Title: Collins v. Shepherd

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
LARRY R. COLLINS 
                                       OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 061728 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
September 14, 2007 
FAYE M. SHEPHERD 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal principally concerns an order entered sua 
sponte by the circuit court dismissing with prejudice a civil 
action for personal injuries pursuant to a local rule adopted 
by that court that provides for the dismissal of cases not 
served on the defendant within one year of filing.  We 
consider two issues:  (1) whether the local rule is valid and, 
therefore, the circuit court was within its authority to 
dismiss the case pursuant to that rule, and (2) what is the 
effect, if any, of the failure to challenge that dismissal 
order until after the expiration of the twenty-one day 
limitation period in Rule 1:1. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The parties do not dispute that the local rule at issue 
is Local Rule 2(F)(3) which is contained in the Civil Case 
                     
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
 
 
2
Management Administrative Plan originally adopted by the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on October 8, 1998.  The 
plan has as its purpose the laudable goal of “concluding all 
civil cases, except by leave of court and in suits for 
divorce, within twelve months of filing.”  In an apparent 
effort to achieve that goal, Local Rule 2(F)(3) provides that 
“[i]f any civil action is not served within the time provided 
by Supreme Court Rule [3:5(e)], the Clerk shall prepare a 
notice of dismissal and send such notice to counsel for the 
plaintiff.”2 
 
The application of Local Rule 2(F)(3) became implicated 
in the following procedural context.  On September 7, 2004, 
Larry R. Collins filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk against Faye M. Shepherd for 
personal injuries allegedly resulting from the negligent 
operation of her motor vehicle.  Collins did not serve 
Shepherd with process.  On September 15, 2005, the circuit 
                                                                
August 16, 2007. 
2 During the proceedings in the circuit court, the local 
rule referenced former Rule 3:3(c).  Effective January 1, 
2006, our Rules of Court were reorganized and Rule 3:3(c) 
became Rule 3:5(e).  The provisions of former Rule 3:3(c) are 
nearly identical to the provisions of Rule 3:5(e) and the 
circuit court’s Local Rule 2(F)(3) has been revised to 
reference Rule 3:5(e).  Accordingly, we will refer to the 
current rule in this opinion. 
 
 
3
court, in accord with its local rule, mailed to Collins’ 
attorney a “Notice of Dismissal” stating that the circuit 
court “on Friday, October 7, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. . . . pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule [3:5(e)] and Nelson v. Vaughan, 210 Va. 
1 [, 168 S.E.2d 126] (1969), will dismiss this case because 
[Shepherd] has not been served with process within one year 
after the filing of the . . . Motion for Judgment . . . unless 
the [c]ourt finds that [Collins] has exercised due diligence 
to have timely service on [Shepherd].” 
 
Collins did not appear on or before the October 7, 2005 
date designated in the notice of dismissal.  On October 20, 
2005, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Collins’ 
action against Shepherd with prejudice.  The dismissal order 
provided that Collins, “having failed to show that due 
diligence was exercised to have timely service upon 
[Shepherd], . . . this case [is] dismissed with prejudice in 
accordance with Supreme Court Rule [3:5(e)] and Nelson v. 
Vaughan, 210 Va. 1 [, 168 S.E.2d 126] (1969).”  The dismissal 
order also provided that endorsement by counsel was waived 
pursuant to Rule 1:13. 
                                                                
 
 
4
 
Collins subsequently filed a motion on March 9, 2006 
requesting that the circuit court vacate the dismissal order 
and restore his case to the court’s docket.  Collins did not 
give Shepherd notice regarding this motion.  By an order dated 
March 16, 2006, the circuit court vacated its prior dismissal 
order and reinstated Collins’ case on the court’s docket.3  On 
the same day, the circuit court by separate order granted 
Collins’ motion to nonsuit the case. 
 
The record does not demonstrate how Shepherd became aware 
of the March 16, 2006 order.4  However, Shepherd filed a motion 
on March 27, 2006 requesting that the circuit court reconsider 
its decision to enter the March 16, 2006 dismissal order.  
                     
3 The March 16, 2006 order provided that the circuit court 
was reinstating the case “in the interest of justice, in that 
it appears that a clerical error and/or a fraud on the court 
occurred.”  This ruling was apparently in response to 
assertions made by Collins’ counsel that a disloyal employee 
of his office had deliberately withheld or destroyed the 
notice of dismissal and the dismissal order that were mailed 
by the circuit court.  Collins’ counsel relied, in part, upon 
the provisions set forth in Code § 8.01-428.  However, it is 
clear that Collins’ argument under Code § 8.01-428 did not 
form the basis of the circuit court’s ultimate ruling in this 
case that gave rise to this appeal.  Therefore, we will not 
address the applicability, if any, of Code § 8.01-428 in this 
case. 
4 On brief, Shepherd states that Collins filed a “second 
but identical complaint” and “immediately served the new 
complaint upon [Shepherd]” following the entry of the March 
16, 2006 order granting Collins a nonsuit of the original 
 
 
5
Shepherd asserted that Collins’ motion to vacate the October 
20, 2005 dismissal order was barred under Rule 1:1 for failure 
to challenge that order within twenty-one days of its entry 
and, therefore, that the circuit court was without authority 
to enter the March 16, 2006 order.  Accordingly, Shepherd 
requested that the circuit court vacate the March 16, 2006 
order. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on April 3, 2006 on 
Shepherd’s motion for reconsideration.  At the hearing, 
Collins contended that, under the procedural posture of the 
case at the time, the circuit court did not have the authority 
to enter the October 20, 2005 dismissal order and, therefore, 
the order was void ab initio.  The circuit court took the 
matter under advisement. 
 
In a letter brief to the circuit court, Shepherd 
contended that even if entry of the October 20, 2005 dismissal 
order was error, such error rendered that order voidable 
rather than void ab initio.  Accordingly, Shepherd maintained 
that the dismissal order was subject to Rule 1:1 and Collins 
was barred from challenging the order more than 21 days after 
its entry.  Furthermore, Shepherd contended that the circuit 
                                                                
action.  For purposes of our resolution of this appeal, we 
 
 
6
court should have the authority to dismiss cases that have not 
been served within a year of filing so that dockets will not 
“become unduly burdened with pending cases which have not been 
served but which the [c]ourt may not manage in any manner.” 
 
Responding by letter brief, Collins contended that the 
sua sponte dismissal order was void ab initio because “the 
character of the order is such that the court had no power to 
render it” and “the mode of procedure used by the court was 
one that the court could not lawfully adopt.”  Therefore, 
Collins asserted that his challenge to the order was not 
subject to the 21 day time limitation of Rule 1:1.  Collins 
also contended that the authority the circuit court cited in 
the dismissal order, Rule 3:5(e) and Nelson, authorize 
dismissal of a suit only after process has been served on the 
defendant more than one year after filing and only after the 
defendant files a motion to dismiss, neither of which occurred 
in this case.  Collins further contended that circuit courts 
are authorized by statute to clear inactive cases from their 
dockets through the mechanism prescribed in Code § 8.01-335.  
Finally, Collins contended that the circuit court’s Local Rule 
2(F)(3) was invalid under Code § 8.01-4 because it abridged 
                                                                
will accept that assertion as accurate. 
 
7
Collins’ substantive right to nonsuit the action prior to 
service of process on Shepherd. 
 
In order to consider the issues presented, the circuit 
court entered an order on April 6, 2006 vacating its prior 
order granting Collins a nonsuit.  Subsequently, the circuit 
court issued a letter opinion in which it rejected Collins’ 
assertions that the October 20, 2005 dismissal order was void 
ab initio.  The circuit court stated that the procedure used 
to dismiss Collins’ case was a “docket control procedure” 
created to deal with “moribund” cases where no service has 
been made within a year and the plaintiff has failed to 
exercise due diligence to effectuate service.  The circuit 
court concluded that its docket control procedure was not 
inconsistent with the provisions of Code § 8.01-4 authorizing 
circuit courts to adopt such docket control procedures so long 
as they do not “abridge the substantive rights of the 
parties.”  Addressing Collins’ contention that his case 
remained viable after one year because he still had a right to 
nonsuit and refile, the circuit court noted that Collins had 
the opportunity to exercise his right to nonsuit up until the 
return date on the notice of dismissal.  The circuit court 
acknowledged that Code § 8.01-335 provided a mechanism for 
clearing its docket of inactive cases, but found that 
mechanism inadequate to prevent the “indefinite tolling of the 
 
8
statute of limitations and harassment of the defendant,” which 
was an abuse that Rule 3:5(e) was designed to prevent.  The 
circuit court explained that the local rule was intended to 
prevent such abuse while at the same time giving the plaintiff 
the “opportunity to protect his substantive rights.” 
 
