Title: Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: June 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

PETER GLADHART and EMILY GLADHART, husband and wife; 
WILD PLUM FARMS, INC., 
an Oregon Corporation, 
dba Winter's Hill Vineyard,
	Respondents on Review,
	v.
OREGON VINEYARD SUPPLY COMPANY, 
an Oregon Corporation; 
and KAREN BENOIT, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Mark Benoit,
	Petitioners on Review.
(CC CV97346; CA A100805; SC S47211)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 9, 2001.
	Thomas M. Christ, of Mitchell, Lang & Smith, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.
	James H. Marvin, of Marvin, Chorzempa & Associates, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause for respondents on review.  With him
on the brief was J. Nicholas Baldwin-Sayre.
	Roger K. Stroup, of Bodyfelt Mount Stroup & Chamberlin,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel.
	Robert K. Udziela and Scott A. Shorr, Portland, filed a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	*Appeal from Yamhill County Circuit Court,
	 John W. Hitchcock, Judge.
	 164 Or App 438, 994 P2d 134 (1999).
 		DE MUNIZ, J.
		This is a products liability case involving the
timeliness of plaintiffs' complaint.  Until the legislature
codified a civil action for products liability in 1977, a
products liability claim was considered a common law action, 
subject to the general tort limitations period specified in ORS
12.010 and 12.110.  See Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or
273, 279, 512 P2d 776 (1973) (applying two-year statute of
limitations to product liability claim).  The commencement of the
limitation period for product liability actions under those
statutes was conditioned on discovery of the harm.  See Berry v.
Branner, 245 Or 307, 315-16, 421 P2d 996 (1966) (discovery rule
incorporated in ORS 12.010).
		However, when the legislature codified a civil action
for products liability in ORS 30.900, it also enacted ORS
30.905(1) and (2).  Those statutory provisions establish separate
limitation periods within which a product liability action must
be commenced.  ORS 30.905(2) specifies, in part, that a product
liability action "shall be commenced not later than two years
after the date on which the death, injury or damage complained of
occurs."  The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' product
liability action was filed timely because plaintiffs' injury did
not "occur" until plaintiffs discovered the injury.  Gladhart v.
Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., 164 Or App 438, 994 P2d 134 (1999). 
We allowed defendant's petition for review and now hold that,
under ORS 30.905(2), the "death, injury or damage complained of
occurs" when the harm or damage happens, whether or not the
plaintiff discovers those consequences within the ensuing two
year period.
		The trial court decided plaintiffs' product liability
claim on a motion to dismiss.(1)  Accordingly, we begin by
summarizing the pertinent facts found in plaintiffs' complaint. 
See Huff v. Great Western Seed Co., 322 Or 457, 460, 909 P2d 858
(1996) (stating methodology).  In February 1991, plaintiffs
purchased grape plants from Oregon Vineyard Supply Company, a
nursery owned by the late Mark Benoit.  Benoit and his company
("defendants") guaranteed that the stock was free of phylloxera,
a microscopic aphid that feeds on grape vine roots, reduces grape
production and, eventually, kills the plant.  The Oregon
Department of Agriculture also certified the stock to be
phylloxera-free.  Soon thereafter, plaintiffs planted the stock
in their existing vineyard.  In October 1995, plaintiffs
discovered that their vineyard was infested with phylloxera.  In
September 1997, they brought this action against defendants. (2) 
Plaintiffs' product liability claim asserts that defendants'
grape stock was not phylloxera-free as guaranteed and that
plaintiffs were injured when they purchased and planted the stock
in 1991.
		On review, defendants contend that plaintiffs' action
was not timely because ORS 30.905(2) requires that the action be
"commenced not later than two years after the date on which the
death, injury or damage complained of occurs."  According to
defendants, plaintiffs' injury "occurred" more than two years
before plaintiffs filed their complaint.  Plaintiffs assert,
however, that ORS 30.905(2) includes a "discovery rule," which
means that the two-year period did not begin to run until
plaintiffs discovered that they had been injured.  
		At the outset, we observe, that "[a] discovery rule
cannot be assumed, but must be found in the statute of
limitations itself."  See Huff, 322 Or at 462 (ORS 659.121(3)
requiring action to "be commenced within one year of the
occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice" does not
incorporate a discovery rule).  Whether the statute contains a
discovery rule is a matter of legislative intent.  Under the
interpretive methodology established by this court in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143
(1993), we first examine the text and context of a statute,
because the statute's wording "is the best evidence of the
legislature's intent."  Id. at 610.  The context of a statute,
also relevant at the first level of analysis, may include other
provisions of the same statute and related statutes.  Id.  If,
but only if, the intent of the legislature cannot be ascertain
from the first level of analysis, will this court consider
legislative history.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.
		ORS 30.905(2) provides:
		"Except as provided in ORS 30.907 and 30.908(1) to
(4), a product liability civil action shall be
commenced not later than two years after the date on
which the death, injury or damage complained of
occurs."
		The two-year period of limitation in the statute begins
to run on "the date on which the death, injury or damage
complained of occurs."  Id.  The legislature did not use the
words "discover" or "discovery" to describe when the two-year
limitation period begins to run.  Neither did the legislature use
the term "accrued" as it did in ORS 12.010 -- a term that this
court, in 1966, concluded did incorporate a discovery rule.  See 
Berry, 245 Or at 315-16 (cause of action "accrued" at time
plaintiff obtained knowledge, or reasonably should have obtained
knowledge, of tort committed upon her person by defendant).  The
legislature's failure to use those words or make any apparent
reference to the discovery of the injury in the text of the
statute suggests that the legislature did not intend to place a
discovery rule in ORS 30.905(2). 
		Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the word "occurs"
incorporates a discovery rule.  The statute does not define
"occurs."  We accord undefined words of common usage their
"plain, natural, and ordinary meaning."  PGE, 317 Or at 610-11. 
The dictionary defines "occur" as follows:
		"1. To be found or met with: APPEAR * * *  2. To
present itself: come to pass; take place: HAPPEN * * *  
3. To come to mind: suggest itself ."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1561 (unabridged ed 1965).
		Plaintiffs argue that the first and third dictionary
definitions, "appear" and "to come to mind/suggest itself,"
support their contention that events do not occur until an
observer notices or discovers them.  However, defendants point
out that the second definition "to present itself/come to
pass/take place/happen," supports the contrary construction,
viz., that the limitation period begins to run when the death,
injury or damage happens, whether or not the event is discovered. 
		The contrasting definitions do not stand on equal
footing.  Even assuming, as plaintiffs do, that the definitions
that plaintiffs embrace -- "appear" and "to come to mind/suggest
itself" -- are themselves similar in meaning, those definitions
refer to abstractions and ideas rather than to events.  In
contrast, the definitions "to present itself/come to pass/take
place/happen" deal with events.  The words "death, injury, or
damage" used in ORS 30.905(2) refer to events, not to
abstractions or ideas.  Accordingly, when considered without
reference to other contextual clues, the term "occurs" describes
the happening of an event, not its eventual discovery.  
		There are, however, other significant contextual clues
to the legislature's intent.  As enacted originally, ORS
30.905(2) (1977) stated:
		"A product liability civil action shall be
commenced not later than two years after the date on
which the death, injury or damage complained of
occurs."
		In 1983, the legislature amended ORS 30.905 by adding
subsections (3) and (4).  Or Laws 1983, ch 143, § 1.  Only
subsection (3) is relevant here, and it established a two-year
limitation period for product liability actions for asbestos-related diseases.  Unlike the original enactment, subsection (3)
provided that the product liability action "shall be commenced
not later than two years after the date on which the plaintiff
first discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have discovered, the disease and the cause thereof."  (Emphasis
added.)  When the legislature added subsection (3) to ORS 30.905,
it also amended subsection (2) by inserting the phrase "[e]xcept
as provided in subsection (3) of this section."  In excepting
subsection (3) from the reach of subsection (2), the legislature,
in 1983, expressly included a discovery rule in product actions
for asbestos-related disease, leaving all other product actions
subject to the limitation period specified in subsection (2).
		In 1987, the legislature added subsection (5) to ORS
30.905.  That subsection established a two-year limitation period
for product liability actions involving intrauterine
contraceptive devices. (3)  Again, the legislature expressly
provided a discovery rule.  At the same time, the legislature
amended ORS 30.905, renumbering subsection (3) as ORS 30.907 for
product liability actions based on asbestos-related disease.  Or
Laws 1987, ch 4, §§ 1-10.
		Finally, in 1993, the legislature enacted ORS 30.908,
creating a specific limitation period for product liability
actions involving death, injury or damage resulting from breast
implants.  Again, the legislature expressly provided that those
actions be "commenced not later than two years after the date on
which the plaintiff first discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have discovered" the death, injury or
disease.  Or Laws 1993, ch 259, §§ 4, 5.  At that time, the
legislature also amended ORS 30.905(2) to except "ORS 30.907 and
30.908(1) to (4)" from the limitation period expressed in
subsection (2).  Id. at § 6.
		The legislature intended the amendments in 1983, 1987
and 1993 to except certain product actions from the limitation
period originally enacted in ORS 30.905(2).  The limitation
periods expressed in those later provisions contain an express
discovery rule.  Although those later-enacted provisions do not
establish the legislature's intent when it enacted ORS 30.905(2),
they are strong evidence that, when the legislature intends to
condition the commencement of a limitation period on the
discovery of the harm, it knows how to express that intention. 
See Armstrong v. Rogue Federal Credit Union, 328 Or 154, 160, 969
P2d 382 (1998) (legislature's demonstrated ability to condition
cause of action provides context for statutory construction);
State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or 275, 281, 917 P2d 494 (1996)
(applying same principle in criminal setting); see also State ex
rel Hall v. Riggs, 319 Or 282, 286, 877 P2d 56 (1994) ("[T]he
legislature knows how to distinguish between reasons for an
action when it wishes to do so."); PGE, 317 Or at 614 ("The
legislature knows how to include qualifying language in a statute
when it wants to do so.").  
		Moreover, by 1977, the legislature clearly had
demonstrated its ability to express a discovery rule in numerous
other limitation statutes.  See, e.g., ORS 12.110(1) (1977)
(action based in fraud or deceit "shall be deemed to commence
only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit"); ORS 12.110(4)
(1977) (action based on medical treatment "shall be commenced
within two years from the date when the injury is first
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been
discovered"); ORS 72.7250(2) (1977) (action for breach of
warranty extending to future performance "accrues when the breach
is or should have been discovered"); ORS 273.241(2) (1977) 
(action based on removal of material from state lands "must be
commenced within six years from the date of the trespass or the
date on which the trespass is discovered by the state, whichever
last occurs"); ORS 618.516(5) (1977) ("actions brought under this
section shall be commenced within one year from the discovery of
the security seal violation"); ORS 646.638(5) (1977) (actions for
unlawful trade practices "shall be commenced within one year from
the discovery of the unlawful method, act or practice"); ORS
656.807(1) (1977) (claims for occupational disease shall commence
"180 days from the date the claimant becomes disabled or is
informed by a physician that he is suffering from an occupational
disease"). 
		We conclude, based on the text and context, that the
legislature's intent is clear.  ORS 30.905(2) does not contain a
so-called "discovery rule."  The legislature used the word
"occurs" in the sense of an event that happens, rather than an
idea that comes to mind.  The phrase "death, injury or damage"
describes events, not abstractions or ideas.  The legislature
knows how to express a discovery rule when it desires to do so. 
The legislature did not include the words "discover,"
"discovery," or any words that imply a similar meaning in ORS
30.905(2).  Accordingly, the limitation period expressed in ORS
30.905(2) begins to run when the "death, injury or damage
complained of" happens, whether or not the plaintiff discovers
the harm within the ensuing two years.  The complaint alleges
that plaintiffs' injury occurred in 1991, when they purchased and
planted the infested grape stock in their vineyard.  Plaintiffs
did not file their complaint until 1997, which was more then two
years after the limitation period in ORS 30.905(2) began to run. 
The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.	

1. 	Plaintiffs' complaint also included claims for
negligence, negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation,
breach of contract, and breach of warranty.  The trial court
dismissed those claims and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., 164 Or App 438, 994 P2d
134 (1999).  Those rulings are not at issue on review.

2. 	Plaintiffs also brought an action against the State of
Oregon.  This appeal is from an ORCP 67 B judgment dismissing
plaintiffs' claims against Benoit and Oregon Vineyard Supply 
Company.  The State of Oregon is not a party to this appeal.

3. 	A sunset provision repealed section (5) on July 1,
1989.  Or Laws 1987, ch 4, § 7 complied as a note after ORS
30.905 (1987).