Title: Mehring v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mehring v. State1993 WY 123860 P.2d 1101Case Number: 92-114Decided: 09/27/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Timothy 
Jay MEHRING,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v. 

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, Cheyenne, and Lee E. Christian, Fort Collins, 
CO, for appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Timothy Jay Mehring (Mehring), pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault in 
the second degree. He brings this appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the 
procedure used by the trial court in determining his understanding of the 
charges. In addition, Mehring maintains his guilty pleas were not voluntary, in 
part, because one of the three public defenders who represented him performed in 
such a deficient manner as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Finally, Mehring asserts the contents of a presentence investigative report 
violated substantive and procedural requirements.

[¶2]      We affirm. 
However, because of a procedural error in sentencing, we order a limited remand 
to complete the record.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Mehring 
identifies four issues for this court's consideration:

I. 
Does the court's failure to advise appellant of the nature of the charge as 
required by Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 require automatic 
reversal?

II. 
Was appellant's guilty plea knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary?

III. 
Was appellant prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel at several 
critical stages of the proceedings?

IV. 
Did the presentence investigation report violate W.R.Crim.P. 32 and due 
process?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      In December of 
1990, Mehring moved into a Jackson, Wyoming townhouse. An eleven-year-old child 
(victim) and the child's father also lived in the townhouse. Shortly after 
moving in, Mehring committed an act involving sexual contact with the victim. In 
a series of incidents between December of 1990 and May of 1991, the sexual 
contact escalated to sexual intrusion.

[¶5]      Jackson police 
interviewed the victim and the victim's father while investigating another 
reported occurrence of sexual contact with a minor allegedly involving Mehring. 
Further investigation resulted in the filing of an Information on July 23, 1991, 
charging Mehring with eight counts of sexual assault in the second degree, Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (1988), and two counts of sexual assault in the third 
degree, Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (1988). All the charges stemmed from 
incidents involving the victim living in the townhouse.

[¶6]      Mehring appeared 
at a change of plea hearing on February 3, 1992. The State disclosed that as 
part of a plea bargain, Mehring had agreed to plead guilty to two counts of 
sexual assault in the second degree and the State had agreed to dismiss the 
first eight counts of the Information. Additionally, the State had agreed not to 
bring charges for the alleged sexual assaults of other victims. Mehring 
established a factual basis for the pleas at the hearing.

[¶7]      Following a 
presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Mehring to serve terms of 
not less than eighteen years nor more than forty years at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary for each count of sexual assault in the second degree. The 
sentences are to be served concurrently. The sentences given by the trial court 
exceeded the State's recommendation of ten to twenty-five year terms contained 
in the plea bargain. Following the filing of a timely appeal, this court ordered 
a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing to consider issues related to the 
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶8]      This court 
reviews the conduct of a hearing in which a guilty plea is entered as a whole. 
Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Wyo. 1990). Our inquiry determines if the 
district court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the 
possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; 
informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a 
factual basis for the plea. Osborn v. State, 806 P.2d 259, 271 (Wyo. 1991); 
Stice, 799 P.2d  at 1209; W.R.Cr.P. 11(b). The intent of the procedural 
requirements is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled 
into a waiver of substantial rights. Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶9]      Mehring maintains 
reversible error occurred when the trial court failed to advise him of the 
nature of the charges before accepting his guilty plea. Mehring considers the 
failure of the trial court to either explain the elements of the charges or 
obtain a representation by counsel that the nature of the charges had been 
explained violated the rule of strict compliance announced in Crawford v. State, 
701 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1985). See also Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141, 
1143 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10]   At the outset of the change of plea 
hearing, the trial court informed Mehring that before accepting his plea, the 
trial court would be talking to him to "make sure that you understand exactly 
what you're doing." After confirming that Mehring did not desire to proceed with 
his scheduled jury trial, the trial court inquired:

THE 
COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Mehring, that if you plead guilty to one or more 
of these counts, that you are admitting all of the essential elements contained 
in those counts, that there won't be a further trial of any 
kind?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 
Your Honor.

* 
* * * * *

     THE COURT: Mr. 
Mehring, it is my understanding that you are choosing to plead guilty to two 
counts of second degree sexual assault; is that correct?

     THE DEFENDANT: Yes * * 
*.

The 
trial court then informed Mehring of the possible minimum and maximum sentences 
he faced if he pled guilty. This colloquy followed:

     THE COURT: Do you have 
any questions about these charges or any of the possible 
consequences?

     THE DEFENDANT: No, 
Your Honor.

     THE COURT: Do you 
recall - [the judge who] arraigned you on this case. Do you recall him talking 
with you about the elements of the crime?

THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes * * * I do.

     THE COURT: You 
understand the State has to prove each element contained in each count by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt before you can be convicted of these 
crimes?

     THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

Prior 
to accepting the guilty pleas, the trial court questioned whether Mehring had 
discussed his change of pleas with his counsel. Mehring replied that he 
had.

[¶11]   When the change of plea proceeding 
occurred, the applicable rule of criminal procedure provided, in part: 

Before 
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the 
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he 
understands, the following:

     (1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered * * *[.]

W.R.Cr.P. 
15(c)(1), Wyo.Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978) (hereinafter Former Rule 15). See 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(b).

[¶12]   Analysis of a trial court's 
compliance with the requirements of Former Rule 15 may be divided into two 
components, one mandatory and one discretionary. The mandatory component is 
stated in the plain language of the rule. The trial court accepting the plea 
must inform the accused of the nature of the charge and determine 
that the charge is understood before accepting the plea. The failure to 
satisfy this component will result in reversal as a violation of due process. 
Crawford, 701 P.2d  at 1153.

[¶13]   The discretionary component is the 
trial court's ability to select the means utilized to comply with the 
requirements of Former Rule 15. "We have no hard and fast rule regarding how 
much information is necessary to explain the nature of a charge to a defendant." 
Stice, 799 P.2d  at 1209. We have noted that one method would be for the trial 
court to read the indictment or information and permit the defendant to ask 
questions. Peper, 768 P.2d  at 29. Another method may be to explain the elements 
of the charged crime and define complex legal terms. Id. at 30. "The actions 
required of the district court in any particular case depend largely on whether 
the elements of the offense are difficult to understand, considering both their 
complexity to the average person with no legal training and the sophistication 
of the individual defendant." Id. The relevant question on appeal becomes 
whether the means selected by the trial court complied with constitutional 
requirements of due process and the intent of Former Rule 
15.

[¶14]   The pertinent language of Former 
Rule 15 was identical to the pre-1983 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal 2d, § 171 (1982 & Supp. 1993). See Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543, 
545 (Wyo. 1972). The present F.R.Cr.P. 11, as amended in 1983, is substantially 
similar to revised W.R.Cr.P. 11 which became effective March 24, 1992. In 
adopting rules which are substantially similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, this court has traditionally given great weight to relevant precedent 
from federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States. See, 
e.g., Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 603-04 (Wyo. 1993) and Dobbins v. State, 
483 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1971).

[¶15]   In the leading case on determining 
the understanding of the charge, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States offered 
guidance on the sufficiency of the notice required before a guilty plea may be 
accepted in a plea bargain. Morgan was charged with first-degree murder; but in 
a plea bargain, he agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder. Id. at 638, 
96 S. Ct.  at 2254. The United States Supreme Court held Morgan's plea was 
involuntary because he did not receive adequate notice that intent to kill was 
an element of second-degree murder. Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2258.

[¶16]   Two critical points converged to 
result in the decision. First, Morgan never received the constitutionally 
required notice of the charge he faced. Id. at 645, 96 S. Ct.  at 2257. The 
original indictment did not include a charge for the lesser included offense of 
second-degree murder. Id. at 642, 96 S. Ct.  at 2256. Therefore, the charge of 
second-degree murder to which Morgan pled guilty as part of the plea bargain was 
never formally made. Id. at 645, 96 S. Ct.  at 2257. And second, because Morgan 
had an unusually low mental capacity, his counsel had failed to explain to him 
that intent to kill was, in what the court termed, "a critical element of the 
offense * * *." Id. at 647 n. 18, 96 S. Ct.  at 2258 n. 18. While counsel's 
failure to explain the charge was called "reasonable" by the court, it precluded 
a finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct.  at 2258.

[¶17]   Justice Stevens, writing for the 
United States Supreme Court, noted that this case was "unique" because the trial 
judge found, as a matter of fact, that the element of intent was never explained 
to Morgan. Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct.  at 2258. While the record usually contains 
either an explanation of the charge by the judge or a representation from 
counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained, the court said that 
"even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume 
that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense 
in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to 
admit." Id. at 647, 96 S. Ct.  at 2258. Specifically referring to the suggestion 
that a plea could not be accepted without a complete enumeration of the elements 
of the offense, the court said that it would assume that a description of the 
elements was not required. Id. at 647 n. 18, 96 S. Ct.  at 2258 n. 
18.

[¶18]   The logical thrust of the court's 
holding in Morgan is the proceeding in which a plea is accepted does not take 
place in a sterile vacuum. While compliance with Former Rule 15 must not occur 
by installments, Crawford, 701 P.2d  at 1153, the totality of the circumstances 
contribute to the determination of whether the plea is voluntary. In the case 
before us, Mehring was specifically charged in the Information with the counts 
of sexual assault in the second degree to which he changed his plea. As a 
result, unlike Morgan, Mehring pled guilty to charges which he was first given 
notice of by Information and during a prior arraignment proceeding. At the 
change of plea proceeding, the trial court inquired if Mehring intended to plead 
guilty to the two counts of sexual assault in the second degree contained in the 
Information. He replied that he did. Also unlike Morgan, Mehring is of above 
average intelligence. He had attended college and had previous experience with 
plea bargains and the criminal justice system. In the change of plea proceeding, 
Mehring acknowledged that he recalled the elements of the offense and that he 
had discussed the plea bargain with his counsel. Despite the fact that the trial 
court did not inquire if the discussions with counsel included descriptions of 
the elements of sexual assault in the second degree, we may apply the 
presumption that they did. Morgan, 426 U.S.  at 647, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2258.

