Title: Fournier v. Flats Industrial, Inc.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 40 
Docket: 
BCD-22-312 
Argued: 
May 10, 2023 
Decided: 
 July 25, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
BRIAN J. FOURNIER 
 
v. 
 
FLATS INDUSTRIAL, INC., et al. 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
 
[¶1]  Brian Fournier, a shareholder of Flats Industrial, Inc., appeals from 
an order entered by the Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) that 
dismissed two of three counts in Fournier’s action against Flats and three other 
Flats shareholders, Beth Fournier, Patrick Fournier, and Douglas Fournier 
(collectively, the Fourniers).  The parties later stipulated to the dismissal of the 
remaining count.  Flats and the Fourniers contend that Fournier’s notice of 
appeal was untimely filed.  We agree and dismiss Fournier’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction without reaching the issues raised in the appeal. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[¶2]  “The following substantive facts are taken from the allegations in 
the [operative] complaint and are viewed as if they were admitted, and the 
 
 
2 
procedural facts are drawn from the record.”  20 Thames St. LLC v. Ocean State 
Job Lot of Me. 2017 LLC, 2021 ME 33, ¶ 2, 252 A.3d 516 (citation omitted). 
[¶3]  Flats is incorporated in Delaware, has its principal place of business 
in Cleveland, Ohio,  and owns a four-mile stretch of railroad in northern Ohio.  
Arthur Fournier was the sole shareholder of Flats until he died testate in 2013.  
When Arthur died, Flats’s stock was conveyed to his family in the following 
manner: his four children, Fournier, Douglas, Patrick, and Catherine (who is not 
a party to this action), each received twelve and a half percent, and Arthur’s 
widow, Beth, received the remaining fifty percent.1  Fournier and the other 
shareholders all reside in Maine.  Flats has several bank accounts in Maine. 
[¶4]  On February 18, 2020, and on other occasions since that date, 
Fournier requested to inspect and copy corporate records to determine the 
status and financial health of Flats and the value of the shares he owns.  
Fournier provided a written demand under oath as required by 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2023).  Flats failed to make the requested 
documents available for inspection and copying. 
[¶5]  On or about July 13, 2020, Fournier made a written demand upon 
Flats to investigate and bring an action against the Fourniers for breach of 
 
1  According to the record, Beth is the sole officer and director of Flats. 
 
 
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fiduciary duty, fraud, and other wrongful acts.  See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1.  Four days 
later, Fournier filed his initial complaint in this action.  It contained two counts: 
(1) a claim in Count 1 against Flats for failing to disclose records in violation of 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(b) and (2) a claim in Count 2 against the Fourniers 
for breaching their fiduciary duty.2  Flats and the Fourniers filed an answer with 
affirmative defenses.  On February 11, 2021, the shareholders of Flats voted not 
to bring claims against the Fourniers.  The Fourniers did not abstain from this 
vote. 
[¶6]  On March 4, 2021, Fournier amended his complaint with the court’s 
permission, see M.R. Civ. P. 15(a), and without objection by the Fourniers.  The 
 
2  Fournier’s initial and amended complaints assert that the Fourniers have breached their 
fiduciary duty to Fournier by 
 
• 
causing Flats “to refuse [or] fail to perform necessary repairs, maintenance[,] and 
improvements to Flats’[s] assets . . . despite receiving directive from federal regulatory 
authorities” to do so; 
 
• 
“improperly attempt[ing] to pressure a customer to pay for [] repairs, maintenance[,] and 
improvements, resulting in the loss of one of Flats’[s] three customers”; 
 
• 
managing and operating Flats in a manner that has devalued the company and wasted its 
assets; 
 
• 
failing to hold director or shareholder meetings and lawful votes; 
 
• 
failing to retain existing customers or identify new customers; and 
 
• 
“caus[ing] Flats to hire Riverside Management Group” to operate and manage Flats—
Riverside does not understand railroads and does not know how to retain existing customers 
or attract new customers, and Riverside has not responded to or followed up on offers from 
third parties to purchase Flats and has prevented Fournier from dealing with those parties. 
 
 
4 
first amended complaint repeated the two counts in the original complaint and 
added a third count asserting a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation 
against the Fourniers.  On April 22, 2021, Fournier filed a second motion to 
amend his complaint.  See M.R. Civ. P. 15(a).  Although the Fourniers opposed 
the motion, the court again granted leave to amend on May 25, 2021.  Fournier’s 
second amended complaint—the operative complaint on appeal—contained 
the same three counts from the first amended complaint, with additional factual 
allegations to support the derivative claim in the third count.  On June 4, 2021, 
Flats and the Fourniers filed a motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of Fournier’s 
second amended complaint, and Fournier opposed the motion.  While the 
motion was pending, Fournier filed a third motion to amend his complaint to 
add a fourth count seeking appointment of a receiver pursuant to Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, § 291 (2023).  Flats and the Fourniers opposed the motion.  On 
August 12, 2021, the court denied Fournier’s third motion to amend. 
[¶7]  On September 20, 2021, the court granted Flats and the Fourniers’ 
motion to dismiss and the order was entered on the docket dismissing Counts 
2 and 3 of Fournier’s second amended complaint.  The court’s dismissal order, 
which is the subject of Fournier’s appeal,3 left Count 1 of Fournier’s second 
 
3  Fournier’s notice of appeal designates the September 20, 2021, dismissal order as the judgment 
appealed from. 
 
 
5 
amended complaint—the claim against Flats based on alleged nondisclosure of 
records—as the only remaining claim for relief in the action. 
[¶8]  About a year later, on September 2, 2022, the parties filed and the 
court docketed a stipulation of dismissal of Count 1 of Fournier’s second 
amended complaint, along with an agreed-upon motion for a protective order.  
The stipulation stated that Fournier and Flats, “pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii), hereby stipulate to the dismissal of Count I of the 
operative Complaint in this matter—which is the sole remaining pending Count 
in this matter—with prejudice, without costs, expenses, fees, attorney’s fees, 
and/or interest, and waiving all rights of appeal.”4  The proposed order filed 
with the motion indicated that the purpose of the requested protective order 
was to preserve the confidentiality of “documents and/or information 
produced pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Parties’ Release and Settlement 
Agreement . . . .”  Four days after the stipulation of dismissal was docketed, the 
court granted the motion for protective order by signing the proposed 
protective order on September 6, 2022.  On September 7, 2022, the protective 
order was entered on the docket.  On September 26, 2022, twenty-four days 
after the stipulation of dismissal of Count 1 was filed and docketed and nineteen 
 
4  The parties agree that the waiver of appeal applied only to the stipulated dismissal of Count 1. 
 
 
6 
days after the court’s protective order was docketed, Fournier filed a notice of 
appeal from the court’s order dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of his second amended 
complaint.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
[¶9]  On October 24, 2022, Flats and the Fourniers moved to dismiss the 
appeal on the ground that Fournier’s notice of appeal was not filed within the 
twenty-one-day limit prescribed by the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1) (“The time within which an appeal may be taken in a civil 
case shall be 21 days after entry into the docket of the judgment or order 
appealed from, unless a shorter time is provided by law.”).  The motion to 
dismiss asserted that the appeal deadline began to run on September 2, 2022, 
when the stipulation of dismissal was filed and docketed.  Fournier’s opposition 
to the motion asserted that the appeal period began to run on 
September 7, 2022, when the court docketed the protective order.  We ordered 
that the motion to dismiss the appeal be considered with the merits of the 
appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶10]  A notice of appeal must be filed within twenty-one days from the 
entry in the docket of a final judgment.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1); Bourke v. City 
of S. Portland, 2002 ME 155, ¶ 3, 806 A.2d 1255.  We require strict compliance 
 
 
7 
with the time limits of M.R. App. P. 2B because it is a prerequisite to our 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.5  Bourke, 2002 ME 155, ¶ 4, 806 A.2d 1255. 
[¶11]  An appealable final judgment is a trial court decision that resolves 
all claims against all parties.  See Kittery Point Partners, LLC v. Bayview Loan 
Servicing, LLC, 2018 ME 35, ¶ 6, 180 A.3d 1091 (“Absent an exception to the 
final judgment rule, a trial court’s decision is not appealable unless it resolves 
all claims against all parties.”); Murphy v. Maddaus, 2002 ME 24, ¶¶ 12-13, 789 
A.2d 1281.  “It is the consummating effect that identifies an appealable final 
judgment.”  Estate of Kerwin, 2020 ME 116, ¶ 8, 239 A.3d 623 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶12]  Flats and the Fourniers contend that Fournier’s notice of appeal 
was untimely filed because the parties’ stipulation dismissing Fournier’s sole 
remaining claim created an appealable final judgment—effective when the 
stipulation was docketed because the court did not need to approve the 
dismissal or enter a final judgment separately. 
[¶13]  We have noted that the filing and docketing of a stipulated 
dismissal of all remaining pending claims in a civil case pursuant to 
 
5  We have emphasized that failure to learn of the entry of judgment does not insulate a party from 
the strict requirements of M.R. App. P. 2B.  Bourke v. City of S. Portland, 2002 ME 155, ¶ 4, 806 A.2d 
1255; see M.R. App. P. 2B(a)(2). 
 
 
8 
M.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) can create an appealable final judgment without any 
action by the court.  See, e.g., Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 
97, 98-99 (Me. 1984); Camplin v. Town of York, 471 A.2d 1035, 1037 n.5 
(Me. 1984); Fortney & Weygandt, Inc. v. Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC, 2019 ME 175, 
¶ 11 n.7, 222 A.3d 613.6 
[¶14]  Fournier argues that his appeal is timely because the stipulation of 
dismissal and the motion for a protective order “were inextricably intertwined 
and, in fact, interdependent,” meaning that the appeal period did not begin to 
run until the court had signed and docketed the proposed protective order.  For 
four reasons, we do not agree. 
[¶15]  The first reason is that the continued pendency of a motion at or 
after the entry of judgment does not necessarily prevent the judgment from 
being final.  See True v. Harmon, 2015 ME 14, ¶ 4 n.1, 110 A.3d 650 (“Although 
the court never explicitly ruled on Harmon’s cross-motion to modify, the court’s 
 
6  Federal courts observe the same principle under the counterpart federal rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), although some have held that a voluntary dismissal of remaining claims generally 
must be with prejudice in order to result in an appealable final judgment.  See United States v. Gila 
Valley Irrigation Dist., 859 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he general rule in this circuit is that 
voluntary dismissals without prejudice do not create appealable, final judgments.” (quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Bechuck v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 814 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2016); Chappelle v. 
Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1996).  The court in Chappelle noted that other 
circuit courts of appeals have not required that a voluntary dismissal be with prejudice in order to 
create an appealable final judgment.  Chappelle, 84 F.3d at 654.  We have not been called on to 
consider the question, nor need we here, because Fournier stipulated to the dismissal of his sole 
remaining pending claim with prejudice. 
 
 
9 
conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction functioned as a final 
judgment on all pending motions.”).  The second reason is that neither the 
stipulation nor the motion mentions the other.  In other words, there is nothing 
in either indicating that the effect of the stipulation was intended to be 
conditioned on the granting of the motion, or that the docketing of the 
stipulation should be deferred until after the motion was granted.  The third 
reason is that motions for protective orders are not among the motions that, if 
timely filed, toll the running of the appeal deadline until they have been acted 
upon.7  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).  The qualifying motions in civil actions are 
those made pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b), M.R. Civ. P. 52(a)-(b), and M.R. Civ. P. 
59.  M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).  Motions for protective orders do not qualify.8  
See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2). 
[¶16]  The fourth reason is that a pending motion that is collateral to the 
judgment—in other words, one that would not affect the judgment regardless 
of how the motion is decided—does not prevent a judgment that resolves all 
 
7  Parties may also file a motion with the court to enlarge the time for appeal if good cause is shown.  
M.R. App. P. 2B(d).  Additionally, “if an appeal is timely filed after entry of judgment, but prior to filing 
a post-judgment motion or during consideration of the post-judgment motion, the appeal is valid to 
preserve (1) any issues arising prior to judgment . . . and (2) any issues arising in the course of 
consideration of the post-judgment motions.”  Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 2B.4 at 57 
(6th ed. 2022). 
 
8  Whether the court had jurisdiction to enter the protective order is not before us. 
 
 
10 
claims as to all parties from being final.  See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 
565-66 (10th Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Cooper v. Salomon Brothers Inc., 1 F.3d 82, 
84-86 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that a motion for Rule 11 sanctions on an 
attorney was collateral to the final judgment in the case and that the court could 
exercise jurisdiction over the final decisions in the case); Battryn v. Indian Oil 
Co., 472 A.2d 937, 938 n.1 (Me. 1984) (holding that finality was achieved when 
all other claims, except an outstanding unqualified order against attorney to 
pay a sum of money to defendant’s counsel, were disposed of by the court).  Our 
civil rules reflect that principle in providing that a pending request for attorney 
fees does not affect the finality of a judgment unless the request is “integral” to 
the relief sought in the case.  See M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1)-(2).  Because the parties’ 
motion for a protective order did not affect the judgment on any claim in the 
case, it was collateral to the judgment. 
[¶17]  Accordingly, we are required to conclude that the continued 
pendency of the motion did not prevent the docketing of the stipulation of 
dismissal from creating an appealable final judgment.  Because Fournier’s 
appeal was filed after the deadline for appeal had expired, we do not have 
jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. 
 
 
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The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brendan P. Rielly, Esq. (orally), Jensen Baird, Portland, for appellant Brian J. 
Fournier 
 
Brett R. Leland, Esq. (orally), Verrill Dana LLP, Portland, for appellees Flats 
Industrial, Inc., Beth Fournier, Douglas Fournier, and Patrick Fournier 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CV-2020-32 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY