Title: Matter of Estate of Roosa

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Roosa1988 WY 59753 P.2d 1028Case Number: 87-152Decided: 04/14/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GORDON C. ROOSA, DECEASED. NEOLA WHIPPLE, MARJORIE 
M. COSTA, HOWARD A. ROOSA, AND THE ESTATE OF THE REVEREND RAY ROOSA, APPELLANTS 
(PETITIONERS/CONTESTANTS),

v.

NORTHERN WYOMING 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE FOUNDATION OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT/INTERVENOR), FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF SHERIDAN, FORMERLY BANK OF 
COMMERCE OF SHERIDAN, APPELLEE (RESPONDENT/EXECUTOR).

Appeal from the District Court,SheridanCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Jeffrey J. 
Gonda, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellants.

Robert E. 
Holstedt, Holstedt & Holstedt and Bruce P. Badley and Clay B. Jenkins, 
Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., 
and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case presents two 
questions relating to testamentary capacity. The first involves a motion for 
summary judgment, by proponents of a will in response to a contest which raised 
the issue of testamentary capacity, and is concerned with the nature of the 
information which must be presented to support a motion for summary judgment 
and, conversely, by the party opposing the motion to structure a genuine issue 
of material fact. The second question relates to whether a presumption of lack 
of testamentary capacity attaches to a guardianship created under the Uniform 
Veterans' Guardianship Act, §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, W.S. 1977 (May 1985 
Replacement). The district court held that the will contestants failed to 
demonstrate appropriately a genuine issue of material fact as to testamentary 
capacity and afforded no efficacy to the veteran's guardianship. Summary 
judgment was ordered in favor of the proponents of the will. We agree with the 
ruling of the district court in this instance and affirm the summary judgment 
which was entered.

[¶2.]     In attacking the 
summary judgment in this appeal, the will contestants, who are nieces and 
nephews of the testator, set forth the following issues:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment to respondents when there existed 
substantial questions of material fact?

"2. Whether the 
affidavits filed in opposition to respondents' motion for summary judgment 
raised questions of material fact?

"3. Whether the 
guardianship imposed on testator prior to his execution of the will raised a 
presumption of testamentary incapacity?

"4. Whether a presumption 
of testamentary incapacity raises a question of material fact sufficient to 
prevent the entry of summary judgment?"

The appellees, 
Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of Sheridan, Wyoming (the 
beneficiary under the will), and First Interstate Bank of Sheridan (the executor 
of the will), urged that the issues to be resolved are:

"1. Whether there are any 
issues of material fact?

"2. Whether the 
appointment of a guardian under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act raises a 
presumption that the ward lacks testamentary capacity?"

[¶3.]     After the death of 
Gordon C. Roosa (Roosa), this proceeding was initiated to probate his Last Will 
and Testament. The will was contested by the appellants who asserted lack of 
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed. Subsequent to the 
initiation of the will contest, Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of 
Sheridan, Wyoming was allowed to intervene in order to defend the will. 
Following additional pleading by the parties and the pursuit of discovery, a 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the executor and the beneficiary, 
supported by affidavits of two attorneys (one who had prepared the Last Will and 
Testament of Gordon C. Roosa and served as a witness, and the other who only 
witnessed the will); a certified copy of the will; and depositions of a bank 
employee who had worked with the administration of the guardianship of Roosa, 
one of the attorneys who witnessed the will, and two of the contestants. The 
contestants resisted the Motion for Summary Judgment and supported their 
resistance with the affidavits of two people who had known Roosa for some 13 
years prior to his death, which period of time encompassed the date of execution 
of his Last Will and Testament. The probate court granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and this appeal is taken from that order.

[¶4.]     Roosa was a veteran of 
the Armed Forces of the United States of 
America, apparently 
of World War I, although the record is not clear on this point. It would appear 
that he would have been in his late twenties or early thirties at the time of 
World War I because he was ninety-eight or ninety-nine when he died in 1985. He 
was separated from his brothers and sisters at an orphanage early in life. Roosa 
and his siblings were raised in separate families and, over the years, he 
maintained only minimal contact with any brothers and sisters. Probably he had 
not seen any of them since the 1940's, and all predeceased him. None of the 
appellants ever had met Roosa.

[¶5.]     From approximately 1963 
until March of 1983 (about a year and 9 months prior to his death), Roosa had 
lived in a trailer on property belonging to a firm known as Barker Brothers, 
Inc. In 1974, he became a ward under a guardianship created pursuant to the 
Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, W.S. 1977 (May 
1985 Replacement). He executed his Last Will and Testament at Sheridan, Wyoming on March 2, 1977. The Northern Wyoming 
Community College Foundation of Sheridan, Wyoming was the sole beneficiary under 
that Last Will and Testament. Roosa's estate was composed essentially of 
accumulated Veterans' Administration benefits which had been subject to the 
guardianship. If the appellants' challenge to the will on the basis of lack of 
testamentary capacity should succeed, then they, as his statutory heirs, would 
receive the estate.

[¶6.]     In order to properly 
enter a summary judgment, the district court must find that there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 
(1983); Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980); Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975), and the cases cited 
in these authorities. Materiality of a fact depends upon it having some legal 
significance so that it establishes or refutes some essential element of a cause 
of action or defense asserted by one of the parties. Schepps v. Howe, supra; 
Johnson v. Soulis, supra. The burden is assigned to the moving party to 
demonstrate clearly the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Weaver v. 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, supra. If the motion for summary judgment is 
supported properly by affidavits, as supplemented by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits, the party opposing the motion cannot 
rely upon allegations or denials in his pleading, but he must, by affidavit or 
otherwise, demonstrate facts which pose a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), 
W.R.C.P.; Schepps v. Howe, supra. In reviewing a summary judgment, we examine 
the entire record in the light most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the material either 
supporting or opposing the motion must be afforded to the party against whom 
judgment was entered. O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 (1985); Schepps v. Howe, supra. 

[¶7.]     In this case, the 
materiality of any facts is limited by the pertinent legal standard. The 
standard of testamentary capacity articulated in 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, § 
12.21 at 606-608 (1960) has been adopted for Wyoming:

"`* * * Testator must 
have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and memory, to know, in general, 
without prompting, the nature and extent of the property of which he is about to 
dispose, and nature of the act which he is about to perform, and the names and 
identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and his 
relation towards them. He must have sufficient mind and memory to understand all 
of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in their relation to each 
other, and a charge, in negative form, that capacity is lacking if testator is 
not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he 
is unable to understand any one of them. He must be able to appreciate the 
relation of these factors to one another, and to recollect the decision which he 
has formed.'" In re Estate of Morton, Wyo., 
428 P.2d 725, 729 (1967).

There are three 
factors which must be considered in applying this standard. The testator must be 
able to comprehend:

"* * * (1) [T]he extent 
and nature of the estate, (2) the identity of the beneficiaries and their 
relationship, whether by blood or circumstances, to the testator, and (3) the 
nature of the testamentary act, that it is a disposition of property to take 
effect at death." 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, § 12.21 at 
608.

These elements 
of testamentary capacity must be present at the time the will is made. 1 
Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, § 12.21 at 571.

[¶8.]     We also recognize a 
presumption of sanity and the possession of testamentary capacity. Wyoming embraced that general rule in Matter of Faragher's 
Estate, Wyo., 
367 P.2d 972 (1962). This presumption of testamentary capacity arises upon proof 
of the due execution and attestation of the will. 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills §§ 106 and 
107 (1975), and cases cited therein. The effect of this presumption in a will 
contest is that the burden is assigned to the contestants to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the claimed testamentary incapacity, and the only 
exception is if the prior incompetency of the testator has been established by 
proof or admission. In re Estate of Morton, supra.

[¶9.]     We examine then the 
factual information in this record in the light of the standard and the burden 
of proof. In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the appellees 
offered:

(1) the affidavit and 
deposition of Harlan Rasmussen, an attorney who represented First Interstate 
Bank of Sheridan 
in its capacity as guardian for the decedent, and who was an attesting witness 
to the Last Will and Testament;

(2) the affidavit of 
James N. Wolfe, the attorney who drafted the decedent's Last Will and Testament 
and who also was an attesting witness to the Last Will and Testament; 
and

(3) the deposition of 
Mary Lou Sare, a trust officer at First Interstate Bank of Sheridan who handled 
the guardianship of Gordon Roosa for the Veterans' 
Administration.

In his 
affidavit, Harlan Rasmussen averred that, on the date of execution of the will, 
Roosa appeared lucid and well oriented. Testifying in his deposition, Mr. 
Rasmussen stated that, although he was unable to recall the exact conversation 
on the day the will was executed, he would not have witnessed the will without 
satisfying himself that it did express the intent of the testator. He further 
testified that, having represented the bank in connection with the guardianship, 
he had met with Roosa some ten to twenty-five times before the will was 
executed. Mr. Rasmussen's testimony was to the effect that Roosa knew how much 
money he had in the guardianship; wanted to do something with his money that 
would help people; and did not talk about his family, leaving the impression 
with Mr. Rasmussen that he had no family.

