Title: Foley v. University of Dayton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Foley v. Univ. of Dayton, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7591.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7591 
FOLEY ET AL. v. UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Foley v. Univ. of Dayton, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7591.] 
Certified questions of state law—No cause of action exists in Ohio for the tort of 
negligent misidentification—Questions certified by the federal court are 
moot. 
(No. 2015-2032—Submitted July 13, 2016—Decided November 3, 2016.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the  
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, 
Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 3:15-cv-96. 
_____________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
I.  Introduction 
{¶ 1} The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, submitted three certified questions of Ohio law in accordance 
with S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.01: 
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1. What is the statute of limitations for claims of negligent 
misidentification? 
 
2.  Is the doctrine of absolute privilege applicable to claims 
of negligent misidentification and, if so, does it extend to 
statements made to law enforcement officers implicating another 
person in criminal activity?  
 
3.  Is the doctrine of qualified privilege applicable to claims 
of negligent misidentification? 
 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a plaintiff does not 
have a cause of action in tort for negligent misidentification and that it would 
contravene public policy to allow such a claim.  Accordingly, because we hold 
that no cause of action for negligent misidentification exists in Ohio, the certified 
questions are moot. 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} These certified questions originate from a lawsuit filed on March 13, 
2015.  Respondents here, Evan Foley, Andrew Foley, and Michael Fagans, 
alleged that on March 14, 2013, they knocked on the door of a townhouse on the 
University of Dayton’s campus, angering the occupant, petitioner Michael Groff, 
who then called the police.  Based on that call, the Foleys and Fagans were 
arrested for burglary.  On March 22, 2014, the criminal charges against Andrew 
Foley and Fagans were eventually dismissed, and the charge against Evan Foley 
was resolved. 
{¶ 4} Respondents asserted claims of negligence against Groff and 
petitioner Dylan Parfitt, Groff’s roommate, in the federal district court.  
Petitioners filed motions for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, to 
certify questions of state law to this court, asserting that a claim of negligent 
January Term, 2016 
3 
misidentification sounds in defamation and, because defamation is subject to a 
one-year statute of limitations, respondents’ claim was time-barred.  Petitioners 
also argued that because the law in this area is unsettled, the federal court should 
certify several questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.  The federal district court 
has now certified three questions to this court and we agreed to answer those 
questions.  144 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2016-Ohio-652, 45 N.E.3d 1048. 
III.  Law and Analysis 
{¶ 5} The first Ohio court to recognize the tort of negligent 
misidentification was the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Wigfall v. Soc. Natl. 
Bank, 107 Ohio App.3d 667, 669 N.E.2d 313 (6th Dist.1995).  The court 
concluded:  
 
Our careful reading of [Mouse v. Cent. Sav. & Trust Co., 
120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929)] and of [Walls v. 
Columbus, 10 Ohio App.3d 180, 461 N.E.2d 13 (10th Dist.1983)] 
leads us to the conclusion that there is a tort cause of action, 
separate from defamation, which exists in Ohio for persons who 
are negligently improperly identified as being responsible for 
committing a violation of the law, and who suffer injury as a result 
of the wrongful identification. 
 
Id. at 673. 
{¶ 6} We disagree. 
{¶ 7} In Mouse, a bank refused to pay a check written by the plaintiff, 
even though he had sufficient funds in his account.  The payee filed an affidavit 
claiming that Mouse had issued the checks without sufficient funds. Mouse was 
arrested and jailed.  Mouse claimed in an action against the bank that the refusal 
to pay the checks was the proximate cause of his arrest and confinement.  The 
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trial court directed a verdict for the bank on the ground that the bank’s action was 
not the proximate cause of Mouse’s arrest, a court of appeals affirmed, and Mouse 
appealed. 
{¶ 8} We recognized that Mouse was arrested on a charge that was 
“concededly erroneous,” 120 Ohio St. at 611, 167 N.E. 868, and Mouse could 
have a claim for false arrest.  Id. 
{¶ 9} In reversing a judgment of the court of appeals, we held that the 
intervention of a person responsible for issuing the warrant did not absolve the 
bank “upon the ground of lack of proximate cause, if the injury ensued in the 
ordinary course of events and the intervening cause was set in motion by the 
defendant.”  Mouse at paragraph one of the syllabus.  Moreover, although G.C. 
710-132 shielded banks from liability when a bank, without malice, mistakenly 
denied payment of a check unless the depositor “allege[d] and prove[d] actual 
damage,” id., the arrest and imprisonment of Mouse “constitute[d] an actual 
damage.”  Mouse at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Therefore, the court 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination on false arrest, stating:  
 
What could be a more real and existing damage to a person of 
good reputation than confinement in the county jail upon a charge 
concededly erroneous? Such damage is actual, so real, present, and 
existing, in fact, that the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical 
liberty of another gives rise to a cause of action all its own, namely, that of 
false arrest. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Mouse at 611. 
{¶ 10} In Wigfall, the Sixth District also misread the Tenth District Court 
of Appeals’ decision in Walls v. Columbus, 10 Ohio App.3d 180, 461 N.E.2d 13 
(10th Dist.1983).  The plaintiff in Walls claimed that the state bureau of motor 
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5 
vehicles had acted negligently when it supplied incorrect information to a police 
officer, which led to Walls’s arrest.  The Court of Claims dismissed the action 
prior to trial.  Relying on a general discussion of torts and on Annotation, Liability 
for Negligently Causing Arrest or Prosecution of Another, 99 A.L.R. 3d 1113 
(1980), the appellate court reversed the judgment of the Court of Claims and 
remanded the matter for trial, stating that there was potential liability under the 
allegations of the complaint.  The appellate court noted, “[I]t has been recognized 
in Ohio through the Mouse case, supra, that giving false information which results 
in the arrest and imprisonment of another may be grounds for tort liability.”  Id. at 
182. 
{¶ 11} Other Ohio appellate courts have discussed claims for negligent 
misidentification.  In Breno v. Mentor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81861, 2003-
Ohio-4051, ¶ 20, while recognizing a cause of action for negligent 
misidentification, the court noted that the cause was not pled.  And in Woods v. 
Summertime Sweet Treats, Inc., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08-MA-169, 2009-Ohio-
6030, ¶ 36-38, the court held that summary judgment was proper because no set 
of facts were established to support a claim for negligent misidentification. 
{¶ 12} However, this court has never recognized the tort of negligent 
misidentification, and we decline to do so today.  In the past, we have recognized 
a new avenue of civil redress when there was a compelling public policy reason to 
do so.  See Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 (1995) 
(recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
based on sexual harassment or discrimination); Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio 
St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (recognizing the tort of false-light 
invasion of privacy); Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 
617 N.E.2d 1052 (1993) (recognizing that parents can recover damages for loss of 
filial consortium); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912) 
(recognizing an action against a person who wrongfully and maliciously interferes 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with the marital relationship).  Recognition of the tort of negligent 
misidentification, however, would contravene public policy. 
{¶ 13} “ ‘ “Public policy favors the exposure of crime.” ’ ” Dailey v. First 
Bank of Ohio, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1309, 2005-Ohio-3152, ¶ 14, quoting 
Miller v. Omar Baking Co., 24 Ohio Law Abs. 375, 380 (2d Dist.1937), quoting 
18 Ruling Case Law 11 (1917).  It encourages all citizens to report crime and to 
come forward to aid law-enforcement officers during the investigation of those 
crimes. Manis v. Miller, 327 So.2d 117 (Fla.App.1976). The tort of negligent 
misidentification would have a chilling effect on that public policy.  See Lundberg 
v. Scoggins, 335 N.W.2d 235, 236 (Minn.1983); Jaindl v. Mohr, 541 Pa. 163, 167, 
661 A.2d 1362 (1995), quoting Davis v. Equibank, 412 Pa.Super. 390, 392–393, 
603 A.2d 637 (1992). 
{¶ 14} That is not to say that public policy prevents the right of civil 
redress.  “Ohio law, like the English common law before it, has long recognized a 
right to recover in tort for the misuse of civil and criminal actions as a means of 
causing harm.”  Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 559 
N.E.2d 732 (1990).  Since at least 1834, this court has recognized the tort of 
malicious prosecution. Anderson v. Buchanan, Wright 725 (1834).  Malicious 
prosecution is established when a prosecution is initiated or continued with malice 
and without probable cause, the prosecution has ended in the injured party’s 
favor, and in cases founded on civil proceedings, a seizure of the injured party or 
his property during the prior proceedings has occurred.  See Trussell at 144.  
Malicious prosecution applies not only to the state, but also to an individual or 
corporation. Id.  Recognizing the tort of negligent misidentification, however, 
would diminish the tort of malicious prosecution to a mere negligence action and 
in turn would expose the victim of a crime or an eyewitness to civil liability for an 
honest mistake, thereby turning victims of crime and eyewitnesses into 
January Term, 2016 
7 
“guarantors of the accuracy of their identifications.”  Turner v. Mellon, 41 Cal.2d 
45, 49, 257 P.2d 15 (1953). 
{¶ 15} While we must balance the interests of public policy and the right 
to civil relief, we also believe that a line should be drawn so that citizens who in 
good faith report crimes or come forward as eyewitnesses to crimes can do so 
without fear of civil liability. 
{¶ 16} Ohioans are not limited to the tort of malicious prosecution in 
seeking redress for an injury caused by another’s false reporting of a crime.  Since 
1823, we have recognized the tort of defamation. Goodenow v. Tappan, 1 Ohio 60 
(1823).  Since 1863, we have recognized the tort of wrongful or false arrest or 
imprisonment.  William T. Spice & Son v. Steinruck, 14 Ohio St. 213, 216 (1863).  
And, in 2007, this court also recognized the tort of false-light invasion of privacy.  
Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051,  
¶ 61. 
{¶ 17} Our decision today that Ohio does not recognize the tort of 
negligent misidentification is in keeping with decisions of other courts across the 
United States.  See Ramsden v. W. Union, 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 881, 138 Cal.Rptr. 
426 (1977).  See also Lundberg v. Scoggins, 335 N.W.2d 235, 236 (Minn.1983); 
Campbell v. San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 981 (5th Cir.1995); Shelburg v. Scottsdale 
Police Dept., D.Ariz. No. CV-09-1800-PHV-NVW, 2010 WL 3327690, *11 
(Aug. 23, 2010); Jaindl, 541 Pa. at 167, 661 A.2d 1362.  Our decision is also in 
keeping with the decisions of those courts that have declined to replace the 
standard of malice with the lesser standard of negligence in claims of false arrest 
or imprisonment. See LaFontaine v. Family Drug Stores, Inc., 33 Conn.Supp. 66, 
78, 360 A.2d 899 (C.P.1976).  See also Baggett v. Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 174 
Ga.App. 346, 348, 330 S.E.2d 108 (1985); Manis v. Miller, 327 So.2d 117, 118 
(Fla.App.1976); see also Shires v. Cobb, 271 Or. 769, 772, 534 P.2d 188 (1975); 
see also Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 529, 368 A.2d 1242 (1977). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 18} We conclude that there is no cause of action in Ohio for the tort of 
negligent misidentification. Accordingly, we decline to answer the questions of 
law certified by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, because they are moot. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by PFEIFER, J. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} Respectfully, I must dissent. 
{¶ 20} Rather than further limiting recourse in tort for the citizens of the 
state of Ohio, I would proceed to answer the questions certified to us by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division.  
The majority adopts a narrow reading of the case law on negligent 
misidentification and then bolsters the correctness of its position by appealing 
selectively to public policy in favor of reporting crimes, all while ignoring the 
questions before us.  I do not agree that this case is simple, and I will address the 
case law, public policy, and procedure in turn. 
{¶ 21} In all cases alleging negligence, the fundamental guiding principle 
is that “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and 
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of 
apprehension.”  Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99 
(1928).  So the entry-level question whether a tort such as negligent 
misidentification exists is answered by considering whether there are any 
reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in falsely reporting a crime.  The tort of 
negligence really is that simple, and it is that broad. 
{¶ 22} The majority’s understanding of the tort of negligence is too rigid.  
The fact that we recognized the intentional tort of false arrest in Mouse v. Cent. 
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9 
Sav. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929), does not foreclose 
pleading a cause in negligence alleging the wrongful identification of an alleged 
wrongdoer by a person who should have known there was no crime. The same is 
true, for example, when someone accidentally strikes another with a fist, a car, or 
a bullet: the existence of the tort of battery does not foreclose pleading a cause in 
negligence if the evidence might show that the conduct was unintended rather 
than intended.  And at the pleadings phase in a federal district court, where the 
underlying matter is pending, it may be wise to plead both the intentional and the 
unintentional tort because a court could decide at that phase that recovery on one 
of the causes of action is unavailable given the facts that were pled.  See Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). 
{¶ 23} There is a glaring conclusion to draw from Mouse.  The plaintiff 
had pled his claim in negligence, the defendant answered alleging contributory 
negligence, and this court analyzed the claim as one sounding in negligence while 
ruling on the issue of whether an intervening act cuts off proximate causation.  
Mouse at 600.  In short, we reviewed Mouse applying traditional negligence law 
dating back some 200 years.  Id.  Ohio courts have followed the guidance of 
Mouse and have drawn an obvious conclusion from it: this court recognized a 
duty to not make allegations to law enforcement if one should have reasonably 
known that those allegations were untrue.  E.g., Walls v. Columbus, 10 Ohio 
App.3d 180, 461 N.E.2d 13 (10th Dist.1983). 
{¶ 24} Although couching its decision in terms of recognizing or declining 
to recognize a cause of action, the majority opinion is mistaken as to the import of 
its decision.  There is already a cause of action for negligence.  With the sweep of 
a pen, the majority effectively negates what we previously recognized to be an 
actionable legal duty not to falsely accuse the innocent. 
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{¶ 25} The majority’s discussion of the public policy supporting their 
decision is one dimensional.  I can readily agree that public policy favors the 
reporting of crime.  But public policy does not favor the inaccurate reporting of 
crime or the vindication of a personal quarrel through embellished or inaccurate 
reports of crime.  Today, Ohio loses an important bulwark against these risks to 
the public.  If we are going to talk public policy, let’s talk about it from all 
realistic perspectives.  The bottom line is that in today’s electronically enhanced 
climate of heightened police response, there are some things you can say on a 9-1-
1 call that will bring the cavalry out in force.  The news regularly reports on those 
who are injured or killed during the police response to inaccurate or false reports 
of crime.1  If our police are going to be able to respond appropriately to threats in 
                                                 
1 In August 2014, a 9-1-1 caller reported to police in Beavercreek, Ohio, that a man was 
attempting to load a rifle and pointing it at children in a Walmart store.  Wing, 911 Caller Will Not 
Be Charged for Giving Cops Bad Info Before Fatal Police Shooting, The Huffington Post (Apr. 7, 
2016; updated Apr. 18, 2016), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ronald-ritchie-
john-crawford_us_57065a21e4b0b90ac2714e86 (accessed October 19, 2016).  The man, John 
Crawford III, was holding a toy pellet gun that he had taken off a shelf in the store.  Crawford was 
shot and killed by police.   
In November 2014, a 9-1-1 caller reported to police in Cleveland, Ohio, that a person 
who was “probably a juvenile” was pointing a gun around outside a recreation center and that the 
gun was “probably fake.”  MacDonald, Errors by police radio worker ‘significant’ factor in fatal 
shooting of Tamir Rice, prosecutor says, Cleveland.com (Dec. 28, 2105), available at 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/12/ 
errors_by_police_radio_workers.html (accessed October 19, 2016).  The dispatcher told the 
responding officers that the person was scaring people with a gun but did not report that the person 
was probably a child or that the gun was probably fake.  Responding officers shot and killed 
Tamir Rice immediately upon arriving at the scene. 
In July 2016, a 9-1-1 caller reported to police in Avon, Ohio, that a man in traditional 
Arabian garb had pledged allegiance to ISIS during a cell-phone conversation.  Grinberg & 
Johnson, For Muslim visitor, ugly encounter leads to apology, CNN (updated July 5, 2016), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/03/us/ohio-false-isis-report/ (accessed October 19, 
2016).  Police responded with guns drawn and handcuffed  a citizen of the United Arab Emirates 
before determining that the man had not made statements related to ISIS.  The man, who had been 
seeking medical treatment in the United States, collapsed during the encounter and was 
hospitalized for a light stroke.  
There are also examples of property damage due to false reports of crime.  See, e.g., 
Victim of fake 911 call sues Ohio police over damage to home, The Washington Post (September 
7, 2016), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/victim-of-fake-911-call-sues-
ohio-police-over-damage-to-home/2016/09/07/458c5ace-74fd-11e6-9781-
49e591781754_story.html (accessed October 19, 2016).  
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the modern era, it will be because they can trust information received.  The 
appropriate balance of the range of public needs in this area is to enforce a duty to 
accurately report crime through the civil justice system.  Let the word go out 
across the land that if you wrongfully accuse your neighbor of a crime, and the 
neighbor is summarily placed in jail based upon your negligent act, your day in 
court will arrive. 
{¶ 26} Finally, the majority modifies tort law in a case that lacks an 
adequate foundation for such a sweeping holding.  If this court wants to change 
the law, it should do so in a case that arises in the state’s court system and comes 
before us on direct appeal.  Although the existence of a duty is a question of law, 
the circumstances and context of a case are vital to determining whether a duty 
exists.  Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989). 
 
The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law 
for the court to determine.  See Railroad Co. v. Harvey (1907), 77 
Ohio St. 235, 240, 83 N.E. 66, 68.  There is no formula for 
ascertaining whether a duty exists.  Duty “ * * * is the court's 
‘expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection.’ (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.1971) pp. 325-326.) 
Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty 
in particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our 
continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the convenience 
of the rule, and social judgment as to where the loss should fall. 
(Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited (1953), 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 15). * * * ”  
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975), 15 Cal.3d 40, 46, 123 
Cal.Rptr. 468, 471, 539 P.2d 36, 39. 
 
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{¶ 27} We should answer the questions submitted by the federal court.  I 
would hold that the two-year statute of limitations for actions for bodily injury, 
R.C. 2305.10(A), applies because the one-year statute of limitations in R.C. 
2305.11(A) does not, by its plain terms, govern suits in negligence.  I would 
further hold that absolute and qualified privileges are not applicable, because 
there is no public interest sufficiently important to justify placing the foreseeable 
risks of inaccurate reporting of crime upon the misidentified person. Keeton, 
Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, Section 114, 
815 (5th Ed.1984) (“The defense of privilege * * * rests upon the * * * idea, that 
conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the 
defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is 
entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation”).  And I believe that juries are better able to determine the 
reasonableness of a person’s inaccuracies in reporting a crime than are courts. 
{¶ 28} Respectfully, I dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Green & Green, Jane M. Lynch, and Jared A. Wagner, for petitioner 
Dylan Parfitt. 
Benjamin, Yocum & Heather, L.L.C., Timothy P. Heather, and R. David 
Weber, for petitioner Michael R. Groff. 
Spangenberg, Shibley & Liber, L.L.P., Michael A. Hill, and Dennis R. 
Lansdowne, for respondents Andrew Foley, Evan Foley, and Michael Fagans. 
_________________