Title: Moronese v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHARLES MORONESE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 34Case Number: S-11-0183Decided: 03/08/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, WY 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permament volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
CHARLES 
MORONESE,
 
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Charles Moronese, 
the appellant, pled guilty to attempted second-degree murder and received a 
sentence of 20 to 22 years (or 240 to 264 months) imprisonment.  More than four years after starting his 
sentence, the appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.  He alleged that his sentence violated 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 (LexisNexis 2011) because the minimum term was 
greater than ninety percent of the maximum term.  Rather than decrease the minimum term 
below the statutory minimum, as requested by the appellant, the district court 
increased the maximum term from 264 months to 267 months.  The appellant appealed, arguing that 
increasing his sentence after he had begun to serve that sentence violated 
double jeopardy.  We affirm, but 
remand for amendment of the sentence to include credit for time 
served.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Did the 
district court violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Wyoming and United 
States Constitutions by increasing the term of the appellant’s prison sentence 
following the appellant’s motion to correct an illegal 
sentence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The appellant 
was originally charged with attempted first-degree murder.  Ultimately, he pled guilty to attempted 
second-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a)(i) and 
6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2011), and was sentenced to a prison term of 20 to 22 
years.  The penalty for attempted 
second-degree murder is imprisonment “in the penitentiary for any term not less 
than twenty (20) years, or during life.”  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104.  
The appellant was transferred to the Wyoming State Penitentiary on June 
6, 2006.
 
[¶4]      After serving 
more than four years of his sentence, the appellant filed a motion to correct 
illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence violated the indeterminate 
sentencing statute.  That statute 
requires that “the court imposing the sentence . . . shall establish a maximum 
and minimum term within the limits authorized for the statute violated.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-201.  The statute 
continues, “the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law 
for the statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum 
term imposed.”  Id.  The appellant correctly stated that his 
sentence of 20 to 22 years, or 240 to 264 months, violated this requirement 
because 240 months exceeds ninety percent of 264 months.  To bring his sentence into compliance 
with this requirement, the appellant requested that the district court suspend 
one year of his minimum sentence, so his effective term would be 19 to 22 
years.  Ruling that the original 
sentence was illegal in violation of the indeterminate sentencing statute, the 
district court resentenced the appellant to a term of imprisonment of 240 to 267 
months.  The appellant now appeals 
that decision.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      Whether a 
sentence is illegal is a question of law we will review de novo.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
argues that his right not to be subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the 
Wyoming and United States Constitutions was violated when the district court 
increased his sentence as a result of his motion to correct an illegal 
sentence.  Acknowledging that his 
original sentence was illegal under the indeterminate sentencing statute, the 
appellant contends that the proper remedy would be to decrease the minimum term 
from 220 months to 216 months.  
Finally, the appellant complains that his new sentence failed to provide 
credit for time served.
 
[¶7]      The Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no person 
shall “be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” for the same crime.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The rights provided in the Fifth 
Amendment are enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 
89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969).  Additionally, the Wyoming Constitution 
explicitly includes the protection against double jeopardy.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11.  “The double jeopardy provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. 1, § 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution have the same meaning and are coextensive in application. . 
. .  Each protects against . . . 
multiple punishments for the same offense.”  Simonds v. State, 799 P.2d 1210, 1212 
(Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted).  
This bars increases to a defendant’s sentence after beginning 
imprisonment.  Turner v. State, 624 P.2d 774, 776 (Wyo. 
1981).
 
[¶8]      There are, 
however, situations in which double jeopardy principles will not bar a sentence 
increase.  “[T]he prospect of 
increased punishment upon resentencing raise[s] a double jeopardy problem only 
to the extent of a defendant’s reasonable expectations that his original 
sentence had become final.”  Simonds, 799 P.2d  at 1213.  Here, the appellant moved to correct his 
illegal sentence.  “With respect to 
those instances where a defendant initiates an appeal . . . it is evident that 
such a defendant harbors no justifiable expectation in the finality of the 
original sentence.”  Id.  The appellant initiated the hearing on 
his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  
At that point, he no longer had an expectation of finality in his 
sentence as his very argument rests on the fact that his sentence is improper 
and ought to be corrected.
 
[¶9]      There is also no 
expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.
 
When 
a second sentence imposed on resentencing is more severe than the original 
sentence, the relevant double jeopardy analysis requires that we ask whether the 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his 
original sentence.  A defendant 
cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which is 
illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to 
modification.
 
United 
States v. Rourke, 
984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).  In Rourke, the appellant had been sentenced 
to thirteen years in prison.  Id. at 1065.  Although it was required by statute, his 
sentence did not include a mandatory special parole term of at least three 
years.  Id.  The appellant filed a motion to correct 
his sentence and requested a reduction of at least three years to his thirteen 
year term, with the parole term added at the end of that sentence.  Id.  The district court, instead, added a 
three year special parole term to the end of his original sentence without 
reduction.  The Tenth Circuit ruled 
that “[b]ecause Rourke lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his 
original illegal sentencing, the resentencing did not implicate double jeopardy 
concerns even though Rourke’s sentence was increased.”  Id. at 1066.  Similarly, this Court has stated that 
“[t]he double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prevents a court from increasing a sentence, which is in all respects legal, 
after a defendant has begun serving it.”  
Maher v. State, 991 P.2d 1248, 
1249 (Wyo. 1999) (emphasis added).
 
[¶10]   The appellant’s original sentence 
was clearly illegal since the minimum term was more than ninety percent of the 
maximum term.  “An illegal sentence 
is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for 
the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutional provisions or the 
law.”  Sarr v. State, 2007 WY 140, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 891, 894 (Wyo. 2007).  Wyoming 
law allows a court “to correct an illegal sentence at anytime.”  W.R.Cr.P. 35(a).  The U.S. Supreme Court has found no 
double jeopardy violation where an illegal sentence was corrected and increased 
after the appellant had begun to serve his sentence.  In Bozza v. United States, the appellant 
had been sentenced to imprisonment where the applicable statute required 
imprisonment as well as a fine.  330 U.S. 160, 165, 67 S. Ct. 645, 648, 91 L. Ed. 818 (1947).  Five hours later, while the appellant 
was in the custody of the U.S. Marshal’s office, the judge recalled the 
appellant and imposed the mandatory fine as well.  Id. at 165-66, 67 S. Ct.  at 648.  “It is well established that a sentence 
which does not comply with the letter of the criminal statute which authorizes 
it is so erroneous that it may be set aside on appeal or in habeas corpus 
proceedings.”  Id. at 166, 67 S. Ct.  at 648-49 (citation 
omitted).  The court continued, 
“[i]n this case the court only set aside what it had no authority to do, and 
substitute[d] directions required by the law to be done upon the conviction of 
the offender.  It did not twice put 
petitioner in jeopardy for the same offense.”  Id. at 167, 67 S. Ct.  at 649 (citation 
omitted).  Similarly, in the instant 
case, the appellant’s sentence had been increased in order to bring it into 
compliance with statutory requirements.  
It is of no consequence that the appellant had served a significantly 
longer portion of his term prior to resentencing than the appellant in Bozza, nor does it matter that the 
resentencing in Bozza was not a 
result of a motion by the appellant.  
The original sentence was illegal and the district court was required to 
correct it.
 
[¶11]   In order to bring the appellant’s 
sentence into compliance with the ninety percent requirement, either the minimum 
term had to be reduced or the maximum term increased.  The appellant requested that the illegal 
sentence be corrected by reducing the minimum term.  Such a reduction, however, would result 
in the sentence remaining illegal, albeit for a different 
reason.
 
It 
is clear that in fixing punishment the court must comply with the law, and the 
sentence must be within the limits of the minimum and maximum punishment 
prescribed by statute for the particular offense. . . .  A court may not assess punishment below a 
mandated minimum term.  If the 
sentence imposed is less than the minimum term, the court must revoke the 
initial sentence and substitute the longer one that should have been 
imposed.
 
Williams 
v. State, 
692 P.2d 233, 235 (Wyo. 1984) (internal citations omitted).  The appellant’s original sentence was 
for 20 to 22 years, with 20 years being the minimum threshold permitted by the 
applicable statute.  Because the 
appellant could have no expectation of finality in his sentence, double jeopardy 
was not violated when the maximum term was increased.  This was the appropriate option to 
correct the appellant’s sentence.
 
[¶12]   Finally, the appellant is entitled 
to credit for his time already served on the original sentence.  The amended sentence will only increase 
the maximum term, and the four-and-a-half years he spent incarcerated prior to 
his motion to correct the illegal sentence must be applied toward the corrected 
sentence.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶13]   The appellant was sentenced to 20 
to 22 years imprisonment for a crime punishable by a term of 20 years to 
life.  This sentence was illegal 
because it violated the statutory requirement that a minimum term may not be 
more than ninety percent of the maximum term.  As a result of the appellant’s motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, the district court correctly increased the maximum 
term from 264 months to 267 months.  
The corrected sentence should, however, reflect the appropriate credit 
for the time the appellant has served.
 
[¶14]   We affirm the order granting the 
motion to correct illegal sentence, but we remand for inclusion in that sentence 
of credit for time served.