Title: Redmond v. Socha

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99625-Agenda 23-May 2005.
TOMMIE REDMOND, Appellee, v. ELAINE SOCHA, 
Appellant.
Opinion filed October 6, 2005.
JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 4, 2001, near the corner of Ogden Avenue and 
California in Chicago, the car driven by defendant/cross-plaintiff Socha 
collided with the rear of a motorcycle driven by plaintiff/cross-defendant 
Redmond, injuring Redmond and damaging Socha's car. In the litigation that 
followed, no evidence was presented by either party of any cause or contributing 
factor other than the alleged negligence of the other party. The weather was 
good; the pavement was dry and clean; no other vehicles were involved; and no 
mechanical failure caused either vehicle to malfunction. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Socha on Redmond's complaint and in favor of Redmond on 
Socha's counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. 
Following a hearing on Redmond's posttrial motion, the trial court found that 
the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was 
no evidence of any intervening cause of the accident and, thus, it was "not 
logically possible to find that an accident occurred without [its] being 
anyone's fault."
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the verdicts 
were "irreconcilably inconsistent." 352 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1055. The appellate 
court rejected the approach taken by the Fourth District in a factually similar 
case, Barrick v. Grimes, 308 Ill. App. 3d 306 (1999). Thus, there is an 
apparent split of opinion among the appellate districts. We granted leave to 
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to determine 
whether, in such a case, a new trial must be granted because the verdicts are 
legally inconsistent. We have permitted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association 
to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff. 155 Ill. 2d R. 
345.

BACKGROUND
Both vehicles were traveling in the same direction when 
they collided. According to Redmond, he was changing lanes from the right lane 
to the left lane when Socha's car, which had been traveling in the right lane 
behind two other motorcycles, "shot" from behind the other cycles and came up 
behind him in the left lane. According to Socha, she was already in the left 
lane when Redmond swerved in front of her. In either event, she was unable to 
stop in time to avoid hitting him. The right front fender of her car hit the 
left rear of his motorcycle.
Each party alleged that the negligence of the other was 
the proximate cause of the accident. As noted, neither party introduced evidence 
of any factor that might be seen as an intervening cause. Both parties 
introduced evidence of damages. Redmond claimed medical expenses in excess of 
$25,000. Socha's claimed automobile repair costs were in excess of $7,000. Both 
parties raised the defense of comparative negligence.
The trial court instructed the jury according to Illinois 
Pattern Jury Instruction No. B21.04 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, 
No. B21.04 (1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil (1995)) that, because the case involved 
both a claim and a counterclaim, there were four possible outcomes. The jury 
could find: for the plaintiff and against the defendant (IPI Civil (1995) No. 
B21.04(3)), for the defendant and against the plaintiff (IPI Civil (1995) No. 
B21.04(4)), against both (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(5)), or for both (IPI 
Civil (1995) No. B21.04(6)). The jury was further instructed that to prevail on 
his or her claim, each party had the burden of proving three propositions: an 
act or failure to act that constituted negligence, injury, and proximate cause. 
IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.02. In addition, the term "burden of proof" was defined 
for the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 21.01: 
"When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use the 
expression 'if you find," or 'if you decide,' I mean you must be persuaded, 
considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has 
the burden of proof is more probably true than not true." IPI Civil (1995) No. 
21.01. Finally, in the event that both parties were found negligent, the jury 
was instructed to apportion fault between them. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(22).
The jury returned verdicts under the third option-against 
Redmond on his claim and against Socha on her counterclaim. Following the trial 
court's entry of judgment, Redmond filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict in which he argued, inter alia, that the verdicts indicated 
that the "jury clearly feels that both the parties were equally at fault." The 
jury, according to Redmond, mistakenly utilized verdict forms C and F (finding 
neither party negligent) rather than verdict forms B and E (finding both parties 
negligent). Redmond argued that the verdicts were "clearly inconsistent" because 
they failed to apportion 100% of the fault between the parties. The motion was 
accompanied by an affidavit from Redmond's attorney in which he stated that he 
was "advised by the jurors" that they used verdict forms C and F because they 
"thought both parties were at [sic] equally at fault, and therefore, 
entitled to money." Redmond's motion sought entry of judgment in favor of both 
parties on the question of liability, with a new trial on the issue of damages. 
Alternatively, he requested that the verdicts be set aside and a new trial be 
held on all issues.
Socha's answer to the posttrial motion included a 
statement that her counsel "was present with" Redmond's attorney "when at least 
three of the jurors explained that it was felt that neither party sustained 
their burden of proofs and this is the reason they decided the case as they 
did." Socha argued that the totality of the evidence at trial did not so 
overwhelmingly favor Redmond that the jury verdicts should be set aside.
Redmond filed a response to the answer accompanied by an 
additional affidavit. His attorney stated in the second affidavit that the three 
jurors who spoke in the presence of both attorneys actually stated that the 
"reason for the verdict is because the jurors could not agree as to whom [to] 
award damages."
At the hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated 
its understanding that the pending motion was a motion for a new trial and/or a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Redmond's attorney then argued 
that because the verdict forms required an apportionment of liability totaling 
100%, it was "clear that the jury either didn't want to . . . decide the case or 
were lazy or just didn't get it." He also argued that "the only logical 
interpretation" of the verdicts was that the jury found the parties equally at 
fault and used the incorrect verdict forms, perhaps because "they didn't care." 
