Title: State v. Carl R. Kramer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 132 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2580-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Carl R. Kramer,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 271 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 44, 622 N.W.2d 4 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 18, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Stephen D. 
Willett and Stephen D. Willett, S.C., Phillips, and oral 
argument by Stephen D. Willett. 
 
 
2001 WI 132 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-2580-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 143) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Carl R. Kramer,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
DEC 18, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Petitioner 
Carl 
Kramer 
(Kramer), a tavern owner in the Village of North Fond du Lac, 
was convicted on two counts of being a party to the crime of 
commercial gambling after his tavern made payouts on two 
separate occasions to police investigators who earned credits on 
a video slot machine in the tavern.  Kramer had moved to dismiss 
his criminal complaint on selective prosecution grounds, arguing 
that he and other owners of taverns located in North Fond du Lac 
were unfairly singled out for prosecution.  The circuit court 
denied this motion, permitting the trial at which the defendant 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
2 
 
was convicted.  The court of appeals reversed both the order 
denying 
Kramer's 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
and 
his 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
after 
concluding 
that 
Kramer 
was 
selectively 
prosecuted.  
¶2 
The State now appeals and asserts that Kramer did not 
meet his burden on one of the elements of selective prosecution:  
that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect.  We disagree.  
Because the evidence in this case establishes a prima facie 
showing of discriminatory effect, and because the State concedes 
that there was a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose, 
we agree with the court of appeals' determination that Kramer 
established a prima facie claim of selective prosecution.  We 
disagree, however, with the court of appeals' determination that 
the 
State 
failed 
to 
rebut 
this 
prima 
facie 
claim 
by 
demonstrating a valid exercise of discretion.  The State was 
never afforded the opportunity to rebut this prima facie claim 
by presenting evidence showing a valid use of prosecutorial 
discretion.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision 
and remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on 
the rebuttal issue. 
I 
¶3 
Kramer owned The Dog House Saloon in the Village of 
North Fond du Lac in Fond du Lac County.  On July 12, 1996, a 
bartender at The Dog House Saloon paid cash to an undercover 
police investigator for credits the investigator had accumulated 
while playing a video slot machine.  The investigator was a 
member of the Lake Winnebago Area Metropolitan Enforcement Group 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
3 
 
Drug Unit (MEG Unit).  The MEG Unit was working with the Village 
of North Fond du Lac Police Department in investigating 
commercial gambling in North Fond du Lac.  At that time, the 
Fond du Lac County District Attorney's Office and the Fond du 
Lac County Sheriff's Department were allegedly not investigating 
or prosecuting such activity because they believed that the law 
was 
unclear 
concerning 
whether 
this 
activity 
constituted 
criminal 
commercial 
gambling 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 945.03(5)(1995-96).1   
¶4 
This prosecution policy was later changed in light of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision 
in 
State 
v. 
Hahn, 
203 
Wis. 2d 450, 553 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1996).  In Hahn, Hahn was 
prosecuted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 945.03(5) 
after 
he 
collected 
proceeds from video poker machines, which he had placed in three 
Jefferson County taverns.  Id. at 452.  The issue presented to 
the court of appeals was whether Hahn's video poker machines 
were "gambling machines" under Wis. Stat. § 945.01(3).  Id. at 
454.  The court held that a video poker machine is a "gambling 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted. 
This statute provides in relevant part as follows: 
945.03  Commercial gambling.  Whoever intentionally 
does any of the following is engaged in commercial 
gambling and is guilty of a Class E felony: 
. . . . 
(5)  Sets up for use for the purpose of gambling 
or collects the proceeds of any gambling machine. . . 
.  
No. 
99-2580-CR 
4 
 
machine" only if it affords a successful player an opportunity 
to obtain something of value, even if the machine itself does 
not award the prize.  Id. at 457-458.  Thus, Hahn clarified the 
type of machine that may form the basis for a violation of 
§ 945.03(5).  
¶5 
On September 2, 1996, the Fond du Lac County District 
Attorney and the Fond du Lac County Sheriff sent a letter to 
tavern owners in the county warning them of the change in policy 
and informing them that complaints of payouts on video poker 
machines would now be investigated and prosecuted.  The body of 
the letter stated in full: 
 
Dear Tavern Owner/Liquor License Holder: 
 
 
We are writing to you today to address the issue 
of video games that can be used as gambling devices.  
We recognize the fact that this issue is controversial 
and has been in litigation for some time.  The 
Wisconsin Attorney General has taken the position that 
video poker machines are gambling machines.  A recent 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
decision 
indicates 
that 
their 
presence is not in itself a violation, but any type of 
pay-out from playing the machine constituted an act of 
gambling. 
 
Some 
jurisdictions 
have 
already 
chosen 
to 
confiscate machines because of their mere presence, 
but the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department and 
the District Attorney's Office have been patient with 
this issue because of the vagueness of the law.  The 
Court of Appeals has now established a precedent 
[Hahn] 
which 
will 
stand 
unless 
a 
higher 
court 
overrules it.  In the future, Deputies will make note 
of who has machines when they do their routine tavern 
checks.  If we receive a complaint that payouts of any 
kind are being made in an establishment, we will 
commence a commercial gambling investigation.  You 
should be aware that a conviction for commercial 
gambling under state statute 945.03 is a felony.  The 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
5 
 
law also provides for such matters to be forwarded to 
the 
licensing 
authority 
for 
revocation 
of 
the 
establishment's liquor license. 
 
We are sure that the legal battle will continue 
over video gambling, but this henceforth will be the 
policy of the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department 
and the District Attorney's Office.  We do not seek to 
exacerbate the situation, but we will not be put in a 
position where we are unable to respond in an 
effective manner to a violation of the law.  For those 
of you who do not have machines, we apologize for 
taking your time.  For those of you that do, this 
letter will serve as your only warning to this policy.  
If you have any questions on this matter, please feel 
free to call on us.  [Second, third, and fourth 
emphases added.] 
This letter was not sent to Kramer or any other owner of a 
tavern located in the Village of North Fond du Lac. 
¶6 
On December 4, 1996, after playing a video slot 
machine at The Dog House Saloon, an undercover investigator from 
the MEG Unit received a payout from Kramer, who was tending bar 
at that time.  The next day, a search warrant was executed at 
the tavern, during which a video slot machine was seized.  That 
same day, search warrants were also executed and video gambling 
machines seized at several other North Fond du Lac taverns, 
including (1) The North Fondy Connection owned by Charles Erke; 
(2) The Village Vault owned by Carol Van Norman; and (3) The 
Freight House Tavern owned by Roger Lange.   
¶7 
Kramer was subsequently charged with two counts of 
being a party to the crime of commercial gambling in violation 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 945.03(5) for the payouts on July 
12, 1996 and December 4, 1996.  Charges were also brought 
against Erke, Van Norman, and Lange.  No tavern owners outside 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
6 
 
the Village of North Fond du Lac were prosecuted on commercial 
gambling charges.  
¶8 
Kramer moved to dismiss the charges based in part on 
the claim that he was the victim of selective prosecution.  He 
alleged that he and other owners of taverns located in North 
Fond 
du 
Lac 
were 
unfairly 
singled 
out 
for 
prosecution.  
According to Kramer, this systematic prosecution was evidenced 
by the fact that he and the other North Fond du Lac tavern 
owners were the only tavern owners in the county prosecuted even 
though they never received a letter from the prosecutor 
informing them of the change in policy.  This unfairness was 
exacerbated, Kramer contended, by the fact that North Fond du 
Lac Police Chief Larry Wodack assured him and the other tavern 
owners that their use of video slot machines was legal, while at 
the same time Wodack was conducting an investigation into 
alleged commercial gambling against these same owners.  Kramer 
alleged that Wodack's overall objective was to eliminate some of 
the taverns in North Fond du Lac.   
¶9 
The Fond du Lac County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Peter L. Grimm presiding, denied the motion, concluding that 
Kramer had failed to make a prima facie case of selective 
prosecution.  The court noted that selective prosecution may be 
raised when the defendant is a member of a protected class; it 
concluded, however, that Kramer did not fall within any such 
classification.  Selective prosecution, the court stated, could 
also occur in instances where the defendant is a solitary 
prosecution.  The court then viewed Kramer's evidence to support 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
7 
 
