Title: Commonwealth v. Rosa-Roman

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12504 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DENNIS ROSA-ROMAN. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 10, 2020. - September 8, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Waiver of constitutional rights, Voluntariness of 
statement, Jury, Fair trial.  Due Process of Law, Police 
custody, Examination of jurors, Fair trial.  Fair Trial.  
Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Third-party culprit, Relevancy and materiality.  
Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Jury and jurors, 
Empanelment of jury, Challenge to jurors, Examination of 
jurors, Fair trial, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to 
jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 27, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Edward 
J. McDonough, Jr., J.; and the case was tried before Mark D. 
Mason, J. 
 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Dennis Rosa-Roman, was convicted 
by a jury of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, for 
stabbing to death the victim, Amanda Plasse, in her apartment.  
He was convicted on theories of both deliberate premeditation 
and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant appeals from his 
conviction on the grounds that his statements to police should 
have been suppressed after his Miranda rights were violated and 
that the trial judge erred by ruling against him on two juror 
challenges pursuant to Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 
491, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); by excluding third-party 
culprit evidence; by denying the defendant's motion to strike 
the prosecutor's opening statement; by striking a portion of the 
defendant's opening statement; and by declining to instruct the 
jury in accordance with Commonwealth v. Reid, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 
537 (1990), prejudicing the verdict.  After careful 
consideration of the record and the defendant's arguments, we 
affirm the defendant's conviction, and we decline to grant 
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found at trial, leaving the recitation of other facts for 
discussion in connection with the issues raised on appeal. 
 
On August 26, 2011, the victim was found stabbed to death 
in her apartment in Chicopee.  The victim had sustained multiple 
blunt force injuries to her face, head, and shoulders.  She had 
3 
 
scrapes and sharp force injuries to her face, neck, chest, and 
abdomen, including six stab wounds and two slashes to her neck 
from chin to collar bone. 
 
During the two-year investigation that followed, police 
received information from the victim's friends, family, and 
acquaintances.  In 2013, while reviewing the case file, State 
police Trooper Ronald Gibbons noticed a dry-erase board in a 
photograph of the victim's bedroom.  Written on the board were 
the words, "Dennis was here," with a date of "8/11/11."  Gibbons 
performed a search for people named Dennis who lived near the 
victim.  He found the defendant, who lived in nearby Westfield, 
and whose telephone number appeared in the victim's telephone 
records. 
 
On October 29, 2013, police approached the defendant and 
told him that they wanted to speak to him about a woman named 
Amanda from Chicopee.  The defendant confirmed that he knew the 
victim because he had sold marijuana to her.  At some point, the 
defendant told Gibbons that he had to leave and asked Gibbons 
for a telephone number so he could call Gibbons the following 
week.  The defendant discarded the cigarette he had been 
smoking, and Gibbons retrieved it for deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) testing. 
That same day, the defendant and his girlfriend went to the 
home of Melissa Hoy.  The defendant told Hoy about his encounter 
4 
 
with police.  Hoy asked the defendant whether the investigation 
concerned the victim, and the defendant stated that he did not 
know.  Hoy showed the defendant a picture of the victim on her 
telephone, and the defendant "got really quiet" and "put his 
head down."  He admitted that he knew her and that he sold her 
marijuana occasionally.  That night, the defendant returned to 
Hoy's home and apologized for lying to Hoy and his girlfriend.  
The defendant then told them that he had gone to the victim's 
home to deliver marijuana, and an unknown white male opened the 
victim's door, grabbed the bag of marijuana out of the 
defendant's hand, and told him to leave and not to return. 
 
In addition to these statements and additional statements 
made by the defendant over the course of multiple police 
interviews, the Commonwealth introduced forensic evidence.  DNA 
evidence recovered from underneath the victim's fingernails on 
both hands matched the Y-chromosome short tandem repeat DNA 
testing method profile of the defendant and his patrilineal male 
relatives.  The defendant's right palm print was found on a 
broken window near the door of the victim's apartment.  Bloody 
shoe prints were found on the right side of the victim's body 
that corresponded with a size seven of a certain brand of 
sneaker.  During the defendant's first interview at the police 
station, he was wearing sneakers similar to those matching the 
prints found on the victim, and police later recovered two pairs 
5 
 
of the same size and brand of sneaker from a bedroom closet in 
the defendant's residence. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress statements.  Police 
spoke with the defendant outside his home on October 29, 2013; 
at the Westfield police station on November 1 (first interview); 
in Westfield again on November 5 (second interview); and at the 
Chicopee police station on November 5 (third interview.  Before 
trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all statements 
he made after he allegedly invoked his Miranda rights during the 
second interview.  After a three-day evidentiary hearing, during 
which two officers testified, a Superior Court judge (motion 
judge) granted in part the defendant's motion with respect to 
certain statements that the defendant made during booking at 
Westfield.  The motion judge denied the defendant's motion as to 
all other statements.  We affirm the motion judge's order.  
Because the defendant alleges multiple constitutional violations 
throughout a series of interviews, we discuss each allegation 
chronologically. 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error, 'but conduct an independent review of his 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth v. 
White, 475 Mass. 583, 587 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 382-383 (2015).  However, "an 
6 
 
appellate court may independently review documentary evidence, 
and [the] lower court findings drawn from such evidence are not 
entitled to deference."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 
645, 654-655 (2018).  "The case is to be decided upon the entire 
evidence, however, giving due weight to the judge's findings 
that are entitled to deference" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Id. at 655.  Ultimately, this court will "make an 
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found" 
(citation omitted).  Hernandez, supra at 383. 
The following facts are derived from the motion judge's 
findings, and these facts are supplemented, as relevant, with 
statements drawn from the video exhibits in evidence. 
b.  November 1 Westfield interview.  On November 1, 2013, 
three days after police first spoke with the defendant at his 
home, the defendant telephoned Gibbons and told him that he had 
to speak with him immediately.  The defendant agreed to meet 
with Gibbons that day in Westfield.  Gibbons, Trooper Gary 
Fitzgerald, and Sergeant Eric Watson of the Chicopee police 
department met with the defendant in an interview room.  The 
defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights.  The 
defendant does not contest the validity of this particular 
waiver. 
7 
 