He asked the trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
apportioning fault 50% to each party, with a new trial on damages only, or, in 
the alternative, to grant a new trial. Socha's attorney argued that the verdicts 
stood for the simple proposition that the jury found that neither party had 
satisfied his or her burden of proof on all of the elements of the negligence 
claim.
The trial court denied Redmond's motion for judgment 
n.o.v., finding that all of the evidence, when viewed most favorably to 
Socha, the nonmoving party, did not so overwhelmingly favor Redmond that a 
verdict in Socha's favor could never stand.
As for the motion for a new trial, the trial court stated 
that "events don't happen without being caused by some act or omission." Because 
there was no evidence presented of any intervening cause, the "only two possible 
causes of this accident" were the acts or omissions of Redmond and Socha. 
Because "[s]omebody has to be at fault," the court was "unable to see how a 
rational trier of fact could come up with nobody's entitled to anything." The 
court explained further that "in this closed universe of facts . . . there has 
to be a logical result," and "the jury has to make a choice." In the end, the 
trial court granted the motion for a new trial, stating that "[s]omebody has to 
be at fault. Somebody is entitled to damages in some amount."
On appeal, Socha argued that the two verdicts were neither 
against the manifest weight of the evidence nor inconsistent. Her position was 
that the jury could have found that each party failed to meet its burden of 
proof. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1053. The appellate court concluded, however, that 
"in the context of the facts of this case such a hypothesis is unreasonable," 
because, "[i]n the absence of any evidence of an intervening cause of the 
collision, one or both of the parties must necessarily have been negligent." 352 
Ill. App. 3d at 1054.
In reaching this result, the appellate court rejected the 
reasoning employed in Barrick, a case in which the parties were the 
drivers of a car and a truck that collided in an intersection. The evidence was 
conflicting as to which driver violated a red light. Barrick, 308 Ill. 
App. 3d at 307. The jury reached verdicts against both claimants and the trial 
court denied a posttrial motion based on inconsistent verdicts. Barrick, 
308 Ill. App. 3d at 309. The appellate court found that the verdicts were not 
legally inconsistent because the jury could have found that neither party met 
its burden of proof on the issues of negligence or proximate cause. Barrick, 
308 Ill. App. 3d at 310. In addition, the Barrick court noted that the 
jury "may well have felt that the evidence of which vehicle had the green light 
was so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it simply could not 
determine from the evidence presented which party was negligent." Barrick, 
308 Ill. App. 3d at 310.
In the present case, the appellate court declined to 
follow this reasoning and found the two verdicts "irreconcilably inconsistent." 
352 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The court stated that if "the jury was unable to 
determine which of the parties was negligent, a mistrial should have been 
declared and a new trial ordered." 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The appellate court 
further observed that because the total fault of the parties in this case must 
equal 100%, and it would have been impossible for both parties to have been more 
than 50% negligent, it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for both 
claims to fail. In sum, the appellate court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it ordered a new trial based on its determination that 
the jury's verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 352 Ill. 
App. 3d at 1055.

THE RECORD ON APPEAL
According to Redmond's answer to Socha's petition for 
leave to appeal, when the jury originally returned with verdicts finding both 
parties not negligent, the trial court sent the jurors back to deliberate 
further, saying that the verdicts were inconsistent. Nevertheless, the jury 
again returned verdicts finding neither party negligent. This continued 
adherence to the two verdicts might be viewed as support for Socha's contention 
that the jury was not confused or lazy, but rather reached these verdicts based 
on a careful consideration of the evidence and a conclusion that neither party 
had met its burden.
Similarly, according to a footnote in Socha's petition for 
leave to appeal, one of the jurors specifically pointed out to the trial judge 
before judgment was entered that this outcome was theoretically possible and the 
judge acknowledged this possibility. Socha suggests, based on this exchange, 
that "[c]learly, the jury intended to return the verdicts as they did, and 
neither the trial court nor the appellate court held otherwise."
We note, however, that the record provided to this court 
on appeal is incomplete. See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546 (1996) (as the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal is on 
the appellant, any doubts arising from an incomplete record must be resolved 
against the appellant). Because we are unable to determine from the record 
provided that further deliberation took place after the jury rendered its 
initial verdict, or, if additional deliberation did indeed take place, what 
instructions were given to the jury regarding the reason that further 
deliberation was necessary, we can give no weight to the jury's apparent 
reaffirmation of these verdicts.
Similarly, the purported exchange between judge and juror 
is not documented in the partial record provided by Socha to this court. As the 
record on appeal does not disclose the content of this exchange, or when or 
under what circumstances it took place, it cannot be considered by this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES PRESENTED
The parties are in disagreement regarding the standard of 
review that should be applied in this appeal. Acknowledging the standard applied 
by the appellate court, Socha cites Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976), for the proposition that a trial court may grant a new trial if 
the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. " ' "A 
verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite 
conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are 
unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence." ' " McClure 
v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 (1999), quoting 
Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992), quoting Villa v. Crown 
Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (1990). Socha also 
acknowledges that once a trial court has applied this test and granted a new 
trial, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's decision to grant a 
motion for a new trial unless it finds that the trial court abused its 
discretion. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d  at 132-33. Further, she notes that it 
would be an abuse of discretion to order a new trial if a verdict were supported 
by sufficient evidence. Kleiss v. Cassida, 297 Ill. App. 3d 165, 175 
(1998). Analogizing this "sufficient evidence" standard to the "reasonable 
hypothesis" standard applicable to claims of inconsistent verdicts (see 
Tedeschi v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 445, 448-49 
(1996)), Socha asserts that a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a 
new trial on the basis of inconsistent verdicts if a reasonable hypothesis 
supports the verdicts.
She argues, however, that whether verdicts are legally 
inconsistent is a question of law and that the appellate court erred by not 
reviewing the trial court's determination on this question de novo. The 
case upon which she relies, P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 
184 Ill. 2d 224, 233-34 (1998), does indeed state that questions of law are 
subject to de novo review. It does not, however, involve a claim of 
inconsistent verdicts, so it does not provide authority for Socha's basic 
premise that this is a question of law.
Redmond and amicus curiae state that the 
authority relied upon by Socha is inapposite and that the appellate court 
correctly employed the abuse of discretion standard to determine that the 
granting of a new trial was proper. Redmond cites authority for the proposition 
that a reviewing court should defer to the trial court because the judge who 
granted the motion for a new trial " ' "has the benefit of his previous 
observation of the appearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, and 
of the circumstances aiding in the determination of credibility." ' " Maple, 
151 Ill. 2d  at 456, quoting Buer v. Hamilton, 48 Ill. App. 2d 171, 
173-74 (1964), quoting Hulke v. International Manufacturing Co., 14 
Ill. App. 2d 5, 47 (1957). "If the trial judge, in the exercise of his 
discretion, finds that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence, he should grant a new trial; on the other hand, where there is 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury, it constitutes an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to grant a motion for a new trial." Maple, 
151 Ill. 2d  at 456. " 'A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence 
where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the 
jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.' " 
Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 454, quoting Villa, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 
1089.
Socha responds that determining whether two verdicts are 
legally inconsistent does not require the trial court to give any consideration 
to credibility. The trial court is not in any better position than a reviewing 
court to determine whether two verdicts are irreconcilable.
We suspect that the confusion surrounding the 
identification of the proper standard of review stems from two things. First, a 
standard of review applies to an individual issue, not to an entire appeal. Each 
question raised in an appeal is subject to its own standard of review. Thus, 
under Supreme Court Rule 341, the appellant is required to provide not only a 
"statement of the issue or issues presented for review," but also "a concise 
statement of the applicable standard of review for each issue, with citation to 
authority." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(3). Second, no Illinois decision, either from 
this court or the appellate court, has expressly stated that the determination 
of legal inconsistency is a question of law.
Before this court, the parties frame the issue as whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial. A more precise 
statement of the issues would be: (1) whether the IPI Civil Jury Instruction No. 
B21.04(5) is inapplicable in cases involving counterclaims in which there is no 
evidence of causation aside from the alleged negligence of the parties, (2) 
whether the verdicts in this case were legally inconsistent, and (3) whether the 
verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For reasons explained 
below, the first issue has been forfeited, the second is subject to de novo
review, and the third is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
only when the trial court actually engages in an exercise of discretion.

AFFIDAVITS FOR PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING THE 
JURY'S VERDICT
Before addressing these issues, we feel compelled to 
comment on Redmond's reliance on affidavits of counsel as support for his 
posttrial motion. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from his attorney 
stating that he had spoken with unidentified jurors after the trial. The 
attorney reported the jurors' belief that the parties were equally at fault. 
Socha did not object to the admission of the affidavit, but challenged the 
accuracy of its contents. A second affidavit, filed with Redmond's reply to 
Socha's memo in opposition to the motion, reported that three unnamed jurors 
told Redmond's attorney that they could not agree on who should be awarded 
damages.
These affidavits represent an attempt by Redmond to 
impeach the jury's verdicts. Although this court has frequently addressed this 
issue in the criminal context (see, e.g., People v. Pitsonbarger, 
205 Ill. 2d 444, 467-69 (2002)), we have not discussed the attempted impeachment 
of a jury verdict via affidavit in a civil case since Chalmers v. City of 
Chicago, 88 Ill. 2d 532, 534 (1982).
In Chalmers, the plaintiff made claims of 
negligence and willful and wanton misconduct against the city after her car was 
hit by a police squad car. The jury awarded $1,705.99 in damages, which 
represented her medical expenses, no damages for her disability and pain and 
suffering, and $13,000 in punitive damages. In answer to a special 
interrogatory, however, the jury found that the officer who had been driving the 
squad car was not guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. The trial court 
entered judgment for the lesser amount only. Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d  at 
534.
In his closing arguments, Chalmers's attorney had asked 
the jury to award total damages of $14,500 for her medical expenses plus her 
temporary disability and pain and suffering. Thus, the amount sought in 
noneconomic damages was approximately $13,000. Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d  at 
536. His posttrial motion sought one of several remedies: an order conforming 
the verdict to the apparent intention of the jury; reassembly of the jury so 
that its members could be polled to determine their intentions; an order for 
additur; or a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Chalmers, 
88 Ill. 2d  at 534. The motion was supported by affidavits of 11 of the 12 jurors 
(Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d at 534), in which they explained that they had 
been confused by the verdict form and that it was their intention to award 
$13,000 in compensatory damages for disability and pain and suffering. 
Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d  at 536. The trial court refused to alter the verdict 
or to grant a new trial. This court noted:
"It is well established in this State, and almost 
universally recognized, that a jury may not impeach its verdict by affidavit or 
testimony which shows the motive, method, or process by which the verdict was 
reached. [Citations.] Thus, it is impermissible to challenge a verdict following 
the jury's discharge by explaining the basis for the jury's findings [citation] 
or by asserting that the jury was mistaken." Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d  at 
537.
After considering the plaintiff's argument that the 
jurors' affidavits should be deemed a competent basis for the correction of an 
error that was essentially clerical in nature, this court affirmed the trial 
court's denial of the motion for a new trial based on its conclusion that:
"It is apparent to us that under the facts before us 
plaintiff seeks to impeach the verdict not because of a 'clerical' mistake in 
recordation but because of the jury's misapprehension of the instructions or the 
effect of their findings. This type of impeachment is clearly impermissible."
Chalmers, 88 Ill. 2d  at 539.
Further:
"[T]he testimony or affidavits of jurors cannot be used to 
show that the jury misunderstood the instructions or the law [citation], [or] 
the effect of a particular finding or of their verdict. [Citations.] The meaning 
and effect of the verdict must be judged from its terms alone." Chalmers, 
88 Ill. 2d  at 539.
The law in Illinois is clear on the subject of the use of 
juror testimony or affidavits for the purpose of impeaching a verdict. Juror 
testimony or affidavits will not be admitted to show the motive, method, or 
process by which the jury reached its verdict, but may be offered as proof of 
the existence of improper extraneous influences on the jury. Pitsonbarger, 
205 Ill. 2d  at 468. See also Carroll v. Preston Trucking Co., 349 Ill. 
App. 3d 562 (2004) (rejecting juror affidavits offered to support assertion that 
the jury used an impermissible quotient process to reach its verdict). This rule 
serves to protect not only the finality of judgments but also the privacy of the 
jury room. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d  at 468. In addition, the 
inadmissibility of such affidavits protects jurors from being " ' "harassed and 
beset by the defeated party" ' " (Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d  at 468, 
quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90, 
106, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 (1987), quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 59 L. Ed. 1300, 1302, 35 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1915)), in an effort to have 
an unfavorable verdict set aside.
In the present case, the trial court was not presented 
with juror affidavits, but with affidavits from plaintiff's counsel describing 
statements made to him by individual jurors. Opposing counsel disputed the 
accuracy of the description and offered her own version of the jurors' 
statements. In the end, the trial court was faced with a swearing contest 
between attorneys that could have been resolved only by the testimony or 
affidavits of the jurors themselves. We see no reason to treat an attorney's 
affidavit purporting to reveal jurors' opinions on motive, method, or process 
any differently than juror affidavits. In both instances, the party proffering 
the affidavits is making an improper attempt to impeach the verdict and the 
jurors themselves, having done their civic duty, are subjected to questioning by 
a disappointed litigant.
We conclude that the contents of the affidavits could not 
properly be considered in ruling on the posttrial motion. We are unable to 
determine from the record how much weight, if any, the trial court gave to the 
affidavits. The appellate court made no mention of the affidavits in its 
opinion.
Because the affidavits impermissibly seek to impeach the 
jury's verdict, this court will not consider the affidavits as we determine 
whether the verdicts were legally inconsistent or against the manifest weight of 
the evidence.

APPLICABILITY OF ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION No. B21.04(5)
At trial, Redmond tendered pattern jury instruction No. 
B21.04(5) verbatim, without asking the trial court to modify the instruction. 
Socha made no objection and the trial court gave the instruction as tendered. 
Redmond now argues that, under the facts of this case, instruction No. 
B21.04(5), which permits the jury to find against both the plaintiff and the 
counter-plaintiff, invites legally inconsistent and, therefore, impermissible 
verdicts. Socha argues that Redmond should not now be heard to challenge the 
applicability of the pattern instruction when he made no attempt to modify the 
instruction before it was given to the jury.
In support of her forfeiture argument, Socha cites 
Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 550 (1984), a products 
liability action in which, at trial, the plaintiff argued against a comparative 
negligence instruction but, on appeal, argued that a new trial was required 
because this court had recently applied comparative fault to a products 
liability claim. In Auton, this court stated:
"A plaintiff cannot take the position on appeal that a 
case should have been presented to the jury with different instructions than 
those which were given unless at trial he tendered instructions which set forth 
the statement of the law he contends, on appeal, would have been the proper 
one." Auton, 105 Ill. 2d  at 549.
Redmond's brief does not respond directly to the 
forfeiture assertion, but asserts that "[r]egardless of the jury instructions 
submitted in this case, without evidence of any intervening cause, there is no 
other possible outcome" than a finding that either one or both of the parties 
were negligent. At oral argument, he stated that he submitted the most relevant 
pattern jury instruction available. Having submitted the proper instruction, he 
argued that he should not be penalized by application of the forfeiture doctrine 
when that instruction led to an unjust or illogical result.
We conclude that to the extent Redmond is now objecting to 
the instruction itself, he has forfeited this argument by failing to seek a 
modified jury instruction in the trial court. Because he did not ask for a 
modified jury instruction seeking to conform IPI Civil No. B21.04 to what the 
trial court later characterized as the "closed universe of facts" in this case, 
we cannot know whether Socha would have objected to a modified instruction or if 
the trial court would have allowed it. We, therefore, find that Redmond is 
barred by the doctrine of forfeiture from arguing to this court that the jury 
instruction itself was improper.

LEGALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
Socha also argues that Redmond should not be heard to 
complain that the verdicts are legally inconsistent when it was his instruction 
that gave the jury the option of rendering such verdicts. She cites McGrath 
v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 190 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279 
(1989), for the proposition that it is "too late" to declare a mistrial "after 
the jury has already returned its verdicts." In McGrath, one plaintiff 
was a passenger in a car driven by her father, the other plaintiff, when she was 
injured. Defendant called the father as an adverse witness and questioned him 
about a settlement he reached with his daughter. The daughter objected to these 
questions and the trial court found that the questioning was improper. 
McGrath, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 278. Plaintiff's counsel moved for judgment 
against the defendant. The trial court stated that it would reserve judgment on 
the motion, which it characterized as a motion for mistrial, but counsel did not 
press the point or ask for an immediate ruling. McGrath, 190 Ill. App. 
3d at 278. After the jury returned with a verdict for the defendant, plaintiffs 
renewed the earlier motion. McGrath, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 279.
The appellate court explained that a motion for mistrial 
is "a procedural tool designed to cut short a trial for legal reasons which 
preclude a verdict and judgment." McGrath, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 279. A 
motion for mistrial prevents parties from getting two chances at a verdict and, 
thus, can be made only before the jury returns its verdict. McGrath, 
190 Ill. App. 3d at 279. If the motion is not made before the verdict, the party 
seeking a new trial has waived the mistrial issue. McGrath, 190 Ill. 
App. 3d at 279. The McGraths' conduct, first in failing to ask for a ruling when 
the judge first referred to the possibility of a mistrial and, second, in 
failing to renew the motion (if indeed there was a mistrial motion to renew) 
before the jury verdict, constituted "waiver of mistrial as a basis for a new 
trial." McGrath, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 280.
McGrath, therefore, does not stand for the 
proposition that a verdict can never be set aside and a new trial ordered once 
the jury in a civil case has reached a verdict. Rather, it stands for the 
proposition that an error at trial that would be a sufficient basis for 
declaring a mistrial must be asserted in a timely manner.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "mistrial" is 
either a trial "that the judge brings to an end, without a determination on the 
merits, because of a procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the 
proceedings," or a trial that "ends inconclusively because the jury cannot agree 
on a verdict." Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (8th ed. 2004). If a jury is 
deadlocked, a mistrial must be declared. When the jury returns a unanimous 
verdict, a motion for mistrial is untimely and inappropriate.
However, even when a jury has rendered a unanimous 
verdict, making a motion for mistrial improper, a party may still seek a new 
trial on the basis of legally inconsistent verdicts or on the basis that the 
verdicts are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Such motions must 
necessarily be made after the jury has returned its verdict. See Joe & Dan 
International Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 178 Ill. App. 
3d 741, 745-46 (1988) (motion for mistrial based on inconsistent verdicts is not 
timely because a motion for mistrial must be made before a verdict is entered; 
however, party's motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial adequately 
preserved the issue of inconsistent verdicts for appeal). Thus, the appellate 
court was not entirely accurate when it stated that "[i]f the jury was unable to 
determine which of the parties was negligent, a mistrial should have been 
declared and a new trial ordered." 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1055.
We conclude that Redmond did not forfeit his ability to 
seek a new trial on either of these grounds by submitting the jury instruction. 
The errors he asserts did not arise until the jury rendered its verdicts. These 
issues were preserved for appeal by his filing of a timely posttrial motion and 
were, therefore, properly considered by the trial court and the appellate court.
This court last considered the effect of legally 
inconsistent verdicts in the context of civil litigation in Wottowa 
Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Bock, 104 Ill. 2d 311 (1984), in which the 
plaintiff insurance agency sued two individuals who were attorneys and officers 
of two businesses that owed it over $27,000. The agency proceeded under two 
alternative theories of liability. First, Wottowa claimed that defendants should 
be required to pay the debts of the corporations because they had personally 
guaranteed payment. Second, Wottowa alleged that the individuals had 
fraudulently induced the agency to grant extensions of credit to the businesses.
Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 312-13. The jury found that the guarantee 
agreement was executed by the defendants in their capacity as corporate officers 
and, thus, created a corporate obligation rather than a personal obligation. As 
for the fraud count, the jury found that the defendants, as individuals, had 
committed fraud. Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 316.
Citing earlier decisions of the appellate court, this 
court stated that "[i]n the same action, where verdicts are returned which are 
legally inconsistent with each other, the verdicts should be set aside and a new 
trial granted." Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 316. Because the jury had 
determined that the corporations were liable for the debt owed to Wottowa, it 
was legally inconsistent for the jury to also find that the individual 
defendants (as opposed to the corporation) were liable for fraud. This court 
found the two verdicts to be "irreconcilably inconsistent" (Wottowa, 
104 Ill. 2d at 316) and ordered a new trial.
In Wottowa, this court did not expressly state 
that it was engaging in de novo review. However, it is implicit in our 
analysis in Wottowa that legal inconsistency is a question of law. We 
relied on the law of agency to determine that the individual defendants could 
not be acting both as individuals and as officers of the debtor corporations 
when they signed the guarantee agreement. Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 316, 
citing Knightsbridge Realty Partners, Ltd-75 v. Pace, 101 Ill. App. 3d 
49, 53 (1981). Thus, the two verdicts-one of which found the defendants not 
liable because they were acting as agents of the corporations, and one of which 
found them liable as individuals for fraud for the same transaction-were legally 
inconsistent. In effect, the jury determined that agency both did and did not 
exist. This result is legally inconsistent. See also Boasiako v. Checker 
Taxi Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 210, 212-13 (1986) (if same jury, on same set of 
facts and circumstances, reaches two different factual conclusions as expressed 
by their verdicts, such verdicts will not support a valid judgment unless they 
are reconcilable under an applicable rule of law).
We, therefore, hold that whether two verdicts are legally 
inconsistent is a question of law. As a result, a trial court's order granting 
or denying a new trial based on a claim of legally inconsistent verdicts is 
subject to de novo review. P.R.S. International, 184 Ill. 2d  
at 233-34. This conclusion is supported by the well-established principle that 
although a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial will generally not 
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, legally inconsistent verdicts must be 
set aside and a new trial granted. Tedeschi, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 448. 
If a new trial must be granted upon a finding of legally inconsistent 
verdicts, no exercise of discretion is involved and, therefore, no deference is 
due.
We note at least two lines of cases on the question of 
legally inconsistent verdicts in civil cases. The first line of cases consists 
of those involving a single claim in which the single verdict is alleged to be 
internally inconsistent or "inherently self-contradictory" (75B Am. Jur. 2d 
Trial §1805, at 563 (1992)), as when the damages awarded are not reasonably 
related to the liability found. See, e.g., Galloway v. Kuhl, 
346 Ill. App. 3d 844, 850 (2004) (jury's verdict imposing liability and awarding 
damages for disfigurement and pain and suffering was legally inconsistent with 
failure to award reasonable expenses of medical treatment received by 
plaintiff); Hinnen v. Burnett, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1038 (1986) (jury's 
verdict awarding damages for the expense of pain medication and physical therapy 
was inconsistent with failure to award any damages for pain and suffering).
The second line of cases involves those in which multiple 
claims are made by one or more parties and where a verdict as to one claim is 
alleged to be inconsistent with the verdict as to another. See, e.g.,
Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 316 (verdict in favor of defendants on basis 
that they were acting as agents of corporations was legally inconsistent with 
verdict that they were liable, as individuals, for fraud based on same 
transaction); Action Construction & Restoration, Inc. v. West Bend Mutual 
Insurance Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 181, 183-84 (2001) (jury verdict finding 
that defendant breached oral contract necessarily required the jury to find that 
the parties had a meeting of the minds, which finding was legally inconsistent 
with verdict that defendant obtained plaintiff's agreement by perpetuating a 
common law fraud). The present case falls into the second category.
In both categories of cases, the same general rules apply: 
the court will exercise all reasonable presumptions in favor of the verdict or 
verdicts, which will not be found legally inconsistent unless absolutely 
irreconcilable; further, the verdict or verdicts will not be considered 
irreconcilably inconsistent if supported by any reasonable hypothesis. 
Tedeschi, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 448-49.
In the second category of cases, it has been observed that 
"[a]lthough causes of action may be consolidated for trial, they remain distinct 
causes of action." 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial §1805, at 562 (1992). Thus, 
"the plaintiff in each cause must meet his burden of proof with respect to each 
element of his claim, without regard to whether the opposing party has or has 
not met his burden of proof in the competing claim." Further, "only when a 
judgment rests on some particular finding for its validity and support" will 
inconsistencies "between two findings treating of the same essential matter" 
necessitate a new trial. 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial §1805, at 652 (1992). 
See also IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04, Comment ("A plaintiff's burden of proving 
the issues raised by the complaint cannot be distinguished from a defendant's 
burden of proving the issues made by the counterclaim. The two pleadings are of 
equal dignity in that they embody separate causes of action and must be resolved 
by verdicts").
Such was the case in Wottowa, where the jury 
found in one count that defendants were not acting in their individual 
capacities, but as corporate officers, yet found, on the same set of underlying 
facts, that with regard to the other count, the same individuals were personally 
liable. Wottowa, 104 Ill. 2d  at 316.
Socha argues that, unlike the verdicts in Wottowa, 
the verdicts in this case are not legally inconsistent because they are 
supported by the reasonable hypothesis that the jury found that both parties 
failed to meet their burden of proof. She argues further that the appellate 
court's decision conflicts with the decision of another appellate district in
Barrick, and with a decision within the same appellate district in 
Boasiako.
Support for her first proposition is found in the Illinois 
pattern jury instructions themselves. The applicable instruction in this case (IPI 
Civil (1995) No. B21.04) specifically authorizes such an outcome and 
incorporates the elements of negligence from instruction B21.02 (IPI Civil 
(1995) No. B21.02). Instruction 21.01, which was also given, defines burden of 
proof: the jury "must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, 
that the proposition on which he has the burden of proof is more probably true 
than not true." IPI Civil (1995) No. 21.01. Socha argues that the appellate 
court's decision in this case essentially means that instruction B21.04 does not 
accurately state the law in a case in which there is no evidence of an 
intervening cause or condition.
The approach taken by the appellate court would mean that 
in such cases, neither party has to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence. So long as the parties are involved in an accident under 
conditions that do not clearly demonstrate an intervening cause, the jury would 
be required to impose liability on one, or the other, or both-without regard to 
whether they had met their respective burdens of proof. As the comment to the 
instruction makes clear, however, even when there is a complaint and a 
counterclaim based on the same set of facts, a party must prove each element of 
his or her claim in order to prevail. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04, Comment.
The approach taken by the appellate court in this case was 
rejected in Boasiako, which involved a claim and counterclaim arising 
from a collision between two taxicabs. The jury found for the plaintiff, but 
determined that he was 40% at fault. However, on the counterclaim, the jury 
again found for the plaintiff. Because the same individual was found 40% at 
fault in one verdict, but not negligent in the other, defendants argued that the 
verdicts were legally inconsistent and could not stand. Boasiako, 140 
Ill. App. 3d at 212. The appellate court held that the two verdicts were 
reconcilable. Noting that the "principles of comparative negligence do not 
relieve [counter] plaintiff of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
essential elements of an action in negligence," the appellate court determined 
that the jury could have decided that the defendants failed to prove one or more 
elements of their counterclaim, even though it had already decided that the 
plaintiff's damages should be reduced by his comparative negligence. 
Boasiako, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 213.
We agree and, therefore, conclude that because the law 
demands that a plaintiff meet the burden of proving every necessary element of 
his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, a jury may find against both the 
plaintiff and the counterplaintiff in a negligence action, even when the 
evidence suggests that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of 
either or both parties.
The appellate court in the present case both overlooked 
its own previous decision in Boasiako and declined to follow the 
reasoning of the Barrick court. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. In 
Barrick, a collision between a car and a truck resulted in a claim by the 
driver of the car for personal injury and property damage and a counterclaim by 
the driver of the truck for property damage. Barrick, 308 Ill. App. 3d 
at 307. After hearing conflicting testimony regarding which driver violated a 
red light, the jury entered verdicts for the defendant and the counterdefendant.
Barrick, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 309. The trial court denied Barrick's 
motion for a new trial based on inconsistent verdicts and the appellate court 
affirmed. The verdicts were not inconsistent, according to the appellate court, 
because the jury could have determined that neither party proved its case. In 
addition, the jury might "well have felt that the evidence of which vehicle had 
the green light was so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it 
simply could not determine from the evidence presented which party was 
negligent." Barrick, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 310. In the present case, the 
appellate court, without attempting to distinguish the two cases, described the
Barrick verdicts as "irreconcilably inconsistent," and stated that a 
new trial should have been ordered. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1055.
At oral argument, Redmond attempted to distinguish 
Barrick from the present case on the basis that neither party in 
Barrick raised the defense of comparative negligence. Both claims were "all 
or nothing" and, as a result, the jury was asked to impose complete liability 
for the accident on one party or the other. In the present case, he argues that 
because the jury was offered the option of apportioning liability between the 
two parties, Barrick is not applicable.
We are not persuaded that this difference is significant. 
The appellate court in Barrick based its conclusion on how the jury 
might reasonably have viewed the evidence. The same rationale applies in the 
present case. Even though it is clear in the present case that 100% of the 
responsibility for the accident must rest, in some unknown proportion, upon 
either or both of the parties, it is still possible that the jury found the 
evidence "so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it simply could 
not determine from the evidence presented" (Barrick, 308 Ill. App. 3d 
at 310), whether Redmond was negligent and, if so, to what degree, and whether 
Socha was negligent and, if so, to what degree.
We conclude that Barrick and Boasiako 
are consistent with each other and with this court's decision in Wottowa, 
and that these cases offer support for Socha's position that the verdicts in 
this case are not legally inconsistent.
At oral argument, Redmond offered the additional authority 
of Millette v. Radosta, 84 Ill. App. 3d 5 (1980), in support of his 
contention that someone must be found liable in this case. In Millette, 
the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the negligence of one or more of three 
defendants, one of whom counterclaimed against the other two. The trial court 
held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent 
and instructed the jury that it must find for the plaintiff and against one or 
more of the defendants. No verdict form was submitted that would have allowed 
the jury to find all three defendants not liable. Millette, 84 Ill. 
App. 3d at 26. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff against all defendants 
and in favor of the counterplaintiff against the other two defendants. All 
defendants appealed. Millette, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 7. The appellate 
court affirmed, noting that there was no evidence of any intervening cause or 
act of God and that "the real issue for the jury to determine was which of the 
defendants caused the [plaintiff's] injury." Millette, 84 Ill. App. 3d 
at 26. The court posited that when two vehicles collide, " 'thereby injuring an 
innocent party,' " a " 'presumption of negligence' " arises. Millette, 
84 Ill. App. 3d at 26-27, quoting Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co., 30 
Ill. App. 2d 103, 105 (1961). In such cases, the court stated, once the 
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of negligence, the burden is 
on any nonnegligent defendant to " 'make the required proof of exculpation.' "
Millette, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 27, quoting Krump, 30 Ill. App. 
2d at 106.
Redmond offers Millette as authority for the 
proposition that, in the present case, verdicts in favor of both the defendant 
and the counterdefendant cannot stand. We find Millette distinguishable 
from the present case and from the line of cases involving claims and 
counterclaims of negligence. Millette involved a plaintiff who was 
found, as a matter of law, not to have contributed to his own injury. He made a
prima facie case that his injuries were caused by the negligence of one 
or more of the three defendants. The present case involves only two parties, 
each of whom accuses the other of being primarily responsible for the accident.
Applying the case law from the line of cases involving two 
or more claims, we find that there are several reasonable explanations for the 
jury's finding that neither the defendant nor the counterdefendant in the 
present case should be held liable, even in the absence of evidence of any 
intervening cause or condition for the accident. The jury could have found 
neither party credible and, thus, found the evidence so conflicting, 
inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it could not find, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that either party had made its case. The jury might have concluded 
that one of the parties was not negligent, but that he or she failed to meet the 
burden of proving that the other party was negligent. It is also possible that 
the jury found the relative fault of the parties to be more or less equal to 
their proportion of damages and decided to do rough justice by just leaving each 
party where it stood. In effect, the jury could have found that Redmond caused 
his own injuries and Socha caused the damage to her car.
We conclude that the jury's verdicts are not legally 
inconsistent. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "legally inconsistent 
verdict" is one "in which the same element is found to exist and not to exist, 
as when a defendant is acquitted of one offense and convicted of another, even 
though the offenses arise from the same set of facts and an element of the 
second offense requires proof that the first offense has been committed." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1592 (8th ed. 2004). Another reference describes legally 
inconsistent verdicts as "two findings treating of the same essential matter." 
75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial §1805, at 652 (1992). In the present case, 
Redmond identifies no such essential matter that the jury in this case found to 
be proven in one action but not in the other. The same fact or element was not 
found in one verdict but not the other as would have been the case if the jury 
had found in favor of both plaintiff and counterplaintiff and found the same 
party 25% at fault in one verdict but 75% liable in the other. Such verdicts 
would, indeed, be legally inconsistent because the same fact would have been 
found both to exist and not to exist.
Redmond implicitly acknowledged that his argument was 
based on the application of logic to a hypothetical closed set of facts, not on 
the application of law to the actual evidence presented at trial. In his motion 
for judgment n.o.v., he stated: "In apportioning 100% of the fault for 
this collision, it is impossible for both Plaintiff and Defendant to be more 
than 50% at fault. Therefore, the only logical conclusion from the 
jury's verdict is that the jury felt both parties were equally at fault." 
(Emphasis added.) The trial court also focused on logic, rather than law, when 
stating that "in the closed universe of facts which were elicited in this trial, 
there has to be a logical result. And the jury has to make a choice. 
It's not logically possible to find that an accident occurred without 
[its] being anyone's fault." (Emphases added.)
There is, of course, no authority for the proposition that 
a verdict or verdicts in a civil case must be without any conceivable flaw in 
logic, only that they must be legally consistent. Tedeschi, 282 Ill. 
App. 3d at 448-49. The verdicts in the present case may have been logically 
inconsistent in the abstract, that is, in the sense that when two parties are 
involved in an accident that occurs in the absence of any intervening cause, the 
accident must have been caused by the negligence of either or both. The verdicts 
are not, however, legally inconsistent because the jury did not find some 
essential matter proven in one claim but not proven in the other. Instead, the 
jury, dealing with the evidence presented rather than with abstract concepts, 
found neither claim proven.
We conclude that the trial court erred by granting a new 
trial on the basis that the jury verdicts were legally inconsistent. We note, 
however, that Redmond's posttrial motion also sought a new trial on the basis 
that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. This 
argument does not rest on a claim that the verdicts are legally inconsistent 
with each other, but rather stands on the assertion that they are not supported 
by the evidence presented at trial.

ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL
Thus, the question still remains whether a new trial is 
justified on the basis that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. " 'A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the 
opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are 
unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.' " Maple, 
151 Ill. 2d  at 454, quoting Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. 
App. 3d 1082, 1089 (1990). In general, the determination of whether a new trial 
should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose 
ruling will not be reversed unless it reflects an abuse of that discretion. 
Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 455. "If the trial judge, in the exercise of his 
discretion, finds that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence, he should grant a new trial; on the other hand, where there is 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury, it constitutes an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to grant a motion for a new trial." Maple, 
151 Ill. 2d  at 456.
We must begin our consideration of this issue by observing 
that once a trial court determines that jury verdicts are legally inconsistent, 
whether to grant a new trial is not up to the trial court's discretion. It is 
mandatory. Tedeschi, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 448. In the present case, we 
are not reviewing an exercise of discretion because it is clear from the trial 
court's comments that it believed it had no choice but to grant a new trial.
Even if we were to treat the trial court's ruling on the 
motion as an exercise of discretion based on its assessment of the manifest 
weight of the evidence, we still must reverse. If the trial court had considered 
Redmond's motion as a motion for a new trial based purely on the state of the 
evidence, rather than on the state of the verdicts, it would have been required 
to give substantial deference to the jury. "[I]t is the province of the jury to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the 
witnesses, and to decide what weight should be given to the witnesses' 
testimony." Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 452. The trial court, when ruling on 
a motion for a new trial, may not "reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict 
merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or 
because the court feels that other results are more reasonable." Maple, 
151 Ill. 2d  at 452. Thus, a trial court may not set aside a verdict merely to 
achieve "more reasonable" (Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452) results.
We, therefore, hold that the trial court's order granting 
a new trial must be reversed because the verdicts are not legally inconsistent 
and because they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
The order granting a new trial is vacated and the 
appellate court judgment is reversed.



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order vacated and
judgment reinstated.