Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Davie

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Davie, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4328.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4328 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. DAVIE ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Davie,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4328.] 
Unauthorized practice of law—Paralegals—Preparing pleadings and other 
documents on behalf of other persons—Appearing on  behalf of another at 
parole hearing—Receiving financial compensation for services—Respondents 
enjoined from further acts constituting unauthorized practice of law—Civil 
penalty imposed.  
(No. 2011-1681—Submitted January 18, 2012—Decided September 27, 2012.) 
ON FINAL REPORT by the Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law of the 
Supreme Court, No. UPL 09-07. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} On December 23, 2009, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, filed a three-count complaint with the Board on the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law against the respondents, Michael D. Davie and his company, 
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Alpha Legal Services, Inc. (“ALS”).1  The complaint alleged that Davie, a 
paralegal who is not licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio, prepared 
pleadings and other legal documents for three persons in separate cases, appeared 
at an Ohio Parole Board Hearing on behalf of another, and twice received 
financial compensation for his services. 
{¶ 2} After conducting a hearing, the panel submitted a report to the 
board finding that while doing business as ALS, Davie engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law as alleged in the first two counts.  But citing the 
insufficiency of the evidence, the panel voted to dismiss Count Three of relator’s 
complaint.  The panel recommended that we enjoin the illegal acts of respondents, 
impose a civil penalty of $2,000 for each of the two violations, require 
respondents to refund all fees received in connection with these matters, and 
further require Davie to notify the Cleveland Municipal Court in writing that the 
judgments he obtained against the affected clients have been satisfied. 
{¶ 3} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but citing numerous aggravating factors, modified the sanction to 
recommend that we impose the maximum civil penalty of $10,000 for each of the 
respondents’ offenses. 
{¶ 4} Relator objects to the recommendation that Count Three be 
dismissed and asks us to find that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law with respect to that count.  Despite having stipulated to an extension of 
time to file a response to the objections, neither Davie nor ALS has responded.  
Relator argues that despite Davie’s admission at the parole board hearing that he 
was not an attorney, the memorandum he submitted prior to that hearing was 
designed to give the impression that he was an attorney representing the inmate 
                                                 
1 The corporation is registered with the secretary of state as “Alpha Legal Services, Inc.,” but 
Davie’s correspondence and other documents consistently refer to it as Alpha Legal Service.  We 
will use the official name registered with the state. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
seeking parole.  Therefore, relator contends that we should find that Davie and 
ALS engaged in the unauthorized practice of law with respect to Count Three. 
{¶ 5} We adopt the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction with respect to Counts One and Two of relator’s 
complaint, with the exception that we do not order restitution.  And for the 
reasons that follow, we sustain relator’s objections and find that respondents 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as alleged in Count Three.  Therefore, 
in addition to the sanction recommended by the board, we impose a $10,000 civil 
penalty for that conduct. 
Davie and ALS 
{¶ 6} In 1992, Davie began serving a 33- to 75-year sentence following 
his convictions for an array of offenses, including attempted murder, aggravated 
burglary, and aggravated robbery.  While in prison, he took paralegal 
correspondence courses from Blackstone School of Law.  In 2006, after serving 
14 years of his sentence, Davie received parole.  At all times relevant to this 
matter, he was registered with the Ohio State Bar Association as a paralegal with 
the registration number 101919. 
{¶ 7} ALS is an Ohio corporation formed, owned, operated, and 
controlled by Davie for the purpose of “provid[ing] legal consulting and ancillary 
services to Attorneys, Organizations, pro se and indigent litigants.”  Following his 
release from prison, respondent Davie began doing business as ALS in Shaker 
Heights, Ohio.  Respondents Davie and ALS are not, nor have they ever been, 
attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Ohio pursuant to Gov.Bar R. I, 
registered pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI, or certified pursuant to Gov.Bar R. II, IX, 
or XI.  Nor are they admitted to the practice of law in any other state. 
The Brown/Stephens Matter 
{¶ 8} On March 1, 2008, Tiona Brown executed a written contract with 
respondents in which she agreed to pay $1,500 for services, including “interviews, 
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legal research & preparation of pretrial motion to suppress” for her incarcerated 
boyfriend, DeCharles Stephens.  The records produced by Davie show that on 
June 2, 2008, Brown paid him $100. 
{¶ 9} Davie visited Stephens in jail to discuss his criminal case, advised 
him about his plea, and performed legal research for a motion to suppress 
evidence that he filed on Stephens’s behalf.  Although Stephens was represented 
by a public defender, Davie claimed that his own work was supervised by another 
attorney, Sebraien Haygood.  And although Davie admitted that he had contracted 
to draft a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, he testified that it was Haygood 
who had actually prepared that motion. 
