Title: Decker v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Decker v. State, No. 44, September Term 2008
EVIDENCE – FLIGHT AS CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT – THE COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
LEFT THE COURTHOUSE BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF HIS SCHEDULED
TRIAL.
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. 12-K-05-000199
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 44
September Term, 2008
CHARLES HENRY DECKER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
      Bell, C.J.
      Harrell
      Battaglia
      Greene
      Adkins
      Barbera
      Eldridge, John C. 
                       
              (Retired, specially assigned),
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., joins in judgment only.
           Filed:   May 13, 2009
During the trial of Petitioner Charles Henry Decker, the court admitted evidence that
on a previously scheduled trial date Petitioner left the courthouse before trial commenced.
The State offered the evidence to show that Petitioner fled from prosecution, thereby
reflecting his consciousness of guilt of the charged crimes.  Petitioner challenges the
admission of the evidence, arguing that it was too ambiguous and equivocal to be indicative
of consciousness of guilt, and, even if marginally probative, its relevance was outweighed
by unfair prejudice to him.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court neither
erred nor abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
I.
Petitioner was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County, on June 8
and 9, 2006.  The jury found Petitioner guilty of possession of a regulated firearm after
having been convicted of a disqualifying crime, driving under the influence of alcohol, and
other driving and weapon offenses. 
The convictions stemmed from Petitioner’s involvement in a single-vehicle accident
that occurred in the early morning of January 9, 2005.  Petitioner, while driving a Ford
Expedition (“Expedition”), evidently lost control of it and drove off the road.  Only Petitioner
was injured.  During their investigation of the accident, police officers found a nine
millimeter Beretta handgun on the passenger’s seat of the vehicle.
Petitioner conceded during opening statement that he was drunk at the time of the
accident, and he stipulated that he had been convicted of a crime that made it illegal for him
to possess a firearm.  The trial therefore focused on whether Petitioner knowingly possessed
the handgun that the police found in the Expedition.  
1  A “shot” is defined as “a small quantity, esp. an ounce, of undiluted liquor.”
Random House Dictionary 1771 (2d ed. 1987).
-2-
The evidence showed that on the evening before the crash Petitioner and his half
brother, William Pell, went “bar hopping.”  Petitioner drove the Expedition and, over the
course of several hours, the two men visited four bars and each drank at least twenty beers
and an unspecified number of “shots.”1  At approximately 1:30 a.m., Petitioner and Mr. Pell
left the last bar to go home.  The two men exchanged words about Petitioner’s sobriety and
ability to drive.  Mr. Pell became angry with Petitioner and decided to make his own way
home.  Petitioner drove off, alone, in the Expedition.
Petitioner was driving southbound on Conowingo Road, near Main Street, Darlington,
when he evidently lost control of the Expedition.  It crossed the center line, went off the
highway and up an embankment, hit some trees, then rolled down the embankment and back
onto the highway. 
Deputy Sheriff Ronald Randow was the first officer to arrive at the accident scene.
He found the Expedition unoccupied.  He heard, however, someone walking through the
brush of the wooded area of the embankment.  As Deputy Randow began his search of the
Expedition, he spotted a man, later identified as Petitioner, standing in the parking lot in front
of a convenience store, across the highway.  Deputy Randow radioed Corporal Donald
Gividen, who was en route to the accident scene, and directed him to go to the parking lot
to investigate.  Deputy Randow joined Corporal Gividen soon thereafter.  The two officers
noticed that Petitioner was bleeding from the mouth, his eyes were glassy, and he smelled
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of alcohol. Petitioner told Corporal Gividen that he left the scene of the accident because he
was scared, had been drinking, and was “fucked up.”
Meanwhile, Corporal Mark Fox conducted a more thorough search of the Expedition
and found what turned out to be a loaded, nine millimeter Beretta handgun laying on the
passenger seat of the Expedition, next to the center console.  Although there were papers
strewn around the vehicle, none was atop the handgun. 
Petitioner was transported by ambulance to the emergency room of the local hospital.
There, Deputy Randow advised Petitioner that he was under arrest and informed him of the
charges, including, evidently, a weapons charge.  Petitioner responded that “the gun in the
vehicle was not his.”
Deputy Randow testified that he and other officers had Petitioner under guard at the
hospital.  At one point, Petitioner was taken to a room for an x-ray.  Deputy Randow and two
other officers waited for Petitioner outside the room.  After a few minutes, Deputy Randow
had cause to go into the room and saw that Petitioner had left the room via another exit.  The
police officers later found Petitioner “going down another hallway.” 
Near the close of Deputy Randow’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked him if
he had been in the courthouse a year earlier, on June 1, 2005.  Petitioner’s trial in this case
was originally scheduled to go forward on that date.  Deputy Randow testified that he was
present in the courtroom on that date and observed Petitioner there.  Before the deputy could
testify further, defense counsel objected.  At the bench, the State argued that the evidence it
was about to elicit from the deputy was relevant as “flight to avoid prosecution.”  Defense
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counsel responded that, unlike the evidence that Petitioner was “trying to leave the hospital,”
his “being here on a prior court appearance and leaving, I don’t know that that is indicia of
guilt.”  The court overruled the objection, reasoning that the evidence was relevant as
“indicia of guilt.”
Deputy Randow then testified about what took place at the courthouse on the
previously scheduled trial date.  Deputy Randow spotted Petitioner in the courtroom where
the trial was to be held, after which Petitioner “basically [] walked out of the courthouse.”
Officer Randow and other deputies searched the hallways of the courthouse, but could not
find Petitioner.  Deputy Randow added that Petitioner’s trial was postponed for a year.
The defense called one witness, Petitioner’s mother, Wanda Decker.  Ms. Decker
testified that, although the Expedition belonged to her, Petitioner was the primary driver.  She
also testified that other persons regularly drove the Expedition; she found things in the
Expedition “all the time” that did not belong to Petitioner; and on only one occasion did
someone retrieve an item that had been left in the Expedition.  Ms. Decker also testified that
her employer owned a gun and sometimes used the Expedition to take deposits from the store
where she worked to the bank.  She was not sure, however, if her employer ever took the gun
out of the store.
Without objection from the defense, the court gave the jury an instruction concerning
flight evidence, reading verbatim the pattern instruction on that subject from Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 3:24.  During closing argument, the State summarized
three instances of what it characterized as flight by Petitioner:  when he walked away from
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the crash scene; when he left the x-ray room at the hospital through an unguarded exit; and
when he left the courthouse on the scheduled first trial date.
The jury found Petitioner guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
driving while under the influence of alcohol, failure to drive to the right of the center line of
a roadway, and transporting a handgun.  The court sentenced Petitioner to a total of six years’
imprisonment.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in an
unreported opinion, affirmed the judgments.  The intermediate appellate court held, inter
alia, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Deputy Randow’s testimony
concerning Petitioner’s leaving the courtroom on the prior trial date.  That court reasoned that
the evidence was relevant as consciousness of guilt, and “[e]vidence of the first two instances
of flight, when considered along with the other evidence of guilt, tend[s] to buttress the
court’s reasoning in admitting evidence of appellant’s leaving the courthouse immediately
prior to trial one year before.”  
We granted a writ of certiorari, Decker v. State, 405 Md. 290, 950 A.2d 828 (2008),
to address two questions.  The first, raised by Petitioner, asks:  
Did the trial court err in admitting evidence that Petitioner walked out of the
courthouse on a prior trial date before the case was called for trial?  
The second, raised by the State by way of a conditional cross-petition, asks:
 
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in failing to address the State’s argument
that Decker’s claim was not properly preserved for appellate review?
II.
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We first address the State’s cross-petition.  The State argues in its brief:  “[T]o the
extent that [Petitioner] claims that he was prejudiced as a result of the flight instruction, that
claim is not preserved.”  The State notes that Petitioner “did not object to the flight
instruction, and has never alleged that the instruction was not proper in this case.
Accordingly, any objection to the flight instruction has been waived.”  In any event, the State
further argues, the instruction was proper.  Petitioner replies that he “has not raised any issue
concerning the flight instruction.”  Rather, he challenges only the “admissibility of the
testimony that [he] walked out of the courthouse on a prior trial date.”  
Because Petitioner raises no challenges related to the instruction, we have no need to
address the merits of the State’s cross-petition.  
III.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit evidence that
on the previously scheduled trial date he departed the courthouse before commencement of
trial.  He argues that the testimony was “too ambiguous and equivocal to be admissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt” and was, therefore, irrelevant.  Petitioner also argues that,
even if arguably relevant, its relevance was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to him.
The State counters that the evidence was relevant to establish Petitioner’s guilt, and the court
exercised proper discretion in admitting it.
“Relevant evidence” is defined in the Maryland Rules of Procedure as “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
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evidence.”  Maryland Rule 5-401.  Such evidence is generally admissible.  Snyder v. State,
361 Md. 580, 591-92, 762 A.2d 125, 131-32 (2000), see Md. Rule 5-402 (providing:
“Except as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional law
not inconsistent with these rules, all relevant evidence is admissible.  Evidence that is not
relevant is not admissible.”).  Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if it is unfairly
prejudicial, confusing to the fact finder, or a waste of time.  E.g., Snyder, 361 Md. at 591-93,
762 A.2d at 131-32; see Md. Rule 5-403 (providing that, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
It is well established in Maryland that, “[i]f relevant, circumstantial evidence
regarding a defendant’s conduct may be admissible under Md. Rule 5-403, not as conclusive
evidence of guilt, but as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.”  Thomas
v. State, 372 Md. 342, 351, 812 A.2d 1050,1055 (2002).  Indeed, on a number of occasions
we have upheld the admission of such evidence.  See, e.g., Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30,
62-65, 665 A.2d 223, 239-40 (1995);  Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 664, 566 A.2d 111,
113-14 (1989);  Sorrell v. State, 315 Md. 224, 227-28, 554 A.2d 352, 353 (1989); Hunt v.
State, 312 Md. 494, 508-09, 540 A.2d 1125, 1132 (1988); Davis v. State, 237 Md. 97,
105-06, 205 A.2d 254, 259 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 945, 86 S. Ct. 402, 15 L. Ed. 2d
354 (1965); Westcoat v. State, 231 Md. 364, 368, 190 A.2d 544, 546 (1963).
Consciousness of guilt evidence can take various forms, including “flight after a
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crime, escape from confinement, use of a false name, and destruction or concealment of
evidence.”  Thomas, 372 Md. at  351, 812 A.2d at 1055; accord Sorrell, 315 Md. at 228, 554
A.2d at 354 (noting that any flight from justice, escape from custody, resistance to arrest,
concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, which takes place after the
commission of a crime, is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt).  The evidence
need not be contemporaneous with the crime to be evidence of the defendant’s consciousness
of guilt.   See, e.g., Sorrell, 315 Md. at 226-27, 554 A.2d at 352-53 (holding that the
defendant’s failure to return from a lunch recess during his trial supported a jury instruction
on “flight”).  Moreover, “[a]ny evidence contradicting the inference of guilt derived from
flight ‘does not render the evidence of flight inadmissible, but is merely to be considered by
the jury in weighing the effect of such flight.’” Bedford, 317 Md. at 664, 566 A.2d at 114
(quoting Sorrell, 315 Md. at 228, 554 A.2d at 354); see also Thompson v. State, 393 Md.
291, 303, 901 A.2d 208, 214-15 (2006) (stating that “a defendant’s flight may be motivated
by reasons unconnected to the offense at issue in the case and that the determination as to the
motivation for flight is properly entrusted to the jury”).  
Consciousness of guilt evidence is “considered relevant to the question of guilt
because the particular behavior provides clues to the person’s state of mind[,]” and state of
mind evidence is relevant because “the commission of a crime can be expected to leave some
mental traces on the criminal.”  Thomas, 372 Md. at 351-52, 812 A.2d at 1055-56 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Thus, by application of the accepted test in Maryland
for ascertaining relevancy, “guilty behavior should be admissible to prove guilt if we can say
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that the fact that the accused behaved in a particular way renders more probable the fact of
[his or her] guilt.”  Id. at 352, 812 A.2d at 1056 (citation omitted).  
As with other forms of circumstantial evidence, however, “the probative value of
‘guilty behavior’ depends upon the degree of confidence with which certain inferences may
be drawn.”  Id.  “There must be an evidentiary basis, either direct or circumstantial,” to link
the defendant’s conduct to the consciousness of guilt inference.  Id. at 355, 812 A.2d at 1057.
In Thomas, we adopted from United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977),
a test for determining when evidence is admissible as consciousness of guilt.  Under that test,
the probative value of the evidence
“depends upon the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be
drawn: (1) from the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to
consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of
guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt
concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.”    
Thomas, 372 Md. at 352, 812 A.2d at 1056-57 (quoting Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049); see also
Snyder, 361 Md. at 596, 762 A.2d at 134 (recognizing that the consciousness of guilt
inference contains four sub-inferences (much like those we later adopted in Thomas), all of
which must have evidentiary support).
 
Notwithstanding the long tradition of admitting consciousness of guilt evidence in
Maryland and around the country, we and other courts have recognized that such evidence
has the potential to be “unreliable and unfairly prejudicial.”  Thomas, 372 Md. at 353-54, 812
A.2d at 1057 (collecting cases).  Consequently, on several occasions, including Thomas
itself, we have reversed convictions on the ground that evidence admitted to show
2  Thomas was retried following our reversal of his conviction, and the trial court
again admitted evidence that he had resisted the blood test.  Thomas was convicted, appealed,
and again challenged the admissibility of that evidence.  The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the conviction, 168 Md. App. 682, 686, 899 A.2d 170, 172 (2006),  and we granted
a writ of certiorari to review the case.  We affirmed, holding that the State provided sufficient
evidence on retrial to support the inference that Thomas’s refusal to provide a blood sample
was connected to consciousness of guilt of the crimes of murder and robbery.  Thomas v.
State, 397 Md. 557, 576-77, 919 A.2d 49, 61 (2007).
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consciousness of guilt was too ambiguous to be admissible.  
In Thomas, we held that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting
evidence that Thomas, charged with murder, initially resisted the efforts of the police to
obtain a blood sample from him pursuant to a search warrant. We concluded that the
evidence was inadmissible because  the State had not laid an adequate foundation to support
the inference that Thomas’s refusal to give a blood sample reflected his consciousness of
guilt for the murder.2  See id. at 357-58, 812 A.2d at 1058-59; see also Snyder, 361 Md. at
596, 762 A.2d at 134 (holding that evidence that the defendant had not contacted the police
to inquire about the progress of the police investigation into his wife’s murder was
inadmissible because it was “too ambiguous and equivocal” as evidence of consciousness of
guilt); Bedford, 317 Md. at 665-68, 566 A.2d at 114 (holding that evidence that the
incarcerated capital murder defendant was carrying a four-inch piece of sharpened metal wire
on his person was too equivocal as evidence of a plan to escape and unfairly prejudiced the
defendant, and as such, was inadmissible). 
IV.
Petitioner acknowledges the four-inference Thomas test for determining the probative
3    Petitioner’s argument is much like the argument the appellant made in Myers, the
case from which we adopted the test.  In Myers, the court concluded that an arresting
officer’s testimony about the defendant’s actions at the time of arrest was too inconsistent
to be probative of “flight,” failing the first of the four inferences identified in the test. See
550 F.2d at 1049-50 (pointing out that the officer testified that the defendant, about to be
arrested, had stepped three feet away from his motorcycle, then testified that the distance was
fifty feet, and, in an earlier court proceeding, testified that the defendant had not stepped
away at all). 
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value of evidence of consciousness of guilt, but he does not specify how his departure from
the courthouse on the previously scheduled trial date fails that test.  We glean from
Petitioner’s arguments, however, that he views the evidence as failing the first of the four
inferences described in the test (“from the defendant’s behavior to flight”).3  
Petitioner devotes much of his brief to a discussion of cases from other jurisdictions
in which appellate courts have concluded that a defendant’s mere failure to appear for trial,
without some indicia that the departure was actual flight from prosecution, does not support
an inference of consciousness of guilt.  See United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 252 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that it was error for the trial court to “instruct[] the jury that it could
equate the defendant’s non-appearance with ‘flight’” and requiring that any evidentiary
predicate for a flight instruction must include “some evidence surrounding the failure to
appear at trial”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original); accord
State v. Horne, 869 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Commonwealth v.
Muckle, 797 N.E.2d 456, 460-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Commonwealth v. Holloman, 621
A.2d 1046, 1052 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v. Babbs, 499 A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Burk, 761 P.2d 825, 827 (Mont. 1988); Commonwealth v. Kane,
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472 N.E.2d 1343,1348-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).  Petitioner argues that his unexplained
departure from the courthouse on the scheduled trial date is analogous to a mere “failure to
appear” for trial and, much like the cases he cites, is too equivocal to have much, if any,
probative value as consciousness of guilt.  
The State argues, in response to the cases upon which Petitioner relies, that, “[w]hile
this case is more than a mere failure to appear, some courts hold that a failure to appear,
standing alone, is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.”   The State cites as one
example United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 944, 117 S.
Ct. 331, 136 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1996).  In that case, the defendant failed to appear on the first
day of his initial trial and was apprehended a year later.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence, as flight evidence.  The court reasoned that,
like flight from the crime scene,  “evidence of flight that occurs in close temporal proximity
to other significant events in the course of a prosecution (such as the commencement of trial)
also may be probative of the defendant’s guilt.”  Id. at 973; see also Harold v. State, 579 So.
2d 908, 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding admission of defendant’s failure to appear
for a previous trial date in the case); Scott v. State, 455 S.E.2d 609, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that the trial court properly admitted as evidence two bench warrants issued for
defendant’s failure to appear on an earlier date in the same case).
We need not decide the circumstances under which a defendant’s failure to appear for
trial will support an inference of flight from prosecution.  As the State points out, the case
at bar is different.  Here, unlike in those cases in which the defendant fails to appear for trial,
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Petitioner had made his way to the courthouse, indeed, to the courtroom where his case was
scheduled to be tried and in which one of the State’s main witnesses, Deputy Randow, was
present.  These facts among others, the State argues, make Petitioner’s case more like the
situation in which a defendant departs while the trial is ongoing.  In that regard, the State
directs us to our decision in Sorrell, supra. 
 In Sorrell, the defendant Sorrell left the courthouse during a recess on the first day
of trial, after a State’s witness identified him as the person who had assaulted and robbed
him.  The trial court made a finding that Sorrell had voluntarily absented himself from the
proceedings.  The court resumed trial in Sorrell’s absence and later instructed the jury that
it could infer consciousness of guilt from Sorrell’s conduct.  315 Md. at 225-27, 554 A.2d
at 352-53.  Sorrell challenged the court’s decision to give the instruction.  We held that there
were sufficient facts of which the trial court was aware that supported the instruction,
including Sorrell’s failure to meet his mother for lunch after leaving the courtroom and the
officers’ inability to locate Sorrell in the courthouse “after a conscientious investigation.”
Id. at 230-31, 554 A.2d at 355.
The State argues that the facts surrounding Sorrell’s flight from trial are like those
presented in this case.  The State directs us to the discussion in Sorrell where we said:
Here, a criminal defendant under bond absented himself from trial, did so
without explanation either through counsel or by personal notification, was not
located after a conscientious investigation, failed to meet his mother for a
scheduled lunch and was identified by an eyewitness shortly before the
defendant absented himself from the courtroom.     
Id. 
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The State contends that, as in Sorrell, the record shows that Petitioner, having
appeared for trial, “voluntarily and knowingly absented himself, and could not be located
after a conscientious investigation.”  The State reminds us of Deputy Randow’s testimony
that he and other officers “checked the hallways,” after Petitioner’s departure but were
unable to locate him.  The State also directs us to the docket entries reflecting the following:
Petitioner was on bond before trial; the court, on the date of Petitioner’s departure from the
courthouse, issued a bench warrant for Petitioner’s failure to appear at trial; and Petitioner
was not apprehended for some six months thereafter.
Petitioner counters that Sorrell is distinguishable from his case.  He points out that in
Sorrell it could reasonably be inferred from the facts before the court that the defendant
voluntarily absented himself from trial because he was concerned he would be convicted.
In the present case, however, the Deputy’s testimony provides no indication of why
Petitioner left the courthouse.  Consequently, Petitioner argues, “[his] departure amounted
to nothing more than a mere unexplained absence.”
We agree with the State that, in material respect, this case is quite similar to Sorrell.
In both this case and Sorrell, the jury learned that the defendant left the courthouse, whether
in the midst of trial, as in Sorrell, or on the day trial was scheduled to commence, as here.
And both here and in Sorrell, the jury could infer from the circumstances surrounding the
departure from the courthouse that it likely was prompted by a concern that the trial would
not conclude well for the defense.  In that regard, the jury in the present case could take into
account that Petitioner, well aware of the charges he was facing, departed from the courtroom
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where his trial was about to occur and where at least one witness for the State (Deputy
Randow) was also present.
That Petitioner’s departure from the courtroom immediately preceded the originally
scheduled trial makes this case also similar to Bedford, supra.  In that case, we concluded
that evidence of a defendant’s efforts to avoid imminent trial was indicative of consciousness
of guilt.  See Bedford, 317 Md. at 665-66, 566 A.2d at 114 (upholding the admission of
evidence that, on the morning Bedford was brought to the courthouse for trial, he walked
away from the holding cell and was spotted by an officer “duck[ing] into an open cell” that
was located in a darkened hallway elsewhere in the basement lockup); see also Smith v.
United States, 777 A.2d 801, 808 (D.C. 2001) (upholding the admission of evidence that the
defendant attempted to escape from the courtroom after appearing for a preliminary hearing,
concluding that, because defendant’s attempted flight was from a courtroom immediately
after learning of the charges, the evidence “reasonably supported the inference that he fled
because of consciousness of guilt” of the charged crimes).  
Like these cases, the immediate circumstances of Petitioner’s departure from the
courthouse support an inference of flight.  Further, though our decision would be the same
even without additional evidentiary support, the inference of flight from Petitioner’s
departure from the courthouse was strengthened by other evidence suggesting flight:
Petitioner’s leaving the scene of the accident because he was scared, had been drinking, and
was “fucked up”; and his slipping past his guards at the hospital, later that day. 
Petitioner makes much of the fact that his departure from the courthouse was
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“unexplained.”  He argues that an inference of flight cannot be drawn from his actions
because there is no indication that he acted to avoid trial.  We rejected such a notion in
Thomas, 397 Md. at 578, 919 A.2d at 62.  We made clear in that case that, if Thomas had an
explanation for the conduct that the State offered as evidence of consciousness of guilt, then
“it was incumbent upon him to generate that issue”:
Simply because there is a possibility that there exists some innocent, or
alternate, explanation for the conduct does not mean that the proffered
evidence is per se inadmissible.  If it was the position of petitioner that he
feared needles, or that the drawing of blood violated some religious belief he
held, or any other innocent explanation for his conduct, it was incumbent upon
him to generate that issue.  He had the opportunity at trial to offer alternative
theories explaining his resistance to the blood test, and the record is completely
devoid of any such evidence.    
Id.; accord Thompson, 393 Md. at 315, 901 A.2d at 222 (stating that, “[w]here the defendant
possesses an innocent explanation that does not risk prejudicing the jury against him, it
would be expected that the defendant would present his purported reasons for his flight to
the jury”); see also 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 276, at 129 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979)
(commenting that, “[t]he prosecution cannot be expected to negative beforehand all
conceivable innocent explanations.  The fact of flight is of itself significant; it becomes most
significant when after all no explanation is forthcoming.”).  Petitioner offered no evidence
at trial to refute the inference that he fled the courthouse on the previous trial date to avoid
prosecution. 
We conclude that the State supplied the evidentiary foundation to support the first of
the four inferences described in the Thomas test, that Petitioner’s departure from the
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courthouse was flight.  The remaining three inferences described in the test are supported by
the evidence, and Petitioner does not argue otherwise.  The court did not err in deciding that
the evidence of Petitioner’s departure from the courthouse on the previously scheduled trial
date was relevant evidence.
Petitioner, citing Md. Rule 5-403, argues that even if the evidence is relevant the
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value and the circuit court should
have excluded it on that basis.  We do not agree. 
We have observed that “‘all relevant evidence is generally admissible.’”  Thomas, 397
Md. at 579, 919 A.2d at 62 (quoting Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404-05, 697 A.2d
432, 439 (1997)).  Moreover, once a trial court has made a finding of relevance, “‘we are
generally loath to reverse [the] trial court unless the evidence is plainly inadmissible under
a specific rule or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.’” Id.
The flight evidence is not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”
to Petitioner such as would render it inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-403, as Petitioner
contends.  Petitioner’s defense was that he did not own the handgun and was unaware of its
presence in the Expedition.  The flight evidence was an appropriate counter to that defense.
See Thompson, 393 Md. at 308, 901 A.2d at 218 (stating that flight evidence is “particularly
appropriate” when the defendant has placed into issue his or her state of mind at the time the
crime was committed).
Nor do we have in this case anything otherwise suggesting that the trial court abused
its discretion in ruling that the jury could hear the flight evidence.  As we previously noted,
4  Because we have decided that the trial court properly admitted the evidence, we do
not need to address the State’s argument that the admission of the evidence was harmless.
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the State points out the docket entries reflecting the following:  Petitioner forfeited his bond
as a result of his conduct on June 1, 2005, a warrant for his failure to appear immediately
issued, and it was months before he was apprehended.  We presume the court knew those
facts when it ruled on the evidence.  In this respect, the case stands in sharp contrast to
Thompson, in which we held that the trial court abused its discretion by giving a flight
instruction notwithstanding that the court knew of a reason for the defendant’s fight that was
unconnected to the case and which, had it been offered by Thompson, could have unfairly
prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury.  See id. at 315, 901 A.2d at 222.  In the present case,
the court heard no similar reason for excluding the otherwise relevant evidence. 
In sum, the challenged evidence was admissible.  We affirm the judgments,
accordingly.4
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED. 
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.
Chief Judge Bell joins in the judgment only.