Title: Ogle v. Gordon

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

706 So. 2d 707 (1997)
Anthony Joe OGLE, as Administrator of the Estate of Margaret Ogle, deceased
v.
Raymond GORDON, et al.
1941989.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 12, 1997.
Rehearing Denied November 7, 1997.
Steven A. Martino and Robert J. Hedge of Jackson, Taylor & Martino, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
J. Garrison Thompson of Pitts, Pitts & Thompson, Selma; and Ronnie E. Keahey, Grove Hill, for appellees.
MADDOX, Justice.
The plaintiff in this wrongful death action was not issued letters of administration until more than two years after the death of his wife. However, he filed this action, based on his wife's death, within the two years allowed by the Wrongful Death Statute, § 6-5-410, Ala.Code 1975. The legal question presented is whether the failure of the probate court to issue letters of administration within the two-year period after the death requires the dismissal of a wrongful death action that was timely filed by the person later issued letters of administration.
The trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants, holding that, even though the plaintiff, Anthony Ogle, petitioned the Clarke County Probate Court for letters *708 of administration four months after the death occurred and filed the wrongful death action within the two-year period allowed by the statute, his action was barred by § 6-5-410 because the letters were not issued by the probate court until after the two years had run. We disagree.
Margaret Ogle, the wife of Anthony Ogle, was killed on May 28, 1992, when the car in which she was traveling collided with a vehicle being driven by Raymond Gordon. At the time of the accident, Gordon was employed by Johnson Logging Company ("Johnson"), and the vehicle he was driving was owned by Johnson. On September 30, 1992, Anthony Ogle filed a personal injury action against Gordon and Johnson, based on his own injuries, and a wrongful death action based on his wife's death. In both actions Ogle alleged that Gordon had operated Johnson's vehicle negligently or wantonly and that Johnson had negligently or wantonly entrusted its vehicle to Gordon.
The following dates and events are undisputed:
We must first recognize that this Court has held that the wrongful death statute, which provides a two-year limitations period, is a statute of creation, otherwise known as a nonclaim bar to recovery, and that it is not subject to tolling provisions. See, Cofer v. Ensor, 473 So. 2d 984, 992 (Ala.1985); Ivory v. Fitzpatrick, 445 So. 2d 262, 264 (Ala.1984).
The plaintiff argues that because he filed his petition for letters of administration within the two-year limitations period, any subsequent action by the probate court should relate back to the date on which the petition was filed. Consequently, we must determine whether the doctrine of relation *709 back applies to our wrongful death limitations provision.
The doctrine of relation back with respect to the powers of a personal representative has been in existence for approximately 500 years,[1] and this Court first recognized it in Blackwell v. Blackwell, 33 Ala. 57 (1858). See also, McAleer v. Cawthon, 215 Ala. 674, 112 So. 251 (1927), and Nance v. Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 38 So. 916 (1905). In McAleer v. Cawthon, this Court stated:
215 Ala. at 675-76, 112 So.  at 251. In Griffin v. Workman, 73 So. 2d 844 (Fla.1954), the Florida Supreme Court, citing this Court's opinion in McAleer, supra, discussed the doctrine and stated:
73 So. 2d  at 846-47.
In 1993, the Alabama Legislature codified this doctrine by adopting Act No. 93-722, § 2, Ala. Acts 1993, codified at § 43-2-831, Ala.Code 1975. That Act became effective on January 1, 1994. Section 43-2-831, provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The defendants cite Strickland v. Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co., 293 Ala. 348, 303 So. 2d 98 (1974), a case construing federal statutes (and holding that the plaintiff who filed the wrongful death claim was not the personal representative at the time the action was filed), for the proposition that the doctrine of relation back does not apply in this case, on the basis that the appointment, coming beyond the two-year limitations period, gave the plaintiff no capacity to sue and was a nullity and that, therefore, there is nothing to relate back to. Our decision in Strickland, however, came long before the Legislature's codification of § 43-2-831. We, therefore, overrule Strickland`s holding regarding the application of the doctrine of relation back, insofar as it is inconsistent with what we hold today, but we note that Strickland correctly points out that under the doctrine of relation back one must have something to relate back to, and we note that in the present case the filing of the original petition is the event to which the appointment would relate back.
This doctrine is especially applicable in this case for the reason that the probate court has no discretion in issuing letters of administration when there is no question relating to the qualification of the person requesting the letters. The probate court had no right to delay the issuance of the letters for 27 1/2 months. Section 43-2-42, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) It is well established that a probate court has no discretion in matters concerning appointment, except as to matters of qualification. In Burnett v. Garrison, 261 Ala. 622, 626, 75 So. 2d 144, 147 (1954), this Court concluded:
Likewise, in Smith v. Rice, 265 Ala. 236, 248, 90 So. 2d 262, 274 (1956), this Court held:
See also, Hollis v. Crittenden, 251 Ala. 320, 37 So. 2d 193 (1948); Loeb v. Callaway, 250 Ala. 524, 35 So. 2d 198 (1948); Griffin v. Irwin, 246 Ala. 631, 21 So. 2d 668 (1945); Calvert v. Beck, 240 Ala. 442, 199 So. 846 (1941); Bivin v. Millsap, 238 Ala. 136, 189 So. 770 (1939); Starlin v. Love, 237 Ala. 38, 185 So. 380 (1938); Johnston v. Pierson, 229 Ala. 85, 155 So. 695 (1934); Marcus v. McKee, 227 Ala. 577, 151 So. 456 (1933); Murphy v. Freeman, 220 Ala. 634, 127 So. 199 (1930); and Castleberry v. Hollingsworth, 215 Ala. 445, 111 So. 35 (1927).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff complied fully with § 43-2-42, Ala.Code 1975, when he filed a petition for letters of administration in the Clarke County Probate Court on September 30, 1992, and it is undisputed that there was no question of qualification in this case. The probate court, through inadvertence, did not issue the letters of administration until January 19, 1995, the day after the plaintiff notified the court of its dereliction. That dereliction should not bar the plaintiff's action.
Based on these facts, we hold that Ogle's January 19, 1995, appointment relates back to the date he filed his petition, September 30, 1992; consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and KENNEDY, BUTTS, and SEE, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  J.B.G., Annotation, Relation Back of Letters Testamentary or of Administration, 26 A.L.R. 1359, 1360 (1923).