Title: COFFEE v. HENRY

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

COFFEE v. HENRY  COFFEE v. HENRY 2010 OK 4 Case Number: 106839 Decided: 01/26/2010 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA GLENN COFFEE, President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate and CHRIS BENGE, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioners, v. BRAD HENRY, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, Respondent. ¶0 Proceeding to assume original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between the Legislature and Governor over use of the line item veto provided by Okla Const. Art. 6, § 12. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED, OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 4; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED, HOLDING GOVERNOR MAY USE LINE ITEM VETO IN REVIEW OF BILLS THAT ADD CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY APPROPRIATED FUNDS. Fred Morgan, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Cheryl Ann Purvis, Staff Counsel, Oklahoma State Senate, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Lee Slater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Amy L. Alden, General Counsel, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners. D. Kent Meyers, Harvey D. Ellis, Molly H. Tolbert, Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Stephen Cortes, General Counsel, Governor Brad Henry, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. REIF, J. ¶1 The President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma Senate and the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives have petitioned this Court to assume original jurisdiction. They ask this Court to resolve their dispute with the Governor over use of the line item veto provided by Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12. The Legislative Leadership specifically complains about two instances in the last Legislative session where the Governor used the line item veto to reject provisions in two bills - S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286. The Legislative Leadership characterizes these bills as "general bills." They contend that use of the line item veto is limited to "appropriation bills." The Legislative Leadership asks this Court to issue a declaratory judgment that interprets Art. 6, § 12 as limiting the Governor's use of the line item veto to "appropriation bills," that is, bills that deal exclusively with appropriations. While the distinction between "general bills" and "appropriation bills" may be determinative in other contexts, the language of Art. 6, § 12 is determinative of the controversy at hand. ¶2 The text of Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12 reads as follows: Every bill passed by the Legislature, making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or any item, or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds vote, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the preceding section in reference to other bills: Provided, That this section shall not relieve emergency bills of the requirement of the three-fourths vote. Nothing in the language of this provision reflects that it is limited to bills that deal exclusively with appropriations; rather, the language plainly indicates it applies to "Every bill...making appropriations...embracing distinct items."(Emphasis added.) ¶3 The term "every" ordinarily means "any" or "all" and suggests a broad expansive meaning, Christianson v. City of Bismark , 476 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1991); it is considered a term of inclusion. See Rockfield v. First Nat. Bank of Springfield, 83 N.E. 392 (Ohio 1907). Clearly, the scope of Art. 6, § 12 goes well beyond just bills that deal exclusively with appropriations and extends to any and all bills that "mak[e] appropriations...embracing distinct items." ¶4 Examination of S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286 reveals that each of these bills "mak[e] appropriations...embracing distinct items." That is, S.B. 1323 added conditions and restrictions for the expenditure of funds previously generally appropriated to the Department of Corrections, while H.B. 2286 added a restriction on the use of funds previously appropriated to the Ethics Commission to purchase computer software. These additions "mak[e] appropriations" because they materially change the predicate authorization for such funds to be paid out of the State treasury as provided in Okla. Const. Art. 5, § 55. This constitutional provision commands, in pertinent part, that "No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State...except in pursuance to an appropriation by law." The restrictions in S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286 necessarily affect the payment of funds out of the State treasury for the items embraced, because the funds in question cannot be paid out contrary to the restrictions. Stated another way, these restrictions supplement the original general appropriations and govern the payout of funds on the items they embrace. ¶5 In summary, the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution provided a classic system of checks and balances for the expenditure of public funds. The framers first required expenditures to be based on bills that make appropriations and made any and all such bills subject to the scrutiny and line item veto of the Governor, including bills that materially change prior appropriations by adding conditions or restrictions that affect the payout of the funds from the State treasury. The framers clearly intended the Governor to play a critical role at every stage of the appropriations process. As a counter-check or balance on the exercise of line item veto power by the Governor, the framers authorized the Legislature to repass a "bill, or any item or appropriation therein" that the Governor may have disapproved. ¶6 Accordingly, this Court assumes original jurisdiction of this dispute between the Legislature and the Governor over the exercise of their respective constitutional powers in regard to the making and approval/disapproval of appropriations of public funds. We enter a declaratory judgment that (1) rejects the challenge by Legislative Leadership to the Governor's use of line item veto power in review of bills that add conditions or restrictions to funds that have been previously appropriated and (2) holds the Governor may use the line item veto provided in Art. 6, § 12 in review of bills by the Legislature that add conditions or restrictions to previously appropriated funds, because such bills form a part of the predicate appropriation for the payout of funds from the State treasury as provided in Art. 5, § 55. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED, OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 4; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED, HOLDING GOVERNOR MAY USE LINE ITEM VETO IN REVIEW OF BILLS THAT ADD CONDITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY APPROPRIATED FUNDS. ¶7 EDMONDSON, C.J., KAUGER, WATT, COLBERT, and REIF, JJ., concur. ¶8 TAYLOR, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, and WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. KAUGER, J ¶1 I fully concur with the majority. It holds that every bill making appropriations is subject to the Governor's line-item veto. Although our previous cases may not be written in the clearest language, when they are clearly analyzed there is no question that the Governor vetoed appropriation bills. ¶2 However, there is another rationale for reaching this conclusion. Because HB 2286 and SB 1323 supplement and amend appropriations made in the general appropriations bill HB 2276, the appropriations were incorporated into the subsequent bills, thus subjecting them to the Governor's line-item veto. In Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 370 N.E.2d 1350 (Mass. 1977), the State of Massachusetts reached the same result in a similar case. The opinion provides at p. 1352: Each new item sets apart from the public revenue a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object and for no other. It is therefore an appropriation. . . . The Legislature cannot narrow the Governor's power to disapprove such an item by stating it in words and phrases rather than in figures. If the Governor could not veto such a new item the way would be open for evasion of the item veto by a two-step process. The Legislature could first make a noncontroversial appropriation. Once that was enacted, it could then insert the controversial restriction as a separate section in an essential supplementary appropriations bill. This should be the end of the discussion. However, I am compelled to write further to address our precedents. ¶3 Here's what happened. On April 29, 2008, the Governor of the State of Oklahoma approved House Bill No. 2276, a general appropriation bill which appropriated money for the expenses of various agencies of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the state. Included in the money appropriated by H.B. No. 2276 were appropriations to the Ethics Commission and the Department of Corrections. ¶4 The Governor vetoed the legislative mandate within H.B 2286 for the Ethics Commission which required it to use a specified amount of its appropriation to purchase particular computer software, and he vetoed the legislative mandate within S.B. 1323 for the Department of Corrections to "budget" specified amounts of its appropriation for delineated purposes. The petitioners, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, brought this original proceeding in this Court to challenge the Governor's ability to exercise such a line-item veto. ¶5 The Petitioners argue that H.B. 2286 and S.B.1323 are not appropriation bills subject to the Governor's veto authority as provided by the Oklahoma Constitution art. 6 §12 which provides: Every bill passed by the Legislature, making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or any item, or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds vote, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the preceding section in reference to other bills: Provided, That this section shall not relieve emergency bills of the requirement of the three-fourths vote. This provision involves the Governor's authority to line-item veto "appropriations of money embracing distinct items." Over 100 years after the enactment of this Constitutional provision, the Court still cannot unanimously agree upon what an appropriation of money embracing distinct items means -- perhaps because the definition seems so simple. The Constitution does not define "appropriation," but according to the dictionary it means "money set aside as for a specific purpose." ¶6 The precise question is whether two bills which add conditions and restrictions for the expenditure of funds previously generally appropriated meet that definition; the majority concludes that it does. Why? Because the bills supplement the original general appropriation bill and govern the payment of funds on the items they embrace -- thus coming within the term "every appropriation." To construe these measures any other way would defy what the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution were attempting -- to provide a classic system of checks and balances for the expenditures of public funds. ¶7 The only way to sort this out is to start at the very beginning. The Oklahoma Constitution art. 5 §55 also uses the words "appropriation by law." 1. STATE FINANCE -- "Appropriation." An "appropriation" in this state is an authority of the Legislature, given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers, to apply a distinctly specified sum, from a designated fund out of the treasury in a given year, for a specified object or demand against the state. In other words: money set aside (by the Legislature) for a specific purpose. Here, the Legislature set aside money for the Department of Corrections to use in a particular year, and it set aside money for the Ethics Commission to use for computer software only. ¶8 The second syllabus of Menefee is particularly helpful. It provides: 2. STATE FINANCE -- Appropriation--Form. No arbitrary form of expression or particular words are required by the Constitution in making an appropriation, which may be made by implication when the language employed reasonably leads to the belief that such was the intention of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied.) The Okla. Const. art. 6 §12 is an exception to the Governor's veto power, and the Menefee Court recognized that there may be attempts by future Legislatures to bypass the Governor's ability to line-item veto by artfully crafting legislation that, at first glance, may not appear to be an express appropriation of any funds. ¶9 The exception to the rule is what this is all about. It is the exact situation which the Menefee Court foresaw. The legislation at issue appropriated funds and then added conditions and restrictions to the expenditure of the funds. Taken collectively, the legislation reasonably leads one to the finding that the intention of the Legislature was to make an appropriation, but carefully bypass the Governor's ability to line-item veto by splitting the appropriation into multiple bills. In fact, as the language in Menefee shows, Menefee actually supports this conclusion. ¶10 However, Menefee alone is not dispositive, because it involved a direct, specific, sum-certain appropriation for the salary of the Game and Fish Warden. Nor is Meyer v. Clift, ¶11 In 1911, the Court decided Regents of State University v. Trapp., ¶12 In actuality, both Trapp and Rathburn involve the question of the timeliness of the Governors' actions. The fact that these cases stand for this and for nothing else was expressly and clearly pointed out by the Court in Peebley v. Childers, ¶13 Unfortunately, the rationale of Peebley or its holding is of little help because it involved a Governor who went through a bill and reduced dollar amounts rather than disapproving them in toto. The Peebly Court held that the Governor was required to disapprove objectionable items in toto, rather than merely approve parts and disapprove parts by changing the dollar amounts -- this is not what happened here. ¶14 The Court reaffirmed the teaching of Menefee, supra, when it recognized again in Riley v. Carter, ¶15 Another interesting case is State ex rel. Murray v. Carter, ¶16 This is an entirely different issue than the one before us -- whether the Governor's action exceeded his authority to line-item veto "appropriations of money embracing distinct items." Rather, the proper analysis to resolve this question can be found in Edwards v. Childers, ¶17 The Edwards Court concluded that the challenged legislation qualified as an appropriation because it created a special fund, appropriated and directed it to be expended for a special purpose and in an express manner, and the amounts to be appropriated were the entire fund. In short, the fund was capable of being mathematically calculated. The Court again recognized that no arbitrary form of expression or particular words were required in making an appropriation, but that it could be made by implication, when the language employed reasonably leads to the belief that such was the intent of the Legislature. In Edwards, it was apparent that the Legislature, through the language of the statutes, intended to set apart money from this specially created fund for the sole use of the department for the construction and maintenance of state highways. In other words, the Legislature quite clearly set aside money for a specific purpose. ¶18 It is, however, the teachings rather than the facts of Edwards which are particularly helpful. In re Initiative Petition No. 332, The main teaching of Edwards, which is the foundation upon which it is based and upon which it distinguishes Menefee, is the fundamental and absolute division of governmental power, and the exclusion of the executive from the appropriation and disbursement of public funds. ¶12 As a matter of historical perspective, the Court in Edwards observed that the provisions of art. 5, § 55 exist to curb the power of the monarch to save the people from the prodigality of the King. ¶13 The Court observed that an appropriation of public funds to a department of state does not conflict with the specific sum requirement if it leaves no power in the department to use or expand any funds except as the lawmakers reviewed, considered and thereafter determined to allocate. The concept upon which both of these cases rely is the notion that an "appropriation" is akin to that which is defined in the dictionary [money set aside for a specific purpose] or by the Legislature [a legislative allocation of funds for a specific purpose]. ¶19 The Court further addresses this subject of improper delegation of the legislative appropriation process in Wells v. Childers, . . .[G]ubernatorially created objects of expenditures would constitute an appropriation, a function exclusively legislative. As a matter of fundamental principle, the Legislature may not create any fund, designate it an appropriation, and delegate determination of the objects of expenditure to any executive or administrative officer at his discretion. So to do not only would violate the Constitution (art. 5, § 55), requiring the distinct specification of the object to which it may be applied; additionally, such legislative authority sought to be delegated would violate section l, art. 4, Constitution, by which the government is divided into three separate and distinct departments and in which it is provided that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. ¶20 The rationale of Edwards, supra, In re Initiative Petition No. 332, supra, and Wells, supra, is applicable. When it is clear from the questioned legislation that the intent of the Legislature was to set aside money for a specified purpose, and that it is not an attempt by the Legislature to delegate to another branch the ability to allocate an unspecified sum of money for a unspecified, discretionary purpose, the measure qualifies as an appropriation. Here, S.B. 2286 set aside the funds previously appropriated in H.B. 2276 to be used for budgeting for Fiscal year 2009 or 2010. H.B. 2286 set aside $50,000.00 of the funds previously appropriated by H.B. 2276 to be used to purchase computer software. Clearly both bills set aside dollars to be used for a specific purpose -- each qualifying as an appropriation. Because each qualifies as such, the provisions of Section 12, art. 6 of our Constitution CONCLUSION ¶21 It is well-settled that no particular words are required by the Constitution in making an appropriation. It may be made by implication, when the language employed reasonably leads to the belief that such was the intention of the Legislature. Even though drafted in terms of "transferring" and "allocating," H.B.1105 unmistakably appropriates nearly 135 Million Dollars from the General Revenue Fund. It is an appropriation bill, and it must satisfy the requirements of an appropriation law set out in art. V, §§ 55 and 56 of the Oklahoma Constitution. An appropriation may also be made by an amendment to an existing bill. ¶22 These are the facts. FOOT