Title: Ball v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Wallace Ball v. State of Maryland - No. 59, 1996 Term
CRIMINAL LAW - Death Penalty — Trial court did not err in refusing to suppress
defendant’s inculpatory statements.  Evidence of taking property after the death of the victim
was legally sufficient to convict of robbery — no error in admitting victim impact evidence
and prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case #95-1185
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 59
  
September Term, 1996
_______________________________________
WALLACE BALL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
_______________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
         *Karwacki
Raker
Wilner
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
_______________________________________
      Filed:    September 10, 1997                
*Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, § 3A, he also
participated in the decision and the adoption of this
opinion.
     Appellant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for robbery with a deadly weapon, twenty
1
years for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and 10 years for daytime
housebreaking.
This appeal is before the Court pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 414.  The appellant, Wallace Dudley Ball, was tried by jury in the Circuit Court
for Charles County, the Honorable Joseph S. Casula presiding, for the murder of Debra Anne
Goodwich and related offenses.  The jury found Appellant guilty of first degree premeditated
murder, first degree felony murder, second degree murder, robbery with a dangerous or
deadly weapon, robbery, daytime housebreaking, and use of a handgun in the commission
of a felony.  Appellant elected to be sentenced by the judge and received a sentence of death
for the first degree murder conviction.  With regard to the lesser offenses, Appellant was
sentenced to a total of fifty years imprisonment.  
1
On this appeal of the imposition of the death penalty, Appellant presents eight issues
for our review.  In a somewhat different order from their presentation in Appellant’s brief,
they are:
(1)
Whether the lower court erred in refusing to
suppress Appellant's inculpatory statements to
police.
(2)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel
disclosure to the defense of a video tape shown,
for the purpose of training, to trial judges who
preside over capital trials.
(3)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to
propound a jury instruction on the offense of
theft.
(4)
Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to
2
sustain the conviction of robbery with a deadly
weapon and the aggravating circumstance of
murder in the course of a robbery.
(5)
Whether the trial court erred in considering
certain victim impact evidence at sentencing.
(6)
Whether the trial court erred in admitting at
sentencing 
evidence 
of 
Appellant's 
prior
convictions for non-violent offenses, and of
offenses not resulting in convictions.
(7)
Whether the prosecution engaged in improper
closing argument at sentencing.
(8)
Whether Maryland's death penalty statute is
unconstitutional.          
Following a brief summary of the pertinent facts, we shall address the above issues, and their
attendant sub-issues, seriatim.
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 3:45 p.m. on September 30, 1994, Arlene Goodwich arrived at her
Baltimore County residence to find her house ransacked and her nineteen-year-old daughter,
Debra Anne Goodwich, dead of numerous gunshot wounds.  A subsequent autopsy report
revealed that Debra had been shot six times in the torso and once in the arm.   Police officers
who were called to the scene found evidence of a forced entry through a rear window of the
Goodwich home.  They also discovered that the telephone line had been cut and the alarm
system disabled.  Debra Goodwich, it was later determined, had interrupted a burglary in
progress.
3
Preliminary investigation of the crime led to the questioning of Appellant, Wallace
Dudley Ball, at his home on October 12, 1994.   The identification of Appellant as a
potential suspect apparently resulted from the police learning that the victim's father, Walter
Goodwich, was the former employer of Appellant's wife, Sharon Ball.  Shortly before the
murder of Debra Goodwich, Ms. Ball had terminated her employment with Walter
Goodwich's firm in the wake of allegations that she had embezzled firm funds.   Appellant
informed Baltimore County police detectives at this initial meeting that he had done some
roofing work at the Goodwich home and that he knew the victim.  Six months later, a warrant
was issued for Appellant's arrest.  
Following his arrest in Knoxville, Tennessee, on April 27, 1995, Appellant was
interviewed by Terry Clowers, an investigator in the Criminal Investigation Division of the
Knoxville Police Department.  Investigator Clowers testified that he informed Appellant that
he would be audio taping the interview and that he advised Appellant of his Miranda rights.
 Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and elected to waive them.  
Soon after the interview began, however, Appellant motioned to Investigator Clowers
to turn off the tape recorder.  Investigator Clowers complied with this request.  According
to Investigator Clowers, Appellant then stated that he would continue the discussion, but that
he did not wish to talk on tape.  The information that Appellant provided to Investigator
Clowers at that point did not implicate him in the crime.  
Upon learning of Appellant's arrest, Baltimore County police detectives Carroll
Bollinger and William Cordwell proceeded to Knoxville and arranged to question Appellant.
4
     The reference to September 20, as opposed to September 30, appears to have been a
2
typographical error.
 At the beginning of the interview, at which Investigator Clowers also was present, Detective
Bollinger verified that Appellant had been advised of and understood his Miranda rights.
Appellant indicated that, indeed, he knew his rights and that he was willing to talk to the
detectives.  
The detectives then asked Appellant to review two documents that had been prepared
by Detective Bollinger prior to his arrival in Knoxville.  One of the documents read as
follows:
“ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1994, DEBBIE GOODWICH WAS
BRUTALLY KILLED IN HER PARENT'S HOME.
WALLACE BALL
1.)
IS A COLD BLOODED KILLER.
2.)
HAS NO REGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE.
3.)
KILLED DEBBIE GOODWICH FOR FUN.
4.)
HAS BEEN LOOKING TO KILL SOMEONE
FOR A LONG WHILE.
5.)
WOULD KILL AGAIN BECAUSE HE LIKED IT.
6.)
KILLED DEBBIE BECAUSE HE HATES
WALTER GOODWICH.” 
In contrast, the other document stated:
“ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1994,  DEBBIE GOODWICH WAS
2
ACCIDENTALLY KILLED IN HER PARENT'S HOME.
5
WALLACE BALL
1.)
HAS HAD A TOUGH LIFE.
2.)
LOVES HIS SON, DILLON.
3.)
KILLED DEBBIE GOODWICH BECAUSE HE
WAS AFRAID SHE COULD IDENTIFY HIM.
4.)
WAS TRYING TO SUPPORT HIS FAMILY
WHICH IS WHY HE BROKE INTO THE
GOODWICH HOME.
5.)
UNFORTUNATELY BECAME HOOKED ON
DRUGS.
6.)
WALTER 
GOODWICH 
WAS 
AN
UNREASONABLE MAN IN DEALING WITH
WALLACE AND SHARON BALL.
7.)
IS SORRY IN HIS HEART FOR KILLING
DEBBIE GOODWICH.
8.)
WISHES HE COULD CHANGE WHAT
HAPPENED TO DEBBIE.
9.)
DEBBIE STRUGGLED WITH HIM CAUSING
HIM TO SHOOT HER WHICH HE DIDN'T
WANT TO DO.” 
Detective Bollinger testified that, after Appellant read the documents, “[h]e placed them back
on the table and he asked what do they do for me.”  Detective Bollinger explained to
Appellant that they were two different ways of characterizing him.  Soon thereafter, sensing
that Appellant was uncomfortable with the presence of 3 police officers, Detective Bollinger
asked Detective Cordwell and Investigator Clowers to leave the room. 
After some discussion, Appellant confessed to Detective Bollinger that he had killed
6
Debra Goodwich.  The particulars of the oral confession were described by Detective
Bollinger at a pre-trial hearing as follows:
“[BOLLINGER]:
[Appellant] stated he had gone to the
Goodwich residence the night before the burglary occurred and
the homicide occurred, that he waited outside.  Waited outside
on the property, waited there all night long.  Waited until the
morning hours to see the residents leave....  At that point he felt
it was safe to enter the residence, he broke in the residence.
Q:
Did he do anything to disable anything?
[BOLLINGER]: Yes, Ma'am.  Before entering the
residence he cut the alarm wires and the phone wires for the
residence.  They had a security system, an alarm system.  He cut
those wires.  He also cut the phone lines to the residence.
Q:
And did he do anything while he waited outside
all night?
[BOLLINGER]:  Yes Ma'am.  As he sat there and waited
he had brought food along and he was eating barbecue chicken
wings outside the residence, all night long.
Q:
So after he cut the phone and burglar alarm wires
how did he break in the house?
[BOLLINGER]:
Through a basement window. * * *
Once inside he wanted to make it look as if an amateur had
committed the offense so he went into the kitchen area and
dumped [a] household product like sugar on the ... floor to make
it look like it was a juvenile committing the offense.
He even wore a pair of boots, roofer[']s boots that were
larger in size than his actual foot.  He did this because he had
told me that once the burglary had been committed he thought
the Goodwich[e]s would immediately assume that he was the
one responsible....
Q:
While he was burglarizing the home did he tell
7
you there was a time somebody came home?
[BOLLINGER]:
Yes, Ma'am, he said he heard
someone state who is in here and at that point --
Q: 
Where was he at that time?
[BOLLINGER]:
He was in the back bedroom  I
believe, master bedroom.
Q:
And what did he hear?
[BOLLINGER]:
His exact words to me, who is in
here.
Q:
What did he say next?
[BOLLINGER]:
Stated that he moved toward the
door, the front door and as he moved toward the front door the
victim, Debra Goodwich, came around the corner and they
almost bumped into each other.  At that point he was startled,
she was startled.  At that point he shot her.  He shot her a total
of 6 times.” 
Appellant also told the detective that after he shot Debra Goodwich, he remained
inside the Goodwich residence, collecting his thoughts, for approximately thirty minutes. 
He then fled the scene in the victim’s car.  Later, Appellant tossed incriminating evidence,
consisting of jewelry, a pocket book, a gun, and a pair of boots, into Liberty Reservoir.
These items and Debra Goodwich’s vehicle eventually were recovered by police during the
course of their investigation.
After Appellant orally confessed to the crimes, Detective Bollinger asked him if he
would like to write a letter to the Goodwich family, explaining the events that had occurred.
8
Apparently recognizing that such a letter would amount to a written confession, Appellant
initially resisted.  Detective Bollinger described the exchange as follows:
“Q:  Did you give [Wallace Ball] an opportunity to give
a statement in writing?
[BOLLINGER]:  Yes, ma'am, I did.
Q:
How did you do that?
[BOLLINGER]:
We went back and forth and
Wallace advised that he did not want to put it on paper.  At that
point I explained to him, I said Wallace at that point when this
comes to trial, when this all comes to trial if you don't put it on
paper then it is going to be me up on the stand telling the jury
what occurred.  It is going to be through you to me to the jury.
I said it is much better if you told the story, not that it would get
distorted through me to the jury, that it is your words, not mine,
it is -- I don't want to miscommunicate anything, I don't want to
misrepresent anything, that it should be you telling the jury what
occurred on that day.  That is why I am here, I am here to find
out the why for you to tell the people, tell everybody the why.
Q:
What did the defendant say in response to that?
[BOLLINGER]:
He stated I like that.  And he said
give me those papers.  I am going to convict myself.” 
Appellant thereupon confessed in writing to the murder of Debra Goodwich.  Prior to trial,
Appellant sought, unsuccessfully, to suppress the oral and written inculpatory statements.
The propriety of the court’s refusal to grant the motion to suppress is at issue in this appeal
and will be developed in further detail below.   
 Appellant’s trial by jury resulted in  a verdict of guilty on, inter alia, the first degree
murder charge.  As authorized by Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(b)(3),
9
Appellant elected to be sentenced by the judge, rather than the jury.  At the sentencing
hearing, the State introduced the mandatory pre-sentence investigation report, certified copies
of court documents that evidenced Appellant’s prior convictions, and the victim impact
testimony of the victim’s mother, Arlene Goodwich.  Defense counsel, in turn, elicited
testimony from Appellant’s wife, Appellant’s mother,  and licensed social worker Hans
Selvog.  The testimony of the defense witnesses appears to have been aimed, in part, at
establishing that Appellant was emotionally disturbed from a young age and that he had no
prior convictions for crimes of violence.   Toward this end, Mr. Selvog prepared a social
history of Appellant, which included information concerning Appellant’s previous
convictions for drug-related and motor vehicle offenses, as well as various burglary and theft
offenses.  Based on the evidence presented at trial and at sentencing, the judge found as an
aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery.  As
a mitigating circumstance, the judge found that Appellant had no prior convictions for crimes
of violence.  In addition, the judge stated:
“I find by the preponderance of the evidence that the
following additional mitigating factors exist:
That the defendant’s confession, his unstable childhood,
his prior institutional history and adjustment to prison life —
and I also considered mercy.” 
Concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the
judge  imposed a sentence of death, which Appellant now asks this Court to review. 
Additional facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal will be provided as needed
10
throughout this opinion.
II.  ANALYSIS
A.  Appellant’s Inculpatory Statements to Police
The first issue that we shall address is whether the trial court erred in denying
Appellant's pre-trial motion to suppress the inculpatory statements that Appellant made to
Detective Bollinger.  The essence of Appellant's argument is that the oral and written
confessions were not freely and voluntarily given.  He also asserts, as an additional basis for
suppression, that there was conflicting evidence as to whether Appellant invoked his right
to remain silent during the initial interview conducted by Investigator Clowers and that the
hearing judge erred in failing to articulate findings of fact that resolved this conflict.  We find
no merit in these various contentions.   
1.
We shall begin with the issue of the voluntariness of Appellant's confessions to
Detective Bollinger.   The introduction of a confession as evidence  against the accused at
trial is permitted only where it is determined that the confession was  “‘1) voluntary under
Maryland non-constitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda.’” Hof
v. State, 337 Md. 581, 597-98, 655 A.2d 370, 378 (1995)(quoting Hoey v. State, 311 Md.
11
473, 480, 536 A.2d 622, 625 (1988)).  In this appeal, Appellant relies primarily on State
common law grounds for asserting that his confessions were not freely and voluntarily given.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the confessions were induced by improper promises,
threats, and psychological coercion.  See Hoey, 311 Md. at 483, 536 A.2d at 627 (stating that
confessions that are “induced by force, undue influence, improper promises, or threats” may
not be used as evidence against the accused). 
a.
Appellant first finds fault with the manner in which Detective Bollinger responded
to Appellant's initial resistance to provide a written confession via a letter of explanation to
the Goodwich family.  Detective Bollinger testified that he told Appellant that it would be
“much better if you told the story, not that it would get distorted
through me to the jury, that it is your words, not mine, it is -- I
don't want to miscommunicate anything, I don't want to
misrepresent anything, that it should be you telling the jury what
occurred on that day.”  
Appellant asserts that the court's admission of a confession made in light of the assurance
that it would be “much better if you told the story” runs afoul of the well-established
principle of Maryland law that
“if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an
inculpatory statement will be to his advantage, in that he will be
given help or some special consideration, and he makes remarks
in reliance on that inducement, his declaration will be
considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore
inadmissible.”
12
Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153, 406 A.2d 415, 420 (1979).
The rule against the inducement of confessions through the promise of some benefit
has been repeated by Maryland courts on numerous occasions.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. State,
327 Md. 494, 505, 610 A.2d 782, 787 (1992)(observing that “[c]ourts abhor, or at least find
distasteful, promises of leniency or immunity made by state agents to defendants subject to
the vulnerability of custodial interrogation”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 981, 122
L.Ed.2d 134 (1993); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 35-36, 375 A.2d 1105, 1108  (explaining that
“[f]or a statement to be the free and voluntary act of an accused, it must be obtained without
... hope held out or promise made on the part of the authorities”), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002, 98 S.Ct. 646, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 561, 132 A.2d 494,
497 (1957)(stating that “[t]he State must show ... that no hope or promise was held out to the
accused for the purpose of inducing him to confess”); James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 41-42, 65
A.2d 888, 892 (1949)(defining voluntary confession as “not obtained by fear of prejudice or
hope of advantage”).  
The historical justification for excluding confessions made in reliance on a promise
of some benefit is that they are, of course, inherently untrustworthy.  DAVID M. NISSMAN
AND ED HAGEN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 2:2, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1994).  Examples of specific
types of promises that have rendered subsequent confessions inadmissible in Maryland courts
include: a promise that the suspect's wife would not be arrested, Stokes v. State, 289 Md.
155, 160, 423 A.2d 552, 554 (1980); a detective's assurance that he would “go to bat” for the
suspect, Hillard, 286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420; and an official's statement that “‘it would
13
be better for [the suspect] to tell the truth, and have no more trouble about it.’”  Biscoe v.
State, 67 Md. 6, 7, 8 A. 571, 572 (1887)(emphasis added).  
Notwithstanding the prohibition against the inducement of confessions by improper
promises or other forms of coercion, it has been held that an officer's mere admonition to the
suspect to speak the truth does not render a statement involuntary.  Reynolds, 327 Md. at
507, 610 A.2d at 788 (citing Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 486, 174 A.2d 163, 166 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 689, 7 L.Ed.2d 613 (1962); State v. Rochester, 391
S.E.2d 244, 247 (1990)).  The following exhortations by interrogating officers, for example,
all have been held to be proper: “‘I want you to tell me the truth,’”  Nicholson v. State, 38
Md. 141, 153  (1873); “‘the truth would hurt no one,’”  Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624, 630,
96 A. 878, 880 (1916); “‘get it off [your] chest,’” Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 442, 199 A.2d
773, 777-78 (1964); and there's “‘no sense in lying,’”  Clark v. State, 48 Md. App. 637, 646,
429 A.2d 287, 292 (1981).  
The issue is whether Detective Bollinger's statement that it would be “better” for
Appellant to tell the story in his own words falls within the former category of improper
inducement.  The context in which this suggestion was made clearly indicates that it does
not.  Detective Bollinger was not suggesting to Appellant that the police or any other State
official would confer any special benefit or advantage on Appellant in exchange for a written
confession.  Rather, the message that Detective Bollinger was trying to convey when he
stated that it would be “better” for Appellant was simply that a written confession would
provide Appellant an opportunity to explain his criminal behavior in his own words.  To the
14
extent that this opportunity constituted a “benefit” to Appellant, it did not rise to the level
of an improper inducement.  That Appellant was aware that no other benefit was to be
realized from providing a written confession is evidenced, in fact, by his remark to Detective
Bollinger that “I am going to convict myself.” 
b.
Appellant also claims that his written confession was coerced in that Detective
Bollinger implied that if Appellant failed to provide a written statement, the jury would hear
a distorted version of Appellant's oral confession.  In support of his position, Appellant cites
Watts v. The State, 99 Md. 30, 35, 57 A. 542, 544 (1904), a case in which a newspaper
reporter told an arrestee, in the presence of police officials, that “‘it would be possibly better
for him if he would make a clean statement, so it would not appear erroneously in the papers;
that the papers would get it anyway, and as my paper was an evening paper, the correct
statement would come out first.’”  Although the Watts Court held that a confession thereafter
obtained was inadmissible, there were other circumstances surrounding the confession that
make Watts inapposite to the present case.  
First, the Court noted in Watts that the newspaper reporter “frankly admitted that he
found the defendant shortly after the tragedy, on the same day, in a nervous and depressed
condition, covered with blood from a wound on the side of his head ... and apparently
suffering from shock; and that he told [the defendant] ‘it would possibly be to his
advantage’” to give his version of the events that had transpired.  Watts, 99 Md. at 36, 57 A.
15
at 545.  The defendant’s poor physical condition apparently was a factor, not present in the
instant case, in the Court’s ruling that the confession should have been suppressed.  Id.
Furthermore, the defendant in Watts, unlike Appellant, had not confessed verbally to the
crime of which he was suspected prior to the statements of the newspaper reporter. 
Rather than the newspaper reporter in Watts, therefore, the conduct of Detective
Bollinger is more closely akin to that of the interrogating detective in Hoey, supra.   In Hoey,
the detective suggested to the suspect, after the suspect had orally confessed, that he reduce
the confession to writing “to ensure that there would not be a disagreement later as to what
[he] actually admitted.” 311 Md. at 484, 536 A.2d at 627.  The suspect gave a written
confession.  Hoey, 311 Md. at 478, 536 A.2d at 624.  On appeal, the suspect argued that the
detective's suggestion was improper. Hoey, 311 Md. at 480, 536 A.2d at 625.  This Court
upheld the trial court's determination that the confession was freely and voluntarily given and
found no error, under Maryland non-constitutional law, in the admission of the confession
at trial. Hoey, 311 Md. at 484, 536 A.2d at 627.  In assessing the voluntariness of the
confession under constitutional standards, the Court further characterized the detective's
conduct as follows:  
“We find this action to be innocuous.  Even considering [the
suspect]'s mental impairment, [the detective]'s action cannot be
deemed coercive.  Rather, his action can only be viewed as
neutral, if not helpful, to [the suspect].  [The suspect] had
already orally confessed when [the detective] suggested
reducing his confession to writing, and [the detective] merely
sought to protect himself and [the suspect] from the conflicts
that often arise when oral statements are the only evidence of an
occurrence.  Consequently, we find that [the detective]'s actions
16
were not ‘so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they
must be condemned.’”
Hoey, 311 Md. at 486, 536 A.2d at 628.  We adopt the same view of Detective Bollinger's
statement in the present case.  Detective Bollinger's suggestion that Appellant reduce his
confession to writing in order to tell the story “in his own words” can be interpreted as a
neutral attempt to avoid later disagreement as to the particulars of Appellant’s oral
confession.  It did not overbear Appellant’s free will and does not render the subsequent
written confession involuntary.
c.
Appellant also assails the method of interrogation employed by Detective Bollinger,
whereby the detective presented Appellant with two contrasting descriptions of Appellant
and the murder of Debra Goodwich.  Characterizing this interrogation technique as a “classic
example” of psychological coercion, Appellant claims his subsequent statements were
involuntary.  
A confession clearly is not voluntary if it is the product of physical or psychological
coercion.  Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 379, 402 A.2d 900, 905 (1979); Kidd, 281 Md. at 36,
375 A.2d at 1108; Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465, 190 A.2d 797, 799 (1963); James, 193
Md. at 41-43, 65 A.2d at 892.  A person who has committed an illegal act, however, is not
always  eager to admit his or her wrongdoing.  Police officers, charged with investigating
crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice, are permitted to use a certain amount of
subterfuge, when questioning an individual about his or her suspected involvement in a
17
crime.  As the Court of Special Appeals has observed, “[d]eception short of an overbearing
inducement is a ‘valid weapon of the police arsenal.’”  Rowe v. State, 41 Md. App. 641, 645,
398 A.2d. 485, 488 (1979)(quoting Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 424, 311 A.2d 483,
489 (1973), cert. denied, 271 Md. 738 (1974)).  Similarly, an appeal to “[t]he inner
psychological pressure of conscience to tell the truth does not constitute coercion in the legal
sense.”  Kier, 213 Md. at 562, 132 A.2d at 498.  It is only where police conduct “‘overbear[s
the accused's] will to resist and bring[s] about confessions not freely self-determined....’” that
the confession will be suppressed.  Rowe, 41 Md. App. at 645, 398 A.2d at 488 (quoting
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct.735, 741, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768 (1961)).
Simply stated, police officers are not permitted to employ coercive tactics in order to compel
an individual to confess, but they are permitted to “trick” the suspect into making an
inculpatory statement.  State v. Carrillo, 750 P.2d 883, 894 (Ariz. 1988)(observing that
“[t]he police are not forbidden to outsmart -- they are forbidden to compel”).
The decision in Rowe, supra, illustrates this principle.  The Court of Special Appeals
held in Rowe that the police did not improperly induce the appellant to confess where the
interrogating officer feigned loathing of the victim and admiration for the perpetrator.  The
officer stated that he wanted to shake the hand of the person who killed the victim; in
response, the appellant offered the officer his hand.  Rowe, 41 Md. App. at 644, 398 A.2d
at 488.  Holding that the officer's deception did not amount to an overbearing inducement,
the court explained:
“[t]he words used ... are certainly not such as to automatically
18
render that which follows inadmissible.  It is barely conceivable
that anyone could have interpreted the officer's comment as
anything more than an effort to ‘soft soap' the appellant....”
(Emphasis in original).
Rowe, 41 Md. App. at 645, 398 A.2d at 488.  
The court reached a similar conclusion in Fuget v. State, 70 Md. App. 643, 651, 522
A.2d 1371, 1375 (1987), where the appellant complained that he was deceived by the
interrogating officer's smile, “coddling words,” and “sympathetic sounds.”  The court
acknowledged that although this interrogation technique was “somewhat unique,” it did not
“coerce[] the appellant into making an incriminating statement.” Fuget, 70 Md. App. at 652,
522 A.2d at 1375.  (Emphasis added).  
The same reasoning applies to the interrogation technique employed by Detective
Bollinger in the case sub judice.  There is no indication that Appellant's will was overborne
by the use of this interrogation method.  Nor does the record support Appellant's assertion
that the police took advantage of Appellant's ignorance that the two different scenarios both
amounted to first degree murder.  Detective Bollinger testified that after Appellant read the
two documents, he asked “what do they do for me.”  Appellant apparently recognized,
therefore, that under either scenario he would be admitting to the murder of Debra
Goodwich.  We find no merit in Appellant's contention that this interrogation technique
rendered his subsequent statements involuntary.
2.
19
Appellant also asserts reversible error in the alleged failure of the lower court, in
ruling on the admissibility of Appellant's extrajudicial confession, to make factual findings
as to whether Appellant invoked his right to remain silent during the initial interview
conducted by Investigator Clowers. 
This Court has indeed emphasized that in ruling on a motion to suppress “the trial
court [must] ma[ke] the necessary factual findings to support its conclusion that the waiver
[of constitutional rights] was valid and the statement properly admissible in evidence.”
McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 623, 526 A.2d 30, 38 (1987).  If there is no conflict in the
evidence with respect to the circumstances under which the statement was made, however,
there is no need for articulated factual conclusions. See Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 648,
579 A.2d 744, 749 (1990)(holding articulated factual determinations unnecessary where, at
the suppression hearing, the facts presented were undisputed and the defendant did not  raise
a challenge), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1024, 112 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991).  
The conflict in evidence that Appellant perceives is the manner in which Investigator
Clowers concluded the aborted tape recording of his interview of Appellant, as evidenced
by a written transcript of the recording, and the testimony of Investigator Clowers at the
suppression hearing.  The final passage of the transcript reads as follows: 
“This is going to conclude the interview with Wallace Dudley
Ball.  Refused to answer any questions.  Subject did not request
an attorney ..., just refused to answer any questions.  We just
talked a little bit about his past ..., the supposed murder. [H]e
advised me that ... he didn’t do it, that ... his girlfriend did it and
then they pinned it on him and he left Baltimore.” (Emphasis
added). 
20
Appellant asserts that this transcript indicates that Appellant invoked his right to remain
silent, which Investigator Clowers then failed to honor.  Investigator Clowers testified at the
suppression hearing, however, that Appellant “did not want to talk on tape,” but that he was
otherwise willing to continue the discussion.  He further explained that the notation on the
tape that Appellant “refused to answer any questions” was intended to mean that Appellant
refused to answer any questions on tape.  The validity of this explanation was bolstered by
the introduction of a handwritten summary of the off-tape conversation with Appellant,
prepared by Investigator Clowers shortly after the conclusion of the interview, that begins
with the statement that Appellant “would not talk on tape....” Appellant did not testify to the
contrary at the suppression hearing. 
To the extent that the documentary evidence generated a “dispute” as to whether
Appellant invoked his right to remain silent, therefore, Investigator Clowers, the only witness
to testify on the issue, resolved the conflict by explaining that Appellant only refused to
answer questions on tape.  Investigator Clowers’ testimony at the hearing, therefore, clarified
Investigator Clowers’ statements on the audio tape.  Under these circumstances, we find no
error in the judge’s failure to articulate that he found that Appellant had not invoked his right
to remain silent.  This finding was implicit in the judge’s ruling.
B.  The Judicial Institute Video Tapes
The second issue concerns certain Maryland Judicial Institute video tapes and
accompanying materials that are used to train judges who preside over capital cases.  Prior
21
to trial, defense counsel sought a court order, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-264, directing
that these materials be turned over to the defense for inspection.  The reason proffered by
counsel for this unusual request was that review of the materials was necessary “to ensure
that these materials do not contain any directives, guidelines, protocols, models, procedures,
and/or statements of policy to the trial court regarding rulings on discretionary matters which
might unduly prejudice the defendant and/or operate to his detriment in any way....”
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying this motion.   
Appellant's asserted right to review these tapes is based, in part, on Bartholomey v.
State, 267 Md. 175, 193 n.13, 297 A.2d 696, 706 n.13 (1972), in which this Court observed:
“Any information which might influence the judgment of
the sentencing judge, not received from the defendant himself,
or given in his presence, should (without necessarily disclosing
its source) be called to the defendant's attention so as to afford
him an opportunity to refute or discredit it.”  (Citations omitted).
Appellant argues that because these tapes might have influenced the sentencing judge, they
should have been disclosed.  Appellant's position suffers, however, from a fatal flaw:  the
sentencing judge in this case had never seen the subject video tapes.  In response to defense
counsel's request for access to the video tapes, Judge Casula clearly stated that the video
tapes were not presented at the training program that he attended:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  ***  I would like the record to
reflect my continuing request to see the tapes on the death
penalty training.
THE COURT:  Your purpose?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
To be updated on the most current
22
state of the law and ascertain there is no prejudice towards my
client in the information given out by the judicial institute to the
judges specifically in this case.
THE COURT:  I understand.  I did not attend the one --  the one
I attended was 1992 and 1991, whatever it was, 1993, 1992, I
believe, which I understand they have changed considerably
since then because I did not have a video tape.”  (Emphasis
added). 
Judge Casula could not have been influenced by video tapes that he had not seen.  There was
no error, therefore, in denying Appellant's request for access to these tapes.  In fact, there
would be no error in the denial of Appellant’s request even if Judge Casula had seen the
subject video tapes.   The discovery of Judicial Institute training tapes is neither permitted
under the Maryland rules, nor “mandated by constitutional guarantees.”  See Goldsmith v.
State, 337 Md. 112, 122, 651 A.2d 866, 871 (1995)(stating that “the right to pre-trial
discovery is strictly limited to that which is permitted by statute or court rule or mandated
by constitutional guarantees”).
Maryland Rule 4-264 provides:
“On motion of a party, the circuit court may order the
issuance of a subpoena commanding a person to produce for
inspection and copying at a specified time and place before trial
designated documents, recordings, photographs, or other
tangible things, not privileged, which may constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the action.” (Emphasis added). 
A general training video on the conduct of capital cases does not “constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the action.”  The circuit court, therefore, has no authority to order the
third-party custodian of these video tapes to turn them over to the accused in a criminal
23
action.  Furthermore, to the extent that there exists a constitutional right to pre-trial discovery
of certain information, recognition of that right generally has been based on the notion that
the accused in a criminal proceeding is entitled to access to exculpatory information, see
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987), or
to information about the accused upon which the judge or jury relies in imposing a particular
sentence, see Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 31-32, 92 A.2d 570, 573 (1952)(Chief Medical
Officer’s report about accused).  The Judicial Institute video tapes provide no such
information and do not give rise to due process concerns.  For these reasons, discovery of
the video tapes need not be allowed.  To conclude otherwise would be to authorize, in effect,
discovery of  all materials associated with any continuing legal education course, seminar,
or training program that a judge has ever attended.
C.  The Conviction of Robbery with a Deadly Weapon and 
Robbery as an Aggravating Circumstance of Murder
The next issue concerns the validity of the jury’s conclusion at trial, and the judge’s
conclusion at sentencing, that Appellant committed the offense of robbery.   Robbery has
been defined by this Court as “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal
property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear, or,
more succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear.”
West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988)(citations omitted).  Invoking this
common law definition, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a
24
finding of robbery in that:  (1)  the asportation of the property occurred before [Appellant]
used force against the victim; and (2) “the property was not taken from the person or in the
presence of [Debra] Goodwich.”  We find no merit in these contentions.
We begin with Appellant's assertion that the element of force necessary to support a
robbery conviction is only force that precedes, or is precisely contemporaneous with, the
physical “taking” of the property.  Appellant contends that he did not commit a robbery
because he murdered Debra Goodwich after he had already seized the jewelry and other
items from the master bedroom; that is to say, he did not use force to accomplish the initial
“taking.”  
Under Appellant's theory, guilt must be assessed as of the exact point in time at which
asportation of the property occurs, without regard to any events thereafter.   If force is used
during the thief's escape from the scene of the taking or in an effort to retain possession of
property already taken,  Appellant contends that there has been no robbery.
Historically, there has been some disagreement among the various jurisdictions as to
whether the use of force to retain property or to effectuate an escape supplies the requisite
element of robbery, as the offense is defined at common law.  See Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Use of Force or Intimidation in Retaining Property or in Attempting to Escape,
Rather Than in Taking Property, as Element of Robbery, 93 A.L.R.3d 643 (1979).   Some
courts, adhering to the approach suggested by Appellant, have refused to uphold robbery
convictions where force was applied subsequent to the physical act of “taking.”  See, e.g.,
Royal v. State, 490 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1986)(holding that robbery convictions were improper
25
     Royal v. State has since been superseded by statute, as stated in State v. Baker, 540 So.2d 847,
3
848  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (commenting that amendment to robbery statute provides that “the
force used in the course of taking property may be subsequent to the taking if the force and the act
of taking ‘constitute a continuous series of acts or events’”).
where force was not used “prior to or while taking” the property) ; State v. Aldershof, 556
3
P.2d 371, 375 (Kan. 1976)(stating that “robbery is not committed where the thief has gained
peaceable possession of the property and uses no violence except to resist arrest or to effect
his escape”).  Other courts, in contrast, have interpreted robbery as a continuous transaction
that is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety.  See, e.g.,
People v. Estes, 194 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Turner, 328 N.W.2d
5, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).  Under this latter theory, the offense of robbery occurs whenever
force is used in furtherance of the “taking,” regardless of whether force is used to gain
original possession of the property, or to retain possession in the face of subsequent
resistance from the victim.   
In Estes, supra, for example, the court held that a robbery had occurred where the
defendant used force to prevent a security guard from retaking property that the defendant
had stolen from a department store.  The security guard had witnessed the defendant steal
the items and confronted him in the store parking lot.  In resisting the guard's attempt to
detain him, the defendant threatened the guard with a knife, and the guard retreated.  Estes,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 910.  The court held that evidence of these facts was sufficient to support
a robbery conviction in that:
“[t]he crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from
26
the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of
relative safety.  It is sufficient to support the conviction that
appellant used force to prevent the guard from retaking the
property and to facilitate his escape.  The crime is not divisible
into a series of separate acts.  Defendant's guilt is not to be
weighed at each step of the robbery as it unfolds.  The events
constituting the crime of robbery, although they may extend
over large distances and take some time to complete, are linked
by a single-mindedness of purpose.”
Estes, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 912. 
The Court of Appeals of  Michigan reached a similar conclusion in People v. Tinsley,
439 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989),  where the robbery conviction was predicated on
a threat of force during the defendant's flight from the scene of the “taking.”  In this case, the
taking occurred when the accused snatched money from a store counter and fled.  The
customer, who had placed the money upon the counter, and his son gave chase.  The pursuit
continued until the victim’s son came within approximately nine feet of the accused, at
which point the accused drew a gun.  The victim and his son abandoned their pursuit upon
this show of force.  Tinsley, 439 N.W.2d at 314.  In upholding a conviction of armed robbery
on these facts, the court referred to robbery as a “continuous offense, which is not complete
until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety,” and explained that “the use of
force or intimidation in retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape rather than in
taking the property itself is sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion essential to
the offense of robbery.”  Tinsley, 439 N.W.2d at 314 (citations omitted).     
The Court of Special Appeals expressed approval of the “continuous offense”
approach in upholding a robbery conviction in Burko v. State, 19 Md. App. 645, 657-58, 313
27
     In Gray v. State, 10 Md. App. 478, 481, 271 A.2d 390, 393 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals
4
stated: “[I]f subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from
retaking his property by violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery.”
A.2d 864, 871 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 2624, 45 L.Ed.2d
667 (1975).  The appellant in Burko appealed his conviction for armed robbery of a shoe
store on the ground that he did not draw his gun until after the taking of the money had been
accomplished.  Although the court primarily relied upon witness testimony that the gun was
in plain view prior to the taking, its rejection of the appellant's claim was also based, in part,
on precedent to the effect that “when one commits a larceny and then displays a weapon so
as to overcome the resistance of the witness, the crime is then elevated to robbery.  See
Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, § 12.09 (6th ed. Wingersky  rev.
1958).”  Id.  The Burko decision has been interpreted as implicitly overruling earlier case law
in Maryland, at the intermediate appellate court level,  that the use of force to prevent an
4
immediate retaking of the property does not constitute robbery.  Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Use of Force or Intimidation in Retaining Property or in Attempting to Escape,
Rather Than in Taking Property, as Element of Robbery, 93 A.L.R.3d 643, 650 (1979).
Another suggested justification for the “continuous offense”  approach is that when
a thief must use force to retain possession of the property, the thief does not acquire  full
possession of the property until the force or threat of force overcomes the custodian’s
resistance to the taking. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 463, at 39-40 (15th ed. 1996).
Stated in other words, a “taking” does not occur until the perpetrator has neutralized any
28
immediate interference with his or her possession.  Id.  The point of asportation thus is not
absolutely determinative.  This does not mean, of course, that a thief cannot be convicted of
robbery unless and until resistance to possession has been overcome and the thief has
reached temporary safety.  “On the one hand, a criminal is guilty of a completed robbery and
not merely of an attempt if he moves the stolen goods a short distance.  On the other hand,
the crime is continuous and not completed until the parties have reached temporary safety.”
Turner, 328 N.W.2d at 7 (citation omitted).
We agree that the better view is that the use of force during the course of a  larceny
in order to take the property away from the custodian supplies the element of force necessary
to sustain a robbery conviction.  The mere fact that some asportation has occurred before the
use of force does not mean that the perpetrator is thereafter not guilty of the offense of
robbery.  Rather, the totality of the circumstances that surround the taking must be
considered.   If, as in the instant case, the use of force enables the accused to retain
possession of the property in the face of immediate resistance from the victim, then the
taking is properly considered a robbery.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we hold that Appellant's use of
force against Debra Goodwich satisfied the “force” element of robbery.  Debra Goodwich
presumably  sought to prevent Appellant from removing the items of personal property from
her parents’ home.  In using force to prevent  immediate interference with his possession of
the property, therefore, Appellant committed the crime of robbery.  From this conclusion,
it follows that the property was taken from Debra Goodwich's person or presence, as required
29
under the common law definition of robbery.  The law is settled that the victim of a robbery
need not be in the same room of the dwelling from which property is taken in order for the
“person or presence” element of robbery to be satisfied.  See State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 19-
20, 548 A.2d 506, 515 (1988)(finding that robbery had been committed in victim’s presence
where the victim was stabbed in different room of the house from which  the property was
taken).   Moreover, it should be  noted that Appellant was indicted not only for robbery with
regard to the jewelry and other items, but also with regard to Debra Goodwich's 1988 Honda
Accord.  Appellant stole the vehicle after he murdered Debra Goodwich and as she lay dead
in the foyer of the Goodwich home.  Even if we had concluded that the elements of armed
robbery were not satisfied with respect to the other items, Appellant was at least guilty of
armed robbery with respect to the vehicle.  See Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 353-54, 473
A.2d 903, 913-14 (holding that taking and asportation of property constitutes robbery even
where intent to steal is not formed until after application of force resulting in death), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984).  Appellant's assignments of
error with regard to the robbery conviction, therefore, are without merit.
D.  The Court’s Refusal to Instruct the Jury on the Offense of Theft
In light of the fact that the charge of robbery was before the jury, Appellant contends
that the trial court erred in refusing to propound a requested jury instruction on the
30
     Because the State presented no evidence at trial as to the value of the items taken from the
5
Goodwich home, Appellant presumably is arguing that he was entitled to an instruction on even
misdemeanor theft.
uncharged, lesser  offense of theft.   We disagree.  There exists no rational basis upon which
5
the jury could have concluded that Appellant was guilty of theft, but not guilty of robbery.
For this reason, Appellant was not entitled to have the offense of theft submitted to the jury.
Appellant cites Maryland Rule 4-325(c) in support of his asserted right to a jury
instruction on theft.  That rule provides, in pertinent part: “The court may, and at the request
of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law....”  The mandate of this rule does
not apply in the present case, however, because Appellant was not charged with theft.
Where a particular charge is not before the court, “it [i]s not incumbent on the judge to give
an instruction under Md. Rule 4-235(c).”   Dean v. State, 325 Md. 230, 240, 600 A.2d 409,
414 (1992).  Rather, a trial judge's obligation to propound a requested jury instruction on an
uncharged, lesser  offense is evaluated in light of the principles established in Hook v. State,
315 Md. 25, 553 A.2d 233 (1989), and its progeny.  See Hagans v. State, 316 Md. 429, 455,
559 A.2d 792, 804 (1989).  
The defendant in Hook was convicted of, among other things, first degree murder.
The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in permitting the State to enter
a nolle prosequi to a second degree murder charge.  Also at issue was whether the trial judge
erred in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction on second degree murder as a
lesser included offense of first degree murder.  Hook, 315 Md. at 33, 553 A.2d at 237.  
31
Finding error in both regards, the Hook Court explained that there was evidence
adduced at Hook's trial from which the jury reasonably could have determined that the
defendant lacked the specific intent necessary for first degree murder.  Hence, a rational
basis existed for finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, but not guilty of first
degree murder.  Under these circumstances, the State's decision to nolle pros the lesser
offense was held to violate principles of “fundamental fairness essential to the very concept
of justice.”  Hook, 315 Md. at 41-42, 553 A.2d at 242.   The refusal to instruct the jury with
regard to second degree murder similarly was erroneous and contrary to Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggesting that a defendant in a capital case is entitled to a requested
instruction on a lesser included offense “when the evidence warrants such an instruction....”
See Hook, 315 Md. at 41, 553 A.2d at 241 (reviewing Supreme Court treatment of lesser
offense rule). 
In reviewing the denial of a request for an instruction on a lesser offense in this capital
murder case, we must consider whether there exists, in light of the evidence presented at
trial, a rational basis upon which the jury could have concluded that the defendant was guilty
of the lesser offense, but not guilty of the greater offense.  If a rational jury could not reach
this conclusion, then the judge need not submit the lesser offense to the jury.  Because the
same test is used in assessing the validity of the State's decision to nolle pros a lesser
included offense, see, e.g., Jackson v. State, 322 Md. 117, 127-28, 586 A.2d 6, 10-11 (1991);
Fairbanks v. State, 318 Md 22, 25-27, 566 A.2d 764, 765-67 (1989), we look to those cases
for guidance.  In so doing, we find Burrell v. State, 340 Md. 426, 667 A.2d 161 (1995),
32
particularly instructive.
The appellant in Burrell was convicted as an accomplice to the armed robbery of a
gas station attendant.  On appeal, he asserted that because he neither had knowledge of, nor
intended the use of, a gun during the course of the robbery, the judge erred in permitting the
State to nolle pros a simple robbery charge.  Burrell, 340 Md. at 435, 667 A.2d at 165.  In
rejecting this claim, we explained:
“There was ample evidence at trial for a rational jury to convict
[the appellant] of either participating in the armed holdup ... or,
if jurors believed his claims that he was not a participant, to
acquit him of the same.
* * *
There was absolutely no evidence at trial, however, from
which a rational jury could infer that [the appellant] was guilty
of aiding and abetting a simple robbery only.  The gas station
attendant testified that a gun was used.  The eyewitness said he
saw the attendant's hands in the air, from which a jury could
infer that the men holding up the station were using a deadly
weapon.  [The appellant] did not contest at trial the prosecutor's
evidence that a weapon was used in the commission of the
crime.  Without any contravening evidence tending to disprove
the use of a deadly weapon, the only rational inference from the
evidence which was presented was that an armed robbery, not
a simple robbery, had been committed....  The crime to which
[the appellant] was an accomplice was unquestionably an armed
robbery.”  (Emphasis in original).
Burrell, 340 Md. at 435-36, 667 A.2d at 165-66.
Applying the same principles to the instant case, we conclude that Appellant was not
entitled to an instruction on theft in that there was no evidence at trial from which a rational
jury could conclude that Appellant committed theft, but not robbery with a deadly weapon.
33
     Since the trial and sentencing of Appellant, certain portions of the relevant statutes have been
6
transferred and renumbered.  Because the substance of the provisions remains unchanged, we shall
cite the statutes as presently codified.
The murder of Debra Goodwich, committed in furtherance of the taking of items from the
Goodwich home, precludes this possibility.  Appellant was not entitled, therefore, to a jury
instruction on the uncharged, lesser  offense.
E.  Victim Impact Evidence
Appellant next raises several issues concerning victim impact statements and the role
of victim impact evidence at sentencing.
1.
In any case in which the State seeks the death penalty or imprisonment for life without
the possibility of parole, the Division of Parole and Probation (“the Division”) is required
to prepare a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report for consideration by the judge or jury at
sentencing.  Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-609(d).  A victim impact
statement is a required component of this report.  Id.; Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Art. 27, § 781.6
In this case, the Division complied with the victim impact statement requirement by
attaching approximately fifty letters from friends and colleagues of the victim to the PSI
report.  To indicate the incorporation of these letters, the author of the PSI report wrote, “See
attached” under the “Victim Impact Statement” portion of the report.  Appellant claims that
34
these letters were improper, both in form and in substance.  With regard to form, Appellant
contends that, because the Division of Parole and Probation simply attached the letters to the
PSI, it did not comply “with the statutory requirement that the Division of Parole and
Probation prepare a victim impact statement.”  The applicable statutes, in fact, do not use
the term “prepare” with regard to the Division’s responsibility for victim impact statements,
but instead require that the PSI report “include” a victim impact statement in certain
instances.  Appellant's position, therefore, is that merely stapling the information to the PSI
report, with a notation that incorporates the letters by reference,  is inadequate to satisfy the
statutory requirement that victim impact evidence be “included” as part of the PSI report.
We decline to adopt Appellant’s narrow interpretation of the meaning of  “included.”
As for the substance of the statements, Appellant asserts that the letters were improper
because (1) they were authored by friends and colleagues who did not meet the statutory
definition of “victim” for purposes of victim impact statements; and because (2) the content
of the statements exceeded the limitation contained in § 781(d)(6) that victim impact
statements pertain to the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's family.  This
allegation of error largely is disposed of by the fact that the multitude of letters from friends
and colleagues of the victim were not admitted as evidence at the sentencing hearing.  The
only victim impact statements offered by the State and admitted by the judge were those
composed by the victim's parents and grandmother. Even if we were to agree with Appellant
that the letters from friends and colleagues were not proper victim impact evidence,
therefore, it would be of no favorable consequence to Appellant.  Evidence that is not
35
admitted at sentencing ordinarily cannot be said to have had an unfairly prejudicial effect on
the sentencing proceeding.
Counsel for Appellant suggested at oral argument, however, that the sentencing
judge's mere awareness of the existence of these letters, notwithstanding the fact that they
were not admitted, was somehow improper.   We find no merit in this contention.  A judge
cannot rule on an evidentiary matter without being “aware” of the evidence that is the subject
of his or her ruling.  In those cases where the judge serves as trier of fact, it is presumed that
he or she will consider only that evidence that is actually admitted.  “[W]e have consistently
reposed our confidence in a trial judge’s ability to rule on questions of admissibility of
evidence and to then assume the role of trier of fact without having carried over to his factual
deliberations a prejudice on the matters contained in the evidenced which he may have
excluded.”  State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 236, 271 A.2d 641, 646 (1970)(finding no
error in trial judge first admitting, and then excluding, confession where judge, sitting as trier
of fact, declared that he would disregard the inculpatory statement in reaching verdict).  If
we were to reject this presumption and accept Appellant's argument, any judge who grants
a motion to suppress, or otherwise rules to exclude, evidence would be precluded from
further involvement in the case.  This result would create an unworkable trial system.  For
these reasons, Appellant's argument must fail.
2.
The opportunity for a victim, or family member of the victim, to testify orally at
36
sentencing is governed by Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 780(a), which
provides: 
“In every case resulting in serious physical injury or death, the
victim or a member of the victim's immediate family ... may, at
the request of the State's Attorney and in the discretion of the
sentencing judge, address the sentencing judge or jury under
oath or affirmation before the imposition of sentence.”
In light of this provision and other legislation aimed at remedying what has been perceived
as the justice system’s neglect of crime victims, “trial judges must give appropriate
consideration to the impact of crime upon the victims”; “[a]n important step towards
accomplishing that task is to accept victim impact testimony wherever possible.”  Cianos v.
State, 338 Md. 406, 413, 659 A.2d 291, 295 (1995)(emphasis in original).  
In this case, Arlene Goodwich described the effect of her daughter’s death, in part,
as follows:
“I found my daughter dead on the floor of our home and
every day of my life I am haunted by the vision of her lying
there like a stone, still and cold, and her black hair fanned
around her face.  Her deep blue eyes were open and staring
emptily.  Her mouth was slightly ajar, but it was silent.  This
vision is a living nightmare, especially for a parent.  And the
shock and the terror and the horror of that day will live on in me
forever.
I suffer from nightmares.  I wake up shaking.  I have
panic attacks.  I’m sometimes overcome by waves of nausea and
it takes me a long time to get out of bed and face the day right
now.
My concentration and my memory are a fraction of what
they once were and I spend a lot of time walking around in
circles feeling completely powerless and totally overwhelmed.”
37
Arlene Goodwich also described to the judge the “pain and hurt and guilt and rage” that
Debra’s father has experienced as a result of the murder, as well as the “fear and terror” that
so envelopes Debra’s brother that the Goodwiches must keep all windows of their home
closed and an elaborate security system activated.  This testimony “inform[ed] the sentencing
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 735, reh’g denied, 501 U.S. 1277,
112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1110 (1991), and Appellant does not dispute the propriety of its
consideration by the judge. 
Appellant contends, however, that the testimony of the victim's mother in this case
was improper to the extent that it included references to the impact on individuals beyond
immediate family members.  In support of his argument, Appellant cites Md. Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 781(d).  Pursuant to § 781(d), a victim impact statement must:
“(1)  Identify the victim of the offense;
(2)  Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result
of the offense;
(3)  Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a
result of the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(4)  Describe any change in the victim’s personal welfare or
familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(5)  Identify any request for psychological services initiated by
the victim or the victim’s family as a result of the offense; and
(6) Contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim’s family that the court
requires.”
38
     This argument, of course, presumes that § 781(d) represents the totality of admissible
7
victim impact evidence, to the exclusion of any other types of victim impact evidence.  This
Court has previously interpreted this type of statute as establishing the “minimum standards
for the information to be provided to judges” prior to the imposition of sentence.  Lodowski
v. State,, 302 Md. 691, 745, 490 A.2d 1228, 1256 (1985)(emphasis added)(interpreting
predecessor to § 781(d), the substance of which is identical to § 781(d)).  Indeed, we recently
observed in Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 763, 679 A.2d 1106, 1126 (1996), that
statements of friends and colleagues of the victim “may well be admissible if [they are]
included in or incorporated as part of the PSI report prepared by the Division of Parole and
Probation, which has wide latitude in preparing such reports.”
Because this statute makes reference only to the impact of the offense on the victim or the
victim’s family, Appellant asserts that victim impact testimony as to the effect of the crime
on individuals beyond the victim’s family is not permitted. 7
Appellant's exclusive reliance on this statutory provision is misplaced.   Section
781(d) pertains only to written victim impact statements as a required component of a PSI
report.  Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 743, 490 A.2d 1228, 1254 (1985)(stating that the
predecessor to § 781(d) “is concerned only with victim impact evidence that is submitted to
the court or jury by way of a statement included in a presentence investigation report”),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986).   It does
not, by its express terms, extend to oral victim impact testimony; indeed, it would be difficult
to conform oral testimony to the requirements of this statute.  Because written victim impact
statements are prepared and reviewed prior to the commencement of the sentencing
proceeding, their content can be effectively delineated by statute.  Oral victim impact
testimony, in contrast, cannot be controlled with such precision. Victim impact witnesses
39
     Pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 780(b), the defendant
8
has the right to cross-examine victim impact witnesses with regard to “factual statements
made in the address to the judge or jury.”
testify under great emotional strain and, in venting their pain and frustration, may make an
occasional reference to the impact of the crime on individuals beyond the victim’s family.
An emotionally distraught witness may mention, for example, that “everyone” misses the
victim.  This comment is hardly likely to influence the sentencing authority and should not
form the basis for reversal.  Therefore, although § 781(d) may provide guidance as to
appropriate matters for victim impact witnesses to address orally at sentencing, it should not
be viewed as establishing the outer limits of that testimony such that any deviation warrants
automatic reversal of the sentence imposed.  Appellant’s assertion to the contrary is without
merit.
At a capital sentencing proceeding, the permissible scope of victim impact testimony
instead lies within the sound discretion of the presiding judge, as limited by Md. Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(c)(1)(v).  This statute defines the type of evidence that is
admissible at a capital sentencing proceeding to include “[a]ny ... evidence that the court
deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any statements.”  The impact of a crime on a victim or the victim’s
family is both relevant and probative.   Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 687, 637 A.2d 117, 130,
8
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S.Ct. 109, 130 L.Ed.2d 56 (1994).  The relevance and
probative value of the impact of the offense on individuals beyond the victim’s family,
40
however, is less certain.  Victim impact testimony generally should be limited, therefore, to
the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim’s family members.  In this case, however,
we do not find that Arlene Goodwich’s remarks warrant reversal.
First, a review of the transcript in the instant case reveals that Arlene Goodwich
delivered her testimony without a single objection from defense counsel.  The error that
Appellant alleges, therefore, has not been properly preserved for review by this Court.
Furthermore, even it were preserved, we would consider any error in this regard to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Throughout what amounts to seventeen pages of
transcribed testimony, the only remarks that related to the impact of Debra’s death on
individuals beyond the immediate family were that “it was very obvious to me that Debbie
was missed by people she worked with, by people in the community who knew her...,” and
that “[Debbie’s] aunts and her uncles and her cousins ... cry because they know she won’t
be present anymore and they won’t get to know her as she may have become....”   We are
satisfied that, in light of all the other evidence before the judge, these remarks did not
influence the imposition of the death penalty.  Accordingly, any error in the admission of
these statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Evans, 333 Md. at 684, 637
A.2d at 129 (concluding that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where Court was
satisfied that any erroneously admitted evidence did not influence sentence imposed).
3.
Finally, Appellant argues that the admission of victim impact statements in a PSI
41
report violates an accused's constitutional right, in a criminal proceeding, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.  The State counters that the same principles that justify the
admission of the PSI report itself apply with equal force to the victim impact statements
contained in that report.  In addition, the State contends that even if Appellant is correct that
cross-examination of the authors of the victim impact statements is permitted, Appellant
made no attempt to exercise that right and cannot now claim error in his own tactical
decision.  We agree with the State that Appellant’s “failure to avail himself of [the
opportunity to confront the victim impact witnesses] does not translate into a denial of his
right of confrontation.”  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights confer upon a defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to confront
the witnesses against him.  Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 587,  671 A.2d 974, 978, cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 102, 136 L.Ed.2d 56 (1996).  Ordinarily, the right of confrontation
includes the right to cross-examine witnesses concerning matters that might expose any bias,
interest, or motive to falsify.  Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978 (citing Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1974)).  This right “extends
to the sentencing phase of a capital trial and applies to [live,] victim impact witnesses as well
as factual witnesses.” Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 206, 670 A.2d 398, 413 (1995), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 581, 136 L.Ed.2d 512 (1996). 
Whether a defendant is entitled to cross-examine the authors of written, victim impact
statements has not previously been considered by this Court.  The issue was touched upon,
42
     The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of  victim impact evidence to the sentencing
9
process. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 735
(1991)(observing that “victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the
sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime....”).   This Court, as well, has
acknowledged that “there is a reasonable nexus between the impact of the offense upon the victim
or the victim’s family and the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime[,] especially as to the
gravity or aggravating quality of the offense.”  Lodowski, 302 Md. at 741-42, 490 A.2d at 1254.
however, in McWilliams v. State, 640 So.2d 982 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), aff’d in part and
remanded in part sub nom., Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala. 1993), where the
appellant similarly argued that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated in that
he was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of victim impact
statements.  McWilliams, 640 A.2d at 993.  The court rejected this argument apparently on
two bases.  The court first suggested that the appellant’s right of confrontation was not
denied because although the appellant would have been entitled to call the authors of the
statements as witnesses, he elected not to exercise this right.  McWilliams, 640 A.2d at 995.
Furthermore, the court explained that Alabama’s death penalty statute permits the
introduction at sentencing of “‘[a]ny evidence which has probative value and is relevant to
sentence ... regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided
that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.’”
McWilliams, 640 A.2d at 994 (quoting Ex parte Davis, 569 So.2d 738, 741 (Ala. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1127, 111 S.Ct. 1091, 112 L.Ed.2d 1196 (1991))(in turn citing Ala. Code
1975 § 13A-5-45(d)).  Because “[t]he evidence contained in the victim impact statements
was relevant  ..., and the defendant was given an opportunity to rebut th[at] evidence,” the
9
43
court found no error.  McWilliams, 640 So.2d at 995 (citation omitted)(footnote added).  
The same factors justify a finding that Appellant’s right of confrontation was not
violated in this case.  Appellant was provided with copies of the victim impact statements
well in advance of the commencement of the sentencing proceedings.  He was, in fact,
successful in having certain portions of those statements redacted.  Notwithstanding
Appellant’s access to the statements and awareness of the individuals who authored them,
he made no attempt to subpoena the authors to appear at sentencing and undergo cross-
examination.  The tactical decision to forego cross-examination of witnesses does not amount
to a denial of the right of confrontation. See Brown v. State, 230 Md. 467, 469-70, 187 A.2d
683, 684-85 (1963)  (referring to failure to exercise right of cross-examination as a tactical
decision).   In addition, Appellant had the opportunity to present evidence in rebuttal to any
information contained in the victim impact statements.   Appellant’s claim that his
confrontation rights were violated, therefore, is without merit.
In light of Appellant’s decision not to pursue cross-examination of the authors of the
statements, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the Confrontation Clause requires that
cross-examination be allowed upon request.  We note, however, that the right of
confrontation poses no obstacle to the admission of the PSI report itself, notwithstanding the
fact that the report is drafted by individuals whom the defendant is unable to cross-examine.
See Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 58-59, 427 A.2d 991, 999 (1981)(observing that “the
constitutional right of confrontation does not proscribe the use of presentence reports in
capital sentencing proceedings”); Driver, 201 Md. at 32, 92 A.2d at 573-74 (stating that “the
44
sentencing judge may consider information, even though obtained outside the courtroom,
from persons whom the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine”) .
The right of confrontation with regard to victim impact statements that are contained in the
PSI reports may well be satisfied, therefore, if the defendant is given a copy of the statements
and is provided an opportunity to rebut any information contained therein.  See McWilliams,
640 So.2d at 994-95.  We need not resolve the issue, however, for purposes of this appeal.
F.  The Admission at Sentencing of Evidence of Appellant's Prior Convictions
Appellant next asserts that the judge erred in permitting the introduction, at
sentencing, of evidence concerning Appellant's prior convictions for non-violent offenses,
as well as evidence of other charges that did not result in convictions.  The PSI report
admitted by the sentencing judge established that Appellant previously had been convicted
of various motor vehicle offenses, possession of controlled dangerous substances, theft,
daytime housebreaking, and burglary. According to Appellant, “the PSI [also] include[d] a
number of offenses which were resolved by stet or nol pros, including controlled dangerous
substance offenses, theft, malicious destruction, disorderly conduct, burglary, and motor
vehicle offenses.”  Citing the decision of this Court in Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d
1126 (1983), Appellant contends that the judge committed prejudicial error in allowing this
evidence.  We disagree.
Preliminarily, we note that this alleged error has not been preserved properly for
review.  Defense counsel voiced no objection to the introduction of the PSI report and other
45
     In our review of the record, we noticed that the State neglected to redact from the certified court
10
documents a few, minor motor vehicle and drug offenses that were resolved by stet or nolle prosequi.
 To the extent that the admission of these offenses was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  As will be explained, infra, Appellant himself introduced evidence of his history of drug
abuse, and the motor vehicle offenses cannot be said to have influenced the imposition of the death
penalty.
court documents at the sentencing proceeding.  Furthermore, Appellant's suggestion that
unadjudicated charges were included on the PSI report is incorrect.  These charges were
redacted from the PSI report prior to the State's introduction of the report at sentencing.
Hence, they were not considered by the judge in imposing the sentence.  Only Appellant’s
prior convictions, as enumerated in the PSI report, are at issue.10
In a capital sentencing proceeding, the admissibility of evidence is governed by Md.
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(c)(1), which provides:
“The following type of evidence is admissible in this
proceeding:
(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance listed in
subsection (g) of this section;
(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in
subsection (d) of this section of which the State had notified the
defendant pursuant to § 412(b) of this article;
(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty
or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or
pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing
procedures;
(iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any
recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not
admissible; and
46
     
Subsection (g), to which reference is made in subsection (i), includes as a mitigating
11
circumstance the fact that “[t]he defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of
violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had
a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence.”
(v) Any other evidence that the court deems of probative value
and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a
fair opportunity to rebut any statements.”
The five subsections of § 413(c)(1) are read in conjunction with one another such that
evidence that is admissible under subsections (i) through (iv) must also have “probative
value” and be “relevant to sentence,” as required by subsection (v).  Conyers v. State, 345
Md. 525, 566, 693 A.2d 781, 800 (1997).    
In Scott, the State conceded the existence of a mitigating circumstance that was
admissible pursuant to subsection (i): the absence of a prior conviction for a crime of
violence.   Scott, 297 Md. at 237, 465 A.2d at 1128.  The State also proffered evidence,
11
however, that the accused had committed two unrelated murders for which he had neither
been convicted nor pled guilty or nolo contendere.  Id.  The Court held that the admission
of this evidence amounted to prejudicial error.  In so holding, the Court concluded that the
proper interpretation of subsection (i), as supplemented by subsection (g), is that evidence
of other crimes is restricted to “crimes of violence for which there has been a conviction.”
Scott, 297 Md. at 247, 465 A.2d at 1134.   
As we recently clarified in Conyers, supra, however, the “crime of violence”
limitation announced by the Scott Court pertains only to evidence offered in connection with
mitigating circumstances under subsection (i).  345 Md. at 572, 693 A.2d at 803.  In contrast,
47
     It was suggested at oral argument that the tactical decision to portray Appellant as a “lesser”
12
criminal was invalid as a matter of law.  We disagree.   See Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 290, 681
A.2d 30, 47 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 681 (finding that defense
counsel’s decision to present evidence, through expert testimony, that defendant suffered from mental
disorder of sexual sadism in the hope that it would convince jury not to impose death penalty was
valid trial strategy).
the prior convictions in the case at bar were admitted under subsection (iv) as part of a PSI
report.  The Scott limitation thus does not apply.  Rather, the only restrictions on the
admissibility of “[r]eliable information contained in a [PSI] report” is that it have “probative
value and [be] relevant to sentencing,” and that “the defendant [be] accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any statements.”  Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 431-32, 583 A.2d 218,
239 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991).  Evidence of
Appellant’s prior convictions as set forth in the PSI, therefore, was admissible.
There is yet another basis for rejecting Appellant’s claim of error with regard to
evidence of his prior criminal record.  At the sentencing proceeding, Defense counsel elicited
extensive testimony concerning Appellant's prior criminal history and drug use.  Counsel’s
strategy apparently was to portray Appellant as a mere petty thief and burglar, who suffered
from a drug addiction and who intended to commit a non-confrontational daytime
housebreaking, as opposed to murder.  Appellant thus introduced at sentencing substantially
the same evidence about which he now complains.   “[T]he admission of improper evidence
12
cannot be used as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct
examination that establishes the same facts as those to which he objects.”  Hillard, 286 Md.
at 156, 406 A.2d at 421.  For this reason as well, Appellant’s claim must fail.  
48
G.  The Prosecution’s Closing Argument at Sentencing
The penultimate issue presented by Appellant is whether the prosecutor engaged in
improper closing argument at the sentencing hearing.  Appellant takes exception to the
prosecutor's explanation, as follows, of the purpose of victim impact evidence:
“Now, Your Honor, the reason victim impact evidence is
admissible in a death penalty sentencing proceeding is to rebut
information about the defendant's  childhood or background
that's presented to you in mitigation.” 
Appellant asserts that this explanation was “erroneous,” “misleading,” and inimical to the
“constitutionally-protected role of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.”
The function of victim impact evidence, Appellant argues, is not to counterbalance mitigating
evidence, but to assess the seriousness of the crime and the harm caused by its commission.
The prosecution thus misinformed the judge about the role of victim impact evidence.
In Payne, supra, the Supreme Court described the role of victim impact evidence as
follows:
“We are now of the view that a State may properly
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it
at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by
the defendant. ‘[T]he State has a legitimate interest in
counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is
entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the
murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the
victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to
society and in particular to his family.’  Booth [v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 517, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 457, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2540
(1987)].”  (Emphasis added).
501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735.  This passage from Payne suggests
49
that victim impact evidence may be used both to assess the harm caused by the defendant’s
actions, as suggested by Appellant, and to counteract mitigating evidence, as argued by the
State in closing argument. The prosecutor thus did not necessarily misstate the purpose of
victim impact evidence.
Even if the prosecutor were incorrect in her assessment of the role of victim impact
evidence, however, this comment during closing argument would not constitute reversible
error.  The death sentence in this case was imposed by a judge, not a jury.  Trial judges are
presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.  Regardless of the prosecution's
representation of the purpose of victim impact evidence, therefore, the court is presumed to
have made proper use of the victim impact evidence.  Nothing in the record suggests
otherwise.  In fact, the judge made no mention of the victim impact evidence in delivering
the sentence.
H.  The Constitutionality of Maryland's Death Penalty Statute         
Appellant's final argument is that Maryland's death penalty statute is unconstitutional
because (1) it requires the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence; (2) it requires the defendant to establish that arguably
mitigating circumstances that are not enumerated in the statute are, in fact, mitigating
circumstances; and (3) it requires a death sentence when aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by some higher
standard. 
50
“‘We have addressed these claims in prior cases and have
rejected each of them.  See Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175,
231, 670 A.2d 398, 425 (stating that a similar claim, “though
made time and time again over the years, has been consistently
rejected by this Court”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct.
581, 136 L.Ed. 2d 512 (1996); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30,
82-83, 665 A.2d 223, 249 (1995)(rejecting similar constitutional
challenges to Maryland death penalty statute), cert. denied,
____ U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 1021, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996);
Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 582-83, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374
(1991)(finding no merit in challenges to defendant's burden
regarding statutorily recognized and other mitigating factors and
to burden of proof), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007, 112 S. Ct.
1765, 118 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1992).’”  
Conyers, 345 Md. at 576, 693 A.2d at 805-06 (quoting Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 247-48,
686 A.2d 274, 295 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1318, 137 L.Ed.2d 480
(1997)).   
I.  Other Considerations
In addition to considering the arguments advanced by Ball on this appeal, we have
also considered the imposition of the death sentence from the standpoint of the factors set
forth in Article 27, § 414(e), and we make the following determinations:
(1) The sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) The evidence supports the trial court’s findings of statutory aggravating
circumstances under § 413(d); and
(3) The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances
51
outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.