Title: Turner v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Carrico, Lacy, and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
DUSTIN ALLEN TURNER 
 
v.  Record No. 101457 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 16, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred when it dismissed Dustin Allen Turner's ("Turner") 
petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological 
evidence. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
On Sunday, June 18, 1995, Turner and Billy Joe Brown 
("Brown"), both Navy SEAL trainees, went to The Bayou, a 
nightclub in Virginia Beach.  Brown had spent the afternoon 
drinking heavily, and he and Turner left for The Bayou around 
10:30 p.m.  Brown estimated that he drank six beers and eight to 
ten shots of liquor during the afternoon, as well as an 
additional six beers on the way to the nightclub and eight to 
ten beers, eight to ten shots, and twelve mixed drinks while at 
the nightclub. 
That same night, Jennifer Evans ("Evans"), who was 
vacationing in Virginia Beach, decided to go to the nightclub 
around 11:00 p.m. with her two friends, Andria L. Burdette 
("Burdette") and Michelle McCammon ("McCammon").  Evans noticed 
 
2 
Turner, whom she had not previously met, and commented to her 
friends about him.  Evans and Turner began talking and continued 
socializing on and off for the remainder of the night.  Evans 
also met Brown briefly, but she did not continue socializing 
with him.  According to Brown, Evans "[s]parked no interest" and 
he continued to purposefully drink excessive amounts of alcohol. 
Around midnight, Burdette, who was the designated driver 
for the women, wanted to go home.  Evans was still talking with 
Turner, and she wrote her phone number on a napkin and gave it 
to him.  While Burdette and McCammon were waiting to leave, 
Evans stalled to continue talking to Turner.  Turner and Evans 
seemed to be getting along very well, and at one point Turner 
sat in a chair while Evans perched on the armrest.  Evans wanted 
to invite Turner back to their house, but Burdette refused. 
Burdette and McCammon then walked out of the nightclub with 
Turner and Evans trailing behind them.  The women entered their 
car, and while Evans sat in the back seat, Turner leaned against 
the back door and continued to talk with Evans through the open 
window.  Turner offered to drive Evans home but Burdette refused 
the offer.  Evans wanted to stay out longer, so Burdette and 
McCammon eventually agreed to leave Evans at the nightclub and 
return at 2:00 a.m. to take her home.  Turner then "open[ed] the 
door with surprising force," and Evans got out of the car and 
walked back toward the nightclub with Turner. 
 
3 
Around 1:15 a.m., Turner approached Kristen H. Bishop 
("Bishop"), Brown's ex-girlfriend, who worked as a waitress at 
The Bayou but was off-duty that night and socializing with 
friends.  Turner asked Bishop if she could give Brown a ride 
home if Turner did not return to the bar before it closed, and 
Bishop agreed.  Bishop understood this to mean that "[Turner] 
was planning on taking [Evans] home." 
Between 1:15 and 1:30 a.m., the lights came on at the 
nightclub, signaling that it was almost time to close.  Around 
this time, Julio C. Fitzgibbons ("Fitzgibbons"), a Navy SEAL who 
had met Brown and Turner that night, spoke with Brown and Turner 
about their plans for the rest of the evening.  Fitzgibbons 
testified that Turner said that he and Brown "were going to have 
a threesome" with Evans.  Shortly thereafter, Evans approached 
and Turner introduced her to Fitzgibbons.  Fitzgibbons "gave 
[Turner] a thumbs up," and Turner returned the "thumbs up" and 
"[h]ad a smile on his face." 
At approximately 1:35 a.m., Bishop saw Turner and Evans 
leave the nightclub holding hands.  About ten minutes later, 
Brown told Bishop that he wanted to leave, but Bishop told him 
that she needed to wait a few minutes for her friend.  At 
approximately 1:50 a.m., Brown became impatient and indicated an 
unwillingness to wait, so he left the nightclub and Bishop 
followed him outside.  Bishop told him that she would wait for a 
 
4 
few minutes to give him a ride home if Brown was not able to 
find Turner, and she waited on a bench outside of the nightclub 
for approximately five minutes.  At approximately 2:10 or 2:15 
a.m., Bishop went back inside the bar, found her friend, and 
walked back out to her car.  Bishop and her friend drove around 
the parking lot looking for Brown, and she left the premises 
after she did not find him. 
When Burdette and McCammon returned to the nightclub at 
approximately 1:50 a.m., Evans was not in the parking lot where 
she had promised to meet them.  They searched for her around the 
parking lot and oceanfront area until around 6:00 a.m. but were 
unable to find her.  Later that day, they filed a missing 
persons report with the Virginia Beach police.  On the following 
Wednesday morning, after reading about Evans' disappearance in 
the newspaper, Bishop contacted the police and told them that 
she had seen Turner and Brown with Evans on the night Evans 
disappeared.   
On June 21, 1995, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Special 
Agents Thomas L. Carter ("Agent Carter") and Robert Elliot 
("Agent Elliot") of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 
interviewed Turner at Fort A.P. Hill near Fredericksburg, 
Virginia.  Turner told the agents that on Sunday night, he and 
Brown went to The Bayou, stayed until closing time, and then 
returned to the barracks by themselves.   
 
5 
When asked for further details, Turner said that he met two 
women at the nightclub that evening.  Turner could not recall 
their names, but he said he continued to speak intermittently 
with the second woman, later identified by the agents as Evans, 
for the remainder of the evening.  The woman was with two 
friends, who left the bar and planned to return around closing 
time to pick her up.  Before the bar closed, the woman wrote her 
name and phone number on a cocktail napkin for him to call later 
in the week.  Turner said that he and Brown left the nightclub 
while the woman was still waiting for her friends.  After the 
agents continued to press Turner about the woman's name, Turner 
went to his barracks to retrieve the cocktail napkin, which had 
the name Jennifer and a phone number written on it.   
In response to further questioning regarding Evans' 
disappearance, Turner told the agents that "he had believed at 
some point during the evening that there might be a chance that 
[Evans] would agree to leave with him," so Turner asked Brown to 
ride home with Bishop.  However, Brown did not want to get a 
ride with Bishop, and Turner said that he told Evans he would 
try to contact her later in the week.  Then, he and Brown left 
the nightclub alone.  Turner also told the agents that neither 
he nor Brown had been drinking that evening.  Agent Carter 
testified that throughout the interview, Turner appeared "very 
calm, very collected," and "very forthright." 
 
6 
Turner was subsequently interviewed on June 28, 1995, at 
the FBI headquarters in Richmond, Virginia, by Sergeant Thomas 
Baum ("Sergeant Baum") of the Virginia Beach Police Department's 
homicide unit.  Turner told Sergeant Baum that he didn't begin 
speaking to Evans until about 12:30 a.m. on the night he met her 
at The Bayou.  Later, around 1:00 a.m., Turner said that Evans' 
friends wanted to leave, so he walked the women to their car.  
Evans agreed to stay with him at the nightclub longer, and her 
friends agreed to return to pick her up at closing time.  Just 
after the lights went on signaling that the bar was closing, 
Turner and Evans discussed meeting later in the week, and she 
wrote her phone number on a napkin for him.  Turner then 
returned to Brown, who was persistent on leaving, so Turner and 
Brown left the nightclub around 1:45 a.m. without Evans.  
Sergeant Baum testified that the interview was "conversational," 
and Turner seemed "calm, cool," and "very straightforward." 
Shortly after Sergeant Baum's interview, Turner was 
interviewed further by Detectives John T. Orr ("Detective Orr") 
and Al Byrum ("Detective Byrum") of the Virginia Beach Police 
Department.  At first, Turner continued to adamantly deny any 
knowledge about what happened to Evans after he left her at the 
nightclub.  However, as the officers "continued to speak to 
Turner, it became apparent that his denials became weaker and 
weaker" and his story began to change.  Eventually, Turner told 
 
7 
the detectives that he would "tell [them] what [they] want to 
know," but that he needed to speak with his chief warrant 
officer first.  After allowing him to do so, the detectives 
asked Turner where they could find Evans' body, and Turner 
described its location and drew a diagram of where it could be 
found.  Later that afternoon, Turner traveled with the officers 
and helped them locate Evans' body.  Turner also agreed to 
provide the police with his car and clothing from that night. 
In response to direct questioning, Turner stated that he 
was not the person who killed Evans but that he was present when 
Brown killed her in Turner's car.  Turner told the detectives 
that "Brown had choked Evans until she was dead" while they were 
in the parking lot of The Bayou. 
After the police told Brown that Turner confessed and drew 
the map to the body, Brown wrote a statement for police that 
when he left the nightclub, he found Turner's car in the parking 
lot with Evans "passed out" in the backseat.  Turner and Brown 
drove to a side street, parked the car, and they both began 
touching Evans.  She woke up, started screaming, and Turner 
"started choking her.  She stopped moving and we let go of her.  
She started spitting up some blood, and [Turner] started choking 
her again.  [Brown] grabbed her arms and legs." 
Then, approximately an hour later, Brown told police that 
he had not been honest and should "tell the truth."  Brown wrote 
 
8 
another statement in which he explained that when he found 
Turner's car in the parking lot, Evans was in the backseat and 
Turner said, "Dude, I think I fucking killed her."  Evans "had 
blood running out of her nose and foam coming out of her mouth."  
Turner and Brown drove away and dumped her body in the woods. 
At his trial in May 1996, Brown testified that when he left 
the nightclub and approached Turner's car, he saw "two heads in 
the back [of the car]" before Turner jumped out and demanded 
that Brown get into the car.  When he got into the car, Brown 
saw Evans lying in the back seat with "blood coming out of her 
nose" and "foaming out of the mouth," and her clothes were open 
with her breasts exposed.  Brown testified that Turner said, "I 
think I fucking killed her."  Brown said that he pulled her body 
down to the floorboard, and he thought she was dead because he 
saw no signs of life. 
Brown said that Turner started driving away and said, "I 
know what we'll do. . . .  We'll take her to the beach, we'll 
rape her, throw her in the water[] and [t]he cops will think she 
drowned."  Brown was in and out of consciousness in the car, but 
he remembered that they drove on "the [6]4 freeway" and pulled 
off in a wooded area to dump Evans' body.  Brown testified that 
two days later, Turner told him that he was attempting to have 
sex with Evans in the parking lot, but when she tried to stop 
him, Turner "put his forearm on her throat and pushed her back."  
 
