Title: Ex Parte Robinson

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

565 So. 2d 664 (1990)
Ex parte Sara Nell ROBINSON.
Re Sara Nell Robinson
v.
State.
88-1572.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 2, 1990.
*665 W. Lloyd Copeland of Clark, Deen & Copeland, Mobile, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and James B. Prude, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice.
The defendant, Sara Nell Robinson, was convicted, on April 3, 1985, in Mobile Circuit Court of the murder of her husband, Franklin Delano Copeland. She received a sentence of ten years in the state penitentiary for the crime. In 1986, Robinson appealed her conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and that court affirmed, in an opinion issued on October 14, 1986. Thereafter, Robinson filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we denied on July 1, 1988. No other appeals or petitions were asserted by Robinson.
In August 1988, Robinson petitioned for a new trial pursuant to Rule 20, Alabama Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure. The instant petition for writ of certiorari grows out of that action. In that Rule 20 petition Robinson asserted that she had newly discovered evidence of a pistol permit issued to the deceased and that the prosecutor had withheld knowledge of that permit from her. That petition states as grounds the following:
The trial court, on September 23, 1988, granted Robinson a new trial. She was released from custody on a $50,000 bond. The State of Alabama, through the attorney general, appealed the new trial order to the Court of Criminal Appeals. That court reversed, with an opinion dated May 12, 1989. 565 So. 2d 661.
To aid the reader in grasping the factual scenario of this case, we set forth the statement of facts that is found in the order of the trial court granting Robinson a new trial:
The granting or denial of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is a matter left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will be overturned only for an abuse of that discretion. White v. State, 294 Ala. 265, 314 So. 2d 857 (1975). An appellate court, in reviewing a grant or denial of a new trial motion, is obliged to indulge every presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial court's decision. Ward v. State, 440 So. 2d 1227 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Woodard v. State, 401 So. 2d 300 (Ala.Cr.App.1981).
We find persuasive the following argument by defense counsel to the trial judge at the hearing on Robinson's Rule 20 motion:
We agree with the argument made by Robinson's counsel that this new evidence was exculpatory and that it should have been disclosed to Robinson by the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Brady states:
Thus, it matters not that the trial judge found that the prosecution did not intentionally fail to disclose the pistol permit to Robinson. The prosecution was bound by a duty to disclose all exculpatory *668 evidence to Robinson. The concept of due process of law demands no less.
In its order granting Robinson a new trial, the court stated:
The sheriff's representative also stated that the permits for the murder weapon issued to Robinson and her husband were kept in the same file. We can not but conclude, therefore, that the attorney general had possession of the permit in question and that this evidence was not disclosed to Robinson.
A particular piece of evidence is "material" and must be disclosed if "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). See generally, Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 Duke L.J. 892. The pistol permit issued to the deceased tended to negate the inference that Robinson had greater access to, and greater control of, the murder weapon. Based upon our review of the evidence and the other items in the record before us, we conclude that the pistol permit would have been useful to Robinson's defense, and that it was material and should have been disclosed to Robinson. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Robinson a new trial.
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.