Title: RICK L. CAPELLEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICK L. CAPELLEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 107161 P.3d 1076Case Number: No. 05-127Decided: 07/12/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
 
 
RICK L. 
CAPELLEN,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 

v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public 
Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director, 
and William L. Foster, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program.  
Argument by Mr. Foster.

 
 
 
 
Before VOIGT, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the 
Court; GOLDEN, J., files a specially concurring opinion, in which VOIGT, C.J., 
joins; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring opinion, in which GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

  
 
 

BURKE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Appellant, Rick Capellen, pled guilty to one felony and 
four misdemeanor drug-related charges.  The district court sentenced Mr. Capellen to 
eight to twelve years on the felony conviction and to time served during 
presentence incarceration on the misdemeanor convictions.  On appeal, Mr. 
Capellen claims he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing because the 
district court considered unreliable evidence offered by the prosecutor.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Did the district court abuse its discretion in relying upon 
evidence presented by the prosecution at Mr. Capellen's sentencing hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
During a field interview with Mr. Capellen, Riverton police 
officers observed Mr. Capellen attempting to hide something under his leg while 
he was in the driver's seat of his vehicle.  After Mr. Capellen complied with the 
officers' request to exit the vehicle, they discovered a baggie containing 
methamphetamine in the area where Mr. Capellen had been seated.  The officers 
arrested Mr. Capellen for possession of a controlled substance.  A search of Mr. 
Capellen's person incident to his arrest revealed two additional baggies of 
methamphetamine, a baggie containing marijuana, and $2,149.26 in currency.  The combined weight 
of the three baggies of methamphetamine was approximately two grams.  Upon searching Mr. 
Capellen's vehicle, the officers discovered a backpack on the backseat, inside 
of which was 24 grams of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia commonly 
associated with the use and distribution of methamphetamine, including various 
zip lock style bags, syringes, ledger-style notes, and digital scales.

 
 

[¶4]           
When questioned that afternoon by DCI Agent Jeff Smith, Mr. 
Capellen stated that he had picked up two passengers earlier that morning and 
that they were in his vehicle at the time of the arrest.  Mr. Capellen 
informed Agent Smith that he purchased the small bags of methamphetamine found 
on his person from one of his passengers.  He also admitted to having sold one-half gram 
of methamphetamine to another individual for $75.00 a few days earlier, although 
he "usually gives' the [m]ethamphetamine to people rather than selling' it to 
them."

 
 

[¶5]           
The State charged Mr. Capellen with a total of eight 
criminal counts:  
two counts of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2005); two counts of 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2005); one count of felony delivery of 
methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2005); one count of felony possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005); one count of 
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005); and one count of operating a vehicle without liability 
insurance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-4-103 (LexisNexis 2005).  The amended 
information included notices that Mr. Capellen faced enhanced penalties on 
several of the counts as a result of his prior convictions for drug 
offenses.

 
 

[¶6]           
Mr. Capellen ultimately pled guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement to one count of delivering methamphetamine, two counts of possessing 
methamphetamine, and two counts of possessing marijuana.  In exchange for Mr. 
Capellen's guilty pleas, the State dismissed the remaining charges and the 
sentence enhancements on the charges subject to the plea agreement.  Under the terms of 
the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a one-year sentence on each of the 
misdemeanor drug offenses, which would be served concurrently to each other and 
to the sentence imposed on the felony delivery charge.  The parties had no 
agreement as to the sentence on the delivery charge.  The district court 
accepted Mr. Capellen's guilty pleas and conditionally accepted the plea 
agreement pending receipt of the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI).

 
 

[¶7]           
The PSI reflected an extensive criminal history and Mr. 
Capellen's prior probation failures.  It also contained a recommendation for 
incarceration in lieu of probation.  Mr. Capellen took exception to the criminal 
history section of the PSI which included numerous dismissed charges and 
allegations of unlawful conduct with no disposition.  He filed a motion 
to have it stricken and replaced with a list of his actual convictions.  The district court 
granted Mr. Capellen's motion and then accepted the terms of the parties' plea 
agreement.  

 
 

[¶8]           
At sentencing, the prosecutor argued for a lengthy prison 
term on the delivery charge.  The prosecutor characterized Mr. Capellen as 
a substantial supplier of methamphetamine in the FremontCounty area.  In support of that 
characterization, she pointed to the quantity of methamphetamine found in Mr. 
Capellen's possession at the time of his arrest, the discovery of paraphernalia 
associated with the manufacturing and distribution of methamphetamine during a 
search of Mr. Capellen's home, and information received from two drug 
informants.  

 
 

[¶9]           
The prosecutor presented the testimony of DCI Agent Jeff 
Smith, who investigated the charges against Mr. Capellen.  Agent Smith 
detailed the methamphetamine-related items found when a search warrant was 
executed at Mr. Capellen's residence.  Among the items discovered were scales, 
paraphernalia, lab parts, a handwritten diagram for the construction of a lab, 
and a recipe for making methamphetamine.  Agent Smith also described information he 
obtained from informants regarding their knowledge and drug-related dealings 
with Mr. Capellen.  
Based on his experience and his investigation of the case, Agent Smith 
opined that Mr. Capellen was involved in the trafficking of methamphetamine in 
FremontCounty.  Defense counsel 
moved to strike Agent Smith's reference to the information obtained from the two 
informants, and the district court granted the motion. 

 
 

[¶10]      Defense counsel argued for a suspended sentence of three to 
six years with the requirement that Mr. Capellen complete a long-term drug 
treatment program.  
The district court declined Mr. Capellen's request for probation and 
sentenced him to 331 days on each of the misdemeanor convictions and eight to 
twelve years on the felony delivery conviction, with the sentences to be served 
concurrently.  
The district court awarded Mr. Capellen 331 days presentence confinement 
credit on each sentence.  In pronouncing sentence on the delivery 
charge, the district court specifically referred to the seriousness of the 
offense, Mr. Capellen's criminal history, the drug-related items found in Mr. 
Capellen's home, Agent Smith's opinion concerning Mr. Capellen's drug 
activities, and the methamphetamine found in the backpack recovered from Mr. 
Capellen's car.  
Mr. Capellen timely appealed from the district court's judgment and 
sentence.

 
 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶11]      We review a trial court's sentencing decision under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 
2004).  We will 
not disturb a sentence on appeal because of sentencing procedures unless the 
appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial 
to the appellant, and circumstances manifesting inherent unfairness and 
injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.  Peden v. State, 2006 WY 26, ¶ 10, 129 P.3d 869, 871-72 (Wyo. 2006); Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 
2003); Mehring v. 
State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993).  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶12]      In this appeal, Mr. Capellen complains of errors at 
sentencing which he claims denied him a fair sentencing hearing and violated his 
right to due process.  
He asserts that the prosecutor improperly presented evidence which did 
not appear in the PSI and characterizes the evidence as "unreliable" and 
"undocumented."  
In that regard, he identifies the following: 1) ownership of the backpack 
containing 24 grams of methamphetamine found on the backseat of his vehicle; 2) 
items recovered from a search of his home; and 3) Agent Smith's testimony that 
Mr. Capellen was a drug dealer and the basis for that opinion.  Mr. Capellen 
contends the district court erred in relying upon this information in 
sentencing.

 
 

[¶13]      First, Mr. Capellen asserts it was never proven that the 
backpack containing 24 grams of methamphetamine belonged to him, and that the 
allegation was made at sentencing "for the first time."  It is apparent that 
the quantity of methamphetamine from the backpack was not the basis for the 
delivery charge to which Mr. Capellen pled guilty.  However, Mr. 
Capellen's complaint that the State associated the backpack with him "for the 
first time" at sentencing is simply not borne out by the record.  The backpack and 
its contents were identified in the affidavit of probable cause supporting the 
information, and that statement was repeated verbatim in the PSI:

 
 
. . . The Defendant's vehicle was also searched incident to 
arrest, at which time a backpack was located in the rear seat of the vehicle, 
which contained suspected Methamphetamine along with other paraphernalia 
commonly used in the use and distribution of Methamphetamine including various 
zip lock style bags, syringes, ledger-style notes, and digital scales. 

 
 
. . . Officer Biesheuvel weighed the bag containing 
suspected Methamphetamine taken from the backseat of the Defendant's vehicle, 
and reported the total weight to be approximately twenty-four (24) grams.  Each bag of 
suspected Methamphetamine was tested using a NIK Public Safety Test Kit, which 
resulted in a presumptive positive for Methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶14]      The existence of the backpack, where and when it was found, 
and what it contained have never been disputed.  What Mr. Capellen challenges is the inference 
to be drawn from these undisputed facts.  Although precise words indicating ownership 
of the backpack were not used in the affidavit or the PSI, the implication was 
clear.  We do 
not believe that the prosecutor's statement, or Agent Smith's testimony, 
indicating the backpack belonged to Mr. Capellen should have been a 
surprise.  

