Title: Randy Lamz v. Geico General Insurance Co.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-492
____________
RANDY LAMZ, et ux., 
Petitioners,
vs.
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
[August 16, 2001]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review Lamz v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 748 So. 2d 319
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with Government
Employees Insurance Co. v. Krawzak, 675 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1996), on the issue of
whether the petitioners are entitled to have their uninsured/underinsured motorist
carrier specially referred to as such, when the carrier is joined as a party defendant. 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth
below, we quash the Fourth District’s decision and find that the plaintiffs are
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entitled to have the jury know that the joined carrier is the plaintiffs’
uninsured/underinsured carrier.
The facts of this case, as stated by the Fourth District, are as follows:
Appellants Randy and Deborah Lamz were involved in an
automobile accident with a car driven by appellee Marnee Nichols and
owned by appellee Morris Leisner. The Lamzes sued Nichols and
Leisner, alleging that Nichols was negligent in the operation of
Leisner's automobile. As the Lamzes' underinsured motorist carrier,
Geico General Insurance Company ("Geico") was joined as a party
defendant.
Geico participated at trial as a party defendant, represented by
its own attorney.  A different attorney represented Nichols and
Leisner.  During voir dire, the trial judge identified all the defendants in
the case for the jury venire: 
  
[I]t's alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint that the defendant,
Marnee Heather Nichols, was the operator of the other
vehicle, that Mr. Morris Leisner was the owner of the
other vehicle, and the other defendant, Geico General
Insurance Company, is the plaintiffs' automotive
insurance carrier, and is also joined here as a defendant.
The judge denied appellants’ request that Geico be specifically
referred to as the plaintiffs’ "underinsured motorist carrier."  
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the ruling of the trial court, opining that our
decision in Krawzak v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 675 So. 2d 115
(Fla. 1996), does not require revelation of the exact nature of the insurance
coverage implicated by the appearance of the plaintiffs’ carrier in the lawsuit.   
 
In Krawzak, this Court indicated that in actions pursuant to section
1.   Section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes, was substantially changed in 1992
and no longer provides the authority for joinder of the uninsured/underinsured
carrier in the same action with the tortfeasor.  See, e.g., Young v. Dharamdass, 695
So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
2.  We recognize that Geico was not made a party in this case pursuant to
section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes (1991); however, the parties agree that Geico
was properly named as a defendant.  Therefore, Geico’s status as a proper party
defendant is not an issue before this Court.  In any event Geico’s policy requires
the insured to sue the tortfeasor and Geico if the parties cannot agree to arbitrate. 
The insured may sue Geico if within 30 days after receipt of a settlement agreement
Geico does not approve of the settlement, waive its subrogation rights, and agree to
arbitrate the claim.
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627.727(6), Florida Statutes (1991)1, it is appropriate to tell the jury of the presence
of an uninsured motorist (UM) carrier which has been properly joined in the action
against the tortfeasor.  Krawzak, 675 So. 2d at 117.2   In so holding, we approved
the reasoning of the Fourth District that because the UM carrier was lawfully sued
under the statute and pursuant to the terms of the contract its actual status should
be disclosed to the jury.  We relied in part on our decision in Dosdourian v.
Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1993), which concerned “Mary Carter agreements”
between the plaintiff and one or more settling defendants and which encouraged full
disclosure before the jury.  We said:
In Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla.
1993), we took a strong stand against charades in trials. 
To have the UM insurer, which by statute is a necessary
party, not be so named to the jury is a pure fiction in
violation of this policy.  The unknown consequence of
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such a fiction could adversely affect the rights of the
insured who contracted and paid for this insurance.
Krawzak, 675 So. 2d at 118 (footnote omitted).  In 1999, we went a step further
and deemed the failure of the trial court to identify a properly joined
uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier to the jury as per se reversible error. 
Medina v. Peralta, 724 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1999).  The plaintiffs in Medina, like the
plaintiffs in the case before us, filed a complaint against the tortfeasors and their
uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier based on an automobile accident. 
Geico argues here that the trial court did follow the mandate of Krawzak by
explaining to the jury that Geico was the Lamzes’ insurer.  Geico was, however,
being sued in its capacity as the Lamzes’ underinsured motorist carrier.  The trial
court refused to make this distinction.  The Fourth District agreed with the trial
court and stated: 
We read Krawzak as requiring identification of a
UM or UIM carrier as a party defendant and designation
of the attorneys representing the carrier at trial.  We do
not read the case as mandating the revelation of the
precise nature of the insurance coverage implicated in the
case.  The major policy reason behind the Krawzak
rule–the avoidance of charades at trial–is satisfied by the
disclosure of the insurer as a party and the identification
of the lawyers at trial acting on its behalf.  With such a
disclosure, a jury observing and listening to the carrier’s
lawyers will understand the carrier’s position at trial.
