Title: Mann v. County of Maricopa

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

104 Ariz. 561 (1969) 456 P.2d 931 Beulah MANN, a widow, and Clarence Burnett, Petitioners, v. The COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Barney Burns, J. Robert Stark and Henry Haws, members of the Board of Supervisors, Charles Miller, County Manager, and C.M. Pifer, Personnel Director of Maricopa County, Respondents. No. 9691. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. July 8, 1969. *562 James E. Flynn, Phoenix, for petitioners. Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty., by William Carter, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for respondents. ROBERT O. ROYLSTON, Superior Court Judge. Petitioners filed in this Court for a Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, or Certiorari in the alternative. On June 3, 1969, after hearing extensive oral arguments, this Court issued an Alternative Writ of Mandamus, and continued in full force and effect the Stay Order of this Court which prevented the Respondents from terminating the employment of the Petitioners, OR REMOVING THEM FROM THE PAYROLL OF mARICOPA cOUNTY. The pertinent facts are as follows: Both Petitioners have been employed for many years in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County. Petitioner Mann is a Bailiff in the Division over which Judge Laurens L. Henderson presides; Petitioner Burnett is an Adult Probation Officer in the Division over which Judge Fred J. Hyder presides. Both Petitioners have passed their seventieth birthdays. Application for continued employment after age seventy was timely filed by each Petitioner with the Respondents. Each application included a certification by each respective judge that the "employee is specially fitted by reason of long experience to perform the duties of his position." The applications were made pursuant to A.R.S. 38-759, subsec. I, which provides as follows: Though a series of correspondence and memoranda between the judges, the personnel director, and county manager, including an Opinion from the office of the Attorney General, it was made clear that *563 both applications were rejected by the Board of Supervisors, and that the Petitioners would be removed from the payroll no later than the pay period ending May 24, 1969. Each judge entered an order that the Petitioners be continued in service in their respective positions for a term of one year. No evidence was presented in this Court indicating any reason for the Board's failing to approve the request for continued employment, other than age alone. As a result, this Petition was filed May 23, 1969. Respondents contend that this Court does not have original jurisdiction of this matter, and that mandamus is improper. From the balance of this opinion, it will become apparent that the Petitioners have no other adequate remedy; that an important facet of the administration of justice is concerned; and that an abuse of discretion must be corrected and controlled by mandamus; State ex rel. Corbin v. Murry, 102 Ariz. 184, 427 P.2d 135. Although the specific relief requested is limited to a determination of whether these Petitioners shall be retained on the payroll of Maricopa County for an additional year, the actual issue is much broader and directly affects the operation of the Courts, that is: which department of government has the power of control of personnel directly connected with the operation of the Courts? The "personnel" involved herein contemplates bailiffs, probation officers, court reporters, court administrators, secretaries, and others working directly in connection with the administration of justice. The Constitution of the State of Arizona, A.R.S., provides: The solution to the problem has been succinctly and eloquently stated: Courts of general jurisdiction have "the right to quarters appropriate to the office and personnel adequate to perform the functions thereof. The right to appoint a necessary staff of personnel necessarily carries with it the right to have such appointees paid a salary commensurate with their responsibilities. The right cannot be made amenable to and/or denied by a county council or the legislature itself. Our Courts are the bulwark, the final authority which guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and be secure within the framework of a constitutional government. The arm which holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another branch of that government." Noble County Council v. State of Indiana ex rel. Fifer (1955), 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709. This Court has determined the question of control in relation to court reporters, Powers v. Isley (1947), 66 Ariz. 94, 183 P.2d 880. The following determinations were made: 1. A court reporter is not a county officer but "`a sworn officer of court.' Garcia v. State, 26 Ariz. 597, 229 P. 103." 2. The only limitation on the power of the Court to fix the reporter's salary is that it be "fixed with the approval of the Board of Supervisors," and the term "approval" means "to commend, confirm, ratify, sanction or to consent to some act or thing done by another," and in disapproving such salary, the board must act in a reasonable manner and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 3. The board of supervisors has no authority to remove a court reporter. The reasoning of Powers v. Isley, supra, has been adopted in virtually every jurisdiction where similar problems have arisen. The Supreme Court of Nebraska quotes at great length from this case in Bass v. County of Saline (1960), 171 Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860. The case is also cited as authority *564 and followed by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Smith v. Miller (1963), 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738. Because the constitutional provision of Colorado is almost identical to that of Arizona, because the statutes involved are extremely similar, and because the Colorado Supreme Court was relying to a great extent on Powers v. Isley, supra, it would seem appropriate to quote at length from Smith v. Miller, supra, 384 P.2d at p. 740: Our legislature has traditionally recognized the distribution of powers as provided in Article III of the Constitution, and has further treated court personnel as being directly under the control of the judiciary. The county officers have always been designated by the legislature. They are set forth in A.R.S. 11-401, as follows: It is obvious that the Judge of Superior Court was specifically omitted as being in the department of the Judiciary under our Constitution. This intent on the part of the legislature to keep the departments separate is further evident in the recently enacted bill providing for a county employee merit system. Sections 11-351 to 11-356 were added to the Arizona Revised Statutes, and A.R.S. 11-409 was amended. The system provides for dismissal, suspension, or reduction *566 in rank or compensation of any appointed employee only by written order of the appointing authority filed with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors. Provision is made for an appeal by the appointed employee to the merit system commission, and a hearing before that commission. A.R.S. 11-409, before amendment, states: The amendment removes section B, thereby taking the sole power of dismissal from the appointing officer and substituting the merit system procedure. It is also obvious that the merit system does not apply to court personnel, since A.R.S. 11-409 refers only to the officers enumerated in § 11-401, which section, as stated above, specifically excludes the Judge of Superior Court, thereby keeping the department of the Judiciary completely separate. It then follows that the Judiciary has the power of control over the personnel directly connected with the Courts. Therefore, the issues as stated must be determined as follows: 1. The department of government which has the power of control of personnel directly connected with the operation of the Courts is the Judicial Department. 2. The Judges of the Superior Court had the right to request that Petitioners be continued in service for a period of one year, as provided in A.R.S. 38-759, subsec. I, as amended. 3. The Board of Supervisors had the ministerial duty of approving the requests, unless there is a clear showing that the judges acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and capriciously in making the request. As hereinbefore stated, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Judges of the Superior Court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and capriciously. The alternative writ is made permanent. UDALL, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, McFARLAND and HAYS, JJ., concur. Note: Vice Chief Justice LORNA E. LOCKWOOD did not participate, therefore the Honorable ROBERT O. ROYLSTON of Pima County was called to sit in the determination of this matter.