 
 

[¶15]      We also disagree with Mr. Capellen's argument that the 
district court lacked any evidentiary basis for concluding that the backpack 
belonged to him.  
The evidence before the district court included: admissions by Mr. 
Capellen that he had delivered methamphetamine on several occasions; $2,149.26 
in cash and 3 bags containing small amounts of methamphetamine were found on his 
person at the time of his arrest; and directions and parts for constructing a 
methamphetamine lab, as well as a recipe for making methamphetamine and scales, 
were found in his home.  Given the totality of this evidence, the 
district court had a sufficient evidentiary basis to support its conclusion that 
the backpack and the methamphetamine belonged to Mr. Capellen. 

 
 

[¶16]      Moreover, we reject Mr. Capellen's contention that the 
district court may not consider the basis of dismissed charges.  We have 
consistently stated that a trial court has broad discretion to consider a wide 
range of information about the defendant and his crimes in imposing 
sentence.  Doherty v. State, 
2006 WY 39, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006); Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334, 1339 
(Wyo. 1996); Mehring, 860 P.2d  
at 1116.  In 
the exercise of that discretion,

the trial court is permitted to go beyond the record to 
consider the defendant's past conduct and activities including evidence of 
crimes for which charges were filed but no conviction resulted.  The scope of the 
inquiry may include the factual basis of dismissed charges "as well as hearsay 
reports implicating the defendant in other crimes if such reports are deemed 
sufficiently reliable."  

 
 

Swingholm, 910 P.2d 1339 (quoting Mehring, 860 P.2d 
at 1117); see 
also Doherty, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d  at 974.  

 
 

[¶17]      Next, Mr. Capellen contends the district court should not 
have relied upon the drug-related evidence found in his home because the State 
failed to disclose information about the search during discovery.  The record reveals 
that, after defense counsel informed the district court that she had not 
received any information concerning the search in discovery, the prosecutor 
assured the court that the information had been provided to counsel:

 
 
Your Honor, that can't be farther from the truth.  It was part of the 
entire investigation which [defense counsel] -- and I have documentation  
[defense counsel] was provided.  It was back at the beginning, so she may not 
remember, but in fact she has been provided with every stick of paper we have in 
this file.

 
 
After that assurance, defense counsel did not pursue the 
matter further.  
Contrary to Mr. Capellen's contention, there is no clear evidence that 
the State failed to disclose information concerning the search.    

 
 

[¶18]      Finally, Mr. Capellen faults the district court for 
considering Agent Smith's opinion testimony that he was a drug dealer, arguing 
that Agent Smith's opinion was based on unreliable information.  He claims the 
district court erroneously considered Agent Smith's testimony about the 
information he had obtained from the two informants.  However, the 
district court sustained Mr. Capellen's objection to the testimony and granted 
his motion to strike it.  The district court later reiterated that it 
would not consider Agent Smith's testimony regarding the informants when it 
identified the information it was relying upon in imposing sentence.  We find no 
indication from our review of the record that the district court improperly 
relied on the stricken information in its sentencing decision.  While Mr. Capellen 
contends that Agent Smith's opinion rested entirely upon the information 
received from the informants, the record reveals that the opinion was also based 
upon the evidence recovered from the search of the home, the methamphetamine 
found at the time of arrest, and Mr. Capellen's admissions, collectively.  Accordingly, the 
district court was entitled to consider Agent Smith's opinion, notwithstanding 
the stricken testimony concerning the informants.

 
 

[¶19]      In a broad sense, Mr. Capellen takes issue with all of the 
evidence not contained in the PSI.  In the context of sentencing, the district 
court may consider any information pertinent to its sentencing decision without 
offending due process so long as it is reliable and accurate and the defendant 
has been given an opportunity to respond to the information.  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d 1016, 1021 (Wyo. 2004).  Throughout his brief, Mr. Capellen challenges 
the prosecution's evidence, labeling it "unverifiable," "undocumented," and 
"unreliable." However, the evidence presented is reliable.  It consisted of 
sworn testimony subject to adversarial testing via vigorous 
cross-examination.  
With respect to prior notice of Agent Smith's testimony, nothing in the 
record indicates that defense counsel was not adequately prepared to handle the 
additional evidence.  
Defense counsel did not request a continuance at any point during the 
hearing and was able to address concerns regarding Agent Smith's testimony 
through cross-examination.  We find that Mr. Capellen was afforded a full 
opportunity at sentencing to dispute all of the information he challenges in 
this appeal.  
Accordingly, he was not deprived of a fair sentencing.

 
 

[¶20]      Although Mr. Capellen did not articulate so directly, he 
suggests that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a lengthy 
prison term which was unwarranted for his single felony conviction.  The district court 
specifically considered, but rejected, Mr. Capellen's request for 
probation.  
Relying upon Mr. Capellen's prior failures to comply with the terms of 
probation, his significant criminal history involving controlled substances, and 
the severity of the crime of delivering methamphetamine, the district court 
found Mr. Capellen unsuitable for probation.  The sentence imposed was well below the 
statutory maximum of twenty years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(i).  
We do not find that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Mr. Capellen.    

 
 

[¶21]      Finally, we must note a procedural development appearing in 
the record.  On 
November 22, 2005, while this appeal was pending, Mr. Capellen, through trial 
counsel, filed a motion in the district court under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) for a 
reduction of his eight to twelve year prison sentence.  The district court 
granted his motion, resulting in a reduced sentence of four to twelve 
years.  Had 
briefing and record designation in this case been timely according to W.R.A.P. 
7.06 and 3.05, we probably would not be aware of this development.  However, 
significant delays in the prosecution of this appeal occurred because of 
extensions requested by Mr. Capellen and the State.  As a result, the 
motion and order were included in the record in this appeal.  No appeal was taken 
from the order granting the sentence reduction.  See Padilla v. State, 2004 WY 66, ¶ 5, 91 P.3d 920, 921 (Wyo. 
2004) (holding that order resolving a motion for sentence reduction is a final 
appealable order that must be appealed within thirty days to obtain appellate 
jurisdiction).  
Accordingly, neither the district court's authority to reduce a sentence 
after an appeal is docketed nor the validity of the sentence reduction is 
presently before this Court and ordinarily we would not comment further.  However, in light 
of the concurring opinions, additional comment is warranted.

 
 

[¶22]      The district court had jurisdiction to modify the sentence 
while this appeal was pending pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35 which states:

 
 

(a) Correction.  The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or modify a sentence within the time 
and in the manner provided herein for the reduction of 
sentence.

(b) Reduction.  A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may 
reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the sentence is 
imposed or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the 
court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the 
appeal, or within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment 
of conviction or probation revocation. The court shall determine the motion 
within a reasonable time. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration 
to a grant of probation shall constitute 
a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision. The court may 
determine the motion with or without a hearing.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Additionally, reliance upon W.R.A.P. 1.02(b) 
in the concurring opinions is misplaced for two reasons.  First, the rule 
applies only to "rules  addressing procedural matters."  Neither the 
challenge to the original sentence that is the subject of this appeal nor the 
order reducing sentence addresses procedural matters.  Second, there is no 
conflict between W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) and W.R.A.P. 6.01(b).  The two cases cited 
in the concurring opinions, Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 
(Wyo. 1995) and Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 257-58 
(Wyo. 1991), illustrate proper 
application of W.R.A.P. 6.01(b).  

 
 

[¶23]      In Jacobs, mother appealed the district court's refusal to 
consider her motion to modify custody "because the judgment involving custody 
was on appeal before this court."  895 P.2d  at 444.  We specifically 
addressed W.R.A.P. 6.01 and held that despite the pending appeal regarding 
custody, the district court retained continuing jurisdiction to modify the 
decree.  We 
observed:

 
 
Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.01(b) states:

 
 
 
 
  
(b) The appellate court shall acquire jurisdiction over the matters 
appealed when the case is docketed.  In all cases, the trial court retains 
jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings not the subject of the 
appeal[.]

 
 
. . . The mother's motion for change of custody was based 
upon an allegation of changed circumstances since the time of the district 
court's order awarding the father custody of the children and thus did not 
involve matters that were the subject of her first appeal.

 
 

Id., 895 P.2d  at 444 (emphasis in original).

 
 

[¶24]      In Moore, husband obtained an order 
finding wife in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the divorce 
decree.  Wife 
appealed the contempt order.  On appeal, wife challenged "the jurisdiction 
of the district court to entertain the husband's motion for an order to show 
cause" because the case was pending on appeal in this Court. Id., 809 P.2d  at 
257.  We flatly 
rejected wife's contentions:  

 
 
We do not agree with this argument. . . . For purposes of 
this appeal, we need only recognize that a district court has the right and the 
power, during the pendency of an appeal, to enforce its decree and to protect 
the parties as to any rights which the decree gave to them. That is precisely 
what the district court endeavored to do in this instance, and we hold that the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion by the husband for an 
order to show cause. We note that we frequently are confronted with appeals in 
divorce cases in which additional proceedings are being continued in the 
district court. In almost all instances, we have adopted the view that such 
additional proceedings, which are collateral to the issues presented in the 
appeal and which do not affect the issues on appeal or the outcome of the 
appeal, may be conducted in the district court even while the appeal is pending 
in this court. We hold that the district court did have jurisdiction to address 
the cross-petitions presented below.

 
 

Id., 809 P.2d  at 257-258 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶25]      Our decisions in Moore and Jacobs offer insight regarding the proper 
interpretation and interplay of W.R.Cr.P.35(b) and W.R.A.P 6.01(b).  In the criminal 
context, as in the domestic relations context, we are frequently confronted with 
appeals while additional proceedings are continuing in district court.  As is obvious from 
this case, district courts continue to consider motions to modify 
sentences.  
They also consider motions to correct illegal sentences pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), and make determinations modifying or revoking probation.  They decide whether 
a defendant who has completed boot camp should be granted probation pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1002 (LexisNexis 2005) which states: 

(a)       The sentencing court 
may reduce the sentence of any convicted felon who:

 (i) Is certified by the department 
as having successfully completed the youthful offender program under 
W.S. 7-13-1003; and

(ii) Makes application to the 
court within one (1) year after the individual began serving a sentence of 
incarceration at a state penal institution.

 
 
There are no doubt many other post sentencing issues which 
must be, and should be, resolved by the sentencing court while an appeal is 
pending.  All 
of those proceedings are, as stated in Moore, "collateral to the issues 
presented in the appeal."  All of those issues involve new facts 
developed after the original judgment and sentence was entered. 

 
 

[¶26]      The factual background regarding the motion for sentence 
reduction presented by Mr. Capellen is similar in nature to the motion to modify 
custody in the Jacobs' case.  Shortly after sentencing, Mr. Capellen moved 
for stay of the sentence and sought to be released on bond pending appeal.  
The State resisted the motion but conceded that a sentence reduction motion 
might be appropriate in the future if Mr. Capellen took action to establish that 
a reduction was warranted.  Counsel for the State explained:

 
 
. . . [M]y last point is with respect to the treatment 
issue.  You 
know, I'd like to see Mr. Capellen get into treatment now, take advantage of the 
program that's being offered to him now and if he thinks that at some point 
within the next year he's got an argument to be made for sentence reduction, to 
make it then.

 
 
In his motion for sentence reduction, Mr. Capellen 
described the actions he took to support a reduction in his sentence.  The 
motion states:  

 
 

1.      Rick L. Capellen was sentenced on December 7, 2004 to 8 to 
12 years at [the] Wyoming State Penitentiary and was given credit for 331 days 
served up to December 7, 2004.

 
 

2.      Prior to Sentencing, Rick L. Capellen completed 11 months 
of his sentence and since Sentencing has completed another 11 months for a total 
of 1 year and 10 months, all without incident.

 
 

3.      Attached as Exhibit "A" is an "Inmate Evaluation 
Form" submitted by Rick L. Capellen's supervisor at [the] Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, Dorothy Robertson, Food Service Supervisor #SS03, showing that Mr. 
Capellen is a "very proficient worker, a self starter, finished tasks assigned 
to him.  He is 
a lead man . . . takes a lot of pride in his work.  Works well with 
peers and promotes team work with crew members"; and Exhibit "B" which is a 
review/reclass.

 
 

4.      Mr. Capellen is, in fact, currently enrolled at [the] 
Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp at New 
Castle, Wyoming, and has been enrolled 
there since May, 2005.

 
 

5.      Additionally, attached as Exhibit "C" is a "Certificate of 
Participation" from the WyomingSmallBusinessDevelopmentCenter; and attached as Exhibit 
"D" is a "Certificate of Accomplishment" from the Wyoming State 
Forestry Division.

 
 
Although no transcript of the motion hearing has been 
provided, the ultimate result, sentence reduction, indicates that Mr. Capellen's 
efforts paid dividends.  

