Title: State v. Jeffries

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Jeffries, 119 Ohio St.3d 265, 2008-Ohio-3865.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JEFFRIES, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Jeffries, 119 Ohio St.3d 265, 2008-Ohio-3865.] 
Plea agreements — Rules of Evidence — Statements that were not made in the 
course of plea discussions are not protected by Evid.R. 410, even if the 
statements were later provided to the state in the course of plea 
discussions. 
(No. 2007-1478 – Submitted May 20, 2008 – Decided August 7, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County,  
No. 2005-L-057, 2007-Ohio-3366. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Statements that were not made in the course of plea discussions are not protected 
by Evid.R. 410, even if the statements were later provided to the state in 
the course of plea discussions. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Evid.R. 410(A)(5) provides that statements made in the course of 
plea discussions are not admissible against the defendant in court.  The Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals held that a particular statement that had been made 
before the commencement of plea discussions was protected by Evid.R. 410 
because the statement was later provided to the state in the course of plea 
discussions.  We hold that statements that were not made in the course of plea 
discussions are not protected by Evid.R. 410, even if they were later provided to 
the state in the course of plea discussions.  We reverse the judgment of the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals. 
Facts 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} In December 2001, a body was discovered in a park in Painesville, 
Ohio.  A few hours later, Jennifer L. Jeffries called 9-1-1 to report that she and the 
deceased had been the victims of a robbery.  For over a year and a half, the police 
department investigated the death without pursuing an indictment. 
{¶ 3} In October 2002, while the investigation was ongoing, an assistant 
public defender arranged for Jeffries to submit to a polygraph test with an 
independent polygraphist to test her veracity regarding a “new story” about the 
murder.  This version exonerated Jeffries of any knowledge of or responsibility 
for the murder and identified her husband as the killer.  Jeffries submitted a 
written statement to the polygraphist and submitted to the polygraph test.  Neither 
the written statement nor the results of the polygraph test were provided to the 
state then. 
{¶ 4} In May 2003, Jeffries and her attorneys signed a cooperation 
agreement with Lake County prosecutors, which was to grant her immunity on all 
charges related to the murder.  Before entering into the agreement, an assistant 
public defender informed the state that Jeffries had previously passed a polygraph 
test and described some of the questions that had been asked.  Additionally, the 
statement that Jeffries had submitted to the polygraphist was provided to the state.  
The agreement required Jeffries to cooperate with prosecutors and submit to a 
polygraph to confirm her truthfulness.  Jeffries failed the polygraph and fled the 
jurisdiction, and the agreement became void.  Consequently, she was indicted on 
several charges arising from the murder. 
{¶ 5} Prior to trial, Jeffries’s counsel asked the court to suppress the 
statement she had made to the polygraphist.  The court denied the request.  At 
trial, Jeffries was convicted of trafficking in cocaine; tampering with evidence; 
involuntary manslaughter, with a firearm specification; complicity to robbery, 
with a firearm specification; and murder, with a firearm specification. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 6} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, 
holding that the trial court had abused its discretion by not suppressing the 
statement to the polygraphist.  The court of appeals based its holding on its 
conclusion that the statement was made in the course of plea negotiations:  “Even 
though the parties were not engaged in active plea negotiations in October 2002, 
we conclude that when the state requested a copy of the October 28, 2002 
statement and polygraphist’s report, and when Jeffries complied with that request, 
those documents were in furtherance of verifying the validity of Jeffries’ 
statements for the purpose of offering her a deal in exchange for her testimony, 
i.e., a plea negotiation.  * * * Jeffries’ subjective intent on October 28, 2002, is 
not germane because her statement was made to [the polygraphist], who was not 
an agent of the state, and because Evid.R. 410 merely requires that the statement 
be ‘made in the course of plea discussions.’ ”  State v. Jeffries, Lake App. No. 
2005-L-057, 2007-Ohio-3366, ¶ 72-73. 
{¶ 7} We accepted the discretionary appeal.  State v. Jeffries, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 1437, 2007-Ohio-6518, 877 N.E.2d 989. 
Discussion 
{¶ 8} Evid.R. 410(A)(5) provides that the following is not admissible 
against the defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding:  “any statement made in 
the course of plea discussions in which counsel for the prosecuting authority or 
for the defendant was a participant and that do not result in a plea of guilty or that 
result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.”  (Emphasis added.)  It is clear from the 
language of Evid.R. 410(A)(5) that the rule protects statements that were 
originally made in the course of plea discussions—not statements that were made 
prior to plea negotiations and later provided to the state. 
{¶ 9} Evid.R. 410 protects statements that were originally made in the 
course of plea discussions.  We have held that in order for statements to be 
protected by Evid.R. 410, it is necessary that “at the time of the statements, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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accused had a subjective expectation that a plea was being negotiated.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 
syllabus.  We also held that the subjective belief of the accused must have been 
“reasonable under the circumstances.”  Id.  Frazier thus stands for the principle 
that Evid.R. 410 protects the statements of an accused when, at the time the 
statements were originally made, the accused had both a subjective and an 
objectively reasonable expectation that a plea was being negotiated.  Frazier does 
not stand for the principle that Evid.R. 410 protects the statements of an accused 
when, at the time the statements were provided to the state by the accused or his 
or her attorney, the accused had an expectation that a plea was being negotiated. 
{¶ 10} A defendant cannot protect existing statements by providing them 
to the prosecution in the course of plea discussions.  We have long recognized a 
similar principle in the context of attorney-client privilege:  “ ‘A document of the 
client existing before it was communicated to the attorney is not within the present 
privilege so as to be exempt from production.  But a document which has come 
into existence as a communication to the attorney, being itself a communication, 
is within the present privilege.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  In re Klemann (1936), 132 
Ohio St. 187, 7 O.O. 273, 5 N.E.2d 492, quoting 5 Wigmore on Evidence (2d 
Ed.1923) 67, Section 2318 (applying the rule that an attorney may not testify 
regarding a communication made to him by his client). 
{¶ 11} The statement at issue here was made far in advance of plea 
discussions, and there is no evidence that Jeffries believed that her statement to 
the polygraphist was made in the course of plea discussions.  Indeed, the court of 
appeals recognized that the parties “were not engaged in active plea negotiations 
in October 2002” and that Jeffries “may not have had a subjective expectation that 
her counsel was preparing for a plea negotiation at the time the statement was 
given.”  Jeffries, 2007-Ohio-3366, ¶ 72, 74.  That conclusion should have directed 
the court of appeals to simply apply the plain words of the rule to the facts in the 
January Term, 2008 
5 
record and affirm the judgment of the trial court.  That the statement was later 
provided to the prosecution in the course of plea discussions is irrelevant.  
Jeffries’s statement was not protected by Evid.R. 410. 
{¶ 12} The interpretation of the court of appeals is incorrect and based on 
an unreasonable interpretation of Evid.R. 410 and of our holding in Frazier.  We 
hold that statements that were not made in the course of plea discussions are not 
protected by Evid.R. 410, even if the statements were later provided to the state in 
the course of plea discussions.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Karen 
A. Sheppert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. 
Clapp, Supervising Attorney, Appellate Division, for appellee. 
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