Title: In re Gadlin

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re GREGORY GADLIN  
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S254599 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Five 
B289852 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
 BA165439 
 
 
December 28, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban and Hill* concurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*   
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
In re GADLIN 
 
S254599 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
In November 2016, the California electorate approved 
Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.  
The initiative amended the California Constitution to provide, 
in relevant part, that “[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent 
felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for 
parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her 
primary offense.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1) (article I, 
section 32(a)(1)).)1  The initiative also directed the Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) to “adopt 
regulations in furtherance of these provisions” and instructed 
the Secretary of the Department to “certify that these 
regulations protect and enhance public safety.”  (Art. I, § 32, 
subd. (b) (article I, section 32(b)).) 
The Department adopted regulations implementing a 
nonviolent offender parole consideration process.  Those 
regulations 
exclude 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration any inmate who “is convicted of a sexual offense 
that currently requires or will require registration as a sex 
offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act, codified in 
Sections 290 through 290.024 of the Penal Code.”  (Cal. Code 
 
1  
Further 
article 
references 
are 
to 
the 
California 
Constitution unless otherwise indicated. 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
Regs., tit. 15, § 3491, subd. (b)(3) [governing determinately 
sentenced offenders]; see also id., § 3496, subd. (b) [governing 
indeterminately sentenced offenders].)2  We granted review to 
address the validity of these provisions.   
The Department asserts it is authorized by article I, 
section 32(b) to exclude from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration all inmates convicted of a registerable sex offense, 
regardless of whether that offense is defined by the regulations 
as a nonviolent felony and regardless of whether the inmate is 
currently incarcerated for that conviction.  Indeed, the 
Department’s regulations categorize inmates convicted of a 
registerable sex offense as “nonviolent offenders” unless, among 
other criteria, they are currently incarcerated for a violent 
felony listed in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).  (Cal. 
Code Regs., §§ 3490, subd. (a), 3491, subds. (a), (b), 3495, 
subd. (a), 3496, subds. (a), (b).)  Nonetheless, the regulations 
entirely exclude from nonviolent offender parole consideration 
inmates previously convicted or currently convicted of any 
registerable sex offense.  We conclude that this categorical 
exclusion conflicts with the constitutional directive that inmates 
“convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state 
prison shall be eligible for parole consideration.”  (Art. I, 
§ 32(a)(1).)  
We emphasize that this determination does not require 
the release on parole of any inmate.  The evaluation of an 
inmate’s suitability for parole and the processes involved in 
conducting that evaluation remain squarely within the purview 
of the Department and the Board of Parole Hearings.  We 
 
2  
Further undesignated references to the California Code of 
Regulations are to title 15 unless otherwise noted.   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
emphasize, too, that our conclusion here does not disturb the 
Department’s exclusion from parole consideration of inmates 
currently incarcerated for violent felony sex offenses as defined 
in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).  The Department is 
not permitted, however, to entirely exclude from parole 
consideration an entire class of inmates when those inmates 
have been convicted of nonviolent felony offenses. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  The Underlying Conviction 
In 2007, a jury convicted petitioner Gregory Gadlin of 
assault with a deadly weapon.  (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).)3   
The jury sustained allegations that he had previously been 
convicted of two serious felonies (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)):  
a 1984 conviction for forcible rape (id., § 261, former subd. (2)), 
and a 1986 conviction for forcible child molestation (id., § 288, 
subd. (b)).  Both prior convictions require registration under the 
Sex Offender Registration Act.  (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (c).)   
Following his conviction in 2007, petitioner was sentenced 
to a total prison term of 35 years to life, consisting of 25 years to 
life for assault with a deadly weapon under the “Three Strikes” 
law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), and an 
 
3  
As discussed below, the Department’s regulations 
implementing Proposition 57 adopt the definition of “violent 
felony” established in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).  
(Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3490, subd. (c), 3495, subd. (c).)  Petitioner’s 
current conviction for assault with a deadly weapon is not a 
violent felony under that statute.  The parties do not discuss, 
and we do not consider, the validity of the Department’s 
regulations concerning the adoption of the Penal Code on this 
point. 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
additional five years for each of his two prior serious felony 
convictions.  His judgment was affirmed on appeal. 
B.  The Underlying Habeas Corpus Petitions and 
the Court of Appeal Opinion 
After the electorate approved Proposition 57, petitioner 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles 
County Superior Court.  The petition challenged the 
Department’s determination that petitioner did not qualify for 
nonviolent offender parole consideration, and specifically 
challenged the provision of the regulations excluding from 
nonviolent offender parole consideration inmates like petitioner 
who had been convicted under the Three Strikes law.  The trial 
court denied the petition, finding that the then-applicable 
regulations properly excluded inmates serving third strike 
sentences from eligibility for nonviolent offender parole 
consideration.  It does not appear that either petitioner or the 
Department addressed in the superior court proceedings the 
effect of defendant’s prior sex offense convictions on his 
eligibility for nonviolent offender parole consideration. 
Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the Court of 
Appeal.  That court appointed counsel, directed counsel to file 
an amended petition, and eventually issued an order to show 
cause.  In its return to the order to show cause, the Department 
asserted that petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender 
parole consideration for two reasons:  first, because he was 
serving an indeterminate term pursuant to the Three Strikes 
law; second, because he had suffered a prior conviction for a sex 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
offense requiring registration under Penal Code section 290.  
The Department’s first argument is not before us.4   
The appellate court held that the amended regulations 
improperly excluded petitioner from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration based on his two prior sex offense convictions.  
(Gadlin, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 789–790.)  Looking to the 
language of the constitutional provision, the court determined 
that “[t]he reference to ‘convicted’ and ‘sentenced’ [in article I, 
section 32(a)(1)], in conjunction with present eligibility for 
parole once a full term is completed, make[s] clear that early 
parole eligibility must be assessed based on the conviction for 
which an inmate is now serving a state prison sentence (the 
current offense), rather than prior criminal history.”  (Id. at 
p. 789.)  The court rejected the Department’s assertion that the 
Department could exclude offenders with prior sex offense 
convictions in order to protect public safety, noting that “[t]hese 
policy considerations . . . do not trump the plain text of section 
32[(a)(1)].”  (Ibid.)  The court declined to express any opinion 
 
4  
When the present matter was pending in the Court of 
Appeal, that same court decided In re Edwards (2018) 
26 Cal.App.5th 1181 (Edwards).  Edwards held that the 
regulations implementing Proposition 57 improperly excluded 
from nonviolent offender parole consideration third strike 
offenders whose third strike was for a nonviolent offense.  
(Edwards, at pp. 1185–1186.)  The court directed the 
Department to amend the regulations accordingly, and the 
Department did so in December 2018.  (Id. at pp. 1192–1193.)  
The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that the 
amended regulations effectively mooted the Department’s 
argument that petitioner’s conviction under the Three Strikes 
law made him ineligible for nonviolent offender parole 
consideration.  (In re Gadlin (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 784, 787 
(Gadlin).) 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
concerning whether the exclusion of inmates based on a current 
conviction for a nonviolent sex offense also violates the 
Constitution.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal granted the petition 
and ordered the Department to consider petitioner for parole 
within 60 days.  (Id. at p. 790.)   
Justice Baker authored a concurring opinion agreeing 
with the majority that individuals convicted of prior sex offenses 
may not be excluded from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration under the newly enacted constitutional provision.  
(Gadlin, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 790 (conc. opn. of Baker, 
J.).)  The concurring opinion, however, maintained that 
individuals currently incarcerated for nonviolent sex offenses 
may properly be excluded from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration.  (Id. at pp. 793–796 (conc. opn. of Baker, J.).) 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review and 
directed the parties to address whether the Department had the 
authority 
to 
exclude 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration inmates with prior sex offense convictions 
requiring registration.  Following oral argument, we asked the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether the 
Department had the authority to exclude from nonviolent 
offender parole consideration those inmates with current 
nonviolent sex offense convictions (that is, convictions not listed 
as violent in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)) that 
require registration.5  Although petitioner was excluded from 
 
