Title: Commonwealth v. Escobar

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13321 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RIGOBERTO ESCOBAR. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 7, 2023. - March 20, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver, 
Arraignment, Mistrial, Instructions to jury, Capital case.  
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional 
rights.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Expert opinion, Fingerprints, 
Firearm.  Witness, Expert.  Waiver.  Firearms.  License. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 14, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kathe 
M. Tuttman, J., and the cases were tried before Elizabeth M. 
Fahey, J. 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
Chia Chi Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A jury found the defendant, Rigoberto Escobar, 
guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
2 
 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty for the shooting 
death of Magno Sosa (victim).  In the early morning hours of 
January 17, 2015, after drinking together, the men got into a 
heated argument that escalated into a fist fight.  After they 
were separated and the victim left the scene, the defendant 
followed the victim to a dead-end street and shot him three 
times, before fleeing and hiding the murder weapon. 
On direct appeal, the defendant advances several arguments. 
He contends that his motion to suppress his confession to the 
police was erroneously denied, either because he was improperly 
Mirandized, because improper behavior by the police coerced him 
to confess involuntarily, or because the police allegedly 
violated his rights to prompt arraignment and telephone use 
after arrest.  Furthermore, he suggests that the trial judge 
erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and erred in 
declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and 
involuntary manslaughter.  Finally, he contends that improper 
testimony by the Commonwealth's experts on fingerprint 
identification and forensic ballistics created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Separately, the 
defendant argues that his convictions of possession of a firearm1 
 
1 The defendant was convicted of illegal possession of a 
firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and illegal 
possession of a loaded firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
 
3 
 
must be vacated under our recent holding in Commonwealth v. 
Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (Guardado I), S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023) 
(Guardado II).   
We conclude that the defendant's motion to suppress was 
properly denied, as was his motion for a mistrial.  We also 
conclude that the trial judge did not err in declining to 
provide a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  The 
trial judge did err, however, in declining to instruct the jury 
on voluntary manslaughter.  Nonetheless, in view of the jury 
instructions as a whole, the jury's decision to convict him of 
murder in the first degree and not murder in the second degree, 
and the paucity of evidence supporting a finding of voluntary 
manslaughter, the defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous 
decision not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.  
Lastly, even assuming that testimony by the Commonwealth's 
experts was improper, the improper testimony did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because, 
separate and apart from the expert testimony, the Commonwealth 
presented overwhelming evidence tying the defendant to the 
firearm and to the crime.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree.  However, 
 
§ 10 (n).  The defendant was also convicted of discharging a 
firearm near a dwelling in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 12E, but 
that conviction was placed on file, and the defendant does not 
make any arguments on appeal specific to it.   
4 
 
we vacate the defendant's firearm convictions and remand for a 
new trial to give the Commonwealth the opportunity to meet its 
burden under Guardado II to prove that the defendant was not 
licensed to carry a firearm.  
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the 
jury reasonably could have found them, reserving certain facts 
for our discussion of the legal issues.   
 
At around 9 P.M. on the evening of January 16, 2015, the 
defendant went to the Everett home of his friends Johnny Pineda 
and Oscar Interiano.  The three men drank together, and at 
around 11:45 P.M., they drove in Pineda's truck to a local 
restaurant.  At the restaurant, they met the victim, a Nantucket 
resident who was visiting friends in Everett.  All four remained 
at the restaurant, socializing and drinking, until 1 A.M. on 
January 17, when the restaurant closed.  Pineda drove the four 
men back to his house, stopping at the defendant's house on the 
way, where the defendant briefly went inside and retrieved a .40 
caliber pistol he owned.    
Shortly after returning to Interiano and Pineda's house, 
the defendant, the victim, and Interiano began arguing.2  As the 
 
2 Evidence at trial suggested that the defendant and the 
victim were arguing about a video recording they had watched, 
but contradictory evidence was introduced regarding the contents 
of the recording.  In his statement to police the day after the 
murder, which was recorded and played for the jury, the 
 
5 
 
argument escalated, Pineda told the three men that if they had 
any problems with each other, they should take it outside.   
 
Once outside, the argument turned physical, with the 
defendant and the victim pushing each other and throwing punches 
at one another.  Interiano attempted to separate the victim and 
the defendant, but he also pushed and punched the victim.  At 
one point, the victim fell to the ground, and the defendant and 
Interiano kicked him.  After a few minutes of fighting, 
Interiano succeeded in separating the defendant and the victim, 
and the victim left the scene.  The defendant told Interiano to 
go inside and open the back door, and that he would meet 
Interiano there.  Interiano went inside, but the defendant 
followed the victim down the road to Elmwood Street, a dead-end 
road roughly 200 feet away.  The defendant then shot the victim 
at close range, within one or two feet, through the right eye.  
The victim fell, and the defendant shot the victim twice more 
through the back of the head.   
 
The defendant fled the scene, running between houses and 
jumping over a fence to return to Interiano and Pineda's house.  
Interiano opened the back door and let him in.  Interiano asked 
 
defendant stated that the argument had started over a video 
recording of a football match.  In his testimony at trial, the 
defendant instead stated that the video recording showed Pineda 
being arrested.  Police searched the victim's cell phone and 
found only a short video recording of animated Christmas lights. 
6 
 
what had happened, and the defendant replied that the man he had 
had a problem with would not be able to talk.  The defendant 
showed Interiano the firearm and asked to hide it at the house.  
Interiano replied that he could hide it anywhere but his 
bedroom, so the men wrapped the firearm in a shirt and hid it in 
a rolled-up carpet in the basement.  Hearing police sirens 
outside, the defendant told Interiano he would sleep on the 
couch in the living room, but when Interiano woke up at 6:30 
A.M., the defendant was gone.   
 
The defendant testified at trial and denied shooting the 
victim.  He stated that he had retrieved the firearm from his 
home because Pineda and Interiano had expressed interest in 
purchasing it and that he hid the firearm in the basement as 
soon as they arrived at Interiano and Pineda's house.  He 
acknowledged fighting the victim outside but maintained that 
after the fist fight he went home and went to sleep.   
 
b.  The defendant's interrogation.  We recite the facts as 
found by the motion judge when considering the defendant's 
motion to suppress.  See Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 
299-300 (2020). 
Shortly before 9:30 P.M. on January 17, 2015, a group of 
State police detectives and Everett police officers went to the 
defendant's home.  Officer Nancy Butler, an Everett police 
officer and native Spanish speaker, accompanied the officers to 
7 
 
ensure the defendant understood what was said to him.  The 
officers entered the defendant's bedroom with their weapons 
drawn.  They awakened the defendant, who had been asleep, and 
holstered their weapons.  Butler informed the defendant that the 
officers wished to speak with him and requested that he 
accompany them to the Everett police station, but that he was 
not required to do so.  The defendant agreed to accompany the 
officers and was transported to the Everett police station.  
 
At the police station, the defendant waited for over three 
hours, and then was brought to an interrogation room at around 
12:55 A.M.  Butler read the defendant the Miranda warnings in 
Spanish from a booking form and asked the defendant if he 
understood his rights.  The defendant replied, "Yes."  Butler 
asked the defendant to read the Spanish form that she had read 
to him.  The defendant reviewed the forms for a few minutes and 
stated that he had read the form.  Both the defendant and Butler 
signed the form.    
 
State police Trooper Michael Cashman and Everett police 
Detective Daniel Tucker proceeded to interview the defendant, 
with Butler translating.  At the beginning of the interview, the 
officers did not inform the defendant that he was a suspect or 
tell him why he was being interviewed.  After about twenty 
minutes, however, the officers told the defendant they knew what 
had happened, that he had to tell them the truth, and that he 
8 
 
would only have one chance to tell what happened.  The defendant 
acknowledged that he had had an argument with the victim that 
had escalated to a fight, but he denied that anything more 
serious had occurred.  The officers told the defendant that they 
knew he was lying, and that they could not help him unless he 
told the truth.  They also told him that they had recovered 
security camera footage that proved he was lying, and that they 
would recover "microscopic" evidence from his apartment that 
would prove he was lying.  
 
The defendant reiterated that he had gotten into a fist 
fight with the victim for about five minutes but denied that the 
victim had been injured, stating that the victim was standing 
when the defendant walked home after the fight.  The officers 
then told the defendant that the victim had been killed in the 
same area where the fight took place, and that many people had 
stated that the defendant carried a gun.  The officers also told 
the defendant that they had been told the defendant was involved 
with the 18th Street gang, and that the victim was associated 
with the gang MS-13.  The defendant denied carrying a gun and 
denied having any involvement with gangs.   
 
Later in the interview, the officers informed the defendant 
that they had searched Interiano and Pineda's house and had 
recovered the defendant's firearm.  The defendant changed his 
posture, slumped forward in his chair, and put his head down.  
9 
 
After a few more minutes of questioning, the defendant stated 
that he had been very drunk, that he had been fighting with the 
victim, and that the fight had continued as the defendant and 
the victim went from the house to Elmwood Street.3  He stated 
that they kept fighting and he went crazy, took the gun out, and 
fired several times at the victim at close range.  He stated 
that he did not know how many times he had fired the gun.  He 
also stated he did not know where he had hit the victim but did 
see the victim fall to the ground.  Afterward, he returned to 
Interiano and Pineda's house, where he hid the gun in the 
basement and then went home.  Following the interview, the 
defendant was placed under arrest and booked. 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that he lied during the 
interrogation in order to prevent his friends from getting in 
trouble.  He also stated that he did not understand his Miranda 
rights when they were read to him, and that he generally had 
trouble understanding Butler's Spanish translation during the 
interrogation.    
 
3 The defendant gave conflicting answers as to whether there 
was a break in the fighting between the fist fight at the house 
and the fight that led to the victim's death.  When asked 
originally, the defendant agreed that the victim had left the 
scene of the fight at the house and that the defendant had 
followed him.  Later, the defendant denied having followed the 
victim, stating that they "kept fighting" as they both walked 
from the house to Elmwood Street, where the defendant shot the 
victim. 
10 
 
c.  Procedural history.  The defendant moved to suppress 
his statement to the police.  He argued that he had not been 
properly given Miranda warnings, had not knowingly waived his 
rights, and, in the alternative, had not made the statements 
voluntarily.  He suggested that because the officers 
interviewing him had improperly implied that the interview would 
be his only chance to tell his story, had made assurances to him 
that a confession would assist him, and lied about the evidence 
to which they had access, his statement was the result of police 
coercion.  He also contended that his right to make a telephone 
call under G. L. c. 276, § 33A, was violated because he was not 
informed of his right to make a telephone call until the end of 
the interview.  
Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge 
concluded that the defendant's interview was a custodial 
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), and its progeny.  However, the motion judge also 
found that Butler read the complete Miranda warnings to the 
defendant, and the defendant read the warnings himself, "which 
he was able to do without difficulty. . . .  The Miranda 
warnings were thus properly conveyed to the defendant." The 
motion judge also concluded that the defendant was not 
unlawfully deprived of his telephone rights. 
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of 
11 
 
murder in the first degree, unlawful possession of a firearm, 
and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm.  The defendant 
timely appealed. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant 
advances several arguments as to why his January 18, 2015 
statement to the police should have been suppressed.  We address 
each in turn.   
i.  Miranda warnings.  First, the defendant argues that he 
was not properly given his Miranda warnings and consequently did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda 
rights.  "A defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda rights must 
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."  
Commonwealth v. Delossantos, 492 Mass. 242, 247 (2023).  The 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was valid, and "must 
demonstrate not only what warnings were provided to the 
defendant, but also that the defendant understood such 
warnings."  Id., citing Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 Mass. 
179, 186 n.6 (2015).  "In reviewing a judge's determination 
regarding a valid waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, give substantial deference to the judge's ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law, but independently review the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
12 
 
principles to the facts found" (quotation and alterations 
omitted).  Delossantos, supra at 250, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Vao Sok, 435 Mass. 743, 751 (2002). 
In the present case, we see no reason to disturb the motion 
judge's findings of fact or well-reasoned conclusions of law.  
As the motion judge noted, the defendant was read the Miranda 
warnings in Spanish by a native Spanish speaker, and he verbally 
confirmed that he understood the warnings.4  He then read the 
warnings himself, "which he was able to do without difficulty," 
and signed a statement affirming that he understood his rights.  
Furthermore, it is clear based on the record that the defendant 
waived his rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
The motion judge found: 
"[T]he defendant was sober, alert, focused, and responsive 
to questions.  He felt comfortable asking for clarification 
when he did not understand a particular question.  After 
receiving the warnings, the defendant demonstrated with 
words and with behavior that he heard, read, and understood 
them . . . and that he agreed to speak with officers." 
 
Accordingly, we conclude, as the motion judge did, that the 
defendant was properly given his Miranda warnings and made a 
 
4 The transcript of the defendant's interview with police 
suggests that Butler mispronounced two Spanish words, 
"contestar" and "guardar," as "contester" and "guarder," 
respectively.  Despite the defendant's contention on appeal that 
these minor mispronunciations caused him not to understand the 
Miranda warnings, we note that during the interview the 
defendant stated that he understood the warnings as read to him, 
and subsequently he had the opportunity to read the warnings in 
Spanish, which provided the correct terms. 
13 
 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights.  See Delossantos, 492 Mass. at 250. 
 
ii.  Police misconduct and voluntariness.  The defendant 
next contends that improper behavior by the police officers who 
interviewed him on January 18 rendered his statement to the 
police involuntary, thus requiring that the statements be 
suppressed.  Although the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver and 
the voluntariness of a statement to police are distinct 
inquiries, in both cases the issue on appeal is "whether the 
Commonwealth has proved, by a totality of the circumstances, 
that [the defendant] made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 
waiver of his rights, and that his statements were otherwise 
voluntary."  Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 655 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 254-255 (2008).  
Where there is evidence of misconduct by police during an 
interrogation, a defendant's statement will be considered 
involuntary if the misconduct by police resulted in the 
defendant's will being overborne.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 596-597 (2010), S.C., 475 Mass. 657 
(2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896 (2017) (no suppression 
required where "the incriminating statements made by the 
defendant were not tied to or otherwise made in response to the 
pressure tactics employed by the officers"). 
The motion judge found that the officers interviewing the 
14 
 
defendant had acted improperly by making assurances that a 
confession would assist the defendant and by telling him that 
they would find incriminating "microscopic evidence" in his home 
and that the interview was the only chance for him to tell his 
side of the story.  However, the motion judge noted that the 
officers "made only one reference that could be interpreted as 
suggesting that cooperation would result in a lesser sentence," 
that the officers made only a single false representation 
(regarding inculpatory "microscopic evidence" in the defendant's 
home), and that the officers referred to a judge hearing only 
"the other side of the story" on one occasion.  The motion judge 
also found that the defendant continued to deny any involvement 
in the victim's death despite the improper pressure tactics.  
Rather, the defendant only confessed when he was informed that 
the gun used in the attack had been found.  Therefore, the 
motion judge concluded that the defendant's will was not 
overborne by the improper interrogation techniques.  We agree. 
Assurances by police, "express or implied that [a 
confession would] aid the defense or result in a lesser 
sentence" may render a confession to police involuntary and 
require its suppression (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 486 Mass. 646, 661 (2021).  We have also "expressed 
our disapproval of police tactics that employ the use of false 
statements during an interrogation because such tactics cast 
15 
 
doubt on the voluntariness of any subsequent confession or 
admission."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 208 
(2011).  Finally, police may not tell a defendant that if he 
does not speak with them, a judge or jury will never hear his 
side of the story.  See Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 
268-269 (2004), S.C., 449 Mass. 84 (2007) ("plainly untrue" 
statements suggesting "that [the defendant's] right to tell his 
side of the story to a jury was conditioned on his revealing it 
to them during the interview" violated defendant's 
constitutional rights and rendered his confession inadmissible).  
However, there must be a causal link between police misconduct 
and a defendant's statement such that the defendant's will is 
overborne for the statement to be suppressed as involuntary.  
Compare Durand, 457 Mass. at 596-597 (suppression not required 
where "the incriminating statements made by the defendant were 
not tied to or otherwise made in response to the pressure 
tactics employed by the officers"), with Novo, supra at 267-269 
("now or never" theme, which was "repeated incessantly," and 
"persisted up to and through [the defendant's] confession" cast 
substantial doubt on voluntariness of subsequent confession and 
required suppression).   
We conclude, as did the motion judge, that during the 
interview, "the defendant resisted all efforts to pressure him 
to admit his involvement in the shooting, despite repeated and 
16 
 
intense admonitions to cooperate."  Rather, the defendant 
admitted to the shooting only after the officers truthfully told 
him that they had recovered his gun, when he recognized "that 
the evidence against him was overwhelming."  We also note the 
motion judge's finding that "[d]uring the entire interview, the 
defendant remained calm, alert, focused and responsive.  He did 
not appear to be physically uncomfortable, unduly fatigued, or 
in any apparent distress."  Once the defendant was confronted 
with the fact that police had recovered the firearm, however, 
"[he] changed his posture and slumped forward in his chair and 
put his head down" before confessing to shooting the victim.  
This strengthens the conclusion that it was not improper tactics 
by police but tangible evidence of his guilt that convinced the 
defendant to confess to the murder.  Accordingly, although the 
officers may have acted improperly in questioning the defendant, 
these improper tactics did not coerce the defendant into 
confessing, and thus his confession to the police was voluntary.  
See Durand, 457 Mass. at 596-597. 
iii.  Telephone right.  The defendant next argues that his 
statement to police should have been suppressed because he was 
not informed of his right to use a telephone under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 33A.  We review the motion judge's denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress on this ground for clear error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 492 Mass. 498, 509 (2023). 
17 
 
Under G. L. c. 276, § 33A, an arrested person has a right 
to make a telephone call.  If an arrested person's right to make 
a telephone call is intentionally violated, statements made to 
police must be suppressed.  Gallett, 481 Mass. at 672, citing 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 466 Mass. 268, 278 (2013).  However, 
"[a] defendant's rights under [§ 33A] are triggered by . . . 
formal arrest, not by the custodial nature of any prearrest 
interrogation."  Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 155 
(2010), citing Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 374-375 
(2004).   
A formal arrest occurs when there is (1) "an actual or 
constructive seizure or detention of the person," (2) "performed 
with the intention to effect an arrest," and (3) it is "so 
understood by the person detained."  Hampton, 457 Mass. at 158, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 198 (1994), S.C., 
447 Mass. 1023 (2006) and 451 Mass. 1008 (2008).  Whether a 
defendant has been seized depends on whether, given the totality 
of the circumstances, "a reasonable person would have believed 
he was not free to leave."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 458 Mass. 
684, 695 (2011), quoting Cook, supra at 199. 
Here, the motion judge found that the defendant was in 
custody for Miranda purposes during his interview with the 
police.  The judge reasoned that because the defendant was 
awakened by several police officers with their weapons drawn, a 
18 
 
reasonable person in his circumstances would not have felt free 
to decline the officers' request that he come to the police 
station.  Indeed, the defendant waited at the police station for 
over three hours before being brought to the interview room, 
leading the motion judge to conclude that "no person in the 
defendant's circumstances would have remained for such a long 
period of time if he felt free to leave."  The motion judge 
nonetheless concluded that, notwithstanding the custodial nature 
of the police interview, the defendant was not unlawfully 
deprived of his telephone rights because he was not formally 
arrested until he was booked after the interview concluded. 
Police officers testified at the motion to suppress hearing 
that they did not intend to arrest the defendant until he 
admitted to the murder when confronted with the evidence of the 
firearm recovered from Interiano and Pineda's house.  This 
police testimony was implicitly credited by the motion judge, 
who concluded that the police interrogation of the defendant 
preceded his formal arrest.  We discern no error in the motion 
judge's conclusion, particularly where, as discussed infra, 
there is substantial evidence that until the defendant confessed 
to the murder, the police believed they lacked probable cause to 
arrest him.  See Hampton, 457 Mass. at 158 (no arrest 
necessitating telephone rights where police lacked intent to 
arrest defendant until after they obtained incriminating 
19 
 
statement during interview). 
iv.  Prompt arraignment.  The defendant next contends that 
his statements should have been suppressed because they were 
taken in violation of his right to a prompt arraignment.  After 
being arrested, a criminal defendant has the right to be 
arraigned "as soon as is reasonably possible."  Commonwealth v. 
Powell, 468 Mass. 272, 275 (2014), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 
7 (a) (1), as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012).  In 
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), we established 
a bright-line rule governing the admissibility of statements 
made by defendants awaiting arraignment.  Otherwise admissible 
statements made in the six-hour window following arrest will not 
be suppressed on the ground of unreasonable delay in 
arraignment, but "[s]tatements made after the six-hour period 
following arrest are inadmissible."  Powell, supra at 276, 
citing Rosario, supra at 56-57.  The issue of prompt arraignment 
was not raised prior to the instant appeal, and thus we review 
the issue only for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 492 Mass. 301, 305 
(2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 144 
(2022). 
 
The six-hour Rosario safe harbor period begins when a 
defendant is arrested.  Martinez, 458 Mass. at 694, citing 
Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56.  "An arrest occurs where there is [1] 
20 
 
'an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, 
[2] performed with the intention to effect an arrest and [3] so 
understood by the person detained.'"  Martinez, supra at 694-
695, quoting Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 145 
(2001).  Whether a defendant has been seized depends on whether, 
given the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person 
would have believed he was not free to leave."  Martinez, supra 
at 695, quoting Cook, 419 Mass. at 199.  The defendant's 
interview ended at around 6 A.M. on January 18, 2015, so the 
issue is whether the defendant was arrested prior to midnight on 
January 18.  
 
As discussed supra, the motion judge concluded that the 
defendant was in police custody and thus was seized, as 
evidenced by the fact that the defendant was awakened by 
multiple police officers with their weapons drawn, as well as 
the fact that he stayed in the Everett police station for 
several hours before his interrogation began, which suggests 
that a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would 
not have felt free to leave.  
 
As to the second prong, there was evidence presented at the 
motion to suppress hearing that police did not intend to arrest 
the defendant until he confessed to the killing at around 4 A.M.  
Trooper Cashman testified that he did not believe he had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant until the defendant 
21 
 
confessed to shooting the victim.  Cashman also stated that 
prior to the confession, the defendant was free to leave the 
interview.  When the defendant's interview began, police were 
still actively investigating the murder and had not concluded 
that the defendant had killed the victim.  Indeed, police only 
recovered the defendant's firearm at around 3 A.M., in the 
middle of the defendant's interrogation, which supports the 
conclusion that when the defendant's interrogation began at 
12:55 A.M., the police did not intend to arrest him.  Thus, even 
assuming that the defendant was constructively arrested at 4 
A.M., when he confessed to killing the victim and police thus 
understood that they had probable cause to arrest him, the 
defendant's interrogation was concluded prior to the close of 
the six-hour Rosario safe harbor.  Therefore, the admission of 
the defendant's statement to police did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice on this basis.  See 
Martinez, 458 Mass. at 594; Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56. 
b.  Motion for a mistrial.  Next, the defendant contends 
that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial.  Prior to trial, the trial 
judge ruled that there would be no mention of any witness's 
immigration status during the trial without prior approval of 
the court.  Additionally, the defense and the Commonwealth 
agreed to certain redactions from the video recording of the 
22 
 
defendant's police interview before it was shown to the jury.   
On the seventh day of the trial, defense counsel moved for 
a mistrial, or, in the alternative, sanctions against the 
Commonwealth.  The defendant challenged three pieces of evidence 
introduced at trial:  testimony by Everett police Lieutenant 
Scott Stallbaum that Everett has a large population of 
undocumented immigrants; testimony by police Officer Michael 
Lavey referring to the defendant's home as "like a boarding 
house, undocumented wooden house"; and a portion of the 
unredacted police interview videotape inadvertently shown to the 
jury, which included a statement that "many people have told 
[the police] that [the defendant] carries a gun" and the 
question "do you know where Eighteenth Street is?" the latter 
being a reference to the Eighteenth Street gang.  The trial 
judge denied the motion for a mistrial. 
"The decision whether to declare a mistrial is within the 
discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 
Mass. 494, 503 (2006).  Accordingly, we defer to the trial 
judge's decision unless that decision represents a "clear error 
of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  "Where a party 
seeks a mistrial in response to the jury's exposure to 
23 
 
inadmissible evidence, the judge may 'correctly rel[y] on 
curative instructions as an adequate means to correct any error 
and to remedy any prejudice to the defendant.'"  Bryant, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 37-38 (1997).   
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in 
denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial.  At the beginning 
of his direct examination, the prosecutor asked Lieutenant 
Stallbaum to identify the cities and towns that border Everett 
and to provide the approximate population of Everett.  Stallbaum 
replied, "On the census, I think it's thirty-five to forty 
thousand, but we have a large undocumented community, so it's 
probably around fifty thousand."  The Commonwealth argued that 
this line of questioning was appropriate to familiarize the jury 
with the city of Everett.  The prosecutor further stated that 
Stallbaum's statement about the undocumented population of 
Everett was a surprise to the prosecution, and that the 
statement by itself did not imply that the defendant was a 
member of Everett's undocumented population.  Similarly, Lavey's 
testimony describing the defendant's home as an undocumented 
boarding house appears to have been spontaneous testimony by the 
officer in response to an otherwise permissible question by the 
prosecution.  Furthermore, Lavey's answer was objected to by the 
defendant and struck by the judge, and the jury were instructed 
to disregard the answer.  Accordingly, the record does not 
24 
 
suggest that either remark was so inflammatory that the trial 
judge abused her discretion in not declaring a mistrial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 796-797 (2023) (no abuse 
of discretion in denying motion for mistrial where statement was 
surprise to prosecutor, not highlighted, and not repeated during 
remainder of trial).  See also Bryant, 447 Mass. at 503-504 
(discussing cases where spontaneous statements by witnesses did 
not require mistrial).  
Regarding the unredacted videotaped interview, the judge 
found that the Commonwealth showed the unredacted portion of the 
video recording by mistake and turned off the tape when the 
mistake was realized.  The trial judge offered to provide a 
curative instruction to the jury, but this offer was rejected by 
the defense counsel, who reasoned that a curative instruction 
would draw attention to the redacted material.  We thus find no 
abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial.  See Bryant, 447 Mass. at 503 
(curative instructions are adequate means to correct errors and 
to remedy prejudice to defendant from inadmissible evidence 
being presented at trial). 
 
c.  Jury instructions.  The defendant requested that the 
jury hear instructions on both voluntary manslaughter and 
involuntary manslaughter.  On appeal, the defendant contends 
that the trial judge erred by declining to provide these jury 
25 
 
instructions.  We address each proposed jury instruction in 
turn.   
i.  Voluntary manslaughter instruction.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter based on mitigating factors of reasonable 
provocation, sudden combat, and excessive use of force in self-
defense.  Because the defendant preserved the issue,5 we review 
for prejudicial error, "inquir[ing] whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to 
the jury's verdict."  Miranda, 492 Mass. at 306, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Odgren, 483 Mass. 41, 46 (2019).  "Voluntary 
manslaughter is an unlawful killing arising not from malice, but 
from . . . sudden [heat of] passion induced by reasonable 
provocation, sudden combat, or [the use of] excessive force in 
self-defense."  Miranda, supra at 307, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 918 (2020).  "In deciding whether an 
instruction is warranted regarding these mitigating 
circumstances, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant."  Miranda, supra, quoting Richards, 
 
5 Based on the record, it does not appear that the defendant 
specifically objected to the omission of the voluntary 
manslaughter instruction, but we nonetheless consider the issue 
preserved where, as here, "defense counsel requests a specific 
instruction and the judge rejects it, or gives an instruction 
inconsistent with the requested one."  Commonwealth v. Vacher, 
469 Mass. 425, 442-443 (2014).  We also note that the 
Commonwealth agrees that the issue was properly preserved.   
26 
 
supra.   
A.  Reasonable provocation and sudden combat.  An 
instruction on reasonable provocation must be given  
"where the evidence raises 'a reasonable doubt that 
something happened which would have been likely to produce 
in an ordinary person such a state of passion, anger, fear, 
fright, or nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity 
for reflection or restraint, and that what happened 
actually did produce such a state of mind in the 
defendant."  
 
Richards, 485 Mass. at 918, quoting Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482 
Mass. 823, 826 (2019).  Although "physical contact between a 
defendant and a victim is not always sufficient to warrant a 
manslaughter instruction," Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 
724, 727 (1980), "even a single blow[] may amount to reasonable 
provocation," Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 77 (2018).  
Sudden combat is a form of reasonable provocation that we 
have long described as when two people "meet, not intending to 
quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs 
up in which blows are given on both sides, without much regard 
to who is the assailant," and in the course of such combat one 
combatant kills the other with a deadly weapon.  Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 58 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 308 (1850).  Neither a reasonable 
provocation instruction nor a sudden combat instruction is 
necessary if the defendant "cooled off and regained a measure of 
self-control before attacking the victim," or where there is a 
27 
 
break in the fight "and then the defendant seeks out the victim" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Miranda, 492 Mass. at 307. 
In the light most favorable to the defendant, the jury 
heard evidence that the defendant and the victim were arguing as 
they left the house, and that once outside, the argument 
escalated and turned violent, with both men pushing each other, 
throwing punches, and fighting on the ground after both men 
fell.  The jury might also have credited the defendant's 
statement to the police denying that he followed the victim, and 
instead asserting that the two men "kept fighting" as they 
walked from the house to Elmwood Street, and that once on 
Elmwood Street, the defendant "went crazy," pulled out the 
pistol, and fired several times at the victim.  The jury 
therefore could have concluded, if they credited this statement, 
as opposed to others made by the defendant or other witnesses, 
that the defendant killed the victim in the heat of passion 
arising from reasonable provocation or sudden combat.  As a 
result, the judge erred in not instructing the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter.  
Where the defendant requested voluntary manslaughter 
instructions and the judge did not provide them, we must decide 
whether this error was prejudicial.  "An error is not 
prejudicial only if the Commonwealth can show 'with fair 
assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed' 
28 
 
by it."  Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 647 (2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Rosado, 428 Mass. 76, 79 (1998).  In other words, we must decide 
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might 
have contributed to the jury's verdict."  Miranda, 492 Mass. at 
306, quoting Odgren, 483 Mass. at 46.  We conclude, with fair 
assurance, that the defendant was not prejudiced by this error.   
The trial judge instructed the jury on murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, as well as murder in the second degree.  
The jury were instructed that to convict the defendant of murder 
in the first degree with deliberate premeditation, they must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant decided to 
kill the victim after a period of reflection, meaning that the 
defendant considered whether to kill the victim and decided to 
kill him and the killing arose from that decision.  The jury 
were specifically instructed that there is no deliberate 
premeditation where the action is taken so quickly that a 
defendant takes no time to reflect on the action.  As a result, 
if the jury had a reasonable doubt whether the events occurred 
as described by the defendant to the police, which involved a 
protracted fight and the defendant "[going] crazy" before 
shooting the victim, they were required to find the defendant 
not guilty of murder in the first degree with deliberate 
29 
 
premeditation.  Instead, they found the defendant guilty on 
theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity 
or cruelty.  The defense at trial was also that the defendant 
did not shoot the victim, but only fought with him, and that 
someone else did the shooting.  Because of these instructions 
and the paucity of evidentiary support for a finding of 
voluntary manslaughter, see infra, we conclude with fair 
assurance that the defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous 
omission of the voluntary manslaughter instruction.  See Martin, 
484 Mass. at 647-648 (jury instructions and verdict inconsistent 
with jury believing version of events supporting voluntary 
manslaughter, coupled with "feeble evidence" supporting 
manslaughter, made clear defendant was not prejudiced by failure 
to instruct jury on manslaughter).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Felix, 
476 Mass. 750, 758-759 (2017) ("the time required to strangle 
the victim . . . supported a finding of deliberate premeditation 
inconsistent with sudden provocation").    
The tenuous evidence that could support a verdict of 
voluntary manslaughter on theories of reasonable provocation or 
sudden combat contributes to our conclusion that the defendant 
was not prejudiced by the omission of instructions on reasonable 
provocation or sudden combat.  See Martin, 484 Mass. at 647-648.  
In order for the defendant to have been found guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter because of reasonable provocation or 
30 
 
sudden combat, the jury would have needed to credit the 
defendant's statement that he did not follow the victim and that 
instead the fight continued without stopping for nearly three 
hundred feet from the driveway to Elmwood Street, where the 
victim's body was found.  See Miranda, 492 Mass. at 307 
("Regardless of the theory evoked, a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction is not warranted when the defendant 'cooled off' and 
regained a measure of self-control before attacking the victim 
or where the defendant and victim are separated for a few 
minutes following the provocation and then the defendant seeks 
out the victim" [quotations and citations omitted]).  To so 
find, the jury would have needed to disbelieve the defendant's 
earlier statement to the police that he followed the victim 
after the victim left the house, the trial testimony of 
Interiano and Pineda that the defendant followed the victim 
after the victim fled, and the defendant's own trial testimony, 
where he denied involvement in shooting the victim entirely.  
The improbability of this finding by the jury supports our 
conclusion that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial 
judge's erroneous omission of jury instructions on sudden combat 
or reasonable provocation.  See Martin, supra at 648 ("feeble 
evidence supporting a finding of manslaughter" contributed to 
conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced by failure to 
instruct on voluntary manslaughter). 
31 
 
B.  Excessive use of force in self-defense.  To receive a 
jury instruction on excessive use of force in self-defense, "the 
defendant must be entitled to act in self-defense."  
Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 266 (2022), S.C., 
491 Mass. 247 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 
655, 674 (2012).  In turn, a self-defense instruction is only 
necessary where "there is some evidence that the defendant 
availed himself of all means, proper and reasonable in the 
circumstances, of retreating from the conflict before resorting 
to the use of deadly force."  Yat Fung Ng, supra at 253, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 226-227 (2008). 
 
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, no reasonable jury could conclude, solely on the 
basis of the defendant's isolated statement to the police, that 
after fighting for several minutes in front of the house, the 
defendant and the victim "kept fighting" over a distance of 
nearly three hundred feet to where the victim was shot on 
Elmwood Street, and that at no point did the armed defendant 
have the opportunity to retreat.  There was also undisputed 
evidence that Interiano interceded in the fight and separated 
the defendant and the victim at least once.  See Commonwealth v. 
Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 335 (2000) (defendant not entitled to 
self-defense instruction where "the fight was on a public street 
and at least at some point [the defendant] had adequate means of 
32 
 
escape").  Finally, the only apparent injury to the defendant 
was to his knuckles.  Accordingly, the trial judge did not err 
in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter 
under the theory of excessive use of force in self-defense. 
 
ii.  Involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant also argues 
that the trial judge erred by declining to give an instruction 
on involuntary manslaughter.  When a defendant is charged with 
murder, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is 
appropriate where a "reasonable view of the evidence would 
[permit] the jury to find wanton [or] reckless conduct rather 
than actions from which a plain and strong likelihood of death 
would follow" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 
487 Mass. 77, 92, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 408 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 438 (2015).  Conversely, 
"[w]hen it is obvious . . . that the risk of physical harm to 
the victim created a plain and strong likelihood that death will 
follow, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not 
required" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Moseley, 483 
Mass. 295, 303 (2019).  The defendant requested an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction and objected when it was denied, so we 
review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 
Mass. 413, 417-418 (2019). 
A defendant shooting at a victim creates a plain and strong 
likelihood of death, negating the possibility of a finding of 
33 
 
involuntary manslaughter.  See, e.g., Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 
93 (no involuntary manslaughter instruction necessary where 
"defendant shot a firearm at the victim multiple times, firing 
an initial pair of rounds before changing his position and 
continuing to shoot"); Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 752 
(2020), S.C., 493 Mass. 216 and 493 Mass. 322 (2024) (no 
involuntary manslaughter instruction required where apparent 
shooter "intentionally shot multiple times at the two victims").  
"[D]ischarging a shot at another person, regardless of whether 
the shot is meant to injure or kill, . . . 'creates a plain and 
strong likelihood of death.'"  Pina, 481 Mass. at 424, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 290 (1996).  
In the present case, the jury heard the defendant's 
statement to police that as the defendant and the victim 
continued to fight, the defendant "went crazy and . . . got the 
weapon out" and fired at the victim.  Although the defendant 
also told the police that he did not see where he hit the 
victim, the jury heard evidence that the victim was shot through 
the eye at close range and was also shot twice in the back of 
the head.  The evidence that the defendant was drinking does not 
change our analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 
302-303 (1992) (even where there is evidence that defendant had 
consumed alcohol, "[t]he traditional elements of involuntary 
manslaughter must be shown by evidence that the jury might 
34 
 
believe before an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is 
required").  Even considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, no reasonable jury could conclude 
that shooting at the victim at close range did not present a 
plain and strong likelihood of death, and thus the trial judge 
did not err in declining to instruct the jury on involuntary 
manslaughter.  See Pina, 481 Mass. at 424.  
 
d.  Testimony on scientific certainty.  Finally, the 
defendant postulates that expert testimony describing 
fingerprint evidence and ballistic evidence "in absolute terms" 
caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.6   
i.  Fingerprint testimony.  The defendant argues that 
expert testimony by the Commonwealth's fingerprint analysis 
expert impermissibly suggested a level of scientific certainty 
in testimony identifying a fingerprint on the firearm magazine 
as belonging to the defendant.  The defendant did not object to 
the expert's testimony, so we review the testimony to determine 
 
6 The defendant also argues that the failure by defense 
counsel to object to the improper testimony constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  When a defendant has been 
convicted of murder in the first degree, "we review his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the 
alleged lapse created a 'substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice,'" so both inquiries are ultimately the same.  
Commonwealth v. Louis, 487 Mass. 759, 763 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29, cert. denied, 583 
U.S. 923 (2017). 
 
35 
 
whether the testimony was improper and whether any improper 
testimony created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 492 Mass. 341, 354 
(2023).   
State police Trooper Sidney Chambers testified as to the 
fingerprint identification that matched a latent fingerprint7 on 
the magazine of the firearm recovered at Interiano and Pineda's 
house with the defendant's left ring finger.  During cross-
examination defense counsel asked Chambers, "Now you can't say 
that one hundred percent, you cannot be one hundred percent 
[certain] of the identification you made with the print; can 
you?" to which Chambers responded, "No, I absolutely can."  When 
pressed, Chambers reaffirmed that he was one hundred percent 
certain that his identification of the fingerprint as belonging 
to the defendant was correct.  
We have previously considered scientific literature on the 
limitations of ACE-V8 fingerprint analysis -- the methodology 
used by Chambers in this case.  See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 
 
7 A latent fingerprint is a fingerprint impression that is 
generally not visible to the naked eye without chemical 
enhancement.  See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 629 
(2005). 
 
8 ACE-V stands for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and 
verification.  Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 721 
(2010). 
 
36 
 
Mass. 715, 724-726 (2010).  We have therefore offered guidance 
that "[t]estimony to the effect that a latent print matches 
. . . a known print, if it is to be offered, should be presented 
as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute 
certainty about, or the infallibility of, an 'individualization' 
of a print should be avoided."  Id. at 729 n.22.   
Trooper Chambers's testimony was improper because it 
"express[ed] absolute certainty" that the fingerprint found on 
the magazine of the firearm corresponded to the defendant.  See 
Gambora, 457 Mass. at 729.  The defendant contends that the 
testimony created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice because it provided a link between the defendant and the 
weapon.  The defendant's argument is belied, however, by the 
plethora of other evidence tying the defendant to the firearm.9  
See, e.g., Armstrong, 492 Mass. at 357-358 (no substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice where evidence linking 
defendant to crime besides fingerprint evidence was strong).  
For example, the defendant's own trial testimony acknowledged 
 
9 We also note that the remainder of defense counsel's 
cross-examination of Chambers elicited testimony regarding the 
scientific community's consensus regarding the fallibility of 
fingerprint identification, and that this theme was reiterated 
by defense counsel in closing arguments.  See Armstrong, 492 
Mass. at 357, quoting Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass 20, 45, 
cert. denied, 583 U.S. 923 (2017) ("the vigorous cross-
examination of the analyst countered any possible misconception 
that individualization is infallible"). 
37 
 
that he owned the firearm recovered from Interiano and Pineda's 
house.  The jury also watched a video recording of the 
defendant's statement to police, wherein he also stated that he 
owned the firearm, stated and demonstrated how he had used it to 
shoot the victim, and described the steps he had taken to hide 
the firearm after the murder.  Furthermore, Interiano testified 
at trial and corroborated the account of the two men hiding the 
firearm in the basement.  Given this evidence, any erroneous 
testimony by Chambers did not create a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.   
ii.  Ballistics testimony.  The defendant also argues that 
improper testimony by the Commonwealth's ballistics expert as to 
the scientific degree of certainty of ballistics evidence 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by 
suggesting to the jury it was scientifically certain that the 
firearm recovered from Interiano and Pineda's house was the 
murder weapon.  Defense counsel did not object to the testimony, 
so we consider whether any improper testimony from the 
ballistics expert created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 247. 
At trial, State police ballistics expert Trooper Michael 
Bonasoro testified as to tests he had conducted with the firearm 
recovered from Interiano and Pineda's house.  Based on the 
results of those tests, Bonasoro concluded that the firearm 
38 
 
recovered from the house was the murder weapon.  Specifically, 
Bonasoro testified that the unique marks found on the cartridge 
casings at the scene, when compared to casings from test fires 
of the firearm, enabled him "to form an opinion beyond a 
reasonable doubt of ballistic certainty that these marks were 
produced from" the firearm recovered from the house.  Bonasoro 
also agreed that his statement was made "with a degree of 
scientific certainty."  
"Where a qualified expert has identified sufficient 
individual characteristic toolmarks reasonably to offer an 
opinion that a particular firearm fired a projectile or 
cartridge casing recovered as evidence, the expert may offer 
that opinion to a 'reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.'" 
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848 (2011).  We have 
specifically disapproved of the use of "[p]hrases that could 
give the jury of an impression of greater certainty."  Id. at 
849.   
Here, Bonasoro's testimony that the firearm recovered from 
Interiano and Pineda's house was the weapon that discharged the 
casings recovered from Elmwood Street "beyond a reasonable doubt 
of ballistic certainty" was improper.  See Pytou Heang, 458 
Mass. at 848.  The proper formulation is, as stated supra, "to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty."  Id.  It was also 
improper for Bonasoro to agree that his statements were made 
39 
 
"with a degree of scientific certainty."  We have expressly 
stated that "[t]he phrase 'reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty' should . . . be avoided because it suggests that 
forensic ballistics is a science, where it is clearly as much an 
art as a science."  Id. at 849.  Bonasoro's formulation, albeit 
somewhat different, invites similar confusion.  Therefore, we 
must determine whether Bonasoro's improper testimony created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, meaning that 
the error likely influenced the jury's decision.  See Yat Fung 
Ng, 489 Mass. at 247. 
Because there was ample evidence tying the firearm to the 
murder outside of Bonasoro's testimony, we conclude that there 
was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Armstrong, 492 Mass. at 357-358.  The defendant admitted in his 
testimony at trial that he owned the firearm recovered from 
Interiano and Pineda's house, and further admitted that he had 
brought it to the house on the night of the murder.  In the 
video recording of his police interrogation, the jury heard the 
defendant admit that he shot the victim several times with the 
firearm and explain the steps he took to hide the firearm after 
committing the crime.  Interiano's testimony corroborated the 
account of the defendant returning to the house after his fight 
with the victim and hiding the firearm in the basement.  
Finally, the jury heard evidence that the firearm was a .40 
40 
 
caliber pistol, consistent with the .40 caliber casings 
recovered from the crime scene.  Thus, Bonasoro's testimony, 
although improper, did not create a significant likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Armstrong, supra (no substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice from testimony expressing 
scientific certainty regarding fingerprint identification where 
Commonwealth's evidence apart from testimony was strong).  
 
e.  Firearm convictions.  The defendant was also convicted 
of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm.  On appeal, the defendant argues that following 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 8 (2022), his 
convictions should be overturned because the jury were not 
instructed that the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid 
firearms license.  Whereas prior to Bruen, licensure was an 
affirmative defense to a charge of unlawful possession of a 
firearm, after Bruen we ruled "that the absence of a license is 
an essential element" of firearm possession offenses.  Guardado 
I, 491 Mass. at 690.  We then held in Guardado II, 493 Mass. at 
12, that the proper remedy was to remand for a new trial on the 
firearm charges.  See id. ("Because Bruen was decided after the 
defendant's trial but while the case was pending on appeal, he 
is entitled to the benefit of the new rule; that is, the right 
41 
 
to have the Commonwealth prove that he lacked a license").   
 
In the present case, the defendant was convicted of 
possession of a firearm and possession of a loaded firearm 
without the benefit of requiring the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he lacked a firearm license.  
Accordingly, we vacate those convictions and remand for a new 
trial on those charges.  See Guardado II, 493 Mass. at 12.  
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and find no reason to set aside the verdict or 
reduce the degree of guilt. 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree.  We vacate 
the defendant's firearm convictions and remand for a new trial 
on those indictments.   
So ordered.