 
18
trial testimony that was false, rather than his initial recantation.  We will not 
disturb the jury’s verdict based upon a recantation that must be viewed with 
suspicion and was subsequently disavowed by Long. 
As to the inducements provided by the prosecution upon which the referee 
relied, these matters were presented to the jury, which convicted petitioner 
nonetheless. 
Prosecution witness Yacotis also recanted portions of his trial testimony.  
As noted above, Yacotis testified at trial that he had been confined in the 
segregation wing with petitioner and Menefield after the killings and overheard 
petitioner and Menefield discuss the murder.  Yacotis recanted part of his 
testimony in a 1995 declaration and in his testimony at the reference hearing, 
denying that he overheard such a conversation and further denying that he had 
been housed in the same segregation unit with petitioner and Menefield.  Prison 
records showed, however, that Yacotis had been housed in the same segregation 
unit within six cells of petitioner and Menefield for a period of three days.  
Despite these prison records, and the referee’s acknowledgement that recantations 
should be viewed with suspicion, the referee found Yacotis’s testimony at the 
reference hearing “to be believable.”  This finding is entitled to great deference 
but, even if believed, Yacotis’s recantation does not warrant relief on habeas 
corpus because it does not undermine our confidence in the judgment of 
conviction. 
Yacotis was not an eyewitness to the murder.  Rather, he testified that he 
later overheard petitioner and Menefield discuss the crime.  Had this evidence not 
been admitted, the jury still would have heard the testimony of Long, Hayes, and 
Cade that they saw petitioner stab Gardner, and Cade’s further testimony that 
petitioner later confessed to the murder.  Yacotis’s recantation of portions of his 
 
19
testimony does not undermine our confidence in the judgment of conviction.  (In 
re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th 535, 546.) 
As noted above, Cade testified that he saw petitioner stab Gardner and that 
petitioner later admitted that he killed Gardner.  The referee found that Cade’s trial 
testimony “was not truthful and varied from what he actually heard or saw.”  In 
making this finding, the referee was responding to a question posed by this court:  
“Did the trial testimony of Ryland T. Cade, Robert Hayes, or David Calvin, Jr., 
vary from what they actually saw or heard?”  Under the circumstances, however, 
the answer to this inquiry is irrelevant. 
The referee’s finding was not based upon new evidence that had not been 
presented to the jury, but upon Cade’s demeanor while testifying at the reference 
hearing and essentially repeating his trial testimony.4  It is not the function of a 
referee or an appellate court to reweigh credibility determinations made by the 
jury.  It is true that the referee observed Cade’s demeanor while testifying at the 
reference hearing, but the jury already had observed Cade’s demeanor when he 
testified at trial.  The jury was in the best position to determine the truthfulness of 
Cade’s trial testimony. 
The referee also relied upon the circumstance that Cade’s testimony had 
been impeached at trial.  Again, this finding was not based upon new evidence that 
                                             
 
4  
The dissent argues that the referee was in a better position than the jury to 
evaluate Cade’s credibility because certain of Cade’s psychiatric and medical 
records were supplied for the first time at the reference hearing.  (Dis. opn., post, 
at p. 7.)  The referee, however, found these records and the expert testimony based 
upon them of little value.  The referee found that Dr. Tucker, the psychiatrist who 
testified at the reference hearing, “could not draw any conclusions . . . , twenty 
years after the fact, as to Cade’s ability to perceive, recall or relate at the time of 
the stabbing or the time of the trial.  Any finding by the Referee as to Cade’s 
mental condition at the time of the event or at the time of trial would at best be idle 
speculation.” 
 
20
had not been presented to the jury.  To the contrary, we noted on the automatic 
appeal that Cade’s trial testimony had been “impeached thoroughly.”  (People 
v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 302.)  The jury had heard this impeachment 
evidence and convicted defendant nonetheless.  The circumstance that Cade’s 
testimony had been impeached at trial does not cause us to question the validity of 
the jury’s verdict. 
Further, the referee found only that “Cade’s trial testimony was not truthful 
and varied from what he actually heard or saw” and did not specify in what respect 
Cade’s testimony was untruthful.  The referee’s finding that Cade’s trial testimony 
was not truthful, therefore, does not undermine our confidence in the judgment of 
conviction.  (In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th 535, 546.) 
Despite the findings of the referee, petitioner is not entitled to relief based 
upon the claim that his conviction is based upon false testimony. 
 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under either the federal or 
state guarantee, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that 
counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., that a reasonable probability 
exists that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to 
the defendant.  [Citations.]”  (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 239.) 
Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because his trial counsel, Richard C. Urquhart, failed to impeach Officer Peter 
DuQuesnay with DuQuesnay’s earlier statement, made to a defense 
investigator, that the third floor east grille gate was kept locked. 
Gardner was stabbed on the first floor.  As noted above, petitioner 
sought to prove he was on the third floor when Gardner was stabbed and 
introduced alibi evidence at trial that he was seen on the third floor shortly 
 
21
after the stabbing.  The prosecution introduced evidence that petitioner could 
have run from the first floor to his cell on the third in less than one minute.  In 
order to do so, however, petitioner would have had to pass through the third 
floor east grille gate.  Petitioner asserted it would not have been possible for 
him to pass through the gate because it was locked. 
DuQuesnay, a correctional officer on the date of the killings, testified 
for the prosecution at trial that when the alarm sounded he locked up the 
prisoners in his charge, which took some time, headed for the third floor east 
grille gate, and found it locked.  He could not remember whether that gate was 
unlocked when the alarm sounded.  He recalled that Officer Rudolph was in 
charge of the third floor east grille gate. 
Rudolph testified that he was going back and forth from the corridor 
leading to the third floor east grille gate to another wing of the prison on the 
morning of the stabbings.  He was standing in the corridor when the alarm 
sounded, but he could not remember how long he had been there.  Nor did he 
remember whether he locked the gate before running to the second floor in 
response to the alarm.  Rudolph further testified that, prior to the stabbings, the 
gate was not always monitored and usually was unlocked. 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner alleged that on July 
9, 1982, four months before DuQuesnay testified at trial, Danny Clark, a 
defense investigator, interviewed DuQuesnay and typed a report saying 
DuQuesnay told him “the grill gate at the top of the stairs was kept closed and 
locked . . . .  He states that the procedure was for the officer to unlock the gate 
if anyone came up and then to relock it.  If the officer happened to be back 
inside one of the wings at the time someone came to the gate they would just 
have to wait to be let on the . . . third floor corridor.” 
 
22
Urquhart declared that he was unaware of the contents of Clark’s 
interview of DuQuesnay at the time DuQuesnay testified at trial.  Urquhart 
stated:  “I would definitely have cross-examined DuQuesnay using this prior 
statement to Clark had I been aware of the statement.  The locked condition of 
the East gate was the most important fact in the entire case.” 
On February 16, 1996, petitioner’s counsel, Robert Bloom, and an 
investigator, Robert Buechler, visited DuQuesnay, by then a lieutenant in the 
corrections corps, at the California Training Facility at Soledad.  DuQuesnay 
agreed to talk with them, and Bloom showed DuQuesnay Clark’s July 9, 1982, 
report.  Bloom declared:  “Lt. DuQuesnay took a few minutes to read the Clark 
report, and then spontaneously said that the report was accurate. . . .  [I]t also 
accurately reflected his independent recollection of the events that took place 
the day Officer Patch and inmate Gardner were killed.  He specifically 
remembered that the East Gate on the third floor of Vacaville prison was kept 
locked at all times and that a person without a key . . . would have to wait for 
an officer with a key to unlock the gate in order to pass through that gate.” 
DuQuesnay testified at the reference hearing and stated he did not recall 
much about his conversation with Bloom.  DuQuesnay testified that although 
the procedure was to keep the east grille gate locked, that policy was often 
honored in the breach—the gate would be left open and unmonitored, against 
the rules.  Inmate witness David Calvin, Jr., testified to the same effect.  So did 
Donald Maurice Glenn, who was a correctional sergeant at the California 
Medical Facility at Vacaville at the time of the incident, and Gloria Manuel, a 
retired correctional lieutenant at the time of the reference hearing, who was 
stationed at Vacaville in 1980.  Even Clark, petitioner’s pretrial investigator 
and a lawyer in the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office at the time 
of the reference hearing, agreed on cross-examination that DuQuesnay was 
 
23
commenting only on procedure, not whether the third floor grille gate actually 
was locked when Gardner was killed.  The referee so found:  “the east grille 
gates, including the third floor east grille gate, were often left open and 
unattended, especially when the institution was running programs such as 
meals, yard release, and Sunday morning church services.”  The killings 
occurred on a Sunday morning.  “The Referee further finds that the third floor 
east grille gate was in fact open at the time of the stabbings.” 
As concerns the question of ineffective assistance of counsel, the referee 
found:  “It is clear from this evidence that further investigation . . . would only 
have disclosed more evidence that (1) enforcement of the third floor east grille 
gate procedure was notably lax at the time of the stabbing; (2) [California Medical 
facility, Vacaville] administrators attributed the circumstances leading up to the 
stabbings in part to lax security procedures and thereafter took measures to tighten 
up the procedures; and (3) it was possible that the second perpetrator could pass 
through that gate unnoticed immediately after the stabbings.”  Petitioner excepted 
to portions of this finding. 
Substantial evidence supports the referee’s findings, and we adopt them.  
There is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed, with 
regard either to guilt or to penalty, had petitioner’s counsel discovered Clark’s 
report and cross-examined DuQuesnay further.  There was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
24
 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
 
Unlike the majority, I would adopt the referee’s findings that inmate 
witnesses Raybon Long, Ryland Cade, and Rick Yacotis gave false testimony 
against petitioner at his capital trial, claiming that they saw petitioner stab inmate 
Charles Gardner or heard petitioner confess to the stabbing.  (People v. Roberts 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 295.)  The referee’s findings are supported by substantial 
evidence and therefore entitled to great weight.  Without the false testimony, there 
is a reasonable probability the jury would not have convicted petitioner of 
Gardner’s killing.  (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 546.)  I would 
therefore grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On the morning of August 17, 1980, as Charles Gardner, an inmate at the 
California Medical Facility in Vacaville, was walking down a hallway lined with 
other inmates, he was attacked and repeatedly stabbed.  Gardner retrieved a 
prison-made knife dropped on the floor and pursued two inmates who had fled up 
a stairway.  Grievously wounded, Gardner reached the second floor where, before 
he collapsed and died, he fatally stabbed a guard, Albert Patch.  Shortly thereafter, 
guards apprehended petitioner in his third floor cell and seized another inmate, 
Archie Menefield, just as he reached the third floor. 
 
2
 
Petitioner and Menefield were tried jointly.  At trial, various inmates 
testified that petitioner harbored ill feelings toward Gardner, stemming either from 
a recent incident in which Gardner insulted petitioner or from a power struggle 
within the Black Guerilla Family, a prison gang.  Five eyewitnesses to the 
stabbing testified at trial.  Inmate witnesses Long and Cade testified that petitioner 
was armed and waiting in the corridor, that he stabbed Gardner and then ran up the 
stairs.  Inmates Cade and Yacotis testified that after the stabbing, while each was 
in a segregation unit near petitioner and Menefield, they heard petitioner admit to 
stabbing Gardner. 
 
Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death for the first degree 
murders of Officer Patch and inmate Gardner (Pen. Code, § 187), and assault by a 
life prisoner that results in death (Pen. Code, § 4500).  On appeal this court 
reversed petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Patch, but it affirmed his 
conviction and death sentence for the murder of Gardner.  (See People v. Roberts, 
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 294.)   
 
In a petition for habeas corpus filed in this court, petitioner asserted, as 
relevant here, that inmate witnesses Long, Cade, and Yacotis had lied at trial.  This 
court appointed Superior Court Judge Franklin R. Taft as referee to determine 
whether the inmate witnesses had discussed their trial testimony among 
themselves.  Specifically, the order directed the referee to ascertain what Long, 
Cade, and Yacotis saw of the stabbing and heard petitioner say about it, and 
whether their trial testimony against petitioner diverged from their perceptions.  
After hearing testimony recorded in almost 3,000 pages of transcript, the referee 
found that Long, Cade, and Yacotis each had testified falsely against petitioner at 
trial. 
 
We are not bound by a referee’s findings on factual questions, but we 
accord them great weight if they are supported by substantial evidence.  (In re 
 
3
Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 461.)  We defer to the referee’s factual findings, 
“especially those requiring resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of 
witnesses’ credibility” because the referee had “the opportunity to observe the 
witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying.”  (Ibid.)   
II.  TESTIMONY OF INMATE LONG 
 
At petitioner’s capital trial, inmate Long testified that the day before the 
stabbing he heard petitioner threaten to kill fellow-inmate Gardner.  He also said 
that on the morning of the stabbing Long saw petitioner pull a prison-made knife 
from his clothes, stab Gardner, drop the knife, and run upstairs.  In 1995 Long 
recanted his trial testimony, then in 1999 he retracted his recantation.  The 
reference order directed the referee to determine whether Long heard petitioner 
discuss the stabbing beforehand, saw petitioner stab Gardner, and then saw 
petitioner run upstairs.  At the reference hearing, Long invoked his Fifth 
Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. 
 
 
The referee found that before petitioner’s trial, while Long was 
housed at Chino prison with Leslie Rooks and David Calvin, these three 
prosecution witnesses were “overheard talking about the case, stating that they had 
to keep their [trial] testimony consistent.”  The referee found that Rooks and 
Calvin “did in fact discuss the case” but, “with the exception of Long,” he did “not 
find any identifiable portion of their testimony to be fabricated.” 
 
At the reference hearing, inmate Ruben Howard testified that while 
incarcerated at Chino he overheard one of the Long/Rooks/Calvin trio say 
petitioner did not stab the victim.  Howard also heard Long say that petitioner had 
nothing to do with the stabbing.  The referee noted that in Long’s 1995 recantation 
of his trial testimony against petitioner he specifically denied hearing petitioner 
discuss the stabbing of Gardner beforehand, seeing petitioner stab Gardner, or 
seeing petitioner flee up the stairs after the stabbing.  Discounting Long’s 1999 
 
4
retraction of that recantation, the referee found that during the interview with 
prosecutors that led to the retraction, Long was as concerned that petitioner might 
get off death row so he would pose a risk to Long as he was concerned about the 
truth or falsity of his conflicting declarations.  The fact that Long had received 
“money and better prison housing” as well as a promise that the prosecutor would 
make “favorable recommendations” at Long’s parole hearing, coupled with 
Long’s conflicting 1995 and 1999 declarations, led the referee to conclude that 
Long’s trial testimony “should not be treated as believable.” 
 
The majority refuses to credit this finding by the referee because at the 
reference hearing Long exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege not to 
incriminate himself and consequently did not testify at the reference hearing other 
than to disclaim much memory of the crime.  Thus, the majority reasons, the 
referee had no opportunity to assess Long’s demeanor as a witness and hence 
Long’s credibility. 
 
This court’s decisions have long applied the rule that “the offer of a 
witness, after trial, to retract his sworn testimony is to be viewed with suspicion.”  
(In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 722; accord, In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 
418 [“we routinely view recantations with suspicion”].)  Although, as the majority 
points out, two Court of Appeal decisions have said that recantations are given 
“little credence” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-18), this court has never adopted that 
standard.  This court has never intimated that a recantation automatically is given 
“little credence.”  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  Here the referee viewed with 
suspicion Long’s recantation of his trial testimony, but he found that Long had 
fabricated his trial testimony against petitioner.  I would give that finding great 
weight because it is supported by ample, credible evidence.  
 
The majority dismisses Long’s 1995 recantation of his trial testimony 
against petitioner and his 1999 retraction of that 1995 recantation with the cursory 
 
5
comment that “it is clear he has lied at some point.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  
One cannot assume that either of Long’s two versions was the truth.  He may well 
have lied in both.  What is clear is that Long is a liar.  The referee found that 
because Long and the other inmates were “housed together” and because the 
investigators used leading and suggestive questions, “the inmate witnesses were 
able to learn the general theory of the prosecution’s case.”  The prosecution’s 
theory was this:  Petitioner, armed with a knife, waited outside the first floor clinic 
with codefendant Menefield.  When fellow inmate Gardner approached, petitioner 
stabbed, while Menefield restrained, Gardner.  In the next two to three minutes, 
petitioner ran upstairs to his third floor cell. 
 
Although Long did not testify at the reference hearing, and the referee thus 
was unable to observe his demeanor and evaluate his credibility, the referee did 
observe three witnesses testify about Long.  Inmate Howard, who was not a trial 
witness, testified at the reference hearing that at Chino prison he heard Long say 
petitioner had nothing to do with the stabbing of inmate Gardner. 
 
Inmate Arthur Givens testified at trial that at Chino prison Long said he had 
not been present at the stabbing, and that he and other inmates were trying to align 
their trial testimony.  At the reference hearing, Givens expanded upon his trial 
testimony:  Long said he was reluctant to testify at petitioner’s trial, fearing the 
jury would discover they were lying, but Long planned to testify in order to get 
out of prison. 
 
