Title: HLC Properties, Limited  v. Super. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 2/14/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
HLC PROPERTIES, LIMITED, et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioners, 
) 
 
 
) 
S120332 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B167458 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SC062601 
 
 
) 
MCA RECORDS, INC., et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
At issue in this matter are 59 written communications pertaining to three 
recording contracts executed by the late Harry Lillis Crosby, the talented 
entertainer known to all as Bing Crosby.  In the proceedings below, the trial court 
rejected plaintiffs’ claim of attorney-client privilege with respect to the 59 
documents, many of which were either authored or received by persons Crosby 
had hired to help manage his business interests.  We conclude that the trial court 
ruled correctly and that the Court of Appeal erred in granting plaintiffs’ petition 
for writ of mandate. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Bing Crosby was one of the most successful entertainers of his time.  When 
he died in 1977, he left an extensive portfolio of interests in records, radio and 
 
2 
television productions, motion pictures, and musical and literary works, as well as 
the contract and publicity rights related to those interests.  He also left business 
interests he had accumulated in mining, oil, real estate, and other financial 
ventures.  Crosby owned these interests during his lifetime, but he managed them 
with the assistance of others he employed.  One such employee was Basil Grillo 
(Grillo), an accountant who became Crosby’s business manager and worked for 
him for over 30 years.  Crosby and his employees referred to Crosby’s various 
business operations collectively as “Bing Crosby Enterprises” (Enterprises).1 
After Crosby’s death, the executor of his estate (Richard C. Bergen of the 
law firm of O’Melveny & Meyers) continued to maintain “Mr. Crosby’s business 
office,” where Enterprises operated.  In 1980, the executor entered into a limited 
partnership agreement with Hillsborough Productions, Inc. and Kathryn G. Crosby 
(Crosby’s second and surviving spouse) to form HLC Properties, Limited (HLC 
Properties), an entity that would manage the interests Crosby left.  Ultimately, the 
executor transferred the estate’s 78.685 percent interest in certain properties to 
HLC Properties.  Kathryn G. Crosby also transferred her 21.315 percent interest in 
these same properties to HLC Properties.  The properties transferred to HLC 
Properties include the three recording contracts that are the subject of this 
litigation.  In January 1981, the superior court filed the “Order Settling First and 
Final Account and Report of Executor, etc.,” which approved the formation of 
HLC Properties, approved the estate’s agreement to transfer estate properties and 
assets to HLC Properties, and approved the estate’s transfer of its limited 
                                             
 
1  
Not to be confused with Enterprises, a corporation called Bing Crosby 
Enterprises, Inc. was formed in the 1940’s, but was later dissolved or otherwise 
liquidated in the 1950’s. 
 
3 
partnership interest in HLC Properties to various family member trusts.  Upon 
final distribution of the estate, the executor was discharged. 
In July 2000, HLC Properties and the trustee for the Wilma Wyatt Crosby 
Trust2 (collectively HLC) initiated this action against defendants MCA Records, 
Inc., GRP Records, Inc., UMG Recordings, Inc., MCA, Inc., and Universal 
Studios, Inc. (collectively MCA), for allegedly underpaying royalties due on three 
recording contracts between Crosby and MCA’s predecessors in interest, dated 
March 29, 1943, January 3, 1949, and May 10, 1956, respectively. 
In the course of pretrial discovery, MCA propounded to HLC a demand for 
production of documents.  In response, HLC produced some documents but 
withheld others that it listed in a privilege log as containing protected attorney-
client communications.  MCA later issued a third party deposition subpoena to 
Crosby’s former law firm, O’Melveny & Meyers, for production of documents.  
O’Melveny & Meyers produced some documents through HLC’s attorney, who 
also submitted a “supplemental privilege log” that added three documents to 
HLC’s original privilege log. 
Thereafter, MCA issued a subpoena duces tecum to HLC for the production 
at trial of 59 of the documents HLC listed in its privilege logs.  Many of the 59 
documents reflected written communications between attorneys and persons 
Crosby had hired, and of those, approximately 48 had been sent when Crosby 
apparently was conducting an audit of his recording artist royalties in 1959 and 
1960.  In its motion and trial court briefing on the matter, MCA contended the 59 
documents might provide critical support to its interpretation of the royalty 
                                             
 
2  
Wilma Wyatt Crosby, Crosby’s first wife, owned a community property 
interest in any royalty stream from recordings made during their marriage. 
 
4 
provisions in dispute and its position that the contracting parties had previously 
resolved the accounting matters at issue. 
On the first day of trial, the court considered the enforceability of MCA’s 
subpoena duces tecum in view of HLC’s attorney-client privilege objections.  
After hearing counsel’s arguments, the court agreed with MCA that Crosby was 
the client and the holder of the privilege and that the privilege terminated after his 
death.  The court did not recognize Enterprises or HLC as a privilege holder. 
The Court of Appeal granted HLC’s petition for a writ of mandate in a 
published opinion.  In brief, it found that Enterprises constituted an organization 
during Crosby’s lifetime, and therefore that HLC, as Enterprises’ successor, 
currently holds the privilege.  The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial 
court with instructions to vacate its order compelling compliance with MCA’s 
subpoena duces tecum and to consider each document listed in HLC’s privilege 
logs to determine whether, in accordance with the appellate court’s opinion, the 
attorney-client privilege applied. 
We granted MCA’s petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
As proposed by the California Law Revision Commission (the 
Commission) and subsequently enacted by the Legislature in 1965, the Evidence 
Code3 declares authoritatively that evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-
client privilege are governed by statute.  (§ 911; Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 1124, 1129.)  The party claiming a privilege shoulders the burden of 
showing that the evidence it seeks to suppress falls within the terms of an 
applicable statute.  (D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 
                                             
 
3  
All further statutory references to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
5 
729 (Chadbourne); see also People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1208 
(Gionis).) 
“ ‘When the facts, or reasonable inferences from the facts, shown in support 
of or in opposition to the claim of privilege are in conflict, the determination of 
whether the evidence supports one conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and 
a reviewing court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial evidence 
to support it [citations].’ ”  (Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1208, quoting 
Chadbourne, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 729.)  Accordingly, unless a claimed privilege 
appears as a matter of law from the undisputed facts, an appellate court may not 
overturn the trial court’s decision to reject that claim.  (See ibid.) 
In the matter before us, HLC relies on section 953, subdivision (d), which 
defines a holder of the attorney-client privilege to include “[a] successor . . . of 
a[n] . . . association [or] organization . . . that is no longer in existence.”  HLC’s 
primary argument, which the Court of Appeal also largely espoused, is that 
Enterprises was an unincorporated organization; that during Crosby’s lifetime, 
Enterprises was the client and holder of the attorney-client privilege with respect 
to the 59 withheld documents; and that HLC currently holds the privilege as 
Enterprises’ successor.4 
Conversely, MCA relies on section 953, subdivision (c), which provides 
that, “if the client is dead,” the holder of the attorney-client privilege is the client’s 
                                             
 
4  
At times, HLC contends Enterprises was either an “association” or an 
“organization” as those terms are used in section 953, subdivision (d).  As HLC 
points out, however, Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “association” to include 
“[a]n unincorporated business organization that is not a legal entity separate from 
the persons who compose it” and defines an “organization” as “a body of persons 
(such as a union or corporation) formed for a common purpose,” thus offering 
somewhat overlapping definitions for the two terms.  (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 
1999), pp. 119, col. 1 [association], 1126, col. 1 [organization].) 
 
