Title: State v. Hughbanks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HUGHBANKS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 2000-0057 — Submitted April 29, 2003 — Decided August 20, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-980595. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
In this appeal, Gary Hughbanks Jr. (“Hughbanks”) raises 15 
propositions of law.  For the reasons that follow, we reject them.  We have also 
independently weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
factors and compared his sentence to those imposed in similar cases, as R.C. 
2929.05(A) requires.  We affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence of 
death. 
{¶2} 
Around 9:00 p.m. on May 13, 1987, William and Juanita Leeman 
returned to their home in Springfield Township in Hamilton County, Ohio.  Once 
inside, William Leeman confronted a burglar, who proceeded to kill 55-year-old 
William and 53-year-old Juanita with a knife. 
{¶3} 
These murders went unsolved for ten years.  In August 1997, Larry 
Hughbanks, the defendant’s brother, and Gary Hughbanks Sr., the defendant’s 
father, informed police that Hughbanks had murdered the Leemans. 
{¶4} 
Hughbanks was tried and convicted of the aggravated murders of 
the Leemans and sentenced to death.  To establish Hughbanks’s guilt, the state 
introduced a confession, testimony that Hughbanks’s accurately described the 
layout of the Leeman home and the Leemans’ personal property, and two of 
Hughbanks’s knives, which were linked to the murders. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶5} 
Hughbanks had gone to the Leeman home during the evening of 
May 13, 1987, to commit burglary.  After looking through the windows to ensure 
that no one was home, Hughbanks broke in through a back window.  Hughbanks 
went to the master bedroom and took William’s wallet and jewelry from the 
dresser. 
{¶6} 
When the Leemans came into the house, William confronted 
Hughbanks in a bedroom.  Hughbanks attacked William with a knife, stabbed him 
repeatedly, and then slit his throat.  According to Hughbanks’s confession, the 
attack was over in “a matter of seconds.”  After Hughbanks slit William’s throat, 
he chased Juanita into the living room, grabbed her, and slit her throat. 
{¶7} 
Hughbanks washed in the bathroom and left a bloody hand towel 
in the sink.  He then left the house through the back door, ran through the back 
yard into adjoining woods, and traveled along a creek to a nearby school.  
Hughbanks was gone by the time police officers arrived. 
{¶8} 
After being attacked, Juanita stumbled out the front door of her 
home.  While bleeding profusely, she somehow moved from the patio to the 
driveway, then down the driveway, before collapsing near the street. 
{¶9} 
At approximately 9:25 p.m. that evening, Police Officer Pat 
Kemper was driving his patrol car when he saw someone lying on the driveway at 
the Leemans’ house “waving [her] arm in a real slow motion * * * to get 
attention.”  Kemper noticed that the person was covered in blood.  Upon stopping, 
Kemper asked, “Who did this to you[?]”  Juanita was conscious, but when she 
started to talk, “blood was gurgling out of her throat, and the whole side of her 
face just fell open * * *.”  Juanita died of her injuries at the hospital. 
{¶10} Police officers entered the Leemans’ house and found William’s 
body in the master bedroom.  There were signs of a violent struggle;  part of the 
bedroom wall was bashed in, a lamp was turned over, and blood was smeared on 
the wall.  There was a pool of blood on the carpet between the bed and the wall 
January Term, 2003 
3 
and a pool of blood under William’s head.  The telephone cord had been cut, and 
open dresser drawers appeared to have been searched. 
{¶11} A “large puddle of blood” on the living room carpet indicated 
where Juanita had been attacked.  A trail of blood leading out the front door, onto 
the front porch, and down the driveway showed Juanita’s line of travel after the 
attack. 
{¶12} Blood smears on an unlocked back screen door suggested that the 
killer had left that way.  On the day after the murders, a police bloodhound 
tracked the killer’s scent using the hand towel Hughbanks had left in the sink.  
The bloodhound followed the scent out the back door, down a hill, and into the 
creek that borders the Leemans’ back yard.  The bloodhound then traveled along 
the creek for a quarter of a mile before losing the scent near a neighborhood 
school. 
{¶13} The police investigation did not uncover any trace evidence, hair 
fibers, or fingerprints that could identify the killer.  Between May 1987 and 
August 1997, the police checked out “hundreds of leads,” but the killer remained 
unidentified. 
{¶14} During the summer of 1997, Larry Hughbanks told the police that 
Gary Hughbanks Jr., his brother, had killed the Leemans.  Larry told police that 
Hughbanks was living in Arizona, but that before leaving, Hughbanks had said, 
“[I] did it, and * * * threw the knife in some woods.”  Gary Hughbanks Sr., the 
defendant’s father, soon thereafter went to the police station “to talk * * * about 
his son murdering the Leemans.” 
{¶15} In August 1997, Larry and Gary Sr. met with John Jay, an 
investigator with the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office, and Mark Piepmeier, 
an assistant county prosecutor.  Larry turned over a survival knife with a ball 
compass on the end of the handle.  Larry said that Hughbanks “had thrown that 
knife in a wooded area back in the early part of 1988 out in Amelia, Ohio, when 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
they lived in a trailer.”  Gary Sr. also implicated Hughbanks in the Leeman 
murders. 
{¶16} Subsequent police interviews of Jerry Shaw, Hughbanks’s uncle, 
and Howard Shaw, Hughbanks’s cousin, resulted in additional information 
implicating Hughbanks as the Leemans’ killer.  Lisa Leggett, identified as 
Hughbanks’s “ex-common-law wife,” provided police with another survival knife 
with a ball compass on the handle that had belonged to Hughbanks.  In May 1987, 
Leggett and Hughbanks had lived near the Leeman home.  According to Leggett, 
the knife was “left behind by [Hughbanks] when they split.” 
{¶17} In September 1997, Tucson, Arizona police arrested Hughbanks.  
During a police interview on September 9, 1997, Hughbanks denied any 
involvement in the Leeman murders.  Thereafter, Hughbanks remained in police 
custody in Arizona pending extradition to Ohio. 
{¶18} Several days later, on September 16, 1997, Tucson police 
detectives interviewed Hughbanks again.  Hughbanks admitted breaking into the 
Leemans’ house and said that two accomplices had been with him during the 
burglary.  Later, Hughbanks said that a fourth man might have also been at the 
scene.  Hughbanks admitted confronting William in the bedroom after the 
Leemans arrived home but stated that an accomplice had stabbed William and cut 
his throat.  Hughbanks stated that he did not know where Juanita had been and 
said that his accomplice had “probably got her first.” 
{¶19} As Hughbanks’s interview progressed, Hughbanks acknowledged 
telling his father, brother, and uncle, “I killed somebody.”  Hughbanks then said, 
“I went in to commit a burglary.  I got scared.  I fought with the guy. * * * And I 
probably ran after the woman and killed her, too.”  Hughbanks also admitted that 
he was by himself when he broke into the home and killed the Leemans.  
Hughbanks said that he had been “completely surprised” by William and had tried 
to “get away from him in the bedroom.”  Hughbanks indicated that he “probably” 
January Term, 2003 
5 
tried to get away by getting out the window, but said, “I think he pulled me back.” 
Hughbanks stated that he had killed the Leemans with a “military knife,” which 
he had found in an “ammo box” in the Leemans’ bedroom closet. 
{¶20} When asked about Juanita’s location during her husband’s murder, 
Hughbanks replied, “Probably behind me, watching me, and then after I cut his 
throat, she took off running out of the house and I went after her.”  Hughbanks 
said that he caught her in the living room and added, “I figured I cut her enough 
that she—she’d bleed to death.” 
{¶21} Hughbanks admitted that he had kept the knife with him when he 
fled the scene.  Hughbanks stated that after he had left the Leemans’ house, he ran 
towards the woods and creek behind the house.  Hughbanks “got the blood off 
[himself] in the creek” and then followed the creek to Greener School.  Later, 
Hughbanks threw away the costume jewelry that he had taken. 
{¶22} The grand jury indicted Hughbanks on two counts of aggravated 
murder.  Count 1 charged Hughbanks with the aggravated murder of William 
Leeman while committing burglary.  Count 2 charged Hughbanks with the 
aggravated murder of Juanita Leeman while committing burglary.  The grand jury 
also indicted Hughbanks for aggravated burglary. 
{¶23} Each count of aggravated murder contained three identical death 
penalty specifications: murder for the purpose of escaping detection or 
apprehension pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), murder as part of a course of 
conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more people pursuant to R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5), and, as the principal offender, murder while committing or 
attempting to commit aggravated burglary pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶24} At trial, Leonard Leeman, the victims’ son, testified that to the best 
of his knowledge, Hughbanks did not know his parents and had never been inside 
their house prior to the murders.  After reading Hughbanks’s confession, Leonard 
testified that Hughbanks accurately described the white Formica breakfast bar in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the kitchen, the presence of military photographs of the Leemans’ children on the 
hallway wall, and the location of Afghans in the closet.  Moreover, Hughbanks 
had accurately described the Leeman back yard, the hill leading to the creek, and 
the path to Greener Elementary School.  However, Leonard testified that his 
parents had not kept any survival knives in their home. 
{¶25} Detective Kemper pointed out that Hughbanks’s confession 
accurately described the victims’ wounds and where in the house the attacks took 
place. 
{¶26} Dr. Lee Lehman, who was a deputy coroner for Hamilton County 
in 1987, performed autopsies on both victims.  William had been stabbed 17 
times.  One stab wound was almost four and one-half inches deep.  William died 
as the result of multiple stab wounds to his head, neck, thorax, and extremities. 
{¶27} Juanita had a “nine-inch by four-inch area of criss-crossing cuts 
across her throat * * * [and] through the voice box, or larynx, which would 
prevent her from screaming or talking.”  Dr. Lehman concluded that Juanita had 
died from multiple stab wounds to her head, chest, neck, and extremities. 
{¶28} Dr. Lehman testified that all of these wounds were caused by a 
“fairly heavy knife” that was “at least an inch or more in width, and * * * at least 
four inches in length.”  State’s exhibits 45 and 46, the two knives recovered by 
police as possible murder weapons, were of a type that could have caused the 
wounds inflicted on the Leemans.  Serological testing of the knives failed to 
reveal any trace of blood. 
{¶29} At trial, the defense did not present any evidence. 
{¶30} The jury convicted Hughbanks as charged and recommended the 
death penalty.  The trial court sentenced Hughbanks to death on each count of 
aggravated murder and sentenced him to a prison term of 10 to 25 years for 
aggravated burglary. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶31} The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.  The 
cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
Pretrial issues 
{¶32} Denial of Bond.  In his fifth proposition of law, Hughbanks 
contends that the trial court’s denial of a reasonable bond prior to trial violated his 
constitutional right to assist counsel in the preparation of his defense.  We 
disagree. 
{¶33} Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:  “All 
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for a person who is charged 
with a capital offense where the proof is evident or the presumption great * * *.”  
It is the trial court’s role to determine whether a capital defendant should be 
admitted to bail.  State ex rel. Reams v. Stuart (1933), 127 Ohio St. 314, 188 N.E. 
393, syllabus. 
{¶34} Hughbanks argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proof or presumption warranted a 
denial of bail.  However, Hughbanks never requested such a hearing and thereby 
waived this issue.  See State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 
364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 49, 64, 752 N.E.2d 904. 
{¶35} Moreover, following conviction, “any error concerning the issue of 
pretrial bail is moot.”  State v. Patterson (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 264, 271, 673 
N.E.2d 1001.  Thus, we overrule the fifth proposition of law. 
{¶36} Funding of defense experts.  In his first proposition of law, 
Hughbanks claims that he was not provided with adequate funding for an expert 
on substance abuse, a coroner, or a crime-scene investigator.  In his third and 
fourth propositions of law, Hughbanks claims that he was not provided with 
adequate funding for an independent pathologist or a neuropharmacologist. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶37} In Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 
L.Ed.2d 53, the United States Supreme Court held that the state must provide a 
psychiatric expert for the defense when the defendant has made a preliminary 
showing that his sanity will be a significant factor at the trial.  Although Ake dealt 
only with a defendant’s entitlement to a psychiatric expert, we have recognized 
that due process may require the state to provide other types of expert assistance 
to an indigent criminal defendant.  State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 149, 
694 N.E.2d 932.  Moreover, R.C. 2929.024 requires the trial court to provide 
expert assistance when “reasonably necessary for the proper representation of a 
defendant charged with aggravated murder * * *.”  See State v. Tibbetts (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 146, 150, 749 N.E.2d 226. 
{¶38} In Mason, we held that the state must provide an indigent criminal 
defendant with funds to obtain expert assistance when the defendant has made a 
particularized showing that (1) there exists a reasonable probability that the 
requested expert would aid the defense and (2) denial of that expert assistance 
would result in an unfair trial.  Whether the showing has been made is determined 
by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion.  Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 
144, 694 N.E.2d 932, syllabus. See, also, Sup.R. 20(IV)(D). 
{¶39} We find that Hughbanks’s claims in his first, third, and fourth 
propositions of law were waived.  Hughbanks never requested that the trial court 
provide funds for an expert on substance abuse, a coroner, a crime-scene 
investigator, an independent pathologist, or a neuropharmacologist.  The court 
“need not consider an error” when the complaining party “could have called, but 
did not call” the matter to the trial court’s attention.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 
5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus.  “Notice of plain 
error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances 
and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  State v. Long (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
January Term, 2003 
9 
Because there is no plain error, we conclude that the first, third, and fourth 
propositions of law lack merit. 
{¶40} Hughbanks never requested funding for any of the five experts and 
never made a “particularized showing” suggesting a “reasonable probability that 
the requested expert would aid” in his defense as required by Mason, 82 Ohio 
St.3d 144, 694 N.E.2d 932, syllabus.  Further, the facts, as discussed below, 
demonstrate that denial of the requested expert did not result in an unfair trial. 
{¶41} Despite a general assertion in the first proposition of law that 
Hughbanks needed a crime-scene investigator, a coroner, and an expert on 
substance abuse, Hughbanks has not explained how these experts would have 
helped his defense.  In the face of overwhelming evidence of Hughbanks’s guilt, 
the defense strategy was to concede his guilt during the trial phase and to contest 
the appropriateness of a death sentence during the penalty phase. 
{¶42} Our review of the record shows a thorough, professional, and well-
documented police investigation even though ten years had elapsed between the 
time of the murders and Hughbanks’s identification as the murderer.  Thus, the 
defense did not need a crime-scene investigator.  Nor is there any reason to 
believe that an expert on substance abuse would have made any difference to the 
defense case.  Further, since the cause of death was not an issue, it is unclear what 
value a coroner would have provided to the defense.  Under these circumstances, 
we find that Hughbanks has failed to show a particularized need for these experts 
and has not shown how the failure to employ these experts denied him a fair trial.  
See State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 12, 752 N.E.2d 859 (need for an 
investigator, crime-scene investigator, and a coroner not established); Issa, 93 
Ohio St.3d at 63, 752 N.E.2d 904 (crime-scene investigator and general 
investigator not justified); Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 151, 749 N.E.2d 226 
(investigator, crime-scene investigator, and a coroner not warranted). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶43} In his third proposition of law, Hughbanks makes the broad 
assertion that an “independent pathologist could have conducted his own 
investigation and testing.”  The coroner examined the victims, and the autopsies 
were thoroughly documented and photographed.  There was no mystery about the 
cause, manner, or timing of the deaths.  Hughbanks has failed to show a 
particularized need for this expert and  has not shown that the lack of an 
independent pathologist resulted in an unfair trial.  See Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 
12, 752 N.E.2d 859 (need for an independent pathologist not established); Issa, 93 
Ohio St.3d at 63, 752 N.E.2d 904 (forensic pathologist not justified); Tibbetts, 92 
Ohio St.3d at 151, 749 N.E.2d 226 (independent pathologist not required). 
{¶44} In his fourth proposition of law, Hughbanks claims that a 
neuropharmacologist could have conducted an analysis and provided an opinion 
on the effects of his alcohol and drug consumption at the time of his confession.  
However, Hughbanks’s confession to police on September 16, 1997, was made 
after he had been in continuous police custody for one week.  Moreover, nothing 
indicates that Hughbanks was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time 
of his confession, and he denied having taken “any drugs or medication that 
morning.”  Thus, a neuropharmacologist would not have helped the defense.  
Since counsel at trial never suggested that they needed further assistance from a 
neuropharmacologist, no “particularized showing” was made. 
{¶45} Hughbanks also claims that a neuropharmacologist could have 
presented mitigating evidence for the jury’s consideration during the penalty 
phase although he fails to specify the nature of such evidence.  Again, this claim 
is speculative.  Moreover, the trial court provided Hughbanks with funds for a 
neuropsychologist, and two psychiatrists testified as defense witnesses during 
mitigation.  These experts could have advised the defense counsel about how 
drugs and alcohol had affected Hughbanks’s mental state. 
January Term, 2003 
11 
{¶46} Counsel had “alternative devices that would fulfill the same 
functions as the expert assistance sought.”  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph four of the syllabus.  See State v. 
Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 288-289, 574 N.E.2d 510 (pharmacologist not 
justified because several mental health professionals appointed by the court could 
explain how drugs and alcohol affected the defendant); Nields, 93 Ohio St.3d at 
12, 752 N.E.2d 859 (need for a neuropharmacologist not established because 
other experts were available); Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 151, 749 N.E.2d 226 
(neuropharmacologist not required because defense had already allotted funds for 
a forensic psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist). 
{¶47} As an alternative argument in his third and fourth propositions of 
law, Hughbanks claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to request funds for such professionals.  Reversal of convictions on 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show, 
first, that counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶48} However, trial counsel were not deficient for failing to make such 
requests because the trial court would have had no basis to grant the motions, as 
discussed.  See Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d at 68, 752 N.E.2d 904 (failure to request funds 
to hire an investigator not ineffective assistance of counsel). 
{¶49} Based on the foregoing, we reject the first, third, and fourth 
propositions of law. 
{¶50} Voluntariness.  In his tenth proposition of law, Hughbanks argues 
that the waiver of his Miranda rights and his statements and confessions to the 
police were involuntary.  Hughbanks claims that because police were aware of his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
psychiatric problems and drug use, the police were obligated to have him 
evaluated by a competent mental health professional before advising him of his 
rights and interviewing him.  Alternatively, Hughbanks argues that the police 
should have, sua sponte, provided him with a lawyer. 
{¶51} On September 9, 1997, Detective Kemper and William Fletcher, an 
investigator with the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office, interviewed 
Hughbanks while he was in police custody in Tucson.  Fletcher advised 
Hughbanks of his Miranda rights before beginning the interview.  Hughbanks 
also read a copy of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver. 
{¶52} In response to a question asked by Fletcher, Hughbanks denied 
taking any drugs or medication on the morning of the interview.  Moreover, 
Fletcher observed nothing in Hughbanks’s comments or behavior that led him to 
believe that Hughbanks was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the 
interview.  When asked about his mental history, Hughbanks told Fletcher that he 
had “conferred with a psychiatrist off and on” over a number of years.  
Hughbanks stated that Dr. Bernard DeSilva, a psychiatrist from Cincinnati, had 
treated him.  Police did not attempt to call Dr. DeSilva before completing their 
interview.  The police interview lasted several hours; Hughbanks denied any 
involvement in the murders. 
{¶53} Following this initial interview, a Tucson detective, Millstone, 
administered a polygraph examination to Hughbanks.1  The detective advised 
Hughbanks of his Miranda rights and obtained Hughbanks’s consent to take the 
polygraph prior to the test. 
{¶54} During the polygraph examination, Hughbanks denied committing 
the murders.  However, results of Hughbanks’s polygraph were inconclusive 
because of his lack of physiological response.  According to the detective, 
                                          
 
1. 
Testimony about the polygraph exam was not presented to the jury. 
January Term, 2003 
13 
Hughbanks showed “very little reaction to anything in the galvanic skin response, 
the pulse, blood pressure readings.  Everything was very, very flat which is 
consistent with drug use.”  Hughbanks said that he had injected crystal 
methamphetamine into his body that morning and showed Millstone a small 
bruise on his inner arm that was the injection site. 
{¶55} After the September 9 polygraph test, Hughbanks remained in 
Tucson in police custody pending extradition to Ohio for the murders.  On 
September 16, 1997, at the request of Hamilton County authorities, Tucson 
detectives sought to give another polygraph test to Hughbanks.  Hughbanks 
waived his rights and signed a consent form. 
{¶56} During the pretest interview, Hughbanks stated that he was in good 
physical condition and had slept well the previous evening, having gotten eight or 
nine hours of sleep.  Hughbanks disclosed that he had been treated by Dr. DeSilva 
for severe depression and a bipolar disorder.  He also stated that he had been an 
inpatient at psychiatric hospitals “several different times” over a 15-year period, 
the last time being six or seven years earlier.  Hughbanks told the polygraph 
administrator that he had been prescribed Lithium, Zoloft, and Trazadone to treat 
his mental condition but had discontinued taking medication about two years 
before.  Hughbanks also stated that he had not been receiving psychiatric care 
during the previous year. 
{¶57} To the polygraph administrator, Hughbanks “appeared to be 
normal * * * that day.  He said he hadn’t taken drugs recently or in the past 24 
hours.”  Another detective present during the polygraph examination agreed that 
Hughbanks did not appear to be high or under the influence of any drugs.  The 
detectives made no attempt to contact a psychiatrist about Hughbanks’s mental 
condition prior to administering the polygraph examination. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶58} Polygraph test results showed that Hughbanks was deceptive, and 
detectives confronted Hughbanks with the test results.  Hughbanks eventually 
admitted that he had committed the murders. 
{¶59} A court, in determining whether a pretrial statement is involuntary, 
“should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, 
and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency 
of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the 
existence of threat or inducement.”  Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 154, 694 N.E.2d 
932, quoting State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 
1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The same considerations apply to whether 
Hughbanks voluntarily waived his rights.  State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 
352, 366, 738 N.E.2d 1208. 
{¶60} Hughbanks acknowledges that he was advised of his rights and 
waived those rights before making a statement to the police.  However, 
Hughbanks contends that prior to questioning, the police failed to consult a 
psychiatrist to find out whether his decision to waive his rights and answer police 
questions was “truly voluntary.”  Alternatively, Hughbanks claims that the police 
should have, sua sponte, found a lawyer to represent him. 
{¶61} A defendant’s mental condition is but one factor in the totality of 
circumstances to be considered in determining voluntariness.  A defendant’s 
mental condition may be a “significant factor in the ‘voluntariness’ calculus.  But 
this fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant’s mental condition, by itself 
and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry 
into constitutional ‘voluntariness.’ ”  (Citation omitted.)  Colorado v. Connelly 
(1986), 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  See State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844. 
{¶62} The police officers were not required to consult a psychiatrist or 
have Hughbanks evaluated by a psychiatrist to ensure that his waiver of rights and 
January Term, 2003 
15 
his statements were the product of his free will.  Connelly rejected the premise 
that voluntariness of a confession depended on notions of “free will.”  Connelly, 
479 U.S. at 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  Rather, “voluntariness * * * has 
always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in 
any broader sense of the word.”  Id.  See Coe v. Bell (C.A.6, 1998), 161 F.3d 320, 
341; United States v. Santos (C.A.1, 1997), 131 F.3d 16, 19. 
{¶63} The police officers never subjected Hughbanks to threats or 
physical abuse or deprived him of food, sleep, or medical treatment.  Moreover, 
the police interview and polygraph testing of Hughbanks on September 16 lasted 
only several hours.  We find no evidence of police coercion or overreaching that 
might show  Hughbanks’s confession to be involuntary.  See State v. Eley (1996), 
77 Ohio St.3d 174, 178, 672 N.E.2d 640. 
{¶64} Hughbanks’s disclosures about his mental condition during the 
pretest interview on September 16 undermine his claim that his Miranda waiver 
and his subsequent confession were involuntary.  During his pretest interview, 
Hughbanks informed police that he had not been hospitalized for psychiatric 
treatment for several years, was no longer receiving psychiatric treatment, and 
had 
discontinued 
taking medication 
approximately 
two 
years 
earlier.  
Hughbanks’s tape-recorded interview on September 16 indicates that he was alert 
and responsive to police questioning and that he was not suffering from any 
apparent mental problems. 
{¶65} Finally, Hughbanks’s injection of crystal methamphetamine prior 
to his first interview on September 9 did not affect the voluntariness of his 
September 16 confession.  Hughbanks remained in police custody between 
September 9 and 16.  The detectives who interviewed Hughbanks on September 
16 stated that he appeared normal.  Moreover, lines on charts from Hughbanks’s 
polygraph examination on September 16 were “no longer flat line, he was 
responsive [and] reacting to the questions.”  Hughbanks stated that he had not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
been taking any drugs recently or within the previous 24 hours.  We find no 
evidence that Hughbanks’s drug use on September 9 had any impact on the 
voluntariness of his confession or his waiver of his Miranda rights a week later. 
{¶66} In conclusion, the totality of the circumstances shows that 
Hughbanks voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his confession to 
police was voluntary.  Moreover, the police officers had no obligation, sua sponte, 
to supply Hughbanks with a lawyer or consult a psychiatrist prior to questioning 
him, nor did their failure to do so impact the voluntariness of his confession or the 
waiver of his Miranda rights.  Thus, we overrule the tenth proposition of law. 
{¶67} In his 11th proposition of law, Hughbanks argues that his counsel 
were ineffective by litigating the motion to suppress his pretrial confession 
without the assistance of supportive psychiatric testimony. 
{¶68} Hughbanks contends that his motion attacking the voluntariness of 
his confession or the waiver of his Miranda rights was “doomed to failure” 
without supportive expert testimony about his mental condition at the time he 
waived his rights and provided his confession to the police.  Hughbanks suggests 
that his counsel could have called Dr. DeSilva and Dr. Sagi Raju, two 
psychiatrists who testified for the defense during mitigation, to testify during the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. 
{¶69} We find that counsel’s decision not to present psychiatric 
testimony during the hearing on the motion to suppress was not deficient 
performance pursuant to Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  As discussed in the tenth proposition of law, mental illness, absent coercive 
police activity, is not a sufficient basis for excluding Hughbanks’s statement.  The 
voluntariness of his statement depends on whether the police engaged in coercion 
and misconduct and not whether Hughbanks was mentally ill.  See Connelly, 479 
U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473.  Neither Dr. DeSilva nor Dr. Raju 
testified during mitigation that Hughbanks was incapable of making a voluntary 
January Term, 2003 
17 
statement.  Moreover, their description of Hughbanks’s mental problems does not 
support a conclusion that he was unable to voluntarily make a statement or waive 
his Miranda rights.  Therefore, we reject the 11th proposition of law. 
Trial issues 
{¶70} Gruesome photographs.  In his sixth proposition of law, 
Hughbanks argues that the trial court erred in admitting gruesome photographs of 
the victims.  However, Hughbanks fails to specify what photographs were 
objectionable.  The record shows that, over defense objection, the trial court 
admitted crime-scene photographs of William’s body, three autopsy slides of 
William, and three autopsy slides of Juanita. 
{¶71} In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are 
admissible as long as the probative value of the photographs outweighs the danger 
of material prejudice to the accused.  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 
15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. Morales 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267.  Decisions on the admissibility 
of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Slagle 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916. 
{¶72} The crime-scene photographs showed different angles of William’s 
body at the foot of his bed.  These photos depicted the crime scene, illustrated the 
testimony of the detective at the scene, and helped to prove Hughbanks’s intent.  
See State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 288, 754 N.E.2d 1150; State v. 
Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 342, 703 N.E.2d 1251. 
{¶73} One autopsy photograph of William’s torso shows where he had 
been stabbed.  Two others present closeups of William’s face and neck and show 
where his throat had been slit.  Autopsy photographs of Juanita present close-ups 
and different angles of her face and neck and show how her throat had been slit.  
These exhibits depicted the victims’ wounds, illustrated the coroner’s testimony 
on the cause of death, and helped prove Hughbanks’s intent.  See State v. Smith, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 36; Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 
at 158, 694 N.E.2d 932. 
{¶74} We find that the trial court could have reasonably found that the 
probative value of each photograph and autopsy slide outweighed any prejudicial 
impact on the jury.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
these photographs and autopsy slides.  We reject the sixth proposition of law. 
{¶75} Sufficiency and weight of the evidence.  In his second proposition 
of law, Hughbanks challenges both the sufficiency and the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 
{¶76} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259-
260, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
{¶77} Hughbanks provides no explanation on how the evidence was 
insufficient to establish his guilt.  At trial, Hughbanks offered no defense to the 
charges and conceded his guilt.  Indeed, the defense counsel informed the jury, 
“[Y]ou’re not going to have any trouble with a guilty verdict on this.” 
{¶78} Hughbanks’s confession to the police, his confession to family 
members, and other corroborating evidence strongly support the jury’s verdict.  
