Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bahan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bahan, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1210.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1210 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. BAHAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bahan, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-1210.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar—Conditionally stayed 
six-month suspension. 
(No. 2021-0224—Submitted June 15, 2021—Decided April 14, 2022.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2019-065. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Natalie J. Bahan, of West Mansfield, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0079304, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2005.  On 
February 12, 2020, we publicly reprimanded her for violating Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(a) 
(a lawyer shall not, by in-person, live-telephone, or real-time electronic contact, 
solicit professional employment when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing 
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so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain).  Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bahan, 159 Ohio St.3d 
479, 2020-Ohio-434, 152 N.E.3d 189 (“Bahan I”). 
{¶ 2} In a four-count complaint filed in December 2019, relator, Columbus 
Bar Association, charged Bahan with four counts of professional misconduct 
arising from (1) her loud, profane, and alcohol-fueled outburst that she had directed 
at a former judge during a presentation at the 2018 Logan County Bar Association 
holiday event (Count One), (2) seven other incidents related to her alleged alcohol 
use (Count Two), (3) failing to diligently represent a client (Count Three), and 
(4) failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation and allowing her attorney 
registration to lapse (Count Four). 
{¶ 3} A three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct 
conducted a hearing and heard testimony from Bahan and 14 other witnesses.  At 
the conclusion of the evidence, relator withdrew Count Three.  After the hearing, 
the panel unanimously accepted that withdrawal and also dismissed the charges 
alleged in Count Four. 
{¶ 4} The panel issued a report finding that Bahan’s alcohol-related conduct 
violated two rules governing the ethical conduct of lawyers, unanimously dismissed 
two alleged charges (one from Count One and one from Count Two), alleging 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), and recommended 
that we impose a conditionally stayed, six-month suspension for Bahan’s 
misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 5} Bahan raises five objections to the board’s findings and recommended 
sanction.  Her primary argument is that her conduct at the bar association’s holiday 
event is constitutionally protected speech that may not be sanctioned under Gov.Bar 
R. IV(2). 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 6} With one exception, we overrule Bahan’s objections and adopt the 
board’s findings of misconduct.  We also adopt the board’s recommendation that 
Bahan be suspended for six months with the entire suspension stayed on the 
condition that she engage in no further misconduct—with the additional condition 
that she submit to a substance-use assessment conducted by the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and comply with all recommendations arising from 
that assessment. 
Bahan’s Alcohol-Related Misconduct 
Count One: Failure to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts 
{¶ 7} Bahan and her husband attended the annual Logan County Bar 
Association holiday event on December 8, 2018.  During the event, the bar 
association presented a “mock award” to William Goslee, who at that time was a 
judge on the Logan County Court of Common Pleas.  Bahan, who had consumed 
alcohol at the event and appeared to be intoxicated, loudly and rudely interrupted 
the presentation of the award and called Judge Goslee a “piece of shit,” an 
“asshole,” and a “motherfucker.” 
{¶ 8} The board found that Bahan was displeased with Judge Goslee 
because he was involved with filing the grievance that had resulted in relator’s 
decision to file the disciplinary complaint against her in Bahan I, 159 Ohio St.3d 
479, 2020-Ohio-434, 152 N.E.3d 189.  At the time of the bar event, Bahan I was 
pending before the board, and the hearing was scheduled for two days after the bar 
event. 
{¶ 9} The board found that Bahan’s “loud, profane, and drunken conduct,” 
which was directed at Judge Goslee, violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a lawyer 
to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts). 
Count Two: Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
{¶ 10} In its complaint, relator alleged that over a nine-year period, Bahan 
had engaged in seven additional incidents of improper conduct while under the 
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influence of alcohol and that her conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  The board found that Bahan’s conduct in three of those incidents violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). 
{¶ 11} In the first incident, while attending a charity benefit with her 
husband in May 2019, Bahan called the Logan County Sheriff’s Office to report 
that “William Branan” had stolen her vehicle.  Approximately ten minutes into that 
call, a male got on the phone and informed the dispatcher that “William Branan” 
was Bahan’s husband, that Bahan was mad at him, and that there was no car theft 
in progress. 
{¶ 12} During Bahan’s disciplinary hearing, Deputy Miriam Reames 
testified that she responded to Bahan’s call.  Reames was unable to locate Bahan at 
the charity benefit, so she went to Bahan’s home along with another deputy.  There, 
Bahan told Reames that she and her husband had had a verbal disagreement, that 
he had gone outside, and that she thought he had left her at the party.  At some point 
after Bahan called the sheriff’s office, Bahan’s husband took her home.  Reames 
concluded that Bahan was intoxicated because her eyes were glassy and bloodshot 
and there was an odor of alcohol coming from her person and breath. 
{¶ 13} The second incident involved a phone call that Bahan made to the 
sheriff’s office in February 2017 to report that her teenaged son had stolen her iPad.  
While Bahan was speaking to a sheriff’s deputy, her husband called 9-1-1 to report 
that she was “heavily intoxicated and causing problems.”  Sheriff’s deputies arrived 
at Bahan’s residence and learned that her son had left the home with the iPad.  The 
deputies noticed that Bahan was loud and unsteady on her feet.  She was also 
slurring her speech and had bloodshot and glassy eyes and a strong odor of alcohol 
on her breath.  They concluded that she was intoxicated.  Bahan yelled profanities 
at the deputies as they helped her husband leave the home.  The deputies 
admonished her to calm down and repeatedly told her to remain in her home. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 14} No charges were ever brought against Bahan’s son, but Bahan was 
cited for disorderly conduct—though that charge was later dismissed.  The board 
found that Bahan engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and that she abused the legal system by reporting these two trivial incidents to law-
enforcement authorities. 
{¶ 15} The third incident occurred while Bahan was serving as a guardian 
ad litem (“GAL”) in 2010.  Bahan had attempted to make a surprise visit to the 
home of her ward’s mother, but the mother was not at home.  Bahan and her 
husband went to eat dinner at a nearby restaurant, where she drank one glass of 
wine with her meal before returning to the mother’s home to complete the visit.  
The board found that by drinking alcohol before a home visit while serving as a 
GAL, Bahan engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
Bahan’s Objections to the Board’s Findings 
{¶ 16} Bahan raises four objections to the board’s findings of fact, 
misconduct, and evidentiary rulings.  For the following reasons, we overrule all but 
her third objection. 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) is constitutional as applied to Bahan’s conduct in this case 
{¶ 17} In her first objection, Bahan contends that her conduct at the Logan 
County Bar Association event may not support a finding of a violation of Gov.Bar 
R. IV(2), because that conduct consisted of political speech that is protected under 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Ohio Constitution, and was not directed “toward the courts.”  Specifically, 
Bahan contends that her speech at the event was political in nature because she 
intended to express her disapproval of Judge Goslee’s courtroom conduct that 
purportedly led the bar association to present him with a mock award that evening.  
Relator, in contrast, argues that this matter is not about the freedom of speech, but 
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rather “the uncontrolled, self-indulgent, drunken behavior of a member of the bar.”  
For the following reasons, we find that Bahan’s objection is without merit. 
Factual background 
{¶ 18} At its 2018 holiday event, at which approximately 50 to 70 people 
attended, the Logan County Bar Association offered bar members and their spouses 
an opportunity to socialize over dinner, drinks (including alcohol), and some 
dancing.  The event also included an awards ceremony. 
{¶ 19} According to Bahan and other witnesses, she was not intoxicated 
when she arrived at the event, but she began to drink wine soon thereafter.  Bahan 
testified that she had about three glasses of wine, because that is her “public limit.”  
She did not believe that she was intoxicated, but she also did not believe that it was 
a good idea for her to drive herself home.  Judge Charles Chamberlain testified that 
Bahan “was a little unsteady on her feet.”  Although her conduct suggests 
otherwise, Bahan denied that alcohol played any role in her conduct at the event. 
{¶ 20} Witnesses testified that they did not notice anything unusual about 
Bahan’s behavior until after dinner.  Natasha Kennedy, a magistrate with the Logan 
County Family Court, testified that as the evening progressed, she observed some 
tension between Bahan and Judge Goslee. 
{¶ 21} After dinner had been served, Judge Goslee was presented with a 
mock award that he described as “a bit of a roast.”  As he gave remarks after 
accepting the award, Bahan started calling him foul names under her breath and her 
voice got progressively louder.  As the people around her told her to be quiet, she 
stood up and loudly interrupted Judge Goslee, calling him a “piece of shit,” an 
“asshole,” and a “motherfucker.” 
{¶ 22} Bahan’s comments were loud enough for the entire room to hear.  
Kennedy and Miranda Warren, an attorney who was seated five to ten feet away 
from Bahan, testified that the other attendees appeared to be shocked by Bahan’s 
conduct.  Warren stated that she could see Judge Goslee and believed that he heard 
January Term, 2022 
 
