Title: Matter of Pankowski

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

EFiled: Dec 52007 4:59PI
Filing 1D 17544328
Case Number 575,2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 

In the Matter of a Member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court of Delaware

EDWARD C. PANKOWSKI, JR.,

§
§
§ No. $75, 2007
§
Respondent, §

§

‘Submitted: November 9, 2007
Decided: December 5, 2007

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.
AMENDED ORDER

This 5® day of December 2007, it appears to the Court that the Board on
Professional Responsibility has filed a Report on this matter pursuant to Rule 9(4)
of the Rules of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Neither
the Respondent, having waived his right to file objections by not responding, nor
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel has filed objections to the Board's Report. The
Court has reviewed the matter pursuant to Rule 9(e) of the Rules of the Delaware
Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and concludes the Board's Report
should be approved.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report filed by the Board

 

‘on Professional Responsibility on October 29, 2007 (copy attached) is hereby

APPROVED.
‘The Court hereby imposes a public reprimand and the following sanctions.
‘The Respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
months, beginning on January 1, 2008; permanently barred from acting as a
notarial officer pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 4323(a)(3); and pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings.

Additionally, for a period of at least five years from the date of this Order,
the Respondent's practice shall be limited to (a) residential real estate closings for
a flat fee and (b) criminal defense in connection with a court supervised conflicts
program. The Respondent may thereafter file a petition with the Delaware
‘Supreme Court requesting that he be permitted to expand his practice areas beyond
residential real estate closings for a flat fee and criminal defense in connection with
court supervised conflicts program. Prior to filing such a petition with the
Administrative Assistant to the Board on Professional Responsibility, with service
upon the ODG, the Respondent shall send a written notification to the ODC of his
intent to file such petition, and shall thereupon comply with any procedures
deemed appropriate by the ODC for the purpose of gathering information to
respond to the petition. The Respondent shall have the burden of demonstrating,
by clear and convincing evidence, his fitness to expand his practice areas beyond

residential real estate closings for a flat fee and a criminal conflicts program.
Further, the Respondent shall be required to instruct any non-lawyer notarial
officer who performs notarial services in connection with his practice regarding the

notarial duties and the notarial officer's obligation to have signatures placed on

 

documents in their presence only and that Respondent be required to provide a
copy of Title 29 Delaware Code Chapter 43 “Notaries Public” to any such non-
lawyer notarial officer.

‘The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is directed to file within ten days of the
date of this Order the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter, the
Respondent is directed to have all costs paid within thirty days.

‘The matter is hereby CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

‘sl Henry duPont Ridgely

Justice
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER )

(OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME. ) CONFIDENTIAL
‘COURT OF DELAWARE, )

EDWARD C. PANKOWSKI, JR, ) BOARD CASE NOS.
RESPONDENT )

 

1d 17, 2007

BOARD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF SANCHION

wad wip we

vine

 

Procedural Background
Pending before a pane! ofthe Board on Professional Responsibility (the “Board”)

is a Petition for Discipline filed on July 17, 2007 in Case Nos. 9 and 17, 2007 (the “Petition”
involving Edward C. Pankowsk, Jr, Esquire (“Respondent”), a member ofthe bar ofthe
Supreme Court ofthe State of Delaware.

Respondent, through his counsel, Charles Slanina, Esquire, filed a Response to
the Petition on August 7,2007 (the “Response”) in which Respondent denied the allegations.

“The Board convened a hearing (the “Hearing” by the panel on September 12,
2007." Action by the panel constitutes action by the Board. (Rule 2c), Dise. Proc. Rules)

‘At the hearing, the Office ofthe Disciplinary Counsel (the “ODC”) and

Respondent submited a Stipulation of Admitted Facts and Violations and Joint

 

mn of Sanction (the “Stipulation”) (hereinafter cited as"Stip. At _"). The
‘Stipulation was signed by Andrea L. Rocaneli, Esquire, Chief Counsel of the ODC and by Mr,
Slanina and included a Certification by Respondent unconditionally admitting the facts and

