Title: MacLaird v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MacLaird v. State1986 WY 101718 P.2d 41Case Number: 85-163Decided: 04/25/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Steven Wayne MacLAIRD, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director, Raymond W. Martin, Student Intern, Laramie, for appellant 
(defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John Renneisen, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Darold W. Killmer, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Steven Wayne 
MacLaird was found guilty of burglary by a jury and sentenced to a term in the 
penitentiary. On appeal he raises five issues:

"1. Can a person in 
custody, whose claimed personal property has been inventoried, segregated, and 
placed in a police evidence locker, have specific items seized without a warrant 
even if probable cause exists?

"2. May a prosecuting 
attorney give his personal affirmative unsworn testimony, while further 
demonstrating the evidence in an attempt to impeach an accused 
witness?

"3. May the prosecutor on 
cross-examination of the defendant inquire into charges against the defendant 
that were dismissed after the defendant entered a plea of guilty to two other 
counts?

"4. Is it prosecutorial 
misconduct to skillfully and persistently refer by innuendo and association of 
evidence, and alleged witness accomplices, to matters subject to a motion in 
limine?

"5. Was it reversible 
error for the trial judge to deny defense counsel's request for a jury 
instruction explaining the careful scrutiny that the jury should use in 
receiving the testimony of an accomplice against the 
accused?"

[¶2.]     We have combined issues 
2, 3 and 4 urged by appellant, rephrased the other two, and will address the 
following issues:

I

Were appellant's fourth 
amendment rights violated when the police transferred items appellant claimed as 
his from Delta, Colorado to Torrington?

II

Does the conduct of the 
prosecutor warrant reversal of appellant's conviction? 

III

Was it reversible error 
for the trial judge to refuse defense counsel's requested jury instruction that 
the jury should give careful scrutiny to certain 
testimony?

[¶3.]     The TorringtonMiddle School was burglarized December 17, 
1984. One Steven Teske fingered appellant and Troy Rosenbaum as his partners in 
crime, and stated that the trio had burglarized the school. Teske sang after he, 
Rosenbaum and appellant had been arrested in Delta, Colorado, as suspects in 
a local crime. They were in possession of a vehicle owned by a Mr. Haddorff. 
After a search warrant was obtained by Colorado 
authorities, goods involved in a Colorado robbery were seized. A few days after 
the arrest Mr. Haddorff consented to the search of his vehicle, and the 
Colorado police officers seized the remaining 
items of property in the car, which included the items stolen in the Torrington burglary. These 
items included a coffee hot pot, cash box and three pounds of coffee, which were 
inventoried, segregated and placed in the evidence locker of the Delta sheriff's 
department. Appellant claimed the coffee pot, cash box and can of coffee; the 
items were eventually transferred to the Torrington police department to be used in 
evidence. No warrant to seize these items was obtained.

[¶4.]     Appellant was charged 
with burglary proscribed by § 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), to 
which he pled not guilty. Before trial appellant made a motion to suppress 
evidence taken from the vehicle that he was driving at the time of his arrest in 
Colorado. This 
motion was denied. On the morning of trial appellant made a motion in limine 
concerning alleged burglaries in Casper and 
Rock Springs for 
which no charges had yet been filed. The motion was granted. At trial appellant 
was found guilty as charged.

I

[¶5.]     The search of the car 
was authorized by the owner and appellant does not contend that the search was 
improper, nor does he question the propriety of the car's contents being 
inventoried, segregated and placed in an evidence locker. Rather, appellant 
contends that the seizure of the items in the evidence locker of the DeltaCounty sheriff's department was invalid 
because it was done without a search warrant.

[¶6.]     Once an item has been 
seized in connection with a lawful search, as in this case, any expectation of 
privacy by a person claiming ownership is significantly reduced. An accused may 
claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule only if he first demonstrates that 
his legitimate expectation of privacy in that which was either searched or 
seized was violated. Parkhurst v. State, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981). Without such an expectation, a 
defendant cannot complain about the introduction of evidence at trial against 
him, whether or not it was seized legally. Tompkins v. State, Wyo., 705 P.2d 836 
(1985).

[¶7.]     The facts here 
illustrate the above principles. Appellant, along with the two other men, was 
arrested in Delta, Colorado; none of the three owned the car in 
which they were traveling. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978), reh. denied 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1979), the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court 
that the search of a car not belonging to petitioner did not violate 
petitioner's rights, so it was unnecessary to decide whether the search may have 
violated someone else's rights. In this case, appellant could not have a 
reasonable expectation that items inside the borrowed car would remain private. 
Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating prejudice. Scheikofsky v. 
State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981); Jackson v. State, Wyo., 
624 P.2d 751 (1981); Mainville v. State, Wyo., 607 P.2d 339 
(1980).

[¶8.]     After the vehicle had 
been searched with the owner's consent and the property that was later claimed 
by appellant had been seized, inventoried and segregated, the Colorado authorities received a list of stolen property 
from authorities in Torrington, Wyoming. The list included the items claimed 
by appellant; he contends that the items in question were not searched for and 
seized incidentally to his arrest in Delta, Colorado. He argues, therefore, that probable 
cause to believe that these goods were stolen property from another crime should 
have been independently established by a magistrate.

[¶9.]     Requiring a warrant for 
a further seizure after new information has been received regarding an item 
which has already been lawfully searched and seized would not provide any 
additional protection of an accused's privacy, and would be a useless and 
meaningless formality. Hilley v. State, Ala., 
484 So. 2d 485 (1985); and U.S. v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied 439 U.S. 926, 99 S. Ct. 310, 58 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1978).

[¶10.]  Appellant apparently concedes that under 
the circumstances of this case his privacy interest was no longer present. He 
argues, however, that the interests of property to be secure against 
unreasonable searches remains. This argument is difficult to follow, and no 
authority is cited. It is difficult to see how a lawful search and seizure 
becomes unreasonable when new information is received linking the property 
seized with a crime not known to the authorities 
initially.

[¶11.]  Appellant relies principally on Ortega v. 
State, Wyo., 
669 P.2d 935 (1983), for his search and seizure argument. There, exigent 
circumstances were found to justify the search of a residence without a warrant 
at the scene of a murder. Upon searching the upstairs bedroom to determine if 
the defendant's wife was actually dead, the officers saw numerous items of 
evidence in plain view. Plain view of the scene gave the police probable cause 
to obtain a search warrant; however, the police proceeded without one. Later, 
upon reentry, various items were seized without a warrant including a number of 
guns and ammunition. At the time of seizure the police were uncertain which gun 
was the murder weapon; therefore, they seized all the guns found in the home. 
Subsequently, one of the guns and four bullets from its chamber were objects of 
a motion in limine which was overruled. On appeal the court held that the police 
did not have probable cause to believe that any particular gun was the murder 
weapon, and that the motion in limine should have been 
granted.

[¶12.]  This case does not afford much comfort to 
appellant. In Ortega the initial seizure of some of the property was determined 
to be improper. Here, the initial search and seizure was legal in all respects. 
We have already explained why it was unnecessary to obtain a warrant to do that 
which had already been done.

[¶13.]  Appellant's fourth amendment rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure were not violated.

II

[¶14.]  In appellant's argument that the 
prosecutor's misconduct warrants reversal of the verdict he focused on three 
areas as follows:

A. It was error for the 
prosecutor to try on a pair of boots with accompanying 
commentary.

B. Cross-examination of 
appellant regarding previous felonies included additional charges which were 
dropped.

C. The prosecutor 
circumvented an order in limine.

A

[¶15.]  At trial appellant maintained that he 
remained at the motel to rest while his confederates Teske and Rosenbaum 
burglarized the Torrington school. A snowboot print was found 
at the scene of the crime. A snowboot introduced into evidence, and allegedly 
worn by appellant at the Torrington school burglary, was size seven to 
eight.

[¶16.]  In connection with appellant's testimony 
at trial he stated that his shoe size was ten and one-half; he also displayed to 
the jury the shoes he was wearing which showed the size of the shoe. On 
cross-examination the prosecutor had appellant try on the boot in evidence; 
appellant said his toes were curled up in front and it felt like he was stepping 
on some kind of material in the back. At that time, the prosecutor said he 
(prosecutor) had a size ten and one-half foot, and offered to try on the boot. 
Over defense counsel's objection, the court permitted the prosecutor to put on 
the boot. Defense counsel requested the prosecutor be sworn if he was going to 
testify. While wearing the boot, the prosecutor walked back and forth in front 
of the jury, stating, "I would testify that they feel rather 
good."

[¶17.]  Appellant contends that the prosecutor's 
statements and demonstration violated DR 7-106(C)(4), Wyoming Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which states:

"In appearing in his 
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: * * * Assert his 
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a 
witness * * * but he may argue, on the analysis of the evidence, for any 
position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated 
herein."

[¶18.]  The prosecutor's remarks were improper, 
and the court should not have allowed such remarks to be made to the jury. Rule 
49(a), Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

"Harmless error. - Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded."

[¶19.]  Because of abundant direct evidence 
introduced against appellant we hold there is not a reasonable possibility that 
the verdict would have been different if the demonstration made by the 
prosecutor had been eliminated. We conclude, therefore, that any error or 
irregularity in permitting the demonstration was harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Ortega v. State, supra; and Roberts v. State, Wyo., 711 P.2d 1131 
(1985).

B.

[¶20.]  On cross-examination appellant admitted 
without objection that previously he had been convicted of burglaries. On 
redirect examination a prior conviction was alluded to and appellant was further 
questioned as follows:

"Q. Did you go to trial 
or did you plead guilty?

"A. I pled 
guilty.

"Q. Why did you plead 
guilty?

"A. Because I was 
guilty.

"Q. Why didn't you plead 
guilty this time?

"A. Because I didn't do 
this."

[¶21.]  On recross examination appellant tacitly 
admitted without objection that other charges were dropped when he pled guilty. 
Thereafter the prosecutor attempted to ask appellant if counts I, II, III, IV, 
VI, and VIII of the indictment were dropped when he pled guilty. Defense counsel 
objected and the question was never answered. The prosecutor continued with a 
line of questions designed to obtain an admission from appellant that he pled 
guilty in exchange for the state dropping other charges. Appellant steadfastly 
maintained that he pled guilty because he was guilty, and dropping the charges 
did not influence his plea of guilty. Both counsel tried to have the last word, 
and it was difficult for the attorneys to let go of appellant. Defense counsel 
pursued what might loosely be called re-redirect examination. The prosecutor did 
not try re-recross examination.

[¶22.]  Appellant contends that it was error for 
the prosecutor to bring out in cross-examination that six additional charges had 
been dropped. We fail to see any significance in the prosecutor's suggestions 
that the charges dropped were, in fact, six in number. In any event, this line 
of questioning was invited by defense counsel.

[¶23.]  Time and again appellant stated his 
motive for pleading guilty to a previous burglary. It was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial judge to permit the state to attempt to show that 
appellant may have had a different motive to plead guilty, that is, to take 
advantage of a favorable plea bargain. 

[¶24.]  The credibility of a defendant in a 
criminal case may be tested and his testimony impeached like that of any other 
witness. When he testifies in his own behalf he has no right to set forth to the 
jury facts favorable to him without laying himself open to cross-examination 
upon those facts. Brown v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 148, 78 S. Ct. 622, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, reh. denied 356 U.S. 948, 78 S. Ct. 776, 2 L. Ed. 2d 822 
(1958).

C

[¶25.]  Before their arrest in Delta, Colorado, appellant, 
Teske and Rosenbaum had been traveling men. Witnesses for the state had some 
information that this threesome may have had some involvement in burglaries in 
three other cities, Casper, Rock Springs and Salt Lake City.1 Upon defense counsel's request a 
motion in limine was granted. The district court said:

"The Motion in Limine is 
sustained so far as Casper and Rock Springs are 
concerned. I'm not going to rule that it is as far as Delta, Colorado, because it is 
liable to come out because of evidence that will be there. I feel that it would 
be highly, highly prejudicial for the acts alleged in Rock 
Springs and Casper to come into evidence here, and the only 
purpose for that would be to show by prejudice that this man committed the crime 
here.

"Now, I have no doubt 
that at some time during the course of this trial some reference by some witness 
might accidently come into this, and I will handle it by instructions if it 
should come in, but as far as the prosecution going into the events that 
happened in Casper or Rock Springs for simply the purpose of showing that the 
events happened - or for that matter the events that happened or might have 
happened in Delta, Colorado, simply to show that they happened rather than to 
show why this particular witness, and I understand there is going to be an 
officer from there who seized some evidence in issue in this case - will 
likewise be restricted. * * *"

[¶26.]  Appellant contends that the prosecutor by 
innuendo, and otherwise, circumvented the court's order in limine. He complains 
that the prosecutor in his opening statement referred to appellant's prearrest 
activities as an "odyssey,"2 and that his companions Teske and 
Rosenbaum had pled guilty to the Torrington burglary. No objection was made. In 
his opening statement the prosecutor further said, "I can only get into part of 
that Odyssey. * * * I am not going to get into any possible prior other stuff." 
This last statement indicated above prompted defense counsel's objection to the 
prosecutor's opening statement.

[¶27.]  In addition to complaints regarding the 
opening statement, appellant also complains there was testimony that Teske had 
pled guilty to charges in Colorado. This testimony, however, was in 
answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. A photograph 
of appellant taken when he was in jail was admitted in evidence over his 
objection. In other testimony reference was made to pawn shops, but no objection 
was made. Also, the car driven by appellant in Colorado was said to be borrowed. Appellant 
complains that this was an implication that the car was stolen. Incidental 
reference was made to drug paraphernalia found in the car used by appellant in 
Delta, Colorado. Most of the complaints now made by 
appellant regarding innuendo connecting him with other crimes were not raised at 
the trial.

[¶28.]  Appellant sums up his complaint regarding 
violation of the order in limine by stating: 

"The point is, that alone 
the errors may arguably not be prejudicial, but when viewed cumulatively they 
demonstrate a persistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct. * * 
*"

In alleging 
cumulative error appellant has the prodigious burden of demonstrating that 
several harmless errors add up to reversible error.

[¶29.]  One of appellant's problems in the 
alleged violation of the court's limiting order is that no objection was made at 
trial except as we have indicated. At least on one occasion the objectional 
testimony was elicited on cross-examination.

[¶30.]  The trial judge did not think the 
limiting order had been circumvented. Certainly he was in the best position to 
know what the order proscribed and in the best position to enforce it. We must 
accord considerable deference to the trial judge's determinations. He is in a 
superior position to appreciate the context of the testimony and the impact it 
might have on the trial. Yates v. Yates, Wyo., 
702 P.2d 1252 (1985). We are not persuaded that the prosecutor violated the 
limiting order nor that appellant suffered any prejudice.

III

[¶31.]  Appellant requested the following 
instruction:

"The testimony of an 
informer who provides evidence against a defendant for pay, or for immunity from 
punishment, or for personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and 
weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. 
The jury must determine whether the informer's testimony has been affected by 
interest, or by prejudice against the defendant."

[¶32.]  The district court refused to give the 
instruction. We could uphold the court's determination for any one of several 
reasons:

1) An "informer" 
instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case.

2) We do not know the 
source of this instruction nor was any authority cited demonstrating its 
correctness in a proper case.

3) Appellant did not 
state the grounds for his objection and thus failed to comply with Rule 51, 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

4) Other instructions 
adequately instructed the jury.

[¶33.]  Appellant argues, in effect, that while 
his proposed instruction was an "informer" instruction it was meant to be an 
"accomplice" instruction. He further argues that there was enough in the 
proposed instruction to advise the court what he was trying to say, and that the 
court should have fashioned a correct instruction. In support of this argument 
appellant cites Stapleman v. State, Wyo., 680 P.2d 73 
(1984).

[¶34.]  The proposed instruction bears little 
resemblance to § 2.104 "Testimony of an Accomplice" of the Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instructions Criminal, and appellant did not explain to the court why the 
instruction should be given as required by Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P.:

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objections. * * 
*"

[¶35.]  We cannot say that appellant was 
prejudiced because of the court's failure to give an "accomplice" instruction 
sua sponte. The court included in its instructions the 
following:

"The Jury is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 
testimony. You should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness 
stand, their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, their means of knowledge of the facts 
testified to, the interest, if any, which any witness may have in the outcome of 
this trial, the prejudice or motives, or feelings of revenge, if any, which 
have been shown by the evidence. In so doing, you may take into consideration 
all of the facts and circumstances in the case and give such weight as you think 
the same are entitled to, in the light of your experience and knowledge of human 
affairs, which you share with mankind in general." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶36.]  This instruction seems to address the 
concerns that appellant has regarding the testimony of his companions who 
testified against him. In this instruction the court directed the jury to 
consider the interest, prejudice, motives or feelings of revenge of the 
witnesses.

[¶37.]  The trial was not perfect; however, we 
are not persuaded that there was any reversible error.

[¶38.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 In the opening statement 
and testimony the cities of Rock Springs, 
Casper and Salt Lake City were merely mentioned in 
connection with the wanderings of appellant and his companions, but no testimony 
was produced regarding crimes in those areas.

2 The term odyssey does 
not have an iniquitous connotation. It is defined as: A series of adventurous 
journeys usually marked by many changes of fortune. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, p. 1564 (1966).