Revealing in this case that GEICO was the underinsured
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motorist carrier would have suggested to the jurors that the
other defendants had insurance coverage.  This runs counter to
the policy of “excluding improper references of a defendant’s
insurance coverage in civil proceedings . . . to preclude jurors
from affixing liability where none otherwise exists or to arrive at
excessive amounts through sympathy for the injured party with
the thought that the burden would not have to be borne by the
defendant.”
Lamz v. GEICO  Gen. Ins. Co., 748 So. 2d at 320-21.  Conversely, failure to
specifically identify the underinsured carrier as such leaves the jury to speculate
about the exact role of the plaintiff’s carrier in the lawsuit, perpetuating the
“charades in trials” denounced by this Court in Dosdourian.     
Moreover, the Medina, Krawzak, and Dosdourian line of cases clearly
establishes the principle that the jury should be made aware of the precise identity
of an uninsured or underinsured insurance carrier if it is a party at trial.  The policy
behind such a requirement is that full disclosure of the identity of the parties
protects the integrity of the jury system and prevents charades at trial.  See 
Medina; Krawzak; Dosdourian.   This principle was violated by the trial court and
the Fourth District.  Identifying the insurance company as merely a plaintiff’s
insurer without clarifying the full capacity in which it is being sued does not make
the jury fully aware of the underinsured carrier’s posture in the litigation.
Geico argues that many of the cases decided after Krawzak are 
3.   We do not address the nonjoinder issue raised by amicus curiae since the
issue was neither raised by the parties nor ruled on by the Fourth District.
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distinguished from the instant situation by the fact that in those cases, including the
Medina case, the trial judge did not identify the insurer at all, and the insurer’s
counsel was considered the tortfeasor’s co-counsel.  The Fourth District also
found a distinction based on the fact that in this case Geico was not permitted to
“sit out” of the trial anonymously.  Such distinctions, however, do not change the
basic premise on which Medina, Krawzak, and Dosdourian were decided. 
Krawzak and its progeny make clear that when the uninsured or underinsured
motorist carrier is properly named as a party defendant, it must be identified as
such.  We have made it clear that the jury should know who the parties are, and in
this case, the jury was not fully apprised of  Geico’s specific party status.  This
was reversible error.  See Medina. 3 
For the foregoing reasons, we quash the Fourth District’s decision and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion in which ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ.,
concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion in which HARDING, J., concurs in part.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion in which WELLS, C.J., concurs.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I concur with Justice Quince's majority opinion.  Identifying the plaintiff's
insurer as a party to the jury without identifying the capacity in which the insurer is
being sued leaves the jury to speculate as to why the plaintiff's insurer is a party in
the lawsuit and why the plaintiff's insurer is taking a position adverse to the plaintiff. 
Thus, identifying Geico simply as the plaintiff's insurer, without identifying its status
as an underinsured motorist carrier, has the real potential for misleading the jury as
to the reason for Geico's presence in the lawsuit.
ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent.  I would discharge jurisdiction because there is no conflict
jurisdiction.  The majority relies on Government Employees Insurance Co. v.
Krawzak, 675 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1996), for conflict jurisdiction and then upon
Krawzak and Medina v. Peralta, 724 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1999), in deciding that the
trial court is obligated to specifically identify GEICO as an underinsured motorist
(UIM) carrier.  However, Krawzak and Medina specifically state that those
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decisions are applicable only when a lawsuit is brought pursuant to section
627.727(6), Florida Statutes (1991) (hereinafter the 1991 statute).  In the case
before us, GEICO was not sued and joined pursuant to the 1991 statute, but rather,
the 1995 version of section 627.727(6) would have been applicable to this 1996
accident.  Therefore, this Court’s decisions in Krawzak and Medina are not
applicable, and there clearly is no conflict with Krawzak in view of the dramatic
statutory difference.
In Krawzak, this Court held that the jury should be made aware that a UIM
carrier is a party when properly sued and joined in an action against a tortfeasor
pursuant to the 1991 statute.  See Krawzak, 675 So. 2d at 116.  This Court
emphasized that the UIM carrier’s joinder was pursuant to the 1991 statute.  See id.
at 117 (“[I]n actions to which section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes (1991), is
applicable, it is appropriate for a jury to be aware of the presence of a [UIM]
insurer which has been properly joined in the action against the tortfeasor.”).  In
Medina, this Court held that it was per se reversible error to fail to identify a
necessary party that was joined pursuant to the 1991 statute.  See Medina, 721 So.
2d at 1190.  Consistent with our discussion in Krawzak, this Court emphasized that
our decision was based on the 1991 statute.  See id.
Our emphasis on the 1991 statute in Krawzak and Medina is important
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because the 1991 statute makes the UIM carrier a necessary party to the injured
party’s suit.  The record before this Court does not adequately reflect why GEICO
was added by a court order as a defendant to this action.  Although the majority
asserts that GEICO’s policy requires the insured to sue the tortfeasor and GEICO,
the written insurance contract is not in the record which is before this Court.  It is
clear that GEICO was not joined as a statutorily necessary party; neither was
GEICO sued for breach of contract based on the pleadings.  I do not agree with
the majority’s assumption that GEICO’s status as a party defendant makes our
analysis in Krawzak applicable.
As the majority points out, the Legislature rewrote much of the 1991 statute
in 1992.  See ch. 92-318, § 79, at 3149, Laws of Fla.  The following language was
removed from section 627.727(6) in 1992:  “[T]he personal representative may file
suit joining the liability insurer's insured and the underinsured motorist insurer to
resolve their respective liabilities for any damages to be awarded.”  § 627.727(6),
Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added); see ch. 92-318, § 79, at 3149, Laws of Fla. 
The 1992 amendments to the 1991 statute eliminated all references to joining a UIM
carrier as a necessary party to an injured party’s suit.  See id.  Our holding in
Krawzak was based on the language that was subsequently deleted by the
Legislature in 1992.
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This case involves how a trial court determined to advise the jury that the
UIM carrier was a party in this case for reasons not explained in the pleading. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the decision as to what to tell the jury about
GEICO being a party was within the discretion of the trial judge.  See Galbut v.
Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1976) (“[I]n the absence of a controlling statute
or overriding rule of procedure, trial courts have a broad discretion in the trial of a
cause.”).
I conclude that the trial court was well within its authority in this case,
especially in light of this Court’s policy against allowing irrelevant references to
insurance in these cases.  This Court has emphasized that unless the existence or
amount of insurance coverage has direct relevancy to a matter at issue, it is not a
proper matter for the jury's consideration of liability and damages.  See Beta Eta
House Corp. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1970).  By
mandating specific identification of insurers as UIM carriers under the
circumstances of the pleadings in this case, this Court will force courts to explain
UIM coverage to every jury when a UIM carrier is a party for any reason.  Forcing
courts to make such disclosures creates a substantial risk of unnecessarily shifting
the jury’s attention to insurance details where there are no insurance issues to be
decided by the jury.
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This is a special concern in light of the majority’s statement that “Identifying
the insurance company as merely a plaintiff’s insurer without clarifying the full
capacity in which it is being sued does not make the jury fully aware of the
underinsured carrier’s posture in the litigation.”  Majority op. at 5-6.  Does this
mean that the trial court not only has to identify the insurer as the UIM insurer but
must also give an instruction explaining what UIM coverage is?  What does the trial
judge then explain to the jury that it is to decide about UIM coverage?  If the UIM
carrier was sued for a breach of contract, perhaps this would be what the trial judge
should do.  That, however, is not the case before us.
However, more important than the decision in this specific case is the
jurisdictional issue which must be confronted.  As previously stated, this is a case
which first has to be analyzed on its pleadings.  When that is done, it is apparent
that this is not a case which should render a rule of law applicable to other cases. 
The applicability of the UIM statute is not at issue in this case.  This is precisely the
type of case in which this Court should refrain from accepting review and respect
the role of the Florida District Courts of Appeal as the courts of last resort in this
State.  See generally John M. Scheb, Florida’s Courts of Appeal:  Intermediate
Courts Become Final, 13 Stetson L. Rev. 479 (1984) (discussing intermediate court
finality as restored by the 1980 amendment to article V of the Florida Constitution). 
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The treating of the UIM carrier’s presence as a party defendant was a discretionary
decision by the trial court, and the Fourth District’s decision respected that
discretion.  For Florida’s jurisdictional plan to be effective, this Court cannot be an
additional appellate court providing a second appeal of a trial court’s exercise of
discretion.
HARDING, J., concurs in part.
HARDING, J., dissenting.
I dissent and would discharge jurisdiction in this case as improvidently
granted.  I do not believe the cases in question are in conflict.
WELLS, C.J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-3619 
(Broward County)
Scott A. Mager and Gary S. Gaffney of Mager & Sonn, LLP, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida; and Robert B. Baker of Baker & Zimmerman, P.A., Boca Raton, Florida,
for Petitioners
Richard A. Sherman and Rosemary B. Wilder of the Law Offices of Richard A.
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Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Alan W. Kaback of the Law Offices
of Gary E. DeCesare, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondents
Jeff Tomberg, J.D., P.A., Boynton Beach, Florida,
for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae