Title: Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4992.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4992 
GILMAN, APPELLEE, v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLEES; RHODES, AUD., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4992.] 
Taxation — Property — Homestead exemption — R.C. 323.151(A) — Definition 
of “owner” — List of “owners” in R.C. 323.151(A)(2) is not exhaustive — 
Dwelling held in trust is not disqualified from exemption merely because 
trustee who occupies dwelling is not grantor of trust. 
(No. 2010-0267 — Submitted October 13, 2010 — Decided October 20, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2008-M-2304. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this case, the Hamilton County Auditor appeals from a decision 
of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that granted a homestead exemption with 
respect to the property at issue.  The auditor had denied the request for the 
exemption, and the Hamilton County Board of Revision (“BOR”) upheld that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
denial.  The auditor asserted, and the BOR agreed, that the property did not 
qualify for the tax reduction because the property was held in trust and its current 
occupant, Julia M. Gilman, was the trustee but not the settlor of the trust. 
{¶ 2} On appeal, however, the BTA reversed.  The BTA concluded that 
the property qualified for the tax reduction because Ms. Gilman occupied the 
property as her home and, as trustee, owned legal title to the property that 
qualified as “one of the several estates in fee” under the statute.  The auditor has 
appealed and renews his contention that when property is held in trust, the 
property qualifies for the homestead exemption under R.C. 323.151(A)(2) only if 
the settlor of the trust is the resident and occupant of the property.  We disagree, 
and we therefore affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} Appellee Julia M. Gilman is the surviving spouse of Ronald Keith 
Gilman, who while alive settled a trust and included the property at issue within 
the corpus of that trust.  The property is residential real estate on which Julia 
Gilman herself resides. Pursuant to the excerpt of the trust instrument in the 
record, Gilman succeeded her husband as trustee upon her husband’s death. The 
excerpt of the trust instrument indicates that Ronald Gilman was the sole grantor 
of the trust, and the deed in the record by which the property was conveyed into 
the trust listed Ronald Gilman as the sole grantor of the property.  By the terms of 
the trust, the settlor retained the power to revoke during his lifetime; the excerpt 
does not include provisions that directly address the character of the trust after the 
death of the grantor. 
{¶ 4} On June 7, 2007, Julia Gilman submitted an application for 
homestead exemption to the Hamilton County Auditor.  By correspondence dated 
November 29, 2007, the auditor denied the application because the “applicant is 
not the grantor/settlor of the trust in which the subject property is held.”  On 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
December 7, 2007, Gilman appealed the denial through the filing of a complaint 
at the BOR. 
{¶ 5} On August 11, 2008, the BOR held a hearing, and a follow-up 
hearing was held on October 30, 2008 at Gilman’s request.  The hearing revealed 
that the county prosecutor had furnished the auditor with a legal opinion 
concluding that under R.C. 323.151, the settlor of a trust who occupied residential 
property as a matter of right under the trust terms could qualify as an “owner,” but 
that the trustee could not.  On this basis, the BOR denied the tax reduction, and 
Gilman appealed to the BTA. 
{¶ 6} Without holding a hearing or otherwise taking additional evidence, 
the BTA issued its decision on January 19, 2010.  Relying on case law that the 
trustee owns the legal title to the property held in the trust, the BTA concluded 
that Gilman as trustee qualified as an owner under R.C. 323.151(A)(2)1 by virtue 
of being the “holder of one of the several estates in fee.”  Accordingly, the BTA 
reversed and remanded to the BOR.  The auditor has appealed, and we now 
affirm. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} When a BTA decision is appealed, this court looks to see if that 
decision was reasonable and lawful.  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 
2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14.  In reviewing a BTA decision under this 
standard, we acknowledge that “ ‘[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual 
issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support for these BTA 
determinations,’ ” we will affirm them.  Id., quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483.  On the other hand, we “ ‘will 
not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
                                                 
1.  The BTA decision actually cites “R.C. 353.521(A)(2),” but the context and the absence of any 
Chapter 353 in the Revised Code establish that the BTA meant to cite R.C. 323.151(A)(2). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
conclusion.’ ”  Id., quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789. 
{¶ 8} This appeal presents the question whether the trustee of a trust that 
holds title to real property qualifies as an “owner” under R.C. 323.151(A)(2).  
Because this calls for us to construe the statute, it presents an issue of law that we 
determine de novo on appeal.  Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
460, 466, 639 N.E.2d 425; State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-
4163, 871 N.E.3d 1167, ¶ 8.  To resolve that issue, we turn to an examination of 
the pertinent statutes. 
The enactment and expansion of the homestead exemption 
{¶ 9} Beginning in 1971, the General Assembly provided real property 
tax relief to owner-occupied residential property belonging to persons 65 and 
over.2  Referred to as the homestead exemption, the tax break took the form of a 
credit against real property taxes that was tied to the income of the owner-
occupants of the property. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 475, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1485, 
1490-1494.  Originally available only because of the age of the owner-occupants, 
the tax reduction in 1975 became available to permanently and totally disabled 
homeowners.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 23, 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1409-1413.  In 1991, 
the law extended the benefit to certain surviving spouses who did not 
independently qualify for the reduction.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66, 144 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 2877. 
{¶ 10} In 1999, the General Assembly extended the tax break to mobile 
and manufactured homes, and in 2001 the credit was extended to units in a 
                                                 
2.  Parallel to but distinguishable from the homestead exemption based on age or disability is the 
generally available 2.5 percent rollback on homesteads, which was originally enacted in 1979 
(Am.Sub.H.B. No. 204, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1915, 1983), and in its amended form is codified at 
R.C. 323.152(B).  Under the statute, the availability of the 2.5 percent rollback is tied to the 
definition of homestead, so that the issue of who qualifies as an “owner” determines the 
availability of the rollback as well as the availability of the homestead exemption itself.  See State 
ex rel. Swetland v. Kinney (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 23, 24, 16 O.O.3d 14, 402 N.E.2d 542. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
housing cooperative.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 142, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7986, 8002; 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 595, 148 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6422.  Finally, in 2007 the 
General Assembly broadened the availability of the tax reduction by eliminating 
the income test as a limit on its availability, with the result that the homestead 
exemption now affords tax freedom on $25,000 of a property’s value whenever 
the owner-occupants satisfy the age or disability criteria.  See R.C. 323.151 to 
323.153, as amended, 127th General Assembly, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 119. 
{¶ 11} The tax reduction applies to real property taxes imposed on a 
“homestead,” which is defined as various types of dwellings together with 
whatever surrounding land “not exceeding one acre, that is reasonably necessary 
for the use of the dwelling as a home.”  R.C. 323.151(A)(2).  The dwelling must 
be “owned and occupied as a home by an individual whose domicile is in this 
state.”  R.C. 323.151(A)(1)(a). 
Because R.C.232.151 predicates the homestead exemption on a dwelling being 
owned and occupied by the person who uses the property as a home, the statute 
addresses who qualifies as an “owner” 
{¶ 12} Crucial to the decision of this case is R.C. 323.151’s language 
concerning who may qualify as an “owner.”  At its first enactment in 1971, the 
statute stated that an owner “includes a vendee in possession under a purchase 
agreement or a land contract, a mortgagor, one or more joint tenants with right of 
survivorship, and tenants in common.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 475, 134 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 1485, 1490.  In 1991, the General Assembly added to this inclusive list a 
“settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust holding the title to a homestead occupied 
by the settlor as of right under the trust.”  Sub.H.B. No. 641, 144 Ohio Laws, Part 
IV, 6034. 