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the October 20, 
2005 dismissal order was valid.  Collins filed a motion for 
reconsideration.  By order entered May 26, 2006, the circuit 
court ruled that the dismissal order was not void ab initio, 
denied Collins’ motions to vacate the dismissal order and for 
reconsideration, and dismissed Collins’ September 7, 2004 
suit.  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In three assignments of error, Collins principally 
asserts that the circuit court’s October 20, 2005 dismissal 
order was void ab initio because it was entered pursuant to an 
invalid local rule.  According to Collins, the local rule is 
invalid because it abridges his substantive right to take a 
nonsuit and refile his case, conflicts with the procedures for 
discontinuance set forth in Code § 8.01-335, and permits 
dismissal of a case that was never served on the defendant in 
contravention of Rule 3:5(e), which he asserts applies only 
where the defendant is served with process outside of the one-
year period.  Shepherd assigns cross-error on two grounds:  
 
9
(1) that the dismissal order was a final order and all orders 
entered subsequent to it were void, and (2) this Court is 
without jurisdiction over this appeal because Collins did not 
appeal the dismissal order, which was entered on October 20, 
2005, until June 16, 2006.  Because the assignments of error 
and cross-error raise solely questions of law, we will apply a 
de novo standard of review.  Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 
363, 634 S.E.2d 754, 759 (2006). 
 
Similar to Rule 3:5(e), the local rule at issue targets 
cases not served within a year of filing.  Rule 3:5(e) 
provides that “[n]o order, judgment or decree shall be entered 
against a defendant who was served with process more than one 
year after the institution of the action against that 
defendant unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service on that 
defendant.”  However, unlike the local rule, Rule 3:5(e) does 
not expressly contemplate dismissal of cases not served within 
a year, although such cases are potentially subject to 
dismissal under Rule 3:5(e) upon motion by the defendant.  See 
Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 440, 463 S.E.2d 836, 837 
(1995). 
 
Despite the local rule’s reference to Rule 3:5(e), the 
critical question raised in this appeal is whether the circuit 
court had the authority to adopt a local rule that essentially 
 
10
translates Rule 3:5(e) into a mode of procedure for the court 
dismissing unserved cases sua sponte.5  Collins asserts that 
the circuit court did not have such authority because the 
local rule violates the provisions of Code § 8.01-4.  Code 
§ 8.01-4 provides that: 
 
The district courts and circuit courts may, 
from time to time, prescribe rules for their 
respective districts and circuits.  Such rules shall 
be limited to those rules necessary to promote 
proper order and decorum and the efficient and safe 
use of courthouse facilities and clerks’ offices.  
                     
5 The linchpin of the analysis in the dissenting opinion 
in this case upon which rests the ultimate conclusion that the 
circuit court’s erroneous October 20, 2005 dismissal order was 
merely voidable and not void ab initio is the initial 
conclusion that the circuit court did not enter that order 
pursuant to its Local Rule 2(F)(3) but, rather, pursuant to 
our Rule 3:5(e).  It reaches that conclusion by applying the 
settled principle that a court speaks only through its written 
orders. 
In this case, however, the parties do not dispute that 
the authority upon which the circuit court dismissed Collins’ 
action was the circuit court’s Local Rule 2(F)(3).  This is 
supported by the record before us in this appeal.  Indeed, the 
circuit court in its opinion letter of April 19, 2006, which 
it subsequently incorporated into its May 26, 2006 order 
holding that the October 20, 2005 dismissal order was not 
void, leaves no room for dispute that the circuit court 
entered the dismissal order in reliance upon the “docket 
control procedure this court has adopted.”  The docket control 
procedure adopted by the circuit court is Local Rule 2(F)(3) 
and obviously not our Rule 3:5(e).  Additionally, if there 
could be any remaining doubt, the circuit court explained in 
some detail in its opinion letter its concern with our 
decision in Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 515 S.E.2d 124 
(1999), which addressed the application of Rule 3:3(c), now 
Rule 3:5(e), and, thus, why it was relying upon its docket 
control procedure instead. 
 
11
No rule of any such court shall be prescribed or 
enforced which is inconsistent with this statute or 
any other statutory provision, or the Rules of 
Supreme Court or contrary to the decided cases, or 
which has the effect of abridging substantive rights 
of persons before such court.  Any rule of court 
which violates the provisions of this section shall 
be invalid. 
 
 
The courts may prescribe certain docket control 
procedures which shall not abridge the substantive 
rights of the parties nor deprive any party the 
opportunity to present its position as to the merits 
of a case solely due to the unfamiliarity of counsel 
of record with any such docket control procedures. 
 
