Title: State Farm v. Shady Grove Baptist Church

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

838 So. 2d 1039 (2002)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
v.
SHADY GROVE BAPTIST CHURCH.
1010018.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 14, 2002.
Roderick K. Nelson and Adam M. Milam of Spain & Gillon, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Gerald D. Colvin, Jr., of Bishop, Colvin, Johnson & Kent, Birmingham; and Frank S. Buck, Birmingham, for appellee.
HARWOOD, Justice.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (hereinafter referred to as "State Farm") appeals from the trial court's denial of its motions for a judgment as a matter of law in regard to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by the Shady Grove Baptist Church (hereinafter referred to as "the Church"). We reverse and remand.
On February 2, 1998, the Church sued State Farm, seeking to recover damages on claims of breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud in regard to State Farm's denial of a claim made by the Church following the collapse of a portion of the roof on its building. The Church's complaint alleged that an insurance policy issued by State Farm provided coverage for the roof collapse *1040 but that State Farm refused to pay the claim it made based on the collapse. On February 1, 1999, State Farm filed a motion for a summary judgment with attached exhibits and a supporting brief; on February 23, 1999, it filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion. On March 4, 1999, the Church filed an opposition to State Farm's motion for a summary judgment.
On May 3, 1999, the trial court entered a summary judgment for State Farm on the Church's claims of bad faith and fraud, and certified its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; on May 12, 1999, the Church filed a notice of appeal. On November 19, 1999, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without an opinion. Shady Grove Baptist Church v. State Farm Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 253 (Ala.Civ.App.1999)(table). On July 21, 2000, State Farm resubmitted its motion for a summary judgment as to the Church's breach-of-contract claim; the trial court denied that motion on November 6, 2000. The breach-of-contract claim was tried before a jury on April 9-11, 2001.
State Farm made an oral motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of the Church's case-in-chief; the trial court denied the motion. On April 11, 2001, at the close of all the evidence, State Farm filed a written motion for a judgment as a matter of law; the trial court denied the motion that same day. On April 13, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Church in the amount of $128,800, and the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict, adding $31,586.03 to the judgment as interest, for a total judgment of $160,386.03.
On May 10, 2001, State Farm filed a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial or for a remittitur. On August 9, 2001, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. However, the trial court granted the motion insofar as it requested a remittitur and reduced the amount of the judgment to $98,700 to comport with the coverage limits of the insurance policy. The court added $24,205.98 in interest, for a total judgment of $122,905.98. On September 20, 2001, State Farm filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
State Farm states the issue presented in this appeal as whether "[t]he trial court erred by denying [its] Motion for Judgment As a Matter of Law because [the Church] failed to present any evidence which was sufficient to create a question of fact whether the cause of the roof collapse at the church was covered by the policy." Our review of the denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law is settled.
Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Ala.1999)(emphasis added). Further, this Court has stated that "`[e]vidence supporting nothing more than speculation, conjecture, or a guess does not rise to the level of substantial evidence.' " McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 800 So. 2d 140, 145 (Ala.2001)(quoting Brushwitz v. Ezell, 757 So. 2d 423, 432 (Ala.2000)).
The insurance policy at issue provides, in pertinent part:
In a section entitled "Definitions," the policy also states:
In Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mutual Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 687 (Ala.2001), this Court observed:
In regard to its burden of proof under the policy, the Church states in its brief to this Court:
However, the policy states that it does not provide coverage for collapse unless the collapse resulted from one or more of the six specific enumerated causes stated within the section entitled "Extensions of Coverage."[2] Further, it is not State Farm's position on appeal that the collapse was excluded from coverage; rather, State Farm asserts that the collapse was not covered under the policy. Therefore, this is not a case in which the Church has to prove that a collapse, as defined within the policy, has occurred and State Farm then has to prove that a certain exclusion within the policy removed the collapse from the scope of its coverage. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d  at 697 ("[The insurer] has the burden of proof in asserting that a claim is excluded under its policy of insurance."). Rather, in resisting State Farm's motions for a judgment as a matter of law, and for the trial court's denial of those motions to have been proper, the Church must have submitted substantial evidence showing that the collapse fitted within the definition of that term in the policy and that it was covered under the policy by virtue of its being caused by at least one of the six enumerated causes provided in the policy. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 325-26 (Ala.1999)(considering, on rehearing, whether the insureds had presented substantial evidence showing that their loss was a collapse as that term was defined in a policy); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Collins, 280 Ala. 373, 376, 194 So. 2d 532, 535 (1967)("The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the insured's death *1044 resulted from injuries sustained in such a manner as to bring him within the coverage of the policy."). Accordingly, we must consider whether the Church submitted substantial evidence as to this issue. Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., supra.
During the Church's case-in-chief, testimony was elicited from Preston Walker, a former trustee, deacon, and pastor of the Church; Joann Lewis, Walker's sister and chairman of the Church's building committee; and Timothy Ryan, a State Farm claim-team manager. Portions of the deposition testimony of Hugh Walker, Jr., deceased, the brother of Preston Walker and Lewis and a former trustee and deacon of the Church, was also read into evidence. Preston Walker, Lewis, and Hugh Walker all testified that a coal company had conducted blasting activity in close proximity to the community in which the Church's building was located; the Church alleges in its brief that the blasting constituted an "explosion," listed as a specified cause of loss in the policy.
Preston Walker testified as follows:
Lewis testified as follows:
The deposition testimony of Hugh Walker, which was read into evidence, stated:
*1045 In regard to the activities conducted in the Church's building, i.e., weight of people, Lewis testified as follows:
Further, in regard to weather conditions the Church's building had been exposed tothe load of wind, rain, ice, and snow Lewis testified:
Lewis also made mention of possible termite damage to the roof, stating:
In regard to Preston Walker's belief as to a specific cause of the roof's collapse, he stated:
*1046 As to the question of a specific cause, Hugh Walker testified in his deposition as follows:
The Church's final witness was Timothy Ryan, a State Farm claim-team manager, who testified as to why the Church's claim was denied. Ryan stated that the claim was denied based on an engineer's report. That report, which was admitted into evidence during Ryan's testimony, appears in the record as a 17-page document prepared by Joel D. Wehrman, identified as a registered engineer in the state of Alabama, on behalf of JADE Engineering. The report's conclusion was that the collapse of the roof was not caused by blasting, a concern Wehrman stated was reported to him by the Church's members, but was caused by improper construction.
After considering the evidence presented by the Church, we conclude that the Church failed to present substantial evidence showing that the collapse of the roof on its building was a result of any one of the enumerated causes contained in the policy. Rather, the testimony elicited provided several possible causes for the collapse, but substantial evidence as to any one cause was not presented. Further, the testimony of Preston Walker and Hugh Walker bolster this conclusion because their statements concerning their beliefs as to the specific cause of the collapse were speculative. Therefore, their testimony does not rise to the level of substantial evidence, McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., supra, and the trial court erred when it denied State Farm's motions for a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court's judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., dissents.
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court's denial of State Farm's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law because I believe Shady Grove Baptist Church presented substantial evidence to submit to a jury the issue whether the collapse of the church building's roof was a result of any of the causes covered by the Church's insurance policy with State Farm.
At trial, the Church presented the following evidence, from which a jury could have resolved the dispute in the Church's favor. Preston Walker, a former trustee, deacon, and pastor of the Church, testified that at his home in Sipsey, one block from the church, he "could kind of feel a rumble sometimes" from blasting activity at strip mines in the area. In his deposition, admitted into evidence at trial, Hugh Walker stated that one of his neighbors had experienced "cabinets and things" rattling from the blasting. Hugh Walker also stated in his deposition that he didn't know what happened to the roof: "It just fell in." But when pressed as to his opinion as to the cause of the collapse, he said, "Old and it could have been blasting and termites. *1047 It could have been anything. I don't know. I just don't know." Walker stated in his deposition what he may have told the State Farm inspector about the cause of the collapse: "I could have said blasting or something." Walker stated in his deposition that, in the past, he had seen broken rafters on other people's houses and that those people had said that the cause of the broken rafters was "coming from blasting."
Joann Lewis, the Walkers' sister and the chairman of the Church's building committee, testified at trial that blasting in Sipsey sometimes "rattled the dishes, you know, no kind of effects in my house. It was just like a rattle." Ms. Lewis responded affirmatively when she was asked whether there had been occasions at her house and at the church building where the wind and rain were heavy and where sleet and snow "piled up on the roofs" of her house and the church. Ms. Lewis also described what she and other church members observed after the collapse:
Harold McCain, a former member and trustee of the Church testifying for State Farm, testified on cross-examination that when he arrived at the church building after the roof had collapsed, he "was told it was done through blasting, that through a mining company doing blasting was the first thing I heard." After the collapse, McCain was told what others thought had caused the collapse: "I was told it was due to blasting, and I pursued it in the sense of blasting, so I didn't feel that the insurance company [had any] liability to take care of it if it was a blasting company that caused the problem."
Joel Wehrman, an engineer employed by JADE Engineering sent by State Farm to inspect the collapsed church building, testified that when he went to see the church building after the collapse, "that's when I learned that many of the people there believed that the blasting from a coal mine had caused or contributed to the damage." More specifically, Wehrman stated that "the only thing anyone ever told me was there was a coal mine, I believe, it was south of the building and that there was some vibrations in the area, that several people felt had caused the collapse."
Such evidence would beand was weighed by the jury, but I believe the majority errs in holding that the evidence is not substantial and therefore not sufficient to present to a jury the issue whether the collapse of the roof was covered by the Church's insurance policy.
[1]  We note that the Church makes no argument that the policy is ambiguous.
[2]  See, e.g., Paula B. Tarr et al., Insurance Coverage for Collapse Claims: Evolving Standards and Legal Theories, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 57, 59 (1999):

"In response to [some courts'] application of the concurrent causation theory, property insurance form writers made a number of changes in standard forms. One of those changes was to exclude collapse as a covered cause of loss except as provided in an `additional' or `extended' coverage. Coverage was provided only if the collapse was caused by certain enumerated perils. In this sense, collapse was not a peril but rather a result of other perils. The clear intent seemed to be to provide collapse coverage only if the cause or causes of the collapse were among those listed...."