Title: State of New Jersey v. Charles G. Hackett

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVecchia, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to sustain defendant's conviction for third-degree endangering the welfare of children. The charges arose from defendant's conduct that was observed by three victims, ages 11 and 13, as they walked to their school bus stop, which was located in front of defendant's house. The defendant was seen talking on the phone while standing nude in front of a window by one victim, age 11, on at least ten occasions. Another 11- year-old victim observed this conduct on only one occasion when defendant was facing away from the window while talking on the phone. The third victim, age 13, observed defendant nude while talking on the phone in front of the window and testified that he posed for her. This victim later approached the defendant and complained to him about somebody standing nude in his house. Upon questioning by the police, defendant denied any wrongful conduct, but conceded that he may have answered the phone nude. The jury convicted defendant of fourth-degree lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4b(1), and third-degree endangering the welfare of children, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. He was sentenced to a four-year term on the endangering conviction and a concurrent eighteen-month term for lewdness. On appeal, the Appellate Division, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether a defendant's conduct that is completely encompassed by the fourth-degree crime as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4b(1) (lewdness observed by a child less than 13 years of age) may also be prosecuted as a third-degree crime as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 (endangering the welfare of children). Answering the question in the affirmative, a majority of the Appellate Division panel concluded that the two statutes proscribe independent criminal conduct and require distinct proofs to warrant conviction for each offense. The majority found that defendant's exposure to the girls constituted the sexual-conduct element of the endangering conviction, but determined that the exposure also must have a more-than- theoretical capacity to have impaired or debauched the child's morals. Noting the absence of expert opinion or other evidence by the State that defendant's nudity would tend to corrupt, mar or spoil the morals of the girls, the majority reversed defendant's endangering conviction. The majority also found that the jury instructions on third- degree endangering were flawed because the definition of sexual conduct used a reference to nudity that was applicable to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(1)(i), a child pornography provision in which the nudity relates to the child, not the actor as was the case here. The dissent contended that it was not necessary for the State to prove that defendant's conduct actually impaired or debauched the morals of a minor. The dissent also asserted that expert testimony was not necessary to prove that endangering had occurred and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's endangering conviction. The State appealed as of right due to the dissent in the Appellate Division, pursuant to R. 2:2-1(a)(2). Although the defendant died on September 26, 2000, the Court determined to hear the appeal because the case involves important public issues in need of resolution. HELD: The evidence adduced at defendant's trial was sufficient to have enabled a properly-instructed jury to conclude that the defendant's conduct would debauch or impair the morals of girls aged thirteen and under. However, the trial court's jury instruction regarding endangering was flawed because it reasonably could have had the effect of directing a guilty verdict. 1. Lewdness is a fourth-degree offense when it constitutes the exposing of the actor's genitals for the sexual gratification of the actor or some other person and is observed by a minor who is less than age thirteen with the actor being at least four years older than the victim. The mens rea of the actor is an important element of the offense of fourth-degree lewdness. Endangering the welfare of children is a third-degree crime where an actor engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of a child under age sixteen. The focus in the endangering statute shifts from the mental state of the actor to the potential effect on the morals of the child. The same nudity that may constitute fourth-degree lewdness can form the basis for third-degree endangering if such nudity would impair or debauch the morals of the child. A conviction for fourth-degree lewdness, however, should not automatically sustain a third-degree endangering conviction. Instead, there must be proof that the nudity went beyond mere exposure and would impair or debauch the morals of the child. (Pp. 8-12). 2. Reviewing the history of the lewdness and endangering statutes, both of which were amended in 1992, the Court finds that mere nudity repeatedly presented at a window can constitute endangering the welfare of children if the other elements of the crime are met. Proof of actual impairing or debauching of the victim's morals, however, is not required. The legislative language prohibits any sexual conduct that would have this result on an average child in the community. Moreover, the word would signals the futurity of a likely event; it does not require the event's actual occurrence. (Pp. 12-17). 3. The victims' testimony at trial provided a sufficient basis upon which a jury could have arrived at a guilty verdict on the endangering charge. Rather than a case of a child's stolen glimpse of nudity, there was testimony of repeated incidents in which the defendant allowed himself to be viewed naked through an unobstructed front window in the morning hours at the designated time children were assembling at a school bus stop located directly in front of his home. A jury might have determined that defendant's actions appeared designed to attract the attention of little girls in a flagrant and repetitive way. Testimony that defendant waived at one girl as he stood nude talking on the phone, testimony by another that she saw defendant posing and that she confronted him suggests that the girls sensed a sexual element to the conduct. There is no need for expert testimony to establish that defendant's conduct had the tendency to impair or debauch the morals of the children who observed his nudity. This is a determination that a jury is well-equipped to make by drawing on its knowledge, common sense and experience as to the kind of conduct that is likely to impair the morals of young children. Furthermore, the question is not whether the victims actually had their morals impaired or debauched, but whether the actor's sexual conduct was conduct that likely would do so. Such a determination is well within the abilities of the average jury and allows it to fulfill its role as arbiter of community standards. (Pp. 18-22). 4. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the trial court's jury instruction on endangering was flawed, but for a different reason. The charge was flawed because it reasonably could have had the effect of directing a guilty verdict. The jury was incorrectly instructed that if it found defendant's actions constituted sexual conduct, it must conclude that the defendant necessarily impaired or debauched the morals of children. Whether defendant's sexual conduct would debauch or impair the morals of a child is a separate determination for the jury. Although such an error would normally constitute plain error requiring a new trial, the defendant is deceased. (Pp. 22-26). 5. The Model Jury Charge for endangering the welfare of a child was revised June 19, 2000, and the revision addresses problems presented in this case. The Court entrusts to the Committee on Model Jury Charges, Criminal, the question of whether further amendments to the Model Charge are necessary. In that connection, the Court notes that the charge could be supplemented to more clearly inform the jury of its obligation to consider the State's proof of sexual conduct and to evaluate that proof in the context of objectively reasonable contemporary standards in determining whether the conduct would tend to impair the morals of the victim. (Pp. 26-27). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, as MODIFIED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES G. HACKETT, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ Argued September 12, 2000 -- Decided January 18, 2001 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 323 N.J. Super. 460 (1999). John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for appellant (Mr. Farmer, attorney; Catherine M. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Michael N. Huff argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence adduced at the trial of a defendant accused of exposing himself to three minor girls was sufficient to sustain convictions for both fourth-degree lewdness and third-degree endangering the welfare of children. We were informed after oral argument that defendant passed away on September 26, 2000. Citing the significant public importance of addressing the relationship between these two sexual offenses, the State has urged the Court to issue an opinion notwithstanding defendant's death. Defense counsel has not objected to that request. We agree that this case involves important public issues in need of resolution. Accordingly, we elect to decide the issues presented even though the defendant has passed away. See Zirger v. General Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330 (1996). After a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant, Charles Hackett, of fourth-degree lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4b(1), and third-degree endangering the welfare of children, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. The victims were three young girls, M.M., A.S., both age eleven, and M.R.K., age thirteen. On several occasions while they were walking to their school bus stop located in front of defendant's residence in Middle Township, the girls witnessed defendant standing nude near the front window in his home. Defendant was sentenced to a four-year term on the endangering conviction and a concurrent eighteen-month term for lewdness. The majority of the Appellate Division panel below, in reversing defendant's endangering conviction, concluded that while a defendant could be prosecuted for both crimes, the State had failed to present adequate evidence that the lewd conduct here would tend to impair or debauch the morals of a child, a requisite element of an endangering conviction. State v. Hackett, 323 N.J. Super. 460, 478 (1999). The majority also found fault with the jury instruction pertaining to the endangering charge, determining that it lacked sufficient clarity. The dissent, however, concluded that there was sufficient evidence introduced into the record upon which the endangering conviction could have been sustained. The State appeals as of right due to the dissent below. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We hold that based on the testimony offered, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hackett's conduct had the capacity to impair or debauch the morals of a minor. reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. The trial court, in omitting the offending sentence, avoided the error cited by the majority of the Appellate Division. The dissent correctly observed that the trial court's charge specifically limited the jury's consideration of sexual conduct to the acts of lewdness. But the jury charge as given here was flawed nonetheless because it reasonably could have had the effect of directing a guilty verdict. The trial court must give a clear explanation of the applicable law to provide the jury with an adequate understanding of the relevant legal principles. State v. Burgess, 154 N.J. 181 (1998). A jury must be charged on each element of the crime. State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 376 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd, 163 N.J. 140 (2000). That portion of the jury's charge that stated that [t]he law provides that sexual conduct would impair or debauch the morals of the child effectively obscured the distinction between the second and third elements of the endangering statute. The jury was instructed incorrectly that if it found defendant's actions constituted sexual conduct, then the jury must conclude the defendant necessarily impaired or debauched the morals of children. The separate determination that the jury must make on the third element of the endangering crime was not properly explained. We are certain that the jury was entitled to a more precise instruction than it received from the charge it was given in order for it to have properly determined beyond a reasonable doubt whether defendant's sexual conduct would debauch or impair the morals of a child as required under the statute. Normally we would consider that defect to constitute plain error requiring a new trial. But, defendant is deceased and a retrial is not possible. We note that the Model Jury Charge for endangering the welfare of a child was revised June 19, 2000. The charge in its current form appears to correct the infirmities inherent in the charge's previous version. The revised charge deletes any reference to nudity and leaves it to the trial court to instruct the jury on the nature of the sexual conduct allegedly committed by the defendant. The revised charge also appears to have addressed the problem in this case by completely omitting the following sentence: The law provides that the sexual conduct would impair or debauch the morals of a child. We shall entrust to the Committee on Model Jury Charges, Criminal, the question whether any further amendment to the model charge is necessary. In that connection, we note that the revised charge states that [s]exual conduct [that] would impair or debauch the morals of a child is conduct which tends to corrupt, mar or spoil the morals of a child under sixteen (16) years of age. (emphasis added). That explanatory language could, in our view, be supplemented to more clearly inform the jury of its obligation to consider the proof of sexual conduct offered by the State and to evaluate that proof in the context of objectively reasonable contemporary standards in determining whether that conduct would tend to impair the morals of the victim. NO. A-53 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES G. HACKETT, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 18, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz