Title: HERALD CO INC V EASTERN MICH UNIV BD OF REGENTS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 19, 2006 
HERALD COMPANY, INC, d/b/a 
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC and 
ANN ARBOR NEWS,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 128263 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
BOARD OF REGENTS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J. 
The question presented in this case is whether the Washtenaw Circuit Court 
(the circuit court) properly withheld from disclosure a letter (Doyle letter) written 
by Eastern Michigan University’s (EMU) Vice President of Finance Patrick Doyle 
to a member of defendant EMU Board of Regents, Jan Brandon.  The circuit court 
held that the letter was exempt as a frank communication under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. The Doyle letter was written at 
Brandon’s request as part of defendant’s investigation of allegations that the then­
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
president of EMU, Samuel Kirkpatrick, had run the construction of a new 
president’s house (University House project) precipitously over budget. 
Applying the balancing test set forth in the statutory language of MCL 
15.243(1)(m), the frank communication exemption, the circuit court concluded 
that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighed 
the public interest in disclosure and, therefore, that the Doyle letter was exempt 
from disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, determining 
that the circuit court did not commit clear error.  We granted leave to appeal.   
We affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but we take this 
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of review of discretionary 
determinations in FOIA cases.  In Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing,1 
we held that appellate courts must review the trial court’s discretionary 
determinations in FOIA cases for clear error.  We continue to hold that the clear 
error standard of review is appropriate where the parties challenge the factual 
findings of the trial court. 
However, where the parties do not dispute the 
underlying facts but rather challenge the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we 
hold that an appellate court must review that determination for an abuse of 
1 467 Mich 98; 649 NW2d 383 (2002). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
discretion, which this Court now defines as a determination that is outside the 
principled range of outcomes.2 
In this case, the parties do not dispute the underlying facts.  Rather, they 
dispute the import of those facts as they factor into the weighted balancing test of 
the frank communication exemption.  Accordingly, we review the circuit court’s 
decision to affirm the nondisclosure of the Doyle letter for an abuse of discretion. 
We hold that the circuit court reached a decision that was within the principled 
range of outcomes when it determined the balance of competing interests favored 
nondisclosure and that it therefore did not abuse its discretion. 
We also hold that, pursuant to MCL 15.244, the public body must “to the 
extent practicable, facilitate a separation of exempt from nonexempt information” 
and “make the nonexempt material available for examination and copying.” 
Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court to separate this material from 
the Doyle letter and make the nonexempt material available to plaintiff. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Established by the Michigan Constitution, which confers upon it “general 
supervision of the institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from 
2 City of Novi v Robert Adell Children’s Funded Trust, 473 Mich 242, 254; 
701 NW2d 144 (2005), quoting People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 
231 (2003) (“Discretion is abused when the decision results in ‘an outcome falling 
outside this principled range of outcomes.’”). 
3  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
the institution’s funds,”3 defendant has broad constitutional and statutory4 
oversight to govern Eastern Michigan University.  Pursuant to this constitutional 
mandate, defendant investigated the University House project controversy as it 
unfolded in 2003.  The Doyle letter arose out of this internal investigation. 
Plaintiff Herald Company, Inc., doing business as Booth Newspapers, Inc., 
and the Ann Arbor News, sent FOIA requests to defendant on September 10 and 
11, 2003, as it conducted its own investigation, seeking numerous documents 
related to the University House project.5  In an October 1, 2003, letter, defendant 
3 Const 1963, art 8, § 6. 
4 MCL 390.553. 
5 In the September 10, 2003, FOIA request, plaintiff sought two categories 
of correspondence: 
1. Copies of all correspondence, including but not limited to 
letters, reports, memos and e-mails, to and from the following parties 
since Jan. 1, 2002, regarding the new University House on campus: 
• 
Vice President for Business and Finance Patrick Doyle 
or other staff members of the Office of Business and Finance. 
• 
The EMU Board of Regents. 
• 
EMU President Samuel Kirkpatrick. 
2. Copies of all correspondence, including but not limited to 
letters, reports, memos and e-mails, between Vice President for 
Business and Finance Patrick Doyle to and from the EMU Board of 
Regents, EMU President Samuel Kirkpatrick and/or the Office of 
Human Resources, regarding Doyle’s recent resignation and-or 
retirement. 
(continued…) 
4  
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
granted plaintiff’s FOIA requests except where defendant indicated either the 
documents sought did not exist or were in the possession of a separate corporate 
entity, the EMU Foundation.  Defendant sent a second letter to plaintiff on 
October 7, 2003, that specifically identified the Doyle letter and advised plaintiff 
that it would not disclose the letter pursuant to the frank communication 
exemption of the FOIA. 
On February 5, 2004, plaintiff filed simultaneously in the circuit court a 
complaint and an emergency motion to compel disclosure of the Doyle letter under 
the FOIA. After a hearing and viewing the letter in camera, the circuit court 
issued a written opinion and concluded that the Doyle letter met the statutory 
definition of a frank communication. In resolving the required statutory balancing 
test, the circuit court concluded that the balance favored nondisclosure.  It 
permitted defendant to withhold the Doyle letter in its entirety. 
In a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit 
court.6  Chief Judge Whitbeck filed a dissent, arguing that the circuit court 
(…continued) 
In the September 11, 2003, FOIA request, plaintiff sought all (1) budgets, 
(2) bank accounts, (3) invoices, (4) change orders, (5) bids, (6) funding sources, 
(7) board of regents resolutions, (8) and fees, salary, or other income paid to 
Pamela Kirkpatrick, wife of EMU President Samuel Kirkpatrick, related to the 
University House project. 
6 265 Mich App 185; 693 NW2d 850 (2005). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
committed clear error by misconstruing the balancing test.  We subsequently 
granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal.7 
II. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.8  To  
effectuate the intent of the Legislature, we interpret every word, phrase, and clause 
in a statute to avoid rendering any portion of the statute nugatory or surplusage.9 
In addition, certain FOIA provisions require the trial court to balance 
competing interests.10  In  Federated, this Court announced the appropriate 
standard of review of discretionary determinations in FOIA cases.  While 
discussing both factual findings and discretionary determinations, we stated in 
Federated that when an appellate court is called upon to evaluate the trial court’s 
discretionary determinations, it must defer to the trial court’s decision unless there 
7 472 Mich 928 (2005).  The parties were instructed to brief:  (1) whether 
the Court of Appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review; (2) 
whether the Washtenaw Circuit Court clearly erred in applying the § 13(1)(m) 
FOIA exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(m), to the public record in question; and (3) 
whether purely factual materials, if any, contained within the public record were 
properly included within the scope of the exemption. 
8 Federated, supra at 101. 
9 State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 
644 NW2d 715 (2002). 
10 For example, in addition to the weighted balancing test in the frank 
communication exemption, the Legislature codified FOIA balancing tests at MCL 
15.243(1)(c), (k), (n), (s), and (y). 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
 
