Title: State v. Faltynowicz

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Faltynowicz1983 WY 28660 P.2d 368Case Number: 5763Case Number: 5763Decided: 03/18/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
PLAINTIFF, (APPELLANT),

v.

KATHY ANN FALTYNOWICZ, 
DEFENDANT, (APPELLEE). 

Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Allen 
C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Dallas J. Laird, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case is before us 
on a bill of exceptions. A complaint charging appellee with committing a 
misdemeanor was filed in county court on August 30, 1982. The arraignment was 
held on the same date, and appellee entered a plea of guilty. The court, to 
establish a factual basis for the plea, asked appellee to describe what had 
happened on August 29, the date of the incident which led to her arrest. As 
appellee was describing the events which led to her arrest, the court 
interrupted her and said that there was a defect in the complaint because it did 
not state the year of the alleged crime. The court also said that since appellee 
had attempted to enter a plea, it would dismiss the complaint with 
prejudice.

[¶2.]     We sustain the bill of 
exceptions taken by the State.

[¶3.]     Section 5-5-108, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provides:

"The Wyoming supreme court 
shall adopt rules governing the procedures and practices of the county courts. 
The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, as amended or supplemented from time to time, shall govern county 
courts unless such rules or any parts thereof are declared inapplicable by the 
supreme court. Commissioners, as used in the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, shall include county court judges and county court 
commissioners."

[¶4.]     This court has adopted 
rules for county courts, effective January 1, 1983. Since the rules were not in 
effect when the complaint against appellee was dismissed, we will consider only 
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure in this appeal. Rule 3, W.R. Cr.P., 
says, "The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a commissioner." The 
complaint here had blanks for the day, month, and year of an alleged offense. 
The day and month were filled in, but the year was not typed 
in.

[¶5.]     At the time this 
complaint was issued, a complaint in county court could serve two purposes. The 
first was to allow the court to make an independent probable cause determination 
that an offense had been committed and that the appellee had committed it. The 
second purpose was that the complaint functioned as an indictment or 
information.

[¶6.]     Concerning the probable 
cause determination, a complaint provides a foundation for a neutral judgment by 
a judicial officer that resort to further criminal process is 
justified.

"* * * It must provide 
the affiant's answer to the magistrate's hypothetical question, `What makes you 
think that the defendant committed the offense charged?' * * *" Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224, 
85 S. Ct. 1365, 1371, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 353 (1965).

[¶7.]     The question to ask in 
evaluating the complaint for probable cause sufficiency is whether it meets the 
test of minimal adequacy in setting forth the essential facts establishing 
probable cause, using a commonsense approach. Organ v. State, 65 Wis.2d 36, 221 N.W.2d 823 (1974). It does not make sense to dismiss a complaint as being insufficient 
because it has an obvious typographical error. In United States v. Markis, 352 F.2d 860 
(2nd Cir. 1965), an agent swore to a complaint before a commissioner on October 
5, 1964. The complaint alleged that John Doe had been engaged in criminal 
activity on or about October 8, 1964. John Doe had later been identified as 
Joseph Markis. The commissioner then issued a warrant of arrest. Concerning the 
attack on the warrant based on the discrepancy in the date, the court 
ruled:

"The attack on the arrest 
warrant based on the point that, in obvious error, the complaint alleged Markis 
had committed the offense three days in the future requires no discussion. * * * 
A complaint, like affidavits supporting a search warrant, must be read `in a 
commonsense and realistic fashion.' * * *" United States v. Markis, supra, at 
864.

[¶8.]     This court has taken 
the same commonsense approach to evaluate the adequacy of a complaint. In Martinez v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 105 
(1973), appellant contended that there was a lack of reasonable cause for the 
issuance of a warrant for his arrest, because the complaint recited that it was 
based on attached affidavits, when no affidavits were attached. This court said 
that where a justice of the peace had access to sworn statements and knew their 
contents at the time he issued the arrest warrant, it was immaterial whether the 
statements were attached.

[¶9.]     As we have noted, the 
second purpose of the complaint in county court was that it functioned as does 
an indictment or information in district court.1 Rule 9, W.R. Cr.P., speaks to 
indictments and informations; at the time the complaint was filed the rule also 
applied to complaints in county court when the complaints had the same function 
as an indictment or information.

[¶10.]  Rule 9(c), W.R.Cr.P., 
provides:

"(c) Amendment of 
information. - An information may be amended in matter of form or substance at 
any time before the defendant pleads without leave of court. The court may 
permit an information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no 
additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced."2

[¶11.]  The rule makes the granting of an 
amendment to an information mandatory if it is requested before the defendant 
pleads. It allows more discretion to the trial court after a defendant pleads. 
However, this discretion is limited by Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., which 
says:

"* * * Error in the 
citation or its omission or any other defect or imperfection which does not tend 
to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant upon the merits or to 
mislead the defendant to his prejudice shall not be grounds for the dismissal of 
the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction. * * 
*"

[¶12.]  This rule is similar to statutes which 
were in effect before they were superseded by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because of the similarity in our present rules and previous statutes, the 
rationale of cases interpreting the previous statutes is still pertinent. 
According to State v. Hickenbottom, 
63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 (1947), § 33-415, W.R.S. 1931, used to provide that no 
indictment should be deemed invalid, nor should a trial, judgment or other 
proceeding be affected for "`* * * any defect or imperfection which does not 
tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.'" We 
said in State v. Hickenbottom, supra, 
that under statutory provisions of this type, slight verbal inaccuracies, or 
typographical or spelling errors were not to be favorably regarded, but that 
objections to them had to at least be raised. We then ruled that appellant's 
contention concerning the defect in the indictment was without merit, implying 
that, if the defect is merely one of form and not substance, defendant must 
object to the defect.

[¶13.]  This court has not taken the same 
position with respect to a defect of substance. In Town of Green River v. Martin, Wyo., 254 P.2d 198 (1953), we noted a fatal defect in an information, and took notice of 
it as a fundamental reversible error, even though appellant had not objected 
below or raised the issue on appeal. We further said in Gonzales v. State, Wyo., 551 P.2d 929, 931 
(1976), that we do not approve or allow haphazard and careless pleading charging 
a crime. "`* * * [T]he substantial safeguards to those charged with serious 
crimes cannot be eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the 
rules.'"

[¶14.]  Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., is also similar to 
Rule 7(c)(3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the latter rule 
only pertains to error in the citation or its omission, and does not have the 
language "or any other defect or imperfection," which arguably gives the federal 
courts more discretion to dismiss indictments or informations. The policy of 
these rules is that imperfections of form which are not prejudicial are 
disregarded. United States v. Dreer, 
457 F.2d 31 (3rd Cir. 1972); and United States ex rel. Harris v. Illinois, 457 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 860, 93 S. Ct. 147, 34 L. Ed. 2d 106 
(1972). "`* * * [T]he practice of fine combing indictments for verbal and 
technical omissions is no longer countenanced by the courts.'" Gonzales v. State, supra, at 
931.

[¶15.]  An indictment to be legally sufficient 
must fairly indicate the crime charged, must state the essential elements of the 
alleged crime and be sufficiently definite so that the defendant can prepare his 
defense, and definite enough so that the indictment will grant protection from 
further prosecution for the same offense. Hovee v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1127 
(1979). Such an indictment will allow the accused his Sixth Amendment right 
under the United States Constitution "to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation," and his right under Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution 
"to demand the nature and cause of the accusation." The same standards, of 
course, would apply in judging the sufficiency of an information.3

[¶16.]  Other courts have given only cursory 
attention to arguments that a defendant was prejudiced in being able to prepare 
a defense because of an obvious error in the indictment. In United States v. Reece, 547 F.2d 432 
(8th Cir. 1977), one count of an indictment contained a typographical error in a 
date, alleging that appellant had illegally possessed a check on October 1, 
1975, instead of October 1, 1974. The court said that any argument for error was 
frivolous, since the appellant failed to point to any prejudice to his case as a 
result of the error. In United States v. 
Zambito, 315 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924, 83 S. Ct. 1524, 10 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1963), the appellant complained of a typographical error 
in the indictment which stated October 23, 1962, rather than 1961, as the date 
of an alleged false statement. The court ruled that the obvious clerical mistake 
was in no way prejudicial. In Government 
of Canal Zone v. Green C., 521 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held that 
appellant was not prejudiced by a typographical error giving the wrong date of 
an alleged offense. The correct date was specified at his arraignment, at the 
preliminary hearing, and at trial.