[¶10.]  The other witness to the will, James 
Wolfe, Mr. Rasmussen's law partner at the time of the execution of the will, 
actually prepared the will. In an affidavit, Mr. Wolfe stated that he discussed 
this will with Roosa, on several occasions, both before and after it was 
executed. Mr. Wolfe stated that Roosa did not indicate that he had any living 
relatives to whom he wished to leave his estate but that the discussions with 
respect to testamentary disposition revolved around various charitable and 
educational institutions, including Sheridan's college. Mr. Wolfe's affidavit ended 
with this statement:

"* * * Mr. Roosa executed 
the will in the presence of both myself and my law partner, Mr. Rasmussen, and 
in my opinion at the time understood that he was executing his last will and 
testament disposing of the money and other property which he might have at the 
time of his death in accordance with the will which he was 
signing."

[¶11.]  By deposition, Mary Lou Sare testified 
that she saw Roosa regularly over a number of years. These meetings occurred 
because of her employment as the trust officer handling Roosa's guardianship. 
She stated that Roosa knew exactly how much money he had; and, frequently, he 
would ask where it had been invested and what its rate of return was. She 
testified that he came to the bank two or three times a month with these 
inquiries up until 1982. She also testified that on different occasions Roosa 
had spoken of SheridanCollege with 
approval.

[¶12.]  Singularly or collectively, the 
information submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment established 
a prima facie factual demonstration of testamentary capacity in accordance with 
the standard adopted for Wyoming. The information distinctly justified 
the validity of the presumption of testamentary capacity. In light of the 
requirements of Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., the appellants could not have failed to 
respond.

[¶13.]  In opposition to the evidentiary material 
supporting the summary judgment, the appellants filed the affidavits of Barbara 
Barker and Gabriel Barker, employees of Barker Brothers, Inc. These individuals 
were acquainted with Roosa much of the time during 1963 through 1983 when he 
resided in a trailer located on land owned by Barker Brothers, Inc. These 
affidavits essentially contained conclusions and opinions, such as: Roosa lived 
in a dream world; he did not operate in reality; he did not have a clear 
understanding of his business affairs; and he lacked capacity to sign a will. 
The affiants supported their conclusions by recitation of specific instances of 
eccentric or even delusional behavior on the part of Roosa. The incidents relied 
upon included such things as Roosa calling himself "Craig R." and "Major Craig 
R."; his statement of belief that he was a partner with Barker Brothers, Inc. in 
a number of large projects; his attempt to contribute large sums of money to 
those projects in 1978; his statement that he was working for the Attorney 
General of the United States; and his periodic billing to Barker Brothers, Inc. 
for "work" he believed he was doing for that firm. Roosa did putter around with 
various projects on Barker Brothers, Inc. property to "occupy Mr. Roosa's time 
and keep him happy," even though he was not on the 
payroll.

[¶14.]  In her deposition, submitted by the 
appellees, Mary Lou Sare also related incidents of eccentric behavior. She said 
that Roosa had mentioned to her a connection with a car factory in Colorado. Occasionally, 
he made vague requests that she transfer his money to a Montana bank; he poured 
a package of sugar on her desk, complaining that it was not processed properly 
and discussing the fact that it should be reported to someone; and, on one 
occasion, he suggested that Ms. Sare might have to assist him to prevent aliens 
from coming across the border, this apparently in connection with his perceived 
duties as a guard for Barker Brothers, Inc.

[¶15.]  With this record, the appellants urge the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the testamentary capacity of 
Roosa. A careful analysis of the record, however, demonstrates that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. In light of the standard for testamentary 
capacity adopted in In re Estate of Morton, supra, the facts which are material 
for our purposes are Roosa's comprehension of the extent and nature of his 
estate, the identity of the beneficiary and its relationship to Roosa and the 
disposition of his property which was to take effect at his death. The summary 
judgment materials produced by the executor and the beneficiary address these 
facts directly. The materials submitted by the appellants do not reach these 
factors. Although the events recited in the affidavits of Barbara Barker and 
Gabriel Barker encompass the date of execution of Roosa's Last Will and 
Testament, there is nothing which establishes that any of them occurred in close 
proximity to the date of execution. The facts recited do not serve to illustrate 
any miscomprehension by Roosa of the requisite factors for testamentary 
capacity. These materials reflect some unusual incidents, remote from the date 
of the execution of the will, but they do not directly refute the factual 
matters set forth in the materials filed by the executor and the beneficiary 
under the will. Those materials state facts reflecting that, on the date of the 
execution of his will, Roosa knew the extent of his estate and the identity of 
the object of his bounty, and he understood the effect of the execution of his 
Last Will and Testament.

[¶16.]  The circumstances of this case cause us 
to revisit Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983) (which was 
decided in reliance upon Forbes Company, Inc. v. MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56 
(1963)), and Kobielusz v. Wilson, Wyo., 701 P.2d 559 (1985). In the former case, 
we said that:

"* * * [A]n inference 
which is contrary to direct testimony is insufficient to support a finding that 
a genuine issue of material fact exists * * *." Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, 
supra, 671 P.2d  at 337.

In Kobielusz v. 
Wilson, supra, 
701 P.2d  at 560-561, we recognized the quoted rule but went on to 
say:

"* * * [T]hat 
determination usually depends upon the quality of evidence creating the 
inference and the direct testimony."

Later we adopted 
language as follows:

"`A reasonable inference 
is as truly evidence as the matter on which it is based, and is not a mere 
presumption or guess; appropriate inferences from proved facts are not a low 
order of evidence, but are just as valid as evidence as statements of 
eye-witnesses and are to be weighed by the jury along with the other evidence 
before it and may be strong enough to outweigh positive and direct oral 
statements. Whether or not they should be permitted to overcome positive and 
direct testimony depends, in every case, on the relative strength of the one or 
the other.' 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1044." Kobielusz v. Wilson, supra, 701 P.2d  at 
562-563.

[¶17.]  In these instances, we perhaps were 
painting with too broad a brush. We know that it is our duty to consider the 
record in the light most favorable to the appellants, who opposed the motion for 
summary judgment, and, in so doing, to give them the benefit of all favorable 
inferences. We have adopted the following statement:

"Guess-work cannot be 
substituted for evidence or inference, for `an inference is the conclusion drawn 
on reason from premises established by proof. In a sense, it is the thing 
proved. Guesswork is not.' Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50 A. 240." 
Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 241 P. 369, reh. denied 34 Wyo. 42, 51, 242 P. 1107, 
1110 (1925).

California, by succinct 
legislation, has captured the concept that is pertinent 
here:

"An inference is a 
deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact 
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." Cal.Evidence 
Code § 600(b) (West 1966).

See also, e.g., 
Cummins v. King and Sons, Alaska, 453 P.2d 465 
(1969); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Company v. Hicks, 64 Ariz. 15, 165 P.2d 167 
(1946); Draper v. Louisville & N.R. Company, 348 Mo. 886, 156 S.W.2d 626 
(1941); Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wn.2d 376, 165 P.2d 95 (1946). A properly drawn 
inference, contrary to direct testimony, can serve to structure a genuine issue 
of material fact.

[¶18.]  We turn then to an analysis of inferences 
which properly may be drawn from the affidavits of Barbara Barker and Gabriel 
Barker. If the issue to be resolved were general incapacity, those affidavits 
might serve to create an inference of general incapacity. Their adequacy to 
overcome a presumption of sanity is open to question. Wood v. Wood, 25 
Wyo. 26, 164 P. 844 (1917). A showing of general incapacity, however, would not meet the 
standard for lack of testamentary capacity established in In re Estate of 
Morton, supra. Furthermore, general incapacity is not the only inference that 
can be drawn from the Barker affidavits.

[¶19.]  For example, one can infer from them that 
Roosa was an eccentric. A conclusion of eccentricity, though, does not foreclose 
the possession of testamentary capacity. The general rule 
is:

"* * * Eccentricity has 
no effect on testamentary capacity; * * *.

"The fact that the 
testator was filthy, forgetful, and eccentric, * * * believed in witchcraft, and 
had dogs eat at the same table with him, * * * or that testator thought that 
others were plotting against him and was afraid to go out in the dark, * * * 
does not establish lack of capacity." 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, § 
12.37 at 644-645.

In a similar 
vein, this court discussed the effects of aging, another inference which can be 
drawn from the Barker affidavits, and specifically referred to evidence that 
during the two-year period surrounding the execution of his will the testator 
soiled his pants in public without realizing it; lost his ability to play 
checkers; could not remember if he had paid his rent; was hospitalized when he 
made his will; was belligerent in the hospital; and wrote checks promiscuously. 
In re Estate of Morton, supra. Then we said:

"* * * [A]t best it tends 
to show no more than the testator was in poor physical condition, forgetful, 
untidy and unclean about his person, not as alert as in the past, contrary and 
belligerent on occasion, suspicious, encountered some minor difficulty with 
money matters, and in general was undergoing a gradual aging process in keeping 
with his age. Such matters, collectively or alone and without more, do not 
establish mental incompetency to make a will." In re Estate of Morton, supra, 
428 P.2d  at 732.

The entry of a 
directed verdict which determined that there was insufficient proof of lack of 
testamentary capacity as a matter of law was sustained.

[¶20.]  Alternatively, it might be possible to 
infer instances of insane delusions from the Barker affidavits. That would not 
serve to defeat the presumption of testamentary capacity, however, 
because:

"* * * [A]n insane 
delusion does not deprive the testator of the capacity to make a will, if the 
delusion was not such as to affect his knowledge, memory and understanding of 
the extent and nature of his estate, the proper objects of his bounty and the 
nature of the testamentary act. An insane delusion * * * that men were hiding 
near testatrix, spying on her, and trying to rob her; * * * or a belief that 
people came into testator's room at night with trucks and that a very large man 
was trying to get his pocketbook; or that people and cattle were up the trees 
near his home and that butchering was going on in the trees; * * * or that the 
national capital was to be moved to a piece of swamp land which the testatrix 
owned and that she would become very wealthy; does not affect the will in 
question, and does not render it invalid." 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, 
§ 12.48 at 657-659.

[¶21.]  It is necessary to incorporate a 
sequential inference if a lack of testamentary capacity in any respect is to be 
inferred from the Barker affidavits. Given the rules of substantive law set 
forth above, the court must decide whether that sequential inference can be 
derived from those affidavits in a way that the law accepts. Such an inference, 
if properly drawn, would be sufficient to controvert the direct information 
relating to Roosa's testamentary capacity.

[¶22.]  We have discussed, but we have never 
premised a decision upon, the concept of sequential inferences. In Downs v. 
State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 (1978), we said that 
in Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 (1925), and Richey v. State, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154 (1921), reh. denied 28 
Wyo. 117, 205 P. 304 (1922), the court had alluded to the pyramiding or stacking of inferences 
but did not directly apply the concept. We also noted that according to 
Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules Against Basing an Inference Upon an 
Inference or a Presumption Upon a Presumption, 5 A.L.R.3d 100 (1966), the 
concept was perceived to be extremely technical as well as much criticized. In 
that case, we distinguished the situation from the pyramiding of inferences, 
however, and we, in effect, made the same distinction in Cowell v. State, Wyo., 
719 P.2d 211 (1986).

[¶23.]  The concept of sequential inferences is 
addressed in 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 41 (Tillers Rev. 1983). The treatise denies 
the existence of an orthodox rule to the effect that an inference upon an 
inference will not be permitted and adopts with approval the rationale set forth 
in New York Life Insurance Company v. McNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 P.2d 948 (1938). 
The Wigmore treatise presents a rational analysis which avoids an arbitrary rule 
prohibiting the stacking of inferences and, at the same time, avoids reliance by 
the fact finder upon remote inferences. Wigmore's analysis is directly related 
to the quality of the evidence concept articulated in Kobielusz v. Wilson, supra, and 
prevents resolution upon little more than a guess. The result is that an 
inference may be drawn from an inferential fact, that is a fact that itself was 
inferred, when the prior inference excludes any other reasonable theory or 
alternative inference. A mere probability that the prior fact exists is not 
sufficient to sustain the next sequential inference.

[¶24.]  Applying that approach, in this instance, 
we are satisfied that, other than a conclusional statement that Roosa lacked the 
capacity to sign a will, the facts in the Barker affidavits do not lead to any 
inference with respect to Roosa's comprehension of the extent and nature of his 
estate, the identity of and the nature of his relationship to the beneficiary, 
or the nature of the disposition of the property that was to take effect at his 
death. From the information in those affidavits, one could infer general 
incapacity, but not to the exclusion of simple eccentricity or the impact of 
advancing age discussed in In re Estate of Morton, supra. In accordance with the 
analysis of the sequential inference proposition in Wigmore, supra, it would not 
be proper to draw the successive inference, lack of testamentary capacity. 
Neither would an inference of insane delusion represent an exclusive theory on 
the basis of the Barker affidavits. Even if it were, the substantive law does 
not treat insane delusions as preventing testamentary capacity unless it appears 
that persons having a special claim to the bounty of the testator are the object 
of such delusions. In re Estate of Edwards, Fla.App., 433 So. 2d 1349 (1983). 
Nothing in the Barker affidavits indicates any information relating to the 
contestants.

[¶25.]  Resolving then whether this record 
creates a genuine issue of material fact, we agree with the district court that 
it does not. The quality of the materials presented by the appellants does not 
permit the inference of any fact which controverts the factual material 
presented by the executor and the beneficiary that Roosa was possessed of 
testamentary capacity according to the Wyoming standard. The district court correctly 
ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact manifested as to Roosa's 
testamentary capacity.

[¶26.]  In their second issue, appellants contend 
that the appointment of a guardian pursuant to the Uniform Veterans' 
Guardianship Act, §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, W.S. 1977 (May 1985 Replacement), 
results in a presumption of lack of testamentary capacity. They argue that this 
presumption is not overcome by the evidentiary materials presented by the 
appellees to the trial court, and thus, a genuine issue of material fact can be 
found premised upon the presumption. The appellants rely upon language from 79 
Am.Jur.2d Wills § 153 at 386 (1975), to the effect that an adjudication of 
insanity constitutes prima facie evidence of lack of testamentary capacity. 
While that principle may be sound, it is not pertinent here. The Uniform 
Veterans' Guardianship Act does not specify any grounds for appointment of a 
guardian. Such a guardianship is of limited effect and relates primarily to the 
receipt of veterans' benefits. The conclusion of the Veterans' Administration as 
to incompetency does not depend upon a finding of insanity which would justify 
an adjudication in state courts. Annotation, Constitutionality, Construction, 
and Effect of the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 173 A.L.R. 1061 (1955). 
The ordinary procedural safeguards involved in the creation of guardianship are 
not required under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act. Furthermore, the 
appointment of a guardian or conservator in this state does not constitute any 
adjudication of unsoundness of mind or lack of testamentary capacity. Section 
3-1-201, W.S. 1977 (1985 Replacement). We hold that the creation of a 
guardianship pursuant to the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act does not result 
in any presumption of insanity or lack of testamentary capacity, a conclusion 
that is supported by authority elsewhere. Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 804, 191 S.E. 479 (1937); Annotation, 173 A.L.R. 1061, supra, and cases cited 
therein.

[¶27.]  Our examination of this record under the 
appropriate standards persuades us that the appellees successfully demonstrated 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Gordon C. Roosa's 
testamentary capacity. The appellants were not successful in structuring any 
genuine issue of fact with respect to lack of testamentary capacity on his part, 
and the district court, properly having applied the appropriate standard, 
correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The order of the 
district court is affirmed.

CARDINE, J., filed a special 
concurrence, in which MACY, J., 
joined.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom MACY, Justice, 
joins.

[¶28.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority. I wholeheartedly agree with the majority's conclusion that "[a] 
properly drawn inference, contrary to direct testimony, can serve to structure a 
genuine issue of material fact." I part with the majority, however, when it 
ventures into an unnecessary and troublesome discussion concerning sequential 
inferences and their questionable application to summary judgment 
proceedings.

[¶29.]  I see no reason to inject further 
uncertainty into the area of summary judgment. The majority's discussion of 
sequential inferences does just that. Particularly troubling are the following 
statements:

"The result is that an 
inference may be drawn from an inferential fact, that is a fact that itself was 
inferred, when the prior inference excludes any other reasonable theory or alternative 
inference. A mere probability that 
the prior fact exists is not sufficient to sustain the next sequential 
inference." (Emphasis added.)

In my view, 
conclusions such as what is "reasonable" and what is a "mere probability" should 
be left to the trier of fact.

[¶30.]  The majority explains that while the 
materials submitted by appellant could support an inference of general 
incapacity, eccentricity, senility, or insane delusions, these inferences are 
insufficient to establish lack of testamentary capacity, which is a different 
concept. Then the majority states that "[i]t is necessary to incorporate a 
sequential inference if a lack of testamentary capacity in any respect is to be 
inferred from the Barker affidavits." The following potential "sequential 
inference" is then identified: Evidence of general incapacity, eccentricity, 
senility, and/or insane delusions may be sufficient to establish lack of 
testamentary capacity. This is precisely the idea which the majority rejects as 
a matter of substantive law. The evidentiary concept of "sequential inferences," 
cannot possibly affect our discussion of this case. It can only serve to further 
confuse the law of summary judgment. I would simply hold that appellant, even 
with the benefit of all favorable inferences, failed to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact.