Title: State v. Ozuna

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1877-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lazaro Ozuna, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 224, 880 N.W.2d 183 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Kristine E. Drettwan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Alisha McKay, assistant state public 
defender, with whom on the briefs was Colleen Marion, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of Legal Action 
of Wisconsin, Inc. by Kori L. Ashley, Christine Donahoe, Susan 
 
 
2 
Lund, Sheila Sullivan, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
2017 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1877-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CM458) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lazaro Ozuna, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Ozuna, No. 
2015AP1877-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 13, 
2016), affirming the Walworth County circuit court's order1 
denying expungement of the defendant's misdemeanor convictions. 
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that the circuit court properly concluded that the 
defendant was not entitled to expungement.  We do so because the 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Kristine E. Drettwan, presiding. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
2 
 
defendant 
did 
not 
meet 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
for 
expungement. 
 
Specifically, 
in 
order 
to 
be 
entitled 
to 
expungement, a probationer must "satisf[y] the conditions of 
probation."  Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) (2013-14).2  In this 
case, when the Department of Corrections ("DOC") notified the 
circuit court that the defendant had completed probationary 
supervision, it simultaneously notified the court that the 
defendant had violated the court's expressly ordered condition 
that he neither possess nor consume alcohol.  Consequently, the 
circuit court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to 
expungement, and the court of appeals affirmed.  We affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
On November 20, 2013, the Walworth County district 
attorney's office charged Lazaro Ozuna with one count of 
criminal damage to property contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1) 
(2011-2012) and one count of disorderly conduct contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 947.01(1) (2011-2012), both misdemeanors.  Ozuna was 17 
years old at the time these charges were filed. 
¶4 
On May 27, 2014, the circuit court held a plea and 
sentencing hearing,3 at which Ozuna pled guilty to both counts.  
The court accepted Ozuna's guilty plea and imposed a sentence of 
120 days' incarceration, but the court stayed the sentence and 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable James L. Carlson, presiding. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
3 
 
placed Ozuna on a period of probationary supervision for 12 
months.  As one of the conditions of his probation, the court 
ordered Ozuna "[n]ot to possess or consume alcohol, illegal 
drugs or paraphernalia." 
¶5 
The court further determined that Ozuna's conviction 
was eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015 so long 
as Ozuna satisfied the conditions of probation.  The court 
stated, "I will allow expungement if there is no violation of 
probation . . . ."  The court asked Ozuna if he understood that 
he would have to comply with the conditions of probation and 
that the convictions "could be on your record unless you 
complete the sentence[4] successfully and get it expunged; do you 
understand that?"  Ozuna answered, "Yes, sir." 
¶6 
Ozuna was placed on probation under the supervision of 
DOC for a term of 12 months.  After Ozuna was discharged from 
probation, DOC filed a form with the circuit court on June 5, 
2015, entitled "Verification of Satisfaction of Probation 
Conditions for Expungement."  On that form, the probation agent 
had marked a box labeled "The offender has successfully 
completed his/her probation."  Further down on the form, 
                                                 
4 We note that probationary supervision, commonly referred 
to as "probation," is not itself a sentence; rather, it is an 
alternative to sentencing.  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 647, 
594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).  However, the expungement statute defines 
the "successful completion of the sentence" so as to encompass 
probation.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).  Probation is 
therefore 
considered 
a 
"sentence" 
for 
purposes 
of 
the 
expungement statute.  State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, ¶36, 353 
Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
4 
 
however, the agent had marked the box labeled, "All court 
ordered conditions have not been met."  The agent inserted the 
following explanation: "[Ozuna] [f]ailed to comply with the no 
alcohol condition.  Lake Geneva PD went to Harbor Shores Hotel 
for noise complaint.  Mr. Ozaro [sic] cited for underage 
drinking (102 pbt [sic]) and marijuana odor in the halls." 
¶7 
On June 12, 2015, the circuit court entered an order 
denying expungement of Ozuna's record.  The order noted that 
Ozuna had failed to fulfill the obligations of his probation.  
Ozuna appealed the circuit court's order, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court.  The court of appeals 
concluded that "Ozuna was entitled to expungement only if he 
successfully completed his sentence.  Ozuna did not do so 
because he did not satisfy the conditions of probation."  Ozuna, 
unpublished slip op., ¶11.  The court of appeals noted that the 
"State claims——and the DOC form confirms——that Ozuna violated 
the no alcohol condition of his probation.  Nowhere in the 
briefs does Ozuna contest this crucial fact."  Id., ¶9.  For 
these reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order denying expungement. 
¶8 
Ozuna petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 15, 2016. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
This case requires us to interpret the expungement 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015, which is a question of statutory 
interpretation that we review de novo.  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 
129, ¶12, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811.  The application of a 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
5 
 
statute to undisputed facts is also a question of law for our 
independent review, benefiting from the analyses of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 
¶32, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 We begin by setting forth the relevant statutory 
requirements for expungement and discussing the circuit court's 
authority to deny expungement.  We then apply these principles 
to the facts of this case, and we hold that, because Ozuna did 
not satisfy the conditions of probation, the circuit court 
properly denied expungement of his conviction.  Finally, we 
address Ozuna's procedural due process argument, and we conclude 
that Ozuna's rights were not violated in this case. 
A.  A Probationer Must Satisfy the Conditions of Probation In 
Order To Be Entitled to Expungement 
¶11 The Wisconsin statutes empower a circuit court to 
order certain criminal offenses to be expunged from a person's 
record, if the offender was younger than 25 at the time of the 
commission of the offense.5  The overarching legislative purpose 
                                                 
5 Section 973.015(1m)(a)1. provides, in relevant part, that 
when a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense . . . for which the 
maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the 
court may order at the time of sentencing that the 
record be expunged upon successful completion of the 
sentence if the court determines the person will 
benefit and society will not be harmed by this 
disposition. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
6 
 
of the expungement statute is to provide "a break to young 
offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply with the law."  
Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20 (quoting State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 
77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341).  A circuit court may 
order expungement "if the court determines the person will 
benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)1.  Under the statutory scheme, the 
determination of a defendant's eligibility for expungement must 
be made at the time of sentencing.  State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 
27, ¶45, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811. 
¶12 If the circuit court determines that the defendant is 
eligible for expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a), "the 
plain language of the statute indicates that once the defendant 
successfully completes his sentence, he has earned, and is 
automatically entitled to, expungement."  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 
¶23.6  The statute provides a three-part definition of what it 
means to "successfully complete the sentence" for purposes of 
earning expungement:  "A person has successfully completed the 
                                                 
6 The statute provides, in relevant part, that 
A person has successfully completed the sentence if 
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation.  Upon successful completion 
of 
the 
sentence 
the 
detaining 
or 
probationary 
authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which 
shall be forwarded to the court of record and which 
shall have the effect of expunging the record. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
7 
 
sentence if [1] the person has not been convicted of a 
subsequent offense and, if on probation, [2] the probation has 
not been revoked and [3] the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation."  § 973.015(1m)(b) (emphasis added).  
"If a probationer satisfies these three criteria, he has earned 
expungement, and is automatically entitled to expungement of the 
underlying charge."  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23. 
¶13 We emphasize that, in order to be entitled to 
expungement, the probationer must meet all three of the 
statutory criteria, including satisfying "all the conditions of 
probation."  Id., ¶22.  Because the three criteria are distinct, 
we reject Ozuna's notion that a probationer has "satisfied the 
conditions of probation" under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) 
simply because his probation was not revoked.  Whether a 
probationer's conduct was adequate to avoid revocation is a 
question separate and distinct from whether the probationer "has 
satisfied all the conditions of probation."7  Hemp, 359 
Wis. 2d 320, ¶22.  To "satisfy" a condition or obligation is to 
meet or fulfill it, not merely to avoid the penalty for 
violating it.  See Satisfy, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 2017 (2002) ("to conform to (accepted criteria or 
requirements): fulfill, meet").  Therefore, the mere fact that a 
                                                 
7 Revocation is a discretionary decision. When a violation 
of probation occurs, DOC regulations permit the agent to counsel 
the probationer, issue a warning, or choose another alternative 
to revocation.  See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 331.03(2)(b) (July 
2013). 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
8 
 
probationer has completed the term of probationary supervision 
without revocation does not necessarily establish that the 
probationer has also satisfied the conditions of probation. 
B.  The Court May Deny Expungement if a Probationer Does Not 
Satisfy the Conditions of Probation 
¶14 Although the expungement statute puts the onus on DOC 
to determine whether a probationer has satisfied the conditions 
of probation and to notify the court when that occurs,8 a court 
has no duty to expunge a probationer's record if the probationer 
has not satisfied the conditions of probation.  This is so 
because a person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends 
not on whether the court receives a particular notice from DOC, 
but on whether the probationer meets all of the statutory 
criteria for the "successful completion of the sentence."  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) 
(providing 
that 
only 
"[u]pon 
successful completion of the sentence" shall a DOC-forwarded 
certificate of discharge "have the effect of expunging the 
                                                 
8 As we recognized in State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 
Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, a probationer who has met all the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) and is therefore 
entitled to expungement has no duty to notify the court of that 
fact; that duty rests with DOC as the probationary authority.  
See id., ¶30.  DOC policy is in accord with this understanding.  
Its Electronic Case Reference Manual requires that, "[w]ithin 10 
days following the discharge date, the agent shall forward 
information to the court indicating whether or not the eligible 
offender has successfully completed probation."  Wisconsin DOC 
Electronic Case Reference Manual, Procedures Prior to Discharge: 
Expungement, § .04 (effective May 1, 2015) (available at 
http://doc.helpdocsonline.com/case-closing/transition/status-
change). 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
9 
 
record").  In Hemp, we held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b) 
provides for a "self-executing" expungement process, in which 
"the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 
certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 
individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and 
at that point the process of expungement is self-executing."  
Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25 (emphasis added).  The terms of the 
statute provide that this self-executing process is triggered 
only "[u]pon successful completion of the sentence," as the 
statute defines that term in § 973.015(1m)(b).  "In construing 
or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to 
disregard the plain, clear words of the statute."  State v. 
Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, under the expungement 
statute, it is proper for the circuit court to deny expungement 
if a defendant has not met all three criteria for the 
"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b), 
including 
satisfying 
the 
conditions 
of 
probation.9 
                                                 
