Title: JASON LELAND GOMPF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JASON LELAND GOMPF V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 112120 P.3d 980Case Number: No. 04-55Decided: 09/07/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JASON 
LELAND GOMPF,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbell  
County

The 
Honorable John Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

            

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director, PAP; and Michael Stulken, Student 
Intern, PAP.  Argument by Mr. 
Stulken.

            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Jason Gompf of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, marijuana, with 
intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  Prior to trial, 
Mr. Gompf filed two motions to suppress the evidence and statements obtained by 
police during an encounter with him at his place of residence. The district 
court denied both motions, and Mr. Gompf appeals his conviction claiming the 
evidence should have been suppressed. Finding no error in the district court's 
denial of the suppression motions, we affirm Mr. Gompf's conviction. 

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Gompf 
presents the following issues for review:

 
 
Issue 
I

 
 
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress 
evidence.

 
 
Issue 
II

 
 
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress 
statements.

            

The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress 
the evidence found in his room?

 
 
II.          
Whether the district court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress 
the statements he made to law enforcement officers?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 10, 
2003, at approximately 12:16 a.m., Officer Daniel Stroup was dispatched to a 
Gillette motel to interview David Frazier about a stolen handgun. Mr. Frazier 
told Officer Stroup that he had stolen a Ruger semi-automatic 9 mm handgun from 
an individual in Sheridan, 
Wyoming, and it was in the 
possession of Herb Morgan who lived at 815 E. 5th Street in Gillette. 
After speaking with Mr. Frazier for approximately 45 minutes, Officer Stroup 
returned to the police department to "make inquires concerning the 
handgun."   

 
 
[¶4]      Officer Stroup 
was unable to confirm any report of a stolen handgun matching Mr. Frazier's 
description. Nevertheless, shortly after 2:00 a.m., Officer Stroup and three 
other officers1 drove to 815 E. 5th 
Street to speak with Mr. Morgan.  The home was owned by Peggy 
VanLitsenborgh, and Mr. Morgan was a tenant in the home.  Officer Stroup and Officer Overton 
knocked on the door after noticing several interior lights were on.  Mr. Morgan answered the door and invited 
the officers inside.  The officers 
explained they had received a report of a stolen handgun and wanted to talk to 
him about it.  Ms. VanLitsenborgh 
approached and asked everyone to step outside.  Officer Stroup and Officer Carter 
stepped outside with Mr. Morgan while Officer Overton remained in the entryway 
with Ms. VanLitsenborgh.  Officer 
Stroup continued to question Mr. Morgan outside, and asked whether the stolen 
handgun was in the house.  Mr. 
Morgan stated that he had received a handgun from Mr. Frazier, and it was in the 
basement in a safe.

 
 
[¶5]      The officers and 
Mr. Morgan re-entered the house and Ms. VanLitsenborgh offered to show the 
officers where the gun was in the basement.  She led the officers downstairs, where 
the officers smelled burnt marijuana and observed Mr. Gompf and Jamie Nelms 
sitting in chairs in the family room.  Ms. VanLitsenborgh showed the officers a 
.22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. They informed her the gun did not match Mr. 
Frazier's description of the stolen handgun, but she denied having any other 
guns in the house.  

 
 
[¶6]      The officers then 
asked the group about the smell of burnt marijuana in the air.  Ms. VanLitsenborgh responded that she 
had a personal stash in her bedroom, which she would surrender.  Officer Overton indicated he would have 
to accompany Ms. VanLitsenborgh to her bedroom to retrieve the marijuana, but 
she responded that she "didn't feel comfortable [having them] in her house 
without a warrant."  In anticipation 
of needing a warrant, the officers asked everyone to move upstairs, conducted a 
protective sweep of the basement "to make sure . . . no other individuals [were] 
hiding," and secured the occupants in the upstairs living room.  Officers Stroup and Overton proceeded to 
the county attorney's office to apply for a search warrant, which was issued 
"shortly after 4 a.m."  The warrant 
sought marijuana, packing materials, pipes, bongs, related paraphernalia and the 
stolen Ruger 9-mm handgun and two clips. 

