Title: Pressey v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMOUR PRESSEY, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 96, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr.I.D. No. 1001019406 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  July 20, 2011 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  August 2, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Peter W. Veith, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire and Elizabeth A. Powers, Esquire, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
 
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant-appellant, 
Jamour Pressey (“Pressey”), was convicted of Robbery in the First Degree 
and Resisting Arrest.  In this direct appeal, Pressey contends that the trial 
judge abused her discretion in admitting a victim’s prior out-of-court 
statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  We 
have concluded that claim is without merit.  Accordingly, the judgments of 
the Superior Court are affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History  
 
 
The crime at issue occurred when seventeen-year-old Anthony Calm 
(“Calm”) was walking to his house in Wilmington.  When Calm was 
approximately one-half of a block away from his house, three men 
approached him.  All three men were wearing black-and-white checkered 
scarves and pointing guns at Calm.  The men robbed Calm of his cell phone, 
house key, school identification card, and cash.  Two of the men then 
walked away.  The third man stayed and robbed Calm of the coat, pants, and 
boots that he was wearing.  That man then directed Calm to sit on a nearby 
step.  Calm complied. 
 
As soon as the third man was out of sight, Calm ran home.  Because 
the men had stolen his house key, Calm began banging on the front door.  
After approximately two minutes, Calm’s sister answered the door.  Calm 
3 
 
told his sister and mother that he had been robbed.  Calm’s mother, 
Kimberly Wallace, recalled that Calm was “scared,” “hysterical,” and 
“crying.”   
Wallace left the house in search of the perpetrators.  After Wallace 
drove two blocks, she encountered Wilmington Police Detective Michael 
Ballard and Wilmington Police Officer Brian Vettori in their vehicle.  
Wallace “frantically” informed them of the robbery and then continued to 
drive in search of the robbers.  Ballard and Vettori followed.   
Wallace then observed a man walking down the street.  Wallace 
exited her car and told Ballard and Vettori that the man was one of the 
robbers.  Ballard, who was wearing a tactical vest, exited his vehicle and 
yelled, “Stop, police!” but the man fled.  Ballard chased the man on foot, 
and Vettori followed in his car.   
When the man stopped running, Vettori exited his vehicle and ordered 
the man to the ground at gunpoint.  The man that Ballard and Vettori took 
into custody was Pressey.  Vettori recalled that Pressey was wearing a black-
and-white checkered scarf.  Ballard and Vettori discovered several items on 
Pressey’s person, including a cell phone, Calm’s school identification card, 
and Calm’s house key.  When Vettori called Calm’s cell phone number, the 
4 
 
cell phone that was discovered on Pressey’s person rang, with Vettori’s 
number displayed on the caller ID. 
 
Wallace returned to the house and then drove Calm to the scene of the 
arrest to identify the assailant.  While Wallace was searching for the 
perpetrators, Calm put on a t-shirt and sweatpants because the robber had 
left him in only his boxers and socks.  Calm testified that he was “in shock,” 
“nervous,” “upset,” and “shaken up” at that time.  Wallace also testified that 
Calm was “still shook up, scared.”   
When Wallace arrived with Calm to identify the robber, Calm stayed 
in the car and “put his hood on, slouched down where he couldn’t be seen.”  
Wallace recalled that Calm was “still crying” and appeared “scared.”  Both 
Wallace and Vettori testified that Calm identified Pressey as one of the 
robbers.  The record reflects that the time from when Calm was robbed to 
the time that he identified Pressey was between twenty and sixty minutes. 
 
Pressey was charged by indictment with Robbery in the First Degree, 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Resisting Arrest.  The State nolle 
prossed the Conspiracy in the Second Degree count.  The matter then 
proceeded to a jury trial.  Several witnesses testified at the trial, including 
Calm, Wallace, Ballard, and Vettori.   
5 
 
 
The jury found Pressey guilty of Robbery in the First Degree and 
Resisting Arrest.  For the Robbery in the First Degree conviction, the trial 
judge sentenced Pressey to ten years at Level V, suspended after four years 
for Level IV and Level III probation.  For the Resisting Arrest conviction, 
the trial judge sentenced Pressey to one year at Level V, suspended for one 
year of Level III probation. 
Excited Utterance Rulings 
 
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Wallace, defense 
counsel objected: “[T]hey are going to ask [Wallace] whether [Calm] 
identified Pressey as the person who robbed him . . . . I think that’s clearly 
hearsay.”  The trial judge ruled from the bench as follows: 
Under . . . Delaware [R]ule[] of [E]vidence 803, an excited 
utterance [is a] statement related to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition. 
 
The availability of the declarant is immaterial.  Therefore, if the 
State can lay a foundation that this was indeed an excited 
utterance, whether or not the questions were asked of [Calm] is 
irrelevant.  And if you can lay that foundation I am going to 
admit the statements as excited utterances. 
 
Immediately thereafter, Wallace testified that Calm was “scared,” “still 
crying,” and “slouched down” and that he “didn’t want to get out of the car” 
when he identified Pressey as one of the robbers.  The trial judge ruled that 
6 
 
the prosecutor had laid a sufficient foundation.  Wallace then testified that 
Calm identified Pressey as one of the robbers. 
 
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Vettori, defense counsel 
again objected for the same reason.  The trial judge ruled: “You are going to 
have to lay the foundation again.”  Vettori testified that Calm “was seated in 
the back seat of the car,” “appeared to be nervous,” was “shaking,” and 
“[h]is voice was shaky.”  The trial judge again ruled that the prosecutor had 
laid a sufficient foundation.  Vettori then testified that Calm identified 
Pressey as one of the robbers.   
Pressey argues that the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting 
Calm’s prior out-of-court statement under the excited utterance exception to 
the hearsay rule.  We review a trial judge’s decision to admit evidence based 
on an exception to the hearsay rule for abuse of discretion.1 
Excited Utterance Exception  
 
 
The Delaware Rules of Evidence provide that hearsay is generally 
inadmissible as evidence at trial.2  However, the Delaware Rules of 
Evidence (“D.R.E.”) also explicitly provide for many exceptions to that 
                                          
 
1 Purnell v. State, 979 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Del. 2009); Foster v. State, 961 A.2d 526, 529–
30 (Del. 2008). 
2 D.R.E. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these Rules.”). 
7 
 
general rule.3  One of those is the “excited utterance” exception, which 
provides that “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition” is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness.4  This Court has held that the excited utterance 
exception is a “firmly rooted exception” to the hearsay rule.5  We have 
explained that “[i]nherent in this exception is the notion that the declaration 
is reliable because the declarant, under the duress of excitement, is not in a 
position to fabricate and will exclaim the truth as he perceives it.”6 
 
In Gannon v. State,7 we held that three foundational requirements 
must be satisfied to admit a statement under the excited utterance exception: 
“(1) the excitement of the declarant must have been precipitated by an event; 
(2) the statement being offered as evidence must have been made during the 
time period while the excitement of the event was continuing; and (3) the 
statement must be related to the startling event.”8  Pressey acknowledges that 
                                          
 
3 See D.R.E. 803, 804.  See also Dixon v. State, 996 A.2d 1271, 1276–77 (Del. 2010) 
(“These exceptions are defined by circumstances that are deemed to provide an indicia of 
trustworthiness to the statement.”). 
4 D.R.E. 803(2). 
5 Foster v. State, 961 A.2d at 529–30 (quoting Nalley v. State, 2007 WL 2254539, at *2 
(Del. Aug. 6, 2007)). 
6 Collins v. State, 420 A.2d 170, 177 (Del. 1980).  
7 Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272 (Del.1998). 
8 Id. at 274.  See also Dixon v. State, 996 A.2d at 1276; Foster v. State, 961 A.2d at 530; 
Bruce v. State, 781 A.2d 544, 552 (Del. 2001); Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 253 (Del. 
8 
 
the prosecutor laid a proper foundation to satisfy the first and third 
requirements.  Pressey argues that the prosecutor did not satisfy the second 
requirement because Calm’s statement was not made during the time period 
while the excitement of the event was continuing.  Pressey argues that “the 
act of Wallace forcing Calm to return to the scene was a superseding event 
that cause[d] Calm to be excited, not the prior robbery.” 
 
