Title: Samuel Mostkoff v. Board of Bar Examiners

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 33 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2640-BA 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Samuel Mostkoff: 
 
Samuel Mostkoff,  
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF MOSTKOFF 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 24, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
September 22, 2004   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs filed by Samuel 
Mostkoff, Sun Prairie. 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. 
Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 33 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2640-BA  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Samuel Mostkoff: 
 
Samuel Mostkoff,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
MAR 24, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of Board of Bar Examiners' decision.  Decision 
affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review, pursuant to SCR 40.08(5) 
(2002),1 the Board of Bar Examiners' (Board) September 8, 2003 
decision concluding that the petitioner, Samuel Mostkoff, has 
failed to satisfy the requirements for admission to the practice 
of law in Wisconsin based on "proof of practice elsewhere."  
                                                 
1 SCR 40.08(5) provides that "[a] petition to the supreme 
court for review of an adverse determination of the board under 
this rule shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days of the 
date on which written notice thereof was mailed to the 
applicant." 
No.  03-2640-BA 
2 
 
SCR 40.05.  We determine that the findings of fact the Board 
made in this matter were not clearly erroneous and that its 
conclusions based on those facts were proper. Accordingly, we 
affirm the Board's decision not to recommend that Mr. Mostkoff 
be admitted to the practice of law on the basis of proof of 
practice elsewhere. 
¶2 
Mr. Mostkoff has been a practicing lawyer for some 29 
years.  It is undisputed that he is an experienced lawyer.  He 
was admitted to practice in Michigan in 1973, and has been a 
corporate attorney for more than 18 years.   
¶3 
On April 1, 1997, Mr. Mostkoff's legal employment as 
corporate counsel in Michigan was terminated as a result of a 
corporate reorganization.  Mr. Mostkoff was retained as a legal 
consultant for the company through December 1997.   
¶4 
On August 25, 1997, Mr. Mostkoff, who had moved to 
Ohio, became a legal consultant for Penda Corporation located in 
Wisconsin.  For a time, he commuted to Penda Corporation from 
his Ohio residence.  In January 1998, Mr. Mostkoff became in-
house counsel for Penda Corporation.  He continued to reside in 
Ohio. 
¶5 
Mr. Mostkoff became a Wisconsin resident in February 
1999.  In May 1999, he requested an application for admission to 
the Wisconsin State Bar, but he did not complete it.  Indeed, 
more than four years elapsed before Mr. Mostkoff actually filed 
an application for admission to the Wisconsin State Bar on 
February 10, 2003. 
No.  03-2640-BA 
3 
 
¶6 
Mr. Mostkoff sought admission to the Wisconsin bar 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 
40.05(1), 
entitled: 
 
"Legal 
competence 
requirement: Proof of practice elsewhere."2   
                                                 
2 SCR 40.05 provides in relevant part:  Legal competence 
requirement: Proof of practice elsewhere. 
 
(1)  An applicant shall satisfy the legal competence 
requirement 
by 
presenting 
to 
the 
clerk 
certification of the board that the applicant 
has provided all of the following: 
(a) 
Proof of admission to practice law by a 
court of last resort in any other state 
or 
territory 
or 
the 
District 
of 
Columbia.  
(b) 
Proof 
that 
the 
applicant 
has 
been 
primarily engaged in the active practice 
of law in the courts of the United 
States or another state or territory or 
the District of Columbia for 3 years 
within the last 5 years prior to filing 
application for admission. 
(c) 
If any state, territory or the District 
of 
Columbia 
practice 
in 
which 
is 
proposed to satisfy the requirement of 
sub. (b) has, as of the date of the 
filing of the application, requirements 
for bar admission in that jurisdiction 
on the basis of practice in Wisconsin 
other than those set forth in subs. (a) 
and (b), proof that the applicant has 
satisfied those requirements of that 
state, territory or the District of 
Columbia. 
(1m)  Eligibility for admission under this rule 
shall be limited as follows: 
(a) An applicant who proposes to satisfy sub. 
(1)(b) by practice in a jurisdiction that 
does not grant bar admission to attorneys 
licensed in Wisconsin on the basis of 
No.  03-2640-BA 
4 
 
