Title: Abeokuto v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Abeokuto v. State, No. 129, Sept. Term, 2004.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DEATH PENALTY - SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL - ARTICLES 5, 21, AND 24 OF THE
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS - RECORD OF VOLUNTARY AND
KNOWING WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL RIGHT - STATUTORY RIGHT TO JURY
SENTENCING - RECORD OF VOLUNTARY AND KNOWING WAIVER OF JURY
SENTENCING RIGHT - REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE - FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION - CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION -
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE - CONSENT TO SEARCH AND SEIZE PROPERTY - PROBABLE CAUSE
NEEDED TO ISSUE WARRANT TO SEARCH AND SEIZE PROPERTY - IMPROPER
INCREASE OF SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 4-345 - MERGER OF
KIDNAPPING AND CHILD KIDNAPPING CONVICTIONS FOR SENTENCING
PURPOSES
Jamaal Kenneth Abeokuto was convicted, following a bench trial, of first-degree
murder, first-degree assault, kidnapping, child kidnapping, extortion, and wearing or carrying
a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure in the death of the eight-year old
daughter of his female romantic interest.  The trial court sentenced him to death for the
murder conviction and periods of incarceration for each of the other convictions, although
merging the assault conviction with the murder conviction.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly accepted Abeokuto’s
waiver of jury trial because the overall relevant portions of the record reflected a knowing
and voluntary waiver when the inquiry by the court ensured that he had some knowledge of
the jury trial right and the waiver was not a product of coercion.  Although the trial court
knew that Abeokuto had been prescribed an anti-psychotic medication, the court was not
required, at that time, to determine whether he was taking the medication or if he was
experiencing any side effects of the medication that would impact adversely upon his ability
to give a knowing and voluntary waiver because the court, virtually contemporaneously  with
the jury trial waiver inquiry, heard testimony regarding his  mental health and medication
state in a competency inquiry.  The Court also determined that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion to deny requests for a continuance of trial and sentencing because a sound basis
existed for denial of the requests.  The lower court also committed no error when it admitted
Abeokuto’s statement obtained at the police station, without the receipt of a Miranda
warning, because the  statement was not a product of a custodial interrogation.  Abeokuto
was not arrested during the questioning and no reasonable person would be led to believe to
the contrary.  The record revealed no coercion throughout the interrogation, either during the
interrogation at issue or the eleven hours before the relevant interrogation. He agreed to
answer questions and did so cooperatively.  He was not deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.  The lower court committed no error when it admitted clothing obtained
from Abeokuto at the police station because he consented to the search and seizure by
silently unbuckling and lowering his pants so that detectives could observe the label of his
jean pants, and, in response to a request by police for the clothing, removing all of his
clothing and laying it on the table.  The lower court committed no error when it admitted the
fruits of a search of Abeokuto’s car because the affidavit in support of the search warrant
provided probable cause for the search when it stated that Abeokuto was the last person to
see the victim alive and demonstrated that his statements were inconsistent with the
statements of others.  
A majority of the Court vacates the sentences and directs a new sentencing hearing.
Three members of the Court would vacate the sentencing because the record did not
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury sentencing right because the trial
court, in view of the relatively long passage of time since the competency determination
proceeding, failed to inquire anew into Abeokuto’s medication state and consider its impact
on his ability to give a knowing and voluntary waiver when the facts of the case raised that
issue.  A fourth member of the Court would vacate the sentencing proceeding for other
reasons.  A majority of the Court also found error in the sentencing in that the trial court
illegally increased Abeokuto’s sentence for extortion by its Amended Commitment Order,
in violation of Maryland Rule 4-345, and failed to merge the kidnapping and child
kidnapping convictions for sentencing purposes.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case # 03 CR 2127
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2004
JAMAAL KENNETH ABEOKUTO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by 
Wilner, J., joined by Cathell and Battaglia, JJ.;
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,
joined by Greene, J.;
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.,
joined by Bell, C.J., and Greene, J.
Filed:    February 13, 2006
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
In this direct appeal by Jamaal Kenneth Abeokuto (Appellant) of his conviction by the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County for first-degree murder (and other crimes) and the
resultant primary sentence of death, we are asked to consider the following questions:
1.  Did the trial court err in determining that Appellant’s waiver
of his constitutional right to a trial by jury at the guilt/innocence
phase was knowing and voluntary?
2.  Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of Appellant’s
post-arrest and post-Miranda1 warning silence?
3.  Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant’s requests for
continuance to permit new counsel to prepare for trial and the
sentencing hearing?
4.  Did the suppression court err when it denied Appellant’s
motion to suppress his statement, given without a Miranda
warning, at the Homicide Unit?
5.  Did the suppression court err when it denied Appellant’s
motion to suppress his clothing taken by police while he was at
the Homicide Unit?
6.  Did the suppression court err when it determined that the
issuance of the warrant to search Appellant’s car was supported
by probable cause?
7.  Did the trial court err in accepting Appellant’s sentencing
jury waiver?
8.  Did the trial court illegally increase Appellant’s sentence for
extortion?
9.  Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence at the
sentencing hearing the testimony of a medical expert when he
opined that Appellant had lied about symptoms of psychosis?
2
10.  Did the trial court err in admitting victim’s impact
testimony by the victim’s family members?
11.  Should Appellant’s death sentence be reversed as a result of
the prosecutor’s closing argument at the sentencing hearing
when he stated that the trial court proceeding would not be the
final proceeding?
12.  Did the trial court err in imposing separate sentences for
kidnapping and child kidnapping?
13.  Did the trial court err if it in fact found as separate
aggravating circumstances that the victim was taken in the
course of an abduction or kidnapping and that the victim was a
child abducted in violation of § 3-503(a)(1) of the Criminal Law
Article?
14.  Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence at the
sentencing hearing a handgun recovered from Appellant’s car?
15.  Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprive
Appellant of a fair trial and/or a fair sentencing hearing?
16.  Should the failure of the indictment to allege principalship
and aggravating circumstances have precluded the imposition of
a sentence of death?
17.  Is the Maryland death penalty statute unconstitutional
because it requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances only by a preponderance of the
evidence?
I.
A.
Appellant, Jamaal Kenneth Abeokuto, was found guilty, following a bench trial in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, of: first-degree murder, first-degree assault, kidnapping,
3
and child kidnapping of his girlfriend’s eight-year old daughter, Marciana Monyai Ringo;
extortion; and, wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure.
According to the State’s evidence at trial, Abeokuto abducted Marciana on 3 December 2002,
took her to a wooded area in Harford County, and killed her by slitting her throat and kicking
her head.  
After charging in Harford County, the Circuit Court for Harford County granted
Appellant’s request for a change of venue, citing pre-trial publicity in Harford County, and
transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  Appellant separately elected
to waive both his right to trial by jury and sentencing by jury.  Accordingly, he was tried and,
after being found guilty, sentenced by the court. On 15 November 2004, the court sentenced
him in open court as follows:  death for the murder conviction; merged for sentencing
purposes the first degree assault count with the murder count; ten years of incarceration, to
be served from the initial date of Appellant’s arrest (24 December 2002), for the extortion
conviction;  thirty years of imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction, consecutive to the
sentence for extortion; three years for the deadly weapon conviction, to be served consecutive
to the extortion and kidnapping sentences; and twenty years to be served for child
kidnapping, to run concurrently with the sentences for the extortion, kidnapping, and deadly
weapon convictions.  At the sentencing hearing, the court stated, as to the sentence for
murder, that it found two statutory aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, kidnapping and child kidnapping.  The court found as a mitigator, by a preponderance
2 Appellant sought to suppress all of the statements that he gave to police between
3:42 a.m. and 5:10 a.m. on 4 December 2002, which were obtained by the police before
giving Appellant any Miranda warning, contending that the statements were made during the
course of a custodial interrogation.  The statement sought to be suppressed was admitted as
evidence at trial.  Appellant gave two subsequent statements at the Homicide Unit, which
were obtained after giving Appellant Miranda warnings.  The State did not offer these two
statements as evidence at trial, nor does the record reveal the contents of those statements.
4
of the evidence, that Appellant had not been found guilty previously  of a crime of violence.
Penultimately, the court determined that the State had proven beyond a preponderance of the
evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  It
therefore imposed the sentence of death for Marciana’s murder.  
In the trial judge’s required Post-Sentencing Report, he stated that, although he found
at the sentencing proceeding two aggravating circumstances, kidnapping and child
kidnapping, he “wish[ed] to clarify that although the evidence names [sic] Kidnapping and
Child Kidnapping, the Court considered one Kidnapping as the aggravating circumstance.”
The sentence of ten years for the extortion conviction was later amended in the Commitment
Report and the Trial Judge’s Post-Sentencing Report to reflect that it was to be served
consecutive to the sentence for the murder conviction. 
B.
The State’s evidence presented at the suppression hearings on 12 and 13 November
20032 revealed the following facts:
At approximately 4:45 p.m. on 3 December 2002, Officer Joseph Petryszak of the
Baltimore City Police Department responded to 5300 Leith Road, Apartment C, because he
3 Marciana and her younger brother, Marc Ringo, Jr. lived with Ms. White in an
apartment in Baltimore City.  Ms. White was separated from the children’s father, Mr. Ringo.
At the time of the murder, Ms. White was involved in a romantic relationship with Appellant.
5
received a report that Marciana was missing.  When he arrived at the apartment, he found
Marciana’s parents, Milagro White and Marc Ringo, Sr., present.3  Officer Petryszak called
Appellant, who, at the time was attending class at a commercial truck driving school, and
requested that he come to the apartment.  Appellant agreed to the request and drove himself
there.  When he arrived, Officer Petryszak and two other officers questioned Appellant for
about five minutes in the stairwell in front of the apartment.  In response to Officer
Petryszak’s questions, Appellant told him that Marciana had walked to school around 7:30
a.m., came back around 7:35 a.m., and said that she needed her homework signed.  While
signing her homework he noticed a note about a field trip.  Appellant then said that he drove
her back to school, which, Officer Petryszak noted, was just across the street from the
apartment.  Appellant further explained that he dropped her off by the school’s front doors,
noticed a yellow school bus parked there with teachers and students around it, and then,
without waiting to see whether Marciana went inside the school, drove through the alley at
the 5200 block of Loch Raven Boulevard on his way to work.  
After this initial questioning, Officer Petryszak and Appellant entered the apartment.
Twenty minutes later, a sergeant at the scene asked Appellant to come back out to the
hallway outside of the apartment to speak with him and Officer Petryszak because of the
noise in the apartment.  Appellant obliged and was again cooperative.  Appellant repeated
4  Ms. Greene told police that she saw Marciana get into Appellant’s car at 8:05 a.m.
that morning.
6
his earlier statements.  Meanwhile, the sergeant and officers coordinated a search for
Marciana and canvassed the apartment complex.  No Miranda warnings were given to
Appellant at that time. 
Detective Timothy Rabbit of the Missing Persons Unit of the Baltimore City Police
Department asked Officer Petryszak to transport Appellant, Ms. White, and Mr. Ringo to his
unit.  Officer Petryszak advised Appellant that the detectives at the Missing Persons Unit
wanted to talk with him to gather more information.  Appellant said okay and was again
cooperative.  At about 8:00 p.m., Appellant, Ms. White and Mr. Ringo were transported
separately  to the Missing Persons Unit (about 15 minutes away) in marked police cars.
Appellant fell asleep on the way.  Ms. Constance Greene, a neighbor, also came to the
Missing Persons Unit to be interviewed.
When they arrived, Officer Petryszak escorted Appellant to Detective Rabbit, who
interviewed him in a small interview room.  The door was shut and no officers waited
outside.  Appellant repeated what he had told Officer Petryszak, and also stated that he
arrived at work that morning at 8:00 a.m.  Detective Rabbit described Appellant as without
emotion, not upset, “very low key,” and cooperative.  After the interview, Appellant was
escorted to one of the unit’s other interview rooms to wait while Detective Rabbit
interviewed Ms. White, Mr. Ringo, and Ms. Greene.4  These interviews took place in
7
Detective Rabbit’s office cubicle.  Mr. Ringo told Detective Rabbit that he usually saw
Marciana in the 7:30 to 7:45 a.m. time frame, but he did not that morning when he came to
pick up Marc, Jr.  The door to the interview room where Appellant waited alone following
his interview was closed and locked.  Detective Rabbit explained that Appellant was secured
in the room for his own safety.   
Appellant then was transported by a marked police car to the Homicide Unit of the
Baltimore City Police Department between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on 3 December 2002.
Detective Rabbit called the Homicide Unit to become involved because he was alarmed that
Marciana may have been kidnapped or abducted.  The detective also became suspicious of
Appellant because of his demeanor, statements, criminal record, and factual discrepancies
between his and Ms. Greene’s statements.  Ms. White and Mr. Ringo were driven to the
Homicide Unit by Ms. White’s father.
The officers and Appellant arrived at the Homicide Unit at about 11:20 p.m. Appellant
was escorted to an interview room where he remained for the evening, except when he was
interviewed elsewhere in the offices or went to the bathroom; on those latter occasions, he
was escorted according to normal police practices.  The door to the interview room remained
open.  After first interviewing Ms. White and Ms. Greene, Detectives Keith Hagan and
Robert Patton interviewed Appellant in a sergeant’s office.  The interview began at 3:42 a.m.
and ended at 5:10 a.m. on 4 December 2002.  The interview was tape recorded and a
transcript created.  Appellant was not given Miranda warnings prior to making these
5 At the motion for judgment of acquittal and in its closing argument, the State
referenced this statement.
8
statements.  Appellant recounted his previous statements that Marciana went to school at
7:30 a.m. on 3 December 2002, Marc, Jr. walked to Mr. Ringo’s car at 7:40 a.m., and that,
as Appellant was leaving the apartment to go to work, Marciana came back and said that she
needed her homework signed.  He said that he signed her homework, told her that he would
drive her to school, and then did so within a span of two minutes.  Appellant stated that he
“carried . . . [Marciana’s] bookbag out to the car and she just came with me.”5  Then
Appellant told the detectives that he drove to work via Interstate-95 to Aberdeen, Maryland,
from Ms. White’s apartment in northern Baltimore City, and clocked into work a little after
8:00 a.m.  Like Detective Rabbit, the homicide detectives doubted that Appellant could have
driven so quickly to work on that route, especially at that time of morning. Appellant said
that he left work at approximately 1:00 p.m. and drove back to Ms. White’s apartment, before
proceeding to the truck driving school, to pick up a book that he had left there.  While there,
he locked his car and apartment keys inside, so he used a neighbor’s phone to call Ms. White
who agreed to meet him at her place of work, Goucher College. He called a cab at about 1:30
p.m. to take him there.  It was just after 3:00 p.m., Appellant told the detectives, when he
arrived at the truck driving school, after borrowing Ms. White’s keys and ATM card, taking
the cab back to the apartment, and then driving to his school.
6 The record does not reveal the contents of this polygraph interview.
9
At this point in the interview, the detectives alerted Appellant to a time discrepancy
with his time card at work, which indicated that the card had been punched out at 1:35 p.m.
on December 3, and compared it to the caller identification feature of the telephone that
Appellant used to call Ms. White at work, which indicated that the call to her had been placed
at 1:28 p.m.  The detectives explained to him that: “[i]t looks like there’s something going
on here” and “you better let us know about that shit, because we find out anything further,
then you’re going to be looking like a prime suspect in this stuff[.]”  Appellant eventually
admitted that a co-worker named Dwayne had punched his card for him at work that
afternoon, but that Appellant had clocked himself in that morning at 8:00 a.m.  The
detectives were suspicious.  Detective Patton, when asked at the suppression hearing to
describe Appellant’s demeanor during the interviews, replied: 
At first, he was sort of cooperative, trying to help us, you with it, and then as
we started talking, he became defensive, became – his responses were sort of
– weren’t to the point.  He was sort of beating around the bush.  He wasn’t
responding with direct responses to the questions we were asking him.
A second interview of Appellant occurred at 2:00 p.m. on 4 December 2002.  This
was preceded by Appellant being given his first Miranda warning.  He was asked to take a
polygraph test in conjunction with this interview.  He agreed and the interview took place.
His interview occurred after detectives had administered a polygraph examination of Ms.
White.6
10
On the prior evening, 3 December 2002, Detective Rabbit applied for and was issued
a search warrant for Appellant’s car.  The first search was conducted around 7:25 a.m. on 4
December 2005.  A second search was conducted around 7:15 p.m. that same day.  A lab
technician and the homicide detectives participated in the searches.  During the first search,
they found a nine millimeter handgun and a clip with fifteen rounds in a compartment in the
trunk of the car.  The second search produced a receipt for the purchase from a Wal-mart
store, dated 3 December 2002, of a pair of Backwoods Blues jean pants, waist 40/inseam 32.
The receipt was found lying on the back seat behind the driver’s seat.   
An earlier sweep search of the grounds and improvements of Ms. White’s apartment
complex by police department trainees recovered a blue Wal-mart bag (located at an area
behind a dumpster) that contained a pair of previously worn blue jeans and a pair of white
gloves, both of which appeared to be stained with blood.  Paper labels for Backwoods Blues
jean pants, waist 40/inseam 32, were also contained in the bag.  The detectives brought Ms.
White to the processing bay to see if she could identify the bloody clothing.  She identified
the clothing as Appellant’s.  The detectives then recalled that the jeans Appellant was
wearing at the police station looked new, “more or less right off the hanger.”
In response to these discoveries, the detectives returned to Appellant’s interview room
in the Homicide Unit at about 8:55 p.m. on 4 December 2002 and asked him to show them
the label on his jeans.  According to Detective Patton, Appellant “did not react at all, stood
up, and unbuckled his pants,” revealing a sewed-in label that was consistent with the paper
7 Here again, the contents of this interview are not revealed in this record.
11
labels contained in the Wal-mart bag recovered from the dumpster near Ms. White’s
apartment.  Detective Patton asked Appellant to give the police the jean pants he was
wearing.  The two detectives and a crime lab technician were present and the interview room
door was open.  Without a word, Appellant complied.  After taking off his pants, Detective
Patton noticed what appeared to be a smear of blood on one of Appellant’s socks, and so
asked Appellant for the rest of his clothing.  In response, Appellant took off his clothes and
laid them on the table.  He was given a jumpsuit and shoe covers to wear.
At 9:15 p.m. on 4 December 2002, Appellant was again given a Miranda warning and
he agreed to answer questions.  Thirty minutes into that questioning, Appellant invoked his
right to remain silent and the interview ended.7  Appellant was not placed under arrest at that
time.  Instead, he was driven to his mother’s house around 12:00 a.m. on 5 December by
Detective Patton and his partner.  
The State’s evidence at trial revealed the following additional facts:
Appellant began dating Ms. White in early 2001.  Their relationship initially
concluded approximately a year later because Ms. White felt that Appellant was not “pulling
his weight . . . financially.”  Ms. White dated other men after she and Appellant separated,
including a Mr. Julian Brown.  In November of 2002, Appellant and Ms. White rekindled
their relationship.  At that time, Appellant worked part-time at C & S Wholesalers, located
in Aberdeen, Maryland, and attended a vocational school part-time in an effort to earn a
12
commercial  truck-driving license.  Ms. White planned to move into Appellant’s house in
mid-December of 2002.  Over the preceding Thanksgiving weekend, after borrowing Ms.
White’s cell phone, Appellant confronted Ms. White about telephone calls that she had made
to Mr. Brown earlier that November.  They discussed the matter, and, according to Ms.
White, “moved on.”
Appellant was close with Ms. White’s children, Marciana and Marc Ringo, Jr.
Marciana and Marc, Jr. called Appellant “Daddy-mall” and would run to greet him when they
heard him at their front door.  Appellant would often stay overnight at Ms. White’s
apartment, sometimes bringing his daughter, Brianna, with him.  With Ms. White’s
permission, Appellant would take her children to doctors’ appointments, help Marciana with
her homework, attend PTA meetings, and transport Marc, Jr. to football practice.  He
continued to help with the parenting of Marciana and Marc, Jr. during the period of time
when he and Ms. Ringo were not dating.  Ms. Ringo listed Appellant as an emergency
contact for Marciana at school and did not remove his name from the list during the period
when they were not dating. 
Ms. White was separated from the children’s father, Mr. Ringo, who would come to
Ms. White’s apartment to take Marc, Jr. to daycare and take the children for visits with his
family.  When Appellant would try to speak with Mr. Ringo, Mr. Ringo would not respond.
On the night before the murder of Marciana, Appellant visited Ms. White at her
apartment.  He was upset and told her that he had just learned that a good friend of his had
13
been murdered.  Ms. White comforted him.  Appellant stayed over that night and slept in Ms.
White’s bedroom while Marciana and Marc, Jr. slept beside them on a mattress on the floor.
On 3 December 2002, Ms. White left for work at around 7:10 a.m.   Appellant was
still in bed at that time and the children were getting ready for school.  When Ms. White
called home from work at approximately 7:35 a.m., Appellant told her that Marciana had left
for school and that he was waiting for Mr. Ringo to pick up Marc, Jr. and take him to
daycare.  At 7:40 a.m., Mr. Ringo called to say that he was waiting outside for Marc, Jr.
Appellant sent Marc, Jr. outside.  
At 11:00 a.m., when Appellant was supposedly at his place of work, he called Ms.
White at her work to remind her to look into changing Marc, Jr.’s daycare facility in
anticipation of their upcoming move to Appellant’s house.  According to bank records and
a surveillance tape, at around 12:30 p.m., Appellant used his debit card to purchase the jeans
that he was wearing when questioned at the Homicide Unit at a Wal-Mart store in Aberdeen,
Maryland near his workplace.  Appellant called Ms. White again at 12:43 p.m. to tell her that
he had gone to her apartment and mistakenly locked his keys inside.  They agreed that he
would meet her at her place of employment, Goucher College, to borrow her keys.  He
arrived a little after 2:00 p.m., wearing his work clothes.  After borrowing her ATM card to
get some money to pay for the cab, Appellant left with her keys.  He returned within the hour
to restore to Ms. White her keys.
14
Marciana, in fact, did not attend school that day.  When Ms. White returned home
from work around 4:45 p.m., she found a message on her answering machine from
Marciana’s teacher to that effect.  A neighbor called the police while Ms. White searched for
her daughter.  Ms. White then telephoned Appellant at school and told him that Marciana was
missing.  He replied, “No way, no.”  Ms. White spoke to another neighbor, Constance
Greene, who said that she had seen Marciana getting into Appellant’s car that morning.  Ms.
White asked Appellant about this and he told her that Marciana had come home to get her
homework signed and that he dropped her off at school.  At Ms. White’s urging, Appellant
agreed to leave the truck driving school and come to her apartment.  Appellant, Ms. White,
and Mr. Ringo spent that evening, as well as the following day, at the Missing Person’s and
Homicide Units of the Baltimore City Police Department, as outlined supra.
DNA samples taken from the worn jeans in the Wal-mart bag recovered at Ms.
White’s apartment complex were found to match Appellant’s DNA profile.  Samples taken
from blood stains on one of the gloves and the blood stains on the worn blue jeans found in
the Wal-mart bag matched Marciana’s DNA profile.  Samples taken from stains on
Appellant’s hat and sock, which he had worn at the police station, matched Appellant’s DNA
profile, but not Marciana’s profile.  In addition, evidence confirmed that a co-worker of
Appellant’s caused Appellant’s work time card to be punched in around 8:00 a.m. on 3
December 2002.
8Starks was a nickname for Mr. Ringo.
15
On 5 December 2002, Ms. White received a letter in the mail postmarked the previous
day, which stated: “Tell Starks I want $5000.  Put in bag and put in men’s bathroom at Druid
Hill Park by 8 p.m. tomorrow or the girl dies.  If she die, let just say we even.  An eye for an
eye.”8  Ms. White gave the letter to the police, who found Appellant’s fingerprint on the letter
and DNA matching his profile in a saliva sample taken from the envelope flap. 
Marciana’s body was discovered on 12 December 2002 by two children walking home
from school in a wooded area near the intersection of Joppa Farm Road and Haverhill Road
in Harford County.  Her frozen body was partially covered by snow.  Forensic evidence
indicated that she did not suffer instantaneous death.  One of her hands gripped leaf debris
that was similar to the kind of debris surrounding her body.  Cuts on her hands indicated
defensive wounds.  Marciana died from multiple cutting wounds, including a gaping wound
to the neck, and a blunt force injury to the head that occurred after the infliction of the cutting
wounds.
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Appellant in
Birmingham, Alabama, on 24 December 2002 after tracking him to a hotel where he had
registered under an assumed name.
Additional facts, particularly as relevant to the proceedings in the trial court
implicated by the issues raised in this appeal, will be supplied in our analysis of the issues.
16
II.
Section 2-401 of the Criminal Law Article outlines the scope of our required review
in capital cases.  It provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In general. – (1) After a death sentence is imposed and the
judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals shall review the
sentence on the record.
     (2) The Court of Appeals shall consolidate an appeal from
the verdict with the sentence review.
***
(d)  Consideration by Court of Appeals. – (1) In addition to any
error properly before the Court on appeal, the Court of Appeals
shall consider the imposition of the death sentence.
     (2) With regard to the death sentence, the Court of Appeals
shall determine whether:
(i) the imposition of the death sentence was influenced by
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
(ii) the evidence supports the finding by the court or jury
of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 2-303(g) of this
title; and
(iii) the evidence supports a finding by the court or jury
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances under § 2-303(h) and (i)(1) of this title.
     (3) In addition to its review under any direct appeal, with
regard to the death sentence, the Court of Appeals shall:
(i) affirm the death sentence;
(ii) set the death sentence aside and remand the case for
a new sentencing proceeding under § 2-303 of this title; or 
(iii) set the death sentence aside and remand the case for
modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life.
Md. Code (2002, 2005 Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 2-401.
III.
A clear majority of the Court affirms Abeokuto’s convictions.  As required to be
considered by § 2-401 of the Criminal Law Article in every death penalty appeal, the Court,
9The new sentencing proceeding, whether before a judge alone or a jury, may include
consideration of the sentence of death in accordance with the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence standard, see Evans v. State,
389 Md. 456, 482-83, 886 A.2d 562, 577 (2005); Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 253, 835 A.2d
1105, 1148 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 2084, 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), and
irrespective of Appellant’s argument under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428,
153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), as to the validity of the indictment, see Evans, 389 Md. at 472-80, 886
A.2d at 571-76.
17
by a majority concurring, concludes, on this record, that the imposition of the death penalty
was not influenced by passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.  Because of an unusual
divergence of views among the members of the Court regarding the sentencing issues,
however, there is no majority view on all of those issues.  That notwithstanding, the
sentences shall be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing
proceeding.  The divergence that gives rise to this result is as follows: (1) Chief Judge Bell,
Judge Greene, and I would vacate the sentences based on the failed waiver of the right to
have a jury impose sentence, a view not shared by the other members of the Court; and (2)
Chief Judge Bell, Judge Raker, and Judge Greene, for different reasons expressed in Judge
Raker’s concurring and dissenting opinion, would reverse the sentence of death.  Thus, a
combined four members of the Court find some reversible error or another affecting the
sentencing proceeding and a new one is required.9
As to the considered dicta expressed in this opinion, for the benefit of the trial court
on remand, regarding certain of the other sentencing issues raised by Abeokuto, a majority
18
of the Court agrees with the analyses as to the increase in the sentence for the extortion
conviction and the need to merge for sentencing purposes the convictions for kidnapping and
child kidnapping.
A.
Guilt/Innocence Phase Issues
1.
Waiver of Trial by Jury
Appellant alleges that the record contains no support for the trial court’s determination
that he voluntarily or knowingly waived his right to trial by jury.  This argument is based
upon the trial court’s failure to inquire expressly whether:  Appellant had been coerced or
threatened into waiving his right to a jury trial;  anyone, including defense counsel or the
prosecutor, had promised Appellant anything in exchange for his waiver; Appellant was
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or prescription medications that might impact his
ability to make a voluntary waiver; and, the state of Appellant’s mental health at the time
could have affected his ability to make a knowing voluntary the waiver.  
Appellant elected on 16 August 2004 to waive his right to a jury trial.  The following
preliminary colloquy occurred between Appellant, defense counsel, prosecutor, and court:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Stand up, Mr. Abeokuto.  Mr.
Abeokuto, we have spoken about this on a number of occasions,
that is, that you have the right to have this matter tried either
before Judge Bollinger or a jury on the issue of guilt or
innocence.  If you decide to pursue a jury trial, you would be
faced with the selection and you would be involved – in fact, I
think you were involved to a certain extent earlier in the
selection of twelve individuals selected from the voter and
19
motor rolls of Baltimore County.  They would listen to the
evidence that [the] State presented, listen to any evidence that
we might present, and they would have to decide whether or not
if you were guilty on any of these counts that you have been
charged with.
In making that decision, before they could convict you,
find you guilty or not guilty, all twelve of those jurors would
have to agree on the verdict, otherwise a hung jury would result.
A mistrial would be declared and the State would be free to
prosecute you all over again before a different jury next time or
the second time around.
You want it in front of the Judge alone, a Court trial.  Do
you understand your right to have your matter tried by a jury on
the issue of guilty or innocence?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.  You can waive the right to be
tried in front of a jury and have the Court listen to the evidence
and decide whether the State had proven you guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  If the Judge harbors any doubt based upon
reason, then the Judge would be duty bound to find you not
guilty.  
Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.  Tell us what is your decision
as to whether or not you want a Court trial or a jury trial on the
issue of guilt or innocence?
DEFENDANT: Court.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.  Now, let me also add this,
that it should be made clear that regardless of whether you
choose a Court trial or a jury trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence, if, if you are found not guilty you don’t have to
20
worry about any further proceedings.  If you are found guilty,
then the next stage quite possibly will involve another choice of
jury or Judge.
Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But no matter what you choose here
today, Court trial or jury trial, it does not impact, if we get to the
next stage, on whether you want a Court trial or jury trial for that
stage of these proceedings.
You understand that, correct?
DEFENDANT: Correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So it is my understanding at this point
you would want a Court trial and you would waive your right to
a jury trial, is that correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Very good.  Judge, should we also
speak about the – since it is a bifurcated proceeding so that the
Jury Commissioner would have some sense as to [the] guilt
stage as well if we get to that, or do you want to wait until after
– 
COURT: Prepared to waive that now – I think we have to wait
until after, don’t you?
PROSECUTOR: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s fine.
COURT: Let me just say this to him so we dot our I’s and cross
our T’s.  You realize if you elected a jury trial the burden of
proof would be that the State would have to show that jury
unanimously, that means all together, all of them must agree
21
together, beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty,
that’s the burden of proof they have, do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
COURT: That’s the same burden of proof that myself or some
other Judge would have, but in the case of a jury that is the
burden of proof.  Do you understand that.
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
COURT: Do you have anything else open as to the election.
PROSECUTOR: I just would like to clarify that the next stage,
just so it is clear on the record, that in the event the Defendant
is found guilty of a first degree murder count, the fact that the
State is seeking the death penalty, that the next stage would be
the sentencing stage, and the Defendant would not by electing
a Court trial at this time, he still has an election to make as to a
Judge or a jury to make the, to make the decision on whether the
sentencing could be death, life without parole or life sentence,
and that by electing to go forward today, you are not impacting
or you are not prejudicing your right to make that election at a
later time.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I think we have covered that but
that is fine.  We all understand.  Don’t you, Mr. Abeokuto?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Do you have any questions of [Defense Counsel]
about that or me?
DEFENDANT: No, sir.
The court concluded on the record that “Defendant has knowingly and voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.”
10 We have stated before that there exist “many, many instances where trial before the
court is in the best interest of the accused.” Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 131 n.5, 522
A.2d 950, 953 n.5 (1987) (quoting State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 19, 273 A.2d 156, 160
(1971)).  
The defendant may want to waive a jury trial when he feels that
a jury panel composed of members of the community will be
prejudiced against his case.  This may be especially true when
the defendant’s alleged crime has received wide publicity or is
particularly gruesome.  The defendant may also feel that a judge
would be less apt than a jury to draw negative conclusions from
the defendant’s appearance or manner of speech.  Or, he may
merely prefer that the arbiter of his fate be one person trained in
the law rather than twelve laymen.
Id. (quoting C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 27.03, at 607 (1986)).  Being charged with
the brutal murder of a small child might present a basis to make that election.
11 The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”
22
A defendant may elect to waive his or her right to a trial by jury and instead be tried
by the court.10  The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution11 and by Articles 5 (entitled to trial by jury), 21 (in all criminal
prosecutions, every man has a right to trial by an impartial jury and may only be found guilty
by unanimous consent of the jury), and 24 (due process) of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.  To waive properly the constitutionally protected right to trial by jury, the defendant
must elect to do so by a knowing and voluntary waiver election.  Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365,
377-80, 825 A.2d 1055, 1063 (2003).  Md. Rule 4-246 effectively summarizes the protocol
12 Section (c), regarding withdrawal of the defendant’s waiver, is not at issue in this
case.  We apply Rule 4-246 as adopted at the time of the jury waiver election in 2004.
23
regarding jury trial waiver at the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal proceeding and
provides, in pertinent part:
   (a) Generally.  In the circuit court a defendant having a right
to trial by jury shall be tried by a jury unless the right is waived
pursuant to section (b) of this Rule.  If the waiver is accepted by
the court, the State may not elect a trial by jury.
   (b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver.  A defendant may
waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the
commencement of trial.  The court may not accept the waiver
until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the
record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s
Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination
thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.
Md. Rule 4-246(a)-(b) (2004).12   The trial court therefore is required to conduct an
examination of the defendant, in open court, to determine whether the defendant waived
voluntarily (with intention and without duress or coercion) and knowingly his or her right to
be tried by a jury.  Md. Rule 4-246(b);  State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182-83, 582 A.2d 507,
509-10 (1990);  Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 133-34, 522 A.2d 950, 955 (1987) (citing
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) and
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, (1938)); see also
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998) (holding that, for the waiver to be made
knowingly, the defendant must have some knowledge of the jury trial; full knowledge is not
required).  The defendant must directly respond to the court’s examination because the
13 We stated in Hall:
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case,
see Dortch v. State [290 Md. 229, 325, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981)],
we think that the trial judge could fairly find that Hall
(continued...)
24
waiver must come from the defendant.  Martinez, 309 Md. at 133, 522 A.2d at 954 (Citation
omitted).  Although the examiner may be the court, the prosecutor, and/or the defense
counsel, it is the trial court that “bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the
accused has tendered a valid waiver.”  Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 n.9, 522 A.2d at 954 n.9.
“The questioner need not recite any fixed incantation.”  Hall, 321 Md. at 182, 582 A.2d at
509; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955.  The trial court “must, however, satisfy
itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion and further that the defendant has
some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.”  Hall, 321 Md. at
182-83, 582 A.2d at 509; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955.  Whether the waiver
is valid depends upon the facts and totality of the circumstances of each case.  Hall, 321 Md.
at 182, 582 A.2d at 509. 
In Hall, supra, we concluded that, where no facts in the particular case suggested a
propensity for an involuntary or unknowing waiver by the defendant, a trial court is not
required to ask the defendant whether he or she understood what he or she had been told
about the jury trial process, or whether the election of a court trial was the result of any
physical or mental duress or coercion. Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509-10.13  The
(...continued)
intentionally relinquished his known right to a jury trial by his
voluntary act in waiving that right. 
* * *
While the court did not specifically ask Hall whether he
understood what he had been told, or whether his election of a
court trial was the result of any physical or mental duress or
coercion, we think that the record before us demonstrates that
the court could fairly be satisfied that Hall had the requisite
knowledge of the jury trial right, that the waiver was voluntary,
and that the requirements of the rule were satisfied.  Moreover,
the court was not required to advise Hall, as he contends, as to
the details of the jury selection process.
Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509-10.  
In Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 32, 590 A.2d 550, 551 (1991), we concluded,
however,  that it was 
not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a
naked inquiry, either from his lawyer or the court, that he
understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that he knows “what
a jury trial is,” and waives that right “freely and voluntarily”
[without more inquiry,] [n]otwithstanding that Tibbs may have
had some prior unspecified experience with the criminal justice
system . . . . 
The trial court in Tibbs should have inquired further.
25
circumstances that we considered in that case included the following pertinent facts: (1) the
defendant had signed a written waiver form prior to the in-court election to waive jury trial,
which acknowledged that the defendant had a right to a jury, that unanimity of all 12 jurors
was required for a guilty verdict, and that the applicable standard of guilt for both a jury trial
and bench trial was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial judge, in open court,
26
engaged in a short colloquy stating the same and asked the defendant whether he wanted a
jury trial or court trial; (3) the defendant had waived his right to jury trial on a prior occasion
(during in-court plea negotiations); and (4) the defendant had been represented by counsel
each time he had elected to waive his right to a jury trial.  Hall, 321 Md. at 179-83, 590 A.2d
at 509-10.  Thus, the colloquy in Hall was sufficient and the waiver valid.
In Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), we held that the trial court
did not commit error when it failed to inquire specifically  whether the jury trial waivers by
two defendants in separate cases were induced by promises or by physical or mental
coercion.  While noting that no facts existed supporting a finding of involuntariness as to the
waivers election, we highlighted, in support of the trial court’s finding of voluntariness, that
one defendant, when prompted, explained to the court what he thought a jury trial to be and
told the judge on three separate occasions that he did not want a jury trial.  Dortch, 290 Md.
at 233, 428 A.2d at 1223.  Even so, we advised judges that it was a “preferable practice” to
inquire about the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver election.  Dortch, 290 Md. at 236,
428 A.2d at 1224.
In Martinez, supra, we found that the transcript of the waiver hearing did not support
the court’s finding that the defendant waived voluntarily his right to a jury trial.  Martinez,
309 Md. at 134-35, 522 A.2d at 955.  The relevant portion of the waiver hearing transcript
revealed that the defendant was taking Lithium, a medicine prescribed to treat schizophrenia,
paranoia, and possibly other psychiatric or psychological conditions; the defendant did not
27
feel that he was “presently suffering from any physical illness;” and stated that he understood
that he was entitled to a jury trial.  Martinez, 309 Md. at 127-28, 522 A.2d at 951-52.  When
asked by the court, “Are you voluntarily waiving that right [to a jury trial]?,” the defendant
replied, “I am a little bit nervous.”  Martinez, 309 Md. at 128, 522 A.2d at 952.  After further
questions about whether the defendant understood the jury selection process and guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, the trial judge asked, “Has any person, either inside or outside
of this courthouse, made you any promise, or has anyone threatened you in any way in order
to have you give up your right to a jury trial?”.   Martinez, 309 Md. at 129, 522 A.2d at 952.
The defendant answered, “Yes.”  Id.  The trial court accepted the jury waiver.  We found this
last question “particularly relevant,” concluding that the record did not disclose a
knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of a jury trial, and ordered a new trial.  Martinez, 309
Md. at 135-36, 522 A.2d at 955-56 (“It is one thing to say that a trial court need not recite a
specific litany relating to the voluntariness of an election.  But it is quite another thing to say
that, if the court decides to ask such a question, it is free to ignore the answer.”).
We conclude, after considering the totality of the circumstances, that the record in the
present case demonstrates a knowing and voluntary waiver of Appellant’s right to a jury trial.
Defense counsel and the trial court asked Appellant a total of seven times whether he
understood the various “byte-size,” if you will, explanations given of his rights and jury trial
process.  They and the prosecutor also discussed with Appellant the jury trial process,
standard of guilt, burden of proof, the necessity of a unanimous guilty verdict, and that, if
28
convicted, Appellant would have a later opportunity to choose whether to waive his right to
a sentencing by jury.  Appellant was represented by counsel, who, prior to the 16 August
2004 hearing, had discussed with Appellant the decision whether to elect a court or jury trial.
Finally, Appellant affirmed that he wanted a court trial.
As we stated in Hall, the trial court is not required to engage in a fixed litany or
boilerplate colloquy with a defendant.  No facts from the record demonstrate that the court
had reason to ask Appellant whether he had been coerced or threatened to waive his right to
a jury trial or whether anyone, including defense counsel or the prosecutor, promised
Appellant anything in exchange for his waiver.  Therefore, questions directed to those areas
were not required in this case.  The court, after viewing the behavior of Appellant and
defense counsel (who clearly advised Appellant to waive his right to a jury trial), did not
believe, we assume, that defense counsel was forcing Appellant, by coercion or otherwise,
to elect a bench trial.  
While the trial court was aware that Appellant may have been taking a prescription
medication and that Appellant’s mental health had been an issue earlier in the proceedings,
the court’s failure to ask anew about these particular facts during the colloquy was not error
at that point in the proceedings when the jury trial waiver was given.  We look at the record
in its entirety.  On 22 June 2004, the trial court commenced a competency inquiry as to
Appellant’s ability to stand trial.  The court heard testimony from several medical experts,
including a psychiatrist, Dr. Dean A. Inouye, a State’s witness, who conducted a psychiatric-
29
forensic evaluation to determine Appellant’s competency to stand trial.  On cross-
examination by defense counsel, Dr. Inouye stated that he learned that Dr. Coleman, a
clinical psychiatrist at the Baltimore County Detention Center where Appellant resided, had
prescribed for Appellant the anti-psychotic medication Geodon some time after 20 April
2004 (the date Dr. Inouye examined Appellant). 
The following cross-examination of Dr. Inouye by defense counsel occurred regarding
the Geodon prescription:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Now, can you inform the Court
what Geodon is?
DR. INOUYE: Geodon is a medication that was originally
marketed as medication to treat psychotic symptoms.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.
DR. INOUYE: It has also been found helpful to treat symptoms
of bi-polar disorder.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  In your discussions with Dr. Colman,
the Geodon was prescribed for psychotic symptoms?
DR. INOUYE: For this diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder, N[ot]
O[therwise] S[pecified]. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.
DR. INOUYE: Not otherwise specified.  I’m sorry.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Does Geodon have possible side
effects?
DR. INOUYE: It does have possible side effects.
30
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  So, a doctor prescribing that
would have to be, take some care in terms of prescribing it?
You don’t do it like you would say, take two Tylenol?
DR. INOUYE: Absolutely not.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Were you aware of any other
prescriptions, any other medications that were prescribed?
DR. INOUYE: I don’t recall.  Not at that time.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Did Dr. Coleman say anything
about starting him on Prozac?
DR. INOUYE:  I don’t recall that he was taking Prozac at the
time.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Did Dr. Coleman speak to you
about attempting to try Heladol with Mr. Abeokuto?
DR. INOUYE:  No.  Heladol would have been a medication
with far more side effects.  Potential side effects.  I’m sorry.
* * *
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.  Did you follow up with Dr.
Coleman with regard to Mr. Abeokuto’s progress while taking
the Geodon?
DR. INOUYE:  No, I did not.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.
DR. INOUYE:  You mean, after the completion of our
evaluation?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Like a week later?  Or how long would
it take for Goedon to make a difference?
31
DR. INOUYE:  It’s a medication that doesn’t work overnight.
If its effective it works very gradually.  It is not a high potency
anti-psychotic medication.  And the response to the drug
probably wouldn’t be seen for a few days.  Depending on
whether or not you know, there were true symptoms that would
respond to the medication.  Whether he could keep Mr.
Abeokuto on the medication.  That is [sic] did not have side
effects that would have caused him to stop the medication
presuming the medication dose was sufficiently high.  It would
ordinarily take several days.  I mean, again, the medication
works very gradually as I said.  If a person were truly psychotic
a clinician and the patient himself might see improvement over
time.  Even over weeks.
* * *
Whether its an anti-psychotic medicine or a [sic] anti-high blood
pressure medicine.  You have to prescribe it and then monitor it
to see if there is a beneficial response.  And to make sure the
benefit outweighs what other risks may be potential for that
medicine.
Dr. Coleman was not called to testify by either side.  On 16 August 2004, the court
concluded the competency hearing after a brief examination by defense counsel of Dr. David
Waltos, a psychiatrist associated with the Circuit Court’s staff.  He testified that after a 15
or 20 minute screening interview of Appellant, that he “got a sense that there was an issue”
concerning a possible dissociative disorder, but could not reach a conclusion in the brief time
that he spent with Appellant.  At the conclusion of this testimony, the court found Appellant
competent to stand trial based upon the testimony presented on 22 June 2004 and 16 August
2004 and reports submitted regarding Appellant’s medical diagnoses,  screening, and
32
medication prescribed.  Appellant does not here question directly the outcome of the
competency proceeding.
Literally a minute after finding Appellant competent to stand trial, the trial court
conducted the jury trial election/waiver inquiry.  The short time period between when the trial
court finished hearing and considering testimony and other evidence regarding Appellant’s
mental health and medication treatment and Appellant’s election to waive a jury trial
suggests that the court remained aware, for the jury trial waiver proceedings, of what it
learned of Appellant’s mental status and medication and that the two decisions were virtually
contemporaneously considered.  The ground plowed at the competency hearing, therefore,
need not be replowed at the jury trial waiver proceeding.  These same circumstances,
however, serve also to differentiate Appellant’s valid jury trial waiver from what we shall
later determine to be his invalid jury sentencing waiver, discussed infra at Section III(B)(1)
of this opinion.  We also distinguish the present case from the facts in Martinez because here
the trial judge did not ignore an affirmative answer to a question aimed at coercion and
duress.  Nor does the record reveal evidence of outward symptoms or reluctance on
Appellant’s part when waiving his jury trial right.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court did
not err in determining that Appellant’s waiver of his right to trial by jury for the
guilt/innocence phase was knowing and voluntary.
2.
Evidence of Post-Miranda Silence Admitted at Trial
14 As we recently stated in Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 456, 863 A.2d 999, 1001-02
(2004) and Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227, 854 A.2d 1259, 1264 (2004), evidence of a
defendant’s post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt.  
33
Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting testimony
at trial by a Special Agent of the FBI who informed the court that Appellant was read
Miranda warnings and chose to remain silent when arrested in Alabama on 24 December
2002.14  This testimony also was incorporated by reference into the sentencing proceeding.
The testimony consisted of the following:
Q: After the Defendant was placed in custody, then what
happened to him?
A: He was – it was early in the morning of the 24th, he was
transported to the Jefferson County jail and the next morning he
was transported to the District Court to go before the magistrate
on his initial appearance.
Q: And who transported him to go before the magistrate for his
initial appearance?
A: Transporting agents were myself, Special Agent Ralph
Phillips and we were joined at the courthouse by supervisory
Special Agent Jimmy Brown.
Q: All right.  And did there come a time that the Defendant was
advised of his rights?
A: Yes, he was advised of his rights by supervisory Special
Agent Jimmy Brown.  After explaining the rights to the
Defendant, the Defendant did not wish to speak.
Q: Where did the advice of rights take place?
34
A: Took place inside of a government vehicle.
Q: Okay.  Subsequently did the Defendant make any statements
without being asked questions by you all?
A: Correct.  Shortly after being advised of his rights and
indicating that he did not wish to waive those rights, a few
moments passed, maybe a minute, before the Defendant asked
the question of us, what, what this was all about, in his words.
Q: Did anyone respond to his question?
A: Yes.  Supervisory Special Agent Brown indicated to the
Defendant that he was under arrest for mailing threatening
extortion communications and that there was also wanted
posters from the State regarding his alleged involvement in
kidnapping and murder.
Q: And did he ever have a response to being advised of that?
A: His response was that, yes, he’d heard something about a
kidnapping but not murder.  Mr. Brown, Supervisory Special
Agent Brown then again asked the Defendant if he wanted to
waive his rights regarding speaking to the agents and again the
Defendant said no, he did not wish to waive those rights.
Supervisory Special Agent Brown informed him that only
questions we would be asking of him from that point on were
just personal identifiers, name, date of birth and such.
The State argues that this claim is not preserved because no objection was made to any
of the Special Agent’s testimony.  Appellant requests that we review this claim, despite the
15 This same defect afflicts several of Appellant’s other appellate issues, to wit
questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11).
35
lack of objection at either trial or sentencing,15 under the plain error standard.  We decline
to do so.
Our review of this evidentiary issue is a discretionary decision.  “Ordinarily, the
appellate court will not decide any [issue not presented to the trial court] unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .”  Md. Rule 8-
131(a) (2004);  see also Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 149-51, 729 A.2d 910, 918-19
(1999); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995); State v. Bell, 334 Md.
178, 187, 638 A.2d 107, 112 (1994); Md. Rule 4-323(a) (2004) (“An objection to the
admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter
as the grounds for objection become apparent.  Otherwise, the objection is waived.”);
Leuschner v. State, 41 Md.App. 423, 436, 397 A.2d 622, 630 (1979) (holding that “[i]t is
axiomatic that to preserve an issue for appeal some objection must be made or a party will
be deemed to have waived an objection”).  Although some of our previous death penalty
cases may have suggested that we will be less strict about the failure to properly preserve
issues for review, we reiterated in Conyers v. State that “despite the special character of a
capital case, the tried and tested rules of evidence and procedure still apply.”  354 Md. at 150,
729 A.2d at 919 (quoting Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 611, 616 A.2d 392, 400 (1992)).  In
36
Conyers, we explained the reasons why we ordinarily  do not exercise the discretion to
address and decide unpreserved issues:
The rules for preservation of issues have a salutary purpose of
preventing unfairness and requiring that all issues be raised in
and decided by the trial court, and these rules must be followed
in all cases including capital cases.  The few cases where we
have exercised our discretion to review unpreserved issues are
cases where prejudicial error was found and the failure to
preserve the issue was not a matter of trial tactics. 
* * *
Counsel should not rely on this Court, or any reviewing court,
to do their thinking for them after the fact.  Furthermore, we
have stated that even in a death penalty case, with the potential
finality of its outcome, litigation cannot continue ad infinitum
through counsel “withholding issues or framing the questions
differently each time.”
Conyers, 354 Md. at 150-51, 729 A.2d at 919-20 (Internal citation omitted). 
We will review the unpreserved claim only where the unobjected to error can be
characterized as “compelling, extraordinary, exceptional, or fundamental to assure the
defendant a fair trial” by applying the plain error standard.  Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223,
236, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993) (Citations omitted);  Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 588-89,
602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992).  We decline to apply the plain error standard in the present case
because the claim is neither compelling nor extraordinary.  The trial judge properly sat as the
trier of fact.  The testimony of the Special Agent at issue likely did not effect the court’s
finding of guilt in light of the overwhelming evidence establishing Appellant’s guilt, thus the
unobjected-to error was not fundamental to assure Appellant a fair trial.   Defense counsel
37
may have elected not to object as a tactical decision.  It would not be wise for this Court to
review the unpreserved claim in the context of the record of the direct appeal where that
possibility goes unexplored.  Thus, Appellant’s failure to object to the agent’s testimony
precludes our review of this contention. 
3.
Denial of Requests for Continuance
Appellant argues for reversible error in that the lower court denied requests for a
continuance of the trial and sentencing by his then defense counsel, Warren Brown, Esq.  Mr.
Brown asserted that he would not be prepared for the trial or sentencing without the
continuance.  Initially, an assistant public defender represented Appellant with regard to the
charges.  In March 2004, the public defender and Appellant’s mother informed the trial court
that Appellant planned to engage Mr. Brown as privately-retained counsel to represent him
at trial and that Mr. Brown required a continuance of trial, which was then scheduled to begin
on 6 April 2004.  At a hearing on 5 April 2004, the court noted that Mr. Brown had not
entered his appearance yet, but, nonetheless he had been made aware of the scheduled
hearing and trial dates.  Upon inquiry, Appellant stated that he wanted to proceed with his
assigned public defender as counsel.  The trial date was re-set to 23 August 2004 to
accommodate the conduct of the competency proceeding. 
On 16 July 2004, Mr. Brown entered his appearance in the case and the Public
Defender’s Office filed a motion to strike that office’s appearance.    The matter was
38
considered by the trial judge at a hearing on 6 August 2004.  Mr. Brown requested a
postponement of the trial because he now expressed the desire to retain his own defense
experts to examine the blood and soil samples.  In response, the State told the court that it
had supplied the relevant discovery to the Public Defender’s Office previously and that it
initiated  no challenge to the forensics at the suppression hearings. In addition, the State
noted that Mr. Brown had represented Appellant in related matters before the federal district
court for months prior to entering his appearance in the present case.  The trial judge referred
the matter to the Circuit Administrative Judge, who denied the request stating,  “I am not
satisfied that the reasons at this point in time two weeks prior to trial are satisfactory.”
The decision whether to grant a request for continuance is committed to the sound
discretion of the court.  Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 706, 759 A.2d 764, 794 (2000).  We
conclude that the court’s decision to deny Appellant’s request for continuance was not an
abuse of discretion.  Over five months elapsed between the announcement of Brown’s
involvement in Appellant’s defense (although he did not enter his appearance formally until
16 July) and the commencement of trial on 23 August 2004.  During that time, whether
formally represented by the Public Defender’s Office or Mr. Brown, Appellant did not take
issue with the State’s potential forensic evidence, for which full discovery had been
provided, until two weeks prior to the scheduled commencement of trial.  Moreover,
Appellant (and Mr. Brown) received the benefit for trial preparation purposes of the
continuance of the trial date from 6 April to 23 August to accommodate the competency
39
inquiry.  We therefore find a reasonable basis for the lower court’s decision to deny the
request. 
We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
request for continuance of sentencing.  The trial court set the date of sentencing with the
assistance of the prosecutor and defense counsel, Mr. Brown.  Mr. Brown filed a Motion for
Continuance with the court around 4 November (nine days before the sentencing hearing)
because he found it difficult to focus the necessary attention on the case with its troubling
facts and because the witnesses who had worked with the public defender to develop
evidence of mitigating circumstances were not prepared for the hearing as a result of a mis-
communication by Mr. Brown.  The trial court, in its order denying the request, stated:
This case has a long and troubled history.  The indictment
was brought fourth by the Grand Jury of Harford County and the
case was transferred to Baltimore County and assigned to the
Honorable J. Norris Byrnes.  Months went in to the preparation
for trial, and Judge Byrnes was struck with an illness prior to
trial, necessitating a transfer of the case to this Court.
This Court has had numerous hearings and an attempted
trial through jury selection; there have been hearings on the
competency of the Defendant.  Finally, in August, 2004 a court
trial was concluded and the Defendant found guilty.
The dates that were set aside for the sentencing hearing,
November 15, 16 and 17, 2004, have been cleared by this Court,
the various witnesses and the Assignment Office and will not be
postponed.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion because sound reasons existed for the
decision. 
40
The reasons offered by Appellant for the continuance of trial and sentencing, as he
concedes, “boil down to absence of preparation.”  We reiterate what we stated in Ware, “[i]f
Appellant is raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is more properly raised in
post-conviction proceedings.  See Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 227-28, 686 A.2d 274, 285
(1996).”  Ware, 360 Md. at 706, 759 A.2d at 793-94.  The primary reason for this rule is that,
ordinarily, the trial record does not illuminate the basis for the challenged acts or omissions
of counsel.  In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 726, 770 A.2d 202, 207 (2001) (citing Johnson
v. State, 292 Md. 405, 434-35, 439 A.2d 542, 559 (1982)).  We shall not disturb the exercise
of the trial court’s discretion on this record in the direct appeal.
4.  
Admission of Appellant’s Statements at the Homicide Unit
Appellant contends that the trial court committed error when it denied his motion to
suppress all of the statements that he gave to police at the Homicide Unit between 3:42 a.m.
and 5:10 a.m. on 4 December 2002, which were obtained without giving Appellant a
Miranda warning, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Appellant cites the following circumstances as evidence that Appellant was in custody at the
time of his questioning by police and so should have been issued a Miranda warning: it was
the fourth time that he had been questioned in connection with Marciana’s disappearance;
he was isolated from Marciana’s family and neighbor who were also questioned by the
detectives; he was questioned in a station house; he had been in a small locked room at the
41
Missing Persons Unit for two and one-half hours before being transported by police car to
the Homicide Unit; police made him wait three hours at the Homicide Unit until they
questioned him; the record is unclear whether he offered to go to the Homicide Unit; and
that, because the detectives told Appellant that there were inconsistencies in his statements,
that he was being questioned as a suspect and, as a result, a reasonable person in Appellant’s
position would have considered himself to be in custody.
The law presumes that, absent an appropriate rights warning, statements made during
a custodial interrogation are made involuntarily and so are in violation of a defendant’s right
against self-incrimination.  Therefore, when a person is held in custody, police are required
to issue the so-called Miranda warning preceding the interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966) (“Any statement given freely
and voluntarily without any compelling influence is, of course, admissible in evidence.  The
fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is
allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can
be interrogated.”).  To determine whether Appellant was in custody when he was questioned
by detectives at the Homicide Unit between 3:42 and 5:10 a.m. on 4 December 2002, the
applicable standard is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree associated with a formal arrest.  State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 209-210, 821
A.2d 439, 445 (2003) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517,
3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)).  We apply this standard by considering the
16 In Whitfield, we concluded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the
interrogations at issue in that case.  We considered there the following circumstances not
found in the present case: defendant was interrogated in the “isolation wing” of the police
station so as to be alone with his interrogators;  he was the only inmate questioned; he was
immediately confronted with law enforcement’s knowledge of his guilt in order to shock the
needed information from him; he was only permitted to leave the police station so that he
could assist in retrieving the weapon;  and, he was detained once he complied.  Whitfield, 287
Md. 124, 141-42, 411 A.2d 415, 426 (1980).
42
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.  Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520,
77 L.Ed.2d at 1279.  As we said in Whitfield v. State, “some actual indication of custody must
exist, such that a reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off police
questioning.” 287 Md. 124, 141, 411 A.2d 415, 425 (1980) (Citation omitted); see also
Rucker, 374 Md. at 209; 821 A.2d at 445.16
After considering the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s interrogation at the
Homicide Unit, we hold that, while some circumstances hint at restraint or coercive elements,
we are not prepared to conclude that they rise to the level that a reasonable person would feel
that he or she were under arrest or his or her freedom of movement restrained to the degree
associated with a formal arrest.  That the questioning occurred in a police station is not
determinative of whether a custodial interrogation occurred.  In Oregon v. Mathiason, the
U.S. Supreme Court held there was no custody and no deprivation of freedom when the
defendant, a burglary suspect, came voluntarily to the police station at the request of the
police, was told that he was not under arrest, although a suspect, and was permitted to leave
at the end of the half-hour interview because the defendant was not deprived of his freedom
43
of action in any significant way.  429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719
(1977) (per curiam).  The Court stated that a non-custodial interrogation is not converted
merely because the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.”  Id.  
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that
the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.  But
police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings
to everyone whom they question.  Nor is the requirement of
warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is
one whom the police suspect.  Miranda warnings are required
only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s
freedom as to render him “in custody.”  
Id.  
In the present case, at no time during the questioning was Appellant arrested, nor do
we believe that a reasonable person would be led to believe to the contrary.  He was told that
he may become a suspect.  Although detectives made him aware of the inconsistencies in his
statements and, in fact, obtained an admission from him to a lie about the time he left his
workplace on the afternoon of 3 December, the record of the questioning reveals no coercion
of the type the federal or Maryland constitutions prohibit.  Nor does the record show that
Appellant was coerced into being interviewed four times prior to his first interview at the
Homicide Unit.  Nor was he coerced into staying at the Missing Persons and Homicide Units
17 Detectives offered Appellant pizza and soda (the record indicates he ate one slice
and drank a soda), and, as police safety procedure provide, escorted him to the restroom
when he wished to use it.  The record does not disclose that the statements were elicited
involuntarily from Appellant by use of physical actions employed by the police or their
methods of interrogation. 
44
for a total of 11 hours before the questioning at issue took place.17  We find no indication
from the circumstances of the interrogation that a reasonable person would not think that he
or she could break off the police questioning and leave freely.  Appellant agreed to go to the
Missing Persons Unit.  He agreed to answer police questions, and did so, as detectives
testified, cooperatively.  When answering questions at the first interview at the Homicide
Unit, he did so cooperatively.  He agreed to wait in the interview room, the door of which
stood open throughout Appellant’s time there.  Appellant was taken to his mother’s home the
evening of 4 December 2002 after he terminated further questioning.  We conclude that
Appellant was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way during the relevant questioning by police before his arrest.  We hold that the
trial court committed no error in admitting  Appellant’s statements given without a prior
Miranda warning.
5.
Admission of Appellant’s Clothing
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the
clothes obtained from him at the Homicide Unit, contending that he did not consent to the
45
seizure.  The State responds that Appellant voluntarily gave police the clothes, and, even if
it were found that he did not, that the detectives properly effected a warrantless seizure due
to the risk that any evidence of blood or other matter could be destroyed or removed.  We
conclude that Appellant consented to the search and seizure.
It is well settled that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, one of which is a search conducted
pursuant to consent.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44,
36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (Citations omitted).  When the State argues that a search was
conducted pursuant to consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent, in fact, was
given freely and voluntarily.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 S.Ct. at 2045, 36 L.Ed.2d at
859.  To determine whether the State met that burden, we consider the totality of the
circumstances.    Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862-63;
Brown v. State, 378 Md. 355, 362, 835 A.2d 1208, 1211 (2003).
Based upon our review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search and
seizure of the clothes at the Homicide Unit, we conclude that the State satisfied its burden
to prove that Appellant consented to the detectives’ request for the clothes.  For the reasons
stated in Section III(A)(4), supra, we determine that Appellant was not in custody at the time
police obtained the clothing.  In addition, the record exposes no evidence of coercion or force
on the detectives’ part in obtaining the clothing.  
46
The detectives present in the interview room testified at the suppression hearing that
Appellant allowed them to view the sewed-on label on his jeans and gave them the clothing
by placing it on the table.  Detective Patton stated that, after reviewing the blue jean paper
labels recovered from the blue Wal-mart bag, he visited Appellant in the interview room to
examine his jeans to determine their brand and size and observe whether other forensic
evidence was on the jeans.  Detective Patton, Detective Jones, and a crime lab technician
went to the room where Appellant was waiting and “asked [Appellant] could we see his
labels on his pants.”  When asked what Appellant’s reaction was to this question, Detective
Patton replied, “Sir, he didn’t react at all.  He stood up and unbuckled” and lowered his
pants. The police took photographs of the tags. Observing that the brand and size of the jean
pants matched the labels found in the Wal-Mart bag, Detective Patton then “asked
[Appellant] to give us his clothing.”  As Appellant took off the jeans, Detective Patton
noticed what appeared to be a smeared blood stain on a sock, and then asked for the
remaining clothing.  In response, Appellant took off his clothing and “laid them on the table”
in front of him.  Detective Jones’ testimony was consistent with Detective Patton’s testimony
regarding the seizure of the clothing.  The clothing requests occurred after Appellant’s initial
questioning (3:42 a.m. to 5:10 a.m.) and the subsequent polygraph test, when Appellant first
was given a Miranda warning.  After the clothing recovery, the detectives asked Appellant
if he would talk to them again and, after issuing Appellant another Miranda warning, spoke
47
with him for another thirty minutes before Appellant terminated the interview.  Appellant,
by his conduct, consented to the search and seizure of his clothing.
6.
Admission of Fruits of the Car Search
Appellant perceives reversible error in the trial court’s admission of the fruits of the
search of Appellant’s car because the warrant for the search was not supported by probable
cause.  Police sought the warrant to search Appellant’s car after Detective Rabbit, of the
Missing Persons Unit, questioned Appellant.  Detective Rabbit offered the following
averments in the affidavit in support of the search warrant:
On December 3, 2002 your affiant received a call for a
missing person from Officer Petryseak [sic], 4C21.  The missing
child is identified as Marciano [sic] Monia [sic] Ringo (F/B/8
date of birth 5/2/1994).  Your affiant’s investigation under
Baltimore Police Department Central Complain Number 02-
4L01748, revealed that Marciano Monia Ringo was last seen
in front of her school, which is located at 5201 Loch Raven
Boulevard at 0735 hours (07:35 a.m.) this date.  The missing
child’s mother, Milagro Wight [sic] (F/B/5/1977) advised that
Jamal [sic] Abeakuto [sic] (M/B/12/1979) last saw the child,
who left her apartment building to walk to school, Northwood
Elementary School 5201 Loch Raven Boulevard.  Milagro
Wight advised that she contacted the school principal, who
advised that Marciano Monia Ringo did not attend school on
this date.
Your affiant was advised by Officer Petryseak that he
spoke with the missing child’s father, Marc Ringo.  He advised
Officer Petryseak that he went to 5300 Leith Road Apartment C
to pick his son up and while at the location he asked Jamal
Abeakuto about the location of Marciano Monia Ringo.  Marc
48
Ringo advised that Jamal Abeakuto told him that she walked
to school.
Jamal Abeakuto advised Officer Petryseak that the child
walked to school at 0735 hours and returned home at 0740 hours
to get her homework signed.  Jamal Abeakuto stated that he
signed the homework and noticed that there was a note on the
page concerning a filed trip to Port Discovery.  Jamal
Abeakuto stated that he drove Marciano Monia Ringo in his
car back to Northwood Elementary School and dropped her off
in front of the school by the front doors.  Jamal Abeakuto
advised that there was a yellow school bus with children and
teachers around them.  Jamal Abeakuto advised that he did not
see Marciano Monia Ringo enter the school because he drove
through the alley in the odd side of the 5200 block of Loch
Raven Boulevard.
Milagro Wight advised that when she spoke to the school
principal, she was advised that Marciano Monia Ringo was not
scheduled to go on a field trip today but rather on December 4,
2002.
The apartment building and surrounding areas were
canvassed for Marciano Monia Ringo; however, she could not
be located.
Marciano Monia Ringo was last seen wearing a pink
Barbie fur coat, a white shirt, blue jeans and white and blue
tennis shoes.
Police thereafter executed the warrant and searched the car, recovering several items that
were later introduced in evidence at trial and sentencing, including the gun, which was
introduced in the sentencing phase and the Wal-mart receipt, which was introduced in the
State’s case-in-chief at trial.  
49
Appellant argues that the only support for the issuance of the search warrant was the
fact that Appellant was the last person to have seen Marciana and that the situation presented
by the averments in the affidavits an ordinary, everyday scenario -- not suspicious
circumstances that would constitute probable cause to search Appellant’s vehicle.  Although
Appellant did not attack the warrant at the suppression hearing, the suppression court, sua
sponte, found that the judge who issued the warrant had “plenty of probable cause to issue
this warrant.”  
The State argues the issue was not preserved, contending that the validity of the search
warrant was not presented to the suppression court by Appellant.  Even if the issue were
preserved, the State argues that the affidavit supported the issuing court’s finding of probable
cause. 
We conclude that the issue was preserved for appellant review, despite Appellant’s
failure to object at the suppression hearing, because the trial court made a finding, albeit
gratuitously so, that the judge who issued the warrant “had plenty of probable cause.”   Based
upon the averments submitted by Detective Rabbit in the affidavit, we determine that the
issuing judge had probable cause to issue the warrant to search Appellant’s car.  The
applicable standard of review of a probable cause determination is: “so long as the magistrate
had a substantial basis for [] concluding that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] requires no more.”  Potts v.
State, 300 Md. 567, 571, 479 A.2d 1335, 1337-38 (1984) (Internal quotations and citations
50
omitted).  The finding of probable cause must ordinarily be shown within the four corners
of the affidavit supporting it.  Valdez v. State, 300 Md. 160, 168, 476 A.2d 1162, 1166
(1984).  The affidavit supporting the warrant to search Appellant’s car indicated that the last
place Marciana had been seen was in Appellant’s car and that Appellant had dropped
Marciana off at school.  The affidavit also indicated that Marciana did not attend school that
day.  The affidavit notes another inconsistency in Appellant’s statements that raised
suspicion:  Appellant had told the detective that he had seen a note for a field trip scheduled
to take place that day (3 December 2002), but Ms. White told the detective that the school
principal had told her that the field trip was scheduled for 4 December.  We therefore
conclude that the suppression court committed no error by admitting the fruits of the car
search.
B.
Sentencing Phase Issues
1.
Waiver of Jury at Sentencing
Appellant contends that the record fails to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver
of jury sentencing.  The circumstances pointed to by Appellant in support of his argument
are: the lack of questioning for the purpose of assuring the court of the absence of threats,
promises, or inducements; the lack of questioning as to Appellant’s mental health; defense
counsel’s urging of a court trial, rather than a jury trial; and Appellant’s poor mental state at
18 The prosecutor offered the written version of the litany, stating:
(continued...)
51
the time of the sentencing waiver colloquy because it occurred immediately after the court’s
finding of Appellant’s guilt.  Appellant also argues that the court’s description of jury
deliberation in a sentencing proceeding as incomplete, confusing, and inaccurate to a point
where it could have induced Appellant to reject the option of a jury sentencing.
In response, the State argues that the record of the trial court’s inquiry supports its
acceptance of the waiver as voluntary and knowing.  The State contends that the inquiry
conducted here was comparable to the inquiry and jury sentencing waiver in Baker v. State,
367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629 (2002) and Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727 (1993),
and “shows that Abeokuto, an educated man, possessed sufficient knowledge of his jury
sentencing right and understood what he was doing in waiving that right.”  Moreover, the
State urges that, Appellant’s waiver of jury sentencing should be viewed in light of this
previous waiver of jury trial.  In addition, the State asserts that the trial court bestowed upon
Appellant comprehensive and accurate advice on his right to jury sentencing.  The State notes
that Appellant’s election of a court sentencing arose from his discussions with his defense
counsel. 
Immediately after the guilt findings by the trial judge, the prosecutor, with the consent
of defense counsel, offered a written version of an advisement of rights litany to be used by
the trial judge.18  The trial court accepted the proposal, read aloud the litany, and, at the end
(...continued)
Your Honor, prior to getting – to putting the Defendant’s
election on sentencing, I have an – I have a request, and I would
file this pleading, that there is a litany that I would ask the Court
to read to the Defendant.  The state would file this at this time,
to go over to make sure that the election of sentencing is based
on solely the Defendant’s decision without being influenced by
anything the Court may have done or said that may – especially
under the [sic] what happened in the Tichnell case and
Defendant’s election of a specific sentencer one way or the
other.
I would ask the Court . . . [to] go over this litany with the
Defendant and that the, just to make this clear for the record in
terms of Defendant’s election.
52
of the relatively lengthy recitation, asked a few questions of Appellant, which questions also
were part of the offered litany.  The colloquy between the court and Appellant was as
follows:
COURT: Mr. Abeokuto, we have now concluded the guilt phase
of your trial and you have been convicted of murder in the first
degree.
The next phase of your trial is the sentencing phase at
which it will decided whether the sentence to be imposed on the
murder conviction shall be death, life without parole, or life
imprisonment.
Your trial was conducted before the Judge sitting without
a jury.  You are not obliged to maintain that same election for
sentencing, however, because you were tried by the Judge, if
you elect to be sentenced by a jury, you will be sentenced by a
jury that is selected for the purpose of sentencing you.
A jury is comprised of twelve citizens selected from the
53
voter rolls and motor vehicle rolls of this jurisdiction.  You, with
our attorney, would have an opportunity to examine all potential
jurors as part of the process of selecting twelve jurors.  If a
potential juror holds a belief either for or against capital
punishment which would prevent or substantially impair him or
her from being impartial, that juror would not be allowed to
serve as a juror in this case.
In order to secure a death sentence, it is the obligation of
the State of Maryland to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
you were a principal in the first degree to the murder, that is, the
murder was committed by your own hand and that one or both
of the aggravating circumstances listed in the notice of intent to
seek a death penalty exists.
The same burden of proof and standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt exists regardless of whether you elect to be
sentenced by the Court or by a jury.  If you elect to be sentenced
by a jury, each of these threshold determinations must be
unanimous, that is, all of the jurors must agree upon.  If the
sentencer, whether Court or jury, finds that the State has
satisfied its burden, the sentencer will go on to consider whether
any mitigating circumstances exist. 
Mitigating circumstances are any circumstances relating
either to yourself or this crime that would tend to make a
sentence of death less appropriate.  The statute lists seven
circumstances that are considered to be mitigating.  To be
considered there must be proof of the existence of any of these
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.  This burden
exists whether the sentencer is the Court or the jury.
The statutory mitigating circumstances that the jury must
consider are these:
One, the Defendant has not previously been found guilty
of a crime of violence, entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a charge of a crime of violence, or have a
judgment of probation or a stay of entry of judgment entered on
54
a charge of crime of violence.
Crime of violence as used in the statute means abduction,
arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary
manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery, or rape or sexual
offense in the first or second degree, or any attempt to commit
any of these offenses or the use of handguns in the commission
of a felony or other crime of violence.
Number two, the victim was a participant in the
Defendant’s conduct or consented to the act which caused the
victim’s death.
Number three, the Defendant acted under substantial
duress, domination or provocation of another person, but not so
substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the
prosecution.
Number 4, the murder was committed while the capacity
of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental
disorder, or emotional disturbance.
Number 5, the youthful age of the Defendant at the time
of the crime.
Number 6, the act of the Defendant was not the sole
proximate cause of the victim’s death. 
And, number 7, it is unlikely that the Defendant will
engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
In addition to the seven listed mitigating circumstances,
the sentencer may write down any other fact or circumstance it
finds to be mitigating.  That is anything about you or the trial
that would make a sentence of death less appropriate.  This
includes anything relating to your background as well as your
55
relevant and material conduct up to and including this
sentencing proceeding, as well as any factor causing one to feel
sympathy or mercy toward you.
Mercy in and of itself may be considered a mitigating
circumstance.
Again, mitigating circumstances must exist by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Further, with respect to nonstatutory mitigating factors,
it is necessary, too, that the sentencer be convinced both of the
fact or circumstance exists and that it is mitigating.  As with the
listed mitigating circumstances, this is the same whether the
sentencer is the Court or a jury.
Unlike the matters on which the State bears the burden of
proof, if you elect to be sentenced by a jury, the jury need not be
unanimous with respect to whether a particular mitigating
circumstance exists other than mitigating circumstance number
one, which they must unanimously find.  This is true as to both
the listed mitigating circumstances and the other mitigating
circumstances.
If after a period of deliberation the sentencing jury cannot
unanimously agree on the existence of a particular mitigating
circumstance, those jurors finding the mitigating circumstance
will be instructed to consider it in determining the appropriate
sentence.  Those jurors finding that the mitigating circumstance
does not exist will not consider it.  If all of the jurors agree that
no mitigating circumstance has been proven, they will be
instructed to enter a sentence of death.
Similarly, if the Court, sitting without a jury, would find
that no mitigating circumstance exists, the Court would also
enter a sentence of death.
If the Court or any juror finds that one or more mitigating
circumstances has been proven, the Court or jury will balance
56
those mitigating circumstances, if found to exist, against the
aggravating circumstance that has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to determine whether the sentence should be
death or not death.  The same balancing process is undertaken
by a jury or the Court.
In the event of a jury sentencing, all jurors will balance
the mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist and
each individual juror will balance as well mitigating
circumstances found by that juror to exist.
Whether the sentencer is the Court or a jury, the State
bears the ultimate burden to establish the propriety of a death
sentence.
If the sentencer, is the court or jury, the State bears the
ultimate burden to establish the propriety of a death sentence.
If the sentencer, whether court or jury, concludes that the
mitigating 
circumstances 
outwe igh 
the 
agg ravating
circumstances, the sentence may not be death.
If the mitigating circumstances and aggravating
circumstances are in even balance, the sentence may not be
death.  Only if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances is a sentence of death to be imposed.
Where the sentencer is a jury, the outcome of the balance must
be a unanimous conclusion of the jury.
The need for jury unanimity has been noted on several
occasions.  If after a reasonable period of deliberation the jury
is unable to reach agreement unanimously on any matter for
which unanimity is required, including whether a sentence of
death should be imposed, then the Court shall not impose a
sentence of death.
If the sentencer determines that the sentence shall not be
death, then the same sentencer shall proceed to determine
whether the sentence should be life or life without parole.
57
If the sentencer is a jury and they aren’t able to reach a
verdict on the issue of death within a reasonable period of time,
then the sentence of death shall not be imposed and the same
jury shall nevertheless proceed to consider the question of life
or life without parole.  If the sentencer is a jury, a sentence of
life without parole must be a unanimous decision.
If the jury cannot achieve unanimity on the issue of life
without the possibility of parole after a reasonable period of
deliberation, the sentence of life must be imposed.
If you choose the Court as the sentencer, then I must
consider whether life or life without parole is appropriate if I
determine that death is not the proper sentence.
Do you have any questions concerning what I have
described and read to you in these instructions?
DEFENDANT: No.
COURT: Have you had an opportunity to discuss your election
with your attorney, [defense counsel]?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT.  Do you understand the various distinctions that I have
outlined for you?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: What is your age?
DEFENDANT: 24
COURT: What is your educational background?
DEFENDANT: Some college.
COURT: What is your election for sentencing, to be sentenced
19 In Ware v. State, we stated that “[w]hether a defendant is to be sentenced by the
court or the jury is a decision for the defendant.”  360 Md. 650, 704, 759 A.2d 764, 792
(2000) (citing Md. Rule 4-246 (waiver of jury trial); Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 670, 629
(continued...)
58
by the Court or to be sentenced by the jury?
DEFENDANT: Court.
COURT: 
Any 
other 
questions, 
[defense 
counsel] 
or
[prosecutor]?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, not from the defense.  No.
COURT: [Prosecutors]?
PROSECUTOR: No, Your Honor.
COURT: Mr. Clerk, would you file the election read and file
this as Motions Exhibit Number 1 – Court’s Exhibit Number 1.
According to the election, the court proceeded to sentence Appellant.  It conferred, among
other sentences, the sentence of death for the murder conviction.
The right to a jury at a capital sentencing is a creature of statute.  Bruce v. State, 328
Md. 594, 602, 616 A.2d 392, 396 (1992).  A capital sentencing hearing shall be conducted
before a jury unless the defendant waives the jury.  Md. Code (2002, 2003 Repl. Vol., 2004
Supp.) Criminal Law Article, § 2-303(c)(3);  Baker, 367 Md. at 690, 790 A.2d at 654 (citing
the predecessor statute to § 2-303).  A defendant’s waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
Baker, 367 Md. at 690, 790 A.2d at 654 (Citation omitted); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248,
262, 582 A.2d 794, 801 (1990).19  When examining whether a defendant made a knowing and
(...continued)
A.2d 685, 694 (1993); and Bruce, 328 Md. at 602-07, 616 A.2d at 396-98). We held, in
Ware, that a defendant’s “decision to proceed with jury sentencing in light of defense
counsel’s recommendation to the contrary is insufficient in and of itself to trigger a
competency examination.”  Ware, 360 Md. at 706, 759 A.2d at 793.
59
voluntary waiver, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the court’s
colloquy with the defendant.  Baker, 367 Md. at 690-91, 790 A.2d at 654.  We determine
whether the court’s explanation of the jury sentencing right is proper.  Id.; Trimble, 321 Md.
at 262-63, 582 A.2d at 801; Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-40, 455 A.2d 979, 984 (1983).
We also determine whether the court made an effort to ensure that the defendant’s waiver
was knowing and voluntary by considering the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into
voluntariness based upon the facts and issues presented to the court.  We base our conclusion
on the record provided.  Baker, 367 Md. at 691, 790 A.2d at 654. 
When determining whether a trial court properly instructed a defendant, we consider
the accuracy and clarity of the court’s statement of the law and whether the defendant had
sufficient time to discuss the election with defense counsel prior to the court’s inquiry.  In
Baker, Baker argued that his waiver of jury sentencing was not knowing and intelligent.
Baker, 367 Md. at 690-91, 790 A.2d at 654-55.  He contended that the court failed to mention
the standard of proof applicable to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and erred in stating that the jury’s finding at trial that Baker was a principal in the first degree
20 Baker also argued that the trial court did not properly advise him of the balancing
of aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, relying on Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).  We held, in Baker, that
Apprendi is not applicable to Maryland’s death penalty statute.   Baker, 367 Md. at 691, 790
A.2d at 654.
60
was binding at sentencing.20  Baker, 367 Md. at 690, 790 A.2d at 654.  We examined the
waiver colloquy between the trial court and Baker, considered the totality of the
circumstances, and concluded the waiver knowing and voluntary because the “record
reflect[ed] that the trial court made a thorough and reasonable effort to explain the sentencing
proceeding to Baker and [made] sure that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.”  Baker,
367 Md. at 691, 790 A.2d. at 654.  We stated:
The trial court asked Baker and his counsel several times if they
had been able to adequately discuss the question of whether to
be sentenced by the court or a jury.  Baker’s attorneys were also
asked if the court had adequately covered the advisements and
they responded that the court had.  Baker also stated [several
times] that he did not have any questions, that he had a sufficient
opportunity to discuss the election with his attorneys, and that he
did not have any questions that his attorneys were unable to
answer.  Baker also responded that he was satisfied making his
election at that time, that he understood that he could not change
his mind, and that he did not need to have further time to discuss
the election with his attorneys.  
Baker, 367 Md. at 691, 790 A.2d at 654-55.  Although we found no facts in Baker that would
call into question the defendant’s mental or medication status at the time that would suggest
that the trial judge should ask about them in the inquiry, the court asked Baker whether he
was under the influence of any medication, or drugs, or alcohol that would affect his ability
61
to understand the court’s instructions, hear the court’s questions, or answer the court’s
questions.     Baker, 367 Md. at 662, 790 A.2d at 637-38.   Baker replied that he did not.  Id.
The court also asked about his age and level of education.  Id.   The court characterized the
standard of proof applicable to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
as “outweighing,” rather than characterizing it as the “preponderance standard.” Baker, 367
Md. at 660, 790 A.2d at 636.  We concluded that this instruction, although somewhat
ambiguous, did not rise to the level that it would dramatically increase the chance that Baker
would choose to be sentenced by the court, rather than a jury.  Baker, 367 Md. at 693, 790
A.2d. at 656.  Thus, because the court’s inquiry into the voluntariness of the election and the
adequate instructions given by the court supplied the requisite knowledge concerning the
election, we concluded the jury sentencing waiver to be valid.
We engaged in the same analysis in Trimble, supra. In that case, we vacated a
sentence of death  because, during the colloquy by the court at the time of the jury sentencing
waiver, the trial judge told Trimble that he “had the authority” to dismiss the jury (if it could
not decide on a sentence within a reasonable time) and impose a life sentence, a statement
which may have caused Trimble to believe that he had nothing to lose by electing to be
sentenced by the court.  Trimble, 321 Md. at 262-63, 582 A.2d at 801 (citing as controlling
Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 455 A.2d 979 (1983) (holding that the defendant’s waiver of
jury sentencing was not knowing and voluntary because the court failed to instruct Harris that
the jury would have to be unanimous before imposing death)).  Because of the inaccuracy of
21 While the presence of an attorney to discuss the waiver election tends to show that
a defendant has made a knowing waiver, see Baker, that fact will not mitigate an inaccurate
or incomplete court instruction on the jury sentencing right, see Trimble and Harris.
Therefore, evidence that a defendant discussed the election with an attorney prior to the
waiver is only one circumstance for us to consider when determining whether a waiver is
voluntary and knowing.
62
the court’s instruction, we vacated Trimble’s death sentence even though he was represented
by counsel at the time of the election.21
In Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727 (1993), we considered evidence of the
voluntariness of the jury sentencing waiver, which we found to be knowing and voluntary.
Rejecting Thanos’ claim that the trial court erred in explaining his right to be tried and
sentenced by a jury, we determined that his arguments were “merely extensions of his
[actual] claim that he was incompetent to stand trial.” Thanos, 330 Md. at 94, 622 A.2d at
735.  We found the incompetency claim to be devoid of merit because:
None of Thanos’s four expert witnesses at the sentencing
proceeding ever suggested that he was incompetent to stand
trial.  While Thanos did make some peculiar remarks to the trial
judge, his words on the whole were very lucid.  He appeared to
grasp all of his rights as they arose throughout the proceedings.
He explained very clearly why he preferred conditions in the
Super Max facility in Baltimore to those of the St. Mary’s
County Detention Center[, the reason he offered for preferring
a court trial to a jury trial].  And he understood and insightfully
articulated his tendency to become disruptive under stress,
which reasonably justified his initial desire to absent himself
from the proceedings.
Thanos, 330 Md. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.  The record indicated that Thanos was “lucid,”
63
“insightfully articulate[],” and “appeared to grasp all of his rights” as demonstrated by his
statements during the proceedings and his responses to the court’s questions.  Thus, the
record supported the trial court’s finding of a voluntary waiver.
After an examination of the totality of the circumstances on the record of the present
case, we are unable to conclude with requisite confidence that Appellant made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of a jury sentencing.  Our confidence in the waiver is undermined
because the trial court knew (or should have recalled) from testimony given at the
competency hearing on 22 June 2004 that Appellant had been prescribed Geodon (an anti-
psychotic medication) while in custody at the County Detention Center.  The court failed at
the sentencing waiver hearing to ascertain whether Appellant had been taking the medication
since the competency determination; whether he currently was taking the medication; and,
if so, whether Appellant was experiencing any side effects as alluded to by Dr. Inouye, at
least insofar as they might impact adversely his ability to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver some nine weeks after the competency determination.  This line of inquiry, under the
facts of the case, was important because Geodon ingestion may give rise to the side effects,
among others, of sedation, nausea, dizziness, and confusion.  PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE
2517-20 
(60 
ed. 
2006); 
see 
also 
Facts 
About 
Geodon, 
available 
at
http://www.geodon.com/GeoPat_FactGeo_side_effects.asp (providing product information
by the manufacturer, Pfizer Inc.); Geodon, Physicians’ Desk Reference, 2005 WL 1158531
(2005) (providing information on common side effects by the Physicians’ Desk Reference,
22 Appellant also argues that the court erred because it did not make an explicit finding
of a voluntary and knowing waiver.  It is unnecessary for us to reach this question.
64
current through the printing of the 2005 edition).  The effect of the failure to make a specific
inquiry on this point in the jury sentencing waiver is distinguishable from the absence of a
similar inquiry during the jury trial waiver process because, in the latter, the court heard
contemporaneous expert medical testimony regarding Appellant’s competency to stand trial,
which included learning of the prescription of Geodon, see supra Section III(A)(1).  Thus,
the information was fresh in the court’s mind as it evaluated the waiver proceedings before
it then.  The jury sentencing waiver election, however, took place on 27 August 2004, nearly
nine weeks after the court last heard testimony regarding Appellant’s medication status.  As
Dr. Inouye stated at the competency hearing on 22 June 2004, the positive effects, if any, of
Geodon may take “weeks” to display themselves.  Whether the potential adverse side effects,
if any, take as long to materialize is unexplored on this record, particularly so at the jury
sentencing waiver proceeding.
We do not hold, by finding this jury sentencing waiver colloquy insufficient to support
a knowing and voluntary waiver, that every jury sentencing waiver colloquy must inquire into
mental health and medication.  As stated before, we do not require a specific or standard
litany or colloquy in every case.22  The necessary inquiry by the court to determine whether
a jury sentencing waiver is knowing and voluntary is bound by the facts and circumstances
of the particular case.  Here, the trial court knew from the competency hearing that Appellant
23 For guidance to the trial court on remand, we choose to comment on a collateral
point regarding the waiver litany employed by the court.   The court read aloud a five page
description of Appellant’s rights and sentencing standards before asking Appellant whether
he understood them.  This could be a rather daunting explication to a layman, even one not
possibly on an anti-psychotic medication.  In contrast, the court, prosecutor, and defense
counsel inquired about Appellant’s understanding of his various rights seven times at the jury
trial waiver election.  Although the court’s explanation of jury sentencing rights was accurate
and clear, it might be a better approach to present such information to defendants in smaller
intellectual “bytes” and inquire discretely after each “byte” or logical grouping of “bytes”
whether a defendant understands them.  
65
had been prescribed Geodon, an anti-psychotic drug that, not surprisingly, carries with it
relevant potential side effects – information that easily could be found in the Physician’s
Desk Reference.23
Because we vacate the sentences due to a finding of fault with the sentencing
proceeding by four members of the Court, it is not-strictly necessary that we reach and decide
the other preserved issues regarding sentencing.  We nonetheless choose to offer some dicta
guidance, however, on a few of them in order that, on remand, the trial court may consider
that guidance should the circumstances recur at a new sentencing proceeding, as it seems to
us they likely will.   
2.
Sentence for Extortion
Had we not vacated the entire sentencing proceeding for the failure of the jury waiver,
we would have concluded that the Circuit Court illegally increased the sentence for the
extortion conviction by changing the sentence that it first imposed at the sentencing hearing
66
to an increased one in an Amended Commitment Order.  At the sentencing hearing on 15
November 2004, the sentence for extortion was imposed as follows:
COURT:  As to the extortion count, the sentence of the Court is
ten years in the Department of Correction, and that sentence will
date from the initial date of his arrest, which was that?
PROSECUTOR: 12-24 of – actually it was – yes, 12-24 of 02.
COURT: 12-24-02.  Okay.
The Amended Commitment Report prepared thereafter provided that the sentence for the
extortion conviction was ten years to be served consecutive to the sentence of death for the
first-degree murder conviction.  In the post-sentencing Report of Trial Judge, prepared in
capital cases pursuant to Md. Rule 4-343, the court re-affirmed its intent that the sentence for
extortion be ten years to be served consecutively with the sentence of death for the first-
degree murder conviction.  
Md. Rule 4-345 (2004) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.
(b) Modification or reduction – Time for.  The court has
revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed
within 90 days after its imposition . . . (2) in a circuit court,
whether or not an appeal has been filed.  Thereafter, the court
has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of
fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of
this Rule.  The court may not increase a sentence after the
sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident
mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is
made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom
following the sentencing proceeding.
67
* * * 
(d) Open court hearing.  The court may modify, reduce,
correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court,
after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim
or victim’s representative who requests an opportunity to be
heard . . . . (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the trial court initially imposed the sentence for extortion to begin
on 24 December 2002 and then purported in subsequent papers to change it to consecutive
with the death sentence, which effected an increase (albeit potentially a metaphysical one)
in the sentence.  This was not permitted.
3.
Separate Sentences for Kidnapping and
Child Kidnapping
The doctrine of merger of offenses for sentencing purposes is premised in part on the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state
court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment.  Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 236, 772
A.2d 283, 299 (2001) (Citations omitted).  The applicable standard for determining whether
one offense merges into another is what is often called the “required evidence test,”
McGrath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 23, 736 A.2d 1067, 1068-69 (1999) (Citations omitted); but,
it is also known as the “same evidence test,”“Blockburger test,” or “elements test.” Dixon,
364 Md. at 237, 772 A.2d at 299-300.  In McGrath, supra, we summarized the required
evidence test as follows:
The required evidence test focuses upon the elements of
68
each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are included
in the other offense, so that only the latter offense contains a
distinct element or distinct elements, the former merges into the
latter.  Stated another way, the required evidence is that which
is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for each []
offense.  If each offense requires proof of a fact which the other
does not, or in other words, if each offense contains an element
which the other does not, there is no merger under the required
evidence test even though both offenses are based upon the
same act or acts.  But, where only one offense requires proof of
an additional fact, so that all elements of one offense are present
in the other, and where both offenses are based on the same act
or acts, [] merger follows []. 
* * *
When applying the required evidence test to multi-
purpose offenses, i.e., offenses having alternative elements, a
court must examine the alterative elements relevant to the case
at issue.  (Internal quotations and citations omitted).
McGrath, 356 Md. at 23-24, 736 A.2d at 1068-69 (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385,
391-392, 631 A.2d 453, 456-57 (1993)).  When a merger is required, separate sentences are
normally precluded;  instead, a sentence may be imposed only for the offense having the
additional element or elements.   See, e.g., Dixon, 364 Md. at 237, 772 A.2d at 299 (citing
Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699, 702, 542 A.2d 373, 374 (1988)); McGrath, 356 Md. at 24,
736 A.2d at 1069 (Internal quotations omitted).  “[W]here there is a merger of a lesser
included offense into a greater offense, we are not concerned with penalties – the lesser
included offense generally merges into and is subsumed by the greater offense regardless of
penalties.”   Dixon, 364 Md. At 238, 772 A.2d at 300 (citing Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md.
114, 125, 665 A.2d 685, 690 (1995) and Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 722-23, 421 A.2d 957,
69
963 (1980)) (Emphasis in original); see also Lancaster v. State,  332 Md. at 404-07, 631 A.2d
at 463-64.
We have not before determined whether kidnapping merges with child kidnapping.
We would examine first the elements of each offense, regardless of the penalties imposed.
Section 3-502 of the Criminal Law Article regarding kidnapping provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited. – A person may not, by force or fraud, carry or
cause a person to be carried in or outside the State with the
intent to have the person carried or concealed in or outside the
State.
Md. Code (2002), Criminal Law Article, § 3-502(a).  Section 3-503 of the Criminal Law
Article regarding child kidnapping, as it stood in 2002, provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited.  – (1) A person may not, without color of right:
(i) forcibly abduct, take, or carry away a child under the
age of 12 years from:
   1.  the home or usual place of abode of the child; or
   2.  the custody and control of the child’s parent or legal
guardian; 
(ii) without the consent of the child’s parent or legal
guardian, persuade or entice a child under the age of 12 years
from:
    1.  the child’s home or usual place of abode; or
   2.  The custody and control of the child’s parent or
legal guardian; or
(iii) with the intent of depriving the child’s parent or legal
guardian, or any person lawfully possessing the child, of the
custody, care, and control of the child, knowingly secrete or
harbor a child under the age of 12 years.
Md. Code (2002), Criminal Law Article, § 3-503(a).
Appellant was convicted of one count of statutory kidnapping (according to the
70
Indictment:  “unlawfully did forcibly and fraudulently carry and cause to be carried Marciana
Monyai Ringo, with intent to have [her] carried and concealed in or outside this State . . .”)
and one count of statutory child kidnapping (according to the Indictment:  “unlawfully did,
without color of right, without the consent of Marciana Monyai Ringo’s parent or legal
guardian, persuade and entice [her], a child under the age of 12, from [her] home and the
custody and control of [her] parent or legal guardian . . .”).  
Because both kidnapping and child kidnapping are multi-element offenses, we look
to the alterative elements relevant to the present case.  See, e.g., Dixon, 364 Md. at 243, 772
A.2d at 303.  The elements of kidnapping relevant here are:  (1) forcibly or fraudulently (2)
carry or cause to be carried (3) a person (4) with the intent to have the person carried or
concealed in or outside the State.  The elements of child kidnapping relevant here are:  (1)
without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian, (2) persuade or entice (3) a child
under the age of 12 years (4) from the child’s home custody or control of the child’s parent
or legal guardian.  A relevant element of kidnapping not present in the relevant elements of
child kidnapping is force or fraud.  To commit child kidnapping, one need only persuade or
entice the child; force or fraud is not required.  A relevant element of child kidnapping not
present in the relevant elements of kidnapping is the age of the victim as twelve or younger.
To commit kidnapping, the victim may be any age.  Therefore, the trial court here was not
required to merge the two convictions for sentencing purposes under the required elements
test.
71
 The required evidence test is not, as we pointed out in McGrath, 356 Md. at 25, 736
A.2d at 1069 and Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990), the only
standard under Maryland law for determining questions of merger, even when two sentences
are not required to be merged under the required evidence test.  Those sentences might still
require merger under either the rule of lenity and/or principles of fundamental fairness.  The
rule of lenity, which is only applicable to statutory offenses, provides that “where there is no
indication that the [L]egislature intended multiple punishments for the same act, a court will
not impose multiple punishments but will, for sentencing purposes, merge one offense into
the other.”  McGrath, 356 Md. at 25, 736 A.2d at 1069  (citing Miles v. State, 349 Md. 215,
227, 707 A.2d 841, 847 (1998), Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 321-22, 593 A.2d 671, 675
(1991), Monoker, 321 Md. at 220, 582 A.2d at 527-28, and White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 745-
46, 569 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1990)).  We explained the purpose of the rule of lenity in Monoker:
The rule of lenity was originally formulated by the United States
Supreme Court as a principle of statutory construction.  The
policy behind the rule is “‘that the Court will not interpret a . .
. criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an
individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more
than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’” White v.
State, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d 1271, quoting Simpson v. U.S.,
435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), which
in turn quotes Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209,
214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958).
Monoker,  321 Md. at 222-23, 582 A.2d at 529.  Where “there is a merger under the rule of
lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense
24 According to the Indictment, the State charged Appellant for violation of two
statutory offenses under §§ 3-502 and 3-503(a)(1)(ii).
25 The first enacted version of the common law crime of kidnapping provided:
Every person, his or her counsellors, aiders or abettors, who
shall be duly convicted of the crime of kidnapping, and forcibly
or fraudulently carrying, or causing to be carried out of this
state, any free person, or any person entitled to freedom at or of
after a certain age, period or contingency, or of arresting and
imprisoning any free person, or any person entitled to freedom
at or after a certain age, period or contingency, knowing such
(continued...)
72
carrying the greater maximum penalty.”  McGrath, 356 Md. at 25, 736 A.2d at 1069
(quoting Miles, 349 Md. at 229, 707 A.2d at 848).  We conclude that the rule of lenity would
be applicable to the operative considerations in the present case.  In reaching this view, we
consider the Legislature’s chosen statutory language and evidence, if any, of legislative intent
regarding multiple sentences for the same criminal conduct.24  
The history of the kidnapping and child kidnapping statutes has been summarized
aptly in Moore v. State, 23 Md. App. 540, 329 A.2d 48 (1974), cert. denied, 274 Md. 730
(1975).  The common law of kidnapping prohibited the forcible abduction or stealing away
of a man, woman, or child from their own country to another, a capital crime under Jewish
law.  Moore, 23 Md. App. at 543, 329 A.2d at 50 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
219).  The first alternation to the common law definition of kidnapping occurred as a result
of a law enacted in 1809, which required as an element the carrying of “any free person,” or
causing him or her be carried, out of this state. Chapter cxxxviii, § 4 of the Acts of 1809.25
(...continued)
person to be free, or entitled to their freedom, as aforesaid, with
intent to have such person carried out of this state, shall be
sentenced to undergo a confinement in the penitentiary house for
a period of time not less than two nor more than ten years to be
treated as the law directs.
Chapter cxxxviii, § 4 of the Acts of 1809.
73
In 1819, the Legislature enacted a statute entitled, “An Act to punish the offence of
Kidnapping White Children.”  Chapter cxxxii of the Acts of 1819.  The statute provided:
Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, That every
person, his or her counsellors, aiders or abettors, who shall be
duly convicted of kidnapping, and forcibly or fraudulently
stealing, taking or carrying away, any white child or children
under the age of sixteen years, shall be sentenced to undergo a
confinement in the penitentiary for a period of time not less than
five years, nor more than twelve years, there to be treated as the
law directs.
Chapter cxxxii of the Acts of 1819.  The penalty under this statute provided for a sentence
between five and twelve years.  The kidnapping statute in effect in 1819 provided a sentence
between two and five years.  The racial aspect of the child kidnapping law was deleted in
1888.  Md. Code (1888), Article 27, § 155.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that
the legislative intent behind the enactment of the first child kidnapping statute “was to create
a special statute for the protection of children and to proscribe the forcible or fraudulent
taking or carrying away of a child from his or her parent, custodian, or guardian regardless
of whether the child was asported beyond the territorial confines of Maryland,” a measure
26 Indeed, the child kidnapping law presented a broader definition of criminal conduct
than kidnapping, even after the kidnapping law was first amended to no longer require
asportation out of the State. Compare Chapter 589, § 317 of the Acts of 1933 (providing that
child kidnapping requires “forcibly or fraudulently stealing, taking or carrying away any
child under the age of sixteen years . . . ”) (Emphasis added) with Chapter 589, § 316 of the
Acts of 1933 (providing that kidnapping requires “forcibly or fraudulently carrying or
causing to be carried out of or within this State any person . . .”).
74
taken by the Legislature because the kidnapping statute at the time required that the victim
be carried outside of the State.  Moore, 23 Md. App. at 546-47, 329 A.2d at 52.  In 1949, the
Legislature amended the kidnapping statute to include asportation both outside  and within
the State.  Chapter iv, § 385 of the Acts of 1949. 
Now that neither the kidnapping statute nor the child kidnapping statute require that
a victim be asported beyond the territorial confines of M aryland, the original legislative
intent to create a special statute to protect children from being kidnapped and carried away
to a place within the State is appeased.  The current version of the child kidnapping law
differs from the kidnapping law in other respects.  As we noted, supra, under § 3-503, child
kidnapping may be committed by circumstances that are not covered by the current general
kidnapping statute, § 3-502, and vice versa.26  Thus, it appears that the Legislature intended
to create two separate offenses, each with its own penalty.  Nonetheless the statutory
language and legislative history are silent as to the legislative intent to punish the two
offenses as distinct offenses, or a single merged crime, when a defendant violates both § 3-
503 and § 3-502 by the same conduct.  Therefore, the rule of lenity applies. As a result of the
75
ambiguity, “we, in effect, will give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and [would] hold
that the crimes do merge.”  Monoker,  321 Md. at 222, 582 A.2d at 529 (Citations omitted).
The trial court erred when it failed to merge the kidnapping and child kidnapping counts into
one sentence of thirty years.
4.
Unpreserved Sentencing Issues:
Admission of Medical Expert’s Testimony,  Victim Impact Testimony, 
and the Prosecutorial Closing Statement at the Sentencing Hearing
Appellant raises three unpreserved issues regarding his sentencing.  See supra
questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11).  In light of the effect of our holding as to the
invalid jury sentencing waiver, it is unnecessary for us to address these issues in any event,
but we choose to note that, if the questions were before us, we would not review these claims
because the unpreserved appellate arguments of error cannot be characterized as compelling,
exceptional, or fundamental to assure the defendant a fair sentencing, after applying the plain
error doctrine.  See supra Section III(A)(2).
5.
Constitutionality of the Maryland Death Penalty Statute
Appellant argues that the Maryland death penalty statute is unconstitutional because
it requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances only by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Appellant’s argument fails.  “We have consistently found
no due process violation in the provision directing that the weighing process be based on a
76
preponderance of the evidence.”  Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 253, 835 A.2d 1105, 1148
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 2084, 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004) (quoting
Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 121, 786 A.2d 631, 648-49 (2001)).
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED AS TO
ALL 
CONV ICTION S; 
SENT ENCIN G
VACATED; CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW
SENTENCING PROCEEDING; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.
/In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-CR-2127
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
JAMAAL KENNETH ABEOKUTO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion by Wilner, J., which
Cathell and Battaglia, JJ., join
______________________________________
Filed:   February 13, 2006
I concur in that part of the judgment that affirms the convictions and vacates the
sentence imposed on the extortion conviction but, with respect, I dissent from the Court’s
vacation of the death sentence.  
Here is a case in which defense counsel and the State agreed on the appropriate advice
to be given to the defendant, to make certain that, if he chose to waive sentencing by a jury
and allow the court to determine the sentence, his waiver and election would be knowing and
voluntary.  The court agreed with the written statement presented by the prosecutor, with the
consent of defense counsel, and read that statement as approved by them.  After reading the
statement, the court asked the defendant if he had any questions, to which the defendant
responded that he did not.  The court inquired whether the defendant had discussed his
election with his attorney, and the defendant replied that he had.  The court inquired whether
the defendant understood what the court had recited, and, again, the defendant replied in the
affirmative.  The court inquired whether defense counsel, who was presumably aware that
his client had been prescribed anti-psychotic medication, had any questions, and the answer
was “no.”
Notwithstanding the careful, fully adequate, and agreed upon, recitation, this Court
declares Abeokuto’s waiver of jury sentencing invalid because the trial court failed to
determine whether the defendant, who had been prescribed Geodon while incarcerated at the
County Detention Center, was in fact, taking that medication at the time of the waiver.  I find
this strained excuse to vacate a death sentence lawfully imposed more than troubling.
-2-
In his brief, Abeokuto acknowledges that, in June, 2004, two months before the
waiver at issue, he had been found competent to stand trial, a ruling that he has not
challenged (yet).  His argument on this point is that the court was “on notice” that “his mental
health was an issue” and that he “had been prescribed an anti-psychotic medication,” and that
“[a]ccordingly, the court was required to ask questions designed to reveal whether Mr.
Abeokuto’s mental illness and the drugs that he had been prescribed for that illness might
have adversely affected his ability to both voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to be
tried by a jury.”  
This Court seemingly rejects that argument, as presented, but from its own presumed
pharmacological expertise drawn from an Internet web site, the Court finds that Geodon
“may give rise to the side effects, among others, of sedation, nausea, dizziness, and
confusion,” and on that basis declares the waiver/election invalid. There is, of course,
nothing – absolutely nothing – in the record to indicate that Abeokuto was experiencing any
sedation, nausea, dizziness, or confusion when he made his election.  Abeokuto made no
such complaint, nor did his attorney.  Nor does the transcript reveal any colloquy from which
any possible sedation, nausea, dizziness, or confusion may be inferred.  Simply from the fact
that a drug that was prescribed for Abeokuto may, according to the Internet, have those
effects, the Court requires – not in every case, but just in this one – that the judge make some
inquiry.
-3-
What kind of inquiry?  It does not appear that the trial judge had the same
pharmacological expertise regarding Geodon that the Majority of this Court has assumed for
itself.  Was he required to consult the Internet to determine the possible side effects of every
drug that Abeokuto had taken in the recent or distant past?  In the absence of any suggestion
by Abeokuto or his attorney that there was a problem in this regard, was the judge obliged
to summon into court a pharmacist, or psychiatrist, or Court of Appeals judge to testify as to
the possible side effects of any such drugs?  Was he obliged to deny the election in the
absence of such expert testimony and require Abeokuto to proceed before a jury even though
he chose not to do so?
What if the judge had made an inquiry and learned that Abeokuto was actually taking
Geodon – what then?  In the absence of any suggestion that Abeokuto was, in fact, sedated,
nauseous, dizzy, or confused – which, to this day Abeokuto has not contended – would he
have been obliged to deny the waiver?  Would he have been required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, with experts opining as to the alternative effects of taking or not taking
the medication in various dosages?  If, as argued, the medication is designed to counteract
the effects of a psychosis, of hallucinations, would the judge have nonetheless been obliged
to insist that Abeokuto stop taking the medication so that he could make his election while
not sedated, dizzy, confused, or nauseous but simply hallucinating?
The Court’s decision in this case is inconsistent with the approach taken in Thanos v.
State, 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727 (1993) and Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648, 790 A.2d 629
-4-
(1990) and, despite the Court’s attempt to cabin it, will make routine sentencing proceedings
exponentially more complex.  We can take judicial notice of our own statistics that fewer
than 5% of the criminal cases in the Circuit Courts of this State are resolved by jury trial.  In
more than 95% of the cases, the defendant waives a jury trial, and, in most of those cases,
accepts a plea agreement and waives trial altogether.  We know that many, probably most,
of those defendants have some kind of drug history – illegal or prescription drugs.  Are we
now going to require, as a condition to finding a waiver to be valid, an inquiry into the
defendant’s past and current drug use, to determine whether there are any current side effects
that might affect the knowingness or voluntariness of the waiver?  Such an inquiry is
certainly appropriate, and judges often do inquire whether a defendant is on any medication,
but is it required when there is no indication that the defendant is suffering from any effect
of a drug?  If not, why not?  What is different about this case?
I would certainly agree that, if there was anything in the record even to suggest that
Abeokuto was suffering from any drug-related (or non-drug-related) inability to make a
knowing and intelligent decision, the judge would have been required to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the matter.  There is nothing in this record to suggest such a problem,
however, and this Court should not invalidate a perfectly good waiver by conjuring such a
hypothesis out of thin air or its own imaginings.
Judges Cathell and Battaglia authorize me to state that he joins in this concurring and
dissenting opinion.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2004
JAMAAL KENNETH ABEOKUTO
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
          Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene, JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,
 which Greene, J. joins
File: February 13, 2006
1Maryland Rule 4-246 (b) provides:
“Procedure for Acceptance of Waiver. A defendant may waive the right to a
trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial. The court may
not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the
defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's
Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that
the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”
  
 
 It is well settled that a defendant may waive the right, personal to, and exercisable only
by, him or her, Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379-81, 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003), Howell v.
State, 87 Md. App. 57, 77, 589 A.2d 90, 100 (1991), to trial by jury, but that any such waiver
is effective and valid only if made on the record in open court and found by the court to have
been made “knowingly and voluntarily.”  Maryland Rule 4-246 (b);1 Smith, 375 Md. at 378-
81, 825 A.2d at 1063-1064; State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 724-25, 720 A.2d 311, 319 (1998);
Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 90, 570 A.2d 1229, 1233-34 (1990); Martinez v. State, 309 Md.
124, 131-35, 522 A.2d 950, 953-56 (1987); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32, 590 A.2d 550,
551-552 (1991).  This determination is fact and circumstance specific, Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31,
590 A.2d at 551, citing State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990); Stewart,
319 Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1233-34; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955, and dual-
faceted, requiring that the waiver be both “knowing” and “voluntary.”
For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, it must have been, for the possessor of the
right, “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”  Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938).   In Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756 (1970), the
-2-
Supreme Court elucidated: “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.” (Footnote omitted).    Thus, while it is true that no fixed litany need
be followed in complying with Maryland Rule 4-246, “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused
merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his lawyer or the court, that he
understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that he knows ‘what a jury trial is,’ and waives
that right ‘freely and voluntarily.’” Tibbs, 323 Md at 32, 590 A.2d at 551.  On the contrary,
our case law is clear: 
“[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress
or coercion, and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial
right before being allowed to waive it.”
Id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 550, citing Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 509.  See Martinez,
309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955, in which this Court instructed:
“In determining whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to a jury trial, the questioner need not recite any fixed incantation.
Whether there is an intelligent, competent waiver must depend on the unique
facts and circumstances of each case. ...  However, the court must be concerned
that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion. ...  Adams [v. United
States ex rel. McCann], 317 U.S. [269,] 275, 280, 63 S. Ct. [236,] 240, 242, 87
L. Ed. 268[, 272, 275, (1942)]. ...  Furthermore, a defendant must have some
knowledge of the jury trial right before he is allowed to waive it. See Dortch [v.
State], 290 Md. [229,] 232, 428 A.2d [1220,] 1222[ (1981)]; Harris v. State,
295 Md. 329, 339 n. 1, 455 A.2d 979, 984 n. 1 (1983); Adams, 317 U.S. at 280,
63 S. Ct. at 242, 87 L. Ed. 268.”
(Footnotes and some citations omitted).   See Bell, 351 Md. at 725, 720 A.2d at 319. 
Although questioned concerning his right to a jury trial, the nature of that right,
including the composition of the jury and the burden of proof, and the effect of a waiver of
-3-
a jury trial for the guilt or innocence stage of the trial on the right to jury sentencing, the
petitioner was not questioned with respect to the voluntariness of the election; he was not
asked if the decision was freely and voluntarily made or was the product of promises,
intimidation or coercion.  Nevertheless, the majority concludes that, “considering the totality
of the circumstances,” __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ [slip. op. at 27] (2006), from that record,
the trial court could have found, as it did, that the petitioner’s waiver of trial by jury was
knowing and voluntary.    Id.   In addition to emphasizing the number of times that the
petitioner was asked about his jury trial right and the jury trial process, id. at __, __ A.2d at
__ [slip op. at 27], it relies on Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), and State
v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507, in both of which the Court repeated that there is no fixed
litany for jury trial waivers and, on a totality of the circumstances review, excused the trial
court’s failure to inquire as to whether the defendants in those cases had been subjected to
physical or mental duress or coercion, Dortch, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224; Hall, 321
Md. at 183, 590 A.2d at 510, or been made promises, which induced the waiver, Dortch, 290
Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224.  Id. at __, __ A.2d at __ [slip op at 24-25].  The majority is also
persuaded by the facts that “Appellant was represent by counsel, who, prior to the 16 August
2004 hearing, had discussed with appellant the decision whether to elect a court or a jury
trial,” id. at __, __ A.2d at __  [slip op. at 27], that “Appellant affirmed that he wanted a court
trial, ” id.,  and that “[n]o facts from the record demonstrate that the court had reason to ask
Appellant whether he had been coerced or threatened to waive his right to a jury trial or
whether anyone, including defense counsel or the prosecutor, promised Appellant anything
in exchange for his waiver.”  Id.
2There were two cases addressed in the one opinion.   In the other case, Cohen v.
State, the Court stated, simply, “the trial judge specifically determined on the record from
his dialogue with Cohen prior to trial that he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.”
Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235, 428 A. 2d 1220, 1224 (1981).   This explanation can
only be described as conclusory.
-4-
In both Hall and Dortch, the defendant was undeniably informed of the nature of the
jury trial right and, so, there was no issue as to his having met the “knowledge” prong of the
test.  Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509, Dortch, 209 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224.
Neither defendant was questioned concerning whether he had been coerced or whether he had
been made promises which prompted his waiver.  Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509,
Dortch, 209 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224.  To be sure, the argument was made in each of
those cases, as I am doing here, that the failure of the court or counsel to inquire specifically
with respect to the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver of jury trial prevented it from being
able to determine, as the rule requires, that the waiver was not only knowing, but voluntary,
as well.   
In rejecting the argument, the Dortch Court appears to have conflated the two prongs
of the waiver test.   After noting that the predecessor to Rule 4-246 (b), Rule 735 d, did not
require a specific inquiry into voluntariness and did not contemplate a fixed litany or specific
ritual, it concluded that “the failure of the trial judge to specifically inquire as to whether the
jury trial waivers were induced by promises or by physical or mental coercion did not
constitute error.” 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224.   The Court explained:
“The record in the Dortch case[2] indicates that the defendant made a written
election witnessed by counsel, stating that his election for a court rather than a
jury trial was ‘knowingly and voluntarily’ made.  The voluntary character of the
election was fortified by the colloquy between the trial judge and Dortch at the
commencement of the trial.  We think the trial judge fairly determined that
Dortch, having been fully advised with respect to the nature of a jury trial,
voluntarily relinquished that right when he elected a court trial.”
-5-
Id. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224.    It is far from clear how full advise with respect to the nature
of a jury trial, which satisfies the knowledge prong, permits a court to infer that the right also
was voluntarily relinquished, but that is precisely what, and all that, the Court said.
Hall is to like effect.   There, the Court opined:
“Considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, see Dortch
v. State, supra, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d 1220, we think that the trial judge
could fairly find that Hall intentionally relinquished his known right to a jury
trial by his voluntary act in waiving that right. When Hall appeared for trial
before the court, in the presence of his attorney and the prosecutor, the court
advised him of his right to a jury trial ‘where twelve people would hear the
evidence,’ all of whom would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
before he could be found guilty. The court advised Hall that if he waived his
right to a jury trial, the court would hear the evidence and have to be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt before he could be found guilty. At the end of this
colloquy, the trial judge asked Hall whether he wanted to be tried by jury or  by
the court, to which Hall answered: ‘Tried by the Court.’
“While the court did not specifically ask Hall whether he understood what he
had been told, or whether his election of a court trial was the result of any
physical or mental duress or coercion, we think that the record before us
demonstrates that the court could fairly be satisfied that Hall had the requisite
knowledge of the jury trial right, that the waiver was voluntary, and that the
requirements of the rule were satisfied. Moreover, the court was not required
to advise Hall, as he contends, as to the details of the jury selection process.
“We conclude, therefore, that constitutional due process requirements were not
transgressed in this case. Fortifying this determination is the fact that on two
prior occasions, the first in writing, and the second during in-court plea
negotiations, Hall also waived his right to a jury trial; on each occasion, he was
also represented by counsel.”
Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509-510.
These cases stand in stark contrast to a later case, Tibbs, 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550,
penned by the author of both Hall and Dortch.   In that case, the defendant’s proffered waiver
of jury trial was accepted by the trial court as knowingly and voluntarily made, on the basis
of a colloquy between the defendant and his counsel, occurring after the defendant responded,
-6-
“Yes, I do,” to counsel’s inquiry concerning his knowledge of his right to have a trial by a
jury:
“‘MR. STILLRICH [Defense Counsel]: And do you understand what a jury
trial is? 
“‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: And you indicated to me when I spoke with you at the
detention center the other evening that you desired to have the case tried before
this Court alone, is that correct? 
“‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: And you do specifically waive your right to have the
matter tried before a jury? 
“‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: Has anyone forced you or threatened you to have you give
up your right to a jury trial? 
“‘DEFENDANT: No, they haven't. 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: Have you given up your right to a jury trial freely and
voluntarily? 
“‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
* * * * * *
“‘MR. STILLRICH: Your Honor, I would proffer to the Court that a waiver of
a jury trial is freely and voluntarily tendered.
* * * * * *
“‘THE COURT: All right. 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: And we're ready to proceed, Your Honor. 
“‘THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Tibbs enters a plea of not guilty to the four
counts, is that right? 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: That's correct. 
“‘THE COURT: Waives his right to a jury trial? 
“‘MR. STILLRICH: Yes, Your Honor.”’
Id. at 30, 590 A.2d  551.
In reversing the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmance of the defendant’s conviction, on
a totality of the circumstances review, acknowledging that the validity of a jury trial waiver
does not depend on a fixed litany, id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551, the Court held:
“[T]he record is woefully deficient to establish that Tibbs knowingly and
voluntarily relinquished his right to a jury trial. The record fails to disclose that
Tibbs received any information at all concerning the nature of a jury trial, as
required by our cases. See Hall, supra, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d 507;  Martinez
v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987). It is not sufficient that an accused
-7-
merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his lawyer or the
court, that he understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that he knows ‘what
a jury trial is,’ and waives that right ‘freely and voluntarily.’”
Id. at 31-32, 590 A.2d at 551.  We added that speculation, based on past criminal justice system
involvement, could not supply the “knowledge” requirement: “[a]ccordingly, notwithstanding
that Tibbs may have had some prior unspecified experience with the criminal justice system,
the trial judge could not fairly be satisfied on this record that Tibbs had the requisite
knowledge of the nature of the jury trial right, that his waiver of the right was knowing and
voluntary, and that the requirements of the rule were thus met.”  Id. at 32, 590 A. 2d at 551-52.
The majority, in responding to the contrary result reached by the Tibbs court, merely
states that the trial court in that case “should have inquired further.” __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at
__, n.12 [slip op. at 24].  I agree, it should have and the fact that it did not was fatal.
Moreover, that is exactly what I believe should have happened here.  If Tibbs stands for the
proposition that knowledge of the right to jury trial cannot be inferred when the litany focuses
exclusively on voluntariness factors, how, I ask, can the majority infer no coercion or
inducements when the litany focuses exclusively on knowledge factors?
The circumstances in Tibbs mirror this case.  At no time was the petitioner asked about
anything that would impact the voluntariness of his waiver, except, of course, the nature of the
jury trial right and the effect of waiver in the context of a death penalty proceeding.  That a
defendant is aware of, has some knowledge of, the jury trial right, while it may be necessary
to a finding of voluntariness, it simply does not address directly the motivation issue and it
certainly does not inform the court as to it.  Whether a person has been coerced or induced to
act, whether physically, mentally, by promise or otherwise, ordinarily is not readily, and may
3The Court was not unaware of the tenuousness of relying on a record that was not
developed fully as to all aspects of the waiver construct.   In Dortch v. State,  290 Md.
229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), taking note of the fact that many trial judges inquired
specifically into the motivation of defendants who waived jury trials, the Court
pronounced that to be the preferable practice and “encourage[d] trial judges to engage
persons electing court trials in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances
permit so as to insulate jury trial waivers from successful direct or collateral attack.”  Id.
at 236, 428 A.2d at 1224, quoting Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 118, 361 A.2d 113, 121
(1976).  We reiterated that encouragement in Hall, in light of our recognition “that the
cold record before us does not reflect a defendant's demeanor, tone, facial expressions,
gestures, or other indicia which, to a trial judge, may  be indicative of a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the jury trial right.”  Id. at 183-84, 582 A.2d at 510.
-8-
not be at all,  observable.3   As in Tibbs, there is in this case nothing whatsoever on which the
trial court could have relied to determine, as it must have done, that the petitioner’s jury trial
waiver was not the product of duress or coercion.  The majority’s reliance on the absence of
facts in the record demonstrating that the court had a reason to ask questions going to the
voluntariness of the waiver is, therefore, quite curious.   Nor can the fact that the petitioner was
represented by counsel provide the necessary basis for the voluntariness determination. 
We can not forget that coercion and improper inducements may have many sources.
Indeed, it is not unheard of that a defendant’s attorney may be the source of an improper
inducement.   To be sure, we can speculate that counsel properly advised the petitioner about
his jury trial right and satisfied himself that the defendant’s decision was not the result of
coercion, duress or promises.   Moreover, we may also surmise that counsel did not himself do
anything to coerce or improperly induce the waiver.   As with the knowledge prong, see Tibbs,
that is not sufficient.   Nor is it uncommon that disclosure of such inducements is made, if at
all, only upon direct inquiry, perhaps because of the nature of the proceedings - the defendant
is responding to questions and likely does not know that he should, or is expected to, volunteer
information.  Expecting the defendant to volunteer the information or, at least signal that there
may be matters that may call into question the voluntariness of the defendant’s announced
-9-
decision, without explicitly advising him of the consequences of not doing so, therefore, is, I
submit, most unrealistic.   In any event, it is the court’s burden to satisfy itself that the waiver
is voluntary, not the defendant’s.   The absence of evidence hardly seems an appropriate or
adequate basis on which to meet that burden.
I join the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the record is insufficient to establish
that the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury sentencing.   I dissent,
however, from the conclusion that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury trial
at the guilt or innocence stage.  I would remand and order a new trial.
Nevertheless, I feel compelled to mention one curiosity regarding the basis for the
majority’s holding that the petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to jury
sentencing - the failure of the trial judge to make an inquiry concerning the voluntariness of
the petitioner’s jury sentencing decision.   Noting that the trial court knew that the petitioner
had been prescribed psychiatric medication while in custody, the majority is troubled, and
rightly so, by the trial judge’s failure to ascertain whether, when he was required to decide
whether to waive jury sentencing,  he was still taking the medication and, if so, whether any
side effects of such medication might have affected the petitioner’s ability to make a knowing
and voluntary waiver.   Not having made this inquiry, directly implicating  the voluntariness
of the petitioner’s  waiver decision, the trial judge erred, the majority concludes, in finding the
waiver to have been knowing and voluntary.   Interestingly, the petitioner did not volunteer any
information on the subject of his medication, or the effect of not taking it, at the sentencing
waiver hearing.
It is interesting that the petitioner was not questioned on this subject, just as he did not
volunteer such information, during the initial jury trial waiver either.  The majority states that
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such an inquiry was unnecessary at that earlier stage, reasoning “[t]he effect of the failure to
make a specific inquiry on this point in the jury sentencing waiver is distinguishable from the
absence of a similar inquiry during the jury trial waiver process because, in the latter, the court
heard contemporaneous expert medical testimony regarding Appellant’s competency to stand
trial, which included the prescription of [psychiatric medication]...”  __ Md. at __, __ A.2d __
[slip op. at 60]. 
This difference is curious.   The issue of whether the petitioner’s voluntariness was
compromised by the petitioner’s failure to take his prescribed medication was as much an issue
at the jury trial waiver at the guilt or innocence stage as it was at the jury sentencing stage.  I
do not agree that whether an inquiry on that subject is appropriate depends on the timing of a
competency hearing.   Unless the issue of the timing of the last taking of the medication
literally had  been explicitly addressed immediately before the waiver proceeding, there really
is little difference between the two scenarios.
In any event, the focus of a hearing on a defendant’s competency to stand trial is on
whether that defendant has the capacity to make a voluntary waiver, whether he or she
understands the proceedings, appreciates their significance, and is able to assist counsel in
mounting a defense.  What is encompassed in the concept of voluntariness as it relates to
waiver is much more; it involves determining whether, in fact, that defendant voluntarily
waived his or her right to a jury trial or sentencing, as appropriate.   That determination, in turn,
may be informed, and often is, by  more than a defendant’s capacity to waive due to lack of
medication and its effect; also relevant to the determination is the presence or absence of
coercion, inducements or promises affecting the waiver decision.   The temporal proximity
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between a competency hearing and the waiver of jury trial hearing, accordingly, is not
dispositive, even if relevant. 
Judge Greene joins in the views expressed herein.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-CR-2127
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 2004
JAMAAL KENNETH ABEOKUTO
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J., 
which Bell, C.J., and Greene, J., join in dissent. 
Filed:    February 13, 2006
Raker, J., concurring and dissenting, in which Bell, C.J., and Greene, J., join in dissent:
I.
I would reverse the sentence and the imposition of the death penalty on the grounds
that the Maryland death penalty statute violates due process and is therefore unconstitutional
because the statute requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances
only by a preponderance of the evidence rather than the standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.  I adhere to my views expressed more fully in the dissenting opinions of Evans v. State,
389 Md. 456, 886 A.2d 562 (2005), Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 843 A.2d 803 (2004), Oken
v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 786 A.2d
631 (2001).
I would sever the preponderance of the evidence standard from Md. Code (2002, 2005
Cum. Supp.), § 2-303(i) of the Criminal Law Article, vacate appellant’s death sentence, and
remand the case for a new capital sentencing proceeding at which a reasonable doubt standard
would apply to the weighing process under § 2-303(i).  Although I find that the preponderance
of the evidence standard in § 2-303(i) is invalid, that standard clearly is severable from the
remainder of the Maryland death penalty statute.  The Maryland death penalty statute is
complete and capable of being enforced with the preponderance of the evidence standard
severed from § 2-303(i).  That standard would, under the requirements of due process, be
replaced by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene have authorized me to state that they join in this
dissent.
II.
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I would affirm the judgments of conviction on the guilt/innocence phase.