Title: Beecher v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

320 So. 2d 727 (1975)
In re Johnny Daniel BEECHER
v.
STATE of Alabama.
Ex parte Johnny Daniel Beecher.
SC 1054.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 10, 1975.
Rehearing Denied September 4, 1975.
*728 U. W. Clemon, Birmingham, Elaine R. Jones, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational *729 Fund, Inc., Jack Greenberg, New York City, for petitioner.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
EMBRY, Justice.
Petition for writ of certiorari was granted and we here review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Beecher v. State, 56 Ala.App. 212, 320 So. 2d 716, 8 Div. 426 (1974), which upheld the third conviction of petitioner for murder in the first degree.
The former trials resulted in reversals on appeal. Beecher v. State, 280 Ala. 283, 193 So. 2d 505 (1967), rev'd 389 U.S. 35, 88 S. Ct. 189, 19 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1967); Beecher v. State, 288 Ala. 1, 256 So. 2d 154 (1971), rev'd 408 U.S. 234, 92 S. Ct. 2282, 33 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1972). These cases fully report the overall facts. We will discuss only those pertinent to review of the alleged errors occurring during the third trial. Those errors are said to consist in: (1) A remark made by the prosecutor in final argument was impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify, (2) Blacks were systematically excluded from the jury venire. We find that Const. of Ala., 1901, § 6, mandates reversal, therefore we remand for new trial.
Petitioner's first contention is that a remark made in final argument by the District Attorney was impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. To decide if the remark was impermissible we must look to the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Ray Phillips who related to the jury an extrajudicial self inculpatory admission of defendant Beecher.
"BY MR. BLACK:[1]
At the end of the State's case, petitioner rested without offering any evidence. Pursuant to directions by the trial court, the final arguments were not reported, except for objections and rulings made during the arguments.[2] At the close of arguments petitioner moved for a mistrial. The grounds for the mistrial were established by petitioner's attorney in the following manner:
"(WHEREUPON MR. CLEMON WAS SWORN BY THE COURT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER)
Alabama Constitution, § 6, declares:
Code of Ala., Tit. 15, § 305, states:
Our statute goes further than the comparable federal statute, 18 U.S.C., § 3481. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's comment on the failure of a defendant to testify was violative of U.S.Const., Amends. V, XIV. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), raised the possibility that such comments would not require automatic reversal when such a comment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that the matter complained of could have in no way contributed to the conviction. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has raised the possibility that such prosecutorial comment may achieve the status of requiring automatic reversal.
In the following case, although it did not deal with the prosecutor's comment on the failure of a defendant to testify, the matter of comment by the prosecutor about defendant (and counsel for him) made during final argument was the subject of review. The statement of the Supreme Court in that case is instructive:
Where there has been direct comment on defendant's failure to testify, and the trial court has not promptly acted to cure such a statement, the conviction must be reversed. Lamberth v. State, 54 Ala. App. 233, 307 So. 2d 43 (1975).
More difficult questions arise where indirect reference is made to defendant's failure to testify. In Padgett v. State, 45 Ala.App. 56, 223 So. 2d 597 (1969), the prosecutor remarked "Did anybody tell you under oath from the stand that John Allen Padgett didn't put that lock up there * * *." This was held to be an impermissible comment on the failure of the defendant to testify since he was the only one who could have refuted the State's testimony. In Padgett, supra, and King v. State, 45 Ala.App. 348, 352, 230 So. 2d 538, 541 (1970), it was said:
"Under Washington v. State, 259 Ala. 104, 65 So. 2d 704; Welch v. State, 263 Ala. 57, 81 So. 2d 901, and Taylor v. State, 279 Ala. 390, 185 So. 2d 414, § 305 is read literally, i.e., covert references are construed against the defendant. In other words, no matter what the jury might infer, there must virtually be a direct identification of the defendant alone as the individual who has not become a witness. Earlier cases to the contrary *734 apparently must be viewed askance. See Williams v. State, 43 Ala.App. 343, 190 So. 2d 556, and the border line case of White v. State, 44 Ala.App. 312, 208 So. 2d 222."
Presumably had there been someone other than Padgett who could have refuted the State's evidence, the decision in Padgett would have resulted in affirmance. See Street v. State, 266 Ala. 289, 96 So. 2d 686.
The difficulties of the virtual identification doctrine are illustrated by Welch v. State, 38 Ala.App. 239, 81 So. 2d 897, rev'd 263 Ala. 57, 81 So. 2d 901 (1955). A defendant's right not to testify must be preserved inviolate. But where the case presented by the prosecutor stands uncontradicted, should be not be allowed to comment on that fact to the jury in a situation where the defendant has not testified, offered no other evidence, nor elicited contradictions in the case of the State by cross-examination of witnesses for the State.
This presents competing principles which require accommodation. Before finding such accommodation we should discuss present construction placed on Code of Ala., Tit. 15, § 305. The appellate courts of this State have construed that statute strictly. As was said in Padgett, supra, it must be found that the prosecutor's comment is virtually a direct identification of the defendant alone as the person who has not testified. See Cates, Closing Arguments In A Criminal Case, 33 Ala. Law. 87, 212 (1972). In so construing Code of Ala., Tit. 15, § 305, our earlier cases have not given sufficient emphasis to Const. of Ala. of 1901, § 6. It has long been held regarding the introduction of illegal evidence, such as coerced confessions, that the test is not whether the illegal evidence did influence the jury, but whether it might have influenced it in arriving at the verdict. Hubbard v. State, 283 Ala. 183, 215 So. 2d 261 (1968), vacated in part 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2851, 33 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1972). See also Chapman, supra, and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S. Ct. 229, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1963). Under Const. of Ala. of 1901, § 6, there is no valid basis for using a different test for improper prosecutorial comment. Thus we hold today that where there is the possibility that a prosecutor's comment could be understood by the jury as reference to failure of defendant to testify, § 6 is violated. We specifically disapprove any contrary cases[4] which construe Code of Ala., Tit. 15, § 305, as requiring reversal only when there is virtually a direct identification of the defendant as the one who did not testify. Such a construction of Code of Ala., Tit. 15, § 305, is not countenanced by the constitutional protections afforded under Const. of 1901, § 6.
The rule of Alabama constitutional law which we adopt today may make it appear that a prosecutor could never impress the jury with the fact that his case, or any facet of it, is uncontradicted. Where the State's evidence does stand uncontradicted, the prosecutor does have the right to point this out to the jury. In that circumstance the prosecutor could say: "There has been no refutation of any of the evidence presented by the State," or more simply, "The State's evidence stands uncontradicted," or other appropriate comment to like effect.
But it is concomitantly the duty of the prosecutor not to, in any manner, comment on the failure of the defendant to testify. Thus if there exists the possibility that the prosecutor[5] has commented in *735 such a manner that the jury may understand it as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, it is for the trial court to cure this violation of prosecutorial duty by prompt and vigorous instructions to the jury informing them of defendant's right not to be compelled to testify and that they may draw no presumption from his decision not to testify. Tillis v. State, 292 Ala. 521, 296 So. 2d 892 (1974), and cases cited therein. In this regard we note that some comments can be so prejudicial as to be ineradicable. Stain v. State, 273 Ala. 262, 138 So. 2d 703 (1961); McLemore v. International Union, 264 Ala. 538, 88 So. 2d 170 (1956) (noncriminal case).
Under the specific facts of this case, we have no doubt that even under the rule enunciated in Padgett, supra, reversal is required. Our interpretation of the record leads to the conclusion that the "it" in "No one took the stand to deny it" could only refer to the testimony of Deputy Phillips. The jury could well have understood this as reference to Beecher's failure to testify. The trial court took no action to cure the effect of the prosecutor's comment. In this posture we cannot say that Beecher received the fair and impartial trial, free of constitutional infirmity, to which he and all other persons are entitled.
Since there must be a new trial we deem it appropriate to consider on this record Beecher's contention that blacks were systematically excluded from the jury venire. As to this contention and on this point our decision does not differ from that of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case, 56 Ala.App. 212, 320 So. 2d 716 (8 Div. 426, 10-1-74). The decision of that court and the recommendation contained therein is very well stated in the words of Judge Wright, the author of that opinion.
We would add the following comments: Mere statistical disparity between the number of blacks presumed eligible for jury duty and the number actually included in the jury roll does not of itself establish a primary inference of invidious discrimination. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965). This is not to say that substantial disparity would not do so. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S. Ct. 532, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1970). These cases illustrate that each case must be considered on its own peculiar facts. Alexander, supra, does indicate that where there is opportunity for discrimination then this, coupled with statistical disparity, may be enough to establish the rebuttable inference of impermissible exclusion.
Once a movant has by proof created a primary inference of discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to show there was no discrimination. This burden is met only by a clear and convincing showing that the selection process utilized was racially neutral. It is apparent from Alexander, supra, that if opportunity for discrimination is present, we cannot consider that resort was not had to it. Thus if a trial judge is confronted by evidence which shows, at least, opportunity for discrimination *736 and blacks were excluded from the venire then the primary inference arises. The burden then falls on the State to prove that in the process of venire selection, no consideration whatsoever was given to race. Affirmations of good faith alone, in the selection process, is insufficient to rebut the primary inference. Alexander, supra. The Const. of Ala. of 1901, § 6, guarantees that jury selection shall be free of discrimination and imposes a duty on officials who make such selection to insure that this guarantee remains inviolate. Brand v. State, 13 Ala.App. 390, 69 So. 379 (1915). See also Finnett v. State, 12 Ala.App. 237, 67 So. 768 (1915).
Reversed and remanded.
SHORES, J., and CATES, P.J. (sitting specially) concur.
HEFLIN, C.J., and MADDOX and JONES, JJ., concur specially.
MERRILL, BLOODWORTH and FAULKNER, JJ., dissent in part and concur in part.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring specially.)
I think that the prosecutor's statement in this case was a direct comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Consequently, I think this case must be reversed. I disagree, however, with that portion of the opinion which reads as follows:
I concur in part two of the opinion which holds that there was no showing of systematic exclusion of blacks from the Lawrence County jury venire.
JONES, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion reversing and remanding this cause. I further agree with the rationale for its holding. I disagree with that portion of the opinion dealing with the "prompt and vigorous instructions to the jury informing them of defendant's right not to be compelled to testify . . ." I believe that the constitutional guarantee of the right against self incrimination is of such quality that its violation is incurable by any attempt on the part of the trial court to disabuse the minds of the jury with respect thereto. This is a bell once rung which cannot be unrung. In all other respects, I agree with the opinion.
HEFLIN, C.J., concurs.
BLOODWORTH, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in Part II of Mr. Justice Embry's opinion for the Court (affirming the Court of Criminal Appeals) and holding there was no showing of systematic exclusion of blacks from the Lawrence County jury venire from which the jury was chosen to try Beecher.
I dissent from the holding as to Part I because I do not think the "it" in "No one took the stand to deny it" is sufficiently identified so that it could be said to refer to the inculpatory statement testified to by Deputy Sheriff Phillips as having been made by Beecher to him. I would not go so far as the majority do and hold that "where there is the possibility that a prosecution's *737 comment could be understood by the jury as reference to failure of defendant to testify, § 6 [Alabama Constitution] is violated." I would affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this regard.
MERRILL and FAULKNER, JJ., concur.
[1]  John T. Black, Esq., District Attorney, Ninth Judicial Circuit. The State was also represented by Thomas C. Pettus, Esq., District Attorney, Thirty-Sixth Judicial Circuit.
[2]  It is not required that final arguments be reported. Code of Ala., Tit. 13, § 262. We think the better practice in criminal cases, however, is for the trial court to require that final arguments be reported.
[3]  Defendant Beecher was represented by U. W. Clemon, Esq., Elaine R. Jones, Esq., and Thomas J. Divens, Esq.
[4]  In all candor we point out that prior cases on this question are bottomed on § 305 rather than § 6 of Const. of 1901; obviously § 305 is a legislative enactment of the principle involved which is contained in § 6 of Const. of 1901. Chamberlain v. State, 46 Ala.App. 642, 247 So. 2d 683.
[5]  As distinguished from comment by the trial court in its instruction to the jury. Pierson v. State, 39 Ala.App. 346, 100 So. 2d 47.