Title: Robert Patton v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC89669
____________
ROBERT PATTON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 28, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Robert Patton appeals an order entered by the trial court summarily denying
his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the
reasons stated below we remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing on the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise intoxication or
insanity as a defense to first-degree premeditated murder, despite the substantial
evidence of the defendant’s long-term use of drugs and history of mental illness.  In
1   Patton's name was spelled "Patten" in the direct appeal and resentencing appeal opinions.  See
Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985); Patten v. State, 598 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1992).  References to
these two opinions will contain the spelling as it appears in the opinions. 
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all other respects we affirm.
The pertinent facts are taken from our opinion on direct appeal:
[O]n September 2, 1981, the victim, a Miami police officer,
attempted to stop appellant for traveling the wrong way on
a one-way street.   Appellant abandoned his car, which was
later determined to have been stolen, and fled the scene on
foot.   He ran down an alley with the officer in pursuit.
Witnesses heard gunshots and one witness testified that
appellant had hidden in the alley and waited for the officer
to approach before shooting him.  The officer was found
dead with two bullet wounds.  One bullet had penetrated his
heart, killing him instantly, and another had entered the
officer's foot in a manner indicating that the officer had
been shot after he was dead and lying prostrate. 
Immediately after the shooting, appellant stole a car
at gunpoint and fled the area.  He was arrested later that day
and charged with first-degree murder, armed robbery, grand
theft, and violation of probation.  Two days later, after
obtaining a search warrant, the police recovered the murder
weapon from beneath a heating grate in appellant's
grandmother's home.
Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975-76 (Fla. 1985).1
Robert Patton (Patton) was charged with first-degree murder, armed
robbery, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.  He was found guilty as charged. 
During the penalty phase, the jury sent a note to the judge indicating that it was
2   Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
-3-
deadlocked by a six-to-six vote.  The trial judge gave the jury an Allen2 charge,
instructing the jury to continue deliberations.  The jury returned with a seven-to-five
vote recommending Patton be sentenced to death.  The judge sentenced him to
death for first-degree murder, 110 years for armed robbery, and 5 years for grand
theft.
Patton appealed his convictions and sentences.  This Court affirmed all the
convictions and the armed robbery and grand theft sentences.  See Patten v. State,
467 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985).  However, the death sentence was vacated and the case
was remanded for a new sentencing proceeding before a different jury because the
jury was given an improper Allen charge.  See id.  At resentencing, the jury
recommended death by an eleven-to-one vote, and the judge imposed a death
sentence.  On appeal, the death sentence was affirmed.  See Patten v. State, 598
So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1992).  
Patton filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 on June 7, 1994.  He filed a second amended motion for
postconviction relief on July 22, 1995.  The State filed a response to the second
amended motion and supplied the trial court with six boxes of records on July 28,
1995.  At a telephone hearing held on September 21, 1995, the trial judge stated she
3   Patton argues the lower court erred by: (1) summarily denying his claims; (2) improperly
dismissing his motion for lack of verification; (3) denying his public records request and the request for the
police booking tape; (4) finding counsel was effective during the guilt phase of the trial; (5) finding counsel
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was summarily denying the motion for the reasons advanced in the State’s
response.  The trial judge asked the State to prepare an order to that effect.  The
State prepared two proposed orders, each detailing the arguments made in the
State’s response as the reasons for denying the motion for postconviction relief. 
One proposed order granted the State’s motion to compel production of the
defense attorney’s files, and the other proposed order denied it.  Both proposed
orders were presented to Patton for objections.  He objected to both proposed
orders, arguing they went beyond the trial judge’s directions.  Patton wanted the
proposed orders to merely state that the motion for postconviction relief was
denied for all the reasons argued in the State’s response without stating the actual
arguments.  He further objected to the proposed order granting the motion to
compel production of documents, arguing the motion to compel should be denied. 
Both proposed orders and Patton’s objections were forwarded to the trial judge. 
The judge signed the proposed order which denied Patton’s motion for
postconviction relief and denied the motion to compel.  A copy of the signed order
was sent to the State, and the State sent a copy to defense counsel.  
