Title: Evans v. City of Berkeley

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 3/9/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
EUGENE EVANS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S112621 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A097187 
CITY OF BERKELEY et al., 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. 809180-4 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A city requested that a volunteer youth group affiliated with the Boy Scouts 
of America, in order to qualify for continued free use of berths in the city’s 
marina, provide written assurance the group would not discriminate against 
homosexuals or atheists wishing to participate in the group’s program.  The city, 
deeming the policy statement the group provided ambiguous and therefore 
insufficient, discontinued its subsidy.  Members of the group sued, claiming, 
among other things, that the city’s action violated their freedoms of speech and 
association.  The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed.  We conclude the Court of Appeal correctly determined that the 
complaint does not establish a violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and 
affirm the lower court’s judgment.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Because this case comes to us on a demurrer for failure to state a cause of 
action, we accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ first amended 
 
 2
complaint.  “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly 
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  [Citation.]  
We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’  (Serrano v. Priest 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187].)  
Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole 
and its parts in their context.  (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 
Cal.2d 34, 42 [172 P.2d 867].)”  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  
“ ‘[A] complaint otherwise good on its face is subject to demurrer when facts 
judicially noticed render it defective.’  [Citation.]”  (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. 
Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. 
(a).)  The following facts appear from the allegations of the complaint and from 
judicially noticeable sources. 
Plaintiffs are 14 individual adult and youth participants in the Berkeley Sea 
Scouts, suing for themselves and other program participants.  The Berkeley Sea 
Scouts (Sea Scouts) are volunteers joining together in a nonprofit association with 
no formal administrative structure, no budget, and no employees.  Adults, 
including some of the named plaintiffs, use Sea Scout vessels to teach sailing, 
seamanship, marine engine repair, electrical repair, woodworking, and other skills 
for a maritime career, as well as teamwork, to teenagers who pay no more than $7 
a year to participate.  Ethnic diversity is a hallmark of the Sea Scouts, and many 
youth participants are economically disadvantaged.  Girls as well as boys 
participate, and the Sea Scouts have never actually discriminated against anyone 
on the basis of sexual orientation or religion. 
According to the operative complaint, the Sea Scouts are “a subdivision 
of,” or “associated/affiliated with,” the national Boy Scouts of America (BSA).  
The Sea Scouts operate under what the complaint describes as BSA’s “regional 
office,” the Mount Diablo Council.  Each Sea Scout “ship” functions as the 
 
 3
equivalent of a Boy Scout troop.  BSA provides the group with a low-cost 
maritime liability insurance policy but gives it no direct funding.  BSA, according 
to the complaint, follows a “policy of discriminating against homosexuals’ and 
atheists’ participation.”1   
In the late 1930’s, Berkeley began giving BSA one or more free berths at 
its marina for use by the Sea Scouts, after the Mount Diablo Council permitted 
Berkeley to quarry rock from BSA property to build the marina and breakwater.  
The arrangement was formalized by city resolutions in 1945 and 1969 that 
required compliance with marina rules and regulations and allowed revocation on 
30 days’ written notice.   
In March 1997, in response to requests from other nonprofit organizations 
for free berths, the city manager recommended and the Berkeley City Council 
adopted through resolution No. 58,859-N.S. (Resolution 58,859) a uniform policy 
for awarding free berths to nonprofit community service organizations.2  Under 
the resolution, an organization seeking free berth space must “supply a beneficial 
                                              
1  
The complaint cites Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 530 U.S. 640, 
both of which describe BSA’s doctrinal opposition to participation in scouting 
programs by atheists and known homosexuals. 
2  
Resolution 58,859 is a “legislative enactment[] issued by or under the 
authority of . . . [a] public entity in the United States,” of which notice may be 
taken under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (b).  (See Cooke v. Superior 
Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 401, 416 [county resolution increasing level of 
dental care for indigents], disapproved on another point in County of San Diego v. 
State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 106, fn. 30.)  The operative complaint 
also alleges the existence and some of the terms of the resolution.  We also take 
notice, as legislative history reflecting on the purposes of the enactment, of the 
city manager’s memorandum to the mayor and city council recommending the 
resolution’s adoption.  (See Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 824, 848, fn. 6; Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 929 & fn. 10.) 
 
 4
public service,” the benefit of which “greatly exceeds the value of the berth.”  The 
organization also must “demonstrate,” through “[m]embership policy and 
practices,” among other criteria, that it “promote[s] cultural and ethnic diversity.”  
Resolution 58,859 goes on to specify that access to marina facilities may “not be 
predicated on a person’s race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin, age, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, political affiliation, disability or medical 
condition.”  The resolution provides for the Berkeley Waterfront Commission 
(Waterfront Commission) to review applications and make recommendations to 
the city council.  Organizations receiving berthing subsidies are to have those 
subsidies reviewed annually by the city council after a review and 
recommendation by the Waterfront Commission.  
The continued provision of free marina berths to the Sea Scouts came up 
for review in the Waterfront Commission in early 1998.  The commission 
expressed concern that BSA’s policy of discrimination against homosexuals and 
atheists was in conflict with Resolution 58,859 and asked the Sea Scouts to 
provide a “local policy statement” ensuring nondiscrimination.  The Sea Scouts, in 
negotiation with the Mount Diablo Council, approved a policy statement intended 
to satisfy Berkeley’s requirements.  In a letter to the waterfront manager, dated 
April 8, 1998, the Sea Scouts stated:  “We will continue to comply with the 
Constitution of the United States of America, the laws of the State of California 
and the Berkeley Municipal Code—including Section 13.28.060 and City Council 
Resolution No. 58,85[9], N.S.  [¶] . . . We actively recruit adult leaders and 
adolescents meeting the minimum age requirements without regard to sex, race, 
color, national origin, political affiliation, religious preference, marital status, 
physical handicap or medical condition.  We believe that sexual orientation is a 
 
 5
private matter, and we do not ask either adults or youths to divulge this 
information at any time.”3   
The Waterfront Commission recommended the city council continue the 
Sea Scouts’ free berths.  The city manager, however, recommended the council 
discontinue the free berths, based on an opinion by the city attorney concluding 
that continuation of the free berth subsidy to the Sea Scouts would violate both 
Resolution 58,859 and section 13.28.060 of the Berkeley Municipal Code, which 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in the use of city owned or 
supported facilities and services.4  
In her opinion, which was provided to the council with the city manager’s 
recommendation, the city attorney concluded the Sea Scouts’ April 8, 1998, letter 
did not constitute compliance with Resolution 58,859 or Berkeley Municipal Code 
section 13.28.060.  In the city attorney’s view, the Sea Scouts’ assertion in the 
April 8 letter that they considered sexual orientation to be “a private matter” did 
not state a policy that the group would not, in the future, discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  According to the city attorney, the Sea Scouts said they 
were unwilling to state such an express policy “due to fear of losing their charter 
from the Boy Scouts.”  From her examination of this court’s then recent opinion in 
                                              
3  
The text of the Sea Scouts’ April 8, 1998, letter appears in the appellate 
record only in plaintiffs’ original complaint, which was superseded by amendment 
after the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for Berkeley with leave to 
amend.  Both parties, however, quote the letter’s language in their briefing.  The 
superseded allegation, it thus appears, was not made by mistake or inadvertence, 
and no potential dispute exists as to the letter’s language, allowing its 
consideration on demurrer.  (See Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 
822, 836; Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 375.) 
4  
Regarding judicial notice of the city attorney’s opinion, see footnote 5, 
post. 
 
 6
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 670, and her 
discussion with BSA’s attorney in that case, the city attorney concluded that BSA 
requires local groups to adhere to its policy of excluding avowedly gay or atheistic 
members or adult leaders, even where a local nondiscrimination law requires 
otherwise.  In light of BSA’s policy, the city attorney concluded, the qualified 
language of the April 8 letter was insufficient to show compliance with Berkeley’s 
ordinance and resolution.   
The Berkeley City Council took up the matter on May 5, 1998.  According 
to plaintiffs’ complaint, at the May 5 meeting the city council was “made aware” 
that the Sea Scouts had never discriminated against gays or atheists and that the 
Sea Scout program served an ethnically and economically diverse group of young 
people.  The city council nevertheless voted to end the berth subsidy.   
According to the minutes of the May 5 council meeting, the free berths 
were discontinued “due to [BSA’s] discriminatory policies against gays and 
atheists.”5  In a letter giving the Sea Scouts notice their free berths were cancelled, 
the Berkeley Waterfront Manager indicated the city council had denied free berths 
to the Sea Scouts because, in the complaint’s words, the Sea Scouts “were 
                                              
5  
Berkeley asserts the minutes are noticeable as a legislative enactment (Evid. 
Code, § 452, subd. (b)) and the city attorney’s opinion is noticeable as legislative 
history reflecting on the basis for that enactment.  Plaintiffs do not dispute the 
former point and quote the minutes’ statement of the reason for denial at least 
twice in their brief, which we take as a concession the minutes may be considered 
on review of the demurrer.  In their reply brief, plaintiffs object to the city 
attorney’s opinion on the ground it contains hearsay regarding BSA’s policies, but 
that objection does not reach the facts for which notice is sought:  that the city 
attorney concluded continuing free berths would violate the city’s resolution and 
ordinance and conveyed that opinion to the city manager and council.  In the 
absence of a sound objection, we take notice of the opinion as well as the minutes.   
 
 7
associated with the national Boy Scouts of America organization which has a 
national policy of discriminating based on sexual orientation and atheism.” 
Because of its hostility to BSA, plaintiffs allege, Berkeley “decided to 
punish and intentionally discriminated against the completely innocent children 
and community volunteer[s]” of the Sea Scouts.  Berkeley allegedly knew 
plaintiffs had, in the April 8, 1998, letter, “agreed not to discriminate against gays 
or atheists.”  The city used “[g]uilt by association,” excluding plaintiffs from the 
free berth program solely because of BSA’s policies, without ever determining 
that the Sea Scouts themselves “pose[d] the threat feared by the government”― 
discrimination in the use of publicly owned facilities.  “Here, there is no evidence 
that Plaintiffs or any participant in the Berkeley Sea Scouts program was going to 
unlawfully discriminate against anyone, yet they have been penalized by the 
deprivation of the continued free use of the public facilities.”   
Plaintiffs allege the exclusion of the Sea Scouts from the free berth program 
violated their rights of free speech and association and constituted a denial of due 
process and equal protection of the laws.  These deprivations of constitutional 
rights are claimed to be violations of state and federal civil rights laws, including 
Civil Code sections 51, 52, and 52.1, and title 42 United States Code section 1983.  
Plaintiffs seek damages reflecting the value of berths they were unable to afford to 
continue using, the rental they have paid and will pay for the berth they still use, 
emotional distress, and consequential losses.  The complaint does not pray for 
injunctive or declaratory relief.   
The trial court sustained Berkeley’s demurrer to the amended complaint 
without leave to amend.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that plaintiffs 
had merely been denied a city subsidy “because they declined to adhere to 
Berkeley’s nondiscrimination policy.”  Berkeley had not “attempted to muzzle 
anyone’s speech” or force the Sea Scouts to sever their association with BSA, but 
 
