Title: Jerome Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Commission

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2013 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Jerome Hoepker and Jane Hoepker, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Petitioners, 
 
v. 
City of Madison Plan Commission, and City of 
Madison, a Municipal Corporation, 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 63 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners the 
cause was argued by James M. Voss, assistant city attorney, with 
whom on the briefs was Christopher G. Wren, assistant city 
attorney and Eunice Gibson, city attorney. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross petitioners 
there were briefs by Steven C. Underwood and Annemarie G. Pace, 
and Neider & Boucher, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Steven 
C. Underwood.  
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Curtis Witynski, legal 
counsel,Madison, for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Mark B. Hazelbaker and Bell, 
Metzner, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison for Dane County Towns 
Association. 
 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2013 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jerome Hoepker and Jane Hoepker, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Cross Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
City of Madison Plan Commission, and City 
of Madison, a Municipal Corporation, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  Jerome and Jane Hoepker 
(collectively "Hoepkers") sought preliminary plat approval for a 
proposed residential subdivision from the City of Madison Plan 
Commission and the City of Madison Common Council (collectively 
"City").  The City approved the preliminary plat, subject to 
eight conditions.  The Hoepkers sought certiorari review, 
challenging two conditions which require them:  (1) to agree to 
annex the land encompassed by the preliminary plat to the City; 
and (2) to reconfigure their plat to provide an open space 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
2 
corridor.
1  The Circuit Court for Dane County, Gerald C. Nichol, 
Judge, entered an order denying the Hoepkers' challenge, and the 
Hoepkers appealed.  The court of appeals held that the City 
could not condition approval of the plat on annexation, but 
could condition approval on the open space corridor.
2  
¶2 
In this court, the City filed a petition for review of 
the court of appeals' decision regarding annexation, and the 
Hoepkers filed a cross-petition for review of the court of 
appeals' decision regarding the open space corridor.  Thus, 
there are two issues before us.  First, does the City have 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 236.45 to condition approval of the 
Hoepkers' preliminary plat on a requirement that they agree to 
annexation?  Second, does the requirement that the Hoepkers 
reconfigure their plat to provide an open space corridor 
constitute a taking without just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?  We hold that the 
City does not have authority under § 236.45 to condition 
approval of the preliminary plat on annexation.  We further hold 
that the Hoepkers' takings claim is not ripe for adjudication.  
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals in 
part, reverse it in part, and remand the cause for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTS 
                     
1  However, the Hoepkers also claim that the validity of the 
remaining six conditions directly depends upon the validity of 
these two primary conditions.  
2  Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n & City of Madison, 
No. 95-2013, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 1996). 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
3 
¶3 
The pertinent facts are not disputed.  The Hoepkers 
own approximately 49 acres of land in the Town of Burke 
("Town"), Dane County ("County"), Wisconsin.  The property is 
surrounded on three sides by the City.  Accordingly, since the 
property is within three miles of the City's corporate limits, 
the City has extraterritorial plat approval jurisdiction over 
it.
3  The Hoepkers therefore must receive plat approval from the 
City, Town, and County in order to develop their land. 
¶4 
In connection with plans to develop their property as 
a residential subdivision, the Hoepkers prepared a preliminary 
plat entitled "Hoepker Heights Preliminary Plat."  The plat 
contains 
sixty-two 
single-family, 
residential 
lots 
with 
individual on-site conventional or mound-type septic disposal 
systems and private water supply wells.  The plat also contains 
three outlots that will remain undeveloped until public sanitary 
service 
becomes 
available. 
 
The 
property 
is 
zoned 
A-1 
Agriculture (non-exclusive) by the County, which permits the 
proposed development. 
¶5 
The Town approved the preliminary plat on January 22, 
1992, and conceptually approved the draft final plat on August 
4, 1993.  In addition, the County conditionally approved the 
                     
3  Wis. Stat. § 236.02(5) states:  "'Extraterritorial plat 
approval jurisdiction' means the unincorporated area within 3 
miles of the corporate limits of a first, second or third class 
city, or 1 1/2  miles of a fourth class city or a village."  
Madison is a second class city for plat approval purposes.  See 
Gordie Boucher Lincoln-Mercury Madison, Inc. v. City of Madison 
Plan Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 74, 79 n.1, 503 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
4 
preliminary plat on October 27, 1992, and approved the final 
plat on January 25, 1994.       
¶6 
On October 11, 1993, the Hoepkers submitted their 
preliminary plat to the City.
4  The City's Department of Planning 
& Development ("Department") reviewed the preliminary plat, and 
concluded that it did not comply with Madison General Ordinances 
("MGO") §§ 16.23(3)(a)5. & 16.23(3)(a)6.,
5 as well as the City's 
                     
4  Upon the City's request, the Hoepkers agreed to several 
extensions of the ninety-day review period set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 236.11(1)(a); therefore, the City was not required to 
approve or object to the preliminary plat until June 21, 1994. 
5 MGO § 16.23(3)(a)5. provides in relevant part:   
 
Subdivisions 
shall 
conform 
to 
the 
following 
policies . . .  
c. To direct new growth to those areas capable of 
providing 
a 
full 
range 
of 
urban 
services 
and 
facilities. . . .  
f.  To insure that new development will be 
organized and timed so as to permit urban services and 
facilities 
to 
be 
provided 
as 
economically 
and 
efficiently as possible.   
g. To discourage new developments in those areas 
that are premature in terms of planning and timing for 
the 
provision 
of 
adequate 
public 
services 
and 
facilities. . . . 
 
MGO § 16.23(3)(a)6. provides in relevant part:  
A preliminary plat or final plat of any subdivision 
shall not be approved unless the Plan Commission and 
the Common Council determine that adequate public 
facilities 
and public 
services are available to 
support 
and 
service 
the 
area 
of 
the 
proposed 
subdivision. . . . 
Where 
the 
Plan 
Commission 
and 
Common Council determine that one or more public 
facilities or public services are not adequate for the 
full 
development 
proposed . . . conditional 
approval . . . may 
require 
a[n] . . . annexation 
agreement to insure future provision of required 
public facilities and services.  
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
5 
Peripheral 
Area Development 
Plan 
and 
Rattman 
Neighborhood 
Development Plan.
6  In particular, the Department indicated:  
"The plat is located right at the current edge of the City, 
where City services are available, yet the plat will not be 
provided with the full range of urban servicesincluding 
sanitary sewer, public water service and urban levels of police 
and fire protection services."
7  (R.2 at 31).  The Department 
explained:  
 
Without public sewer or public water, it is reasonable 
to expect that water quality problems may develop in 
the future here, as they have elsewhere, due to 
nitrate concentrations in the private wells. . . . 
 
. . . By enabling urban residential development in the 
township, at this time, without public sewer and 
water, the proposed plat would result either in the 
necessary urban services never becoming available to 
these homes, or in the services being extended to them 
at a later date after the area is fully developed at 
much greater cost. 
(Id. at 29.)  In addition, the Department concluded that the 
preliminary plat did not comply with a recommendation, contained 
in the Peripheral Area Development Plan and Rattman Neighborhood 
Development Plan, that an open space corridor be preserved on 
the south frontage of Hoepker Road
8 for a future recreational 
                     
6  These plans are elements of the City's master plan.  They 
detail conceptual recommendations for the area bounded by 
Interstate Highway 90-94, U.S. Highway 151, and Hoepker Road. 
7  The Town does not provide public sewer and water, and the 
Hoepkers' property is not in an urban service area of the City. 
 Therefore, public sewer and water cannot be extended to the 
property unless the Central Urban Service Area is amended to 
include the property, which can only occur upon annexation of 
the property to the City. 
8  Hoepker Road runs through the Hoepkers' property, 
splitting it into two main parcels. 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
6 
trail which will connect a proposed 250-acre open space 
preservation area south of Hoepker Road with Token Creek County 
Park and Cherokee Park to the north and west.  Thus, the 
Department recommended that the City either reject the plat, or, 
alternatively, approve it with eight conditions.  The two 
primary conditions provide:  
 
1. 
Annexation 
of the 
lands 
encompassed 
by the 
preliminary plat to the City of Madison, so that the 
full 
range 
of 
urban 
services, 
including 
public 
sanitary sewer and public water service, may be 
provided to the proposed development area in a timely 
manner 
by 
the 
City 
of 
Madison, 
according 
to 
established 
regulations, 
practices, 
policies, 
and 
procedures of the City of Madison. 
 
. . . . 
 
