Title: Esponda v. Esponda

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Esponda v. Esponda1990 WY 86796 P.2d 799Case Number: 90-71Decided: 08/24/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN ARTHUR ESPONDA, JR., 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

BRENDA K. ESPONDA, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Johnson County, James N. Wolfe, J.

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellant.

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and ROONEY and BROWN, Retired 
JJ.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from a determination by the district court that there was not a material and 
sufficient change in the circumstances of the parties to warrant a modification 
of the child support provisions of the court-approved stipulation entered into 
by the parties in connection with their divorce.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      With reference to 
child support, the stipulation required payment by appellant of $250 per month 
for each of the two minor children of the parties.1 In his Petition for Modification, 
appellant sets forth the basis upon which he relies for a change in the required 
amount of child support as follows:

     "5. Since the 
divorce Decree was entered between the parties, there has been a material 
and substantial change of circumstances which would warrant a modification of 
the same pertaining to the payment of child support.

     "6. Said material and 
substantial change of circumstances consists of the Defendant's change of 
employment and substantial reduction in gross and net month income." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶4]      Actually, there 
was very little change in appellant's income between the time of the divorce 
decree and the time at which the Petition for Modification was filed. When the 
decree was entered, appellant was working at the family ranch (in which he had 
part ownership) for a monthly income of $1,000 plus room, board and use of a 
vehicle. When the Petition for Modification was filed, he was employed by the 
School District as a custodian at a monthly salary of $1,200.

[¶5]      However, 
appellant argues that the change in conditions should be based on income from a 
comparatively short-term employment by Hood Communications from March 1988 to 
September 2, 1988. He testified that his income from this employment was $3,000 
per month. The hearing on the divorce (at which time the original stipulation 
was amended) occurred during appellant's employment by Hood Communications. The 
original stipulation (requiring higher payment for the present period) was 
agreed to before such employment, and the divorce decree was entered after the 
termination of such employment. Excepting the income received by appellant from 
Hood Communications, his income during the course of these proceedings has been 
approximately half of that received from Hood Communications.2 The following chronology reflects 
the dates of appellant's pertinent employments as reflected in the record and as 
they pertain to dates of pertinent court proceedings:

Date                                        
Employment                           
Court                           
Proceeding

9/3/87                                                                                                                                     
Complaint filed 

1/88                                        
Hood Corporation ($1,790/month)3 

1/23/88                                   
                                                                                    
Original Stipulation entered into 

2/19/88                                                                                                                       
Original Stipulation filed 

3/88                                        
Started Hood Communications ($3,000/month) 

8/26/88                                                                                                           
Hearing - Stipulation amended in open court 9/2/88                                        
Terminated with Hood Communications 

10/15/88                                 
Started at Ranch ($1,000/month plus board, room and auto use) 

11/15/88                                                                                                                     
Decree filed (incorporated stipulation) 6/89                                             
Ranch employment terminated 

7/89                                        
Started with School District ($1,200/month) 

8/16/89                                                                                                                       
Petition for Modification filed

12/12/89                                                                                                                     
Hearing on Petition to Modify 

12/29/89                                                                                                                     
Judgment signed 

1/04/90                                                                                                                       
Judgment entered 

2/90                                        
To be promoted by School District to bus driver 
($1,560/month)

[¶6]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the district judge commented in part:

"I don't find there's 
been any change of circumstances in this situation. There was no real employment 
history of any income level for Mr. Esponda at the time this agreement was 
entered into. He had a job that he had had for a very brief period of time, but 
there's been no basis given to this Court from the evidence presented here as to 
what, you know, what he anticipated his real income level was other than just 
testimony that he had started to work just a short time before this divorce 
thing at that job that he was making $3,000 a month. I assume before that he was 
on the ranch doing something else, you know. He had several other things that 
are involved here with land and livestock.

     "I don't find anything 
that is a sufficient change of circumstances for this Court to reduce the amount 
of support, * * *."

[¶7]      In this appeal, 
appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant words 
the issue on appeal:

     "Did the trial Court 
abuse its discretion in finding that there was not a sufficient change in 
circumstances since the divorce proceeding and the entry of the decree to 
warrant a modification by reducing the child support to be paid by the 
Appellant?"

[¶8]      In Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980), we stated:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 
251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910); 
DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 303 A.2d 709 (1972); In re Estate of Horman, 
265 Cal. App. 2d 796, 71 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968)."

[¶9]      In Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), this court stated:

     "We have usually 
alluded to abuse of discretion in general terms and have not made an exhaustive 
list of circumstances constituting abuse of discretion, nor do we care to. Each 
case must be determined on its peculiar facts."

[¶10]   The district court could reasonably 
conclude as it did under the evidence in this case, i.e., it could conclude that 
there was not a material and substantial change in appellant's average income 
since he stipulated to the amount for child support as contained in the decree - 
he agreed to an even greater amount in the original stipulation. Recognizing the 
considerations necessary in fixing the amount of child support, the trial court 
did not here act in a manner which exceeded its bounds of reason under the 
circumstances. It did not abuse its discretion.

[¶11]   Appellant himself accurately sets 
forth some of the considerations for the trial court in instances such as 
this:

     "Appellant filed his 
petition for modification pursuant to the provisions of W.S., Section 
20-2-113(a). The indicated section allowed  
children required. The change in the circumstances must be substantial or 
material in order to outweigh society's interest in applying the doctrine of res 
judicata to a final decree of divorce. There must be an end to litigation at 
some point, or the judicial system would become bogged down. Kreuter v. Kreuter, 
Wyo., 728 P.2d 1129 (1986); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981). 
Appellant had the burden of proof to show that a substantial or material change 
of circumstances had occurred subsequent to the divorce proceedings. Nuspl v. 
Nuspl, Wyo., 717 P.2d 341 (1986); Cubin v. Cubin, Wyo., 685 P.2d 680 (1984); 
Kreuter v. Kreuter, supra.

     "Decisions regarding 
child support rest largely with the district court, and this Court will not 
disturb the trial court's decision in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion 
or in violation of some legal principle. Kreuter v. Kreuter, supra; Nuspl v. 
Nuspl, supra; Manners v. Manners, Wyo., 706 P.2d 671 (1985). This Court has 
repeatedly held that an abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of 
law committed by the court under the circumstances. In determining whether there 
has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court 
could reasonably conclude as it did. The reviewing Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court, whose judgment must be sustained unless 
clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or totally against the evidence. Roberts v. 
Vilos, Wyo., 776 P.2d 216 (1989)."

[¶12]   The district court considered the 
financial condition of the appellee: monthly salary of $1,000 as secretary at 
First United Methodist Church, extra work when available for $4.00 to $5.00 per 
hour at the Water Hole Bar, the Moose, and at a concession stand. She worked "60 
to 70 to 80 hours a week most of the summer." The children are taken care of by 
her parents after school. She and her children eat at her parents' home 
regularly. Her itemized expenses exceed her income.

[¶13]   The district court commented in 
part at the conclusion of the hearing for modification:

     "What I find here is 
Mrs. Brenda Esponda seems to make ends meet because she's willing to work 60, 70 
to 80 hours a week, and that if Mr. Esponda has to work 60, 70 to 80 hours a 
week to pay, I guess he's going to have to do it."

[¶14]   Thus, the district court obviously 
took the welfare of the children into consideration. Appellee properly refers to 
Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1985); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155 
(Wyo. 1982); and Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1981), to note the 
necessity for the court to consider the resources and circumstances of both 
parents as well as the needs and interests of the children, with the paramount 
concern being the welfare of the children, in connection with child support 
proceedings.

[¶15]   Applying such established law to 
this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion or act totally 
against the evidence in a clearly erroneous fashion.

[¶16]   Appellant contends on appeal that 
the amount for child support exceeds that authorized by W.S. 20-6-3034 and W.S. 20-6-304.5 W.S. 20-6-303 provided:

     "The basic child 
support obligation may be apportioned between the parents in proportion to their 
incomes. Four hundred fifty dollars ($450.00) income per month per parent shall 
be considered to be a minimum living allowance and shall not be subject to child 
support obligation."

[¶17]   W.S. 20-6-304 provided:

    "Child support for each 
child shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the balance of the gross income 
of the obligor after the deduction of the minimum living allowance established 
in W.S. 20-6-303. Total child support shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of 
the gross income of the obligor after the minimum living allowance has been 
deducted."

[¶18]   However, a computation based upon 
appellant's gross income (including that from all sources and not only that 
received from the school district) reflects the award to be well within the 
statutory guidelines. This issue was not presented to the trial court, and, 
normally, we will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal 
unless they go to jurisdiction or are otherwise of a fundamental nature. Dennis 
v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1984); Gore v. John, 61 Wyo. 246, 157 P.2d 552 
(1945). We note the inapplicability of the statutes to this case because they 
may be said to establish a fundamental right or limit jurisdiction - all 
without a determination by us that such is done and without otherwise ruling on 
any aspect of the statutes.

[¶19]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The original stipulation 
required payment of $350 per month for each child. It was amended in open court 
to require payments of $250 per month per child from September 10, 1988 to 
September 10, 1992; $300 per month per child from September 10, 1992 to 
September 10, 1995; and $325 per month per child from September 10, 1995 until 
one of the children was no longer in appellee's care and custody after which it 
was agreed that the payment be $400 per month for the other child.

2 There was evidence of 
income from sources other than employment, e.g., sale of sheep, mineral royalty, 
trustee fee, but there was no evidence of a change therein.

3 Appellant testified on 
cross-examination:

"Q Now, when did you go 
to work for Hood Communications?

"A In March of - or, no, 
November of '87.

"Q And you were employed 
by that company in January of 1988, and at that time, your salary or your income 
from Hood was $396 a week. Is that - I'll tell you, what I'm looking at is your 
Answers to Interrogatories.

"A Yes. That was Hood - 
the Hood Corporation.

"Q Hood Communications, 
21214 Center Place, Anaheim, California; that's correct?

"A I was not employed by 
them at that time. I was employed by Hood Corporation at that time.

"Q But anyway, your rate 
of pay was $396 a week?

"A Yes.

"Q And that was the time 
that you signed the first stipulation in the case whereby you agreed to pay $350 
a month child support for each of the children?

"A Yes."

4 Repealed effective July 
1, 1990.

5 Amended effective July 
1, 1990.