Title: State v. Kaplowitz

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Kaplowitz, 100 Ohio St.3d 205, 2003-Ohio-5602.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KAPLOWITZ, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Kaplowitz, 100 Ohio St.3d 205, 2003-Ohio-5602.] 
Criminal law — Statutory construction — Effect of reenactment, amendment, or 
repeal — R.C. 1.58(B) does not apply to give a criminal defendant the 
benefit of a reduced sentence if, by applying it, the court alters the 
nature of the offense, including specifications to which the defendant 
pled guilty or of which he was found guilty. 
(No. 2002-1831 — Submitted June 4, 2003 — Decided November 5, 2003.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2001-L-025, 2002-
Ohio-4217. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 1.58(B) does not apply to give a criminal defendant the benefit of a reduced 
sentence if, by applying it, the court alters the nature of the offense, 
including specifications to which the defendant pled guilty or of which he 
was found guilty.  State v. Kinder (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 235, 746 
N.E.2d 1205, disapproved. 
 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶1} 
Today this court must answer the question certified for our review: 
“[W]hich version [of R.C. 2903.08] applies—the version in effect at the time of 
the offense or the current version, effective prior to the institution of sentencing 
by the trial court—when application of the newer statute would change the 
offense from the offense indicted and to which the defendant pled[?]” 
{¶2} 
On September 21, 1999, Mike Kaplowitz, defendant-appellant, 
was involved in a motor vehicle accident where both he and his passenger were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
injured.  In April 2000, a grand jury indicted Kaplowitz on one count of 
aggravated vehicular assault (a fourth-degree felony), in violation of R.C. 
2903.08, with a specification that he was under the influence of alcohol and a 
specification of a prior conviction.  Kaplowitz was also indicted on one count of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), 
and one count of driving with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, in violation 
of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). 
{¶3} 
In September 2000, Kaplowitz pled guilty to aggravated vehicular 
assault and the specification that he was driving under the influence at the time of 
the offense.  The remaining counts were nolled.  The trial court sentenced 
Kaplowitz to 90 days in jail and two years of community control, suspended his 
driver’s license for five years, and ordered him to pay restitution. 
{¶4} 
After the offense, but before Kaplowitz was sentenced, the General 
Assembly amended R.C. 2903.08, effective March 23, 2000.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 
107, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8701.  In January 2001, the state moved to vacate 
Kaplowitz’s sentence, which had been announced but not yet journalized, arguing 
that the trial court had erred by failing to apply R.C. 2903.08 as written at the time 
of the offense.1  The state requested that the trial court resentence Kaplowitz 
under the version of the statute effective on September 21, 1999, the date of the 
crime.  The following day, the trial court journalized the sentence without ruling 
on the motion.  The court later explicitly declined to rule on the motion to vacate 
because the state had by then filed an appeal. 
{¶5} 
The Lake County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the 
trial court, vacated the sentence, and remanded the cause to the trial court for 
                                                          
 
1. 
During oral argument, this court learned that after obtaining a special prosecutor to avoid 
a conflict or potential conflict, the Lake County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office interjected itself 
into the case by asking the special prosecutor to move to vacate.  Once a special prosecutor was 
assigned, the Lake County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office should no longer have been involved in 
the case. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
resentencing.  The appellate court noted that the trial court should allow 
Kaplowitz the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea and that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would not bar a trial on the aggravated vehicular assault charge.  
Therefore, the defendant could choose to enter a plea or seek a trial after which, if 
convicted, he would be sentenced under the former sentencing structure. 
{¶6} 
This court stayed the judgment of the court of appeals pending this 
appeal and acknowledged the existence of a conflict with the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for Muskingum County in State v. Kinder (2000), 140 Ohio 
App.3d 235, 746 N.E.2d 1205, concerning R.C. 2903.08: “At issue is which 
version applies—the version in effect at the time of the offense or the current 
version, effective prior to the institution of sentencing by the trial court—when 
application of the newer statute would change the offense from the offense 
indicted and to which the defendant pled.”  State v. Kaplowitz, 97 Ohio St.3d 
1480, 2002-Ohio-6866, 780 N.E.2d 285.  This cause is now before this court upon 
our determination that a conflict exists. 
