Title: Tingle v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JEREMAINE T. TINGLE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 542, 2018 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID Nos. N1702000035 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
N1702000526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 8, 2019 
Decided: 
May 10, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of May 2019, after careful consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Jermaine Tingle was convicted by a Superior Court jury in January 
2018 of multiple drug and firearm offenses and eventually sentenced as a habitual 
offender to 20 years of unsuspended Level V incarceration.  In this direct appeal, 
Tingle does not claim that anything untoward occurred during his trial.  Instead, his 
appellate claims relate exclusively to the Superior Court’s denial of his 11th-hour 
request for a continuance so that he could fire his privately retained counsel to hire 
another lawyer.  We see no merit to Tingle’s claims and therefore affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
2 
 
(2) 
Tingle was arrested on February 1, 2017.  A few months later, a 
privately retained lawyer entered his appearance on Tingle’s behalf.1  Tingle’s 
lawyer conducted discovery and filed two motions to suppress evidence, one in 
October 2017 and the other in December 2017.  The Superior Court denied both 
motions. 
 
(3) 
On the morning when Tingle’s trial was scheduled to begin and after 
the court entertained argument on and denied Tingle’s second motion to suppress, 
the court engaged Tingle in the standard colloquy regarding his rejection of the 
State’s final plea offer.  
 
(4) 
During the colloquy, Tingle expressed dissatisfaction with his lawyer 
and, in particular, his inability to give “definite answers to yes or no questions”2 
about what might occur during his trial. The Superior Court asked Tingle and his 
counsel whether there were any questions the court might answer that would not 
require the disclosure of confidential communications.  Tingle’s counsel responded 
that Tingle was asking questions “about how things will be done at trial,”3 observing 
that such questions cannot be “answer[ed]. . . 100 percent in the affirmative or 
negative”4 because decisions that are made during a trial depend on “what evidence 
                                                 
1 App. to Opening Br. A22 (hereinafter “A __”). 
2 A51.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at A51–52. 
3 
and testimony . . . reveal[].”5  The trial judge then again told Tingle that she would 
answer any questions he had that could be asked without revealing his trial strategy 
and confidential information.  Tingle then asked, “[s]o you’re saying there’s no way 
I can seek new counsel?”  The court replied, “[t]hat’s correct.  It’s too late.  We are 
ready for trial today.”6 
 
(5) 
After the Superior Court told Tingle that the trial would not be 
continued, Tingle asked the court if he could express an objection.  It was not clear 
whether Tingle was asking about his right to make objections at trial or whether he 
wished to object to the court’s answer to his question regarding his ability to seek 
new counsel.  The following exchange addressed the difference between these 
possibilities: 
THE COURT:  . . .  [I]f you want to object to a question that the State 
is asking a witness, your attorney has to do that.  You 
cannot do that.  If you want to put on the record that 
you object to the Court’s ruling that you be permitted 
to get new counsel, then you can do that.  
[TINGLE]:  
Well, I would like to object to the Court’s ruling and 
put that on.  Let the record reflect that I objected to the 
Court’s denying me to seek new counsel.7 
 
(6) 
On appeal, Tingle raises two issues, both grounded in our guidance in 
Briscoe v. State8 regarding eve-of-trial continuance requests for the purpose of 
                                                 
5 Id. at A52. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at A52–53. 
8 606 A.2d 103 (Del. 1992).  
4 
retaining substitute counsel.  First, Tingle argues that the Superior Court committed 
reversible error when it did not continue Tingle’s trial so that he could replace his 
privately-retained lawyer with a new one.  Second, Tingle contends that the Superior 
Court erred by not determining whether he wished to represent himself “even after 
he implicitly requested to represent himself”9 in violation of his right to self-
representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution.10 
 
(7) 
“We review the denial of a continuance for a change of counsel at the 
start of a criminal trial for an abuse of discretion.”11  “As an issue of constitutional 
dimension, we review de novo the trial court’s denial of [a defendant’s] request to 
proceed pro se.”12 
 
(8) 
In Briscoe, we held that when a defendant requests a continuance on 
the eve of trial to seek new counsel, the Superior Court must engage in a two-part 
inquiry.13  First, “[t]he trial court must initially determine if the reasons for the 
                                                 
9 Opening Br. 8. 
10 Id. 
11 Joyner v. State, 2017 WL 444842, at *4, 155 A.3d 832 (Del. 2017) (Table); see Mills v. State, 
2007 WL 4245464, at *5, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007) (Table) (“The Sixth Amendment grants a 
defendant the right to choose and retain private counsel.  That right, however, is not absolute. It 
must be weighed against the substantial governmental interest in a prompt and efficient 
prosecution. A defendant should not be able to assert his Sixth Amendment right to retain private 
counsel in a way that interferes with the court's ‘inherent power to control and oversee the 
administration of justice.’” (citations omitted)). 
12 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996) (citing Grace v. State, 658 A.2d 1011, 1015 
(Del. 1995)).  
13 Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 107.  
5 
defendant's request for substitute counsel constitute good cause to justify a 
continuance of the trial, in order to allow new counsel to be obtained.”14  Second, 
“[i]f the trial court determines that the defendant is not entitled to a continuance, in 
order to engage new counsel, the defendant must then choose between two 
constitutional options, either continuing with his existing counsel or proceeding to 
trial pro se.”15   If the defendant chooses to proceed pro se, then the Court must 
ensure that his waiver of his right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.16 
 
(9) 
On appeal, Tingle’s claim that the Superior Court erred when it did not 
continue his trial is based on the court’s purported failure to ascertain whether his 
dissatisfaction with his trial counsel constituted good cause to justify a 
continuance.17  But this argument ignores our close adherence in Briscoe to United 
States v. Welty,18 in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
[W]hen, for the first time, an accused makes known to the court in some 
way that he has a complaint about his counsel, the court must rule on 
the matter.  If the reasons are made known to the court, the court may 
rule without more.  If no reasons are stated, the court then has a duty to 
inquire into the basis for the client's objection to counsel and should 
withhold a ruling until reasons are made known.19 
 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id. (emphasis in original). 
16 Id. 
17 Opening Br. 9.  
18 Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 108.  
19 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 303, 369 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959)).  
6 
Welty concluded that a defendant could establish good cause to warrant a substitution 
of counsel on the eve of trial by showing “a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney.”20 
 
(10) In Jones v. State,21 we addressed a claim similar to Tingle’s.  In Jones, 
the defendant stated that his reasons for seeking new counsel were his attorney’s 
lack of preparation and apparent interest in having him accept a plea bargain instead 
of going to trial.22  Because the defendant did “not identify any other pertinent 
information that the court should have known before deciding whether to grant his 
request,” we concluded, citing Welty, that the Superior Court did not abuse its 
discretion by failing to question the defendant as to the reasons for his dissatisfaction 
with counsel before denying his request for a continuance.23 
 
(11) This Court has also determined that “‘[t]he denial of a continuance for 
change of counsel on the eve of trial is not an abuse of discretion when: (1) there had 
been no previous complaint about counsel; (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity 
to obtain substitute counsel; and (3) obtaining substitute counsel was uncertain and 
appeared to be a dilatory tactic.’”24  Likewise, in Mills v. State, this Court held that 
                                                 
20 Welty, 674 F.2d at 188. 
21 2000 WL 1504965, 765 A.2d 952 (Del. 2000) (Table). 
22 Id. at *1. 
23 Id. at *2.  
24 Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 631 (Del. 1998) (quoting Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1018 
(Del. 1985)); see Joyner, 2017 WL 444842, at *1; see also Waltman v. State, 2003 WL 23104199, 
at *1, 840 A.2d 642 (Del. 2003) (Table). 
7 
the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s request 
for a continuance on the eve of trial to seek new counsel because (i) “[the defendant] 
never complained about his court-appointed attorney before the morning of 
the trial when he requested the continuance,” (ii) “[the defendant] had ample 
opportunity to retain substitute counsel before the date of his request for 
a continuance,” and (iii) “a continuance would have unnecessarily delayed the 
proceedings.”25 
 
(12) 
Here, like the defendant in Jones, Tingle revealed his reason for seeking 
new counsel—it was because his lawyer was unable to provide him with “definite 
answers to yes or no questions.”26  In response, Tingle’s trial counsel stated Tingle’s 
questions, by their very nature, were not so simply answered.  The Superior Court 
had no duty to make a further inquiry to determine whether Tingle had additional 
reasons for seeking new counsel.  It is worth noting that, like the defendant in Mills, 
(i) Tingle expressed no prior dissatisfaction with trial counsel until the day of trial;27 
(ii) Tingle had the opportunity to replace his privately retained counsel seven months 
before trial;28 and (iii) a continuance would have unnecessarily delayed the trial.  The 
                                                 
25 2007 WL 4245464, at *5, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007) (Table).  
26 A50–51.  
27 A15–16; A43–50.  
28 A22; A34.  
8 
manner in which the Superior Court addressed—and denied—Tingle’s continuance 
request was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
(13) Tingle next argues that the Superior Court “denied Mr. Tingle his right 
to self-representation by failing to determine whether he wished to proceed to trial 
with counsel or represent himself, and by informing him that he had to allow his 
attorney to try the case.”29  This claim fails for two reasons. 
 
(14) First, Tingle reads our decision in Briscoe too expansively.  In Briscoe, 
the Superior Court denied a last-minute continuance request to retain new counsel.  
Briscoe then told the trial judge that he wished to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses.  The trial judge consented and, after a very brief colloquy, the trial began 
without any warnings to Briscoe about the dangers of self-representation.  Although 
Briscoe’s counsel made an opening statement, “the trial proceeded thereafter with 
Briscoe acting as his own attorney and his appointed attorney serving as standby 
counsel.”30  Briscoe cross-examined witnesses, made objections to the State’s 
evidence, and called defense witnesses.  But Briscoe’s appointed lawyer also 
participated in the trial, making (as mentioned) the opening statement, making 
several evidentiary objections, and moving to reopen the case to present testimony 
that would support an entrapment instruction. 
                                                 
29 Opening Br. 21. 
30 Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 106. 
9 
 
(15) It was against this backdrop that we held that, if the Superior Court 
denies an 11th-hour continuance request to retain substitute counsel, “the defendant 
must then choose between two constitutional options, either continuing with his 
existing counsel or proceeding to trial pro se.”31  Tingle now argues that this 
language mandated a colloquy, after the denial of his continuance request, to 
determine whether he wished to proceed to trial with his current counsel or represent 
himself.  This represents a misreading of Briscoe, which was plainly addressing a 
scenario where the defendant had proceeded to trial largely acting as his own lawyer 
but where the defendant’s so-called “standby” counsel did much more than “stand 
by.”  What Briscoe said is that when a defendant chooses to represent himself (i) he 
cannot “tag-team” with his standby counsel, and (ii) the trial court must engage in a 
careful inquiry to ensure that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived 
his right to counsel.  Because the Superior Court had not made the determination 
that Briscoe had effectively waived his right to counsel, we reversed.  Here, Tingle 
did not elect to proceed pro se, and his counsel remained as counsel throughout the 
trial.  Therefore, whether Tingle had waived his right to counsel was not an issue, 
and no separate colloquy on the topic of self-representation was required. 
                                                 
31  Id. at 107 (emphasis in original). 
10 
 
Second, Tingle’s argument hinges on what he characterizes his “tacit request 
to represent himself at trial.”32  He claims that his questioning of the trial judge about 
whether he could make an objection triggered the need for an inquiry into whether 
Tingle wished to exercise his right to self-representation.  But our case law does not 
support this argument.  To the contrary, we have emphasized that the right to self-
representation will be honored only when it is “clearly and unequivocally assert[ed]” 
and only if the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right 
to counsel.33  Tingle’s ambiguous question about his standing to make objections, 
characterized by Tingle himself as a merely “implicit”34 or “tacit”35 request, does not 
meet this standard.  To be sure, a more robust inquiry by the trial judge might have 
teased out a request to proceed pro se by Tingle, but such exploratory questioning 
in response to Tingle’s request was not constitutionally required. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED as to Tingle’s convictions. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
32  Opening Br. 24. 
33 Morrison v. State, 135 A.2d 69, 73 (Del. 2016); see also Stigars, 674 A.2d at 479 (“When 
faced with an ambiguous request for self-representation, trial court should lean in favor of the 
right to counsel.”). 
34 Opening Br. 8. 
35 Id. at 24.