Title: State v. Richard Feaster

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD FEASTER (now known as SEAN PADRAIC KENNEY), Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 31, 2005 Decided July 14, 2005 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Gloucester County. Isabel K. McGinty and Michael A. Priarone, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Debra A. Owens, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Richard Feaster, now known as Sean Padraic Kenney, See footnote 1 was convicted of capital murder by a jury and sentenced to death. This Court upheld his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 18 (1998) (Feaster I), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001), and on proportionality review, State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 388, 393 (2000) (Feaster II), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001). Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Superior Court in which he alleged numerous grounds for reversal, centered primarily on the claim that at trial he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. After the PCR court rejected defendant s petition, he sought review by this Court. In this opinion, we address only one issue raised by defendant in his PCR petition. At the PCR hearing, defendant intended to call Michael Sadlowski, a key State s witness who had recanted his trial testimony in a certified statement made to defendant s attorneys. Before Sadlowski took the stand at the hearing, the prosecutor indicated to Sadlowski s attorney that there would be considerations if he testified consistent with his recantation statement. When called as a witness, Sadlowski withdrew his certified statement and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant contends that the prosecutor s thinly veiled threat to prosecute Sadlowski for perjury if he testified in defendant s favor deprived him of a critical witness. We agree. We will not theorize whether Sadlowski would have invoked the privilege even in the absence of a prosecutorial threat. We now hold that the prosecutor substantially interfered with Sadlowski s decision to testify and, therefore, denied defendant a witness who might have supported his claim that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The prosecutor s interference with that witness s decision to testify violated defendant s state constitutional due process and compulsory process rights. Michael Sadlowski, presently an inmate at Bayside State Prison #286305/581123B certify [sic] as follows: (1) I was a witness at the murder trial of [defendant] Richard Feaster in March of 1996. (2) When I testified at the trial that Richard Feaster admitted the murder of Keith Donaghy to me, I was not telling the truth. (3) Richard Feaster has never told me that he killed anyone. (4) I testified at his trial that he admitted the killing because the prosecutor s office said I would go to prison on a charge I had at the time and that they would charge me with conspiracy on the murder charge. (5) The prosecutor s investigator, . . . and Assistant Prosecutor . . . told me that if I testified against Richard Feaster they would help me with my charge and that I would not be charged with conspiracy. (6) Before I testified, the investigator and the prosecutor asked me to work into my testimony as many bad things about Richard Feaster as I could think of. As a result, during my testimony I said Rich was a violent person who liked to beat people up. I have read the above statement of seven [handwritten] pages and I certify that the foregoing statement is true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements are wilfully false I am subject to punishment. Relying on that statement, in March 2002, defendant submitted a Notice of Motion for a New Trial based on newly discovered evidence. About one year after giving his statement, Sadlowski reaffirmed in a meeting with the defense investigator and defendant s two PCR attorneys that he stood by the recantation of his trial testimony. In August 2003, pursuant to a writ commanding his presence from state prison, Sadlowski appeared before the PCR court to give testimony. Defendant s PCR counsel conveyed to the court that Sadlowski wished to consult with counsel before he testified. Louis Fletcher, Esq., later was assigned to represent Sadlowski at the PCR hearing. Fletcher sought both to retract Sadlowski s certified statement and to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination without placing Sadlowski on the stand. Defendant s PCR counsel insisted that any repudiation of the recantation had to come from Sadlowski himself, and not from his lawyer. The PCR court permitted Sadlowski to take the stand for the limited purpose of withdrawing his certified statement and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. Fletcher engaged in the following colloquy with Sadlowski: Q: [D]id you have the opportunity to speak with me before court today concerning your statement? A: Yeah. Q: Did you make a request to me to withdraw that statement on the record? A: Yeah. Q: It is your desire, then, to retract, withdraw that statement, is that correct, sir? A: Yes. Q: Is it your desire to invoke your Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against any and all questions? A: Yes. Q: Did anybody force you, threaten you to withdraw this statement? A: No. Defendant s PCR counsel objected to this procedure. He argued that Sadlowski waived his privilege against self-incrimination when he withdrew his certified statement on the stand and that defense counsel had a right to cross-examine him on the substance of his testimony. Defense counsel contended that it was unfair to allow Sadlowski to say something in aid of the State s case and then hide behind the privilege. The PCR court concluded that Sadlowski had testified at defense counsel s request and had not waived the privilege. The court also refused to strike Sadlowski s testimony. When PCR counsel inquired whether there had been a threat of prosecution against Sadlowski, the Assistant Prosecutor responded: Judge, when I talked to when I talked to Mr. Fletcher I gave him his statement and said this is his statement. If he testifies the way he does, then there are considerations. That s all I said. Then Mr. Fletcher took that statement and talked to his client. I don t know what he told him. So, there is no threat. [(Emphasis added).] Defense counsel argued that it was fundamentally unfair for the State to raise the specter of a perjury prosecution with the recanting witness, thus threatening him into silence. Counsel noted that the State has no real means of discerning the truth or falsity of the recantation as opposed to trial testimony. Although, in its opinion the State may feel they know the difference. That being so, counsel submitted that [t]o threaten the witness if he recants . . . to me seems like the height of unfairness. Defense counsel requested that the State or the PCR court grant Sadlowski immunity so [Sadlowski] can come to court and tell [whether] the truth is what he said at trial or in his certified statement. The prosecutor refused to grant Sadlowski immunity, asserting that the State had done nothing inappropriate. The court then granted counsel time to brief the issue and excused Sadlowski without requiring him to explain his reasons for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. When the hearing resumed six days later, defendant moved to have the court compel Sadlowski to testify. In denying the motion, the court observed that it s clear on its face as to why he invoked his privilege. The court noted that Sadlowski invoked the privilege because he was subject to a possible perjury charge. The judge recognized that the considerations that the prosecutor was alluding to [were] the possibility of perjury charges . . . . (Emphasis added). The court, nevertheless, concluded that the prosecutor s warning to Sadlowski s attorney did not influence Sadlowski s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment because he knew he had some criminal exposure. In denying defendant s petition for post-conviction relief, the court did not consider Sadlowski s certified statement recanting his trial testimony. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD FEASTER (now known as SEAN PADRAIC KENNEY), Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting In this appeal we focus on the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR) to defendant Richard Feaster who, in 1993 and with a shotgun at close range, executed an innocent gas station attendant for the paltry sum of $191.72. After a six-day PCR hearing that consumed more than 1,000 pages of transcripts, the PCR court issued a comprehensive and exhaustive oral opinion rejecting more than twenty assignments of error. In our review of the PCR court s denial of relief, we have focused exclusively on defendant s attempt to have one of the witnesses who testified against him at trial, Michael Sadlowski, recant his trial testimony. Sadlowski, who testified and was cross-examined in detail at defendant s capital murder trial, recanted his trial testimony in a written statement when he was visited in prison by defendant s counsel and, more to the point, when Sadlowski was without the benefit of counsel. Once brought from his prison cell to defendant s PCR hearing pursuant to a writ, Sadlowski requested that counsel be appointed to represent him, See footnote 15 a request the PCR court granted. After discussions between the prosecutor and Sadlowski s counsel and later separate discussions between Sadlowski and his own counsel, Sadlowski s counsel advised the PCR court that Sadlowski withdrew his recantation so as to take advantage of the statutory affirmative defense to a perjury prosecution available to those who retract a false statement in the course of the proceeding or matter in which it was made prior to the termination of the proceeding or matter without having caused irreparable harm to any party. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1d. Sadlowski s counsel also advised the PCR court that Sadlowski would assert the privilege against self-incrimination at the PCR hearing. The PCR court permitted the retraction and accepted Sadlowski s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The majority today correctly reaffirms the role of trials as a search for truth, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 20). However, in doing so, it foists on the State a needlessly harsh Hobson s choice: either grant a witness use and derivative use immunity or suffer the suppression of that witness trial testimony. Because the majority s analysis concerning the import and effect of Sadlowski s recantation and the withdrawal of his recantation is flawed factually, procedurally, legally and as to its remedy, I respectfully dissent. A. Yes. Q. I then borrowed a pad from you, a public defender pad? A. Yes. Q. I wrote, essentially, what Mr. Sadlowski was telling me down on the pad? A. Yes. Q. Mr. Sadlowski went over it and read it? A. Yes, he did. Q. We asked him to sign it? A. Yes. Q. He signed it of his own free will? A. Yes, he did. Q. Let me ask you to turn to the final page of D-70 [the written recantation], ask you if you see the signature of Mr. Sadlowski? A. Yes, I do. Q. Did you then witness that signature? A. Yes, I did. Q. Did anybody twist his arm to give this statement? A. No. Q. He gave it willingly? A. Yes, he did. Q. Told us it was the truth, correct? A. Yes. Gutierrez then testified that, during a later interview, Sadlowski reaffirmed his recantation: Q. Yes, by the way, did we note you had a further interview of Mr. Sadlowski about a year later? A. Yes. Q. At which time myself, [another of defendant s PCR counsel], and you met again with Mr. Sadlowski? A. Yes. Q. At Bayside? A. Yes. Q. Did he then say anything about this statement? A. No. He said that he stood by it. As the prosecution noted in its cross-examination of Gutierrez, neither of these two interviews of Sadlowski were tape-recorded. Acknowledging that Sadlowski s retraction of his sworn trial testimony would expose him to a prosecution for perjury, the PCR court inquired directly of defendant s PCR counsel whether anybody advise[d] Mr. Sadlowski of the fact that he might be placed in jeopardy. Defendant s PCR counsel responded: I can make representations about that. That is that that subject did come in. We informed Mr. Sadlowski that we couldn t give him legal advise. It he wanted to see counsel before he gave us any statement, then that was his privilege. He did not want to do so. He fully understood that, obviously, it was inconsistent with his trial testimony. He recognized the fact that that might put him in some form of legal jeopardy. Nevertheless, he wanted to give the [statement]. We didn t undertake to advise him legally. We specifically told him that that s at odds with what our representation of the defendant is. See footnote 19 Immediately on the heels of those representations, the PCR court noted that [g]iven the representation, the first time [Sadlowski] had [legal] representation he exercised his privilege [against self-incrimination,] and ultimately held that, [w]hen [Sadlowski] got to court this past summer the first thing he did when he was called upon to testify was ask for an attorney. (emphasis supplied). See footnote 20 When Sadlowski was called to testify after he was represented by counsel, his counsel informed the PCR court that Mr. Sadlowski [was] going to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to any and all questions that might be asked of him[,] and that [i]n addition, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(d) [sic], any statement that [] has been proferred to this Court is withdrawn and retracted. A verbal skirmish then ensued, with defendant s PCR counsel insisting that only Sadlowski himself could withdraw his recantation and, therefore, Sadlowski would have to testify, at least to that limited extent. After the PCR court agreed to limit Sadlowski s testimony to the withdrawal of his recantation and his assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination, Sadlowski, questioned by his own counsel, testified as follows: Q. Mr. Sadlowski, Michael - - A. Yeah. Q. - - did you have the opportunity to speak with me concerning your statement? A. Yeah. Q. Did you make a request to me to withdraw that statement on the record? A. Yeah. Q. Is it your desire, then, to retract, withdraw that statement, is that correct, sir? A. Yes. Q. Did anybody force you, threaten you to withdraw this statement? A. No. [(emphasis supplied).] Defendant s PCR counsel did not contemporaneously object to this line of questioning or the procedure that was followed. See footnote 21 Instead, it was only after Sadlowski s withdrawal of his recantation and assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege were complete that defendant s PCR counsel sought to have the PCR court require that Sadlowski continue testifying, despite Sadlowski s now twice asserted privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant s PCR counsel argued that defendant s interest must have primacy because defendant awaits execution and, hence, anyone else s privileges must give way to defendant s needs. The PCR court rejected that notion, correctly observing that I can t go picking and choosing whose rights I m going to violate because one has a more permanent alternative than the other. That can t be. Defendant s PCR counsel then commenced the inquiry on which the majority grounds our review: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, in that [vein], may we inquire as to whether or not there s been a threat of prosecution by the Gloucester County Prosecutor s Office? THE COURT: I don t think it matters. I don t think it matters. If he is aware that he is in criminal jeopardy, he doesn t have to wait until he is prosecuted to invoke his right. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My question is different than that. It s not whether or not he just has an apprehension of prosecution, but whether or not he s been actively advised that he will be prosecuted. THE COURT: I don t think it s relevant. You have to ask someone else that question. Obviously, this witness is not going to testify to that. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If we might, can we get a representation from the state as to whether or not such a bit of [advice] has been given to Mr. Sadlowski or his counsel? [PROSECUTOR]: Judge, when I talked to- - when I talked to [Sadlowski s counsel] I gave him [Sadlowski s] statement and I said this is his statement. If he testifies the way he does, then there are considerations. That s all I said. Then [Sadlowski s counsel] took that statement and talked to his client. I don t know what he told him. So, there is no threat. THE COURT: Nor should you know what [Sadlowski s counsel] discussed with his client. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I m taking the assistant prosecutor s representations that there are considerations to mean that the inference was that should he testify pursuant to the affidavit he would be prosecuted. That s all I m looking for, Judge. [PROSECUTOR]: That s what I said. THE COURT: I don t know what that means, but. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just to pin it down, Judge, that in conversation with the witness, counsel, prior to his testimony, the assistant prosecutor advised him that should Mr. Sadlowski testify pursuant to his affidavit or certification he d be prosecuted for perjury. I think we should have that spread on the record. [PROSECUTOR]: That s not what I said. There are considerations. THE COURT: That wasn t what I heard. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I m trying to get at what that means, there are considerations. THE COURT: It may sound mysterious. If you want to call this gentleman as a witness to determine what it was, maybe that s another recourse. With respect to this particular witness, he invoked his rights, withdrawn his statement. You can argue what the implications of that are if you like, but I m not going to require him to participate anymore. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don t think we need his participation for that. THE COURT: He being Mr. Sadlowski. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I ll accept [the prosecutor s] general representations. I don t feel I need to place her on the stand under oath. I want to understand here today, correct me if I m wrong, that the representation was made, inferentially or otherwise, to Mr. Sadlowski s attorney that should he testify in accordance with his affidavit the prosecutor would consider prosecuting him for perjury. THE COURT: I m not sure that that was said. I want to be fair to the record, I want to be fair to everyone else. [Sadlowski s counsel] is an experienced counsel. I don t think he needs [the prosecutor s] suggestion as to anything, nor would he wait for it. Let me not speak for you, [Sadlowski s counsel], to advise his client in accordance with what his jeopardy might be. Rejecting the suggestion advanced by defendant s PCR counsel that the State grant Sadlowski immunity, the prosecutor made clear that [t]here was nothing that I said to [Sadlowski s counsel] to strongarm him into telling his client. That conversation was probably a two-second conversation. Absolutely nothing from the state that was inappropriate as to what I said to [Sadlowski s counsel]. The PCR court then noted the quandary in which Sadlowski had been placed, observing that [i]t seems to me the witness [Sadlowski], it may be you [defendant s PCR counsel] in obtaining the statement, somebody has placed this witness in jeopardy. I don t know who it was, but somebody placed him in jeopardy. Whether you knew about it or whether, I assume, he signed this document, whether or not he knew that is another matter. Six days later, at the continued hearing date, defendant s PCR counsel ultimately moved to compel the continued testimony of witness Michael Sadlowski. Relying on State v. DeCola, 33 N.J. 335 (1960), defendant s PCR counsel urged that the PCR court examine the basis of Sadlowski s assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination before ruling whether Sadlowski would be required to testify further. The PCR court rejected this end-run: I m satisfied that the defense is attempting to do indirectly what it can t do directly, that is, require Mr. Sadlowski to testify over his invoking his privilege to remain silent. He was advised by counsel. I suspect at the [] moment he arrives and I have him start making statements about why he doesn t want to give his statement [of retraction], or you want to cross-examine him on that issue, the problem will become even broader. It appears on its face he invoked his privilege. I think it s clear on its face as to why he invoked his privilege. With respect to his subjection to a possible perjury charge, his counsel invoked it. His counsel insisted that he wished to not only invoke the privilege, but withdraw the statement from consideration. Pursuant to the statute, that being the case, I don t have to require Mr. Sadlowski to testify at this proceeding. So I m going to deny the application. In a thoughtful, forty-one page oral opinion, the PCR court denied defendant s petition for post-conviction relief as well as his motion for a new trial. With respect to defendant s motion for a new trial on the issue of Sadlowski s recantation and the withdrawal of his recantation, the PCR court made the following specific findings: Sometime in 2001 when post-conviction relief was first filed, the defense counsel visited Mr. [Sadlowski] in jail, spoke to him, and obtained from him a statement, which I included and attach for the record because I want a reviewing court to have its availability; although I did not consider it in my findings. He made a statement saying that his original statements at trial were not true. When he got to court - - it was signed by an investigator. When he got to court this past summer the first thing he did when he was called upon to testify was ask for an attorney. This is a witness who already [is] spending time in jail asking for an attorney. Which leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that this witness[] knew he had some criminal exposure, knew he had problems. So he wanted an attorney to discuss it. The Court granted a postponement with respect to his testimony, allowing counsel to contact him. He was contacted and interviewed by extremely competent counsel, whose reputation in this county, in South Jersey as well, [is] well known in criminal courts. And at the time he was represented for testimony he relied upon his Fifth Amendment Privilege. Counsel objected to that, requesting the Court to give limited immunity to the defendant so that he could [give] testimony with respect to that recantation. That was a specific circumstance involving Mr. Sadlowski. The implications, however, [of] that argument, in thinking about it further, just seem to me to be so broad and overpowering that it would invite testimony at a trial, and any time thereafter anybody can come in under a grant of immunity to say anything they wanted. Which means that the original testimony, basically, is worthless. It s worthless as a means of allowing the state to utilize witnesses and plea offers in exchange for testimony, because it would insulate that person, once they completed their obligation, from any liability to merely recant later on, thereby throwing the entire system into a state of chaotic disarray. In this particular instance, however, having consulted with counsel, this witness[] knew he had a problem once he appeared in court, having given that original recanting statement. The prosecutor indicated that if the [witness] did in fact testify there were going to be some considerations. Clearly, the considerations that the prosecutor was [alluding] to was the possibility of perjury charges, of which this witness knew before the prosecutor - - weeks before the prosecutor even said that, because he asked for an attorney from the get-go. Obviously implying, or inferring, that he knew that there were going to be considerations with respect to his different testimony, his recanting statement and the original testimony.[ See footnote 22 ] Defense counsel made much of the fact that the prosecutor had suggested considerations, implying that there was something improper about the prosecutor suggesting that there would be charges brought or hinting at it. I m not sure it was ever actually said. I certainly got the import of the implication. And I suspect the witness got it as well. But it should have been obvious on its face that that was a natural course once the witness testified contrary to the original trial testimony. That, again, did not raise any particular problem. Mr. Sadlowski is a state prisoner. His motivations for wanting to execute a recanting statement could be legion. I don t think that impacted on this petitioner s rights in any fashion. That was a decision made by a witness to protect himself. I think he had a right to protect himself. I think he took steps to protect himself. In further consideration his motivation would have exposed him to further criminal liability. Counsel at one point suggested that I weigh the seriousness of his exposure to the petitioner s exposure. I think I suggested on the record at that point that that would be an improper consideration for me to make since everyone s rights had to be determined in their own context. Having said that, I don t think that the existence of that note of recantation plays an impact, plays a role in these proceedings in any fashion. They were withdrawn properly pursuant to the statute. I m satisfied that the Court need give no further consideration to that issue. [(emphasis supplied).] This appeal followed. That Sadlowski s post-trial recantation is nothing more than impeaching or contradictory to his trial testimony brooks no argument and, hence, cannot meet the first and threshold test in the determination of whether new evidence is newly-discovered evidence sufficient to justify a new trial. See ibid. It is precisely because of the more stringent test we apply for newly discovered evidence, ibid., as the majority correctly acknowledges, See footnote 24 ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 38-39), that we generally regard recantation testimony as suspect and untrustworthy [and c]onsequently, the burden of proof rests on those presenting such testimony to establish that is it probably true and the trial testimony probably false. State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427 (1976) (citations omitted). We have consistently held that [t]he test for the judge in evaluating a recantation upon a motion for a new trial is whether it casts serious doubt upon the truth of the testimony given at the trial and whether, if believable, the factual recital of the recantation so seriously impugns the entire trial evidence as to give rise to the conclusion that there resulted a possible miscarriage of justice. His first duty is, therefore, to determine whether the recanting statement is believable. [Ibid. (citing State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 107-08 (1965)).] The PCR court found that Sadlowski s motivations for wanting to execute a recantation could be legion. That finding, coupled with the PCR court s rejection of Sadlowski s recantation as a whole, leads to the conclusion that the PCR court did not find Sadlowski s recantation believable. Our inquiry should proceed no further. That result does not change even if one considers this application within the context of a petition for post-conviction relief. We recently held that, while we are not bound by and give no deference to the legal conclusions of the PCR court[,] . . . we give deference to the trial court s factual findings . . . when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The uncontroverted facts are that the State neither threatened nor forced Sadlowski to withdraw his recantation: in response to the direct question Did anybody force you, threaten you to withdraw this statement?, Sadlowski s response was a straightforward and unequivocal No. Coupling Sadlowski s response with the uncontested finding that Sadlowski s recantation withdrawal was the product of his own concerns and discussions with his counsel, the conclusion that Sadlowski acted as a result of some form of blameworthy prosecutorial interference simply crumbles. Regardless of whether viewed as a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence or as a petition for post-conviction relief, the construct founded on the claim that the prosecutor substantially interfered with Sadlowski s decision to testify simply is without basis in this record. For that reason, the decision today is, at its core, flawed. [ N.J. Const. art. III, 1.] The doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental principle of our State government. Communications Workers of Am. v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 449 (1992). And, Article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution contemplates that each branch of government will exercise fully its own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfully belonging to a cognate branch. Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 388 (1981). In a conceptually indistinguishable context -- whether the executive has the discretion to charge a person suspected of a criminal offense - - we made clear that [t]he constitutional principle of separation of powers discourages judicial review of the decisions of the executive branch of government. State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 265 (1990); see also In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. 342, 353 (1985) (holding that [a]ny decision by the Attorney General s office not to present this matter to a grand jury involves a discretionary determination by the executive branch ). Simply said, the discretionary power to grant immunity rests exclusively in the executive, and not the judiciary. If the executive chooses to exercise that power, our courts are required to issue an order of immunity. In the absence of that election by the executive, our courts are powerless to grant immunity. The correctness of the separation of powers limitation on this Court s power to grant immunity is not disputed by the majority. It is in tacit acknowledgement of that limitation that the majority does not directly order the grant of immunity in this case but, instead, gives the State the choice of either granting Sadlowski immunity or suffering the loss of Sadlowski s trial testimony in its entirety. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 38-39). That procedure seeks to accomplish indirectly what cannot be done directly. Acknowledging that the State has already refused to grant Sadlowski testimonial immunity, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 14), the majority asserts that it will not compel the State to grant Sadlowski testimonial immunity. If it does not, however, [the majority] direct[s] the PCR court to disregard Sadlowski s trial testimony in full. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 39). There is no basis for that result. Even if this Court has the inherent power to grant immunity, no prior authority from this Court, and singularly few cases from our lower courts, even address that proposition. That paucity of authority alone is more than sufficient cause to tread lightly. Indeed, only one case from our Law Division even purports to recognize that our courts have the inherent power to grant use immunity to a defense witness in order to vindicate both the witness Fifth Amendment rights and the defendant s due process rights. State v. Summers, 197 N.J. Super. 510, 514 (Law Div. 1984). Yet, even in that case the request for judicial immunity was denied. The court explained that [t]he availability of such relief is limited only to those appropriate circumstances when it is truly required by due process. Id. at 516. The court nonetheless held that the requested immunity is an extraordinary one, which should only be granted in the clearest of circumstances. Defendant s claim does not approach the required standards. Id. at 518. Less than one month after State v. Summers was approved for publication, the Appellate Division explicitly rejected its reasoning, explaining that [a] trial court has recently stated that a judge in certain circumstances may be required by due process considerations to grant a witness called by a defendant use immunity. But prior cases indicated that a judge does not have power to grant use immunity. Rather the procedure for a witness to obtain such immunity is statutory. [State v. Jordan, 197 N.J. Super. 489, 504 n.5 (App. Div. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis suppled).] See also State v. Cito, 213 N.J. Super. 296, 301-02 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 141 (1987) (describing view that court has inherent power to grant use immunity to a defense witness who claims the Fifth Amendment privilege as a minority position that does not prevail[] in the State of New Jersey ). It cannot be said more plainly: there simply is no precedent for the extraordinary step the majority takes today and, to the contrary, every precedent in this State specifically eschews what this Court orders. NO. A-63 SEPTEMBER TERM 2003 ON REMAND FROM Law Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICHARD FEASTER (now known as SEAN PADRAIC KENNEY), Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 14, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto By way of contrast, had the roles been reversed and the questioning of Sadlowski been carried out by agents of the State, we likely would have required that the statement be preceded by the explanation and waiver of Sadlowski s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966): that Sadlowski had the right to remain silent; that if he surrendered that right, what he said could be used against him; that he had a right to have counsel present during either of those interviews; and that if he could not afford counsel, counsel could be appointed free of charge.