In Culp v. State,9 we explained that although “the amount of time that 
has elapsed from the occurrence of the event or condition is a factor to 
consider in the analysis, it is not solely determinative.”10  We noted that “[i]t 
is generally recognized that the more time that has passed, the less likely it is 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event.”11  We 
also observed, however, that “[w]here the declarant is continuously under 
the influence of the event, a statement made later in time from the event may 
be just as reliable as one made closer to the time of the event.”12 
                                                                                                                             
 
2001).  This Court in Gannon noted that “[a] variety of factors have been considered by 
courts in determining whether the foundational requirements have been met to qualify the 
statement being offered into evidence as an excited utterance.”  Gannon v. State, 704 
A.2d at 274. 
9 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486 (Del. 2001). 
10 Id. at 490. 
11 Id. at 490 n.5.  See also Collins v. State, 420 A.2d at 177 (“Implicit in the rule is a 
requirement that the statement be contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous with the 
event described so that there is no time to fabricate the statement.”). 
12 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d at 490 n.5.  “The amount of time that has elapsed between the 
making of the statement and the startling event is an important, but not dispositive 
consideration, in determining whether the declarant was in an excited state when the 
statement was made.”  Id. at 490. 
9 
 
 
In Culp, this Court compared D.R.E. 803(1) with D.R.E. 803(2) and 
pointed out that D.R.E. 803(1) contains an express contemporaneity 
requirement that must be satisfied for a statement to be admitted as a present 
sense impression.13  We also noted that D.R.E. 803(2) does not mandate that 
a statement be made within a certain amount of time following the startling 
event to be admissible, but that the rule explicitly requires the declarant to be 
under the “stress of excitement” caused by the startling event or condition at 
the time of the statement’s making.14  Additionally we stated “[i]t is the 
making of the statement under these circumstances that furnishes the 
underlying reliability of a statement admitted pursuant to Rule 803(2).”15  
In Culp, we held that a D.R.E. 803(2) analysis must focus on the 
condition of the declarant at the time the statement was made and includes a 
careful consideration of all the factors present.16  We recently reiterated 
                                          
 
13 D.R.E. 803(1) (“The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: . . . A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately 
thereafter.”). 
14 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d at 490. 
15 Id.  See also Littlejohn v. State, 219 A.2d 155, 157 (Del. 1966) (“[T]he test applied is 
one of spontaneity; that is, was or was not the statement induced by the shock of the 
event.”) (internal citations omitted). 
16 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d at 490–91.  We explained that “[o]ther factors that may be 
pertinent to the analysis are the nature of the startling event, whether the statement was 
made in response to questioning, the nature of the declarant, and whether the statement is 
self-serving.” Id. at 491 n.7. 
10 
 
those principles in Dixon v. State,17 and we have applied those principles in 
several other cases.18  For example, we held in Evans v. State19 that the trial 
judge correctly admitted two out-of-court statements of a gunshot victim 
under the excited utterance exception, even though the statements occurred 
approximately four and nine hours later, because the declarant made those 
statements while under the stress of excitement caused by the event.20 
Evidence Properly Admitted 
 
In this case, Wallace testified that Calm was “scared,” “still crying,” 
and “slouched down” and that he “didn’t want to get out of the car” when he 
identified Pressey as one of the robbers.  Vettori testified that Calm “was 
seated in the back seat of the car,” “appeared to be nervous,” was “shaking,” 
and “[h]is voice was shaky.”  The record reflects that Calm’s identification 
of Pressey as one of the robbers satisfied all three of the foundational 
requirements to qualify as an “excited utterance” under D.R.E. 803(2).  The 
                                          
 
17 Dixon v. State, 996 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Del. 2010) (“[T]he declarant must simply be 
‘under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event or condition at the time of 
the statement’s making.’”). 
18 See e.g., id. at 1276–77 (holding that 911 call made fifteen minutes after startling event 
-- a shooting -- was made under stress of excitement); Warren v. State, 774 A.2d at 253 
(holding that 911 call to describe events that occurred over one hour before call was 
admissible under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule); Collins v. State, 420 A.2d 
at 177 (holding that even though victim was “dazed and bleeding,” apparent calm with 
which he spoke and passage of time excluded statement from excited utterance exception 
to hearsay rule.”). 
19 Evans v. State, 2004 WL 1790191 (Del. Aug. 3, 2004). 
20 Id. at *2. 
11 
 
record does not establish that “the act of Wallace forcing Calm to return to 
the scene was a superseding event that cause[d] Calm to be excited, not the 
prior robbery.”  Accordingly, Pressey has not shown that the trial judge 
abused her discretion in admitting Calm’s statement into evidence under the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 
Conclusion 
 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.