Title: State v. Henry

State: south-dakota

Issuer: South Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

210 N.W.2d 169 (1973) STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph HENRY, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11153. Supreme Court of South Dakota. August 28, 1973. *170 Donald R. Shultz, of Whiting, Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Ireland & Lebrun, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant. Walter W. Andre, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kermit A. Sande, Atty. Gen. (on the brief), Pierre, Jack T. Klauck, State's Atty., Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent. WINANS, Justice. The defendant, Joseph Henry, convicted of the crime of attempted third degree burglary with intent to commit larceny, appeals such conviction by assignments of error which present the following questions for review: Under the assignment having to do with the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the evidence, direct or circumstantial, fails to identify the defendant other than by mere speculation and conjecture on the part of the jury. The evidence given at the trial was wholly on behalf of the state's case, the defendant offering no evidence. As a reviewing court we must view the evidence in light most favorable to the state on appeal from a conviction. This court held in State v. Geelan, 1963, 80 S.D. 135, 120 N.W.2d 533, 536: The North Dakota Supreme Court has so held in State v. Moe, 1967, 151 N.W.2d 310. The evidence on behalf of the state stands undisputed and the material facts to the issue involved are: City police officer, Charles B. Johnson, on January 19, 1972 at approximately 4:00 o'clock A.M. was traveling in his patrol car at 10 to 15 miles per hour in the vicinity of Star Liquor Store in the 1100 block of Main Street in Rapid City, Pennington County, South Dakota. He observed two individuals standing in the northeast door of the Star Liquor Store. Johnson drove beyond, or to the west of the liquor store, stopped and drove in reverse for a "bootlegger turn". When the vehicle was turned the lights focused on the two individuals in the doorway of the Star Liquor Store and they took off, running. Officer Johnson testified that he recognized the smaller one of the individuals as a Mr. Prue. When the two individuals ran, Officer Johnson jumped out of the patrol car and took after them on foot. When Officer Johnson first saw these two individuals and before he left his car, he had communicated with headquarters that there was a burglary in process and he also notified another officer, named Price. The two whom Officer Johnson was chasing separated, running in different directions. Officer Johnson testified to the following: Officer Johnson also testified that the pickup under which he found the defendant was 75 to 80 feet from the rear of Star Liquor and that from the time he first drove upon these individuals until he found Mr. Henry underneath the pickup was approximately two minutes. He further testified that when Mr. Henry came out from under the pickup, "Mr. Henry was breathing quite heavily and perspiring", that the temperature was "cold and snowing." He further testified that when he lost sight of the individual with Prue was when the individual rounded the corner of an old vehicle and that that vehicle was approximately 30 feet from the vehicle under which Henry was found. On cross-examination, Officer Johnson testified as follows: We recognize that in the absence of evidence of participation a conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. United States v. Irons, 1973, 8 Cir., 475 F.2d 40. Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to prove defendant committed the offense. State v. Jellema, 1973, Iowa, 206 N.W.2d 679; State v. Peck, 82 S.D. 561, 150 N.W.2d 725. It is well established that in criminal as well as civil actions issues may be established by circumstantial evidence and circumstantial evidence alone may justify conviction providing it is of such probative force as to enable the trier of fact to say that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DePriest, 1973, N.D., 206 N.W.2d 859. It was held in State v. Johnson, 1940, 67 S.D. 459, 293 N.W. 822, that: Further guidelines on the weight and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence are found in State v. Scott, 84 S.D. 511, 173 N.W.2d 287. It is also "a general rule that the question of identity is a question for the jury, as is also the credibility of the witness, or witnesses, testifying as to identity, and the weight to be given the testimony." State v. Johnson, supra. We think the evidence in this case, though circumstantial, was sufficient to identify appellant as a participant in whatever crime was being committed. His identification as a participant is borne out by the fact that he fled, that within two minutes he was captured under a vehicle 75 feet from the building being burglarized, 30 feet from a vehicle where he was *173 last seen, on a cold night, breathing heavily and perspiring. This is all circumstantial evidence and we believe it to be sufficient. State v. Rodden, 1972, S.D., 201 N.W.2d 232, 234. These issues were presented and argued to the jury whose conclusion is based upon competent evidence. The defendant also complains of the information which charged: It is defendant's contention that the description, "Star Liquors" is insufficient to indicate who owned the building and that the allegation of ownership is not satisfied by "said building not being the property of the defendant", and that the failure of allegation of ownership is a material allegation, quoting State v. Ham, 1908, 21 S.D. 598, 114 N.W. 713. We note that SDCL 23-32-14 provides as follows: Ham, supra, is not authority for defendant's position. In Ham it was charged that the defendant stole "twenty-two head of cattle, the same being neat, and which cattle were then and there all steers two and three years old, * * * owned by * * * C. F. Coppersmith and C. Reid, * * * and not the property of the said John Ham * * *." The evidence disclosed that Louis Comer was a part owner of the cattle. The defendant moved to strike the evidence pertaining to ownership on the ground that proof of ownership was at variance with the allegations in the information. This was overruled by the lower court. The Supreme Court, in overruling the lower court had this to say: "It will be observed, however, that in the information the only allegation descriptive of the property alleged to have been stolen is the ownership; that the 22 head of live stock are only described as steers two and three years old of the value of $700. Clearly such description independently of the ownership might be applied to any 22 head of steers two and three years old found in any herd of live stock in the state, and does not serve to identify any particular steers, and consequently that without the allegation of the ownership of the property there is nothing by which the same can be identified." The description in our information is not that general; further, in the later case of State v. Wilson, 36 S.D. 416, 155 N.W. 186, this Court held that where an information failed to allege the ownership of the burglarized building but did identify it by the city lot and block, and also as a building in which a firm whose individual names and firm name were stated as those of the owners of a hardware store kept by them therein sufficiently describes and identifies the building. The court quoted from People v. Prather, 120 Cal. 660, 53 P. 259, as follows: Again, in a still later case, State v. Blue Fox Bar, Inc., 1964, 80 S.D. 565, 128 N.W.2d 561, this court after referring to the applicable state statutes, said: "The test of the sufficiency of an information under these provisions is whether it apprises a defendant with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense." (citations omitted). The Blue Fox Bar case has stood as a warning to the prosecution to be precise in the criminal charge against the defendant as contained in the information filed against him. We hold that the information in the case at bar was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, that he could not possibly have been misled, that the building is sufficiently identified, and that he could prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The third and last contention of the defendant is the failure of the judge to define the words, "wilfully", "unlawfully", "break" and "intent". The defendant has not made his record properly to raise this issue of definition. He did not propose any instructions regarding the matter of which he now complains. He is, therefore, precluded from assigning as error the failure to give instructions he claims should have been given. In State v. Greene, S.D., 192 N.W.2d 712, we held: See also State v. Nelson, 80 S.D. 574, 129 N.W.2d 54 and State v. Halverson, S.D., 203 N.W.2d 421. However, facing the issues squarely which defendant raises, we think the specific words as used in context with which the defendant finds fault for lack of specific definition are simple words, which as used in the instructions either were explained or are self-explanatory and readily understood.[*] The instructions did explicitly set forth the elements necessary for the state to prove the offense charged. In the case of State ex rel. Van Nice v. Whealey, 5 S.D. 427, 59 N.W. 211, this court, among other things, said: Judgment affirmed. BIEGELMEIER, C. J., HANSON and WOLLMAN, JJ., and RENTTO, Retired Judge, concur. RENTTO, Retired Supreme Court Judge acting by appointment pursuant to SDCL 16-8-13, sitting for DOYLE, J., absent. [*] 169 A.L.R. 315.