Title: State ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning County Board of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4003.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4003 
THE STATE EX REL. BOBOVNYIK v. MAHONING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Bobovnyik v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4003.] 
Mandamus—Elections—Action to compel board of elections to certify relator as an 
independent candidate for election for the office of county sheriff—
Residency—R.C. 311.01(B)(2)—County board of elections did not abuse its 
discretion or disregard applicable law in determining that relator did not 
satisfy residency requirement—Writ denied.  
(No. 2020-0784—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided August 7, 2020.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Douglas Bobovnyik, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent, the Mahoning County Board of Elections, to certify his name to the 
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November 3, 2020 ballot as an independent candidate for the office of Mahoning 
County Sheriff.  We deny the writ. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In 2018, Bobovnyik began considering whether to run for the office of 
Mahoning County Sheriff in the November 2020 general election.  At that time, he 
was a lieutenant in the Youngstown Police Department and a Columbiana County 
resident.  Under R.C. 311.01(B)(2), to be an eligible independent candidate, 
Bobovnyik had to be a resident of Mahoning County “for at least one year 
immediately prior to” March 16, 2020.  In March 2019, he took steps to establish his 
residency in Mahoning County. 
{¶ 3} On March 1, 2019, Bobovnyik signed a commercial lease for a used-
car lot in Austintown, Mahoning County.  The premises included a two-story 
building, and Bobovnyik testified that he immediately moved into an apartment on 
the second floor of the building.  According to Bobovnyik, he furnished the apartment 
with a bed, established utility and Internet connections, and began receiving mail 
there.  He also reported the Austintown address to his bank as his new address and 
purchased checks reflecting that change.  And he testified that on several occasions 
he had been served subpoenas (related to his work as a police officer) at the 
Austintown address.  He testified that he lived there until March 1, 2020, when he 
moved to an apartment in Canfield, which is also in Mahoning County, where he 
still resides. 
{¶ 4} Throughout this time, Bobovnyik’s wife continued to live at the 
couple’s Columbiana County home.  Bobovnyik has conceded that he split his time 
between the Mahoning County apartments and the Columbiana County family 
home and that he occasionally spent the night in Columbiana County.  He also has 
acknowledged that he entertained guests at his Columbiana County home after 
March 2019. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 5} On March 16, 2020, Bobovnyik filed with the board his statement of 
candidacy and nominating petition to be an independent candidate for Mahoning 
County Sheriff for the November 3, 2020 general election.  At a hearing on May 
26, the board heard testimony from several witnesses concerning Bobovnyik’s claim 
that he had resided in Mahoning County since March 2019.  Bobovnyik testified to 
the facts set forth above, but other witnesses either contradicted him or gave the board 
reasons to question whether Bobovnyik actually had resided in Mahoning County. 
{¶ 6} Bobovnyik’s stepdaughter and her husband testified that Bobovnyik 
and his wife have continued to live at their Columbiana County house since March 
2019, and they both suggested that the apartments in Mahoning County were a ruse 
to allow Bobovnyik to run for office in Mahoning County.  The Youngstown Police 
Department’s chief of police testified that when Bobovnyik completed paperwork 
for his retirement in April 2019, he listed his Columbiana County address as his 
home address. And a process server who had attempted to serve a subpoena on 
Bobovnyik’s wife at the Columbiana County house (to compel her to attend the 
May 26 hearing) testified that Bobovnyik answered the door in his bathrobe at 7:00 
a.m.  Bobovnyik’s wife was in Florida at the time of the May 26 hearing and did 
not attend.  Bobovnyik testified that when his wife is out of town, he spends the 
night at the Columbiana County house to care for their dogs. 
{¶ 7} The board also considered numerous documents relating to a federal 
lawsuit involving the Bobovnyiks’ Columbiana County house.  In several of those 
documents, Bobovnyik or his attorney suggested that Bobovnyik was residing—
and would continue to reside—at the house after March 1, 2019.  Most notably, in 
a May 2019 conveyance-fee statement that was recorded with the Columbiana 
County auditor, Bobovnyik (or someone acting on his behalf) indicated that his 
Columbiana County house would be his principal residence on or before January 1, 
2020.  That representation qualified Bobovnyik for a homestead exemption to 
reduce the taxes on the property, which was titled solely in his name.  See R.C. 
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323.151 et seq.  And Bobovnyik also signed a settlement agreement filed in federal 
court in May 2019 suggesting that he was still living at his house in Columbiana 
County.  At the May 26 hearing, Bobovnyik conceded that by signing the settlement 
agreement, he had told the federal court that he was residing in Columbiana County 
at the time. 
{¶ 8} The board questioned Bobovnyik’s credibility and found him ineligible 
to be a candidate for the office of Mahoning County Sheriff because he had not 
demonstrated that he had resided in Mahoning County for the year immediately 
preceding March 16, 2020, as required under R.C. 311.01(B)(2).  The board also 
found Bobovnyik to be ineligible because the board had not received the results of 
his background check, as required under R.C. 311.01(B)(6).  The board therefore 
refused to place Bobovnyik’s name on the ballot. 
{¶ 9} On June 24, 2020, Bobovnyik filed this mandamus action to compel 
the board to place his name on the November 3, 2020 ballot for the office of 
Mahoning County Sheriff.  We granted Bobovnyik’s motion for an expedited case 
schedule, and the case is now fully briefed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Bobovnyik must prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear 
legal duty on the part of the board to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 
2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 11} The first two elements require us to determine whether the board 
“engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable legal provisions.”  Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.  Bobovnyik does not allege fraud 
or corruption, so the question is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly 
disregarded applicable law.  A board of elections abuses its discretion when it acts 
January Term, 2020 
 
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unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably.  State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 155 Ohio St.3d 14, 2018-Ohio-3342, 118 N.E.3d 224, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 12} As for the third element, a relator in an election mandamus action 
often lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to the 
proximity of the election.  See State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18.  The 
election at issue here is less than 90 days away, and under R.C. 3511.04, the board 
must distribute uniformed-services and overseas absentee ballots at least 46 days 
before the election.  Bobovnyik therefore lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law and satisfies the third element for mandamus relief. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 311.01(B)(2) provides that “no person is eligible to be a 
candidate for sheriff, and no person shall be elected * * * to the office of sheriff, 
unless * * * [t]he person has been a resident of the county in which the person is a 
candidate for * * * the office of sheriff for at least one year immediately prior to 
the qualification date.”  The parties agree that the applicable qualification date was 
March 16, 2020. 
{¶ 14} “In election cases involving candidate-residence issues, this court 
applies R.C. 3503.02.”  State ex rel. Morris v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 143 Ohio 
St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 23.  Four provisions of R.C. 3503.02 
are relevant to determining Bobovnyik’s residence: 
 
(A) That place shall be considered the residence of a person 
in which the person’s habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the 
person is absent, the person has the intention of returning. 
(B) A person shall not be considered to have lost the person’s 
residence who leaves the person’s home and goes into another state 
or county of this state, for temporary purposes only, with the 
intention of returning. 
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(C) A person shall not be considered to have gained a 
residence in any county of this state into which the person comes for 
temporary purposes only, without the intention of making such 
county the permanent place of abode. 
(D) The place where the family of a married person resides 
shall be considered to be the person’s place of residence; except that 
when the spouses have separated and live apart, the place where 
such a spouse resides the length of time required to entitle a person 
to vote shall be considered to be the spouse’s place of residence. 
 
{¶ 15} R.C. 3503.02 “emphasizes the person’s intent to make a place a fixed 
or permanent place of abode.”  State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 578, ¶ 11.  When the various 
factors listed in R.C. 3503.02 lead to conflicting conclusions, the person’s claim 
that a particular location is his voting residence must be accorded substantial 
weight.  State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 
N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 16} The board argues that because Bobovnyik is married, R.C. 
3503.02(D) controls.  Bobovnyik correctly points out, however, that the language 
in R.C. 3503.02(D) does not create an irrebuttable presumption that Bobovnyik’s 
residence was in Columbiana County.  See Husted at ¶ 32-34.  But Bobovnyik goes 
even further, suggesting that we should disregard his wife’s residency entirely and 
focus only on his stated intent to reside in Mahoning County.  We do not accept 
that invitation; although not irrebuttable, R.C. 3503.02(D) does “create[] a 
presumption that the place where the family of a married person resides is the 
person’s place of residence.”  Husted at ¶ 32.  The residency of Bobovnyik’s wife 
is relevant. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 17} Bobovnyik also argues that R.C. 3503.02(D) does not apply here, 
because it contains an exception for “when the spouses have separated and live 
apart.”  He argues that the exception applies because, although he and his wife are 
not legally separated, they do live apart.  Bobovnyik’s reading of that exception 
fails to account for the statute’s language that the exception applies when the 
spouses are “separated and liv[ing] apart.”  (Emphasis added.)  To have meaning 
other than “living apart,” “separated” must refer to something akin to legal 
separation under R.C. 3105.17.  Otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule 
entirely—the place where a person’s spouse resides would be the person’s 
residence, unless the person does not live with the spouse. 
