Title: STATE v BASHOR

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 14542 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- HOWARD L. BASHOR, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Ninth J u d i c i a l District, I n and f o r t h e County of Toole, Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel o f Record: For Appellant: Conner, Baiz and Olson, Great F a l l s , Montana Dennis P. Conner agrued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: Hon. ~ i k e Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mary B. Troland argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Marc Racicot argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Rae K a l b f l e i s c h argued, County Attorney, Shelby, Montana Filed: 4w-1- 1%f( Submitted: March 2 5 , 1980 Decided : Mr. chief ~ustice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. ~efendant Howard L . Bashor appeals from his conviction by a jury in Toole County of the crime of deliberate homicide. This case arose out of the death of James Hurley. It is undisputed that Hurley died of a gunshot wound and that defendant fired the fatal shot. The parties, however, present conflicting versions of the events which led to Hurley ' s death. The State's version is that Hurley, Marian Irgens, Duane Enneberg, and Jeanette Frost visited a bar in Kevin, Montana, on the evening of December 2, 1977. During the evening, Marian Irgens twice observed defendant's car being driven down the street next to the bar. At approximately 1:30 a.m. of December 3, the group decided to leave the bar. As they left, they noticed defendant's car parked a short distance away with the heatil.ghts on. They saw William Schaeffer, a friend of defendant, standing in front of the car, hollering at them in a belligerent manner. The four friends began to get into Hurley's car, but the hollering continued. F i n a l l . ; ! , Hurley and Enneberg started walking in the direction of defendant's car. As Enneberg and Hurley approached, Schaeffer confronted Enneberg in front of the car. Hurley proceeded toward the driver's window. The defendant was sitting in the driver's seat. A few seconds later a shot was heard, and Hurley walked away from the car saying, "I've had it." He died shortly thereafter. Defendant's version is that he and Schaeffer had noticed Hurley's car at the Kevin bar during the early morning hours of December 3, 1977, and decided not to go inside until Hurley and his friends had left. Hurley approached defen-- dant's car while Schaeffer was still sitting in the pas- senger's seat of the car. Defendant rolled down his window and at about this time, Schaeffer got out on his side of the car and began to walk around to the front of the car. Meanwhile, Hurley reached into the driver's window and began trying to pull defendant out of the car. Fearing that his eye, which had been operated on the previous summer, would be permanently damaged in a fight, defendant took his gun from the car console and fired at Hurley. Prior to trial Schaeffer underwent a polygraph examina- tion. His answers were to the effect that Hurley had been the aggressor in the altercation. The operator of the polygraph testified that he was satisfied as to the truth- fulness of Schaeffer's answers. The State filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit defendant from entering or at- tempting to enter into evidence the polygraph examination. The motion was granted. The defendant raises nine specifications of error: 1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for change of place of trial? 2 . Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's challenge to the jury panel and in denying defendant's challenge to juror Pettigrew for cause? 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly hear and consider defendant's offer of proof concerning the polygraph examination of witness Bill Schaeffer? 4 . Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the examination of Bill Schaeffer was inadmissible as a matter of l3.w? 5. Whether the trial court erred in refusing admission of the polygraph test given Bill ~chaeffer? 6. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict because of prejudicial remarks made by the special prosecutor in his closing ar- gument? 7. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to place into evidence acts, statements and circum- stances occurring prior to December 2, 1977? 8 . Whether the trial court failed to fairly and fully instruct the jury on the law of self-defense? 9 . Whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses of mitigated de- liberate homicide and negligent homicide? In the present case the defendant moved for a change of place of trial based on inflammatory pretrial publicity and general bias against him in Toole County. Defendant and the State each submitted affidavits on the matter, and a hearing was held on the motion in District Court. The judge reserved his ruling on the issue pending the outcome of voir dire examination, at the conclusion of which he denied defendant's motion. Defendant contends this denial constituted reversible error. Section 46-13-203(1), MCA, provides that a defendant "may move for a change of place of trial on the ground that there exists in the county in which the charge is pending such prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had in such county." A motion for change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and a denial is not rever- sible error in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v . Kirkaldie (1978), - Mont . , 587 P.2d 1298, 1303, 35 St.Rep. 1532, 1537; State v. ~ewis (1976), 169 Mont. 290, 295, 546 P.2d 518, 521. I n S t a t e v. Board (1959), 135 Mont. 139, 143-144, 337 P.2d 924, 927, t h i s Court said: " I n d i c i a of t h i s d e n i a l of f a i r t r i a l , r e s u l t i n g from p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y , a s gleaned from our l a w , seems t o be: Arousing f e e l i n g s of t h e community, t h r e a t t o personal s a f e t y of defen- dant, e s t a b l i s h e d opinion of members of t h e community a s t o t h e g u i l t of t h e accused, news a r t i c l e s beyond t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of news p r i n t - i n g and dissemination, S t a t e v. Dryman, 127 Mont. 579, 269 Pac.(2d) 796, and d i f f i c u l t y o r f a i l u r e i n securing a f a i r , i m p a r t i a l jury from t h e community i n which t h e news a r t i c l e s appeared, S t a t e v. Davis, supra, 60 Mont. 426, 199 Pac. 421; S t a t e v. B e s s , 60 Mont. 558, 199 Pac. 426. "Our c o u r t looks f o r a chain r e a c t i o n . I t s t a r t s a t t h e b a s i c premise t h a t t h e accused i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r t r i a l . Next it checks t h e p u b l i c i t y complained o f , as t o its con- t e n t s and more important, a s t o i t s t o t a l e f - f e c t upon t h e ' f a i r t r i a l r i g h t . ' Further it looks a t e f f e c t s i n t h e form of t h e discrimi- nating marks w e have discussed. F i n a l l y , it o b j e c t i v e l y considers t h e end result--was a f a i r t r i a l denied as a r e s u l t of t h e publi- c i t y and i t s e f f e c t s ? I f its f i n d i n g s a r e negative it r e f u s e s t o f i n d abuse of d i s c r e - t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . " The news i t e m s of which defendant complains consisted of a newspaper article appearing on Friday, December 9, 1977, and a statement on t h e l o c a l r a d i o t h a t was made a day o r two a f t e r t h e shooting. The newspaper article had t h e heaaline: "Bashor Charged with Deliberate Homicide i n Shooting." The f i r s t two paragraphs of t h e a r t i c l e read a s follows : "Shades of t h e o l d w e s t were re-enacted a t B e r t ' s Bar i n Kevin e a r l y Saturday morning, when a b a r patron was s h o t down and k i l l e d , a t about 1:15. "According t o r e p o r t s , James F. Hurley, 4 1 , was i n s i d e t h e bar when Howard 'Ozzie' Bashor, 56, drove up and s e n t word i n s i d e f o r Hurley t o come o u t s i d e . Hurley walked o u t s i d e and w a s s h o t down. " Defendant contends t h a t the a r t i c l e i n s i n u a t e s he s h o t Hurley i n cold blood. The S t a t e agrees t h a t the a r t i c l e w a s an i n c o r r e c t statement of the f a c t s . However, a misstate- ment of f a c t s i n a s i n g l e newspaper a r t i c l e does n o t neces- s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t grounds t o change venue. I n S t a t e v. B e s s (1921), 60 Mont. 558, 199 P. 426, t h i s Court s a i d t h a t newspaper articles may n o t be t h e b a s i s of a change of venue unless t h e articles ". . . w e r e passionate enough t o e x c i t e undue prejudice, t o t h e e x t e n t of rendering it impossible f o r an accused t o secure a jury f r e e from exception." 60 Mont. a t 569, 199 P. a t 429. I n S t a t e v. Sarzdstrom (1978), Mont. - , 580 P.2d 106, 35 St.Rep. 744, rev'd - on o t h e r grounds, Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 4 4 2 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, t h i s Court s a i d t h a t "[plublished accounts of crimes a r e n o t considered p r e j u d i c i a l unless s o passionate as t o e x c i t e undue preju- d i c e , rendering it impossible t o empanel a trial jury f r e e from prejudice a g a i n s t the defendant." 580 P.2d a t 108, 35 St.Rep. a t 746. The a r t i c l e complained of states t h a t the defendant ". . . s e n t word i n s i d e f o r Hurley t o come outside." This is t h e only statement which is a c t u a l l y contrary t o the undisputed f a c t s . The a r t i c l e only appeared once, and t h i s was s i x months before the t r i a l . To j u s t i f y a change of venue n o t only must an article be adverse t o the defendant, it must a l s o make i t impossible t o empanel a f a i r jury. During t h e examination of prospective jurors, each person who eventually s a t on t h e jury s t a t e d e i t h e r t h a t they had n o t read t h e article a t a l l o r t h a t they could n o t repember any of t h e d e t a i l s other than t h a t someone had been shot, o r t h a t they could p u t a s i d e any prejudice and judge t h e case s o l e l y on t h e evidence presented. The a r t i c l e i s n o t t h e impassioned type of news i t e m which w i l l j u s t i f y a change of venue. Under t h e circumstances t h e jury could n o t have been influenced by t h e a r t i c l e i n any event. Conse- quently, t h e a r t i c l e d i d n o t p r e s e n t a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r granting a change of venue. The r a d i o broadcast of which t h e defendant complains contained t h e statement t h a t the victim ". . . was apparently s h o t as he w a s leaving a Kevin tavern." The defendant contends t h a t t h i s statement, when taken i n conjunction with t h e newspaper a r t i c l e , suggests t h a t t h e victim was s h o t i n cold blood. A reading of t h e record i n d i c a t e s t h a t Hurley w a s s h o t s h o r t l y a f t e r he l e f t t h e tavern. Neither p a r t y d i s p u t e s t h i s f a c t . The r a d i o r e p o r t was simply a f a c t u a l r e p o r t of t h e homicide. When news accounts a r e n o t e d i t o r i a l i z e d r e p o r t s and they appear t o be f a c t u a l l y done and no inflam- matory statements appear, t h e r e i s no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n denying a defendant's motion f o r change of venue. See S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t (1957), 131 Mont. 152, 156, 308 P.2d 969. Based on t h e s e news accounts t h e r e was no e r r o r i n denying t h e motion. The defendant a l s o based h i s motion f o r change of venue on h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e community i n Toole County harbored a b i a s a g a i n s t him, making it impossible t o r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l t h e r e i n . The a f f i d a v i t s and testimony a t t h e hearing on change of venue a r e l a r g e l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y opinions con- cerning whether defendant could have a f a i r t r i a l i n ~ o o l e County. The a f f i d a v i t s supporting a change of venue i n d i - cate t h r e a t s a g a i n s t defendant's brother, t h e c a r e t a k e r of defendant's property, and t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace who had a pending motion t o admit defendant t o b a i l . The t h r e a t s w e r e made anonymously by telephone c a l l s , by patrons a t b a r s , and i n one instance, d i r e c t l y t o t h e c a r s t a k e r by a f r i e n d of t h e victim while i n a bar. Certain members of the community t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e had been a l o t of t a l k i n t h e county t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t defendant w a s g u i l t y . The people who testi- f i e d f o r t h e S t a t e on t h e venue motion s a i d t h a t most of t h e t a l k had died down s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e shooting, t h a t t h e community was n o t biased a g a i n s t t h e defendant, and t h a t he could r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l i n Toole County. A s i n d i c a t e d by t h e quote from S t a t e v. Board, supra, our b a s i c concern i s t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e l e v e l of community b i a s d i d n o t reach a p o i n t where t h e defendant could n o t secure a f a i r trial. I n analyzing t h e f a c t s , we must con- s i d e r a l l of t h e i n d i c a t i o n s of prejudice, including t h e news r e l e a s e s mentioned above. I n determining t h e l e v e l of community b i a s which w i l l j u s t i f y a change of venue, it i s h e l p f u l t o consider t h e c a s e s of S t a t e v. Spotted Hawk (1899), 2 2 Mont. 33, 55 P. 1026, and S t a t e v. Dryman (1954), 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796. I n Spotted Hawk a sheepherder had been murdered, and t h e white c i t i z e n s of t h e county suspected members of an Indian t r i b e who l i v e d on a nearby reservation. The defen- d a n t was a member of t h e t r i b e . The defendant moved f o r a change of venue based upon a f f i d a v i t s which showed t h e degree of community prejudice. Examples of t h i s p r e j u d i c e w e r e : 200 armed men who gathered near t h e Cheyenne Indian Agency demanding t h e murderer and threatening t o exterminate t h e t r i b e i f he w a s n o t handed over; an o a t h taken by a l a r g e number of men t h a t they would take t h e law i n t o t h e i r own hands i f t h e murderer w e r e a c q u i t t e d and would take l'engeance upon t h e c o u r t and counsel i n case of a c q u i t t a l ; and newspaper r e p o r t s made during a five-week period which tended t o e x c i t e t h e readers by extravagant and inflammatory accounts of t h e murder and of t h e c u r r e n t t r o u b l e between whites and Indians. The D i s t r i c t Court refused t o g r a n t a change of venue, and t h e defendant w a s convicted. This Court reversed because of t h e obvious b i a s i n t h e community and made t h e following observation: " I . . . J u r o r s , witnesses and o f f i c e r s cannot be i n s e n s i b l e t o a strong and e x c i t e d p u b l i c f e e l i n g and sentiment concerning t h e t r i a l t h a t i s going on, 3,1d a r e l i a b l e t o be influenced by it, uncon- s c i o u s l y , and with an honest i n t e n t i o n of doing t h e i r whole duty. The c o u r t room i s a p u b l i c place, and a t r i a l , i n which a community i s deeply i n t e r e s t e d , brings t h e people t h e r e ; and t h e pressure of t h e i r presence and f e e l i n g i s a s t r o n g argument, and almost i r r e s i s t i b l e , one way o r t h e other. The influence of t h e i r pres- ence, and t h e expression of t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e event of t h e t r i a l , i n d i v e r s ways, might give a f a l s e coloring t o t h e testimony, o r warp and b i a s the judgment i n weighing and consider- i n g it.' (Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mont., a t page 264, 5 P. 850.)" 22 Mont. a t 56. I n Dryman, supra, t h e defendant had pleaded g u i l t y t o a homicide charge and then had asked t o withdraw h i s plea. The t r i a l c o u r t refused t o allow t h e withdrawal, b u t t h i s Court allowed him t o withdraw t h e p l e a and ordered a new trial. The defendant then asked f o r a change of venue based i n p a r t upon a news a r t i c l e t h a t had appeared i n t h e county. This a r t i c l e had a p i c t u r e of t h e defendant captioned "KILLER." The a r t i c l e used phrases describing t h e defendant a s a "cold blooded k i l l e r " and ". . . it appeared he w a s so steeped i n criminal tendencies t h a t nothing could appeal t o h i s warped and stony mind." The a r t i c l e described t h e homicide as ". . . t h e most d a s t a r d l y deed i n t h e h i s t o r y of Toole County . . ." The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e motion f o r change of venue, and t h e defendant was convicted. This Court reversed, saying t h a t the record revealed a "wide- spread and deep-seated opinion i n Toole County . . . t h a t defendant i s g u i l t y . . ." 127 Mont. a t 590. The b i a s presented i n t h e i n s t a n t case does n o t reach t h e l e v e l of t h a t presented i n Spotted Hawk and Dryrnan. The a f f i d a v i t s lack any convincing q u a l i t y t h a t t h e f e e l i n g s of t h e members of t h e community were aroused t o t h e p o i n t where t h e defendant could n o t receive a f a i r t r i a l . The examples of prejudice were obviously genuine, b u t most of it appears t o be i n t h e nature of i s o l a t e d o u t b u r s t s by people who w e r e connected with t h e victim. The news a r t i c l e s i n t h i s case a r e nDt c f t h e outrageous q u a l i t y presented i n Dryman, supra. The evidence of prejudice presented by t h e defendant is inconclusive. I n such circumstances, t h e t r i a l judge's d i s c r e t i o n must be r e l i e d upon. I n t h i s case t h e judge took t h e change of venue motion under advisement u n t i l t h e v o i r d i r e examination of t h e jury. I t was n o t u n t i l a f t e r v o i r d i r e t h a t t h e motion was denied. From our review of t h e record w e do n o t f i n d countywide prejudice which would preclude a f a i r t r i a l . I n view of t h e c o n f l i c t i n g testimony and a f f i d a v i t s and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s opportunity t o personally observe t h e v o i r d i r e examination of t h e prospec- t i v e j u r o r s , we f i n d t h a t t h e r e was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e change of venue motion. Defendant next contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n deny- i n g h i s challenge t o t h e jury panel a s a whole and t o juror Pettigrew s p e c i f i c a l l y . This Court has held t h a t t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l jury i s an unqualified one. S t a t e v. Brooks (1920), 57 Mont. 480, 487, 188 P. 942. In the present case approximately sixty prospective jurors were examined before twenty-eight positions were filled from which the final twelve trial jurors were selected. Twenty-nine prospective jurors were excused for cause. The State and defendant each used nine peremptory challenges. Defendant alleges that these large numbers indicate the difficulty of securing an impartial jury. The pertinent inquiry is, however, whether the jury as empaneled were able to render an impartial judgment based solely upon the evi- dence presented at trial. Defendant's arguments concerning the bias and partiality of the jury amount in large part to speculation as to the hidden pressures and prejudices of the jury members. Defen- dant alleges that certain jurors were closely connected with law enforcement personnel or had some connection with the victim. The State correctly points out that the trial judge allowed both parties wide latitude in examination of the jurors and permitted individual questioning of each prospec- tive juror in chambers. All of the jurors who finally sat at the trial stated under oath either that they would judge defendant solely on the evidence presented and that they could put aside any opinions they might have formed, or th.at they had no opinions in the case, or that they understood a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. "In the examination of a juror to determine his competency the trial court is in a peculiarly advantageous position from observing his de- meanor, his expression and his manner in an- swering questions." State v. Simpson (1939), 109 Mont. 198, 207, 95 P.2d 761, 764. In State v. Borchert (1970), 156 Mont. 315, 320, 479 P.2d 454, 457, this Court stated that a trial judge's deci- sion as to the impartiality of a jury should not be set a s i d e unless t h e r e i s a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . I n speaking of t h e l e v e l of juror p r e j u d i c e which would mandate t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a juror, t h i s Court said: " I t i s only where they form fixed opinions on t h e g u i l t o r innocence of t h e defendant which they would n o t be a b l e t o l a y a s i d e and render a v e r d i c t based s o l e l y on t h e evidence pre- sented i n c o u r t t h a t they become d i s q u a l i f i e d as jurors." G r e a t F a l l s Tribune v. D i s t r i c t Court (19801, Mont. , 608 P.2d 116, 120, 37 ~t.~e~.02, 5 0 6 . A s noted above, each juror gave an assurance of impar- t i a l i t y . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e t r i a l judge made cautionary remarks t o t h e jury t h a t they had a duty t o l a y a s i d e t h e i r opinions and impressions. Under t h e s e circumstances t h e t r i a l judge d i d n o t abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n by denying defen- d a n t ' s challenge t o t h e jury panel. The defendant a s s i g n s a s e r r o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e challenge f o r cause of juror Pettigrew. M r s . Pettigrew was t h e dancing i n s t r u c t o r of Donna Hurley, t h e daughter of the victim. Donna t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . During v o i r d i r e examination M r s . Pettigrew t e s t i f i e d a s follows while being questioned by defense counsel: "Q. D o you think you could be a f a i r and impar- t i a l juror i n t h i s case? A. W e l l , no, I r e a l l y d o n ' t think I can. "Q. You c a n ' t give your p o s i t i v e assurance t h a t you could g i v e M r . Bashor a f a i r t r i a l ? A. There's a question about it, s o I guess m y an- s w e r i s no. "Q. You c a n ' t give u s your p o s i t i v e assurance? A. No." The c o u r t then conducted t h e following inquiry: "Q. You s a i d previously t o M r . Conner t h a t you d i d n ' t think you could be a f a i r juror. Explain what you mean o r what y0u.r thoughts a r e on t h a t , and j u s t why you think t h i s . A. Okay. M r . Kalbfleisch, when he asked m e , w a s asking i f I could do t h i s on t h e f a c t s , you know, of t h e case, and I r e a l l y think I can. The o t h e r lawyer was questioning on m y emotions, and those a r e two d i f f e r e n t things. "Q. Undoubtedly you w i l l be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i f you were t o serve as a juror i n t h i s c a s e t h e case must be decided upon t h e evidence presented i n t h e courtroom-- A . Yes. "Q. --and t h a t you a r e n o t t o decide t h i s case on sympathy, conjecture, o r any o t h e r thing. N o w would you be a b l e t o follow an i n s t r u c t i o n of t h a t nature? A. Yes, I r e a l l y think I could because even though I would f e e l sympathy o r emotion m y conscience would n o t l e t me. I would s t i l l have t o be f a i r when it came t o choosing. "Q. You think you could be a f a i r juror? A. Y e s , I think I could. "Q. I gather what you a r e saying i s t h a t you a r e a compassionate person, b u t a f a i r person a l s o ? A. Y e s .I1 This Court has previously considered a s i m i l a r problem. I n S t a t e v. Juhrey (1921), 61 Mont. 413, 202 P. 762, a proposed juror had s t a t e d t h a t he had already formed an opinion about t h e case based on a newspaper a r t i c l e . H e a l s o s t a t e d , however, t h a t he would base h i s opinion a s t o defendant's g u i l t upon t h e evidence presented a t t h e t r i a l . This Court noted t h a t during v o i r d i r e t h i s juror had ". . . made statements which, i f standing alone, would i n d i c a t e a fixed opinion amounting t o prejudice." The Court went on t o say: ". . . where t h e evidence r e l a t i n g t o t h e q u a l i - f i c a t i o n s of a juror i s i n c o n f l i c t , it i s t h e function of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o pass upon t h a t evidence and determine the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e j u r o r , and t h i s determination of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s f i n a l , unless it appears from t h e record t h a t t h e r e has been some abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . " 61 Mont. a t 4 2 1 . I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e juror gave answers t o defense counsel which, i f standing alon2, would i n d i c a t e t h a t she could n o t give a f a i r opinion i n t h e case. When questioned by t h e judge, however, M r s . Pettigrew made it clear t h a t she could p u t her emotions a s i d e and judge t h e defendant f a i r l y and s o l e l y upon t h e evidence presented a t t r i a l . A s i n Juhrey, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the challenge for cause. Prior to defendant's trial, the State made a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of expert testimony regarding the results of a polygraph examination taken by William Schaeffer. The motion was granted. Defendant attacks the ruling on three grounds: (1) The trial court erred in refusing to hear defendant's offer of proof on the polygraph; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that the proposed testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing admission of the particular polygraph-related testimony offered by defendant. These three grounds will be disposed oi in the following discussion. The questions and answers during the polygraph examina- tion were : "Question No. 1: 1 : s your last name Schaeffer? "Answer: Yes. "Question No. 2 : Was Ozzie [defendant] looking for Jim on that night? "Answer : No. "Question No. 3: Are you now in Great Falls? "Answer : Yes. "Question No. 4 : Did you see the gun at any time? "Answer : No. "Question No. 5: Is your hair brown? "Answer : Yes. "Question No. 6: Did you know if Ozzie ever got out of his vehicle at any time? "Answer : No. "Question No. 7: Are your eyes hazel? "Answer : Yes. "Question No. 8: Did you see Ozzie fire the gun? "Answer : No. "Question No. 9: Regarding this case are you telling me the complete truth? "Answer : Yes. "Question No. 10: Did Jim start the altercation? "Answer : Yes. "Question No. 11: Are you 37 years old? "Answer: Yes. "Question No. 12: Other than what you said did Ozzie say anything about the shooting? "Answer : No. "Question No. 13: Are you covering up for Ozzie in any way? "Answer : NO. I ' These answers corroborate the story which defendant gave to the law enforcement authorities. This testimony could conceivably have helped defendant by showing Hurley as the aggressor and the defendant as a victim, thereby lending credence to the self-defense theory. The trial judge ruled that as a matter of lad the testimony of the polygraph examiner was inadmissible. If this ruling was correct, it was not error for the District Court to refuse to consider defendant's offer of proof or for it to refuse to admit into evidence this particular area of testimony and evidence. In State v. Hollywood (19601, 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 437, the defendant had attempted to introduce polyg3:a~>h tests in District Court by laying a foundation as to the accuracy of the tests and the qualifications of the examiner. The District Court refused to admit the evidence, and this Court affirmed t h a t r u l i n g . This C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was based, i n p a r t , on t h e lack of r e l i a b i l i t y i n h e r e n t i n polygraph tests, The decision, however, w a s a l s o p a r t i a l l y based on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e machine cannot be cross-examined and t h a t t h e polygraph examination had taken place approxi- mately f i v e and one-half months a f t e r t h e c r i m e was coa- a i t t e d . I n S t a t e v. Campbell (1978), 176 Mont. 525, 579 P.2d 1231, 1234, 35 St-Rep. 733, 737, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The Montana r u l e i s t h a t t h e r e s u l t s of poly- graph examinations a r e n o t admissible a s evidence i n a criminal trial. S t a t e v. Holly- wood [ c i t a t i o n ] ; S t a t e v. Cor (1964) , 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86." I n t h e p r e s e n t case defendant argues t h a t H - and Campbell a r e based upon t h e lack of r e l i a b i l i t y of polygraph tests a t t h e t i m e those decisions w e r e w r i t t e n . The t i m e has now come, defendant a s s e r t s , when t h e c o u r t s must recog- n i z e t h a t polygraph examinations have reached t h e l e v e l of accuracy where they should be admitted as evidence. I n defense of t h i s a s s e r t i o n , defendant has presented s e v e r a l s c h o l a r l y a r t i c l e s on t h e s u b j e c t . The most persua- s i v e of t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s i s a 1977 treatise e n t i t l e d "Truth and Deception 2nd Edition" ( W i l l i a m s and Wilkins Company, 1977). I n t h i s t r e a t i s e t h e authors r e v e r s e t h e i r long- standing opposition t o t h e introduction of polygraph r e s u l t s i n t o evidence and s t a t e t h a t such evidence should now be allowed s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n conditions. For a f u l l discus- s i o n of t h e s c i e n t i f i c r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of polygraph r e s u l t s , see S t a t e v. Stanislawski (1974), 62 Wis.2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8. As noted in the Stanislawski case, s e v e r a l j u r i s d i c - t i o n s have allowed polygraph r e s u l t s i n t o evidence under varying circumstances. Two cases a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e circumstances under which courts have allowed this type of evidence. In United States v . Ridling (D.C. Mich. 1972), 350 F.Supp. 90, which involved a perjury charge, the court said, ". . . polygraph evidence would be a valuable aid in connection with determining the kinds of issues involved in this case . . .", i.e., was the defendant telling the truth when he made the statements that were alleged to be the basis of the perjury charge? "A perjury case is based on 'willfully' or 'knowingly' giving false evidence. The experts all agree that the polygraph examination is aimed exactly at this aspect of truth." 350 F.Supp. at 93. As a result, the court allowed polygraph evidence to be intro- duced into evidence. In State v. Dorsey (Ct. App. 1975), 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, aff'd, State v. Dorsey (1975), 88 N.M. 184, 539 P. 2d 204, the trial court had refused to allow into evidence the results of the defendant's polygraph examination. The results tended to bolster the defendant's story that the victim had provoked the fight and that the defendant had killed the victim in self-defense. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the results were admissible under a due process rationale. The court in Dorsey said that the examination results were admissible because they were reliable and critical to the defendant's case. "[Tlhe defense case came down to the credibility of defendant." The Dorsey decision was followed in State v. Shaw (Ct. App. 1977), 90 N.M. 540, 565 P.2d 1057. In the present case the District Court refused the polygraph evidence as a matter of law. Apparently the judge had the mistaken belief that the examination was of the defendant rather than of the witness Schaeffer. Regardless of this mistake, however, we decline to overrule Hollywood and Campbell. We also decline to follow the rationale expressed by the New Mexico court in Dorsey. We believe that the better rationale is expressed in United States v. Alexander (8th Cir. 1975), 526 F.2d 161. Alexander contains an in depth discussion of the science of polygraph and why the results should not be allowed into evidence, viz., the scientific unreliability of the process. The Eighth Circuit Court, however, went on to point out an even larger problem in allowing such evidence before the jury. It said: ". . . in many cases where polygraph evidence is admitted, a single person, the polygraphist, will give testimony which will often be the determina- tive factor as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant in a jury-tried case. This would de- prive the defendant of the common sense and collective judgment of his peers, derived after weighing facts and considering the credibility of witnesses, which has been the hallmark of the jury tradition." 525 F.2d at 168. The court noted that other forms of scientific evidence may be allowed into evidence under Federal Evidence Rule 702 which is identical to Rule 702, Mont.R.Evid. Both rules state: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under- stand the evidence or to determine a fact in is- sue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. " The court in Alexander noted, however, that there is a profound difference between polygraph results and most other types of scientific evidence which are admissible, such as fingerprint comparisons or handwriting analysis. These types of scientific evidence are ". . . elicited solely for the purpose of iden- tifying either an individual or an object al- legedly involved in the perpetration of a criminal act. These scientific tests do not purport to indicate with any degree of conclu- siveness that the defendant who is so identi- fied or connected with the object actually committed the crime. The jury, after receiving such expert testimony, has the additional re- sponsibility of reviewing other facts which tend to prove or disprove defendant's connec- tion with the crime and, if participation is shown, the jury may further be required to as- certain the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime in appropriate cases. "The role of the jury after a polygraphist has testified that the results of a polygraph exam- ination show that the defendant's denial of participation in the crime was fabricated is much more circumscribed. If the expert testimony is believed by the jury, a quilty verdict is usu- ally mandated. The polygraphist's testimony often is not limited to mere identification or any other limited aspect of defendant's possible participation in the criminal act. Through the testimony of the polygraph expert relating to whether the defendant was being truthful in his responses concerning participation in the crime, the expert is thus proffering his opinion based on scientific evidence bearing upon the sole issue reserved for the jury--is the defendant innocent or guilty?" 526 F.2d at 169. The same rationale applies to Schaeffer's polygraph results. Rule 702 allows expert opinion to be introduced at trial if specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Defendant contends that Schaeffer's polygraph results will help establish a defense of sslf-defense. We disagree. The only thing that Schaeffer's polygraph results can accomplish in this regard is to establish Schaeffer's under- standing of the defendant's motives. This is not a fact in issue in this case. Schaeffer's credibility in understand- ing the defendant's motive is not the type of evidence which needs to be explained by an expert witness. The only facts in issue here were defendant's acts and intentions on the night Hurley was killed. The opinion of the polygraph operator does not fall within the scope of Rule 702 because this expert would not be assisting the jury to understand a fact in issue. Schaeffer was allowed to testify fully at trial to every item that he testified to during the polygraph examination. The jury was able to determine for themselves whether this testimony was credible. The polygraph expert in this case would be directly invading the province of the jury if he had been allowed to offer his opinion as to whether Schaeffer had been telling the truth. Schaeffer's credibility was not a fact in issue. It is distinctly the jury's province to determine when a witness is being truthful or untruthful. For these reasoris it was not error for the District Court to grant the State's motion and rule as a matter of law that the evidence was inadmis- sible. Defendant next argues that his conviction must be reversed because of certain statements that the special prosecutor made in his closing argument to the jury. The gist of these statements was to discredit defendant's claims that he acted in self-defense and that Hurley was the aggressor. The language used by the special prosecutor in the closing argument was as follows: "Bill Schaeffer thought they were just going there to beat him up a little. And you can tell by the way he sat on the stand and testi- fied that it wouldn't take him long to com- pletely annihilate more than two or three people. So he knew they were going over there for a fight. That's why he came into town. But he didn't know the defendant was going to shoot Hurley. He never had any idea about that. But he was out in front of the Blazer, and he was jumping and hollering around like a wild maniac with his Kung Fu. While he was out there the dome light of the Blazer came on. (Counsel taking exhibit gun in hand.) The defendant reaches down into the console, withdraws his weapon out of the holster-- because this is the time--this is the time he has finally chosen after all of these months of trailing, surveilling, calling-- this is the time. And he cocks it, (Counsel cocking gun) and he looks in there to make sure there's a shell. That's why the dome light is on. That's why Bill Schaeffer never saw the gun. And he shoots. (Counsel pulling trigger.) He shot James Hurley before Hurley ever even got a chance to grab him." Defendant notes that these statements are contrary to Schaeffer's answers during the polygraph examination. Because the State was aware of the polygraph results, defendant argues, the State should not be allowed to present a version of the facts that is contrary to those results. In other words, the prosecution should not take unfair advantage of the District Court's exclusionary rulings. Section 46-16-401(6), MCA, allows an attorney to com- ment upon the evidence of the case. An attorney may argue and draw reasonable inferences from evidence so long as there are facts to support such statements. State v. Moore (1975), 112 Ariz. 271, 540 P.2d 1252, 1256. The State, in the present case, presented evidence to support the prose- cution's version of the homicide. There was evidence that defendant knew Hurley was in the bar, that defendant and Schaeffer attracted Hurley's attention outside of the bar, that Schaeffer had been standing outside defendant's vehicle prior to the time Hurley approached defendant, and of the defendant's prior relationship with Marian Irgens and Hurley. Given this evidence, the closing remarks did not exceed the bounds of comment and reasonable inference which may be made upon the evidence by an attorney. Once again we note that the defense was allowed to put on their evidence. In particular Schaeffer was allowed to testify at trial as to every fact which was asked about during the polygraph examination. Defense counsel was allowed to comment on this evidence and put forward, to the jury, defendant's version of the circumstances surrounding Hurley's death. The S t a t e d i d n o t v i o l a t e any constitu- t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y provisions by making t h e closing argu- ment quoted above. Defendant next contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred i n admitting i n t o evidence a c t s and statements of the defendant which occurred p r i o r t o t h e shooting. This evidence, which w a s introduced by t h e S t a t e , was t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t defen- d a n t and Marian Irgens had had a romantic r e l a t i o n s h i p and t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p had subsequently d e t e r i o r a t e d . This r e s u l t e d , according t o t h e S t a t e ' s testimony, i n i l l - f e e l i n g s on t h e defendant's p a r t toward Marian Irgens and James Hurley, when these two began seeing each o t h e r s o c i a l l y . This testimony indicated t h a t defendant was keeping Marian Irgens and Hurley under surveillance, t h a t defendant made phone calls t o Irgens and t o t h e Hurley household, and t h a t defendant made threatening statements t o and about Irgens. Defendant made a motion i n limine t o exclude any t h r e a t s t h a t r e l a t e d t o persons other than James Hurley. The t r i a l judge ruled t h a t t h e t h r e a t s made d i r e c t l y t o Marian Irgens w e r e n o t t o be mentioned b u t t h a t statements made about her t o o t h e r people were admissible. Defendant p o i n t s t o t h r e e instances of testimony i n t h i s regard. (1) Marian Irgens w a s allowed t o t e s t i f y as follows: "Q. The defendant s a i d t o you, 'When you have a problem you eliminate i t ? ' A . Right. "Q. And you f e l t t h a t you w e r e h i s problem? A. I f e l t t h a t , yes, a t the time." ( 2 ) Irgens was allowed t o t e s t i f y t h a t " H e [ t h e defen- dant] s a i d he w a s going t o r u i n m y name i n Toole County . ." Thj-s testimony was admitted i n evidence d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t r i a l judge had s p e c i f i c a l l y r u l e d t h a t Marian Irgens could not t e s t i f y a s t o t h i s f a c t . (3) Deidra Merritt w a s c a l l e d t o t h e stand and testi- f i e d t h a t t h e following conversation took place on August "Q. . . . W h o came i n ? A. Ozzie Bashor. H e came i n and sat down next t o m e and bought a drink. . . Then he proceeded t o say, 'You know, I caught Marian and J i m Hurley i n bed last n i g h t a t f i v e o'clock i n t h e morning.' Then he s a i d , 'She's too goddam o l d a g i r l t o be screwing around u n t i l f i v e o'clock i n t h e morning with some young guy l i k e J i m . ' I s a i d , ' W e l l , under t h e circumstances, you and Marian a r e n ' t married and so you have no c o n t r o l of t h e s i t u a t i o n and she can do anything she pleases.' H e s a i d , ' W e l l , s h e ' s nothing b u t a goddam whore. I ' m going t o make her pay f o r t h i s . ' I s a i d , 'How are you going t o do t h a t ? ' and he s a i d , ' I d o n ' t know, b u t I ' m going t o make her pay, and I ' m going t o h u r t her as bad as s h e ' s h u r t m e , and s h e ' s nothing b u t a fucking whore.' . . ." Rule 402, Mont.R,Evid., states i n p a r t t h a t r e l e v a n t evidence is admissible, while i r r e l e v a n t evidence i s not. Rule 401, Mont.R.Evid., defines r e l e v a n t evidence as ". . . evidence having any tendency t o make t h e existence of any f a c t t h a t i s of consequence t o t h e determination of t h e a c t i o n more probable o r less probable than it would be without t h e evidence." I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e S t a t e had t o prove t h a t defendant purposely o r knowingly caused t h e death of James Hurley. Section 45-5-102 (1) (a) , MCA. Consequently, evidence of t h e defendant's i n t e n t i n t h i s case i s relevant. I n S t a t e v. Fine (1931), 90 Mont. 311, 2 P.2d 1016, t h i s Court said: "The jury w a s e n t i t l e d t o know t h e r e l a t i o n s of t h e parties,--to be given information of the con- d i t i o n s which l e d up t o the homicide. The de- fendant alleged t h a t he s h o t i n self-defense. I t w a s permissible f o r t h e state t o show, i f it could, t h a t he had another motive than s e l f - protection. . . It i s f a m i l i a r l a w t h a t the emotion of jealousy may lead t o a d e s i r e t o k i l l . . . The motive t o k i l l may spring a s c e r t a i n l y from a f i x e d i n t e n t i o n t o possess t h e o b j e c t of o n e ' s a f f e c t i o n s , as from a f e a r of l o s s of t h a t already possessed." 90 Mont. a t 314, 2 P.2d a t 1017. Similarly, i n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e defendant a l l e g e d t h a t he s h o t i n self-defense. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e defendant and Marian Irgens was r e l e v a n t t o show i n t e n t . Consequently, it w a s admissible. Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e t h r e a t s made a g a i n s t Marian Irgens were i r r e l e v a n t because they were n o t d i r e c t e d a t Hurley, t h e victim. A s a general r u l e , t h r e a t s a g a i n s t persons o t h e r than t h e victim a r e n o t admissible. "However, where t h e circumstances a r e such t h a t t h e t h r e a t , although made t o a t h i r d person, tends t o show h o s t i l i t y toward t h e deceased, it i s relevant. ThusI it may be shown t h a t t h e accused made a t h r e a t t o a woman with whom both t h e accused and t h e deceased w e r e intimate. . ." 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 5204 (13th Ed. 1972). "Evidence of o t h e r crimes, wrongs, o r a c t s i s n o t admissible t o prove t h e c h a r a c t e r of a per- son i n order t o show t h a t he acted i n conformity therewith. I t may, however, be admissible f o r o t h e r purposes, such as proof of motive . . . [or] i n t e n t . . ." Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid. I n S t a t e v. Eaton (Me. 1973), 309 A.2d 334, t h e Maine c o u r t said: "Previous t h r e a t s made and a s s a u l t s committed by t h e defendant a r e admissible i n evidence where t h e r e is a c l o s e l o g i c a l connection with t h e crime charged i n t h e indictment such a s shedding l i g h t upon t h e motive o r i n t e n t of t h e defendant o r where such evidence forms p a r t of a s i n g l e chain of f a c t s s o i n t i m a t e l y connected t h a t t h e whole must be considered i n order t o i n t e r p r e t i t s s e v e r a l p a r t s . " 309 A.2d a t 338-39. The s a m e observations apply i n t h e p r e s e n t case. The t h r e a t s made t o Marian Irgens i n d i c a t e t h a t defendant was very upset about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between Hurley and Irgens. This bears on defendant's intent or motive for the shooting. As such, it is relevant and admissible. Defendant contends that even if this evidence was relevant, it should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid. We disagree. The State was required to prove intent. It was impor- tant, therefore, to show that defendant had harbored strong feelings of resentment against Marian Irgens and Hurley and that this feeling manifested itself in a pattern of harass- ment, threatening statements and belligerent actions. This showing was especially necessary to counter defendant's contention that he was the victim of an unprovoked attack. Thus, the challenged testimony was crucial to prove defen- dant's mental state at the time of the shooting, and as a result, the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Defendant next contends that the trial court failed to fairly and fully instruct the jury on the law of self- defense. Under this specification of error defendant directs our attention to several of his proposed instruc- tions which the trial court refused to give. Defendant also directs our attention to several of the State's proposed instructions concerning the law of self-defense which the trial court did give to the jury. These will be considered separately. Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 15 states: "You are instructed that 'serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or process of any bodily member or organ. " This proposed i n s t r u c t i o n i s taken from s e c t i o n 45-2-101(53), MCA. The S t a t e objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n a s follows: "We o b j e c t t o Defendant's Proposed No. 15. This i s n o t a proper i n s t r u c t i o n f o r a self-defense case. It is n o t applicable t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y . I t i s meant f o r t h e s t a t u t e on aggravated a s s a u l t . The e n t i r e d e f i n i - t i o n s i n t h e j u s t i f i a b l e use of f o r c e s e c t i o n of t h e code and a l l through t h e comment r e f e r t o s e r i o u s bodily harm and n o t s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y o r death and s e r i o u s bodily harm. This i s n ' t a proper i n s t r u c t i o n . " The t r i a l c o u r t refused t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . The jury w a s given an i n s t r u c t i o n which was v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's s t a t u t e on self-defense. Section 45- 3-102, MCA. This s t a t u t e says, i n p a r t , t h a t a person may use deadly f o r c e t o p r o t e c t himself t o prevent " . . . s e r i o u s bodily harm t o himself . . ." The term " s e r i o u s bodily harm" i s n o t defined i n Montana's Criminal Code. During t r i a l t h e defense introduced testimony which showed t h a t t h e defendant had had a r e c e n t eye operation and t h a t a blow t o t h e head could cause t h e l o s s of v i s i o n i n t h a t eye. According t o defendant, t h e r e f u s a l t o g i v e t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y " a s an i n s t r u c t i o n denied him t h e a b i l i t y t o f u l l y p r e s e n t h i s self-defense theory t o t h e jury. I n S t a t e v. Freeman (1979), - M o n t . - , 599 P.2d 368, 36 St.Rep. 1622, t h e defendant had pleaded self-defense and t h e t r i a l c o u r t gave both the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of self-defense and " s e r i o u s bodily injury." This Court held t h a t t h e jury had been adequately i n s t r u c t e d on t h i s - p o i n t . This Court, however, d i d n o t hold i n Freeman t h a t t h e " s e r i - ous bodily injury" d e f i n i t i o n had t o be given t o t h e jury. Rather, t h e t e s t i s whether " I . . . t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given on j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e gave t h e defendant ample opportunity t o expound t o t h e jury i n argument h i s theory with r e s p e c t t o t h e use of f o r c e a s self-defense a g a i n s t an unlawful a c t . ' " Freeman, 599 P.2d a t 373, 36 St.Rep. a t 1628. I n t h e p r e s e n t case defendant was a b l e t o p r e s e n t h i s evidence t o t h e jury concerning t h e condition of h i s eye. He was permitted t o argue t h a t Hurley's a c t i o n s threatened s e r i o u s bodily harm. The jury w a s f r e e t o consider whether t h e f e a r of t h e l o s s of an eye could be considered as s e r i - ous bodily harm. I n s h o r t , defendant had ample opportunity t o p r e s e n t t o t h e jury h i s theory of self-defense. The r e f u s a l by t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o give Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15 d i d n o t prevent defendant from f u l l y presenting h i s case. Consequently, t h i s r e f u s a l d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e e r r o r . A f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t refused t h e Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15, defendant o f f e r e d Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15-A, which s u b s t i t u t e d t h e word "harm" f o r " i n j u r y " i n Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15. The S t a t e objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , a s follows: "No. W e would have t h e same objection, Your Honor. The e n t i r e code i s phrased i n terms of s e r i o u s bodily harm, and t h e comments very c l e a r l y say s p e c i f i c a l l y whether o r n o t some- thing i s s e r i o u s bodily harm i s a question f o r t h e jury, and t h i s would be a comment on t h e evidence by d e f i n i n g what i s o r i s n o t s e r i o u s bodily harm." The i n s t r u c t i o n was c o r r e c t l y refused by t h e t r i a l court. "Serious bodily harm" i s n o t defined by s t a t u t e and does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y equate with t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of " s e r i o u s bodily injury." There i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o i n t e g r a t e t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y " i n t o t h e s e l f -defense s t a t u t e . "We must presume t h e l e g i s l a t u r e knew what it was doing and was cognizant of t h e s t a t u t e s of Montana a s then enacted." Dept. of Revenue v. B.N. Inc. (1976), 169 Mont. 202, 211, 545 P.2d 1083, 1088. A s a r e s u l t , it was n o t e r r o r t o r e f u s e defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15-A. Defendant asserts t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i - b l e e r r o r by refusing t o g i v e defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 17, which read: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t ' f o r c i b l e felony' means any felony which involves t h e use o r t h r e a t of physical f o r c e o r violence a g a i n s t any i n d i v i - dual. " This proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was taken from s e c t i o n 45-2- 101 (16) , MCA. The S t a t e objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t - ing, "We w i l l o b j e c t t o No. 17 because t h e r e i s no evidence i n t h i s case of a felony of any kind, much less a f o r c i b l e felony. " A s noted above, t h e jury was given an i n s t r u c t i o n on self-defense which was taken from s e c t i o n 45-3-102, MCA. The s t a t u t e and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n use t h e t e r m " f o r c i b l e felony." I n Freeman, supra, t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " f o r c i b l e felony" was given, but, once again, t h i s Court d i d n o t hold t h a t a D i s t r i c t Court must give a d e f i n i t i o n of every t e r m included i n an a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e . By necessity, each case must be considered on i t s own f a c t s as t o whether t h e jury has been adequately i n s t r u c t e d on every theory having support i n t h e evidence presented. When t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " f o r c i b l e felony" i s considered it i s apparent t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err i n n o t including it i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The d e f i n i t i o n adds nothing t o t h e t e r m being defined. The lack of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n could n o t prevent t h e defendant from f u l l y presenting h i s case t o t h e jury. Defendant claims e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 16 and 18. Defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 16 read: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t 'occupied s t r u c t u r e ' means any building, vehicle, o r o t h e r place s u i t e d f o r human occupancy o r n i g h t lodging of persons o r f o r carrying on business whether o r n o t a person i s a c t u a l l y present. Each u n i t of a building c o n s i s t i n g of two o r more u n i t s s e p a r a t e l y secured o r occupied i s a s e p a r a t e occupied s t r u c t u r e . " This proposed i n s t r u c t i o n w a s taken from s e c t i o n 45-2- 101(34), MCA. Defendant's Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 18 b a s i c a l l y consisted of t h e s t a t u t o r y explanation of t h e l a w of defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e . Section 45-3-103, MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n r e f u s i n g these i n s t r u c - t i o n s . Defendant argues t h a t it was e r r o r t o r e f u s e such i n s t r u c t i o n s because t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "occupied s t r u c t u r e " includes t h e word "vehicle." Defendant w a s s i t t i n g i n a Chevrolet Blazer when he s h o t Hurley. There is no evidence presented t h a t t h e v e h i c l e was equipped f o r human occupancy o r n i g h t lodging. From a reading of t h e d e f i n i t i o n of "occupied s t r u c t u r e " it i s c l e a r t h a t a v e h i c l e , such a s defendant's, i s n o t intended. The s t r u c t u r e must be " s u i t a b l e f o r human occu- pancy o r n i g h t lodging of persons o r f o r carrying on business . . ." A defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n having support i n t h e evidence presented. S t a t e v. Quinlan (1929), 84 Mont. 364, 372, 275 P. 750, 753. H e i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a n i n s t r u c t i o n having no support i n t h e evidence. Defendant next contends t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n giving s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s which defined self-defense. The i n s t r u c t i o n s involved are Nos. 24, 26 and 28. Defendant argues t h a t these i n s t r u c t i o n s do n o t c l e a r l y express t h e proposition t h a t a person has t h e r i g h t t o defend himself a g a i n s t what he reasonably believes t o be a t h r e a t of death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm even though t h e danger i s n o t r e a l . Section 45-3-102, MCA, uses t h e t e r m "reasonably believes." The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 24 reads: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t before t h e defendant can a v a i l himself of t h e r i g h t of self-defense, it must appear t o him, a c t i n g a s a reasonable person, t h a t a t t h e time of t h e k i l l i n g the danger w a s apparently s o urgent and pressing t h a t i n order t o save h i s own l i f e , o r t o pre- v e n t h i s receiving s e r i o u s bodily harm, t h e k i l l i n g was absolutely necessary." The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 28 reads: " I n order t o j u s t i f y t h e use of f o r c e l i k e l y t o cause death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm ( o f t e n c a l l e d deadly f o r c e ) , it must appear t o the Defendant t h a t t h e danger w a s s o urgent t h a t , i n order t o save h i s own l i f e , o r t o save him- s e l f from s e r i o u s bodily harm, t h e use of such deadly f o r c e was absolutely necessary. And it must f u r t h e r appear t h a t t h e deceased was t h e a s s a i l a n t . A bare f e a r of t h e commission of t h e offense, t o prevent which t h e Defendant used a deadly weapon, is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y it; b u t t h e circumstances must be suf- f i c i e n t t o e x c i t e t h e f e a r s of a reasonable man, and t h e Defendant must have a c t e d under t h e influence of such f e a r s alone. I t i s not necessary, however, t o j u s t i f y t h e use of a deadly weapon t h a t t h e danger be a c t u a l . I t i s enough t o be an apparent danger; such an appearance a s would induce a reasonable per- son t o believe he was i n danger of s e r i o u s bodily harm. Upon such appearance a p a r t y may a c t with s a f e t y , nor w i l l he be held account- a b l e though it would afterward appear t h a t t h e i n d i c a t i o n s upon which he acted w e r e wholly f a l - l a c i o u s , and t h a t he was i n no a c t u a l p e r i l . The r u l e i n such c a s e i s t h i s : "What would a reasonable person--a person of ordinary caution, judgment and observation-- i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e Defendant, seeing what he s a w , knowing what he knew, suppose from t h i s s i t u a t i o n and t h e s e surroundings? I f such rea- sonable person s o placed would have been j u s t i - f i e d i n believing himself i n imminent danger, then t h e Defendant would be j u s t i f i e d i n be- l i e v i n g himself i n such p e r i l and a c t i n g upon such appearances." Defendant's objection t o both of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s was t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t they w e r e i n c o r r e c t statements of t h e l a w . A review of t h e s e two i n s t r u c t i o n s i n d i c a t e s t h a t it was made absolutely c l e a r t o the jury t h a t t h e danger need n o t be a c t u a l , it need only be what a reasonable person would perceive a s being a t h r e a t t o t h e person's l i f e o r a t h r e a t of s e r i o u s bodily harm. The i n s t r u c t i o n s were cor- r e c t l y given. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 26, which was given t o t h e jury, reads: "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i f you b e l i e v e from t h e evidence t h a t t h e defendant k i l l e d t h e de- ceased i n necessary self-defense as explained and defined i n these i n s t r u c t i o n s , you must a c q u i t the defendant." Conceivably, t h e words "necessary self-defense" could be an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e l a w . However, i n t h i s case t h e i n s t r u c t i o n contains t h e proviso " a s explained and defined i n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s . " A s noted above, self-defense was c o r r e c t l y explained and defined i n t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s ; t h e r e f o r e , i n t h i s context, t h e r e was no e r r o r committed by giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 24, 26, and 28. Next, defendant contends t h a t it w a s e r r o r t o give I n s t r u c t i o n No. 27, which s t a t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t an aggressor i s one who provokes an a t t a c k upon himself, brings on o r encourages a d i f f i c u l t y o r q u a r r e l . A n ag- gressor cannot a s s e r t t h a t he acted i n self- defense. " Defendant contended a t t r i a l and contends on appeal t h a t t h e r e was no evidence presented i n support of t h i s i n s t r u c - t i o n and t h a t t h e law a s given was an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e l a w . The t r i a l judge must i n s t r u c t t h e jury on every essen- t i a l question presented by t h e evidence. S t a t e v. Quinlan, supra, 84 Mont. a t 372, 275 P.2d a t 753. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e r e was some evidence t o support t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given which defined "aggressor." There was testimony t h a t defendant had l e f t t h e headlights on as he s a t i n h i s v e h i c l e i n t h e parking l o t , thereby a t t r a c t i n g ~ u r l e y ' s a t t e n t i o n . There was testimony t h a t Schaeffer was o u t s i d e defendant's v e h i c l e h o l l e r i n g a t Hurley and h i s companions. There was a l s o t h e testimony, discussed above, as t o defendant's p r i o r a c t s of h o s t i l i t y towards Hurley and Marian Irgens. Given t h i s testimony, t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o j u s t i f y t h e aggressor i n s t r u c t i o n . Defendant a l s o contends t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n was an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e law. H e bases t h i s contention upon t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e some exceptions t o t h e aggressor l i m i t a t i o n . Section 45-3-105, MCA, s t a t e s t h a t an aggressor may use t h e theory of self-defense i f (1) he has exhausted every reasonable means of escape, o r ( 2 ) i f he withdraws from physical c o n t a c t with t h e a s s a i l a n t and c l e a r l y i n d i - c a t e s t h a t he d e s i r e s t o terminate t h e use of force. These exceptions a r e inapplicable under t h e evidence i n t h i s case. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e State o f f e r e d an i n s t r u c t i o n which incorporated t h e s t a t u t o r y language of s e c t i o n 45-3-105, MCA. The defense objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e ground t h a t t h e r e was no evidence t h a t defendant provoked an a t t a c k . The S t a t e then withdrew t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . Defendant d i d n o t o f f e r an i n s t r u c t i o n which d e a l t with t h e same subject. He now contends such an i n s t r u c t i o n should have been given. I n S t a t e v. Romero (1965), 146 Mont. 77, 8 3 , 404 P.2d 500, 503, t h i s Court considered a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n and s a i d : "Had t h e defendant f e l t t h e c o u r t improperly in- s t r u c t e d t h e jury on a l l a s p e c t s of t h e case, it was h i s duty t o submit i n s t r u c t i o n s which more f u l l y covered t h e p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r which he w a s d i s s a t i s f i e d with, and i n f a i l i n g t o do s o he cannot now a l l e g e p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . " ~ a v i n g objected t o t h e very i n s t r u c t i o n he now a s s e r t s should have been included, defendant may n o t now p r e d i c a t e e r r o r on t h e absence of t h e q u a l i f y i n g i n s t r u c t i o n . Defendant contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l - i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and negligent homicide. This Court has r e c e n t l y s t a t e d t h e general r u l e t h a t "an i n s t r u c t i o n i s required where t h e r e i s some evidence t o support t h e l e s s e r [included] offense." S t a t e v. Hamilton (1980), - Mont. - , 605 P.2d 1121, 37 St.Rep. 70, 77. This Court a l s o s a i d i n Hamilton t h a t negligent homicide ( s e c t i o n 45-5-104, MCA) was t o be con- sidered a lesser included offense of d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( s e c t i o n 45-5-102, MCA). The same reasoning can be applied t o mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( s e c t i o n 45-5-103, MCA), because t h e two crimes c o n s i s t of t h e same elements, t h e only d i f f e r e n c e being t h e presence of "extreme mental o r emotional s t r e s s " i n t h e l e s s e r crime. W e need not, i n t h i s case, determine whether t h e r e i s evidence t o support t h e l e s s e r included offense. The S t a t e o f f e r e d an i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Defense counsel objected t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n " f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e evidence shows t h e defendant was e i t h e r g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide o r n o t g u i l t y . " The i n s t r u c t i o n Was then withdrawn. This Court has held t h a t e r r o r may n o t be predicated upon t h e f a i l u r e t o g i v e an i n s t r u c t i o n when t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s n o t offered. S t a t e v. Harvey (1979), Mont . - I 603 P.2d 661, 36 St.Rep. 2035, 2038. F a i l u r e t o o f f e r an i n s t r u c t i o n removes t h e cause of e r r o r , p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h e defense counsel has objected t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n upon t h e ground that the defendant was either guilty of deliberate homicide or not guilty. Af firmed. Z d ( 9 4 , ~ d Chief Tustice Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea and Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissent and will file a written dissent later. I N THE SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A No. 1 4 5 4 2 STATE V. B A S H O R D I S S E N T M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy, and M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea D A T E D J u l y 17, 1980 Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting: I think the motion to change the place of trial in this case should have been granted. The newspaper article using unfounded facts to portray the incident as an old west shoot-out together with the news broadcast over radio station KSEN created a climate of opinion in the county which is evidenced by the several calls received by the Toole County Sheriff's Office to determine whether the defendant had been released from jail on bond, and making known the callers' objections if the defendant was to be released. The justice of the peace who set the bail bond at $50,000 received thereafter an anonymous telephone call indicating that the defendant would be shot if he were released. The situation was bad enough that when the defendant was released on bond, the judge made it a condition of his release that he leave Glacier and Toole Counties, except for court appearances, for his own protection. The caretaker who managed the Bashor property in Bashor's absence was then threatened and intimidated. The antagonistic attitude of the community was demon- strated in the voir dire examination of the juror to which reference is made in the majority opinion. Our courts are understandably cautious about the added costs of trials in places other than the county where the alleged crime occurred. However, the constitutional requirement of fair trial, Art. 11, g17, 1972 Mont. Const., overrides financial considerations. See State v . Spotted Hawk (18991, 22 Mont. 33, 55 P . x 1026; State v . Dryman (1954), 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796. As a second point, the instructions offered by the State, given by the District Court, and now approved by this - 35- Court make it impossible for a defendant to establish self- defense in this state. Court's instruction no. 24, tells the jury that before a defendant can avail himself of the defense of self-defense, it must appear to him as a reasonable person that "the danger was apparently so urgent and pressing" that "the killing was absolutely necessary." In court's instruction no. 28, the jury is told that in order to justify the use of force, it must appear to the defendant that the danger was so urgent that in order to save his own life or to save himself from serious bodily harm, the use of such deadly force was "absolutely necessary.' This instruction obliterated the "reasonable man" test. In instruction no. 26, the jury was told that defendant could be acquitted if he killed the deceased "in necessary self-defense." The use of the terms "necessary", "absolutely necessary", and "urgent and pressingn require nearly impossible tests for self-defense. The approval of those terms by this Court will bring us a log-jam of cases in the future to straighten out the law. The instructions go far beyond section 45-3- 102, MCA, on which model Instruction no. 35, Criminal In- structions--Montana, is based: "You are instructed that a person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of such force. "However, a person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if he really believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or the commission of a forcible felony." We should not give judicial sanction to the misstatements of law contained in those three instructions which were properly objected to. Thirdly, the final argument of the prosecutor to the jury went beyond the bounds of propriety, because he used inflammatory material which he knew to be untrue in that argument. The prosecutor stated: "Bill Schaeffer thought they were just going there to beat him up a little. And you can tell by the way he sat on the stand and testified that it wouldn't take him long to completely annihilate more than two or three people. So he knew they were going over there for a fight. That's why he came into town 11 . . . The prosecutor knew from the polygraph examination of Bill Schaeffer that statements that they went to the bar looking for a fight were not true. Otherwise the State would have had to prosecute Bill Schaeffer as an accomplice. The "bounds of comment and reasonable inference" relied upon by the majority do not include untruth. To make matters worse, the State, though making statements in final argument which are not in accordance with the polygraph examination of Bill Schaeffer, nevertheless argued to keep out the polygraph examination which would have shown those prosecutor statements to be false. One detects a reluctance on the part of the courts involved in this case to face up to an irate community aroused because of the killing of a popular citizen by an unpopular citizen. It is for that kind of criminal that the law sets up con- stitutional and legal safeguards to insure a fair trial for every defendant, no matter how guilty eventually he may turn out to be. I would reverse for a new trial in a different county. M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea concurring i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t : I agree with J u s t i c e Sheehy t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have granted a change of venue and I would reverse t h i s case with t h e proviso t h a t t h e cause be t r i e d i n another county. While I do not f e e l t h a t t h e self-defense i n s t r u c t i o n s submitted by t h e S t a t e and adopted by t h e court, w e r e erroneous when taken as a whole, they w e r e not model i n s t r u c t i o n s by any means and I would not recommend t h a t they be used again. The S t a t e i s engaging i n t h e p r a c t i c e of @A%wj,the l i l l y and t h i s can only lead t o unfortunate r e v e r s a l s i f t h e p r a c t i c e i s continued. I believe, furthermore, t h a t t h e polygraph examination r e s u l t s should have been admitted i n evidence, and t h a t it w a s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r not t o do so. It is u n f a i r t o t h e extreme f o r t h e S t a t e t o i n s i s t on a polygraph examination, and a f t e r the defendant' has taken one, to resist i t s admission i n \'.. - ..- evidence. For whatever the,polygraph r e s u l t s would have had I . i t o t h e jury, they should have been admitted. I note i n t h i s regard t h a t the t i m e has come when t h e c o u r t s should not be s o r i g i d i n t h e i r s t e a d f a s t r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e use of polygraph examination r e s u l t s . With proper r e s t r a i n t s , polygraph test r e s u l t s can be a valuable a i d i n t h e fact-finding process. \ . . . , , , -------------- --------- --- - J u s t i c e