Title: State v. Debra Noble

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 64 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3271-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Debra Noble,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 145 
Reported at:  246 Wis. 2d 533, 629 N.W.2d 317 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Crawford   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert P. VanDeHey   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Thomas H. 
Boyd, Karl E. Robinson, Matthew D. Spohn and Winthrop & 
Weinstine, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota, and oral argument by 
Thomas H. Boyd 
 
 
2002 WI 64 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-3271-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 39) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Debra Noble,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed the perjury conviction of Debra Noble after concluding 
that her testimony during a John Doe proceeding should have been 
suppressed because during the proceeding she was questioned by a 
law enforcement officer who was not licensed to practice law.  
The court regarded the officer's conduct as a violation of the 
unauthorized practice of law statute and concluded that, 
although neither a constitutional violation nor a statutory 
violation requiring suppression occurred, suppression was still 
necessary as a sanction.  We disagree.  Even assuming that the 
officer's conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law, 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
2 
 
we conclude that suppression is not required in this case.  We 
are not compelled by any statute, constitutional violation, or 
policy considerations to suppress the testimony in this case.  
In turn, we conclude that the court of appeals' decision must be 
reversed, and Noble's perjury conviction must be reinstated.   
I 
¶2 
During March and April 1999, City of Prairie du Chien 
Detective 
Gerald 
Ostrander 
(Ostrander) 
and 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin Division of Narcotics Enforcement Special Agent David 
Matthews (Matthews) conducted a narcotics investigation in 
Prairie du Chien.  The investigation culminated in an April 2, 
1999 raid of a city tavern, Rowdy's Bar, and the arrests of 
Bobbie Serrano, Arlene Melvin, and Jean Boland for distribution 
of cocaine and marijuana.  Debra Noble was present at Rowdy's 
Bar when the raid occurred.  Her husband, Dan Noble, was also 
present at the bar that day, but had left the bar shortly before 
the police arrived.   
¶3 
Ostrander and Matthews interviewed Debra Noble on 
April 9, 1999, concerning drug activity at Rowdy's Bar.  This 
interview revealed the following information.  On the day of the 
raid, Dan and Debra Noble went to the bar so that Dan could 
purchase cocaine from Boland.  Dan had been purchasing cocaine 
from Boland and Serrano for the last two years.  Before that 
time, Dan had been purchasing cocaine from Melvin.  On the day 
of the raid, Dan left the tavern shortly before the police 
arrived so that he could get some money to pay Boland for the 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
3 
 
cocaine.  Debra Noble used cocaine in the past, but was not a 
current user. 
¶4 
Around that time, the Crawford County Circuit Court 
was conducting John Doe proceedings in connection with an 
investigation of Melvin.  Debra Noble (Noble) was subpoenaed to 
appear in a proceeding on April 23, 1999, based on her 
statements during the interview.   
¶5 
On that date, Noble appeared before Crawford County 
Circuit Judge Michael Kirchman.  Matthews, Crawford County 
District Attorney Timothy Baxter, and Jeff Brinkman, Noble's 
attorney, were also present in the courtroom.  At the hearing, 
Noble was sworn and then informed by Judge Kirchman of her right 
against self-incrimination, of her right to claim privilege to 
certain questions, of her right to confer with her attorney, and 
of the ramifications of any untruthful testimony.1  After a short 
                                                 
1 The court specifically informed Noble as follows:   
Q 
[The court]:  Okay.  And you're here with 
Attorney Jeff Brinckman [sic].  Now, let me go through 
this information for you.  Have you ever been in a 
John Doe proceeding before? 
A 
[Noble]:  No. 
Q: 
All right.  Let me tell you what it's about.  
This is a John Doe proceeding before a judge, myself, 
and under our Wisconsin law the circuit judge has the 
power to subpoena witnesses and compel testimony 
before the John Doe.  So you're directed to answer all 
questions that are put to you, remembering that you've 
just taken the oath.  If you believe that a truthful 
answer to any of the questions that are asked of you 
would incriminate you, that is, subject you to a 
criminal prosecution, you can refuse to answer the 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
4 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
question on the grounds that it may incriminate you.  
Do you understand that? 
A: 
Yeah. 
Q: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege. 
A: 
Yeah. 
Q: 
Now, your answers to the questions that are put 
to you could be used against you by this John Doe or 
in any other legal proceeding.  Do you understand 
that? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
If you testify falsely you could be criminally 
prosecuted for perjury or false swearing committed 
during your testimony before the John Doe proceeding.  
Do you understand that? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Now, 
there's 
several 
types 
of 
confidential 
communications that are privileged . . . .  You can 
refuse to answer any question that's asked of you if 
it would require you to reveal conversations which are 
privileged under the law.  Do you understand that? 
A: 
Yes, I do. 
Q: 
Do you understand that there are no other lawful 
grounds upon which you may refuse to answer questions 
before this John Doe proceeding? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Okay.  I see that you have an attorney with you 
here today, and he will be present during your 
testimony.  You may confer with your attorney during 
your testimony if you have any questions, if you want 
to talk to him.  However, your attorney is not going 
to be allowed to ask you questions or cross-examine 
other witnesses or argue before the judge.  Do you 
understand that? 
A: 
Yes, I do.   
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
5 
 
discussion with Noble's attorney, Judge Kirchman then stated 
that Matthews would conduct some of the questioning of Noble.2  
Matthews was not licensed to practice law.   
¶6 
Matthews asked Noble questions related to their April 
9, 1999 conversation.  During this questioning, Noble denied 
making statements to Matthews during the interview about the 
sale of drugs at Rowdy's Bar and about her husband's drug use.3  
                                                 
2 The court stated: 
[The court]:  All right.  I'm going to permit other 
persons here to ask some questions of you to get to 
the facts which are sought to be disclosed here.  Mr. 
Matthews then? 
[The prosecutor]:  Yes, Your Honor.  As we discussed 
earlier, 
Special 
Agent 
David 
Matthews 
from 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice 
will 
be 
conducting 
the 
examination.  Sir. 
[Matthews]:  Thank you. 
3 The complaint provides several examples and states in part 
as follows: 
Your Complainant [Orlander] states that he was 
present during the examination of the defendant, which 
was conducted by Special Agent Matthews, and the 
defendant answered several questions untruthfully.  
Your Complainant states that some examples include: 
. . . . 
Q: 
Okay.  My recollection was that you told us that 
Dan had ordered cocaine from Jean Boland a week prior 
to April 2nd and that on April 2nd he was there to 
pick up the drugs that he had ordered a week earlier.  
Do you deny telling us that? 
A: 
I don't know what you're talking about. 
Q: 
Do you deny telling us that? 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
6 
 
Based on this alleged false testimony, Noble was charged with 
one count of perjury contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1)(a)(1999-
2000).4   
¶7 
Noble moved to suppress the transcript of the John Doe 
proceeding from her perjury prosecution and to dismiss the 
complaint against her with prejudice.  She claimed that, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.30,5 which prohibits a person from 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: 
Yes. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.31(1)(a) states as follows: 
Whoever under oath or affirmation orally makes a false 
material statement which the person does not believe 
to 
be 
true, 
in 
any 
matter, 
cause, 
action 
or 
proceeding, before any of the following, whether 
legally constituted or exercising powers as if legally 
constituted, is guilty of a Class D felony: 
 
(a) A court; . . . . 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.30 states in relevant part as 
follows: 
757.30  Penalty for practicing without license.  (1) 
Every person, who without having first obtained a 
license to practice law as an attorney of a court of 
record in this state, as provided by law, practices 
law within the meaning of sub. (2), or purports to be 
licensed to practice law as an attorney within the 
meaning of sub. (3), shall be fined not less than $50 
nor more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one 
year in the county jail or both, and in addition may 
be punished as for a contempt.  
(2) 
Every 
person 
who 
appears 
as 
agent, 
representative or attorney, for or on behalf of any 
other person, or any firm, partnership, association or 
corporation in any action or proceeding in or before 
any court of record, court commissioner, or judicial 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
7 
 
practicing law without a license, it was unlawful for Matthews 
to represent the state in the proceeding.  She contended that, 
because the state conducted the proceeding in an illegal manner, 
the transcript must be suppressed because the transcript is the 
"fruit of an illegal activity" committed by the state.   
¶8 
The Crawford County Circuit Court, Robert P. VanDeHey, 
Judge, denied the motion.  The court noted that Judge Kirchman 
warned Noble before she testified at the John Doe that, if she 
testified falsely, she could be criminally prosecuted.  Based on 
this warning, the court concluded that it did not make any 
difference as to who was asking the questions.  The court also 
noted that the John Doe proceeding was conducted under Judge 
Kirchman's authority and that he specifically permitted Matthews 
to ask questions.   
¶9 
A jury later convicted Noble on one count of perjury.  
Noble appealed this conviction.   
¶10 The court of appeals, in a split decision, reversed 
Noble's conviction.  See State v. Noble, 2001 WI App 145, 246 
Wis. 2d 533, 629 N.W.2d 317.  After rejecting other arguments 
presented by Noble, the court addressed whether the John Doe 
transcript should have been suppressed based on the judge's 
decision to permit the questioning by Matthews.  On this issue, 
the court concluded that Matthews had engaged in the unlawful 
practice of law, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 757.30, and that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
tribunal 
of 
the 
United 
States, 
or 
of 
any 
state . . . shall be deemed to be practicing law 
within the meaning of this section.   
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
8 
 
judge should not have permitted such conduct.  Id. at ¶¶19-23.  
The question then became "whether there is a remedy for the 
State's use of an unlicensed person to examine witnesses at the 
John Doe investigation, and if so, what that remedy should be."  
Id. at ¶24.   
¶11 The court concluded that some type of sanction was 
required, noting that the unauthorized practice of law was a 
significant violation and that, if such conduct was authorized 
by the state, it would be unlikely that the state would then 
prosecute such conduct.  Id.  Therefore, the court determined 
that "[t]he only effective remedy for the use of unauthorized 
persons in John Doe investigations is to prohibit the State from 
profiting from the abuse."  Id. at ¶27.  To this end, the court 
concluded that, when an unlicensed person examines a witness at 
a John Doe investigation, the proper sanction would be exclusion 
of a witness's testimony.  Id. at ¶30.  This sanction, the court 
noted, "properly balances the right of the State to investigate 
allegations of criminal conduct with the prohibitions against 
the unauthorized practice of law."  Id.  In turn, the court 
reversed Noble's conviction and remanded for a new trial, with 
the condition that, if Noble were re-tried, the circuit court 
would be required to exclude the information obtained by the 
state's unauthorized practice of law.  Id.   
¶12 Judge Roggensack dissented, partially based on her 
contention 
that 
suppression 
of 
the 
evidence 
was 
not 
an 
appropriate sanction in this case.  Id. at ¶34 (Roggensack, J., 
dissenting).  In short, she stated that the majority's decision 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
9 
 
was 
"contrary 
to 
long-standing 
precedent," 
holding 
that 
suppression of evidence is applicable "'only where the evidence 
sought 
to 
be 
excluded 
was 
obtained 
in 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional right or a statute that specifically requires 
suppression of wrongfully or illegally obtained evidence as a 
sanction.'"  Id. at ¶¶34-35 (quoting State ex rel. Peckham v. 
Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999)).  
The State appealed.   
II 
¶13 The sole issue on review is whether testimony provided 
by Noble during the John Doe proceeding should be suppressed 
from her subsequent perjury prosecution based on the allegation 
that 
the 
state 
abused 
the 
proceeding 
by 
permitting 
her 
examination to be unlawfully conducted by Matthews, a state 
agent who was not authorized to practice law.  Noble contends 
that such abusive conduct warrants suppression because such 
conduct constitutes a violation of her constitutional right to 
due process.  Alternatively, she argues that, even if a 
constitutional violation did not occur, suppression is still 
required because it is an appropriate sanction for such abusive 
conduct.  We conclude that the suppression of Noble's testimony 
is not required in this case.  It is not required because 
Matthews' examination of Noble during the John Doe proceeding 
did not amount to either a constitutional violation or a 
statutory violation for which suppression is provided as a 
remedy.  We find no other basis for suppressing this evidence.  
As a result, we disagree with the court of appeals' decision to 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
10 
 
suppress Noble's testimony, and accordingly, we reverse the 
court's decision overturning Noble's conviction.   
III 
¶14 We assume, for purposes of this case, that Matthews' 
conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 757.50.  Thus, the question becomes whether the 
testimony provided by Noble should be suppressed based on the 
state's use of Matthews during the John Doe proceeding.  
Recently, we noted that "[s]uppression is only required when 
evidence has been obtained in violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights or if a statute specifically provides for 
the suppression remedy."  State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, ¶15, 248 
Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690 (citation omitted).  In this case, 
Noble concedes that her testimony was not obtained in violation 
of a statute that specifically provides suppression as a remedy.  
Instead, she contends that this testimony was obtained in 
violation of her constitutional right to procedural due process.  
Noble asserts that this violation is evidenced by the conduct of 
the state at her John Doe proceeding, considering the rights and 
protections 
afforded 
to 
witnesses 
appearing 
during 
such 
proceedings.   
¶15 Noble first argues that a witness at a John Doe 
proceeding, who is also the target of the investigation, has a 
right to due process protections, including protection from the 
prosecutor 
using 
the 
proceeding 
to 
elicit 
incriminating 
testimony from the target witness.  In this case, Noble 
acknowledges that the state identified Arlene Melvin as the 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
11 
 
target of the investigation.  However, Noble contends that the 
proceeding 
was 
actually 
conducted 
as 
a 
means 
to 
gather 
incriminating evidence against Noble and others.  The nature of 
the questioning, she asserts, went beyond the subject matter for 
which the proceeding was commenced and revealed that she was the 
target of the investigation.  Specifically, Noble points to 
questions about her own drug use, which she contends had nothing 
to do with the investigation of Melvin.6  Noble contends that, by 
using the proceeding in this manner, the state violated the due 
process safeguards provided to John Doe witnesses who are also 
the target of the investigation.   
                                                 
6 During the John Doe proceeding, the following exchange 
occurred between Matthews and Noble: 
Q 
[Matthews]:  Do you recall telling me that Becky 
had shared cocaine with you on July 4th of 1998? 
A 
[Noble]:  Yes, I deny that. 
Q: 
You deny telling me that? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
I'm sorry, '98, thank you.  That would have been 
July 4th of 1998, do you deny telling me that? 
A: 
I don't do drugs, so - -  
Q: 
Have you ever done drugs? 
A: 
No, I have not. 
Q: 
You've never used cocaine? 
A: 
No. 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
12 
 
¶16 Second, Noble argues that a witness at a John Doe 
proceeding has a right to be questioned by a licensed attorney 
to ensure that the questioning is conducted in a competent and 
ethical manner.  Noble notes, citing Wis. Stat. § 978.05(3), 
that prosecutors have an obligation to participate in John Doe 
proceedings and also argues, citing State v. O'Connor, 77 
Wis. 2d 261, 281-82, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977), that law enforcement 
officers are permitted to attend such proceedings only under 
exceptional circumstances.  In this case, however, examination 
responsibilities were delegated to Matthews, a state agent who 
was not licensed to practice law.  Noble argues that this 
conduct violated both the strict limitations of John Doe 
proceedings 
and 
the 
statutory 
prohibition 
against 
the 
unauthorized practice of law, Wis. Stat. § 757.30(1).  Such 
conduct, she alleges, injects the very danger of inadequate and 
unethical representation by nonlawyers that the unauthorized 
practice of law statute is intended to prevent.  Noble also 
points out that Matthews was not bound by the rules of 
professional responsibility and, if he was, he would have 
violated these rules because his questions incorporated his 
direct knowledge of the facts, thereby improperly acting as both 
advocate and witness in the same proceeding in violation of 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:3.7.7  Noble contends that the 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:3.7 states that, with some 
exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness . . . ."  
The comment to this rule explains the basis for the rule: 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
13 
 
