Title: In re Hendrick

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: April 2, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re complaint as to the Conduct of
R. KEVIN HENDRICK,
Accused.
(OSB 06-110; SC S056041)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted December 10, 2008.
Mary
A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Tigard, argued the cause and filed
the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
Andrew
P. Ositis, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for the accused.
PER CURIAM
The
case is remanded to the Disciplinary Board for the appointment of a new trial
panel to hear the charges against the accused.  
Kistler, J., dissented
and filed an opinion, in which Linder, J., joined.
PER CURIAM
The issues in this lawyer
disciplinary proceeding are whether the Oregon State Bar (Bar) committed a
procedural error in connection with the accused's disciplinary proceeding and,
if it did, whether the remedy for such an error is dismissal of the charges
against the accused.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Bar did
commit a procedural error, but that the appropriate remedy is to remand the
case for a hearing before a new trial panel.
In October 2006, the Bar filed a
complaint against R. Kevin Hendrick (the accused), charging him with various violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC).  In
January 2007, the Disciplinary Board appointed a trial panel to hear the Bar's
case against the accused.  The accused and the Bar each made a peremptory
challenge to a member of the trial panel pursuant to Bar Rule of Procedure (BR)
2.4(g), set out post 346 Or at ___ (slip op at 5-6); in each instance, the
Disciplinary Board replaced the challenged member.  After the replacement trial
panel members were appointed, the hearing was scheduled for July 24 - 25,
2007.  
On
July 10, 2007, the Bar sent a letter to the accused's lawyer explaining that, before
the hearing, it intended to deliver to the accused and to the trial panel notebooks
that contained the exhibits on which the Bar intended to rely at the hearing. 
The Bar requested that the accused review the exhibits and notify it of any
objections that the accused might have.  The accused did not make any objection
to that procedure at that time.  On July 17, 2007, the Bar sent the accused and
the trial panel a copy of its trial memorandum.  In the cover letter
accompanying that document, the Bar informed the trial panel that it would be
providing the trial panel and the accused with the notebook of proposed
exhibits before the hearing, and again asked the accused's lawyer to notify it
of any objections that the accused might have to any of those exhibits.  Again,
the accused offered no objection either to the delivery of the trial memorandum
or to the Bar's plan to deliver its proposed exhibits to the trial panel in
advance of the hearing.  On July 19, 2007, the Bar hand-delivered the exhibit
notebooks to the trial panel and to the accused.  Again, the accused did not
object.  
On July 24, 2007, the first day of the hearing, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming that the Bar's early
delivery of the exhibit notebooks constituted an improper ex parte communication
with the trial panel.  The trial panel denied the accused's motion, asserting
that the communication was not ex parte because the Bar had
provided the accused with the same documents, at the same time, as it had the
trial panel.  The panel also noted that the accused had had advance notice of
the Bar's intent to serve the exhibit notebooks and had not objected.  
The
hearing proceeded.  At some point, a document was introduced into evidence that
revealed to one of the trial panel members that she had opposed the accused in
another, possibly related, matter.  After a brief conversation off the record involving
Bar counsel, the accused, and the accused's counsel about the possible conflict,
the parties elected not to proceed with the existing trial panel.  The trial
panel chairperson closed the hearing and dismissed the trial panel, announcing
that "a new panel needs to be appointed."  
In
August 2007, the Disciplinary Board appointed a new trial panel.  The new panel
did not include any of the former panel members.  Five days later, the accused served
notice that he intended to challenge peremptorily one of the new trial panel
members.  The Bar objected, noting that the accused previously had exercised a
peremptory challenge to a member of the former trial panel and asserting that,
under the relevant Bar rule, the accused was not entitled to an additional peremptory
challenge.  The accused responded that the appointment of a new trial panel
entitled him to a new peremptory challenge.  The Disciplinary Board chairperson
rejected the accused's argument, disallowed the peremptory challenge, and
notified the parties that a panel consisting of the three members appointed in
August 2007 would hear the case. 
A hearing
before the new trial panel was scheduled for February 2008.  This time, the Bar
did not distribute its exhibit notebooks in advance and the new trial panel did
not see the exhibits until the trial date.  The hearing proceeded.  On March
31, 2008, the panel issued its opinion, which was adverse to the accused in
some respects.  The accused then sought review by this court pursuant to ORS
9.536(1) and BR 10.1.
On
review, the accused does not raise directly any issue concerning the substance
of the trial panel's decision.  Instead, the accused argues that two alleged procedural
errors by the trial panel so deprived him of important procedural rights that this
court should dismiss the entire disciplinary action against him.  The accused
contends, first, that the Bar violated his due process rights by engaging in ex
parte contacts with the first trial panel and, therefore, the first trial
panel should have dismissed the charges against him.  Second, the accused
argues that he was improperly denied the right to exercise a peremptory
challenge to a member of the second trial panel and, therefore, this court
should dismiss the charges against him.  As we shall explain, we find no merit
in the accused's first claim, but some merit in the second.
With
respect to the accused's first argument (concerning the Bar's allegedly
improper ex parte communications with the first trial panel), the
accused argues at some length why he thinks that the Bar's conduct in
delivering its exhibits to the trial panel in advance of the disciplinary proceeding
violated the Bar's rules for the conduct of such proceedings and why ex
parte communications with a factfinder are not permissible.  However, in
making those arguments, the accused neglects several key points, any one of
which is fatal to his position.  We discuss fully only the most fundamental
one.
That
fundamental point is that the Bar's communications with the trial panel were
not ex parte.  Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase ex
parte as follows:  "Done or made at the instance and for the benefit
of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely
interested; of or relating to court action taken by one party without notice to
the other, usu. for temporary or emergency relief."  Black's Law
Dictionary 616 (8th ed 2004).  Thus, an essential feature of an ex
parte communication is that it is made without notice to the opposing
party.  Here, documents attached to the accused's own opening brief show that
the Bar fully apprised the accused of its intent to provide the trial panel
with an advance copy of its exhibits and that, when it did so, it also provided
the accused with copies of everything that it gave the trial panel.  The Bar
did not engage in ex parte communications with the trial panel.  The
accused's argument in that respect is not well taken.(1)
The
accused's second argument is that the regional chairperson in charge of ruling
on challenges to members of trial panels erred in failing to permit him under
BR 2.4(g) to exercise a peremptory challenge to a member of the second trial
panel, that the error was prejudicial, and that the charges against him therefore
should be dismissed.   We set out certain details of the trial panel
appointment process to explain our analysis of the accused's argument.
The
Bar's Disciplinary Board consists of a state chairperson, six regional
chairpersons, and at least six additional members from each of the regions.  BR
2.4(a).  When the Bar files a formal complaint and Bar Counsel notifies the Disciplinary
Board of that filing, BR 4.1(a), the regional chairperson "appoint[s] a
trial panel from the members of the regional panel and a chairperson
thereof."  BR 2.4(f)(1).
Once
"a trial panel" has been appointed, both the accused and the Bar may,
under BR 2.4(g), challenge the participation of members of that trial panel. 
That section is at the heart of our inquiry.  It provides, in part:
"The
Bar and an accused * * * shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge and an
unlimited number of challenges for cause as may arise under the Code of Judicial
Conduct or these rules.  Any such challenge shall be filed in writing within
seven days of written notice of an appointment of a trial panel with the
Disciplinary Board Clerk, with copies to the regional chairperson for
disciplinary proceedings * * *.  Challenges for cause shall state the reason
for the challenge.  The written ruling on the challenge shall be filed with the
Disciplinary Board Clerk, and the regional chairperson * * * shall serve copies
of the ruling on all parties.  These provisions shall apply to all substitute
appointments, except that neither the Bar nor the accused shall have more than [one]
peremptory challenge.  * * *." 
The accused concedes that the rule,
read in isolation, is silent as to whether the "one peremptory challenge"
limitation in BR 2.4(g) applies to each appointed trial panel, when two or more
trial panels have been appointed serially, or, instead, applies to the case as
a whole.  But, he argues, when the rule is read in context with BR 2.4(h),
which directs the Disciplinary Board Clerk to "mail to the trial panel
finally selected" a copy of all pleadings, and then directs the trial
panel chairperson promptly to select a date and place for the hearing, it becomes
clear that the rule applies to each appointed trial panel.  The Bar, on the
other hand, argues that BR 2.4(g) is not silent on the matter because it
states specifically that its provisions concerning challenges "shall apply
to all substitute appointments, except that neither the Bar nor the accused
shall have more than [one] peremptory challenge."  The Bar argues that the
second panel was a "substitute appointment ('for cause') of all members
of the first trial panel."  (Emphasis in original.)  And, the Bar
explains, BR 2.4(g) specifically provides that, no matter how many substitute
appointments are made, each side may exercise only one peremptory challenge. 
We agree with the accused that BR
2.4(g) does not clearly specify whether the allocation of one peremptory
challenge per side applies to the case as a whole or to each separate appointment
of a complete trial panel, in cases in which separate, successive trial panels
are appointed.  On the other hand, we agree with the Bar that the wording in BR
2.4(g) on which it relies could, at least when read in isolation, justify the
outcome that the Bar seeks.  But we do not think that it is appropriate to read
the wording on which the Bar relies in that way.
The reason that we do not find the
wording on which the Bar relies dispositive is that other wording of the rule
supports a contrary conclusion.  The right to a peremptory challenge does not
arise until "a trial panel" has been appointed.  BR 2.4(g) specifies
that "[a]ny such challenges shall be filed in writing within seven days of
written notice of an appointment of a trial panel."  (Emphasis
added.)  The emphasized wording just as easily could be read to mean
"any" trial panel (the accused's reading) as it could be read to mean
"the one and only" trial panel (as the Bar would have it).  Thus,
both parties have legitimate -- but hardly conclusive -- arguments to support
their positions.
As noted, the Bar argues that there
is separate contextual support for its view in this further provision of BR
2.4(g):  "These provisions shall apply to all substitute appointments,
except that neither the Bar nor an accused * * * shall have more than [one]
peremptory challenge."  (Emphasis added.)  The Bar argues, in effect, that
the second trial panel was a "substitute" for the first, so that the
accused is foreclosed from making a peremptory challenge to any member of the
second trial panel.  The accused responds that the reference to
"substitute appointments" in the rule is a reference to the
replacement of a member of an existing trial panel, i.e., that the
wording is intended to make it clear that the right to challenge a member of a
trial panel includes the right to challenge a substitute member, if the
challenging party has not already exercised its peremptory challenge by the
time that the substitute panel member is appointed.
In interpreting a Bar rule, this
court looks to the wording of the rule, read in context.  See In re Haws,
310 Or 741, 746-48, 801 P2d 818 (1990) (using that methodology to interpret
disciplinary rule, focusing on meaning of rule's key words).  Nothing in BR
2.4(g) tells us whether a "substitute appointment" refers to
appointment of persons to replace individual members of a particular trial
panel or, instead, includes the more sweeping exercise of authority to appoint
a trial panel that is new and different in toto from an earlier panel. 
No contextual or other clues resolve the ambiguity.  Lacking any other source
to assist us, we look to the purposes of the right to make a peremptory
challenge.
The right is not a constitutional
one.  Due process does not require that the Bar make peremptory challenges --
as opposed to challenges for cause -- available at all.  Instead, like other
procedural trial rights, the right to exercise a peremptory challenge is
intended to foster a sense of confidence in the system by those who are subject
to disciplinary proceedings.  Allowing an accused lawyer to remove a member of
a new, separately appointed trial panel by peremptory challenge would advance
that purpose.  As this case developed, the accused exercised his right to a
peremptory challenge before the first trial panel with the expectation that he
at least had been able to reduce the known members of the trial panel to the two
persons out of the original three whom he thought were most likely to give him
a fair hearing.  With the total change of panels, however, that assurance was
lost -- the accused faced three different people and was powerless to remove
any of them, in the absence of cause.  Leaving an accused lawyer in that
position does not further the goals that are fostered by the right to make
peremptory challenges.
We view the accused's position as
analogous to that of a criminal defendant in a jury trial who has exercised his
available peremptory challenges, but then loses the benefit of those challenges
when the entire jury is dismissed due to a mistrial.  We do not believe that
anyone questions such a defendant's right thereafter to exercise peremptory
challenges during the selection of a new jury panel.  Still, the analogy on
which we rely is useful, but not necessarily controlling, and the issue that we
are addressing remains a close one.  Ultimately, however, we are persuaded by a
combination of the analogy that we have noted and another, perhaps even more
persuasive consideration.  That consideration is the nature of this kind of
case, and of our relationship to it.
In Bar disciplinary proceedings, the
Bar serves as a surrogate for this court.  That is, it investigates and (where
it appears appropriate) prosecutes possible disciplinary violations, with a view
to assisting this court in ensuring that practicing members of the Bar behave in
an ethical manner.  This court, if it were performing that function itself,
would make every attempt to see to it that, whatever the outcome, an accused
lawyer would think that he or she was treated fairly in the process.  We read
the Bar Rules as promoting that same goal and, as we have explained, we view
the right to a peremptory challenge to be a part of that effort.  If it were
our own rule, we would read it to permit a new peremptory challenge if an
entirely new panel were summoned, because reading the rule in that way would
foster a sense of fairness in the system.  We take that same view respecting
our surrogate -- the Bar.  We hold that the Disciplinary Board chairman erred
in denying the accused the right to exercise a peremptory challenge to one of the
members of the second trial panel.  We turn to a consideration of the remedy,
if any, to which the accused is entitled in light of that error.
In an ordinary lawyer disciplinary proceeding,
this court performs a de novo review of the facts respecting the charges
against the accused lawyer and then either adopts, modifies, or rejects the
decision of the trial panel.  BR 10.6.  Thus, it could be argued that any error
respecting the composition of the trial panel technically would be "cured"
by our separate review of the record.  Indeed, that is the view adopted by the
dissent, and it has some force.  In this case, however, the accused's case was
not heard by a properly constituted trial panel:  One person whom the accused
was entitled to have removed nonetheless participated.  To use another analogy,
the accused's position is analogous to that of a party to a circuit court case
who timely has made a motion for a change of judge, but the challenged judge
unaccountably declines to step aside.  In such circumstances, we think that all
would agree that the issue is not whether the resisting judge can be (or is, or
has been) fair.  Instead, the issue is whether the objecting party must accept
an adverse outcome if that judge tries the case.  As to that issue, we think
that the party's right to a second trial before a different judge follows from
the nature of the right itself.  And, if the trial panel was not properly
constituted, there is no way to know whether a properly constituted trial panel
would have created the same record, made the same rulings, or construed the
evidence in the same way, much less reached the same conclusions that this one
did.  
Finally, and in addition to the
foregoing, we note that, were we simply to exercise our de novo review authority
and decide the accused's case on the merits notwithstanding our conclusion that
the accused was denied a procedural right guaranteed by the Bar's rules, his
ability to exercise that right would be profoundly undercut.  Put differently,
if we were to decide that this court's de novo review of decisions of
trial panels means that, as a matter of law, an accused lawyer is not
prejudiced by the denial of one or more procedural rights during the course of
a disciplinary proceeding, no accused lawyer's procedural "rights" have
any certain meaning -- de novo review may trump any of them.  We decline
to take that view.  The accused is entitled to some sort of relief.(2)
That said, however, we reject the
accused's argument that the appropriate remedy for this violation of his
procedural right is to dismiss the charges against him.  This error -- like
most others -- can be cured fully by affording the accused a new hearing at
which he may (if he so chooses) exercise his right peremptorily to remove one
trial panel member.  We therefore remand the case to the Disciplinary Board for
the appointment of a new trial panel to hear the charges against the accused.  
The case is remanded to the
Disciplinary Board for the appointment of a new trial panel to hear the charges
against the accused.  
KISTLER, J., dissenting.
The
majority holds that the Bar should have given the accused another peremptory
challenge when it impaneled a new trial panel, and it remands this case for a
new hearing because of that error.  I agree with the majority that, under the
Bar's rules, the accused was entitled to another peremptory challenge.  I part
company, however, from the majority when it remands this case for a new
hearing.  In effect, and without citing any authority, the majority holds that
the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge in a bar disciplinary proceeding
automatically requires a new hearing.  This court, however, has rejected the notion
that a similar error in the composition of a trial panel automatically required
a new hearing, and the underlying substantive issue in this case involves only
a legal question -- whether the accused's actions constituted the practice of
law.  Because there is no legal or procedural reason to remand this case for a
new hearing, I respectfully dissent.
Before
turning to the question whether a remand is required, it is helpful to put that
question in perspective.  Chex Systems, Inc., maintains a list of persons with
a history of overdrawn checks or closed accounts and provides that information
to banks.   If a person is on Chex Systems' list, that person frequently will
have difficulty opening a new bank account.
The
accused, doing business as Valley Law Center, offered consumers help in getting
off Chex Systems' list.  The website for Valley Law Center told consumers that,
in return for an advance payment of $249, Valley Law Center would help them
remove their names from Chex Systems' list.  The website also explained why
Valley Law Center's services were superior to nonlegal alternatives.  According
to the website, the "most important reason [why Valley Law Center provides
effective help] is that we are an actual Law Firm.  We know the law and we use
our legal knowledge and extensive experience to get you out of [Chex
Systems]."
The
accused received advance payments from multiple clients for his help in
removing their names from Chex Systems' list.  The accused, however, did not
deposit those payments in a separate trust account, and the Bar charged the
accused with violating two Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC):  RPC 1.15-1(a)
(failure to deposit and maintain client funds in a separate trust account) and
RCP 1.15-1(c) (failure to deposit advance payments in a lawyer trust account).(3)
Before
the trial panel, the accused did not dispute that, if he were engaged in the
practice of law, his failure to deposit the advance payments in a separate
trust account violated both ethical rules.  The accused argued, however, that
all that he did for his clients was send a series of form letters, under the
client's signature, to Chex Systems and that those form letters did not
constitute the practice of law.  In essence, the accused's defense before the
trial panel turned on whether the undisputed facts established that he was or
was not engaged in the practice of law.  The trial panel ruled that the accused
was engaged in the practice of law and accordingly found that the Bar had
proved both rule violations.
On
review before this court, the accused does not argue that the trial panel erred
in resolving the legal issue on which its decision turned -- whether the
letters that he sent on behalf of his clients constituted the practice of law. 
Nor does he argue that the trial panel erred in admitting any evidence or
making any factual finding.(4) 
Rather, the accused argues that, under Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 2.4(g), the
panel should have allowed him to exercise a peremptory challenge against one of
its members.(5)
Even
though the accused does not challenge on review the legal issue on which the
trial panel's decision turned and even though the accused does not identify any
reason why the Bar's procedural error would affect our ability to decide that
legal issue (if he had raised it on review), the majority holds that the
erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge entitles the accused to a new
hearing before a different trial panel.  In effect, the majority holds that the
denial of peremptory challenge in a bar disciplinary hearing is a structural
error that always requires a new hearing.
The
majority paints with too broad a brush.  To be sure, some procedural rights are
so fundamental that the denial of the right requires a new trial even if the
procedures a party received were fundamentally fair.  The right to a jury trial
provides an obvious example, as does the right to an unbiased decisionmaker.  See,
e.g., Thompson v. Coughlin, 329 Or 630, 640, 997 P2d 191 (2000)
(jury trial); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 61-62, 93 S Ct
80, 34 L Ed 2d 267 (1972) (unbiased decisionmaker); cf. Rivera v.
Illinois, 556 US ___, ___ S Ct ___, ___ L Ed 2d ___ (Mar 31, 2009) (slip op
at 7) ("If a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of
individuals not challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due
to a state court's good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional
concern.").  But the right granted by the Bar Rules to excuse a member of
a trial panel for any reason or no reason at all does not rise to the same
level as those fundamental constitutional rights, as this court has recognized
in two functionally indistinguishable cases.  See In re Paulson, 341 Or
542, 546, 145 P3d 171 (2006) (rejecting challenge to composition of trial panel
because the challenge, even if correct, did not affect this court's ability to
decide on de novo review whether the accused committed the charged
ethical violations); In re Reuben G. Lenske, 269 Or 146, 164-65, 523 P2d
1262 (1974) (same).
 It
is also true that some procedural errors may affect the development of a record
in a way that cannot be cured on appeal, even on de novo review.  In
those instances, the case has to be remanded for a new hearing.  But this court
has never held that every procedural error requires a remand.  Some errors are,
after all, harmless, and the inquiry is or should be whether a procedural error
affected the trial panel's decision in a way that requires a new hearing.  In
this case, the accused has not even attempted to identify any way in which the
erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge affected either his ability to
create a record or our ability to correct any perceived error in the trial
panel's resolution of the charges against him.  Perhaps the accused has not
done so because the only real dispute below appears to have been whether his
undisputed acts on behalf of his clients constituted the practice of law.  Had
the accused chosen to raise that legal issue on review, we could have addressed
it and resolved it one way or the other.  However, without any challenge to
that issue and without some basis for thinking that the Bar's procedural error
affected our ability to review these proceedings, I would affirm the trial
panel's decision.
The
majority advances two reasons for reaching a contrary conclusion.  It reasons
initially that we can never know whether the failure to permit an accused to
exercise a peremptory challenge affected either the record or our ability to
review the charges against the accused.  The majority's reasoning goes too
far.  If, as in this case, the essential facts are undisputed and the only
question is legal, then it is difficult to see how the failure to permit the
accused to exercise a peremptory challenge affects our ability to determine
whether the accused's acts constituted the practice of law.  As a subsidiary
matter, I would put the obligation on the party challenging the trial panel's
decision to explain why a procedural error affected the record in a way that
requires a remand.  In the proper case, the point can be easily made.(6)  Here,
however, the accused has not attempted such a showing.
The
majority advances a second reason in support of its automatic remand for a new
hearing.  It reasons that, if
"we were to decide that this court's de novo
review of decisions of trial panels means that, as a matter of law, an accused lawyer
is not prejudiced by the denial of one or another procedural rights during the
course of a disciplinary proceeding, no accused lawyer's procedural 'rights'
have any certain meaning -- de novo review may trump any of them."
346 Or at ___
(slip op at 11).  The majority takes aim at the wrong target.  The Bar has not
suggested that de novo review trumps every procedural right.  The denial
of some procedural rights may affect the record or the panel's fact-finding, as
noted above.  And, as also noted above, some procedural rights may be so
fundamental that their denial will always require a new hearing.  But this
court has never held that the denial of every procedural right requires a new
hearing, nor has it held that the denial of the sort of right at issue here
requires one.  Rather, it has reached precisely the opposite conclusion.  See
Paulson, 341 Or at 546 (alternative holding).
In
Paulson, the accused argued that the Board of Bar Governors and the
Bar's disciplinary counsel "'actually appoints the disciplinary
board,'" from which the trial panels are drawn, and that this court had
abandoned its responsibility to exercise independent authority over the
appointment process.  Id. at 546.  After noting that the record did not
support the accused's argument, this court offered an alternative reason why
his argument did not provide any basis for ordering a new hearing before a
different trial panel.  The court began by noting that the accused did not
argue that "any person on his trial panel was biased against him."  Id. 
The court then explained that, even if the accused's charge were correct,
"in light of this court's de novo review in disciplinary cases, the
deficiency that the accused perceives in the appointment process has no effect
on either the fairness or the legitimacy of our conclusion that the
accused committed the charged disciplinary violations."  Id.
(emphasis added); see also Lenske, 269 Or at 164 ("The fact that
the Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar [who concluded that the accused
had committed certain ethical violations] may have been selected by what is
referred to by the accused as an 'undemocratic process' does not invalidate
these [disciplinary] proceedings.").
Paulson
establishes that, contrary to the majority's reasoning, not every procedural
error that affects the composition of a trial panel requires a new hearing. 
More importantly, Paulson establishes that there is no basis for
remanding for a new hearing in this case:  The procedural error in this case is
functionally indistinguishable from the claimed procedural error in Paulson. 
In this case, as in Paulson, the accused did not seek to recuse
the panel member for cause; that is, he did not argue that there was any basis
for saying that the panel member was biased against him.  The accused did,
however, seek to exercise a peremptory challenge against the panel member.  A
party can exercise a peremptory challenge for any reason or no reason at all,
but the accused presumably sought to exercise a peremptory challenge in this case
because he suspected that the panel member, although neutral and unbiased,
might not be receptive to his arguments.
In
Paulson, the accused argued that the perceived procedural deficiency in
that case resulted in precisely the same problem; that is, the accused argued
in Paulson that the Bar and its disciplinary counsel had handpicked the
trial panel members and that those panel members, although neutral and
unbiased, were not receptive to the accused's arguments.  If, as this court
explained in Paulson, that perceived deficiency in the composition of
the trial panel "has no effect on either the fairness or the legitimacy of
our [determination whether] the accused committed the charged disciplinary
violations," 341 Or at 546, then it is difficult to see why a different
rule should apply here.  The majority errs in automatically remanding this case
for a new hearing.  I respectfully dissent.
Linder,
J., joins in this dissent. 
1. The
accused's argument also fails because the Bar's communication was to a separate
trial panel that did not decide his case.
2. The
dissent's opposing view relies heavily on In re Paulson, 341 Or 542, 145
P3d 171 (2006), but that reliance is misplaced.  Paulson was a case in
which the accused, in a scattershot argument, accepted the idea that the
members of his trial panel might be objective and honorable, but nonetheless
argued that any decision that they made should not be sustained because they
were "hand picked" by the hierarchy of the Bar and that hierarchy --
in the accused's view -- was biased against him.  This court there suggested
that its de novo review authority was a bulwark against the problem that
the accused described.  Id. at 546.  Here, however, the accused has an
actual right -- not simply a generalized complaint based on dark suspicion --
to have a panel member removed.  Vindication of that right cures the problem. 
Where, as here, there is a path that we can follow that vindicates a clear
right, it is that path that we shall follow.
3. The
Bar also charged the accused with violating RPC 1.15-1(d) (failure to promptly
deliver funds to a client), but the trial panel found that the Bar had not
proved that charge by clear and convincing evidence.  The Bar does not
challenge that ruling on review.
4. The
accused also argues on review that the Bar engaged in an improper ex parte
contact with the first trial panel.  As the majority correctly explains,
however, the Bar acted properly.
5. The
accused did not seek to recuse the panel member for cause, and he has not
argued either before the trial panel or this court that he has any basis for
saying that the panel member was biased against him.  
6. For
instance, on de novo review, this court defers to some credibility
determinations that the trial panel makes.  See In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or
86, 103-04, 162 P3d 260 (2007) (explaining that this court will defer to
credibility determinations based on the "accused's demeanor and manner of
testifying" but not credibility determinations based on "objective
factors").  When the proof of a charge turns on a credibility
determination to which we will defer, then the composition of the trial panel
may make a difference and a new hearing may be appropriate.  As noted, the
accused does not argue that that circumstance, or a similar difficulty, is
present in this case.