 
 
was clear error.11  Clear error exists only when the appellate court “is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”12 
Federated inadvertently misstated the appropriate standard of review for 
discretionary determinations in FOIA cases.13  In Michigan, the clear error 
standard has historically been applied when reviewing a trial court’s factual 
findings14 whereas the abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing 
11 Federated, supra at 101. 
12 Id. at 107. 
13 We disagree with Justice Cavanagh’s argument that the abuse of 
discretion standard is inappropriate because the plaintiff has not and cannot view 
the contents of the withheld document.  Although the plaintiff does not know the 
factual content of a requested document, such is the nature of litigation under the 
FOIA. This asymmetry does not reveal a defect in the abuse of discretion standard 
of review. 
Justice Cavanagh does not disagree that, under Michigan’s traditional 
jurisprudence, discretionary determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
and he does not answer how, under the clear error standard, the plaintiff could 
better challenge facts of which it is unaware.  Consistent with our law, it is more 
appropriate for appellate courts to consider whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when it makes a discretionary determination in light of the constellation 
of known facts that form the “particular instance.”  Both parties concede that the 
Doyle letter contains Doyle’s written impressions about the University House 
project, and hence its legal status as a “frank communication,” and that the audit 
released a flood of financial information also pertaining to the project.  It is the 
importance of the former in light of the latter that is disputed by the parties. 
Resolving this dispute in the context of the statutory weighted balancing test 
requires the trial court to make a judgment call.  Therefore, we review that 
judgment call for an abuse of discretion. 
14 See, e.g., Federated, supra at 106; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 
NW2d 161 (1989); MCR 2.613(C). 
7  
 
   
                                                 
 
matters left to the trial court’s discretion.15  We take this opportunity to refine our 
position in Federated. First, we continue to hold that legal determinations  are 
reviewed under a de novo standard. Second, we also hold that the clear error 
standard of review is appropriate in FOIA cases where a party challenges the 
underlying facts that support the trial court’s decision.  In that case, the appellate 
court must defer to the trial court’s view of the facts unless the appellate court is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the trial 
court. Finally, when an appellate court reviews a decision committed to the trial 
court’s discretion, such as the balancing test at issue in this case, we hold that the 
appellate court must review the discretionary determination for an abuse of 
discretion and cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless it falls outside the 
principled range of outcomes.16 
15 See, e.g., Babcock, supra at 265, 268-270; People v Jendrzejewski, 455 
Mich 495, 500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997); Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, 
Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583; 624 NW2d 180 (2001). 
16 Cf. Babcock, supra at 265 (“whether a factor exists [fact question] is 
reviewed for clear error . . . whether a reason is substantial and compelling 
[discretionary determination] is reviewed for abuse of discretion”) (emphasis 
added). 
8  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
III. The FOIA and the Frank Communication Exemption 
 
The Legislature codified the FOIA to facilitate disclosure to the public of 
public records held by public bodies.17  However, by expressly codifying 
exemptions to the FOIA, the Legislature shielded some “affairs of government” 
from public view. The FOIA exemptions signal particular instances where the 
policy of offering the public full and complete information about government 
operations is overcome by a more significant policy interest favoring 
nondisclosure.18  In many of these instances, the Legislature has made a policy 
determination that full disclosure of certain public records could prove harmful to 
the proper functioning of the public body. Indeed, in Federated we instructed that 
a circuit court “should remain cognizant of the special consideration that the 
Legislature has accorded an exemptible class of records.”19 
The frank communication exemption at issue in this case provides that a 
public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record 
17 MCL 15.231(2) (“It is the public policy of this state that all persons, 
except those persons incarcerated in state or local correctional facilities, are 
entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public 
employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may 
fully participate in the democratic process.”). 
18 See MCL 15.243. 
19 Federated, supra at 110. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
[c]ommunications and notes within a public body or between public 
bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than 
purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency 
determination of policy or action.  This exemption does not apply 
unless the public body shows that in the particular instance the 
public interest in encouraging frank communication between 
officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure.[20] 
The frank communication exemption ultimately calls for the application of 
a weighted balancing test where the circuit court must weigh the public interest in 
disclosure versus the public interest in encouraging frank communication.  Under 
the plain language of the provision, these competing interests are not equally 
situated, and the Legislature intended the balancing test to favor disclosure.  The 
Legislature’s requirement that the public interest in disclosure must be clearly 
outweighed demonstrates the importance it has attached to disclosing frank 
communications absent significant, countervailing reasons to withhold the 
document. Hence, the public record is not exempt under the frank communication 
exemption unless the public body demonstrates that the public interest in 
encouraging frank communication between officials and employees of public 
bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.21 
20 MCL 15.243(1)(m) (emphasis added). 
21 Michigan is not alone in valuing and protecting frank communication. 
As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals majority, other state legislatures and the 
United States Congress have recognized that a public agency’s sensitive, internal 
deliberations must be granted some level of protection from public disclosure to 
(continued…) 
10  
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
In addition to the statutory language initially favoring disclosure of a frank 
communication, it is important to consider carefully other words and phrases in 
the statutory text. First, we must be cognizant of the competing interests at stake 
in the particular instance.22  Rather than speak in platitudes and generalities, the 
parties and the courts must consider how the unique circumstances of the 
“particular instance” affect the public interest in disclosure versus the public 
interest in encouraging frank communication.  Second, the Legislature decided 
that the public has an interest in encouraging frank communication so that public 
officials’ ongoing and future willingness to communicate frankly in the course of 
reaching a final agency determination is an essential component in the balancing 
test. Therefore, when a court interprets the “particular instance” in the frank 
communication exemption, it must remember that there is a valid public interest 
that officials and employees of a public body aspire to communicate candidly 
when the public body considers an issue that is “preliminary to a final agency 
determination of policy or action.” 
(…continued) 
promote the quality of those deliberations and to ensure overall good governance 
by the public agency.  See, e.g., 5 USC 552(b)(5); Cal Gov’t Code  6254(a); Colo 
Rev Stat 24-72-204(2)(a)(XIII); Conn Gen Stat  1-210(b)(1); Hawaii Rev Stat 
92F-13(3); Ind Code  5-14-3-4(b)(6); Ky Rev Stat Ann  61.878(1)(j); Wash Rev 
Code 42.17.310(1)(i); W Va Code 29B-1-4(a)(8); Wyo Stat Ann  16-4-203(b)(v). 
22 Cf. Federated, supra at 110, interpreting “in the particular instance” in a 
different FOIA context. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
   
Before the trial court may apply the balancing test, the public body must 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court that the public record is a “frank 
communication.”23  Drawing from the statutory language, the Court of Appeals 
has held that the public body must establish two things.24  First, the document 
must cover other than purely factual materials, and, second, the document must be 
preliminary to a final determination of policy or action.  We agree with the Court 
of Appeals precedent, but we conclude that a third qualification is apparent in the 
statutory language: the document sought must also be a communication or note of 
an advisory nature within a public body or between public bodies. 
Therefore, a document is a “frank communication” if the trial court finds 
that it (1) is a communication or note of an advisory nature made within a public 
body or between public bodies, (2) covers other than purely factual material, and 
(3) is preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action.  If, in the 
trial court’s judgment, the document fails any one of these threshold 
qualifications, then the frank communication exemption simply does not apply. 
For example, if the document is composed entirely of purely factual materials, it is 
23 If the public body denies the requesting party access to a public record, 
and the requesting party commences an action in the trial court, “the burden is on 
the public body to sustain its denial.” MCL 15.240(4) (emphasis added). 
24 See Herald Co, Inc v Ann Arbor Public Schools, 224 Mich App 266, 274; 
568 NW2d 411 (1997), citing Milford v Gilb, 148 Mich App 778, 782; 384 NW2d 
786 (1985). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
not a frank communication, and the public body must disclose the document to the 
requesting party unless it has asserted an alternate, valid basis for nondisclosure. 
In this case, the circuit court concluded that the Doyle letter was a frank 
communication.25  It found that defendant carried its burden of proving (1) that the 
Doyle letter was of an advisory nature and covered other than purely factual 
materials, (2) the communication was made between officials and employees of 
public bodies, and (3) the communication was preliminary to a final agency 
determination. 
The circuit court then moved to the balancing test and concluded that the 
balance of interests favored nondisclosure.  The court offered four reasons to 
support the balance it struck.  Its third and fourth reasons specifically address the 
balance of interests favoring nondisclosure of the Doyle letter: 
(1) 
The letter contains substantially more opinion 
than fact, and the factual material is not easily severable from 
the overwhelming majority of the contents:  Doyle’s views 
concerning the President’s involvement with the University 
House project. 
(2) 
The letter is preliminary to a final determination 
of policy or action.  The communication was between 
officials of public bodies. The letter concerns Defendant’s 
investigation and ultimate determination of what action, if 
any, would be taken regarding the University House 
controversy. 
25 Plaintiff concedes that the Doyle letter is a frank communication.  It 
challenges only the application of the weighted balancing test. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
The public interest in encouraging frank 
communications within the public body or between public 
bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 
Plaintiff’s specific need for the letter, apparently to “shed 
light on the reasons why a highly respected public official 
resigned in the wake of EMU being caught misleading the 
public as to the true cost of the President’s house”, or the 
public’s general interest in disclosure, is outweighed by 
Defendant’s interest in maintaining the quality of its 
deliberative and decision-making process. 
(4) 
Defendant conducted an investigation and 
recently published a “voluminous and exhaustive report” 
concerning its findings regarding the University House 
project, a copy of which was furnished to Plaintiff. 
The circuit court identified the two competing interests.  On one hand, 
plaintiff had an interest in obtaining the letter to “shed light” on President 
Kirkpatrick’s involvement in the University House project.  On the other hand, 
defendant needed to preserve its “deliberative and decision-making process” to 
carry out an effective internal investigation.  The circuit court found that defendant 
had published and distributed to plaintiff a “voluminous and exhaustive report” of 
financial data related to the controversy.  Defendant hired Deloitte & Touche to 
audit the expenditures related to the University House project and disseminated 
this audit to plaintiffs about the time plaintiffs filed suit to obtain the Doyle letter. 
In the circuit court’s judgment, the wave of data related to the University House 
project flowing from this independent report lessened plaintiff’s interest in 
disclosure of the Doyle letter and tipped the balance in defendant’s favor such that 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighed the 
public interest in disclosure. 
IV. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
Reiterating what we said in Federated, we note that the trial court must 
determine whether defendant met its burden of proof that a public record is 
exempt. In this case, the circuit court found that defendant met its burden of 
showing that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly 
outweighed the interest of disclosure in “the particular instance.”  On appeal we 
are to evaluate that conclusion for an abuse of discretion to determine if that 
decision falls outside the principled range of outcomes.  
Plaintiff claims that two “outcome determinative” facts tip the balance of 
interests decisively in favor of disclosure and should compel this Court to find the 
circuit court committed clear error. First, bringing to public light any criticism 
supposedly leveled by Doyle against President Fitzgerald in the letter would foster 
accountability and facilitate good government, which plaintiff contends is the core 
purpose of the FOIA.  Second, Doyle wrote the letter in view of his impending 
departure, so in this “particular instance” defendant has a relatively weak interest 
in encouraging frank communication. 
According to plaintiff, because the 
balancing test is already tilted in favor of disclosure, it is inconceivable that the 
circuit court’s decision to withhold the Doyle letter did not amount to error 
requiring reversal. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
Reviewing the circuit court’s decision for an abuse of discretion rather than 
clear error, we reject, first, plaintiff’s blanket assertion that every frank 
communication that criticizes a public official must be disclosed to assure good 
governance and accountability and accomplish the “core purpose” of the FOIA. 
That a frank communication contains criticism of a public official or a public 
body, which is unremarkable considering that these are frank communications, 
certainly factors into the balancing test, but it cannot singularly serve to outweigh 
the public interest in nondisclosure.  Were we to adopt such a rule, we would 
eviscerate the frank communication exemption. We doubt that officials within a 
public body would offer candid, written feedback, or that they would do so for 
very long, if that feedback would invariably find its way into the public sphere.  If 
the frank communication exemption can never protect a candid communication, 
which almost assuredly contains unfiltered criticism of policies and people, then 
we will have rendered this FOIA exemption a nullity.  We agree with the Court of 
Appeals majority that defendant “need[s] more than cold and dry data to do its job, 
it need[s] the unvarnished candid opinion of insiders to make policy judgments 
and, particularly, to conduct sensitive investigations of top administrators” and to 
conclude otherwise would “sound the death knell of this vital tool for board 
members to discharge their oversight roles for the benefit of the public.”26 
26 Herald Co, 265 Mich App 202-203, 205. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for plaintiff’s second “outcome determinative” consideration, we are not 
persuaded that Doyle’s retirement marginalized the public interest in encouraging 
frank communication within the public body.  In plaintiff’s view, Doyle’s 
retirement diminished the public interest in nondisclosure because, with Doyle 
departing, he would suffer no employment-related retribution by disclosing his 
honest feedback. By emphasizing this fact, plaintiff erroneously conflates the 
interests of the disclosing person, one member of the public body, with the public 
body’s need, as an institution, to encourage frank communication in this 
“particular instance.” 
Quite simply, Doyle’s resignation does not negate defendant’s need to 
investigate thoroughly this controversy and future controversies.  That one out­
going member of defendant’s administration might not be inhibited by the 
possibility of disclosure does not allay the concern that every other member of 
defendant’s administration may harbor if Doyle’s communications, and possibly 
theirs, are disclosed for public consumption.  This Court has recognized, in a 
related FOIA context, that internal investigations are perilous precisely because 
employees are frequently afraid to make candid disclosures: 
“1. Internal investigations are inherently difficult because 
employees are reluctant to give statements about the actions of 
fellow employees. 
“2. If their statements would be a matter of public knowledge 
they might refuse to give any statements at all or be less than totally 
forthcoming and candid.   
17  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
“3. Also, disclosure could be detrimental to some employees.   
“4. 
Public disclosure of records relating to internal 
investigations into possible employee misconduct would destroy or 
severely diminish the Sheriff Department’s ability to effectively 
conduct such investigations.”[27] 
Defendant was investigating the possible misconduct of the most senior 
member of management, President Kirkpatrick, and, in doing so, sought Doyle’s 
candid observations regarding the matter.  Disclosure of Doyle’s letter would 
foster a fear among university officials that they could no longer communicate 
candidly about a sensitive topic without their written communications being 
disclosed to the public. This would create a chilling effect that would surely dry 
up future frank communications. Thus, the departure of Doyle has very little 
bearing on the institutional interests protected by the frank communication 
exemption. 
Plaintiff would transform the weighted balancing test of the frank 
communication exemption into an irrebuttable presumption of disclosure.  We 
decline to adopt plaintiff’s position.  The plain language of the balancing test 
requires the public interest in encouraging frank communication to clearly 
outweigh the public interest in disclosure, but it does not tacitly create an 
insurmountable obstacle to the public body’s seeking to withhold a frank 
27 Kent Co Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 365­
366; 616 NW2d 677 (2000) (citation omitted). 
18  
 