state's use and authorization of Matthews to question her 
resulted in an unfair and oppressive examination, thereby 
violating her due process rights.   
¶17 Third and finally, Noble contends that a witness at a 
John Doe proceeding has the right to a neutral and detached 
magistrate and that the judge must insure that the witness is 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The opposing party has proper objection where the 
combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights 
in the litigation.  A witness is required to testify 
on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate 
is expected to explain and comment on evidence given 
by others.  It may not be clear whether a statement by 
an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an 
analysis of the proof. 
Noble points to the following questions asked by Matthews 
during the John Doe proceeding: 
Q: 
Okay.  My recollection and my notes of that day 
indicate your telling us, in addition to the other 
things that you have just denied, my notes indicate 
that you told us that [Jean Boland] offered to sell 
[Dan Noble] two eight balls of cocaine.  Do you deny 
that knowledge? 
. . . . 
Q: 
It's my notes and recollection also that before 
the relationship was established with Jean [Boland] 
and her daughter Bobbie Serrano, that Dan was getting 
his cocaine from Arlene Melvin.  Do you recall that 
now or do you deny telling us that? 
. . . . 
Q: 
And 
because 
today 
you've 
answered 
questions 
concerning events I was present for and therefore know 
that 
your 
answers 
have 
not 
been 
truthful, 
I'm 
concerned that someone may have threatened you with 
respect to today's testimony.  Have you or Dan 
received any threats regarding today's testimony? 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
14 
 
treated fairly and protected from oppressive prosecutorial 
tactics.  Noble contends that, despite this obligation, Judge 
Kirchman permitted Matthews to unlawfully question her during 
the John Doe proceeding.  She asserts that the judge essentially 
conspired with the prosecutor and Matthews to allow Matthews to 
question her in violation of the law.   
¶18 Thus, on the whole, Noble argues that, by allowing 
Matthews to conduct her examination, the state ignored the 
strict limitations of John Doe proceedings and the requirements 
of the unauthorized practice of law statute.  This conduct 
resulted in an unfair examination that violated her due process 
rights.  Accordingly, suppression of her testimony was required 
in her perjury prosecution.  We disagree.   
¶19 Certainly, fair play underpins the concept of due 
process of law.  State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 
205, 177 N.W.2d 106 (1970).  Governmental conduct violates such 
notions of fundamental fairness when the conduct is "'shocking 
to the universal sense of justice . . . .'"  State v. Hyndman, 
170 Wis. 2d 198, 208-09, 488 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting 
U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)); see also State v. 
Steadman, 152 Wis. 2d 293, 300-02, 448 N.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 
1989).  On a motion to suppress, the defendant generally bears 
the burden of producing evidence to support a constitutional 
violation.  State v. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 336, 600 
N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999).  The state then bears the burden of 
showing a constitutionally valid procedure by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  See Raflik, 2001 WI 129, ¶55.  We review the 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
15 
 
application of constitutional principles to the facts de novo.  
See Hyndman, 170 Wis. 2d at 207.   
¶20 We conclude that the facts in this case do not support 
a finding of a due process violation.  Our conclusion is based 
on several reasons.   
¶21 First, under the current facts, there is no support 
for Noble's contention 
that 
she 
was 
the 
target of any 
investigation and that the state used the John Doe proceeding as 
a means of obtaining incriminating evidence against her as the 
target of the investigation.  Certainly, there are limitations 
to the use of John Doe proceedings.  In particular, "a John Doe 
proceeding cannot be used to obtain evidence against a defendant 
for a crime with which the defendant has already been charged."  
State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 745, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996) 
(emphasis added). In this respect, the prosecution cannot use a 
John Doe proceeding to aid in preparing its case.  Id.; see also 
State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 
Wis. 2d 605, 622, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997) (citing State v. 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 824, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)). Such 
conduct constitutes an abuse of the procedure.  Id. at 746; see 
also State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 205, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. 
App. 1982).   
¶22 This case does not involve a situation where there was 
a criminal complaint filed against Noble before she appeared at 
the John Doe proceeding.  Therefore, the concerns discussed in 
Cummings are not implicated.  Noble contends that she became the 
target of the investigation when some of the questions posed by 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
16 
 
Matthews concerned her drug activity directly, instead of the 
drug activity of Melvin or other defendants.  We recognize that 
the John Doe proceeding is "essentially limited to the subject 
matter of the petition filed under Wis. Stat. § 968.26."  State 
ex rel. Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 622 (citing Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 822).  However, this brief questioning, which was 
enumerated under footnote 6 of this opinion, did not transform 
Noble into the target of the investigation nor create a 
situation where the state was using the John Doe proceeding to 
improperly build a case against Noble after she had already been 
charged.  Matthews asked these questions only after he asked 
numerous other questions surrounding drug activity, which did 
not involve Noble, at Rowdy's Bar.  Noble denied knowledge of 
such 
activity, 
contradicting 
her 
previous 
statements 
to 
Matthews.  Matthews then briefly questioned Noble about her own 
drug activity, apparently not as a means to ferret out her 
criminal activity, but instead to determine the extent to which 
Noble would deny her prior statements to Matthews.  Again, this 
brief questioning did not transform Noble into the target of the 
investigation.     
¶23 Further, this is not a case where the state is 
prosecuting the defendant based on incriminating statements 
concerning his or her illegal activity obtained during the John 
Doe proceeding.  Instead, it is prosecuting her based on her 
failure 
to 
give 
truthful 
testimony 
during 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceeding.  Indeed, even if Noble was being prosecuted based on 
any alleged incriminating testimony, the state's prosecution of 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
17 
 
her based on this testimony is lawful in light of the procedural 
protections afforded to witnesses at John Doe proceedings.  See 
Ryan v. State, 79 Wis. 2d 83, 96, 255 N.W.2d 910 (1977).  We 
cannot conclude that the proceeding was abused in this instance 
to support a violation of due process.   
¶24 Second, even assuming that Matthews engaged in the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law, 
there 
is 
nothing 
in 
his 
examination of Noble to show that his participation resulted in 
a proceeding that was particularly unfair and oppressive in 
nature.  Law enforcement agents are not, as Noble contends, 
restricted to attending John Doe proceedings in only exceptional 
circumstances.  Noble relies on O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, for 
this contention.  However, O'Connor, like this case, involved a 
secret John Doe proceeding.  Even under such circumstances, it 
is still within the judge's discretion whether to allow, upon 
the prosecutor's request, law enforcement agents to attend and 
assist in the proceeding.  Id. at 281.  The judge must be 
persuaded, however, that the law enforcement agent will make a 
material contribution to the proceedings, otherwise the judge 
should not allow the agent to attend in the interest of the 
secrecy of the proceeding.  Id. at 282.  The O'Connor court 
warned judges not to abuse this practice.  Id.  However, the 
concern in O'Connor was to preserve the secrecy of the 
proceedings by limiting the number of people at the proceeding.  
It was not focused on the extent to which an agent participated 
in the proceeding once the judge allows the agent to attend.  
Matthews was able to attend and even confer with the district 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
18 
 
attorney during the John Doe proceeding.  Thus, his examination 
of Noble was not as drastic a step beyond his permissible duties 
as Noble contends. 
¶25 Further, even in cases that have presented instances 
of the unauthorized practice of law, the acts themselves have 
been regarded as valid.  See Drugsvold v. Small Claims Court, 13 
Wis. 2d 228, 233, 108 N.W.2d 648 (1961).  Thus, even if Matthews 
was an invalid participant, his questions——and the answers to 
these questions——are not necessarily void.  In addition, Noble 
does not explain how Matthews' questions themselves resulted in 
an unfair and oppressive examination.  There was nothing 
inherently unfair that Noble identifies about the questions.  
Noble points to SCR 20:3.7, but, as the State contends, the rule 
limits 
such 
conduct 
only 
at 
trial. 
 
Further, 
Matthews' 
questioning was supervised by the prosecutor and the judge and 
observed by Noble's attorney, who was present in the courtroom, 
and could have advised Noble not to answer any unfair questions.  
Finally, any policy considerations behind the unauthorized 
practice of law only implicate the public in this case, not 
Noble.  Certainly, the public may be harmed when prosecutors 
rely on persons who are not licensed attorneys to appear on 
behalf of the state.  However, there is no evidence to show that 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
19 
 
Noble suffered from any representation of the state by Matthews 
in this case.8   
                                                 
8 In other jurisdictions, in cases involving the prosecution 
of a defendant by an unlicensed attorney, courts have similarly 
found that no due process violation was present.  See Andrew 
Horwitcz, Taking the Cop Out of Copping a Plea:  Eradicating 
Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1305, 
1350-54 (1998).  The author argues, however, that the analyses 
supporting these decisions were flawed and that a due process 
right to be prosecuted by a licensed attorney should be 
recognized.  Id.   
In his article, the author also noted several cases in 
which courts have held, without finding a due process violation, 
that a defendant's conviction is void when the prosecution is 
undertaken by an unlicensed person, including State v. Russell, 
83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892).  In Russell, the court 
appointed an attorney who was not licensed in Wisconsin to 
assist the district attorney in prosecuting a first-degree 
murder trial.  Id. at 331.  The unlicensed attorney, the court 
noted, practically controlled the management of the trial, 
including examining witnesses.  Id.  The court concluded:   
[The defendant] certainly had a right to be prosecuted 
by the lawfully elected or appointed officers of the 
law.  That right was violated.  She ought not to have 
been compelled to submit to such a trial.  She has 
suffered all the terrible consequences of an illegal 
trial and conviction for murder in the first degree.  
She was, of course, prejudiced by it.  The error is 
material. 
Id. at 335.  Thus, the Russell court recognized that a defendant 
has a right to be prosecuted by a licensed attorney and that, if 
this right is violated, the court must conduct a harmless error 
analysis to determine whether the error was prejudicial to the 
defendant.  In Noble's case, however, it was not her trial that 
was conducted by an unlicensed person; it was her examination at 
a John Doe hearing.  Even if she had a right to be examined by a 
licensed attorney during this proceeding, we do not find that 
the violation of this right in this case was sufficient to 
constitute a constitutional violation requiring suppression or 
that this violation caused Noble to suffer any prejudice in this 
case.    
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
20 
 
¶26 Third, although we recognize that Noble was entitled 
to a neutral and detached magistrate at her proceeding, 
Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 833, 835-36, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Judge Kirchman acted partially by permitting 
Matthews to conduct the examination of Noble.  Whether a judge's 
impartiality can be reasonably questioned, based on an objective 
test, is a question of law for our de novo review.  State v. 
Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982).  We 
acknowledge that Judge Kirchman should have recognized that the 
examination by Matthews, who was not licensed to practice law, 
presented a problem.  However, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the judge did not abide by his responsibilities in 
acting as a neutral and detached magistrate.  We therefore find 
this due process argument without merit. 
¶27 On the whole, the arguments presented by Noble do not 
support a finding that the state's conduct at the John Doe 
proceedings constituted an abuse of the proceedings sufficient 
to constitute a due process violation.  As a result, suppression 
is not warranted based on a constitutional violation. 
¶28 Noble argues that, even if a constitutional violation 
did not exist, we should still suppress her testimony because it 
is the only remedy that will serve to deter such abuse of the 
John Doe proceedings by the state.  She contends that, in both 
Cummings and Hoffman, the court recognized that suppression is 
required when such abuse occurs, even though no constitutional 
violation has occurred.  As discussed above, however, the type 
of abuse contemplated by Cummings and Hoffman was not present in 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
21 
 
this case.  In turn, these cases do not compel us to suppress 
the evidence in this case.  Further, we do not interpret 
Cummings and Hoffman as creating an exception to the general 
rule, which requires——in the absence of a statutory violation 
providing 
for 
suppression 
as 
a 
remedy——a 
constitutional 
violation before suppression will be invoked.  The court did not 
find, in either case, an actual abuse of the John Doe 
proceeding.  See Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 745-47; Hoffman, 106 
Wis. 2d at 206-07.  Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, both 
courts noted that suppression is required in instances where the 
state abuses the John Doe proceeding by using the proceeding to 
gather evidence "against a defendant for a crime with which the 
defendant has already been charged."  Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 
745.  "Such use is clear abuse of the process."  Id.  The court 
never discussed whether such abuse constitutes a violation of 
due process; however, the terse conclusion reached by the court 
that such conduct is "clear abuse" suggests that such conduct 
could rise to the level of a due process violation.  Thus, we do 
not conclude that Cummings and Hoffman necessarily created any 
exception to the general rule, and we do not create one in this 
case.   
¶29 Our conclusion that suppression is not warranted in 
this case is also based on two additional reasons.  First, in 
this case, the evidence used by the state in Noble's perjury 
prosecution was not the "fruit" of any "poisonous tree."  To be 
sure, in cases where there has been a violation of a 
constitutional right, evidence obtained as a direct result of 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
22 
 
the illegal conduct is inadmissible as well as derivative 
evidence if this evidence is obtained "'by exploitation of that 
illegality.'"  State v. Schneidewind, 47 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 176 
N.W.2d 303 (1970) (quoting Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)).  In such cases, evidence is admissible only when it has 
been obtained by exploitation of the illegality, and not when it 
is obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable that it is 
purged 
of 
the 
primary 
taint. 
 
State 
v. 
Phillips, 
218 
Wis. 2d 180, 206, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  If there is a close 
causal connection between the illegal conduct and the evidence 
obtained, the evidence is inadmissible.  State v. Kraimer, 91 
Wis. 2d 418, 433, 283 N.W.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶30 In Noble's case, however, we are examining a statutory 
violation, not a constitutional violation.  Thus, a "fruit of 
the 
poisonous 
tree" 
analysis 
is 
not 
wholly 
applicable.  
Nevertheless, the relevant evidence in this case (testimony 
showing that Noble lied under oath) was not generated by any 
illegal activity by the state (allowing Matthews to examine 
Noble).  Noble's answers to the questions likely would have been 
the same regardless of who was asking the questions.  Thus, this 
lack of a close causal connection between the evidence and the 
illegal activity supports our conclusion that suppression is not 
necessary because the evidence would have been likely obtained 
regardless of the illegal activity.   
¶31 Second, 
the 
policy 
considerations 
warranting 
suppression are not present in this case.  Two important policy 
suppression considerations are deterrence of police misconduct 
No. 
99-3271-CR   
 
23 
 
and maintenance of judicial integrity.  Suppression will not 
necessarily serve as a deterrent to future unlawful questioning 
by unlicensed agents.  There is no evidence to show that this 
activity occurs on a regular basis so that suppression would 
have an effect on such questioning by agents.  Further, 
suppression may encourage perjury in those rare instances where 
agents undertake such questioning.  The integrity of the 
judiciary is also not threatened by declining to suppress this 
evidence.  There is nothing to suggest that the judge acted in 
bad faith in allowing the agent to ask questions.  Indeed, the 
judge took significant steps in this case to insure that Noble 
understood her rights and the ramifications of providing false 
testimony.  If anything, suppression will only serve to threaten 
judicial integrity by condoning perjured testimony.  Thus, we do 
not find that policy considerations support suppression in this 
case.   
IV 
¶32 In sum, we conclude that, even assuming that the 
unauthorized 
practice 
of 
law 
was 
present 
in 
this 
case, 
suppression is not a valid remedy in this instance.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
conclude that Noble's perjury conviction should be reinstated.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 99-3271.dtp 
1 
 
¶33 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
mandate and opinion of the court but write separately because of 
several sentences in ¶28 of the majority opinion.   
¶34 The opinion discusses two cases, State v. Cummings, 
199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), and State v. Hoffman, 
106 Wis. 2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982), indicating that 
in neither case did the court find "an actual abuse of the John 
Doe proceeding."  Then the opinion states: 
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, both courts 
noted that suppression is required in instances where 
the state abuses the John Doe proceeding by using the 
proceeding to gather evidence "against a defendant for 
a crime with which the defendant has already been 
charged."  "Such use is clear abuse of the process."  
The 
court 
never 
discussed 
whether 
such 
abuse 
constitutes a violation of due process; however, the 
terse conclusion reached by the court that such 
conduct is "clear abuse" suggests that such conduct 
could rise to the level of a due process violation.  
Majority op. at ¶28 (citations omitted). 
¶35 First, 
these 
cases 
do 
not 
require 
automatic 
suppression of all evidence gathered in a John Doe proceeding 
against a charged defendant.  These cases stand for the 
proposition that the state may not orchestrate a John Doe 
proceeding to obtain additional evidence "against a defendant 
for a crime with which the defendant has already been charged."  
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 745.  The state may still use a John 
Doe to "(1) investigate other possible defendants related to the 
crimes that will be charged in the information filed against the 
original defendant, and (2) investigate other crimes that cannot 
be charged in the information, but may have been committed by 
the defendant."  Id. at 745-46.  "It is only when the John Doe 
No. 99-3271.dtp 
2 
 
is used to gather evidence specifically relating to the crime 
for which the defendant is being tried that an abuse of the 
procedure occurs."  Id. at 746. 
¶36 In my view, this opinion does not settle the question 
whether evidence uncovered in a John Doe proceeding focusing on 
one person may be used in a trial against another person on a 
charge filed against that person before the new evidence was 
obtained.9 
¶37 Second, I do not see how due process violations would 
be implicated by the use of a John Doe-type proceeding to gather 
additional evidence against a charged defendant even on the 
crime charged, so long as the defendant is not asked to testify.  
A John Doe investigation does not come to an abrupt halt the 
moment the prosecutor has gathered enough evidence to file a 
criminal charge.  It usually continues until all key witnesses 
have been examined, and then a charge is filed.  Moreover, at a 
preliminary examination after the charge is filed, new evidence 
                                                 
9 In his oft-quoted dissent in State ex rel. Kowaleski v. 
District Court, 254 Wis. 363, 375, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949), Justice 
Henry Hughes stated: "Certainly where [the magistrate] issues a 
warrant he cannot continue a hearing as an aid to the district 
attorney in preparing the prosecution."  But Justice Hughes went 
on to say: "If a bona fide John Doe proceeding were necessary to 
investigate other crimes . . . and the defendant were not named 
as a party, but evidence came out against him incidental to such 
investigation, he would have no cause for complaint."  Id. at 
376. 
More than 30 years later in State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 
185, 205, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982), Judge Dykman observed 
that: "Federal courts have held that a grand jury may inquire 
into matters which are the subject of a pending prosecution so 
long as that is not the dominant or primary purpose of the 
inquiry."  He cited United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 
1328 (10th Cir. 1979). 
No. 99-3271.dtp 
3 
 
may be sought and adduced; and that evidence may be used against 
the defendant.10 
¶38 The 
prosecutor 
and 
the 
police 
do 
not 
stop 
investigating a crime once a defendant has been charged with the 
crime.  The state has the burden of proving each element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is inconceivable that the 
state would stop gathering information and evidence to meet its 
burden of proof once a charge had been filed.  The state may 
also have to continue investigating to meet its discovery 
obligations. 
¶39 One 
may 
argue 
persuasively 
that 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceeding is intended to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and, if so, by whom, and is not intended to help firm 
up the case against a charged defendant.  But how would the use 
of an authorized John Doe-type proceeding to take testimony from 
potential witnesses against the defendant be fundamentally 
unfair or violate the due process rights of the defendant?  
Under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), the state would be required to 
disclose any of the defendant's oral statements about the crime 
that it learned of in the proceeding, the names of any witnesses 
whom the prosecutor intended to call at trial, together with a 
transcript of John Doe-type testimony, and any exculpatory 
evidence that came out of the proceeding. 
¶40 Today, John Doe proceedings are usually less secretive 
and more fair than they once were.  This court should not invite 
                                                 
10 In civil cases, litigants expect sworn testimony to be 
taken from witnesses in depositions after a complaint is filed 
but before trial.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 804.05 and 804.06. 
No. 99-3271.dtp 
4 
 
