Title: State ex rel. Miley v. Parrott

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Miley, v. Parrott, Judge. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Miley v. Parrott (1996),     Ohio St.3d    .] 
Writ of procedendo to compel judge in domestic relations court to 
reactivate and proceed with divorce case after bankruptcy court 
lifted an automatic stay on the divorce proceedings granted, when. 
 
(No. 96-1292 -- Submitted September 10, 1996 -- Decided November 6, 
1996.) 
 
In Procedendo. 
 
In September 1995, relator, Shirley A. Miley (“Miley”), filed a complaint 
for divorce against her husband, John W. Miley (“debtor”), in the Union County 
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.  In October 1995, the 
debtor filed a Chapter 12 (family farm reorganization) bankruptcy action in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern 
Division.  An automatic stay then went into effect.  In November 1995, 
respondent, domestic relations court Judge Richard E. Parrott, entered the 
following order:  “The Court being advised that a stay in these proceedings has 
been issued in this matter by the Federal Bankruptcy Court, this matter is placed 
on inactive status until such time as this Court is advised in writing of the stay 
 
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having been lifted, or counsel inform this Court that the case is ready for a trial 
date.”   
 
In March 1996, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay “in order to 
allow the Court of Common Pleas, Union County, Ohio, Division of Domestic 
Relations, to go forward in hearing and ruling upon the Complaint for Divorce 
filed by the Plaintiff, and all matters pertinent thereto, including but not limited to 
the resolution of past, present, and future spousal support of the parties; 
responsibility for payment of indebtedness; the right to any and all marital and 
separate property, both real and personal; and to allow the Court of Common Pleas 
to exercise appropriate jurisdiction over the assets and liabilities of John William 
Miley.”  The bankruptcy court also noted that any common pleas court order 
concerning the division of property and allocation of indebtedness would be 
subject to the review of all creditors in the debtor’s bankruptcy case “with an 
opportunity for objection and hearing by the Bankruptcy Court.”   
 
Judge Parrott subsequently rejected two requests by Miley to reactivate the 
divorce case.   Judge Parrott initially stated that he would “not take the matter off  
inactive status until such time as I may deal with all of the remaining problems 
after the bankruptcy has been concluded,” and later advised that he did “not intend 
 
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to get into a contemptuous situation with the federal court by deciding matters the 
bankruptcy court has pre-empted by virtue of the stay.”   
 
In May 1996, Miley filed a motion in the domestic relations court for an 
order setting the cause for a hearing on the issue of whether to reactivate the 
divorce case based on the bankruptcy court’s lifting of the automatic stay.  Judge 
Parrott refused to grant the motion, and the debtor refused to answer discovery 
requests in the divorce case until it had been reactivated.   
 
Miley then filed this action for a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Parrott 
to reactivate and proceed with the divorce case.  Parrott filed an answer conceding 
that he will not reactivate the divorce case until the bankruptcy case has been 
concluded.   
____________________ 
 
John C. Hemphill, for relator. 
 
Richard E. Parrott, pro se. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) provides that “[a]fter the time for filing an 
answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court will either 
 
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dismiss the case or issue an alternative or a peremptory writ, if a writ has not 
already been issued.”   
 
In order to be entitled to a writ of procedendo, a relator must establish a 
clear legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the 
court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  
State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899, 900.  A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a 
court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed 
proceeding to judgment.  State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 184, 652 N.E.2d 742, 745.  An “‘inferior court’s 
refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action is the ill a writ of 
procedendo is designed to remedy.’”  State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 33, 35, 656 N.E.2d 332, 333, quoting State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield 
Lake (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 110, 637 N.E.2d 319, 324. 
 
Judge Parrott refuses to proceed with the divorce case because of the 
pending bankruptcy action.  A bankruptcy petition filed pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic stay to prevent creditors from taking 
any actions regarding the creation, perfection, or enforcement of any debt, lien, or 
 
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judgment.  3 Spike, Ohio Family Law and Practice (1994) 200, Section 41.11; 
Section 362(a), Title 11, U.S.Code.  The automatic stay does not apply to the 
“establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support,” 
or the “collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not the 
property of the estate.”  Sections 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 362(b)(2)(B), Title 11, 
U.S.Code. 
 
Judge Parrott initially inactivated Miley’s divorce case specifically because 
of the automatic stay.  However, although the filing of a bankruptcy petition stays 
the equitable distribution in a divorce case of the debtor’s interest in marital assets, 
certain aspects of the divorce case, such as dissolution of the marriage and child 
custody issues, are not stayed.  In re Roberge (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1995), 181 B.R. 
854, 857.  Further, the stay may be lifted or modified for cause.  See, generally, 2 
King, Collier on Bankruptcy (15 Ed.1995) 362-64, Section 362.07; Section 
362(d)(1), Title 11, U.S.Code. 
 
The stated duration of Judge Parrott’s order inactivating the divorce case 
was “until such time as [he] is advised in writing of the stay having been lifted 
***.”  The bankruptcy court granted relief pursuant to Section 362(d), Title 11, 
U.S.Code, and lifted the stay to permit Judge Parrott to proceed with the divorce 
 
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case.  Miley advised Judge Parrott in writing that the bankruptcy court had 
modified and lifted the stay order.  Therefore, Judge Parrott’s initial rationale for 
inactivating the divorce case no longer exists. 
 
Judge Parrott later stated that he would not reactivate the divorce case 
because he feared being in contempt of the bankruptcy court’s stay.  Willful 
violation of the automatic stay may subject the violator to a finding of contempt.  2 
King, supra, at 362-89, Section 362.11.  Yet, in this case, the bankruptcy petition 
filed by the debtor did not stay all aspects of the divorce case, and as to those 
aspects it did stay, the bankruptcy court expressly modified and lifted the stay.  
Judge Parrott’s concern that he may be found in contempt of the stay is thus 
meritless. 
 
Judge Parrott also seems to suggest the divorce case would be better 
resolved after the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.  However, the 
opposite is  true.  “‘It is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions into 
family law matters out of consideration of court economy, judicial restraint, and 
deference to our state court bretheren and their established expertise in such 
matters.’”  In re Bible (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1990), 110 B.R. 1002, 1009, quoting In re 
 
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MacDonald (C.A.9, 1985), 755 F.2d 715, 719.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed: 
 
“Lifting the automatic stay as provided in 11 U.S.C. [Section] 362(d) in this 
case will permit the state court to exercise limited jurisdiction in the kind of matter 
that is traditionally exclusively reserved for state divorce courts.  Bankruptcy 
courts in other cases have not declined to lift the stay to allow divorce proceedings 
to conclude.  *** The Bankruptcy Code does not define a debtor’s interest in 
property; the answer to that question must be made after reference to state law.  
*** With regard to the present pending state court divorce proceedings, the 
bankruptcy court has acted to permit the state court with expertise in such matters 
to decide questions that are an inherent part of the divorce process.”  (Citations 
omitted.)  In re White (C.A.6, 1988), 851 F.2d 170, 173; see, also, In re 
Hohenberg (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. 1992), 143 B.R. 480, 485. 
 
Judge Parrott finally claims that Miley possesses an adequate remedy at law 
by litigating her property rights in the pending bankruptcy action.  In order for an 
alternate remedy to be considered adequate, the remedy must be complete, 
beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 134, 
136, 656 N.E.2d 940, 943.  The bankruptcy action is inadequate because it is not 
 
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complete, i.e., the bankruptcy court cannot grant Miley a divorce, award child 
custody, child and spousal support, or visitation.  Moreover, Miley is entitled to an 
expeditious resolution of these important issues, which the bankruptcy court 
acknowledged by modifying and lifting the stay.  Although the issues in the 
pending divorce and bankruptcy cases are interrelated, they are nevertheless 
distinct so that the common pleas court determines the property division and the 
bankruptcy court determines the property of the debtor’s estate, which primarily 
consists of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor at the time of filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. Section 541(a)(1), Title 11, U.S.Code; Spike, supra, at 208, 
Section 41.18. 
 
Procedendo is an order from a court of superior jurisdiction to proceed to 
judgment; it does not attempt to control the inferior court as to what the judgment 
should be.  Sherrills, 72 Ohio St.3d at 462, 650 N.E.2d at 900; State ex rel. 
Hansen v. Reed (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 600, 589 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-1327.  
We have previously granted a writ of procedendo to order a common pleas court 
and the Court of Claims to proceed in identical wrongful death cases where both 
courts had stayed the cases before them pending the resolution of the other court’s 
case.  State ex rel. Wallace v. Tyack (1984), 13 Ohio St.3d 4, 6, 13 OBR 379, 381, 
 
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469 N.E.2d 844, 846-847 (“[W]e find that the situation in the case at bar presents 
such an abuse of discretion because both the Court of Claims and the court of 
common pleas have issued stays of proceedings, thereby precluding Edwards from 
litigating his wrongful death claim.  We cannot agree that the interests of Judge 
Tyack and Judge Crawford in preserving their right to control their dockets is 
paramount to Edwards’ interest in having his claims litigated without undue 
delay.”); see, also, In re Pidgeon (Bankr.D.N.H. 1993), 155 B.R. 24, 26-27, where 
the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to permit a pending divorce action to 
proceed in order to break the “potential judicial gridlock.”  Similarly, the 
bankruptcy court here lifted the stay in order to have Judge Parrott resolve the 
divorce matter, including the determination of the division of marital property.  
Judge Parrott’s refusal to reactivate and proceed in the divorce case is unjustified.  
Absent a writ of procedendo, Miley’s divorce action, which was filed prior to her 
husband’s bankruptcy case, would also be the subject of potential judicial 
gridlock. 
 
The pertinent facts are uncontroverted.  No further evidence or argument is 
required to decide this case.  Miley has a clear legal right to have her divorce 
action proceed, and Judge Parrott has a corresponding clear legal duty to proceed 
 
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in the divorce case.  Miley does not possess an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  Based on the foregoing, we grant the requested writ of 
procedendo to compel Judge Parrott to reactivate and proceed with the divorce 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.