Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF TLC

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF TLC2002 WY 7646 P.3d 863Case Number: C-00-5Decided: 05/21/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION

OF 
TLC: 

TOC, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

TND and 
DLD, 

Appellees(Petitioners).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

DaNece 
Day Koenigs and Daniel B. Bailey of Lubnau, Hand & Bailey LLC, Gillette, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Koenigs. 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Michael N. Patchen, Gillette, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Patchen. 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and KITE, JJ.; and SPANGLER, D.J., 
Ret.

   

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
TOC (Father) appeals from the district court's order granting the adoption of 
his seven-year-old daughter, TLC to TND (Stepfather) without Father's 
consent.  We hold that the record 
does not demonstrate clear and convincing evidence to support either of the 
statutory factors relied upon by the district court to grant this adoption 
without the consent of Father.  
Accordingly, we reverse.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Father presents 
the following issues for our analysis:

 

A.  Did 
the District Court err in failing to strictly construe the provisions of W.S. § 
1-22-101 et seq. and grant every reasonable intendment in favor of the 
father contesting the adoption of his child?

 

B.  Was 
the District Court's finding that the father had willfully failed to pay child 
support pursuant to W.S. § 1-22-110(a)(iv) and (ix) an abuse of discretion when 
the failure to pay child support was a result of the father's 
incarceration?

 

C.  Was 
the District Court's finding that the father had abandoned the child pursuant to 
W.S. § 1-22-110(a)(iii) an abuse of discretion when there was no intent to 
abandon the child?

 

D.  Without 
specific statutory authority, can the District Court find a parent's 
incarceration sufficient grounds for entering an adoption pursuant to W.S. § 
1-22-110?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The record before 
this court contains no transcript of the hearing in this case.  Additionally, Father has improperly 
invoked W.R.A.P. 3.03 by failing to follow its requirements.1  However, for the limited purpose of 
generating this contextual section of our opinion, we will utilize portions of 
the parties' agreed upon statement of proceedings as otherwise supported by the 
record.  

 

[¶4]      On June 4, 1992, 
TLC was born to Father and DLD (Mother).  
Since her birth, the child has continuously lived with Mother.  Mother and child resided with Father for 
various periods from the time of the child's birth until the spring of 
1997.  During one of these periods, 
Mother and Father purchased a home together.  Mother and child have lived with 
petitioner Stepfather since May of 1997.  

 

[¶5]      In December of 
1995, Father was sentenced to serve a term of three to six years in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary for delivering a controlled substance.  He was released on probation and ordered 
to serve a forty-five day split sentence on weekends.  In April of 1996, his probation was 
revoked, and he was placed in the state penitentiary.  He was transferred to the Campbell 
County Community Corrections Facility in August of 1996 where he stayed until 
March of 1997.  In July of 1998, 
Father's parole was revoked and he was again placed in the state penitentiary 
until August of 1999 when he was again released to the corrections facility 
where he resided at the time of trial.  

 

[¶6]      Father's 
paternity and parental obligations were judicially established by a court order 
that was entered on September 15, 1995.  
The paternity decree required Father to pay $192 per month in child 
support.  In December 1999, Father 
owed $9,636.50 in child support arrearages.  During periods of incarceration, Father 
was under thirty-five to sixty-five percent wage withholding for his child 
support obligations and while imprisoned failed to seek modification of his 
child support obligation.

 

[¶7]      In addition to 
the periods Mother and Father lived together, Father saw the child approximately 
twenty times from her birth until the spring of 1997.  Since 1997, Father has purchased three 
gifts for the child including a bicycle and a clock. While in the penitentiary 
Father mailed his daughter three letters and made monthly collect calls to her 
lasting from two to five minutes.  

 

[¶8]      Stepfather and 
Mother filed a Petition for Adoption October 14, 1999, alleging that Father had 
abandoned the child and had willfully failed to provide court-ordered child 
support.  Father objected to the 
petition.  A hearing was conducted, 
and the district court entered its Final Decree of Adoption over Father's 
objection on January 21, 2000.  This 
timely appeal followed. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      
This court reviews orders of adoption under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  We succinctly stated this 
standard in Matter of Adoption of SMR, 982 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Wyo. 
1999):
 

The power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within the 
discretion of the trial court.  
Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo. 1996); 
Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo. 1986).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria."  Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 
257 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).  "In determining whether 
there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court 
could reasonably have concluded as it did."  Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d  at 377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 
1982)).  In the context of alleged 
abuse of discretion, the assessment of the circumstances in the case 
 

is tantamount to an evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient 
to support the decision of the district court.  In review of the evidence, we accept the 
successful party's submissions, granting them every favorable inference fairly 
to be drawn and leaving out of consideration conflicting evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party.
 

(Quoting Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 
1995).)
 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   It is within 
the following constitutional framework that we are constrained to review 
Father's case.  First and foremost, 
we recognize that the right to familial association is a fundamental right 
protected by both the Wyoming and the United States Constitutions.  DS v. Dep't of Public Assistance 
& Social Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 1980); Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1213, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (integrity of 
the family unit protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth 
Amendment).  Accordingly, adoption 
statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against a nonconsenting 
parent, and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's 
claims.  In re Adoption of Female 
Child X, 537 P.2d 719, 723 (Wyo. 1975); In re Adoption of Narragon, 
530 P.2d 413, 414 (Wyo. 1975).  This 
court has explored the substantial policies supporting that tenet in Matter 
of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976):
 

[T]he earliest and most hallowed of the ties that bind humanity, in 
all countries considered sacred, is the relationship of parent and child.  Therefore, parents have the first and 
natural right to their children.  A 
decree of adoption tears asunder forever the parent-child relationship and for 
all legal and practical purposes, that child is the same as dead to the parent 
affected.  The parent has lost the 
right to ever again see the child or even know of his whereabouts.  Courts cautiously guard the parent-child 
relationship. 
 

[¶11]   
Adoptions can occur without the consent of a parent only under certain 
statutorily delineated circumstances.  
Because of the fundamental liberty interest at stake, the applicable 
statutes must be strictly construed.  
Moreover, the party requesting adoption bears the burden of proving the 
existence of at least one of the statutory factors by clear and convincing 
evidence.  In re Adoption of 
Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862, 867 (Wyo. 1948) ("When a parent refuses 
to consent, and the matter in controversy is whether he had abandoned the child 
so as to dispense with the necessity of his consent, the burden of proof is on 
the party seeking to justify the adoption on that ground, and the courts often 
say that the evidence to show abandonment must be clear and convincing."); In 
re Adoption of Female Child X, 537 P.2d  at 722 ("Petitioners, seeking to 
establish an exception and facts which would justify the absence of parental 
consent, have the burden of this proof.")

 

[¶12]   
Subsequent to this court's decisions regarding the standard and burden of 
proof, the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the clear and convincing 
standard as the constitutionally mandated minimum standard for the termination 
of parental rights.  In Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 
(1982)2 the Court determined that: 

 

The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents 
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their 
child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a 
vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. 
If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have 
a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state 
intervention into ongoing family affairs.  
When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide 
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.

 

[¶13]   
The Court next reasoned that, "[t]he function of a standard of proof, as 
that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of 
factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence 
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for 
a particular type of adjudication.'" 455 U.S.  at 754-55, 102 S. Ct.  at 
1395 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979)).  It 
ultimately held:  "In parental 
rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the 
risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the 
countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively 
slight.  Evaluation of the three 
Eldridge factors compels the conclusion that use of a fair preponderance 
of the evidence' standard in such proceedings is inconsistent with due 
process."  455 U.S.  at 758, 
102 S. Ct.  at 1397.3  

 

[¶14]   
Turning now to our review of the instant case, as a consequence of 
Father's failure to comply with W.R.A.P. 3.03, this court cannot consider the 
agreed statement of proceedings submitted by the parties or any facts contained 
therein in rendering our decision.  
Jackson v. State, 624 P.2d 751, 756 (Wyo. 1981).  We must, therefore, refer to the 
district court's findings of fact in its order for the purposes of this 
discussion.  Under the circumstances 
of this appeal, all facts as found by the district court are required to be 
taken as adequately supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.  G.C.I. Inc. v. Haught, 7 P.3d 906, 911 (Wyo. 2000) ("When no transcript has been made of trial proceedings, 
this court accepts the trial court's findings as being the only basis for 
deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.")  Thus, the question before this court is 
whether the district court's findings of fact support its ultimate legal 
conclusion that the requirements of the applicable statutory subsections have 
been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.  Pursuant to the order, the district 
court granted the adoption without the consent of Father under two statutory 
sections, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iii) and (a)(ix).  

 

Abandonment
 

[¶15]   Section 
1-22-110(a)(iii) provides for the grant of adoption over the objection of a 
nonconsenting parent if the nonconsenting parent has "willfully abandoned or 
deserted the child."  The district 
court determined:
 

Pursuant 
to Wyoming Statute §1-22-110(a)(iii), this court finds that [Father] has 
willfully abandoned or deserted the child pursuant to the following facts: 
a) [Father's] contact with the minor child has been sporadic over her life 
time.  b) The testimony 
indicates that [Father] did not attempt to exercise regular visitation.  c) His lack of contact with the 
minor child was a result, among other items, [sic] the lack of reasonable notice 
given to the petitioners to see the child.  
d) While in prison, he called collect to the minor child once a 
month with the calls being 2 to 5 minutes in length.  Further, he sent the minor child 3 
letters and 3 gifts since 1997.  The 
Court can disregard such incidental contacts.  e) [Father] had the opportunity to 
establish a relationship in the life of the child, but he never availed himself 
of the rights and responsibilities of a parent nor developed any meaningful 
systematic way to have contact with the child and as a result has willfully 
abandoned and deserted the child.  
f) The Court will not put the good intentions of a parent before the 
best interests of a child.  The law 
does not allow a second chance to a parent who has not met the demands of 
parenting.

 

The 
facts as related in the order do not clearly and convincingly support a finding 
of willful parental abandonment.  
The trial court stated that Father had sporadic contact with his daughter 
over her lifetime.  The trial court 
also found that Father failed to exercise regular visitation.  Neither of these findings supports a 
determination that Father willfully abandoned his daughter.  A certain degree of parental 
inattention, neglect or temporary absence is not enough to establish willful 
abandonment.  In re Adoption of 
Female Child X, 537 P.2d  at 721; In re Adoption of Strauser, 196 P.2d  
at 868.  Infrequent but continuing 
contact with a child is sufficient to indicate an intent to maintain parental 
ties and prevent a finding of willful abandonment.  Matter of Adoption of SMR, 982 P.2d  at 1249.

 

[¶16]   
A finding of "abandonment" requires "an actual intent manifested to sever 
parental relations."  Matter of 
Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d  at 487.  
In this case, the facts in the order reflect that Father attempted to 
maintain contact with his daughter.  
This is implicit in the finding that one reason for the lack of contact 
between Father and his daughter was Father's failure to give reasonable notice 
to the petitioners (appellees) to see the child.  It is explicit in the finding that 
Father made monthly telephone calls to his daughter while he was in prison.  The trial court dismissed the telephone 
calls as "incidental" contact and thus irrelevant.  However, we think that such consistent 
contact cannot be disregarded, especially under a proper statutory construction 
of Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-110(a)(iii).  
We note the legislature has not made specific provision for incidental 
contacts to be disregarded under this section as it has in the termination 
provision of Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(i).  
Therefore, the better analytical approach would be to focus on the 
definitions of "willful" and "abandonment" as established by this court.  All contact should be analyzed within 
the context of these definitions.

 

[¶17]   
In the instant case, the monthly telephone calls and occasional letters 
indicate an attempt by Father to maintain contact with his daughter to the best 
of his ability while incarcerated.  
We do not hold that incarceration tolls a nonconsenting parent's familial 
obligations; however, when determining "abandonment," the trial court should 
consider whether an incarcerated nonconsenting parent, unable to fulfill the 
customary parental duties of an unrestrained parent, has nonetheless pursued the 
opportunities and options which may be available to carry out such duties to the 
best of his or her ability.  See 
generally, Annotation, Parent's Involuntary Confinement, or Failure to 
Care for Child as Result Thereof, as Permitting Adoption Without Parental 
Consent, 78 A.L.R.3d 712 (1977) and cases cited therein.  

