Title: Hupp v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hupp v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming1986 WY 66715 P.2d 223Case Number: 85-149Decided: 03/07/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
TIMOTHY L. HUPP, D/B/A YOUR APPEARANCE, PETITIONER,

 
 
v. 

 
 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OFWYOMING, RESPONDENT.

 
 
Appeal from the 
Employment Security Commission.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

Rodger 
McDaniel, SoutheastWyoming Law 
Offices of Rodger McDaniel, Cheyenne. 

 
 
Representing 
Respondent:

Karen A. Byrne, Asst. 
Atty. Gen.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROONEY,* BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The single dispositive 
issue in this case is whether the Wyoming Employment Security Commission (ESC) 
has the authority to reconsider its own ruling in a contested case when that 
ruling was made by the full commission at the final stage of intra-agency 
review. We reverse and hold that decisions of the full commission sitting as an 
appellate tribunal are final unless a judicial appeal is taken to the district 
court by an unsuccessful party.1

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2.]     This case arose when 
Raylene Davis, a barber formerly employed at a barbershop owned by appellant 
Timothy Hupp, filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Ms. Davis listed 
appellant as her last employer. When the claim was processed, the ESC staff 
discovered that appellant had not registered his business with the commission. 
The ESC then began an investigation to find out whether appellant was liable for 
employer contributions to the unemployment compensation 
fund.

 
 

[¶3.]     The ESC's investigation 
resulted in an "Official Notice of Unemployment Insurance Coverage" which the 
agency sent to appellant. The notice informed appellant that he was an employer 
rather than an independent contractor and was, therefore, required to contribute 
to the fund. Appellant perfected a timely intra-agency appeal which was heard by 
an agency appeals examiner in Cheyenne on November 14, 1984. The examiner 
affirmed the initial agency determination, and appellant again appealed, this 
time to the Employment Security Commission itself. After entertaining oral 
argument on December 17, 1984, the three-member commission reversed the prior 
agency determinations and held that the barbers working at appellant's place of 
business "were not engaged in employment for Timothy L. Hupp, d/b/a Your 
Appearance. Timothy L. Hupp is not liable for taxes paid on their 
wages."

 
 

[¶4.]     The agency staff was 
apparently unhappy with the commission's decision and, on January 14, 1985, 
requested that the commission reconsider. Appellant was notified of the staff's 
request by mail. A nonevidentiary reconsideration hearing was held in Casper on January 24th, 
and the commission reversed itself by an order dated January 28th. The order 
stated:

 
 
"Upon reconsideration, we 
conclude that those who performed barber and cosmetology services for Hupp prior 
to August 2, 1983, were engaged in employment, under the Wyoming Employment 
Security Law, which subjected Hupp to contributions to the unemployment 
compensation fund based upon compensation paid to those 
individuals."

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant perfected a 
timely appeal to the district court, and the case was then certified directly to 
this court as permitted by Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. (Cum.Supp. 
1985).

 
 
THE PARTIES' 
CONTENTIONS

 
 

[¶6.]     The parties agree that 
the procedures followed by appellant and the ESC were entirely proper until the 
commission decided to reconsider its ruling of December 17, 1984. Appellant 
claims that the commission had no authority to reconsider and that even if it 
had such authority, its decision upon reconsideration was unsupported by 
substantial evidence.2 Appellee, the Employment Security 
Commission counters that the power to reconsider is inherent in an agency's 
power to decide and that the agency's decision upon reconsideration was 
supported by substantial evidence. We believe that the parties' first issue, 
whether the agency had authority to reconsider, is dispositive so we do not 
address the parties' second issue involving substantial 
evidence.

 
 
THE POWER TO 
RECONSIDER

 
 

[¶7.]     Any attempt to 
ascertain the powers of an administrative agency must begin with the proposition 
that only those powers expressly conferred by the legislature are granted to an 
agency. Brasel & Sims Construction 
Company, Inc. v. State Highway Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 655 P.2d 265, 
267 (1982).

 
 
"Stated in another 
manner, an administrative body has only the power and authority granted by the 
constitution or statutes creating the same * * *. Such statutes must be strictly 
construed or `any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved 
against the exercise thereof' * * *." (Citations omitted.) Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. 
City of 
Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3, 8-9 
(1974).

 
 
In the context of an 
agency's power to reconsider a final decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has 
stated:

 
 
"The weight of authority 
requires that an administrative agency's power to reconsider final decisions be 
statutorily grounded, either stated expressly or inferred from a reading of the 
entire statute." Yamada v. Natural 
Disaster Claims Commission, 54 Haw. 621, 513 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1973). Accord Olson v. Borough of Homestead, 66 
Pa.Cmwlth. 120, 443 A.2d 875, 878 (1982); Klaren v. Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners of Village of Westmont, 99 Ill. App.2d 356, 240 N.E.2d 535, 
537 (1968); Koehn v. State Board of 
Equalization, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal. App. 2d 109, 
333 P.2d 125, 128 (1958).3

 
 

[¶8.]     Consistent with the 
principle of enumerated agency authority, § 27-3-602(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 limits 
the ESC's power to create its own procedures. It states:

 
 
"(a) The commission 
shall:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) Determine its 
organization and methods of procedure in 
accordance with this act." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
In essence, the ESC may 
create and employ a reconsideration procedure only if that authority can be 
found somewhere in the Wyoming Employment Security Law, §§ 27-3-101 through 
27-3-704, W.S. 1977.

 
 

[¶9.]     Our search for 
statutory authority covers a limited portion of the Employment Security Law 
because only a few of the act's provisions relate to employer contribution 
cases. These cases commence either when the employer requests a contribution 
determination by the commission or when the ESC staff begins an investigation on 
its own motion. Section 27-3-502, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985). The staff makes 
the initial determination of employer liability, and it becomes final unless the 
employer appeals within 15 days after the determination is mailed. Section 
27-3-502(a), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985). If the employer appeals under § 
27-3-502(a), then § 27-3-506(d), W.S. 1977, supra, comes into play. That 
section, in turn, incorporates the procedures found in §§ 27-3-401 through 
27-3-409:

 
 
"An employer may apply to 
the commission for review of a decision or determination involving contribution 
liability. * * If the commission grants review, the employer shall be given 
opportunity for hearing in accordance with W.S. 27-3-401 through 
27-3-409."

 
 

[¶10.]  Section 27-3-403, W.S. 1977 governs the 
employer's initial appeal. It is conducted by an appeal tribunal which is 
composed of either a hearing examiner or a three-member body consisting of a 
salaried examiner and representatives of the employer and employee. When, as in 
this case, an employee is not a party, a single hearing examiner makes up the 
appeal tribunal. The initial appeal takes the form of a contested case governed 
by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See §§ 27-3-403 and 27-3-405, 
W.S. 1977, supra.

 
 

[¶11.]  If the appeal tribunal's decision is 
adverse to the employer, he can attempt an additional appeal under § 27-3-404, 
W.S. 1977. This second appeal within the agency is taken to the entire 
employment security commission. The commission can base its decision on the 
evidence taken by the hearing examiner, and it can also take new evidence. 
Section 27-3-404(b), W.S. 1977.

 
 

[¶12.]  Finally, if the full commission affirms a 
decision adverse to the employer, he has 30 days in which to bring an appeal to 
the district court. Section 27-3-506(d); Rule 12.04, 
W.R.A.P.

 
 

[¶13.]  Section 27-3-404, W.S. 1977 governs 
appeal procedure before the full commission. It is the statute which must be 
searched for language authorizing the full commission to reconsider its ruling 
in the employer's second appeal. Subsection (c) states in relevant 
part:

 
 
"The commission shall 
promptly notify parties to a proceeding of its decision including findings and 
conclusions. The decision is final unless 
judicial review is initiated pursuant to this article." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14.]  We think that the finality language of 
subsection (c) is clear. The commission cannot reconsider its appellate decision 
unless there is some other statute expressly permitting reconsideration. At 
first glance, it appears that subsection (d) of § 27-3-404 is just such a 
statutory exception. It states:

 
 
"Subject to limitations 
prescribed under W.S. 27-3-402(c), the commission may reconsider a determination 
provided by a final decision of an appeal tribunal and may apply to the tribunal 
for a revised decision."

 
 
But closer inspection 
reveals that the commission's power to reconsider the final decisions of appeal 
tribunals under § 27-3-404(d) is "subject to limitations prescribed under W.S. 
27-3-402(c)." Section 27-3-402(c) permits reconsiderations only when there is 
"an error in computation or identity [of the unemployment claimant]," when wages 
of the claimant relevant to the determination were omitted, or when benefits 
were denied or determined based on a misrepresentation of facts. In this case, 
none of these grounds for reconsideration were present. The commission 
reconsidered its decision because the staff thought the commission had misread 
its own precedent, not because there had been an error in computation, an 
omission of claimant's wages, or misrepresentation of facts. Its reconsideration 
exceeded the limitations created in § 27-3-402(c).

 
 
THE SPECIAL 
CONCURRENCE

 
 

[¶15.]  In his special concurrence, Justice 
Urbigkit contends that the APA authorizes the ESC to reconsider its decisions as 
long as the agency adopts rules of reconsideration procedure. Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming , Wyo., 601 P.2d 1306 (1979), is cited for the proposition 
that the APA prevails over the procedural sections of the Wyoming employment 
security statutes.

 
 

[¶16.]  Our holding in Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission 
of Wyoming 
was actually much narrower than suggested. We held that the APA procedures 
supersede conflicting statutes pertaining to employment security procedures that 
were passed before the APA was 
enacted. The key statute in this case, § 27-3-404(c), W.S. 1977, is not 
superseded by APA § 16-3-102 because the legislature recodified § 27-3-404 after the most recent revision of § 
16-3-102. 1983 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 114, § 
1 (§ 27-3-404); 1982 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 62, § 3 (§ 
16-3-102). It appears that the legislature intended that § 27-3-404(c), W.S. 
1977 as amended, rather than the provisions of the APA, govern ESC 
rehearings.

 
 

[¶17.]  If the legislature intended that the APA 
supersede all conflicting employment security statutes, it probably would have 
said so in the 1983 amendments to the Employment Security Law. In 1985, the 
legislature amended the statute at issue in Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming, supra, § 27-3-407, so that it no longer conflicted 
with the APA judicial review provision. But the legislature did not change the 
procedural statute which governs ESC rehearings - § 
27-3-404(c).

 
 

[¶18.]  The specially concurring opinion states 
that the legislature did not consciously withhold from the ESC power to rehear. 
But the plain language of § 27-3-404(c) suggests a conscious legislative 
decision to do just that. Section 27-3-404(c) states:

 
 
"The decision [of the 
full Employment Security Commission] is final unless judicial review is 
initiated pursuant to this article."

 
 
If the legislature 
intended to empower the ESC to rehear, it surely knew how to grant that power in 
plain terms. When the legislature gave the Public Service Commission the power 
to rehear, the legislature used the following unmistakable 
language:

 
 
"At any time after an 
order has been made by the commission any person interested therein may apply 
for a rehearing in respect to any matter determined therein and the commission 
shall grant and hold such rehearing if in its judgment sufficient reason 
therefor be made to appear, which rehearing shall be subject to such rules as 
the commission may prescribe." Section 37-2-214, W.S. 
1977.

 
 

[¶19.]  We cannot find ESC rehearing authority in 
Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P., which gives aggrieved parties 30 days to appeal final 
agency decisions to the district court. The rule applies to decisions on 
rehearing as well as all other final decisions. But this does not mean that all 
agencies must have the power to rehear. The rule is simply a procedural 
provision that applies to those agencies that have been given the power to 
rehear.

 
 

[¶20.]  Nor do subsections (a)(ii) and (b) of § 
27-3-602, W.S. 1977 authorize rehearings by the ESC. A careful reading of these 
sections reveals that the ESC can adopt rules of procedure only when they are in 
accordance with the specific procedural statutes in the Employment Security 
Law.

 
 

[¶21.]  While we sympathize with Justice 
Urbigkit's suggestion that the ESC be able to revise its own decisions within a 
reasonable time after they are made, we believe that authority to rehear must 
come from the legislature. Section 27-3-404(c) can be amended, or a rehearing 
provision similar to the Public Service Commission's rehearing statute, § 
37-2-214, W.S. 1977, can be enacted.

 
 

[¶22.]  Reversed.

1 The agency itself cannot 
bring an appeal to the district court because it is not a "person aggrieved or 
adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested 
case." Section 16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977; Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, Department of Health and Social Services, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523, 526 (1975).

2 Appellant also argued in 
his brief that even if permitted, the ESC's reconsideration was untimely. 
Appellant abandoned this contention at oral argument apparently recognizing that 
§ 27-3-506(d), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1985) governs the finality of the ESC's 
decision. If reconsideration were authorized, then § 27-3-506(d) would permit 
reconsideration within 30 days after the ESC's decision. In this case, the ESC 
did reconsider within 30 days of the December 17th decision. We must decide 
whether the agency could reconsider, not whether its reconsideration was 
timely.

3 Some state courts and 
several United 
States circuit courts of appeal have held that 
the power to reconsider is inherent in an administrative agency's power to 
decide. E.g., Trujillo v. General Electric Company, 621 F.2d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1980). This is clearly contrary to the Wyoming principle of 
limited agency authority.

 
 

BROWN, Justice, 
concurring.

 
 

[¶23.]  I concur in the result reached by the 
majority opinion. But I disagree with the majority insofar as it holds that the 
Employment Security Commission may reconsider a prior decision only if such 
authority is expressly granted by statute in the Wyoming Employment Security 
Act. I agree with Justice Urbigkit's special concurrence and would also hold 
that an agency may reconsider its prior decision if it has promulgated rules 
governing such reconsideration.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring, 
with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶24.]  I concur in the result of the majority 
opinion, except to determine only that an agency does not possess the right to 
reconsider a decision in the absence of adopted rules of procedure. I do not 
agree that "the ESC may create and employ a reconsideration procedure only if 
that authority can be found somewhere in the Wyoming Employment Security Law." I 
would hold that an agency, with the general powers to adopt rules of procedure 
when granted by the legislature, may reconsider a decision if the agency has 
adopted rules pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act regarding 
such reconsideration procedures, at a time when the post-decision appeal time 
has not expired. See § 27-3-506(d), W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., and appellate 
Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P.

 
 

[¶25.]  The authority of the Employment Security 
Commission is statutorily stated in the same general form as for many state 
agencies:

 
 
"(a) The commission 
shall:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(ii) Determine its 
organization and methods of procedure in accordance with this 
act;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(b) The commission may 
adopt, amend or rescind rules and regulations after notice and public hearing in 
accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act." Section 27-3-602, 
W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.

 
 

[¶26.]  The principle to be addressed is whether 
that rule-making authority includes the power to provide for the adoption of 
rules for a rehearing process under the time constraints otherwise provided by 
Wyoming law 
for the ultimate right to appeal to the courts. In order to accommodate the 
modern theories of administrative procedure, I would hold that the Wyoming law is sufficient to permit the adoption of these 
procedural rules and to permit agency case rehearings in the same general 
fashion as is now available to the trial courts of this state as the other fact 
finders in the Wyoming adjudicatory system. Koch, 
Administrative Law and Practice § 1.21, p. 38.1

 
 

[¶27.]  To authenticate this approach, the 
Wyoming 
legislature enacted the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act as § 16-3-101, et 
seq., W.S. 1977 (1982 Replacement):

 
 
"General rulemaking 
requirements; assistance of attorney general.

 
 
"(a) In addition to other 
rulemaking requirements imposed by law, each agency shall:

 
 
"(i) Adopt rules of 
practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal 
procedures available in connection with contested cases;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(c) In formulating rules 
of practice as required by this section, each agency may request the assistance 
of the attorney general and upon request the attorney general shall assist the 
agency or agencies in the preparation of rules of practice." Section 
16-3-102.

 
 

[¶28.]  A rule for this purpose is defined by § 
16-3-101(b)(ix), W.S. 1977:

 
 
"(ix) `Rule' means each 
agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets and 
prescribes * * * procedures, or practice requirements of any 
agency."

 
 

[¶29.]  The Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure 
recognize the potential rehearing process:

 
 
"In a contested case, or 
in a noncontested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the 
petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, 
certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of 
the petition for a rehearing, or, if 
a rehearing is held, within thirty 
(30) days after written, certified notice to all parties of the decision thereon 
* * *." (Emphasis added.) Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P.

 
 
See Big HornCounty 
Commissioners v. Hinckley, Wyo., 
593 P.2d 573 (1979).

 
 

[¶30.]  The majority opinion in this case is 
correct in assessing the status of the law as less than unanimous. Three basic 
rules exist, with a number of deviations for specific 
circumstances.

 
 

[¶31.]  The rule adopted in the majority opinion 
is the statutory requirement standard, as particularly reflected in a Hawaiian 
case, Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims 
Commission, 54 Haw. 621 Hawaii, 513 P.2d 1001 (1973). But see Kahalekai v. Doi, 60 Haw. 324 Hawaii, 590 P.2d 543 
(1979), where apparently the discretionary rehearing process existed. Most but 
not all California cases are in accord. Cf. Koehn v. State Board of Equalization, 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal. App. 2d 109, 333 P.2d 125, 
128 (1958), and Heaps v. City of Los 
Angeles, 6 Cal. 2d 405, 57 P.2d 1323 (1936), with In re Fain, 135 Cal. Rptr. 543, 65 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1976). A differential may be determined by which an agency is 
subject to the California Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 537, Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. State, 217 Cal. App. 2d 77, 31 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1963). In general accord with this rule, at 
least in earlier times, see Arizona Magma 
Copper Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 67 Ariz. 77, 191 P.2d 169 
(1948). See also Pearce Hospital 
Foundation v. Illinois Public Aid Commission, 15 Ill. 2d 301, 154 N.E.2d 691 
(1958); Slosburg v. City of Omaha, 
183 Neb. 839, 
165 N.W.2d 90 (1969). But see American 
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Arizona Air Pollution Control Hearing Board, 
113 Ariz. 243, 550 P.2d 621, 622 (1976):

 
 
"A board, commission or 
tribunal can use its appropriate modification power to reconsider decisions 
until the time when an appeal is perfected."

 
 

[¶32.]  The second rule, designated as the 
inherent-authority rule, is derived from a theory of jurisprudence that the 
nature of the task appointed to the administrative agency and its responsibility 
in performance affords an inherent authority for a rehearing opportunity to 
reconsider a previous result. Most federal cases fall into this category, and 
the rule is likewise found in a substantial number of states. Lane v.   United States ex rel. Mickadiet, 241 U.S. 201, 36 S. Ct. 599, 60 L. Ed. 956 (1916); Trujillo 
v. General Electric Co., 621 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1980); Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Commission, 44 
Del. 304, 58 A.2d 889 (1948); Air-Way 
Branches v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, 10 N.J. 609, 
92 A.2d 771 (1952); Henry v. Department 
of Labor, Del.Super., 293 A.2d 578 (1972); United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 845, 222 Ct.Cl. 421, cert. denied in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 
446 U.S. 953, 100 S. Ct. 2920, 64 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1980); State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. 
Environmental Board of Review, 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 374 N.E.2d 1355 (1978); 73A 
CJS Public Administration Procedure § 161, p. 151.

 
 

[¶33.]  Some detail of the various mutations can 
be elicited from Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 932, 933, with supplements, and 73A C.J.S., 
Public Administration Procedure § 161, supra.

 
 

[¶34.]  A close look at a significant number of 
cases in individual states causes questions of consistency, as, for example, 
California and Arizona, and the differences may be derived 
from statutory factors not clearly disclosed by the 
opinions.

 
 

[¶35.]  The third rule, which applies logic and 
will best accommodate Wyoming law and legislative procedure, is to acknowledge 
that the general power provisions of the normal agency statute, including the 
ability and obligation to adopt rules of procedure, afford the right through 
those provisions and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to adopt the 
additional rules as part of the hearing process which provide agency procedural 
flexibility by rehearing. Some states have an express provision in their 
administrative procedures act, as, for example, Pennsylvania. SeeCommonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources v. 
Wolford, 16 Pa. Commw. 254, 329 A.2d 304 (1974). 

 
 

[¶36.]  Without requiring specific additional 
statutory provision, this recommended approach of statutory adoption permits an 
agency through its rule-making process to provide any rehearing arrangements as 
are deemed necessary or useful within appeal-right time constraints. Conversely, 
this approach affords the legislature an opportunity to deny rights of rehearing 
for the individual agency by specific language in the general powers provisions 
for that particular agency. The agency has more time and more expertise to deal 
with the governmental mission than can be afforded by the legislature as 
otherwise would be required for individual agency statutory approval for each 
rule adoption. Koch, supra at pp. 127-128. It should not necessarily be assumed 
that a particular agency will want a rehearing process, since it might afford an 
automatic additional pleading stage and decisional requirement which the agency 
would prefer to avoid. Other agencies, such as the Public Service Commission, 
which incidentally does have the statutory authority, might find that the 
complexity of the issues to be decided justifies and accommodates a second-look 
opportunity of the nature that would be afforded by a rehearing rule as a matter 
of discretion of the agency, and for exercise of the discretion of the agency in 
the utilization of the adopted rule, if any. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535, 66 S. Ct. 687, 697-98, 
90 L. Ed. 821 (1946); Duvin v. State 
Department of Treasury, Public Emp. Retirement System, 76 N.J. 203, 386 A.2d 842 (1978); Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.09, pp. 
605, 610.

 
 
 
 

[¶37.]  Additionally, it should be recognized 
that the statutory requirement standard is logically not necessarily constrained 
to "state" agencies and could rationally envelop all public instrumentalities 
created by legislative authorization, as might include hospital boards, weed and 
pest control districts, the community development authority, and even city 
councils. There are many governmental agencies in Wyoming which function by 
virtue of statutory provisions, permitting adoption of rules and regulations for 
operational procedure.

 
 

[¶38.]  In the absence of the repeal of the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which repeal is highly unlikely, this 
court is mandated to require agency rule adoption in accord with its terms as a 
predicate for power or procedure exercise.2 Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary 
School District No. 9, Fremont County, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (1971); Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979).

 
 

[¶39.]  The process which I recommend is 
consistent by discussion of either a statute or a rule, with an Illinois 
decision, Klaren v. Board of Fire and 
Police Commissions of Village of Westmont, 99 Ill. App.2d 356, 240 N.E.2d 535 (1968), and Olson v. Borough of 
Homestead, 66 Pa. Commw. 120, 443 A.2d 875 (1982). A case specifically in 
point is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation 
v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 132 W. Va. 650, 54 S.E.2d 169 
(1949). SeeState ex rel. Klotter v. Police Board of City of 
New 
Orleans , 51 La. Ann. 747, 25 So. 637 
(1899); Helvering v. Continental Oil 
Co., 63 App.D.C. 5, 68 F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 292 U.S. 627, 54 S. Ct. 629, 78 L. Ed. 1481 (1933); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 939, 
955.

 
 

[¶40.]  Atlantic Greyhound affords a thoughtful 
discussion of the view which I recommend that this court should rationally 
adopt.

 
 

[¶41.]  Based upon the statutory premise that 
"the commission may prescribe rules of practice and procedure, and the method 
and manner of holding hearings," the West Virginia agency adopted a rule which 
"authorizes rehearing as a proceeding upon petition, duly verified, filed within 
ten days after final decision in the case." The court, in reference to the 
adopted rule, said: 

 
 
"Denial of the authority 
of the commission to rehear a matter of which it has jurisdiction, in view of 
its power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure * * * would disrupt the 
orderly discharge of the duties and the functions which the Legislature, by the 
enactment of statutes, has required it to perform, produce confusion and 
uncertainty, and add to the number and the frequency of unnecessary appeals. 
Unless legally necessary, a conclusion which produces those results should not 
be adopted. In the absence of any limitation or precept of law which requires 
disavowal of that right, and it seems that there is none, the power of the 
commission to rehear a proceeding of which it has and retains jurisdiction will 
be recognized and its effective operation sustained and upheld." 54 S.E.2d  at 
175-176.

 
 

[¶42.]  I also find support in another Wyoming 
case involving the Employment Security Commission, Sage Club, Inc., v. Employment Security 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1306 (1979), as a significant step in 
looking to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act rather than to specific 
legislation for guidance in agency procedural matters.3 This court in Sage Club 
acknowledged that the Unemployment Compensation statute "sets out an elaborate 
scheme providing for judicial review." Id. at 1308. The court then determined that 
judicial review of final decisions of the Employment Security Commission is 
governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and by court rule,4 and that inconsistent statutes in 
the Employment Security Law were superseded. The court wrote 
that:

 
 
"* * * While the statutes 
which govern the activities of the E.S.C. are extraordinarily detailed in 
setting out the rules which govern that agency's operations and also set out in 
detail the procedures for conducting hearings in contested cases, as well as 
providing a specific procedure for judicial review of final agency 
determinations, the E.S.C. is not immune from the terms of the W.A.P.A." 601 P.2d  at 1308.

 
 

[¶43.]  Just as this court in Sage Club ruled 
that the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act superseded the 
specific Employment Security Law statutes on judicial review, it could have with 
equal justification ruled that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
superseded the Employment Security Law statutes regarding agency operations and 
contested-case procedures. This court may have in fact done just that in the 
quoted sentence.

 
 

[¶44.]  The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
has been in effect in Wyoming since 1965, Ch. 108, S.L. of Wyoming 
1965. Agencies, lawyers, contestants, and regulated parties have become 
accustomed to its requirements. Quoting again from Sage Club, 
supra:

 
 
"* * * The readily 
apparent purpose of the W.A.P.A. was to provide uniform procedures to be 
followed in the adoption of rules and in conducting contested hearings." 601 P.2d  at 1308.

 
 

[¶45.]  Some agencies may have specific statutory 
authority to reconsider decisions while others do not. An example of an agency 
with rehearing authority is the Public Service Commission. See § 37-2-214, W.S. 
1977. A similar statute for other agencies was not found. These inconsistencies 
are not based on conscious decisions by the legislature to distinguish agencies 
which should have authority to reconsider from agencies which should not have 
that authority. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, as a conscious 
legislative act, did provide a mechanism for agencies to adopt procedural ground 
rules which guide agency decisionmaking in a predictable manner.5 First National Bank of Thermopolis v. 
Bonham, Wyo., 
559 P.2d 42 (1977). Had the Employment Security Commission previously adopted a 
rule allowing for reconsideration, Mr. Hupp would not have been taken by 
surprise in this case when the agency decided to reconsider its 
decision.

 
 

[¶46.]  Correction of a patent error at the 
administrative level will save the judiciary time and may save the parties the 
expense of an appeal. Both are desirable objectives. They should not be 
foreclosed by requiring specific statutory authority to reconsider a decision 
when the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking statutes serve as a 
mechanism to create needed procedural rules for an agency to reconsider its own 
erroneous decisions. The legislature, in any event, retains the right to 
ultimate decision through the text of the Administrative Procedure Act or by 
specific provisions in the individual agency statutes. The additional control 
afforded through the rules review process, § 28-9-101 et seq., W.S. 1977 (1984 
Replacement), in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-101 
et seq., is a very significant legislative restraint. See XIV Land & Water 
L.Rev., supra, for a discussion of the rather unusual process as retained 
administrative and legislative control or supervision as providing for 
participation by the attorney general, § 16-3-102(c); approval by the governor, 
§ 16-3-103(d); and also review by the legislature, § 28-9-101 et seq., and § 
16-3-103(a)(i).

 
 

[¶47.]  I concur in the reversal, but would not 
deny agency authority to adopt reasonable rules of procedure to afford a 
discretionary rehearing process.

1 The basic goal and 
responsibilities for an administrative law system as accommodated by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act is expressively discussed by Koch, supra, § 1.11, 
p. 25, to facilitate the optimum delivery of government services to the public 
with fairness, responsiveness and efficiency. See also Bloomenthal, Administrative Law in Wyoming - An 
Introduction and Preliminary Report, 16 Wyo. L.J. 191 (1962), and Comment, 
The Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act, I Land & Water L.Rev. 497 (1966). Of interest generally on the 
adaptation of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act see Administrative Law, Wyoming Style, XVIII 
Land & Water L.Rev. 223 (1983); Singer, Administrative Regulation Review - Act 
II, XV Land & Water L.Rev. 205 (1980); and Comment, Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act, 
XIVLand & Water L.Rev. 189 
(1979).

2 This court was advised 
at oral argument that the Employment Security Commission has, since this case 
developed, adopted a rule of procedure for rehearing. The majority would void 
that rule, which I would not choose to do.

3 The definition of agency 
in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act includes commissions. Section 
16-3-101(a)(i), W.S. 1977.

4 Specifically governed by 
Rule 12, W.R.A.P., which, at the time the Sage Club dispute arose, was Rule 
72.1, W.R.C.P.

5 An administrative agency 
should have the authority to reconsider and correct its own decisions, 
especially when a decision is determined upon reflection to be obviously 
erroneous. District courts need not be burdened with correcting errors which 
become obvious to an agency before the agency loses jurisdiction when the 
judicial appeals process is invoked. Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bongards Co-Op 
Creamery Ass'n, 253 Minn. 101, 91 N.W.2d 122, 73 A.L.R.2d 933 (1958); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
Arizona Air Pollution Control Hearing Board, 113 Ariz. 243, 550 P.2d 621 
(1976); State ex rel. Republic Steel 
Corp. v. Environmental Board of Review, 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 8 Ohio.Ops.3d 79, 
374 N.E.2d 1355 (1978).