Title: Larkin v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

240 Ind. 161 (1959)
162 N.E.2d 515
LARKIN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,738.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 3, 1959.
*162 Orval W. Anderson and Thomas R. Fadell, both of Gary, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Merl M. Wall, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a conviction in the Lake Juvenile Court. The appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of contributing to the delinquency of minors, the affidavit, omitting the formal parts thereof, signature and jurat, reads as follows:
"Ronald Lee Sutton, born 11-11-1941, and Jerry Mulloy, born 7-9-42, were then and there minor children, under the age of eighteen years and that NANCY LARKIN, age 46, late of Lake County, Indiana, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and willfully cause and encourage said children to violate laws, municipal ordinances and regulations to wit:
Thereafter the defendant filed an affidavit for a change of venue from the regular judge, which change *164 was granted and George Krstovich was selected and qualified as such special judge.
The statute upon which prosecution was based, Acts 1945, ch. 218, § 1, p. 1011, being § 10-812, Burns' 1956 Replacement, reads in pertinent parts as follows:
This court has previously held that the above statute must be construed in pari materia with Acts 1945, ch. 347, being §§ 9-3101 to 9-3124, Burns' 1956 Replacement, and Acts 1945, ch. 356, being §§ 9-3201 to 9-3224, Burns' 1956 Replacement. State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court (1945), 223 Ind. 375, 391, 61 N.E.2d 168. The pertinent statute to be so construed in the instant case, Acts 1945, ch. 356, § 4, p. 1724, being § 9-3204, Burns' 1956 Replacement, reads in pertinent parts as follows:
....
....
...."
There is some conflict in the evidence in this case and when this is true this court does not weigh the evidence, and all presumptions are in favor of the trial court.
Appellant's assignment of error consists of four separate specifications, viz.:
Specifications two, three and four do not present any question here on appeal, the record discloses that the appellant waived arraignment and trial by jury and admitted the venue.
The appellant's motion for a new trial likewise contains four specifications, which motion, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
The first two specifications of the above motion are proper and are argued at length by the appellant. On the basis of the record before us those questions, as well as those embraced in specifications three and four, must be decided adversely to *167 the appellant. Appeals come to the Supreme Court with the presumption that the correct result was reached in the trial court. The burden is upon appellant to overthrow such presumption. Souerdike v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 204, 108 N.E.2d 136; Rudd v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168.
The defendant took the witness stand and stated she was married and operated a tavern. From observation of the defendant as well as her testimony the Judge could conclude she was more than 21 years of age. Watson v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 329, 140 N.E.2d 109.
The question of the age of the appellant in issue here is important only to the extent that it be proved that she be an adult.
Appellant's contention, that the finding of the court is contrary to law by reason of being sentenced "to serve a term of six months at the Indiana Women's Prison" instead of being imprisoned "in the county jail for a term not to exceed six months" is without merit since this question has heretofore been decided adversely to the appellant in Garner v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 503, 86 N.E.2d 675. See also Acts 1921, ch. 191, § 2, p. 497, being § 13-616, Burns' 1956 Replacement.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., and Bobbitt, J., concur.
Landis, J., concurs in result.
Achor, J., not participating because of illness.
NOTE.  Reported in 162 N.E.2d 515.