Title: STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR FARM V. LEONARD (LEE) WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TAMMY SUE WATTS; THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR FARM V. LEONARD (LEE) WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TAMMY SUE WATTS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR FARM V. LEONARD (LEE) WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TAMMY SUE WATTS; THE STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR FARM V. LEONARD (LEE) WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TAMMY SUE WATTS2008 WY 19177 P.3d 793Case Number: S-07-0050, S-07-0095Decided: 02/22/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR 
FARM,Petitioners,v.LEONARD (LEE) WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TAMMY SUE 
WATTS,Respondent.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, WYOMING HONOR 
FARM,Appellants(Defendants),v.LEONARD (LEE) 
WATTS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
TAMMY SUE WATTS,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioners/Appellants:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Misha Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General; C. Levi Martin, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Westby.

 
 
Representing 
Respondent/Appellee:

David B. 
Hooper and Tom A. Glassberg of Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Hooper.   

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Leonard (Lee) 
Watts brought a wrongful death suit after his 
wife, Tammy Sue Watts, who was a contract nurse at the Wyoming Honor Farm, was 
murdered by an inmate.  The Wyoming 
Department of Corrections, Wyoming State Penitentiary and Wyoming Honor Farm 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the State") moved for summary 
judgment, claiming they were immune from suit pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA).  The 
district court denied their motion.  
In this combined appeal and writ of review, the State contests the 
district court's ruling.  We 
conclude that Mr. Watts' claims are barred under the WGCA.  Consequently, we reverse.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The State phrases 
the issue as:

 
 
Do 
Appellee's claims fall within the "operation or maintenance of any building" 
exception to governmental immunity under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 (LexisNexis 
2003)?

 
 
Mr. 
Watts states the following appellate issues:

 
 

1.                  
Does 
the Court have jurisdiction to review the District Court's Order Denying the 
State's Motion for Summary Judgment?

 
 

2.                  
Was 
the death of Tammy Watts a direct result of the manner in which the State of 
Wyoming operated the Honor Farm Administration Building thus permitting a claim 
to be made for wrongful death "caused by the negligence of public employees . . 
. in the operation or maintenance of any building . . ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 (LexisNexis 
2003)? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Watts was 
a contract nurse who worked at the Wyoming Honor Farm.  She usually arrived for work around 6:00 
a.m. each day.  Ms. Watts was 
typically alone in the medical offices until the other nurse arrived between 
6:30 and 7:00 a.m.  The medical 
offices were located in the basement of the administration building, and inmates 
could access them from the east door without being observed.  Sometime before 7:00 a.m. on April 15, 
2004, Floyd Grady, an inmate at the Honor Farm, murdered Ms. Watts in the 
medical offices.  

 
 
[¶4]      As personal 
representative of Ms. Watts' estate, Mr. Watts brought a wrongful death suit on 
behalf of her heirs.  He claimed the 
State was negligent by:

 
 

·         
releasing 
Mr. Grady from the Wyoming State Penitentiary and transferring him to the Honor 
Farm; 

·         
failing 
to provide for Ms. Watts' safety and security;

·         
failing 
to "provide the security and reasonably safe conditions necessary to protect 
contract workers" from persons known to be extremely dangerous such as Mr. 
Grady; 

·         
failing 
to "imprison and guard" Mr. Grady and other dangerous inmates in a reasonable 
manner; 

·         
failing 
to operate the administration building in a safe and secure manner; 

·         
providing 
an insufficient number of detention officers at the Honor Farm;  

·         
improperly 
training, supervising and managing the detention officers at the Honor Farm; 

·         
failing 
to provide Ms. Watts with security from dangerous inmates; 

·         
failing 
to prevent Mr. Grady from attacking and killing Ms. Watts.  

 
 
[¶5]      The State filed a 
motion for summary judgment, asserting it was immune from suit under the WGCA, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101, et 
seq.  (LexisNexis 2003).  Mr. Watts argued that § 1-39-106, which 
waives immunity for "the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building," applied 
to his claims.  Mr. Watts argues 
that the "lack of sufficient guards, surveillance over the stairs and area where 
Tammy Watts traveled to the medical offices and locating and operating the 
medical offices in the Administration Building in a fashion that permitted the 
inmates direct, unobserved access to the medical offices between 6:00 and 6:30 
a.m. when Tammy Watts was there by herself" fell within the waiver of immunity 
in § 1-39-106.    

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court denied the State's motion for a summary judgment, 
stating:

 
 
            
1.         
The State asserts no exception of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
(Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-117) that permits the estate of Tammy Watts 
to bring this lawsuit.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
            
3.         Plaintiff 
asserts that Defendants are liable pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-106[,] i.e. 
Tammy Watts' death was caused by the negligence in Defendants' operation or 
maintenance of the Wyoming Honor Farm.

 
 
            
4.         
Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the negligence, if any, of 
Defendants in the operation and maintenance of the Wyoming State Honor Farm, 
including but not limited to the number of security officers on duty the morning 
of Tammy Watt's murder, the lack of security cameras in certain areas of the 
facility, Tammy Watts' duties as a nurse at the Honor Farm, and inherent risks, 
if any, of such employment.  

 
 
[¶7]      The State filed a 
notice of appeal or, in the alternative, a petition for writ of review, seeking 
appellate review of the district court's ruling on its claim it was immune from 
suit.  We 
granted a writ of review.    

      

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

 
 
[¶8]      Summary judgment 
motions are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.

 
 
We review a district court's summary judgment rulings de novo, using the 
same materials and following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are 
reviewed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly 
be drawn from the record.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 
2006); Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 
(Wyo. 1996).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶9]      Before we consider 
the merits, we will address whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal and 
the proper procedure for obtaining judicial review of a denial of a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis of immunity.1  Generally, the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order.  Gilstrap v. June Eisele 
Warren Trust, 2005 WY 
21, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 858, 861 (Wyo. 
2005); Wolter v. 
Equitable Resources Energy Co., 979 P.2d 948, 953 (Wyo. 1999).  However, we have 
recognized an exception to the general rule when a district court refuses to 
dismiss a case on the basis of qualified immunity.  Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo. 1992).

 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held . . .  that a federal 
district court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity was 
"an appealable final decision' * * * notwithstanding the absence of a final 
judgment."   
Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 
(1985).  The 
Court reasoned that qualified immunity provides "an immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability, and like an absolute immunity, it is 
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."  Mitchell, 472 U.S.  at 526, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2815 (emphasis in original).  In other words, unless the order denying 
dismissal can be reviewed before trial, it can never be effectively reviewed at 
all, because the defendant will have already suffered an irreparable loss to his 
immunity from suit.  

 
 
. . . .

 
 
State courts are divided on whether interlocutory appeal is 
available under these circumstances.  We believe the state decisions which allow 
appeal, for the reasons detailed in Mitchell as cited above, are better reasoned; and we 
therefore hold that an order denying dismissal of a claim based on qualified 
immunity is an order appealable to this court.  See Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96, 775 P.2d 1160, 1162-64 (Ariz. 1989).

 
 

Id.  

 
 
[¶10]   We have, in the past, granted a writ of 
review for the purpose of examining a denial of a governmental entity's motion 
for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under the WGCA.  See, e.g., City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102 (Wyo. 1993).  However, the same 
policies which favor an exception to the general rule in qualified immunity 
cases that summary judgment denials are not appealable apply to claims of 
governmental immunity.  We conclude, therefore, an order denying a 
summary judgment on a claim of governmental immunity is appealable and it is not 
necessary to grant discretionary review in such circumstances.  Because we have 
jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of the district court's order 
denying its motion for summary judgment on the immunity issue, the writ of 
review is superfluous and we, therefore, dismiss it as unnecessarily 
granted.   

 
 

            
2.         Section 
1-39-106

 
 
[¶11]   Section 1-39-104 (a) states:

 
 
(a) A governmental entity and its public employees while 
acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any 
tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 
1-39-121.   

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Watts argued, and the district 
court apparently agreed, his claims fell within the waiver of immunity in § 
1-39-106.  
Section 1-39-106 states:  

 
 
            
A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, 
wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees 
while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of 
any building, recreation area or public park.

