Title: State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene County Board of Commissioners

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3423 
THE STATE EX REL. THE CITY OF XENIA, APPELLEE, v. GREENE COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., Slip 
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3423.] 
Annexation—Mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel county board of 
commissioners to grant city’s annexation petition—Board failed to show 
that city’s petition does not satisfy R.C. 709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7)—
Court of appeals’ judgment granting writ of mandamus ordering board to 
approve city’s petition affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1791—Submitted May 12, 2020—Decided June 25, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, 
No. 2018CA0021, 2019-Ohio-4805. 
_________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an annexation case concerning roughly 45 acres of land located 
between the city of Xenia and Central State University.  The Second District Court 
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of Appeals granted the city’s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Greene 
County Board of Commissioners (“the county”) to approve the city’s annexation 
petition.  The county has appealed, arguing that a writ of mandamus cannot compel 
it to grant the city’s petition because, it says, it relied on its discretion in denying 
the petition and performed all its statutorily required duties.  The county also argues 
that the city’s petition falls short of the statutory requirements for approval.  For 
the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In Ohio, “annexation is strictly a statutory process.”  In re Petition to 
Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon, 64 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 597 N.E.2d 463 (1992).  
The General Assembly comprehensively reformed Ohio’s annexation processes in 
2001 with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 621 (“S.B. 
5”).  See State ex rel. Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 3 (discussing 
the legislation).  S.B. 5 established three procedures “allow[ing] for expedited 
annexations when all the property owners within a parcel to be annexed sign an 
annexation petition.”  Id.  The three procedures are referred to as expedited type-1, 
type-2, and type-3 annexations.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
{¶ 3} This appeal involves a type-2 annexation, which is governed by R.C. 
709.023.  In a type-2 annexation, “the residents of the territory become residents of 
both the township and the municipality, subject to the taxes of both, and potentially 
able to receive services from either.”  Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees at ¶ 7 (citing R.C. 
709.023(H)).  A type-2 annexation petition must be filed with the clerk of the board 
of county commissioners.  R.C. 709.023(B).  After the petition is filed, the 
municipal corporation to which annexation is proposed must adopt an ordinance or 
resolution specifying what services it will provide to the territory proposed for 
annexation and when it will provide them.  R.C. 709.023(C).  A township or 
municipal corporation that opposes the proposed annexation may file objections 
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with the board.  R.C. 709.023(D).  If objections are filed, the board must “review 
[the petition] to determine if each of the following conditions” are satisfied: 
 
(1) 
The petition meets all the requirements set forth in, 
and was filed in the manner provided in, section 709.021 of the 
Revised Code. 
(2) 
The persons who signed the petition are owners of 
the real estate located in the territory proposed for annexation and 
constitute all of the owners of real estate in that territory. 
(3) 
The territory proposed for annexation does not 
exceed five hundred acres. 
(4) 
The territory proposed for annexation shares a 
contiguous boundary with the municipal corporation to which 
annexation is proposed for a continuous length of at least five per 
cent of the perimeter of the territory proposed for annexation. 
(5) 
The annexation will not create an unincorporated 
area of the township that is completely surrounded by the territory 
proposed for annexation. 
(6) 
The municipal corporation to which annexation is 
proposed has agreed to provide to the territory proposed for 
annexation the services specified in the relevant ordinance or 
resolution adopted under division (C) of this section. 
(7) 
If a street or highway will be divided or segmented 
by the boundary line between the township and the municipal 
corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the municipal 
corporation to which annexation is proposed has agreed as a 
condition of the annexation to assume the maintenance of that street 
or highway or to otherwise correct the problem. 
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R.C. 709.023(E). 
{¶ 4} A board of county commissioners must grant a petition that satisfies 
all the conditions and must deny a petition that does not.  R.C. 709.023(F).  
Although “[t]here is no appeal in law or equity from the board’s entry of any 
resolution under this section,” a party may request “a writ of mandamus to compel 
the board * * * to perform its duties * * *.”  R.C. 709.023(G). 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 5} In September 2017, the city filed a type-2 annexation petition with the 
county seeking approval to annex roughly 45.6 acres of territory located in Xenia 
Township.  The city owns approximately 41.1 acres of the territory proposed for 
annexation, and its ownership interest consists of a narrow strip of land used for a 
bicycle path.  The path runs outward from the city in a northeasterly direction, 
where it ends adjacent to the remaining roughly 4.5 acres of the territory proposed 
for annexation—a triangular-shaped parcel owned by Central State University.  A 
report prepared by the city’s staff explained that the city would benefit from the 
annexation by receiving income-tax revenue from Central State University’s 
employees and contractors and that Central State University, in turn, would benefit 
by becoming a recipient of the city’s services.  Central State University consented 
to the city’s proposal to annex the 4.5-acre parcel. 
{¶ 6} The township trustees urged the county to deny the petition, which the 
county did after determining that the city’s petition did not satisfy R.C. 
709.023(E)(1), (4), (5), or (7).  The city then filed an original action in the court of 
appeals requesting a writ of mandamus ordering the county to approve the petition.  
The court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment, granted the city’s 
motion for summary judgment, and issued the writ.  The county has appealed.  The 
Ohio Township Association has filed an amicus brief in support of the county, and 
the Ohio Municipal League has filed an amicus brief in support of the city. 
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III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶ 7} For a writ of mandamus to issue in a type-2 setting, the relator must 
establish that it has a clear legal right to the requested relief by showing that it 
satisfies the conditions necessary for annexation.  State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone 
Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 
N.E.3d 404, ¶ 26.  If the relator can show that it satisfies the conditions, a board of 
county commissioners has a clear legal duty to approve the annexation.  Id.  
Because R.C. 709.023(G) authorizes an action in mandamus, a court need not 
consider whether the relator lacks an adequate remedy at law.  Id. 
{¶ 8} This court exercises de novo review in an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment.  Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio 
St.3d 193, 2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8.  Summary judgment may be 
granted only when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) upon viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach 
only a conclusion adverse to the nonmoving party.  Id. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 9} Our analysis proceeds in two parts.  We first address the county’s 
claim that a writ of mandamus is an improper vehicle to compel it to grant the city’s 
petition.  We then address the county’s claim that the city’s petition fails to satisfy 
the conditions specified in R.C. 709.023(E). 
A.  Whether a writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to compel the county to grant 
the city’s petition 
{¶ 10} A writ of mandamus is a command directing the “performance of an 
act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or 
station.”  R.C. 2731.01.  A writ cannot compel the exercise of a permissive act.  
State ex rel. Hodges v. Taft, 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 591 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).  Nor can 
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it “issue to control an officer’s exercise of discretion, but it can be issued to compel 
him to exercise it when he has a clear legal duty to do so.”  Id. 
{¶ 11} The county claims that mandamus does not lie because it applied its 
discretion under R.C. 709.023(E) in denying the city’s petition.  Because a board 
of county commissioners is a statutory creation, with only “such power and 
jurisdiction as are conferred expressly by statutory enactment,” State ex rel. Shriver 
v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 148 Ohio St. 277, 74 N.E.2d 248 (1947), 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, the county must locate its claimed 
discretionary powers in the text of division (E)’s seven conditions.  We discern no 
such powers here.  Division (E)’s seven conditions are tightly written legal rules 
requiring straightforward application, see, e.g., R.C. 709.023(E)(3) (“The territory 
proposed for annexation [must] not exceed five hundred acres”), not open-ended 
standards permitting a “power of free decision or choice within certain legal 
bounds” or a “latitude of decision [to] decide[] questions * * * not expressly 
controlled by fixed rules of law,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
647 (1993) (defining “discretion”).  Tellingly, the county does not develop an 
argument centered on division (E)’s seven conditions that shows otherwise.1 
{¶ 12} Had the General Assembly intended to confer discretion on a board 
of county commissioners in a type-2 setting, it would not have been difficult to use 
wording to that effect.  Under what we have termed the “traditional” method of 
annexation, Sugarcreek Twp. v. Centerville, 133 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-4649, 
979 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 3, a board must consider whether “the general good of the 
                                                          
 
1. The county argues for the first time in its reply brief that it performed a ministerial act when it 
reviewed the petition, determined that it did not satisfy all of R.C. 709.023(E)’s conditions, and 
denied it.  That argument is not only in tension with the county’s claim in its merit brief that it 
exercised discretion in reviewing the petition, applying division (E), and denying the petition, see 
Maloney v. Rhodes, 45 Ohio St.2d 319, 322, 345 N.E.2d 407 (1976) (distinguishing a discretionary 
act from a ministerial act)—the argument is also tardy, see Corrigan v. Illum. Co., 151 Ohio St.3d 
85, 2017-Ohio-7555, 86 N.E.3d 287, ¶ 11, fn. 1 (disregarding an argument raised for the first time 
in a reply brief). 
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territory proposed to be annexed will be served” by the annexation, R.C. 
709.033(A)(5).  Interpreting virtually identical language found in R.C. 709.033’s 
predecessor, we observed that such language presents a “question of fact within the 
discretion of the board.”  In re Annexation of 118.7 Acres in Miami Twp. to 
Moraine, 52 Ohio St.3d 124, 132, 556 N.E.2d 1140 (1990).  Division (E)’s seven 
conditions do not contain this type of open-ended language. 
{¶ 13} Turning from the statutory text to our caselaw, we observed in Butler 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees that S.B. 5 put “in place firm standards to govern the 
consideration of annexation petitions * * *.”  112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 
858 N.E.2d 1193, at ¶ 8.  And in Natl. Lime & Stone, we explained that when a 
type-2 annexation petition satisfies all seven of division (E)’s conditions, a board 
“has no discretion to deny the petition” and a writ of mandamus will issue.  152 
Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, at ¶ 2.  The boards in those two 
cases did not raise precisely the same argument that the county is raising here, but 
we see no reason why the logic of those two decisions does not apply here. 
{¶ 14} The county next contends that mandamus does not lie because it 
performed all its statutorily imposed duties.  It points to division (G), which 
provides that a party may pursue relief in mandamus to “compel the board of county 
commissioners to perform its duties under this section,” R.C. 709.023(G).  In the 
county’s view, it performed its statutory duties when it reviewed the petition, 
determined that it does not comply with the statutory conditions, and adopted a 
resolution denying it.  See R.C. 709.023(E) and (F). 
{¶ 15} The county’s argument fails under Natl. Lime & Stone.  There, a 
board of county commissioners denied a mining company’s type-2 annexation 
petition.  The company then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court 
of appeals to compel the board to grant the petition, which the court of appeals 
dismissed.  We reversed and granted the writ, determining that the company had 
satisfied division (E)’s conditions.  As we explained, when a relator satisfies all the 
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statutory conditions, it establishes a “clear legal right to the requested relief and a 
clear legal duty on the part of the commissioners to provide it,” meaning that a 
board “must grant the annexation.”  Id. at ¶ 32 (citing R.C. 709.023(F) and (G)).  It 
follows from Natl. Lime & Stone that the county’s performance of its three 
statutorily imposed duties does not, on its own, foreclose the possibility that the 
county could be compelled to grant the city’s petition in a mandamus action.  
Indeed, if the county were correct here, we would not have reversed the court of 
appeals’ judgment and granted the writ in Natl. Lime & Stone. 
B.  Whether the city’s petition satisfies the conditions of R.C. 709.023(E) 
{¶ 16} The county claims that the city’s petition fails to satisfy four of the 
seven conditions specified in R.C. 709.023(E).  We address the conditions in turn. 
1.  Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(1) 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(1), a petition must “meet[] all the 
requirements set forth in” and be “filed in the manner” prescribed by R.C. 709.021.  
R.C. 709.021(A) provides: 
 
When a petition signed by all of the owners of real estate in 
the unincorporated territory of a township proposed for annexation 
requests the annexation of that territory to a municipal corporation 
contiguous to that territory under one of the special procedures 
provided for annexation in sections 709.022, 709.023, and 709.024 
of the Revised Code, the annexation proceedings shall be conducted 
under those sections to the exclusion of any other provisions of this 
chapter unless otherwise provided in this section or the special 
procedure section chosen. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 18} The word “contiguous” in R.C. 709.021(A) is undefined by statute, 
leading the county to argue that the word should be understood according to the 
contiguity principles we announced in Middletown v. McGee, 39 Ohio St.3d 284, 
530 N.E.2d 902 (1988), a pre-S.B. 5 decision that addressed whether a territory 
proposed for annexation was contiguous with the annexing municipality.  We 
observed in McGee that although “the law is unsettled as to what degree of touching 
is needed to fulfill the contiguity requirement,” there “is general[] agree[ment] that 
some touching of the municipality and the territory to be annexed is required.”  Id. 
at 287.  We explained that Ohio courts had looked with disfavor on the “use of 
connecting strips of land to meet the contiguity requirement when annexing 
outlying territory not otherwise connected to the municipality.  Such annexations 
are usually referred to as ‘strip, shoestring, subterfuge, corridor, and gerrymander 
annexations.’ ”  Id., quoting Watson v. Doolittle, 10 Ohio App.2d 143, 148-149, 
226 N.E.2d 771 (6th Dist.1967).  Applying these principles, we concluded that a 
section of the territory proposed for annexation, which included a strip of roadway 
that extended outward from the annexing municipality for several miles, could not 
lawfully be annexed, because it was “not sufficiently contiguous” to the 
municipality.  Id. at 288. 
{¶ 19} The county asserts that because R.C. 709.023(E)(1) incorporates 
R.C. 709.021, a type-2 annexation petition must conform to McGee’s contiguity 
principles.  The city responds that the sole contiguity requirement in a type-2 setting 
lies in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), which requires that the territory proposed for annexation 
have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of “at least five per 
cent” of the territory’s perimeter.  We conclude that McGee does not apply here. 
{¶ 20} As McGee itself makes clear, the General Assembly had not, at the 
time we decided that case, defined the word “contiguous” for the purpose of 
applying Ohio’s annexation statutes.  That statutory silence led us to draw from the 
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caselaw in determining the minimum degree of touching necessary for a territory 
and an annexing municipality to be contiguous.  See id. at 287. 
{¶ 21} Here, in contrast, the General Assembly has defined the minimum 
degree of touching necessary in a type-2 setting.  As set forth in R.C. 709.023(E)(4), 
the territory proposed for annexation must have a boundary contiguous to the 
annexing municipality for a “continuous length of at least five per cent” of the 
territory’s perimeter.  See also Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Canal Fulton, 185 
Ohio App.3d 267, 2009-Ohio-6822, 923 N.E.2d 1180, ¶ 38-40 (5th Dist.) (rejecting 
the view that a type-2 annexation petition must satisfy contiguity requirements in 
addition to those prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4)); 1 Gotherman, Babbitt & Lang, 
Baldwin’s Ohio Practice: Local Government Law—Municipal, Section 2.19, at 3 
(Sept. 2019) (“territory that is a ‘balloon on a string’ may nevertheless be annexed 
using the expedited type-2 annexation process provided that the territory shares a 
contiguous boundary with the municipal corporation for a continuous length of at 
least 5% of the perimeter of the territory”).  It follows that applying McGee’s 
contiguity principles in a type-2 case would render meaningless the specific 
contiguity limitations embodied in R.C. 709.023(E)(4).  See In re Adoption of M.B., 
131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 19 (disfavoring an 
interpretation that renders a statute meaningless); R.C. 1.47(B) (“The entire statute 
is intended to be effective”). 
{¶ 22} Another problem with the county’s argument is that it is in tension 
with our decision in Natl. Lime & Stone, 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 
N.E.3d 404.  There, we considered whether each of the seven conditions applicable 
in a type-2 setting were satisfied.  Not once did we refer to McGee’s contiguity 
principles in determining whether the territory proposed for annexation was 
contiguous with the annexing municipality.  Instead, we simply performed the 
analysis prescribed by R.C. 709.023(E)(4), determining that the territory proposed 
for annexation was sufficiently contiguous because it “share[d] a contiguous 
January Term, 2020 
 
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boundary of at least 5 percent of the territory’s perimeter.”  Natl Lime & Stone at  
¶ 30.  To be sure, Natl. Lime & Stone does not squarely resolve the argument that 
the county raises here.  But even so, it would be hard to characterize the above 
language of Natl. Lime & Stone as dicta because its contiguity analysis was 
essential to the judgment.2 
{¶ 23} The county urges this court to apply State ex rel. Overholser 
Builders, L.L.C. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2007 CA 
36, 2008-Ohio-6338, ¶ 37-39, a decision holding that McGee’s contiguity 
principles apply to type-1 annexation petitions filed under R.C. 709.022.  But 
Overholser Builders does not apply here, because the city filed its annexation 
petition under R.C. 709.023, not R.C. 709.022. 
{¶ 24} In summary, we hold that R.C. 709.023(E)(4) establishes the sole 
contiguity requirement in a type-2 setting.  Because the county does not otherwise 
contend that the city’s petition departs from R.C. 709.023(E)(1), we conclude that 
the petition satisfies the requirements of that provision. 
2.  Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4) 
{¶ 25} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(4), the territory proposed for annexation 
must have a boundary contiguous with the municipal corporation of at least 5 
percent of the territory’s perimeter.  The city attested to the court of appeals that 
the territory proposed for annexation has a perimeter of 36,302.11 feet and has a 
boundary contiguous with the city of 1,929.14 feet, equating to a shared boundary 
of roughly 5.31 percent of the territory’s perimeter.  For its part, the county attested 
that the territory proposed for annexation has a perimeter of 38,317.34 feet and has 
a boundary contiguous with the city of 1,929.14 feet, equating to a shared boundary 
of roughly 5.03 percent of the territory’s perimeter.  The court of appeals 
                                                          
 
2. Our decision in Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees does not require a different result.  There, we observed 
that “balloon-on-a-string annexations can be a significant problem.”  112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-
Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.3d 1193, at ¶ 40.  But we did not hold in that case that they are unlawful under 
R.C. 709.023. 
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determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact about the petition’s 
compliance with R.C. 709.023(E)(4) because, although the parties’ numbers 
slightly diverge, they nevertheless establish that the shared boundary exceeds the 5 
percent threshold. 
