Title: SIMS v. DAY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SIMS v. DAY2004 WY 12499 P.3d 964Case Number: 03-198Decided: 10/28/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

STEVEN 
P. SIMS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

CYNTHIA 
S. DAY, f/k/a

CYNTHIA 
S. SIMS,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Farrah 
L. Fraughton of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
this case, we must consider whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it granted an attorney's motion to withdraw without adhering to the 
mandatory requirements of Uniform Rules for District Courts 102(c).  After his attorney withdrew, Appellant 
Steven P. Sims requested a continuance to obtain substitute counsel, but that 
request was denied.  Sims challenges 
that denial as an abuse of discretion. Unrepresented at a show cause hearing, 
Sims' visitation with his daughter was modified, he was found in contempt for 
failing to pay child support, and attorney's fees were awarded.  Sims contends that he was denied due 
process when the trial court decreased his visitation with his daughter by one 
third without notice at a hearing that was limited to consider whether he was in 
contempt for failure to timely satisfy a child support judgment against 
him.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
hold that although the requirements set forth in Rule 102(c) are mandatory, 
district courts do have the discretion to vary from its requirements to control 
the course of litigation and avoid unwarranted delays when continuing without 
substitute counsel would not violate a substantial right of the client and no 
prejudice would result.   Under 
the particular circumstances of this case, however, we hold that the district 
court abused its discretion by not adhering to Rule 102(c)'s requirements 
because it allowed Sims' attorney to withdraw on the eve of trial without either 
notifying the district court that substitute counsel would enter an appearance 
or providing the district court with Sims' statement that he would proceed pro 
se.  No showing of extraordinary 
circumstance was made justifying the grant of the motion to withdraw.  Denying Sims' request for a continuance 
to allow him to obtain substitute counsel, the district court proceeded to 
hearing and issued a child custody modification that is unsupported by the 
evidence.  We therefore find that 
Sims has carried his burden of proving that a substantial right was violated and 
he was prejudiced.  We reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand for a new 
hearing.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Sims 
presents this statement of the issues:

 

I. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered that appellant's 
counsel be allowed to withdraw one business day before his 
hearing?

 

II. 
Did the trial court's denial of appellant's request for continuance to obtain 
new counsel after allowing withdrawal [one business day] prior to the hearing 
require reversal?

 

III. 
[Was] the appellant denied due process when the trial court decreased his 
visitation by one third at a show cause hearing?

 

Appellee 
Cynthia S. Day (Day) rephrases the issues as follows:

 

I. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing appellant's counsel to 
withdraw prior to hearing and denying appellant's request for a 
continuance?

 

II. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it modified appellant's 
visitation rights?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
During 
their marriage, Sims and Day had one child. When the parents separated, they 
negotiated an agreement for joint custody with Day having primary physical 
custody and Sims receiving substantial visitation of seventy-two hours per week 
in lieu of standard visitation.  
This stipulated agreement was incorporated in their divorce decree 
entered on May 13, 1999, and reads as follows:

 

At 
least Seventy-two (72) hours of visitation each and every week, said visitation 
to take place when Defendant is not working at his place of employment, such 
visitation is in lieu of "standard" weekend visitation as normally awarded by 
this Court, as Defendant normally works during the weekend; such visitation is 
also in lieu of the "standard" holiday and summer visitation as normally awarded 
by this Court, as Defendant, under this decree, shall have visitation each and 
every week.

 

On 
January 3, 2003, Day filed a petition to modify visitation to a standard 
schedule and to seek an order to show cause why Sims should not be held in 
contempt for child support arrearages.  
On January 9, 2003, the district court entered an order to show cause and 
setting hearing. Sims' attorney filed a counterpetition, and the show cause 
hearing was continued while negotiations were conducted.  

 

[¶5]           
After 
representing Sims since February of 2003, and having secured a continuance for a 
show cause hearing to Monday, July 7, 2003, Sims' attorney filed a motion to 
withdraw on July 1, 2003.  He mailed 
a copy of that motion to his client and the next day, July 2, the district court 
signed an order allowing the attorney to withdraw from the case.  On July 3, 2003, Sims received his 
mailed copy of his attorney's motion to withdraw.  Sims contends that he was not afforded 
notice of the motion in accordance with the rules of civil procedure before it 
was granted and was not notified that the order was entered.  A national holiday and the weekend 
intervened and early on Monday, Sims found himself in front of the district 
court requesting a continuance to find substitute counsel.  That request was denied.  

 

[¶6]           
The 
proceeding had been noticed as a "show cause" hearing; however, the district 
court proceeded with a hearing on the combined issues of modification and 
contempt.   In less than one 
page of transcript record, the issue of material change of circumstances was 
decided when the district court asked Sims whether he agreed that his child was 
now five years old and of school age.  
Sims agreed, and the district court summarily determined "that to be a 
material change in circumstances" and advised Sims that he would be losing hours 
of visitation.  

 

[¶7]           
Sims 
objected to the drastic loss of visitation that would result from a standard 
visitation schedule, but that objection was overruled.  Neither Sims nor the district court 
addressed any evidence supporting modification of a stipulated visitation 
agreement.  Sims proposed that he be 
allowed to maintain reduced weekly visitation, but the district court summarily 
rejected Sims' alternative visitation proposal.

 

[¶8]           
The 
district court then considered contempt and, after advising Sims that he could 
be jailed if found in contempt, the district court found him in contempt and 
ordered an arrearage amount.  Sims 
contends that the amount determined is not supported by the record.  The record shows that Sims agreed that 
there was no "factual issue whether [he had] missed paying the $140 a month 
totaling $4480."  Day contends that 
the record shows that the $4,480 represents an arrearage of daycare expenses of 
$140 per month from January 1, 2000, through August 31, 2002, and, because Sims 
did not dispute the amount, no evidence was necessary.  After the hearing, orders were entered 
for payment of arrearage, modification of visitation, and an award of Day's 
attorney fees.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶9]           
Sims 
first claims the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Sims' 
counsel to withdraw one business day before his hearing.  Because the mandatory language of 
Uniform Rules for District Courts 102(c) is at issue, Sims contends that our 
review should be de 
novo; 
however, he concedes that under long standing precedent, our review of motions 
to withdraw and for a continuance is the abuse of discretion standard.  Byrd 
v. Mahaffey, 2003 
WY 137, ¶5, 78 P.3d 671, ¶5 (Wyo. 2003).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Ready 
v. Ready, 2003 
WY 121, ¶11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003); Vaughn 
v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  "We 
must ask ourselves whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did 
and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."  Ready, 
¶11 (citing Johnson 
v. Johnson, 
11 P.3d 948, 950 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

[¶10]      Rule 
102(c) provides:

 

Counsel 
will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order.  Except in the case of extraordinary 
circumstances, the court shall condition withdrawal of counsel upon the 
substitution of other counsel by written appearance.  In the alternative, the court shall 
allow withdrawal upon a statement submitted by the client acknowledging the 
withdrawal of counsel for the client, and stating a desire to proceed pro 
se.  An attorney who has entered a 
limited entry of appearance shall be deemed to have withdrawn when the attorney 
has fulfilled the duties of the limited entry of 
appearance.

 

As 
Sims notes, the rule's requirement that withdrawal be conditioned upon either 
substitution of other counsel or a client's statement of a desire to proceed pro 
se was not followed in this case. Under our general rule, language in a rule 
that prohibits a certain act is mandatory language "to refrain altogether from 
doing the forbidden act."  Wyoming 
State Treasurer v. City of Casper, 551 P.2d 687, 699 (Wyo. 1976).  We have 
previously determined that the use of the term "shall" in a procedural rule is 
generally mandatory.  Loghry 
v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 668 (Wyo. 1996).  
Loghry 
stated 
that "[o]rderly judicial administration is dependent upon procedural rules, and 
in order to assure uniform and timely disposition of appeals they must be 
enforced and not relaxed or changed at the whim of any court."  Id. 
(quoting Mayland 
v. State, 
568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977)) (emphasis omitted).  Loghry held 
that reasonable adherence to the rules of the court is necessary to the proper 
administration of justice.  568 P.2d  
at 668 
(citing 
Mayland, 
568 P.2d at 899).  We find further 
support for our interpretation because Rule 102(c) was changed to its present 
form in March of 1993, with a minor amendment in 2002, following our decision in 
Carlson 
v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1992).  That decision 
noted that substitute counsel was preferred but did not require it because the 
former version of the rule did not mandate substitute counsel:  

 

The 
district court entered its order before replacement counsel had entered an 
appearance which is not a favored practice.  Rule 102(c) of the Uniform Rules for the 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming provides "[c]ounsel will not be 
permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order."   In contrast, Rule 19.02 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure provides "[n]o attorney or firm who has 
appeared in a cause on appeal may withdraw from it without written consent of 
the court filed with the clerk.  
Such consent may be conditioned upon substitution of other counsel."  The Uniform District Court Rules do not 
require that substitute counsel be obtained before the court allows withdrawal 
of an attorney.  However, a better 
practice, and one that will avoid the difficulties here presented, would be to 
condition withdrawal on substitution of new counsel.  This practice would avoid the waste of 
time and resources that may occur in a case such as this.  Nevertheless, the order permitting 
withdrawal of appellant's attorney was permissible under the rules for district 
courts.

 

Id. 
at 302 (alterations in original).

            
  

[¶11]      Requiring 
substitute counsel remains our preference, and the rule's language now mandates 
it when the client desires it.  
Therefore, the rule does not allow counsel to withdraw except upon court 
order after the court is informed of substitution of counsel or the court is 
informed by the client of a desire to proceed pro se.  The district court's failure to adhere 
to the rule's mandate is error and reversible if a substantial right of Sims has 
been violated to his prejudice.  
Alternatively, the district court's order can be affirmed if 
extraordinary circumstances were present that permitted an exception to the 
rule.  Here, the attorney's motion 
to withdraw stated reasons but made no assertion that those reasons amounted to 
extraordinary circumstances.  At the 
hearing, the district court used those stated reasons as justification for 
denying Sims' motion for a continuance to obtain substitute counsel, 
stating:  

 

THE 
COURT:  We've had this matter set 
since last . . . since, you know, early this year.  Your attorney withdraws, seeks to 
withdraw last week saying that representation has been rendered unreasonably 
difficult by the client -- due to the client's neglect in communicating and 
complying with requests of Counsel. The below signed has afforded the client a 
reasonable amount of time to obtain substitute counsel.  And you come in here today asking for an 
attorney.

 

MR. 
SIMS:  Well, I found out on the 
3rd of July I didn't have an attorney.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, 
--

 

MR. 
SIMS:  And he 

 

THE 
COURT: -- your request is denied.  
We're going ahead.  And this 
is not a difficult thing.  I don't 
know exactly what the original decree provided.  It had  was it  I'll have to look at 
it from the standpoint of the  to me, the easy issue is clarifying the 
visitation schedule.

 

[¶12]      In 
Byrd 
v. Mahaffey, similar 
reasons as part of many more facts were found to constitute extraordinary 
circumstances; however, considering all of the facts, Byrd 
is significantly different from this case:

 

Byrd 
was extended notice concerning his counsel's motion to withdraw.  The withdrawal hearing was held days 
before the actual trial date, and Byrd was provided notice of the pending trial 
date many months in advance.  
Further, although the record before this [C]ourt is limited, it does 
indicate that Byrd knew of his counsel's withdrawal prior to the trial date 
because he filed a motion for a continuance and appeared at trial with his file 
that he had obtained from his withdrawn counsel.  Byrd was also allowed to participate in 
the trial representing his own interests after the district court denied his 
motion for continuance.

 

Byrd, 
¶23.  

 

[¶13]      In 
this case, Sims was not extended notice concerning his counsel's motion to 
withdraw; there was no withdrawal hearing, and Sims was not notified of the 
withdrawal order.  The purpose of a 
hearing is to establish facts from allegations made after both sides are 
heard.  The facts in Byrd 
were established by Byrd's opportunity to appear at his hearing whereas Sims was 
not afforded that opportunity and the statement of Sims' attorney remain mere 
allegations despite the fact that they formed the basis for the district court's 
denying Sims' motion for a continuance to obtain substitute counsel.  Although Sims has now appeared before 
the district court about the allegations, the exchange quoted above indicates 
that Sims was not afforded the opportunity to be heard at that point.  As such, the allegations have not been 
established as fact and cannot form the basis for extraordinary 
circumstances.  We turn now to 
whether Sims' substantial rights were violated to his 
prejudice.

  

 

Prejudice

 

[¶14]      Sims 
asserts that the denial of his motion for a continuance prejudiced him because 
the district court proceeded although Sims had no notice his counsel had 
withdrawn, the nature of the hearing changed from a simple show cause to a 
modification hearing, and because the district court misstated the issue as 
simply clarifying the visitation schedule.  
Day contends that Sims' actions are to blame for the withdrawal of his 
attorney and, because Sims did not object when the district court considered 
modification, he cannot now raise that issue for the first time on appeal.  We view Sims' contentions as a general 
claim that the court's denial for a continuance denied him due process to notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  

 

[¶15]      Our 
settled rule states that the withdrawal of an attorney does not entitle the 
party to a continuance if he created the situation and an unwarranted delay of 
judicial proceedings would occur.  
Byrd, 
¶¶6, 8.  Looking to the time of the 
request for a continuance, we review all of the particular circumstances to 
determine if the district court abused its discretion.  Id. 
at ¶7.  A 
court abuses its discretion if an arbitrary refusal denies due process.  Id.  Sims 
has the burden to prove a violation of due process and prejudice.  Id.  Byrd holds 
that due process issues created by a violation of Rule 102(c) and presented for 
the first time on appeal will be considered by this Court.  Id. 
at ¶¶10, 11. 
 "Parents are entitled to due process in 
custody and visitation matters, which includes adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard."  Jackson 
v. Jackson, 961 P.2d 393, 395 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Matter 
of SAJ, 
942 P.2d 407, 409 (Wyo. 1997)).  

 

One 
of the basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be apprised 
of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to 
examine, explain or rebut such evidence.  
And the right to hear and controvert all evidence upon which a factual 
adjudication is to be made includes the right to hear and cross-examine 
witnesses.  

 

Jackson, 
at 396 (quoting Matter of SAJ, at 410).

 

[¶16]      Here, 
the district court believed that the modification request was a simple issue 
that could be resolved by adopting and clarifying standard visitation.  This view resulted in the court's 
summarily deciding that a substantial change in circumstances existed that 
justified modifying Sims' substantial visitation which had been negotiated and 
stipulated to in the divorce decree.   
We acknowledge that we have previously held that even in a proceeding 
that may have been limited to a contempt proceeding, the district court has the 
discretion to modify child custody matters.   Ready 
v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382, 386 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Gaines 
v. Doby, 
794 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Wyo. 1990); Wardle 
v. Wardle, 
464 P.2d 854, 856 (Wyo. 1970) (in child custody modification matters the 
district court possesses inherent equitable powers independent of its statutory 
revisory power); and Marquiss 
v. Marquiss, 
837 P.2d 25, 42-43 (Wyo. 1992) (the district court has the right to terminate a 
parent's custody based upon contempt for noncompliance with existing decree 
provisions for visitation)). Nevertheless, when proceeding to modify a decree, 
the district court cannot modify to punish the offending parent in contempt but 
must act to achieve its goal of serving the best interests of the child and 
striving to achieve a reasonable balance between the rights and affections of 
the parents.  Ready, 
at 386 (citing Marquiss, 
at 45). 
 

 

[¶17]      While 
we recognize these inherent powers, the district court abuses its discretion 
when it modifies visitation without evidence that Day proved that a change in 
circumstances affecting the child's welfare has occurred after the entry of the 
initial decree, that the change warrants modification of the decree, and that 
the modification will be in the best interests of the children.  Ready, 
906 P.2d  at 385 (quoting DJG 
v. MAP, 
883 P.2d 946, 947 (Wyo. 1994) 
(citing 
Goss 
v. Goss, 
780 P.2d 306, 312-13 (Wyo. 1989), and Ayling 
v. Ayling, 
661 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wyo. 1983)).  
Our review of the record shows that the hearing was so abbreviated that 
the district court could not reasonably conclude that evidence had been 
presented of such a change warranting modification or that modification would be 
in the best interest of the child. In neither the transcript nor the order 
modifying visitation did the district court reference evidence that the best 
interests of the child required its decision.  Under these circumstances, we must find 
that Sims has been prejudiced by the denial of the continuance.  This case is reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. 

 
KITE, 
J., dissenting.

 

[¶18]   I disagree with the conclusion of 
the majority opinion that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Mr. Sims' request for a continuance and proceeded to modify the custody 
order and find him in contempt.  
While the hearing in this case was admittedly short and the court's 
explanation for its actions was somewhat minimal, the entire record reflects the 
district court had over a year's experience with Mr. Sims and his numerous 
failures to comply with previous orders and settings.  In addition, a certain urgency existed 
for the court to address the issue of custody because the start of school was 
approaching.  While it certainly 
would have been preferable for Mr. Sims to have appeared with substitute 
counsel, the problems he had with his attorney were of his own making and the 
district court retained wide discretion to assess the situation and determine 
whether extraordinary circumstances existed which allowed the matter to go 
forward without substitution of counsel.

