Title: State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Willacy, Appellant, v. Smith, Judge, et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997),       Ohio St.3d      .] 
Writ of prohibition to prevent juvenile court from proceeding in parentage 
action denied, when. 
 
(No. 96-1819 -- Submitted January 21, 1997 -- Decided March 19, 1997.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 69723. 
 
In July 1986, Chisara S. Nwabara (“Nwabara”) married Walter L. Hugley, 
Jr. (“Hugley”).  One child, Starr Chika Hugley, was born as issue of the marriage 
in January 1987.  After October 1987, Nwabara and Hugley lived separate and 
apart. In December 1989, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations Division, entered a judgment granting Nwabara a divorce 
from Hugley.  The domestic relations court expressly determined that at the time 
of the divorce decree, Nwabara was pregnant and that Hugley was not the father of 
the unborn child.  The parties to the divorce action never appealed the foregoing 
finding.  In February 1990, Nwabara gave birth to Maxim Chidi Nwabara 
(“Maxim”). 
 
In February 1992, Nwabara and Maxim filed a parentage action in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, appellee, to 
 
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establish appellant, Aubrey Willacy, as the biological father of Maxim.  Nwabara 
alleged that Maxim’s conception and birth resulted from an affair with Willacy 
from December 1987 through July 1989.  Nwabara further alleged that no other 
person was presumed to be Maxim’s biological father and that a paternity test 
indicated that Willacy was the biological father.  In an amended answer, Willacy 
admitted having sexual intercourse with Nwabara and additionally conceded that 
the paternity test purported to establish that he is Maxim’s biological father.   
 
Appellee, Judge Burke E. Smith, a visiting judge assigned to hear the 
parentage action in juvenile court, overruled Willacy’s motion to dismiss the 
action based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Judge Smith also determined 
that because of the domestic relations court’s previous finding in the divorce 
action that Hugley is not the biological father of Maxim, Hugley’s name would not 
be mentioned to the jury.  The jury found that Willacy is Maxim’s natural father.  
In January 1993, Judge Smith entered a decision incorporating the jury verdict, 
granting temporary custody of Maxim to Nwabara, and ordering Willacy to pay 
interim child support of $200 per week.   
 
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County dismissed Willacy’s appeal 
from the January 1993 entry.  The court of appeals determined that Judge Smith’s 
 
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January 1993 entry “clearly contemplated further action with regard to past due 
care, permanent support and permanent custody and, therefore, was not a final 
judgment or order.”    Nwabara v. Willacy (May 6, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 
65450, unreported, 1994 WL 189141, appeal dismissed (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
1465, 640 N.E.2d 527. 
 
In October 1995, Willacy filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking  
(1) a writ of prohibition to prevent appellees, Judge Smith and the juvenile court, 
from proceeding any further in the parentage action, and (2) a writ of mandamus 
compelling appellees to vacate their interlocutory orders and reimburse Willacy 
for any amounts paid pursuant to those orders.   
 
Two days after Willacy filed the court of appeals action, Judge Smith 
ordered Willacy to (1) pay Nwabara $34,003 for past care, (2) pay Nwabara’s 
counsel $5,000 in attorney fees, and (3) share in the $1,842.02 expense for an 
expert witness.  Judge Smith stated that his October 1995 entry was a final order, 
and he overruled Willacy’s motion to stay enforcement of the entry.  The court of 
appeals dismissed Willacy’s appeal from Judge Smith’s October 1995 entry 
because it did not constitute a final appealable order absent a determination on 
 
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permanent custody and child support.  Nwabara v. Willacy (June 13, 1996), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 69786, unreported, 1996 WL 325318. 
 
In Willacy’s action for writs of prohibition and mandamus, the court of 
appeals converted appellees’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment, and gave Willacy notice of the conversion and an opportunity to 
respond to the summary judgment motion.  The court of appeals subsequently 
granted appellees’ motion and denied the writs.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Willacy, LoPresti & Marcovy and Timothy A. Marcovy, for appellant. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Willacy asserts in his propositions of law that the court of 
appeals erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying 
the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus.  Before summary judgment may 
be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact 
remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, and (3) it appears that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion of 
the evidence, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving 
 
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party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the summary judgment 
motion is made.  Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 
N.E.2d 1197, 1199. 
 
Initially, we note appellees did not file an appellate brief in this court.  
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(6), “[i]f the appellee fails to file a merit brief within the 
time provided by this rule or as extended in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV, 
Section 3, the Supreme Court may accept the appellant’s statement of facts and 
issues as correct and reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears 
to sustain the reversal.”  State ex rel. Montgomery v. R & D Chem. Co. (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 202, 204, 648 N.E.2d 821, 822-823.  We do not condone appellees’ 
failure to file a merit brief because “[b]riefs serve the important function of 
narrowing and sharpening the parties’ arguments to the Court.”  Staff Commentary 
to S.Ct.Prac.R. VI(6).  Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, Willacy is not 
entitled to reversal of the court of appeals’ judgment. 
Adequate Remedy at Law 
 
The court of appeals determined that Willacy was not entitled to the 
requested extraordinary relief because appellees did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage action, and Willacy 
 
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thus had an adequate remedy at law by appeal to raise his jurisdictional 
contentions.  Willacy contends that the court of appeals improperly restricted its 
review of his action because postjudgment appeal does not constitute an adequate 
remedy at law.  Willacy suggests that due to the inadequacy of the appellate 
remedy, the court of appeals should have determined each of his jurisdictional 
contentions, rather than examining only whether a “patent and unambiguous” lack 
of jurisdiction existed.   
 
Neither prohibition nor mandamus will lie where relator possesses an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Newton v. Court of 
Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 555, 653 N.E.2d 366, 369.  Appeal is 
inadequate if it is not complete in its nature, beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. 
Nichols v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities (1995), 
72 Ohio St.3d 205, 209, 648 N.E.2d 823, 826. 
 
Willacy asserts that appeal following the entry of a final appealable order by 
the juvenile court in the parentage action is not an adequate remedy because of the 
numerous interlocutory orders and the fact that there is no mechanism to guarantee 
reimbursement of his payments of, e.g., temporary child support, should he obtain 
a reversal on appeal.  But contentions that appeal from any subsequent adverse 
 
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final judgment would be inadequate due to time and expense are meritless.  
Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 124, 
656 N.E.2d 684, 688; State ex rel. Gillivan v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1994), 70 Ohio 
St.3d 196, 200, 638 N.E.2d 74, 77. 
 
In addition, Judge Smith’s interlocutory orders and his failure to require 
security pending appeal from a subsequent judgment do not render the remedy of 
postjudgment appeal inadequate.  Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Domestic Relations Div. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 379, 667 N.E.2d 1189, 
1194 (“Although the amount of money involved may be substantial, the parties 
appear to possess a large wealth of marital assets, which includes twelve vehicles 
and numerous investment accounts.  The interlocutory orders and their effect on 
relator’s finances do not supply the ‘dramatic fact pattern’ necessary for us to 
conclude that postjudgment appeal is not a complete, beneficial, and speedy 
remedy.”).  Willacy advised Judge Smith that he grossed $105,000, and maybe 
more, in 1991.  There is also no evidence in the record that an order on appeal 
vacating the interlocutory orders and providing for reimbursement of the sums 
paid by Willacy would necessarily be futile. 
 
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Willacy further claims that postjudgment appeal is inadequate because 
appellees did not comply with the court of appeals’ “mandate” to issue a final, 
appealable order.  See State ex rel. Heck v. Kessler (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 101-
102, 647 N.E.2d 792, 796 (“In cases where a lower court refuses to follow a 
superior court’s mandate, appeal is an inadequate remedy, *** [because] *** [t]o 
hold otherwise might lead to the result of a lower court perpetually refusing a 
superior court’s mandate, necessitating repeated, ineffective appeals.”).  The court 
of appeals, however, issued no such mandate in Nwabara v. Willacy (May 6, 
1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65450, unreported, 1994 WL 189141.  Instead, it 
simply dismissed the appeal and remanded the cause “for further proceedings 
according to law.”  Id.  Therefore, Heck is inapposite. 
 
In sum, we need not determine whether appellees’ exercise of jurisdiction in 
the parentage proceedings is unauthorized, since postjudgment appeal constitutes 
an adequate remedy at law to raise the alleged jurisdictional errors, absent a patent 
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction.  Willacy’s arguments to the contrary are an 
ill-conceived attempt to contravene the well-settled rule that neither prohibition 
nor mandamus may be employed as a substitute for an appeal from interlocutory 
orders.  State ex rel. Hunter v. Patterson (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 512, 514, 664 
 
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N.E.2d 524, 526; Newton, 73 Ohio St.3d at 555, 653 N.E.2d at 369; State ex rel. 
Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 55, 63 O.O.2d 88, 295 N.E.2d 659, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.   
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction 
 
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal.  State 
ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court 
of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931.  
Conversely, appeal is immaterial in prohibition and mandamus actions where the 
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to act.  State ex rel. Lewis v. 
Moser (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155, 157.  In this latter 
circumstance, extraordinary relief lies to prevent the excesses of jurisdiction and 
to invalidate orders previously made that engage in such excesses.  State ex rel. 
News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (1996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 40, 43, 671 N.E.2d 5, 7. 
 
Willacy contends that appellees lacked jurisdiction over the parentage 
action because (1) Maxim was conceived during marriage and born within three 
 
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hundred days of the natural mother’s divorce, (2) Hugley, Nwabara’s ex-husband, 
was not joined in the parentage proceeding, (3) the domestic relations court 
acquired jurisdictional priority over the parentage issue and that issue is still 
pending in that court, and (4) even if the domestic relations court’s jurisdiction 
over the parentage issue is exhausted, the statutory nature of the parentage action 
precludes the juvenile court from subsequently exercising jurisdiction over the 
parentage action. 
  
Juvenile courts have original jurisdiction over parentage actions.  State ex 
rel. Smith v. Smith (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 418, 419, 662 N.E.2d 366, 368; R.C. 
3111.06(A).  Nwabara, Maxim’s natural mother, was a proper party to bring the 
parentage action.  R.C. 3111.07(A).  Under R.C. 2151.23(B)(2), appellees possess 
jurisdiction to “determine the paternity of any child alleged to have been born out 
of wedlock” pursuant to the parentage provisions.  Nwabara’s complaint 
sufficiently alleged that Maxim was born out of wedlock by stating that his 
conception and birth resulted from Nwabara’s affair with Willacy.  Appellees thus 
possessed basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage action. 
 
None of Willacy’s jurisdictional contentions establishes a patent and 
unambiguous divestment of appellees’ basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed.  In 
 
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fact, it does not appear that Willacy even asserts on appeal that any of his 
jurisdictional arguments reflects a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction.  
Instead, Willacy submits these arguments under his erroneous premise that the 
court of appeals improperly restricted its analysis to a patent and unambiguous 
lack of jurisdiction and that this court must consequently resolve each 
jurisdictional issue under a less restrictive standard. As previously discussed, 
however, postjudgment appeal provides Willacy with an adequate remedy at law.  
Therefore, as the court of appeals correctly held, this court need not expressly rule 
on Willacy’s jurisdictional issues, “‘since our review is limited to whether *** 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking.’”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. 
Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 118, 647 N.E.2d 807, 810, quoting 
Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 238, 638 N.E.2d 541, 545. 
Conclusion 
 
The summary judgment evidence established that appellees did not patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage action and that 
Willacy has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by postjudgment 
appeal to raise his claims of error.  Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals 
properly granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied Willacy’s 
 
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request for extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.