Title: People v. Glisson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92482-Agenda 15-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
								MONICA GLISSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 5, 2002.


	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial, defendant, Monica Glisson, was
convicted of chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance
pursuant to section 401.5(a-5) of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401.5(a-5) (West 1998)) and
misdemeanor theft; judgment was entered November 3, 1999.
Effective January 1, 2000, the General Assembly added a
subsection to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act exempting
defendant's conduct from criminal liability. 720 ILCS
570/401.5(c) (West 2000). Both parties agree that this amendment,
in effect, repealed the crime of possession with the intent to
manufacture the illicit controlled substance methamphetamine
from the section on chemical breakdown of illicit controlled
substance. The appellate court vacated defendant's conviction for
chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance and reversed
defendant's conviction for misdemeanor theft. 324 Ill. App. 3d
249, 253-54. Before this court, the State challenges only the
vacatur of the conviction for chemical breakdown of illicit
controlled substance. More specifically, the issue presented for
review by this court is whether the general savings clause of
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000))
applies to repeals.

I. BACKGROUND
	Shortly after midnight on March 10, 1999, Massac County
sheriff's deputy Kent Miles, while on routine patrol on Highway
45, observed a vehicle stopped on the road. The vehicle was about
three hundred yards from the Fruitbelt Services Company, which
housed tanks of anhydrous ammonia. Miles watched a person
close the trunk and enter the passenger side of the vehicle. He
followed the vehicle after it pulled out and drove down Highway
45. After checking the vehicle's plates, Miles initiated a traffic
stop for illegally stopping on the highway. He detected the faint
odor of anhydrous ammonia during the traffic stop. Miles spoke
with defendant, who was driving, and the passenger, Joseph
Draffen. He checked defendant's license and insurance
information and ran Draffen's name through his computer. Miles
called for backup, and Deputy Richard Douglas arrived shortly
thereafter.
	As defendant explained the reason she had been stopped on
the highway, Douglas noticed a key in the keyhole of the trunk.
After defendant refused permission to search the car, Douglas
touched the key and the trunk automatically opened. The officers
had been trained that if anhydrous ammonia is in an enclosed
space, the area should be ventilated as much as possible given the
volatility of the material. The smell of anhydrous ammonia
became much stronger when the trunk was opened. The State
Police Drug Task Force was called to assist in the handling of the
anhydrous ammonia, and Officers Dean Hamilton and Rick
Griffey were dispatched. Inside the trunk was a five-gallon bucket
sealed with duct tape. The officers also found a cooler containing
anhydrous ammonia, a respirator mask, and a piece of wood
wrapped with duct tape inside the trunk. Hamilton disposed of the
anhydrous ammonia.
	At trial, Douglas testified on the basis of his training that
anhydrous ammonia is one of the antecedents in the production of
methamphetamine. The only legitimate use of anhydrous ammonia
is to fertilize corn; for this purpose, large quantities are required.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. While the case
was pending on direct appeal, the General Assembly adopted
section 401.5(c), which removed from sanction the possession of
methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 570/401.5(c) (West
2000). The appellate court vacated defendant's conviction for
chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance (720 ILCS
570/401.5(a-5) (West 1998)) because the statute defining the
offense of which defendant was convicted had been repealed. 324
Ill. App. 3d at 253. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Rule
315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

II. ANALYSIS
	Effective after the date of the relevant conduct and
defendant's conviction, the General Assembly passed section
401.5(c), which provides: "This Section does not apply to the
possession of any methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals
with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine or any salt of an
optical isomer of methamphetamine, or an analog of
methamphetamine." 720 ILCS 570/401.5(c) (West 2000). This
change repealed the crime of which defendant was convicted. No
specific savings clause was passed with section 401.5(c).
Therefore, the sole issue before this court is whether the general
savings clause of section 4 (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000)) preserves
the conviction for chemical breakdown of illicit controlled
substance despite the subsequent repeal of the statutory prohibition
of the conduct in question while defendant's conviction was
pending on direct appeal. Because this issue is one of statutory
interpretation, this court reviews the question de novo. Paris v.
Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177-78 (1997).
	At common law, the repeal of a penal statute abated
prosecutions that had not reached final judgment, unless other
authority supported the continuation of pending prosecutions.
United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 223, 78 L. Ed. 763, 765-66, 54 S. Ct. 434, 435 (1934); People v. Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d 175,
177 (1956). The common law doctrine established a presumption
of abatement for nonfinal prosecutions for courts to apply where
the legislature was silent. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 322, 13 L. Ed. 2d 300, 311, 85 S. Ct. 384, 394-95 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
	Dissatisfaction with the common law rule developed because
the conviction and punishment of similarly situated defendants
could be disparate solely because the proceedings of one had
moved more quickly and had become final before the change in
the law. Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d  at 181. This problem was addressed
through the passage of general savings clause legislation, section
4, which reversed the common law presumption. People v.
Chupich, 53 Ill. 2d 572, 583 (1973); Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d  at 181.
The Illinois courts rarely have interpreted section 4 as it relates to
repeal of criminal statutes because the General Assembly
infrequently decriminalizes behavior.

