Title: OWEN R. PHILLIPS V. TOM C. TONER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

OWEN R. PHILLIPS V. TOM C. TONER2006 WY 59133 P.3d 987Case Number: 05-77Decided: 05/12/2006
APRIL TERM, 
A.D. 2006

 
 
OWEN R. 
PHILLIPS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
TOM C. 
TONER,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, 
Retired

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C. M. Aron, of Aron & Hennig, 
LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Raymond B. Hunkins and Amanda 
Hunkins Newton, of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Dr. 
Phillips appeals from an Order Granting Summary Judgment.  He contends the district court erred in 
deciding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred his claims.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]       Are Dr. 
Phillips' claims barred by collateral estoppel?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       Dr. 
Phillips is a professor at the University of Wyoming and Chair of the Department of 
Economics.  In 2002, he was hired by 
Jack J. Grynberg to provide services as a consulting economist for Mr. Grynberg 
in a Colorado 
lawsuit.  A dispute arose between 
Dr. Phillips and Mr. Grynberg regarding Dr. Phillips' bill.  The dispute was not resolved and, in 
2003, Dr. Phillips initiated litigation against Mr. Grynberg to recover payment 
in the amount of $52,896.00 for services rendered (Phillips I).

 
 
[¶4]       The 
district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Grynberg on the basis 
that Dr. Phillips and Mr. Grynberg had entered into a contract as reflected in a 
November 4, 2002, letter from Dr. Phillips to Mr. Grynberg.  The district court determined that Dr. 
Phillips had been paid in full pursuant to the provisions of the agreement.  Dr. Phillips responded to the order by 
filing a Rule 60 motion in which he asked the district court to set aside the 
judgment on the basis that the district court had erred in finding that the 
November 4, 2002, letter established the terms of the contract.  Dr. Phillips contended that the work for 
which he sought payment resulted from "an entirely different agreement . . . 
made with Mr. Toner."  The district 
court denied the motion finding that there was only one contract and reiterated 
its decision that Dr. Phillips had been paid in full.  Dr. Phillips did not appeal the order 
granting summary judgment or the order denying the Rule 60 motion.  Instead, he sued Mr. Toner (Phillips II).

 
 
[¶5]       Mr. Toner 
is a Wyoming 
attorney.  He represented Mr. 
Grynberg in the Colorado litigation.  In Phillips II, Dr. Phillips alleged that 
Mr. Toner was legally obligated for payment of the $52,896.00.  He alleged theories of recovery based 
upon money owed on account, breach of contract, quantum meruit, negligent 
misrepresentation, and fraud.  Mr. 
Toner denied the allegations and filed a motion for summary judgment.  The district court granted the motion 
finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and Dr. Phillips' 
claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Dr. Phillips timely appealed from the 
Order Granting Summary Judgment.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 

 
 
[¶6]       Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Lee v. LPP Mortgage Limited, 2003 
WY 92, ¶ 8, 74 P.3d 152, 157 (Wyo. 2003).  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
The record must be viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving to that party all favorable inferences that fairly 
may be drawn from the record.  
Id.  
"We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de 
novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling."  Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 7, 86 P.3d 270, 274 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]       Collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and involves an 
analysis of four factors:  (1) 
whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue 
presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in 
a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel 
is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; 
and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 
WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 2001).  
Dr. Phillips concedes that the prior adjudication in Phillips I resulted in a judgment on the 
merits and that he was a party in Phillips I.  He contends that collateral estoppel 
does not bar his claim against Mr. Toner because the issues determined in Phillips I were not identical to the 
issues presented in Phillips II.  He also contends that he did not have a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in Phillips I.  In response, Mr. Toner asserts that all 
of the services for which Dr. Phillips seeks payment were provided pursuant to 
the contract between Dr. Phillips and Mr. Grynberg and that Dr. Phillips has 
been fully paid for his services.  
He contends that this issue was judicially determined in Phillips I and bars all of the claims 
asserted by Dr. Phillips in this case.  

 
 
[¶8]       In 
determining whether collateral estoppel applies it is necessary to compare the 
prior adjudication with the present action.  The complaint in Phillips I was filed on June 24, 2003, 
in AlbanyCounty by Dr. Phillips 
against Jack J. Grynberg.1  Pertinent allegations of the complaint 
state:  

 
 
3.         
Defendant Grynberg is the president and CEO of Grynberg Petroleum 
Company, with its principal offices in Denver, Colorado.

 
 
4.         
Plaintiff Phillips is a resident of Laramie, Albany 
County, Wyoming.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
6.         
Phillips earned his Ph.D. in Economics from StanfordUniversity in 1980 and is presently Department 
Chairman and Professor of Economics in the Economics and Finance Department at 
the University of 
Wyoming; in addition, 
Phillips is engaged in the business of providing consulting services in the 
field of economic analysis, including services as an expert witness in 
litigation matters.

 
 
. . .

 
 
8.         
During 2002 Grynberg was a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit in the Montezuma 
County, Colorado, District Court, Case Number 98CV43, in which Grynberg and 
Defendant Celeste Grynberg asserted fourteen claims of breach of contract, fraud 
and antitrust violations against Shell Oil Company, Mobil Oil Corporation and 
other companies affiliated with them.

 
 
9.         
Beginning in August 2002, Grynberg repeatedly requested and pleaded with 
Phillips to perform certain services related to the said 
litigation.

 
 
10.        On or 
about December 6, 2002, Grynberg's agent, Tom Toner, Esq., met with Phillips to 
induce him to perform the work and gave repeated assurances that he would be 
paid for his services.

 
 
11.        On 
December 9, 2002, Phillips and Grynberg entered into a contract pursuant to 
which Phillips and Mason were engaged by Grynberg to perform a detailed 
evaluation and expert witness report concerning complex issues relating to the 
artificial suppression of the price of CO2 in a particular market, 
and whether various vertically integrated companies had the incentive to 
misstate profits and suppress the price at a particular delivery 
point.

 
 
12.        The 
said contract required Phillips and Mason to perform services under a severe 
deadline, and required them to employ others to perform services for computer 
data entry and econometric modeling.

 
 
13.        In 
accordance with the said contract, Phillips and Mason submitted billings for 
work performed in December 2002 in the total amount of 
$19,743.92.

 
 
14.        In 
accordance with the said contract, Grynberg timely paid the December billing of 
$19,743.92.

 
 
16.        [sic] 
In reliance on the said contract and the assurances of payment from Grynberg and 
Toner, Phillips retained and paid for subcontract work to his detriment in the 
amount of $8,971.00.

 
 
COUNT I: MONEY 
OWED ON ACCOUNT

 
 
17.        By 
this reference Plaintiffs incorporate herein the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1-16, inclusive of this Complaint, as though they were set forth in 
their entirety.

 
 
18.        In 
accordance with the said contract, Phillips and Mason performed services after 
December 2002 in the total amount of $52,896.00.

 
 
19.        In 
accordance with the said contract, Phillips and Mason submitted billings for the 
work they performed after December 2002, including the work for which they paid 
others, in the total amount of $52,896.00, as set forth in the attached 
account.

 
 
20.        
Phillips and Mason have demanded payment of the $52,896.00 owing to them 
on the said account for services under the said contract.

 
 
21.        
Without justification or excuse, Grynberg has refused to pay the 
account.

 
 
COUNT II: BREACH 
OF CONTRACT

 
 
22.        By 
this reference Plaintiffs incorporate herein the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1-16, inclusive of this Complaint, as though they were set forth in 
their entirety.

 
 
23.        
Phillips and Mason performed all their obligations under the said 
contract.

 
 
24.        
Grynberg has breached the said contract by failing and refusing to pay 
Phillips and Mason the $52,896.00 owing to them.

 
 
COUNT III: 
CONVERSION

 
 
25.        By 
this reference Plaintiffs incorporate herein the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1-16, inclusive of this Complaint, as though they were set forth in 
their entirety.

 
 
26.        In 
accordance with the said contract, Phillips and Mason delivered to Grynberg work 
product required under the contract, in the form of intellectual property of 
significant value to Grynberg.

 
 
27.        By 
his use for their own benefit of the said work product, Defendants have 
converted to their own use and benefit intellectual property owned by Phillips 
and Mason valued at $74,000.00.

 
 

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs demand judgment [on] all 
Defendants in whichever amount proved at trial herein is greater of the 
$52,896.00 damages on Counts I and II, or the $74,000.00 damages on Count III; 
together with interest and costs of suit, and for such other and further relief 
as the Court deems appropriate, the premises considered.

 
 
[¶9]       The 
statement of account referenced in the Phillips I complaint was attached to the 
complaint. The complaint was never amended.  In due course, both parties sought 
summary judgment.  On March 5, 2004, 
the district court issued its decision letter finding in favor of Mr. 
Grynberg.  In its decision letter, 
the district court succinctly framed the dispute: 

 
 
The parties generally do not dispute 
that they entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiffs would perform expert 
consulting services for Grynberg.  
What they dispute is the terms of that agreement insofar as Plaintiffs' 
final bill.  Plaintiffs contend that 
the "agreement" was that they would charge $275.00 per hour (plus costs) for 
their time; Grynberg agrees but asserts that the costs [were] to be "capped" at 
$11,000.00 (e.g. 40 hours of time) prior to the report-writing phase of the 
process.

 
 
In arriving at its decision, the 
district court relied extensively upon a letter from Dr. Phillips.  The court deemed the letter an offer 
which ripened into a contract upon acceptance by Mr. Grynberg.  The court stated:

 
 
On November 4, 2002, Phillips sent 
correspondence to Grynberg that set forth the terms of his engagement as a 
consultant in the case.  The letter, 
in pertinent part, stated:

 
 
If you desire to use my services, I 
shall work with a colleague in the Department of Economics and Finance to manage 
the data and to do the statistical analysis that estimates a CO2 price.  Time will be billed at $275/hour and 
expenses will be billed at my cost.  
Data management, statistical estimate, and analyses are likely to take 40 
hours of time.  From this an 
expert report could be written, which would require additional time.  Statements are submitted monthly to be 
paid on a thirty-day cycle.

 
 

Correspondence from Phillips to 
Grynberg, Nov. 4, 
2002 (emphasis added).  
Subsequently, Grynberg telephoned Phillips and engaged him as a 
consultant.  Over the next months, 
Plaintiffs continued their work for Grynberg, but the contract terms apparently 
were not discussed in any other detail.

 
 
            
In December 2002, Grynberg received a bill from Plaintiffs in the amount 
of $19,743.92.  Grynberg paid the 
bill.  However, Grynberg refused to 
pay subsequent invoices totaling $52,896.00 because he contended this sum far 
exceeded what the parties had agreed upon in their contract for Plaintiffs' 
services.  The total amount billed 
by Phillips for his services, including his written report, is 
$76,639.92.

(Emphasis in original; footnotes 
omitted.)  

 
 
[¶10]     Ultimately, the 
district court determined that no genuine issues of material fact existed and 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts.  Essentially, the district court held 
that Dr. Phillips had agreed to perform the work for approximately $11,000.00, 
and was paid in full for that work.  
The court explained:  

 
 
Here, Phillips was not bound to the 
exact 40-hour estimate but he was 
bound to only slight discrepancy from 
that amount (without some other modification to the contract terms).  Varying a pre-report total estimate from 
$11,000 to approximately $69,743, the same being 634%, clearly is not a "slight 
discrepancy."  In fact, Grynberg has 
already paid $19,743.92, an amount that is 79.49% over the estimated contract 
amount.  While one might well 
understand and accept a variance of 10%, 20% or even 30% under certain 
circumstances, even 79.49% is more than a "slight discrepancy" by any definition 
of the term.  The court holds that 
the amount which Plaintiffs seek to recover here is so far at odds with the 
estimated contract price as to constitute a material alteration of the terms of 
the contract which cannot be included as part of the contract.  The court holds further that [G]rynberg 
bears no further obligation to Plaintiffs under the terms of the parties' 
agreement.  Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and money due on 
account is granted.

 
 
(Emphasis in original.)  The Court entered an order granting 
summary judgment on March 24, 2004.

 
 
[¶11]     Following entry of the 
summary judgment order, Dr. Phillips filed a pleading entitled Plaintiffs' Rule 
60 Motion.  According to the 
district court, in such motion "Plaintiffs allege that this court's factual 
finding of a letter contract' based upon Defendant Owen R. Phillips's November 
4, 2002 letter to Grynberg is in error."  
The district court denied the motion and explained its reasoning in a 
decision letter:

 
 
Beginning in August 2002, Grynberg 
requested that Phillips perform services related to certain litigation.  Complaint on Account and for Conversions and 
Breach of Contract, at ¶ 9 (June 24, 2003); Affidavit of Plaintiff Owen R. Phillips, 
at ¶ 3 (Nov. 17, 2003).  Grynberg 
sent Phillips some documents to review and requested Phillips's assistance.  When he did not hear from Phillips by 
October, Grynberg contacted Phillips to inquire whether Phillips would be able 
to assist him (Grynberg).  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 
39-42.

 
 
Initially, Phillips declined the 
work.  Affidavit of Plaintiff Owen R. Phillips, 
at ¶ 4 (Nov. 17, 2003).  However, 
after the October telephone conversation between him and Grynberg, Phillips 
agreed to review the documents Grynberg had sent (consisting of one box of about 
one thousand pages).  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 39-42.  Subsequently, Phillips sent Grynberg a 
letter dated November 4, 2002, which stated, in part:

 
 
I have reviewed the large stack of 
documents that you have sent me.  In 
the case at hand, I can contribute information on plausible fair market 
(competitive) prices for CO2.  To 
successfully procure these estimates I would need information on a variety of 
elements of the EOR production process, including capital expenditures, number 
of rigs employed, quantities of CO2 injected, and volumes of crude oil produced. 
. . .

 
 
. . .

 
 
I shall not bill for the review of 
the documents (which stand at least 12 inches high when stacked).  Let me know how you want to 
proceed.  If you desire to use my 
services, I shall work with a colleague in the Department of Economics and 
Finance to manage the data and to do the statistical analysis that estimates a 
CO2 price.  Time will be billed at 
$275/hour and expenses will be billed at my cost.  Data management, statistical estimate, 
and analyses are likely to take 40 hours of time.  From this an expert report could be 
written, which would require additional time.  Statements are submitted monthly to be 
paid on a thirty-day cycle.

 
 

Correspondence from Phillips to 
Grynberg, at 1 
(Nov. 4, 2002).  The "intent" of 
this correspondence was to convey Phillips's beliefs "about the different values 
of the project."  Phillips also 
sought to communicate that he "was able to begin an estimation of the fair 
market value of carbon dioxide gas if [Grynberg] wanted to do that, [Phillips] 
could help him."  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 39-42.  Phillips explained, by way of summary, 
that the November 4th letter stated: "If you want an opinion from me 
based on the documents you have, a report will roughly cost you."  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 
39-42.

 
 
A few weeks after Phillips sent the 
letter, Grynberg telephoned to express his interest in having Phillips work on 
the matter.  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 39-42.  Phillips confirmed that he would charge 
"$275 an hour."  Phillips Deposition,  at pp. 39-42.

 
 
In early- to mid-December, 
Grynberg's attorney, Tom Toner ("Toner"), met with Phillips.  Phillips now asserts that Toner was sent 
to "induce him" to accept the work for Grynberg; Toner disclaims any knowledge 
of the contract negotiations.  Toner 
asserts that he never had any discussions with Phillips regarding price 
estimates for the matter.  Rather, 
Toner's only involvement in the price negotiations was his receipt of a copy of 
the November 4, 2002 letter from Phillips to Grynberg.  Toner Deposition, at 21-22.  Further, Toner was not aware that 
Phillips initially declined to do the work or that "Mr. Grynberg said that he 
was going to send Tom Toner to talk to him to try and talk [Phillips] into 
acting as an expert."  Toner Deposition, at 7-8.  In fact, Toner denies being a party to 
any "agreement" with Phillips; Grynberg, not Toner, hired Phillips.  Toner Deposition, at 
17-18.

 
 
In any event, Phillips now asserts 
that the "scope" of the contract changed after his meeting with Toner.  Phillips Deposition, at pp. 39-42.  In his Affidavit, Phillips claims that it was 
not until December 9, 2002 that he agreed to "perform a detailed evaluation and 
expert witness report for Mr. Grynberg's attorney, Mr. Toner, in a Colorado case."  Affidavit of Plaintiff Owen R. Phillips, 
at ¶ 5 (Nov. 17, 2003).  He also 
asserts:

 
 
The terms of the work to be 
performed by Dr. Mason and myself were clear and unambiguous.  We were to perform a complete evaluation 
of the pricing of natural gas as related to Mr. Grynberg's claim.  We were to be paid at the rate of 
$250.00 per hour, which was less than the usual fee of $275.00 per 
hour.

 
 

Affidavit of Plaintiff Owen R. 
Phillips, at ¶ 6 
(Nov. 17, 2003).

 
 

            
In Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Phillips asserts that "the portion of the work 
performed by Plaintiffs before January 1, 2003 . . . was performed and paid 
for.  It is not at issue in this 
case. . . . [T]he written letter in November 2002, by its terms deals with only 
a small portion of the work."  
Id., at p. 1 (Feb. 17, 2004).  Thus, Plaintiffs seem to concede that 
one of two scenarios occurred:

 
 

1.                   
Phillips 
and Grynberg entered into an agreement based upon the November 4, 2002 letter 
and the late-November telephone call.  
The scope of that agreement was that Phillips would perform work at the 
rate of $275.00 per hour and that the work essentially would include what was 
detailed in the November 4th letter.   Phillips asserts that the work he 
did in response to that contract was performed and paid for but that the "scope" 
of his work expanded after the December 2002 meeting with Toner; it is for this 
"second" contract that Phillips now seeks compensation; or

 
 

2.                   
Phillips 
and Grynberg never entered into a contractessentially Grynberg rejected 
Phillips's November 4th letter and sent Toner to persuade Phillips to 
accept the work.  Then, on December 
9, 2002, after meeting with Toner, Phillips entered into an agreement (with 
Toner or Grynberg) whereby Phillips was to be paid $250.00 per hour.  The scope of that work was that Phillips 
was to perform a complete evaluation of the pricing of natural gas as related to 
Grynberg's claim.

 
 
It is based upon these two theories 
that Plaintiffs allege that this case should go forward as a breach of contract 
action and/or claim on account.  
Further facts will be set out below as necessary.

 
 
 (Footnote omitted.)  The court ultimately concluded: 

 
 
If anything, the description set 
forth in the November 4th letter is more descriptive and 
all-inclusive [than] that described by Phillips as his understanding of his 
assigned tasks after his meeting with Toner.  That said, this court again concludes 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact; there was no modification of 
the agreement based on the November 4th letter.

 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  The court entered its Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to Rule 60 on June 1, 2004.  Plaintiffs did not appeal the order 
granting summary judgment or the order denying the Rule 60 
motion.

 
 
[¶12]     On July 29, 2004, Dr. 
Phillips filed his complaint in Phillips 
II against Mr. Toner.2  In this complaint, Dr. Phillips alleged 
that the services he provided in the Colorado lawsuit were provided pursuant to a 
contract with Mr. Toner.  His claim 
against Mr. Toner is capsulized in paragraph eleven of the complaint: 

 
 
11.        On or 
about December 9, 2002, Phillips and Toner entered into a contract pursuant to 
which Phillips was engaged by Toner to perform a detailed evaluation and expert 
witness report for Toner and Kelly concerning complex issues in the Colorado 
Lawsuit relating to the artificial suppression of the price of CO2 in 
a particular market, and to the incentive for vertically integrated companies to 
misstate profits and suppress the price at a particular delivery 
point.

 
 
It is readily evident that paragraph 
eleven of the Phillips II complaint 
is nearly identical with paragraph eleven of the Phillips I complaint.  In Phillips II, however, Dr. Phillips 
substituted the name of Mr. Toner for that of Mr. Grynberg.  

 
 
[¶13]     In Phillips II, Dr. Phillips alleged 
several causes of action against Mr. Toner.  In Count I, entitled Money Owed on 
Account, he asserted:

 
 
19.        
Phillips submitted billings for the work he and Mason performed after 
December 2002, and for amounts [Phillips] paid to others, in the total amount of 
$52,896.00, as set forth in the attached account and cover 
letters.

 
 
20.        
Phillips has demanded payment of the $52,896.00 owing to him on the said 
account for services.

 
 
[¶14]     In Count II, entitled 
Breach of Contract, he alleged:

 
 
24.        
Phillips, together with Mason and Phillips' subcontractors, performed all 
their obligations under the said contract with Toner.

 
 
25.        Toner 
has breached the said contract by failing and refusing to pay Phillips the 
$52,896.00 due and owing for Phillips, Mason and Phillips' subcontractors in 
accordance with the engagement by Toner for Phillips to perform expert witness 
services.

 
 
[¶15]     In Count III, entitled 
Quantum Meruit, he 
alleged:

 
 
29.        Toner 
and Kelly have been unjustly enriched by their use, and suppression, in the 
Colorado Lawsuit of the work product and intellectual property owned by Phillips 
and Mason valued at $74,000.00 or such greater amount as may be proved at 
trial.

 
 
[¶16]     In Count IV, entitled 
Fraud, he alleged:  

 
 
44.        As a 
direct and proximate result of the reasonable reliance on the false 
representations of Toner, Phillips has been damaged in the sum of $52,896.00 for 
services performed and expenditures made.

 
 
[¶17]     In Count V, entitled 
Negligent Misrepresentation, Dr. Phillips alleged: 

 

49.        As a 
direct and proximate result of the reasonable reliance on the negligent 
misrepresentations of Toner, Phillips has been damaged in the sum of $52,896.00 
for services performed and expenditures made.

 
 
Dr. Phillips attached his January 
31, 2003, and February 26, 2003, billings to Mr. Grynberg, to the 
complaint.

 
 
[¶18]     Our comparison of the 
prior adjudication with the issues present in the current litigation results in 
the inescapable conclusion that the district court properly granted summary 
judgment to Mr. Toner.  The 
statements of account attached to the complaints in Phillips I and Phillips II are identical.  The services and charges for which Dr. 
Phillips seeks payment in both lawsuits are identical.  The amount which Dr. Phillips alleges is 
due is the same.  The only apparent 
difference in both lawsuits relates to the named defendant.  In Phillips I, Dr. Phillips asserted that 
Mr. Grynberg and related family members owed him the money.  In Phillips II, Dr. Phillips alleges that 
Mr. Toner owes him for the services which he provided.  Dr. Phillips contends this distinction 
is critical.  We disagree.  

 
 
[¶19]     In Phillips I, the district court 
determined that all of the services provided by Dr. Phillips were performed 
pursuant to the November 4, 2002, letter agreement between Dr. Phillips and Mr. 
Grynberg.  The district court also 
concluded that Dr. Phillips was paid in full for the services which are the 
subject of his claim in Phillips 
II.  Although Dr. Phillips 
contended in his Rule 60 motion that the district court erred in making such a 
determination, the district court rejected his argument, and the findings became 
final and conclusive when Dr. Phillips failed to appeal the decision rendered in 
Phillips I.  Dr. Phillips had a fair and full 
opportunity to litigate all issues regarding the terms of the agreement for 
which he performed services and whether he was paid for those services in Phillips I.  Pokorny v. Salas, 2003 WY 159, ¶ 19, 81 P.3d 171, 176 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶20]     Dr. Phillips contends 
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude his claim against Mr. 
Toner because in Phillips I "there 
was no litigation of a contract between Phillips and Toner."  Dr. Phillips also notes that, in Phillips I, "there was no litigation of 
the fraud committed by Toner in obtaining work with no intent to pay for 
it."  Those statements, even if 
accurate, do not prevent application of collateral estoppel to bar Dr. Phillips' 
claims.  The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues.  Pokorny, ¶ 12.  The issues that were litigated in Phillips I are integral to all of the 
claims asserted in Phillips II.  Resolution of those issues against Dr. 
Phillips in Phillips I is fatal to 
the claims asserted in Phillips 
II.

 
 
[¶21]     In Phillips I, the district court 
determined that all of the work for which Dr. Phillips sought payment was 
performed pursuant to the November 4, 2002, letter agreement and that he had 
been fully paid for his services.  
The services for which he now seeks payment from Mr. Toner are identical 
and the amount sought is identical.  
Even if Mr. Toner was also liable for payment of the services, Dr. 
Phillips is not entitled to collect because the obligation was satisfied.  

 
 
If the debt for which a joint, joint and 
several, or several obligor is bound is completely satisfied, the creditor can 
have no further right against anyone.  
As there is but a single obligation, though more than one person is bound 
to pay it, performance by one of the obligors . . . necessarily discharges them 
all.  

 
 
12 Samuel Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 
36.12, at 653 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1999).  Because he has been fully compensated, 
Dr. Phillips has no damage claim against Mr. Toner.  Damages are an essential element of all 
of the claims asserted against Mr. Toner.

 
 
[¶22]     Dr. Phillips' fraud 
claim against Mr. Toner merits specific comment.  Dr. Phillips sums up his fraud claim 
against Mr. Toner as follows:

 
 
It is undisputed, and blithely 
admitted by Toner, that he asked Phillips to do the work of an expert in 
litigation in another state.  There 
is no suggestion by Toner that Phillips was doing the work without charge.  Toner concedes that Phillips expected 
payment.  Toner admits he did not 
intend to pay for the work.  That is 
fraud.

 
 
Actions sounding in fraud must be 
pled with particularity and proved by clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence.  Lee, ¶ 11.  Fraud will never be presumed and a party 
relying on a fraud claim must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact even 
at the summary judgment stage by clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence.  Bitker v. First National Bank in Evanston, 2004 WY 114, 
¶ 12, 98 P.3d 853, 856 (Wyo. 2004).  
"Fraud is established when a plaintiff demonstrates, by clear and 
convincing evidence that, (1) the defendant made a false representation intended 
to induce action by the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the 
representation to be true; and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false 
representation and suffered damages."  
Bitker, ¶ 
12.

 
 
[¶23]     Mr. Toner's position 
regarding the fraud allegation was set forth in his answer to the 
complaint.  He stated, "Defendant 
Toner admits that he had no intention to pay Plaintiff for work done by 
Plaintiff or his associates in connection with the Colorado litigation, 
because Defendant had no agreement with Plaintiff to pay for those 
services.  Plaintiff's agreement was 
with Defendant's client in the Colorado litigation, . . . ."  In his affidavit Mr. Toner 
elaborated:

 
 
8.         
Mr. Phillips has accused me of fraud because I stated in the Answer in 
this case that I had no intention to pay Mr. Phillips for work done by him or 
his associates in connection with the Cortez case because I had no agreement 
with Mr. Phillips to pay for those services.  It is true that I did not intend to pay 
Mr. Phillips for the work on the case because Mr. Grynberg was to pay Mr. 
Phillips for the work that Mr. Phillips did on the Cortez case.   I never told Mr. Phillips that I 
would pay him for his work on the Cortez case because his agreement was with Mr. 
Grynberg as he alleged in his earlier lawsuit.  As he did with all of the experts in the 
Cortez case, Mr. Grynberg made his arrangements for compensation directly with 
Mr. Phillips.  Mr. Phillips sent 
bills for his work to Mr. Grynberg, and Mr. Grynberg made payments directly to 
Mr. Phillips.  None of those 
payments were made through me, and I have never made any payments to any of the 
expert witnesses employed in the Cortez case.   It was my understanding that the 
contract for services in this case was between Mr. Grynberg and Mr. Phillips, 
and I certainly expected that Mr. Grynberg would pay Mr. Phillips for work that 
Mr. Phillips did, but I did not know what financial arrangements they had 
ultimately agreed upon, and I did not know if the bills sent by Mr. Phillips to 
Mr. Grynberg were consistent with their agreement or not.

 
 
The evidence in the record provides 
additional factual support for Mr. Toner's understanding.  

 
 
[¶24]     When a party accused of 
fraud has presented facts, in support of a motion for summary judgment, that 
refute the allegations of fraud, "the party relying upon the fraud claims then 
must demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence."  
Bitker, ¶ 12.  Dr. Phillips did not allege fraud with 
particularity nor did he meet his burden of demonstrating genuine issues of 
material fact by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence."  Summary judgment on the fraud claim was 
proper even if not barred by collateral estoppel.

 
 
[¶25]     We find no error in the 
district court's determination and affirm the Order Granting Summary 
Judgment.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Charles F. Mason was also a named 
plaintiff.  Mr. Grynberg's wife was 
also named as a defendant in her individual capacity and as trustee for the 
Grynberg children.  She is not a 
party in Phillips 
II.

 
 

2Dr. Phillips also named Jon Kelly as a 
defendant; however, Mr. Kelly was never served with the complaint.  Dr. Mason is not a party in Phillips II.