Title: Chioffi v. City of Winooski

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Chioffi v. City of Winooski  (95-169); 165 Vt 37; 676 A.2d 786 

[Opinion Filed 15-Mar-1996]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-169


Gregory T. Chioffi                                Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

City of Winooski et al.                           November Term, 1995



Matthew I. Katz, J.

       Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       William M. O'Brien and Kristin C. Wright of O'Brien Law Offices,
  Winooski, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Gregory T. Chioffi owns land and a burnt-out
  building in the City of Winooski, and was denied a zoning permit to
  reconstruct the building.  Eventually, after an appeal to this Court, the
  superior court reversed the city zoning board and granted plaintiff a
  variance to build a duplex.  In a separate action, plaintiff claims a
  taking occurred during the time the permit was denied, because he was
  deprived of the use of his property, and seeks compensation for the lost
  use during the regulatory delay.  The superior court held that no taking
  occurred, and granted the city's request for summary judgment.  We affirm.

       The property comprises less than one-twentieth of an acre in a
  residential neighborhood and contains three residential units in one
  building.  When the city's new zoning ordinance went into effect in
  December 1981, the building became a nonconforming use.  It lay in an R-2
  district that allows only a two-unit residential development as a
  conditional use.  The lot is undersized, and the building did not meet
  setback requirements.  The building was destroyed in October 1983, when the
  previous owner intentionally set fire to it, an act for which he was

 

  convicted of arson.  Pursuant to the city's zoning ordinance, the owner had
  one year to reconstruct the destroyed building before he lost
  preexisting-use status and had to comply fully with the new ordinance
  provisions.  The building was not rebuilt within the specified time.

       Plaintiff acquired the property by foreclosure sale in May 1985.  He
  applied for a zoning permit to remove the third floor of the building and
  remodel the remaining two units.  The Winooski Zoning Board denied
  plaintiff's request, concluding he no longer had a right to
  nonconforming-use status and that the proposal failed to comply with
  current zoning requirements. The Board also denied a dimensional variance. 
  The Chittenden Superior Court refused to review the Board's decision,(FN1)
  but we held that that trial de novo was required. Chioffi v. Winooski
  Zoning Board, 151 Vt. 9, 14, 556 A.2d 103, 106 (1989).  The superior court
  then granted plaintiff a variance under 24 V.S.A. § 4468(b) to reconstruct
  the building as a duplex.

       In December 1991, plaintiff brought this action claiming he was
  deprived of the use of his property during the time between the denial of
  the zoning permit by the city zoning board and the issuance of the permit
  pursuant to the 1990 court decision granting the variance.  He requested
  $200,000 for estimated lost rent, increased cost of construction, other
  miscellaneous costs resulting from the regulatory delay in construction,
  and attorney's fees.  The parties stipulated to the relevant facts (FN2) and
  filed cross-motions for summary judgment on liability.  The court granted
  summary judgment in defendant's favor.

       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
  "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
  compensation."  Plaintiff claims that a regulatory

 

  taking for public use occurred during the permit process and he is entitled
  to "just compensation" for the temporary taking.  For two reasons, we
  reject this claim.

       First, no damages are available for the regulatory delay that occurred
  in this case. Plaintiff's theory is based on First English Evangelical
  Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty.,