 

[¶19]   The decree of divorce was entered 
May 13, 1999.  On April 6, 2001, the 
State filed a motion for an order to show cause alleging Mr. Sims had failed to 
make any child support payments and was in arrears $1,659.56.  The court set a hearing on the State's 
motion for July 11, 2001.  
Indicating the parties were trying to resolve the matter, the State 
sought a continuance of that hearing and it was reset for August 9, 2001.  Because Mr. Sims made "a child support 
payment", the State asked that the hearing be vacated, and it was.  The State, Mr. Sims and Ms. Day then 
entered into a stipulation to modify the child support order in which Mr. Sims 
agreed to make the originally ordered $290 per month payment and an additional 
$60 which would be applied to the amount in arrears and the court entered an 
order consistent with that stipulation on September 10, 2002.  Mr. Sims again failed to make any of the 
payments to which he had stipulated, and on December 19, 2002, the State again 
filed a motion for an order to show cause as to why he should not be held in 
contempt.  That matter was set for a 
hearing on January 22, 2003.  In the 
meantime, however, Ms. Day filed a petition to modify the decree, together with 
a request that Mr. Sims be held in contempt for failing to make child support 
payments.  The January 22, 2003, 
hearing was then continued to allow Mr. Sims' new counsel time to prepare and 
conduct discovery on the claims asserted by Ms. Day's petition.  On May 28, 2003, the district court 
entered an order setting the matter for hearing on July 7, 2003.  One month later, Mr. Sims' counsel moved 
to withdraw stating his client had made representation "unreasonably difficult" 
and represented he had given his client reasonable notice to obtain substitute 
counsel. 

 

[¶20]   The district court was faced with 
this record when it considered Mr. Sims' claim at the July 7, 2003, hearing that 
he had only received notice on July 3 that his counsel was withdrawing.  We recognized in Byrd v. 
Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶14, 78 P.3d 671, ¶14 (Wyo. 2003) that in determining 
whether extraordinary circumstances exist within the meaning of U.R.D.C. 102(c) 
many jurisdictions, including Wyoming, consider the actions of the appellant, 
whether these actions contributed to the situation at hand, and weigh the 
appellant's right to counsel against the prompt administration of justice.  We also recognized that the trial court 
is better able to judge the matter, is more conversant with local conditions, 
the status of the docket, and the capacity and disposition of counsel, and is 
more familiar with the background and general setting of the situation, which is 
frequently not apparent in the formal record.  Given these considerations, I would hold 
that the circumstances supported the district court's finding that Mr. Sims was 
undeserving of an additional continuance, that "extraordinary circumstances" 
existed and substitute counsel was not required by the 
rules.

 

[¶21]   I also disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Mr. Sims was prejudiced by the withdrawal of his counsel and the 
denial of his last request for a continuance such that he was denied due process 
and an opportunity to be heard.  
While Mr. Sims' testimony was brief with regard to his preference for 
visitation, the district court did provide him an opportunity to present his 
argument.  He did not dispute the 
fact that his daughter was going to be starting school or that the court should 
consider that fact in deciding whether custody should be modified.  We do not have the benefit of full 
explanation by the district court of the reasons for its finding of a material 
change of circumstances.  We have 
said,

 

when 
a trial court is exercising its discretionary power in custody matters, it 
should place on the record the circumstances and factors which were crucial to 
the determination.  The court should 
further spell out its reasons so counsel and the reviewing court can understand 
and evaluate the soundness of the decision.

  

Pace 
v. Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶15, 22 P.3d 861, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  Particularly detailed findings are 
paramount where unconventional custody orders are involved.  Id.  The present case did not involve an 
unconventional custody order and it is clear from the record that the factors 
crucial to the district court's determination were the child's age and the fact 
that she was starting school.  This 
record contains sufficient facts to support a finding that a material change of 
circumstances occurred and the child's interests were best served by a stable 
custody arrangement while she was attending school.  

 

[¶22]   I would affirm the district court's 
modification of the divorce decree.