Title: M.H. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JT-323 
In the Matter of Ma.H., Le.H., Lo.H., W.H., La.H., 
Me.H., and S.W. (Minor Children); M.H. (Father) and 
R.H. (Mother), 
Appellants (Respondents) 
–v– 
Indiana Department of Child Services, 
Appellee (Petitioner) 
Argued: June 18, 2019 | Decided: October 31, 2019 
Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court,  
Nos. 90C01-1707-JT-22, -29, -30, -31, -32, -34, -35 
The Honorable Kenton W. Kiracofe, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A-JT-1296 
Opinion by Chief Justice Rush 
Justices David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 31 2019, 12:16 pm
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Rush, Chief Justice. 
Civil child welfare proceedings often implicate a parent in criminal 
activity. In such cases, the trial court needs to strike a delicate balance: it 
must safeguard children’s well-being, while protecting parents’ 
constitutional rights. 
Here, a mother and a father appeal the termination of parental rights to 
seven children, arguing that the trial court violated the father’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. After a court found that 
the father sexually abused his stepdaughter, he was required to select and 
complete a sex-offender treatment program. He briefly attended a 
program but stopped when it required an admission of wrongdoing. The 
father has always denied the sexual abuse, and the mother has likewise 
never believed her daughter. 
We find no constitutional violation. The trial court’s order did not 
require the father to admit to a crime at the risk of losing his parental 
rights. And because the parents failed to address the sexual abuse 
allegations—several of which a court found were true—we find sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court’s termination decision and affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
M.H. (Father) and R.H. (Mother) have a blended, Amish family of nine 
children. Seven of the children were born during their marriage; the oldest 
two, S.W. and R.W., are Mother’s daughters from a prior relationship.1 
In early spring 2016, seventeen-year-old R.W. abruptly left home. 
About a week later, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a 
report alleging that Father had sexually abused R.W. for years and that the 
condition of Parents’ home was unacceptable. Parents denied both 
allegations; but after a detective interviewed R.W., DCS removed the 
 
1 Neither Parents’ youngest child nor R.W. are part of this appeal. Thus, the term “children” 
hereafter refers only to the seven other children. 
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remaining children from the home. They were placed with their maternal 
uncle and his family, who are also part of the Amish community. 
DCS alleged the children were in need of services (CHINS) based on 
the Parents’ actions. At the hearing, DCS provided testimony on the 
home’s deplorable condition, and R.W. testified to numerous and specific 
instances of sexual abuse by Father. The court found the children to be 
CHINS, noting that R.W.’s testimony was credible and that most of the 
allegations in DCS’s petition were true. 
As a result, Parents were ordered to complete services, including ones 
to address sexual abuse. Specifically, Father had to complete sex-offender 
treatment; and Parents were required to create a safety plan to protect the 
children from future abuse. 
Father objected to the sex-offender treatment. He was concerned that 
completing such a program would involve a polygraph examination, 
which he argued would require him to waive his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court disagreed. In its order, 
the court explained that Father could refuse to answer questions during 
treatment, but that if Father chose to remain silent, then the court could 
“infer what his answer[s] might have been.” 
About a month later, Father began sex-offender treatment. But because 
of his continued denial, little progress was made. So, the therapist 
recommended a polygraph test to show that Father had done nothing 
wrong—“to help things move forward.” Father took the polygraph, and 
the results showed he was “deceptive” when asked about the sexual 
abuse. 
At that point, the therapist could not continue the program with Father 
unless he admitted wrongdoing. Father refused and stopped attending. 
During this time, Mother never wavered in her support of Father or in her 
belief that R.W. lied about the sexual abuse. Thus, Father never completed 
sex-offender treatment, and Parents never created a safety plan. 
In late summer 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate parental rights, citing 
Parents’ failure to adequately address the CHINS court’s finding that 
Father sexually abused R.W. During a four-day hearing, R.W. described 
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Father’s sexual abuse and explained that she twice told Mother about it, 
including once after the first encounter. The court also heard testimony 
about Father’s failure to complete sex-offender treatment; Parents’ 
continued denial of R.W.’s allegations; and Parents’ failure to develop a 
safety plan. Additionally, both the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and 
a DCS caseworker recommended termination. A few months later, the 
trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights. 
Mother and Father both appealed, and a divided panel reversed. In re 
Ma.H., 119 N.E.3d 1076, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The majority concluded 
that Father’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated and reversed the 
termination. Id. Judge Robb dissented, believing that no Fifth Amendment 
violation occurred and that sufficient evidence supported the court’s 
decision. Id. at 1091–92, 1091 n.8 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
DCS petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of 
Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
This challenge to the trial court’s termination decision invokes two 
standards of review. 
We affirm a trial court’s termination decision unless it is clearly 
erroneous; a termination decision is clearly erroneous when the court’s 
findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal 
conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 
642 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 
credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 
that support the court’s judgment. In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 
2015). But to the extent our analysis depends on whether Father’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated, we review 
that purely legal question de novo. See Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907, 917 
(Ind. 2014). 
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Discussion and Decision 
Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right 
is not absolute. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). When 
parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental 
rights may be terminated. Id. 
To terminate parental rights, Indiana law requires DCS to prove certain 
elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-4(b)(2); 
31-37-14-2 (2018). We focus today on two: (1) a reasonable probability that 
the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal will not be 
remedied;2 and (2) that termination is in the children’s best interests. I.C. § 
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), (C). 
Here, the trial court determined that DCS met its burden on both 
elements. Parents argue that the trial court’s conclusions are clearly 
erroneous. 
Specifically, they assert that the trial court violated Father’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and thus, the trial court 
erred in considering evidence of Parents’ response to services addressing 
the CHINS court’s finding that Father sexually abused R.W. Father argues 
that, when the improperly considered evidence is removed, there remains 
insufficient evidence to support the court’s conclusion that there is a 
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children’s 
removal will not be remedied. And each parent similarly argues that there 
is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination is in the children’s best interests. We disagree. 
Our review of the record shows there is no constitutional violation 
because the court never ordered Father to admit to a crime. We also find 
 
2 Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires DCS to make one of three showings. The trial court here 
found that DCS met its burden on two: (1) a reasonable probability that the reasons for 
removal will not be remedied; and (2) a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children’s well-being. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), 
(ii). Because we determine that the court’s findings support its conclusion on the former, we 
need not address the latter. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. 
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that the evidence favorable to the trial court’s decision supports its factual 
findings, which in turn support its challenged legal conclusions. Thus, 
Parents have failed to show that the trial court’s termination decision is 
clearly erroneous. 
I. There is no Fifth Amendment violation. 
CHINS proceedings and proceedings to terminate parental rights 
(TPR), though non-criminal, can implicate a parent in criminal activity. 
For example, a CHINS or TPR petition may include allegations of neglect, 
physical abuse, illegal drug activity, human trafficking, endangerment, or 
sexual abuse—each its own criminal offense carrying serious 
consequences. Compare I.C. §§ 31-34-1-1, -2(a), -2(d), -3, -4, with Ind. Code 
§§ 35-46-1-4, -42-2-1, -42-4-1, -48-4-1.2 (2018). 
As a result, trial courts presiding over CHINS and TPR proceedings 
must remain conscientious of possible criminal implications and 
safeguard a parent’s constitutional rights—such as those guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment, including the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Father argues that the trial court violated this privilege “by expressly 
requiring him to confess to a crime for which he was never charged.” 
Generally, in any proceeding—civil or criminal—the Fifth Amendment 
protects an individual from being compelled to answer questions when 
the answers might be used in a future criminal proceeding. See Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Bleeke, 6 N.E.3d at 925. This means that, in 
CHINS and TPR proceedings, a court may not compel a parent’s 
admission to a crime—if the admission could be used against him or her 
in a subsequent criminal proceeding—under the threat of losing parental 
rights. See In re A.D.L., 402 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Nev. 2017) (collecting cases). 
See generally Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[W]hen a 
State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless 
the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment[.]”). 
Yet, in civil proceedings, a court can draw a negative inference from a 
claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See 
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Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Hardiman v. Cozmanoff, 4 
N.E.3d 1148, 1152 (Ind. 2014). To that end, the trial court here noted that 
Father could choose not to answer questions during sex-offender 
treatment, but the court could then “infer what his answer[s] might have 
been.” The trial court was correct. Ultimately, though, Father voluntarily 
took the polygraph, so there was no silence from which to draw an 
adverse inference. Our inquiry then is whether any court action forced 
Father to choose between losing his parental rights and waiving his right 
against self-incrimination. 
“[T]here is a distinction between a court-ordered case plan that 
mandates admission of culpability for family reunification and one that 
requires meaningful therapy for family reunification.” A.D.L., 402 P.3d at 
1286. While the former constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation, the latter 
does not. Id. Here, the trial court ordered Father to “select” and “complete 
a course of sex offender treatment” from options that DCS would provide, 
within sixty miles of his home. Father began a sex-offender treatment 
program that ultimately required him to admit wrongdoing after a 
voluntary polygraph showed deceptive denials of misconduct. Refusing 
to admit to sexual abuse, Father stopped attending. 
We recognize that Father attended a program that eventually required 
an admission of guilt. But the trial court’s order did not compel Father to 
admit to a crime; the order simply required Father to select and complete 
a course of sex-offender treatment. See Ma.H., 119 N.E.3d at 1091 n.8 
(Robb, J., dissenting). Other states have made a similar distinction. See In 
re A.W., 896 N.E.2d 316, 326 (Ill. 2008) (“[A] trial court may order a service 
plan that requires a parent to engage in effective counseling or therapy, 
but may not compel counseling or therapy requiring the parent to admit 
to committing a crime.”); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002) 
(“The State may require parents to otherwise undergo treatment, but it 
may not specifically require an admission of guilt as part of the 
treatment.”). 
Father, nonetheless, asserts that the trial court’s order “created a 
requirement for [him] to testify against himself and make an admission of 
a specific crime.” In other words, Father seemingly argues that, even if the 
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court order didn’t explicitly mandate him to participate in a program that 
would require an admission, this was the order’s practical effect. Yet, 
Father points to no evidence that he sought out a different program; that 
he requested DCS to provide him with other options; or that there were no 
treatment programs available, within sixty miles of his home, that did not 
require an admission of sexual abuse. See A.W., 896 N.E.2d at 326 (noting 
that the court did not order the parent “to complete a specific program 
requiring him to admit abuse” and pointing out that the parent had 
“presented no evidence that there are no other treatment programs 
available offering sex offender counseling without requiring an admission 
of sexual abuse”); C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150 (finding no evidence that the 
State required the father “to complete any particular sexual offender 
treatment program” or “disapproved of [the father’s] participation in a 
treatment program that would not require an admission of guilt”). 
In sum, the trial court did not violate Father’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. And so the trial court could properly 
consider evidence of Parents’ failure to respond to services addressing the 
CHINS court’s finding that Father sexually abused R.W. 
The trial court relied on this evidence, and other evidence in the 
record, to support its conclusions that there is a reasonable probability 
that a primary reason for the children’s removal will not be remedied and 
that termination is in the children’s best interests. We now address 
whether that evidence was sufficient. 
II. The evidence-backed findings support the trial 
court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable 
probability that a primary reason for the 
children’s removal will not be remedied. 
Father argues there is insufficient evidence to clearly and convincingly 
show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to 
the children’s removal will not be remedied. He is incorrect. 
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Here, the trial court’s findings show that it engaged in the appropriate 
two-step analysis. See In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010). First, it 
identified the removal conditions. Id. Specifically, the court found that the 
children were removed, in relevant part, because of Father’s alleged long-
term sexual abuse of R.W. Second, the trial court made findings on 
whether there is a reasonable probability that this removal condition will 
not be remedied. Id. On that point, the court found that despite Father’s 
“history of substantiated sexual abuse of his stepdaughter,” he “failed to 
complete . . . sex offender specific treatment, and has refused to admit he 
has a problem.” Ample evidence in the record supports these findings. 
Turning to that evidence, there is no dispute that the CHINS court 
found several of R.W.’s sexual-abuse allegations to be true, including the 
following: When R.W. was a young girl, Father told R.W. to come into his 
bedroom where he pulled her on top of him. She said that she “didn’t 
understand what was happening” and “was frightened.” On another 
occasion, R.W. was asleep on the couch and woke up to Father on top of 
her, touching his penis to her vagina. A couple of years later, Father told 
R.W. to take water to the horses in the barn. Once inside the barn, Father 
pulled his pants down and inserted his fingers and then his penis into 
R.W.’s vagina while she cried. R.W. also testified at the termination 
hearing, explaining that Father molested her “almost all the time I was left 
alone with him,” until she was a teenager. 
Similarly, there is no dispute that Father did not complete a sex-
offender treatment program. In fact, at the termination hearing, Father 
displayed resentment toward the court-ordered service. When Father was 
asked if he agreed that he needed to attend sex-offender treatment, he 
responded, “No.” When asked whether he felt that he could benefit from 
the treatment, Father responded, “I don’t know how I could.” And most 
notably, when Father was asked what he had done to remedy R.W.’s 
claims that he molested her, he responded, “Nothing.” By his own words, 
Father conceded that he has done nothing to remedy a primary reason for 
the children’s removal. 
Ultimately, the court’s findings—that Father repeatedly sexually 
abused his stepdaughter and that he failed to complete sex-offender 
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treatment—are supported by the evidence. And those findings clearly and 
convincingly support the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable 
probability that a primary reason for the children’s removal—R.W.’s 
sexual abuse allegations against Father—will not be remedied. 
We now address whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests. 
III. The evidence-backed findings support the trial 
court’s conclusion that termination is in the 
children’s best interests. 
Parents each argue that there is insufficient evidence to clearly and 
convincingly show that termination is in the best interests of the children. 
Specifically, Father alleges that terminating all parental rights based on a 
“sole allegation” of sexual abuse is not in the children’s best interests. And 
Mother maintains that she completed all services offered to her and her 
continued support of Father is likewise not sufficient to show termination 
is in the children’s best interests. We disagree. Parents’ arguments are a 
request for us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court, which we will not do. Instead, looking at the 
evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we find ample evidence 
supporting the court’s findings, which in turn support its best-interests 
conclusion. 
Deciding whether termination is in children’s best interests is 
“[p]erhaps the most difficult determination” the trial court must make. 
E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647. To make this decision, trial courts must look at the 
totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests 
to those of the children. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013), trans. denied. Central among these interests is children’s need for 
permanency. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Indeed, 
“children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward 
preservation or reunification.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. 
The trial court here echoed the children’s need for permanency, noting 
that Parents have had plenty of time “to accomplish the steps necessary to 
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have the children returned to their care.” Those “steps” included Parents’ 
addressing R.W.’s allegations of sexual abuse against Father—several of 
which the CHINS court found to be true. Yet, Parents failed to address the 
sexual abuse, and the court made many findings on this failure. It 
referenced Father not completing a sex-offender treatment program; 
Father not believing that he needed treatment or that he would benefit 
from it; Mother dismissing R.W.’s claims and refusing to acknowledge the 
sexual abuse; Mother not believing Father posed any potential danger to 
her other children; and testimony from others showing concern for the 
children’s safety if they were to return without a safety plan in place and 
with Father not having completed treatment. Evidence in the record 
supports each finding. 
The evidence supporting the court’s findings on Father is well-
documented: he did not complete a court-ordered sex-offender treatment 
program; and he testified that he does not need treatment and does not 
believe he could benefit from it. 
The evidence similarly supports the trial court’s findings on Mother. 
Mother testified at the termination hearing that R.W. never mentioned 
anything to her at the time of Father’s alleged sexual abuse. But R.W. later 
confirmed that she twice told Mother about the abuse, including once 
after the first time it happened. Mother has also twice listened to her 
daughter provide specific, detailed testimony of Father’s sexual abuse. 
And R.W. recalled a more recent conversation with Mother, which ended 
with Mother telling R.W. to “basically, forgive and forget—just get over 
what happened.” Yet, Mother testified at the termination hearing that she 
has never believed R.W. and does not believe Father poses any danger to 
the children. Mother is free to believe Father, but the trial court—
responsible for resolving conflicting testimony—believed R.W. See Bester 
v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Ind. 2005). 
Finally, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings on a concern for 
the children’s well-being if returned home. Specifically, the court heard 
testimony from four witnesses who shared a concern for the well-being of 
the children should they return home without a safety plan in place and 
without Father having completed treatment. 
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A psychologist testified that, when one child is sexually abused within 
a home, there is a similar risk to the other children in that home. The GAL 
shared her trepidation on returning the children: “[W]e have no safety 
plan in place, we have no plan where [Mother] has talked to her 
individual therapist or anyone that she worked with about what she’s 
gonna do to be a protective factor for her own children.” R.W. similarly 
voiced her concern that her siblings wouldn’t “get the proper care that 
they need,” if they were to return home and Father hadn’t changed. And a 
DCS caseworker testified that she feared for the children’s safety if they 
were returned to the home without Father completing treatment. 
Though we acknowledge that Mother and Father completed most of 
the required services, “simply going through the motions of receiving 
services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed 
change,” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, Parents 
have not made the needed change to address the CHINS court’s finding 
that Father sexually abused R.W. or to protect the other children from 
future abuse. As the GAL observed, the children are “no closer to being 
reunified” than when they were removed “twenty months ago.” 
In sum, the totality of the evidence above supports the trial court’s 
findings, which in turn support the court’s best-interests conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The trial court did not violate Father’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, and the court’s decision to terminate Parents’ 
parental rights is not clearly erroneous. We thus affirm. 
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
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A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  M . H.  
Yvonne M. Spillers 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  R .H .  
Mark Small 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Stephen R. Creason 
Chief Counsel 
Katherine A. Cornelius 
Robert J. Henke 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana