Title: KEVIN TAYLOR V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., WYOMING WORKERS SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEVIN TAYLOR V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2010 WY 76Case Number: S-09-0170Decided: 06/09/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

KEVIN 
TAYLOR,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex. 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Kevin Taylor 
appeals the district court's order affirming the Medical Commission's (the 
Commission) determination that he failed to meet his burden of proving his 2007 
chiropractic treatment was related to a 1991 work related injury.  Mr. Taylor maintains that the Commission 
was collaterally estopped from considering evidence of a pre-existing condition 
that could have been presented by the State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) in a 1998 contested workers' compensation 
case.  We affirm, concluding that 
the Commission was not collaterally estopped from considering such evidence and, 
in any event, its decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial 
evidence even if the disputed evidence is ignored.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Taylor 
presents a single issue on appeal, which he phrases as a 
statement:

 
 
The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not in accordance with the law due 
to reliance on evidence which is barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel.

 
 
The 
Division phrases the issue differently:

 
 
When 
an administrative hearing in 1998 result[ed] in an award of benefits for [Mr.] 
Taylor's chiropractic care in 1998, does the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
prevent the Division from considering his current claims for additional 
chiropractic care?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      Mr. Taylor was 
injured in 1991 when he was emptying water buckets while working as a 
housekeeper for Hillhaven Nursing Home1 in Rock Springs.  He reported that he had injured his left 
shoulder and upper back.  The 
Division concluded that injury was compensable and allowed payment of his 
medical claims, including chiropractic care. 

 
 
[¶4]      The Division 
continued to pay for Mr. Taylor's chiropractic treatments until 1998, when it 
denied some claims on the grounds that the treatment was not related to his 1991 
work injury.  The Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) held a contested case hearing and concluded that 
his chiropractic treatment was related to the 1991 injury and "until further 
medical evidence would warrant a change, [Mr. Taylor] is entitled to receive 
medical benefits for continuing chiropractic care received twice per 
month."     

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Taylor 
continued to receive chiropractic treatment until 2007, when the Division again 
denied payment on the basis that the 1991 injury had been resolved and any 
further treatment would be due to a preexisting medical condition and/or natural 
aging.  Mr. Taylor objected to the 
Division's final determination and the matter was referred to the Commission for 
a contested case hearing.  After a 
hearing, the Commission hearing panel concluded that Mr. Taylor had not 
satisfied his burden of proving his chiropractic treatment in 2007 was related 
to the 1991 work injury.     

 
 
[¶6]      The Commission's 
decision was based upon Mr. Taylor's lengthy and complicated medical history 
involving numerous accidents, both before and after the 1991 work accident.  Prior to his work-related accident, Mr. 
Taylor injured his neck and left shoulder in a motor vehicle accident in 1987 
and received chiropractic treatment and surgery on his left shoulder.  As part of litigation resulting from 
that accident, a physician authored a letter in 1988 which 
stated:

 
 
[Mr. 
Taylor] has received . . . a whiplash injury of his cervical spine with 
concomittant [sic] tension headaches, and a sprain/strain syndrome of his 
thoracic and lumbar spine.  I think 
that this whiplash injury and the sprain/strain are not of a permanent nature 
and they will eventually improve.  
However, I feel that the injury to his shoulder is of a permanent nature 
and the prognosis of that is unknown at this time.  

 

[¶7]      After the 
contested case hearing in 1998, Mr. Taylor was involved in a number of 
accidents, including a serious automobile accident in July 1999.  According to the record, Mr. Taylor 
reported a whiplash injury and complained of back pain in 2000.  A series of tests showed significant 
problems in his cervical spine.  On 
August 15, 2000, neurosurgeon John H. Schneider, M.D. performed an anterior 
cervical diskectomy and fusion with plating at the C5-6 level.  After the surgery, Mr. Taylor 
experienced additional neurological problems and eventually had a second fusion 
of the cervical spine at the C6-7 level.     

 
 
[¶8]      As part of the 
litigation arising from the 1999 car accident, Kyle Norris, M.D. stated in 2002 
that he believed Mr. Taylor's chiropractic treatment "would continue to be 
related to his original Workers' Compensation injury."  Mr. Taylor's neurosurgeon, Dr. 
Schneider, also opined:

 
 
            
With regard to Mr. Taylor's neck post-motor vehicle accident, the 
structural anomalies threatening the nervous system have now been alleviated [by 
the surgeries]; however, he has had continued myofascial neck discomfort that 
will likely be permanent and require rehabilitation modalities, such as an 
occasional physical therapy or chiropractic manipulation.

 
 
The 
litigation was settled and his medical bills were paid from the proceeds.    

 
 
[¶9]      During the years 
after his work related injury, Mr. Taylor continued to receive treatments by a 
number of chiropractors paid by the Division.  Michael Davidson, D.C. was providing 
treatment when the Division denied further payments in 2007.  Dr. Davidson testified for Mr. Taylor at 
the contested case hearing, opining that his treatment was related to the 
original 1991 work injury.  The 
Commission ruled that Dr. Davidson was not credible because he had a poor 
working knowledge of the mechanism of the 1991 injury and "an extremely poor 
understanding of the prior care and treatment that Mr. Taylor had received in 
the interim years between 1991 and 2006."    

 
 
[¶10]   The Commission also considered the 
report of an independent medical evaluation performed by Gerald R. Moress, 
M.D.  Dr. Moress concluded that the 
2007 chiropractic treatment was not related to the 1991 injury.  The Commission found his opinion "to be 
credible and consistent with the evidence provided in this matter."  The Commission's final finding of fact 
states:

 
 
This 
Panel finds that the chiropractic care and treatment 17 years after the 
purported work injury, has not been proven to be directly and causally related 
to the original work injury of [March] 25, 1991.  Numerous intervening causes have 
provided substantial problems to Mr. Taylor for which he has received a wide 
variety of care and treatment.

 
 
Accordingly, 
the Commission upheld the Division's denial of his claims.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Taylor filed a petition for 
review of the agency order, and the district court affirmed.  He appealed to this Court.      

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal from a district court's 
review of an administrative agency's decision, we give no deference to the 
district court's decision.  We 
review the case as if it had come directly to us from the administrative agency. 
 Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 (Wyo. 2010); 
Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 
557 (Wyo. 2008). Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009), which provides:

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Taylor claims the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel barred the Commission from considering evidence of matters 
which occurred prior to his 1998 contested case hearing.  This issue presents a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  Boe v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2009 WY 115, ¶ 7, 216 P.3d 494, 496 (Wyo. 2009).  To the extent that the issue is 
presented, we review the Commission's conclusion that Mr. Taylor did not meet 
his burden of proving that his 2007 chiropractic care was related to his 1991 
work related injury by applying the substantial evidence standard.  Dutcher, ¶ 10, 223 P.3d  at 
561.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶14]   
Mr. Taylor asserts that the Commission committed an error of law when 
it considered any evidence that was, or could have been, presented at the 1998 
contested case hearing.  In 
particular, he challenges the Commission's reliance on evidence of his 
preexisting injury incurred in the 1987 motor vehicle accident to deny his 
claims for chiropractic care.  Mr. 
Taylor maintains that collateral estoppel bars consideration of such evidence. 

 
 
[¶15]   The preclusion doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata apply in the administrative context, 
although we have stated that the issue preclusion associated with collateral 
estoppel is more appropriate in the administrative setting than the claim 
preclusion doctrine of res judicata.  
Jacobs v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2009 WY 118, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Wyo. 
2009); Slavens v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685-86 (Wyo. 1993).  The factors considered in determining 
whether collateral estoppel applies are:

 
 
(1) 
whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with 
the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication 
resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel 
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.

 
 

Wilkinson 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers Safety and Comp. Div., 
991 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo.1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting Slavens, 
854 P.2d at 686).

                        

Jacobs, 
¶ 
12, 216 P.3d  at 1132.  See also, Hemme v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Comp. Div., 914 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 1996) (ruling made in previous agency order 
could not be challenged in a subsequent case because the first order was not 
appealed); Hall v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Comp. Div., 2001 WY 136, ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 373, 377 (Wyo. 2001) 
(holding collateral estoppel applies to workers' compensation claims that have 
been adjudicated before the OAH).  

 
 
[¶16]   The first step in the collateral 
estoppel analysis requires us to determine whether the issues presented in each 
action were identical.  The record 
contains only a limited amount of information concerning the 1998 contested case 
proceeding.  The notice of referral 
for hearing on January 16, 1998, stated the issue as:  "[c]urrent treatment is not related to 
the original left shoulder and thoracic spine injury on March 25, 1991."  The findings of fact in the 1998 order 
awarding benefits, included:

 
 

-          
Mr. 
Taylor was injured while lifting a mop bucket at work in 1991. 

-          
The 
original injury was diagnosed as combined muscular and ligament strain with mild 
nerve injury, brachioplexus.2 

-          
Mr. 
Taylor received medical benefits for that injury for several years, including 
twice monthly chiropractic treatments.

-          
 A 1993 independent medical examination by 
Dr. Paulos gave a different diagnosis and indicated that "the lifting injury 
incurred by the Claimant was probably an exacerbation of an original 
injury."  

-          
Testimony 
by Mr. Taylor's treating chiropractor indicated that his treatment was 
consistent with Mr. Taylor's original "neck and upper back 
injury."

 
 
The 
OAH order concluded:

 
 
[I]t 
is more likely than not that the twice monthly chiropractic treatments being 
received by the Claimant are reasonably medically necessary and that they are 
related to the original injury.

 
 
It 
may be that the [Division's] final determination could be upheld by this Office 
upon receipt of further medical evidence.  
In any event the Office concludes that until further medical evidence 
would warrant a change, the Claimant is entitled to receive medical benefits for 
continuing chiropractic care received twice per month. 

 
 
[¶17]   It is not clear whether the OAH 
considered the effect of Mr. Taylor's pre-existing shoulder and neck injury 
incurred in the 1987 accident on his 1991 work related injury at the 
hearing.  There is, of course, a 
general rule that "[c]laim preclusion principles of res judicata bar the 
relitigation of issues that were or could have been raised in the first 
action."  Cermak v. Great West Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Wyo. 2000).  However, 
our statutes and case law indicate that application of the general principle is 
limited in the workers' compensation context.  

 
 
[¶18]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-606 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
            
Each determination or award within the meaning of this act is an 
administrative determination of the rights of the employer, the employee and the 
disposition of money within the worker's compensation account as to all matters 
involved. No determination shall be final without notice and opportunity for 
hearing as required by this act.

 

Thus, 
the Wyoming legislature has made it very clear that workers' compensation claims 
can, and should, be separately decided.  

 
 
[¶19]   
Jacobs demonstrates the precision with which the issues are 
scrutinized for collateral estoppel effect in the workers' compensation 
context.  In that case, although 
there were earlier contested case proceedings which discussed the claimant's 
abdominal pain, this Court held that collateral estoppel did not bar 
consideration of the compensability of treatment for that pain.  We stated that the issue had not been 
fully litigated in the earlier proceedings nor had a final decision been made on 
that issue.  This Court did not hold 
that, because the Division could have raised the issue in an earlier proceeding, 
it was prohibited from later contesting that aspect of the claimant's care.  Jacobs, ¶ 13-15, 216 P.3d  at 
1132-33.   

 
 
[¶20]   The issue determined in 1998 was 
whether Mr. Taylor's chiropractic treatment, at that time, was related to the 
1991 work injury.  The Division is 
certainly prohibited from re-litigating that issue.  The Commission did not re-analyze the 
propriety of the 1998 contested case ruling in its decision in this case; it 
determined whether Mr. Taylor's treatment in 2007 was related to the 1991 work 
injury.  That issue was not 
identical to the issue considered at the 1998 hearing.  We, therefore, conclude that collateral 
estoppel did not bar the Commission from considering any of the evidence 
presented at the hearing.           

 
 
[¶21]   It is also worth noting that the 
Commission did not rely solely, or even primarily, upon evidence concerning the 
injuries Mr. Taylor suffered in the 1987 motor vehicle accident. A good summary 
of the Commission's rationale is found near the end of its 
order:

 
 
            
The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division paid for many years 
of chiropractic care and treatment for Mr. Taylor's work injury of March 25, 
1991, and the OAH found that the original injury continued to be compensable for 
purposes of continued chiropractic treatment in 1998.  However, a review of the current care 
and treatment, in light of numerous intervening motor vehicle accidents, and two 
non-work related cervical fusions, does not establish that current care and 
treatment has been proven to be related to the original work injury.  Mr. Taylor has not provided credible 
evidence to establish that connection.  
Current chiropractic care and treatment has not been proven to be related 
to the work injury 17 years previous, and is therefore 
non-compensable.

    

[¶22]   Even if all of the evidence of 
events occurring prior to the 1998 hearing is disregarded, there was substantial 
evidence to justify the denial.  As 
the above-quoted conclusion indicates, the records show that the intervening 
accidents affected the same areas of the body as were being treated by Dr. 
Davidson.  Although the record 
contains physician statements which relate chiropractic care to the original 
injury, such as Dr. Norris's letter of 2002, they pertain to treatment prior to 
2007.    

 
 
[¶23]   Dr. Davidson was the only medical 
provider who provided evidence relating Mr. Taylor's 2007 chiropractic treatment 
to his original injury.  The 
Commission rejected Dr. Davidson's opinion because he had an insufficient 
understanding of the original injury and the intervening events.  Moreover, in direct contradiction of Dr. 
Davidson's testimony that he only treated the areas of the original injury, Mr. 
Taylor testified that Dr. Davidson actually treated his whole spine, both 
shoulders and his hips.  Mr. Taylor 
does not contest any of the Commission's findings of fact about the intervening 
injuries and Dr. Davidson's credibility.  
Those aspects of the Commission's decision, without reference to Mr. 
Taylor's preexisting condition, are sufficient to uphold its 
decision.

 
 
[¶24]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Taylor's employer is variously referred to in the record as 
Hillhaven, Sage View Care Center and Kindred Nursing Centers West, LLC. 

 
 

2Injuries to the brachio plexus affect the nerves supplying the shoulder, 
upper arm, forearm and hand, causing numbness, tingling, pain, weakness, limited 
movement, or even paralysis of the upper limb.    Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1400-01 
(27th 
ed. 2002).