 
Collins contends that the local rule is invalid because 
it abridged his substantive right to proceed with his lawsuit, 
noting that even after failing to serve Shepherd with process 
within one year of filing his civil action, he retained the 
right to take a nonsuit under Code § 8.01-380 and subsequently 
recommence the action against Shepherd.  Collins also asserts 
that the local rule is invalid because it conflicts with the 
provisions governing the discontinuance of cases set forth in 
Code § 8.01-335.  We agree with Collins.6 
                     
6 Collins’ assignments of error also raise the issue of 
whether Rule 3:5(e) only applies when the defendant is served 
with process more than one year after filing, and here 
Shepherd was never served.  Our decision in Gilpin resolves 
this issue.  257 Va. at 582, 515 S.E.2d at 126 (“[T]his rule 
applies only where there has been service of process.”). 
 
 
12
 
Code § 8.01-4 delegates to circuit courts the authority 
to establish rules regarding the management of their courts 
and the cases handled therein.  Clearly, however, Code § 8.01-
4 denotes that such authority must be carefully exercised so 
that local rules do not encroach upon statutes, Rules of 
Court, or case law.  To this end, Code § 8.01-4 expressly 
states that local rules must not “abridge the substantive 
rights of the parties” or deprive any party from having a case 
heard on the merits, reflecting the General Assembly’s 
intention that local rules govern the administration, but not 
become the determining factor in the ultimate outcome, of 
cases. 
 
Here, by operation of a procedure effectuated solely by 
its local rule, the circuit court dismissed Collins’ case with 
prejudice without the case being heard on the merits.  In the 
absence of this local rule, Collins would have retained the 
right to take a nonsuit and refile his civil action beyond the 
one-year limitation period established by the local rule.  See 
Code § 8.01-380; Berry v. F&S Fin. Mktg., 271 Va. 329, 332-33, 
626 S.E.2d 821, 823 (2006) (citing Waterman v. Halverson, 261 
Va. 203, 208, 540 S.E.2d 867, 869 (2001); McManama v. Plunk, 
250 Va. 27, 32, 458 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1995)).  The dismissal 
under a local rule of a case that the plaintiff would 
otherwise be able to pursue under the Code, case law, and 
 
13
Rules of Court exceeds the authority delegated to circuit 
courts under Code § 8.01-4. 
 
The tension between this particular local rule and the 
Code is further demonstrated by a comparison of this rule to 
Code § 8.01-335, which governs circuit courts’ authority to 
discontinue inactive cases.  Code § 8.01-335 provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
A. [A]ny court in which is pending an action, 
wherein for more than two years there has been no 
order or proceeding, except to continue it, may, 
in its discretion, order it to be struck from its 
docket and the action shall thereby be 
discontinued.  However, no case shall be 
discontinued if either party requests that it be 
continued.  The court shall thereafter enter a 
pretrial order pursuant to Rule 4:13 controlling 
the subsequent course of the case to ensure a 
timely resolution of that case.  If the court 
thereafter finds that the case has not been 
timely prosecuted pursuant to its pretrial order, 
it may strike the case from its docket.  The 
clerk of the court shall notify the parties in 
interest if known, or their counsel of record at 
his last known address, at least fifteen days 
before the entry of such order of discontinuance 
so that all parties may have an opportunity to be 
heard on it.  Any case discontinued under the 
provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, 
on motion, after notice to the parties in 
interest if known or their counsel of record, 
within one year from the date of such order but 
not after. 
 
B. Any court in which is pending a case wherein for 
more than three years there has been no order or 
proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its 
discretion, order it to be struck from its docket 
and the action shall thereby be discontinued.  
The court may dismiss cases under this subsection 
without any notice to the parties.  The clerk 
 
14
shall provide the parties with a copy of the 
final order discontinuing or dismissing the case.  
Any case discontinued or dismissed under the 
provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, 
on motion, after notice to the parties in 
interest, if known, or their counsel of record 
within one year from the date of such order but 
not after. 
 
Under Code § 8.01-335(A), the earliest point at which the 
circuit court may discontinue a pending case is after two 
years of inactivity, and even then discontinuance may be 
ordered only if neither party requests a continuance or the 
parties fail to abide by a schedule set by the court following 
a continuance.7  A case must be inactive for three years before 
                     
7 After the trial court’s disposition in this case, and 
after the briefing in this appeal was completed, the General 
Assembly has added a new subsection (D) to Code § 8.01-335, 
effective July 1, 2007, which provides: 
 
Any court in which is pending a case wherein process 
has not been served within one year of the 
commencement of the case may, in its discretion, 
order it to be struck from the docket, and the 
action shall thereby be discontinued.  The clerk of 
the court shall notify the plaintiff or his counsel 
of record at his last known address at least 30 days 
before the entry of an order of discontinuance so 
that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to show 
that service has been timely effected on the 
defendant or that due diligence has been exercised 
to have service timely effected on the defendant.  
Upon finding that service has been timely effected 
or that due diligence has been exercised to have 
service timely effected, the court shall maintain 
the action on the docket and, if service has not 
been timely effected but due diligence to effect 
 
 
15
a circuit court may dismiss a case sua sponte under Code 
§ 8.01-335(B).  Additionally, Code § 8.01-335 provides the 
parties to a discontinued case the opportunity to reinstate 
the case within one year of the discontinuance. 
 
In comparison to Code § 8.01-335, Local Rule 2(F)(3) 
would drastically expand the circuit court’s authority to 
dismiss an inactive case by permitting dismissal, sua sponte, 
after one year rather than after two or three years.  
Furthermore, unlike Code § 8.01-335 the local rule does not 
provide an opportunity for revival of a discontinued case, 
thus the local rule totally ignores the statutory distinction 
between a discontinuance and a dismissal with prejudice.  As 
Code § 8.01-4 expressly provides, “[n]o rule . . . shall be 
prescribed or enforced which is inconsistent with . . . any 
. . . statutory provision.”  Here, the inconsistency between 
                                                                
service has been exercised, shall require the 
plaintiff to attempt service in any manner permitted 
under Chapter 8 (§ 8.01-285 et seq.) of this title.  
Nothing herein shall prevent the plaintiff from 
filing a nonsuit under § 8.01-380 before the entry 
of a discontinuance order pursuant to the provisions 
of this subsection.  Nothing in this subsection 
shall apply to asbestos litigation. 
 
We express no opinion about the validity of the subject local 
rule of court in light of this amendment to the statute. 
 
16
Local Rule 2(F)(3) and Code § 8.01-335 is palpable and beyond 
debate. 
 
For these reasons, the circuit court did not have the 
authority under Code § 8.01-4 to adopt a local rule permitting 
the sua sponte dismissal with prejudice of cases not served 
within a year of the filing date.  Accordingly, we hold that 
Local Rule 2(F)(3), which purports to authorize the circuit to 
do so, is invalid.  Thus, the circuit court’s entry of the 
October 20, 2005 dismissal order based on that local rule was 
in error. 
 
We turn now to address the effect, if any, of Collins’ 
failure to challenge the October 20, 2005 dismissal order 
until after the twenty-one day period set forth in Rule 1:1.  
Under Rule 1:1, “final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control 
of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or 
suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no 
longer.”  Collins took no action regarding the October 20, 
2005 order until March 10, 2006, well beyond the twenty-one 
day period. 
 
Collins contends that the circuit court entered the 
dismissal order pursuant to a “mode of procedure the court 
could not lawfully adopt,” making the dismissal order void ab 
initio and, thus, not subject to the limitation period of Rule 
 
17
1:1.  Shepherd responds that even if the circuit court’s entry 
of the dismissal order was in error, such error merely 
rendered the order voidable, not void ab initio.  Therefore, 
Shepherd argues that the dismissal order was subject to Rule 
1:1.  Again, we agree with Collins. 
 
An order is void ab initio, rather than merely voidable, 
if “the character of the judgment was not such as the court 
had the power to render, or because the mode of procedure 
employed by the court was such as it might not lawfully 
adopt.”  See Evans v. Smyth-Wythe Airport Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 
73, 495 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1998); Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 
575, 579, 311 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1984);  Watkins v. Watkins, 220 
Va. 1051, 1054, 265 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1980); Barnes v. American 
Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 706, 130 S.E. 902, 906 (1925); 
Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 340, 5 S.E. 176, 177 (1887).  An 
order that is void ab initio is a “complete nullity” that may 
be “impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, 
anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.”  Singh v. Mooney, 
261 Va. 48, 52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001). 
 
In this case, the procedure utilized by the circuit court 
to enter the dismissal order was done pursuant to a local rule 
that, under Code § 8.01-4, the circuit court was not 
authorized to adopt.  As such, the “mode of procedure” 
utilized by the circuit court was one that it could “not 
 
18
lawfully adopt.”  Accordingly, the dismissal order was void ab 
initio and subject to challenge at any time.8 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court 
erred in entering the October 20, 2005 order dismissing 
Collins’ lawsuit against Shepherd, and that the dismissal 
order was void ab initio.  We further hold that Collins was 
entitled to the nonsuit granted by the circuit court’s March 
16, 2006 order and, accordingly, the April 6, 2006 order 
vacating that order was entered in error and upon remand 
Collins’ subsequent action against Shepherd is to be restored 
if necessary to the circuit court’s active docket.  We will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case 
for further proceedings in accordance with the principles 
stated herein. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE and SENIOR JUSTICE LACY 
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding 
that the circuit court’s entry of the October 20, 2005 
dismissal order was in error.  However, the majority also 
                     
8 In light of our resolution of these issues, we need not 
address any remaining issues raised in Shepherd’s assignments 
 
 
19
concludes that the dismissal order was void ab initio.  I 
respectfully disagree.  The dismissal order was not void ab 
initio because it involved an action by the circuit court that 
was in error rather than an action concerning the underlying 
authority of the circuit court to act on a matter.  See Singh 
v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 51, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001). 
The majority focuses on the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk Local Rule 2(F)(3) and states that the “critical 
question raised in this appeal is whether the circuit court 
had the authority to adopt a local rule that essentially 
translates Rule 3:5(e) into a mode of procedure for the court 
dismissing unserved cases sua sponte.”  By its terms, that 
local rule only authorizes the clerk of the circuit court to 
send a notice of dismissal to a plaintiff’s counsel advising 
that, because the plaintiff’s civil action has not been served 
within one year after commencement of the action, it will be 
dismissed unless the plaintiff has exercised due diligence to 
serve process. 
While the local rule at issue was the impetus for the 
notice of dismissal being sent to counsel for the plaintiff, 
                                                                
of cross-error. 
 
20
Larry R. Collins,9 it was not the authority upon which the 
circuit court relied to enter the October 20, 2005 order 
dismissing the action filed by Collins against Faye M. 
Shepherd.  Instead, the court stated in the dismissal order 
that “[Collins] having failed to show that due diligence was 
exercised to have timely service upon [Shepherd], and it 
seeming proper to the [c]ourt to do so, it is ORDERED that 
this case be dismissed with prejudice in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule [3:5(e)] and Nelson v. Vaughan, 210 Va. 1[, 
168 S.E.2d 126] (1969).”10  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, contrary 
to the majority’s conclusion, the circuit court did not 
dismiss Collins’ action “by operation of a procedure 
effectuated solely by its local rule.”  Speaking through the 
plain terms of its written order, the circuit court, instead, 
applied this Court’s Rule 3:5(e) and our decision in Nelson to 
                     
9 The notice of dismissal sent to Collins’ counsel stated 
that, pursuant to the predecessor of current Rule 3:5(e) and 
Nelson v. Vaughan, 210 Va. 1, 168 S.E.2d 126 (1969), the 
circuit court would dismiss the action because Shepherd had 
not been served with process within one year unless the court 
found that Collins had exercised due diligence to serve 
process. 
10 In Nelson, the trial court dismissed an action because 
of a “long delay” in serving process on the defendant.  210 
Va. at 1-2, 168 S.E.2d at 127.  We reversed the trial court’s 
judgment because process had been served within one year after 
the filing of the motion for judgment.  Id. 
 
 
21
dismiss the action.11  See Conyers v. Martial Arts World, 273 
Va. 96, 103, 639 S.E.2d 174, 177 (2007) (“[A] court speaks 
only through its written orders.”); Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 
137, 147, 597 S.E.2d 64, 70 (2004) (same); Upper Occoquan 
Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 266 Va. 582, 588, 587 
S.E.2d 721, 724 (2003) (same). 
 
There is no question that the circuit court erred in 
dismissing Collins’ action because the court misconstrued the 
provisions of Rule 3:5(e).  As we explained in Gilpin v. 
Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 515 S.E.2d 124 (1999), only a defendant 
who has been served with process more than one year after 
commencement of an action can invoke the provisions of Rule 
                     
11 In a letter opinion incorporated by reference in its 
May 26, 2006 order denying Collins’ motion to vacate the 
dismissal order, the circuit court referenced a “docket 
control procedure” that, in its view, was designed to allow a 
defendant “to have a stale claim against him dismissed.”  The 
docket control procedure reflected in Local Rule 2(F)(3) 
provided the circuit court with a method to identify what it 
regarded as stale claims, but it was not the basis of the 
circuit court’s dismissal order.  See Berean Law Group, P.C. 
v. Cox, 259 Va. 622, 627, 528 S.E.2d 108, 111 (2000) (holding 
that an oral ruling of a court cannot nullify its written 
order); Wagner v. Shird, 257 Va. 584, 588, 514 S.E.2d 613, 615 
(1999) (holding that an agreement of parties extending stay 
cannot change terms of court’s written order). 
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that the 
local rule abrogated Collins’ right to take a nonsuit.  After 
the circuit court issued the notice of dismissal, nothing 
precluded Collins’ from taking a nonsuit pursuant to Code 
 
 
22
3:5(e) in order to obtain a dismissal of the action with 
prejudice.  Id. at 583, 515 S.E.2d at 126; see also Gilbreath 
v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436, 442, 463 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1995) 
(“[A] dismissal under Rule [3:5(e)] is a dismissal with 
prejudice.”).  When the circuit court dismissed the action, 
Collins had not served Shepherd with process, nor had Shepherd 
filed any pleading invoking the provisions of Rule 3:5(e). 
 
Collins’ argument that the circuit court’s dismissal 
order was void ab initio is similar to the argument we 
rejected in Singh.  There, the trial court entered an order 
that did not comply with the provisions of Rule 1:13.  161 Va. 
at 51, 541 S.E.2d at 551.  The issue before us was whether the 
order was “void ab initio or merely voidable.”  Id. at 50, 541 
S.E.2d at 550.  We held that “a claim that an order does not 
comply with Rule 1:13 is a claim that the trial court abused 
its discretion in dispensing with the requirements of the Rule 
when it entered the order.”  Id. at 52, 541 S.E.2d at 552.  
Such a claim “involves a question of court error; it is not a 
question of the jurisdiction or authority of the court to 
enter the order.”  Id. at 52, 541 S.E.2d at 552. 
                                                                
§ 8.01-380.  Indeed, the circuit court acknowledged this fact 
in its letter opinion. 
 
23
Likewise, in the case before us, the circuit court’s 
failure to adhere to the provisions of Rule 3:5(e) when it 
dismissed Collins’ action raises a question of error by the 
court.  See Parrish v. Jessee, 250 Va. 514, 521, 464 S.E.2d 
141, 145 (1995) (“The validity of a judgment based upon a 
challenge to the application of a statute raises a question of 
trial error, and not a question of jurisdiction.”).  “[I]f the 
inferior court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 
controversy, and the parties are before it, . . . a mistaken 
exercise of that jurisdiction does not render its judgment 
void.”  County School Bd. v. Snead, 198 Va. 100, 107, 92 
S.E.2d 497, 503 (1956).  An order containing reversible error, 
such as the dismissal order at issue, “is merely voidable 
[and] may be set aside by motion filed in compliance with Rule 
1:1 or provisions relating to the review of final orders” such 
as Code § 8.01-428.  Singh, 261 Va. at 52, 541 S.E.2d at 551. 
A trial court has the power to dismiss an action pending 
before it.  That it does so for the wrong reason does not 
render its dismissal order void ab initio.  An order is void 
ab initio only “if entered by a court in the absence of 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the parties, if the 
character of the order is such that the court had no power to 
render it, . . . if the mode of procedure used by the court 
was one that the court could ‘not lawfully adopt,’ ” id. at 
 
24
51-52, 541 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting Evans v. Smyth-Wythe Airport 
Comm’n, 255 Va. 69, 73, 495 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1998)), or if the 
order was obtained by extrinsic or collateral fraud.  Rook v. 
Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987). 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the circuit 
court employed a “mode of procedure” that it could “not 
lawfully adopt” and that the dismissal order was therefore 
void ab initio.  That “mode of procedure,” according to the 
majority, was “the procedure utilized by the circuit court to 
enter the dismissal order . . . pursuant to a local rule that, 
under Code § 8.01-4, the circuit court was not authorized to 
adopt.”  As I previously explained, the local rule authorized 
only the issuance of a notice of dismissal.  And, the circuit 
court relied on Rule 3:5(e), not the local rule, as the 
authority for its dismissal order.  Moreover, the few cases 
cited by the majority in which this Court has addressed 
whether an order was void ab initio because the “character of 
the judgment was not such as the court had the power to 
render, or because the mode of procedure employed by the court 
was such as it might not lawfully adopt” are inapposite.  
Evans, 255 Va. at 73, 495 S.E.2d at 828. 
 
Three of those cases involved issues that arose in the 
context of divorce proceedings and addressed the validity of 
orders awarding certain types of relief that were not 
 
25
authorized by statute.  In Barnes v. The American Fertilizer 
Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902 (1925), we stated that, without 
specific statutory authority, a circuit court “has no power to 
transfer to the wife any specific portion of her husband’s 
real estate as alimony,” and that the character of such an 
order doing so would not be such as the court had the power to 
render.  Id. at 709, 130 S.E. at 907.  We concluded, however, 
that the order at issue there was “within the limits of the 
court’s jurisdiction, and did not constitute an attempt on the 
part of the court to transfer to [the wife] title to her 
husband’s real estate as alimony.”  Id. at 714, 130 S.E. at 
908.  Similarly, in Watkins v. Watkins, 220 Va. 1051, 265 
S.E.2d 750 (1980), the issue before us was whether “the trial 
court, as a part of the maintenance and support provisions of 
the final decree, [had] jurisdiction to enjoin the husband 
from disposing of his shares of stock in two family-owned 
corporations.”  Id. at 1051-52, 265 S.E.2d at 751.  We 
concluded that “the court lacked the statutory power to 
lawfully adopt the remedy in question.”  Id. at 1055, 265 
S.E.2d at 753.  Finally, in Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 
311 S.E.2d 786 (1984), the trial court directed the husband in 
a divorce proceeding “to contract for life insurance as a part 
of spousal support for his wife.”  Id. at 577, 311 S.E.2d at 
787.  Again, we found that “[n]othing in the divorce statutes 
 
26
empowered the court to take the action it took.”  Id. at 579, 
311 S.E.2d at 788. 
In Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 5 S.E. 176 (1887), a 
surety attacked the validity of a personal judgment previously 
entered against him on the basis that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to render the decree.  Id. at 339-40, 5 S.E. at 
177.  We affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the decree 
was null and void because the surety was not a party to the 
original suit and “the procedure by rule to bring [him] in and 
subject [him] for liability as suret[y] on the bond of the 
receiver . . . was against every sound principle of 
jurisprudence and without any recognized precedent.”  Id. at 
341, 5 S.E. at 178. 
The remaining case cited by the majority, Evans v. Smyth-
Wythe Airport Commission, involved an order that restricted an 
airport commission’s power of eminent domain.  255 Va. at 70, 
495 S.E.2d at 826.  We held that the order was “void ab initio 
because the circuit court did not have the power to render a 
judgment which permitted a governmental entity to relinquish 
the power or right of eminent domain.”  Id. at 74, 495 S.E.2d 
at 828.  Neither this case nor the other cases discussed 
support the majority’s position that the local rule, which the 
 
27
majority declares invalid,12 is tantamount to a “mode of 
procedure” that the circuit court could not lawfully adopt, 
thereby rendering its dismissal order void ab initio. 
The circumstances in which a court employs a “mode of 
procedure” that it could not lawfully adopt or renders a 
judgment the character of which was beyond its power to render 
is perhaps best illustrated by this passage from Windsor v. 
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876): 
All courts, even the highest, are more or less 
limited in their jurisdiction: they are limited to 
particular classes of actions, such as civil or 
criminal; or to particular modes of administering 
relief, such as legal or equitable; or to 
transactions of a special character, such as arise 
on navigable waters, or relate to the testamentary 
disposition of estates; or to the use of particular 
process in the enforcement of their judgments. 
Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a 
cause, of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it 
is still limited in its modes of procedure, and in 
the extent and character of its judgments. It must 
act judicially in all things, and cannot then 
transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for 
instance, the action be upon a money demand, the 
court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction 
over the subject and parties, has no power to pass 
judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon 
the defendant. If the action be for a libel or 
personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a 
specific performance of a contract. If the action be 
for the possession of real property, the court is 
powerless to admit in the case the probate of a 
                     
12 In my view, it is not necessary to decide whether Local 
Rule 2(F)(3) is invalid because the circuit court based its 
dismissal order on Rule 3:5(e), not the local rule. 
 
28
will. . . . The judgments mentioned, given in the 
cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous: they 
would be absolutely void; because the court in 
rendering them would transcend the limits of its 
authority in those cases. 
 
Id. at 282 (citation omitted).  Surely, it cannot be said that 
a trial court “transcends the limits of its authority” when it 
dismisses an action properly before it, even when it does so 
erroneously, or when, according to the majority, it does so 
based on an invalid local rule. 
Today’s decision will allow litigants to mount collateral 
attacks on final judgments whenever a local rule, or even a 
Rule of this Court, is subsequently invalidated.  In other 
words, litigants will be able to circumvent the mandate of 
Rule 1:1 that “final judgments, orders, and decrees, 
irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control 
of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or 
suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no 
longer.”  (Emphasis added.)  For these reasons, I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part, and would affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.