 

[¶18]   
The district court also concluded that it would "not put the good 
intentions of a parent before the best interests of the child."  However, Father's intent was the crux of 
the issue before the district court on the subject of abandonment.  Because of the fundamental nature of 
parental rights, the issue of the requirement of parental consent to an adoption 
is determined without regard for the best interests of the child.  In re Adoption of Female Child X, 
537 P.2d  at 722; Matter of Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Wyo. 
1985) (best interests of child irrelevant until the consent issue had been 
resolved).  

 

[¶19]   Presumably, the "good intentions" 
referred to by the court are Father's good intentions to maintain contact with 
his daughter.  The facts as found in 
the order indicate that Father attempted to maintain contact, and at least while 
incarcerated did maintain consistent contact, with his daughter.  Because there is no evidence, clear and 
convincing or otherwise, of an actual intent to terminate the parental ties and 
a purpose to relinquish parental ties, the finding of abandonment must be 
reversed.

 

Willful nonpayment of court-ordered 
support

 

[¶20]   
The district court also granted the petition for adoption without the 
consent of Father pursuant to § 1-22-110(a)(ix).  Though enacted in 1992, this subsection 
has not yet been subject to interpretation by this court.4  Additionally, our research discloses 
that no other state has adopted a comparable provision, thus there is no 
persuasive authority which might aid in our statutory analysis.  Nevertheless, our rules of statutory 
construction are well established.  
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law, so our standard of review 
is de novo.  If the conclusion of 
law is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct 
it."  May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 1997) (citation omitted).  
In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  State ex 
rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  All statutes must be construed in pari 
materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating 
to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and 
construed in harmony.  Id. at 
735.  Holtz explained our 
statutory construction rules:

 

If the language is sufficiently clear, there is no 
need to resort to rules of construction.  
When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to 
the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of 
law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of 
the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is 
reasonable and consistent.  

 

Id. at 736; 
see also Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 
894 -95 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶21]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(ix) 
provides:

 

 (a)      In addition to 
the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108 the adoption of a child may be ordered 
without the written consent of a parent . . . if the court finds that 
the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or parents have:
 

. . .

 

(ix)  Willfully failed to pay a total dollar amount of at 
least seventy percent (70%) of the court ordered support for a period of two (2) 
years or more and has failed to bring the support obligation one hundred percent 
(100%) current within sixty (60) days after service of the petition to 
adopt.
 

[¶22]   Unfortunately, subsection (ix) has 
not been crafted with the linguistic precision desired in a statute that 
substantially affects a fundamental liberty interest of the citizens of this 
state.  Initially, we note that it 
fails to reference a focal point for the period of consideration comprising "two 
years or more" of willful nonpayment of child support.  The district court interpreted the 
statute to mean "two years or more" immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition to adopt.  We agree 
that this is the proper interpretation and by doing so ensure that subsection 
(ix) is applied consistently with subsections (iv) and (v) which reference the 
filing of the petition to adopt as the appropriate focal point.  

 

[¶23]   Other courts likewise have 
construed adoption statutes in this manner determining that such constructions 
are proper because they are reasonable and because termination of one's parental 
rights is a drastic action requiring that statutes like the present one be 
narrowly construed.  See e.g., 
Sale v. Leachman, 131 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1963); In re Adoption of Sharp, 
419 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1966); Petition of R.H.N., 673 P.2d 805, 806 
(Colo.App, 1983) (appeal after remand 678 P.2d 1070 (1984)), aff'd 710 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1985).  The Kansas 
Supreme Court, in interpreting a statute that included the phrase for "two 
consecutive years" but likewise referenced no focal point, reasoned 
thusly:

 

If the 
statute were construed to mean that any two-year period in which a parent failed 
or refused to assume parental duties was sufficient to dispense with consent, a 
parent, who through a change of heart or circumstances had attempted to reassume 
such duties after the two-year period, would be placed in the difficult position 
of proving there had been in fact repentance.  While there appears to be authority 
permitting a repentant parent to show a resumption of parental obligations and 
thus reacquire the right to object to adoption, we believe that by limiting the 
two-year period of consideration to that next preceding the filing of the 
petition a natural parent is placed in a more advantageous position to uphold 
his rights.  In other words, the 
fulfillment of parental duties and obligations, is, in our thinking, more 
accurately gauged by the facts found to exist during the two-year period next 
preceding the initiation of the adoption proceedings.  

