Title: Weiss v. Pedersen

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Weiss v. Pedersen1997 WY 36933 P.2d 495Case Number: 96-56Decided: 02/28/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

EARL G. WEISS and MILDRED L. WEISS, husband and wife; 
CHAD PORTER and BETTY PORTER, husband and wife; and JAMES L. FISHER and KATHRYN 
B. FISHER, husband and wife, 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

ALFRED L. PEDERSEN and MARVA M. PEDERSEN, husband and 
wife, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County 

The 
Honorable D. Terry Rogers, Judge

 

Representating Appellants:            

Maureen T. Donohoue, Lander.

 

Representating Appellees: 

William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., 
Riverton.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellants Earl 
and Mildred Weiss, Chad and Betty Porter, and James and Kathryn Fisher appeal 
from the order which granted an injunction and a declaratory judgment against 
them and in favor of Appellees Alfred and Marva Pedersen.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The appellants 
present the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err in granting a permanent 
injunction to appellees as against appellants absent a showing and finding by 
the trial court of irreparable harm and the insufficiency of a legal 
remedy[?]

II.[] If the trial court did not err in granting a 
permanent injunction to appellees as against appellants[,] was the trial 
court[']s injunctive relief overbroad in that it prevents appellants from using 
the easement ex[c]e[p]t by permission of appellees and restricting appellees['] 
access easement "in any way with gates or fences"[?]

III. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
finding that appellants should be denied a prescriptive easement because their 
use was "presumed permissive"[?]

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The dispute in 
this case is over the use of a roadway which branches off a public road and 
traverses the parties' properties. The land which is involved in this dispute 
was owned at one time by the parents of James Fisher and Mildred Weiss, who are 
brother and sister. The parents conveyed the property to James Fisher in 
1970.

 

[¶5]      In October 1975, 
James and Kathryn Fisher, together with James's parents, conveyed a parcel of 
land (Tract 1) to William and Marianne Trees. The Fishers also granted a 
thirty-foot easement to the Treeses across property which they continued to own 
to provide the Treeses with access to a public road. The Fishers did not, 
however, reserve an easement for themselves across Tract 
1.

 

[¶6]      In December 1975, 
James and Kathryn Fisher and James's parents conveyed another parcel of land 
(Tract 2) to Duane and Barbara Ayers. The Treeses joined in the transaction to 
convey a thirty-foot easement to the Ayerses along the eastern boundary of Tract 
1. The Fishers were not, however, granted a similar easement across Tract 1. The 
easement across the Fishers' property and the easement across Tract 1 comprise 
the roadway which is at issue in this case.

 

[¶7]      In May 1985, 
James and Kathryn Fisher conveyed approximately sixteen acres of land which was 
located generally east of Tracts 1 and 2 to Mildred and Earl Weiss. The Weisses 
allowed Betty and Chad Porter, their daughter and son-in-law, to locate a 
modular home on their property east of Tract 1. The Fishers and the Weisses also 
grew hay on this property.

 

[¶8]      A wire fence 
located on the Weisses' property ran just east of the eastern boundary of Tract 
1. A wire gate providing access to the hayfield was located in the fence near 
the northeast corner of Tract 1. Over the years, the Fishers, and later the 
Weisses, occasionally traveled on the roadway on Tract 1 to get to the gate to 
their hayfield. The Weisses replaced the wire gate with a metal gate in 1988. In 
that same year, the Treeses conveyed Tract 1 to Merrill Lynch Realty Operating 
Partnership, and Merrill Lynch conveyed the property to the 
Pedersens.

 

[¶9]      A cattleguard was 
located on the roadway in the southeast corner of Tract 1. When the appellants 
drove equipment over the cattleguard on their way to their hayfield, they 
damaged the posts at the ends of the cattleguard. The appellants erected a gate 
in the southeast corner immediately adjacent to the cattleguard and occasionally 
swung the gate across the roadway, effectively blocking the Pedersens' access 
easement. Sometime around 1991, the Porters and/or the Weisses opened a large 
section of the fence between their property and Tract 1. For access to their 
home, the Porters created a circular driveway in front of their house which made 
use of the roadway across Tract 1.

 

[¶10]   On January 16, 1995, the Pedersens 
filed a complaint, seeking to have a declaratory judgment and an injunction 
entered against the appellants. The Pedersens sought to have the trial court 
declare that they were the sole and exclusive owners of Tract 1 and that the 
appellants did not have any interests or rights in their property. Additionally, 
they petitioned the trial court for an injunction against the appellants to 
prohibit them from crossing Tract 1. The Pedersens also requested injunctive 
relief to prohibit the appellants from interfering with their access easement 
across the Fishers' property. The appellants filed a counterclaim, requesting 
that the trial court order the Pedersens to properly maintain the cattleguard 
or, in the alternative, to secure the gate across the roadway to prevent their 
livestock from entering Tract 1 and asserting that they had acquired a 
prescriptive easement on the roadway across Tract 1.

 

[¶11]   The trial court held a bench trial 
and entered a judgment generally in favor of the Pedersens and against the 
appellants. The trial court concluded in pertinent part:

 

1. [The Pedersens] are the sole owners of Tract 1 and 
in particular the thirty-foot strip of land located along the east boundary of 
Tract 1 reflected as a thirty-foot right-of-way easement on [the map]. . . . 
Said thirty-foot strip of land is subject to a right-of-way easement in Duane S. 
Ayers and Barbara E. Ayers but none of the [appellants].

2. [The Pedersens] have a thirty-foot wide access 
easement across the east boundary of property owned by Defendants James L. 
Fisher and Kathryn B. Fisher which provide[s the Pedersens] access to Tract 1 . 
..

"[Legal description of the 
easement.]"

3. The [appellants] have no right to interfere with 
the use of said easement.

4. [The Pedersens] have the right to place a cattle 
guard as well as gates on their property line adjacent to their easement and 
[the appellants] have no right to require a gate in lieu of a cattle 
guard.

5. The [appellants] and each of them, their heirs and 
assigns are permanently enjoined from restricting [the Pedersens'] access 
easement in any way with gates or fences.

6. The [appellants] and each of them and their heirs 
and assigns are permanently enjoined from entering [the Pedersens'] property, 
Tract 1, without the permission of [the Pedersens].

7. [The Pedersens] are entitled to erect a fence 
along the east boundary of Tract 1 to define the boundary of their property and 
the [appellants] are permanently enjoined from cutting the fence, moving the 
fence or placing any gates or openings in the fence.

 

The appellants appealed to 
this Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of 
Review

 

[¶12]   The trial proceedings in this case 
were not recorded or transcribed, and the appellants did not present a 
settlement of the record under W.R.A.P. 3.03. We must, therefore, accept "the 
trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues which 
pertain to the evidence." Willowbrook 
Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1995). "In 
the absence of anything to refute them, we will sustain the trial court's 
findings, and we assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support 
those findings." 896 P.2d  at 771-72. See also Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1989).

 

B. The 
Injunction

 

[¶13]   The appellants contend that the 
trial court erred by granting a permanent injunction against them absent 
showings by the Pedersens and findings by the trial court of irreparable harm 
and insufficiency of a legal remedy. They also argue that the trial court erred 
by prospectively enjoining them from cutting, moving, or placing gates in any 
fence which the Pedersens may construct on their property in the 
future.

 

[¶14]   Although actions for injunctive 
relief are authorized by statute, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-28-101 to -111 (1988 & 
Supp. 1996), they are, by nature, requests for equitable relief which are not 
granted as a matter of right but are within the lower court's equitable 
discretion. Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 332 (Wyo. 1986). Injunctions are 
issued when the harm is irreparable and no adequate remedy at law exists. Id.; Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 
801 (Wyo. 1981). Injunctive relief is appropriate when an award of money damages 
cannot provide adequate compensation. Rialto Theatre, Inc., 714 P.2d  at 332. 
An injury is irreparable "`where it is of a "peculiar nature, so that 
compensation in money cannot atone for it." Gause v. Perkins, 56 N.C. 177 (1857).' 
Frink v. North Carolina Board of 
Transportation, 27 N.C. App. 207, 218 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1975)." Gregory, 635 P.2d  at 
801.

 

[¶15]   "[T]he traditional office of 
injunction has been to protect property rights." 42 AM.JUR.2D Injunctions § 69 at 814 
(1969).

"Jurisdiction to prevent threatened disturbance of 
the peaceful use and enjoyment of real property is inherent in a court of 
equity, and injunction is a proper and ordinary remedy for the protection of 
owners in the enjoyment of their rights in real estate. . . ." (Footnotes 
omitted.) 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions, § 71, p. 815 (1969).

Gregory, 
635 P.2d  at 801. In the Gregory case, 
this Court determined that the district court had properly enjoined the 
appellants from using private roadways in a subdivision. 635 P.2d  at 801. We 
noted that monetary damages were not sufficient to compensate the injured 
parties for their loss of privacy. Id. With regard to easements in 
particular, injunctive relief is appropriate to prohibit the servient estate 
owner from interfering with the dominant estate owner's use of his easement. See 
Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1976); Weber v. Johnston Fuel 
Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1974). An injured party is not required to 
wait until the threatened injury has been consummated before he can obtain 
injunctive relief. Rialto Theatre, 
Inc., 714 P.2d  at 333. "`Injunctive relief is designed not to deal with past 
violations, but to avoid future wrongs.'" Id. (quoting Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 153 (Wyo. 1981)).

 

[¶16]   In this case, the trial court 
specifically found:

29. [The Pedersens] are entitled to a judgment 
declaring them to be the sole owners of Tract 1 in its entirety and the 
[appellants] have no right to any roadway across Tract 1 nor any right to enter 
on Tract 1 for any reason without the permission of the [Pedersens]. [The 
Pedersens] have no adequate remedy at law and therefore an injunction should be 
entered enjoining the [appellants] from entering [the Pedersens'] property 
and/or interfering with [the Pedersens'] use of their easement across the 
property owned by [Appellants] Fisher.

The trial court also found 
that the appellants had used the roadway across Tract 1 to access their hayfield 
and the Porters' home; that they had damaged the posts at the ends of the 
cattleguard with their hay harvesting equipment; and that they had also, on 
occasion, swung the gate across the Pedersens' access 
easement.

 

[¶17]   The trial court's findings reveal 
that the Pedersens' peaceful use and enjoyment of Tract 1 and their easement 
across the Fishers' property were compromised. The Pedersens suffered 
irreparable harm which could not be compensated for by monetary damages. 
Further, the trial court did not err by making its ruling prospective to forbid 
the appellants from interfering with any fence which the Pedersens may build in 
the future. Injunctive relief is specifically intended to prevent future wrongs. 
When the trial court prohibited the appellants from entering the Pedersens' 
property without the Pedersens' permission, it necessarily forbade them from 
interfering with any fence that the Pedersens may build on their property. The 
ruling which prohibited the appellants from cutting or moving the Pedersens' 
fence was simply a part of its general ruling which banned the appellants from 
entering the Pedersens' property. Since injunctive relief is particularly suited 
to protecting property interests, the trial court did not err by granting the 
injunction in favor of the Pedersens. The record does not contain any evidence 
which refutes the trial court's findings that the Pedersens did not have an 
adequate remedy at law, and, in the absence of a transcript, we must accept the 
trial court's rulings.

 

[¶18]   The appellants also contend that 
the injunction was overbroad. The trial court's order "enjoined [the appellants] 
from entering [the Pedersens'] property, Tract 1, without the permission of [the 
Pedersens]." The appellants insist that, by preventing them from using the 
roadway across Tract 1 except with the Pedersens' permission, the trial court 
ignored the Ayerses' easement across Tract 1 which "may be used by family, 
friends and visitors to the Ayers home."

 

[¶19]   In Gregory, this Court held that an 
injunction which prohibited "the appellants from using the private roadways even 
if invited by the homeowners in the subdivisions who have the right to allow 
guests, employees or other invitees on the roads" was overly broad. 635 P.2d  at 
802. We stated that the order should have banned only the appellants' 
unauthorized use of the roadways. Id.

 

[¶20]   The trial court's order recognized 
the Ayerses' easement over Tract 1 and did not expressly prohibit the appellants 
from using the road to visit the Ayerses with their permission. The order does 
not show that the trial court considered the possibility of the appellants using 
the roadway to visit the Ayerses. Instead, the trial court was concerned with 
the appellants entering the Pedersens' property without authorization. When we 
read the trial court's injunctive order together with its findings, we conclude 
that the injunction did not prohibit the appellants from using the roadway to 
visit the Ayerses with their permission. The trial court's order, therefore, was 
not overly broad.

 

[¶21]   The appellants further contend that 
the injunction was overbroad because it prohibited them from restricting the 
Pedersens' access easement "in any way with gates or fences." They contend that 
the restriction denied them the right to control and manage livestock on their 
own property.

 

[¶22]   A cattleguard and a gate were 
located near the southeast corner of Tract 1 to keep the appellants' livestock 
from entering Tract 1. The trial court found that the appellants had, on 
occasion, swung the gate located adjacent to the cattleguard across the 
easement, that the appellants did not have a right to restrict the Pedersens' 
easement by swinging the gate across the roadway, and that the appellants did 
not have a right to require the Pedersens to employ a gate in lieu of a 
cattleguard.

 

The owner of an easement cannot materially enlarge 
the burden on the servient estate or impose a new burden on the servient estate. 
When a right-of-way easement is granted, a right of passage is given. The owner 
of the servient estate, of course, retains all rights of ownership which are 
consistent with the use of the easement. These competing rights must be balanced 
to promote the enjoyment of both the easement and the servient 
estate.

 

Van Raden v. Harper, 891 P.2d 78, 79 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted). In Van Raden, this Court determined that 
the owner of an easement could place cattleguards instead of gates on the 
easement in order to improve the convenience of using the easement. Id. We held that the use of cattleguards 
in lieu of gates did not materially increase the burden on the servient estate. 
Id.

 

[¶23]   On the record before us, we cannot 
say that the trial court erred. The trial court's findings support its ruling 
which enjoined the appellants from restricting the access easement in any way 
with fences or gates. The Pedersens' use of a cattleguard in place of a gate did 
not materially increase the burden on the servient estate. Further, the trial 
court properly enjoined the appellants from restricting the easement in the 
future. Since the appellants had swung the gate across the easement in the past, 
a threat existed that they might similarly restrict the easement in the 
future.

 

C. Prescriptive 
Easement

 

[¶24]   In their counterclaim, the 
appellants asserted that they had acquired a prescriptive easement on the 
roadway across Tract 1. The trial court denied their claim for a prescriptive 
easement because it found that the appellants' use of the roadway was presumed 
to be permissive and that the appellants had not presented any evidence which 
showed that their actions gave notice to the Pedersens of "the adverse use and 
adverse nature of their claim for the statutory [period] of ten years." The 
appellants argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found 
that their use of the roadway on Tract 1 was permissive.

 

[¶25]   This Court does not favor claims 
for prescriptive easements. Prazma v. 
Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586, 589 (Wyo. 1989). A party who is claiming an easement 
by prescription has the burden of proof. Id.

 

To establish and acquire a prescriptive easement 
requires proof of four necessary elements: (1) adverse use; (2) claim of right 
under color of title or claim of right; (3) to be of such use as to put the 
owner of the subservient estate on notice of the claim; and (4) that the adverse 
use must be continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten 
years.

