Title: State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker, 86 Ohio St.3d 169, 1999-Ohio-151.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BANC ONE CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WALKER, 
JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 169.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent judge of common pleas court from 
proceeding in an action involving claims of tortious interference with a 
contract — Mandamus sought to compel judge of common pleas court to 
transfer venue of action involving claims of tortious interference with a 
contract — Writs denied, when — Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not 
divest courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, when. 
(No. 99-168 — Submitted June 22, 1999 — Decided July 28, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-97-092. 
 
Appellee Donald A. Sibbring is an independent insurance agent who 
conducts business through appellee Data Analysis Services Company (“DASCO”), 
a company he owns and operates.  In 1979, representatives of appellants Banc One 
Corporation and Banc One Ohio Corporation1 (collectively referred to as “Banc 
One”) engaged in negotiations with Sibbring concerning his potential appointment 
as agent of record for Banc One’s collateral protection insurance (“CPI”) program.  
CPI is a type of insurance purchased by a lender to protect its interest in collateral 
in case a borrower breaches an agreement to maintain required insurance on the 
collateral, e.g., an automobile purchased with loan proceeds.  When a borrower 
breaches an agreement to purchase the required insurance on the collateral, the 
lender has the right to buy CPI to protect its interest, and it may charge the cost of 
the CPI to the borrower. 
 
From 1980 to 1984, Sibbring acted as agent of record for various Banc One 
affiliates and procured their CPI.  In mid-1984, Banc One canceled its agency 
agreement with Sibbring, and, effective November 1984, placed its entire CPI 
 
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program with Transamerica Premier Insurance Company, the corporate 
predecessor to appellant TIG Premier Insurance Company  (“TIG”).  Transamerica 
Premier Insurance Services, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary or affiliate of these 
entities. Transamerica Premier Insurance Company and Transamerica Premier 
Insurance Services, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Transamerica” in this 
opinion. 
 
In 1994, Sibbring and DASCO filed a complaint in the Erie County 
Common Pleas Court against Banc One, Transamerica, and TIG.  Sibbring and 
DASCO claimed that Transamerica and TIG tortiously interfered with Sibbring 
and DASCO’s contractual relationship with Banc One; that the combined efforts of 
Banc One, Transamerica, and TIG violated the Valentine Act, R.C. 1331.01 et 
seq., by squeezing out independent insurance agents like Sibbring and permitting 
appellants to obtain illegal profits through anti-competitive activity; and that this 
conduct also breached Banc One’s, Transamerica’s, and TIG’s duties of good faith 
and fair dealing.  Sibbring and DASCO sought damages.  In July 1997, appellee 
Judge Robert D. Walker of the common pleas court denied Banc One, 
Transamerica, and TIG’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, or alternatively, to transfer venue of the case to Franklin County.  
Judge Walker scheduled a jury trial in the matter. 
 
In August 1997, Banc One and TIG filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Erie County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Walker from 
proceeding in the underlying action or, alternatively, for writs of prohibition and 
mandamus ordering Judge Walker to transfer the underlying case from Erie County 
to Franklin County.  The court of appeals granted Sibbring and DASCO’s motion 
to intervene as respondents and they and Judge Walker filed answers. Judge 
Walker also filed a motion for summary judgment.  In December 1998, the court of 
 
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appeals granted Judge Walker’s motion for summary judgment and denied the 
writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right by Banc One 
and TIG. 
__________________ 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., David S. Cupps and Anthony J. 
O’Malley, for appellant Banc One et al. 
 
Flynn, Py & Kruse, L.P.A., William Charles Steuk and Wm. R.S. Steuk, for 
appellant TIG. 
 
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gary A. Lickfelt, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judge Robert D. Walker. 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., John T. Murray and Sylvia M. Antalis, for 
appellees Sibbring and DASCO. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the 
writs.  Based on the following, we find that appellants’ claims are meritless and 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Prohibition; Primary Jurisdiction; Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 
Appellants first claim that they are entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent 
Judge Walker from proceeding in the underlying action.  Although it is evident that 
Judge Walker and the common pleas court have basic statutory jurisdiction over 
the claims in Sibbring and DASCO’s civil action pursuant to R.C. 2305.01 and 
1331.08, appellants nevertheless contend that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
patently and unambiguously divested Judge Walker of that basic jurisdiction.  State 
ex rel. Jackson v. Miller (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 541, 542, 700 N.E.2d 1273, 1275 
(“If  * * * an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the 
cause, prohibition will lie to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of 
 
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jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized 
actions.”). 
 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally 
cognizable in a court and enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues 
that have been placed within the special expertise of an administrative body.  
United States v. Western Pacific RR. Co. (1956), 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 
165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 132; United States v. Haun (C.A.6, 1997), 124 F.3d 745, 749.  
Under this doctrine, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of the issues 
to the administrative body for its views.  Id. 
 
Contrary to appellants’ contentions, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does 
not divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Reiter v. Cooper (1993), 507 U.S. 
258, 268-269, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604, 617-618.  In Reiter, 507 
U.S. at 268, 113 S.Ct. at 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d at 617, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required dismissal 
of a court action where petitioners did not initially present their unreasonable-
tariff-rate claims to the Interstate Commerce Commission because potential 
referral of issues to an administrative agency did not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction.  Appellants similarly claimed here that the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction required dismissal of the underlying action for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
Therefore, because it is not a jurisdictional defect, appellants’ claim that 
primary jurisdiction patently and unambiguously divested Judge Walker of 
jurisdiction is meritless.  In other words, potential referral of an issue to an 
administrative agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine where an action is 
filed does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the matter so as to require 
dismissal of the case.  Id. 
 
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In addition, the General Assembly has not conferred exclusive jurisdiction 
over Sibbring and DASCO’s claims of tortious interference with a contract, 
violation of the Valentine Act, and breach of the duties of good faith and fair 
dealing in an administrative agency.  When the General Assembly intends to vest 
exclusive jurisdiction in a court or agency, it provides it by appropriate statutory 
language.  Cf. State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ‘98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 487, 488, 700 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Ohio Elections 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 3517.151[A] over claims 
of fraudulent and false statements in campaign advertising); State ex rel. Ohio 
Edison Co. v. Parrott (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 705, 708-709, 654 N.E.2d 106, 109 
(Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under R.C. 4903.12 and 4906.12 to 
enjoin construction of a board-approved transmission line); State ex rel. Sanquily v. 
Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 573 N.E.2d 606, 
609 (Court of Claims has exclusive, initial jurisdiction under R.C. 2743.02[F] to 
determine whether public employee is immune from suit).  As the court of appeals 
concluded, nothing in R.C. Title 39 patently and unambiguously confers exclusive 
jurisdiction of the claims in the underlying action on the Department of Insurance. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly noted in 
an appeal involving a federal class action against Bank One, Columbus, N.A., and 
TIG concerning their CPI program that “ ‘[t]he fact that the unlawful practices 
alleged in the instant case involve a scheme for passing on the cost of insurance 
premiums does not convert this case into one limited to the insurance industry.’ ”  
Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A. (C.A.6, 1996), 92 F.3d 384, 393, quoting 
Bermudez v. First of America Bank Champion, N.A. (N.D.Ill.1994), 860 F.Supp. 
580, 591.  We have also permitted a comparable claim against TIG for tortious 
interference with a contractual relationship to proceed in common pleas court.  
 
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Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 415, 650 N.E.2d 
863. 
 
None of the cases cited by appellants requires a contrary result.  
Significantly, most of the authorities relied on by appellants were resolved by 
appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.  See, e.g., Salvation Army v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of N. Ohio (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 571, 636 N.E.2d 399; Elwert v. 
Pilot Life Ins. Co. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 529, 602 N.E.2d 1219; Strack v. 
Westfield Cos. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 336, 515 N.E.2d 1005; Allen v. Golden 
Rule Ins. Co. (Aug. 15, 1990), Montgomery App. No. 12109, unreported, 1990 WL 
119288; Orra v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn. (Mar. 31, 1988), Lucas App. 
No. L-87-233, unreported, 1988 WL 36380; Kimpel v. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., 
Inc. (Jan. 9, 1987), Williams App. No. WMS-86-8, unreported, 1987 WL 5310.  
Further, Salvation Army based its main holding on the failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, which is a nonjurisdictional defect.  Jones v. Chagrin 
Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, syllabus.  The court of appeals 
in Elwert expressly permitted a trial court to proceed on a former insurance agent’s 
claim for tortious interference with a business relationship against a life insurance 
company.  And the insurance claims found not to be cognizable in courts in Elwert, 
Strack, Allen, Orra, and Kimpel were based on specific, alleged violations of R.C. 
Title 39.  In contrast, Sibbring and DASCO’s claims do not expressly assert a right 
to recovery based on any alleged insurance law violations. 
 
Appellants’ reliance on State ex rel. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. 
Ohio v. Carroll (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 263, 21 OBR 307, 487 N.E.2d 576, is also 
misplaced.  In Blue Cross, the court of appeals granted a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a trial court judge from enforcing a preliminary injunction on restraining 
an insurance company’s allegedly misleading or deceptive advertising.  The claims 
in Blue Cross were completely remediable by the Department of Insurance and its 
 
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Superintendent.  R.C. 3901.21 and 3923.16.  Here, however, it is not patent and 
unambiguous that Sibbring and DASCO’s claims would likewise be completely 
remediable by administrative proceedings under R.C. Title 39. 
 
Therefore, Judge Walker does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over Sibbring and DASCO’s claims, and appellants have an adequate 
remedy by appeal in the underlying action to raise their contentions.  State ex rel. 
Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Holmes Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 152, 684 N.E.2d 1234, 1236.  Appellants are consequently not entitled 
to the requested writ of prohibition. 
Mandamus and Prohibition; Venue 
 
Finally, appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Judge 
Walker to transfer venue of the underlying action from Erie County to Franklin 
County.  Nor are they entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Walker 
from proceeding in the underlying action because of the claimed improper venue in 
Erie County.  Extraordinary relief in mandamus or prohibition generally does not 
lie to challenge a decision on a motion to change venue because appeal following a 
final judgment provides an adequate legal remedy.  State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski 
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 623, 625, 665 N.E.2d 212, 215.  The cases relied on by 
appellants are inapposite because there is neither a prospect of simultaneous 
multiple actions nor a risk of appellants’ having to resort to an additional remedy 
besides mere retrial of a case following potential reversal on appeal.  75 Ohio St.3d 
at 625-626, 665 N.E.2d at 215, distinguishing State ex rel. Starner v. DeHoff 
(1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 163, 18 OBR 219, 480 N.E.2d 449, and State ex rel. Ohio 
State Racing Comm. v. Walton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 246, 525 N.E.2d 756. 
 
Banc One specifies no facts establishing that appeal would not be a 
complete, beneficial, and speedy remedy, and TIG’s contentions that appeal from 
any subsequent adverse final judgment would be inadequate because it would be 
 
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“too costly” are without merit.  State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 391, 395, 678 N.E.2d 549, 553-554.  The mere fact that postjudgment 
appeal may be expensive to pursue does not render appeal inadequate so as to 
satisfy extraordinary relief.  Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations Div. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 379, 667 N.E.2d 1189, 1194. 
 
Based on the foregoing, appellants did not establish entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Banc One Corporation was a multistate bank holding company that wholly 
owned Banc One Ohio Corporation, a bank holding company that owned several 
Ohio banks.  Banc One Ohio Corporation subsequently merged into Banc One 
Corporation, and in 1998, Banc One Corporation merged with First Chicago/NBD 
Bank to form Bank One Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principal 
place of business in Chicago, Illinois.