Title: Arthur-Lawrence v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AMY ARTHUR-LAWRENCE, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 133, 2005 
 
 
Respondent Below, 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, )  File No. 04-04-03TS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 7, 2005 
Decided: September 27, 2005  
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 27th day of September 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:  
(1) 
The respondent below, appellant, Amy Arthur-Lawrence,1 appeals 
from an order of the Family Court terminating her parental rights to two of her 
children. On appeal Lawrence argues that the Division of Family Services did 
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Lawrence failed to plan for her 
minor children. Lawrence also argues that DFS failed to provide reasonable 
effort towards reunification. Because the Family Court correctly found that the 
                                                 
1   
This court has assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supr. Ct. R. 7(d).  
 
2
DFS proved the required elements in a termination action by clear and 
convincing evidence, we affirm.2 
(2) 
On March 24, 2003 the Family Court granted an ex parte motion 
granting temporary custody of Lawrence’s two children, to DFS. The Court did 
so because Lawrence did not have the basic parenting skills necessary for the 
care of her children and because she did not have a stable residence. At this 
time, Shelly Jimenez Domingo also applied for temporary custody on the same 
grounds. Prior to the hearing, Lawrence and her children had been living with 
Domingo, a family friend, and her two children, ages four and thirteen. After an 
argument with Domingo, Lawrence and her children moved out of Domingo’s 
residence. At that point, Lawrence was receiving SSI in the amount of $575 per 
month because she was considered mildly mentally retarded with a tested IQ of 
65.  
(3) 
The Family Court held an adjudicatory hearing on May 6, 2003. At 
that hearing, Lawrence admitted that she was unable to provide adequate care 
for her two children because of her lack of parenting skills and lack of stable 
housing. She further admitted that she had lived in five different residences in 
the six months since the birth of her children. By the date of the hearing, 
                                                 
2  
The Family Court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father on 
abandonment grounds. The father did not appear in any of the dependency/neglect or 
termination proceedings, and is not a party to this appeal.  
 
3
Lawrence had resumed residing with Domingo and DFS had placed the children 
with her. 
(4) 
Before a June 10, 2003 dispositional hearing in the Family Court, 
Lawrence and DFS entered into a case plan with the goal of ultimately 
reunifying Lawrence and her children. After reviewing the case plan, the 
Family Court adopted it as part of the order at the dispositional hearing. 
(5) 
The Case Plan required Lawrence to (a) ensure that her children’s 
medical needs were satisfied; (b) participate in a parenting class; (c) cooperate 
with a DFS referral to the Association of Retarded Citizens (“ARC”) of 
Delaware and the Delaware Division of Disability Services (“DDDS”) 3; (d) 
schedule an appointment to begin counseling services with People’s Place, an 
organization with counselors trained in dealing with people who suffer mental 
disability; (e) apply for and maintain eligibility for food stamps, Medicaid, and 
other State assistance; and (f) cooperate with DFS on arranging the services 
outlined in the plan.  
(6) 
Jennifer Hudson, a DFS treatment worker, made referrals to ARC 
and DDDS for Lawrence to obtain services to assist her with her mental 
disability. Hudson also made Lawrence an appointment to speak with a 
counselor at People’s Place and signed Lawrence up for a parenting class 
                                                 
3  
DDDS is a state agency that provides services for mentally retarded Delawareans.  
 
4
scheduled to start on July 1. Domingo agreed to attend the parenting classes 
with Lawrence to help her understand the class work. During this time, 
Lawrence and her children continued to reside with Domingo.  
(7) 
On June 23, 2003, with no notice to the Family Court, Lawrence 
left Delaware to return to New York. Lawrence was originally from New York 
and two of her other minor children lived there with their maternal 
grandmother. Lawrence moved out of Domingo’s residence because she had a 
disagreement with Domingo concerning Lawrence’s failure to take more 
responsibility for the children and how Lawrence managed her finances.  
Before moving, Lawrence discussed the move with Hudson.  Hudson informed 
Lawrence that DFS would not be able to provide services to her in New York 
and that Lawrence could not take her children with her if she moved. Thus, 
after Lawrence moved, the children remained at Domingo’s residence in her 
care.  
(8) 
Shortly thereafter, Domingo advised DFS that she could no longer 
care for Lawrence’s children and asked that DFS take custody. On June 25, the 
children were placed in foster care.  
(9) 
The Family Court held a hearing on September 9, 2003 to review 
the first case plan. The court found that Lawrence had not made significant 
progress on the case plan largely due to the fact that she moved to New York. 
 