 8
had only “conditioned a city subsidy on compliance with nondiscrimination 
principles.” 
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs contend Berkeley violated their rights of free association, speech, 
and equal treatment under the law by punishing them for being part of BSA 
despite their having never violated Berkeley’s antidiscrimination laws and having 
“solemnly promised” not to do so in the future.  The Court of Appeal, plaintiffs 
argue, erred in holding Berkeley had properly conditioned the subsidy on 
compliance with nondiscrimination laws because plaintiffs “have agreed to 
comply.”  The lower court and Berkeley, plaintiffs maintain, “are refusing to take 
. . . yes for an answer.”   
Berkeley, in contrast, argues that it may place nondiscrimination conditions 
on government funding without violating rights of speech and association, and 
insists it properly denied continued free berthing solely because the Sea Scouts 
were unable to provide adequate assurances of future nondiscrimination, 
assurances Berkeley reasonably demanded in light of the known policies of BSA, 
of which the Sea Scouts are a part.   
We agree with Berkeley and the Court of Appeal that a government entity 
may constitutionally require a recipient of funding or subsidy to provide written, 
unambiguous assurances of compliance with a generally applicable 
nondiscrimination policy.  We further agree Berkeley reasonably concluded the 
Sea Scouts did not and could not provide satisfactory assurances because of their 
required adherence to BSA’s discriminatory policies. 
 
 9
I.  Berkeley Could Constitutionally Demand Sufficient Guarantees of 
Nondiscrimination 
Berkeley’s requirement that an individual or group receiving a city subsidy 
in the form of free berths in the Berkeley Marina agree in advance to administer its 
program without invidious discrimination did not infringe on plaintiffs’ speech or 
associational rights.  In order to meet the city’s mandate of nondiscriminatory 
participation policies, the Sea Scouts were required neither to espouse nor to 
denounce any particular viewpoint nor to form or break any association or 
affiliation, but only to assure Berkeley of their adherence to the city’s policies in 
connection with subsidized use of Berkeley’s facilities.   
Under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, that Berkeley’s 
nondiscrimination requirement applied only to programs assisted by a city 
subsidy, in the form of free berths at the marina, is virtually dispositive.  The high 
court has generally approved, against First Amendment challenges, programs of 
governmental financial assistance that limit the expressive activities for which the 
funds may be used.   
In the leading case of Rust v. Sullivan (1991) 500 U.S. 173, the court 
rejected a First Amendment challenge to regulations prohibiting abortion 
counseling in programs supported by federal family planning funds.  “The 
Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the 
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in 
another way.  In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.  
‘[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does 
not infringe the right.’  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 193.)   
 
 10
In restricting the range of counseling and advocacy in which programs 
receiving federal funding could engage, the government had not denied the 
grantees the right to engage in abortion-related activities.  “Congress has merely 
refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc . . . .”  (Rust v. Sullivan, supra, 
500 U.S. at p. 198; accord, United States v. American Library Assn., Inc. (2003) 
539 U.S. 194, 212 (plur. opn.) [statutory requirement that libraries receiving aid 
for Internet access use filtering software “does not ‘penalize’ libraries that choose 
not to install such software, or deny them the right to provide their patrons with 
unfiltered Internet access.  [The statute] simply reflects Congress’ decision not to 
subsidize their doing so.  To the extent that libraries wish to offer unfiltered 
access, they are free to do so without federal assistance”]; Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Wash. (1983) 461 U.S. 540, 549 [denial of full tax-exempt 
status to an organization that engages in substantial lobbying activities does not 
infringe on freedom of speech:  “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject 
to strict scrutiny”]; cf. Locke v. Davey (2004) 540 U.S. 712, 721 [scholarship 
program’s exclusion of theology students does not violate First Amendment’s free 
exercise clause; provision of assistance to those pursuing secular education does 
not constitute a “ ‘baseline’ ” against which denial of assistance to theology 
students must be deemed a burden on religion].) 
The Supreme Court has applied these principles, in particular, to uphold, 
against First Amendment challenges, government rules limiting financial 
assistance to those organizations that agree in advance not to practice invidious 
discrimination in government-assisted programs.  Grove City College v. Bell 
(1984) 465 U.S. 555 (Grove City) is the closest case on point.  A federal statute 
required recipients of federal education funds to agree not to discriminate on the 
basis of sex in any program so funded.  When the plaintiff college declined to 
 
 11
provide an “Assurance of Compliance” with the statute, the federal Department of 
Education terminated a program of tuition assistance to the college and its 
students.  (Id. at pp. 557-561.)   
The Grove City plaintiffs attacked the statutory condition as, inter alia, a 
violation of their First Amendment rights, but the high court found the 
constitutional claim “warrants only brief consideration.  Congress is free to attach 
reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that 
educational institutions are not obligated to accept.  E.g., Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  Grove City may terminate its 
participation in the [tuition aid] program and thus avoid the requirements of [the 
nondiscrimination provision].  Students affected by the Department’s action may 
either take their [tuition aid] elsewhere or attend Grove City without federal 
financial assistance.  Requiring Grove City to comply with Title IX’s prohibition of 
discrimination as a condition for its continued eligibility to participate in the 
[tuition aid] program infringes no First Amendment rights of the College or its 
students.”  (Grove City, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 575-576, italics added; see also Bob 
Jones University v. United States (1983) 461 U.S. 574, 602-604 (Bob Jones) 
[restrictive condition on charitable tax status, requiring lack of racial 
discrimination, did not infringe university’s First Amendment right to freedom of 
religion because the compelling interest in preventing racial discrimination in 
education justified the policy’s limited impact on exercise of religion:  “Denial of 
tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private 
religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious 
tenets”].)6 
                                              
6  
Plaintiffs argue Grove City and Bob Jones govern only where eliminating a 
particular type of discrimination has been recognized as a “compelling national 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 12
Similarly, Berkeley, in conditioning free berths on a group’s adoption of a 
nondiscriminatory membership policy, has not prohibited or penalized plaintiffs’ 
exercise of speech or associational rights.  In adopting Resolution 58,859 and 
applying it to end free berths for the Sea Scouts, the city did not purport to prohibit 
the scouts from operating in a discriminatory manner; it simply “refused to fund 
such activities out of the public fisc . . . .”  (Rust v. Sullivan, supra, 500 U.S. at 
p. 198.)  To the extent the Sea Scouts objected to compliance with Resolution 
58,859, the organization (to paraphrase Grove City, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 575) was 
free to terminate its participation in the free berth program and thus avoid the 
requirements of the nondiscrimination provision; “a legislature’s decision not to 
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right” (Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation of Wash., supra, 461 U.S. at p. 549).   
The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to its broad rule that the 
government’s refusal to subsidize exercise of a First Amendment right does not 
infringe that right.  Neither is applicable here.   
First, a funding restriction that has as its purpose the suppression of a 
disfavored viewpoint―especially, but not only, where the government program at 
issue exists to create or foster a public forum―is subject to strict scrutiny. 
Invalidating a rule precluding federally funded legal services affiliates from 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
interest.”  The high court in Grove City, however, relied on no such 
compelling-interest analysis, holding simply that the government could attach 
“reasonable and unambiguous conditions” to financial assistance it offered private 
institutions.  (Grove City, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 575.)  The court did, in Bob Jones, 
supra, 461 U.S. at page 603, apply the compelling-interest test for free exercise 
claims, but it later held, in Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith 
(1990) 494 U.S. 872, 885, that such a justification was not required for neutral 
laws of general applicability. 
 
 13
challenging welfare laws, the Supreme Court explained:  “Where private speech is 
involved, even Congress’ antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the 
suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own interest.”  (Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez (2001) 531 U.S. 533, 548-549; see also Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 832-834 [exclusion of 
journals promoting a particular set of religious viewpoints from program of 
financial assistance to student newspapers infringed student group’s freedom of 
speech]; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., supra, 461 U.S. at 
p. 548 [refusal to subsidize lobbying would not come within the rule of 
permissibility “if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such 
a way as to ‘ “aim[] at the suppression of dangerous ideas” ’ ”]; Perry v. 
Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 595, 598 [college teacher’s allegation that the 
administration’s decision not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of its 
policies presented “a bona fide constitutional claim”]; Speiser v. Randall (1958) 
357 U.S. 513, 518 [“denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech” 
infringes freedom of speech because it is “ ‘frankly aimed at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas’ ”].)7  
The exception for attempted suppression of a disfavored viewpoint is 
inapposite to the condition imposed here.  In terminating the Sea Scouts’ free 
berths because of the group’s failure fully and unambiguously to promise future 
nondiscrimination, Berkeley did not demand adherence to or renunciation of any 
                                              
7  
The restriction on speech of family planning grant recipients in Rust v. 
Sullivan, supra, 500 U.S. 173, might appear to fall logically within this exception, 
but the high court has since characterized the program in Rust as involving 
government promulgation of its own message, an enterprise in which the 
government enjoys even greater leeway than in the funding of private speech.  
(Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, supra, 531 U.S. at p. 541.) 
 
 14
idea or viewpoint.  A government that requires aid recipients to conform their 
actions to its laws does not thereby enforce adherence to the philosophy or values 
behind those laws.  More specifically, to state, in applying for government 
funding, that one will not use the funding for a discriminatory program is not 
necessarily to state that one agrees with the government’s nondiscrimination 
objective.  Thus Berkeley, in requiring assurances that its subsidy and property 
will be used without discrimination on the basis of religion or sexual orientation, 
does not demand adherence to the viewpoint that motivated the nondiscrimination 
provision.  (See Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman (2d Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 80, 94 
[exclusion of BSA from state’s workplace charitable contribution campaign 
because of its discriminatory policies was viewpoint neutral in that 
nondiscrimination rule’s purpose was “to protect persons from the . . . economic 
and social harms of discrimination” rather than “to impose a price on the 
expression of [BSA’s] point of view”]; but see Boy Scouts of America, South 
Florida v. Till (S.D.Fla. 2001) 136 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1308 [exclusion of local 
council from off-hours use of public schools because of its adherence to BSA’s 
discriminatory policy characterized as punishment of council for its “message”].) 
Second, a restriction is suspect to the extent it goes beyond limiting the 
government funded expressive activity of the recipient and attempts further to 
limit expressive activities that are not government funded.  In Rust v. Sullivan, 
supra, 500 U.S. at pages 196-197, the high court explained that funding 
restrictions previously held to constitute unconstitutional conditions had involved 
“a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or 
service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected 
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program,” but that a recipient of 
family planning funds could, despite the restrictions at issue, “continue to . . . 
engage in abortion advocacy . . . through programs that are separate and 
 
 15
independent from” the federally assisted project.  (See also FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California (1984) 468 U.S. 364, 400 [invalidating rule 
precluding public broadcasting stations from editorializing, in part because under 
the rule a station that received only a small amount of its income from federal 
grants was “barred absolutely from all editorializing. . . .  The station has no way 
of limiting the use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities, and, more 
importantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its 
editorial activity”]; Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions (1989) 102 Harv. L.Rev. 
1413, 1463-1467 [discussing “germaneness” as a limitation on government 
funding conditions].) 
This exception, too, is inapplicable.  Berkeley, in conditioning its free 
berths on the Sea Scouts’ agreement not to engage in invidious discrimination, did 
not purport to control the exercise of speech or associational rights by the Sea 
Scouts or individual plaintiffs outside the Berkeley Marina program.  Even were 
the nondiscrimination assurance demanded by Berkeley regarded as a conditional 
burden on speech or association, its scope would be limited to the very program 
subsidized by the city.  As in Rust v. Sullivan, supra, 500 U.S. 173, and Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation of Wash., supra, 461 U.S. 540, plaintiffs here would 
be free to exercise their expressive or associational rights fully in any program not 
funded by public money.  Federal high court precedent thus fails to support 
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 
Plaintiffs also contend that by conditioning free berths on adequate 
assurance of nondiscrimination, Berkeley has established an unconstitutional 
condition under the decisions of this court.  We disagree.   
In Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 536, this court 
held invalid on First Amendment grounds a statutory and regulatory scheme that 
permitted the use of school facilities for the meetings of private groups but 
 
 16
excluded “subversive elements.”  We explained that while “[t]he state is under no 
duty to make school buildings available for public meetings” (id. at p. 545),  
having done so it could not constitutionally “demand tickets of admission in the 
form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable” (id. at p. 547).  We 
reiterated this principle in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 
65 Cal.2d 499, 504, explaining that “the power of government, federal or state, to 
withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass a supposed ‘lesser’ power 
to grant such benefits upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional right.”  At the 
same time, we emphasized that some such conditions on public benefits were 
justifiable; we articulated a test of justification focusing on how germane and well-
tailored the condition is to the purpose of the legislation establishing the benefit 
and whether the utility of imposing the condition outweighs the impairment of 
constitutional rights.  (Id. at pp. 505-507; see also Committee to Defend 
Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 265-266.) 
To apply these principles governing conditions on public benefits here, we 
need not decide whether Berkeley had adequate justification for its condition, as 
the condition―the giving of adequate assurances of nondiscrimination―did not 
demand or preclude the exercise of any speech or associational right by plaintiffs.  
Plaintiffs repeatedly disavow, both in their complaint and in their briefs in this 
court, any desire to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or religion.  
They therefore cannot, and do not, claim that Berkeley, by requiring them to 
refrain from such discrimination as a condition of the free berths, is restricting 
their freedom to limit their membership for purposes of expressive association.  
(Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, supra, 530 U.S. 640; Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 557.)  Indeed, 
plaintiffs, in their briefing, explain why this is a misconstruction of their claims:  
“Berkeley suggests that Petitioners challenge the condition as ‘forc[ing] inclusion’ 
 
 17
of homosexuals and atheists in their ranks.  Obviously this is not so, because 
Petitioners do not discriminate.”   
Berkeley’s requirement that the Sea Scouts document a nondiscriminatory 
membership policy in order to qualify for the free berth program also did not 
condition receipt of a public benefit on the Sea Scouts’ giving up their right to be a 
part of BSA.  In requiring assurances of nondiscrimination, Berkeley did not in 
any way demand, even as a condition of the free berths, that the Sea Scouts quit 
BSA.  To the extent compliance with the city’s requirement would have that 
effect, it would be by the choice of a third party, BSA.  Were BSA, that is, to cut 
its ties with a local scouting program because the program made assurances of 
nondiscrimination to a local government, the decision to sever the association 
would be BSA’s, not the government’s.  We are aware of no authority for the 
extraordinary proposition that government infringes on associational rights by 
offering one group a financial benefit that, if accepted, could lead another group to 
sever its association with the recipient.8   
Nor, as already discussed, did Berkeley’s requirement that free berth 
recipients have nondiscriminatory membership policies require the Sea Scouts, as 
a condition of the subsidy, to adopt an antidiscrimination viewpoint or repudiate 
BSA’s discriminatory philosophy (a philosophy the Sea Scouts, in any event, 
expressly state they do not share).  We therefore do not agree with plaintiffs that 
by conditioning free berths on the Sea Scouts’ statement of a local 
nondiscrimination policy, the city compelled them to “renounce” BSA’s positions 
and to “advocate and disseminate” Berkeley’s own philosophy.  As already 
                                              
8  
In part II of the discussion, post, we reject plaintiffs’ additional argument 
that Berkeley has infringed their associational rights by punishing them for being 
affiliated with BSA. 
 
 18
explained, to condition a public benefit on assurances of nondiscrimination is not 
to compel advocacy of a viewpoint. 
The complaint alleges Berkeley attempted to compel the Sea Scouts to 
subscribe to a “pledge of fealty” or “loyalty oath” according with Berkeley’s 
antidiscrimination values.  On analysis, however, these general claims provide no 
valid grounds for a claim of unconstitutionality.  The only facts alleged regarding 
such a coerced statement of viewpoint concern the Waterfront Commission’s 
request for a local policy statement of nondiscrimination.  The Sea Scouts, 
according to the complaint, provided such a statement in their letter of April 8, 
1998.  This satisfied the Waterfront Commission, which recommended 
continuation of the free berths, albeit on conditions that the letter be distributed to 
program participants and that the Sea Scouts initiate a dialogue with the Mount 
Diablo Council on obtaining a change in the national BSA policy.  Had the 
Berkeley City Council accepted the Waterfront Commission’s recommendation 
and imposed these conditions on continuation of the free berths, plaintiffs might 
with greater plausibility contend the conditions infringed their freedom of speech.  
But the city council rejected the Waterfront Commission’s recommendation, 
instead accepting the city manager’s and city attorney’s recommendation that the 
subsidy be discontinued because the April 8 letter was an insufficient assurance of 
nondiscrimination.  The city council’s action mooted any claim that the conditions 
proposed by the Waterfront Commission were unconstitutional. 
 
 19
II.  Plaintiffs Have Not Been Punished for Associating with BSA 
Relying on Healy v. James (1972) 408 U.S. 169, plaintiffs contend they 
have been subjected to a judgment of “ ‘guilt by association’ ” in that Berkeley 
had no reason to believe the Sea Scouts themselves “ ‘pose[d] the threat [of 
discrimination] feared by the Government,’ ” but rather assumed they 
discriminated simply because of their affiliation with BSA.  (Id. at p. 186.)  
Berkeley’s denial of free berths was arbitrary and unjustified by its 
nondiscrimination purpose because, plaintiffs contend, it “punishes innocent 
children, and their adult leaders, who are not engaged in the discrimination that 
Berkeley claims to be battling.”  In a related claim, they argue they were denied 
equal protection of the laws in that they were treated differently from other 
nonprofit community service organizations using the marina, solely because of 
their association with BSA.  Again, we disagree.   
The Sea Scouts are a part of BSA, an organization whose official policy 
excludes homosexuals and atheists from participation.  That Berkeley officials 
were unaware of any past discrimination by the Sea Scouts does not mean none 
would occur in the future.  To require of a group operating as part of an 
organization with an official policy of discrimination that it agree in advance not 
to discriminate in the use of the city’s free marina berths is a reasonable and 
narrowly tailored step to implement the diversity and nondiscrimination provisions 
of Resolution 58,859.  That other groups, which were not part of BSA, were not 
required to give local policy statements assuring nondiscrimination does not show 
unequal treatment. 
When the city asked the Sea Scouts to document that their local policy 
differed from BSA’s, the Sea Scouts negotiated with BSA over such a policy, but, 
as their attorney explained to the trial court, “They couldn’t say the words ‘We do 
not discriminate on the basis of sexual discrimination [sic:  orientation],’ because 
 
 20
the Boy Scouts objected.”  According to the attorney, BSA told plaintiffs, “You 
can’t say you don’t discriminate based on sexual orientation.”   
At oral argument in this court, plaintiffs, through their attorney, expanded 
on these concessions.  When asked by the court what plaintiffs’ course of action 
would be if an “openly and avowedly gay” person sought to participate in the Sea 
Scouts program, counsel responded, “If the Boy Scouts forbid it, it wouldn’t 
happen. . . .  [I]f the Boy Scouts came down on us, we would have to exclude that 
person.”  Asked whether plaintiffs and BSA were “one and the same” with regard 
to potential discrimination, counsel replied, “Essentially,” and explained that while 
BSA and the Sea Scouts were “different organizations, . . . we are bound by what 
the Boy Scouts tell us we have to do.”  We accept these concessions by plaintiffs 
as establishing, even as against any contrary allegation or implication of the 
complaint, that the Sea Scouts could not, consistent with the limitations imposed 
on them by BSA, truthfully state they would not in the future discriminate against 
openly gay or atheistic participants.  (See DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 
Cal.App.3d 1011, 1018-1019 [concessions of the plaintiff’s attorney before trial 
court negate contrary allegations for purposes of demurrer]; cf. Browne v. 
Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 593, 599 [the petitioner’s concessions at oral 
argument negate contrary allegations in the habeas corpus petition]; Sacramento 
County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Sacramento (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 
1468, 1474, fn. 6 [admissions in the plaintiffs’ appellate brief negate statements in 
declarations for summary judgment purposes].)9 
                                              
9  
In light of plaintiffs’ concessions that the Sea Scouts could not 
unequivocally state they would not discriminate against gay and atheistic 
participants and that they would have to follow BSA’s discriminatory policy if the 
occasion arose, their reliance on Robb v. Hungerbeeler (8th Cir. 2004) 370 F.3d 
735 is misplaced.  In that case, the State of Missouri claimed it had properly 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 21
Because of the restrictions enforced by BSA, the April 8, 1998, letter was 
ambiguous as to how the Sea Scouts would treat an avowedly gay or atheistic 
participant.  The Sea Scouts’ statement that they would obey city law implied they 
would not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or religion, as city law 
forbade such discrimination.  But the subsequent statement that the Sea Scouts 
recruit without regard to a list of factors including race, sex, and “religious 
preference,” but not including sexual orientation or religion as such, implied, to 
the contrary, that the group would disfavor potential participants who were known 
to be gay or who “prefer[red]” no religion.  Finally, the Sea Scouts’ statement that 
they viewed sexual orientation as a “private matter” they do not ask participants to 
“divulge” strongly implied that they viewed openly or avowedly gay people 
differently from those who kept their orientation private, and reserved the right to 
treat them differently, contrary to the nondiscrimination requirement of Resolution 
58,859.  In the April 8 letter, the Sea Scouts, in effect, reserved the right to 
discriminate against avowedly gay or atheistic participants. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
excluded a local unit of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from the state’s Adopt-
A-Highway program because of the group’s judicially noticed history of violence.  
(Id. at p. 740.)  The court of appeals found the state’s rationale for exclusion “rings 
hollow” (ibid.) because the judicially noticed history of violence related generally 
to organizations named Knights of the Ku Klux Klan rather than specifically to the 
local unit or its organizers (id. at p. 741).  “The mere fact that an applicant’s 
organizational name includes certain widely-used language that has been used in 
the past by groups for which judicial notice has been taken of having a history of 
violence is inadequate to demonstrate that the applicant itself violates the dictates 
of the regulation.”  (Ibid.)  The Sea Scouts, who according to the complaint form a 
subdivision of BSA, whose statement of local policy was limited by BSA dictates, 
and who, plaintiffs concede, must follow BSA’s discriminatory policy, obviously 
share more than a coincidence of nomenclature with the national organization.   
 
 22
Healy v. James, supra, 408 U.S. 169, upon which plaintiffs rely, actually 
supports Berkeley’s decision.  While the high court there condemned government 
actions “denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen’s association 
with an unpopular organization” (id. at p. 186), the court went on to explain that 
the government could legitimately demand assurances that an individual or group 
would not engage in the same prohibited activities as the larger organization with 
which the individual or group was associated (id. at pp. 191-194).  Specifically, 
the high court held that a local Students for a Democratic Society chapter’s 
“equivocation” regarding the use of violent and disruptive tactics could warrant 
denying the group official recognition.  (Id. at p. 191.)  Though there was no 
evidence the local group actually posed a significant threat of disruption to the 
college (id. at pp. 189-190), the court explained, “the benefits of participation in 
the internal life of the college community may be denied to any group that 
reserves the right to violate any campus rules with which it disagrees” (id. at 
pp. 193-194).  The requirement that a student group seeking official recognition 
“affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law . . . does not 
impose an impermissible condition on the students’ associational rights.”  (Id. at 
p. 193; see also Grove City, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 575 [requiring “Assurance of 
Compliance” from college was a “reasonable and unambiguous” condition of 
federal assistance].)   
Similarly, Berkeley did not engage in overbroad or arbitrary regulation in 
denying a subsidy to a BSA program that refused to state an unambiguous local 
policy of nondiscrimination, instead pointedly reserving the right to discriminate 
against openly gay and atheistic participants.  Denial of free berths to a program 
operating under a national organization with an enforced policy of discrimination, 
a program that was asked to and would not give an unqualified assurance of future 
nondiscrimination, was not overbroad or unjustified as a means of enforcing 
 
 23
Berkeley’s policy limiting free berths to nonprofit community service 
organizations that serve the public diversely and without invidious discrimination. 
As explained earlier, a demurrer assumes the truth of the complaint’s 
properly pleaded allegations, but not of mere contentions or assertions 
contradicted by judicially noticeable facts.  (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 
p. 318; Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374.)  Here, 
the noticeable and conceded facts contradict the complaint’s assertions that 
Berkeley “decided to punish . . . [the] completely innocent” plaintiffs for their 
association with BSA despite knowing that plaintiffs had, in the April 8, 1998, 
letter, “agreed not to discriminate against gays or atheists.”  The facts, including 
those in the complaint, those subject to judicial notice, and those conceded by 
plaintiffs, show the Sea Scouts could not and did not unambiguously promise not 
to discriminate in the use of the marina facilities.  The city council, in receipt of 
the city attorney’s opinion discussing the April 8 letter’s ambiguity and the city 
manager’s consequent denial recommendation, denied the continued subsidy 
because BSA’s “discriminatory policies against gays and atheists” made 
impossible a full and unambiguous assurance the Sea Scouts would not 
discriminate in the future. 
Similarly, plaintiffs’ allegation that the city excluded plaintiffs from the 
free berth program without ever determining that the Sea Scouts themselves 
“pose[d] the threat” of discrimination and without “evidence that Plaintiffs or any 
participant in the Berkeley Sea Scouts program was going to unlawfully 
discriminate against anyone,” is contradicted by their own concessions and the 
noticeable facts.  The city asked for full assurances that the program posed no 
threat of future discrimination, but it did not receive them.  In light of BSA’s 
policies, which, as counsel conceded in this court, plaintiffs would have to follow, 
Berkeley reasonably concluded that the Sea Scouts’ representations were 
 
 24
inadequate to assure future compliance with the city’s nondiscrimination rules.  
Plaintiffs’ claim that Berkeley simply “refuses to take . . . yes for an answer” is 
belied by the record, which establishes that the Sea Scouts, because of BSA’s 
enforced policies, could not and did not respond to the city with a simple “yes,” 
but rather with an evasive “maybe.” 
Plaintiffs rely in part on allegations that individual members of the 
Berkeley City Council and other city officials expressed the intent to punish BSA 
or the Sea Scouts for BSA’s policies.10  Under some circumstances, where the 
decision maker’s reason or object is itself a contested element of a claim of 
unconstitutionality, “statements made by members of the decisionmaking body” 
are properly considered, together with other types of evidence, in determining the 
object of the official action.  (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah 
(1993) 508 U.S. 520, 540; see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 267-268.)  But here there is no dispute the basis for 
the city council’s action was, as the council minutes stated, BSA’s “discriminatory 
policies against gays and atheists,” which―as the record shows and plaintiffs’ 
attorney conceded in this court―made it impossible for the Sea Scouts to give a 
complete and unambiguous guaranty against future discrimination.  In light of that 
undisputed legislative object, allegations suggesting merely that individual council 
                                              
10  
Councilmembers Woolley and Worthington allegedly “made clear,” around 
the time of the March 11, 1998, Waterfront Commission meeting, that they 
intended to take “punitive actions” against the Sea Scouts in an “attempt to 
overturn [BSA’s] national policies.”  At the May 5, 1998, city council meeting, 
unnamed Berkeley “officials” allegedly indicated the city should and would deny 
the Sea Scouts continued benefits in order to discourage BSA from maintaining its 
disfavored policies and to retaliate for BSA’s expulsion of Timothy Curran (the 
plaintiff in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 
670) pursuant to those policies.   
 
 25
members voted for the action because of their personal hostility to BSA’s views 
do not state a claim for a constitutional violation, for such individual motives do 
not alter the undisputed grounds upon which the council, as a body, acted.  (See 
Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 572, fn. 5 [“ ‘Material 
showing the motive or understanding of an individual legislator, including the 
bill’s author, his or her staff, or other interested persons, is generally not 
considered.  [Citations.]  This is because such materials are generally not evidence 
of the Legislature’s collective intent’ ”].)  
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
The properly pleaded factual allegations of the first amended complaint, 
taken as true and read in light of the judicially noticeable facts and plaintiffs’ 
factual concessions, show that Berkeley discontinued the Sea Scouts’ berth 
subsidy because the program was unable, consistent with the enforced policies of 
BSA, to provide adequate assurances of future nondiscrimination.  Denial of a 
continued subsidy on this ground did not infringe plaintiffs’ associational, speech, 
or equal protection rights.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Evans v. City of Berkeley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 104 Cal.App.4th 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S112621 
Date Filed: March 9, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: James A. Richman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Offices of Jonathan D. Gordon and Jonathan D. Gordon for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Pacific Legal Foundation, John H. Findley and Harold E. Johnson for Plaintiff and Appellant Tonatiuh 
Alvarez. 
 
John H. Findley and Harold E. Johnson for Pacific Legal Foundation  as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Brad W. Dacus and Roger G. Ho for Pacific Justice Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Bartko, Zankel, Tarrant & Miller, William I. Edlund, Ramiz I. Rafeedie; and Andrew W. Fortin for 
California State Club Association and National Club Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
 
Eric R. Carleson for American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, William T. Bisset, George A. Davidson and Carla A. Kerr for Boy Scouts of 
America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Kirton & McConkie and Alexander Dushku for The Church of Christ of Latter-Day Saints, National 
Catholic Committee on Scouting, Orestimba Presbyterian Church and Hope Chapel Christian Fellowship as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Sweeney & Greene, James F. Sweeney and Eric Grant for California Catholic Conference as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Manuela Albuquerque, City Attorney, Matthew J. Orebic and Laura McKinney, Deputy City Attorneys, for 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
Page 2 – counsel continued – S112621 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jerome C. Roth, Ailsa W. Chang; and Jon W. Davidson for Bay Area Lawyers 
for Individual Freedom and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amici on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Therese Stewart, Burke Delventhal and Ellen Forman, Deputy City 
Attorneys, for City and County of San Francisco, California League of Cities and California State 
Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, Warrington S. Parker III;  Miranda D. Junowicz and Oren Sellstrom 
for Anti-Defamation League and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area as 
Amicus on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Mark W. Danis, M. Andrew Woodmansee; Jordan C. Budd, Watson Branch; Martha 
Matthews; and Margaret C. Crosby for ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, ACLU 
Foundation of Southern California and ACLU Foundation of Northern California as Amici on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Louis Verdugo, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Suzanne M. Ambrose and 
Timothy M. Muscat, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jonathan D. Gordon 
Law Offices of Jonathan D. Gordon 
140 Mayhew Way, Suite 1001 
Pleasant Hill, CA  94523 
(925) 284-1901 
 
Manuela Albuquerque 
City Attorney 
2180 Milvia Street, 4th Floor 
Berkeley, CA  94704 
(510) 981-6950