Title: Baxter v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13190 
 
DARIO BAXTER  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 2, 2022. - April 12, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Accessory and Principal.  Constitutional 
Law, Double jeopardy.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, 
Mistrial.  Evidence, Identification, Intent.  Intent. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on June 21, 2021. 
 
The case was reported by Wendlandt, J. 
 
 
Jillise McDonough for the petitioner. 
Andrew S. Doherty, Assistant District Attorney (Tara B. 
Burdman, Assistant District Attorney) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Dario Baxter, was tried on 
charges of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, accessory after 
the fact to murder, carrying a firearm without a license, and 
carrying a loaded firearm without a license in connection with 
2 
 
the killing of Michael Ross, who was shot multiple times on the 
morning of March 30, 2018.  The Commonwealth alleged that the 
defendant drove the shooter and another coventurer to and from 
the scene of the fatal shooting.  After four days of 
deliberations, the Superior Court jury were unable to reach a 
verdict, and the trial judge declared a mistrial.  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  The 
motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the motion.  
The defendant filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
which was reserved and reported to the court by the single 
justice. 
On appeal, the defendant maintains that a retrial would 
violate his right against double jeopardy.  Because we agree 
that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant shared 
the lethal intent of the shooter required to support a 
conviction of murder in the first degree on a joint venture 
theory, we reverse the denial of his motion to dismiss insofar 
as it concerns this charge.  We remand for further proceedings 
as to the remaining charges. 
1.  Background. a.  Facts.  We review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Pinney v. 
Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1001, 1001-1002 (2018), S.C., 484 Mass. 
1003 (2020) and 487 Mass. 1029 (2021); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 
378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). 
3 
 
The defendant and his two friends, codefendant Dawon Wright 
and Dakarai Pittman, were training to become personal trainers.  
On the morning of the shooting, Wright and Pittman attended a 
training session in an office building in downtown Boston along 
with their supervisor.  Afterward, Wright and Pittman asked to 
be dropped off in the Orchard Park neighborhood of the Roxbury 
section of Boston -- a location the supervisor "associate[d] 
with" the defendant.  The supervisor dropped off Wright and 
Pittman on Zeigler Street in that neighborhood at around 8:40 
A.M.  Wright was wearing a red-colored Red Sox jacket with a 
black hooded sweatshirt underneath, and Pittman was wearing a 
blue jacket over a grey hooded sweatshirt. 
The defendant's girlfriend lived on Zeigler Street.  She 
was the registered owner of a gold Honda Accord, which was 
parked in her driveway that morning.  The car had heavily tinted 
side windows, a scratch on the front driver's side door, and 
damage to the front bumper.  The defendant had permission to 
drive the car. 
Video footage showed a person matching Pittman's 
description walking toward the car that morning, and the car 
leaving the driveway at 9:01:20 A.M.1  Video footage showed the 
 
1 The jury could infer that the defendant's girlfriend was 
not driving the car because she had clocked into work at 8:10 
A.M. and did not clock out until 12:32 P.M. 
4 
 
car passing the intersection of Zeigler and Dearborn Streets at 
9:01:30 A.M.  The front driver's side window was partially open, 
and a person who appeared to be the defendant was driving the 
car.  A person wearing a red article of clothing was visible 
beside him in the front passenger's seat.  At 9:06 A.M., video 
footage showed the car at the intersection of Wayland Street and 
Howard Avenue. 
Additional video footage showed the victim leaving an 
apartment building on Howard Avenue at 9:06 A.M., crossing the 
street, and walking down Wayland Street.  The Accord followed 
him down Wayland Street, and then went past him and stopped 
along the curb on the side of the street where he was walking.  
The car waited about eighteen seconds while the victim walked 
toward it on the sidewalk.  As the victim approached the car, it 
pulled away from the curb and traveled a short distance on 
Wayland Street before taking a right turn onto Balfour Street. 
About forty-five seconds later, as the victim walked past 
Balfour Street, a man in a red jacket came from Balfour Street 
on foot and quickly approached the victim from behind, extending 
his arms in front of him.  The victim did not appear to be aware 
that the man was behind him until the man was just a few feet 
away.  The man fired at least six shots at the victim, striking 
him in the back on the right side of his torso, his left arm, 
and his right wrist.  The shooter fled to Balfour Street, and 
5 
 
the victim began to run but collapsed on the sidewalk.  He later 
succumbed to his wounds. 
Two witnesses, both of whom were residents of Balfour 
Street, heard the gunshots and looked out their windows.  Both 
observed two men running from the direction of Wayland Street to 
a gold car parked on Balfour Street:  a tall Black man wearing a 
red-colored Red Sox sweatshirt, who got into the passenger's 
seat and appeared to have a gun at his side; and a shorter Black 
man wearing black jeans and a gray sweatshirt, who entered the 
back seat.  Once the men were in the car, it sped away on 
Balfour Street toward Dalkeith Street. 
A witness, who was driving on Howard Avenue at the time of 
the shooting, turned onto Dalkeith Street when he heard the 
shots, and subsequently turned onto Balfour Street.  He observed 
a man running from Wayland Street onto Balfour Street and 
getting into a light brown Accord that was stopped on Balfour 
Street.  The car went past him toward Dalkeith Street, and he 
observed three Black men inside the car, two in the front seat 
and one in the back.  The Commonwealth's theory at trial was 
that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle, codefendant 
Wright was the shooter who entered the front passenger's seat of 
the vehicle, and Pittman acted as the lookout and entered the 
back seat of the vehicle after the shooting. 
6 
 
After reviewing surveillance video recordings from the 
area, Boston police issued a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) alert 
for a gold Honda with damage to the front bumper and tinted side 
windows.  Later that night, officers stopped a car matching the 
BOLO description.  The defendant was driving the car, and Wright 
was in the front passenger's seat.  The men and the car were 
photographed and released. 
The following day, the defendant's girlfriend removed the 
dark tinting from the car's windows.  Later that same day, 
Boston police seized and searched the car pursuant to a warrant.  
They recovered a security pass receipt for Pittman from the 
building where the personal training session had been held the 
morning of the shooting.  In addition, the defendant's 
fingerprints were found on the driver's door and interior 
handle. 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted for 
murder in the first degree, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; 
accessory after the fact to murder, in violation of G. L. 
c. 274, § 4; carrying a firearm without a license, in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and carrying a loaded firearm without 
a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  At a jury 
7 
 
trial in the Superior Court,2 the jury indicated that they were 
unable to reach a verdict after four days of deliberations, and 
the judge declared a mistrial.  The defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied by a judge 
who was not the trial judge. 
The defendant filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  The single justice reserved and reported the matter to a 
full panel of the court. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Following a 
mistrial, double jeopardy precludes the Commonwealth from 
retrying a defendant for the same offense where the evidence 
presented at the first trial was legally insufficient to warrant 
a conviction.  See Pinney, 479 Mass. at 1001-1002, quoting 
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 361, 363 (2017) ("After a 
mistrial, the Commonwealth may retry a defendant [only] if it 
has presented evidence at the first trial that, if viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, would be sufficient 
for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt" [alteration in 
original]).  To determine whether the evidence was legally 
sufficient to permit a retrial, "[w]e consider whether, after 
 
2 The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty 
at the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and at the 
close of all the evidence.  Both motions were denied. 
8 
 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 162 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51 (2018).  "The evidence 
may be direct or circumstantial, and we draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."  Watson, supra, 
quoting Ayala, supra. 
b.  Murder in the first degree.  "For murder in the first 
degree both under the theory of deliberate premeditation and 
under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, to prove the 
defendant guilty as a joint venturer, the Commonwealth had to 
'prove . . . that "the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, and that the defendant had or 
shared the required criminal intent."'"  Watson, 487 Mass. at 
162, quoting Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100-101 
(2013).  "Because the Commonwealth did not contend that the 
defendant [him]self carried out the killing, but only that [he] 
aided the coventurers, . . . it was the Commonwealth's burden to 
show that the defendant (a) 'participated in the commission of 
the crime charged,' (b) did so 'knowingly,' and (c) 'shared the 
required criminal intent.'"  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 
396, 406 (2016), quoting Britt, supra.  "In the circumstances 
here, this required a showing that the defendant was the driver 
9 
 
of the suspect vehicle, that [he] knew [his] passenger[] 
intended to kill the victim, and that [he] shared this intent."  
Gonzalez, supra at 406-407.  On appeal, the defendant challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the driver of the 
vehicle and that he knew of and shared the shooter's intent to 
kill the victim. 
i.  Identification.  Our decision in Watson is instructive 
as to the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence that he was the driver of the Accord.  In Watson, we 
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to identify the 
defendant as the driver of the suspect vehicle where the 
defendant borrowed the vehicle from his girlfriend the day 
before the murder occurred, the defendant's cell phone and car 
keys were found in the vehicle, and the defendant's fingerprints 
were found on the outside and inside of the vehicle, and 
specifically on the gear shift.  Watson, 487 Mass. at 162-163. 
Similarly, in the present case, a rational trier of fact 
reasonably could have found that the defendant was the driver of 
the Accord on the morning of the shooting.  The car belonged to 
the defendant's girlfriend, and he had her permission to drive 
it.  The morning of the shooting, Wright and Pittman, known 
compatriots of the defendant, asked to be dropped off in a 
neighborhood affiliated with the defendant and near the 
defendant's girlfriend's home.  Pittman approached the Accord 
10 
 
shortly before it pulled away from the girlfriend's driveway, 
and his security tag from the office that he and Wright visited 
earlier that morning was found in the Accord.  Video footage 
captured the car's movements shortly thereafter as it traveled 
from the girlfriend's home to the scene of the shooting; 
specifically, the car is shown leaving the girlfriend's driveway 
at about 9:01 A.M. and traveling over the next six minutes to 
the scene of the shooting, including maneuvering near the victim 
just prior to the shooting.  Significantly, the defendant's 
girlfriend was at work, so she could not have been the driver 
herself, and video footage showed a person resembling the 
defendant driving the Accord about six minutes before the 
shooting occurred, just shortly after the car left the 
girlfriend's driveway.  The jury could infer from the footage 
that Wright, who was wearing a red jacket, was in the front 
passenger's seat.  The defendant's fingerprints were found on 
the interior and exterior of the driver's door.  Several 
witnesses identified the Accord as leaving the scene of the 
shooting after the shooter, who was wearing a red jacket, and a 
coventurer ran away from the victim's body.  The defendant and 
Wright were found traveling in the Accord, hours after the 
shooting.  In sum, the evidence of identification was sufficient 
to support a reasonable inference that the defendant was the 
driver.  See Pinney, 479 Mass. at 1001-1002. 
11 
 
ii.  Knowledge and intent.  The defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence that he knew of and shared the 
shooter's intent to kill the victim stands on different footing.  
See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 414, citing Commonwealth v. Nolin, 
448 Mass. 207, 217 & n.11 (2007) (to support conviction of 
murder in first degree on theory of joint venture, "the 
Commonwealth was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
not only that the defendant drove the suspect vehicle, but that 
[he] knew [his] passenger[] intended to kill the victim and that 
[he] shared [that] intent").  "While such '[m]atters . . . are 
rarely proved by direct evidence and are most often proved 
circumstantially,' . . . the circumstantial evidence may not 
consist solely of a 'show[ing] that the defendant . . . was 
present when the crime was committed,' even if that showing is 
supplemented by evidence that the defendant 'knew about [the 
crime] in advance'" (alterations in original).  Gonzalez, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rosario, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 640, 643 
(2013), and Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 470 (2009) 
(Appendix).  The Commonwealth asserts that the manner by which 
the defendant maneuvered the vehicle before and after the 
shooting is sufficient evidence to prove that the driver knew of 
and shared the lethal intent of the shooter.  Because such an 
inference rests on speculation and conjecture, see Commonwealth 
v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 94 (1988), we disagree. 
12 
 
In particular, while the evidence of the defendant's 
maneuvering of the vehicle may have allowed the jury to infer 
that the defendant knew of and shared the passenger's intent to 
assault the victim, it fails to sustain a reasonable inference, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he shared the passenger's intent 
that the attack be deadly, as required for a conviction under a 
joint venture theory.  See, e.g., Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 415 
(evidence of shared lethal intent legally insufficient despite 
evidence that defendant had motive, had planned alibi, had 
engaged in multiple cell phone calls with perpetrators in hours 
before shooting, had driven shooter to scene of killing, and 
maneuvered vehicle after dropping off shooter, suggesting she 
"had the purpose of 'buy[ing] some time' until the killing could 
be completed, so that the driver could retrieve the 
perpetrators"); Mandile, 403 Mass. at 95, 100-101 (evidence of 
shared lethal intent insufficient where defendant participated 
in stealing guns, was present at scene of murder but remained in 
getaway vehicle, knew coventurer was armed, was driver of 
getaway vehicle, and attempted to conceal crime by disposing of 
murder weapon). 
There was no direct evidence that the defendant intended 
that the victim be killed.  Compare Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 
Mass. 707, 709, 711, cert. denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014), S.C., 
480 Mass. 231, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 649 (2018) (defendant, 
13 
 
who was not shooter, had made threats to shoot or kill victim); 
Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 247-248 (2011) 
(defendant threatened to kill victim).  Nor did the defendant's 
actions by their nature demonstrate a shared lethal intent.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 432-433 (2015) 
(defendant brought firearm to scene of killing, chambered 
bullet, and pointed gun at victim); Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 
Mass. 231, 233-234 (2014) (defendant held and fired gun along 
with two others); Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 27, 29-30 
(2014) (defendant supplied firearm).  In addition, there was no 
evidence that the defendant heard the passenger express lethal 
intent or that he saw the passenger do anything to demonstrate 
lethal intent, such as displaying a firearm before the shooting.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 Mass. 222, 226-228 (2015) 
(defendant knew coventurer had just used gun and subsequently 
drove coventurer to site of fatal shooting); Commonwealth v. 
Reaves, 434 Mass. 383, 386-387, 392-393 (2001) (defendant was 
present during planning of drive-by shooting, saw guns, rode in 
vehicle with shooters, and assisted in disposing of weapons 
after shooting).  And there was no evidence that the defendant 
saw or joined the shooter during the commission of the shooting.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 283-284 (2022) 
(evidence sufficient that defendant shared shooter's lethal 
intent where defendant observed shooter wield firearm, 
14 
 
manipulate slide, and aim at victim, and defendant then moved to 
shooter's side to lend encouragement, kicked victim in head and 
called him an expletive, facilitated shooter's escape, and 
disposed of murder weapon). 
The evidence as a whole did not support a reasonable 
inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant arrived 
at the scene with the knowledge and sharing the purpose of the 
passenger to kill the victim.  Therefore, the denial of the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of murder in the first 
degree must be reversed. 
c.  Postshooting charges.  Unlike the charge of murder in 
the first degree, which requires an assessment of the 
defendant's knowledge and intent prior to and during the 
commission of the killing, the remaining charges involve an 
assessment of his knowledge and intent after the shooting.  See 
Bonner, 489 Mass. at 281 (noting that shared lethal intent 
element occurs before or during commission of crime, and 
accessory after the fact occurs after commission of crime). 
i.  Accessory after the fact.  The defendant's challenge to 
the charge of accessory after the fact, see G. L. c. 274, § 4, 
apparently relies on his challenge to the identification 
evidence.  Because the evidence of identification was 
sufficient, his challenge to this charge is without basis.  As 
relevant here, to support a conviction of accessory after the 
15 
 
fact, the Commonwealth was required to present evidence that the 
defendant knew the identity of the perpetrator, was aware of the 
substantial facts of the crime committed, and assisted the 
principal in his escape.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 437 Mass. 
186, 190 (2002).  See also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 
145, 150 (2019).  From the evidence, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the defendant knew the identity of the shooter, 
inferably Wright.  The jury could also infer from the witnesses 
who were on Balfour Street and heard the shots fired that the 
defendant, who was in approximately the same location, also knew 
that a shooting had occurred.  Finally, the defendant helped the 
shooter escape by driving him away from the scene of the 
killing. 
ii.  Firearm charges.  With regard to the sufficiency of 
the evidence as to the firearm charges, the defendant contends 
only that no evidence suggests that he knew anyone was armed as 
required to convict him of the charges on a theory of joint 
venture.  See Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 768 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 
256 (2000) (to establish liability for firearm possession under 
theory of joint venture, Commonwealth must prove "only that 
[the] defendant 'was accessory to another identified defendant 
in possessing a firearm'").  As discussed supra, two Balfour 
Street residents heard the shots from inside their homes, 
16 
 
suggesting that the defendant also heard the shots from where he 
was parked.  Moreover, one witness saw the shooter holding a 
firearm as he ran back to the car, supporting a reasonable 
inference that the defendant also saw the gun before driving 
away.  We agree with the Commonwealth that this evidence was 
sufficient to support a reasonable inference, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew his passenger was 
armed when the passenger returned to the car after the shooting. 
3.  Conclusion.  Because the Commonwealth did not present 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant shared the lethal intent of 
the shooter, a retrial of the defendant on the charge of murder 
in the first degree is prohibited by the principles of double 
jeopardy.  Therefore, so much of the order denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of murder in the first 
degree is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court, where the indictment charging murder in the first degree 
shall be dismissed, and for further proceedings on the remaining 
charges. 
So ordered.