{¶ 18} The fact that Bobovnyik’s wife continues to reside in Columbiana 
County works against Bobovnyik’s mandamus claim and supports the board’s 
conclusion.  That alone makes it difficult for him to show—by clear and convincing 
evidence—that the board abused its discretion.  See Husted, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, at ¶ 27.  But additional relevant factors also 
support the conclusion that the board did not abuse its discretion. 
{¶ 19} As noted above, R.C. 3503.02 emphasizes a person’s intent to reside 
in a particular place.  Duncan, 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 
578, at ¶ 11; Husted at ¶ 27.  Bobovnyik argues that his own testimony expressing 
his intent to become a Mahoning County resident, along with the Austintown lease 
and his updated banking records, definitively establishes his residency in Mahoning 
County.  He contends that the board misapplied the law by considering 
documentary evidence to the contrary.  And he argues that a statement of a board 
member at the May 26 hearing—that a person cannot establish residency “just by 
leasing a property and saying * * * this is where I live now”—is emblematic of the 
board’s legal error in disregarding his subjective intent. 
{¶ 20} Bobovnyik overestimates the legal significance and weight of his 
own testimony.  Although we repeatedly have emphasized that a person’s declared 
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intent to reside in a particular place is a significant factor in determining the 
person’s residency, Bobovnyik fails to support his argument that a person’s own 
statements are conclusive in the face of conflicting evidence.  When the evidence 
is not one-sided, a board of elections has discretion to consider a witness’s 
credibility and assign weight to the evidence accordingly.  See State ex rel. 
Herdman v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 67 Ohio St.3d 593, 596, 621 N.E.2d 
1204 (1993). 
{¶ 21} In cases involving a challenge to a candidate’s residency, the main 
issue often is the candidate’s subjective intent.  See, e.g., Morris, 143 Ohio St.3d 
507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, at ¶ 27.  It is obviously hard to scrutinize a 
candidate’s own claims about where he intends to reside.  That is, how can one 
really question Bobovnyik’s intent after he clearly took steps to try to establish his 
residency in Mahoning County?  
{¶ 22} But the board did not disbelieve Bobovnyik’s stated intent.  Rather, 
the record indicates that the board did not believe that Bobovnyik actually started 
living in Mahoning County in March 2019 or that he continued to live there 
throughout the next 12 months.  Using the terminology of R.C. 3503.02(A), the 
board did not believe that Bobovnyik’s “habitation [wa]s fixed” in Mahoning 
County. 
{¶ 23} Indeed, several pieces of evidence raised legitimate questions about 
where Bobovnyik was actually living between March 2019 and March 2020.  
Significantly, Bobovnyik’s own stepdaughter and her husband testified that they 
believe that Bobovnyik had been living in Columbiana County all along, and they 
even suggested that Bobovnyik and his wife had considered multiple possible 
Mahoning County addresses to identify as a residence.  Besides Bobovnyik’s own 
testimony, there is no evidence showing that Bobovnyik was actually living in 
Mahoning County.  In fact, his Austintown lease limited his use of the premises to 
commercial car-lot purposes, and his connection to utilities and the Internet, 
January Term, 2020 
 
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procurement of checks that included that address, and receipt of subpoenas at that 
address are all consistent with his establishing a used-car business.  In this light, the 
board member’s statement that a person cannot establish residency “just by leasing 
a property” has clearer meaning: it does not appear that the board member 
questioned Bobovnyik’s subjective intent. 
{¶ 24} Bobovnyik mainly relies on three cases to support his claim that the 
board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law.  He first relies on this 
court’s decision in State ex rel. Holwadel v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 
Ohio St.3d 579, 2015-Ohio-5306, 45 N.E.3d 994, to argue that it does not matter 
that he frequently had been absent from Mahoning County, so long as he always 
intended to return there.  In Holwadel, the question was whether a person who had 
relocated to South Korea for work was qualified to be a Hamilton County elector.  Id. 
at ¶ 1, 6-7.  Before moving to South Korea, the elector had been working and living 
in Chicago, and over the course of several months before the move to South Korea, 
he vacated his Chicago residence and stayed for short periods with a friend in 
Cincinnati.  Id. at ¶ 6-28.  During that time, he used his friend’s address to register to 
vote in Hamilton County.  Id. at ¶ 7.  We held that the board of elections did not abuse 
its discretion in rejecting a challenge to the elector’s qualifications, because there was 
evidence that the elector intended to return to Cincinnati when his business in South 
Korea had concluded.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 25} Although Holwadel suggests that it is relatively easy to establish a 
fixed place of habitation for voting purposes, that case is distinguishable.  
Significantly, there was no dispute in Holwadel that the elector’s other place of 
habitation—South Korea—was temporary.  See id. at ¶ 22.  In contrast, here, there 
are legitimate questions about whether Bobovnyik’s habitation at his house in 
Columbiana County after March 2019 was truly temporary.  In fact, he testified that 
he would sell the house only if he won the election. 
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{¶ 26} Bobovnyik also relies on our decision in Morris, 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, to support his claim that signing a lease for a 
new place to live, moving belongings there, and sleeping there for several nights is 
enough to prove a change in residency.  In Morris, the question was whether a 
candidate to be mayor of Canton had been a resident of that city on the day that he 
filed his nominating petition.  Id. at ¶ 1, 20.  The day before he filed the petition, 
the candidate had moved from his home in another municipality into a house in 
Canton that was owned by a friend.  Id. at ¶ 7, 9, 14, 16.  He had signed a lease for 
the house and took some furniture with him, but his wife stayed at the family home.  
Id. at ¶ 14-15.  The candidate slept in the house for only four nights before moving 
into another house in Canton with his wife.  Id. at ¶ 15.  Despite the fact that the 
candidate’s wife had initially remained in another municipality, we held that the 
candidate’s subjective intent controlled.  Id. at ¶ 23-26. 
{¶ 27} Morris certainly supports the proposition that a court considering a 
residency challenge must give a candidate’s declaration of a voting residence 
substantial weight.  Id. at ¶ 26.  But it does not advance Bobovnyik’s claim that his 
“habitation [wa]s fixed,” R.C. 3503.02(A), in Mahoning County.  Whereas the 
candidate in Morris apparently only had to show that he had been living in Canton 
on the day that he filed his petition, Bobovnyik has a much greater burden: he must 
show that he had a fixed habitation in Mahoning County over the course of the 
entire year before the qualification date.  Based on the evidence presented, it was 
within the board’s discretion to find that Bobovnyik did not meet that burden. 
{¶ 28} Finally, Bobovnyik relies on this court’s decision in State ex rel. 
O’Neill v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-1476, __ 
N.E.3d __, to emphasize that a candidate can satisfy a one-year residency 
requirement based on her “subjective intention * * * to move permanently” to a 
new county.  But O’Neill, too, fails to support Bobovnyik’s argument that the board 
abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law.  Although O’Neill involved a 
January Term, 2020 
 
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one-year residency requirement, it was uncontroverted that the state-legislature 
candidate began residing in the district before the one-year period began and that 
she continued to reside there.  Id. at ¶ 15.  And Bobovnyik himself acknowledges 
that it was significant in O’Neill that the board of elections had “identified no other 
R.C. 3503.02 factors that it believe[d] contradict[ed the candidate’s] stated 
intention to make Athens County her residence.” Id. at ¶ 22.  The same cannot be 
said here, because the application of R.C. 3503.02(D) (which implicates 
Bobovnyik’s wife’s residency in Columbiana County) clearly contradicts 
Bobovnyik’s stated intent. 
{¶ 29} Under R.C. 311.01(B)(2), Bobovnyik had to be a resident of 
Mahoning County for the entire year preceding March 16, 2020.  He testified that 
he had met that requirement by living in two Mahoning County apartments during 
that one-year period and because he intended to establish his residency there.  But 
after considering substantial evidence, the board questioned whether Bobovnyik 
had actually been living in Mahoning County.  We defer to that factual 
determination and hold that the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard 
applicable law in determining that Bobovnyik did not satisfy R.C. 311.01(B)(2). 
{¶ 30} Because the board’s residency determination alone was sufficient to 
prevent Bobovnyik’s name from being placed on the ballot, we need not address 
the board’s additional determination that Bobovnyik failed to satisfy R.C. 
311.01(B)(6). 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY and STEWART, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
Brunner Quinn, Rick L. Brunner, and Patrick M. Quinn, for relator. 
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Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gina D. 
Zawrotuk and Sharon K. Hackett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent. 
_________________