9 
Turner said that "the next thing he knew [Evans] started 
spitting up blood and foam."  Despite this testimony, Brown was 
convicted in June 1996 of murder, abduction with intent to 
defile and attempted rape, and he was sentenced to 72 years in 
prison and a $63,000 fine. 
Turner's trial for murder and abduction with intent to 
defile began on August 26, 1996. Charlotte Lowe ("Lowe"), the 
forensic supervisor who analyzed the crime scene, testified that 
Evans' body was found in an advanced state of decomposition and 
skeletalization from being in the heat, sun, and elements for 
nine days.  Evans' vest was pulled back and her bra was pulled 
up, exposing her breast.  Her belt was unfastened, and her 
shorts and underwear had been pulled down so that they were only 
around one leg.  Lowe also examined Turner's car for semen, 
fingerprints, and other physical evidence, but she found nothing 
of forensic value and no evidence suggesting that any sexual 
activity occurred inside the car. 
Dr. Leah Bush ("Dr. Bush"), Assistant Chief Medical 
Examiner for the Commonwealth of Virginia in the Tidewater 
district, performed the autopsy on Evans' body and testified 
that it was impossible to determine the exact cause of death 
because her body was severely decomposed.  However, she opined 
that manual strangulation was a possible cause of Evans' death, 
and she described the various chokeholds that could have led to 
 
10 
Evans' death.  Dr. Bush stated that when strangled, a person 
becomes unconscious "very quickly," within ten to thirty 
seconds.  However, the time required to cause death depends on 
the chokehold used, varying from "several seconds" to "less than 
a minute" to "three to five minutes."  Dr. Bush conclusively 
ruled out a broken neck as a cause of death because Evans' 
spinal cord did not show signs of fracture.  
Todd P. Ehrlich ("Ehrlich"), a Navy SEAL who completed some 
training with Brown and Turner, testified that Brown and Turner 
had spoken previously about engaging in group sex.  
Specifically, Ehrlich testified that on June 16, 1995, two days 
before the night of Evans' disappearance, Turner and Brown were 
socializing with two women at a bar in Fredericksburg.  Ehrlich 
saw Turner alternating between talking to one of the women and 
then talking to Brown to give him a "progress report" in their 
attempts to convince the woman to "go home with them."  Ehrlich 
also testified that he witnessed Brown and Turner engage in 
group sexual intercourse with a woman while the three men were 
stationed in California in 1994.  Ehrlich testified that Turner 
and Brown bragged about how they later engaged in group sex 
again with the same woman.  Ehrlich could not remember what 
specific statements Turner made about group sex, and he 
testified that there was never any suggestion that the woman 
 
11 
involved was forced to act against her will or that the sexual 
activity involved physical violence. 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Turner 
moved to strike, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for 
the jury to find abduction with the intent to defile or murder.  
The trial court denied the motion, stating, "I don't think that 
[Evans] went knowingly and voluntarily with [Turner] to the 
parking lot or to his car for the purposes of engaging in a 
'threesome' or what has been described as group sex with 
[Turner] and [Brown]; but we certainly know from the evidence in 
this case that that was [Turner's] intent."  The trial court 
further stated, 
It's clear from all the circumstances in evidence 
in this case that [Turner] had a sexual mode; and, 
of course, his specific intent to defile or 
sexually molest, as the law has stated many times, 
is derived not only from his conduct but from his 
statements as well.  
 
I certainly don't think that Jennifer Evans 
voluntarily left The Bayou with [Turner] and 
[Brown] for the purposes for being sexually 
molested and certainly not to be killed. . . . 
 
From all the evidence presented, we know that 
Jennifer Evans had made very specific plans to meet 
her two friends back in the parking lot of The 
Bayou nightclub at approximately 2:00 a.m. when it 
closed, and that was less than an hour from the 
time that she was seen returning to the nightclub 
with [Turner].  [Turner] was present when those 
plans were made. . . . 
 
The court is of the opinion, therefore, that 
the evidence in this case is sufficient to find 
 
12 
[Turner] guilty of both [abduction with intent to 
defile and murder] and the motion to strike will be 
overruled. 
 
Turner testified in his own defense and stated that he did 
not kill Evans, nor did he ever intend to have sex with her.  
According to Turner, he and Evans discussed going to the beach 
to continue talking, but they abandoned that idea because it 
would have been impossible to do so and still return to the club 
by 2:00 a.m. to meet her friends.  Turner also stated that when 
he informed Brown that Bishop would give him a ride home, Brown 
was "extremely drunk" and "seemed a bit angry at something," and 
Turner was not sure "if it was at [him] because [he] kind of 
palmed [Brown] off to get him a ride."  He denied mentioning a 
"threesome" or group sex to Fitzgibbons. 
Turner testified that he and Evans went to his car to 
listen to music and wait for her friends.  While waiting, Turner 
saw Brown approach the car and told Evans to "pay no attention 
to this guy.  He's drunk.  Don't believe a word he says."  Brown 
then entered the car and sat in the back seat directly behind 
Evans.  Immediately, Brown began cursing and making belligerent 
remarks about Turner and Bishop.  Then Brown shifted his 
attention toward Evans, and he made belligerent and vulgar 
comments to her, including asking if she was a virgin or had 
ever "had sex with a frogman."  Turner could tell that Evans was 
 
13 
uncomfortable, and he told Brown to "chill out."  Brown started 
touching her hair, and Evans slapped his hand away. 
Turner saw Brown respond by putting both of his arms around 
Evans' neck.  Turner testified that "it was like boom.  I looked 
over.  It was like a jerk and an instant motion."  Turner said 
that "[Brown's] arms were around her, [Brown] was pulling back; 
[Brown] was really squeezing, and she wasn't even moving."  
Turner testified that he tried to pry Brown's arms from her 
neck, and at the same time Brown was yelling at Turner to 
"[j]ust drive."  "[E]ventually [Turner] pried [Brown's] arms off 
of [Evans], and she was just limp."  Turner checked to see if 
she was breathing and checked her neck for a pulse, but he did 
not feel anything.  Brown continued to yell at Turner to drive, 
and Turner complied. 
As Turner was driving, Brown reclined the passenger seat 
back and started "moving his hand into [Evans'] pants."  Turner 
yelled at him to stop, and Brown "just sat back and passed out."  
Turner drove to a secluded wooded area, where he and Brown took 
Evans' body out of the car.  Turner returned to his car to look 
for a shovel, and when he returned, Brown was laying on top of 
Evans' body.  Turner pulled Brown off, and Brown said, "It 
doesn't matter because I couldn't get it – a hard on anyway."  
Turner testified that they "grabbed some leaves and sticks and 
placed them on top of [Evans]" and left. Upon leaving the scene, 
 
