Title: State v. Hawkins

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HAWKINS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Hawkins (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 311.] 
Criminal law — Application of R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) to a recommitment 
hearing that arose subsequent to the effective date of the statute. 
(No. 98-2336 — Submitted October 20, 1999 — Decided December 22, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 18765. 
 
On August 4, 1976, appellee, Herman E. Hawkins, was indicted for 
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).  At the time, felonious assault 
was a second-degree felony punishable under former R.C. 2929.11(B)(2) by a 
maximum term of incarceration of fifteen years.  On November 12, 1976, appellee 
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  On February 2, 1977, appellee 
waived his right to trial by jury and appellant, state of Ohio, stipulated that 
appellee was not legally sane at the time of the offense.  On February 4, 1977, the 
trial court found appellee not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him 
committed to the care and custody of Lima State Hospital “until he is restored to 
reason.” 
 
Periodic reviews of appellee’s mental state were conducted over the next 
twenty years, each resulting in an order for continued commitment upon a finding 
that appellee is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order.  The 
most recent review was conducted on September 2, 1997.  At that hearing, 
appellee’s attorney moved to have appellee discharged from further custody on the 
basis that R.C. 2945.401, effective July 1, 1997, divested the trial court of 
jurisdiction to order appellee’s continued commitment.  He argued that the 
maximum prison term for felonious assault in 1977 was fifteen years and, under 
the provisions of R.C. 2945.401, the trial court could not continue to order appellee 
committed after that fifteen-year period had expired. 
 
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The trial court found that appellee “is not amenable to” the provisions of 
R.C. 2945.401 and, by entry dated September 5, 1997, ordered his continued 
commitment for two years at the Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare System. 
 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that “the trial court was without 
jurisdiction on September 2, 1997, to act upon NBHS’s application for continued 
commitment.”  Appellant had argued that the application of R.C. 2945.401 to a 
person found not guilty by reason of insanity prior to July 1, 1997 would cause its 
provisions to operate retrospectively in violation of R.C. 1.48 and Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  In rejecting this argument, the appellate court 
found that the provisions of R.C. 2945.401 relative to final termination of 
commitment “do not turn upon the time a defendant was adjudicated not guilty by 
reason of insanity, but turn instead upon the time that post-adjudication 
commitment hearings are conducted.”  The court reasoned that R.C. 2945.401 
“merely provides the procedural and jurisdictional bases upon which 
determinations of continued commitment are to be conducted after July 1, 1997.  
Its provisions do not change any determinations about guilt, innocence, or 
commitment made prior to July 1, 1997.  Nor do they take away any vested rights, 
create any new obligations, impose any new duties, or attach any new disabilities 
with respect to the 1976 offense with which defendant was charged.” 
 
This cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Michael T. Callahan, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul 
Michael Maric, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Richard S. Kasay, for appellee. 
 
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David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Jane P. Perry, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Ann E. Henkener, Assistant 
Attorney General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Department of 
Mental Health. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  In this case, the dispositive issue is whether R.C. 
2945.401(J)(1)(b) operates retrospectively when applied to a post-July 1, 1997 
recommitment hearing involving a person who was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity prior to July 1, 1997. 
 
Prior to the enactment of R.C. 2945.401, there was no temporal limitation on 
the continued commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.  A 
defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a 
psychiatric hospital remained indefinitely subject to the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to order continued periodic recommitments.  See former R.C. 2945.39, 
2945.40, and 5122.15. 
 
R.C. 2945.401, enacted by the 121st General Assembly as part of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 285, effective July 1, 1997, provides that: 
 
“(A) * * * [A] person found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed 
pursuant to section 2945.40 of the Revised Code shall remain subject to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court pursuant to that commitment, and to the provisions of 
this section, until the final termination of the commitment as described in division 
(J)(1) of this section.  If the jurisdiction is terminated under this division because of 
the final termination of the commitment resulting from the expiration of the 
maximum prison term or term of imprisonment described in division (J)(1)(b) of 
 
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this section, the court or prosecutor may file an affidavit for the civil commitment 
of the defendant or person pursuant to Chapter 5122. or 5123. of the Revised Code. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(J)(1) * * * For purposes of division (J) of this section, the final termination 
of a commitment occurs upon the earlier of one of the following: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(b) The expiration of the maximum prison term or term of imprisonment 
that the defendant or person could have received if the defendant or person had 
been convicted of the most serious offense with which the defendant or person is 
charged or in relation to which the defendant or person was found not guilty by 
reason of insanity.” 
 
In State v. Jackson (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 11, 2 OBR 11, 440 N.E.2d 1199, 
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County faced a similar situation involving the 
application of former Am.Sub.S.B. No. 297 enacted by the 113th General 
Assembly, effective April 30, 1980.  The court held that the provisions of that Act 
were properly applied to a post-April 30, 1980 recommitment hearing involving a 
defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity prior to April 30, 1980.  
In so holding, the court explained: 
 
“The new procedures do not make the punishment for a crime more 
burdensome, as defendant contends.  Defendant is not being punished for a 
crime[,] for he was acquitted by reason of insanity; and, under R.C. 2945.40, he is 
being treated for his illness.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 297 is therefore not ex post facto 
legislation. 
 
“Neither is application of the new procedures to defendant’s situation 
prevented by reason of their being retroactive legislation, as prohibited by Section 
28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  Instead, the questioned provisions of 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 297 are prospective in nature, since they are intended to govern 
 
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treatment and discharge procedures after the law’s effective date.  The new 
provisions of law do not take away any vested rights and do not attach any new 
obligations.  See General Industries Co. v. Leach (1962), 173 Ohio St. 227 [19 
O.O.2d 46, 181 N.E.2d 39].  It cannot be presumed that holding the hearing before 
the trial court, rather than before the Probate Court for Allen County, will result in 
prejudice to defendant.”  Id., 2 Ohio App.3d at 13-14, 2 OBR at 14-15, 440 N.E.2d 
at 1202. 
 
Appellant argues that the Jackson court’s “analytical approach is fatally 
flawed” because it “omits any reference to R.C. 1.48 in its analysis of the 
retroactive application of law.”  Similarly, appellant argues that “[i]n the instant 
case the court of appeals erred when it failed to conduct a statutory analysis under 
R.C. 1.48.  * * * The court below made but a passing reference to this maxim of 
statutory construction that did not factor into the ultimate decision.”  (Citation 
omitted.)  Relying on Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
100, 522 N.E.2d 489, appellant contends that it was improper for both appellate 
courts to proceed to the constitutional issue under Section 28, Article II without 
first ascertaining whether the General Assembly intended retrospective application. 
 
The flaw in appellant’s argument lies in its misunderstanding of these 
decisions.  In determining that the questioned provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 297 
and Am.Sub.S.B. No. 285 were not violative of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, the appellate courts did not conclude that those statutory provisions 
may be applied retrospectively.  To the contrary, they concluded that the 
challenged application of these statutes did not, in the first instance, cause their 
provisions to operate retrospectively.  In so doing, these courts never reached the 
constitutional question, which involves an analysis of whether the statutes are 
substantive or remedial in their operation on preexisting rights.  Instead, the courts 
determined that the statutes, as applied, affect nothing past, neither right nor 
 
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remedy.  R.C. 1.48 and Section 28, Article II serve to guard against the unjustness 
of retrospective legislation.  They are by no means designed to prevent a statute 
from operating prospectively; nor is their function to ascertain legislative intent 
other than with regard to retroactivity.  By definition, these sections do not come 
into play where the challenged application of a statute is determined to be 
prospective in nature.  In such a situation, the most that can be accomplished under 
Van Fossen or R.C. 1.48 is to force the very application at issue.  Thus, we find no 
error on the part of either appellate court in failing to conduct a statutory analysis 
under R.C. 1.48. 
 
This case involves a straightforward application of R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b) to 
a recommitment hearing that arose subsequent to the effective date of the statute.  
The issue of retroactivity arises only artificially in this case, by virtue of 
appellant’s contention that R.C. 2945.401 becomes retrospective in its operation 
when applied to persons found not guilty by reason of insanity prior to July 1, 
1997.  However, that finding and the considerations pertinent thereto, although 
already past, remain unaffected by the application of R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b).  
Commitment is neither punishment nor sentence for a crime of which the 
defendant has been acquitted.  Having found that the challenged application of 
R.C. 2945.401 is prospective in nature, there is no need to conduct a statutory 
analysis under R.C. 1.48. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.