Title: Parker v. Parker

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

434 So. 2d 1361 (1983) Bonnie Lou PARKER v. Ronald Keith PARKER, Executor of Estate of Carley Hugh Parker and Marion G. Barlow, Guardian of Carl Gregg Parker. No. 54327. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 27, 1983. Jimmy D. McGuire, Gulfport, for appellant. Billie J. Graham, Thomas T. Buchanan, Laurel, for appellee. Before BROOM, P.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE and BOWLING, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court: Bonnie Lou Parker is the appellant in this case. Ronald Keith Parker, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Carley Hugh Parker, and Marion G. Barlow, Guardian of Carl Gregg Parker, minor son and beneficiary of Carley Hugh Parker, deceased, are the appellees. The Chancery Court of the First Judicial District, Harrison County, Mississippi, Honorable William L. Stewart, presiding, entered a decree enforcing certain provisions of a previous divorce decree between Bonnie Lou Parker and Carley Hugh Parker and ordered sale of real property involved. Bonnie Lou Parker and Carley Hugh Parker acquired on October 27, 1972, certain property occupied and used as their home, by the following language: On April 14, 1978, the Parkers were divorced. The decree recited that the parties announced to the court that they had reached a settlement before the conclusion of the hearing and the following was ordered with reference to the property involved here: Carley Hugh Parker died September 22, 1979, prior to the expiration of the three-year period provided in the divorce decree for the sale of the property. The question presented is whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the estate of Carley Hugh Parker possessed an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the property and in enforcing the provisions of the divorce decree for the sale of the property. Appellant contends that the divorce itself did not terminate the joint tenancy created by the warranty deed; that there was no property settlement; that there was no intention to destroy the joint tenancy; and that, upon the death of Carley Hugh Parker, the entire fee simple title became vested in appellant. The appellant cites and relies upon Shepherd v. Shepherd, 336 So. 2d 497 (Miss. 1976), which simply holds that an estate in entirety with right of survivorship did not terminate and become an estate in common when parties were divorced. However, the Court in Shepherd went further and stated: The appellees argue that, although no property settlement agreement was entered into for attachment to the divorce action, there was a firm agreement by the parties for the disposition of their home and such agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree as a consent decree and amounted to a contract which terminated the joint tenancy and vested the home property equally in the parties. We agree with that position of the appellees. In Wray v. Langston, 380 So. 2d 1262 (Miss. 1980), an agreement for conveyance of property was incorporated in the decree of divorce (by agreement) and we held that the decree itself did not divest title from the appellant but it simply set out and followed the agreement of the parties, and was an enforceable provision of the decree. See also Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1980). The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.