Title: State v. Allen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2840-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Christopher Joseph Allen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 9, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 20, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
and oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
2017 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2840-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF670) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
     v. 
 
Christopher Joseph Allen,   
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 9, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Christopher Joseph 
Allen ("Allen"), seeks review of a court of appeals decision 
affirming a circuit court amended judgment and order denying his 
motion for a new sentencing hearing.1  The court of appeals 
determined that under State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 253 
Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341, a sentencing court is permitted to 
consider all of the facts underlying an expunged record of 
                                                 
1 State v. Allen, 2015 WI App 96, 366 Wis. 2d 299, 873 
N.W.2d 92 (affirming judgment and order entered by the circuit 
court for Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Wagner, J., presiding). 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
2 
 
conviction, and not only those facts underlying the crime 
itself. 
¶2 
Allen requests a new sentencing hearing, contending 
that Leitner prohibited the sentencing court from considering 
that he had previously completed supervision in a case where the 
record of conviction had been expunged pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015 (2013-14).2  Additionally, Allen asserts that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to references to 
Allen's expunged record of conviction in the pre-sentence 
investigation report ("PSI") and at sentencing. 
¶3 
Like the circuit court and court of appeals, we 
conclude that the sentencing court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion when it considered the fact that Allen had 
previously successfully completed supervision in a case where 
the record of conviction had been expunged.  Under Leitner, a 
circuit court is permitted to consider not only those facts 
underlying the crime itself, but also all of the facts 
underlying an expunged record of conviction provided those facts 
are not obtained from expunged court records.  Because the 
references to Allen's expunged record of conviction in the PSI 
and at sentencing were obtained from sources other than expunged 
court records, they are permitted under Leitner.  Given that any 
objections to these references would have been meritless, we 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
3 
 
determine that Allen's trial counsel did not perform deficiently 
and was not ineffective. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute.  
In 2013, Allen crashed his vehicle into a tree while traveling 
at approximately 97 miles per hour, killing one passenger and 
severely injuring another.  His blood alcohol concentration at 
the time of the collision was .122. 
¶6 
The State charged Allen with:  (1) homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a); (2) homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(b); (3) injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
resulting in great bodily harm in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.25(1)(a); (4) injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
resulting in great bodily harm with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(b); and (5) 
homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.10(1). 
¶7 
Allen entered a no contest plea to count one, homicide 
by intoxicated use of a vehicle in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a) and count three, injury by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle resulting in great bodily harm in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).  In exchange for Allen's plea, the State 
agreed to dismiss and read in count five and to dismiss the two 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
4 
 
other counts.  Additionally, the State agreed to recommend four 
years of initial confinement at sentencing but to make no 
recommendation with regard to extended supervision. 
¶8 
The circuit court ordered a PSI.  At sentencing, both 
Allen and his trial counsel stated that they had reviewed the 
PSI but did not offer any additions or corrections.  The PSI 
indicated that Allen had a prior municipal citation that had 
been paid and a 2005 conviction for substantial battery that had 
been expunged in 2011. 
¶9 
Under certain circumstances, a young offender's record 
of 
conviction 
may 
be 
expunged 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.015(1m)(a)1., which provides in relevant part: 
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 
years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition. 
 
If a record of conviction is expunged, the court records for 
that case are destroyed by the clerk of court.3 
                                                 
3 SCR 72.06 provides: 
 
When required by statute or court order to expunge a 
court record, the clerk of court shall do all of the 
following: 
(1) 
Remove any paper index and nonfinancial court 
record and place them in the case file. 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
5 
 
¶10 Referencing Allen's expunged record for the 2011 
substantial battery conviction, the PSI stated: 
According to the CIB/FBI Criminal Background report, 
Mr. Allen was arrested for Substantial Battery on 
5/11/05.  Mr. Allen acknowledges that this incident 
involved a fight with another boy at high school and 
he was charged because the other boy lost a tooth in 
the fight and his mother pursued the case.  On 
10/07/05, he was given a withheld sentence with 
conditions that if he pay restitution in the amount of 
$1139.00, 
complete 
anger 
management 
classes 
and 
successfully completes 9 months of probation, the case 
shall be expunged.  WICS database reveals that the 
offender successfully completed his term of probation 
on 07/07/06.  This case was officially expunged under 
SS973.015 on 4/11/11. 
The State commented on this expunged record of conviction at 
sentencing, informing the circuit court that "Mr. Allen has a 
substantial battery which was expunged, the State will grant 
that, back in '05."  Allen's counsel did not object to the 
State's reference to the seven-year-old expunged record of 
conviction. 
¶11 In accordance with the plea agreement, the State 
recommended four years of initial confinement but did not 
provide a recommendation with regard to extended supervision.  
Allen's trial counsel likewise took no position on extended 
supervision, but recommended that the sentencing court impose 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) 
Electronically remove any automated nonfinancial 
record, except the case number. 
(3) 
Seal the entire case file. 
(4) 
Destroy expunged court records in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
6 
 
two years of initial confinement.  The circuit court sentenced 
Allen to five years of initial confinement and four years of 
extended supervision. 
¶12 When sentencing Allen, the circuit court expressed 
concern that the defendant failed to learn from his prior court 
experience: 
THE COURT: The court looks at any record of——any 
record of any undesirable behavior——behavior problems 
or any history of other contacts. 
 . . .  
THE COURT: [W]hat I do give serious consideration for 
is that you——you were on supervision before, right, 
and that was expunged. 
ALLEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you had every opportunity to go through 
that——that 
period 
of 
supervision 
with 
the 
understanding that——you know, you've got to comply 
with certain things, certainly the rules of law making 
sure that you don't do bad things because you can be 
punished for them if you do. 
Having gone through that you would think that that 
would be a learning experience for yourself like I 
never want to be back in the criminal justice system. 
I don't know anything about——quite frankly, about the 
case except for what it says in the presentence 
investigation report, but the message is——is that I 
should this with me [sic], it was expunged which is a 
good 
thing 
because 
I 
do 
that 
myself 
when 
the 
appropriate case comes to the court, expunged so that 
wouldn't be wrapped around somebody's neck for the 
rest of their lives, especially a felony conviction, 
but you had an opportunity to learn something from 
that. 
That's what the Court's concerned about.  I don't know 
what was going through your mind going 97 miles an 
hour on a city street . . .  
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
7 
 
¶13 Allen filed a post-conviction motion requesting a new 
sentencing hearing on the basis that the circuit court erred 
when it considered his expunged record of conviction at 
sentencing.  Further, he asserted that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to references to the expunged 
record of conviction in the PSI and at sentencing.4  The circuit 
court denied Allen's motion for a new sentencing hearing. 
¶14 In denying Allen's motion for resentencing, the 
circuit court explained that it considered his prior supervision 
and his failure to learn from that experience as relevant to an 
assessment of the defendant's character and behavior: 
The court does not read Leitner to preclude a court 
from considering the fact of an offender's prior 
supervision and failure to learn from that experience 
as part of its duty at sentencing to acquire full 
knowledge of the character and behavior of the 
defendant.  See State v. Hubert, 181 Wis. 2d 333 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  In fact, that is the only fact the court 
assigned any significant weight to regarding the 
defendant's prior expunged conviction, and therefore, 
the court perceives no violation under Leitner, and 
consequently no ineffective assistance on the part of 
trial counsel for failing to raise an objection. 
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
judgment and order.  State v. Allen, 2015 WI 96, ¶1, 366 Wis. 2d 
299, 873 N.W.2d 92.  It determined that under Leitner, 253 
Wis. 2d 449, a sentencing court is permitted to consider all of 
                                                 
4 Allen also moved for an order vacating a $250 DNA 
surcharge, which the circuit court granted.  This part of the 
circuit court's decision and order was not appealed and is not 
before this court. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
8 
 
the facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, and not 
only those facts underlying the crime itself.  Id., ¶18.  
Additionally, 
it 
concluded 
that 
trial 
counsel 
was 
not 
ineffective because the references to Allen's expunged record of 
conviction in the PSI and at sentencing are permitted under 
Leitner.  Id., ¶20. 
II 
¶16 We are asked to determine whether Leitner prohibited 
the sentencing court from considering the fact that Allen 
previously completed supervision in a case where the record of 
conviction had been expunged pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  
If so, then we must also determine whether Allen's trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to references to the 
expunged record of conviction in the PSI and at sentencing. 
¶17 This court reviews a circuit court's sentencing 
decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion when it 
imposes a sentence based on an error of law.  State v. Harris, 
119 Wis. 2d 612, 625, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984).  When reviewing a 
circuit court's discretionary determination involving a question 
of law, we review the question of law independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Abrose v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 2d 346, 356, 560 
N.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶18 Whether 
counsel's 
actions 
constitute 
ineffective 
assistance presents a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
9 
 
Tourville, 2016 WI 17, ¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735.  We 
will not reverse the circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 
This 
court 
reviews 
independently, as a matter of law, whether trial counsel's 
conduct breached the defendant's right to effective assistance 
of counsel.  Id. 
III 
¶19 We address first Allen's assertion that 
Leitner 
prohibited the sentencing court from considering the fact that 
he had previously completed supervision in a case where the 
record of conviction had been expunged pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015. 
¶20 In Leitner, the defendant entered a no contest plea to 
reckless driving causing great bodily harm.  253 Wis. 2d 449, 
¶4.  Leitner's PSI stated that in 1997 he was convicted of 
misdemeanor hit and run and operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated causing injury.  Id., ¶6.  The information in the 
PSI about Leitner's prior convictions came from the district 
attorney's case files.  Id.  Both of these records of 
convictions had been expunged.  Id.  However, the fact that the 
records of the convictions had been expunged was not mentioned 
in the PSI.  Id. 
¶21 The prosecutor agreed not to refer to Leitner's 1997 
convictions because the court records of these convictions had 
been expunged.  Id., ¶7.  Yet, at sentencing the prosecutor 
discussed 
the 
facts 
underlying 
the 
expunged 
records 
of 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
10 
 
convictions by relying on information contained in the police 
reports and district attorney's case files.  Id. 
¶22 In determining Leitner's sentence, the circuit court 
referred to and considered facts underlying his expunged records 
of convictions: 
 
You say you have no problem with alcohol and yet this 
is the second incident that you have been involved in 
that has resulted in your being charged with an 
alcohol-related offense, although it was not charged 
in this particular case, but certainly alcohol was 
involved. 
Id., ¶9. 
¶23 On appeal, Leitner asserted that the sentencing court 
erred when it considered information about the facts underlying 
the records of the expunged convictions.  Id., ¶42.  This court 
disagreed, concluding that "the circuit court may consider, when 
sentencing an offender, the facts underlying a record of 
conviction expunged under § 973.015."  Id., ¶48.  The Leitner 
court emphasized the need of a sentencing court to have 
available relevant information: 
When Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is read in the context of 
the objectives of a sentencing proceeding, it is clear 
that the legislature did not intend § 973.015 to 
deprive sentencing courts of relevant information 
regarding an offender when that information is in 
government files relating to a record of conviction 
expunged under § 973.015. 
Id., ¶47.  Thus, Leitner reasoned that it does not make sense to 
prohibit a circuit court from considering the underlying facts 
of an expunged record of conviction if those facts are located 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
11 
 
in a file of a district attorney or law enforcement agency that 
is not required to be expunged.  Id., ¶46. 
¶24 In this case, Allen asserts that he is not seeking to 
overturn or modify Leitner.  Instead, he contends that Leitner 
should be interpreted to permit consideration only of the facts 
or behaviors underlying the crime itself, rather than all of the 
facts underlying the expunged record of conviction.  Further, 
Allen argues that a sentencing court may consider only facts 
underlying a prior expunged record of conviction if those facts 
are interrelated to the facts underlying the current offenses 
for which a defendant is being sentenced. 
¶25 Allen relies on the portion of Leitner in which this 
court determined that the "facts underlying the record of a 
conviction 
expunged 
under 
§ 973.015 
are 
significant 
to 
sentencing this defendant . . . ."  Id., ¶44.  Leitner explained 
that "the facts of his prior behavior elucidate his character, 
including the escalating harms caused by his interrelated 
intoxication and hit and run accidents."  Id.  Thus, Allen 
asserts that Leitner requires interrelated facts between the 
expunged record of conviction and the current conviction, which 
he contends are not present here. 
¶26 According to Allen, the facts of this case are 
distinguishable from Leitner because the sentencing court did 
not consider the underlying behaviors that led to his expunged 
battery conviction.  Unlike Leitner, the underlying facts of 
Allen's expunged battery conviction are not interrelated to his 
current convictions for homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
12 
 
and injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  Specially, there is 
no evidence in the record that the expunged battery conviction 
involved alcohol or a motor vehicle. 
¶27 We disagree with Allen because he reads Leitner too 
narrowly.  As set forth more fully below, a defendant's behavior 
on supervision is relevant to a sentencing court's consideration 
of his future behavior and overall character.  Leitner does not 
require interrelated facts between the crime underlying a prior 
expunged record of conviction and the facts underlying a current 
criminal conviction.  It allows consideration of all facts 
underlying an expunged record of conviction, not just the facts 
underlying the crime itself provided those facts are not 
obtained from expunged court records. 
¶28 Allen also contends that his previous successful 
completion of supervision in a case where the record of 
conviction had been expunged does not inform the sentencing 
court about his individual character.  According to Allen, 
expunction requires the successful completion of a sentence or 
probation in every case.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  Thus, Allen 
asserts that consideration of his prior successful completion of 
supervision 
is 
not 
individualized 
because 
it 
is 
equally 
applicable to every sentencing in which a defendant has an 
expunged record of conviction. 
¶29 Individualized sentencing, as Allen correctly asserts, 
"has long been a cornerstone to Wisconsin's criminal justice 
jurisprudence."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48.  However, we 
agree with the court of appeals that allowing sentencing courts 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
13 
 
to consider the facts of an expunged record of conviction in 
addition to the facts of the underlying crime allows sentencing 
courts to better perform their duty to make informed sentencing 
decisions. 
¶30 It is well-established that sentencing courts must 
acquire "full knowledge of the character and behavior pattern of 
the convicted defendant before imposing sentence."  Leitner, 253 
Wis. 2d 449, ¶45 (citing Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 
286 N.W.2d 559 (1980)); see also Wasman v. United States, 468 
U.S. 559, 563 (1984) ("The sentencing court . . . must be 
permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably 
might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, 
given the crime committed.").  Thus, a sentencing court may 
consider uncharged and unproven offenses and facts related to 
offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted.  Leitner, 
253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶45.  To ensure that a circuit court has full 
information, "prosecutors may not keep relevant information from 
a sentencing court."  Id. 
¶31 As Gallion explained, judges have a need for more 
complete 
information 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing. 
 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶34.  In addition, under Gallion, sentencing courts 
are encouraged "to refer to information provided by others."  
Id., ¶47.  When imposing a sentencing, a circuit court must also 
explain 
"how 
the 
sentence's 
component 
parts 
promote 
the 
sentencing objectives."  Id., ¶46.  "By stating this linkage on 
the record, courts will produce sentences that can be more 
easily reviewed for a proper exercise of discretion."  Id. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
14 
 
¶32 We also agree with the State that consideration of a 
defendant's prior successful completion of supervision in a case 
where a record of conviction had been expunged may often benefit 
defendants.  For example, a sentencing court may determine that 
a defendant who has previously complied with the terms of 
probation is at a low-risk for reoffending while on probation or 
supervision.  In that case, a sentencing court may consider the 
fact that a defendant has previously successfully completed 
supervision in order to determine whether to divert an offender 
to a non-prison alternative. 
¶33 Here 
the 
sentencing 
court 
properly 
considered 
information provided in the PSI that was obtained from a CIB/FBI 
Criminal Background report.5  As Leitner determined, a circuit 
court may consider the underlying facts of an expunged record of 
conviction if those facts are located somewhere other than in 
the court records that must be destroyed with the case file 
pursuant to SCR 72.06.  253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶46. 
¶34 A defendant's behavior on supervision is relevant to 
his overall character.  The sentencing court in this case  
referenced the fact of Allen's prior successful completion of 
supervision in the context of considering Allen's possible 
future behavior and his failure to learn a lesson. 
                                                 
