Title: IVERSON v. FROST CONSTRUCTION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IVERSON v. FROST CONSTRUCTION2003 WY 16281 P.3d 190Case Number: 02-208Decided: 12/16/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

KEITH 
IVERSON,

 

Appellant(Employee-Claimant),

 

v.

 

FROST 
CONSTRUCTION,

 

Appellee(Employer-Objector).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Colin 
M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Randy 
L. Royal, Greybull, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
this appeal, the primary issue we must resolve is whether the hearing examiner 
properly resolved the date of compensable injury.  Appellant Keith Iverson was involved in 
two separate incidents that caused pain in his lower back.  After the first incident, he completed 
all assigned shifts and overtime for several weeks.  After the second incident, he finished 
his shift and completed another the next day, but then notified his employer of 
the injury, discontinued work, sought medical treatment and, based upon x-rays, 
was diagnosed with a herniated disc.

 

[¶2]           
Iverson 
filed an injury report within one week after the second incident and, although 
the Worker's Compensation Division granted benefits, Appellee Frost Construction 
contested that decision and requested a hearing.  The Division withdrew, and Frost 
appeared at the hearing.  Iverson 
contended that the second incident resulted in the herniated disc; however, the 
hearing examiner decided that Iverson had suffered a compensable, work-related 
injury on the earlier occasion and, because he neither reported the injury to a 
supervisor nor filed an injury report within the statutory time frame, his claim 
for benefits was found to be untimely and denied.  The denial of benefits was upheld by the 
district court, and that order is challenged on those grounds articulated in the 
statement of issues.  

 

[¶3]           
We 
accept the hearing examiner's conclusion that Iverson suffered a work-related 
injury in the first incident; however, our law is well established that 
statutory reporting requirements are not triggered when an employee sustains an 
apparent trivial injury which does not result in present disability and which 
would not reasonably be expected to cause future disability.  An employee is charged with knowing the 
full extent and nature of the injury no later than when a correct diagnosis and 
prognosis of present or likely future disability is communicated to the 
claimant.  At that point, the injury 
is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of limitations begins to 
run.  Applying the correct rules of 
law, we hold that the relevant facts show that Iverson timely reported his 
injury to his supervisor and the Division.  
We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting 
benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶4]           
Iverson 
presents the following statement of the issues:

 

I.  The 
decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings, in setting aside its finding 
of compensability and ordering a contested hearing, was contrary to law and 
established precedent.

 

II.  The 
decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings was outside the scope of the 
issues raised in these proceedings and therefore improper.

 

III.  The 
decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings, that Appellant did not timely 
comply with the requirements of W.S. § 27-14-502(a) (LexisNexis 2001), was 
contrary to law, established precedent and the great weight of the 
evidence.

 

IV.  The 
decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings in denying benefits to 
Appellant was not supported by substantial evidence. 

 

Frost 
does not rephrase any of the issues.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]           
Iverson 
worked as a truck driver for Frost Construction.  On April 3, 1998, another Frost driver 
operating a road grader contacted the back of Iverson's truck at a few miles per 
hour.  Iverson was jolted and 
experienced a burning sensation in his lower back.  The other driver testified that the road 
grader had a push plate on the front and Iverson's truck had a push plate on the 
back that allowed for contact when the heavy trucks became stuck in fill.  The road grader driver testified that he 
pushed various dump trucks in the same manner up to twenty or thirty times per 
day.  Neither driver reported the 
contact to Frost, and Iverson continued to work all assigned shifts including 
overtime. 

 

[¶6]           
In 
early May, Iverson injured himself while moving items for his girlfriend but 
again continued to work.  Several 
weeks later, Iverson claimed that he experienced severe back and leg pain for 
the first time on May 14, 1998, while chopping asphalt from the gates of his 
bellydump truck while lying on his back. However, he completed his shift.  Iverson worked the next day, May 15, 
1998, and claimed that his back and leg hurt while shoveling gravel.  The hearing examiner found that 
Iverson's claim of injury on these days was not credible because he worked full 
shifts on both days and did not tell his supervisor that he had injured his 
back.  Based on these findings, the 
hearing examiner concluded that Iverson's injury had occurred in the April work 
incident, he had failed to timely report it, and this failure prejudiced Frost. 

 

[¶7]           
The 
record shows that on May 18, 1998, Iverson discontinued working, notified his 
employer that he had been injured, and received chiropractic treatment from Dr. 
Grant who testified that he believed that Iverson was suffering from a 
misaligned vertebra.   Iverson 
filed an injury report on May 22, 1998, that stated he had hurt his back at work 
on May 14.  When Dr. Grant's 
manipulations did not relieve his pain, Iverson saw Dr. Gary Shinn on June 1, 
1998.  Dr. Shinn took x-rays and 
diagnosed a herniated disc.  Dr. 
Shinn referred Iverson to Dr. Moseley for a surgical evaluation.  On June 8, 1998, Dr. Moseley documented 
that, after Iverson was rear-ended, he developed burning in his back but 
continued to work and it was only after he twisted his back on May 14, 1998, 
that Iverson developed leg pain. 