"The wasrpt ofthe Seesber 12,2007 hearing is ited erin as "Tr. At_"
‘violations set frth in the Stipulation and consenting to the tems ofthe sanctions set forth in the
‘Stipulation. Respondent also certified that he currently limits his practice of law to
(e) residential realestate closings fora fat fee and (b) criminal defense in connection with a
‘cour-supervised conflicts program. Respondent also certified that he has ceased acting as a
notarial officer

‘tthe hearing the pane! received into evidence as joint exhibits the Stipulation
and a memorandum from the Board dated August 28, 1992 addressed to all members ofthe
Delaware Bar to which was attached a memorandum prepared by David C. Johnson-Glebe, then
‘Deputy Disciplinary Counsel ofthe Supreme Court of Delaware entitled “Professional Integrity
and the Delaware Lawyer” addressing false notarizations (the “1992 Memorandum), The panel
alo received into evidence without objection a letter dated September 6, 2007 o Mr. Slanina
fom Jerome Capone, Esquire. The pane! also heard testimony from Respondent and testimony
‘on Respondent's behalf from Gregory M. Johnson, Esquire and Michael C. Heyden, Esquire,
members of the Delaware Bar. The Board also recived a proffer of testimony on Respondent's
behalf fom Lee C. Goldstein, Esquire, a member ofthe Delaware Bar,

M1, Eactual Findings
1. Mr, Pankowski

 

‘member ofthe Bar ofthe Supreme Court of Delaware,

 

‘having been admitted to the Bar in 1972. At all times relevant to this Petition, Mr. Pankowski
was engaged inthe private practice of law in the State of Delaware as a solo practitioner with an

‘office in Wilmington, Delaware. (Stip. At $41 and 2)
Board Case No. 17,2007 (Susanna Khos)

2 On January 15, 2007, Ms. Susanna Khoe (“Khoe") retained Respondent o
represent her in a divorce action in the Family Court ofthe State of Delaware in and for New
(Castle County “Family Coun”) (Stip. At 3),

3. Beginning March 8,2007, Khoe left telephone messages and sent e-mails
{nguiring sbou the status of her divorce case, but Respondent had not responded to these

 

inguities. On March 22, 2007, Khoe poke with Respondent onthe telephone conceming the
Rule 16(e) financial report that she wa trying to complete forthe Family Cour case (Stp. At
9.

4. OnMarch 23,2007, Respondent signed Khoe’s name to Petitioner's
‘Answer to Respondents Counterclaim, Respondent id not incl any notation with the
also notarized the

 

signature reflecting tha he was signing on behalf of Khoe, Responde
ocument he had executed with Khoe's name and fled i that day withthe Family Court. The
‘otrzation falsely represented tothe Family Cour that Khe had “personally appeared” before
Respondent and tht the verification was “SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED before [hm] onthe
foresai date” of March 23,2007 (Stp. A'S).

5. On March 27,2007, having received from Respondent a copy of the
Peon’ Answer reflecting her unauthorized signstre, Khoe asked Respondent to eease
ction” on he ease, thereby intending to terminate Respondents termination. Respondent did
‘ot flea motion to withdraw with he Family Court, Nor did Respondeat contact Khoe to
<iscus the filing of such a motion or alteratives, such a a substitution of counsel (Stip. AL 6)

6 On April 3,207, Khoe feds complaint with the ODC concerning the

‘unauthorized signature (Stip. At $7).
7. On April 9,2007, Khoe reviewed her ease file a the Family Coun, and
discovered that he final divorce desre had been signed on Apri 3 and set to Respondent.

hoe had nt recived a copy ofthe decree fom Respondent, nor had he informed he tha it had
been entered. The case file ls included an Apri 3 order concerning ancillary maters and a
Mach 20 notice of tral-eadines, neither of which Respondent had provided to Khoe
Respondent forwarded the divore decree and scheduling order to Khoe on April 15,2007.
Khe picked up her entire file from Respondent on April 18,2007. Respondent, who wa sil
counsel of reord in Family Court because he had ot filed motion to withdraw, continued to

. Christine K. Demsey,
Esquire entered her appearance in Family Court ss counsel of record for Khoe on April 24,2007

 

{forward information and documents to Khoe after she picked up her fi

(Stip. AL48).

‘Board Case No.9, 2007 (Thomas EF. Zeglin)

8. In April 2005, Mr. Thomas E. Zeglin (“Zeglin”) retained Respondent to
pursue a motion for reduction of sentence. At the time, Zeglin was incarcerated in Delaware

 

following his criminal conviction and sentencing in March 2005 for fourth-offense driving under

the influence, and was serving a one-year mandatory prison sentence (Stip. At 17).

 

9. Zeglin’s family provided Respondent with a checkin the amount of|
{51,500.00 to investigate, prepare and file the motion for reduction of sentence (Stip. At 18).

10. Despite specific written document requests made to him by the ODC,

 

Respondent produced no evidence that (1) he had provided a written statement to Zegln or
{family member(s) concerning the fee arrangement, including the bass on which the $1,500.00

Pid in advance would be considered earned and informing Zeglin thatthe fee was refundable if
not eared, or that (2) the $1,500.00 advance fe receive for Zeglin's case had been deposited
and safeguarded in a client trust account (Stip. At 19).

11, On June 2,200, Respondent filed a mation for reduction of sentence in
the Superior Court ofthe State of Delaware, in and for New Cale County (“Superior Coun”)
‘As grounds forthe motion, Respondent sated as follows

“Ma Zeglin iin poor health and is 58 years of age. He
suffers from diabetes and lower spine and hip problems and
the was previously treated by physicians before his
incarceration" (Stip. At 20)

12, Respondent did not attach tothe motion for reduction of sentence any
copies of medical record, affidavits or other corroborating information upon which the Superior
Court might rely to reduce Zeglin's sentence. He didnot meet with Zeglin before filing the
rmotion. He di not investigate Zeglin's medical condition, the cae he needed, and whether he
‘vas receiving that care in prison. The motion didnot provide any showing regarding the risks
faced by Zeglin ihe did not receive adequate care (Stip. At 21).

13, On August 29, 2005, the Superior Cour entered an order denying the
‘motion for reduction of sentence (Stip. At 422).

I, Standard of Proof

Allegations of professional misconduct set forth inthe ODC's Petition must be

cstblished by clear and convincing evidence (Rule 18, Dis. Proc. Rules)
1. Violations ofthe Rules
‘As admite inthe Stipulation, the Board finds that Respondent has violated the

following Rules:

 

1, Rule 1.2(a) provides that a lawyer “shall abide by a client's decisions concerning

the objectives ofthe representation, und, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the clients
1 the means by which they are tobe pursued.” By failing to consult with Khoe about the
contents ofthe Petitioner's Answer tothe Respondent's Counterclaim, signing her name on the
document, and fling it with the Family Court without her approval, the Respondent violated
Rule 1.2(2).

2 Rule 1.4(a) requires, in pertinent part, that a “lawyer shall (1) promptly inform
the client of any decision or circumstance as to which the client's informed consent... is
required by these Rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the
status ofthe matter; (and) (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information...”. By
(1) filing to consult with Khoe about the contents ofthe Petitioner's Answer tothe
‘Respondent's Counterclaim; (2) filing to respond to Khoe's attempts to contact him about the
‘status ofthe Family Court case over a period of two weeks in March 2007; and (3) failing
‘promptly to inform Khoe tha a final divorce decree and other orders had been entered by the
Family Cour, the Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a)

3. Rae 3.3(a}(1) provides that “fa lawyer shall not knowingly .. make a false
statement of material fact or law ta tribunal.” By filing with the Family Court the Petitioner's
‘Answer to the Respondent's Counterclaim, on which the Respondent had signed Khoe’s name
and had falsely notarized the signature, the Respondent violated Rule 3.3(aXt),

4. Rule 8.46) provides that i is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in
‘conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” By filing withthe Family
‘Court the Petitioner's Answer tothe Respondent's Counterclaim, on which the Respondent had
signed Petitioner's name and had falsely notarized the signature, the Respondent violated Rule