7
Bahan’s outburst, though she, Kennedy, and another attorney all testified that Judge 
Goslee did not react. 
The First Amendment and the regulation of attorney conduct 
{¶ 23} As a general matter, “the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”  Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 
2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).  That said, “the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak 
whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any circumstances 
that he chooses.”  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 
284 (1971). 
{¶ 24} “It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial 
proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.”  Gentile v. Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 
115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991).  And “[e]ven outside the courtroom, * * * lawyers in 
pending cases [a]re subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary 
citizen would not be.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that “[e]ven 
in an area far from the courtroom and the pendency of a case, our decisions dealing 
with a lawyer’s right under the First Amendment to solicit business and advertise, 
contrary to promulgated rules of ethics, have not suggested that lawyers are 
protected by the First Amendment to the same extent as those engaged in other 
businesses.”  Id. at 1073, citing Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 
2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 
Comm. of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990), and Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978).  “In 
each of these cases, [the court] engaged in a balancing process, weighting the 
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State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer’s First 
Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue.”  Gentile at 1073. 
{¶ 26} Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized an 
attorney’s duty to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts. 
 
[T]he obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not 
by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are 
admitted to the bar, is not to merely be obedient to the Constitution 
and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of 
justice and judicial officers.  This obligation is not discharged by 
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but 
it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and 
offensive conduct toward the judges personally and for their judicial 
acts. 
 
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). 
{¶ 27} In an effort to preserve the honor, integrity, and dignity of the legal 
profession and Ohio courts, this court has adopted Gov.Bar R. IV(2) to regulate 
attorney conduct toward the courts.  That rule provides: “It is the duty of the lawyer 
to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts, not for the sake of the temporary 
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme 
importance.”  While recognizing that judges and justices are entitled to receive the 
support of lawyers against unjust criticism and clamor, the rule declares that a 
lawyer has the right and duty to submit a grievance to proper authorities, 
“[w]henever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer.”  Id.  
Indeed, it emphasizes that “[t]hese charges should be encouraged and the person 
making them should be protected.”  Id. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 28} The requirements of Gov.Bar R. IV(2) are consistent with an Ohio 
lawyer’s oath to conduct herself “with dignity and civility and show respect toward 
judges, court staff, clients, fellow professionals, and all other persons” in her 
capacity as an attorney and an officer of the court.  Gov.Bar R. I(9)(A).  Those 
requirements are also consistent with Section 5 of the preamble to the Ohio Rules 
of Professional Conduct, which provides that “[a] lawyer should demonstrate 
respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other 
lawyers, and public officials,” and underscores that “[a]lthough a lawyer, as a 
citizen has a right to criticize such officials, the lawyer should do so with restraint 
and avoid intemperate statements that tend to lessen public confidence in the legal 
system.” 
{¶ 29} Significantly, none of these regulations prohibit a lawyer from 
speaking on any subject matter.  Instead, they require a lawyer to conduct herself 
with the dignity and respect that is commensurate with her role as an officer of the 
court to encourage civility and to preserve public confidence in the legal system. 
Analysis of Bahan’s objection 
{¶ 30} Bahan contends that Gov.Bar R. IV(2) should not be broadly 
interpreted so as to proscribe the use of offensive language to criticize a judge.  
Citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 
N.E.2d 425, Bahan asserts that attorneys may still “freely exercise free speech 
rights and make statements supported by a reasonable factual basis, even if the 
attorney turns out to be mistaken.”  But Bahan was not charged under the rule that 
prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false accusation against a judge.  
She was charged under a rule that requires a lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude 
toward the courts. 
{¶ 31} Here, Bahan’s conduct is not objectionable simply because she 
publicly criticized Judge Goslee and it remains unclear how directing profane 
insults toward a judge is “political speech.”  Bahan argues that she intended to 
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express her disapproval of Judge Goslee’s courtroom conduct that purportedly led 
the bar association to present him with a mock award that evening.  But Bahan did 
not associate her vulgarities with any other facts or context.  Instead, on its face, 
Bahan’s conduct—offensive name-calling, which was apparently induced by 
alcohol and directed toward a sitting judge while he was being publicly recognized 
at a bar-association function—erodes the civility, dignity, and respect for the rule 
of law contrary to an attorney’s duty described in Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 32} Bahan argues that her speech is not sanctionable under the First 
Amendment standard set forth in Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir.2012).  
But the Sixth Circuit in Berry expressly stated: “We also take no position on the 
constitutionality of sanctioning a lawyer’s profanity or threats directed against the 
courts, or other examples of a lawyer’s unmitigated expression of disrespect for the 
law, even outside the courtoom.”  Id. at 305.  Bahan’s conduct is more fitting of 
this description than to being categorized as political speech.  Thus, Berry is not 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
{¶ 33} Unlike the opinion concurring in judgment only, we fail to see how 
finding misconduct in this case will have a chilling effect on “legitimate [attorney] 
criticism of the judiciary.”  Opinion concurring in judgment only, ¶ 106.  Surely, 
we are not asked to determine whether Bahan’s choice expletives to describe Judge 
Goslee are “legitimate criticism” or even whether they are knowingly false.  The 
opinion concurring in judgment only also suggests that a finding of misconduct 
here sends a message that attorneys should not get “anywhere close to the line of 
saying something about the judiciary that someone might consider disrespectful.”  
Id. at ¶ 107.  We do not agree that the facts of this case are “close to the line” or 
otherwise warrant such a concern. 
{¶ 34} By accepting the privilege of practicing law, an attorney accepts 
certain conditions and duties as an officer of the court. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. 
v. Morton, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-4095, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 38 (O’Connor, C.J., 
January Term, 2022 
 
