Title: JENSEN v. FREMONT MOTORS CODY, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JENSEN v. FREMONT MOTORS CODY, INC.2002 WY 17358 P.3d 322Case Number: 01-210, 01-211Decided: 11/27/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 
   

THOMAS 
JENSEN,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

FREMONT 
MOTORS CODY, INC.,

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

FREMONT 
MOTORS CODY, INC.

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellant(Plaintiff) ,

 
 

v.

 

THOMAS 
JENSEN,

Appellee(Defendant) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing Thomas Jensen:

Daniel M. Fowler of Fowler Schimberg & Flanagan, P.C., 
Denver, CO.

 

Representing Fremont Motors Cody, Inc.:

S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, WY; 
and Timothy H. Scott of Fisher & Phillips, New Orleans, LA.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference.

  

LEHMAN, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Thomas Jensen 
(Jensen) appeals the district court's denial of his request for attorney fees, 
interest, and costs pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104 (LexisNexis 
2001).  
Specifi­cally, Jensen contends that the damages awarded to him at 
trial under his breach of employment contract counterclaim against his former 
employer Fremont Motors Cody, Inc. (Fremont) are wages and, as such, the 
district court was required to award him attorney fees, interest, and 
costs.  Fremont 
cross-appeals the district court's denial of its motions for judg­ment as a 
matter of law and its combined motion for a new trial based on the contention 
that Jensen's conduct clearly showed that he waived any breach of contract.  Further, Fremont 
asserts that the district court's jury instruction pertaining to waiver misled 
and confused the jury.  

 

[¶2]      We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Collectively, the 
parties present five issues on appeal:

 

I.                     
Whether the district court erred in denying Fremont's 
motions for judgment as a matter of law and combined motion for a new trial 
based on the issue of waiver. 

II.                   
Whether the district court erred in failing to give the 
jury Fremont's proposed instruction pertaining to contract waiver, and giving 
the jury a modified waiver instruc­tion.

III.                  
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in 
refus­ing to allow the statutory remedies without a break­down between 
Jensen's wage claim and non-wage claims.

IV.               
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in 
refus­ing to allow the statutory remedies because it deemed Jensen's damages 
to be unliquidated.

V.                 
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law by 
refusing to award "all costs of suit."

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Jensen and John Owen 
(Owen) met in 1984 while both worked at Greiner Ford in Casper.  The two became good 
friends and remained so for many years.  Jensen was an out­standing salesman at 
Greiner Ford selling three times the amount of an average salesman.  In 1992, Owen and 
his two partners, Chuck and Jim Guschewsky, purchased Fremont.  Owen left Greiner 
Ford upon the purchase of Fremont and moved to Cody.  At this time, 
because Jensen was such an outstanding salesman, Owen offered Jensen a job as a 
salesman at Fremont.  
Jensen did not accept Owen's offer of employment.  Rather, Jensen left 
Greiner Ford accepting employment in Denver.  Nevertheless, Owen was not deterred by 
Jensen's rejection and extended a standing offer to Jensen for employment with 
Fremont.  

 

[¶5]      Subsequently, Jensen 
and Owen remained close friends keeping in contact with each other.  In the numerous 
visits and conversations that the two had, Owen repeatedly offered Jensen 
employment as a salesman, which Jensen rejected for various reasons.  However, in January 
of 1995, Jensen and Owen began to have serious discussions about Jensen coming 
to work at Fremont.   On February 28, 1995, Owen wrote a 
letter for Jensen to present to banks in order to secure financing on a 
house.  The 
letter, in relevant part, stated:  "This is to advise you that Tom Jensen's 
employment at Fremont Motors Company in Cody, WY in a sales position will be 
commission and partial guarantee.  In the event that his commissions fall short 
of $8,000 per month, Fremont Motor Company will make up the difference.  Fremont Motors will 
also pay for his move."  No other documentation of this agreement 
exists, or, if it does exist, it was not presented at trial.1  Jensen began his 
employment as a sales manager on April 4, 1995.  

