Title: Hozian v. Weathermon

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hozian v. Weathermon1991 WY 161821 P.2d 1297Case Number: 91-102Decided: 12/13/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
TAMRA L. HOZIAN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

GARY B. WEATHERMON, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Edward Grant, 
J.

Ronald E. Triggs, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Raymond W. Martin, 
Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
THOMAS and MACY, JJ., and ROONEY and BROWN, JJ. 
(Retired).

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     Appellee, Gary B. 
Weathermon, while driving behind appellant, Tamra L. Hozian, on a snowy and icy 
road, struck the rear of Hozian's vehicle. In a lawsuit filed by appellant, the 
trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and this appeal 
followed.

[¶2.]     The single issue is 
whether summary judgment was appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case.

[¶3.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶4.]     On December 21, 1989, 
at approximately 2:00 p.m., appellant was driving her automobile near the 
eastern outskirts of Cheyenne and approaching the intersection of 
12th and Kingham Streets. It was snowing and there was an accumulation of snow 
on the street, but generally, the streets were not icy or slick. There is a 
slight disagreement about the accumulation of snow on the road. Appellee, when 
asked if the roads were slick, said "[n]ot really." Appellant testified that 
appellee told the police that he was going forty miles per hour before the 
collision. Appellee paid a fine for careless driving after the intersection 
collision.

[¶5.]     Appellant was 
approximately two car lengths from the intersection and traveling between twenty 
and twenty-five miles an hour when she signaled for a right-hand turn. She began 
to steadily apply her brakes at the same time she began to signal and, 
immediately thereafter, her vehicle slid on an icy section of roadway and she 
was unable to complete her turn within the arc and distance originally planned. 
Appellant's vehicle missed the normal turning point, stopped in the travel lane, 
and remained stationary for approximately five seconds before appellee's car 
"rear-ended" her vehicle.

[¶6.]     Ice had formed in the 
area of the intersection and both parties lost control of their vehicles at 
substantially the same time - appellant when she began to brake and signal, and 
appellee when he responded to appellant's brake lights and turn signal. A broken 
water main in the vicinity may have been the source of the water in the 
intersection which had turned to ice. Appellee testified he thought he may have 
been able to stop in time to avoid the accident if he had been twice as far 
behind appellant's automobile. In that event, he said he could have changed 
lanes. Appellee's theory of defense was that the accident was unavoidable. The 
trial court apparently agreed with appellee and granted his motion for summary 
judgment from which order this appeal is taken.

[¶7.]     The standard of review 
in summary judgment cases applicable here has been set out in recent Wyoming 
Supreme Court cases. We have noted that summary judgments are not favored, 
particularly in negligence actions. Randolph v. 
Gilpatrick Construction Co., Inc., 702 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1985).

     Summary judgment is a 
useful tool for disposing of litigation in which there are no real issues or 
questions of fact that ought to be determined in a trial. Larsen v. Roberts, 
Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 (1984). It is, however, a drastic remedy which, when granted, deprives a 
litigant of a right to trial. It, therefore, ought to be utilized with caution 
and restraint. Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980); Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976). Negligence cases 
usually involve mixed questions of law and fact concerning the existence of a 
duty, the standard of care required of a reasonable person, and proximate cause 
and are ordinarily not susceptible to summary adjudication. Keller v. Anderson, supra; Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1350 
(1974).

Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559, 560 (Wyo. 1985).

     A motion for summary 
judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a prima 
facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 
present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. 
England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (1986). We 
analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts.

Boehm v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶8.]     In summary judgment 
actions, all reasonable inferences are to be given the nonmoving party. 
Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986). If reasonable 
minds could reach different conclusions and inferences from the facts, the issue 
of negligence must be submitted to the trier of fact.

     Whether, under the 
circumstances of this case, appellee was negligent in failing to keep a proper 
lookout was a question to be resolved by the jury. Failure to keep a proper 
lookout, excessive speed, reliance on stop signs, or other situations of 
observation are jury questions. See Welch v. Young, 225 Kan. 189, 589 P.2d 567 (1979); Batt v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 470 P.2d 337 
(1970).

Brockett v. Prater, 675 P.2d 638, 641 (Wyo. 1984).

The question of 
negligence, whether nonexistent, slight or gross, is one of fact and if the 
evidence respecting it is in conflict and such that ordinarily might draw 
different conclusions, a question of fact for the jury to determine is 
presented.

Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680, 684 (Wyo. 1976).

In negligence cases, the 
question of negligence is one of fact for the jury to decide if the evidence 
respecting the negligence is in conflict, and we must be mindful that negligence 
issues do not often lend themselves to summary 
adjudication.

Connett v. Fremont County School District No. 6, FremontCounty, 581 P.2d 1097, 1104 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶9.]     In the case before us, 
there is some dispute regarding appellee's speed immediately before the 
collision and there is a slight difference in the testimony regarding the 
condition of the road and the extent of the ice.

[¶10.]  We believe that reasonable minds could 
reach different conclusions and inferences from the facts of this case. 
Considering the summary judgment standards of review, together with the facts of 
this case, we conclude that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that 
appellee was traveling too fast for existing conditions; and/or he failed to 
keep a proper look out; and/or failed to maintain a proper and safe distance 
between his and appellant's vehicles; and/or failed to take evasive action by 
changing lanes or otherwise; and/or failed to keep his vehicle under 
control.

[¶11.]  Reversed and remanded for 
trial.