Title: Noland Co. v. SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

445 So. 2d 266 (1984)
NOLAND COMPANY
v.
SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., et al.
82-491.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 20, 1984.
*267 Harry Asman, Birmingham, for appellant.
Fred Ray Lybrand, Anniston, for appellees.
EMBRY, Justice.
This is an action to establish a materialman's lien on real property in Piedmont, Alabama. Appellant, Noland Company, commenced the action by filing a complaint against Southern Development Co., Inc., Southern Development Company of Piedmont, Ltd., Management Builders, Inc., Lovelace Plumbing Contractors, Inc., and First National Bank of Montgomery, Alabama.
In the process of pretrial pleading and during the oral hearing no issue was taken nor testimony introduced against the interests of Southern Development Co., Inc., and First National Bank of Montgomery. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Noland Company, but only against Lovelace Plumbing Contractors, Inc., which had, meanwhile, changed its corporate name to Lovelace Brothers, Inc. Therefore, the appellees are Southern Development Company of Piedmont, Ltd. (Southern Development), Management Builders, Inc., and Lovelace Brothers, Inc.
The trial court's findings were as follows:
The trial court's factual findings have the effect of a jury's verdict. A judgment, grounded on such findings, is accorded, on appeal, a presumption of correctness which will not be disturbed unless plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. Mayo v. Andress, 373 So. 2d 620 (Ala.1979); Cauley v. Sanders, 388 So. 2d 891 (Ala.1980); Elmer Tallant Agency, Inc. v. Bailey Wood Products, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1312 (Ala.1979).
Noland Company presents two issues for this court's review. The first is whether the trial court erred by refusing to impose a lien in its favor against the Piedmont Manor property, owned by Southern Development Company, Ltd., because of Noland's alleged failure to meet statutory notice requirements prerequisite to the establishment of a lien. Second, Noland Company contends the trial court erred in determining that Noland's contract of guarantee with Management Builders estopped Noland from asserting a statutory lien against Piedmont Manor.
Because the evidence is basically uncontroverted, we will make no further statement of the facts except as relevant to the issues here presented.
Section 35-11-210, Code 1975, essentially provides that when a materialman furnishes materials to a subcontractor, and complies with the provisions of that section, he can take a lien on property involved. Two types of liens are provided for therein. First, the statute provides:
Noland Company claims under the above section.
The second portion provides a more inclusive lien in the event the materialman notifies *269 the owner of the property of its plan to supply materials prior to furnishing them:
Noland contends, and we agree, that the trial court erred in its judgment by imposing on Noland Company the prior notice requirement of the second portion of § 35-11-210 rather than the subsequent notice provision for declaring a more limited form of lien under the first portion.
Noland Company calls our attention to § 35-11-218, Code 1975, which provides as follows:
In Crane Co. v. Sheraton Apartments, Inc., 257 Ala. 332, 58 So. 2d 614 (1952), this court was confronted by the very issue presented by the instant case. There, notice to the owner was not given prior to the materialman's furnishing of goods to a subcontractor. This court held the materialman could, under the statute, fix a lien, on the building and land to the extent of any unpaid balance due the original contractor by the owner at the time the lien was claimed and notice was given as required by Tit. 33, § 46, Code 1940. That section is identical to the statute above quoted, and now applicable, § 35-11-218, Code 1975.
It is undisputed that Noland Company gave notice in writing to Southern Development Company of Piedmont, Ltd., the owner of the subject real property, that it was claiming a lien on Piedmont Manor. That notice stated, as per the statute, the amount claimed, for what, and from whom it was owing. It is undisputed that when that notice was given, there were monies due the original contractor from Southern Development.
Under the Crane interpretation of the above quoted series of statutes, the conclusion is inescapable that Noland complied with the statutory notice requirements.
The second basis for the trial court's decision that Noland Company would not prevail except against Lovelace Brothers, Inc., is stated by that court as follows:
Noland Company argues that because it does not wish to pursue its claim against Management Builders, Inc., on its agreement of guarantee, the agreement is not material to the issues in this case. We deem it significant in discussing this issue. An agreement by a person entitled to a lien that he will look exclusively to the contractor or some person other than the owner for the payment of his claim may be a waiver of his right to a lien. See United States v. Village of Alsip, 345 F.2d 365 (7th 1965), cert. den., 383 U.S. 906, 86 S. Ct. 242, 15 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1965). Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101, 33 So. 2d 360 (1948). In Floyd v. Rambo, this court outlined the application of the doctrine, in Alabama, of waiver as applicable to mechanic's liens:
33 So. 2d  at 363.
Under Floyd, it is clear there was no express or implied waiver of its right to a statutory lien upon the part of Noland Company because of the guarantee agreement.
The agreement of guarantee entered into between Noland Company and Management Builders, Inc., provides in pertinent part:
We find no evidence of an express nor an implied intention in the above instrument by Noland Company to waive its statutory right to claim a lien against Piedmont Manor. Neither do we find the contract of guarantee to be inconsistent with the enforcement of a lien by Noland against Southern Development Company, Ltd. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented by defendants of a knowing waiver by Noland Company in any other instrument or by other actions upon its part.
Under Crane, it is clearly the defendants' burden to show that Noland Company knowingly surrendered or waived its right to a statutory materialman's lien fixed or imposed. Our careful review of the record has revealed the only evidence presented as to waiver was the guarantee agreement above quoted. We find, therefore, that *271 defendants failed to meet their burden of proof as to this issue.
Because the trial court misapplied the law set out in § 35-11-210, Code 1975, and further, because it failed to apply correct legal precedents regarding an express or implied waiver of a statutory materialman's lien, we are compelled to reverse its decision and remand to that court with directions that it modify its judgment consistent with the views expressed herein.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.