 

[¶6]      Jensen worked as the 
sales manager of Fremont for approximately 28 months, offi­cially resigning 
on July 13, 1997.  
During his employment, Jensen was paid in varying amounts every 
month.  Only on 
six occasions did Jensen's monthly salary meet or exceed $8,000.  Jensen never 
complained about repeatedly being shorted to the other partner of Fremont, Chuck 
Guschewsky, or to Jeanne Orkney, the company's comptroller.  Jensen claimed that 
he did complain to Owen and that Owen repeatedly told him to "hang tough with 
me" and things would get better.  Owen denies that such conversations ever took 
place.

 

[¶7]      Jensen, like many 
other Fremont employees, was given what the parties referred to as an accounts 
receivable account (A/R account). This arrangement allowed Jensen to make 
personal charges with businesses around Cody on accounts, which listed Fremont 
as the debtor.  
Fremont would pay these charges and then deduct the amount from Jensen's 
pay­check at the end of the month.  When Jensen received his paychecks, a sheet 
would be attached to the paycheck which itemized the charges attributed to his 
A/R account.  
Also attached to the check was a statement of how Jensen's salary was 
calculated that period based on each vehicle sold, the profit on each vehicle, 
and his 6% commission for the vehi­cle.  Jensen detached and discarded these 
statements. 

 

[¶8]      Over the term of his 
employment, Jensen's relationship with Owen deteriorated, eventu­ally 
resulting in Jensen's resignation on July 13, 1997.  A balance of 
$4,883.18 remained on Jensen's A/R account when he departed.  As Fremont and its 
accountant were going over the company's books at year end, they discovered that 
Jensen's A/R account was still in exis­tence.  Chuck Guschewsky contacted Jensen at that 
time to determine if Jensen intended to pay off the account.  Jensen assured him 
that he would pay what he owed and requested backup documentation.  However, Jensen 
never made any payment to Fremont.  On April 21, 1998, Fremont filed an action 
against Jensen in Park County Court for the collection of the A/R account.  Jensen then filed a 
counterclaim asserting that he was entitled to additional wages based on the 
$8,000 guarantee and other contract damages.  Jensen further claimed that should he prevail 
in showing wages justly due, he would be entitled to interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of termination, reasonable 
attorney fees, and all costs of suit pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-4-104.  

 

[¶9]      At the time of trial, 
Fremont claimed $4,857.09 was owed on Jensen's A/R account. Jensen claimed 
$66,155.16 in damages including wages, moving expenses, and losses on the sale 
of various homes.  
After a five-day trial, the jury found that Jensen owed $2,912.77 on his 
A/R account.  
Additionally, the jury found that Jensen had a contract with Fremont 
guar­anteeing him $8,000 a month, that Fremont breached that contract, and 
that Jensen was entitled to damages in the amount of $20,496.  Because Jensen was 
awarded damages on his breach of employment contract counterclaim, Jensen made a 
motion for the award of attorney fees, interest, and costs.  The district court 
denied this motion after a brief hearing.  This appeal followed.   

 

[¶10]   In addition, Fremont cross-appeals 
denial of its motions for judgment as a matter of law based on waiver of 
contract issues.  
Fremont made two motions for judgment as a matter of law during the 
course of the proceedings.  The first came at the close of Fremont's case 
in chief.  The 
second motion occurred at the end of the proceedings.  This second motion 
was for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial.  The second motion 
asserted that Jensen failed to present sufficient evidence to create a triable 
jury issue, that Jensen waived any right he had to receive a minimum of $8,000 
per month, and that the jury's verdict was against the weight of evidence.  These motions were 
denied by the district court.

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶11]   Our standard of review related to 
judgment as a matter of law is well known and well stated in John Q. Hammons Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 
1998) (citations omitted):

 

Our standard of 
review is the same whether it arises in the procedural context of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law prior to the submission of the case to the jury 
(formerly, a motion for a directed verdict) or in the context of a renewed 
motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury has returned a verdict 
(formerly, a motion for judgment notwith­standing the verdict).  We undertake a full 
review of the record without deference to the views of the trial court.  The test to be 
applied is whether the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility 
of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can 
be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have 
reached.  We 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and give 
that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence.  When 
the facts permit the drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to 
choose which will be utilized.  Since a judgment as a matter of law deprives 
the party opposing the motion of a determination of the facts by a jury, it 
should be cautiously and sparingly granted.

 

Further, in Poletis our 
standard of review for a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict 
is against the weight of the evidence was set forth.  "In contrast, a 
trial court is vested with broad discretion when ruling on a motion for new 
trial, and we will not overturn the court's decision except for an abuse of that 
discretion."  
Poletis, 954 P.2d  at 1357.

 

[¶12]   The standard of review that we utilize 
for alleged jury instruction error is:

 

In considering the validity of instructions to a jury, we 
must determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately advise the 
jury of the applicable law.  Proper instructions should be clear 
declarations of the pertinent law.  The ruling of a trial court on an instruction 
will not constitute reversible error unless there is a showing of prejudice, 
which connotes a demonstration by the complaining party that the instruction 
misled or confused the jury with respect to the applicable principles of 
law.

 

Ormsby v. Dana Kepner Co. of Wyo. Inc., 997 P.2d 465, 471 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting L.U. Sheep Co., v. 
Board of County Comm'rs of County of Hot Springs,  790 P.2d 663, 672 (Wyo. 
1990) (citations omitted)).  

 

[¶13]   We review determinations concerning 
requests for an award of attorney fees by apply­ing an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Cowardin v. Finnerty, 994 P.2d 335, 337 (Wyo. 
1999) (citing, Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 (Wyo. 
1997); Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 
1993)).   
An abuse of discretion is found only when a court acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  In addition, the 
ultimate issue is whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it 
did.  Cowardin, at 337.

 

[¶14]   We also review apportionment of costs 
issues for an abuse of discretion. The deci­sion of the trial court will not 
be reversed absent proof of such abuse.  Carlson v. Carlson, 
888 P.2d 210, 216 (Wyo. 
1995).    

 

DISCUSSION

 

Denial of the Motions for Judgment 
as a Matter of Law and New Trial 

[¶15]   As stated earlier, Fremont made two 
motions for judgment as a matter of law, the latter motion being coupled with a 
motion for a new trial in the alternative.  Fremont con­tends that the evidence 
presented at trial results in the drawing of only one conclusion, that Jensen 
waived his contract claims.  

 

[¶16]   We have defined waiver as the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right that must be manifested in some 
unequivocal manner.  
Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 392 (Wyo. 
1988).  "While 
the necessary intent for waiver may be implied from conduct, the conduct should 
speak the intent clearly."  Murphy v. 
Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 93 (Wyo. 
1982) (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Pacific Employers 
Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. den. 368 U.S. 822, 82 S. Ct. 41, 7 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1961)).  In addition, we have recognized that the 
three elements of wavier are: 1) an existing right; 2) knowledge of that right; 
and 3) an intent to relinquish it.  Jackson State Bank v. 
Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 
1992) (citing Ramirez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
580 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 
1978)).  The 
only element of waiver truly at issue is Jensen's intent to waive his right to 
make a claim for his asserted wage guarantee.  The party asserting waiver carries the burden 
of proving it.  
Murphy, at 93.  Therefore, Fremont had the obligation of 
proving that Jensen explicitly intended to relinquish his right to payment under 
the contract.  

 

[¶17]   Fremont's theory of waiver is based 
entirely on the assertion that Jensen accepted his paychecks without resigning 
or complaining until Fremont sued for the A/R account balance.  Fremont calls 
attention to many instances of Jensen failing to assert that he was underpaid to 
support the proposition that he waived any right to claim he was shorted.  In essence, Fremont 
contends that it is inconceivable that Jensen would have been underpaid for 22 
out of 28 months and never assert his right to full payment during that time 
period.  

 

[¶18]   In particular, Fremont points to 
testimony that Jensen failed to complain that he had been underpaid after 
receiving his first check, even though his first paycheck came at a time when 
Jensen had not yet moved his family to Cody and Jensen had not yet closed on his 
house.  Fremont 
also proffers in support of its contention Jensen's failure to mention the 
shortage to Owen, Orkney, and Chuck Guschewsky, the company's majority owner, 
along with Orkney's testimony that Jensen never saved the back-up documentation 
pertaining to his commission and A/R account charges.  Fremont also 
directs this court to the fact that Jensen never asserted that the shortfall in 
wages could be offset against any amount that he owed on the A/R account.  Finally, Fremont 
offers Owen's testimony of Jensen's request in May of 1997 that he needed to 
make at least $6,500 a month or his wife was going to move back to Denver.  Nevertheless, our 
review of the record indicates that these matters, besides not clearly speaking 
to Jensen's alleged intent to waive, are all matters in dispute.  

 

[¶19]   For example, we note that evidence 
presented by Jensen showed that Jensen and Owen were close personal friends, and 
that Jensen felt an obligation to help Owen with his newly acquired 
dealership.  
Jensen also testified that he didn't complain about the unpaid wages to 
people other than Owen because he valued his friendship with Owen and because 
Owen assured him that things would get better. Further, Owen asked Jensen not to 
discuss the monthly guarantee with others.  Finally, Owen suggested that over time Jensen 
might become a part owner in the business.  Obviously, these facts permit the drawing of 
more than one inference.  Moreover, as previously recognized, Fremont 
has the applicable burden of proof with respect to the issue of intent.  Murphy, 645 P.2d  at 93.  Therefore, it was properly left to the jury 
to decide which inference to utilize.  Accordingly, we hold that although the 
evidence is conflicting, such evidence was certainly sufficient to warrant a 
conclusion by the jury that Jensen did not waive his contract claims.

 

[¶20]   Indeed, even if we were to expressly 
disregard Jensen's testimony, we would not find waiver.  A thorough 
explanation of "intent to waive" is given in 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 209 (2000).  This section 
explains, "mere silence is no waiver unless there is an obligation to speak, or 
if the silence or inaction is for so long a period as to show intention to yield 
a known right" (footnotes omitted).  We cannot point to a single instance where we 
have held that mere silence and delay in asserting a claim without more 
constitutes the unequivocal manifestation of intent required for a 
claim of waiver.  
To the contrary, we have held that simply failing to commence an action 
sooner does not mean that a plaintiff waives any right that he had.  Flygare v. Brundage, 76 Wyo. 350, 302 P.2d 759, 764 
(1956).  As 
stated above, Jensen offered a wide range of reasons why he did not earlier 
commence an action against Fremont. 

 

[¶21]   Furthermore, a portion of Jensen's 
claim was brought under the wage act for wages due.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-507 (LexisNexis 2001).  In NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 925 (Wyo. 
1989), we indicated that the interpretation of wage act sections must be in pari materia to synthesize the common purpose and 
intent regarding the collection of unpaid wages.  Pursuant to § 24-4-507,2 an employer 
must fully pay the wages provided by contract, and payment of any lower amount 
is unlawful.  
An employee that sues for wages upon termination and establishes in court 
the amount justly due is also provided with the right to eighteen percent 
interest, attorney fees, and all costs of suit.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104(b) (LexisNexis 
2001).  This 
statute surely manifests the importance of the right to the prompt, full payment 
of wages.

 

[¶22]   Finally, other jurisdictions have held 
that waivers of statutory rights are not favored.  Hoehne v. Sherrodd, 
Inc., 668 P.2d 232, 235 (Mont. 1983); Holden & 
Martin Lumber Co. v. Stuart, 108 A.2d 387, 389 (Vt. 1954); Worley v. Johnson, 53 So. 543, 545 (Fla. 1910).  Fur­ther, 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 214 (2000) explains 
that statutory rights should ordinarily be waived only by clear affirmative 
words or actions.  
We have held that a person may not generally waive a statutory or 
constitutional right enacted for the benefit of that per­son if public 
interests are jeopardized.  Taylor v. State, 
612 P.2d 851, 861 (Wyo. 
1980).  Public 
interests are clearly involved here.  To hold that remaining at a job when not paid 
what you are owed waives a right to assert a statutorily given right defies 
common sense.  
A person getting less than the agreed wage should not have to 
affirmatively object to an employer that might fire them in order to benefit 
from the rights provided by the wage statute.   

 

[¶23]   Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the successful party and giving that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, we hold that the 
district court did not err in denying the motions for judgment as a matter of 
law.  For the 
same reasons, we likewise hold that the district court's denial of the motion 
for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.  Again, there was sufficient evidence to find 
that there had been no waiver of claim.

 

Jury 
Instruction Issues 

 

[¶24]   Fremont argues that the waiver 
instruction given by the trial court misled and con­fused the jury.  The waiver 
instruction offered by Fremont was identical to an Arizona Civil Pattern Jury 
Instruction.  
The instruction as offered by Fremont read:

            
A party to a contract may waive the other party's duty to perform.  "Performance" 
refers to what a party agreed to do as his part of the contract.

            
Waiver is an express, voluntary, and intentional relin­quishment of a 
known right, or it is conduct that shows an intentional relinquishment of that 
right.

            
A waiver may be expressly stated by a party, or 
it may be implied by or inferred from actions taken by a party that are 
inconsistent with an intention to assert a particular contractual right.

            

Similarly, by knowingly and unconditionally accepting 
defective performance, a party has waived any objection to it.

            
If Defendant waived a promised performance, then the Plaintiff is no 
longer bound to perform on that promise and Defendant is not entitled to damages 
for that particular non-performance.

            
Plaintiff has the burden of proving waiver by preponder­ance of the 
evidence.  

 

The trial court modified the instruction by eliminating the 
italicized portions above.  Fremont does not complain about the language 
actually contained in the subject instruction.  Rather, Fremont argues that the two 
paragraphs omitted from its proposed instruction were necessary to adequately 
instruct the jury.  

 

[¶25]   As stated in our standard of review, 
proper instructions should be clear declarations of pertinent law.  Ormsby, 997 P.2d  at 471.  As we discussed above, the elements of waiver 
are 1) an existing right; 2) knowledge of that right; and 3) an intent to 
relinquish it.  
Jackson State Bank, 837 P.2d  at 1086.  All these elements 
are present in the instruction as given.  Furthermore, the omitted language was merely 
duplicative.  
Specifi­cally, when looking at the first italicized paragraph, it 
essentially restates the immediately preceding paragraph, i.e., that waiver can 
be express or it may be conduct that shows an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.  

 

[¶26]   During deliberations the jury asked, 
"What constitutes waiver of rights?"  Fremont would have us believe that this 
question shows that the instruction was misleading.  How­ever, we 
cannot say that Fremont has demonstrated that the instruction misled or confused 
the jury.  The 
duty of the trial court with regard to instructions at the close of evidence and 
argument is different than its duties upon receiving jury questions during 
deliberations.  
Matter of CH, 783 P.2d 155, 159 (Wyo. 
1989).  The 
trial court's denial of further instruction during deliberation does not 
automatically amount to reversible error.  The mere fact that the jury is interested in 
the definition of terms or more extensive explanation does not mean that the 
trial court must give further instruction or that there is an error in the 
original instruction.  
In re Matter of CH, 783 P.2d. at 160.  See also Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935, 939 (Wyo. 
1982).

