Title: Spencer v. City of Norfolk

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,* S.J. 
 
MARGUERITE SPENCER 
 
v.  Record No. 051044     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 21, 2006 
CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal we are asked to consider whether the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a violation 
of the reckless driving provision of the Norfolk City Code.  
We also must determine as a threshold matter whether this case 
is within this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
 
We recite the facts along with all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party in the proceedings below.  Coles v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 585, 587, 621 S.E.2d 109, 110 (2005). 
On November 19, 2003, Mary Parsons was babysitting 
twelve-year-old Kelyn Cusson when Parsons' dog jumped the 
fence, and Parsons asked Cusson to retrieve the dog.  Cusson 
followed the dog into a neighbor's yard.  When she attempted 
to put a leash on the dog, she heard a loud, long horn coming 
from a car parked in the driveway of a house diagonally across 
                     
* Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
 
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the street.  Marguerite Spencer was in the car.  The dog ran 
into the street, and Cusson followed.  Spencer drove the car 
out of her driveway and in the direction of Parsons' house.  
Cusson "walked quickly" towards a van parked in front of 
Parsons' home.  As Spencer passed Cusson at a "fast" rate of 
speed, Cusson "felt the wind coming off the car" that "blew 
her and caused her to step back."  Cusson estimated Spencer's 
car passed her at a distance of "about 3 feet."  Cusson then 
joined Parsons on Parsons' porch.  Parsons called after 
Spencer but although Spencer had stopped the car, she pulled 
away and did not talk with Parsons.  Spencer circled the block 
twice before parking again in her driveway. 
 
Spencer was charged with and convicted of reckless 
driving in violation of Norfolk City Code § 25-217.  The trial 
court sentenced Spencer to 10 days imprisonment in the Norfolk 
City Jail but suspended the sentence conditioned on Spencer's 
good behavior for a period of two years and having no contact 
with Cusson or her mother.  The trial court also imposed a 
fine of $250.00.  The Court of Appeals denied Spencer's 
petition for appeal by order, Spencer v. City of Norfolk, 
Record No. 1312-04-1 (May 2, 2005).  We awarded Spencer an 
appeal. 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether this 
appeal is within the category of cases that this Court may 
 
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consider; that is to say, does this Court have subject matter 
jurisdiction?  Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170, 387 
S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990) ("a court always has jurisdiction to 
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction").  Code 
§ 17.1-411 provides that this Court may hear an appeal of any 
case in which a party is aggrieved by a final decision of the 
Court of Appeals except in those cases in which the decision 
of the Court of Appeals is made final by Code §§ 17.1-410 or 
19.2-408.  A judgment of the Court of Appeals is final under 
Code § 17.1-410 in traffic infraction and misdemeanor cases 
"where no incarceration is imposed."  Code § 17.1-410(A)(1). 
The City argues that this Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the trial 
court suspended Spencer's jail sentence and therefore imposed 
no incarceration.  We disagree.  The finality provisions of 
Code § 17.1-410(A)(1) do not require physical confinement, 
only the imposition of incarceration.  In this case, the trial 
court imposed a 10-day period of incarceration.  The 
subsequent suspension of the sentence does not eliminate the 
imposition of the jail sentence and place this case in a 
category of cases in which no incarceration is imposed.  
Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is within the class 
of cases that we may consider.  We now turn to the merits of 
Spencer's appeal. 
 
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Spencer was convicted of violating Norfolk City Code 
§ 25-217, which substantially mirrors Code § 46.2-852 in 
defining "reckless driving:" 
Irrespective of the maximum speeds provided in 
this article, any person who drives a vehicle 
on any street or highway recklessly or at a 
speed or in a manner so as to endanger the 
life, limb, or property of any person shall be 
guilty of reckless driving. 
 
In Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388, 177 S.E.2d 628, 
630 (1970), this Court held that " 'recklessly' . . . imparts 
a disregard by the driver . . . for the consequences of his 
act and an indifference to the safety of life, limb or 
property" and that speed alone does not constitute 
recklessness unless it endangers life, limb, or property.  In 
applying these principles and determining whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the conviction, our rules of 
appellate review require that we must affirm the conviction 
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  
Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72 
(1998). 
In this case, Cusson and Spencer were the only 
eyewitnesses to the facts surrounding the driving at issue.  
Their testimony does not demonstrate that Spencer was driving 
erratically, nor does it indicate she lacked control of the 
car.  Cf. Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 468, 138 S.E.2d 
 
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22, 27 (1964) (finding recklessness where driver drove 
diagonally across road in front of police officer, forcing 
officer to brake "violently" in order to avoid collision); 
Sheckler v. Anderson, 182 Va. 701, 705-66, 29 S.E.2d 867, 868-
69 (1944) (finding recklessness where driver in residential 
neighborhood maintained speed too fast to allow him to stop to 
avoid emergency). 
Spencer drove out of her driveway and proceeded up the 
street.  Cusson was aware of Spencer's car before it left the 
driveway because she heard the horn blowing.  According to 
Cusson's testimony, she followed the dog into the street, the 
dog ran back to Parsons' house, and then Cusson walked to the 
van parked in front of Parsons' house.  Thus, at the time the 
"wind blew her," Cusson was standing in the street near the 
van parked in the street, and when Spencer passed Cusson, her 
car was not near the curb but had to be in the travel lane of 
the street, three feet beyond the parked van.  Though Cusson 
testified she had to "step back," she claimed she did so 
because of the wind, not because she feared injury or impact 
with Spencer's car.  "Fast" driving alone, without the element 
of endangering life, limb, or property, is not sufficient to 
support a conviction for reckless driving.  Powers, 211 Va. at 
388, 177 S.E.2d at 630. 
 
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This record does not support a conclusion that Spencer 
had a disregard for the consequences of her act, was 
indifferent to the safety of others, or that her rate of speed 
endangered Cusson.  Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, vacate the conviction, and dismiss the 
case. 
Reversed and final judgment.