Title: Breslauer v. Fayston School District

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

BRESLAUER_V_FAYSTON_SCHL_DIST.93-256; 163 Vt 416; 659 A.2d 1129

[Filed 24-Mar-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 93-256


Gail Breslauer                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Washington Superior Court

Fayston School District, et al                    February Term, 1994


Stephen B. Martin, J.

James S. Suskin and Catherine Roberts-Suskin of Suskin & Roberts-Suskin,
P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant 

Peter B. Joslin and John Davis Buckley of Theriault & Joslin, P.C.,
Montpelier, for defendants-appellees 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Gail Breslauer brought this action against the
Fayston School District, her former employer; Fayston School Board; Robert
Stanton, the former principal of the Fayston School; Andreas Lehner,
principal of the Warren Elementary School; and the Warren School Board.  The
complaint centers on plaintiff's attempt to obtain a teaching job in the
Warren Elementary School after leaving a similar position in the Fayston
School.  Most of the counts relate to adverse comments about plaintiff which
she alleges were made by Stanton to Lehner and resulted in her not receiving
the Warren teaching job.  She alleges that these comments breached a written
agreement between her and Stanton and the Fayston Board and were tortious
under a number of theories.  One count against Lehner and the Warren School
Board alleges that they discriminated against her on account of age in not
hiring her, in violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act.  The
superior court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants except
defendant Stanton.  We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part. 

     Most of the facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff was a teacher in the
Fayston School District 

 

from 1974 to 1985, when she took a one year leave of absence.  During her
employment with Fayston, she had been very active in the teacher's union and
became president and negotiator for the Valley Teachers' Association, the
collective bargaining representative for teachers in a number of towns
including Fayston and Warren.  During her leave of absence, she was
approached by William Lincoln, Superintendent of Schools, to inform her that
the Fayston Board was satisfied with its staff and preferred that she not
return to the Fayston School. 

     This contact led to the negotiation of a written agreement, which is at
the heart of many of the counts of plaintiff's complaint.  The main terms of
the agreement were that: (1) plaintiff would continue on leave of absence for
the 1986-87 school year; (2) during that year she would be paid $12,600 and
could maintain group insurance coverage; (3) she would resign effective June
30, 1987; (4) all reference inquiries, particularly those made to principal
Stanton, were to be referred to superintendent Lincoln "even though he may be
physically out of Vermont;" (5) plaintiff and superintendent Lincoln were to
negotiate a letter of recommendation to cover certain aspects of plaintiff's
experience at Fayston; (6) any derogatory material, and any record of
grievances, was to be removed from plaintiff's personnel file; and (7) the
parties agreed not to discuss or disclose the terms of the settlement or the
issues that might have precipitated the agreement.  The agreement was signed
by plaintiff, the chair of the Fayston School Board, superintendent Lincoln,
and principal Stanton. 

     In May of 1989, plaintiff decided to return to teaching and applied to
fill either of two vacant positions at the Warren Elementary School.  She was
interviewed by principal Lehner, who thereafter called principal Stanton for
a reference.  By this time, Stanton had left Fayston and had become principal
at the Stowe Elementary School.  Stanton's telephone reference was negative. 
For example, he said plaintiff "polarized" the staff and caused "negative
relations between the faculty and board."  Lehner took notes of this
conversation; the notes were found by a Warren teacher and turned over to
plaintiff. 

     Lehner did not recommend that the Warren Board hire plaintiff in 1989,
and again in 

 

1990 when she applied for another job.  He indicated in a deposition that a
Warren teacher told him that the teacher would not be able to work with
plaintiff.  He also had a policy of not hiring "expensive" teachers, and
plaintiff's salary would be quite high.  He admitted, however, that he
considered the information from Stanton in making his decision. 

     Plaintiff's amended complaint named the Fayston School Board (the Board)
and the Fayston School District (Fayston), principal Stanton and principal
Lehner and set forth eight counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of
plaintiff's rights of free speech and association because Stanton's actions
were done to retaliate against plaintiff's union activities; (3) defamation;
(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) violation of public
policy; (6) invasion of privacy; (7) negligence of Fayston in failing to
advise Stanton of his obligations under the contract and to supervise him;
and (8) age discrimination against Lehner in not recommending that plaintiff
be hired.  The first seven counts were against the Fayston defendants and
Stanton.  Counts 5 & 8 were against Lehner.  In response to Lehner's motion
to dismiss the age discrimination count (count 8), plaintiff sought to join
the Warren School Board and amend the count to make the Board the defendant. 
The court granted the motion to dismiss (FN1) and denied the motion to join
the Board on the ground that the age discrimination claim was not properly
joined with the remaining counts of the complaint. 

     The bulk of the case was considered on defendant's motion for summary
judgment.  The court dismissed the counts against Fayston related to
Stanton's negative reference (counts 1 through 7), on the grounds that
Fayston could not be responsible for the actions of Stanton once he left its
employ.(FN2)  As to count 7, the court ruled specifically that any duty
Fayston had to 

 

supervise Stanton's conduct ended when he left its employ. The court did not
dismiss counts 1 through 7 against Stanton. 

     On appeal, plaintiff raises four issues: (1) whether Fayston's duty to
train or supervise Stanton continued after Stanton left its employ; (2)
whether Stanton remained the agent of Fayston for purposes of the termination
agreement even after he left its employ; (3) whether the court should have
considered parol evidence on the meaning of the termination contract; and (4)
whether the motion to join the Warren School Board was properly denied. 

     We first address trial court's decision to dismiss count 7 which charged
that Fayston had a duty of care to ensure that Stanton understood his
obligations under the agreement with plaintiff, that Fayston knew from
Stanton's past conduct that he was likely to give a negative evaluation of
plaintiff, and that Fayston breached this agreement by failing to inform and
supervise him in signing and performing the agreement.  Plaintiff argues that
Fayston is liable for any damage that occured as a result of the breach of
this duty even if it occured after Stanton terminated his Fayston employment.

     Plaintiff acknowledges that generally Fayston had no duty to control the
conduct of a third person apart from its duty to control the conduct of its
servants.  Plaintiff relies on Restatement (Second) Torts  315 (1965) to
establish Fayston's direct duty of care to her: 

          315.  General Principle

         There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to
         prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless
         (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
         which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
         conduct, or
         (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
         gives to the other a right of protection.


The wording of  315 demonstrates the main deficiency in plaintiff's theory.
 The section is about "physical harm," see id. at  7(3) (physical harm
means "physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels"), but
the gravamen of plaintiff's theory is that Stanton 

 

caused a breach of contract, and the loss of the Warren jobs, by his negative
reference as communicated to Lehner.  The injury related to plaintiff's
negligence claim is economic. 

     In explaining the relationship between tort and contract, Prosser and
Keeton state: 

         [I]f the alleged obligation to do or not to do something that was
         breached could not have existed but for a manifested intent, then
         contract law should be the only theory upon which liability would
         be imposed.

          . . . .

         . . . Generally speaking, there is no general duty to exercise
         reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss or losses to
         others that do not arise from tangible physical harm to persons and
         tangible things.  This being so, the manifested intent of the parties
         should ordinarily control the nature and extent of the obligations
         of the parties to a contract of sale, either of real or personal
         property, or a contract of service.

W. Keeton et al, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts  92, at 656-57 (5th
ed. 1984) (emphasis in original).  The limitation here is logical.  Apart
from the knowledge that Stanton might provide a negative evaluation of
plaintiff unless prevented from doing so, there is nothing special about this
contract that imposes on Fayston a duty to train one of its senior managers
in implementing the contract.  The contract itself created no duty to train
or supervise.  Stanton signed the contract which, under plaintiff's theory of
the case, imposes on him a personal obligation to comply apart from his
employment with Fayston.  If we find a duty here, we create a new tort theory
available in any breach of contract case where an economic entity acts
through employees.  We find this an unwise expansion of tort liability
concepts. 

     In other contexts, we have been careful to maintain a dividing line
between contract and tort theories of recovery.  See, e.g., Winey v. William
E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. ___, ___,