Hughbanks’s confession accurately described the layout of the Leemans’ house, 
the location of personal property found inside, and the locations where the attacks 
took place.  Moreover, two of Hughbanks’s survival knives, one of which was the 
probable murder weapon, were introduced into evidence.  Thus, there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Hughbanks murdered the Leemans during a burglary. 
January Term, 2003 
19 
{¶79} Finally, we reject Hughbanks’s contention that his conviction was 
against the manifest weight of the evidence.  “Pursuant to R.C. 2953.02, we can 
overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in a 
capital case, but only where the crime was committed after January 1, 1995.”  
State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 254, 750 N.E.2d 90; see, also, State v. 
Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 83.  The 
Leemans were murdered in May 1987.  Based on the foregoing, we reject the 
second proposition of law. 
{¶80} Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his 12th proposition of law, 
Hughbanks argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
call as witnesses his family members who had implicated him in the murders.  
Hughbanks claims that they should have been subject to cross-examination.  We 
reject this claim. 
{¶81} First, Hughbanks has not supported his claim that the failure to call 
family members represents deficient performance, as required by Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  The totality of the record before us 
indicates that the testimony of family members would have only underscored 
Hughbanks’s guilt.  Detective Kemper testified that Larry Hughbanks had told 
police that Hughbanks admitted killing the Leemans.  Investigator Jay testified 
that Larry provided police with Hughbanks’s survival knife that was introduced as 
a possible murder weapon.  According to other testimony, Hughbanks’s father, 
uncle, and cousin provided information to the police implicating Hughbanks in 
the Leeman murders.  Additional testimony indicated that Lisa Leggett, 
Hughbanks’s “ex-common-law wife,” provided police with a survival knife that 
Hughbanks owned, as another possible murder weapon. 
{¶82} “Generally, counsel’s decision whether to call a witness falls 
within the rubric of trial strategy and will not be second-guessed by a reviewing 
court.”  State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 490, 739 N.E.2d 749; see, also, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 2002-Ohio-2221, 767 N.E.2d 678, ¶ 118.  
Trial counsel’s decision not to call any family members as witnesses was 
reasonable given that Hughbanks’s confession had already been introduced at trial 
and given the fact that that testimony would have been repetitive.  Moreover, the 
trial counsel informed the court that the defense was not calling any family 
members as witnesses, as a matter of “trial strategy.” 
{¶83} We also conclude that the decision to forgo calling family 
members was not prejudicial.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  Such testimony would likely have strengthened the state’s case, 
since the jury would have viewed Hughbanks’s confession to family members as 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt.  We conclude that Hughbanks’s counsel were 
not ineffective.  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  We reject the 12th proposition of law. 
Penalty phase issues 
{¶84} Other acts.  In his 13th proposition of law, Hughbanks argues that 
he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor was allowed to cross-examine a 
defense psychiatrist during the penalty phase about Hughbanks’s previous 
imprisonment, his domestic violence, and his failure to support his children.  
Hughbanks claims that the prosecutor’s cross-examination elicited “other acts” 
testimony prohibited by Evid.R. 404(A) and (B). 
{¶85} During the penalty phase, the defense presented the videotaped 
testimony of Dr. DeSilva, a defense psychiatrist.  Dr. DeSilva testified that he had 
diagnosed Hughbanks with a “[s]chizoaffective disorder” and a “bipolar 
disorder.”  Dr. DeSilva discussed Hughbanks’s family history of mental disorders, 
the drugs prescribed to treat Hughbanks’s mental problems, and Hughbanks’s 
hospitalization for mental problems. 
{¶86} On direct examination, Dr. DeSilva testified that Hughbanks’s 
bipolar illness was “inherent” and not caused by his “drug use alone.”  Dr. 
January Term, 2003 
21 
DeSilva also testified that Hughbanks’s suicide attempts, delusions, and 
hallucinations were not simply a function of his drug use or alcohol abuse because 
“the symptoms persist.” 
{¶87} During cross-examination, Dr. DeSilva testified that he would 
expect Hughbanks’s aberrant and unpredictable behavior to continue even after he 
had ceased to consume alcohol and drugs for a long period of time.  Over 
objection, the prosecution asked Dr. DeSilva, “Are you aware he’s been 
incarcerated on several occasions in the past?”  Dr. DeSilva mentioned that he 
was aware of a prior DUI and stated, “I think once [Hughbanks] was in prison, 
yes, sir.”  The prosecutor then asked Dr. DeSilva, “Are you aware of him having 
any major difficulties like this in prison when he’s off of this alcohol and drugs?”  
Dr. DeSilva replied that he did not have any knowledge about Hughbanks’s 
behavior in confinement.  Over further objection, Dr. DeSilva was asked whether 
he was aware that Hughbanks had been incarcerated for approximately nine 
months while awaiting trial.  Dr. DeSilva answered, “Yes.”  The prosecutor then 
asked, “Are you aware of any major problems he’s had while incarcerated, * * * 
this bipolar disorder rearing its ugly head and causing him to act out of 
character?”  Dr. DeSilva replied, “I have not been informed of anything of that 
nature.” 
{¶88} Evid.R. 611(B) provides that cross-examination shall be permitted 
on all relevant matters and on matters affecting credibility.  “The limitation of * * 
* cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, viewed in 
relation to the particular facts of the case.  Such exercise of discretion will not be 
disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Acre (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 140, 145, 6 OBR 197, 451 N.E.2d 802; Treesh, 90 
Ohio St.3d at 480, 739 N.E.2d 749.  Moreover, Evid.R. 705 permits the court, the 
jury, and adverse counsel to know what facts or data in evidence form the basis 
for the expert’s opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶89} Dr. DeSilva’s testimony that Hughbanks’s mental disorder was 
“inherent” and that his aberrant behavior, delusions, and hallucinations could not 
be explained by drug and alcohol abuse alone opened the door to cross-
examination testing this conclusion.  See State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-
Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 98; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 263, 15 OBR 379, 473 
N.E.2d 768 (“[a] witness may be properly cross-examined as to all relevant facts 
developed by the examination in chief”).  Thus, the state could properly cross-
examine Dr. DeSilva about Hughbanks’s behavior in the controlled setting of a 
prison environment, after the effect of drugs or alcohol had worn off.  See State v. 
Gowdy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 387, 396, 727 N.E.2d 579.  Dr. Nancy 
Schmidtgoessling, a psychologist, testified on rebuttal that she interviewed 
Hughbanks after he had been incarcerated for a couple of months and that 
“nothing” suggested that “there was anything wrong with him.” 
{¶90} On direct examination, Dr. DeSilva described problems between 
Hughbanks and other family members.  Dr. DeSilva described a fight where 
Hughbanks’s mother “struck him in the face * * * to control his behavior at the 
time.  * * *  And then he tried to hurt her in return.” 
{¶91} Dr. DeSilva was cross-examined regarding his conversations with 
a clinic’s personnel  about Hughbanks’s diagnosis.  The prosecutor asked Dr. 
DeSilva whether there was an “indication of homicidal threats and that he’s not 
violent or dangerous?”  Dr. DeSilva answered, “In my office, the time I seen [sic] 
him, he has never been violent, never dangerous, never any homicidal threat.”  
Over defense objection, the prosecutor then asked, “How about domestic violence 
convictions, are you aware of that?”  Dr. DeSilva replied, “[T]here was domestic 
violence, I was aware of at different times, yes.” 
{¶92} The defense opened the door to cross-examining Dr. DeSilva about 
domestic violence, since Dr. DeSilva mentioned during direct examination that 
Hughbanks had struck his mother.  See Gowdy, 88 Ohio St.3d at 395, 727 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2003 
23 
579.  Moreover, cross-examination about Dr. DeSilva’s awareness of 
Hughbanks’s domestic violence convictions was relevant to Dr. DeSilva’s 
comment that Hughbanks was not violent or dangerous.  Evid.R. 611(B) and 705.  
See State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 335, 738 N.E.2d 1178. 
{¶93} During this cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired about 
Hughbanks’s relationship with his children.  At one point, the prosecutor asked 
whether Hughbanks had “had any interaction with them or supported them in any 
fashion[.]”  Dr. DeSilva replied that Hughbanks had tried to support his children 
and “was unhappy that he couldn’t do anything more for the children.”  In a 
followup question, the prosecutor asked, “Did [Hughbanks] ever, to your 
knowledge, manifest that in anyway by supporting them or getting a job to try to 
support them * * *?”  Dr. DeSilva replied, “He tried.  He was * * * not the 
world’s best person at holding a job.” 
{¶94} Because Hughbanks failed to object at trial to evidence about his 
failing to provide child support, he waived all but plain error.  State v. Childs 
(1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  See Crim.R. 15(G) (“Objections to receiving in evidence a deposition or 
a part thereof shall be made as provided in civil actions”). 
{¶95} The cross-examination of Dr. DeSilva about Hughbanks’s failure 
to provide child support was irrelevant and tended to portray Hughbanks in a 
negative light.  Nevertheless, we find that it did not result in outcome-
determinative plain error.  Dr. DeSilva’s reference to Hughbanks’s child support 
was isolated and of minor significance given the gravity of the offenses charged 
against Hughbanks.  See Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 161, 749 N.E.2d 226 
(erroneous admission of defendant’s failure to provide child support deemed 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
{¶96} Based on the foregoing, we reject the 13th proposition of law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶97} Cross-examination of expert witness.  In his 14th proposition of 
law, Hughbanks claims that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined Dr. 
DeSilva during the penalty phase by asking him whether Hughbanks met the legal 
definition of insanity at the time of the murders.  Hughbanks did not object to this 
testimony at trial and thus waived all but plain error.  State v. Childs (1968), 14 
Ohio St.2d 56, 43 O.O.2d 119, 236 N.E.2d 545, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶98} During cross-examination at the penalty phase, Dr. DeSilva was 
asked, “Are you familiar with the guidelines in Ohio for insanity, and one of the 
guidelines is your inability to conform your acts to the law?”  Dr. DeSilva replied, 
“Yes, it’s a legal guideline.” Dr. DeSilva was then asked, “And are you aware that 
he was actually recently examined by Dr. Schmidtgoessling for that very subject * 
* *?”  Dr. DeSilva said that he was “not aware of that.” Following this exchange, 
Dr. DeSilva was asked, “Are you aware that Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s finding was 
that there’s nothing at all to suggest during the time of this offense * * * that the 
defendant was suffering from any type of mental disease or defect, or that he was 
unable to know the wrongfulness of his alleged acts?”  Dr. DeSilva said, “[T]hat’s 
not what we discussed * * * and * * * if she made that statement, I would say that 
statement is not quite accurate.” 
{¶99} Hughbanks argues that the prosecution improperly cross-examined 
Dr. DeSilva about Hughbanks, since sanity was not at issue during the penalty 
phase.  We reject this argument.  Hughbanks raised his mental disorder as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor.  Thus, cross-examination of Dr. DeSilva about 
Hughbanks’s sanity was relevant, since the “issues involved are similar: whether a 
‘mental disease or defect’ existed and, if so, whether and to what degree it may 
have impaired his cognition and volition.”  State v. Cooey (1989) 46 Ohio St.3d 
20, 33, 544 N.E.2d 895; see, also, State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 203, 
661 N.E.2d 1068.  Accordingly, we reject the 14th proposition of law. 
January Term, 2003 
25 
{¶100} Jury verdict as a recommendation.  In his 15th proposition of 
law, Hughbanks claims that the trial court’s instructions violated Caldwell v. 
Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, by indicating 
that the jury’s verdict was merely a recommendation. 
{¶101} Before voir dire and over defense objection, the trial court 
instructed the jury that “in the sentencing phase, * * * you’ll hear information, 
you’ll deliberate, and basically you will come back to me, the Court, and tell me 
the sentencing recommendation.  But please understand, we use that word, 
recommendation, but whatever sentencing recommendation that you give me will 
be the sentencing in regards to this particular case.”  The trial court’s penalty-
phase instructions stressed that the jury should “assume that the recommendation 
shall be the sentence of this Court.” 
{¶102} We have repeatedly rejected similar complaints alleging a 
Caldwell violation.  See, e.g., State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 93, 568 
N.E.2d 674; State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 326-327, 686 N.E.2d 245.  
In this case, there was no Caldwell violation, since the trial court’s instructions 
accurately stated the law, emphasized the jury’s responsibility to impose a 
sentence, and did not induce reliance on the prospect of appellate review.  See 
State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 109.  We 
reject the 15th proposition of law. 
Constitutional issues 
{¶103} 
In his seventh proposition of law, Hughbanks argues that 
requiring that mitigating factors be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
violates the Ohio and United States Constitutions.  His claim is without merit.  
Delo v. Lashley (1993), 507 U.S. 272, 275-276, 113 S.Ct. 1222, 122 L.Ed.2d 620.  
See Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 171, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264.  In any event, 
the trial court instructed the jury during the penalty phase that “the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
* * * outweigh the factors in mitigation.  Gary Hughbanks does not have any 
burden of proof.” We reject the seventh proposition of law. 
{¶104} 
In his eighth proposition of law, Hughbanks challenges the trial 
court’s instructions on reasonable doubt during the penalty phase of the trial.  We 
summarily reject this challenge.  See State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 
131-132, 694 N.E.2d 916; Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d at 69, 752 N.E.2d 904. 
{¶105} 
In his ninth proposition of law, Hughbanks disputes the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statutes.  We summarily reject this 
challenge.  See State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; 
State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; Jenkins, 15 
Ohio St.3d at 179, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
Independent Sentence Evaluation 
{¶106} 
The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Hughbanks murdered William and Juanita Leeman to escape detection or 
apprehension pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), as a course of conduct pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and, as the principal offender, while committing or 
attempting to commit aggravated burglary pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  The 
trial court merged the (A)(3) and (A)(7) specifications prior to imposing sentence. 
{¶107} 
Hughbanks called five mitigation witnesses, made an unsworn 
statement, and introduced documentary evidence for the jury’s consideration. 
{¶108} 
Dr. Raju treated Hughbanks when he was hospitalized for 
psychotic behavior in June 1986.  Hughbanks “complained about hearing voices 
and noises telling him to kill himself.  And he also express[ed] some homicidal 
thoughts.”  Hughbanks mentioned “multiple problems at home” and admitted 
“drinking alcohol for the past month every day.” 
{¶109} 
During his hospitalization, Hughbanks expressed feelings of 
“helplessness and hopelessness.”  He stated that he could not “control the fear of 
losing self control and hurting himself or somebody else.”  Hughbanks was 
January Term, 2003 
27 
hospitalized for 14 days and was treated with Lithium and Thorazine. 
Hughbanks’s final diagnosis was that he suffered from a “major affective disorder 
and bipolar disorder, which is of manic episode [and] drug and alcohol abuse.”    
{¶110} 
Hughbanks was readmitted to the hospital in August 1986 
following “an overdose of drugs that were prescribed to him.”  He was 
hospitalized for fewer than three days and was treated with “psychotropic 
medication as well as some medication for agitated behavior.” 
{¶111} 
Dr. DeSilva treated Hughbanks for “about a five-year period” 
during the 1980s.  Dr. DeSilva also had treated Gary Sr. a couple of years prior to 
his treatment of Hughbanks. 
{¶112} 
Gary Sr. was diagnosed and treated for a “mixture of paranoid 
schizophrenia with some schizoaffective features.”  Gary Sr.’s mental disorders 
resulted in his hospitalization on a couple of occasions during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
{¶113} 
Dr. DeSilva testified that Gary Sr.’s illness had a “[v]ery serious 
impact” on his wife and children and that “he could never remember the 
relationship being very good * * *.”  Hughbanks was abused by his father and 
was sometimes “beaten” or “threatened with beatings.”  Moreover, Gary Sr.’s 
illness may have affected the defendant, since the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
“runs in families.  There is a genetic tendency and sometimes a familial 
augmentation [and] anywhere from three to five percent of the population is 
genetically prone to schizophrenia.” 
{¶114} 
Hughbanks was diagnosed with a “[s]chizoaffective disorder” 
and “[b]ipolar Type II” illness with “intermittent concomitant drug abuse and 
alcohol abuse.”  Hughbanks’s bipolar disorder was identified by his “variations in 
mood * * * from a manic phase and then * * * fairly fast to the depressed phase.”  
Dr. DeSilva testified that Hughbanks experienced hallucinations similar to his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
father’s.  Hughbanks saw “something very much like * * * what his father saw, * 
* * a red-eyed devil or a red-eyed man.” 
{¶115} 
Dr. 
DeSilva 
testified 
that 
“most 
of 
[Hughbanks’s] 
hospitalizations and interventions were because of suicidal intent.”  Hughbanks 
“really wanted to die * * * [since] he felt that he could not handle life as it was.”  
Hughbanks was treated with Lithium, but he “could not stay on it long enough.”  
He was also treated with Chloroform, Thorazine, and Antabuse. 
{¶116} 
During cross-examination, Dr. DeSilva testified that there was 
“no evidence” that Hughbanks has an organic brain disorder or is mentally 
retarded.  Dr. DeSilva stated that Hughbanks’s bipolar disorder was responsible 
for his aberrant behavior, excessive reactions, and flamboyant statements.  Dr. 
DeSilva testified that he would expect Hughbanks’s aberrant behavior to continue 
even after he was off alcohol and drugs for a long period of time. 
{¶117} 
Under cross-examination, Dr. DeSilva disputed the diagnosis of 
a Dr. Feuss that Hughbanks suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and 
not from schizoaffective or bipolar disorders.  Dr. DeSilva disagreed with Dr. 
Nancy Schmidtgoessling’s findings that, at the time of the 1987 murders, 
Hughbanks was not suffering from any type of mental disease or defect and was 
able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts.  Dr. DeSilva disagreed with Dr. 
Schmidtgoessling’s diagnosis even though Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s more recent 
evaluation of Hughbanks included intelligence tests and the MMPI-II.  
Intelligence testing showed that Hughbanks had a full-scale IQ of 82. 
{¶118} 
Records show that Dr. DeSilva told the court clinic that 
Hughbanks was “crazy before he was born” and “isn’t competent to stand trial.”  
However, Dr. DeSilva acknowledged that he had not seen Hughbanks in at least a 
year when he stated this opinion. 
{¶119} 
Larry Kramer, Hughbanks’s uncle, lived near the Hughbanks 
family while Hughbanks was growing up.  Kramer and Gary Sr. also worked 
January Term, 2003 
29 
together.  Kramer stated that the Hughbanks family “always had financial 
problems” and “[m]any a time they would cook on a Coleman stove because their 
electricity would be turned off.”  However, Gary Sr. had a “fancy for cars” and 
would drive a nice car even if the family did not have enough to eat. 
{¶120} 
Dr. DeSilva treated Kramer for paranoid schizophrenia.  Kramer 
introduced Gary Sr. to Dr. DeSilva, who treated Gary Sr. for his mental problems.  
Kramer felt that Hughbanks’s mother also had a mental disorder.  She 
experienced a “lot of depression,” and she’s “had a very pitiful life.”  During 
cross-examination, Kramer testified that Hughbanks’s mother loved Hughbanks 
very much, never physically abused him, and taught him the difference between 
right and wrong. 
{¶121} 
Larketa Ann Hughbanks, Hughbanks’s younger sister, grew up 
with Hughbanks and another brother.  Larketa and her siblings had very few 
friends because if “[Gary Sr.] didn’t like them, of [sic] if he disapproved of them, 
they weren’t to come back around.”  Gary Sr. often made Larketa and her siblings 
“go to bed at 5:30 in the afternoon or 6 o’clock.”  Larketa and her brothers “used 
to call him the Warden.” 
{¶122} 
Larketa testified that Hughbanks tried to kill himself on several 
occasions by taking an overdose of pills, slitting his wrist, and trying to jump off a 
balcony.  Hughbanks also talked about hearing and seeing things.  For example, 
Hughbanks once described seeing a black figure “with red piercing eyes.”  
Larketa stated that Hughbanks becomes “very irate” and “not normal when he’s 
not on his Lithium.”  However, “[w]hen he’s on the Lithium, he’s very mellow.  
He can handle things.” 
{¶123} 
Evangeline Hughbanks, the defendant’s mother, was 16 years 
old when she married Gary Sr., who was then 15, in 1965.  Evangeline had three 
children, including Hughbanks, who was born on August 29, 1966.  Hughbanks 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
was born with a “ruptured omphalocele, which is an open stomach.”  Hughbanks 
underwent surgery and was almost two months old before leaving the hospital. 
{¶124} 
Evangeline testified that Gary Sr. was a “very abusive” husband 
and used to beat her.  Gary Sr. never physically abused Hughbanks or his siblings.  
Evangeline disciplined the children, including spanking them and using the belt 
on them. 
{¶125} 
Larry Hughbanks, the defendant’s younger brother, has had 
numerous legal problems.  He has stolen guns, been sentenced as a pedophile, and 
spent approximately six years in prison. 
{¶126} 
In making a final plea for Hughbanks, Evangeline said, 
“[P]lease don’t kill my son.  It hasn’t been easy for him, for me, for my children.  
Please don’t kill him.” 
{¶127} 
During cross-examination, Evangeline testified that Hughbanks 
had relationships with three women.  He married Brenda Williams in August 
1984, and their relationship lasted four months.  Hughbanks next had a 
relationship with Lisa Vanselow, and “they had four children together.”  He then 
had a relationship with Kelly Richards, and they had a little boy.  According to 
Evangeline, Hughbanks beat each of these women. 
{¶128} 
In his unsworn statement, Hughbanks told the jury, “[Y]ou did 
the right thing in finding me guilty.”  He told the Leeman family, “I’m sorry it 
happened.  I wish it would have never happened.  And if my life being taken gives 
you comfort of your mother and father being gone, then so be it. It’s out of my 
hands.  I can’t undo what’s been done, and I will not beg for my life, because I 
don’t deserve that.” 
{¶129} 
Further, Hughbanks stated, “I have a mental illness, but I will 
not use that as the blame for what has happened.”  Finally, Hughbanks said, “I 
was the only one that night, so you need not worry about anyone else being out 
January Term, 2003 
31 
there.  I did this.  And there’s no, no excuse I can give in the world for saying that 
it was right.  None.” 
{¶130} 
Rebuttal evidence.  Dr. Schmidtgoessling, a psychologist at the 
Community Diagnostic and Treatment Center, performed a sanity evaluation on 
Hughbanks.  She interviewed Hughbanks, conducted psychological testing, an IQ 
test, and reviewed his jail records.  During her initial interview of Hughbanks on 
November 24, 1997, he “repeatedly stated * * * he had not done this offense.”  
Dr. Schmidtgoessling testified that “[h]e was very clear in his speech.  He was 
very well organized in his thoughts.  He did not appear to be particularly high in 
his mood or dejected. * * * [T]here was nothing to suggest that there was 
anything wrong with him.”  After 
conducting her evaluation, Dr. 
Schmidtgoessling concluded that Hughbanks was sane at the time of the offenses. 
{¶131} 
Dr. Schmidtgoessling visited Hughbanks on May 23 and May 
29, 1998, just prior to his trial.  Hughbanks stated “that he was not having any 
hallucinations, did not have any bizarre thoughts, his mood was stable.”  During 
these interviews, Hughbanks admitted committing the murders because he was 
frightened and angry.  According to Dr. Schmidtgoessling, Hughbanks said that 
Mr. Leeman had put him in this position, “that is to say, he was caught inside this 
house accosted.  And he said that’s the reason he fought back and stabbed Mr. 
Leeman.”  Hughbanks explained that he killed Mrs. Leeman because “she had 
seen him and could identify him.” 
{¶132} 
Dr. Schmidtgoessling diagnosed Hughbanks as having “some 
sort of a mood disorder, a possible substance abuse and dependence, and a 
character disorder.”  She testified that other doctors may have diagnosed 
Hughbanks with more serious mental disorders while he was still under the 
influence of illicit drugs.  However, Dr. Schmidtgoessling testified that 
Hughbanks was “not delusional, was not bizarre in thought.  He said that he was 
stable at the time that these things happened.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
{¶133} 
On cross-examination, Dr. Schmidtgoessling agreed that 
immediately before trial, Hughbanks was tearful, upset, and “repeatedly stated 
that he was sorry he had done this.”  Dr. Schmidtgoessling also agreed that 
Hughbanks “does much better in a structured environment, one in which there 
[are] no substances.” 
Sentence evaluation 
{¶134} 
We find nothing in the nature and the circumstances of the 
offenses to be mitigating.  Hughbanks murdered William Leeman after William 
surprised Hughbanks in the act of burglarizing the Leeman home.  According to 
Hughbanks’s confession, he attempted to avert confrontation.  Hughbanks 
explained that he killed William only after William tried to stop Hughbanks from 
fleeing.  Hughbanks’s explanation suggests that he was more a frightened burglar 
than a cold-blooded killer. 
{¶135} 
Hughbanks’s explanation is not supported by other facts 
surrounding the murders.  Hughbanks stabbed William 17 times and slit his 
throat.  Moreover, Hughbanks did not flee after killing William.  Instead, 
Hughbanks chased Juanita Leeman as she tried to escape, and, after catching her, 
slit her throat.  The facts establish two horrific murders that lack any mitigating 
features. 
{¶136} 
We find that Hughbanks’s history and background provide some 
mitigating factors.  Hughbanks was raised in an abusive and dysfunctional family.  
Moreover, Gary Sr.’s financial problems had a serious impact on the family while 
Hughbanks was growing up. 
{¶137} 
Mental illness affected many members of Hughbanks’s family.  
His father was a paranoid schizophrenic, his mother suffered mental problems, 
and his uncle was treated for paranoid schizophrenia.  Undoubtedly, the mental 
illness of these family members adversely affected Hughbanks’s growth and 
development. 
January Term, 2003 
33 
{¶138} 
Almost ten years passed between the murders and Hughbanks’s 
arrest for the murders.  During this time, Hughbanks was briefly married to one 
woman and lived with two other women.  According to his mother, Hughbanks 
was the father of a number of children.  Little information was disclosed about 
Hughbanks’s work history between 1987 and 1997. 
{¶139} 
The following statutory mitigating factors are inapplicable here: 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (“duress, coercion, or strong 
provocation”), (B)(5) (lack of a criminal record), and (B)(6) (accomplice only). 
{¶140} 
The R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) factor is entitled to some weight, since 
Hughbanks was 20 years old at the time of the murders.  See State v. Baston 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 431, 709 N.E.2d 128. 
{¶141} 
Hughbanks’s mental illness does not qualify as an R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3) factor.  Dr. DeSilva diagnosed Hughbanks with a schizoaffective 
disorder and a bipolar disorder.  Hughbanks’s mental problems necessitated 
hospitalization in the 1980s prior to his commission of the Leeman murders.  
However, psychiatric testimony failed to establish that Hughbanks lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law at the time the murders were committed.  
Moreover, Dr. Schmidtgoessling insisted that Hughbanks suffered only from a 
personality disorder and substance abuse.  See State v. Allard (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 482, 502, 663 N.E.2d 1277 (bipolar disorder did not qualify as an R.C. 
2929.04[B][3] factor absent testimony that the defendant lacked substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law).  There was no 
evidence that Hughbanks is mentally retarded; intelligence testing showed that he 
has an IQ of 82. 
{¶142} 
Nevertheless, we give considerable weight to Hughbanks’s 
mental illness as another relevant mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  
See State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 8-9, 564 N.E.2d 408 (lifelong mental 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
illness involving psychotic lapses and paranoid ideation as one of the mitigating 
“other factors”).  Moreover, Hughbanks’s hospitalization and treatment for his 
psychiatric problems occurred near the time of the offenses in the 1980s.  
Hughbanks’s mental condition may have improved; that fact would help to 
explain Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s 1997 diagnosis and evaluation. 
{¶143} 
Hughbanks’s expressions of remorse during his unsworn 
statement are entitled to weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. Stallings 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 300, 731 N.E.2d 159; State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 433, 456, 709 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶144} 
In summary, we find that Hughbanks’s youth, his family 
background, his mental illness, and his remorse are entitled to some weight in 
mitigation.  Even so, we conclude that the aggravating circumstances in each 
count outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hughbanks’s 
course of conduct in multiple killings during the course of burglarizing the 
Leeman home is a grave aggravating circumstance.  Hughbanks’s mitigating 
evidence pales in significance when compared with the aggravating 
circumstances. 
{¶145} 
Finally, we find that the death sentence is proportionate when 
compared with other “course of conduct” murders.  See Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d at 
174, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 131, 734 N.E.2d 
1237; State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 574, 715 N.E.2d 1144.  The 
death sentence is also proportionate with the sentence imposed in other 
aggravated-burglary murders.  See State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 423, 
739 N.E.2d 300; State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 56, 630 N.E.2d 339; 
State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 126, 559 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶146} 
Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and 
sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
January Term, 2003 
35 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PETREE, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
CHARLES R. PETREE, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Faulkner & Tepe, L.L.P., A. Norman Aubin and Herbert E. Freeman, for 
appellant. 
__________________