Title: State v. Reed

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,307 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIE E. REED, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
In stating the elements of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age 
of 14 in K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), the legislature did not define the prohibited conduct by 
identifying body parts that could or could not be fondled or touched. Nor did the 
legislature specify that there must be skin-to-skin contact or that the offender must use his 
or her hands to fondle or touch the victim for there to be a violation of the law. Instead, a 
touch is prohibited if it meets the common meaning of the term "lewd," i.e., if the touch 
is sexually unchaste or licentious; suggestive of or tending to moral looseness; inciting to 
sensual desire or imagination; or indecent, obscene, or salacious. In considering if a touch 
is lewd, a factfinder should consider whether the touch tends to undermine the morals of 
a child and is so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person. 
 
2. 
 
Under the facts of this case, a rational factfinder could find the defendant's 
touching of two 8-year-old female victims—acts that included the defendant rubbing his 
genital area against the girls' buttocks in what was described as a "humping" motion and 
touching one girl on the buttocks—tended to undermine the girls' morals and to outrage 
the moral sense of a reasonable person, even though everyone was fully clothed. 
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3. 
 
K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) prohibits lewd touching with the intent to arouse the 
offender, the child, or both; actual arousal or satisfaction of the sexual desires of either 
participant is not necessary. 
 
4. 
 
Under the facts of this case, the defendant's act of rubbing two 8-year-old girls' 
buttocks with his genitalia, by its very nature, suggests a sexual intent. 
 
5. 
 
An issue not briefed by an appellant is deemed waived and abandoned. 
 
6. 
 
K.S.A. 60-404 dictates that evidentiary errors shall not be reviewed on appeal 
unless a party has lodged a timely and specific objection to the alleged error at trial. The 
trial judge must be provided the specific objection, so the judge may consider as fully as 
possible whether the evidence should be admitted. Thus, appellate review is precluded if 
a party objects to evidence on one ground at trial but then asserts a different ground on 
appeal. 
 
7. 
 
Prior statements by a witness are generally material and probative, i.e., relevant, 
because the consistency or lack thereof between the statement and the testimony either 
corroborates or undercuts the witness' credibility. 
 
 
 
 
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8. 
Raising new grounds for an evidentiary objection in a motion for new trial is too 
late to satisfy the timely objection requirement of K.S.A. 60-404. 
 
9. 
 
Constitutional grounds for reversal asserted for the first time on appeal are not 
properly before the appellate court for review. While there are exceptions to this general 
rule, a party waives and abandons those exceptions by failing to argue in the party's 
appellate brief for their application.  
 
10. 
 
Under the holding in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 
2d 91 (1976), the State may not attempt to impeach a defendant's credibility by 
introducing evidence that the defendant did not avail himself or herself of the first 
opportunity to clear his or her name when confronted by police officers but instead 
invoked his or her constitutional right to remain silent as recognized in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 
890 (1966). 
 
11. 
 
A prosecutor's reference to a defendant's prearrest silence is not a violation of 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). 
 
12. 
 
The cumulative error doctrine does not apply if no error or only one error supports 
reversal. 
 
 
 
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13. 
Appellate courts do not make factual findings but review those made by trial 
judges.  
 
14. 
 
A defendant who wishes to appeal on the basis of a constitutional challenge to a 
sentencing statute must ensure the findings and conclusions by the trial judge are 
sufficient to support appellate argument by filing of a motion invoking the judge's duty 
under Supreme Court Rule 165 (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 265), if necessary. 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; ROBERT P. BURNS, judge. Opinion filed August 8, 2014. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
Ronald L. Jurgeson, of Ronald L. Jurgeson, LLC, of Lee's Summit, Missouri, argued the cause 
and was on the brief for appellant. 
 
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Willie E. Reed was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated 
indecent liberties with a child under the age of 14, in violation of K.S.A. 21-
3504(a)(3)(A). The offenses, which occurred approximately 2 years apart, involved two 
8-year-old-girls, C.T. and A.R. The sentencing judge imposed concurrent life sentences 
without the possibility of parole for 40 years. Now Reed appeals, raising five issues 
relating to alleged trial errors and one issue relating to sentencing:  (1) Was the evidence 
sufficient to support Reed's convictions; (2) did the trial judge err by admitting into 
evidence two handwritten notes, one from each victim describing her version of events; 
(3) did the trial judge err by admitting into evidence the victims' recorded statements; (4) 
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during Reed's testimony, did the trial judge err by allowing the prosecutor to ask 
questions which, according to Reed, pointed to his postarrest silence; (5) even if no single 
error warrants setting aside Reed's convictions, does the cumulative error doctrine entitle 
Reed to a new trial; and (6) does Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643, as applied to Reed, 
constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution?  
 
 
 
Reed failed to preserve several of these arguments by not making a timely and 
specific objection to evidence or not creating a sufficient record for appeal. Reed's 
remaining arguments lack merit, leading us to affirm Reed's convictions and sentences.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The incident involving C.T. took place at her home between August 1, 2006, and 
September 30, 2006. C.T.'s stepfather regularly invited friends, including Reed, to watch 
Sunday football at the family's home. According to C.T.'s trial testimony, one day while 
Reed and others were at her house watching football, Reed entered her room. C.T. was on 
her bed, lying on her stomach, and reading a book. Reed leaned over her and "humped 
[her] back and forth." When asked which of Reed's body parts was touching her, C.T. 
said it was his "hip area and down," and C.T.'s mother testified that C.T. also referred to 
him touching her with his "private." C.T. further explained that Reed rubbed against "the 
middle of [her] back and down" to the "knee area." Reed then went into the bathroom, 
which could only be accessed through C.T.'s bedroom or the master bedroom. When he 
came out, he told C.T. "to get on the ground so he could see what [she] was reading" C.T. 
knelt next to her bed and leaned on the bed with the book in front of her. Then, Reed 
knelt down behind her and "humped [her] back and forth again" with his "private." C.T. 
said she got up to get a drink of water, and he left.  
 
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C.T. told her parents about Reed's conduct a couple of weeks later. C.T.'s parents 
decided they would not report the incident to law enforcement, but C.T.'s mother 
suggested C.T. write about the incident in her journal. C.T.'s mother explained to the jury 
that Reed was no longer welcome in their home, and if they and Reed happened to attend 
the same event, C.T.'s parents would either leave or keep their daughter close to them.  
 
The incident involving A.R. occurred 2 years later on or about September 1, 2008, 
at a Labor Day barbecue at which Reed, A.R., and A.R.'s family were guests in a mutual 
friend's home. A.R. testified she wanted to play in the backyard with her 14-year-old 
brother and some other children, but her brother told her to go to the front yard. As they 
argued, Reed came up to A.R. and told her it was "okay" and she did not "have to worry 
about it." He told her to "come on" and started walking with A.R. around the house to the 
front yard. Reed draped his arm over her shoulder and placed his hand on her buttocks. 
According to A.R., when they got to the "vent" (air conditioning unit) at the side of the 
house, Reed stopped her and pulled her in front of him. He then pressed the "front of his 
pants" against her "butt." A.R. explained to the jury that by "front of his pants," she 
meant the area used for "peeing." A.R. told him to stop and ran away.  
 
At some point, Reed approached A.R.'s brother and asked him something like, 
"[I]f somebody ever touch[ed] my sister, would I take up for her, or would I do 
something for her." A.R.'s brother found the question odd and simply told Reed, "[Y]eah, 
I would take up for her."  
 
Later that night, A.R. told her mother about her encounter with Reed. At some 
point that night or the next day, A.R. also told her aunt. A.R.'s mother, like C.T.'s mother, 
told her daughter to write a note about what happened at the barbecue. A.R. did so on 
September 8, 2008, approximately 1 week after the incident.  
 
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C.T.'s mother heard about the incident involving A.R. from A.R.'s aunt. This led to 
C.T's and A.R.'s mothers visiting. The two mothers decided to file police reports and to 
turn over their daughters' handwritten descriptions of what had happened with Reed.  
 
Reed was charged with two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child 
under the age of 14. At trial, Reed testified in his own defense and denied ever touching 
either girl. With regard to the 2006 allegation involving C.T., Reed acknowledged that 
because of the layout of the house, he passed through C.T.'s bedroom to access the 
bathroom. When asked if he had ever seen C.T. "over at the house," Reed said, "Yes." 
But he denied seeing C.T. on her bed reading a book on the day in question. With regard 
to the 2008 allegation involving A.R., Reed denied having any contact with A.R. or even 
seeing her at the barbecue. He testified that the "[f]irst time I laid eyes" on A.R. was at 
the trial.  
 
