Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cox

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. COX. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cox (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 218] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Engaging in a series 
of actions that demonstrate contempt for clients and for the bar. 
(No. 97-2667 — Submitted May 13, 1998 — Decided September 23, 1998.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-55. 
 
On December 9, 1996, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed a sixteen-
count amended complaint charging respondent, Roosevelt Cox of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0034112, with the violation of several Disciplinary 
Rules.  After receiving two extensions, respondent filed an answer, and a panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“board”) held a 
hearing on July 10, 1997.  The respondent appeared pro se at the hearing, his 
counsel having resigned after respondent failed to appear at an earlier scheduled 
deposition, and then failed to appear at the continuation of the hearing in October 
1997. 
 
The panel found with respect to count one of the complaint that Charlotte 
Glaude employed respondent to file a motion for shock probation for her son, 
Nicholas.  Respondent received a fee of $4,500 from Glaude and filed two motions 
less than six months after Nicholas had been incarcerated.  The court dismissed 
both motions.  The panel concluded that respondent’s actions violated DR 2-
106(A) (charging a clearly excessive fee) and 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter 
without preparation adequate under the circumstances). 
 
With respect to count two the panel found that Michelle Birinyi retained 
respondent in May 1992 to handle her workers’ compensation claim, later to 
represent her in a personal injury matter arising out of an automobile accident, and 
in August 1992 to represent her daughter, Kelly, in a personal injury claim.  
 
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Respondent did not contact Birinyi regarding the claim and did not immediately 
return Birinyi’s files when she discharged him.  The panel concluded that 
respondent’s actions and failure to act in the Birinyi matters violated DR 1-
102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 2-
110(B)(4) (a lawyer shall withdraw from employment when discharged by a 
client), and 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal matter). 
 
In considering count three, the panel found that after Peggy Mayo hired 
respondent on a contingent fee basis to represent her with respect to injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident, respondent sent a letter to the insurance 
company and took no further action even though the insurance company attempted 
to contact him regarding the claim.  Mayo discharged respondent, but he refused to 
release himself, did not notify the insurance company that he had been discharged, 
and failed to return Mayo’s files to her.  The panel concluded that in his 
representation of Mayo, respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 2-110(B)(4), and 6-
101(A)(3). 
 
The facts found by the panel in count four were that Viola McKinney, who 
was in the automobile accident with Mayo, also contacted respondent requesting 
that he represent her.  After their initial meeting, McKinney made several 
unsuccessful attempts to contact respondent.  Finally, McKinney did contact 
respondent and discharged him.  Respondent did not return the file, did not remove 
himself from the case, and demanded a portion of the settlement proceeds.  The 
panel concluded that in the McKinney matter respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5), 
2-110(B)(4), and 6-101(A)(3). 
 
In addition, the panel found in count five that Roberta Nalls retained 
respondent in October 1990 to pursue a dental malpractice claim.  Although Nalls 
was unsuccessful in her attempts to contact respondent after the initial meeting, 
respondent’s office personnel assured her that the case was proceeding.  After 
 
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Nalls discharged respondent in November 1993, she employed another attorney 
who told her that no lawsuit had been filed by respondent and that the statute of 
limitations period for her claim had expired.  The panel concluded that respondent 
violated Gov.Bar R. IV(1) (willful breaches of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility shall be punished by an appropriate sanction). 
 
The panel found in count six that in March 1990, Dusty Olkowski retained 
respondent to represent her both in a personal injury matter and on an aggravated 
robbery charge.  Respondent obtained a reduced charge of robbery and was to be 
paid from the proceeds of the personal injury case.  However, respondent failed to 
file the personal injury suit within the statute of limitations period.  Subsequently, 
Olkowski sued respondent for malpractice and obtained a judgment in the amount 
of $50,000, which remains unsatisfied.  The panel reached no conclusions with 
respect to respondent’s actions in the Olkowski matter. 
 
The facts found by the panel with respect to count seven were that in April 
1991, respondent filed a personal injury case on behalf of  Tony Johnson.  The case 
was dismissed because respondent neglected to attend a pretrial.  Respondent 
refiled the case, but it was dismissed two and one-half years later for want of 
prosecution.  The panel concluded that respondent’s conduct violated DR 6-
101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a contract of 
professional employment). 
 
The complaint made no charges in count eight. 
 
In considering count nine, the panel found that after Georgie Lapsley 
employed respondent to represent her in an action resulting from a motor vehicle 
accident, respondent told her that the trucking company involved refused to settle 
and that he would file suit on her behalf.  Thereafter, Lapsley was unable to contact 
respondent.  Respondent failed to file the lawsuit and the statute of limitations 
 
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period for the action expired.  The panel concluded that in the Lapsley matter 
respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), and Gov.Bar R. IV(1). 
 
In count ten the panel found that Kenneth Hart hired respondent and paid 
him a retainer of $500 to represent him as executor of his grandmother’s estate.  
Hart was unable to contact respondent for several weeks.  Finally, respondent filed 
an application to probate the grandmother’s will signed by someone other than 
Hart.  The panel concluded that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects upon the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and 
Gov.Bar R. IV(1). 
 
The panel found in considering count eleven that respondent failed to 
register as an attorney with the Supreme Court, and concluded that he was in 
violation of the Rules for the Government of the Bar. 
 
It found in count twelve that Gwendolyn Johnson paid respondent $1,500, 
which, pursuant to a separation agreement, was to be used to pay marital debts 
presented by her husband.  When her husband failed to present any bills within the 
allotted time, respondent failed to return the funds to Johnson although requested 
to do so.  Johnson sued respondent in common pleas court and obtained a 
judgment, which respondent has refused to pay.  The panel concluded that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and (6), as well as 9-102(B)(4) (failure to 
promptly deliver to the client property to which the client is entitled). 
 
The panel found in considering count thirteen that respondent received funds 
under an oral agreement to act as escrow agent.  He was to return the funds to John 
Taylor, Myrna Taylor, and Pauline Dixon if a liquor license was not transferred.  
The panel made no conclusions on this count, which involved respondent’s receipt 
of funds as an escrow agent. 
 
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With respect to count fourteen the panel found that Tyra R. Williams 
engaged respondent to pursue a personal injury claim arising out of an automobile 
accident.  Respondent settled the claim and, in addition to his one-third fee, 
retained a portion of the settlement funds to pay medical expenses.  However, 
respondent did not pay the medical expenses, and despite the requests of Williams 
did not provide her with a settlement statement.  The panel concluded that 
respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), and 9-102(B)(4), as well as Gov.Bar 
R. IV(1). 
 
The panel found with respect to count fifteen that in May 1995, Sandra 
Martin paid respondent $200 to expunge the record of a felony case. Martin heard 
nothing from respondent after engaging him and has no information that any work 
was performed on her behalf.  The panel concluded that in the Martin matter 
respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), and Gov.Bar R. IV(1). 
 
The panel finally found in considering count sixteen that Julia Garnett hired 
respondent to pursue a personal injury claim.  Respondent settled the matter and 
retained funds from the settlement to pay the medical  bills. Respondent paid some 
bills, but not others, and failed to provide Garnett with a settlement statement.  The 
panel concluded that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), and 9-
102(B)(4), as well as Gov.Bar R. IV(1). 
 
The panel noted that respondent was previously reprimanded in 1984 and 
recommended that for these recent infractions he be indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  The board adopted the findings of the panel.  It 
dismissed counts two, six, eight, and thirteen because relator did not establish them 
by clear and convincing evidence.  It adopted the remaining conclusions and the 
recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas P. Meaney, Jr., and Robert Lustig, for relator. 
 
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Roosevelt Cox, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We first take judicial notice that respondent was suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio on August 11, 1995 for failure to meet his 
continuing legal education obligations and remains suspended on this date. In re 
Report of the Comm. on Continuing Legal Edn. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1428, 1429, 
655 N.E.2d 1312, 1314. 
 
Having reviewed the record, we adopt the findings of fact of the board.  We 
adopt also its conclusions with respect to counts one, three, four, seven, and 
twelve.  We agree with the board that counts two, six, eight, and thirteen should be 
dismissed. 
 
The board found in counts five, nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen that 
respondent’s conduct violated Gov.Bar R. IV(1).  This rule states, “The Code of  
Professional Responsibility as adopted by this Court on October 5, 1970, and set 
forth in 23 Ohio State 2d Reports, as amended, shall be binding upon all persons 
admitted to the practice of law in Ohio.  The willful breach of the Code shall be 
punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided by 
Gov.Bar R. V.”  This rule does not specify any standards of conduct that are to be 
observed by lawyers with respect to the public, the legal system, or the legal 
profession.  Instead, this rule merely declares the binding nature of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and the sanctions that may be imposed for its willful 
breach. 
 
Therefore, to the extent that the board found that respondent’s conduct 
violated this rule, the board’s conclusions are vague and fail to inform respondent 
of the nature of the charges against him.  We adopt the conclusions of the board in 
counts nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen insofar as they do not rely on 
Gov.Bar R. IV(1).  The board’s conclusion in count five relying as it does solely 
 
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upon this rule, count five is dismissed.  Likewise, we dismiss the board’s 
conclusion in count eleven for lack of specificity. 
 
Nevertheless, the facts which do remain and the conclusions which the board 
has drawn from them are sufficient for us to find that respondent has engaged in a 
series of actions that demonstrate contempt for his clients and for the bar.  We find 
that respondent should no longer be included on the roll of those permitted to 
practice law in Ohio.  Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in judgment only.