Title: Susan M. Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 71 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0221 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Susan M. Lodl,  
 
Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
Kohl's Department Store,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
 
Co-Appellant, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company, Officer 
Brian M. Fredericks and Town of Pewaukee,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Walker J. Young, Jr.,  
 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 3 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 652, 625 N.W.2d 601 
(Published) 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Raymond J. Pollen, Michele M. Ford and Crivello, 
Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Michele Ford. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-appellant and third-party defendant-
appellant there was a brief by Thomas A. Cabush and Kasdorf, 
Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas 
A. Cabush. 
 
For the plaintiff-co-appellant and defendant-third-party 
plaintiff-co-appellant there was a brief by John D. Surma and 
Hills & Hicks, S.C., Brookfield, and Mark L. Thomsen, Sarah E. 
Frink and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument 
by Mark L. Thomsen. 
 
 
2002 WI 71 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0221  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 497) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Susan M. Lodl,  
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
Kohl's Department Store,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Progressive Northern Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff- 
          Co-Appellant, 
 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company,  
Officer Brian M. Fredericks and Town of  
Pewaukee,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Walker J. Young, Jr.,  
 
          Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
JUN 25, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-0221   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This case concerns the scope and 
proper application of the judicially-created "known danger" 
exception to municipal and public officer immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) (1997-98).1 
¶2 The plaintiff Susan Lodl was injured in an intersection 
accident in the Town of Pewaukee.  The traffic control lights at 
the intersection were inoperable because of an evening storm, 
and so the Town of Pewaukee dispatched a police officer to the 
scene.  Lodl sued the officer and the Town, claiming that the 
officer 
negligently 
failed 
to 
control 
traffic 
at 
the 
intersection, and that the Town was liable for the officer's 
negligence under respondeat superior theory. 
¶3 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the officer and the Town, concluding that they were immune under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that the known danger exception to immunity applied, 
and that material factual issues regarding the adequacy of the 
officer's response to the known danger precluded summary 
judgment.  We accepted review, and now reverse the court of 
appeals. 
¶4 
The "known danger" exception to municipal and public 
officer immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is a narrow, 
                                                 
1 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1997-98 version, unless otherwise noted.  
No. 
00-0221   
 
3 
 
judicially-created exception that arises only when there exists 
a danger that is known and compelling enough to give rise to a 
ministerial duty on the part of a municipality or its officers.  
Here, the plaintiff contends that the danger created by the 
inoperative stoplights at the intersection gave rise to a 
ministerial duty on the part of the officer to undertake manual 
traffic control. 
¶5 We conclude that the situation at the intersection, 
while admittedly dangerous, nonetheless allowed for the exercise 
of officer discretion as to the mode of response, and therefore 
did not give rise to a ministerial duty to perform manual 
traffic control.  Accordingly, the known danger exception to 
municipal and public officer immunity does not apply.  Summary 
judgment based upon statutory immunity was properly granted. 
I 
¶6 
On the night of July 18, 1998, a storm in Waukesha 
County caused the power to go out.  The power outage affected 
the traffic control lights at the intersection of Capitol Drive 
and Highway J in the Town of Pewaukee.  The inoperative 
stoplights turned what is normally a controlled intersection 
into an uncontrolled one.  In addition, the heavy rain decreased 
visibility at the intersection. 
¶7 
The Town of Pewaukee Police Department dispatched 
Sergeant Richard Ryman to investigate the blackout at the 
intersection.  Ryman testified in deposition that he "dropped," 
or opened, the folded stop signs affixed to the poles of the 
No. 
00-0221   
 
4 
 
traffic control signals.  Ryman then called dispatch to have an 
officer sent to the intersection, and left the scene.   
 
¶8 
At approximately 8:49 p.m., Officer Brian Fredericks 
was dispatched to the intersection, arriving about two minutes 
later.  Fredericks parked his squad car on the south side of 
Capitol Drive.  The parties disagree about what happened next.  
It is clear at the very least that Fredericks got out of his 
car, put on an orange or yellow raincoat and grabbed a 
flashlight.  It is also undisputed that he called for backup and 
requested 
that 
portable 
stop 
signs 
be 
brought 
to 
the 
intersection. 
¶9 The factual dispute——and the basis for the claim of 
negligence here——concerns the extent to which Fredericks was 
actually directing traffic at the time of the accident.  
Fredericks testified in deposition that he was in the center of 
the intersection attempting manual traffic control, but that 
"nobody was yielding to nobody," which prompted his call for 
assistance and portable signs.  Walker J. Young, Jr., the driver 
of the car Lodl was riding in, testified only that he saw 
Fredericks standing on the shoulder of the road as he approached 
the intersection. 
 
¶10 The accident occurred within minutes of Fredericks' 
arrival at the scene, and before the police backup or portable 
signs arrived.  Young and Lodl entered the intersection from the 
westbound lanes of Capitol Drive.  At the same time, a car 
driven by James R. Radmer entered the intersection from the 
No. 
00-0221   
 
5 
 
northbound lane of Highway J, colliding with Young's car and 
injuring Lodl.   
 
¶11 Lodl sued, alleging that Fredericks was negligent in 
his manner of directing traffic at the intersection, and that 
the Town of Pewaukee was liable for Fredericks' negligence under 
respondeat superior theory.  The Town and its officer asserted 
municipal 
and 
public 
officer 
immunity 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4). 
 
¶12 After extensive discovery, Fredericks and the Town 
moved for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity.  
The Waukesha County Circuit Court, the Honorable Kathryn W. 
Foster, granted the motion.  Lodl appealed, arguing that the 
Town and its officer were not immune because the officer had a 
ministerial 
duty 
to 
manually 
control 
traffic 
at 
the 
intersection, by statute and Town policy, and by operation of 
the known danger exception. 
¶13 The court of appeals concluded that while no statute, 
regulation, or policy created a ministerial duty to manually 
control traffic at the intersection, the known danger exception 
to immunity applied, because the inoperative traffic lights 
created a hazardous situation requiring a response.  The court 
of appeals also concluded that the factual dispute regarding the 
sufficiency of Fredericks' response precluded summary judgment 
on the issue of the known danger exception. 
¶14 More specifically, the court of appeals concluded that 
the 
known 
danger 
exception 
required 
that 
Fredericks 
"do 
something 
about 
the 
compelling 
and 
known 
danger 
at 
the 
No. 
00-0221   
 
6 
 
intersection."  Lodl v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 2001 WI 
App 3, ¶16, 240 Wis. 2d 652, 625 N.W.2d 601 (Ct. App. 2000).  
Because there were material issues of fact in dispute about 
whether Fredericks "nonetheless did nothing," the court of 
appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded to the 
circuit court with these instructions: 
 
The factual issue at trial will be whether the police 
officer in fact tried to alleviate a dangerous 
situation or whether he simply sat at the intersection 
and did nothing.  The question of immunity will depend 
on that factual finding . . . . 
 
If the finder of fact concludes that Fredericks acted, 
Fredericks and Pewaukee are entitled to governmental 
immunity 
even 
if 
his 
direction 
of 
traffic 
was 
negligent.   
 
Id. at ¶¶17-18.   
 
II 
 
¶15 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court, benefiting 
from the lower courts' analyses.  See Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 
74, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102.  Summary judgment is 
granted when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and other 
moving papers establish that no material facts are in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
See Wis. Stat. § 802.08. 
¶16 "The well-established purpose of summary judgment 
procedure is to determine the existence of genuine factual 
disputes in order to 'avoid trials where there is nothing to 
try.'"  Yahnke, 2000 WI 74, ¶10 (citing Rollins Burdick Hunter 
No. 
00-0221   
 
7 
 
of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 
N.W.2d 752 (1981)).  If Fredericks and the Town are entitled to 
statutory immunity, then there is nothing to try even though 
factual disputes may exist on the issue of the officer's 
negligence. 
¶17 The immunity defense assumes negligence, focusing 
instead on whether the municipal action (or inaction) upon which 
liability is premised is entitled to immunity under the statute, 
and if so, whether one of the judicially-created exceptions to 
immunity applies.  See Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 546 
N.W.2d 151 (1996); Ottinger v. Pinel, 215 Wis. 2d 266, 572 
N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1997).  The application of the immunity 
statute and its exceptions involves the application of legal 
standards to a set of facts, which is a question of law. See 
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 
N.W.2d 417 (1999).   
¶18 As we have noted, there is a factual dispute in this 
case about whether Fredericks was in the intersection attempting 
traffic control or merely standing on the side of the road at 
the time of the accident.  The circuit court considered this to 
be a factual dispute on the issue of whether the officer was 
negligent.  The court of appeals characterized it instead as a 
factual dispute on the issue of the known danger exception to 
statutory immunity. 
¶19 The circuit court had it right.  The dispute about 
whether Fredericks was actually manually directing traffic at 
the intersection when the accident occurred goes to the question 
No. 
00-0221   
 
8 
 
of whether he was negligent.  We assume negligence for purposes 
of the immunity defense, and apply the test for immunity and its 
exceptions to the municipal act alleged to have been negligently 
performed or omitted. 
III 
¶20 The 
governmental 
immunity 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), confers broad immunity from suit on municipalities 
and their officers and employees: 
 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 
¶21 
The 
statute 
immunizes 
against 
liability 
for 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial 
acts, which have been collectively interpreted to include any 
act that involves the exercise of discretion and judgment.  
See Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 
235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶25, 611 N.W.2d 693; Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 
90; Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 683, 292 
N.W.2d 816 (1980); Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 512, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977). 
No. 
00-0221   
 
9 
 
¶22 Municipal immunity derives from the common law2 and was 
first adopted by this court in 1873.  See Hayes v. City of 
Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 318 (1873).  It was partially abrogated 
almost 100 years later, in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 
2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962),3 and was eventually codified by 
the 
legislature 
in 
what 
is 
now 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  
Municipal immunity differs from its state counterpart in that 
liability is the rule and immunity is the exception.  See Kimps, 
200 Wis. 2d at 11 n.6.  
 
¶23 Immunity for public officers and employees, both state 
and 
municipal, 
is 
based 
largely 
upon 
public 
policy 
considerations that spring from the interest in protecting the 
public purse and a preference for political rather than judicial 
redress for the actions of public officers.  See Kierstyn, 228 
Wis. 2d at 89-90.    The policy considerations include: 
 
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of a 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office.   
                                                 
2 Municipal and public officer immunity is distinct from the 
constitutionally-based 
doctrine 
of 
sovereign 
immunity, 
a 
"distinction [that] is often overlooked."  Kierstyn v. Racine 
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 89, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999). 
3 Holytz left immunity for legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial and quasi-judicial acts in place.  Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).   
No. 
00-0221   
 
10 
 
Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976).   
¶24 Both state and municipal immunity are subject to 
several exceptions "representing a judicial balance struck 
between 'the need of public officers to perform their functions 
freely [and] the right of an aggrieved party to seek redress.'"  
C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 710, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988) 
(quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300). There is no immunity 
against liability associated with: 1) the performance of 
ministerial duties imposed by law; 2) known and compelling 
dangers that give rise to ministerial duties on the part of 
public 
officers 
or 
employees; 
3) 
acts 
involving 
medical 
discretion; and 4) acts that are malicious, willful, and 
intentional.  See Willow Creek Ranch, 2000 WI 56, ¶25. Lodl 
invokes the "ministerial duty" and "known danger" exceptions to 
immunity. 
¶25 The ministerial duty exception is not so much an 
exception as a recognition that immunity law distinguishes 
between discretionary and ministerial acts, immunizing the 
performance of the former but not the latter.  See Kierstyn, 228 
Wis. 2d at 91.  A ministerial duty is one that "is absolute, 
certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a 
specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the 
time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty 
that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."  Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 301.  
No. 
00-0221   
 
11 
 
¶26 Put another way, a duty is regarded as ministerial when 
it has been "'positively imposed by law, and its performance 
required at a time and in a manner, or upon conditions which are 
specifically 
designated, 
the 
duty 
to 
perform 
under 
the 
conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's 
judgment or discretion.'"  Meyer v. Carmann, 217 Wis. 329, 332, 
73 N.W.2d 514 (1955) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Filer, 145 So. 
204 (Fla. 1933)).  If liability is premised upon the negligent 
performance (or non-performance) of a ministerial duty imposed 
by law or government policy, then immunity will not apply. 
¶27 Lodl relies on Wis. Stat. § 346.40 and Section 4.23 of 
the Town of Pewaukee Police Department's Operations Policy to 
support her contention that Fredericks had a ministerial duty to 
manually control traffic at the intersection.  Section 346.40 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes describes the various whistle blasts a 
law enforcement officer must use when directing traffic using a 
whistle.4  The statute does not, however, direct law enforcement 
officers to perform manual traffic control in any given 
situation, or otherwise remove officer discretion over the 
decision to undertake manual traffic control. 
¶28 Section 4.23 of the Operations Policy Manual describes 
the procedure an officer should follow when conducting manual 
traffic control: 
 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Statute § 346.40(1) states: "Whenever traffic is 
alternately being directed to stop and to proceed by a traffic 
officer using a whistle, such officer shall use the following 
whistle signals which shall signify as follows . . . ."  
No. 
00-0221   
 
12 
 
POLICY 4.23 - CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC 
 
I. PURPOSE - The purpose of controlling and directing 
traffic is to facilitate the safe and efficient 
movement of such traffic. It is up to the police to 
see that traffic moves as safely and as quickly as 
possible. 
 
II. PROCEDURE - Direction and Control - Officer should 
first place himself in the center of traffic flow. 
Using police whistle signals as indicated in State 
Statutes 346.40, officer should indicate traffic which 
should stop by holding both arms horizontal, with 
palms of hands facing traffic. After traffic has 
stopped, officer should then turn his body to face one 
lane of traffic which has stopped. In this manner, the 
officer's body acts as a token barricade to the 
stopped traffic. To begin movement of a column of 
vehicles, officer should look directly at the lead 
driver, point at him, and then indicate with whistle 
signal and arm motion that he should move. To begin 
traffic flow from the opposite direction, repeat this 
procedure with lead driver in that column. After flow 
has 
started, 
intermittent 
arm signals 
will 
keep 
traffic moving. Arm signals should be intermittent, 
however, not continuous, and should be crisp. Left 
turning should be directed to do so in front of the 
officer, rather than behind. In this manner, the 
officer can observe the vehicle throughout the turn, 
thereby lessening the possibility of being struck by 
the 
turning 
vehicle. 
During 
hours 
of 
darkness, 
officers should use a flashlight or flares to assist 
him/her in directing traffic, officers should also 
wear reflective clothing to enhance his/her safety. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶29 Pewaukee Police Chief Denny Stone, who drafted the 
procedures and policies contained in the manual, testified that 
Section 4.23 "is a guideline.  There is no way for me to sit in 
an office and tell them the best way to do many, many of the 
jobs 
that 
we 
have 
to 
perform, 
and 
this 
is 
a 
classic 
example . . . . It is simply a guideline.  It is nothing more 
than that."   
No. 
00-0221   
 
13 
 
¶30 The Forward to the manual states that "[o]fficers are 
expected to use judgment in handling problems," and the manual 
contemplates that officers may have to deviate from the 
guidelines in cases of "unforeseen circumstances."  As the court 
of appeals noted, the policy regarding traffic direction and 
control is itself cast in discretionary terms, using the word 
"should" throughout. 
¶31 Finally, while the manual describes the procedure that 
an officer should ordinarily follow when manually controlling 
traffic, it does not eliminate the officer's discretion to 
decide when or whether to undertake manual traffic control in 
the first instance.  Considered separately or together, the 
statute and the policy manual merely establish the general 
protocols for manual traffic control when an officer, in the 
exercise of his judgment and discretion, decides to undertake 
it.  Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that neither the statute nor the policy manual establishes a 
ministerial duty to manually direct traffic. 
¶32 We cannot agree, however, with the court of appeals' 
analysis of the known danger exception.  The exception was first 
announced in Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 
(1977), a case which involved an accident on a state park hiking 
trail.  The trail ran alongside a 90-foot unguarded gorge, and 
the plaintiffs were seriously injured when they fell into the 
steep gorge while hiking at dusk.  They sued the park manager, 
alleging that he knew of the hazard presented by the sharp 
No. 
00-0221   
 
14 
 
unguarded drop-off, and that his failure to post signs warning 
against it was negligence. 
¶33 This court concluded that the compelling danger 
presented by the trail, which was known to the park manager, 
gave rise to a ministerial duty requiring the manager to post 
warning signs on the trail or to advise his superiors of the 
hazardous condition so that they could do so.  See id. at 541.  
The court held that the compellingly dangerous circumstances 
established a duty to warn that was "so clear and so absolute 
that it falls within the definition of a ministerial duty."  Id. 
at 542.  
¶34 We elaborated on the known danger exception in C.L., 
143 Wis. 2d at 714-18, which involved allegations that a state 
parole agent negligently supervised a paroled sex offender, who 
abducted and raped the plaintiff while under the agent's parole 
supervision.  There, we indicated that: 
 
[A] public officer's duty is ministerial where a 
danger is known and of such quality that the public 
officer's duty to act becomes "absolute, certain and 
imperative . . ." Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 541 (quoting 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301).  Stated otherwise, where a 
public officer's duty is not generally prescribed and 
defined by law in time, mode, and occasion, such that 
"nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
discretion," 
circumstances may give rise to such a certain duty 
where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is 
compelling and known to the officer and is of such 
force that the public officer has no discretion not to 
act. 
As 
subsequently 
explained 
in 
Scarpaci 
v. 
Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 
(1980), it is the nature of the specific act upon 
which 
liability 
is 
based, 
as 
opposed 
to 
the 
categorization of the general duties of a public 
No. 
00-0221   
 
15 
 
officer, which is determinative of whether an officer 
is immune from liability. 
C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715-16 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).  
We concluded in C.L. that the known danger exception did not 
apply, because the danger presented by the parolee was not of 
"such a degree of probability" that the parole agent was 
deprived of discretion regarding the manner and level of parole 
supervision required.  Id. at 724-25.   
 
¶35 Similarly, in Barillari v. City of Milwaukee, 194 
Wis. 2d 247, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995), we held that the known 
danger exception did not apply to a claim that the City of 
Milwaukee Police Department was negligent in failing to fulfill 
a promise to arrest a sex offender.  In that case, the police 
had promised a sexual assault victim that they would arrest her 
assailant, a former boyfriend, but did not do so because the 
district attorney decided to give the suspect a few days to turn 
himself in.  In the meantime, the former boyfriend attacked 
again, this time killing the victim and himself.  We concluded 
that "the nature of law enforcement requires moment-to-moment 
decision making and crisis management which, in turn, requires 
that the police department have the latitude to decide how best 
to utilize law enforcement resources."  Id. at 260.  
 
¶36 Other cases involving the application of the known 
danger exception to the alleged negligence of law enforcement 
officers have produced mixed results.  In Hoskins v. Dodge 
County, 2002 WI App 40, 251 Wis. 2d 276, 642 N.W.2d 213, a case 
involving a claim of negligent search-and-rescue, the exception 
No. 
00-0221   
 
16 
 
was held inapplicable where law enforcement received a report of 
a boat in trouble, sent a deputy to investigate by land but did 
not dispatch 
a rescue boat. In 
Ottinger 
v. 
Pinel, 215 
Wis. 2d 266, 572 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1997), the exception was 
also held inapplicable to a claim that corrections officers 
negligently failed to prevent an inmate's escape from a work-
release facility. 
¶37 In contrast, in Linville v. City of Janesville, 174 
Wis. 2d 571, 
497 
N.W.2d 465 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993), 
aff'd, 
184 
Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994), the known danger exception 
applied to pierce immunity for negligent failure to attempt an 
immediate rescue of occupants of a van submerged in a park pond.  
And 
in 
Domino 
v. 
Walworth 
County, 
118 
Wis. 2d 488, 
347 
N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984), the known danger exception applied 
where a sheriff's department failed to send an officer to 
investigate a tree that had fallen across a road at night. 
¶38 These cases, and others not involving law enforcement 
officers,5 demonstrate the case-by-case nature of the immunity 
inquiry.  Nevertheless, the legal standard remains the same: a 
dangerous situation will be held to give rise to a ministerial 
                                                 
5 See Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 96 (reduction of disability 
benefits due to mistaken advice by school district benefits 
specialist not a known and compelling danger); Kimps v. Hill, 
200 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996) (separation of metal 
base 
from 
volleyball 
stand 
in 
state 
university 
physical 
education class not a known and compelling danger); Bauder v. 
Delavan-Darien Sch. Dist., 207 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 558 N.W.2d 881 
(Ct. App. 1996)(use of partially-deflated soccer ball in indoor 
gym class at public school not a known and compelling danger). 
 
No. 
00-0221   
 
17 
 
duty only when "there exists a known present danger of such 
force that the time, mode and occasion for performance is 
evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the 
exercise of judgment and discretion."  C.L., 142 Wis. 2d at 717. 
¶39 In this context, the ministerial duty arises not by 
operation of law, regulation or government policy, but by virtue 
of particularly hazardous circumstances——circumstances that are 
both known to the municipality or its officers and sufficiently 
dangerous to require an explicit, non-discretionary municipal 
response. 
If 
liability 
is 
premised 
upon 
the 
negligent 
performance (or non-performance) of a ministerial duty that 
arises by virtue of a known and compelling danger, then immunity 
will not apply.6 
¶40 The cases also demonstrate that not every dangerous 
situation will give rise to a duty that can be characterized as 
ministerial for purposes of piercing immunity.  A ministerial 
duty——whether imposed by law or arising out of dangerous 
circumstances——is one that is absolute, certain, and imperative.  
                                                 
6 The dissent views this opinion as collapsing the known 
danger exception into the ministerial duty exception.  This is 
untrue; the exceptions remain separate and distinct.  As the 
cases make clear, however, both exceptions derive from the 
principle that only discretionary acts are immunized.  The 
exceptions constitute two different legal theories by which 
courts determine that a particular municipal or public officer 
duty was non-discretionary and therefore not entitled to 
immunity.  The ministerial duty exception applies when a law, 
statute, ordinance, government policy, or the like establishes 
the ministerial duty.  The known danger exception applies when 
the known dangerous circumstances establish the ministerial 
duty.   
No. 
00-0221   
 
18 
 
To qualify as ministerial, the time, mode, and occasion for 
performance of the duty must be so certain that discretion is 
essentially eliminated.  For the known danger exception to 
apply, the danger must be compelling enough that a self-evident, 
particularized, 
and 
non-discretionary 
municipal 
action 
is 
required.  The focus is on the specific act the public officer 
or official is alleged to have negligently performed or omitted. 
¶41 The court of appeals concluded that the inoperable 
traffic lights at the intersection constituted a known danger 
requiring the responding officer to "do something," and because 
there 
is 
a 
factual 
dispute 
about 
whether 
the 
officer 
nevertheless "did nothing," summary judgment on the immunity 
issue was improper.  There are two problems with the court's 
analysis. 
¶42 
First, 
as 
noted 
above, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
misconstrued the factual dispute about Fredericks' negligence as 
a factual dispute about the applicability of the known danger 
exception.  For purposes of the immunity defense, we assume that 
the public officer was negligent in performing or omitting to 
perform the act in question, and focus instead on whether the 
act negligently performed or omitted can be characterized as 
ministerial in nature because of known dangerous circumstances.  
That there is a factual dispute about the officer's negligence 
is irrelevant to the immunity inquiry. 
¶43 Second, the court of appeals' analysis is incomplete.  
The court determined only that the situation at the intersection 
was sufficiently dangerous to require the officer to "do 
No. 
00-0221   
 
19 
 
something" about it.  The generic "doing" of "something" cannot 
possibly be characterized as a ministerial duty. 
¶44 A ministerial duty is not an undifferentiated duty to 
act but a duty to act in a particular way: to post a warning 
sign (Cords), to attempt an immediate rescue of occupants of a 
submerged van (Linville), to send a squad to investigate a 
downed tree in a roadway at night (Domino).  A ministerial duty, 
by definition, is explicit as to time, mode, and occasion for 
performance, and does not admit of any discretion.7 
¶45 Accordingly, in this case, a proper application of the 
known 
danger 
exception 
begins 
with 
the 
assumption 
that 
Fredericks was negligent in failing to perform, or inadequately 
performing, manual traffic control.  To pierce immunity pursuant 
to this exception, we must be able to conclude that the 
circumstances were sufficiently dangerous so as to give rise to 
a ministerial duty——not merely a generalized "duty to act" in 
some unspecified way, but a duty to perform the particular act 
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that there is language in some of the cases 
referring generally to a "duty to act" instead of a duty to 
perform a particular act.  As we have noted, a generalized "duty 
to 
act," 
without 
more, 
could 
never 
be 
characterized 
as 
ministerial in nature, because it is too non-specific and leaves 
the mode of official action open to discretion.  We note again 
that a ministerial duty, whether imposed by law or arising out 
of known dangerous circumstances, requires specificity as to 
time, mode, and occasion for performance so that nothing remains 
for 
the 
exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
Despite 
the 
sometimes 
generalized 
language, 
the 
cases 
finding 
a 
known 
danger 
sufficient to pierce immunity are premised on conclusions that 
particularized 
government 
responses 
were 
required 
by 
the 
dangerous circumstances in question. 
No. 
00-0221   
 
20 
 
upon which liability is premised, here, manual traffic control.  
We cannot do so. 
¶46 While the circumstances posed by the uncontrolled 
intersection were certainly known and dangerous, the situation 
nonetheless allowed for the exercise of the officer's discretion 
as to the mode of response.  Stated differently, the situation, 
while 
dangerous, 
did 
not 
compel 
a 
particularized, 
non-
discretionary action on the part of the responding officer.  
More particularly, Fredericks did not have a ministerial duty to 
perform manual traffic control. 
¶47 The officer could reasonably conclude, in his judgment, 
that the situation at the intersection was not conducive to 
manual traffic control by a single officer, or he could choose 
to address the danger in another way (e.g., portable signs, 
flares, flashing squad lights).  In any event, where, as here, 
the public officer clearly retained discretionary authority over 
the nature and mode of his response to the known dangerous 
situation, the circumstances did not give rise to a duty that 
can be characterized as ministerial, and the known danger 
exception to municipal and public officer immunity does not 
apply.   
¶48 Because a ministerial duty to manually control traffic 
did not exist by operation of law, regulation, or government 
policy, or arise by virtue of a known and compelling danger, 
Fredericks and the Town are entitled to municipal immunity 
pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
 
Summary 
judgment was 
No. 
00-0221   
 
21 
 
properly granted, and the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
By the Court.— The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
Today's 
majority opinion reduces the number of recognized exceptions to 
public officer immunity, thereby expanding immunity.  It 
accomplishes this change in the law by collapsing the known 
danger exception into the ministerial duty exception, and then 
adding a heretofore unknown "specific act" requirement.  Because 
the majority opinion's new approach is contrary to precedent and 
without authority, I respectfully dissent. 
¶50  Numerous public officer immunity cases of both this 
court and the court of appeals discuss the known danger 
exception as distinct from the ministerial duty exception.  See, 
e.g., Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 91, 
95, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999); Sheridan v. City of Janesville, 164 
Wis. 2d 420, 426, 474 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1991).  Most 
recently, this court confirmed the known danger exception as 
distinct in Willow Creek Ranch, LLC v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 
56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.  The court explained:  
"immunity does not apply to the performance of:  (1) ministerial 
duties; (2) duties to address a 'known danger;' (3) actions 
involving medical discretion (the Scarpaci rule); and (4) 
actions that are 'malicious, willful, and intentional.'"  Id. at 
¶26. 
¶51 Yet the majority appears unwilling to be bound by this 
precedent.  Instead, without withdrawing language or overruling 
cases, the majority transforms established precedent and adds a 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
2 
 
new standard that requires a "particularized" "specific act."  
Majority op. at ¶40. 
¶52 To be sure, there is ample language in the case law 
that relates the known danger exception to the ministerial duty 
exception.  However, the majority goes too far, not just 
relating the two exceptions but ultimately equating them.  The 
two exceptions are not the same. 
 
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT 
¶53 Any analysis of the known danger exception must begin 
with Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  
Although the court in Cords discussed a "ministerial duty" and 
did not use phrases such as "known and compelling danger" or 
"known danger," over time Cords became the cornerstone for the 
known danger exception.  The majority agrees that "[t]he [known 
danger] exception was first announced in Cords."  Majority op. 
at ¶32. 
¶54 The plaintiffs in Cords fell into a deep gorge at a 
state park, sustaining severe injuries.  One of them fell while 
on a hiking trail only one foot from a steep drop-off into the 
gorge.  Cords, 80 Wis. 2d at 532.  The park manager, Anderson, 
had neither marked the trail with warning signs nor informed his 
superiors of the danger, even though it was his job to make sure 
the trails were in a safe condition and to give reports to his 
superiors as to any steps to be taken to reduce safety hazards.  
Id. at 536-37. 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
3 
 
¶55 This court in Cords set up its analysis using the 
standards that describe the ministerial duty exception to 
immunity.  80 Wis. 2d at 541.  However, the court's application 
of the these standards and its holding marked the beginning of 
the known danger exception as a distinct exception to immunity.  
The court explained as follows: 
 
Anderson knew the terrain at the glen was dangerous 
particularly at night; he was in a position as park 
manager to do something about it; he failed to do 
anything about it.  He is liable for the breach of 
this duty. 
Id.  The court then concluded: 
 
We hold that the duty to either place warning 
signs or advise superiors of the conditions is, on the 
facts here, a duty so clear and so absolute that it 
falls within the definition of a ministerial duty. 
Id. at 542. 
¶56 Thus, in Cords, it was not that the park manager 
failed to perform a "specific act" for which "the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Rather, it was that the park manager 
failed to act in the face of a dangerous situation that clearly 
required him to take action. 
¶57 After Cords, subsequent decisions solidified the known 
danger exception as an exception separate from the ministerial 
duty exception with overlapping but different contours.  For 
example, in C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422 N.W.2d 614 
(1988), this court acknowledged the relationship of the two 
exceptions: 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
4 
 
 
a public officer's duty is ministerial where a danger 
is known and of such quality that the public officer's 
duty 
to 
act 
becomes 
"absolute, 
certain 
and 
imperative." 
It then indicated the difference: 
 
[W]here a public officer's duty is not generally 
prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and 
occasion, such that "nothing remains for judgment or 
discretion," circumstances may give rise to such a 
certain duty where, as in Cords, the nature of the 
danger is compelling and known to the officer and is 
of 
such 
force 
that 
the 
public 
officer 
has 
no 
discretion not to act. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
¶58 Similarly, in Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 546 
N.W.2d 151 (1996), the court related the two exceptions, but 
characterized the known danger exception as involving the 
failure to act:  "a public officer's duty becomes ministerial 
only 'where, as in Cords, the nature of the danger is compelling 
and known to the officer and is of such force that the public 
officer has no discretion not to act.'"  Id. at 15 (emphasis 
added).  The Kimps court also noted that the facts in Cords  
"warranted a special exception be made to the general rule of 
public employee immunity."  Id. 
¶59 In short, the duty to act in a known danger case need 
not be "prescribed and defined by law in time, mode, and 
occasion 
such 
that 
'nothing 
remains 
for 
judgment 
or 
discretion.'"  C.L., 143 Wis. 2d at 715.  Rather, liability 
attaches because the danger is of such a quality that the public 
officer "has no discretion not to act."  Id. 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
5 
 
¶60 To put it simply, the distinction between the two 
exceptions is this:  the foundation for liability in the 
ministerial duty exception is that the defendant failed in 
performing (or failed to perform) a highly particularized and 
prescribed task whereas the foundation for liability in the 
known danger exception is that the defendant failed to act in 
the face of a danger clearly requiring action. 
 
FROM ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT TO THE NEW STANDARD 
¶61 The majority rejects the distinction between the two 
exceptions and collapses the known danger exception into the 
ministerial duty exception.  It does so by departing from the 
"has no discretion not to act" standard associated with the 
known danger exception and replacing that standard with its own 
new standard.  The majority makes three leaps in the law of 
public officer immunity to accomplish this transformation.  
These leaps are contrary to precedent and without authority. 
¶62 As a first leap, the majority begins the process of 
collapsing one exception into the other by questioning whether 
the ministerial duty exception is itself a distinct exception to 
immunity. 
 
The 
majority 
makes 
this 
announcement: 
 
"The 
ministerial duty exception is not so much an exception as a 
recognition 
that 
immunity 
law 
distinguishes 
between 
discretionary and ministerial acts, immunizing the performance 
of the former but not the latter.  See Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 
91."  Majority op. at ¶25.   
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
6 
 
¶63 Although the majority is correct that Kierstyn states 
that "the law has drawn a distinction between discretionary and 
ministerial acts," 228 Wis. 2d at 91, the majority is incorrect 
in citing Kierstyn (or any authority) for the proposition that 
the performance of ministerial acts is not actually an exception 
to immunity.  Our precedent, including Kierstyn, clearly states 
the contrary.  Willow Creek, 2000 WI 56, ¶26 ("[t]his court has 
recognized four exceptions . . . (1) ministerial duties . . ."); 
Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 ("this court has recognized four 
exceptions to public officer immunity"); Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 
10 ("doctrine of immunity is not without exception, however, the 
most common of which is . . . ministerial duty"). 
¶64 The second leap the majority makes is to graft the 
time, mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception 
onto the known danger exception.  Citing C.L., the majority 
explains that the known danger must be of such force that "the 
time, mode and occasion for performance is evident with such 
certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion."  Majority op. at ¶38.  However, when C.L. cited 
Cords for this proposition, it did so incorrectly.  Cords, which 
left it to the park manager's discretion to either post signs 
indicating the danger or inform his superiors, cannot be read 
for this proposition that C.L. attributes to it.  Indeed, 
elsewhere in C.L., the court correctly recognized that the time, 
mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception does 
not apply to the known danger exception.  143 Wis. 2d at 715. 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
7 
 
 
¶65 Finally, in the third leap, the majority magnifies 
C.L.'s erroneous citation to Cords by concluding, without 
citation to authority, that for the known danger exception to 
apply, 
the 
danger 
must 
be 
such 
that 
a 
"self-evident, 
particularized, and non-discretionary" action is required and 
that "[t]he focus is on the specific act the public officer or 
official is alleged to have negligently performed or omitted."  
Majority op. at ¶40 (emphasis added).  Thus, the majority 
requires a level of particularity heretofore unknown and 
accomplishes the collapse of the known danger exception into the 
ministerial duty exception.  
¶66 The crux of the majority's rationale for transforming 
the "has no discretion not to act" standard into a new standard 
appears in a footnote, again, without citation to authority: 
 
We acknowledge that there is language in some of 
the cases referring generally to a "duty to act" 
instead of a duty to perform a particular act. . . .  
Despite the sometimes generalized language, the cases 
finding a known danger sufficient to pierce immunity 
are 
premised 
on 
conclusions 
that 
particularized 
government responses were required by the dangerous 
circumstances in question. 
Majority op. at ¶44 n. 7. 
¶67 The final effect of the majority's analysis is to 
eliminate the known danger exception as envisioned by Cords and 
subsequent precedent.  The majority opinion renders essentially 
meaningless the case law's distinction between the known danger 
exception and the ministerial duty exception. 
¶68 That the majority is eliminating one of the recognized 
exceptions to immunity is underscored by an application of its 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
8 
 
new standard to the facts of Cords.  Was the park manager's duty 
to either post signs or inform his superiors sufficiently 
"particularized" for the majority test?  It seems that the 
answer may be no.  Was the manager's duty one whose "time, mode 
and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that 
nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion"?  
Again, the answer seems to be no.  What was the "specific act" 
in Cords that the manager negligently performed or omitted?  Was 
it the failure to inform his superiors or the failure to post 
signs? 
¶69 Cords shows that the degree of particularity the 
majority requires before the known danger exception will apply 
is too particular.  It seems that under the majority analysis 
here, the result in Cords would have come out differently. 
¶70 In addition, the majority's new conception of the 
known danger exception requiring a "particularized" "specific 
act" 
has 
uncertain 
consequences. 
 
Most 
importantly, 
by 
eliminating one of four exceptions to immunity, it expands 
immunity.  However, there may be other consequences as well, and 
the majority's approach leaves fundamental questions unanswered 
in the pleading and practice of cases involving public officer 
immunity. 
¶71 For example, how must plaintiffs plead and assert the 
known danger exception in order to survive motions to dismiss 
and motions for summary judgment?  At what stage must a 
plaintiff first identify the "particularized" "specific act" 
required of the defendant?  What if the plaintiff identifies one 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
9 
 
specific act (for example, manual traffic control), but it turns 
out that it was a different specific act that was required in 
the face of the known danger?  Does the plaintiff have the 
burden to show which specific act was required, or does the 
defendant have the burden to show that no specific act was 
required? 
¶72 Unlike 
the 
majority, 
I 
apply 
the 
known 
danger 
exception as it exists in our precedent, and in doing so, I 
reach the same conclusion as the court of appeals.  The 
situation here——a failed traffic light that left a high-speed 
intersection uncontrolled during a night-time storm——is a known 
danger.  I also agree with the court of appeals that this danger 
is not unlike the danger presented by a path open for night-time 
hiking that runs within inches of a precipitous drop into a 
gorge.  Finally, as the court of appeals determined, summary 
judgment was granted improperly because the question of whether 
Officer Fredericks took action when confronted with a known 
danger 
hinges 
upon 
the 
resolution 
of 
genuinely 
disputed 
questions of fact. 
¶73 In sum, I cannot join the majority opinion because it 
eliminates the known danger exception as a distinct exception to 
immunity. Rejecting precedent, the majority equates the two 
exceptions, then adds a new "specific act" requirement.  Like 
the court of appeals, I would apply the known danger exception 
as it existed in our precedent until today.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
10 
 
¶74 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE, joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  00-0221.awb 
 
 
 
1