Title: CENTRAL WYOMING MEDICAL LABORATORY, LLC v. MEDICAL TESTING LAB, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CENTRAL WYOMING MEDICAL LABORATORY, LLC v. MEDICAL TESTING LAB, INC.2002 WY 4743 P.3d 121Case Number: 01-126Decided: 03/28/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
   

CENTRAL 
WYOMING MEDICAL

LABORATORY, 
LLC, a Wyoming

limited 
liability company, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

                                                                                                

MEDICAL 
TESTING LAB, INC., a

Wyoming 
corporation, BARBARA ALLEN,

KATHY 
ALLISON, GENELLE BONNEL,

MARIANNE 
HENLEY, KAREN KOENEKAMP,

NANCY 
NEUBERT, HEIDI PALMER,

VALERIE 
SPRECHER, NANCY STEWART,

LINDA 
STRIBLING, RONALD STINSON and

ANITA 
STINSON, 

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge (Retired)

Representing 
Appellant:

James R. 
Bell and Kathleen Swanson of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Kathleen 
Swanson.

 Representing 
Appellees Medical Testing Lab, Inc.; Allen; Allison-Wolter; Bonnel; Henley; 
Koenekamp; Neubert; Palmer; Sprecher; Stewart; and 
Stribling:

W.W. 
Reeves of Reeves & Miller, Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Reeves. 

Representing 
Appellees Dr. Ronald Stinson and Dr. Anita Stinson:

Judith 
Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Studer.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

HILL, 
Justice, 
delivered the opinion of the Court.  
GOLDEN, Justice, filed a dissenting opinion.

  

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Central Wyoming Medical Laboratory, Limited Liability Company (hereafter Med 
Lab), seeks review of an order of the district court granting summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees.  The 
Appellees are Medical Testing Lab, Inc., (hereafter MTL), Ronald Stinson and 
Anita Stinson (hereafter Stinsons), and a group of individuals1 who once served as employees for 
Med Lab, but who did, or now do, own an interest in or work for MTL (hereafter 
Employees).  Med Lab sought damages 
from the Appellees because they caused it to be damaged when they conspired to 
interfere with the sale of Med Lab to Clinical Laboratories of Cheyenne 
(hereafter Dynacare2), to interfere with a contract 
between Med Lab and Wyoming Medical Center (hereafter WMC), to interfere with 
Med Lab's contractual relations with its customers, clients, and WMC, as well as 
other claims sounding in fraud, tortious interference with business and 
economics rights, violation of a covenant not to compete, and civil 
conspiracy.  In addition, Med Lab 
sought punitive damages from Appellees.  
After the submission of briefs and a hearing on the Appellees' motions 
for summary judgment, the district court determined that Med Lab had assigned 
all of its interest in these claims to Dynacare and, therefore, Appellees were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶2]      We will reverse 
the order granting summary judgment and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[¶3]      Med Lab phrases 
the issue presented for review this way:

Whether 
the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact that Appellant transferred all of its claims alleged against the Appellees 
to third parties as part of its asset purchase agreement.

MTL and 
the Employees contend this is the issue:

Whether 
the trial court correctly determined that the contract for the sale of 
Appellant's business unambiguously conveyed to the purchaser of the business the 
claims sued on, so that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

The 
Stinsons advance these proposed issues:

1.  Did 
the trial court correctly rule that [Med Lab] transferred all claims asserted in 
this action pursuant to an asset purchase agreement?

A.  Does 
explanatory language as to what is included as assets limit the sale of all 
assets?

            
B.  Should a specific list of excluded assets be read 
expansively in order to restrict the assets sold?

            
C.   Can parol evidence be used to show intent contrary to the 
unambiguous language of the agreement?

2.  Whether 
there exist sufficient allegations and/or evidence of fraud and constructive 
fraud to sustain such claims.

3.  Does 
[Med Lab] have any basis to support its alleged civil conspiracy 
claim?

[¶4]      The facts we set 
out are the facts alleged by Med Lab in its complaint.  For purposes of disposition of this 
case, the following factual contentions are assumed to be true.  Med Lab was a medical testing laboratory 
providing services to the medical community in Casper.  It was owned by Edward D. Hobart, Jr. 
(Hobart).  Hobart is a pathologist 
who practiced in the Casper area.  
MTL is also a medical testing laboratory, which eventually competed with 
Med Lab in the Casper area.  All of 
the Employees were once employed by Med Lab, but now are owners and/or employees 
of MTL.  The Stinsons are husband 
and wife and both are pathologists who have an ownership interest in Central 
Wyoming Pathology, Inc. (hereafter CWP).  
The Stinsons direct the daily operations of CWP.  Med Lab alleged that the Stinsons have 
or had an ownership interest, monetary interest, or monetary stake in 
MTL.

[¶5]      On April 24, 
1993, Ronald Stinson signed an employment agreement with Med Lab, which included 
a provision that he would not compete within Natrona County for a period of 
three years from the effective date of the termination of his employment with 
Med Lab.  Ronald Stinson terminated 
that employment agreement on September 5, 1997.  On May 25, 1994, Anita Stinson entered 
into an employment agreement with Med Lab, which included a provision that she 
would not compete within Natrona County for a period of three years from the 
effective date of the termination of her employment with Med Lab.  Anita Stinson terminated that employment 
agreement on March 31, 1998.

[¶6]      In early 1998, 
Hobart began negotiating with the Employees to sell them Med Lab.  In conjunction with the negotiations, 
Hobart provided confidential financial information concerning Med Lab and 
afforded them an exclusive negotiating period to buy Med Lab.  Thereafter, Hobart heard nothing from 
the Employees about the proposed sale.  
During this same time period, Hobart alleged that one or more of the 
Employees began spreading rumors that Med Lab was going to be sold to a 
nationally known company and that Med Lab employees would lose their jobs.  One or more Employees also spread rumors 
that Med Lab was in financial trouble.

[¶7]      Also during this 
same time period, Hobart entered into negotiations with the Stinsons to sell 
them his interest in CWP.  At this 
same time, CWP entered into negotiations with WMC to extend the exclusive 
pathology services contract between those two entities.  Also at this same time, and as a part of 
the same transaction, Med Lab and WMC began negotiations for Med Lab to provide 
specified laboratory services for patients of WMC.  Hobart's sale of his interest in CWP was 
conditioned on the approval of these two agreements.  There was yet another aspect to this 
maze of contracts, and that was that Med Lab agreed to pay CWP a fixed sum 
(based on a historical average) for the performance of cytology reviews.  Hobart claims that he would not have 
entered into this agreement if he had known that there was a conspiracy afoot to 
render that agreement very detrimental to Med Lab's 
interests.

[¶8]      Hobart also 
contends that the Stinsons and the Employees entered into a plan to form a 
laboratory to compete against Med Lab and that the Stinsons knew this would 
affect the volume of cytology work CWP would perform for Med Lab (thus, 
rendering the fixed monthly payment Med Lab would pay to CWP very 
uneconomic).  It is alleged that the 
Employees spread rumors of Med Lab being in financial trouble and being in 
imminent danger of ceasing business.  
The Employees did this knowing that information to be false, as well as 
with a purpose of damaging Med Lab's business and luring away its customers and 
employees.  Med Lab's complaint also 
contains this allegation:

15.  During this same time frame, the 
Stinsons purposely delayed finalization of the purchase agreement between them 
and Hobart to allow time for the [Employees] to form their competing laboratory 
business.  The purpose of the delay 
was to ensure that the competing laboratory business was in place and fully 
competing at approximately the same [time] the purchase agreement with Hobart 
and the agreement with Med Lab concerning cytology services was finalized.  The Stinsons knew that once the 
competing lab was in place the volume of cytology work would decrease, thereby 
putting a financial burden on Med Lab to meet its monthly $6,000 payment 
obligation.  It was the Stinsons' 
plan, along with the [Employees], to divert cytology work which Med Lab 
historically had obtained from customers and clients to the new lab and to the 
detriment of Med Lab.

[¶9]      Med Lab further 
alleges that during April, May, and June of 1998, the Employees and the Stinsons 
began soliciting Med Lab's customers and clients to use the new competing 
laboratory.  Other aspects of this 
scheme included that the new laboratory decided to have someone other than one 
of the Stinsons serve as its medical director so that Hobart would not learn of 
their involvement in the new lab.  
In late May, plans for the new lab were well under way, articles of 
incorporation were filed, property for the lab site was leased, and termination 
packets were obtained for the Employees.  
One of the Employees, Barbara Allen,  was the business manager of Med Lab and 
held a position of trust, and it was she that was making many of the 
above-described arrangements.  The 
Employees intended to terminate their employment in as close proximity to one 
another as possible so as to disrupt Med Lab's business, or at least give MTL an 
advantage.  Many of the Employees 
were medical technicians, without whom Med Lab could not conduct business.  On June 1, 1998, Hobart met with the 
Employees about these matters, but all assured him they were loyal to Med 
Lab.  On June 5, 1998, Employee 
Stewart was fired because Hobart found, and she admitted, that she was 
soliciting Med Lab's customers for MTL.  
In addition, the proposed medical director for MTL was never so employed, 
and the medical director ultimately selected was a Daniel Sullivan, M.D., who 
worked for CWP and was under the supervision and control of the Stinsons.  The Stinsons themselves have been and 
continue to be consultants to MTL.  
Concurrently with the final preparations for opening MTL, the Stinsons 
closed their transactions with Hobart, buying his interest in CWP and executing 
the contract with Med Lab.  Med Lab 
claims that this was done deliberately in order to allow MTL to compete with Med 
Lab.  The Employees violated 
confidentiality agreements they had with Med Lab in order to woo away its 
customers and clients and took a series of other actions detrimental to Med Lab, 
which included the sabotage of equipment, deliberately delaying work for up to 
two weeks, spreading rumors of Med Lab's impending bankruptcy and that Hobart's 
home was up for sale, downloading confidential and proprietary information, and 
taking personal property of Med Lab without permission.  The Employees then quit with anywhere 
from a single day to a few days' notice, when the Med Lab policy was to give two 
weeks' notice.  As a result, Med Lab 
had to hire outside help at extra expense.  
Because its ability to provide service was compromised by the mass 
resignations, Med Lab's business was disrupted, its business reputation was 
damaged, and it lost existing customers and accounts.  Hobart contends that the Stinsons also 
used their influence to interfere with Med Lab's existing agreements with WMC, 
and it has consequently lost revenue.

[¶10]   In September of 1998, Med Lab began 
negotiations to sell its assets to another laboratory company.  Med Lab alleges that WMC pathology 
personnel, including the Stinsons, frustrated one such negotiation because they 
disparaged both Med Lab and Hobart.  
The actions of the Stinsons almost frustrated a second negotiated sale, 
but Med Lab was able to restart those negotiations, and a sale finally resulted, 
though at a considerable loss to Med Lab.  
In addition, Med Lab suffered losses due to decreased volume of work 
beginning in July of 1998, until its assets were purchased in April of 
1999.

[¶11]   In its complaint, Med Lab made the 
following claims for relief:

1.  Against 
the Stinsons, a claim of fraud based on their concealment and/or failure to 
disclose information which was detrimental to Med Lab.

2.  Against 
the Stinsons, a claim of constructive fraud.

3.  Against 
the Stinsons, breach of contract for violation of their covenants not to 
compete, which damaged Med Lab during the period immediately preceding its 
sale.

4.  Against 
the Stinsons, tortious interference with prospective advantage in that Stinsons 
interfered with Med Lab's attempts to sell its assets.

5.  Against 
the Stinsons, tortious interference with contract in that Stinsons intentionally 
interfered with Med Lab's contract to perform reference laboratory work for 
WMC.

6.  Against 
the Employees, breach of the duty of loyalty.  The Employees had a contractual duty to 
safeguard confidential information and to act solely for the benefit of Med 
Lab.  Med Lab contends it suffered 
damage as a result and the Employees should be required to repay all wages paid 
them during the period of disloyalty.

7.  Against 
the Employees, tortious interference with contract in that Employees attempted 
to interfere with contractual relations between Med Lab and its customers and 
clients.

8.  Against 
all Appellees, civil conspiracy in that all Appellees conspired to put Med Lab 
out of business.

9.  As 
to all Appellees, Med Lab sought punitive damages, asserting that the Appellees 
acted intentionally, maliciously, willfully and wantonly, in reckless disregard 
of the consequences to Med Lab.

Med 
Lab's complaint was accompanied by a jury demand.