[¶17.]  Here, it would have been impossible for 
appellee to be prejudiced by the omission of the year of the alleged offense. 
Two other defendants, a Mr. and Mrs. Hoffland, were charged with the same 
offense arising from the same incident. They were arraigned at the same time as 
appellee. Appellee was present when the trial court read the complaint against 
Mr. Hoffland; that complaint included the year. Furthermore, when the trial 
court began to ask her questions to establish a basis for the guilty plea, 
appellee began describing the events of August 29, 1982. She obviously knew the 
offense with which she was being charged.

[¶18.]  When a defendant cannot possibly be 
prejudiced, the trial court does not, under Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., have the 
discretion to dismiss a complaint, information, or indictment. For that reason, 
the State's bill of exceptions to the trial court's dismissal of the complaint 
with prejudice is sustained.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 3, Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, County Courts, provides that all prosecutions or offenses 
triable in the county courts shall be by information supported by affidavit. 
Rule 4, W.R.Cr.P.C.C., provides that if it appears from the information or 
affidavits that there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it, a summons upon the defendant shall issue. 
The new rules, then, contemplate that the information can be both the document 
supporting probable cause to arrest and the charging document informing 
defendant of the offense with which he is charged.

2 Appellee here had 
entered her plea, although the court had not yet accepted it. The State did not 
ask to amend the complaint, probably because the court had summarily said, in 
the middle of appellee's description of the incident, that it was dismissing the 
complaint. The State did argue that since appellee had entered her plea, she had 
waived any defects in the complaint.

3 "* * * Generally, where 
an information can be filed only after a preliminary hearing, * * * the 
information must charge substantially the same offense alleged in the complaint 
under which a preliminary hearing was held. * * *" Bartlett v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235, 1243 
(1977).

RAPER, Justice, specially 
concurring, in which ROONEY, Chief 
Justice, joins.

[¶19.]  I concur that error took place and 
completely agree with the court's opinion authored by Justice Brown, but I see 
this case as one to be the catalyst to point up some misleading and poor 
Wyoming 
jurisprudence.

[¶20.]  It is my concern that in this case an 
appeal through the district court, rather than through the bill of exceptions 
procedure, by the State of Wyoming would have been the proper means of 
bringing the issue to the supreme court. I doubt the case would have gotten 
beyond the district court, the error is so blatant. The opinion of the court is 
extremely kind and patient in its disposition based upon elementary law. It may 
have been partly through past decisions of this court that there has developed a 
belief - even a rule - that the State may never appeal in a criminal case, 
regardless of the point in the proceedings at which the alleged error against 
the State occurs. For example, it was loosely and unnecessarily said in State v. Heberling, Wyo., 
553 P.2d 1043 (1976) - which I authored - at fn. 
1:

"A bill of exceptions is 
the only way by which the State may challenge and have reviewed any adverse 
ruling of the district court in criminal prosecutions. * 
*"

In that case, 
the defendant was in jeopardy, having been tried and found 
guilty.

[¶21.]  In State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 
(1906), which is the sire of the rule with more progeny than a rabbit, this 
court also unnecessarily set out the rule repeated in Heberling. In State ex rel. Gibson the proceeding was 
dismissed because the bill of exceptions was not sealed! Even though the 
dismissal was for a technical reason, the court volunteered the rule that "[n]o 
provision is made by this or any other statute for an appeal by the state, or 
any other proceeding on behalf of the state, to vacate, or modify the judgment 
rendered in a criminal case." It was dicta, pure and simple and has been blindly 
followed ever since and demonstrates how dicta can become settled law, though 
erroneous.

