Title: In re Gallagher

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  January 15, 1998  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

	Inquiry Concerning a Judge
	RE:

	THE HONORABLE STEPHEN
	L. GALLAGHER, JR.,

										Accused.

(CJFD 95-96; SC S44156)

		On review of the recommendation of the Commission
on Judicial Fitness and Disability.

		Argued and submitted November 14, 1997.

		Robert A. Schlachter, of Stoll, Stoll, Berne,
Lokting & Schlachter, P.C., Portland, argued the cause
for the accused.  With him on the briefs was Scott A.
Schorr.

		Susan D. Isaacs, Beaverton, argued the cause and
filed the brief for the Commission on Judicial Fitness
and Disability.

		Katherine A. McDowell, Portland, filed a brief in
behalf of amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.

		Before Gillette, Presiding Justice, and Van Hoomissen,

	Graber, Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

		PER CURIAM

		The accused is suspended from office without
salary for a period of six months, commencing on the
effective date of this decision.  

	    *Carson, C.J., and Fadeley, J., did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.

		PER CURIAM

		This judicial discipline case comes before the court on
direct review of a recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
Fitness and Disability (Commission).  Or Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 8; ORS 1.430.  The Commission concluded that Stephen
L. Gallagher, Jr. (the accused), a judge of the Circuit Court for
Multnomah County, had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Code) with respect to the first and second of the three charged
causes of complaint, for which the Commission recommended that he
be censured.

		This court reviews the record de novo, ORS 1.430.  We
do so under a standard of clear and convincing evidence to
establish a willful violation of a provision of the Code.  In re
Schenck, 318 Or 402, 405, 870 P2d 185 (1994).  In this context,
the court has defined a "willful" act to mean an act done with
the conscious objective of causing the result or acting in the
manner contrary to the applicable rule.  Schenck, 318 Or at 405. 
On review pursuant to that standard, we conclude that the accused
violated the Code with respect to the conduct charged in the
second and third causes of complaint, and we suspend him for a
period of six months during which he shall not receive the salary
of his public office.

THE CHARGES

		In its second amended formal complaint, the Commission
charged three forms of misconduct.

		In the first cause of complaint, the Commission charged
that the accused had personally solicited campaign contributions
in willful violation of former Canon 7B(7) and former Canon 2A.(1) 
Former Canon 7B(7) provided:

		"A judge may not:

		"* * * * *

		"(7) personally solicit campaign contributions;
but a judge may establish committees to secure and
manage financing and expenses to promote the judge's
election and to obtain public statements of support for
the judge's candidacy."

Former Canon 2A provided:

		"A judge should respect and comply with the law
and should act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary."

		The second cause of complaint charged that the accused
had used official letterhead, his judicial assistant's work time,
and other public resources for personal and campaign-related
business.  The Commission charged that the foregoing conduct
willfully violated former Canon 2A and current JR 1-101(A) and
(C) and JR 2-107.  JR 1-101(A) provides:

		"A judge shall observe high standards of conduct
so that the integrity, impartiality and independence of
the judiciary are preserved and shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
judiciary and the judicial system."

JR 1-101(C) provides:

		"A judge shall not engage in conduct that reflects
adversely on the judge's character, competence,
temperament or fitness to serve as a judge."

JR 2-107 provides in part that "[a] judge shall be faithful to
the law."	

		The third cause of complaint charged that the accused
had used his official position or office to influence or obtain
an advantage in the manner in which he corresponded with the San
Diego City Treasurer about a parking ticket that he had received,
with golf course representatives, with airline representatives,
with a magazine, and with various other persons and entities. 
The Commission charged that the foregoing conduct willfully
violated former Canon 2A, JR 1-101(A), JR 1-101(C), JR 2-107,
former Canon 2B and JR 1-101(F).  Former Canon 2B provided in
part:

	"A judge should not lend the prestige of the office to
advance the private interests of others, nor should a
judge convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the
judge."

JR 1-101(F) provides in part:

		"A judge shall not use the position to advance the
private interests of the judge or any person, nor shall
a judge convey or permit anyone to convey the
impression that anyone has a special influence with the
judge[.]"