In this appeal, Patton raises twenty issues.3  The nine issues which were or
was effective during the resentencing trial; (6) finding the state did not commit a Brady violation by failing
to disclose that  Patton had a cigarette package containing white paper and pills at the time he was arrested;
(7) not finding counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing prior to his resentencing
and failing to provide the experts who testified at  resentencing with  necessary psychological background;
(8) not finding counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the court- appointed psychiatrists or defense
experts with available documentation of Patton's history of mental problems prior to the competency
hearing which preceded the guilt phase of the trial; (9) finding counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to the trial and the resentencing judges'  bias; (10) failing to suppress statements taken by law
enforcement that were illegally obtained; (11) failing to find that the presence of uniformed police officers
prejudiced the jury; (12) failing to find this Court's decision to remand Patton's case for resentencing
violated the double jeopardy clause; (13) failing to find that the death recommendation was improper
because the jury was not instructed that two of the aggravating factors should have been merged; (14)
failing to finding that Patton was not eligible for the death penalty because two of the aggravating factors
should have been merged; (15) not finding that the resentencing judge erred in failing to find nonstatutory
mitigation; (16) failing to find the death sentence was based upon an unconstitutional prior conviction; (17)
failing to find the state exercised its discretion to seek the death penalty based upon racial considerations;
(18) failing to find counsel was ineffective for failing to object to constitutional errors; (19) failing to hold
the death penalty unconstitutional; and (20) allowing the motion for postconviction relief to be improperly
accelerated. 
4   The issues this Court will not address are issues 10-17 and 19 as they are listed above.
-5-
should have been raised on direct appeal and are therefore procedurally barred will
not be addressed.4  See Eutzy v. State, 536 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1988); Woods v.
State, 490 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1986).  While we find only one issue warrants an
evidentiary hearing, we will briefly comment on the other issues.
Need for an Evidentiary Hearing
Patton argues four reasons in support of his claim that the trial court erred in
summarily denying his postconviction motion:  (1) the allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel were legally sufficient and not conclusively rebutted by the
record; (2) the court considered evidence from the file that was not in the record to
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summarily deny the motion; (3) it was improper for the judge to delegate authority
to the State to draft the order denying the motion for postconviction relief; and (4)
it was improper for the judge to fail to attach specific portions of the record to the
order denying relief.
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion for
postconviction relief unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief; or (2) the motion or 
particular claims are legally insufficient.  See Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla.
1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1993); Holland v. State, 503 So.
2d 1250 (Fla. 1987).  The defendant in a postconviction proceeding bears the
burden, however, of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid
claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient.  See Kennedy v. State, 547
So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).
Because the record does not conclusively refute some of Patton’s allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court should have held an evidentiary
hearing.  Specifically, the court should have held a hearing to determine if counsel
was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence that Patton was
intoxicated or insane at the time of the shooting.  Instead, the court summarily
denied this claim stating a strategy must be presumed.  If this were the standard, a
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strategy could be presumed in every case and an evidentiary hearing would never
be required on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  To the contrary, it was
necessary for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
counsel was acting competently when she chose not to present an intoxication or
insanity defense to a charge of first-degree premeditated murder, where she had
conceded that the defendant shot the victim.  These defenses have the potential to
affect the outcome of the trial since voluntary intoxication or insanity can negate the
specific intent needed for first-degree murder.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). 
With regard to the intoxication defense, counsel had information that the
defendant was a heavy drug user and had a substantial history of drug and alcohol
abuse dating back to when he was seven years old.  Counsel knew of but did not
present evidence that Patton had been doing speedballs (a mixture of cocaine and
heroin) only seven hours prior to the shooting, that the stolen car Patton had driven
prior to the murder had drug paraphernalia in it, or that Patton had fresh track
marks on his arm at the time he was arrested.  Because this evidence was available
but not presented to the jury, the issue of intoxication needs to be explored in the
adversarial setting of an evidentiary hearing.
