Title: MVA v. Jones

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Keith D. Jones
No. 75, September Term, 2003
Headnote:
The plain language of Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 16-
205.1 (f)(7)(i) of the Transportation Article is clear and unambiguous.  The
word “only” limits the issues to be considered in the suspension hearing to
those six issues enumerated within the statute’s subsection.  As the issue of
whether the chemical breath test was performed within two hours of
apprehension of the suspected drunk driver is not included in that list, the
Administrative Law Judge was not required to consider it in her review of this
case.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case #C-2003-86236 AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 75
September Term, 2003
Motor Vehicle Administration
v.
Keith D. Jones
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia
Greene,
   
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   March 10, 2004
1 Hereinafter, unless noted otherwise, all statutory references are to this section of the
Maryland Code.
This case arises out of an Administrative Law Judge’s decision, made on behalf of the
Motor Vehicle Administration, ultimately resulting in the suspension of the Maryland driving
privileges of Keith D. Jones, respondent, following a driving incident where respondent
refused to submit to a chemical breath test.  On October 12, 2002, respondent was forcibly
stopped by officers following a police chase where respondent attempted to drive his car the
wrong way on Interstate Route 95 toward the Fort McHenry Tunnel.  Respondent, who failed
field sobriety tests, was issued an Order of Suspension, pursuant to Md. Code (1977, 1999
Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article,1 for refusing to take a
chemical breath test to determine his amount of alcohol consumption.
Respondent contested this suspension at an administrative show cause hearing
conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), to whom the Motor Vehicle
Administration (hereinafter, the “Administration” or “Agency”), petitioner, had delegated
final administrative decision-making authority in such cases, pursuant to § 16-205.1.
Following a hearing, the ALJ found that respondent had violated § 16-205.1 and
respondent’s Maryland driving privileges were suspended by the Administration for 120
days.  Respondent sought judicial review of the Agency’s decision in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County.  The Circuit Court reversed the Agency’s decision and vacated the
120-day suspension of respondent’s driving privileges.
The Administration then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on
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October 9, 2003, this Court granted the petition.  Motor Vehicle Administration v. Jones, 377
Md. 275, 833 A.2d 31 (2003).  In its brief, the Administration presents one question for our
review:
“Did the circuit court err in reversing an administrative suspension
decision upon its own finding of facts and requiring that the MVA prove a
suspected drunk driver was asked to take a chemical breath test within two
hours of his apprehension, where the implied consent statute Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. § 16-205.1(f) does not impose such a requirement?”
We answer the Administration’s question in the affirmative and reverse the judgment
of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  We hold that the text of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)
is clear and unambiguous and limits the issues to be considered by an ALJ in a suspension
hearing to the six enumerated issues of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)(1-6).  As the issue of whether an
arresting officer must advise and request a chemical breath test from a suspected drunk driver
within two hours of the driver’s apprehension is not listed within the § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)
factors, the ALJ did not have to consider that issue when determining the findings of fact and
conclusions of law resulting in the suspension of respondent’s driving privileges by the
Administration for refusal to take the chemical breath test.
I. Facts
On October 12, 2002, Officer Blair of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police
observed a Ford Explorer, driven by respondent, facing sideways across the northbound
traffic lanes of Interstate 95 (I-95) at mile marker 56.2, near the Fort McHenry Tunnel.
Officer Blair proceeded to pull his cruiser behind the vehicle and activated his lights and
2 The Statement of Probable Cause was included in the record in the case sub judice
due to the fact that the arresting officer submitted it to the Motor Vehicle Administration
along with the forms required to be sent to the Motor Vehicle Administration following a
drinking and driving incident pursuant to Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), §
16.205.1 (b)(3)(vii).  Thus, the administrative record in the case sub judice contains
substantial detail about the incident occurring on October 12, 2002.
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siren.  Respondent made a U-turn from his position and proceeded to drive south in the
northbound lane of Interstate Route 95 in the direction of the Fort McHenry toll booth plaza.
He was pursued by the officer.  During the chase, respondent veered in front of several
oncoming vehicles.  At approximately 1:59 p.m., other officers, including Officer W. R.
Morningstar of the Maryland Transportation Police, were called to assist in apprehending
respondent.  According to the Statement of Probable Cause2 filed by Officer Morningstar,
respondent finally stopped his vehicle after another officer, Officer Grimm, “stood in the
roadway causing the Explorer to stop.”
The Statement of Probable Cause further stated that, after respondent stopped his
vehicle, Officer Morningstar “observed the operator [respondent] stepping out of the vehicle
and attempting to walk to the rear of the vehicle.  The operator kept his hand on the vehicle
to steady himself and when he reached the rear, he sat down on the bumper because he was
having problems standing on his own” (alteration added).  During the course of the stop,
Officer Morningstar smelled the odor of alcohol on respondent’s breath and observed
respondent’s poor coordination.  He also noted that respondent performed poorly on, and thus
failed, the sobriety field tests administered during the stop.  The officers on the scene
3 Specifically, the Statement of Probable Cause noted that “[u]pon placing
[respondent] in the patrol car, [Officer Morningstar] read him the DR-15 and [respondent]
stated he was refusing all tests” (alterations added).
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believed that respondent had been driving his vehicle while impaired or under the influence
of alcohol due to respondent’s driving behavior, his poor performance on the field tests and
the officers’ observations during the stop.
Officer Morningstar then placed respondent in a patrol car and, according to the
officer, respondent was read his DR-15 “Advice of Rights” form at that time.  After being
read his rights, respondent stated that he would refuse all chemical breath sobriety tests.  The
Statement of Probable Cause indicated that respondent’s refusal of the test occurred shortly
after he was placed in an officer’s patrol car, but it did not indicate the exact time of the
refusal.3  Respondent, however, did not actually sign the DR-15 advice form until 4:40 p.m.,
which acknowledged in writing his refusal to take the breath test.  Pursuant to § 16-205.1 of
the Transportation Article, Officer Morningstar issued respondent an Order of Suspension.
Pursuant to his rights under § 16-205.1 (b)(3)(v)(1), respondent requested an
administrative “hearing to show cause why [respondent’s] driver’s license should not be
suspended concerning the refusal to take the [chemical breath] test” (alterations added).  On
December 12, 2002, a hearing was conducted in front of an ALJ at the Office of
Administrative Hearings.  The Administration presented several documents at the hearing
which were admitted into evidence by the ALJ, including the DR-15A “Officer Certification
and Order of Suspension,” the Statement of Probable Cause and the respondent-signed DR-
4 In the alternative to the Administration’s main argument that the plain language of
§ 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) does not require proof the chemical test request was refused within two
hours of the suspect’s apprehension, the Administration additionally argues that the Circuit
Court erred when it made several findings of fact not made by the ALJ in derogation of our
holding that “[a] court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency generally is limited
to determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support
the agency’s findings of fact and whether the agency’s conclusions of law were correct.”
Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 56-57, 821 A.2d 62, 73 (2003) (alteration
added) (footnote added).  See also Motor Vehicle Administration v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480,
490-91, 796 A.2d 75, 81-82 (2002); Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 (h) of the
State Government Article.  As our resolution of the plain language issue is dispositive in the
case sub judice, we need not pin our holding on this issue, even though it had merit.
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15 “Advice of Rights” form acknowledging respondent’s refusal to take the chemical breath
test.
Respondent did not testify or offer any evidence during the hearing.  Respondent,
however, argued that he had not been properly advised by Officer Morningstar of the
ramifications of a refusal to take the chemical breath test.  Respondent contended, and the
Circuit Court found, that the incident occurred at 1:59 p.m. because that was the time Officer
Morningstar listed on the Statement of Probable Cause as the time he was called to assist
with the situation.4  Respondent also asserted that over two hours had passed before he was
advised about and asked to take the chemical breath test because 4:40 p.m. was the time
recorded next to respondent’s and Officer Morningstar’s signatures on the DR-15 “Advice
of Rights” form.  As a result, respondent argued that he was not asked to take a chemical
breath test, nor was he read his “Advice of Rights” form in a timely manner, i.e., within two
hours of his apprehension.
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The ALJ found that respondent’s argument was only relevant in a criminal
prosecution.  The ALJ stated:
“The case law cited by [respondent] pertains to criminal action.  This is an
administrative proceeding.  The two hour limitation on alcohol tests that
you’ve cited in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland
Code is not applicable in administrative hearings. . . .
. . . 
“The other point is that this individual made an election to refuse to
take the test.  I don’t think that a dismissal or a no action in this matter is
appropriate or warranted.
. . . 
“. . . [T]his is an administrative proceeding not a criminal proceeding and the
time frame is not something that is looked at in administrative proceedings.”
[Alterations added.]
The ALJ found that:
“After considering the evidence . . . presented in this case, I find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the police officers who stopped and
detained [respondent] had reasonable grounds to believe that [respondent] was
driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of or
impaired by alcohol based on the fact that on October 12, 2002, the
investigating . . . police officer observed [respondent] driver make a U-turn on
Interstate Route 95 and drive into oncoming traffic forcing other traffic to take
evasive action to avoid collisions.  [Respondent] stopped his vehicle only after
a police officer stood in front of his vehicle.  Police officers detected a strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage on [respondent’s] breath. [Respondent] needed
to hold onto the guardrail and his vehicle to maintain balance while out of the
vehicle. [Respondent] performed poorly on or failed field sobriety exercises
that were administered to him.  I also find that the police fully advised
[respondent] driver of administrative sanctions to be imposed as evidence by
a review of . . . the [signed] DR-15 [form].  And that [respondent] driver
refused to take a chemical test for intoxication.  I conclude that [respondent]
has violated Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation [Article].” [Alterations
added.]
The Agency then suspended respondent’s privilege to drive in Maryland for 120 days as
5 The type of test to be administered is governed by Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.,
2003 Supp.), § 10-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
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provided for in § 16-205.1 (b)(1)(i)(2)(A).
Respondent sought judicial review of the Agency’s decision in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County and that court heard the case on July 14, 2003.  On July 16, 2003, the
Circuit Court issued an Order reversing the decision of the Agency and vacating the 120-day
suspension of respondent’s Maryland driving privileges.  The Circuit Court held that the
Administration:
“had the burden to prove that [respondent] was offered an alcohol
concentration test within the two-hour statutory limitation and that
[respondent] refused it.  The requirement is clear and unambiguous, and it
equally applies to all persons who are stopped for suspected driving while
under the influence of alcohol and all police officers who arrest them.  Since
there was no evidence that [respondent] was offered the test within the two-
hour statutory limitation, the [Circuit] Court will reverse and vacate the
decision of the ALJ and the 120 day license suspension.” [Alterations added.]
II. Discussion
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, commonly known as Maryland’s
Implied Consent Law, provides the statutory structure for the suspension of a suspected
drunk motorist’s driving privileges where that driver refuses to submit to a chemical breath
test for intoxication.5  Section 16-205.1 (a)(2) states:
“(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway
or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is
deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through
10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test
if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive
6 Section 16-205.1 is an extremely lengthy statute, thus we only include the text
specifically relevant to our inquiry in the case sub judice.  The relevant text of § 16-205.1
(b)(1) states:
    “(b) No compulsion to take chemical test; consequences of refusal. – (1)
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not be
compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person
that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so
charged and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result indicated an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, the Administration shall:
     (i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
. . . 
2. For a test refusal:
     A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s license for 120
days; or
 
    B. For a second or subsequent offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 1 year; . . .”
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while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far
impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while
impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol
restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.”
Pursuant to § 16-205.1 (b)(1) of the Transportation Article, an officer detaining a suspected
drunk driver must advise the suspect of certain rights enumerated in that subsection and may
not compel that suspect to take a chemical breath test.6  Section § 16-205.1 (b) further
discusses the exact procedures an officer must follow if the officer has reasonable grounds
to suspect the driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, including detaining the
suspect, requesting a chemical breath and/or blood test and advising the suspect of
administrative sanctions for refusal to take a requested test.  If, as occurred in the case sub
judice, the suspect refuses to take the chemical breath test after being properly advised, § 16-
7 Section 16-205.1 (f)(1) states:
     “(f) Notice and hearing on refusal to take test; suspension of license or
privilege to drive; disqualification from driving commercial vehicles. – (1)
Subject to the provisions of this subsection, at the time of, or within 30 days
from the date of, the issuance of an order of suspension, a person may submit
a written request for a hearing before an officer of the Administration if:
     (i) The person is arrested for driving or attempting to drive a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while
so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of
one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely,
while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol
restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; and
     (ii) 1. There is an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time
of testing; or
2. The person refused to take a test.”
8 Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol.), § 12-206 of the Transportation Article states:
“Except as otherwise provided in this article, a hearing held under the
Maryland Vehicle Law shall be conducted in accordance with Title 10,
Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article.”
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205.1 (b)(3) directs the officer to confiscate the suspect’s driver’s license, serve an order of
suspension, issue a temporary license and inform the suspect of the suspect’s right to a
hearing and of the possible administrative sanctions.
The procedure regarding such an administrative hearing is set forth by § 16-205.1 (f).7
The specific issues to be considered by an ALJ during the suspension hearing are enumerated
by § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i), which states:
“(7)(i) At a hearing under this section, the person has the rights
described in  § 12-206[8] of this article, but at the hearing the only issues shall
be:
1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had
reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive
while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far
impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
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more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while
impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol
restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title;
2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of
alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or more
drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance;
3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person
was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed,
including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for
modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under
subsection (n)(1) and (2) of this section;
4. Whether the person refused to take the test;
5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor
vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of
testing; or
6. If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial
driver’s license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor
vehicle.
    (ii) The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test
technician or analyst shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal or a test
resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing.”
[Footnote added.] [Emphasis added.]
The central issue in the case 
sub judice is whether § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) implicitly requires that,
in a § 16-205.1 suspension hearing, the Administration must also establish that the arresting
officers satisfied the requirements of the provisions of § 10-303 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.
As a § 16-205.1 suspension hearing for refusal to submit to a chemical breath test and
its possible administrative sanctions are purely statutory in nature, we look to the well-settled
canons of statutory interpretation in making our holding.  It has long been settled by this
Court that “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.” Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46
-11-
(2001) (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000) (internal
citation omitted)).  First and foremost, a court should thoroughly examine the plain language
of the statute when attempting to ascertain the Legislature’s intentions.  Holbrook, 364 Md.
at 364, 772 A.2d at 1246; In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A.2d at 139.  If the statutory
language in question is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday
meaning, then this Court “will give effect to the statute as it is written,” Pak v. Hoang, 378
Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814
A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (internal citation omitted)).  This Court, however, will not add or delete
words from the statute, Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002).  We
will look “beyond the statute’s plain language in discerning the legislative intent” only where
the statutory language is ambiguous.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase,
Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003).
The Administration argues that the plain language of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) clearly sets
out the “only” factors that should be considered by an ALJ when deciding whether the
Administration should suspend a motorist’s driving privileges for refusal to submit to a
chemical breath test and that the Legislature did not intend to include any additional issues.
The Administration further argues that the Legislature did not intend for § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)
to contain technical loopholes to benefit suspected drunk drivers because the purpose for
enacting the implied consent law was to encourage drivers to take the test and to protect the
safety of the public.  See Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739
9 Specifically, respondent argues that § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) implicitly requires the
Administration to prove that the chemical breath test was offered within the two hour
statutory time period pursuant to Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 10-303
(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states:
    “(a) Alcohol concentration. – (1) A specimen of breath or 1 specimen of
blood may be taken for the purpose of a test for determining alcohol
concentration.
(2) For the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration, the
specimen of breath or blood shall be taken within 2 hours after the person
accused is apprehended.” 
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A.2d 58, 68 (1999).  The Administration additionally argues that the statute in question was
not enacted to protect the suspected drunk driver’s due process rights, but to obtain the best
evidence of the driver’s impairment to get that driver off of the State’s roadways in order to
protect public safety.
Respondent, however, contends that, regardless of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)’s limiting
language, the fact that § 16-205.1 (a)(2) cross references §§ 10-302 through 10-309 of the
Court and Judicial Proceedings Article 9 adds implicit issues to an ALJ’s suspension hearing
determinations.  In addition, respondent argues that § 16-205.1 (f) must be read in
conjunction with § 16-205.1 (g), which sets out the procedure for a suspected drunk driver’s
withdrawal of an initial refusal to submit to the chemical breath test, a withdrawal that must
be unequivocally given within two hours of the suspect’s apprehension.  Respondent argues
that to not include the two hour requirement within a suspension hearing would render § 16-
205.1 (g) meaningless.
In the case sub judice, we hold that the language of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) of the
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Transportation Article is clear and unambiguous on its face.  The section states that at a
suspension hearing under subsection (f) “the only issues shall be” the six enumerated issues
in the section (emphasis added).  The word “only” is defined as “no one or nothing more
besides; solely or exclusively . . . no more than . . . merely.”  The Oxford American College
Dictionary 953 (Putnam 2002).  It is a limiting word.  When used as it is in § 16-205.1
(f)(7)(i), i.e., preceding a list of several factors to be considered, it is used to exclude all other
possible factors.  If the Legislature intended the ALJ to consider whether the officers
requested the chemical breath test within two hours of his apprehension, it would have
included a seventh factor under (f)(7)(i).  In providing for administrative sanctions, the
Legislature appears to be concerned solely with the issue of whether the refusal was informed
and not with the lapse of time between the suspect’s apprehension and the test being
requested.
Further support for this interpretation is shown in the requirements of § 16-205.1
(f)(8)(i), which directs the suspension of a suspect’s license if the ALJ makes the following
four findings:
“1. The police officer who stopped or detained the person had
reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive
while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far
impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while
impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol
restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title;
2. There was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any
combination of drugs, a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a
controlled dangerous substance;
10 See Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 16-205.1 (g).
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3. The police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised
of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed, including the fact that a
person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a
suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) and (2)
of this section; and
4. A. The person refused to take the test; or
    B. A test to determine alcohol concentration was taken and the test
result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of
testing.”
The Legislature did not include any reference to whether the officer requested the test within
two hours of the suspect’s apprehension in this provision.  As the issue was omitted from
both (f)(7) and (f)(8), it is clear that the Legislature did not intend that issue to be a factor for
the ALJ’s consideration in a license suspension hearing where the suspect refused to take a
chemical breath test.  Moreover, the provision requiring that a withdrawal of a refusal be
within two hours of the suspect’s apprehension10 would only be relevant if, in fact, a
withdrawal of refusal was made or attempted.  None was attempted here.
This plain language interpretation limiting the (f)(7)(i) factors to those specifically
enumerated in the statute is in line with the Legislature’s intent that § 16-205.1 “was written
to provide, in cases of drunk driving, ‘a swift penalty which is separate from any criminal
penalties that may be imposed for the driving offenses.’” Lytle, 374 Md. at 62, 821 A.2d at
76-77 (internal citation omitted).   We have also stated that the Legislature intended “to
create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against
drunk driving.”  Id. at 65, 821 A.2d at 78.  Extracts from the bill file for House Bill 556 of
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1989 “explicitly indicate an intent to limit the issues considered at resultant administrative
hearings.”  Id.  Thus, expediently and efficiently suspending the Maryland driving privileges
of suspected drunk drivers for failing to submit to a chemical breath test also serves the
legislative purpose in designing § 16-205.1 “for the protection of the public and not primarily
for the protection of the accused,” Richards, 356 Md. at 373, 739 A.2d at 68 (quoting Motor
Vehicle Administration v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 464, 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991) (internal
citations omitted)).
The plain language of Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 16-205.1
(f)(7)(i) of the Transportation Article clearly does not include any time related issues
pertaining to the chemical breath test or the DR-15 advice form as the word “only” limits the
issues to be considered in a hearing to suspend a suspected drunk driver’s driving privileges
for refusing a chemical breath test to those six issues enumerated within the statute’s
subsection.  As we may not add or delete any language from a statute, see Gillespie, 370 Md.
at 222, 804 A.2d at 427, we hold that the two hour requirement proffered by respondent and
imposed by the Circuit Court is not relevant in suspension hearings pursuant to § 16-205.1
(f)(7)(i) of the Transportation Article.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit
Court.
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JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
ANNE 
ARUNDEL
C O U N T Y  
R E V E R S E D ;  
C A SE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM
THE DECISION OF THE AGENCY.
C O S T S  
T O  
B E  
P A I D  
B Y
RESPONDENT.