		The Commission also charged that all three forms of
alleged misconduct violated ORS 244.040(1)(a), which provides:

		"No public official shall use or attempt to use
official position or office to obtain financial gain or
avoidance of financial detriment that would not
otherwise be available but for the public official's
holding of the official position or office, other than
[listed exceptions that do not apply in this case]."

FINDINGS OF FACT

		The underlying facts that we find in this section of
the opinion are not disputed.(2)

A.	General Background.

		The accused became a lawyer in 1968 and was in private
practice until January 1981, when he was appointed as a judge of
the District Court for Multnomah County.  In May 1982, he ran
unopposed to retain that position and was elected.

		In the May 1984 primary, the accused ran against four
other candidates for a vacant Circuit Court position.  He won
election to that seat in the November 1984 general election and,
accordingly, began service as a judge of the Circuit Court in
January 1985.  The accused ran unopposed for re-election in 1990
and 1996.

B.	First Cause of Complaint.

		In the 1984 election, the accused's campaign incurred a
substantial debt.  In order to decrease that debt, the accused
held his first golf tournament fundraiser in 1984.  A golf
tournament fundraiser, called "Hizzoner's Classic" or "Hizzoner's
Annual Classic," was held annually from 1984 to 1995.  The 1984
campaign debt was retired in 1989 or 1990.

		The present charges concerning personal solicitation of
campaign contributions stem from the 1995 golf tournament
fundraiser.  The accused sent a personal letter, dated August 18,
1995, to about 700 people who were on the mailing list for his
golf tournament fundraiser.(3)  That letter bore the accused's
courthouse address.  After describing the results of the 1994
golf tournament fundraiser, the accused's letter concluded:

		"The 12th Annual is set for Friday, September 22,
1995, with tee times beginning at 12:15 at
Eastmoreland.  The Committee's letter is enclosed.

		"Once again, thanks for your many years of
friendship and support.  Early next year, I will be
running again for a new term.  One major special-interest group has threatened to challenge my re-election, so your continued support is especially
welcome and appreciated.

					"All the very best,

				"[signature]

				"HIZZONER"	

	(Bold, underlining, and capitalization in original.)

At the bottom left of the signature page, the initials of the
accused and of his judicial assistant appear, along with the
notation "[e]nclosure."

		The enclosure that accompanied the accused's letter in
the same envelope, and that was included at his direction, was
a one-page document dated August 18, 1995, from the Re-elect
Judge Gallagher Committee.  That document announced "Hizzoner's
12th Annual Classic" and stated in part:

	"CONTRIBUTION:  $100.00, which may be a dollar-for-dollar tax credit on your joint Oregon State tax
return,[(4)] so it may actually cost you nothing!  Such a
deal!

		"* * * Make your check payable to:  Re-elect Judge
Gallagher Committee."  (Bold, underlining, and
capitalization in original.)

On a tear-off portion at the bottom there were spaces to respond
with name, address, and handicap, followed by a space stating: 
"____Sorry, I can't make it this year, but here's a donation for
the campaign fund."  Also enclosed was a return envelope
addressed to "Hizzoner's Classic."  That envelope bore the
accused's home address.

C.	Second Cause of Complaint.

		Judicial assistants are state employees who perform
secretarial and other support services related to judges'
official functions.  The job description of a judicial assistant
does not include the performance of personal or campaign services
for judges.  The accused knew that his judicial assistant was a
state employee.

		Linda Austin-Croft became the accused's judicial
assistant in 1985.  From 1988 through 1996, the accused had her
type about 300 pages of personal documents on public equipment
and during working hours.  Austin-Croft generally typed those
personal documents during the regular course of the work day,
whenever they were presented to her.  Although the official
duties of Austin-Croft and the accused did not suffer as a result
of this activity, Austin-Croft's typing of personal documents did
not aid the accused in the efficient performance of his duties as
a judge.  Examples of the personal documents that Austin-Croft
typed include the following:
  A letter to the Consul General of France to secure a visa
for the accused's daughter.
  A letter to the Commissary at McChord Air Force Base about
cash register errors in relation to purchases made by the
accused.
  Minutes of a neighborhood meeting.
  A letter to the president of Nordstrom about the price of a
suit that the accused had bought.
  A letter to the president of Portland General Electric about
service at the accused's residence.
  A letter to the president of United Airlines about securing
bereavement rates for himself and his wife.
  A pleading in the accused's own divorce case.
  A letter about the Gallagher family coat of arms.
  A letter to the director of customer service at a computer
publication, threatening to report practices to the Oregon
Attorney General's office.
  A letter to Golf World magazine, threatening to report its
business practices to the Oregon Attorney General's office.
  Letters to the San Diego City Treasurer about a parking
ticket that the accused had received.
  Letters to his lawyer, his ex-wife, and others about issues
in the accused's divorce case.
  Letters about his financial interests in Ireland.
  Letters to his lawyer and to a trustee in bankruptcy
concerning the collection of a personal debt owed to the
accused.
  Numerous letters to his siblings and others about his
father's estate.
  Letters to acquaintances about his St. Patrick's Day party.
  Jokes and limericks.
  Letters to the Portland Golf Club disputing charges on his
bill.

Most of the personal documents at issue were prepared and mailed
on the accused's official stationery and were signed above the
typewritten official title of Circuit Court Judge.

		In addition to preparing personal documents for the
accused, Austin-Croft occasionally assisted the accused during
work time with other personal tasks.  She obtained airline fares
and schedules for him and booked a flight unrelated to his work. 
On occasion she picked up his dry cleaning and made haircut
appointments for him.

		Austin-Croft also performed campaign-related services
for the accused, at his direction, during work time.  With
respect to the 1995 golf tournament fundraiser, Austin-Croft
typed the accused's August 18, 1995, letter during working hours
and on public equipment at the courthouse.  She had typed similar
letters in previous years.

		Beginning in 1985, Austin-Croft helped with the annual
golf tournament fundraisers in many other ways as well.  While at
work in the courthouse, she answered detailed telephone inquiries
about the golf tournament fundraiser, both on the day of the
tournament and on other days.  The accused did not instruct her
to refer such calls to the campaign committee.

		On tournament days, which occurred during the regular
work week, Austin-Croft prepared the lists of pairings and tee
times.  She took the prizes to the tournament site, where she
performed administrative functions, such as collecting money. 
She also rode around the course in a golf cart with the video
photographer who recorded the tournament.  In a 1991 letter to
participants in the fundraiser, the accused praised his judicial
assistant for those tasks, thanking her by name as the person
"who answers all your phone questions, oversees the distribution
of towels, scorecards, etc., and gets us to the 1st tee on time." 
Austin-Croft performed those functions at the accused's request,
and during what otherwise would have been her working time.

		From 1985 to 1993, Austin-Croft designated golf
tournament fundraiser days as regular work days on her time
sheets, even though she attended to court business for only a
brief period on such days.  In 1994 and 1995, on her own
initiative, she changed the designation to either vacation or
compensatory time.  The accused approved and signed his judicial
assistant's time records every month.

D.	Third Cause of Complaint.

		Beginning in about 1986, the accused used official
letterhead for many letters relating to the advancement of his
personal interests.  In most instances, the title "Circuit Court
Judge" appeared immediately beneath his signature.  The accused
testified that "probably 95 percent" of his "nonofficial"
personal business letters went out on his judge's stationery. 
Some examples follow.

		In 1986, the accused wrote on official letterhead to a
trustee in bankruptcy (who is a lawyer) concerning the collection
of a personal debt owed to the accused.  The accused previously
had obtained a judgment against an individual who later filed for
bankruptcy.  The letter stated:

		"Further to our recent telephone conversation
regarding [debtor's name], enclosed herewith is a copy
of the transcript of [debtor's] judgment-debtor
examination of September 9, 1986.  It is at this
proceeding where he admits for the first time that the
amount of the commission he actually earned immediately
before the date he filed bankruptcy was $60,000.00,
rather than the $30,000.00 he was forced to acknowledge
at the first meeting of creditors.

		"I respectfully request that, as trustee, you deny
[creditor's] 'claim' in her son's bankruptcy estate. 
It is utterly spurious, as is just about everything
these two phony baloneys do.  If you have any doubt at
all regarding these frauds, take a brief look at the
transcript.  If the activities described therein ain't
fraud, what is?

		"Thanks for your consideration.

				"Very truly yours,

				"[signed] Steve

				"Stephen L. Gallagher, Jr.

				"Circuit Court Judge"

		In 1988 and 1989, the accused wrote a series of three
letters to the Portland Golf Club, all on court letterhead and
using the title "Circuit Court Judge" immediately beneath the
signature.  The first letter stated that the accused 
intentionally had deferred payment of his bill.  The letter then
complained of various alleged errors of the bookkeeping office
and the dining room.  The accused enclosed partial payment and
stated that no further payment would be made "[u]ntil a
satisfactory explanation" of charges was received.  A postscript
said:

		"Your form dunning letter, copy enclosed, was
received by me on December 19, 1988, calling for a
response one full day and part of another after
receipt.  By any measure, such inadequate notice is
both unreasonable and insulting."

		A second letter detailed the complaints of the accused
and asserted that certain charges should be deducted from his
bill.  The accused submitted "the aforementioned balance as
payment in full" of his outstanding bill as of the end of the
previous month.  The second letter concluded in part:

	"Kindly either reverse the amount or make a credit
entry on my next statement.  I do not expect to have
any unpaid balance as of that date.

		"I am sure you can tell that I am not particularly
pleased with the way this matter was handled."

		A third letter "insist[ed]" on a reply and reiterated
that the accused "had been erroneously billed and should be
credited with the sums" discussed earlier.

		In 1989, the accused wrote to the supplier of a copy
machine that he had bought at an auction, again on Circuit Court
letterhead and again using the title "Circuit Court Judge"
beneath the signature.  The letter stated that the supplier had
described the copier "as making copies in black or a selected
second color."  The accused stated that he had given the copier
to his lawyer and that she had told him that her requests for an
instruction manual, a warranty, and information about a service
contract had gone unheeded.

	"Further, the machine I requested that you deliver to
her directly does not print in a selected second color,
although the representation that it would was
significant in my decision to continue my bidding to
the point of success.

		"What am I to conclude from this treatment?  Do
you intend not to furnish the described machine?  Do
you intend to leave us without a manual describing the
operation of the machine?  Are you not interested in
pursuing a service contract?

		"Please respond to my questions, in order that I
may advise her on how to proceed."

		In 1989, the accused wrote to an insurance company
regarding payment of household and automobile insurance.  Among
other things, the letter asked "that you waive any so-called late
charges until we get this matter resolved."  The one-page letter,
prepared on Circuit Court letterhead, also used the title
"Circuit Court Judge" beneath the accused's signature.

		In 1991, the accused wrote to a computer publication,
again on official letterhead and again using the designation
"Circuit Court Judge" just beneath the signature line.  The
letter opened by stating that the accused was writing "to
communicate my extreme displeasure with your company's tactics." 
After detailing what had occurred, the letter said in part:

		"Your promotion was grossly misleading and
deceptive.  What was advertised to be a one volume
edition * * * in reality turned out to be, a series of
volumes (how many, or what they cover I haven't a clue)
which come periodically at your convenience.

		"* * * * *

		"You will receive the third of the three volumes
upon delivery by the Postal Service.  You will receive
the other two only after I have received from you good
funds to cover the postage required of $2.94.  I will
not accept any further of your publications.

		"My intent is to report your shabby practices to
the Oregon State Attorney General's Office.  Perhaps
criminal sanctions are in order.  We don't like it much
out here being duped by this kind of deception."

		In 1992, the accused wrote to a physician who had
examined his eyes and had recommended a change in the accused's
prescription lenses.  The letter said in part:

	"Upon receipt of your statement for the lenses, I
submitted it to Blue Cross, which denied my claim
because but 23 months (rather than 24 months) had
elapsed since the last time my glasses were made. 

	* * *"

		"I am enclosing my check in the sum of $214.00,
representing the billing of $324.00 less the $110.00
Blue Cross coverage.  Notwithstanding your assurance
that I would be billed 'your price', I have determined
that the charges incurred are 20 - 25% higher than
comparable amounts charged elsewhere.  Nevertheless, I
will remit the balance of the full amount when you send
me a corrected statement which can be processed through
Blue Cross in order that I receive the coverage
contemplated by the policy."

That letter, too, was on Circuit Court letterhead and bore the
title "Circuit Court Judge" beneath the signature.

		In 1993, the accused wrote on Circuit Court letterhead
to a representative of Golf World magazine.  That letter read in
part:

		"The facts are these:  in response to your offer
during last Christmas season, I ordered a FREE
subscription for my brother [name], and renewed my own: 
Total cost:  $17.47.  In other words, two subscriptions
for the price of one.  I paid $17.47, and the last
correspondence from me to [another employee of the
magazine] contained a copy of my check, front and back. 
For the first time, I receive a letter from you.

		"Either you are going to honor your own
promotional commitments or you are not.  If you do not,
I will cease to become a Golf World subscriber and
report this entire matter to the Office of The Oregon
Attorney General, Consumer Affairs Division.

					"Very truly yours,

				"Stephen L. Gallagher, Jr.

				"Circuit Court Judge" 	

	(Emphasis in original.)	

		The accused wrote a series of letters to the San Diego
City Treasurer in 1995, protesting a notice of parking violation
that the accused had received in December 1994.  In this series
of letters, the accused made clear that he was a judge.

  		The first such letter, which went out on Circuit Court
letterhead, stated in part that the accused and his wife "were
flabbergasted to have received a Parking Violation Notice."  The
accused's letter stated that they "had no prior notice
whatsoever" of the parking restriction in question and that they
had complied with a street sign.  The letter ended with the
sentence, "Thank you for your considerations."  Immediately
beneath that sentence, the accused's name and the title of
"Circuit Court Judge" appeared.

		The second such letter complained that the accused had
received a "form response" to his first letter and that officials
in San Diego had conducted "no investigation of the conditions at
the location where I received the Parking Violation Notice."  The
letter then continued:

		"Why is it that:

				"(1)  You did not respond to me, when
you had a letter containing my complete name
and [courthouse] address and when you were
informed in that letter that I was the driver
of the alleged offending vehicle???  It was
your own Notice that asked for this
information, and it was supplied to you.

			"(2)  No investigation of the scene of
the alleged violation was made by anyone,
although you represent by your computer-generated 'denial' of my 'dismissal request'
that such an investigation has been
conducted???	

		"I hereby insist that you honor my request for an
administrative hearing on all aspects of your shabby
treatment of citizens who visit San Diego.  With
reluctance, I enclose the exorbitant sum of $40.00.  I
further request that you set my hearing in late May
1995 on a Friday or a Monday, so that I can come back
to San Diego over a long weekend.  I also request that
the photographs I included in my letter of January 23,
1995 be made available to me at the hearing." 
(Emphasis in original.)

The accused sent copies of that letter to, among others, the
Mayor of San Diego and the Presiding Judge of the San Diego
Superior Court.

		A third letter(5) contained factual information
respecting the validity of the parking violation, an affidavit
from the accused's wife, and this text in part:

		"I am unable to attend the referenced hearing in
person, as I am presiding over a death penalty case
[identified by name and court docket number], and
several key witnesses are scheduled to testify on
Monday, July 17, 1995."

		On Circuit Court letterhead, also in 1995, the accused
wrote to an Oregon travel agent to complain about a car rental
agency that he had used during personal travel in San Diego.  The
accused noted that he had been pleased by his initial experience
with that agency and had "authorized you to use my pleasant
experience to support your recommendation [to use that agency]."

		"Three months later, I write to revoke my previous
endorsement.  What [the agency] charged me on October
31, 1994 has practically doubled in price.  I paid
$86.99 to rent a 1994 Nissan Sentra for one week. 
Today, I was quoted $169.99 for the same car!!  As it
turns out, the only thing 'special' about [the agency]
is the outrageous way they manipulate their pricing.

		"I will not use [the agency] again and direct you
not to use my name as a reference."  (Emphasis in
original.)

The accused signed that letter above the title "Circuit Court
Judge" and sent a copy to the car rental agency.

DISCUSSION OF CHARGED VIOLATIONS

		In discussing the charged violations, we will limit our
consideration to alleged violations of the Canons and Judicial
Rules.  Whether any of the accused's conduct also violated ORS
244.040(1)(a) would have no bearing on the conclusions that we
reach below or on the sanction that we deem appropriate. 
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to consider the possible
application of that statute further.

A.	Personal Solicitation of Campaign Contributions.

		With respect to his 1995 letter about the golf
tournament fundraiser, the accused advances a series of arguments
as to why he should not be found guilty of violating former Canon
7B(7) and former Canon 2A.  Some of those arguments assert that
the canons did not in fact prohibit his conduct.  In the
alternative, the accused argues that an application of the canons
to his conduct would be unconstitutional.

		We need not decide those questions.  Whether the
accused is guilty of the violations charged in the first cause of
complaint would not alter the sanction that we deem appropriate. 
That being so, we need not decide whether the accused violated
former Canon 7B(7) or former Canon 2A as charged in the first
cause of complaint.

B.	Personal and Campaign Use of State Resources.

		In the second cause of complaint, the Commission
charged that the accused had violated (among other things) former
Canon 2A, which required that a judge "act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary"; and JR 1-101(A), which currently
contains substantially the same requirement.  The accused
acknowledges the underlying facts: that -- at his direction --
his judicial assistant performed purely personal and campaign
tasks on work time, while being paid by the state, using state
property (such as letterhead) and typing equipment (such as
computers) in the process.  Those facts constitute a violation of
the charged rules.  Court staff, court supplies, and court typing
equipment are to be used for court business, not for personal and
campaign purposes.

		The accused argues for a "de minimis" or "incidental
use" exception to the foregoing principle.  An example given by
the accused is having a judicial assistant make a personal
telephone call to cancel a lunch appointment so that a judge may
continue a trial into the lunch hour.

		We assume that a "de minimis" or "incidental use"
exception is proper.  Normal human experience teaches that
judges, like other workers, cannot separate personal life from
work life completely.  In this regard, the accused's example
illustrates the point nicely.

		But the accused's acts, as demonstrated in the record,
can in no way be characterized as falling within such an
exception.  Over a period of years, it was the usual custom and
practice of the accused to make personal use of a state employee
and of state supplies and typing equipment for personal and
campaign purposes.  Those uses were substantial.  Austin-Croft
spent almost full working days, for instance, administering the
annual golf tournament fundraiser, and for many years designated
even the golfing days as regular work time on her time sheets,
which the accused approved and signed as her supervisor. 
Additionally, the quantity of the accused's personal documents,
prepared by a state employee on work time and using official
stationery, was voluminous.

		We conclude that the accused's extensive use of his
judicial assistant's time, and of state property and equipment,
for personal and campaign purposes violated former Canon 2A. 
Taxpayers have a right to expect that the employees and the
materials for which they pay will be used for public purposes. 
Obtaining substantial personal and political benefits directly
from the use of those public employees and materials runs afoul
of the requirement to "act * * * in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity * * * of the judiciary."  For the
same reason, the accused's conduct violated JR 1-101(A), which
contains substantially the same requirement.

C.	Use of Office to Advance Private Interests.

		The third cause of complaint alleged that the accused
had violated, among other things, former Canon 2A, which provided
that a judge "should act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary"; JR 1-101(A), which currently contains substantially
the same provision; JR 1-101(C), which provides that "[a] judge
shall not engage in conduct that reflects adversely on the
judge's character, competence, temperament or fitness to serve as
a judge"; former Canon 2B, which prohibited a judge from lending
the prestige of the office to advance the private interests of
others and from conveying the impression that others are in a
special position to influence the judge; and JR 1-101(F), which
prohibits a judge from lending the prestige of the office to
advance the private interests of the judge or of another and from
conveying the impression that anyone has a special influence with
the judge.  The Commission concluded that the accused was not
guilty of the matters charged in the third cause of complaint. 
Neither party asked this court to come to a different conclusion,
and neither party briefed the issue substantively.

		Nonetheless, it is this court's task to consider the
whole case de novo.  Pursuant to ORS 1.430(1), this court "shall
review the record of the proceedings under ORS 1.420 [relating to
the Commission's procedures respecting charges of misconduct] on
the law and facts."  (Emphasis added.)  We are mindful that in
some past cases this court -- although recognizing its authority
to consider all matters charged -- has chosen to limit review to
only those causes of complaint against a judge that resulted in a
conclusion by the Commission that the judge had violated a
provision of the Code.  See, e.g., Schenck, 318 Or at 404 n 3
(reviewing only those causes of complaint for which the
Commission had found a willful violation of a canon).  On the
other hand, in lawyer discipline cases, the court has exercised
its authority to consider all charged conduct.  See, e.g., In re
Biggs, 318 Or 281, 864 P2d 1310 (1994) (finding additional
violations of the charged disciplinary rules and increasing the
accused's discipline from a two-year suspension to disbarment).

		In this case, we exercise our authority to consider all
charged conduct, for three reasons.  First, the conduct charged
in the third cause of complaint is repeated and serious, and the
nature of the charge does not duplicate the kind of misconduct
complained of in the other causes of complaint.  Second, we note
(as discussed more fully below) that the Commission found that
the accused had committed some of the charged acts; it went on to
conclude only that the conduct was not willful.  Third, the
Commission's conclusion concerning willfulness is facially
dubious.  We turn to a consideration of the merits of the third
cause of complaint.

		The Commission found that the accused's use of official
letterhead and the title "Circuit Court Judge" in connection with
correspondence relating to his parking ticket in San Diego "would
cause an objective observer to conclude he was attempting to
receive better treatment than the average citizen protesting a
parking ticket would receive."  We agree with and adopt those
findings.

		In addition, we find that the use of official
letterhead -- and in most instances further references to the
accused's office (such as the typing of his title beneath his
signature) -- in the examples quoted in the Findings of Fact
above would cause an objective observer reasonably to conclude
that the accused was lending the prestige of the office to
advance his own private interests.  In some cases advancement of
the private interests of others was involved, at least in part: 
his lawyer (with regard to the matter of the copier); his brother
(with regard to the magazine subscription); and his wife (with
regard to the matters involving the accused's own financial
interests).

		In this connection, we note that the official
commentary to Canon 2B of the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (1998) (ABA Code) states in part:

	"Judges should distinguish between proper and improper
use of the prestige of office in all of their
activities.  For example, it would be improper for a
judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a
personal advantage such as deferential treatment when
stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. 
Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for
conducting a judge's personal business."  Commentary to
Canon 2B of the ABA Code (emphasis added).

The relevant portion of Canon 2B of the ABA Code is almost
identical to former Canon 2B of the Oregon Code of Judicial
Conduct and is similar to the pertinent provision of JR 1-101(F). 
Although this court is not bound by the ABA's commentary, we
approve of the quoted interpretation.

		Notwithstanding its factual findings, the Commission
concluded that the accused did not act willfully,(6) but only
negligently.  We disagree with that conclusion on "willfulness"
for several reasons.

		First, the accused's testimony demonstrated that he
knew what the ABA's commentary has made clear: that court
stationery is for court-related business.  Indeed, he had
purchased and used separate personal stationery for non-court
purposes, but his supply "ran out."

		Second, the accused repeatedly used the letterhead and
title of his office in correspondence designed to obtain personal
advantages, including financial advantages, for himself and those
close to him.  That frequency suggests that the practice was far
from inadvertent.

		Third, the official letterhead of the Circuit Court is
colorful and conspicuous, and in most instances the accused
placed his title just beneath his signature.  Those elements
suggest that the accused knew both that he was using stationery
that featured his judicial identity and that the fact of his
position was likely to play a prominent role in the recipient's
response to each such letter.

		Fourth, many of the letters were demanding, and many of
them asserted legal propositions in close proximity to reminders
of the accused's status as a judge.  Examples include his letters
to the bankruptcy trustee, the Portland Golf Club, the computer
publication, and Golf World magazine.  ___ Or at ___  (slip op at
12-17).  Those factors suggest that the accused intended his
position to lend weight or credibility to his assertions.

		Accordingly, we conclude that the foregoing conduct was
willful and that it violated former Canon 2B and JR 1-101(F).

		We also conclude that this conduct violated former
Canon 2A and JR 1-101(A).  The use of one's judicial office as a
pressure tactic to gain personal advantages for oneself and one's
relatives and friends undermines public confidence in the
judiciary and in its integrity and impartiality.

		Finally, we conclude that this conduct violated JR 1-101(C).  An inappropriate attempt to gain such personal
advantages "reflects adversely on the judge's character,
competence, temperament or fitness to serve as a judge."

PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

		The accused raises several challenges to the
Commission's procedures.  Additionally, he presented several
affirmative defenses.  We have considered each issue and all
arguments made in support thereof.  We are not persuaded by any
of those arguments, but an extended discussion of our reasons
would not benefit bench or bar.(7)

SANCTION

		We begin our consideration of an appropriate sanction
by reiterating the aims of judicial discipline:

	"Judges are disciplined primarily to preserve public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.  Thus, disciplining judges serves to educate
and inform the judiciary and the public that certain
types of conduct are improper and will not be
tolerated.  Discipline of a judge also serves to deter
the disciplined judge as well as other judges from
repeating the type of conduct sanctioned."  Schenck,
318 Or at 438.

		The accused portrays this proceeding as being primarily
an overreaction to his asking a judicial assistant to perform a
handful of trivial, sporadic, and incidental personal tasks. 
That perspective misses the main point.  Most seriously, the
accused systematically used state-paid services, property, and
equipment to further his campaign fundraising and his private
interests, and he systematically used his position as a judge to
try to obtain financial advantages for himself and those close to
him.

		In setting the sanction in this case, we consider
several factors to be significant.  Many of those factors point
to the need for a substantial sanction:  The misconduct covered
in the second and third causes of complaint was frequent and
formed a persistent and pervasive pattern of behavior.  The
misconduct covered in the third cause of complaint illustrated
that the accused exploited his position to satisfy personal
desires.  The effect of the misconduct covered in the second
cause of complaint was to the indirect economic detriment of the
public.  The accused was an experienced judge at the time of the
charged conduct and therefore was well familiar with the high
standards of behavior that the privilege of judicial service
demands.  The accused's conduct adversely affects the public's
perception of the integrity and dignity of the judiciary.

		Another factor, however, weighs against a more severe
sanction.  There have been no prior complaints about the accused.

		The Commission asks that we consider as an aggravating
factor the accused's "tactics designed to obstruct and delay" the
Commission's processes.  We need not decide whether such tactics
could be an aggravating factor, because we do not agree with the
Commission's characterization of the accused's actions.  Although
his defense was vigorous, it was not improper.

		Taking into account the reasons for imposing judicial
discipline, the nature of the accused's misconduct, and all the
other factors described above, we conclude that the appropriate
sanction in this case is a six-month suspension during which the
accused shall not receive the salary of his public office.(8)

		The accused is suspended from office without salary for
a period of six months, commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

1. 	By order of the Oregon Supreme Court, the former canons
of the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct were superseded by the
judicial rules in the new Code, effective January 1, 1996.  Order
No. 95-095 (Nov. 22, 1995).

2. 	The reader may note, in our recitation of the facts,
conduct that could be characterized as violating provisions of
the Code other than those cited in the text above.  For purposes
of this case, however, we will confine our analysis to those
violations charged by the Commission.

3. 	More than 30 recipients lived outside Oregon, including
two in a foreign country, and many more recipients did not live
in Multnomah County.  Typically the tournament itself drew
between 48 and 62 players.

4. 	ORS 316.102 provides in part:

		"(1) A credit against taxes shall be allowed for
voluntary contributions in money made in the taxable
year:

		"* * * * *

		"(b) * * * [T]o or for the use of a person who
must be a candidate for nomination or election to a
federal, state or local elective office in any biennial
primary election, presidential preference primary
election, general election or special election in this
state. * * *

		"* * * * *

		"(2) The credit allowed by subsection (1) of this
section shall be the lesser of:

		"(a) * * * [T]he total contribution, not to exceed
$100 on a joint return; or

		"(b) The tax liability of the taxpayer."

5. 	Between the dates of the accused's second and third
letters regarding the San Diego parking ticket, Austin-Croft also
wrote a letter requesting a postponement of a hearing in that
matter.  Her letter identified herself as a judicial assistant
for the accused, a judge.

6. 	As noted above, in this context a "willful" act is an
act done with the conscious objective of causing the result or
acting in the manner contrary to the applicable rule.  Schenck,
318 Or at 405.  It is not necessary that the judge know that the
conduct in question violates an ethical rule, so long as the
judge is aware of circumstances that make the rule applicable. 
Ibid.

7. 	Because of the result that we reach in this case, we
need not and do not discuss the accused's counterclaim for
attorney fees in the event that he were to prevail.

8. 	Cases that we have found from other jurisdictions are
not sufficiently analogous to provide guidance as to the
appropriate sanction in this case.