Title: McAdams v. Town of Barnard

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

McAdams v. Town of Barnard (2005-542)

2007 VT 61

[Filed 20-Jul-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 61

                                No. 2005-542


  Herbert Hall McAdams III and                   Supreme Court
  Letty McAdams
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Windsor Superior Court


  Town of Barnard                                March Term, 2007


  Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

  Karen McAndrew and Douglas D. Le Brun of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C.,
    Burlington, and  Kent J. Rubens of Rieves, Rubens & Mayton (Of Counsel),
    West Memphis, Arksansas, for  Plaintiffs-Appellants.

  Timothy M. Eustace of Stitzel, Page & Fletcher, P.C., Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  BURGESS, J.   Herbert and Letty McAdams ("landowners")
  brought this action in superior court against the Town of Barnard for
  declaratory judgment to quiet title to their land in Barnard.  Landowners'
  motion for summary judgment was granted in part, providing them with a
  judgment order stating that "there are no known public roads, easements,
  rights-of-way or trails" (hereinafter "public road" or "road") on their
  property.  To the extent landowners sought additional relief in the form of
  a judgment that no other public roads exist, the court granted the Town's
  motion to dismiss.  Landowners appealed the judgment, believing a
  definitive statement that there are no public roads on their land is
  necessary to quiet title.  We reverse and remand.

       ¶  2.  The facts are not in dispute.  Landowners hold title to
  approximately 280 acres in Barnard ("the property").  In 2001, landowners
  sought to make improvements to the property.  As part of this process, they
  requested that the Town discontinue an abandoned, dead-end road, Town
  Highway (TH) #15, that crossed the property.  The Town conducted a
  discontinuance hearing pursuant to 19 V.S.A. § 709 (requiring notice and
  hearing to discontinue a road) and discontinued the portion of TH #15
  crossing the property.  Some time later, landowners were granted a building
  permit for their improvements, but a group of Town residents appealed
  issuance of the permit.  Landowners ultimately prevailed in obtaining the
  permit after they appealed to the Environmental Court.  Landowners then
  filed suit in federal court against the residents who had opposed the
  permit, claiming that the residents had acted in concert with state actors
  to deprive landowners of the permit in violation of their constitutional
  rights to due process and equal protection.  The Town itself was not named
  as a defendant in that suit.

       ¶  3.  In 2003, the Town produced a set of maps depicting all parcels
  of land and known public highways and rights-of-way within the Town.  The
  Town's maps indicated another public road, "Dean Road," crossed a portion
  of the property.  There was also reference in Town records to another road
  of undetermined location, known as the "page 4 survey road" or "Fairbanks
  Road" that possibly affected landowners' title.  Landowners thereafter
  filed the present suit against the Town to determine whether any valid town
  highways or rights-of-way existed on the property. 
   
       ¶  4.  In August 2004, the Town and landowners entered into a
  mediation agreement in the present case.  The Town agreed to initiate § 709
  proceedings to discontinue Dean Road and Fairbanks Road.  The Town also
  agreed to admit that it was not aware of any other roads or rights-of-way
  and that it claimed no interest in any roads or rights-of-way on the
  property.  The agreement provided that, when these tasks were completed,
  landowners could move for summary judgment, with the Town reserving its
  right to respond to such a motion.  In November 2004, the Town initiated
  proceedings to discontinue the two roads. 

       ¶  5.  Meanwhile, in the federal suit, landowners moved to amend their
  complaint to add the Town as a defendant.  Prior to a ruling on that
  motion, a mediation session was held in January 2005.  At the mediation
  session, all parties to the federal suit and the Town entered into a
  Memorandum of Settlement that provided in pertinent part:


         3.  The Town of Barnard agrees, subject to formal Selectboard
    approval, that it will promptly take all appropriate legal steps
    to discontinue any known or claimed town roads or highways that
    traverse or lie within the McAdams' property, including taking all
    steps necessary to ratify its prior action in discontinuing TH 15. 
    Warnings to accomplish the foregoing shall be published no later
    than 30 days after the signing of this Agreement, and the action
    shall proceed with all deliberate speed.

         4.  The Town agrees that if any other roads on the McAdams'
    property not presently known, become know[n], the Town will at
    that time take all appropriate steps to initiate discontinuance
    proceedings with respect to such newly-discovered ancient roads.

         5.  The defendants, as individuals and in their official
    capacities, agree that they will not appeal or interpose any
    objection to the Town's actions in discontinuing the roads as
    stated in Paragraphs 3 [and] 4.

         6.  The parties will exchange releases with respect to all
    claims, including but not limited to all claims for costs and
    attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and
    settlement consideration at such times as the steps taken in
    Paragraph 3 have been accomplished and court orders have been
    entered on the settlement agreements in both the pending state and
    federal cases, and the actions have been dismissed, with
    prejudice.

  The Town completed discontinuance of all three known roads,(FN1) and
  subsequently requested landowners to stipulate to dismissal of the state
  court action pursuant to the federal mediation agreement.  Landowners
  refused to agree to dismissal, maintaining that they were entitled to move
  for summary judgment on their claim for declaratory judgment pursuant to
  the state mediation agreement.  Landowners subsequently filed a motion for
  summary judgment on June 20, 2005.  At a hearing in superior court to
  discuss the proposed stipulated dismissal and landowners' objections to it,
  the court indicated that it would wait for a formal motion to dismiss from
  the Town and rule on both motions together. 
   
       ¶  6.  In support of dismissal, the Town argued first that it had
  complied with the federal settlement agreement and the case should be
  dismissed on that basis.  The Town further argued that the case had become
  moot when all known roads over the property were discontinued and that the
  court was without authority to declare any remaining, unknown roads to be
  nonexistent when the statute provided only for discontinuance by town
  selectboards.  Landowners took the position that the federal court
  settlement agreement did not supersede the state settlement agreement's
  provision that the state case would be decided on summary judgment.  At
  most, said landowners, the federal court agreement was ambiguous and other
  evidence pointed to their intent that the state case not be dismissed.  In
  response to the Town's mootness argument, landowners maintained that a
  quiet title action is not moot until all of a party's claims to a property
  are resolved, and that had not yet happened because there still existed the
  possibility that the Town could, at some later time, claim some newly
  discovered right-of-way across the property.  Landowners further maintained
  that it was within the court's equitable power to declare the existence or
  nonexistence of roads, the statutory provisions for discontinuance
  notwithstanding.

       ¶  7.  The lower court's decision adopted all of the Town's arguments
  and concluded that landowners were not entitled to the judgment they sought
  for three reasons.  First, the court said, the undisputed facts supported
  only a conclusion that there were no known public roads on the property,
  not that there were no public roads at all.  Second, the court lacked
  authority to declare the non-existence of any public roads because roads
  may only be discontinued in accordance with a statutory procedure. 
  Finally, the Town was entitled to dismissal based on the federal settlement
  agreement.

       ¶  8.  On appeal, neither party briefed dismissal pursuant to the
  federal settlement agreement, focusing instead on the superior court's
  authority for declaring the nonexistence of any roads on a property and
  whether there was an actual case or controversy remaining.  Arguments not
  briefed are waived.  Bigelow v. Dep't of Taxes, 163 Vt. 33, 37-38,