A. Statutory Construction of Section 4
	The primary concern of the court when interpreting a statute
is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at
177. Whenever possible, the court applies the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory language. People ex rel. Devine v.
$30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 150 (2002).
Only where the language of the statute is ambiguous may the court
resort to other aids of statutory construction. People v. O'Brien,
197 Ill. 2d 88, 90-91 (2001). In addition, where a statute is clear
and unambiguous, courts cannot read into the statute limitations,
exceptions, or other conditions not expressed by the legislature.
People ex rel. Devine, 199 Ill. 2d  at 150-51. The court should
evaluate a statutory provision as a whole rather than reading
phrases in isolation. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d  at 177. The court should
construe a statute to give a reasonable meaning to all words and
sentences so that no part is rendered superfluous. Sylvester v.
Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). Finally, courts
may assume that the legislature did not intend absurdity,
inconvenience or injustice to result from legislation. Burger v.
Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).
	Section 4, the general savings clause of Illinois, first passed
in 1874, states:
			"No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law,
whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as
to any offense committed against the former law, or as to
any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment
incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the
former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such
offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty,
forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued,
or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only
that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as
practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such
proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be
mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision
may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to
any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.
This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express
words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act
making any new provision upon the same subject or in
any other act." (Emphases added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West
2000).
	In People v. Speroni,(1) the appellate court interpreted " 'No
new law shall be construed,' " at the start of the provision, and the
first italicized phrase to mean that section 4 is applicable only to
amendments and not to outright repeals. People v. Speroni, 273 Ill.
App. 572, 577-78 (1934). Defendant argues that, under Speroni,
section 4 should not preserve her conviction because the crime of
which defendant was convicted was repealed outright. This court,
however, has criticized the Speroni analysis in Bilderback. We
said: "This conclusion [by the Speroni court] of course wholly
disregards the last sentence of section 4." Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d  at
180.
	Statutory construction principles require the court to apply the
plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language whenever
possible. People ex. rel Devine, 199 Ill. 2d  at 150. This final
sentence provides that section 4 applies to both express and
implied repeals, regardless of where the repealing language is
located. This sentence confirms the broad applicability of section
4 rather than restricts it, as defendant suggests. We now expressly
hold what we implied in Bilderback: section 4 applies to both
outright repeals and amendments.
	In addition, we give a different interpretation to the first
italicized phrase of section 4 than did the Speroni court. This is the
first time we have interpreted this phrase directly. When
interpreting a statute, the court should evaluate a statutory
provision as a whole rather than reading phrases in isolation.
O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d  at 91. The court should construe a statute to
give a reasonable meaning to all words and sentences so that no
part is rendered superfluous. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232. Section
4 starts with a prohibition on construing a new statute to affect
penalties, punishments, or rights accrued; this forbids retroactive
application of substantive changes to statutes. The italicized
portion, beginning with "save only," allows proceedings to
conform to the present law; this allows retroactive application of
procedural changes to statutes. Therefore, we read the first
italicized part of section 4 above to require that retroactive
application of amendments or repeals in criminal statutes is
permissible only if such changes are procedural in nature. We
expressly reject the holding of Speroni to the extent that it is
inconsistent with this interpretation.
	We note that our present interpretation of this clause in
section 4 is consistent with an interpretation of nearly identical
statutory language in our sister state of West Virginia. West
Virginia's general savings clause provides in part:
			"The repeal of a law, or its expiration by virtue of any
provision contained therein, shall not affect any offense
committed, or penalty or punishment incurred, before the
repeal took effect, or the law expired, save only that the
proceedings thereafter had shall conform as far as
practicable to the laws in force at the time such
proceedings take place, unless otherwise specially
provided ***." (Emphasis added.) W. Va. Code §2-2-8
(2002).
When interpreting the italicized portion of this provision, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained:
		"Even should it be conceded, as claimed, that Sec. 15 of
Chap. 144 of the Code was repealed by the Act of 1920-21, the offense if committed before the repeal is kept alive
and also the penalty. The procedure alone is affected; it
must conform to the new law as far as practicable." State
v. Sanney, 91 W. Va. 477, 480-81, 113 S.E. 762, 764
(1922).
Only procedural changes are given retroactive application under
this substantially identical savings clause language.

B. Section 4 Applied to the Present Case
	Both parties agree that the legislature in effect repealed the
crime of possession with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine from the section on chemical breakdown of
illicit controlled substance, of which defendant was convicted.
Clearly, this statutory change is not of a procedural nature. This is
a substantive change to the scope of the crime of chemical
breakdown of illicit controlled substance. As such, section 4 bars
retroactive application of the statutory change repealing the
offense of which defendant was convicted. Section 4 preserves
defendant's conviction for chemical breakdown of illicit
controlled substance because section 401.5(a-5) criminalized
defendant's conduct at the time the conduct occurred.

C. Changes to Special Remedial Statutes
	The appellate court in this case stated: "The general savings
clause *** has no application to repeals." 324 Ill. App. 3d at 253,
citing Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 970, 974
(1996). However, the Randall case and the cases that are cited to
support this assertion address statutory changes to special remedial
statutes. Randall, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 973; Shelton v. City of
Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 468, 474 (1969); People ex rel. Eitel v.
Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 373-75 (1939). Special remedial statues
are statutory provisions that are purely remedial or procedural in
nature; they do not involve vested rights. Randall, 284 Ill. App. 3d
at 973.
	In criminal cases in which the statutory changes affect only
procedure, Illinois courts hold that the changes can be applied
retroactively. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 438,
440-41 (1973) (noting that lengthening the speedy-trial deadline
after defendant was charged was procedural and therefore could be
applied retroactively). In contrast, however, courts apply section
4 and bar retroactive application where statutory changes alter or
repeal the crime itself. For example, in People v. Tanner, 27 Ill. 2d 82 (1963), this court reviewed an indictment that was quashed
based on the repeal of the charging statute by the Criminal Code
of 1961 ("new Code"). We held that the prosecution could
continue despite the repeal. The new Code, however, also
incorporated section 4 by reference explicitly, which we
acknowledged in our analysis. Tanner, 27 Ill. 2d  at 83-85. Soon
after, the First District of the appellate court evaluated a case in
which the repealing statute did not refer expressly to section 4 in
People v. DeStefano, 64 Ill. App. 2d 389 (1965). In that case, the
charging statute was repealed after defendant's conduct but before
his indictment. The court found that Tanner did not require that a
repealing statute explicitly refer to section 4 for that provision to
apply. Citing Bilderback, the court held that the prosecution could
proceed. DeStefano, 64 Ill. App. 2d at 398. Therefore, the
appellate court and defendant incorrectly assert that section 4 is
inapplicable to all repeals. In accordance with our interpretation of
section 4, courts can apply retroactively statutory changes to
procedural or remedial provisions, whether they are outright
repeals or amendments. Section 4 prohibits retroactive application
of statutory changes that affect substantive provisions or vested
rights.

III. CONCLUSION
	We hold that the general savings clause of Illinois, section 4
(5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000)), applies to preserve defendant's
conviction despite the fact that, while her appeal was pending, the
legislature repealed the statute describing the crime for which she
was convicted without a specific savings clause. Therefore, we
reverse the appellate court in part and vacate the order of the
appellate court vacating defendant's conviction for chemical
breakdown of illicit controlled substance; we affirm the appellate
court order reversing defendant's conviction for misdemeanor
theft, which was not challenged before this court. We remand the
cause to the appellate court to consider the issues raised by
defendant challenging the chemical breakdown of illicit controlled
substance conviction before that court that were not reached in
light of its interpretation of section 4, if that court deems it to be
appropriate. The appellate court then may remand the cause to the
circuit court for further proceedings if necessary. See Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127,
146-47 (1999).
Appellate court judgment vacated in part
and affirmed in part;
cause remanded.
 



1.      1Appellate opinions before 1935 have no binding force on Illinois
courts. Bryson v. New America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 95
(1996).