Title: BLUMHAGEN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BLUMHAGEN v. STATE2000 WY 18011 P.3d 889Case Number: 99-191Decided: 09/29/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CRAIG BLUMHAGEN, 
Appellant (Defendant),v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Edward L. 
Grant, Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Daniel G. Blythe of 
Blythe & Steiner, P.C., Cheyenne, WyomingRepresenting Appellee: 
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Joseph P. Johnson III, Student Intern for the 
Prosecution Assistance Program

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY*, GOLDEN & HILL, 
JJ.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Craig Blumhagen appeals from his conviction on three counts of delivering 
cocaine.

[¶2] We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] Blumhagen 
presents the following issues on appeal:

[¶4] Was the 
trial court's refusal to allow the only eyewitness to the events charged to be 
impeached error?

[¶5] Was the 
trial court's decision to allow [the admission of] the fruits of a search of the 
defendant's new residence some five months after the events in question an abuse 
of discretion and was the admission of uncharged misconduct in violation of Rule 
403 and Rule 404 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence error?

[¶6] Was Mr[.] 
Blumhagen denied the effective assistance of trial 
counsel?

FACTS

[¶7] In the fall 
of 1997, Detective Wesley Gasner of the Cheyenne Police Department enlisted the 
help of a confidential informant to uncover drug activities in Cheyenne. The 
confidential informant asked Blumhagen to meet her at her apartment on November 
2, 1997. Detective Gasner searched the confidential informant prior to the 
meeting and gave her a cellular telephone and money to buy 
cocaine.

[¶8] Blumhagen 
was driven to the confidential informant's apartment by an unidentified person 
in a car registered to Rudy Hernandez. Blumhagen gave the cocaine to the 
confidential informant, and the informant paid him with the money provided by 
Detective Gasner. During the exchange, Detective Gasner hid in the confidential 
informant's bathroom, and two other officers surveilled the apartment from 
outside. Blumhagen left the apartment in Hernandez's car.

[¶9] The 
confidential informant also purchased cocaine from Blumhagen later that evening. 
Detective Gasner drove the confidential informant to Blumhagen's apartment. The 
detective then gave Blumhagen and the confidential informant a ride to a Cribbon 
Avenue residence, which apparently belonged to Hernandez. Detective Gasner 
remained in the car while Blumhagen and the confidential informant walked down 
an alley near the residence. Blumhagen went into Hernandez's house, and the 
confidential informant waited outside in the alley. When he returned from 
Hernandez's house, Blumhagen gave the cocaine to the confidential 
informant.

[¶10] On 
November 23, 1997, the confidential informant met Detective Gasner at the police 
station. Detective Gasner drove the confidential informant to Blumhagen's 
apartment, and she went inside. The detective waited in the car and other 
officers surveilled the area while the confidential informant was in Blumhagen's 
apartment. Blumhagen told the confidential informant that he was "waiting for 
the guy to bring it over. " After approximately fifteen minutes, Hernandez 
arrived at the apartment. He and Blumhagen talked in a corner, and then 
Hernandez left. Blumhagen put the cocaine into the confidential informant's 
pocket, and she paid him.

[¶11] On January 
16, 1998, the district attorney filed a criminal information, charging Blumhagen 
with three counts of delivering cocaine. On April 10, 1998, the police searched 
Hernandez and Blumhagen's residence on Cribbon Avenue, seizing drugs and drug 
paraphernalia.1 Blumhagen was arrested, and, after 
he and Hernandez were tried in a joint trial, a jury found Blumhagen guilty of 
all three counts. The district court subsequently denied Blumhagen's motion for 
a new trial, entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, and 
sentenced him to the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Blumhagen appealed to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

[¶12] In his 
first issue, Blumhagen presents a multi-faceted argument challenging the trial 
court's decisions on the admissibility of evidence about the confidential 
informant's drug use. The state argues that the trial court's rulings were 
correct. We agree with the state.

[¶13] A trial 
court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will 
not disturb that court's evidentiary rulings unless it abused its discretion. 
Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 851 (Wyo. 1999); Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 
1245 (Wyo. 1996). A court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, we must decide the ultimate issue of whether or not the court could 
have reasonably concluded as it did. Id.; see also Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶14] The 
prosecution filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court exclude 
evidence of the confidential informant's prior drug use. The parties argued the 
motion immediately following jury selection. The trial court reserved its ruling 
on the motion, stating that it would allow

[¶15] Blumhagen 
to make an offer of proof concerning his proposed cross-examination of the 
confidential informant after the prosecution finished its direct examination of 
her. The prosecution called the confidential informant as its first witness, but 
it did not question her about her drug use. The prosecution did, however, elicit 
testimony from the confidential informant concerning the fact that she had been 
placed on probation three or four months before she began working as a 
confidential informant and, while on probation, she underwent urine tests, the 
results of which were negative. Blumhagen did not make an offer of proof before 
he cross-examined the confidential informant, and he did not question her about 
her drug use.

[¶16] Detective 
Gasner testified after the confidential informant. During the defense counsel's 
cross-examination of the detective, she questioned him about the confidential 
informant's drug use. He testified that the confidential informant told him she 
had used drugs "in her younger days" but that she was currently 
"straight."

[¶17] After the 
prosecution rested its case, Blumhagen's attorney indicated that she wanted to 
call a witness to testify about the confidential informant's prior drug use. The 
defense attorney insisted that the evidence was necessary to impeach the 
confidential informant's credibility. The defense counsel conceded, however, 
that she did not expect to elicit testimony showing that the confidential 
informant was using drugs while she was acting as a confidential informant. 
Blumhagen called Shane Cauley to testify in an offer of proof concerning the 
confidential informant's drug use. Cauley testified that he had witnessed the 
confidential informant using methamphetamine during the summer of 1997 but that 
he had not seen her use drugs since that time. The trial court refused to allow 
Cauley to testify before the jury, indicating that Cauley's testimony was 
collateral and was not relevant to the trial issues.

[¶18] W.R.E. 
608(b) prohibits using extrinsic evidence to prove a specific instance of a 
witness' conduct for the purpose of establishing the witness' character or 
propensity for lying. Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1137-38 (Wyo. 1997); Gist 
v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Wyo. 1988). That rule 
states:

(b) Specific instances of 
conduct. - Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning 
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

[¶19] W.R.E. 
608(b). Cauley's testimony about the confidential informant's drug use during 
the summer of 1997 amounted to extrinsic evidence concerning a specific instance 
of the confidential informant's conduct and was not, therefore, admissible to 
attack her credibility.

[¶20] A witness' 
use of drugs while she is testifying or during the events about which she is 
testifying may, of course, be presented to the jury because the drug use could 
have affected the witness' observations or statements. See Gist, 766 P.2d at 
1151-53; Valerio v. State, 542 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo. 1975). The defense did not 
present any evidence to show that the confidential informant was under the 
influence of drugs while she was testifying or working with Detective Gasner. 
Indeed, the defense counsel admitted that she did not expect to elicit testimony 
from Cauley that the confidential informant was using drugs while she was acting 
as a confidential informant. Consequently, we agree with the trial court that 
Cauley's testimony about the confidential informant's prior drug use was not 
relevant. W.R.E. 401, 402; Valerio, 542 P.2d  at 877.

[¶21] Blumhagen 
also contends that Cauley's testimony was admissible because it specifically 
contradicted the confidential informant's trial testimony. He claims that this 
Court's decision in Gist supports his position. In that case, an undercover 
narcotics officer testified that he had simulated smoking marijuana while taking 
part in a drug transaction involving the defendant. Gist, 766 P.2d  at 1149. The 
officer testified, however, that he had never actually used illegal drugs. 766 P.2d  at 1150. The defense requested that the trial court allow it to present 
extrinsic evidence of the officer's prior drug use to contradict the officer's 
statement. Id. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to present the 
extrinsic evidence to the jury. 766 P.2d  at 1151-52. On appeal, this Court held 
that extrinsic evidence of the officer's prior drug use was admissible to refute 
his statement that he had not used drugs because that issue was material to the 
case. 766 P.2d  at 1152.