9 We note that, in this instance, Ozuna does not contest the 
factual 
determination 
that 
he 
consumed 
alcohol 
while 
on 
probation, thereby violating one of the conditions of his 
probation.  This case is therefore not the proper vehicle in 
which to set forth the procedures a court is to follow when such 
factual matters are disputed.  See State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, 
¶62 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 (noting that this 
court "does not issue advisory opinions or address hypothetical 
facts").  We note our confidence in the ability of our circuit 
courts to resolve such matters fairly, a confidence informed by 
our knowledge that they routinely do just that. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
10 
 
¶15 This conclusion is not in conflict with our holding in 
Hemp.  Although we stated in Hemp that expungement occurs 
automatically when DOC "forwards a certificate of discharge to 
the court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶36, we were 
resting on the premise that satisfaction of the conditions of 
probation is an indispensable prerequisite to a defendant's 
entitlement to expungement.  Id., ¶¶22-23.  It was because "Hemp 
satisfied all the conditions of probation," we explained, that 
his "successful completion of probation automatically entitled 
him to expungement of his conviction."  Id., ¶24.  Therefore, 
Hemp 
reinforces 
our 
understanding 
that 
a 
probationer's 
entitlement to expungement turns on whether the probationer "has 
satisfied the conditions of probation," as is required by Wis. 
Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). 
¶16 In Hemp, DOC forwarded Hemp's certificate of discharge 
to the court, and there was no dispute that Hemp had 
successfully completed probation as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b). 
 
"The 
record 
clearly 
indicates 
Hemp 
successfully completed probation," we concluded, because Hemp 
was not convicted of any subsequent offense while on probation, 
his probation was not revoked, and "Hemp satisfied all the 
conditions of probation."  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶24.  In such 
a scenario, expungement was "required by statute" and the clerk 
of the circuit court accordingly had a duty to expunge the 
record upon receiving a copy of the certificate of discharge 
from DOC.  Id., ¶33 n.11 (quoting SCR 72.06).  But Hemp does not 
control a case where DOC informs the circuit court that the 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
11 
 
probationer violated the court-ordered conditions of probation.  
In such a case, where one of the statutory requirements for the 
"successful completion of the sentence" under § 973.015(1m)(b) 
has not been met, the probationer has no entitlement to 
expungement and the self-executing process we described in Hemp 
does not occur.  
¶17 Our emphasis on the language of the statute is also in 
accord with our interpretation of the probation statutes in an 
analogous context.  In State ex rel. Greer v. Wiedenhoeft, 2014 
WI 19, 353 Wis. 2d 307, 845 N.W.2d 373, where DOC issued a 
certificate of discharge from probation before the term of 
probation had expired, we held that such certificate did not 
have the effect of discharging the probationer.  Id., ¶¶41, 51.  
The statutes provide that a certificate of discharge is issued 
"[w]hen the period of probation for a probationer has expired," 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(5), but the defendant relied on two court of 
appeals decisions which suggested that the issuance of a 
certificate 
was 
the 
controlling 
event 
that 
effectuated 
discharge.  Id., ¶42.  We rejected this argument, explaining 
that "[n]either decision stands for the proposition that an 
erroneously issued discharge certificate can defeat a valid 
sentence imposed by a circuit court."  Id.  The certificate 
could not trump the statute. Similarly, in the expungement 
context, the simple fact that DOC forwards a certificate of 
discharge or other form to the circuit court does not, by 
itself, establish an entitlement to expungement if the record 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
12 
 
demonstrates that the probationer has not met the prerequisites 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b). 
C.  The Circuit Court Properly Denied Expungement 
¶18 Here, there was never any dispute about the underlying 
facts in the record.  DOC submitted a form to the court which 
showed that Ozuna had violated one of the court-ordered 
conditions of his probation.  On the form, the probation agent 
checked a box marked "All court ordered conditions have not been 
met."  The agent noted the nature of the violation, namely, that 
Ozuna "[f]ailed to comply with the no alcohol condition," 
because he was "cited for underage drinking."  Ozuna has never 
made any suggestion that that he did not, in fact, engage in 
this conduct during the term of probation. 
¶19 These facts demonstrate that Ozuna did not meet the 
criteria for expungement, because he did not "satisf[y] the 
conditions 
of 
probation." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b).  
According to his probation agent, Ozuna engaged in underage 
drinking in spite of the circuit court's command to refrain from 
consuming alcohol.  Based on this clear violation of one of the 
court-ordered conditions of probation, Ozuna did not satisfy the 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
13 
 
conditions of probation.  Therefore, the circuit court properly 
denied expungement of Ozuna's record.10 
¶20 Ozuna disagrees, arguing that the "fact that [his] 
agent forwarded the Verification Form to the circuit court 
communicates her determination that [he] met the requirements" 
for expungement.  However, looking beyond the title of the form 
("Verification of Satisfaction of Probation Conditions for 
Expungement") to its substance reveals that DOC determined Ozuna 
had violated one of the court-ordered conditions of probation.  
Although we held in Hemp that a court has no discretion to deny 
expungement if a probationer "successfully completed probation 
and his probationary authority forwarded his certificate to the 
court of record," Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶41 (emphasis added), 
there was no dispute in Hemp that the probationer had, in fact, 
met the statutory requirements for the successful completion of 
probation, including satisfying all the conditions of probation, 
id., ¶24.  Nothing in Hemp dictates that the mere receipt of a 
form from DOC stating that the probationer "successfully 
completed" probation automatically entitles the probationer to 
expungement where, as here, the very same form contains a 
contradictory determination by DOC that the probationer violated 
                                                 
10 It appears that Ozuna also failed to satisfy the monetary 
conditions of probation, and he argues that it would violate 
equal protection "to deny expungement to probationers who cannot 
afford to satisfy monetary conditions during supervision."  We 
need not reach this argument, because we conclude that Ozuna's 
undisputed violation of the no-alcohol condition was sufficient 
to establish that he was not entitled to expungement. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
14 
 
one of the court-ordered conditions of probation.  Because Ozuna 
did not satisfy the court-ordered condition that he abstain from 
alcohol while on probation, his reliance on Hemp is unavailing. 
D.  Ozuna's Due Process Rights Were Not Violated 
¶21 Finally, we turn to Ozuna's argument that the circuit 
court deprived him of his constitutional right to procedural due 
process by denying expungement without notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.  We conclude that Ozuna's due process rights were 
not violated. 
¶22 "The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and art. I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
prohibit government actions that deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law."  Aicher ex 
rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶80, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  The first step in a procedural due 
process 
analysis 
is 
to 
"examine 
whether 
the 
person 
has 
established that a constitutionally protected property or 
liberty interest is at issue."  Id.   
¶23 Where 
a 
liberty 
interest 
has 
been 
"initially 
recognized and protected by state law, . . . the procedural 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State 
seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status."  
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976).  We note that 
"[r]eputation by itself is neither liberty nor property within 
the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment."  Weber v. City of Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 73, 384 
N.W.2d 333 (1986).  Rather, "a person's reputation is protected 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
15 
 
by procedural due process only when damage to the reputation is 
accompanied by the alteration or elimination of a right or 
status previously recognized by state law."  Stipetich v. 
Grosshans, 2000 WI App 100, ¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 69, 612 N.W.2d 346.  
"In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to 
refute the charge . . . ."  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).  "The purpose of such notice and 
hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his 
name."  Id. at 573 n.12. 
¶24 Here, Ozuna argues that he had a protected liberty 
interest in expungement of his record because the circuit court 
ordered, at the time of Ozuna's sentencing, that his conviction 
was eligible for expungement.  The expungement statute, Ozuna 
argues, "creates a substantive right under state law" to have 
the stigma of a criminal conviction removed.  He relies on our 
statement 
in 
Hemp 
that 
"once 
the 
defendant 
successfully 
completes his sentence, he has earned, and is automatically 
entitled to, expungement."  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶23.  Ozuna 
further argues that he was deprived of this right without due 
process of law, because the circuit court did not provide him 
with notice and an opportunity to be heard before it denied 
expungement.  Ozuna analogizes a denial of expungement to a 
revocation of probation.  This court has recognized that due 
process requires an evidentiary hearing before the State may 
revoke probation, State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 
548, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), and Ozuna argues that the same rule 
should apply to a denial of expungement. 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
16 
 
¶25 We disagree with Ozuna and hold that he did not have a 
protected liberty interest in expungement in this case.  The 
reason that a probationer has a protected liberty interest in 
remaining on probation is because the probationer has already 
been granted a conditional right to freedom.  See Johnson, 50 
Wis. 2d at 548 ("After one has gained the conditional freedom of 
a probationer . . . the state cannot summarily revoke such 
status . . . .") (emphasis added).  By contrast, Ozuna cannot 
claim that he gained any entitlement to expungement, because the 
record shows that he did not meet the statutory criteria for 
"successful completion of the sentence" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b), which include satisfying all the conditions of 
probation.  See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶22. 
¶26 Ozuna suggests that the circuit court should have held 
a hearing before denying expungement, but he has not pointed us 
to any relevant factual dispute that such a hearing could have 
resolved.  He has never questioned DOC's determination that he 
violated the no-alcohol condition by engaging in underage 
drinking during his period of probation.  Because Ozuna was not 
entitled to expungement based on his failure to satisfy the no-
alcohol condition, we also conclude that there was no violation 
of due process in this case, because Ozuna does not challenge 
the underlying facts.  See Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) ("Plaintiffs who assert a right to a 
hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts 
they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the 
statutory scheme."); Stipetich, 235 Wis. 2d 69, ¶25 (affirming 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
17 
 
dismissal of a due process claim on summary judgment where the 
petitioner "did not produce sufficient evidence to allow a fact-
finder 
to 
conclude 
that 
she 
had 
been 
deprived 
of 
a 
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest"). 
¶27 Because Ozuna did not satisfy the conditions of his 
probation, he never earned the expungement for which he was 
otherwise eligible.  Therefore, Ozuna was not deprived of any 
right or status which he previously possessed under state law.  
Absent facts permitting a conclusion that Ozuna was entitled to 
expungement under Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b), his reputational 
interest in hoping to obtain expungement is not, by itself, a 
protected liberty interest.  See Weber, 129 Wis. 2d at 73. 
¶28 For these reasons, we conclude that Ozuna's due 
process rights were not violated. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We hold that the circuit court properly denied 
expungement in this case, because Ozuna did not meet the 
statutory requirements to be entitled to expungement.  The 
statutory requirements for expungement include the requirement 
that the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation.  
Here, DOC notified the circuit court that Ozuna did not meet all 
the conditions of probation because Ozuna violated the circuit 
court's expressly ordered condition to not possess or consume 
alcohol during the term of probation.  Therefore, based on this 
notification from DOC, the circuit court properly denied 
expungement.  Further, because Ozuna never met the requirements 
to be entitled to expungement, the circuit court's denial of 
No. 
2015AP1877-CR 
 
18 
 
expungement did not violate his right to the due process of law.  
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶30 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting). 
The 
majority 
bends over backwards to reach its conclusion.  Not only does its 
analysis undermine the purpose of the expunction statute, it 
also sub silencio overrules recent precedent.  Ultimately, 
because the implications of its holding are yet unclear, it sows 
the seeds of confusion for circuit courts and litigants alike.  
And for what? 
¶31 Since the circumstances leading to this case arose, 
the form in question has been modified to eliminate the 
potential for confusion.1  Due to these revisions, those 
circumstances will not again be presented.  Thus, it is hard to 
imagine what benefit can be gained by the uncertainties and 
problems that inevitably will be wrought by the majority's sub 
silencio overruling of our clear precedent.  
¶32 I determine that the more prudent course is to take an 
approach that is consistent with the purpose of the statute and 
                                                 
1 This case arose because of an unclear form utilized by the 
Department of Corrections to notify the circuit court that the 
defendant had completed his probation.  The form had multiple 
boxes for the probation agent to choose from—boxes indicating 
whether the offender had or had not successfully completed his 
probation 
and 
boxes 
indicating 
whether 
certain 
terms 
of 
probation had been met. 
Here, the probation agent checked the boxes labeled "The 
offender has successfully completed his/her probation" and "All 
court-ordered conditions have not been met."  Based on those 
seemingly inconsistent markings, the circuit court determined 
that the defendant had not satisfied the terms of his probation 
and denied expunction. The old form has now been modified to 
include only two boxes: one indicating that the offender has 
successfully completed probation and one indicating that the 
offender was not successful. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
our recent precedent.  Under that approach, youthful offenders 
can be deemed to have successfully completed their sentences 
when they sufficiently comply with the terms of probation. 
¶33 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶34 The focus of this case is Wisconsin's expunction 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  It permits the expunction of an 
offender's criminal record if the offender meets various 
criteria, including successful completion of probation: 
 
 . . . when a person is under the age of 25 at the 
time of the commission of an offense for which the 
person has been found guilty in a court for violation 
of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment 
is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a)(1). 
¶35 "[S]uccessful completion" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b).  It requires an offender to have "satisfied 
the conditions of probation": 
 
A person has successfully completed the sentence if 
the person has not been convicted of a subsequent 
offense and, if on probation, the probation has not 
been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the 
conditions of probation. 
 
¶36 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) 
anticipates 
that 
a 
certificate of discharge will issue upon successful completion 
of probation and that the certificate "shall have the effect of 
expunging the record": 
 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
Upon 
successful 
completion 
of 
the 
sentence 
the 
detaining or probationary authority shall issue a 
certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to 
the court of record and which shall have the effect of 
expunging the record . . . . 
¶37 The majority reads this language in a manner that 
severely limits an offender's ability to utilize the statute.  
In doing so, it undermines the statute's purpose, overrules 
recent precedent sub silencio, and creates confusion.  I address 
each in turn. 
A 
¶38 It is well established that the purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015 is "'to provide a break to young offenders who 
demonstrate the ability to comply with the law' and to 
'provide[] a means by which trial courts may, in appropriate 
cases, shield youthful offenders from some of the harsh 
consequences of criminal convictions.'"  State v. Matasek, 2014 
WI 27, ¶42, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v. 
Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). 
¶39 This 
is 
a 
laudable 
purpose 
given 
the 
extreme 
consequences a criminal conviction can have on an individual.  
As Legal Action of Wisconsin's amicus brief observes, the 
consequences of a criminal conviction are both wide-ranging and 
long lasting: 
 
The American Bar Association (ABA) has identified over 
38,000 statutes and regulations that impose collateral 
consequences on people convicted of crimes.  Over half 
of these laws deny employment opportunities . . . .An 
offense history that once would have languished in the 
practical obscurity of an old court file, has now 
become a permanent and highly part of an individual’s 
public history. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Amicus Br. 2.  The negative impact a criminal record can have on 
employment is particularly troubling as "[r]esearch consistently 
shows that finding quality steady employment is one of the 
strongest predictors of desistance from crime."  Devah Pager, 
Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 Wis. L. 
Rev. 617, 647.2 
¶40 Thus, expunction offers not only a substantial benefit 
to an offender and society, it also "offers young offenders a 
fresh start without the burden of a criminal record and a second 
chance at becoming law-abiding and productive members of the 
community."  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 
856 N.W.2d 811.  It comes as no surprise then that the history 
of the expunction statute "show[s] a consistent legislative 
effort to expand the availability of expungement to include a 
broader category of youthful offenders."  Id., ¶20.   
¶41 With this background, Wis. Stat. § 973.015 should be 
liberally construed to provide expunction.  See Marquez v. 
Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶23 n.19, 341 
Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314 (citing Hughes v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 983, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996)) ("remedial 
                                                 
2 Other collateral consequences stemming from a criminal 
record include the denial of government issued licenses or 
permits, ineligibility for public services and public programs, 
and the elimination or impairment of civil rights.  See 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Collateral%20Co
nsequences%20of%20Conviction%20Act ("the numbers and complexity 
of these consequences have mushroomed and the U.S. prison 
population has grown . . . There is a real concern on a societal 
level that collateral consequences may impose such harsh burdens 
on convicted persons that they will be unable to reintegrate 
into society."). 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
statutes should be liberally construed to advance the remedy the 
legislature intended to provide."). 
¶42 Yet, the majority interprets the expunction statute in 
a manner that severely limits an offender's ability to utilize 
it.  Although it correctly states that an offender must "satisfy 
all the conditions of probation," it seemingly adopts the 
State's position that the offender's perfect compliance is 
required in order to be entitled to expunction.  Majority Op., 
¶13.  In doing so, the majority completely ignores Ozuna's 
argument that the word "satisfy" has been defined to mean "[t]o 
meet or be sufficient for (a requirement)."  See Satisfy, The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (5th ed. 
2017).. 
¶43 The 
majority's 
approach 
undermines 
the 
statute's 
purpose and the legislature's intent to reach a broader category 
of youthful offenders.  Probationers must adhere to such a 
myriad of conditions that requiring perfection effectively 
removes the possibility of expunction.  For example, there are 
the standard rules of community supervision that probationers 
must follow.3  These rules range from obtaining approval prior to 
borrowing money or making a purchase on credit, to reporting for 
scheduled and unscheduled appointments. 
¶44 Under the majority approach, an offender would be 
denied expunction for missing a single unscheduled appointment 
due to such unavoidable circumstances as an inability to find a 
                                                 
3 See 
http://doc.wi.gov/community-resources/Rules-of-
Community-Supervision/standard-rules-of-supervision-english. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
babysitter, getting stuck in traffic, or being unable to leave 
work.  That result is unreasonable and completely at odds with 
the purpose of the expunction statute. 
B 
¶45 In addition to undermining the statute's purpose, the 
majority's opinion also sub silencio overturns recent precedent. 
¶46 A scant three years ago, this court considered how an 
offender obtains expunction.  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320.  In Hemp, 
the circuit court had determined at sentencing that the 
defendant 
was 
eligible 
for 
expunction 
conditioned 
upon 
successful completion of probation.  Id., ¶5.  After the 
defendant completed probation he received a certificate of 
discharge from the Department of Corrections.  Id., ¶6.  The 
circuit court, however, denied his petition for expunction 
because it was "tardy".  Id., ¶9. 
¶47 This court examined whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 
placed any burden on the defendant to petition the circuit court 
for expunction within a specific timeframe and concluded that 
the duty rested on the detaining or probationary authority, not 
the defendant.  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶25.  We further 
concluded that "once the detaining or probationary authority 
forwards the certificate of discharge to the court of record, 
expungement has been effectuated."  Id., ¶29; see also id., ¶25 
("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 
certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 
individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and 
at that point the process of expungement is self-executing."); 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
id., ¶32 ("the forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the 
circuit court is what triggers expungement"). 
¶48 In explaining the holding, this court specifically 
rejected the notion that a certificate of discharge must be 
approved by the circuit court prior to a grant of expunction.  
Id., ¶36.  We recognized that any inference necessitating 
circuit 
court 
approval 
would 
be 
"impos[ing] 
additional 
requirements that are contrary to the statute's plain language."  
Id.  We repeatedly emphasized that the circuit court's role with 
respect to expunction was limited to its decision at sentencing.  
Id., ¶¶39, 40, 42.  Thereafter, the determination of whether a 
probationer had successfully completed probation was effectively 
left to those in the best position to evaluate it: the probation 
agents. 
¶49 The majority now reinserts the circuit court into the 
process of effectuating expunction.  It declares that "a 
person's statutory entitlement to expungement depends not on 
whether the court receives a particular notice from the DOC 
 . . . " and that "it is proper for a circuit court to deny 
expungement if a defendant has not met all three criteria for 
the 'successful completion of the sentence  . . . .'"  Majority 
Op., ¶14.   
¶50 These declarations cannot be squared with the holdings 
in Hemp.  A certificate of discharge cannot be the trigger for 
automatically effectuating expunction if the circuit court has 
the option to review it and make an independent determination on 
the matter.  Under the majority's analysis, expunction is no 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
longer automatic or self-executing as Hemp mandated.  Further, 
no longer is it the probation agent that exclusively determines 
whether an offender has successfully completed probation.  By 
reintroducing the circuit court into the expunction process 
after the DOC has issued its certificate of discharge, the 
majority unequivocally, yet sub silencio, overrules Hemp, 359 
Wis. 2d 320.4 
C 
¶51 In overruling Hemp, the majority creates confusion for 
circuit courts and litigants alike.  
¶52 It is now unclear what will happen when a certificate 
of discharge is issued.  Will it trigger expunction——as the 
plain language of the statute requires?  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b) ("a certificate of discharge which shall be 
forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect 
of expunging the record . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
¶53 Or will the court opt to review it——in clear violation 
of the Hemp holding?  See Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶32 ("the 
forwarding of the certificate of discharge to the circuit court 
                                                 
4 Recently, 2017 A.B. 331 was introduced in the Wisconsin 
Legislature to amend Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m).  The proposed 
legislation would  allow for the filing of a petition for 
expunction with the sentencing court after completion of the 
sentence. The Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) analysis 
explains:  "Current law specifies that the expungement order 
must be made only at sentencing and then the record is expunged 
when the person completes his or her sentence."  The LRB's 
description of current law is in accord with the plain meaning 
interpretation set forth in this dissent and underscores that 
the majority is indeed sub silencio overruling Hemp. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
is what triggers expungement"); id., ¶29 ("once the detaining or 
probationary authority forwards the certificate of discharge to 
the court of record, expungement has been effectuated."); id., 
¶25 ("the detaining or probationary authority must forward the 
certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the 
individual defendant's successful completion of his sentence and 
at that point the process of expungement is self-executing."). 
¶54 What criteria will the court use to decide whether to 
review the certificate of discharge?  What procedures will a 
court follow if it decides to review a certificate of discharge?  
¶55 Also left unanswered is what happens if there is a 
factual debate over whether the offender has satisfied the terms 
of probation. Must the court hold a hearing?  Will the offender 
have a chance to appear and argue the case? What is the impact 
of this disarray? 
¶56 Rather than providing guidance, the majority leaves a 
void.  It suggests that because Ozuna is not contesting the 
facts, this case "is not the proper vehicle in which to set 
forth the procedures a court is to follow when such factual 
matters are disputed."  Majority op., ¶14 n.9.  It further 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
expresses its "confidence" in the circuit court's ability "to 
resolve such matters fairly."  Id.5 
¶57 The majority's confidence provides cold comfort for a 
youthful offender hoping to get a second chance through 
expunction. 
¶58 Because the most likely result of the majority's 
decision is that circuit courts will adopt ad hoc procedures, an 
offender's chance at expunction could come down to which court 
receives the offender's certificate of discharge.  This poses a 
whole host of future due process concerns.  By creating an 
opportunity for circuit courts to review whether the terms of 
probation have been met, and failing to provide any guidance on 
how to do so, the majority creates more problems than it has 
solved, leaving confusion in its wake. 
II 
                                                 
5 We previously declined the opportunity to revamp our 
supreme court rule on expunction. On June 30, 2009, the Board of 
Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin filed a rules petition 
seeking changes to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) Ch. 72 (Retention 
and Maintenance of Court Record).  The petition also asked this 
court to amend SCR 72.06 (Expunction).  After public hearing and 
further discussion the court took no action on the petition, in 
part because it was aware that the Wisconsin State Legislature 
was then planning to establish a committee to study the issue of 
expunction.  In ensuing years, a number of legislative proposals 
have been introduced to address the issue, but none has advanced 
to fruition.  Ultimately, this court voted to dismiss the 
petition and await further legislative action. For a more 
detailed history of the petition, see S.Ct. Order 09-07 (issued 
July 19, 2016). 
 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶59 Contrary to the majority, I would interpret the 
expunction statute in a manner consistent with its remedial 
purpose. See State v. Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 470, 646 
N.W.2d 341 (2002). ("A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is 
that an interpretation supporting the purpose of the statute is 
favored over an interpretation that will defeat the manifest 
objective of the statute."). 
¶60 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Where the 
language is ambiguous, a court may consult extrinsic sources, 
such as the statute's purpose and legislative history, to 
discern a statute's meaning.  Id., ¶48. 
¶61 Here, both litigants present reasonable meanings for 
the words "satisfied the conditions of probation."  The State 
contends that it means perfect compliance with the terms of 
probation, while Ozuna pointed to a dictionary definition of 
"satisfy" that reads "[t]o meet or be sufficient for (a 
requirement)". Satisfy, The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language, (5th ed. 2017) (emphasis added).  Thus, the 
statute is ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47 ("a statute 
is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses.").6 
                                                 
6 This court has previously recognized statutory ambiguity 
created by use of the word "satisfy".  Abitz v. Abitz, 155 
Wis. 2d 161, 172 455 N.W.2d 609 (1990) (referring to "the 
ambiguous word 'satisfy' in sec. 766.55(2)(c), Stats."). 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶62 As discussed above, the purpose of the expunction 
statute is well established.  It is a remedial statute meant "to 
provide a break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability 
to comply with the law," which the legislature has consistently 
sought to expand.  Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38; see also Hemp, 
359 Wis. 2d 320, ¶20.  Accordingly, using the definition of 
"satisfy" 
that 
permits 
expunction 
when 
an 
offender 
has 
"sufficiently" complied with the terms of probation is more 
consistent with the purpose of the statute than using a 
definition that would limit expunction to offenders with have 
"perfect" compliance. 
¶63 A definition of "satisfy" that is based on sufficiency 
instead of perfection is also supported by the statute's 
legislative history. 
¶64 In 1983 the legislature amended the definition for 
"successful completion of a sentence" provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b).  The initial draft of the amendment stated 
that in order for a probationer to successfully complete a 
sentence, the probationer "must not violate any conditions of 
probation."  Drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 519, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  This language was replaced with 
the current language stating that to successfully complete a 
sentence, a probationer "must also satisfy the conditions of 
probation."  It appears the legislature expressly considered 
requiring perfect compliance with the terms of probation and 
rejected it. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
 
¶65 I turn now to apply the definition of "satisfy" based 
on sufficiency to the case at hand.  Although the form from the 
Department of Corrections indicates that Ozuna violated the term 
of probation prohibiting any alcohol use (it noted a single 
citation for underage drinking), no significant violations were 
reported.  Indeed, the Department of Corrections indicated that 
Ozuna's compliance with the terms of probation was sufficient by 
checking 
the 
box 
labeled 
"the 
offender 
has 
successfully 
completed his/her probation."  Accordingly, I conclude that 
Ozuna successfully completed his sentence. 
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 provides that when an 
offender has successfully completed his sentence, and the 
probation authority has forwarded a certificate of discharge to 
the court, it shall have the effect of expunging the offender's 
record.7  Here, because Ozuna successfully completed probation, 
expunction should have been granted automatically when the DOC's 
verification was received by the court.  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 
¶29.  Therefore, the court of appeals should be reversed. 
III 
¶67  In sum, the majority opinion makes no sense to me.  
It defies: 
                                                 
7 In this case the Department of Corrections (DOC) issued a 
Verification Form, rather than a certificate of discharge.  That 
is because the DOC does not issue certificates of discharge to 
misdemeanants. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
DOC 
§ 328.16(2).  
Nevertheless, the DOC is required to notify the court of a 
probationer's successful completion of sentence.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(5)(c).  It does so through the Verification Form, which 
serves as the functional equivalent of a certificate of 
discharge for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.015. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
 the purpose of the statue; 
 
 the statutory directive that where a certificate 
of discharge has issued it "shall have the effect 
of expunging the record . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(b); 
 
 a 
reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
the 
word 
"satisfies" that is more consistent with the 
statute's purpose and legislative history; 
 
 our clear and recent precedent; and 
 
 reality 
(the 
majority's 
apparent 
demand 
for 
absolute perfection is unmoored from the reality 
of the lives of many youthful offenders). 
 
¶68 It is unclear to me why the majority has bent over 
backwards to reach its confusing conclusion.  What is clear, 
however, is just how devastating the majority opinion is to the 
health of our justice system and to the lives of many youthful 
offenders.   
¶69 With the stroke of a pen, the majority has inexorably 
altered the trajectory of those lives.  They will forever wear 
the scarlet letter of convicted criminal and, together with 
their families, face a future of collateral consequences for 
their youthful convictions.  
¶70 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.  
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No. 2015AP1877-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1