Title: MAM v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MAM v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2004 WY 12799 P.3d 982Case Number: C-03-13Decided: 10/29/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

MAM,

 

Appellant(Defendant/Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY 
SERVICES; and STATE OF WYOMING

ex 
rel., NTE, minor child,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs/Respondents).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Barbara A. Baker, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 
Attorney General; and Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

 

            
Ellen Rutledge, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an order and judgment on the pleadings in which the district court denied a 
petition to declare the non-existence of a father-child relationship and denied 
a motion to set aside a stipulated paternity order.  Finding an abuse of discretion under the 
particular facts of this case, we reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
states the issues as follows:

 

1.         
Did the district court err by applying the wrong 
statute?

 

2.         
Was Appellant entitled to relief from the Stipulated Order for 
paternity?

 

3.         
Is it a violation of public policy to promote the legal fiction that 
Appellant is the biological father in light of evidence to the 
contrary?

 

[¶3]      The appellee 
presents a single issue:

 

Whether 
the district court erred in denying appellant's request for relief from the 
stipulated order of paternity?

 

[¶4]      Finally, the 
guardian-ad-litem identifies two issues:

 

I.          
Did the District Court [err] as a matter of law when it applied statutes 
enacted after the action was commenced, and if so, can the Appellant's claim 
proceed pursuant to the former statutory scheme?

 

II.          
Does public policy support actions for disestablishment of 
paternity?

 

[¶5]      We will restate 
the determinative issue as follows:

 

Was 
it an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny relief from judgment 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)?

 

FACTS

 

[¶6]      A child was 
born on November 16, 1999.  Because 
the child's mother applied for child support services or public assistance, the 
State of Wyoming filed in the district court on May 18, 2000, a Petition to 
Establish Paternity and Support.  
That petition contained the following allegations of 
fact:

 

            
9.         
The putative father [the appellant] had sexual access to the mother . . . 
at the time of conception of the minor child and there are no other known 
persons who could be presumed or alleged to be the father of the minor 
child.

 

            
10. [The appellant] is the natural and biological father of the minor 
child.

 

[¶7]      Six days after 
being served with a copy of the petition, and without obtaining counsel, the 
appellant signed a Stipulated Order Waiving Informal Hearing and Order Waiving 
Genetic Testing.  The record does 
not contain, nor does it make reference to a separate waiver having been signed 
by the appellant, and there is no indication that the appellant waived the 
informal hearing or genetic testing in open court after having been advised of 
the existence and nature of those rights.  
Neither the petition nor the summons and order to appear served with it 
mention any right to genetic testing.  
The stipulated order reads in full as follows:

 

            
THE PARTIES having so stipulated, as appears from their signatures below, 
personally or through their respective attorneys, waive the informal hearing 
scheduled for June 23, 2000, at 4:00 p.m. being authorized by W.S. § 
14-2-108;

 

            
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no informal hearing shall be had in this 
matter.

 

            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
genetic testing is waived in this matter as the Respondent's [sic] 
[mother and the appellant], have signed the Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity 
stating [the appellant] is the natural and biological father of [the 
child].

 

The 
State concedes that this order is in error inasmuch as the appellant has never 
signed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.1

 

[¶8]      Some time after 
the birth of the child, the mother began to question whether the appellant was 
the child's father.  When the child 
was approximately two years old, voluntary genetic testing established with 
certainty that the appellant was not the child's father, and further identified 
with certainty another man to be the father.  The mother requested that the State 
Child Support Enforcement Office assist her in correcting the error, but was 
told nothing could be done.  The 
appellant then filed his petition and motion.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a 
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons:  . . . (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.  The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time[.]

 

[¶10]   "The granting of relief pursuant to 
that rule is a matter of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, and 
appellate review is limited to the question of whether the trial court abused 
its discretion."  State, Dept. of 
Family Services v. PAJ, 934 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Wyo. 1997).  We will not disturb the exercise of that 
discretion unless shown by an appellant that the trial court "was clearly 
wrong."  Claassen v. Ford, 
756 P.2d 189, 193 (Wyo. 1988).

 

"We 
recently clarified the definition of abuse of discretion when we said the core 
of our inquiry must reach the question of reasonableness of the choice made by 
the trial court.'  Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.' Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wash.App.1985)); Basolo [v. 
Basolo], 907 P.2d [348] at 353 [(Wyo.1995)].  We must ask ourselves whether the 
district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 

Cobb 
v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 719 
(Wyo. 1999)).

 

[¶11]   The purpose of the rule "is to 
provide courts with the power to vacate judgments whenever such action is 
appropriate to accomplish justice."  
U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121, 127 
(Wyo. 1983).  Nevertheless, the "rule is applicable 
only to special situations justifying extraordinary relief, and a showing of 
exceptional circumstances must be made."  
Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Wyo. 1981).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   The State's petition to establish 
paternity was filed in May 2000, at which time Wyoming's paternity determination 
statutes were located at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 
1999).  Those statutes were repealed 
in 2003, however, and were replaced with the Wyoming Parentage Act now found at 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-401 et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).  In ruling on the appellant's motion and 
petition, the district court relied on the latter statutes, even though 
proceedings commenced prior to July 1, 2003, "shall be governed by the law in 
effect at the time the proceeding was commenced."  Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 93, § 4 
(2003).  See also In re State, 
Div. of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. NDB, 2001 WY 118, ¶ 17, 35 P.3d 1224, 1229 n.8 (Wyo. 2001).2  The State and the guardian-ad-litem 
concede this error by the district court, but contend that it was harmless 
because the same result would have attended application of the prior 
statutes.  We need not address these 
contentions inasmuch as our resolution of the case is based upon the appellant's 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment rather than upon his petition to 
declare the non-existence of paternity.

 

[¶13]   The same can be said of the 
argument of the State and the guardian-ad-litem that the appellant's 
attempt to establish his non-paternity violates various statutory time limits 
and violates the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and 
judicial estoppel.  They contend 
that, although the appellant's petition was brought in the same civil action as 
the earlier proceedings, it is, in effect, a new action, because the stipulated 
judgment had become final as a matter of law.  While that may be true as to the 
petition, the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and 
judicial estoppel do not bar a motion for relief from judgment under W.R.C.P. 
60(b).  PAJ, 934 P.2d  at 
1260.

 

[¶14]   In evaluating the district court's 
exercise of discretion under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), we must determine whether the 
facts of this case are a special situation justifying extraordinary relief.  We believe they are.  Consider:  (1) the State's petition contained two 
false allegations of material factthat the appellant is the biological father 
of the child and that no other person could be alleged to be the father; (2) the 
record does not indicate whether or how the appellant's rights to an informal 
hearing and to genetic testing were ever explained to him;3 (3) the stipulated order that 
purports to act as a waiver of the appellant's rights specifies that "genetic 
testing is waived" due to the appellant having signed an affidavit acknowledging 
paternity, when in fact the appellant signed no such affidavit; (4) the 
appellant has a meritorious defense in that voluntary genetic testing 
established beyond any doubt that he is not the biological father of the child; 
(5) no disruption in the child's family life would result from granting the 
appellant's motion for relief from judgment because the appellant does not 
reside in the child's home and no father-child relationship has ever been 
established; and (6) the State's interest in obtaining support for the child 
will not be reduced inasmuch as the true biological father is known and subject 
to the district court's jurisdiction.

 

[¶15]   We find the facts of this case to 
be similar to those in PAJ, 934 P.2d  at 1258-59, 
where we affirmed the district court's granting of a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.  In both cases, the State's petition 
alleging paternity was based on false information supplied by the mother, in 
both cases the petition was not initially contested by the appellant, and in 
both cases the appellant filed his motion within a reasonable time of becoming 
aware of the factual inaccuracies contained in the petition.  An alleged father's reliance on a 
mother's misrepresentations and his initial decision not to demand paternity 
testing do not necessarily demonstrate a lack of due diligence.  Smith v. Department of Human 
Resources, 226 Ga.App. 491, 487 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1997).

 

[¶16]   In her report to the district 
court, the guardian-ad-litem argued against the appellant's motion on the 
ground that "the child's best interest will be served by ongoing financial 
support and by ending litigation."  
In turn, the district court cited the guardian-ad-litem's report 
in its findings of fact and went on to state that "[t]he child's interests and 
public policy interests override equitable concerns forwarded by [the appellant] 
. . .."  A similar theme is espoused 
by the State in its appellate brief, where it relies on Whitt v. State ex 
rel. Wright, 2001 WY 128, ¶ 23, 36 P.3d 617, 624 (Wyo. 2001), 
for the proposition that there is "a strong public policy in favor of the 
recoupment of public assistance benefits."

 

[¶17]   We do not disagree that these 
public policies exist and are important.  
But we disagree that, under the particular facts of this case, these 
policy concerns can best be addressed by disregarding the truth and by 
disregarding fairness.  In fact, 
given the ready availability of the child's biological father, it is difficult 
to imagine any justification for denying the appellant's 
motion.  The child's best interests 
are certainly better served by tying his future to his father rather than to a 
stranger.  Furthermore, there is an 
unsaid implication in these public policies that child support payments and 
public assistance recoupment should be from the parent of the 
child.

 

[¶18]   In suggesting that the "child can 
know who his biological father is even if that is not the man financially 
supporting him," the guardian-ad-litem opines that "[t]his does appear absurd, 
but in today's society these kinds of situations occur daily."  While it is certainly true that modern 
American society produces some non-traditional paternity determination 
situations that must be handled by the judicial system, we do not 
believe that such anomalies should be created by the judicial 
system where such a result can easily be avoided.  Similarly, although the "[c]ourts simply 
are not always capable of resolving the sorts of profound human dilemmas that 
are brought to their doorsteps," NDB, 2001 WY 118, ¶ 14, 35 P.3d  at 
1228, 
that does not mean the courts should sidestep such dilemmas where a ready 
solution is available, under existing rules of law, and where that solution is 
clearly in the best interests of the child.4

 

[¶19]   As a final comment, we emphasize 
that this case should not be construed to represent this Court's willingness 
willy-nilly to grant relief from paternity judgments whenever genetic testing 
proves that an error has occurred.  
Rather, the particular combination of facts in this case, especially the 
absence of evidence that the appellant knowingly waived his right to genetic 
testing, and the lack of any prejudice to the child in granting relief from the 
judgment, have dictated the result.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶20]   The State's petition to establish 
paternity contained material misstatements of fact and the appellant filed his 
motion for relief from judgment within a reasonable time after learning the 
truth.  The record does not reveal 
that the appellant made a knowing waiver of his right to an informal hearing and 
to genetic testing, and the stipulated order confirming his alleged waiver was 
erroneous on its face.  Furthermore, 
both justice and the best interests of the child will be fostered if the motion 
to set aside the paternity order is granted.  Under the particular facts of this case, 
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the 
motion.

 

[¶21]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102(c) (Lexis 
1999), in effect at the time, provided as follows:

 

. 
. . [A] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child born in Wyoming if, 
with the consent of the mother, he has acknowledged his paternity by signing an 
affidavit of paternity including his social security number and an 
acknowledgment of the privileges and obligations associated with parentage and 
filed these documents with the state office of vital records services.  The consent of the mother shall include 
an affidavit with her social security number, stating that she was not married 
at the time of conception or at the time of birth of the child.  The father's acknowledgment shall 
include a statement of the right to withdraw the affidavit of paternity as 
provided by subsection (d) of this section on or before sixty (60) days of the 
signing of the affidavit of paternity, or by the date of a judicial proceeding 
relating to the child in which the signatory of the affidavit is a party, 
whichever occurs earlier.  A minor's 
affidavit of paternity and acknowledgement shall also be signed by the legal 
guardian of the minor and include the social security number of the 
minor.

 

  2The district court's findings and 
conclusions included:  (1) the 
appellant was an "adjudicated father" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-402(a)(ii), 
14-2-815, and 14-2-822; (2) the appellant failed to file his petition within the 
two-year time limit found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-608 or 14-2-809; and (3) 
the appellant lacked standing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-802; the adjudication 
of paternity is binding upon the appellant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-823.

 

  3

For 
a waiver to be valid, there must be "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege,'" and the waiver must be knowingly 
and intelligently made.  Nelson 
v. State, 934 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Van Riper v. 
State, 882 P.2d 230, 234 (Wyo.1994)).  
A defendant need not, however, know and understand every possible 
consequence of this waiver for it to be valid.  Solis v. State, 851 P.2d 1296, 
1299 (Wyo.1993).  Whether a waiver 
was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently depends upon the surrounding 
facts and circumstances.  
Id.; Mapp v. State, 953 P.2d 140, 144 
(Wyo.1998).

 

Daugherty 
v. State, 2002 
WY 52, ¶ 38, 44 P.3d 28, 40 (Wyo. 2002).

 

  4We recently recognized the 
increasing need in paternity actions to give effect to the "weightier 
considerations of policy and logic . . ..'"  GDK v. State, Dept. of Family 
Services, 2004 WY 78, ¶¶ 9-19, 92 P.3d 834, 836-39 (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-102 (LexisNexis 2001)).