Title: Anderson v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

JESSE ANDERSON
*
In the
*
Court of Appeals
        v.
*
of Maryland
*    No. 41
STATE OF MARYLAND
*
September Term, 2004
O R D E R
The 
Court 
having 
considered 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
filed 
in
the above-captioned case, it is this 9th day of February, 2005,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the motion be,
and it is hereby, granted in part and denied in part, and it is further
ORDERED that the opinion in this case filed on January 10, 2005,
be, and it is hereby, recalled and a new opinion filed simultaneously
with this order shall replace the opinion filed on January 10, 2005.  
/s/ ROBERT M. BELL            
                            Chief Judge
1
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case Nos. 102308025 and 102316072
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 41
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
JESSE ANDERSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed: February 9, 2005
There is substantial evidence that petitioner, Jesse Anderson, sold heroin to two
undercover Baltimore City detectives.  The question is whether, because of the way the State
chose to proceed in the case, Anderson may be prosecuted for those offenses.  The answer
is “no.”
BACKGROUND
Anderson was the target of a sting operation conducted by Detectives Clasing, Barnes,
and Butler.  The operational scenario, as described by Detective Clasing, was to send one or
more undercover detectives to purchase drugs from the target, to wait until those detectives,
after purchasing the drugs, left the area, and then to have another detective accost the target
in order to ascertain his identity.  So as not to compromise the continued effectiveness of the
undercover officers, charges against the target are normally delayed for a time.
In furtherance of that scheme, at 1:55 p.m. on October 1, 2002, Detective Barnes
approached Anderson in the 1500 block of Myrtle Avenue and purchased two capsules of
heroin from him for $20.  Anderson removed the capsules from a cigarette pack he was
holding.  With the purchase complete, Barnes left the area.  Five minutes later, Detective
Butler approached Anderson, in the same place, and he, too, purchased two capsules
containing heroin for $20 and then left the area.  Those capsules also were removed from the
cigarette pack.  After making their respective purchases, Barnes and Butler called Detective
Clasing and gave him a description of Anderson.
At about 2:30 p.m., Detective Clasing approached Anderson in order to conduct what
1 The transcript of the District Court proceeding that was included in the record
leaves a great deal to be desired and raised some serious concerns on our part.  It shows
that the possession of heroin charge was consolidated with a possession of cocaine charge
arising from an entirely separate incident that occurred on September 12.  It gives no
indication that the State was represented at the trial, which, as noted, took place only eight
days after the Statement of Charges was filed.  There is no indication anywhere in the
transcript that a prosecutor, or even Detective Clasing, who filed the Statement of
Charges, was present.  Clasing later testified that he was not present.  The transcript
shows that the only participants were the judge, who was not identified, the clerk, who
was not identified, defense counsel, who was not identified, and Anderson.
The entire proceeding, which encompassed both charges, could not have taken
more than five minutes, for it consumed less than four pages of transcript.  The transcript
shows that the clerk called the case and immediately read into the record a statement of
facts relating to the possession of heroin charge that consumes less than a half-page
(eleven lines) of transcript.  Defense counsel indicated that he/she had no additions to the
clerk’s statement, whereupon the court immediately found, from the “facts as agreed as
read into the record,” that the evidence sufficed to support a verdict of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and thus entered a verdict of guilty.  That process was then repeated, in
(continued...)
-3-
he referred to as a “field interview.”  After directing Anderson to sit down on the curb,
Clasing saw him throw a red object under a parked car.  Clasing retrieved the object and
found it to be a cigarette pack containing 25 capsules of suspected heroin.  Clasing arrested
Anderson and, the next day – October 2, 2002 – filed a Statement of Charges against him in
the District Court.  The Statement of Charges accused Anderson of one count of possession
of heroin on October 1, 2002, at 1500 Myrtle Avenue.  Eight days later, October 10,
Anderson appeared in District Court and, either on a plea of guilty or a plea of not guilty with
an agreed statement of facts – which of the two is not entirely clear – he was found guilty and
sentenced to a term of nine months in the Baltimore City Jail, which he began serving
immediately.1
1(...continued)
equally summary fashion, with respect to the cocaine charge.
Although the docket shows that, at some point, Anderson entered a plea of not
guilty, when and how that was done is not clear from the record.  No plea was entered or
confirmed at the “trial.”  The court, when indicating its intent to impose a sentence of
incarceration, asked Anderson, who begged not to be incarcerated, if he wanted to
continue with his “guilty plea” or withdraw it.  When Anderson responded that he wanted
to continue, the court said that it had “agreed” to a sentence of nine months, which it then
imposed.  The court then immediately imposed a concurrent sentence of nine months with
respect to the September 12 incident.
The judge’s comments suggest that a bargain of some kind was negotiated and
agreed to, although the record gives no indication of how, where, when, or under what
circumstances such a bargain was struck, much less whether a prosecutor was even aware
of such a bargain or participated in negotiating it.
After this Opinion was initially filed, we were informed, in a Motion for
Reconsideration, supported by an affidavit of an Assistant State’s Attorney in Baltimore
City, that the transcript that the parties placed and allowed to remain in the record as the
“Official Transcript” of what had occurred in the District Court, that they each relied
upon in presenting their arguments, and that we relied upon in resolving the issues
presented, was “incomplete,” “inaccurate,” and “deficient.”  That “Official Transcript,”
we are now told, failed to reflect that the State’s Attorney was aware of the District Court
charge, that a prosecutor participated in the District Court proceeding, and that it was, in
fact, the prosecutor, and not the clerk, who read “the agreed statement of charges.” 
Although that would explain an otherwise apparent and troubling lack of prosecutorial
oversight, it does not explain why the State’s Attorney and defense counsel allowed such
a now-conceded “incomplete,” “inaccurate,” and “deficient” transcript of the critical
proceeding to be placed in the record in the Circuit Court and thus to be offered to that
Court as an accurate representation of what had occurred or why the Public Defender and
the Attorney General permitted such a wholly misleading transcript to remain in the
record on appeal, without comment, to have relied on the transcript in their arguments to
this Court, and, thereby, to have represented it as genuine.  We have no doubt that the
derelictions on the part of counsel were inadvertent and not deliberate.
-4-
On November 4, 2002, nearly four weeks after the District Court proceeding, the State
obtained an indictment based on the sale to Detective Butler.  The indictment charged
-5-
Anderson with possession with intent to distribute heroin and with distribution of heroin to
Butler.  The date and place of those offenses were alleged to be October 1, 2002, at 1500
Myrtle Avenue.  On November 12, the State obtained a second indictment, based on the sale
to Detective Barnes.  That indictment charged Anderson with possession of heroin,
possession with intent to distribute heroin, and distribution of heroin to Detective Barnes.
The date and place of those offenses were alleged to be October 1, 2002, at 1500 Myrtle
Avenue.
Anderson moved to dismiss the two indictments on the ground of double jeopardy.
He averred that the offenses charged in the indictments and that charged in the District Court
case all arose at about the same time and place and involved the same cigarette pack, and he
argued that his conviction in the District Court barred further prosecution.  The court
indicated that the argument may have had merit under the holding in Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed.2d 548 (1990) but observed that the Supreme Court had
later overruled that decision.  See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 125
L. Ed.2d 556 (1993).  The applicable test for double jeopardy purposes, the court found,
remained that enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76
L. Ed. 306 (1932).  To constitute double jeopardy under that test, the court declared, the
multiple offenses must arise from incidents that occur at the same time and place, but it found
that the charges embodied in the two indictments arose from incidents that occurred at a
different time than the incident underlying the District Court charge.  For that reason, the
-6-
motion was denied.
Anderson filed an immediate appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  See Bunting v.
State, 312 Md. 472, 477-78, 540 A.2d 805, 807-08 (1988) and cases cited there, recognizing
the right under the collateral order doctrine to take an immediate appeal from the denial of
a motion to dismiss a criminal charge on double jeopardy grounds.  The intermediate
appellate court, in an unreported opinion, agreed that, because all of the possession charges,
in both the indictments and the Statement of Charges, “relate to the same quantity of CDS
under appellant’s control on the day of his arrest,” double jeopardy barred the possession and
possession with intent to distribute charges in the two indictments.  Relying on Hawkins v.
State, 77 Md. App. 338, 550 A.2d 416 (1988), however, the court held that the distribution
charge arose from “separate acts unrelated to the possession offenses which resulted in
appellant’s arrest by Detective Clasing.”  It noted that the distribution offenses had already
occurred prior to Clasing’s observation of Anderson discarding the cigarette pack and that
the District Court conviction therefore had no bearing on the earlier distributions.  We
granted certiorari to review that decision.
DISCUSSION
As a contextual preface to our consideration of the double jeopardy issue, it is helpful
to note that, subject to certain exceptions, the District Court has exclusive initial jurisdiction
over a charge of simple possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of
-7-
Maryland Code, § 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article (CL).  See Maryland Code, §§ 4-
301(b)(1) and 4-302(d)(2) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article (CJP).  One of the exceptions to
that exclusive initial jurisdiction, provided for in CJP § 4-302(d)(2)(ii), is that the Circuit
Court may try a charge of simple possession if the defendant “[i]s charged with another
offense arising out of the same circumstances that is within a circuit court’s jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis added).
Distribution of a controlled dangerous substance and possession with intent to
distribute such a substance are felonies.  See CL §§ 5-602 and 5-607(a).  As such, and
because they are not within the ambit of CJP § 4-302(a), those charges must originate and
be tried in the Circuit Court.  Thus, if a distribution or possession with intent charge arises
from the “same circumstances” as a simple possession charge, the latter may be joined with
the former and filed and tried in the Circuit Court.  That has a significant utility, for at least
two reasons.   First, even if one or more of the crimes charged is a lesser included offense of
another, subject to any collateral reason for severance, all may be prosecuted together, and
any double jeopardy problem that arises from multiple convictions may be resolved by
merging the lesser and greater convictions and imposing sentence only on the greater offense.
That allows the State to punish the defendant for the most serious crime.  
Second, joinder in the Circuit Court avoids the prospect of the kind of double jeopardy
problem that has arisen in this case.  Subject to the authority granted to the State Prosecutor
in title 9, subtitle 12 of the State Government Article, it is the statutory duty of the State’s
-8-
Attorney to “prosecute . . . on the part of the State, all cases in which the State may be
interested.”  See Maryland Code, Art. 10, § 34; also Babbitt v. State, 294 Md. 134, 448 A.2d
930 (1982).  Police officers, however, on their own and apparently without consulting the
prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, are permitted to file criminal charges in the
District Court.  Maryland Rule 4-202(b) reflects that practice by permitting a Statement of
Charges to be signed only by a peace officer or District Court Commissioner, rather than by
a prosecutor.  If left unknown to, or unattended by, the prosecutor, however, the District
Court case can create coordination problems that can lead to the very situation now before
us.
Both the Federal Constitution, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
Maryland common law prohibit the State from placing a person twice in jeopardy for the
same offense.  That prohibition provides a dual protection – against prosecuting a person for
an offense after that person has already been prosecuted for, and either convicted or acquitted
of, the “same offense,” and against imposing multiple punishments for the “same offense.”
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed.2d 187 (1977); Purnell v. State,
375 Md. 678, 827 A.2d 68 (2003).  With respect to both protections, the issue most often
raised is whether the second prosecution or additional punishment is, in fact, for the “same
offense.”  
That issue can arise in at least two contexts – where there are two or more separate
statutes or common law provisions that embrace the same criminal conduct, and where a
-9-
single statute may be read as creating multiple units of prosecution for search and conduct.
Depending on the context, the issue can turn on whether (1) the two or more offenses
charged, in fact, arise from the same incident or course of conduct and thus are the same in
fact, or (2) if so, despite a facial distinction between the offenses, as defined in the statutes
or by the common law, the relationship between them is such that they are the same in law
for double jeopardy purposes.  See Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 158, 742 A.2d 493, 502
(1999).  Both questions – sameness in fact and sameness in law –  are relevant here.
In Blockburger v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306,
the Supreme Court held that the standard to be used in resolving the sameness in law issue
for purposes of the Constitutional prohibition was the “required evidence” test, and we have
adopted and adhered to that standard as well in applying the common law prohibition.  See
Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977); Purnell v. State, supra, 375 Md. at 693,
827 A.2d at 77.  In Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 267, 353 A.2d 240, 246-47 (1976), we
defined that test as follows:
“The required evidence test is that which is minimally necessary
to secure a conviction for each . . . offense.  If each offense
requires proof of a fact which the other does not, or in other
words, if each offense contains an element which the other does
not, the offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes
even though arising from the same conduct of episode.  But
where only one offense requires proof of an additional fact, so
that all elements of one offense are present in the other, the
offenses are deemed to be the same for double jeopardy
purposes.”
See also Middleton v. State, 318 Md. 749, 757-58, 569 A.2d 1276, 1279-80 (1990).
-10-
That test focuses on the relationship between the offenses, rather than on whether the
multiple offenses arise from the same conduct or incident; indeed, it assumes sameness in
fact.  See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182, 76 L. Ed. at 309.  The question here,
in that regard, is whether, under a Blockburger analysis, possession of a controlled substance
is the “same offense” as possession with intent to distribute or actual distribution of the
substance. 
In State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 329, 658 A.2d 272, 276 (1995), we reached the
necessary conclusion that, because every element of the crime of possession is also an
element of the crime of possession with intent to distribute and only the latter offense
contains an element – intent to distribute – not contained in the former, the two offenses “are
deemed the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.”  In Hankins v. State, 80 Md. App.
647, 565 A.2d 686 (1989), the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the same
result pertains with respect to possession and distribution.  
Criminal Law Art. § 5-601(a)(1) makes it unlawful to possess a controlled dangerous
substance.  The word “possess” is defined in § 5-101(u) as to “exercise actual or constructive
dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.”  Section 5-602(1) makes it
unlawful to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.  The word “distribute,” with respect
to a controlled dangerous substance, is defined in § 5-101(l) as “to deliver other than by
dispensing.”  “Dispense” is defined in § 5-101(k) as to deliver “by or in accordance with the
lawful order of an authorized provider” as defined in § 5-101(d).  “Deliver” means “to make
-11-
an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer or exchange from one person to another whether
or not remuneration is paid or an agency relationship exists.” § 5-101(h).  
Putting these various definitions together, distribution occurs when a controlled
dangerous substance is delivered, either actually or constructively, other than by lawful order
of an authorized provider.  It is not possible, under these statutes, to “distribute” a controlled
dangerous substance in violation of § 5-602 unless the distributor has actual or constructive
possession (dominion or control) of the substance.  Thus, possession of the substance
distributed is necessarily an element of the distribution.  The crime of distribution obviously
contains an element not contained in the crime of possession – the distribution – but there is
no element in the crime of possession not contained in the crime of distribution.  Upon the
same analysis used in Woodson, therefore, possession and distribution are the “same”
offenses for double jeopardy purposes.   
It follows, then, that possession of the heroin distributed to Detectives Barnes and
Butler is a lesser included offense of the respective distributions to the detectives, as charged
in the two indictments, and that it is therefore the “same offense” as the distribution for
double jeopardy purposes.  The sameness in law prong is clearly established.  The issue thus
becomes whether the possession offense charged in the District Court and the distribution
offenses charged in the indictments arose as part of the same course of conduct – whether
they are the same in fact.  Anderson, of course, urges that they did arise from the same course
of conduct – that the heroin that he possessed when arrested by Detective Clasing he also
-12-
possessed when the capsules were sold to Detectives Butler and Barnes and, indeed, came
from the same cigarette pack.  The State looks at the matter differently.  Relying on Hawkins
v. State, 77 Md. App. 338, 550 A.2d 416 (1988), it asserts that, when arrested by Detective
Clasing, Anderson no longer had possession of the capsules sold to the detectives, so the
possession could not be the same.  Possession of the four capsules sold to the detectives
ended when the capsules were sold.  When arrested by Clasing, he had only the 25 capsules.
Anderson focuses on the situation at the moment of the first distribution; the State focuses
on the situation at the time of Anderson’s arrest.
Hawkins does, indeed, support the State’s position.  In that case, a police officer
observed Hawkins remove some aluminum foil packets from a plastic bag, hand one to
another individual, and accept money from that individual.  She then alerted other officers
and directed them to arrest Hawkins.  As an officer approached, Hawkins fled.  While
running, he reached into his pocket and discarded the plastic bag containing the aluminum
foil packets, which packets, it was later shown, contained marijuana and PCP.  Hawkins was
convicted of both possession and distribution, and the question arose whether he could be
sentenced for both.  Relying on a number of out-of-State cases, the Court of Special Appeals
held that the multiple sentences could stand because the crimes “spawned from separate
acts.”  That was so, the court held, because the distribution had been completed before the
discard of the bag observed by the arresting officer.
There have been a number of cases in which this issue has been addressed.  The cases
-13-
arise from a wide variety of fact situations, and, not surprisingly, they reach different results.
We start with the proposition that, absent a clear statutory direction to the contrary, the
uninterrupted possession of an item of contraband is ordinarily regarded as one continuing
offense under Maryland law.  See Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 389, 384 A.2d 456, 458-59
(1978) where, in dicta, we observed that “[w]hen mere possession of a prohibited article is
a crime, the offense is a continuing one because the crime is committed each day the article
remains in possession, as there is a continuing course of conduct.”  See also Webb v. State,
311 Md. 610, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988) where we applied that doctrine to the possession of a
handgun and precluded separate convictions and sentences for the uninterrupted possession
of the same handgun on two occasions three hours apart.  The doctrine of continuing
possession is both unremarkable and necessary; otherwise, what would the unit of
prosecution be – each minute the item is possessed, each hour, each day?
  We noted in Webb, however:
“It may be that were the wearing, carrying, or transporting of the
handgun by Webb interrupted by some lawful possession of it .
. . a subsequent unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting of it
would constitute another violation of the statute.  And it may be
that had Webb removed the weapon from his actual or
constructive possession, it would be a separate violation when
he retrieved it and wore it again on his person.  And it may be
that if it was shown that the handgun involved in the first
incident was a different weapon from that involved in the
second incident, there would be two violations.”
Id. at 618, 536 A.2d at 1165.
These hypotheses illustrate that, when the possession that underlies the first incident
-14-
ends before the second incident – when the possession is interrupted in some way and is not
continuous – multiple offenses, separately punishable, may arise. That is one aspect of the
problem, and happens to be the one now before us.  Another, which may coexist with the
first, is where the defendant possesses two or more quantities of a contraband drug that are
kept in different places.  Although that aspect is not before us, the underlying question is the
same in both situations – whether the possession that underlies one offense is the same
possession that underlies the other –  and much of the discussion of the double jeopardy issue
has been in that second context.  The fact patterns vary, and it is not easy to
compartmentalize the decisions.  The common thread, if there is one, is to consider if there
is a commonality of time, location, and purpose: was the contraband that formed the basis
of the two offenses possessed at the same time, in the same location, and for essentially the
same purpose?   If so, courts have found the two offenses to be the same.
The easier cases are where the defendant simultaneously possesses small amounts of
contraband in nearby places for personal use.  In that situation, where there is a commonality
of time, location, and purpose, courts have concluded that there is but one possession and
therefore but one offense.  See State v. Adel, 965 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1998) (en banc), where
a minute amount of marijuana was found in the defendant’s store and another minute amount
in his car that was parked just outside the store, and he was convicted on two counts of
possession.  Noting that the statute was silent as to the unit of prosecution in that situation,
the Washington court applied the rule of lenity.  In doing so, it observed that, under the
-15-
State’s theory, a defendant could be convicted and sentenced three times if marijuana was
found in his sock, his pocket, and his purse, and it declined to permit that “slippery slope of
prosecutorial discretion to multiply charges.”  Id. at 1075.  See also United States v. Wallis,
1 M.J. 975 (N.C.M.R. 1976) (possession of unlit marijuana cigarette by sailor while on flight
deck and possession of small amount of marijuana in his locker discovered fifteen minutes
later constituted one offense); United States v. Hughes, 1 M.J. 346 (C.M .A. 1976).   
The courts have reached different results where there is not a commonality in all three
respects.   In Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), the police found in Potts’s
house, while executing a search warrant, two quantities of marijuana – one consisting of 40
bags of the drug located in a plastic shopping bag and the other consisting of three bags
found in a cigar box.  The Court regarded the latter as a personal supply.  Potts was convicted
of possession with intent to distribute and sentenced to two years imprisonment based on the
first stash and simple possession, with a concurrent two month sentence based on the second,
and he complained that, under double jeopardy principles, the convictions had to be merged.
This Court disagreed, apparently because the two stashes were being held for different
purposes.   Compare Rashad v. Burt, 108 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 1997) where the court held that
a defendant who had been convicted of possession based on a stash of 650 grams of cocaine
found in his house, could not be later prosecuted for possession with intent to distribute 4,850
grams of cocaine found in his car, parked just outside his house.  
In In re Davis, 12 P.3d 603 (Wash. 2000), the court sustained separate convictions and
-16-
sentences for possession with intent to manufacture or distribute based on evidence that the
defendant operated two distinct marijuana growing operations at different locations – same
time, same purpose, different location.  See also United States v. Blakeney, 753 F.2d 152
(D.C. Cir. 1985), where the court sustained separate convictions and sentences based on
possession of nearly five pounds of marijuana found in defendant’s home and seven
envelopes of marijuana found in his possession when he was subsequently arrested at his
place of employment, several miles away.  The court stressed not only the difference in
location but also in purpose – to distribute the marijuana possessed at work to co-workers at
the place of employment and to reserve the stash at home for other distributions.
Some of the cases are hard to pigeonhole under this approach, in that they either
stretch or sharply circumscribe notions of commonality as to time, location, or purpose.
In State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852, 106 S. Ct. 151, 88 L. Ed.2d
125 (1985), the court upheld convictions for possession with intent to distribute based on a
stash of cocaine and marijuana found and seized during a search of the defendant’s home on
December 29 and separate convictions for simple possession of cocaine and marijuana based
on quantities found in a shoulder bag in the defendant’s car the next day, as he was returning
home from vacation.  Though acknowledging that possession and possession with intent to
deliver are the same in law, the court viewed the offenses as different in fact if they “are
either separated in time or are significantly different in nature.”  367 N.W.2d at 798.  It noted
that the defendant’s possession of the drugs in his house had been terminated by the seizure
-17-
of those drugs on December 29, but that his possession of the drugs in the shoulder bag
continued the next day.  There was thus, in the court’s view, no commonality as to time.
A similar result, based on slightly different facts, was reached in United States v. Ray,
731 F.2d 1361 (9 th Cir. 1984).  Although the opinion is skimpy in reciting the underlying
facts, it appears that one count in an indictment alleged distribution of a quantity of cocaine
on December 7, and another alleged possession with intent to distribute a remaining quantity
of cocaine on December 8.  The court affirmed separate convictions for the two offenses on
the ground, tersely stated, that “[t]he cocaine at issue in count 28 cannot be the same cocaine
that is at issue in count 27, since the count 27 cocaine had already been distributed by
December 8.”  Id. at 1368.
In United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061 (3rd Cir. 1978), Carter carried 19 one-ounce
packages of heroin from Los Angeles to Newark, where he delivered them all to Gorsuch at
the same time.  Gorsuch separated the heroin into two stashes – one, containing 677 grams,
was for a pre-arranged resale the following day; the other, containing 95 grams, he retained
for future resale to others.  Gorsuch followed through with the pre-arranged sale, to
undercover Federal agents, whereupon Carter, as a co-conspirator, was charged with separate
counts of possession with intent to distribute the 95 grams and distribution of the 677 grams,
and he complained that the indictment was multiplicitous – that it charged the same offense
in separate counts.
Carter first argued that he had made only one distribution, of the entire amount to
-18-
Gorsuch, and that he was not liable for Gorsuch’s subsequent conduct.  The court rejected
that argument on the basis that, as a co-conspirator, Carter could be convicted of the two
substantive offenses committed by Gorsuch.  As to the complaint of multiplicity, the court
held that Congress intended that “two distinct offenses, punishable by separate sentences,
should be seen to arise when the evidence shows that the acts of possession and distribution
involved discrete quantities of narcotics, and thus that the facts required to prove the two
offenses differ.”  Id. at 1064.  Because Gorsuch retained the 95 grams for further distribution
after the sale of the 677 grams, the court held that the possession and distribution counts were
distinct: the heroin that was distributed was different from the heroin retained for future sale.
The holding articulated by the court was:
“When an individual possesses an amount of heroin that could
result in a future distribution, and when the same individual also
distributes another quantity of heroin, he is punishable for both
possession and for distribution.
Id. at 1064 (Emphasis added).  The Carter court thus regarded the separation of the stash as
being for different purposes and therefore as creating two separate possessions, only one of
which was involved in the distribution.  