¶7 
On June 20, 2003, the Board issued a preliminary 
decision denying Mr. Mostkoff's application for admission under 
SCR 40.05.  That decision stated: 
. . . the Board [of Bar Examiners] has been unable to 
conclude you were engaged in the active practice of 
law . . . for at least three of the five years 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice 
in 
Wisconsin 
shall 
not 
be 
eligible 
for 
admission 
on 
proof 
of 
practice elsewhere. 
(b) An applicant who proposes to satisfy sub. 
(1)(b) by practice in a jurisdiction that 
does not grant bar admission on the basis 
of practice to attorneys licensed in 
Wisconsin under SCR 40.03 shall not be 
eligible 
for 
admission 
on 
proof 
of 
practice elsewhere. 
(2)   Legal service as corporate counsel or trust 
officer, if conducted in a state where the 
applicant was admitted to practice law, may be 
deemed to be the practice of law for the 
purposes of sub. (1)(b) and (c).  
(3)   The 
following 
activities, 
whether 
or 
not 
conducted in a state where the applicant was 
admitted to practice law, may be deemed to be 
the practice of law for the purposes of sub. 
(1)(b) and (c): 
(a) Service as a judge of a court of record of 
the United States, any state or territory 
or the District of Columbia. 
(b) Legal service with any local or state 
government or with the federal government. 
(c) Legal service in the armed forces of the 
United States. 
(d) Teaching in any law school approved by the 
American bar association. 
No.  03-2640-BA 
5 
 
immediately preceding the date on which your Wisconsin 
application affidavit was filed . . . .  
¶8 
Mr. 
Mostkoff 
filed 
a 
supplement 
to 
his 
bar 
application, arguing that he had indeed been engaged in the 
active practice of law, and asking the Board to file a rules 
petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court to change the 
eligibility requirements for admission under SCR 40.05.   
¶9 
On August 12, 2003, Mr. Mostkoff filed his own rules 
petition in this court, Rules Petition No. 03-07, asking the 
court to amend SCR 40.05 in a manner that would qualify him for 
admission under SCR 40.05.  Mr. Mostkoff's petition was denied 
without a public hearing in October 2003, following an open 
administrative conference.   
¶10 In the interim, on August 21, 2003, the Board formally 
denied Mr. Mostkoff's application for admission to the Wisconsin 
Bar. The Board's final decision stated: 
The 
applicant 
did 
not 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
was 
primarily engaged in the active practice of law in a 
jurisdiction where he was licensed for three of the 
five years immediately preceding February 10, 2003, 
the date he filed his Wisconsin application for 
admission, as is required by SCR 40.05(1)(b). 
¶11 Mr. Mostkoff filed a timely appeal from the Board's 
decision, followed by two motions to compel the Board to produce 
various internal documents.  Both motions were denied.  
¶12 The standard of review for decisions of the Board is 
well settled.  The court adopts the Board's findings of fact if 
they are not clearly erroneous.  In re Bar Admission of Crowe, 
141 Wis. 2d 230, 232, 414 N.W.2d 41 (1987).  The court reviews 
No.  03-2640-BA 
6 
 
legal determinations de novo.  In re Bar Admission of Rusch, 171 
Wis. 2d 523, 492 N.W.2d 153 (1992).  The burden of proof to 
establish compliance with bar requirements rests with the 
applicant.  SCR 40.07.3 
¶13 This is first and foremost a case in which an attorney 
sat upon his rights.  It is undisputed that had Mr. Mostkoff 
applied for admission to the Wisconsin bar promptly upon 
relocating to Wisconsin in 1999, he would have been eligible for 
admission under SCR 40.05 based upon his corporate legal 
practice in Michigan, a state in which he is licensed to 
practice law.  The question before the court is whether, nearly 
four years later, Mr. Mostkoff should still be entitled to 
admission under SCR 40.05. 
¶14 Mr. Mostkoff raises numerous issues in support of his 
assertion that he should be admitted to the Wisconsin bar. 
First, however, we must address Mr. Mostkoff's claim that the 
court cannot decide this matter because it does not have a 
complete record before it.  Mr. Mostkoff contends that the court 
should order the Board "to include all the evidence in the 
Board's possession in the Record on Appeal."  Specifically, he 
refers to documents he sought in his unsuccessful motions to 
                                                 
3 SCR 40.07 provides that "[t]he burden of proof shall be on 
the applicant to establish qualifications under SCR 40.02. 
Refusal of an applicant to furnish available information or to 
answer questions relating to the applicant's qualifications shall 
be deemed a sufficient basis for denial of the certification for 
admission."  
No.  03-2640-BA 
7 
 
compel, including internal legal memoranda prepared by the Board 
to evaluate aspects of Mr. Mostkoff's bar application.   
¶15 We conclude that the Board was well within its 
discretion to decline to produce the internal legal memoranda 
sought by Mr. Mostkoff.  We conclude further that other 
information sought by Mr. Mostkoff was simply not relevant to 
the question whether Mr. Mostkoff met the requirements for 
reciprocity admission under 
existing 
supreme 
court 
rules.  
Therefore, we reject Mr. Mostkoff's assertion that the record 
before the court is inadequate to permit us to decide whether 
Mr. Mostkoff is entitled to admission under SCR 40.05. 
¶16 To qualify for admission to the Wisconsin bar under 
SCR 40.05, Mr. Mostkoff is required to demonstrate that, as of 
the date of his bar application, he had been "primarily engaged 
in the active practice of law in the courts of the United States 
or another state or territory or the District of Columbia for 3 
years within the last 5 years prior to filing application for 
admission."  Thus, we consider Mr. Mostkoff's legal practice for 
the five years preceding the date of his bar application, 
February 10, 2003.  
¶17 The record reflects that Mr. Mostkoff has worked as 
corporate counsel for Penda Corporation in Wisconsin, while 
residing in Ohio or Wisconsin, throughout the relevant period of 
time.   
¶18 SCR 40.05(2) provides:  
Legal service as corporate counsel or trust officer, 
if conducted in a state where the applicant was 
No.  03-2640-BA 
8 
 
admitted to practice law, may be deemed to be the 
practice of law for the purposes of sub. (1)(b) and 
(c).  
(Emphasis added.)  The record is clear that between January 1998 
and February 2003, Mr. Mostkoff's legal service as corporate 
counsel was conducted in Wisconsin, a jurisdiction where he was 
not admitted to practice law.  
¶19 We recognize that Mr. Mostkoff was a busy corporate 
attorney during the relevant period of time.  However, we must 
conclude that the plain language of SCR 40.05(2) precludes Mr. 
Mostkoff's legal service as corporate counsel from constituting 
the "practice of law" for purposes of admission to the Wisconsin 
bar under SCR 40.05.  SCR 40.05(1)(b) and 40.05(2), read 
together, 
explicitly 
provide 
that 
for 
corporate 
counsel 
experience to be deemed the "active practice of law" under SCR 
40.05(1)(b), that work must have been "conducted in a state 
where the applicant was admitted to practice law" (emphasis 
added).  Mr. Mostkoff's corporate counsel work was conducted in 
Wisconsin or Ohio; he is admitted to practice in neither state. 
¶20 In 1987, this court clarified and reaffirmed its 
policy with respect to corporate counsel seeking admission to 
the bar pursuant to SCR 40.05.  We held that legal service as 
corporate counsel does not qualify as the "active practice of 
law" unless it is conducted in a state where the applicant is 
admitted to practice law, or the legal work was "the kind of 
work generally engaged in by attorneys 'primarily engaged in the 
active practice of law in the courts' of another jurisdiction."  
No.  03-2640-BA 
9 
 
See Crowe, 141 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting Application of Townsend, 
126 Wis. 2d 128, 134, 375 N.W.2d 656 (1985)).   
¶21 The 
Board 
has 
previously 
explained 
how 
this 
requirement serves to protect the public.  In order to assess an 
applicant's qualifications for admission to practice law in 
Wisconsin based on proof of practice elsewhere, the Board must 
be able to rely on the regulatory authorities of the other 
jurisdictions 
where 
the 
applicant 
has 
practiced 
to 
have 
monitored the applicant's compliance with continuing legal 
education 
requirements 
designed 
to 
ensure 
professional 
competence, and to have observed and, where appropriate, 
investigated and disciplined the professional conduct of the 
applicant.  See Crowe, 41 Wis. 2d at 235. 
¶22 However, 
an 
applicant 
who 
has 
practiced 
in 
a 
jurisdiction without being admitted to practice is not subject 
to that jurisdiction's regulation of the professional competence 
and conduct of attorneys.  Consequently, that information is not 
available to the Board for its assessment of the applicant's 
qualifications and fitness to practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶23 Mr. Mostkoff's work as corporate counsel between 1998 
and 2003 was not conducted in a state in which he was admitted 
to practice.  However, Mr. Mostkoff nonetheless urges us to 
recognize his legal work as the active practice of law.  He 
cites case law, including Admission of Blue Dog, 126 Wis. 2d 
136, 375 N.W.2d 660 (1985), for the proposition that his legal 
practice for Penda Corporation should nonetheless be considered 
the "active practice of law" for purposes of SCR 40.05.  He 
No.  03-2640-BA 
10 
 
provides several examples of lawsuits from around the country in 
which 
he 
was 
involved 
as 
counsel 
of 
record 
for 
Penda 
Corporation.   
¶24 However, we must conclude that Mr. Mostkoff has failed 
to demonstrate that this legal work was "the kind of work 
generally engaged in by attorneys 'primarily engaged in the 
active practice of law in the courts' of another jurisdiction."  
The 
record 
reflects 
that 
Penda 
Corporation 
was 
actually 
represented in these court proceedings by local counsel who were 
licensed to practice in the respective state in which the 
litigation occurred.  This is not comparable to the situation in 
Blue Dog, 126 Wis. 2d 136. Attorney Blue Dog engaged in 
extensive advocacy litigation before federal and administrative 
courts and had obtained special permission from the courts to 
appear and practice before those federal courts and agencies.   
¶25 We turn to Mr. Mostkoff's assertion that he is 
entitled to admission to the Wisconsin bar pursuant to SCR 
40.05(1)(c).  Supreme Court Rule 40.05(1)(c) provides that Mr. 
Mostkoff is subject to specific requirements of Michigan's 
reciprocity rule, Mich. R. 5(A)(6)(a).   
¶26 The rationale for this provision has previously been 
articulated: 
The underlying rationale of the reciprocity rules is 
to treat out-of-state lawyers seeking admission to 
Wisconsin without bar examination in the same manner 
as their home jurisdictions treat Wisconsin lawyers 
seeking admission without examination. Such treatment 
is 
designed 
to 
stimulate 
lawyers 
in 
other 
No.  03-2640-BA 
11 
 
jurisdictions to encourage their home states to admit 
Wisconsin lawyers without examination. 
In re Bar Admission of Wadsworth, 190 Wis. 2d 576, 583, 527 
N.W.2d 311 (1995) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).   
¶27 We have observed that "SCR 40.05 provides identical 
treatment 
to 
resident 
and 
non-resident 
bar 
admission 
applicants."  Crowe, 141 Wis. 2d at 237.  The applicable 
Michigan bar admission rule permits the five-year practice 
period to be increased for "good cause."  Mr. Mostkoff maintains 
that the Board erred by failing to give him the benefit of this 
Michigan "good cause" provision.  Mr. Mostkoff has not persuaded 
us that the Board applied this provision any differently than 
the Michigan courts would have applied it to a Wisconsin 
attorney seeking admission in that state.   
¶28 Moreover, Wisconsin has an even broader exception, 
which permits this court to waive any requirement under SCR 
40.10 upon a showing of good cause.  SCR 40.10 provides that: 
Except for the requirements of SCR 40.03 [and 40.06],4 
the board may waive any of the requirements of this 
chapter in exceptional cases and for good cause if 
failure to waive the requirement would be unjust.   
¶29 The record reflects that the Board declined to 
recommend a waiver of the requirements of SCR 40.05 in this 
case.  Mr. Mostkoff suggests this was error and requests this 
court exercise its discretion and waive the five-year practice 
requirement with respect to his application.  He asserts that it 
is generally unfair to subject him to the requirements of SCR 
                                                 
4 SCR 40.03 and 40.06 pertain to the diploma privilege and 
the character and fitness requirements, respectively. 
No.  03-2640-BA 
12 
 
40.05 in view of his extensive legal experience.  He contends, 
further, that the Board wrongly issued its final decision while 
his supreme court rules petition was still pending.  He also 
contends that a waiver is warranted on the grounds that the 
Board has failed to file a rules petition suggesting amendments 
to the reciprocity rule as directed by this court in In re Bar 
Admission of Croushore, 225 Wis. 2d 476, 481, 592 N.W.2d 236 
(1999).  And, he suggests that in addition to SCR 40.05's 
various alleged constitutional problems with the rule, the Board 
violated the open meeting law, Wis. Stat. § 19.81-19.98 (2003-
04) by failing to give him notice of the closed session at which 
the Board considered and denied his bar application.5 
¶30 We 
consider 
de novo 
whether 
Mr. 
Mostkoff 
has 
established that this is an exceptional case warranting waiver 
of the requirements of SCR 40.05. See, e.g., In re Bar Admission 
of Wescoe, 165 Wis. 2d 738, 478 N.W.2d 841 (1992).  Ultimately, 
we are not persuaded that this is the extraordinary situation 
warranting waiver of the requirements set forth in SCR 40.05. 
¶31 We acknowledge Mr. Mostkoff's effort to seek admission 
to the bar pursuant to a rules petition seeking to change SCR 
                                                 
5 We note that obtaining redress for an alleged open meeting 
law violation requires the filing of a verified complaint with 
the District Attorney.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.97(1) (2003-04).  In 
any event, Mr. Mostkoff has not demonstrated how the Board's 
compliance with the open meeting law here would have changed the 
outcome of this matter. In the absence of some evidence that 
adherence to the requirements of the open meeting law would have 
altered the Board's final decision in this matter, we decline to 
explore Mr. Mostkoff's allegations with respect to the open 
meeting law. 
No.  03-2640-BA 
13 
 
40.05.  The court did not, however, formally direct the Board to 
hold Mr. Mostkoff's bar application in abeyance pending its 
consideration 
of 
that 
petition. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
Board's 
decision, rendered while the rules petition was pending, did not 
contravene any order of this court.   
¶32 As we noted at the onset, had Mr. Mostkoff promptly 
petitioned for admission to the Wisconsin bar upon relocating to 
Wisconsin, he would have been eligible for admission under SCR 
40.05 based on his corporate practice in Michigan, a state in 
which he is licensed to practice law.  Mr. Mostkoff has provided 
no compelling explanation for his delay, other than the demands 
of his practice.  We conclude that a decision to waive the 
requirements of SCR 40.05 here would excuse and endorse delay in 
seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar.  Such a result would not 
serve the public's interest in ensuring that lawyers admitted to 
practice in this state have established their professional 
competence and their compliance with continuing legal education 
requirements. 
¶33 Mr. Mostkoff has raised a litany of constitutional 
challenges to SCR 40.05.  We decline to address these arguments 
as they are not supported by the facts of record.  Mr. Mostkoff 
is barred from admission to practice law in Wisconsin under the 
terms of SCR 40.05 as a result of his own delay in failing to 
file a bar application within a reasonable period of time.  
Moreover, Mr. Mostkoff is not precluded from continuing his 
corporate practice in Wisconsin.  Indeed, he is not precluded 
No.  03-2640-BA 
14 
 
from seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar; he retains the 
option of taking the Wisconsin bar exam at any time. 
¶34 We make one final comment with respect to Mr. 
Mostkoff's claim that the Board has failed to comply with the 
court's directive that it revise SCR 40.05.  The Board was 
indeed directed to "consider and propose for adoption an 
amendment of the corporate practice bar admission rule that it 
deems sufficient to satisfy the interest of the court in 
ensuring the competent practice of those it admits to the 
practice of law in Wisconsin."  Croushore, 225 Wis. 2d at 481.  
The Board responds that it had considered the matter and 
determined that no change was necessary.  We invite the Board to 
revisit this matter and to present the court with a petition 
recommending changes to SCR 40.05, if it sees fit.6 
¶35 Having determined that the Board properly concluded 
that Mr. Mostkoff failed to establish his qualifications for 
admission to practice law in Wisconsin based on proof of 
practice elsewhere, we affirm the Board's decision. 
¶36 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners concluding that Mr. Mostkoff failed to satisfy the 
requirements of SCR 40.05 is affirmed.  
 
                                                 
6 We appreciate that we may not have addressed each and 
every one of the arguments presented in Mr. Mostkoff's appeal.  
To the extent we have not, it is deemed denied.  See Libertarian 
Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 546 N.W.2d 
424 (1996) (appellate court need not discuss arguments unless 
they have "sufficient merit to warrant individual attention"). 
No.  03-2640-BA.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶37 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
reluctantly join the per curiam.  I find myself disagreeing with 
the governing rules and disagreeing with the result I am 
compelled to reach under the rules.   
¶38 The applicant missed the time limitations set forth in 
our rules for admitting lawyers licensed in other states without 
having to sit for the Wisconsin bar examination.  The applicant 
in the instant case appears to be a competent lawyer.  The 
people of the state of Wisconsin are not placed in jeopardy by 
granting admission to this applicant because he was late.  He 
can engage in corporate practice in Wisconsin without being a 
member of the bar.  It seems formalistic, and not necessarily 
relevant to the issue of the applicant's competence and public 
protection, to hold the applicant to the time limits, thereby 
denying him admission to the Wisconsin bar, at least without a 
Wisconsin bar examination.  But that's what time limits are——
formalistic, bright lines and not necessarily relevant to the 
merits of the issue.      
¶39 If the court makes an exception for this applicant it 
must, to be fair, make an exception for all late applicants.   
There's nothing special about this late application that 
distinguishes it from all others.  If it turns out that the 
court does not want to adhere to its own rules, it must, in my 
opinion, forthrightly repeal the rules, not surreptitiously 
avoid or undercut them by making exceptions for some people and 
not for others similarly situated.  Without a repeal of the 
No.  03-2640-BA.ssa 
 
2 
 
rules, and because an exception is not an option, I reluctantly 
join the per curiam. 
¶40 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  03-2640-BA.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶41 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The petitioner 
is a qualified attorney who was admitted to practice in Michigan 
in 1973.  If he had applied for admission in 1999 when he moved 
to Wisconsin, he would have been eligible for admission under 
SCR 40.05, based on his corporate practice in Michigan.  
Although he neglected to seek admission at that time, he 
nonetheless engaged in corporate practice in Wisconsin from 1999 
to 2003, and the court indicates that he is not precluded from 
continuing such practice now.  Majority op., ¶33. 
¶42 Inasmuch as the petitioner could have been admitted 
without a problem in the past and may continue corporate 
practice without admission in the future, I see no sensible 
reason why we should not admit him to the bar and subject him to 
Wisconsin membership dues, Wisconsin continuing legal education 
requirements, and Wisconsin discipline.  The court has the power 
to admit Mr. Mostkoff and I would do so.  His admission could be 
conditioned on any reasonable requirement that reinforces the 
integrity of our rules on reciprocity and education. 
 
 
No.  03-2640-BA.dtp 
 
1