this claim, including various police reports showing three 
seizures of video gambling machines in City of Fond du Lac 
taverns.  The owners of these taverns were never prosecuted.  
The court determined, however, that the city cases did not 
support the selective prosecution claim because they were 
factually distinguishable from Kramer's case based on a lack of 
evidence to show commercial gambling.  The court noted that in 
two of the city cases there was no evidence of payouts or of 
actual customers playing the games to get money from the tavern 
owners.  In the third city case, although there was evidence 
that the tavern owner admitted to video gambling taking place in 
the tavern, the court concluded that there was still no actual 
evidence of a payout to a customer.  This evidence, the court 
stated, amounted to an insufficient statistical showing to 
constitute a prima facie claim of selective prosecution.   
¶10 The court did not regard the distribution of the 
warning letter as having any significance on the selective 
prosecution claim; in fact, it stated that the letter by itself 
was insufficient to show evidence of malicious prosecution.  The 
prosecutor, the court stated, was not constitutionally required 
to provide any such warning letter because the owners were 
expected to follow and obey the law.  In addition, no 
vindictiveness was found on the part of the police to support 
the selective prosecution claim.  The court stated that the 
desire to have fewer taverns was not an improper motive.  After 
concluding that a prima facie case was not established, the 
court excused a number of witnesses the State had produced to 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
8 
 
rebut any prima facie showing.  A jury later convicted Kramer on 
the two counts.   
¶11 Kramer appealed, and, in a published decision, the 
court of appeals reversed, holding that Kramer had been 
selectively prosecuted.  State v. Kramer, 2000 WI App 271, ¶1, 
240 Wis. 2d 44, 622 N.W.2d 4.  The court concluded that, based 
primarily on the discriminatory manner in which the county 
distributed the warning letter, Kramer had presented a prima 
facie showing of selective prosecution.  Id. at ¶¶10-13.  The 
court also concluded that the State had failed to rebut this 
showing by demonstrating a valid exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Id. at ¶¶13-15.  As a result, the court reversed 
the order denying Kramer's motion to dismiss and reversed his 
judgment of conviction.  Id. at ¶16. 
¶12 We granted the State's petition for review.  On appeal 
to this court, the State concedes that Kramer established a 
prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose, which is one of 
the two prongs necessary to establish a prima facie case for 
selective prosecution.  However, it argues that Kramer's 
selective prosecution claim must fail because he did not 
establish a prima facie showing on the other prong, that the 
prosecution had a discriminatory effect.  More specifically, the 
State asserts that Kramer failed to present sufficient evidence 
to show that similarly situated tavern owners outside the 
Village of North Fond du Lac were also engaged in commercial 
gambling but were not prosecuted.  We disagree.  As discussed 
below, the evidence presented by Kramer established a prima 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
9 
 
facie showing of discriminatory effect, and as a result, a prima 
facie case for selective prosecution was made.  We disagree with 
the court of appeals' conclusion, however, that the State failed 
to rebut this prima facie showing because it was never afforded 
an opportunity to present evidence on this issue.  For this 
reason, this case must be remanded for further proceedings.  
II 
¶13 This case presents two issues concerning Kramer's 
claim of selective prosecution.  The first issue is whether he 
presented a prima facie case for selective prosecution.  We 
conclude that he did.  The second issue is whether the State 
rebutted this prima facie case by presenting evidence of a valid 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  We conclude that remand 
to the circuit court is necessary to decide this issue.   
¶14 "A prosecutor has great discretion in deciding whether 
to prosecute in a particular case."  County of Kenosha v. C & S 
Mgmt., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 400, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999) (citing Sears 
v. 
State, 
94 
Wis. 2d 128, 
133, 
287 
N.W.2d 785 
(1980)).  
"Exercise of this discretion necessarily involves a degree of 
selectivity."  Sears, 94 Wis. 2d at 134.  For this reason, a 
prosecutor's 
conscious 
exercise 
of 
some 
selectivity 
in 
enforcement 
does 
not 
in 
itself 
create 
a 
constitutional 
violation.  Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 
(1962)).  A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution will occur, however, when a defendant can 
show "persistent selective and intentional discrimination in the 
enforcement of the statute in the absence of valid exercise of 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
10 
 
prosecutorial discretion."  State v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d 169, 
172, 246 N.W.2d 503 (1976).   
¶15 "A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the 
merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent 
assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons 
forbidden by the Constitution."  United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456, 463 (1996).  An allegation that the defendant was 
selectively prosecuted is judged under ordinary equal protection 
standards.  C & S, 223 Wis. 2d at 401 (citing Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).  A defendant has the initial 
burden to present a prima facie showing of discriminatory 
prosecution before he or she is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on the claim.  Id. (citing State v. Nowakowski, 67 
Wis. 2d 545, 565-66, 227 N.W.2d 697 (1975)).  If the defendant 
succeeds, the burden then shifts to the state to show that the 
charging decision reflects a valid exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d at 175.   
¶16 A defendant establishes a prima facie case when the 
facts presented are sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
the prosecution's purpose.  See Nowakowski, 67 Wis. 2d at 567-68 
(applying United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620-23 (7th Cir. 
1973)).  More specifically, a prima facie case requires the 
defendant to submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient 
to establish a fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.  See 
Thomas v. City of West Haven, 734 A.2d 535, 540 (Conn. 1999).  
In other words, it is evidence that is sufficient to raise an 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
11 
 
issue to go to the trier of fact.  Id.  (citing 9 Wigmore 
Evidence § 2494 (4th ed. 1974)).  
¶17 We review the circuit court's decision on whether the 
defendant has established a prima facie case on selective 
prosecution under the clearly erroneous standard because both 
prongs of the analysis for selective prosecution (discriminatory 
purpose and discriminatory effect) essentially involve factual 
inquiries.  See State v. McCollum, 159 Wis. 2d 184, 193-94, 201-
02, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1990); United States v. Gutierrez, 
990 F.2d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1993).  Under this standard, we will 
uphold the decision of the circuit court if it is supported by 
credible evidence or reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from this evidence.  See State v. Lopez, 173 Wis. 2d 724, 729, 
496 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1992).  Our review of whether the 
circuit court applied the correct legal standard, however, is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  McCollum, 159 
Wis. 2d at 194. 
¶18 To establish a prima facie showing on a selective 
prosecution claim, a defendant must show that the prosecution 
had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.  C & S, 223 Wis. 2d at 401 (citing 
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608).  That is, a defendant must show that he 
or she has been singled out for prosecution while others 
similarly situated have not (discriminatory effect) and that the 
prosecutor's 
discriminatory 
selection 
was 
based 
on 
an 
impermissible consideration such as race, religion or another 
arbitrary classification (discriminatory purpose).  Id. (citing 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
12 
 
United States v. Kerley, 787 F.2d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1986)); 
Sears, 94 Wis. 2d at 134 (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456).  Under 
the discriminatory purpose prong, a defendant is not limited to 
proving his or her case through proof of discriminatory 
selection based on suspect or arbitrary classifications.  In 
cases involving solitary prosecutions, a defendant may also show 
that "the government's discriminatory selection for prosecution 
is based on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional 
rights or motivated by personal vindictiveness on the part of a 
prosecutor or the responsible member of the administrative 
agency recommending prosecution."  Id. at 135 (citations 
omitted).   
¶19 For purposes of this appeal, the parties concede that 
Kramer established a prima facie case for discriminatory 
purpose.  The prosecutions were limited to charges against North 
Fond du Lac tavern owners, indicating that the prosecutions were 
based on an arbitrary consideration: geographic location.  At 
oral argument, the State conceded that the county's failure to 
distribute the warning letter to North Fond du Lac tavern owners 
shows a discriminatory intent against these tavern owners.  
Indeed, discriminatory intent was also evidenced by the fact 
that the State applied its prosecution policy retroactively only 
against Kramer for the July 12, 1996 incident, even though the 
letter suggested that the policy would only apply prospectively.  
Nevertheless, because of the concession, our review focuses on 
whether Kramer met his burden in establishing a prima facie case 
for discriminatory effect.   
No. 
99-2580-CR 
13 
 
¶20 Under the discriminatory effect prong, we look at 
whether persons similarly situated to the defendant were 
generally not subject to prosecution.  C & S, 223 Wis. 2d at 
401. 
 
"'[D]efendants 
are 
similarly 
situated 
when 
their 
circumstances 
present 
no 
distinguishable 
legitimate 
prosecutorial factors that might justify making prosecutorial 
decisions with respect to them.'"  Id. at 404-05 (quoting United 
States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996)).  The inquiry 
must focus on the governmental action challenged.  That is, the 
inquiry examines whether the defendant is similarly situated to 
another group with respect to the challenged governmental 
action.  Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 
1994).  Courts must be careful, however, not to define who is 
similarly situated too narrowly.  Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 
251 F.3d 612, 636 (7th Cir. 2001).  The governmental action 
challenged in this case was the State's prosecution of tavern 
owners in North Fond du Lac for commercial gambling.  The 
circuit court correctly examined the evidence to determine 
whether any tavern owners outside of North Fond du Lac had also 
been engaged in commercial gambling but were not prosecuted.  We 
examine the evidence in a similar manner. 
¶21 In support of his motion, Kramer presented several 
police reports from the City of Fond du Lac Police Department 
involving three different city taverns where video slot machines 
were found in 1996.  The report concerning a tavern named 
Beernuts 
is 
of 
particular 
importance 
to 
Kramer's 
claim.  
According to this report, the police received an anonymous 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
14 
 
complaint on September 5, 1996, alleging that a gambling machine 
was in operation at the tavern and that the tavern was making 
payouts for credits earned on the machine.  The police then 
conducted an investigation on September 13, 1996, during which 
the owner and an employee of the tavern both admitted to making 
payouts.  Although the police confiscated the gambling machine 
and referred the matter to the county district attorney's 
office, after the September 2, 1996 letter and change in policy, 
no subsequent prosecution was pursued.  Beernuts is similarly 
situated to Kramer's tavern inasmuch as there was evidence that 
Beernuts likewise made payouts for credits earned on a gambling 
machine.   
¶22 The other police reports submitted by Kramer involved 
Frannie's Bar and Sully's Tavern.  In both cases, during checks 
of taverns for video gambling machines in April 1996, City of 
Fond du Lac police discovered machines in the taverns.  The 
police confiscated the machines and referred the matters to the 
county district attorney's office.  The owners of these taverns 
were never prosecuted.  The police reports do not indicate 
whether the owners of the taverns were making payouts on these 
machines, as Kramer did at his tavern on July 12, 1996 and 
December 4, 1996.  However, before the county changed its 
prosecution policy on September 2, 1996, there is no evidence 
that payouts were required for purposes of prosecution in Fond 
du Lac County.  Further, the court of appeals did not decide 
Hahn until July 18, 1996.  Thus, before July 18, 1996, Kramer 
was similarly situated to other tavern owners who had video 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
15 
 
gambling machines; that is, all such taverns were subject to 
prosecution——at 
least 
according 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
commercial gambling from the Attorney General——even though the 
district 
attorney 
was 
not 
pursuing 
such 
prosecutions.  
Therefore, despite the fact that the warning letter indicated 
that the prosecution policy would apply prospectively, the 
prosecutor applied it retroactively against Kramer only, not to 
other similarly situated taverns.  Kramer was prosecuted for a 
violation during this period while other similarly situated 
tavern owners outside of North Fond du Lac were not prosecuted.   
¶23 Finally, the letter is important in our analysis.  The 
sending 
of 
the 
letter 
suggests 
that 
many 
tavern 
owners 
throughout the county were similarly situated to Kramer, that 
is, that they were equally suspected of having video poker 
machines.  The letter warned that all tavern owners who had such 
machines would be subject to the same enforcement policy.  
Although the record is unclear as to which taverns received the 
letter, the record is clear that the letter was never sent to 
North Fond du Lac tavern owners.  Several tavern owners in North 
Fond du Lac were then targeted for prosecution by the county for 
alleged violations.  Tavern owners outside of North Fond du Lac 
were not prosecuted.  This record presents no distinguishable 
legitimate prosecutorial factors that justify making these 
prosecutorial distinctions with respect to the North Fond du Lac 
tavern owners.   
¶24 We conclude that, collectively, the above evidence 
established a prima facie case for discriminatory effect.  The 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
16 
 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
on 
this 
issue 
was 
clearly 
erroneous because it was not supported by the credible evidence 
and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.  
The circuit court applied the correct legal standard because it 
examined, as the discriminatory effect prong requires, whether 
Kramer had produced evidence to show that others similarly 
situated to him were not prosecuted.  It erred, however, by 
requiring similarly situated cases to have identical evidence as 
Kramer's case for prima facie purposes.  In its analysis, the 
court erred first by concluding that Beernuts was not similarly 
situated based solely on the fact that there was no actual 
evidence of a payout to a customer.  The admission of the owner 
of Beernuts that payouts occurred was sufficient to show 
Beernuts was similarly situated.  Second, the court erred by 
regarding the other police reports as irrelevant because they 
did not involve payouts.  There was no express policy requiring 
payouts for prosecution prior to the release of the letter, and 
therefore, these taverns were similarly situated to Kramer with 
respect to his pre-Hahn prosecution.  Finally, for reasons 
explained above, the court erred by concluding that the letter 
had no bearing on discriminatory effect.  As discussed above, 
the evidence indicates that North Fond du Lac tavern owners were 
specifically targeted for prosecution while other similarly 
situated tavern owners outside of North Fond du Lac were 
ignored.  This evidence was sufficient to raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the prosecution's purpose.   
No. 
99-2580-CR 
17 
 
¶25 As a result, the burden now properly shifts to the 
State to rebut the prima facie showing of selective prosecution.  
At this stage, the test is whether there exists any reasonable 
basis to justify the classification.  State v. Barman, 183 
Wis. 2d 180, 
191, 
515 
N.W.2d 493 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994). 
 
The 
government is required to put forth compelling evidence to meet 
its burden.  Falk, 479 F.2d at 624.  The defendant may also 
present additional evidence supporting his claim.  Id.  In this 
case, the circuit court never reached a determination on 
rebuttal evidence.  It ended its analysis after concluding that 
a prima facie case had not been established.  Regardless, an 
examination of the record reveals the State never submitted any 
evidence to rebut a prima facie case.  Instead, the State argued 
that Kramer's evidence did not support a prima facie case and 
that therefore an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.  The 
State did argue that its decisions not to prosecute in the city 
cases were based on the adequacy of the evidence; however, there 
was insufficient evidence in the record at the time of the 
hearing to support this allegation.    
¶26 The court of appeals concluded that the State failed 
to rebut the prima facie showing.  The court noted that the 
State had alleged that the sheriff's department, not the 
district attorney, was responsible for the distribution of the 
letter and that therefore the letter indicated a new policy for 
the sheriff, not the district attorney.  As the court of appeals 
concluded, this argument contradicts the plain language of the 
letter because it was signed by both the district attorney and 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
18 
 
the sheriff.  However, the court of appeals' decision not to 
remand for an evidentiary hearing failed to provide the State 
with sufficient opportunity to present evidence to rebut 
Kramer's prima facie case.  We therefore remand to the circuit 
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
State has produced sufficient evidence to rebut this prima facie 
showing.   
III 
¶27 In sum, we conclude that Kramer met his burden in 
establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory effect.  
Therefore, because the parties concede that a prima facie case 
of discriminatory purpose was shown, we agree with the court of 
appeals' decision that a prima facie showing of selective 
prosecution was made.  We disagree, however, with the court of 
appeals' determination that the State failed to rebut this 
showing with evidence displaying a proper use of prosecutorial 
discretion.  The State must be afforded the opportunity to 
present evidence on this issue.  As a result, we remand to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.  The 
judgment of conviction stands subject to the results of the 
evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded.   
 
No. 
99-2580-CR 
 
 
1