During this interview, the defendant told officers that he 
had met the victim one or two weeks before her murder.  On the 
day of the murder, according to the defendant, the victim called 
him to ask for marijuana.  When the defendant approached the 
victim's back door, he could hear a male voice arguing with the 
victim.  The defendant knocked on the door, and an unknown male 
answered the door and took the marijuana from him.  The 
defendant told police that he feared for his life because of 
this unknown male and that the male had been following him in 
different cars.  He asked for police protection. 
The defendant claimed that he had never been inside the 
victim's apartment, and he identified a friend who was with him 
on the day he had gone to the apartment.  According to the 
defendant, he had been hanging out with this friend, the friend 
waited in front of the home while the defendant went around the 
back, and the two left together on foot after the defendant's 
encounter with the man at the victim's door. 
Gibbons asked the defendant if they could collect a DNA 
sample, and the defendant readily agreed, stating, "Didn't you 
guys take a cigarette off me, anyways? . . .  I know you're 
investigating me, no matter what."1  At the end of the interview, 
                     
1 The quoted portions of the defendant's interviews are as 
reflected in the transcripts.  Reviewing the video recordings 
revealed minor discrepancies that are not material. 
8 
 
Gibbons read the defendant his statement, which the defendant 
signed. 
The defendant does not allege that his constitutional 
rights were violated in any way during the course of this first 
interview, and we conclude that there was no violation. 
c.  November 5 at Westfield police station.  On November 5, 
2013, Gibbons and other officers approached the defendant at his 
home and requested another interview.  Officers wanted to follow 
up on statements that the defendant had made during his first 
interview.  The defendant stated that he was willing to speak 
with officers, but that he was currently babysitting his 
girlfriend's child.  Gibbons offered to have another officer 
watch the child at the station, and the defendant agreed to the 
arrangement. 
 
Once in the interview room, Gibbons read the Miranda 
warnings to the defendant, which the defendant waived.2  At the 
start of the interview, the defendant was friendly with the 
officers, laughing with them before expressing concern that his 
girlfriend may be angry if she found out that he had brought her 
child to the police station. 
                     
2 The motion judge found that the defendant freely and 
willingly waived those rights and was eager to participate in 
the interview.  After viewing the recorded interview, we agree. 
9 
 
 
Throughout the interview, as the motion judge noted, the 
defendant repeatedly expressed a desire to assist the detectives 
with their investigation.  The defendant said, "This is 
terrible.  You guys need help"; "I gotta help you guys out.  You 
know what I'm saying"; "You need people to help. . . .  I can 
understand that, and I'm one of those people"; and "You got 
questions for me man."  The defendant made several statements 
indicating his desire to get home before his girlfriend returned 
from work, first saying, "I just have to hurry up.  My girl is 
gonna be out soon" and later saying, "I need to go soon.  Like, 
we need to wrap this up"; "My girl is about to be home soon"; 
and "Guys, my girl is getting out soon.  I have the house keys 
and her phone, you know? . . .  I'm trying to wrap this up and 
help you guys as much as I can."3 
 
The defendant acknowledged that he brought the victim 
marijuana on multiple occasions and that on one occasion, the 
defendant, his girlfriend, and the victim spoke on the victim's 
back porch. 
Gibbons showed the defendant a picture of a dry-erase board 
located in the victim's bedroom with the phrase, "Dennis was 
here" written on it.  Although the defendant previously had 
denied being inside the victim's apartment, he admitted that he 
                     
3 The defendant does not allege that any of these statements 
were attempts to invoke his Miranda rights. 
10 
 
had stepped inside to sign the dry-erase board, but explained 
that the board was located by the back door and that her bedroom 
did not look the way it was pictured in the photograph at the 
time.  In response, Watson asked, "How do you know this room 
didn't look like this?" and the defendant answered, "All I seen 
was a bed in her room.  That's about it." 
Gibbons asked the defendant if he had ever smoked marijuana 
with the victim inside the apartment, and the defendant admitted 
that he "lit" a "bowl" in the kitchen, "placed the lighter on 
the counter," and "sat on the couch."  Finally, the defendant 
stated, "Well, I have been inside her house.  But, like, I just 
don't want people to look at me like I'm a fucking murderer."  
He then said, "I seen that shit go down.  I heard that shit.  
And . . . I'm scared." 
 
When Gibbons informed the defendant that they did "a lot of 
processing" on the scene, the defendant stated that his 
fingerprints might be on a glass cup, the table, and a doorknob.  
The defendant then asked, "What did you guys find?  I wanna 
know."  Gibbons informed the defendant that they found "some 
things" underneath the victim's fingernails, and asked the 
defendant if he ever had a fight with the victim or a "scuffle," 
to which the defendant replied, "No." 
Watson informed the defendant that they tried to locate the 
friend that the defendant had identified as being with him on 
11 
 
the day of the murder but that this friend was in jail on that 
day.  The defendant emphatically stated that this was 
impossible. 
Gibbons again showed the defendant a picture of the dry-
erase board in the victim's bedroom and asked if the defendant 
had written anything besides his name on that board.  In 
response, the defendant said, "No.  I want to know what's going 
on.  You guys trying to pin this on me?  You guys trying to 
what?  What's up?  'Cuz I don't have no time here.  I gotta go."  
Gibbons explained, "We're still investigating," to which the 
defendant stated, "But like, I wanna know, like this shit ain't 
cool.  Like, you guys are asking me a bunch of shit. . . .  You 
need people to help." 
i.  First alleged invocation -- Miranda rights.  The 
defendant argues that he invoked his right to silence during the 
second interview when he said, "I want to know what's going on.  
You guys trying to pin this on me?  You guys trying to what?  
What's up?  'Cuz I don't have no time here.  I gotta go."  The 
motion judge, however, disagreed. 
First, the motion judge found that the defendant was not in 
custody at the time of this statement.  He credited Gibbons's 
testimony that it was only when officers learned that the 
defendant's DNA was found underneath the victim's fingernails, 
which happened much later in the interview, that the defendant 
12 
 
was no longer free to leave.4  Second, the motion judge stated 
that even if the defendant had been in custody for the entire 
interview, the defendant properly was advised of his rights at 
the start of the interview, and he freely and willingly waived 
those rights.  Finally, the motion judge concluded that this 
statement did not "express[] clear, unequivocal unwillingness to 
continue with the interview."  We agree. 
When a suspect is not in custody, and therefore not subject 
to custodial interrogation, he has "no right of silence to 
invoke."  Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 665 (2016), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 259 (2017).  The defendant bears the 
burden of proving that he was in custody.  Commonwealth v. 
Almonte, 444 Mass. 511, 517, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1040 (2005), 
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 
71, 79-80 (2007).  "An interview is custodial where a reasonable 
person in the suspect's shoes would experience the environment 
in which the interrogation took place as coercive" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 
617 (2018).  "Four factors are considered in determining whether 
a person is in custody:  (1) the place of the interrogation; (2) 
whether the officers have conveyed to the person being 
                     
4 The defendant himself did not think he was in custody, as 
approximately ten minutes later, he asked, "You got questions 
for me, man?  Are you gonna drop me off?" 
13 
 
questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; 
(3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the 
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in 
its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, 
at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was 
free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the 
interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as 
evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an arrest."  
Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 501 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001).  A judge 
must "consider[] the above factors in total."  Amaral, supra at 
502.  See Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 301 (2020) 
(Groome factors "provide a framework for assessing what kinds of 
circumstances may be relevant when a court considers whether a 
defendant was in custody; they do not limit the obligation of a 
court to consider all of the circumstances that shed light on 
the custody analysis"). 
No one factor is dispositive, and questioning that occurs 
at a police station is not necessarily custodial interrogation.  
See Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 46 (2015); Almonte, 444 
Mass. at 518; Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 657 (2001).  
For example, a defendant arriving voluntarily at a police 
station would suggest that an interrogation there is 
noncustodial.  See Amaral, 482 Mass. at 501; Almonte, supra; 
14 
 
Sparks, supra at 656; Commonwealth v. Smith, 426 Mass. 76, 80-81 
(1997), S.C., 460 Mass. 318 (2011).  This may be true even where 
a suspect agrees to a police request to go to a police station 
for questioning.  Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 118-119 
(1998).  Where interrogating officers are focusing their 
investigation on a suspect, that suspect may not be subject to 
custodial interrogation if the general demeanor of the exchange 
is "explanatory rather than accusatory" (citation omitted).  
Libby, supra at 46.  The subjective suspicion of interrogating 
officers is relevant to the custody analysis "only to the extent 
that an officer's suspicions influence the objective conditions 
of an interrogation, such that a reasonable person in the 
position of [the suspect] would not feel free to leave the place 
of questioning" (citation omitted).  Id.  See Medina, 485 Mass. 
at 302-306 (defendant not in custody based on assessment of 
over-all nature of interaction with police). 
In Amaral, 482 Mass. at 501-502, we agreed with the motion 
judge that the defendant was not in custody during an 
interrogation at a police station that ultimately ended in his 
arrest because (1) he had gone to the station voluntarily; (2) 
the interrogating officers had not conveyed to the defendant 
that he was a suspect or revealed that they had incriminating 
evidence against him; (3) the exchange was "calm and cordial 
. . . and the defendant heavily influenced [the interview's] 
15 
 
direction"; and (4) until the point of his arrest, the defendant 
had never been told he was in custody and indicated that he felt 
free to leave by calling his mother to make dinner plans. 
Here, the motion judge's finding that the defendant was not 
in custody at this point during the second interview was not 
clearly erroneous.  There is ample evidence in the record to 
support such a conclusion.  Specifically, the motion judge 
credited Gibbons's testimony that (1) the defendant voluntarily 
agreed to speak with police at the station after Gibbons 
requested a second interview; (2) Gibbons testified that he and 
other officers would have honored the defendant's refusal in the 
event that he declined their request; (3) the defendant told 
Gibbons that he wanted to help with the case; (4) the defendant 
was not under arrest; (5) the room in which the interview was 
held was the same room used during the November 1 interview, for 
which the defendant does not claim he was in custody; (6) the 
tone of the interview was cordial and respectful, punctuated 
with several statements by the defendant expressing his 
willingness to assist the detectives; and (7) the defendant was 
eager to gather information related to the officers' 
investigation. 
As in Amaral, the defendant went to the station 
voluntarily, and until the point of his arrest, interrogating 
officers had not conveyed to the defendant that he was a suspect 
16 
 
or revealed that they had incriminating evidence against him.  
The exchange was cordial and respectful, and the defendant 
indicated that he felt free to leave by his numerous requests to 
hasten the interview so he could return home before his 
girlfriend arrived.  These factors, viewed together, support the 
motion judge's conclusion that the defendant was not in custody 
during the Westfield interrogation on November 5. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that the defendant was in 
custody, we also conclude that the motion judge did not err in 
finding that the defendant did not express a clear, unequivocal 
unwillingness to continue with the interview when he stated, 
"You guys trying to what?  What's up?  'Cuz I don't have no time 
here.  I gotta go."  The responsibility for invoking the rights 
to silence and counsel after having waived them "rests squarely 
in the hands of criminal defendants" (citation omitted).  
Durand, 475 Mass. at 665.  "Whether invocation of the right is 
clear and unequivocal is to be determined by the totality of the 
circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 488 
(2005). 
In this case, considering the defendant's statement, "You 
guys trying to what?  What's up?  I don't have no time here.  I 
gotta go," in the context of the entire exchange, such statement 
reasonably could easily have been perceived as a desire to speed 
the interview along because he was babysitting his girlfriend's 
17 
 
young child, and not as an expression of unwillingness to 
continue.  He indeed had made numerous statements during the 
interview, as outlined supra, about needing to "hurry up" or 
leave "soon" to return home to his girlfriend.  Further, the 
defendant made several statements both before and after the 
alleged invocation indicating a desire to help the officers with 
their investigation and seeking to obtain information for 
himself.  In fact, after the first alleged invocation of the 
right to remain silent, the defendant continued to speak with 
police for nearly an hour, repeatedly telling them that he 
wanted to help them catch the murderer.5  In the context of the 
entire interview, this statement does not even rise to the level 
of an ambiguous invocation. 
ii.  Second alleged invocation -- right to counsel.  After 
the defendant stated, "I gotta go," the interview continued.  
Gibbons asked the defendant why he thought the victim might have 
been killed, and the defendant speculated that the victim owed 
someone money or stole drugs from someone and "maybe a fucking 
dealer . . . got mad at her or something."  Because the 
defendant previously had told police that the victim had called 
him on that day to get marijuana, Watson told the defendant that 
                     