{¶ 10} Davie admitted that Haygood was not present during his initial 
meeting with Brown, did not accompany him to visit Stephens in jail, and, to 
Davie’s knowledge, never had any communications with Brown.  Haygood’s 
name does not appear in Davie’s contract with Brown or in any other document 
that Davie has provided to relator.  Davie claimed that the relevant documentation 
was lost when ALS was evicted from its office.  But the testimony of Davie’s 
father-in-law, Bishop David Lee Owens, placed the eviction in 2007—the year 
before respondents undertook the Brown/Stephens representation.  Although 
Owens shared office space with respondents at all times relevant herein, he 
testified that he had not heard Haygood’s name prior to the panel hearing and had 
never met him or seen him in the office.  Haygood died on June 26, 2008, and 
therefore was unavailable to either confirm or deny claims that he supervised 
Davie’s paralegal work. 
{¶ 11} When Brown refused to pay for his services, Davie filed a breach-
of-contract action in the Cleveland Municipal Court.  He averred in his complaint 
that he had “worked to bring forth favorable results in the criminal matter of 
Charles [sic, DeCharles] Stephens,” but did not mention Haygood.  Davie 
obtained a $1,400 judgment against Brown. 
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The Singleton Matter 
{¶ 12} In April 2008, Katina and Anthony Singleton contracted with 
respondents for legal assistance in a custody dispute involving their son, who 
resided in Michigan.  Their written agreement provided that ALS would assist in 
the preparation of an answer to a motion for full custody and a motion for 
continuance in exchange for $3,500.  Although the agreement stated that the work 
would be performed under the direction of a licensed legal professional, it did not 
identify Haygood or any other attorney, and further provided that the agreement 
was “not in any way conditioned upon an attorney agreeing to have [ALS’s] 
assistance.” 
{¶ 13} Davie filed “Defendant’s Answer and Motion for MCR 
2.116(C)(8) Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Motion for Full Legal and Physical Custody” 
and a motion for continuance, both signed by Katina Singleton, in a Michigan 
court.  He testified that he did the research for the documents, but that Attorney 
Haygood prepared the documents and their attachments.  Haygood’s name, 
however, does not appear on any of the documents. 
{¶ 14} The Singletons paid Davie $500, but when they failed to pay a 
$3,000 invoice for his services, Davie filed suit against them.  In his complaint, 
Davie stated that “Plaintiff rendered Defendant the requested services and worked 
to bring forth favorable results in the custody matter of Prude v. Singleton 98-
836323-DM, State of Michigan, Third Judicial Circuit, Wayne County.”  Davie 
did not mention Attorney Haygood in his complaint, either as his supervisor or a 
third-party beneficiary of the collection litigation, and testified that the action was 
for his own benefit alone.  Furthermore, Davie averred, “Defendants represented 
that they could not meet the expense that an attorney would charge but could meet 
Plaintiff’s billing costs at a reduced rate of $125.00 per hour having totaled 20 
hours including other out of pocket expenses.” 
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{¶ 15} The magistrate presiding over the collection action issued, and the 
court adopted, a decision finding that Davie was practicing law without a license 
and granting a judgment in favor of Katina Singleton.2  After Davie objected on 
the ground that the issue of the unauthorized practice of law was not properly 
before the court, the court vacated the judgment, and Davie later obtained a 
$3,000 judgment against Katina Singleton. 
{¶ 16} The panel and board found that Davie had presented conflicting 
explanations regarding the identity of the attorneys allegedly supervising his 
work.  In his objections to the magistrate’s decision, Davie stated, “In the present 
case, Plaintiff’s [sic] was supervised in the Defendant’s administrative-custody 
matter by Donald R. Murphy, Esq.”  At his deposition, however, he claimed that 
this was a “typo” and that it was Attorney Haygood who had supervised his work.  
And in his objections to the magistrate’s decision, Davie stated that he assists pro 
se parties, which directly contradicts his testimony that he works under the 
supervision of various attorneys.  The panel and board, however, found that there 
was no credible evidence that Attorney Haygood had supervised Davie in either 
the Brown or the Singleton matters and ultimately concluded that “Davie took 
advantage of the untimely death of Attorney Sebraien M. Haygood and fabricated 
testimony in an attempt to establish that Mr. Haygood was supervising him in the 
Brown and Singleton matters.” 
