Title: Suzanne M. Boschen v. City of Clearwater

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC96874
____________
SUZANNE M. BOSCHEN,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF CLEARWATER, etc.,
Appellee.
[January 18, 2001]
QUINCE, J.
We have on appeal a decision of the trial court declaring a proposed bond
issue valid.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.  For the reasons
expressed below, we hold that competent, substantial evidence supported the
finding that the proposed project was in furtherance of public health and safety and
affirm the bond validation judgment.
BACKGROUND
The City of Clearwater (the City), filed a complaint for bond validation with
-2-
the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in Pinellas County.  Suzanne Boschen (Boschen)
filed an answer, contesting the design, engineering, and purpose of the project, and
the City’s authority to issue the bonds.  The trial court validated the bonds, and this
appeal followed.  
Pursuant to article IX of the City’s Charter, which requires the City to
provide fiscal aspects of bond issuances by ordinance, the City enacted Ordinance
No. 6352-99 on May 6, 1999, authorizing the issuance of Infrastructure Sales Tax
Revenue Bonds, Series 1999, to finance the cost of capital improvements in
Clearwater.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla., Ordinance 6352-99 § 3
(May 6, 1999) (hereinafter Bond Ordinance).  On the same day, the City enacted
Resolution 99-28, authorizing the bonds to be issued in a principal amount not to
exceed $12,000,000.00 to finance the cost of roadway and related capital
improvements on Clearwater Beach.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas County, Fla.,
Resolution 99-28 § 2, Ex. A (May 6, 1999) (hereinafter Resolution 99-28).  The
City did not hold a public referendum for the issuance of the bonds.  
The Bond Ordinance specifies that the sole source of repayment of the
bonds is derived from the City’s infrastructure sales tax revenues.   See Bond
Ordinance § 3(B).  These revenues are generated pursuant to an interlocal
agreement with Pinellas County and other participating municipalities regarding the
-3-
distribution of the additional infrastructure sales tax revenues collected by Pinellas
County.  See id.  § 2 (defining “Sales Tax Revenues”).  The Bond Ordinance
further provides that the City shall never be required to levy ad valorem taxes to
fund repayment of the bonds.  See id.  § 3(D).  According to Margaret Simmons,
the City’s financial services administrator, the City’s share of the infrastructure
sales tax revenues is adequate to fund repayment of the bonds.  The City issued the
bonds pursuant to article IX of the Charter, which requires a public referendum for
the issuance of bonds in excess of $1 million.  See City of Clearwater, Pinellas
County, Fla., Charter art. IX (March 9, 1999) (hereinafter Charter).  The exceptions
to this referendum requirement are revenue bonds issued for public health, safety or
industrial development, and refunding.  See id.
In its legislative findings, enumerated in Resolution 99-28, the City concluded
that the project was necessary for the continued health and safety of the citizens
and visitors in Clearwater.  See Resolution 99-28 § 1(B).  Indeed, the City
concluded that the proposed changes would increase the roadway’s level of
service, improve air quality, and provide a safer environment for pedestrians.  See
id.  Ex. A.  The City further noted that this conclusion was reached after reviewing
extensive information and input from its staff, public hearings, and professional
consultants.  See id.  § 1(A).  The project proposes several improvements to the
-4-
entranceway at Clearwater Beach, including construction of a traffic roundabout,
roadway realignment, elimination of the signal system, pedestrian crossings,
landscaping, and a water fountain central to the roundabout.  See id.  Ex. A.   
