Title: Acordia of Ohio, LLC v. Fishel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4648.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-4648 
ACORDIA OF OHIO, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. FISHEL ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4648.] 
On reconsideration—Acordia has the right to enforce noncompete agreements as 
if it had stepped into the shoes of the contracting companies—Judgment 
reversed, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2011-0163—Submitted July 10, 2012—Decided October 11, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,  
No. C-1000071, 2010-Ohio-6235. 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This matter is before us on a motion for reconsideration filed by 
appellant, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. (“the L.L.C.”) and supported by amici curiae, 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Ohio Chemistry Technology Council, USI 
Holdings Corporation, USI Midwest, Inc., Hylant Group, Inc., Cintas 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Corporation, and professors Sean K. Mangan and John A. Barrett Jr.  A 
memorandum in opposition was filed by appellees Michael Fishel, Janice Freytag, 
Mark Taber, Sheila Diefenbach (collectively, “the employees”), Neace Lukens 
Insurance Agency, L.L.C., Neace & Associates Insurance Agency of Ohio, Inc., 
and Joseph T. Lukens. We granted the motion for reconsideration.  Acordia of 
Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-3334, ___ N.E.2d ___. 
{¶ 2} In Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-
Ohio-2297, ___ N.E.2d ___ (“Acordia I”), this court affirmed the judgment of the 
court of appeals.  The lead opinion concluded that while the employees’ 
noncompete agreements transferred by operation of law following merger with 
the L.L.C., the language found in those agreements precluded the L.L.C. from 
enforcing them as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting 
employer.  Id. at ¶ 14, 19. 
{¶ 3} After reviewing the memoranda presented to the court on 
reconsideration, we have determined that portions of the lead opinion in Acordia I 
should be clarified.  We reassert that in accordance with R.C. 1701.82(A)(3), all 
assets and property, including employment contracts and agreements, and every 
interest in the assets and property of each constituent entity transfer through 
operation of law to the resulting company postmerger.  We clarify the lead 
opinion by noting that certain language was, upon further consideration, 
erroneous.  As a result, we now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court so that it may determine whether the 
noncompete agreements are enforceable against the employees. 
I.  Our Decision Is Limited to the Context of Noncompete Agreements 
{¶ 4} At the outset, we wish to emphasize that both the lead opinion in 
Acordia I and our decision today are limited in scope.  In its motion for 
reconsideration, the L.L.C. worries that Acordia I may affect not only 
noncompetition agreements, but all other contracts transferred as a result of a 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
merger.  This is not the case.  The proposition of law we accepted for review in 
this case stated: 
 
Pursuant to Ohio’s merger statutes, agreements between employees 
and employers that contain restrictive covenants are assets of the 
constituent company that transfer automatically by operation of 
law in a statutory merger from the constituent company to the 
surviving company and are enforceable by the surviving company 
according to the agreements’ original terms as if the surviving 
company were a party to the original agreements. 
 
Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2011-Ohio-1829, 945 
N.E.2d 522.  Our review of this case was thus limited to the narrow legal issues of 
whether noncompete agreements transferred by operation of law to the surviving 
company and whether the surviving company could enforce the agreements as if it 
had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting company.  Both the lead 
opinion in Acordia I and our decision today are based upon considerations unique 
to noncompete agreements in the context of a merger and apply only to this 
narrow vein of cases.  Nothing in either opinion should be construed as addressing 
the effect of a merger on any other company contracts. 
II.  The Noncompete Agreements Transfer by Operation of Law 
{¶ 5} The lead opinion in Acordia I clearly stated that noncompete 
agreements transfer automatically to the surviving company by operation of law.  
The lead opinion specifically provided, “We emphasize that in accordance with 
R.C. 1701.82(A)(3), the surviving company possesses all assets and property and 
every interest in the assets and property of each constituent entity, including 
employment contracts and agreements.”  Acordia I, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-
2297, __ N.E.2d __, at ¶ 14.  We reemphasize this principle today.  Ohio merger 
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law remains undisturbed, and employee noncompete agreements transfer to the 
surviving company after a merger has been completed pursuant to R.C. 
1701.82(A)(3). 
III.  Portions of the Lead Opinion in Accordia I Were Erroneous 
{¶ 6} After reviewing the parties’ memoranda and giving further 
consideration to this case, we conclude that portions of the lead opinion in 
Acordia I require correction.  Specifically, a portion of analysis found in Acordia 
I’s lead opinion was based upon a misreading of language from a previous case 
that “a merger involves the absorption of one company by another, the latter 
retaining its own name and identity, and acquiring the assets, liabilities, franchises 
and powers of the former. Of necessity, the absorbed company ceases to exist as a 
separate business entity.”  Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 26, 31, 
272 N.E.2d 105 (1971).  Based on this language, the lead opinion in Acordia I 
concluded that the companies with which the employees had signed noncompete 
agreements ceased to exist following the merger.  Acordia I at ¶ 12.  The lead 
opinion further reasoned that because the noncompete agreements do not state 
that they can be assigned or will carry over to the contracting company’s 
successors, the agreements’ specific language indicated that the contracting 
parties intended that the noncompete agreements would operate only between 
themselves—i.e., the employee and the specific employer.  Id. 
{¶ 7} Upon further consideration, we now recognize that the lead 
opinion’s reading of Morris was incomplete.  While Morris does state that the 
absorbed company ceases to exist as a separate business entity, the opinion does 
not state that the absorbed company is completely erased from existence.  Instead, 
the absorbed company becomes a part of the resulting company following merger.  
The merged company has the ability to enforce noncompete agreements as if the 
resulting company had stepped into the shoes of the absorbed company.  It 
follows that omission of any “successors or assigns” language in the employees’ 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
noncompete agreements in this case does not prevent the L.L.C. from enforcing 
the noncompete agreements. 
{¶ 8} Based on the foregoing clarification, we note that any language in 
the lead opinion in Acordia I stating that the L.L.C. was unable to enforce the 
employees’ noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the original 
contracting company’s shoes or that the agreements were required to contain 
“successors and assigns” language for the L.L.C. to have the power to enforce the 
agreements was erroneous. 
IV.  The Reasonableness of the Noncompete Agreements 
{¶ 9} While we now hold that the L.L.C. may enforce the noncompete 
agreements as if it had stepped into each original contracting company’s shoes, 
we agree with Justice Cupp’s assertion in his dissent in Acordia I that even though 
the agreements transfer to the L.L.C. by operation of law, the transfer does not 
“foreclose appropriate relief to the parties to the noncompete agreement under 
traditional principles of law that regulate and govern noncompete agreements.”  
Acordia I, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-2297, __ N.E.2d __, at ¶ 36 (Cupp, J., 
dissenting).  In other words, the employees still may challenge the continued 
validity of the noncompete agreements based on whether the agreements are 
reasonable and whether the numerous mergers in this case created additional 
obligations or duties so that the agreements should not be enforced on their 
original terms.  Id. at ¶ 39 (Cupp, J. dissenting). 
{¶ 10} We have held that “[a] covenant not to compete which imposes 
unreasonable restrictions upon an employee will be enforced to the extent 
necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate interests.”  Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 
42 Ohio St.2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975), paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Furthermore, “[a] covenant restraining an employee from competing with his 
former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if the restraint is 
no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public.”  Id., 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  In determining the reasonableness of a 
noncompete agreement, we have stated that courts must determine whether the 
restraints and resultant hardships on the employee exceed what is reasonable to 
protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.  Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., 
Inc., 57 Ohio St.3d 5, 8, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991). 
{¶ 11} Therefore, while we hold today that the L.L.C. has the right to 
enforce the employees’ noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes 
of the original contracting companies, we recognize that whether the noncompete 
agreements are reasonable remains an open question.  Because the lower courts 
have not ruled on the reasonableness of the noncompete agreements, we will not 
address that issue in this decision, and we now remand the case to the trial court 
so that it may consider the issue. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 12} Recognizing that both the lead opinion in Acordia I and our 
opinion today apply only in the limited context of employee noncompete 
agreements, we reassert that employee noncompete agreements transfer by 
operation of law to the surviving company after merger.  The language in Acordia 
I stating that the L.L.C. could not enforce the employees’ noncompete agreements 
as if it had stepped into the original contracting company’s shoes or that the 
agreements must contain “successors and assigns” language in order for the 
L.L.C. to enforce the agreements was erroneous.  We hold that the L.L.C. may 
enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of the 
original contracting companies, provided that the noncompete agreements are 
reasonable under the circumstances of this case.  We accordingly reverse the  
 
 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court so that it 
may determine the reasonableness of the noncompete agreements. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 13} I concur with the majority’s decision to reconsider this matter.  A 
noncompete agreement existing between an employee and a constituent entity is 
an asset of that entity and, in a statutory merger, transfers by operation of law to 
the surviving entity and is enforceable by the surviving entity as if it were a 
signatory to the original agreement.  As a result of a series of successive corporate 
mergers, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete agreements at issue 
in this case by operation of law, along with the ability to enforce them without 
regard to assignment.  The reasonableness of those agreements is not at issue 
before this court. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, I concur in the judgment to reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and to remand this matter for further proceedings. 
A Noncompete Agreement is an Asset that 
Passes by Operation of Law 
{¶ 15} R.C. 1701.82(A)(3) states, “The surviving or new entity possesses 
all assets and property of every description, and every interest in the assets and 
property, wherever located, and the rights, privileges, immunities, powers, 
franchises, and authority * * * of each constituent entity, and * * * all obligations 
belonging to or due to each constituent entity” without reversion or impairment.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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R.C. 1705.39, which pertains to mergers between corporations or partnerships and 
limited liability companies, confers the same vestments on the surviving entity. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 1701.82(A)(1) states that a constituent entity ceases to exist 
as a separate business in a merger; but that statute also provides several 
exceptions to this general rule, including when “a conveyance, assignment, 
transfer, deed, or other instrument or act is necessary to vest property or rights” in 
a surviving entity.  In those instances, “the existence of the constituent entities 
and the authority of their respective officers, directors, general partners, or other 
authorized representatives is continued notwithstanding the merger or 
consolidation.”  Id.; compare R.C. 1705.39(A)(1) (contains similar exceptions). 
{¶ 17} R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, by their operation, vest all the assets 
and obligations of a constituent entity in the surviving entity without reversion or 
impairment.  When we examined the effect of R.C. 1701.82 in the context of a 
stock purchase agreement entered into by a constituent entity, we held that a 
properly executed contract is binding on the surviving entity “in a merger unless 
the agreement explicitly sets forth that in the event of a merger, the obligations of 
the constituent corporation cease to exist”.  ASA Architects, Inc. v. Schlegel, 75 
Ohio St.3d 666, 665 N.E.2d 1083 (1996), syllabus.  In that case, the agreement 
made no provision for what would happen in the event of a merger, the surviving 
entity in the merger assumed full responsibility for all obligations of the 
constituent entity, and the parties did not enter into a new agreement following the 
merger.  Id. at 673.  Based on those factors, we determined that the contractual 
obligations of the constituent entity flowed, by operation of law, to the surviving 
entity.  Id.  These same considerations are present here and compel a similar 
conclusion. 
{¶ 18} More than 180 years ago, we recognized that contracts are 
subordinate to statutes, and the latter “may regulate them, prescribe their form, 
their effect, and the mode of their discharge, and every contract is supposed to be 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
made with reference to those laws.”  Smith v. Pasons, 1 Ohio 236, 238-239 
(1823).  And almost 100 years ago, we construed railroad-consolidation statutes 
that contained language similar to that in R.C. 1701.82 and determined that in a 
merger, “the consolidated company merely steps into the shoes of the constituent 
companies.”  Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 111 Ohio St. 139, 161-
164, 144 N.E. 689 (1924).  The appellate court’s determination that the terms of 
the agreements preclude Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., from their enforcement thus 
runs counter to our century-old precedent. 
{¶ 19} We applied this analysis more recently, rejecting the argument that 
a change in corporate structure invalidated noncompete agreements originally 
entered into by the constituent entity.  Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc., 57 Ohio 
St.3d 5, 7, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991).  There, the employees signed noncompete 
agreements while working for a sole proprietorship, which subsequently changed 
its business structure to that of a corporation, during their tenure of employment.  
Id.  In determining that the noncompete agreements were valid and could be 
enforced by the newly incorporated business, which had acquired all the assets 
and liabilities of the sole proprietorship, we were guided in our analysis by the 
fact that “[o]nly the legal structure of the business changed, not the business 
itself,” id., and that the change in corporate structure did not place additional 
burdens on the “duties or daily operations” of the employees.  Id. at 9.  This is the 
same circumstance that we confront in this case. 
{¶ 20} Here, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete 
agreements from Wells Fargo, which in turn had acquired them through a series 
of corporate mergers.  Those mergers, which began with Frederick Rauh & 
Company, did not affect the nature of the business — the sale of insurance 
securities; thus, the mergers changed only the corporate structure of the business 
operation.  Similarly, there is no evidence or claim in this record that additional 
employment duties or obligations resulted from these mergers.  Thus, Rogers 
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supports the conclusion that Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., is entitled to enforce the 
agreements it acquired in the merger that passed to it by operation of law. 
{¶ 21} Other courts construing similar statutes have reached this same 
result.  For example, in Corporate Express Office Prods., Inc. v. Phillips, the 
Supreme Court of Florida held that a surviving entity in a “merger assumes the 
right to enforce a noncompete agreement entered into with an employee of the 
merged corporation by operation of law, and no assignment is necessary * * * 
because in a merger, the two corporations in essence unite into a single corporate 
existence.”  847 So.2d 406, 414 (Fla.2003).  And in AON Consulting, Inc. v. 
Midlands Fin. Benefits, Inc., the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached the same 
result when it construed a Maryland statute, concluding that a surviving entity 
could enforce a noncompete agreement acquired in a merger because it was an 
asset that passed by operation of law, and no assignment was necessary.  275 Neb. 
642, 650-652, 748 N.W.2d 626 (Neb.2008).  See also Natl. Instrument, L.L.C. v. 
Braithwaite, Md.Cir.Ct.No. 24-C-06-004840, 2006 WL 2405831, *3 (June 5, 
2006), (identifying cases in which courts construed merger statutes that vested in 
surviving entities the assets of a constituent entity without further act or deed, and 
which held that surviving entities could enforce noncompete agreements because 
they were business assets that passed by operation of law and not by assignment). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Pursuant to R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, statutes governing mergers 
in Ohio, assets pass to a surviving entity by operation of law.  It has been 
understood for more than a century that contracts are subordinate to statutes and 
that the latter also determine the effect of merger contracts and their mode of 
discharge.  The agreements here automatically vested in Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., 
without reversion or impairment, because they are assets that passed by operation 
of law, and Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., can enforce the noncompete agreements as if 
it were a signatory to them. Because the surviving entity in a merger acquires the 
January Term, 2012 
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right to enforce a noncompete agreement entered into by a constituent entity by 
operation of law, neither assignment nor consent is necessary to effectuate that 
result. 
{¶ 23} In my view, it is not necessary to direct the trial court to determine 
the reasonableness of the noncompete agreements; although a trial court has the 
obligation to review a noncompete agreement for reasonableness, that issue has 
not been presented as a proposition of law, nor is it otherwise briefed or at issue 
before the court.  Accordingly, I concur in the judgment to reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and to remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} This case has been properly decided three separate times.  The trial 
court had it right, the court of appeals had it right, and this court had it right the 
first time.  I did not vote to accept jurisdiction, did not vote to reconsider the case, 
and remain convinced that this court should not have accepted jurisdiction or 
granted reconsideration.  Even though I believe that this case is being incorrectly 
decided, the good news is that, on remand, the lower courts are likely to reach the 
same sensible conclusions that they reached when they first encountered this case. 
{¶ 25} The common law and judicial policy have long disfavored 
noncompete agreements.  Starting with Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Henry 5, fol. 5, pl. 26 
(C.P.1414), noncompete agreements were prohibited.  Since the early 18th 
century, however, many jurisdictions have allowed noncompete agreements to be 
enforced when they are reasonable.  Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, 24 
Eng.Rep. 347 (Q.B.1711); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to 
Compete, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 625, 630 (1960).  The Supreme Court of the United 
States stated:  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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It is a well-settled rule of law that an agreement in general 
restraint of trade is illegal and void; but an agreement which 
operates merely in partial restraint of trade is good, provided it be 
not unreasonable and there be a consideration to support it.  In 
order that it may not be unreasonable, the restraint imposed must 
not be larger than is required for the necessary protection of the 
party with whom the contract is made. 
 
Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. 64-67, 66, 22 L.Ed. 315 (1873). 
{¶ 26} Noncompete agreements remain in disfavor and tend to be strictly 
construed against the employer.  Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., Inc. v. A–
1–A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 499, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 369 N.E.2d 4 (1977); Grant 
v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 411-412 (4th Cir.1984) (applying Virginia law).  
“In Minnesota, employment noncompete agreements ‘are looked upon with 
disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized.’ ”  Kallok v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn.1998), quoting Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting, 
270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965).  In certain respects, noncompete 
agreements are similar to indentured servitude.  See Blake at 632 (common law 
disfavor of noncompete agreements was aimed at preventing employers from 
violating the underlying precepts of the apprenticeship system).  In most respects, 
noncompete agreements are inimical to the free enterprise system. 
{¶ 27} The policy considerations that affect whether a particular 
noncompete agreement is reasonable and enforceable are explained by Michael J. 
Garrison and John T. Wendt: 
 
 
 
As a matter of public policy, courts have traditionally 
looked upon agreements not to compete with disfavor.  Such 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
restrictions on employees were prohibited under the early English 
common law; however, over time, the common law prohibition 
against noncompete agreements loosened.  The courts recognized 
that such agreements can be legitimate if they serve business 
interests other than the restriction of free trade.  Thus, agreements 
not to compete ancillary to an employment relationship have been 
permitted, subject to a reasonableness requirement. 
 
The common law reasonableness approach is an attempt to 
balance the conflicting interests of employers and employees as 
well as the societal interests in open and fair competition. 
Employers have a legitimate interest in preventing unfair 
competition through the misappropriation of business assets by 
former employees.  On the other hand, employees have a 
countervailing interest in their own mobility and marketability. 
Society has interests in maintaining free and fair competition and 
in fostering a marketplace environment that encourages new 
ventures and innovation.  There is a complementary public interest 
in preventing employers from using their superior bargaining 
position to unduly restrict labor markets.  Given these competing 
interests, the common law approach allows employee noncompete 
agreements but imposes significant limits on restrictive covenants 
to assure that they are not overly burdensome to employees and 
harmful to the marketplace. 
 
Under the common law approach, the employer must 
demonstrate a legitimate commercial reason for any agreement not 
to compete to ensure that the agreement is not a naked attempt to 
restrict free competition.  Merely preventing competition from a 
former employee is not a sufficient justification for a noncompete 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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agreement, even if the employee received training or acquired 
knowledge of a particular trade during his employment.  
Employees are entitled to use the general skills and knowledge 
acquired during their employment in competition with their former 
employer.  An employer must demonstrate “special circumstances” 
that make the agreement necessary to prevent some form of unfair 
competition. 
Traditionally, the courts recognized two primary interests as 
legitimate justifications for a noncompete agreement: the 
employer’s interests in protecting the goodwill of the business and 
in protecting its trade secrets. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Garrison & Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements:  Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 
Am.Bus.L.J. 107, 114-116 (2008). 
{¶ 28} In Ohio, “ ‘[a] covenant not to compete which imposes reasonable 
restrictions upon an employee will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect 
an employer's legitimate interests.  * * * [Such a] covenant “is reasonable if the 
restraint is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not 
impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public.’ ”  
Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc., 57 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991), 
quoting Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544, paragraphs 
one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 29} In this case, the noncompete agreement is an undue infringement 
on free enterprise.  The agreement unfairly protects the employer from 
competition from its former employees.  The employer’s trade secrets and 
customer list are already legitimately protected; the noncompete agreement does 
not protect them further.  The principal purposes undergirding the enforcement of 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
a noncompete agreement, both generally and in Ohio, are not applicable.  Under 
the circumstances of this case, I conclude that the noncompete agreement is 
unreasonable and, therefore, that it should not be enforced.  I would so conclude 
now, based on the record before us, without remanding the case. 
{¶ 30} In Dyer’s Case, Y.B.2 Henry 5, fol.5, pl. 26, the court concluded 
that the noncompete agreement “is void because the condition is against the 
common law, and by God, if the plaintiff were present he should rot in gaeol till 
he paid a fine to the King.”  That was justice. 
__________________ 
 
Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild, James F. McCarthy III, and Laura 
Hinegardner, for appellant. 
 
Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, L.P.A., and Mark E. Lutz, for 
appellees. 
 
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornette, John B. 
Nalbandian, and Ryan M. Bednarczuk, urging reconsideration for amici curiae 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. 
Beckman Weil Shepardson, L.L.C., and Peter L. Cassady, urging 
reconsideration for amici curiae USI Holdings Corporation and USI Midwest, Inc. 
Keating Muething & Klekamp and Robert E. Coletti, urging 
reconsideration for amicus curiae Cintas Corporation. 
Michelle Lafferty, urging reconsideration for amicus curiae Hyland 
Group, Inc. 
Manley Burke, L.P.A., and Timothy Burke, urging reconsideration for 
amici curiae Sean K. Mangan and John A. Barrett Jr. 
______________________