Title: Wintersteen v. Semler

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed with instructions November 26, 1952.
Petition for rehearing denied March 25, 1953.
*604 Norman L. Easley, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Griffith, Phillips & Coughlin, of Portland, and Lloyd M. McCormick, of Portland.
Irving Korn, of Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Krause, Evans & Korn, of Portland, and Elam Amstutz, of Portland.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE and TOOZE, Justices.
REVERSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
LATOURETTE, J.
This is an appeal by defendant Harry Semler, a dentist, in a malpractice case, from a judgment after verdict assessing damages against him in the sum of $75,000. At the conclusion of the taking of testimony, defendant, by timely motions, moved for a directed verdict, and, after judgment, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, on the grounds that as a matter of law the evidence failed to show any negligence on the part of defendant which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, which motions were denied by the trial court. On the appeal, it is again urged that there is no substantial evidence of negligence or proximate cause warranting the submission of the case to the jury.
It is alleged in plaintiff's second amended complaint that defendant was negligent in the following particulars:
that as the proximate result of such negligence, plaintiff alleges that she suffered certain injuries, including an abscessed lung, which necessitated several operations, the removal of several ribs, and the placing of drainage tubes in her back to expel the purulent matter, whereby she sustained permanent injury.
The evidence discloses that plaintiff, suffering from pyorrhea over a number of years, went to defendant's office on the morning of July 10, 1948, to have her remaining 17 teeth extracted. A general anesthetic was administered to her, whereupon her teeth were extracted and false ones inserted. Oxygen was administered to her to bring her out of her coma, whereupon she was walked to an adjoining recovery room and placed on a cot. Thereafter Nurse Magner, according to the testimony of plaintiff's husband, went to the waiting room to summon him to the door of the recovery *606 room, whereupon he entered and the nurse left. He testified that when he first saw plaintiff she was lying prone on her back with her head turned to the right. He tried to revive her by shaking her shoulder but there was no response. After remaining in the recovery room for a period of about five minutes, plaintiff regained consciousness. A nurse then brought in a card of instructions for care and a bottle of mouthwash. Plaintiff was asked to return on Monday, July 12, for examination, which she did. At that time a nurse removed her plates and asked her to rinse out her mouth, after which she was examined by Doctor Burton, who told her that everything was "fine", and she was asked to return to the office in a week.
Late that night or early the next morning, she commenced getting a "funny sensation" with choking, coughing and vomiting. This condition continued for the following week. She felt very weak, was unable to sleep and had no appetite. She was only able to retain milk and took many anacin tablets as these had been recommended on the instruction card in case she felt the need for medication.
Upon the following Monday, July 19, she returned to the defendant's office to have the sutures removed. A Nurse Schamel performed this act, and plaintiff informed her that she had been "terribly ill" all week, describing her symptoms. The nurse assured her that "that was the natural thing after the extraction of teeth." On August 2, she again returned to the dental office but only to make a payment and did not talk to anyone about her condition.
Plaintiff testified that her physical condition became worse and that she went to Doctor Tuhy, who, on October 28, 1948, operated, removed a part of one *607 rib and found an abscess of the right lung. She was hospitalized 11 days after this operation, and around the first part of December underwent another operation for the removal of another abscess.
Turning to the alleged negligence of defendant, it is plaintiff's theory, on the first allegation of negligence, that the defendant was negligent in placing plaintiff on her back rather than on her side on the cot following the extraction of her teeth, she being in an unconscious condition, thereby causing foreign material to pass down her trachea which resulted in the lung abscesses. It is claimed that such a procedure was improper and not in conformity with the rules of the practices of the profession. Plaintiff called as a witness a qualified dentist, Kenneth R. McIntyre, who testified as follows in answer to hypothetical questions:
1. We are of the opinion that Doctor McIntyre's testimony would be substantial evidence tending to show that the placing of a patient on the back and not on the side would not be in accord with the proper treatment that is ordinarily employed by members of the dental profession of good standing in the same locality. The law requires of a dentist in treating a patient that he exercise that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge which is ordinarily possessed by the average of the members of the profession of good standing in similar localities. Malila v. Meacham, 187 Or 330, 335, 211 P2d 747; Darling v. Semler, 145 Or 259, 264, 27 P2d 886.