[¶22] There are 
two important differences between the facts of Gist and the facts of the case at 
bar. The first is that, in this case, the confidential informant did not testify 
about her prior drug use. The confidential informant's only testimony touching 
on the subject of her drug use was that the results of the urine tests she took 
while on probation were negative. Cauley's proposed testimony did not address 
the confidential informant's urine tests and, accordingly, did not contradict 
the confidential informant's testimony. The other difference between Gist and 
this case is that there was evidence in Gist which suggested that the officer 
had used drugs during the events about which he was testifying; in this case, 
there was no such evidence. Consequently, the holding in Gist is not applicable 
to the case at bar.

[¶23] Blumhagen 
contends that, under W.R.E. 806, he should have been allowed to have Cauley 
testify to refute Detective Gasner's testimony that the confidential informant 
told him she had used drugs in "her younger days" but was presently "straight." 
W.R.E. 806 provides:

[¶24] When a 
hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), 
has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked 
and if attacked may be supported by any evidence which would be admissible for 
those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement 
or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay 
statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an 
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement 
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to 
examine him on the statement as if under 
cross-examination.

[¶25] Cauley's 
testimony would not have contradicted the confidential informant's statement to 
Detective Gasner. During the offer of proof, Cauley testified that the 
confidential informant had used methamphetamine at some unspecified time during 
the summer of 1997. Detective Gasner's testimony pertained to his conversation 
with the confidential informant while she was working with him in November 1997. 
Cauley's proposed testimony was not directed specifically toward the 
confidential informant's credibility, and it did not directly contradict the 
confidential informant's out-of-court statement. Consequently, W.R.E. 806 did 
not apply in this case.

[¶26] Blumhagen 
also contends that, during the prosecution's redirect examination of him, 
Detective Gasner improperly vouched for the confidential informant's 
credibility:

Q. Has [the confidential 
informant] been a successful confidential informant for 
you?

A. She's been a great 
confidential informant and very reliable. She has given me information on other 
cases that has worked out to be true and correct.

[¶27] Blumhagen 
did not object to this line of questioning. We, therefore, apply our three-part 
plain error standard of review. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶28] First, the 
record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second, appellant 
must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a 
clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he 
was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against 
him.

[¶29] CB v. 
State, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo. 1988); see also Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶30] Generally, 
one witness may not testify as to another witness' credibility. See, e.g., 
Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1215; Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860. The purpose of this rule is 
to preserve the integrity of the jury process by protecting the jury's right to 
act as the final determiner of the credibility of the witnesses. Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860. We have stated, however, that a trial court does not necessarily 
commit plain error when it allows testimony which illuminates some aspect of the 
case even though the testimony incidentally bolsters the credibility of another 
witness. Id.; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶31] Detective 
Gasner did not express an opinion as to whether or not the confidential 
informant was a truthful witness in this case. He merely stated that he 
considered the confidential informant to be reliable and information she 
provided to him in other cases had turned out to be true and correct. The trial 
court did not, therefore, commit plain error by allowing the detective's 
testimony. Nevertheless, questions like the one posed in this case must be 
carefully worded so the answer does not invade the jury's province. We, 
therefore, caution counsel that, generally, such types of questions should be 
avoided. See Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860.

A. Evidence Seized in 
Search of Blumhagen's Residence

[¶32] Blumhagen 
contends that the trial court erred by allowing the physical evidence recovered 
during the April 1998 search of his residence to be admitted because the 
physical evidence was obtained in a search conducted nearly five months after 
the November 1997 drug sales and was, therefore, not relevant and the trial 
court did not follow the proper procedure in admitting the evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b). The state argues that Blumhagen is precluded from claiming on appeal 
that the trial court's admission of the evidence was erroneous because he 
withdrew his objection to the evidence. We agree with the 
state.

[¶33] The police 
searched the Cribbon Avenue residence on April 10, 1998, seizing drugs and drug 
paraphernalia. Prior to the trial, the prosecution filed a notice of its intent 
to introduce evidence at the trial under W.R.E. 404(b). The evidence listed in 
that notice, which is pertinent to our resolution of this issue, included 
evidence describing two sales of cocaine by Blumhagen in March and April 1998 
and physical evidence retrieved during the search of the Cribbon Avenue 
residence.

[¶34] At the 
trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce physical evidence seized from the 
Cribbon Avenue residence. The defense objected, claiming that the physical 
evidence was not relevant because the search was too remote in time from the 
November 1997 drug transactions. The prosecution argued that the evidence was 
relevant and, taking into account the on-going nature of the investigation, the 
search was not too remote in time from the charged transactions. It offered to 
establish the relevancy of the physical evidence by calling the confidential 
informant to testify about the details of March and April 1998 drug sales. The 
defense objected to evidence of 1998 drug deliveries being admitted, asserting 
that such evidence would be highly prejudicial to Blumhagen. Blumhagen withdrew 
his objection to the physical evidence, and the evidence was admitted. Evidence 
of March and April 1998 drug transactions was not, however, presented to the 
jury.

[¶35] We 
conclude that any error which resulted from the trial court's failure to require 
the prosecution to establish the relevancy of the physical evidence was invited 
by the defense. We thoroughly discussed the "invited error" doctrine in Schott 
v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 (Wyo. 1993):

"In appellate practice, 
the principle of `invited error' is that if, during the progress of a cause, a 
party requests or moves the court to make a ruling which is actually erroneous, 
and the court does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal 
or review."

BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 487 (5th ed. 1979).

"The doctrine of `invited 
error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on 
appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite 
party to commit."

5 AM. JUR. 2D 
Appeal and Error § 713 at 159 (1962).

[¶36] By 
withdrawing his objection to the physical evidence, Blumhagen induced the trial 
court to admit the evidence without requiring the prosecution to prove its 
relevancy. If Blumhagen had not made the tactical decision to withdraw his 
objection, presumably the prosecution would have presented evidence of March and 
April 1998 deliveries to establish that the investigation into Blumhagen's 
illegal activities was on-going and to tie the April 1998 search to the November 
1997 drug sales. We will not allow Blumhagen to profit on appeal from a 
situation he created.

[¶37] Blumhagen 
also claims that the trial court erred by failing to make findings concerning 
the admissibility of the other bad acts evidence seized during the search as 
required by Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1993). The Dean case articulated a 
five-step analysis for determining the admissibility of other bad acts evidence. 
865 P.2d  at 606. Of course, the Dean holding was superseded by this Court's 
decision in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo. 1996), wherein we adopted 
the four-part test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988). A trial 
court is not, however, obligated to conduct a hearing to determine whether 
other-bad-acts evidence is admissible when the defendant does not object to the 
evidence. Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 738 (Wyo. 1997); Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (Wyo. 1997). In this case, the trial court did not err by 
failing to conduct a Vigil analysis because Blumhagen withdrew his objection to 
the evidence.

[¶38] Blumhagen 
contends that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a limiting 
instruction concerning the other-bad-acts evidence. "A criminal defendant is 
entitled, upon making a proper request, to have a jury instruction given which 
sets forth the limited purpose for which the evidence is being admitted." 
Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 738. The trial court is not obligated to give a limiting 
instruction, however, when the defendant does not request it. Id. Blumhagen did 
not request a limiting instruction, and he may not, therefore, complain on 
appeal about the trial court's failure to give one.

B. Assistance of 
Counsel

[¶39] Blumhagen 
claims that he was not provided with effective assistance from his trial 
counsel. The state maintains that Blumhagen has failed to establish on appeal 
that his counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced by the alleged 
inadequacies in his representation. We agree with the 
state.

[¶40] In order 
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant 
must establish that his counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 678 (Wyo. 
1999); Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 1998). In making a case for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must overcome "a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment." Gist v. State, 
737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987); see also Cureton v. State, 950 P.2d 544, 546 
(Wyo. 1997).

[¶41] Blumhagen 
maintains that he was not properly represented because, during the pendency of 
his case, his original defense attorney left his position with the public 
defender's office and took a job with the district attorney's office. Prior to 
his trial, Blumhagen filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney's office 
from prosecuting his case because his first defense attorney had begun to work 
for that office. The trial court denied Blumhagen's 
motion.

[¶42] Blumhagen 
contends that the district attorney's office's continued representation of the 
state after his original attorney "switched sides" violated the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law. In general, the rules of professional 
conduct prohibit attorneys from representing clients when there is a potential 
conflict of interest. See, e.g., Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at 
Law 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12. Nevertheless, the rules recognize that attorneys 
change employment and, consequently, include a number of safeguards to protect 
the clients' interests under such circumstances. For example, when an attorney 
who works for a governmental agency leaves his employment and enters private 
practice or takes a position with another governmental agency, he cannot be 
involved in a matter that he participated in with his first employer. Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law 1.11 & cmt. [4]. Other attorneys 
associated with the disqualified attorney's new employer may, however, undertake 
or continue representation in a matter that the transferring attorney is 
prohibited from being involved with, provided that "the disqualified lawyer is 
screened from any participation in the matter" and notice is given to the former 
employer. Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law 1.11(a). The 
evidence in this case shows that the district attorney's office complied with 
the requirements of Rule 1.11(a) by screening Blumhagen's former attorney from 
participation in the matter and giving notice to the public defender's office. 
Additionally, Blumhagen has not shown that his defense was prejudiced, or even 
affected, by the attorney's change of employment.

[¶43] Blumhagen 
also argues that the legislature's failure to adequately fund the public 
defender's office had an unfavorable impact upon his defense. He claims that the 
lack of funds caused qualified attorneys to leave the public defender's office 
for employment with other governmental agencies. Blumhagen presented a report 
prepared by the Legislative Service Office which pertained to the funding of the 
public defender's office. The report was, however, dated nearly five years 
before Blumhagen's trial took place. Blumhagen does not establish how the 
information set out in the report was relevant to the funding condition of the 
public defender's office when his trial took place in 1998 or how the alleged 
lack of funding directly impacted his defense. Consequently, his claim must 
fail.

[¶44] In a third 
argument, Blumhagen maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective because she 
was not adequately prepared for trial. He points to a statement his attorney 
made during her argument on a motion to continue, which was filed four days 
before the trial began, as evidence that she was not prepared for his trial. The 
defense attorney claimed that a continuance of the trial date was necessary 
because "[t]here is [a] considerable amount of investigation that I believe 
would be helpful and which I have attempted to get done and which I have not 
been able to get done." The trial court denied the motion to 
continue.

[¶45] 
Blumhagen's attorney was appointed to represent him on August 1, 1998, and his 
trial began on September 22, 1998. Although the defense counsel stated that she 
would like to have more time to investigate the case, she did not give specific 
information about the focus of the proposed investigation or the evidence she 
expected to recover during her investigation. Without more, an attorney's 
statement that additional investigation would be helpful to the defendant's case 
certainly does not establish that the attorney was not adequately prepared for 
trial or that she did not provide the defendant with a sufficient defense. See 
Cureton, 950 P.2d  at 547.

[¶46] Blumhagen 
maintains that, if his attorney had been better prepared for trial, she would 
have called additional witnesses to impeach the confidential informant and 
Detective Gasner. He does not, however, provide us with a detailed account of 
the proposed witnesses' testimony. We do not, therefore, know whether the 
testimony would have been admissible or helpful to Blumhagen's defense. 
Consequently, on the record presented here, Blumhagen has not overcome the 
strong presumption that he was provided with effective assistance by his trial 
counsel or established that he was prejudiced by the alleged failings of his 
attorney.2

[¶47] 
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Blumhagen 
apparently moved into Hernandez's Cribbon Avenue house sometime between November 
1997 and March 1998.

2 Blumhagen's 
appellate brief contains a number of other statements suggesting additional 
claims of error. He does not, however, support those claims with cogent argument 
or pertinent authority, and, accordingly, we will not address them in this 
decision. Osborn v. Estate of Manning, 968 P.2d 932, 933 (Wyo. 
1998).