Title: PAGE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAGE v. STATE2003 WY 2363 P.3d 904Case Number: 01-230Decided: 02/25/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 
   

FRANKLIN 
ROSS PAGE,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
          
       

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Ericka S. 
Cook, Assistant Attorney General.

 
         
           
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
the appellant, Franklin Ross Page (Page), of felony possession of marijuana, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2001).  Page was sentenced to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a period of fifteen to thirty months.  Page contends in this appeal that his 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress evidence obtained 
during a search of Page's residence.  
Page argues that such a motion would have been granted because the 
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant did not establish probable cause 
to search.

 
            
            
 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 
 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The issues presented 
in this case are:

 
  
    

            
1.         
Whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in 
failing to move to suppress evidence seized during a search of Page's 
residence?

            
2.         
Whether the judicial officer who issued the search warrant erred as a 
matter of law because the affidavit presented in support of the warrant did not 
establish probable cause to search?

 
            
              
    

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In early 2001, 
Page was living at a residence in Gillette with his girlfriend and his 
girlfriend's daughter.  On March 6, 
2001, a Campbell County Sheriff's deputy went to the residence to perform a 
welfare check on the child.  His 
purpose was to ascertain the living conditions in the residence.  Upon the deputy's arrival, the child's 
mother allowed him to enter the residence.  
Page was present.  The deputy 
inspected the residence and made arrangements for the girl to reside with 
relatives until conditions in the residence could be improved.

 
  
            
        

[¶5]      During the course 
of the inspection, the deputy noticed a pipe fitting with a duct-taped handle in 
the entry room.  He picked it up, 
noticed burnt residue on the end, and asked what it was.  Page replied that he used it to smoke 
tobacco.  The deputy then asked Page 
if there were other similar pipes in the residence.  Page produced another pipe, which he 
again said was used to smoke tobacco.  
Upon the deputy's assertion that the pipes did not smell like tobacco, 
Page admitted that he had smoked marijuana from the second pipe.  The deputy then called another deputy to secure the premises while he 
obtained a search warrant.

 
       
        

[¶6]      A circuit court 
judge issued a warrant to search Page's residence, based on the deputy's 
four-page affidavit.  During the 
ensuing search, numerous items identified as drug paraphernalia, plus about .11 
grams of marijuana, were seized.  
After his arrest, and after being advised of his "Miranda rights," Page 
admitted that the marijuana was his.  
The pipes seized before the warrant was obtained, the items seized after 
the warrant was obtained, and Page's admission that the marijuana was his were 
the State's primary evidence against Page at trial.

 
            
             
       

            
The 
Affidavit

 

[¶7]      In four separately 
numbered paragraphs, the deputy's affidavit set forth the following 
information:

 
  
          

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      We have recently 
repeated our well-established standard for reviewing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:

 
   
         
  

"When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986).  
The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment.  
Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 104; 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 
1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo.1986); 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In 
other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such 
assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and 
that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of [the] case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo.1990).  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064.'

 
      
  

Chapman 
v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 
(Wyo.2000))."

 
  

Becker 
v. State, 
2002 WY 126, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 94, 98-99 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 
105, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Wyo. 2001)).  An appellant bears the burden of proving 
that counsel was ineffective.  
Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 
2002).  Specifically, with reference to the 
allegations of this case, the failure to file a suppression motion does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se.  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 
58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002).  Prejudice to a defendant can only be 
shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been granted, and had the 
evidence been suppressed, "only a limited amount of evidence was available to 
the prosecution to support a conviction.'"  
Id. at ¶ 59, 43 P.3d  at 102 (quoting Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 612 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

[¶9]      Our recent 
jurisprudence reveals the development of a "separate state constitutional 
analysis" of search and seizure issues, emphasizing Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4, 
which reads as follows:

 
  
         
             
   

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, 
particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
              
            
          
              

See 
Hixson v. State, 
2001 WY 99, 33 P.3d 154 (Wyo. 2001); 
Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, 33 P.3d 142 (Wyo. 2001); 
and Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999).1  Our review of the sufficiency of an 
affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant is de novo.  Hixson, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 7, 33 P.3d  
at 157.  In applying a "totality of the 
circumstances" test, we give deference to the probable cause determination of 
the judge issuing the warrant, and the appellant has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that his rights were violated.  Id.  The test is as 
follows:

 
    

            
"In order to issue a search warrant, the judge or magistrate must have a 
substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause exists.  * * *  The judge or magistrate must be supplied 
with sufficient information to support his independent judgment that probable 
cause exists.  * * *  The affidavit must include facts 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent and cautious man to believe that a 
crime has been committed and that there is evidence of the crime at the place to 
be searched.'  * * *  While mere suspicion is not enough, 
certainty is not required.  * * 
*

            
There is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit 
supporting a search warrant.  * * 
*  Furthermore, the affidavit is to 
be tested by much less vigorous standards than those governing the admissibility 
of evidence at trial.  * * *  The issuing judge's determination should 
be paid great deference upon appeal.  
* * *  Because of the 
preference for warrants, and the desire to encourage law enforcement personnel 
to seek warrants, any doubt should be resolved by sustaining the 
search."

 
   
           
           

Id. 
at ¶ 6, 33 P.3d  at 156-57.  Because 
the Wyoming Constitution, unlike the Fourth Amendment, requires an affidavit, 
rather than just an oath or affirmation, we have held that sufficient factual 
support for issuance of the warrant must be found within the affidavit, itself, 
and may not be provided by additional testimony at the time the warrant is 
issued.  Hixson, 2001 WY 99, 
¶ 7, 33 P.3d  at 157; 
Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d  at 148.2

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   The deficiencies in the affidavit 
that was used to obtain the search warrant in this case are patent.  To begin with, the affidavit states that 
the affiant's "personal knowledge" is based upon "information and belief," the 
latter standard having long been found wanting in this state.  Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 16, 33 P.3d  at 149; 
State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342, 348 (1920).  Next, while the affiant's training and 
experience are factors to be considered, especially in the context of a 
warrantless arrest or a warrantless search, they have less validity in 
determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant.  Cordova, 2001 WY 
96, ¶ 16, 33 P.3d  at 149.  That is because the judge3 is the one charged with making the 
ultimate determination; he may not simply rely on the claimed expertise of law 
enforcement officials.  
Id.

 

[¶11]   There is nothing factual within the 
affidavit to support the paragraphs detailing what the affiant "believes" and 
"knows" about what he is likely to find if the search is authorized.  Indeed, these paragraphs appear to be 
"boilerplate" taken from a form intended for use when a search of a known drug 
dealer's premises is contemplated.4  Similarly, the paragraphs setting forth 
the results of the welfare inspection, and noting the presence of the second 
deputy and his dog, present no facts from which a detached judge could infer the 
presence of controlled substances or any other evidence of a crime.  In particular, a refusal to consent to a 
search may not form any part of the basis for probable cause to search.  United States v. Skidmore, 894 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990); 
State v. Washington, 623 So. 2d 392, 397 (Ala.App. 1993).  See also United States v. Manuel, 
992 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1993); 
State v. Moreno, 619 So. 2d 62, 66 (La. 1993); 
and Garcia v. State, 103 N.M. 713, 712 P.2d 1375, 1376 (1986).

 

[¶12]   The only relevant facts contained 
in the affidavit in the present case are those set out in the paragraph 
describing the two pipe fittings with duct-taped handles and burnt residue.  And there is no indication in the 
affidavit that the pipes were used to ingest marijuana or any other controlled 
substance.5  Page claimed he used them to smoke 
tobacco.  The affiant makes no claim 
to the contrary, either based on his observations or his training and 
experience.  It is certainly "too much of a leap" to allow 
the issuing judge to speculate that the affiant must have thought the pipes were 
used to ingest controlled substances.

 
    
               
         

[¶13]   In the hierarchy of protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the location deserving the highest 
level of protection is the personal residence.  In this area of the law, a man's home 
truly is his castle.  
Peterson, 194 P.  at 345.  A citizen's expectation of privacy, 
which is the starting point for analyzing the question of the reasonableness of 
a search or seizure, is certainly at its highest level in his home.  For that reason, it 
is imperative in cases of residential searches that we keep in mind the 
limitations upon the deference we are to afford to the findings of the judge 
issuing a search warrant.

 
       
             
              

This 
deference places the burden of establishing a constitutional violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence on parties claiming that their rights were 
violated.  However, it is
  

"not 
to be employed to blindly sustain the actions of the magistrate or to place any 
reviewing court in a position that it may refuse to examine the factual basis 
for such issuance.  To refuse or to fail to do so could result in 
serious erosion of one of our most valuable constitutional rights, and unless 
there is factual basis for determination of probable cause this court would be 
evading its responsibility by failing to declare this to be the 
case."

 
    
               
           
            
     

Cordova, 
2002 WY 96, ¶ 11, 33 P.3d at 148 (quoting Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 133 (Wyo. 1976)).

 

[¶14]   When the search warrant was issued 
in this case, the issuing judge knew only that the affiant had located in the 
residence two duct-taped pipe fittings with burnt residue that the owner claimed 
were used to smoke tobacco.  Under 
an objective test, that is simply too little information to justify the sweeping 
assertions made by the affiant and relied upon by the judge in issuing the 
warrant.  In his affidavit, the 
affiant does not even claim that the pipes did not smell like they had been used 
to smoke tobacco, or that they smelled like they had been used to smoke 
marijuana, or that they resembled other homemade instruments used to smoke 
marijuana.  The gap from fact 
to inference was simply too great for the warrant to have been issued in this 
case.

 
     
              

[¶15]   We must assume that, had this issue 
been raised in the district court by defense counsel, the district court judge 
would have applied the same law and would have reached the same conclusion that 
we have reached.  A motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search, including Page's later 
admission, would have been granted, leaving the State with no evidence with 
which to prosecute Page.  Given the 
fact that the State's entire case rested on this evidence, no reasonable 
attorney would have foregone the opportunity to test the search warrant via a 
motion to suppress.  Page was 
clearly prejudiced by counsel's failure in that regard.  Page received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.
     

GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION

 

[¶16]   Near the end of its brief, the 
State opines that "[e]ven if the affidavit were deemed deficient, the search of 
Appellant's house and the seizure of the evidence in question can be sustained 
under the good faith' rule set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)."  The State then goes on 
to describe how in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court fashioned a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule whereby, if an officer relies in good faith upon a search 
warrant, the fruits of the search will not be suppressed just because the 
warrant is later determined to have been invalid.  While we acknowledge the existence of 
this exception under the Fourth Amendment, we have never been called upon to 
determine whether the same exception should be recognized under Wyo. Const. art 
1, § 4.  The instant case is not the 
proper one in which to take up this task.  
Neither side has presented the issue as part 
of a separate state constitutional analysis and we are not inclined to pursue 
the issue absent such input.

            
             

CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]   Defense counsel was ineffective in 
failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of Page's home 
pursuant to the warrant.  Page was 
prejudiced by introduction at his trial of the evidence that would have been 
suppressed had such a motion been made.  
Without such evidence, it is probable that the trial would have had a 
different outcome.  Indeed, without the illegally obtained evidence, it is highly likely that 
there would have been no trial, since the State had no other 
evidence.

 
  
             
        

[¶18]   Resolution of this case in this manner 
obviates the need separately to answer the second issue posed by 
Page.

 
      
            

[¶19]   Reversed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:  

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

2The 
affidavit may, however, be formally supplemented under W.R.Cr.P. 41(c).  See Hixson, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 7 n.4, 
33 P.3d  at 157 n.4.

3We 
use the word "judge" as a general term to include all judicial 
officers.

4The 
lack of care in construction of the affidavit is evidenced by the fact that ten 
lines of such boilerplate are repeated in two separate 
paragraphs.

5Inexplicably, 
Page's alleged admission that he used the second pipe to smoke marijuana was not 
mentioned in the affidavit.