[¶22.]  This court adopted the rule of State ex rel. Gibson in State v. 
Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938) in an appeal by the State in a case 
dismissed by the district court because it thought the information inadequate, 
but added what it considered to be the prevailing rule 
that

"[i]t seems generally 
held under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not 
bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case, 
unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute, though there are 
some decisions which appear to hold that without statutory authority the 
prosecution may obtain a review of judgments favorable to the defendant upon 
questions of law when no verdict of acquittal has been had. * *"1 77 P.2d  at 
803.

 

The bill of 
exceptions provisions pertaining to proceedings initiated by the State has its 
roots in and implements § 11, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution:

"No person shall be 
compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the 
judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error 
in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in 
jeopardy."

As I see it, the 
intent of the constitution is that a person is not entitled to avoid prosecution 
unless that person has been placed in jeopardy. The statutory bill of exceptions 
proceedings authorized to be taken by the State is one designed for use when the 
defendant has been placed in jeopardy, a serious error of law against the State 
has taken place, and the defendant is acquitted. In order to prevent that same 
error of law to crop up again and become a practice in other cases, a means is 
provided to prevent it in the future. A good example of this real purpose and 
legislative intent is found in State v. 
Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786 (1981), where it appeared that an improper 
practice had grown up of not giving lesser-included-offenses instructions in 
first degree homicide cases. The defendant had been tried and, in a new trial, 
acquitted; in the first case there was a hung jury. The court had refused to 
instruct on the lesser-included offenses. The bill of exceptions served the 
valuable purpose of preventing such error against the State in future 
instances.

[¶23.]  Section 7-12-105, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state."

A careful 
examination of that language indicates that the particular proceeding in which 
the bill of exceptions was taken cannot be disturbed. However, if the defendant 
was not in jeopardy at the time and an erroneous decision at law was made in his 
favor, that does not mean that new proceedings may not be initiated and pursued. 
An analogous situation exists when, as a result of a preliminary hearing, a 
complaint is dismissed. As was said in Richmond 
v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217, 1221-1222 
(1976):

"The rule has long been 
that one preliminary hearing, unproductive for the State, does not prohibit 
another. As set out in United 
States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 1925, 268 U.S. 390, 393, 
45 S. Ct. 516, 517, 69 L. Ed. 1010, 1011:

"`Under state law it has 
uniformly been held that the discharge of an accused person upon a preliminary 
examination for want of probable cause constitutes no bar to a subsequent 
preliminary examination before another magistrate. Such an examination is not a 
trial in any sense and does not operate to put the defendant in jeopardy. * * 
*'

"Since that 1925 
decision, there has been no change in the law.[3]"

Footnote 3 to 
the foregoing enlarges upon the text:

"[3] A 
proceeding before an examining magistrate is not a judicial trial but merely a 
judicial inquiry and dismissal of a complaint is not an absolute bar to further 
prosecutions. State v. Elling, 1973, 19 Ariz. 
App. 317, 506 P.2d 1102; Skinner v. Superior Court, In and for PimaCounty, 
1970, 106 Ariz. 287, 475 P.2d 271. Following are more of 
some of the recent cases holding that dismissal does not bar refiling before 
another magistrate: Commonwealth v. Smith, 1975, 232 Pa. Super. 546, 334 A.2d 741; Perkins v. State, 1975, 26 Md. App. 526, 339 A.2d 360; State v. Thomas, Mo. 
1975, 529 S.W.2d 379; People v. Uhlemann, 1973, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609; State v. Fish, 1963, 20 Wis.2d 431, 122 N.W.2d 381."

Since Richmond, this rule has 
been incorporated into Rule 7(c), W.R.Cr.P. where it is provided that if the 
commissioner dismisses the complaint and discharges the defendant at a 
preliminary hearing, "[t]he discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense."