{¶7} 
The General Assembly amended the aggravated vehicular assault 
statute, R.C. 2903.08, effective March 23, 2000.  As noted above, Kaplowitz 
committed the offense before the amendment and was sentenced after the 
amendment.  Today this court must decide whether the former or the amended 
version of the aggravated vehicular assault statute applies. 
{¶8} 
R.C. 1.58(B) identifies which law to apply when a statute is 
amended after the commission of a crime but before sentence is imposed:     
{¶9} 
“If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced 
by a reenactment or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or 
punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the statute as 
amended.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶10} Thus, it is necessary to examine the two versions of the aggravated 
vehicular assault statute.  At the time of the commission of the crime, R.C. 
2903.08, provided:  
{¶11} “(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of 
a motor vehicle * * * shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to another 
person or another’s unborn. 
{¶12} “(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated 
vehicular assault, a felony of the fourth degree.  * * * 
{¶13} “If the jury or judge as a trier of fact finds that the offender was 
under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, at 
the time of the commission of the offense, then the offender’s driver’s or 
commercial driver’s license or permit or nonresident operating privileges shall be 
permanently revoked pursuant to section 4507.16 of the Revised Code. 
{¶14} “* * * 
{¶15} “(C) * * * [I]f in the commission of the offense the offender was 
driving under suspension or operating a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, the offender shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory prison term and is not eligible for a sentence to a 
community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.13 of the Revised Code, for 
judicial release pursuant to section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, or for a 
reduction of a stated prison term or a release pursuant to section 2967.193 of the 
Revised Code or any other provision of Chapter 2967 or Chapter 5120 of the 
Revised Code.”  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10856-10857. 
{¶16} After the commission of the crime, but before Kaplowitz was 
sentenced, R.C. 2903.08 was amended, effective March 23, 2000. The amended 
version of the statute now provides: 
January Term, 2003 
5 
{¶17} “(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of 
a motor vehicle * * * shall cause serious physical harm to another person or 
another’s unborn in either of the following ways: 
{¶18} “(1) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division 
(A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent 
municipal ordinance; 
{¶19} “(2) Recklessly. 
{¶20} “(B)(1) Whoever violates division (A)(1) of this section is guilty of 
aggravated vehicular assault.  Except as otherwise provided in this division, 
aggravated vehicular assault is a felony of the third degree. * * * 
{¶21} “In addition to any other sanctions imposed, the court shall 
suspend the offender’s driver’s license * * * for a definite period of two to ten 
years pursuant to section 4507.16 of the Revised Code * * *. 
{¶22} “(2) Whoever violates division (A)(2) of this section is guilty of 
vehicular assault.  Except as otherwise provided in this division, vehicular assault 
is a felony of the fourth degree. * * * 
{¶23} “In addition to any other sanctions imposed, the court shall 
suspend the offender’s driver’s license * * * for a definite period of one to five 
years pursuant to section 4507.16 of the Revised Code * * *. 
{¶24} “(C) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term on an 
offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) of 
this section.” 
{¶25} Thus, in the current version of R.C. 2903.08, the legislature 
provides for two different offenses: (A)(1) now categorizes aggravated vehicular 
assault caused by drunk driving as a third-degree felony, and (A)(2) now 
categorizes vehicular assault by recklessly causing serious physical harm to 
another as a fourth-degree felony.  The differences in the sentence that Kaplowitz 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
would have received under the former statute versus the current statute are 
illustrated by the following table:   
 
 
Former R.C. 2903.08 
New R.C. 2903.08 (A)(1) 
New R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) 
Crime  
Agg. Vehicular Assault 
with a finding of driving 
under the influence 
Agg. Vehicular Assault 
Vehicular Assault 
Degree 
Fourth-degree felony 
Third-degree felony 
Fourth- degree felony 
Mandatory 
prison? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Eligible 
for 
Community 
Control? 
No 
No 
Yes 
Driver’s 
License 
Permanent revocation 
2-10 years’ suspension 
1-5 years’ suspension 
 
{¶26} The trial court applied subsection (A)(2) of the amended version of 
the statute, i.e., vehicular assault by recklessly causing serious physical harm to 
another.  The court of appeals correctly held that the trial court could not sentence 
Kaplowitz under that subsection, current R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), because that 
offense—vehicular assault by recklessly causing harm—is in effect a lesser 
offense than the one of which he was convicted—aggravated vehicular assault 
with an alcohol specification.  On the other hand, the trial court could not properly 
apply current R.C. 2903.08(A)(1), because the penalty for the offense had been 
increased with its elevation to a third-degree felony, and imposing that penalty 
would violate ex post facto principles. 
{¶27} In State v. Kinder, 140 Ohio App.3d 235, 746 N.E.2d 1205, the 
conflict case, Kinder was involved in a vehicular accident in 1999 and indicted on 
January Term, 2003 
7 
aggravated vehicular assault and other charges.  On March 27, 2000, four days 
after the effective date of the R.C. 2903.08 amendments, Kinder pled guilty to 
aggravated vehicular assault with a specification of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or a drug of abuse.  Kinder was sentenced 
under the former version of R.C. 2903.08 to the maximum of 18 months on the 
aggravated vehicular assault and given a 99-year license suspension.  Later, 
Kinder moved to reconsider his sentence, alleging that R.C. 2903.08 had been 
amended and that his sentence should be governed by the new statute. 
{¶28} The Court of Appeals for Muskingum County applied the 
sentencing provisions of the newly amended statute.  While the court found that it 
might have been factually more appropriate to sentence Kinder under the 
amended (A)(1) subsection because of its element of drunk driving, the court held 
that the penalties set forth for that subsection were more stringent than those set 
forth in the previous version.  Thus, because of the significant organizational 
differences in the previous and current versions of R.C. 2903.08, the Kinder court 
found that Kinder must be subject to the sentencing provisions set forth for a 
conviction under (A)(2) of the newly amended R.C. 2903.08, the recklessness 
subsection of the statute, a third-degree felony.  140 Ohio App.3d at 240, 746 
N.E.2d 1205. 
{¶29} We conclude that the Kinder court’s application of amended R.C. 
2903.08(A)(2) was in error because it changed the offense of aggravated vehicular 
assault with an alcohol specification to the lesser offense of recklessly causing 
harm, i.e., vehicular assault.  R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) does not refer to use of alcohol 
and/or a drug of abuse.  The fact that Kinder was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the commission of the aggravated vehicular assault was central to the 
crime and specification of which he pled guilty.  Thus, sentencing Kinder under 
the (A)(2) subsection of the newly amended statute ignores the specification to the 
offense to which Kinder pled.  Because Kinder should have been sentenced under 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
former R.C. 2903.08 as it existed at the time of the commission of his offense, we 
disapprove of State v. Kinder (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 235, 746 N.E.2d 1205. 
{¶30} There are two components of punishment in R.C. 2903.08: 
incarceration and license suspension.  When R.C. 1.58(B) is applied in this 
context, as discussed above, Kaplowitz should have been sentenced under the 
incarceration component that existed under the former version of R.C. 2903.08, 
but he should have received the benefit of the reduced driver’s license suspension 
(from a permanent revocation to a finite period of suspension).  Although the trial 
court mistakenly applied the suspension for vehicular assault under current R.C. 
2903.08(B)(2) instead of the suspension applicable to aggravated vehicular 
assault under current R.C. 2903.08(B)(1), the five-year suspension of Kaplowitz’s 
driver’s license still fell within the appropriate range of two to ten years.  
However, since five years was the maximum under (B)(2), we do not know 
whether the trial court would have imposed a longer suspension if it had known 
that it could. 
{¶31} Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 1.58(B) does not apply to give a 
criminal defendant the benefit of a reduced sentence if, by applying it, the court 
alters the nature of the offense, including specifications to which the defendant 
pled guilty or of which he was found guilty.  State v. Kinder (2000), 140 Ohio 
App.3d 235, 746 N.E.2d 1205, disapproved. 
{¶32} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.  
Specifically, we agree with the court of appeals that since the defendant did not 
know all of the ramifications of his plea prior to this court’s clarification, the 
defendant should therefore have the option to withdraw his plea and plead anew, 
withdraw his plea and proceed to trial, or be resentenced consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment affirmed 
January Term, 2003 
9 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent, would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals, and would reinstate the judgment of the trial court. 
__________________ 
 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian L. 
Summers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Rosplock & Perez and Richard J. Perez, for appellant. 
__________________