Title: RONALD H. HARSHA AND SHARON A. HARSHA v. MARCELLA ANASTOS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RONALD H. HARSHA AND SHARON A. HARSHA v. MARCELLA ANASTOS1985 WY 2693 P.2d 760Case Number: 84-38Decided: 01/07/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
RONALD H. HARSHA AND 
SHARON A. HARSHA, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

MARCELLA ANASTOS, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Patricia Schick 
of Patricia Schick & Associate, Laramie, for appellants.

William J. 
Flynn, Green River, for appellee. 

Before 
THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal concerns 
the application of the "clean hands" rule to proceedings to quiet title to 
certain real property claimed by appellants under the doctrine of adverse 
possession. The district court refused to enforce appellants' interest in the 
property on the ground that their "unfair acts" precluded equitable relief. 
Accordingly, the court restored possession of the disputed property to appellee, 
the title holder of record.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     Appellee Marcella 
Anastos and appellants Ronald and Sharon Harsha reside on adjoining tracts of 
land in Green River, 
Wyoming, with the Harsha property 
lying to the east of the Anastos property. The parties are the record title 
holders of their respective lots. Their dispute concerns the ownership of a 
strip of land located on the Harshas' side of a boundary fence between the two 
lots.

[¶4.]     Mr. Harsha's interest 
in his lot dates from 1944 when his father purchased the property for a family 
home. The Anastos family acquired their lot in 1928 and appellee became the 
record owner in 1962. Since at least 1944, a barrier has existed between the two 
lots, with the parcel of land at issue in the possession of the Harsha family. 
The Anastos family did not challenge the Harshas' use of the land until the 
1970's.

[¶5.]     In 1976 appellee's son, 
John Anastos, attempted to obtain a permit from the city to build a trailer 
court on property south of his mother's lot. He had difficulty obtaining the 
permit, apparently because of the confused state of the property lines in the 
neighborhood. In response to this problem, Mr. Anastos had the lots in the area 
surveyed and called a meeting of the affected property owners. Mr. Harsha and 
appellee attended the meeting. The boundaries of the lots were staked and the 
owners agreed to move their fences so as to conform to the proper boundary 
lines. Mr. Harsha agreed to move the fence separating his land from appellee's, 
when his neighbor on his eastern border, Walter Trujillo, adjusted his fence 
line to the east.

[¶6.]     In Trujillo's presence, Mr. 
Harsha identified a surveyor's stake which marked the boundary between the 
Anastos and Harsha properties. Harsha informed Trujillo that, in the event John Anastos required the 
alignment of the fence with the boundary line, Trujillo would have to surrender ten feet of 
land to the Harshas. Trujillo agreed to this proposal after 
measuring his property and determining that his fence encroached upon the 
Harshas' lot.

[¶7.]     Subsequently, Trujillo moved his fence 
and a trailer, surrendering, without compensation, approximately ten feet of 
land on his western boundary to appellants. Appellants used this additional 
property as their own, but refused to relinquish a similar parcel of land on 
their western boundary to appellee.

[¶8.]     Appellee brought this 
action to quiet title to the disputed strip of land against the Harshas and all 
other persons. The Harshas counterclaimed for a decree adjudging their title 
superior to that of Anastos, based on adverse possession of the property for the 
statutory period.

[¶9.]     Following a trial to 
the court, the judge entered an order restoring possession of the disputed land 
to Anastos and granting her motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence so 
as to reflect a claim for ejectment. According to his opinion letter, the trial 
judge denied appellants relief, notwithstanding their proof concerning adverse 
possession, on the principle that "`he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands,'" (27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity § 136, p. 666):

"* * * [Appellants] 
obtained legal ownership of one strip of land adjoining theirs from Trujillo by 
Ron Harsha's representations to him, and seek ownership through the application 
of equitable principles of another tract of land adjoining theirs from Anastos. 
I submit they came into this Court with unclean hands, seeking equity and giving 
none, and this they will not be permitted to do."

On appeal to 
this court, appellants assert that neither the facts nor principles of equity 
support the trial court's application of the "clean hands" doctrine to deny 
their claim to the adversely possessed land.

