Title: Commonwealth v. Guastucci

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12829 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT GUASTUCCI. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 5, 2020.  -  October 14, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Obscenity, Child pornography.  Constitutional Law, Search and 
seizure, Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Search and 
Seizure, Computer, Probable cause, Affidavit.  Evidence, 
Information stored on computer.  Practice, Criminal, Motion 
to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 15, 2018. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John T. 
Lu, J., and a conditional plea of guilty was accepted by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Benjamin L. Falkner for the defendant. 
 
Gabriel Pell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On March 15, 2017, an unknown computer user 
uploaded an image of child pornography to an Internet-based 
communication service that is designed to share files and "chat" 
with others.  After receiving a tip from the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), police tracked the 
specific computer address by which the device had connected to 
the Internet to the defendant's house in Tyngsboro, and an 
account owned by his wife.  Seven months after the alleged 
illegal activity, on October 18, 2017, a State police trooper 
obtained a warrant authorizing a search of all computer systems 
and digital storage devices located within the residence for 
evidence of child pornography.  Following execution of the 
search warrant, the defendant's laptop computer and a "flash" 
drive were seized; the defendant subsequently was indicted on 
two counts of possession of child pornography, in violation of 
G. L. c. 272, § 29C, as a result of images found on these 
devices. 
At issue in this appeal is whether the information in the 
search warrant affidavit was too stale to establish probable 
cause to believe that evidence of child pornography would be 
found on computers or digital storage devices at the time of the 
search, seven months after the Internet activity with one 
specific image.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion to 
suppress after finding that the seven-month period was "less 
3 
 
 
than ideal, but . . . a tolerable amount of delay."  The 
defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to both 
charges, see Commonwealth v. Gomez, 480 Mass. 240, 252 (2018), 
and we allowed his petition for direct appellate review.  
Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a 
magistrate to have found probable cause, we affirm. 
1.  Background.  a.  Investigation and warrant application.  
On October 18, 2017, State police Trooper Christopher MacDonald 
applied for a warrant to search computers and digital storage 
devices located within a single-family house in Tyngsboro.  In 
support of the warrant application, McDonald submitted a ten-
page affidavit and an attached exhibit.  The exhibit described, 
in general terms, the investigation of child pornography that 
has been distributed over the Internet and stored in a suspect's 
computer.  The affidavit and exhibit then stated the following. 
 
On March 16, 2017, electronic service provider Skype.com 
(Skype) filed a report with NCMEC of a suspected incident of 
possession or distribution of child pornography.2  Skype is a 
                     
2 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC), among other functions, operates a "CyberTip line" that 
the public may use to report suspected instances of Internet-
related child exploitation.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2258A(a)(1)(A), Internet service providers are required to 
report suspected child pornography to NCMEC "as soon as 
reasonably possible."  In its role as a clearing house for this 
type information, NCMEC forwards these tips to Federal and State 
law enforcement agencies.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(c)(1)-(3). 
4 
 
 
Web-based application that provides its customers with video 
communication and voice call services, as well as "chat" 
services where typed messages are exchanged interactively.  
Skype users also may use the platform to exchange digital images 
and video files.  According to the information reported by 
Skype, a computer user with a "screen name" of "live: 
boullett_1" at a particular Internet Service Protocol (IP) 
address uploaded a digital image believed to be child 
pornography on March 15, 2017.  At a date not specified in the 
affidavit, NCMEC forwarded the information contained in the tip 
to the State police computer crimes unit. 
On May 5, 2017, pursuant to an administrative subpoena 
issued by the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, the 
internet service provider (ISP) provided records for its 
subscriber at that IP address.  The ISP identified the 
subscriber, as of March 15, 2017, as the defendant's spouse, 
with a service address in Tyngsboro.  The Internet account, 
which had been created in August of 2007, listed three user 
names; none of these matched the Skype screen name "live: 
boullett_1" that had been used to upload the image. 
On September 27, 2017, McDonald viewed the digital image 
uploaded to Skype and confirmed that it depicted child 
pornography.  That day, he queried the registry of motor 
vehicles for vehicles and driver's licenses registered at the 
5 
 
 
street address in Tyngsboro.  He found three listed drivers:  
the defendant, his spouse, and their child.  On October 11, 
2017, MacDonald conducted surveillance of the single-family home 
and "was unable to locate any open unprotected wireless networks 
within the vicinity of the residence." 
In addition to the facts involving this investigation, 
MacDonald's affidavit included generalized information about 
possession of child pornography.  He averred that "[t]hose who 
have possessed and/or disseminated child pornography have an 
interest or preference in the sexual activity of children" and 
are "likely to keep secreted, but readily at hand, sexually 
explicit visual images depicting children. . . . These 
depictions tend to be extremely important to such individuals 
and are likely to remain in the possession of or under control 
of such an individual for extensive time periods." 
He further averred that, in the event an individual with an 
interest in child pornography were to delete a file, it could be 
possible to recover that evidence from the computer's hard drive 
or temporary storage "months or years" after it had been 
deleted.  The ability to recover deleted files depends upon many 
factors, including whether temporary files have been overwritten 
by new data; whether the hard drive has been damaged; and 
whether the computer user effectively encrypted the data. 
6 
 
 
The search warrant was issued, and police executed the 
warrant on October 19, 2017.  The search yielded a laptop 
computer and a flash drive, both owned by the defendant, which 
contained images of child pornography. 
b.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
charging the defendant with two counts of possession of child 
pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  The defendant 
moved to suppress the evidence seized from the laptop computer 
and the flash drive on the ground that the affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause to search his home because it was based 
on stale information.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion.  
The judge endorsed the motion as follows:  "[A]fter hearing this 
motion is denied because an uploader on this online platform is 
in a different position than a downloader or uploader on 
platforms like icloud or Dropbox, March to October is less than 
ideal but is a tolerable amount of delay and digital files are 
often kept on computers for years.  Also, the appellate case[s] 
point toward this result." 
On November 13, 2018, with the Commonwealth's assent (and 
with the judge's acceptance), the defendant tendered a 
conditional guilty plea to both counts of possession of child 
pornography.  He then filed a notice of appeal, and we allowed 
his motion for direct appellate review. 
7 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  Under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, a search warrant may issue upon a showing of probable 
cause.  Commonwealth v. Anthony, 451 Mass. 59, 68 (2008).  "For 
probable cause to arise, the facts contained in an affidavit, 
plus the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, 
must allow the magistrate to determine that the items sought 
are related to the criminal activity under investigation, and 
that they reasonably may be expected to be located in the 
place to be searched at the time the search warrant issues" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
476 Mass. 410, 415 (2017).  See Commonwealth v. Long, 482 Mass. 
804, 809 (2019) (probable cause means substantial basis to 
believe evidence of criminal activity may reasonably be expected 
to be located in place searched "at the time the search warrant 
issues" [citation omitted]).  "Facts asserted in the affidavit 
must be closely related in time to the issuance of the warrant 
in order to justify a finding of probable cause . . . ." 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 814 (2009). 
"Whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause is 
a question of law that we review de novo" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 866 
(2019).  Review of a probable cause determination is limited to 
the four corners of the warrant affidavit and any attachments 
8 
 
 
thereto.  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017).  In 
determining whether probable cause exists, "we deal with 
probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men [and women], not legal technicians, 
act."  Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 174 (1982), quoting 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).  Thus, we 
view consider the statements in the warrant affidavit in a 
"commonsense manner," Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 299 
n.4 (2003), and consider the warrant affidavit "as a whole, 
without overly parsing or severing it, or subjecting it to 
hypercritical analysis" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Perkins, supra. 
In addition, we are mindful that the probable cause inquiry 
is "not a high bar" (citation omitted), District of Columbia v. 
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018), and that probable cause "does 
not require definitive proof of criminal activity," Anthony, 451 
Mass. at 69.  "And officers need not 'rule out a suspect's 
innocent explanation for suspicious facts' to obtain a warrant" 
(citation omitted).  United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 
194, 205 (W.D.N.C. 2019). 
The defendant does not dispute that the image viewed by 
police constituted child pornography or that it was uploaded 
from a computer at his house on the date alleged.  Moreover, the 
9 
 
 
defendant does not contest that the statements in the warrant 
affidavit would be sufficient to establish probable cause that 
the image was uploaded from his computer to the Skype service.  
Nor does he claim that someone else accessed his computer and 
uploaded the image.  Thus, the primary issue we must address is 
whether the passage of seven months between the alleged upload 
and the application for a search warrant rendered the warrant so 
stale that it lacked probable cause. 
The defendant argues that the upload of a single image of 
child pornography is not enough, standing alone, to justify 
issuing a warrant to search his computer seven months later.  He 
contends that there was nothing in the search warrant affidavit 
to suggest that the individual who uploaded the image was a 
collector of child pornography, such that the image would be 
likely to be retained on the laptop rather than being deleted at 
some point over a fairly lengthy period of time.  The 
Commonwealth responds that, to the contrary, because the target 
of the search warrant deliberately uploaded an image of child 
pornography to Skype, a service which is designed for online 
conversations, chats, and sharing of files, there was probable 
cause to believe that the individual who uploaded the image "was 
interested in [child pornography] enough to retain the uploaded 
file."  While the delay of seven months may be at the outer 
limit in these circumstances, we conclude, as did the motion 
10 
 
 
judge, that the information in the warrant affidavit was not 
stale when the warrant was filed. 
Because of the highly fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, 
it is not possible to formulate a bright-line test for 
staleness.  See Commonwealth v. Atchue, 393 Mass. 343, 349 
(1984), quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 211 (1932) 
(timeliness of facts is "determined by the circumstances of each 
case").  See also Connolly, 454 Mass. at 814, citing 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 843 (2000).  We typically 
measure the timeliness of information supporting a search 
warrant by considering two factors: (1) the nature of the 
criminal activity under investigation; and (2) the nature of the 
item to be seized.  Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787, 792-
793 (2004); Cruz, supra. 
As to the nature of the criminal activity under 
investigation, with crimes such as possession of narcotics, 
which are "readily consumed or distributed, . . . probable cause 
to search for them rapidly dwindles with the passage of time," 
and an affidavit concerning a tip about a single drug 
transaction that took place several months earlier would not 
serve to establish probable cause (quotations and citation 
omitted).  See Matias, 440 Mass. at 792-793.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Reddington, 395 Mass. 315, 322-323 (1985).  
Where an affidavit contains information indicating ongoing or 
11 
 
 
protracted criminal activity, however, the question is 
different, and "time is of less significance" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Vynorius, 369 Mass. 17, 25 (1975).  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 422 Mass. 198, 205 (1996) 
(affiant observed series of drug transactions at suspect's 
apartment, including transaction one and one-half weeks before 
seeking warrant, and individual who said he had purchased drugs 
from suspect the previous day was arrested on day before warrant 
affidavit was filed containing that information); Connolly, 454 
Mass. at 817 (information was not stale where defendant was said 
to engage in repeated drug sales); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. 504, 510-511 (2019) (affidavit provided 
"powerful" evidence of ongoing theft ring). 
With respect to the second factor, the nature of the item 
to be seized, the inquiry is related and also proceeds along two 
distinct lines.  Information concerning an item that is 
perishable, readily disposable, or transferrable might not 
establish probable cause even a few days later.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Wade, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651-652 (2005) 
(information from confidential informant that he had been 
purchasing cocaine from suspect who was sitting in his vehicle, 
and last had done so five days previously, did not establish 
probable cause that drugs would still be in vehicle five days 
later); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 669 
12 
 
 
(2000) (information about single instance of possession three 
days before issuance of warrant, without more, might not have 
established probable cause). 
On the other hand, an item that is durable, of enduring use 
to its holder, and not inherently incriminating might reasonably 
be found in the same location several weeks later.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 346-347 (2013); Matias, 
440 Mass. at 792-793; Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 703, 716 
(1985).  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Beliard, 443 Mass. 79, 84-85 
(2004) (six week old information concerning firearm was not 
stale where "there was no evidence that the weapons sought by 
the warrant had been used in any other crime, or that the 
defendant . . . knew that the weapons had been identified to the 
police thereby stripping them of their continued utility"); 
Commonwealth v. Blye, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 817, 818 (1977) 
(seemingly innocuous stolen household goods were likely to be 
retained for longer periods of time).3 
                     
 
3 Of course, that an object is durable and useful alone is 
not sufficient to infer that information in the warrant is not 
stale.  This, again, is a context-specific inquiry dependent on 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hart, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 165, 168 (2019) 
(confidential informant's tip that, sixty days before 
application for warrant, defendant had kept semiautomatic weapon 
on floor in bedroom, without more, was stale, even though 
firearms are durable and "not likely to be consumed or 
destroyed" [citation omitted]).  Contrast Commonwealth v. James, 
424 Mass. 770, 778-779 (1997) (affidavit indicating knives had 
been used in recent crimes and routinely were carried by 
13 
 
 
In addition, the timeliness of the information in a search 
warrant depends on the ability of the police to examine an item 
and to detect relevant evidence of the commission of a crime at 
a prior time.  Something that is inherently incriminating, in 
some circumstances, might establish probable cause well after 
the commission of the crime.  See United States v. Contreras, 
905 F.3d 853, 858-859 (5th Cir. 2018) (discussing forensic 
computer analysis of deleted child pornography files).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 484 Mass. 650, 652 (2020) (twelve years 
after murder police recovered evidence of blood stains on floor 
boards); Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 235-236 (2017) 
(police searched defendant's computer one year after spouse's 
death and recovered search queries "antifreeze death human" and 
"poison recipe"). 
To our knowledge, no reported Massachusetts appellate 
decisions have addressed the issue of staleness in the context 
of a search for evidence of child pornography.  Courts in other 
jurisdictions, however, have observed that "the determination of 
staleness in investigations involving child pornography is 
unique" (citation omitted).  United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 
105, 114 (2nd Cir. 2015).  This observation is based on the 
                     
particular suspects was not stale eighteen days after crimes 
took place, where knives were to be expected to be kept at home 
and were not inherently incriminating). 
14 
 
 
belief that individuals who are interested in child pornography 
are likely to collect and retain such images in the privacy of 
their own homes.  See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 125 
(2d Cir. 2006) (because "images of child pornography are likely 
to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the 
privacy of their homes," evidence that such persons possessed 
child pornography in past supports reasonable inference that 
they retain those images -- or have obtained new ones -- in 
present [citation omitted]).  See also United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 528 (3d Cir. 2010) (collectors of child 
pornography are unlikely quickly to discard images of child 
pornography because of difficulty and risk involved in obtaining 
them); United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 
2009) (possession of child pornography is not typically "a 
fleeting crime"); United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 
F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008) (customers of child pornography 
sites do not quickly dispose of their cache).  Accordingly, the 
same time limitations that have been applied to "more fleeting 
crimes do not control the staleness inquiry for child 
pornography" (citation omitted).  Frechette, supra. 
This does not mean that a person accused of possessing or 
disseminating child pornography is, in effect, precluded from 
challenging a search warrant on the grounds of staleness because 
of a de facto presumption.  Nor does it suggest that the 
15 
 
 
government is not bound by the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 when seeking evidence related to 
allegations of possession of child pornography.  Every 
investigation, including the possession and distribution of 
child pornography, has a shelf life.  See Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 
529 ("We do not hold, of course, that information concerning 
child pornography crimes can never grow stale").  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of the few 
appellate courts to have examined the question of the collector 
inference in search warrants seeking evidence of child 
pornography, and to have developed a more nuanced analysis.  The 
court has explained, "Crucially, however, the value of that 
inference [that an individual who is interested in child 
pornography will retain images of child pornography for lengthy 
periods of time] in any given case depends on the preliminary 
finding that the suspect is a person 'interested in' images of 
child pornography."  Raymonda, 780 F.3d at 114.  See United 
States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (generalized 
allegations about propensity of collectors of child pornography 
to hoard images is relevant to probable cause determination only 
if there is indication in affidavit that suspect was inclined to 
do so); United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 
2005) (alleged child pornographer's proclivities are relevant 
only if there is probable cause to believe that suspect is 
16 
 
 
collector of child pornography).  We are persuaded that this 
distinction is critical and adopt this important qualification 
on the inferences that can be drawn in cases involving child 
pornography with respect to the length of time that an image 
containing child pornography is likely to be retained in an 
individual's computer or other electronic device. 
We therefore must consider what constitutes evidence of an 
"interest in" child pornography sufficient to trigger an 
inference that the target of a search warrant is a collector and 
likely to retain such images, adequate to establish that a 
search warrant affidavit is not stale.  As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed, there are 
several factors that could support a reasonable inference that a 
suspect is a collector of child pornography:  an admission or 
other evidence identifying the individual as a pedophile; paid 
subscriptions to child pornography sites or participation in 
peer to peer file sharing; and a past history of possessing or 
receiving child pornography.  Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 at 114-115, 
and cases cited.  In addition, in some circumstances, a 
reasonable inference that a suspect is "interested in" child 
pornography might be drawn based on a single incident of 
possession or receipt of child pornography where, for example, 
the images were obtained through "a series of sufficiently 
complicated steps" suggesting a "willful intention to view the 
17 
 
 
files," or where the suspect redistributed the file to others.  
See id. at 115. 
Thus, an inference that an individual is a collector of 
child pornography "proceed[s] from circumstances suggesting that 
[the suspect] accessed those images willfully and deliberately, 
actively seeking them out to satisfy a preexisting 
predilection."  Id.  Importantly, it excludes circumstances, 
even involving multiple images, where "the suspect's brush with 
child pornography was a purely negligent or inadvertent 
encounter, the residue of which was long ago expunged."  Id.  In 
Raymonda, for example, the search warrant affidavit alleged 
that, nine months earlier, a computer user at a specified IP 
address associated with the defendant's home accessed seventy-
six thumbnail images of child pornography over a period of 
seventeen seconds.  Id. at 117 & n.4, 120.   The user did not 
download the images, or even click on the thumbnails to open 
them and view full-sized images.  Id. at 117.   The court 
concluded that there was not probable cause the images would 
still be on the computer because "[i]t was necessary to show 
that [the suspect] accessed [child pornography] in circumstances 
sufficiently deliberate or willful to suggest that he was an 
intentional 'collector' of child pornography, likely to hoard 
those images -- or acquire new ones -- long after any automatic 
traces of that initial incident had cleared."  Id.  See Falso, 
18 
 
 
544 F.3d at 121 (no probable cause where affidavit was 
inconclusive as to whether suspect actually gained access to 
child pornography website and there was no indication that he 
viewed or downloaded images). 
Here, the defendant contends that the affidavit did not 
establish any "propensity-raising circumstances" so as to 
trigger an inference that he would have stored images of child 
pornography in his computer for seven months.  As the defendant 
asserts, the affidavit does not allege that the defendant is an 
admitted or known pedophile, paid for access to child 
pornography, had a history of possessing or receiving 
pornographic images, or used sufficiently complicated steps to 
access the image in question.  Nonetheless, we do not agree with 
the defendant's contention that there was no information in the 
affidavit suggesting that the person who uploaded the image 
redistributed that file to another person.4  To the contrary, the 
affidavit alleged that the computer user, who had a Skype 
account and used the screen name "live: boullett_1," uploaded an 
                     
4 The defendant also argues that the affidavit "offered no 
information or evidence from which the magistrate could have 
inferred that the particular computer or device from which the 
photograph was uploaded still existed."  As more time passes 
between the upload and the search, he argues, it becomes more 
likely that the computer was replaced with a newer model.  
While, as time goes on, it is indeed more likely that a computer 
or other electronic device will have been replaced, seven months 
is not outside the realm of probability. 
 
19 
 
 
image of child pornography to an Internet chat, talk, and file-
share service.  As the motion judge noted, the use of Skype, a 
service that is designed for communication and file sharing, was 
significant, and is substantively different from, potentially 
inadvertently, storing (technically, "uploading")5 a file to a 
cloud storage service such as "iCloud" or "Dropbox." 
Given the facts as asserted in the warrant affidavit, which 
would have required multiple, intentional steps to place the 
image in a file-sharing service, it would have been unlikely 
that the suspect negligently or inadvertently stumbled upon the 
                     
 
5 The key to the distinction lies in the degree of 
intentionality demonstrated by the user, which may depend on the 
software used.  For certain software, as here, the inference 
that an upload implies intentional possession may be warranted.  
See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2010).  
The advent of cloud computing, however, cautions against 
applying this inference blindly.  See Riley v. California, 573 
U.S. 373, 397 (2014) ("Cell phone users often may not know 
whether particular information is stored on the device or in the 
cloud").  A computer user who, intentionally or inadvertently, 
places a file in a cloud storage service may have intentionally 
acquired that file and stored it on his or her computer, or may 
have inadvertently saved it to cloud storage through browsing an 
innocuous webpage.  See United States v. Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319, 
346 (4th Cir. 2019) (Wynn, J., dissenting).  "Cloud" services 
often automatically back up data with no intentional action by 
the user.  See Comment, Child Pornography Statutes and the 
Cloud:  Updating Judicial Interpretations for New Technologies, 
57 Hous. L. Rev. 727, 748 (2020) ("If a device uploads or backs 
up visual depictions by default, it is not clear that the user 
'knowingly' transported the visual depictions").  See also 
Williams vs. Apple, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 19-CV-04700, slip 
op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (quoting Apple terms of 
service:  "When iCloud is enabled, your content will be 
automatically sent to and stored by Apple").  See, generally, 
Svenson, Backup in the Modern Law Firm, 94 Mich. B.J. 54 (2015). 
20 
 
 
image and, "horrified by what he saw," promptly closed the 
window and deleted it.  Contrast Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 at 117.  
Therefore, on the facts asserted in the warrant affidavit here, 
it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer that the computer 
user "live: boullett_1" possessed a digital image of child 
pornography, intentionally accessed this image, and distributed 
it to another person by uploading the file to Skype.  Compare 
People v. Donath, 357 Ill. App. 3d 57, 67 (2005) ("Uploading is 
sending something from your computer 'up' to someone else's 
computer. . . . Because the defendant uploaded and distributed 
the images, it is reasonable to infer that defendant possessed 
[child pornography] somewhere in his home, either on his 
computer or some electronic media storage device").  See also 
United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1045 & n.2 (9th Cir. 
2013) (act of uploading child pornography to file-sharing 
network, distinguished from "onetime accidental download or 
inadvertent receipt" of image, connected defendant to profile of 
collector of child pornography); United States v. Bynum, 604 
F.3d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2010) (probable cause to search existed 
based on allegation individual uploaded suspected child 
pornography to Internet).6 
                     
 
6 The defendant based his argument in this court on Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14 grounds.  As the defendant points out, in 
general, art. 14 provides "more substantive protection to 
criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the 
21 
 
 
 
The defendant's primary argument before the motion judge 
was that suppression was required based on the reasoning of the 
United States Court of Appeals in Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 at 114-
117.  Because the defendant did not raise the propensity issue 
before the motion judge, the argument is waived.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 309 (2017).  "We nonetheless 
review to determine whether there was a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Id. 309-310.  For the reasons 
discussed, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's 
conclusion that the information supporting the search warrant 
was not stale, and established probable cause to search the 
defendant's laptop and electronic storages devices for evidence 
of child pornography on the date that the warrant was issued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  suppress affirmed. 
                     
determination of probable cause."  Commonwealth. v. Upton, 394 
Mass. 363, 373 (1985).  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 
91, 98-99 (2018), and cases cited.  We have not, however, been 
called upon to extend additional protections under art. 14, 
beyond those provided by the Fourth Amendment, to the staleness 
inquiry in a case involving child pornography, and we discern no 
reason to address the issue in this case, where the defendant 
raises it for the first time on appeal.