Title: RICHARD G. BLOOMER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD G. BLOOMER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 77209 P.3d 574Case Number: No. S-08-0139Decided: 06/12/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
RICHARD 
G. BLOOMER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, 
Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric K. Thompson, Student 
Director; and Curtis H. Cheney, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Cheney.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
Hill, 
J., delivers the opinion of the 
Court; Voigt, C.J., files a dissenting opinion, with 
whom Burke, J. joins in part; Burke, J. files a separate dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Richard G. Bloomer (Bloomer), was convicted of two counts of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  
He challenges those convictions on the basis that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to quash the jury panel because the method used to 
select that panel violated principles associated with selecting a jury that 
represents a fair cross section of the community.  In addition, he asserts that the 
district court refused to consider probation for Bloomer in violation of 
established legal principles.  We 
will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Bloomer raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in denying [Bloomer's] motion to quash the jury 
panel?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err in refusing to consider probation for 
[Bloomer]?

 
 
The 
State presents the issues in these terms:

 
 
I.          
Did the clerk of court violate either Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-129 or the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution by drawing jurors in 
alphabetical order from a random list prepared by Wyoming's Secretary of 
State?

 
 
II.         
Is [Bloomer] entitled to a new sentencing as a consequence of the trial 
judge's statement  at an abortive change-of-plea hearing  that he would not 
consider probation if [Bloomer] went to trial and was convicted by a 
jury?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of Bloomer's crimes are not of any special significance to the issues 
raised in this appeal and so we will not recite them in detail.  It suffices to note that he was selling 
methamphetamine as a dealer.  At his 
arraignment on August 16, 2004, Bloomer entered pleas of not guilty to both 
charges.  Bloomer absconded to 
Montana in November of 2004, and so his December 13, 2004 trial date was 
vacated.  Bloomer was imprisoned in 
Montana on other charges but was returned to Wyoming in the summer of 2007 under 
a detainer.  Bloomer's trial was set 
for January 17, 2008, but on October 24, 2007, Bloomer requested a "Change of 
Plea and Sentencing Hearing," and that proceeding was scheduled for December 17, 
2007.  When he appeared at that 
hearing, Bloomer disclosed that he no longer wanted to enter guilty pleas.  It was in response to this development 
that the district court stated:

 
 
I 
want to tell you something, you certainly have a right to have a jury trial, but 
as of today there will be no plea agreements.  We go to jury trial.  If you are found guilty on either one of 
the counts, there will be no request for any type of 
probation.

 
 
This 
occurrence forms the basis for Bloomer's second issue.

 
 
[¶4]      On January 28, 
2008, the first day of Bloomer's trial, Bloomer filed a "Motion to Quash Jury 
Panel."  The motion was based upon 
the district court clerk's policy of selecting jurors from the master list in 
alphabetical order, rather than in a random selection process.  Bloomer posits that, in combination, 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 7 ("Absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and 
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest 
majority."); art. 1 § 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in 
criminal cases."); and art. 1, § 10 ([T]he accused shall have the rightto a 
speedy trial by an impartial jury[.]"), mandate that the jury selection process 
used in Park County is in violation of those core constitutional 
principles.  In addition, he asserts 
that the jury selection process used by the clerk of the district court violates 
the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
(Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975)).

 
 
[¶5]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-11-109 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
(a)  The 
clerk shall shake the box containing the names of the regular jurors so as to 
mix the ballots therein as well as possible.  He shall then draw from the box as many 
ballots as are ordered by the court.

            
(b)  The name on each ballot drawn shall be entered in the 
minutes of the court.

            
(c)  If the name of any person is drawn who is not competent to 
serve as a trial juror, and the incompetence shall be made to appear to the 
satisfaction of the court, the name of the person shall be stricken from the 
jury list, the ballot containing the name shall be destroyed, and such fact 
shall be entered in the minutes of the court.

            
(d)  When the necessary number of jurors has been drawn, the 
clerk shall make and certify a list of the names drawn.  The certificate shall 
state:

                        
(i)  The date of the court order for the 
drawing;

                        
(ii)  The date of the drawing;

                        
(iii)  The number of jurors drawn;

                        
(iv)  The names and addresses of the competent jurors; 
and

                        
(v)  The time and place where the jurors are required to 
appear.

            
(e)  The jurors on the certified list shall be summoned to 
appear.

 
 
[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-11-129 (LexisNexis 2007) provides:

 
 
The 
procedures for compiling and maintaining of jury lists, jury ballots and jury 
boxes, and for drawing jurors, may be modified by the court to permit the 
compilation and maintenance of jury lists and ballots and for the drawing of 
jurors by any manual, mechanical, electronic or other means calculated to insure 
the integrity of the system and a random selection 
process.

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court took testimony from the district court clerk who described her process in 
detail, including that it was adopted by order of the presiding judge.  The district court 
ruled:

 
 
[T]hat 
process does ensure that there is a fair representation of those people of the 
community to ensure a fair and adequate trial for the Defendant in this 
matter.  Therefore, the Court is 
going to decline to quash the jury panel.

 
 
DISCUSSSION

 
 
Make-Up 
of Jury Panel

 
 
[¶8]      Although the 
facts which were brought out in the district court clerk's testimony are 
important in resolving this issue, at bottom this is a question of statutory 
construction which we review de 
novo:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with [the] legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  We must not give a 
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.

 
 

Muller 
v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 
2006 WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo.2006) (quoting Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, 
¶ 9, 126 P.3d 105, 108)).  
Moreover, a party's claim asserting an infringement of the right to due 
process is reviewed de novo.  Reece v. State, 2008 WY 121, ¶ 8, 
193 P.3d 274, 276 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶9]      The clerk of the 
district court described her methodology in detail. Before each term of court, 
she receives a randomly selected list of 350 jurors' names from the Wyoming 
Secretary of State.  The names are 
drawn from voter registration lists and driver's license records.  When a jury trial is scheduled, the 
district court clerk selects a number of jurors as recommended by the district 
judge for a particular trial.  For 
various reasons (such as moving out of the district, over age 72, health 
problems, etc.) some jurors are deleted from the list.  Thereafter, for the first jury drawn 
from a new master list, the clerk selects the number of names needed for the 
immediate jury panel.  In this case, 
that was 53 names.  The names were 
taken from the list in alphabetical order, rather than by a random selection 
from all jurors on the list.   
Those names were then randomly drawn to select the jury in the instant 
case.  This is done largely for the 
convenience of jurors.  That is, 
rather than drawing from the entire list each time a panel is required, names 
are taken from the list in alphabetical order.  By this means the same jurors are not 
drawn over and over.  Once an 
alphabetical list is given to the district court as a jury panel, those same 
names will not be subject to being called again, unless the clerk has gone 
through the entire list and it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the 
list once again.  This methodology 
has been in use in Park County for over 15 years.  In the district court clerk's view, § 
1-11-129 allows each district to use a method that best suits its needs.  For example, for the first trial during 
a term of court, the jurors will all be from the beginning of the alphabetized 
list.  In the instance of this 
particular trial, all jurors' names began with the letters "H" through 
"P."

 
 
[¶10]   This issue has arisen before in 
other jurisdictions.  For instance, 
in State v. Azure, 2005 MT 328, 
¶¶ 14-17, 125 P.2d 1116, 1118-20 (Mont. 2005) it was 
held:

 
 
Azure's 
jury venire was compiled by combining three separate jury panels that had been 
randomly selected by computer from the list of Cascade County registered 
voters.  These panels were called 
for trials scheduled to occur around the same time as Azure's trial.  When these other trials did not take 
place, the jury panels were held over and ultimately assigned to Azure's 
trial.  Panels one and two each 
originally consisted of seventy persons.  
Panel three originally consisted of thirty-five persons.  Prior to being assigned to Azure's 
trial, these panels were reduced to forty-six, forty-seven, and twenty-four 
persons respectively as a result of some jurors being excused by the clerk's 
office or the judge for legitimate reasons.  Additionally, ten people were eliminated 
for failure to contact the clerk after the summons was mailed to them and the 
clerk was subsequently unable to reach them.