[¶19]   The present Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which became effective after this proceeding, incorporate 
the presumption of Morgan that a defendant's discussions with his counsel will 
include descriptions of the plea bargain and the elements of the offense. The 
new rule states:

Except 
for forfeitures on citations (Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), 
before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to a 
misdemeanor when the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and, unless the defendant has 
been previously advised by the court on the record and in the presence of 
counsel, inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, 
the following:

     (1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered * * *.

W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b).

[¶20]   While the discretionary means 
utilized by the trial court in this proceeding to inform the accused fall short 
of what may be considered the "better practice," see 2 Wayne R. LaFave & 
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 20.4(c) at 642 (1984), we agree with the 
Morgan court's assumption that complete descriptions of the elements are not 
mandatory in accepting a plea under Former Rule 15. See W.R.Cr.P. 11(b). The 
courts of our land do not function with scripts requiring each participant to 
perform his or her specific part in the same manner on each occasion. We should 
never mistake the presence of the printed or spoken word for comprehension. A 
ritualistic expression of verbiage, complete with legal terminology and excess, 
may provide a comfortable layer of support for technically demanding members of 
the bar, but would provide little real assurance that the accused actually 
understands what is about to be accomplished.

[¶21]   Given the totality of the 
circumstances, Mehring received adequate notice of the charges to comply with 
due process. Therefore, we hold the discretionary means by which the trial court 
informed Mehring of the nature of the charges and determined that he understood 
was sufficient to result in voluntary pleas of guilty. W.R.Cr.P. 15(c)(1), 
Wyo.Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978). See W.R.Cr.P. 11(b).

[¶22]   Mehring, however, maintains his 
guilty pleas were not voluntary. He presents three contentions. First, Mehring 
challenges that the pleas were not voluntary because he did not understand the 
nature of a "recommendation" plea agreement. Second, Mehring asserts that when 
the trial court sentenced him to a greater term than recommended in the plea 
agreement, the trial court should have permitted him to withdraw his pleas. 
Third, Mehring challenges the voluntary nature of his pleas in light of threats 
and other promises made during the proceedings.

[¶23]   A guilty plea is valid when it 
"`"represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses 
of action open to the defendant."'" Osborn, 806 P.2d  at 271 (quoting Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) and North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970)). 
See W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) (Former Rule 15(d)). The acknowledged standard, adopted by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, to test whether a plea is voluntary 
states:

     "`[A] plea of guilty 
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual 
value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).' * * 
*."

Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) 
(quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd 
on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S. Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed. 2d 579 
(1958)).

[¶24]   During the change of plea 
proceeding, the trial court informed Mehring that if he entered guilty pleas to 
the two counts of sexual assault in the second degree contained in the 
Information, he would be facing a possible maximum penalty of life in the 
penitentiary and a minimum sentence of five years. The trial court specifically 
inquired:

THE 
COURT: Is this change of plea voluntary?

THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes * * * it is.

THE 
COURT: Is it the result of any force or threat or promise 
-

THE 
DEFENDANT: No * * *.

THE 
COURT: - outside of those contained in the plea bargain agreement which I 
understand is in effect?

Before 
asking the State to disclose the recommendations of the plea bargain, the trial 
court told Mehring:

THE 
COURT: * * * Plea bargain agreements are permissible; they are not binding on 
this Court; this Court might reject the same; particularly, Mr. Mehring, with 
respect to any sentencing agreement contained in the plea 
bargain.

As 
part of the plea bargain disclosure, the State recommended a sentence of not 
less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years on each count to be served 
concurrently. Mehring's counsel affirmed that these were the terms of the plea 
bargain. The trial court then repeated:

THE 
COURT: I want you to understand that I have some concerns with the plea bargain 
agreement, particularly that portion of the agreement recommending the actual 
amount of time that you would be ordered to serve at the 
penitentiary.

I 
do not have to be bound just because your attorney and the State's attorney 
agree on that amount of time. I can move that amount of time up or down. You 
understand that?

THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes * * *.

The 
trial court inquired what plea Mehring wished to enter to count nine of the 
Information charging him with sexual assault in the second degree. He replied, 
"I plead guilty." When asked about count ten, Mehring said, "I plead 
guilty."

[¶25]   A plea bargain which includes a 
sentencing recommendation is authorized by Former Rule 15:

(e) 
Plea agreement procedure.

     (1) In General. - The 
attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when 
acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement 
that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged 
offense or to a lesser related offense, the attorney for the state will do any 
of the following:

(i) 
Move for dismissal of other charges; or

(ii) 
Make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a 
particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or 
request shall not be binding upon the court; or

(iii) 
Agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of this 
case.

The 
court shall not participate in any such discussions.

W.R.Cr.P. 
15(e)(1), Wyo.Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978) (emphasis added). See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(1).

