Title: RAUL GARAY, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RAUL GARAY, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 130165 P.3d 99Case Number: 06-220Decided: 08/10/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RAUL 
GARAY, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofWashakieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jack 
Vreeland of Evanston, Wyoming; and Robert M. Archuleta of Salt 
Lake City, Utah.  
Argument by Mr. Archuleta.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cathleen D. Parker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 
third-degree sexual assault.  We 
affirm.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶2]      Our standard for 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as 
follows:

 
 
When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider  conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did.

 
 

Kenyon 
v. State, 2004 
WY 100, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting May v. State, 2003 WY 14, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 574, 578 (Wyo. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).  Stated somewhat differently, with 
emphasis upon witness credibility determinations, our standard of review has 
been identified as follows:

 
 
When the 
issue of sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, this Court must 
respect the role of the fact-finder, in this case the jury, to weigh the 
credibility of the respective witnesses.  
A jury is entitled to weigh and disregard any evidence intended to 
discredit the witnesses for the State.  
Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 
642 (Wyo. 
1985).  This Court does not 
second-guess the credibility determinations of the jury.  Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 
6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003).  To 
that end, this Court must presume that the jury resolved any conflict in the 
evidence in favor of the prosecution.  
McFarlane v. State, 2001 WY 
10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, ¶ 4 (Wyo. 2001).  
Ultimately, in order to preserve the role of the fact-finder, this Court 
does not review the record evidence to determine if it agrees with the verdict, 
but rather the critical inquiry of this Court is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Ekholm v. State, 2004 WY 159, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d 201, ¶ 18 (Wyo. 2004); Tanner v. 
State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 7, 57 P.3d 1242, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 

Leyo v. 
State, 2005 
WY 92, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005).1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The standard of 
review just elucidated requires us to set forth the facts shown in the trial 
record in the light most favorable to the State.  Because the victim in this case is a 
minor, and because many of the witnesses also were minors, and because many of 
the witnesses share the same surname, we will refer to the victim as "the 
victim," we will identify witnesses by their given name, and we will refer to 
Mr. Garay as "the appellant."

 
 
[¶4]      On August 10, 
2005, the victim traveled from Salt Lake 
City, 
Utah, to Worland, Wyoming, to visit a cousin, Shantell.  On the evening of August 12, 2005, the 
victim and Shantell went to the appellant's house to babysit.  The appellant is also the victim's 
cousin.  The appellant left the 
residence, returning later with T.J. and Jamie.  The appellant and T.J. then left to buy 
alcohol with money given them by Shantell.  They returned with a bottle of vodka, 
from which both the victim and the appellant began to 
drink.

 
 
[¶5]      At some point, 
the victim and Shantell went to Mark's house, where they were later picked up by 
the appellant and T.J.  The four of 
them drove around town, with the appellant and the victim continuing to drink 
vodka, while the victim sat on the appellant's lap in the back seat.  Along the way, they picked up T.C. and 
Enrique, whose vehicle had broken down along the road.  They then drove to the Rendezvous Lounge, 
where they picked up Jackie.

 
 
[¶6]      The group next 
went to Jackie's house, where the victim, who was visibly drunk, remained 
outside when the others entered the house.  
She vomited repeatedly on the front porch.  Jackie and other adults directed the 
victim's friends to move her from the front porch so "the cops" would not notice 
her.  In response, Shantell searched 
for the victim, finding her in the back yard with the appellant.  Shantell attempted to help the appellant 
with the victim, but the appellant resisted her efforts and insisted on helping 
the victim by himself.  The 
appellant then carried the victim down into the basement and into a back 
bedroom, closing the door behind them.

 
 
[¶7]      Shantell, 
Enrique, Justin, and T.C. were sitting in the living room just outside the 
bedroom.  Their estimates of the 
length of time the appellant was in the bedroom with the victim varied, with the 
longest estimation being 10 to 20 minutes.  The victim testified that she recognized 
the person in the room with her as being the appellant.  She identified him by his voice, his 
shaven head, his headband, and the white sweatshirt he was wearing.  She testified that the appellant laid her 
down on a mattress, laid down beside her, rubbed her arm, and told her he was 
going to "try something new."  He 
then "pull[ed] and tugg[ed]" her pants off, positioned himself between her legs, 
and "lick[ed her] private [parts]."  
The victim testified that she was going in and out of 
consciousnesspassing outand the next thing she remembered was being on top of 
the appellant, "going side to side" and falling over, while the appellant 
struggled to keep her upright so he could "have sex with" her.  She testified that she felt his penis 
"inside" and she felt it "hit my leg."

 
 
[¶8]      When the 
appellant left the bedroom, he closed the door behind him, and as Shantell got 
up to go check on the victim, the appellant said, "[N]o, she's fine."  He also said that the victim had vomited 
on her pants.  The appellant left 
the basement a few minutes later, at which time Shantell, Enrique, T.C., and 
Justin went into the bedroom.  They 
found the victim lying on the mattress.  
Her pants were on the floor.  Shantell noted that there was no vomit on 
the victim's pants.  After a period 
of indecision as to what they should do, T.C. covered the victim with a blanket 
and the group went back out into the living room.  T.J. and Jamie then came downstairs.  Upon being told the situation, they went 
into the bedroom and put the victim's pants back on her.  In doing so, they noticed that the top 
button of the pants was missing.  The button was found in a "dust ruffle" 
next to the mattress.  Shantell then 
told Mark about the victim's condition, and Mark carried her to his car and took 
her and Shantell home. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Eventually, the 
victim's parents learned about the incident and, after an investigation, the 
appellant was charged with third-degree sexual assault, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005), which reads as 
follows:

 
 
(a)       An actor 
commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree;

 
 
(i)      The actor is at 
least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim under the age of sixteen (16) years[.]

 
 
((i) and 
(ii) Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159 § 3.)  
The elements of that crime, as the jury was instructed in this case, are 
as follows:

 
 
1.    On or about the 12th or 13th 
day of August, 2005.

 
 
2.    In Washakie 
County, Wyoming.

 
 
3.    The Defendant, Raul 
Garay.

 
 
4.    Inflicted sexual intrusion 
upon [the victim].

 
 
5.    The Defendant was at least 
four years older than [the victim]; and

 
 
6.    [The victim] was under the 
age of sixteen years.

 
 
[¶10]   After a jury trial, the appellant 
was convicted of third-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to incarceration 
for a term of 13 to 15 years.  The 
only element of the crime contested in this appeal is whether the appellant 
inflicted sexual intrusion upon the victim.  The appellant does not challenge the 
fact that any incident, if such occurred, occurred in Washakie County, Wyoming, on or about August 12-13, 2005, and 
that, at the time, he was 29 years of age and the victim was 14 years of 
age.

 
 
[¶11]   We will affirm the appellant's 
conviction because (1) the appellant's arguments are 
based almost exclusively upon inferences he wishes the jury would have drawn 
from the evidence, rather than the inferences the jury apparently did draw;  (2) the focus of the appellant's brief 
and oral argument was upon the supposed lack of qualifications of one of the 
State's expert witnesses, despite the fact that he did not object below to the 
witness's qualifications and, in fact, waived the necessity of a Daubert hearing; and (3) the trial 
record contains not just sufficient evidence, but abundant evidence, of the 
appellant's guilt, with or without the drawing of any inferences and with or 
without the expert's testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   Several witnesses saw the 
29-year-old appellant take a drunken 14-year-old girl into a bedroom and shut 
the door.  When they went in, she 
had her pants on.  When he left, her 
pants were off.  She testified that 
he forcefully removed her pants, then licked her private parts and put his penis 
in her vagina.  Her pants were found 
on the floor, with the top button missing.  
He lied about the reason her pants were off by claiming that 
she had vomited on them.  A 
reasonable trier of fact could determine, from those facts alone, that 
third-degree sexual assault had occurred as charged.  The appellant did not testify, leaving 
the question of what happened in the bedroom solely a question of the victim's 
credibility.  The jury was aware 
that the victim did not immediately report the incident, that there was no 
biological evidence to corroborate her story, and that, while the victim 
exhibited signs typical of a child who had been sexually abused, not all 
children who show those signs have been sexually abused.  Nevertheless, the jury believed her, and 
it is not for us to second-guess that conclusion.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   There was sufficient evidence for 
the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of 
third-degree sexual assault.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Historically, 
this Court has paid lip service to the concept of giving only the plain error 
rule's limited review to sufficiency of the evidence issues, but in practice we 
have performed our usual sufficiency of the evidence analysis whether or not a 
motion for judgment of acquittal was made in the trial court.  In truth, the plain error standard does 
not lend itself to application where the issue is sufficiency of the 
evidence.  One, there is no 
"incident" that is alleged to be error, and no objection can be made to the 
failure to have presented evidence on one or more of the elements of the 
crime.  Two, the "clear and 
unequivocal rule of law" element of plain error analysis does not "fit" a 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis.  
Third, the proposition that a defendant's guilt must be proved with 
competent evidence bearing upon each of the crime's elements always involves a 
fundamental right.  Finally, a 
defendant is always prejudiced if he is found guilty and the evidence is not 
sufficient to establish his guilt.   
For these reasons, we hereby abandon any adherence to the plain error 
rule where sufficiency of the evidence is the issue.