At the validation proceeding below, the City presented evidence to explain its
process for assessing the necessity and feasibility of the proposed roadway
improvements.  According to the public works administrator, Richard Baier, the
site for the roadway project has three major intersections which have experienced
higher than average accident counts.  Nevertheless, the site is not one of the top ten
accident locations in the city, and the present level of service for traffic operations
is considered acceptable.  The City’s Public Works Department, which oversees
road design, commissioned a traffic study to examine and analyze traffic volumes
and movements in the Clearwater Beach area.  After receiving the traffic study, the
Public Works Department and the City’s master planner researched options for
reconfiguring the intersections.  They considered various factors, including the
traffic study data, the number of pedestrian and vehicle-to-vehicle accidents, and
the area’s seasonal peaks.  After they presented options for redesigning the
intersections to the City Commission, the Commission decided on the roundabout
concept as the preferred design and hired a design consultant to pursue preliminary
engineering designs.  According to the public works administrator, the purpose of
-5-
the preliminary engineering report was to identify the objectives of the project,
synthesize data collection, and lay a foundation for the design.  In selecting the
roundabout design as its preferred alternative, the City relied, in part, on data
suggesting that the roundabout would improve air quality.  Indeed, the City issued a
Congestion Mitigation Air Quality report (CMAQ report), stating its conclusion that
air pollutants would be reduced by substituting the present multiple intersection
design with the proposed roundabout design.  The City further concluded that the
landscaping of the roundabout could be used to calm traffic leading into the beach,
thereby reducing pedestrian accidents.  According to the public works
administrator, "every element in the project was purposely done to create a total
design concept, both to facilitate pedestrian movement and vehicle movement, and
to allow them to co-exist in that constrained right of way."  Indeed, “the project
was primarily for transportation purposes.  Economic development was a
secondary benefit . . . .”  The Public Works Department and its consultants made
additional visual and oral presentations to a number of bodies, including the
Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPO), the Citizens Advisory Committee of
the MPO, and the Traffic Control Committee of the MPO.  After reviewing findings
from its consultants and staff, the City Commission approved the project and
authorized the issuance of bonds to be repaid with proceeds of the City’s
-6-
infrastructure sales tax revenues.
Notwithstanding the City’s findings, conflicting evidence intimated that the
reconstruction of the beach site was motivated by different concerns.  Despite the
public works administrator’s testimony regarding the transportation purposes of the
project, notes from the design team meetings indicate that “the primary purpose of
this project is economic redevelopment of the beach, not maximizing traffic flow.” 
Further, these notes indicate that the twin principles for the project are developing a
place to have an experience and providing a sense of arrival at the beach.  Similarly,
the traffic study indicates that the improvements are designed “primarily to support
and enhance the economic redevelopment potential for the Beach area.”   
Additional evidence was introduced to cast doubt on the propriety of the
City’s decision.  For example, the traffic study indicated that roundabout traffic
conditions would be equivalent to traditional signalized control and not as efficient
as the current one-way system.  In addition, the level of growth over the next
twenty years is considered relatively minor, at 2000 additional cars per day. 
Reginald Mesimer, an expert traffic engineer, testified that he conducted an
independent review of the traffic study and engineering report and concluded that
the roundabout’s projected level of service would actually be decreased by two
levels due to the engineering report’s failure to account for pedestrians.  The
-7-
engineer, however, also testified that he offered no input to the City Commission
and was present at a meeting where the project was discussed, but did not express
any opinion as to the project’s alleged deficiencies.        
In response to Boschen’s challenge to the financing of the project without
prior referendum approval, the trial court concluded that the City had authority to
issue the bonds pursuant to chapter 166, Florida Statutes, which addresses
municipal home rule powers, the Charter, and the Bond Ordinance.  The court
declined to second-guess the City Commission’s approval of the engineering and
design concept of the project.  It noted that objections to these aspects of the
projects were better handled through the legislative, not judicial, process.  The
court held, as a matter of law, improvement of traffic circulation and reduction of
speed in congested areas constitute essential governmental responsibilities.  In so
doing, it recognized that the provision of sidewalks, enlarged walkways, and
crosswalks fell within the ambit of essential governmental responsibilities.  The
court further found that although the fountain and landscaping were part of the
aesthetic presentation, they were inextricably intertwined with the overall project,
which was designed to slow traffic within the traffic circle.  Boschen filed a notice
of appeal invoking this Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction under article
3(b)(2).
-8-
ANALYSIS     
This Court’s inquiry in bond validation proceedings is limited to three legal
issues: whether the public body has the authority to issue the bonds; whether the
purpose of the obligation is legal; and whether the bond issuance complies with the
requirements of law.  See State v. Osceola County, 752 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1999);
State v. Inland Protection Fin. Corp., 699 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1997);
Washington Shores Homeowners’ Ass’n v. City of Orlando, 602 So. 2d 1300,
1301 (Fla. 1992).  A final judgment validating bonds comes to this Court with a
presumption of correctness.  Osceola County, 752 So. 2d at 533; see Wohl v.
State, 480 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1985).  The burden of proof is on the appellant,
who must demonstrate that the record and evidence fail to support the lower
court’s conclusions.  See id. 
