Title: People v. Trainor

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89350-Agenda 8-January 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								TIMOTHY TRAINOR, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 24, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether, pursuant to a defendant's
filing of an application for recovery under the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998)), the State can
obtain summary judgment. In the present situation, the La Salle
County circuit court granted the State's motion for summary
judgment following Timothy Trainor's application for recovery.
The appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding
that "summary judgment is a civil remedy that has no place in
sexually dangerous person proceedings." 312 Ill. App. 3d 860,
862. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the
appellate court, which remanded the cause for a jury trial on
defendant's application.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person in
May 1984. A jury found that he was still dangerous and the circuit
court denied his petition for recovery. In May 1995, defendant
filed a second petition for recovery. The State filed a motion to
dismiss, which the trial court granted. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision. People v Trainor, No. 3-95-0629 (1997)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Thereafter, in
May 1998, defendant filed a third petition for recovery. In his
petition, defendant stated that for the past 14 years he participated
in therapy when it was offered to him and that he made significant
progress in controlling his inappropriate sexual behavior.
Defendant further stated in the petition that he had recovered to the
point where he could be placed in a less restrictive environment as
part of his reintegration into society. Along with the petition,
defendant filed a motion for a jury trial and appointment of an
independent expert to evaluate his progress. Defendant maintained
that the psychologist retained by the Department of Corrections
(Department) to evaluate defendant was biased against him.
	In response, the Department filed a socio-psychological
evaluation signed by the Department's administrative
psychologist, psychiatrist, a social service worker, the assistant
warden and the warden at Big Muddy River Correctional Center.
The report described the method of treatment received by
defendant and explained the stage of "recovery" that defendant had
achieved. The report concluded that defendant was not
"recovered." It further noted that defendant was at a high risk to
reoffend if placed into mainstream society.
	The State filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1005 (West 1998)) arguing that there was no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. In support of the motion the State maintained that
the Department's report indicated that defendant had not recovered
and was still deemed sexually dangerous. The State further argued
that defendant presented no credible evidence that would permit
a determination on the petition that he is no longer sexually
dangerous or that would create a genuine issue of material fact.
Rather, the State argued, defendant merely presented his own
allegation that he was recovered. Such an bald assertion,
unsupported by other evidence, was insufficient to overcome a
summary judgment motion.
	In granting the motion for summary judgment the trial court
stated:
			"The law does state that Mr. Trainor can file an
application showing recovery, however, on motion[s] for
summary judgment the application for recovery can be
dismissed before a jury is impaneled or before the issue
goes to a jury. Courts have ruled that that is [a]
permissible procedure.
* * *
			The defendant has made significant progress in his
therapy, is learning to control his sexually inappropriate
behavior which led him to being a sexually dangerous
person. Those are the allegations contained in Mr.
Trainor's petition for recovery. However, when you look
to the report which was ordered by this Court and the
statute provides for ***there are several things that the
report which was completed by the members of the
Department of Corrections as far as the rehabilitations
treatment program, there are several things contained in
the report which state to the contrary.
* * *
			I see no genuine issue of material fact, and in light of
the Department of Corrections report I see no substantial
change, and apparently it's just the same thing as before.
There is no marked improvement. Mr. Trainor is not
entitled to any court-appointed expert, independent of the
Department of Corrections. If he wishes privately to
obtain one, he can always do so; but it's never been done.
So what I have in front of me is the Department of
Corrections report. It does not indicate any genuine issue
of material fact. The motion for summary judgment will
be granted in this matter."
	Defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the decision
of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
The appellate court concluded that summary judgment is
inappropriate in sexually dangerous person proceedings because
it deprives a defendant of his "statutory method of regaining his
liberty." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 862. Additionally, the appellate court
ruled that defendant was not entitled to an independent expert.
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
	The question before us is whether the State is entitled to move
for summary judgment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). In order to answer
that question, we must review the legislature's purpose and intent
in creating the Act.
	A sexually dangerous person is defined, under the Act, as a
person who suffers from a mental disorder coupled with
propensities to the commission of sex offenses and has
demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of
sexual molestation of children. 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 1998).
