Title: Brown v. Sparks

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM R. BROWN 
 
v.  Record No. 002794     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
HAROLD SPARKS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 
Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, William R. Brown seeks reversal of the 
circuit court's judgment holding that Brown's motion for 
judgment was precluded by an accord and satisfaction. 
 
Brown and Harold Sparks, an employee of Interstate 
Batteries of Raleigh, N.C., t/a Interstate Battery Systems of 
Southern Virginia (Interstate), had an altercation on 
Interstate's business premises.  Brown and Sparks swore out 
criminal warrants against each other for assault and battery.  
Prior to the general district court hearing, the parties 
through counsel, orally agreed to dismiss the charges against 
each other and the agreement was not later reduced to writing.  
The general district court dismissed the charges and wrote on 
Sparks' criminal warrant, "Plea of satisf. cost assessed." 
 
Brown subsequently initiated the instant litigation 
against Sparks on the theory of assault and battery and 
against Interstate on the theory of respondeat superior.  
Sparks and Interstate filed a joint motion for summary 
judgment, asserting that, pursuant to the holding in Orndorff 
v. Bond, 185 Va. 497, 39 S.E.2d 352 (1946), any right to a 
civil remedy against Sparks was relinquished when Brown 
compromised and settled his criminal claim against Sparks.  
Following an ore tenus hearing, the circuit court granted the 
motion and ruled that certain undisputed conduct of the 
parties established an accord and satisfaction.  We awarded 
Brown an appeal. 
 
Sparks seeks to have the Court uphold the trial court's 
summary judgment order by arguing that "principles of res 
judicata" bar Brown's motion for judgment in this case.  
According to Sparks, dismissal of the criminal charges against 
him in the general district court pursuant to Code § 19.2-151 
and the notations on the warrant, "Plea of satisf. cost 
assessed," conclusively established the existence of an accord 
and satisfaction for all purposes and Brown is bound by that 
judgment. 
 
Sparks' argument is flawed in two respects.  First, a 
final judgment in a criminal proceeding does not operate as 
res judicata in a civil proceeding based on the same events.  
Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466, 472, 111 S.E.2d 
434, 438 (1959).  Moreover, in this case, the trial court did 
not consider the dismissal of the criminal warrants pursuant 
to Code § 19.2-151 as conclusive evidence that the parties had 
entered into an accord and satisfaction.  Rather the trial 
 
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court stated that Code § 19.2-151 was not the "exclusive 
method for the accomplishment of an accord and satisfaction," 
and that "the conduct of the parties," as outlined by the 
court, established the accord and satisfaction.   
 
The circumstances of this case are much like those found 
in Orndorff.  That case involved dismissal of a misdemeanor 
charge of obtaining money under false pretenses pursuant to 
the predecessor to Code § 19.2-151, former § 4849 (Code of 
1942).  The agreement to compromise and settle the criminal 
complaint was not reduced to writing as the statute required.  
The Court in Orndorff refused to allow the failure to comply 
with the written agreement requirement of the statute to 
"prevent its application where it appears that the aggrieved 
party received satisfaction, appeared before the justice, and 
the warrant was dismissed."  185 Va. at 502, 39 S.E.2d at 354.  
The Court in Orndorff considered the facts surrounding the 
previous compromise and found that the evidence "conclusively" 
established that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the 
amount sought by the defendant in return for dismissal of the 
criminal charge and that the agreement had been fully 
performed.  Under these circumstances, the plaintiff "knew 
what was going on and agreed to it" and was not entitled to 
escape the effect of that agreement.  185 Va. at 503, 39 
S.E.2d at 355.  Consequently, the Court held that the 
 
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plaintiff was precluded from bringing a subsequent action for 
malicious prosecution based on the bringing of the criminal 
charge. 
 
As in Orndorff, the parties in this case did not reduce 
their agreement to writing.  Thus, evidence was required in 
order to determine the terms of the compromise and settlement, 
and the parties' agreement to those terms. 
 
In an ore tenus hearing before the trial court, Brown's 
attorney testified that he told the general district court 
judge that Brown and Sparks had reached an agreement to 
dismiss the criminal charges and that "Mr. Brown would be 
allowed to pursue any civil matters against Mr. Sparks or 
others, and that this [in] no way affected the civil side of 
the case, they were simply allowing, or agreeing, that the 
criminal warrants would be dismissed."  This testimony was 
corroborated by Sparks' attorney, who testified that during 
the criminal prosecution, Brown's attorney represented that, 
in agreeing to dismiss the criminal warrants, Brown "wanted to 
preserve his civil remedies."  Sparks' former attorney also 
testified that, when the general district court sought a 
response, he told the court, "I'm here with an accord and 
satisfaction and that's fine with me, but if we need to try it 
we will try it."  Following this exchange, the general 
 
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district court made notations on the criminal warrants and 
dismissed the cases. 
 
Brown's refusal to relinquish his civil remedies is not 
disputed.  Both the attorneys and the court knew that Brown's 
intent was to retain his civil remedies.  Further, the 
statement from Sparks' attorney, indicating that despite the 
accord and satisfaction he would proceed to trial if 
necessary, creates an inference that Sparks would not accept 
an accord and satisfaction without the inclusion of civil 
remedies.  The general district court, however, proceeded to 
dismiss the cases.  Neither trial counsel objected to the 
dismissal of the cases or asked for clarification regarding 
the basis for the dismissal.  Thus, the evidence is not clear 
whether the dismissal of the cases without a trial included an 
understanding that Brown's civil remedies were precluded by 
the dismissal, or whether the dismissal of the cases without a 
trial was based on an agreement regarding settlement of the 
criminal matters only. 
 
Summary judgment is available to a litigant only when no 
material facts are in dispute.  Rule 3:18; Turner v. Lotts, 
244 Va. 554, 556, 422 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1992).  We agree with 
Brown that there was a material conflict in the evidence 
regarding the nature of any agreement.  Disputes of material 
 
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facts should be submitted to the finder of fact and not 
resolved on summary judgment. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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