That approach was also used in State v. McFadden, 820 P.2d 53 (Wash. App.1991),
review denied, 832 P.2d 487 (1992) where the defendant was charged with two counts of
possession of cocaine – one arising from 84 grams found in his van and the other from his
bringing 5.5 grams into an apartment for the purpose of selling it.  The court sustained the
two charges on the ground that the two stashes were in different locations.  An intermediate
-19-
appellate court in Georgia took the same position in 
Camp v. State, 353 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. App.
1987).  The defendant had a large stash of marijuana, from which she took a small amount
that she sold.  Upholding separate sentences for possession with intent to distribute and for
the distribution, the court concluded that “[i]nasmuch as the sale of marijuana was not
directly related to nor did possession of the quantity sold constitute the basis for the count
of possession of the remainder of the marijuana, the separate conviction and punishment did
not constitute double jeopardy.”  Id. at 835.
The efficacy of applying a strict time, location, and purpose approach to street dealers
such as Anderson depends on how we view those criteria, particularly that of time.  Anderson
began his working day with a certain quantity of drugs that he kept in the cigarette pack.  He
apparently remained in the same location near 1500 Myrtle Avenue throughout the day (or
at least between 1:55 and 2:30 p.m.) distributing the drugs from that location and from that
cigarette pack.  There is no evidence that he was resupplied between the time he sold two
capsules to Detective Barnes and the time he was arrested by Detective Clasing. There was,
therefore, clearly a commonality as to location and purpose.  The question is whether, for
double jeopardy purposes, there was a continuity of time.  Do we view the time element from
the moment he started business, from the point at which he made each distribution, or from
the point at which he was arrested?  
Hawkins and Ray viewed the time element from the point of arrest: at that point, under
that view, Anderson no longer had in his possession the drugs that previously had been
-20-
distributed, so there was no commonality as to time.  Because he did not then possess the
drugs that he had sold to the detectives, his possession of what was left could have no bearing
on, or significance with respect to, the distributions.  
That view, we think, may work in some situations, but does not work here, principally
because of the charge actually made against Anderson in the District Court.  Although the
Statement of Probable Cause attached to the Statement of Charges notes that the cigarette
pack, when recovered by Detective Clasing, contained 25 gel-caps of suspected heroin, the
Statement of Charges itself charged Anderson generally with possession of heroin in
violation of CL § 5-601 on October 1, 2002 at 1500 Myrtle Avenue.  It did not specify a time
and did not specify how much heroin Anderson possessed.  In a full prosecution of that
offense, Anderson could have been convicted based on whatever he had in his possession
that day at that place, including the drugs sold to detectives Barnes and Butler or, indeed, to
anyone else.  
In determining the scope of the former conviction, the court must ordinarily look at
the effective charging document upon which judgment was entered, not just the evidence
presented in support of that charge.  We have often made clear that the primary purpose of
a charging document is to inform the defendant of the accusation against him/her by so
describing the crime “as to inform the accused of the specific conduct with which he is
charged,” Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 336, 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 (1985), in order, among
other things, to “protect[] the accused from a future prosecution for the same offense.”
2We need not consider here whether a different result would be warranted had the
Statement of Charges specified and charged only the possession of the 25 capsules at 2:30
p.m.
-21-
Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 791, 490 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1985).  See also State v. Morton,
295 Md. 487, 490-91, 456 A.2d 909, 911 (1983) and cases cited there.
One may never know, unless a transcript is prepared, what evidence was presented,
and one could never be certain in any event what evidence a trier of fact (or the court on
motion) credited in reaching its verdict.   The Supreme Court, for Constitutional purposes,
and we, as a matter of common law, have rejected an “actual evidence” test to determine
sameness in law, and we see no profit, absent special circumstances not present here, in
adopting that test to determine sameness in fact.  In most cases, the only sensible and
workable criterion for determining the nature and scope of the prior offense is the effective
charging document.  That states the offense for which the defendant was tried.
Because the Statement of Charges filed in the District Court encompassed all of the
heroin that Anderson possessed on October 1, 2002, at 1500 Myrtle Avenue, it necessarily
included the heroin that he sold to Detectives Barnes and Butler.  Having been convicted of
that offense, he cannot later be prosecuted for crimes that, in law, constitute the same
offense.  The motion to dismiss the two indictments should have been granted.2
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT OF
-22-
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND TO
REMAND TO CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO DISMISS INDICTMENT NOS. 102316072 AND
102308025; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.