THE "CLEAN HANDS" 
DOCTRINE

[¶10.]  For a time, well in excess of the 
ten-year statutory period of limitations, § 1-3-103, W.S. 1977,1 appellants occupied the land to the 
fence line openly, notoriously, exclusively, continuously, in a hostile manner, 
and under a claim of right. We have held that possession of this quality and 
duration demonstrates the possessor's right to good title to the property under 
the doctrine of adverse possession. Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 
Wyo., 623 P.2d 1196 (1981); City of Rock 
Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908 (1929). We have also 
held, however, that an action to quiet title is equitable in nature, Norris v. United Mineral Products Co., 
61 Wyo. 386, 158 P.2d 679 (1945), and equitable remedies, including the 
declaration of interests in real property, depend upon a showing by the claimant 
of clean hands. Wantulok v. Wantulok, 
67 Wyo. 22, 
214 P.2d 477, 21 A.L.R.2d 572, reh. denied 223 P.2d 1030 (1950); Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting 
Co., 58 Wyo. 330, 131 P.2d 339 (1942); Dutch Maid Bakeries, Inc. v. Schleicher, 
58 Wyo. 
374, 131 P.2d 630 (1942).

[¶11.]  In Dutch Maid Bakeries, Inc. v. Schleicher, 
supra, this court considered the circumstances surrounding the parties' 
execution of and performance under a contract to refrain from competition. We 
refused to enforce the otherwise valid agreement, concluding that the evidence 
established plaintiff's unclean hands:

"Equity will not assist a 
party seeking to enforce a hard bargain. The right to specific performance 
depends upon circumstances and conditions in addition to the existence of a 
valid contract. The contract must be perfectly fair in all its parts, and free 
from misrepresentation or misapprehension. Specific performance will be refused 
when it appears that the plaintiff's conduct in obtaining the contract, or in 
acting under it, has been unjust and unfair. Though the contract be free from 
fraud, mistake or other feature that would authorize a court to set it aside, 
equitable relief may be denied if plaintiff obtained it by taking undue 
advantage of his position, or if in acting under it he has resorted to unfair 
conduct. These are expressions commonly used in elaboration of the maxim: `He 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.' See Pomeroy on Specific 
Performance, 3d Ed., §§ 38, 40; on Equity Jurisprudence, § 400." 131 P.2d  at 
634.

Similarly, the 
trial court in the instant case concluded that appellants' conduct and the 
circumstances surrounding neighborhood efforts to correct property lines 
precluded appellants from establishing good title in equity, notwithstanding 
their satisfaction of the elements of adverse possession. The Harshas joined 
their neighbors in agreeing to adjust their fence lines to conform to the proper 
boundaries of the lots. Walter Trujillo moved his fence, thereby enlarging 
appellants' lot. Appellants used and enjoyed that additional land, while 
continuing to assert their right to a similar strip of property adversely 
possessed. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that appellants 
acted inequitably toward their neighbors, including appellee. We will not 
disturb on appeal this factual finding of the trial court which is supported by 
the evidence. Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. 
Stadler, Wyo., 685 P.2d 13, 19 (1984). Since appellants failed to 
demonstrate the equities which entitled them to prevail in this quiet title 
action, the district court properly restored the disputed property to appellee, 
the record title holder. See Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting 
Co., supra, 131 P.2d  at 356.

[¶12.]  Appellants contend that by awarding the 
disputed land to appellee, the trial court enforced Mr. Harsha's 1976 oral 
agreement to return land which he had acquired under the doctrine of adverse 
possession. Such relief would be improper, appellants point out, since oral 
agreements to convey real property are unenforceable under Wyoming's statute of 
frauds.2

[¶13.]  Neither the trial court, nor this court 
through affirmance, has resolved this action by enforcing an oral contract to 
convey real property. Rather, the district court refused to quiet title in appellants, 
since they failed to demonstrate the equities which entitled them to such 
relief. The "clean hands" doctrine effectively frustrated appellants' efforts to 
enforce their interests acquired through adverse possession, and possession of 
the property was restored to the title holder of record.

[¶14.]  Appellants also advance the argument that 
Anastos failed to carry her burden of proof in her action for ejectment3 since no expert testimony nor 
appropriate description established the boundaries of the disputed property. 
However, Anastos established that she is the record title holder of Lot 4, Block 32, of the original town plat, and entitled 
to possession of the land described by such lot. Appellants concede that their 
fence encloses a strip of land, approximately ten feet wide, included within 
appellee's lot description. Under the facts of this case, appellee carried her 
burden of proof for an action in ejectment.

[¶15.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

1 Section 1-3-103, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"An action for the 
recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments can 
only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of such action 
accrues."

2 The statute of frauds, § 
1-23-105, W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp., provides in part:

"(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Every agreement or 
contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one 
(1) year * * *."

3 Section 1-32-202, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"In an action to recover 
real property it is sufficient if the plaintiff's petition states that he has a 
legal estate in and is entitled to possession of the real property, describing 
the same with sufficient certainty as to enable an officer holding an execution 
to identify it, and that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of possession. 
It is not necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is 
derived."