[¶26]   A plea bargain is not binding upon 
the court until it is accepted. Percival v. State, 745 P.2d 557, 559 (Wyo. 
1987). Once the court accepts the plea bargain it is bound to honor the 
provisions of Former Rule 15(e)(1)(i) or (iii). Percival, 745 P.2d  at 559. 
However, recommendations of particular sentences made under Former Rule 
15(e)(1)(ii) are not binding upon the court even after accepting the plea. 
Percival, 745 P.2d  at 559.

[¶27]   The two cautionary warnings 
delivered by the trial court to Mehring before accepting his pleas provided him 
with sufficient information about recommendation plea bargains to make an 
intelligent choice. He made the voluntary decision to proceed and pled guilty to 
two counts of sexual assault in the second degree. The sentences imposed at the 
trial court's discretion were within the limits, five years to life, imposed by 
the legislature for an actor who commits two separate acts of sexual assault in 
the second degree. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-306(c)(i) (1988). Absent due process 
defects, which will be considered later, the sentences will not be disturbed on 
appeal. Angerhofer v. State, 758 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶28]   Mehring's arguments reflect 
disappointment that the sentences the trial court imposed exceeded the 
recommendation contained in the plea bargain. Despite the clear language of the 
trial court prior to accepting the change of pleas and of Former Rule 15, 
Mehring contends that he did not understand that sentences greater than those 
recommended by the State could be imposed. Mehring admits, however, that he did 
understand and desire that the trial court impose sentences for lesser terms 
than the ten year minimums recommended. His positions urge logical 
inconsistencies in which all benefits from a plea bargain flow to the 
defendant.

[¶29]   Despite his voluntary decision to 
plead guilty to the charges, Mehring contends when the trial court imposed 
sentences outside the recommended range, the trial court should have permitted 
him to withdraw the pleas. The trial court, if it rejects a plea bargain, is 
required to advise the defendant personally and "afford the defendant the 
opportunity to then withdraw his plea * * *." W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(4), Wyo.Rep. 
578-584 P.2d XIX (1978). See W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4). However, this provision applies 
only if the trial court rejects the bargain as a whole, the dismissal of charges 
or an agreement for a specific sentence. W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(2), Wyo.Rep. 578-584 
P.2d XIX (1978). See W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2). The opportunity to withdraw permitted 
by Former Rule 15(e)(4) does not extend to the trial court's rejection of 
sentencing recommendations. Percival, 745 P.2d  at 560.

[¶30]   Mehring suggests that the trial 
court should have warned him that if the recommended sentences were rejected, he 
would not be permitted to withdraw his pleas. The present Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure include a provision requiring such advice. See W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(2) (requiring advisement that if the court rejects a sentencing 
recommendation, the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea). However, at 
the time of the change of plea proceeding, the applicable rule did not require 
this notice. W.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(2), Wyo. Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978). This court 
has previously stated that it would not read requirements into Former Rule 15 
that were not included in its plain language. Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 834 
(Wyo. 1990); Percival, 745 P.2d  at 560.

[¶31]   The final procedural issue under 
Former Rule 15 is whether Mehring's guilty pleas were involuntary because of 
threats or promises made prior to the change of plea proceeding. The unspecified 
threats apparently involved the father of one of the uncharged victims. One 
incident of threatening comments delivered by telephone was acknowledged. The 
threats were targeted at the first public defender appointed to represent 
Mehring. Following that incident, that public defender withdrew and a second 
public defender was appointed from another city.

[¶32]   Due process is generally offended 
only when a plea is coerced by conduct fairly attributable to the State, such as 
from the judge or prosecutor. LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 753 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S. Ct. 397, 102 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1988). However, 
coercion from a defendant's counsel may create an involuntary plea; for example, 
by threatening withdrawal if the defendant does not accept the plea bargain or 
forcing the plea to be entered because counsel is not prepared for trial. See, 
e.g., Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases) and 
Downton v. Perini, 511 F. Supp. 258, 266 (N.D.Ohio 1981) (holding counsel's 
threat to withdraw made plea involuntary). Coercion by third parties not 
representing the State or the defendant has generally not been found to 
invalidate a plea. LoConte, 847 F.2d  at 753 (holding coercion by co-defendants 
and family members did not invalidate plea); Iaea, 800 F.2d  at 867 (collecting 
cases).

[T]hird 
parties are not responsible for the integrity of the criminal justice system in 
the same way as judges or prosecutors nor are they in the same positions of 
power and authority. Acts that might constitute coercion if done by the court or 
a prosecutor may not rise to that level if done by others.

Iaea, 
800 F.2d  at 867.

[¶33]   The existence of threats against 
the first public defender does not establish that Mehring's guilty pleas were 
involuntary as the product of coercion. When the trial court inquired at the 
change of plea proceeding if Mehring was acting as a result of any threat or 
promise, he replied "No * * *." During the first public defender's 
representation, there is no evidence of pressure on Mehring to change his pleas 
or take any other action in response to the threats. Most significantly, there 
is no contention that the State in any way acted to procure Mehring's pleas by 
threats.

