Title: DAMATO v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DAMATO v. STATE2003 WY 1364 P.3d 700Case Number: 01-88Decided: 01/29/2003

                                                                                              
October Term, A.D. 2002

 
NICHOLAS 
DAMATO,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

Representing Appellant:

Daniel G. Blythe, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Michael J. Crosson, Student Intern, of the 
Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. Crosson.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

GOLDEN, J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.

 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Appellant Nicholas Damato's stop for a traffic violation 
led to the discovery of more than 300 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of his 
car.  After 
charges were filed, the district court granted his motion to suppress this 
evidence; however, upon the State's motion for reconsideration, the trial court 
reversed its ruling.  
In its second ruling, the district court denied the motion to suppress 
the evidence upon finding that the marijuana would inevitably have been 
discovered by a canine drug sniff.  Damato entered a conditional plea of guilty, 
preserving his right to appeal the evidentiary ruling, and now appeals this 
denial.

 

[¶2]           
We reverse and remand.  

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Damato states the issues as:

 

1.  Whether the continued detention of Mr. Damato 
was justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity.

2.  Whether the district court erred in ruling 
that the drugs found in the trunk of Mr. Damato's vehicle would have been 
inevitably discovered by a canine drug unit.

 

The State believes the issues are:

 

I.  Did the district court err in holding that 
Trooper Bauer had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain appellant for a 
reasonable period of time awaiting the arrival of the drug detection dog?

II.  Did the district court err in holding that 
the marijuana in the trunk of appellant's vehicle would have been inevitably 
discovered by the drug detection dog?

III.  Did Trooper Bauer have independent lawful 
cause to search the trunk of appellant's vehicle, either as an inventory search 
following appellant's arrest for possession of marijuana, or based upon 
appellant's admission that there was marijuana in the trunk?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
The parties do not dispute the following findings of fact 
made by the district court:

 

On April 16, 2000, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Patrolman 
David Rettinger stopped Defendant Nicholas Damato for speeding on [east]bound 
Interstate 80 in Albany County, Wyoming.  Defendant was traveling 82 in a 75 mile per 
hour zone.  
During the stop Patrolman Rettinger became suspicious of Defendant 
because he appeared unusually nervous, his luggage was in the back seat instead 
of the trunk, and there was an unusual quantity of fast food wrappers on the 
passenger floorboard of the vehicle.  Patrolman Rettinger also noticed 
discrepancies in Damato's answers to where he had rented the car and where he 
was headed to.  
Damato told Patrolman Rettinger that he had rented the car in San 
Francisco and that he was returning to his home in Illinois, when the rental 
agreement showed that the car was rented in San Diego and was to be dropped off 
in Omaha.  All 
of these observations led Patrolman Rettinger to be suspicious of Mr. 
Damato.  
Patrolman Rettinger then requested to search the vehicle and Damato 
refused.  
Patrolman Rettinger, believing he could not detain Damato any longer, 
allowed him to leave without issuing a citation for speeding.

Patrolman Rettinger then radioed the highway patrol 
dispatch to inform other officers of his observations and to ask other officers 
to look for the vehicle.  He told Patrolman Bauer that the driver did 
not consent to a search, which inferred the officer was looking for drugs.  Patrolman John 
Bauer was one of the officers who received the call.  He proceeded to 
head eastbound on I-80, trying to "get probable cause to stop him," when he 
identified a vehicle he believed to be Defendant's. . . .  Patrolman Bauer, in 
an effort to look like he was ignoring Damato, went on past the car before he 
turned around.  
Patrolman Bauer then followed the vehicle, looking for probable cause, 
until he was able to lock Damato's vehicle in on radar traveling 77 in a 75 mile 
per hour zone.  
Patrolman Bauer then closed in on Damato, who moved right to get out of 
the patrol car's way, and Patrolman Bauer turned on his lights.  Patrolman Bauer 
noted that at this point, Damato had also not used his turn signal for 100 feet 
prior to changing lanes.  Patrolman Bauer then stopped the vehicle.

Patrolman Bauer called for the canine unit and then 
proceeded to the vehicle.  Patrolman Bauer then asked to see Defendant's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance.  Defendant questioned why he had been stopped 
saying he did not believe he was speeding and that he had been careful since he 
had just been pulled over by Patrolman Rettinger.  As Defendant reached for the glove box to 
retrieve the documents, he said something about them being in the "trunk" and 
then corrected himself.  At this point, Patrolman Bauer noticed the 
wrappers on the floor and luggage in the backseat, while also observing the 
Defendant was unusually nervous.  Additionally Patrolman Bauer noticed Visine 
on the console and that Defendant appeared to have pink "dope" eyes.

 

Patrolman Bauer then directed Damato to get out of the car 
to come look at the radar.[1]  The officer 
testified that Mr. Damato was not free to leave at this time as the patrolman 
still had possession of his license and other documents.  As Damato reached 
the back of the vehicle, Patrolman Bauer did a pat-down search.  Patrolman Bauer 
justified this action by saying it was for his own safety since Damato was going 
to be getting into the front seat of the patrol car. The pat-down revealed two 
small, ordinary pocket knives, and Patrolman Bauer felt what he believed to be 
marijuana in a cellophane bag in Defendant's right, back pocket.  Patrolman Bauer 
then asked Damato what was in his pocket, and after fumbling around, and being 
asked again, Defendant pulled a cellophane bag with approximately 3 grams of 
marijuana in it out of his pocket.

 

Defendant was then arrested and the canine units were 
called again, along with DCI.  Patrolman Bauer then read Defendant his Miranda warnings.  Defendant did not appear to orally or 
otherwise agree to answer questions, but he acknowledged that he understood his 
rights and later answered questions from Patrolman Bauer.  Patrolman Bauer 
told Defendant repeatedly that Defendant could help himself now by telling 
Patrolman Bauer what was in the car, and that he would find out anyway when he 
did an inventory of the car.  After repeated questions and repeated 
denials, Defendant told Patrolman Bauer first that there was a marijuana 
cigarette in the console of the vehicle, and later that the trunk was full of 
marijuana.  
Defendant was subsequently arrested for possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver.  
No citations were issued for the traffic violations or the misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana.

 

After making these findings of fact, the district court 
determined that

 

Standing alone, the Visine, the litter on the floor, the 
suitcase in the rear seat do not give rise to the level of conduct which would 
justify a finding of articulable suspicion.  However, when the false information about the 
point of origin and destination is added to the mix, the facts support a 
suspicion that the defendant is transporting something that may be evidence of 
criminal activity.  

 

When the trooper ordered the drug sniffing dogs he would 
have been justified in detaining the defendant until the dogs arrived.  However, he did not 
wait for the dogs, instead he directed Damato to exit the vehicle, and to 
proceed to the patrol car to view the radar . . . .

 

[¶5]           
The district court determined that the trooper improperly 
ordered Damato from the car and the subsequent pat-down required that the motion 
to suppress be granted.  The State filed for reconsideration, 
contending that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because the marijuana 
in the trunk would have been discovered by the canine sniff that had been 
ordered.  
Following a hearing that established the reliability of the particular 
dog, the district court denied the motion to suppress.  

 

[¶6]           
Damato entered a conditional plea of guilty and was 
sentenced to four and one-half to nine years and fined $10,000.00.  This appeal 
followed.

 

DISCUSSION

            

[¶7]           
Our standard of review was stated in McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 
1999):

 

            
Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a 
motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 
1994).  Since 
the district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the 
opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id. The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de 
novo.  Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶8]           
A state constitutional analysis is required unless a party 
desires to have an issue decided solely under the Federal Constitution.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485 (Wyo. 
1999).  Damato 
limits his analysis to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  That amendment 
protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.  

 

The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment 
is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.  Reasonableness, of 
course, depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's 
right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.

 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also, 
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001).

 

[¶9]           
A traffic stop is a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief."  Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979).   However, a routine traffic stop is more 
analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and such stops 
are analyzed under the principles developed for investigative detentions set 
forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  

 

"The investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes 
Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only 
the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be 
committing a crime."  
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220 (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 [(Wyo. 
1982)]); see also Putnam [v. 
State], 995 P.2d [632] at 637 [(Wyo. 2000)]; and McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 
1999).  We have 
a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) 
whether the officer's actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether 
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  
at 223 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 
1879); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).  An officer's conduct is judged by an 
objective standard which takes into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  
Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637; Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-81; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th 
Cir. 1996).

 

Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 
52, ¶11, 24 P.3d 1138, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2001).  In 
applying this test, the Court has "consistently eschewed bright-line rules, 
instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry."  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996).  "The government has the burden of 
demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable 
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the 
conditions of an investigative seizure." United States 
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).

 

[¶10]      The mandated two-part inquiry requires that we first 
determine whether the stop was justified at its inception.  Our inquiry is 
limited to Officer Bauer's stop.  Officer Bauer testified that the information 
he received from Officer Rettinger motivated him to search for Damato's car and, 
after finding it, follow it with the intent to find probable cause to stop it 
and detain it for a canine drug sniff.  The Court has been unwilling to entertain 
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual 
officers and has held unanimously that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996).  Whren held that 
"a traffic-violation arrest . . . [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact 
that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search.'"  Id. (citing United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470 n.1, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973)).    The Court later confirmed the 
validity of Whren in Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001) 
(per curiam), reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision that a legitimate 
traffic stop was invalid when motivated for the purpose of conducting a search 
for drugs.  A 
concurring opinion written by Justice Ginsburg in Sullivan noted that the Arkansas court feared the Whren decision would accord police officers disturbing 
discretion to intrude on individuals' liberty and privacy. Id. at 772-73, 121 S. Ct.  at 1879 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). The Arkansas Court had expressed unwillingness "to sanction conduct 
where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely 
suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by 
one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown 
inventory search of the vehicle with impunity."  Id.   The 
concurring opinion also noted that the Court has held that such exercises of 
official discretion are unlimited by the Fourth Amendment and cited Whren and Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001).   

 

[¶11]      The Court clarified that had the Arkansas Supreme Court 
decided that it could not apply Whren under its own state constitution, the Court would not 
interfere.  
Sullivan, 532 U.S.  at 772, 121 S. Ct.  at 1878.  The concerns of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court are also ours where, as here, the officer intended to use 
any traffic violation as a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation; 
however, because Damato does not contend that the Wyoming Constitution provides 
greater protection in this area, we must follow the federal constitutional 
decisions in Whren and Sullivan.  

 

[¶12]   In addition to pretextual reasons, we 
are concerned also that Damato had previously been stopped and released, and, in 
a "tag-team" fashion, was passed on to the next jurisdiction to be stopped in 
hopes the subsequent officer would be more successful in obtaining a canine 
sniff within a reasonable time.  Limited to a federal constitutional analysis, 
we are constrained to say Whren is controlling in this particular case because Officer 
Bauer stopped Damato for an observed traffic violation.  The officer 
activated his patrol car lights to stop Damato after observing on radar that 
Damato exceeded the maximum allowable speed limit by two miles per hour in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-301. Under Wyoming statute, exceeding the 
maximum allowable speed limit is a misdemeanor punishable by fines and/or 
imprisonment.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1201 (LexisNexis 2001).  Officer Bauer, 
therefore, had probable cause to stop Damato because he had observed a traffic 
violation.  
Whren, 517 U.S.  at 810, 116 S. Ct.  at 1772. 

 

[¶13]      Having found that the initial stop was valid, we must 
examine the second prong of Terry, "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 392 U.S.  at 
20, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879.  "In the course of making a routine traffic 
stop, a law enforcement officer may:  request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration; run a computer check; and issue a citation."  Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998) (citing United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also, Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 224.   Generally, the driver must be allowed 
to proceed without further delay once the officer determines that the driver has 
a valid license and is entitled to operate the vehicle.  Burgos-Seberos, 969 P.2d  at 1133.  "In the absence of the particular individual's 
valid consent, an officer may expand an investigative detention only if there 
exists an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion' that criminal 
activity has occurred or is occurring."  United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1610 (2002) (citing United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998)).  "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the 
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion."  
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880.  

 

[¶14]      Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still 
assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport 
with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been "reasonably related in 
scope" to the basis for the stop, which in this case was a traffic 
violation.  
Id. at 20, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879.  In that regard, the Court states that an 
officer may remove occupants from the vehicle and may conduct a pat-down search 
if he or she harbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is 
armed and dangerous.  
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998) (citing Mimms, 434 U.S.  at 111, 98 S. Ct.  at 334-35, and Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883).  In this case, the 
district court stated:

 

The Fourth Amendment balances the nature and quality of the 
intrusion against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion.  U. S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 
(1985).  "The 
touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion 
of a citizen's personal security.'"  Mimms, 434 U.S.  at 108-9, citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 19.  
The governmental interest in directing Damato to view the monitor and 
hence frisk him must outweigh a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable 
intrusion.  
Officer Bauer does not adequately explain the necessity of having Damato 
view the monitor, nor does he explain why such viewing necessitated Damato to 
sit in the patrol car for viewing, when the monitor was plainly visible from 
outside the car.  
I have no choice but to conclude that the State has failed to justify the 
intrusion. 

The district court granted the motion to suppress.  We agree with the 
district court's decision that Damato was unlawfully seized when he was 
commanded to exit his car and "frisked."  As the district court determined, although 
the officer could have removed Damato from the vehicle for the sake of safety, 
the officer had no objectively based suspicion that Damato was armed and 
dangerous, and the subsequent pat-down search he performed violated Damato's 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Thus, the product of the pat-down and 
everything thereafter must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  McChesney, 988 P.2d  at 1078.    

[¶15]             
The State again argues that, upon stopping Damato by 
activating his lights, Officer Bauer immediately called for the canine drug 
unit, and the drug discovery was inevitable.  The record shows that the canine drug unit 
was called for at 10:27 a.m. and arrived at 11:11 a.m., some forty-four minutes 
after Damato was first stopped. This detention period is beyond that necessary 
to complete a routine traffic stop and, thus, must be justified by articulable, 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Williams, 271 F.3d  at 1267-68.  The district court 
determined that, based on the information provided to Officer Bauer by Officer 
Rettinger, reasonable suspicion existed that would have justified detaining 
Damato until the canine unit arrived.  Ultimately, the district court determined 
that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied and denied the motion to 
suppress.  We 
disagree with the district court's determination that Officer Bauer had 
reasonable suspicion that justified Damato's prolonged detention and find that 
the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable to these 
facts.  

[¶16]             
We find that the analysis of the factors supporting 
reasonable suspicion should be governed by United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 
1997).  As the 
Tenth Circuit stated in Wood, we must determine if the totality of the 
circumstances demonstrates the existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity.  
Id. at 946.  

The "whole picture" must be taken into account.  Common sense and 
ordinary human experience are to be employed, and deference is to be accorded a 
law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions.  
Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches, however, do not provide 
reasonable suspicion.  
Even though reasonable suspicion may be founded upon factors consistent 
with innocent travel, some facts must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or 
susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous.  We therefore 
examine, both individually and in the aggregate, the factors found by the 
trooper and the district court to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain . 
. . .

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[¶17]      The Court has said: 

Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and 
"probable cause" mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical 
conceptions that deal with "the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)); see United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585-1586, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).  As such, the standards are "not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."  Gates, supra, at 232, 103 S. Ct.  at 2329.  
We have described reasonable suspicion simply as "a particularized and 
objective basis" for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), and probable cause to search as 
existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man 
of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found, see Brinegar, supra, at 175-176, 69 S. Ct. at 1310-1311; Gates, supra, at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332.  

 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). 

[¶18]             
The Tenth Circuit has recently distinguished between 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause: 

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than  probable cause not 
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information 
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish 
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from 
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable 
cause.

 

United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 195 (2001) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)).  

 

[¶19]      Assuming without deciding that the collective knowledge of 
Officer Bauer and Rettinger could be aggregated to permit Officer Bauer to call 
for the canine unit immediately upon stopping Damato, the district court found 
that the evidence indicated that the following factors during Officer 
Rettinger's stop created Officer's Bauer's suspicion of criminal 
activity:

 

1)   Damato seemed unusually nervous for a routine 
traffic stop;

2)   Damato told the patrolman that the car was 
rented from San Francisco instead of San Diego, which is a known drug hub;

3)   Damato said that he was taking the car home 
to Illinois when it was to be dropped off in Omaha;

4)   Damato's luggage was in the back seat instead 
of the trunk;

5)   many fast food wrappers on the passenger 
floorboard suggested Damato was on a "hard run"; and

6)   Damato did not consent to the search which 
caused Patrolman Rettinger to suspect drugs.  

"The failure to consent to a search cannot form any part of 
the basis for reasonable suspicion."  Wood, 106 F.3d  at 
946.  Thus, the 
last factor has no place in our determination.   

[¶20]             
The "extreme nervousness" factor is generally considered of 
limited significance.  
In Wood, the court noted that is not uncommon 
for most citizens whether innocent or guilty to exhibit signs of nervousness 
when confronted by a law enforcement officer who is making a subjective 
assessment of a person with whom he had no prior acquaintance and cannot compare 
with his usual demeanor.  Id. at 948.  The court stated 
that it had "repeatedly held that nervousness is of limited significance in 
determining reasonable suspicion and that the government's repetitive reliance 
on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion must be treated with 
caution."  Id.  Officer Rettinger provided the following 
descriptive account of Damato's nervousness: 

Q.  In the course of contacting him did you ask 
him for his driver's license and registration?

A.  Yes, sir.  And as I asked for that information, I asked 
a number of other questions.  He started to seem somewhat not normal than 
from someone on a normal traffic stop.

Q. Could you explain to the Court what you mean by 
that?  What do 
you mean by "not normal?"

A.  Most people are very comfortableor I 
shouldn't say very comfortable, but they're somewhat comfortable with what law 
enforcement's role is and what we do.  They don't seem to be very surprised when 
they're pulled over or of that nature.  I have experienced some people that live in 
different parts of the world or the nation where they do have fear of police, 
and they will act somewhat like that.  But he didn't seem to have any reason to be 
acting somewhat kind of jerky, unsure about his questions, really methodically 
thinking out what he was telling me or saying.

Q.  When you asked him for his driver's license 
and his registration, was that early on in the stop you did that?

A.  Yes, yes, right away, just like I normally 
would ask anyone who I stop.

[¶21]             
It is generally accepted that nervousness upon the initial 
confrontation is normal and the telling information is whether the citizen 
calmed after the initial few minutes of the encounter.  "Extreme and continued nervousness, however, is entitled to 
somewhat more weight.'" Williams, 271 F.3d  at 1268 (quoting United States v. 
West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th 
Cir. 2000)).    Williams distinguished its facts 
from Wood in this manner:

[In] Wood, [the] panel concluded that the officer's 
testimony as to the defendant's rapid breathing, trembling hands, and 
throat-clearing constituted a mere "generic claim of nervousness," and therefore 
discounted the nervousness as a factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis. 106 F.3d  at 948.  
In Wood, however, the officer and the defendant engaged in casual 
conversation, including a discussion of the good rate the defendant had received 
on the rental car. Id. at 944. Thus, Wood appears to have involved the more 
common situation where a citizen exhibits initially "signs of nervousness when 
confronted by a law officer," id. at 948, but then tends to "settle down" as the 
traffic stop continues.  See West, 219 F.3d  at 1179. 

 

In this case, the district court found credible the 
officer's testimony that Mr. Williams' extreme nervousness did not dissipate 
throughout the entire stop. Given our standard of review, the record supports 
the district court's finding that Mr. Williams' nervousness exceeded that of the 
average citizen during a routine traffic stop. While we do recognize that  "nervousness alone 
cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity," United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1994)), we see no reason in this case to ignore Mr. 
Williams' nervousness in reviewing the totality of the circumstances.  See West, 219 F.3d  at 1179.

[¶22]             
Officer Rettinger testified that he returned to his patrol 
car, ran a criminal history and found that Damato's record and driver's license 
status was clear.  
The officer then returned to Damato and completed a warning for 
speeding.  He 
returned Damato's paperwork and then leaned in and asked if Damato would be 
willing to answer a few questions.

A.  I asked him if he was sure about where the 
vehicle was coming to and going from, since the documents said differently.  He became very 
nervous as I was asking.

[¶23]             
By this, Officer Rettinger explained that he observed 
Damato sweating heavily although it was a chilly day, his carotid artery 
pulsating hard and fast, and an inability to keep eye contact.  Although this 
descriptive account supplies more than a generic claim of nervousness, it in and 
of itself remains of limited significance given that Officer Rettinger at the 
time that he observed these matters was asking Damato whether he had any large 
amounts of money or drugs in the vehicle and whether Damato would permit him to 
search.  Upon 
Damato's refusal, the officer asked Damato whether there was some reason he did 
not want the officer looking in the vehicle.  Realistically, few citizens would not have 
become uncomfortable to some degree with these questions.  The evidence does 
not indicate that the officer treated the stop as a routine traffic stop and, 
despite this, Damato's nervousness continued throughout the stop without 
ceasing.  We 
believe Damato's reaction to the officer's behavior was as consistent with 
innocence as with criminal activity, and we, therefore, find this factor of no 
significance.   

[¶24]             
Damato stated that he had rented the car in San Francisco, 
although the rental agreement indicated that he had rented it in San Diego, and 
was "going home" to Illinois, although the rental documents showed that he would 
be leaving the car in Omaha, Nebraska.  Officer Rettinger testified that he knew that 
both San Diego and Omaha were "known drug hubs."  Few large cities in the western states are 
not "known drug hubs."2  The rental document 
information likely would have been equally significant to the officers because 
it showed that Damato had rented the car in San Diego and was ending his trip in 
Omaha although his driver's license showed that his home was in Illinois.  Although proper 
documentation of ownership or legal possession of a vehicle can be crucial in 
ascertaining whether criminal activity is in progress, Officer Rettinger did not 
believe that Damato possessed a stolen car, and the failure to ask Damato for an 
explanation about the discrepancies requires that we find that the officer based 
suspicion upon mere inconsistency, which is prohibited. 

[¶25]             
Finally, the luggage in the back seat and fast food 
wrappers on the car floor can be said to describe "a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers and any suspicion associated with these items is 
virtually nonexistent."  Wood, 106 F.3d  at 
947 (citation omitted).   

[¶26]      Although we have decided that each of these factors are 
innocent, under the totality of the circumstances test, individually innocuous 
factors can combine to arouse a reasonable suspicion for the experienced 
officer.  Id. at 948.  In this case, however, none of these factors 
were sufficient to arouse a reasonable suspicion on the part of Officer 
Rettinger.  
Because Officer Bauer relied on these factors when he called for the 
canine unit immediately upon stopping Damato, intending to detain him for that 
purpose, and without conducting his own investigation first, we must conclude 
that Damato was detained without reasonable suspicion.

 

[¶27]      That Damato was illegally transporting a large amount of 
marijuana is undisputed; however, few decisions on Fourth Amendment issues 
vindicate innocent people.  It has been said that the "safeguards of 
liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice 
people."  
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). In performing our duty of properly applying Fourth Amendment law to 
this case, we are obligated to ignore Damato's guilt and focus our analysis on 
the state action that led to his arrest.

 

[¶28]      The illegal detention and subsequent impermissible seizure 
and pat-down search require suppression of the evidence.  The State does not 
argue that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies when no reasonable 
suspicion existed for calling a canine unit, and we do not address that 
doctrine.  See United States v. Buchanan, 72 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir. 1995).   The order denying the suppression 
motion is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court, where 
Damato "shall be allowed to withdraw" his plea of guilty.  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2).

 

FOOTNOTES

1In the discussion portion 
of its order, the district court found:

[Patrolman Bauer] did not 
wait for the dogs, instead he directed Damato to exit the vehicle, and to 
proceed to the patrol car to view the radar displaying 77 m.p.h.  Although Patrolman 
Bauer testified his action was justified because Mr. Damato "requested [to see 
the] radar," the Highway Patrol videotape of the stop does not disclose such a 
request.  Bauer 
further testified that Damato "made a little argument about the speeding," so he 
offered to show Damato the radar.  I have carefully reviewed the videotape of 
the stop and have played it back several times.  I do not see or hear Defendant arguing or 
requesting to see the radar on the tape.  Defendant reacted with a sense of bafflement 
over the stop, no different than any driver.  He did not resist the officer's questions and 
cooperated as any driver would.

 

2"Standing alone, a vehicle that hails from a purported known 
drug source area is, at best, a weak factor in finding suspicion of criminal 
activity. In this Circuit alone, police testimony has identified an extremely 
broad range of known drug source areas.' See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 638 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (identifying the entire West Coast as a drug source area); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (Colorado); Wood, 106 F.3d  at 947 
(California); United States v. Garrett, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Kan. 1999) (Texas); see also United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases and noting that 
law enforcement officers have identified a number of drug supply states and a 
significant number of the largest cities in the United States as "drug source 
cities")."  Williams, 271 F.3d  at 1270.