 
 

[¶27]      According to the Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Appellate Rules 
and Practices, one of the goals of the committee in adopting W.R.A.P. 6.01 
was "[t]o provide for shared jurisdiction between the appellate court and the 
trial court."  
823-832 Wyo. Rptr. XLI-XLII (1992).  The position 
espoused in the concurring opinions, which deprives a district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction to reduce a sentence while an appeal is pending, is contrary 
to this goal and is problematic for both procedural and policy reasons.  

 
 

[¶28]      According to the concurring opinions, a district court no 
longer has jurisdiction to modify a sentence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 6.01(b) "when 
the case is docketed" and an appellant challenges his sentence.  From a procedural 
standpoint, it is impossible to tell if an appellant is challenging his sentence 
when an appeal is docketed.1  An appellant is not required to identify his 
appellate issues until his brief is filed (typically within 45 days pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 7.06).  
Even then, it would be difficult for a district court to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction to modify a sentence because there is no provision 
in the Rules of Criminal Procedure or Rules of Appellate Procedure mandating 
filing of the brief in the district court.  In this case, Mr. Capellen's appeal was 
docketed on May 10, 2005.  His brief was filed on October 26, 2005.

 
 

[¶29]      From a policy perspective, it seems obvious that a system 
that offers those convicted of crimes the opportunity for a sentence reduction 
increases the likelihood that those individuals will take appropriate action to 
earn a reduction.  The result urged in the concurring opinions threatens 
that objective.  The sentencing judge is in the best position to decide if 
a sentence modification is appropriate.  There is no provision in our 
appellate rules that would allow this Court to consider, in the first instance, 
a motion to reduce or modify a sentence.  If the district court is deprived of subject 
matter jurisdiction when the appeal is docketed, and no procedure exists at the 
appellate level for sentence modification, much of the incentive for an 
individual to seek treatment evaporates.  Such an approach is undesirable, will create 
confusion, and is at odds with W.R.Cr.P. 35 and our precedent interpreting 
W.R.A.P. 6.01.

 
 

[¶30]      Affirmed.

  

GOLDEN, J., specially concurring, in which VOIGT, C.J., 
joins.

 
 
[¶31]   I agree with the majority's 
determination that no error occurred at sentencing and that the original 
sentence should be affirmed.  I write separately because I cannot ignore a 
serious procedural infirmity encompassed in this appeal.

 
 
[¶32]   The majority opinion states that, while 
this appeal was pending, the district court granted a motion by Capellen to 
reduce his original 8- to 12-year prison sentence.  The existence of 
the district court's sentence reduction order is problematic.2  This Court simply 
cannot disregard the order because, if it is allowed to stand, it supersedes the 
sentencing order before the Court on appeal.  The end result would be that the appeal would 
be moot and should be dismissed.  If, on the other hand, the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to reduce Capellen's sentence, then its order is void and of 
no effect, and this Court can address the merits of this appeal.  

 
 
[¶33]   Rule 6.01(b) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure states that this Court "acquire[s] jurisdiction over the 
matters appealed when the case is docketed" and "the trial court retains 
jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings not the subject of the 
appeal."  This 
Court has construed this rule to mean that a district court retains jurisdiction 
to conduct proceedings and decide issues that would not affect the issues on 
appeal or the outcome of the appeal while the appeal is pending in this 
Court.  Jacobs v. Jacobs, 
895 P.2d 441, 444 
(Wyo. 1995); Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 257-58 
(Wyo. 1991).  The sole issue in 
this appeal concerns the validity of the 8- to 12-year sentence.  Capellen's sentence 
reduction motion involved a matter that is the subject of this appeal.  According to 
W.R.A.P. 6.01(b), the district court did not have jurisdiction to decide that 
motion after Capellen's appeal was docketed in this Court.3

 
 
[¶34]   Because I believe the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to grant Capellen's motion for a sentence reduction, the 
sentence reduction order is void.  This Court is, therefore, correct in 
considering the merits of this appeal.  However, along with affirming Capellen's 
original sentence, this Court should make clear that the sentence reduction 
order is void and Capellen's original sentencing order of 8 to 12 years 
controls.  

  
VOIGT, C.J., specially concurring, in which GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 
[¶35]   I continue to join in Justice Golden's 
specially concurring opinion, but I find it necessary to respond to the 
majority's reply to that opinion.  The majority is simply wrong, and by issuing 
its opinion, the majority has written out of W.R.A.P. 6.01(b) the language "all 
matters and proceedings not the subject of the appeal."  Sometimes, the 
context of an issue can make otherwise seemingly clear language seem 
unclear.  But 
that is not true here.  The subject of this appeal is the sentence 
imposed upon the appellant.  That fact deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction over the sentence.  The language in W.R.Cr.P. 35(b), emphasized 
by the majority, simply sets a period of limitations during which a sentence may 
be reduced; it does not grant the district court jurisdiction where it has 
none.  Indeed, 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) actually extends that period of limitations to 

within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate 
issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one 
year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying 
review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or 
probation revocation.

 
 
Extension of the district court's jurisdiction to reduce a 
sentence in such manner suggests that jurisdiction to reduce a sentence is not 
retained during the appeal.  

 
 
[¶36]   I also fail to see any significance in 
the fact that only the untimely briefing in this case allowed this Court to 
learn of the filing of the motion for sentence reduction.  Nowhere either in 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure or in the Rules of Appellate Procedure does it 
suggest that the retention of jurisdiction in the district court depends upon 
whether or not the parties or the district court are able to keep something 
secret from this Court.  The district court should have denied the 
motion for want of jurisdiction, or the appellant should have sought remand from 
this Court to pursue his motion.

 
 
[¶37]   Next, the majority says that "[n]o 
appeal was taken from the order granting the sentence reduction."  The first question 
raised by that comment might be to ask why the appellant would appeal from an 
order granting his motion.  Beyond that, the failure to appeal from an 
order granted without jurisdiction is of no legal consequence in the 
determination of whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the 
underlying motion.  
It certainly does not lead to the majority's conclusion that, 
"[a]ccordingly, neither the district court's authority to reduce a sentence 
after an appeal is docketed nor the validity of the sentence reduction is 
presently before this Court."  The question of the district court's 
authority to reduce a sentence after an appeal is docketed is before this Court 
because it happened in this very case, and it raised a question of 
jurisdiction.  
If the district court had jurisdiction to reduce the sentence, then the 
subject of the appeal was moot, and we should not have issued an opinion about 
it.

 
 
[¶38]   Finally, I cannot argue with the 
majority's statement that Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 
(Wyo. 1995) and Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 257-58 
(Wyo. 1991) "illustrate proper 
application of W.R.A.P. 601(b)."  Of course they do.  They stand for the 
proposition that, in a divorce case, even while an appeal pends, issues like 
child support and visitation may continue to arise that need the attention of 
the district court, and the district court retains jurisdiction to consider 
those matters.  
Those cases are entirely dissimilar from the facts of this case, which is 
why Justice Golden was correct to cite them as he did in his specially 
concurring opinion.  
It is that dissimilarity that proves the majority wrong in this case.

 
 
[¶39]   Once a criminal sentence has been 
appealed, the district court loses jurisdiction of that sentence until this 
Court issues its mandate in the case.  Otherwise, we are just down here spinning our 
wheels, reading briefs, listening to oral argument, and writing an opinion on a 
moot point, which obviously is what W.R.A.P. 6.01 is trying to avoid.  The point is best 
illustrated by this question:  If this Court reverses the original judgment 
and sentence, what is the effect of the sentence reduction?  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1See 
W.R.A.P. 2.07. which provides in pertinent part:

 
 

Notice of appeal; contents.

 
 

(a)  
The notice of appeal shall:

(1) Specify the party or parties taking the appeal;

(2) Identify the judgment or appealable order, or 
designated portion appealed; and

(3) Name the court to which the appeal is taken.

(4) Be accompanied by the certificate or endorsement 
required by Rule 2.05.

      
. . . 

(c)         
In a criminal case, the notice of appeal shall have as an 
appendix the judgment and sentence or other dispositive 
order.

  

2This Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties 
on the potential ramifications of the district court's order reducing Capellen's 
sentence.

 
 

3I recognize that 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) appears to permit a trial court to entertain a sentence 
reduction motion during the pendency of an appeal.  However, W.R.A.P. 
1.02(b) specifically states that the appellate rules "shall supersede any 
conflicting statutes, rules or regulations addressing procedural matters."  The limitations 
placed on a trial court's jurisdiction by W.R.A.P. 6.01(b) therefore trump the 
general authority of the court to entertain a W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion while an 
appellate challenge to the legality of the subject sentence is pending in this 
Court.