Title: Christiana Care Health Services Inc. v. Carter, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH 
SERVICES INC., 
 
Defendant-Petitioner Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
MEEGHAN CARTER Individually 
and as Administratrix of the Estate of 
MARGARET RACKERBY FLINT, 
Decedent, 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Below,  
Appellees. 
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No.  58, 2019 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
C.A. No. N17C-05-353 
 
 
Submitted:  September 18, 2019 
Decided:  December 2, 2019 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
Richard Galperin, Esquire, Joshua H. Meyeroff, Esquire (Argued), and Ryan T. 
Keating, Esquire, Morris James LLP, for Appellant, Christiana Care Health 
Services, Inc. 
 
Leroy A. Tice, Esquire (Argued), Leroy A. Tice, Esquire P.A., for Appellees 
Meeghan Carter Individually and as Administratix of the Estate of Margaret 
Rackerby Flint.  
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an interlocutory appeal in a medical negligence case.  The appellant, 
Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. (“CCHS”) claims that the Superior Court erred 
by denying its motion for partial summary judgment.  The alleged medical 
negligence occurred during surgery performed on Margaret Rackerby Flint at 
Christiana Care Hospital, which is operated by CCHS.  The surgery allegedly caused 
her death two days later.  The complaint was filed by Meeghan Carter, Ms. Flint’s 
daughter, individually and as administratrix of Ms. Flint’s estate.  It named as 
defendants Dr. Michael Principe, who performed the surgery, Dr. Eric Johnson, who 
assisted him, and CCHS.  Later, the medical practices of the two doctors were added 
as defendants.  The sole claim against CCHS is that the two doctors were its agents 
and it is vicariously liable for their alleged negligence.   
A mediation resulted in settlement of all the plaintiff’s claims against Dr. 
Principe and his medical practice.  As part of that settlement, the plaintiff signed a 
release which released all such claims.  CCHS was not a party to the settlement or 
the release.  Following that settlement, CCHS filed its motion for partial summary 
judgment against the plaintiff on the theory that the release of Dr. Principe released 
it from any vicarious liability for Dr. Principe’s alleged negligence.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion.   
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CCHS raises two issues on appeal.  First, it contends that the release of an 
agent releases a vicarious liability claim against the principal as a matter of law.  
Second, and apart from its first contention, it contends that the terms of the release 
which the plaintiff signed when she settled with Dr. Principe and his medical practice 
also released it from liability for Dr. Principe’s conduct.  We agree with CCHS’s 
second contention.  For the reasons which follow, the written release operated as a 
complete satisfaction of the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against CCHS arising 
from Dr. Principe’s alleged conduct, and the motion for partial summary judgment 
should have been granted. 
Shortly after CCHS filed the motion for partial summary judgement which is 
at issue in this appeal, the plaintiff and Dr. Johnson stipulated that all of the 
plaintiff’s claims against him, his medical practice, and the vicarious liability claim 
against CCHS based on his alleged negligence, were dismissed.  Therefore, when 
the Superior Court decided CCHS’s motion for partial summary judgment, the only 
remaining claim was the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against CCHS based on 
Dr. Principe’s alleged negligence. 
In denying CCHS’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Superior Court 
reasoned that:  
The Court finds that CCHS is a joint tortfeasor, as defined 
under the [Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 
(“UCATA”)].  Pursuant to Section 6304[a], the Joint 
Tortfeasor Release does not operate to exclude the 
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possibility of CCHS’s vicarious liability.  CCHS is not a 
party to the Release, and the Release does not prohibit 
Plaintiffs from proceeding against CCHS.  There is no 
basis in Delaware’s UCATA or Delaware common law for 
finding as a matter of law that the release of a joint 
tortfeasor discharges the vicarious liability of a joint 
tortfeasor who was neither a party nor explicitly listed in 
the release.1 
 
DISCUSSION 
This Court “review[s] the Superior Court’s decision on a motion for summary 
judgment de novo.”2  In making this inquiry, we “determine ‘whether the record 
shows that there is no genuine material issue of fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.’”3  If material facts are in dispute, a motion for 
summary judgment should not be granted.4  
The release signed by the plaintiff when she settled with Dr. Principe and his 
medical practice was entitled Joint Tortfeasor Release.  It includes the following 
provision:  
This release is intended to protect the Releasees from any 
further exposure or future liability from any claim relating 
in any way to the medical care described herein and in the 
Complaint filed in the above referenced lawsuit.  This 
Release is executed in conformity with the provisions of 
10 Del. C. §6301, et seq. the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, and shall be governed by Delaware law.  
Accordingly, should it be determined that any person or 
                                                 
1 Carter v. Principe, 2019 WL 193138, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 15, 2019). 
2 Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 145 (Del. 2009).  
3 Id. (quoting Berns v. Doan, 961 A.2d 506, 510 (Del. 2008) (citation omitted)). 
4 Id. 
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entity not released herein is jointly or severally liable with 
the Releasees, to the Releasors in tort or otherwise, the 
claims against and damages recoverable from such other 
person or entity shall be reduced by the greater of 
Releasees’ pro rata share of liability or responsibility for 
such damages or the sum of $1,000,000, and this release 
shall operate as a satisfaction of those claims against such 
other parties to that extent.5 
 
The purpose of this provision is to protect the releasees from claims from other 
parties for contribution or indemnity by reducing the plaintiff’s claims against such 
other parties by the releasees’ pro rata, meaning proportionate, share of the 
plaintiff’s total damages.     
The application of the plain and unambiguous language of this provision in 
this case leads to the conclusion that the release extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim 
against CCHS.  CCHS is an “entity not released herein” which is, at least, “severally 
liable with [Dr. Principe] to [the plaintiff] in tort or otherwise.”6  The provision 
reduces the plaintiff’s claim against CCHS by “the greater of [Dr. Principe’s] pro 
rata share of liability or responsibility for such damages or the sum of $1,000,000 
and operate[s] as a satisfaction of those claims . . . to that extent.”  In the context of 
a vicariously liable principal, the agent’s pro rata share of responsibility for the 
                                                 
5 App. to Appellees’ Answering Br. at B351. 
6 See Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978) (reasoning that a doctor and his employer 
were “(at least) ‘severally’ liable for the same injury to plaintiff” where the employer’s liability 
was “derived solely from” the doctor’s alleged negligence).  
 
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plaintiff’s damages is the entire amount of those damages.7  Since the release 
provides that the plaintiff’s claim is reduced by “the greater” of Dr. Principe’s pro 
rata share of responsibility, whatever that amount may be, or $1,000,000, the release 
reduces the plaintiff’s claim against CCHS by the entire amount of plaintiff’s 
damages.  The release, therefore, completely exhausts any damages that could be 
asserted against CCHS and operates as a full satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim 
against CCHS. 
The plaintiff makes a number of contentions as to why CCHS’s liability is not 
identical to Dr. Principe’s, primarily to the effect that CCHS made statements in the 
trial court which are inconsistent with the claims it has made on appeal.  The 
plaintiff’s contentions are not persuasive and we reject them.   
Since we find the terms of the release to be case dispositive, we need not 
address the appellant’s first contention. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed. 
                                                 
7 This principle is inherent from the ability of a vicariously liable principal to seek indemnification 
from an agent for liability the principal incurs as a result of the agent’s wrongdoings.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 886B(1)-(2)(a) (1979).  Indemnification operates to fully 
shift the loss from the party incurring it (i.e., the principal held vicariously liable to an injured 
party) to the party whose negligence was “the primary cause of the injured party’s harm” (i.e. the 
agent whose wrongdoing harmed the third party).  41 AM. JUR. 2D INDEMNITY § 3 (1968); see id. 
at § 1 (“Stated simply, indemnity is an obligation by one party to make another whole for a loss 
that the other party has incurred. . . . Indemnity in its most basic sense means reimbursement and 
may lie when one party discharges a liability which another rightfully should have assumed, and 
it is based on the principle that everyone is responsible for his or her own wrongdoing, and if 
another person has been compelled to pay a judgment which ought to have been paid by the 
wrongdoer, then the loss should be shifted to the party whose negligence or tortious act caused the 
loss.” (footnote omitted)).