Title: Reed v. Bowen

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

512 So. 2d 198 (1987)
Shaun Leo REED, etc., et al., Petitioners,
v.
Felix BOWEN, et al., Respondents.
No. 69689.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 17, 1987.
*199 Hank B. Campbell of the Law Offices of Frost & Purcell, P.A., Bartow, for petitioners.
Louis L. Suprina, Winter Haven, for respondents.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Reed v. Bowen, 503 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), which expressly and directly conflicts with Harris v. Moriconi, 331 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 341 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1976). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The Bowen's dog bit four-year-old Shaun Reed on September 2, 1983. Shaun brought suit pursuant to section 767.04, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides:
The court found, as a matter of law, that Shaun was lawfully on the Bowen's property, and submitted the case to the jury for determination as to whether Shaun mischievously or carelessly provoked or aggravated the dog. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bowens and the trial court entered final judgment accordingly.
The district court affirmed, rejecting the argument that, as a matter of law, a four-year-old cannot mischievously or carelessly provoke or aggravate a dog. The court found that section 767.04 makes the dog owner an insurer against damage caused by his dog, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, thus modifying the common law basis for recovery grounded in negligence, and superseding common law defenses. 503 So. 2d  at 1267 (relying on Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney, 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984); Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 358 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1978); and Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970)). See also Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1986). Further, since the statute plainly states that the owner shall not be liable to "any person" who maliciously or carelessly provokes the dog, the court found that whether a particular child is capable of such an act is a question for the jury. Accord Porter v. Allstate Insurance Co., 497 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
The district court recognized that its decision conflicts with Harris, which held that, as a matter of law, a child of tender years cannot carelessly provoke or aggravate a dog. The Harris court reasoned that "careless" is synonymous with "negligence" and that a child of tender years is presumed incapable of negligence under *200 the common law. Judge Rawls dissented, correctly stating:
331 So. 2d  at 356 (citing Carroll).
Accordingly, we approve the reasoning of the second district court in Reed and we disapprove Harris. The decision under review is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.