 
A jury convicted Reed as charged. Because he was over 18 years old when he 
committed these crimes and because of prior convictions for sex offenses, the sentencing 
judge, pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C) and (b)(1), imposed a life sentence with a 
mandatory minimum term of 40 years' imprisonment for each count and ordered the 
sentences to run concurrent. Reed brings a timely appeal, over which this court has 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (convicted of off-grid crime; case docketed 
before July 1, 2011). 
 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT 
 
First, Reed argues that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to 
support his convictions. "When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case, the standard of [appellate] review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
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Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 581, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). An 
appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or 
resolve conflicting evidence. 292 Kan. at 581; see State v. Spear, 297 Kan. 780, 791, 304 
P.3d 1246 (2013). 
 
In order to apply this standard in this case, we must consider the evidence as it 
relates to the elements of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under 14 years of age. 
To prove the charges, the State had to show that (1) Reed lewdly fondled or touched C.T. 
and A.R.; (2) he engaged in this conduct with the intent to arouse or satisfy the "sexual 
desires of either the child or the offender, or both"; (3) C.T. and A.R. were under the age 
of 14 at the time of the acts; and (4) the conduct took place in Wyandotte County on or 
about the dates alleged in the criminal complaint. See K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A); PIK 
Crim. 3d 57.06 (aggravated indecent liberties with a child).  
 
Reed challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the first two elements, 
i.e., the act of lewdly fondling or touching and the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his 
sexual desires, the sexual desires of the girls, or both.  
 
Lewd Fondling or Touching 
 
Consistent with Kansas law, the jury was given the following pattern instruction in 
which the term "lewd fondling or touching" was defined: 
 
"As used in these instructions, 'lewd fondling or touching' means fondling or 
touching in a manner which tends to undermine the morals of the victim, which is so 
clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, and which is done 
with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the victim or the 
offender or both. Lewd fondling or touching does not require contact with the sex organ 
of one or the other."  
 
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See PIK Crim. 3d 53.00 (definitions and explanations of terms). 
 
Reed acknowledges that the PIK instruction correctly describes the prohibited 
conduct, but he argues his conduct does not meet the definition. He notes that he and each 
girl were fully clothed and there was no skin-to-skin contact between him and either girl. 
He also argues he did not use his hands to reach under their clothes and touch their 
"actual body parts or skin," nor did he ask the girls to touch him. Although the evidence 
showed that Reed touched A.R.'s buttocks, Reed attempts to minimize this act by noting 
that A.R.'s testimony showed he "only touched her fully-clothed bottom," and he suggests 
the buttocks are not a sex organ, which he describes as the "breasts or private area." He 
argues there was no evidence he touched either girl in these areas. 
 
These arguments attempt to recast the elements of the offense by adding 
requirements not found in the statutory definition of aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child under the age of 14, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A). The legislature did not 
restrict the prohibited conduct by identifying body parts that could or could not be 
fondled or touched. Nor did the legislature specify that there must be skin-to-skin contact 
or that the offender must use his or her hands to fondle or touch the victim for there to be 
a violation of the law. See State v. Wells, 223 Kan. 94, 98, 573 P.2d 580 (1977), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Ta, 296 Kan. 230, Syl. ¶ 5, 290 P.3d 652 (2012). 
Instead, a touch is prohibited if it meets "the common meaning of the term 'lewd,' that is, 
whether a touch[] is 'sexually unchaste or licentious; suggestive of or tending to moral 
looseness; inciting to sensual desire or imagination; indecent, obscene, or salacious.'" Ta, 
296 Kan. at 242-43 (quoting Wells, 223 Kan. at 98); see Black's Law Dictionary 1047 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining "lewd" as "[o]bscene or indecent; tending to moral impurity or 
wantonness"). In considering if a touch is lewd, a factfinder—in this case, the jury—
should consider whether the touch "tends to undermine the morals of a child [and] is so 
clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person." Wells, 223 Kan. 
at 98; see State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952, 967, 235 P.3d 1234 (2010).  
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When the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
the State presented evidence that Reed's touching of both C.T. and A.R. was lewd. C.T. 
testified that Reed "humped me back and forth." There was also evidence indicating that 
Reed approached C.T. while she was alone in her bedroom, positioned himself behind her 
and, through their clothing, rubbed his "private," i.e., his penis, against her buttocks and 
lower back. According to C.T., Reed rubbed his "private" on her both before and after he 
went into the adjoining bathroom.  
 
As for the incident involving A.R., the State presented evidence that Reed led her 
to the side of the house, away from the other guests attending the barbecue, and touched 
her buttocks as they walked side by side. Reed attacks the credibility of A.R., suggesting  
A.R.'s testimony should be "discarded" because she was inconsistent in her description of 
Reed's touching her buttocks and in other ways. This argument ignores the oft-stated rule 
that an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 296, 312 
P.3d 328 (2013). Instead, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State.  
 
Accepting A.R.'s testimony without any reweighing, she established that Reed 
"was like, touching my bottom, like really touching my bottom." Then, Reed stopped 
A.R. at the air conditioning unit and pulled her in front of him. At that point, he rubbed 
the "front of his pants" on A.R.'s buttocks. She explained that the part of his body that 
touched her buttocks was the area used for "peeing." In her interview with a social 
worker at Sunflower House, Inc., a child abuse prevention center, A.R. said Reed was 
"humping" her by moving up and down. A.R. testified that she told him to "stop" and got 
away from him.  
 
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Even with everyone fully clothed, a rational factfinder could have found that these 
touches tended to undermine the morals of C.T. and A.R. and to outrage the moral sense 
of a reasonable person. As such, the touches can be characterized as indecent, obscene, 
salacious, unchaste, or licentious. See Wells, 223 Kan. at 98. Hence, the State presented 
sufficient evidence that Reed committed "lewd fondling or touching" of C.T. and A.R.  
 
Intent to Satisfy Sexual Desires 
 
Reed also contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence of a specific 
intent to satisfy his sexual desires, the sexual desires of the girls, or both. As he points 
out, there was no direct evidence of actual arousal or sexual intent. But this court has 
stated that "[a]ctual arousal or satisfaction of the sexual desires of either participant is not 
necessary for the existence of the crime." State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 201, 284 P.3d 
977 (2012). This construction arises from the plain language of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), 
which says nothing about actual arousal and instead prohibits "lewd fondling or touching 
. . . with the intent to arouse." (Emphasis added.) See State v. Clark, 298 Kan. 843, 849, 
317 P.3d 776 (2014). And it is well established that the State can prove specific intent, 
which in this case includes sexual intent, with circumstantial evidence. State v. Hurd, 298 
Kan. 555, 568, 316 P.3d 696 (2013); State v. Becker, 290 Kan. 842, 852, 235 P.3d 424 
(2010), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 
273-74, 323 P.3d 829 (2014). 
 
Reed attempts to deny the existence of sexual intent by arguing the points he made 
with regard to lewd touching. Namely, he notes that he did not touch the girls under their 
clothes, he did not touch their "breasts or private area," and he did not ask the girls to 
touch him. Again, his argument fails. The existence of these circumstances would have 
strengthened the State's case against Reed, but the absence of them does not mean the 
evidence of intent was insufficient. Similar arguments regarding a lack of direct evidence 
were made by the defendant in Clark—where the victims' grandfather draped his arm 
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around the girls and rubbed their breasts over their clothing—and were rejected. Clark, 
298 Kan. at 849-50. There, we held that regardless of the fact the defendant and the 
victims were fully clothed, "the repeated rubbing of both girls' breast area, as opposed to 
an area of the body without sexual connotation, by its very nature suggests a sexual 
intent." Clark, 298 Kan. at 850. 
 
Likewise, in this case, circumstantial evidence showed Reed's intent to arouse or 
satisfy sexual desires. He placed his hand on A.R.'s buttocks. And while there was no 
evidence of his placing his hand on C.T.'s buttocks, Reed's pattern of conduct with both 
girls was consistent and demonstrates his sexual intent. Reed approached both girls in an 
area of isolation, he positioned himself behind them, and then he rubbed his genitalia 
against their buttocks. Reed's act of rubbing the girls' buttocks with his genitalia in a 
"humping" motion by its very nature suggests a sexual intent. See Clark, 298 Kan. at 850. 
Moreover, although Reed did not make any sexually-charged comments to the girls, 
Reed's awareness of the inappropriate nature of his actions, at least with respect to A.R., 
can also be inferred in Reed asking if A.R.'s brother would "take up for her" "if 
somebody ever touch[ed]" his sister. See, e.g., State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, Syl.     
¶ 3, 318 P.3d 140 (2014) ("A jury may draw an inference of intent when a defendant's 
actions or words demonstrate that the defendant is conscious of his or her guilt."). 
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Reed's actions, coupled with the circumstantial 
evidence that surrounded the incidents, was sufficient to demonstrate his intent to arouse 
or satisfy his sexual desires, the sexual desires of the girls, or both. See State v. McCaslin, 
291 Kan. 697, 710, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) ("conviction of even the gravest offense '"can 
be based entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible 
therefrom."'"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395, 402, 324 
P.3d 1046 (2014). 
 
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HANDWRITTEN