5  
The Court of Appeal recently considered this issue and 
concluded that the Department could not exclude inmates 
currently convicted of a nonviolent registerable sex offense.  
(Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws v. Department of 
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 225, 234 
 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
nonviolent offender parole consideration based solely on his 
prior conviction, in light of the concurring opinion below and the 
interest in resolving the matter expeditiously we will consider 
the Department’s regulations as they apply to both prior and 
current convictions. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Proposition 57 
In 2009, a three-judge federal district court panel ordered 
the Department “to reduce the prisoner population to 137.5% of 
the adult institution’s total design capacity.”  (Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see 
also Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 501–503.)  The 
California Legislature and electorate subsequently enacted 
several measures aimed to reduce the prison population, 
including Assembly Bill No. 109 (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482 
(2011–2012 Reg. Sess.); criminal realignment) and Proposition 
36 (the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000).  
Still, the issue persisted and in February 2014 the federal 
district court ordered the Department to implement additional 
measures. 
Against this backdrop, in November 2016 the electorate 
approved Proposition 57.  (Cal. Sect. of State, Statement of Vote 
Summary Pages (2016) p. 12  [as of Dec. 17, 
 
(Alliance).)  Counsel in the present matter is the same counsel 
as appeared in Alliance.  We granted review in Alliance and 
deferred briefing pending resolution of the matter before us.  
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
2020].)6  As relevant here, the initiative added section 32 to 
article I of the California Constitution.  The new section states:  
“Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and 
sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole 
consideration after completing the full term for his or her 
primary offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  It further provides that 
“the full term for the primary offense means the longest term of 
imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding 
the imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or 
alternative sentence.”  (Id., § 32(a)(1)(A).)  Finally, as noted 
earlier, the new provision directs the Department to “adopt 
regulations in furtherance of these provisions” and instructs the 
Secretary of the Department to “certify that these regulations 
protect and enhance public safety.”  (Id., § 32(b).)   
Article I, section 32(a) identifies the purposes behind the 
constitutional provision, stating that it was “enacted to enhance 
public safety, improve rehabilitation, and avoid the release of 
prisoners by federal court order, notwithstanding anything in 
this article or any other provision of law.”  Uncodified portions 
of Proposition 57 further identify the initiative’s purpose and 
intent.  Those purposes, in relevant part, are:  “1.  Protect and 
enhance public safety.  [¶]  2.  Save money by reducing wasteful 
spending on prisons.  [¶]  3.  Prevent federal courts from 
indiscriminately releasing prisoners.  [¶]  4.  Stop the revolving 
door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for 
juveniles.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) 
text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)  The initiative also states that the 
 
6  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket number, and case name at . 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
“act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”  (Id., 
§ 9, p. 146.)     
B.  The Department’s Regulations 
In March 2017, the Department proposed emergency 
regulations to implement Proposition 57.  Those regulations, 
which were adopted on a temporary basis, defined a “nonviolent 
offender” as an inmate who was not, among other things, serving 
a term for a violent felony as defined in Penal Code section 
667.5, subdivision (c) or convicted of a sex offense requiring 
registration under Penal Code section 290.  (Cal. Code Regs., 
§§ 3490, former subds. (a), (c), 2449.1, former subds. (a), (c).)  
Under the emergency regulations, inmates with current or prior 
sex offense convictions requiring registration were excluded 
from nonviolent offender parole consideration. 
In May 2018, the Department issued final regulations to 
replace the March 2017 emergency regulations.  The May 2018 
regulations modified the March 2017 emergency regulations in 
various ways, including by changing the definition of 
“nonviolent offenders.”  As relevant here, the final regulations 
do not exclude from the definition of “nonviolent offenders” 
individuals convicted of a current or prior sex offense requiring 
registration.  (See Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3490, subd. (a) [defining 
“determinately-sentenced nonviolent offender”], 3495, subd. (a) 
[defining “indeterminately-sentenced nonviolent offender”].)  
Thus, inmates with prior sex offenses requiring registration 
may be deemed “nonviolent offenders” under the final 
regulations (unless they are excluded on another basis).  The 
regulations state, too, that nonviolent offenders “shall be eligible 
for parole consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings.”  (Id., 
§ 3491, subd. (a); see also § 3496, subd. (a).)   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
The final regulations go on to say that, “[n]otwithstanding 
[section 3491,] subsection (a),” even nonviolent offenders are 
“not eligible for parole consideration” if, among other things, 
“[t]he inmate is convicted of a sexual offense that currently 
requires or will require registration as a sex offender under the 
Sex Offender Registration Act, codified in Sections 290 through 
290.024 of the Penal Code.”  (Cal. Code Regs., § 3491, subd. (b), 
(b)(3); see also § 3496, subd. (b).)7   
The final statement of reasons accompanying the May 
2018 regulations acknowledged that individuals convicted of a 
sex offense “are no longer excluded from the definition of 
‘nonviolent offender.’ ”  (Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 
Credit Earning and Parole Consideration Final Statement of 
Reasons (2018) p. 14.)  It went on to explain that, 
notwithstanding 
that 
definition, 
inmates 
currently 
or 
previously convicted of a sex offense requiring registration 
would be excluded from nonviolent offender parole consideration 
based on public safety concerns.  (Id. at pp. 14, 20.)8  The 
statement asserted that such offenders pose a “potentially high 
 
7  
The regulations detail the eligibility criteria for both 
determinately sentenced offenders (see Cal. Code Regs., 
§§ 3490–3491) and indeterminately sentenced offenders (see id., 
§§ 3495–3496).  The provisions are identical as relevant here; 
both exclude from nonviolent offender parole consideration an 
inmate convicted of a sexual offense that currently requires or 
will require registration.  (Id., §§ 3491, subd. (b)(3), 3496, subd. 
(b).) 
8  
The risk to the community posed by individuals convicted 
of sex offenses is sharply contested by the parties and amici.  
Given our conclusions regarding the language of the 
Constitution and the intent of the voters as reflected in the 
ballot materials, however, we need not address this issue. 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
risk of committing further sex offenses after release from 
incarceration or commitment, and that protection of the public 
from reoffending by these offenders is a paramount public 
interest.”  (Id. at p. 20.)9    
C.  Other Cases Regarding Nonviolent Offender 
Parole Consideration  
In addition to excluding from parole consideration inmates 
convicted of prior offenses requiring registration, the May 2018 
regulations categorically excluded certain other “nonviolent 
offenders”:  (i) inmates deemed ineligible based on a public 
safety screening and referral, and, as noted, (ii) inmates serving 
an indeterminate term under the Three Strikes law, even when 
the third strike was a nonviolent felony.  Courts of Appeal have 
invalidated both exclusions as inconsistent with Proposition 57 
and have directed the Department to adopt new regulations 
consistent with the constitutional provision.  (See In re McGhee 
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 902 (McGhee); Edwards, supra, 
 
9  
The final statement of reasons accompanying the 
regulations also provided estimates concerning the number of 
inmates who would be affected by this exclusion.  According to 
the Department, approximately 22,400 inmates were required 
at that time to register for a sex offense based on a current or 
prior conviction.  Of those, more than 18,000 were currently 
convicted of a violent offense as defined in Penal Code section 
667.5, subdivision (c) and thus, under the Department’s 
regulations, were ineligible for nonviolent offender parole 
consideration based on their current conviction in any event.  Of 
the remaining 4,400 or so inmates convicted of a nonviolent 
offense (and currently incarcerated based on that offense), it is 
not clear how many would be excluded from nonviolent offender 
parole consideration based on a prior (as opposed to a current) 
sex offense conviction. 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1181.)  The Department did not seek review 
in either case.10 
D.  Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation  
The principles applicable to determining the validity of 
regulations promulgated by a state agency are well settled.  
Those precepts have traditionally been applied in the context of 
a state agency’s regulations addressing statutes enacted by the 
Legislature.  (See Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748 
(Morris).)  Neither party argues that the relevant principles of 
interpretation differ when an agency has promulgated 
regulations to give force to a constitutional provision, rather 
than a statutory provision.  The parties in this case have not 
suggested an alternative framework to interpret agency 
regulations authorized by constitutional provisions, and we see 
no reason to think a different framework would lead to a 
different result.  Therefore, for purposes of this case we proceed 
as though the ordinary analytical approach applies.  (Cf. 
Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 330.) 
In evaluating the validity of a regulation under these 
principles, we first ask whether the regulation is “ ‘consistent 
and not in conflict with’ ” the provision that authorizes it.  
(Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 748, italics omitted.)  We then 
inquire whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to 
 
10  
As noted, the Department amended its regulations 
following the decision in Edwards, and it did so again following 
the decision in McGhee.  As amended, the operative language 
regarding the exclusion of individuals convicted of registerable 
sex offenses remains unchanged from the May 2018 version of 
the regulations.  (See Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3490–3491, 3495–
3496.) 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
effectuate the purpose of the authorizing law.  (Id. at pp. 748–
749; see also Gov. Code, § 11342.2 [“Whenever by the express or 
implied terms of any statute a state agency has authority to 
adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or 
otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation 
adopted is valid or effective unless consistent and not in conflict 
with the statute and reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the statute”]; see also Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 
28 Cal.3d 668, 679 (Woods).)  Our task as a reviewing court “ ‘ “is 
to decide whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted [its] 
mandate.” ’ ”  (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, quoting Credit 
Ins. Gen. Agents Assn. v. Payne (1976) 16 Cal.3d 651, 657.)  We 
presume the validity of a regulation promulgated by a state 
agency.  (Assn. of California Ins. Companies v. Jones (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 376, 389 (Jones).)  The burden lies with the party 
challenging the regulation to show its invalidity.  (Payne, supra, 
16 Cal.3d at p. 657.)  “Such a limited scope of review constitutes 
no judicial interference with the administrative discretion in 
that aspect of the rulemaking function which requires a high 
degree of technical skill and expertise.”  (Woods, supra, 
28 Cal.3d at p. 679.) 
“ ‘Our function is to inquire into the legality of the 
regulations, not their wisdom.’ ”  (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
p. 679, quoting Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 737.)  Still, 
“ ‘ “final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests 
with the courts.”  [Citations.]  Administrative regulations that 
alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void 
and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down 
such regulations.’ ”  (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, quoting 
Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 748.)   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
To determine whether the regulation here is consistent 
with the constitutional provisions enacted by Proposition 57, we 
must interpret the constitutional provisions themselves.  Our 
“primary concern” in construing a constitutional provision 
enacted through voter initiative is “giving effect to the intended 
purpose of the provisions at issue.”  (California Cannabis 
Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933.)  And, “[i]n 
interpreting a voter initiative . . . , we apply the same principles 
that govern statutory construction.”  (People v. Rizo (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 681, 685, citing Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 
21 Cal.4th 272, 276.)  In doing so, we look to the text of the 
constitutional provision at issue and, as appropriate, extrinsic 
sources such as an initiative’s ballot materials.  (See City of 
Upland, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 933–934.)        
E.  The Language of Proposition 57 
We therefore begin our analysis by returning to the 
language of the constitutional provisions enacted by Proposition 
57.  As noted above, article I, section 32(a)(1) states:  “Any 
person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to 
state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after 
completing the full term for his or her primary offense.”  Article 
I, section 32(b) provides that the Department shall “adopt 
regulations in furtherance of these provisions.”  The question 
here is whether these provisions indicate that the voters 
intended to permit the Department to exclude an inmate from 
nonviolent offender parole consideration based on a conviction 
for a registerable sex offense.  In deciding that question, we 
consider whether that prohibition may apply, not only with 
respect to prior sex offense convictions but also with respect to 
current sex offense convictions.  
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Department could 
not 
exclude 
inmates 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration based on prior convictions:  “The reference to 
‘convicted’ and ‘sentenced,’ in conjunction with present 
eligibility for parole once a full term is completed, make clear 
that early parole eligibility must be assessed based on the 
conviction for which an inmate is now serving a state prison 
sentence (the current offense), rather than prior criminal 
history.  This interpretation is supported by section 32[(a)(1)]’s 
use of the singular form in ‘felony offense,’ ‘primary offense,’ and 
‘term.’ ”  (Gadlin, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.)  Petitioner 
agrees and asserts there is no “suggestion in the text of the 
initiative that the electorate had any concern about prior 
convictions at the qualification stage:  the focus was exclusively 
on those offenders serving a term for a nonviolent offense, 
regardless of their criminal history.”   
As to inmates currently convicted of an offense requiring 
registration, petitioner again emphasizes the language of the 
constitutional provision.  He notes that article I, section 32(a)(1) 
provides for parole consideration for inmates convicted of 
nonviolent felony offenses and that the Department’s exclusion 
of inmates convicted of any sex offense requiring registration — 
including nonviolent felony offenses — is not based on a 
conclusion that these inmates have committed “violent offenses” 
as defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c), but on 
the Department’s assertion that such an exclusion is required 
by public safety considerations.    
The Department does not assert that the text of article I, 
section 32(a)(1) expressly demonstrates the intent of the 
electorate to exclude inmates from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration based on a prior conviction or a current conviction 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
for any registerable offense.  The Department contends, 
however, that the language of article I, section 32(a)(1) is 
ambiguous, and that the Department appropriately exercised its 
authority to “ ‘ “ ‘fill up the details’ ” ’ ” of article I, section 32’s 
parole scheme.  (Jones, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 391.)  Thus, the 
Department asserts, an analysis of the ballot materials is 
appropriate in order to determine the voters’ intent. 
In so arguing, the Department focuses on the terms 
“convicted” and “nonviolent felony offense.”  The Department 
asserts that “nonviolent” as used in the provision “lacks a firm 
definition,” noting that the voter information guide informed 
voters that “the measure and current law do not specify which 
felony crimes are defined as nonviolent . . . .”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, 
p. 56.)  We consider the alleged ambiguity of each of those terms 
before turning to the language of the constitutional provision as 
a whole.     
1. “Nonviolent felony offense” 
The term “nonviolent felony offense” is not defined in the 
constitutional language.  Article I, section 32(b) delegates the 
Department authority to promulgate regulations in furtherance 
of the constitutional language.  That authority may include 
some discretion to define what constitutes a “nonviolent felony 
offense” 
for 
purposes 
of 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration.  We need not decide the full scope of the 
Department’s authority in this context, however, given the 
limited question before us.  Rather, our task is to determine 
whether 
the 
Department’s 
current 
regulations, 
which 
categorially 
exclude 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration all inmates subject to sex offender registration, 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
are consistent with the constitutional directive that “[a]ny 
person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense . . . shall be 
eligible for parole consideration . . . .”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).) 
In its initial briefing before this court, the Department 
conceded that its regulations defined petitioner as a “nonviolent 
offender” based on his current conviction.  The Department 
noted that the regulation at issue “does not merely interpret 
particular terms, such as ‘nonviolent’ or ‘nonviolent felony 
offense.’  Instead, it reflects the Secretary’s public safety 
determinations . . . .”11   
In an abrupt change of position, however, the Department 
asserts in its supplemental briefing that its regulations 
excluding inmates with registerable sex offenses from parole 
consideration “in effect deem those offenses not to be ‘nonviolent 
felony offense[s]’ under section 32, subdivision (a)(1).”  That is, 
the Department now asserts that any inmate excluded from 
nonviolent offender parole consideration under its regulations 
has been excluded based on an implicit determination that the 
inmate did not commit a “nonviolent felony offense” for purposes 
of article I, section 32(a)(1).  We have previously declined to 
consider belated arguments not raised in a party’s opening brief.  
(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.)  Even 
 
11  
The Department likewise asserted in Alliance that its 
exclusion from parole consideration of inmates with current 
convictions for nonviolent registerable sex offenses was based 
only on public safety concerns.  (Alliance, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 231 [“the Department does not argue that all sex offenses 
requiring registration under Penal Code section 290 are 
excluded from the term ‘nonviolent felony offense’ for purposes 
of California Constitution, article I, section 32, subdivision 
(a)(1)”].) 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
considering the Department’s new argument, we find it to be 
inconsistent with the Department’s regulations.   
Article I, section 32(a) refers to parole consideration for 
individuals “convicted of a nonviolent felony offense.”  The 
regulations do not interpret this phrase, but they do provide 
definitions of “nonviolent offender” and “violent felony.”  (Cal. 
Code Regs., §§ 3490, subds. (a), (c), 3495, subds. (a), (c).)  An 
inmate is deemed a “nonviolent offender” if he or she does not 
meet any of the listed criteria, including that the inmate is 
“currently serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ ”  
(Id., § 3490, subd. (a)(5); see also id., § 3495, subd. (a)(3).)  The 
regulations define a “violent felony” as “a crime or enhancement 
as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code.”  
(Id., § 3490, subd. (c); see also id., § 3495, subd. (c).)  The 
Department now asserts that a “nonviolent felony offense” is 
“not simply any offense that is not among the violent felonies 
listed” in the Penal Code, but that under the regulations “all 
inmates not excluded by [the regulatory] criteria are considered 
‘convicted of a nonviolent felony offense’ and eligible for 
participation in the nonviolent parole program.”   
The regulations do not support the Department’s position.  
Although the regulations do not define what constitutes a 
“nonviolent felony,” the adoption of a definition for what 
constitutes a “violent felony” indicates that offenses not defined 
as “violent” would amount to “nonviolent felonies.”  This not only 
makes intuitive sense, but also is supported by the structure of 
the regulations. 
The regulations refer to “nonviolent felony offense[s]” (Cal. 
Code Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(6)) and offenses that are “not a 
‘violent felony’ ” (id., § 3490, subd. (b)).  In defining the term 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
“nonviolent offender,” for example, the regulations exclude from 
that term an inmate “currently serving a term of incarceration 
for a nonviolent felony offense after completing a concurrent 
determinate term for a ‘violent felony.’ ”  (Id., § 3490, subd. 
(a)(6), italics added; see also id., §§ 2449.1, subd. (a)(6), 2449.30, 
subd. (a)(5), 3495, subd. (a)(5).)  In this context, it is clear that a 
“nonviolent felony offense” stands in contrast to a “violent 
felony.”   
Other portions of the regulations make the same 
distinction.  They note that the term “nonviolent offender” 
“includes an inmate who has completed a determinate or 
indeterminate term of incarceration and is currently serving a 
determinate term for an in-prison offense that is not a ‘violent 
felony.’ ”  (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. (b), italics added; see 
also id., §§ 2449.1, subd. (b), 2449.30, subd. (b), 3495, subd. (b).)  
Similarly, the regulations direct the Department to review each 
inmate’s eligibility for nonviolent offender parole consideration.  
(Id., § 3491.)  The Department conducts a new eligibility review, 
in relevant part, “when an inmate begins serving a determinate 
term for an in-prison offense that is not a violent felony.”  (Id., 
§ 3491, subd. (d), italics added; see also §§ 3496, subd. (e)(2)(A), 
(B).)  The regulations, then, effectively define the term 
“nonviolent felony offense” not by implicitly prescribing the 
scope of those inmates ultimately deemed eligible for parole 
consideration, but by contrasting that term with the definition 
of  “violent felony” as adopted by the Department. 
Further, the regulations exclude from nonviolent offender 
parole consideration another class of inmates defined by the 
regulations as “nonviolent offenders” — inmates eligible for a 
parole consideration hearing under Penal Code section 3051 or 
section 3055 within one year, or whose initial parole 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
consideration hearing under those provisions has already been 
scheduled.  (Cal. Code Regs., § 3491, subd. (b)(2).)  Applying the 
Department’s new assertion to that context, the exclusion of 
these inmates would reflect the Department’s determination 
that they have not been convicted of a “nonviolent felony 
offense.”  But the assertion does not pass muster; although we 
are not considering the validity of this regulatory provision, we 
perceive no tenable argument that an exclusion based on the 
timing of a parole hearing in turn reflects a determination 
regarding the nature of the inmate’s underlying offense as 
violent or nonviolent.   
Finally, the regulations do not include registerable sex 
offenses within the definition of what constitutes a “violent 
felony,” nor do the regulations  explicitly state that such offenses 
are excluded from the definition of a “nonviolent felony.”  
Although the Department now asserts the regulations 
effectively exclude registerable sex offenses from the category of 
“nonviolent felony offenses,” the regulations at issue plainly are 
not focused on nonviolent felony offenses — they exclude from 
parole consideration an inmate convicted of any registerable sex 
offense, felony or misdemeanor.  (Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3491, subd. 
(b)(3), 3496, subd. (b); see, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 290, subd. (c) 
[listing offenses requiring registration, including possession of 
child 
pornography 
and 
indecent 
exposure], 
311.11 
[criminalizing 
possession 
of 
child 
pornography 
as 
a 
misdemeanor or felony]; 314 [criminalizing indecent exposure as 
misdemeanor in some cases].) 
In short, the regulations do not exclude inmates with 
registerable sex offenses from parole consideration based on a 
determination that those inmates have not been convicted of 
nonviolent felonies.  Rather, the regulations categorize 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
otherwise eligible inmates with registerable sex offenses as 
“nonviolent offender[s]” who are nonetheless excluded from 
parole consideration.  (Cal. Code Regs., §§ 3491, subds. (a), 
(b)(3), 3496, subds. (a), (b).)  The structure of the Department’s 
regulations therefore contradicts the Department’s newly 
asserted position.  The regulations indicate the Department’s 
exclusion of registerable sex offenses is not based on an 
interpretation of what offenses are considered “nonviolent,” but 
is based on a public safety determination that requires the 
Department to carve out exceptions to parole consideration 
within the class of inmates it has determined to be “nonviolent 
offender[s].”12      
 
 
12  
The Department also relies on the final statement of 
reasons accompanying its regulations (see ante, fn. 9) for the 
assertion that inmates convicted of registerable sex offenses 
were excluded from the parole scheme based on a determination 
that those felonies were not nonviolent.  The final statement of 
reasons, however, indicates otherwise.  The Department 
emphasizes that the final statement of reasons essentially 
stated that the Department had determined registerable sex 
offenses did not constitute nonviolent felony offenses, pointing 
to the language, “these sex offenses demonstrate a sufficient 
degree of violence and represent an unreasonable risk to public 
safety to require that sex offenders be excluded from nonviolent 
parole consideration.”  Elsewhere, however, the final statement 
of reasons notes that “Public safety requires that sex offenders 
be excluded from nonviolent parole consideration.”  Nowhere 
does the final statement of reasons provide that registerable sex 
offenses are not considered “nonviolent felony offenses.”     
Further, to the extent the final statement of reasons 
supports the Department’s newly raised position, it is 
inconsistent with the structure of the regulations the 
Department ultimately adopted, as discussed above.  
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
2. “Convicted” 
The Department asserts that the term “convicted” 
“ ‘conveys no self-evident meaning,’ ” quoting People v. 
Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008 (Woodhead).  In that 
case, we considered a Welfare and Institutions Code provision 
stating that “ ‘[n]o person convicted of . . . any . . . serious felony 
. . . committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older shall 
be committed to Youth Authority.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1006, quoting 
Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 1732.5.)  The Youth Authority in 
Woodhead had rejected such a commitment for the defendant 
because, although his current conviction was not for a serious 
felony, he had previously been convicted of a serious felony.  
(Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1006.)  We held this was 
improper, and that the term as used in the relevant code section 
meant “currently convicted.”  (Id. at p. 1010.)  In doing so, 
however, we noted that the term “convicted” “may have different 
meanings in different contexts, or even different meanings 
within a single statute.”  (Id. at p. 1008, citing People v. 
Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 177, fn. 2.)  Thus, we looked to 
extrinsic sources to determine its meaning in that case.  
(Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1008.) 
The Department does not assert that the term “convicted” 
as used in the amended constitutional provisions means “ever 
convicted” or otherwise evinces an intent to exclude inmates 
from nonviolent offender parole consideration based on a prior 
conviction.  Nor can we conclude that the term is ambiguous in 
this context.  As the Court of Appeal explained, the language of 
article I, section 32(a)(1) indicates the voters intended that 
nonviolent offender parole consideration would be premised on 
the inmate’s current conviction alone.  The use of the terms 
“convicted” and “sentenced,” viewed in context with the 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
provision that the inmate would be eligible for parole 
consideration “after completing the full term for his or her 
primary offense,” make this clear.  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  Parole 
eligibility under the provision is conditioned on an inmate’s 
current conviction for a nonviolent felony, the inmate’s being 
sentenced to prison, and the inmate’s completion of the “full 
term” for the “primary offense.”  (Ibid.)  None of those terms 
indicate any intent to consider prior convictions in determining 
nonviolent offender parole eligibility.  Nor does the Department 
assert that the term “convicted” has any bearing on the 
eligibility of inmates currently convicted of nonviolent felony 
offenses requiring registration under Penal Code section 290. 
3. The language read as a whole 
We conclude, then, that article I, section 32(a)(1), although 
containing some terms that might be ambiguous in other 
respects, is not ambiguous concerning its scope regarding 
offenders who were previously convicted of a registerable sex 
offense or who are currently convicted of a registerable sex 
offense that the Department has itself defined as nonviolent.  
Under those regulations, these offenders have been convicted of 
a nonviolent felony offense and article I, section 32(a)(1) directs 
that they “shall be eligible for parole consideration.”   
Still, the Department asserts that the alleged general 
ambiguity of those terms allows it to provide exceptions to the 
general rule that such offenders “shall be eligible for parole 
consideration.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  That is, even when it is not 
contested that an inmate is “convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense and sentenced to state prison” (ibid.), the Department 
asserts it retains discretion to carve out exclusions barring 
otherwise eligible inmates from parole consideration — 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
notwithstanding the constitutional language stating that 
“[a]ny” such inmates “shall be eligible for parole consideration” 
(ibid.).  
In support of that position, the Department points to the 
directive in article I, section 32(b) specifying that it “shall adopt 
regulations in furtherance of these provisions,” and that the 
Secretary of the Department “shall certify that these 
regulations protect and enhance public safety.”  According to the 
Department, this language “signaled to voters that the 
Department would continue to have an important role in 
shaping 
the 
implementation 
of 
the 
nonviolent 
parole 
consideration process,” and that “the Proposition’s text is not 
itself the whole of the nonviolent parole program, but only the 
framework for that program.” 
The Department’s position is unpersuasive.  Article I, 
section 32(b) directs the adoption of regulations “in furtherance 
of” the prior provisions of article I, section 32.  Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary defines “furtherance” as “the act of 
furthering; ADVANCEMENT.”  (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online 
(2020) 
 [as of Dec. 17, 2020].)  And in its verb form, 
“further” is defined as “to help forward; PROMOTE.”  (Merriam-
Webster 
Dict. 
Online, 
supra, 
 [as of Dec. 17, 2020].)  The 
Department makes no argument, and we perceive none, that 
deeming ineligible for parole consideration all offenders within 
the class considered here — those with prior registerable 
convictions or current convictions for nonviolent offenses 
requiring registration — would further the intent of the 
constitutional 
provision 
declaring 
inmates 
convicted 
of 
nonviolent felonies to be eligible for parole consideration.   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
The Department’s reliance on the requirement that the 
Secretary certify that the regulations “protect and enhance 
public safety” is similarly unpersuasive.  Indeed, the Secretary 
must so certify.  (Art. I, § 32(b).)  But this requirement does not 
authorize the Department to promulgate regulations that are in 
conflict with the constitutional provisions.  To conclude 
otherwise would eviscerate the language of article I, section 
32(a)(1) mandating that inmates convicted of nonviolent felony 
offenses “shall be eligible” for parole consideration.  Indeed, 
under the Department’s interpretation the Secretary would be 
empowered to curtail parole eligibility based on any criteria so 
long as the Secretary asserted those restrictions protected 
public safety.  Such an approach would be untenable, violating 
the directive that regulations must be “ ‘consistent and not in 
conflict with’ ” an authorizing constitutional provision.  (Morris, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 748, italics omitted.)   
This is not to suggest that the Department lacks any 
meaningful power to promulgate regulations pursuant to 
article I, section 32(b).  The Department is empowered to adopt 
regulations consistent with the constitutional provisions and 
the purpose of article I, section 32.  As relevant here, the adopted 
regulations must constitute a reasonable interpretation of the 
requirement in article I, section 32(a)(1) that “[a]ny person 
convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state 
prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing 
the full term for his or her primary offense.”  The regulations 
also must evidence some connection with the mandate to 
“protect and enhance public safety.”  (Art. I, § 32(b).) 
Nor can it be said that the initiative’s overall focus on 
public safety is sufficient to grant the Department the broad 
authority it claims.  A conclusion that the electorate made 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
certain inmates eligible for parole consideration does not require 
the Department to find each of those inmates suitable for parole.  
Indeed, many factors relevant to public safety may best be 
addressed through parole suitability determinations.  The 
Department is left with ample room to protect public safety by 
crafting the specific processes under which parole suitability is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  And it has done so; the 
regulations direct the Board of Parole Hearings to consider “all 
relevant and reliable information” (Cal. Code Regs., § 2449.4, 
subd. (b)) to determine whether the inmate poses a “current, 
unreasonable risk of violence or a current, unreasonable risk of 
significant criminal activity” (id., subd. (c)), including an 
inmate’s “documented criminal history” (id., subd. (b)(1)). 
As noted earlier, the Department also contends the voters 
would have understood from the constitutional provision 
directing the Department to adopt regulations in furtherance of 
the initiative that the measure provided only a “framework” for 
nonviolent offender parole consideration, and that the 
Department 
would 
“fill 
up 
the 
details” — again, 
notwithstanding the constitutional directive that inmates who 
fall under article I, section 32(a)(1) “shall be eligible for parole 
consideration.”  
In support of this proposition, the Department relies on 
Jones, supra, 2 Cal.5th 376.  There we considered the validity of 
a regulation enacted by the Insurance Commissioner.  (Id. at 
p. 382.)  The underlying statute directed the Commissioner to 
“ ‘promulgate reasonable rules and regulations . . . as are 
necessary to administer’ ” the Unfair Insurance Practices Act.  
(Jones, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 382, quoting Ins. Code, § 790.10.)  
Included in the act was a prohibition on making or 
disseminating any “untrue, deceptive, or misleading statements 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
with respect to the business of insurance.”  (Jones, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at pp. 390–391.)  The Commissioner’s regulation, in 
turn, specified how insurance company estimates concerning 
the cost to rebuild or replace a home were calculated and 
communicated, 
and 
barred 
insurance 
companies 
from 
communicating a replacement cost estimate that did not comply 
with the regulation.  (Id. at p. 385.)  The plaintiffs sought 
declaratory relief, asserting that the Commissioner had 
exceeded the authority given under the act by defining a new 
unfair and deceptive insurance practice.  (Id. at p. 388.) 
We disagreed, noting that the act vested broad power in 
the Commissioner to promulgate regulations “necessary to 
administer” the act.  (Jones, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 391.)  We held 
that the Commissioner’s authority to administer the act 
included promulgating rules “applying to a specific kind of 
statement prohibited under” the act.  (Id. at p. 392.)  Thus, we 
held it was well within the Commissioner’s power to promulgate 
regulations implementing and interpreting the act’s prohibition 
on unfair and deceptive insurance practices by identifying a type 
of specific unfair and deceptive insurance practice and 
developing rules concerning that practice.  (Ibid.)   
Jones is readily distinguishable from this case.  As we 
have described above, the Department’s regulations do not 
interpret the arguably ambiguous terms of Proposition 57.  And, 
as the Department initially conceded, its regulations do not 
purport to clarify which inmates are “convicted of a nonviolent 
felony offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  Rather, the Department 
asserts a power to create an exception not expressly or impliedly 
referred to in the constitutional provisions.  Neither our analysis 
nor our holding in Jones authorizes such a departure from the 
electorate’s command.   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
Instead, the framework described by the language of the 
constitutional provision establishes a parole consideration 
process for “[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  Although the Department asserts 
its regulations merely fill up the details of that provision, 
carving out wholesale exclusions from an otherwise broad 
mandate “is hardly a detail.”  (McGhee, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 911.)  Had the drafters of Proposition 57, and by extension the 
voters, intended to exclude inmates from nonviolent offender 
parole consideration based on prior or current sex offense 
convictions, it would have been a simple matter to say so 
explicitly.  (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 1170.18, subd. (i) [statutory 
provision enacted by Prop. 47 “does not apply to a person who 
has one or more prior convictions . . . for an offense requiring 
registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290”]; 
1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii) [statutory provision enacted by Prop. 
36 excludes offenders whose “current offense is a felony sex 
offense . . . that results in mandatory registration as a sex 
offender pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290”]; 2933.05, 
subd. (e)(3) [statute enacted by Legislature excludes from 
custody credit provision “[a]ny person required to register as a 
sex offender”].)  As it stands, the initiative’s language provides 
no indication that the voters intended to allow the Department 
to create a wholesale exclusion from parole consideration based 
on an inmate’s sex offense convictions when the inmate was 
convicted of a nonviolent felony.  We decline to create one 
ourselves.13 
 
13  
Every Court of Appeal to have considered the issue has 
agreed with our conclusion that the Department’s regulations 
excluding inmates from nonviolent parole consideration based 
 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
F.  Consideration of the Ballot Materials 
When the constitutional text “is unambiguous and 
provides a clear answer, we need go no further.”  (See Microsoft 
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 758.)  
Consideration of the ballot materials, however, only buttresses 
our reading of the constitutional text in this case.  (See Scher v. 
Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 149 [legislative history and 
historical circumstances may buttress reading of a statute and 
are entitled to “some weight,” but are “by no means 
dispositive”].)   
1. The ballot materials presented to the voters 
The ballot materials presented to the voters consisted of 
three sections:  the official title and summary prepared by the 
Attorney General, the analysis of the Legislative Analyst, and 
the arguments in favor of and against the proposition (an 
argument in favor by the proponents followed by a rebuttal by 
the opponents, and an argument against by the opponents 
followed by a rebuttal by the proponents).   
The official title and summary described the parole 
provisions of Proposition 57 as follows:  “Allows parole 
consideration for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies, upon 
completion of prison term for their primary offense as defined.  
[¶] . . . Requires Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
to adopt regulations to implement new parole and sentence 
credit provisions and certify they enhance public safety.”  (Voter 
 
on prior offenses are contrary to the constitutional language 
enacted by Proposition 57.  (See In re King (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 
814; In re Chavez (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 748, 756; In re Schuster 
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 943, 954–955.) 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official Title and 
Summary, p. 54.) 
The analysis by the Legislative Analyst provided a broad 
description of the then-existing sentencing and parole 
consideration scheme.  Notably, the analysis described a parole 
process implemented by the Department following the February 
2014 federal court order in Coleman/Plata known as nonviolent 
second strike offender parole.14  The analysis stated:  
“Individuals who receive a determinate sentence do not need a 
parole consideration hearing to be released from prison at the 
end of their sentence.  However, some of these individuals 
currently are eligible for parole consideration hearings before 
they have served their entire sentence.  For example, certain 
individuals who have not been convicted of violent felonies are 
currently eligible for parole consideration after they have served 
half of their prison sentence.  This was one of several measures 
put in place by a federal court to reduce the state’s prison 
population.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 
analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 54.)  
The analysis then described the changes to the parole 
system that would result from the passage of Proposition 57.  
It stated that the initiative “changes the State Constitution to 
make individuals who are convicted of ‘nonviolent felony’ 
offenses eligible for parole consideration after serving the full 
prison term for their primary offense.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, 
 
14  
The nonviolent second strike offender parole process 
provided parole eligibility for nonviolent, non-sex-registrant, 
second strike offenders who had served 50 percent of their 
sentence.  (See In re Ilasa (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 489, 495.) 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
p. 56.)  The analysis noted that “[a]lthough the measure and 
current law do not specify which felony crimes are defined as 
nonviolent, this analysis assumes a nonviolent felony offense 
would include any felony offense that is not specifically defined 
in statute as violent.”  (Ibid.)  It also described the anticipated 
fiscal effects of the initiative “[b]ased on recent [Board of Parole 
Hearings] experience with parole consideration for certain 
nonviolent offenders,” pursuant to the federal court order.  
(Ibid.)  Finally, the analysis estimated that “the ongoing fiscal 
impact of this provision would likely be state savings in the tens 
of millions of dollars annually.  These savings would be offset 
somewhat by additional costs for [the Board of Parole Hearings] 
to conduct more parole considerations.”  (Ibid.)   
Ultimately, the arguments for and against the proposition 
were presented to the voters.  The proponents first urged that 
the initiative would allow “parole consideration for people with 
non-violent convictions who complete the full prison term for 
their primary offense.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  The proponents did 
not address whether individuals convicted of nonviolent sex 
offenses would be eligible, or whether prior convictions would 
impact an inmate’s eligibility.   
The 
opponents’ 
rebuttal 
and 
argument 
against 
Proposition 57 asserted that the initiative would allow for parole 
consideration for those convicted of various “nonviolent” sex 
offenses, including rape of an unconscious victim and sex 
trafficking.  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 
rebuttal to argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)  The opponents 
further asserted that inmates would be eligible for nonviolent 
offender parole consideration despite having suffered prior 
convictions, stating:  “Those previously convicted of MURDER, 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
RAPE and CHILD MOLESTATION would be eligible for early 
parole” (ibid.), that “[Proposition] 57 permits the worst career 
criminals to be treated the same as first-time offenders” (id., 
argument against Prop. 57, p. 59, italics omitted), and that 
“16,000 dangerous criminals, including those previously 
convicted of murder and rape, would be eligible for early release” 
(ibid., italics omitted).   
The proponents’ rebuttal responded by saying the 
opponents “are wrong.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.)  The 
rebuttal stated that the initiative would not authorize parole for 
violent offenders, “as defined in Penal Code 667.5(c).”  (Ibid.)  
Finally, the rebuttal stated that the initiative “[d]oes NOT and 
will not change the federal court order that excludes sex 
offenders, as defined in Penal Code 290, from parole.”  (Ibid.) 
2. The Department’s argument 
 
The Department contends the ballot materials clearly 
indicate the voters’ intent to exclude inmates with any 
registerable sex offense conviction (prior or current) from 
nonviolent offender parole consideration.  The Department 
focuses on the back-and-forth in the arguments for and against 
the initiative, and primarily emphasizes the statement in the 
proponents’ rebuttal that Proposition 57 “[d]oes NOT and will 
not change the federal court order that excludes sex offenders, 
as defined in Penal Code 290, from parole.”  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, 
p. 59.)  According to the Department, this statement 
“unequivocally rebutted” the opponents’ argument that any sex 
offender would be eligible for nonviolent offender parole 
consideration, regardless of whether the conviction was for a 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
current or prior offense.  The Department also points to the 
proponents’ assertion that the Secretary of the Department 
must certify the regulations implementing Proposition 57 “as 
protecting public safety.”  In light of these statements, the 
Department contends, “A reasonable voter thereby understood 
that the Secretary would ensure that the adopted regulations 
would exclude sex offenders from parole, just as the proponents 
indicated.” 
The Department further points to the Legislative 
Analyst’s discussion of the federal court order in the ballot 
materials.  As noted, the analysis informed the voters that 
“certain individuals who have not been convicted of violent 
felonies are currently eligible for parole consideration after they 
have served half of their prison sentence” and identified that 
parole scheme as “one of several measures put in place by a 
federal court to reduce the state’s prison population.”  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 
Legis. Analyst, p. 54.)  Based on these “repeated references to 
the federal court order,” the Department asserts, the voters 
should be understood to have approved the initiative with the 
intent that individuals convicted of a registerable sex offense 
would 
be 
excluded 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration. 
Finally, the Department emphasizes that the voters were 
considering arguments made in favor of the initiative by then-
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., who was listed on the ballot 
materials as an author of the arguments in favor of the initiative 
and the rebuttal to the arguments against the initiative.  The 
Department asserts that it “seems reasonable that voters would 
give special weight to the arguments and assurances of 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
government experts — here, of the Governor of the State of 
California.” 
3. Analysis  
 
The question is whether the ballot materials indicate that 
voters intended to exclude certain inmates convicted of 
nonviolent 
felonies 
from 
nonviolent 
offender 
parole 
consideration — or intended to allow the Department to craft 
regulations that would exclude such inmates — including those 
previously or currently convicted of sex offenses requiring 
registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.  Considering 
the ballot materials as a whole, the language of the 
constitutional provision, and the ambiguous nature of the ballot 
arguments, we cannot conclude the voters intended to base 
eligibility for nonviolent offender parole consideration on any 
prior convictions an inmate may have suffered, or any current 
conviction for a nonviolent offense requiring registration as a 
sex offender.   
 
The Department’s focus on a single line in the proponents’ 
rebuttal argument overlooks the context of the entire ballot 
materials provided to the voters.  The language of the 
constitutional provision did not indicate to the voters that 
inmates’ prior convictions would play a role in determining 
nonviolent offender parole eligibility.  Nor did the Attorney 
General’s official title and summary, the Legislative Analyst’s 
analysis, or the proponents’ initial argument in favor of 
Proposition 57 so indicate.  If, as the Department asserts, the 
voters intended to carve out an entire category of offenders from 
nonviolent parole consideration based on prior criminal history, 
these sources likely would have mentioned as much.  (See People 
v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 365–366.)   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
 
Even the arguments in the ballot materials are not as 
helpful to the Department’s position as it contends.  The 
opponents of the initiative pointed out that “career criminals” 
would be treated the same as first-time offenders under the 
initiative, and that inmates “previously convicted of murder and 
rape” would be eligible for early release.  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument against Prop. 57, p. 59, 
italics omitted.)  The opponents’ argument was thus clear:  An 
inmate’s prior convictions, regardless of their number or nature, 
would not be a disqualifying factor for nonviolent parole 
consideration purposes.  That the voters approved Proposition 
57 “despite these warnings” supports a conclusion that the 
voters intended to provide broad parole consideration for 
nonviolent offenders without regard for prior convictions.  
(Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 907 (Robert 
L.).)   
It is true that the proponents stated broadly that the 
opponents’ arguments were “wrong.”  (Voter Information Guide, 
Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.)  
But this cannot be taken as a blanket denial of each argument 
raised by the opponents, and the Department does not claim it 
is.  Indeed, there are portions of the opponents’ argument that 
the Department must concede were correct, including the 
characterization that individuals convicted of and currently 
serving sentences for nonviolent offenses (as defined in Pen. 
Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)) like assault with a deadly weapon would 
be eligible for nonviolent offender parole consideration, or that 
an individual with a prior violent felony conviction for murder 
would not be excluded from nonviolent offender parole 
consideration.  The proponents’ failure to respond directly to the 
opponents’ clear assertion that individuals with prior sex 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
offenses or extensive criminal histories would be eligible for 
parole consideration under the initiative is another indication 
that the voters did not intend to exclude such inmates from the 
nonviolent offender parole process.  (See Robert L., supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 906–907.)   
The Department’s position is somewhat more persuasive 
with regard to the exclusion for inmates currently convicted of 
nonviolent registerable sex offenses.  Plainly, there is tension 
between the language of the constitutional provision directing 
parole consideration for all inmates convicted of nonviolent 
felonies and the assertion in the ballot argument that “sex 
offenders” would be excluded from parole consideration.  (Voter 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument 
against Prop. 57, p. 59.)  And there is a clear conflict between 
the arguments from the proponents (asserting all sex offenders 
would be excluded) and the opponents (asserting that some sex 
offenders would not be excluded).  But we do not resolve these 
tensions by relying solely on the ballot materials.  Rather, we 
presume that the voters relied on the text of the measure.  (See 
Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 803; see also 
Amwest Surety v. Wilson (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1243, 1260–1261, 
citing Wright v. Jordan (1923) 192 Cal. 704, 713.)   
The voters were explicitly warned in the margins of the 
voter guide that “Arguments printed on this page are the 
opinions of the authors, and have not been checked for accuracy 
by any official agency.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 
supra, pp. 58–59.)  Even assuming the ballot materials conveyed 
to the voters that any conviction for a registerable sex offense, 
current or prior, would exclude an inmate from parole 
consideration under the proposed initiative, this interpretation 
remains at odds with the language of the constitutional 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
provision before the voters, as we have already discussed.  And 
nothing in the remaining ballot materials suggested that sex 
offender registration for a nonviolent felony (or for a 
misdemeanor) 
would 
exclude 
an 
inmate 
from 
parole 
consideration.  We cannot say that a reasonable voter, after 
reviewing the ballot materials and the language of the proposed 
constitutional provision, would have believed that a single line 
reflecting the proponents’ disputed opinion would overcome the 
language of the constitutional provision.   
The Department’s view is that because the then-existing 
nonviolent second strike offender parole process excluded 
inmates with a prior or current sex offense requiring 
registration, the voters would have understood that Proposition 
57 would exclude those offenders as well.  But there is no 
indication the voters would have understood that to be the case.  
As the Department acknowledges, the federal court order 
referenced in the ballot materials did not exclude inmates with 
sex offenses from parole consideration.  Rather, it was the 
Department’s implementation of the nonviolent second strike 
offender parole process that carved out that exception.   
The Department contends that the other references in the 
ballot materials to the federal court order would have alerted 
voters that Proposition 57 would not alter the nonviolent second 
strike offender parole process established under that order.  
This argument, too, falls short.  The only other reference to the 
federal court order in the ballot materials is contained in the 
analysis of the Legislative Analyst.  That passage notes that 
under then-existing law, certain inmates sentenced to 
determinate terms for nonviolent offenses were eligible for 
parole, a measure “put in place by a federal court to reduce the 
state’s prison population.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 54.)  Even 
if it were clear to the voters that this referred to the same federal 
court order mentioned in the proponents’ rebuttal argument, it 
does not assert that the then-existing parole scheme excluded 
inmates based on prior or current convictions for sex offenses.   
The Department’s assertion, then, is that the voters would 
have read the single oblique reference to the court order in the 
proponents’ rebuttal and would have been familiar not only with 
that order but also with the administrative documents 
implementing 
that 
court 
order. 
 
Those 
implementing 
documents, however, were not before the voters.  An assumption 
that voters understood the nuances of an administrative 
program the ballot materials referenced only vaguely and did 
not actually present would stretch beyond the breaking point 
our axiom that voters are generally aware of existing law.  (See 
Robert L., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 905 [“to the extent the Court 
of Appeal, in ascertaining the voters’ intent, relied on evidence 
of the drafters’ intent that was not presented to the voters, we 
decline to follow it”]).  “[A] possible inference based on the ballot 
argument is an insufficient basis on which to ignore the 
unrestricted and unambiguous language of the measure itself.  
It would be a strained approach to constitutional analysis if we 
were to give more weight to a possible inference in an extrinsic 
source (a ballot argument) than to a clear statement in the 
Constitution itself.”  (Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 
50 Cal.3d at p. 803.)    
Our analysis of the voters’ intent does not change merely 
because the proponents of the initiative here included the 
Governor.  The Department cites no authority for the 
proposition that the voters would credit the views of the 
Governor over those of the opponents, and we have found none.  
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
On the contrary, our case law examining ballot materials to 
discern the voters’ intent has considered arguments proffered by 
both opponents and proponents, and without regard for whether 
one party was an elected official.  (See, e.g., Robert L., supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 906–907 [giving weight to opponents’ 
arguments].)  In any event, as explained earlier, when an 
argument for or against a ballot measure conflicts with the 
measure’s plain text, the text must govern the measure’s 
interpretation. 
The Department reprises yet again its arguments that the 
voters would have understood from the constitutional provision 
directing the Department to adopt regulations in furtherance of 
the initiative that the initiative provided only a “framework” for 
nonviolent offender parole consideration, that the Department 
would fill up the details, and that the focus on public safety 
considerations in the constitutional language and ballot 
materials would give the Department broad authority to 
determine what inmates would be eligible for parole 
consideration under the initiative.  These assertions are no more 
persuasive in the context of the ballot materials than they are 
in the context of reviewing the language of the constitutional 
provisions at issue.  Without language in the constitutional 
provision that expressed or strongly implied the authority of the 
Department to carry out such exclusions, we cannot say the 
voters intended such exclusions.  (People v. Valencia, supra, 
3 Cal.5th at p. 364.)   
 
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The constitutional provision approved by the voters does 
not require the release of any inmate.  Whether an inmate is 
suitable for parole depends in part on that individual’s prior 
criminal history and the nature of his or her current offense.  
Thus, the Board of Parole Hearings may consider an inmate’s 
prior or current sex offense convictions when evaluating the 
inmate’s suitability for parole.  (Cal. Code Regs., §§ 2449.4, 
subd. (b)(1), 2449.5.)  The Department’s regulations, however, 
treat all individuals with convictions for registerable sex 
offenses as categorically ineligible for parole, even when the 
Department’s own regulations classify those inmates as having 
been convicted of a nonviolent felony.  In doing so, the 
Department denies even the mere possibility of parole to an 
entire category of “person[s] convicted of a nonviolent felony 
offense.”  (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).)  This precondition to parole 
consideration is inconsistent with the Constitution as amended 
by Proposition 57.   
We therefore hold that nonviolent offender parole 
eligibility must be based on an inmate’s current conviction.  We 
further hold that an inmate may not be excluded from 
nonviolent offender parole consideration based on a current 
conviction 
for 
a 
registerable 
felony 
offense 
that 
the 
Department’s regulations have defined as nonviolent.  The 
regulatory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the 
language of article I, section 32(a)(1) and cannot stand.  We 
direct the Department to treat as void and repeal California 
Code of Regulations, section 3491, subdivision (b)(3), and section 
3496, subdivision (b), and to make any further conforming 
changes necessary to render the regulations consistent with 
article I, section 32(a)(1) and this opinion.   
In re GADLIN  
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
HILL, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*   
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Gadlin 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 31 Cal.App.5th 784 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S254599 
Date Filed:  December 28, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  William C. Ryan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Satris; Law Office of Janice M. Bellucci and Janice M. Bellucci, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Petitioner Gregory Gadlin. 
 
Law Office of Janice M. Bellucci and Janice M. Bellucci for Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Gregory Gadlin. 
 
Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld and Ernest Galvan for Nineteen Social Science and Law Scholars as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner Gregory Gadlin. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, James Root and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, 
Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Julie 
A. Malone, Charles Chung and Amanda J. Murray, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent The People. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Charles Chung 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6026 
 
Janice M. Bellucci 
Law Office of Janice M. Bellucci 
1215 K St., 17th Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(805) 896-7854