Title: State v. Moses

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-117


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Diane Moses                                  November Term, 1991


 Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

 Christopher C. Moll, Chittenden County Deputy State's Attorney,
   Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant challenges her probationary sentence, which was
 imposed after a plea of no contest, contending that five special conditions
 of probation included in the sentence are not reasonably related to the
 crimes committed or are unnecessarily restrictive.  Although challenged on
 similar grounds, each of the five conditions presents a separate inquiry.
 Two of the challenged conditions are reasonably related to ensuring that
 defendant avoids future criminal activity; those conditions are affirmed.
 We hold that the remaining three special conditions are overbroad and
 unnecessarily restrictive; they are reversed and the case remanded.
      The state's charges in this case are set forth in the affidavit of the
 investigating officer.  Defendant took an elderly woman into her home and
 confined her for a period of almost fifteen months.  During this time,
 defendant forced the woman to turn over her pension income to defendant.
 She physically abused the woman on numerous occasions and, on at least one
 occasion, sexually abused her.  She was aided in this abuse by her boyfriend
 and other men.
      Defendant was arrested and subsequently pleaded no contest to kid-
 napping, one count of elderly abuse, and two counts of assault.  She was
 sentenced to ten to twenty years on the felony kidnapping charge and zero to
 six months on each of the remaining charges.  All the sentences were
 suspended except for six months to serve, and defendant was placed on
 probation.  In addition to certain standard conditions, the trial court
 imposed the following special conditions:
         18. You shall reside where your Probation Officer
             directs;
         23. You shall not open, maintain, or possess any
             materials for a checking account;
         24. You shall not receive as [a] representative payee[,]
             nor in any other manner[,] monies belonging to
             another person than yourself;
         25. You shall not associate with any person prohibited
             by your probation officer;
         26. [You] must consent in writing to all inspections and
             enforcement of these conditions, including search
             and investigation without warrant when necessary.
      At sentencing, defendant objected to these special conditions, arguing
 that each of the conditions either bears no reasonable relation to the crime
 committed, is unnecessarily restrictive, or fails to place defendant on
 sufficient notice of what conduct violates the terms of probation.  This
 latter problem, defendant argued, is the result of the probation officer's
 unlimited discretion to determine the conditions.  The court, noting that
 defendant has a history of taking elderly people into her home to prey upon
 them, overruled the objections and expressed a "very deep and a very abiding
 concern" for the safety of others in support of the imposition of special
 conditions.  Defendant subsequently filed a motion for correction and
 modification of sentence, which the trial court denied without hearing.
      Vermont law authorizes a sentencing court to set probation conditions
 that reasonably relate to the crime committed or that aid the probationer in
 avoiding criminal conduct.  28 V.S.A. { 252(b)(13); see State v. Whitchurch,
 155 Vt. 134, 137, 577 A.2d 690, 692 (1990) (citation omitted); State v.
 Mace, 154 Vt. 430, 435, 578 A.2d 104, 107 (1990).  We further stated in
 Whitchurch that probation conditions "`should not be unduly restrictive of
 the probationer's liberty or autonomy.'"  155 Vt. at 137, 577 A.2d  at 692
 (quoting American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice 2d { 18-
 2.3(e)).  Although the trial court has discretion in determining appropriate
 conditions of probation, we are required to find error where, applying
 proper legal standards, discretion has been exercised to a clearly
 unreasonable extent.  See State v. Goodrich, 151 Vt. 367, 375, 564 A.2d 1346, 1351 (1989).
      Two of the conditions imposed by the trial court satisfy the Vermont
 standards on probation conditions.  The condition that defendant not receive
 monies as a representative payee (condition 24) is clearly related to her
 criminal activities.  The record establishes that defendant's desire to
 control the funds of her elderly victims was one of the primary motivating
 forces of her behavior.  Curtailing her ability to handle monies in a
 representative capacity is closely linked to eliminating the conduct for
 which defendant has been placed on probation.  Thus, this restriction is
 proper.
      The condition that defendant not associate with any person prohibited
 by her probation officer (condition 25) is an acceptable term of probation
 in the proper case.  The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
 Justice 2d { 18-2.3(f)(vii) authorize conditions that restrict a probationer
 from "consorting with specified types of people."  See also Weissman,
 Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 N. Eng. J. on Prison
 L. 367, 376 (1982) ("associational restrictions supported by evidence of
 reasonable relationship to crime prevention will be upheld").  Where the
 potential class of victims is broad -- and individual associations are not
 always foreseeable or easily subject to prior approval -- the condition
 necessarily must retain a degree of flexibility to facilitate its proper
 implementation.
      The special condition restricting defendant's freedom of association is
 reasonably related to the underlying offenses, in which the victim suffered
 abuse at the hands of both defendant and her male companion.  The condition
 is intended to prevent defendant from associating with individuals who might
 induce her to take advantage of weak, frail people of the type she has
 previously abused, as well as such vulnerable potential victims.
 Imposition of this probation condition is within the reasonable discretion
 of the trial court.
      The three remaining challenged probation conditions are overbroad and
 excessively restrictive and, as such, are clearly unreasonable extensions of
 judicial discretion.  First, condition 23, which prohibits defendant from
 maintaining a checking account, does not meet the Whitchurch requirement
 that a probation restriction be reasonably related to the crime, nor does it
 satisfy the requirement that the restriction not be "unduly restrictive" of
 defendant's autonomy.  As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has explained
 in describing a standard similar to ours:
         [A] condition is related to the goals of probation if it
         is designed, in light of the crime committed, to promote
         the probationer's rehabilitation and to insure the
         protection of the public.  A condition is reasonable if
         it is not unnecessarily harsh or excessive in achieving
         these goals . . . .  [C]onditions that restrict a
         probationer's freedom must be especially fine-tuned.

 United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis in
 original) (citations omitted); see also Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (otherwise permissible condition of probation is
 invalid if negative impact on probationer is "substantially greater than is
 necessary to carry out [its] purposes").
      This restriction is hardly "fine-tuned" to accomplish its purpose.  It
 is so indirectly related to the conduct to be prevented that it can only
 have a minor impact.  Defendant can maintain a savings account or enlist the
 aid of third parties with checking accounts.  She will have to establish a
 relationship with some business, bank or person to cash checks because her
 income is likely to come by check.  It is not clear why that business, bank
 or person would refuse to cash third-party checks.
      On the other hand, the lack of a checking account is a serious impedi-
 ment to conducting a normal and desirable economic life.  Everyday chores
 like paying a utility bill become far more difficult without a checking
 account.  Before depriving a probationer of this basic tool of economic
 interaction, a sentencing court should ensure that the measure is closely
 linked to the conduct to be regulated.  Given the highly attenuated
 connection of this restriction with defendant's criminal activity, we cannot
 conclude that the condition is reasonable.
      It takes little creativity to see that other restrictions would provide
 much more public protection, with less imposition on defendant's legitimate
 needs.  For example, defendant could be required to provide check returns to
 the probation officer to demonstrate that she has not engaged in the type of
 conduct for which she has been convicted.  It is no coincidence that the
 only reported cases involving a no-checking-account probation condition
 relate to defendants who have been convicted of passing bad checks. (FN1) See,
 e.g., People v. Burden,