At trial inmate Yacotis testified that at Chino prison Long and Calvin were 
trying to tell consistent stories, but Yacotis denied overhearing lengthy coaching 
sessions between Long and Calvin, and denied saying he had overheard one of 
them say they were “lying for their freedom.”  At the reference hearing, Yacotis 
testified that Long said he and the other testifying inmates would do “anything” to 
 
6
get out of prison and that Long, as the leader of the inmates who testified for the 
prosecution, was insistent they get their stories straight before trial. 
 
Thus, although the referee had no opportunity to assess whether inmate 
Long’s reference hearing testimony was credible, the referee did have an 
opportunity to hear and assess the credibility of three other inmate witnesses who 
testified that before petitioner’s trial Long said he intended to testify falsely that 
petitioner had committed the stabbing, which Long acknowledged he had not 
seen.  Moreover, the testimony of Yacotis and Givens at the reference hearing 
focused on Long’s motive to give false trial testimony, namely, Long’s stated 
belief that he would be released from prison in exchange for testifying against 
petitioner.  Unlike the referee, neither the jury nor this court has had the 
opportunity to hear this testimony of these three witnesses. 
 
Ample evidence presented at the reference hearing supports the referee’s 
finding that Long’s pretrial conduct and statements were at odds with his trial 
testimony.  That evidence was bolstered by Long’s 1995 recantation of his trial 
testimony, which he retracted in 1999 when he feared petitioner might be released 
from death row.  (See People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 431, fn. 10 
[retraction of recanted trial testimony “cast[s] some doubt on the credibility” of the 
witness].)  Because the referee had an opportunity to assess the credibility of three 
witnesses to Long’s pretrial statements, and there is substantial evidence to 
support the referee’s finding that Long’s trial testimony against petitioner was 
false, I would adopt that finding. 
III. TESTIMONY OF INMATE CADE 
 
Inmate Cade testified at petitioner’s capital trial that he saw petitioner stab 
inmate Gardner, drop the knife, and run upstairs; shortly thereafter, while 
petitioner and Cade were both housed in a segregation unit, petitioner told Cade he 
had stabbed Gardner.  This court’s reference order directed the referee to 
 
7
determine whether Cade’s trial testimony varied from what he had seen or heard at 
the Vacaville facility.  Although Cade’s testimony at the reference hearing was 
consistent with his trial testimony, at the reference hearing the defense presented 
evidence that severely undercut Cade’s credibility as a witness.  Newly disclosed 
documents and expert testimony about Cade’s institutional and psychiatric history 
came into evidence at the reference hearing. 
 
Dr. Douglas Tucker, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that inmate Cade had a 
history of significant mental illness with several prior hospitalizations and in 1977 
was found incompetent to stand trial.  In February 1980, when Cade arrived at the 
Vacaville Medical Facility, medical records described him as psychotic, suffering 
hallucinations, and having inflicted injury on himself.  By Cade’s account he 
stopped taking his anti-psychotic medication about a week before the stabbing.  In 
Dr. Tucker’s view, Cade’s ability to perceive, recall, remember, and relate events 
on August 17, 1980, the date of inmate Gardner’s stabbing, was probably 
somewhat impaired by the week without the medication Cade took to control aural 
or visual delusions.  Dr. Tucker found various entries in the series of newly 
disclosed documents suggesting Cade was untruthful or unreliable, but Dr. Tucker 
offered no opinion on whether Cade had given truthful or untruthful trial 
testimony.  As the referee notes, Dr. Tucker concluded “that Cade’s story was 
adjustable depending on what was to his advantage.” 
 
Dr. Tucker further testified that although inmate Cade had a fairly severe 
mental illness, in conversation Cade would appear normal and could describe 
events he had seen.  The referee specifically asked Dr. Tucker, assuming that Cade 
was delusional or hallucinatory, “Could a delusional event be created by the 
suggestion of someone else, such as a person interviewing Cade who feeds him 
some of the facts during questioning?”  Tucker agreed that the effect of such 
 
8
suggestions could be to “modify and adjust [Cade’s] memory or perceived 
memory of what occurred.” 
 
Deputy Attorney General Charles Kirk, the prosecutor at petitioner’s capital 
trial, testified at the reference hearing that Cade did not exhibit signs of mental 
illness at trial, that Kirk had seen the notation “insane” on Cade’s rap sheet, but 
that Cade had good recall of the stabbing.  Members of the prosecution team 
testified at the reference hearing that in questioning Cade they had disclosed 
details of the stabbing, such as the number and location of Gardner’s wounds. 
 
In light of the evidence summarized above, the referee concluded that 
although “Cade’s general account of the stabbing itself remained consistent” with 
his trial testimony, his testimony at the reference hearing was “evasive and often at 
variance with prior testimony.”  The referee found Cade’s trial testimony “not 
truthful.” 
 
Seizing on the referee’s isolated finding that Cade’s reference hearing 
description of the stabbing was “consistent” with his trial testimony, the majority 
considers “irrelevant” the referee’s answer to our question whether Cade’s 
testimony varied from what he actually saw or heard at the Vacaville facility in 
connection with inmate Gardner’s stabbing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The 
majority points out that at the reference hearing Cade did not give new evidence 
beyond what the jury heard at trial, and therefore this court should defer to the 
jury’s assessment of Cade’s credibility.1   
                                             
 
1  
The majority notes that on appeal this court indicated that Cade’s trial 
testimony was thoroughly impeached.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  Cade was 
impeached with his reluctance to identify either petitioner or Menefield or other 
inmates who witnessed the stabbing, and with inconsistencies between his 
preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony as to which inmates were 
present.  Because the jury did not hear any impeachment of Cade’s ability to 
perceive and recount the events of the crime, only of his willingness to name 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
9
 
The majority misses the point.  True there was no new evidence from Cade.  
Instead, there was evidence that Cade may have been delusional at the time of 
Gardner’s stabbing, that he was anxious to tailor his story to suit the investigators, 
and that he was especially susceptible to having his perception of events altered by 
details of the crime learned from others.  The jury at petitioner’s capital trial, 
however, never heard testimony about Cade’s mental health.  The referee, who 
did, was in a better position to evaluate Cade’s credibility. 
 
In my view, there is substantial evidence to support the referee’s finding 
that inmate Cade falsely testified at petitioner’s capital trial that he saw petitioner 
stab inmate Gardner.  I would adopt the referee’s finding. 
IV.  TESTIMONY OF INMATE YACOTIS 
 
Inmate Richard Yacotis testified at petitioner’s capital trial that after the 
fatal stabbing of inmate Gardner, while housed in a segregation unit, he overheard 
a conversation between petitioner and codefendant Menefield.  Petitioner asked 
Menefield why he had not picked up “the knife.”  Menefield replied, “Because I 
was running right behind you up the stairs.”  In 1995, Yacotis recanted that trial 
testimony, claiming that he had testified for the prosecution because he feared for 
his safety. 
 
At the reference hearing in 2000, Yacotis stood by his recantation.  He 
testified that he was originally going to testify for petitioner at trial, but switched 
sides when the prosecution told him that he “could be put on the [main] line as 
easily as [he could] be taken off.”  Fearing retaliation by other inmates were he in 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
names, its assessment of Cade’s credibility as a witness was made without any 
evidence of Cade’s mental problems or his suggestability, and the impact of those 
problems on his credibility. 
 
10
the general prison population, Yacotis testified for the prosecution feigning 
illiteracy in an effort to explain inconsistencies between his trial testimony and an 
earlier statement that bore his signature but had been prepared by another inmate.   
 
At the reference hearing, Yacotis acknowledged being housed in the 
segregation unit two cells away from petitioner, but said he had lied about 
overhearing a conversation between petitioner and Menefield about the stabbing 
of inmate Gardner.  He added that petitioner and Menefield were not housed close 
to one another in the segregation unit.  Seeking to undercut Yacotis’s account, the 
majority points to prison records showing that after the stabbing petitioner and 
Menefield had been housed in the segregation unit near one another for three days.  
Yacotis, however, consistently testified at trial and at the reference hearing that in 
the segregation unit he and petitioner were housed on one tier, and Menefield on 
another. 
 
Although the referee recognized that recantations should be viewed with 
suspicion (In re Weber, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 722), the referee found Yacotis to 
be “sincere” and his reference hearing testimony “believable,” in part because 
Yacotis, who was out of prison at the time of the reference hearing, believed that 
were he ever to return “his recantation of his trial testimony would cause [him] 
difficulty with the authorities.”  The majority acknowledges that the referee’s 
finding is entitled to great deference.  It nonetheless concludes that the finding 
“even if believed” would not warrant habeas corpus relief.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 18.) 
 
Unlike the majority, I am persuaded not only that Yacotis gave false 
testimony against petitioner at the latter’s capital trial, but that the testimony was 
damning evidence of petitioner’s guilt.  The conversation between petitioner and 
codefendant Menefield that Yacotis claimed to have overheard was, in effect, a 
confession by petitioner that he had stabbed Gardner and then fled, dropping the 
 
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knife for Menefield to pick up.  Moreover, it was an especially dramatic 
confession because it conformed exactly to the prosecution’s theory of the 
stabbing of Gardner. 
V.  EYEWITNESSES TO STABBING 
 
Of the five inmates who testified against petitioner at his capital trial as 
eyewitnesses to the stabbing of inmate Gardner, three identified petitioner as the 
stabber—Raybon Long, Ryland Cade, and Robert Hayes.  Hayes was apparently 
deceased at the time of the reference hearing.  The referee found no evidence that 
the trial testimony of Hayes was false. 
 
False evidence is that which “is substantially material or probative on the 
issue of guilt” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)); it is evidence so significant that 
“ ‘with a reasonable probability it could have affected the outcome. . . .’  
[Citation.]”  (In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546.)  A reasonable 
probability is “such as undermines the reviewing court’s confidence in the 
outcome.”  (Ibid.; In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 965.)  The reasonable 
probability standard is an objective one, measured in light of all the relevant 
circumstances.  (Ibid.)  Here, the trial testimony of witnesses Long, Cade, and 
Yacotis was substantially material and with a reasonable probability could have 
affected the outcome of petitioner’s capital trial.  Long and Cade both testified 
they saw petitioner stab Gardner.  Without their testimony, the trial evidence 
identifying petitioner as the stabber is greatly weakened.  According to inmate 
witnesses David Calvin and Norman Goodwin, it was Menefield who had stabbed 
Gardner. 
 
At the reference hearing, the referee found that “Calvin generally reiterated 
his trial testimony.”  Calvin testified that he saw two men involved in the attack on 
Gardner, but that the stabber was Menefield; although Calvin knew petitioner, the 
second man whose face he saw from 12 feet away was not petitioner.  The referee 
 
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found that no evidence had been presented to suggest Calvin’s trial testimony 
varied from what he saw during the stabbing. 
 
Goodwin had testified at trial that he saw two men attack Gardner.  One of 
the assailants was Menefield who stabbed Gardner three times, then ran up the 
stairs, followed closely by a second man whom Goodwin could not identify.  
Goodwin’s testimony was not included in our reference order.  
 
Without the trial testimony of Long and Cade, there was only the testimony of 
Hayes that petitioner stabbed Gardner.  By contrast, two witnesses, David Calvin and 
Norman Goodwin, testified that it was not petitioner but Menefield who was the 
stabber.  Neither Calvin nor Goodwin identified the man accompanying Menefield; 
Calvin was certain that Menefield’s companion was not petitioner, whom Calvin had 
seen go upstairs before the stabbing, which occurred on the ground floor.  Although 
there was testimony at trial that petitioner had threatened Gardner and was seen with a 
prison-made knife on the morning of the stabbing, it is reasonably probable that the jury 
would not have found petitioner guilty of assault and murder of Gardner without the 
false testimony of either Long or Cade, or both, that they saw petitioner stab Gardner, 
an account at odds with the testimony of eyewitnesses Calvin and Goodwin that it was 
Menefield, not petitioner, who had stabbed Gardner. 
 
Accepting the findings of the referee, as I do, it is reasonably probable that the jury, 
faced with conflicting evidence of who had stabbed inmate Gardner in the hallway melee, 
would not have convicted petitioner of Gardner’s murder but for the false testimony from 
two fellow inmates that petitioner had confessed to stabbing Gardner.  Accordingly, I 
would grant petitioner habeas corpus relief.  (Pen. Code § 1473, subd. (b)(1).) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Roberts 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S071835 
Date Filed: January 2, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Solano 
Judge: Ellis R. Randall (Trial Judge) and Franklin R. Taft (Referee) 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lewis, D’Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Claudia J. Robinson; and Robert 
Bloom for Petitioner Larry H. Roberts. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Ronald A. Bass and Dane R. Gillette, Assistant Attorneys General, Peggy Ruffra, Ronald S. 
Matthias and Susan Duncan Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Bloom 
3355 Richmond Boulevard 
Oakland, CA  94611 
(510) 595-7766 
 
Susan Duncan Lee 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 703-5876