 

            
In light of the foregoing rules of statutory construction, and the 
inclination of the courts to uphold the rights of the natural parent, we are of 
the opinion that it was reasonably intended by the legislature that the failure 
or refusal to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years 
. . . refers to the period next preceding the filing of a petition for 
adoption.

 

In re 
Adoption of Sharp, 419 P.2d  
at 814-15 (citation omitted.). 

 

[¶24]   The next 
portion of subsection (ix) we must interpret is its language, "[w]illfully 
failed to pay a total dollar amount of at least seventy percent (70%) of the 
court ordered support for a period of two (2) years or more."  It is conceivable this language might be 
interpreted to mean that the nonconsenting parent must have willfully failed to 
pay at least 70% of his monthly support payment for a period of at least 
twenty-four consecutive months; or alternatively, it could be interpreted to 
mean that the total dollar amount of his court-ordered support for a period of 
at least two years is aggregated and it is then determined whether he has 
willfully failed to pay at least 70% of that total dollar amount.
 

[¶25]   To 
illustrate:  if Parent has 
court-ordered support of $100 per month, if interpreted in the first manner, 
Parent may forfeit his right to withhold consent to the adoption of his child 
only if he fails to pay, at a minimum, $70 every month for at least twenty-four 
months.  If interpreted in the 
second manner, Parent may forfeit his right if he willfully fails to pay, at a 
minimum, 70% of $2,400, or $1,680, for at least the two-year period.  Ultimately, we think the second 
interpretation was the one intended by the legislature as demonstrated by its 
use of the term "total dollar amount."  
The inclusion of this phrase would seem to indicate that an aggregation 
of the monthly court-ordered support for at least a two-year period is 
contemplated.  
 

[¶26]   
We further necessarily conclude that the term "willfully" continues to 
modify the remaining portion of the sentence including the term 
"for a period of two (2) years or more."  
The plain language of the statute provides that the petitioner may 
prevail only if he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 
nonconsenting parent has willfully failed to pay the 
court-ordered support and that such willfulness has occurred "for 
a period of two years or more"5 and that the parent 
has failed to bring the support obligation one hundred percent (100%) current 
within sixty (60) days after service of the petition to adopt.  Stated another way, if within the 
two-year period the parent's nonpayment of child support is not proven as 
willful, a petitioner cannot meet his burden to prove the parent's willful 
nonpayment has occurred for the requisite period of time.  Consequently, a petition for adoption 
pursuant to this subsection must fail.  
To hold otherwise would excise the language "for a period of two years or 
more" from the sentence in question and relieve petitioners of their burden to 
prove two years of continual willful nonpayment of court-ordered child 
support.  The plain language of the 
statute adopted by the legislature and the rule of strict statutory construction 
that where two interpretations of the statute are reasonably possible, that 
interpretation which is most protective of the rights of the natural parent is 
to be selected further support this interpretation.  As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in 
Sale v. Leachman:

 

            
The statute here construed imposes a harsh and severe penalty upon the 
father not abiding by and obeying the mandate of a decree or order previously 
entered requiring him to pay a designated amount periodically for the support of 
his minor children.  The penalty is 
to take from his bosom his own children, blood of his blood and bone of his 
bone, and without his consent give them to another.  Our laws abhor penalties and 
forfeitures, . . . and a law imposing a penalty must be strictly 
construed.
 

Sale, 131 S.E.2d  at 188 (citations omitted).
 

[¶27]   
Finally, it should be obvious without extensive elaboration that the 
penalty of the forfeiture of one's parental rights cannot be imposed on the 
basis of strict liability through the application of a crude monetary 
equation.  Simple proof of a 
parent's failure to pay 70% of his or her court-ordered support for a period of 
two years or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition, is not, as a 
matter of law, sufficient to satisfy either the requirements of the statute 
itself or the protections guaranteed to the parent by the U.S. and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  Clearly, by 
inclusion of the modifying term "willfully" the statute draws a distinction, as 
it must, between the parent who though financially able to pay his court-ordered 
child support is unwilling to do so, and the parent who though willing to pay 
his court-ordered child support is financially unable to do so.  "A natural parent's failure to support 
his or her child does not obviate the necessity of the parent's consent to the 
child's adoption, where the parent's financial condition is such that he or she 
is unable to support the child." 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 88 (1994).  See Owens v. Griggs, 261 S.E.2d 463 (Ga.App. 1979); Leithold v. Plass, 505 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Civ.App. 
1974); In re Adoption of Masa, 492 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1986); see 
generally Annotation Natural Parent's Indigence Resulting from 
Unemployment or Underemployment as Precluding Finding that Failure to Support 
Child Waived Requirement of Consent to Adoption 83 A.L.R.5th 375 
(2000) and cases cited therein; and Annotation Natural Parent's Indigence as 
Precluding Finding that Failure to Support Child Waived Requirement of Consent 
to AdoptionFactors Other than Employment Status 84 A.L.R.5th 191 (2000) and cases cited therein. 

 

[¶28]   Moreover, 
this court has defined willfully in the context of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 as 
"intentionally, knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, 
and without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, 
inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly."  Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1982); Matter of Adoption of CJH, 778 P.2d 124, 127 
(Wyo. 1989); Matter of Adoption of SMR, 982 P.2d  at 1249.  While analyzing an analogous provision, 
§ 1-22-110(a)(iv) in Matter of Adoption of CCT, we said:  "Appellant's failure to contribute to 
the support of the children was not accidental, inadvertent or financially 
impossibleat least not during the year immediately prior to the filing 
of the petitions for adoption.  The 
failure was deliberate and voluntary.  
It was done consciously and intentionally and without justifiable 
excuse.  It was not due to 
oversight or lack of means to make contributions."  Id. at 76. (emphasis 
added).
 

[¶29]   In the case 
at bar, applying Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(ix), the district court in its 
order stated: 
 

8.  Under 
the Paternity Decree, [Father] is to pay $192.00 per month in child 
support.  Through December 1999, 
[Father] should have paid $13,292.00 in child support, and currently owes of 
that amount $9,636.50.

 

9.  The 
Court specifically finds [Father] willfully failed to pay at least 70% of the 
court ordered child support for a two year period prior to the filing of this 
petition and that he has not brought his support 100% current within 60 days 
after being served the petition as set forth in W.S. §1-22-110(a)(ix).  This finding of willful failure to pay 
is supported by the following facts:  
a) [Father] for the year prior to the petition made minimal support 
contributions.  However, since he 
entered the CAC in August 1999, in Gillette, Wyoming, his support has been 
reasonable and substantial.  b) His 
failure to pay child support from October 8, 1998, through October 8, 1999, is a 
consequence of incarceration which was his own making and which was 
willful.  c) [Father] was released 
on probation after he was sentenced in 1995.  His probation was revoked in 1996.  He was then placed on probation in 1997, 
failed to make child support payments in 1997 and was held in contempt of 
court.  His probation under a 
criminal case was revoked and he was incarcerated to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary in July 1998.  d) 
[Father] had the opportunity to avoid incarceration and pay support, but failure 
to pay support was a willful failure, as his acts which resulted in his sentence 
and probation revocation were willful acts.

 

[¶30]   The petition 
for adoption was filed October 14, 1999, alleging two years of nonpayment of at 
least 70% of court-ordered child support.  
Thus, the period of time under consideration is from October 13, 1997, to 
October 14, 1999.  The district 
court found:  "[Father] for the year 
prior to the petition made minimal support contributions.  However, since he entered the CAC in 
August 1999, in Gillette, Wyoming, his support has been reasonable and 
substantial. . . . His failure to pay child support from October 
8, 1998, through October 8, 1999, is a consequence of incarceration which was 
his own making and which was willful."  

 

[¶31]   Thus, the 
district court found that from October 8, 1998, through October 8, 1999, Father 
was incarcerated yet still during that time "made minimal support 
contributions."  Evidence in the 
record before us on review also supports this finding.  The district court further found that 
since August of 1999, Father's support had been "reasonable and 
substantial."6  

 

[¶32]   
As found by the district court, following his release from prison, and 
prior to the filing of the petition to adopt, Father made two child support 
payments well over the amount of his court-ordered support.  As a consequence, the petitioner 
Stepfather cannot show that the statute has been satisfied because any willful 
nonpayment by Father has not occurred "for a period of two years or more" prior 
to the filing of the petition for adoption.  See Matter of Adoption of A.F.M., 
960 P.2d 602, 604-05 (Alaska 1998) (vacating the adoption decree because the 
lower court implicitly misinterpreted the statute and therefore miscalculated 
the period of nonsupport as a year and a day rather than eleven months.)  

 

[¶33]   
Furthermore, the district court's reliance on Father's incarceration as 
providing the necessary grounds for dispensing with his consent to the adoption 
is clearly erroneous.  We herein 
expressly disapprove the reasoning used to decide that Father's nonpayment of 
child support was willful.  The 
court determined that "[Father's] failure to pay child support from October 8, 
1998, through October 8, 1999, is a consequence of incarceration which was his 
own making and which was willful."  
It concluded that Father, "had the opportunity to avoid incarceration and 
pay support, but failure to pay support was a willful failure, as his acts which 
resulted in his sentence and probation revocation were willful acts."  

 

[¶34]   
The statute requires that a parent must have "willfully failed to pay" 
support.  The act that must be 
willful is the failure to pay support.  
Incarceration, standing alone, does not provide the direct intent 
necessary to constitute willful failure to pay under the pertinent statute.  Otherwise, the granting of an adoption 
without the consent of a parent can be based upon a mere desire to compound the 
sentence for a parent's past crime.  
The statutory language clearly does not support such a result.7  

 

[¶35]   In Matter 
of Adoption of V.A.J., 660 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1983), the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reviewed the propriety of the granting of an adoption against the consent of an 
incarcerated parent on the statutory grounds of willful failure to contribute to 
the support of the minor.  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the order granting the adoption, finding that 
the incarcerated parent did not have the financial ability to pay any 
support.  In discussing the 
requirement that any failure to pay must be "willful," the court 
stated:
 

The statutory language . . . is clearly devoid of any 
explicit legislative intent that imprisonment for any crime or for any duration 
afford a ground for dispensing with a parent's consent.  The statute requires willful failure or 
refusal to contribute.  Imprisonment 
cannot be equated with willful failure to contribute to the child's 
support.  The natural father is not 
to be deemed willful when, as here, incarceration prevents his making any 
contribution to the child's support.  
The proper inquiry to address in this case is whether the natural parent 
intentionally incapacitated himself for the purpose of avoiding the duty imposed 
by law; if so, then imprisonment may constitute justification for dispensing 
with his consent in the adoption proceeding.  The evidence here does not support an 
inference that the father's commission of a felony, and subsequent incarceration 
therefor, was for the purpose of avoiding his support obligation.  Thus his incapacity to earn income and 
pay support may not be deemed "willful."
 

Id. at 141.  
(Footnotes omitted).  

 

[¶36]   In so 
holding, we do not imply that incarceration provides total justification for 
nonpayment of child support.  A 
parent must always pay child support according to his or her financial 
ability.  Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1993) (the legislature intended child support obligations to 
be paid where reasonably possible, including out of funds received by an 
incarcerated parent).  Rather, the 
focus must remain on the parent's intent and ability to pay.  The courts should look at whether the 
parent has demonstrated, through whatever financial means available to him, that 
the parent has not forgotten his statutory obligation to his child.  See Baker v. Nicholson, 279 S.E.2d 717 (Ga.App. 1981) (overruled on other grounds) (reversing and remanding 
case for trial court finding that failure to support or communicate with child 
was without justifiable cause where father by reason of his incarceration was 
involuntarily prevented from supporting his children and involuntarily 
restricted in his communication with his children.  "[W]e would be remiss in the exercise of 
judicial economy to fail to note that there is a paucity of evidence to support 
a finding that appellant was without justifiable cause in failing to support or 
communicate with his children.  To 
hold otherwise would subject every prisoner without independent means to the 
loss of his parental rights."  At 
718.)
 

[¶37]   Accordingly, 
the focus must be on Father's ability to provide court-ordered support, and, if 
he lacked the ability, the reason therefore.  The order under review does contain 
affirmative findings regarding payments by Father for at least one year.  The trial court found that Father made 
minimal support contributions for the year preceding the filing of the 
petition.  The trial court concluded 
that Father was unable to make full child support payments during this period of 
time because of his incarceration.  
No other reason for nonpayment of the full amount of court-ordered 
support is given.  There is no 
indication in the order under review that Father's acts resulting in his 
incarceration were in any way motivated by an intent to avoid payment of 
court-ordered child support.  The 
court went on to specifically find that Father has made "reasonable and 
substantial" contributions since his release to CAC in August 1999.  This suggests that the lack of payment 
of the full amount of court-ordered child support for a period of one year 
within the statutorily required "period of two years or more" was the result of 
a lack of ability to pay rather than a deliberate repudiation of parental 
responsibilities.  See also In re 
Adoption of S.E.B., 891 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1995) (stating that under 
applicable statute, courts are required to take into consideration the period of 
time that the father was incarcerated and unable to support the children and 
finding father's incarceration for seven of the required twenty-four months 
meant under the circumstances the trial judge had improperly granted the 
adoption).  
 

[¶38]   For the foregoing reasons, we hold 
that the district court improperly interpreted and applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-110(a)(ix).  We reverse the 
court's grant of adoption to petitioner pursuant to this subsection because, 
under the facts as found by the trial court, Stepfather cannot, as a matter of 
law, satisfy the requirements of the statute that he show by clear and 
convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to pay 70% of court-ordered 
child support for a period of two or more years prior to the filing of the 
petition to adopt.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶39]   
The district court abused its discretion in granting Stepfather's 
petition to adopt over the objection of the child's natural father.  The court misinterpreted the applicable 
statutory subsections in determining that clear and convincing evidence 
supported Stepfather's claims pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(a)(iii) and 
(ix).  Accordingly, the court's 
order granting the adoption is vacated and this case is 
reversed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1           
The parties submitted an agreed statement of the proceedings.  However, this attempted statement fails 
to comply with W.R.A.P. 3.03 in two regards.  First, W.R.A.P. 3.03 can be utilized 
only to provide a settled statement of a proceeding if a transcript is 
unavailable.  A transcript is 
unavailable only if the proceeding was not stenographically or otherwise 
recorded or if the recording is somehow lost or destroyed. 16A Charles A. 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d 
§ 3956.3, at 341 (3d ed. 1999).  
The record before us does not reflect whether the hearing was recorded, 
stenographically or otherwise.  
Father merely states in his Notice of Appeal that "no transcript of this 
proceeding was made."  This 
statement is insufficient to invoke the use of W.R.A.P. 3.03.  If the proceeding was recorded, it is 
mandatory for Father to have a transcript made and present to this court at 
least those sections of the transcript pertinent to the issues on appeal.  

The second problem with the process 
attempted by Father to provide a settled statement of the proceedings is that 
the statement, although signed by the attorneys for the parties, was never 
presented to the district court for its approval.  W.R.A.P. 3.03 clearly requires trial 
court approval of a statement before it can properly be considered settled and 
become part of the record.  

 

2The Court held that determination of 
the precise burden equal to or greater than the "clear and convincing" standard 
is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts. 

3Though Santosky v. Kramer 
involved state-initiated neglect proceedings, as this court has held, the 
requirement for clear and convincing evidence supporting termination is equally 
applicable to the parental rights terminations involved in stepparent-initiated 
adoption proceedings because the same fundamental liberty interest of the 
natural parent in the relationship with the child is involved and because the 
State, through its courts, acts to sever a parental tie. 

4Nor has this statutory subsection 
been subject to constitutional challenge. 

5If the petitioner chooses to allege 
nonpayment of court-ordered support for a period of time greater than two years, 
then he also must prove the nonpayment was willful for the entire time so 
chosen. 

6The record indicates that Father 
made the following payments. 

9/24/1999          
$238.79

10/8/1999          
$264.98

10/22/1999        
$293.58

11/5/1999          
$192.63

11/15/1999          $96.73

7This court rejected similar 
reasoning in Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1998).  There the district court refused to 
modify an incarcerated father's child support obligation finding that the father 
had "voluntarily" committed a criminal offense and had thus become "voluntarily 
underemployed" for the purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-302(b).  In reversing the judgment we held, 
"[a]lthough this statute does not explain how to determine whether or not a 
parent is voluntarily underemployed, it illustrates what types of situations 
qualify a parent as being voluntarily underemployed.  The legislature obviously did not 
contemplate voluntarily committing a crime when it enacted this statute."  Id. at 1266.