 

Id. 
(citations omitted). See also WYO. STAT. § 1-3-103 (1988).1 Absent any evidence of hostile 
entry, a party's use of an easement is presumed to be permissive. Prazma, 768 P.2d  at 589. The party who 
is claiming an easement by prescription is required to show how his actions gave 
notice to the opposing party that his use was adverse. Id.

 

[¶26]   The appellants argue that, under Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1981), they are entitled to a presumption that their use of the 
roadway was adverse. The appellants misread the Shumway case. In that case, this Court 
recognized that our prior decisions were inconsistent with regard to whether, in 
establishing prescriptive easements, a presumption existed that the use was 
hostile or a presumption existed that the use was permissive. 637 P.2d  at 669. 
We resolved that inconsistency by holding:

[T]he best rule for the State of Wyoming is one which 
requires that a landowner claiming an easement by prescription in an unimproved 
road crossing the lands of his neighbor must assume the burden of establishing 
that his intention to make a hostile use of the road adverse to the interests of 
his neighbor was brought home to the neighbor in a clear and unequivocal way. 
His subjective intent will not be considered material, and while it is likely 
true that a manifestation of his hostile and adverse intent will result in 
revocation of permission to use the road across the neighbor's land, this is the 
best posture for the law to assume in the State of Wyoming. The claimant cannot 
rely upon a presumption arising out of the open, notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period, but in the absence of more that 
use will be presumed to have been with permission. To rebut this presumption the 
claimant must introduce evidence of the facts which demonstrate the manner in 
which the hostile and adverse nature of his use was brought home to the owner of 
the adjacent land.

637 P.2d  at 670. We also 
noted that "neighborliness and accommodation to the needs of a neighbor are 
landmarks of our western lifestyle." Id. We have reaffirmed the Shumway 
holding in subsequent cases. See, e.g., 
Prazma, 768 P.2d  at 589; Caribou Four 
Corners, Inc. v. Chapple-Hawkes, Inc., 643 P.2d 468, 471 (Wyo. 
1982).

 

[¶27]   The appellants suggest that, since 
"[t]he act of building a road gives rise to a strong inference of an adverse 
use," the Pedersens had notice that the appellants' use of the roadway on Tract 
1 was adverse. The trial court did not find that it was the appellants who had 
built the road across Tract 1, and the appellants do not direct us to any 
evidence which establishes that they built a road across Tract 1 after they 
conveyed the land to the Treeses. The appellants' argument, therefore, does not 
have merit.

 

[¶28]   The appellants also argue that 
their continued use of the roadway over the years was sufficient to manifest 
their adverse use. We disagree. Under the Shumway ruling, so long as a showing 
is not made that the use of an easement was hostile or adverse, the use is 
presumed to be permissive even though it was open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninterrupted for the prescriptive period. 637 P.2d  at 670. The appellants' use 
of the roadway to gain access to their hayfields and to the Porters' home does 
not rebut the presumption that they had permission from the Treeses and the 
Pedersens to traverse the roadway on Tract 1. The evidence which was presented 
to this Court indicates that, until the case at bar commenced, the Treeses and 
the Pedersens were simply acting in a neighborly fashion by allowing the 
appellants to use the roadway. The appellants, therefore, failed to overcome the 
presumption that their use of the roadway was permissive, and the trial court 
properly denied their claim for a prescriptive easement.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   The trial court did not err when it 
granted injunctive relief to the Pedersens to prohibit the appellants from 
entering Tract 1 without authorization and to prevent the appellants from 
interfering with the Pedersens' use of their easement across the Fishers' 
property. Additionally, the trial court properly held that the appellants did 
not acquire a prescriptive easement across Tract 1.

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Section 1-3-103 
states:

An action for the recovery of the title 
or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can only be brought within 
ten (10) years after the cause of such action 
accrues.