Title: Donley v. Donley

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Donley v. Donley  (95-463); 165 Vt 619; 686 A.2d 943

[Opinion Filed 3-Oct-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-463

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1996


Debra Donley                         }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     Windsor Family Court
                                     }
David Donley                         }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. F198-8-92WrFa


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals the family court's denial of his motion to set aside
  a relief-from-abuse order.  We affirm.

       In August 1992, plaintiff, who is defendant's sister and rented an
  apartment in the home of the parties' mother, obtained a relief-from-abuse
  order based on an incident in which defendant physically attacked her and
  threatened to kill her.  The order required defendant to stay away from his
  sister, and permitted defendant to visit his mother at her home only within
  a three-hour period every other Sunday afternoon.  As a result of the
  incident, defendant was also charged with aggravated domestic assault.  A
  jury acquitted him of that and lesser-included offenses in June 1993.  In
  January 1994, defendant's sister obtained an extension of the abuse-
  prevention order "until further order of the court," with the same
  conditions.  In June 1995, defendant was served with a summons for
  violating the order when he remained at his mother's residence beyond the
  allotted time.  In July 1995, defendant filed a motion to set aside the
  order, claiming that (1) there had been a substantial change of
  circumstances since it was issued; (2) the unlimited duration of the order
  was unlawful; (3) the jury acquittal was res judicata as to whether he
  abused his sister, and the extended order placed him in double jeopardy for
  the same offense; and (4) his sister had lacked standing to obtain the
  order.  The family court denied the motion, rejecting each of these
  arguments.  On appeal, defendant raises only the latter two arguments. 
  First, he claims that because his sister is not a family or household
  member as defined in 15 V.S.A. § 1101(2), she lacked standing to obtain the
  abuse-from-relief order, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to issue
  it.  Second, he claims that the issuance of the extended order based on the
  same incident for which he had been previously acquitted of domestic
  assault charges violated the principles of res judicata and placed him in
  double jeopardy.

       We first note that although defendant seeks to set aside a prior
  order, he provides no grounds to do so as set forth in V.R.C.P. 60(b).  See
  V.R.F.P. 9(a) (except as provided in this rule or by statute, rules of
  civil procedure shall apply to actions to prevent abuse).  A person who is
  the subject of an abuse-prevention order may seek modification of the order
  based on a change of circumstances, 15 V.S.A. § 1103(d), but here, rather
  than seeking modification based on changed circumstances, defendant seeks
  to set aside the January 1994 order by challenging its validity on
  jurisdictional and other legal grounds.  Accordingly, he must satisfy Rule
  60(b).

       Because defendant's motion to set aside was filed more than one year
  after the order was issued, he cannot proceed under subsections (1), (2),
  or (3) of the rule.  See V.R.C.P. 60(b) (motion shall be made within
  reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than

 

  one year after order was entered).  Subsection (5) is not relevant.  Nor do
  subsections (4) (judgment is void) or (6) (any other reason justifying
  relief) provide the relief defendant seeks, at least with respect to his
  jurisdictional claims.  Rule 60(b) "`is not intended to function as a
  substitute for a timely appeal.'"  Richwagen v. Richwagen, 153 Vt. 1, 3,
  568 A.2d 419, 420 (1989) (quoting Tetreault v. Tetreault, 148 Vt. 448, 451,