Title: State v. Fisher

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

223 N.W.2d 243 (1974) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kenneth Wayne FISHER, Appellant. No. 1-56174. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 13, 1974. Thomas M. Walter, Ottumwa and Thomas Rowe, Fairfield, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Samuel O. Erhardt, County Atty., for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REES and HARRIS, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Defendant appeals from judgment on guilty plea to charge of assault with intent to commit rape, The Code 1971, Section 698.4. We reverse. August 25, 1972, defendant, Kenneth Wayne Fisher, went with Vicki Ream to the Y.W.C.A. in Ottumwa. Shortly after entering Ms. Ream's room defendant went to a separately located toilet. Upon leaving that facility Fisher mistakenly entered quarters occupied by Rena Cowan, complainant. The alleged assault followed. November 2, 1972, defendant pled not guilty. December 5 the aforesaid plea was withdrawn by Fisher and he thereupon entered a guilty plea. This, at least in part, stemmed from a plea bargain between defense counsel and the county attorney. In this regard the latter had apparently agreed to recommend a 60 day jail sentence with 30 days suspended and one year probation. December 28 defendant was "sentenced to the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa for one year." In support of a reversal defendant contends trial court did not, by personally addressing the accused, meaningfully determine whether (1) defendant understood the nature of the charge; (2) defendant understandingly waived right to trial by jury; (3) defendant knew and understood the possible maximum sentence and consequences of his guilty plea; (4) defendant voluntarily entered that plea; and (5) there existed a factual basis upon which said plea was entered. For reasons later disclosed we reverse because defendant's guilty plea was not shown to have been voluntarily entered. *244 For that reason there is no need to consider other assignments of error here urged. I. As to the aforesaid voluntariness issue we need refer only to the plea bargain element here involved. In that area the record discloses this brief pre-plea colloquy between trial court and defendant's attorney: In light of the foregoing we first take note of this comment in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Iowa 1969): This court also said in Sisco, supra, 169 N.W.2d at 549: See generally Brainard v. State of Iowa and Lou V. Brewer, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974). Furthermore, § 1.5 ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft) states: II. Without question the instantly involved plea was entered upon assurance by the prosecutor that probation would be recommended by him as to any sentence imposed. This was also clearly made known to trial court. Although the county attorney's agreement could not be binding on the court it still remains such was undoubtedly a factor which, at least in material part, induced the guilty plea. At the outset, as stated in White v. Gaffney, 435 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1970): See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 427-428 (4th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, § 4.3, ABA Standards Relating to The Prosecution function and The Defense Function (Approved Draft), states at 108-109: Correlatively, § 4.1, ABA Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge (Approved Draft), provides: The foregoing is thus capsulated in State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1968): In brief, prior to entry of judgment trial court, having elected not to honor the aforesaid plea bargain, neither so advised defendant nor accorded him related opportunity to stand on his guilty plea or move to withdraw same. Upon the record here made we cannot say defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily entered. This case must therefore be reversed and remanded with instructions (1) that the sentence be set aside; (2) defendant afforded meaningful opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) for further appropriate proceedings. In this regard see generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969); People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313, 314-315 (1968); § 2.1, ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft); Code § 777.15. Reversed and remanded with instructions.