5
Because she was in New York she was unable to attend the children’s medical 
visits. She did not begin parenting classes or become involved with DDDS as 
required by the order, again because she was in New York. Finally, Lawrence 
did not begin the process of evaluating her mental health issues.  
(10) Hudson prepared a second case plan for Lawrence after she moved 
to New York. This case plan set forth means for Lawrence to obtain services in 
New York and to be reunified with her children there.  At the hearing on 
September 9, the Family Court reviewed this second plan and made it a part of 
its order.  The second plan was more comprehensive. It required that Lawrence 
(a) manage her finances so that she could financially support herself and her 
children (this included obtaining Medicaid and food stamps from New York 
State); (b) keep in contact with her children’s medical providers in Delaware; 
(c) successfully complete a parenting class in New York; (d) undergo a 
substance abuse evaluation including a urinalysis by an agency in New York; 
(e) contact the New York Developmental Disability Services to assist her in 
coping with her everyday living needs; (f) undergo mental health counseling 
regarding her feelings of being overwhelmed by the children, wanting to harm 
herself, and other issues; and (g) establish stable housing so that a home study 
of her residence could be conducted by the New York agency under the 
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.  
 
6
(11) The Family Court also advised Lawrence that the move to New 
York would make it more difficult for DFS to monitor the case plan. Moreover, 
the Family Court judge noted that he could not “state strongly enough to 
[Lawrence] the difficulties that she seems to be facing in successfully 
completing her case plan and having her children returned to her care.”4 
(12) Hudson testified at trial that Lawrence’s move to New York 
created many additional difficulties with the reunification plan. Hudson was 
often unable to make contact with the Lawrence by phone. She also sent 
Lawrence a series of letters to various different New York addresses regarding 
services under the case plan. Many of the letters were intended to keep 
Lawrence informed of her children’s medical appointments and concerns.  
(13) During the time she lived in New York, Lawrence never 
established a permanent residence. She advised DFS that she was staying at 
three different homes in different counties. Despite Lawrence’s lack of a 
permanent residence, DFS made a referral through ICPC for New York to 
consider approving placement of the children in New York. On October 7, 
2003, Susan Thurston of the Cayuga County Department of Health and Human 
Services in Auburn, New York, commenced a home study on Lawrence’s 
purported New York residence where she resided with her current boyfriend. 
                                                 
4 Family Court Order of September 9, 2003.  
 
7
Lawrence missed the first scheduled appointment with Thurston on October 
29th. On the second scheduled visit on November 7, Lawrence was present, but 
less than cooperative. She refused to allow Thurston to see certain parts of the 
house allegedly because the rooms were locked or someone was sleeping 
inside. Moreover, Lawrence’s boyfriend and his roommate were not present. 
This was a large concern for Thurston because these individuals would be 
living with the children. Thurston also noticed several specific safety hazards 
around the house, and that there was virtually no furniture in the rooms she was 
allowed to see. To make things worse, Lawrence informed Thurston that she 
planned to find another apartment and that she did not intend to live in the 
residence Thurston was currently evaluating.  
(14) After evaluating Lawrence’s living situation and discussing the 
situation with her, Thurston recommended against approving placement of the 
children in New York. She based this recommendation on Lawrence’s lack of 
stable housing, lack of basic parenting skills, and lack of means for supporting 
her children.  
(15) During the course of Lawrence’s six month stay in New York, 
Hudson arranged for Lawrence to visit her children in Delaware on a monthly 
basis. DFS paid the bus fare. Nonetheless, Lawrence only visited three times 
while she was living in New York; in September, October and December.  
 
8
(16) After being informed that the ICPC request to place the children in 
New York had been denied, Lawrence decided to move back to Delaware.  
(17) The Family Court conducted a review hearing on December 16, 
2003.  The Family Court judge concluded that while Lawrence had made 
progress in some areas of the second case plan, she nevertheless failed satisfy 
several elements of the case plan by failing to (a) obtain food stamps from New 
York; (b) contact the New York DDDS during the six months she lived there; 
(c) obtain mental health counseling; and (d) establish stable housing. More 
importantly, the judge informed Lawrence that the CASA had filed a motion for 
the change of the goal from reunification to termination of parental rights.  
(18) Lawrence returned to Delaware on January 13, 2004. DFS again 
paid the bus fare.  
(19) Despite the fact that the next Family Court hearing was a 
permanency hearing in which the court would determine whether to terminate 
Lawrence’s rights, Hudson prepared a third case plan for Lawrence. This plan 
was essentially the same as the second, but it provided that Lawrence would 
obtain services through the state of Delaware instead of New York. Although 
Hudson created a third revised case plan, Lawrence never signed it.  
(20) Shortly after she returned to New York, Lawrence moved back in 
with Domingo.  She was paying $375 per month out of her $575 Social Security 
 
9
Check for rent. Hudson told Lawrence that DFS would not approve placement 
of the children in the home of Domingo because of the previous problems 
Lawrence and Domingo encountered.  
(21) After Lawrence moved back to Delaware, Hudson resumed her 
efforts in helping Lawrence fulfill the goals of her most recent case plan. On 
January 19, 2004, Lawrence attended a medical appointment with her children. 
Hudson also arranged for Lawrence to receive a substance abuse evaluation 
with Rose Basher, a certified drug and alcohol counselor. Basher completed her 
evaluation on January 27, 2004. She recommended that Lawrence attend 
weekly group education sessions and monthly individual sessions to gain an 
understanding of alcoholism. Lawrence signed a treatment plan on January 30, 
2004. Between February 6th and March 30th, Lawrence, however, only 
sporadically attended the individual and group sessions on alcoholism. She 
attended four of the sessions and missed six.  
(22) Basher also recognized that Lawrence had certain mental health 
issues.  She therefore arranged for Lawrence to attend a mental health 
assessment to be performed by a Dr. Centers. Basher scheduled an appointment 
for February 13, 2004, but Lawrence did not attend.  The appointment was 
rescheduled for March 4, 2004, but Lawrence apparently did not go. Basher 
never received a report from Dr. Centers.  
 
10
(23) On January 27, 2004, in an attempt to obtain stable housing, 
Lawrence mailed an application for Section 8 housing that Hudson had aided 
her in completing.  
(24) On February 4, 2004, Susan Morrison-Smith, the intake 
coordinator at Delaware’s DDDS, received Lawrence’s application for services 
from Hudson. The four-part application was missing two parts as well as copies 
of Lawrence’s birth certificate, social security card and Medicaid card.  Smith 
estimated that at least half of the applications received are not complete. 
Thereupon, Smith sent a letter of incompleteness to Lawrence on February 5th. 
Having received no response containing the missing information, Smith sent 
another letter to Lawrence on March 9th. Smith, however, never called 
Lawrence or Hudson.  
(25) On March 1, 2004, the Family Court conducted a permanency 
hearing. At this hearing, the judge found that the children were dependent and 
that it was in their best interests to remain in the care of DFS. The judge then 
ordered that the permanency goal for the children should be changed from 
reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.  
(26) On May 12, 2004, Hudson filed a second application with DDDS 
for Lawrence. Again, this application was incomplete. The next day, Smith sent 
a letter to Lawrence. After receiving no response, she mailed another letter six 
 
11
weeks later. Again, she received no response. The letters were not returned to 
Smith as undeliverable.  
(27) After a three day trial in October and November of 2004, and a 
thorough review of the facts and the law, taking into account the best interests 
of the children, the Family Court judge found that Lawrence’s parental rights 
should be terminated on the basis of a failure to plan. On March 14, 2005, the 
Family Court entered an order to this effect. Lawrence appealed.  
(28) In an appeal from a termination of parental rights in the Family 
Court, our review is limited to the trial judge’s factual findings as well as the 
inferences and deductions made by the trial judge.5  We will not disturb a trial 
judge’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and justice requires 
that they be overturned.6  If the trial judge’s factual findings are supported by 
the record “and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, in 
the exercise of judicial restraint we accept them, even though independently we 
might have reached opposite conclusions.”7  To the extent that a trial judge’s 
                                                 
5 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983) (citing Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., 
Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979)).   
 
6 Id.  
 
7 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972). 
 
 
12
decision implicates rulings of law, our review is de novo to determine whether 
the trial judge properly applied the law.8 
(29) Under Delaware’s statutory scheme the standard for terminating 
parental rights requires two separate inquiries.9  The court must determine, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that one of the statutory grounds for termination 
has been met.10 Second, after finding a ground for termination, the court must 
determine that severing the parental rights is in the best interests of the child.11  
In addition to finding a statutory basis for termination and concluding that 
termination is in the best interest of the child, the Court must also find that the 
DFS has made “reasonable efforts” to reunite the family through written case 
plans or reunification services.12  
(30) Delaware law provides that when a child has been in the care of 
DFS for one year, the best interest of the child is served by terminating the 
rights of a parent who is not able or fails to “plan adequately for the child’s 
                                                 
8 Reed v. Dillard (In the Interest of Stevens), 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995). 
 
9 Division of Family Servs. v. Hutton, 765 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Del. 2001). 
 
10 Id. (citing Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000) (en banc)). 
 
11 Id.  
 
12 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1989).  
 
 
13
physical needs or mental and emotional health and development….”13 
Lawrence concedes that her children have been in the care of DFS for in excess 
of one year.  She does not contest the trial court’s finding concerning the best 
interests of the child. On appeal, Lawrence contends only that DFS failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that she did not plan for her children. 
She also contends that DFS failed to offer reasonable efforts towards 
reunification. Accordingly, this court will address these issues and leave 
undisturbed the trial Court’s ruling that terminating Lawrence’s parental rights 
is in the best interests of the children. 
(31) Lawrence claims that she completed most portions of her case 
plans and was prevented from completing all portions due to her failure to 
receive services from the ARC and DDDS. She claims that the services the plan 
required either did not exist or were never delivered due to mishandling by 
DFS. Because DFS allegedly failed to ensure that the services to be provided by 
ARC and DDDS were accessible, Lawrence claims that DFS failed to offer 
reasonable reunification efforts. Lawrence’s position is not persuasive.  
(32) In each of Lawrence’s two signed case plans, and the third 
unsigned case plan, Lawrence never attended the required mental health 
assessments, which would have allowed DFS to better accommodate her mental 
                                                 
13 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).  
 
 
14
disorders. Moreover, when DFS attempted to assist Lawrence in receiving 
services for her mental disorders, Lawrence either left the state or did not 
respond to letters from DDDS sent to her last known residence. Furthermore, 
Lawrence never obtained a stable residence.  
(33) The record supports the trial judge’s finding that DFS made 
reasonable efforts to reunify Lawrence with her children. Hudson drafted three 
case plans for Lawrence. DFS arranged a drug and alcohol evaluation, enrolled 
Lawrence in parenting classes, albeit unsuccessfully, and assisted in 
applications for Section 8 and DDDS. Hudson worked with various agencies in 
the State of New York in an attempt to tailor the second case plan to 
Lawrence’s decision to move to New York. Moreover, DFS arranged an ICPC 
study in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain placement of the children in New 
York. DFS paid for bus tickets for Lawrence to visit her children in Delaware 
while she was living in New York.  After Lawrence moved back to Delaware, 
Hudson again worked with various Delaware agencies in an attempt to get 
Lawrence the help she needed so that she could complete her plan.  
(34) The record also supports the trial judge’s finding that Lawrence 
failed to plan adequately for her children’s physical needs or mental and 
emotional health and development. Lawrence failed to obtain safe, stable 
 
15
housing. Lawrence also failed to attend appointments and failed to respond to 
mailings precluding the possibility of her completing portions of her case plan.   
(35) The trial judge’s findings are supported by the record, are not 
clearly erroneous, and are supported by an orderly logical and deductive 
process.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Myron T. Steele  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice