Title: GILLEARD v DRAINE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No 11922 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA WILLIAM T GILLEARD, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs- M K DRAINE, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Harold L Garnaas, argued, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent: Larry E Riley, argued, Missoula , Montana. Submitted: Maoch 15, 1972 Decided: APR 2 1 1972 Filed: PiPR 2 1 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. In a personal injury a c t i o n involving a c o l l i s i o n between p l a i n t i f f ' s pickup and defendant's parked truck on an unopened s e c t i o n of I n t e r s t a t e highway, t h e d i s t r i c t court of Missoula County, t h e Hon. Jack L. Green, d i s t r i c t judge, granted summary judgment t o defendant. P l a i n t i f f now appeals from t h i s summary judgment entered a g a i n s t him. The material f a c t s i n t h i s case a r e undisputed. The a c c i - dent occurred about 4:45 p.m. on November 18, 1966, on a n unopened section of I n t e r s t a t e Highway 90 about e i g h t miles west of Missoula, Montana. P l a i n t i f f was driving h i s pickup, with its headlights on i n a dense fog, i n an e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n i n what would become t h e eastbound area of t h e roadway a t a speed of 10-15 miles an hour. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s truck, which was towing a house behind it, was parked facing west i n t h e same f u t u r e eastbound area of t h e roadway; i t was standing there unoccupied and unattended, without f l a r e s o r warning devices. P l a i n t i f f ' s pickup s t r u c k defendant's truck headon, r e s u l t i n g i n extensive disabling i n j u r i e s t o p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f is William T. Gilleard, an ironworker employed i n construction a t t h e W a ldorf -Hoerner plant west of Missoula . O n the day of t h e accident he had l e f t t h e Waldorf-Hoerner plant a f t e r completing h i s day's work and was returning t o h i s home i n Clinton, s e v e r a l miles e a s t of Missoula. He entered t h e unopened section of I n t e r s t a t e 90 by driving past t h r e e signs marked I I Construction Aheadr', spaced a t 500 foot i n t e r v a l s commencing a t a point 1500 f e e t before reaching t h e detour o f f t h e I n t e r s t a t e highway; and then by driving through or around 5 or 7 ten-foot wide black and white "zebra boardq' barricades spaced diagonally across t h e width of the I n t e r s t a t e highway t o route t r a f f i c off the unopened section of the I n t e r s t a t e and onto the detour. P l a i n t i f f knew t h a t t h a t section of t h e I n t e r s t a t e where the accident occurred, was under construction and t h a t it had not been opened t o public travel. However, he had used the unopened section some 30 o r 40 times in the three month period pre- ceding the accident. O n some of these occasions he had observed s t a t e highway patrol c a r s , c i t y police cars and s h e r i f f ' s de- partment cars traveling on the unopened section; he had a l s o seen construction crews working there. P l a i n t i i t had never been stopped o r told by anyone t o stay off the unopened section, s o he "figured i t was a l l r i g h t as long as you drove i n a careful and prudent manner on it1' and "figured it was legal". P l a i n t i f f i n h i s deposition indicated t h a t he had driven enough "on con- s t r u c t i o n roads where you don't t l y down them, you drive easy, because you never know what you a r e going t o find." A t the time of the accident the unopened section o i the roadway had been surfaced and sealed but it had not been striped. Guardrails were s t i l l being i n s t a l l e d . The record does not disclose whether the unopened section was signed or not, nor does it disclose what other construction work, i f any, remained uncompleted. About a month a f t e r the accident, the new highway was opened t o public t r a v e l . Defendant i s M. K. Draine who had purchased a house from the s t a t e of Montana a t public auction; the s t a t e had previously acquired t h i s house by condemnation or purchase i n connection with construction of the I n t e r s t a t e highway. Defendant, with the permission and consent o t both the s t a t e and the construction contractor, was using the unopened section of Intersection 90 t o haul the house away. He had driven h i s truck, with the house attached behind, west along the unopened section of t h e roadway and had apparently l e f t it parked for the night on the future eastbound area of the roadway facing west. The i n s t a n t personal injury action was f i l e d on November 14, 1969. P l a i n t i f f seeks recovery o t $233,500 damages allegedly resulting from defendant's negligence i n leaving h i s vehicle on the highway "without putting out any f l a r e s , f l a g s , or other warning devices whatsoever". ~ e f e n d a n t ' s answer contains f i v e defenses: (1) f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim, (2) a general denial, (3) contributory negligence, (4) assumption of r i s k , and (5) trespass by p l a i n t i f f . Three depositions were taken and f i l e d i n the action: the f i r s t from p l a i n t i f f ; the second from Robert L. Harper, construction superintendent for Peter Kiewit Sons ' Company, the construction contractor on the section of the I n t e r s t a t e highway i n question; and the t h i r d from Martin J. Briggeman, property manager for the Montana Highway Department. O n t h i s s t a t e of t h e record, defendant moved f o r summary judgment. After hearing thereon, Judge Green granted defendant 's motion and entered summary judgment i n favor of defendant, d i s - missing p l a i n t i f f ' s claim wich prejudice. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h i s summary judgment. There i s but a s i n g l e controlling issue upon appeal: Was p l a i n t i f f contributorily negligent a s a matter of law precluding recovery on h i s claim? ' Rule 56 (c) , M.R.Civ. P. , provides t h a t summary judgment "sha 1 1 be rendered forthwith i f t h e pleadings, depositions, answers t o interrogatories, and admissions on f i l e show there i s no genuine issue a s t o any material f a c t and t h a t the moving party is e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law." The burden of proof is on the party seeking summary judgment t o show the absence of any genuine issue of material f a c t and t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. Roope v. The Anaconda Company, - M o n t . - 2 - P.2d , 29 S t . Rep. 170; Byrne v. Plante, 154 Mont. 6 , 459 P.2d 266 and cases c i t e d therein. In t h i s case the negligence of defendant is conceded inso- f a r a s summary judgment is concerned. This e n t i r e controversy concerns whether p l a i n t i f f , under t h e undisputed f a c t s here, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Contributory negligence, by d e f i n i t i o n , involves the dual elements of (1) p l a i n t i f f ' s negligence and (2) proximate cause. M J I G #11.00; DeVerniero v. Eby, Mont . 9 P.2d , 29 St.Rep. 273 . P l a i n t i f f contends t h a t he was not contributorily negligent a s a matter of law because he was not a trespasser on the unopened highway against deiendant; t h a t h i s use of the unopened highway i n i t s e l f does not c o n s t i t u t e negligence a s a matter of law; t h a t he was not negligent i n the operation of h i s pickup a s a matter of law; and t h a t , i n any event, any a c t s o r omissions on h i s part were not, a s a matter of law, a proximate cause of t h e accident. Upon o r a l argument p l a i n t i f f indicated t h a t , i n h i s view, the following material f a c t s were i n controversy precluding summary judgment for defendant: (1) Was the roadway where t h e accident occurred an uncompleted road? (2) Must a vehicle t r a v e l on the shoulder of t h e highway t o g e t around t h e "zebra boardtt barricades and onto the unopened section of the roadway where the accident occurred? (3) \?hat was the s t a t u s of p l a i n t i f f on the unopened highway where the accident occurred? (4) Was p l a i n t i r f using the unopened highway with implied consent? ( 5 ) was p l a i n t i f f ' s negligence, i f any, a proximate cause of the accident? Directing our a t t e n t i o n i n i t i a l l y t o p l a i n t i f f ' s claim t h a t there a r e genuine issues of material f a c t precluding summary judgment. W e find none. Whether the roadway where t h e accident occurred was i n f a c t uncompleted is irrelevant. The undisputed facts show t h a t it was signed with three detour signs, barricaded with 5 o r 7 "zebra boards", and t h a t i t was not open t o t r a v e l by the public. P l a i n t i f f admitted i n h i s deposition t h a t he knew t h a t the roadway was under construction and t h a t he drove through or around t h e "zebra board" barricades t o get onto the roadway. The deposition of the construction superintendent in- dicates t h a t the roadway was unstriped, and t h a t the i n s t a l l a t i o n of guardrails was i n progress and uncompleted on t h e day of the accident. Under such circumstances whether the roadway was completed or not is an immaterial f a c t unnecessary t o t h e resolu- t i o n of any issue i n t h i s case. Nor is the question of whether a vehicle must t r a v e l on the shoulder of t h e highway t o g e t around t h e "zebra board" b a r r i - cades and onto t h e unopened section of t h e roadway a m a t e r i a l f a c t i n i s s u e here. P l a i n t i f f admits t h a t he knew t h e roadway was under construction, t h a t he drove through or around t h e "zebra board" barricades, and t h a t i n driving on t h e unopened roadway he was driving i n a construction zone. The deposition of Harper, t h e construction superintendent, shows t h a t t h e "zebra boards" were located a t t h e entrance t o t h e detour and " s e t a t a diagonal angle across the i n t e r s t a t e o r t h e portion of road t h a t ' s closed t o t r a f f i c " and were inspected and i n place only a few minutes p r i o r t o the accident, a l l of which is unrefuted. Whether p l a i n t i f f had t o t r a v e l on the shoulder of the highway t o g e t around t h e "zebra board" barricades has no m a t e r i a l i t y o r relevance t o any i s s u e i n t h i s case. The s t a t u s of p l a i n t i f f on t h e unopened s e c t i o n of t h e highway is not a question of f a c t but a question of law under the circumstances of t h i s case. Here t h e material f a c t s concerning p l a i n t i f f ' s entry upon and use of t h e unopened roadway a r e un- disputed. Under such conditions, p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t u s thereon is purely a question of law. Nor i s t h e use of t h e roadway by p l a i n t i f f with "implied consent", a s he contends, a material i s s u e of f a c t here. Section 32-2136 ( a ) , R.C.M. 1947, requires the d r i v e r of a motor v e h i c l e t o obey the i n s t r u c t i o n s of any o f f i c i a l t r a f f i c c o n t r o l device. Section 32-2119, R.C.M. 1947, defines o f f i c i a l t r a f f i c c o n t r o l devices a s " A l l s i g n s , s i g n a l s , markings, and devices * * * placed o r erected by a u t h o r i t y of a public body o r o f f i c i a l * * * f o r the purpose of regulating, w a rn ing , o r guiding t r a f f i c . " The deposition of the construction superintendent indicates t h a t the construction project was signed according t o s p e c i f i - cations of the Montana Highway Department. Thus the detour signs and "zebra board" barricades were o f f i c i a l t r a f f i c con- t r o l devices erected by public authority i n conformity with the foregoing p ~ o v i s i o n s of the highway code. Disobedience t o any of the provisions of the highway code is punishable a s a misdemeanor under the provisions of section 32-21-157, R.C .M. 1947. '.'Implied consent" is not an issue i n t h i s case a s our decision is not grounded on p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t u s on the highway. Accordingly, no issue of material f a c t is presented. Finally, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t a material issue of f a c t e x i s t s concerning proxima t e cause. W e disagree. P l a i n t i f f i n a dense fog maneuvered around or through the "zebra board" barricades t o enter a highway unopened f o r public t r a v e l , committing a misdemeanor i n the process. He knew he was i n a construction zone and t h a t "you never know what you a r e going t o find" there. Although h i s headlights were on and he was only driving 10-15 miles an hour, he was driving beyond t h e range of his headlights and vision. H i s deposition indicates t h a t he never saw defendant's parked truck with the house a t - tached behind and consequently h i t it headon without ever applying h i s brakes : "Q. Did you have any opportunity t o see t h i s truck and house before you a c t u a l l y h i t it; an opportunity t o brake your c a r , o r did you h i t it without braking? O r do you r e c a l l ? "A. I never seen it. I didn' t even know what I h i t , u n t i l I woke up. I seen I was pinned. The brake pedal had m y foot pinned down. . Your foot was under the brake pedal? "A. Was under the brake pedal. So--- "Q. To t h e best of your recollection----- "A. So I never touched t h e brakes. In f a c t P d i d n ' t even know what I h i t u n t i l a c a r came a long. I I Under these circumstances, p l a i n t i f f ' s own negligence contributed a s a proximate cause t o the c o l l i s i o n and h i s r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s a s a matter o t law. This is t h e only con- clusion possible under the undisputed facts,. Under such circum- stances the i s s u e of contributory negligence becomes a matter of law t o be determined by t h e court. 0 ' ~ r i e n v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 148 Mont. 429, 421 P.2d 710. Although no cases involving a c t i o n s for damages by one inotorist a g a i n s t another f o r obstructing an unopened highway have been brought t o our a t t e n t i o n by counsel and we have d i s - covered none, s e v e r a l cases involving a c t i o n s by motorists a g a i n s t construction contractors a r i s i n g from obstructions crea ted o r maintained on unopened highways have been c i t e d which involve the same p r i n c i p l e a s t h e i n s t a n t case with l i k e r e s u l t s . See Fenske v. Kramp Const. Co., 207 W i s . 397, 241 N.W. 349; Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252; Trantham v. G i l l i o z , (Mo.1961), 348 S.W.2d 737. Cases r e l i e d on by p l a i n t i k t t h a t reached a contrary r e s u l t a r e distinguishable on t h e f o l - lowing grounds: Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 29, 188 P.2d 600 (no barricades o r warnings a t m o t o r i s t ' s point of entry) ; Gaither v. Richardson Co., 152 Mont. 504, 452 P.2d 428 (absence of barricades) ; Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (no barricades) . W e find it unnecessary t o consider or decide whether p l a i n t i i f was a trespasser o r n o t , a s p l a i n t i f f cannot p r e v a i l whatever h i s s t a t u s may have been. For the foregoing reasons, we hold t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y negligent a s a matter of law precluding recovery by him on h i s claim. The summary judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t court is affirmed. Associate J u s t i c e