Title: KITZKE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KITZKE v. STATE2002 WY 14755 P.3d 696Case Number: 01-19Decided: 10/02/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

KENNETH 
KITZKE,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan 
Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a Judgment and Sentence entered by the district court on December 14, 
2000.  The appellant, Kenneth Kitzke 
(Kitzke), initially pled not guilty to seven drug charges, but later entered 
into a plea agreement whereby he unconditionally pled guilty to possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031 (LexisNexis 2001).1  In exchange, the State dismissed the 
remaining six counts.  The district 
court sentenced Kitzke to 96 months to 120 months incarceration, to be served 
consecutively to the sentence he was then serving in the Washington state 
penitentiary.  Kitzke appealed, 
alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress certain evidence and failing to prepare for 
sentencing.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
Was Kitzke's counsel ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained in violation of Kitzke's rights under both the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions?2

 

2.         
Was Kitzke's counsel ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress 
evidence because a thermal heat-imaging device was used on Kitzke's residence 
without a search warrant?

 

            
3.         
Was Kitzke's counsel ineffective in failing to prepare for 
sentencing?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On March 9, 1998, 
sheriff's deputies learned from some juveniles that Kitzke was growing marijuana 
in a trailer with multiple locks on the door, located behind his residence on 
his property in Natrona County.  
Kitzke's stepson had told the juveniles about the drug-growing 
operation.  On the same day, the 
police verified the juveniles' report by identifying the trailer and noting what 
appeared to be multiple locks on its door.  
Police also verified that Kitzke owned the land on which the trailer was 
located.  The police checked 
Kitzke's criminal history and found that he had been convicted of drug-related 
offenses in Oregon and Wyoming, including manufacturing a controlled 
substance.

 

[¶4]      Officers then 
obtained and executed a search warrant on Pacific Power and Light Company.  The power company's records indicated 
that the electricity demand for Kitzke's property was more than twice that of 
similar properties and structures in the area.  Using this and other information, the 
officers next obtained a search warrant for Kitzke's property.  A search of the locked trailer revealed 
seeds, pipes, scales, ammunition, a .32 caliber revolver, airline tickets, 
equipment for growing marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms, plus various bags of 
marijuana.

 

[¶5]      On May 12, 1998, 
an Information was filed in the Natrona County Court (now referred to as circuit 
court) charging Kitzke with seven drug violations.3  Kitzke was in prison in the state of 
Washington, but he requested disposition of the Wyoming case via the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers.  He was 
arrested on the Wyoming warrant on July 20, 2000.  Kitzke pled not guilty at arraignment in 
the district court on August 10, 2000.  
The district court set a jury trial for October 2, 2000, but on September 
29, 2000, the State requested a setting for a change of plea hearing.  The district court held the hearing on 
October 24, 2000, and accepted a plea agreement whereby Kitzke unconditionally 
pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, in 
exchange for the State dismissing the six remaining 
counts.

 

[¶6]      Sentencing 
occurred on December 5, 2000.  The 
appellant received a sentence of incarceration for not less than 96 months and 
not more than 120 months.  The 
district court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence 
Kitzke was serving in Washington.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Kitzke first 
alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a 
motion to suppress evidence based on an insufficient search warrant 
affidavit.  He next alleges that use 
of a thermal heat-imaging device at his residence constituted a presumptively 
unreasonable search, and its use was one of the factors that directly led to the 
issuance of the search warrant.  
Finally, Kitzke contends that his sentencing counsel was ineffective at 
sentencing for failure to review the record, failure to file a motion to 
withdraw guilty plea and a suppression motion, and failure to prepare for 
sentencing.  He argues that the 
suppression motion would have kept out the incriminating evidence, and he would 
have been acquitted.

 

[¶8]      Analysis of these 
claims must begin with the observation that an unconditional guilty plea waives 
all non-jurisdictional defenses, including claims based on the alleged 
deprivation of constitutional rights.  
Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Wyo. 1994); 
Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 205-06 (Wyo. 1992).  The only claims not waived by an 
unconditional guilty plea are those that address the jurisdiction of the court 
or the voluntariness of the plea.  
Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 
1992).  "Jurisdictional defenses involve the 
state's power to bring the defendant into court; non-jurisdictional defenses are 
those "objections and defenses which would not prevent a trial."'"  Smith, 871 P.2d  at 188 
(quoting Davila, 831 P.2d at 205-06).  "When a criminal defendant has solemnly 
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is 
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 
guilty plea.'"  Smith, 871 P.2d  at 188 (quoting Davila, 831 P.2d at 206).

 

[¶9]      Examples of 
jurisdictional defects are unconstitutionality of the statute defining the 
crime, failure of the indictment or information to state an offense, and double 
jeopardy.  Davila, 831 P.2d  
at 205.  Non-jurisdictional defects include the 
use of inadmissible evidence, the use of unlawfully obtained statements, a claim 
that a grand jury was improperly convened and conducted, and a claim of 
violation of the right to speedy trial.  
Id. at 206.  Kitzke's 
claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress is 
non-jurisdictional, as it does not implicate a matter directly relating to the 
entry of his guilty plea or the power of the state to bring him into court.  See, e.g., State v. Quick, 
177 Ariz. 314, 868 P.2d 327, 329 (1993).  
Nevertheless,

 

[w]hen 
a guilty plea has been entered upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of 
that plea may depend on the extent to which that advice comports with the 
constitutional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir.1988).

 

Lower 
v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  In 
Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1112-13 (Wyo. 1993), we 
said:

 

            
The examination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires 
a showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  
Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo.1992) (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  When a guilty 
plea is challenged based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant, to 
establish prejudice, must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, a plea of guilty would not have been entered and the 
defendant would have insisted on going to trial.  Hill [v. Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] 
at 59, 106 S.Ct. [366] at 370 [88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)].  The Hill standard was adopted by 
Wyoming in Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990).  A strong presumption is invoked that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance.  Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 
(Wyo.1987).  The burden is on the 
defendant to overcome this presumption.  
Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.

 

[¶10]   Kitzke alleges that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to suppress the evidence that the 
State obtained through a search warrant.  
The gist of his argument is that there was insufficient information in 
the affidavit that was used to obtain the search warrant from which a neutral 
magistrate could find probable cause to allow the search.  The affidavit reads as 
follows:

 

1.         
Your affiant is a Deputy Sheriff with the Natrona County Sheriff's Office 
assigned as a Special Agent with the Division of Criminal Investigation, Central 
Drug Enforcement Team.  Affiant has 
approximately three years of law enforcement experience.  Affiant has received training from the 
Wyoming Law Enforcement Academy, Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, and 
the United States Attorney's Office in the area of controlled substance 
violations.  Your affiant has also 
received training from the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigations in 
regards to indoor grow operations.

 

2.         
Your affiant knows from his training and experience and from information 
shared by other agents, that marijuana growers normally use indoor grow lights 
and exhaust fans, which use substantially more electricity than would be used in 
a normal house hold [sic].

 

3.         
On March 9, 1998, Investigator Corey Davison of the Natrona County 
Sheriff's Department, forwarded to your affiant a report concerning an indoor 
marijuana grow.  Investigator 
Davison shared with your affiant that during the course of an aggravated assault 
investigation, the information of a marijuana grow was received.  During questioning of juvenile suspects 
under their Miranda Rights, the suspects admitted the following.  The suspects went to [address], Natrona 
County to steal marijuana from Kenneth Kitzke.  The suspects told Investigator Davison 
that the pair went to the house and were confronted by Kitzke, who was then 
assaulted by the suspects.  During 
questioning under Miranda the suspects told Investigator Davison that they were 
there to steal the marijuana which Kitzke was growing but were unable because 
someone inside the house had called 911.  
When asked how they knew of this grow, they told Investigator Davison 
that Kitzke's son had told them about his father[']s grow and process.  The suspects further admitted under 
Miranda to Investigator Davison that the marijuana was grown in a trailer house 
which was located behind Kitzke's house to the west.  The trailer was used for grow purposes 
and not inhabited.  The suspects 
described a series of six locks on the door of the back trailer securing the 
door.

 

4.         
On March 9, 1998, Special Agents Bennett and Street went to [address], 
Natrona County, and confirmed the location of the trailers.  Through the use of binoculars and photo 
equipment, the described trailer was found to the west of the main trailer.  A series of locks or locking devices 
could be on the door to the trailer as described.

 

5.         
On March 9, 1998, your affiant checked FBI files and found Kitzke had 
prior convictions for manufacture of marijuana in Washington, Oregon, and 
Wyoming.  The most recent conviction 
was on February 10, 1993 for delivery of marijuana.  Kitzke was convicted and placed on 60 
months probation.

 

6.         
Your affiant knows from his experience and from information shared by 
other agents that records showing the subscriber to the electricity and records 
showing electrical consumption of electricity along with records showing the 
items using the electricity, and usage history records of said address needs to 
be compared with comparable residences to show if there is [a] difference in the 
electricity usage.

 

7.         
On March 11, 1998 your affiant received power records from Pacific Power 
and Light, of Kitzke's property and like properties and structures located in 
the . . . subdivision, Natrona County, Wyoming.  Power usage for Kitzke's property is 
more than double that of like properties and structures located in the . . . 
subdivision.

 

8.         
Your affiant was told by SA Bennett that on Wednesday, March 11, 1998, at 
approximately 11:00 pm, SA Bennett, being trained in the use and interpretation 
of thermal imaging equipment, with personally using the thermal imager 14 times 
in marijuana grow investigations resulting in 9 positive readings, resulting in 
grow operations that yielded between 6 and 400 marijuana 
plants.

 

9.         
Your affiant was told by SA Bennett that the thermal detection device is 
a passive, non-intrusive system which detects differences in the surface 
temperature of the structure being observed.  This system does not send any beams or 
rays into an area, nor does it enter any structure.  The system only detects differences in 
the surface temperatures of a structure.  
The use of this device in the early morning or late evening hours without 
solar loading, (sunshine), will highlight man-made heat sources as a white color 
and cooler temperatures by a shade of gray.  Similar devices have been used for other 
applications such as locating missing persons in forests, identifying 
ineffective building insulation, detecting hot overloaded power lines, and 
detecting fresh fires through smoke.  
On the aforementioned night SA Bennett aimed the thermal device at the 
building structures located at [address].  
SA Bennett used the thermal device while staying on the . . . 
roadway.

 

10.       The 
resulting reading showed some higher than usual surface temperatures on the back 
trailer house but due to the distance from the roadway to the trailer house SA 
Bennett could not get a conclusive reading.

 

* 
* *[4]

 

[¶11]   We have twice recently, at 
considerable length, reiterated our standard for the review of search warrant 
affidavits, and we will not do so here again.  See Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, 
¶¶ 5-12, 33 P.3d 154, 156-59 (Wyo. 2001) and Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, 
¶¶ 5-29, 33 P.3d 142, 146-53 (Wyo. 2001).  Suffice it to say that, under the 
totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the issuing judicial 
officer's determinations, and recognizing Kitzke's burden of proving a violation 
of his constitutional rights by a preponderance of the evidence, we conclude 
that the affidavit presented probable cause to issue the search warrant, with or 
without the thermal imaging information.

 

[¶12]   The issuing judge learned from the 
affidavit of a trained and experienced law enforcement officer that juvenile 
suspects in a criminal case had, against their penal interests, admitted an 
attempt to steal marijuana from Kitzke.  
The juveniles had learned of the marijuana grow operation from a member 
of Kitzke's family.  They identified 
the location, identified the individual buildings on the premises, and told of 
the series of locks on the trailer in which the grow operation was housed.  Law enforcement officers then 
corroborated that information.  In 
addition, Kitzke's criminal history revealed previous controlled substance 
convictions, including the illegal manufacture of marijuana.  And finally, power company records 
indicated an inordinate use of electricity on Kitzke's property, such being an 
indicator of a grow operation.  
Taken together, these facts constituted probable cause to believe that 
the crime was being committed on the identified premises.  A motion to suppress would not have 
succeeded, so trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file such a 
motion.  Burnett v. State, 
997 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Wyo. 2000).  On appeal, Kitzke has not overcome the 
deference afforded to the issuing judge's determinations nor has he overcome the 
presumption that the issuance of the search warrant was valid.  Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 522-23 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶13]   In a supplemental brief, Kitzke 
raises the additional argument that the use of a thermal detection device 
constituted a presumptively unreasonable search of his premises, and that, since 
this was one of the factors that led to the issuance of the search warrant, the 
results of the search should have been suppressed.  Kitzke's argument is based on Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 
(2001).  In Kyllo, the United States 
Supreme Court held that use of a thermal imaging device on a home constituted a 
search in violation of the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 34-40.  Because Kyllo was published after 
Kitzke was sentenced, Kitzke's argument on appeal is that his counsel was 
ineffective in not knowing of the case's existence and its potential 
impact.

 

[¶14]   For several reasons, we decline to 
address the Kyllo issue.  
First, the results of the thermal imaging device in the present case were 
inconclusive and added nothing to the search warrant affidavit.  Second, the facts set forth in the 
affidavit, discounting the thermal imaging information, were sufficient to 
establish probable cause.  Third, 
the device was not used on Kitzke's residence.  And fourth, no bad faith on the part of 
law enforcement is shown, given that Kyllo was published after the search 
warrant was obtained.5

 

[¶15]   Finally, Kitzke claims that his 
counsel at sentencing was unprepared.  
He contends his sentencing counsel should have filed a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea and a motion to suppress evidence.  We have already analyzed these 
contentions, based as they are on Kitzke's search warrant affidavit arguments, 
and we will not repeat that analysis here.6  Kitzke also claims that his sentencing 
counsel did not sufficiently review the entire file before sentencing and did 
not obtain the most favorable sentence for him.  Kitzke fails to identify what, if any, 
portion of the file his sentencing counsel did not review.  He also fails to identify what more 
favorable sentence he might have gotten or was entitled to get but failed to 
receive due to any omission by his sentencing counsel at sentencing.  For example, Kitzke argues that his 
sentencing counsel did not provide support for his contention that the marijuana 
he was raising was for his ill wife.  
The State's reply in its appellate brief to this contention aptly shows 
why it must fail:

 

            
Appellant also complains that his counsel at sentencing did not support 
his contentions that the marijuana he was growing and distributing was solely 
for his ill wife.  However, the 
record shows that Appellant's counsel gingerly addressed this issue, and 
expressed an understanding for Appellant's actions in aid of his ill wife.  Appellant fails to identify what 
additional support from counsel was necessary following his own explanation to 
the court for his growing marijuana, and given the fact that such were [sic] 
also set out in the pre-sentence investigation report which the court 
reviewed.  . . 
.

 

            
Moreover, while Appellant acknowledges that counsel's efforts to support 
such explanations would not have provided a legal defense for growing marijuana 
with the intent to distribute it, he argues that the lack of support deprived 
him of some unidentified amount of mitigation of his sentence.  Again, Appellant altogether fails to 
identify what mitigation could have arisen from counsel's support of his dubious 
claims.  Based on the initial 
charging information, Appellant's pre-sentence investigation report, Appellant's 
unconditional and voluntary guilty plea, evidence at the sentencing hearing that 
Appellant's wife did not smoke any of the marijuana that Appellant grew, and the 
State's evidence related to Appellant's possession and delivery of drugs other 
than marijuana, Appellant's counsel at sentencing likely maintained a modicum of 
professional credibility by declining to more stridently argue that Appellant's 
involvement with marijuana was solely related to his wife's illness.  Indeed, vigorously pressing such an 
absurd claim could have convinced the court that Appellant was in need of a more 
lengthy period of correctional confinement than the one actually 
imposed.

 

[¶16]   Kitzke's similar complaints that 
his sentencing counsel did not sufficiently challenge the findings of the 
presentence investigation report and did not find or prepare witnesses to speak 
for him must also fail.  Kitzke's 
sentencing counsel did present to the district court corrections that Kitzke 
wished to be made to the presentence investigation report.  Beyond that, Kitzke neither identifies 
the witnesses he now claims were necessary nor what their testimony would have 
been.  There is nothing in the 
record to support Kitzke's allegation that his sentencing counsel was 
ineffective.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶17]   Kitzke has not met his burden of 
showing inadequate probable cause for issuance of the search warrant in this 
case, and he has, therefore, also not met his burden of proving that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained as a result of the execution of that search warrant.  Likewise, Kitzke has failed to meet his 
burden of proving that his sentencing counsel was ineffective at 
sentencing.

 

[¶18]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Kitzke was charged under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031 (1977) (as amended).  
While this statute was amended in 1985, 1995, 1996, and 1998, the 
subsection dealing with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver has not changed, and, therefore, we will refer to the 2001 
statute.

 

  2In his appeal, Kitzke has not 
presented an independent state constitutional analysis of the issues.

 

  3The charges were conspiracy to 
deliver marijuana, conspiracy to deliver psilocybin mushrooms, conspiracy to 
possess marijuana with intent to deliver, conspiracy to possess psilocybin 
mushrooms with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver, possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver, and 
possession of marijuana in a plant form exceeding three ounces.

 

  4Omitted are five paragraphs of 
"boilerplate" language.

 

  5Before the United States Supreme 
Court held in Kyllo that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device 
on a residence was an unreasonable search, several federal circuits had 
concluded that such was not a search at all.  See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305, rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); 
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995); 
United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995); 
United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 
1994); 
and United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1057 (1994).  In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in a case arising in Wyoming, had decided not to decide the issue.  United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).

 

  6The thrust of Kitzke's argument is 
that he would have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not 
voluntarily entered in that he did not know that the evidence would have been 
suppressed.