Title: Ward v. Carmona

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 518PA13   
FILED 10 April 2015 
SHEENA MOODY WARD,  
             Plaintiff  
 
 
v. 
LUIS ENRIQUE CARMONA,  
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
                     v. 
JUSTIN MICHAEL WARD,  
Third-Party Defendant  
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 752 S.E.2d 260 
(2013), affirming the trial court’s judgment entered on 6 August 2012 and an order 
entered on 9 August 2012, both by Judge Christine M. Walczyk in District Court, 
Wake County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 September 2014. 
E. Gregory Stott for plaintiff-appellant and third-party defendant-appellant. 
 
Brown, Crump, Vanore & Tierney, L.L.P., by Orlando L. Rodriguez, for 
defendant/third-party plaintiff-appellee. 
 
BEASLEY, Justice.   
 
 
We consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming1 the trial court’s 
denial of plaintiff’s claim for damages when a jury found defendant and third-party 
                                            
1 We use the term “affirm” noting that the Court of Appeals used “no error” in its 
opinion.   
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-2- 
defendant were both negligent in the operation of their vehicles and whether the 
Court of Appeals created a new theory of motor vehicle law.  Because there was 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found both defendant and third-
party defendant negligent, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s 
denial of plaintiff’s claim and dismissal of plaintiff and third-party defendant’s 
motion for a new trial.  We affirm.   
This action arose out of an automobile collision in which plaintiff’s son, third-
party defendant, Justin Michael Ward (hereinafter “Ward”), operated a 1991 
Mercedes owned by his mother, plaintiff Sheena Moody Ward on 5 January 2011 at 
approximately 6:00 p.m.2  At the time, Ward traveled east on Spring Forest Road in 
Raleigh, North Carolina.  At the same time, defendant, Luis Enrique Carmona 
(hereinafter “defendant”), operated a 1999 Plymouth van traveling west on Spring 
Forest Road.  These two vehicles collided in the intersection of Spring Forest Road 
and Departure Drive.  Plaintiff filed suit on 15 March 2011 against defendant seeking 
damages for his alleged negligence.  On 26 May 2011, defendant filed an answer and 
third-party complaint, naming Ward as a third-party defendant.  
Ward testified to the following during trial.  He stated that he intended to make 
a left turn at a traffic light at the intersection of Departure Drive and Spring Forest 
Road.  Ward stated in his testimony that as he approached the intersection of Spring 
                                            
2 Although we recognize that plaintiff owned the 1991 Mercedes, for ease of 
reading, we refer to the vehicle as Ward’s vehicle. 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
Forest Road and Departure Drive, the traffic light was green.  To determine whether 
it was safe to make a left turn, he testified that he came to a complete stop at  some 
point at or in the intersection.  After Ward waited at the traffic light for several 
seconds, the traffic light changed to red.  Ward testified his view of oncoming traffic 
was unobstructed.  When he attempted to turn left, Ward knew the traffic light was 
red.  As Ward attempted to complete a left turn onto Departure Drive, Ward’s vehicle 
and defendant’s vehicle collided in the intersection.   
There were inconsistencies in defendant’s testimony regarding the color of the 
traffic light when he proceeded through the intersection.  On direct and cross-
examination, defendant repeatedly testified that the light was green as he entered 
the intersection; however, on cross-examination, at the request of plaintiff’s attorney, 
defendant read his response to a previous interrogatory in which he stated that the 
light “turned yellow when [he] was approximately eight (8) feet away” from the 
intersection.  Additionally, several exhibits offered by defendant were admitted into 
evidence.  A jury found both defendant and Ward negligent and denied plaintiff any 
relief.  As a result, the trial court ordered that plaintiff recover nothing in a 6 August 
2012 amended judgment.   The trial court also denied plaintiff and Ward’s motion for 
a new trial.  Plaintiff and Ward both appealed the judgment and the order denying 
their motion for a new trial to the Court of Appeals.  
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order denying the 
motion for a new trial, concluding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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both defendant and Ward negligent.  Ward v. Carmona, ___  N.C. App. ___, 752 S.E.2d 
260, 2013 WL 5629388 at *10 (2013) (unpublished).  Plaintiff and Ward petitioned 
this Court for discretionary review which was allowed on 6 March 2014.  
This appeal raises two issues:  (1) whether the jury’s verdict finding that both 
defendant and Ward negligently operated their vehicles was contrary to the greater 
weight of the evidence and, therefore, erroneous as a matter of law, and (2) whether 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals created a new theory of motor vehicular 
negligence.  We answer these questions in the negative. 
The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the jury’s verdict finding both defendant 
and Ward negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.  To prove negligence, 
a plaintiff must show:  “First that there has been a failure to exercise proper care in 
the performance of some legal duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff . . . and, 
second that such negligent breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury—a 
cause that produced the result in continuous sequence and without which it would 
not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have 
foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts as they existed.” 
Mattingly v. N.C. R.R. Co., 253 N.C. 746, 750, 117 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1961)(citation 
omitted).   
The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility 
of any witnesses.  Strum v. Greenville Timberline, LLC, 186 N.C. App. 662, 667, 652 
S.E.2d 307, 310 (2007) (citing Anderson v. Hollifield, 345 N.C. 480, 483, 480 S.E.2d 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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661, 664 (1997)); Brown v. Brown, 264 N.C. 485, 488, 141 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1965) (per 
curiam) (Jurors are the sole judges of the witnesses’ credibility and have a right to 
believe all, part, or none of the testimony.).  The testimonial and demonstrative 
evidence presented by defendant and Ward created issues of fact that were submitted 
to and decided by the jury as the finder of fact.  The jury found both defendant and 
Ward negligent.  
Plaintiff argues that there was no competent evidence to support the jury’s 
finding that both drivers were negligent in the operation of their vehicles.  By hearing 
the testimony and viewing the exhibits admitted at trial, however, the jury was in 
the best position to weigh the evidence.  Ultimately, the issue of whether Ward or 
defendant or both were negligent is a decision for the jury.  As to Ward, evidence was 
conflicting regarding when he entered the intersection and whether he should have 
seen the other driver.  As to defendant, evidence was conflicting on the color of the 
light when he entered the intersection.  Considering the evidence presented by both 
parties, including the testimonies of Ward and defendant, we hold that there was 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could impute negligence to both defendant and 
Ward in the operation of their vehicles.   
Additionally, plaintiff incorrectly argues that the Court of Appeals created a 
new theory of motor vehicle negligence inconsistent with North Carolina motor 
vehicle law.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that the holding in Cicogna v. Holder 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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controls and that the judgment and rulings of the trial court are inconsistent with 
Cicogna.  345 N.C. 488, 480 S.E.2d 636 (1997).  
In its opinion, in the case sub judice, the Court of Appeals stated 
Drivers approaching an intersection have a duty “to 
maintain a lookout and to exercise reasonable care under 
the circumstances.”  Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co., 
242 N.C. 553, 557, 89 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1955).  Failure to do 
so “is likely to endanger the safety of persons and 
property.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.23(a)(2) (2011).   
When drivers approach a green traffic signal at an 
intersection they must keep “a reasonable lookout for 
vehicles in or approaching the intersection at excessive 
speed.”  Hyder, 242 N.C. at 557, 89 S.E.2d at 128.  They 
have a duty to “anticipate and expect the presence of 
others.”  Id.  Drivers “cannot go forward blindly even in 
reliance on traffic signals.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[a]ny person 
who undertakes to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway 
must exercise reasonable care to ascertain that such 
movement can be made in safety before he turns to the 
right or left from a direct line.”  Wiggins v. Ponder, 259 N.C. 
277, 279, 130 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1963) (emphasis added); see 
also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-154(a) (2011). 
 
Ward, 2013 WL 5629388 at *4.  We emphasize that this analysis by the Court of 
Appeals must not be interpreted to contradict N.C.G.S. § 20-158 or impose a duty not 
intended by the statute.  That statute provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a traffic 
signal is emitting a steady red circular light controlling traffic approaching an 
intersection, an approaching vehicle facing the red light shall come to a stop and shall 
not enter the intersection.”  N.C.G.S. § 20-158(b)(2)(a) (2014).   
Plaintiff is correct in stating that N.C.G.S. § 20-158(b)(2)(a) permits vehicles 
approaching an intersection with a red circular light to make a right turn; however, 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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this statutory provision allows a driver to make a right turn on red only if the 
intersection is clear.  Id. § 20-158(b)(2)(b)(2014).  Here Ward was attempting to make 
or complete a left turn on a red circular light.  If Ward entered the intersection while 
the circular light was green and the light turned red, he was permitted to complete 
his turn to exit the intersection and avoid blocking traffic as long as he “maintain[ed] 
a lookout” and “exercise[d] reasonable care under the circumstances.”  Hyder, 242 
N.C. at 557, 89 S.E.2d at 128.  If Ward had not yet entered the intersection when the 
light turned red, he had a duty to stop.   
In Cicogna, this Court held that when the plaintiff had not been “put . . . on 
notice” that the defendant would not obey the traffic light, the trial court should not 
have given a contributory negligence instruction to the jury.  345 N.C. at 489, 480 
S.E.2d at 637.  There, while operating her vehicle, the plaintiff stopped for a red 
traffic signal.  Id. at 489, 480 S.E.2d at 636.  When the traffic signal facing her turned 
green, the plaintiff started into the intersection, at which time the defendant struck 
her vehicle from the left.  Id.  The plaintiff testified that “she looked both ways and 
did not see the defendant’s vehicle although he was ‘right there.’ ”  Id.  The defendant 
did not introduce any evidence at trial.  345 N.C. at 489, 480 S.E.2d at 637.  The trial 
court submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury despite the plaintiff’s 
objection.  Id.  The jury found in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.  
Id.  This Court held that contributory negligence should not have been submitted to 
the jury because there was “no evidence in this case that there was anything that 
WARD V. CARMONA 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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would have put the plaintiff on notice that the defendant would not obey the traffic 
light.”  Id.  
Plaintiff argues here that no evidence indicated Ward was on notice that 
defendant would proceed through the intersection.  But plaintiff’s reliance on Cicogna 
is misplaced.  
The undisputed evidence presented in Cicogna showed that the plaintiff had a 
green traffic light and proceeded straight into the intersection as allowed under North 
Carolina law.  The defendant approached from the plaintiff’s left.  These important 
distinctions show Cicogna is not controlling.  Therefore, contrary to plaintiff’s 
assertions in this case, the Court of Appeals does not create a new theory of motor 
vehicle negligence inconsistent with North Carolina statutes and case law.  
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
denying plaintiff’s claim for damages and the trial court’s order denying plaintiff and 
Ward’s motion for a new trial.      
AFFIRMED.  
Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.