The Act's purpose is twofold: (1) to protect the public by
sequestering a sexually dangerous person until such a time as the
individual is recovered and released, and (2) to subject sexually
dangerous persons to treatment such that the individual may
recover from the propensity to commit sexual offenses and be
rehabilitated. People v. Cooper,132 Ill. 2d 347, 355 (1989).
	The Illinois legislature first created a civil commitment statute
for sex offenders, known as the criminal sexual psychopathic
persons act, in 1938. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 38, par. 820. The
1938 Act was revised in 1955 and thereafter became the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 38, pars. 820.01
through 825e. The revised act further provided that the
proceedings be civil in nature. Despite being civil in nature,
however, an accused was provided with some of the same
procedural rights guaranteed in a criminal proceeding, such as the
right to a trial by jury and the right to counsel. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
ch. 38, par. 822.01.
	In 1963 the Act was amended to include a provision that
quashed all outstanding indictments that served as the basis for an
offender's civil commitment proceeding. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963,
ch. 38, par. 105-9. This change altered the aim of the Act because
it focused on the rehabilitative treatment of the offender rather
than punishment. Nearly two decades later, in 1982, the Act was
again amended. This time the amendment added a requisite burden
of proof. The amendment designated that before one could be
committed as a sexually dangerous person, the State must prove
the same beyond a reasonable doubt. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38,
pars. 105-3.01.
	In creating and amending the Act, the Illinois legislature
intended that, instead of being criminally punished for their
criminal sexual offenses, sexually dangerous persons be
committed to the Department for treatment until they are no longer
considered sexually dangerous. People v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347,
355 (1989). The legislature classified sexually dangerous persons
as people who suffer from a mental illness and need specialized
care and commitment. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d  at 355. Thus, the Act
does not promote traditional aims of punishment, such as
retribution or deterrence. Rather, under the Act, the State has a
statutory obligation to provide care and treatment for persons
adjudged sexually dangerous. This care is designed to effect
recovery in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care. Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
II. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment	The question of whether the State can obtain summary
judgment on defendant's application for recovery under the Act is
a legal one which we review de novo. Berlin v. Sarah Bush
Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1997). The purpose of
summary judgment is to determine whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986).
Summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). If the party moving for
summary judgment supplies facts which, if left uncontradicted,
would entitle the party to a judgment as a matter of law, the
opposing party cannot rely on its pleadings alone to raise an issue
of material fact. Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d  at 240.
	 Here, the State moved for summary judgment on the basis
that, "The petitioner has no credible evidence *** pursuant to
which could create or permit a determination that he is no longer
sexually dangerous, nor which could create a genuine issue of
material fact of the same." In support of this motion, the State
cited to an appellate court case that upheld a trial court's ruling on
a similar motion for summary judgment. People v. Savage, 277 Ill.
App. 3d 63, 67 (1995). In Savage, the trial court noted that the
defendant failed to offer any substantive evidence to support his
allegation that he had recovered. The trial court, therefore, granted
summary judgment after finding that " '[t]here is absolutely no
basis whatsoever in the record to suggest that there is ***a triable
issue of material fact in a civil proceeding.' " Savage, 277 Ill. App.
3d at 67.
	As an initial matter, we note that the appellate court in Savage
approached the recovery proceeding from the perspective that the
defendant had the burden to establish that he had recovered from
his sexual affliction and that he had failed to do so. The appellate
court cited, with approval, the trial court's finding that " 'the
defendant has not offered any substantive evidence of any kind in
support of his bald allegation that he is recovered.' " Failing to
meet that burden, and create a triable issue of fact, the appellate
court held that a motion for summary judgment was appropriate.
Savage, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 67.
	The State's reliance on the Savage case reveals a pervasive
underlying issue that must be addressed, namely, whether the
defendant or the State bears the burden of proof in a recovery
proceeding. To answer this threshold question, we carefully
examine the structure and language of the Act.
a. Commitment Proceeding
	The Act is composed of two separate, yet interrelated
proceedings. The first part involves the commitment proceeding.
During this proceeding, the defendant is committed to the
Department and is adjudicated sexually dangerous. This
proceeding is triggered when the State files a petition for
commitment. A petition can be filed "[w]hen any person is
charged with a criminal offense and it [appears] *** that such
person is a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning of [the]
Act." 725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998). This petition must set forth
facts "tending to show that the person named is a sexually
dangerous person." 725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998). The Act
specifies that either the State's Attorney or the Attorney General
may seek an involuntary, indeterminate institutional commitment
in lieu of criminal prosecution if the person is charged with a
criminal offense and is believed to be sexually dangerous. 725
ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).
	While the question of whether an individual is a sexually
dangerous person is one of fact, it is one which, by its nature,
cannot be answered by a court or jury without hearing the opinions
of people who have a special knowledge in the field of mental
disorders and sexual aberration. People v. Covey, 34 Ill. 2d 195
(1966). Thus, after filing a petition alleging sexual dangerousness,
the trial court must appoint two psychiatrists to make a personal
examination of the person so charged and determine whether such
person is sexually dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).
	The Act states that "[t]he psychiatrists shall file with the court
a report in writing of the result of their examination, a copy of
which shall be delivered to the respondent." 725 ILCS 205/4
(West 1998). Once the psychiatrists file their report and provide
the respondent with a copy, a hearing is held to determine the
defendant's sexual dangerousness. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).
The reports of the psychiatrists must be introduced by direct
testimony. People v. Pearson, 65 Ill. App. 2d 264 (1965).
Nonetheless, although the statute provides that two qualified
psychiatrists shall be appointed to examine the defendant, there is
no requirement that both psychiatrists shall testify; testimony of
one may provide a prima facie case in the absence of contradictory
reports. People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306 (1965).
	Once the hearing begins, section 3.01 of the Act controls.
Section 3.01 specifies that the proceedings under the Act are civil.
It states,
			"The proceedings under this Act shall be civil in
nature[;] however, the burden of proof required to commit
a defendant to confinement as a sexually dangerous
person shall be the standard of proof required in a
criminal proceedings of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The provisions of the Civil Practice Law, and all existing
and future amendments of that Law and modifications
thereof and the Supreme Court Rules now or hereafter
adopted in relation to that Law[,] shall apply to all
proceedings hereunder except as otherwise provided in
this Act." 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998).
	Section 5 of the Act mandates that the defendant is accorded
certain rights:
			"The respondent in any proceedings under this Act shall
have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be
represented by counsel. At the hearing on the petition it
shall be competent to introduce evidence of the
commission by the respondent of any number of crimes
together with whatever punishments, if any, were
inflicted." 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998).
	These rights are conferred upon the defendant/respondent
because, although the proceedings under the Act are civil in
nature, they may result in deprivation of liberty and incarceration
in the penitentiary for psychiatric treatment. Therefore, a
respondent under the Act must be accorded the essential
protections available at a criminal trial. See Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at
312; People v. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d 11 (1967); People v. Nastasio,
19 Ill. 2d 524 (1960). Moreover, due process under both the
United States and Illinois Constitutions require that the loss of
liberty which results from civil commitment under the Act be
justified by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 725 ILCS 205/3.01
(West 1998); People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 321 (1976).
	In discussing the Act, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 937
(7th Cir. 1975), stated:
		"We recognize that society has a substantial interest in the
protection of its members from dangerous deviant sexual
behavior. But when the stakes are so great for the
individual facing commitment, proof of sexual
dangerousness must be sufficient to produce the highest
recognized degree of certitude."
	The Seventh Circuit further stated, and we agree, that the right
to due process entitles the defendant to the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses testifying against him, the right against
self-incrimination and the right to a speedy trial. Coughlin v.
Stachulak, 424 U.S. 947, 47 L. Ed. 2d 354, 96 S. Ct. 1419 (1976).
We note that our legislature intended rigid adherence to rules of
evidence and that every necessary element of the State's petition
be proved by competent evidence. People v. Bruckman, 33 Ill. 2d 150 (1965); People v. Pearson, 65 Ill. App. 2d 264 (1965).
	If the State succeeds on its petition to adjudicate the
respondent sexually dangerous, the respondent is committed to the
custody of the Director of Corrections as guardian. Section 8 of the
Act states,
		"The Director of Corrections as guardian shall keep safely
the person so committed until the person has recovered
and is released as hereinafter provided. The Director of
Corrections as guardian shall provide care and treatment
for the person committed to him designed to effect
recovery. The Director may place that ward in any facility
in the Department of Corrections or portion thereof set
aside for the care and treatment of sexually dangerous
persons." 725 ILCS 205/8 (West 1998).
The respondent is committed for an indeterminate time until the
time the respondent has recovered and is released under the Act.
725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998). We now turn to the second part of
the Act, the recovery proceeding.
b. Recovery Proceeding
	 Once a person has been adjudicated sexually dangerous, that
person may file, at any time, an application showing that he has
recovered and requesting release. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998).
When such an application is filed, the psychiatrist, sociologist,
psychologist and warden of the institution where the applicant is
confined must prepare a socio-psychiatric report concerning the
applicant. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998). Section 9 of the Act
states,
			"An application in writing setting forth facts showing
that such sexually dangerous person or criminal sexual
psychopathic person has recovered may be filed before the
committing court. Upon receipt thereof, the clerk of the
court shall cause a copy of the application to be sent to the
Director of the Department of Corrections. The Director
shall then cause to be prepared and sent to the court a
socio-psychiatric report concerning the applicant. *** The
court shall set a date for the hearing upon such application
and shall consider the report so prepared under the
direction of the Director of the Department of Corrections
and any other relevant information submitted by or on
behalf of such applicant. If the patient is found to be no
longer dangerous, the court shall order that he be
discharged." 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998).
	We note that both the commitment and recovery proceedings
involve the "paramount factual issue of the mental condition of the
defendant; both involve his liberty." Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 313.
The first proceeding, the commitment of the defendant as a
sexually dangerous person, deprives the defendant of his liberty.
The second proceeding, the recovery phase, gives a defendant
applying for recovery a chance to regain his freedom.
	In Olmstead, this court decided the issue of whether section
5 of the Act, the right to demand a jury trial and the appointment
of counsel in the commitment proceeding, applies to a defendant
who files an application for recovery under section 9 of the Act.
The defendant, in Olmstead, was adjudicated sexually dangerous
pursuant to the Act and the trial court dismissed his application for
recovery before appointing counsel and granting the defendant a
jury trial. In determining whether the trial court erred in striking
the defendant's application for recovery, we concluded that in
devising the statute, "the legislature *** intended the right to
counsel and a jury to apply to both the original petition
proceedings and the application for discharge." (Emphasis added.)
Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 313.
	In Capoldi, we reiterated the principle that persons proceeding
under the Act must be accorded the same procedural safeguards
that are available to a defendant in a criminal trial. In Capoldi, the
defendant filed an application for recovery under section 9 of the
Act that the trial court dismissed without a hearing. We noted that
once the application has been filed, the court "shall" set a date for
the hearing and concluded that upon filing of the application for
recovery, the trial court should have held a hearing to determine if
the defendant had recovered. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. We further
held that at the recovery hearing, the defendant is entitled to a
court-appointed attorney and the right to demand a trial by jury
pursuant to section 5 of the Act. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18.
	 Because both the commitment proceeding and the recovery
proceeding implicate a defendant's liberty interest, we have
continuously emphasized in Olmstead and its progeny that the
legislature, in enacting the Act, clearly intended section 5 of the
Act to apply both at the commitment proceeding and the recovery
proceeding. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 313; accord People v. Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d 279, 282 (1972) (when a defendant files an application for
recovery, he must be granted a jury trial if so requested). With
these crucial principles in mind, we next turn to a review of the
burden of proof during the proceedings under the Act.
c. Burden of Proof
	There is no dispute that the language in the Act clearly states
that the State must prove a defendant sexually dangerous beyond
a reasonable doubt during the commitment proceeding. 725 ILCS
205/3.01 (West 1998). The Act does not explicitly state, however,
where the burden of proof lies in a recovery proceeding.
	 In deciding this issue, we are guided by the fundamental rule
of statutory construction-to ascertain and give effect to the true
intent and meaning of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). We look first to the words chosen by the
legislature and used in the statute itself as the best indicators of
what the statute means. The statutory language, however, is a
reliable indicator of true meaning only when it is read in the
context of the entire Act. See Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d  at 189 Thus,
sections 3, 5 and 9 of the Act must be read in conjunction with one
another and their language so construed as to make them
harmonious and consistent. Their words cannot be read in a
fashion that would render other words or phrases, meaningless,
redundant, or superfluous. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d  at 189.
	 Section 9 of the Act states that during the recovery
proceeding, the "patient" (defendant) shall file an "application" for
recovery. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998). In resolving issues
concerning applications for recovery, however, courts, including
this court, have used the phrase "petition for recovery" when
discussing an "application" for recovery. See, e.g., People v.
Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347 (1989); Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d  at 282; People v.
Sizemore, 311 Ill. App. 3d 917 (2000); People v. Tunget, 287 Ill.
App. 3d 533 (1997). People v. Hannan, 184 Ill. App. 3d 937
(1989); People v. Parrott, 108 Ill. App. 3d 222 (1982). The
interchangeable use of the terms "petition" and "application" over
the years has led to a misinterpretation of the burden of proof that
is required during a recovery proceeding. It has also led to a
misunderstanding of the nature of the proceedings that the
legislature intended.
	 A "petition" is defined as "[a] formal written request
presented to a court or other official body." Blacks Law Dictionary
1165 (7th ed. 1999). A "petitioner" is defined as "[a] party who
presents a petition to a court or other official body, esp. when
seeking relief on appeal." Blacks Law Dictionary 1166 (7th ed.
1999). This definition is consistent with the understanding that a
petitioner is one who must proceed with pleadings. In contrast to
the petitioner, a "respondent" is the "party against whom an appeal
is taken" or a "party against whom a motion or petition is filed."
Blacks Law Dictionary 1313 (7th ed. 1999). An "application," on
the other hand, is defined as "[a] request for an order not requiring
advance notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the order
is issued." Black's Law Dictionary 96 (7th ed. 1999).
	The Act clearly states that when initiating commitment
proceedings against a person, the State should file "a petition"
setting forth facts to show that the person is sexually dangerous.
725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998). Thus, the State must set forth facts
in the pleadings to show a person's sexual dangerousness. In
addition to having the burden of pleading the facts necessary to
commit a person under the Act, the State must further show that
the person is sexually dangerous "beyond a reasonable doubt." 725
ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998). Clearly, when the State files its
"petition," it must sustain the burden of proof.
	However, the term "petition" has no place in the recovery
proceeding under section 9 of the Act. Section 9 mandates that a
defendant who is committed to the Department of Corrections can
file "[a]n application in writing setting forth facts showing that
such sexually dangerous person or criminal sexual psychopathic
person has recovered." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 205/9 (West
1998). Using the term "petition" when speaking of an "application
for recovery" is misleading because it implies that the defendant
must proceed with the evidence and sustain a burden of proof
during the recovery phase.
	A review of various cases discussing recovery hearing
proceedings under the Act shows that our appellate court has
structured a recovery hearing scheme that places the burden of
proceeding with the evidence and the burden of proof on the
defendant to show that he has recovered. See People v. Coan, 311
Ill. App. 3d 296 (2000); Sizemore, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 920; People
v. Cash, 282 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641 (1996); Savage, 277 Ill. App. 3d
at 67; People v. Finkle, 214 Ill. App. 3d 290, 296 (1991); People
v. Cooper, 199 Ill. App. 3d 985, 987 (1990); Hannan, 184 Ill. App.
3d 937; Parrot, 108 Ill. App. 3d 222; People v. Beksel, 10 Ill. App.
3d 406, 407 (1973); People v. Sweeney, 114 Ill. App. 2d 81, 86
(1969).
	Over the years, the burden of proof on the defendant has
emerged as one of "preponderance of the evidence." Sizemore, 311
Ill. App. 3d at 926; Cooper, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 989; Hannan, 184
Ill. App. 3d at 941; Beksel, 10 Ill. App. 3d at 407; Sweeney, 114
Ill. App. 2d at 88. Even this court, in dicta, has alluded to a
defendant's burden of proof during recovery proceedings. People
v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 355 (1989) (until a defendant proves to
the court he is no longer sexually dangerous, he retains that
status); People v. Fish, 36 Ill. 2d 220, 222 (1966) (burden of proof
shifts to the defendant in subsequent proceedings); People v.
Couvion, 33 Ill. 2d 408, 411 (1965) (the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant in subsequent proceedings following commitment).
	We note that the Act specifically refers to the defendant as an
"applicant" and a "respondent." Under a plain reading of these
terms, the defendant does not have the obligation to move forward
with the evidence or to sustain the burden of proof during the
recovery proceeding. Nonetheless, panels of the appellate court
have extrapolated the language in the Act to place a nonexistent
burden on the defendant. The result is the creation of an entire
hearing scheme that is incompatible with the notion of due process
and the express language of the Act.
	Had the defendant been required to sustain the burden of
proof during the recovery proceeding, that language would have
been incorporated in the Act. If this court can ascertain legislative
intent from the plain language of the statute itself, that intent must
prevail. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996). We
will not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading
into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the
express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 389. Under a plain
language reading of the Act, when the defendant/applicant files an
application for recovery, this application triggers the requirement
of a recovery hearing. At the recovery hearing, the defendant
becomes a respondent and the State is the petitioner. The State, as
the petitioner, must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant/respondent is still sexually dangerous.
	Additionally, section 5 of the Act, the right to counsel and to
demand a jury trial, clearly applies both during the commitment
proceeding and during the recovery proceeding. Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d 
at 282. We find significant that our legislature, in granting the
defendant the right to demand a jury trial and the right to be
represented by counsel, referred to him as the "respondent," not
the "petitioner." 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998). The reference to
defendant as a "respondent" in a proceeding where he is granted
the right to demand a jury and appointment of counsel indicates
that, as the respondent, the defendant does not have the burden of
proceeding with the evidence.
	In support of our conclusion, we also look to a similar statute,
the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (hereinafter, the
Sexually Violent Persons Act). The Sexually Violent Persons Act
applies to persons who are within 90 days of (1) discharge for a
sentence that was imposed upon a conviction for a sexually violent
offense; (2) release from a Department of Corrections juvenile
correctional facility following a delinquency adjudication on the
basis of a sexually violent offense; or (3) release from a
commitment following a finding of not guilty of a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity. 725 ILCS 207/15(b) (West 1998).
	We realize that in creating the Sexually Violent Persons Act,
the legislature encompassed a more limited group of offenders
than those to which the Act applies. A sexually violent person,
who is likely to commit acts of sexual violence in the future,
creates different societal problems from those created by a
sexually dangerous person who has suffered from a mental
disorder for more than one year. See People v. McVeay, 302 Ill.
App. 3d 960 (1999); People v. McDougle, 303 Ill. App. 3d 509
(1999). Despite the fundamental differences(1) between the two acts,
however, we note that the underlying goal and the legislature's
intent in creating these two statutes is the same.
	Both statutes are specifically tailored towards achieving their
dual objectives to provide for care and treatment of sexually
dangerous individuals and to remove such individuals from
society. People v. McDougle, 303 Ill. App. 3d 509 (1999).
Consistent with these objectives, our legislature has also provided
mechanisms that are available to a committed person to obtain
discharge once he has recovered and no longer needs treatment or
exclusion from society. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998); 725 ILCS
207/65 (West 1998).
	During the recovery hearing under the Sexually Violent
Persons Act, the State must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is still sexually violent. 725 ILCS
207/65(b)(2) (West 1998). The Sexually Violent Persons Act
provides three different procedures that are available to a
defendant who is committed where the State must sustain its
burden of proof.(2) In this respect, the State's evidence, which is the
barrier to a defendant's discharge from commitment, is tested
before an impartial fact finder.
	We find it significant that in crafting the Sexually Violent
Persons Act the legislature clearly mandated that the State, not the
defendant, must continue to sustain a burden of proof during the
recovery proceeding. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 1998). We
believe that the legislature intended that a similar mechanism for
discharge be available to a defendant proceeding under the Act.
Although the language in the Act is not as precise as the Sexually
Violent Persons Act, nor does it provide three different methods
to obtain discharge, it does, nonetheless, provide a specific
mechanism, through the recovery hearing, for a defendant to test
the State's evidence against him.
	Our legislature has implemented specific safeguards to protect
a defendant's due process rights. Of paramount importance is the
right to be represented by counsel, the right to a jury trial and the
right to have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d  at 321; Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 312. Thus,
when a defendant files an application for recovery under the Act,
this application triggers an opportunity for a hearing in which the
defendant becomes a respondent and is entitled both to a right to
demand a jury and appointment of counsel. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West
1998). The burden of proof, as in the Sexually Violent Persons
Act, remains on the State, to provide that defendant is still
sexually dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998).(3) We now
turn to the substantive issue in the present case.
