Title: Renko v. McLean

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  77
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
NATASHA RENKO
v.
TERESA KAYLOR McLEAN
___________________________________
Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
    Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:  July 30, 1997        
         
       Robert McLean is Natasha Renko's stepfather.
1
       The Complaint charged Teresa McLean with direct negligence as the operator
2
of the motor vehicle in which Natasha Renko sustained her injuries.  Robert McLean
was named as a defendant under a theory of vicarious liability for engaging Teresa
McLean as an agent or servant.
In Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994), and
Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986), this Court declined
to create an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine in
motor tort cases based upon the existence of compulsory automobile
liability insurance coverage.  We are asked in this case to
reexamine those decisions.  Having done so, we shall reaffirm the
vitality of the parent child-immunity doctrine in this State and
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
I.
The facts of this case are brief and undisputed.  On December
8, 1992, Natasha Renko suffered serious injuries when her
biological mother, Teresa Kaylor McLean, negligently drove the car
both women were occupying into the rear of another vehicle.  At the
time, Natasha Renko was seventeen years old.
On January 18, 1994, and following her eighteenth birthday,
Renko filed a Complaint and Election of Jury Trial in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County seeking damages in the amount of
$100,000 for injuries she allegedly sustained in the December 8,
1992 automobile accident.  The Complaint named Teresa McLean and
her husband, Robert McLean,  as defendants,  here appellees. 
1
2
       Natasha Renko did not appeal the judgment entered in favor of her
3
stepfather, Robert McLean.
       We have departed from this rule on only two occasions.  First, when a
4
child has suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent,
an action for monetary damages may be maintained.  Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77
A.2d 923 (1951).  Second, a child may sue a parent's business partner for negligence
committed in the operation of the partnership.  Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md.
340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988).  The reasons for these departures are discussed more
fully, in Part III a., infra.
       The first formulation of the parent-child immunity doctrine was adopted
5
(continued...)
-2-
Both Teresa and Robert McLean filed Motion[s] to Dismiss.
Robert McLean subsequently filed an independent Motion for Summary
Judgment.  In a hearing on the motions, Renko beseeched the court
to recognize an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine and
allow emancipated children to file actions against their parents
for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents occurring in
minority between fifteen and eighteen years of age.  The court
declined to do so and entered judgment in favor of the appellees.
Renko appealed the judgment entered in favor of her mother to
the Court of Special Appeals.   We issued a writ of certiorari
3
before consideration by the intermediate appellate court of the
issues presented in this appeal.
II.
For nearly seventy years, the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine has been, with few exceptions,  a salient feature of
4
Maryland law.  See Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498
(1930).   It remains so today.
5
     (...continued)
5
by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891).  Mississippi has since repudiated the doctrine in motor tort cases.  See
Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
       The immunity does not apply to tort actions between parents and their
6
adult children arising beyond minority .  Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 125-
26, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957).
       See, e.g., Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369, 381 (1868)(father entitled
7
to earnings of minor child); Lucas v. Maryland Drydock, 182 Md. 54, 58-60, 31 A.2d
637, 639 (1943)(parents possess right to discipline children for the benefit of
their education); Mahnke, 197 Md. at 64, 77 A.2d at 924 (minor childrens' rights
inferior to parental rights so that latter can effectively discharge their parental
obligations); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 510-11, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1977)(duty of
support entitles father to child's earnings and services); Singer v. Singer, 300 Md.
604, 611, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984)(parents have duty to support adult
incapacitated child); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, CH. 16, OF PARENT AND CHILD.
       Indeed, Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 5-203(b)(1)
8
of the Family Law Article obligates parents to provide for the "support, care,
(continued...)
-3-
Once an absolute bar to tort actions between parents and their
minor children,  the parent-child immunity doctrine grew out of an
6
abiding belief that it served the compelling public interest in
preserving, under normal circumstances, the internal harmony and
integrity of the family unit and parental authority in the parent-
child relationship.  Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622, 650 A.2d
252, 254; Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 145-46, 571 A.2d 1219, 1222
(1990); Frye, 305 Md. at 548, 505 A.2d at 829-30; Yost v. Yost, 172
Md. 128, 134, 190 A. 753, 756 (1937); Schneider, 160 Md. at 21-22,
152 A. at 499-500.  In fact, the special relationship, with its
reciprocal duties and obligations, that the minor child shares with
his or her parents forms a major component of the foundation upon
which the parent-child immunity doctrine is built — a relationship
recognized both at common law  and by the General Assembly.    Other
7
8
     (...continued)
8
nurture, welfare, and education of their children," and §§ 10-203 and 10-209 of that
same Article provide for civil and/or criminal penalties upon a failure to do so.
See also §§ 10-301, et seq. (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act).  In
that regard, the preservation of the family is, and has always been, a primary
objective of Maryland law.  See § 4-401 of the Family Law Article.
-4-
justifications offered for the rule include the prevention of fraud
and collusion among family members to the detriment of third-
parties, and the threat that intrafamilial litigation will deplete
family resources.  See Warren, 336 Md. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255.
Nevertheless, the parent-child immunity doctrine has never
stood static where historical experience and common sense dictated
that it must yield.  Indeed,
"[t]he parent[-]child immunity rule . . . was
a creature of the common law.  It was
judicially conceived, judicially adopted in
Maryland, 
judicially 
changed 
in 
certain
significant aspects, and otherwise judicially
nurtured and applied in this jurisdiction[.]"
Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 839; see also n.4, supra.  But
our acknowledgment that circumstance sometimes severs the doctrine
from its rationale and reason in no way detracts from our
fundamental belief that "the parent-child immunity rule [is still]
essential to the maintenance of discipline and to the stability of
family harmony."  Frye, 305 Md. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836; see also
Warren, 336 Md. at 622-24, 650 A.2d at 254-55.
In Frye, supra, we exhaustively surveyed the creation and
refinement of the parent-child immunity doctrine both in this State
and across our Country.  Despite the growing chorus of criticism
       See, e.g., Pipino, In Whose Best Interest?  Exploring the Continuing
9
Validity of the Parent Child Immunity Doctrine?, 3 Ohio St. L.J. 1111 (1992); W.
Prosser & W.P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 122 (5th ed. 1984); Comment, Parent-Child
Tort Immunity: Time for Maryland to Abrogate an Anachronism, 11 U.Balt. L. Rev. 435
(1982); Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
Fordham L. Rev. 489 (1982); Comment, The Demise of Parent-Child Immunity, 12
Willamette L. J. 605 (1976); Comment, Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity:
A Call to Repudiate Mississippi's Gift to the American Family, 4 Nova L.J. 25
(1980);  McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 521 (1960);
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. R. 1030, 1077-1081
(1930).
-5-
surrounding the doctrine,  we determined that the parent-child
9
relationship had changed little, if at all, in the ensuing years
since our predecessors first recognized parent-child immunity.  We
thus concluded that "today's parent-child relationship, as
recognized by this Court and the Legislature, furnishes no
compelling reason to abrogate the rule."  Id. at 561, 505 A.2d at
836; see also Warren, 336 Md. at 627-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57.
III.
Renko nonetheless mounts a three-pronged attack upon the
parent-child immunity doctrine.  She asserts that (1) adult
children should be allowed to maintain actions against their
parents for injuries occurring in their minority; (2) no
contemporary justification exists to apply the doctrine to the
facts of the case sub judice in light of compulsory motor vehicle
liability insurance; and (3) any such application is violative of
Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We shall
address each of these contentions in turn.
       Md. Code (1993 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 9-401 of the Corporations and
10
Associations Article requires that
"(1) Each partner . . . must contribute towards the
losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the
partnership according to his share in the profits.
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities
reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper
conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its
business or property."
In our view, application of § 9-401 would have "the economic effect [of] . . .
reduc[ing] the recovery within the family unit by the parental partner's
contractual, pro rata share of the partnership liability to the plaintiff."
Hatzinicolas, 314 Md. at 359, 550 A.2d at 956.
-6-
a.
Renko correctly points out that we have permitted suits
between parents and their minor children in limited circumstances.
For instance, we have held that a minor child may maintain an
action against a father's business partner for alleged negligence
arising out of the operation of the partnership.  Hatzinicolas v.
Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988).  That decision was
predicated upon our belief that the parent-child relationship, so
important to the parent-child immunity rule, would remain inviolate
in a suit against the father’s business partner. Id. at 357, 550
A.2d at 947.
