Title: People v. Bonutti

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96218-Agenda 3-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BORIS
							P. BONUTTI, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Boris P. Bonutti, was charged with driving while
under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West
2002)) and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more
(625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2002)). Defendant moved to
suppress the results of his breath-alcohol test, arguing that an episode
of gastroesophageal reflux rendered those results unreliable.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court of Effingham
County granted the motion and suppressed the test results. The
appellate court affirmed. 338 Ill. App. 3d 333. We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

BACKGROUND
	On the evening of April 26, 2001, Illinois State Trooper Richard
Largen stopped defendant's vehicle for speeding. After noticing that
defendant smelled of alcohol and was slurring his speech, Officer
Largen administered a battery of field sobriety tests, which defendant
failed. Officer Largen then arrested defendant for driving under the
influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)). At the
station, defendant submitted to a breath-alcohol test, which showed
that defendant had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.174.
Accordingly, defendant was also charged with driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)
(West 2002)). In addition, defendant's driving privileges were
summarily suspended (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(c) (West 2002)), and
that suspension was later confirmed by the Secretary of State (625
ILCS 5/11-501.1(h) (West 2002)).
	On July 26, 2001, defendant asked the trial court to rescind the
summary suspension. In his motion, defendant argued that the results
of his breath-alcohol test were unreliable because the test was
administered in violation of the statutorily mandated procedures.
Specifically, defendant argued that, in violation of section 1286.310(a)
of chapter 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code
§1286.310(a) (2002)), Officer Largen failed to observe defendant
continuously for 20 minutes prior to administering the test and failed
to confirm that defendant had not regurgitated during the 20-minute
observation period.
	On September 10, 2001, a hearing was held on defendant's
petition to rescind. At the hearing, Officer Largen testified that he is
trained and certified in the administration of breath-alcohol tests.
Pursuant to that training, Officer Largen observed defendant
continuously for at least 20 minutes prior to administering the breath-alcohol test. During that period, defendant did not ingest anything by
mouth, did not show any outward manifestations of pain, and did not
burp, belch, or regurgitate. Although defendant did request a glass of
water during the observation period, his request was denied. When
asked by Officer Largen whether he had taken any medications within
the last six hours, defendant responded that he had taken both aspirin
and Prilosec.
	 Defendant, in turn, testified that he suffers from esophageal
reflux disorder, which causes acid from his stomach to rise through his
esophagus to the back of his throat. This process causes defendant to
suffer pain "similar to a heart attack," and defendant was experiencing
a reflux episode during his wait at the police station. Although he did
not tell anyone at the station that he was experiencing a reflux
episode, he did request a glass of water, which relieves the burning
sensation caused by such episodes. Defendant testified that he takes
Prilosec to control the buildup of acid in his stomach, and that reflux
episodes, while often painful, are usually silent.
	The trial court denied defendant's petition for rescission. In so
doing, the trial court specifically found that Officer Largen was
credible and that there was no reason to doubt that Officer Largen
observed defendant continuously for at least 20 minutes prior to
administering the test and did not observe any burping or regurgitation
during that time. Moreover, the trial court noted the absence of any
medical testimony to support defendant's assertions about the effects
of esophageal reflux disorder or the uses of Prilosec. Finally, the trial
court believed that, if defendant had in fact experienced pain on the
magnitude of a heart attack, defendant would have brought that to
Officer Largen's attention.
	Four days later, defendant filed a "Supplemental Motion to
Exclude Breath Test Evidence." Unlike defendant's previous request,
which was aimed at rescinding the summary suspension of defendant's
driver's license, this motion was aimed at keeping the breath-alcohol
test results out of defendant's criminal trial. The supplemental motion
was set for hearing on September 18, 2001. Prior to that hearing, the
parties agreed that the trial court should base its decision not only on
the new evidence presented at the September 18, 2001, hearing, but
also on the evidence already presented at the September 10, 2001,
hearing.
	The September 18, 2001, hearing began with the testimony of Dr.
Karl Rudert, defendant's treating physician. Dr. Rudert testified that
defendant has suffered from and been treated for gastroesophageal
reflux disorder (GERD) since 1992. GERD results in acid and fluid
from the stomach traveling back up the esophagus and into the back
of the throat. Defendant treats this condition with Prilosec, a drug that
neutralizes stomach acid and thereby reduces the burning sensation
associated with a reflux episode. In other words, Prilosec eliminates
the pain associated with reflux but not necessarily the reflux itself.
Reflux is usually a silent process that is not outwardly manifested, and
an episode can be triggered by, among other things, the consumption
of alcohol. According to Dr. Rudert, "reflux" and "regurgitation" are
synonymous.
	At the conclusion of Dr. Rudert's testimony, defendant returned
to the stand to confirm both that he experienced an episode of reflux
shortly before the breath-alcohol test was administered and that, other
than asking for a glass of water, he exhibited no outward
manifestations of his condition.
	This time, the trial court granted defendant's motion. In so doing,
the trial court noted that, in contrast to the prior hearing, defendant
presented medical testimony to support his claims. According to the
trial court, Dr. Rudert's testimony confirmed that defendant has
suffered from and been treated for GERD for several years, that
GERD causes acid and fluid from the stomach to travel up the
esophagus to the back of the throat, that reflux episodes are often
silent and unnoticeable to an outside observer, and that "reflux" is
synonymous with "regurgitation." On the basis of this testimony, the
trial court concluded that defendant met his burden of demonstrating
that the breath-alcohol test results were unreliable. Accordingly, those
test results were suppressed.
	The State appealed from the order suppressing the breath-alcohol
test results, and defendant appealed from the order denying his
petition to rescind the summary suspension. The appellate court
affirmed both orders. 338 Ill. App. 3d 333. We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	On appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress, this court
employs a bifurcated standard of review. With respect to factual
findings, this court accords a great deal of deference to the trial court
and will reverse only if its factual findings are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431
(2001). On the ultimate question of whether the evidence in question
should or should not be suppressed, however, we employ a de novo
standard. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 431. In this case, the State does not
contest any of the trial court's factual findings. Rather, the State's sole
argument is that the trial court's reading of section 1286.310(a) of
chapter 20 of the Administrative Code is erroneous as a matter of law.
	Administrative regulations have the force and effect of law and
are construed according to the same standards that govern the
construction of statutes. Union Electric Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 391 (1990). The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of
Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The best indication of
legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479
(1994). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply
the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction.
Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85
(1999). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330
(2000).
	The regulation at issue in this case derives from section 11-501.2
of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2002)),
which governs the use of breath-alcohol test results in drunk-driving
prosecutions. Under section 11-501.2, breath-alcohol test results
"shall be admissible," provided that the test is "performed according
to standards promulgated by the Department of State Police." 625
ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2002). Those standards, in turn, are set forth
in section 1286.310(a) of chapter 20 of the Administrative Code,
which states:
			"(a) Prior to obtaining a breath analysis reading from a
subject, the BAO or another agency employee shall
continuously observe the subject for at least 20 minutes.
				(1) During the 20 minute observation period the subject
shall be deprived of alcohol and foreign substances and
shall not have regurgitated or vomited.
				(2) if the subject regurgitates or vomits during the
observation (deprivation) period, the process shall be
started over by having the individual rinse the oral cavity
with water.
				(3) If the individual continues to regurgitate or vomit,
alternate testing shall be considered." 20 Ill. Adm. Code
§1286.310(a) (2002).
	According to the State, the sole inquiry under section
1286.310(a) is whether or not the testing officer actually observes any
vomiting or regurgitating during the 20-minute observation period. If
the officer does observe vomiting or regurgitation during that period,
the test results are presumptively unreliable and therefore inadmissible.
Conversely, if the officer does not observe vomiting or regurgitation
during that period, the test results are presumptively reliable and
therefore admissible as a matter of law. In other words, under the
State's reading of section 1286.310(a), any inquiry into whether the
subject in fact vomited or regurgitated is both irrelevant and
inappropriate, as the officer's observations are solely dispositive.
	Like both the trial court and the appellate court, we categorically
reject the State's reading of section 1286.310(a). First, the State's
reading finds no support in the text of section 1286.310(a). Section
1286.310(a)(1) plainly states that "[d]uring the 20 minute observation
period the subject shall be deprived of alcohol and foreign substances
and shall not have regurgitated or vomited." (Emphasis added.) 20 Ill.
Adm. Code §1286.310(a)(1) (2002). Section 1286.310(a)(2), in turn,
provides that "[i]f the subject regurgitates or vomits during the
observation (deprivation) period, the process shall be started over by
having the individual rinse the oral cavity with water." (Emphasis
added.) 20 Ill. Adm. Code §1286.310(a)(2) (2002). Neither of these
clauses in any way speaks to the officer's observations. On the
contrary, both clauses speak exclusively to the subject's actions,
which were properly the focus of the trial court's attention in this
case.
	Second, the State's reading of section 1286.310(a) finds no
support in public policy. As the appellate court below correctly noted,
the purpose of section 1286.310(a) is to ensure that only accurate
breath-alcohol tests are admitted into evidence against a criminal
defendant. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 341. The State's reading of section
1286.310(a) wholly undermines this purpose by virtually ensuring that
inaccurate test results will be admitted. In this case, for example, the
trial court believed that Officer Largen both observed defendant
continuously for 20 minutes and failed to notice any vomiting or
regurgitation during that period. But the trial court also believed that
defendant has long suffered from GERD, that GERD results in silent,
unobservable regurgitation, and that defendant experienced a reflux
episode during the 20-minute observation period. Thus, the trial court
believed that, despite Officer Largen's diligence, the results of
defendant's breath-alcohol test may have been compromised by an
episode of reflux. If the State had had its way, the trial court
nevertheless would have been compelled to admit those results, treat
them as reliable, and perhaps even use them as the basis for a criminal
conviction. The problem, then, is that, while the State's reading of
section 1286.310(a) ensures that breath-alcohol tests are admissible,
it does nothing to ensure that those results, once admitted, are
reliable. And reliability, after all, is the paramount concern.
	The State responds with a public policy argument of its own.
According to the State, "[o]nce substantial compliance with the
regulation is taken out of the objective officer's control and put into
a defendant's control, defendants across the board will have a ready
way to circumvent the suspension rules and impair their ultimate
prosecutions for driving under the influence of alcohol." In other
words, the State is convinced that today's decision will allow every
future DUI defendant to walk into court with a manufactured GERD
defense and walk out of court with an acquittal. This argument is
wholly without merit, and it does a tremendous disservice to the trial
court's thoughtful decision in this case. Contrary to the State's
suggestion, the trial court was not hoodwinked by a manufactured
defense. On the contrary, the trial court was convinced by the
testimony of defendant's personal physician, who testified both to the
nature of GERD and to defendant's 10-year bout with that condition.
As the trial court explained it:
			"The State has made reference to this being a perfect
defense for this type of offense, and I have to admit candidly
that initially there was some skepticism on this Court's part
with respect to issues related to Mr. Bonutti's condition. For
this to be the perfect defense for Mr. Bonutti, then one would
have to think that he somehow has planned this since 1992
and has been treated at least since 1995 by Dr. Rudert."
As these comments illustrate, there is absolutely no foundation for the
State's belief that, after today, "defendants across the board will have
a ready way to circumvent the suspension rules and impair their
ultimate prosecutions for driving under the influence." Trial courts are
smarter than that, and they appreciate the distinction between a family
physician who has treated the accused for years and a hired gun who
first met the accused last Tuesday.
	In closing, we note that this is not the type of suppression case in
which clear evidence of criminal wrongdoing is withheld from the fact
finder because of a prosecutorial misstep. Section 1286.310(a) exists
because regurgitation within 20 minutes of a breath-alcohol test can
render a false positive. In other words, a lack of compliance with
section 1286.310(a) has the potential to create criminals out of people
who are not. This is not a "technicality," and it is not a contingency
that this court will countenance.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.