Title: In re Matter of D.J.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
        
                                                            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
GR.J. (MOTHER) 
 
 
        
 
                           INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 
Roberta L. Renbarger  
       
                                               CHILD SERVICES 
Renbarger Law Firm 
 
      
           
 
        Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Fort Wayne, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
        Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
          Robert J. Henke 
J.J. (FATHER) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        James D. Boyer 
Gregory L. Fumarolo  
 
 
 
 
        Deputy Attorneys General 
Fort Wayne, Indiana       
 
 
 
 
        Indianapolis, Indiana   
__________________________________________________________________________________  
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 02S03-1610-JC-548 
 
IN RE: THE MATTER OF D.J. AND G.J., 
CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES; 
GR.J. (MOTHER) AND J.J. (FATHER) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
V. 
 
 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, 
 
 
Appellee.  
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court, Nos. 02D08-1507-JC-324 and 02D08-1507-JC-325  
The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, Judge 
The Honorable Lori K. Morgan, Magistrate 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 02A03-1512-JC-2207 
_________________________________ 
 
February 7, 2017 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 07 2017, 1:31 pm
 
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Slaughter, Justice. 
 
We have previously held that a tardy notice of appeal forfeits the aggrieved party’s right to 
appeal, but does not deprive a reviewing court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Today, we hold that 
a premature notice of appeal likewise is not fatal to appellate jurisdiction. The two prerequisites for 
invoking appellate jurisdiction were both present here—an appealable trial-court order and entry of 
the notice of completion of clerk’s record in the chronological case summary. 
The trial court found that Parents’ two minor children were “in need of services”—meaning 
they had been abused or neglected at home and were unlikely to receive the care or treatment they 
needed without a court’s coercive intervention. A child-in-need-of-services (CHINS) determination 
is not a final judgment. Finality does not occur until the court, after a dispositional hearing, resolves 
such questions as what specific services are warranted and whether the child should be placed in an 
alternative living arrangement, either provisionally or permanently. Although the CHINS 
determination was not final, Parents filed notices of appeal challenging only this interlocutory ruling 
and not the court’s later dispositional order. The Court of Appeals concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction and dismissed Parents’ appeal. We do not take issue with the Court’s decision to dismiss 
the appeal; it is never error to dismiss a forfeited appeal. The Court’s only error was its stated reason 
for dismissal—lack of jurisdiction. 
Despite Parents’ forfeited appeal, we exercise our discretion to decide their case on its merits. 
Having previously granted transfer in this CHINS matter, we reverse the trial court. The record does 
not support the court’s finding that Parents needed the court’s coercive intervention to provide for 
their Boys’ needs at the time of the dispositional hearing.  
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Gr.J. and J.J. (Parents) have two young sons, D.J. and G.J. (Boys). On the evening of July 
16, 2015, Gr.J. (Mother) was bathing the Boys in their home’s upstairs bathroom. D.J. was four years 
old at the time; G.J. was fourteen months. At some point, Mother left them alone in the bathtub for 
approximately two minutes while she went downstairs to let out the family’s dog. When she returned, 
she found the younger son, G.J., lying face down in the water and immediately “grabbed him out.” 
 
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Mother flipped him over to allow any remaining water to drain from his body and saw “his back was 
super pale”. She carried him to the bedroom and called 9-1-1. 
 
While waiting for the ambulance to arrive, Mother laid G.J. on the family’s bed and 
attempted “CPR like activity”. Although he “wasn’t breathing easily or well by any means”, he did 
begin gurgling. As Mother tried to resuscitate him, he defecated on himself. When emergency 
medical technicians arrived, they cleaned him with a towel and transported him to Lutheran Hospital 
in Fort Wayne. 
In the early-morning hours of July 17, Detective Renee Davis of the Fort Wayne Police 
Department and Joseph Sims, a family case worker with the Indiana Department of Child Services 
(Department), obtained Parents’ consent to inspect the family home. Upon entering the house, Sims 
“almost gagged on the smell of feces and animal feces and urine.” He said the smell “smack[ed] you 
in the face when you walk[ed] in the front door.” Likewise, Detective Davis noted, “there was an 
overwhelming odor when I walked in the house . . . probably an animal definitely urinating.” 
Detective Davis said the odor “made [her] cough” and “kicked [her] asthma up.” Sims and Detective 
Davis also said the house “was in complete disarray” and “very cluttered” with “stuff everywhere.” 
During the home inspection, Sims noticed it had no beds for the Boys—no crib for G.J. and 
no toddler bed for D.J. When asked about the family’s sleeping arrangements, J.J. (Father) said they 
practiced co-sleeping, where all four sleep together in the same bed. After he and Mother researched 
co-sleeping’s pros and cons, they decided to try it and found it helped Mother to breastfeed G.J., to 
alleviate D.J.’s night terrors, and to help with his autism. 
Based on the bathtub incident, the messy condition of the family home, and the family’s co-
sleeping practice, the Department removed the Boys from their Parents’ care and placed them with 
their grandparents. On July 21, the Department filed a petition alleging the Boys to be children in 
need of services under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 and began services with the family. Required 
“home-based” services included parental psychological evaluations, drug screens, parenting 
curriculum, homemaker services (cleaning the home and keeping it clean), home-based individual 
and family therapy, unsupervised visitation for Father, and supervised visitation for Mother. 
 
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When the trial court held its fact-finding hearing in October 2015, Parents had completed or 
were in the process of completing all services the Department required. The Department deferred 
family homemaker services because Parents had already cleaned the house, and the court deferred 
Father’s psychological evaluation for unspecified reasons. On November 13, the court issued a 
written order containing extensive findings and conclusions. It found the Boys to be children in need 
of services and scheduled a dispositional hearing for December 3. The court issued its Dispositional 
Hearing Order on January 5, 2016, maintaining the status quo: the Boys were to stay with 
Grandparents; Father had unsupervised parenting time; Mother had supervised parenting time. The 
trial clerk issued the notice of completion of clerk’s record on January 6. 
Mother and Father filed separate notices of appeal (on December 11 and 14, respectively) 
challenging the CHINS determination after the court held the dispositional hearing but before it 
entered the dispositional order. After full briefing, the Court of Appeals dismissed Parents’ appeal 
with prejudice based on lack of jurisdiction. Parents then sought transfer, which we granted. 
Standard of Review 
We review jurisdictional questions de novo, giving no deference to lower courts. See In re 
Adoption of J.T.D., 21 N.E.3d 824, 827 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). We likewise review de novo 
the significance and scope of Indiana case law and court rules. Miller v. Danz, 36 N.E.3d 455, 457 
(Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). 
When reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge 
witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the 
evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” 
Id. at 1287 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial court supplements 
a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of 
review. We consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” and, second, “whether the 
findings support the judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only 
if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly 
erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard to 
properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) (citation omitted). 
 
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Discussion and Decision 
This case presents two issues: one procedural, one substantive. Because Parents filed 
premature notices of appeal, the Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed their 
appeal with prejudice, declining to reach the merits. We hold, first, that appellate jurisdiction is 
secure; and, second, that the Department failed to prove that Parents required the State’s coercive 
intervention to meet their children’s needs. We thus reverse the trial court’s determination that the 
Boys were in need of services. 
 
I. 
Parents’ premature notices of appeal were not fatal to appellate jurisdiction. 
 
A. 
The determination that a child is in need of services is not a final judgment. 
Within the CHINS context, a court’s “finding of CHINS status is a mere preliminary step” 
to final disposition of the matter. In re J.L.V., 667 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted). Standing alone, the CHINS finding “d[oes] not constitute a final, appealable judgment.” 
Id. (citation omitted). Even after making a CHINS determination, the court is still required to hold a 
dispositional hearing to determine next steps in the child’s placement, care, treatment, or 
rehabilitation and the nature and extent of the parent’s, custodian’s, or guardian’s role in fulfilling 
those steps. Ind. Code § 31-34-19-1. The court must then issue written findings and conclusions in 
a dispositional decree. Id. § 31-34-19-10. To the extent our case law leaves any doubt, we make 
explicit that a CHINS determination, by itself, is not a final judgment. 
B. 
A reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear a forfeited appeal. 
A party initiates an appeal by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of an 
appealable order. Usually, the appealable order will be a final judgment, Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), 
meaning it disposes of all claims as to all parties, App. R. 2(H)(1). But not all orders must be final 
to be appealable. Non-final orders that are appealable right away—on an interlocutory basis—
include those recited in Appellate Rule 14. 
Despite the thirty-day requirement for filing a notice of appeal, timeliness is not a prerequisite 
to invoking appellate jurisdiction. Stated differently, the reviewing court is not deprived of 
jurisdiction if the notice is untimely—meaning belated or premature. The only two prerequisites 
 
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under our appellate rules are (i) the trial court must have entered an appealable order, and (ii) the 
trial clerk must have entered the notice of completion of clerk’s record on the CCS. 
Appellate Rule 8 specifies that “[t]he Court on Appeal acquires jurisdiction on the date the 
Notice of Completion of Clerk’s Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” See also 
Alexander v. State, 4 N.E.3d 1169, 1170 n.3 (Ind. 2014). In contrast, Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) speaks 
not of jurisdiction but forfeiture: “Unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal 
shall be forfeited except as provided in [Post-Conviction Rule] 2.” It is noteworthy that “[f]orfeiture 
and jurisdiction are not the same.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind. 2014). Forfeiture 
is “[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a … breach of obligation[] or neglect of 
duty.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 765 (10th ed. 2014)). Jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to 
“[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree,” Black’s Law Dictionary 980—it “speaks to 
the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties,” Adoption of O.R., 16 
N.E.3d at 971 (brackets, citations, and emphases omitted). 
Here, the notices of appeal indicated, erroneously, that Parents were pursuing an expedited 
appeal from a final judgment. In fact, Parents filed their respective notices before the trial court had 
entered a final judgment. By filing notices of appeal from a non-final CHINS determination—and 
not a final CHINS judgment—Parents forfeited their rights to appeal. The Court of Appeals 
understandably relied upon the above procedural rules in declining to reach the merits of Parents’ 
appeal, and it had every right to do so. But an untimely notice of appeal does not divest a reviewing 
court of jurisdiction. See id. at 970-71; App. R. 8. 
C. 
A reviewing court may elect to decide the merits of a forfeited appeal. 
With the jurisdictional point settled, we consider whether to exercise our discretion to address 
the merits despite the forfeiture. Although it is never error for an appellate court to dismiss an 
untimely appeal, the court has jurisdiction to disregard the forfeiture and resolve the merits. Adoption 
of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971-72. 
Indiana’s rules and precedent give reviewing courts authority “to deviate from the exact 
strictures” of the appellate rules when justice requires. In re Howell, 9 N.E.3d 145, 145 (Ind. 2014). 
“Although our procedural rules are extremely important . . . they are merely a means for achieving 
the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice.” American States Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Jennings, 
 
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258 Ind. 637, 640, 283 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1972). See also App. R. 1 (“The Court may, upon the 
motion of a party or the Court’s own motion, permit deviation from these Rules.”). This discretionary 
authority over the appellate rules allows us to achieve our preference for “decid[ing] cases on their 
merits rather than dismissing them on procedural grounds.” Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972 
(citation omitted). See also In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 661 n.2 (Ind. 2014) (considering 
merits after denying appellees’ motion to dismiss based on procedural defect); Pabey v. Pastrick, 
816 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ind. 2004) (stating that “dismissal with prejudice was not the appropriate 
remedy for . . . noncompliance with” Appellate Rule 9.). 
These principles have been borne out in Court of Appeals precedent that departed from the 
strictures of the appellate rules to consider the merits of procedurally similar CHINS cases—also 
concerning premature notices of appeal. See In re J.V., 875 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(electing to decide merits of CHINS appeal, despite premature notice of appeal, because trial court 
held dispositional hearing and issued dispositional decree before Court of Appeals obtained 
jurisdiction), trans. denied. See also In re T.Y.T., 714 N.E.2d 752, 756 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); In 
re M.K., 964 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
We recently deviated from the appellate rules in Adoption of O.R. due in part to the weighty 
parental interest involved. Indeed, it is well established that “the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their 
children.” 16 N.E.3d at 972 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)). 
Given the purpose of our appellate rules, our preference for deciding cases on their merits, 
our Court of Appeals precedent, and the important parental interest at stake, we choose to disregard 
Parents’ forfeiture and reach the merits. See Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971-72. 
II. 
On the merits, the trial court committed clear error in holding that coercive 
intervention was required to enable Parents to fulfill their children’s needs. 
We recently held that “[n]ot every endangered child is a child in need of services,” and not 
every endangered child needs “the State’s parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere 
of the family.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citation omitted). To prove a child is “in need of services”, 
the Department must prove three statutory elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 
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1. 
The child is under eighteen (18) years of age; 
 
2. 
The child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously 
endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, 
guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, 
shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and 
 
3. 
The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: 
 
a. 
the child is not receiving; and 
b. 
is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 
intervention of the court.  
See I.C. §§ 31-34-1-1; 31-34-12-3. 
We agree with the trial court that the Department proved the first two elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The Boys are younger than eighteen years old. And Mother’s 
decision to leave them alone, unsupervised in a bathtub for two minutes, seriously endangered their 
physical or mental condition. Also endangering them was the family’s unkempt, unclean, foul-
smelling home.  
The third element, however—that Parents were unlikely to attend to the Boys’ care or 
treatment without the court’s coercive intervention—is not sufficiently supported by the record. The 
point of a CHINS inquiry is to “protect children, not [to] punish parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 
102, 106 (Ind. 2010) (citation omitted). To that end, the third element “guards against unwarranted 
State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability 
to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s 
needs.’” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citation omitted) (emphases in original). When determining CHINS 
status under Section 31-34-1-1, particularly the “coercive intervention” element, courts “should 
consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id. at 
1290 (citation omitted). Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already 
corrected them. See id. at 1289–90. 
The trial court’s CHINS order included factual findings that amply support its conclusion 
that Parents required coercive intervention early in the CHINS process. But those findings did not 
show that Parents needed ongoing coercive intervention throughout the process, and they certainly 
did not show that Parents needed such intervention by the time of the fact-finding hearing months 
 
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later. To the contrary, the record shows that Parents eventually cooperated with the Department’s 
services and had satisfactorily completed all services (except those deferred by the Department or 
the court) by the time of the fact-finding hearing. 
Chris Spurling, a social worker, testified at the hearing that “the family ha[d] completed the 
parenting curriculum[,] which was the main goal”. He said Parents were “[v]ery open and willing”, 
“engaged in services” and were “serious about doing what the court and the Department … asked 
them to do.” Joesi Shah, a family coach and caseworker who supervised Mother’s visits with the 
Boys, testified she could tell Parents completed the parenting curriculum because they began 
implementing it during visits. Kristen Matheson, a clinical therapist who treated Mother individually 
and Parents collectively, described them as “[e]xtremely compliant” with services, “always willing 
to meet with me and make it work at scheduling everything.” Matheson testified that, by the time of 
the fact-finding hearing, Parents did not require more individual or family therapy and had met all 
their goals. She opined that Mother might need additional therapy, but only if she were criminally 
charged for the bathtub incident. Lastly, evidence in the record documented that Parents had 
voluntarily secured individual and family services to treat or cope with D.J.’s autism.  
Because we conclude the Department did not prove the third element by a preponderance of 
the evidence, we reverse the trial court’s CHINS determination. 
Conclusion 
 
We hold that Parents’ premature notices of appeal did not deprive the Court of Appeals of 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Given the importance of the family interest at issue here, we 
exercise our discretion to decide this case on its merits. Having previously granted transfer, we 
reverse the trial court’s CHINS determination, concluding that the Department failed to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Parents required the court’s coercive intervention to ensure 
the Boys were properly cared for. 
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, JJ., concur.