2. We have carefully searched the record and are unable to find any evidence from which the jury could find that the plaintiff was placed on her back when put on the cot. The only evidence touching on this question is that supplied by plaintiff's husband who testified that, after the nurse had come to the waiting room to invite him to the recovery room, he went into that room and found plaintiff on her back with her *609 head tilted to the right. Since proper practice would dictate that the patient should be placed on her side, the presumption would be that defendant did place plaintiff in that position when she was laid on the cot. This presumption was fortified by the testimony of Doctor Burton and Nurse Magner who testified that, although they had no recollection of the particulars of who placed plaintiff on the cot or of in what position she was placed, the ordinary practice which they followed was to place a patient on her side with an emissis basin under her mouth for drainage, and that a patient afterward often turned over onto her back in attempting to get into the most comfortable position, which is in harmony with the well-recognized fact that even a person in deep sleep will do this.
In passing, it is interesting to note that plaintiff's evidence discloses that, although she was lying horizontally on her back, her head was tipped to the right. In this connection, Doctor Tuhy, plaintiff's witness, testified as follows in answering questions propounded:
*610 Since plaintiff's head was tipped to the right, it is difficult to understand, as a practical matter, what difference it would make what position her body was in since, in both instances, her head would be tipped over to the right, thus permitting drainage, or "secretion", as Doctor Tuhy termed it.
We are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to sustain the allegations of negligence hereinbefore discussed.
Since this case is of unusual importance, we will assume, for the purpose of a discussion of proximate cause, that plaintiff's allegation of negligence in the foregoing respect was supported by substantial evidence which warranted the submission of the same to the jury. Proximate cause will then next become the pivotal question. In this connection plaintiff asserts that her being placed on her back following the extraction in the manner aforementioned was responsible for foreign matters draining down through her windpipe into her lungs, thus causing the abscesses in her right lung.
When Doctor Tuhy, plaintiff's witness, was asked the hypothetical question of whether or not he had an opinion that the lung abscesses were connected with or resulted from plaintiff's teeth extractions, he replied that he thought they were due to the aspiration of the infected material during or after the extraction when she was unconscious from the anesthesia, but that it was more probable that it had happened afterward while she was on the cot, if the dentist had used all the proper precautions during the extraction. When he was asked if he thought it was because of her being on her back on the cot following the extraction that the *611 abscesses were caused, he replied that the prone position under general anesthesia in tonsillectomies was one of the least desirable positions to be in since the infected material could drain down into the trachea, and also the coughing and expectorating so soon (two days) after the extractions under anesthesia caused him to think that she had aspirated infected material while on the cot. He also admitted on cross-examination that on account of her pyorrheatic condition it was possible that the infected material could have been aspirated during deep sleep, with or without an operation or the giving of an anesthetic, or that embolism might have occurred from the blood stream during the extractions, or without them, which could have caused the infection to travel via the heart into the lungs, or that it could have happened while she was being transferred to the recovery room after the extraction.
Throughout his testimony Doctor Tuhy insisted that the probabilities were that plaintiff aspirated the foreign material while reposing on her back following the extraction, and that the aspiration in the other particulars were mere possibilities. He concluded:
Before proceeding to analyze Doctor Tuhy's testimony, we call attention to the fact that there was no direct evidence that any foreign substance went down plaintiff's trachea into her lungs, or that such foreign material was infectious, or that such foreign matter infected plaintiff's lung to the extent of causing plaintiff's abscesses.
*612 The purport of Doctor Tuhy's testimony in answer to hypothetical questions was that when he operated in October he found that plaintiff had an abscess in her lung, and that, since she was on her back in an unconscious condition for five minutes after her teeth were extracted, she having pyorrhea, infected material in all probability was aspirated through her windpipe into her lungs, and that such infected material caused the abscesses. As against this supposition or inference, we have his testimony that there could have been aspirations into her lungs while her teeth were being extracted, while she was being taken into the recovery room after the extraction, during the night while she was asleep, with or without teeth extraction, or through pyorrheatic infection getting into the blood stream and finally lodging in her lungs.
The legal question is whether or not, in view of the foregoing testimony of Doctor Tuhy, the proximate cause of the abscess was the placing of plaintiff on her back on the cot in an unconscious condition following the extraction of her teeth.