 
 
[¶13]   In order to resolve this case, we must 
interpret the statutory language.  "Questions of statutory interpretation are 
matters of law."  
Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2007 WY 43, ¶ 10, 154 P.3d 331, 334 (Wyo. 
2007), citing Powder 
River Coal Co. v.  
Bd. of Equalization, 2006 WY 
137, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 442, 446 (Wyo. 
2006).  In 
interpreting statutes, our task is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent.  We 
look first to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the legislature and 
apply that meaning if the language is clear and unambiguous.  "A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability."  RME Petroleum Co. v. 
Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 25, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 
2007).  "All 
statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony."  State ex rel. Dep't of 
Revenue v. UPRC, 2003 WY 
54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 
2003).  See also, Lance Oil & Gas Co. 
v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 2004 WY 
156, ¶ 4, 101 P.3d 899, 902 (Wyo. 
2004).  If, 
however, the wording of a statute is ambiguous or capable of varying 
interpretations, we employ well-accepted rules of statutory construction.   Chevron, ¶ 10, 154 P.3d  at 334.  

 
 

[¶14]   Our case law includes specific 
principles that apply when interpreting the WGCA.   The WGCA is considered a close-ended 
tort claims act, which means that a claim is barred by governmental immunity 
unless it falls within one of the statutory 
exceptions.   City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, ¶ 7, 145 P.3d 1274, 1277 (Wyo. 
2006); Sawyer v. 
City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 
(Wyo. 1990).  While the statement that the WGCA is a close-ended act is 
made consistently throughout our precedent, in reviewing cases decided over the 
years since the WGCA was first enacted, we find some inconsistency with regard 
to how the act should be interpreted.  

 
 
[¶15]   One group of cases states that the WGCA 
should be interpreted liberally. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(Wyo. 1985); Troyer v. State Dep't 
of Health and Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 158, 162 (Wyo. 1986).  In Hurst, the Court stated 
that the WGCA should be liberally construed, but did not cite any authority for 
that statement.  
Troyer 
cited to Hurst 
and Thomson v. 
Wyo. In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982) for the proposition that 
the WGCA should be interpreted liberally.  However, Thomson did not 
address the WGCA and, while discussing the argument that the laws at issue in 
that case should be interpreted liberally, stated:

 
 
The argument is made that the constitutional and statutory 
provisions before us should be construed liberally.  There is no 
statutory provision for liberal construction.  Section 8-1-103(a)(i), W.S. 1977, provides 
the rule of construction for statutes unless "plainly contrary to the intent of 
the legislature:  
(i) Words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense * 
* * *."   
By a liberal interpretation, it is only meant that words should not be 
forced out of their natural meaning and should receive a fair and reasonable 
construction so as to obtain the objects for which a statute is designed.  Liberal 
construction does not require that words be forced out of their natural 
meaning.  First National Bank 
& Trust Company of Wyoming v. Brimmer, Wyo., 504 P.2d 1367 (1973).   

 
 

Thomson, 651 P.2d  at 789.2  

 
 
[¶16]   Moreover, although we ruled that 
immunity was waived in Stovall, in Hurst and Troyer we concluded that the state was immune from suit 
because the claims made in those cases did not fall within a statutory 
exception.  
None of these cases relied in any significant  way on the "liberal" 
interpretation principle.  More importantly, even when announcing a rule 
of liberal construction, the cases emphasized that "a liberal construction does 
not require that words be accorded a forced, strained, or unnatural meaning, or 
warrant an extension of the statute to the suppression of supposed evils or the 
effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not referred to, nor indicated 
in any of the terms used.   Crawford, Construction of 
Statutes § 238 at 451-452 (1940)."  Hurst, 698 P.2d  at 1133.   

 
 
[¶17]   The liberal construction concept is 
also, arguably, supported by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-101 (LexisNexis 2007), which 
states:

 
 
            
The Code of Civil Procedure [this title] and all proceedings under it 
shall be liberally construed to promote its object and assist the parties in 
obtaining justice.  
The rule of common law that statutes in derogation thereof must be 
strictly construed has no application to the Code of Civil Procedure, but this 
shall not be so construed as to require a liberal construction of provisions 
affecting personal liberty, relating to amercement or of a penal nature.

 

We discussed § 1-1-101 in the context of the WGCA in Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1991).  In that case, 
we stated that § 1-1-101 must be tempered by the plain statement of purpose of 
the WGCA in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102:

 
 
            
(a) The Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and 
inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of 
governmental immunity and is cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of 
Oroz v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 575 P.2d 1155 (1978).  
It is further recognized that the state and its political subdivisions as 
trustees of public revenues are constituted to serve the inhabitants of the 
state of Wyoming and furnish certain 
services not available through private parties and, in the case of the state, 
state revenues may only be expended upon legislative appropriation.  This act is adopted 
by the legislature to balance the respective equities between persons injured by 
governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues are utilized 
by governmental entities on behalf of those taxpayers.  This act is 
intended to retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue 
of decisions from this or other jurisdictions.

 
 
            
(b) In the case of the state, this act abolishes all judicially created 
categories such as "governmental" or "proprietary" functions and "discretionary" 
or "ministerial" acts previously used by the courts to determine immunity or 
liability.  
This act does not impose nor allow the imposition of strict liability for 
acts of governmental entities or public employees.

 
 

Id. at 774.  Soles also reiterated that even when a statute is 
liberally interpreted, the court is still required to give the words used their 
plain meaning.  
Id.

   

[¶18]   Another group of cases advances a 
"strict construction" rule for the WGCA.  In Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 956 
(Wyo. 1990), we said statutes that 
waive sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.  We cited Harrison v. Wyo. Liquor 
Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947) for 
this principle.  
Harrison was decided before 
adoption of the WGCA; however, it stated:

 
 
It is generally held that statutes authorizing suit against 
the state are to be strictly construed, since they are in derogation of the 
state's sovereignty 59 C.J. 303.  And "the history of sovereign immunity and 
the practical necessity of unfettered freedom for government from crippling 
interferences require a restriction of suability to the terms of the consent, as 
to persons, courts and procedure."  Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 
64 S. Ct. 873, 88 L. Ed. 1121.   

 
 

Id. at 399.  In Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 364 
(Wyo. 1994), we stated that in 
"interpreting the [WGCA], this court must strictly construe the statutory 
exceptions to immunity against potential claimants and, conversely, liberally 
construe the grant of immunity in favor of the governmental entity."  Harbel cited 
Martinez as authority for 
that principle.  
Id. 

 

[¶19]   More recent cases have not spoken in 
terms of a strict or liberal construction of the WGCA.  Instead, they 
simply state the principle that the WGCA is a close-ended act in which immunity 
is the rule and liability is the exception.  See, e.g., Sponsel v. ParkCounty, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 8, 126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 
2006).  That 
statement is completely in accord with the stated purpose of the WGCA and the 
language used by the legislature in § 1-39-104 -- "a governmental entity and its 
public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity 
from liability for any tort except as provided [by statute.]"   Further, it is 
consistent with our typical rules of statutory interpretation which include the 
tenet that "[c]ourts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to 
matters not falling within its express provisions."  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Walters, 707 P.2d 733, 738 
(Wyo. 1985).  See also, Sponsel, ¶ 9, 126 P.3d  at 108.  

 
 
[¶20]   Thus, we conclude the general rule in 
Wyoming is that the government is 
immune from liability, and, "[u]nless a claim falls within one of the statutory 
exceptions to governmental immunity, it will be barred."  Cottier, ¶ 7, 145 P.3d  at 1277.  See also, Newberry v. Board of County Comm'rs of Fremont County, 
919 P.2d 141, 145 
(Wyo. 1996).  We will use our 
 standard rules 
of statutory construction to determine whether the legislature intended that 
immunity be waived for a particular claim and will not resort to reliance upon 
previous unsupported and unnecessary suggestions that the act is to be 
interpreted either liberally or strictly.  

 
 
[¶21]   The plain language of § 1-39-106 states 
that immunity is waived for negligence by a governmental entity's employees in 
the "operation" or "maintenance" of "any building."  The parties take 
differing positions on whether Mr. Watts' claims pertain to the "operation" of a 
building.  The 
term "operation" is not defined in the statute; thus, we use the ordinary and 
obvious meaning of the term.  Cottier, ¶ 8, 145 P.3d  at 1278.  In Cottier, we 
recognized the following definitions of operation:

 
 
The American Heritage College Dictionary 975 (4th ed.2004), 
defines "operation" as the "state of being operative or functional."   See also Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 827 (1991).  Black's Law Dictionary 1092 (6th ed. 1990), 
defines "operation" as "the process of operating or mode of action."

 
 

Id.  
Using these definitions, § 1-39-106 waives immunity for the 
State's negligence in making the building functional.  

 
 
[¶22]   The parties disagree as to whether the 
statute waives immunity for operation of the physical building itself or the 
Honor Farm as an organization or entity.  Mr. Watts argues that the statute should be 
read broadly because the administration building, where the murder took place, 
is part of the penal institution and the building's operation must be viewed in 
light of its purpose.  
The State argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted the 
statutory waiver of immunity as applying to the operation of the Honor Farm as 
an institution rather than the operation of the building structure.  In other words, it 
argues that the waiver of immunity is limited to matters pertaining to the 
building structure itself rather than the Honor Farm as a penal institution.

 
 
[¶23]   We construe a statutory provision to 
harmonize it with other provisions relating to the same subject matter.  Some of the other 
statutes waiving governmental immunity pertain to the operation of specific 
types of institutions.  For example, § 1-39-109 waives immunity for 
the "negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their 
duties in the operation of any public hospital[.]"  If we were to 
accept Mr. Watts' broad interpretation of the waiver of immunity for operation 
of public buildings, there would be no need to specifically waive immunity for 
the operation of hospitals because such negligence would already be subsumed in 
the statute waiving immunity for operation of hospital buildings.  Thus, the context 
of § 1-39-106 within the WGCA indicates that the legislature intended the waiver 
to extend only to the function of the building itself rather than the entity 
operated within the building.  If the legislature had meant to waive 
immunity for operation of a penal institution, it could have done so expressly. 
See, e.g., Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-106(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (specifying governmental 
liability for negligence in operation of correctional facilities and 
jails).  In 
accordance with our rules of statutory interpretation, we will not expand the 
waiver of immunity to include matters not expressly stated by the legislature. 
  

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Watts argues that Cottier supports 
his argument that § 1-39-106 should be read to include operation of the Honor 
Farm as an entity.  
In that case, we were dealing with the waiver of immunity for operation 
of a public utility in § 1-39-108.  Cottier, ¶ 12, 145 P.3d  at 1279.  This provision of 
the WGCA waives immunity for "operation" of public utilities, but not 
"maintenance," and the issue was whether the clearing of sewer lines fell into 
the category of "operation" or "maintenance."  We concluded that because the sewer lines 
could not function, or "operate," without being cleared, that activity was 
necessarily included in the term "operation" and immunity was waived for failing 
to keep the sewer lines free from obstruction.   Id., ¶ 12, 145 P.3d  at 
1280.  
Nevertheless, we fail to see how that holding supports Mr. Watts' claim 
that, when the legislature waived immunity for negligence in operation of a 
building, it intended to include the entity that occupied the building.   Unlike with 
public utilities and hospitals, the legislature did not waive immunity for 
negligence in the operation of penal institutions.

 
 
[¶25]   Moreover, we have, in prior cases, 
limited the reach of § 1-39-106 in accordance with its plain language.  In Huitt, 844 P.2d  at 
1105, we 
stated:

 
 
[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the words "operation or 
maintenance of any building" does not encompass the deliberate destruction of 
it.  In the 
context of the Act, the operation of a building is not the same as an operation 
on a building, and while the maintenance of a building is that done on or to a 
building, that done under maintenance is just the opposite of the destruction of 
it.

 
 
In Soles, 809 P.2d  at 773-74, we ruled that inspection of 
a building did not fall within the definition of maintenance of a public 
building.  

 
 
[¶26]   Both parties direct us to cases from 
New Mexico to support their 
respective positions.  
New Mexico's 
governmental claims act is similar to Wyoming's.  The analogous 
New Mexico statute states that 
governmental immunity is waived for "liability for damages . . . caused by the negligence of 
public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation 
or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or 
furnishings."  
N.M. Stat. § 41-4-6(A) (LexisNexis 2007).  Because of these similarities, one 
commentator has stated that New 
Mexico decisions "should be consulted to interpret like provisions" 
of the Wyoming act.  L. Wolfe, Comment, Wyoming's 
Governmental Claims Act:  Sovereign Immunity with Exceptions  A 
Statutory Analysis, 15 Land & Water L. Rev. 619, 623 (1980).  See also, Cottier, ¶ 12 n. 5, 
145 P.3d  at 1279.  

 
 
[¶27]   Unfortunately, the New 
Mexico decisions interpreting its public building 
statute do not give us clear guidance.  In fact, it is not unfair to say the 
New Mexico courts have followed a 
winding and tortured path in interpreting their statute.  One line of cases 
specifically holds that the public building exception does not waive immunity 
for negligence in the security, custody and classification of inmates.  Wittkowski v. 
State, 710 P.2d 93, 97 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Silva v. State, 
745 P.2d 380 (N.M. 1987); 
Gallegos v. State, 
758 P.2d 299, 301 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1987); Archibeque v. Moya, 866 P.2d 344, 347 (N.M. 
1993).     

 
 
[¶28]   In Wittkowski, two 
violent and psychotic inmates escaped from a New Mexico minimum security facility and 
crossed the border into Colorado where they 
killed the plaintiff's decedent during a liquor store robbery.  Wittkowski, 710 P.2d  at 94-95.  
The complaint alleged the New 
Mexico authorities failed to properly classify the 
prisoners and utilize proper means to ensure they did not escape.  Id.  The New 
Mexico court of appeals held that the public building 
exception did not waive immunity for negligence in the security, custody and 
classification of inmates.  
Id.at 97.  The court ruled 
the statute did not apply because "the injuries alleged did not occur due to a 
physical defect in the building."  Id.  Similarly in Gallegos, 758 P.2d  
at 301, the court of appeals applied the holding of Wittkowski and 
ruled that immunity was not waived for negligence in failing to keep a mop 
wringer, which was used as a weapon by other inmates in the plaintiff inmate's 
assault, away from the assailants.   

 
 
[¶29]   The New Mexico Supreme Court confirmed 
the Wittkowski 
and Gallegos 
decisions in Archibeque, 866 P.2d  at 347, which involved a certified 
question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  A penitentiary employee had negligently 
classified Archibeque as an inmate that could be released into the general 
population and he was subsequently assaulted by other prisoners.  Id. at 346.  The court ruled 
that, when the employee determined the plaintiff could be released into the 
general population, she was performing an administrative function and was not 
operating or maintaining the prison's physical premises.  Id. at 347.  The opinion 
specifically distinguished other cases in which the "public building" exception 
had been read more broadly, ruling that they "left intact the rule that the 
security, custody, and classification of inmates does not comprise the 
operation' and maintenance' of penitentiary premises."  Id. at 348, citing Bober v. New MexicoState Fair, 808 P.2d 614 (N.M. 1991) 
and Castillo v. 
County of Santa Fe, 755 P.2d 48 (N.M. 
1988).  The 
court noted the difference between negligence in operation of a public building, 
for which immunity was waived by the legislature, and negligence in operation of 
the corrections system, for which immunity had not been waived.  Id. at 347.    

  

[¶30]   Other cases, including those referred 
to in Archibeque, 
read the "public building" exception more broadly.  See, e.g., Bober, 
808 P.2d 614 (holding the 
plaintiff stated a claim under the public buildings exception for an injury 
arising from an unsafe condition on State Fair grounds even though the accident 
occurred outside of the grounds); Castillo, 755 P.2d 48 (holding that a common area surrounding a publicly owned housing project 
was a part of the public building and allowing a claim for an unsafe condition 
involving dogs roaming loose in the common area); and Leithead v. City of 
Santa Fe, 940 P.2d 459 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1997) (ruling immunity was waived for negligence in operating a public 
swimming pool without sufficient guards because it was a dangerous condition on 
the physical premises which affected the swimming public at large).  In those cases, the 
New Mexico appellate courts allowed 
claims to be brought under the public building exception for unsafe conditions 
on public property which endangered the general public or a certain class of 
persons.  

 
 
[¶31]   In Rivera v. King, 765 P.2d 1187, 1194 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1988), the plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim after her husband, 
who was an inmate in the penitentiary, was tortured to death by other inmates 
during a riot.  The New 
Mexico court of appeals ruled, in part, that the 
plaintiff had properly stated a claim that the state failed to "timely renovate 
or repair riot control grilles so that they could be operated by remote control 
. . .".  
Id. at 1194.  That claim, 
arguably, implicated the state's responsibility to maintain the physical 
premises.  

 
 
[¶32]  In Callaway v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 875 P.2d 393 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1994), the New Mexico court of appeals seemed to back away from Wittkowski and its 
progeny and adopt a broader interpretation of the New Mexico public buildings 
immunity waiver in the context of prisons.  The court of appeals allowed an inmate's 
claim that the state officials were negligent under the public building 
exception.  

 
 
[W]e hold that Plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to 
waive immunity under Section 41-4-6 because Defendants knew or should have known 
that roaming gang members with a known propensity for violence had access to 
potential weapons in the recreation area, that such gang members created a 
dangerous condition on the premises of the penitentiary, and that the danger to 
other inmates was foreseeable.  

 
 

Id. at 399.  The court of appeals remarked that, unlike in 
Archibeque where 
only the individual victim was endangered by the state's actions, the alleged 
condition in Callaway exposed the general prison population to 
danger.  The 
New Mexico Supreme Court refused to hear the Callaway case on 
appeal.  
Id. at 393, cert. denied, May 
17, 1994.  

 
 
[¶33]   In Espinoza v. Town of 
Taos, 905 P.2d 718 (N.M. 1995), 
the Supreme Court discussed the Callaway decision and remarked that the court of 
appeals simply allowed a claim for negligent security practices which resulted 
in unsafe conditions for the entire prison population.  Id. at 722.  The court was able 
to reconcile the cases by stating that in all of the cases where the claims had 
been allowed, the negligent conduct had "itself created unsafe conditions for 
the general public."  
Id.

 
 
[¶34]   In a case outside of the prison 
context, the New Mexico court of appeals ruled 
that a student who was injured when he fell into a window that contained regular 
glass instead of safety glass and was not fitted with any safety guards to 
prevent someone from falling through the window stated a claim under the public 
buildings exception.  
Williams v. 
Central Consol. School Dist., 952 P.2d 978, 979-81 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).  The ruling was based, in part, on the factual 
finding that the applicable building codes required that the window be altered 
to ensure the safety of the students.  Id.    

 
 
[¶35]   In a more recent decision, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court broadly read the statute and allowed a claim brought by the 
parents of a student who died of an asthma attack at school to proceed.  Upton v. Clovis Municipal School Dist., 141 P.3d 1259 (N.M. 2006).  
The parents claimed that the school district operated the school in a 
manner which put their daughter and other similarly situated students at 
risk.  The New 
Mexico Supreme Court held that the failure of the school to follow safety 
procedures for students with special needs impacted the safe operation of the 
school building and, therefore, fell within the statutory waiver of immunity for 
negligence in the operation of public buildings.  Id. at 1262-65.   

 
 
[¶36]   We find no clear rationale in the 
New Mexico cases for interpreting 
"operation of a building" to include activities unrelated to the physical 
building.  
However, the New Mexico cases have clearly held, and we have no 
difficulty agreeing, that matters pertaining to the security, custody and 
classification of inmates are not cognizable under the public buildings 
exception, provided those matters do not concern the physical structure of the 
building.  We 
are not, however, inclined to agree that any "unsafe condition," beyond those 
involving the building itself, should come within the statute, especially when 
interpreted as broadly as the New Mexico Supreme Court did in Upton.  Instead, we 
believe the waiver of immunity in Wyoming was intended to apply only 
if the unsafe condition is due to a physical defect in the building.  The concept of 
physical defect would include any safety features mandated by applicable law, as 
recognized by the New Mexico court of appeals in Williams.       

 
 
[¶37]   This Court is more inclined to agree 
with Maine's interpretation of its 
public buildings exception, also similar to § 1-39-106.  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
14 § 8104-A(2) (2007) states in pertinent part:   

 
 

PUBLIC BUILDINGS.  
A governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in 
the construction, operation or maintenance of any public building or the 
appurtenances to any public building.  

 
 
Interpreting this provision, the Maine Supreme Court has 
ruled that the "operation of a public building exception to immunity . . . must 
implicate the physical structure of the public building."  Lightfoot v. School 
Admin. Dist. No. 35, 816 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 2003).  Thus, the exception 
did not apply to allegations that the decedent was negligently placed in a 
closed room that contained the instruments necessary for him to hang 
himself.  Jensen v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 574 A.2d 885, 886 (Me. 1990).  In Lightfoot, the 
plaintiff was a wrestler and the coach required the team to run through the 
school hallways during practice.  While taking part in this activity one day, 
the plaintiff put his arm through a glass window on the side of an open fire 
door.  Lightfoot, 816 A.2d  
at 65.  The 
Maine Supreme Court stated that the focus of the plaintiff's complaint was not 
the operation of the building, but the manner in which the wrestling team was 
permitted to use it.  
Id. at 66.  The court, 
therefore, decided that the plaintiff's claims were not cognizable under the 
waiver of immunity for negligence in the operation of a public building because 
there was no claim that the "hallways, the fire door openings, or the fire doors 
were physically operated in an unsafe manner, or improperly maintained."  Id. at 66-67.  We agree with 
Maine's interpretation of its 
statute.  In 
order to be cognizable under the public buildings exception the claimed 
negligence must pertain to the physical building.  

 
 
[¶38]   We, therefore, conclude the clear and 
unambiguous language of § 1-39-106, within the context of the rest of the WGCA, 
indicates that the legislature intended to limit the waiver of immunity to 
negligence associated with the function of the building structure and did not 
intend to extend the waiver to negligence associated with operation of the penal 
institution within the building.  The operation and maintenance responsibility 
includes fixtures attached to the building.  Moreover, like the New 
Mexico court of appeals recognized in Williams, if 
applicable building codes, statutes or ordinances mandate that certain safety 
features be installed or in use in the building, then liability would extend to 
injuries arising from the failure of the governmental entity to install or 
maintain those devices.  We have no difficulty stating that such 
matters fall within the definition of operation of public buildings because they 
are necessary to make the building legally functional.  We do, as always, 
take this opportunity to invite the legislature to revise the statute if we have 
not interpreted it in accordance with its intent.  

 
 
[¶39]   We turn now to the substance of Mr. 
Watts' claims.  
The allegations that the State improperly moved Mr. Grady to the Honor 
Farm, had insufficient or improperly trained or supervised guards at the Honor 
Farm, and failed to imprison and guard Mr. Grady properly do not pertain to the 
physical structure of the building and, consequently, do not fall within the 
exception.  

 
 
[¶40]   With regard to his lack of surveillance 
claim, Mr. Watts argues that security cameras should have been installed so that 
the guards could monitor the east entrance.  The Honor Farm warden testified that security 
cameras had been ordered for the medical office area, but they apparently had 
not been installed at the time of Ms. Watts' death.  Mr. Watts submitted 
an affidavit from a former correctional officer at the Honor Farm.  He stated that, in 
his opinion, "if there had been security cameras to monitor the entrance to the 
medical offices, it is unlikely Floyd Grady could have prevented detection of 
his presence and Tammy Watts would not have been killed."  Mr. Watts does not, 
however, direct us to any building code or other law that mandated installation 
of security cameras in the medical offices.  Thus, Mr. Watts' claims of insufficient 
surveillance or the lack of security cameras do not fall within the waiver.     

 
 
[¶41]   Mr. Watts claims the State was 
negligent by placing the medical offices in the basement and that action falls 
within the statutory waiver of immunity for public buildings.  We cannot 
agree.  The 
record indicates that the medical offices had previously been located on the 
ground floor of the administration building, but, because more room was needed, 
they had been moved to the basement at least a year before the homicide 
occurred.  The 
decision to place the medical offices in the basement was administrative and did 
not pertain to the physical structure of the building.  Instead, it was a 
decision concerning how the Honor Farm would be operated as an entity.  Mr. Watts' claim in 
that regard is not, therefore, cognizable under § 1-39-106.

 
 
[¶42]   Finally, Mr. Watts also asserts the 
State was negligent in providing for Ms. Watts' security and safety.   As we stated 
earlier, matters pertaining to the security, custody and classification of 
inmates are not cognizable under the public building exception to the WGCA.  Because Mr. Watts 
does not argue that any particular physical defect in the building resulted in 
Ms. Watts' death, his claim does not fall within the parameters of § 
1-39-106.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶43]   Section 1-39-106 does not waive the 
State's immunity for negligence in the operation of the corrections system.  Instead, it 
specifically limits the exception to matters associated with the physical 
building itself.  
Because Mr. Watts' claims do not pertain to the physical condition of a 
building at the Wyoming Honor Farm, the State is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.  

 
 
[¶44]   Case No. S-07-0050, writ of review, is 
dismissed.  
Case No. S-07-0095, appeal, is reversed and remanded to the district 
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We issued an order 
requiring the parties to brief the jurisdiction issue.

   

2State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982) could also be argued to 
promote a liberal interpretation of the WGCA.   Stovall stated that the general rule requiring strict 
interpretation of statutes which are in derogation of common law did not 
necessarily apply to the WGCA because it was "not entirely in derogation of 
common law."  
Id. at 548.  Moreover, Stovall rejected a 
strict construction of the statute because it would result in an absurd 
result.  
Id.  Considered in its 
entirety, we are not convinced that Stovall stands for the proposition that the WGCA should 
be liberally construed.