Title: State v. Hineman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP226-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jeffrey L. Hineman, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 274,968 N.W.2d 867 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 10, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark F. Nielsen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney 
general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Frances Reynolds Colbert, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Frances Reynolds Colbert, assistant 
state public defender.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP226-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1159) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey L. Hineman, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JAN 10, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Hineman, No. 2020AP226-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam), reversing the Racine County circuit 
court's1 judgment of conviction against Jeffrey Hineman for 
first-degree child sexual assault, S.J.S., and order denying 
Hineman's motion for postconviction relief.  We reverse. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Mark F. Nielsen presided. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
3 
 
¶2 
Hineman argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the State suppressed evidence favorable to his defense 
in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963).  According to Hineman, the State failed to 
disclose a report from Child Protective Services ("CPS") which 
contained "material exculpatory impeachment evidence that went 
to an issue at the heart of the case."  He argues the circuit 
court erred in denying his motion for postconviction relief and 
that the court of appeals was correct to reverse that decision.  
Hineman also argues two alternative grounds for affirming the 
court of appeals:  "he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel," and he "is entitled to a new trial[] and an in camera 
review of [S.J.S.'s] treatment records[] in the interests of 
justice." 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Hineman 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
postconviction relief.  The State did not violate Hineman's due 
process rights by failing to disclose the CPS report because the 
report was not material.  There is no reasonable probability of 
a different result if the State had disclosed the CPS report 
because Hineman had access to a police report containing the 
same information.  Hineman's four ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims also fail.  He was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel's failure to request the subject report, and the other 
claims fail because counsel's performance was not deficient.  
Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to grant Hineman 
a new trial in the interest of justice because there were no 
errors at trial that prevented the real controversy from being 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
4 
 
tried.  The circuit court was correct to deny Hineman's motion 
for postconviction relief.  We therefore reverse the court of 
appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
Hineman was in a romantic relationship with S.J.S.'s 
mother, S.S., since shortly before S.J.S. was born in 2008 and 
until June 2009.  Though Hineman is not S.J.S.'s biological 
father, he continued to remain in contact with S.J.S. until S.S. 
and S.J.S. moved away in September 2009.  S.S. eventually lost 
custody of S.J.S., and S.J.S. moved in with his biological 
father, F.S.  In 2013, Hineman contacted M.S., S.J.S.'s 
grandmother and F.S.'s mother, requesting to reestablish contact 
with S.J.S. because Hineman "cared for [S.J.S.] and wanted to be 
a part of [his] life and family."  M.S. and F.S. both agreed, 
after which Hineman had regular contact with S.J.S.  Hineman 
would spend time with S.J.S. at F.S.'s home, buy gifts for 
S.J.S, and take him out for activities such as shopping or going 
to the park. 
¶5 
On March 12, 2015, CPS received a mandatory report 
from a therapist S.J.S. was seeing at the time.2  According to 
the report, S.J.S. had been seeing the therapist to address 
behavioral issues such as "pulling his pants down in class and 
also at home in his room and acting as if he is going to 
defecate on the floor."  The therapist reported that "during 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 48.981 (2019-20).  All references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
5 
 
school . . . [S.J.S.] was observed sucking on his pen cap" and 
that S.J.S. "told a classmate [it] 'feels good when someone 
sucks on your privates.'"  S.J.S. initially told the therapist 
that he learned this from a Garfield book or movie but later 
"indicated that [Hineman] had told him."  The CPS report also 
states, "Reporter indicated that no information was given by 
[S.J.S.] that [Hineman] had touched him or forced [S.J.S.] to 
touch [Hineman]."  The therapist reported that she told F.S. and 
M.S. about her concerns, and that they were no longer permitting 
Hineman to have contact with S.J.S.    
¶6 
CPS received a second report on April 20, 2015, from a 
nurse at Aurora Healthcare.  The nurse reported that S.J.S.'s 
behavioral issues persisted.  She spoke with F.S. and M.S. and 
reported they "feel that someone must be abusing [S.J.S.] since 
his behavior is getting worse."  The nurse also reported that 
F.S. and M.S. believed either Hineman or "an autistic son, whose 
name is not known," abused S.J.S. 
¶7 
CPS received a third report on May 29, 2015, from both 
a teacher and a counselor at S.J.S.'s school.  The CPS report 
states, "Both reporters feel the concerns today for [S.J.S.] are 
his continuation of defiant behaviors at school resulting from 
what is believed to be sexual[] abuse by a former family 
friend."  The teacher and counselor reported their concerns are 
based on observations of S.J.S.'s behavior at school as well as 
conversations with S.J.S.'s family.   
¶8 
On June 5, 2015, the Racine County Sheriff's Office 
received a copy of the March 12 CPS report.  It is undisputed 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
6 
 
that the sheriff's office never received either the April 20 or 
May 29 CPS reports.   
¶9 
Investigator Tracy Hintz was assigned to the case and 
began her investigation by reviewing the March 12 CPS report.  
She summarized the CPS report's contents in a police report: 
The report indicates that [S.J.S.] was sucking on a 
pen at school and told a classmate that it feels good 
to have your privates sucked on.  He said he learned 
it in a Garfield book but then stated it was from the 
Garfield 2 movie.  The reporter spoke to [F.S.] about 
it and [S.J.S.] indicated that [Hineman] had told him.  
No specific information was given on if [Hineman] 
touched 
[S.J.S.] 
or 
forced 
[S.J.S.] 
to 
touch 
[Hineman]. 
Investigator 
Hintz 
interviewed 
F.S. 
and 
M.S. 
 
She 
also 
coordinated a forensic interview of S.J.S., which took place at 
the Child Advocacy Center ("CAC") on August 4, 2015.  During the 
forensic interview, S.J.S. disclosed that Hineman had touched 
him inappropriately.  Investigator Hintz interviewed Hineman the 
next day. 
¶10 On August 6, 2015, based on this investigation, the 
State filed a criminal complaint charging Hineman with first-
degree child sexual assault, sexual contact with a person under 
the age 13, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e). 
¶11 Hineman filed a pretrial discovery demand for the 
State to disclose "[a]ll evidence and/or other information which 
would tend to negate the guilt of the defendant, including 
laboratory reports, hospital records or reports, police reports, 
or 
any 
other 
information 
within 
the 
state's 
possession, 
knowledge, or control."  The State did not provide the March 12 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
7 
 
CPS report, but it did provide Investigator Hintz's police 
report summarizing the CPS report. 
¶12 At trial, defense counsel waived opening statement.  
The State called four witnesses:  the forensic interviewer from 
the CAC, S.J.S., M.S., and Investigator Hintz.  The forensic 
interviewer, Heather Jensen, testified that she interviewed 
S.J.S. and described how a forensic interview is conducted.  She 
also described the concepts of "piecemeal disclosure" and 
"delayed disclosure":  
Piecemeal disclosure is where kids tell bits and 
pieces of their disclosure at a time.  So it's typical 
for kids to tell a little bit over extended periods of 
time so they might tell the initial reporter just one 
detail.  Then they might tell more later on to 
different people.  So some time kids will disclose a 
little bit to just gauge you as an adult, the reaction 
to see how the adult will react. . . .  
[D]elayed disclosure is when a victim reports abuse 
after it[']s happened.  Research shows that typically 
about a third of kids delay disclosing what happened.  
About a third of kids will tell what happened right 
after it happened.  About a third of kids do not 
disclose at all.  So it's common that kids delay in 
their reporting.  There is different reasons for it. 
Some is that kids are fearful.  Some kids have been 
told that they could be hurt if they disclose so they 
don't disclose initially.  Some kids have been hurt by 
the maltreater.  They are afraid of the maltreater.  
They don't disclose immediately or if they don't have 
trusted adults to disclose to.   
There is lots of different reasons that kids 
don't talk right away.  A difficult thing for kids to 
talk about something that's shameful or embarrassing.  
Or even young kids some times don't know at the time 
that it's happening; that it's wrong.  So they some 
times don't disclose until they realize that that's 
what happened to them is not right. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
8 
 
The State did not notice Jensen as an expert witness.  Defense 
counsel did not object to this testimony, but she did challenge 
its relevance on cross-examination:  "Ms. Jensen, this is not a 
case of delayed disclosure, correct?"  
¶13 After Jensen's testimony, the State next played the 
video recording of S.J.S.'s forensic interview.  It included the 
following exchanges: 
[Interviewer]:  Did [Hineman] ever do anything 
else that you didn’t like?  Tell me about that. 
[S.J.S.]:  He touched my private parts. 
[Interviewer]:  Okay. 
 
Tell 
me 
all 
about 
[Hineman] touching your private parts. 
[S.J.S.]:  Ugh, my mom and dad were sleeping, and 
me and him were on the couch and he just touched my 
private parts.   
[Interviewer]:  Uh-hmm.  And then what happened? 
[S.J.S.]:  He laughed at me. 
[Interviewer]:  He laughed at you? Okay.  Then 
what happened? 
[S.J.S]:  I woke my mom and dad up and I told 
them. 
[Interviewer]:  Okay.  And then what happened? 
[S.J.S.]:  Um, he kicked [Hineman] out again, and 
he told him that -- to never come back. 
. . . . 
[Interviewer]:  Okay.  And did [Hineman] touch on 
your clothes or your skin? 
[S.J.S.]:  My clothes. 
. . . . 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
9 
 
[Interviewer]: . . . Did [Hineman] ever want you 
to do something to his privates? 
[S.J.S.]:  Yeah, but I didn't do it. 
[Interviewer]:  What did [Hineman] want you to 
do? 
[S.J.S.]:  Touch his privates, but I didn't do 
it. 
S.J.S. said in the interview that this incident occurred during 
the "wintertime."  He first told the interviewer that Hineman 
touched him four times but later said it was six.  
¶14 After the State played the video, S.J.S. testified.  
S.J.S. initially responded "No" or "I can't remember" to most of 
the State's questions regarding whether Hineman had touched him, 
but S.J.S. became more responsive after saying that he felt 
nervous.  S.J.S. testified, "I think [Hineman] touched me on my 
private part."  He said this happened "the day right after 
trick-or-treating," nobody else was in the house at the time, 
and he told M.S. and F.S. about it the same day.  On cross-
examination, S.J.S. said he told M.S. and F.S. "[a] few weeks 
after it happened" and at different times.  M.S. later testified 
that no such disclosure took place:  "[S.J.S.] claims that he 
told his daddy but he didn't come right out and say what 
anything was.  He just didn't want to be around [Hineman] any 
more. . . . I knew something was wrong.  I kept saying [S.J.S.] 
what's wrong.  Tell grandma.  He kept saying nothing." 
¶15 The State's final witness was Investigator Hintz.  She 
testified that Hineman's behavior toward S.J.S. "in the totality 
of everything that he was doing is often described as what we 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
10 
 
would refer to as grooming."  Defense counsel objected to this 
statement as unnoticed expert testimony, and the court sustained 
that objection. 
¶16 On 
cross-examination, 
defense 
counsel 
questioned 
Investigator Hintz regarding when S.J.S. first disclosed that 
Hineman had touched him: 
[Defense Counsel:]  You first met with [F.S.] and 
[M.S.] in July of 2015? 
[Hintz:]  Correct. 
. . . .  
[Defense Counsel:] . . . There was no mention 
that [Hineman] had inappropriately touched [S.J.S.]? 
[Hintz:]  From [F.S.] no.  There was not. 
[Defense Counsel:]  And there is no mention from 
[M.S.] that there was a[n] allegation that [Hineman] 
had touched [S.J.S.]? 
[Hintz:]  No. 
[Defense Counsel:]  So the forensic interview of 
[S.J.S.] in August of 2015? 
[Hintz:]  In the beginning, correct. 
[Defense Counsel:]  And you were present for 
that? 
[Hintz:]  I was. 
[Defense Counsel:]  And is that the first time 
that 
[S.J.S.] 
says 
that 
[Hineman] 
touched 
his 
privates? 
[Hintz:]  I don't know if that's the first time 
[S.J.S.] had said that.  I know that was the first 
time that I had seen that.  But I believe in the CPS 
report, that there was a statement in there that he 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
11 
 
said [Hineman] had done that.  But I would have to 
look at the original report that came from CPS. 
[Defense Counsel:]  Would that have been anywhere 
in your report if you -- if there was a mention that 
[Hineman] had inappropriately touched [S.J.S.]? 
[Hintz:]  I don't know if I documented that.  
Whether or not I would have to look at my report 
again, in my original narrative to see if I did indeed 
write that in there. 
[Defense Counsel:]  But if you were told that, 
you would have then put it in your report? 
[Hintz:]  I would think I would have but it's 
not -- I might have not put it in there but that's why 
I would have to look at the report and look at the 
original CPS.  I believe it does state that he later 
says that. 
¶17 The defense called no witnesses except for Hineman.  
Hineman described his relationship with S.J.S. and his family, 
how his communication with them changed after March 2015, and he 
denied sexually assaulting S.J.S. 
¶18 The jury found Hineman guilty of first-degree child 
sexual assault, sexual contact with a person under the age 13.  
The court sentenced Hineman to 17 years of initial confinement 
and 8 years of extended supervision.   
¶19 On March 1, 2019, Hineman filed a motion requesting 
postconviction relief and an order compelling postconviction 
discovery of the March 12 CPS report.  He claimed the State 
suppressed material evidence favorable to his defense in 
violation of his due process rights under Brady.  Hineman also 
claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of 
his attorney's "failing to obtain the CPS report before trial," 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
12 
 
"failing to make an opening statement," "failing to object to 
improper expert testimony," and "conceding Mr. Hineman's guilt 
at closing."3  Hineman further requested a new trial in the 
interest of justice and in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment 
records. 
¶20 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Hineman's 
motion 
for 
postconviction discovery and recommended the release of all 
three CPS reports.4  After briefing and oral argument, the court 
issued 
a 
decision 
denying 
each 
of 
Hineman's 
claims 
for 
postconviction relief.  The court first held that the March 12 
CPS 
report 
was 
not 
material 
under 
Brady 
because 
"[t]he 
information in Investigator Hintz's report corresponded to the 
information in the March [12] report."   
¶21 The circuit court also rejected each of Hineman's 
ineffective assistance claims.  The court did not address trial 
counsel's failure to obtain the CPS reports because the March 12 
report was "the only report of consequence."  It held that trial 
counsel's decision to waive opening statement was not deficient 
                                                 
3 Hineman also claimed he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because of his attorney's "failing to obtain a defense 
expert," "failing to file a Shiffra/Green motion," and "failing 
to move for a mistrial."  See State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 
499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  The circuit court rejected each of 
these claims, and Hineman did not raise them either before the 
court of appeals or this court. 
4 The circuit court recommended to the juvenile court that 
it release the CPS reports.  The Honorable David W. Paulson of 
the juvenile court ordered the release. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
13 
 
performance based on counsel's explanation at the Machner5 
hearing:  "I had some concerns about what [Hineman] would say 
when he took the stand.  I didn't want to make an opening 
statement and commit him to something that he wouldn't then say 
in his direct."  The circuit court also credited trial counsel's 
explanation for not objecting to Jensen's unnoticed expert 
testimony.  Counsel explained, "I just thought that I would on 
my cross cover [the delayed disclosure testimony] because I 
didn't think that this was a case of delayed disclosure, if I 
remember correctly."  The circuit court rejected Hineman's last 
claim of ineffective assistance——that trial counsel conceded 
guilt in closing argument by stating, "but I believe the sexual 
assault happened."  The court found the statement was not a 
concession of guilt because "[c]learly defense counsel was 
speaking ironically. . . . Counsel's point was to criticize the 
version of events that had been testified to."  
¶22 Finally, the circuit court denied Hineman's request 
for an in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment records.  The 
court concluded Hineman did not satisfy the standard under State 
v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, because 
"no one has shown in this record a 'fact specific evidentiary 
showing' that the records of [S.J.S.'s] therapy support any 
defense to this charge." 
                                                 
5 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
14 
 
¶23 Hineman appealed the circuit court's order, and the 
court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals concluded that 
suppression of the March 12 CPS report violated Hineman's due 
process rights under Brady.  The court reasoned that the report 
was material under Brady because Investigator Hintz "could not 
be impeached . . . without the report itself, and thus, the 
undermining of the investigator's recall of events related to 
the investigation and her credibility more generally could not 
occur without the report itself."  Hineman, No. 2020AP226-CR, 
¶47.  The court of appeals also concluded Hineman was entitled 
to an in camera review of S.J.S.'s therapy records based on the 
information the therapist reported to CPS.  Id., ¶52. 
¶24 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.     
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 When assessing a Brady claim, "we independently review 
whether a due process violation has occurred, but we accept the 
trial court's findings of historical fact unless clearly 
erroneous." 
 
State 
v. 
Wayerski, 
2019 
WI 
11, 
¶35, 
385 
Wis. 2d 344, 922 N.W.2d 468.  We apply this same standard of 
review to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment.  State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶86, 358 
Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44 ("An appellate court upholds the 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous . . . [and] independently determines whether those 
historical facts demonstrate that defense counsel's performance 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
15 
 
met the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel . . . ."). 
¶26 Regarding Hineman's request for an in camera review of 
therapy records, we review such claims de novo.  Green, 253 
Wis. 2d 356, ¶20.  Finally, because neither the circuit court 
nor the court of appeals addressed whether to grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice, we consider this issue de novo.  See 
Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶22, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157 
(analyzing de novo an issue raised below but not addressed). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶27 We begin our review by addressing Hineman's Brady 
claim and concluding that the State did not commit a Brady 
violation because the subject evidence was not material.  We 
then turn to each of Hineman's claims that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In analyzing those claims, 
we determine Hineman was not prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to request the March 12 CPS report and that the 
remaining ineffective assistance claims fail for lack of 
deficient performance.  Finally, we deny Hineman's request to 
order a new trial in the interest of justice. 
A.  Brady Claim 
¶28 The United States Supreme Court in Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 
imposed on prosecutors a duty under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to disclose evidence favorable to the 
defense.  Brady involved a defendant on trial for murder who 
testified he was involved in the murder but that his co-actor 
directly committed it.  Id. at 84.  The jury found the defendant 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
16 
 
guilty and sentenced him to death.  Id.  After the defendant was 
convicted and sentenced, he learned the prosecution failed to 
comply with a pretrial discovery request by withholding a 
statement by the defendant's co-actor admitting to the murder.  
Id.  The Court held that such "suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution."  Id. at 87.  
¶29 The Supreme Court has since explained, "[t]here are 
three components of a true Brady violation:  The evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must 
have 
been 
suppressed 
by 
the 
State, 
either 
willfully 
or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued."  Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  The parties do not dispute 
that the March 12 CPS report is favorable to Hineman's defense 
and that the State suppressed the report.  We therefore assume 
without deciding that the first two requirements of Hineman's 
Brady claim are satisfied.  The parties do however disagree as 
to whether Hineman was prejudiced by the State's suppressing the 
report——that is, whether the report is "'material' either to 
guilt or to punishment."  Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶35.  
¶30 "While previously the standard for materiality varied 
depending upon the type of Brady violation, the Supreme Court 
has since adopted a uniform standard for materiality . . . ."  
State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
17 
 
(citation omitted).  The Court explained that standard in United 
States v. Bagley:  "The evidence is material only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
A 
'reasonable 
probability' 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  473 U.S. 
667, 682 (1985).  In conducting this analysis,6  
[t]he reviewing court should assess the possibility 
that such effect might have occurred in light of the 
totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of 
the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial 
proceeding the course that the defense and the trial 
would have taken had the defense not been misled by 
the prosecutor's incomplete [discovery] response.  
Id. at 683. 
¶31 Hineman argues the March 12 CPS report "was material 
exculpatory impeachment evidence that went to an issue at the 
heart of the case——when and how [S.J.S.] disclosed that 
Mr. Hineman 
had 
sexually 
assaulted 
him, 
and 
what 
the 
circumstances 
of 
the 
disclosure 
indicated 
about 
its 
reliability."  "Generally, where impeachment evidence is merely 
cumulative 
and 
thereby 
has 
no 
reasonable 
probability 
of 
affecting the result of trial, it does not violate the Brady 
                                                 
6 The State criticizes the court of appeals' analysis for 
"reweighing the witnesses' credibility based on a paper record, 
displacing the role of the factfinder."  The State asks us to 
clarify that, "on review, deference to the factfinder's unique 
function is warranted in determining whether but for the 
complained-of errors, there is a substantial likelihood of a 
different result."  We see no need to rework the formulation for 
assessing Brady materiality that the Supreme Court announced in 
Bagley. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
18 
 
requirement."  United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th 
Cir. 1990).  Impeachment evidence is cumulative and therefore 
not material when "the witness was already [or could have been] 
impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence."7  Conley v. 
United States, 415 F.3d 183, 192 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Cuffie, 
80 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Ferrara v. United 
States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006) (considering "whether 
the sequestered evidence was cumulative of other evidence 
already in the defendant's possession"); United States v. 
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding officer's 
police report contradicting officer's testimony was cumulative 
where officer also made a similar inconsistent statement in a 
deposition).  
¶32 According to Hineman, the March 12 CPS report was not 
merely cumulative in two respects:  "the CPS report is the only 
document that contains the clear exculpatory statement that as 
of March 12, [S.J.S.] had not made any disclosures of 
maltreatment," 
and 
"even 
more 
important, 
the 
CPS 
report 
                                                 
7 Impeachment evidence may also be cumulative, and therefore 
not 
material, 
"when 
the 
testimony 
of 
the 
witness 
is 
'corroborated by other testimony,' or when the suppressed 
impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on 
which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been 
shown to be questionable."  United States v. Payne, 63 
F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir. 1995)(citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also 
State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶41, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 
N.W.2d 269.  
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
19 
 
clarifies 
who 
the 
mandatory 
reporter 
was:  [S.J.S.'s] 
therapist."  We disagree on both counts. 
¶33 The March 12 CPS report's use as impeachment evidence 
was not material because it fails to create a reasonable 
probability of a different result.  The CPS report contains the 
same information as Investigator Hintz's police report except 
for the identity of the reporter, which is not material.  The 
CPS report states, "Reporter indicated that no information was 
given by [S.J.S.] that [Hineman] had touched him or forced 
[S.J.S.] to touch [Hineman]."  The police report states, "No 
specific information was given on if [Hineman] touched [S.J.S.] 
or forced [S.J.S.] to touch [Hineman]."  The only difference 
between the two is that the CPS report includes, "by S.J.S."  
Regardless of this difference, both statements make the same 
point:   At the time Investigator Hintz completed her report, 
she had no knowledge from any source that there was an 
allegation of touching.  The CPS report provided defense counsel 
everything she needed to impeach Investigator Hintz's testimony 
that there was a prior allegation of touching.   
¶34 The report also is not material as evidence that a 
therapist was the mandatory reporter.  Hineman argues S.J.S.'s 
therapist is "a material fact witness," that the patient-
provider privilege does not apply because there is no privilege 
"when the therapist makes a mandatory report . . . under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.981," and that "[l]ogically, any person trying to 
ascertain Mr. Hineman's guilt or innocence would want to know 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
20 
 
more about how, when, and why the reporter suspected Mr. Hineman 
of this crime."  These arguments are unpersuasive.   
¶35 First, Hineman is mistaken that filing a mandatory 
report waives any privilege from testifying.  He cites Wis. 
Stat. § 905.04 as support.  However, the only relevant exception 
to the provider-patient privilege is far narrower than Hineman 
claims:  "There is no privilege for information contained in a 
report of child abuse or neglect that is provided under s. 
48.981(3)."  § 905.04(4)(e)2m. (emphasis added).  The only way 
Hineman could have accessed information about S.J.S.'s treatment 
beyond the CPS reports' contents was to file a Shiffra-Green 
motion, which, as we discuss below, would fail.   
¶36 Second, and more importantly, nowhere in Hineman's 
argument does he explain how the fact that the mandatory 
reporter was a therapist creates a reasonable probability of a 
different result.  He fails to identify any way the mandatory 
reporter's identity is relevant to the determination of guilt or 
innocence beyond the vague assertion that the jury might "want 
to know more."  This does not undermine our confidence in the 
outcome.  Accordingly, such evidence of the mandatory reporter's 
identity is not material. 
¶37 Because the March 12 CPS report contained no evidence 
that creates a reasonable probability of a different result, it 
is not material.  Its suppression therefore did not violate 
Hineman's due process rights under Brady. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
21 
 
B.  Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
¶38 For a criminal defendant to succeed on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, "[f]irst, the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was deficient."  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  "To establish that 
counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must show 
that it fell below 'an objective standard of reasonableness.'"  
State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶38, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 
N.W.2d 93 (quoting State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305).  "This court will not second-guess 
a reasonable trial strategy, [unless] it was based on an 
irrational trial tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon 
judgment."  Id., ¶65 (quoting State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶49, 
337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364) (alteration in original). 
¶39 "Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687.  This is the same test used to determine 
materiality under Brady.  See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("We find 
the Strickland formulation . . . for materiality sufficiently 
flexible to cover . . . cases of prosecutorial failure to 
disclose evidence favorable to the accused[.]"); Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶14 (stating that Brady materiality "is the same 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland"); 
Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶36 ("The materiality requirement of 
Brady is the same as the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
22 
 
analysis.").  A criminal defendant "must prevail on both parts 
of the test to be afforded relief."  State v. Allen, 2004 WI 
106, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. 
¶40 Hineman argues he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in four ways:  trial counsel failed to request the March 
12 CPS report, waived opening statement, failed to object to 
improper expert testimony, and conceded Hineman's guilt during 
closing argument.  We address each of these claims in turn. 
1.  Failure to request the CPS report. 
¶41 Hineman's first claim of ineffective assistance is 
based on trial counsel's failure to request the CPS report 
before trial.  This claim fails for lack of prejudice.  Because 
the test for prejudice under Strickland is here the same as the 
test for materiality under Brady, trial counsel's failure to 
request the March 12 CPS report was not prejudicial for the same 
reasons that it was not material. 
¶42 Hineman also asserts he was prejudiced because, "had 
counsel filed motions pre-trial to obtain the CPS report, she 
likely would have obtained the related April 20 and May 29 CPS 
reports."  However, neither one of these reports creates a 
reasonable probability of a different result. 
¶43 According to Hineman, the April 20 CPS report was 
"exculpatory" because it "states that [M.S.] and [F.S.] took 
[S.J.S.] to be examined by a physician for signs of sexual abuse 
and that 'there [was] nothing from his doctor who examined 
[S.J.S.] that any type of sexual abuse has taken place.'"  
However, the nature of the sexual contact the State alleged 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
23 
 
likely would not produce the kind of evidence that would appear 
in a physician's examination.  Hineman also argues the April 20 
CPS report "underscores that it was [S.J.S.'s] behaviors, not 
Mr. Hineman's, that led to the concern that [S.J.S.] was being 
abused."  Evidence of S.J.S.'s behavioral issues was presented 
at trial.  Trial counsel did not need the April 20 CPS report to 
support this line of argument.  
¶44 The May 29 CPS report's absence also did not prejudice 
Hineman.  He argues the report impeaches S.J.S. because it 
"suggest[s] that [S.J.S.] was 
repeatedly questioned about 
Mr. Hineman and inappropriate sexual touching."  But this too 
came out at trial.  M.S. testified that she repeatedly asked 
S.J.S. to tell her what was wrong, and he was nonresponsive.  
¶45 Overall, Hineman was not prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to request the March 12 CPS report because any evidence 
derived from that request would have been cumulative.8  Because 
we resolve this claim on prejudice, we need not address 
deficient performance.  
2.  Waiving opening statement. 
¶46 Hineman next argues that trial counsel was ineffective 
for choosing to waive opening statement.  He argues trial 
                                                 
8 Hineman makes the additional argument that "[h]ad counsel 
obtained these CPS reports before trial, a defense expert could 
have rebutted the therapist's assumption that [S.J.S.'s] unusual 
behaviors meant that he was being sexually abused."  Hineman 
could have called a defense expert even without first reviewing 
the CPS reports.  Officer Hintz's report contains the same 
information about S.J.S.'s behavior that Hineman alleges raised 
suspicion that S.J.S. had been sexually assaulted. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
24 
 
counsel performed deficiently because "[f]oregoing an opening 
statement because you are not sure what your client is going to 
say——when he has a constitutional right to say nothing at all——
is not a reasonable strategy." 
¶47 In this case a Machner hearing was conducted.  As a 
result, we benefit from the testimony and circuit court 
findings.  We conclude that this claim fails for lack of 
deficient performance.  Trial counsel explained, "I had some 
concerns about what he would say when he took the stand.  I 
didn't want to make an opening statement and commit him to 
something that he wouldn't then say in his direct."  The circuit 
court concluded, "The failure to give an opening statement, when 
supported 
by 
a 
strategic 
reason, 
is 
largely 
within 
the 
discretion of the trial attorney.  I see no reason to disturb 
this judgement."  As a result, trial counsel's strategic 
decision was reasonable.  Courts that have addressed this issue 
consistently 
hold 
that 
waiving 
opening 
statement 
is 
an 
acceptable trial strategy.  See, e.g., United States v. Haddock, 
12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that counsel's 
uncertainty about what his client might say justified waiving 
opening statement); United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 20-
21 (2d Cir. 1983) ("It is common knowledge that defense counsel 
quite often waive openings as a simple matter of trial 
strategy.") (collecting cases); Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851, 
863 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that counsel's desire not to 
disclose trial strategy was a reasonable strategic reason for 
waiving opening statement). 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
25 
 
¶48 Trial counsel did not know how or even whether Hineman 
would testify.  It was perfectly reasonable for her to waive her 
opening statement and avoid making promises to the jury she 
could not keep.  This decision did not fall below "an objective 
standard of reasonableness."  Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38. 
Because we resolve this claim on deficient performance, we need 
not address prejudice. 
3.  Failure to object to improper expert testimony. 
¶49 Hineman's third ineffective assistance claim also 
fails for lack of deficient performance.  He claims that Jensen 
presented 
unnoticed 
expert 
testimony 
on 
the 
concepts 
of 
"piecemeal disclosure" and "delayed disclosure" and that trial 
counsel's failure to object to this testimony was deficient 
performance.  Hineman argues this was deficient because trial 
counsel's proffered strategy of "attacking Jensen's improper 
expert testimony by trying to establish that this case involved 
an immediate disclosure——when that testimony could have been 
kept out altogether——would have undermined the defense strategy 
and bolstered [S.J.S.'s] incriminating statements." 
¶50 However, 
the 
testimony 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
findings at the Machner hearing revealed that trial counsel did 
not object because she had a reasonable alternative strategy of 
showing Jensen's testimony did not match the State's theory of 
immediate disclosure.  Trial counsel testified at the Machner 
hearing, "I just thought that I would on my cross cover [the 
delayed disclosure testimony] because I didn't think that this 
was a case of delayed disclosure, if I remember correctly."  The 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
26 
 
circuit court concluded, "The attorney could rely on her 
experience in examining such experts to have a moment in front 
of the jury of wrenching an admission out of the witness.  That 
is what the attorney decided to risk and it paid off."   
¶51 The record supports that trial counsel pursued this 
strategy.  During cross-examination, she asked Jensen, "And 
let's say the abuse happens and the child goes and tells the 
parent immediately.  Is that a delayed disclosure?"  By pointing 
out that Jensen discussed delayed disclosure despite the State 
arguing there was an immediate disclosure, trial counsel 
highlighted an inconsistency in the State's case.  This was 
consistent with trial counsel's overall strategy.  During her 
closing argument, trial counsel argued the State's witnesses 
presented varying accounts of when the assault happened, how 
many times it happened, and when S.J.S. disclosed.  We cannot 
say that trial counsel was deficient for attempting to use 
otherwise objectionable testimony to her client's advantage.  
Because we resolve this claim on deficient performance, we need 
not address prejudice.    
4.  Conceding guilt during closing argument. 
¶52 Hineman's final ineffective assistance claim is that 
trial counsel conceded Hineman's guilt during closing argument 
by saying, "But I believe the sexual assault happened."  At the 
Machner hearing, trial counsel explained, "I don't recall 
conceding Mr. Hineman's guilt[]. . . . [M]y notes say, if it 
happened, what version do you believe.  Then I would go into --
the different things."  Though the circuit court found trial 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
27 
 
counsel was "speaking ironically" to explain the competing 
versions of events, Hineman argues, "conceding guilt——even in 
jest——is not a reasonable strategy in a first-degree sexual 
assault of a child trial."  
¶53 Hineman misconstrues the circuit court's finding.  The 
circuit court, who heard the trial and also heard the testimony 
at the Machner hearing, concluded that counsel's performance was 
not deficient.  Contrary to Hineman's argument, the court did 
not find that trial counsel conceded guilt "in jest"; it found 
she did not concede guilt at all.  The court explained, "The 
structure of the closing was designed to contrast the version 
told in the forensic interview with that coming out at 
trial. . . . By attempting to force the jury between two 
different theories, the defense obviously played to doubt."  The 
court found that, in this context, trial counsel's statement was 
meant only "to criticize the [State's] version of events that 
had been testified to."  Accordingly, the statement was ironic 
and not a concession of guilt.  This is a factual determination 
to which we owe deference, and it is not clearly erroneous.  See 
Dillard, 358 Wis. 2d 543, ¶86.  Because trial counsel never 
conceded Hineman's guilt, this last claim fails for lack of 
deficient performance.9  Because we resolve this claim on 
deficient performance, we need not address prejudice.  
                                                 
9 The 
parties 
disagree 
as 
to 
whether 
there 
was 
a 
transcription error and the trial transcript should actually 
say, "But to believe the sexual assault happened."  We need not 
resolve this issue because the circuit court found there was no 
concession of guilt under the assumption that the transcript was 
correct. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
28 
 
C.  The Interest Of Justice 
¶54 Hineman's final claim is that this court should 
exercise its discretion to order a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  Absent other grounds for doing so, this court may 
order a new trial "if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable 
that justice has for any reason miscarried."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06.  
¶55 Hineman asserts the real controversy in this case has 
not been fully tried because the State improperly presented 
unnoticed expert testimony and "in camera review of [S.J.S.'s] 
treatment records is necessary to fully try this controversy."  
There are two situations where the real controversy has not been 
fully tried such that the interest of justice may require a new 
trial:  
(1) when 
the 
jury 
was 
erroneously 
denied 
the 
opportunity to hear important evidence bearing on an 
important issue in the case or (2) when the jury had 
before it evidence not properly admitted that "so 
clouded" a crucial issue that it may be fairly said 
that the real controversy was not tried. 
State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38 n.18, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 
N.W.2d 60.  "However, such discretionary reversal power is 
exercised only in 'exceptional cases.'"  Id., ¶38 (quoting State 
v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶98, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350).  
"We are reluctant to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice, and thus we exercise our discretion only in exceptional 
cases."  Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶87, 235 Wis. 2d 235, 
611 N.W.2d 659.  
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
29 
 
¶56 Hineman's first argument regarding unnoticed expert 
testimony fails.  His assertion that Jensen's testimony on the 
concepts of "piecemeal disclosure" and "delayed disclosure" 
requires 
a 
new 
trial 
merely 
repackages 
his 
ineffective 
assistance claim, which we already rejected, as an interest-of-
justice claim.  As for Investigator Hintz's testimony on the 
concept of "grooming," it consisted entirely of the following 
statement:  "Those things, in the totality of everything that he 
was doing is often described as what we would refer to as 
grooming." 
 
Trial 
counsel 
immediately 
objected 
to 
this 
testimony, and the court sustained that objection.  Neither 
Jensen's nor Investigator Hintz's testimony on these topics was 
so inflammatory or pervasive that it clouded the real issue at 
trial:  whether Hineman had sexual contact with S.J.S.  
¶57 Hineman's second argument also fails because he has 
not made the requisite evidentiary showing necessary to obtain 
in camera review of S.J.S.'s treatment records.  In order to 
gain in camera review of treatment records, a defendant must 
"make a sufficient evidentiary showing that is not based on mere 
speculation or conjecture as to what information is in the 
records."  Green, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶33.  "[T]he evidence sought 
from the records must not be merely cumulative to evidence 
already available to the defendant.  A defendant must show more 
than a mere possibility that the records will contain evidence 
that may be helpful or useful to the defense."  Id.  Because we 
conclude the absence of the CPS reports did not prejudice 
Hineman, it follows that the reports do not form an adequate 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
30 
 
evidentiary basis supporting in camera review of S.J.S.'s 
treatment records, and the jury was not "erroneously denied the 
opportunity 
to 
hear 
important 
evidence."10 
 
Avery, 
345 
Wis. 2d 407, ¶38 n.18.   
¶58 The 
real 
issue 
was 
fully 
tried. 
 
Hineman's 
disagreements on whether the jury should or should not have 
heard certain evidence does not change that fact.  We therefore 
deny Hineman's plea for a new trial in the interest of justice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 Hineman argues that he is entitled to a new trial 
because the State suppressed evidence favorable to his defense 
in violation of his due process rights under Brady.  According 
to Hineman, the State failed to disclose a report from CPS which 
contained "material exculpatory impeachment evidence that went 
to an issue at the heart of the case."  He argues the circuit 
court erred in denying his motion for postconviction relief and 
that the court of appeals was correct to reverse that decision.  
Hineman also argues two alternative grounds for affirming the 
court of appeals: "he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel," and he "is entitled to a new trial[] and an in camera 
                                                 
10 We heard argument earlier this term in State v. Johnson, 
No. 2019AP664-CR, regarding whether "the court [should] overrule 
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 
1993)."  State v. Johnson, No. 2019AP664-CR, unpublished order, 
at 2 (Wis. Oct. 14, 2021).  That case remains pending.  
Regardless of how we resolve the issue in Johnson, we conclude 
that Hineman cannot make the evidentiary showing necessary for 
review under the Green standard. 
No. 
2020AP226-CR   
 
31 
 
review of [S.J.S.'s] treatment records[] in the interests of 
justice." 
¶60 We 
conclude 
that 
Hineman 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
postconviction relief.  The State did not violate Hineman's due 
process rights by failing to disclose the CPS report because the 
report was not material.  There is no reasonable probability of 
a different result if the State did disclose the CPS report 
because Hineman had access to a police report containing the 
same 
relevant 
information. 
 
Hineman's 
four 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims also fail.  He was not prejudiced 
by trial counsel's failure to request the subject report, and 
the other claims fail because counsel's performance was not 
deficient.  Finally, we decline to exercise our discretion to 
grant Hineman a new trial in the interest of justice because 
there were no errors at trial that prevented the real 
controversy from being tried.  The circuit court was correct to 
deny Hineman's motion for postconviction relief.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.    
 
No.  2020AP226-CR.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶61 JILL 
J. 
KAROFSKY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately to push back against a pernicious myth about child 
sexual assault victims found in the court of appeals opinion.  
The court of appeals determined that the child victim in this 
case presented credibility issues, in part because he did not 
disclose to his therapist that he was a victim of Hineman's 
sexual 
abuse. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Hineman, 
No. 
2020AP226-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam).  
Such reasoning ignores the barriers child sexual assault victims 
face in reporting sexual abuse and perpetuates the misguided 
notion that delayed disclosures in these cases are the exception 
rather than the norm. 
¶62 To bolster its conclusion that "[t]he state's case was 
not particularly strong," the court of appeals faulted S.J.S. 
for not disclosing his abuse to his therapist.  The court wrote, 
"[S.J.S.] meeting with his therapist around this time would have 
provided an obvious opportunity for S.J.S. to reveal if he had 
been inappropriately touched by Hineman, yet S.J.S. made no such 
revelations."  Id. at ¶41 (emphasis added).  Assertions such as 
this ignore the victim's herculean task of reporting sexual 
abuse. 
¶63 There are myriad reasons children do not report sexual 
abuse——to anyone.  These include: an inability to recognize or 
articulate sexual abuse, an uncertainty about which adults are 
safe, a lack of opportunities to disclose, fear of not being 
believed, 
trauma 
that 
results 
from 
the 
abuse, 
power 
differentials between the child victim and adult perpetrator, 
No.  2020AP226-CR.jjk 
 
2 
 
and 
institutional 
power 
dynamics. 
 
CHILD 
USA, 
Delayed 
Disclosure: A Factsheet Based on Cutting-Edge Research on Child 
Sex Abuse, 2 (Mar. 2020).  Additionally, recounting abuse, 
particularly for child sexual abuse survivors, "creates new 
painful 
and 
traumatic 
memories 
that 
compound 
older 
pain 
associated with the abuse.  Recounting the abuse experience, 
especially more than once, 'triggers' survivors and can leave 
them feeling exhausted, fatigued, and defeated."  James Marsh & 
Margaret Mabie, Trauma-Informed Advocacy, Trial, Aug. 2022, at 
38 (footnotes omitted). 
¶64 Importantly, when disclosure does occur, it does not 
usually happen in one sitting.  Rather, disclosure is a process 
that can take decades and may involve "telling through direct 
and indirect hints and signs, decisions to tell, re-decisions 
and delaying, or withholding until adulthood, and the dependency 
on trusted confidants who ask and listen for final disclosure to 
occur."  CHILD USA at 2 (quoting Maria Larsen Brattfjell & Anna 
Margrete Flam, "They Were the Ones That Saw Me and Listened."  
From Child Sexual Abuse to Disclosure: Adults' Recalls of the 
Process Towards Final Disclosure, 89 Child Abuse Neglect 225 
(2019)). 
¶65 The truth——as opposed to the myth——is that when it 
comes to child sexual assault cases, disclosure is the departure 
from the norm.  According to data from the U.S. Department of 
Justice as much as 86 percent of child sexual abuse may go 
unreported altogether.  Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., U.S. Dep't 
Just., Youth Victimization: Prevalence and Implications, 6 (Apr. 
No.  2020AP226-CR.jjk 
 
3 
 
2003).  And when disclosure of child sexual abuse does occur, it 
is almost always delayed.  Strikingly, the average age of 
disclosing childhood sexual abuse is 52.  CHILD USA at 3. 
¶66 In short, there was never an "obvious opportunity" for 
S.J.S. to disclose to his therapist or anyone else.  There were 
only barriers and trauma and uncertainty.  In the face of these 
obstacles, what should cause us to pause is not that S.J.S. 
failed to disclose to his therapist but that he had the courage 
to disclose at all. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.