 

[¶27]   The instruction as proposed might have 
been more beneficial to Fremont's case, but the fact that an instruction may 
have been more precisely drafted or drafted in a way more favorable to a party 
does not warrant reversal for a new trial.  Betts v. Crawford, 
965 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 
1998) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994)).  We hold that the district court did not err 
in giving the instruction pertaining to contract waiver as modified because it 
was a comprehensive, balanced, and fundamentally accurate statement of the 
law.  Betts, at 686.

 

Denial of Statutory Remedies 

 

[¶28]      Jensen contends that the trial court 
erred by refusing to award the statutory remedies allowed by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-4-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  That statute reads:  

 

a)  Whenever an employee quits the service or is 
dis­charged, the employee shall be paid whatever wages are due him in lawful 
money of the United States of America, or by check or draft which can be cashed 
at a bank, within five (5) working days of the date of termination of 
employment.  
The employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any 
sums due the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the employee 
during his employment.  This section does not apply to the earnings 
of a sales agent employed on a commission basis and having custody of accounts, 
money or goods of his principal where the net amount due the agent may not be 
determinable except after an audit or verification of sales, accounts, funds or 
stocks.

            
(b)  Whenever an employee who has quit or has been discharged 
from service has cause to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall 
establish in court the amount which is justly due, the court shall allow to the 
plaintiff interest on the past due wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) 
per annum from the date of discharge or termination, together with a reasonable 
attorney fee and all costs of suit.  Prosecution of a civil action to recover 
unpaid wages does not preclude prosecution under W.S. 27-4-105.

 

[¶29]   Generally, in Wyoming attorney fees are 
the responsibility of each party.  These fees are only recoverable from the 
opposing party when expressly provided for by statute or con­tract.  Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo. 
1998).  In this 
case, the relevant statute, § 27-4-104, allows for the payment of reasonable 
attorney fees when an employee "shall establish in court the amount which is justly 
due" (emphasis added).  

 

[¶30]   Jensen was awarded contract damages, 
but he did not establish that any or all of these contract damages amount to 
wages justly due.  
At trial, Jensen presented evidence consistent with amounts that he asked 
for in his closing arguments.  In closing argument, Jensen's attorney 
requested $32,592.44 for lost wages, $1,053.20 for the move from Denver to Cody, 
$2,087.52 for the move from Cody back to Denver, $10,928 for the loss on the 
sale of his home in Denver prior to moving to Cody, and $19,494 for loss on the 
sale of his home in Cody after he moved back to Denver.  Thereafter, the 
jury awarded a lump sum of $20,496.

 

[¶31]   Clearly, Jensen was seeking contract 
damages above and beyond past due wages, as the damages related to losses on the 
sale of his homes or moving expenses after Jensen resigned from Fremont do not 
qualify as wages in accordance with the wage statute.3  Proceedings that 
are outside the scope of the wage claim statute, although related to employment, 
do not allow for recovery of attorney fees.  NL Indus., Inc. v. 
Dill, 769 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo. 
1989).  
Moreover, in NL Indus. we found that expenses 
incurred in defending a separate suit brought by the employer will not support 
an award of attorney fees.  Id.  In Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805, 812 (Wyo. 
1984), we determined that when a party failed to establish in court that wages 
were justly due, he cannot recover attorney fees pursuant to § 27-4-104.  It is pure 
speculation to consider that the contract damages awarded in Jensen's favor were 
exclusively wages covered under the wage payment statute.  Jensen failed to 
present any evidence to the district court which clarified this issue.  

 

[¶32]   Additionally, 
the jury was given a special verdict form prior to deliberation.  This form did not 
provide for a segregation of damages pertaining to wages from any non-wage 
contract losses, and Jensen did not object to the use of this form.  Jensen knew from 
the date of asserting his counterclaim that he ultimately would be asking for an 
award of attorney fees.  It would have been simple enough for Jensen 
to request that these claims be separated on the verdict form.  Had Jensen done so, 
wages justly due would have been established for the court.

 

[¶33]   Furthermore, even if we were to 
speculate that the damage award was comprised entirely of back due wages, Jensen 
would still not have met his requisite burden of proof.  Jensen's submitted 
evidence for an award of attorney fees combined all wage and non-wage 
claims.  "This 
Court has repeatedly held that segregation of fees between multiple clients 
and/or multiple claims is required when it is possible."  Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 952 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Air 
Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 925 (Wyo. 1989); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 
753 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Wyo. 
1988)).  
Implicit in this directive is the requirement that a party must show 
segregation is impossible before he may recover for claims for which there is no 
authorization of fee shifting.  Jensen made no attempt to show that 
segregation of the fees for each claim was impossible.4  As the district 
court recognized, wages justly due and the amount spent on each claim were never 
established.  
Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of the district court's 
discretion to deny recovery of statutory attorney fees.

 

[¶34]   Jensen also contends that the district 
court erred in denying each of the remedies allowed by the statute because the 
claim was unliquidated.   One of the district court's stated 
reasons for denying the claim was "The Jensen claim was unliquidated."  While the statute 
does not explicitly require a liquidated claim, as stated previously, the 
statute does require that the remedies be provided upon establishment of wages 
justly due.  
Damages are liqui­dated if they are certain or by computation made 
certain.  Blittersdorf v. Eikenberry, 964 P.2d 413, 416 (Wyo. 
1998).  Here, 
the amount asserted by Jensen is unliquidated in the sense that we are uncertain 
as to what the figure for wages justly due is.  For instance, according to the statute 
eighteen percent interest is to be applied to past due wages from the date of 
dis­charge.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104(b).  In this case, the amount to which interest 
may be applied cannot be calculated with a simple mathematical calculation.  Therefore, the 
claim of Jensen is unliquidated because uncertainty still exists as to the exact 
amount of wages past due.  Hence, it was not an abuse of discretion to 
deny the award of interest to Jensen in these circumstances.

 

[¶35]   Finally, costs were unknown at 
common law.  
Costs, therefore, were never awarded to either party.  Costs may only be 
recovered if authorized by statute and then may be awarded only to parties to 
the litigation in amounts supported by evidence as having been incurred and 
reasonable.  Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial 
Dist. of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo. 1987).  Again, the applicable statute provides for 
"all costs of suit," to be awarded, but as we look to the plain language of the 
statute, we note that the suit referred to is the suit for wages earned and 
due.  As 
indicated previously, this suit encompassed more than simply wages earned and 
due.  

 

[¶36]   We have the 
same problem with Jensen's request for an award of costs as his request for an 
award of attorney fees.  Besides not establishing the amount of wages 
justly due, Jensen has not segregated the costs associated with the wage claim 
from those associated with non-wage claims.  Again, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the district court to deny all costs of suit in this circumstance.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶37]   Given those reasons set forth above, 
the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Owen argues that the agreement referenced in the letter was 
for a salesman position that Jensen eventually rejected only to later accept a 
position as sales manager, and the $8,000 was simply an estimate of what Jensen 
would make and that Jensen would be paid 6% commission.  Jensen argues that 
the only agreement that was ever reached was for the sales manager position. 
 

2In relevant part, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-507(b) (LexisNexis 
2001) provides:

(b)  It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay 
to any employee a lower wage, salary, or compensation than that provided for or 
agreed upon by (1) a collective bargaining agreement; (2) a contract between the 
employer or employee.  

3We have held that relocation benefits that are promised to 
an employee as a fringe benefit qualify as wages.  NL Indus., Inc. v. 
Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 
1989).  Here, 
the only moving expenses Jensen may have been promised appear to be the moving 
expenses related to the move to Cody.  However, this issue was not addressed in 
depth at trial.  

4For example, drafting a power of attorney for Margaret 
Jensen, calling the title company for escrow, and drafting, revising, and 
finalizing trial exhibits regarding non-wage related claims do not relate to 
wages.