{¶ 13} In 1995, the General Assembly added a “life tenant” to the list 
along with a “holder of one of the several estates in fee.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 117, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 898, 1070.3  Thus, the statute in effect for tax year 2007 
addressed who qualified as an “owner” by stating that “[a]n owner includes the 
holder of one of the several estates in fee, a vendee in possession under a purchase 
agreement or a land contract, a mortgagor, a life tenant, one or more tenants with 
a right of survivorship, tenants in common, and a settlor of a revocable inter vivos 
trust holding the title to a homestead occupied by the settlor as of right under the 
trust.” 
{¶ 14} In the present case, the Hamilton County Auditor read R.C. 
323.151(A)(2)’s reference to the settlor of property held in trust as constituting 
the exclusive circumstance in which trust property could qualify for the tax 
reduction.  By contrast, the BTA construed the phrase “a holder of one of the 
several estates in fee” to apply to a trustee, who under established law holds the 
legal title to the corpus of the trust. 
R.C. 323.151(A)(2) does not foreclose extending the tax reduction 
to trust property that is occupied by the trustee 
{¶ 15} The auditor regards R.C. 323.151(A)(2)’s list of those 
encompassed by the term “owner” as exhaustive.  We disagree.  By using the 
phrase “owner includes,” the General Assembly indicated its intent not to set forth 
an exhaustive list.  Instead, the list clarifies that certain persons qualify in 
accordance with, or in addition to, an “owner” under the meaning of that term in 
common usage.  See R.C. 1.42 (requiring that words and phrases be “read in 
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage”).  
See Trans Rail Am., Inc. v. Enyeart, 123 Ohio St.3d 1, 2009-Ohio-3624, 913 
N.E.2d 948, ¶ 28 (by listing items that an “act” or “action” includes, the General 
Assembly showed its intent “to illustrate the types of actions that may be 
                                                 
3.  Subsequent to the 2007 tax year at issue, the 127th General Assembly in 2008 broadened the 
list of owners by allowing the settlor of an irrevocable as well as a revocable trust to qualify.  See 
R.C. 323.151(A)(2), Am. Sub. H.B. No. 130 (2008).   
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
appealable, rather than to set out an exhaustive list”).  Indeed, had the list been 
intended as exhaustive at the outset, “owner” in 1971 would not even have 
included the holder of full legal title to property that was not subject to a purchase 
agreement, land contract, mortgage, or joint tenancy.  Plainly, the creation of an 
exhaustive list was not the intent of the General Assembly.4 
{¶ 16} In its ordinary meaning, “owner” generally refers to “[o]ne who 
has the right to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or 
more interests are vested.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (9 Ed.2009) 1214.  In cases 
that address issues of real property taxation, we have construed “owner” narrowly 
to encompass only the legal-title holder and not the holder of an equitable interest 
in the property.  See Performing Arts School of Metro. Toledo, Inc. v. Wilkins, 
104 Ohio St.3d 284, 2004-Ohio-6389, 819 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 12; Victoria Plaza Ltd. 
Liab. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 712 
N.E.2d 751.  Again applying common usage and plain meaning in legal contexts, 
a “trustee” is “[o]ne who, having legal title to property, holds it in trust for the 
benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary.”  Black’s at 1656.  
Accord Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins, 106 Ohio St.3d 200, 
2005-Ohio-4556, 833 N.E.2d 726, ¶ 11, citing Goralsky v. Taylor (1991), 59 Ohio 
St.3d 197, 198, 571 N.E.2d 720. 
{¶ 17} We hold that “owner” for purposes of R.C. 323.151(A)(2) 
encompasses the trustee of a trust to which real property is subject.  It follows that 
                                                 
4.  The Department of Taxation’s Division of Tax Equalization has issued Bulletin 23 
(Rev.Nov.2007), explaining aspects of the homestead exemption.  A copy of that publication is in 
the record.  In it, the tax department declares that the seven categories of owner listed in R.C. 
323.151 are “exclusive,” a statement that is incompatible with our reading of the statute.  Id. at 17.  
On the other hand, the publication does not appear to support the auditor’s specific conclusion that 
the legal title held by a trustee does not qualify as a fee-simple interest in real property.  Indeed, 
the publication acknowledges that ownership need not involve a “fee simple absolute,” but fee 
ownership may be subject to a condition, limitation, or restriction to particular heirs.  Because the 
publication does not discuss whether a trustee’s legal title to real property qualifies her as an 
“owner,” we will not evaluate the publication as a statement of administrative practice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
when the other requirements of the statute are satisfied, a dwelling that is held in 
trust may qualify as a “homestead” when the trustee is an individual who occupies 
the property as a home. 
{¶ 18} The auditor predicates his contrary position on an erroneous 
reading of the “owner” provision.  In the auditor’s view, a dwelling held in trust 
can qualify as a “homestead” only by virtue of the one status listed under “owner” 
that explicitly refers to a trust arrangement.  Because that portion of the list 
specifies that the settlor of the trust may qualify as an owner, the trustee cannot 
qualify under this theory.  The auditor’s error lies in the reading the list as an 
exhaustive one that excludes all holders of legal title who do not fall within one of 
the specified categories. 
{¶ 19} In advancing his argument, the auditor necessarily takes issue with 
the BTA’s holding that Gilman as trustee qualifies as the “holder of one of the 
several estates in fee.”  Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (Jan. 19, 2010), 
BTA No. 2008-M-2304, at 3.  Concerning the addition of that language in 1995 
through Am.Sub.H.B. No. 117, the Legislative Service Commission’s Bill 
Analysis explained that a “holder of one of the several estates in fee has an 
absolute and unconditional interest in real property” and observed that “[s]ince a 
person holding an estate in fee is commonly regarded as the owner, this addition 
is for the purpose of form rather than substance.”  Id. at 186-187.  Because under 
a trust arrangement the legal and equitable estates are divided, the legal title held 
by a trustee may be deemed not to constitute a fee-simple interest in the property 
in some instances and for certain purposes.  See Hill v. Irons (1953), 160 Ohio 21, 
27, 50 O.O. 485, 113 N.E.2d 243.  The auditor argues that the trust situation in 
this case is one in which the title to the dwelling is not a fee-simple interest. 
{¶ 20} We need not determine the technical question whether Gilman’s 
legal title in this case involves holding a fee-simple interest in the property, 
because we more generally conclude that “owner” encompasses holders of legal 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
title without regard to any division of legal and equitable estates.  Accordingly, 
Gilman qualifies as an owner under R.C. 323.151(A)(2) by virtue of her authority 
over the property as trustee. 
{¶ 21} Finally, the auditor urges that recognizing a trustee’s status as 
owner will lead to absurd results that the General Assembly did not intend.  The 
auditor points out that in many cases a bank or an “unrelated third party” might be 
the trustee, and rhetorically asks whether those trustees would “be entitled to the 
Homestead Exemption in derogation of the rights of the beneficiaries.”  But the 
plain terms of R.C. 323.151 limit the exemption to a dwelling “owned and 
occupied as a home by an individual,” along with other personal restrictions.  As a 
result, a bank-trustee will not qualify because a bank is not an individual and will 
not be able to occupy a “dwelling” as its “home.”  Nor do we anticipate that 
fiduciary duty and trust terms will usually permit an individual trustee to occupy a 
dwelling as a home apart from a familial relationship with the settlor or 
beneficiary, and the statute restricts the availability of the exemption where 
related persons transfer the property for the purpose of creating an entitlement to 
the exemption.5  Additionally, if the legislature decides that the exemption 
extends too far, it is free to restrict it through further amendments. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the BTA acted 
reasonably and lawfully when it reversed the determination of the BOR and 
granted the homestead exemption for tax year 2007.  We therefore affirm the 
decision of the BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
                                                 
5.  To qualify as “owner,” an individual must be an Ohio domiciliary and cannot have “acquired 
ownership from a person, other than the individual’s spouse, related by consanguinity or affinity 
for the purpose of qualifying for the [homestead exemption].”   R.C. 323.151(A)(1)(a). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Julia M. Gilman, pro se. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas J. 
Scheve, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________