 
 
[¶7]      The officers 
began the search of the VanLitsenborgh residence at approximately 4:50 a.m.  While other officers were searching the 
basement of the house, Officer Stroup conversed with Mr. Gompf outside on the 
front porch.  Officer Stroup asked 
about the handgun and then inquired whether there were any drugs in the house. 
Mr. Gompf informed him that one quarter ounce of marijuana could be found in his 
bedroom.   

 
 
[¶8]      During the 
search, the officers discovered marijuana, pay-owe sheets,2 a scale, a live marijuana plant, 
and paraphernalia in Mr. Gompf's bedroom.  
Corporal McGrath told 
Mr. Gompf about the items they found in his bedroom and asked him if he 
was a drug dealer.  Mr. Gompf 
initially denied selling drugs, claiming they were only for his personal 
use.  He subsequently admitted he 
sold drugs to his friends.  

 

[¶9]      The discovery of 
the drugs and paraphernalia caused the officers to apply for a second warrant to 
further search the residence, Mr. Gompf's car, and all persons in the 
house.  The second warrant was 
issued at 8:45 a.m.  When the 
officers returned to the scene with the second warrant, Detective Paige Wells 
and day shift personnel arrived.  
Detective Wells was briefed on the situation, surveyed the evidence found 
up to that point, and interviewed those present, including Mr. Gompf, 
individually in an upstairs bedroom.  
At the suppression hearing, Detective Wells testified that, before 
beginning her interview of Mr. Gompf, she informed him of his constitutional 
rights in accordance with Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), but she 
admitted that she recited the rights without the aid of a Miranda card.  According to Detective Wells, Mr. Gompf 
indicated he understood his rights.  
However, Mr. Gompf denied receiving any Miranda warnings.  

 
 
[¶10]   Detective Wells testified that she 
then asked Mr. Gompf a series of questions and learned he had lived at the 
residence for about one year.  Mr. 
Gompf admitted that the marijuana, including the plant, and the pay-owe sheets 
belonged to him.  Nevertheless, he 
denied selling marijuana, claiming he used it himself and "gave" it to his 
friends.  Mr. Gompf refused to 
provide Detective Wells with any of his friends' names.  The interview lasted approximately 15 
minutes, after which Detective Wells arrested Mr. Gompf and transported him to 
the CampbellCountyDetentionCenter. 

            

[¶11]   Mr. Gompf was charged with 
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to deliver, in 
violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and entered a plea of not guilty.  Prior to trial, Mr. Gompf filed a motion 
to suppress all evidence obtained during the searches.  Mr. Gompf's motion included three bases 
for suppression:  1) the officers 
did not have "reasonable cause" to come to his home in the middle of the 
night;  2) the warrants were invalid 
because they did not include the affidavits for the search warrants; and 3) the 
officers improperly executed the second warrant at 4:50 a.m. when it required 
execution during daytime hours.  At 
the suppression hearing, Mr. Gompf withdrew the third basis for his motion and 
limited his argument to the first two issues.  At the conclusion of the hearing,  the district court orally denied the 
motion to suppress the searches "based on the testimony  and the examination of 
the warrants." 

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Gompf filed a second motion, 
seeking suppression of the statements he made while he was "detained by or in 
the custody of Gillette Police Department officers on March 11, 2003, at 815 E. 
5th St., Gillette, Wyoming," as well as all evidence obtained as the 
fruit of his statements.  The 
district court held a hearing and, subsequently, denied that motion as 
well.  

            

[¶13]   A jury found Mr. Gompf guilty of 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and the district court sentenced 
him to three to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary and fined him 
$10,000. The court suspended the sentence of incarceration and $5,000.00 of the 
fine and instead ordered him to spend one year in the CampbellCountyDetentionCenter followed by six years of probation. 
 This appeal followed. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]   We review a district court's legal 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo, giving deference to the 
trial court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶12, 
84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004); Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, ¶5, 64 P.3d 716, 
719 (Wyo. 2003).  This Court 
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's 
decision because that court is in the best position to "assess the witnesses' 
credibility and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions 
therefrom." Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citation omitted). The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a 
question of law which we review de 
novo. Id.

 
 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

A.                 
First 
Motion to Suppress

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Gompf contends that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
searches of his residence.   
Mr. Gompf presents a multi-faceted argument, claiming that the searches 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  
He asserts the officers had no right to come to the house unexpectedly to 
inquire about the stolen gun; the officers exceeded the scope of the occupants' 
consent when they entered the basement; Ms. VanLitsenborgh lacked the authority 
to consent to the search of Mr. Gompf's bedroom; and no exigent circumstances 
existed to search the residence.  
With the exception of his first contention  the officers did not have 
"reasonable cause" to come to his house to question him  these arguments are 
raised for the first time on appeal.  

 
 

[¶16]   In general, a criminal defendant 
may not raise an argument for the first time on appeal.  Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶19, 65 P.3d 378, 384 (Wyo. 2003); Meerscheidt 
v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Kennedy 
v. State, 890 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo. 1995)).  
"Our rule is that in the absence of 
fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the appellant an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered."  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶55, 73 P.3d 1041, 1090 (Wyo. 2003), 
quoting, Davis v. 
State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 1993).  Violation of a defendant's Fourth 
Amendment protections would, of course, amount to fundamental error.  

 
 
[¶17]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  It 
provides:

 
 
The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

 
 
"It is 
axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United States v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed. 2d. 752 
(1972)).  "[A] home is entitled to special dignity and 
special sanctity and . . . the proper way to search a home is to obtain a search 
warrant."  Brown v. State, 
738 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Wyo. 1987).  Thus, searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, but there are a 
few "well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." Vassar v. 
State, 2004 WY 125, ¶19, 
99 P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo. 2004).  
Consent and the existence of exigent circumstances are two of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 
¶29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶24, 65 P.3d 33, 40 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 

[¶18]   The appellant has the burden of 
establishing plain error when the claim is not raised in the district 
court.  Belden, ¶55.  Plain error is:  "[t]he violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the 
abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice."  Id.  See also, Arevalo 
v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 1997).    

 
 
[¶19]   The limited record in the instant 
case does not support the Fourth Amendment claims Mr. Gompf raises for the first 
time on appeal.  Ms. VanLitsenborgh 
clearly had the authority to consent to the officers entering her home, and 
there is no question that she invited the officers to follow her to the basement 
to retrieve the handgun.  The area 
Ms. VanLitsenborgh led the officers to in the basement was a family room which 
was used as a common area by the occupants of the house and their guests.  In fact, Mr. Gompf and another person 
were sitting in the area when the officers entered.  

 
 
[¶20]   Once the officers were lawfully in 
the basement common area, they smelled burnt marijuana.  At this point, the officers had probable 
cause to justify issuance of the search warrant.  Indeed, Mr. Gompf does not claim that 
the officers lacked probable cause to procure the search warrant.  It was pursuant to this warrant that the 
officers eventually searched Mr. Gompf's bedroom and discovered the drug 
evidence.3   Thus, Mr. Gompf's arguments that 
Ms. VanLitsenborgh did not have the authority to consent to the search of his 
bedroom or that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the search of his 
bedroom are not valid or even relevant under the facts of this case.  Because the search was authorized by the 
warrant, it is unnecessary to consider any exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  Mr. Gompf obviously 
cannot establish plain error on the record presented here; consequently, we 
decline to further consider the issues Mr. Gompf raises for the first time on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶21]   We turn now to Mr. Gompf's argument 
that the district court erred by failing to suppress the evidence because the 
officers had no right to approach the house in the first instance.  Our resolution of this issue revolves 
around the police officers' initial encounter with the occupants of the 
residence. Mr. Gompf claims the officers conducted a warrantless "search" of the 
residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment merely by knocking on the door 
and asking about the handgun.  The 
State contends the initial encounter, commonly known as a "knock and talk," did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.   

            
 

[¶22]   A "knock and talk" investigation 
"involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as 
officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and 
eventually requesting permission to search the house."  Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 
496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  The phrase "knock and talk" was 
apparently first used by an Oregon appellate court in  State v. Land, 806 P.2d 1156 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1991).  See generally Swingle 
& Zoellner, "Knock and talk" consent searches: If called by a panther, 
don't anther, 55 J Mo B 25 (1999).  
Since then, the use of this new shorthand description for a 
long-established police investigative technique has become commonplace across 
the country. Id.  Nevertheless, this is apparently the 
first opportunity for the Wyoming Supreme Court to directly consider the "knock 
and talk" procedure.   

 
 
[¶23]   The prevailing rule is that, absent 
a clear expression by the owner to the contrary, police officers are permitted 
to approach a dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant in the course 
of their official business. See Scott v. State, 67 S.W.3d 567, 575 
(Ark. 2002); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 720 (7th Cir. 1999); United 
States. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 
(5th Cir. 2001); Scott v. State, 782 A.2d 862, 872-73 (Md. Ct. App. 
2001); People v. Frohriep, 637 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) 
Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001).  There is no requirement that law 
enforcement have probable cause or reasonable suspicion before they may approach 
a home and ask for permission to enter.  
Swingle & Zoellner, "Knock and talk" supra, 26.   When police utilize a "knock and 
talk" procedure, whether as a spur of the moment response to an anonymous tip or 
the final culmination of a long but successful effort to develop probable cause 
for a search warrant, they are merely asking for permission to search a person's 
home, recognizing and risking that a refusal would not only alert the suspect 
that he is being watched but would quite likely leave the police empty 
handed.  Swingle & Zoellner, 
"Knock and talk" supra, 25.     

 
 
[¶24]   Thus, at the heart of the "knock 
and talk" procedure lies consent, which has long been recognized as one of the 
many exceptions to the search warrant requirement.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). 

 
 
Consent 
searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement 
agencies.  They normally occur on 
the highway, or in a person's home or office, and under informal and 
unstructured conditions.  The 
circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or 
be a logical extension of investigative police questioning.  

 
 

Id. 
at 
231-232.   

 
 
[¶25]   With this discussion in mind, we 
proceed to apply this law to the instant facts.   There can be little doubt that the 
officer's presence at Ms. VanLitsenborgh's house at 2:00 a.m. was unexpected and 
surprising.  However, there is no 
evidence that she or her tenants clearly indicated to law enforcement that they 
were not welcome to approach the front door of the residence.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
the officers acted in a manner which would communicate to a reasonable person 
that he could not refuse their requests.  
The officers did not brandish their weapons, raise their voices or 
command the residents to let them into the house. Rather, the record clearly 
shows the opposite occurred. The lights were on in the house and the officers, 
therefore, assumed people were awake inside.  In addition, the officers did not 
believe that the gun had been stolen by any of the residents of the home, and, 
initially, they were not there to investigate any wrongdoing by the occupants of 
the home.  Considering the totality 
of the circumstances, we hold that no illegal search occurred as a result of the 
"knock and talk" investigation in this case.

 
 
[¶26]   Mr. Gompf also contends the entire 
exchange between the police and the occupants of the house was tainted because 
an unreliable tip from Mr. Frazier directed the officers to the residence in the 
first place.  Mr. Gompf's argument 
ignores the fact that the officers were not required to have probable cause or 
even a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to approach the front door and 
ask for permission to enter.  In the 
context of the "knock and talk" procedure, the officers were not relying on the 
informant's tip to procure a warrant or to seize anyone; rather, they were 
merely investigating evidence of a possible crime, in this case the theft of a 
handgun.  This is not unusual or 
illegal behavior by law enforcement.  
See for example United States v. Bernitt, 392 F.3d 873 
(7th Cir. 2004)  (acting on an informant's tip that marijuana 
plants were growing alongside Bernitt's home, [police officers] went to do a 
"knock and 
talk" investigation the purpose of which was to gather more 
information); United States v. Miller, 104 Fed. Appx. 591 (8th 
Cir. 2004)  (an 
unidentified caller reported suspected drug dealing and subsequent  "knock and talk" to further 
investigate); United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235 (10th 
Cir. 2004)  (investigation of a tip regarding 
possible drug use and stolen property involved officers observing lights on 
inside the house and knocking on the door to talk).  Accordingly, the fact that the officers 
relied on a possibly unreliable tip is irrelevant to our analysis and did not 
undermine the officers' right to approach the residence and ask for permission 
to enter.    

 
 
 
 

B.                
Second 
Motion to Suppress

 
 
[¶27]   In Mr. Gompf's second issue, he 
claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements 
he made to law enforcement prior to his arrest and the evidence obtained as a 
result of those statements. He argues his statements to Officer Stroup and 
Corporal McGrath were taken while he was in custody and the officers violated 
his constitutional rights by failing to provide a proper warning pursuant to Miranda.  Mr. Gompf also claims that the district 
court should have suppressed his statement to Detective Wells because she did 
not provide an adequate Miranda 
warning and his statement was not voluntary.  

 
 
[¶28]   On the night of March 10, 2003, the 
police officers first encountered Mr. Gompf in the basement of Ms. 
VanLitsenborgh's house. The occupants of the house were subsequently asked to 
move to the upstairs living room while the officers secured a warrant, thereby 
ensuring that evidence in the house remained intact.  

 
 
[¶29]   The first instance of questioning 
took place when Officer Stroup asked Mr. Gompf to come outside onto the porch 
while the first warrant was being executed.  First, he asked Mr. Gompf "about the 
possibility of . . . there being a gun in the house," and about "the possibility 
of finding any narcotics."  Mr. 
Gompf replied that there might be a gun in the house, and that approximately 
one-quarter ounce of marijuana could be found in his bedroom.  Officer Stroup further testified that he 
asked Mr. Gompf "a couple more questions" about the firearm.  He did not advise Mr. Gompf of his 
rights, nor did he place him under arrest or in handcuffs. After their 
conversation, the two men returned to the living room.

 
 
[¶30]   Later, Corporal McGrath questioned 
Mr. Gompf when he asked him to accompany him outside while he smoked a 
cigarette.  Once outside, Corporal 
McGrath told Mr. Gompf what was found during the execution of the first search 
warrant: "a plant, approximately one pound of marijuana, some paraphernalia, 
pay-owe sheets, a scale."  Mr. Gompf 
responded immediately that "it was all for personal use."  Mr. Gompf also stated that he used the 
scale so he "didn't get ripped off" and that the pay-owe sheets were used to 
"keep track of friends" that owed him money.   Corporal McGrath testified his 
conversation with Mr. Gompf lasted "less than five minutes" and he never 
brandished his weapon, touched Mr. Gompf, or threatened him.  Furthermore, Mr. Gompf volunteered a 
great deal of information to Corporal McGrath without being questioned.  

            

[¶31]   A suspect is entitled to be warned 
pursuant to Miranda if he is "in 
custody" when interviewed by the police.  
CSC v. State, 2005 WY 106, ¶¶18-19 (Wyo. 
2005).

  

When the 
authorities make the proper advisements, statements made by a suspect while in 
custody are admissible into evidence.  
The corollary of this rule is that "[s]tatements made during custodial 
interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the defendant was not advised 
of his Miranda rights." Nevertheless, "this Court adheres to the 
principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to 
counsel, apply only in the context of custodial interrogation."  In Miranda, the United States 
Supreme Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

 
 
            
The determination of whether a suspect is "in custody" when questioned is 
made by considering the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. In 
resolving the custodial status of a suspect we consider "whether a reasonable 
man in [the suspect's] position would have considered himself to be in police 
custody."

