Title: State v. Hailey

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

505 S.W.2d 712 (1974) STATE of Tennessee v. James Edward HAILEY. Supreme Court of Tennessee. February 4, 1974. David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., of Tenn., Robert H. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas H. Shriver, Dist. Atty. Gen., E.E. Edwards, III, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant. J. William Rutherford, Nashville, for appellee. McCANLESS, Justice. The State has perfected its appeal in the nature of a writ of error from the judgment of the Criminal Court of Davidson County, Part Two, by which that court had held unconstitutional and void Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973. Because the constitutionality of the statute is the sole and single question for determination the appeal is to the Supreme Court. The grand jury indicted James Edward Hailey for murder in the first degree in the following language: Hailey entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment but on motion was allowed to withdraw his plea and to file a plea in abatement by which he contended that (1) Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973, providing for the death penalty for murder is unconstitutional under the standards of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 [1972], and (2) that Chapter 192 "is unconstitutional in that it fails to meet the requirement of Article II, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution in that it `embraces more than one subject' and fails to state `the substance of the law repealed, revised or amended.'" The Criminal Court in its order expressed the opinion, with which we agree, that the question of the death penalty presented by Furman v. Georgia, supra, was premature since the defendant had not been found guilty and sentenced to death. It then determined that Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973, is invalid under the provisions of Article II, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution and sustained the plea in abatement. The correctness of this action is the only question presented by the appeal. The title or caption of Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973 (originally House Bill 553) is as follows: Section 1 of Chapter 192 provides, among other things, that murder that theretofore had been murder in the second degree thenceforth would be murder in the first degree if the victim should be a fellow prison inmate, or a peace officer, fireman or judge acting in the course of his employment, or a popularly elected public official. The section also provides that when one is in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 52-1432(a)(1)(A), a section of the Drug Control Act, and the recipient of the controlled substance dies as the result of such controlled substance, the violator shall be guilty of murder in the first degree. Section 2 of the Act provides that "Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for some period over 25 years." The section requires the jury after hearing evidence to render a sentence based on their finding of aggravating circumstances, or mitigating circumstances which are defined in the language of the section. It is further provided that there shall be the automatic review by the Supreme Court of judgments of conviction and sentences of death. Section 5 provides a new and different punishment for the crime of rape. Article II, Section 17 of the Constitution of Tennessee is, as follows: The controlling issue here is whether Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973 "embraces more than one subject, that *714 subject to be expressed in the title." We are of opinion that the act is defective because the body embraces more than one subject and because the title or caption does not express all the subject matter set forth in the body. The title did not give to the Legislature and to the public notice of the change that was to be made in increasing the gravity of certain homicides from murder in the second degree to murder in the first degree, in providing for the offense of murder in the first degree when death resulted in certain circumstances from the violation of Section 52-1432, T.C.A., or of the matters we have mentioned which the provisions of Section 2 undertake to change. Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 50 S.W. 744 [1899]. The Court, by Mr. Justice Shields, in Railroad v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460 [1907], said: In McCamey v. Cummings, 130 Tenn. 494, 172 S.W. 311 [1914], the Court said: The objects of this act, in our judgment, are so related to the objects indicated by the title that no part of the body can be elided so as to "leave a complete and sensible enactment which is capable of being executed." We, therefore, hold that Chapter 192 of the Public Acts of 1973 is void for two reasons: (1) it contains more than one subject and (2) the title or caption gave no notice to the Legislature or to the public of some of the subjects contained in its body. We affirm the judgment of the Criminal Court and remand the case for action consistent with this opinion. DYER, C.J., CHATTIN and FONES, JJ., and LEECH, Special Justice, concur.