Title: McMurray Contracting, LLC v. Hardy

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: November 3, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0287 
_________________________ 
 
McMurray Contracting, LLC  
 
v.  
 
Kenneth Hardy and Helen Hardy 
 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-22-901301) 
 
 
MENDHEIM, Justice. 
 
 
 
McMurray Contracting, LLC ("McMurray"), appeals from the 
Baldwin Circuit Court's order denying its second motion to compel 
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arbitration of this action commenced by Kenneth Hardy and his wife 
Helen Hardy. We dismiss the appeal.  
I. Facts 
The Hardys commenced this action on December 6, 2022, by filing 
a complaint against McMurray in the Baldwin Circuit Court. The Hardys 
alleged that on September 16, 2020, their house was damaged by 
Hurricane Sally and that, in October of the same year, they "retained" 
McMurray "to provide restoration work" to their house. The Hardys 
specifically alleged that McMurray "did not complete all restoration work 
in a good and workmanlike manner, and has refused to correct numerous 
deficiencies through [the Hardys'] property," and that McMurray 
"performed work and charged for materials that were never approved." 
The Hardys asserted claims alleging breach of contract, breach of 
warranty, negligence, and a violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 8-19-1 et seq. The Hardys' original 
complaint did not request a jury trial.  
On January 31, 2023, McMurray filed a "Motion to Dismiss" in 
which it asserted:  
"3. The Contract at issue requires that disputes between 
the parties be resolved 'under the Construction Mediation 
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3 
 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association' within 30 days 
of service of a written demand for mediation. The Contract 
further states that if 'the mediation does not result in 
settlement of the disputes, then any unresolved controversy 
or claim arising or relating to this contract or breach thereof 
shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American 
Arbitration Association….' 
 
"4. [The Hardys] have never made a demand to 
[McMurray] for mediation and[,] by filing [their] Complaint 
with this Court, have failed to abide by the Arbitration clause 
of the Contract [they] allege[] has been breached. 
 
"5. The Contract that [the Hardys] allege has been 
breached requires that this matter be mediated before the 
American Arbitration Association[;] therefore, the [Hardys'] 
Complaint is due to be dismissed or, in the alternative, the 
parties should be ordered to arbitration before the American 
Arbitration Association, as required by the Contract. 
 
"Wherefore, premises considered, [McMurray] prays 
that the [Hardys'] Complaint will be dismissed or in the 
alternative that the parties be ordered to arbitration pursuant 
to the terms of the attached Contract." 
 
McMurray attached as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss/compel 
arbitration a copy of the contract that it asserted required the parties to 
submit disputes to mediation and then to arbitration. That contract was 
titled "Authorization Agreement," and it provided that it was a contract 
between McMurray and Kenneth Hardy. The Authorization Agreement 
stated that the "Contracted Service" was for "Mitigation" and 
"Restoration Work." The Authorization Agreement primarily purported 
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to give McMurray the authority to work with the Hardys' homeowners' 
insurer on the claim to repair their house by allowing McMurray to be "a 
payee on all drafts issued for the repairs of this claim" and to be "[t]he 
main contact for the property repair process." Additionally, the 
Authorization Agreement contained the following paragraph: 
"Except as to the collection of delinquent payments, any 
controversy, claim, defense of counterclaim arising out of or 
relating to this contract or breach thereof, shall be settled by 
mediation under the Construction Industry Mediation Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association. If within 30 days 
after service of a written demand for mediation, the mediation 
does not result in settlement of the dispute, then any 
unresolved controversy or claim arising or relating to this 
contract or breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration 
administered by the American Arbitration Association in 
accordance with its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, 
and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator may 
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." 
 
McMurray refers to that paragraph as "the arbitration provision," and, 
for ease of reference, we will do so as well.  
 