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).

            

[¶32]   According to the United States 
Supreme Court, two inquiries are essential to the determination of whether or 
not a suspect is in custody. In Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995), the Court outlined those inquiries:

 
 
[F]irst, 
what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given 
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at 
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.  Once the scene is set and the players' 
lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to 
resolve the ultimate inquiry: "was there a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."  

 
 

Id. 
at 
112.

 
 
[¶33]   This Court has outlined the 
numerous factors which may be relevant in determining whether a suspect has been 
subjected to "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda in 
Gunn, ¶7.  Among them 
are: (1) whether a suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; 
(2) the number of police officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint 
and whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal arrest; and (4) 
the duration and character of the interrogation.  See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. 
Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed. 1999); see also Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 
335 (Wyo. 
1985).  Other important factors to 
consider include the nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the 
time and place of the interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the 
time of the interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention 
would not be temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and 
the arrest. Id., at 335; J.F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes 
"Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that 
Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial 
Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).  
No one factor alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors 
are relevant to a given case.  
Hannon, ¶42.

 
 
[¶34]   As in most cases where the 
determinative issue is whether or not a suspect was "in custody" when 
questioned, there are factors in this case weighing both in favor of the 
conclusion that the encounters were noncustodial and factors which also could 
suggest that the encounters were custodial.  CSC, ¶¶18-19.    The fact that law enforcement was 
present in the residence for approximately eight hours and the occupants' 
movements were somewhat limited supports the suggestion they were "in 
custody."   On the other hand, 
the officers did not brandish their weapons, tell the occupants they could not 
leave, or advise them that they were under arrest. The occupants were not 
handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. Although the occupants of the 
house were not allowed to use the restroom unaccompanied because the officers 
were concerned about the possibility evidence could be destroyed, they were not 
prevented from using the restroom facilities.   

 
 
[¶35]   The record clearly shows that the 
occupants were comfortable during their encounter with law enforcement.  In fact, Mr. Gompf slept for a great 
deal of the time the officers were at the house.   Neither Officer Stroup nor 
Corporal McGrath forced or coerced Mr. Gompf to go outside to visit with 
him.  He was not handcuffed or 
physically restrained in any manner.  
The interviews were brief, and Mr. Gompf freely volunteered information. 
The officers did not tell him he was under arrest, threaten him, or promise 
anything to him.  Thus, looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, the district court's finding that Mr. Gompf 
was not in custody when talking to Officer Stroup and Corporal McGrath is 
supported by the evidence.  

 
 
[¶36]   Our conclusion is supported by this 
Court's rationale in a factually similar case entitled Southworth v. State, 
913 P.2d 444 (Wyo. 1996). In that case, police 
officers questioned the defendant while executing a search warrant based on a 
tip of stolen computer equipment.  
Id. at 446.  We stated:

 
 
Appellant does 
not make any claim of coercion, threats, promises, or deception.  He had not been physically seized, he 
was not handcuffed, and no weapons were drawn when he made his remarks. The 
officers did not give any outward signs that they were restricting Appellant's 
ability to leave or any indication that Appellant was under arrest. In fact, 
Appellant was very friendly, polite, and talkative during the entire time that 
the officers were conducting their search. Additionally, Appellant was in his 
own home when he offered these statements. The other residents of the mobile 
home, whom Appellant had lived with on and off for about three and one-half 
years and whom he thought of as being family, were also present when this 
questioning took place. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976) (holding that interrogation in 
the suspect's home was noncustodial); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. 
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e) (1984) (the view that at-home questioning is 
noncustodial is strengthened when the suspect's friends or family members are 
present at the time). Furthermore, even though Appellant had been asked to stay 
in the living room until the mobile home was secured, he took his dog 
outside. Upon reentering the mobile home, he followed the officers around as 
they conducted their search rather than staying in the living room area as he 
was asked to do.

Id.

 
 
[¶37]   In a very brief argument, Mr. Gompf 
contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to 
Detective Wells because she did not properly advise him of his Miranda rights.  He also claims that, even if he was 
properly advised of his rights, the district court erred by refusing to suppress 
his statements because they were involuntary.  

 
 
[¶38]   Detective Wells awakened Mr. Gompf, 
who was asleep in a recliner, to question him.  Detective Wells described her 
conversation with Mr. Gompf as follows:

 
 
DW: I 
asked him to come in the bedroom.  
He gets up.  We go in the 
bedroom. We sit on the bed. I tell him I think he's in a lot of trouble, and he 
kind of shrugs and says, yeah.

 
 
            
We sit on the bed. I tell him that he's going to go to jail, and then I 
Mirandize him.  He doesn't - - he 
tells me that he understands his rights, but when I ask him with those in mind 
will he speak with me, he just kind of shrugs.  So then I ask him  I tell him, I said, 
I'll ask questions.  If you don't 
want to answer them, you don't have to.  
And that's how we got into our conversation. 

 
 
Q: Okay. 
Describe for the Court the questions you ask and his 
answer.

 
 
DW: 
First thing I asked him about was did he live in this residence, and he told me 
that he did.  He lived there 
approximately a year.  That one of 
the bedrooms in the basement was his, and, in fact, the bedroom where we found 
the one package of marijuana.

 
 
            
I asked him if that marijuana belonged to him, and he said that it 
did.  I asked him about the 4 and a 
half, 5-foot plant, and he said that was his as well.  At this point he's not making any 
comment about the other four or five bags of marijuana that we found in a kind 
of a little room off of his room. So I asked him whose marijuana that is, and he 
says, it's mine.

 
 
            
I think we have some discussion about  Corporal McGrath had mentioned 
pay-owe sheets to me.  I think I 
asked if he sells his marijuana.  He 
tells me he does not sell marijuana.  
He gives it to his friends.  
I asked him what the numbers and the names are on the pay-owe 
sheets.  He says those are his 
friends that he gives marijuana to.

 
 
            
I had asked him if he'll give their names, and he says he won't.  I asked him if he'll give me the name of 
who he purchased the marijuana from, and he said he would not.  He said he'd comply with me with 
anything I wanted except people's names who either get marijuana from him or 
that he gets marijuana from.  

 
 
At that 
point we pretty well were through and I had officers take him to the detention 
center.

 
 
Q.  Okay.  Did you have any further discussions 
with Mr. Gompf after he was arrested?

 
 
DW: No, 
I did not.

 
 
[¶39]   Detective Wells testified that she 
recited the Miranda warning to Mr. 
Gompf from memory because she did not have a Miranda card on her person.  She told him "he had the right to remain 
silent; that anything he said would and could be used against [him] in a court 
of law," that "he had [the] right to an attorney and if he could not afford one, 
one would be appointed for him," and that "once we started talking that he could 
stop my questioning and not answer any questions if he wanted to."  Detective Wells testified that Mr. 
Gompf indicated that he understood his rights.  In contrast, Mr. Gompf testified at the 
suppression hearing that the detective did not advise him of his Miranda rights.   

 
 
[¶40]   In Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 544 
(Wyo.  1998), we concisely described the 
requirements for a proper Miranda 
warning:

 
 

Miranda 
requires 
police to inform an accused during a custodial interrogation that 1) he has the 
right to remain silent, 2) that anything said may be used against him in court, 
3) that he has the right to have an attorney present at questioning, and 4) 
that, if he cannot afford to retain an attorney, on will be appointed for 
him.  

 

After 
weighing the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the district court found 
Detective Wells to be credible and accepted her testimony that she properly 
advised Mr. Gompf of his Miranda 
rights.  We find nothing in the 
record which causes us pause in accepting the district court's 
determination.  This Court 
consistently defers to the district court in situations such as this, where the 
trial court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the 
evidence. Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶20, 108 P.3d 852, 857-58 (Wyo. 
2005).  On this record, it is clear 
that Detective Wells properly advised Mr. Gompf of his rights under Miranda.   

 
 
[¶41]   Mr. Gompf also argues that his 
statements to Detective Wells were involuntary and should have been suppressed. 
We have stated that even confessions obtained after Miranda warnings are 
subject to scrutiny for voluntariness.  
Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, ¶26, 67 P.3d 635, 643 (Wyo. 
2003).  For statements to be 
voluntary, they must "result from free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception.'"  Id.         
  See also, Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 
(Wyo. 
1999).  If a statement resulted from 
coercion, then it is inadmissible at trial for any purpose because its validity 
is suspect.  Id.  

 
 
[¶42]   The ultimate issue of whether a 
statement was voluntary is a question of law, and our standard of review is, 
therefore, de novo.  Mitchell, 982 P.3d  at 721.  
Nevertheless, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact on the 
voluntariness issue and do not disturb those findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  We consider the totality 
of the circumstances to determine if the defendant's statements were voluntary. 
 Id.  
   

            

[¶43]   On appeal, Mr. Gompf suggests that 
his statements to Detective Wells were involuntary because he was under the 
influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time and was questioned during the 
early morning hours.   He also 
claims that he was "herded upstairs and kept there for hours with the rest of 
the house's occupants, and was only allowed' to relieve himself when taken 
outdoors by one of the police."  

 
 
[¶44]   The record contradicts Mr. Gompf's 
contention that his statement was the product of coercion.    We recently addressed a 
claim that the defendant's intoxication rendered his statement involuntary in Gordon, ¶15.  In that case, we 
stated:

 
 
[F]or 
intoxication to render a confession involuntary, the impairment must be so great 
so as to deprive an individual of a capacity to understand the meaning of his 
statements. . . . [T]he fact that he understood what he was doing, carried on a 
conversation and responded to questions will render the statements 
admissible.  

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶45]   Mr. Gompf does not direct us to any 
evidence in the record to suggest that he was so impaired by drug or alcohol use 
his statements were involuntary.  
Furthermore, Detective Wells' testimony indicates that Mr. Gompf was 
lucid during the interview and offered appropriate responses to her 
questions.  In fact, although he 
answered some of the detective's questions, he refused to identify his drug 
supplier or customers.  

 
 
[¶46]   We also reject Mr. Gompf's 
characterization of the atmosphere of the interview as coercive and 
intimidating.  Detective Wells 
testified she and Mr. Gompf were in the room alone and he was unrestrained 
throughout the interview.  Detective 
Wells characterized the interrogation as her posing questions to Mr. Gompf and 
he "answered if he wanted to."  He 
took advantage of that option by refusing to identify his supplier or 
customers.  Moreover, despite the 
fact the occupants were watched to ensure that no evidence was compromised, they 
were basically allowed to do what they pleased.  Mr. Gompf apparently slept for a great 
deal of the time the officers searched the premises, and, when he needed to 
relieve himself, the officers respected his choice to go outside rather than be 
accompanied to the restroom by an officer.   

 
 
[¶47]   On this record, we are convinced 
that the totality of the circumstances support the conclusion that Mr. Gompf 
made the statements to Detective Wells of his own free and deliberate 
choice.  The district court's 
findings were not clearly erroneous, and its decision that Mr. Gompf's 
statements should not be suppressed was correct.  

 
 
[¶48]   We affirm the district court's 
denial of both of Mr. Gompf's motions to suppress.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The other officers were Officer 
Tracy Overton, Corporal Kevin McGrath, and Officer Doug 
Carter.

 
 

2Pay-owe sheets record names of 
marijuana buyers and how much they owe their dealer.

 
 

3Mr. Gompf's appellate brief suggests 
that the officers discovered the drug evidence in Mr. Gompf's bedroom prior to 
securing the warrant.  The State 
strongly disagrees with Mr. Gompf's reading of the record.  Considering the record in the light most 
favorable to the district court's decision, we must agree with the State and 
conclude Mr. Gompf's assertion is not supported by the record.