 
 
Panel 
one was initially assigned to Azure's trial.  However, the District Court notified the 
clerk several days before the trial that it wanted at least eighty 
prospective jurors in this case.  To 
accommodate this request, the clerk's office added the twenty-four names from 
panel three to the forty-six names on panel one.  This created a pool of seventy 
people.  The clerk then added the 
first twenty-one names from panel two.  
However, because panel two had previously been alphabetized, the selected 
surnames began with the letters A through K, and the names beginning with the 
remaining letters of the alphabet were eliminated.  Subsequently, one person from panel two 
was excused, leaving the District Court with ninety potential jurors from which 
to choose.  These ninety names were 
placed in a box for additional random selection, and the first twenty-seven 
names selected comprised the venire for the jury and one alternate.

 
 
Azure's 
complaint on appeal arises from the manner in which panel two was split.  He maintains that it was error to 
alphabetize this list and then select only the first twenty-one persons based 
upon the first letter of their last names.  
He posits that once the list was put in alphabetical order and then not 
used in its entirety, it ceased to be random.  He further asserts that when this list 
was combined with the other panels, the overall jury pool was tainted, he was 
denied a fair cross-section jury panel, and he is entitled to a new 
trial.

 
 
Section 
3-15-503(1)(b), MCA (1995), upon which Azure relies, 
states:

 
 
If 
the drawing of jurors is conducted by means of a computerized database, it must 
be conducted by use of a computerized random selection process that the 
judges of the district court of the county have approved in writing as 
satisfactorily fulfilling the requirements for the drawing of trial juries. 
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
Azure 
complains his jury panel was not "randomly" selected.  Using the ordinary meaning of the term 
"random," i.e., lacking a specific plan or pattern,FN1 it could be argued that once the list was 
alphabetized, it was no longer random. However, to prevail, Azure must prove 
that the selection process was not random.  This he has failed to do. Mere 
alphabetization of a randomly selected list of names and elimination of some of 
those names based exclusively on where they fall in the alphabet does not taint 
the random selection process.  As a 
result, we conclude Azure's jury selection process did not violate § 
3-15-503(1)(b), MCA (1995).1

 
 
FN1.  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1448 
(4th ed. 2000).

 
 
Without 
substantive analysis, Azure relies on State v. Taylor (1975), 168 Mont. 
142, 542 P.2d 100, and Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690, in arguing that the alphabetization and subsequent 
bifurcation of one jury panel "systematically excluded an identifiable class of 
citizens."  Our review of these 
cases leads us to share Justice Harrison's observation in State v. Taylor, 
"We have no disagreement with the case authority cited by defendant nor the 
law established by that authority, however, the case authority cited is not 
applicable to the instant case."  
While these cases stand for the proposition that a systematic exclusion 
of an identifiable class of citizens violates the requirement that the 
jury be a fair cross-section of the community, Azure failed to establish that 
the persons eliminated from the alphabetical list were eliminated based upon 
their "race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or 
religious ideas."  State v. 
Taylor, 168 Mont. at 144, 542 P.2d  at 101.  Moreover, Azure failed to show any 
prejudice against him or injury affecting his right to an impartial jury 
resulting from the alleged discriminatory selection of his jury.  State v. Taylor, 168 Mont. at 
148, 542 P.2d  at 103.

 
 
The 
elimination of panel members from a venire based exclusively on the first letter 
of the person's last name is not a systematic exclusion of a distinctive, 
identifiable class of the community.  
There was no discernible gender, ethnic, or other suspect grouping that 
occurred when certain names from panel two were used while others were not.  Simply put, the twenty-six people from 
panel two who were not selected for Azure's jury pool do not comprise an 
"identifiable class of citizens," and the alphabetization of panel two and 
limited selection therefrom did not run afoul of the statute or applicable case 
law.

 
 
Lastly, 
as noted by the District Court in its Order, the jury selection process in the 
case before us is distinguishable from that utilized in State v. LaMere, 
2000 MT 45, 298 Mont. 358, 2 P.3d 204.  
In LaMere, the clerk notified prospective jurors of jury duty by 
telephone instead of through the mail.  
Noting that this method necessarily eliminated any person who did not 
have a telephone, or allowed persons with telephones to "excuse himself or 
herself from possible jury duty simply by failing to return the clerk's phone 
call," the Court held that the telephone summoning method was a "substantial 
failure to comply" with relevant jury selection statutes, and materially 
undermined the purpose of these selection statutes to provide for random 
selection of jurors on the basis of objective criteria.  LaMere, ¶¶ 73 and 75.  We vacated LaMere's conviction and 
remanded the matter for a new trial.  
LaMere, ¶ 76.  We 
conclude that Azure has not established that the jury summoning method employed 
by the clerk in this case was a "substantial failure to comply" with the 
statutes governing the procurement of a trial jury.

 
 
[¶11]   A different result was reached in a 
West Virginia case that was based on a statute different from Montana's and 
Wyoming's:

 
 
The 
petitioner herein, Thomas Stanley, Esq., requests this Court to issue a writ of 
prohibition against the respondent herein, Virginia Sine, Circuit Clerk of 
Berkeley County.FN1  Specifically, Petitioner Stanley seeks 
relief to prohibit Clerk Sine from selecting prospective jurors in sequential 
alphabetical order and to require her to comply with the random jury selection 
criteria set forth in W.Va.Code §§ 52-1-6 (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) and 52-1-7 
(1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000).  Upon a 
review of the parties' arguments, supporting materials, and pertinent 
authorities, we grant as moulded the requested writ of 
prohibition.

 
 
FN1.  
We agree with Clerk Sine's assertion that the circuit judge of Berkeley 
County should have been made a party to this proceeding.  Given the urgency of this matter based 
upon its far-reaching impact upon all cases currently pending in that 
jurisdiction, however, we will consider this case with respect to the parties 
presently before the Court.

 
 

I.

 
 

FACTUAL 
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 
 
The 
petitioner herein, Thomas Stanley, Esq., is an attorney with the Public Defender 
Corporation in Martinsburg, West Virginia.   During his representation of clients in 
the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, he learned that the respondent herein, 
Virginia Sine, Circuit Clerk of Berkeley County, selects prospective jurors in 
sequential alphabetical order from that term of court's jury panel list.  Designation of the jury panel list 
begins with a source list consisting of a consolidated listing of 
licensed drivers and registered voters in Berkeley County, in accordance with 
the requirements of W. Va.Code § 52-1-5 (1993) (Repl. Vol. 
2000).FN3  A master list is then created 
every two years by a computer-generated random drawing of 10,000 names from the 
source list, pursuant to W. Va.Code § 52-1-6(b) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000).  The prospective juror list is 
then compiled each month through a computer-generated random drawing of 300 
names from the master list, as required by W. Va.Code § 52-1-7(a) (1993) (Repl. 
Vol. 2000).

 
 
FN3.  Although not referenced in Clerk 
Sine's recitation of facts, persons comprising the source list may also include 
those "who have filed a state personal income tax return for the preceding tax 
year[.]"  W. Va.Code § 52-1-5(a)(1) 
(1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000).

 
 
Upon 
selection as a member of the prospective juror list, all prospective jurors are 
sent a questionnaire.  After 
disqualifying jurors who indicate an inability to serve due to non-residence, 
age, death, or other legal disability, the remaining members of the prospective 
juror list ultimately comprise the jury box.FN4  
Because the source list and master list are arranged alphabetically, the 
computerized numbering of the members of the prospective juror list also, 
coincidentally, is arranged alphabetically.  Rather than selecting prospective jurors 
according to the key number system delineated in W. Va.Code § 52-1-6(c), by 
which a key number is derived and used to select members of the jury 
box,FN5 the clerk had been 
directed to start at the beginning of the jury box list and to select 
prospective jurors in sequential alphabetical order until the desired number of 
jurors had been attained.  It is the 
selection of prospective jurors pursuant to this sequential alphabetical order 
to which Petitioner Stanley objects in this proceeding.

 
 
FN4.  
More specifically, W. Va.Code § 52-1-3(7) (1988) (Repl. Vol. 2000) 
defines a "jury box" as "any physical, nonelectronic device in which are placed 
names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors taken from the master list 
and from which names are drawn at random for jury panels."  Cf. W. Va.Code § 52-1-3(6) 
(defining "[j]ury wheel" as "any electronic system in which are located names or 
identifying numbers of prospective jurors taken from the master list and from 
which names are drawn at random for jury panels").

 
 
FN5.  W.Va. Code § 52-1-6(c) (1993 (Repl. Vol. 
2000) describes the key number system as follows:

 
 
The 
names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury 
wheel or jury box shall be selected by the clerk at random from the master list 
in the following manner:  The total 
number of names on the master list shall be divided by the number of names to be 
placed in or added to the jury wheel or jury box and the whole number next 
greater than the quotient shall be the "key number", except that the key number 
shall never be less than two.  A 
"starting number" for making the selection shall then be determined by a random 
method from the numbers from one to the key number, both inclusive.  The required number of names shall then 
be selected from the master list by taking in order the first name on the master 
list corresponding to the starting number and then successively the names 
appearing in the master list at intervals equal to the key number, recommencing 
if necessary at the start of the list until the required number of names has 
been selected.  Upon recommencing at 
the start of the list, or if additional names are subsequently to be selected 
for the jury wheel or jury box, names previously selected from the master list 
shall be disregarded in selecting the additional names.  The clerk is not required to, but may, 
use an electronic or mechanical system or device in carrying out its 
duties.  (For example, assume a 
county with a master list of eight thousand nine hundred eighty names, a 
population of less than fifteen thousand and a desired jury box or wheel 
containing two hundred names.  Eight 
thousand nine hundred eighty names divided by two hundred is forty-four and 
nine-tenths percent.  The next whole 
number is forty-five.  The clerk 
would take every forty-fifth name on the list, using a random starting number 
between one and forty-five.)

 
 
According 
to Clerk Sine, all of the jury panels seated in Berkeley County, including those 
for circuit court, family court, magistrate court, and Martinsburg Municipal 
Court, are selected in this manner.  
Petitioner Stanley suggests that the proper method for selecting 
prospective jurors is enumerated in W. Va.Code § 52-1-7 which requires that the 
names of prospective jurors be drawn from a properly comprised jury box to 
ensure their randomness.

 
 
Upon 
Petitioner Stanley's questioning of Clerk Sine as to the origins of the current 
method of sequential alphabetical selection, she indicated that she had been 
instructed to proceed in this manner by a Berkeley County circuit judge in 
approximately 1998.  This directive 
was occasioned by several jurors' complaints that they could not access the 
designated telephone number to ascertain whether they were required to report 
for jury duty.  In so ruling, the 
circuit judge had hoped to simplify the manner in which prospective jurors were 
notified as to whether or not their appearance would be required.  Respondent Sine concedes that this 
directive was made on the record in open court, and was not memorialized by a 
written administrative or judicial order. Because Clerk Sine indicated that she 
intends to continue selecting prospective jurors in sequential alphabetical 
order until a judicial officer directs her to do otherwise, Petitioner Stanley 
filed the instant writ of prohibition to challenge the propriety of this 
practice.

 
 
.

 
 

III.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
The 
sole issue presented for resolution by this extraordinary proceeding is whether 
the statutory law delineating the manner in which prospective jurors should be 
selected permits prospective jurors to be selected in sequential alphabetical 
order.  Petitioner Stanley contends 
that the present method of selecting prospective jurors in sequential 
alphabetical order is not sufficiently random to comply with the governing 
common law and statutory requirements mandating the random selection of 
prospective jurors. Citing W. Va.Code § 52-1-1, et seq.; Toothman v. 
Brescoach, 195 W.Va. 409, 465 S.E.2d 866 (1995) (per curiam) (recognizing 
importance of random jury selection (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975))); Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va. 
742, 372 S.E.2d 920 (1988) (observing that random selection of jurors is 
important public policy recognized by Legislature); State v. Nuckols, 152 
W.Va. 736, 166 S.E.2d 3 (1968) (finding that same random selection procedures 
for grand jury panels apply to petit jury panels). In short, Stanley argues that 
the failure to randomly select prospective jurors unconstitutionally violates a 
litigant's right to a fair and unbiased jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 14 of the West Virginia 
Constitution.

 
 
Clerk 
Sine first questions the propriety of the parties to this extraordinary 
proceeding.  As she is subject to 
the direction and control of the judge or chief circuit judge of the circuit in 
which she serves, Clerk Sine suggests that the circuit judge or chief circuit 
judge of Berkeley County should have been joined as a party to this 
proceeding.  CitingW. Va.Code 
§§ 52-1-7(a) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) and 52-1-9(a) (1986) (Repl. Vol. 2000); 
Rutledge v. Workman, 175 W.Va. 375, 332 S.E.2d 831 (1985).  As to the merits of this case, Clerk 
Sine denies that the current method of selecting prospective jurors is improper. 
Rather, she contends that she has substantially complied with the pertinent 
authorities delineating the procedure to be followed to ensure randomness.  CitingW. Va.Code § 52-1-15 (1993) 
(Repl. Vol. 2000); Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va. 742, 372 S.E.2d 920 
(1988); State v. Nuckols, 152 W.Va. 736, 166 S.E.2d 3 (1968). Clerk Sine 
further suggests that the appropriate remedy to address Petitioner Stanley's 
complaint is not through a writ of prohibition but through the statutory 
provision which permits him to raise the propriety of the jury selection 
procedures in advance of swearing the petit jury for a given case.  CitingW. Va.Code §§ 52-1-15(a, 
c).

 
 
At 
the outset, we wish to address the propriety of hearing this matter in the 
context of a prohibition proceeding. Pursuant to the governing statute, W. 
Va.Code § 52-1-15(c) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000), the procedures described therein 
are the "exclusive means" by which a person may challenge the propriety of the 
jury selection process in a given case.FN6 Cf. Syl. pt. 2, State v. 
Hankish, 147 W.Va. 123, 126 S.E.2d 42 (1962) (holding, prior to enactment of 
W. Va.Code § 52-1-15 in 1986, that "[t]he proper method of challenging, before 
the trial of a case, alleged irregularities in the selection, drawing, or 
impaneling of jurors, is by plea in abatement"); State v. Nuckols, 152 
W.Va. 736, 742, 166 S.E.2d 3, 8 (1968) (same).  Despite this statutory directive, the 
instant case falls within that group of cases we previously have identified as 
"really extraordinary causes,"  
State ex rel. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 
W.Va. 431, 436, 460 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1995) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted), to which the extraordinary remedy of prohibitory relief applies. 
See also State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 193 W.Va. 32, 37, 454 S.E.2d 77, 
82 (1994) (Cleckley, J., concurring) (" [W]rits of prohibition ... provide a 
drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations."); McConiha v. 
Guthrie, 21 W.Va. 134, 140 (1882) ("Prohibition .... issues only in cases of 
extreme necessity[.]").

 
 
FN6.  In its entirety, W. Va.Code § 
52-1-15 (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) provides

 
 
(a)  Within 
seven days after the moving party discovers, or by the exercise of due diligence 
could have discovered, the grounds therefor, and in any event before the petit 
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay the proceedings, quash 
the indictment or move for other relief as may be appropriate under the 
circumstances or the nature of the case.  
The motion shall set forth the facts which support the party's contention 
that there has been a substantial failure to comply with this article in 
selecting the jury.

 
 
(b)  Upon 
motion filed under subsection (a) of this section containing a sworn statement 
of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with 
this article, the moving party is entitled to present, in support of the motion, 
the testimony of the clerk, any relevant records and papers not public or 
otherwise available used by the clerk, and any other relevant evidence.  The clerk may identify the lists 
utilized in compiling the master list, but may not be required to divulge the 
contents of such lists.  If the 
court determines that in selecting a jury there has been a substantial failure 
to comply with this article, the court shall stay the proceedings pending the 
selection of the jury in conformity with this article, quash an indictment or 
grant such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.

 
 
(c)  In 
the absence of fraud, the procedures prescribed by this section are the 
exclusive means by which a person accused of a crime, the state or a party in a 
civil case, may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in 
conformity with this article.

 
 
As 
noted above, when deciding whether a particular case is appropriate for the 
issuance of a writ of prohibition, we consider whether other remedies are 
available and, if they are, whether they will adequately afford the petitioner 
relief, as well as the likelihood that a trial of the underlying matter "will be 
completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance."  Syl. pt. 1, in part, Hinkle v. 
Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744. Accord Syl. pt. 4, State ex 
rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12.  See also Dankmer v. City Ice & 
Fuel Co., 121 W.Va. 752, 760, 6 S.E.2d 771, 775 (1939) ("The writ of 
prohibition should not be used except in cases where relief is not available 
through ordinary channels of practice."); McConiha v. Guthrie, 21 W.Va. 
at 140 ("Prohibition, like all other extraordinary remedies, is to be resorted 
to only in cases where the usual and ordinary forms of remedy are insufficient 
and inadequate to afford redress.").  
Given the exceptional circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the 
remedies provided by W. Va.Code § 52-1-15 are not sufficient to provide the 
relief requested by Petitioner Stanley.  
The remedies provided by § 52-1-15 presuppose that the jury challenge 
will be limited to the procedures employed in a solitary case rather than a 
widespread challenge to the jury selection procedures employed in all cases, in 
all courts, within a particular circuit.

 
 
Furthermore, 
the dictates of judicial economy clearly gravitate in favor of deciding this 
matter as expeditiously as possible.  
It goes without saying that the far-reaching consequences of the 
propriety of the jury selection process in Berkeley County affects not only 
those cases prosecuted by Petitioner Stanley but also the entirety of all 
judicial proceedings currently pending in that circuit.  Failure to resolve the instant 
controversy at this time would certainly necessitate further proceedings in 
these cases should we find Clerk Sine to have compromised the statutory juror 
selection process.  In short, 
"[p]rohibition is a preventive remedy." Syl. pt. 5, in part, State ex rel. 
City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W.Va. 671, 143 S.E.2d 535 (1965).  Cf. Syl. pt. 1, Town of Hawk's 
Nest v. County Court, 55 W.Va. 689, 48 S.E. 205 (1904) ("Prohibition does 
not lie where the act complained of has been already done.").  Thus, prohibition is an appropriate 
vehicle by which to consider and decide whether the current method of selecting 
prospective jurors in Berkeley County is proper and to prevent the perpetuation 
of improper juror selection practices should we so find.  Having thus resolved this source of 
contention, we now shift our focus to the crux of the instant controversy, 
i.e., whether selection 
of prospective jurors in sequential alphabetical order is 
proper.

 
 
The 
method by which prospective jurors are selected requires a random selection 
process.

 
 
It 
is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be 
selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area 
served by the court, and that all citizens have the opportunity in accordance 
with this article to be considered for jury service and an obligation to serve 
as jurors when summoned for that purpose.

 
 
W. 
Va.Code § 52-1-1 (1986) (Repl. Vol. 2000).  
See also W. Va.Code § 52-1-7(a) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) 
(directing that "[t]he chief judge of the circuit, or the judge in a single 
judge circuit, shall provide by order rules relating to the random 
drawing by the clerk of panels from the jury wheel or jury box for juries in 
the circuit and magistrate courts" (emphasis added)); W. Va.Code § 52-1-9(a) 
(1986) (Repl. Vol. 2000) (requiring that "[t]he jurors drawn for jury service 
shall be assigned at random by the clerk to each jury panel in a manner 
prescribed by the court" (emphasis added)).  In order to achieve this randomness, the 
Legislature has developed a detailed listing of the procedures circuit clerks 
are to follow when selecting prospective jurors.  See generally W. Va.Code §§ 
52-1-5 through 52-1-7a.  At issue in 
this case is the composition of the jury box or the final grouping of 
prospective jurors from which the parties select the jury that will ultimately 
hear and decide their case.

 
 
W.Va.Code 
§ 52-1-6 (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) specifies the manner in which prospective 
jurors are to be randomly selected.  
To achieve this end, § 52-1-6(c) establishes the key number system to 
ensure that prospective jurors for the jury box will be selected 
randomly:

 
 
The 
names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors to be placed in the jury 
wheel or jury box shall be selected by the clerk at random from the master list 
in the following manner:  The total 
number of names on the master list shall be divided by the number of names to be 
placed in or added to the jury wheel or jury box and the whole number next 
greater than the quotient shall be the "key number", except that the key number 
shall never be less than two.  A 
"starting number" for making the selection shall then be determined by a random 
method from the numbers from one to the key number, both inclusive.  The required number of names shall then 
be selected from the master list by taking in order the first name on the master 
list corresponding to the starting number and then successively the names 
appearing in the master list at intervals equal to the key number, recommencing 
if necessary at the start of the list until the required number of names has 
been selected.  Upon recommencing at 
the start of the list, or if additional names are subsequently to be selected 
for the jury wheel or jury box, names previously selected from the master list 
shall be disregarded in selecting the additional names.  The clerk is not required to, but may, 
use an electronic or mechanical system or device in carrying out its 
duties.  (For example, assume a 
county with a master list of eight thousand nine hundred eighty names, a 
population of less than fifteen thousand and a desired jury box or wheel 
containing two hundred names. Eight thousand nine hundred eighty names divided 
by two hundred is forty-four and nine-tenths percent. The next whole number is 
forty-five. The clerk would take every forty-fifth name on the list, using a 
random starting number between one and forty-five.)

 
 
W. 
Va.Code § 52-1-6(c).  The question 
now becomes whether this statutory provision also allows prospective jurors to 
be selected in sequential alphabetical order.

 
 

When 
examining language employed by the Legislature, we are constrained to read and 
consider precisely what was written by the legislative drafters.  "We look first to the statute's 
language.  If the text, given its 
plain meaning, answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and 
further inquiry is foreclosed."  
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 
W.Va. 573, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995).  Accordingly, "[w]here the language of a 
statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted 
without resorting to the rules of interpretation."  Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 
W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).  
Accord Syl. pt. 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W.Va. 635, 487 S.E.2d 293 (1997) (" A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and 
plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts 
but will be given full force and effect.' Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 
135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951).").

 
 

From 
the statutory text recited above, it is clear that the plain language of W. 
Va.Code § 52-1-6(c) does not authorize a method of prospective juror selection 
other than the procedures delineated therein.  " Inclusio unius est exclusio 
alterius,' the expression that one is the exclusion of the others,' has 
force in this case.  This doctrine 
informs courts to exclude from operation those items not included in the list of 
elements that are given effect expressly by statutory language."  State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. 
Stone, 196 W.Va. 624, 630 n. 11, 474 S.E.2d 554, 560 n. 11 (1996).  Therefore, we hold that the jury 
selection procedures enumerated in W. Va.Code § 52-1-6(c) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 
2000) do not permit prospective jurors to be selected in sequential alphabetical 
order.  To the extent that Clerk 
Sine has been selecting prospective jurors in this improper manner, we grant as 
moulded the requested writ of prohibition.

 
 
It 
has also been argued, however, that the presiding circuit judge possesses the 
ability to establish his/her own rules pertaining to the jury selection process 
with which the circuit clerk is then obligated to comply.  For example, W. Va.Code § 52-1-7(a) 
instructs that "[t]he chief judge of the circuit, or the judge in a single judge 
circuit, shall provide by order FN7 rules relating to the random drawing by the 
clerk of panels from the jury wheel or jury box for juries in the circuit and 
magistrate courts." (Footnote added).  
Likewise, W. Va.Code § 52-1-9(a) directs that "[t]he jurors drawn for 
jury service shall be assigned at random by the clerk to each jury panel in a 
manner prescribed by the court." See also W. Va.Code § 52-1-4 (1993) 
(Repl. Vol. 2000) (indicating that the circuit clerk's selection of potential 
petit jurors shall be performed "under the supervision of the circuit court ... 
or ... the chief judge of the circuit"); W. Va.Code § 52-1-6(a) (endowing 
circuit court with authority to direct manner in which circuit clerk maintains 
jury wheel or jury box). While these various statutory provisions do, indeed, 
afford a circuit judge such latitude, this discretionary power may not be 
exercised in such a way as to contravene the stated legislative purpose of 
ensuring randomness in the selection of prospective jurors. We repeatedly have 
observed in this Opinion that the solitary goal of the jury selection statutes 
is to ensure "that all persons selected for jury service be selected at 
random."  W. Va.Code § 52-1-1.  This goal of randomness is so 
fundamental to the American judicial system that it is not an ideal peculiar to 
the courts of this State but a process similarly recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court as an integral part of the federal court system as well.  See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529, 95 S. Ct. 692, 697, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690, 697 (1975) ("[T]he policy of the 
United States [is] that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by 
jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a 
fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the 
court convenes."(internal quotations and citation 
omitted)).

 
 
FN7.  In the case sub judice, 
the parties have indicated that the court's order directing Clerk Sine to select 
jurors in sequential alphabetical order was not reflected in writing.  That portion of W. Va.Code § 52-1-7(a) 
(1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) referencing such an order does not indicate whether the 
order must be written or whether an oral directive will suffice.  As the resolution of this conundrum is 
not necessary to our decision of the issue before us, i.e., jury 
selection through sequential alphabetical order, we will await a more factually 
appropriate case in which to address and resolve this 
query.

 
 
In 
light of the extreme importance of randomness and the role it plays in our 
judicial system, we simply cannot construe the jury selection statutes as 
permitting a circuit court judge to establish rules that contravene this 
purpose, no matter how innocent his/her intent may have been in adopting the 
same.  Accordingly, we hold that a 
circuit court judge adopting rules governing the selection of prospective jurors 
pursuant to W. Va.Code § 52-1-7(a) (1993) (Repl. Vol. 2000) must comply with the 
public policy and stated requirements of the statutory jury selection procedures 
set forth in W. Va.Code § 52-1-1, et seq.  Therefore, insofar as the circuit judge 
of Berkeley County has adopted rules directing Clerk Sine to select prospective 
jurors in sequential alphabetical order, we grant the requested prohibitory 
relief.  Given that our decision 
herein involves a determination of a matter of first impression with 
far-reaching application to all jury trials previously had in Berkeley County 
since approximately 1998 and those jury trials currently pending in that 
county's courts, we conclude that the rulings we announce today should apply 
prospectively only.  See Syl. 
pt. 5, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 
(1979) (enumerating criteria court should consider when contemplating "whether 
to extend full retroactivity").

 
 
Finally, 
in closing we wish to address the catch-22 in which Clerk Sine found herself 
vis-a-vis the jury selection matters at issue herein.  On the one hand, Clerk Sine is obligated 
to abide by the dictates of the circuit judge of the circuit for which she 
serves as clerk. We specifically have held that

 
 
[i]t 
was the intention of the framers of the judicial article (Article VIII) of the 
W. Va. Const. that the clerk of a circuit court, although an 
independently elected, public official, be subject to the direction and control 
of the circuit court of the county in which she serves or of the chief judge of 
that county's circuit court with regard to her court-related 
duties.

 
 
Syl. 
pt. 1, Rutledge v. Workman, 175 W.Va. 375, 332 S.E.2d 831 (1985).  Although required to abide by the 
circuit judge's directive, Clerk Sine was likewise required to comply with the 
statutory requirements setting forth the proper procedure for jury selection. In 
this regard, W. Va.Code § 52-1-4 dictates that "[p]otential petit jurors shall 
be selected by the clerk of the circuit court pursuant to the provisions of 
this article and under the supervision of the circuit court, or in circuits 
with more than one circuit judge, the chief judge of the circuit." (Emphasis 
added).  We understand the 
predicament in which the Clerk found herself as she was simultaneously bound to 
follow the established statutory guidelines and obligated to comply with the 
circuit judge's jury selection rules.  
Furthermore, we appreciate the reasons underlying the judge's decision to 
implement this procedure for jury selection.  Unfortunately, the method of jury 
selection heretofore followed in Berkeley County is not commensurate with the 
procedure established by the West Virginia Legislature to accomplish this 
end.  Thus, to the extent to which 
the current jury selection process does not comport with the statutory 
requirements of W. Va.Code § 52-1-1, et seq., we grant as moulded the 
requested writ.

 
 

State 
v. Sine, 
215 W.Va. 100, 594 S.E.2d 314, 315-22 (2004).

 
 
[¶12]   In an Arkansas case, Henry v. State, 29 Ark.App. 5, 775 S.W.2d 911, 915 (1989) the appellate court ruled:

 
 
The 
appellant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to quash the jury 
panel because the jury was selected in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 16-32-107 
(1987). Subsection (b) states:

 
 
If 
the jurors are not present in court, the judge shall direct the sheriff to 
summon the number of jurors needed, the names of whom shall be taken from the 
jury book in the same order as they appear thereon, exempting those who have 
been excused from attendance.

 
 
The 
record reflects that there was a list of 152 persons in the jury book.  Of the 152, approximately 50 had been 
excused.  A list of 30 jurors was 
prepared by the judge and Dean Nelson, the Ashley County Circuit Clerk.  According to Nelson, the list reflected 
the persons who had been present at a prior impaneling of the jury.  The record also reflects that some of 
the potential jurors were not called because they had not returned 
questionnaires or had not been served.  
However, no reason was given for not calling many of the jurors except 
for the fact that they had not appeared at the prior 
impaneling.

 
 
In 
Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W.2d 717 (1980), the names of 
prospective jurors were selected at random, placed in alphabetical order, and 
placed on the jury wheel, and a smaller active jury panel was drawn.  The appellant argued that putting this 
smaller list in alphabetical order and summoning the jurors in that order rather 
than in the order that they had been drawn from the wheel was in violation of 
Arkansas law.  In affirming, the 
Supreme Court noted that no possibility of prejudice had been shown and that the 
names were put in alphabetical order for convenience rather than any sinister 
purpose. We find the same rationale in the present case:  the trial court clearly was attempting 
to avoid the expense and time of calling jurors who had not bothered to respond 
to their call to duty.  However, 
even though the appellants here have failed to demonstrate prejudice, we note 
that it is a better practice for trial courts to follow the method of jury 
selection prescribed in the Arkansas Jury Wheel Act.  See Hall v. State, 259 Ark. 815, 
537 S.W.2d 155 (1976).

 
 
[¶13]   In the Georgia case, Larmon v. State, 256 Ga. 228, 345 S.E.2d 587, 588-90 (1986), it was determined:

 
 
We 
granted certiorari in Larmon v. State, 177 Ga.App. 763, 341 S.E.2d 237 
(1986), to review the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's denial 
of the appellant's challenge to the array of the traverse jury. We 
affirm.

 
 
The 
appellant does not contend that the electronic selection process authorized by 
OCGA §§ 15-12-40(b), 15-12-42(b) per se violates the right to an impartial jury, 
but rather that the particular computer selection process then in use in the 
Superior Court of Whitfield County failed to randomly select the jury panels as 
required by law; did not "provide for a fair, impartial, and objective method of 
selecting persons for jury service," as required by OCGA § 15-12-42(b)(2)(A); 
and did not select the traverse jury from a fair cross section of the 
community.  Wilson v. State, 
250 Ga. 630, 635(3a), 300 S.E.2d 640 (1983).

 
 
"A 
defendant is entitled to an array of properly drawn, impartial jurors to which 
he may direct his peremptory challenges.  
A party is entitled to this as a matter of right; but, conversely, he is 
entitled to no more. [Cit.]" Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 427, 433, 265 S.E.2d 565 (1980).  "There is no 
constitutional guarantee that the grand or petit juries, impaneled in a 
particular case will constitute a representative cross-section of the entire 
community.  A defendant is not 
constitutionally entitled to a venire or jury roll of any particular 
composition... [Cits.]' [Cit.]"  
What the Constitution does require is that the state not deliberately 
and systematically exclude identifiable and distinct groups from their jury 
lists.' [Cit.]" Campbell v. State, 240 Ga. 352, 356, 240 S.E.2d 828 
(1977). " Criminal defendants in state courts may challenge discriminatory 
selections of grand and petit juries through the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. [Cits.]' [Cit.]  
Moreover, criminal defendants in state courts have the right to 
challenge, under the Sixth Amendment, petit juries not selected from a fair 
cross section of the community. [Cit.]  
The two challenges are not entirely analogous. [Cits.]  However, common to each is the 
requirement that the defendant must establish prima facie that a distinct and 
identifiable group in the community is substantially underrepresented on the 
jury venire being challenged."  
Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, supra, 635 (3a), 300 S.E.2d 640.

 
 
The 
appellant apparently makes no contention that the initial elements and stages of 
the jury selection process were not randomly neutral.  His sole contention appears to be that 
the ultimate arrangement of the names of the selected jurors on the final 
computer print out contains: (a) alphabetical sequences, (b) a numerical 
sequence, and (c) geographical patterns.

 
 
(a)  Alphabetical 
sequences. The computer print-out contained a number of blocks or sets of 
alphabetized jurors, which the appellant argues is inconsistent with a true 
random-selection process.  However, 
the official jury list consists of an alphabetically-arranged computer 
print-out, OCGA § 15-12-43(b), and the system in question scanned the entire 
list, as required by OCGA § 15-12-40(b)(4).  An employee of the company which 
originated this particular computer system testified that the fact of jurors' 
names being in alphabetical order or their residences being on the same street 
is "just at random" and "a coincidence."  
Furthermore, this sequence does not cause substantial underrepresentation 
of any "distinct and identifiable group in the community."  Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 
supra, 635 (3a), 300 S.E.2d 640.

 
 
(b)  Numerical 
sequence. The jurors selected were listed on the final print-out according 
to their corresponding voter registration number, with the individual who had 
been assigned the lowest voter registration number being first on the computer 
print-out and the one with the highest number being last.  The computer was not specifically 
programmed to rearrange the randomly selected jurors in this order. 
Rather, the master list from which the selections were made was itself arranged 
in sequential order of voter registration number.  The computer was merely programmed to 
initiate its selection process from a randomly selected position in the master 
list and then to scan the entire length thereof, selecting jurors at regular 
intervals so as to ensure that individuals from all segments of the master list 
would be chosen.  The arrangement of 
the names on the final print-out was purely the consequence of the fact that the 
computer was also programmed to list the jurors in order of their random 
selection from the master list.

 
 
The 
appellant argues that the system used results in jury lists which always begin 
with jurors who have lower voter registration numbers, hence are older.  (The appellant was 24 years old at the 
time of his trial.)  However, the 
county's Chief Registrar testified that the appellant's premise was not 
necessarily true, and that many persons with lower numbers are the same age or 
younger than those with higher numbers, which would include newer 
residents.  There was also testimony 
that the voters list is alphabetically, not numerically, arranged, and that the 
registration number is used in the computer merely for the purpose of accessing 
the computer files to update them.  
The programmer of the computer system in question testified that it was 
not feasible to set up the computerized jury list alphabetically because of the 
possibility of there being more than one juror with the same name.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
the appellant failed to establish prima facie that those who were more recently 
registered voters and those who had been registered for a longer period were 
"distinct and identifiable" groups in the community.  See generally Berryhill v. State, 
249 Ga. 442, 445(3), 291 S.E.2d 685 (1982).  Compare Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 
403, 409(6b), 330 S.E.2d 686 (1985).

 
 
(c)  Geographical 
patterns. The appellant maintains that the master jury list was composed in 
order of the various voter boxes in the county; therefore, he contends that this 
resulted in blocks or groups of jurors from the same geographical areas being 
put upon him on the panel.  The 
significance of this, he argues, is that he was a white man being tried for the 
voluntary manslaughter of the black male lover of his black female ex-lover; 
that the black population of the county (who, he contends, would be more 
sympathetic with his lifestyle in this interracial love triangle) was 
concentrated mainly in one section of the City of Dalton; and that, because of 
this composition, he had to exhaust all of his peremptory challenges to 
eliminate jurors anticipated to be hostile to him (i.e., older, rural, and white 
residents).

 
 

The 
defendant had no constitutional guarantee that his jury would constitute a 
representative cross-section of the entire community, nor was he entitled to a 
venire or jury roll of any particular composition. Campbell v. State, 240 
Ga. 352, supra, 356, 240 S.E.2d 828.  
Since the appellant does not contend that the original selection process 
was not randomly neutral, the mere fact that the names were originally obtained 
from geographical voting districts would not result in a non-random geographical 
pattern.  There was no showing of a 
deliberate and systematic exclusion of identifiable and distinct groups, such as 
urban or black.

 
 
It 
is possible that a geographical arrangement could result in a list which is 
improperly constituted.  The record 
in this case does not reveal such an effect.  However, even though the jury list was 
not constitutionally infirm in this case, we note that it would be desirable if 
the list contained no alphabetical, geographical, or numerical patterns, and we 
strongly suggest that trial courts take steps to totally randomize the juror 
selection process.

 
 
What 
the appellant apparently seeks is for the computer to randomly print a list of 
names which are admitted to have been randomly selected already.  In construing the Jury Selection and 
Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq., a federal court has held that "[i]t is 
sufficient for the purpose of this legislation if the plan adopts some system of 
selection that affords no room for impermissible discrimination against 
individuals or groups ... Absolute or true' statistical randomness is thus not 
required for reasons of administrative feasibility.  While an additional random selection 
might be better in terms of fairness to counsel trying a number of cases in a 
short period of time, by decreasing the chance that a given panel of jurors 
would remain as a group and meet the same attorney again, the lack of such an 
additional selection is not a deficiency in terms of ... the Constitution."  U.S. v. Haley, 521 F. Supp. 290, 
294 (N.D.Ga.1981).  Since the 
appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional jury 
discrimination, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's 
denial of the appellant's challenge to the array of the traverse 
jury.

 
 
[¶14]   In the case United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 
1213 (11th Cir. 1991), the appellate court 
held:

 
 
The 
appellants contend that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment right 
to trial before a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community by creating a 
venire of jurors with surnames that began with letters from only one portion of 
the alphabet.  The district court 
qualified forty-eight jurors from which thirty-seven potential jurors were 
selected as the panel from which the parties would strike.  Lynn objected when the forty-eight had 
been called on the grounds "that the panel that has been selected for the jury 
venire was not done on a random basis." (R7:37).  Eyster joined in the motion.  The district court noted that the panel 
represented a fair cross-section of the panel called, and denied the 
motion.  The jury was selected. Lynn 
later moved the district court to dismiss the indictment, stay the proceedings, 
or discharge the jury on the grounds that a venire composed of jurors with 
surnames beginning with letters A through J would overrepresent some ethnic 
groups while underrepresenting others.  
Eyster and Marshall joined in the motion. The district court again denied 
the motion.

 
 
We 
addressed this issue in United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978, 108 S. Ct. 491, 98 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1987), in 
which the defendant claimed that her trial had been tainted because jurors with 
last names beginning with the letters M through Z were excluded from the 
jury.  We held that "[w]hile we do 
not approve this practice, such an action does not systematically exclude a 
distinctive group of the community." Id. at 706; see Walker v. 
Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16, 17 (9th Cir.1990) (persons with surnames W through Z 
found not to constitute a distinct class).

 
 
The 
appellants, recognizing our holding in Puleo, rely on the Jury Selection 
and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1988), an issue not raised in 
Puleo.  The Act requires a 
random selection of jurors from a representative sample.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1866(a).  The appellants contend that an 
arrangement of names in alphabetical order violates the Act's mandate of random 
selection.  The very same contention 
was brought in United States v. Haley, 521 F. Supp. 290 
(N.D.Ga.1981).  In Haley, the 
district court noted that the Act does not require true or absolute statistical 
randomness, and that it is sufficient " for the purpose of this legislation if 
the [jury selection] plan adopts some system of selection that affords no room 
for impermissible discrimination against individuals or groups.' " Id. at 
294 (quoting S.Rep. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, n. 9 (1967)).  The district court held that the 
practice of selecting names in alphabetical order does not violate the Act. 
Id.  We agree, although we 
restate our admonition discouraging the practice.

 
 
[¶15]   In Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16, 16-17 
(9th Cir. 1990), the court held:

 
 
Petitioner, 
an Arizona state prisoner, appeals the district court's summary denial of habeas 
relief.  Walker argues that his 
sixth amendment right to a jury that represents a fair cross section of the 
community and his fourteenth amendment right to equal protection were violated 
because the venire pool from which his trial jury was selected did not include 
those whose surnames began with the letters "W," "X," "Y," and "Z".  Walker also argues that the venire 
system employed in his case violated Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 21-301A and 21-313.  We affirm the district court's order 
because there is no evidence that surnames beginning with the letters W through 
Z constitute a cognizable and distinctive class within the 
community.

 
 
Walker 
was tried before a jury in the Arizona Superior Court for Pima County.  He was convicted of aggravated assault 
and leaving the scene of an accident on September 30, 1983.  He was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment.  On May 1, 1987, 
Walker petitioned the Pima County Superior Court for post-conviction relief 
based on the failure to include those with surnames beginning with the letters W 
through Z in the venire from which his trial jury had been selected.  Walker contended that this group 
constituted a recognizable and distinct class. FN1

 
 
FN1.  Walker's contention that this 
group is a recognizable and distinct class is based on a survey by Dr. Trevor 
Weston.  See Autry & 
Barker, Academic Correlates of Alphabetical Order of Surname, 8 J. Sch. 
Psychology 22, 22 (1970).  Weston 
claims that those whose surnames begin with the letters S through Z are 50% more 
likely to develop a condition called "alphabetic neurosis" than are those whose 
surnames begin with the letters A through R.

 
 
The 
Pima County Superior Court refused to recognize that those with surnames 
beginning with the letters W through Z constitute a cognizable class.  The court denied Walker's petition.  The Arizona Court of Appeals denied his 
petition for review. After the Arizona Supreme Court denied certiorari, Walker 
petitioned for habeas relief in federal district court.  The petition was summarily denied. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  
We review de novo a district court's denial of a habeas petition.  Jessup v. United States Parole 
Comm'n, 889 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir.1989).

 
 
Walker 
must establish that those persons with surnames beginning with the letters W 
through Z are a "recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different 
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied," as a first step in 
establishing his claim that the Pima County venire system violated his right to 
equal protection.  Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). He 
fails to do so.

 
 
A 
recognizable and distinct class for the purposes of jury selection is one 
"which, in some objectively discernible and significant way, is distinct from 
the rest of society, and whose interests cannot be adequately represented by 
other members of the ... jury panel."  
United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1977).  Persons whose surnames begin with the 
letters W through Z do not constitute such a class in this case.  See United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702, 706 (11th Cir.) (persons whose surnames begin with the letters M 
through Z found not to constitute a distinct class), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978, 108 S. Ct. 491, 98 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1987); Krause v. Chartier, 406 F.2d 898, 901 (1st Cir.1968) (no prejudice found to result from venire 
consisting entirely of persons with surnames beginning with the letters T 
through Z), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960, 89 S. Ct. 2102, 23 L. Ed. 2d 747 
(1969).

 
 
[¶16]   Finally, we take note that in United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702, 
706 (11th Cir. 1987), the court 
held:

 
 
Puleo's 
contention that her trial was tainted because jurors with last names beginning 
with the letters M-Z were excluded from the jury is also without merit.  While we do not approve this practice, 
such an action does not systemically exclude a distinctive group of the 
community. See United States v. Blair, 493 F. Supp. 398, 410 (D.Md.1980), 
aff'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.1981); Krause v. 
Chartier, 406 F.2d 898, 901 (1st Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960, 89 S. Ct. 2102, 23 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1969).

 
 
[¶17]   In the instant case, Bloomer has 
failed to demonstrate that the method used by the district court clerk deprived 
him of a fair cross section of the community or that any distinctive group was 
systematically excluded from the jury panel.  Thus, we conclude that the district 
court did not err as a matter of law in denying Bloomer's motion to quash the 
jury panel.  As was the case with 
many of the appellate courts represented above, we do not approve of the method 
used because there are other more "tried and true" methods available that 
eliminate the concerns raised by the appeal.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-129, does confer 
a degree of discretion to the district courts and the clerks of district courts 
in assembling jury panels.  However, 
if the method chosen is not the one described in §§ 1-11-106 through 109, then 
the court and the clerk must be prepared to defend the "science" behind it.  In this instance, the only apparent 
reason for choosing the method used was so as not to inconvenience jurors.  We agree that the convenience of jurors 
is a laudable goal, but when it collides with the constitutional principles of 
Equal Protection, Due Process of Law and Trial by Jury, it must give way.  As noted above, we do not approve of the 
method used to select the jury panel in this case, and it may not be used in any 
future cases.  However, from the 
record on appeal before us, we are unable to conclude that the jury selected 
violated the crux of the random selection requirement, although it might not 
have been fully faithful to the spirit of that time-honored standard.  To the extent its use was an improper 
deviation from what the governing statutes require, the error, if any, was 
harmless because we are unable to identify an irregularity that affected 
Bloomer's substantial rights.  
W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 
 
District 
Court's Refusal to Consider Probation

 
 
[¶18]   
Bloomer did not object at the time the district court made the 
offending remark, which we set out verbatim in our recitation of the facts and 
proceedings above.  Therefore, we 
review this issue for plain error.  
To prove plain error, Bloomer must demonstrate: (1) that the record 
clearly reflects the alleged error, (2) that a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
was violated, and (3) that the violation adversely affected a substantial right 
of Bloomer's to his material prejudice.  
Guinn v. State, 2009 WY 15, 
¶ 3, 201 P.3d 423 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶19]   With respect to the district 
court's obligation to consider probation we have held:

 
 
The 
district court's decision whether or not to grant probation in any given case is 
discretionary, and our review, therefore, is for the abuse of that 
discretion.  Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 56, ¶ 6, 
44 P.3d 943, 945 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 680 
(Wyo.1988)).  While the district 
court is not obligated to grant probation, it must consider an application for 
probation and, if such is not granted, include a statement in the written 
sentence expressly acknowledging that it considered the application.  Martinez, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d  
at 396; W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D).  

 
 
In 
making a determination as to whether probation is appropriate, the sentencing 
judge has discretion to frame and consider, in a reasonable manner, the relevant 
inquiries with respect to the recognized purposes for imposing sentence.  Robinson v. State, 678 P.2d 374 
(Wyo.1984).  The societal need for 
retribution is a relevant consideration in the imposition of punishment.  Kavanaugh [v. State ], 769 P.2d [908], 915 
[(Wyo.1989)].  Another appropriate 
consideration is whether the imposition of a penitentiary sentence would serve 
to deter others from committing similar crimes.  Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179 
(Wyo.1985).  It is appropriate to 
impose a sentence of imprisonment if probation would unduly depreciate the 
seriousness of the charged offense.  
Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183.  

 
 

Whitfield 
v. State, 
781 P.2d 913, 916 (Wyo.1989).

 
 
The 
appellant contends that the district court's refusal even to consider probation 
was evidenced by statements it made in rejecting the plea agreement, and by the 
following statement it made during the second sentencing hearing:  "But I don't think the message can be 
sent to the public that there can be an aggravated homicide by vehicle with a 
.15 blood alcohol, going on the wrong side of the road, and not have a sentence 
of imprisonment imposed."

 
 
We 
will affirm the district court on this issue because we believe the appellant 
has mistaken that court's refusal to grant probation for a refusal to consider it.  The district court's rationale for 
rejecting the plea agreement--the central focus of which was probation--was very 
similar to its later rationale for incarcerating the appellant.  In both instances, the district court 
stated that, under the totality of the circumstances (high blood alcohol 
content, driving on the wrong side of the road, other near accidents, and a 
prior D.W.U.I.), probation would send the wrong message to the 
public.

 
 
Even 
taken out of context, the above-quoted statement of the district court does not 
say, "I would never grant probation in an aggravated vehicular homicide 
case."   In context, the 
statement is simply one of many giving the court's reasoning for not granting 
probation in this case.  In 'fact, 
the transcripts from the two hearings reveal the district court's struggle in 
deciding between "leniency"--meaning probation--and the "right" message.  The facts of this case resemble those in 
which we previously have found a sufficient consideration of 
probation:

 
 
This 
court has stated that no particular amount of consideration of probation is 
required as long as the record reveals the district court did consider it.  Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275, 275 
(Wyo.1980); see also Volz v. State, 
707 P.2d 179, 182-83 (Wyo.1985).  We 
applied this rationale in Beaulieu 
and held that, because a probation plan appeared in the presentence report and 
the defendant requested probation at the sentencing hearing, sufficient evidence 
existed in the record to support the conclusion that the district court 
considered probation.  608 P.2d  at 
275.  Similarly, in Burk [v. State, 848 P.2d 225 (Wyo.1993)], we 
found sufficient proof that the district court had considered probation when it 
imposed sentences in two cases against the defendant.  848 P.2d  at 236.  In the first case, the defense counsel 
argued for leniency and mentioned that other persons involved in the defendant's 
case had received probation.  Id. In the second case, the defense 
counsel asked for leniency, the defendant's parents requested that the court 
grant probation, and the presentence investigation report addressed the issue of 
probation.  Id.

 
 

Martinez, 
2002 WY 10, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d  at 396.

 
 

Cohee 
v. State, 
2005 WY 50, ¶¶ 15-18, 110 P.3d 267, 272-73 (Wyo. 2005); also see Monjaras v. State, 2006 WY 71, 
¶ 11, 136 P.3d 162, 164-65 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶20]   In this instance, the district 
court's comment is more troubling than in some of the many cases cited 
immediately above because it does suggest that probation would not be considered 
if Bloomer opted for a trial.  
However, we must measure the impropriety of the statement in the context 
of the entirety of the record on appeal.  
There was ample time between the hearing on Bloomer's request to vacate 
his jury trial date and enter a plea of guilty and the district court's 
offending comment, for the district court to reconsider what was likely a "spur 
of the moment" reaction to Bloomer's continued efforts to frustrate the orderly 
progress of his case.  At sentencing 
the district court explicitly indicated that it could not consider probation 
given Bloomer's offenses.  In the 
sentencing order, the district court considered the advisability of probation 
and rejected it as an option in sentencing.  The presentence report indicated that 
due to Bloomer's extensive criminal history, "a term of probation cannot be 
recommended."

 
 
[¶21]   The record clearly reflects the 
asserted error and that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  However, we are unable to conclude, in 
light of the entire record with respect to this matter, that the violation 
adversely affected a substantial right of Bloomer's to his material 
prejudice.  Compare Guinn, 201 P.3d  at 423.  The district court clearly considered 
probation at sentencing despite his unfortunate remarks earlier in the 
proceedings.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Montana 
Code Ann. § 3-15-503 (1995) states:

 
 
(1)  (a) 
If the drawing of jurors is conducted by means of a jury box, the jury 
commissioner shall place the box on a rod so that it may readily revolve.  The box must be revolved a sufficient 
number of times to ensure that the numbered slips in it become thoroughly 
mixed.  The jury commissioner shall 
then draw from the box, one at a time, as many of the numbered slips as are 
ordered by the court.

(b) 
If the drawing of jurors is conducted by means of a computerized database, it 
must be conducted by use of a computerized random selection process that the 
judges of the district court of the county have approved in writing as 
satisfactorily fulfilling the requirements for the drawing of trial 
juries.

(2)  A 
record of the drawing must be entered in the minutes of the court.  It must show the names of the jurors 
corresponding to the numbers drawn from the jury box or the names drawn by means 
of the computerized random selection process.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURKE, Justice, joins in 
part.

 
 
[¶23]   I concur with the majority's 
resolution of the jury panel issue, but I would reverse on the second 
issue.  I believe the facts of this 
case are barely distinguishable from those in Guinn v. State, 2009 WY 15, ¶ 7, 201 P.3d 423, 424 (Wyo. 2009), where we reversed a conviction because "the record 
certainly leaves open the possibility that the district court's sentencing 
decision was based in part upon" the appellant's exercise of his right to trial 
by jury.  The present facts may be 
even more egregious.  In Guinn, the judge merely said he believed 
it was appropriate in sentencing to consider that the appellant had not pled 
guilty.  Id. at ¶ 5, 201 P.3d  at 424.  Here, the judge openly avowed that a 
jury trial conviction would result in "no request for any type of 
probation."

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 
[¶24]   I join Chief Justice Voigt's 
dissent, but write separately because I disagree with the majority's resolution 
of the jury panel issue.  The 
question presented is simple:  Did 
the jury selection process comply with the Wyoming statutory requirements?  To answer that question, I would 
interpret and apply the applicable Wyoming statutes.  See State v. Curtis, 2002 WY 120, 
¶¶ 23-26, 51 P.3d 867, 872 (Wyo. 2002) (Golden, J., dissenting).  Because these statutes are clear and 
unambiguous, it is unnecessary to rely on constitutional principles or decisions 
from other jurisdictions with different jury selection 
statutes.

 
 
[¶25]   Under Wyoming's statutory process, 
a list of persons qualified to serve as jurors is certified to the clerk of 
court as "the base jury list for the district court . . . from April 1 of the 
year in which the list is certified and delivered through March 31 of the 
following year."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-11-106(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  
The clerk of court prepares ballots using all of the names on the base 
jury list, and places the ballots "in a box known as and plainly marked jury 
box number one.'"  Id.  When a jury trial approaches on the 
docket, the district court directs the clerk to draw a specified number of names 
from "jury box number one."  Id.  Before drawing those 
names:

 
 
The 
clerk shall shake the box containing the names of the regular jurors so as to 
mix the ballots therein as well as possible.  He shall then draw from the box as many 
ballots as are ordered by the court.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-11-109(a).  
Persons whose names are drawn from "jury box number one" become members 
of the jury panel, and they are summoned to appear at the specified time and 
place for jury selection.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-11-109(d) and (e).

 
 
[¶26]   In Mr. Bloomer's case, the 
base jury list consisted of 350 persons, listed in alphabetical order.  The clerk of court did not put all 350 
names in a box, shake them, and draw names for the jury panel.  Instead, she limited the potential 
jurors to those on the base jury list whose last names began with the letters 
"H" through "P."

 
 
[¶27]   The clerk's failure to draw the 
names from "jury box number one" is not, by itself, fatally defective.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-129 
expressly allows alternative methods for the drawing of jurors, but it 
explicitly specifies that the alternative methods must be "calculated to insure 
the integrity of the system and a random selection process."  Id.  (Emphasis added.)  The word random is defined as "having 
the same probability of occurring as every other member of a set."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1880 (2002).

 
 
[¶28]   The procedures specified by statute 
insure a random selection process.  
The set of 350 names on the base jury list is placed into "jury box 
number one."  When the clerk draws 
names, every person in the set has an equal probability of being selected for 
the jury panel.

 
 
[¶29]   The procedures used to select the 
jury panel in Mr. Bloomer's case did not result in a random selection from 
the set of 350 jurors on the base jury list.  Only those whose last names began with 
letters "H" through "P" had the potential to be selected as jurors.  Those whose last names began with the 
letters "A" through "G" and "Q" through "Z" had no probability of being 
selected.  Because every person on 
the base jury list did not have an equal probability of being selected, the 
selection process was not random, and did not comply with the statutory 
requirements.  

 
 
[¶30]   I am perplexed by the majority's 
failure to grant relief to Mr. Bloomer in light of its determination that this 
method "may not be used in any future cases."  Such determination prompts the question, 
"Why not?"  Is the majority finding 
that the procedure failed to comply with the statute?  The opinion does not specifically make 
that finding.  Will this Court apply 
a harmless error analysis to future violations?  If so, as Mr. Bloomer has 
discovered, the Court's mandate is essentially meaningless.  Future litigants will find themselves in 
the same position as Mr. Bloomer.  A 
trial court's failure to satisfy jury selection requirements will remain a wrong 
without a remedy.  

 
 
[¶31]   If the Court is not going to apply 
a harmless error analysis in future cases, it should not apply that analysis 
here.  Mr. Bloomer raised this issue 
prior to trial.  He established that 
the procedure did not comply with the statutorily mandated random jury selection 
process.  If any litigant is 
entitled to relief, it is Mr. Bloomer.1  I would reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See, 
e.g., Oroz v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon 
County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Wyo. 1978):

 
 
The final question herein is the application of this decision. The court 
is fully cognizant that a long reliance has been placed upon the rule of 
immunity and that it will raise certain problems which must be considered and 
proper arrangements made. . . .  
However, this appellant should not be the recipient of a pyrrhic victory 
but should be allowed to proceed. There is abundant authority as to the 
propriety of this approach. There are at least three reasons given for this 
result: Unless it is applied to the appealing party the decision is mere dicta; 
refusal would deprive the successful appellant of the fruits of his time, effort 
and expense; and further that the plaintiff should have recovery for the reason 
that case law is not likely to keep up with the needs of society if the litigant 
who successfully champions a cause is left with only that 
distinction.

 
 
(Internal citations and punctuation 
omitted.)