It is defendant's position that the plaintiff's entire case of proximate cause is predicated upon an inference on an inference, and that this violates § 2-402, OCLA, which, in part, reads as follows: "An inference is a deduction which the reason of the jury makes from the facts proved, * * *."
It is urged that the only established fact or the fact proved was that plaintiff had an abscess, and that to arrive at the conclusion that such abscess was caused by plaintiff's position on her back, the following inferences must be indulged in: (1) that foreign matter got into plaintiff's trachea; (2) that such matter proceeded into plaintiff's lungs; (3) that such matter was *613 infectious, and (4) that such infectious material caused the abscess.
In the case of McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 161 Or 191, 195, 198, 201, 87 P2d 202, may be found a full and complete discussion of an inference upon an inference, with citations of earlier Oregon cases. It was claimed that the decedent received an electric shock while using a telephone. He proceeded to his home in an automobile, and, after traveling about 28 miles, his car left the pavement, throwing McKay to the pavement and causing his death. It was the theory of the plaintiff that McKay's death was due to heart failure which was caused by the electric shock which he had received earlier that day. Two doctors testified that in their opinion "heart fibrillation, induced by electric shock, was the probable cause of his death.", which caused him to either die or collapse at the wheel, thus causing his loss of control of the automobile. Speaking through Mr. Justice LUSK, we said:
We further said that there is sometimes no accountability for automobiles leaving the highway. The drivers of automobiles sometimes fall asleep at the wheel, sometimes there are mechanical defects which cause accidents, and that,
So, in the instant case the only known or proved fact is that plaintiff had an abscess, and, to arrive at the conclusion that such abscess was caused by the improper position of plaintiff on her back, Doctor Tuhy had to indulge in the several inferences hereinbefore set out. It is well known that a person may suffer an abscess from various causes, and to say that plaintiff's abscess was caused in the manner delineated by Doctor Tuhy would be pure conjecture and highly speculative.
In the case of Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 153 P 470, Ann Cas 1917E, 1104, speaking through Mr. JUSTICE McBRIDE, we said:
Plaintiff relies on Clemens v. Smith, 170 Or 400, 134 P2d 424. In that case defendant Smith, a physician and surgeon, was charged with malpractice while removing a cyst from the back of plaintiff's wrist by failing to use sterile instruments, to the end that plaintiff's wrist became infected. The evidence showed that the instruments used by Doctor Smith were unsterile, that no infection could come from the cyst in and of itself, and that the infection the plaintiff had came from the kind of germ that could come from unsterile instruments. The facts in the Clemens case are a far cry from the facts in the present case.
In citing the Clemens case plaintiff quoted from Lippold v. Kidd, 126 Or 160, 269 P 210, 59 ALR 875, as follows:
In the Lippold case there were four uncertainties as to the cause of the loss of an eye, and, in denying plaintiff recovery, at p. 170 we said:
*616 3. We will treat plaintiff's second and third allegations of negligence together as they emanate from the same circumstances. They follow:
In connection with the above, plaintiff testified that she told the nurse when she went back on July 19, 1948, to have her sutures removed that, "`I don't know what is the matter with me; * * * I have been having violent coughing spells and coughing up this greenish bile-like substance and I felt as though I was losing weight.'" Upon being queried, "Did she respond to that?", plaintiff replied, "She [the nurse] said that was the natural thing after the extraction of teeth ____."
Since the evidence showed that it was the duty of the nurse to notify defendant of any complaints the patients might make, we will assume for the purpose of this discussion that defendant had knowledge of the complaints of plaintiff which she conveyed to the nurse. There was evidence by Doctor McIntyre that proper practice would dictate that defendant upon being apprised of plaintiff's condition should have referred her *617 "to a physician and have a checkup." The complaint did not allege that by reason of the failure of the defendant to advise her to go to a physician she refrained from taking such course, nor that had she seen a physician her condition would have been alleviated.
The rule of pleading in the above respect is laid down in Horn v. National Hospital Association, 169 Or 654, 670, 131 P2d 455, wherein, speaking through Mr. JUSTICE BRAND, we said:
*618 Since plaintiff's complaint was deficient as hereinbefore pointed out, plaintiff could not recover on said allegation of negligence.
4. In considering the third allegation that defendant was negligent by reason of the nurse's telling plaintiff that, "That was the natural thing after the extraction of teeth.", we find that there is no allegation in the complaint nor any evidence in the record that the symptoms alleged and testified to were not the ordinary and probable consequence of extractions, nor is there any evidence of express or apparent authority in the nurse to give such advice. Mrs. Schamel, the nurse in attendance, was a dental and not a registered nurse. The uncontradicted testimony of Doctor Semler was that when complaints were made by patients to the nurses after teeth extractions, it was their duty to report such complaints to the dentists and not give advice. In fact, Doctor McIntyre testified as follows: "My opinion is the nurse shouldn't give any advise [sic] at all. She has no qualifications to state those things."
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of defendant.
Krause, Evans & Korn, and Elam Amstutz, of Portland, for the petition.
Easley, Whipple & McCormick; Phillips, Coughlin, Buell & Phillips; and Lloyd M. McCormick, all of Portland, contra.
Before BRAND[*], Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, LATOURETTE[**] and TOOZE, Justices.
*619 PETITION DENIED.
TOOZE, J.
Plaintiff petitions for a rehearing, presenting a number of assignments of error directed to our original opinion.
It is unnecessary for us to review in detail the evidence in the case, because practically all the essential facts are set forth in our former opinion. However, for the purposes of this opinion, we will hereinafter enlarge upon our statement of the evidence.
We have given careful consideration to the several assignments of error and to the briefs of the respective parties relating thereto. Although there is merit in some of the assignments, nevertheless, with one exception, they do not reach the heart of this case. We therefore refrain from discussing all the assignments, because, in our opinion, only one deserves serious consideration, and our decision thereon will be decisive of this matter.
Plaintiff alleges that this court erred "in holding that defendant's negligence in allowing plaintiff to assume a horizontal position on her back on the cot while unconscious was not a proximate cause of the putrid abscesses", and further, that "the court erred in holding that Dr. Tuhy's testimony as to proximate cause was pure conjecture and highly speculative for the reason that Dr. Tuhy testified that the putrid lung abscesses were probably caused by the aspiration of infected pyorrheatic material while reposing on her back under anaesthesia following the extractions, and that all other causes of her putrid abscesses, while possible, were improbable." (Italics ours.)
*620 5, 6. It is elementary that to fix liability in a case of this nature two things must concur and combine: (1) an act of negligence on the part of defendant: and (2) such act of negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury. If either of these elements is missing, there can be no liability. To warrant a recovery of damages, each and both of these constituents of a cause of action must be established by a preponderance of evidence.
At the outset it may be conceded that there is substantial evidence in the record to establish an act of negligence on the part of defendant in permitting plaintiff to lie on her back in the recovery room immediately following the teeth extraction operation. This is the act of negligence upon which plaintiff relies and upon which her entire case rests.
The decisive question then remains: Is there substantial evidence in the record tending to establish the fact that this act of negligence was a proximate cause of the injury of which plaintiff complains?
7, 8. Ordinarily the question of whether a particular act was the proximate cause of the injury complained of is one for decision by the jury, and it is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them that the question of proximate cause becomes one of law for the court. When the existence of proximate cause under the facts is challenged, it is for the court to say whether there is substantial evidence in the record sufficient to submit the question to the jury. Kukacka v. Rock, 154 Or 542, 544, 61 P2d 297; Miami Quarry Co. v. Seaborg Packing Co., 103 Or 362, 370, 204 P 492.
9. In determining the question whether there is substantial evidence in this case to support a finding that *621 defendant's act of negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, we must view the testimony in the light most favorable to her.
To establish proximate cause, plaintiff relies entirely upon the testimony of Dr. John E. Tuhy, a duly licensed physician and surgeon of the city of Portland. She has caused a complete transcript of his testimony given on the trial to be attached to her brief on rehearing. It is manifest from the record that if Dr. Tuhy's testimony is insufficient as a matter of law to warrant the submission of the question of proximate cause to the jury, plaintiff's cause of action against defendant must fail.
10. In our former opinion when discussing the question of proximate cause, we quoted to some extent from the testimony of Dr. Tuhy. We concluded that it was insufficient to establish the element of proximate cause. We have carefully reexamined that conclusion and in doing so have given additional and painstaking attention to all his testimony. Although we must and do assume as true all facts to which Dr. Tuhy testified, we are not required to, nor do we, assume the correctness of any of his conclusions or opinions unless they are based upon substantial evidence in the record.
To clarify the problem before us, we propose to quote at length from Dr. Tuhy's testimony, setting out all of his testimony which, in our opinion, is material to the question of proximate cause.
Plaintiff suffered from an abscess of the upper lobe of the right lung. It was discovered when X-rays were taken in September and October, 1948. Dr. Tuhy operated upon her "in order to drain the abscess". Before the operation Dr. Tuhy examined plaintiff's windpipe and bronchial tubes "with a lighted instrument", *622 to determine "if there were any foreign materials such as tooth fragments and so on in the bronchial tube". No tooth fragment "or anything of the like" was found. In reply to a question whether plaintiff suffered any permanent disability as the result of the abscess, Dr. Tuhy said: "I think there will be a slight permanent disability. * * * She would tend to be short of breath, more than the average person, so I would say that there was some slight permanent disability."
Dr. Tuhy was then asked the following hypothetical question:
Defendant at this point objected upon the ground that the hypothetical question did not contain a statement of all the material facts, particularly the time element, and upon other grounds which we deem unnecessary to mention. After some discussion between court and counsel, plaintiff requested and received permission of the court to modify the question by stating the time element without reciting the question. Whereupon, the following question was directed to the witness:
To this question the Doctor replied:
11. At this point we think it should be emphasized that in order to establish the necessary element of proximate cause in this case, the evidence must tend to show that the aspiration of infected material, if there was such aspiration, occurred during the short period of time plaintiff rested in the recovery room following the operation. If it occurred during the operation, then defendant's act of negligence hereinbefore noted could not possibly be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. We make note of the fact that the Doctor stated that it may have occurred not only during the operation, as well as following, but also that it was "when she was under the influence of general anaesthesia."
The following question was then directed to Dr. Tuhy:
An objection was made and sustained to this question, and then the following question was propounded:
*625 Dr. Tuhy replied:
The witness further testified as follows:
Later in his direct examination Dr. Tuhy testified that plaintiff had a putrid lung abscess, which he described as one where the pus has a foul odor. He also expressed it as his opinion that following an operation involving the throat or mouth, a patient should be placed in a head-down position, because, as he said:
Thereupon, another hypothetical question was directed to the witness. The following are the proceedings in connection therewith:
It is noted that in the Doctor's reply to the question he again stated that "in all probability" the aspiration occurred either during the operation or immediately afterward, and while plaintiff was "under general anaesthesia" and "when she was unconscious." We also observe that in his answer to the second question relating to the time element, he repeated that the "probabilities" were it "could have occurred either during the extraction" or "in the period of unconsciousness under general anaesthesia afterwards." (Italics ours.) His statement: "and I don't think I could say when it was more likely to have occurred", is significant.
*629 His later assertion "that it was very likely that this infected material had gone down afterwards when she was on the couch", must be considered in the light of his prior answers which were in substance to the effect that it occurred, if it occurred at all, while plaintiff was "under general anaesthesia" and "when she was unconscious." Moreover, it is obvious that there is a decided inconsistency between his last statement and that made immediately prior thereto that, "I don't think that I could say when it was more likely to have occurred." Considering his prior replies and the foundation upon which they were based, is it not manifest that his opinion as to what was "very likely" or "probable" constituted but a mere guess on his part and is purely speculative?
12, 13. An opinion of a medical expert that a result is "probable" or "very likely" presents no question for jury determination, unless it is based upon facts and, in the light of all the evidence in the case, is reasonably sustainable. In McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 161 Or 191, 87 P2d 202, Mr. Justice LUSK, in writing the opinion of the court, rejected the testimony of a medical expert who had testified that "heart failure" at a particular specified time was "probable". When such medical "opinion" is plainly opposed to reason, it fails to constitute substantial evidence for any purpose.
Upon cross-examination, Dr. Tuhy was examined as to the causes of lung abscesses. Several possibilities as to how plaintiff's lung abscess may have been caused by the pyorrhea, other than the manner claimed in this case, were developed, and admitted by the witness. Thereafter, he testified as follows:
The theory of the doctor, as well as of plaintiff in this case, is that plaintiff's cough reflexes were depressed by the anaesthesia, so that they did not operate to prevent foreign material from entering the lung cavity by way of the windpipe. From the foregoing testimony of the witness, it is evident that the cough reflex is not ordinarily lost in light or fairly deep anaesthesia, but only in "deep anaesthesia" or "profound sleep under the influence of alcohol * * *."
In reference to anaesthesia and its effects, the witness testified:
The undisputed facts show that plaintiff was administered nitrous oxide; that before the operation was entirely completed, oxygen was used to restore her to consciousness, the amount of oxygen being regulated so that recovery was coincident with the end of the operation. When plaintiff had sufficiently recovered from the anaesthesia, the operation being completed, *634 she got out of the dental chair and with the assistance of the nurse walked to the recovery room.
14. From the foregoing statement of the evidence, it is patent that plaintiff was not under "fairly deep" nor "deep" anaesthesia while in the recovery room. She had come out from under the anaesthesia before she left the dental chair; so much so, in fact, that she was able to walk, with assistance, to the recovery room. There is no substantial evidence in the record that she was "unconscious" at any time after the operation was completed. The testimony of her husband as to what was said and done in the recovery room falls far short of being substantial evidence to establish the essential fact that plaintiff was "unconscious" at that time, or even that she was sound asleep, and his testimony is the only testimony in the record which relates to the few moments plaintiff was lying on the cot. This testimony is summarized in the hypothetical questions, supra.
Our search of the record fails to disclose any medical testimony to the effect that one who has been administered nitrous oxide, recovery from which is fairly prompt, and who has been given oxygen to hasten consciousness (and who has recovered consciousness to the extent of being able to walk with assistance from the dental chair to the resting room), may again lapse into a state of unconsciousness from the effects of the drug theretofore used. Common sense teaches us that one who has been restored to consciousness after anaesthesia will, for a short time at least, remain drowsy and not wish to be disturbed. The fact that within a period of five minutes, more or less, after lying down, plaintiff was able to get up, walk through the dental offices to the elevator, and leave the building, *635 the nurse having done nothing in the meantime to hasten wakefulness, also is significant.
The most that can be claimed for the testimony of plaintiff's husband is that it affords the basis for a speculative inference, another doubtful link in the chain of causation; a "speculative inference", because from this testimony alone, considered in the light of the entire record, it is manifest that the jury would necessarily be compelled to resort to mere guess to find that plaintiff was "unconscious under general anaesthesia", with her cough reflexes depressed, at the time in question. To eliminate all the other possibilities mentioned in our former opinion as to time and cause, and as an essential step in pinpointing "aspiration of infected material" during the brief time plaintiff was in the recovery room, it is necessary to depend entirely upon Mr. Wintersteen's testimony.
Plaintiff's case upon proximate cause must first pass the test of whether there is substantial evidence to show "unconsciousness under general anaesthesia" on her part while she was resting immediately following the operation. "Unconsciousness under general anaesthesia" is the sole basis for Dr. Tuhy's inference that aspiration likely occurred while plaintiff was so lying down. We again repeat his answer to the hypothetical question: "It could have occurred either during the extractions or in the period of unconsciousness under general anaesthesia afterward * * *." (Italics ours.) It is obvious from the record that Dr. Tuhy's deduction was based upon an erroneous premise, a premise which finds no substantial support in the evidence. As we point out in our former opinion and as further demonstrated herein, Dr. Tuhy's opinion was purely speculative.
*636 15. In 15 Am Jur 413, Damages, § 22, the following rules are stated:
Also see Becker v. Tillamook Bay Lbr. Co. et al., 194 Or 134, 142, 240 P2d 237; Allen et ux. v. McCormick, 193 Or 604, 612, 238 P2d 220; Spain v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co., 78 Or 355, 369, 153 P 470, Ann Cas 1917E, 1104.
16. The conclusion we reached in our former opinion that plaintiff had failed, as a matter of law, to establish the element of proximate cause is correct, and we adhere to the result therein announced.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
[*]  Chief Justice when original decision was rendered.
[**]  Chief Justice when this decision was rendered.