Title: Watson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EMIL WATSON,
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No. 116, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for New Castle County
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I.D. No. 0312019673
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: October 19, 2005
Decided: November 28, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY,
Justices, constituting the Court en banc.
On appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellee.
BERGER, Justice:
2
In this appeal, we consider, among other issues, whether a person may be
sentenced as an habitual offender where one of his prior offenses has been
legislatively reclassified.  Appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine at a time
when the offense required possession of at least 5 grams of the narcotic.  Recently, the
trafficking statute was amended to require possession of a minimum of 10 grams of
cocaine.  Under current law, appellant’s prior conduct would result in a misdemeanor
conviction.  Nonetheless, we hold that appellant was properly sentenced as an habitual
offender.  The habitual offender statute identifies trafficking as a predicate crime and
provides  no exception for prior felony convictions that thereafter are reclassified.
Accordingly, appellant’s convictions and sentence are affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 30, 2003, a confidential informant told Wilmington Police
Detective Robert Cunningham that a black male, nicknamed “Pee Wee,” was driving
a red Ford Taurus with temporary tags.  The informant also said that Pee Wee’s
license was suspended and that he was traveling with a black female with large lips
who “on occasion” would carry drugs for Pee Wee in her crotch.  Detectives Handy
and Armorer, who knew that Watson’s nickname was Pee Wee, spotted the red Taurus
and conducted a motor vehicle stop. 
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There were two female passengers in the car.  One, later identified as Markita
Clayton, fit the description given by the informant.  The other passenger was released.
The detectives took Watson into custody for driving during suspension. After Watson
and his passengers had been removed from the car, the detectives saw a digital scale
in plain view on the front seat.  They did not find any other contraband in the car or
on Watson.  At the police station, however, Clayton admitted that she was “dirty,” and
then pulled a quantity of crack cocaine from inside the crotch area of her pants.
Clayton testified that the cocaine belonged to Watson.  
Prior to trial, Watson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized
after the traffic stop.  After a three day trial, the jury convicted Watson of trafficking
in cocaine and four related drug charges.  The State then moved to have him declared
an habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. §4214(b).  Watson admitted that he was
convicted of the two prior crimes relied upon as predicate offenses: 1) 1999 -
trafficking in cocaine 5-50 grams; and 2) 1996 - burglary second degree.  In opposing
the State’s motion, however, Watson presented evidence establishing that his 1999
trafficking conviction involved possession of 6.18 grams of cocaine. Watson argued
that because the trafficking statute now establishes 10 grams as the minimum for a
felony conviction, his prior conviction for possession of less than 10 grams of cocaine
should not be counted as a predicate offense under the habitual offender statute.  The
 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1046 (Del. 2001).
1
 Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 985 (Del. 2004).
2
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Superior Court rejected that argument and declared Watson an habitual offender.   As
required by the habitual offender statute, the trial court sentenced Watson to life in
prison.  This appeal followed.
Discussion
Watson first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to
suppress.  He contends that the police used his suspended license as a pretext to stop
him and search for drugs.  Watson claims that the informant’s information was too
vague and generic to support the search, and that, if it was just a motor vehicle stop,
then there was no basis on which to conduct the more extensive drug search that led
to the discovery of the digital scale.
We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Watson’s motion to suppress.
The motor vehicle stop was lawful because the police knew that Watson was driving
with a suspended license.   The digital scale was in plain view, and the investigating
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officer testified that digital scales are considered drug paraphernalia because they are
commonly used to weigh illegal drugs.  Thus, regardless of whether there was a
sufficient basis to conduct a search of Watson’s vehicle, the digital scale was
admissible under the “plain view” doctrine.    Finally, the police did not discover the
2
Jarvis v. State, 600 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 1991).
3
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
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16 Del.C. §4753A(2) (1999).
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cocaine in Watson’s car.  Clayton had been hiding it in her clothes and turned it over
to the police at the station. Since Watson had no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to items in Clayton’s custody, he has no standing to seek suppression of
that evidence.   
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Watson next argues that he was denied a fair trial because two police officers,
when asked about Watson’s relationship to Clayton, testified that Watson called
Clayton, “just a piece of ass.”  Because Watson did not object at trial, we review this
claim for plain error, which is error “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.”   Although the comment was crude,
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it was not particularly inflammatory, and we find no plain error in the trial court’s
failure, sua sponte, to instruct the jury to disregard it.
Finally, Watson argues that he was unlawfully sentenced as an habitual
offender.  As noted above, when Watson was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, a
person knowingly in possession of 5-50 grams of cocaine was guilty of a felony.   In
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fact, Watson possessed 6.18 grams of cocaine.  Before Watson was sentenced on the
present convictions, however, the statute was amended to increase the lower limit for
16 Del.C. §4753(A) (2003).
6
 16 Del.C. §4763.
7
 11 Del. C. §4214(b).
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trafficking from 5 grams to 10 grams.   Thus, if Watson were found guilty of
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possessing 6.18 grams of cocaine under current law, it would be a misdemeanor.7
Watson argues that because one of his prior convictions now would be considered a
misdemeanor, it should not count as a predicate conviction for purposes of deciding
whether he should be sentenced as an habitual offender.
The habitual offender statute provides, in relevant part:
(b) Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony or an
attempt to commit a felony hereinafter specifically named... and who
shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony hereinafter
specifically named... is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court
... shall impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted....
Such felonies shall be:
*
*
*
825
Burglary in the second degree
*
*
*
4753A
Trafficking in marijuana, cocaine, illegal
drugs or methamphetamine.  
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The statute does not expressly address prior felony convictions that were legislatively
reclassified as misdemeanors after the convictions.  In other jurisdictions, however,
courts have consistently held that the status of the crime at the time of conviction is
See: R.P.Davis, Annotation, Determination of Character of Former Crime as a Felony, so
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as to Warrant Punishment of an Accused as a Second Offender, 19 A.L.R.2d 227 (1951-2005).
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controlling for purposes of repeat offender statutes.   In Delaware, that conclusion is
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mandated by the recent enactment of 11 Del. C. §4215A, which provides:
(a)  Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if a
previous conviction for a specified offense would make the defendant
liable to a punishment greater than that which may be imposed upon a
person not so convicted, that previous conviction shall make the
defendant liable to the greater punishment if that previous conviction
was:
(1) for an offense specified in the laws of this State
or for an offense which is the same as, or equivalent to,
such offense as the same existed and was defined under the
laws of this State existing at the time of such conviction;....
(b) This section shall apply to any offense or sentencing provision
defined in this Code unless the statute defining such offense or
sentencing provision or a statute directly related thereto expressly
provides that this section is not applicable to such offense or sentencing
provision.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the habitual offender statute is directed
at repeat felony offenders, and that Watson is serving a life sentence because of
conduct that today would be considered a misdemeanor.  But §4215A leaves no doubt
as to the General Assembly’s intent.  In 1999, when Watson was previously convicted,
the amount of cocaine he possessed constituted a felony.  As a result, that prior
conviction was properly included as a predicate offense for purposes of §4214(b).
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.