Title: Hood v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
LARRY HOOD 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092402 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
November 4, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 
Charles J. Strauss, Judge 
 
In a proceeding under the Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), Code § 37.2-900 et seq., the 
Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County ruled that the respondent 
prisoner, Larry Lee Hood, Jr., would not be permitted to 
present expert evidence because he had refused to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth’s mental health expert during an 
assessment examination prior to the filing of the commitment 
petition.  Hood had contended that because his decision not to 
cooperate had been made without the benefit of counsel, he 
should have been permitted to rescind that decision once 
counsel had been appointed for him and he expressed a 
willingness to be examined by the Commonwealth’s expert.  In 
this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court’s ruling 
violates principles of procedural due process. 
BACKGROUND 
Because this appeal is limited to the consideration of 
the issue resulting from a discrete ruling of the circuit 
court, we will recite only those facts necessary to our 
resolution of that issue.1  Commonwealth v. Garrett, 276 Va. 
590, 593, 667 S.E.2d 739, 741 (2008).  In 2001, Hood was 
convicted in Pittsylvania County of rape and abduction and was 
sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison with eleven 
years suspended.  Hood was scheduled for release from 
confinement by the Department of Corrections on February 5, 
2009. 
On August 11, 2008, pursuant to Code § 37.2-903, the 
Director of the Department of Corrections identified Hood as 
qualifying for assessment under the SVPA to determine whether 
he should be confined in a mental health facility following 
the completion of his active sentence.  Following receipt of 
notice from the Director that Hood was subject to the 
provisions of the SVPA, the Commitment Review Committee 
(“CRC”) ordered Hood to undergo a mental health examination as 
required by Code § 37.2-904.  Glenn Rex Miller, Jr., Ph.D., a 
licensed clinical psychologist, was designated by the CRC to 
                     
1 In his petition for appeal, in addition to the issue we 
decide in this opinion, Hood also assigned error to the 
circuit court’s finding that he was a sexually violent 
predator, its exclusion of certain evidence concerning the 
alleged deficiencies of the in-patient treatment being 
provided by the Commonwealth to sexually violent predators, 
and to the court’s failure to approve Hood’s proposed 
conditional release plan.  We refused Hood’s appeal as to 
these issues and, accordingly, we need not recite the evidence 
relevant to the circuit court’s rulings and judgment thereon. 
 
 
2
conduct the examination and prepare a report evaluating 
whether Hood met the criteria to be civilly committed as a 
sexually violent predator under the SVPA. 
In his written report, Dr. Miller indicated that he 
interviewed Hood in prison on September 12, 2008.  At the 
outset of the interview, Dr. Miller 
advised [Hood] of the purpose of this evaluation and 
that all relevant information would be relayed to 
the [CRC].  [Hood] verbalized an understanding of 
the process, the limitations of his confidentiality, 
and the fact that a written report would be 
generated.  Following notification of this 
information, [Hood] declined to participate in the 
evaluation.  It was explained to [Hood] that a 
report would be generated with or without his 
participation and that if he chose not to 
participate that the [c]ourt “may bar the inmate 
from introducing his/her own expert psychiatric or 
psychological evidence.” 
 
Dr. Miller further stated that Hood then 
 
asked numerous questions regarding the potential 
consequences of hi[s] refusing the evaluation for 
approximately 45 minutes.  It was explained to him 
that [Dr. Miller] was unable to administer advice in 
terms of whether or not participation in the 
assessment process was in his best interest and that 
he needed to make his own determination.  [Hood] 
eventually determined that it was not in his best 
interest to participate in the evaluation despite 
the possibility that the court could bar the 
appointment of a defense expert. 
 
It is undisputed that prior to deciding not to cooperate with 
the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination, Hood did not 
have an opportunity to consult with an attorney about the 
consequences of his decision. 
 
3
Because Hood declined to be interviewed further, Dr. 
Miller based his evaluation principally upon Hood’s criminal 
and prison records, including Hood’s performance on two risk 
assessment tests that had been administered by the Department 
of Corrections prior to Hood’s referral by the Director to the 
CRC.  Dr. Miller diagnosed Hood as having “Paraphilia NOS 
[and] Non-Consent and Personality Disorder NOS with Antisocial 
Traits.”2  Dr. Miller concluded that “[b]ased on the available 
records, Mr. Hood appears to have a mental disorder and 
personality disorder that makes it difficult for him to 
control his predatory behavior which makes him likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts.” 
On December 30, 2008, following receipt of Dr. Miller’s 
report, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the Circuit Court 
of Pittsylvania County seeking to have Hood declared a 
sexually violent predator and to have him involuntarily 
committed to a secure mental health facility.  Code § 37.2-
905(A).  As required by Code § 37.2-906(A), concurrent with 
the service of the petition, Hood was served with a formal 
                     
2 The designation NOS, which stands for “not otherwise 
specified,” is used to classify a diagnosis when a mental 
disorder appears to fall within a given category of disorders, 
such as paraphilia, but does not meet the criteria of any 
specific disorder within that category.  American Psychiatric 
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders - Text Revision § 302.9, at 576 (4th ed. 2000). 
 
4
explanation of the SVPA’s civil commitment process and his 
rights thereunder, including his right to be represented by 
counsel and to “employ experts at [his] own expense to . . . 
testify on [his] behalf.”  The Code § 37.2-906(A) notice also 
stated that upon a finding by the circuit court that the 
commitment petition was supported by probable cause, the 
“court may appoint experts . . . to perform examinations and 
participate in the trial on [Hood’s] behalf,” further stating 
that any such experts would be required to “prepare a written 
report detailing his/her findings and conclusions and submit 
the report and [its] supporting data to the [c]ourt, the 
Attorney General and [Hood’s] counsel.” 
The Code § 37.2-906(A) notice also included the following 
explanation of the application of Code §§ 37.2-901 and -
907(A): 
If a respondent refuses to cooperate with the mental 
health examination to determine if he/she is a 
sexually violent predator, the court may admit 
evidence of the respondent’s refusal and may bar the 
respondent from introducing his/her own expert 
psychiatric or psychological evidence.  Code of 
Virginia § 37.2-901.  Furthermore, if a respondent 
refuses to cooperate, any expert appointed to assist 
the respondent shall not be permitted to testify at 
trial.  Code of Virginia § 37.2-907(A). 
 
On January 29, 2009, the circuit court entered an order 
appointing counsel to represent Hood in the commitment 
proceedings.  On April 20, 2009, the court conducted a hearing 
 
5
to determine whether there was probable cause to find that 
Hood was a sexually violent predator.  Code § 37.2-906(C). 
After the court received testimony from Dr. Miller on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, Hood testified on his own behalf.  Hood 
conceded that he had refused to cooperate with Dr. Miller 
during the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination.  After 
confirming that Hood did not have legal counsel at that time 
and had not otherwise consulted with an attorney about his 
decision not to cooperate with Dr. Miller, Hood’s counsel 
asked whether, after having discussed the matter with him 
following his appointment after the commitment petition had 
been filed, Hood was now willing to cooperate and be examined 
by Dr. Miller if it were determined that there was probable 
cause to proceed to a trial.  Hood responded, “Yeah, I will, 
I’ll cooperate.  I don’t have anything to hide.” 
In a colloquy with the circuit court at the conclusion of 
the probable cause hearing, Hood’s counsel contended that it 
was “against [Hood’s] due process rights to be forced to make 
the decision of whether to cooperate with a doctor months 
before he has counsel.”  Hood’s counsel noted that by refusing 
to cooperate, Code §§ 37.2-901 and -907(A) limited Hood’s 
right to present expert testimony in the commitment 
proceedings, even though such evidence was “very dispositive 
and very crucial” to his ability to put on a defense.  The 
 
6
Commonwealth responded that it had met its burden of showing 
that there was probable cause to believe that Hood was a 
sexually violent predator, and that the issues raised 
concerning Hood’s right to present expert evidence, and 
whether his due process rights had been violated “are for the 
trial.” 
The circuit court announced its ruling that there was 
probable cause to find that Hood was a sexually violent 
predator.  The Commonwealth then indicated that although it 
was prepared for trial, it would not oppose a continuance for 
setting a trial date if Hood “want[ed] an expert to assist in 
this matter.”  The court queried whether a defense expert 
would be allowed to testify at the trial, and the Commonwealth 
responded that its position was that the expert would not be 
allowed to testify, but “they are allowed to have one.”  The 
court ruled, based on its reading of Code § 37.2-907(A), that 
it did not have any discretion to permit an appointed defense 
expert to testify because Hood had refused to cooperate at the 
time of the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination, though 
the expert “could certainly assist them . . . in ways at 
trial.”  After asking the court to clarify its ruling that 
Hood “cannot have the expert testify,” the court confirmed 
that it had so ruled.  Hood’s counsel noted his objection to 
that ruling. 
 