With regard to the insanity defense, there was also ample evidence available
-8-
which could have suggested to defense counsel that Patton was legally insane at the
time he committed this murder, including the fact that Patton had previously been
adjudicated insane.  The State argues that counsel was unable to find an expert who
would testify that Patton was legally insane, and therefore she was not ineffective
for failing to present this defense.  This argument is rebutted by the record.  Dr.
Toomer testified at resentencing that Patton was legally insane at the time he shot
the police officer.  In addition there are records available that document Patton’s
history of mental illness.  A proven claim of insanity at the time of the offense
would negate the specific intent needed for a first-degree murder conviction.  At the
very least this claim should be tested at an evidentiary hearing.
Moreover, one of the bases for the State’s argument that counsel could not
find an expert to testify that Patton was legally insane was the fact that four court-
appointed experts testified Patton was competent to stand trial.  This argument is
flawed for two reasons.  First, whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is not
necessarily relevant on the question of whether the defendant was insane at the time
of the killing.  Competency to stand trial and insanity at the time of the offense
involve the defendant’s mental state at separate and distinct points in time.  Second,
the competency experts may not have been given the type of background
information that would be necessary to evaluate Patton’s true mental status at the
-9-
time of the murder.  Patton had a substantial history of mental health problems
beginning in his early childhood.  Only two of the court-appointed experts who
testified Patton was competent to stand trial reviewed any of Patton's hospital
records from an early commitment.  One of those experts was the most hesitant to
find Patton competent to stand trial.  He further stated he would need more
information to make an informed decision.  This claim warrants an evidentiary
hearing.
Patton’s other claims of entitlement to an evidentiary hearing are without
merit.  His argument that the court erred in considering the court files in addition to
the record is erroneous and contrary to the plain language of rule 3.850.  Rule 3.850
states that the court should consider the “records” and “files” in the case.  This
language must be given its common meaning.  No evidentiary hearing is needed on
this claim.
We also disagree with Patton’s allegations that the court erred by failing to
properly attach specific portions of the record to the order and by allowing the
State to draft the order.  The order gives very specific reasons as to why each
claim was denied.  The court does not have to attach specific portions of the
record to the order summarily denying postconviction relief where the reasons for
denial are clearly spelled out in the order.  See Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365
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(Fla. 1998); Mills v. State, 684 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So.
2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1993).
Patton also objects to the fact that the State drafted the order and to the
wording of the order.  The record shows the court reviewed six boxes of records
and files, the defendant’s motion, and the State’s response before concluding the
State’s responsive arguments were correct.  At a telephone hearing with both
parties, the court denied the motion for the reasons contained in the State's
response.  This statement amounted to the trial court’s oral findings.  The court
then asked the State to reduce the findings to writing by drafting an order denying
the motion for the reasons contained in the State’s response.  Patton claims the
order should have been one sentence stating the court denied the motion based
upon the State's arguments contained in its response, rather than a well-drafted
order specifically detailing the portions of the record that proved the claims were
legally insufficient or conclusively rebutted.  To the contrary, such a conclusory
order would have been insufficient.  
Patton’s reliance on Smothers v. State, 555 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990),
for the proposition that the court cannot rely on portions of the record supplied by
the state attorney is not well taken because the record in that case was not given to
the trial court for review at the time the response was filed; rather, the record was
5   This holding is limited to these specific facts and would caution trial courts that the more prudent
approach is for courts to draft their own orders. 
-11-
offered to the appellate court.  Here, the record was provided to the trial court and
the record reflects the court carefully reviewed the boxes of documents.  The court
chose to adopt the State's arguments as an accurate and well-documented reflection
of the facts and law pertaining to the issues.  See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 572 (1985)(stating “even when the trial court adopts proposed findings
verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly
erroneous”).
We also do not find merit in Patton's argument that this issue should be
guided by Patterson v. State, 513 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1987), and its progeny.  In
Patterson, we held the State should not draft the trial court’s sentencing order. 
This statement was based on the fact that a sentencing order is a statutorily required
personal evaluation by the trial judge of aggravating and mitigating factors.  The
evaluation done in the sentencing order is the basis for a sentence of life or death. 
