Title: MAJOR v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MAJOR v. STATE2004 WY 483 P.3d 468Case Number: 02-233Decided: 01/28/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

SARGENT 
K. MAJOR,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Weston County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
E. Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Lindsay Hoyt, Student 
Director; and K. Adam Christian Jr., Student Intern

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
D.J.

 

 

            
YOUNG, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      Sargent Major 
(Appellant) contends that his plea of nolo contendere to one count of kidnapping 
should have been rejected by the district court because it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily given.  He also argues 
that the district court erred in denying his pro se motion to withdraw 
his plea.  We 
affirm.

 

[¶2]      Appellant states 
the issues on appeal as:

Did 
the district court err in accepting Mr. Major's no contest plea to the 
kidnapping charge when the record did not demonstrate that the plea was knowing 
and voluntary?

 

Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Major's presentence 
motion to withdraw his guilty [sic] plea?

 

The 
State's statement of the issues is substantively identical to 
Appellant's.

 

[¶3]      On December 4, 
2000, Appellant and a companion escaped from the Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp 
in Weston County.  Three days later, 
the escapees entered the garage of an isolated home as the elderly woman who 
resided there returned.  After 
taking her credit cards and some cash, Appellant and his companion forced her to 
accompany them in her car on a cross-country trip.  The group drove from Wyoming to Lansing, 
Michigan, where Appellant's companion went his own way.  Thereafter, Appellant and the victim 
began to head back west.  They were 
stopped in Junction City, Kansas, where Appellant was arrested and the victim, 
who was not physically harmed during the ordeal, was 
freed.

 

[¶4]      An Information 
dated December 10, 2000, charged Appellant with one count of escape in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  A second Information was filed on 
January 25, 2001, charging Appellant with five felonies: (1) aggravated burglary 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003); (2) 
larceny in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and (c)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003); (3) aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(ii) 
and (c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003); (4) kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-201(a)(ii) or (iii) and (d) (LexisNexis 2003); and (5) kidnapping in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) and (d).  At arraignment, Appellant pleaded not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency to all 
charges.

 

[¶5]      At the request of 
Appellant's appointed counsel, several psychiatric examinations were performed 
on Appellant.  A forensic 
psychologist, who was designated by the defense, concluded that Appellant 
suffered from some "relatively mild neuro-psychological deficits" but "this 
mental illness did not interfere with his capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the alleged criminal conduct."  The evaluation concluded that Appellant 
was competent to stand trial.

 

[¶6]      As the 
proceedings progressed toward trial, Appellant began to express complaints about 
the performance of his appointed counsel.  
Appellant directed his complaints to the Wyoming State Bar and the 
district court.  He requested 
removal of counsel and the appointment of a substitute.  On March 18, 2002, the district court 
held an ex parte hearing with Appellant and his counsel.  Appellant had expressed his opposition 
to a defense based upon a claim of mental illness or deficiency.  Defense counsel responded that based 
upon his contacts with Appellant and the facts of the case, he thought it was 
the most viable defense.1  Next, Appellant complained that defense 
counsel did not communicate with him.  
At the time, Appellant was in the Wyoming State Penitentiary serving the 
sentence that was the basis for his presence in the Honor Camp at the time of 
his escape.  Appellant had also 
spent significant time at the state hospital undergoing a mental health 
evaluation.  Defense counsel cited 
both of these factors as reasons for limited visitations with Appellant.  However, he also noted that he had 
contacted Appellant by phone and in person, and that Appellant was 
misrepresenting the frequency of the contacts.  During the discussion of this matter, it 
became apparent that part of the communication problem related to actions taken 
by personnel at the penitentiary.  
The court directed the State to intervene and help alleviate some of the 
conditions about which Appellant was complaining.  Appellant then complained that his 
counsel had a conflict of interest because counsel had a relationship with the 
victim.  Defense counsel explained 
that he had known the victim's late husband, who had been a prosecutor in Weston 
County for many years.  Counsel had 
noted that he met the victim only once at a conference many years ago.  He indicated that his passing 
acquaintance with the victim had worked to the defense's advantage since the 
victim consented to an interview.

 

[¶7]      Appellant's 
final, and main, complaint was that defense counsel had failed to investigate a 
potential defense that he wanted to pursue.  Specifically, he insisted that the 
victim was not kidnapped because she had accompanied him voluntarily.  Appellant contended that there were 
various witnesses2 in Michigan who could confirm that 
the victim had several opportunities to escape or to inform third parties that 
she was being held against her will, but she never did either.  Counsel countered that to the extent he 
had been able to locate any of the witnesses, they simply did not support 
Appellant's story.  Counsel also 
noted that the victim completely denied Appellant's allegations and he just did 
not believe Appellant was advancing a plausible defense.  At that point in the hearing, Appellant 
informed the court that he thought his counsel was a good lawyer, that he did 
not want him replaced, and that all he really wanted was for the witnesses he 
had identified to be contacted.  
Defense counsel replied that he would attempt to do so, though he was not 
optimistic about locating them or that they would support Appellant's 
position.  After hearing all of 
this, the district court concluded that it would not allow defense counsel to 
withdraw absent a competent replacement.  
Appellant concurred in the decision noting that his preference was to 
retain his current counsel.

 

[¶8]      Eleven days 
later, a change of plea hearing was held.  
Appellant appeared and entered a plea of guilty to the escape 
charge.  After the district court 
accepted the plea, Appellant complained about his attorney and requested a new 
one to handle the remaining charges against him.  The crux of Appellant's complaint was 
that counsel was not going to call the witnesses from Michigan to testify at 
trial.  Defense counsel explained 
that he could not locate some of the witnesses and those that he had found 
either could not remember Appellant or their stories did not agree with 
Appellant's.  The court noted that 
Appellant had said he wanted to retain defense counsel at the March 18 hearing 
and that there was no reason to allow a change of counsel at such a late date 
just four days before the scheduled trial on April 1.  Accordingly, the court denied 
Appellant's request for new counsel.

 

[¶9]      After a short 
discussion with Appellant about the consequences of self-representation, the 
court asked if there was anything else, at which point Appellant replied, 
"Yeah.  How can I get all this mess 
settled now, right here right now?"  
The hearing was recessed so that Appellant could consult with 
counsel.  When the hearing resumed, 
the parties announced that a plea agreement had been reached.  In exchange for a no contest plea to a 
single count of kidnapping, the State agreed to dismiss the other four pending 
counts against Appellant.3  After reviewing the proposed plea 
agreement, the court questioned Appellant on whether he understood the agreement 
and the attendant consequences.  
Appellant repeatedly insisted that he understood the plea and that it was 
what he wanted to do.  The district 
court noted that the plea was being made with a complete understanding by 
Appellant of the pending charges and the attendant penalties, along with the 
rights that were being waived by making the plea.  The court then accepted the no contest 
plea.

 

[¶10]   Appellant's sentencing hearing 
commenced on August 21, 2002.  Just 
prior to the hearing, Appellant presented to the court and counsel a pro se motion to withdraw his no contest 
plea on the kidnapping charge.  The 
sole basis of the motion was a contention by Appellant that he had been denied 
his constitutional right to adequate legal representation.  The crux of Appellant's motion was the 
allegation that defense counsel had failed to develop a defense based on the 
existence of exculpatory witnesses identified by Appellant.  When the court asked Appellant if he 
wanted to elaborate on his motion, he declined saying that the motion was 
self-explanatory.  After hearing 
from the State, the district court concluded that Appellant had received 
adequate representation, and that there was no fair or just reason to allow 
withdrawal of the plea.  The court 
proceeded to sentence Appellant, who has now brought this appeal challenging the 
validity of his no contest plea to kidnapping.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]   For purposes of appellate review, a 
nolo contendere plea is functionally equivalent to a guilty plea.  Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶11, 53 P.3d 94, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1993)).  A guilty plea must be made knowingly and 
voluntarily.  Id. (quoting McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 372 
(Wyo. 1994) and Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)). Whether or not a plea 
was knowing and voluntary is determined by an analysis within the context of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11:

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
11(d) requires a district court to assure that a plea is voluntary and not the 
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.  The purpose of this rule is to allow the 
judge to determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the consequences of the plea.  Smallwood v. State, 748 P.2d 1141, 1143 
(Wyo. 1988).  This court looks to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a plea.  Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶9, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001). The well defined standard for determining whether a plea 
was knowing and voluntary provides:

 

"[A] 
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including 
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. 
bribes)."

 

Brady 
v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 
572 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S. Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1958)); see 
also State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 139 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

Schade 
v. State, 
2002 WY 133, ¶9, 53 P.3d 551, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶12]   Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(d), if a 
motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea is made prior to the imposition of 
sentence, then the court may permit withdrawal upon a showing by the defendant 
of any fair and just reason.  Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶7, 29 P.3d 86, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).  A defendant 
does not possess an absolute right to withdraw his plea before sentence is 
imposed and where the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been complied with and 
the defendant entered into the plea knowingly and voluntarily, the district 
court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw is within its discretion.  Id. (citing Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929-30 
(Wyo. 1999)).

 

In 
deciding whether or not a trial court abused its discretion, this court must 
"determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and 
whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious."  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶44, 46 P.3d 309, ¶44 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Cook v. 
State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 Wyo. 2000) and Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 

Herrera 
v. State, 
2003 WY 25, ¶10, 64 P.3d 724, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003). 

 

[¶13]   In Frame, we set forth seven 
factors that we identified as pertinent to the exercise of a trial court's 
discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea:  (1) whether the defendant has asserted 
his innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether 
the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would 
substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel 
was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) 
whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources.  Frame, ¶7 (citing United 
States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2000) and 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 2001)); see also 
Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶¶11-12, 55 P.3d 29, ¶¶11-12 (Wyo. 2002).  The State contends that the factors set 
out in Frame and Doles are considered only in situations where the 
defendant is claiming that ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a 
coerced guilty plea.  In other 
situations, such as here, the State suggests that review should be limited to a 
determination of whether a plausible, just, and fair reason was offered for the 
plea withdrawal and whether a knowing and voluntary plea was entered in 
compliance with Rule 11.  Appellant 
counters that nothing in our decisions in Frame and Doles 
justifies such a narrow interpretation, and that the factors simply provide 
guidance for determining whether a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea has 
been presented.

 

[¶14]   Appellant is correct.  Our intention in setting out the list of 
factors in Frame was to provide guidance to the trial courts in making 
the determination of whether a defendant has presented a fair and just reason in 
support of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Frame, ¶7 ("Seven factors have 
been suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the [trial] court's 
discretion.").  The factors were 
also intended to assist us in reviewing the district court's decision.  There is nothing in either Frame 
or Doles that limits consideration of these factors to a particular 
factual scenario.  The factors may 
be applied whenever a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing is 
made.  We emphasize, however, that 
the factors were offered in Frame as a guide to the considerations that 
may be relevant in determining a motion to withdraw and consideration on the 
record of each specific factor by the court is not mandatory.4  No single factor is dispositive, and the 
ultimate determination on the motion is based upon whether the defendant has 
carried his burden of establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawal.  Doles, ¶13.

 

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   In his first issue, Appellant 
claims that his plea was neither knowing nor voluntary. Appellant stresses two 
factors in support of his contention that his plea was infirm:  (1) his mental illness and (2) his 
contentious relationship with defense counsel.  With respect to his mental condition, 
Appellant contends that the district court failed to take into account that it 
may have affected his ability to understand the proceedings.  Specifically, Appellant points to his 
memory problems, which were noted in the psychological evaluations.  He insists that the fact that he was 
competent to stand trial was not dispositive of whether his plea was voluntary 
and knowing.  Appellant contends 
that his obvious mental impairments should have put the court on notice that 
there were questions concerning his ability to plead knowingly and 
voluntarily.  He complains that the 
trial court made no effort to accommodate or treat with solicitude his mental 
impairment.

 

[¶16]   In making his arguments, Appellant 
acknowledges that the district court complied with the requirements of Rule 
11.  However, Appellant contends 
that the compliance was strictly technical and the spirit of the rule was not 
adhered to.  At the beginning of the 
hearing when Appellant offered his no contest plea to kidnapping, Appellant 
pleaded guilty to the escape charge.  
Under Rule 11, advisements must be given to the defendant on the rights 
he possesses including the right to counsel, to persist in a not guilty plea, 
and to a jury trial, among others.  
W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(2)-(5).  If 
the court has already advised the defendant of his rights on the record and in 
the presence of counsel, then the court does not have to repeat the 
advisements.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(b).  Appellant received those advisements 
during the plea colloquy on the escape charge.  He complains that while the court was 
not technically required to give the advisements again during the plea colloquy 
on the kidnapping charge, the court should have done so in light of his mental 
impairment and related memory problems.  
The failure to do so deprived the no contest plea on the kidnapping 
charge of voluntariness and left it impossible to say that Appellant had given 
the plea knowledgeably.  In short, 
Appellant contends that a prior determination that he was competent to plead on 
the escape charge did not automatically render his plea on the kidnapping charge 
knowing and voluntary.

 

[¶17]   Appellant also cites the 
contentious nature of his relationship with defense counsel as a basis for 
concluding that his plea was not voluntary.  He claims that he was under coercive 
pressure to plead out on the kidnapping charge because the lack of communication 
with his counsel left him in a position where there was no meaningful choice but 
to accept the plea agreement.  
Appellant alleges that defense counsel effectively pressured him into 
pleading because defense counsel: (1) did not adequately investigate the case, 
especially Appellant's claims that there were witnesses who would verify his 
contention that the victim had accompanied and remained with him voluntarily; 
(2) was not ready for trial; (3) did not communicate with Appellant; (4) 
expressed a desire not to represent Appellant; and (5) was more concerned with 
protecting his own professional interests than with protecting Appellant's right 
to a fair proceeding.  According to 
Appellant, these problems with defense counsel's representation "snowballed" 
into an involuntary plea.

 

[¶18]   We begin with a review of the plea 
proceedings.  The hearing was 
originally scheduled for the purpose of Appellant changing his plea on the 
escape charge to guilty.  The 
district court gave Appellant the extended advisement on his rights and the 
penalties associated with the escape charge as required by Rule 11.  Appellant entered his guilty plea, and a 
factual basis was supplied for the plea.  
At that point, the court mentioned that trial was scheduled to commence 
in four days on the remaining charges.  
Appellant interjected a request for new counsel for the trial.  The basis of Appellant's request was his 
frustration with what he perceived as defense counsel's failure to adequately 
pursue a defense based upon the theory that the victim had voluntarily 
accompanied him.  Defense counsel 
responded with a detailed description of his investigation of the witnesses 
cited by Appellant and explained that those who could be located did not support 
Appellant's theory.  The district 
court denied the request for new counsel citing the proximity of trial.  A discussion arose about the possibility 
of self-representation with the district court informing Appellant of his right 
to do so but also pointing out the drawbacks to that course of action.  It is at this point when Appellant 
inquired into the possibility of pleading out and avoiding 
trial:

 

THE 
COURT:   Anything else that you would like to 
address?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah.  How can 
I get all this mess settled now, right here right now?

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, there isn't really a way to get it settled and we need 
to have a trial.  The only way to 
settle it would be if there's some offer, if there's some offer that the State 
made that you wanted to accept.  
They're not trying to force you to accept it.  As you will recall, I told you earlier 
if you want to plead not guilty, that is your right to stick with a not guilty 
plea.

 

After 
a discussion about whether Appellant would be able to return to the penitentiary 
that day if he pleaded, the court ordered a break to allow Appellant time to 
consult with his attorney:

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, let's take a break right at this moment and you can 
discuss the issue with your attorney, and then he'll come and get me and we'll 
deal with whatever is left.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Well, I'm willing to plead to whatever you guys want.  Couple lifes, three lifes.  Whatever.  Don't matter 
anymore.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, I want you to thoroughly discuss it with your attorney 
and 

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  It's ridiculous.

 

THE 
COURT:  We'll be in recess.

 

After 
a twenty-eight minute recess, the parties returned to 
court:

 

THE 
COURT:   Mr. Major, have you discussed this with your attorney 
now?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah.

 

THE 
COURT:  And what do you want to do?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Huh?

 

THE 
COURT:  What do you want to do?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Just give me the time.  Whatever you guys are going to give me. 
I don't care.

 

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, Mr. Major has advised me that he would agree to 
accept the recommendation, the offer of the State which was that in exchange for 
a  that they would dismiss  he'd plead to the kidnapping charge which alleges 
that she was returned unharmed prior to trial, which therefore carries a maximum 
of 20 years, and that they would dismiss the other counts in that 
Information.  And Mr. Majors [sic] 
has advised me that he would offer a plea of no contest to the 
kidnapping.

Is 
that correct?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah.  
Sure.  Whatever.  Sure.  Whatever.

 

THE 
COURT:  Are we talking amending Count IV then, the unlawful 
confinement?  Or would it be Count 
V, the unlawful removal count in 

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  I 
guess the State's  it would be Count V, Judge.

 

THE 
COURT:  All right.

Mr. 
Major, the offer then by the State is that they would dismiss Counts I, II, III 
and IV for your plea to the kidnapping charge in Count V, except that they are 
amending the charge in Count V to allege that you  or that  yes, that you did 
release the victim unharmed in a safe place prior to trial.  The effect of the change in Count V 
reduces the maximum penalty from life imprisonment to a maximum of 20 
years.

Is 
that your understanding?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah.  
Sure.  
Whatever.

 

After 
explaining the allegations contained within the amended charge and the penalties 
attached thereto, the court inquired into Appellant's understanding and 
intention: 

 

THE 
COURT:   Do you feel you understand the charge in Count V as it's now 
amended?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I understand perfectly.

 

THE 
COURT:  Pardon?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I understand it all.

 

THE 
COURT:  Do you feel you understand the possibly [sic] 
penalties?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yep.

 

THE 
COURT:  Do you have any questions at this time?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Nope.

 

THE 
COURT:  All right.  Are 
you ready at this time to enter your plea to the amended charge in Count 
V?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yep.

 

THE 
COURT:  Would you please stand.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Stand up?  I 
get f------ if I stand up now?

 

THE 
COURT:  To the charge as amended in Count V that on or about December 
4, 2000, you did remove another, [the victim], from her place of residence or 
from the vicinity where she was at the time of removal, with intent to hold her 
as a shield or hostage, facilitate the commission of a felony, or terrorize her, 
and you did release her substantially unharmed in a safe place prior to trial, 
in violation of Wyoming Statute Section 6-2-201(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) what is 
your plea?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  What?  No 
contest.

 

THE 
COURT:  You want to enter a no contest plea?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I'm not going to tell you I did it.

 

THE 
COURT:  All right.  You 
may be seated.

Now, 
I want you to understand that if I accept a no contest plea, as I told you 
before, it would allow the Court to treat you as if you had pled 
guilty.

A 
no contest plea means that you do not contest the charges, but it means that in 
this case the Court would be able to enter a conviction.  The trade off here for you is obviously 
the dismissal of Counts I through IV and the amendment to Count 
V.

You 
understand that this is the trade off?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT: Sure.

 

THE 
COURT:  And is this the reason that you're entering or wanting to 
enter the no contest plea?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  What?

 

THE 
COURT:  Is it the dismissal of the other charges and the amendment to 
the charge part of the reason that you're entering a no contest 
plea?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  No.  I'm 
screwed anyway so it don't really matter.  
That's fine.  I entered my 
plea.  Give me my sentence.  Let me get on my way 
already.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, I would be doing a sentence at a later time so I could 
have an opportunity to look at your background.  Because, as I said, the maximum is 30 
[sic] years.  I'm not necessarily 
going to give you 30 [sic] years unless it were absolutely 
appropriate.

Chances 
are 

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  How am I going to help myself?  Twenty years in jail is life.  Get it through your head, 
man.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, Mr. Major, I want to make sure that you understand what 
would happen if the Court accepts this no contest plea.  And I want to make sure that it's a 
decision that you want to follow because we're set ready to go to trial on 
Monday.  And you can have a trial on 
all these charges.

 

If 
you feel that you have a better chance at being found not guilty, then you can 
go to trial.  If you feel that it 
would be better for you because of dismissal of four counts and an amendment of 
Count V to have the Court accept the no contest plea, then we'll go that 
direction.

In 
other words, the decision has to be yours.  
I know you are unhappy at this point because of the charges, and because 
of maybe the way your confinement has gone but you still need to make an 
intelligent  or try to make an intelligent decision on what you want to 
do.

So 
if I accept the no contest plea, I would enter the conviction of guilty.  We would have a sentencing date, and I 
would dismiss Counts I through IV.  
And, of course, you're pleading to an amended charge so that would 
automatically be considered amended.  
So it does reduce the maximum possible penalties that I could 
enter.

And 
I'm promising you I would give a very careful look at your record and pay 
attention to your background and decide based upon that what the sentence should 
be.  I'm telling you the maximum is 
30 [sic] years.  I'm not telling you 
I'm going to give you 30 [sic] years.

You 
said 20, that's a lifetime.  You're 
probably right.  That is a 
lifetime.  That's a long period of 
time.  So I'm not necessarily going 
to give you 20 years either.  I 
don't know what I'll give you because I don't know enough about you. 

But 
it is difficult when, you know, you're acting just mad at me and at your 
attorney that I can know what your background is.  But I want you to understand that I have 
to tell you what the maximum is, and I have to tell you that if I accept it, 
then the trial would be cancelled and we would just go forward with the 
sentencing where I would hear about your background.  I wouldn't hear anymore really about the 
alleged crime.

So 
do you want me to accept the no contest plea or do you want to have this matter 
go to trial?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  No.  It's the 
same outcome.  Can we just get it 
over now?

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, I don't know whether it would be the same outcome.  But if you feel it would be, then you're 
probably best to have the Court accept this no contest 
plea.

Is 
that what you would rather me do?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yeah.

 

The 
State proceeded to give a factual basis for the plea.  The following colloquy between the court 
and Appellant occurred before the acceptance of the plea:

 

THE 
COURT:  All right.  Mr. 
Major, is there any reason the Court should not accept the no contest 
plea?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  I have no idea.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, do you want me to accept it?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Sure.  If you 
want, go ahead.

 

THE 
COURT:  Well, it's up to you; not up to me.  If you say yes, you want me to accept 
it, we won't have a trial.  If you 
say no, we'll have a trial.

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Sure.

 

THE 
COURT:  Yes, accept it?

 

THE 
DEFENDANT:  Sure.  
Yeah.  It doesn't 
matter.

 

THE 
COURT:  It does matter.

All 
right.  I'm going to find that the 
no contest plea is made freely and voluntarily of the defendant's own free will 
and accord and without any coercion of any kind and without any improper 
inducement.

The 
plea is made with a complete understanding of the charges pending, of the 
penalties, of his plea options, and of the rights waived by the plea of guilty 
plea [sic].

The 
plea is made after consultation with competent counsel.  And I know he's said on the record his 
points where he's not satisfied with his counsel, but the Court finds that he's 
been provided with competent counsel.

The 
defendant is competent to enter the plea, and there's a factual basis upon which 
the plea rests.

 

I'm 
going to accept the plea agreement.

 

[¶19]   To the extent that Appellant is 
challenging his competence to plead, the record does not support his claim.  Contrary to Appellant's 
characterization, the majority rule is that the standard for determining 
competence to stand trial is the same as the standard for determining competence 
to plead.  See Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 395 n.5, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993) 
(Stating that all circuits that had considered the issue except the D.C. and 
Ninth have "determined that the competency standard for pleading guilty is 
identical to the competency standard for standing trial" and collecting cases); 
see also State v. Quarrels, 211 Neb. 204, 318 N.W.2d 76 (Neb. 1982); 
State v. Heral, 25 Ill.App.3d 806, 323 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. 1975); and 
State v. Byrd, 527 P.2d 777 (Ariz. App. 1974).  The psychological evaluations of 
Appellant concluded that he was competent to stand trial, and Appellant does not 
challenge that determination.  
Further, Appellant admits that he was competent to plead guilty to the 
escape charge, which was given at the commencement of the very same hearing 
where the plea on the kidnapping charge was given.

 

[¶20]   This is not to confuse the question 
of competence with the separate question of whether a plea is knowing and 
voluntary.  A failure to follow the 
precepts of Rule 11, for example, could render the subsequent plea unknowing and 
involuntary but that is not related to whether Appellant was competent to 
plead.  The evidence in the record 
shows conclusively that Appellant was competent to plead on the kidnapping 
charge.  Appellant appears to be 
arguing that his alleged mental impairments affected his competence to a degree 
that the district court was required to take extraordinary measures to ensure 
that his plea was knowing and voluntary.  
Appellant cites no legal authority for that proposition.  In any event, the record does not 
support his claim of a mental impairment.  
The psychological evaluations stated that "[t]here is also clear evidence 
in the testing data to support the conclusion that [Appellant's] memory for 
verbal material is more intact than he would like others to believe" and that 
there were "some indications of malingering in regard to [Appellant's] memory 
functioning."  In short, the 
evidence clearly demonstrates that Appellant was competent to plead, and his 
claims of a mental impairment affecting his memory were not 
credible.

 

[¶21]   Appellant contends that his plea 
was coerced because of the adversarial nature of the relationship that had 
developed between him and his counsel.  
The record does not support Appellant's contentions.  The main crux of the dispute between 
Appellant and his counsel concerned Appellant's insistence on a defense based 
upon the theory that the victim had voluntarily accompanied him.  Defense counsel acceded to Appellant's 
request and investigated the plausibility of the theory by contacting or 
attempting to contact the various witnesses identified by Appellant.  The witnesses that defense counsel was 
able to locate failed to support Appellant's story.  This was a question of trial strategy 
and it was incumbent upon defense counsel to offer his opinion to Appellant on 
the efficacy of any defense.  In 
fact, defense counsel would have been remiss in his duty to represent Appellant 
if he had failed to do so.  Here, 
defense counsel advised Appellant that he did not believe the proposed defense 
was viable in light of the facts.  
Simply because Appellant may have disagreed with that advice does not 
mean his plea was coerced.