[¶24.]  While not all complaints dismissed at a 
preliminary hearing are the result of arbitrary action by the commissioner, the 
State does need protection from not only arbitrary and capricious action by a 
tribunal but also errors of law and must not be forever foreclosed from 
proceeding upon what may be a meritorious complaint when the defendant has not 
been placed in jeopardy. The proper administration of justice in criminal 
matters requires a balancing of the defendant's constitutional rights with the 
interests of society in being protected from those who violate our criminal 
laws.

[¶25.]  It was well put in a musty old volume 
with a fresh view, State v. Buchanan, 
5 Harris and Johnson (Md.) 317, 329-330 
(1821):

"* * * Hence it is 
manifest that, in the opinion of Lord Hale, the King might have a writ of error 
in a criminal case; since it would be absurd to say that a man who had obtained 
a judgment of acquittal for a defect in the indictment, or on a special verdict, 
could never again be indicted for the same offence, until that judgment was 
reversed by writ of error, if a writ of error would not lie. * * But instances 
are not wanting of writs of error being prosecuted by this state, in criminal 
cases, [citations]. In each of those cases there was a demurrer to the 
indictment, and judgment on the demurrer for the defendant, in the court below. 
* * *"

In Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 6 A. 685 (1886), the court noted that several different statutes of Pennsylvania 
mentioned the rights of criminal defendants to writs of error to the supreme 
court, but none mentioned any such right in the state. It stated in that regard 
that "[a] view of the statutes reveals the purpose to secure to defendants or 
accused persons the right of removal and review, - not to take away any right 
from the commonwealth." The court went on to hold that for error in quashing an 
indictment, arresting judgment after verdict of guilty, and the like, the 
commonwealth may have a writ of error.

[¶26.]  The appellate jurisdiction of this court 
is derived from § 2, Art. 5, Wyoming Constitution:

"The supreme court shall 
have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil 
and criminal causes * * *";

and § 3, Art. 5, 
Wyoming Constitution:

"* * * The supreme court 
shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review,[2] prohibition, habeas corpus, 
certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and 
revisory jurisdiction. * * *"

Section 1, Art. 
2, Wyoming Constitution provides:

"The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

I seriously 
question that the legislature has the authority to restrict our "complete" 
appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals taken by the State in proper cases if in 
fact the bill of exceptions procedure does that. There is no constitutional 
prohibition against the State taking an appeal in a criminal case as long as it 
is to an issue which would not place the defendant in jeopardy for a second 
time. Section 11, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution, supra. When a statute and the 
constitution collide, the constitution prevails.

[¶27.]  We can, and should, avoid the 
constitutional issue of the legislature's authority to do so if we can 
reasonably interpret the statute in such a way that it is not viewed as 
unconstitutional. Schoeller v. Board of 
County Commissioners of County of Park, Wyo., 568 P.2d 869 (1977). We can do 
that here by holding the design of §§ 7-12-102 through 7-12-105 to be applicable 
only in those cases where the defendant has been placed in jeopardy, and appeals 
can be taken by the State in all other cases. In other cases the State may 
appeal within the spirit of § 11, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution, 
supra.

[¶28.]  A somewhat similar approach was made in 
Prosecuting Attorney v. Judge of 
Recorder's Court, 59 Mich. 529, 26 N.W. 694 (1886). The prosecuting attorney 
in that case applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the trial judge to proceed to trial on indictments for bribery which the 
judge had quashed for want of jurisdiction. The supreme court noted that under 
the Michigan Constitution it has "general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, with power to issue all the various classes of original and 
remedial writs, including writs of error, mandamus, procedendo, etc." The court 
observed that,

"* * * Under the common 
law and under our constitution no writ of error or other proceeding lies on 
behalf of the public to review a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, as no 
one can be twice put in jeopardy; but there is no rule of law to prevent the 
review of proceedings which have not gone to a trial. It is very well settled 
that a decision quashing an indictment may be reviewed. * * *" 26 N.W.  at 
695.

The court 
concluded that it could have considered the case on either writ of error or 
mandamus but preferred mandamus because of the lesser delay in setting aside the 
order, thus permitting an earlier trial of the improperly quashed indictment. 
Michigan, some forty years later, adopted a statute specifically authorizing the 
State to appeal in such cases, People v. 
Weiden, 239 Mich. 169, 214 N.W. 120 (1927), but in the meantime the 1886 
case was the law of the state.

[¶29.]  The Idaho Supreme Court has been 
confronted with a similar problem as to appeals by the State. In State v. Lewis, 
96 Idaho 743, 536 P.2d 738 (1975), an appeal was taken by the State from an 
order not listed in a statute "authorizing" appeals by the State. The question 
became whether the statute exclusively defined the authority of the Idaho 
Supreme Court in such cases. The court held that it did not and that its 
appellate jurisdiction was governed by the State constitution, providing 
that

"`[t]he Supreme Court 
shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district 
courts * * *.'

"* * * So long as we do 
not order a disposition of the case that subjects the defendant to being twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense, our holding is in conformity with the 
Constitutions of Idaho and of the United States and we are exercising powers 
that have been given to this Court by the Constitution of Idaho and which cannot 
be withheld by the legislature. `The legislature shall have no power to deprive 
the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to 
it * * *.' Idaho Constitution, Art. 5, § 13. * * *" 536 P.2d  at 
741-742.

The Idaho court 
thereupon proceeded to overrule and set aside other cases in conflict which had 
held the statute to be exclusive and stood on its plenary right of 
review.

[¶30.]  My concern is not so much the rather 
minor case we have before us, but the major crimes of homicide, other crimes of 
violence, serious larcenies, drug-related offenses, and heavy frauds. It is 
shocking to me that the State should be foreclosed from appealing the dismissal 
of indictments or informations which may have been improvidently set aside. I am 
also concerned about the instances where a trial judge may have, in a pretrial 
proceeding, suppressed evidence necessary to the State in proceeding with the 
prosecution, or because of a holding that the statute under which the State was 
going ahead was unconstitutional, or even the post-trial situation of an illegal 
sentence which does not raise a jeopardy question, which rulings may also have 
been ill-founded.

[¶31.]  I would have pointed out in this case 
that a final order of the district court based upon a motion by the defendant or 
upon the court's own motion dismissing an indictment or information under the 
provisions of Rule 16, W.R.Cr.P., for insufficiency is appealable by the State. 
Like motions with orders of dismissal in courts of limited jurisdictions, Rule 
8, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. and Rule 11, W.R.Cr.P.C.C., should also be appealable to 
district courts by the State. I would set aside any decision of this court 
holding to the contrary.

[¶32.]  I would also point out in this case that 
the State, if that is the desire of the prosecutor, may file a new complaint in 
the case now before us, in that the defendant has never been in 
jeopardy.

FOOTNOTES

1 See Annot., 92 A.L.R. 
1137 "Right of prosecution to review of decision quashing or dismissing 
indictment or information, or sustaining demurrer thereto." My examination of 
the cases in this annotation and in the Later Case Service leads me to believe 
that practically every state has a specific statute authorizing the State to 
appeal from an order or judgment dismissing an information or indictment. That 
would seem to be the only reason for the expression that there must be a statute 
- a most frail rationale. The United States has had such a statute 
ever since 1907, 18 U.S.C. § 3731:

"In a criminal case an 
appeal by the United 
States shall lie to a court of appeals from a 
decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or 
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where 
the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further 
prosecution.

"An appeal by the United 
States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district 
courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized 
property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in 
jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if 
the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is 
not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a 
fact material in the proceeding.

"The appeal in all such 
cases shall be taken within thirty days after the decision, judgment or order 
has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.

"Pending the prosecution 
and determination of the appeal in the foregoing instances, the defendant shall 
be released in accordance with chapter 207 of this title.

"The provisions of this 
section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes."

What the 
presence of such statutes says to me is that the nationwide policy is that the 
State should be permitted to appeal in the absence of double jeopardy. I am not 
convinced there must be a statute. The real fact is that there are such 
statutes, so there is a misconception that there is such a requirement. My view 
is that the constitution of this state gives this court authority to entertain 
an appeal by the State, as I shall later develop.

2 A writ of review is any 
form of process issuing from an appellate court and intended to bring up for 
review the record or decision of the court below. Black's Law Dictionary (5th 
ed. 1979).

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom RAPER and ROSE, Justices, 
join.

[¶33.]  I agree with everything that is 
encompassed in the opinion of the majority in this case. In my view this is an 
appropriate instance in which to speak also to the authority of the trial court 
to dismiss the complaint "with prejudice." It is my position, sustained by the 
law, that the county court had no authority to dismiss the complaint "with 
prejudice," without regard to whether it might have properly dismissed the 
complaint for some defect.

[¶34.]  The only rule or statutory authority for 
dismissal of criminal cases by the county court in our state was found in Rule 
45(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rule which governed this 
particular case, and now found in Rule 39 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure for County Courts. That authority is intended to permit dismissals in 
order to protect the constitutional right of the defendant to a speedy trial. 
Presumably it would be futile for the State to refile a criminal charge once it 
had been dismissed for that reason. Similarly, when other paramount 
constitutional considerations such as the right not to be twice put in jeopardy 
or the right to due process of law lead to dismissal, the futility of refiling 
also would be apparent. In such instances a dismissal "with prejudice" would aid 
in securing the individual right, and on the assumption that the refiling would 
be unlawful, there would be no infringement of the executive 
prerogatives.

[¶35.]  Beyond that, when no constitutional 
inhibition against further prosecution is involved, any attempted dismissal of a 
criminal charge with prejudice by a trial court contravenes the provisions of 
Art. 2, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. It there is provided as 
follows:

"The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

 

The prosecutive 
decision traditionally has been exercised by the executive department, Confiscation Cases, 74 
U.S. (Wall.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 
(1869), and an attempt by the judicial branch of government to exercise that 
authority by purporting to foreclose the refiling of a criminal charge in the 
absence of a constitutional or statutory proscription is constitutionally 
prohibited as a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.

[¶36.]  Other jurisdictions have recognized that 
a trial court is without power to enter a nolle prosequi over the objections of 
the prosecuting attorney. While they have not necessarily articulated that rule 
in terms of a constitutional standard, still the essential thrust of their 
statements of the rule is consistent with this 
proposition.

[¶37.]  As the Texas court said in State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174, 
175, 69 A.L.R. 233 (1930):

"The courts of Texas must look to the 
Constitution of this state, the enactments of the Legislature, and the common 
law for their authority to summarily dismiss criminal cases over the protest of 
the district attorney in charge of such prosecution. And, if the authority does 
not exist at common law, and has not been conferred by the Constitution nor by 
the statutes of this state, then the attempted exercise of such power by the 
court in this instance is ineffectual and void. 
[Citations.]"

The Texas court cites a 
number of cases as authority for that proposition. In addition the same 
proposition appears in Hammers v. 
State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); State v. Summa, 5 Conn.Cir. 78, 242 A.2d 94 (1968); and State v. Hodsdon, Del. 
Super., 289 A.2d 635 (1972). The logical extension of a rule that the trial 
court cannot dismiss a criminal charge over the protest of the prosecuting 
attorney has to be that it cannot inhibit the refiling of a criminal charge even 
though technically a dismissal is found to be proper. Such an assumed power, as 
noted earlier, would contravene the separation of powers doctrine provided in 
our constitution.

ROSE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶38.]  I concur in the specially concurring 
opinion of Justice Thomas, but I do not hold with the specially concurring 
opinion of Justice Raper for two reasons:

[¶39.]  First, the right of the State of Wyoming 
to appeal an adverse decision in a criminal case is not raised and, therefore, 
according to our traditional position, we should not undertake decision-making 
where issues are not raised by the parties to the appeal, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981).

[¶40.]  Secondly, Justice Raper has not shown me 
that there is any authority for the State of Wyoming to "appeal" an adverse decision. So 
far as I am concerned, bills of exception remain the only avenue along which the 
State may travel to find relief from where the decision in the district court is 
adverse in a criminal prosecution.