Title: State v. Brooks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Brooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 537, 2001-Ohio-1278] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. BROOKS. 
[Cite as State v. Brooks (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 537.] 
Appellate procedure — Application for reopening appeal from judgment of 
conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — 
Application denied when applicant fails to raise a genuine issue as to 
whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal 
as required by App.R. 26(B)(5). 
(No. 00-2200 — Submitted May 15, 2001 — Decided August 15, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 48914. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant, Reginald Brooks, was convicted of the 
aggravated murders of his three sons, Reginald, Jr., Vaughn, and Niarchos 
Brooks, and sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions and 
sentence.  State v. Brooks (Aug. 15, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 48914, 
unreported, 1985 WL 8589.  We also affirmed Brooks’s conviction and death 
sentence.  State v. Brooks (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 144, 25 OBR 190, 495 N.E.2d 
407, certiorari denied, Brooks v. Ohio (1987), 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1330, 94 
L.Ed.2d 182. 
 
Subsequently, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
deny Brooks’s petition for postconviction relief.  State v. Brooks (June 17, 1999), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 73729, unreported, 1999 WL 401655.  We refused to accept 
Brooks’s appeal of that decision.  State v. Brooks (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 1432, 724 
N.E.2d 809. 
 
On August 3, 2000, Brooks filed an application with the court of appeals 
to reopen his initial appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, alleging ineffective assistance of his 
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appellate counsel before the court of appeals in his first appeal.  However, the 
court of appeals found that Brooks had failed to establish good cause for his 
untimely application for reopening, and denied Brooks’s application.  
Notwithstanding Brooks’s failure to establish good cause for his untimely 
application, the court of appeals reviewed Brooks’s assignments of error and 
concluded that Brooks failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue existed as to 
ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel.  State v. Brooks (Nov. 9, 2000), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 48914, unreported, 2000 WL 1706723.  The cause is now 
before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Brooks’s counsel have filed two motions.  In their first motion, Brooks’s 
counsel request an order authorizing state funding for a licensed forensic 
psychologist to evaluate Brooks’s competency to move forward in these 
proceedings, and, if need be, to testify.  Brooks’s counsel also request an ex parte 
hearing to present further evidence in support of this motion should we deem that 
necessary.  In their second motion, Brooks’s counsel move for a stay of the 
proceedings to allow counsel time to complete their investigation into Brooks’s 
competency to proceed further with his appeal. 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, Brooks attacks the court of appeals’ denial 
of his similar motion for a stay pending completion of Brooks’s competency 
evaluation, and its denial of Brooks’s motion to employ a psychologist at state 
expense. 
 
There is no requirement that Brooks be competent in order for his appeal 
to proceed in this court or for his appeal to have proceeded in the court of appeals.  
Moreover, this case does not involve any waiver of appellate rights.  The trial 
court found that the defendant was competent to stand trial.  While R.C. 2945.37 
provides detailed procedures for determining competency to stand trial, no 
comparable statute concerns competency during a defendant’s appeal.  R.C. 
2949.28 and 2949.29 govern competency to be executed, but the appellant is not 
January Term, 2001 
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at that stage in these proceedings.  Thus, the services of a psychologist or 
psychiatrist are simply not relevant at this juncture in the appellate process. 
Brooks’s ninth proposition of law and his motions to employ a psychologist at 
state expense and for a stay are therefore denied. 
 
In his third through eighth, tenth, and eleventh propositions of law, Brooks 
asserts that his counsel have established a genuine issue as to whether he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel in his initial appeal to the court of 
appeals.  The two-pronged analysis found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, is the appropriate 
standard to assess whether Brooks has raised a genuine issue as to the 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, in his request to reopen under App.R. 
26(B)(5).  State v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696, 697; 
State v. Reed (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456, 458. 
 
“To show ineffective assistance, [Brooks] must prove that his counsel 
were deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents and that there was a 
reasonable probability of success had he presented those claims on appeal.”  State 
v. Sheppard (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 329, 330, 744 N.E.2d 770, 771, citing State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  Moreover, to justify reopening his appeal, Brooks “bears the burden of 
establishing that there was a ‘genuine issue’ as to whether he has a ‘colorable 
claim’ of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio 
St.3d at 25, 701 N.E.2d at 697. 
 
We have reviewed Brooks’s assertions of deficient performance by 
appellate counsel and find that Brooks has failed to raise a “genuine issue as to 
whether [he] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal” before 
the court of appeals, as required under App.R. 26(B)(5). 
 
In his first proposition of law, Brooks argues that he filed his application 
for reconsideration under App.R. 26(B) in a timely fashion, and that, in any event, 
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he had good cause for the late filing of his application.  However, our disposition 
of Brooks’s propositions of law, on the merits,  negates any need to decide these 
questions. 
 
In his second proposition of law, Brooks attacks the procedural limitations 
of the Murnahan process (e.g., the ten-page limit on briefs at the court of appeals) 
to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Here, Brooks’s 
counsel faced no page limitation in filing a brief, and our review of Brooks’s 
assertions of ineffective assistance has eliminated any prejudice at the court of 
appeals. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. 
Christopher Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Alan C. Rossman and Michael J. Benza, for appellant. 
__________________