Title: Mississippi Power & Light Company v. Tillman

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

291 So. 2d 736 (1974) MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY v. Clifton M. TILLMAN. No. 47425. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 18, 1974. Green, Cheney, Jones & Hughes, Jackson, for appellant. Wilkins, Ellington & Latham, Jackson, for appellee. ROBERTSON, Justice: The Mississippi Power & Light Company brought suit in the County Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, against Clifton M. Tillman to recover $244.71, the cost of replacing a utility pole broken by Tillman when his car hit the pole. The utility pole was about four years old when broken and knocked down, and the *737 jury was instructed that they could consider depreciation in arriving at their verdict. The jury was likewise instructed that they could consider the reasonableness of the lost time costs and indirect overhead costs attributable to this particular job in arriving at their verdict. The jury returned a verdict for $210.62 damages and the Company appeals. The facts are not in dispute. Tillman admitted that he negligently drove his automobile off the traveled portion of Fortification Street Extension and negligently and violently collided with the plaintiff's utility pole, breaking it so that it had to be replaced. The court instructed the jury to find for the Company as to liability. The Company poses the two questions of law to be answered by this Court in this way: The Company assigns as error: 1. The court's refusal to grant Plaintiff's instruction No. 5, which was: 2. The Court's granting Defendant's instruction No. 6, which provided: The testimony was uncontradicted that there was no life expectancy for an individual utility pole. One might last a few years and another 50 years. So testified L.E. Toole, line foreman, Graham Temple, Division Superintendent; and W.R. Casper, Treasurer of the Company. Each utility pole in and of itself has no value. Each pole was an integral part of an electric distribution system, which system as a whole had a value. Casper did testify that for bookkeeping and income tax purposes the Company handled depreciation in this way: Instead of being a utility pole that was damaged and broken, suppose it had been a four-year-old utility truck. Suppose it was necessary to replace a damaged fender with a new fender. Should the tortfeasor be allowed to submit to the jury the taking of depreciation on the four-year-old fender? We think not. The fender was an integral part of the truck, and the new fender added nothing to the overall value of the truck. In New Jersey Power & Light Company v. Mabee, 41 N.J. 439, 197 A.2d 194 (1964), the Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned: This is the majority rule which is also followed by North Carolina, Connecticut, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia. The trial court was in error in denying Plaintiff's instruction No. 5 and in granting Defendant's instruction No. 6. We hold that when a utility pole is an integral part of an electric distribution system, has no value of its own, but has a value only as an integral part of a complete distribution system, the question of depreciation should not be submitted to the jury to decide. The Company next contends that the trial court erred in granting Defendant's instruction No. 7 which provided: It is the contention of the Company that this instruction is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with Plaintiff's instruction No. 2 which was: For the year 1970, the Company charged against each reimbursable job 15 1/2% of the direct labor costs of each particular job as a lost time adjustment and 10% of the direct labor costs and materials used on each reimbursable job as an indirect overhead costs adjustment. These percentages are reviewed and updated annually. The uncontradicted testimony was that these were reasonable expenses attributable to this particular job and were in accordance with sound accounting practices and the practice of the entire electric utility industry. In fact, the Mississippi State Highway Department and the Bureau of Public Roads of the United States accepted these percentage charges for lost time and indirect overhead costs as reasonable expenses of each job performed for them and authorized payment as billed. The only logical and fair way that the defendant could rebut this testimony would be to offer testimony that such items as lost time adjustment and indirect costs adjustment were not in accord with sound accounting principles and were not in accord with the customs and practices of the electric utility industry in this geographical area. These specific items have been approved as reasonable expenses by the courts of Connecticut, Oklahoma, Ohio, New York and Wisconsin. While there are no Mississippi cases directly in point, the reasoning and policy of the Mississippi decisions clearly support the application of such rule in the present case. Thus, in Vining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 58 So. 2d 34 (1952), Smith's automobile was damaged in a collision with an automobile driven by Mrs. Vining. The actual amount of the bill for the repair of Smith's car was $388.85. However, since Smith was financially unable to pay this repair bill, he had to borrow money from a finance company, and in doing so he incurred the additional expense of a carrying charge of $78.24. This Court held that this carrying charge was a legitimate expense incurred by Smith as a result of the accident and that he was entitled to recover this item in addition to the amount of the actual repair bill. *740 Inasmuch as the testimony was uncontradicted that these were reasonable charges for lost time and indirect overhead costs, were in accord with sound accounting principles and the customs and practices of the electrical utility industry, the Company was entitled to a directed verdict. The trial court erred in granting defendant's instruction No. 7 and in submitting the question of the reasonableness of these expenses to the jury. The trial court should have instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff for $244.71. The judgment of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the county court is reversed, and judgment is rendered here for the appellant for $244.71. Reversed and rendered. GILLESPIE, C.J., and SUGG, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.