Title: EWAN v STENBERG

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12892 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A \mIGHT LWAN and HAZEL EWAN, husband and wife, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, OLAV S. STENBERG, and GLADYS K. STEWBERG, husband and wife, LOUISE BEER, and t h e EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Lee Overfelt argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondents : Longan and Holmstrom, B i l l i n g s , Montana Franklin S. Longan argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: A p r i l 11, 1975 Decided : F i l e d : Clerk Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. P l a i n t i f f s appeal from a summary judgment entered f o r defendants i n the d i s t r i c t court, Sweet Grass County. P l a i n t i f f s ' amended complaint alleged a r i g h t of way by prescription o r a public way across Stenberg's land o r , i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , t o condemn a way of necessity. A 1 1 de- fendants f i l e d motions t o dismiss and t o s t r i k e . Defendant Stenberg was ordered t o show cause why injunctive r e l i e f should ti not be granted. The d i s t r i c t court treated the motions a s being f o r summary judgment. Stenberg has f i l e d no answer. The t e s t i - mony which was before t h e court was t h a t adduced a t the hearing on the motions and the order t o show cause. Prior t o t h a t hearing the judge, i n company with counsel, viewed the premises. Following the hearing, summary judgment of dismissal was entered f o r the defendants. P l a i n t i f f s appeal. The d i s t r i c t judge a t the time of making the order granting summary judgment f i l e d a memorandum and provided it should c o n s t i t u t e the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law, and we w i l l l i b e r a l l y quote from it, since the court painstakingly answered the contentions of p l a i n t i f f s . It reads: "Commencing i n 1945 the P l a i n t i f f s operated a c a t t l e and sheep ranch u t i l i z i n g two t r a c t s of non- joining fee land. One t r a c t , Tract A , i s located i n the valley of the Boulder River and the other, Tract B , i s located generally on top of a h i l l which i s steeply sloped on the sides. Tract A i s the home place and i s used f o r winter pasture while Tract B i s summer pasture and has sometimes been hayed i n part. The h i l l on which Tract B i s located i s situated i n the i n t e r - s t i c e s of a fork of the Boulder River so t h a t t h i s h i l l i s bounded on one side by the main Boulder River and the main Boulder road (Highway 2 9 8 ) , and on the other by the West Boulder River and West Boulder road. Although Tract B l i e s between two roads, it abuts upon neither of them, it being hemmed i n on a l l sides by other f e e land owner- ships so t h a t ingress and egress require the t r a - versing of lands of other owners. 9~ 7 k * "From the beginning of p l a i n t i f f s ' operations of these lands, a use exchange of 40 acre t r a c t s was i n e f f e c t with one of the landowners adjoining, being M r . Work, a predecessor i n t i t l e t o Defendants Sten- berg. By v i r t u e of t h i s use exchange, a 40 acre ex- tension (Parcel X) was tacked onto one end of Tract 9, toward and almost reaching the West Boulder road, so t h a t Tract B ' S isolation was narrowed t o within a matter of yards and f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes made access t o Tract B from the West Boulder road possible. However, the West Boulder side i s the side f a r t h e s t from l-'laintiffsl Tract A home place, so t h a t a s occasion required, the P l a i n t i f f s would t r a i l down the East side 02 the h i l l t o Tract A, i n the process of which they were crossing another part of the Work land. The general pattern which developed i n p l a i n t i f f s ' operation over the years was t o move onto Tract B i n the Spring by going around t o the West Boulder side and entering through Parcel X. In the l a t e Fall o r early Winter, the livestock would be brought down the East side of the h i l l , across the Work land, through a Work gate and on to p l a i n t i f f s ' Tract A , t h i s being the shortest and most d i r e c t route. Because of topographical encumbrances A n the h i l l side, the livestock generally followed a singularantrse so t h a t a t r a i l developed. "In t h e e a r l y 1950's t h e Work land was sold t o X r . Beer, who, i n about 1956, bulldozed a rough road on the East s i d e which had the same general beginning and ending points a s t h e old cow t r a i l but traversed a some- what d i f f e r e n t r o u t e i n between i n an e f f o r t t o make a ~ r a d e and r o u t e which would make some vehicular use possible. Except f o r an i n s i g n i f i c a n t portion where the road edged onto P l a i n t i f f s ' land, the road was a l l on Beer property. P l a i n t i f f s did not p a r t i c i p a t e i n making t h i s road o r i n maintaining i t , b u t a f t e r it was b u i l t they used it i n normal course of t h e i r operations on Tract B f o r checking on t h e c a t t l e , moving equipment and livestock, e t c . " A t a l l times, t h e r e was another access r o u t e a v a i l a b l e i n t o Tract B from the West Boulder s i d e , s t a r t i n g a t point 'z' and following up the Mason Coulee over what i s now Schilling property t o t h e s i d e of t h e buildings of the Mason homestead which were s i t u a t e d on Tract B. P l a i n t i f f s , however, made only occasional use of t h i s r o u t e , it obviously being l e s s convenient than t h e others. Also, P l a i n t i f f s have a t t i m e s used a route up Chokecherry Springs, which i s bulldozed but is very s t e e p and a l s o t r a v e r s e s Defendant stenberg's Land. "In 1966 t h e Defendant Stenbergs became t h e owners of the Beer land and the land use exchange of t h e two 4 0 ' s was continued a s was the p l a i n t i f f s ' pattern as t o in- gress and egress t o Tract B. Sometime i n l a t e 1971 o r a e a r l y 1972 and a s a consequence of/Jisagreement of some s o r t , Stenberg advised P l a i n t i f f s t h a t t h e land use exchange would be discontinued and t h a t P l a i n t i f f s were n o t t o use t h e East s i d e r o u t e t o and from Tract B anymore because he d i d n ' t want them on h i s land. Pursuant t o t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n Stenberg barricaded the entry of the route where it entered h i s land and each party re- fenced t h e i r 40 acre t r a c t i n t o t h e i r own u n i t s which effected a discontinuance of the use exchange. In the F a l l of 1972 and again i n the F a l l of 1973, P l a i n t i f f s nevertheless used the East side route t o bring t h e i r c a t t l e out of Tract B , going through stenberg's b a r r i - cade t o do so. s he evidence shows t h a t other persons, many of them being friends of P l a i n t i f f s , a l s o used t h i s road f o r hunting o r sightseeing purposes from time t o time i n past years. "There i s a sharp c o n f l i c t between the parties over whether t h e gate i n t o Defendant stenberg's land to the Beer road was or was not ever locked or posted. The P l a i n t i f f s a r e d e f i n i t e i n t h e i r belief t h a t it never was, while witnesses f o r the Defendants s t a t e t h e i r 1 best recollection t o be t h a t locks and N o s re spas sing' signs were used during hunting season. Such locks and signs, however, were intended t o apply t o t r a f f i c of hunters and not t o neighbors who would be welcome t o a key t o go through. " P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t they have a right-of-way by prescription over the East side route because of consistent usage of it over the years and, because it has been used by a number of others, it may in f a c t be a public road, o r , i n any event, t h a t because of the t o t a l isolation of Tract B the East side route should be decreed t o P l a i n t i f f s as a right-of-way easement founded upon necessity, 2 condemnation. 11 The basic requirements t o the accrual of a r i g h t - of-way easement by^prescription a r e so well established by Piontana case authority t h a t a review of them i s un- necessary. (See White v. Kamps, 119 Iqont. 102 and ~ o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 554 a s examples.) Suffice L S t o note t h a t one requirement i s t h a t the usage made af the claimed right-of-way be adverse and h o s t i l e , not permissive. The t o t a l i t y of the evidence here can support only one conclusion, namely, t h a t from the beginning the p l a i n t i f f s ' usage of the t r a i l and the l a t e r bulldozed road was a matter of neighborly cooperation between friendly ranchers. Consequently, i t was a permissive use and has remained so u n t i l the p l a i n t i f f ' s defiance of stenberg's barricade i n 1972, which i s not a s u f f i - c i e n t length of t i m e t o ripen i n t o a prescriptive r i g h t . Lhe f a c t t h a t t h e use has been permissive r a t h e r than adverse i s f a t a l t o the claim of P l a i n t i f f s a s t o a prescriptive easement. (Wilson v. Chestnut, 31 St.Rep. 606) "The a s s e r t i o n t h a t the road has become a public one, e n t i t l i n g P l a i n t i f f s t o i t s usage a s members of the public, a l s o i s not supported by the f a c t s appearing. Occasional use by hunters, by sightseeing friends and by neighbors v i s i t i n g neighbors f a l l s short of t h e extent dnd type of usage necessary t o r e s u l t i n the accrual of a public r i g h t . I f The remaining ground upon which P l a i n t i f f s ' claim r e l i e f i s t h a t they a r e e n t i t l e d t o be decreed a r i g h t - of-way by necessity over the route i n dispute. The crux of t h i s claim i s t h e question of whether the r e q u i s i t e necessity does o r does not e x i s t . It i s not disputed t h a t ~ l a i n t i f f s ' Tract B i s e n t i r e l y surrounded by other uwnerships. R t the same t i m e , it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e ~ ~ r i g i n a l and h i s t o r i c a l access route, the so-called a as on Coulee r o a d ' , always has been, and i s now, a v a i l a b l e a s a way i n t o Tract B. It i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t i n t h e years of 1972 and 1973, P l a i n t i f f s had a way of g e t t i n g i n t o Tract B from a point of e n t r y o f f of t h e West Boulder road i n t o S t a t e land which they have had continuously leased and which adjoins Tract B. The f a c t is t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s do have o t h e r ways of access t o and from Tract B. The f a c t t h a t t h e o t h e r ways involve longer distances and more inconvenience i s n o t an acceptable b a s i s upon which t o grant t h e r e l i e f requested. The c r i t e r i o n i s not one of convenience, b u t of necessity. "1n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s appearing, t h e request f o r injunctive r e l i e f by P l a i n t i f f s must be denied. Further, i t i s apparent t h a t a l l of t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t u a l i s s u e s have been addressed and t h a t no genuine i s s u e of a material f a c t remains so t h a t Defendants a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. I I While p l a i n t i f f s contend the d i s t r i c t court erred i n i t s r u l i n g s , finding and conclusions, we have c a r e f u l l y examined the record and i n our opinion it f u l l y supports the findings and conclusions of t h e court. I n such a s i t u a t i o n the summary judgment should be, and it i s hereby, affirmed. + , /. ~, b ................................. Chief J u s t i c e W e Concur: J u s t i c e s .