5 Allen does not contend that the PSI writer possessed 
information that should have been destroyed pursuant to SCR 
72.06. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
15 
 
¶35 In accord with Leitner, the sentencing court explained 
that it "looks at any record of——any record of any undesirable 
behavior——behavior problems or any history of other contacts."  
It explained that it considered Allen's prior supervision as 
relevant to Allen's character because of his failure to learn 
from the opportunity of having his prior record of conviction 
expunged: 
THE COURT:  And you had every opportunity to go 
through that——that period of supervision with the 
understanding that——you know, you've got to comply 
with certain things, certainly the rules of law making 
sure that you don't do bad things because you can be 
punished for them if you do. 
Having gone through that you would think that that 
would be a learning experience for yourself like I 
never want to be back in the criminal justice system. 
The sentencing court used the fact of Allen's prior supervision 
to impose a sentence based upon his character and behavior, 
including his failure to learn the consequences of breaking the 
law. 
¶36 Additionally, as required by Gallion, the circuit 
court 
explained 
its 
reasoning 
for 
considering 
Allen's 
supervision for the expunged conviction at sentencing.  In every 
case 
where 
the 
facts 
underlying 
an 
expunged 
record 
of  
conviction are included in a PSI, the court will be aware of the 
fact that the defendant successfully completed a sentence or 
probation.  Rather than ask sentencing courts to turn a blind 
eye to relevant facts before them, pursuant to Gallion, we 
expect that courts explain the facts considered when imposing a 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
16 
 
sentence.  That is what the sentencing court did here when it 
explained 
that 
it 
was 
considering 
Allen's 
behavior 
in 
successfully completing probation. 
¶37 We turn next to Allen's argument that the sentencing 
court's consideration of Allen's successful completion of 
supervision in a prior case where the record of conviction had 
been expunged contravenes the purposes of expunction.  As Allen 
correctly observes, expunction "offers young offenders a fresh 
start without the burden of a criminal record and a second 
chance at becoming law-abiding and productive members of the 
community."  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 
856 N.W.2d 811.  It is "intended to provide a break to young 
offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply with the law."  
Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶38. 
¶38 However, 
expunction 
provides 
a 
means 
by 
which 
sentencing courts may shield youthful offenders from some of the 
future consequences of criminal convictions.  Id.  The Leitner 
court determined that only court records, rather than all 
government records regarding expunged convictions need to be 
destroyed.  It explained that "nothing in the language or 
history of § 973.015 indicates that the legislature intended 
record expunction . . . to wipe away all information relating to 
an expunged record of a conviction or to shield a [defendant] 
from all of the future consequences of the facts underlying a 
record of a conviction expunged . . . ."  Id. 
¶39 Concluding that expunction required the destruction of 
only court records, Leitner explained that "district attorneys 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
17 
 
and law enforcement agencies have significant ongoing interests 
in maintaining case information, even when a court record of a 
conviction has been expunged . . . ."  Id., ¶40.  For example, 
case information from an expunged record of conviction may 
assist police and prosecutors in a variety of ways: 
Case information may assist in identifying suspects, 
determining whether a suspect might present a threat 
to officer safety, investigating and solving similar 
crimes, anticipating and disrupting future criminal 
actions, informing decisions about arrest or pressing 
charges, making decisions about bail and pre-trial 
release, making decisions about repeater charges, and 
making recommendations about sentencing. 
Id. 
¶40 Furthermore, expunging the court record continues to 
provide substantial advantages to an offender.  As Leitner 
explained, an expunged record of a conviction cannot be 
considered at a subsequent sentencing or used for impeachment at 
trial under § 906.09(1) and is not available for repeater 
sentence enhancement.  Id., ¶39.  Expunction allows "offenders 
to . . . present 
themselves 
to 
the 
world——including 
future 
employers——unmarked by past wrongdoing."  Hemp, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 
¶19 (internal citations omitted). 
¶41 Finally, we address Allen's concern that allowing 
consideration of a defendant's prior successful completion of 
supervision contravenes Leitner's statement, set forth in the 
paragraph above, that an expunged record of conviction cannot be 
considered at a subsequent sentencing.  As discussed in Leitner, 
expunction requires the destruction of the court record of 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
18 
 
conviction.  It is the court record, with all of its contents, 
which cannot be considered at a subsequent sentencing.  The 
facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, if obtained 
from a source other than a court record, may be considered at 
sentencing.  Leitner, 253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶47. 
¶42 For 
the 
foregoing 
reasons, 
we 
determine 
that 
consideration 
of 
the 
fact 
that 
a 
defendant 
previously 
successfully completed probation does not contravene the purpose 
of expunction.  The benefits of expunction shield a defendant 
from some, but not all, of the future consequences of a prior 
conviction.  A defendant is offered a fresh start when a 
conviction is expunged, but when he returns to the criminal 
justice system the facts of that expunged record of conviction 
are not erased and may be properly considered at sentencing. 
¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the 
fact 
that 
Allen 
had 
previously 
successfully 
completed 
supervision in a case where the record of conviction had been 
expunged.  Under Leitner, a circuit court is permitted to 
consider not only those facts underlying the crime itself but 
also all of the facts underlying an expunged record of 
conviction provided those facts are not obtained from expunged 
court records. 
IV 
¶44 Having concluded that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the fact 
that Allen had previously successfully completed supervision in 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
19 
 
a case where the record of conviction had been expunged, we 
briefly address Allen's claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to references to his expunged 
record of conviction in the PSI and at sentencing. 
¶45 In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a defendant must show both (1) that his counsel's 
representation was deficient and (2) that this deficiency 
prejudiced him.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  Allen cannot succeed on his claim here because he 
cannot show that his counsel's representation was deficient. 
¶46 It is well-established that trial counsel could not 
have been ineffective for failing to make meritless arguments.  
See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Toliver, 
187 
Wis. 2d 346, 
360, 
523 
N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 
74, ¶37, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583; State v. Harvey, 139 
Wis. 2d 353, 380, 407 N.W.2d 235 (1987); State v. Luedtke, 2014 
WI App 79, ¶28, 355 Wis. 2d 436, 851 N.W.2d 837.  Because the 
references to Allen's expunged record of conviction in the PSI 
and at sentencing were obtained from sources other than expunged 
court records, they are permitted under Leitner.  Any objection 
from 
trial 
counsel 
to 
these 
references 
would 
have 
been 
meritless.  Thus, trial counsel's performance was not deficient 
and consequently Allen could not have been prejudiced as a 
result of counsel's performance.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Allen's trial counsel was not 
ineffective. 
No. 2014AP2840-CR 
 
20 
 
V 
¶47 In sum, we conclude that the sentencing court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the fact 
that Allen had previously successfully completed supervision in 
a case where the record of conviction had been expunged.  Under 
Leitner, a circuit court is permitted to consider not only those 
facts underlying the crime itself, but also all of the facts 
underlying an expunged record of conviction provided those facts 
are not obtained from expunged court records.  Because the 
references to Allen's expunged record of conviction in the PSI 
and at sentencing were obtained from sources other than expunged 
court records, they are permitted under Leitner.  Given that any 
objections to these references would have been meritless, we 
determine that Allen's trial counsel did not perform deficiently 
and was not ineffective because the references to Allen's 
expunged record of conviction in the PSI and at sentencing are 
permitted under Leitner. 
¶48 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2014AP2840-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion, although it is an extension of Leitner.  See 
State v. Allen, 2015 WI App 96, ¶¶21-25, 366 Wis. 2d 299, 873 
N.W.2d 92 (Kessler, J., concurring).   
¶50 The legislature's goal in expunction is to "to provide 
a break to young offenders who demonstrate the ability to comply 
with the law."  State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶38, 253 
Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341.   
¶51 I am concerned that the court's permitting more 
extensive use of the facts underlying the expunged record of 
conviction chips away at the purpose of expunction.   
¶52 For me, the test to apply to the interpretation and 
application of the expunction statute in different factual 
situations is whether the court is making it harder for young 
offenders to escape the shadows of their past.  The instant case 
is a close call.   
 
 
No.  2014AP2840-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1