[¶34]   The withdrawal of the first public 
defender effectively diminished any potential coercive influence on Mehring. The 
record discloses that the first public defender withdrew from the case only 
after insuring that the second public defender, an experienced trial counsel, 
would represent Mehring. Several months passed between the time the threats were 
directed to the first public defender and the time of the change of plea 
proceeding further attenuating any pressure. While threatening behavior should 
never be tolerated or accepted, the threats in this case did not result in 
Mehring's pleas being made involuntarily.

[¶35]   Mehring also challenges that 
promises from the second public defender induced the guilty pleas. Mehring 
maintains that the public defender said he had never seen a court exceed the 
sentencing recommendation without rejecting the plea bargain and a possibility 
existed for a shorter term sentence than the plea bargain recommendation. 
Mehring claims the key influence on his decision to accept the plea bargain was 
the public defender's promise that an effort would be made at sentencing to get 
Mehring into a sexual offender treatment program.

[¶36]   The public defender's statements 
about the range of sentencing do not rise to the level of promises. At best, the 
statements represent predictions. It is settled law that "an attorney may offer 
his client a prediction, based upon his experience or instinct, of the sentence 
possibilities * * *," which the accused should weigh in considering a plea 
bargain. Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970). However, an 
erroneous prediction of a likely sentence, unsupported by any promises from the 
court or the prosecution, does not make a plea involuntary. State v. Lake, 180 
W. Va. 628, 378 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1989) (quoting State v. Pettigrew, 168 W. Va. 
299, 284 S.E.2d 370 (1981)).

[¶37]   At the change of plea proceeding, 
the trial court addressed the prospects of a treatment 
program:

THE 
COURT: Secondarily, I have some concern about the treatment program that is 
being looked into. I want you to understand that I have nothing to do with that. 
That would be up to the executive branch of government or the prison 
administration as to whether you were able to go to any treatment program, so 
that you must not rely on this Court having any jurisdiction to order you into 
that kind of a program. You understand that?

THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes * * *.

This 
colloquy occurred before the trial court accepted Mehring's guilty pleas. If the 
public defender promised Mehring to ask for treatment, he fulfilled his promise 
by his actions both at the change of plea proceeding and at the sentencing 
hearing. The trial court correctly articulated to Mehring the limit of its 
sentencing authority. See Van Duser v. State, 796 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶38]   Mehring's guilty pleas represent a 
sensible bargain. By pleading guilty to two counts of sexual assault in the 
second degree, Mehring avoided possible conviction and sentencing for the eight 
additional counts of sexual assault in the second and third degree contained in 
the Information. In addition, by accepting the plea bargain, Mehring prevented 
the State from proceeding to trial on charges of sexual assault involving other 
victims which could have led to additional sentences. We hold Mehring made a 
voluntary and intelligent choice in pleading guilty. Osborn, 806 P.2d  at 
271.

[¶39]   Mehring contends that his guilty 
pleas could not have been voluntary because he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel from his second public defender. First, Mehring contends counsel was 
ineffective in choosing to make a motion to remove the judge who presided at the 
arraignment. Second, Mehring challenges counsel was ineffective in advising 
Mehring about the change of pleas. Third, Mehring asserts counsel was 
ineffective in his performance at the sentencing hearing.

[¶40]   At a hearing on remand to consider 
the issue of the ineffectiveness of counsel, Mehring produced testimony from the 
first public defender and himself supporting his claims. The second public 
defender was called as a witness by the State to refute the claims. The trial 
court found, as a matter of law, that the second public defender's conduct was 
not deficient and did not result in prejudice to Mehring.

[¶41]   The examination of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 
When a guilty plea is challenged based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant, to establish prejudice, must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, a plea of guilty would not have been 
entered and the defendant would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. 
at 59, 106 S. Ct.  at 370. The Hill standard was adopted by Wyoming in Lower v. 
State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990). A strong presumption is invoked that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance. Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987). The burden is on the defendant to overcome this 
presumption. Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.

[¶42]   Mehring's ineffectiveness claim 
over the removal of the first trial judge depends upon a showing of prejudice. 
Mehring finds prejudice in his belief that the challenged judge would have 
imposed a more lenient sentence. Mehring supports his belief with the first 
public defender's testimony at the ineffectiveness hearing that the judge was 
"quite sympathetic to sexual offenders." Mehring also refers to a comment the 
first trial judge made at arraignment. During a motion for bail reduction, 
Mehring's first public defender argued that a lower bail would permit Mehring to 
begin a sexual offender treatment program. The judge said:

THE 
COURT: * * * Well, at this time I don't feel comfortable in reducing his 
[Mehring's] bail, but if you find an appropriate program and he can be enrolled 
and it can be a situation where he can be taken there and that sort of thing the 
Court would consider something like that.

[¶43]   Mehring's analysis reflects mere 
speculation. The first public defender's comments about the challenged judge are 
not evidence of prejudice to Mehring's representation from the change of judges; 
rather, the comments reflect unsupported prediction. The comments of the trial 
judge at the arraignment do not disclose any predisposition favoring treatment 
as opposed to jail confinement in the sentencing of sexual offenders. The 
judge's comments indicate, at most, that if Mehring found an adequate treatment 
program, the trial court would consider a reduction in bail. Even if we assume 
deficient performance from counsel at this stage, Mehring failed in his burden 
to demonstrate prejudice.

[¶44]   Next, we move to the claim that 
Mehring's counsel provided ineffective assistance in advising about the change 
of pleas. Mehring says he was misled by his counsel about the effect of a 
recommendation plea bargain. At the ineffectiveness hearing, however, counsel 
testified that he informed Mehring during discussions about the plea bargain 
that the trial court could reject the recommendation and impose a sentence 
exceeding the recommended maximum.

[¶45]   If we choose to ignore the 
testimony of counsel and assume deficient performance, Mehring failed again to 
establish prejudice. The trial court's colloquy before accepting the plea 
informed Mehring that his sentence could exceed the recommendation contained in 
the plea bargain. Since the trial court accurately informed Mehring, there is no 
possible prejudice from counsel's performance at this stage. Duffy v. State, 837 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1992); Lower, 786 P.2d  at 349.

[¶46]   The final stage at which Mehring 
asserts his counsel was ineffective was during sentencing. Counsel did not call 
any witnesses on behalf of Mehring. Mehring testified he desired to have his 
sister present to refute a statement she had reportedly made during the 
presentence investigation favoring incarceration. Mehring also said he wanted to 
have testimony introduced that he had previously been denied treatment by Ohio 
authorities following sexual offense convictions there.

[¶47]   While counsel did not call 
Mehring's sister during the sentencing hearing, he successfully argued that her 
desire was for Mehring to obtain treatment. The trial court agreed to ignore the 
statement urging incarceration. Counsel also introduced two letters dealing with 
Mehring's previous attempts to get treatment. The first was from an Ohio 
correctional facility indicating that while incarcerated there, Mehring had not 
received treatment. The second letter was from an attorney who had 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain treatment in Ohio for 
Mehring.

[¶48]   Mehring has not established 
prejudice from the failure to present witnesses at the sentencing hearing. 
Counsel effectively countered the impact of the sister's reported statement. 
Counsel also presented credible information to the trial court that Mehring had 
previously been denied treatment. In addition, counsel supported the need for 
some sort of sexual offender treatment program with medical evidence indicating 
Mehring suffered from pedophilia.

[¶49]   The representation provided by the 
second public defender was competent. Prior to the entry of the guilty pleas, 
counsel aggressively pursued multiple pre-trial motions on Mehring's behalf. The 
advice given to Mehring about the plea bargain demonstrated an understanding of 
the severity of the charges and the State's evidence. The plea bargain Mehring 
entered into voluntarily and intelligently offered him the best opportunity to 
avoid life sentences as a consequence of his repeated crimes. As the trial court 
noted at sentencing, by entering guilty pleas, Mehring avoided the further 
trauma of a court appearance for the victim in this case. The trial court 
acknowledged that this mitigating fact would be taken into consideration when 
imposing sentence. Mehring has not established a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel's errors, he would have insisted on going to trial. Lower, 786 P.2d  
at 349.

[¶50]   In his final issue, Mehring 
presents substantive and procedural challenges to the presentence investigation 
report (hereinafter presentence report). The substantive challenges involve 
claims that the presentence report contained information not authorized by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32 which, when considered by the trial court, created a due process 
violation. The challenged information includes: a sentencing recommendation from 
the Division of Probation and Parole; a statement about prior probation status; 
and statements from persons other than the victim.

[¶51]   Sentencing took place on April 9, 
1992. The revised Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on March 
24, 1992. Therefore, the sentencing hearing was governed by those rules. Aden v. 
State, 761 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 1988). For felony proceedings, the presentence 
report is required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) which provides, in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
Presentence investigation.

(1) 
When Made. - In every felony case the Department of Probation and Parole shall 
conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report to the court. * * * In 
felony cases the investigation and report may not be waived but, with the 
parties['] consent, the court may permit the report to be filed after 
sentencing. Otherwise, it shall be considered by the court before the imposition 
of sentence or the granting of probation. * * *

(2) 
Report. - The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

(A) 
Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including 
prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances 
affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or 
in the correctional treatment of the defendant;

(B) 
Verified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment 
of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, 
any individual against whom the offense has been committed and attaching a 
victim impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-103 if the victim chooses to 
make one in writing. In any event the report shall state that the victim was 
advised of the right to make such a statement orally at the defendant's 
sentencing or in writing. If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall 
describe the efforts made to contact the victim;

(C) 
Unless the court orders otherwise, information concerning the nature and extent 
of non-prison programs and resources available for the defendant; 
and

(D) 
Such other information as may be required by the court.

[¶52]  In Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 
(Wyo. 1990), we examined the use of a presentence report and what circumstances 
would create a due process violation in sentencing:

     We have said that 
filed presentence reports and information are evidence for the exercise of 
sentencing discretion, subject only to the rights of the convicted individual to 
deny, dispute or disprove. Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204 (Wyo. 1987). In three 
recent cases (Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011 (Wyo. 1989); Coletti v. State, 769 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1989); and Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1989)), we said 
that the sentencing will not be disturbed as violation of due process because of 
sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, 
procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play. We further said that the defendant had the burden to "establish that the 
sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises." 
Smallwood, 771 P.2d  at 802.

Johnson 
dealt with interpretation of the predecessor of the present W.R.Cr.P. 32. See 
W.R.Cr.P. 33, Wyo.Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978). However, the same principles 
govern review of due process challenges under W.R.Cr.P. 
32.

[¶53]   The presentence report is divided 
into several sections. Under the heading "Recommendation," the author states: "I 
recommend the Court sentence Mr. Mehring to a minimum of 20 years in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary and that he be ordered to cooperate and participate in any 
and all programs recommended by his counselor at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary." At the sentencing hearing, Mehring objected to the inclusion of 
the sentencing recommendation in the report. The trial court overruled the 
objection and stated: "[O]bviously this Court is not bound by and does not have 
to consider such a recommendation."

[¶54]   Sentencing recommendations are 
commonly included in a presentence report. See, e.g., Johnson, 790 P.2d  at 232 
n. 2. Mehring is correct in contending that W.R.Cr.P. 32 does not specifically 
require the inclusion of a sentencing recommendation. Similarly, the 
legislature, in authorizing a presentence report, did not require a sentencing 
recommendation as a part of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Wyo. Stat. § 
7-13-303 (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1993). To the extent that the recommendation is 
not specifically required, it represents surplusage. However, in imposing 
sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to consider a wide variety 
of factors about the defendant and his crimes. Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 
477 (Wyo. 1988). A recommendation contained in the presentence report represents 
one of the factors which the trial court may properly consider. See W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(2)(D).

[¶55]   Analytically, we are unable to 
identify any difference between the presence of the sentencing recommendation 
included in the plea bargain and the sentencing recommendation included in the 
presentence report. As we have stated, the sentencing recommendation included in 
a plea bargain is not binding upon the trial court. W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B). 
Similarly, the sentencing recommendation included in the presentence report is 
not binding upon the trial court. We hold there was no abuse of discretion in 
refusing to strike the sentencing recommendation contained in the presentence 
report and no prejudice to Mehring from the presence of the recommendation in 
the report. Johnson, 790 P.2d  at 232.

[¶56]   Mehring then challenges the 
accuracy of a statement about probation status contained in the "Evaluation" 
portion of the presentence report. After detailing Mehring's seven previous 
convictions for sexual offenses in Ohio and unfulfilled promises of treatment 
programs, the report states: "Mr. Mehring was on probation following his first 
prison sentence. That probation was revoked because of more offenses and that he 
absconded from Ohio to Wyoming." At the sentencing hearing, Mehring's counsel 
successfully challenged this information by telling the trial court that 
probation was revoked by Ohio authorities because Mehring failed to report to 
his probation officer, not because of additional offenses. The successful 
challenge and correction of the presentence report prevents any possible 
prejudice.

[¶57]   Mehring's final substantive 
challenge is to the inclusion of statements from persons other than the victim 
in the presentence report. The statements include three letters from parents of 
other children allegedly sexually assaulted by Mehring and written comments in 
the report from Mehring's sister that her son continues to suffer trauma after 
being abused by Mehring. Mehring characterizes these statements as victim impact 
statements from uncharged victims or past victims.

[¶58]   Wyoming permits the trial court to 
consider a victim impact statement prior to the imposition of sentence. Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-21-103(b) (Cum.Supp. 1993). The "victim impact statement" is an 
explanation of the nature and extent of harm or trauma suffered by the victim 
which may include economic loss. Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-102(c)(i) and (ii) (Cum.Supp. 
1993). The victim is specifically permitted to recommend "an appropriate 
disposition" and discuss the need for restitution. Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-102(c)(iii) 
and (iv).

[¶59]   A "victim" is defined as "an 
individual who has suffered direct or threatened physical, emotional or 
financial harm as a result of the commission of a crime or a family member of a 
minor * * *[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-101(a)(iii) (Cum.Supp. 1993). The victim is 
permitted to present an oral victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing. 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-103(a)(i). If the victim chooses, a written statement may be 
incorporated into the presentence report. Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-103(a)(ii); 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2)(B).

[¶60]   The State contends, without 
authority, that W.R.Cr.P. 32 does not restrict victim impact statements to only 
the victim of charged crimes. We disagree. The victim impact statement is 
accorded special status under Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-103, including the right to 
appear before the sentencing court to offer an oral statement and request 
restitution. We find in that special status a limitation which confines the 
victim impact statement to information about a particular crime. In Payne v. 
Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991), the 
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of victim impact 
statements in capital sentencing. The court considered the general purpose of 
"victim impact statements" and stated:

Congress 
and most of the States have, in recent years, enacted similar legislation to 
enable the sentencing authority to consider information about the harm caused by 
the crime committed by the defendant. * * * While the admission of this 
particular kind of evidence - designed to portray for the sentencing 
authority the actual harm caused by a particular crime - is of recent 
origin, this fact hardly renders it unconstitutional.

Id. 
at ___, 111 S. Ct.  at 2606 (emphasis added). See Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522 
(Wyo. 1993) (No. 92-198, decided 8/6/93) (citing Payne). We hold the purpose of 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-21-103 is to permit the sentencing court to consider information 
about the harm caused by the defendant during the commission of the particular 
crime for which sentence is about to be imposed.

[¶61]   Our holding does not mean, however, 
that information about other crimes or convictions unrelated to the particular 
crime for which sentence is about to be imposed is impermissible. W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a) specifically permits information about the prior criminal record of the 
defendant and his characteristics to be considered by the trial court before 
imposing sentence. In evaluating character, the trial court, in exercising its 
discretion, may consider a broad range of reports and information. Christy v. 
State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo. 1987). 

[¶62]   The federal courts have had 
considerable experience with evaluation of character information under F.R.Cr.P. 
32 which is substantially similar to W.R.Cr.P. 32. In imposing sentence, the 
trial court is permitted to go beyond the record to consider the defendant's 
past conduct and activities including evidence of crimes for which charges were 
filed but no conviction resulted. United States v. Garcia, 693 F.2d 412, 416 
(5th Cir. 1982). The scope of inquiry may include the factual basis of dismissed 
charges "as well as hearsay reports implicating the defendant in other crimes if 
such reports are deemed sufficiently reliable." Id. (citing United States v. 
Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981)). Such evidence of prior criminal 
activity is "highly relevant to the sentencing decision * * *" and may be 
considered by the court despite the fact that no prosecution or conviction may 
have resulted. United States v. Hill, 688 F.2d 18, 20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1074, 103 S. Ct. 498, 74 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1982). See also United States v. 
Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1315 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983) 
(holding no due process violation occurred in considering a presentence report 
which contained references to a pending charge and a previously dismissed 
charge).

[¶63]   In Madison, 689 F.2d  at 1314-15, 
the court offered an exposition on the value of considering all evidence of 
character in determining the length of a defendant's 
sentence:

     While all judges have 
the obligation to protect individual rights the judge must not lose sight of the 
common good of all mankind. In order to render justice to all the judge must be 
able to impress upon a defendant through the expansive contents of an all 
encompassing presentence report that we are a country of laws and not men. The 
criminal must learn that with every cherished right he enjoys he also assumes a 
corresponding obligation to live according to the law of the land. Our laws are 
for the protection of all mankind and not just the criminal. Thus, if the 
defendant has displayed a propensity toward criminal activity over a period of 
years and has not learned from his past mistakes and transgressions of the law 
it is important that the judge take these matters into consideration including 
those cases where the crimes may have been nolle prosequi or read into 
the record and considered by the judge in sentencing the defendant for another 
crime, but relieving the defendant of a formal judgment of conviction on the 
particular crimes read into the record. * * * A defendant's juvenile record as 
well as his record as an adult, a record which contains both convictions and 
dismissed charges provides the court with evidence of a pattern of criminal 
behavior which, in turn, is an index of the defendant's character, a critical 
factor in sentencing when determining a possible potential for 
rehabilitation.

[¶64]   We hold that no due process 
violation occurred in incorporating the statement of Mehring's sister or the 
three letters from parents of uncharged victims into the presentence report. The 
statements were sufficiently reliable for the trial court to consider them in 
imposing sentence. In sentencing, due process provides a right to be sentenced 
only on accurate information. Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 1989). 
Mehring's failure, on appeal, to show a manifest injustice from the inclusion of 
the statements and his failure to demonstrate that the trial court relied upon 
the statements in sentencing means his appeal on this issue must 
fail.

[¶65]   Mehring's procedural challenge to 
sentencing involves the trial court's failure to attach written findings to the 
presentence report regarding disputed factual information as required by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)(ii). Mehring argues that the failure to attach written 
findings should require a remand for re-sentencing. We disagree. The record 
sufficiently revealed that the trial court either did not rely on the disputed 
facts or resolved the questions during the sentencing hearing. United States v. 
Kramer, 943 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 63, 121 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1992). Therefore, the failure to attach a written 
record of the trial court's disposition of disputed information to the 
presentence report requires only a limited remand. United States v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432, 1435 (10th Cir. 1988). We hold this ministerial duty may be corrected 
by either attaching the relevant pages from the sentencing hearing or by 
appending the trial court's written findings regarding the disputed information 
to the presentence report. United States v. Jackson, 950 F.2d 633, 638 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Kramer, 943 F.2d  at 1553. Upon completion of this task, the 
presentence report and attachments are to be forwarded to the Department of 
Corrections in compliance with Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-303 (1987 & Cum.Supp. 
1993).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶66]   The careful review of the 
substantive and procedural contentions of error made by Mehring reveals that he 
made, with the assistance of competent counsel, two voluntary pleas of guilty to 
sexual assault in the second degree. The criminal justice system accorded 
Mehring every necessary procedural safeguard to insure due process. In accepting 
a plea bargain, Mehring avoided the strong possibility of even more severe 
penalties for his crimes, despite the fact that his sentences exceeded those 
recommended in the plea bargain.

[¶67]   We affirm and remand for the 
limited purpose noted in this opinion.