Title: Commonwealth v. Taylor

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12877 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEYSHAUN TAYLOR. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     April 7, 2020. - December 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy.  Judicial 
Estoppel.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, Required 
finding. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 
the District Court Department on December 26, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Diane E. Moriarty, J., 
and questions of law were reported by her to the Appeals 
Court. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Seena A. Pidani for the defendant. 
Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney (Emil Ata, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present), for the 
Commonwealth. 
Timothy St. Lawrence, for Lee Ashford, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death.  Justice Lenk participated in 
the deliberation on this case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), provides that 
whoever violates G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), carrying a firearm 
without a license, or G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c), unlawful 
possession of a machine gun or sawed-off shotgun, "by means of 
a loaded [weapon] shall be further punished by imprisonment in 
the house of correction for not more than [two and one-half] 
years, which sentence shall begin from and after the 
expiration of the sentence for the violation of [§ 10 (a) or 
(c)]."  The Commonwealth charged the defendant with carrying a 
loaded firearm, in violation of § 10 (n), but not either of 
the required predicate offenses of § 10 (a) or (c).  See 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 604 (2018).  At trial, 
after the close of the Commonwealth's case, a District Court 
judge granted the defendant's motion for a required finding of 
not guilty based on this defect in charging.  The Commonwealth 
subsequently obtained a second complaint charging the 
defendant with violating G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), based on the 
same alleged conduct.  The defendant moved to dismiss on 
grounds of double jeopardy, and the motion judge reported four 
questions to the Appeals Court.2  After the Appeals Court 
issued its decision, we allowed the defendant's application 
for further appellate review.  We conclude that double 
jeopardy bars the current prosecution because the termination 
                                                 
 
2 See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 333 (2002); 
note 4, infra. 
3 
 
of the trial, which properly is considered a mistrial rather 
than an acquittal, was not justified by manifest necessity.3 
 
Background.  In April of 2017, a complaint issued against 
the defendant, charging him with a single count of carrying a 
loaded firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  That 
count contained the allegation that the defendant carried a 
loaded firearm, in violation of both G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) 
(carrying a firearm without a license), and G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n) (carrying a loaded firearm), as well as descriptions 
of the potential penalties for each of those offenses.  The 
complaint did not, however, contain a separate count for 
either of the required predicate offenses, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), or G. L. c. 269, § 10 (c) (unlawful possession of a 
machine gun or sawed-off shotgun).  See Brown, 479 Mass. 
at 604. 
 
After the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant 
moved for a required finding of not guilty.  He argued that 
the Commonwealth could not prove a finding of a violation of a 
predicate crime, an element of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  The 
trial judge agreed that the lack of a predicate charge impeded 
the prosecution, and he stated that a charge under § 10 (n) 
requires an additional count of one of the predicate offenses. 
 
The Commonwealth did not dispute this interpretation, but 
requested that the judge instruct the jury on G. L. c. 269, 
                                                 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of Lee Ashford. 
4 
 
§ 10 (a), rather than § 10 (n).  In response, the defendant 
argued that amendment would be improper because § 10 (a) was 
not a lesser included offense of § 10 (n).  The defendant also 
said that if the Commonwealth were to bring charges again, 
that would implicate the protections against double jeopardy.  
The Commonwealth later moved to amend the complaint to a 
single violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Without 
explicitly ruling on either of the Commonwealth's requests, 
the trial judge allowed the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the solitary count of § 10 (n). 
 
The Commonwealth subsequently charged the defendant in a 
second complaint with a violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), 
based on the same conduct as the previous complaint, and the 
defendant moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  A 
District Court judge, who was not the trial judge in the first 
prosecution, at first allowed the defendant's motion to 
dismiss; after the Commonwealth sought reconsideration, the 
motion judge reported the following questions to the Appeals 
Court:4 
                                                 
 
4 "We answer the reported questions only insofar as it is 
necessary to resolve the issues raised by the record.  
'Although a judge may report specific questions of law in 
connection with an interlocutory finding or order, the basic 
issue to be reported is the correctness of his [or her] 
finding or order.  Reported questions need not be answered in 
this circumstance except to the extent that it is necessary to 
do so in resolving the basic issue.'"  Markvart, 437 Mass. 
at 333, quoting Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 493 n.5 
(2000). 
5 
 
"1.  Is G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n)[,] a freestanding crime?"5 
 
"2.  Is G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a)[,] a lesser included 
offense of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n)[,] under Morey v. 
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871)?" 
 
"3.  In the context of double jeopardy, is the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel applicable as against a defendant?" 
 
"4.  If the answers to questions 1–3 are 'Yes,' did the 
court, in the circumstances of this case, properly 
conclude that the [C]ommonwealth may proceed upon the 
complaint charging the defendant with a violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a)[,] without violating the 
defendant's protections afforded under principles of 
double jeopardy?" 
 
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). 
 
Accompanying her report, the motion judge included a 
legal analysis.  She determined that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
is a freestanding offense, of which G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is 
a lesser included offense.  She concluded, however, that 
judicial estoppel precluded the defendant's double jeopardy 
claim.  Because, in response to the Commonwealth's request for 
the judge to instruct on § 10 (a), the defendant had argued 
that § 10 (a) was not a lesser included offense of § 10 (n), 
the motion judge reasoned that the defendant subsequently was 
precluded from arguing that double jeopardy bars the current 
prosecution of § 10 (a) as a lesser included offense of the 
prior § 10 (n) charge. 
 
The Appeals Court concluded that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
is not a freestanding crime, but, rather, a sentencing 
                                                 
 
5 As discussed infra, we consider a freestanding crime to 
be one for which a defendant can be charged and convicted 
without any accompanying charges. 
6 
 
enhancement.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 
143, 146 (2019), citing Brown, 479 Mass. at 604.  Based on 
this conclusion, the court determined that § 10 (a) cannot be 
a lesser included offense of § 10 (n).  See Taylor, supra 
at 146-147.  The court then ruled that judicial estoppel did 
not preclude the defendant's arguments.  See id. at 147-149. 
 
Lastly, the Appeals Court ruled that double jeopardy did 
not bar the current prosecution.  See Taylor, 96 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 149.  The court reasoned that because G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), is a sentencing enhancement, the first complaint was 
a nullity over which the District Court had no jurisdiction.  
See Taylor, supra at 151.  Therefore, the court concluded, 
under the jurisdictional exception, jeopardy never attached.  
See id., citing Commonwealth v. Love, 452 Mass. 498, 504 
(2008).  The court further determined that, even if jeopardy 
had attached, it did not terminate because the acquittal was 
not on the "facts and merits."  See Taylor, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 437 Mass. 276, 282 (2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 962 (2003).  We subsequently granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We conclude that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is 
not a freestanding crime.  Moreover, under the facts of this 
case, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is a lesser included offense of 
§ 10 (n).  Additionally, we agree with the Appeals Court that 
judicial estoppel does not preclude the defendant's argument 
7 
 
that a trial on § 10 (a) would be prohibited under the 
protections against double jeopardy. 
 
As to the substance of the double jeopardy claim, we 
conclude that jeopardy attached when the jury were sworn, but 
that the trial judge's order was not based on the facts and 
merits of the evidence; thus, the order was equivalent to the 
declaration of a mistrial.  Because the defendant did not 
consent to reprosecution, the second complaint is barred 
unless there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial.  As an 
alternative to ending the trial, the judge could have granted 
the Commonwealth's request to instruct on the lesser included 
offense of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), instead of the defective, 
greater offense of § 10 (n).  Thus, there was no manifest 
necessity for the mistrial, and the defendant's motion to 
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds should be granted. 
 
To set the stage for our double jeopardy analysis, we 
first discuss certain aspects of the statutes at issue. 
 
1.  Statutory scheme.  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (a), 
provides for the punishment of anyone who knowingly possesses 
a firearm, outside the individual's residence or place of 
business, absent compliance with the relevant licensing 
provisions.  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), states that 
"[w]hoever violates [§ 10 (a) or (c)] by means of a loaded 
firearm . . . shall be further punished by imprisonment in the 
house of correction for not more than [two and one-half] 
years, which sentence shall begin from and after the 
8 
 
expiration of the sentence for the violation of [§ 10 (a) or 
(c)]" (emphasis added).6  "Further punishment, of course, can 
only occur if there is punishment in the first instance."  
Commonwealth v. Dancy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 703, 705 (2016).  By 
the same token, the § 10 (n) sentence can be "from and after" 
only if there is a previous sentence.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Taylor, 413 Mass. 243, 246 n.2 (1992). 
 
For these reasons, we have held that "in order to be 
convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), an individual must 
first have been convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) or 
(c)."  Brown, 479 Mass. at 604.  See Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 
456 Mass. 411, 423–424 (2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 723 (2011).  
Thus, the parties and the trial judge properly concluded that, 
had the jury been instructed only on G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
the defendant could not have been convicted lawfully. 
 
The foregoing observations, however, do not answer all 
pertinent questions regarding the statute, as evinced by the 
differing determinations reached by the Appeals Court and the 
motion judge regarding whether G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), is a 
freestanding crime and whether G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is its 
lesser included offense.  See Taylor, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 146-147. 
                                                 
 
6 General Laws c. 269, § 10 (c), which is not at issue in 
this case, criminalizes the possession of a machine gun or 
sawed-off shotgun. 
9 
 
 
In Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 708-709 (1999), 
we distinguished between freestanding crimes and sentencing 
enhancements.  We determined that G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d),7 the 
statute at issue in that case, was a quintessential sentencing 
enhancement.  See Bynum, supra.  It increased the sentence to 
be imposed for a different crime, based on previous 
convictions of certain enumerated offenses.  See id.  
Conversely, the plain meaning of the term "freestanding crime" 
indicates a crime for which a defendant may be charged and 
convicted without any accompanying charges.  As we explain, 
infra, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), does not fit neatly into either 
category. 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), does not establish a 
freestanding offense.  The requirement of § 10 (n), that its 
"further" punishment be "from and after" the predicate 
punishment, demonstrates that the two sentences must be 
imposed in the same proceeding.  If the Commonwealth could 
bring the charges in separate proceedings, a defendant could 
complete his or her sentence of incarceration under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), prior to the final disposition in the 
                                                 
 
7 General Laws c. 94C, § 32A (d), currently provides that 
"[a]ny person convicted of violating the provisions of 
subsection (c)[, which prohibits, inter alia, the possession 
of certain drugs with intent to distribute,] after [one] or 
more prior convictions of manufacturing, distributing, 
dispensing or possessing with the intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, . . . shall be 
punished by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not 
more than [fifteen] years." 
10 
 
successive prosecution under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  Such a 
factual scenario necessarily would entail a gap between the 
two punishments; a "from and after" sentence under § 10 (n) 
would be impossible.  Thus, dismissal of the pending § 10 (n) 
charge would be required upon completion of the § 10 (a) 
sentence.  We therefore conclude that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
is not a freestanding crime; it must be accompanied by a 
charge of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) or (c).8  See Brown, 479 Mass. 
at 604 ("§ 10 (n) . . . does not create a stand-alone 
offense"). 
 
Due to the dependent nature of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), 
this court and the Appeals Court previously have referred to 
it as a sentencing enhancement.  See Brown, 479 Mass. at 604; 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 289 (2017), 
S.C., 479 Mass. 600 (2018).  See also Dancy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 705 (referencing "penalty enhancement provision in 
§ 10 [n]").  We have made similar statements regarding G. L. 
                                                 
 
8 Our holding in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 413 Mass. 243, 
247 (1992), regarding the similar statute G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, 
is not to the contrary.  Although we stated in that case that 
the school zone statute "creates and punishes a distinct 
offense which can be charged separately from the underlying 
offense," this statement was dependent on the unusual 
procedural posture of the case, in which the defendant was 
convicted of both a drug offense and a school zone violation, 
but appealed only the school zone violation to a de novo trial 
in the jury session.  See Taylor, supra.  See also Berry v. 
Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 799 (1985) ("defendant's 
voluntary choice of a bench trial and subsequent choice of a 
trial de novo create a situation in which double jeopardy is 
not implicated" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Cf. 
St. 1992, c. 379, § 139 (abolishing de novo jury trial 
system). 
11 
 
c. 94C, § 32J, which, as with the statute at issue here, 
provides for an additional "from and after" sentence when 
certain drug crimes are committed within a school or park 
zone.  See Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61 (2017) 
(describing statute as "school zone enhancement"); 
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 556 (2013) ("Although 
framed as a separate crime, a school zone violation under 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, is effectively a sentencing enhancement 
. . ."); Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 125 (2004) 
("enhanced penalties"); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 
224, 235 (1992) ("two-year mandatory enhancement"); 
Commonwealth v. Pixley, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 630 (2010) 
("provides for enhanced penalties").  Indeed, both G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), and G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, provide for 
additional punishment when the underlying crime is committed 
in certain types of circumstances. 
 
Despite the use of this nomenclature, however, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), differs from traditional sentencing 
enhancements in several respects.  Importantly, the statute is 
not based on previous convictions; rather, it concerns a 
single incident or course of criminal conduct.  Cf. Bynum, 429 
Mass. at 708-709, citing G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d).  Moreover, 
instead of leading to a single, longer sentence, the statute 
mandates two consecutive sentences.  Compare G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (d), with G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  Thus, while G. L. 
12 
 
c. 269, § 10 (n), is not a freestanding crime, it also 
deviates from traditional sentencing enhancements. 
 
Although we agree with the Appeals Court that G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n), is not a freestanding crime, we disagree 
with the court's resulting conclusion that G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), cannot be a lesser included offense of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n).  "Under our long-standing rule derived from Morey v. 
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), a lesser included 
offense is one whose elements are a subset of the elements of 
the charged offense" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 531 (2010).  General Laws c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), contains three elements.  First, there must be a 
finding that the defendant violated either G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) or (c), as alleged in a separate count.  See Brown, 
479 Mass. at 604, citing Dancy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 705.  
Second, the weapon at issue must have been loaded.  G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (n).  Third, the defendant must have known that 
the weapon was loaded.  See Brown, supra at 608.  Here, 
because there was no alleged violation of § 10 (c), a finding 
of a violation of § 10 (a) was an element of the § 10 (n) 
charge, making § 10 (a) a lesser included offense under the 
Morey test.  See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 189 n.7 
(2013) ("under the traditional elements test of Morey[, 
13 
 
supra,] unlawful possession of a firearm is a lesser included 
offense of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm").9 
 
Having addressed the relevant characteristics of the 
statutory scheme, we turn to the question of double jeopardy. 
 
2.  Double jeopardy.  The Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution mandates that "a person cannot twice be 
put in jeopardy for the same offence."10  Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Burke, 342 Mass. 144, 145 (1961).  See Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that Fifth Amendment is 
applicable to States).  The prohibition against double 
jeopardy protects primarily "against three specific evils -- a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 
multiple punishments for the same offense" (quotations and 
                                                 
 
9 Although in many cases G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is a 
lesser included offense of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), a defendant 
can be punished under both statutes in a single proceeding, 
because the Legislature clearly intended to allow for multiple 
punishments.  See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 189 
n.7 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 54 
n.11 (2011).  See also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 
(1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a 
single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than 
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the [L]egislature intended"); Commonwealth v. 
Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 231 (1992). 
 
 
10 "Although not expressly included in the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, the prohibition against double jeopardy 
has long been recognized as part of our common and statutory 
law."  Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 79 n.20 (2007), 
quoting Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 416 n.3 (1995).  
See G. L. c. 263, § 7. 
14 
 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hebb, 477 Mass. 409, 411–
412 (2017).  "State and Federal double jeopardy protections 
[also] bar . . . retrial of a defendant whose initial trial 
ends over his [or her] objection and without a conviction 
[unless] a mistrial is declared as a matter of manifest 
necessity" (quotations omitted).  Marshall, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Steward, 396 Mass. 76, 78 (1985).  See Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-505 (1978).  We review 
determinations regarding double jeopardy de novo.  See Hebb, 
supra at 411, citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 367, 
369 (2017). 
 
In determining whether the defendant can be retried, we 
first consider whether judicial estoppel precludes the 
defendant's claim, and, if not, whether attachment, a 
prerequisite to the invocation of double jeopardy, occurred in 
the first proceeding.  Next, we consider whether the order 
terminating the trial was not an acquittal but, rather, a 
declaration of a mistrial.  Because we conclude that it was 
the latter, and because the defendant did not consent to 
retrial and there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial, 
the current prosecution is barred. 
 
a.  Judicial estoppel.  In support of his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty in the first prosecution, the 
defendant argued that the trial judge should not instruct on 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), because it was not a lesser included 
offense of the charged offense.  In his motion to dismiss the 
15 
 
second complaint, on the other hand, the defendant argued that 
the second complaint was barred by double jeopardy because 
§ 10 (a) was a lesser included offense of G. L. c. 269, § (n).  
Because these positions were in conflict with each other, the 
motion judge determined that the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
precluded the defendant's double jeopardy claim.  We review 
for an abuse of discretion.  See Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. 
Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640 (2005), and cases cited.  As did the 
Appeals Court, we conclude that the motion judge erred in 
determining that the defendant's argument was estopped.  See 
Taylor, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 147-149. 
 
Judicial estoppel, an equitable doctrine, is intended "to 
safeguard the integrity of the courts by preventing parties 
from improperly manipulating the machinery of the judicial 
system."  See Otis, 443 Mass. at 642, quoting Alternative Sys. 
Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir. 
2004).  Estoppel may be appropriate where "a party has adopted 
one position, secured a favorable decision, and then taken a 
contradictory position in search of legal advantage."  Otis, 
supra at 641, quoting InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 
144 (1st Cir. 2003).  Rather than ascribing to "inflexible 
prerequisites," however, the doctrine properly is invoked 
"whenever a party is seeking to use the judicial process in an 
inconsistent way that courts should not tolerate" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 
Mass. 627, 637 (2013). 
16 
 
 
Without addressing whether the doctrine ever can be 
applied constitutionally against criminal defendants, we 
conclude that it is inapplicable here.  First, it is not clear 
that the defendant's initial argument "secured a favorable 
decision."  See Otis, 443 Mass. at 641.  After the close of 
the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required 
finding of not guilty based on the Commonwealth's inability to 
prove a finding of a violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) or 
(c).  Acknowledging the deficiency, the Commonwealth requested 
that the judge "conform to the evidence" and instruct the jury 
on § 10 (a) instead of § 10 (n).  The judge responded, "That 
ship had sailed a long time ago."  Defense counsel then argued 
that the Commonwealth's request was improper because § 10 (a) 
is not a lesser included offense of § 10 (n); the judge 
appeared to agree.  Without directly responding to the 
Commonwealth's motion, the judge allowed the defendant's 
motion for a required finding. 
 
While the judge's actions clearly amounted to a denial of 
the Commonwealth's request, the basis for that denial is 
unclear.  The judge might have determined, as indicated by his 
statement that the "ship had sailed a long time ago," that the 
motion was untimely, regardless of its merits.  Thus, we 
cannot conclude that the defendant secured a favorable 
decision based on his later-reversed position regarding lesser 
included offenses. 
17 
 
 
Second, although the defendant adopted conflicting 
positions at trial and in his motion to dismiss, he did not 
"improperly manipulat[e] the machinery of the judicial 
system."  See Otis, 443 Mass. at 642, quoting Alternative Sys. 
Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d at 33.  The first 
of the defendant's conflicting arguments consisted of a single 
sentence, made in response to the Commonwealth's last-minute 
oral motion.  Shortly thereafter, any arguable impropriety was 
eliminated when defense counsel implied that the defendant 
would seek to dismiss any subsequent prosecution on double 
jeopardy grounds.  These actions do not illustrate an intent 
to play "fast and loose with the courts" (citation omitted).  
See Otis, supra.  Rather, they reflect the inherently 
imprecise nature of spur-of-the-moment legal arguments.  We 
conclude that the motion judge erred in determining that the 
defendant was estopped from arguing for dismissal based on a 
violation of the protections against double jeopardy. 
 
b.  Attachment.  The prohibition against double jeopardy 
is not implicated unless jeopardy attached in the first 
proceeding.  See Love, 452 Mass. at 503, citing Serfass v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390–391 (1975).  "There are few 
if any rules of criminal procedure clearer than the rule that 
'jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.'"  
Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839 (2014), quoting Crist 
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978).  Under the Commonwealth's 
jurisdictional exception, however, when a charge is brought in 
18 
 
a court that does not have jurisdiction, but another court 
does have jurisdiction, jeopardy does not attach.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 397-398 (1978).  This 
doctrine is justified by an "interest in not having an 
offender go entirely free from punishment because the 
government walked into the wrong forum."  Commonwealth v. 
Norman, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 90, S.C., 406 Mass. 1001 (1989). 
 
Here, the Appeals Court concluded that G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), is merely a sentencing enhancement that does not 
establish a crime on its own.  See Taylor, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 146.  Thus, the court reasoned, the defendant's trial was a 
"nullity" over which the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction, and jeopardy never attached.  See id. at 151.  
Although, as discussed, we agree that § 10 (n) is not a 
freestanding offense, we conclude that the jurisdictional 
exception is inapplicable in the circumstances here, and 
jeopardy therefore attached.11 
 
In Commonwealth v. Labadie, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 263, 269 
(2012), the Appeals Court set aside the defendants' 
convictions of embezzling money from a bank because the money 
was taken from a Federal credit union.  Since there was no 
Massachusetts crime specifically prohibiting embezzlement from 
a Federal credit union, the court reasoned that "the original 
                                                 
 
11 The Commonwealth did not argue in its brief that the 
jurisdictional exception applies.  Indeed, at argument before 
us, the Commonwealth stated that the District Court had 
jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
19 
 
convictions were nullities in light of the lack of 
jurisdiction, [and therefore] double jeopardy [did] not 
preclude retrial."  See id. at 269, citing Lovett, 374 Mass. 
at 397–398.  Because embezzlement from a bank was a valid 
criminal prohibition over which the Superior Court had 
jurisdiction, we disagreed.  See Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 
Mass. 81, 89, cert. denied sub nom. Carcieri v. Massachusetts, 
574 U.S. 902 (2014).  We concluded that the deficiency in the 
case was one of proof, not jurisdiction, and thus jeopardy had 
attached.  See id.  See also Love, 452 Mass. at 504 (exception 
inapplicable because court had jurisdiction); Norman, 27 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 90–91 (same). 
 
Here, the analysis is similar.  Carrying a loaded firearm 
is a crime, albeit not a freestanding one, over which the 
District Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction.  See G. L. 
c. 218, § 26; G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  The government did not 
"walk[] into the wrong forum" but, rather, failed properly to 
charge the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Hrycenko, 417 Mass. 
309, 318 (1994), citing G. L. c. 263, § 7 ("that the 
indictment was defective in form or in substance does not 
prevent the defendant from raising the acquittal as a bar 
against subsequent prosecution").  See also United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669–670 (1896) ("although the indictment 
was fatally defective, . . . if the court had jurisdiction of 
the cause and of the party, its judgment is not void, but only 
voidable . . .").  As we discuss infra, the judge could have 
20 
 
instructed on G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and the jury could have 
convicted the defendant of that crime.  Thus, we conclude that 
jeopardy attached when the jury were sworn.12  See Love, 452 
Mass. at 503. 
 
Because jeopardy attached in the first proceeding, the 
protections against double jeopardy are implicated.  Depending 
on the manner in which the proceeding ended, however, a future 
prosecution may not be prohibited. 
 
c.  Character of the terminating order.  Under double 
jeopardy principles, there are two overarching categories of 
orders by which a judge can terminate a trial prior to a 
verdict by the fact finder:  acquittals and procedural 
dismissals, often referred to as mistrials.  See Evans v. 
Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 319-320 (2013).  The defendant argues 
that the trial ended in his acquittal. 
 
An acquittal occurs where there is a ruling on "the facts 
and merits," Gonzalez, 437 Mass. at 282, quoting G. L. c. 263, 
§ 7, such as "a ruling by the court that the evidence is 
                                                 
 
12 It is unclear whether the jurisdictional exception, 
which historically has been limited to situations in which a 
charge was brought in the incorrect court, see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 400 (1978), ever can be 
invoked based on a crime being a "nullity."  See Commonwealth 
v. Perry P., 418 Mass. 808, 813 (1994) ("trial judge described 
the trial on the murder count as a 'nullity' [based on lack of 
indictment,] and, in such circumstances, it may be that 
principles of double jeopardy do not bar a retrial . . .").  
We need not answer that question here.  See Commonwealth v. 
AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 506 (2016) ("We do not decide 
constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached" [citation omitted]). 
21 
 
insufficient to convict, a factual finding [that] necessarily 
establish[es] the criminal defendant's lack of criminal 
culpability, [or] any other rulin[g] which relate[s] to the 
ultimate question of guilt or innocence" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  See Evans, 568 U.S. at 319.  See also 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978), quoting United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) 
("defendant is acquitted only when 'the ruling of the judge, 
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the 
defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the 
factual elements of the offense charged'").  "Perhaps the most 
fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence has been that [a] verdict of acquittal . . . 
could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting 
[a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the 
Constitution" (quotations and citation omitted).  Martin Linen 
Supply Co., supra.  This prohibition against appeal or retrial 
abides even where the acquittal was "based upon an egregiously 
erroneous foundation."  See Commonwealth v. Lowder, 432 Mass. 
92, 104 (2000), quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 
141, 143 (1962). 
 
"In contrast, a 'termination of the proceedings . . . on 
a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the 
offense . . . ,' i.e., some procedural ground, does not pose 
the same concerns, because no expectation of finality attaches 
to a properly granted mistrial."  Evans, 568 U.S. at 319-320, 
22 
 
quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 98–99.  "[W]hat constitutes an 
'acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's 
action."  Martinez, 572 U.S. at 841–842, quoting Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571.  See Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 
Mass. 143, 147 (2016) ("We are not bound by labels or 
checkmarks on a form" [citation omitted]).  Rather, "the 
relevant distinction is between judicial determinations that 
go to 'the criminal defendant's lack of criminal culpability,' 
and those that hold 'that a defendant, although criminally 
culpable, may not be punished because of a supposed' 
procedural error."  Evans, supra at 323–324, quoting Scott, 
supra at 98. 
 
In Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977), the 
trial judge dismissed the case after jeopardy had attached, 
but "stressed that the only obstacle to a conviction was the 
fact that the information had been drawn improperly."  The 
United States Supreme Court determined that "the order entered 
by the [judge] was functionally indistinguishable from a 
declaration of mistrial."  Id. at 31. 
 
Here, the analysis is quite similar.  The trial judge 
ended the trial because, as he correctly stated, the complaint 
"would need at least two charges" in order for the defendant 
to be convicted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  The complaint 
contained all of the elements of both G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) 
and (n), but mistakenly combined them into only one count, 
rather than setting forth two distinct counts.  The defendant 
23 
 
made the reasonable, but ultimately mistaken, argument that 
the deficiency here was based on the facts and merits.  He 
contended that because a violation of § 10 (a) is an element 
of § 10 (n), an inherently merits-based deficiency, the 
Commonwealth could not prove an element of the crime.  But 
neither the defendant nor the judge made any reference to the 
evidence presented, or the lack thereof.  Cf. Smith v. 
Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469 (2005) (judge "evaluated the 
Commonwealth's evidence and determined that it was legally 
insufficient to sustain a conviction" [citation omitted]).  
Indeed, "the only obstacle to a conviction was the fact that 
the [complaint] had been drawn improperly."  See Lee, 432 U.S. 
at 30. 
 
Because the termination of the trial was procedural, the 
judge's order did not constitute an acquittal for purposes of 
double jeopardy.  Rather, it played the functional role of a 
declaration of a mistrial.  See Lee, 432 U.S. at 31.  We thus 
analyze whether double jeopardy bars the current prosecution 
under our jurisprudence concerning mistrials.  See United 
States v. Council, 973 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(determining that judge's "acquittal" was procedurally based, 
and therefore analyzing it as mistrial). 
 
d.  Mistrial.  "[T]he [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause 
affords a criminal defendant a 'valued right to have his trial 
completed by a particular tribunal.'"  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 
U.S. 667, 671–672 (1982), quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 
24 
 
684, 689 (1949).  Thus, where a mistrial is entered "without 
the defendant's request or consent," retrial is impermissible 
unless there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial.  See 
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606–607 (1976), citing 
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Nicoll, 452 Mass. 816, 818 (2008).  On the 
other hand, "when a defendant persuades the court to declare a 
mistrial, jeopardy continues and retrial is generally 
allowed."  Evans, 568 U.S. at 326, citing Dinitz, supra.  This 
is so because the defendant is considered to have elected "to 
forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence 
determined before the first trier of fact."  Scott, 437 U.S. 
at 93. 
 
i.  Consent.  When a defendant moves for a mistrial or 
agrees to one proposed by the prosecutor or judge, the 
Commonwealth may seek retrial.  See Poretta v. Commonwealth, 
409 Mass. 763, 765 (1991).  The successive prosecution is 
permissible because "in such circumstances the defendant 
consents to a disposition that contemplates reprosecution, 
whereas when a defendant moves for acquittal he does not."  
See Evans, 568 U.S. at 326, citing Sanabria v. United States, 
437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978).  "The important consideration, for 
purposes of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause, is that the 
defendant retain primary control over the course to be 
followed . . . ."  Scott, 437 U.S. at 93–94, quoting Dinitz, 
424 U.S. at 609. 
25 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that where a 
defendant did not have an opportunity to object to the 
discharge of the jury, the defendant is not deemed to have 
consented.  See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 
(1971) (had defendant "been disposed . . . to object to the 
discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to 
do so").  Similarly, we have concluded that where a defendant 
has impliedly but not expressly articulated opposition to a 
mistrial, the defendant has not consented.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cassidy, 410 Mass. 174, 177 n.2 (1991); Picard v. 
Commonwealth, 400 Mass. 115, 116 & n.1 (1987). 
 
The defendant here moved for a required finding of not 
guilty, making the reasonable, yet ultimately insufficient, 
argument that acquittal was required because the Commonwealth 
had failed to prove one of the elements of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n).  He explicitly argued that, if the motion were 
granted, double jeopardy protections would bar a future 
prosecution.  Had the judge denied the motion for a required 
finding and instead proposed a mistrial, the defendant might 
have objected, believing that his odds with the existing jury 
were better than they would be with another.  Or, posed to use 
his knowledge of the Commonwealth's tactics from the first 
trial to his future advantage, he might have consented to a 
mistrial.  We can never know.  Accordingly, the rule allowing 
for retrial when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial 
does not control here.  To hold otherwise would be to ignore 
26 
 
the directive that the defendant "retain primary control over 
the course to be followed."  See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 609.  See 
also Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 ("defendant has a significant 
interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from 
the jury"). 
 
Thus, under the unusual circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the defendant did not consent to reprosecution, 
notwithstanding the fact that he filed the motion that led to 
termination of the trial.  See Lowder, 432 Mass. at 106 
("principle that a defendant who invites a mistrial usually 
may not claim double jeopardy protection against retrial . . . 
does not apply to directed acquittals" [citations omitted]).  
Therefore, the defendant can be retried only if there was a 
manifest necessity for the mistrial.  See State v. Lynch, 155 
N.J. Super. 431, 443 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 79 N.J. 327 
(1979) (concluding that if judge's action, in response to 
defendant's midtrial motion to dismiss, were to be considered 
declaration of mistrial, "then it was done by the judge on his 
own motion, without defendant's request or consent, and, we 
would conclude, would not have been compelled by any manifest 
necessity" [quotation omitted]). 
 
ii.  Manifest necessity.  In determining whether a 
mistrial is manifestly necessary, a judge must weigh two 
competing policy considerations:  "the defendant's valued 
right to have his [or her] trial completed by a particular 
tribunal and the interest of the public in fair trials 
27 
 
designed to end in just judgments" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bryan, 476 Mass. 351, 358 (2017).  
See Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 & n.11; Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
at 672.  We review a determination regarding manifest 
necessity for an abuse of discretion.  See Cruz v. 
Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 664, 669-670 (2012).  Two principles 
guide our review:  "(1) counsel must [have been] given full 
opportunity to be heard and (2) the trial judge must [have 
given] careful consideration to alternatives to a mistrial."  
Ray v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1, 4 (2012), quoting Nicoll, 
452 Mass. at 818.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 607, 
622 (1980), citing Washington, supra at 516-517 ("Appellate 
deference will be accorded the trial judge's discretionary 
determination that 'manifest necessity' exists only if the 
record reflects that the trial judge gave reasoned 
consideration to the various available alternatives . . ."). 
 
Here, there was a clearly superior alternative to a 
mistrial.  In response to the defendant's motion for a 
required finding, the Commonwealth requested that the judge 
instruct the jury on a single count of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), 
instead of the charged count of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  
"[W]hen the evidence permits a finding of a lesser included 
offense, a judge must, upon request, instruct the jury on the 
possibility of conviction of the lesser crime."  Commonwealth 
v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 679 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737 (1990).  This requirement applies 
28 
 
to requests made by the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 663 (1998).  More precisely, the test 
is "whether the evidence at trial presents a rational basis 
for acquitting the defendant of the crime charged and 
convicting him of the lesser included offense."  Commonwealth 
v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 480 (2015), quoting Porro, 458 
Mass. at 536. 
 
As discussed, under the circumstances of this trial, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), was a lesser included offense of 
§ 10 (n).  Thus, the judge was required to grant the 
Commonwealth's request for an instruction if a rational basis 
existed for finding the defendant guilty of the lesser 
included offense but not of the greater.  Under the defective 
complaint, a conviction of the greater offense was impossible, 
thereby providing a rational basis for the jury to convict 
only on the lesser offense.  Instructing solely on G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), as requested by the Commonwealth, would have 
been adequate to satisfy the public's interest in the 
enforcement of the criminal laws.  Contrast Somerville, 410 
U.S. at 459–460 ("indictment was fatally deficient under 
Illinois law"); Commonwealth v. Perry P., 418 Mass. 808, 814 
(1994) ("mistrial was unavoidable"). 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that there was not a 
manifest necessity for a mistrial.  Thus, the defendant cannot 
again be prosecuted for the "same offence," including the 
lesser included offense at issue here.  See Harris v. 
29 
 
Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-683 (1977), citing Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161 (1977), and Nielsen, petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 
(1889); Rodriguez, 476 Mass. at 370-371. 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported questions as follows: 
 
"1.  General Laws c. 269, § 10 (n), is not a freestanding 
crime." 
 
 
"2.  Under the facts of this case, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), is a lesser included offense of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n)." 
 
 
"3.  Judicial estoppel should not preclude the 
defendant's double jeopardy claim." 
 
 
"4.  The defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds should be granted." 
 
 
The matter is remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.