5 At one point he told police, "I wish I could give you 
more."  Later, he stated that he wanted to "help you guys as 
much as I can." 
18 
 
they had searched the victim's telephone records and there was 
no record of a telephone call to him on that day.  The defendant 
told officers that he "smoked so much" marijuana that he did not 
"remember a lot of things" and was not sure if he had his days 
mixed up. 
Nearly two hours into the interview, Gibbons stepped out of 
the room for approximately nine minutes, during which time he 
learned for the first time that police had DNA implicating the 
defendant.  When Gibbons returned, he told the defendant that 
they had physical evidence implicating him, and Watson informed 
the defendant that they had found DNA connecting him to the 
victim underneath her fingernails.  In response, the defendant 
stated, "I know the fucking murderer and I tried to save her 
life."  Gibbons asked, "What did you do?"  The defendant 
explained, "I tried to grab her and the guy tossed me down the 
stairs.  I can't give you no more.  I'm sorry.  That's it."  
Then the defendant said, "I want a lawyer.  I want a lawyer.  
. . . That is it."  The officers immediately ceased questioning, 
ended the interview, and arrested the defendant. 
iii.  Defendant makes spontaneous statement to police 
during booking in Westfield.  Moments later, as Gibbons and the 
defendant proceeded to the booking area at the Westfield police 
station, but before they entered the booking room and turned on 
the video equipment, the defendant stated, unprompted, that his 
19 
 
DNA was underneath the victim's fingernails because the 
defendant was pulled into the victim's apartment during the 
attack and the victim grabbed him.6 
iv.  Questioning defendant during Westfield booking.  The 
defendant repeatedly interrupted the booking process to tell 
police that they had arrested the wrong person and that his 
family was now in danger.  Detective Todd Edwards, who overheard 
the defendant's unprompted statements and was unaware that the 
defendant had invoked his right to counsel,7 asked the defendant 
if the victim had grabbed him.  In response, the defendant 
answered that he tried to grab the victim, but the victim had 
grabbed him, and he apologized for not trying to save her. 
The motion judge found that in this instance police did not 
scrupulously observe the defendant's invocation of the right to 
counsel, and he correctly suppressed the defendant's statements 
that were made in response to the officer's questioning.  The 
defendant alleges no error here, and we agree that the 
defendant's responses to Edwards were found properly to be 
inadmissible at trial.  See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
                     
6 Gibbons testified about this encounter at the motion to 
suppress hearing. 
 
7 The motion judge notes that there was no indication that 
Edwards was present during the Westfield interview.  Gibbons 
testified that Edwards was not present during the interview nor 
was he watching the interview from the detective bureau. 
20 
 
481-482 (1981) (once defendant invokes right to counsel, all 
questioning must cease); Commonwealth v. Sarourt Nom, 426 Mass. 
152, 157 (1997) ("before police may recommence interrogation in 
these circumstances, they must first obtain from the suspect a 
voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver"). 
d.  Chicopee interview.  Shortly after being booked in 
Westfield, the defendant was transported to the Chicopee police 
station.  The transporting officer, David Gagnon, testified that 
there was no conversation during the transport except when the 
defendant asked if he could stop at his girlfriend's house to 
tell her that he loved her.  In Chicopee, the defendant was 
again advised of his Miranda rights.  The defendant was booked 
and taken to a holding cell until another trooper was ready to 
take the defendant's "major case" prints.8  When the print setup 
was complete, Gibbons walked the defendant to the interview room 
to take his prints.  At this point, the defendant reinitiated 
conversation with Gibbons, stating that he wanted to clear his 
name. 
The defendant was then informed of his Miranda rights for a 
second time at the Chicopee police station.  He waived those 
rights and provided police with a third version of events.  He 
                     
8 "Major case" prints comprise the entire hand, including 
the palm, and require a more extensive equipment setup than what 
is required for the collection of just fingerprints. 
21 
 
said that he had gone to the victim's apartment that day to hang 
out with her, they smoked marijuana, and he was at her apartment 
for about two hours.  She told him to come back later to smoke 
more.  He admitted that he was not with his friend and that he 
had lied about his friend's presence at the apartment because he 
hated the friend and wanted to get him in trouble. 
As he approached the apartment, he could hear the victim 
screaming, "Stop, stop, stop, stop.  This isn't right.  Stop, 
stop, stop."  When he heard something slam and the sound of 
glass breaking, he pushed inside the door and entered the house, 
where he found the assailant and the victim in the kitchen.  The 
assailant was on top of the victim.  The defendant tried to 
separate them when the assailant pushed him back and brandished 
a knife.  The defendant said that the victim grabbed him when he 
tried to help her off the floor.  The defendant fought with the 
assailant and eventually was punched in the jaw repeatedly 
before fleeing out the door. 
The defendant told police that he had lied to them about 
what had happened because he feared for his safety and the 
safety of his family.  Gibbons tried to get the defendant to 
identify the third man, and the defendant responded, "I can't 
say nothing.  I really can't.  I hold to my word, I can't say 
nothing."  Gibbons asked, "Hold your word to who?" and said, 
"You're going to jail, though."  The defendant then said, "I 
22 
 
know I'm going to jail, so I'm not saying no more.  So, I'm 
sorry, you have to charge me with this shit.  I'm done.  You can 
try this shit, but I'm done."  The defendant continued to speak 
with police, revealing that the victim owed him money for drugs, 
the killer was the defendant's drug dealer, and the defendant 
went to the victim's apartment with his dealer to get paid.  He 
also stated that after the violent attack, he looked down at the 
victim's body and thought to himself, "Wow, how do I get myself 
out of this?" 
The defendant asserts two bases on which statements made 
during the Chicopee interview should be suppressed.  He argues, 
first, that the entirety of the interview was tainted by the 
Edwards violation during the Westfield booking.  Edwards, 451 
U.S. at 481-482.  In the alternative, the defendant argues that, 
if the taint of the prior Edwards violation was removed, he 
invoked his right to silence during the interview when he 
stated, "I know I'm going to jail, so I'm not saying no more.  
So, I'm sorry, you have to charge me with this shit.  I'm done.  
You can try this shit, but I'm done." 
i.  Taint of the Edwards violation.  "In this Commonwealth, 
there is a presumption that a statement made following the 
violation of a suspect's Miranda rights is tainted. . . .  [The] 
presumption may be overcome by showing that either:  (1) after 
the illegally obtained statement, there was a break in the 
23 
 
stream of events that sufficiently insulated the post-Miranda 
statement from the tainted one; or (2) the illegally obtained 
statement did not incriminate the defendant, or, as it is more 
colloquially put, the cat was not out of the bag" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 658 n.9.  The second 
prong of the analysis asks whether, in giving the statements in 
Chicopee, "the defendant was motivated by the belief that, after 
a prior coerced statement, his effort to withhold further 
information would be futile and he had nothing to lose by 
repetition or amplification of the earlier statements" (emphasis 
added).  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 552 (2014). 
The motion judge held, and the Commonwealth agrees, that 
the presumption of taint created by the prior Edwards violation 
was overcome both by a sufficient break in the stream of events 
and because the proverbial cat was not yet out of the bag.  We 
agree with the motion judge's analysis under both prongs. 
We recognize that where police illegally have obtained a 
statement from a suspect, "a subsequent statement may be the 
product of the initial coercion even where the suspect knowingly 
and voluntarily waives [his] right to silence and to counsel, if 
the custodial interrogation was essentially continuous or if the 
suspect believes that it would be futile to invoke [his] rights 
because [he] incriminated [himself] in the first statement."  
Thomas, 469 Mass. at 551.  However, "'[i]f the defendant's 
24 
 
subsequent statements were not a product of coercion, either by 
coercive external forces or primarily by a sense of futility 
that he has already incriminated himself with the first 
statement,' then suppression of the subsequent statement is not 
required."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 
581 (1995). 
The defendant reinitiated conversation with Gibbons by 
making a spontaneous statement after he was booked in Chicopee.  
See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 276 (1980) (Powell, 
J., concurring) ("Massiah [v. United States, 430 U.S. 201, 206 
(1964),] does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous 
statements that are not elicited by governmental action"); 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 727 (2014), S.C., 479 
Mass. 52 (2018) (defendant's statements made at time of arrest, 
transport, and booking "were spontaneous and not obtained 
through police questioning, and . . . therefore Miranda 
protections did not apply"); United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 
78, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Edwards does not bar the introduction 
into evidence of spontaneous utterances merely because the 
utterances occur subsequent to the accused's invocation of his 
right to counsel").  When analyzing whether there was a 
sufficient "break in the stream of events," the court focuses 
"on external constraints, continuing or new, which may have 
overborne the defendant's will," the "temporal proximity" of the 
25 
 
two statements, and the "presence of intervening circumstances" 
between the two statements (citations omitted).  Prater, 420 
Mass. at 582.  In Prater, this court concluded that there was a 
sufficient break in the stream of events where (1) ninety 
minutes elapsed between the defendant's first, coerced 
confession and his second, voluntary one; and (2) the defendant 
appeared calm and relaxed during the second confession.  Id. 
Here, there was a two-hour break between the Edwards 
violation in Westfield and the interrogation in Chicopee.  
Further, the two occurred at different locations, and the 
defendant was transported from Westfield to Chicopee without any 
improper questioning by police.  After arriving in Chicopee and 
again receiving Miranda warnings during booking there, the 
defendant reinitiated conversation with Gibbons, stating that he 
wanted to assert his innocence.9  Gibbons recited Miranda 
warnings to the defendant again, meaning the defendant received 
such warnings twice between the Edwards violation and the 
subsequent interrogation in Chicopee.  These circumstances, 
taken together, indicate a sufficient break in the stream of 
events to overcome the presumption of coercion arising from the 
prior Edwards violation.  Therefore, the initiation of the 
                     
9 The motion judge credited Gibbons's testimony that the 
defendant reinitiated conversation without any prompting or 
solicitation from Gibbons. 
26 
 
Chicopee interrogation did not violate the defendant's Miranda 
rights. 
It also is clear from the record that the defendant did not 
feel, at the time of initiating conversation in Chicopee, that 
the "cat was out of the bag" due to any responses he gave to the 
improper questioning in Westfield.  As previously noted, the cat 
is not out of the bag "[i]f the defendant's subsequent 
statements were not a product of coercion . . . by a sense of 
futility that he has already incriminated himself with the first 
statement" (emphasis added).  Prater, 420 Mass. at 581. 
First, the improper questioning during the Westfield 
booking did not lead to the revelation of any new material 
information.  Therefore, to the extent that any incriminating 
statement was made before such improper questioning and was not 
the result of coercion, the "cat out of the bag" analysis is 
irrelevant because the Edwards violation occurred after the 
defendant made the incriminating statements.  It also is clear 
that the defendant did not feel he had made incriminating 
statements that would render further efforts to withhold 
information futile.  On the contrary, he appeared eager to 
assert his innocence.  The motion judge found that "the video of 
the interview in Chicopee reflected a man motivated to tell his 
side of the story, and not one who has buckled under the 
27 
 
pressure of a coercive environment."  After reviewing the video 
footage, we agree. 
ii.  Alleged invocation during interview.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that he unequivocally invoked his right to 
silence when he stated, "I know I'm going to jail, so I'm not 
saying no more.  So, I'm sorry, you have to charge me with this 
shit.  I'm done.  You can try this shit, but I'm done."  When 
the statement is analyzed in the context of the interview, it is 
apparent that the statement was made when the defendant was 
explaining to police that he would not identify the man who he 
claimed killed the victim to avoid being labeled as a "snitch."  
The motion judge found that, in the totality of the 
circumstances, the defendant's statement fell short of a clear 
and unequivocal invocation, and police had no obligation to 
cease questioning.  We agree.  The defendant's statement was not 
a clear, unequivocal invocation of his right to cease 
questioning.  See Durand, 475 Mass. at 665-666 (no invocation of 
right where defendant stated, "I want to go home and I want to 
go to bed" and "I can't take any more of this," followed by 
defendant continuing to talk without prompting from officers).  
There was no error.10 
                     
10 The prosecutor's opening statement began:  "Wow, how am I 
going to get myself out of this.  Those, ladies and gentlemen 
are the words of this defendant when he talked about how he felt 
right after he watched Amanda Plasse take her last breath in her 
28 
 
e.  Voluntariness.  The defendant argues that the Chicopee 
statement was involuntary because he was young and immature 
and did not understand the process.  He further argues that 
his statement was involuntary because giving him a cigarette 
before the interview was the "equivalent of giving him drugs 
to obtain a Miranda waiver."  The video recording shows that 
at the time he waived his rights and gave a statement, "[h]e 
was sober, alert, oriented, and lucid."  Commonwealth v. 
Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 597 (2010).  The recording reveals 
that as Gibbons began to advise the defendant of his Miranda 
rights, the defendant interrupted to ask if they had to go 
through all of the warnings again.  Gibbons confirmed that 
they did, and then asked the defendant if he understood each 
individual warning.  The recording also shows that the 
defendant was not subjected to any psychological coercion or 
improper tactics.  Cf. id. at 596.  He was calm and 
deliberative throughout the interview process. 
                     
kitchen . . . ."  The defendant did not object to this statement 
at trial, but he now argues that the statement was so grossly 
misleading that it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  When the 
Commonwealth charges a defendant with murder in the first degree 
on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the prosecutor is 
permitted to attempt to illustrate the magnitude of the crime 
during his or her opening statement.  Commonwealth v. Siny Van 
Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 554 (2011).  Moreover, the judge 
appropriately instructed the jurors that opening statements are 
not evidence.  Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 831 
(1996). 
29 
 
The defendant also claims that he was told during the 
Westfield booking that he would die in jail and that this 
tainted the voluntariness of his later statement.  Our 
review of the video recording of the interview in Chicopee 
reveals that when the defendant said a second time that he 
was going to die in jail Gibbons appeared to say, "You 
will, you would hope so," in response to another officer, 
not the defendant.11  Where our review of the record reveals 
no improper police tactics, this argument is without merit.12  
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549, 555 (2001) (confession 
voluntary where no evidence of police pressure and defendant, 
although emotionally upset, spoke calmly and acted 
rationally). 
                     
11 Throughout the booking procedure, Gibbons avoided 
speaking to the defendant, despite the defendant's repeated 
attempts to engage him and the other officers.  When Gibbons 
stated, "You will, you would hope so," he was turned toward 
another officer.  Additionally, there is no evidence that the 
defendant heard the statement by Gibbons as he did not appear to 
react to it in any way. 
 
12 The defendant also argues that the officers attempted to 
coerce a confession by offering to find the defendant's 
biological father.  This argument is without merit, and it 
completely mischaracterizes what happened during the interview.  
Gibbons asked the defendant for his parents' names, and the 
defendant stated that he did not know his father.  After the 
defendant pleaded with officers to locate his father, Gibbons 
only responded, "I don't know.  We could try."  Commonwealth v. 
Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 484 (2005) (waiver of Miranda rights 
voluntary where defendant had "purported hope at the time that 
he would receive medical help for his pain after talking with 
the police"). 
30 
 
2.  The Soares challenges.  During jury selection, the 
defendant objected, under Soares, 377 Mass. at 486, to the 
Commonwealth's use of peremptory strikes on two minority jurors:  
juror no. 29, a Hispanic female, and juror no. 2, an African-
American female.  With regard to both jurors, the trial judge 
determined that a prima facie showing of impropriety had been 
made; however, the judge denied both challenges, finding that 
the Commonwealth's proffered reasons for each juror were 
adequate and genuine.  Because the defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth's justifications for exercising a peremptory strike 
on each juror were neither adequate nor genuine, we analyze each 
peremptory challenge in turn. 
 
a.  Juror no. 29.  During venire, juror no. 29 raised her 
juror card in response to the question, "Do you have any 
interest whatsoever in this case or its outcome?"  At sidebar, 
the juror did not mention that she had raised her hand in 
response to this question, which prompted the Commonwealth to 
ask the court to inquire further on this issue.  In response, 
the juror stated, "I've always been like -- I've always liked 
the criminal justice system.  It's always interesting."  To 
further clarify, the judge asked, "Do you have any, as we would 
say, vested interest? . . .  By that, meaning, do you have any 
stake in this case?"  The juror responded, "No.  No."  Defense 
counsel asked similar follow-up questions and received responses 
31 
 
indicating that the juror had initially misinterpreted the 
meaning of the word "interest" in the judge's question.13 
 
When defense counsel challenged the Commonwealth's 
peremptory strike of juror no. 29, the judge found that there 
was a prima facie showing of an improper challenge because the 
defendant was Hispanic and none of the four jurors who 
previously had been seated appeared to be Hispanic.  When asked 
to provide a group-neutral basis for the challenge, the 
prosecutor explained, 
"[I]t solely has to do with the unsettled feeling that the 
Commonwealth has in regards to the fact that [juror no. 29] 
raised her hand in regard to having a stake in this case 
and has . . . an interest in the case and an interest in 
the outcome of the case.  [Juror no. 29] raised her hand to 
that question, but when she came to sidebar she . . . 
didn't freely volunteer that she had raised her hand to 
that question.  We had to ask her about that.  She 
indicated that she did for a reason that she's just 
interested in criminal law.  But it gave the Commonwealth 
an unsettled feeling that it had to be brought to her 
attention.  In addition, in looking at her juror 
questionnaire, she is very overeager to be on this jury.  I 
would note that she appears to be a single mother of three 
young children without any spousal support.  And all of 
that taken together, the Commonwealth has an unsettled 
feeling as to her eagerness and overeagerness to want to be 
on this jury." 
 
The judge found that the explanation given was both "adequate 
and genuine," and that the Commonwealth's basis for exercising a 
                     
13 Defense counsel asked if the juror's interest was because 
she was "interested generally" in the case, and counsel 
confirmed that the juror was not "looking forward to acquitting 
or convicting any particular defendant." 
32 
 
peremptory strike of juror no. 29 was "clear and reasonably 
specific and personal to Juror Number 29."  The judge agreed 
with the Commonwealth, in that he "maintain[ed] some concerns 
initially" when the juror stated that the case would present no 
hardship despite the fact that she had three young children and 
was a part-time worker at a fast food restaurant.14  The judge 
concluded that juror no. 29 "was more eager to participate in 
the trial than we generally see" and that the challenge fell 
"within the parameters of a peremptory challenge when combined 
with the other factor that [the judge] raised."  He noted the 
defendant's objection for the record, but allowed the peremptory 
strike to stand. 
 
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit 
a party from exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of 
race" or any other protected class.  Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 
Mass. 307, 319 (2017), citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
95 (1986), and Soares, 377 Mass. at 486.  While the Federal 
inquiry "turns on the right of the prospective juror to be free 
                     
14 Although it is true that potential jurors sometimes 
express a reluctance to serve because of inconvenience, there 
are those who are eager to serve either because of an interest 
in our criminal justice system or to fulfill their duty as a 
citizen.  Being a twenty-nine year old single mother of three 
with a part-time job in a fast food restaurant is not 
incompatible with an interest in serving as a juror, one of the 
more meaningful ways to participate in our democracy. 
33 
 
from discrimination in the exercise of his or her right to 
participate in the administration of the law," the art. 12 
inquiry "focuses on the defendant's right to be tried by a 
fairly drawn jury of his or her peers" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Jones, supra.  "Regardless of the perspective from 
which the problem is viewed, the result appears to be the same."  
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 n.6 (2008). 
 
The procedure that follows a Batson-Soares challenge is 
well established: 
"First, the burden is on the objecting party to make a 
prima facie showing of impropriety that overcomes the 
presumption of regularity afforded to peremptory 
challenges.  Next, if the judge finds that the objecting 
party has established a prima facie case, the party 
attempting to exercise a peremptory challenge bears the 
burden of providing a group-neutral reason for the 
challenge.  Finally, the judge then evaluates whether the 
proffered reason is adequate and genuine.  Only if it is 
both may the peremptory challenge be allowed."  (Quotations 
and citations omitted.) 
 
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 390-391 (2018).  
Because the trial judge found that the defendant had established 
a prima facie showing of impropriety with respect to this 
juror,15 our analysis turns on whether the judge appropriately 
                     
15 This court has adopted the Federal language to clarify 
the first step of a Batson-Soares inquiry.  "[T]he presumption 
of propriety is rebutted when the totality of the relevant facts 
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 511 (2020). 
34 
 
concluded that the Commonwealth's reasoning was both "adequate" 
and "genuine." 
 
"We grant deference to a judge's ruling on whether a 
permissible ground for the peremptory challenge has been shown 
and will not disturb it so long as it is supported by the 
record."  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804, 811 (2000). 
 
An explanation is adequate if "it is clear and reasonably 
specific, personal to the juror and not based on the juror's 
group affiliation . . . , and related to the particular case 
being tried" (quotations and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 464-465 (2003).  We repeatedly have 
held that "[c]hallenges based on subjective data such as a 
juror's looks or gestures, or a party's 'gut' feeling should 
rarely be accepted as adequate because such explanations can 
easily be used as pretexts for discrimination."  Id. at 465. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth suggested five possible grounds for 
exercising a peremptory strike on juror no. 29:  (1) the juror 
raised her hand to indicate that she had an interest in the 
outcome of the case; (2) the juror did not "freely volunteer" at 
sidebar that she had raised her hand; (3) the juror was "very 
overeager to be on this jury"; (4) the juror was a single mother 
of three young children without any spousal support; and finally 
(5) all of those factors taken together left the Commonwealth 
with an "unsettled feeling."  The judge found that the 
35 
 
explanation given was both adequate and genuine and noted that 
overeagerness to participate would not survive a challenge for 
cause, but when combined with the juror's status as the "sole 
supporter for [her] children," it fell "within the parameters of 
peremptory challenge." 
 
This court reviews a trial judge's decision to allow a 
juror to be struck through the use of a peremptory challenge for 
an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 
593, 602 (2018).  While we may not have allowed this strike, we 
do not conclude that the judge, who was able to observe the 
jurors and the attorneys, erred in determining that this 
challenge was within the permissible range of peremptory 
challenges.  L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014) (defining abuse of discretion as decision that "falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives").  Although we 
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding 
that the prosecutor's "unsettled feeling" about this juror was 
not based on the juror's race or sex, we pause to comment. 
The first two reasons were interconnected.  The 
Commonwealth expressed concern that the juror had a "stake in 
this case," and this was compounded by the fact that the juror 
did not bring her response to this question to the court's 
attention at sidebar.  But, the juror's responses to further 
questioning made it abundantly clear that the juror was confused 
36 
 
by the meaning of the word "interest" in this context.  A "lack 
of working knowledge of the vocabulary of criminal law . . . 
simply does not qualify as a valid, race-neutral basis on which 
to exercise a peremptory challenge here."  Benoit, 452 Mass. at 
224. 
 
The third and fourth reasons also are interconnected.  Both 
the Commonwealth and the judge take issue with the juror's 
apparent eagerness to participate as a juror, especially in 
light of her perceived status as a single mother of three 
children working at a fast food restaurant.  We caution that 
reasoning of this nature should be scrutinized carefully.  
Compare id. at 224-225 ("occupation as legitimate disqualifier 
should be carefully scrutinized").  Here, although we do not 
conclude that the judge erred in concluding that the 
prosecutor's reasons were proper, we remind attorneys that they 
should search their conscience for implicit bias and 
stereotypes. 
b.  Juror no. 2.  During a different panel voir dire, the 
Commonwealth asked the panel if they would have trouble 
convicting the defendant if they felt that he was guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but still had lingering questions.  This 
prompted responses from multiple jurors.  One juror volunteered 
that it would "really depend on some of our questions that 
didn't get answered."  When juror no. 2 was asked to respond, 
37 
 
she stated that she agreed with the juror who had explained that 
it would depend on the unanswered question.  As the Commonwealth 
continued to ask juror no. 2 clarifying questions, the juror 
maintained that she would not "be able to put the thoughts aside 
because [she] would still be thinking about the question that 
wasn't answered," and that although she would "try [her] hardest 
not to [speculate]," it "might" affect her deliberations. 
The Commonwealth moved to strike juror no. 2 for cause, and 
the defendant objected.  The judge sustained the objection 
because he was "satisfied that she would be willing to follow 
[his] instructions."  The Commonwealth then exercised a 
peremptory challenge to excuse juror no. 2, and the defendant 
again objected.  The Commonwealth argued that the juror was 
being challenged because of her answers to the reasonable doubt 
questions, which made the prosecutor feel "unsettled."  The 
judge again found that there was a prima facie showing of an 
improper challenge, but stated, 
"I understand the Commonwealth's concerns relative to Juror 
Number 2's responses that were posed of her during the 
panel portion of the voir dire.  Certainly there was a 
degree of equivocation in Juror Number 2's responses which 
might righteously be the basis for a peremptory challenge.  
And I've conducted a meaningful independent evaluation and 
find that the Commonwealth's basis for their challenge is 
both adequate and genuine.  So, therefore, the Soares 
challenge is denied." 
 
 
Because the juror indicated that she might not be able to 
return a guilty verdict, even if the Commonwealth proved its 
38 
 
case beyond a reasonable doubt, we determine that this was an 
adequate reason to use a peremptory strike.  With regard to 
genuineness, again, here the judge was in a position to evaluate 
both the prosecutor and the juror's demeanor.  Maldonado, 439 
Mass. at 465-466 ("For example, while a proffered explanation 
based solely on the innocuous demeanor of a juror might 
generally be considered inadequate, the judge's specific 
observations of the juror might well provide the basis for 
exclusion where odd or inappropriate deportment is noted").  
Although the judge rendered sparse findings, the record does 
"explicitly contain the judge's separate findings as to both 
adequacy and genuineness" as required by Maldonado.  Id.  There 
is nothing in the record that requires a conclusion that the 
prosecutor's challenge was not genuine.  The reasons given were 
personal to juror no. 2 and not based on the juror's group 
affiliations.  Therefore, there was no structural error. 
 
3.  Third-party culprit evidence.  Before trial, the 
defendant moved to admit certain statements based on a third-
party culprit theory.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. 782, 800 (2009) ("A defendant may introduce evidence that 
tends to show that another person committed the crime or had the 
motive, intent, and opportunity to commit it" [citation 
omitted]).  The defendant sought to admit three key pieces of 
evidence:  the testimony of two witnesses who would have 
39 
 
testified that a third party confessed to the murder, and a 
recorded police interview where the same third party recanted an 
accusation that someone else had committed the murder. 
The judge did not allow the defendant to admit the 
statements under a third-party culprit theory because the 
statements were hearsay.  The judge did, however, allow the two 
statements in evidence as part of the defendant's argument that 
the police failed adequately to investigate alternate suspects 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  
Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801-802.  Further, although the 
recorded interview itself was not allowed, defense counsel was 
allowed, under Bowden, to elicit testimony from the police that 
this alleged third party had recanted his initial accusation. 
The defendant argues that the judge's decision to exclude 
his third-party culprit defense denied him his right to a fair 
trial.  The defendant further argues that trial counsel's 
"failure to press the issue" manifestly was unreasonable.16 
                     
16 The defendant also argues that the judge's order striking 
a crucial portion of trial counsel's opening statement was 
prejudicial error.  The judge struck one portion of one sentence 
from the defendant's four-page opening argument.  The sentence 
was, "They were not interested in investigating Ryan Coggins and 
it was he who killed, not Dennis."  Additionally, the entire 
opening statement focused on the failure of police to 
investigate (i.e., his Bowden defense).  The judge already had 
ruled that third-party culprit evidence was inadmissible, and 
defense counsel knew that he would be prevented from directly 
stating that Coggins was the perpetrator. 
40 
 
The judge did not allow the defendant to admit the 
statements pursuant to a third-party culprit defense because 
they were hearsay.  Although we have concluded that hearsay may 
be admitted if "there are other substantial connecting links to 
the crime," Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 588 (2000), 
here there was no other evidence implicating the third party.  
"Absent an abuse of discretion, the judge's decision in 
determining relevance and prejudice will not be reversed unless 
justice requires a different result."  Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 
Mass. 18, 23 (1996).  Moreover, the statements were still 
submitted to the jury as part of the defendant's Bowden defense, 
but with a limiting instruction that they could not be 
considered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Therefore, we also disagree with the defendant's contention 
that his trial counsel did not press the issue.  He did so, 
repeatedly, and was allowed other concessions by the judge.17 
Ineffective assistance of counsel, when based on an attorney's 
                     
17 For example, during cross-examination of Gibbons, defense 
counsel sought to introduce a written statement taken from the 
third party when he first accused someone else of committing the 
murder.  The Commonwealth argued that the statement could not be 
admitted under Bowden because the police had investigated that 
statement, and that this was an attempt by the defendant to 
introduce third-party culprit evidence. Although the judge noted 
that he was "not convinced that this statement comes in for 
Bowden purposes because . . . there was an investigation and 
within [twenty-four] hours [the third-party had] recanted," the 
judge allowed the statement in evidence because he wanted to 
"err on the side of extreme caution in this case." 
41 
 
strategic or tactical decision, constitutes error "only if it 
was manifestly unreasonable when made."  Commonwealth v. Coonan, 
428 Mass. 823, 827 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 
Mass. 816, 822 (1998).  That was not the case here. 
4.  The Bowden instruction.  The defendant argues that the 
judge's failure to instruct the jury in accordance with Reid, 29 
Mass. App. Ct. 537, created unfair prejudice and demands 
reversal.  This argument is without merit.  Reid states only 
that "it might [be] preferable for the judge to inform the 
jurors that evidence of police omissions could create a 
reasonable doubt," and reiterates that Bowden "only holds . . . 
that a judge in his instructions should not remove from the 
jury's consideration evidence of failure to follow normal police 
procedures" and "[a] judge has discretion whether to give an 
instruction."  Reid, supra at 540, 541.  Here, the judge used 
the District Court's model jury instructions for omissions in 
police investigations, and we see no error. 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in its entirety in accordance with our obligation under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we see no basis to set aside or reduce 
the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.