Title: R.L. v. Indiana Department of Child Services & Child Advocates, Inc.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-JC-296 
In the Matter of R.L. (Minor Child); J.R. (Mother), 
Appellant, 
–v– 
Indiana Department of Child Services and Child 
Advocates, Inc., 
Appellees. 
Argued: February 20, 2020 | Decided: May 5, 2020 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division 
No. 49D09-1803-JC-638 
The Honorable Marilyn Moores, Judge 
The Honorable Gael Deppert, Magistrate 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 18A-JC-2927 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 05 2020, 2:11 pm
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David, Justice. 
Last year, our Court handed down Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201 
(Ind. 2019), a case in which we determined that the doctrine of claim 
preclusion applies to child in need of services (CHINS) proceedings. 
Without the benefit of that opinion, the parties in this case argued over 
whether the Department of Child Services (DCS) could file a subsequent 
CHINS petition alleging R.L. was a child in need of services after an initial 
petition was dismissed with prejudice. Although the second case 
proceeded and R.L. was found to be a CHINS, the Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding DCS was barred from relitigating this matter. After 
Matter of Eq.W. was handed down, however, the State successfully 
petitioned for rehearing and the Court of Appeals reversed course, 
ultimately affirming the juvenile court’s CHINS finding. 
Mother sought transfer, arguing that DCS should have been barred 
from filing a successive CHINS action after the first petition was 
dismissed with prejudice. Applying Matter of Eq.W. to the circumstances 
of this case, we agree with Mother and find that the subsequent CHINS 
petition should have been barred. We therefore reverse the juvenile court 
and dismiss the present CHINS petition with prejudice.   
Facts and Procedural History 
R.L. was born on November 2, 2017, to J.R. (Mother) and R.L. (Father). 
Shortly after his birth, DCS removed R.L. from his parents’ care. On 
November 6, 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging R.L. was a child in need of 
services pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. The petition alleged 
the following facts:  
• R.L.’s parents failed to provide him with a safe, stable, and 
appropriate living environment; 
• The parents were involved in a separate CHINS case regarding 
another child; 
• Services in the other case had not been successfully completed to 
remedy the reasons for DCS’s involvement; 
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• Mother was found unsupervised with the other child despite a 
court order prohibiting such conduct; 
• Mother struggled with anger issues and had not successfully 
demonstrated an ability and willingness to appropriately care for 
R.L.; and 
• Father discontinued parenting time with the other child and had 
not shown an ability to care for R.L.’s safety and wellbeing.  
An initial hearing on the petition took place on November 7, 2017, and a 
factfinding hearing took place on January 26, 2018.  
On March 1, 2018, the juvenile court determined R.L. was not a child in 
need of services. Among other things, the court found DCS made no 
service referrals for Mother related to R.L., DCS failed to establish an 
adequate foundation for relevant testimony and evidence, and it was 
uncontroverted that Mother had a stable home and was aware of local 
community resources for her family. Because the manner of dismissal was 
unspecified, the action was dismissed with prejudice. See Ind. Trial Rule 
41(B).  
On March 2, 2018—the day after the first petition was dismissed—DCS 
contacted Mother to complete a home visit and assess the condition of her 
home. Between the dismissal of the first petition and the home visit 
request, R.L. remained in foster care due to ongoing safety concerns with 
Mother’s home. Although the family case manager (FCM) was aware the 
CHINS petition had been dismissed, the FCM did not share this 
information with Mother or indicate that R.L. could have been returned to 
her care. Mother told the FCM that her home was not in a safe condition 
because of a mold issue and that she was waiting to be switched to a 
different apartment. Mother also refused to allow the FCM to inspect her 
home.  
On March 6, 2018, DCS filed a subsequent petition alleging R.L. was a 
CHINS. The subsequent petition was based on the following alleged facts:  
• Mother and Father failed to provide R.L. with a safe, stable, and 
appropriate living environment; 
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• Mother continued to struggle with mental health issues that 
interfered with her ability to care for R.L.;  
• Though Mother completed a mental health evaluation, she was not 
taking her prescribed medication or following through with 
treatment;  
• Mother was currently involved in a DCS case with her other child 
and services had not been successfully completed in that case;  
• Mother still struggled with basic care for infants including using 
proper amounts of formula and demonstrating a lack of 
willingness to change diapers;  
• Mother and Father’s personal relationship remained aggressive; 
and 
• Mother reported her home was unsafe and refused to allow the 
FCM to enter. 
Mother moved to dismiss the petition on claim preclusion grounds and 
renewed her motion at a March 16, 2018, pretrial hearing. The juvenile 
court denied Mother’s motion and ultimately found R.L. was a child in 
need of services. Mother appealed.  
In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed. Matter of R.L., 
126 N.E.3d 864, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), modified on reh’g. The court found 
the second petition was barred by res judicata and should have been 
dismissed because “a number of the issues litigated by DCS in the 2018 
CHINS were, or could have been, litigated in the 2017 CHINS.” Id. at 869. 
More specifically, “Mother’s compliance with services in [the other 
child’s] CHINS, her mental health, her parenting abilities, and domestic 
violence” were all issues that were already litigated or otherwise known 
to DCS during the first CHINS proceeding. Id. at 870. However, because 
there were new allegations—namely that Mother failed to provide 
formula during a February 2018 visit, had failed to provide a safe home 
environment, and struggled with basic infant care—the court remanded 
the matter to the juvenile court to reconsider the second CHINS petition 
“without reliance on issues that were already litigated or could have been 
litigated at the time of the 2017 CHINS.” Id. at 871. 
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After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, our Court handed down 
Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1201, which prompted the State to file a 
petition for rehearing. Matter of R.L., 133 N.E.3d 173, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2019), on reh’g. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals concluded, “Eq.W. has 
now clarified that DCS may rely on evidence of a parent’s prior conduct in 
bringing a subsequent CHINS, and, therefore, contrary to this court’s 
decision, the trial court must be able to rely on that evidence in rendering 
its determination.” Id. at 175. Opining that Eq.W.’s holding empowered 
DCS to file the subsequent CHINS petition, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court in all respects. Id. at 176. 
Mother sought transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating the 
Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).   
Standard of Review 
When we review a CHINS adjudication, we neither reweigh evidence 
nor judge witness credibility. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). 
We reverse a CHINS finding only if the decision was clearly erroneous. Id. 
at 578. “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support 
the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found 
facts.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
Discussion and Decision 
On transfer, Mother argues that the trial court should have granted her 
motion to dismiss the second petition because it was barred by claim 
preclusion. More specifically, Mother urges this Court to find that the 
matters alleged in the second petition were or could have been litigated in 
the first petition and any new allegations of fact in the second petition 
were not material. DCS argues the opposite, believing that claim 
preclusion is inapplicable in this case because the subsequent petition 
introduced new allegations of material fact such that, when combined 
with Mother’s previous acts, the petition would survive a motion to 
dismiss.  
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Both sides attempt to use our recent decision in Matter of Eq.W. as 
sword and shield. Matter of Eq.W. stands for the proposition that when 
DCS attempts to bite the proverbial apple, it must do so with 
intentionality and cannot engage in piecemeal litigation to get subsequent 
bites at the same apple. In other words, DCS must have its house in order 
when it institutes a CHINS proceeding or else it risks dismissal that will 
bar future actions. In our view, DCS has attempted to take the prohibited 
second bite in this case after it largely failed to make its case during the 
first CHINS filing. For this reason—and those expressed below—we agree 
with Mother that the second CHINS petition pertaining to R.L. should 
have been barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.  
I.  
Our decision in Eq.W. held that claim preclusion applies to CHINS 
proceedings. 124 N.E.3d at 1211. The opinion laid out the four essential 
elements of claim preclusion: 
(1) The former judgment must have been rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction;  
(2) The former judgment must have been rendered on the 
merits;  
(3) The matter now in issue was or might have been 
determined in the former suit; and 
(4) The controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have 
been between the parties to the present action or their privies. 
Id. at 1209 (quoting Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 
(Ind. 2014)). Focusing on element (3), our opinion noted “application of 
res judicata in a CHINS proceeding is [not] without limits.” Id. at 1212. 
That is, “DCS must necessarily rely on the past actions of parents to give a 
trial court the full story of why a CHINS petition was filed in the first 
place.” Id. So, as a corollary of element (3), our Court found any 
subsequent CHINS petition “must include new allegations of material fact 
separate from what was available to DCS to use at the original fact-finding 
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hearing” that “took place in time after the relevant CHINS petition was 
dismissed.” Id. 
Our observations in Eq.W. are in step with several of our sister courts 
across the nation. For example, in People ex rel. L.S., 721 N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 
2006), the South Dakota Supreme Court considered the doctrine of res 
judicata through the lens of a child welfare proceeding. There, the court 
observed, “when it comes to protecting children res judicata should be 
cautiously applied.” Id. at 90. This was because “[t]he protection of 
children from continuing abuse and neglect is not the type of needless 
litigation contemplated by the doctrine [of res judicata].” Id. at 90. See also 
In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 460 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Ct. 1983) (observing 
claim preclusion “should be flexible and must give way when [its] 
mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on 
values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by 
finality in legal controversies”); Interest of J.J.T and T.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (sharing concerns that “a hyper-technical application 
of res judicata is improper in adjudications where the welfare of children 
is at stake” because “the child’s environment is constantly evolving”). In 
allowing the State to present evidence of changed circumstances, the 
South Dakota court concluded flexibility was needed in these cases 
because “[t]o hold otherwise is to turn our legal process for protecting 
abused and neglected children into a hollow ritual.” People ex rel. L.S., 721 
N.W.2d at 92. 
More recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that “the doctrine of 
claim preclusion should not be strictly applied in abuse and neglect cases 
when doing so would fail to protect children from continuing abuse or 
neglect.” In re Interest of Noah B., 891 N.W.2d 109, 124 (Neb. 2017). The 
court cautioned, however, that “the State does not have unfettered 
authority to adjudicate abuse and neglect allegations in a piecemeal 
fashion, free from the constraints of claim preclusion.” Id. To that end—
and consistent with our holding in Matter of Eq.W.—the State must rely on 
evidence “from the time period after the prior adjudication to prove the 
allegations of the supplemental petition” so as to escape the preclusive 
effect of res judicata. Id. at 124-25. This conclusion sounds in the basic 
premise that “the doctrine of claim preclusion cannot settle a question of a 
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child’s welfare for all time to come; it cannot prevent a court at a 
subsequent time from determining what is best for the children at that 
time.” Id. at 122 (cleaned up) (quotation omitted).  
So in sum, the basic framework of Eq.W. straddled the divide between 
finality in a court’s determination and the flexibility demanded by the 
evolving nature of CHINS cases. As was the case in Matter of Eq.W. and 
many of the aforementioned cases from other states, the battleground 
often concerns the third element of claim preclusion: whether the matter 
now in issue was or might have been determined in the former suit.  
While DCS must introduce new allegations of material fact in a 
subsequent petition, Eq.W. also cautioned courts against turning a blind 
eye to piecemeal litigation and/or actions that undermine the confidence 
we must place in our State’s child welfare system. Here, we take issue 
with both. 
II.  
Recall that Matter of Eq.W. observed, “DCS must necessarily rely on the 
past actions of parents to give a trial court the full story of why a CHINS 
petition was filed in the first place.” 124 N.E.3d at 1212. There, we agreed 
with DCS’s argument that “past acts by parents can be relevant to new 
CHINS filings involving the same parents and children.” Id. at 1211. 
However, our opinion also warned that repeated filings are “ripe for 
potential abuse” and we declined to “endorse the procedural tactics 
employed in [Eq.W.] to essentially string out the CHINS proceeding until 
enough evidence was collected, all the while keeping the children 
separated from their parents.” Id.; see also In re Interest of Noah B., 891 
N.W.2d at 124. In our view, the record in this case demonstrates the type 
of piecemeal litigation that Eq.W. sought to prevent. 
First, the second petition largely duplicated allegations or relied on 
matters that could have been determined in the first petition. These 
included allegations that Mother was currently involved in a separate 
CHINS action with her other child, that services had not been completed 
in that case, that Mother failed to follow through with treatment after a 
psychological evaluation, and that Mother and Father had a tempestuous 
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relationship. To be sure, these are serious allegations, but DCS failed to 
carry its burden in the first petition, which ultimately led to dismissal with 
prejudice.  
Second, the circumstances surrounding the second petition are 
concerning. Although the first petition had been dismissed, Mother either 
did not know about the dismissal or had no knowledge that R.L. should 
have been returned to her care. The FCM was involved in both the first 
and second petitions; she was aware of the first petition’s dismissal but 
made no effort to return the child. Without speculating whether Mother’s 
actions would have been different had she known that her child could 
have been returned before refusing the FCM’s request to inspect her 
apartment, we are concerned that Mother’s refusal became part and parcel 
of the second filing.  
Finally, our underlying rationale in Matter of Eq.W. is amplified in this 
case, especially when it comes to procedural protections for children and 
parents. “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not 
punish parents.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (citation 
omitted). Parents should appropriately be held accountable for the care of 
their children, but DCS also bears responsibility to move “cautiously and 
meticulously … through each stage of a CHINS proceeding.” Matter of 
Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1210. The tactics employed by DCS in this case 
undermine the confidence parents have in Indiana’s child welfare system. 
This practice should not be condoned, especially when DCS has vastly 
superior resources at its disposal to properly and accurately move 
through each stage of the CHINS proceeding. 
For these reasons, we find that the juvenile court should have granted 
Mother’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the juvenile court and 
dismiss the present CHINS action with prejudice. See id. at 1212 
(observing that, “Practically speaking, if the parent or guardian is 
successful in showing claim preclusion applied to bar a subsequent 
petition, the CHINS petition must be dismissed”).  
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Conclusion 
Matter of Eq.W. sought to prevent the type of piecemeal litigation that 
occurred in this case. The subsequent petition was largely duplicative of 
the first and enunciated three new, weakly supported allegations. At least 
one of those allegations was likely the result of DCS’s failure to inform 
Mother that her child could have been returned to her care—information 
that could have further informed Mother’s actions. If there is to be any 
predictability for parents, children, and the State in these proceedings, we 
must hold each party properly accountable to their individual 
responsibilities. Therefore, Mother’s motion to dismiss should have been 
granted because under the framework of Eq.W., the subsequent petition 
should have been barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
We reverse the trial court and dismiss the present CHINS petition with 
prejudice. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Suzy St. John 
Valerie K. Boots 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Katherine Cornelius 
Abigail Recker 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana