Title: Soutiere v. Soutiere

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

SOUTIERE_V_SOUTIERE.93-451; 163 Vt 265; 657 A.2d 206

[Filed 17-Feb-1995]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 93-451


Pauline B. Soutiere                               Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
          v.                                      Chittenden Family Court

Roger A. Soutiere                                 June Term, 1994


Alden T. Bryan, J.

Kurt M. Hughes of Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

Norman R. Blais, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   Defendant husband appeals from a final divorce order of the
Chittenden Family Court, alleging error in the court's admission of expert
testimony on battered-woman syndrome, and also challenging the court's
property and maintenance awards in favor of plaintiff wife.  We affirm. 

     Plaintiff and defendant married in February 1966.  The parties remained
together for twenty-seven years, and raised two daughters.  During the
marriage, defendant was the primary income-provider, working at IBM for
twelve years before taking early retirement in 1992.  In his last full year
of employment in 1991, defendant earned over $41,300.  Defendant supplemented
his IBM income with work as a barber, bringing in an additional $200 to $500
a 

 

week.  Defendant, age fifty-one at the time of divorce, continues to work
as a barber.  Although plaintiff worked as a beautician prior to marriage, at
defendant's behest she stayed home and raised the parties' children.  Only
when the children were older did she seek work outside the home.  At that
time, her employment was limited by defendant's demand that she not work in
any job where there would be men in the workplace.  At the time of divorce,
plaintiff was forty- seven years old, and had been working for six years
part-time in a retail shop.  In 1992, plaintiff's earnings were just over
$4,300.  Plaintiff does not enjoy good health, in part due to defendant's
abusive treatment of her during the marriage, and this limits her ability to
work. 

     The family court found that the parties' marital assets totalled
$177,500, not including the value of defendant's IBM pension.  The court also
found that plaintiff and defendant had roughly equivalent credit card debt of
about $6,000 and $6,550, respectively.  The court awarded plaintiff 59% of
the parties' property, including the marital residence, for a total value of
$105,250, plus 75% of defendant's pension.  Of this amount, $11,681 was
attributed to defendant's arrearages in paying temporary maintenance,
property taxes and unreimbursed medical bills.  The court also awarded
plaintiff $125 a week in permanent maintenance, or $6,500 annually. 

     Before analyzing defendant's claims of error, it is appropriate to
address one point that appears in each claim.  Defendant faults the court
because, with only minor modifications, it adopted the extensive findings of
fact, conclusions and order proposed by plaintiff.  This practice is
specifically authorized by V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2), and made applicable to divorce
proceedings by V.R.F.P. 4(a).  As long as the findings reflect careful review
of the evidence, they are not reversible because they are based on a party's
proposals.  Reporter's Notes to 1987 Amendment 

 

to V.R.C.P. 52(a).  The findings here embody a thorough review of the
evidence as well as consideration of each of the relevant statutory factors
in determining the award of property and maintenance. 

     We reiterate, however, that the better practice is for the court to
prepare its own findings.  Proposals often have an unnecessarily adversary
tone.  Thus, plaintiff proposed, and the court adopted, a conclusion that
read, "There are not enough assets in the entire marital estate to compensate
the Plaintiff adequately for the Defendant's behavior."  Defendant cites this
sentence as proof that the court intended a one-sided property award to
punish defendant.  The reality is different, as set out below, but the
language chosen provides support for defendant's complaint. 

     Defendant first challenges the court's allowance of expert testimony
concerning plaintiff's affliction with a version of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), commonly known in this context as battered-woman syndrome. 
At trial, plaintiff testified to numerous instances of physical and
psychological abuse she suffered during her marriage to defendant.  Although
defendant denied many of plaintiff's allegations, he admitted at trial to
making plaintiff shave her pubic hair while on their honeymoon, marking her
entire body with lipstick and writing profanity on her stomach while she was
pregnant, and swearing at plaintiff and accusing her of infidelity if she
returned home from work late.  Plaintiff secured a relief-from-abuse order
against defendant in 1992. 

     To help explain the impact of the abuse on plaintiff, she offered expert
testimony on PTSD and battered-woman syndrome.  Plaintiff argued that the
testimony was relevant and helpful on the property and maintenance issues
before the court.  Defendant objected to the 

 

expert testimony, arguing that expert testimony on post-traumatic stress
disorder resulting from abuse was admissible only to explain the victim's
bizarre behavior and that the expert was prohibited from giving her opinion
that plaintiff suffered from PTSD or battered-woman syndrome.  The court
accepted plaintiff's offer and admitted the testimony. 

     Trial courts have wide discretion in making evidentiary rulings, and we
will not overturn the court's decision in the absence of an abuse of
discretion.  State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 501,