The sentencing order must be sufficiently detailed to allow this Court to perform its
proportionality review, the review which may ultimately determine whether a person
lives or dies.  On the other hand, a motion for postconviction relief is brought after
the judgment and sentence have been affirmed and are presumed correct.5  The
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order on postconviction is not a sentencing order; it is a recitation of the facts, law,
and reasons for the granting or denial of requested relief.  Accordingly, we find this
claim is also without merit.
Dismissal for Lack of Verification
Next, Patton claims the court erred in dismissing his motion due to lack of
proper verification.  Patton is correct that the proper remedy for failure to file a
timely oath is dismissal without prejudice.  See Groover v. State, 703 So. 2d 1035
(Fla. 1997); Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1993); Jewson v. State, 688
So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  However, despite the wording used by the trial
court, this claim does not warrant an evidentiary hearing because the court
considered each claim on its merits.  There was no dismissal on this basis.
Public Records
Patton argues the trial court erred by denying his public records request and
his request for the police booking tape.  These claims are both without merit.  A
review of the sealed records reveals the alleged public records are nothing more
than the prosecutor's personal notes used during the trial.  See Ragsdale v. State,
720 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1998); Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1998). 
All of the notes are handwritten details of specific questions to ask during voir dire,
notes on potential jurors, a time-line of events, or specific detailed questions the
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prosecutor planned to ask witnesses.  This is clearly work-product and not
discoverable as public records.  Furthermore, Patton's claim that the court could
not have conducted a proper in camera hearing without comparing the notes to the
final drafts of documents is completely without merit as none of the notes are
related to memoranda, briefs, or other pleadings.
Patton also alleges the case should be remanded with instructions that the
court order the Miami Police Department to conduct a search for the missing
booking videotape.  Such a search would be futile because the court previously
ordered the police department to produce the video or show cause why it could not
be produced.  The police department responded by informing the judge that all the
tapes from that time period had been destroyed.  This claim also is without merit.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
In his fourth issue, Patton argues counsel was ineffective during the guilt
phase of his trial for several reasons, many of which were raised in the first issue. 
We find all of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit
with the exceptions of counsel’s failure to raise voluntary intoxication and insanity
defenses.
Patton alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a change of
venue.  The court properly summarily denied this claim because Patton failed to
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argue sufficient facts demonstrating he suffered prejudice due to counsel's failure to
request a change of venue.  Had counsel made the request, it appears unlikely the
court would have granted it.  See Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 284-88 (Fla.
1997) (no requirement that venue be changed in a high profile case when the ability
to seat an impartial jury was demonstrated by individual voir dire).  Every first-
degree murder case naturally involves some publicity.  Here, there were no
allegations of extraordinary publicity; therefore, this claim was legally insufficient. 
Moreover, any potential prejudice was cured when the court conducted an
individual voir dire which revealed a few jurors had heard something about the case
through the media but that none of them remembered many details.  All jurors
believed they could rely exclusively on the evidence presented at trial to come to a
fair decision.   Thus, this claim was properly summarily denied.
Patton also argues counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present voluntary intoxication and insanity defenses.  There is some doubt as to
counsel’s possible strategy for not presenting these defenses as discussed above;
therefore, this claim is remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  See Remeta v. Dugger,
622 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla.1993) (approving, after an evidentiary hearing, counsel's
tactical decision to forego a voluntary intoxication defense which was inconsistent
with defendant's theory of the case that the accomplice was the main perpetrator
6   Counsel was also utilizing a jury consultant/psychologist, which affected the voir dire strategy.
7   Patton’s claims that the trial court rendered counsel ineffective by allowing the media in the
courtroom, by not appointing co-counsel, and by holding ex parte communications are issues which were
or could have been raised on direct appeal and are now being presented in the guise of ineffective
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and triggerman in the murder).  In a related claim, Patton argues counsel was
ineffective for failing to question the jury about mental illness during voir dire.  This
claim also depends upon whether counsel was motivated not to ask such questions
for strategic purposes and is therefore intertwined with the intoxication and insanity
defenses.  Accordingly, this claim should be explored during the evidentiary
hearing.
Patton next argues counsel failed to ask the jury questions about drug
addiction during voir dire.  This claim is conclusively rebutted by the fact that
counsel submitted written questions to the jury addressing this issue.6  
Patton claims counsel was ineffective for failing to be an advocate.  This
claim is without merit because the facts counsel conceded were supported by
overwhelming evidence.  If counsel had denied these facts, there is no reasonable
possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict.  See, e.g., McNeal v.
Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1984); McNeal v. State, 409 So. 2d 528 (Fla.
5th DCA 1982).
Patton alleges the court rendered counsel ineffective7 by allowing the media
assistance of counsel claims.
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to be in the courtroom during the trial.  This claim is procedurally barred because it
was raised and rejected on direct appeal.  See Patten, 467 So. 2d at 979.
Patton also claims the court rendered counsel ineffective by failing to appoint
co-counsel when it was requested.  This claim is conclusively rebutted by the
record.  The court allowed counsel to consult with any other partner or associate in
her firm and waived any billing limits.  Moreover, Patton was represented by two
attorneys throughout his trial.  
Patton further claims the court rendered counsel ineffective by holding an ex
parte proceeding.  This claim is procedurally barred because it should have been
raised on direct appeal.  This claim is also without merit because it is conclusively
rebutted by the fact that the judge had previously ruled on the subject matter of the
alleged ex parte proceedings (the State was to receive a copy of a psychological
report) and was merely carrying out an administrative function.  See Rose v. State,
601 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992) (ex parte proceedings with respect to
administrative matters are not prohibited); Nassetta v. Kaplan, 557 So. 2d 919, 921
(Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (allegations regarding ex parte proceedings must evidence
prejudice on the part of the judge).
Lastly, Patton alleges counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of his
8   Patton’s argument concerning the failure to cross-examine witnesses concerning ownership of
the drug paraphernalia in the car should be explored during the evidentiary hearing concerning the
intoxication and insanity defenses.
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trial for failing to cross-examine witnesses.  This claim is also without merit. 
Counsel admitted Patton committed the homicide because of the overwhelming
evidence of his guilt.  Therefore, it was not necessary for counsel to cross-examine
many of the witnesses who testified with regard to the fact that Patton shot the
victim.  Patton has not alleged that any of the witnesses counsel failed to cross-
examine could have provided any insight into his mental state at the time of the
shooting.8  See, e.g., Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1991); Magill v.
State, 457 So. 2d 1367, 1369 (Fla. 1984).  Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Resentencing
As his fifth issue, Patton argues counsel was ineffective during his
resentencing trial.  He raises seven claims within this issue.  We find each to be
without merit.
First, the record conclusively rebuts the allegation that counsel was
ineffective for failing to impanel a new jury after jurors read a newspaper article
detailing the prior jury's findings.  Prior to this incident, counsel had specifically
asked the court to tell the resentencing jury exactly what had happened in the
previous trial.  The newspaper article did nothing more than what counsel had
-18-
previously requested.  Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to object when the
record proves counsel wanted the jury to know the prior jury had been deadlocked. 
The court cannot view this issue with the heightened perspective of hindsight and
determine that counsel's strategic decision was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996) (holding disagreement with trial
counsel's choices as to strategy was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also
Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.1995) (concluding standard is not how
current counsel would have proceeded in hindsight).  Therefore, the court did not
err in summarily denying this claim. 
Patton alleges as his second claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness during
resentencing the failure of counsel to request removal of the trial judge based on
contrary rulings and communication with the victim’s mother during a recess.  The
mere fact that a trial judge makes rulings that are adverse does not give a defendant
basis to remove the judge.  Accordingly, this claim is without merit.  See Barwick
v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1995); Jackson v. State, 599 So. 2d 103, 107
(Fla. 1992).  In addition, we find Patton’s blanket statement that the judge talked to
the victim’s mother during a recess to be insufficient to establish that the judge
acted improperly.  Accordingly, Patton’s allegations do not demonstrate counsel
should have filed a motion to dismiss the judge.  See Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d
9   In fact, his mother denied much of the abuse alleged by Mr. Patton's sister and stepsister.
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1331 (Fla. 1997).  Since the issue was insufficiently pled, it was not error to
summarily deny it. 
Third, Patton claims counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a
competency hearing prior to the resentencing.  This claim was insufficiently pled
because there were no specific instances of abnormal behavior alleged that would
have put counsel on notice that his client may have been incompetent for
resentencing.  Without such allegations, there was no basis to find counsel should
have asked for such a hearing.  Therefore, this claim was legally insufficient. 
Fourth, Patton's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
investigate and present mitigating evidence is also without merit.  Patton alleges
counsel should have had his mother testify.  There is no allegation that his mother
or any other witnesses could have provided any mitigation not presented by his
sister and stepsister.9  Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present
cumulative mitigation.  See Valle, 705 So. 2d at 1334.  
Fifth, Patton alleges counsel should have called additional witnesses to
corroborate the mitigation presented by his sister and stepsister.  Much of the
information provided by these witnesses was corroborated by the expert witnesses. 
Additionally, Patton has failed to indicate that there are persons available who
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would corroborate the sisters’ testimony and has failed to specify the degree of
corroboration.  Moreover, Patton's sister and stepsister provided not only adequate
but substantial mitigation.  Counsel cannot be incompetent for failing to present
cumulative evidence.  This allegation also has not been sufficiently pled.
Patton alleges as the sixth instance of ineffective assistance at resentencing
that the mental health experts were not provided with adequate background history
to make an accurate assessment of his mental and drug-related problems.  This
allegation is also conclusively rebutted by the record because Dr. Krop and Dr.
Toomer, defense experts, were provided with school, social worker, doctor,
hospital, and prison records, background information obtained from Patton's
family, and the trial transcripts from the original trial. 
Lastly, Patton argues counsel was ineffective for failing to properly inform
Dr. Krop of the legal definition of insanity.  While Dr. Toomer’s change of opinion
between the trial and the resentencing called his understanding of the proper legal
standard into issue, there is no basis for the Court to conclude Dr. Krop also failed
to understand the legal definition of insanity under Florida law.  Dr. Krop is an
experienced expert witness who has evaluated over 400 patients to determine
competency and mitigation, and has testified on behalf of defendants in over 45
cases.  Dr. Krop was aware of the legal definition of insanity; he found Patton sane
10     Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-21-
at the time he shot the police officer.  There is simply no basis in the record to
support Patton’s claim that Dr. Krop was not aware of the proper legal definition of
insanity.  Therefore, counsel had no reason to question Dr. Krop’s understanding
of the legal principles applicable to this case.  The trial court correctly summarily
denied this claim.  
Brady Violation  
In his sixth issue, Patton argues the State committed Brady10 violations. 
However, in his reply brief, Patton conceded there were no Brady violations, but
instead argued counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize evidence related to a
voluntary intoxication defense.   This issue was discussed previously under the
ineffectiveness claim.
Competency Hearing/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his seventh and eighth issues, Patton argues his competency hearing was
inadequate and counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the mental health
experts of Patton’s history of mental illness.  The competency issue is procedurally
barred because it should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Johnston v.
Dugger, 583 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1991).  The claim that counsel was ineffective
-22-
for failing to properly inform the court-appointed experts of Patton’s history of
mental illness is insufficient to overcome the procedural bar.  See Kennedy v. State,
547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).  Furthermore, this claim is without merit because
Patton has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to inform
the experts.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.  Two of the four court-appointed
experts, who had previously found Patton competent to stand trial, testified at his
resentencing.  Prior to their testimony, each reviewed the hospital records.  Both
experts testified that the additional information did not change their opinions about
Patton’s sanity.  Thus, the record demonstrates that even if counsel had provided
these experts with more information at the original competency hearing, they still
would have found Patton competent to stand trial.  Accordingly, this claim was
properly summarily denied.  
As a corollary to the substantive competency claim, Patton also argues
counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the four court-appointed experts with
proper background history with regard to his previous confinement in mental
hospitals.  This claim is without merit for the same reason stated above.  Two of
the experts were later given this information and they both testified that it would not
have affected their opinion that Patton was competent to stand trial.
Bias of the Trial Judge and Resentencing Judge/Ineffective Assistance
11   Some of the same issues and arguments concerning the trial court’s alleged bias were raised
and addressed as part of issue five above and will not be stated again in these arguments.
-23-
Patton, in his ninth issue, alleges both that the trial judge was biased and that
counsel was ineffective for failing to request the trial judge be removed for making
biased decisions.11  The record supports the conclusion that all of the trial judge's
decisions were either proper, did not affect the outcome, or were addressed on
direct appeal and are not subject to review in this postconviction proceeding. 
Therefore, there is no basis to find that counsel was ineffective for failure to file a
motion to recuse.  First, Patton alleges the trial judge was biased for rushing to trial
before counsel had an adequate opportunity to prepare.  This claim is conclusively
refuted by evidence that the trial judge granted defense counsel a two-month
continuance and a two-week continuance.  No other continuances were requested
during the guilt phase of the trial.  
Next, Patton claims the trial judge was biased for refusing to grant a
continuance prior to the penalty phase.  Patton cannot demonstrate any prejudice
stemming from this claim because the case was remanded for resentencing.  
Patton’s argument that the trial judge was biased for scheduling a
competency hearing before his arraignment and before counsel was assigned
likewise does not entitle him to relief.  He cannot demonstrate any prejudice based
-24-
on this decision because counsel also requested a competency hearing.  
Patton next alleges the trial judge was biased because he held ex parte
proceedings.  This claim is procedurally barred and without merit as discussed
above.  Patton also claims the trial judge was biased in denying the request for
additional peremptory challenges.  This claim is procedurally barred because it was
raised on direct appeal.  See Patten, 467 So. 2d at 979.  He argues the trial judge
was biased because he denied counsel an opportunity to be heard on the effect of
the media's presence in the courtroom.  This issue too was raised and rejected on
direct appeal.  See id.  
Patton argues the trial judge was biased because he denied counsel adequate
funds to properly prepare the defense necessary to ensure a fair trial.  This claim is
conclusively rebutted by the record because all funds counsel requested were
granted and the judge gave counsel the opportunity to request additional funds as
necessary.  Counsel consulted with other lawyers, mental health experts,
investigators, ballistic experts, and jury consultants.  Patton has failed to allege or
demonstrate what additional persons or funds were needed.  
Lastly, Patton contends the trial judge was biased because he made
inflammatory comparisons between the defendant and Satan or Hitler in front of the
jury.  This claim is conclusively rebutted by the record.  The trial judge made these
-25-
references during the questioning of a juror who was opposed to the death penalty. 
In an effort to determine how deep-rooted her opposition was, the trial judge asked
the juror if she would feel the same way if the defendant was Satan or Hitler.  There
was certainly no comparison made between Patton and either Satan or Hitler.  None
of the allegations of bias by the trial judge either individually or collectively
demonstrate bias or prejudice by the trial judge.
Patton also alleges the resentencing judge was biased and that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to request removal of the resentencing judge
based upon his biased decisions.  All of Patton's allegations are without merit. 
First, he alleges the resentencing judge was biased because he did not impanel a
new jury after the jury read a newspaper article that stated the prior jury had been
deadlocked but ultimately returned with a death recommendation.  This claim is
conclusively rebutted by the record.  The resentencing judge offered to impanel a
new jury; however, counsel made a strategic decision not to do so.  
Patton further argues the resentencing judge acted with bias by making it
known to counsel that he believed in the death penalty.  This claim is also
conclusively rebutted by the record.  The comment complained of was made by
the judge, out of the presence of the jury, after the prosecutor objected to the judge
telling the jury the method of execution would be death by electrocution.  The judge
-26-
stated that it was the truth and most people, including himself, believed in it.  When
the comment is taken in this context it demonstrates the judge was not biased,
rather he was refuting the prosecutor's objection.  See Jernigan v. State, 608 So. 2d
569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Patton alleges the resentencing judge was biased in not allowing evidence of
his sister's suicide in mitigation.  Patton cannot demonstrate that the decision to
exclude this evidence affected the outcome of his case in light of the substantial
amount of mitigating evidence that was presented.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. 