Respondents’ Unauthorized Practice of Law 
With Respect to the Stephens/Brown and Singleton Matters 
{¶ 17} The panel and board found that respondents had not been 
supervised by an attorney and that no attorney had delegated the tasks performed 
by respondents in the Stephens/Brown or Singleton matters.  Therefore, they 
found that respondents had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by (1) 
                                                 
2 The court had previously dismissed the complaint as to Anthony Singleton.   
January Term, 2012 
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entering into contracts to perform legal services on behalf of Stephens and 
Singleton, (2) researching and preparing a motion to suppress evidence in 
Stephens’s criminal case, (3) consulting with Stephens regarding the course of 
legal action to be taken in his criminal case and the plea he should enter, (4) 
preparing and filing two documents in Singleton’s custody matter—a 
memorandum seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s motion for full legal and physical 
custody and a motion for continuance—that Singleton signed and submitted to the 
court pro se. 
{¶ 18} The Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(1)(g) gives this 
court original jurisdiction over all matters relating to the practice of law, including 
the unauthorized practice of law.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Martin, 118 Ohio St.3d 
119, 2008-Ohio-1809, 886 N.E.2d 827, ¶ 31.  Pursuant to this authority, we have 
defined the unauthorized practice of law as “the rendering of legal services for 
another by any person not admitted to practice in Ohio.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Pearlman, 106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005-Ohio-4107, 832 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 19} The rendering of legal services includes more than the handling of 
cases in court.  We have held that it encompasses “preparing and filing legal 
pleadings and other papers, appearing in court cases, and managing actions and 
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges, whether before courts or 
administrative agencies.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Coats, 98 Ohio St.3d 413, 2003-
Ohio-1496, 786 N.E.2d 449, ¶ 3, citing Richland Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clapp, 84 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 278, 703 N.E.2d 771 (1998); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Estep, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 172, 173, 657 N.E.2d 499 (1995).  Accord Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Picklo, 96 
Ohio St.3d 195, 2002-Ohio-3995, 772 N.E.2d 1187, at ¶ 5.  In other words, it 
includes “all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected 
with the law.”  Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 
N.E. 650 (1934), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 20} Although laypersons may assist lawyers in preparing legal 
documents to be filed in court and managing pending client matters, their 
activities must be carefully supervised and approved by a licensed practitioner.  
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Thomas, 109 Ohio St.3d 89, 2006-Ohio-1930, 846 N.E.2d 
31, ¶ 14.  In Thomas, we held that a paralegal’s conduct in drafting pleadings and 
other legal documents for litigants and providing them with legal advice without a 
licensed attorney’s supervision constituted the unauthorized practice of law.  We 
have also recognized that a paralegal who advises and represents a claimant in a 
personal-injury matter without the supervision of an attorney has engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Purnell, 94 Ohio St.3d 126, 
760 N.E.2d 817 (2002). 
{¶ 21} Here, Davie claims to have been supervised by Attorney Haygood, 
but it was Davie who made the initial contact with persons seeking legal advice 
and who entered into contracts to provide legal services on their behalf.  Attorney 
Haygood was not present at those meetings, was not identified in the contracts 
used by Davie and ALS, let alone as the attorney supervising Davie’s work, and 
does not appear to have had any contact with the clients.  Moreover, the invoice 
Davie submitted in the Brown/Stephens matter, demanding payment of $1,400 for 
services rendered, did not identify the services provided or who provided them, 
and Davie admitted that neither he nor Brown had paid Haygood to draft the 
motion to suppress.  These facts, combined with Davie’s testimony that the late 
Attorney Haygood supervised his work in just two cases—the only two in which 
he claimed attorney supervision—are simply not credible.  In the absence of any 
documentary evidence to support these claims, we find that respondents 
contracted for and provided legal services in the Brown/Stephens and Singleton 
matters without any attorney supervision.  Thus, they engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the panel and board with respect to Counts One and Two of relator’s 
complaint. 
Count Three:  The Jones Matter 
{¶ 23} In Count Three of the complaint, relator alleged that Davie and 
ALS engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by (1) preparing and filing a 
memorandum of support of inmate Cleophus Jones in his bid for release on parole 
that contained legal and persuasive arguments and intentionally gave the false 
impression that Davie was an attorney and (2) appearing at Jones’s parole hearing 
on Jones’s behalf. 
{¶ 24} Based upon the panel’s findings that Davie (1) did not refer to 
himself as an attorney or use the designations Esq., Atty., or J.D. in his 
memorandum, (2) did not attempt to portray himself as an attorney at the parole 
hearing, (3) disclosed early in the hearing that he was not an attorney, and (4) was 
authorized to represent Jones pursuant to R.C. 5149.101(B)(6), the panel 
determined that relator failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
respondents had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in the Jones matter. 
Therefore, the panel unanimously concluded that Count Three of relator’s 
complaint should be dismissed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law with respect to this count. 
The Panel Did not Dismiss Count Three of Relator’s Complaint 
{¶ 25} The panel unanimously voted to dismiss Count Three of relator’s 
complaint and purports to have dismissed that count by stating, “The Panel hereby 
dismisses the third count of the Complaint pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VII(7)(C).”  
Gov.Bar. R. VII(7)(C) provides for unanimous dismissal by the panel of a charge 
of unauthorized practice of law based on the insufficiency of the evidence, but 
requires the panel chair to “give written notice of the action taken to the board, the 
respondent, the relator, all counsel of record, Disciplinary Counsel, the 
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unauthorized practice of law committee of the Ohio State Bar Association, and 
the bar association serving the county or counties from which the complaint 
emanated.”  Gov.Bar R. VII(7)(F) requires the same notice when the board 
dismisses a charge.  The record in this case, however, does not establish that 
either the panel or the board provided the notices required by Gov.Bar R. 
VII(7)(C) and (F).  Therefore, we conclude that neither the panel nor the board 
has effectuated dismissal of this count.  See, e.g.,  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 33 (holding 
that the board did not effectuate dismissal of a count in an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding because the record did not demonstrate that it had given written notice 
of the dismissal to certain persons and entities as required by Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(K)). 
Relator’s Objections to the Recommendation of Dismissal 
{¶ 26} Relator raises two objections to the board’s recommendation that 
Count Three of its complaint be dismissed.  First, relator disputes the board’s 
finding that Davie did not intend to portray himself as an attorney by any of his 
actions in the Jones case.  Relator argues that Davie’s memorandum to the parole 
board evinces a purpose to induce the reader to believe that it was prepared by an 
attorney.  Relator argues that viewed in its entirety, the memorandum shows that 
it was crafted to give the impression that Davie and ALS were part of the legal 
profession.  Thus, they engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  Second, 
relator argues that R.C. 5149.101(B)(6) and ODRC Policy No. 105-PBD-06 
cannot authorize nonlawyers to engage in the practice of law.  Respondents have 
neither objected to the board’s report nor responded to relator’s objections. 
{¶ 27} Gov.Bar R. VII(7)(E) requires proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence that respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
{¶ 28} R.C. 4705.07(A) provides:  
 
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No person who is not licensed to practice law in this state 
shall do any of the following:   
(1) Hold that person out in any manner as an attorney at 
law;  
(2) Represent that person orally or in writing, directly or 
indirectly, as being authorized to practice law;  
(3) Commit any act that is prohibited by the supreme court 
as being the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
{¶ 29} R.C. 4705.07(B)(1) further states:  
 
The use of “lawyer,” “attorney at law,” “counselor at law,” 
“law,” “law office,” or other equivalent words by any person who 
is not licensed to practice law, in connection with that person’s 
own name, or any sign, advertisement, card, letterhead, circular, or 
other writing, document, or design, the evident purpose of which is 
to induce others to believe that person to be an attorney, constitutes 
holding out within the meaning of division (A)(1) of this section. 
 
{¶ 30} And Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A)(4) defines the unauthorized practice of 
law as including “[h]olding out to the public or otherwise representing oneself as 
authorized to practice law in Ohio by a person not authorized to practice law by 
the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar or Prof.Cond.R. 5.5.”  
The rule defines “holding out” as including conduct prohibited by R.C. 
4705.07(A)(1), (A)(2), and (B)(1), quoted above. 
{¶ 31} Relator argues that like intent of the parties to a contract, the 
evident purpose of Davie’s parole board memorandum should be determined from 
the four corners of the document, and that the evident purpose is a matter of law 
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which this court should review de novo.  By way of analogy, relator cites In re All 
Kelley & Ferraro Asbestos Cases, 104 Ohio St.3d 605, 2004-Ohio-7104, 821 
N.E.2d 159, ¶ 28 (“the construction of a written contract is a question of law, 
which we review de novo”).  But Davie’s memorandum is not a contract, and this 
is not an appeal. 
{¶ 32} In cases involving the regulation of the practice of law, we have 
stated:   
 
[I]t is true that we ordinarily accept the panel’s and board’s 
conclusions as to the propriety of an attorney’s conduct or the 
appropriate sanction, and to that extent, our decisions reflect 
deference to their expertise.  But as the ultimate arbiter of 
misconduct and sanctions in disciplinary cases, this court is not 
bound by factual and legal conclusions drawn by either the panel 
or the board.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Powers, 119 Ohio St.3d 
473, 2008-Ohio-4785, 895 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 21. Accord Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Furth (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 173, 181, 754 N.E.2d 219; 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 330, 708 
N.E.2d 193. Thus, we need not defer to either’s conclusions and 
remain free to exercise our independent judgment as to evidentiary 
weight and applicable law. 
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009-Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 
798, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 33} These precepts are equally true in the context of cases involving 
the unauthorized practice of law.  Therefore, in unauthorized-practice cases, we 
conduct an independent review of the alleged misconduct, the evidence adduced 
at the panel hearing, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
recommendations of the panel and board, and determine whether the respondent’s 
conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law.  See Gov.Bar R. 
VII(19)(D)(1) (providing that the supreme court “shall enter an order as it finds 
proper”).  While we give some deference to the panel’s findings of fact, based 
upon its firsthand observation of the witnesses, we will disregard the panel’s 
findings when the record weighs heavily against them.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Cleary, 93 Ohio St.3d 191, 198, 754 N.E.2d 235 (2001), citing Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 218, 729 N.E.2d 1167 (2000); 
Findlay/Hancock Cty. Bar Assn. v. Filkins, 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 734 N.E.2d 764 
(2000). 
{¶ 34} The panel found that Jones and Davie met while they were in 
prison and that both men participated in a paralegal correspondence course while 
incarcerated.  Davie testified that after he was released, Jones asked him for 
assistance in “typing” a document for his parole hearing. Davie stated that Jones 
sent him a handwritten letter3 with the information to be included in the document 
and that he typed the document, entitled “Memorandum in Support of Inmate 
Cleophus Jones No. A159-388 Consideration for Parole Release,” without any 
attorney supervision. 
{¶ 35} The memorandum, dated November 9, 2008, was printed on the 
letterhead of “Alpha Legal Service, Inc., Professional Legal Consulting,” that 
bore an image of the scales of justice.  Davie signed the document and included 
the following information in the signature block:  “Alpha Legal Service, Inc., 
11900 Shaker Blvd., Suite 102, Cleveland, OH 44120, Michael Davie 
(Bar#101919), On Behalf of Cleophus Jones, Inmate Number A159-388.” 
{¶ 36} The panel acknowledged that Davie’s memorandum was 
misleading and caused some of the participants to “mistakenly assume” that 
                                                 
3 He claimed, however, that he lost the handwritten correspondence from Jones following his 
eviction from his office.   
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Davie was an attorney, based upon his inclusion of terms like “legal service,” 
“professional legal consulting,” a picture of the scales of justice in the letterhead, 
and a signature block that mimics the signature block used in most legal filings 
and includes the attorney registration number of the attorney filing the document.  
The panel, however, attributed these features to careless drafting and noted that 
Davie did not refer to himself as an attorney or use the designations Esq., Atty., or 
J.D. in his memorandum.  Observing that the bar number that Davie used was the 
paralegal membership number assigned to him by the Ohio State Bar Association 
(“OSBA”), consisting of six digits that did not start with two zeros—unlike the 
seven digit attorney registration numbers issued by this court—the panel 
concluded that Davie’s use of the number was not misleading. 
{¶ 37} We disagree with the board’s assessment of these facts and find 
that Davie’s use of these words and images gave the distinct impression that the 
document that had been created by an attorney.  Davie signed the document in a 
signature block identical in form to the signature block routinely used by 
attorneys throughout the state—including the name of his “firm,” Alpha Legal 
Services, Inc.—and listing a number after his name.  Despite the minor 
differences between the OSBA paralegal membership number Davie provided to 
the parole board and an attorney registration number issued by this court, there is 
no mistaking that the purpose of Davie’s statements is to induce others to believe 
that he is an attorney.  Indeed, Davie’s memorandum caused the chairwoman of 
the Ohio Parole Board to believe that he was an attorney representing Jones in his 
parole hearing, as evidenced by her June 9, 2009 letter addressed to “Michael 
Davie, Esq.” 
{¶ 38} In determining that Davie did not attempt to portray himself as an 
attorney, the panel focused on his conduct at the parole hearing, finding that 
Davie disclosed early in the parole board hearing that he was not an attorney and 
that the hearing officer personally knew him to be an ex-convict because she had 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
presided over Davie’s own parole hearing in 2006.  But Davie’s conduct and 
revelations at the hearing—more than seven months after he submitted his 
memorandum—cannot alter the evident purpose or effect of that document. 
{¶ 39} The panel also found that Davie was authorized to appear at 
Jones’s parole board hearing pursuant to R.C. 5149.101(B)(6) (permitting counsel 
or some other representative designated by the prisoner to appear and give 
testimony or submit written statements on the prisoner’s behalf at the prisoners’ 
parole hearing).  The panel noted that R.C. 5149.101(B)(6) and Ohio Department 
of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) policy 105-PBD-06 authorize a 
nonattorney inmate representative to communicate with the parole board orally 
and in writing and that the current version of 105-PBD-06 requires an inmate 
representative, prosecutors, and victim advocates to supply a “written summary of 
the arguments presented at the hearing for or against release.”  ODRC Policy 105-
PBD-06(VI)(E)(4) (eff. July8, 2011), available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/ 
drc_policies/documents/105-PBD-06.pdf.  Therefore, the panel concluded that 
Davie’s memorandum was a written statement of an inmate representative as 
authorized by R.C. 5149.101(B)(6) and that it did not constitute the rendering of 
legal services for another in violation of Gov.Bar R. VII(2)(A).  That version of 
the ODRC policy, however, was not in effect when Davie submitted his 
memorandum to the parole board, and the version then in effect had no 
requirement that the inmate representative submit a written summary of 
arguments.  Rather, it permitted the inmate representative to submit a written 
statement instead of attending the hearing and providing oral testimony and 
information.  Former ODRC Policy 105-PBD-06(VI)(D) (eff. July 2, 2008). 
{¶ 40} Because this court has exclusive power to regulate, control, and 
define the practice of law in Ohio, we also have the ultimate authority to 
determine the qualifications of persons engaged in the practice of law before an 
administrative agency.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, 104 Ohio 
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St.3d 168, 2004-Ohio-6506, 818 N.E.2d 1181 (“CompManagement I”), ¶ 39, 
quoting In re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Cuyahoga Cty., 175 Ohio St. 149, 
151, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963).  Even if a statute or administrative rule purports to 
permit laypersons to practice law before a board or an administrative agency, this 
court retains the ultimate authority to determine what activities a layperson may 
engage in without crossing the line into the unauthorized practice of law.  
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. at 31, 193 N.E. 650.  Recognizing, however, that “it is not 
always necessary or desirable for the court to exercise that power to its full 
extent,” we have acknowledged that “the power to regulate includes the authority 
to grant as well as the authority to deny, and in certain limited settings, the public 
interest is better served by authorizing laypersons to engage in conduct that might 
be viewed as the practice of law.”  CompManagement I at ¶ 39.  See, e.g., 
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Pearlman, 106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005-Ohio-4107, 832 
N.E.3d 1193, syllabus (permitting lay representation of limited-liability 
companies before a small claims court, provided that the layperson does not 
engage in cross-examination, argument, or other acts of advocacy); 
CompManagement I, syllabus (permitting lay representation of claimants and 
employers before the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation within circumscribed limits); and Henize v. Giles, 22 Ohio St.3d 
213, 490 N.E.2d 585 (1986) (permitting laypersons to appear on another’s behalf 
at administrative unemployment-compensation hearings before the Ohio Bureau 
of Employment Services and the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 
to assist the claimant or the employer in the preparation and presentation of their 
respective versions of the circumstances attendant to the claim). 
{¶ 41} In Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 
444, 2006-Ohio-6108, 857 N.E.2d 95 (“CompManagement II”), we considered 
whether third-party administrators who assisted employers in workers’ 
compensation proceedings before the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
Workers’ Compensation pursuant to a commission resolution had engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.  We held that third-party administrators could offer 
general claims assistance as long as that assistance did not involve legal analysis, 
skill, citation, or interpretation.  Id. at ¶ 49, citing Dayton Bar Assn. v. Lender’s 
Serv., Inc., 40 Ohio St.3d 96, 532 N.E.2d 120 (1988), at syllabus (the mere use of 
legal terms as headings in a title abstract without any legal analysis does not 
constitute the practice of law); State ex rel. Doria v. Ferguson, 145 Ohio St. 12, 
60 N.E.2d 476 (1945), at paragraph one of the syllabus (providing that 
preparation for another of a title report containing only facts in the public record 
without engaging in any legal analysis does not constitute the practice of law); 
Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 397, 35 N.E.2d 435 
(1941) (completion for another of preprinted forms for sale of real estate involves 
“ordinary intelligence rather than the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced 
in the law” and does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law).  Applying 
this standard to the facts of the case, we determined that there was no evidence 
that either CompManagement or its employees had committed any specific act 
that constituted the unauthorized practice of law.  Id. at ¶ 117. 