 
 
 
communication from disclosure. The circuit court in this case acknowledged that 
the frank communication exemption required a weighted balancing test. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that it misapprehended the weighted balancing test 
when it exempted the Doyle letter from disclosure. 
We do not minimize the general public interest in the disclosure of frank 
communications. 
The Legislature explicitly codified within the frank 
communication exemption its policy determination that a frank communication 
must be disclosed to the public unless the public interest in disclosure is clearly 
outweighed. Moreover, the public has a keen interest in receiving information 
regarding the alleged misuse of public funds, which, if such misuse were true, 
might undermine the public’s trust and confidence in the public body.  If public 
resources are squandered under their watch, then it calls into question whether 
members of the public body are fit to discharge the responsibilities that have been 
committed to them on behalf of the general public. 
However, we do not hypothesize generally whether the public interest in 
disclosure should prevail over the public interest in nondisclosure.  We only 
consider the balance struck by the circuit court in the context of this “particular 
instance.” The circuit court reviewed the evidence and made appropriate findings 
of fact pertaining to the Doyle letter. It found that defendant had released a 
“voluminous and exhaustive report” that tipped the balance in favor of 
nondisclosure because the Deloitte audit disclosed for the public record pertinent 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
financial data related to the University House project.  Without question, the 
circuit court’s decision is controversial.  But a circuit court is permitted to reach a 
controversial conclusion with which reasonable people and reasonable appellate 
courts may disagree without abusing its discretion and reaching a result outside the 
principled range of outcomes.  Members of this Court, members of the Court of 
Appeals, or another circuit judge might have resolved this balance of interests 
differently, but the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. 
V. Separation of Exempt and Nonexempt Material 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s conclusion that the 
Doyle letter is exempt as a frank communication.  However, pursuant to MCL 
15.244, we hold that the exempt and nonexempt material within the Doyle letter 
must be separated and the latter disclosed to plaintiff. 
The FOIA requires that 
[i]f a public record contains material which is not exempt under 
section 13, as well as material which is exempt from disclosure 
under section 13, the public body shall separate the exempt and 
nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material available for 
examination and copying.[28] 
The public body is assigned the responsibility, “to the extent practicable, [to] 
facilitate a separation of exempt from nonexempt information.”29  This provision 
28 MCL 15.244(1).  
29 MCL 15.244(2).  
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
applies without exception to every public record.  Accordingly, we remand this 
matter to the circuit court with the direction that it separate the opinion from the 
purely factual material and disclose the latter to plaintiff. 
VI. Conclusion 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the public 
interest in frank communication clearly outweighed the public interest in 
disclosure. 
In this “particular instance,” defendant had a strong interest in 
preserving candid internal investigatory communications.  Although Doyle may 
have retired soon after writing the letter, defendant maintained its interest in 
preventing a ripple effect of chilled communications during this or subsequent 
investigations. The public interest in disclosure is favored initially in the weighted 
balancing test. 
However, the circuit court found that defendant’s release of 
financial data mitigated that interest.  As such, we cannot conclude that the circuit 
court abused its discretion. 
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary 
disposition in favor of defendant and remand this matter to the circuit court to 
separate the exempt and nonexempt information in the Doyle letter, to the extent 
practicable, and make the nonexempt material available to plaintiff. 
Robert P. Young 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Stephen J. Markman 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
HERALD COMPANY, INC, d/b/a 
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC and 
ANN ARBOR NEWS,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 128263 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
BOARD OF REGENTS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with part II of the majority’s opinion, correcting the standard of 
review in Freedom of Information Act1 cases. In all other respects I join in the 
analysis and conclusion of Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, signing all but part II of 
that dissent. 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
1 MCL 15.231 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
V 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
HERALD COMPANY, INC, doing business 
as BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC., and ANN 
ARBOR NEWS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 128263 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
BOARD OF REGENTS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with and sign all but part II of Justice Cavanagh’s dissenting 
opinion. Defendant did not carry its burden of proving that the letter was exempt. 
The statutory language supports no other decision.  Therefore, the trial court 
abused its discretion. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand the case to the circuit court for release of the letter and an award of 
attorney fees. 
I concur with the majority’s clarification of the standard of review in 
Freedom of Information Act1 cases and agree that discretionary decisions in them 
should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.   
 
Marilyn Kelly 
1 MCL 15.231 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
HERALD COMPANY, INC, d/b/a 
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC and 
ANN ARBOR NEWS,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 128263 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
BOARD OF REGENTS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today’s majority decision is an example of a court properly articulating the 
law, yet failing to apply it correctly.  Because I strongly disagree with the 
majority’s position that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that 
defendant Eastern Michigan University Board of Regents met its burden under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., I must respectfully 
dissent. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff Herald Company, Inc., doing business as Booth Newspapers, Inc., 
and Ann Arbor News, sought disclosure of a number of public records related to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
the building of the Eastern Michigan University president’s new house.1  One of 
the records requested was a letter written by Eastern Michigan University’s vice 
president of finance, Patrick Doyle. Doyle wrote the letter at the request of an 
Eastern Michigan University regent to offer insight about expenditures associated 
with the president’s residence.  Defendant granted in part plaintiff’s request for 
documents, but it declined to produce the Doyle letter, citing MCL 15.243(1)(m). 
Plaintiff filed a complaint under the FOIA, and the trial court granted summary 
disposition to defendant, finding that the letter was exempt from disclosure under 
the “frank communication” exemption of the FOIA, MCL 15.243(1)(m).  The trial 
court listed four reasons why it believed that the letter was exempt.   
(1) The letter contains substantially more opinion than fact, 
and the factual material is not easily severable from the 
overwhelming majority of the contents:  Doyle’s views concerning 
the President’s involvement with the University House project. 
(2) The letter is preliminary to a final determination of policy 
or action. 
The communication was between officials of public 
bodies. The letter concerns Defendant’s investigation and ultimate 
determination of what action, if any, would be taken regarding the 
University House controversy. 
(3) The public interest in encouraging frank communications 
within the public body or between public bodies clearly outweighs 
the public interest in disclosure. Plaintiff’s specific need for the 
letter, apparently to “shed light on the reasons why a highly 
respected public official resigned in the wake of EMU being caught 
misleading the public as to the true cost of the President’s house”, or 
the public’s general interest in disclosure, is outweighed by 
Defendant’s interest in maintaining the quality of its deliberative and 
decision-making process. 
1 The president at the time, Samuel Kirkpatrick, has since resigned. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Defendant conducted an investigation and recently 
published a “voluminous and exhaustive report” concerning its 
findings regarding the University House project, a copy of which 
was furnished to Plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision.  265 Mich App 185; 693 
NW2d 850 (2005). This Court granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. 
472 Mich 928 (2005). 
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Summary disposition was granted to defendant on the basis of the FOIA. 
This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo.  Herald 
Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).  Similarly, the proper 
interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that this Court reviews 
de novo. Id. Application of FOIA exemptions involving legal determinations are 
also reviewed under a de novo standard of review.  Federated Publications, Inc v 
City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 106; 649 NW2d 383 (2002).  Exemptions involving 
discretionary determinations, such as an exemption requiring a court to engage in 
a balancing of public interests, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard 
of review. Id. at 107. 
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ if, after reviewing the entire evidence, the 
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made.” Id. (citation omitted). As stated by the United States Supreme Court, 
this is the foremost of the general principles governing the clearly erroneous 
standard. Anderson v City of Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573; 105 S Ct 1504; 84 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
L Ed 2d 518 (1985). The Supreme Court further explained that as long as a trial 
court’s “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
entirety, the [reviewing court] may not reverse it even though convinced that had it 
been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” 
Id. at 574 (emphasis added). “Where there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
This standard, however, does not suggest that the mere fact that a court has viewed 
the evidence in a particular manner necessarily amounts to a permissible view of 
the evidence. Rather, “[d]ocuments or objective evidence may contradict [a] 
witness’ story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible 
on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.”  Id. at 575. Where 
such factors are present, a court may indeed find clear error.  The majority claims 
that the clear error standard of review was “inadvertently misstated” in Federated 
Publications, supra, but I fail to see how this is so.  The Federated Publications 
majority opinion was written by Justice Markman and signed by six members of 
this Court, including all justices in the majority in this case.  The standard of 
review was not just mindlessly inserted into Federated Publications; a discussion 
of the standard of review spanned three pages. 
Yet even more important is that the standard of review as articulated in 
Federated Publications is correct. The majority now states “that the clear error 
standard of review is appropriate in FOIA cases where a party challenges the 
underlying facts that support the trial court’s decision.”  Ante at 8. “However, 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
where the parties do not dispute the underlying facts but rather challenge the trial 
court’s exercise of discretion,” the proper standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 2-3. In this case, the majority asserts that the parties do not 
dispute the underlying facts, they only dispute the import of those facts as they 
factor into the weighted balancing test of the frank communication exemption. 
Ante at 3. Therefore, the majority asserts the proper standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. 
But the majority ignores the obvious reason why clear error is the proper 
standard of review when a court is analyzing FOIA exemptions requiring a 
determination of a discretionary nature.  Simply, the party challenging the 
exemption has never seen the document being sought.2  It will often be impossible 
for a party seeking a document to dispute the underlying facts when those facts are 
only to be found in the document that the party cannot see.  Plainly put, plaintiff 
needs to see the document to challenge underlying facts, but plaintiff cannot see 
the document because defendant is claiming it is exempt.  The majority now holds 
that because plaintiff has not challenged the underlying facts, a higher standard of 
review applies. Not only does this nonsensical argument ignore the reality of 
2 As plaintiff stated, “Indeed, at oral argument the only person in the 
courtroom who will not have seen the Doyle letter will be undersigned counsel, 
who must rely upon the public Opinions of the reviewing courts to know anything 
about what is in the letter.”  (Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, p 4.) 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
proceedings dealing with FOIA exemptions, it also ignores the reality in this case 
because plaintiff did challenge an underlying fact. 
Plaintiff challenges the claim that the letter is not relevant in light of the 
“exhaustive” public report defendant issued.  Plaintiff argues that all the facts in 
the Doyle letter are not contained in the public report, contrary to the trial court’s 
opinion.3  But, of course, plaintiff is limited in its arguments by the fact that 
plaintiff has never seen the letter. Further, plaintiff cannot further challenge any 
other underlying facts because defendant has offered no evidence to support its 
position. Defendant’s position, reiterated by the trial court, is based on nothing 
more than generalized assumptions about what is in the public’s interest.  Because 
defendant never came forward with any factual evidence to support its position, 
there were no other facts for plaintiff to challenge. In essence, defendant has not 
met its burden under the statute, yet plaintiff is being penalized with a more 
deferential standard of review for defendant’s failing.  However, even using the 
abuse of discretion standard adopted by the majority to evaluate this case, the trial 
court still abused its discretion because the trial court’s decision was certainly not 
a reasonable and principled outcome when defendant presented no evidence to 
support its position, contrary to the clear language of the statute. 
3 This argument is supported by Chief Judge Whitbeck's thorough dissent in 
the Court of Appeals. Herald, supra at 222. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS  
This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation.  The primary goal of 
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  In re MCI 
Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  The first step is 
to review the language of the statute. 
Id. 
If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed 
in the statute and judicial construction is not permissible.  Id. 
The FOIA starts from a basic premise—the disclosure of public documents 
is the cornerstone of responsible government.  The FOIA provides, “It is the 
public policy of this state that all persons . . . are entitled to full and complete 
information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who 
represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act.” 
MCL 15.231(2) (emphasis added).  The FOIA also recognizes that the public has a 
strong interest in ensuring that it receives information to make sure that those 
individuals in government who are entrusted with the operation of public 
institutions do so in a responsible manner.  To this end, the FOIA provides, “The 
people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic 
process.” Id. This Court has consistently held that the FOIA is intended primarily 
as a prodisclosure statute.  Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 
536, 544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991); see also State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mgt & 
Budget, 428 Mich 104, 109; 404 NW2d 606 (1987); Booth Newspapers, Inc v 
Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 231-232; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). 
7  
 
 
  
 
 
Accordingly, under the FOIA, unless expressly exempt, a public body must 
disclose a public record if provided with a written request that sufficiently 
describes the record. MCL 15.233(1).  A person has a right to inspect, copy, or 
receive a copy of the requested record.  Id. If a public body denies access to a 
public record, the public body has the burden to prove that its denial comports 
with the law. MCL 15.240(4). 
In this case, defendant is the governing body of a Michigan public 
university and is a public body as defined by the FOIA.  See MCL 15.232(d). 
Plaintiff provided defendant with a specific written request for the Doyle letter, 
and defendant denied this request claiming that the letter was exempt under MCL 
15.243(1)(m) as a “frank communication.” 
MCL 15.243(1)(m) states, in relevant part, that a public body may exempt 
from disclosure the following: 
Communications and notes within a public body or between 
public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover 
other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final 
agency determination of policy or action.  This exemption does not 
apply unless the public body shows that in the particular instance 
the public interest in encouraging frank communication between 
officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the 
public interest in disclosure. [Emphasis added.] 
In assessing whether a public record can be withheld under the “frank 
communication” exemption, a court must determine whether a public body has 
met its burden of showing that the requested public record is of an advisory nature 
and contains other than purely factual materials that are preliminary to a final 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
agency determination of policy or action.  If so, the court must next determine 
whether “in the particular instance,” the public interest in encouraging frank 
communication between officials and employees of public bodies “clearly 
outweighs” the public interest in disclosing the record.   
If a court determines that the document should not be disclosed because the 
public body has met its burden of showing that in the particular instance the public 
interest in encouraging frank communication between officials and employees of 
public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure, see MCL 
15.243(1)(m), then the court must next determine if fact can be separated from 
opinion in the document.  If so, then the document must be redacted and factual 
information disclosed. MCL 15.244.4 
4 MCL 15.244 provides the following: 
(1) If a public record contains material which is not exempt 
under section 13, as well as material which is exempt from 
disclosure under section 13, the public body shall separate the 
exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material 
available for examination and copying. 
(2) When designing a public record, a public body shall, to 
the extent practicable, facilitate a separation of exempt from 
nonexempt information. If the separation is readily apparent to a 
person requesting to inspect or receive copies of the form, the public 
body shall generally describe the material exempted unless that 
description would reveal the contents of the exempt information and 
thus defeat the purpose of the exemption. 
9  
 
 
 
The Legislature has plainly set forth that the provision is weighted toward 
disclosure. 
Indeed, the “frank communication” exemption states that the 
exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that the public interest in 
not disclosing the record clearly outweighs disclosure in the particular instance. 
Notably, the “frank communication” exemption is the only FOIA provision that 
uses the term “clearly outweighs.”  Other provisions merely use the term 
“outweighs” when providing for a balancing test. See, e.g., MCL 15.243(1)(c), 
(k), (n), (s), and (y). 
In this case, the letter at issue is a communication of an advisory nature 
within a public body. It covers materials other than purely factual materials 
because it contains facts and the vice president’s opinions, and the letter, when 
written, was preliminary to a final agency determination about the house 
controversy.  The trial court used this set of facts as one of its reasons to support 
the decision to grant summary disposition to defendant. The trial court stated that 
nondisclosure was favored because the letter was preliminary to a final 
determination of policy or action, the communication was between officials of 
public bodies, and the letter concerned defendant’s investigation and ultimate 
determination of what action, if any, would be taken regarding the university 
housing controversy.  However, this “finding” does not favor disclosure or 
nondisclosure. It is merely a recitation of the circumstances that must initially be 
met for a document to fall within the “frank communication” exemption.  Even 
when all the above circumstances are met, the public body must still show that in 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that particular instance, the public interest in encouraging frank communication 
between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure. See MCL 15.243(1)(m). 
Not only does the majority neglect the fact that defendant has offered 
nothing but mere platitudes to support its position, it uses these platitudes in an 
attempt to bolster its analysis.  The majority states, “Disclosure of Doyle’s letter 
would foster a fear among university officials that they could no longer 
communicate 
candidly 
about 
a 
sensitive 
topic 
without 
their 
written 
communications being disclosed to the public.  This would create a chilling effect 
that would surely dry up future frank communications.”  Ante at 18. 
Yet 
defendant offered no evidence that this was or would be the case.  There is no 
evidence of any chilling effect or any future chilling effect.  There is certainly no 
evidence of any fear among university officials.  The majority assumes that people 
will not speak candidly if their opinions will be made public, but such a blanket 
assertion is not relevant under the statute as it was written by our Legislature. 
While the majority may believe that secrecy is critical to good government, this 
belief has no bearing when interpreting the language selected by the Legislature.   
Based on the facts of the case, defendant has not met its burden to prove 
that the public interest in nondisclosure to encourage frank communication in this 
particular instance clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure, and the trial 
11  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
court abused its discretion when it held otherwise.5  Defendant merely offers 
general arguments about how a public body needs candid input to maintain the 
quality of its decision-making process.  However, defendant has offered no 
convincing argument about why in this “particular instance” the public interest in 
nondisclosure to encourage frank communication clearly outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure. Rather, defendant has presented generic arguments that 
could be applicable to almost any case, and the trial court and the majority have 
accepted these generalizations without question.  But the Legislature did not seek 
to create a blanket exemption for frank communications.  The Legislature only 
created an exemption when the public interest in nondisclosure to encourage frank 
communication clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure in “the 
particular instance” at issue. 
This Court examined the phrase “in the particular instance” as it relates to 
the FOIA law enforcement exemption, MCL 15.243(1)(s), and a request for 
records relating to various subjects in Federated Publications, supra at 110. We 
stated that the word “particular” means “‘pertaining to a single or specific person, 
thing, group . . . not general,’” and “instance” “means ‘a case or occurrence of 
something.’” Id., quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
5 I note that plaintiff also argued that defendant did not meets its burden 
under the statute based on the facts of the case. I disagree with the majority that 
plaintiff advocated a “blanket exemption” for every frank communication that 
contains criticism of a public official or public body.  
12  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
We noted that “a FOIA request may be general and entail a request for records 
relating to varied subjects, arguably implicating several different aspects of the 
public interest.” Id. at 111. When a request is made for records relating to varied 
subjects, a “court may be required to conduct a ‘particular instance’ categorization 
of records to enable it to identify and weigh similar aspects of the public interest in 
favor of disclosure or nondisclosure.”  Id. However, “[i]n some cases, it may be 
clear that the FOIA request is comprised of a sufficiently precise or narrow 
category of records that the circuit court can adequately balance the public 
interests at stake without the need of further ‘particular instance’ categorization.” 
Id. at 110. 
In this case, the request was not for records related to varied subjects, but 
for documents related to the vice president’s resignation and expenditures for the 
president’s home. 
This request was sufficiently narrow so the court could 
adequately balance the public interests at stake without further categorization.6 
6 The September 10, 2003, request was for the following: 
1. Copies of all correspondence, including but not limited to 
letters, reports, memos and e-mails, to and from the following parties 
since Jan. 1, 2002, regarding the new University House on campus: 
● Vice President for Business and Finance Patrick Doyle or 
other staff members of the Office of Business and Finance. 
● The EMU Board of Regents. 
● EMU President Samuel Kirkpatrick. 
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
However, the general discussion in Federated Publications is still helpful. The 
meaning of “the particular instance” in both the law enforcement exemption and 
the “frank communication” exemption requires an examination of the arguments 
relating to the specific case at hand.  The “frank communication” exemption 
requires a public body to make specific arguments about the public interest in the 
particular instance at issue. It is not sufficient for a public body to simply make 
general statements about what is in the public interest. 
The majority’s acceptance of the generalized arguments proffered by 
defendant results in the “frank communication” exemption being effectively 
eliminated. See, e.g., Evening News Ass’n v City of Troy, 417 Mich 481, 492; 339 
NW2d 421 (1983) (“We hold that a ‘generic determination’ does not satisfy the 
FOIA.”). It should go without saying that in many, if not most, cases, a public 
body may prefer that public records that express criticism or cast the public body 
in a negative light be withheld to avoid embarrassment. However, the purpose of 
the FOIA is not to provide a shield to public bodies.  The purpose of the FOIA is 
to ensure that our citizens fully participate in the democratic process.  MCL 
(…continued) 
2. Copies of all correspondence, including but not limited to 
letters, reports, memos and e-mails, between Vice President for 
Business and Finance Patrick Doyle to and from the EMU Board of 
Regents, EMU President Samuel Kirkpatrick and/or the Office of 
Human Resources, regarding Doyle’s recent resignation and-or 
retirement. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
15.231(2).  Knowledge, not secrecy, is fundamental to ensuring that this purpose is 
fulfilled. 
In this case, defendant is a public body, and there was much criticism and 
concern about the high cost of the president’s new residence.  The public’s interest 
in who approved the costs associated with the house and how expenditures were 
authorized is certainly an important matter.  It is not merely a matter of “morbid 
public curiosity,” as expressed by one amicus curiae.  The letter at issue was 
written by the vice president of finance at the university.  The letter provides 
information about how expenditures were authorized and reviewed, as well as the 
president’s level of involvement in the expenditures.  The vice president’s insights 
are undoubtedly relevant to the possible misuse of tuition, fundraising, and 
taxpayer dollars. The public has an interest in learning if those who have been 
charged with administering a public university are doing so properly and 
responsibly.   
The fact that defendant had released a report on the matter was not a 
sufficient reason to find that the public interest favored nondisclosure, contrary to 
the trial court’s holding.  Defendant’s investigation and release of a report does not 
lessen the public interest in disclosing a letter written by the vice president of 
finance. As the vice president of finance, Doyle was in a unique position to 
comment on how funds were spent, who was involved, and what exactly 
happened. The fact that defendant may have fulfilled its role by investigating and 
reporting on the matter does not lessen the public’s interest in learning what 
15  
 
 
 
occurred before the matter was investigated and reported.  In other words, the 
public has a genuine interest in learning how the misuse happened in the first place 
and if the misuse was the result of faulty procedures or oversight.  The vice 
president is particularly qualified to discuss the situation and the concerns about 
the expenditures that go to the core of governmental accountability.  This is not a 
private matter, but a public one. 
As it specifically relates to Vice President Doyle, he had already decided to 
retire when the letter was written, and defendant has presented no specific 
evidence explaining how keeping the letter undisclosed would encourage further 
communications.  Notably, Doyle’s letter has a section labeled in bold “Why did I 
decide to retire?” The vice president then goes on to detail in the letter itself the 
reasons why he decided to retire.  Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this fact is 
critical in examining whether the public interest in nondisclosure clearly 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure in this particular instance. In this 
particular instance, defendant has not provided specific evidence that disclosure of 
the letter would inhibit frank communication.  The letter writer had decided to 
retire, and there is certainly no evidence that disclosing the letter would inhibit any 
future frank communications from him. Notably, there is also no evidence that 
disclosing the letter would inhibit anyone from offering additional insight.  There 
is no indication that any employee was reluctant to share information because of a 
fear of retribution. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
The majority has stated that Doyle’s retirement “does not allay the concern 
that every other member of defendant’s administration may harbor if Doyle’s 
communications, and possibly theirs, are disclosed for public consumption.”  Ante 
at 17. But defendant has not offered one instance where an employee expressed 
any concern about providing information or an opinion that would prohibit 
defendant from engaging in any type of decision-making process.  Defendant has 
offered not one example of encountering any type of hindrance in investigating 
this matter—or any matter—because a person was afraid their communication 
would be made public. The majority is expressing a general concern that is not 
grounded in the facts of this case. The statute uses the phrase “in the particular 
instance,” yet the majority ignores that there has been no evidence offered of any 
hint of fear or hesitation in this particular instance. 
Notably, there is also no indication that defendant was continuing its 
investigation and would need to seek additional information from other 
employees. 
In fact, in an attempt to show that the release of the letter is 
unnecessary, defendant argues that it released an “exhaustive” report on its 
findings. 
However, the release of this report indicates that defendant’s 
investigation into the housing matter was complete. 
In an attempt to support its flawed analysis, the majority offers only 
generalizations. The majority states, “We doubt that officials within a public body 
would offer candid, written feedback, or that they would do so for very long, if 
that feedback would invariably find its way into the public sphere.”  Ante at 16 
17  
 
 
 
 
(emphasis in original). The majority further asserts, “Disclosure of Doyle’s letter 
would foster a fear among university officials that they could no longer 
communicate 
candidly 
about 
a 
sensitive 
topic 
without 
their 
written 
communications being disclosed to the public.  This would create a chilling effect 
that would surely dry up future frank communications.”  Ante at 18.  But the  
majority’s general concerns are not grounded in any facts presented by defendant, 
and they are certainly not grounded in the statutory language.  Defendant has 
offered no specific evidence that releasing the letter would have a chilling effect 
on an investigation that was essentially over nor has defendant presented any 
evidence of a chilling effect on future investigations.  The majority’s incredible 
statement that they “do not hypothesize generally,” ante at 19, about the public 
interests is false. All that the majority relies on—as the trial court did as well—are 
generalizations about the public interest.  Accordingly, the trial court’s finding 
that defendant’s interest in maintaining the quality of its deliberative and decision­
making process outweighed the public interest in disclosure was an abuse of 
discretion because defendant offered only general arguments and no specific 
evidence explaining why disclosing the letter would inhibit its decision-making 
process. The trial court’s decision is not a reasonable and principled outcome 
because there is no evidence to support such a decision. 
Vague and rote arguments about the chilling effect of disclosing the letter 
are insufficient to satisfy the Legislature’s clear mandate that a public body offer 
evidence pertinent to the particular instance at issue. See, e.g., Evening News 
18  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
Ass’n, supra at 501-503, 506-507 (Generic claims that revealing names would 
have a chilling effect on the investigation in that matter were entirely conclusory 
because no reasons were given.). The majority’s decision grants public bodies 
almost complete control over determining what is and what is not in the public 
interest. Abdicating this control to a public body is not consistent with the FOIA, 
which was enacted to ensure disclosure to prevent abuses in the operation of 
government. See Swickard, supra at 543.  The Legislature has mandated that our 
courts require more from our public bodies than merely deferring to broad 
arguments that are not grounded in fact. Mere platitudes are insufficient to meet 
the statutory requirements. 
Because defendant has not met its burden to prove that, in this particular 
instance, the public interest in nondisclosure to encourage frank communication 
clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure, I believe the entire requested 
document must be disclosed.  Therefore, while fact can be separated from opinion 
in the letter, it is unnecessary to do so because I believe the whole letter must be 
released.7 
7 It is not relevant whether the letter contains more opinion than fact, as the 
trial court stated. The statute applies to communications and notes that cover 
“other than purely factual materials . . . .” MCL 12.243(1)(m). The letter in this 
case covers other than purely factual material because it contains both fact and the 
vice president’s opinions; therefore, it is analyzed under the “frank 
communication” exemption. The statute does not provide different standards 
based on how much opinion is in the document as opposed to how much factual 
material is in the document.  The statute merely refers to documents that “cover 
other than purely factual materials,” which this document does.  Therefore, the 
(continued…) 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Our citizens’ full participation in the democratic process requires openness 
and accountability. Today, the majority has ignored the language of the statute 
and embraced generalizations that are not supported in any manner by the 
evidence presented by defendant.  The impact of such a decision is to effectively 
abolish the “frank communication” exemption that was crafted by our Legislature. 
Because I believe that defendant has not met its burden of showing that the public 
interest in nondisclosure to encourage frank communication clearly outweighs the 
public interest in disclosure in this particular instance, I would reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for an 
expedited proceeding under MCL 15.240(5) to release the letter and award 
reasonable attorney fees, costs, and disbursements to plaintiff, in accord with MCL 
15.240(6).  I believe that the statutory language and lack of evidence presented by 
defendant support no other decision. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
(…continued) 
trial court abused its discretion in using the fact that there was more opinion than 
fact in the letter as a basis to deny disclosure because the statute applies to all 
documents that contain “other than purely factual materials” and provides for no 
further categorization. 
20