Finally, Patton claims the resentencing judge was biased because he talked to the
victim's mother in public view.  This claim is insufficiently pled as discussed above
with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
The
defense has failed to demonstrate that the either the trial judge or the resentencing
judge was biased.  Therefore, defense counsel cannot be found ineffective for
failing to request recusal of the trial or resentencing judge.  Accordingly, this claim
was properly summarily denied.
Constitutional Error
As issue eighteen, Patton alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to various constitutional errors.  Specifically, he claims the following as
constitutional error:  (1) the aggravating and mitigating circumstances instruction
12   Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
-27-
shifted the burden to Patton to prove a life sentence was appropriate; (2) the State
and the resentencing judge relieved the jury from the weight of its decision to
recommend death by telling the jury its decision was only a recommendation and
that the final decision would be imposed by the judge; and (3) the State argued
nonstatutory aggravating factors including the statements that Patton killed a young
officer and was a drug dealer who often became violent when he was without
drugs.  Patton has failed to demonstrate that the instructions given or the arguments
made during the penalty phase were error; therefore, counsel cannot he held
ineffective for failing to object to them.
Appellate counsel alleged on appeal that the State argued nonstatutory
aggravation by referring to the fact that the victim was a police officer.  This court
addressed the issue on the merits and concluded the argument “was allowable and
did not deny Patten’s right to due process or a fair trial.”  Patten, 598 So. 2d at 62. 
Patton's other alleged constitutional errors, the burden-shifting and Caldwell12
claims, were not raised as ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Patton’s
motion below and cannot be considered as such for the first time on appeal.  In
addition, the underlying burden-shifting and Caldwell error claims are legally
insufficient and conclusively rebutted by the record.  Because there was no error
-28-
demonstrated concerning these issues, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to
object.  These claims were properly summarily denied.
Timing of Postconviction Motion
Patton argues his motion for postconviction relief was improperly
accelerated.  This claim is without merit.  See Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d 1255
(Fla. 1990); Cave v. State, 529 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1988).  Patton was allowed to
amend his motion after the two-year period had expired.  Thus, he has been allowed
additional time to file the motion, not deprived of adequate time.
Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above, we remand this case to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on the claims relating to whether counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise voluntary intoxication or insanity as a defense to first-degree murder. 
In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of Patton’s 3.850
motion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
-29-
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I write separately to address a fundamental injustice that has occurred in this
case and that should be corrected by this Court without further delay.  See State v.
Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (“This Court has the power to reconsider
and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on
the previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such
rulings have become the law of the case.”); Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942
(Fla. 1984).      
Under Florida law when a sentencing jury is divided six to six as to its
sentencing recommendation, this vote must be accepted as a recommendation for a
life sentence.  This is precisely what happened in Patton’s case, although this Court
has previously rejected his claim that he is entitled to the benefit of the jury’s split. 
See Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 1985) (“During sentencing
deliberations, the jury advised the trial judge that they were deadlocked six-to-six
with regard to a recommended sentence.”)  This Court’s prior rejection of this claim
is patently erroneous and without support in fact or law.  It is also important to note
that this mistake cannot be attributed to the State since the State has previously
urged this Court to treat the jury’s split vote as a recommendation of life.  The State
was obviously correct.  Double jeopardy principles also guarantee that a life
-30-
recommendation, once secured, cannot be taken away. 
Moreover, because there is no factual dispute about the jury’s split and
because our prior erroneous ruling could result in Patton’s life being unlawfully
taken, we should recognize our error as fundamental and correct it at once.  The
existence of this fundamental flaw in this almost twenty-year-old case is simply
another illustration of the need for careful scrutiny of all cases in which the death
penalty is imposed.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,
Carol Gersten, Judge - Case No. 81-19702
Todd G. Scher, Chief Assistant CCRC, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Fariba N. Komeily and Lisa Rodriguez,
Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee