Title: Coots v. Isbell

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

552 So. 2d 139 (1989)
Daniel G. COOTS, as Administrator of the Estate of Sheila K. Coots, Deceased
v.
Dr. John B. ISBELL III, et al.
88-541.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 29, 1989.
Stephen D. Heninger of Heninger, Burge & Vargo, Birmingham, for appellant.
Patrick M. Lamar of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, Huntsville, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
This medical malpractice case was filed by Sheila K. Coots against Dr. John B. Isbell III, Dr. Blake Isbell, and Isbell Clinic, P.A., in DeKalb County, Alabama. Mrs. Coots's claim was based on the alleged negligence of the defendants in failing to *140 diagnose a malignant tumor in her rectum while she was an obstetrical patient. Mrs. Coots died prior to trial, and her husband, Daniel G. Coots, was made administrator of her estate and was substituted as the proper party plaintiff. The case was tried before a jury during the week of October 17, 1988, and resulted in a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on October 26, 1988, alleging juror misconduct and deprivation of complete cross-examination of defendants' medical expert witnesses, and alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. A hearing was held before the trial judge on December 21, 1988, in which testimony was taken from witnesses and by submission of affidavits. The motion for a new trial was denied, and plaintiff appealed.
Mrs. Coots was an obstetrical patient of the defendants, who had delivered both of her children. It is the plaintiff's contention that during her second pregnancy (the child was delivered February 7, 1985) she was under the care of the defendants, and that while under their care she reported to them repeated episodes of rectal bleeding, abnormal abdominal pressure, and severe constipation. The records of the Isbell Clinic and the Baptist Medical Center in Fort Payne, Alabama, indicate no such complaints, however, until six weeks after the delivery of the second child.
In May 1985, Mrs. Coots saw a general surgeon about her continued rectal bleeding. She was diagnosed by Dr. Alex Walker as having a rectal tumor. The tumor was removed May 30, 1985; she died on January 7, 1987.
At the trial, expert testimony was presented by both sides on the issue of proper obstetrical care and the use of rectal examinations; the grade and size of the tumor; and the likelihood of Mrs. Coots's survival with earlier detection of the tumor. The factual issue of whether Mrs. Coots had made complaints to the defendants concerning rectal problems prior to the birth of her second child was contested. Although Mrs. Coots had died before trial, a videotape of her testimony was presented to the jury. The case was submitted to the jury in the early afternoon of October 20, 1988. The jury was sent home at approximately 6:30 p.m. and returned to deliberate the next morning. The jury returned a verdict after 45 minutes of deliberation on October 21, 1988.
Two issues are presented on appeal.
The first question is whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on allegations of juror misconduct. The plaintiff contends that after the trial one of the jurors, Eldon Lanier, told plaintiff's attorneys that during the overnight recess he had contacted a physician who was not a witness in the case to inquire about the standard of care to be used in examining an obstetrical patient.
We examined the question of when juror misconduct justifies the granting of a new trial in Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 655 (Ala.1984), where we stated the rule to be as follows:
447 So. 2d  at 658. In determining that a new trial should have been granted in Whitten, the Court reviewed the affidavits and testimony in the case and determined that the jurors were prejudiced by the unauthorized viewing of the scene of the accident and by the subsequent discussions about those views. In each of the cases in which we have held that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial, there has been a common factorthe existence of juror misconduct that could have affected the verdict. See Hallmark v. Allison, 451 So. 2d 270 (Ala.1984); Jones v. McMonigal, 409 So. 2d 1381 (Ala.1982); Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Ry., 341 So. 2d 671 (Ala.1977).
*141 The trial judge in this case held a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a new trial on December 21, 1988. At that hearing, testimony was taken from two jurors, as well as two of the attorneys for the plaintiff. In addition, affidavits were submitted by the defense from other jurors who sat on the case, as well as from two doctors named "Wood." The trial judge denied the motion for new trial on January 3, 1989. His order, which contained findings of fact, read as follows:
"It is not necessary, however, for the court to rule upon the admissibility of Attorneys Cooper and Hutcheson's testimony, for even if it is admitted and accorded great weight, it is not conclusive on the inquiry. The evidence as a whole convinces the court that juror Lanier did not consult with Dr. Wood in spite of *142 statements he may have made that he did.
"DATED JANUARY 3, 1989.
It is well established that a ruling on a new trial motion rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness, which will not be disturbed by this Court unless some legal right is abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial judge to be in error. Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d 1357 (Ala.1986). The trial judge had the unique opportunity to view the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. He made a ruling based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence before him.
The plaintiff relies upon a transcript that was admitted into evidence and that purports to be of a meeting between juror Eldon Lanier and attorneys Cooper and Hutcheson. In this meeting juror Lanier related that he had made contact with another doctor, as had another juror. The transcript had been typed from a tape of the meeting; although there was testimony by Cooper's legal secretary that this was an accurate transcript, the tape itself was never located and presented into evidence. During his testimony before the trial judge, juror Lanier denied making this statement.
Affidavits were presented by the defense from the foreman and five of the jurors who served on the jury panel. The affidavits are all identical in substance. The affidavit of juror Brian K. Blansit is as follows:
"On October 21, 1988 the jury reconvened. After a short discussion the one undecided juror stated that he had changed his mind and had decided to join in the verdict for the defendants. The *143 foreman then determined that the other eleven jurors were still decided in favor of the defendants and the verdict was reported to the bailiff.
R. 795-96.
We have carefully examined the record in this case. The evidence is insufficient to prove that there was juror misconduct that indicates bias or corruption or that affected the verdict. Furthermore, the evidence is insufficient to find that extraneous facts were considered by the jury.
The second question presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in not allowing plaintiff's counsel to examine medical experts on the fact that they were also insured by the defendants' professional liability carrier. In the case of Otwell v. Bryant, 497 So. 2d 111 (Ala.1986), this Court looked at the question of "whether testimony that the defense's medical experts belonged to the same mutual liability insurance carrier should have been allowed." Id. at 113. Otwell was also a medical malpractice action against a physician and his medical group. The trial court had granted a motion in limine that prohibited questioning of medical expert witnesses with regard to the existence and source of medical malpractice insurance.
In Otwell we traced the general rule that a plaintiff may not ordinarily introduce evidence showing that the defendant has liability insurance, but recognized that the trial court has the discretion to admit evidence to show the bias, prejudice, or interest of a witness, as follows:
497 So. 2d  at 113.
In holding that evidence that the medical experts were insured by the same professional liability carrier was inadmissible, we wrote the following:
497 So. 2d  at 115.
We have carefully examined the record in this case. The testimony of the medical experts reflects that the potential for bias *144 on their part was so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.
On the basis of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.