Title: Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3907.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3907 
HOLLINGSWORTH v. TIMMERMAN-COOPER, WARDEN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Hollingsworth v. Timmerman-Cooper,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3907.] 
Criminal law—Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2)—Admissibility of no-
contest plea in subsequent proceeding—No-contest plea is admissible in 
habeas corpus action in which petitioner collaterally attacks the criminal 
conviction that resulted from his no-contest plea. 
(No. 2011-1095—Submitted April 3, 2012—Decided September 4, 2012.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. 1:08-CV-00745. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Neither Crim.R. 11(B)(2) nor Evid.R. 410(A)(2) prohibits the use of a defendant’s 
no-contest plea in a subsequent proceeding in which the defendant 
collaterally attacks the criminal conviction that resulted from the no-
contest plea. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Petitioner, Ernest Hollingsworth, filed a habeas corpus action in 
federal district court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at his criminal trial.  Respondent, Deb Timmerman-Cooper, warden of the 
London Correctional Institution, countered that Hollingsworth’s plea of no contest 
in the underlying criminal case constituted a waiver of his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  Hollingsworth objected, arguing that under Ohio law, the 
state may not use his no-contest plea and resulting conviction against him, 
including using the plea as evidence that he waived his right to effective 
assistance. 
{¶ 2} Finding that there was no controlling precedent on the 
admissibility of a no-contest plea in a habeas proceeding, the federal district court 
certified the following question for our resolution:   
 
Do Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(B)(2) and Ohio R. Evid. 
410(A)(2), which prohibit the use of a defendant’s no contest plea 
against the defendant “in any subsequent civil * * * proceeding” 
apply to prohibit the use of such a plea in a subsequent civil 
proceeding which is a collateral attack on the criminal judgment 
which results from the no contest plea, such as a petition for post-
conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21, or a federal 
habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254? 
 
(Ellipsis sic.) 
{¶ 3} Today we answer the question in the negative. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
Analysis 
Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2) 
{¶ 4} Crim.R. 11(B)(2) states, “The plea of no contest is not an 
admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged 
in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not 
be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” 
{¶ 5} Evid.R. 410(A)(2) states that evidence of a plea of no contest “is 
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the defendant who 
made the plea.” 
{¶ 6} In Elevators Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. Patrick O'Flaherty's, Inc., 125 
Ohio St.3d 362, 2010-Ohio-1043, 928 N.E.2d 685, at ¶ 14, we stated:  
 
The purpose behind the inadmissibility of no-contest pleas 
in subsequent proceedings is to encourage plea bargaining as a 
means of resolving criminal cases by removing any civil 
consequences of the plea. [State v.] Mapes, 19 Ohio St.3d [108] at 
111, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140 [1985]; Rose v. Uniroyal 
Goodrich Tire Co. (C.A.10, 2000), 219 F.3d 1216, 1220. The rule 
also protects the traditional characteristic of the no-contest plea, 
which is to avoid the admission of guilt. Id. The prohibition against 
admitting evidence of no-contest pleas was intended generally to 
apply to a civil suit by the victim of the crime against the 
defendant for injuries resulting from the criminal acts underlying 
the plea. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Simansky (1998), 45 Conn.Supp. 623, 
628, 738 A.2d 231. 
 
{¶ 7} The purposes served by these two rules are of limited applicability 
in the present case.  The present case involves a habeas action, not a civil suit by a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
victim.  In postconviction proceedings, there is no risk of subsequent civil liability 
or even of enhanced criminal liability.  The worst-case scenario for a defendant in 
a postconviction proceeding is the status quo. 
Application of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 in Other Cases 
{¶ 8} In State v. Mapes, 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 484 N.E.2d 140, the 
defendant, on trial for an Ohio murder, had pled “non vult,” the equivalent of no 
contest, to an earlier murder charge in New Jersey.  Id. at 111.  In the Ohio 
proceeding, the trial court allowed police officers from New Jersey to testify that 
the defendant had been convicted of a murder in that state.  Id.  This evidence was 
introduced to establish a death specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  Id.  
This court stated: 
 
Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 prohibit only the 
admission of a no contest plea. These rules do not prohibit the 
admission of a conviction entered upon that plea when such 
conviction is made relevant by statute. The trial court was correct 
in admitting the evidence of the prior conviction as it was not 
equivalent to the admission of the no contest plea and it was not 
introduced by the prosecution for any purpose other than 
establishing the specification. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 9} In Elevators Mut. Ins. Co., a business was damaged by fire.  125 
Ohio St.3d 362, 2010-Ohio-1043, 928 N.E.2d 685, ¶ 3.  One of the owners pled 
no contest to arson and insurance fraud and was convicted.  Id. at ¶ 5. The insurer 
brought an action seeking a declaration of no coverage and recovery of $30,000 
advanced on the owners’ claim.  Id. at ¶ 4.  The trial court refused to allow the 
insurer to use the owner’s plea of no contest against him on the basis that doing so 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
would contradict the goal of Evid.R. 410.  But the court held that the convictions 
based on the no-contest plea were admissible to prove that the owner had 
intentionally set the fire. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals reversed and remanded, rejecting the trial 
court’s distinction between a no-contest plea and a conviction based on that plea.  
The court further held that the limited exception to inadmissibility in Mapes did 
not apply.  The plea was inadmissible. This court affirmed. 
{¶ 11} Elevators Mut. illustrates perfectly the intended application of 
Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2).  The result is in keeping with their goal 
of removing the civil consequences of a no-contest plea, thereby encouraging plea 
bargaining as a means of resolving criminal cases.  It also preserves the traditional 
characteristic of the plea, which is to avoid an admission of guilt.  Admission of 
the no-contest plea against the defendant in that case would have thwarted both 
goals. 
Application of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410 to This Case 
{¶ 12} We turn now to a consideration of the applicability of the general 
rule barring the use of no-contest pleas in habeas corpus proceedings. 
{¶ 13} Respondent argues that a no-contest plea is admissible in the 
context of habeas corpus.  She contends that a habeas action is not a “subsequent 
civil or criminal proceeding” within the meaning of Crim.R. 11(B)(2).  Nor is it a  
proceeding distinct from the proceeding at which the petitioner pled no contest.  
Citing State v. Lloyd, 8 Ohio App.2d 155, 156, 220 N.E.2d 840 (4th Dist.1966), 
respondent asserts that a habeas action is instead a collateral proceeding, a 
“continuation of the criminal action itself.” 
{¶ 14} Hollingsworth argues that the rules are unambiguous and therefore 
not susceptible of interpretation.  Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 
413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus (“An unambiguous statute is to be 
applied, not interpreted”).  He asserts that the language of the two rules is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
sweeping and absolute and that Elevators Mut. controls the issue before us.  Thus, 
neither the plea nor the resulting conviction is admissible in habeas as evidence of 
waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 15} At its core, a habeas action is a collateral attack on the underlying 
conviction.  Wall v. Kholi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1278, 1284, 179 L.Ed.2d 
252 (2012).  In the instant case, the conviction was the result of a no-contest plea.  
To prohibit the state from using the no-contest plea to defend the validity of the 
conviction that resulted from the plea would render the state mute.  The state has 
no defense if the no-contest plea is not in play.  As noted earlier, the clear 
purposes of Crim.R. 11(B)(2) and Evid.R. 410(A)(2) are to encourage the use of 
plea bargaining by removing the civil consequences of the plea and to avoid an 
admission of guilt.  Prohibiting the state from introducing evidence of a no-
contest plea in a habeas action to show that the petitioner has waived his claim of 
ineffective counsel does nothing to advance those purposes, and permitting use of 
the plea does not frustrate them.  The plea is not being used to impose liability on 
the petitioner or to prove his guilt.  There is no risk of subsequent civil liability or 
even of enhanced criminal liability.  The worst-case scenario for a defendant in a 
postconviction proceeding such as habeas corpus  is the status quo.  As we stated 
in Mapes, the purposes of the two rules “are not disserved” here.  19 Ohio St.3d at 
111, 484 N.E.2d 140. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} We conclude that neither Crim.R. 11(B)(2) nor Evid.R. 410(A)(2) 
prohibits the use of a defendant’s no-contest plea in a subsequent proceeding in 
which the defendant collaterally attacks the criminal conviction that resulted from 
the no-contest plea.  Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
__________________ 
Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for petitioner. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, and M. Scott Criss, Assistant 
Attorney General; and Lauren S. Kuley, for respondent. 
______________________