The second and third prongs--the legality of purpose and compliance with
bond issuance requirements--are not in dispute.  Indeed, Boschen concedes that a
legitimate municipal purpose exists.  As we noted in Linscott v. Orange County
Industrial Development Authority, 443 So. 2d 97, 101 (Fla. 1983), the expenditure
of public funds is legal if it serves a valid public purpose.  We have broadly
construed “public purpose,” recognizing that road construction, see Northern Palm
Beach County Water Control Dist. v. State, 604 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1992),
-9-
development of recreational facilities, see Osceola County, 752 So. 2d at 538, and
aesthetic presentation, see City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n, 414 So. 2d
1030 (Fla. 1982), all satisfy the “public purpose” requirement in bond validation
cases.  See generally City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (Fla.
1983) (noting the broad construction of “municipal purpose”); see also State v.
City of Jacksonville, 50 So. 2d 532, 535 (Fla. 1951) (“Though there was a time
when a municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as
were strictly governmental that concept has been very much expanded and a
municipal purpose may now comprehend all activities essential to the health,
morals, protection and welfare of the municipality.”).     
Similarly, there is no valid challenge to the City’s compliance with chapter
75, Florida Statutes.  Chapter 75 outlines the procedures for validating bonds.  In
accordance with these guidelines, the City enacted an ordinance authorizing the
issuance of bonds, adopted a resolution approving the beach entranceway project,
and filed a complaint for validation in the circuit court, which properly joined the
State, taxpayers, property owners, and citizens of Clearwater.  In short, the City
complied with the requirements of chapter 75 in seeking to issue and validate the
bonds.  See generally Osceola County, 752 So. 2d at 540 (holding that Osceola
County, which followed the same course of action, was not required to do anything
1  Article VII, section 12, provides:
Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental
bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of
tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than
twelve months after issuance only:
 
            (a)  to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when
approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly
exempt from taxation; or                                                     
(b)  to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium thereon
at a lower net average interest cost rate.
Art. VII, § 12, Fla. Const.  
-10-
more).
Although Boschen challenges the City’s authority to issue bonds for the
proposed project without prior referendum approval, there is generally ample
authority for the City’s issuance of bonds to finance capital improvements.  First,
the relevant constitutional restriction on municipal bond issuance, article VII,
section 12, Florida Constitution, is inapplicable to the bonds at issue.1  Article VII,
section 12, authorizes municipalities to issue bonds to finance capital projects, but
requires a referendum when the bonds are payable from ad valorem taxation.  See
art. VII, § 12, Fla. Const.  In the instant case, the funds for repayment of the bonds
are derived solely from the pledged infrastructure tax revenues and do not include
ad valorem taxes.  Thus, the City’s issuance of bonds does not trigger the state
constitutional referendum requirement.  See, e.g., State v. Sarasota County, 549 So.
-11-
2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1989).  Second, article VIII, section 2, Florida Constitution, has
been construed repeatedly as giving municipalities broad home rule powers,
providing that municipalities “may exercise any power for municipal purposes
except as provided by law.”  Art. VIII, § 2(b),  Fla. Const.; see State v. City of
Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978).  Third, pursuant to this constitutional
provision, the Legislature enacted the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, codified
in chapter 166, Florida Statutes, which provides that municipalities shall have full
authority to issue bonds.  See §§ 166.021, 166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. Stat. (1999);
see also Washington Shores, 602 So. 2d at 1302 n.2.  Fourth, the Charter similarly
vests the City with broad authority.  See Charter art. I, § 1.01, art. IX.  Fifth, the
City’s Bond Ordinance specifically authorizes the issuance of the bonds for the
proposed project.  See Bond Ordinance § 3.  
As previously mentioned, however, the Charter’s referendum requirement
limits the City’s authority to issue bonds in excess of $1 million that are not in
furtherance of public health and safety.  Consequently, the issue in the present case
is whether the City is authorized to issue bonds without prior referendum approval
for the purpose of reconstructing the proposed roadway site.  More specifically,
we must determine whether the Charter’s public health and safety requirement is
synonymous with the earlier restrictive notion of essential governmental functions
-12-
and whether the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the proposed
project fell within the ambit of public health and safety.  
Boschen contends that the public health and safety exception to the
Charter’s referendum requirement includes only essential government functions.  In
effect, Boschen asserts that the Charter’s public health and safety exception was an
expression of the voters’ will to retain the more stringent essential government
function doctrine in limited circumstances.  The City, by contrast, contends that the
1968 revisions to the Florida Constitution rendered the essential governmental
function doctrine obsolete.
Article IX of the Charter provides that a Bond Ordinance must “contain a
provision requiring that revenue bonds for projects in excess of one million dollars
shall be put to public referendum with the exception of revenue bonds for public
health, safety or industrial development and revenue bonds for refunding.”   Charter
art. IX.  Boschen contends that this exception is synonymous with the judicially
created essential governmental function doctrine, which originated in interpreting the
1930 amendment to article IX, section 6, of the 1885 Florida Constitution.  Indeed,
that constitutional provision, as amended, provided:
[T]he Counties, Districts or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall
have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a
-13-
majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such
Counties, Districts, or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the
manner to be prescribed by law. 
Art. IX, § 6, Fla. Const. (1885).  Thus, local government entities were prohibited
from incurring bond indebtedness without prior referendum approval from the
affected citizens.  Indeed, prior to the 1930 amendment to article IX, section 6, that
provision only applied to the state and permitted bond issuances only for purposes
of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection.  See art. IX, § 6, Fla. Const.
(1885); see also State v. City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla.
1988), receded from on other grounds, State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315
(Fla. 1991).  Consequently, local bond issuances flourished, although widespread
defaults soon followed.  See City of Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d at 252.   As
the Court noted, the stringent referendum requirement encompassed in article IX,
section 6, was imposed during times of economic hardship to curtail capricious
and improvident spending and to prevent local governments from further weakening
the state’s credit.   See State v. Florida State Improvement Comm’n, 60 So. 2d
747, 751, 753 (Fla. 1952) (describing the issuance of bonds preceding the
depression and the ensuing financial hardship that led to the adoption of amended
article IX, section 6).  However, in enforcing this strict constitutional provision, we
recognized the need for a liberal interpretation only with regard to the most basic
-14-
and necessary functions of government.  See id. at 753.  This perceived need
reflected our recognition that the constitutional provision was not enacted to thwart
counties’ ability to maintain critical operating functions.  See id.; see also Leon
County v. State, 165 So. 666, 669 (Fla. 1936).  Indeed, the justification for this
exception was not only that courthouses and jails were so essential that they
warranted special treatment, but also that their essentiality had been established
prior to the 1930 amendment to article IX, section 6.  See State v. County of
Manatee, 93 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1957).  Thus, despite the explicit constitutional
provision, we repeatedly held that prior referendum approval was not required if the
bond obligation supported an essential governmental necessity.  
In a long line of cases, we consistently reaffirmed this doctrine, but sharply
limited its application.  Indeed, the test of essentiality was very restrictive--whether
the county government would cease to exist if the improvement was not provided. 
See County of Manatee, 93 So. 2d at 383.   Accordingly, we held that courthouses,
see Posey v. Wakulla County, 3 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1941), jails, see Tapers v.
Pichard, 169 So. 39 (Fla. 1936), public health centers, see State v. Florida State
Improvement Comm’n, 48 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1950), and mobile fire stations, see
City of Jacksonville v. Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 47 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1950),
were so necessary to the operation of local government that they were exempted
2  Although similar, municipalities faced fewer constraints because they were often-times created
by special acts of the Legislature.  Courts construed these special acts as authorizing the financing of
projects for broad municipal purposes.  See State v. City of Miami, 76 So. 2d 294 (Fla.  1954); State v.
City of Pompano Beach, 47 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1950).  
-15-
from the referendum requirement.  However, we declined to recognize the
essentiality of county hospitals, see Florida State Improvement, 60 So. 2d at 754;
County of Manatee, 93 So. 2d at 383-84, voting machines, see State v. Broward
County, 54 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1951), and the acquisition of rights-of-way for road
construction, see Yon v. Orange County, 43 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1949).  Thus, despite
the health and safety concerns inherent in providing hospitals and constructing
roads, we limited the doctrine to situations that were vital to the governance of the
locality.2
We revisited the issue of the doctrine’s continuing viability in State v. County
of Dade, 234 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1970).  Notwithstanding the foregoing line of cases,
we held the 1968 revision to the constitution superseded our prior decisions
regarding the authority of local governments to issue bonds without referendums. 
See id. at 652-53.  To be sure, we noted that the new constitutional provision,
article VII, section 12, was more restrictive than the former provision because it
expanded the scope of prohibited forms of indebtedness without prior referendum
approval.  See id. at 653.  Nonetheless, we explicitly abandoned the essential
-16-
governmental function doctrine as the test for determining when referendum
approval was required.  Moreover, we reiterated our repudiation of this doctrine in
State v. School Board of Sarasota County, 561 So. 2d 549, 553 (Fla. 1990).  In
that case, we stated:
Appellees, in addition to asking us to validate these bonds,
invite us to reinstitute the “essential governmental function”
referendum-exception first enunciated in Tapers v. Pichard.  We
rejected the exception in State v. County of Dade and decline to
reinstate it here.       
   
Id.  (citations omitted).  Thus, we have explicitly recognized that our prior concept
of what constitutes an essential governmental function doctrine is no longer viable.
Nevertheless, Boschen contends the Charter’s public health and safety
exception reinstated the older doctrine in Clearwater.  This argument is wholly
devoid of merit.  First, the plain language of the Charter does not support this
interpretation.  By using the words “public health, safety or industrial
development,” the Charter refers to situations that could reasonably be construed
as falling within the ambit of those categories.  To be sure, the stipulation that the
bond obligation must preserve public health and safety indicates a more narrow
objective than routine municipal purposes.  But given the absence of any explicit
reference to the essential governmental function doctrine, the language cannot
reasonably be construed as resurrecting this stringent exception to the former
-17-
constitutional referendum requirement.  Second, contrary to Boschen’s
contentions, the citizens of Clearwater did not expressly retain this exception
merely by voting not to repeal article IX of the Charter in March 1999.  Indeed, the
ballot for that election merely crossed out current article IX and inquired whether
voters would support its repeal.  Although voters elected to maintain article IX, they
did not vary its express terms.  Therefore, voter retention of article IX in no way
suggests that the electorate also intended to incorporate the essential governmental
function doctrine.  Third, our express repudiation of this stringent restriction is
further evidence that the Charter should not be interpreted as reinstating the
doctrine.  Fourth, the rationale of the doctrine is no longer applicable.  It was
created at a time when local governments had little authority to finance important
government projects without prior referendum approval.  In recent years, local
governments’ authority to issue bonds has increased significantly.  See generally
art. VII, § 2, Fla. Const.  Moreover, the doctrine itself is unduly restrictive, in part
because it struck a balance between the need for essential governmental operations
and the duty to follow the former constitutional provision, which expressly
imposed referendum requirements on local government spending in most
circumstances.  Thus, given the historical underpinnings of the doctrine, it is
imprudent to construe the Charter as incorporating this stringent exception,
3   Article I, section 1.01(a), of the Charter provides that the City “may exercise any power for
municipal purposes except when expressly prohibited by law.  In addition to the powers enumerated herein,
the city shall be vested with all powers granted by general or special acts of the Legislature of the State of
Florida and otherwise provided by law.”  Charter art. I, § 1.01(a).  Further, subsection (c) provides that
“[t]he powers of the city under this charter shall be construed liberally in favor of the city.  The city is
empowered to do whatever is necessary and proper for the safety, health, convenience and general welfare
of its inhabitants.”  Id. art. I, § 1.01(c).
-18-
especially without any credible evidence indicating such an intent.  To be sure, the
City could elect to limit its authority further by including more stringent
requirements in the charter.  However, there is no evidence to indicate that it did so. 
On the contrary, the Charter vests the City with broad governing authority.3  In
short, the exception to the referendum requirement refers only to bond obligations
that improve “public health, safety and industrial development,” and this term
should not be construed as the equivalent of essential governmental functions.   
As previously stated, the Court must also determine whether the evidence
presented at the validation hearing supported the trial court’s validation of the
bonds.  Boschen contends that the evidence failed to establish that there was an
essential governmental imperative for the project.  According to Boschen, the
evidence did not support the City’s decision to reconstruct the entranceway, but
rather revealed that the proposed improvements were designed to stimulate
economic redevelopment.
The City, by contrast, contends that legislative determinations are presumed
-19-
valid, and that bonds for road improvements warrant validation because they
necessarily involve the public’s health and safety.  Moreover, the City contends
there was ample evidence to support the legislative determination that the project
furthered public health and safety.
Generally, “legislative declarations of public purpose are presumed valid and
should be considered correct unless patently erroneous.”  State v. Housing Fin.
Auth. of Pinellas County, 506 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1987); accord Zedeck v.
Indian Trace Community Dev. Dist., 428 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1983); see also
Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 309 (Fla. 1971)
(“The finding of the Legislature is determinative, and Defendant has failed to show
that such determination was so clearly wrong as to be beyond the power of the
Legislature.”).  Moreover, the wisdom or desirability of a bond issue is not a matter
for our consideration.  See State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recreation
Dist., 383 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980).  Indeed, we have recognized that so long as the
Legislature does not exceed its constitutional authority, our review of legislative
declarations is limited.  For example, in Northern Palm Beach County, we held that
on-site road improvements in a private development, including landscaping and
construction of an overpass, constituted a valid public purpose.  See 604 So. 2d at
442-43.  In so doing, we gave effect to the resolution adopted by the local authority
-20-
which provided that the proposed roadway improvements promoted health and
safety.  See id. at 442.  We noted that although these legislative expressions of
public purpose were not controlling, they were entitled to great weight.  See id.  In
Resolution 99-28, the City found that the project was necessary for the continued
health and safety of the citizens of Clearwater and that financing the project with the
bonds at issue was in furtherance of public health and safety.  See Resolution 99-28
§ 1(B).  Pursuant to the foregoing cases, this legislative determination warrants
deference from this Court.
Although the City’s legislative findings are not entirely dispositive, the record
demonstrates that these findings were not clearly erroneous.  The City
contemplated several health and safety concerns before approving the project,
including accident rates, pedestrian safety, air pollution, and traffic speeds. 
Furthermore, the City thoroughly investigated and evaluated the project’s public
utility.  Indeed, the City analyzed traffic volumes, researched options for
reconfiguring the intersections, made visual and oral presentations to a number of
bodies, and consulted heavily with its internal staff. 
Although the traffic study exposed inconsistencies regarding the basis for
constructing roadway improvements, there was substantial evidence to the
contrary.  While the traffic study suggested that improvements would not be cost
-21-
effective since there were no major operational deficiencies, it also acknowledged
that poor operating conditions occurred during peak periods, congestion could
occur when traffic and parking were not properly managed, and additional parking
spaces to accommodate the peak season were necessary.  The study further noted
that reconfiguring one of the intersections and separating pedestrian/bicycle and
vehicular traffic would mitigate the number of accidents.  
Furthermore, the conclusions of the traffic study are not dispositive because
the engineering report, which utilized the data collected in the traffic study, made
contrary conclusions and evaluated the project in light of the proposed roundabout
design, which was not thoroughly explored in the traffic study.  The engineering
report made several findings that buttressed the City’s legislative determination
concerning public health and safety:  the roundabout design considers safe
pedestrian/bicycle circulation to be of paramount importance; a roundabout design
would improve capacity when compared to a signalized system; the design would
reduce speeds; roundabouts typically reduce the number of accidents that occur by
sixty to seventy percent; overall delay would be considerably less; and roundabouts
were safer overall because of speed control, reduction of conflict points, decrease
in severity of accidents, and consideration of environmental factors.  Although
testimony of the expert traffic engineer conflicted with the City’s ultimate
-22-
conclusions regarding the level of service, these contrary conclusions were never
submitted to the City.   
We recognize that “legislative bodies have broad discretion in determining
what measures are necessary in order to protect the public health, safety, and
general welfare.”  Metropolitan Dade County Fair Hous. & Employment Appeals
Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 511 So. 2d 962, 965 (Fla. 1987). 
More importantly, this Court will not interfere with the City’s exercise of discretion
by second-guessing its judgment.  See Housing Fin. Auth. of Pinellas County, 506
So. 2d at 399; see also State ex rel. Wilcox v. T.O.L., Inc., 206 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla.
4th DCA 1968) (“When [the county commissioners’] plans do not exceed lawful
authority they should be upheld since the courts have nothing to do with
discretionary matters and will not on review substitute their judgment for that of the
respective boards.”).  Indeed, “[w]e are charged only with gauging the legality of
the undertaking though conceivably a project might be as ill-advised as it is legal.” 
City of Miami v. Florida Dev. Comm’n, 165 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 1964). 
Certainly, the City was entitled to rely upon the engineering report in determining the
parameters of the project, despite the traffic study’s competing recommendations. 
Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity
accorded legislative findings.
-23-
Although Boschen asserts a credible argument regarding the specified
purpose for the project--several documents mention economic redevelopment and
improving quality of life at the beach area as objectives--the evidence also
suggested otherwise.  Indeed, the testimony of the public works administrator
indicated that the project was primarily concerned with transportation and
economic development was a secondary benefit.  The public works administrator
further testified that every element of the project was directed toward creating a
total design concept to facilitate pedestrian and vehicle movement.  This testimony
is buttressed by the engineering report, which identifies as objectives improving the
bicycle circulation system and creating more parking opportunities.    
To be sure, the evidence indicates that both economic development and
public health and safety were identifiable goals.  However, in DeSha v. City of
Waldo, 444 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1984), we rejected the argument that a project
promoted growth and development “because the question of the need for
expansion and improvement of [the City’s] water and sewer system is a matter to
be determined by the governing body of that community.”  In a similar vein, we
noted in Town of Medley v. State, 162 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1964), that even if the
primary motivation for the proposed improvements was attracting private industry,
there was “no showing that such facilities [would] be used for the sole benefit of
-24-
any such industry or that the inhabitants of the Town [would] not enjoy the full
benefits of the proposed improvements.”  Likewise, the City’s consideration of
economic development while simultaneously addressing transportation safety does
not detract from the project’s overall commitment to public health and safety. 
Indeed, courts have recognized the health and safety concerns inherent in regulating
traffic congestion.  See Welker v. State, 93 So. 2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1957); Gate City
Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653, 656-57 (Fla. 1953); Garvin v.
Baker, 59 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1952); Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Driggs, 522
So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).  Thus, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the project furthered public
health and safety.  See State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So. 2d
875, 892 (“Plainly, the trial court resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
redevelopment plan.  The court’s findings are adequately supported by competent,
substantial evidence, and must be affirmed.”).   
Nevertheless, Boschen further emphasizes that over half of the actual
construction cost is allocated to the construction of a fountain and landscaping,
although the record is unclear as to the final cost allocation of the project.  In
Northern Palm Beach County, we upheld the validity of bonds that were issued to
provide roadway improvements in a private development.  See 640 So. 2d at 442-
-25-
43.  Over half of the bond issue was allocated for landscaping to provide a
Caribbean motif.  See id. at 444 (Shaw, J., dissenting).  In the present case,
testimony indicated that the landscaping of the roundabout would be used to slow
traffic, thereby reducing pedestrian accidents.  Moreover, the City relied upon the
Florida Department of Transportation Guide, which provides that landscaping must
be designed to optimize safety and operation of the roundabout and should
consider several safety concerns, including:  maintaining minimum stopping and
turning sight distances; maintaining minimum horizontal clearance and clear zone
requirements; ensuring visibility of signs and other vehicles; and discouraging
pedestrian traffic through the center island.  Furthermore, the City determined that
the roundabout design would improve air quality by generating less pollution and
consuming less fuel than the equivalent-volume signalized intersections.  Thus, the
landscaping does not only beautify, but also preserves public health and safety. 
Although the fountain expense, $2.1 million, is for aesthetic purposes, it cannot be
separated from the overall project.  It is interesting to note, however, that even the
circulation of the water was selected based on the safety of motorists.  In short, the
roadway improvements are part of an integrated project, and there is substantial
evidence in the record which demonstrates that the overall project promotes public
health and safety.
-26-
In sum, we recognize that conflicting evidence was presented on the issue of
whether the project promotes public health and safety.  At the same time, however,
we are also mindful of our limited inquiry in bond validation proceedings.  We are
not in a position to reweigh the evidence, but must solely determine whether
competent, substantial evidence supported the City’s decision.  We conclude that it
did.  Accordingly, we affirm the bond validation judgment.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County - Bond Validation
Charles W. Cope, Judge - Case No. 99-3622-CI-20
Patrick T. Maguire, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert C. Reid, Randall W. hanna and Ken Guckenberger of Bryant, Miller and Olive,
P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Pamela K. Akin, City Attorney, Clearwater, Florida,
for Appellee