Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005-Ohio-1143.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BEELER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Beeler, 105 Ohio St.3d 188, 2005-Ohio-1143. 
Attorneys – Misconduct – Engaging in conduct involving deceit, fraud, 
misrepresentation, or dishonesty – Engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on fitness to practice law – Handling a legal matter without 
adequate preparation – Neglecting an entrusted legal matter – Concealing 
a matter for which disclosure is required – Two-year suspension, 18 
months stayed, on conditions. 
(No. 2004-1395 — Submitted January 11, 2005 — Decided March 30, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-068. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Robert Logan Beeler, of Carey, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0002255, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.  
Respondent has been in the general practice of law since that time, predominantly 
practicing probate, tax, and real estate law. 
{¶ 2} On March 12, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed an 
amended complaint against respondent alleging violations of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility arising out of his representation of various clients.  
Respondent and relator entered into joint stipulations regarding instances of fraud 
involving an estate and several wills and deeds.  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and, based on the 
parties’ stipulations, testimony, and other evidence, made findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 
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1993 Will and Warranty Deeds 
{¶ 3} In 1993, respondent prepared a will for Georgeann M. Kuenzli.  
This will bequeathed all of Kuenzli’s property to her daughter, Jackie Predmore 
(“Predmore”), and to her grandchildren, John Brennan and Judilyn Ashley, if 
Predmore predeceased Kuenzli.  Respondent also prepared two warranty deeds 
for Kuenzli in 1993.  The first warranty deed purported to convey Kuenzli’s 
residence on Orchard Lane to Predmore.  The second purported to convey a rental 
property located on Warpole Street to Predmore. 
{¶ 4} On February 1, 1993, Kuenzli signed the warranty deeds in the 
presence of respondent, who signed as a witness and notarized the deeds.  Later, 
Nancy Todd, one of respondent’s secretaries at the time, signed the 1993 will and 
the 1993 deeds as a witness outside the presence of Kuenzli.  Respondent testified 
that he did this for the convenience of his client so that she would not have to 
return to his law office. 
{¶ 5} Respondent retained the original warranty deeds in his possession 
until after Kuenzli’s death.  Respondent admitted that the deeds were not recorded 
until much later.  Respondent was under the mistaken impression that a deed can 
be recorded anytime, because once recorded, it related back to the date on which 
it was signed.  Respondent testified that he followed this practice as a cost-saving 
measure for his clients.  Respondent also testified that at this time, he was 
drinking heavily. 
1996 Wills 
{¶ 6} In 1996, respondent drafted two more wills for Kuenzli.  Kuenzli 
had asked respondent to ensure that her son-in-law, Gordon Predmore, was unable 
to benefit from her assets.  Respondent drafted two new wills for Kuenzli and 
took them to her home. 
{¶ 7} Respondent was present when Kuenzli signed both 1996 wills on 
December 28, 1996.  Respondent instructed her to call him later and let him know 
January Term, 2005 
3 
which of the two wills she wanted to be valid.  Respondent testified that he 
believed that Kuenzli never called. 
{¶ 8} Respondent signed both 1996 wills as a witness in Kuenzli’s 
presence.  One of the 1996 wills, the “life estate” will, also bears the signature of 
Tamara Hunter, another former secretary of respondent.  Hunter signed as a 
purported witness, out of the presence of the testator and at respondent’s 
direction. 
{¶ 9} The other 1996 will, the “trust will,” bears the signatures of 
respondent and Brandi Griffin as witnesses.  Griffin is respondent’s current 
secretary.  Out of the presence of the testator and at respondent’s direction, 
Griffin signed the trust will purportedly as a witness.  Both 1996 wills contain 
language revoking all prior wills and codicils by Kuenzli. 
{¶ 10} The 1993 will and the 1996 wills remained in respondent’s 
possession or under his control until after Kuenzli’s death. 
2000 Quitclaim Deed 
{¶ 11} In August 2000, respondent prepared a quitclaim deed at Kuenzli’s 
direction.  The deed purported to convey Kuenzli’s interest in a rental property on 
West Walker Street in Upper Sandusky to Predmore.  Kuenzli reserved a life-
estate interest for herself.  Respondent witnessed Kuenzli’s execution of the 
quitclaim deed and signed it as a witness.  Out of Kuenzli’s presence and at 
respondent’s direction, Hunter signed the quitclaim deed purportedly as a witness, 
and Griffin notarized it.  Respondent retained the original in his possession until 
after Kuenzli’s death. 
{¶ 12} On November 30, 2000, Kuenzli died at the age of 98.  Following 
her death, respondent met with Predmore, Ashley, and Brennan.  After that 
meeting, respondent began to assist in administering the estate.  On January 30, 
2001, respondent presented the 1993 Orchard Lane and Warpole Street warranty 
deeds to the Wyandot County Recorder’s Office for filing, believing that the 
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transfers would relate back once the deeds were recorded, thus removing them 
from the corpus of the estate for purposes of probate. 
{¶ 13} In February 2001, with the assent of the beneficiaries, respondent 
filed the 1993 will along with an application to probate the estate of Kuenzli and 
an application to relieve the estate from administration in the Wyandot County 
Probate Court.  Respondent also prepared and filed a statement of the assets and 
liabilities of Kuenzli’s estate.  Respondent did not list the Orchard Lane, Warpole 
Street, or Walker Street properties as assets of the estate.  On February 5, 2001, 
the probate court relieved the Kuenzli estate from administration. 
2001 Warranty Deed 
{¶ 14} Sometime before February 24, 2001, respondent realized that he 
needed Predmore’s husband’s signature to release his dower interest.  On 
February 24, 2001, respondent presented Predmore and her husband with a 
warranty deed for their signatures.  The warranty deed reserved life-estate 
interests in the Orchard Lane, Warpole Street, and Walker Street properties in 
favor of Predmore, and transferred equal remainder interests in the three 
properties to Ashley and Brennan.  The Predmores signed the deed in 
respondent’s presence and respondent signed as a witness and notarized the 
document.  The February 24, 2001 warranty deed also bears the signature of 
Tamara Hunter.  Out of the Predmores’ presence and at respondent’s direction, 
Hunter signed the warranty deed purportedly as a witness.  Respondent filed this 
deed with the county recorder four days later. 
{¶ 15} Also on February 24, 2001, respondent presented Predmore with 
an affidavit for her signature.  The affidavit stated that the quitclaim deed had 
been recorded.  Respondent knew that the deed had not been recorded, yet he 
directed Predmore to sign it, notarized it himself, and filed the deed and the 
affidavit together several days later with the county recorder. 
January Term, 2005 
5 
{¶ 16} Shortly thereafter, Predmore contacted respondent and explained 
that she wanted to retain the entire interest in the three properties.  Predmore also 
told respondent that she believed that the deeds had not been properly witnessed.  
After that conversation, respondent hired attorney Mark Ellis to represent him in 
matters pertaining to Predmore and the Kuenzli estate.  Respondent met with 
Predmore and admitted that the deeds signed by Kuenzli and Kuenzli’s wills were 
invalid. 
{¶ 17} Later, in March 2002, Predmore’s new attorney attempted to 
submit the 1996 life-estate will to probate court.  Shortly after that, respondent 
attempted to file the 1996 trust will with the probate court. After respondent 
retained his attorney, he learned that the 1993 deeds and the 2000 quitclaim deed 
that he recorded after Kuenzli’s death did not operate retroactively to transfer the 
property out of Kuenzli’s estate. 
Settlement Agreement 
{¶ 18} In July 2002, the Predmores, Ashley, Brennan, and Thomas Ashley 
(Judilyn Ashley’s spouse) (“the heirs”) entered into a settlement agreement with 
respondent and agreed to use the 1993 will to probate Kuenzli’s estate.  The heirs 
further agreed to a distribution of the various properties.  Respondent agreed to 
waive all attorney fees related to the administration of the Kuenzli estate and 
agreed to help Ashley and Brennan to refinance the Walker Street property 
without charging them.  Ashley and Brennan agreed to reimburse respondent 
$13,588.95 for Kuenzli’s funeral bill and estate taxes, and respondent agreed to 
pay a total of $65,000 to Predmore (all of which has been paid) and $3,500 to 
Predmore’s husband (which also has been paid).  Finally, the heirs agreed to 
execute a release in favor of respondent from any legal malpractice claims arising 
from his representation of Kuenzli and the Kuenzli estate. 
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{¶ 19} In addition, respondent stipulated that there were other deeds and 
wills executed outside the presence of clients.  Although he could not recall 
names, he believed that there were only a few. 
Hearing 
{¶ 20} At the hearing, respondent testified that he is an alcoholic.  He 
sought treatment with George Sakash, a mental-health and substance-abuse 
counselor, approximately 16 times in 1998 and three times in 2000.  Although he 
experimented with attempting to drink in moderation, respondent testified that 
since December 2000, he has abstained from alcohol and committed to total 
sobriety. 
{¶ 21} In April 2004, two and a half weeks before his disciplinary 
hearing, respondent entered the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) 
support recovery system and signed a three-year contract with OLAP.  
Respondent testified that he intends to honor his OLAP contract.  However, the 
contract requires attendance at a local weekly AA meeting, plus at least three 
other AA/NA meetings per week, for a total of four required meetings per week.  
As of the hearing, having signed the contract two and a half weeks before, 
respondent had attended only two AA meetings total.  In addition, an OLAP 
counselor told respondent that he needed a session with a therapist and his spouse 
regarding the disciplinary proceeding, and respondent had not completed this step 
as of the time of his hearing. 
{¶ 22} George Sakash, respondent’s mental-health and substance-abuse 
counselor, diagnosed respondent with alcohol dependence and a secondary 
diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder.  Since respondent stopped drinking, 
Sakash testified, he physically looks better, is more physically active, and has 
grown spiritually.  In addition, Sakash testified that respondent’s wife had 
confirmed that he was not drinking.  However, Sakash was still concerned about 
January Term, 2005 
7 
respondent’s level of anxiety and about the fact that he is still on anxiety 
medication. 
{¶ 23} At the time of the hearing, Sakash did not believe that respondent 
had the support systems in place to help him handle high-stress periods.  
However, Sakash believed that the OLAP program will be positive for 
respondent, that respondent’s alcohol dependence contributed to his disciplinary 
problems, and that he can successfully practice law. 
Disciplinary Counsel’s Recommendation for Sanction 
{¶ 24} At the conclusion of the hearing, relator recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years with six months 
of the suspension stayed.  Respondent requested that if a suspension is imposed, it 
be stayed in its entirety.  The panel recommended a two-year suspension with six 
months stayed on conditions.  The board recommended that respondent be 
suspended for two years with 21 months stayed upon the terms and conditions set 
forth in the panel’s report.  Relator filed objections, arguing that the three-month 
actual suspension recommended by the board is too lenient. 
{¶ 25} Because the parties stipulated to the disciplinary violations, the 
sole issue before this court today is the sanction.  In seeking to bring uniformity to 
the process of sanctioning attorneys, this court turned to the four-step 
methodology of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions in Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 316, 720 
N.E.2d 525.  “First, the court is to determine which ethical duties were violated by 
the attorney.  Second, the court examines the attorney’s mental state at the time of 
the violations.  Third, the court assesses the extent of the actual or potential injury 
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.  Equipped with this information, the court 
makes an initial determination as to the appropriate sanction.  Finally, in the 
fourth step, the court examines any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and 
arrives at a final determination.”  (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 320, 720 N.E.2d 525. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Ethical Duties Violated 
{¶ 26} The parties stipulated and the board determined that respondent’s 
conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
misrepresentation, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit), 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter 
without preparation adequate in the circumstances), 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall 
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him), and 7-102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not 
conceal or knowingly fail to disclose what he is required by law to reveal). 
{¶ 27} Further, as stipulated by the parties and determined by the board, 
respondent’s conduct as set forth in Count Two (directing his staff to sign as 
witnesses) violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6). 
Respondent’s Mental State 
{¶ 28} R.C. 2107.03 requires at least two witnesses for the proper 
execution of a will.  The witnesses must see the testator sign or hear the testator 
acknowledge the signature.  Relator argues that respondent’s mental state at the 
time of the violations was solely one of disdain for the law.  We disagree.  
Respondent was drinking heavily during most of the time in question.  Although 
he appears to have known that he was not properly witnessing Kuenzli’s will and 
deeds, his failings seem to have grown out of confusion due to drinking and a 
concern for the convenience of his client, rather than any contempt for the law.  
While his behavior is clearly unacceptable and did indeed violate the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, his mental state was affected by his substance-abuse 
problems.  Relator stipulated that respondent acted without a selfish or dishonest 
motive. 
Actual or Potential Injury 
January Term, 2005 
9 
{¶ 29} Respondent’s missteps caused Kuenzli to die intestate and the 
Kuenzli estate to linger in probate for many months.  Further, by filing the 
improperly attested wills and deeds with the probate court, respondent 
misrepresented facts to that tribunal, an action which this court does not look 
upon lightly.  “Beyond the fact that these activities are a fraud on the court where 
the documents are filed and on all those who rely on such documents, this casual 
attitude toward statutory requirements breeds disrespect for the law and for the 
legal profession.” Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Papcke (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 91, 93-
94, 689 N.E.2d 549. 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
{¶ 30} Respondent has been practicing law since 1983 and has no prior 
disciplinary record.  Respondent and relator stipulated that the following 
mitigating factors exist and should be considered in determining the appropriate 
sanction:   
{¶ 31} “a) Absence of a prior disciplinary record; 
{¶ 32} “b) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
{¶ 33} “c) Timely good faith effort to make restitution and to rectify 
consequences of misconduct, including payment by Respondent from his own 
personal funds in the amount of $68,500; 
{¶ 34} “d) Full and free disclosure and cooperative attitude toward these 
proceedings; 
{¶ 35} “e) Remorse for his conduct and acknowledgement [sic] of 
wrongdoing; 
{¶ 36} “f) A diagnosis by OLAP’s Stephanie Krznarich, a licensed 
alcohol/substance abuse counselor and professional counselor, of (1) alcohol 
dependence in full remission and (2) generalized anxiety disorder; 
{¶ 37} “g) A diagnosis by George Sakash, a licensed chemical 
dependency counselor and professional counselor * * *, of alcohol dependence 
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that caused Respondent’s judgment to be impaired and contributed to a portion of 
the misconduct set forth above;  
{¶ 38} “h) Respondent treated with Sakash on 16 occasions in 1998; once 
in 1999; and six times in 2000.  Respondent has treated with Sakash on two 
occasions in 2004.  Respondent attended two AA meetings in 1998; and 
{¶ 39} “i) Beginning on April 26, 2004, Respondent has agreed to 
participate in OLAP pursuant to the terms of OLAP’s Lawyers Support System 
Recovery Contract * * * for at term of three (3) years, which includes monitoring 
Respondent’s performance under the terms of the Contract by Scott Mote, 
Stephanie Krznarich and Roger Culbert.” 
{¶ 40} Thus, respondent has admitted to his substance-abuse problem and 
has committed to sobriety. 
Sanction 
{¶ 41} Relator and respondent stipulated that any period of a stayed 
suspension should be accompanied by the following terms and conditions:  
{¶ 42} “A term of probation that includes the following conditions:  (1) 
monitoring, for a period of not less than two years, by a licensed attorney; (2) 
access to regular audits of Respondent’s trust and business accounts by the 
monitor; and (3) client releases to allow the monitor to have full access to 
Respondent’s client’s [sic] files.” 
{¶ 43} As stated above, relator and respondent did not stipulate to a 
recommended sanction.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the panel, but 
recommended a two-year suspension with 21 months stayed, on the same 
conditions as stipulated, but with the additional condition of successful 
completion of the OLAP contract. 
{¶ 44} A violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) ordinarily calls for the actual 
suspension of an attorney’s license.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh 
January Term, 2005 
11 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 237.  The purpose of the disciplinary 
process is not to punish the offender but rather to protect the public.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, at ¶ 
53. 
{¶ 45} However, we find that a six-month actual suspension is more in 
line with conduct in similar cases.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffter, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 320, 2003-Ohio-775, 784 N.E.2d 693, we held that a six-month actual 
suspension was warranted when Heffter notarized signatures of minors in a 
probate matter outside their presence.  In Papcke, 81 Ohio St.3d 91, 689 N.E.2d 
549, we held that a six-month actual suspension was warranted when Papcke 
notarized her secretary’s signing of a client’s name without even asking whether 
the client had authorized the secretary to sign her name, told her client she had 
filed her complaint for divorce when she had not, and failed for six months to 
reply to relator’s notice of investigation.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandy 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 291, 690 N.E.2d 1280, we imposed a six-month actual 
suspension on an attorney for drafting a will for a client in which the attorney was 
named as a beneficiary, signing his own name as a witness, and later attempting to 
add another witness’s signature to the will after the testator’s death.  Finally, in 
Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Speros (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 101, 652 N.E.2d 681, we 
held that filing an affidavit in court bearing a forged signature of a notary and 
containing a false statement blaming failure to timely file a brief on a clerical 
error rather than his own neglect warranted six months’ actual suspension. 
{¶ 46} Accordingly, this court modifies the board’s recommended 
sanction to a 24-month suspension with 18 months stayed, for a total of six 
months’ actual suspension, on the following conditions: probation for a period of 
two years, monitoring by a licensed attorney during the term of probation, access 
to regular audits of respondent’s trust and business accounts by the monitor, and 
client releases to allow the monitor to have full access to respondent’s client files.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In addition, because respondent admitted several instances of improper witnessing 
of documents, this court orders the respondent to review existing files to be 
certain that all documents have been properly witnessed and to cooperate with the 
monitor in correcting any outstanding improperly witnessed documents. 
{¶ 47} If respondent violates the conditions, the stay will be lifted and 
respondent will serve the entire term of the actual suspension.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Geoffrey Stern, Christopher J. Weber, and 
Rasheeda Z. Khan, for respondent. 
_____________________