Title: People v. Collins

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90679-Agenda 12-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								LONDON COLLINS, Appellee.
	The issue presented is whether the circuit court properly
dismissed defendant's pro se post-conviction petition as frivolous
and patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000). We hold that dismissal was proper.

BACKGROUND
	On August 20, 1998, and as part of a negotiated plea
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS
570/401(a)(2)(B) (West 2000)). As required by Supreme Court
Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)), the circuit court fully
admonished defendant as to the nature of the charge, the statutory
sentencing range, and the rights he would be waiving by pleading
guilty. After determining that defendant's guilty plea was both
voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual basis, the circuit
court accepted the plea and imposed the statutory minimum
sentence of nine years in prison (see 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(B)
(West 2000)). The circuit court then advised defendant that,
although he possessed the right to appeal, that right is contingent
upon the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
vacate the judgment. Defendant filed no such motion, and no
appeal was taken.
	On March 16, 1999, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In the petition, defendant alleged several claims
of error, including the following:
			"I wanted to appeal the case, which my counsel told me
that he will. But never did. that brings me to submitt this
motion. thinking im waiting to go back on appeal. I also
ask him to put me in for a reduction sentence. which he
mislead me. He never submitted that either."
The only attachment to defendant's petition was the following
sworn verification, which states in its entirety:
			"I, London Collins, a prisoner incarcerated in Tamms
Minimum Security Unit, have read and understand the
above Petition for Post Conviction Relief. All the facts
presented are true and correct to the best of my
recollection."
The circuit court dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous and
patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000).
	On October 10, 2000, the appellate court issued its initial
order reversing the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's
petition. In that order, the appellate court concluded that, although
the allegations set forth above stated the gist of a meritorious
constitutional claim, the absence of any supporting documentation
rendered defendant's petition insufficient to justify second-stage
review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). The court therefore remanded the
cause to the circuit court so that defendant could file affidavits
that:
		"minimally address the specifics of the defendant's
attorney's statement that he would appeal the case,
describe in detail all of defendant's subsequent contacts
with his attorney and explain fully the twenty-one month
delay between the defendant's conviction and the filing of
his petition."(1) 
According to the appellate court's order, if defendant successfully
filed the requisite affidavits within the allotted time frame, the
circuit court would be required to docket defendant's petition for
further proceedings. Conversely, if defendant failed to file the
necessary affidavits, "the trial court [would be] free to grant a
motion to dismiss by the State."
	On October 25, 2000, defendant filed a petition for rehearing,
arguing that the appellate court lacked the authority to remand the
cause for the submission of additional affidavits. According to
defendant, once it concluded that defendant's petition stated the
gist of a meritorious constitutional claim, the appellate court was
required to remand the cause for second-stage post-conviction
proceedings, including the appointment of counsel. On October
26, 2000, the State likewise filed a petition for rehearing, arguing
that the appellate court's decision ran afoul of the Act in numerous
ways. In particular, the State argued that (1) the Act does not
contemplate a petition that states the gist of a meritorious claim
but nevertheless is insufficient to justify second-stage review, and
(2) the circuit court would not be "free to grant a motion to
dismiss by the State" based on defendant's failure to submit the
requisite affidavits, as the Act does not permit the filing of such
motions until the second stage of post-conviction review. On
November 17, 2000, the appellate court denied both petitions for
rehearing without comment.
	On November 21, 2000, the appellate court notified the
parties of its intent to file a subsequent opinion in this case. The
next day, the appellate court cancelled the filing of any subsequent
opinions "until further notice." On December 5, 2000, the State
filed in the appellate court a notice of intent to seek leave to
appeal. On December 19, 2000, the State filed its petition for leave
to appeal. Two days later, the appellate court withdrew its order of
October 10, 2000, and informed the parties of its intent to file a
new opinion in the case at a later but unspecified date. On
December 28, 2000, defendant filed a motion in the appellate court
requesting reinstatement of the appellate court's original order,
arguing that the appellate court lost jurisdiction over the case when
the State filed its petition for leave to appeal. On December 29,
2000, and without disposing of defendant's motion to reinstate, the
appellate court issued a new opinion.
	In its new opinion, the appellate court again reversed the
circuit court's dismissal of defendant's petition. 319 Ill. App. 3d
193. As in its initial order, the appellate court concluded that the
contested portion of defendant's petition stated the gist of a
meritorious constitutional claim. Contrary to its initial order,
however, the court this time concluded that the absence of
supporting affidavits did not render defendant's petition legally
insufficient. Specifically, the court held that the absence of such
documentation was both "unsurprising" and "justified," given that
defendant was "incarcerated, indigent and apparently barely
literate." Moreover, because the only other likely witness to the
alleged conversation was the attorney that defendant now claims
was ineffective, it would be "both oppressive and unfair" to
require independent evidence of that conversation beyond
defendant's sworn verification. Consequently, the appellate court
reversed the circuit court's summary dismissal of defendant's
petition and remanded the cause for second-stage post-conviction
proceedings.
	The State subsequently filed a motion to substitute a new
petition for leave to appeal for the one originally filed in this court,
and this court granted both the motion and the petition.177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must address the validity of the appellate court's second decision in this case. In
People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 305 (1994), this court
unanimously held that, once a petition for leave to appeal is filed
in this court, the appellate court loses jurisdiction over the cause
and may not file any additional opinions. Here, the appellate court
issued its second opinion sua sponte on December 29, 2000, 10
days after the State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. The
appellate court's December 29, 2000, decision therefore is void for
a lack of jurisdiction, and we order the appellate court to withdraw
that opinion and reinstate its decision of October 10, 2000. See
Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d  at 305. 
	We now turn to the merits. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) establishes a procedure for determining whether a criminal
defendant was convicted in substantial violation of his or her
constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2000).
Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of a
petition in the circuit court in which the conviction occurred. 725
ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000). The petition must identify the
proceeding in which the conviction occurred, state the date of the
contested final judgment, and clearly identify the alleged
constitutional violations. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000). In
addition, the petition must be both verified by affidavit (725 ILCS
5/122-1(b) (West 2000)) and supported by "affidavits, records, or
other evidence" (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000)). If such
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" are unavailable, the
petition must explain why. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000).
	Upon the petition's filing, the circuit court has 90 days in
which to review the petition and determine whether, on its face,
"the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). If the circuit court determines that
the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, it "shall
dismiss the petition in a written order." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)
(West 2000). A post-conviction petition is considered frivolous or
patently without merit if the petition's allegations, taken as true,
fail to present the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim. People
v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Moreover, the failure to
either attach the necessary "affidavits, records, or other evidence"
or explain their absence is "fatal" to a post-conviction petition
(People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 414 (1999)) and by itself
justifies the petition's summary dismissal (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998), quoting People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26
(1952)). We review the dismissal of a post-conviction petition de
novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389.
	In this case, the circuit court properly dismissed defendant's
pro se post-conviction petition. Contrary to the clear mandate of
section 122-2 of the Act, defendant's petition was unsupported by
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" and offered no explanation
for the absence of such documentation. This fact alone justifies the
summary dismissal of defendant's petition. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 380; Jennings, 411 Ill.  at 26.
	In reaching this result, we necessarily reject defendant's
contention that his sworn verification can serve as a substitute for
the "affidavits, records, or other evidence" mandated by section
122-2. First, the Act itself clearly distinguishes between the sworn
verification that defendant filed and the supporting "affidavits,
records, or other evidence" that defendant neglected to file. The
necessity of a sworn verification is addressed in section 122-1 of
the Act, which provides that a post-conviction proceeding is
initiated by the filing of a petition "verified by affidavit." 725
ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2000). The necessity of attaching
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" to the petition is addressed
in section 122-2, which provides that "[t]he petition shall have
attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting
its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached."
(Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000). Thus, under
the plain language of the Act, the sworn verification described in
section 122-1 serves a purpose wholly distinct from the
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" described in section 122-2.
The former, like all pleading verifications, confirms that the
allegations are brought truthfully and in good faith. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 120 (1990). The latter,
by contrast, shows that the verified allegations are capable of
objective or independent corroboration. To equate the two is not
only to confuse the purposes of subjective verification and
independent corroboration but also to render the "affidavits,
records, or other evidence" requirement of section 122-2
meaningless surplusage. We will not adopt such a reading. See
People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 350 (2001) (statute should be
construed so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless). 
	Moreover, the two decisions upon which defendant
principally relies are clearly distinguishable from this case.
Defendant insists that both People v. Washington, 38 Ill. 2d 446
(1967), and People v. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1 (1970), stand for the
proposition that a sworn verification is all that is needed to
substantiate a post-conviction claim arising from discussions
between a criminal defendant and his attorney. Defendant
misreads these decisions. To be sure, in both Washington and
Williams, the post-conviction petitions contained claims arising
from conversations between the defendant and his attorney and
were supported only by the defendant's sworn verification. But in
Washington, the petition also contained an explanation as to why
the necessary "affidavits, records, or other evidence" were
unobtainable. Thus, the petition in Washington explicitly complied
with section 122-2's mandate that a post-conviction petition "shall
have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not
attached." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000).
Similarly, in Williams, the defendant alleged that he relied upon
certain misrepresentations that were "whispered to him" by his
attorney following the entry of his guilty plea. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 
at 2. Thus, although the petition in Williams did not explicitly
explain why "affidavits, records, or other evidence" were not
attached, it did contain facts from which this court easily inferred
that "the only affidavit that petitioner could possibly have
furnished, other than his own sworn statement, would have been
that of his attorney." Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 4. In stark contrast, the
post-conviction petition that defendant filed in this case complies
with neither the letter nor the substance of section 122-2, as it
lacks not only an explanation for the absence of supporting
evidence but also even a single allegation from which such an
explanation could reasonably be inferred.
	We recognize, of course, that requiring the attachment of
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" will, in some cases, place
an unreasonable burden upon post-conviction petitioners. Indeed,
Washington and Williams are two such cases. This does not mean,
however, that the petitioners in such cases are relieved of bearing
any burden whatsoever. On the contrary, section 122-2 makes
clear that the petitioner who is unable to obtain the necessary
"affidavits, records, or other evidence" must at least explain why
such evidence is unobtainable. In this case, defendant is asking to
be excused not only from section 122-2's evidentiary
requirements but also from section 122-2's pleading requirements.
Nothing in the Act authorizes such a comprehensive departure.
	Finally, we note that our recent decision in People v.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001), has no application to this case.
Although factually quite similar to the present case, Edwards
addressed a wholly distinct question. The issue in Edwards was
whether the factual allegations set forth in the defendant's post-conviction petition stated the gist of a meritorious claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In analyzing that question, this
court had neither reason nor occasion to assess the sufficiency of
the petition's supporting documentation. In fact, the opinion in
Edwards does not even describe what, if any, supporting evidence
was attached to the petition. We therefore reject defendant's
contention that Edwards dictates an affirmance of the appellate
court's decision in this case.

CONCLUSION
	Because defendant's pro se post-conviction petition included
neither "affidavits, records, or other evidence" supporting his
claims nor an explanation as to why such supporting evidence was
lacking, the circuit court properly dismissed that petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	The majority holds that defendant's post-conviction petition
must be summarily dismissed because, even though defendant
provided a sworn affidavit verifying the petition, he did not attach
to the petition a second, evidentiary affidavit in support of his
constitutional claim. In reaching this holding, the majority
attempts to distinguish this court's decision in People v. Williams,
47 Ill. 2d 1 (1970), on its facts. However, the majority's recitation
of the facts in Williams is inaccurate. The facts in that case,
properly understood, cannot be distinguished from those in the
present appeal. Williams stands as controlling authority on the
issue of the adequacy of the attachments to defendant's post-conviction petition. Accordingly, I dissent.
	In Williams, the defendant alleged in a post-conviction
petition that he was induced to plead guilty by misrepresentations
made by his attorney. The petition was verified by the defendant's
sworn statement but no additional affidavits were attached. The
State, like the majority today, argued that the petition should be
dismissed "because, contrary to the requirements of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, satisfactory affidavits were not attached
to the petition" and because no reasons were "given for the
absence of such affidavits." Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 3. This court
squarely rejected that argument, noting that the only additional
affidavit the defendant could possibly have furnished to support
his claim, other than his own sworn statement, would have been
that of the very attorney who allegedly made the
misrepresentations. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 4.
	Attempting to distinguish the facts in the present case from
those in Williams, the majority states,
		"[I]n Williams, the defendant alleged that he relied upon
certain misrepresentations that were 'whispered to him'
by his attorney following the entry of his guilty plea.
Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 2. Thus, although the petition in
Williams did not explicitly explain why 'affidavits,
records, or other evidence' were not attached, it did
contain facts from which this court easily inferred that
'the only affidavit that petitioner could possibly have
furnished, other than his own sworn statement, would
have been that of his attorney.' Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 4."
Slip op. at 7.
The majority's attempt to distinguish Williams rests exclusively on
the assumption that the defendant in that case in some way "relied
upon" his attorney's whispered comments. According to the
majority, it was the whispered nature of the misrepresentations in
Williams which made it impossible for the defendant to provide
any other affidavit in support of his post-conviction claim. But this
reading of Williams is incorrect. The defendant in Williams did not
allege that he "relied upon" his attorney's whispered comments.
This court's holding in Williams was not based on that distinction.
	The actual allegations made by the defendant in Williams
were:
			"In his [post-conviction] petition defendant [Williams]
alleged, among other things, that his constitutional rights
were violated in that he was induced to plead guilty by
representation of his attorney that the State would agree to
a sentence of six months to one year in the county jail
instead of seeking a sentence of 40 to 80 years in the
penitentiary if he went to trial, and further, that even after
the court imposed a sentence of three to seven years, his
counsel whispered to him that the court would call him
back and give him one year in the county jail. The
petition, though sworn to by defendant, was unsupported
by any other affidavits." Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 2.
	The foregoing quotation is this court's only description of the
allegations set forth in the defendant's post-conviction petition in
Williams. Nowhere in that quotation does this court state that "the
defendant alleged that he relied upon" (slip op. at 7) his attorney's
whispered comments. Nor, for that matter, does this court make
that statement anywhere else in the Williams opinion. The simple
fact is that, contrary to the majority's assertions in the case at bar,
the defendant in Williams did not allege that he "relied upon" the
whispered comments that were made by his attorney after sentence
had been pronounced. The reason this allegation was not made is
readily understood when one considers the nature of the
constitutional claim at issue.
	The defendant in Williams alleged that, prior to entering his
plea, his attorney made certain representations regarding the length
of sentence he might receive if he were to plead guilty. Based on
these representations, which were inaccurate, the defendant
alleged that he was induced to plead guilty. Accordingly, the
constitutional claim raised by the defendant in Williams was that
his decision to plead guilty was involuntary, and thus violated due
process, because it was based upon inaccurate information given
to him by his attorney. The defendant further stated in his post-conviction petition that his attorney made whispered comments to
him after sentence was pronounced. But the events that occurred
after defendant entered his plea and after he was sentenced
logically had no bearing on his claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary and therefore played no part in this court's decision.
	There was only one constitutional claim raised in Williams
that bore any relation to attorney comments, whispered or
otherwise.(2) That claim was the defendant's allegation that he was
induced to plead guilty by his attorney's misrepresentations. Of
necessity, therefore, when the majority states that the defendant in
Williams "relied upon" his attorney's whispered comments
(although this reliance is mentioned nowhere in the opinion) the
majority must be saying that the whispered comments had some
relevance to the defendant's claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary. But this position is untenable. How could the
defendant in Williams have "relied upon" the whispered comments
in deciding whether to plead guilty, when those comments came
after the defendant had entered his plea and after the court had
pronounced sentence? The obvious answer is that the defendant
could not and did not. The majority's statement that the defendant
in Williams "relied upon" his attorney's whispered comments is
false. Consequently, the majority's attempt to distinguish Williams
fails.
	As noted, this court in Williams rejected the State's argument
that the defendant's post-conviction petition should be dismissed
because it was not supported by a second, evidentiary affidavit.
This court held:
			"The State's only contention is that the petition is
insufficient to entitle petitioner to a hearing in that it was
not accompanied by supporting affidavits. But the only
affidavit that petitioner could possibly have furnished,
other than his own sworn statement, would have been that
of his attorney who allegedly made the misrepresentation
to him. The difficulty or impossibility of obtaining such
an affidavit is self-apparent. In People v. Wegner, 40 Ill. 2d 28, where similar allegations of misrepresentations of
counsel as to sentence were made, we held that dismissal
of the petition without a hearing was improper; that
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing even
though the State had filed a counteraffidavit of
defendant's attorney in which he denied making the
statement attributed to him. It would certainly follow that
if a defendant is entitled to a hearing despite a
counteraffidavit of his attorney denying the allegations of
the petition then a defendant should not be denied a
hearing merely because he did not obtain a supporting
affidavit from the attorney who represented him at the
time of his plea.
			Under such circumstances, to so strictly construe the
Act as requested by the State would defeat its very
purpose by denying petitioner a hearing on the factual
issue raised by the pleadings. However, as stated in
People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, we do not intend hereby to
lessen the duty of petitioners under the Act to make a
substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights,
for the allegations of mere conclusions to that effect under
oath will not suffice. We do find that in this case the
sworn statements of petitioner warrant a fair inference of
a violation of constitutional rights which are not negated
by the State nor by the record, and that an evidentiary
hearing is required to determine the truth or falsity of
petitioner's allegations." Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 4-5.
	Notably, this court's holding in Williams makes no mention
of the defense attorney's whispered comments. Again, this is not
surprising. Because the whispered comments came after defendant
had entered his plea and been sentenced they had no bearing on the
constitutional issue presented, i.e., whether the defendant's plea
was involuntary because it was induced by misrepresentations
made by his attorney.
	Williams is controlling on the issue of whether, for purposes
of surviving summary dismissal, the sworn statement submitted by
defendant in the present case is sufficient to support the claim
presented in his post-conviction petition. Defendant alleges that
his counsel told him he would file an appeal but that counsel failed
to do so. In support of this claim, "the only affidavit that petitioner
could possibly have furnished, other than his own sworn
statement, would have been that of his attorney who allegedly
made the misrepresentation to him. The difficulty or impossibility
of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent." Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 
at 4. Accordingly, the majority in the case at bar errs when it holds
that defendant's post-conviction petition must be summarily
dismissed because defendant failed to attach satisfactory affidavits.
	My colleagues in the majority may be concerned that, by
allowing defendant's sworn affidavit to suffice under the facts of
this case, the standard for obtaining post-conviction relief may, in
some way, be lessened. But as Williams makes clear, defendant's
burden is not diminished. To obtain post-conviction relief,
defendant must still establish a substantial violation of a
constitutional right. Moreover, any concern regarding the lessening
of post-conviction standards is, in fact, much less pressing in the
instant case than it was in Williams. The issue presented in
Williams was whether the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. But the issue in the case at bar is simply whether
defendant's petition survives summary dismissal at the first stage
of post-conviction review. In practical terms, the question
presented in this case is whether defendant, who filed his post-conviction petition pro se, should be permitted to consult with an
attorney regarding his constitutional claim and whether he should
be given the opportunity to have counsel draft his claim into an
appropriate legal form. Under Williams, the lack of a second,
evidentiary affidavit is not a bar to defendant being afforded that
opportunity.
	The majority has inaccurately stated the facts of Williams.
Those facts, with respect to the affidavit issue, are
indistinguishable from the facts in the present case. Williams has
been the law of this state for over 30 years. The majority has
offered no reason to depart from that settled holding. I therefore
dissent.
	JUSTICES FREEMAN and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.
Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	I dissent from the court's denial of rehearing because the
majority opinion in this case is in conflict with People v. Boclair,
Nos. 89388, 89471, 89534 cons. (August 29, 2002), and no
explanation or justification has been offered by the majority for the
discrepancy between the two cases. I also dissent because, as set
forth in detail below, the majority opinion is unsupported by legal
authority and is beset with fundamental analytical flaws.

I
	In Boclair, this court was asked to decide whether a post-conviction petition which has not been filed within the time
limitations set forth in section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000)) and which has
failed to allege facts which show that the delay in filing was not
due to the petitioner's "culpable negligence," may be summarily
dismissed as "frivolous or *** patently without merit" under
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000)). This court concluded that such a petition could not be
summarily dismissed. In so holding, we reasoned that the circuit
court could not consider the timeliness of the post-conviction
petition at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings because
the time limitations were neither included nor mentioned in the
section of the Act which authorizes summary dismissals. We
explained:
			"Section 122-2.1(a)(2) requires the circuit court to
determine within 90 days of the filing of a post-conviction
petition whether the petition is 'frivolous or is patently
without merit.' 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000).
Importantly, we note that this section is silent regarding
timeliness. Rather, timeliness is addressed elsewhere, in
section 122-1(c), instructing defendants as to the time
periods for filing petitions. If this court can ascertain
legislative intent from the plain language of the statute
itself, that intent must prevail. Barnett v. Zion Park
District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996). We will not depart from
the plain language of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the
express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 389.
			Under a plain reading of section 122-2.1(a)(2), the
circuit court may dismiss a post-conviction petition at the
initial stage only if the petition is deemed to be 'frivolous
or patently without merit,' not if it is untimely filed. If the
legislature intended for a trial judge to sua sponte dismiss
a petition as being untimely, it would have so provided in
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act. Instead, the legislature
provided in section 122-5 that the State may file a motion
to dismiss. [Citation.] By addressing timeliness and
frivolousness in separate provisions of the Act, the
legislature plainly intended to draw a distinction between
these two flaws of post-conviction petitions." Boclair, slip
op. at 6-7.
	After reaching the above conclusions, we went on to
determine that the phrase "frivolous or *** patently without merit"
refers only to the substance of the claim alleged in the petition, not
any procedural requirements or limitations imposed by the Act.
We noted:
			"To accept the argument that the circuit court has the
authority to dismiss [an untimely] petition pursuant to
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act we would have to hold,
contrary to the language of the Act, that the phrase
'frivolous or *** patently without merit' encompasses
untimely petitions. We will not ignore the Act's language
and adopt this interpretation. If a petition is untimely that
does not necessarily mean that the petition lacks merit."
Boclair, slip op. at 7.
	We also explained that it would be improper for a circuit court
to consider the timeliness of a post-conviction petition at the
summary dismissal stage because such an inquiry might require
the court to determine whether the petitioner had alleged facts
showing a lack of "culpable negligence" which would excuse the
tardy filing. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000). Making a
determination as to whether a petitioner lacked culpable
negligence, we observed, would require the circuit court to do
more than examine whether the petition alleged a violation of a
constitutional right. We concluded that this would be improper:
			"Moreover, when a circuit court determines whether a
defendant is culpably negligent in filing his petition late,
the circuit court makes an assessment of the defendant's
credibility. See McCain, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 531. At this
initial stage of the proceedings, however, the court should
only determine whether the petition alleges constitutional
deprivations. The process at the summary review stage
measures a petition's substantive virtue rather than its
procedural compliance. See Johnson, 312 Ill. App. 3d at
534. In determining an issue of credibility, the circuit
court necessarily exceeds the boundary set by section
122-2.1(a)(1)." (Emphasis added.) Boclair, slip op. at 8.
	Finally, we noted that it was inappropriate as a matter of
policy for the circuit court to consider the timeliness of a post-conviction petition at the summary dismissal stage because to do
might result in the loss of a meritorious claim of actual innocence.
As we explained:
			"Claims of actual innocence may be raised in a manner
other than in a post-conviction petition, including in a
section 2-1401 motion. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000).
Nonetheless, to allow the circuit court to dismiss
summarily post-conviction petitions for failure to present
evidence of actual innocence in a timely manner could
lead to a miscarriage of justice. Although our criminal
justice system needs finality in criminal litigation and
judgments, it should not come at the expense of justice
and fairness." Boclair, slip op. at 8.
	For the foregoing reasons, we concluded in Boclair that
matters of timeliness must "be left for the State to assert during the
second stage of the post-conviction proceedings." Boclair, slip op.
at 8. During the initial, summary dismissal stage of post-conviction proceedings, Boclair holds, a circuit court may not
consider whether a post-conviction petition has satisfied the
procedural requirement of timeliness.

II
	In the case at bar, the majority holds that the summary
dismissal of defendant's pro se post-conviction petition was
proper because defendant failed to comply with the affidavit
requirement set forth in section 122-2 of the Act (725 ILCS
5/122-2 (West 2000)). That section states, in pertinent part, that
"[t]he petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or
other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the
same are not attached." 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2000).
Defendant's petition does contain an affidavit which attests to the
truthfulness of the claim presented in his petition which is at issue
here, i.e., that his court-appointed attorney failed to comply with
his request to file an appeal. However, according to the majority,
that affidavit serves only to verify the allegations in the petition.
As such, the majority reasons, defendant's affidavit is sufficient to
satisfy section 122-1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West
2000) (post-conviction petition must be verified by affidavit)), but
is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 122-2. Slip op.
at 6.
	To satisfy the affidavit requirement of section 122-2, the
majority holds, defendant should have attached at least one
additional affidavit in support of his post-conviction claim. This
second affidavit is necessary, the majority reasons, to show "that
the verified allegations are capable of objective or independent
corroboration." Slip op. at 6. Presumably, therefore, the additional
affidavit must come from someone other than defendant. The
majority further holds that, in the absence of a second affidavit,
defendant was required to "at least explain why such [objective or
independent] evidence is unobtainable." Slip op. at 7. In the
majority's view, defendant's failure to comply with this latter
"pleading requirement," by itself, warrants summary dismissal of
his post-conviction petition. Slip op. at 5, 7. The majority
emphasizes that it is not deciding in this case whether defendant's
petition alleges a constitutional deprivation. See slip op. at 7
(distinguishing People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001)). Rather,
the majority's holding rests solely on the affidavit requirement of
section 122-2.

III
	The majority opinion in this case conflicts with Boclair at
every significant point in its analysis. For example, the majority
opinion at bar states:
		"Contrary to the clear mandate of section 122-2 of the
Act, defendant's petition was unsupported by 'affidavits,
records, or other evidence' and offered no explanation for
the absence of such documentation. This fact alone
justifies the summary dismissal of defendant's petition."
(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 5.
	The affidavit requirement that the majority finds dispositive
in this case is found in section 122-2 of the Act, not section
122-2.1, the section of the Act which authorizes summary
dismissal. Pursuant to Boclair, a circuit court may not look to any
section of the Act other than section 122-2.1 to determine whether
a post-conviction petition is subject to summary dismissal. See
Boclair, slip op. at 6.
	In addition, Boclair holds that the only inquiry the circuit
court may make at the summary dismissal stage is whether the
post-conviction petition "alleges constitutional deprivations."
Boclair, slip op. at 8. In other words, under Boclair, the circuit
court is limited at the summary dismissal stage to asking whether
the petition states the " 'gist of a constitutional claim.' " Boclair,
slip op. at 6, 8, quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418
(1996). According to Boclair, matters of "procedural compliance"
(Boclair, slip op. at 8) may not be considered in the initial stage of
post-conviction review.
	In contrast, the majority opinion in the case at bar does not
consider whether defendant's petition successfully alleges a
constitutional deprivation by stating the gist of a constitutional
claim. Instead, the majority concerns itself solely with whether
defendant complied with the affidavit requirement of section
122-2. In contrast to Boclair, the majority in this case holds that
the circuit court should consider whether a pro se defendant has
complied with the Act's procedural requirements at the initial
stage of post-conviction review. The majority holds that a pro se
defendant's failure to explain the absence of a second affidavit is
sufficient reason, standing alone, to summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition (slip op. at 5, 7), even though the failure to
provide that explanation "does not necessarily mean that the
petition lacks merit" (Boclair, slip op. at 7).
	The majority opinion in the case at bar also conflicts with the
policy concerns expressed in Boclair. As noted, the majority in
this case holds that a pro se post-conviction petition should be
summarily dismissed if it fails to comply with one of the pleading
requirements set forth in section 122-2 of the Act. Section 122-2
provides, in full:
			"The petition shall identify the proceeding in which the
petitioner was convicted, give the date of the rendition of
the final judgment complained of, and clearly set forth the
respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated. The petition shall have attached thereto
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.
The petition shall identify any previous proceedings that
the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his
conviction. Argument and citations and discussion of
authorities shall be omitted from the petition." 725 ILCS
5/122-2 (West 2000).
	According to the majority, defendant in this case failed to
satisfy section 122-2's requirement that he "at least explain" why
a second affidavit was not attached to his petition. Slip op. at 7.
Therefore, the majority holds, his petition was properly dismissed
at the summary review stage. Slip op. at 7. Notably, in reaching
this conclusion, the majority chooses not to provide defendant
with the opportunity to amend his post-conviction petition with an
explanation for why an additional affidavit is unavailable. Our
case law would permit such an amendment. See People v. Watson,
187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999). Nevertheless, the majority holds that
defendant's petition should be finally dismissed.
	The majority's decision not to permit any amendment of
defendant's post-conviction petition is of considerable importance.
Under this holding, it is possible that a pro se defendant who has
a meritorious constitutional claim, including a claim of actual
innocence, may never have that claim reviewed by the courts
solely because of a technical pleading defect that is easily subject
to correction through amendment. The majority recognizes that its
holding "will, in some cases, place an unreasonable burden upon
post-conviction petitioners." Slip op. at 7. However, the majority
feels constrained by the language of the Act to reach this result.
See slip op. at 7 ("[n]othing in the Act" authorizes the circuit court
to depart from section 122-2's pleading requirements at the
summary dismissal stage).
	Boclair reaches a contrary result. In Boclair, we held that it
would be a "miscarriage of justice" for a meritorious claim of
actual innocence to evade judicial review because of a procedural
deficiency in the post-conviction petition. According to Boclair,
allowing a claim of actual innocence to be lost because of a
procedural deficiency would be contrary to principles of "justice
and fairness." Boclair, slip op. at 8.
	In sum:
			 The majority opinion in this case holds that, in
determining whether a pro se post-conviction petition is
subject to summary dismissal, the circuit court should
look beyond section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act and consider
whether the petition has complied with the pleading
requirements set forth in section 122-2. Boclair holds that
the circuit court may not consider sections of the Act
other than section 122-2.1(a)(2).
			 The majority opinion in this case upholds the
summary dismissal of defendant's petition without
considering whether defendant's petition states the gist of
a constitutional claim. Boclair holds that the circuit court
may dismiss a post-conviction petition at the initial stage
of review only if the petition fails to state the gist of a
constitutional claim.
			 The majority opinion in this case holds that a technical
pleading deficiency in a pro se post-conviction petition
warrants its summary dismissal. Boclair holds that, at the
summary dismissal stage, the circuit court should not
consider whether the petition is in "procedural
compliance." Boclair, slip op. at 8.
			 The majority opinion in this case holds that the
language of the Act requires strict procedural compliance
from pro se post-conviction petitioners at the summary
dismissal stage. Boclair holds that such compliance may
not be required at the initial stage of post-conviction
review because to do so could result in "a miscarriage of
justice." Boclair, slip op. at 8.
	Our opinion in Boclair and the majority opinion in this case
are in direct and irreconcilable conflict. Given this conflict, it is
clear that the court's opinion in Boclair, as the later issued of the
two opinions, has overruled the majority opinion in the case at bar.
As I noted in my separate opinion in Boclair (see Boclair, slip op.
at 30 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Freeman, J.)), the court's decision in Boclair to overrule
the instant case cannot, by itself, be considered error. It is error,
however, for the court in the case at bar not to acknowledge that
fact. Because Boclair has overruled the majority opinion in this
case, rehearing should be granted.

IV
	Although the conflict between Boclair and the majority
opinion in the case at bar is a sufficient basis, by itself, to grant
defendant's petition for rehearing, there are also several other
compelling reasons to allow rehearing in this case.

The Meaning of 'Objective Corroboration'
	Setting Boclair to one side and assuming, arguendo, that the
circuit court may consider a post-conviction petition's compliance
with section 122-2 at the summary dismissal stage, rehearing
should be granted in this case because the majority opinion
overlooks, and thus fails to answer, a very basic question: Why is
it that the affidavit submitted by defendant in this case cannot
serve two purposes? In other words, Why is it that defendant's
affidavit cannot verify the allegations in the post-conviction
petition while also substantiating those same allegations? The
majority holds that a second affidavit is necessary in this case to
show "that the verified allegations [in the petition] are capable of
objective or independent corroboration." Slip op. at 6. But in this
case, defendant was a party to the conversation he had with his
attorney regarding his appeal. Why then does defendant's sworn
statement that his attorney told him he would appeal his case, but
then neglected to do so, fail to satisfy the "objective
corroboration" that the majority requires? As far as I can
determine, the only way one could conclude that defendant's
affidavit in this case does not provide "objective corroboration"
for his claim would be to assume that defendant is not telling the
truth. But we are not permitted to make such an assumption at this
stage of the proceedings. When the circuit court examines a post-conviction petition at the first stage of review pursuant to section
122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act, it must accept everything in the petition
as true. See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81 (1998).
Certainly, if defendant's petition were to advance to an evidentiary
hearing, defendant's testimony by itself, if believed by the circuit
court, would establish the truth of his factual assertions. Why then
is the majority imposing a greater burden of evidentiary
"corroboration" on the pro se defendant at the summary dismissal
stage of the proceedings? The phrase "objective or independent
corroboration" (slip op. at 6) does not appear in the Act and the
majority has offered no authority for its proposition that, under the
circumstances presented here, defendant must supply a second
affidavit to "corroborate" his post-conviction claim at the
summary dismissal stage. At a minimum, rehearing should be
granted to explain why defendant's affidavit fails the majority's
corroboration requirement.

Inapposite Authority
	The majority states that defendant's failure to attach a second
affidavit or explain its absence is "fatal" to his petition. Slip op. at
5. In support of this statement, the majority cites People v. Turner,
187 Ill. 2d 406, 414 (1999), People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
380 (1998), and People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26 (1952). Slip op.
at 5. These cases are manifestly distinguishable from the case at
bar. Jennings is inapposite because that case predates the addition
of section 122-2.1(a)(2) to the Act. The petitioner in Jennings was
represented by counsel and summary dismissal was not a
possibility. Turner and Coleman are death penalty cases. There is
no summary dismissal for post-conviction petitions filed in capital
cases. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). It is plainly
inappropriate to rely on these decisions in this case, which is
concerned solely with the requirements a noncapital post-conviction petition must meet at the summary dismissal stage. 
	Although the majority cites no pertinent authority to support
its holding, there is authority from this court, directly on point,
which is contrary to the majority's position. As I noted in my
original dissent in this case, over 30 years ago, in People v.
Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1 (1970), this court held that when a pro se
post-conviction petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is based on an attorney-client conversation, the only
supporting affidavit required is the defendant's own. In Williams,
we stated:
			"The State's only contention is that the petition is
insufficient to entitle petitioner to a hearing in that it was
not accompanied by supporting affidavits. But the only
affidavit that petitioner could possibly have furnished,
other than his own sworn statement, would have been that
of his attorney who allegedly made the misrepresentation
to him. The difficulty or impossibility of obtaining such
an affidavit is self-apparent. In People v. Wegner, 40 Ill. 2d 28, where similar allegations of misrepresentations of
counsel as to sentence were made, we held that dismissal
of the petition without a hearing was improper; that
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing even
though the State had filed a counteraffidavit of
defendant's attorney in which he denied making the
statement attributed to him. It would certainly follow that
if a defendant is entitled to a hearing despite a
counteraffidavit of his attorney denying the allegations of
the petition then a defendant should not be denied a
hearing merely because he did not obtain a supporting
affidavit from the attorney who represented him at the
time of his plea.
			Under such circumstances, to so strictly construe the
Act as requested by the State would defeat its very
purpose by denying petitioner a hearing on the factual
issue raised by the pleadings. However, as stated in
People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, we do not intend hereby to
lessen the duty of petitioners under the Act to make a
substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights,
for the allegations of mere conclusions to that effect under
oath will not suffice. We do find that in this case the
sworn statements of petitioner warrant a fair inference of
a violation of constitutional rights which are not negated
by the State nor by the record, and that an evidentiary
hearing is required to determine the truth or falsity of
petitioner's allegations."Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 4-5.
	I explained at length in my original dissent in this case why
the majority's attempt to factually distinguish Williams fails. I
leave it to the reader to decide whether the majority has accurately
represented the facts in Williams. For myself, I must reluctantly
conclude, as Chief Justice Harrison once remarked, that "[s]tare
decisis means nothing" (People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316, 348
(1998) (Harrison, J., specially concurring)) to the majority in this
case. Rehearing should be granted in this case to strike the
citations to inapposite case law and to conform the majority
opinion with our holding in Williams.

Failure to Permit Amendment of Defendant's Petition
	In recent years there has been a growing public discussion
regarding possible shortcomings in the Illinois criminal justice
system. Most of the discussion has centered on the cases of 13
individuals who have been released from death row in Illinois.
These cases have provoked a serious reexamination of capital
punishment in this state and prompted some individuals to
question the integrity of our criminal justice system itself. Chief
Justice Harrison, for example, has expressed this view:
		"[L]egislatures and the courts appear to have abandoned
any genuine concern with insuring the fairness and
reliability of the system. Achieving 'finality' in death
cases, and doing so as expeditiously as possible, have
become the dominant goals in death penalty
jurisprudence." People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 227 (1998)
(Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that legal oversight of the capital punishment
system has diminished and that "[t]he General Assembly
has drastically shortened the period in which post-conviction relief can be sought, thereby reducing the time
in which exonerating evidence may be discovered").
	Voicing concerns over the fairness and reliability of the
capital punishment system, Governor Ryan imposed a moratorium
on the death penalty in January 2000. Shortly thereafter, he
authorized the creation of the Commission on Capital Punishment
and charged that body with making recommendations " 'designed
to further ensure the application and administration of the death
penalty in Illinois is just, fair and accurate.' " T. Sullivan, Repair
or Repeal-Report of the Governor's Comm'n on Capital
Punishment, 90 Ill. B.J. 304, 304 (2002). In its recently issued
final report, the commission makes numerous recommendations
for improving the capital punishment system. Importantly,
however, for purposes of the case at bar, the commission notes
that many of the problems underlying the capital punishment
system pertain to the criminal justice system as a whole:
		"It became readily apparent during many of the
discussions on particular points, however, that
recommendations that were being made with respect to
the capital punishment system could apply with equal
force to other cases in the criminal justice system.
			During some of its discussions, Commission members
were struck by the fact that particular cases received a
much higher level of scrutiny because capital punishment
was involved. Had those same defendants been sentenced
to life imprisonment, or a term of years, their cases might
not have been reviewed as carefully and by so many
different parties. As a result, some of the injustices with
which the public has recently become acquainted might
not have been corrected." Report of the Governor's
Commission on Capital Punishment, ch.14, at 188 (April
2002).
	I explained previously in this dissent how the majority
opinion in the case precludes a pro se defendant from amending
his post-conviction petition to correct pleading deficiencies and
how this holding means the possible loss of meritorious
constitutional claims. It is both ironic and unfortunate that at a
time when the entire Illinois criminal justice system is under
intense scrutiny and serious questions have been raised regarding
its fairness and accuracy, the majority has decided to completely
foreclose consideration of meritorious constitutional claims,
including claims of actual innocence, based on technical pleading
deficiencies. As stated, our case law permits the amendment of
post-conviction petitions at the summary dismissal stage. See
People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999). Even assuming,
therefore, that pro se defendants should be held accountable for
section 122-2's pleading requirements at the summary dismissal
stage, rehearing should be granted in this case and the majority
opinion modified to provide defendant with the opportunity to
amend his post-conviction petition with an additional affidavit or
an explanation for why such an affidavit is unavailable.
	The majority's decision in this case is contrary to both recent
and long-established precedent of this court and, with due respect,
is profoundly ill-advised. I therefore dissent from the court's
denial of rehearing.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1In its initial order, the appellate court mistakenly identified the date
of defendant's guilty plea and conviction as July 9, 1997.

2.      2In addition to his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, the
defendant in Williams also alleged "that the hearing on the voluntariness
of his plea should have been heard by a judge other than the trial judge."
Williams, 47 Ill. 2d  at 5.