Title: Longshore v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA:
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 9th day of June, 
2000. 
 
 
Clifton S. Longshore, Jr., 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against     Record No. 992269 
 
 
   Court of Appeals No. 1007-98-1 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia on the 13th day of July, 1999. 
 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
The circuit court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the 
testimony of an absent witness into evidence by reading that 
witness's prior testimony as contained in a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing on this felony charge.  At that preliminary 
hearing, the defendant called the witness and questioned him about 
the robbery that occurred in the "bullpen" of a jail and the fact 
that the witness did not report what he observed to any jail 
personnel at that time.  Although the Commonwealth issued a summons 
for the absent witness to appear at the trial in the circuit court, 
the witness could not be located and was never served with the 
summons. 
 
The defendant objected to the introduction of the absent 
witness's testimony and now claims that the requirements for 
admitting prior testimony of an unavailable witness were not 
satisfied and that the use of the absent witness's testimony at the 
defendant’s trial in circuit court violated the defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. 
 
We have previously held that the preliminary hearing testimony 
of a witness who is absent at a subsequent criminal trial may be 
admitted into evidence if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) that the witness is presently unavailable; (2) that the prior 
testimony of the witness was given under oath (or in a form of 
affirmation that is legally sufficient); (3) that the prior 
testimony was accurately recorded or that the person who seeks to 
relate the testimony of the unavailable witness can state the 
subject matter of the unavailable witness’s testimony with clarity 
and in detail; and (4) that the party against whom the prior 
testimony is offered was present, and represented by counsel, at the 
preliminary hearing and was afforded the opportunity of cross-
examination when the witness testified at the preliminary hearing.  
Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 25, 28, 235 S.E.2d 316, 318 
(1977).  See also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 808, 812-13, 232 
S.E.2d 798, 801-02 (1977). 
 
In the present case, all these requirements were fulfilled.  
Specifically with regard to the defendant's opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the preliminary hearing, the record shows 
that, even though the defendant, rather than the Commonwealth, 
called the witness, the court did not limit the defendant's 
questioning of the witness nor did the Commonwealth object to any 
question.  Furthermore, since the defendant called the witness, his 
questions were not limited by the scope of the Commonwealth's direct 
examination.  In other words, the defendant tested the witness's 
testimony to the full extent that he chose to do and he had more 
than a mere opportunity to conduct the equivalent of cross-
examination.  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 71 (1980).  Thus, we 
find no error, constitutional or otherwise, in permitting the use of 
the absent witness's prior testimony at the trial of this felony 
charge. 
 
It is ordered that the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake 
allow counsel for the appellant a fee of $725 for services rendered 
the appellant on this appeal, in addition to counsel's costs and 
necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses. 
 
The Commonwealth shall recover of the appellant the amount paid 
court-appointed counsel to represent him in this proceeding, 
counsel's costs and necessary direct out-of-pocket expenses, and the 
costs in this Court and in the courts below. 
_______________ 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE WHITING, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL joins, dissenting. 
 
I am unable to agree with the majority for the following 
reasons.  I do not think that the defendant "was afforded the 
opportunity of cross-examination when the witness testified at the 
preliminary hearing," as held by the majority.  In my opinion, 
simply because "the court did not limit the defendant's questioning 
of the witness nor did the Commonwealth object to any question," 
does not mean that the defendant either had or exercised the right 
of cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. 
Nor do I agree that "the defendant tested the witness's 
testimony to the full extent that he chose to do and he had more 
than a mere opportunity to conduct the equivalent of cross-
examination," as the majority concludes.  The record indicates that 
the defendant asked a limited number of innocuous leading questions 
of the witness during his direct examination regarding the witness's 
recollection of what he had observed during the encounter in the 
"bullpen" and his failure to promptly report the alleged robbery.  
Moreover, the record does not indicate that the defendant sought to 
(1) establish ulterior personal reasons of the witness for unfairly 
casting blame on the defendant or challenging the witness's veracity 
as in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 71 (1980), (2) impeach the 
witness in the preliminary hearing by prior inconsistent statements, 
a tool used in cross-examination, as noted in California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970), or (3) establish a bias in favor of the 
Commonwealth in the form of a plea agreement or promise of leniency 
regarding the pending charges against the absent witness, which 
probably would be used as an important part of a cross-examination 
which I think should have been afforded the defendant in the circuit 
court. 
Further, I would reject the Commonwealth's claim that the 
defendant had "the opportunity" to cross-examine the absent witness 
at the preliminary hearing as in the case of Fisher v. Commonwealth, 
217 Va. 808, 812, 232 S.E.2d 798, 801 (1977).  In Fisher (as well as 
in Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 25, 235 S.E.2d 316 (1977), 
cited by the majority), the absent witness had testified as a 
Commonwealth witness at the preliminary hearing and was thus subject 
to cross-examination by the defendant. 
Here, although the absent witness had been called by the 
defendant at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth suggests that 
the defendant's right of cross-examination was "protected" even 
though "he did not avail himself of it."  The Commonwealth reasons 
that the defendant's right of cross-examination arose because the 
absent witness's testimony "was clearly adverse to the defendant 
when he stated that he saw the defendant rob [the victim]." 
None of the three cases that the Commonwealth cites supports 
its contention.  In each case, the witness was held to be adverse 
for reasons other than the fact that he or she gave testimony 
unfavorable to the defendant.  Trout v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 511, 
514-16, l88 S.E. 219, 220-21 (1936) (Commonwealth surprised by its 
witness's testimony because of her prior inconsistent statements); 
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 909, 919, 150 S.E. 407, 410 (1929) 
(Commonwealth's witness proved adverse or hostile); Pendleton v. 
Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676, 704, 109 S.E. 201, 211 (1921) (court 
conducted direct examination of witness because she refused to 
discuss case with Commonwealth's Attorney prior to trial). 
In my opinion the rule in Virginia is that a witness does not 
become adverse simply because his or her testimony is adverse or 
injurious to the calling party's case, as perhaps in the preliminary 
hearing in this case.  Rather, an adverse witness is usually an 
opposing party or a nonparty witness who has a financial or other 
personal interest in the outcome of the case, or a witness who gives 
surprising and unexpected adverse testimony.  Butler v. Parrocha, 
186 Va. 426, 432-33, 43 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1947); Maxey v. Commonwealth, 
26 Va. App. 514, 520, 495 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1998). 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand the case to that Court with directions to remand 
the case to the circuit court for a new trial to be conducted in 
accordance with the principles expressed in this dissent. 
 
Justice Lemons took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
 
This order shall be certified to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and to the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake and 
shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    David B. Beach, Clerk 
Costs due the Commonwealth 
 by appellant in Supreme 
 Court of Virginia: 
 
 
Attorney's fee 
 $725.00 plus costs and expenses 
 
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
David B. Beach, Clerk