Title: ERDMAN v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY & COMPENSATION DIV.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ERDMAN v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY & COMPENSATION DIV.2000 WY 1085 P.3d 64Case Number: 99-215Decided: 05/01/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GARY ERDMAN, Appellant 
(Petitioner),v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Donald L. Painter, 
Casper, WY.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; 
John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Gary Erdman (Erdman) contends that a hearing examiner erred in denying his 
motion for voluntary withdrawal of his permanent partial disability claim, with 
prejudice. That claim was filed several years after, and as an adjunct to, a 
work-related injury, which was covered by worker's compensation benefits. We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Erdman 
posits this issue:

[¶3] Whether the 
Hearing Examiner erred in dismissing Appellant's permanent partial disability 
claim with prejudice.

[¶4] The 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) states this 
issue:

[¶5] After the 
Employee requested a hearing on the denial of a medical bill, the parties agreed 
to submit an intervening permanent partial disability claim to the Hearing 
Examiner. At hearing, the Employee's attorney moved to withdraw the intervening 
claim.

[¶6] A. Was the 
denial of the Employee's motion to withdraw his intervening claim within the 
Hearing Examiner's discretion and in accordance with law?

FACTS

[¶7] Erdman 
injured his back while at work on November 4, 1995. He received worker's 
compensation benefits for that injury. On January 23, 1998, Erdman received some 
additional medical tests/services, which he asserted were related to his 
on-the-job injury. By letter dated February 19, 1998, the Division denied the 
claim on the basis that it was not related to his on-the-job injury, but rather, 
it was related to injuries he suffered in an automobile accident on December 20, 
1997. Erdman objected to the denial of the claim1. That matter was originally set for 
hearing on June 16, 1998. On May 14, 1998, Erdman asked that the hearing be 
continued, and the Hearing Examiner did continue the hearing date until 
September 15, 1998.

[¶8] On June 15, 
1998, Erdman amended his claim for benefits to include a claim for permanent 
partial disability benefits equal to 50% of whole body. That claim was joined 
with his initial claim, and both were to be heard together at the hearing 
already scheduled. At the September 15, 1998, hearing, there was a dispute about 
exhibits, and so the hearing was again continued until October 5, 1998. As one 
of the initial matters of business raised at the October 5, 1998, hearing, 
Erdman asked leave to withdraw the claim for an award of permanent partial 
disability. He maintained that the withdrawal should be without prejudice so 
that he could re-file it at a later date. One of the requirements for such an 
award is that the injured worker has conducted a job search. It was Erdman's 
contention that because of the automobile accident in December of 1997, he was 
unable to complete that search and, therefore, would be unable to document that 
element of his burden of proof. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-405(h) (Michie 1997) 
provides:

(h) An injured employee 
awarded permanent partial impairment benefits may apply for a permanent 
disability award subject to the following terms and 
conditions:

(i) The injured employee 
is because of the injury, unable to return to employment at a comparable or 
higher wage than the wage the employee was earning at the time of 
injury;

(ii) An application for 
permanent partial disability is filed not before three (3) months after the date 
of ascertainable loss or three (3) months before the last scheduled impairment 
payment, whichever occurs later, but in no event later than one (1) year 
following the later date; and

(iii) The employee has 
actively sought suitable work, considering the employee's health, education, 
training and experience.

[¶9] The Hearing 
Examiner denied Erdman's motion to withdraw his claim premised on § 
27-14-405(h), concluding:

2. The 
Employee-Claimant's motion to withdraw the Application for Permanent Disability 
is untimely and arose too late in the proceedings. As late as September 21, 
1998, following the beginning of this contested case hearing, the 
Employee-Claimant had sought the permanent partial disability award. It was not 
until October 5, 1998, that the Employee-Claimant moved to withdraw the 
Application for Permanent Disability without prejudice. It would be prejudicial 
to allow the Employee-Claimant to withdraw the Application for Permanent 
Disability at this late stage of the proceedings only to be brought in the 
future after he has met the statutory requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-405. 
The Employee-Claimant's motion to withdraw the Application for Permanent 
Disability or to have it dismissed without prejudice is 
denied.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶10] Our 
standard of review in a case such as this is 
well-established:

[¶11] A claimant 
for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential 
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case 
hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the 
burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant, Pederson in 
this instance, has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight 
v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil 
Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 
1994). Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish 
the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to 
determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order based 
upon all of the evidence before it. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 274; Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County 
School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶12] Claim of 
Pederson, 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶13] Rather 
than addressing the issue raised in terms of the governing standard of review, 
Erdman simply claims that the Hearing Examiner "erred" in denying his "last 
minute" motion to withdraw the claim without prejudice. Erdman has failed to 
cite pertinent authority or cogent argument in support of the asserted "error." 
A logical source for an argument to have been made by analogy would have been 
W.R.C.P. 41 (dismissal of actions). See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2364 (1995). An examination 
of the material contained in that discussion of the discretion enjoyed by an 
adjudicator, when resolving a motion such as that at issue here, supports a 
conclusion that this Hearing Examiner acted well within her discretion in these 
circumstances. Id. at 292-97. One very non-arbitrary, non-capricious, discreet, 
and lawful conclusion the Hearing Examiner might have reached is that Erdman 
simply had not prepared for the scheduled hearing, and wanted more time to get 
ready.

[¶14] However, 
we will limit our disposition of the issue raised to a conclusion that the 
absence of pertinent authority or cogent argument requires that we decline to 
address the issue further. Painter v. Spurrier, 969 P.2d 548, 549 (Wyo. 1998); 
Hemme v. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 914 P.2d 824, 827 (Wyo. 1996); 
Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1155 (fn. 2) (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶15] The order 
of the district court affirming the determination made by the Hearing Examiner 
is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Hearing 
Examiner determined that this portion of Erdman's claim should be paid, and 
there is no further dispute in that regard.