11 
concurring).  And while the First Amendment may be invoked as a defense for 
permissible criticism, see, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 
425, that is not the situation here.  We therefore overrule Bahan’s first objection 
and adopt the board’s finding that her conduct at the December 2018 Logan County 
Bar Association event violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 35} The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part asserts that 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) “is not a stand-alone, independent ground on which to discipline 
Bahan.”  Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, ¶ 66.  It also asserts that 
because Gov.Bar R. IV(2) is not one of the Rules of Professional Conduct, it 
“cannot serve as an underlying basis for an allegation of misconduct.”  Id. at ¶ 77.  
But those claims are without basis. 
{¶ 36} Indeed, this court has publicly reprimanded an attorney based solely 
on his violations of the Rules of the Government of the Bar.  See, e.g., Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Brand, 164 Ohio St.3d 542, 2021-Ohio-2122, 173 N.E.3d 1211.  In 
Brand, a unanimous decision issued last year, this court adopted the board’s 
findings of misconduct based on Jack Irwin Brand’s violations of Gov.Bar R. 
V(23)(C) (requiring a lawyer seeking to enter into an employment, contractual, or 
consulting relationship with a disqualified or suspended attorney to register that 
relationship with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel), Gov.Bar R. V(23)(D) 
(requiring the lawyer entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting 
relationship with a disqualified or suspended attorney to receive written 
acknowledgment of that relationship from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
before the relationship commences), and Gov.Bar R. V(23)(F) (requiring an 
attorney to provide advance written notice to a client that a disqualified or 
suspended attorney will perform work or provide services on the client’s case).  To 
be clear, this court found no accompanying violation of a Rule of Professional 
Conduct.  And that decision was not an anomaly.  See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
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Dugan, 113 Ohio St.3d 370, 2007-Ohio-2077, 865 N.E.2d 895, ¶ 3 (publicly 
reprimanding an attorney for violating Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(1) (requiring a lawyer 
who employs a lawyer with a suspended license to register the employment with 
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel) and, for separate conduct, violating former 
disciplinary rules); Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Allanson, 72 Ohio St.3d 228, 648 N.E.2d 
1340 (1995) (publicly reprimanding an attorney for violating former Gov.Bar R. 
V(5)(A), which is now Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate with 
a disciplinary investigation) and Gov.Bar R. VI(1)(A) (requiring an attorney to 
comply with regulations for biennial registration and payment of fees)). 
{¶ 37} In addition, this court has disciplined attorneys for violating the same 
rule at issue here, Gov.Bar R. IV(2).  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 215, 2012-Ohio-684, 963 N.E.2d 806, ¶ 5, 8; Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 
122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, ¶ 5; Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Watterson, 114 Ohio St.3d 159, 2007-Ohio-3615, 870 N.E.2d 1153, ¶ 29.  
Although the attorneys in those cases also violated various former disciplinary 
rules, we did not make a distinction between the two sets of rules or otherwise 
disregard the violation of Gov.Bar R. IV(2), as the opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part suggests that we must do here. 
{¶ 38} The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part asserts that 
because Gov.Bar R. IV(1) places attorneys on notice that they must comply with 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, but does not expressly state that attorneys must 
also comply with the Rules for the Government of the Bar, this court does not have 
the authority to sanction an attorney for violating the Rules for the Government of 
the Bar.  But Gov.Bar R. IV(1) does not contain any such limitation.  Nor does it 
contain language stating that the Rules of Professional Conduct are the exclusive 
parameters on an attorney’s conduct.  The Rules for the Government of the Bar 
delineate things like the requirements for an attorney’s admission to the bar, 
attorney registration, and continuing legal education.  See Gov.Bar R. I, VI, and X.  
January Term, 2022 
 
13 
But if we were to accept the statements in the separate opinion as true, the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar would be unenforceable unless a parallel Rule of 
Professional Conduct existed.  And that interpretation is not supported by either set 
of rules or this court’s precedent. 
{¶ 39} If the separate opinions intend to suggest that the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar are not clear regarding an attorney’s risk of being sanctioned 
for his or her failure to comply with those rules, then there is a process by which 
this court may amend those rules.  However, not even Bahan argues that she may 
not be sanctioned for violating one of the Rules for the Government of the Bar.  
Instead, Bahan argues that her conduct did not constitute a violation of Gov.Bar R. 
IV(2).  Thus, our analysis here remains within that scope, and we rely on this court’s 
significant body of precedent in which it affirmed findings of misconduct based on 
a violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar. 
The record supports two of the board’s three findings that Bahan engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
{¶ 40} In her second and third objections, Bahan contends that the evidence 
does not support the board’s finding that the incidents of alcohol-related conduct in 
Count Two were prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Specifically, Bahan 
contends that (1) she appropriately called the sheriff’s office to report the alleged 
theft of her car and iPad and (2) relator’s evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that drinking a single glass of wine with dinner before conducting a visit to 
her ward’s home was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
{¶ 41} Bahan maintains that she had a right to report a crime or an 
emergency and that her May 2019 and February 2017 calls to the Logan County 
Sheriff’s Office did just that.  To support that claim, she asserts (1) that the deputy 
who responded to the call pertaining to the theft of her iPad testified that she “did 
the right thing” by contacting law enforcement, and (2) that another officer, who 
testified about responding to the call that Bahan had made regarding the alleged 
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theft of her vehicle, “likewise saw no problem with [her] contact with law 
enforcement.”  Bahan argues that both officers expressed their preference to receive 
calls like Bahan’s sooner rather than later when they involve situations that could 
lead to domestic violence. 
{¶ 42} All told, law-enforcement officers spent more than an hour 
responding to Bahan’s claim that her vehicle had been stolen.  And Bahan’s initial 
report to law enforcement in no way suggested that the alleged theft involved a 
domestic dispute or a threat of domestic violence. 
{¶ 43} Regarding the alleged iPad theft, the deputy’s audio recording of the 
incident suggests that Bahan’s son was authorized to use the device for schoolwork, 
but that Bahan attempted to take it away from him that night.  Her son retreated to 
his room before leaving the home for the night. 
{¶ 44} The deputies who responded to the scene never investigated Bahan’s 
allegations that her son had stolen her iPad because her husband had also called 9-
1-1 to report—and the deputies’ observations confirmed—that Bahan was heavily 
intoxicated and was the one who had been causing problems at the home.  Bahan’s 
retrospective suggestion that her drunken call may have been intended to forestall 
the potential for domestic violence from which her son had retreated is not 
persuasive.  Nor does the absence of criminal charges for her drunken and 
questionable reports absolve her of her misuse of law-enforcement resources.  We 
therefore overrule Bahan’s second objection and find that her two reports to law 
enforcement were prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). 
{¶ 45} However, we sustain Bahan’s third objection challenging the board’s 
findings regarding her conduct as a GAL more than 10 years ago.  Although Bahan 
admitted to having consumed a glass of wine before conducting a surprise visit at 
the home of her ward’s mother, she also testified that after that visit, she and the 
judge who had appointed her to the case discussed the matter.  Ultimately, Bahan 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
completed her representation in that case and thereafter submitted a bill and 
received payment.  And she stated that the judge continued to appoint her as a GAL 
in other cases.  The judge, however, testified that he believed that Bahan had 
withdrawn from the case at his suggestion. 
{¶ 46} In the absence of any clear and convincing evidence tending to show 
that Bahan’s judgment was impaired that night or that her alcohol consumption 
somehow prejudiced the rights of the ward’s mother, we reject the board’s findings 
that her conduct in that case was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  We 
therefore sustain Bahan’s third objection. 
{¶ 47} Having overruled Bahan’s first and second objections, we agree with 
the board’s findings that her conduct violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2) and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(d). 
Bahan has failed to prove that the panel’s evidentiary rulings prejudiced her case 
{¶ 48} Bahan’s fourth objection relates to the panel’s evidentiary rulings at 
her disciplinary hearing.  On October 21, 2020, relator filed a motion in limine 
seeking to exclude the testimony of Bahan’s witnesses who were not disclosed to 
relator until October 20, 2020—one week before the disciplinary hearing.  In 
response, Bahan argued that the panel chair had vacated every deadline for the 
disclosure of witnesses except for the order directing the parties to file their final 
witness lists, hearing exhibits, and stipulations by October 20, 2020.  At the 
beginning of the disciplinary hearing, the panel chair issued an interlocutory order 
that Bahan’s newly disclosed witnesses would be permitted to testify about Bahan’s 
character, reputation, and professionalism and their observations regarding her 
alcohol use, but that they would not be permitted to testify about any of the 
contested matters in the case.  Bahan objects to that ruling and argues that the 
panel’s limitation of her witnesses’ testimony violated her right to due process. 
{¶ 49} The record shows that the panel chair vacated two scheduling orders 
in Bahan’s disciplinary case—one requiring the parties to disclose their witness 
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lists on or before March 18, 2020, and the other requiring that disclosure was to be 
made no later than June 5.  Both orders were vacated after the disclosure-of-
witness-list deadlines had passed.  The order vacating the June 5 deadline plainly 
contemplated that the parties had already exchanged their initial witness lists as it 
stated that “[t]he parties shall file final witness lists, hearing exhibits, and 
stipulations on or before October 20, 2020.”  (Emphasis added.)  But Bahan did not 
submit a witness list of any kind until October 20, 2020. 
{¶ 50} Although the panel’s scheduling orders could have been more 
carefully drafted, Bahan’s first two deadlines for disclosing witnesses had passed 
well before the orders vacating those deadlines.  In addition, Evid.R. 103(A)(2)—
which is made applicable to disciplinary proceedings by Gov.Bar R. V(27)(A)—
provides that an error may not be predicated on a ruling which excludes evidence 
unless the ruling affects a party’s substantial right and the party made the substance 
of the evidence known to the court. 
{¶ 51} Here, the panel chair agreed to keep an open mind regarding the 
extent of the testimony that he would allow from Bahan’s witnesses and stated that 
Bahan could proffer any testimony that she believed to have been wrongly 
excluded.  But Bahan made only one proffer of evidence to counter testimony that 
she had smelled strongly of alcohol while representing a criminal defendant at 
trial—and it was unrelated to any of the misconduct that had been found by the 
board.  Because Bahan failed to proffer the excluded evidence or otherwise 
demonstrate how the panel’s evidentiary ruling prejudiced her case, we overrule 
her fourth objection. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 52} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
{¶ 53} The board found that four aggravating factors are present in this case, 
namely that Bahan (1) has prior discipline, (2) engaged in a pattern of misconduct, 
(3) committed multiple offenses, and (4) refused to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of her conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), (4), and (7).  As mitigating 
factors, the board found that Bahan acted without a dishonest or selfish motive and 
that she exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2) and (4).  The board declined to accord any mitigating 
effect to the testimony of Mark O’Connor (a former judge in the Logan County 
Court of Common Pleas) and Wade Thomas Minahan (a former magistrate in the 
Logan County Court of Common Pleas), upon finding that those witnesses testified 
to Bahan’s competence as an attorney and not to her character or reputation as 
contemplated by Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5). 
{¶ 54} Although Bahan has been evaluated by OLAP twice in the past, it is 
not clear from the record that she has submitted to a comprehensive substance-use 
assessment conducted by a qualified chemical-dependency professional in 
conjunction with the alcohol-related incidents in this case.   
{¶ 55} The board considered the sanctions we have imposed for comparable 
misconduct in multiple cases.  There are several cases in which we disciplined an 
attorney (or a judge) for multiple ethical violations, including violations of Gov.Bar 
R. IV(2), for making unfounded allegations against judges and other public 
officials.  For example, in Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 
N.E.2d 425, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who, in a motion 
for reconsideration, accused an appellate-court panel of being dishonest, ignoring 
well-established law, and distorting the truth when the appellate court ruled against 
his client.  And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 85 Ohio St.3d 649, 710 N.E.2d 
1107 (1999), we imposed an 18-month suspension, with 12 months conditionally 
stayed, on a judge who had made false and unfounded statements to the media about 
judges and other public officials.  Ferreri stated that (1) an appellate-court panel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
had issued a politically motivated decision, (2) a judge had engaged in a conspiracy 
to cover up the mistreatment of juveniles by detention-center staff, and (3) another 
judge or those under his direct supervision had lied to the federal government about 
the success of a juvenile boot-camp program. 
{¶ 56} The board also considered the sanctions that we imposed on 
attorneys who engaged in alcohol-related misconduct.  For example, in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mitchell, 158 Ohio St.3d 356, 2019-Ohio-5218, 142 
N.E.3d 669, we imposed a one-year conditionally stayed suspension on an attorney 
who was convicted of driving while intoxicated and fleeing the scene of an accident 
involving injuries to the driver and passenger of the other vehicle.  In Lorain Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Lewis, 152 Ohio St.3d 614, 2018-Ohio-2024, 99 N.E.3d 404, we 
imposed a two-year suspension, with six months conditionally stayed, on an 
attorney who had left the scene of a motor-vehicle accident after a night of drinking 
and who was later convicted of obstructing official business for submitting a false 
witness statement to police.  And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 
201, 2007-Ohio-4796, 874 N.E.2d 521, we imposed a two-year conditionally 
stayed suspension on an attorney who, while intoxicated, met with clients and 
attempted to manage his professional affairs. 
{¶ 57} The board found that Bahan’s profane and alcohol-fueled outburst 
against Judge Goslee was not nearly as egregious as the allegations that had been 
made against the attorney in Gardner.  The board further noted that Bahan’s 
outburst at a private, bar-association event was also not as egregious as what had 
occurred in Fererri—i.e., that judge made some negative statements that were 
published by the media.  Moreover, the board found that none of Bahan’s 
misconduct adversely affected her clients or resulted in a criminal conviction, 
rendering her conduct substantially less egregious than the attorneys in Mitchell 
and Lewis—both of whom left the scene of alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents.  
Balancing these facts with the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this 
January Term, 2022 
 
19 
case, the board determined that Bahan’s misconduct warranted a lesser sanction 
than the fully stayed one-year suspension that we imposed in Mitchell.  The board 
therefore recommends that we impose a six-month suspension, with the entire 
suspension stayed on the condition that Bahan engage in no further misconduct and 
pay the cost of these proceedings. 
Bahan’s Objection to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 58} Bahan objects to the board’s recommended sanction and argues that 
a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for her misconduct.  In support of 
that sanction, she cites three cases in which we publicly reprimanded attorneys for 
misconduct that she believes to be more analogous to her own:  Erie-Huron Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Bailey, 161 Ohio St.3d 146, 2020-Ohio-3701, 161 N.E.3d 590 
(publicly reprimanding an attorney who knowingly or recklessly made false 
statements on Facebook concerning the integrity of the judge who had jailed his 
father for direct contempt of court), Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes, 66 Ohio St.3d 
607, 614 N.E.2d 740 (1993) (publicly reprimanding an attorney for making 
inappropriate and disrespectful statements about a judge to a newspaper reporter 
and for making inappropriate statements during a hearing), and Columbus Bar Assn. 
v. Riebel, 69 Ohio St.2d 290, 432 N.E.2d 165 (1982) (publicly reprimanding an 
attorney who directed verbal and written obscenities at an adverse party in a divorce 
proceeding).  But none of those attorneys had a record of prior discipline, and 
Bahan does. 
{¶ 59} Next, Bahan asserts that the board erred by drawing a false 
distinction between evidence of “character” and evidence of “competence,” and it 
therefore failed to credit her with the good-character-or-reputation mitigation 
factor, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5), based on the favorable testimony that former 
judge O’Connor and former magistrate Minahan gave regarding her competence as 
an attorney.  Bahan cites two cases in which we afforded some mitigating effect to 
evidence of the respondents’ competence and/or professionalism as opposed to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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their character or reputation.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Adelstein, 160 Ohio St.3d 
511, 2020-Ohio-3000, 159 N.E.3d 1126, ¶ 16 (attributing some mitigating effect to 
client letters attesting to the respondent’s competence and capability as an 
attorney); Dayton Bar Assn. v. Rogers, 116 Ohio St.3d 99, 2007-Ohio-5544, 876 
N.E.2d 923, ¶ 17 (attributing some mitigating effect to client letters attesting to the 
respondent’s competence and professionalism).  But here, Bahan presented 
evidence from two judicial officers who had been retired for at least four years 
before the date of her disciplinary hearing and well before the misconduct in this 
case even occurred.  And Judge O’Connor observed Bahan’s courtroom 
performance after his retirement only once, in a case in which he served as a visiting 
judge.  For these reasons, we find that evidence of Bahan’s competence is of limited 
probative value and afford it no mitigating weight. 
{¶ 60} Lastly, Bahan argues that she is entitled to a reduction in board costs 
that is commensurate with the overall results of this proceeding.  She notes one case 
in which we reduced the amount of the costs that a respondent was liable to pay 
after 9 of the 17 alleged rule violations were dismissed.  See Akron Bar Assn. v. 
Shenise, 143 Ohio St.3d 134, 2015-Ohio-1548, 34 N.E.3d 910, ¶ 26 (reducing the 
respondent’s liability for costs from $9,571.08 to $4,000).  In this case, however, 
relator withdrew one count from the complaint without presenting any evidence of 
the violations alleged therein and the panel dismissed a second count following the 
hearing.  Bahan was found to have committed one of the two alleged rule violations 
charged in each of the two remaining counts.  While the costs incurred in 
connection with this proceeding may be on the higher side of normal for the number 
of violations that we have found, we do not find that they are so out of line as to 
warrant a reduction. 
{¶ 61} Having considered Bahan’s misconduct, the relevant aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct, we 
agree that a six-month conditionally stayed suspension is the appropriate sanction 
January Term, 2022 
 
21 
in this case.  Given that Bahan’s alcohol use played a significant role in the 
misconduct at issue, and that Bahan has not submitted to a substance-use 
assessment conducted by a qualified chemical-dependency professional since that 
misconduct occurred, a condition of the stay shall include a requirement that she 
submit to an OLAP substance-use assessment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 62} Accordingly, Natalie J. Bahan is suspended from the practice of law 
in Ohio for six months, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that she 
engage in no further misconduct, submit to a substance-use assessment conducted 
by OLAP, and comply with all the recommendations arising from that assessment.  
If Bahan fails to comply with any condition of the stay, it will be lifted and she will 
serve the full six-month suspension.  Costs are taxed to Bahan. 
Judgment accordingly. 
FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J., except for paragraphs 85 and 86. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
KENNEDY, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 63} I agree with the majority that respondent, Natalie J. Bahan, violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  On two occasions, she contacted law 
enforcement while intoxicated to report minor incidents involving her family.  I 
therefore concur with the majority that the appropriate sanction is a six-month 
suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that Bahan engage 
in no further misconduct, that she complete a substance-use assessment conducted 
by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and that she comply with all 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
the recommendations arising from that assessment.  I would also require Bahan to 
contact OLAP within 60 days after this court’s judgment to begin the process for 
the substance-use assessment.  
{¶ 64} I part ways with the majority’s analysis regarding Count One, which 
alleges that Bahan violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2) by failing to maintain a “respectful 
attitude” toward the courts when she called a judge expletives during a bar-
association holiday event. 
{¶ 65} I agree with the opinion concurring in judgment only that the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits this court from discipling 
an attorney solely for exhibiting a disrespectful attitude toward the courts.  The 
majority today has made Gov.Bar R. IV(2) a content-based regulation that prohibits 
lawyers from calling judges—but no one else—rude names.  More alarming is that 
this case is just part of a recent trend in which the majority is ordering that any 
criticism of the judiciary be kept silent.  Last year, this court disciplined an attorney 
for impugning the integrity of this court when that attorney asserted that one of this 
court’s judgments had been based on political motivations.  Cleveland Metro. Bar 
Assn. v. Morton, ___ Ohio St.3d ___ 2021-Ohio-4095, ___ N.E.3d ___.  Today, the 
majority punishes an attorney for failing to show the appropriate amount of respect 
toward a judge outside a courtroom.  In barring attorney speech that supposedly 
erodes “respect for the rule of law,” majority opinion, ¶ 31, the majority chills an 
attorney’s ability to express dissatisfaction in the judiciary in words (that a judge 
is, perhaps, “incompetent,” “unreasonable,” or just “wrong”) or tone.  Ohioans 
should no more countenance the majority slicing away bit by bit at their 
fundamental right of the freedom of expression any more than they would permit 
the government to enter their homes to cut away the legs of their dining-room 
tables. 
{¶ 66} The focus of this dissent, however, will be a textual analysis of the 
majority’s disturbing trend toward ignoring the plain language of Ohio’s 
January Term, 2022 
 
23 
disciplinary rules.  See, e.g., Morton at ¶ 47-48 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Although 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) states that “[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain a respectful 
attitude toward the courts,”  Gov.Bar R. IV(1) states that lawyers are obligated to 
comply with the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and that “[t]he willful breach 
of the Rules shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation 
as provided in Gov.Bar R. V.”  When these provisions are read together, the 
unmistakable conclusion of their meaning is that Gov.Bar R. IV(2) is not a stand-
alone, independent ground on which to discipline Bahan because it is not one of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The fact that the parties have failed to make this 
argument in this case or that this court has failed to notice its inapplicability in past 
cases does not justify turning a blind eye to the plain language of Gov.Bar R. IV, 
especially when a person’s freedom of speech hangs in the balance. 
{¶ 67} Because Gov.Bar R. IV(1) limits attorney discipline to violations of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, I would hold that Gov.Bar R. IV(2) cannot serve 
as an independent basis for sanctioning misconduct.  Therefore, I would dismiss 
that count of the complaint on procedural grounds and would not reach Bahan’s 
First-Amendment-grounds objection to that count. 
{¶ 68} After dismissing Count One, I would sanction Bahan for violating 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  While there is no case directly on point for the misconduct at 
issue here, we have imposed sanctions for a single violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
based on alcohol-related misconduct.  Those cases, along with the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in this case, demonstrate that the appropriate sanction here is a 
six-month suspension, with the entire suspension stayed.  Therefore, I concur in the 
majority’s sanction—a six-month suspension, fully stayed on the conditions that 
Bahan engage in no further misconduct, that she contact OLAP for a substance-use 
assessment conducted by OLAP, and that she comply with all recommendations 
arising from that assessment.  Additionally, I would require Bahan to contact OLAP 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
within 60 days of this opinion to begin the process for her substance-use 
assessment.   
{¶ 69} For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
Gov.Bar R. IV 
{¶ 70} Count One of the complaint charged Bahan with misconduct from 
two separate sources, the Rules of Professional Conduct (Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)) and 
the Rules for the Government of the Bar (Gov.Bar R. IV(2)). The allegations 
stemmed from an alleged loud, profane, and drunken outburst that Bahan directed 
at a common-pleas-court judge during the Logan County Bar Association’s annual 
holiday party. After the hearing, the panel unanimously dismissed the alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  The panel nevertheless proceeded to find that 
Bahan had violated Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 71} The scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides “a 
framework for the ethical practice of law.”  Prof.Cond.R., Preamble [16].  “Failure 
to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking 
the disciplinary process.”  Id. at [19].  “[S]ince the rules do establish standards of 
conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a rule may be evidence of breach of the 
applicable standard of conduct.”  Id. at [20].  The professional-conduct rules 
therefore establish the conduct that an attorney is required to abide by when 
engaging in the practice of law: (1) in the client-lawyer relationship, Prof.Cond.R. 
1.1 through 1.18, (2) as a counselor, Prof.Cond.R. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, (3) as an 
advocate, Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 through 3.9, (4) in transactions with persons other than 
clients, Prof.Cond.R. 4.1 through 4.4, (5) in law firms and associations, 
Prof.Cond.R. 5.1 through 5.7, (6) in public service, Prof.Cond.R. 6.2 and 6.5, 
(7) regarding information about legal services, Prof.Cond.R. 6.1 through 6.7, and 
(8) for maintaining the integrity of the profession, Prof.Cond.R. 8.1 through 8.5. 
{¶ 72} In comparison, the Rules for the Government of the Bar address, 
generally, two separate mandates.  First, they establish the requirements and 
January Term, 2022 
 
25 
procedures to become licensed to practice law in Ohio.  See, e.g., Gov.Bar R. I 
(admission to the practice of law) and XII (pro hac vice admission).  Second, the 
rules set forth the professional responsibilities that are required for attorneys to 
remain licensed to practice law in Ohio.  See, e.g., Gov.Bar R. IV (professional 
responsibility), VI (registration of attorneys), and X (continuing legal education). 
{¶ 73} The specific rule at issue, Gov.Bar R. IV, has two provisions:   
 
Section 1.  Applicability.  The Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct, effective February 1, 2007, as amended, shall be binding 
upon all persons admitted to practice law in Ohio.  The willful 
breach of the Rules shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, 
disbarment, or probation as provided in Gov.Bar R. V. 
Section 2.  Duty of Lawyers.  It is the duty of the lawyer to 
maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts, not for the sake of 
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the 
maintenance of its supreme importance.  Judges and Justices, not 
being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to 
receive the support of lawyers against unjust criticism and clamor.  
Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial 
officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit a grievance to 
proper authorities.  These charges should be encouraged and the 
person making them should be protected. 
 
 
{¶ 74} I recognize that this court has previously disciplined attorneys for 
violating the Rules for the Government of the Bar in general and Gov.Bar R. IV(2) 
in particular.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown, 90 Ohio St.3d 273, 737 
N.E.2d 516 (2000); Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 78 Ohio St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 
517 (1997).  But in deciding those cases, the court never specifically addressed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
whether Gov.Bar R. IV(2) could be a stand-alone violation.  As we explained long 
ago, “A reported decision, although in a case where the question might have been 
raised, is entitled to no consideration whatever as settling, by judicial 
determination, a question not passed upon or raised at the time of the adjudication.”  
State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d 206 (1952), paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  Therefore, prior decisions have little bearing on this issue. 
{¶ 75} I also acknowledge that Bahan has not raised the issue whether 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) may be a stand-alone violation.  However, the failure to raise that 
issue does not prevent this court from reviewing it when called upon to determine 
whether an attorney may be sanctioned for violating Gov.Bar R. IV(2).  In 
interpreting the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules for the Government 
of the Bar, we “have the authority and the duty to ‘say what the law is.’ ”  In re 
Determination of Existence of Significantly Excessive Earnings for 2017 Under the 
Elec. Sec. Plan of Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 651, 2020-Ohio-5450, 166 
N.E.3d 1191, ¶ 105 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only in part and 
dissenting in part), quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803).  Therefore, we abdicate that responsibility when we fail to apply the correct 
meaning of a rule just because a party has not asked us to do so.  Id. 
{¶ 76} The majority gives two responses for why an attorney may be 
disciplined for violating Gov.Bar R. IV(2).  First, it points out that Gov.Bar R. IV(1) 
does not “contain language stating that the Rules of Professional Conduct are the 
exclusive parameters on an attorney’s conduct.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 38.  But 
Gov.Bar R. IV(1) lists the sanctions that may be imposed for attorney misconduct.  
And if a violation for one of the Rules for the Government of the Bar were subject 
of those sanctions, one would naturally expect Gov.Bar R. IV(1) to say so.  Instead, 
Gov.Bar R. IV(1) singles out the professional-conduct rules, and states that a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is to be punished by reprimand, 
suspension, disbarment, or probation.  Accordingly, this statement creates the 
January Term, 2022 
 
27 
common-sense inference that a violation of a different set rules (i.e., the Rules for 
the Government of the Bar) is not subject to those sanctions.  See Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012).  To accept the 
majority’s interpretation would mean disciplining an attorney solely by reading 
between the lines of Gov.Bar R. IV(1).  We cannot do that.  Second, the majority 
falls back on the position that a contrary holding would mean that the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar would be unenforceable unless a parallel Rule of 
Professional Conduct existed.  Majority opinion at ¶ 38.  But that is a judgment 
based on policy, and a policy judgment does not give this court license to read 
language that is not there to cure an oversight in Gov.Bar R. IV(1). 
{¶ 77} The plain and unambiguous language of Gov.Bar R. IV(1) places 
attorneys on notice that their behavior and actions must comply with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and that an intentional breach of one of those rules could 
result in discipline.  Gov.Bar R. IV(2) is not one of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and in my view, this general statement cannot serve as an underlying basis 
for an allegation of misconduct. 
{¶ 78} It is also important to note that Gov.Bar R. IV(2) admonishes 
attorneys to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts.  A court is “ ‘a place 
in which justice is judicially administered.  It is the exercise of judicial power, by 
the proper officer or officers, at a time and place appointed by law.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296 
N.E.2d 544 (1973), quoting Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284, 15 S.Ct. 889, 
39 L.Ed. 982 (1895).  As Gov.Bar R. IV(2) recognizes, there is a difference between 
a court and “the temporary incumbent of the judicial office.”  It is “a fundamental 
understanding of constitutional democracy” that “judges are not imperial.”  State v. 
Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 21, overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 
N.E.3d 248.  Nor are they “anointed priests set apart from the community and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
spared the criticism to which * * * other public servants are exposed.”  Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 292, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  Just like other public officials, judges are not insulated from public 
comment that “may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).  And here, Bahan made 
an expletive-laden personal attack against a sitting judge outside the courtroom 
setting.  That setting—a bar-association holiday event—did not involve any need 
to maintain decorum and order in the courtroom to ensure the proper functioning 
of the court.  Bahan’s behavior, although classless, did not implicate, much less 
violate, Gov.Bar R. IV(2). 
{¶ 79} To charge Bahan with misconduct for making improper statements 
against a member of the judiciary, then, relator would have to have alleged that 
Bahan violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make 
a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its 
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judicial officer, or 
candidate for election or appointment to judicial office.”  (Italics sic.)  However, 
the facts of this case do not support such an allegation.  Bahan made personal 
attacks on the judge by using expletives.  Those comments did not address his 
qualifications or integrity but rather were expressions of opinion that do not amount 
to defamation under the actual-malice standard, as established in Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, that I believe is imposed by Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), 
but which this court has not adopted.  See Morton, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-
4095, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 56-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 80} Because attorneys are not subject to discipline for violating Gov.Bar 
R. IV(2), I would dismiss Count One of the complaint.  Therefore, the only 
remaining findings by the majority of misconduct by Bahan are the violations of 
January Term, 2022 
 
29 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case 
proves that Bahan violated this rule. 
The Appropriate Sanction for Violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
{¶ 81} Turning to the appropriate sanction in this matter, the relevant 
aggravating factors are that Bahan (1) has prior discipline, (2) engaged in a pattern 
of misconduct, (3) committed multiple offenses, and (4) refused to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of her conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), (4), and (7).  
The relevant mitigating factors are that Bahan (1) acted without a dishonest or 
selfish motive and (2) exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2) and (4).  I agree with the majority that 
the testimony of Mark O’Connor (a former judge in the Logan County Court of 
Common Pleas) and Wade Thomas Minahan (a former magistrate in the Logan 
County Court of Common Pleas) attesting to Bahan’s competence is of limited 
probative value and should be afforded no mitigating weight. 
{¶ 82} Recently, in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Hackerd, 156 Ohio St.3d 
545, 2019-Ohio-1340, 130 N.E.3d 254, ¶ 12, this court considered for the first time 
the appropriate sanction for a “stand-alone violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).”  In 
Hackerd, the attorney continued to represent his client after being disqualified by 
the trial court.  We noted the absence of any aggravating factors and the presence 
of four mitigating factors.  “Hackerd ha[d] no prior disciplinary record, he acted 
without a dishonest or selfish motive, he offered full and free disclosure to the board 
and demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and 
he presented evidence of his good character and reputation.”  Id. at ¶ 11, citing 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5).  On that record, this court determined 
that a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction for a single rule violation. 
{¶ 83} Additionally, as recognized by the majority, sanctions that have been 
imposed on attorneys who engaged in alcohol-related misconduct should be 
considered.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Mitchell, 158 Ohio St.3d 356, 2019-Ohio-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
5218, 142 N.E.3d 669, this court imposed a one-year conditionally stayed 
suspension on an attorney based on his convictions for driving while intoxicated 
and leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries to the driver and passenger 
of the other vehicle.  In Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Lewis, 152 Ohio St.3d 614, 2018-
Ohio-2024, 99 N.E.3d 404, the court imposed a two-year suspension, with six 
months conditionally stayed, on an attorney who after being out drinking, left the 
scene of a motor-vehicle accident and was later convicted of obstructing justice for 
submitting a false witness statement to police.  And in Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Scurry, 115 Ohio St.3d 201, 2007-Ohio-4796, 874 N.E.2d 521, ¶ 4, this court 
imposed a two-year conditionally stayed suspension on an attorney who, among 
other things, “repeatedly met with clients and attempted to manage his professional 
affairs while intoxicated.” 
{¶ 84} Bahan’s misconduct is significantly more egregious than the 
continued representation of a client after disqualification in Hackerd because it was 
a pattern of conduct.  She contacted law enforcement twice and made complaints 
against family members to punish and embarrass that family member.  
Additionally, Hackerd is not analogous to this case, because of the aggravating 
factors present here.  However, Bahan’s misconduct does not rise to the level of the 
behavior sanctioned in Mitchell, Lewis, or Scurry.  As recognized by the majority, 
Bahan’s misconduct did not result in harm to any clients or a criminal conviction.  
Although she was intoxicated on the two occasions that she called the sheriff’s 
office to report that family members had stolen her property, she was not 
representing clients or acting in the professional capacity of an attorney. 
{¶ 85} Guided by our caselaw, I agree with the majority that the appropriate 
sanction for Bahan’s misconduct is a six-month suspension, with the entire 
suspension stayed on the condition that Bahan engage in no further misconduct, 
that she complete a substance-use assessment conducted by OLAP, and that she 
comply with all the recommendations arising from that assessment.  However, I 
January Term, 2022 
 
31 
would also require Bahan to contact OLAP within 60 days after this court’s 
judgment to begin the process for the substance-use assessment. 
{¶ 86} Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion, except for paragraphs 85 and 
86. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 87} Today, the majority holds that an attorney may be punished under 
the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio for speech that fails “to maintain 
a respectful attitude toward the courts.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 26.  In doing so, it 
exceeds the limits of our disciplinary authority. Our rules allow us to punish only 
attorney speech about a judge that the lawyer knows to be false or that is made with 
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.  Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a).  What’s more, in 
holding that an attorney’s speech may be punished simply because it is disrespectful 
of the judiciary, the majority makes mincemeat of First Amendment protections.  
The unfortunate result will almost certainly be to chill other attorneys from 
engaging in legitimate criticism of the judiciary. 
We lack the authority to discipline an attorney for speech that is critical of the 
judiciary under the Rules for the Government of the Bar 
{¶ 88} I have no quarrel with the majority’s decision to discipline Natalie 
Bahan for violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) by making unnecessary 
calls to law enforcement while she was intoxicated.  And based on these violations, 
I concur with the majority as to the sanction it imposes.  But I take issue with the 
majority’s decision to discipline Bahan for violating Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a 
lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the courts) for making demeaning 
statements about a common-pleas judge at a bar association’s holiday party. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
{¶ 89} As the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part points out, 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) does not  provide this court with the authority to discipline an 
attorney for engaging in speech that is critical of the judiciary.  The Rules for the 
Government of the Bar make clear that it is the Rules of Professional Conduct that 
prescribe the standards under which an attorney may be disciplined.  Gov.Bar R. 
IV(1) provides that “[t]he willful breach of the Rules [of Professional Conduct] 
shall be punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation.” 
{¶ 90} Thus, when it comes to disciplining attorney speech that is critical 
of the judiciary, we must look to the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) explicitly defines what an attorney may not say about 
a judge:  “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false 
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or 
integrity of a judicial officer.”  The majority errs by ignoring the professional-
conduct rule that defines the standards under which speech critical of the judiciary 
may be sanctioned and instead opts to impose discipline under Gov.Bar R. IV(2)’s 
amorphous “respectful attitude towards the courts” language. 
Using Gov.Bar R. IV(2) as a basis to discipline attorney speech is inconsistent 
with the First Amendment 
{¶ 91} Not only is there no basis for this court to discipline an attorney for 
an independent violation of Gov.Bar R. IV(2), but in doing so, the majority 
eviscerates the protections on speech afforded by the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions.  The majority punishes Bahan for violating Gov.Bar R. IV(2)’s 
admonition that “[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude 
toward the courts.”  Attorney criticism of courts, however, is expressly regulated 
by Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement 
that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judicial officer.”  This professional-
conduct rule was carefully calibrated so as not to abridge First Amendment 
January Term, 2022 
 
33 
freedoms by adopting the actual-malice standard from New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (statement 
is made with actual malice when it is made “with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).  In saying that an attorney’s 
speech may now be punished simply because it fails to “maintain a respectful 
attitude toward the courts,” majority opinion at ¶ 26, the majority substitutes an 
amorphous standard for the one that was developed to conform with United States 
Supreme Court precedent.  It thus allows for the punishment of speech beyond that 
proscribed by Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a)—speech that is entitled to protection under the 
Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
{¶ 92} Just recently, the same majority that writes today stretched the 
meaning of Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) well beyond its terms when it held that an 
attorney’s criticism of the judiciary may be punished even though the attorney’s 
statements have not been shown to be false.  See Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. 
Morton, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-4095, __ N.E.3d __.  What it does in this 
case is even more troubling.  Today, it renders Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a)’s actual-malice 
standard largely beside the point.  In essence, the majority says if we think your 
speech is disrespectful, we can punish you even if your speech doesn’t violate 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a). 
{¶ 93} Never mind that this holding flies in the face of controlling precent 
from the United States Supreme Court.  District Attorney Jim Garrison certainly 
did not have a “respectful attitude toward the courts” when he held a press 
conference criticizing a group of local judges for “inefficiency [and] laziness” and 
suggested that the judges’ conduct might be explained by “racketeer influences on 
[the parish’s] eight vacation-minded judges.”  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
66, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).  Nonetheless, the United States Supreme 
Court found that Garrison’s speech was entitled to constitutional protection and that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
it could be punished only if it satisfied Sullivan’s actual-malice standard.  Garrison 
at 78-79. 
{¶ 94} The majority simply ignores this controlling precedent.  Instead, to 
justify its holding that attorney speech may be restricted just because it is 
disrespectful to a court, the majority reaches back to 1871 and suggests that what 
is “most important[]” is dicta from a case dealing with judicial immunity.  See 
majority opinion at ¶ 26, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355, 20 L.Ed. 646 
(1871).  What the majority neglects to mention is that in the 151 years since Bradley 
was decided, the United States Supreme Court has never cited the Bradley dicta to 
justify a restriction on attorney speech.  Not once. 
{¶ 95} To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has explained that 
“speech cannot be punished * * * ‘to protect the court as a mystical entity or the 
judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and spared 
the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed.”  
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292, 62 S.Ct. 190, 
86 L.Ed. 192 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Today, though, the majority holds 
just the opposite.  Speech about judges can now be punished merely because it is 
disrespectful. 
{¶ 96} Brazenly, the majority even cites Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
19, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), to support the result that it reaches today.  
See majority opinion at ¶ 23.  Cohen, of course, is the seminal free-speech case in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that California authorities could not 
punish a man for wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a county 
courthouse.  “One of the prerogatives of American citizenship,” the court 
explained, “is the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not 
only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and 
without moderation.”   Id. at 26, quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 
January Term, 2022 
 
35 
665, 673-674, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944).  Fair to say, the Cohen court’s 
conception of the First Amendment is dramatically different than the one the 
majority employs today. 
When speech is punished because of its subject, the regulation is not content 
neutral 
{¶ 97} A particularly troubling aspect of the majority opinion is its rejection 
of even the most basic principles of First Amendment jurisprudence.  The majority 
never even acknowledges that in holding an attorney may be disciplined for out-of-
courtroom speech simply because it is about a judge, it is imposing a content-based 
restriction on speech.  “Government regulation of speech is ‘content based’ if a law 
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed.”  Reed v. Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 
(2015).  Here the regulation is specifically based on the “topic discussed” (the 
courts), and thus, is inarguably content based. 
{¶ 98} It would be one thing if the majority sanctioned Bahan simply for 
her drunken, public outburst.  Or if it said that her out-of-court conduct would be 
equally sanctionable whether her tirade was directed at a judge, a minister, a barber, 
a city councilperson, or a member of the public.  In such a situation, the majority 
could plausibly maintain that the regulation it is enforcing is content neutral.  But 
that’s not what it holds.  It holds that her conduct is sanctionable for violating 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) precisely because it was directed at a judge.  That’s not a content-
neutral regulation.  And because it is not content neutral, it can pass constitutional 
muster only if it survives strict scrutiny.  Turner Broadcast Sys., Inc. v. Fed. 
Communications Comm., 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 
(1994).  The majority cannot—and doesn’t even try—to make such a showing.  
Indeed, the very existence of Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) demonstrates that there are less 
restrictive means for the government to accomplish its legitimate interests here. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
{¶ 99} Equally disquieting is the fact that the majority continues to justify 
its hyper-restrictive speech regulation on the need to “preserve public confidence 
in the legal system,” majority opinion at ¶ 29; see also Morton, __ Ohio St.3d __, 
2021-Ohio-4095, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 40 (O’Connor C.J., concurring) (“the integrity 
of the court is an essential cog in the democratic system”).  The United States 
Supreme Court, however, has flatly rejected this rationale.  As the Supreme Court 
has explained, “injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason ‘for repressing 
speech that would otherwise be free.’ ”  Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 
at 841-842, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1, quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-273, 84 
S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686.  And “the institutional reputation of the courts is entitled 
to no greater weight in the constitutional scales.”  Id. at 842.  Instead, “[t]he premise 
of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, 
and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented 
to them and its proximate and ultimate source.”  McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm., 540 U.S. 93, 258-259, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 100} Not only is the reputation-protecting speech restriction endorsed by 
the majority today constitutionally infirm, the restriction is also counterproductive.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned: 
 
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by 
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the 
character of American public opinion.  For it is a prized American 
privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect 
good taste, on all public institutions.  And an enforced silence, 
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the 
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and 
contempt much more than it would enhance respect. 
January Term, 2022 
 
37 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270-271, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192. 
{¶ 101} The majority’s view is that the First Amendment only “may be 
invoked as a defense for permissible criticism.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 34.  News 
flash.  That’s not the way the First Amendment works.  The First Amendment 
guarantees citizens permission to criticize their government; it doesn’t grant 
government the right to decide what criticism is permissible. 
{¶ 102} None of this is to defend Bahan’s conduct.  By all accounts, her 
behavior at the holiday party was boorish, unprofessional, and embarrassing to 
herself and others.  No doubt, regardless of any discipline that this court imposes, 
behavior of this sort has its own consequences.  It’s a fairly safe bet that Bahan’s 
outburst did serious damage to her reputation among the lawyers and judges who 
were in attendance—damage that one may assume will have financial 
consequences to her and her practice.  And there is a case to be made that 
independent of the communicative aspects of her drunken tirade, Bahan could have 
been disciplined for violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  
But for whatever reason, the three-member panel of the Board of Professional 
Conduct that heard Bahan’s case chose to dismiss those alleged violations, and we 
cannot impose discipline on any charge that a panel has unanimously dismissed.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G) (when a unanimous hearing panel finds that the evidence 
is insufficient to support a charge or count of misconduct, the panel may order on 
the record or in its report that the complaint or count be dismissed). 
{¶ 103} The bottom line, though, is that it doesn’t matter what one thinks 
of Bahan’s conduct. Under our own rules and established First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the majority does not have the authority to discipline Bahan under 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) for her holiday-party outburst. It should have dismissed that 
charge. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
The chilling effect of the majority’s opinion 
{¶ 104} One might ask, “What’s the big deal?”  Bahan’s behavior at the 
holiday party was outlandish, so why does it matter if the majority stretches the 
rules to discipline her? 
{¶ 105} One obvious answer is that as judges, we are bound to apply the 
law and to follow the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  We hardly engender 
respect for the rule of law if we ignore United States Supreme Court precedent and 
overlook constitutional limitations on our authority when it comes to punishing our 
critics. 
{¶ 106} The other problem is that the majority’s opinion will almost 
certainly have a chilling effect on legitimate attorney criticism of the judiciary.  Just 
over four months ago, this court issued its decision in Morton, __ Ohio St.3d __, 
2021-Ohio-4095, __ N.E.3d __, and suspended an attorney from the practice of law 
for criticizing this court in a court filing even though nothing that the attorney said 
was shown to be untrue.  Today, this court goes a step further and says that even 
out-of-court speech is subject to punishment when it is disrespectful of the 
judiciary. 
{¶ 107} The majority attempts to hide from the broad rule it writes.  It 
suggests that because Bahan used “choice expletives” to describe Judge Goslee, its 
opinion will not have a chilling effect on legitimate attorney speech.  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 33.  Bahan’s conduct was certainly appalling.  But the problem is that 
rule that the majority writes isn’t cabined to situations like Bahan’s; it applies to 
any criticism of the judiciary that is deemed disrespectful.  The message to 
attorneys is clear—criticize this court or any judge at your own peril.  That message 
may not have much impact on attorneys like Bahan, but it is likely to be heard 
loudly and clearly by others who are more cautious.  Why risk one’s livelihood by 
getting anywhere close to the line of saying something about the judiciary that 
someone might consider disrespectful? 
January Term, 2022 
 
39 
{¶ 108} “[S]peech critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the 
very center of the First Amendment.”  Gentile v. Nevada State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 
1034, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991).  Our nation’s conception of free 
speech is premised on the idea that citizens will serve as a check on public officials, 
including judges.  Indeed, “[t]he operations of the courts and the judicial conduct 
of judges are matters of utmost public concern.”  Landmark Communications, Inc., 
435 U.S. at 839, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1.  But in establishing a rule that makes 
“disrespectful” speech sanctionable, the majority removes from public debate even 
legitimate attorney criticism of the judiciary. 
{¶ 109} As I explained in Morton: 
 
Stifling attorney criticism comes at a high cost.  Attorneys, 
by virtue of their education, training, and experience with the 
judicial branch, are in the best position to “recognize, understand, 
and articulate problems with the judiciary” and “to comment on the 
judiciary and judicial qualifications.”  Tarkington, The Truth Be 
Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial 
Reputation, 97 Geo.L.J. 1567, 1601 [2009].  This is precisely the 
information that the public needs “to make informed decisions about 
the judiciary, to fulfill the self-governing role, and check judicial 
abuses.”  Id. 
Today’s decision will make attorneys hesitant to assert 
opinions critical of the court.  Not just attorneys like Morton whose 
assertions some may consider outlandish, but also the more cautious 
and the more insightful.  By chilling attorney criticism of the 
judiciary, we “forestall[] the public’s access to the thoughts of the 
very class of people in daily contact with the judicial system” and 
“shield the judiciary” from those best situated “to advance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
knowledgeable criticism.”  [State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v.] 
Porter, 766 P.2d [958,] 968 [(Okla.1988)]. 
 
(Second set of brackets added in Morton.)  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-4095, __ 
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 104-105 (DeWine, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 110} Today, the majority follows up on Morton with yet another warning 
to attorneys to watch what they say when it comes to talking about judges; when it 
comes to speech directed at the judiciary, basic principles of free speech do not 
apply.  This is not good for self-government. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 111} In holding that attorneys are now subject to discipline under 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) for directing disrespectful speech at a judge, the majority cites 
the oath that Ohio lawyers take to conduct themselves “with dignity and civility 
and show respect towards judges.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 28.  But as judges, we 
also take an oath.  And by that oath, we promise “to support the constitution of the 
United States and the constitution of this state.”  R.C. 3.23.  Hence, I cannot join 
the majority in its holding that an attorney’s speech is subject to discipline under 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) simply because it is disrespectful to a member of the judiciary. 
{¶ 112} Because I believe that Bahan’s violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by 
themselves warrant the sanction imposed by the majority, I concur in its judgment.  
But because I believe there is no basis to sanction Bahan under Gov.Bar R. IV(2), 
I concur in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Briscoe Law Offices and Collen H. Briscoe; Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and 
Nita Hanson; and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel, and Thomas E. Zani, Deputy Bar 
Counsel, for relator. 
The Steinhelfer Firm, L.L.C., and Tim Steinhelfer, for respondent. 
January Term, 2022

4