Title: Quandt v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL B. QUANDT, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 28, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0211001904 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 22, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: August 3, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 3rd day of August 2007, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Michael B. Quandt, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s December 21, 2006 order denying his motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In November 2003, Quandt entered a no contest plea to the 
charge of Manslaughter, a lesser-included offense of Intentional Murder in 
the First Degree.   The Superior Court sentenced Quandt to 10 years at Level 
V incarceration, to be suspended after 7 years for 3 years of decreasing 
 
2
levels of supervision.  The sentencing order provided that Quandt’s 7 years 
at Level V were to be served without any chance of early release.1  
 
(3) 
In April 2004, Quandt filed a motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35.  The Superior Court granted the motion on 
May 14, 2004, correcting its sentencing order by removing the provision that 
Quandt’s Level V sentence would not be subject to any form of early 
release.  The Superior Court re-sentenced Quandt to 10 years at Level V, to 
be suspended after 8 years for 2 years of probation, and gave Quandt credit 
for 445 days of Level V time previously served.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Quandt claims that a) his sentence exceeds the 
TIS guidelines; b) his sentence was impermissibly increased at re-
sentencing; and c) he should not have been sentenced to 3 years of 
probation. 
 
(5) 
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal 
sentence “at any time.”  The narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit 
correction of an illegal sentence.2  Relief under Rule 35(a) is available when 
the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits or violates 
double jeopardy.3  A sentence also is illegal when it is ambiguous with 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4204(k). 
2 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
3 Id. 
 
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respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally 
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as 
to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.4  While the Superior Court may correct an illegal sentence at any 
time, it may only correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within 90 
days of imposition of the sentence.5  The Superior Court may consider an 
application filed more than 90 days of the imposition of sentence only in 
extraordinary circumstances.6 
 
(6) 
Because Quandt’s claims are, in essence, claims that his 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, they are time-barred under Rule 
35(b).  Moreover, we find no extraordinary circumstances in this case that 
would permit our consideration of those claims.   
 
(7) 
Quandt’s claims are substantively without merit in any case.  
The decision of the Superior Court to depart from the TIS guidelines is not, 
in and of itself, a basis for appeal.7  Moreover, Apprendi and its progeny8 do 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b); Winn v. State, Del. Supr., No. 521, 1997, Veasey, C.J. (July 
6, 1998). 
6 Id. 
7 Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 82-83 (Del. 1997). 
8 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004). 
 
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not impact Delaware’s sentencing scheme because the TIS guidelines are 
voluntary and non-binding.9   
 
(8) 
Quandt’s claim that the sentencing judge improperly increased 
his sentence also is unavailing.  The sentencing judge was not prohibited 
from imposing a harsher sentence on Quandt, as long as vindictiveness 
played no part in the decision to impose the harsher sentence.10  There is no 
indication on the record in this case that the sentencing judge acted out of 
vindictiveness in imposing Quandt’s sentence.  Rather, the record reflects 
that the sentencing judge’s intent was to implement his original sentencing 
plan.11  
 
(9) 
Quandt’s final claim is that he was illegally sentenced to 3 
years of probation rather than the statutory maximum of 2 years.  Because 
the Superior Court corrected Quandt’s sentence to provide for only 2 years 
of probation, this claim is moot.  Moreover, while Quandt urges this Court to 
consider this claim in case of a remand, there is no need to do so since the 
matter is not being remanded.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Benge v. State, Del. Supr., No. 137, 2004, Holland, J. (Nov. 12, 2004). 
10 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1982). 
11 In fact, as the Superior Court noted in its December 21, 2006 decision, assuming that 
Quandt will earn good time credits, he could actually spend less time at Level V under 
the new sentence than under the sentence that was originally imposed.   
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice