Title: Morva v. Warden (ORDER)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
     In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme 
Court Building in the City of Richmond, on Friday, the 12th 
day of April, 2013. 
 
 
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
 
William Charles Morva, 
Petitioner, 
 
 against 
Record No. 102281 
 
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
 
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed December 3, 2010, and the respondent’s 
motion to dismiss, the Court is of the opinion that the 
motion should be granted and the writ should not issue. 
Petitioner, William Charles Morva, was convicted in 
the Circuit Court of Washington County of capital murder 
while in custody, Code § 18.2-31(3), capital murder of a 
law-enforcement officer, Code § 18.2-31(6), capital murder 
of more than one person within a three-year period, Code 
§ 18.2-31(8), assaulting a law-enforcement officer, Code § 
18.2-57(C), escape, Code § 18.2-478, and two counts of use 
of a firearm in the commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1.  
After finding the aggravating factors of vileness and 
future dangerousness, the jury fixed Morva’s sentence at 
 
 
2
death for each of the three capital murder convictions and 
sixteen years’ imprisonment for the remaining convictions.  
The trial court sentenced Morva in accordance with the 
jury’s verdicts.  This Court affirmed Morva’s convictions 
and upheld his sentence of death in Morva v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 329, 683 S.E.2d 553 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 131 S.Ct. 97 (2010). 
CLAIM (I) 
In claim (I), Morva alleges that a juror concealed 
information during voir dire that, if disclosed, would 
likely have resulted in the juror’s exclusion from the jury 
panel for cause.  Morva contends juror Richard M. Bouck 
failed to disclose that he had two relatives in law-
enforcement who were also close friends, that he knew the 
relatives were within the scope of the voir dire question, 
and that he intentionally chose not to reveal those 
relationships. 
Morva argues that had Bouck disclosed this 
information, which Morva did not discover until after his 
direct appeal was final, Bouck could have been stricken for 
cause and, as a result of Bouck’s failure to disclose the 
relationships, Morva’s Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury was violated.  The Court holds that this 
claim is without merit. 
 
 
3
In support of this claim, Morva relies on the 
affidavit of a law student who interviewed jurors on 
Morva’s behalf, after Morva’s appeal became final.  The law 
student describes an interview with Bouck and relates a 
number of hearsay statements purportedly made by Bouck.  
The record, including Bouck’s affidavit, demonstrates that 
Bouck and the interviewer discussed two men who worked in 
law-enforcement, Bouck’s step-mother-in-law’s nephew and a 
former co-worker’s brother.  In his affidavit, Bouck 
asserts that he “barely know[s] either of these men.  They 
are, at best, mere acquaintances.  They are not relatives 
or close friends.” 
Morva fails to proffer any evidence, such as 
affidavits from Bouck’s friends or family or from the 
individuals Bouck identified as persons known to him to be 
in law-enforcement, to support his allegation that Bouck 
failed to answer honestly when asked by the trial court if 
he had “any close friends or family members or associates 
who are employed in law enforcement.”  Thus, Morva has 
failed to demonstrate that juror Bouck failed to answer 
honestly a material question during voir dire and he has 
consequently failed to show he was denied the right to an 
impartial jury.  See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 
 
 
4
CLAIM (II)(A) 
In claim (II)(A), Morva asserts his due process rights 
were violated because he was visibly restrained during 
trial.  Morva alleges he wore visible handcuffs upon 
entering and exiting the courtroom while jurors were 
present, wore leg restraints that were visible to jurors 
beneath counsel table, and wore a stun belt under his 
clothing that was sufficiently bulky to attract attention.  
Morva also alleges that the remote control for the stun 
belt held by an officer in proximity to Morva was visible 
to the jury. 
The Court holds claim (II)(A) is barred because this 
non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial 
and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton v. Parrigan, 
215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
CLAIM (II)(B) 
In claim (II)(B), Morva asserts he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
object to any restraints Morva was made to wear during 
trial, absent a judicial determination of necessity.  In 
addition, he asserts that counsel failed to ensure that the 
restraints were invisible and failed to ensure that 
 
 
5
security and court personnel were advised that the jurors 
should not see or learn about the restraints. 
Morva contends counsel should have taken remedial 
steps, such as placing litigation bags or boxes in front of 
counsel table, monitoring strict compliance with the rule 
that restrained defendants not be moved into or out of the 
courtroom when jurors are present, and providing Morva with 
a blazer to hide the bulge from the stun belt.  Morva 
contends he was prejudiced because the visible restraints 
undermined the presumption of innocence, and, at 
sentencing, underscored the message presented by the 
Commonwealth that he was a danger to society.  He asserts 
that this contributed to his decision not to take the stand 
to present evidence of his “fear that he would die if he 
remained in, or was returned to, the toxic Montgomery 
County [J]ail.” 
The Court holds claim (II)(B) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  The record, including the manuscript record, 
the affidavits of several jurors, and the affidavit of 
Charles Partin, Master Deputy with the Montgomery County 
Sheriff’s Office, who was responsible for coordinating 
transportation and security for Morva in connection with 
 
 
6
his trial, demonstrates that Morva’s right to a fair trial 
was not undermined by courtroom security.  The record 
indicates that all visible restraints were removed from 
Morva prior to the jurors entering the courtroom; Morva 
wore a stun belt that was beneath his clothing and thus 
designed to be invisible to jurors, and a leg-stiffening 
restraint strapped to Morva’s leg was worn under his pants 
and was not visible on the outside of his clothing.  
Accordingly, Morva’s allegation that he wore restraints 
visible to the jurors and was prejudiced because visible 
restraints undermined the presumption of innocence, or at 
sentencing indicated he was a danger to society, has no 
merit. 
Although some jurors executed affidavits after the 
trial stating that during the trial they became aware that 
Morva was wearing a stun belt, Morva proffers no evidence 
to suggest Morva’s counsel was or should have been aware 
any juror had learned that information during trial.  
Because Morva was not visibly restrained in the presence of 
the jury and because there is no evidence that counsel was 
or should have been aware that jurors had learned Morva was 
wearing a stun belt under his clothing, trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the restraints or stun belt placed on 
Morva was not deficient performance.  Moreover, the 
 
 
7
security measures were justified given Morva’s demonstrated 
history, which showed a willingness to use violence to 
effect and maintain an escape from custody, and were not 
inherently prejudicial.  See Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 
Va. 203, 263, 661 S.E.2d 415, 446 (2008).  Thus, Morva has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (III) 
In a portion of claim (III), Morva asserts he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to point out that Jennifer Preston, who witnessed 
Morva shoot Derrick McFarland, was not looking at McFarland 
at the time of the shooting and could not have seen the 
gestures McFarland made.  Morva contends he interpreted 
McFarland’s “movements” as an attempt to draw a weapon and 
that Morva did not know until later that McFarland was 
unarmed. 
Morva also argues that counsel did not use Preston or 
other witnesses to “point out the significance of the dark, 
Special Weapons and Tactics [S.W.A.T.] team/paramilitary-
style uniform McFarland wore that night.”  Counsel failed 
to note that the dark color of the uniform and the multiple 
 
 
8
pockets and bulges made it difficult to detect the absence 
of a weapon, which would have rebutted the Commonwealth’s 
assertion that Morva knew McFarland was unarmed. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates 
Preston testified that the events she witnessed, including 
the shooting, took mere seconds.  She testified that she 
observed McFarland standing very still with his hands 
outstretched in a supplicating gesture, and Morva standing 
very still and pointing a gun at McFarland.  She stated she 
clearly saw the expression on each man’s face, and then she 
saw Morva shoot McFarland.  There is no evidence in the 
record, and Morva proffers none, that Preston was not 
looking at McFarland when Morva pulled the trigger. 
The witnesses testified that McFarland’s uniform 
consisted of a dark shirt with a patch and matching 
trousers.  Morva does not proffer any evidence, nor is 
there any in the record, to support his claim that 
McFarland’s uniform was paramilitary or likely mistaken for 
that of armed law-enforcement personnel.  Furthermore, 
Morva fails to provide evidence of any gestures made by 
 
 
9
McFarland that would indicate he was reaching for a firearm 
before he was shot. 
Even if McFarland was armed and was wearing a 
paramilitary type uniform, Morva shot McFarland as he stood 
in front of Morva with his hands in a supplicating gesture.   
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a 
frivolous argument that Morva was justified in shooting 
McFarland.  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
In another portion of claim (III), Morva contends he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to obtain a corrective jury instruction when 
Preston testified improperly that McFarland looked at her 
with “warning eyes to tell me there was danger.”  Although 
counsel objected that the statement was speculative, and 
the court agreed, counsel did not ask for a curative 
instruction.  Morva contends the jury was instructed that 
they may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony, 
and as there was nothing innately unbelievable about 
Preston’s testimony, the jury was compelled to consider it.  
Morva contends further that the error was compounded 
 
 
10
because Preston was also allowed to testify that McFarland 
“looked scared,” and “like he was trying to appease 
[Morva],” who was “scowling” and “looking angry.” 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  The 
record, including the trial transcript, demonstrates that 
counsel objected to Preston’s speculation as to what 
information she perceived McFarland was attempting to 
impart to her, which objection was sustained.  Thus, such 
testimony was not admitted into evidence. 
Preston was permitted to describe what she observed, 
and she demonstrated for the jury how McFarland was 
standing.  Preston also testified that she was in the 
hallway with McFarland and Morva, that Morva was standing 
two feet from McFarland pointing a “big gun” at McFarland’s 
face while McFarland stood very still with his hands 
outstretched, and that Morva then shot McFarland.  Under 
these circumstances, Morva cannot demonstrate that 
counsel’s failure to ask for a curative instruction 
concerning Preston’s perceptions of the information the 
victim was attempting to convey with his facial expression 
was deficient performance.  The testimony was excluded from 
evidence and to ask for a curative instruction may have 
 
 
11
emphasized the testimony.  See Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 
Va. 123, 127 n.2, 340 S.E.2d 828, 830 n.2 (1986).  Such 
tactical decisions are an area of trial strategy left to 
the discretion of counsel and should not be second-guessed 
in habeas corpus.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.  
Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (III), Morva maintains he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Officer Brian 
Roe.  Morva contends that Roe’s testimony regarding Eric 
Sutphin’s gun holster being snapped shut contradicted other 
witnesses who reported, but did not testify, that upon 
seeing Sutphin’s body later, the weapon was in its holster, 
but the holster was unsnapped.  Morva contends this 
information supports his account that he believed Sutphin 
was drawing a weapon, that he warned Sutphin not to draw 
his weapon, and that Morva only fired after the warning was 
given. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (III) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  No 
 
 
12
witnesses testified that Deputy Sutphin’s holster was 
unsnapped and Officer Roe could not have been cross-
examined on the hearsay reports of others.  Morva fails to 
establish that more comprehensive cross-examination would 
have resulted in Officer Roe changing his unequivocal, 
uncontradicted testimony.  Thus, Morva has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
CLAIM (IV) 
In claim (IV), Morva argues he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
adequately investigate and develop evidence relating to the 
conditions at Montgomery County Jail.  Morva contends that 
conditions at the jail included extreme overcrowding, non-
existent medical care, an ever-present threat of violent 
attack, and lack of privacy when going to the bathroom.  
Morva contends that this evidence would have helped jurors 
understand how Morva’s “horrendous experience at the jail 
influenced his actions.”  Morva further contends that 
failure to provide this information “undermines confidence 
in [the] jurors’ decision at the trial’s guilt and penalty 
phases.” 
 
 
13
The Court holds that claim (IV) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates that Morva was not exposed 
to any unique conditions of confinement and Morva was not 
denied medical treatment.  Morva’s conditions of 
confinement would not have provided a viable defense to the 
murders he committed, and would not have mitigated the 
murders.  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise 
frivolous arguments.  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (V) 
In claim (V), Morva alleges he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
present evidence and argument of Morva’s belief that “the 
specific combination of his longstanding and significant 
medical problems and lack of immediate treatment options 
while incarcerated presented an imminent, life-threatening 
situation, and that he would die soon if he remained in the 
jail.”  Morva contends that his escape from the jail and 
subsequent killing of the two victims to avoid being 
 
 
14
returned to the jail “were motivated by his belief that his 
actions were acts of self-defense and necessary responses 
to the immediate threat posed by his particular experience 
of the circumstances at the jail.”  Thus, according to 
Morva, even if the jury found his “fear to be unreasonable, 
the evidence was sufficient to present argument and 
instruction . . . with regard to a potential lesser-
included offense and in mitigation of the death sentence.” 
The Court holds that claim (V) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  There is no support in law 
for the proposition that one attempting to escape legal 
incarceration because of what he perceives as a threat of 
harm is thereby privileged to kill any individual, no 
matter how innocent or lacking in culpability, who presents 
a bar to that escape.  Moreover, the record, including the 
trial transcript and Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates no 
person could reasonably have apprehended imminent death or 
serious bodily harm from McFarland or Sutphin. 
Morva’s alleged fear that his return to Montgomery 
County Jail might result in his death within a few months 
from some unnamed danger did not create a valid claim of 
self-defense, nor was it reasonably probable that the jury 
would have perceived his alleged fear as mitigating 
 
 
15
evidence for his murder of two innocent people.  Also, the 
record does not support Morva's allegation that he was 
persistently denied necessary medical attention.  In fact, 
he had been taken to the hospital for medical treatment at 
the time he attacked two of the victims and escaped.  
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue a 
frivolous position or argument.  Thus, Morva has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
CLAIM (VI)(A) 
In claim (VI)(A), Morva asserts he received multiple 
punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clause.  
Morva contends his case is indistinguishable from Clagett 
v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996), in that 
Morva’s capital conviction and death sentence for killing 
both McFarland and Sutphin within three years was 
derivative of the underlying capital murders of McFarland 
and Sutphin.  Morva contends “the legislature must be 
deemed to have authorized a defendant’s conviction and 
death sentence for multiple-homicide offenses only when he 
is not also convicted and sentenced to death for the 
predicate murders.” 
 
 
16
 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(A) is barred because 
this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at 
trial and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. 
at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
CLAIM (VI)(B) 
In claim (VI)(B), Morva asserts he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
object to, and thus failed to protect Morva from, multiple 
convictions and multiple punishments in violation of the 
double jeopardy clause.  Morva contends that had counsel 
objected, the third death sentence would not have been 
imposed or would have been vacated. 
The Court holds that claim (VI)(B) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  In Payne v. Commonwealth, 
257 Va. 216, 227-29, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300-01 (1999), this 
Court addressed whether a defendant could be subjected to 
multiple punishments where the convictions are for the 
violation of distinct statutory provisions for which 
separate statutory punishments are authorized.  The Court 
held that such punishments do not violate double jeopardy.  
Id. 
 
 
17
Morva was sentenced to death for three separate 
capital offenses:  capital murder while in custody, Code § 
18.2-31(3), capital murder of a law-enforcement officer, 
Code § 18.2-31(6), and capital murder of more than one 
person within a three-year period, Code § 18.2-31(8).  The 
elements of capital murder while in custody are: (1) the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing; (2) of 
another; (3) by a prisoner of a state or local correctional 
facility, or while in the custody of an employee of such 
facility.  The elements of capital murder of a law-
enforcement officer are:  (1) the willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing; (2) of a law-enforcement officer; (3) 
for the purpose of interfering with the performance of his 
official duties.  The elements of capital murder of more 
than one person within a three-year period are: (1) the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing; (2) of more 
than one person; (3) within a three-year period.  The 
elements of each of these capital offenses are different 
and each carries its own separate penalty. 
There was no double jeopardy violation under the 
circumstances of this case, and counsel is not ineffective 
for failing to raise a frivolous argument.  Thus, Morva has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
 
 
18
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
CLAIM (VII) 
In claim (VII), Morva contends he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
unreasonably failed to investigate and present powerful 
mitigation evidence that Morva had saved a man’s life and 
helped the Commonwealth prosecute the man’s assailant.  
Morva alleges that he once put his own life at risk to help 
the victim of an assault, Kevin Grizzard, and that Morva’s 
later testimony against one of the assailants led to that 
person’s conviction.  Morva also alleges that, as a result 
of his own actions, he suffered bullying and harassment, 
including while he was confined in the Montgomery County 
Jail.  Morva contends that both he and Grizzard would have 
testified to the events in question, if they were called at 
an evidentiary hearing, and that there is a reasonable 
probability that the omitted testimony would have provided 
jurors with a better understanding of Morva’s background 
and character, and would have moved at least one juror to 
select life without parole as the appropriate sentence. 
The Court holds that claim (VII) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva fails to proffer an 
 
 
19
affidavit from Grizzard to verify that he would have 
testified as Morva contends, and the affidavits Morva has 
provided contain hearsay statements concerning the attack 
and Morva’s involvement.  Furthermore, the information 
provided by Morva establishes that Grizzard had been 
recruited by Morva to participate in a number of burglaries 
in 2005, and that Morva had become increasingly anti-social 
leading up to the murders, had expressed his disdain for 
law-enforcement, and felt justified in his criminal 
behavior.  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to 
present evidence that has the potential of being “double-
edged.”  Lewis v. Warden, 274 Va. 93, 116, 645 S.E.2d 492, 
505 (2007).  Such tactical decisions are an area of trial 
strategy left to the discretion of counsel and should not 
be second-guessed in habeas corpus.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689-90.  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (VIII) 
In claim (VIII), Morva asserts he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
conduct an adequate investigation into Morva’s childhood 
 
 
20
and family background, and failed to meaningfully present 
the limited evidence they uncovered about Morva’s home 
life.  Morva contends counsel “cut short” the investigation 
into Morva’s family, which Morva contends would otherwise 
have revealed “influential genetic and environmental 
factors at play.”  Morva contends counsel should have 
pursued information regarding Morva’s father’s ties to 
Hungary because Morva’s father fled Hungary during the 
revolution and was a Catholic of Jewish heritage who had 
suffered through the Holocaust.  Morva argues this 
information was necessary for jurors to accurately 
understand Morva’s background. 
The Court holds that claim (VIII) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  The record, including 
Morva’s exhibits, demonstrates that counsel conducted an 
exhaustive investigation and spoke with the witnesses upon 
whose affidavits Morva now relies.  These affidavits 
contain vast amounts of negative information that shows 
Morva as self-absorbed, manipulative, aggressive, and 
uncaring.  As such, testimony from these witnesses would 
have been “double-edged.”  Lewis, 274 Va. at 116, 645 
S.E.2d at 505.  Furthermore, Morva has not demonstrated 
what impact, if any, his parents’ upbringings had on his 
 
 
21
actions.  The information about his parents that Morva now 
provides does not concern Morva’s personal background or 
history, or the circumstances of the offense, and does not 
mitigate Morva’s actions.  Thus, Morva has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
CLAIM (IX)(A) 
In claim (IX)(A), Morva asserts he did not receive 
constitutionally guaranteed assistance of experts in the 
preparation of his defense because the experts who 
evaluated Morva did not serve as advocates for him, but 
instead improperly maintained objectivity.  In order to 
fulfill the constitutional guarantee of expert assistance, 
Morva asserts that the experts should have identified, 
developed and presented evidence to cast Morva’s history, 
character, background, and mental condition in the light 
most favorable to him. 
The Court holds claim (IX)(A) is barred because this 
non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial 
and on direct appeal and, thus, is not cognizable in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Slayton, 215 Va. at 
29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. 
 
 
22
CLAIM (IX)(B) 
In claim (IX)(B), Morva contends he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
object after being put on notice that the appointed experts 
would not act in Morva’s best interest or advocate on his 
behalf.  As a result, the experts did not fulfill their 
roles as advocates and Morva was denied his constitutional 
right to expert assistance. 
The Court holds that claim (IX)(B) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva proffers no authority 
for his contention that the experts appointed to assist 
Morva should be biased in Morva’s favor.  Morva was 
entitled to, and received, “access to [] competent” mental 
health experts to “conduct an appropriate examination and 
assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of” 
Morva’s defense, as required by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68, 84 (1985).  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
 
 
 
 
23
CLAIM (X) 
In claim (X), Morva asserts he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
conduct an adequate enough investigation to enable the 
mental health experts to make an informed and accurate 
diagnosis.  Morva contends counsel should have obtained 
information from Morva’s family and friends about the 
symptoms of his descent into mental illness.  He also 
claims that counsel should have obtained medical records 
from Morva’s immediate family, and that without such 
information, mental health experts under-diagnosed the 
severity of Morva’s mental illness. 
The Court holds that claim (X) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva proffers no competent 
evidence to substantiate his claim that he suffered from a 
“true mental illness,” or that providing additional 
information to the mental health experts who examined Morva 
in preparation for trial and sentencing would have changed 
the experts’ conclusions.  Thus, Morva has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. 
 
 
24
CLAIM (XI) 
In a portion of claim (XI), Morva asserts he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to provide appointed mental health experts with even 
the minimal information counsel had obtained that would 
have enabled the experts to make an informed and accurate 
diagnosis.  Morva contends counsel should have given the 
mental health experts the names of several individuals with 
whom Morva spent time in the years before the murders.  He 
contends that had counsel done so, the experts would have 
interviewed these individuals and would likely have 
determined Morva suffered from a “true mental illness” such 
as delusional or schizophrenic disorder. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (XI) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva 
proffers no competent evidence to substantiate his claim 
that he suffered from a “true mental illness,” or that 
providing additional information to the mental health 
experts who examined Morva in preparation for trial and 
sentencing would have changed the experts' conclusions.  
Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance was deficient or that there is a reasonable 
 
 
25
probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In another portion of claim (XI), Morva asserts he was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
failed to reconcile the expert testimony with that of lay 
witnesses.  Morva contends these conflicts led the jury to 
conclude that all of Morva’s penalty phase evidence was 
unreliable. 
The Court holds that this portion of claim (XI) 
satisfies neither the “performance” nor the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva 
fails to state how counsel could possibly have reconciled 
the testimony of all the various witnesses, who had each 
known and spent time with Morva at different periods of his 
life, and who each had different experiences with and 
perceptions of him.  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate 
that counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (XII) 
In claim (XII), Morva asserts he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
object to damaging evidence that lacked a proper 
 
 
26
evidentiary foundation and was therefore irrelevant to the 
jurors’ sentencing decisions.  Specifically, Morva contends 
counsel should have objected when the Commonwealth elicited 
testimony from Morva’s mental health experts regarding 
narcissism and predatory aggression because neither expert 
found a basis for diagnosing Morva as having narcissistic 
personality disorder or predatory aggression. 
The Court holds that claim (XII) satisfies neither the 
“performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva’s experts found that 
Morva “met diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality 
disorder” or had “narcissistic personality features.”  
Thus, there was sufficient foundation for the Commonwealth 
to question Morva’s experts regarding narcissistic traits.  
Moreover, the Commonwealth presented evidence that showed 
Morva’s actions were aggressive, premeditated, and goal 
oriented and that Morva did not regret his actions, thus 
establishing a foundation for the questions regarding 
predatory aggression.  Counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to raise a frivolous argument by objecting to such 
evidence.  Thus, Morva has failed to demonstrate that 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged 
 
 
27
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
CLAIM (XIII) 
In claim (XIII), Morva contends he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to 
impeach Gregory Nelson by causing him to admit part of his 
in-court testimony was inconsistent with interview 
statements he made to police officers.  Nelson testified 
during the penalty phase of the trial that he and Morva 
participated in various crimes and that Morva had 
threatened Nelson and others. 
Counsel attempted to impeach Nelson by showing that in 
his interviews with police, Nelson did not say that Morva 
had threatened him.  When Nelson denied this, counsel 
attempted to use the interview statements to refresh 
Nelson’s recollection, but the Commonwealth’s objection was 
sustained because Nelson had not signed the statements.  
Morva contends that although counsel reserved the right to 
recall the police officers and Nelson, counsel failed to do 
so as a result of inadvertence instead of strategy.  Morva 
contends impeaching Nelson through the police officer's 
testimony would have minimized the effect of evidence 
regarding Morva's future dangerousness. 
 
 
28
The Court holds that claim (XIII) satisfies neither 
the “performance” nor the “prejudice” prong of the two-part 
test enunciated in Strickland.  Morva does not provide the 
police report, or affidavits from the police officers or 
from Nelson to demonstrate the testimony they would have 
provided had counsel recalled them.  In addition, Morva 
proffers no evidence to support his claim that counsel’s 
“failure was the result of inadvertence.”  Thus, Morva has 
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
deficient or that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
Upon consideration whereof, Morva’s motions for leave 
to supplement the record, to amend the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, for discovery and production of 
documents, for appointment of experts, and for an 
evidentiary hearing are denied.  Morva’s motion for en banc 
consideration is denied as moot. 
Upon consideration of the respondent’s motion to 
strike portions of Morva’s appendix and Morva’s reply, the 
motion to strike is denied.  The exhibits contained in the 
appendices are considered pursuant to the appropriate 
evidentiary rules. 
 
 
29
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the 
respondent shall recover from Morva the costs expended in 
his defense herein. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports. 
 
 
Respondent’s costs: 
 
 
Attorney’s fee  
 
$50.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
     Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk