Title: State v. Galasso

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

217 So. 2d 326 (1968)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Robert J. GALASSO, Respondent.
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Joseph A. MANCUSI, Respondent.
No. 37220.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 20, 1968.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
C. Wendell Harris, Vero Beach, for respondents.
HOPPING, Justice.
The respondents, Robert J. Galasso and Joseph A. Mancusi, were tried jointly on two count informations charging them with (1) the unlawful possession of marijuana and (2) the cultivation of marijuana. After a jury trial, verdicts were returned against each of the respondents on both *327 counts charged. On appeal the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded both respondents for a new trial. See Galasso v. State, 207 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968).
The State thereafter filed its petition for writ of certiorari to this Court alleging direct conflict between the District Court's decision and the Supreme Court's prior decisions on the same point of law in State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967) and Flowers v. State, 59 Fla. 16, 52 So. 11 (1910).
An understanding of the facts and issues herein can best be gleaned from the District Court's opinion.
Defendant Mancusi also testified that he was not aware of the envelope containing marijuana which was found on the dresser in the defendants' room. The District Court's opinion continues:
The District Court upon the above facts held:
In Footnote 1 of its opinion the District Court stated that it did not believe its holding was inconsistent with our prior decision in State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967), because that case commenced prior to the effective date of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974. Were it not for this statement in the footnote, there would be little doubt that State v. Hines, supra, is in direct conflict with the District Court's decision herein. Although this footnote distinguishes the two decisions for the purposes of the District Court's opinion, it does not foreclose our taking jurisdiction of this cause, because on its face the decision of the District Court of Appeal is clearly and admittedly in direct conflict on the same point of law with the decision of this Court in State v. Hines. For additional conflict see also Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1967).
We are again compelled to treat with another facet of the collateral issues raised by the now famous Miranda cases. The pivotal issue at hand is whether or not "Miranda-tainted" pre-trial statements are nevertheless admissible for the limited purposes of impeachment when defendant voluntarily chooses to testify on the same subject in his own behalf. It is upon this very limited issue that we focus our inquiry.
A brief review of the pertinent decisions in this area will prepare the way for our disposition of this case. Taken in chronological order, we specifically direct attention to the Federal Supreme Court's decision in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954), the Miranda cases, and subsequent federal cases interpreting Walder in light of Miranda.
In Walder, the defendant had been indicted in 1950 for possession of heroin but the indictment had been dismissed because the evidence of such possession had been obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
The same defendant was indicted again in 1952 for another, distinct offense of possession of heroin. In defense of this second charge, the defendant testified before the jury that he had never had any heroin in his possession. The trial court thereafter allowed the government to introduce the evidence of the defendant's earlier possession for the purpose of impeaching his testimony. The evidence was admitted over the objection that the impeaching evidence had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court in sustaining the trial court's ruling wrote:
For discussion of the various lower federal court interpretations of Walder, see the majority opinion in Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.1968).
In 1966 the U.S. Supreme Court published its far reaching Miranda decisions. It should be remembered that the precise question herein concerning the admission of tainted pre-trial statements for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of an accused who voluntarily takes the stand, was not before the Court in Miranda. Nevertheless in Miranda the Supreme Court did say:
Furthermore the Court also explained that "unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 U.S.  at 479, 86 S. Ct.  at 1630 (Emphasis added).
Subsequent to Miranda numerous cases have brought into focus the dilemma caused by the question of whether tainted pre-trial statements can be used for impeachment purposes. A strong line of authority holds that such statements should be excluded for all purposes and that this was the principal import of the Miranda decisions. See Groshart v. United States, supra, and Jones v. State, supra.
There is another line of cases that hold that when the defendant voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf he takes his integrity with him and should not be allowed to complain when subjected to the same inquiries as other witnesses. This line of cases would permit the use of pre-trial statements secured in violation of the required Miranda warning to be used for the limited purpose of impeachment. See State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968) and May v. State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Miss. 1968).
It is our belief that the first line of cases represents the better view. The adoption of an exclusionary rule has in its favor simplicity of operation. It serves as an additional inducement to law enforcement officers to follow the dictates of Miranda by taking from them all hope that any useful advantage would be gained by their failure to give adequate pre-trial warnings to the accused. When law enforcement officers know that their failure to give adequate pre-trial warnings, provide counsel or otherwise follow the dictates of Miranda will absolutely preclude under any circumstances the use of any statement secured without such warnings, then the incentive will not be present for *330 them to violate the constitutional rights guaranteed by Miranda.
With regard to pre-trial statements made by defendant in situations when the required Miranda warnings have not been given, we believe the constitutionally correct rule to be that stated by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the instant case when it said:
Although the District Court correctly adopted the proper rule of law we nevertheless reach a different result than it did in our disposition of this cause. Admittedly the admission of the testimony of Mr. Brumley was error but the issues remain, was it such an error as to require reversal or was it, in fact, harmless error. The defendant Mancusi testified on direct that he did not know there was an envelope containing marijuana on his dresser and that he had never seen the envelope before. On rebuttal, Mr. Brumley testified that he picked up the envelope on the dresser and said, "Look here, boys, look what I found; whose is this?" and that the defendant Galasso replied, "Some man. Don't say anything." This was the only statement made by either defendant at that time.
That such an inconclusive and insubstantial colloquy can vitiate an otherwise proper trial so as to require reversal tends to make a mockery out of our system of jurisprudence. When read in context it is not clear who or what the "Some man," referred to was. Is the "Some man," defendants' former roommate Mr. Thompson or the mysterious Mr. Woolf who Mancusi stated asked the defendants to tend his "oregano" bushes? Was this phrase used in its slang sense meaning "big deal" or did it refer to Mr. Brumley as the "Some man."? Can it be said that the basically savvy cautionary statement to his companion by Galasso, "Don't say anything," so tainted the entire trial that it was such an error as to require a new trial? We cannot believe that either of the defendants' constitutional rights were violated by the admission of the brief exchange between Galasso and Mr. Brumley. The facts before us in the instant case clearly appear to call for a timely application of our harmless error statute. Section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:
See also Section 59.041, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
We conclude that the error committed by the trial court's admission of the inconsequential and imperspicuous pre-trial comment of Galasso was harmless error in that it could not have injuriously affected the substantial rights of either of the accused herein.
For the reasons above stated the writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
CALDWELL, C.J., and DREW, THORNAL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.