Title: State v. Wood

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

235 Kan. 915 (1984)
686 P.2d 128
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DANIEL ALLEN WOOD, Appellant.
No. 56,154

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 13, 1984.
Robert L. Morse, of Mission, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Joseph E. Cosgrove, Jr., assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Dennis W. Moore, district attorney, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
Daniel Allen Wood appeals his jury trial convictions for aggravated sodomy (K.S.A. 21-3506); aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer (K.S.A. 21-3415); aggravated kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3421); aggravated burglary (K.S.A. 21-3716); aggravated assault (K.S.A. 21-3410); three counts of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer (K.S.A. 21-3411); two counts of rape (K.S.A. 21-3502); and two counts of felony theft (K.S.A. 21-3701).
Highly summarized, the events from which the twelve felony convictions arose commenced on the morning of December 9, 1982, when two Kansas City, Missouri, police officers noticed a suspicious vehicle in their city. The officers activated their emergency equipment and the suspect vehicle sped away. A high-speed chase ensued which ended in Johnson County, Kansas, where the defendant (driver of the fleeing vehicle) forced his way into an apartment, taking the female occupant thereof as hostage. All of the crimes against persons occurred in or near the apartment building. The hostage escaped after several hours of confinement and defendant was then arrested. Additional facts will be stated in the discussion of particular issues as necessary.
The first issue is alleged error in the trial court's refusal to *917 change venue. During the hours the hostage was being held prisoner, there was extensive media coverage devoted to the incident. Public interest in the case remained rather high through the trial.
In State v. Miesbauer, 232 Kan. 291, 654 P.2d 934 (1982), the law relative to trial venue was summarized as follows:
Section Ten of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides:
The record reflects there was no particular difficulty encountered in selecting the jury, the process taking less than a day. Defendant relies only upon media publicity in support of his claim of prejudice herein. As we recently iterated in State v. Richard, 235 Kan. 355, 681 P.2d 612 (1984):
We conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown in the trial court's refusal to change the venue of the trial herein.
For his second issue defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to strike the entire jury panel for cause after a prospective juror indicated she believed the defendant was guilty.
During voir dire examination the State was asking questions about whether any of the pretrial publicity had affected potential jurors. One of the potential jurors was a Ms. Rita Summers who on the day of the incident had been listening to police radio communication on her police radio scanner. The following exchange occurred between Mr. Dennis Moore, prosecuting attorney, Ms. Summers and the court.
"MR. MOORE: Thank you. Very good.
"MR. MOORE: You heard something 
"VENIREWOMAN SUMMERS: Yes.
"VENIREWOMAN SUMMERS: Yes.
"MR. MOORE: I ask that she be excused.
"THE COURT: Mrs. Summers may be excused for cause.
No contemporaneous request to strike the jury panel for taint was made by defense counsel. Ultimately, defense counsel passed the panel for cause.
After the jury had been selected (but not sworn) the jury members and alternates were dismissed until the following morning. Subsequent thereto, but before the jury was sworn the following day, defense counsel moved to dismiss the selected jury for alleged taint from the Summers remark.
We conclude defendant's failure to object contemporaneously, coupled with his affirmative act of passing the jury for cause, waived any complaint defendant may have had relative to the Summers statement. It should also be noted there was never an issue in the trial relative to the identity of the perpetrator of the crimes. The defense centered around the mental capacity of the defendant and whether his acts constituted the crimes charged.
For his third issue defendant contends the rape statute then in effect (K.S.A. 21-3502) unconstitutionally discriminates against men.
At the time of the incidents herein, the operative Kansas rape law was found at K.S.A. 21-3502 which defined rape as being a sexual act committed by a man against a woman not his wife. This same challenge was raised and rejected by this court in State v. Price, 215 Kan. 718, 529 P.2d 85 (1974), wherein we said:
See Annot., Constitutionality of Rape Laws Limited to Protection of Females Only, 99 A.L.R.3d 129.
Defendant's position on this issue has fared no better before the United States Supreme Court. E.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 67 L. Ed. 2d 437, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981). We conclude this issue is without merit.
The fourth issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to merge the two rape counts into one count of rape. The facts surrounding the two rape counts must be examined carefully. At about 12:15 p.m. defendant forced his way into the victim's apartment. At about 1:00 p.m. defendant forced the victim to disrobe, whereupon he dragged her into the bedroom and raped her. Immediately thereafter defendant ordered the victim to get dressed and they returned to the living room. Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. defendant again ordered the victim to disrobe, raped her in the living room and ordered her to get dressed. The two rapes herein were clearly separate incidents and are readily distinguishable from the facts of the three attempted rape convictions discussed in State v. Dorsey, 224 Kan. 152, 578 P.2d 261 (1978), which the majority of this court held were merged into one attempted rape. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the two rape charges into one.
For his fifth issue defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction on diminished capacity. In his brief defendant concedes:
The court's rationale for rejecting the diminished capacity doctrine was discussed in State v. Dargatz, 228 Kan. 322, 614 P.2d 430 (1980), as follows:
We continue to steadfastly adhere to the M'Naghten test for insanity and to reject the doctrine of diminished or reduced mental capacity as a substitute therefor. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of diminished capacity as requested by the defendant.
The sixth issue is whether the trial court erred in not merging two of the aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer counts into the aggravated assault charge.
After the defendant had holed up in the apartment and taken the occupant thereof hostage, law enforcement officers converged on the area. One of the officers in immediate pursuit had been shot in the hand by the defendant just prior to defendant entering the apartment complex. (The facts relative to this incident will be discussed in greater detail in another issue.) Police officers knew defendant was in an apartment but due to poor acoustics could not ascertain in which of two apartments defendant was located. Detective Kramer and Officer McBride (both Missouri police officers) were in the stairwell talking to defendant trying to get him to surrender. Another officer was also present. Defendant fired a number of shots through the apartment door. Another shot was fired over the head of the hostage who was sitting in a chair which backed up to the apartment wall adjacent to the stairwell. This latter shot carried through the wall and possibly was the one that narrowly missed Detective Kramer. Two of the three aggravated assault charges against a law enforcement officer were predicated upon the shooting into the stairwell incident (door and wall shots). Defendant contends the shot over the hostage's head was an assault on her alone and the fact the bullet narrowly missed an officer on the other side of *922 the wall does not form the basis of an assault charge on the officer.
The question of whether a single act affecting multiple victims constitutes a single or multiple offense has been a matter of considerable debate by courts in this country. See Annot., Single Act Affecting Multiple Victims as Constituting Multiple Assaults or Homicides, 8 A.L.R.4th 960.
In this issue defendant appears to take the position that the shot aimed at the hostage is the only shot involved. The evidence is undisputed numerous shots were fired through the door. This is not a single shot giving rise to multiple victims situation.
The facts herein are distinguishable from those in State v. Duncan, 3 Kan. App.2d 271, 593 P.2d 427 (1979). In Duncan, defendant fired one shot at an officer and two more at the hasp and padlock on a locked door. The defendant was trying to open the door so he could escape when he fired the door shots. He had no reason to suspect there was another officer on the other side of the door. Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. The Court of Appeals held the only assault was of the officer at whom defendant had fired directly. The Duncan opinion held inter alia:
We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to merge two of the aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer counts into the aggravated assault charge.
The seventh issue is related to the sixth issue. In this issue defendant contends the two aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer convictions arising from the stairwell incident are improper because defendant did not know precisely where the officers were located when he fired the shots. In his brief defendant states:
No "pertinent case" is cited. Indeed no authority of any specie in support of defendant's position is stated.
*923 Defendant knew there were police officers in the stairway barring his escape. He fired the shots to injure or frighten them. The fact he did not know precisely where the officers were located is of no consequence. We conclude this issue is without merit.
For his eighth issue defendant contends his convictions for aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer and for the aggravated assaults against law enforcement officers are invalid on the basis the victims were Missouri officers. K.S.A. 22-2404, Kansas' version of the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Law, provides:
Detective Wharton, a Kansas City, Missouri, officer, was in the original pursuing police car which chased defendant from Missouri to Kansas. After defendant's vehicle collided with another automobile, defendant took off running with Detective Wharton in pursuit. Just outside the apartment building defendant turned and shot the officer in the hand.
Defendant concedes Detective Wharton was in "hot pursuit" when he was shot. Defendant contends, however, the officer did not reasonably suspect defendant had committed a crime in Missouri. The record reflects the officer's attention was first directed to defendant by virtue of his vehicle being an expensive late-model Mercedes-Benz convertible located in a low-income area of the city. Additionally the vehicle had only one license plate and Missouri law requires two. When the officers activated their emergency equipment to stop the vehicle, it sped away. During the ensuing high-speed chase the officers learned from a radio dispatcher the vehicle matched the description of a vehicle recently stolen. It is unclear whether the radio dispatch was received while the chase was in Missouri or Kansas. To state the facts is to answer the question raised by this point. Clearly the officers had reason to believe a crime had been committed in their state. The vehicle was in violation of the law by being operated with only one license plate (adequate cause for stopping the vehicle). In addition there were traffic violations occurring during the chase. The added element of the vehicle *924 having been suspected of being stolen is unnecessary to the issue raised.
Offhandedly defendant questions the law enforcement officer status of McBride and Kramer (the officers in the stairwell shooting incident). The pursuit of defendant did not end when he took the hostage and holed up in the apartment  it ended when the defendant was arrested. These officers were a part of the continuing pursuit. We conclude this issue, in its entirety, is without merit.
For his ninth issue defendant contends the officer victims herein had not previously properly identified themselves as law enforcement officers and hence the various convictions for offenses against law enforcement officers were improper. In State v. Bradley, 215 Kan. 642, 527 P.2d 988 (1974), this court held:
With this in mind, we shall look at the facts relative to each officer-victim. Detective Wharton was in plain clothes in an unmarked vehicle. Upon observing defendant's vehicle was only displaying one license plate, emergency equipment (light and siren) was activated. Defendant declined to stop and sped from the scene. A chase ensued at speeds exceeding 100 m.p.h. After defendant's vehicle collided with another automobile, defendant fled the scene on foot with Detective Wharton in pursuit. No conversation occurred between the two. Defendant shot the detective in the hand and ran into a nearby apartment complex. He then forced his way into an apartment, stating he had just shot a cop in the hand. Obviously, there was sufficient evidence from *925 which the jury could have concluded defendant reasonably should have known Detective Wharton was a police officer at the time he fired upon him.
Next we will consider the facts relative to the two stairwell assaults (Detective Kramer and Officer McBride). The detective was in plain clothes; the officer was in uniform. Defendant could not see either officer so their attire is irrelevant. Approximately two hours elapsed between defendant entering the apartment and the shots being fired. During this time these officers and others were trying to talk defendant into surrendering without harming the hostage. It is clear there was abundant evidence from the totality of the circumstances from which the jury could have concluded the defendant reasonably should have known the men in the stairwell were law enforcement officers.
Next we will consider the facts relative to the assault on Officer Baldwin. This officer was a member of the Overland Park Response Team which is a special police group of the genre commonly referred to as a SWAT unit. The officer was clothed in a dark jumpsuit with a dark baseball cap. He was stationed below an evergreen which gave him a view of the window of the apartment involved in the seige. He was armed with a rifle carrying a telescopic sight. At about 4:07 p.m., with some thirty law enforcement officers on the scene, defendant fired shots in the vicinity of the evergreen. At the same time defendant stated he was "going to kill the guy in the bushes." Defendant had been under police seige several hours at the time. We conclude there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude defendant reasonably should have known Officer Baldwin was a law enforcement officer at the time he fired upon him. We find this issue, in its totality, wholly without merit.
For his tenth issue defendant contends the sentences imposed were excessive. All sentences were within the statutory limits. The sentences imposed were as follows: felony theft (the automobile)  3 to 5 years; aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer  5 to 20 years; aggravated kidnapping  life; aggravated burglary  3 to 10 years; aggravated assault (hostage)  3 to 5 years; aggravated assaults of three law enforcement officers  5 to 10 years on each; rape  15 years to life on each of the two counts; felony theft (the gun)  2 to 5 years; and aggravated sodomy  15 years to life. The sentences imposed for aggravated kidnapping, *926 the two rapes, and the aggravated sodomy were ordered to run consecutively.
All sentences are within the statutory limits therefor. There is no contention the trial court did not consider the sentencing criteria set forth in K.S.A. 21-4606. Defendant intentionally endangered the lives of many persons during his crime spree. He terrorized, degraded, and brutally attacked his hostage sexually. The victim finally escaped the nightmare situation by jumping from her upper-floor apartment whereby she was seriously injured. Defendant then aimed his gun at the woman as she tried to crawl away, but retreated when he was fired upon by the police. This scenario was repeated once more before the hostage could crawl to safety. We do not find any error or abuse of discretion in the sentences imposed herein.
All other issues raised by defendant have been considered and are held to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
HOLMES, J., not participating.