Title: Miller v. IBM

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

MILLER_V_IBM.94-266; 163 Vt 396; 659 A.2d 1126

[Filed 24-Mar-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-266


David Miller                                      Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Department of Labor & Industry

IBM and Liberty Mutual                            January Term, 1995
Insurance Company


Mary S. Hooper, Commissioner

Roger E. Kohn and Beth DeBernardi of Kohn & Rath, Hinesburg, for
plaintiff-appellant 

Keith J. Kasper and Harold Goldman of McCormick, Fitzpatrick & Mertz, P.C.,
Burlington, for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff David Miller appeals, challenging as inadequate
an award of attorney's fees, following a successful workers' compensation
claim against defendant.  The Commissioner of Labor & Industry (Commissioner)
awarded plaintiff attorney's fees in accordance with Workers' Compensation
Rule 10 (WC Rule 10), which caps these fees at $35 per hour.  On appeal,
plaintiff argues that the hourly rate limit in WC Rule 10 is invalid.(FN1)
We affirm. 

     We first consider plaintiff's argument that WC Rule 10 is not valid. 
Two statutes bear 

 

on this argument.(FN2)  The primary statute is 21 V.S.A.  678(a), which
provides in pertinent part: "The commissioner may allow the claimant to
recover reasonable attorney fees when he prevails."  Also relevant is  602,
which authorizes the commissioner to issue rules:  "All process and procedure
under the provisions of this chapter shall be as summary and simple as
reasonably may be.  The commissioner may make rules not inconsistent with
such provisions for carrying out the same . . . ."  The Commissioner claims
that WC Rule 10 is authorized by  602 and is consistent with  678(a). 
Plaintiff argues that the rule is inconsistent with  678(a) because the
rate allowed is not "reasonable."  We agree with the Commissioner's position.

     We must first consider plaintiff's argument that we have already decided
this case in his favor in Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 156 Vt. 247, 590 A.2d 891 (1991).  Jackson considered a fee award at an hourly rate of $75 made by
the superior court for a case that went from the Commissioner to the superior
court and then to this Court.  The fee award covered work done by the
attorney in each administrative and court forum, and the defendant argued
that WC Rule 10 governed an award for the attorney's hours irrespective of
the forum in which the work was done.  We rejected this argument, holding
that subsection (b) of  678 governed an award for attorney's work done in
the superior and supreme courts and that the subsection authorized the
superior court to determine a reasonable rate without regard to the
Commissioner's limit.  Id. at 250, 590 A.2d  at 893.  We affirmed the award of
$75 per hour for that part of the lawyer's work. 

     We did not, however, affirm the award for the work done before the
Commissioner.  For that work, we stated "Rule 10 is at least a starting point
for a determination of the appropriate hourly rate for attorney time spent on
the proceedings before the Commissioner."  Id.  We went 

 

on to hold that the amount of fees for such proceedings "should be
determined, in the first instance, by the Commissioner,"  id., and remanded
for such a determination. 

     We acknowledge that our description of the fee limits in WC Rule 10 as
"at least a starting point" suggested that the limits were not always
determinative.  We think, however, that the language was used to keep open
the exact issue raised in this case, rather than to point to its resolution. 
Thus, we do not find that Jackson is determinative of this case. 

     In considering the validity of WC Rule 10, we must first emphasize the
limited standard of review.  Rules are "prima facie evidence of the proper
interpretation" of the enabling legislation.  See 3 V.S.A.  845(a).  They
enjoy a presumption of validity and are valid if "they are reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling act."  Vermont Ass'n of Realtors v. State,
156 Vt. 525, 530, 593 A.2d 462, 465 (1991) Further, "absent compelling
indication of error," we accept the construction of a statute made by the
administrative agency responsible for its implementation.  In re Petition of
Twenty-Four Vermont Utilities, 159 Vt. 339, 361, 618 A.2d 1295, 1308 (1992). 

     Plaintiff has two main arguments why, despite the deference we must pay
to the Commissioner's action, the rule is nonetheless invalid.  First, he
argues that the rule is not reasonably related to the remedial purpose of the
fee statute "of making employees injured on the job whole".  Hodgeman v. Jard
Co., 157 Vt. 461, 464, 599 A.2d 1371, 1373 (1991). Second, he argues that the
Commissioner's interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with how we have
construed the term "reasonable attorney fees."   In particular, he argues
that we have held that the question of the reasonableness of a fee is one of
fact to be determined by various factors, including usual and customary rates
for similar work, the difficulty of the work, and the amount of time and
labor required.  See Parker, Lamb & Ankuda, P.C. v. Krupinsky, 146 Vt. 304,
306-07,