Title: WASHINGTON v. BARRY

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

WASHINGTON v. BARRY  WASHINGTON v. BARRY 2002 OK 45 55 P.3d 1036 Case Number: 95162 Decided: 05/28/2002 Mandate Issued: 10/14/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA MICHAEL C. WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ROBERT BARRY, ROYCE MELTON, CAPT. SOCKEY, BILLY POGUE, MARION BESS, SGT. McMURTREY, SGT. WILLIAMS, SGT. GARDNER, CPL. DODD, CPL. WELCH, CPL. WORKMAN, and COL. BRITTINGHAM, Defendants-Appellees CERTIORARI TO THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION NUMBER 4 ¶0 Plaintiff, Michael C. Washington, is a prisoner in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at McAlester and defendants are all penitentiary employees. Plaintiff sued defendants for damages and a declaratory judgment for assault and battery and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of defendants'' removal of handcuffs and leg irons from plaintiff''s person over his objection. Plaintiff alleged that the prison employees used "unreasonable force" when they removed the handcuffs and leg irons. The District Court of Pittsburg County, Hon. Stephen Taylor, trial judge, dismissed plaintiff''s petition on the State''s motion on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the Governmental Tort Claims Act and his suit was, therefore, "patently frivolous and without merit on its face." The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed but did so on the ground of plaintiff''s admission that he had not complied with the Governmental Tort Claims Act because the Act, CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS'' OPINION VACATED, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'' MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED. Michael C. Washington, Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General and Barbara C. Stoner, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Oklahoma. OPINION Watt, Vice Chief Justice, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶1 The only recitation of facts in the record comes from plaintiff''s verified petition and other filings because the trial court dismissed plaintiff''s petition on the State''s motion. Consequently, the facts set out in this opinion come exclusively from plaintiff''s petition and other filings. ¶2 On February 9, 2000, plaintiff was incarcerated in a cell in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at McAlester. He objected to prison authorities putting another inmate in his cell, saying, "Plaintiff did decline the invitation, saying that he would not take a cell partner while housed on the disciplinary segregation unit." Plaintiff alleged that he "had a fundamental right to a single cell while on the [55 P.3d 1037] Disciplinary Segregation Unit," but did not further explain why he claimed such a right. Plaintiff also alleged that he had a "fundamental [right] to privacy and to be let alone." Consequently, prison authorities placed plaintiff in handcuffs and leg irons in order to accomplish putting the other prisoner in the cell, which they did "the following evening," apparently without incident. Later, however, plaintiff "refused to give up the handcuffs and leg restraints" and "was allowed to sleep in the restraints over night." The next day, February 11, a guard captain, one of the defendants, assembled the "Corrections Emergency Response Team" to forcibly remove the restraints, which plaintiff had refused to give up voluntarily. Plaintiff also alleged that the altercation that occurred when the Emergency Response Team removed plaintiff''s restraints was videotaped by a prison employee. ¶3 Plaintiff alleged that he was checked after the altercation by "a nurse on the scene" who found that he "had a cut over his right eye and that the eye was swelled and red." Plaintiff also alleged that he was knocked unconscious during the altercation but regained consciousness while it was still going on. He also claims to suffer from dizziness, severe back and neck pain, and blurred vision in his right eye. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that he either sought or required medical attention after the event. ISSUE ¶4 Did the plaintiff''s petition state a cause of action for damages for the use of "excessive force" by the defendants? We answer the question "no." DISCUSSION ¶5 The Court of Civil Appeals''s opinion decided only that the trial court had properly dismissed plaintiff''s petition because of plaintiff''s admission that he had failed to comply with the requirements of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. Although we agree with the result reached by the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals, we have granted certiorari here in order to resolve a first impression issue, which neither the trial court nor the Court of Civil Appeals addressed: what showing must a prisoner in a penal institution make in order to state a cause of action for the use of "excessive force" against his person by prison employees when the prisoner and those employees have come into conflict? I. Plaintiff has no cause of action under the Governmental Tort Claims Act. ¶6 Plaintiff''s petition sought damages for assault and battery and intentional infliction of mental anguish and emotional distress arising from the negligent acts of defendants, not just their intentional acts. Plaintiff made no attempt in his petition to distinguish between negligence and intentional misconduct. Plaintiff made clear in his reply to the Attorney General''s response to the petition for certiorari that he was claiming that the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment: The Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GOVERNMENTAL TORT CLAIMS ACT") was not designed to provide a blanket protection and a safe haven to intentional or negligent correctional officers for wrongs committed within the scope of their employment. [Emphasis added.] Plaintiff''s conclusion on this score is fundamentally wrong because § 152.1(A) the Governmental Tort Claims Act immunizes not only the state and its subdivisions but also "all of their employees acting within the scope of their employment." Further, the foregoing quote from plaintiff''s petition demonstrates plaintiff''s concession that the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. ¶7 In his petition for certiorari, Plaintiff frankly admits that he did not sue the state because the Governmental Tort Claims Act, ¶8 The statutes and cases discussed above reveal that plaintiff may not avoid the immunities granted by and the requirements of the Governmental Tort Claims Act by simply declining to join the state as a party, although he claims the prison employee defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. The prison employee defendants are expressly immunized from liability while acting within the scope of their employment. Here, although plaintiff conceded that defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, he nevertheless seeks to impose liability against them despite their immunity from liability under § 152.1(A) of the Act. Our analysis leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the Act immunizes defendants from liability for the acts complained of by plaintiff just as it does the state itself for negligent acts. II. Plaintiff had a potential cause of action for the excessive use of force by the defendant prison employees but failed to state an actionable claim in his petition. ¶9 Plaintiff seeks to impose liability for the defendants'' use of "excessive force." We have not heretofore examined the issue of what showing must be made by a prisoner in a penal institution under circumstances, such as those in the case at bar, where force has been applied to maintain discipline. We first observe that our analysis in such cases must differ significantly from the analysis we have applied in determining what was "excessive force" in cases involving police officers making arrests and those involving nursing home employees dealing with patients. See, for example, Nail v. City of Henryetta, ¶10 A prisoner in a penal institution has no right to recover for the use of excessive force by prison employees unless the force applied was so excessive that it violated the prisoner''s right to be protected from the infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments" under the state and federal constitutions. Ok. Const., Art. 2 § 9; U.S. Const., 8th Amd. Thus, a prisoner has a significantly greater burden to bear in establishing his right to a cause of action than does a person who is not incarcerated. Whitley v. Albers, ¶11 In Whitley, Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance, such as occurred in this case, that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." [Citation omitted.] [55 P.3d 1039] The court also observed. "such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted should be considered in making the determination whether the prison officials'' conduct was done maliciously and sadistically." [Emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted.] ¶12 The Whitley court recognized that in a prison there is an "ever present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration" so that when that potential ripens into actual [emphasis as in the original] unrest and conflict . . . Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. . . . That deference extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of prison discipline. It does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice. Accordingly, in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict in a case such as this, courts must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives. Unless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain under the standard we have described, the case should not go to the jury. [Emphasis added.] ¶13 Plaintiff''s petition reveals that the Correctional Emergency Response Team waited thirty-six hours before undertaking to remove the restraints that plaintiff had refused to allow to be removed peaceably. These officials videotaped the incident and had a nurse "on the scene." ¶14 "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, ¶15 Our conclusion that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action echos results reached in several federal cases. In LaShpella v. C.E.R.T. Team, . . . The extent of the injury inflicted is not dispositive, but is only a relevant factor to be considered among the other factors: the need for force; the relationship between the need and the amount of force defendants used; the threat reasonably perceived by responsible officials; and efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. (discussing Whitley ). The district court carefully considered each of these factors in its analysis and specifically found that the force was applied in a good faith effort to restore order. Therefore, the district court concluded that appellants had failed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. We review the factual findings of the district court for clear error only. Burgin v. Iowa Dep''t of Corrections, ¶16 In Jackson v. Carl, ¶17 In Bennett v. Cambra, 1997 WL 88329 (U.S.D.C. N.D.Cal.) the court held that the use of pepper spray by the members of a "cell extraction team" was reasonable because the team''s acts had been necessitated by the plaintiff prisoner''s repeated refusal to return a steel food tray from his cell. In so holding the court said, "Plaintiff created a disturbance and security risk by refusing to return his tray and force was used [only] after defendants repeatedly requested that plaintiff return the tray voluntarily." ¶18 Here, by contrast to both Jackson and Bennett, the Emergency Response Team used neither tasers nor pepper spray to subdue plaintiff, despite plaintiff''s pattern over the previous thirty-six hours of first refusing to peaceably accept a cell mate and then refusing to allow his restraints to be removed. Plaintiff''s petition makes no allegation that would support a finding of wantonness under the circumstances present here, circumstances in which plaintiff admits that the conflict arose because of his refusal to submit to prison discipline and that the forceful response of the defendants'' was carefully considered, reasonable, and necessary, given plaintiff''s uncooperativeness. Further, the injuries to plaintiff were minimal, despite his resistence. We hold, therefore, that plain-[55 P.3d 1041] tiff''s petition failed to state a cause of action for the use of excessive force against him by the defendant prison employees. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS'' OPINION VACATED, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'' MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED. ¶19 WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, OPALA, KAUGER, and WINCHESTER, JJ. - concur. ¶20 SUMMERS, J. - concurs in part, dissents in part. ¶21 HARGRAVE, C.J. - dissents. ¶22 LAVENDER and BOUDREAU, JJ. - dissent. FOOT