{¶ 26} The county now points to a different category of evidence, urging us 
to consider the city’s future plans for annexing additional territory.  Specifically, 
the county cites a city report describing the city’s future plan to annex roughly 159 
acres of territory, at least some of which Central State University has an interest in.  
According to the county, if one were to account for the city’s future annexation 
plans, the shared boundary would fall to 4.29 percent. 
{¶ 27} The problem with the county’s argument is twofold.  First, Ohio law 
directs a board of county commissioners to review a petition to determine whether 
it satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)’s seven conditions, not a municipal corporation’s intent 
to annex additional territory at some indeterminate point in the future.  We decline 
the county’s invitation to rewrite the statute by considering the city’s future plans.  
See State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (1999) (“In construing 
a statute, we may not add or delete words”).  Second, the county’s argument 
conflicts with the statement of facts that it and the city jointly filed below, which 
states, among other things, that the city’s petition seeks to “annex 45.637 acres of 
territory, more or less, in Xenia Township to the City of Xenia.” 
{¶ 28} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(4)’s 
requirements. 
3.  Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5) 
{¶ 29} Under R.C. 709.023(E)(5), the petition must show that the 
“annexation will not create an unincorporated area of the township that is 
completely surrounded by the territory proposed for annexation.”  The county 
claims that the city’s petition does not satisfy this condition because the proposed 
annexation of the bicycle path would create two township islands.  The first area, 
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13 
known as the Green Parcel, is a triangular-shaped parcel that is bounded by the city 
on two sides, with the bicycle path running along the third side.  The second, the 
Douglas Street area, is a quadrilateral-shaped group of parcels that are bounded by 
the city on three sides, with the bicycle path running along the fourth side. 
{¶ 30} The city does not dispute that the proposed annexation would create 
two township islands.  But it correctly points out that R.C. 709.023(E)(5) forbids 
only township islands that are “completely surrounded by the territory proposed for 
annexation,” not islands that are created by the coupling of pre- and post-annexation 
boundaries.  Here, “the territory proposed for annexation” would form merely one 
side of the triangular-shaped island and one side of the quadrilateral-shaped island. 
{¶ 31} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(5)’s 
requirements. 
4.  Whether the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(7) 
{¶ 32} R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that “[i]f a street or highway will be 
divided or segmented by the boundary line between the township and the municipal 
corporation as to create a road maintenance problem, the municipal corporation” 
must have “agreed as a condition of the annexation to assume the maintenance of 
that street or highway or to otherwise correct the problem.” 
{¶ 33} Although the city essentially replicated this language in its petition, 
during deliberations on the petition, one of the county commissioners inquired 
about the scope of the city’s agreement.  The city’s attorney initially responded that 
the city would maintain portions of affected roads that crossed over the bicycle path 
but would not maintain any other portions of the roads, because the city would not 
have jurisdiction over the latter portions.  The attorney later clarified this response, 
saying that the city would comply with “whatever legal requirements” regarding 
road maintenance would apply. 
{¶ 34} The county claims that the attorney’s statements invalidate the city’s 
agreement to assume road-maintenance duties.  But as the court of appeals 
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observed, R.C. 709.023(E)(7) provides that a municipal corporation must agree 
either to “assume the maintenance of th[e] street or highway or to otherwise correct 
the problem.”  (Emphasis added.)  In light of the clause’s disjunctive phrasing, it 
does not matter whether the attorney’s statement undermined the city’s promise to 
assume street-maintenance duties, because the city had agreed “to otherwise correct 
the problem,” id. 
{¶ 35} The county next argues that the city failed to present to the township 
or any agency an agreement concerning road-maintenance issues; however, the 
county cites no law that requires a municipal corporation to do this. 
{¶ 36} Last, the county claims that the city had failed to correct road-
maintenance problems arising from prior annexations.  Thus, the argument runs, 
the city will fail to correct problems arising from the proposed annexation.  This 
argument is speculative, and even if true, it fails to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether the city in fact agreed in its petition to correct 
road-maintenance-related problems. 
{¶ 37} We conclude that the city’s petition satisfies R.C. 709.023(E)(7)’s 
requirements. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Donnette A. Fisher, Director of Law, for appellee. 
Stephen K. Haller, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Elizabeth A. 
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants. 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
 
Frost, Brown, Todd, L.L.C., Philip K. Hartmann, Yazan S. Ashrawi, and 
Christopher D. Thomas; and Garry E. Hunter, General Counsel, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
 
Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Peter N. Griggs, Julia E. Donnan, and 
Jennifer L. Huber, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Township Association. 
_________________