Title: Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co.1985 WY 174707 P.2d 1385Case Number: 85-28Decided: 10/23/1985RONALD W. ALEXANDER, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

PHILLIPS OIL COMPANY, A SUBSIDIARY OF PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), 

JOHN WHITMIRE, DEFENDANT.
Supreme Court of Wyoming
RONALD W. ALEXANDER, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

PHILLIPS OIL COMPANY, A 
SUBSIDIARY OF PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), 

JOHN WHITMIRE, 
DEFENDANT.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 
 
H.W. Rasmussen 
and Clay B. Jenkins of Badley and Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, signed the brief 
on behalf of appellant; oral argument by Mr. Jenkins.

Kim D. Cannon of 
Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on 
behalf of appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment entered against appellant in his action for wrongful 
termination of employment from his position of field supervisor over the Douglas 
Gathering System of appellee. Appellant words the issues on 
appeal:

"THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
DOCTRINE SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY ABOLISHED AS CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT AND 
THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH.

"THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SPITE OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF 
FACT."

[¶2.]     We recently settled the 
issue relating to the at will doctrine in Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984); Allen v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 699 P.2d 277 (1985); Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, Wyo., 700 P.2d 1236 (1985); and Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, Wyo., 704 P.2d 702 (1985). We said in Siebken v. Town of Wheatland, supra, at 
page 1237:

"* * * An employee may 
resign from employment under an at-will contract at any time without cause, and 
an employer may discharge an employee under an at-will contract at any time 
without cause. Also see Lukens v. 
Goit, Wyo., 
430 P.2d 607 (1967); Long v. Forbes, 
58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 158 A.L.R. 224 
(1943); Casper Nat. Bank v. Curry, 51 
Wyo. 284, 65 P.2d 1116, 110 A.L.R. 360 (1937). * *"

Accordingly, 
appellant's first issue requires no further discussion.

[¶3.]     A summary judgment is 
proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. A fact is 
material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting 
one of the essential elements of the cause of action. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 867 (1975). The burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of a 
material fact is on the party moving for a summary judgment, and the record is 
reviewed by giving to the party opposing the motion all favorable inferences to 
be drawn from the facts contained in the material submitted in connection with 
the motion. Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525 (1981); Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819 
(1980).

[¶4.]     If appellant's 
employment was at will, he could have been discharged without cause. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra; Mobil Coal Production, Inc. v. Parks, 
supra. A summary judgment would then be proper, the action being for "wrongful" 
discharge. In this case, appellee had issued a handbook which changed the status 
of appellant's employment. The trial court did not have the benefit of our 
opinion in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. 
Parks, supra, wherein we said at page 704:

"In Carlson v. Bratton, supra [681 P.2d 1333 
(1984)], we said at page 1339:

"`Absent a discrimination 
amounting to a violation of civil rights, a person does not have tenure in 
employment unless such tenure is established by statute or by contract or by 
rules and regulations pursuant to statute or by rules and regulations having the force 
of a contract. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

"The question here, then, 
is whether or not appellant's handbook set forth rules and regulations having 
the force of a contract, and, if so, did appellee violate the terms thereof. * * 
*" (Footnote omitted.)

[¶5.]     We then reviewed the 
provisions of the handbook and said at page 706:

"Not only does the tenor 
of the foregoing reflect the necessity for the existence of cause for discharge, 
but it specifically requires such. The essential requirement of an at will 
employment is thus missing.

"This is not to say that 
the existence of a handbook or employer's manual will make employment other than 
at will in all instances. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Some 
handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment at 
will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent 
meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a 
question of fact. Normally, the construction and interpretation of a contract is 
for the court as a matter of law. Rouse 
v. Munroe, Wyo., 658 P.2d 74, 77 (1983); Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 
(1980). If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be 
necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the 
contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Goodman v. Kelly, Wyo., 
390 P.2d 244, 247 (1964)."

[¶6.]     In this case, two of 
appellee's publications which were before the court as exhibits in connection 
with the motion for summary judgment were a "YES" booklet1 and portions of the "Disciplinary 
Procedures Manual for Supervisors." The YES handbook was distributed to all 
employees, and it treated most aspects of employer-employee relations, such as 
hours of work, promotions, transfers, vacations, holidays, leaves of absence, 
terminations, etc. It provided in pertinent part:

"Phillips management 
realizes that you can work with a greater sense of security and more easily 
visualize your personal opportunities if you understand the company's 
organization, its policies and the benefits it offers you in addition to your 
regular wages and promotional advancements.

"This booklet was 
prepared to provide you with some of this information. It applies, with certain 
exceptions, to regular employees * * *. The policies in this booklet apply to 
employees of these corporations except:

"where provisions in 
working agreements, state or local laws replace them, and

* * * * * 
*

"This booklet is an 
informal discussion of your company and its policies as they concern you. It is 
intended to be used only as a general guide for benefits and policies as they 
may exist from time to time. The company retains the right to improve, 
discontinue, modify and/or interpret all or part of such policies and the 
contents of this booklet at any time without the prior knowledge or consent of 
the employee. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Your job, whether 
in an office, plant, laboratory or in the field, is important to company 
progress. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"Terminations

"The company normally 
expects to furnish continuous employment to its employees. However, any employee 
service can be terminated, with or without cause, at any time, at the option of 
either the company or the employee. In the usual situation, your employment with 
Phillips may end in one of several ways:

"Resignation. * * 
*

"Retirement. * * 
*

"Lay-Off. * * 
*

"Discharge. Employees may 
be discharged for cause. This includes, among other things, smoking in 
prohibited areas, insubordination, unsatisfactory work, falsification of 
records, undesirable actions or excessive absenteeism. Employees discharged for 
cause establish unsatisfactory service records and consequently are not desired 
for re-employment in company operations.

"Disability. * * 
*

"Death. * * 
*."

 

[¶7.]     The portions of the 
Disciplinary Procedures Manual for Supervisors were distributed only to 
supervisors, including appellant. They provided in pertinent 
part:

"I. 
INTRODUCTION

"When all other methods 
of employee communication fail, discipline is used as the treatment intended to 
correct violations of working rules/policies or unacceptable conduct and bring 
about a change in an individual's work performance and/or work attendance. The 
following procedures were formulated to ensure fair and equitable treatment of 
all employees and to provide necessary documentation in the event a third party, 
such as an arbitrator in union situations, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission in discrimination investigations, or others, should become involved. 
While the manual was written to apply to nonexempt and field hourly employees in 
accordance with the Federal Wage and Hour Law, it is also intended to apply to 
all employees, regardless of classification or job grade. It provides special 
procedures to follow in most cases; however, you may encounter situations that 
require you to vary somewhat from the procedures and guidelines provided 
herein.

* * * * * 
*

"V. 
DISCHARGE

"Discharge is not a step 
of the Progressive Discipline Procedure.[2] Discharge is the action taken 
after application of the progressive steps has failed to bring about a positive 
change in performance. Discharge also occurs when an employee commits an offense 
so serious that continued employment cannot be tolerated. Offenses such as 
stealing or drunkenness on the job are regarded as so serious that no warning or 
prior disciplinary action need precede discharge."

[¶8.]     There is no ambiguity 
in the foregoing with reference to the fact that the "YES" handbook applied to 
appellant even though he was a supervisor, a salaried position, and one whose 
pay was not calculated on an hourly basis. A nonsupervisory employee may not 
have been able to rely on the contents of the Disciplinary Procedures Manual in 
determination of his employment at will status since it was not issued to him 
and the representations therein were not known to him, but it was issued to 
appellant and the representations contained therein could have been relied upon 
by him in his decision to continue employment with 
appellee.

[¶9.]     There is an 
inconsistency in the foregoing with reference to the question as to whether or 
not appellee has represented that discharge can only be for cause. The "YES" 
handbook recites that "any employee service can be terminated, with or without 
cause." However, it specifically lists causes for which discharge will occur. 
The handbook provisions in this case differ from those in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 
supra, wherein there was no assertion for discharge without cause. We there 
said:

"Not only does the tenor 
of the foregoing [handbook provisions] reflect the necessity for the existence 
of cause for discharge, but it specifically requires such. The essential 
requirement of an at will employment is thus missing."3 704 P.2d  at 
706.

[¶10.]  Except for the recitation in the "YES" 
handbook that termination can be "with or without cause," the tenor of the "YES" 
handbook and of the Disciplinary Procedures Manual reflect necessity of cause 
for discharge. Add to that the circumstances under which appellant was 
discharged, and the intent on the part of appellee to discharge only for cause 
is fortified. Appellee used extreme methods to establish the existence of a 
cause for discharge. It placed a surveillance on appellant to verify his 
presence at liquor establishments during daytime hours and to determine if he 
was carrying on company business during such time. This is not to say that an at 
will employee cannot be discharged for cause or, said another way, that a 
discharge for cause, in itself, is evidence of employment other than at will. 
Nor is it to say that effort to verify such cause, by itself, is sufficient to 
indicate the employment to be other than at will. But, we do say that such 
actions may be considered in interpretation of the ambiguous handbook language 
to determine if appellee has fettered its right to discharge appellant at any 
time and without cause by handbook provisions which

"* * * create an 
expectation on the part of an employee that they will be followed, and they 
induced [employee] to continue his employment with [employer]. [Thus securing] * 
* * `an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force.' * *" Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d  at 707.

[¶11.]  Under the facts of this case, and 
considering the handbook as a whole4, as we must, appellant's employment 
by appellee was not an at will employment, and the discharge could be only for 
cause.

[¶12.]  The material for consideration by the 
trial court in connection with the motion for summary judgment created an issue 
of fact as to the existence of cause for discharge. Appellee submitted 
affidavits and exhibits to evidence the fact that appellant spent substantial 
portions of working days in bars and taverns consuming alcoholic beverages and 
that he transacted company business and drove company vehicles while doing so. 
Such was designated as the cause for his discharge. In his affidavit, appellant 
evidenced that he did not have specific hours to work, that he did not conduct 
company business after drinking alcoholic beverages, and that his drinking of 
such was done only after completing his work for the day.

[¶13.]  Under the standard by which we review 
summary judgments, supra, there was sufficient indication before the court of 
the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact to prevent a summary 
judgment.

[¶14.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

1 "YES" for "Your Extra 
Security."

2 The portion of the 
Disciplinary Procedures Manual for Supervisors containing the Progressive 
Discipline Procedure was not before the trial court.

3 Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 
supra, did not come to us on a summary judgment. Factual determinations had been 
made after a trial to the court.

4 See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 
supra, and cases cited therein holding that an employer's personnel manual or 
handbook may constitute a term of employment contract.