III. A Summary Judgment Motion Is Inappropriate in a
Recovery Proceeding
	The State maintains that because section 3.01 of the Act refers
to the provision of the Civil Practice Law, the summary judgment
provision of that section automatically applies to proceedings
under the Act. There is no dispute that the proceedings under the
Act are civil in nature. The plain language of the statute makes this
fact apparent. Nonetheless, this court has long recognized that the
application of the Act may result in deprivation of liberty. As such,
we have consistently held that a person proceeding under the Act
must be accorded the essential protections available to a defendant
in a criminal trial, including the right to counsel and the right to a
jury trial. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 312; Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. In
that respect the Act can be characterized as a hybrid; although civil
in nature, it still confers certain rights of a criminal defendant to
a person proceeded against under the Act. The extension of these
rights to a person filing an application for recovery under section
9 of the Act guides our decision in this case.
	If the recovery hearing scheme created by the appellate court,
which places the burden of proof on the defendant, was approved,
a defendant would gain nothing in terms of an opportunity to
regain his freedom. Because, according to Illinois law, the trial
court is not required to provide an independent psychiatrist to the
defendant under the Act, the defendant would have nothing but his
own application to present to the trier of fact. People v. McVeay,
302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 964 (1999). The necessarily limited
allegations made in the defendant's application alone would
almost always be insufficient to sustain the burden placed on him
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has recovered.
	Theoretically, a defendant could, on his own or with the help
of privately retained expert witnesses, make a sufficient allegation
in his petition to meet the present burden. However, a review of
nearly half a century of case law interpreting the Act has failed to
reveal such a hypothetical case. To require the defendant to prove
that he has recovered and to rebut the statutorily required socio-psychiatric report effectively reduces the defendant's right to a jury
trial to an exercise in futility. See People v. Coan, 316 Ill. App. 3d
14, 16-17 (2000) (McLaren, J., specially concurring). A
defendant's right to assistance of counsel and the right to demand
a jury trial, that we have previously held is available to him under
section 5 of the Act, would be, in almost all cases, rendered of no
value. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998); Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d  at 282.
	In Shiro, we held that if a person who is committed as a
sexually dangerous person files an application for release, the
court is required to determine whether he should be released and
must grant the defendant's request for a jury trial. Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d 
at 282, citing Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. However, if the defendant
during a recovery proceeding were placed in the situation where
he had to proceed with the evidence, he would never be able to
sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. It
is unlikely that such a defendant would ever survive a motion for
a directed verdict at the close of his evidence. Essentially, section
5 of the Act would be rendered completely ineffectual in the
recovery proceedings.
	The eradication of the protections provided by section 5 of the
Act was the appellate court's concern in this case on direct appeal. 
312 Ill. App. 3d 860. As the appellate court accurately noted,
granting a summary judgment motion would allow the State to
"circumvent the defendant's right to a jury trial in violation of
section 5 of the Act." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 863. That was precisely
the outcome when the trial court granted the State's motion for
summary judgment in this case. Defendant was stripped of his
right to demand a jury trial, the right to be represented by counsel,
and the right to test the State's evidence against him.
	The requirements of due process, under both the United States
and the Illinois Constitutions, required that the drastic impairment
of the liberty and reputation of an individual which results from
civil commitment under the Act be justified. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 
at 321. Allowing a system to exist which would make section 5
essentially inoperable during recovery proceedings would deny the
defendant of any viable method of regaining his freedom and
would violate his due process rights.
	As our court stated in Olmstead, a defendant's route to
freedom should not "find a road block in the fact that the indigent
defendant is inarticulate in the forms of law or that he does not
have the affidavits of psychiatric specialists to support his
application." Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 314. The minimum pleading
requirement for a defendant filing an application for recovery
under the Act is that he must set forth facts and circumstances
showing that he has recovered. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d  at 314. Under
the principles set forth in Olmstead, and its progeny, defendant's
application in this case fulfilled the minimum pleading
requirement. Those facts and circumstances did not need to be
accompanied by additional psychiatric reports or documents.
Therefore, on its face, the application for recovery was sufficient
and required the court to set the matter for a hearing and to
impanel a jury.
	 Defendant's only avenue to freedom, a hearing pursuant to an
application for recovery where the State must sustain the burden
of proof against defendant, would be thwarted through a motion
for summary judgment. Applying the principles of a purely civil
remedy would force defendant to show that a material fact exists.
As we have previously noted, defendant is not entitled to
appointment of an independent expert. Therefore, the only expert
opinion that would be considered at a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment is that contained in the Department's socio-psychiatric report. Thus, the defendant would be placed in a
position where the true decision would not be made by an
impartial fact finder but by the expert testimony of the government
psychiatrist or reliance on the Department's expert's report.
	The defendant would have nothing to present to the trier of
fact, as he is indigent and without any means to procure evidence
necessary to overcome the presumption against him. As a
consequence, the State would never have to meet its burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to show that the defendant had
not recovered and that he should remain confined in the
Department of Corrections.
	The scheme envisioned by our appellate court would deprive
defendant of having a jury of 12 impartial citizens test the
credibility of the witnesses and determine the defendant's future.
A defendant would only find success in a situation where the
State's experts agreed that the accused has recovered from the
condition that first led to his commitment. This outcome, however,
is highly improbable.
	Stripping the defendant of the protections of section 5 under
the Act would render an absurd result. In essence, a defendant's
avenue to liberty, paved with precious rights to counsel and trial
by jury, under the current structure created by various panels of the
appellate court, would be equipped with a dead end. To avoid such
a contrary result, we conclude that a motion for summary
judgment is an inappropriate civil remedy that has no place in
applications for recovery filed under the Act.
	We realize that the Act imposes a significant burden on this
State's limited judicial resources. The Act is silent and contains no
limitation on the number of applications showing recovery that a
sexually dangerous person may file. In addition, it also fails to
specify the length of time allowed between applications, unlike its
similar sister statute.(4) Although we recognize the impact of the Act
on the State's resources, this is a legislative matter that we must
leave for the General Assembly to address.
IV. CONCLUSION
	For these reasons, we find that upon defendant's filing of the
application for recovery, the trial court should have appointed
counsel to represent the indigent defendant, should have
impaneled a jury pursuant to the defendant's jury demand and
should have held a hearing, structured as we have indicated, to
determine if the defendant had recovered from the disability
responsible for his confinement. In this respect, the State's
evidence, which is the barrier to a defendant's freedom, is tested
at a jury trial in which the State's witnesses have been cross-examined by counsel for the defendant; their credibility has been
tested; and a decision is made by 12 impartial citizens whether the
applicant should continue to remain in the custody of the State.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1.    1We recognize that the procedures under the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act are different from the involuntary commitment proceedings
for individuals committed under the provisions of the Sexually Violent
Persons Act, namely, the Act provides an alternative to criminal
prosecution while commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Act
is pursued in addition to criminal proceedings. 725 ILCS 207/15(b)
(West 1998); 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).

2.      2The Sexually Violent Persons Act provides three different
procedures available to a defendant who is committed under the Act of
obtaining discharge. The first involves a hearing where the State has the
right to have the defendant examined by an expert and has the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still
sexually violent. 725 ILCS 207/65(a)(2) (West 1998). The second
mechanism for discharge is triggered whenever the defendant undergoes
one of the periodic examinations required by statute. The State must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is still
sexually violent. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 1998). Finally, a
defendant can petition for discharge at times other than the periodic
examinations, subject to certain limitations outlined in the act. 725 ILCS
207/70 (West 1998).

3.      3Under both statutes the burden of proof during a recovery hearing
remains on the State. However, unlike the Sexually Violent Persons Act,
where the legislature has created a standard of proof by clear and
convincing evidence (725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 1998)) the standard
of proof in the Act remains beyond a reasonable doubt (725 ILCS
205/3.01 (West 1998)).

4.      4Under the Sexually Violent Persons Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.
(West 1998)), after a defendant has been committed to institutional care,
the Department of Human Services is to conduct an examination of his
mental condition within 6 months of the initial commitment and again
thereafter at least once every 12 months.