14 
Brown again passed out in the car, but when he woke up he said 
that he was hungry so they stopped at a diner just outside of 
the military base. 
The following morning, Turner and Brown met and signed a 
lease to be roommates for the coming year.  Turner testified 
that on that day, Brown said to him, "I know what I did was 
stupid, and I'm sorry.  I know it was stupid, but we've got to 
stick together now . . . .  We're both in this now.  We've got 
to stick together." 
Concerning the false statements he made to police, Turner 
testified that he "felt like [he] couldn't turn back at that 
point, so [he] lied to the police to cover up for Brown."  He 
confirmed talking with Fitzgibbons at The Bayou, but he denied 
talking about engaging in a "threesome" with Brown and Evans.  
In response to Ehrlich's testimony about group sexual 
intercourse with a woman in California, Turner stated that "it 
all center[ed] around one incident and bragging about that one 
incident."  Turner stated that he knew Evans would not have sex 
with him because "[j]ust from the short time that [he] knew 
[Evans], [he knew that] she wasn't that type of girl at all." 
At the conclusion of his trial, the jury was instructed on 
the legal theories of concert of action, principal in the first 
and second degrees, abduction with intent to defile, first 
degree felony murder, and accessory after the fact.  On 
 
15 
September 5, 1996, the jury found Turner guilty of abduction 
with intent to defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-48, and first 
degree felony murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-32.  The trial 
court imposed the jury's recommended sentence of 82 years in 
prison fixed by the jury. 
Both Turner and Brown unsuccessfully appealed to the Court 
of Appeals and this Court, and, thereafter, both unsuccessfully 
sought state and federal habeas corpus relief.  In all of his 
petitions, Brown repeatedly asserted that it had been Turner who 
had killed Evans. 
On July 2, 2002, Brown provided a tape-recorded interview 
to Turner's attorney in which he confessed to acting alone in 
killing Evans, and he stated that "[his] actions in choking 
[Evans] came as a complete surprise to [Turner]."  Brown said 
that he spontaneously choked Evans and then blamed Turner 
because he was angry that Turner betrayed him by telling the 
police what happened and where Evans' body was located. 
On February 28, 2003, Brown signed an affidavit 
memorializing his statements from the taped interview.  In the 
affidavit, Brown reiterated that he alone killed Evans, and 
that, "as a Christian, [he] can no longer allow someone who is 
innocent to continue to pay for what [he] did." 
Code § 19.2-327.10 confers original jurisdiction upon the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia to consider a petition for a writ 
 
16 
of actual innocence based on newly-discovered, non-biological 
evidence filed by any individual "convicted of a felony upon a 
plea of not guilty."  Based on Brown's recantation, Turner filed 
a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-
biological evidence in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
alleging that he was innocent of the crimes for which he was 
convicted.  In support of his petition, Turner submitted into 
evidence Brown's signed affidavit. 
To obtain a writ of actual innocence, Turner must prove 
that the newly-discovered evidence  
1) 
"was previously unknown or unavailable to 
the petitioner or his trial attorney of 
record at the time the conviction became 
final in the circuit court;" Code § 19.2-
327.11(A)(iv)(2), 
 
2) 
"is such as could not, by the exercise of 
diligence, have been discovered or obtained 
before the expiration of 21 days following 
entry of the final order of conviction by 
the court;" Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vi), 
 
3) 
"is material and when considered with all of 
the other evidence in the current record, 
will prove that no rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt;" Code § 19.2-
327.11(A)(vii), and 
 
4) 
"is not merely cumulative, corroborative or 
collateral."  Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(viii).1 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 The fourth and final issue was added upon Turner's motion 
to amend the order. 
 
17 
Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 335, 343-44, 641 S.E.2d 486, 
491 (2007).  
 
In support of his petition, Turner asserted that the 
physical evidence and testimony is consistent with Brown's 
confession, and it "will prove that no rational trier of fact 
would have found [Turner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the charges."  Turner argued that "Brown's confession clears 
[Turner] of any wrong-doing other than being an accessory after 
the fact." 
In support of its motion to dismiss the petition, the 
Commonwealth argued that the petition was without merit because 
"Brown's credibility has been so hopelessly compromised by his 
ever-evolving, conflicting accounts of his and Turner's actions 
on the night Evans was murdered that a reasonable trier of fact 
would hardly be compelled to credit his version of history."  
The Commonwealth asserted that even if a jury were to believe 
Brown's recantation, the other evidence against Turner was 
sufficient to find him guilty of murder and abduction with 
intent to defile either as a principal in the second degree or 
under the felony murder doctrine. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals denied the Commonwealth's 
motion to dismiss and entered an order finding that resolution 
of the case required further development of the facts, and, 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-327.12, it remanded the matter to the 
 
18 
circuit court2 to certify findings of fact regarding the 
following issues: 
1) 
whether Brown's recanted testimony is credible in his 
assertion that he testified falsely at the 
petitioner's trial, 
 
2) 
if the answer to Question #1 is "yes," did Brown 
testify falsely as to any material fact, 
 
3) 
if the answer to Question #1 is "yes," was Brown's 
recantation testimony unknown or unavailable to the 
petitioner or his counsel at the time the conviction 
became final, or could such recantation testimony, 
through the exercise of diligence, have been 
discovered or obtained before the expiration of 21 
days following the entry of the final order of 
conviction, [and] 
 
4) 
is Brown credible in his assertion that he acted 
independently in murdering the victim and that Turner 
had no role in the murder or any restraint of the 
victim?3 
 
 
During a two-day hearing, the circuit court heard testimony 
from both Brown and Turner.  Brown testified that on the night 
of June 18, 1995, he purposefully consumed excessive amounts of 
alcohol.  Brown confirmed that Turner arranged for Bishop to 
give Brown a ride home so that Turner could spend more time with 
Evans, but Brown became impatient and left the nightclub.  Brown 
admitted that, by this point, he was extremely intoxicated and 
on the verge of passing out.  He testified that he found 
                                                          
 
 
2 Herein, the term "trial court" will be used to designate 
the courts where the actual trials of Brown and Turner took 
place.  The term "circuit court" will be used to designate the 
court where the hearing upon remand took place. 
 
3 The fourth and final issue was added upon Turner's motion 
to amend the order. 
 
19 
Turner's car in the parking lot and climbed into the back seat 
behind Evans.  He testified: 
 
I was talking to [Turner and Evans].  I said 
something – I don't even remember – and I started 
playing with [Evans'] hair, and then I think I 
sat back in the seat, and then one minute I was 
normal and the next minute I snapped and I 
started choking her; and I think [Turner] – I 
believe I recall him trying to pull my arm away.  
I believe he did.  I'm not 100 percent sure, but 
I believe so.  Then I continued to choke her and 
then I told him to drive and he started to drive. 
He stated that he choked Evans by putting his left arm against 
her neck and holding it against the seat's headrest with his 
right arm. 
 
Brown also admitted to providing police with conflicting 
accounts of how the murder occurred and that he repeated the 
lies at his own trial.  He testified that he lied about Turner's 
involvement in the murder because he was angry with Turner 
because he "snitched" and told police where Evans' body was 
located.  However, after he converted to Christianity, he knew 
that he needed to come forward and tell the truth.  Brown said 
that it was difficult to "stand up before the whole world and 
tell them not only [that he was] a murderer and a liar but [also 
that he] betrayed [his] best friend." 
 
Still, Brown's testimony before the circuit court was 
inherently conflicting.  Brown stated that while he was at The 
Bayou, he "purposely decide[d] not to talk to any girls" because 
 
20 
he was in a relationship.  He stated that usually when he went 
to bars, "my goal was either one of two things: Meet a girl and 
have sex or drink lots of alcohol.  And since that night I 
wasn't looking to have sex with anybody, I just decided to drink 
lots of alcohol."  During his original trial, he also testified 
that Evans "[s]parked no interest for [him]."  However, Brown 
also admitted that just a short time later, he defiled Evans' 
body by undressing her in the car, "moving his hand into her 
pants," and he removed Evans' vest and pulled her pants down.  
He also testified that he attempted to have sex with Evans' body 
after he and Turner placed it in the woods but that Turner 
stopped him.   
 
Additionally, during cross-examination, the Commonwealth 
questioned Brown about a second version of his affidavit 
("second affidavit"), in which Brown stated that he had to 
strangle Evans twice to kill her.  This testimony was in 
contradiction to the affidavit submitted in support of Turner's 
petition ("first affidavit") and Brown's earlier testimony 
during direct examination, both of which proffered evidence 
showing that Evans died instantly.  Specifically, during the 
cross-examination the following exchange occurred: 
 
[Commonwealth:] Let me read you a few 
sentences of this affidavit you signed.  [Turner] 
did not encourage me in any way and, in fact, I 
remember one instance while I was choking [Evans], 
[Turner] tried to pull my hands away.  [Evans] 
 
21 
became unconscious and I believed she was dead.  I 
fell back in the seat, and she woke up.  I then 
choked her again until blood came out of her nose 
and am certain she was dead at that time. . . . 
 
 
That statement reflects, does it not, that 
she was not killed instantly or rendered helpless 
instantly but, in fact, revived and you had to 
choke her a second time, correct? 
 
[Brown:]  Yes. . . . 
 
[Commonwealth:] [W]as there a period where 
she was seemingly unconscious or worse and then 
revived and then you had to assault her a second 
time?  Is that, in fact, the case? 
 
[Brown:]  Yes.  Yes. 
 
 
Upon review of this record, it is apparent that two 
versions of Brown's affidavit existed.  Both versions of the 
affidavit bear the same date, as well as an identical 
handwritten statement and signature by Brown.  However, the font 
utilized on the second page of the second affidavit is different 
than the font utilized on the second page of the first 
affidavit.  It would appear that a change of font was necessary 
to begin and end the second page with the same words.  The only 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these two versions is 
that, at some point before the circuit court's evidentiary 
hearing, the second page of the three-page affidavit was 
substituted. 
 
The two versions of Brown's affidavit differ significantly 
in their substance.  In the first affidavit, which was presented 
 
22 
in support of Turner's petition, Brown stated that Evans died 
almost instantly: 
We were sitting there [in the car] talking and 
next thing you know I reached up and choked 
[Evans].  I did this on my own without any prior 
discussion with [Turner].  He did not encourage 
me in any way and in fact, I remember one 
instance while I was choking [Evans], [Turner] 
trying to pull my hands away.  [Evans] became 
unconscious and I am certain she was dead at that 
time 
. . . . 
 
 
[Turner] was my friend, but I told the 
police he was involved when I was informed he had 
"rolled" on me and had told the authorities where 
[Evans'] body was located. 
 
In the second affidavit, Brown stated that Evans revived: 
We were sitting there [in the car] talking and 
next thing you know I reached up and choked 
[Evans].  I did this on my own without any prior 
discussion with [Turner].  He did not encourage 
me in any way and in fact, I remember one 
instance while I was choking [Evans], [Turner] 
trying to pull my hands away.  [Evans] became 
unconscious and I believed she was dead.  I fell 
back in the seat and she woke up.  I then choked 
her again until blood came out of her nose and [I 
was] certain she was dead at that time.   
 
 
Brown's testimony during direct examination was consistent 
with the first affidavit; however, during cross-examination, 
Brown's testimony was consistent with the second affidavit.  
Despite these contradictions, the circuit court made the 
following findings: 
This court determines that Mr. Brown's recanted 
testimony is credible in his assertion that he 
testified falsely at his own trial.  This court 
 
23 
determines that Mr. Brown testified falsely at 
his own trial as to a material fact in the case.  
This court further finds that Mr. Brown's 
recantation of his earlier testimony was unknown 
and was unavailable to the petitioner in this 
proceeding, Mr. Turner, at the time of his 
conviction and at the time his conviction became 
final. And this court finally finds that Mr. 
Brown is credible in his assertion that he acted 
independently in murdering the victim and that 
Mr. Turner had no role in the murder or in the 
restraining of the victim. 
 
It is clear from this record that at the time of the 
evidentiary hearing, neither Turner, the Commonwealth, nor the 
trial court were aware that two affidavits were in existence.  
Apparently, each lawyer thought that they were utilizing the 
same document.  The confusion on the matter was resolved after 
the circuit court's findings were transmitted to the Court of 
Appeals.  Then, in this original jurisdiction proceeding, the 
Commonwealth submitted the second affidavit to the Court of 
Appeals without objection from Turner. 
 
In a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals granted 
Turner's request for a writ of actual innocence, vacated his 
convictions for murder and abduction with intent to defile, and 
held that, at most, he could be found guilty of being an 
accessory after the fact to murder.  Turner v. Commonwealth, 54 
Va. App. 458, 680 S.E.2d 312 (2009).  Citing Carpitcher, 273 Va. 
at 342-43, 641 S.E.2d at 490, the panel held that "we cannot say 
that the circuit court's factual findings are plainly wrong or 
 
24 
without evidence to support them and, therefore, we are bound by 
these findings."  Turner, 54 Va. App. at 475-76, 680 S.E.2d at 
321.  
 
In light of the circuit court's determination that "Turner 
played no role in the murder or in the restraining of the 
victim," the panel concluded that "the circuit court's use of 
the word 'restraint' constitutes a finding that Turner did not 
participate with Brown in an abduction by either force or 
deception." Id. at 479, 481, 680 S.E.2d at 323.  Instead, the 
panel held that Brown "acted as an independent and superseding 
force so that his actions constituted a separate – and 
completely coincidental – enterprise with no causal connection 
to Turner's own conduct."  Id. at 482, 680 S.E.2d at 324. 
The panel further held that "the evidence is insufficient 
to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Turner made 
any statement or engaged in any act showing an intent to deceive 
Evans for the purpose of sexually molesting her against her 
will," which precludes "any rational trier of fact from finding 
Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent 
to defile."  Id. at 484, 680 S.E.2d at 325.  Rather, "[i]n light 
of Brown's recantation, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable 
doubt, at most, that when Turner invited Evans to wait in his 
car for her friends, he did so with the hope of persuading her 
to have consensual sexual contact."  Id. at 487, 680 S.E.2d at 
 
25 
327.  The panel concluded that the evidence was sufficient to 
find Turner guilty of being an accessory after the fact, and it 
remanded the case to the circuit court to modify his conviction.  
Id. at 491-92, 680 S.E.2d at 329. 
However, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's 
petition for a rehearing en banc, Turner v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. 
App. 699, 682 S.E.2d 77 (2009), and, upon rehearing, dismissed 
Turner's petition for a writ of actual innocence.  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 391, 694 S.E.2d 251 (2010).  The five-
judge majority held that while it was bound by the circuit 
court's credibility determination, "a rational fact finder could 
have found that Turner abducted Evans by deception – meaning no 
finding of force or restraint would have been required – and 
that the abduction ended with Evans' murder."  Id. at 419, 694 
S.E.2d at 265. 
In support of its holding, the Court of Appeals relied on 
circumstantial evidence supporting deception, including Turner's 
request to Bishop to give Brown a ride home, Turner's 
conversation with Fitzgibbons about a "threesome" he was going 
to have with Evans, evidence of Evans' character, Turner's rude 
behavior toward Evans' friends, his "callous disregard" for 
Evans' body, his lead role in finding an isolated location to 
dispose of her body, and Turner's lies to the police.  Id. at 
424-27, 694 S.E.2d at 267-69.  Based on this evidence, the Court 
 
26 
of Appeals dismissed Turner's request for a writ of actual 
innocence and denied his request to vacate his convictions for 
murder and abduction with intent to defile.  Id. at 429, 694 
S.E.2d at 270. 
Turner timely filed his notice of appeal to this Court, and 
we awarded Turner an appeal on the following assignments of 
error: 
1. 
The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to grant the 
writ of actual innocence and vacate Turner's 
convictions for murder and abduction with intent to 
defile. 
 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "a rational 
fact finder could have found that Turner abducted 
Evans by deception – meaning no finding of force or 
restraint would have been required – and that the 
abduction ended with Evans' murder." 
 
3. 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "it cannot 
be said that Brown's credible recantation provides 
this Court with clear and convincing evidence that no 
rational fact finder could have found that Turner used 
deception to abduct Evans with the intent to have 
sexual intercourse with her against her will.  
Therefore, Turner was properly convicted of abduction 
with intent to defile and murder." 
 
We also granted the Commonwealth's assignment of cross-error: 
 
1.  
The Court of Appeals wrongly held that it was bound by 
the circuit court's finding that the co-defendant's 
post-trial statements were "credible." 
II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
We apply the standard of review as set forth in Carpitcher 
and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 315, 641 S.E.2d 480 (2007), 
 
27 
in which we considered appeals from the Court of Appeals' 
dismissals of petitions for a writ of actual innocence based on 
non-biological evidence.  We held that  
in an appeal from the Court of Appeals' dismissal 
of such a petition, we will review de novo the 
Court of Appeals' conclusions of law and its 
conclusions based on mixed questions of law and 
fact.  However, when the Court of Appeals has 
referred issues in the case to a circuit court 
for factual findings under the provisions of Code 
§ 19.2-327.12 and the Court of Appeals has 
approved those findings, we will be bound by the 
factual findings unless they are plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support them.  
 
Johnson, 273 Va. at 321, 641 S.E.2d at 483 (citations omitted).   
B. Abduction with Intent to Defile and Felony Murder 
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-327.12, the Court of Appeals may 
refer factual issues in a petition for a writ of actual 
innocence to a circuit court: 
If the Court of Appeals determines . . . that a 
resolution of the case requires further development 
of the facts, the court may order the circuit court 
in which the order of conviction was originally 
entered to conduct a hearing . . . to certify 
findings of fact with respect to such issues as the 
Court of Appeals shall direct. 
 
This statute gives the Court of Appeals broad discretion to 
certify to the circuit court issues of fact that must be 
resolved before deciding the merits of a petition.  Johnson, 273 
Va. at 322, 641 S.E.2d at 484. 
As we explained in Carpitcher, "to be 'material' within the 
meaning of Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii), evidence supporting a 
 
28 
petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological 
evidence must be true."  273 Va. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 492.  
"Because the Court of Appeals cannot hold its own evidentiary 
hearing to assess a witness' credibility, but must ultimately 
determine whether a recantation is true, Code § 19.2-327.12 
provides a mechanism to assist the Court of Appeals in this 
task."  Johnson, 273 Va. at 322, 641 S.E.2d at 484. 
 
When the circuit court conducts its evidentiary hearing, we 
have observed that 
[T]here is no mandatory formula for a 
circuit court's consideration of the credibility 
of a particular witness.  As the trier of fact, 
the circuit court is charged with the 
responsibility of considering various factors, 
including the witness' demeanor, his opportunity 
for knowing the things about which he has 
testified, his bias, and any prior inconsistent 
statements relating to the subject of his present 
testimony.  In addition, the circumstances of a 
particular case may raise other factors that the 
circuit court deems relevant in assessing a 
witness' credibility. 
 
Id. at 323, 641 S.E.2d at 485.  In reviewing the circuit court's 
factual findings, we have explained that 
[s]uch factual findings are similar to circuit 
court findings made under Code § 8.01-654(C) in 
habeas corpus cases in which we have original 
jurisdiction and have referred factual issues to 
the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.  
Therefore, we will apply to the factual findings 
contained in the record of the Court of Appeals a 
standard of review similar to the standard we apply 
to factual findings entered in our original 
jurisdiction habeas corpus proceedings.  We will be 
bound by the factual findings in the present 
 
29 
record, as approved by the Court of Appeals, unless 
they are plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support them. 
 
Carpitcher, 273 Va. at 342-43, 641 S.E.2d at 490. 
 
In Carpitcher, we observed that  
recantation evidence is generally questionable in 
character and is widely viewed by courts with 
suspicion because of the obvious opportunities and 
temptations for fraud. 
 
Unless proven true, recantation evidence 
merely amounts to an attack on a witness' 
credibility by the witness herself. 
 
Id. at 346, 641 S.E.2d at 492 (citations omitted).  In 
considering Brown's recantation testimony here, as we stated in 
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 612, 626, 70 S.E.2d 293, 302 
(1952), "while we know from his lips that [he] spoke falsely on 
one occasion, this does not establish that his testimony at the 
trial was false and the statements in the subsequent affidavit 
were true."  At the circuit court's evidentiary hearing, Brown 
admitted that before signing the affidavit,4 he gave six 
different statements – including one under oath – regarding the 
circumstances of Evans' death, and each of them differed 
substantively from his affidavit and testimony before the 
circuit court. 
 
However, beyond its questionable reliability, Brown's 
recantation testimony was rife with conflicting statements.  
                                                          
 
 
4 Presumably, Brown was referring to the first affidavit, 
which was part of Turner's petition. 
 
30 
Brown stated that while he was at The Bayou, he "wasn't looking 
to have sex with anybody," and he testified that Evans 
"[s]parked no interest for [him]."  However, he admitted that 
just a short time later, he defiled Evans' body by undressing 
her body in the car, "moving his hand into her pants," and by 
attempting to have sex with her body when he and Turner placed 
her in the woods.  These statements regarding Brown's sexual 
desire are inherently conflicting and undermine the credibility 
of his testimony. 
 
The inconsistencies are most glaring when we consider 
Brown's disparate accounts of Evans' death, both in the two 
affidavits and in his testimony before the circuit court.  
Brown's testimony during direct examination matched his 
statement in the first affidavit – that when he began to 
strangle Evans she died almost instantly.  Brown testified that 
her death was so quick that Turner "would have had virtually no 
chance to react and try to save her." 
However, according to the second affidavit and Brown's 
testimony during cross-examination, Evans "revived" and Brown 
had to strangle her again to kill her.  Before the circuit 
court, Brown affirmed the statement he made in the second 
affidavit – that after he began choking Evans, 
[she] became unconscious and I believed she was 
dead.  I fell back in the seat, and she woke up.  I 
 
31 
then choked her again until blood came out of her 
nose and [I was] certain she was dead at that time.  
 
Brown confirmed that "[Evans] was not killed instantly or 
rendered helpless instantly but, in fact, revived and [Brown] 
had to choke her a second time."  Finally, on re-direct 
examination, Brown testified that by stating that Evans 
"revived," he meant that "[s]he took in a deep breath," and he 
stated that it was only a matter of one or two seconds from the 
time that she revived until the time he began to choke her 
again. 
 
The circuit court's focus was upon the wrong issues.  The 
circuit court stated that it "finds" that Brown "acted 
independently in murdering the victim and that Mr. Turner had no 
role in the murder," and that Turner did not engage "in the 
restraining of the victim."  To the extent that this "finding" 
suggests that the offense of abduction did not occur, it is a 
conclusion of law that we review de novo.  Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 705 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2011).  Whether 
Turner committed abduction with intent to defile and whether 
Turner is guilty of felony murder under these facts are 
questions of law.  We will focus upon the legal conclusions that 
the circuit court reached that are not entitled to the 
traditional deference we afford to credibility findings. 
 
32 
Because Turner was found guilty of felony murder, the 
relevant question before us is not whether Brown acted alone in 
choking Evans or restraining her as Turner claims and as Brown 
now alleges, but rather whether Turner abducted Evans with the 
intent to defile her.  The fact that Brown now confesses that he 
acted alone in restraining and choking Evans does not absolve 
Turner of his guilt. 
Code § 18.2-47 does not use the word "restraint" in its 
definition of abduction.  Use of that word in the context of 
abduction comes from our case law.  For example, in Jerman v. 
Dir., Dept. of Corrections, 267 Va. 432, 439, 593 S.E.2d 255, 
259 (2004), the word "restraint" is used to describe how the 
particular facts of that case satisfied the elements of the 
offense.  Concerning this case, the elements of the offense of 
abduction require seizing, taking, transporting, detaining or 
secreting another person with the intent to deprive such other 
person of his or her personal liberty.  Code § 18.2-47.  
Significantly, the elements of the offense require that such 
acts be accomplished by "force, intimidation or deception."  Id.  
The issue in Turner's case is not restraint; rather, it is 
deception. In this regard the circuit court's "finding" that 
Turner did not restrain the victim does not address the issue of 
deception. 
 
33 
A defendant is guilty of first degree murder under Code 
§ 18.2-32 where the killing occurs "in the commission of, or 
attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or 
animate sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction."  
This statute codifies the common law doctrine of felony-murder 
and, "when supported by the evidence, operates to elevate to 
second-degree murder a homicide committed during the commission 
of a felony by imputing malice to the killing."  Commonwealth v. 
Montague, 260 Va. 697, 700, 536 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2000) (citing 
Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 403, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 
(1984); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 
811, 814 (1981)).  The felony murder statute applies "where the 
initial felony and the homicide were parts of one continuous 
transaction, and were closely related in point of time, place, 
and causal connection."  Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 
1041, 243 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1978). 
The question before us is a narrow one. Code § 19.2-
327.11(A)(vii), requires that the newly-discovered evidence be 
"material and when considered with all of the other evidence in 
the current record, will prove that no rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Of 
course, in order to be material, the evidence must be true. 
Additionally, "[e]vidence that relates to a matter that is 
properly at issue in the case is said to be material."  Charles 
 
34 
E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 11-1 at 431 (6th 
ed. 2003).  The newly-discovered evidence in this case is not 
material. 
 
Turner's assignments of error and argument focus upon proof 
of abduction with intent to defile.  Brown's recantation focuses 
upon whether he alone restrained and choked Evans.  The 
pertinent circuit court "finding" is that Brown "acted 
independently in murdering the victim and that Mr. Turner had no 
role in the murder or in the restraining of the victim."  
Significantly, Brown's recantation and the circuit court's 
"finding" do not address the issue raised by Turner's 
assignments of error and argument. 
Turner argues that no rational trier of fact, upon 
consideration of Brown's recantation, could find Turner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile. 
Because nothing in Brown's recantation is material to this 
issue, the evidentiary record on this issue, with and without 
the recantation, is essentially the same.  
Simply stated, nothing in Brown's recantation or the 
circuit court finding has any bearing on the question presented 
in this petition. Turner has not met his evidentiary burden 
under the statutory provisions. 
 
 
 
35 
III. Conclusion 
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Turner's 
petition for a writ of actual innocence and in denying his 
request to vacate his convictions for murder and abduction with 
intent to defile.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.