We further observed that (1) assuming the existence of a
business liability insurance policy, the father had already paid
his share of liability through his contribution to policy premium
payments; or (2) it would otherwise be unrealistic to assume that
the father did not take his partnership contribution obligation10
-7-
into account when the familial decision was made to initiate a suit
against his partner; and (3) although the ultimate decision to sue
may impair or even destroy the relationship between the partners,
that relationship is not the focus or concern of the parent-child
immunity rule.  Id. at 358, 550 A.2d at 956.    Thus, despite the
possible financial impact upon the father (and therefore, the
family) by the successful prosecution of a suit against his
business partner by a minor child, we concluded that "preservation
of the family interests [justifying the parent-child immunity
doctrine] does not require [the extension of the doctrine] to bar
any recovery from a parent's partner."  Id. at 357, 550 A.2d at
955.
Recognizing that reality sometimes belies the ideal of family
life, our predecessors also deemed permissible a suit by a minor
child against her father's estate for alleged injuries she
sustained when, within the span of one week, the father both
murdered the child's mother and committed suicide in the child’s
presence.  Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).  The
Court reasoned that
"[i]n these circumstances, there can be no
basis for the contention that the daughter's
suit against her father's estate would be
contrary to public policy, for the simple
reason that there is no home at all in which
discipline 
and 
tranquility 
are 
to 
be
preserved. . . . [W]hen . . . the parent is
guilty of acts which show complete abandonment
of the parental relation, the rule giving him
immunity from suit by the child, on the ground
       Section 5-201 provides in relevant part:
11
“Persons under a disability.
(a) Extension of time. — When a cause of action
subject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title
accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that
person shall file his action within the lesser of three
years or the applicable period of limitations after the
date the disability is removed."
-8-
that discipline should be maintained in the
home, cannot logically be applied, for when he
is guilty of such acts he forfeits his
parental authority and privileges, including
his immunity from suit. . . .  Justice demands
that a minor child shall have a right of
action against a parent for injuries resulting
from cruel and inhuman treatment or for
malicious and wanton wrongs."
Id. at 67-68, 77 A.2d at 926.
Renko contends that since this Court has already permitted
children to maintain actions against their parents for acts
occurring after the child reaches the age of majority, see
Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957), we should
take the logical step of allowing otherwise adult children to sue
their parents for wrongful acts that occur during minority.  We see
no such logic.  In fact, Renko's proffered solution to her
particular dilemma would result in a de facto abrogation of the
parent-child immunity doctrine in its entirety.
Maryland Code (1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), § 5-201  of the
11
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article permits minors to bring tort
actions for injuries sustained in minority at the hands of another
within three years after reaching the age of majority.  Thus, an
-9-
injured minor child could simply wait until reaching the age of
majority before initiating a suit that is otherwise barred in his
or her infancy.  In that circumstance, the parent-child immunity
doctrine would serve not as a bar to actions between parent and
child, but rather as an obstacle easily overcome with the passage
of time.  The looming specter of a lawsuit is as surely detrimental
to family peace and harmony and parental authority as is the actual
suit itself.  Given this Court's long commitment to the parent-
child immunity doctrine, we refuse to create an exception that
would effectively negate the rule and open courthouse doors to
every conceivable dispute between parent and child.  See Warren,
336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.  Indeed, the rule was fashioned to
prevent just that.  Id.
b.
Renko alternatively contends that "with mandatory automobile
insurance creating universal coverage for auto torts, there can be
no rational objection to recovery by an emancipated child in" the
case sub judice.  Maryland Code (1992, 1996 Supp.), § 17-103 of the
Transportation Article and Md. Code (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1995
Supp.), Art. 48A, §§ 539, 540, 541 respectively require Maryland
drivers to procure, and Maryland insurers to provide, certain
minimum liability insurance coverage for personal injury and
property damage caused by automobile accidents resulting from the
       See La. Rev. Stat. § 9:571 (West 1997); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801
12
(Ala. 1992); Robinson v. Robinson, 323 Ark. 224, 914 S.W.2d 292 (Ark. 1996); Terror
Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1994); Mohorn v. Ross, 205 Ga. App. 443,
422 S.E.2d 290 (1992); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974);
(continued...)
-10-
primary negligence of the insured.  See National Grange Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 704, 399 A.2d 877, 882 (1979).
Included within these statutes are uninsured motorist provisions
that enable innocent victims of automobile accidents to recover
from their own insurers in the event that the negligent driver is
without insurance.  Art. 48, § 541; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 737, 436 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1981).  It is
these statutes upon which Renko relies.
We recognized in Warren and Frye, supra, that an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions have abrogated the parent-child immunity
doctrine in whole or in part.  See Warren, 336 Md. at 627 n.2, 650
A.2d at 257 n.2; Frye, 305 Md. at 562-54, 505 A.2d at 836-37.  For
a discussion of those cases, see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation,
Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child caused by
Parent's Negligence — Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981, 1996
Supp.).
At the time we issued the Warren opinion, "[o]nly eight
states, including Maryland, continue[d] to adhere to the doctrine
of parent-child immunity without exception for motor torts."  336
Md. at 621 n.1, 650 A.2d at 254 n.1.  Those same jurisdictions
continue to stand their ground.12
     (...continued)
12
Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
-11-
Other jurisdictions, however, have found persuasive arguments
calling for the abolition of the parent-child immunity doctrine in
motor tort cases.  The seminal decision in this area is Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 307 (1975).  There, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed:
“In dealing with an automobile accident in
which two passengers, one an unemancipated
minor child of the defendant driver and the
other a minor who had no familial relationship
to the defendant driver, are injured, it would
be incongruous to permit recovery against a
parent and the parent's insurance company by
the unrelated child but to deny recovery to
the 
parent's 
child 
when 
culpability 
is
admitted or established."
Id. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913.  Noting the basis of the parent-
child immunity doctrine, the court commented that
"[t]he primary disruption to harmonious filial
relations is not the lawsuit brought for
damages after the injury but the injury
itself, resulting from the misconduct of a
parent.  Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282
A.2d 351[, 355] (1971).  When the wrong has
been committed, the harm to the basic fabric
of the family has already been done and the
source 
of 
rancor 
and 
discord 
already
introduced into family relations.  Tamashiro
v. De Gama, 51 Hawaii 74, 78, 450 P.2d 998[,
1001] (1969).  Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419,
429, 142 N.W.2d 66[, 73] (1966).  It can
hardly aid family reconciliation to deny the
injured child access to the courts and,
through them, to any liability insurance which
the family might maintain."
Id. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913.
     
  See Broadbent v. Broadbent, 178 Ariz. 53, 54-55, 870 P.2d 1149, 1150
13
(continued...)
-12-
 
Considering the same issue, the Supreme Court of Delaware
concluded, that with the almost universal existence of motor
vehicle liability insurance,
"the domestic tranquility argument is, at
best, 
hollow. 
 
Liability 
insurance
impersonalizes the suit and negates the
possible disruption of family harmony by
easing the financial repercussions of the
accident.  In short ‘when insurance is
involved, the action between parent and child
is not truly adversary; both parties seek
recovery from the insurance carrier to create
a fund for the child’s medical care and
support without depleting the family's other
assets.’"
Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del. 1979)(citing
Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 362-63, 339 N.E.2d at 914);  see also
Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979)(affirming abrogation of
parent-child immunity in auto tort cases where insurance coverage
exists).  Stated otherwise, "domestic peace and harmony may be more
threatened by denying the cause of action than by permitting one,
especially where there is insurance."  Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.
2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992).  Thus, the argument goes, abrogating
parent-child immunity where automobile liability insurance exists
furthers the objectives of the rule by relieving the family of the
financial burden of an adverse judgment while at the same time
providing a means of recovery for the injured child.  Numerous
other jurisdictions concur in this view.  
13
     (...continued)
13
(1993); Myers v. Myers, 891 P.2d 199, 204 (Alaska 1995); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d
1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982); Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 851, 712 P.2d
550, 552 (1985); Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill.2d 76, 107, 619 N.E.2d 715, 730 (1993);
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (1980); Black v.
Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont.
173, 180, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983); Bank v. Bank, 136 N.H. 286, 289, 616 A.2d 464,
465-66 (1992); France v. A.P.A. Trans. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267 A.2d 490, 494
(1970); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 29, 627 P.2d 869, 871 (1981); Nuelle v.
Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D. 1967); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1368
(Okla. 1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 731-32, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984); Silva
v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (R.I. 1982); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671, 673
(Tex. 1988); Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971);
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980); Lee v. Comer,
159 W. Va. 585, 589-90, 224 S.E.2d 721, 721-23 (1976).
-13-
The Delaware court added that the "domestic-tranquility
justification" also lacked merit in light of the fact that other
courts have permitted various types of intrafamilial litigation,
including, inter alia, suits between siblings.  Williams, 369 A.2d
at 672 (citing Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875
(1960)(suit brought by a minor against his unemancipated brother
for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident); see also Smith
v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971)(parent-
child immunity anachronistic when applied to automobile accident
litigation).
The fraud-collusion justification for the parent-child
immunity doctrine too has suffered its critics, among them, the
Mississippi Supreme Court — the birthplace of the parent-child
immunity doctrine.  See Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891).  In Glaskox, supra, the court majority observed that
“‘[t]he possibility of collusion exists to a
certain extent in any case.  Every day we
depend on juries and trial judges to sift
-14-
evidence in order to determine the facts and
arrive at proper verdicts.  Experience has
shown that the courts are quite adequate for
this task.  In litigation between parent and
child, judges and juries would naturally be
mindful of the relationship and would be even
more on the alert for improper conduct.’"
614 So. 2d at 912 (quoting Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758,
768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980)).   In a similar vein, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has added:
“In the last analysis it is much to be
preferred that we depend upon the efficacy of
the judicial process to ferret out the
meritorious from the fraudulent rather than
using a broad broom to sweep away a class of
claims, a number of which are admittedly
meritorious.”
Falco v. Pados, supra, 444 Pa. at 381, 282 A.2d at 356.
Recognizing the continuing need to protect parental authority
and family harmony, some jurisdictions have attempted to limit
immunity to negligent conduct arising out of an “exercise of
parental authority . . . [or] an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care.”  Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); see also
Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1988); Plumley v.
Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 9, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); Rigdon v.
Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971).
California and New York have adopted their own unique brands
of parent-child immunity.  California courts apply a “reasonable
     
  In this context, Justice Shepard of the Supreme Court of Idaho has
14
observed with respect to his court’s decision to abrogate the parent-child immunity
doctrine in motor tort cases because of mandatory automobile liability insurance
that
“[t]he reason family members are less likely to experience
disharmony over the lawsuit is that they will be more
likely to agree on liability.  A parent is more likely to
admit to negligence, whether or not it is true, when the
insurance coverage of the parent’s child is involved.”
Farmer Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 857, 712 P.2d 550, 558 (1985)(Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
-15-
parent” standard to determine the viability of tort actions between
parent and child.  Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d
648, 653 (1971).  New York, on the other hand, seems to permit all
such actions, except those arising out of a parent’s failure to
properly supervise the child.  Under New York law, parents owe no
legal duty to their children to supervise them properly.  Holodook
v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (1974).
Despite the majority trend, even those most critical of the
rule must acknowledge that its abrogation is not a panacea.  At
least with respect to motor tort cases, the argument for abrogation
suffers from several infirmities.
In a normal case, liability insurance becomes relevant only
after an insured’s liability is fixed in an appropriate legal
proceeding.  Yet as between parent and child, it becomes the raison
d’être of the suit.  Thus, unlike a true adversarial proceeding, an
insurer is forced into the unenviable position of attempting to
defend a suit that its insured has every incentive to lose.14
-16-
This, of course, inevitably leads the trier of fact to realize
that the suit targets not the parent or child (to whom immunity
would otherwise attach) but rather the insurance company.  Maryland
follows the majority rule that evidence of liability insurance on
the part of a defendant is generally inadmissible. Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 258, 572 A.2d 154 (1990); see also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 191, 553 A.2d 1268, 1272
(1989);  Jones v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 252 Md. 475, 494-95, 250
A.2d 653, 664 (1969); Snowhite v. State, 243 Md. 291, 301, 221 A.2d
342 (1966); Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md. 249, 263, 19 A.2d
169, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 672, 62 S. Ct. 134, 86 L. Ed. 538
(1964).  This policy stems from the fact that the matter of
insurance is irrelevant to the issue of a defendant's liability and
evidence of that irrelevant fact is highly prejudicial to the
defendant’s case.  Morris V. Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 680, 579 A.2d
762, 765 (1990)(quoting Atwood, supra, 319 Md. at 258, 572 A.2d at
159).  Yet the insurance justification for abrogation of the
parent-child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases ignores the
practical considerations associated with this policy.  Indeed, at
least one commentator has acknowledged that “[a]n insurance
underwriter may experience . . . problems in defending an intra-
family tort claim.”  See Comment, Parent Child Immunity:  Time for
Maryland to Abrogate an Anachronism, 11 U.Balt. L. Rev. 435, 464-65
(1982).
      In light of the commonly used “household exclusion” in automobile insurance
15
policies, this circumstance is likely to occur.  See State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide
Mut., 307 Md. 631, 643, 561 A.2d 586, 592 (1986)(household exclusion clause in
automobile liability insurance policy invalid to extent of minimum statutory
liability coverage, but otherwise valid and enforceable for exclusions above that
minimum).
-17-
It is a common experience in many courts that a jury’s
generosity is proportional to the amount of available insurance.
Although it has been suggested that informing juries prior to
deliberations that unjustly high awards affect insurance rates
universally, see id. at 466, that warning instructs jurors to
consider cautiously an issue they ought not to consider at all.
Also, the insurance-based argument in favor of abrogation
fails to assess the consequences of an award that exceeds available
coverage.   Is the child then to proceed against the assets of the
15
family?  If that is so, it is hard to believe that the rancor and
discord the insurance is said to obviate would not find its way
back into the mix.  While denying an “injured child access to the
courts, and through them any liability insurance the family . . .
maintain[s] [might not] aid family reconciliation,” see Sorensen,
supra, 369 Mass. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913,  the same can be said
of handing an injured child a large damage award and allowing him
or her to ravage a family through further collection proceedings.
Either way, the family suffers.  And even assuming that a child’s
recovery is limited to the amount of available insurance, the
argument that his or her recovery should be no different than that
of any person negligently injured once again takes center stage.
-18-
Further, many families carry medical insurance that would
necessarily compensate the injured child, and therefore, his or her
family, for injury-related expenses.  Allowing children then to
proceed to court and recover for pain and suffering and other
noneconomic damages, which often far exceed medical costs, might
potentially saddle a family with a judgment that they can ill-
afford to pay because, as previously indicated, it exceeds
available insurance.
Finally, Justice Lee of the Supreme Court of Mississippi
cogently observed that many of the arguments against parent-child
immunity
“impl[y] 
that 
a 
child 
injured 
by 
the
negligence of a parent is adrift in our
current system with no rights of all. . . .
[T]ort law cannot erase physical injuries or
soothe human suffering.  It can only insure
that 
injured 
parties 
are 
compensated.
[P]arents 
already 
have 
the 
legal
responsibility of providing care for their
children. . . .  A policy of immunity in no
way detracts from the seriousness of the issue
of parental neglect or other forms of abuse.
The proper remedy for these injuries, however,
is 
eternal 
vigilance 
on 
the 
part 
of
individuals 
and 
government 
agencies 
and
vigorous enforcement of criminal statutes.”
Glaskox, supra, 614 So. 2d at 916 (Lee J., dissenting).
In light of the foregoing observations and on balance, we
remain convinced that the parent-child immunity rule “is still in
the best interests of both children and parents to retain . . .
[and that] [a]brogating immunity would result only in further
      Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
16
 
“That every man, for any injury done to him in his
person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of
the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land.”
      Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Right provides:
17
“That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”
     
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
18
relevant part:
“No State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”
-19-
discord within the family and would interfere with the exercise of
parental discretion in raising and disciplining children.”  Warren,
336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 255.
c.
Renko lastly contends that the parent-child immunity doctrine
as applied in motor vehicle torts is “irrational and arbitrary and
violates Articles 19
 and 24
 of the Maryland Declaration of
[16]
[17]
Rights, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
[Fourteenth Amendment to the] United States Constitution.
  We
[18]”
find these assertions to be meritless.
With respect to her contention that denying a minor child
access to the courts for injuries sustained at the hands of a
-20-
negligent parent violates the injured child’s due process rights,
Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 628 A.2d 162 (1993)
is dispositive.  In Johnson, we considered the constitutional
validity of an administrative claim requirement under the Maryland
Tort Claims Act.  See Md. Code (1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Supp.), §§
12-101, et seq. of the State Government Article.  In so doing, we
could not “agree [with the Petitioner’s assertion] that there is a
constitutionally protected vested property right in a particular
cause of action.”  Johnson, 331 Md. at 298-99, 628 A.2d at 168; see
also Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 362-63, 601 A.2d 102, 112
(1992).  Renko therefore states no cognizable claim under either
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.
Ed. 2d 548, 556-57 (1972)(in order to assert a due process claim,
individual must have property or liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408,
410, 564 A.2d 414, 415-16 (1989); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287
Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056 (1980)(Art. 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights construed in pari materia with Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution); accord Oursler v.
Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 483, 13 A.2d 763, 768 (1940).
Renko’s equal protection claim suffers a similar analysis.
Although Article 24 does not contain an express equal protection
     
  We find this assertion curious in light of Renko’s contention that the
19
“proper” result in this case is to “permit emancipated children to maintain actions
against a parent (at least for auto torts) committed by a parent after the minor
turns [sixteen] years of age.”  Although such a result would obviously benefit her
cause, she offers no explanation why the line she draws is any less arbitrary or
capricious then the age of majority currently set by the Legislature in Md. Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1, § 24(a).
-21-
clause, the concept of equal protection nevertheless is embodied in
the Article.  See State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Board of
Supervisors, 342 Md. 586, 595 n.6, 679 A.2d 96, 100 n.6 (1996);
Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 623 n.3, 667 A.2d 876, 884 n.3
(1995); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 101 n.17, 660 A.2d 447, 462
n.17 (1995); Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d
967, 969-970 (1994).  In that regard, federal equal protection
decisions are illustrative.  Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 264-65,
623 A.2d 648, 650 (1993).  Even so, we have found neither State nor
federal authority supportive of Renko’s position, and she cites
none.
Renko maintains that the common law parent-child immunity
doctrine impermissibly discriminates against her and others
similarly situated based upon age and familial status.  Neither,
however, is a “suspect class” under traditional equal protection
jurisprudence.   Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
19
U.S. 307, 312, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 524-25
(1976); accord In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 397, 325 A.2d 398, 415-16
(1974)(age).  See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.
Ct. 2727, 
2729, 
91 
L. 
Ed. 
2d 
527, 
533 
(1986)(familial
-22-
relationship).  Thus, even assuming, without deciding, that the
common law doctrine of parent-child immunity is subject to
constitutional attack, we must determine if the classifications of
which Renko complains bear any reasonable or rational relation to
the objectives of the rule.  See Kirsch v. Prince George’s County,
331 Md. 89, 104, 626 A.2d 372, 379 (1993).  Under this analysis,
the parent-child immunity doctrine
“can be invalidated only if the classification
is without any reasonable basis and is purely
arbitrary.  Further, a classification having
some reasonable basis need not be made with
mathematical nicety and may result in some
inequality.  If any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain the
clarification, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was [adopted] must
be assumed.”
Whiting-Turner Contract. Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352, 499 A.2d
178, 185 (1992).
For the reasons articulated in Part II of this opinion and
exhaustively explained in Warren and Frye, supra, we conclude that
the parent-child immunity doctrine survives the rational basis
standard of review.  We continue to believe that the doctrine well
serves the citizens of this State by insulating families from the
vagaries and rancorous effects of tort litigation.  That it may
occasion undesirable consequences is quite irrelevant.  “‘To be
able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity.
It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial
interference.  The problems of government are practical ones and
-23-
may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations,
illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’”  In re Trader, supra, 272
Md. at 399, 325 A.2d at 416-17 (quoting  Metropolis Theatre Co. v.
City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S. Ct. 441, 443, 57 L. Ed.
730, 734 (1913)).
Similarly, although we have held that “Article 19 does
guarantee access to the Courts . . . [,] that access is subject to
reasonable regulation.”  Edmonds, supra, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d
at 113.  In light of the fact that parents are charged with the
“support, care, nurture, and welfare” of their children, see n.8,
supra, Maryland law has long recognized, save for extraordinary
circumstances, that the parent-child immunity doctrine is a
reasonable and well-founded limitation upon a child’s access to our
courts, serving to protect one of the most fundamental and sacred
units in our society.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.