Title: Hawkins, et al. v. Ivey, et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: March 18, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1200847
____________________
Shentel Hawkins, Ashlee Lindsey, Jimmie George, and
Christina Fox
v.
Governor Kay Ivey and Secretary of Labor Fitzgerald
Washington
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-21-900863)
MITCHELL, Justice.
1200847
In response to economic conditions related to the spread of COVID-
19, Congress established several programs that made additional federal
funds available to the states for providing enhanced unemployment-
compensation benefits to eligible individuals ("the programs").  Alabama
elected to participate in the programs, and Shentel Hawkins, Ashlee
Lindsey, Jimmie George, and Christina Fox ("the claimants") were among
the Alabamians who received the enhanced benefits.
As the spread of COVID-19 waned, Governor Kay Ivey announced
that Alabama would be ending its participation in the programs.  When
Alabama did so, the claimants received reduced unemployment-
compensation benefits or, depending on their particular circumstances, no
benefits at all.  Two months later, the claimants sued Governor Ivey and
Secretary of the Alabama Department of Labor Fitzgerald Washington in
their official capacities, alleging that Alabama law did not permit them to
opt Alabama out of the programs.  After the Montgomery Circuit Court
dismissed the claimants' lawsuit based on the doctrine of State immunity,
see Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14, the claimants filed this
appeal.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Standard of Review
In Munza v. Ivey, [Ms. 1200003, Mar. 19, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
2021), this Court reviewed the dismissal of another action filed against
Governor Ivey and a member of her cabinet challenging decisions they had
made related to the spread of COVID-19.  As in this case, the State
defendants in Munza moved the trial court to dismiss that action under
Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing, among other things, that the court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the action because § 14 barred
the asserted claims.  ___ So. 3d at ___.  See also Butler v. Parks, [Ms.
1190043, Jan. 22, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2021) (explaining that,
when State immunity applies, the trial court is divested of subject-matter
jurisdiction).  We stated in Munza that " ' "[a] ruling on a motion to
dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness" ' " and that
" ' "[m]atters of subject-matter jurisdiction are subject to de novo
review." ' "  ___ So. 3d at ___ (citations omitted).  We apply this same
standard of review here.1 
1In Hare v. Mack, [Ms. 1200562, Jan. 21, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___
(Ala. 2022), we clarified that, when an appellate court considers a
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Analysis
The Alabama Constitution provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."  Ala.
Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14.  "This Court, construing Section
14, has held almost every conceivable type of suit to be within the
constitutional prohibition."  Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of
Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So. 2d 281, 283 (1971).  We have further
clarified that the immunity provided by § 14 bars not only actions
expressly naming the State of Alabama as a defendant, but also actions
against State officers or agents in their official capacities.  Patterson v.
Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).  See also Burgoon v.
Alabama State Dep't of Hum. Res., 835 So. 2d 131, 133 (Ala. 2002) ("A suit
against a State agency, or against State agents in their official capacities,
is a suit against the State.").  
judgment dismissing an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), the appellate court reviews the trial court's legal
conclusions de novo, but reviews its jurisdictional findings of fact for clear
error.  But, like in Hare, that distinction makes no difference in this case
because the essential facts are undisputed.
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But, while "[t]he wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly
impregnable," Patterson, 835 So. 2d at 142, it "is not absolute; there are
actions that are not barred by the general rule of immunity."  Ex parte
Hampton, 189 So. 3d 14, 17 (Ala. 2015).  In Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d
1119, 1131 (Ala. 2013), this Court discussed the limited circumstances in
which actions against State officers in their official capacities are not
barred by § 14.   Those permissible categories of actions include cases in
which a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief compelling State officers to
perform their legal duties.  Id.  See also Stark v. Troy State Univ., 514 So.
2d 46, 50 (Ala. 1987) (explaining that "an action seeking to compel [State
officials] to perform their legal duties will not be barred by [§ 14] of the
Alabama Constitution").  The claimants invoke this so-called exception to
the doctrine of State immunity here.  In doing so, they argue that the trial
court erred by dismissing their action on § 14 grounds because, they say,
Governor Ivey and Secretary Washington have a legal duty "to fully
participate in unemployment-compensation programs offered by the
federal government."  The claimants' brief at p. 10.  Although the
claimants offer two statutes in support of their argument, nothing in the
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language of either statute compels Alabama to participate in the
programs.
A. § 36-13-8, Ala. Code 1975
Title 36 of the Alabama Code generally addresses the rights and
responsibilities of public officers and employees.  Chapter 13 specifically
discusses the office of Governor, and § 36-13-8 addresses the Governor's
authority and power to accept federal grants and funds:
"The Governor is hereby authorized and empowered to
accept from the federal government or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, in the name of and for the State of
Alabama, grants and advances of funds and real or other
personal property for any purpose of the state government not
contrary to the Constitution of Alabama.
"The Governor is further authorized and empowered,
insofar as is not specifically prohibited by the constitution and
the then existing statutes, to meet and to require, by his
executive order, any other agency or instrumentality of the
state government to meet the terms and conditions imposed on
such grants and advances in acts of the Congress of the United
States, executive orders of the President of the United States
or any rule, regulation or order of any other agency or
instrumentality of the federal government, it being the intent
of this section to permit the State of Alabama to participate
fully in grants and advances made available to it by the federal
government."
(Emphasis added.)
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The claimants argue in conclusory fashion that § 36-13-8 requires
Governor Ivey to continue Alabama's participation in the programs.2   The
claimants are wrong.  Section 36-13-8 states that it is "the intent of this
section to permit the State of Alabama to participate fully in grants and
advances made available to it by the federal government."  (Emphasis
added.)  To this end, the statute provides that the Governor is "authorized
and empowered" to accept federal funds on behalf of Alabama and to
direct State agencies and instrumentalities to comply with the terms and
conditions that the federal government places upon the receipt of such
funds.  But § 36-13-8 does not require the Governor to accept all federal
funds that might be made available to Alabama.  Embedded in § 36-13-8
is the Governor's discretion to decide whether and when it is wise to
accept available federal funds. 
As the second paragraph of § 36-13-8 recognizes, federal grants and
funds are often accompanied by terms and conditions.  See South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (recognizing the federal government's
2Nowhere in the claimants' brief do they quote any portion of § 36-
13-8 or make specific arguments about its text.   
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general power to require states to comply with conditions attached to
federal funds and the states' authority to decline those funds if they find
the conditions to be overly onerous).  Thus, if the Governor decides that
accepting specific funds and complying with federally mandated terms and
conditions would benefit Alabama, the Governor is authorized and
empowered by § 36-13-8 to accept those funds.  But if the Governor
decides that those terms and conditions are too burdensome, there is
nothing in § 36-13-8 that requires her to accept the funds.  
Put simply, the plain text of § 36-13-8 permits the Governor to
accept funds made available to Alabama under a federal program; it does
not require the Governor to do so.  The claimants' argument that § 36-13-8
required Governor Ivey to have Alabama participate in the programs is
not supported by the text of the statute.  We therefore reject it.
B. § 25-4-118, Ala. Code 1975
The statutes governing Alabama's unemployment-compensation
program are found in Chapter 4 of Title 25 of the Alabama Code.  Article
6 of Chapter 4 addresses the administration of the program and the rights
and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Alabama Department of Labor
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("the secretary") in that program.  Within that chapter, § 25-4-118(a)
provides in part that, "[i]n the administration of this chapter, the
secretary shall cooperate to the fullest extent consistent with the
provisions of this chapter with the U.S. Secretary of Labor ...."  The
claimants argue that this language imposed a duty on Secretary
Washington to continue Alabama's participation in the programs. 
Governor Ivey and Secretary Washington say that the full context of § 25-
4-118(a) makes clear that the statute does no such thing.  Rather than
imposing an affirmative duty to participate in federal programs, they
argue that subsection (a) merely concerns the secretary's administrative
duty to file reports and to comply with federal regulations governing those
federal unemployment programs that already exist under Title III of the
Social Security Act.3  
3In its entirety, § 25-4-118(a) states:
"In the administration of this chapter, the secretary shall
cooperate to the fullest extent consistent with the provisions
of this chapter with the U.S. Secretary of Labor and his
successors, and the Federal Internal Revenue Service, and,
notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, shall
make such reports in such form and containing such
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It is ultimately unnecessary for us to delineate the extent of
Secretary Washington's duty to cooperate with the federal government
under § 25-4-118(a).  As explained, § 36-13-8 authorizes and empowers the
Governor -- not the secretary or any other State official -- to accept federal
grants and funds "in the name of and for the State of Alabama."  The
claimants have identified no authority indicating that Secretary
Washington has power equal to or exceeding Governor Ivey in this sphere,
and there is certainly nothing in § 25-4-118(a) to suggest that he would. 
Indeed, Governor Ivey and Secretary Washington state that the Alabama
information as either may from time to time require, and shall
comply with such provisions as the U.S. Secretary of Labor, or
his successors, or the Federal Internal Revenue Service may
from time to time find necessary to insure the correctness and
verification of such reports, and shall comply with the
regulations prescribed by the U.S. Secretary of Labor, and his
successors, governing the expenditures of such sums as may be
allotted and paid to this state under Title III of the Social
Security Act for the purpose of assisting in the administration
of this chapter. Upon request therefor the secretary shall
furnish to any agency of the United States charged with the
administration of public works or assistance through public
employment, the name, address, ordinary occupation, and
employment status of each recipient of benefits and such
recipient's rights to further benefits under this chapter."
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Constitution and our caselaw affirmatively refute the notion that another
State official would have the power to overrule the Governor's decision. 
See Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. V, § 113 ("The supreme executive
power of this state shall be vested in a chief magistrate, who shall be
styled 'The Governor of the State of Alabama.' "); Tyson v. Jones, 60 So. 3d
831, 849 (Ala. 2010) ("Generally, where the governor is authorized to act
he or she is not subject to any other executive officer.").  
Thus, regardless of what duties may be imposed on Secretary
Washington by § 25-4-118(a), that statute -- which makes no mention of
the Governor -- does not provide any basis for requiring Governor Ivey to
continue Alabama's participation in the programs.  Section 36-13-8
identifies only the Governor as being "authorized and empowered" to
accept federal funds "in the name of and for the State of Alabama," and
Secretary Washington's duty to cooperate with the federal government
under § 25-4-118(a) has no bearing on Governor Ivey's discretion to decide
whether to accept federal grants and funds under § 36-13-8.  Stated
another way, Secretary Washington had no ability to "cooperate" with the
federal government to provide enhanced unemployment-compensation
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benefits to Alabamians under the programs once Governor Ivey
terminated Alabama's participation in them.  The claimants have not
shown that § 25-4-118(a) -- either by itself4 or in conjunction with § 36-13-
8 -- imposes any legal duty on Governor Ivey or Secretary Washington
that would place this action beyond the jurisdictional bar of § 14.
Conclusion
The claimants sued Governor Ivey and Secretary Washington,
alleging that state law did not permit Alabama to opt out of the programs
that provided funds for the claimants to receive enhanced unemployment-
compensation benefits.  The trial court dismissed the action, concluding
4The claimants note that plaintiffs in other states that have
statutory language arguably similar to § 25-4-118(a) have met with some
success in court challenges to those states' decisions to stop participating
in the programs.  See Armstrong v. Hutchinson, No. CV 2021-4507 (Ark.
Cir. Ct., Pulaski Cnty., July 28, 2021); D.A. v. Hogan, No. 24-C-21-002988,
and Harp v. Hogan, No. 24-C-21-002999 (combined) (Md. Cir. Ct.,
Baltimore City, July 3, 2021)  State ex rel. Bowling v. DeWine, No.
21CVH07-4469 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Franklin Cnty., Aug. 24, 2021); Owens v.
Zumwalt, No. CV-21-1703 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Oklahoma Cnty., Aug. 9, 2021). 
Of course, even if the statutory language used by those states is identical
to § 25-4-118(a), those courts' decisions do not bind this Court.  Walls v.
Alpharma USPD, Inc., 887 So. 2d 881, 884 (Ala. 2004).  And none of those
cases address the doctrine of State immunity under Alabama's
Constitution, on which this case turns.
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that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under § 14 of the Alabama
Constitution.  The trial court was correct, and its judgment dismissing the
action is hereby affirmed.5
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
5Our conclusion that the trial court correctly dismissed this action
on the basis of § 14 obviates the need to consider any of the other issues
raised by the parties.
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