{¶ 42} The version of ODRC Policy 105-PBD-06 in effect at the time of 
Jones’s parole board hearing provided:  “The inmate does not have a right to 
attend a full board hearing[;] however, an inmate representative may attend to 
speak on behalf of the inmate.  Any additional speakers on behalf of the inmate 
may be approved at the discretion of the Parole Board Chair/designee.”  Former 
ODRC Policy 105-PBD-06(VI)(F)(1) (eff. July 2, 2008). 
{¶ 43} Former ODRC Policy 105-PBD-06(VI)(F)(2) identified the classes 
of persons who may serve as an inmate representative and provides:  “Inmate 
representatives must not be under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction or any other State, Federal or County jurisdiction 
for having committed a felony.  Inmate representatives, for the purpose of 
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attending full board hearings, shall be limited to family members, personal friends 
as designated on the institution mail and visiting list, employers, clergy, or 
attorneys.  Special interest groups, reform groups or other interested persons will 
not be permitted to serve as an inmate representative.” 
{¶ 44} Nothing in the former ODRC policy purported to authorize 
laypersons to perform any functions that would fall within the definition of the 
practice of law while serving as an inmate representative.  Indeed, the ODRC 
policy contemplated merely that an inmate representative will either attend the 
full parole board hearing and provide oral testimony and information or submit a 
written statement for the board’s consideration.  See former ODRC Policy 105-
PBD-06(VI)(D) (eff. July 2, 2008).  In keeping with that policy, in his November 
2008 memorandum to the parole board, Davie presented reasons that the parole 
board should grant Jones’s release, including his employable skills, 
remorsefulness, and involvement with a community-reentry-support organization. 
{¶ 45} But Davie went on to cite several recent parole board decisions and 
compared the conduct of those inmates who had been granted parole to Jones’s 
conduct, attempted to recast the facts of Jones’s crime in a light that was more 
favorable to Jones and contrary to the evidence supporting the conviction, argued 
that releasing Jones once he had served the minimum sentence of 15 years for his 
offense would not demean the seriousness of the offense, and asked that the 
board’s decision be guided by the Ohio Parole Board Guidelines Manual, Part D, 
Section 101 (2d Ed.2000), which states, “The purpose of the guidelines is to 
establish Parole Board policy with respect to parole release decision-making that 
promote[s] the consistent exercise of discretion, and enables more fair and 
equitable decision-making, without removing individual case consideration.”  It is 
in these actions, involving legal citation, analysis, and interpretation, that Davie 
has ventured into the unauthorized practice of law.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. 
Chiofalo, 112 Ohio St.3d 113, 2006-Ohio-6512, 858 N.E.2d 378, ¶ 9 (a 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
nonlawyer engages in the unauthorized practice of law by arguing statutory 
provisions and case law, construing a legal text to advance the case, and 
interpreting the weight, significance, and credibility of evidence presented). 
{¶ 46} Based upon the foregoing, we sustain relator’s objections and find 
that by drafting and submitting the November 9, 2008 memorandum to the parole 
board on behalf of Jones, respondents have engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law. 
Respondents are Enjoined from Engaging in 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
{¶ 47} Because we find that respondents engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law with respect to each of the three counts alleged in relator’s 
complaint, we adopt the board’s recommendation and enter an injunction against 
each of the respondents forbidding any further violation. 
Civil penalties are justified 
{¶ 48} We now turn to the board’s recommendation that civil penalties be 
assessed against the respondents.  Gov.Bar R. VII(8)(B) authorizes the imposition 
of such penalties in an amount up to $10,000 per offense based upon 
consideration of four specific factors and one catch-all, “[a]ny other relevant 
factors.” 
{¶ 49} 1.  Degree of cooperation.  The panel and board found that on 
numerous occasions, respondents failed or refused to cooperate in relator’s 
investigation and the litigation of this case.  Davie denied that he received proper 
service of process in this case, failed to appear for his scheduled deposition twice, 
and refused to cooperate in the discovery phase of relator’s investigation.  Davie 
also filed an unfounded and frivolous action in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
to prevent this UPL action from proceeding.  The district court dismissed that 
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, observing that 
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it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and that this court, the board, and relator 
were immune from liability.  Despite the district court’s certification that an 
appeal could not, in good faith, be taken from its decision, the panel and board 
found that Davie nevertheless appealed the decision “with a mind toward delaying 
this proceeding and challenging the Court’s authority to regulate the unauthorized 
practice of law in Ohio.” 
{¶ 50} Davie has never admitted that the services he provided in the 
Brown, Singleton, or Jones matters constituted the unauthorized practice of law, 
and at the time of the hearing, he continued to challenge the court’s authority to 
regulate his conduct.  Respondents have not agreed to be enjoined from the 
unauthorized practice of law, and Davie refused to discuss any agreed resolution 
or stipulations. 
{¶ 51} 2.  Number of violations.  The panel and board found that 
respondents committed the unauthorized practice of law in two of the three 
charged counts.  We have found, however, that respondents have engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law with respect to each of the three charged violations.  
And due to respondents’ refusal to cooperate in relator’s investigation, it is 
impossible to determine how many additional violations they may have 
committed. 
{¶ 52} 3 and 4.  Flagrancy and Harm to Third Parties.  Davie and ALS 
had their clients enter into contracts purporting to bind them to pay for legal 
services provided by respondents.  Although Davie testified that his work was 
supervised by the late attorney Haygood, his contract states, “You understand 
(with the exception of a case evaluation service) it is your responsibility to 
provide legal counsel to ALS who will represent you” and purports to require 
payment for the services regardless of whether the client’s attorney agrees to work 
with respondents.  When Brown/Stephens and Singleton failed to pay in 
accordance with their contracts, Davie sued them in the Cleveland Municipal 
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21 
 
Court and obtained monetary judgments against them, which Davie then sought to 
collect. These judgments and corresponding collection efforts undoubtedly appear 
on the clients’ credit reports and have therefore caused ongoing harm to these 
individuals.  Moreover, the panel and board found: 
 
Davie took advantage of the untimely death of Attorney 
Sebraien M. Haygood and fabricated testimony in an attempt to 
establish that Mr. Haygood was supervising him in the Brown and 
Singleton matters.  The Panel was presented with no credible 
evidence that Attorney Haygood supervised Davie in either of 
those matters.  Indeed, Respondents failed to produce a single 
document with Attorney Haygood’s name on it or any 
documentation which might suggest that Attorney Haygood even 
had knowledge of the Brown or Singleton matters before his death. 
 
{¶ 53} 5.  Other relevant factors.  The panel and the board found that 
Davie testified that he has attempted to find employment as a paralegal working 
under a lawyer’s supervision, but that his felony record has prevented him from 
obtaining such employment.  As a result, Davie does not have regular 
employment and is nearly indigent. He has three children to support, and lives 
with his extended family. 
{¶ 54} The panel recommended a civil penalty of $2,000 per violation, for 
a total penalty of $4,000.  Citing numerous aggravating factors, the board 
recommended that we impose the maximum civil penalty of $10,000 per 
violation, for a total penalty of $20,000.  No objections have been filed to these 
recommended penalties. 
{¶ 55} In light of the significant aggravating factors present in this case, 
including respondents’ blatant disregard for our prohibitions against the 
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unauthorized practice of law and their efforts to conceal the wrongful nature of 
their conduct by impugning the character of a deceased attorney who has not been 
shown to have any involvement in these matters and who cannot defend his good 
name, we now adopt the board’s recommendation and impose civil penalties of 
$10,000 in accordance with the board’s recommendation, but impose them for 
each of the three violations we have found herein. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 56} For the foregoing reasons, Michael D. Davie and Alpha Legal 
Services, Inc. are enjoined from further acts constituting the unauthorized practice 
of law.  Davie may work as a paralegal or legal assistant in the state of Ohio, 
provided that he does so under the direct supervision of an attorney authorized to 
practice law in this state and identifies himself as a paralegal or legal assistant in 
all communications and correspondence. 
{¶ 57} A civil penalty of $30,000 is imposed jointly and severally against 
Davie and Alpha Legal Services, Inc. 
{¶ 58} Davie is further ordered, within 30 days of this order, to file the 
appropriate legal forms to release the judgments that he obtained in Cleveland 
Municipal Court cases Davie v. Singleton, case No. 08 CVI 25218, and Davie v. 
Brown, case No. 08 CVI 19312, and forthwith submit proof of the filings to 
relator.  If Davie fails to timely release these judgments, he shall be fined $100 
per day beginning on the thirty-first day following this order. 
{¶ 59} Costs are taxed to respondents. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 60} I concur with the judgment of the court as to counts one and two; 
however, I would accept the findings of the panel as to count three and dismiss 
that count.  I would impose a civil penalty of $5,000 for each remaining count, for 
a total of $10,000. 
__________________ 
 
John A. Hallbauer and Heather M. Zirke, Assistant Bar Counsel, for 
relator. 
 
Donald R. Murphy, for respondents. 
______________________