suppression of reliable evidence in criminal cases by allusions 
to due process violations based upon outmoded notions of past 
practice. 
¶41 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶42 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
The court of appeals concluded that the state narcotics 
enforcement special agent who represented the State in the John 
Doe proceeding by questioning the defendant (who was a witness 
at the John Doe proceeding) was practicing law without a 
license, a criminal offense.11  Indeed, the special agent was 
both an advocate and witness in the proceeding.  The court of 
appeals further concluded that the appropriate remedy was to 
exclude the information obtained by the State's unauthorized 
practice of law if the defendant is retried.   
¶43 I am persuaded by the reasoning and conclusions of the 
court of appeals.12  The special agent was not a lawyer and falls 
under none of the authorized exceptions for the practice of law 
by non-lawyers.  The defendant was never charged for drug 
offenses, which were the subject of the John Doe proceeding, and 
the special agent's unlawful practice of law yielded the perjury 
charge against the defendant.  Wisconsin courts should not be 
partners to the unlawful practice of law in a criminal case.   
¶44 Although not presenting precisely the same facts as 
those here, several cases are sufficiently similar to support 
the reasoning and conclusions of the court of appeals in the 
present case. 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 757.30 (1999-2000) (every person practicing 
law without a license shall be fined not less than $50 nor more 
than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year in the county 
jail or both, and in addition may be punished as for contempt). 
12 State v. Noble, 2001 WI App 145, 246 Wis. 2d 533, 629 
N.W.2d 317. 
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶45 In State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892), 
a Minnesota attorney, not licensed in Wisconsin, assisted the 
district attorney in the prosecution of a criminal case.  The 
Minnesota attorney was appointed by the Wisconsin district 
attorney and was competent.  The court declared, as it has in 
numerous cases thereafter,13 that the district attorney is a 
constitutional officer in Wisconsin, a "quasi judicial officer," 
an attorney with special responsibilities and powers, and no 
attorney or non-attorney can substitute for the district 
attorney unless authorized by statute.14  A person not licensed 
to practice law in this state is not considered an attorney in 
Wisconsin.  The Russell court held that the error of having a 
Minnesota attorney replace the district attorney was material 
and prejudicial and that the conviction must be reversed.   
¶46 In Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888), 
and State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 218 N.W. 367 (1928), 
private counsel licensed to practice in Wisconsin assisted the 
district attorney in prosecuting the respective criminal cases, 
either before or during trial.15  In both cases, the court 
concluded that "public policy, and the fair, just, and impartial 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., County of Kenosha v. C&S Mgmt., Inc., 223 
Wis. 2d 373, 400, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999); State v. Hooper, 101 
Wis. 2d 517, 531 n.9, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981), and cases cited 
therein. 
14 State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 334, 53 N.W. 441 (1892). 
15 In Schedlberger v. State, 204 Wis. 235, 235 N.W. 419 
(1931), this court held that no error occurred when nothing in 
the record demonstrated that the Chicago attorney rendered any 
material aid to the district attorney in preparing the case for 
trial or that the Chicago attorney was present at the trial.   
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
administration of the criminal law of the state, make it the 
duty of the courts to exclude the paid attorneys of private 
persons from appearing as prosecutors."16  The convictions in 
both cases were reversed. 
¶47 The Russell, Biemel, and Peterson cases stand for the 
proposition that when someone other than a district attorney (or 
a person authorized by statute) exercises the functions of a 
district attorney, the criminal proceedings are void.  In the 
present case, the special agent who acted as counsel at the John 
Doe proceeding was neither an attorney, nor the district 
attorney, nor a person identified by statute or case law as 
authorized to substitute for a district attorney.  Relying on 
the Russell, Biemel, and Peterson cases, I conclude that this 
conviction based on a non-attorney substituting for the district 
attorney cannot stand. 
¶48 I write separately to also point out that various 
cases relating to the unauthorized practice of law do not seem 
to be readily reconcilable.  In civil cases, even though a non-
lawyer engages in the unauthorized practice of law, the civil 
                                                 
16 State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 356-57, 218 N.W. 367 
(1928), quoting Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 446, 37 N.W. 244 
(1888). 
In Peterson a private attorney who was paid by private 
persons summoned prospective witnesses, questioned them, and 
prepared memoranda for the district attorney's use at trial.  
Peterson, 195 Wis. at 354. 
 
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
judgment apparently is not void.17  Yet in Jadair Inc. v. United 
States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997), 
this court ruled that a notice of appeal in a civil case signed 
by a non-lawyer on behalf of a corporation is void, and the 
court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  In 
Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18, 250 Wis. 2d 494, 639 
N.W.2d 715, 
this 
court 
dismissed 
a 
civil 
complaint 
with 
prejudice, throwing a case out of court, because the summons and 
complaint were signed by an attorney licensed in Minnesota on 
behalf of an attorney licensed in Wisconsin.  
¶49 Jadair, 
Schaefer, 
and 
the 
present 
case 
seem 
incongruent.  In Schaefer and Jadair, the court is unforgiving 
when a non-Wisconsin lawyer signs preliminary documents on 
behalf of a client.  The result in those cases: final dismissal 
of a case and of an appeal.  In the present case, this court 
imposes no sanction when, in a Wisconsin courtroom, a non-lawyer 
is permitted to perform the functions of a district attorney at 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Littleton v. Langlois, 37 Wis. 2d 360, 364, 
155 N.W.2d 150 (1967) (plaintiff's wife appeared as witness, not 
advocate, 
during 
litigation, 
and 
even 
if 
her 
appearance 
constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the judgment would 
not be void); In Re McManus, 13 Wis. 2d 228, 233-34, 108 
N.W.2d 648 (1961) (statute making unauthorized practice of law 
illegal does not make acts complained of void and appearance by 
lay employee of collection agency on behalf of plaintiff in suit 
commenced 
by 
collection 
agency 
does 
not 
strip 
court 
of 
jurisdiction, 
even 
if 
such 
appearance 
amounted 
to 
the 
unauthorized practice of law). 
A John Doe proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.  State 
v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986).  A John 
Doe proceeding is, however, intimately related to a criminal 
prosecution.   
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
the behest of the State.  The effect of the unauthorized 
practice of law on the outcome of civil and criminal proceedings 
is apparently a work in progress by this court——and from my 
perspective, needs more work and more progress.  
¶50 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
No.  99-3271-CR.ssa 
 
1