Title: Ex parte Wade Tucker et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Wade Tucker et al. v. Richard Scrushy et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:01/07/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090445
____________________
Ex parte Wade Tucker et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Wade Tucker et al.
v.
Richard Scrushy et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-02-5212)
SHAW, Justice.
The plaintiffs below, Wade Tucker; the Wendell H. Cook,
Sr., Testamentary Trust; John P. Cook; and HealthSouth
Corporation ("the petitioners"), petition this Court for a
1090445
The trial court's order also quashed a subpoena seeking
1
production from another law firm, Leitman, Siegal, Payne &
Campbell, P.C. ("Leitman"), that represented Marin Ltd., an
entity in which Scrushy is the sole shareholder.   The
petition for the writ of mandamus originally sought relief
from the order as it related to Leitman.  However, while the
mandamus petition was pending, Leitman agreed to produce the
requested documents and, according to the petitioners,
satisfied the discovery requests and rendered moot that
portion of the petition relating to Leitman.  We thus
consider the petition only as it applies to the Parkman
subpoena.
2
writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
vacate its order in favor of the law firm of Parkman, Adams &
White, LLC ("Parkman"), quashing a subpoena seeking  the
production of documents and records held by Parkman reflecting
payments made by or on behalf of Richard Scrushy.   We grant
1
the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 18, 2009, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a
judgment in favor of the petitioners and against  Scrushy in
the amount of $2,876,103,000.  The petitioners, in an attempt
to collect on the judgment and to discover assets held by
Scrushy, filed a notice of intent to serve a subpoena on
Parkman, which had previously represented Scrushy in various
criminal and civil matters.  The subpoena sought production of
documents and records reflecting payments to Parkman by or on
1090445
Rule 45(a)(3)(B) provides, in part: "Any person or party
2
may serve an objection to the issuance of a subpoena for
production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling within
ten (10) days of the service of said notice and in such event
the subpoena shall not issue."
3
behalf of Scrushy, amounts held in trust relating to Scrushy,
and documents evidencing payments received by Parkman for
legal services rendered to Scrushy.  The subpoena explicitly
excluded attorney work-product and materials protected by the
attorney-client privilege.  
Parkman filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting
that the information requested was privileged, irrelevant, and
immaterial and that the production of it would be unduly
burdensome. 
 
The 
subpoena 
was 
not 
issued. 
See 
Rule
45(a)(3)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P.   Scrushy filed no objection to
2
the subpoena.  After a hearing, the trial court entered an
order granting the motion to quash the subpoena.  The
petitioners timely filed this petition seeking a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order.  
Standard of Review
"Discovery matters are within the trial court's sound
discretion, and this Court will not reverse a trial court's
ruling on a discovery issue unless the trial court has clearly
1090445
4
exceeded its discretion." Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872
So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Rice, 585
So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala. 1991)).  "Accordingly, mandamus will
issue to reverse a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue
only (1) where there is a showing that the trial court clearly
exceeded its discretion, and (2) where the aggrieved party
does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. The
petitioner has an affirmative burden to prove the existence of
each of these conditions." Ex parte Ocwen, 872 So. 2d at 813.
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is
appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte BOC Group, Inc.,
823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001). 
Discussion
 In the trial court, Parkman objected to the subpoena,
arguing that the request sought material that was privileged,
personal and confidential, irrelevant, and immaterial to the
collection of the plaintiffs' judgment against Scrushy and
1090445
5
that the production of the material would be unduly
burdensome.   The materials before this Court contain no
substantiation for these arguments.  Furthermore, Parkman has
not filed an answer or brief in this Court in support of its
position below or in support of the trial court's decision. 
A.
First, the petitioners argue that Parkman failed to prove
in the trial court that the "financial arrangement between
attorney and client is privileged, personal and confidential
information." 
The 
party 
asserting 
the 
attorney-client
privilege bears the burden of establishing that the privilege
attaches to the documents requested. Lynch v. Hamrick, 968 So.
2d 11, 14 (Ala. 2007); Ex parte DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 683 So.
2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1996).  "The burden is on the party
asserting the attorney/client privilege to establish the
existence of ... facts demonstrating the claim of privileged
information." 683 So. 2d at 412.  
Parkman presented no argument in the trial court or in
this Court demonstrating that the information was privileged.
However, even if Parkman had presented an argument in support
of its assertion, it is clear that, generally, "[b]ank records
1090445
6
of receipts and disbursements in lawyers' trust accounts are
not privileged communications." Ex parte Clark, 630 So. 2d
493, 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).  Further, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted: 
"The maintenance of checking accounts is not shown
to have any relevance to any communications made in
confidence between a lawyer and client for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice. A client may not
immunize his business transactions from discovery by
the device of a lawyer's commercial checking
account."
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A.,
447 F.2d 166, 167 (10th Cir. 1971).  See also 2 Charles W.
Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 392.02 (6th ed. 2009)
("The attorney-client privilege generally does not exempt the
attorney from testifying to the fact of the attorney's
employment, the name of the person so employing and the terms
of the employment. This general rule includes disclosure of
the fee arrangement." (footnotes omitted)), and In re Grand
Jury Proceedings in re Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.
1983) ("[I]nformation regarding a fee arrangement and the
identity of the person paying the fee falls outside the
protection of the attorney-client privilege.").
1090445
Because we conclude that Parkman failed to prove that the
3
information was privileged, we do not address the petitioners'
alternative contention that the absence of any express
invocation of the privilege by Scrushy is fatal to Parkman's
assertion of the privilege.   
7
Parkman did not show that the information requested was
privileged or that it contained any communication that could
be considered protected by the attorney-client or attorney-
work-product privilege. Therefore, the petitioners have
demonstrated that Parkman failed to meet its burden in the
trial court of showing that the requested material was
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Without such a
showing by Parkman, the trial court exceeded its discretion by
determining that the requested information was privileged.3
B.
Parkman argued in the trial court that the requested
documents were irrelevant and immaterial to the collection of
the judgment against Scrushy. "In order for the matter to be
discoverable, the information sought must also be relevant."
Zaden 
v. 
Elkus, 
881 
So. 
2d 
993, 
1005 
(Ala. 
2003).
"'"Relevancy," as used in our discovery rules, means relevant
to the subject matter of the action; evidence is relevant if
it affords a reasonable possibility that the information
1090445
8
sought will lead to other evidence that will be admissible.
Ex parte Dorsey Trailers, [Inc., 397 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 1981)];
Drewes v. Bank of Wadley, 350 So. 2d 402 (Ala. 1977); 8 Wright
and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970).'"
Zaden, 881 So. 2d at 1005-06 (quoting Pitts v. Griggs, 585 So.
2d 1317, 1321 (Ala. 1991)).  Under Rule 26(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ.
P., "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in 
the 
pending 
action 
... 
including 
the 
existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books [or] documents."  In Ex parte AMI West Alabama General
Hospital, 582 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Ala. 1991), we explained:
"[Rule 26(b)(1)] contemplates a broad right of
discovery.  Discovery should be permitted if there is
any likelihood that the information sought will aid
the party seeking discovery in the pursuit of his
claim or defense.  Discovery is not limited to
matters that would be admissible as evidence in the
trial of the lawsuit."
Consistent with their argument in the trial court, the
petitioners argue that the subpoena to Parkman was designed to
produce information that could lead the judgment creditors to
assets held by Scrushy, making the requested documents
relevant.  There is no argument before us that such
1090445
9
information is irrelevant or immaterial.  Further, as the
petitioners note, there is a reasonable possibility that the
information obtained from documents indicating who or what
entity paid for legal services on Scrushy's behalf could lead
the petitioners to assets held by Scrushy.  Those assets could
then be used to satisfy a judgment against Scrushy issued by
the same court.  
The petitioners' position is bolstered by Rule 69(g), Ala.
R. Civ. P., which allows a judgment creditor to "obtain
discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor," in
aid of obtaining the judgment. Outside the conclusory argument
that "the information sought is irrelevant and immaterial to
the collection of the plaintiff's judgment against the
debtor," there is no support for Parkman's position that the
information sought is irrelevant.  "A trial judge, who has
broad discretion in this area, should nevertheless incline
toward permitting the broadest discovery ...." Ex parte AMI
West Alabama Gen. Hosp., 582 So. 2d at 486.  We conclude that
the petitioners have met their burden of establishing that the
information they sought was relevant.  The trial court,
1090445
10
without any showing to the contrary by Parkman, exceeded its
discretion in determining otherwise.
C.
Finally, the petitioners argue that Parkman's contention
in the trial court that it would be unduly burdensome to
produce the requested information is not supported by any
evidence and thus is insufficient to support quashing the
subpoena.  This Court has held that discovery should be
allowed in full unless the opposing party can show that the
production of the requested materials would be unduly
burdensome.  Ex parte Jacksonville State Univ., 40 So. 3d 672,
676-77 (Ala. 2009); see generally Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank,
FSB, 872 So. 2d at 815-16.  Parkman's argument in the trial
court, in its entirety, consists of only one statement: "The
request is unduly burdensome."  This statement does not show
why production would be unduly burdensome, and no other
evidence or explanation has been put before us.  We conclude,
therefore, that the petitioners have established that Parkman
failed to meet its burden in the trial court; the trial court
exceeded its discretion in determining that complying with the
discovery request would be unduly burdensome for Parkman.   
1090445
11
Conclusion
The petitioners have established that they are entitled
to the requested discovery; Parkman failed to establish before
the trial court that the subpoena was due to be quashed.  The
petitioners have demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus
relief; therefore, we direct the trial court to vacate the
order quashing the subpoena as to Parkman.  
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.  
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1090445
12
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I am somewhat skeptical of the notion implied in the
position taken by petitioners, i.e., that the financial
arrangements between an attorney and client generally are not,
by their very nature, privileged, personal, and confidential.
Under the facts of this case, including the limited nature of
the information sought and the purposes for which it has been
subpoenaed, I concur in the result reached by the main
opinion.  
As I understand it, the nature and purpose of the
discovery 
sought 
are 
as 
reflected 
in 
the 
"motion 
to
reconsider" filed by the petitioners in the trial court:
"The information which was requested by [the
petitioners] from Parkman ... is simply regarding the
source and identity of the payments that were made to
those firms by or on behalf of Scrushy and Marin,
Ltd....  [D]iscovering the source of payments made by
Scrushy could lead [the petitioners] to bank or
brokerage accounts subject to garnishment that have
yet to be located or identified.  Additionally,
discovering the identity of the payors could lead to
evidence regarding an alter ego or the location of
hidden assets.  Finally, discovering the amount of
the payments will help to determine what happened to
Scrushy's net worth, which was estimated to be
approximately 
$300 
million 
in 
2003. 
 
At 
his
deposition, Scrushy testified that since 2003,
roughly $100 million of his net worth went to pay
lawyers.  [The petitioners] are entitled to test
1090445
13
Scrushy's contention and to trace what happened to
Scrushy's known assets since 2003."