5400.
5. Rule 1 requires that a “lawyer shall provide competent representation to 4
lien.” By filing to conduct an adequate investigation and prepare and file a motion for
reduction of sentence containing medical records, affidavits or other corroborating infomation
‘upon whic he Superior Court might rely to reduce Zegln’s sentence, the Respondent violated
Rate 1

6 Rule 13 requires that a “lawyer shal act with reasonable diligence and
romptnesin representing a client.” By filing to conduct an adequate investigation and

Prepare and file a motion for red

 

of sentence containing medical records, affidavits or
‘other corroborating information upon which the Superior Court might rly to reduce Zeglin's

sentence, the Respondent violated Rule 1.3.

 

Rule 1.5(a) requires that “a lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee.” By charging a fee of $1,500.00 forthe minimal legal services he
‘performed in connection with the motion for reduction of sentence, the Respondent violated
Rate 1.5().

8. Rule 1.5(0 states that a lawyer “may require the client to pay some o ll ofthe
fee in advance ofthe lawyer undertaking the representation, provided that: (1) [he lawyer shall
‘provide the client with a writen statement thatthe fee is refundable if't is not earned, (2) [Jbe
‘writen statement shall state the basis under which the fees shall be considered to have been
‘armed, whether in whole or in prt, and (3) [all unearned fees shall be retained in the lawyer's
‘ust account, with statement ofthe fees eared provided tothe client atthe time such funds are

withdrawn from the trust accou

 

By failing to provide Zeglin with a written statement that the
‘1,500.00 advance fee was refundable if not earned and stating the basis under which the fees

‘would be considered to have been eamed, whether in whole or in part, and (2) failing to deposi
and ein the $1,500.00 in his lent trast account and acount forts fees were ead, the
Respondent violated Rule 1S(0,

9. Re L.18(a requires in par, that “lawyer shal hold propery of lens or thi
persons tat iin a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate om the
lawyer's ov propery” and that property of liens or hid persons must be appropriately
safeguarded. By filing to deposit and safeguard the advance fee of S,500.0 pid in Zelin’s

case ina li

 

‘rust account until eared, the Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a).
V. Recommended Sanctions
‘The ODC and Respondent agreed that the following are the appropriate sanctions and
Jointly proposed thatthe Board, through the panel, recommend said sanctions tothe Delaware
Supreme Cour:
‘The Respondent shal
(1) be suspended fiom the practice of law fora period of three (3)
:months, beginning on the later of January 1, 2008 or the date of the
Delaware Supreme Court’s Orde in these matters;

@) be permanently barred from acting as notarial officer pursuant to
29 Del. C. §4323(0)3); and

@) pay the costs ofthese disciplinary proceedings.

 

(8) fora period ofa east five (5) years from the date of the Supreme
Court's Orde, the Respondents practice shall be limited to (a)
residential real estate closings fora flat fee and (b) criminal
defense in connection with a court supervised conflicts program.
‘The Respondent may thereafter file a petition with the Delaware
Supreme Court requesting that he be permitted to expand his
practice areas beyond residential real estate closings fora flat fee
nd criminal defense in connection with court supervised conflicts
program. Prior to filing such a petition with the Administrative
‘Assistant othe Board on Professional Responsibility, with service
upon the ODC, the Respondent shall send a waitten notification to
the ODC of his intent to file such petition, and shall thereupon
 

comply with any procedures deemed sppropriate by the ODC for
the purpose of gathering information to respond tothe petition
‘The Respondeat shall have the burden of demonstrating, by clear
and convincing evidence, his fines to expand his practice areas
beyond residential el extae closings for slat fee and criminal
conflicts program.
For the reasons which follow, the panc! accepts the recommendation of ODC and
Resgondent, but in addition, recommends that Respondent be required to inset any non lawyer
notarial officer who performs notarial services in connection with his practice regarding the
notarial dates and the notarial officer's obligation to have signatures placed on documents in
‘their presence only and that Respondent be required to provide a copy of Title 29 Delaware Code
Chapter 43 “Notaries Public” to any such nonawyer notarial officer
VI. Rationale for Recommended Sanctions
In making its recommendation, the Pane has utilized the four par framework set
forthin the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp. 1992) *ABA
Standards”) as required in Ine Steiner, 817 A.24 793, 796 (Del. 2003). A preliminary

<etermination ofthe appropriate sanction is made by assessing the First three prongs ofthe test:

 

(1) the ethical duty violated; (2) the lawyers state of mind; and (3) the actual or potential injury
‘caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, ld. (4) Once the preliminary determination is made, the
fourth prong addresses whether an increase or decreas inthe preliminarily determined sanction

is justified because ofthe presence of mitigating or aggravating factors. 1d.

 

The pane! has also been mindful thatthe objectives ofthe lawyer disciplinary
system in Delaware are to protect the public to protect the administration of justice, to preserve

confidence in the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct? The

5 Inve: Francine R Salamon, No. 361 (Del 200) quting re Boley, $21 A24 881 a 866 (De. 2003)

°
focus ofthe lawyer disciplinary system in Delaware isnot on the lawyer bu, rather, on the
danger to the public that is ascertainable from the lawyer's record of professional misconduct.”

We tum toa discussion of the elements of this framework.

|, The Ethical Duties Violated. As previously recited, ODC and Respondent
stipulated and the panel determined thatthe Respondent committed misconduct in violation of
Professional Rules of Conduct 1.1 (lack of competence), 1.2(a), 1.3 (lack of diligence), 1.4(a)
(Cailur of communications), 15a) (agreement for unreasonable fee), 1.5(f,1.15(a) (failure to
‘maintain client funds in separate uccount, 3.3(a)(1) (lack of candor tothe tribunal) and 8.4(2)
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenttion). Under the ABA Standards,
this misconduct constituted violations of duties owed by Respondent to clients (Rules 1.1, 1.2(a),
13,14, 15(@),
84),
‘violation of other duties owed by Respondent as a professional (Rule 1.5(a). See ABA Standards

15 and 8.4(@), violation of duties owed by Respondent to the public (Rule

 

jolation of duties owed by Respondent 1 the legal system (Rules 1.2(a) and 3.3) and

 

Appendix 1
2 State of Mind. The panel determines that Respondent's conduct with respect to
the Susanna Khoe matter (Board Case No, 17) was knowing insofar as he signed Ms. Khoe's
‘name toa pleading and then notarized it. (Tr. At 113). See Ine Bailey, supa at 863-64.
However, the panel does not believe Respondent acted with intent to deceive the Family Court or
to harm his client with respect tothe false notarization, Rather, Respondent intended to protec,
‘ot injure, Ms. Khoe by his actions. Respondent signed and filed a pleading without Ms. Khoe's
consent to protect her positon (Tr. At 35, 51,52) and falsely notarized that pleading because Ms.
hoe was not present o sign the pleading which Respondent mistakenly believed was required

tbe acknowledged. (Tr, At36, 1, 52). Respondent acknowledged that his behavior inthis

 

‘Inve ul, 767524197, 201 (De. 200).
regard was a “very bad mistake in judgment.” (Tr. At 37). Respondents failures to
communicate with Ms. Khoe appeared tobe the product of negligence and misunderstanding of
his responsibilities, rather than any intention to harm Ms. Khoe or knowledge that he was doing,

‘The panel concludes that Respondent's conduct with respect to the Zeglin matter

 

(Bourd Case No.9) exhibited negligence (and not intentional or knowing violations) by
Respondent with respect tothe handling of the $1,500.00 paid on behalf of Mr. Zeglin by his
sister-in-law, Faith Riale, and with respect othe handling of Mr. Zeglin’s representation.
‘Respondent acknowledged that he should have kept such funds in a trust account (Tr. At 46) but
‘was confused by the relationship of Rule 1.15 toa related provision (Rule 1.5(f), Comment 10)
permiiting fes upto $2,500.00 to be deemed earned under certain circumstances (Tr. At 53, $4,
64). Respondent did not provide any meaningful explanation for filing to meet with Mr. Zeglin.
snd filings motion on his behalf without supporting documentation.

Respondent specifically expressed remorse for his handling ofthe Zeglin matter
(Tr. At27) and acknowledged that he should have handled the funds paid on Me. Zeglin's behalf
in adifferent manner (Tr. At 46). Respondent did not explicitly express remorse for his handling
of the Khoe matter, but he did acknowledge the proper course of conduct he should have
followed with respect to fling of pleadings on Ms. Khoe’s behalf (Te. At 32). However, despite
Respondent's expression of remorse for his handling of the Zeglin matter and his
acknowledgement of improper conduct with respect to the Khoe mater, the panel was
Aisappointed by what appeared tobe a lack ofa completely remorseful state of mind, a ttimes,
Respondent seemed more focused on the financial impact of any sanction as opposed tothe

‘harm caused by his ations. In particular, the panel found it irrelevant and disappointingly not
reflective ofa remorseful state of mind that in his dtect testimony Respondent indicated that he
‘can “survive a suspension”, but needs to continue to practice law because he has anew wife and
‘wo stepdaughters and faces “eight years to go with tuitions from private schools”. (Tr. At39).

‘The pane! was again disappointed to discover during the hearing that Respondent
had delayed disclosure ofthe disciplinary charges in this proceeding to Judge Jurden in
connection with his reappointment tothe Superior Court Contract Attomey Program for Indigent
Defendants (the “Superior Court Program”). Respondent was notified ofthe charges inthe
‘Zeglin matter on December 27, 2006 (Tr. At 64-65) and ofthe charges in the Khoe matter on
April 5, 2007 (Tr. At 65). Respondent was further aware that formal charges would be brought
agninst him by OC by early June of 2007 (Tr. At 60) and was informed on July 11, 2007 that
ODC would be recommending suspension asa result ofthese disciplinary complaints, (Tr. At
(66) Respondent's contract with the Superior Court Program was up for renewal as of July 1,
2007 (Tr. At 60) and although there was no evidence that Respondent was required by any
specific requirement ofthe renewal procedure to disclose the existence ofthese proceedings, the
panel fel that Respondent should have made such disclosure to Judge Jurden in connection with
‘the renewal. Infact, Respondent finaly made such disclosure to Judge Jurden atthe end of.
‘August (Te. At 59), only weeks before the hearing.

3. Injury. Caused by Respondent's Misconduct. There is no clear and convincing,

evidence that Respondent's clients were seriously adversely impacted by Respondent's conduct
or that Respondent's conduct was actually prejudicial tothe administration of justice. The panel

‘could not conclude from the evidence presented thatthe improper pleadings in the Khoe matter
‘impacted the outcome ot conduct of proceedings in that case.* There is no evidence that if
Respondent had followed more appropriate procedures to communicate with Mr. Zeglin he
‘would have been able to prepare a more competent motion to reduce Mr. Zeglin's sentence. The
fee paid on Mr, Zeglin's behalf in 2005 was returned (Tr. At 40). It was, however, toublesome
‘the panel thatthe repayment did not occur until August of 2007, 2-1/2 years afer it was pai,
‘two years after Respondent ceased representation of Mr, Zeglin (Tr. At 44), several months
following initiation of these proceedings and Respondent's retention of Mr. Slanina to represent

 

and virwlly onthe eve ofthe hearing.
Inthe panes view, analysis of the ethical duis violated by Respondent,
Respondents state of mind andthe injury caused by Respondents misconduct suggest a
sanction of suspension or public epimand. The ethical duties violated direct the pane othe
following factors contained in the ABA Standards: 4.1 (for violation of Rule 1.15), 4.4 (for

violations of Rules 1.2(a), 1.3 and 1.4), 4.6 (for violation of Rules 1.5(a) and 8.4()) 5.0 (for

 

violation of Rul 5.1), 6.0 for violations of Rules 1.2(a) and 3.3) and 7.0 (for violation of Rule
1.15(@). These provisions generally reserve the sanction of disbarment for knowing or

{intentional misconduct or criminal bebavi

 

‘which has caused serious or potentially serious

    

jury tothe client or significant o poteatialy significant adverse effect onthe legal
proceeding. Where, as inthis mater, the conduct involves knowing or negligent acts with ess
serious or no injury, the appropriate sanction is generally suspension or public reprimand. Of
course, these general principles must be applied against the facts of cach particular case,

including the presence or absence of any mitigaing or aggravating factors

 

4 _Czuel for ODC ud Respondent acknowledge hat Ms. Khe was harmed with respect to her impression
and respect fer the Delaware legal community when se dacovred Respondent signe het nace 1 plete,
‘otra the signature and led with be Faraly Cou (Tr At 52) The pel dda conae his eal arm
fs equing sanctions us severe as would have bea te cae acta hem had resulted oe Respondent's
tena,

B
A. Ageravating Factors
[ABA Standard 9.22 sets forth the following non-exhaustive list of
aggravating factors:

(2) prior dscptnay offenses;

(©) dishonest sesh motive;

(©) patie of misconduct,

(A) multiple offenses;

(©) bad fh obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally fling to comply with es or orders of he
ssciplnaryageney;

(© submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
Practices during the disciplinary process,

() _Fefusal to acknowledge wrongfl nature of conduc:

() Vulnerability of victim,

(©) substantial experience in the practice of law

inference to making restitution; and

legal conduct, including hat involving the use of controlled
substances,

(ABA Standard §9.22)

‘The ODC and Respondent agreed in he Stipulation tat the following aggravating factors
existing in this matter:

(©) 22210) The Respondent has prio disciplinary record. In 2002, the
Respondent vas privately admonished for voltng Rule

 

Af) by falsely noarizing two
signatures onan afidavit of defense and fling that affidavit withthe Court of Chancery. The
nel note ha the 2002 mater involved Respondent's acknowledgment of tw signatures on an
lfidavit of defense even though the afians did not sign the document in his presence.
Respondents violation of the acknowledgment procedures inthis matter are similar, but aot the
same since inthis matter Respondent signed his clients name tothe pleading and then notarized

it. However, the panel considers the related disciplinary action from 2002 a disturbing and
 

¢

gersvtng factor, paricularly because involved a volaton ofboth a uty owed to
Respondents client andthe legal system.

Gi) 2220). Khoe and Zealin were vulnerable victims ofthe
Respondents misconduct, Khoe's native language fot English and Zeglin was incarcerated at
‘he time of is representation by Respondent (Tr, At #8). However, itd not appear othe pal
that Respondent iatentionaly exploited Khoe's and Zeglin’s vulnerability

(ii) 92200, The Respondent has substantial experience in the practice
‘ofl having ben admitted to the Delaware Bar in 1972, hough he didnot begin his private
practic (after many years with the Offic ofthe Attomey General and then the Office ofthe
Publi Defender) unl 2003. Both the Khoe and Zelin mates arose fom Respondents private
practice othe panel has afforded less weight to Standard 9.26) than the typical ease of

practitioner admitted for 35 years

‘The penel concluded that these agaravating factors do not justify imposition of the sanction of

<isbarment but certainly justify a sanction of suspension, rather than reprimand.
8. Mitigating Factors.

‘ABA Standard 9.32 sets forth the following non-exhaustive list of factors
to be considered in mitigation:

(8) absence ofa prior disciplinary record;

(®) absence ofa dishonest or selfish motive;

(6) personal or emotional problems;

(8) timely good faith effort to make restitution orto rectify
‘consequences of misconduct;

(©) fill and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward proceedings;

(0. inexperience inthe practice of laws

(g) character or reputation;

(h) physical disability,

 

1s
(mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or
drug abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence that the Responder
1 chemical dependency or mental disabilt

@) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the
misconduct,

G) the respondent's recovery ftom the chemical dependency or
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and
sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence ofthat
‘misconduct s unlikely,

@) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(&) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse;

(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

 

is affected by

    

‘The ODC and Respondent agreed in the Stipulation that he following mitigating
factors exist in his mater:

232{g). The Respondent has aeeord of substantial public and community
service thoughout the course of his legal career, including mor than 25 yeas of service with
the Office ofthe Public Defender, and several years of service as conflicts counsel inthe
‘Superior Court Program. The panel concurs with ODC and Respondent and further recognizes
that Respondent's many years of service at the Office ofthe Public Defender and his current
service in the Superior Court Program benefit an underrepresented constituency, namely indigent
esimingl defendants. In re Landis, 850 A24 291, 293 (Del. 2004). The panel also received a
letter dated September 6, 2007 to Mr. Slanina attesting to Respondent's cooperation in the
Superior Court Program and other public service and similar live testimony from Gregory M.
Johnson, Esquire (Tr. At 697) and Michael C, Heyden, Esquire (Tr. At 71-73). In aio, the
panel does not believe that Respondent's conduct, ven wih respect othe fee i he Zeglin

matter, was the result of dishonest or selfish motives, but was rather the result of bad judgment

 

oreareless indifference so that Respondent merits some mitigation under Standard 9.32(b). The

16
panel also recognizes that Respondent, albeit particularly after he obtained counsel, exhibited
‘cooperation with ODC as contemplated under Standard 9.32(e) (Tr. At 118-121).

Finally, the ODC and counsel for Respondent as well as the panel are mindful that
the Delaware Supreme Court has expressed the view (consistent with ABA Standard 2.3) that it
{is generally not inclined to accept a period of suspension of less than six (6) months. Inve
Figliola, 652 A24 1071, 1077(1995). However, as indicated above, the pane! has concluded to
accept the joint recommendation of ODC and Respondent's counsel that Respondent be
suspended for only three months. ‘The panel believes that there are several reasons that support
‘that conclusion. First, in expressing a preference for suspensions of no less than six (6) months
inthe Figliola case, the Court observed that a short-term suspension would appear tobe akin to
an unfavored remedy of a fine and would also be impracticable. Here, the Respondent has
agreed to accept the shorter suspension and does not view it as punitive. Moreover, the
[Respondent has already implemented the restrictions on his civil practice to residential realestate
closings fora set fee and has already turned over that practice to Lee C. Goldstein pending the
‘outcome ofthis case, thus having effectively commenced at least a partial suspension as of
September, 2007, (Tr. At4-6). While making arrangements for handling ofthe Superior Court
Program cass in preparation for Respondent's suspension was not addressed, it appears from the
‘testimony of Respondent's colleagues tat they will asist him in any transition. More
‘importantly, the panel doesnot view the recommendation of suspension here like a customary
suspension because Respondent's suspension is not followed by a return to an unrestricted
practice, but by a return toa very restricted practice fora minimum period of five (5) years so
that the three-month suspension combined with the five (S) year practice limitation may be

viewed asa ftnctionally more severe sanction than an unconditional six-month suspension. The
panel is also mindful that imposing only a three-month suspension (as opposed to a six-month

 

suspension) will permit Respondent to resume his participation inthe Superior Court Program

which serves an underrepresented population

Based on the foregoing considerations, the panel recommends as action of the
‘Board thatthe sanctions set forth in Section V ofthis Report be imposed upon Respondent,
including te imposition of cost ofthese disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule 27, Disc.

roe. Rules.

BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

 

Richard A Levine

Kathleen Forey MeDonough

mite ft

Dated: Ocober 22, 2007
panel is also mindful that imposing only a three-month suspension (as opposed toa six-month
suspension) will permit Respondent to resume his participation inthe Superior Court Program
which serves an underrepresented population.

Based on the foregoing considerations, he panel recommends a action ofthe
Board that the sanctions set forth in Setion V ofthis Report be imposed upon Respondent,
including the imposition of costs ofthese disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule 27, Dis.
Proc. Rules.

“ey Pi Wee RESPONSIBILITY

Richard A Levine

Wen .
Kathleen Furey McDoebugh

Kaliya. MeKown

Dated: October 24; 2007

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