6 
“personal representative.”  It is MCA’s position that Bing Crosby, the natural 
person, not Enterprises, was the client and holder of the attorney-client privilege 
with respect to the 59 documents; that the executor of Crosby’s estate held the 
privilege upon Crosby’s death; and that the privilege ceased to exist after the 
estate was finally distributed and the executor discharged. 
Resolution of the instant dispute hinges on two questions.  First, who may 
hold the attorney-client privilege initially?  Second, who may succeed to the 
privilege?  We address these questions in order. 
A.  Who May Hold the Attorney-Client Privilege Initially? 
With certain exceptions not relevant here, the Evidence Code provides that 
a “client” has “a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from 
disclosing, a confidential communication” the client has had with an attorney “if 
the privilege is claimed by” someone statutorily authorized to do so.  (§ 954.)  A 
“client” means “a person who, directly or through an authorized representative, 
consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service 
or advice from him in his professional capacity.”  (§ 951.)  For purposes of the 
Evidence Code, a “person” includes “a natural person, firm, association, 
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, limited liability company, or 
public entity.”  (§ 175.) 
As for who may claim the attorney-client privilege, the Evidence Code 
designates a “holder of the privilege” (§ 954, subd. (a)); a person the privilege 
holder authorizes to claim the privilege (id., subd. (b)); or the attorney at the time 
of the confidential communication if the privilege holder is in existence and has 
not authorized the communication’s disclosure (id., subd. (c)).  Section 953, in 
turn, defines a “holder of the privilege” to mean “[t]he client when he has no 
guardian or conservator” (§ 953, subd. (a)), “[a] guardian or conservator of the 
 
7 
client when the client has a guardian or conservator (id., subd. (b)), “[t]he personal 
representative of the client if the client is dead” (id., subd. (c)), or “[a] successor, 
assign, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative of a firm, association, 
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or public entity that is no 
longer in existence” (id., subd. (d)).  Pursuant to these statutory provisions, an 
individual, an association, or an organization may qualify as a client, and a living 
or existing client is the privilege holder initially. 
HLC contends that when an unincorporated organization such as 
Enterprises manages an individual’s assets or business interests, and the 
individual, either personally or through agents, consults an attorney about those 
assets or business interests, the managing organization holds the privilege.  To 
evaluate this contention, we consider what characteristics, if any, are necessary for 
an organization to hold the attorney-client privilege. 
In the proceedings below, the Court of Appeal reviewed various dictionary 
definitions of the term “organization,” as well as case law addressing the term in 
other contexts.  (E.g., Random House Webster’s College Dict. (2000) p. 933 
[defining “organization” as “a group of persons organized for some end or work” 
or “the administrative personnel or apparatus of a business”].)  Because the term 
generally describes a group of persons working to pursue a common purpose, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that “the business staff assembled by Crosby to operate 
his entertainment interests qualifies as an organization . . . for purposes of 
succession to the attorney-client privilege.”  Similarly, HLC contends here that 
Crosby developed Enterprises as a business organization by “surround[ing] 
himself with long-term, loyal employees and attorneys to advise him in conducting 
his far-reaching business interests.” 
The Evidence Code does not define the term “organization.”  Neither did 
the Commission propose a statutory definition of the term for the Legislature’s 
 
8 
approval.  The Commission, however, observed in a comment to the statute 
defining “client” that “such unincorporated organizations as labor unions, social 
clubs, and fraternal societies have a lawyer-client privilege when the organization 
(rather than its individual members) is the client.”  (Com. com., reprinted at 29B 
pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 951, p. 207; cf. Smith v. Laguna 
Sur Villas Community Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 639, 643 [holding that a 
condominium association was the holder of the attorney-client privilege and that 
its individual members could not demand production of privileged documents, 
except as the association’s board allowed].)  While not binding, the Commission’s 
official comments reflect the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Evidence 
Code and are entitled to substantial weight in construing it.  (Van Arsdale v. 
Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249, overruled on another point in Privette v. 
Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702, fn. 4; see People v. Williams (1976) 16 
Cal.3d 663, 667-668.) 
As MCA points out, each of the three unincorporated organizations the 
Commission lists is a collective entity that the Internal Revenue Code recognizes 
as having tax exempt status.  (Int. Rev. Code, § 501(c)(5) [labor organizations]; 
id., § 501(c)(7) [social clubs]; id., § 501(c)(8) [fraternal organizations].)  
Additionally, the assets of the listed organizations generally are not subject to 
probate administration when their individual members die.  Here, there is no 
suggestion that Enterprises qualified for tax exempt status, and the three recording 
contracts at issue were probated as part of Crosby’s estate.  Nonetheless, such 
circumstances do not necessarily foreclose HLC’s privilege claim because the 
comment to section 951 does not purport to limit availability of the attorney-client 
privilege to only those unincorporated organizations specifically listed. 
A core statutory concept is controlling on the matter, however.  That is, 
even assuming an unincorporated business organization may consist of an 
 
