Title: Sandra L. Shirk v. Bowling, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Sandra L. Shirk,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Bowling, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  231 Wis. 2d 239, 604 N.W.2d 305 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 11, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 3, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr. 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Scott C. Beightol, Brenda S. Kasper and Michael 
Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Scott C. 
Beightol. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Russell C. Brannen, Jr., and O’Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Russell C. Brannen, Jr. 
 
2001 WI 36 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3634-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sandra L. Shirk,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Bowling, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The issue presented by this 
case is whether a circuit court may deny a motion for default 
judgment based on the preemptive use of the statute governing 
relief from judgments, Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(1995-96),1 when the 
party opposing the motion claims excusable neglect for its 
untimely answer.  Petitioner, Bowling, Inc. (Bowling), seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Shirk 
v. Bowling, Inc., No. 98-3634-FT, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. 
Oct. 12, 1999).  The court of appeals reversed a circuit court 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
FILED 
 
      
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 11, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
2 
order which denied a motion for default judgment brought by 
Sandra Shirk (Shirk) based on Bowling's lack of a timely answer 
to her complaint.  The circuit court, Judge Charles F. Kahn 
presiding, denied Shirk's motion based on the preemptive use of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1). The court concluded that it would be 
compelled to reopen the case if Bowling brought a motion to 
vacate the judgment under § 806.07.2  After denying Shirk's 
motion for default judgment, the court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Bowling.  Shirk appealed the summary judgment to the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that 
the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard in denying 
Shirk's motion for default judgment.  According to the court of 
appeals, the circuit court should have addressed whether Bowling 
established excusable neglect for its untimely answer, and 
should 
not 
have 
relied 
upon 
the 
policy 
against 
default 
judgments, which favors allowing parties to have their day in 
court. 
¶2 
We 
hold 
that 
the 
circuit 
court, 
based 
on 
the 
preemptive use of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), properly denied 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or legal representative from a judgment, 
order or stipulation for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  
. . . 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
3 
Shirk's motion for default judgment.  We further hold that 
Bowling 
established 
excusable 
neglect 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a) due to the fact that, when read together, the 
summons and the notice of service were confusing or misleading. 
 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, 
and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals.3 
I 
¶3 
This case arose out of a post-employment dispute 
between Shirk and Bowling.  Shirk filed a complaint against 
Bowling after Bowling terminated her as its Chief Executive 
                     
3 We do not address the circuit court's granting of summary 
judgment in favor of Bowling.  In its petition for review to 
this court, Bowling requested review of the issue of whether the 
circuit court properly denied Shirk's motion for default 
judgment.  The petition does not mention the grant of summary 
judgment.  Shirk's response to the petition for review also 
fails to mention the grant of summary judgment.  In addition, 
neither Shirk nor Bowling addressed the grant of summary 
judgment in their respective briefs to this court, other than to 
note that summary judgment had been granted to Bowling.  In the 
conclusion to the brief on behalf of Shirk, the following is 
stated:  "Even reversal of flat [sic] decision results in remand 
to the Court of Appeals for some relief on Shirk's other 
issues."  Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 37. 
The Court of Appeals decided the present case solely on the 
grounds that the circuit court erroneously denied Shirk's motion 
for default judgment.  The court noted that Shirk raised three 
issues on the appeal.  Because the court concluded that the 
default judgment issue was dispositive of the appeal, the court 
declined to address the other two issues raised by Shirk.  The 
court stated that the other two issues are:  "(1) whether the 
severance package was due in full at the next payroll date as a 
matter of law or by the parties' agreement; and (2) whether 
certain allegedly delinquent payments made by Bowling to Shirk 
were subject to the penalty under § 109.11(2)(a), STATS."  Shirk 
v. Bowling, Inc., No. 98-3634-FT, unpublished slip op. at 3 n.3 
(Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1999). 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
4 
Officer (CEO), seeking a lump sum payment of severance pay, 
additional wages, and an award for expenses and attorneys' fees. 
¶4 
On March 6, 1998, Shirk served a summons, complaint 
and 
notice 
of 
service 
on 
the 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions (DFI) pursuant to the statute governing service to 
foreign corporations, Wis. Stat. § 181.66(2).4  The summons named 
Bowling as the defendant and contained the instruction that 
Bowling must answer the complaint within twenty days of 
receiving the summons or the court may enter judgment against 
Bowling.  On March 16, 1998, the DFI mailed an authenticated 
copy of the Summons and Complaint, and the original Certificate 
                     
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 181.66(2) provides: 
A foreign corporation conducting its 
affairs or acquiring, holding or disposing 
of property in this state, shall by so doing 
be deemed to have thereby appointed the 
department as its agent and representative 
upon whom any process, notice or demand may 
be served 
in 
any 
action 
or proceeding 
arising out of or relating to any affairs 
conducted or property acquired, held or 
disposed of within this state.  Service of 
such process, notice or demand shall be made 
by serving a copy upon the department, and 
such service shall be sufficient service 
upon said foreign corporation, provided that 
notice of such service and a copy of the 
process, notice or demand are within 10 days 
thereafter sent by mail by the plaintiff to 
the defendant at its last-known address, and 
that the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance 
herewith is appended to the process, notice 
or demand.  The department shall keep a 
record of all such processes, notices and 
demands which shows the day and hour of 
service.   
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
5 
of Service on the DFI showing service on March 6, 1998, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 181.66, to the last known address of 
Bowling.    
¶5 
On March 17, 1998, Bowling received the copy of the 
summons and complaint.  In addition, Bowling received a Notice 
of Service from Shirk that stated: 
 
Please take notice, that on the 6th day of 
March, 1998, as reflected in the attached 
Certificate from the Department of Financial 
Institutions, 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
appended 
authenticated 
Summons 
and 
Complaint 
was 
served 
upon 
you 
through 
the 
aforesaid 
Department, 
all 
pursuant 
to 
Wisconsin 
Statutes § 181.66(2).  Reference is herewith 
made to the contents of the appended Summons 
for further instructions. 
 
 
¶6 
On March 30, 1998, Shirk moved for default judgment 
because Bowling did not answer her complaint within 20 days of 
the March 6 service on the DFI.  Bowling then filed an answer to 
Shirk's complaint on April 1, 1998. 
 
¶7 
The circuit court denied Shirk's motion because the 
court determined that it would be required to reopen the case if 
Bowling brought a motion to vacate the default judgment under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1).  In addition, the court recognized the 
policy in Wisconsin to allow litigants their day in court and to 
decide cases based on the merits rather than on "legal traps or 
time limits."  Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at p. 4.  Lastly, the court 
noted that Bowling had filed an answer and was ready to defend 
Shirk's complaint.  After denying Shirk's motion for default 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
6 
judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Bowling. 
 
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
circuit court applied the wrong legal standard in making its 
decision.  According to the court of appeals, the circuit court 
should have addressed whether Bowling had established excusable 
neglect, rather than simply stating a preference for deciding 
the case based on the merits.  In addition, the court of appeals 
held that Bowling's three excuses for its late answer "were 
legally insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish excusable 
neglect."  Shirk, slip op. at 4.  The court of appeals did not 
address whether the circuit court properly granted Bowling's 
motion for summary judgment.  
II 
 
¶9 
The present case requires us to determine whether a 
circuit court may deny a motion for default judgment based on 
the preemptive5 use of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a) when the party 
opposing the motion claims that its untimely answer was due to 
excusable neglect.  A circuit court has discretion in deciding 
whether to grant a motion for default judgment.  Oostburg State 
Bank v. United Savings & Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11, 386 
                     
5 Preemptive is defined as "taken as a measure against 
something 
possible, 
anticipated, 
or 
feared; 
preventive; 
deterrent."  The Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1524 (2d ed. 
1993).    
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
7 
N.W.2d 53 (1986).  We will not reverse a circuit court's 
decision unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. 
 Id.6   
 
¶10 Bowling contends that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  According to Bowling, the 
circuit court, in the present case, followed the court of 
appeals decision in Johns v. County of Oneida, 201 Wis. 2d 600, 
549 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1996).  In Johns, the court of appeals 
held that a circuit court could deny a motion for default 
judgment, without a finding of excusable neglect, if the court 
concluded that it would be required to vacate the judgment under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  201 Wis. 2d at 606.  The reasoning 
behind the Johns decision was that it would be a needless use of 
judicial time and resources to grant a default judgment and then 
immediately vacate that judgment.  Id.  In addition, Bowling 
claims that the Johns decision follows language from this court 
in Willing v. Porter, 266 Wis. 428, 63 N.W.2d 729 (1954).  In 
Willing, we stated that it would be a "useless waste" if a court 
granted a motion for default judgment, and then immediately 
considered a motion to set aside that judgment on the same 
                     
6 We have replaced the phrase "abuse of discretion" with the 
phrase "erroneous exercise of discretion."  City of Brookfield 
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 171 Wis. 2d 400, 423, 491 
N.W.2d 484 (1992).  Although the name has changed, the standard 
to be applied remains the same.  Id.  
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
8 
grounds that were argued to deny the motion in the first place. 
 266 Wis. at 430.  Bowling urges us to follow the holding of 
Johns and the language and holding of Willing. 
 
¶11 Bowling also argues that the circuit court was not 
required to use the phrase "excusable neglect" to exercise 
properly its discretion when denying Shirk's motion for default 
judgment.  Relying on Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 
461, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982), Bowling claims that a circuit court 
makes an implicit finding of excusable neglect so long as it 
adequately recites the grounds for its decision.  In the present 
case, Bowling contends that the circuit court adequately recited 
the grounds for its decision when it stated the policy 
preference for deciding cases on the merits and allowing 
litigants their day in court.  Accordingly, Bowling claims that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion, 
even though it did not expressly use the phrase "excusable 
neglect." 
 
¶12 Lastly, Bowling contends that it was misled by Shirk's 
use of a faulty summons based on an obscure service statute and 
that this constitutes grounds for a finding of excusable 
neglect.  Bowling claims that it was reasonable to believe that 
the 20-day period in which to answer Shirk's complaint began 
when Bowling received the summons on March 17, rather than on 
March 6, the day the summons and complaint were served on the 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
9 
DFI.  Bowling compares the facts of the present case to the 
facts of Jackson v. Employe Trust Funds Board, 230 Wis. 2d 677, 
602 N.W.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Jackson, the court of 
appeals held that a circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in denying a motion for default judgment, when 
the party opposing the motion claimed to be misled by an 
ambiguous service statute.  230 Wis. 2d at 694-95.  Bowling 
argues that the notice of service which referred to Wis. Stat. 
§ 181.66, combined with the language of the summons itself, 
created an ambiguity as to when its answer was due.  Bowling 
therefore claims that its failure to file an answer within 20 
days of the date that service was effected on the DFI was 
excusable neglect. 
 
¶13 By contrast, Shirk contends that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying her motion for 
default judgment.  Shirk argues that Bowling failed to set forth 
the specific details of its claimed excusable neglect.  Shirk 
compares the facts of the present case to the facts of Hedtcke, 
which this court found to be insufficient to establish excusable 
neglect.  109 Wis. 2d at 472.  In Hedtcke, we held that a 
lawyer's claim of the press of other legal business, without 
stating "specific incidents and a persuasive explanation," 
failed to establish excusable neglect.  109 Wis. 2d at 473.  
Shirk argues that Bowling's claim that the summons and notice of 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
10
service were both misleading, without the specific details of 
who was misled and how they were misled, is insufficient to 
support its claim of excusable neglect.  Shirk also relies on 
Gerth v. American Star Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 1000, 480 N.W.2d 
836 (Ct. App. 1992) for the proposition that Bowling cannot 
sustain a claim of excusable neglect based on one sentence from 
the notice of service.   
 
¶14 Shirk also contends that the facts of the present case 
should not have led the circuit court to the conclusion that 
denial of the motion for default judgment was necessary, because 
the court would later have had to vacate the judgment under Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(1).  Shirk claims that, in addition to Bowling's 
failure 
to 
establish 
excusable 
neglect 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a), the test for relief under § 806.07(1)(h) is not 
met here.  The requirements were explained by this court in 
State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 363 N.W.2d 419 
(1985).  Section 806.07(1)(h) allows a court to vacate a 
judgment if there are "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment."  The test is whether there 
are "extraordinary 
circumstances" to 
justify 
such relief.  
M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 549.  According to Shirk, the courts in 
both M.L.B. and Johns found extraordinary circumstances due to 
the consequences of allowing the judgment to stand, and 
therefore vacated the judgment.  Shirk claims that extraordinary 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
11
circumstances 
exist 
when 
a 
judgment 
either 
"prolongs 
a 
controversy or revives a controversy previously resolved."  
Shirk argues that there are no extraordinary circumstances in 
the present case that arise from allowing the default judgment 
to stand. 
 
¶15 We begin our analysis of the arguments of the parties 
with the statute that governs the granting of a default 
judgment, Wis. Stat. § 806.02.7  The first sentence of the 
statute 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
default 
judgment 
may 
be 
rendered . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1).  The use of the word 
"may" indicates that the circuit court "is not required to enter 
a default judgment."  Hansher v. Kaishian, 79 Wis. 2d 374, 387, 
255 N.W.2d 564 (1977).  As noted previously, the decision to 
grant a motion for default judgment is within the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  Oostburg, 130 Wis. 2d at 11.  
We have set forth guidelines for the circuit courts to follow in 
the exercise of such discretion: 
The trial court must undertake a reasonable 
inquiry and examination of the facts as the 
basis of its decision.  The exercise of 
discretion must depend on facts that are of 
record or that are reasonably derived by 
inference from the record and the basis of 
that exercise of discretion should be set 
                     
7 The relevant section of Wis. Stat. § 806.02 provides:  
"(1) A default judgment may be rendered . . . if no issue of law 
or fact has been joined and if the time for joining issue has 
expired."  
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
12
forth. 
 
This 
court 
will 
not 
find 
an 
[erroneous exercise] of discretion if the 
record shows that discretion was in fact 
exercised and if the record shows that there 
is reasonable basis for the trial court's 
determination. 
 
Howard v. Duersten, 81 Wis. 2d 301, 305, 260 N.W.2d 274 (1977). 
¶16 We have also instructed circuit courts to keep certain 
policies in mind when deciding motions for default judgment.  A 
court should consider that:  "(1) [the default judgment statute] 
is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed . . . ; 
(2) the law prefers, whenever reasonably possible, to afford 
litigants a day in court and a trial on the issues . . . ; and 
(3) as a corollary to this preference, default judgments are 
regarded with particular disfavor."  Dugenske v. Dugenske, 80 
Wis. 2d 64, 68, 257 N.W.2d 865 (1977).  Moreover, we have 
directed that a court, in deciding a motion to vacate a default 
judgment, consider whether the party seeking relief from the 
judgment has taken prompt action.  Hansher, 79 Wis. 2d at 392. 
 
¶17 In addition, Bowling is correct that a circuit court 
does not erroneously exercise its discretion when it denies a 
motion for default judgment because it concludes that it would 
thereafter be compelled to entertain a motion to set aside that 
judgment.  Willing, 266 Wis. at 430; Johns, 201 Wis. 2d at 605-
06.  For the sake of judicial economy, a circuit court should 
not grant a motion for default judgment and then immediately 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
13
entertain a motion to vacate that judgment based on the same 
grounds relied upon by a party arguing for denial in the first 
place.  Willing, 266 Wis. at 430; Johns, 201 Wis. 2d at 605-06. 
 In Johns, the court of appeals held that a circuit court may 
deny a motion for default judgment if the court determines that 
it would reopen the case due to the existence of extraordinary 
circumstances under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  201 Wis. 2d at 
605-06.  The court followed our statement in Willing that "'it 
would be a useless waste'" for a circuit court to grant a 
default judgment and then instantly face a motion to vacate that 
judgment.  Id. (quoting Willing, 266 Wis. at 430).  To preserve 
judicial time and resources, a circuit court properly denies a 
motion for default judgment, if it determines that it would be 
compelled to reopen that judgment if the party opposing the 
motion brought a motion to vacate under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1). 
 
¶18 As the parties have discussed, one of the grounds for 
vacating a default judgment is if the party against whom 
judgment has been rendered can establish excusable neglect.  
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  Excusable neglect is "'neglect which 
might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the 
same circumstances.'"  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 468 (citations 
omitted).  Excusable neglect is not just "'neglect, carelessness 
or inattentiveness.'"  Id. 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
14
 
¶19 There is an additional requirement for a party seeking 
the denial of a default judgment motion based on the preemptive 
use of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  The party must also establish 
that it has a meritorious defense to the underlying action.  
J.L. Phillips & Assoc., Inc. v. E & H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 
348, 351, 577 N.W.2d 13 (1998).  A meritorious defense is any 
defense that is "good at law."  Id. at 360.  A defense that is 
good at law "is a defense that requires no more and no less than 
that which is needed in a timely-filed answer to survive a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings."  Id.  The party does not 
need to demonstrate any likelihood of success.  Id. 
 
¶20 In the present case, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  To begin with, the court 
properly concluded that it could deny Shirk's motion for default 
judgment based on the preemptive use of Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1). 
 Willing, 266 Wis. at 430; Johns, 201 Wis. 2d at 605-06.  The 
court determined that it would be "required to reopen the case" 
if Bowling brought such a motion to vacate.  The circuit court 
was not required to waste, needlessly, its time and resources by 
granting 
Shirk's 
motion 
for 
default 
judgment, 
and 
then 
immediately entertaining, and granting, Bowling's motion to 
vacate that judgment. 
 
¶21 There was a reasonable basis for the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion that was supported by the facts in the 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
15
record.  Howard, 81 Wis. 2d at 305.  Even though the court did 
not 
expressly 
use 
the 
phrase 
excusable 
neglect, 
Bowling 
accurately asserts that there was such a reasonable basis in the 
record, namely, the fact that the summons and the notice of 
service seemed to set two different dates as to when the 20-day 
period for answering the complaint began.  We disagree with 
Shirk's argument that Bowling failed to address the specific 
facts of its excusable neglect.8  The notice of service stated 
that Bowling had been served through the DFI on March 6, 1998.  
By operation of Wis. Stat. § 181.66, Bowling had 20 days from 
this date to answer Shirk's complaint.  In addition, the notice 
of service stated "[r]eference is herewith made to the contents 
of the appended Summons for further instructions."  On March 17, 
1998, Bowling received the summons that stated "[w]ithin twenty 
(20) days of receiving this summons, [Bowling] must respond with 
a written answer."  We agree with Bowling that a reasonably 
prudent person, in the same circumstances as Bowling, could have 
been confused as to whether the 20-day period to answer began on 
March 6, the date of service on DFI, or March 17, the date that 
Bowling received the summons.  See Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 468 
                     
8 We do not address Shirk's argument that Bowling failed to 
establish extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from a 
judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) because we conclude 
that 
Bowling 
has 
established 
excusable 
neglect 
under 
§ 806.07(1)(a).  
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
16
(holding that excusable neglect is "'that neglect which might 
have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same 
circumstances.'")(citations omitted).  We, therefore, conclude 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying Shirk's motion for default judgment, 
because the confusion created by the interplay between the 
summons and the notice of service established excusable neglect 
on Bowling's part.9 
                     
9 The facts of the present case are distinguishable from the 
facts of Gerth v. American Star Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 1000, 480 
N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1992).  In Gerth, the plaintiff sent two 
copies of the summons and complaint to the commissioner of 
insurance, which then mailed the process to the defendant's 
office in Waukesha, Wisconsin.  166 Wis. 2d at 1004.  The 
defendant's 
claims 
manager, 
located 
in 
San 
Francisco, 
California, then received the summons 19 days later.  Id. at 
1004-05.  The defendant argued that this delay caused the claims 
manager to believe that he had 20 days from his receipt of the 
summons to answer the complaint.  Id. at 1007-08.  According to 
the defendant, the delay in sending the summons from Waukesha to 
San Francisco, combined with the claims manager's confusion over 
when the answer was due, established excusable neglect.  Id.  
The court of appeals rejected that argument, holding that the 
claims manager's failure to determine the correct date for when 
the answer was due was neglect, but not excusable neglect, 
because the summons was stamped "received" and contained the 
date of receipt at the Waukesha office.  Id. at 1008. 
In the present case, in addition to the summons and 
complaint, Shirk drafted the notice of service which stated 
"[r]eference is herewith made to the contents of the appended 
Summons for further instructions."  It is this sentence in the 
notice of service, combined with the summons, that created 
confusion and established excusable neglect on the part of 
Bowling.  Accordingly we do not require supplemental briefing 
addressing which summons form Shirk should have used, and we 
deny Shirk's motion for supplemental briefing.    
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
17
 
¶22 The circuit court also considered the appropriate 
standards or guidelines when deciding whether to grant a motion 
for default judgment.  See Dugenske, 80 Wis. 2d at 68.  First, 
the court recognized the policy of affording litigants their day 
in court by stating that "we do have a preference in state 
courts that everyone be allowed his or her day in court."  Tr. 
of Mot. Hr'g at 6.  Second, the court took note of the fact that 
default judgments are regarded with disfavor by stating "our 
appellate courts have directed trial courts to attempt to get 
the issues resolved based on the substantive facts as opposed to 
any legal traps or time limits."  Id. at 4.  In addition, the 
circuit court correctly considered the fact that Bowling had 
taken prompt action in opposing the motion for default judgment, 
and, thus, seeking relief, by stating that "[h]ere the defendant 
is ready to answer today."  Id. at 3.  Bowling filed an answer 
two days after Shirk moved for default judgment, was prepared to 
defend against Shirk's complaint, and filed a brief, with 
supporting affidavits, opposing the motion for default judgment. 
 
¶23 In addition to establishing excusable neglect, Bowling 
satisfied the other requirement to succeed on a motion to vacate 
a default judgment, the existence of a meritorious defense.  To 
meet this requirement, Bowling needed to establish a defense 
"good-at-law," that is, a defense that would survive a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  J.L. Phillips, 217 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
18
359-60.  Bowling apparently had such a defense.  The circuit 
court, after denying Shirk's motion for default judgment, 
granted summary judgment in favor of Bowling.  Given that the 
circuit court found that Bowling's defense entitled it to 
summary judgment, then this defense was also good enough to 
survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
III 
 
¶24 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Shirk's motion 
for default judgment.  The circuit court properly concluded that 
it could deny Shirk's motion based on the preemptive use of Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(1).  In addition, we conclude that Bowling 
established excusable neglect due to the confusion created by 
the interplay between the summons and the notice of service.  We 
further conclude that Bowling established the existence of a 
meritorious defense.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
and 
remand 
this 
case 
to 
it 
for 
consideration of the other issues raised there but not before 
us.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
No. 
98-3634-FT 
 
 
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