Title: Osborn v. Roche

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

813 So. 2d 811 (2001)
John Jay OSBORN, M.D., and Seth I. Izenberg, M.D.
v.
Bobbie Jean ROCHE.
1000854.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 14, 2001.
*813 D. Scott Wright and Thomas H. Nolan, Jr., of Brown, Hudgens, P.C., Mobile, for appellants.
Submitted on appellants' brief only.
HARWOOD, Justice.
This appeal was filed pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R.App. P., by John Jay Osborn, M.D., and Seth I. Izenberg, M.D. We granted them permission to appeal from the trial court's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., order setting aside summary judgments entered for them on claims brought by Bobbie Jean Roche under the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("AMLA"). We reverse and remand.
On November 6, 1995, Roche was brought to the emergency room at the University of South Alabama Medical Center. She had suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident. These included a closed-head injury, bilateral frontal lobe hemorrhages, frontal parietal soft tissue hematoma, fracture of the right humerus, a nondisplaced fracture of the left vertebral artery foramen of the second cervical vertebrae in the neck ("C2"),[1] and various other injuries. She was in a coma and was placed on a ventilator. Osborn, a fifth-year resident certified in general sugery, was the resident in charge of Roche's care. Izenberg, a board-certified specialist in both general surgery and critical care, was the supervising physician.
During Roche's emergency-room treatment, a radiological exam of her spine was attempted, but the odontoid process[2] they were trying to X-ray was obscured by the teeth. Dr. Osborn, Roche's primary emergency physician, stated in his deposition that in order to get improved odontoid views it would be necessary to tilt the head back, open the mouth, and insert the X-ray tube into Roche's mouth; he concluded that, in Roche's condition, suffering from a broken neck and a head injury, such a procedure would be unwise. On the basis of those facts, Osborn refused to order repeat odontoid X-rays, and they were never performed.
Roche remained as a patient at the University of South Alabama Hospital ("USAH") for nine days, during which time she was brought off the ventilator and recovered from her coma. On November 15, 1995, as a result of her improved condition, Roche was discharged. At the time of her discharge, her diagnosis was a closed-head injury, a fracture of the right humerus, and a compression fracture of C2, which was stable, all resulting from a motor-vehicle accident.
After her discharge, Roche continued to suffer severe pain in the cervical area. She was seen by Dr. Russell A. Hudgens, a member of the USAH department of orthopedic surgery. Dr. Russell ordered a cervical spine X-ray; that X-ray showed a displaced type II[3] odontoid fracture. As a result of the odontoid fracture, Roche was required to wear a halo apparatus[4] for approximately two months.
On November 5, 1997, Roche filed a complaint against Dr. Osborn, Dr. Izenberg, other USAH doctors who were involved *814 in her care,[5] and numerous fictitiously named parties, alleging negligence under AMLA. The complaint alleged that Roche's treating physicians had negligently failed to diagnose a fracture in her neck, and that as a result she had been required to wear a halo for two months and she had suffered a loss of rotation in her neck.
Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg filed motions for a summary judgment on September 27, 1999, each claiming qualified immunity from civil liability as employees of USAH, a state operated hospital, and each motion asserting that the movant was entitled to a summary judgment because Roche had failed to offer expert testimony as to the standard of care. Although the record does not specify, we infer that Roche offered some form of opposition to the motions for summary judgment. At some point, also not specified in the record, the trial court placed the case on the administrative docket awaiting the outcome of the following cases that were then pending on appeal before this Court: Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.2000); Wells v. Storey, 792 So. 2d 1034 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala.2000); and Wimpee v. Stella, 791 So. 2d 915 (Ala. 2000). These cases all dealt with the extent to which doctors employed by the State were immune from civil liability.
On December 1, 1999, the attorney for Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg wrote the trial judge and informed him of this Court's November 24, 1999, decisions in Cranman, Wells, Rizk, and Wimpee, supra, and offered those cases as additional support for the September 27, 1999, motions for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on December 17, 1999, at which time, finding both doctors immune from civil liability, it issued a summary judgment for Dr. Osborn on the basis of Rizk, supra, and a summary judgment for Dr. Izenberg on the basis of Cranman, supra. The trial court's rulings, having disposed of all claims against the only two remaining defendants, constituted a final judgment. See, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-22-2; Lunceford v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 244 (Ala.1994); Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249 (Ala.1990); and Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So. 2d 267 (Ala. 1981).
Roche did not file a postjudgment motion within 30 days of the entry of the summary judgments, nor did she appeal. On June 16, 2000, on application for rehearing, this Court withdrew its opinion in Cranman and substituted another, with a different result. On June 30, 2000, also on application for rehearing, this Court withdrew its opinion in Rizk and substituted another, also with a different result. Those new opinions both denied absolute immunity for state-employed doctors. On November 30, 2000, Roche filed a "Motion to Reinstate" her case on the basis of the law in the substituted opinions in Cranman and Rizk. Although the motion to reinstate was not designated as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief from a judgment, the trial court appears to have treated it as such.
On December 14, 2000, Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg filed a joint motion in opposition to Roche's motion to reinstate. On January 24, 2001, the trial court issued an order reinstating Roche's case to the trial docket. In pertinent part, the order stated:
The trial court's order reinstating the case also contained a statement pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R.App. P., to allow a permissive appeal to this Court so that we could consider the changed holdings in Rizk and Cranman with respect to their effect on qualified state-agent immunity and the bearing of those holdings on Roche's motion for reinstatement.
On February 7, 2001, Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg petitioned this Court for a permissive appeal to review the interlocutory order of the trial court granting Roche's motion to reinstate. This Court permitted the appeal on March 7, 2001.
As noted, Roche's motion to reinstate was not designated as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, but that rule provides the only avenue by which she could obtain relief from the summary judgments for Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg, and we infer from the trial court's treatment of the motion, and the phrasing of its subsequent reinstatement order, that it proceeded under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, we consider the substance of the order and review it under the standards applicable to the appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders. See, e.g., Adams v. Farlow, 516 So. 2d 528 (Ala.1987); Swain v. Terry, 454 So. 2d 948 (Ala.1984).
This Court has said the following regarding our review of a Rule 60(b) motion:
Ex parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 402 (Ala. 1985).
The sole basis for Roche's motion for reinstatement of her case is that, on June 16, 2000, and June 30, 2000, respectively, this Court changed the law of state-agent immunity in Ex parte Cranman and Ex parte Rizk. The trial court's order does not designate which Rule 60(b) ground was relied upon as a basis for the reinstatement.
Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., states in pertinent part:
Roche's motion to reinstate was filed on November 30, 2000, 11 months after the entry of the final summary judgments on December 17, 1999. Because the last sentence of Rule 60(b) provides that a motion seeking relief under grounds (1), (2), and (3) must be filed within four months of the judgment, those grounds cannot support Roche's motion. Ex parte Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 So. 2d 279 (Ala. 1998), See also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cantley, 717 So. 2d 751 (Ala.1998), and Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 681 So. 2d 1047 (Ala.1996).
Rule 60(b)(4) offers relief from a judgment only when "the judgment is void." Although Rule 60(b)(4) is not subject to the four-month limitation, a judgment is void only under very specific circumstances:
Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So. 2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991), citing Satterfield v. Winston Indus., Inc., 553 So. 2d 61 (Ala.1989). Roche failed to present any evidence, nor is there any indication in the record, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties or that it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Thus, Rule 60(b)(4) cannot serve as a basis for the trial court's reinstatement order.
The specific ground that on its face provides the most likely fit with Roche's petition is that aspect of Rule 60(b)(5) that authorizes relief from a judgment when a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated. This Court considered the application of Rule 60(b)(5) in a similar situation in Patterson v. Hays, 623 So. 2d 1142 (Ala.1993). The Court in Patterson summarized the facts in that case as follows:
Patterson, 623 So. 2d  at 1144.
The plaintiffs in Patterson filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(5) and (b)(6), based on the change in the subsequent law effected by King v. National Spa & Pool Institute, Inc., 607 So. 2d 1241 (Ala.1992). As to the plaintiffs' claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(5), we held:
Patterson, 623 So. 2d  at 1145.
The rationale in Patterson concerning Rule 60(b)(5) is directly applicable to this case. The substituted decisions in Cranman and Rizk, which changed the law of state-employee immunity, were issued in cases unrelated to this one, and Roche's claims against Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg, having been disposed of by summary judgments, were not pending when this Court issued those substituted opinions. Rule 60(b)(5) cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for the trial court's order reinstating Roche's claim. Patterson, supra.
Rule 60(b)(6) is the "catchall" provision of the rule; it provides relief from a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." "Rule 60(b)(6) is an extreme and powerful remedy that should be used only under extraordinary circumstances." Phillips v. General American Life Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 1144, 1144 (Ala.1994). "Rule 60(b)(6) is designed to operate exclusively of the specific grounds listed in (b)(1) through (5), and relief cannot be obtained under (b)(6) if it would have been available under one of the other five subsections." Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., Inc., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala.1995).
The Court in Patterson, supra, also discussed Rule 60(b)(6):
623 So. 2d  at 1145.
In Ex parte Americold Compressors Co., 684 So. 2d 140 (Ala.1996), a plaintiff sued her employer for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court awarded her past medical benefits but found that, because her on-the-job injury had healed, she had suffered no permanent injury and she was not entitled to future medical benefits. At the time of the trial court's order, Davis v. City of Tuscaloosa, 494 So. 2d 643 (Ala.Civ. App.1986), governed the payment of future medical expenses. In Davis, the Court of Civil Appeals held that in cases where a trial court finds that the plaintiff has suffered no permanent disability as the result of an on-the-job injury, he or she was precluded as a matter of law from recovering any future medical benefits. Id. at 645.
In April 1995, the Court of Civil Appeals expressly overruled its decision in Davis in the case of Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Byrd, 659 So. 2d 672 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), "holding that a workers' compensation plaintiff found to have sustained a compensable injury is entitled to future medical *819 benefits, regardless of whether he or she suffers from any permanent disability as the result of the on-the-job accident." Ex parte Americold Compressors Co., 684 So. 2d  at 142.
In May 1995, the plaintiff in Americold made a "Motion to Enforce Judgment," claiming that the judgment rendered in February 1991 should be reopened to determine future medical expenses based on the change of law effectuated by Robbins. This Court disagreed:
Americold, 684 So. 2d  at 144.
In this case, Roche did not file any postjudgment motions or seek an appeal from the summary judgments. Roche could have filed a postjudgment motion or an appeal pending the outcome of the application for rehearing in Cranman, which was filed on December 8, 1999, and the application for rehearing in Rizk, which was filed on December 7, 1999.[6] She chose not to do so. As a result, Roche failed to do everything reasonably within her power to achieve a favorable result before the summary judgment became final. Patterson, supra. Accordingly, Roche's inaction in that regard and the compelling interests of finality discussed in Americold, supra, require us to conclude that the reinstatement of her claim cannot rest on the equitable relief afforded by Rule 60(b)(6).
The reinstatement of Roche's claims is not supported by any of the grounds listed under Rule 60(b) for relief from a judgment. The trial court's order setting aside the summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to reinstate the summary judgments for Dr. Osborn and Dr. Izenberg.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
*820 JOHNSTONE, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the judgment.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the judgment).
I concur with the main opinion in its analysis of why subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) of Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., do not authorize relief for this plaintiff. I think the correct analysis for subsection (5) would be the same as the analysis for subsection (6). I do not think Patterson v. Hays, 623 So. 2d 1142 (Ala.1993), governs the applicability of subsection (5) in the case now before us, because the case before us is distinguishable from Patterson. The reason the new rule in King v. National Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 607 So. 2d 1241 (Ala.1992), did not serve as a ground for reinstating the Pattersons' dismissed claims in Patterson v. Hays was that the new rule in King was expressly prospective only. The new rule in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala.2000), cited by the plaintiff now before us, is not prospective only, but is retrospective as well. Had the plaintiff now before us done all she reasonably could to keep her claims alive until Cranman and Rizk became final judgments of this Court, then their retroactive operation would have served as ground for vacating, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), the summary judgment entered against her.
[1]  These injuries would be generally described as bruising and bleeding in the brain, a broken upper right arm, and a broken neck.
[2]  An odontoid process is a protrusion of bone at the top of the C2.
[3]  A displaced type II odontoid fracture occurs when the odontoid breaks at the base of the C2 and becomes detached.
[4]  A halo immobilizes the head and neck through the use of a metal ring with screws that are attached to the skull.
[5]  These other doctors were subsequently dismissed on motions filed by Roche.
[6]  Filing dates for applications for rehearing are a matter of public record and are readily ascertainable from the office of the clerk of this Court.