9 
individual and his employees working together to further the individual’s business 
affairs, the Evidence Code makes clear that the attorney-client privilege belongs 
only to the client, whether the client is a natural person, an unincorporated 
organization, or some other entity.  (§ 951; see Smith v. Laguna Sur Villas 
Community Assn., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 643-645.)  Thus, the validity of 
HLC’s claim that it holds the attorney-client privilege as Enterprises’ successor 
depends on whether Enterprises itself, as opposed to Crosby or any other of its 
supposed individual members, was the original client and privilege holder with 
respect to the 59 written communications at issue.5 
Here, the trial court found that Crosby, the natural person, not Enterprises 
or any other business organization, was the client who sought the legal advice 
reflected in the 59 documents.  As a reviewing court, we may not disturb the trial 
court’s finding if there is any substantial evidence to support it.  (Gionis, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 1208; Chadbourne, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 729.) 
Our review of the record discloses the following evidence regarding 
Crosby’s identity as the client whose communications with various attorneys are at 
issue.  According to the sworn declaration of HLC’s counsel of record, Mark A. 
Brodka, “Crosby was a ‘business machine’ ” who had business interests in a 
number of fields including entertainment, mining, oil, real estate, and other 
ventures.  With regard to the three recording contracts at issue in this litigation, 
there appears no dispute that Crosby signed them in his individual capacity, rather 
than in a representative capacity on behalf of Enterprises or some other 
organization.  The record also confirms that, after Crosby died, his many business 
                                             
 
5  
For purposes of our analysis, we shall assume the 59 documents reflect 
confidential attorney-client communications. 
 
10 
assets and interests, including the three recording contracts, were probated as part 
of his estate. 
The record shows that the key person responsible for managing Crosby’s 
business interests throughout Crosby’s lifetime, Grillo, believed he was hired to 
work for Crosby “as an individual.”  As Grillo stated in his deposition testimony, 
the “Enterprises” moniker was “just a loose terminology” to “cover everything 
that [Crosby] did.”  Although Grillo also claimed that Enterprises had employed 
him, Mozelle Seger, Nancy Briggs, and others at the time of Crosby’s death, the 
record contains no evidence that any source other than Crosby himself paid their 
salaries and benefits.  Indeed, the court files of Crosby’s probated estate contained 
an order showing that, after Crosby’s death, his estate made employment 
termination payments to Seger and Briggs and paid their health and life insurance 
premiums.6  All this supports the conclusion that Crosby acted in an individual 
capacity in running his business affairs, not in any representative capacity on 
behalf of an entity with independent interests or an organization representing the 
collective interests of Crosby and other members. 
Finally, the record indicates the attorneys listed on HLC’s privilege logs as 
authors or recipients of the 59 withheld documents regarded Crosby as the client 
they represented.  Referring to the logs, Brodka declared:  “Members of the 
[O’Melveny & Meyers] firm who represented Crosby included:  John O’Melveny, 
Richard C. Bergen, and Donald Petroni.  Additional attorneys who represented 
                                             
 
6  
That order also approved the executor’s first and final account and report, 
in which the executor described Grillo as “Mr. Crosby’s former business manager” 
and indicated the estate had incurred expenses to retain Grillo “to advise [the 
executor] with respect to a variety of matters pertaining to the estate.”  The 
executor’s report also described the office located at 170 North Robertson 
Boulevard, where Enterprises operated, as “Mr. Crosby’s business office.” 
 
11 
Crosby or whom Crosby consulted with were, among others:  Thomas O’Sullivan, 
Stewart Schwartz, George Foley, Todd Johnson and B. Beck.”  (Italics added.)  
Similarly, Grillo testified in his deposition that John O’Melveny and Todd 
Johnson “represented Crosby” and hired Grillo “for” Crosby.  Thomas O’Sullivan, 
a tax attorney, indicated in his deposition that he did tax planning and prepared 
state and federal income tax returns for both Crosby and Bing Crosby Productions, 
but not Enterprises.7  Notably, none of these attorneys claimed to have performed 
separate legal work on behalf of Enterprises.8 
In sum, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 
determination that a natural person, Crosby, was the original client who held the 
attorney-client privilege for the communications pertaining to his three recording 
contracts.  Likewise, the evidence fails to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that 
Enterprises was the client of the named attorneys with interests of its own or its 
collective members to protect.  (See Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1208; 
Chadbourne, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 729.)  HLC offers no authority suggesting that 
Crosby himself could not be the client on whose behalf those attorneys were 
consulted, merely because he employed others to assist him in managing his 
business interests and assets.  (See § 951 [“client” means “a person who, directly 
                                             
 
7  
O’Sullivan described Bing Crosby Productions as a corporation engaged in 
motion picture and television production.  For purposes of the matter before us, 
HLC is not claiming an attorney-client privilege with respect to communications 
involving Bing Crosby Productions. 
8  
Although HLC’s privilege logs purport to represent that many of the 
withheld documents reflect communications between attorneys and agents of both 
Crosby and Enterprises (e.g., Grillo), HLC clarified at oral argument that it 
contends only one attorney-client privilege is at issue here.  That is, HLC is not 
claiming there was more than one client holding the privilege when the subject 
communications were made. 
 
12 
or through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer for the purpose of 
retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from him in his 
professional capacity” (italics added)].)  Accordingly, we shall not disturb the trial 
court’s determination. 
To support its claim of privilege, HLC relies on several cases involving 
trusts and/or incorporated organizations to argue that control over the assets of a 
business organization brings with it the right to assert the attorney-client privilege.  
HLC’s authorities, however, merely hold or recognize that when corporate 
organizations are merged or when control of a corporation or formalized trust 
passes to new management, the power to assert or waive the privilege resides in 
the new managers.  (E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub 
(1985) 471 U.S. 343, 354 [trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has power to 
waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy 
communications]; Moeller v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1127 
[successor trustee of a private express trust assumes all powers of a predecessor 
trustee and is entitled to access to trust documents reflecting confidential 
communications between the predecessor trustee and its attorney on matters of 
trust administration]; Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 93, 98-
99 [corporation’s attorney-client privilege passed to successor in interest through 
merger]; Pilates, Inc. v. Georgetown Bodyworks (D.D.C. 2000) 201 F.R.D. 261, 
263-264 [plaintiff was not entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege where it 
acquired no stock and obtained no control of the corporate client, but merely 
obtained two of the client’s trademarks through an assignment].)  Because there is 
substantial evidence in the record that Crosby, a natural person, initially held the 
privilege, we find these decisions, which pertain to invocations or waivers of a 
trust’s or a business entity’s privilege, inapposite. 
 
13 
B.  Who May Succeed to the Attorney-client Privilege? 
We now consider whether the Evidence Code permits HLC to succeed to 
Crosby’s attorney-client privilege. 
We begin with a review of the relevant Evidence Code provisions.  Section 
953 states without qualification that the holder of a deceased client’s attorney-
client privilege is the client’s personal representative.  (§ 953, subd. (c).)  Section 
954 specifies that, except as otherwise provided by statute, the privilege may be 
claimed only by a holder of the privilege (id., subd. (a)), by a person whom the 
holder authorizes to claim the privilege (id., subd. (b)), or by the person who was 
the attorney at the time of the confidential communication, so long as a privilege 
holder exists and has not authorized disclosure (id., subd. (c)). Taken together, 
these two sections unambiguously provide that only a personal representative may 
claim the attorney-client privilege in the case of a deceased client. 
In a comment to section 954, the Commission states:  “the privilege ceases 
to exist when the client’s estate is finally distributed and his personal 
representative is discharged.”  (Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, 
supra, foll. § 954, p. 232.)  According to the comment, the Commission proposed 
this limitation after carefully weighing competing policy concerns:  “Although 
there is good reason for maintaining the privilege while the estate is being 
administered—particularly if the estate is involved in litigation—there is little 
reason to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding relevant evidence after the 
estate is wound up and the representative is discharged.”  (Ibid.)  Here, the 
Commission’s comments confirm the plain meaning of the statutory provisions:  
the attorney-client privilege of a natural person transfers to the personal 
representative after the client’s death, and the privilege thereafter terminates when 
there is no personal representative to claim it. 
 
14 
These statutory provisions dictate the outcome in the matter before us.  
When Crosby died, his privilege transferred to his personal representative, i.e., the 
executor of his estate.  But once Crosby’s estate was finally distributed and his 
personal representative discharged, the privilege terminated because there was no 
longer any privilege holder statutorily authorized to assert it.  (§ 953, subd. (c); 
Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 954, pp. 231-232.)  
Accordingly, HLC’s privilege claim is without merit. 
In arguing to the contrary, HLC contends that, even assuming Crosby 
individually held the attorney-client privilege with respect to the withheld 
documents, an estate also qualifies as an “organization” within the meaning of 
section 953, subdivision (d), so as to render it capable of holding and then validly 
transferring the decedent’s privilege, along with his assets, to a “successor.”  HLC 
finds it significant that an estate is considered an organization for purposes of the 
California Uniform Commercial Code (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1201, subd. (28); see 
also id., § 9503; U. Com. Code com. 2, 23B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Code U. Com. 
Code (2002 ed.) foll. § 9503, pp. 534-535 [financing statement requirements for 
perfecting a security interest or agricultural lien]) and other California statutes 
(Gov. Code, § 6161, subd. (f) [State Payment Card Act]).  HLC reasons that, 
because it acquired all of the estate’s rights to Crosby’s recordings pursuant to a 
limited partnership agreement, HLC validly holds the privilege under section 953, 
subdivision (d), as a successor to the estate.9 
                                             
 
9 
At the trial court hearing on this matter, HLC argued that HLC Properties 
was a successor in interest to Crosby’s estate, which had succeeded to the 
privilege Crosby held as an individual:  “The purpose of [section] 953 
[subdivision] (d) is to clearly permit a successor in interest from the entity.  And 
the precise answer to your question, what was the predecessor of HLC, the 
predecessor of HLC was the estate of Bing Crosby.  The entity.  Which under 
[section] 953 [subdivision] (c) succeeded to the individual privilege of Crosby.” 
 
15 
We are not convinced.  As discussed, the Evidence Code addresses the 
matter of estates in section 953, subdivision (c), which expressly limits the holder 
of the attorney-client privilege in cases of a deceased client to the personal 
representative.  (See also Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, 
foll. § 954, p. 232 [addressing termination of a deceased client’s privilege].)  
Estates are not listed and do not logically belong in section 953, subdivision (d), 
where provision is made for the privilege to survive when the client is not a 
natural person and no longer exists.  Were we to adopt HLC’s position, the 
attorney-client privilege of natural persons would survive distribution of their 
estates and would extend to persons and entities beyond their personal 
representatives.  Regardless whether other statutory schemes categorize estates as 
organizations for other distinct legislative purposes, our doing so here would 
nullify section 953’s specific limitation on who may hold the privilege “if the 
client is dead.”  (§ 953, subd. (c).)  It also would defeat the legislative mandate 
calling for the privilege to terminate when a client has died, the personal 
representative has been discharged, and there is no longer anyone to hold the 
privilege.  (Ibid.; § 954, subd. (a); see Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. 
Code, supra, foll. § 954, pp. 231-232.)  We therefore decline HLC’s invitation to 
construe the term “organization,” as it appears in section 953, subdivision (d), to 
include an estate. 
HLC additionally contends its position is supported by Probate Code 
section 9760, which authorizes a personal representative to continue the operation 
of a decedent’s wholly or partly owned unincorporated nonpartnership business, 
subject to certain restrictions, if “it is to the advantage of the estate and in the best 
interest of the interested persons.”  (Prob. Code, § 9760, subd. (b).)  We do not 
agree. 
 
16 
The authority conferred in Probate Code section 9760 complements section 
953, subdivision (c)’s grant of authority to the personal representative to assert or 
waive the attorney-client privilege while the decedent’s estate is being 
administered.  (See Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. 
§ 953, p. 230 [commenting that section 953 represents a “change in California 
law,” which formerly recognized the privilege “even when it would be clearly to 
the interest of the estate of the deceased client to waive it”].)  If anything, the fact 
that the Evidence Code recognizes no exception to termination of a decedent’s 
privilege when the personal representative is discharged, even though the Probate 
Code specifically authorizes a personal representative to operate the decedent’s 
unincorporated nonpartnership business, undermines the position that termination 
of a decedent’s privilege depends on the personal representative’s activities in 
administering an estate. 
Finally, HLC argues that “[f]ailing to find that Enterprises is the holder of 
the privilege may lead to the unfair and anomalous result of allowing MCA to 
view documents that were clearly attorney-client privileged when made, while 
MCA withholds as privileged its documents relating to the same agreements at 
issue.”  The argument fails to persuade.  It is well settled that “[t]he privileges set 
out in the Evidence Code are legislative creations; the courts of this state have no 
power to expand them or to recognize implied exceptions.”  (Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 201, 206, and cases cited.)  This rule precludes 
judicial expansion of the attorney-client privilege in cases where, as here, 
contracts between an individual and a corporate entity give rise to disputes 
between those asserting rights under such contracts. 
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
In closing, we do not suggest that entities formed to manage the business 
affairs of a natural person can never be clients or never hold attorney-client 
 
17 
privileges in their own right.  Nor do we find that a personal representative’s 
assertion of the privilege categorically forecloses others from claiming it as to the 
same communications.  But the Evidence Code unmistakably provides that the 
attorney-client privilege belongs only to the client, whether the client is a natural 
person or a business entity, and the record here amply supports the trial court’s 
determination that Crosby, not Enterprises, was the original client and holder of 
the privilege with respect to the 59 withheld documents.  Under these 
circumstances, the Evidence Code compels us to find that, when Crosby died, his 
privilege transferred to the executor of his estate and thereafter ceased to exist 
upon the executor’s discharge. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and remand the matter to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
18 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion HLC Properties v. Superior Court 
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Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 305 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S120332 
Date Filed: February 14, 2005 
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Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Terry Friedman 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Mark A. Brodka, Mark A. Brodka; Girardi and Keese, Thomas V. Girardi, Howard B. 
Miller and Shahram S. Shayesteh for Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Irell & Manella, Gregory R. Smith, Steven A. Marenberg, Steve Kang, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt and Philip 
M. Kelly for Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark A. Brodka 
Law Offices of Mark A. Brodka 
12100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 700 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 820-4597 
 
Howard B. Miller 
Girardi and Keese 
1126 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA  90017-1904 
(213) 977-0211 
 
Steven A. Marenberg 
Irell & Manella 
1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-4276 
(310) 277-1010