Title: New Jersey in the Interest of A.R.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of
the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.)

                      State in the Interest of A.R. (A-67-16) (078672)

Argued February 26, 2018 -- Decided July 11, 2018

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

       In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old “Alex,” the family court admitted into
evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule --
the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old “John” gave to police, in which he alleged
that Alex had sexually touched him on a school bus. John, who suffers from severe
developmental disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning was unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who was declared incompetent as a witness by
the court, was permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of N.J.R.E.
803(c)(27). The Court considers that determination, as well as the family court’s
adjudication of Alex as delinquent of committing sexual assault.

       Fourteen-year-old Alex was charged in a juvenile delinquency complaint with
committing sexual assault “by contact” on seven-year-old John. The complaint specifically
alleged that Alex “on one occasion rubbed [John’s] penis with his hand.” The alleged assault
occurred on a bus transporting eighteen special-needs children home from summer school.

        The family court conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements
John made to a detective. John’s mother’s cousin (“Grace”) testified that on July 3, 2014,
she went to the bus stop to pick up John. While walking home, John told Grace that “[Alex]
touched his belly button and pee-pee.” Grace did not ask any follow-up questions. Grace
later called John’s mother and had no further discussion with John about the subject. John’s
mother reported the incident to the police five days later. Detective Abromaitis testified
about his fourteen-minute recorded interview from July 21, 2014.

        The interview began with Detective Abromaitis introducing himself. In response to
the first question, “What’s up,” John stated, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee.” John indicated
that the touching occurred “[u]nderneath my clothes.” However, when John showed the
detective where he was touched using anatomical dolls, without prompting, he stated, “He
touched at me by accident.” On an anatomical drawing, John referred to his “butt” as both
his belly button and his behind, and at one point he referred to his navel as his “dingaleg.” In
response to a leading question, John recalled that he was at home when the touching
occurred, until the detective asked another leading question, and then John recalled that he
was on the bus. John told the detective that he lived with “Chowder and Clarence” (cartoon
characters), his “mom,” his friend Jacob, and “dragons, too.”
                                                1
         The family court ruled that John’s recorded statement would be admissible at trial,
provided that John was available to testify. The next day, at the bench trial, John had
difficulty responding to simple questions in an accurate or truthful way. The court concluded
that John was not “competent to testify.” Nevertheless, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the
court allowed the prosecutor to proceed with John’s direct examination. John could convey
little reliable information. Although it was undisputed that John took a bus to summer
school, he responded to a question about how he went to school by stating, “I was walking
on the street.”

        Although the family court found that John lacked “competency” as a witness, it
declined to exclude from evidence John’s statements to the detective or to dismiss the case.
The State recalled John to the stand. He continued to have difficulty answering simple
questions. For example, he stated “It’s right,” if the prosecutor referred to a spider as a
flower, and in response to a leading question, indicated that the color black might be red.
John stated that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom, touched him on “my clothes, my
pee-pee and my butt.” However, John stated that a little boy named Alex sat near him and
that the little boys and big boys were separated on the bus.

       The defense presented three witnesses. The bus aide stated that the “big kids,” such
as Alex, sat in the back of the bus and the “small kids” sat in the front -- and that she sat in
the middle, separating the two groups. She maintained that Alex did not sit with John. The
school bus driver corroborated the seating arrangement and did not see or hear anything that
gave him concern. The transportation liaison confirmed that two children named Alex were
on the bus that day, one of whom went to elementary school and the other to high school.

        The family court adjudicated Alex delinquent. Alex appealed. The Appellate
Division held that John was effectively unavailable for cross-examination, and therefore the
admission of his statement to the detective violated Alex’s federal confrontation rights. 
447 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2016). The panel did not address any state-law evidentiary
claims and remanded to the family court to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence is
sufficient to prove the adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 525. The Court
granted the State’s petition for certification. 
230 N.J. 425 (2017).

HELD: The Court reverses Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law grounds,
concluding that the video-recorded statement did not possess a sufficient probability of
trustworthiness to justify its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Striking the
juvenile’s recorded statement from the record does not leave sufficient evidence in the record
to support, on any rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex. Accordingly,
the sexual assault charge must be dismissed. The Court concludes that the incompetency
proviso of the present version of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed and remands that rule for
review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence.

1. The Court does not address the constitutional issues reached by the Appellate Division
because this matter can be resolved by resort to New Jersey’s evidence rules, and courts
should not reach a constitutional question unless imperative to the litigation. (pp. 18-19)
                                               2
2. The source of the current tender-years exception, including its incompetency proviso, is
State v. D.R., 
109 N.J. 348 (1988). In D.R., the Court recognized that, in a child-sex-abuse
prosecution, “testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the [State’s]
case,” and determined that the evidence rules needed an additional “exception[] to the
hearsay rule . . . .” Id. at 358. The Court also expressed concern that a child’s incompetency
would present an insurmountable obstacle to the admission of the child-victim’s out-of-court
statement. Id. at 369-70. That concern gave rise to the incompetency proviso. (pp. 19-22)

3. The incompetency proviso proposed in D.R. and adopted as a rule read as follows: “no
child whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness
. . . by virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) [of the competency rule].” Id. at 378. It
rendered inoperative only paragraph (b) of the competency rule; it did not allow a child
deemed incompetent under paragraph (a) to testify. With the 1993 renumbering of the Rules
of Evidence, the reference to paragraph (b) was removed. The proviso now reads: “no child
whose statement is to be offered in evidence . . . shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
proceeding by virtue of the requirements of [the competency rule].” The consequences of
this expansion are significant and far-reaching because it permits the testimony of a child
victim not only incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth (paragraph b) but also
incapable of distinguishing between fantasy and reality and of expressing himself in a
manner to be understood by a judge or jury (paragraph a). The record concerning the
promulgation of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides no clear explanation for the removal of the
reference to paragraph (b). Accordingly, the Court requests that the Supreme Court
Committee on the Rules of Evidence consider whether N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) should be
amended. (pp. 22-26)

4. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), as presently constructed, did not authorize the admission of John’s
video-recorded statement. Before admitting a child’s out-of-court statement, the trial court
must determine whether “there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy.” N.J.R.E.
803(c)(27). The Court has identified “a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to evaluating
the reliability of out-of-court statements made by child victims of sexual abuse, including
[the] mental state of the declarant . . . .” State v. P.S., 
202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010). Clearly, one
consideration in assessing a child’s mental state must be whether the child is able to
distinguish between fantasy and reality and whether the child can communicate in a way that
shows the child has the mental capacity to tell the truth and to be understood by the trier of
fact. A judicial declaration that a child is incompetent to testify should also have some
bearing on determining the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement. Given the
totality of the circumstances, the trustworthiness of John’s video-recorded statement is not
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. John’s video-recorded statement was
wrongly admitted into evidence. (pp. 27-33)

5. After excising from the record John’s video-recorded statement, the remaining evidence --
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State -- is insufficient to support a
sexual-assault adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt. The remaining evidence consists of
John’s incompetent testimony and Grace’s hearsay testimony that, as John walked home with
her after exiting the bus, he said, “[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.” The
                                                3
statement does not tell us whether the alleged touching was accidental, which of the two
Alexes did the touching, or when and where the incident occurred. In addition, no competent
evidence corroborates John’s single statement made to Grace. The remaining evidence is
insufficient to support the sexual-assault adjudication against Alex. (pp. 33-35)

       REVERSED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.

                                            4
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
67 September Term 2016
                                                 078672

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE
INTEREST OF A.R., a minor.

         Argued February 26, 2018 – Decided July 11, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division, whose opinion is
         reported at 
447 N.J. Super. 485 (App. Div.
         2016).

         Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for appellant State of New
         Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
         attorney; Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney
         General, of counsel and on the briefs).

         Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel,
         argued the cause for respondent A.R. (Joseph
         E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
         Alison S. Perrone, on the briefs).

         Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for
         amicus curiae John J. Gibbons Fellowship in
         Pubic Interest and Constitutional Law at
         Gibbons P.C. (Gibbons, attorneys; Lawrence
         S. Lustberg and J. David Pollock, on the
         brief).

    JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In the sexual assault trial of fourteen-year-old Alex, the

family court admitted into evidence pursuant to N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27) -- the tender-years exception to the hearsay rule --

the video-recorded statement that seven-year-old John gave to

police, in which he alleged that Alex had sexually touched him

                                1
on a school bus.1   John, who suffers from severe developmental

disabilities, who during out-of-court and in-court questioning

was unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and who

was declared incompetent as a witness by the court, was

permitted to testify pursuant to the incompetency proviso of

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).   According to the proviso, “no child whose

statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to [N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27)] shall be disqualified” to testify, even though the

child witness is deemed incompetent under the requirements of

N.J.R.E. 601.

     Based on John’s recorded statement, his incompetent

testimony, and an utterance he made to his mother’s cousin, the

family court adjudicated Alex delinquent of committing sexual

assault.

     The Appellate Division found that John’s incompetency, as

evident from his inability to answer truthfully even simple

questions, rendered him unavailable for cross-examination.     The

Appellate Division therefore determined that the admission of

the juvenile’s in-court testimony and the video-recorded

statement violated Alex’s confrontation rights under the Sixth

Amendment, as articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36

1  We use fictitious names to identify the juvenile defendant and
the alleged victim, and the victim’s relatives to protect their
privacy.

                                 2
(2004), and its progeny.     The Appellate Division did not disturb

the juvenile adjudication but rather remanded to the family

court to determine whether sufficient evidence remained to

support that adjudication.

    We now reverse Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law

grounds.    We conclude that the juvenile’s video-recorded

statement was not admissible because the statement did not

possess a sufficient probability of trustworthiness to justify

its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).     The

resolution of the admissibility of the recorded statement based

on our evidence rules ultimately renders unnecessary the

Appellate Division’s constitutional analysis and determination.

Striking the juvenile’s recorded statement from the record does

not leave sufficient evidence in the record to support, on any

rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division

and hold that the sexual assault charge must be dismissed.

    The Appellate Division’s critique, however, has led us to

conclude that the incompetency proviso of the present version of

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed, and therefore we remand that rule

for review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of

Evidence.

                                  I.

                                  A.

                                  3
     Fourteen-year-old Alex was charged in a juvenile

delinquency complaint with committing an act of sexual assault

“by contact” on seven-year-old John on July 3, 2014 in violation

of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b).   The complaint specifically alleged that

Alex “on one occasion rubbed [John’s] penis with his hand.”    The

alleged assault occurred on a bus that was transporting eighteen

special-needs children home from summer school.   John has been

diagnosed with autism and attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder (ADHD), and his intellectual development corresponded

to that of a three-year-old.

     The State’s case depended largely on a comment made by John

to his mother’s cousin Grace after he exited the bus, John’s

recorded statement given to a detective eighteen days later, and

John’s testimony at the juvenile trial.   Alex’s defense

consisted of a general denial that the assault occurred.    Among

other witnesses, Alex presented the bus aide and the bus driver,

both of whom suggested that the assault could not have happened

as described by John, given the seating arrangements on the bus

and their observations that day.

                                B.

     The family court conducted a Rule 104 hearing,2 pursuant to

2 N.J.R.E. 104(a) provides the vehicle for the court to conduct
a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence that is
subject to a condition before the evidence may be introduced at

                                   
4 N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), to determine the admissibility of the

statements John made to Grace and the detective.    The only issue

before this Court is the admissibility of John’s recorded

statement to the detective.

    At the hearing, the State called Grace and Detective David

Abromaitis of the Special Victims Unit of the Hudson County

Prosecutor’s Office, and the defense called Dr. Gerald Cooke, a

board-certified forensic psychologist.

    Grace testified that on July 3, 2014, she went to the bus

stop to pick up John from summer school.    She arrived after John

had exited the bus.    When she first observed John, Alex was

holding him by the hand.    That struck Grace as unusual, and she

told the bus driver that he should not have let John off the bus

until she arrived.    While walking home, John told Grace that

“[Alex] touched his belly button and pee-pee.”     Grace did not

ask any follow-up questions, such as when and where the touching

occurred or about the circumstances of the event.    Grace later

called John’s mother and had no further discussion with John

about the subject.

    John’s mother reported the incident to the Hoboken Police

Department five days later.

    Detective Abromaitis testified about his fourteen-minute

trial.

                                  5
recorded interview at the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office on

July 21, 2014 -- eighteen days after the first report to Grace.

The recording was played in its entirety at the hearing.

       The interview began with Detective Abromaitis introducing

himself as Dave, a police officer, and in response to the first

perfunctory question, “What’s up,” John stated, “[Alex] touched

my pee-pee.”   Detective Abromaitis explained that he did not

conduct a pre-interview of John and met him for the first time

when John entered the interview room -- and therefore did not

prompt John’s response.    When the detective followed up and

asked who touched him, John responded, “[Alex] touched my pee-

pee.   He touched my belly button.    He touched my belly button,

and everybody all laughed at me.”     John indicated that the

touching occurred “[u]nderneath my clothes.”     He also stated,

“He touched my eye.    He touched my hand.   He touched my

eyebrows.   He touched my nose like this.    He touched my mouth.

He touched my legs.”    However, when John showed the detective

where he was touched using anatomical dolls, without prompting,

he stated, “He touched at me by accident.”     On an anatomical

drawing, John referred to his “butt” as both his belly button

and his behind, and at one point he referred to his navel as his

“dingaleg.”

       In response to a leading question, John recalled that he

was at home when the touching occurred, until the detective

                                  6
asked another leading question, and then John recalled that he

was on the bus.   That colloquy is set forth below:

          [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] Okay[.]  [C]an you
          tell me where you were when [Alex] touched
          you? Were you at home?

          [JOHN:]   Yes, I was at home.

          [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:] Or were you somewhere
          else?

          [JOHN:]   Somewhere else [inaudible].

          [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:]    So where were you?
          When you say somewhere else, where’s somewhere
          else?

          [JOHN:]   I don’t know.

          [DETECTIVE ABROMAITIS:]       Okay[.]   [W]ere you
          on the bus?

          [JOHN:]   Yes[.]   [Y]es.3

Detective Abromaitis never asked John where he was seated on the

bus or whether he was seated next to Alex.

     John told the detective that he lived with “Chowder and

Clarence” (cartoon characters), his “mom,” his friend Jacob, and

“dragons, too.”   In speaking with John’s mother, the detective

learned that they lived only with John’s brother, Joe.

3  The transcript of the video-recorded statement was prepared by
the Prosecutor’s Office and moved into evidence. The family
court, however, indicated during its admissibility ruling that
it “did not hear the juvenile say that the alleged incident
happened at home” when listening to and reviewing the recording.
As agreed to by the parties, defense counsel cross-examined
Detective Abromaitis based on the transcript.

                                    7
    Dr. Cooke criticized Detective Abromaitis’s interview

techniques.   He found fault with the detective’s failure to

inquire whether John could distinguish between the truth and a

lie or between fantasy and reality, particularly given that the

child “cognitively” was more like a three-year-old than a seven-

year-old.   Dr. Cooke also criticized the detective for asking

leading questions that suggested that the incident occurred on

the bus and for not making further inquiry when John said the

touching was “by accident.”

    The family court ruled that John’s recorded statement was

sufficiently “trustworthy on the basis of the time[,] content

and circumstances of the statement” and therefore would be

admissible at trial, provided that John was available to

testify.    Although the court agreed with Dr. Cooke that

Detective Abromaitis broke with the “ideal” protocol by not

asking John “any questions to determine whether or not he

understood the difference between telling the truth and telling

the lie” and acknowledged that the detective asked an improper

leading question that suggested to John that he was on the bus,

it nevertheless found “that the statement is probably

trustworthy in the language of [N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)].”

    The court also conditionally admitted into evidence the

comment John made to Grace, finding that the statement “was

completely spontaneous” and “probably trustworthy in the

                                  8
totality of the circumstances.”

                                   C.

     The next day, the family court presided over the bench

trial on the sexual assault charge lodged against Alex.         The

first witness called by the State was John.      The court asked

John some preliminary questions to explore his competency to

testify under N.J.R.E. 601.

     The inquiry made clear that John had difficulty responding

to simple questions in an accurate or truthful way.       For

example, the court showed John a red toy.       When asked whether if

told the red toy was green that would be the truth, John

replied, “yes.”     When asked the same question again, he said,

“no.”   John also identified a tie as red, but when asked if told

that the tie was green, whether that would be the truth, he

responded, “yes.”     The colloquy further developed that John had

difficulty distinguishing between what is real and not real.

          [COURT:] And what kind of toy is the other
          one, what is that?

          [JOHN:]     Dinosaur.   A dinosaur.

          [COURT:] A dinosaur, okay. Now if I told you
          that the dinosaur, if I told you that that toy
          that you say is a dinosaur is a chicken, would
          that be the truth?

          [JOHN:]     Yes.

          [COURT:]   It would be.     Do you know the
          difference between the truth and a lie?

          [JOHN:]     Yes.

                                   9
         [COURT:]   You do, what is it?

         [JOHN:]    I don’t know.

         [COURT:]   You don’t know?

         [JOHN:]    Yeah.    Yes.

    John’s difficulty comprehending and responding to questions

became further evident during the prosecutor’s preliminary

examination:

         [PROSECUTOR:] Okay.         Do you know -- this is
         a courtroom, right?

         [JOHN:]    Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:]   Now if I tell you we’re at
         McDonald’s, would that be the truth or would
         it be a lie?

         [JOHN:]    Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:]      Yes, it would be the truth or
         a lie?

         [JOHN:]    Yes.    Yes.    Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:] Okay. When you talk to mommy,
         do you have to tell her the truth or do you
         tell her a lie?

         [JOHN:]    Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:]      Which one do you do for her?

         [JOHN:]    I don’t know.        I don’t know.

    Based on the exchanges above, the court concluded that John

was not “competent to testify.”      Nevertheless, pursuant to

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), which allows a juvenile witness to testify

despite his incompetency, the court allowed the prosecutor to

proceed with John’s direct examination.         The brief examination

                                    10
revealed that John could convey little reliable information.

Although it was undisputed that John took a bus to summer

school, he responded to a question about how he went to school

by stating, “I was walking on the street.”

    The prosecutor requested permission to recall John on

another day, a request the court subsequently granted.      The

trial resumed several days later, and the prosecutor continued

taking testimony from John.    Again, John had difficulty

answering simple questions.    He stated that, “It’s right,” if

the prosecutor referred to a spider as a flower.    Additionally,

the following example shows how susceptible John was to leading

questions:

         [PROSECUTOR:]   If I tell you that this is
         black, is it really black?

         [JOHN:]   Yes.   Yes.   Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:]    It’s really black or is it red?

         [JOHN:]   It’s red.

    In response to a series of questions by the prosecutor,

John responded that Alex, whom he identified in the courtroom,

touched him on “my clothes, my pee-pee and my butt” while seated

on the bus.

         [PROSECUTOR:]    [John], do you know why we’re
         here today?

         [JOHN:]   Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR:]    Why are we here today?

                                 11
[JOHN:]   I don’t know.

[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Did anything happen this
summer on the school bus?

[JOHN:]   Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:]    What happened?

[JOHN:]   [Alex] touched me.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Okay.    And where did he touch
you?

[JOHN:]   Right here and right here and here.

[PROSECUTOR:] When you say here, what part of
your body is that?

[JOHN:]   My skin.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Okay.   And exactly what part?

[JOHN:]   My -- my clothes, my pee-pee and my
butt.

[PROSECUTOR:] Were you sitting on the bus or
were you standing?

[JOHN:]   Sitting on the bus.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Were there other people around?

[JOHN:]   Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Who was around?

[JOHN:]   [Alex] and Jay.     That’s it.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Do you see [Alex] here today?

[JOHN:]   Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Okay.   Where do you see him?

[JOHN:]   On the bus.

[PROSECUTOR:]    Do you see him here today?

[JOHN:]   Yes.

                         12
         [PROSECUTOR:] Can you do me a favor, [John]?
         I’m just going to ask you to stand up for one
         second and you tell me where you see him?

         [JOHN:]   Right there.

    During the defense examination, John stated that the

“little kids” were separated from the “big kids” on the bus and

that as one of the smaller kids he sat at the front of the bus.

John also admitted that another boy named Alex -- not defendant

-- was on the bus and sat near him.

    Although the family court found that John lacked

“competency” as a witness, it nevertheless concluded that John’s

incompetency did not render him unavailable as a witness.       The

court therefore declined to exclude from evidence John’s

statements to the detective and Grace or to dismiss the case.

    The defense presented three witnesses.

    Leslie Dorsey-Jones testified that she was the bus aide who

traveled with Alex and John and approximately sixteen other

children as they returned home from school on July 3.     She

stated that the “big kids,” such as Alex, sat in the back of the

bus and the “small kids” sat in the front of the bus -- and that

she sat in the middle, separating the two groups.   She

maintained that Alex “was sitting in the back, like behind me

. . . , but I know he wasn’t sitting with the other little boy.

I know that for a fact.”   She neither heard nor saw anything

amiss.

                                  13
    Reuben Quinones, the school bus driver that day,

corroborated that the little kids were seated in the front of

the bus and big kids in the back.    He identified Alex as a “big

kid” who would have been in the back.   Quinones periodically

used his overhead mirror to view the interior of the bus and did

not see or hear anything that gave him concern.

    The final defense witness was Lisa Cruz, the transportation

liaison for the Hoboken Board of Education, who confirmed that

two children named Alex were on the bus that day, one of whom

went to elementary school and the other to high school.

    At the conclusion of the case, the family court found “that

the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that [Alex]

purposely committed an act of sexual contact” by touching

“[John’s] penis underneath his clothes.”    The court further

determined that the “intentional touching” was for the purpose

of degrading or humiliating John and of sexually arousing or

gratifying Alex.   The court acknowledged that John had “the

developmental cognition of a three-year-old,” a “lack [of]

competency to testify,” and “was not able to distinguish or to

articulate what his understanding was between right and wrong or

the consequences of not telling the truth.”   Nevertheless, the

court maintained that “when it came to the incident itself

[John] understood the questions, and he answered coherently in a

responsive way and consistently.”

                                14
    After adjudicating Alex delinquent, the court imposed a

special condition that Alex attend a residential sex-offender

treatment program.

                                 D.

    Alex appealed, claiming that the admission of John’s

statement to the detective and his incompetent testimony

violated our evidence rules.    In particular, Alex argued that

John’s out-of-court statement “was not sufficiently trustworthy

for admission under the 'tender years’ hearsay exception,

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27),” and that basing a juvenile adjudication on

the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of an incompetent witness

was reversible error.   Alex also asserted that the adjudication

was not supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   Finally,

he maintained that John’s incompetency rendered him unavailable

for meaningful cross-examination and thus the admission of his

hearsay statement violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation

Clause, as construed by Crawford v. Washington.

                                 E.

    The Appellate Division held that because John was

incompetent to testify he was effectively unavailable for cross-

examination, and therefore the admission of his incriminating

testimonial statement to Detective Abromaitis violated Alex’s

federal confrontation rights.   State in Interest of A.R., 
447 N.J. Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2016).    The panel did not

                                 15
address any of the state-law evidentiary claims that Alex argued

were grounds for reversing his adjudication.4

       Applying the dictates of the Crawford line of cases, the

panel first concluded that John’s statement to Detective

Abromaitis was testimonial, triggering the constitutional

requirement that John be available for cross-examination.
5 Id.

at 516-21.   Second, the court determined John’s incompetence did

not afford Alex a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine John

about the accusations he made to the detective.     Id. at 521,

523.   More broadly, the panel reached the conclusion that the

incompetency proviso, when “applied to a child’s hearsay

statements made in a testimonial setting,” violates the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.     Id. at 516.

4  The Appellate Division recognized that “courts generally
prefer to steer away from constitutional questions if their
resolution is not essential to a case,” but believed that Alex
“concede[d] in his brief that the hearsay statements of [John]
were admissible as a matter of state evidence law under N.J.R.E.
803(c)(27).” A.R., 
447 N.J. Super. at 515. We do not find such
a concession. To the contrary, Alex asserted in his brief that
John’s out-of-court statement to Detective Abromaitis “was not
sufficiently trustworthy for admission under the 'tender years’
hearsay exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).” Additionally, at oral
argument before this Court, Alex’s attorney asserted that the
defense raised on direct appeal the unreliability of the video-
recorded statement and argued it “should not have been admitted
under 803(c)(27).”
5  The court noted that John’s statement to his mother’s cousin,
Grace, was not testimonial and therefore admissible without the
requirement of cross-examination. Id. at 521. Alex does not
challenge the admission of that statement. Ibid.

                                 16
     Thus, after striking as evidence John’s video-recorded

statement and his testimony, the panel remanded to the family

court to assess whether the State’s remaining evidence is

sufficient to meet its burden to prove the juvenile adjudication

beyond a reasonable doubt.   Id. at 525.   In the interim, the

Appellate Division did not disturb the delinquency adjudication.

Ibid.

                                F.

     We granted the State’s petition for certification.     
230 N.J. 425 (2017).   The John J. Gibbons Fellowship in Public

Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons P.C. appeared as

amicus curiae in support of Alex.

                               II.

                                A.

     In seeking reversal of the Appellate Division’s decision,

the State advances two arguments.6   First, it maintains that

John, who functioned at the level of a three-year-old and was

declared incompetent to testify, did not make a “testimonial

statement” -- a statement uttered with the primary purpose that

it be used in a later criminal prosecution -- and therefore the

6  The Attorney General represents the State before this Court,
having superseded the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office, which
represented the State before the family court and Appellate
Division.

                                17
Confrontation Clause is inapplicable.   In other words, the

admissibility of John’s recorded statement did not depend on

whether he was subject to cross-examination.   Second, the State

contends that, regardless of the declaration of incompetency,

John took the stand, and the defense subjected him to cross-

examination, thus satisfying the requirements of the

Confrontation Clause.

                                B.

     Alex counters that John’s accusatory statement to the

detective meets the standard of a testimonial statement and

therefore its admission required that John be available for

meaningful cross-examination.   Alex argues that meaningful

cross-examination could not and did not occur because of John’s

incompetency, resulting in a violation of Alex’s confrontation

rights.

                                C.

     We do not address the constitutional issues reached by the

Appellate Division or by the parties and amicus curiae because

this matter can be resolved by resort to our evidence rules.7    We

have often stated, “[c]ourts should not reach a constitutional

question unless its resolution is imperative to the disposition

7  The state-law issues were fully briefed by the parties in the
Appellate Division.

                                18
of litigation.”     Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris,

186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006).    Thus, “we do not address constitutional

questions when a narrower, non-constitutional result is

available.”   USDA v. Scurry, 
193 N.J. 492, 500 n.4 (2008)

(citing Randolph Town Ctr., 
186 N.J. at 80).     More particularly,

admission of hearsay statements should first be resolved under

our rules of evidence.     See State v. Branch, 
182 N.J. 338, 354

(2005); see also State v. Buda, 
195 N.J. 278, 298 (2008).        Only

if those hearsay statements satisfy the admissibility

requirements of our evidence rules should we analyze whether the

introduction of those out-of-court statements violates the

Confrontation Clause.     See Branch, 
182 N.J. at 354 (finding

hearsay statements inadmissible under our evidence rules and

therefore opting not “to decide the constitutional challenge”

advanced under Confrontation Clause).

    Before addressing whether John’s video-recorded statement

to the detective met the admissibility requirements of N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27), we review the origin and evolution of the tender-

years exception.

                                 III.

    We begin with the language of the tender-years exception to

the hearsay rule.    N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) provides:

         A statement by a child under the age of 12
         relating to sexual misconduct committed with
         or against that child is admissible in a

                                  19
         criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding if (a)
         the proponent of the statement makes known to
         the adverse party an intention to offer the
         statement and the particulars of the statement
         at such time as to provide the adverse party
         with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it;
         (b) the court finds, in a hearing conducted
         pursuant to Rule 104(a), that on the basis of
         the time, content and circumstances of the
         statement there is a probability that the
         statement is trustworthy; and (c) either (i)
         the child testifies at the proceeding, or (ii)
         the child is unavailable as a witness and
         there    is   offered   admissible    evidence
         corroborating the act of sexual abuse;
         provided that no child whose statement is to
         be offered in evidence pursuant to this rule
         shall be disqualified to be a witness in such
         proceeding by virtue of the requirements of
         Rule 601.

         [(emphasis added).]

    The emphasized portion of the rule is known as the

incompetency proviso.   As is evident from the rule, no matter

the nature of the incompetency of a child witness, that

incompetency cannot disqualify the child as a witness when the

State seeks to introduce a prior statement of the child that

meets the rule’s other requirements.   This version of the

incompetency proviso differs from the one originally adopted by

this Court and the Legislature.

    The source of the current tender-years exception, including

its incompetency proviso, is State v. D.R., 
109 N.J. 348 (1988).

In D.R., we recognized that, in a child-sex-abuse prosecution,

“testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of

                                  20
the [State’s] case.”    Id. at 358.     We determined that our

evidence rules needed an additional “exception[] to the hearsay

rule to authorize under certain conditions the admissibility of

testimony relating the out-of-court statements of a child

victimized by sexual abuse.”    Ibid.     In fashioning a proposed

rule, we looked to other jurisdictions’ rules and statutes, the

American Bar Association’s recommendations, and learned

commentators for guidance.     Id. at 358-63.

    In crafting this new exception to the hearsay rule, we

acknowledged that “a prerequisite to the admissibility of a

child’s out-of-court statement concerning sexual abuse is that

it possess sufficient indicia of reliability” and that any

“modification of the hearsay rule must adequately recognize and

protect the substantial constitutional interests of defendants

in such proceedings.”   Id. at 363.     Importantly, we recognized

that any new exception to the hearsay rule had to conform to the

demands of the Confrontation Clause, which -- in the pre-

Crawford era -- “required (1) availability of the declarant for

cross-examination or a demonstration of unavailability, and (2)

assurances of reliability.”    Id. at 366; see also Ohio v.

Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

    We also grappled with “[t]he most difficult question

. . . [:]   whether a child’s incompetency to testify at trial

should preclude admissibility of the child’s out-of-court

                                  21
statement.”   D.R., 
109 N.J. at 365.   We expressed concern that a

child’s incompetency, which would bar the child’s testimony,

might not constitute unavailability for purposes of Roberts and

therefore would present an insurmountable obstacle to the

admission of the child-victim’s out-of-court statement.     Id. at

369-70.   That concern gave rise to the incompetency proviso.

Although the language of today’s tender-years exception,

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), is almost identical to the one proposed in

D.R. and adopted in Rule 63(33) (currently renumbered as

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)), the incompetency proviso is different.

    The incompetency proviso proposed in D.R. and adopted in

Rule 63(33) read as follows:   “provided that no child whose

statement is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this rule

shall be disqualified to be a witness in such proceeding by

virtue of the requirements of paragraph (b) of Rule 17.”    Id. at

378 (emphasis added).   Importantly, for our discussion here,

          [w]e conclude[d] that the disqualification set
          forth in paragraph (b) of Evidence Rule 17
          should not apply in a sexual abuse prosecution
          in which the victim’s out-of-court statement
          is offered in evidence.     A finding that a
          child-victim is “incapable of understanding
          the duty . . . to tell the truth,” and thus
          incompetent, is difficult to reconcile with a
          ruling that admits into evidence, insulated
          from   cross-examination,   the   out-of-court
          statements of the same child made several
          months prior to trial.

          [Id. at 369-70 (third alteration in original)
          (emphasis added) (quoting Evid. R. 17).]

                                22
The proposed language was adopted in 1989 as Rule 63(33) and

later recast as N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) in 1993 when our evidence

rules were renumbered to parallel the Federal Rules of Evidence.

      Rule 17 -- the predecessor competency rule -- corresponds

to our current N.J.R.E. 601.
8 Rule 17 provided:

           A person is disqualified to be a witness if
           the judge finds that (a) the proposed witness
           is incapable of expressing himself concerning
           the matter so as to be understood by the judge
           and   jury   either    directly   or   through
           interpretation by one who can understand him,
           or (b) the proposed witness is incapable of
           understanding the duty of a witness to tell
           the truth.

      The incompetency proviso in the tender-years exception

adopted by D.R. rendered inoperative only paragraph (b) of the

competency rule.   That apparently was to address, in part, the

notion that “[a] child’s age in itself cannot render him

incompetent as a witness,” D.R., 
109 N.J. at 369 n.8, and that

there is a difference, for a child, between understanding “the

duty” to tell the truth and having the capacity to tell the

8 N.J.R.E. 601, the current rule on competency provides:

           Every person is competent to be a witness
           unless (a) the judge finds that the proposed
           witness is incapable of expression concerning
           the matter so as to be understood by the judge
           and   jury   either    directly   or   through
           interpretation, or (b) the proposed witness is
           incapable of understanding the duty of a
           witness to tell the truth, or (c) except as
           otherwise provided by these rules or by law.

                                23
truth in a manner that is understandable by the trier of fact.

The tender-years exception approved in D.R., however, did not

allow a child deemed incompetent under paragraph (a) of Rule 17

to testify.    Rule 17(a) corresponds directly with N.J.R.E.

601(a).

    In May 1989, the Legislature adopted Rule 63(33) as

proposed in D.R.     See Joint Res. No. 4 (1989).    The rule

remained in effect, verbatim, until the 1993 renumbering of the

Rules of Evidence, when Rule 63(33) became N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)

and Rule 17 became N.J.R.E. 601.       Something more happened,

however.     The scope of the incompetency proviso was broadened by

the removal of the reference to paragraph (b).      Thus, the

proviso now reads, “no child whose statement is to be offered in

evidence pursuant to this rule shall be disqualified to be a

witness in such proceeding by virtue of the requirements of Rule

601.”     N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) (emphasis added).   The consequences

of this expansion are significant and far-reaching because it

permits the testimony of a child victim not only incapable of

understanding the duty to tell the truth but also incapable of

distinguishing between fantasy and reality and of expressing

himself in a manner to be understood by a judge or jury.

    Nothing in the historical record of the evolution of the

tender-years exception suggests that this Court or the Supreme

Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence intended that a child

                                  24
rendered incompetent for reasons other than an inability to

understand the duty to tell the truth would be permitted to

testify at trial.   Allowing the testimony of a child witness,

who is declared incompetent because he “is incapable of

expression concerning the matter so as to be understood by the

judge and jury,” would have been a significant change to

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), yet it is never mentioned in the Evidence

Committee’s Report.

     The record concerning the promulgation of N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27) provides no clear explanation or justification for

the removal of the reference to paragraph (b) of the competency

rule.   When the Committee recommended an alteration to the rule,

it did so explicitly.   Significantly, it recommended applying

the rule to civil and juvenile proceedings.    See Meeting

Minutes, Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence 2 (May

17, 1993) (“N.J.R.E. 803[(c)(27)] . . . shall incorporate the

present language of Evidence Rule 63 (33) and enlarge its scope

to make it applicable to civil and to juvenile proceedings.

Approved by the Committee unanimously with one abstention.”);

see also Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence,

Amendatory Report (May 17, 1993).    The Evidence Committee gave

no indication that it intended to provide for the admissibility

of incompetent testimony lacking indicia of reliability because

it was uttered by a sex-abuse victim of tender years.     The

                                25
Committee’s seeming silence on this important matter suggests

that the Committee may not have focused on expanding the

incompetency proviso in N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).

    The wholesale allowance of incompetent child testimony

evidently prompted the Appellate Division to address the

constitutional issue raised, in light of our current

confrontation clause jurisprudence, which, under Crawford,

prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness

who [does] not appear at trial unless he [is] unavailable to

testify, and the defendant [has] had a prior opportunity for

cross-examination.”   
541 U.S.  at 53-54.   Another point of

concern is the incongruence between, on the one hand, generally

disallowing incompetent child testimony, and on the other,

allowing incompetent testimony without limitation if the child

has uttered a prior statement.   D.R. made clear that less

exacting standards of competency should apply to a child

witness, but did not go so far as to completely suspend the

competency rule for child testimony.

    Accordingly, we request that the Supreme Court Committee on

the Rules of Evidence consider whether N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)

should be amended to conform to the evidence rule adopted in

D.R. and whether any other amendment is advisable as a result of

the concerns raised in this case.

                                 IV.

                                 26
     We nevertheless must address the application of the current

tender-years exception to the case before us.    We cannot

conclude that N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), as presently constructed,

authorized the admission of John’s video-recorded statement to

the detective.

     Before admitting a child’s out-of-court statement pursuant

to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), the trial court must make certain

findings at a Rule 104 hearing.    The court must determine

whether “on the basis of the time, content and circumstances of

the statement there is a probability that the statement is

trustworthy.”    N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).   The statement’s

admissibility is also conditioned on either the child testifying

or, if the child is unavailable as a witness, on the

presentation of “admissible evidence corroborating the act of

sexual abuse.”   Ibid.   When the child-victim’s statement is a

sexual accusation made to police, the statement generally will

be classified as a “testimonial statement.”9    State v. Nyhammer,

197 N.J. 383, 411-12 (2009) (finding that child’s videotaped

statement alleging sexual crimes “-- given to a law enforcement

9  A “testimonial statement” is defined as one made “when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . .
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington,

547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).

                                  27
officer investigating a crime -- constitutes testimonial hearsay

for Sixth Amendment purposes”).    The admissibility of a child’s

testimonial statement, therefore, will be conditioned on the

child taking the stand.   State v. P.S., 
202 N.J. 232, 249 (2010)

(noting that admissibility of child victim’s statement is

conditioned on not only “judicial finding of trustworthiness,”

but also “opportunity to cross-examine the child at trial”

(quoting State v. R.B., 
183 N.J. 308, 318 (2005))); see also

State v. D.G., 
157 N.J. 112, 124 (1999).

    In the present case, the primary issue under N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27) is whether there was a probability that John’s video-

recorded statement to the detective was “trustworthy” based on

“the time, content and circumstances of the statement.”     A court

must “consider 'the totality of the circumstances’” in

determining whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy to

warrant its admission.    P.S., 
202 N.J. at 249 (quoting State v.

Roman, 
248 N.J. Super. 144, 152 (App. Div. 1991)).     We have

identified “a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to

evaluating the reliability of out-of-court statements made by

child victims of sexual abuse, including spontaneity, consistent

repetition, mental state of the declarant, use of terminology

unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to

fabricate.”   Id. at 249 (emphases added) (citing Idaho v.

Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990)).   Clearly, one

                                  28
consideration in assessing a child’s mental state must be

whether the child is able to distinguish between fantasy and

reality and whether the child can communicate in a way that

shows the child has the mental capacity to tell the truth and to

be understood by the trier of fact.    A judicial declaration that

a child is incompetent to testify should also have some bearing

on determining the admissibility of a child’s out-of-court

statement.

                                 V.

                                 A.

    Before applying the legal principles to the facts, we first

set forth the standard of review that governs this appeal.

    A trial judge’s factual finding concerning the

admissibility of a child’s statement offered under N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27) is entitled to deference by an appellate court.       See

P.S., 
202 N.J. at 250-51.   Specifically, “a trial judge’s

finding that a child’s statement meets the trustworthiness

requirement of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)” should not be disturbed

absent an abuse of discretion.   Id. at 250.   Thus, a factual

finding “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the

record” should be upheld.   Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 
192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)).   Only if that finding is clearly mistaken

should an appellate court intervene, in the interest of justice,

to correct the error.    Id. at 250-51; Elders, 
192 N.J. at 244.

                                 29
In that circumstance, an appellate court may “appraise the

record . . . and make its own findings and conclusions.”     P.S.,

202 N.J. at 251 (quoting Elders, 
192 N.J. at 244); see also

State v. S.S., 
229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017) (“Appellate courts have

an important role to play in taking corrective action when

factual findings are so clearly mistaken -- so wide of the mark

-- that the interests of justice demand intervention.”).

                               B.

    Despite the deference that we must afford the family

court’s findings in this case, given the totality of the

circumstances, we cannot conclude that the court’s assessment of

the trustworthiness of John’s video-recorded statement is

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

    By the family court’s own account, John, age seven, had

“the developmental cognition of a three-year-old,” a “lack of

competency to testify,” and “was not able to distinguish or to

articulate what his understanding was between right and wrong or

the consequences of not telling the truth.”   When John entered

the interview room and met with Detective Abromaitis for the

first time, eighteen days after the alleged bus incident, John

responded to a greeting question, “What’s up,” with a targeted

answer, “[Alex] touched my pee-pee.”   The detective did not

suggest that answer because he had not conducted a pre-

interview, but it appears that John was primed for the response.

                               30
See State v. Michaels, 
136 N.J. 299, 309 (1994) (“[F]actors that

can undermine the neutrality of an interview and create undue

suggestiveness [include] . . . the use of leading questions, and

a lack of control for outside influences on the child’s

statements, such as previous conversations with parents or

peers.”).

     During the interview, John had difficulty distinguishing

between different body parts; for example, he called his belly

button his “butt.”   He also claimed to live with cartoon

characters, dragons, and a friend who in fact did not reside

with him.   Given John’s developmental disabilities, the

interview was challenging for the detective.   Nevertheless, the

detective did not make the most basic inquiries to assess

whether John could tell the difference between the truth and a

lie, or reality and fantasy.   In response to one leading

question, John stated that the touching occurred at home, and in

response to another leading question, he stated it occurred on

the bus -- evidencing John’s susceptibility to suggestive

questioning.   When John indicated that the touching happened by

accident, the detective did not follow up.

     The family court conditionally admitted the video-recorded

statement depending on John’s availability as a witness.10

10 Because the juvenile case proceeded as a bench trial, there
was a blending of Rule 104 hearing testimony and trial

                                31
During two days of questioning, John agreed with his

interlocutor when it was suggested that a spider is a flower and

that the color black is red.   John stated that he walked on the

street to summer school, although no one disputed that he took

the bus, and he could not articulate whether it was right to

tell the truth or a lie to his mother.     John, moreover, agreed

that the bigger kids were separated from the smaller ones on the

bus and that another boy named Alex sat near him.     Against this

backdrop, John stated repeatedly that Alex touched his pee-pee,

although without much elaboration.     The sheer repetition of that

claim -- divorced from everything else -- does not make the

statement probably trustworthy.

    We owe the trial court’s evidentiary findings reasoned

deference, not blind deference.    In viewing the totality of the

circumstances related to John’s accusations in the video-

recorded statement, we do not find that sufficient credible

evidence supports the conclusion that John’s statement was

probably trustworthy.   Therefore, we hold that the family court

abused its discretion in allowing the video-recorded statement

into evidence.

testimony. For instance, while conditioning the admission of
John’s video-recorded statement on his availability at trial,
the court allowed Grace’s testimony at the pre-trial motion
hearing to serve as substantive evidence during the trial.

                                  32
    Under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), John was allowed to testify,

despite his incompetence, to afford protection to Alex’s

confrontation rights given the admission of the video-recorded

hearsay accusation.   The general rule barring an incompetent

child witness from testifying adheres when the out-of-court

statement is not admissible.   In light of our determination that

John’s video-recorded statement was wrongly admitted into

evidence, his trial testimony should not have been introduced

for the purpose of confronting that statement.    However, John’s

incompetent testimony still was admissible because of the

introduction of John’s hearsay statement to Grace under N.J.R.E.

803(c)(27).   In effect, the hearsay statement serves to

bootstrap into evidence the incompetent testimony.

                                 VI.

    Last, after excising from the record John’s video-recorded

statement, the remaining evidence -- even when viewed in the

light most favorable to the State -- is insufficient to support

a sexual-assault adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt.    See

State v. Reyes, 
50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967).

    The remaining evidence consists of John’s incompetent

testimony and Grace’s hearsay testimony that, as John walked

home with her after exiting the bus, he said, “[Alex] touched

his belly button and pee-pee.”    Nothing more was said to Grace

on the subject.   The statement provides limited information and

                                 33
no context.     For example, it does not tell us whether the

alleged touching was accidental, which of the two Alexes did the

touching, or when and where the incident occurred.    In addition,

no competent evidence corroborates John’s single statement made

to Grace.11   Weighing against that evidence is the testimony of

the bus aide who unequivocally averred that the big kids, such

as Alex, sat in the back of the bus, and the little kids, such

as John, sat in the front.    The aide testified that Alex sat

behind her and that she knew “for a fact” that Alex and John did

not sit next to each other.    The bus driver also confirmed that

the children were separated by size and age, and both he and the

aide stated that they neither saw nor heard anything amiss

during the ride.     Even John stated that the small boys sat at

the front of the bus and he sat near a little boy named Alex.

Indeed, two boys named Alex -- one little and one big -- were on

the bus that day.     Finally, the State provided no evidence that

the touching -- if there was a touching -- was intentional and

done “for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or

sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.”     
N.J.S.A.

2C:14-1(d).12

11 That big Alex was holding John’s hand outside the bus hardly
counts as evidence suggestive of a sexual assault.
12 A conviction under the sexual-assault statute, 
N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(b), requires an “intentional touching . . . for the
purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim or sexually

                                  34
    Because we resolve this case on state-law grounds, we need

not tackle the constitutional issue at the heart of the

Appellate Division’s opinion -- whether the admission of John’s

incompetent testimony denied Alex his Sixth Amendment

confrontation right.   We neither address nor endorse the

Appellate Division’s constitutional analysis.

    No purpose would be served by remanding this matter to the

family court when we have determined that a rational factfinder

could reach but one conclusion -- that the remaining evidence is

insufficient to support the sexual-assault adjudication against

Alex.

                               VII.

    For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the

Appellate Division, which remanded the case to the family court

for further factfinding based on the remaining record.      Because

we find that the record clearly establishes that there is

insufficient evidence to support the delinquency adjudication,

we order that the delinquency charge against Alex be dismissed.

We remand to the family court for the entry of that judgment.

arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.”     
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
1(d).

                                35
     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s
opinion.

                               36