 

[¶22]   The record does not support the 
other allegations raised by Appellant in regard to his counsel's performance 
either.  Appellant's allegation that 
defense counsel was more interested in protecting his own professional interests 
than ensuring Appellant a fair trial is completely unsupported by any citation 
to the record.  Similarly, 
Appellant's claim that counsel was not prepared for trial is not 
substantiated.  Our review of the 
record shows that defense counsel provided Appellant with effective 
representation.  Initially, counsel 
pursued a defense centered on a contention that Appellant was not guilty by 
reason of a mental impairment.  
Counsel obtained evaluations of Appellant from the state hospital and 
from a forensic psychiatrist designated by the defense.  When communications between defense 
counsel and Appellant were being hindered by security protocols at the 
penitentiary, counsel brought this to the attention of the district court, which 
took action to rectify the situation.  
Despite his misgivings about Appellant's proposed defense, counsel 
undertook an investigation.  
Ultimately, Appellant pleaded guilty to a single count of kidnapping 
pursuant to a plea agreement worked out with the State by defense counsel.  In exchange for Appellant's plea, the 
State dropped four felony counts and the count pleaded to was amended to reduce 
the potential penalty that Appellant was facing from life to twenty years.  The plea agreement appears to be 
reasonable in light of the State's very strong case against Appellant.  Appellant even acknowledged that he 
wanted counsel to represent him and believed that he was "a very good 
attorney."  In sum, the record 
contradicts Appellant's claims that his counsel's representation effectively 
coerced him into pleading.

 

[¶23]   Keeping the above considerations in 
mind, the question remains whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.  We conclude that it was.  While Appellant's attitude, as reflected 
in his responses to the court, could best be described as hostile at times and 
abrupt, it is clear that Appellant understood the consequences of making the 
plea and did so on his own initiative.  
Before accepting the plea, the district court complied with the 
requirements of Rule 11.  Appellant 
was advised of the nature of the plea, the penalties, including the potential 
maximum sentence, associated with the charge he would be pleading to, the rights 
he would be relinquishing, and the consequences if the court accepted the 
plea.  Appellant repeatedly affirmed 
that it was his intent to enter the plea and that he understood the 
proceedings.  The record is clear 
that Appellant entered into the plea agreement on his own volition with full 
awareness of the consequences.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary.

 

[¶24]   In his other issue, Appellant 
claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 
withdraw the no contest plea.  
Appellant's motion was based upon the complaints about his counsel that 
we have already noted.  The motion 
was presented to the court at the outset of the sentencing hearing.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(d), a court may 
allow a plea withdrawal prior to sentencing upon a showing of a just and fair 
reason.  We review the court's 
decision on the motion for an abuse of discretion.  Even if a "plausible" or a "just and 
fair" reason for withdrawal is presented, an abuse of discretion is not 
demonstrated if the requirements of Rule 11 have been met and the record clearly 
shows that the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered the 
plea.  Triplett v. State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶25]   In this case, we do not need to do 
an in-depth review using the factors set out in Frame noted above.  Appellant's motion was based upon his 
complaints regarding his counsel, and we have already set out why those 
complaints did not render the plea unknowing or involuntary.  To the contrary, we noted that Appellant 
entered into the plea intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.  It is evident from the record that 
Appellant failed to supply the district court with any fair and just reason for 
withdrawing the plea.  Also, the 
record manifestly demonstrates the district court's compliance with Rule 11 in 
accepting the plea.  Accordingly, 
denying the motion was a sound exercise of the trial court's discretion, and we 
will not disturb its ruling on appeal.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   Appellant's nolo contendere plea 
was knowing and voluntary, and the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying his motion to withdraw the plea.  Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1The mental 
illness/deficiency defense was withdrawn at a pretrial 
conference.

 

  2The potential 
witnesses cited by Appellant included a checkout clerk at a grocery store, an 
employee at a pizza shop, and two police officers who apparently contacted the 
Appellant in his motel room while inquiring about the occupants of an adjoining 
room.

 

  3The kidnapping 
count subject to the plea was also amended to reflect the fact that the victim 
had been released "substantially unharmed."  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003). This reduced the potential maximum penalty from life to 
twenty years.

 

  4When making an 
argument in favor of a motion to withdraw a plea before the district court, 
however, it would be to the defendant's advantage to present any arguments 
relating to these specific factors, or any others that may arise, which favor 
granting the motion.