 

[¶8]           
Iverson's 
girlfriend testified at the hearing that, after Iverson was struck by the road 
grader, he complained of back and leg pain.  Iverson testified that he did not 
experience leg pain until he twisted his back on May 14.  Considering this testimony to be a 
dispute in the evidence, the hearing examiner determined that Iverson's 
testimony was not credible, determined that the girlfriend's testimony 
established leg pain in April, and concluded that Iverson had not been injured 
in May, but rather in April. 

 

[¶9]           
A 
review of Iverson's girlfriend's complete testimony shows that she did not 
specifically state that the leg pain began in April, was never precise about the 
dates of his complaints, and placed the time of his worsening symptoms at the 
time that she began to take him in for medical treatment.  The medical documents indicate that 
Iverson received no medical treatment until after May 14, 1998.  However, the hearing examiner denied 
benefits, and, after the district court upheld that denial, this appeal 
followed.

 

 

 

[¶10]      "The 
claimant has the burden of proving every essential element of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
Under the statutory definition of injury, he must prove that his injury 
arose out of and in the course of his employment.  Whether an employee's injury occurred in 
the course of his employment is a question of fact."  Kuntz-Dexter v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 101, ¶9, 49 P.3d 190, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citations omitted).

 

[¶11]      The 
substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from 
Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act contested case proceedings when factual 
findings are involved and both parties submit evidence.   Id. at ¶10 (citing 
Newman v. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, 
¶22 (Wyo. 2002).  Because both 
parties presented cases-in-chief, we apply the substantial evidence 
standard.  We afford respect and 
deference to a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence.  
Kuntz-Dezter, ¶10.  
Our task is to examine the entire record to determine whether substantial 
evidence supported the hearing examiner's findings.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his 
decision.  Id. 

 

[¶12]      Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions.  
Id. When only the party with the burden of proof submits evidence 
in the contested case proceeding and that party does not ultimately prevail, the 
arbitrary or capricious standard governs the judicial review of that agency 
decision.  Id.  Even if the factual findings are found 
to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may be 
found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Id.   

 

[¶13]      We 
do not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support the hearing examiner's decision, but we must also examine the 
conflicting evidence to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably 
made its finding and order upon all of the evidence before it.  Id. A hearing examiner's 
conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be affirmed only 
if truly in accord with law.  
Id.; State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 
1159 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶14]      
An 
employee is required to timely notify his employer of an injury and file an 
injury report with the Division.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  A failure to timely report the accident 
or injury as required by statute is a presumption that the claim shall be 
denied.   § 27-14-502(c).  The statutory reporting requirements do 
not begin to run until the employee becomes aware that an accident has caused an 
injury; and the term "injury" as used in the compensation statutes means 
compensable injury.  Rice 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2001 
WY 21, ¶13, 19 P.3d 508, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001); Wesaw 
v. Quality Maintenance, 
2001 WY 17, ¶10, 19 P.3d 500, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); Baldwin 
v. Scullion, 
50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936).  

 

[¶15]      
Our 
law on determining the date of a compensable injury is well-established.  Rice, 
¶13; 
Bemis 
v. Texaco, Inc., 
401 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo. 1965). We have consistently held that when a correct 
diagnosis or prognosis of present or likely future disability is communicated to 
the claimant, the injury is discovered, it is compensable, and the statute of 
limitations begins to run. City 
of Casper v. Haines, 
886 P.2d 585, 589 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Aanenson 
v. State ex rel. Worker's Comp. Div., 
842 P.2d 1077, 1081-83 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing this Court's decisions regarding 
compensable injury)).  "[W]hen 
determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be 
asked:  When would a reasonable 
person, under the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of 
the injury and that the injury was related to his or her employment?"  Aanenson, 
842 P.2d  at 1082.  This question 
necessarily requires a careful evaluation of all facts to determine when an 
employee reasonably understood the nature and seriousness of his condition and 
that it was work-related.  

[¶16]      
Our 
previous decisions have never burdened an employee with filing claims for 
trivial injuries to avoid timeliness issues.  Big 
Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 1972) (citing Potter 
v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 
248 Minn. 380, 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1956)).  
The employee, however, may not ignore these requirements for compensable 
injuries because notice requirements and the statute of limitations exist to 
allow employers to investigate claims, monitor medical care, and avoid stale 
claims.  Sherwin-Williams 
Co. v. Borchert, 
994 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 2000).  The 
finder of fact is charged with determining the time and cause of a compensable 
injury; however, whether an employee's claim is to be barred for failure to 
timely file notice or a claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  Aanenson, 
842 P.2d  at 1080.

 

 

[¶17]      The 
hearing examiner did not believe that Iverson was injured on May 14, 1998, while 
working for the employer.  Iverson 
contends that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence and is 
against the great weight of the evidence.  
The record shows that Iverson testified he injured himself on May 14, 
while chopping asphalt from a belly-dump truck, and he specifically described 
his actions when the injury occurred.  
Frost had a witness testify that it was not possible to clear asphalt 
from a belly-dump truck in that manner.  
A hearing examiner is entitled to reject claimant's testimony about 
events and dates if other evidence indicates that it is not credible.  Kuntz-Dexter, 
¶12.  However, an "inconsistency" 
applies to propositions that cannot both be true, and that term is inappropriate 
to characterize propositions of differing degrees of completeness.  Ikenberry 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 
5 P.3d 799, 803 (Wyo. 2000).  Our 
review of the record shows that the testimony of these two witnesses were 
inconsistent, and the hearing examiner was entitled to reject Iverson's 
version.  

 

[¶18]      The 
hearing examiner decided that Iverson had been injured in a work-related 
accident on April 3, 1998.  We find 
that substantial evidence supports this finding.  The driver of the road grader, Wayne 
Allshousen, testified that he had impacted Iverson's truck from behind and, at 
the time the incident occurred, Iverson had commented to Allshousen that the 
contact had hurt his back.  
Allshousen noted Iverson had continued to work.  The hearing examiner specifically found 
that Allshousen was a credible witness.  
The record shows Iverson testified similarly about the 
incident.

 

[¶19]      Having 
established that a work-related injury occurred, the hearing examiner then 
relied upon Iverson's girlfriend's testimony as to when Iverson began to 
experience leg pain to establish the date of compensability.  The hearing examiner believed that her 
evidence showed that Iverson experienced leg pain in April and contradicted 
Iverson's contention that he did not experience leg pain until he was injured in 
May.  As discussed in the facts, 
however, the girlfriend's testimony did not specify dates nor did she indicate 
that the leg pain happened before Iverson began seeking medical treatment.  She recollected that she took Iverson to 
several doctors for medical treatment when he experienced back and leg 
pain.  The record shows that Iverson 
sought no medical treatment until late May.  Our review of the record shows that the 
testimony of these two witnesses were not inconsistent, only different if not 
viewed completely, and the hearing examiner was not entitled to reject Iverson's 
version.

 

[¶20]      Having 
accepted the hearing examiner's conclusion that Iverson suffered a work-related 
injury on April 3, 1998, we must review the entire record to determine when 
Iverson knew the nature and full extent of his injury.  The parties do not dispute that Iverson 
did not mention that the road grader contact in April hurt his back, or that 
Iverson continued to work all shifts and overtime until May 18, 1998, when he 
called and reported an injury and sought medical treatment.  Legally, Iverson had no obligation to 
report a trivial incident to avoid a timeliness issue.  Rice, 
¶14; Big 
Horn, 
502 P.2d  at 188.  

 

[¶21]      If, 
as the hearing examiner found, Iverson did not injure himself on May 14, the 
evidence remains that by May 18, Iverson claimed that he was beginning to 
experience back and leg pain significant enough to discontinue working.  Iverson immediately sought medical 
treatment and ultimately received a medical diagnosis that he had a herniated 
disc.  Both Iverson and his 
girlfriend testified that he sought medical treatment because of back and leg 
pain.  Although the hearing examiner 
did not find Iverson a credible witness, the girlfriend was specifically found 
to be credible and the record shows that nothing contradicted the testimony on 
this point.  Accordingly, the weight 
of the evidence shows that Iverson injured himself in April, but did not know 
the nature of and the full extent of his injury until May 18, 1998, when he 
notified his employer of injury, discontinued working, and sought medical 
treatment. 

 

[¶22]      We 
hold that the hearing examiner erred in determining the date of compensable 
injury was April 3, 1998, and the claim was untimely filed.  The date of compensable injury is May 
18, 1998, the date it became apparent to Iverson that his injury had resulted in 
compensable disability.  Mitchell 
v. State Recreation Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 40 (Wyo. 1998).  Iverson 
notified his employer of injury on an earlier date and filed his injury report 
on May 22, 1998, based upon his inability to work.  His claim for benefits was not untimely 
filed.

 

[¶23]      The 
order upholding the denial of benefits is reversed, and this case is remanded 
with directions that an order be entered granting the claimant 
benefits.