On February 8, 2023, the circuit court entered an order that 
provided: "Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] 
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filed by McMurray Contracting, LLC, is hereby denied. Motion to Compel 
Arbitration is denied."1 
On February 27, 2023, McMurray filed an answer to the Hardys' 
complaint. McMurray's first affirmative defense in that answer asserted 
that, "[p]ursuant to this contract [entered into by the parties,] all claims 
arising from the subject restoration/construction work are subject to a 
binding arbitration agreement." The answer then quoted the arbitration 
provision in the Authorization Agreement, and it stated: "This case is an 
arbitrable dispute and thus should be sent to arbitration to be 
administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance 
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules."  
On March 1, 2023, the Hardys filed their "First Amended 
Complaint." In all respects, the Hardys' amended complaint was identical 
to their original complaint except that, at the conclusion of the amended 
complaint, the Hardys included a demand for a jury trial. 
 
1In their brief to this Court, the Hardys state -- without 
contradiction from McMurray -- that they "filed an opposition to the First 
Arbitration Motion, but said opposition was not included in the record." 
Hardys' brief, p. 2. A notation on the case-action summary submitted in 
the record on appeal indicates that a response to McMurray's first motion 
to compel arbitration was filed on February 7, 2023. 
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In response to the amended complaint, on March 9, 2023, 
McMurray filed a "Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay All 
Proceedings." McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration was much 
more detailed than its first motion to compel arbitration, and McMurray 
attached three exhibits to that motion: a copy of the Authorization 
Agreement; an affidavit from Ben McMurray, the owner of McMurray; 
and two invoices for construction materials McMurray had ordered from 
different vendors for use in the restoration of the Hardys' house. 
Also on March 9, 2023, the circuit court entered an order stating: 
"Motion to Compel filed by McMurray Contracting, LLC is hereby 
Pending. Opposing party is granted 7 days to file a response. Response 
shall be submitted as a supplement to the pending motion." (Emphasis 
in original.)  
On March 16, 2023, the Hardys filed a response in opposition to 
McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration that they titled 
"Response to [McMurray's] Improper Second Motion to Compel 
Arbitration." In that response, the Hardys argued, among other things, 
that the circuit court had already decided the issue whether arbitration 
SC-2023-0287 
 
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was appropriate and that the previous order denying McMurray's first 
motion seeking to compel arbitration was "the law of the case." 
On March 20, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying 
McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration. That order did not 
provide reasons for the circuit court's decision. On April 4, 2023, 
McMurray filed an answer to the Hardys' amended complaint. On 
April 25, 2023, McMurray appealed.   
II. Standard of Review 
This Court's standard of review of an order denying a motion to 
compel arbitration is well settled: 
"'"This Court reviews de novo the denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration. Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 779 
So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 2000).  A motion to compel arbitration is 
analogous to a motion for a summary judgment. TranSouth 
Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999). The party 
seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the 
existence of a contract calling for arbitration and proving that 
the contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate 
commerce. Id. '[A]fter a motion to compel arbitration has been 
made and supported, the burden is on the non-movant to 
present evidence that the supposed arbitration agreement is 
not valid or does not apply to the dispute in question.' Jim 
Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n.1 
(Ala. 1995) (opinion on application for rehearing)."'" 
 
Hoover Gen. Contractors-Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 201 So. 3d 550, 552 
(Ala. 2016) (quoting Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 
SC-2023-0287 
 
8 
 
315 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 
So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000)). 
III. Analysis 
 
Before we may address any of McMurray's arguments as to why it 
believes that the circuit court erred in denying its second motion to 
compel arbitration, we must confront an issue that implicates this 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Specifically, the Hardys argue that 
McMurray's notice of appeal was not timely filed. The Hardys observe 
that the circuit court denied McMurray's first motion to compel 
arbitration on February 8, 2023, and that, under Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. 
P., that order was a final, appealable judgment.2 However, instead of 
appealing the circuit court's February 8, 2023, order, McMurray chose to 
file an answer to the Hardys' original complaint. The Hardys 
subsequently filed an amended complaint, and McMurray then filed its 
 
2Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., provides: 
 
"An order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration 
is appealable as a matter of right, and any appeal from such 
an order must be taken within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date 
of the entry of the order, or within the time allowed by an 
extension pursuant to Rule 77(d), Alabama Rules of Civil 
Procedure." 
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second motion to compel arbitration on March 9, 2023. On March 20, 
2023, the circuit court denied McMurray's second motion to compel 
arbitration. McMurray then filed an answer to the Hardys' amended 
complaint. Finally, on April 25, 2023, McMurray appealed from the 
circuit court's order denying its second motion to compel arbitration. The 
Hardys note that the basis for McMurray's second motion to compel 
arbitration was the same as the basis for its first motion: the arbitration 
provision in the Authorization Agreement. The Hardys contend that 
McMurray's appeal was well outside the 42-day filing period provided in 
Rule 4(d) for appealing the circuit court's February 8, 2023, order, and 
so, they say, McMurray's appeal must be dismissed. 
 
In response, McMurray argues that its appeal is not untimely 
because it clearly is appealing the circuit court's order denying its second 
motion to compel arbitration. McMurray contends that its second motion 
to compel arbitration was necessary because the Hardys had filed an 
amended complaint and that complaint superseded the previous 
complaint. See McMurray's reply brief, p. 2.  
"Here, the Hardys' Amended Complaint became the 
operative pleading and required a response from McMurray. 
In response to not only the new Amended Complaint, but also 
to the jury demand, McMurray timely moved the circuit court 
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to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings. McMurray's 
[second] Motion to Compel Arbitration was extensive and 
contained additional evidence which was obtained by 
McMurray during the pendency of the case." 
 
Id. (record citation omitted). McMurray further contends that "the 
Hardys' request for a jury trial substantially changed the scope and 
nature of the case." Id., p. 3. McMurray insists that the circuit court 
understood that to be true, which is why it entered an order allowing the 
Hardys to respond to McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration. 
"[I]t is clear that the circuit court asserted its discretion in 
reevaluating the arbitrability issue in light of the new 
evidence and facts presented in McMurray's second motion. 
Had the circuit court decided not to take up the arbitrability 
issue for the second time, the court most certainly would have 
entered an order denying the motion as moot. Instead, the 
circuit court decided to take the issue of arbitrability under 
consideration and allow the Hardys to submit a response to 
the new evidence and arguments submitted by McMurray." 
 
Id., pp. 3-4 (footnote omitted). 
 
The problem with McMurray's argument is that it overlooks the 
fact that, under Rule 4(d), the circuit court's February 8, 2023, order 
denying its first motion to compel arbitration was a final, appealable 
judgment. That rule unequivocally provides that "any appeal from such 
an order must be taken within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry 
of the order, or within the time allowed by an extension pursuant to 
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Rule 77(d), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure." "An order granting a 
motion to compel arbitration is a final judgment, Bowater, Inc. v. Zager, 
901 So. 2d 658, 667 (Ala. 2004), and 'failure to take an appeal from it 
within the 42-day time period forecloses later appellate review.' 901 
So. 2d at 664." Alabama Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. Lazenby, 292 So. 3d 
295, 299 (Ala. 2019). In Bowater, this Court explained that  
"an order granting or denying arbitration is no longer 
interlocutory in the sense that it remains 'within the breast of 
the court' subject to revision at any time before final 
judgment, because it is now established that unless an appeal 
is timely taken from the order, the order is final." 
 
Bowater Inc. v. Zager, 901 So. 2d 658, 666 (Ala. 2004). Thus, McMurray's 
contention that the circuit court had the discretion to reassess the issue 
of arbitrability at any time after the entry of its February 8, 2023, order 
is incorrect.3  
 
3McMurray's citations to cases in which a party filed more than one 
motion to compel arbitration are inapposite. See McMurray's brief, p. 26 
n.2 (citing Equity Tr. Co. v. Morris, [Ms. 1200551, Aug. 19, 2022] ___ So. 
3d ___ (Ala. 2022); Hoover Gen. Contractors-Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 201 
So. 3d 550, 552 (Ala. 2016); Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d 123, 127 (Ala. 
2002); Eastern Dredging & Constr., Inc. v. Parliament House, L.L.C., 698 
So. 2d 102, 104 (Ala. 1997)). In all of those cases, except Stevens, the 
circuit courts never ruled on the first-filed motions to compel arbitration, 
and so the finality of a circuit court's order and the time for taking an 
appeal were not at issue in those cases. In Stevens, the defendant filed a 
postjudgment motion and a second motion to compel arbitration within 
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The only exception, as the Bowater Court also concluded, would be 
if a party files a timely postjudgment motion, which would toll the time 
for filing an appeal. See Bowater, 901 So. 2d at 667 ("We hold that 
Bowater's Rule 59(e)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion to alter, amend, or vacate 
that portion of the trial court's September 17, 2003, order requiring that 
the arbitrators be duly licensed attorneys served, under Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. 
R. App. P., to suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal 
from that order."); see generally Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Karr, 306 
So. 3d 882, 886 (Ala. 2020) ("Postjudgment motions filed pursuant to Rule 
59(e)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment 
'suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal.' Rule 4(a)(3), 
Ala. R. App. P."). But it is undisputed that McMurray did not file a 
postjudgment motion in response to the circuit court's February 8, 2023, 
order denying its first motion to compel arbitration. Instead, it filed an 
answer to the Hardys' complaint.  
 
30 days of the entry of the circuit court's order denying the first motion 
to compel arbitration, and the circuit court granted the second motion to 
compel arbitration, causing the plaintiff to appeal the second order. Thus, 
the issue of the timeliness of appealing the order that denied the first 
motion to compel arbitration never arose. 
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Moreover, McMurray has not argued that we should construe its 
second motion to compel arbitration as a postjudgment motion that tolled 
the time for taking an appeal from the circuit court's February 8, 2023, 
order. "'[I]t is not the function of this Court … to make and address legal 
arguments for a party....'" Penick v. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand 
Lodge F & A M of Alabama, Inc., 46 So. 3d 416, 430 (Ala. 2010) (quoting 
Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)). In fact, 
McMurray argues exactly the opposite by insisting that the Hardys' 
amended complaint that included a demand for a jury trial "changed the 
scope and nature of the case," which, it says, necessitated the filing of a 
new motion to compel arbitration.4 McMurray's reply brief, p. 3. 
Moreover, McMurray argues that the other reason the circuit court even 
considered McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration was because 
of "new evidence and facts presented in McMurray's second motion." Id., 
pp. 3-4. Indeed, McMurray attached new exhibits to its second motion to 
compel arbitration that sought to demonstrate: (1) that Kenneth Hardy 
 
4We note the dubious nature of this argument given that McMurray 
filed its first motion to compel arbitration in response to a complaint that 
did not contain a demand for a jury trial from the Hardys and that 
arbitration seeks to avoid all court litigation, not just jury trials. 
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had signed the Authorization Agreement and (2) that the Authorization 
Agreement involved a transaction that affected interstate commerce. But 
"[a] motion to reconsider is generally a request that the trial court take a 
second look at what has already come before it; such a motion generally 
does not encompass a movant's presentation of new facts or new evidence 
not previously presented to the trial court." Ex parte Ward, 46 So. 3d 888, 
893 (Ala. 2007). Thus, even if McMurray had argued that its second 
motion to compel arbitration was, in substance, a postjudgment motion, 
it simply is not plausible to construe the motion that way in light of the 
facts in the record and McMurray's arguments to this Court. 
In sum, on February 8, 2023, the circuit court entered an order 
denying McMurray's first motion to compel arbitration, which was based 
on the arbitration provision in the Authorization Agreement. On April 
25, 2023, McMurray appealed the circuit court's order denying 
McMurray's second motion to compel arbitration, which also was based 
on the arbitration provision in the Authorization Agreement. McMurray 
did not appeal the circuit court's February 8, 2023, order within 42 days 
of the entry of the order, and McMurray did not file a postjudgment 
motion that would have tolled the time for taking an appeal of the 
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February 8, 2023, order. "An appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of 
appeal was not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate 
court." Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. Thus, we are compelled to dismiss 
McMurray's appeal. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that McMurray's notice of 
appeal was not timely filed so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. 
Accordingly, we dismiss McMurray's appeal.  See Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. 
App. P. 
 
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., 
concur. 
 
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion, which Cook, J., 
joins. 
 
 
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result). 
The majority dismisses this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 
concluding that the notice of appeal filed by McMurray Contracting, LLC 
("McMurray"), was untimely.  I am not fully persuaded that we lack 
jurisdiction, but because McMurray has not adequately responded to the 
jurisdictional issues presented in this case, I concur in the decision to 
dismiss the appeal.  See Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 635 (Ala. 
2008) (plurality opinion) ("The burden of establishing the existence of 
subject-matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking that jurisdiction."); 
see also America's Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 
1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, when a court or an opposing 
party "sounds the alarm" by raising a jurisdictional question, the party 
claiming jurisdiction must "precise[ly]" explain why jurisdiction exists).   
In my view, whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal turns on 
the effect of the amended complaint filed by Kenneth Hardy and Helen 
Hardy on McMurray's prior motion to compel arbitration and the trial 
court's denial of that motion.  Ordinarily, "[a]n amended complaint 
supersedes the previously filed complaint and becomes the operative 
pleading." Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 2005).  For that 
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reason, "'any subsequent motion made by an opposing party should be 
directed at the amended pleading'" because "'the original pleading no 
longer performs any function in the case.'" Holley v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 396 So. 2d 75, 79 (Ala. 1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
6 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1476 (1971)).  Thus, if the Hardys' amended complaint 
"reset" the proceeding such that McMurray was entitled to file a second 
motion to compel arbitration in response, then its appeal from the order 
denying that second motion would be permissible and timely. 
To my knowledge, we have never considered the effect of an 
amended complaint on an earlier motion to compel arbitration.  But in 
other contexts, we have indicated that whether an amended complaint 
moots the opposing party's prior motions -- and any appeals from the trial 
courts' rulings on those motions -- hinges on whether the change in the 
amended complaint is "clearly relevant to the pending dispositive 
motion."5  Meadows v. Shaver, 327 So. 3d 213, 222 (Ala. 2020) (plurality 
 
5See, e.g., Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 2005) (holding that 
a plaintiff's amended complaint mooted the defendant's original motion 
to dismiss); Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So. 2d 146 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing 
an appeal from summary judgment as moot because of the plaintiff's 
intervening amended complaint). 
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opinion), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658, 
May 27, 2022] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2022).  In other words, "an amendment 
of a pleading moots an opponent's pending motion only to the extent that 
the substance of the amendment moots the substance of the motion."  Id. 
As I see it, a key question here is the extent to which the Hardys' 
demand for a jury trial -- which is the only difference between their initial 
complaint and their amended complaint -- "moots the substance" of 
McMurray's first motion to compel arbitration.  Id.  McMurray, however, 
fails to meaningfully address this issue; it asserts in conclusory fashion 
that "the Hardys' request for a jury trial substantially changed the scope 
and nature of the case," but it does not elaborate further.  McMurray's 
reply brief at 3. 
When "parties have not provided sufficient legal or factual 
justification for this Court's jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to 
embark on its own expedition beyond the parties' arguments in pursuit 
of a reason to exercise jurisdiction."  Crutcher, 12 So. 3d at 635.  That 
burden "falls on the party invoking the jurisdiction."  Id.  Because 
McMurray has not met its burden, I concur in the decision to dismiss the 
appeal. 
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Cook, J., concurs.