Title: Paul v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WID-DONALD PAUL,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 302, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0503014554 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 19, 2011 
Decided: August 15, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 15th day of August 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Wid-Donald Paul, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s May 23, 2011 order dismissing his “Motion to Resubmit Post 
Conviction Relief Pursuant to Criminal Rule 61(G) (2).”  The plaintiff-appellee, 
the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the 
 
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ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in October 2005, Paul pleaded 
guilty to Aggravated Menacing.  The State dismissed several other related charges.  
Paul was sentenced to 2 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 90 
days for 6 months Level IV Home Confinement, to be followed by 6 months of 
Level III probation.  The record before us reflects that Paul completed his sentence 
on his conviction of Aggravated Menacing in February 2007.  
 
(3) 
Although the docket does not so reflect, Paul alleges that he filed a 
motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court in March 2011.  In May 
2011, he filed a motion to “amend” that motion.  Paul claimed that his counsel 
provided ineffective assistance by a) failing to advise him that he could be 
deported as a result of his aggravated menacing conviction; and b) advising him to 
plead guilty when there was no proof of his guilt.  The Superior Court denied the 
motion as untimely and moot. 
 
(4) 
Delaware law provides that the Superior Court must first consider 
whether the defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before 
considering the merits of his postconviction motion.2  In this case, the Superior 
Court correctly ruled that Paul’s postconviction motion was time-barred under 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
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Rule 61(i) (1).  Paul attempts to overcome the time bar by arguing that his attorney 
provided ineffective assistance during the guilty plea proceedings, first, by failing 
to advise him that a guilty plea could result in deportation.3 
 
(5) 
Under Delaware law, once a criminal sentence is completed, any 
postconviction claim with respect to that conviction is moot because the defendant 
is no longer “in custody or subject to future custody” as a result of that conviction.4  
The only exception to the rule is when the defendant “suffers collateral legal 
disabilities or burdens.”5  The defendant has the burden of “demonstrating 
specifically a right lost or disability or burden imposed, by reason of the instant 
conviction.”6 
 
(6) 
The record in this case reflects that Paul is no longer in custody or 
subject to future custody with respect to his conviction of Aggravated Menacing.  
In order to overcome the general rule mooting his claim, Paul must demonstrate a 
specific right lost or burden imposed as a result of that conviction.  In that respect, 
Paul’s appeal fails.  Nowhere does he specifically identify a right lost or a burden 
imposed as a result of his conviction.  Moreover, Paul provides no legal or factual 
basis for his second claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
                                                 
3 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (“. . . advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”) 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a) (1). 
5 Gural v. State, 251 A.2d 344, 344-45 (Del. 1969). 
6 Id. 
 
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advising him to plead guilty.  As such, the Superior Court correctly dismissed his 
postconviction motion. 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice