Title: Board of Supervisors v. Reed's Landing Corp.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF POWHATAN COUNTY 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 942142 
                                    November 3, 1995 
REED'S LANDING CORPORATION 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY 
 
Thomas V. Warren, Judge 
 
 
Pursuant to Virginia's conditional zoning statutes, Code 
§ 15.1-491.1 et seq., a locality is empowered to enact a zoning 
ordinance that "may include and provide for the voluntary 
proffering . . . by [a zoning applicant] of reasonable 
conditions," Code §§ 15.1-491.2 and -491.2:1, "for the protection 
of the community," Code § 15.1-491.1.  The dispositive issue in 
this appeal is whether, under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the demand of a cash proffer by the Board of Supervisors of 
Powhatan County (the Board) violates Code § 15.1-491.2:1. 
 
I 
 
Reed's Landing Corporation (the Developer) filed a petition 
for declaratory judgment against the Board, seeking a declaration 
that the Board unlawfully denied the Developer's rezoning 
application.  The Developer alleged that the Board unlawfully 
conditioned the rezoning upon a proffer of a cash payment. 
 
After hearing the evidence ore tenus, the trial court found 
that the Board did act unlawfully by conditioning the rezoning 
upon the proffer of a cash payment and directed the Board to 
reconsider the Developer's rezoning application in the light of 
the court's finding.  The Board appeals. 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
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According to well-established principles of law, we must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Developer, 
the prevailing party at trial.  In 1983, Powhatan County enacted 
its zoning ordinance.  Article 18, entitled "CONDITIONAL ZONING," 
provides, in pertinent part, that a zoning applicant may request 
conditional zoning "by voluntary proffer . . . of reasonable 
conditions."  Article 18 also provides that the rezoning must 
give rise to the need for the conditions and that the conditions 
must have a reasonable relation to the rezoning. 
 
On June 30, 1993, the Developer sought the rezoning of 
approximately 233 acres of land from an agricultural (A-1) zoning 
classification to a single-family residential (R-1) zoning 
classification.  The Developer's rezoning application met all 
requirements of the County's zoning ordinance and for an R-1 
classification. 
 
 At the public hearing on the rezoning application, 
conducted by the Powhatan County Planning Commission on August 3, 
1993, no one appeared in opposition to the Developer's request.  
The planning staff recommended approval of the rezoning, and the 
planning commission later unanimously recommended its approval.  
On August 9, 1993, however, the Board adopted "proffer 
guidelines" which set forth a "recommended" proffer of $2,439 per 
lot "to help defray costs of capital facilities related to new 
development." 
 
The Developer's rezoning application first came before the 
 
 
 
 
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Board on September 13, 1993.  At that time, the Developer 
proffered a cash payment "under protest," but the Board deferred 
the matter to its October 11, 1993 meeting. 
 
At the October 11, 1993 Board meeting and public hearing on 
the Developer's rezoning application, no member of the public 
spoke in opposition to the rezoning request.  It was apparent, 
however, that the Board would not approve the rezoning request 
unless the Developer agreed to pay $2,439 per lot, even though 
the Developer's counsel asserted that the cash proffer demand was 
illegal.  The Developer refused to yield to the Board's demand, 
and the Board denied the rezoning request. 
 
At trial, the County's Director of the Department of 
Planning and Community Development testified that a cash proffer 
of $2,439 per lot was "expected" prior to the approval of 
residential rezoning.  He also testified that, since the Board 
adopted the proffer guidelines in August 1993, virtually no R-1 
rezonings had been approved without the cash proffer. 
 
In his letter opinion, the trial judge recognized that Code 
§ 15.1-491.2:1 enabled the Board to accept "voluntary" proffers 
from applicants requesting a zoning change.  He found, however, 
that "the sole reason for denial of [the Developer's] request was 
its failure or refusal to proffer $2439 per lot."  The judge 
concluded, therefore, that "[t]he County is clearly imposing an 
impact fee not authorized by statute and which it is without 
power to impose." 
 
 
 
 
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III 
 
Boards of supervisors, like other local governing bodies, 
have only those powers that the General Assembly, expressly or by 
necessary implication, confers upon them.  Board of Supervisors 
v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1975); Gordon v. 
Fairfax County, 207 Va. 827, 832, 153 S.E.2d 270, 274 (1967); 
Board of Supervisors v. Corbett, 206 Va. 167, 174, 142 S.E.2d 
504, 509 (1965).  If there is a reasonable doubt whether 
legislative power exists, the doubt must be resolved against the 
local governing body.  City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of 
Richmond, 239 Va. 77, 79-80, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990); 
Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711, 714, 25 S.E. 1001, 1002 
(1896).  However, when an enabling statute is clear and 
unambiguous, its intent is determined from the plain meaning of 
the words used, and, in that event, neither rules of construction 
nor extrinsic evidence may be employed.  Confrere Club of 
Richmond, 239 Va. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 473; Marsh v. City of 
Richmond, 234 Va. 4, 11, 360 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1987). 
 
A plain reading of Code § 15.1-491.2:1 in the light of the 
foregoing principles of law demonstrates that a county is not 
empowered to require a specified proffer as a condition precedent 
to a rezoning.  The statute clearly states that proffers of 
conditions by a zoning applicant must be made voluntarily. 
 
In the present case, the trial court found that the sole 
reason the Board denied the rezoning request was the Developer's 
 
 
 
 
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refusal to proffer $2,439 per lot, a finding fully supported by 
the evidence.  Therefore, under the facts presented, the proffer 
constituted a condition precedent and was not voluntary within 
the meaning of the statute.  Consequently, we hold, as did the 
trial court, that the Board imposed an unlawful condition on the 
Developer.
*T
 
IV 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment and 
remand the case to the trial court with directions that it remand 
the matter to the Board for reconsideration of the Developer's 
rezoning application consistent with this opinion. 
 
Affirmed and remanded. 
                     
     
*It is interesting to note that, since the enactment of Code 
§ 15.1-491.2:1, the General Assembly has rejected all efforts to 
grant to localities greater power to charge landowners and 
developers with the capital costs associated with residential 
growth.  See, e.g., S.B. 788, 1989 Sess. (no action taken); S.B. 
 340, 1992 Sess. (passed by Senate, but stricken from House 
docket by Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns in 1993); H.B. 
1138, 1992 Sess. (passed by indefinitely by Committee on 
Counties, Cities and Towns); H.B. 2323, 1993 Sess. (passed by 
indefinitely by Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns).