Title: Mitchell v. Krieckhaus

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 70 
Docket: 
Cum-16-375 
Argued: 
March 2, 2017 
 
Decided: 
April 18, 2017 
 
Panel: 
MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.* 
 
 
JOYCE E. MITCHELL 
 
v. 
 
ALEXANDER S. KRIECKHAUS 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Joyce E. Mitchell appeals from the denial of her motions for findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, deviation from child support guidelines, and 
reconsideration, all of which addressed the divorce judgment entered by the 
District Court (Portland, J. French, J.) on June 15, 2016.  Mitchell argues, 
inter alia, that before the court issued a child support order it was required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the parties provided 
substantially equal care of their son.  We agree, vacate the judgment of divorce 
insofar as it establishes a child support obligation to be paid by Mitchell, and 
remand for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 
                                         
*  Chief Justice Saufley sat at oral argument and participated in the Court’s initial conference 
regarding this opinion immediately following the oral argument but did not participate further in the 
development of this opinion. 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
[¶2]  Joyce E. Mitchell and Alexander S. Krieckhaus were married on 
October 5, 1997; Mitchell filed a complaint for divorce seventeen years later, on 
October 7, 2014.  The parties undertook discovery and engaged in case 
management conferences, mediation, and settlement conferences.  Ultimately, 
on May 10, 2016, after a day-long, judicially-assisted settlement conference, the 
parties reached a settlement agreement and agreed in writing to waive their 
right 
to 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
that 
would 
result 
from 
it.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 118(c).  A stipulated order on children’s issues was signed by 
the court on that date. 
 
[¶3]  The stipulated order called for child support to “be paid pursuant to 
the Maine Child Support Guidelines based on [Mitchell’s] base income of 
$344,000 and [Krieckhaus’s] anticipated income of $56,000.”  Pursuant to the 
order, the parties were to share parental rights and responsibilities.  They were 
also to share primary residence of their son, with Mitchell having primary 
residence of their two daughters.  Concerning their son, the order set out in 
considerable detail the contact arrangements based on his school-year 
schedule, vacations, holidays, child care, and extra-curricular activities.  The 
parents were to have equal access to records regarding the children and were 
 
3 
to keep each other fully informed of the children’s appointments and school 
matters. 
 
[¶4]  Prior to signing the stipulated order on children’s issues, the court 
conducted a hearing in open court with the parties and their counsel, during 
which Mitchell’s attorney stated, “[T]he order calls for a child support order, 
which isn’t there yet.  And so obviously, that would have to be subject to review 
and approval.”  The court responded,  
One of the things that—and I’m sorry that I didn’t share this with 
all the parties—that was asked of me when I was meeting with the 
defendant and his counsel . . . is whether the Court would draft the 
child support order, based upon—and the worksheet—based upon 
the numbers.[1]  So I’ll do that and provide it to the parties.  So I’ll 
take on that and make sure that they’ve had a chance to review it.  
Is that acceptable? 
 
Mitchell’s attorney confirmed that the proposed procedure was acceptable. 
 
[¶5]  The court requested that Krieckhaus’s counsel submit a stipulated 
divorce judgment by May 23, 2016.  The child support worksheets annexed to 
Krieckhaus’s proposed judgment included a supplemental worksheet that was 
predicated upon a presumption that the parties provided substantially equal 
                                         
1  The record does not disclose whether the private conversation among the judge, Krieckhaus, 
and Krieckhaus’s attorney (which presumably occurred during the judicially-assisted settlement 
process) regarding the preparation of child support worksheets included discussion of the use of 
basic or supplemental worksheets.  A supplemental worksheet would be applicable if the court were 
determining child support for parties who have unequal incomes but who provide “substantially 
equal care” for the child.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1) (2016). 
 
4 
care for their son.  The proposed order called for Mitchell to pay Krieckhaus a 
total of $249.58 biweekly while three children were entitled to parental 
support, $440.22 biweekly while two children were entitled to support, and 
$788.42 biweekly once only their son was entitled to support. 
 
[¶6]  On June 7, 2016, through counsel, Mitchell responded by sending a 
letter to the court advising that the parties did not agree that they provided 
substantially equal care for their son even if they shared primary residence.  
The letter included draft child support worksheets that called for Krieckhaus to 
pay Mitchell a total of $296.24 biweekly while three children were entitled to 
support, $248.92 biweekly when two children were entitled to support, and 
$165.48 biweekly when one child was entitled to support. 
 
[¶7]  The court entered a divorce judgment on June 15, 2016, in which it 
based the amount of child support upon the parties providing substantially 
equal care for their son, consistent with Krieckhaus’s child support worksheets.  
In a footnote to the child support provision, the court explained: 
At the final hearing the Court indicated it would draft the child 
support documents.  Since that time, a dispute has arisen between 
the parties as to whether or not they will be providing substantially 
equal care of their son . . . and consequently whether or not child 
support for him should be calculated using the “supplemental” 
child support worksheet.  The Court has concluded, a) based upon 
the totality of the evidence presented at the final hearing as to the 
parties’ agreement; b) after review of the stipulation; c) finding that 
 
5 
the parties agreed to an award of shared parental rights and 
responsibilities and a shared residential schedule; and, d) the lack 
of evidence that one of the parties would be providing primary 
residential care of [their son] for the purpose of calculating child 
support, that child support will be determined using the 
supplemental child support worksheet. 
 
[¶8]  On June 27, Mitchell filed a motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; on June 30, she filed motions for reconsideration of the child 
support order and for a deviation from the child support guidelines.  Mitchell 
argued that the parties never agreed that they were providing substantially 
equal care for their son; that the court could not find that they were providing 
substantially equal care without holding an evidentiary hearing; that the 
parties did not, in fact, provide substantially equal care; and that even if they 
did provide substantially equal care, a deviation from that provision in the 
guidelines was warranted. 
 
[¶9]  After receiving memoranda from Krieckhaus, and without holding a 
hearing, the court issued an order on July 27, 2016, denying all of Mitchell’s 
motions.  The court reasoned that the motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law was untimely and exceeded the scope of relief afforded by 
M.R. Civ. P. 52.  With respect to the motion for reconsideration, the court stated 
that it had, “in issuing the Divorce Judgment construed the Stipulated Order and 
found as a matter of law that the parties agreed to a ‘substantially equal care’ 
 
6 
arrangement with respect to [their son] . . . requir[ing] the use of the 
supplemental child support worksheet.”  (Emphasis added.)  It denied 
Mitchell’s motion for a deviation from the guidelines as being inconsistent with 
the parties’ agreement that child support be awarded pursuant to the 
guidelines.  The court confirmed the divorce judgment’s provision ordering 
Mitchell to pay $25,000 of Krieckhaus’s attorney fees, but denied Krieckhaus’s 
request to award him additional attorney fees.  Mitchell timely appealed.  
See 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2016). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Availability of Appellate Review 
[¶10]  Krieckhaus argues that Mitchell cannot appeal the judgment after 
reviewing and signing the stipulated order on children’s issues with counsel 
present and then waiving her right to appeal.  He asserts that she should have 
been aware that the child support guidelines include a provision for parents 
who provide substantially equal care.  Mitchell contends that she expressly 
preserved the right to object to the final application of the guidelines when she 
told the court at the hearing that the child support order “isn’t there yet” and 
“would have to be subject to review and approval”; that she did object to 
Krieckhaus’s assertion that the parties would be providing substantially equal 
 
7 
care for their son as soon as that issue was raised; and that her appeal should 
be heard to prevent injustice because there was no indication until after the 
hearing that Krieckhaus would seek child support under the “substantially 
equal care” provision of the statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1) (2016). 
 
[¶11]  Parties to a family matter “may . . . waive their rights to appeal.”  
M.R. Civ. P. 118(c).  We have not yet squarely decided whether M.R. Civ. P. 118 
allows a party to appeal from a court’s determination that is made after the 
parties reach a stipulated agreement that includes a waiver of appeal.  We have 
said, however, that “[w]hen parties report to the court that they have reached 
a settlement and have memorialized the terms of the agreement and expressed 
clear consent to those terms, that settlement becomes an enforceable 
agreement and, upon acceptance by the court, is incorporated as a judgment of 
the court.”  2301 Cong. Realty, LLC v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 2014 ME 147, ¶ 10, 
106 A.3d 1131 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶12]  If the terms of a settlement agreement are “discussed at length on 
the record, and at that time all parties agree[] to the settlement,” a court may 
ordinarily enter a judgment based on those terms even if a dispute arises after 
the agreement is reached but before the entry of judgment.  Page v. Page, 
671 A.2d 956, 957-58 (Me. 1996).  We have, however, “allowed an exception to 
 
8 
this rule in those cases when a party challenges the sufficiency of the agreement 
placed on the record,” for instance “when a party alleges that his attorney acted 
without authority in entering into the agreement.”  Id. at 958; see Lane v. 
Me. Cent. R.R., 572 A.2d 1084, 1085 (Me. 1990).  Absent such a problem, 
“a stipulation of record that sufficiently covers the settlement agreement can 
be summarily enforced by the entry of a judgment” even if a party withdraws 
consent.  Page, 671 A.2d at 958. 
 
[¶13]  Here, unlike in Page, the record demonstrates a clear lack of 
agreement about how the child support guidelines would be applied; 
accordingly, the settlement agreement was insufficient to allow the court to 
enter judgment on that issue in the face of Mitchell’s later objection.  Mitchell 
expressly advised the court that the child support order would be subject to 
“review and approval” by the parties after the court completed its 
computations, and the court both acknowledged the necessity of their review 
prior to the entry of a divorce judgment and confirmed that its child support 
worksheet and proposed order would be made available to the parties for 
review. 
 
[¶14]  The procedural posture of this matter, once it became clear that 
the parties did not agree about the application of the child support guidelines, 
 
9 
is analogous to a partially resolved family matter or a matter in which the court 
does not approve part of a settlement agreement.  In either of those events, the 
court must provide the opportunity for a hearing on disputed issues.  
See Lowd v. Dimoulas, 2005 ME 19, ¶¶ 5-6, 866 A.2d 867; see also Yoder v. Yoder, 
2007 ME 27, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d 228. 
[¶15]  The waiver of appeal, executed on the same day that Mitchell 
reserved her right to review the final child support order, cannot therefore be 
deemed to have encompassed the very issue specifically held open for later 
determination.  As to the terms of the stipulated order on children’s issues 
where no reservation of rights was articulated, no appeal may be taken.  
However, as to the issue of the child support computation, which was expressly 
reserved for later review and ultimately decided on a contested basis by the 
court, the waiver of appeal presents no obstacle to appellate review. 
B. 
Necessity of Evidentiary Hearing 
 
[¶16]  Mitchell argues that the parties never agreed that they were 
providing “substantially equal care,” 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1), and that, 
given the parties’ dispute, such a factual determination can be made only after 
an evidentiary hearing.  Krieckhaus contends that the terms of the agreement 
established that the parties provide substantially equal care for their son.  
 
10 
“We review de novo whether an individual was afforded procedural due 
process. . . . The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  In re Adden B., 
2016 ME 113, ¶ 7, 144 A.3d 1158 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶17]  The determination of whether parents provide substantially equal 
care for a child is grounded in findings of fact.  See Jabar v. Jabar, 2006 ME 74, 
¶ 17, 899 A.2d 796.  The party contending that he provides substantially equal 
care bears the burden of proof on that issue.  Pratt v. Sidney, 2009 ME 28, ¶ 10, 
967 A.2d 685.  Thus, absent an agreement by the parties, the court is placed in 
the position of a fact-finder on a disputed issue.  See id. ¶ 12 (holding that a 
fact-finder must determine whether parents are providing substantially equal 
care). 
 
[¶18]  Ordinarily, a parent’s child support obligation is determined by 
applying 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4) (2016), using the Schedule of Basic Child 
Support Obligation table, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001(3), 2006(1), 2011 (2016).  In 
the “special circumstance[]” in which the parties provide “substantially equal 
care,” however, the calculation is different: 
When the parties do not have equal annual gross incomes but 
provide substantially equal care for each child for whom support is 
being determined, the presumptive parental support obligation 
must be determined as follows. 
 
11 
(1) The enhanced support entitlement for each child must be 
determined. 
(2) Using the enhanced support entitlement, a parental 
support obligation for each child must be determined by 
dividing the total enhanced support obligation between the 
parties in proportion to their respective gross incomes. 
(3) The party with the higher annual gross income has a 
presumptive obligation to pay the other party the lower of: 
(a) The difference between their parental support 
obligations as calculated in subparagraph (2); and 
(b) The presumptive parental support obligation 
determined for the payor party using the basic support 
entitlement under the support guidelines as though 
the other party provided primary residential care of 
the child. 
(4) The parties shall share the child care costs, health 
insurance premiums and uninsured medical expenses in 
proportion to their incomes. 
19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(D-1).  “‘Substantially equal care’ means that both parents 
participate substantially equally in the child’s total care, which may include, but 
is not limited to, the child’s residential, educational, recreational, child care and 
medical, dental and mental health care needs.”  19-A M.R.S. § 2001(8-A) (2016). 
 
[¶19]  Because a finding of “substantially equal care” is not based on a 
limited list of statutory factors, but instead on an open-ended inquiry requiring 
findings regarding the extent to which the parents participate in the “child’s 
total care,” id., the mere fact that parties agree to shared primary residence in a 
 
12 
settlement agreement is insufficient by itself to establish that the parties also 
agree that they provide substantially equal care—even if the time the child 
spends with each parent is roughly equal.  As we have made clear, the 
determination of substantially equal care is based on more than a rigid 
calculation of time spent with each parent or what responsibilities the parents 
share.  See Pratt, 2009 ME 28, ¶ 11, 967 A.2d 685. 
 
[¶20]  The limited testimony at the settlement hearing provided no basis 
for the court to conclude that the parties agreed that they were providing 
“substantially equal care” for their son as defined by statute.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§§ 2001(8-A), 2006(5)(D-1).  On the contrary, the statements by Mitchell’s 
attorney during the May 10 hearing and in his June 7 letter made it abundantly 
clear that the parties were very much not in agreement.  The court’s finding, 
characterized as a decision of law, that the parties had agreed to a substantially 
equal care arrangement with regard to their son was reached without 
providing the parties with a meaningful opportunity to present evidence on this 
hotly-contested factual issue, and thus constituted error.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the judgment in part and remand for the court to hold an evidentiary 
 
13 
hearing on the issue of computation of child support pursuant to the child 
support guidelines.2 
 
The entry is: 
 
Paragraph (4) of the divorce judgment 
imposing a child support obligation on 
Mitchell is vacated.  Remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of child 
support and for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jed Davis, Esq. (orally), Jim Mitchell and Jed Davis, P.A., Augusta, for appellant 
Joyce E. Mitchell 
 
Dori F. Chadbourne, Esq. (orally), Chadbourne Law Offices, P.A., Portland, for 
appellee Alexander S. Krieckhaus 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number FM-2014-983 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
2  Because we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing, we do not reach the remainder of 
Mitchell’s arguments.