7
On June 4, 2009, Hood filed an omnibus pre-trial motion 
including a request for the appointment of Dr. Evan S. Nelson 
as an expert to assist Hood.  The motion further sought “a 
clarification by the [circuit c]ourt . . . so that Dr. Nelson 
will know what role he is to play, and whether he needs to 
prepare and/or submit a report.”  On June 10, 2009, the court 
entered an order appointing Dr. Nelson “as an expert to 
advise” Hood, noting that “[o]ver the objection of [Hood], Dr. 
Nelson shall not be allowed to testify in this case.”3 
At a commitment trial held July 15, 2009, Hood renewed 
his objection to his not being permitted to present expert 
testimony or present a written report from Dr. Nelson.  Hood 
contended that general principles of procedural due process 
required either that Hood should have been afforded the 
opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding 
whether to cooperate with the Code § 37.2-904 mental health 
examination or that he should have been allowed to rescind his 
decision not to cooperate, as he had attempted to do, once he 
had been appointed counsel and had consulted with him on the 
                     
3 Although the circuit court did not expressly address the 
admissibility of a report from Dr. Nelson in this order as 
Hood had requested in his motion, it is undisputed that Hood 
was not permitted to introduce any expert evidence, by 
testimony or exhibit, at his commitment trial and 
dispositional hearing. 
 
 
8
matter.  Hood contended that because he had offered to rescind 
his refusal to cooperate, the court could permit him to 
present expert evidence.  Indicating that it had “already 
ruled on that,” the circuit court stated that the “motion to 
preserve that [is] on the record.” 
At the trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence from 
Dr. Miller and from the sheriff’s deputy who investigated the 
rape and abduction for which Hood had been convicted.  Hood 
was not permitted to put on any expert evidence, and did not 
testify or call any lay witnesses.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the court entered an order finding that Hood was a 
sexually violent predator. 
On September 1, 2009, the circuit court conducted a 
dispositional hearing to determine whether there was any 
suitable alternative treatment plan to having Hood committed 
as an in-patient in a secure mental health facility.  The 
Commonwealth presented evidence from Dr. Miller and Carolyn 
Harrington, a licensed clinical social worker employed by the 
Commonwealth as a sexually violent predator program 
specialist.  Hood presented testimony from his sister, Debbie 
Howard, concerning familial support available if Hood were to 
be conditionally released under a proposed community-based 
treatment plan.  However, Hood was not permitted to present 
any expert evidence concerning the suitability of that plan.  
 
9
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an order 
finding that Hood’s proposed conditional release plan was 
unsuitable and there was “no less restrictive alternative to 
involuntary secure inpatient treatment and hospitalization.”  
Accordingly, the court ordered Hood to be committed to the 
custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Development 
Services to be confined in a secure facility. 
DISCUSSION 
As indicated at the outset, this appeal is limited to the 
discrete issue of whether Hood was denied procedural due 
process when the circuit court barred him from presenting 
testimony or a report from his own expert during the 
commitment proceedings.  As framed by Hood, that issue does 
not challenge the facial constitutionality of the relevant 
provisions of the SVPA, nor does he challenge the statutory 
framework of the SVPA that provides for the appointment of 
counsel to represent a prisoner only after a petition seeking 
his involuntary commitment has been filed.  Rather, the issue 
presented is limited to whether the restrictions imposed by 
Code §§ 37.2-901 and –907(A) upon the prisoner’s right to 
present expert evidence offend procedural due process as they 
were applied to Hood in this case. 
Specifically, this issue involves two separate inquiries.  
First, we must decide whether due process requires that a 
 
10
prisoner who, like Hood, did not have an opportunity to 
consult with an attorney when he initially refused to 
cooperate with the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination, 
should be permitted to revisit that determination once he has 
been assigned counsel.  Second, we must determine whether a 
trial court may permit such a prisoner to present expert 
evidence at his commitment trial and dispositional hearing if 
he is subsequently willing to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert. 
Due process is the embodiment of the concept that the 
government is required to do, or refrain from doing, certain 
things if it is to exercise the authority that it derives from 
the consent of the governed justly and without prejudice or 
excess.  See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (due 
process is “meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, 
but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property”).  Determining what is required of the 
government to satisfy due process depends upon the particular 
situation at issue and the interests involved.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has observed, due process “is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances,” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886, 895 (1961), but involves “intensely practical 
matters.”  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975). 
 
11
As pertinent to the present case, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that “for the ordinary citizen, 
commitment to a mental hospital produces a massive curtailment 
of liberty, and in consequence requires due process 
protection.”  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Similarly, 
with specific application to the SVPA, we have held that 
“involuntary civil commitment is a significant deprivation of 
liberty to which federal and state procedural due process 
protections apply.”  Jenkins v. Director, Va. Ctr. for Behav. 
Rehab., 271 Va. 4, 15, 624 S.E.2d 453, 460 (2006); accord 
Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 240, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 
(2005) (“Civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, 
“[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the 
question remains what process is due.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
In Jenkins, citing Vitek, we recognized that there were 
“certain minimal standards” to which the Commonwealth was 
required to adhere in order to satisfy the “due process 
guarantee[d] to a respondent in an involuntary civil 
commitment proceeding.”  Jenkins, 271 Va. at 15, 624 S.E.2d at 
460.  Chief among these minimal standards is the right to a 
 
12
“hearing at which evidence is presented and the respondent is 
provided a chance to be heard and to present documentary 
evidence as well as witnesses.”  Id. (emphasis added).  We 
further held “the due process protections embodied in the 
federal and Virginia Constitutions mandate that the subject of 
the involuntary civil commitment process has the right to 
counsel at all significant stages of the judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. at 16, 624 S.E.2d at 460. 
Hood contends that he was deprived of his due process 
rights when he was required to make the decision whether to 
cooperate with Dr. Miller in the Code § 37.2-904 mental health 
examination without first being afforded the opportunity to 
consult with an attorney.  This is so, Hood maintains, because 
“[t]he significance of the decision . . . whether to cooperate 
with the government psychiatrist or psychologist is crucial 
under Virginia’s SVP Act, since it affects the entire trial as 
well as the dispositional proceeding on whether outpatient 
treatment is feasible.”  Hood notes that the SVPA does not 
require that the prisoner be advised of its provisions, 
including the consequences of his failure to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth’s expert, until the petition to seek the 
prisoner’s commitment is filed, which necessarily cannot occur 
until after the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination.  He 
likewise notes that it is only at this point that the 
 
13
statutory right to appointment of counsel under the SVPA 
accrues.  Hood thus contends that “an extremely important 
right – the right to present testimony favorable to one’s side 
of the case – is being made dependent upon whether the 
[prisoner] cooperates with the government psychiatrist or 
psychologist, and . . . he must make the decision to cooperate 
or not before having counsel appointed.”4 
The Commonwealth responds that Hood did not have a right 
to the assistance of counsel at the time of the Code § 37.2-
904 mental health examination.  The Commonwealth maintains 
this is so because the SVPA provides that the prisoner has a 
right “[t]o be represented by counsel” only “[i]n hearings and 
trials held pursuant to this chapter.”  Code § 37.2-901.  
Likewise, the SVPA provides for the appointment of counsel to 
an unrepresented prisoner only after a petition seeking 
commitment of the prisoner has been filed, Code § 37.2-906(B), 
                     
4 Hood contends that Virginia is the only jurisdiction in 
the United States that has a statutory process for civilly 
committing sexual predators which pre-conditions the right of 
a person subject to that process to present evidence in the 
commitment proceeding on a requirement that the person assist 
the government in that process before being afforded the 
assistance of counsel.  In a footnote within his brief, Hood 
provided an exhaustive summary of the federal and state 
statutory processes equivalent to the SVPA in support of this 
proposition.  The Commonwealth does not dispute that this 
aspect of Virginia’s SVPA is unique within this area of the 
law. 
 
 
14
and the first “hearing” at which the prisoner is required to 
have counsel is the probable cause hearing required by Code 
§ 37.2-906(C).   
Hood recognizes the SVPA does not provide for the 
appointment of counsel prior to the filing of a petition 
seeking commitment.  Indeed, Hood concedes on brief that until 
the petition is filed, there is no court that would have 
jurisdiction to make such appointment, and no practical 
mechanism for having a court do so.  Hood nonetheless contends 
that because a prisoner is required to make a decision that 
will affect his right to present expert evidence at his 
commitment trial and dispositional hearing at a point in time 
before the prisoner is afforded the opportunity to consult 
with an attorney, procedural due process requires that the 
prisoner should be permitted to revisit that decision once he 
has counsel, and if he is then willing to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert, he should then be permitted to present 
expert evidence on his own behalf. 
Responding to Hood’s due process arguments, the 
Commonwealth asserts that the procedural due process 
protections of the United States and Virginia Constitutions 
that afford a criminal defendant the right to assistance of 
counsel before a formal prosecution has commenced do not apply 
to a prisoner during a pre-petition investigation under the 
 
15
SVPA, since a commitment under the SVPA is a civil proceeding.  
Noting that in his assignment of error Hood specifically 
asserts that requiring him to choose whether to cooperate with 
the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination without the 
benefit of counsel was “in violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, the Right to Counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States, and the Law of the 
Land provision in Article I § 8 of the Constitution of 
Virginia,” the Commonwealth contends that the due process 
guarantees of these constitutional provisions are inapplicable 
to Hood because they are limited in their application to 
criminal prosecutions.  See Jenkins, 271 Va. at 15, 624 S.E.2d 
at 460 (“Even though involuntary civil commitment is a 
significant deprivation of liberty to which federal and state 
procedural due process protections apply, persons subject to 
these commitment proceedings do not enjoy the same rights 
attendant to a criminal proceeding.”) 
While we agree with the Commonwealth that there is no 
statutory or due process requirement for a prisoner to be 
provided with the assistance of counsel at the time of the 
Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination, we conclude that 
the Commonwealth’s response on this point fails to address the 
question whether the statutory provisions that bar a prisoner 
 
16
from presenting expert evidence if he chooses not to cooperate 
with that examination violate procedural due process where, 
having subsequently consulted with counsel, the prisoner 
demonstrates a willingness to rescind that decision prior to 
the trial on a commitment petition.  Thus, while we agree with 
the Commonwealth that Hood’s claim cannot fall within the due 
process protections of the Sixth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, which are specific to 
criminal prosecutions, we conclude that Hood’s argument does 
fall within the procedural due process guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment that no person “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,” which unquestionably 
applies in civil proceedings under the SVPA.  Warrington v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365,370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010); 
Jenkins, 271 Va. at 15, 624 S.E.2d at 460; Townes, 269 Va. at 
240, 609 S.E.2d at 4. 
In short, the issue raised by Hood at trial and in this 
appeal is not whether he could or should have been afforded 
the assistance of counsel at the time of the Code § 37.2-904 
mental health examination.  Rather, the issue is whether the 
penalty imposed for his failure to cooperate in that 
examination violates procedural due process because he was not 
afforded the opportunity to revisit that decision once counsel 
had been appointed.  Stated another way, the issue is whether 
 
17
the statutory provisions that permit the Commonwealth to limit 
the right of a prisoner subject to the SVPA to present 
evidence in his defense offend procedural due process because 
they are based upon conduct of the prisoner that occurred 
prior to the initiation of formal commitment proceedings under 
Code § 37.2-905 at a time when he did not have, and was not 
entitled to, the assistance of counsel.  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude that Code §§ 37.2-901 and –907(A) must be 
construed in a manner consistent with due process.  In 
applying that construction to the facts of this case, we 
further conclude that the circuit court erred in ruling that 
Hood could not rescind his decision not to cooperate and, 
thus, that the court was without discretion to permit him to 
present expert evidence in the commitment trial and 
dispositional hearing. 
The circuit court’s ruling that Hood would not be 
permitted to present expert testimony or a report from Dr. 
Nelson was based upon its construction of Code § 37.2-907(A).  
However, as indicated above, Code § 37.2-901 also addresses 
the Commonwealth’s ability to limit a prisoner’s right to 
present expert evidence in SVPA proceedings.  This Court 
reviews issues of statutory construction de novo.  Farrakhan 
v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007).  
Moreover, “although civil in nature, a statutory scheme such 
 
18
as the SVPA that permits an involuntary commitment process to 
be initiated by the Commonwealth is subject to the rule of 
lenity normally applicable to criminal statutes and must 
therefore be strictly construed.”  Townes, 269 Va. at 240, 609 
S.E.2d at 4. 
In relevant part, Code § 37.2-901 provides:  
In hearings and trials held pursuant to this 
chapter, respondents shall have the . . . . right[] 
. . . . [t]o be represented by counsel . . . . 
[and t]o present evidence and to cross-examine 
witnesses . . . .  In the event the respondent 
refuses to cooperate with the mental health 
examination required under § 37.2-904, the court may 
admit evidence of such refusal and may bar the 
respondent from introducing his own expert 
psychiatric or psychological evidence. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
This statute comports with the minimal standards of due 
process the Commonwealth is required to follow in SVPA 
proceedings as set forth in Jenkins.  Moreover, we find that 
the discretionary power given to the court to limit the 
prisoner’s right to present expert evidence if he “refuses” to 
cooperate with the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination 
is a reasonable limitation on the prisoner’s right to present 
evidence in such proceedings.  This discretionary power 
permits the court to weigh the particular circumstances of the 
specific case, such as whether the decision not to cooperate 
was made with the assistance of counsel, before determining 
 
19
whether to limit the prisoner’s right to introduce expert 
evidence at trial.  Moreover, the use of the term “refuses,” 
in the present tense, implies that the court will be able to 
take into consideration the position of the prisoner at the 
time of the proceeding.  That is, the court can inquire 
whether the prisoner still “refuses” to cooperate even once 
the possible consequence of that action has been made clear.  
In such circumstances, if the prisoner remains adamant in his 
refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert, due 
process certainly would not require the court to afford the 
prisoner an undue advantage by permitting him to present 
evidence based upon a personal interview and examination by 
his expert, while he is simultaneously denying the 
Commonwealth’s expert the ability to form his diagnosis in the 
same way.  Cf. Code § 19.2-168.1(B) (permitting a court to bar 
defendant from presenting expert testimony in support of an 
insanity defense for failing to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert); Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 
620-21, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644-45 (2009) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in trial court’s application of Code § 19.2-
168.1(B)). 
In contrast, Code § 37.2-907(A), the statute relied upon 
by the circuit court to find that Hood’s initial refusal to 
cooperate with the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination 
 
20
created an absolute bar to his being able to present expert 
evidence in the commitment trial and dispositional hearing, 
appears to place greater restrictions on the court’s authority 
in such situations.  After directing the court to appoint 
necessary experts to assist a prisoner if he “requests expert 
assistance and has not employed an expert at his own expense,” 
in relevant part the statute provides that “if the respondent 
refused to cooperate pursuant to § 37.2-901 any expert 
appointed to assist the respondent shall not be permitted to 
testify at trial nor shall any report of any such expert be 
admissible.”5  (Emphasis added.) 
While the use of the term “shall” in a statute is 
generally construed as directory rather than mandatory, we may 
not construe it as such if “the statute manifests a contrary 
intent.”  Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 
636, 638 (1994).  On its face, the clause “shall not be 
permitted to testify at trial nor shall any report of any such 
expert be admissible” appears to manifest a mandatory intent 
that evidence from the prisoner’s appointed experts must be 
                     
5 By its express terms, this statute is limited in its 
application to denying the prisoner the right to present 
evidence from “appointed” experts.  Hood has not asserted an 
equal protection argument in challenging the application of 
the statute to him.  Accordingly, we express no opinion on 
this issue. 
 
 
21
excluded if he “refused to cooperate pursuant to § 37.2-901.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This construction, however, would appear to 
create a conflict between Code § 37.2-907(A) and Code § 37.2-
901, which we have found gives the court discretion in such 
matters, rather than mandating exclusion of the prisoner’s 
expert evidence.   
“It is a well-settled principle of law that where two 
statutes are in apparent conflict they should be so construed, 
if reasonably possible, so as to allow both to stand and to 
give force and effect to each.  It is the object of the courts 
to construe all statutes in pari materia in such manner as to 
reconcile, if possible, any discordant feature which may 
exist, and make the body of the laws harmonious and just in 
their operation.”  Waller v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 731, 737, 
685 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2009) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  This principle is particularly applicable 
under the circumstances of the present case, since two 
statutes within the same legislative act are involved and both 
statutes address the same subject matter, namely a prisoner’s 
right to present expert evidence.  Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 
83 n.2, 84-85, 695 S.E.2d 173, 176 n.2, 177 (2010).  Moreover, 
because Code § 37.2-907(A) does not reference Code § 37.2-904 
directly, but instead defines the determination of whether the 
prisoner “refused to cooperate” with the Commonwealth’s expert 
 
22
“pursuant to § 37.2-901,” we cannot definitively construe the 
relevant language of the latter statute without reference to 
the former. 
Given our holding that Code § 37.2-901 comports with the 
due process requirements for an involuntary commitment 
proceeding under the SVPA because the limitation on a 
prisoner’s right to present expert evidence is discretionary, 
it follows that the similar limitation of Code § 37.2-907(A) 
must likewise have a discretionary, rather than mandatory, 
application.  If this were not the case, a mandatory 
prohibition of Code § 37.2-907(A) would render the 
discretionary authority granted to the court by Code § 37.2-
901 ineffective in those cases where the defendant has not 
privately retained his own expert. 
When Code §§ 37.2-901 and -907(A) are harmoniously 
construed in this manner, it becomes plain that the SVPA does 
not offend those minimal standards of due process required by 
Jenkins because an uncounseled decision by a prisoner to 
refuse to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert during the 
Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination will not serve as an 
absolute bar to his right to present expert evidence during 
his commitment trial and dispositional hearing.  Rather, in 
cases where the Commonwealth seeks to prohibit a prisoner from 
presenting such evidence, the court will have the discretion 
 
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to allow or bar such evidence based upon its inquiry into the 
circumstances under which the prisoner made his decision at 
the time of the examination and whether the prisoner remains 
steadfast in his refusal to cooperate. 
The record in this case adequately demonstrates that at 
the time of the Code § 37.2-904 mental health examination Hood 
wished to be better informed of the requirements and 
consequences of his decision whether to cooperate with the 
Commonwealth’s expert.  It is equally clear that after he was 
afforded the assistance of counsel, Hood offered to rescind 
his refusal to cooperate at the first hearing in which he 
appeared before the circuit court after the commitment 
petition had been filed.  There is no indication in the record 
that this offer was not genuine or that it was made for any 
strategic purpose of delay or to gain some advantage over the 
Commonwealth.  Moreover, given the Commonwealth’s willingness 
to allow for a continuance following that hearing to permit 
Hood to be examined by his own expert, there would have been 
no undue delay in the proceedings if the Commonwealth had also 
desired to have Dr. Miller examine Hood and amend his report 
and diagnosis if necessary. 
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that Code § 37.2-907(A) mandated that Hood was 
prohibited from presenting any expert evidence at his 
 
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commitment trial and dispositional hearing because of his 
refusal to cooperate with Dr. Miller during the prior Code 
§ 37.2-904 mental health examination.  We further hold that 
the court erred in not permitting Hood to rescind his refusal 
to cooperate and not permitting him to present testimony and a 
report from Dr. Nelson at the commitment trial and 
dispositional hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Hood was improperly denied the right to call Dr. 
Nelson and present other expert evidence at his commitment 
trial, a right afforded both by the SVPA and by the minimal 
standards of procedural due process that we have held must be 
applied in such cases, the determination that he is a sexually 
violent predator is necessarily called into question.  
Likewise, this error deprived the circuit court of important 
evidence during the dispositional hearing that might have 
permitted it to determine that Hood’s conditional release plan 
was a viable, less restrictive alternative to full commitment.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court will be 
reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial to determine 
whether Hood is a sexually violent predator, and if so, the 
court shall also conduct a new dispositional hearing to 
determine whether there is any less-restrictive alternative to 
 
25
involuntary inpatient treatment and hospitalization if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.6 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
6 In briefing this appeal, Hood stated in his prayer for 
relief that in any retrial he should be allowed to present 
expert evidence “if [he] chooses to cooperate with the state’s 
expert.”  (Emphasis added.)  Of course, with the passage of 
time, Hood may have reconsidered his offer to cooperate with 
the Commonwealth’s expert made at the probable cause hearing.  
If, however, in any new trial it is established that Hood has 
declined to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s expert, then the 
Commonwealth may seek to have the circuit court rule that Hood 
will be prohibited from presenting expert evidence and, in 
such circumstance, the court would be justified in entering 
summary judgment based upon the prior record. 
 
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