4. 
Reconfiguration 
of 
the 
plat 
to 
provide 
an 
adequate open space corridor along the south frontage 
of Hoepker Road for a future recreational trail 
location.
9 
                     
9 The remaining conditions provide: 
2. 
Amendment of the Rattman Neighborhood Plan to 
recommend that low density residential development, 
totaling not more than 65 [changed to 90 by City] 
dwelling units within the area encompassed by the 
present preliminary plat, is an appropriate land use 
for this area; and to continue to recommend that an 
open space corridor be maintained along the south side 
of Hoepker Road to accommodate a possible future 
public 
recreation 
trail, 
that 
no 
commercial 
development be permitted, and that no new development 
occur unless the full range of urban services is 
available. 
3. 
Amendment of the Central Urban Service Area to 
include those areas of the reconfigured preliminary 
plat which are proposed for development, so that 
public sanitary sewer and public water service may be 
extended to the site. 
 . . . . 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
7 
 
Of the two alternatives, the Department recommended that the 
City conditionally approve the preliminary plat. 
¶7 
On June 6, 1994, the City's Plan Commission adopted a 
resolution 
recommending 
that 
the 
City's 
Common 
Council 
conditionally approve the preliminary plat.  At a public hearing 
held on June 21, 1994, the City's Common Council approved the 
preliminary plat subject to the eight conditions listed in the 
Department's report.  The resolution also incorporated the 
Department's report by reference. 
¶8 
On September 15, 1994, the Hoepkers sought statutory 
certiorari review of the City's conditional approval of the 
preliminary plat pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.13(5).  The 
Hoepkers mainly challenged the annexation and open space 
corridor conditions, but also claimed that the validity of the 
                                                                  
5. 
Redesign of the plat to the extent necessary so 
that public sanitary sewer service and public water 
service from the City of Madison may be efficiently 
extended to it. 
6. 
Comments of reviewing agencies. 
7. 
Rezoning 
of 
the 
lands 
encompassed 
by 
the 
preliminary plat to the Planned Unit Development 
District, or other appropriate City of Madison zoning 
district(s) consistent with the recommendations of the 
revised Rattman Neighborhood Development Plan, prior 
to submittal of a final plat. 
8. 
Development 
of 
the 
proposed 
residential 
subdivision shall not begin until the development may 
be provided with gravity sanitary sewer service, 
unless the developer agrees to provide the temporary 
lift station and force main needed to serve the 
development at an earlier date, at the developer's 
sole expense.  
(R.9 at 29). 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
8 
remaining six conditions directly depended on the validity of 
these two primary conditions.  On the basis of the record 
submitted, the circuit court held that the City has authority 
under Wis. Stat. § 236.45 to condition preliminary plat approval 
on annexation, and that the City properly exercised such 
authority in this case.  Therefore, the circuit court held that 
all conditions relating to annexation are valid.  The circuit 
court also held that conditions two and four are valid, because 
the requirement that the Hoepkers reconfigure their plat to 
provide for an open space corridor is not an unconstitutional 
taking without just compensation.  The court based this decision 
on the two-part test set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374 (1994).
10 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in 
part.  First, a majority of the court concluded that the City 
does not have authority under Wis. Stat. § 236.45 to condition 
approval on annexation for two reasons: (1) annexation, in and 
of itself, is not a regulation which is designed to serve the 
purposes of § 236.45(1), Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n 
& City of Madison, No. 95-2013, slip op. at 12-13 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 11, 1996); and (2) conditional approval based on annexation 
would violate the statutory procedure set forth in chapter 66, 
because a municipality would be permitted to annex property 
against the wishes of the property owner.
  Id. at 14.  Second, a 
different majority of the court held that the City could 
                     
10  However, the circuit court did not address whether the 
condition constituted a taking in fact; instead, it apparently 
presumed that there was a taking.  
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
9 
condition approval on reservation
11 of an open space corridor.  
In particular, the court of appeals determined that Dolan does 
not apply in the present case because Dolan involved conditional 
approval based on the donation of land, whereas this case 
involves conditional approval based on the reservation of land. 
 Id. at 21.  The court also concluded that no taking occurred, 
because the Hoepkers have not been deprived of all beneficial 
use of their entire property.  Id. at 22. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 This case is before the court on statutory certiorari 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.13(5), which incorporates the 
review procedures of Wis. Stat. §§ 62.23(7)(e)10., 14., and 15.
12 
 Generally, the review standards of common-law certiorari apply 
in a statutory certiorari case if "a circuit court is empowered 
under the statute providing for certiorari to take evidence on 
the merits of an administrative decision but takes no such 
evidence . . . ."  State ex rel. Brookside Poultry Farms, Inc. 
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Adjustment, 131 Wis. 2d 101, 122, 388 
                     
11  The majority concluded that the condition requiring the 
Hoepkers to provide an open space corridor constituted a 
reservation, not a donation or dedication.  Hoepker,  No. 95-
2013, at 21. 
12  Although § 236.13(5) states that "[t]he court shall 
direct that the plat be approved if it finds that the action of 
the approving authority or objecting agency is arbitrary, 
unreasonable or discriminatory," § 236.13(5) also incorporates 
the 
procedures 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(e)10. 
 
Section 
62.23(7)(e)10. provides in relevant part:  "The court may 
reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify, the decision 
brought up for review."  Therefore, a reviewing court has wide 
discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy under § 236.13(5). 
 See Pederson v. Town Bd., 191 Wis. 2d 663, 668 n.1, 530 N.W.2d 
427 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
10
N.W.2d 593 (1986).  Under common-law certiorari, "the findings 
of the [approving authority] may not be disturbed if any 
reasonable 
view 
of 
the 
evidence 
sustains 
them . . . ."  
Brookside, 131 Wis. 2d at 120 (quoting Snyder v. Waukesha County 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 476, 247 N.W.2d 98 
(1976)).   
¶11 Under Sections 236.13(5) and 62.23(7)(e)10., a circuit 
court may take additional evidence.  In the present case, the 
circuit court did not do so.  Therefore, the City argues that we 
must uphold its decision if we find any evidence in the record 
that it acted reasonably.  
¶12 We agree that we must give deference to the City's 
factual reasons for conditionally approving the plat.  See Busse 
v. City of Madison, 177 Wis. 2d 808, 811-12, 503 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. 
App. 1993).  However, we disagree that we must give deference to 
the City's decision as to issues of law.  In particular, whether 
an approving authority exceeded its statutory or constitutional 
authority is a question of law, which we review de novo. See 
Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 156, 162-63, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997); Rice v. City of Oshkosh, 148 Wis. 2d 78, 84, 
435 N.W.2d 252 (1989); Pederson v. Town Bd., 191 Wis. 2d 663, 
669 n.2, 530 N.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1995); Gordie Boucher Lincoln-
Mercury v. City of Madison Plan Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 74, 84, 503 
N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993) (hereinafter "Gordie Boucher").
13  
                     
13  The Hoepkers filed a motion for summary judgment in the 
circuit court.  However, neither the circuit court nor the court 
of appeals referred to the summary judgment motion in their 
decisions.  Accordingly, we likewise do not consider this case 
under summary judgment methodology. 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
11
    III.  ANNEXATION CONDITION 
¶13 Section 
236.45(2)(a) 
states: 
"To 
accomplish 
the 
purposes listed in sub. (1),
14 any municipality, town or county 
which has established a planning agency may adopt ordinances 
governing the subdivision or other division of land which are 
more restrictive than the provisions of this chapter."  See also 
Town of Sun Prairie v. Storms, 110 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 327 N.W.2d 
642 (quoting Jordan v. Village Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 
616, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 
(1966)).  Pursuant to this section, the City has adopted a more 
restrictive ordinance, MGO § 16.23(3)(a)6., which provides that 
the City may require an annexation agreement as part of the 
preliminary plat approval process "to insure future provision of 
required public facilities and services."  Accordingly, the key 
issue is whether the annexation condition, which is based on MGO 
§ 16.23(3)(a)6., complies with § 236.45.
15  
¶14 Section 
236.45 
explicitly 
indicates 
that 
"[t]his 
section  . . . shall not be deemed a  . . . repeal of any 
requirement . . . granted or 
appearing 
in this chapter or 
elsewhere, relating to the subdivision of lands."  This language 
                     
14  Section 236.45(1) provides in relevant part: "The 
purpose of this section is to promote the public health, safety 
and general welfare of the community and the regulations 
authorized to be made are designed . . . to further the orderly 
layout and use of land . . . ." 
15  The City clearly could not have conditioned approval of 
the preliminary plat on a requirement that the Hoepkers make and 
install public improvements, because "only the government within 
which 
the 
plat 
lies 
may 
establish 
public 
improvement 
requirements."  Rice v. City of Oshkosh, 148 Wis. 2d 78, 84-85, 
435 N.W.2d 252 (1989); see also Wis. Stat. § 236.13(2)(a).  
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
12
unambiguously demonstrates that the legislature did not intend 
to give municipalities the authority to adopt ordinances that 
conflict with any statute relating to the subdivision of land.  
As this court has explained:  "[Section 236.45] reserves to the 
city a broad area of discretion in implementing subdivision 
control provided that the ordinances it adopts are in accord 
with the general declaration of legislative intent and are not 
contrary, expressly or by implication, to the standards set up 
by the legislature."  Storms, 110 Wis. 2d at 64 (quoting City of 
Mequon v. Lake Estates Co., 52 Wis. 2d 765, 774, 190 N.W.2d 912 
(1971)) (emphasis added).  
¶15 The legislature has set forth the standards for 
annexation in chapter 66.  A municipality must follow these 
procedures, because "[a] municipal corporation has no power to 
extend its boundaries otherwise than as provided for by 
legislative enactment or constitutional provision."  Town of 
Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 615, 70 N.W.2d 249 
(1955).  In particular, ch. 66 provides safeguards so that "[n]o 
populated fringe area may become part of the city until the 
majority of electors and/or property owners in a particular area 
desire to annex."  In re Fond du Lac Metropolitan Sewerage 
Dist., 42 Wis. 2d 323, 333, 166 N.W.2d 225 (1969); see also Wis. 
Stat. §§ 66.021(2) & 66.024.
16  
                     
16  The statutes do specify other methods for annexation. 
See Wis. Stat. § 281.43 (annexation by order of Department of 
Natural Resources) (previously § 144.07); Wis. Stat. § 66.025 
(annexation of territory owned by village or city).  Neither of 
these procedures are applicable here.  Moreover, even where the 
DNR orders annexation, the order is void if a majority of the 
electors and/or property owners votes against it. See § 281.43. 
    
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
13
¶16 Municipalities cannot coerce or unfairly induce an 
elector and/or property owner into agreeing to annexation.  See 
Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 
629, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975) (annexation cannot be the result of 
any undue influence or pressure from the annexing municipality); 
Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d 533, 539-
40, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (city cannot use economic pressure to 
promote annexation). As this court has stated: 
 
The signing of a petition for annexation is more than 
the exercise of a private right or of a property 
right.  The right of an elector to participate in an 
annexation proceeding partakes of the nature of a 
political 
right 
"analogous 
to 
voting 
upon 
the 
question" 
and 
therefore 
must 
be 
the 
elector's 
"individual act . . . discharging his duty in shaping 
and influencing this particular affair of government." 
. . . The signing of an annexation petition, like 
voting, constituting participation in a governmental 
process is governed by a higher standard of conduct 
than prevails in the marketplacevotes are not a 
commodity of commerce. 
Town of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis. 2d at 539 (citations omitted).  In 
Town of Fond du Lac, this court held that the annexation was 
void because the City of Fond du Lac: (1) agreed with an elector 
that he would obtain the signatures of his tenants on the 
annexation petition; (2) agreed to permit two electors to remain 
in their home rent free for one year if they signed the 
annexation petition; (3) informed two electors that they would 
be evicted from their home unless they agreed to sign the 
annexation petition.  Id. at 536-40.  
¶17 We conclude that, as in Town of Fond du Lac, the City 
of Madison is unduly influencing a property owner to sign an 
annexation petition, contrary to the safeguards provided in 
ch. 66.  Although the City claims that it is not coercing the 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
14
Hoepkers because they can refuse to sign an annexation petition 
and therefore not receive approval to develop their land, we do 
not find this argument persuasive or consider it a basis to 
distinguish this case from Town of Fond du Lac.  If the Hoepkers 
signed an annexation petition because the alternative would be 
to leave their land undeveloped, their consent would be the 
product of direct economic pressure from the City, similar to 
the situation in Town of Fond du Lac.  Thus, the City's action 
is improper because it denies the Hoepkers their political right 
to participate in an annexation proceeding by voluntarily 
deciding whether to support or oppose annexation.
17  See id.    
¶18 In making this determination, we have not overlooked 
the City's and The League of Wisconsin Municipalities' assertion 
that municipalities should have authority to condition plat 
approval on annexation, because otherwise municipalities will be 
forced to approve unsewered development on their immediate 
fringe.  While this may very well be good public policy, the 
                     
17 We also conclude that Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 321 (1982), is inapposite 
here.  In Town of Hallie, electors and property owners of 
unincorporated territory sought sewer services from the City of 
Eau Claire.  Under Wis. Stat. § 66.069(2)(c), the city had no 
obligation to extend sewer services outside its boundaries;  
therefore, the city informed the inhabitants of Hallie that it 
would not provide sewer services unless the area was annexed.  
The court determined that the city could deny extension of sewer 
services to unincorporated territory unless such territory was 
annexed to the city. Id. at 542.  In the present case, the 
Hoepkers are not seeking sewer services.  Thus, it is irrelevant 
that, pursuant to Hallie, the City may refuse to extend sewer 
services to the Hoepkers' land unless it is annexed to the City. 
  
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
15
question of whether municipalities should have such authority is 
a matter for the legislature.  See Rice, 148 Wis. 2d at 91. 
¶19 In addition, we stress that, in the present case, the 
City is not being forced to approve the Hoepkers' preliminary 
plat.  If, on remand, the City determines that the land is 
unsuitable for the proposed development, it may reject the 
preliminary or final plat.  See MGO § 16.23(3)(a)3.  However, if 
the City rejects the plat on suitability grounds, it must inform 
the Hoepkers of the particular facts upon which it bases its 
conclusion, and provide them with an opportunity to present 
evidence regarding suitability at a public hearing.  See id. 
¶20 In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 236.45 does not 
authorize the City to condition approval of the Hoepkers' plat 
on annexation, because this would be contrary to the annexation 
standards set forth by the legislature in ch. 66.  Accordingly, 
conditions one, three, five, and eight of the City's conditional 
approval are completely invalid, and conditions two and six are 
invalid to the extent that they involve annexation.  In 
addition, after this decision, the City of Madison cannot apply 
MGO § 16.23(3)(a)6. to require, as a condition of plat approval, 
a person seeking to subdivide property to annex that property to 
the City.  However, if the subdivider and the City agree to 
annexation, the provisions of ch. 66 provide the necessary 
procedure.  
IV.  OPEN SPACE CORRIDOR 
¶21 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 236.45, the City adopted a 
more restrictive ordinance, MGO § 16.23(8)(f), which provides 
that the City may require a developer to dedicate land for 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
16
public sites or open spaces, or may require the developer to 
reserve such an area of land for five years, after which time 
the City must either acquire the reservation or release it.
18  
The City clearly has the power to condition plat approval on the 
donation of land,  see Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 618, or on the 
provision of open space or greenspace, Gordie Boucher, 178 Wis. 
2d at 97.  It is likewise clear that compensation is not always 
required in such circumstances.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 
391.
19  Moreover, in this case, the City concedes that it will be 
required to pay full compensation to the Hoepkers if it decides 
to physically acquire the property encompassed by the open space 
corridor during the five-year reservation period.  Therefore, 
the only question before us is whether the open space corridor 
                     
18  A dedication or donation requires the landowner to 
convey an interest in land to a municipality for a public use.  
See Wis. Stat. § 236.29(1); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 385 (1994); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908, 915 
(Md. 1984).  "Reservation, on the other hand, involves no 
conveyance but restricts the right of the subdivider and others 
to use the land for anything but the restricted purpose."  
Howard County, 482 A.2d at 270 (quoting D. Hagman, Urban 
Planning & Land Development Control Law § 140, at 259 (1975)).  
In the present case, the open space condition appears to be a 
reservation, 
because 
the 
condition 
does 
not 
involve 
a 
conveyance, but instead restricts the Hoepkers and others from 
using the open space corridor for anything but a future 
recreational trail.  
19  In Dolan, the Court held that when a municipality 
conditions 
plat 
approval 
on 
the 
donation 
of 
land, 
the 
municipality is required to compensate the landowner only if 
there is no "essential nexus" between the legitimate state 
interest and the condition, or there is no rough proportionality 
between 
the 
condition 
and 
the 
impact 
of 
the 
proposed 
development.  512 U.S. at 386, 391.   
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
17
condition constitutes a temporary
20 "regulatory taking" for which 
just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution,
21 applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383. 
¶22 A "regulatory taking" does not involve an actual 
physical occupation of property.  Instead, where a regulatory 
taking claim is made, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a 
government restriction or regulation is excessive and therefore 
constitutes a "taking" of property; and (2) any proffered 
compensation is unjust. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo 
County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).  Both elements must be ripe 
before a claim is justiciable.  See Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 (1985). 
¶23 In regard to the first element, the United States 
Supreme Court has determined that "a claim that the application 
of government regulations effects a taking of a property 
interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at 
                     
20  A temporary deprivation may constitute a "taking."  See 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 
417, 427, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983). 
21 There is some debate over whether a "regulatory taking" 
involves a claim under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
or a claim of unreasonable exercise of police power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197-98 (1985).  
 We do not attempt to resolve this question, since our analysis 
regarding ripeness applies even if we view the Hoepkers' claim 
as a question of due process.  See id. at 197-200.   
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
18
issue."  Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 
186.  As the Court has explained: 
 
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings 
claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion 
is a final and authoritative determination of the type 
and intensity of development legally permitted on the 
subject property.  A court cannot determine whether a 
regulation has gone "too far" unless it knows how far 
the regulation goes. 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 348.  Thus, the Court 
has 
stated 
that 
its 
precedent 
"uniformly 
reflect[s] 
an 
insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted 
development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the 
regulations that purport to limit it."  Id. at 351.   
¶24 As to the second element, the Supreme Court has 
explained:  
 
The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of 
property; 
it 
proscribes 
taking 
without 
just 
compensation.  Nor does the Fifth Amendment require 
that just compensation be paid in advance of, or 
contemporaneously with, 
the taking; all 
that is 
required is that a "'reasonable, certain and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation'" exist at the 
time of the taking. 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 194 
(citations omitted).  Therefore, no constitutional violation 
occurs until a landowner is denied just compensation.  Id. at 
194 n.13.  Accordingly, the Court has determined that "if a 
State 
provides 
an 
adequate 
procedure 
for 
seeking 
just 
compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the 
Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and 
been denied just compensation." Id at 195. 
¶25 In the present case, the City has not made a final 
determination as to approval of the Hoepkers' plat.  More 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
19
importantly, the dimensions and exact location of the open space 
corridor are presently unknown.  Since it is impossible to 
ascertain the nature and extent of permitted development on the 
Hoepkers' land, we cannot determine whether the City's actions 
are 
excessive 
and 
therefore 
constitute 
a 
"taking."  
Consequently, the first element is not ripe.   
¶26 Additionally, 
the 
legislature 
has 
established 
a 
procedure  for inverse condemnation through which an individual 
may seek compensation for a regulatory taking.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10.  The Hoepkers have not utilized this procedure.  Thus, 
the second element also is not ripe. 
¶27 Since the Hoepkers' temporary regulatory takings claim 
is not ripe, we do not reach the merits of this claim.
22  
However, we also conclude that it is unreasonable to require the 
Hoepkers to wait until the final plat approval process for 
details as to the size and location of the open space corridor, 
because "[t]he purpose of a preliminary plat is to assure the 
subdivider that he is proceeding in an acceptable manner before 
he spends the money to have a final plat made."  Lakeshore 
Development Corp. v. Plan Comm'n of Oconomowoc Lake, 12 Wis. 2d 
                     
22  We acknowledge that in Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 
Wis. 2d 365, 371-72, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996), this court reached 
the merits of a regulatory takings claim even though the claim 
was not ripe because Zealy had not sought to have his property 
rezoned, and therefore the decision of the city was not 
considered final.  However, unlike the present case, the nature 
and extent of permitted development was known in Zealy; 
therefore, the court could determine whether the government 
regulation was excessive and accordingly constituted a taking.  
In addition, Zealy had applied for compensation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10. 
 
Thus, 
we 
consider 
the 
present 
case 
to 
be 
distinguishable from Zealy. 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
20
560, 
568, 
107 
N.W.2d 
590 
(1961) 
(quoting 
IV 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Reports,  at 20 (1955)).  Therefore, on 
remand, the City must provide the Hoepkers with specific details 
as to the size and location of the open space corridor. 
¶28 In conclusion, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 236.45 does 
not authorize the City to condition plat approval on annexation, 
because this would contravene the procedures established by the 
legislature in ch. 66 by allowing the City to coerce the 
Hoepkers into agreeing to annexation.  In addition, we conclude 
that the Hoepkers' temporary regulatory takings claim is not 
ripe for adjudication.  Therefore, we remand this case to the 
circuit court, with directions to remand it to the City for 
further proceedings on the Hoepkers' application for preliminary 
plat approval. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.  
 
 
 
No.  95-2013 
 
 
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