[¶12]   In fairness, it is appropriate that 
we point out that the Appellees vigorously contested these allegations and, 
indeed, it is evident from the record extant that Hobart was experiencing 
considerable difficulties within the Casper medical community which were only 
partially related to the travails of Med Lab.  However, for the purposes of summary 
judgment, the Appellees concede that all facts well pleaded by Med Lab may be 
read as true.  Appellees' simple and 
very direct assertion is that any right of recovery was not owned by Med Lab, 
but by its successor in interest, Dynacare.

[¶13]   The district court issued a 
decision letter, which concluded that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact and that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The district court provided this 
reasoning for its decision:

The 
plaintiff seeks damages caused to its business from activities beginning in 1998 
with injuries continuing until sale of most assets of plaintiff's business in 
April of 1999.  The sale included 
all assets other than listed excluded assets.  Among the assets specifically sold were 
going concern value, goodwill, all contracts, software, supplies, books and 
records, the customer list, and all plaintiff's claims against third parties 
relating to the transferred assets.

The list 
of excluded assets consists of ten items.  
The tenth excluded asset is plaintiff's "claims against third parties 
relating to items that are not included in the assets."  Of the other nine items not included in 
the assets, none is the subject of damages claimed in the complaint.  Instead, the damages were to assets that 
are conveyed in the sale.

The sale 
contract is not ambiguous.  If the 
parties to that contract had not wanted to convey plaintiff's claims in this 
action, they could have included that provision.  Instead, plaintiff transferred all of 
its claims against third parties relating to the transferred assets.  That includes the claims in this 
case.

Reviewing 
the complaint, the first two claims allege fraud and constructive fraud against 
defendants Stinsons because, while negotiating a contract between plaintiff and 
Central Wyoming Pathology, Stinsons did not disclose that they were involved in 
establishing a lab to compete with plaintiff.  If plaintiff was injured in connection 
with this contract, that cause of action was transferred in the asset sale.  The complaint also states that 
plaintiff's chief executive knew of the incorporation of the competing lab 
before he closed on this contract.  
Thus, it is not clear that the nondisclosure by Stinsons was 
important.

The 
third cause of action against the Stinsons is for breach of their covenants not 
to compete with plaintiff.  Again, 
these contracts and rights of action were sold by 
plaintiff.

The 
fourth cause of action against Stinsons is for tortious interference with the 
prospective advantage plaintiff had in two proposed sales of the business.  The allegation is that the prospective 
buyers met with Stinsons and were told that Stinsons would not support any 
agreement involving Dr. Hobart or plaintiff.  The significance of this is not clear to 
me.  Nor is it clear why Stinsons 
should not have been able to say this.  
In any event, the cause of action was transferred with the other business 
assets.

The 
fifth cause of action against Stinsons concerns tortious interference with a 
contract between Wyoming Medical Center and plaintiff.  Again, the contract and cause of action 
were transferred in the sale.

The 
sixth cause of action is against the former employees for breach of duty of 
loyalty in the manner specified in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the complaint.  Those paragraphs allege that the 
employees committed unauthorized acts with business equipment, records, and 
other property and assets which were conveyed in the sale.  Any cause of action for injury to those 
items was sold by plaintiff.

The 
seventh cause of action alleges tortious interference with contracts by the 
former employees.  Those contracts 
and rights of action were conveyed in the sale of assets.

Without 
an underlying cause of action in tort, plaintiff cannot claim civil conspiracy 
or punitive damages.

[¶14]   The issue raised necessitates the 
use of two distinct standards of review.  
First, of course, the standard applicable to the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment and, second, those principles that apply to the construction of 
contracts.

[¶15]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Company, 2001 WY 16, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2001).  A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of 
action or defense.  We, of course, 
examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to that party who opposed 
the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn from the record.  
Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 
23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2001).

[¶16]   Our primary focus in construing or 
interpreting a contract is to determine the parties' intent, and our initial 
inquiry centers on whether the language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous.  If the language of the 
contract is clear and unambiguous, then we secure the parties' intent from the 
words of the agreement as they are expressed within the four corners of the 
contract.  Common sense and good 
faith are leading precepts of contract construction, and the interpretation and 
construction of contracts is a matter of law for the courts.  Reed, ¶ 10.   We have also recognized that the 
language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was 
written, and the court may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject 
matter, and the purpose of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties 
at the time the agreement was made.  
Polo Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 
1998); Williams Gas Processing--Wamsutter Company v. Union Pacific Resources 
Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶¶ 11-12, 25 P.3d 1064 ¶¶ 11-12 (Wyo. 
2001).

[¶17]   We begin our discussion with a 
notation that the contract in issue was 47 pages in length, with an additional 
22 pages of exhibits.  We note, as 
well, that this was not a particularly complex transaction; indeed, in most 
respects, it was as routine and straightforward as contract matters can 
get.  Reduced to its nub, the case 
involves Med Lab's contention that it intended to retain the right to sue these 
Appellees, and the Appellees' counter-contention that the contract does not say 
that, indeed, Appellees contend that the contract unambiguously assigns any 
lawsuits, such as those at issue herein, to Dynacare and, thus, Med Lab has no 
remaining interest in this litigation.

[¶18]   The contract provided that Med Lab 
sold to Dynacare "all of the Assets other than the Excluded Assets," and that 
"[t]he Assets shall include all of the assets of the Seller that are used or 
useful in the Acquired Business and that are not specifically described as 
Excluded Assets[.]"  The "Assets" 
sold to Dynacare are set out at length using the adjective "all" to apply to 
each distinct category of assets (and there are 12 categories of assets included 
in the contract, the last of which is simply titled "Other Assets").  However, the word "all" is qualified in 
that final category with this phrase:  
"[I]n each case excluding the Excluded Assets."  Among the "Excluded Assets" was this 
item:  "All of Seller's claims 
against third parties relating to items that are not included in the 
Assets."  The contract did provide 
that Dynacare was assigned, "[a]ll other intangible and tangible assets of 
Seller associated with or used in the operation of the Acquired 
Business[.]"  The phrase "Acquired 
Business" was defined by the contract:

"Acquired 
Business" shall mean the business of providing laboratory services carried on by 
the Seller at the Facility; at the collection stations, satellite laboratories 
and storage sites utilized by the Seller; and at the hospitals or other 
facilities to which the Seller provides laboratory services; in each case as the 
same has been conducted during the twelve months preceding the date hereof and 
as the same shall be conducted between the date hereof and the Closing 
Date.

[¶19]   In addition, Paragraph 2.7 included 
in the sale "all the Seller's claims against third parties relating to items 
included in the Assets[.]"  
Paragraph 8.8 of the contract (and the associated Schedule 8.8) purported 
to itemize:

[A]ll of 
the Seller's material security deposits, security bonds and claims against third 
parties of a similar nature relating primarily to items included in Assets and 
sets forth the party with whom material security has been deposited or, with 
respect to those claims of Seller against third parties which the Seller is 
transferring to the Buyer hereunder, the party against whom claims have been 
asserted, the amount of the claim and the present status or the resolution of 
the claim.

Schedule 
8.8 contained only the word "None."  
Paragraph 8.12 provided that:  
"None of the Assets being sold by the Seller to the Buyer pursuant to 
this Agreement are subject to any claim or dispute[.]"

[¶20]   In structuring their argument, the 
Appellees rely in significant part on the case of Knott v. McDonald's 
Corporation, 147 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1998) wherein the appeals 
court relied on contract language to the effect that the sellers had assigned 
"'all [their] right, title, and interest' to the [buyers]."  Id., at 1067 (emphasis in 
original).  The reviewing court then 
concluded that:  "In short, all' 
means all."  Id.  In the instant case, "all" very clearly 
meant something less than all; indeed, we conclude that it 
did not mean all at all, and its use did not serve to transfer or 
assign to Dynacare the claims at issue in this appeal.  Much of the other language used in the 
Knott case, especially that relating to the construction of contracts, 
and to the construction of an assignment of contract rights in particular, is 
substantially the same as the parallel Wyoming law set out herein.  The general rules applicable to the 
construction of an assignment, such as that at issue here, are 
these:

            
If a contrary intention is not shown, an assignment ordinarily passes 
whatever is necessary to make it completely effectual, and vests in the assignee 
all rights, remedies, and contingent benefits which are incidental to the thing 
assigned, except those which are personal to the assignor and for his benefit 
only . . . .

            
In the final analysis, however, the question of what rights or remedies 
will pass as incidental to the thing assigned is dependent entirely on the 
intention of the parties; and the assignee will acquire no right to incidents 
which it is clear the parties did not intend to pass, or which it would be 
inequitable to pass because of resulting injury to the 
assignor.

6A 
C.J.S. Assignments § 76 (1975); also see 6 Am. Jur. 2d 
Assignments §§ 145 and 148 (1999); also see Allied Chemical 
Corporation v. American Independent Oil Company, 623 S.W.2d 760, 763 
(Tex.App. 1981) (applying rule summarized in C.J.S., Assignments, that 
intention of parties must be gleaned from entirety of contract; summary judgment 
appropriate where contract as a whole unambiguously established limitations of 
assignment).

            
In the absence of a contrary intention, an assignment usually passes as 
incidents all ancillary remedies and rights of action which the assignor had or 
would have had for the enforcement of the right or chose 
assigned.

            
Unless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates them, accrued 
causes of action arising out of an assigned contract, whether ex contractu or ex 
delicto, do not pass under the assignment as incidental to the contract if they 
can be asserted by the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the 
contract and are not essential to a continued enforcement of the contract.  If, however, an accrued cause of action 
cannot be asserted apart from the contract out of which it arises or is 
essential to a complete and adequate enforcement of the contract, it passes with 
an assignment of the contract as an incident thereof.

            
. . . .

            
An assignment of a title or interest in property, however, does not, of 
itself, constitute an assignment of an existing cause of action for a tort 
previously committed with reference to the property; and a cause of action for 
fraud on the assignor, which induced the purchase of the property or the 
creation of the debt or chose assigned, is often held not to pass to the 
assignee, except where an intention of the assignor to assign such cause of 
action is apparent or can be inferred.

6A 
C.J.S. Assignments § 77 (1975).

[¶21]   We have previously held that an 
assignment is a contract and is interpreted or construed according to rules of 
contract construction.  Boley v. 
Greenough, 2001 WY 47, ¶¶ 1-5, 22 P.3d 854, ¶¶ 1-5 (Wyo. 2001); Farr v. 
Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 (Wyo. 1987).  
An assignment is an act or expression (e.g., a writing) of intention by 
which one person causes to transfer, set over or vest in another a right or 
property or an interest therein.  
Matter of Estate of Boyd, 606 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 1980); and 
see generally Wyoming Wool Marketing Association v. Urruty, 394 P.2d 905, 907-9 (Wyo. 1964).  
Applying the rules of contract construction set out above, we are obliged 
to conclude that the contract is not ambiguous, and that it is clear that the 
contract did not operate so as to assign the causes of action at issue in this 
appeal to Dynacare.  For these 
reasons, the order granting summary judgment must be reversed and this matter 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

[¶22]   As noted more fully above, we have 
reviewed the same materials from the record as did the district court.  The contract terms at issue are not 
ambiguous, and our review of the applicable terms of the contract convinces us 
that the intent of the parties was that the causes of action at issue here were 
not a part of the sale of Med Lab to Dynacare.  Although Med Lab, through Hobart and his 
attorney, submitted extrinsic evidence as to what Med Lab's intention was, we 
have not relied on that material, as was the case with the district court.  Looking at all of the terms of the 
contract in context, as we must, we conclude that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.  The order granting summary judgment is, 
therefore, reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

  

GOLDEN, J., 
dissenting.

[¶23]   I respectfully dissent.  In my judgment, the district court's 
decision letter, referred to in the majority opinion, succinctly and correctly 
analyzed this dispute.  I would 
affirm the summary judgment to all appellees.

FOOTNOTES

1Those individuals are:  Barbara Allen, Kathy Allison, Genelle 
Bonnel, Marianne Henley, Karen Koenekamp, Nancy Neubert, Heidi Palmer, Valerie 
Sprecher, Nancy Stewart, and Linda Stribing.  It is alleged that these are the primary 
owners of MTL.

2Although the asset purchase agreement 
identified the purchaser as Cheyenne Clinical Laboratories, the new laboratory 
was operated as, and referred to by all parties as, Dynacare.  Cheyenne Clinical Laboratories is a 
subsidiary of Dynacare.