Title: Merryman v. University of Baltimore

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Keith Merryman and Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 146 v. University of Baltimore, No. 
33, September Term, 2020 
 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT – MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. (1978, 2014 REPL. 
VOL.) (“ED”) §§ 13-201 TO 13-207 – GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE – ED § 13-201(c) 
– “GRIEVANCE” – “GRIEVABLE ISSUE” – Court of Appeals held that, under 
memorandum of understanding between parties, which incorporated grievance procedures 
set forth in Md. Code Ann., Educ. (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.) (“ED”) §§ 13-201 to 13-207, 
including definition of “grievance” set forth in ED § 13-201(c), complaint brought by 
petitioners concerning holiday leave was not grievable issue because it was dispute that 
“pertain[ed] to [] general level of . . . fringe benefits, or to other broad areas of financial 
management and staffing[.]”  Holiday leave is fringe benefit and complaint concerning 
number of hours of holiday leave to which all officers are entitled, which essentially 
requested that each officer receive additional twenty-two hours of holiday leave per year, 
was complaint pertaining to general level of fringe benefits provided to officers and thus 
not grievable issue.  
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 33 
 
September Term, 2020 
______________________________________ 
 
KEITH MERRYMAN AND FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 146 
 
v. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 26, 2021 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-18-006045 
 
Argued: February 1, 2021 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-03-26 
09:52-04:00
 
 
Md. Code Ann., Educ. (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.) (“ED”) §§ 13-201 to 13-207 sets 
forth grievance procedures used to resolve certain disputes or complaints between the 
institutions that comprise the University System of Maryland and their employees.  ED § 
13-203 establishes a three-step procedure for addressing grievances brought by employees.  
To be subject to the three-step grievance procedure, a complaint must meet the definition 
of a grievance as set forth in ED § 13-201(c) and must not be a matter that the section 
identifies as not a grievable issue: 
“Grievance” means any cause of complaint arising between a classified 
employee or associate staff employee and his employer on a matter 
concerning discipline, alleged discrimination, promotion, assignment, or 
interpretation or application of University rules or departmental procedures 
over which the University management has control.  However, if the 
complaint pertains to the general level of wages, wage patterns, fringe 
benefits, or to other broad areas of financial management and staffing, it is 
not a grievable issue.[1] 
 
1The definition of “grievance” contained in ED § 13-201(c) is the version of the 
statute that was incorporated into a memorandum of understanding between the parties in 
this case and which remained in effect as the parties went through the three-step grievance 
process concerning the dispute at issue in the case.  Effective October 1, 2019, the General 
Assembly amended ED § 13-201(c).  See 2019 Md. Laws 4069-71 (Vol. V, Ch. 697, H.B. 
822); 2019 Md. Laws 4072-74 (Vol. V, Ch. 698, S.B. 711).  Md. Code Ann., Educ. (1978, 
2018 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.) § 13-201(c) now provides: 
 
(1) “Grievance” means any cause of complaint arising between a regular full-
time or part-time employee and the University on a matter concerning 
discipline, alleged discrimination, promotion, assignment, or interpretation 
or application of University rules or departmental procedures over which the 
University management has control. 
 
(2) “Grievance” does not include: 
 
(i) Complaints on the general level of wages, wage patterns, fringe 
benefits, or other broad areas of financial management and staffing; or 
 
- 2 - 
 
ED § 13-203(a) provides that the three-step grievance procedure is available only 
if, after informal discussion with a supervisor, a dispute remains unresolved.  ED § 13-
203(b) describes step one of the grievance procedure, which involves initiation of a 
complaint presented to a department head or chairman or designee followed by a 
conference and a written decision from the department head or chairman or designee.  ED 
§ 13-203(c) sets forth step two of the grievance procedure—appeal of the initial written 
decision—which similarly involves a conference followed by a written decision from the 
president of the constituent institution or the president’s designated representative.  ED § 
13-203(d) sets forth step three of the grievance procedure, which involves arbitration or 
submission of the grievance to the Chancellor of the University System of Maryland, who 
may delegate responsibility to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an administrative 
hearing to be conducted by an administrative law judge. 
In this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 146 (“the Union”), Petitioner, is 
the bargaining unit representative of the police officers who work at the University of 
Baltimore (“the University”), Respondent.  Keith Merryman, Petitioner, is a police officer 
employed by the University and the President of the Union.2  In January 2018, the 
 
(ii) Any cause of complaint by any employee who is not represented 
by an exclusive representative under Title 3 of the State Personnel and 
Pensions Article. 
 
The amendment to the definition of “grievance” set forth ED § 13-201(c) is of no 
consequence to our analysis. 
2Although both Merryman and the Union are Petitioners, because Merryman’s 
involvement in the case is due to his role as the President of the Union, unless specifically 
referring to an action that Merryman individually took, we refer to actions by Petitioners 
as actions by the Union. 
- 3 - 
 
University implemented a work schedule change for police officers, moving from five 
eight-hour shifts to four ten-hour shifts per week.  The schedule change did not affect the 
total number of hours police officers were required to work a week.  According to 
Merryman, because, as a result of the schedule change, an officer’s workday now consisted 
of ten hours, each holiday should also “be credited at the same rate of 10 hours.”  In other 
words, the Union sought to have a holiday defined as consisting of ten hours, seeking a 
total of 110 hours rather than eighty-eight hours of holiday leave per year, essentially 
requesting twenty-two additional holiday leave hours per year for all officers of the Union. 
Merryman, on behalf of himself and all other members of the Union, initiated a Step 
1 Grievance through the statutory grievance procedure, which had been incorporated into 
a memorandum of understanding between the parties.  The University concluded that the 
complaint pertained to fringe benefits and staffing and was not a grievable issue under the 
memorandum of understanding and ED § 13-201(c).  Merryman next submitted a Step 2 
Grievance.  The University again concluded that, pursuant to the memorandum of 
understanding and ED § 13-201(c), holiday leave is a fringe benefit, and a dispute 
involving holiday leave is not a grievable issue.  Additionally, the University determined 
that it could not increase the amount of holiday leave authorized by the University System 
of Maryland and the Board of Regents.  
The Union filed a Step 3 Grievance with the Office of Administrative Hearings, 
requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).  The University moved 
to dismiss the grievance on the ground that a complaint about holiday leave was not 
grievable because it was a complaint pertaining to fringe benefits.  Following a hearing on 
- 4 - 
 
the motion to dismiss, the ALJ denied the motion, concluding that the issue raised by the 
Union was one of contract interpretation and thus grievable.  Thereafter, the ALJ conducted 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits, and issued a written decision ruling in favor of the 
Union.  Among other things, the ALJ concluded that, as a result of the schedule change, 
the University effectively changed the definition of a workday from eight hours to ten hours 
and that the memorandum of understanding should be interpreted to provide officers with 
ten hours of paid leave for each holiday (rather than eight hours).  The ALJ ordered the 
parties to identify the officers affected by the schedule change (officers who had used non-
holiday leave hours for a holiday) and to credit those officers with the non-holiday hours 
used.  
The University sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  After 
a hearing on the matter, the circuit court issued an order affirming in part and reversing in 
part the ALJ’s decision.  The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the University 
changed the definition of a workday to ten hours and that the change affected the allocation 
of holiday leave.  The circuit court reversed, however, as to all other conclusions made by 
the ALJ.  The circuit court found that, pursuant to ED § 12-105, neither the circuit court 
nor the ALJ could issue an order that had the effect of increasing the budget of the 
University System of Maryland.3  
 
3ED § 12-105(a)(1)(ii) provides that, “[i]n consultation with the institutions and the 
Chancellor, the Board [of Regents] shall: [r]eview, modify, as necessary, and approve 
consolidated budget requests for appropriations for the University System of Maryland 
with respect to: 1 The operating budget; and 2. The capital budget[.]”  (Paragraph breaks 
omitted).  
- 5 - 
 
The Union appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported opinion, 
held that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the dispute was not a 
grievable issue under the statutory grievance procedure contained in the memorandum of 
understanding.  See Merryman v. Univ. of Baltimore, 246 Md. App. 544, 560, 231 A.3d 
498, 508 (2020).  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the parties could not, by 
agreement, confer jurisdiction upon the ALJ by expanding the scope of grievances covered 
by the statutory procedures incorporated into the memorandum of understanding.  See id. 
at 559, 231 A.3d at 507.  Because it held that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction, the Court of 
Special Appeals did not address the merits of the ALJ’s decision or the propriety of the 
remedy ordered.  See id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508.  The Court of Special Appeals vacated 
the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case to that court with instruction to remand 
the case to the ALJ for the ALJ to dismiss the grievance proceeding.  See id. at 561, 231 
A.3d at 508.  Thereafter, the Union filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
which this Court granted.  See Merryman v. Univ. of Baltimore, 471 Md. 101, 240 A.3d 
852 (2020). 
Against this backdrop, at bottom, we must determine whether the complaint about 
holiday leave presents a grievable issue that is subject to the three-step grievance procedure 
set forth in the memorandum of understanding.  We hold that, under the memorandum of 
understanding, which incorporates the grievance procedures set forth in ED §§ 13-201 to 
13-207, including the definition of a “grievance” set forth in ED § 13-201(c), the complaint 
brought by the Union concerning holiday leave does not constitute a grievable issue 
because it is a dispute that “pertains to the general level of . . . fringe benefits, or to other 
- 6 - 
 
broad areas of financial management and staffing[.]”  Holiday leave is a fringe benefit and 
the complaint concerning the number of hours of holiday leave to which officers are 
entitled—which essentially requested that each officer receive an additional twenty-two 
hours of holiday leave per year—is a complaint pertaining to the general level of fringe 
benefits provided to officers and as such is not a grievable issue.  As such, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, although for somewhat different reasons. 
BACKGROUND 
Policy VII-7.30 
The Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland has adopted Policy 
VII-7.30 (Policy on Holiday Leave for Regular Nonexempt and Exempt Staff Employees), 
Part II (Amount of Holiday Leave) of which states that “[e]mployees are eligible to earn 
11 holidays per year, or 12 holidays during a year of general or congressional elections[.]”4  
Part IV (Scheduling of Holidays for Continuous Operations) states: 
Institutions which have departments that must provide service on a 
continuous seven day-a-week basis may schedule an employee’s holidays.  
Affected departments may schedule a specific day or days each month as a 
day off, and these days shall be treated in the same manner as regular 
holidays are treated for other employees.  For employees in this category, 
one day of holiday leave shall be granted for each month, except that for the 
months of January and July when two days of holiday leave shall be granted.  
During a year of general or congressional elections, an additional day shall 
be granted for the month of November.  Institutions have the sole discretion 
to determine which individual employees in a department will be placed in 
this category. 
 
 
4On December 3, 1999, the Board of Regents adopted Policy VII-7.30.  On January 
2 and 12, 2000, Policy VII-7.30 became effective, and was later amended on October 9, 
2015. 
- 7 - 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding 
The Union and the University entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, 
effective from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017 (“the MOU”).5  The MOU applies to the 
relationship between the University and its sworn police officer unit.6  Article 6 of the 
MOU, entitled “Hours of Work,” addresses officers’ work hours.  Pursuant to Section 1 of 
Article 6, a “regular workday” for University police consists of eight hours.  According to 
Section 3, a “regular workweek” consists of five regular workdays.  Section 5 gives the 
University the discretion to change the work schedule “as deemed necessary to meet the 
operational needs of the University[,]” provided that the University gives the affected 
officers at least fourteen days’ notice of any permanent change in the work schedule. 
 
5The MOU contained in the record indicates that it expired on June 30, 2017.  The 
dispute regarding holiday leave occurred after that date.  Section 2 of Article 29 of the 
MOU contemplated renewal of the MOU, though, stating:  
 
Should either party desire to negotiate a successor MOU, they may only do 
so by providing written notification of its intent to do so to the other party by 
August 1, 2016.  After notification is provided, the parties shall then 
commence negotiations for a successor MOU during the remainder of the 
last year of this MOU at dates and times agreed by the parties.   
 
At an evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, a witness for the University testified that the 
MOU was still in effect, and that there was a revised agreement pending ratification.  Like 
the Court of Special Appeals, we assume that the MOU was renewed or otherwise 
extended.  See Merryman v. Univ. of Baltimore, 246 Md. App. 544, 547 n.2, 231 A.3d 498, 
500 n.2 (2020). 
6According to the MOU, the terms “employees,” “sworn police officers,” and 
“employees covered by this MOU” “mean all eligible sworn police officers employed by 
the University in the following job classifications: Police Officer I, Police Officer II.” 
- 8 - 
 
The MOU addresses various forms of leave.7  Relevant here, Article 15 of the MOU 
addresses holidays.  Section 1 of Article 15, entitled “Recognized Holidays,” states that 
“[b]argaining unit employees are eligible to earn 11 holidays per year, or 12 holidays 
during a year of general or congressional elections, and any other special observance as 
required by the legislature and Governor.”  Section 1 lists twelve holidays for which 
bargaining unit employees were eligible in an election year, including Election Day.  In 
addition to those holidays, bargaining unit employees are granted three administrative 
holidays each year.  
Section 2 of Article 15 of the MOU, titled “Scheduling of Holidays for Continuous 
Operations,” explains that University police would sometimes be required to work on 
holidays, but would be permitted to use accrued holiday leave hours to schedule an 
alternative day off or, if rescheduling was not possible, an officer could cash in the hours 
and receive a day’s pay in lieu of taking another day off.  Specifically, Section 2 provides: 
Holidays for Sworn Police Officers will be prescheduled based upon 
the workweek schedule rotation.  The University reserves the right to assign 
holidays in accordance with this schedule rotation and shall make an effort 
to grant the Employee the day off requested, subject to operational needs.  
An Employee may be required to work on the Employee’s prescheduled 
holiday.  If required to work on their prescheduled holiday, the Employee 
will be paid at their regular straight time rate of pay for all hours worked plus 
any overtime pay required in accordance with Article 6 Hours of Work, 
Section 7 of this MOU.  However, in the event, the Officer is required to 
 
7For example, Article 12 of the MOU addresses sick leave.  Article 13 addresses 
other types of leave, including annual leave, personal leave, the leave reserve fund, family 
and medical leave, jury service and legal actions leave, educational leave and professional 
improvement leave, administrative leave, military leave with pay, call-up to active military 
duty during a national or international crisis or conflict, leave of absence without pay, leave 
for disaster service, accident leave, and parental leave.  Article 14 addresses union leave—
leave “for the purpose of participating in approved union activities.”   
- 9 - 
 
work on Thanksgiving Day and/or Christmas Day the Employee will receive 
pay at the rate of one and half (1½) times their regular straight time rate of 
pay for all hours worked on those days.  In addition, the Employee shall be 
granted the holiday with pay or an alternative date to be scheduled by the 
University within forty-five (45) days of the date initially pre-scheduled, 
provided however that, if all operational needs prevent the rescheduling of 
the holiday within that ninety (90) day period, the University will reschedule 
the holiday within six (6) months of the date initially pre-scheduled.  Subject 
to operational needs, the University will make a good faith effort to schedule 
an employees’ [sic] pre-scheduled or alternative holidays on a mutually 
agreeable date, however, the employee may be paid at the applicable rate for 
all hours worked and provided with a regular day’s pay as holiday pay in lieu 
of being granted another day off.  
 
Section 3 of Article 15, entitled “Termination Payment,” provides: “Employees, 
who leave their employment at the University for any reason, are entitled to be paid for any 
unused holiday leave that has been earned as of the date of separation.”   
Aside from recognizing that University police officers are eligible to earn eleven 
holidays per year (twelve during a general or congressional election year), neither Article 
15 nor any other Article in the MOU specifies how many hours of paid leave officers 
accrued for each holiday, i.e., how many hours were in a holiday. 
Article 11 of the MOU, entitled “Grievance Procedure,” outlines the procedures for 
resolving certain disputes between the Union and the University.  In relevant part, Article 
11 states: 
In the event of an alleged violation or disagreement over any of the 
provisions of this MOU, a bargaining unit employee represented by FOP, 
which shall be the exclusive employee organization to represent the 
employees, shall have the right to file a grievance in accordance with Section 
13-201 et seq. of the Annotated Code of Maryland, Education Article, a copy 
of which is set forth below for convenient reference.   
 
(Underlining omitted).  Article 11 quotes and incorporates into the MOU ED §§ 13-201 to 
- 10 - 
 
13-207.    
Relevant Statutory Provisions 
The provisions of the Education Article incorporated into Article 11 of the MOU 
set forth procedures for addressing grievances.  ED § 13-201(c), as incorporated into the 
MOU, defines a “grievance” as  
any cause of complaint arising between a classified employee or associate 
staff employee and his employer on a matter concerning discipline, alleged 
discrimination, promotion, assignment, or interpretation or application of 
University rules or departmental procedures over which the University 
management has control.  However, if the complaint pertains to the general 
level of wages, wage patterns, fringe benefits, or to other broad areas of 
financial management and staffing, it is not a grievable issue.  
 
ED § 13-203(a) provides for a three-step grievance procedure that is available only 
“[i]f, following informal discussion with [a] supervisor, a dispute remains unresolved[.]”  
ED § 13-203(b) describes step one of the grievance procedure, which involves initiation of 
a complaint followed by an initial conference and a written decision, stating:   
(1) Step One.  Step one is the initiation of a complaint.  Grievances shall be 
initiated within 30 calendar days of the action involved, or within 30 calendar 
days of the employee having reasonable knowledge of the act, unless these 
time limits are further delimited as stated in § 13-205 of this subtitle.  Appeals 
within the grievance procedure shall be timed from receipt of the written 
opinion of management or from when such opinion is due, whichever comes 
first.  An aggrieved employee or the employee’s designated representative 
may present the grievance in writing to the department head or chairman or 
designee for formal consideration. If the grievance is presented to the 
department head or chairman or designee, within 5 days after the receipt of 
the written grievance a conference shall be held with the aggrieved or the 
employee’s designated representative and within 5 days after the conclusion 
of the conference a decision shall be rendered in writing to the aggrieved or 
the employee’s designated representative.  If the aggrieved employee is not 
satisfied with the decision rendered at this step, the employee or the 
employee’s designated representative may appeal in writing to step two 
within 5 days. 
- 11 - 
 
 
(2) Both employee and department head or chairman or designee shall 
continue to review the matter, either privately or with the help of others in 
the employee’s immediate work unit who are directly involved in the 
grievance.  Each department head or chairman or designee shall use 
judgment in keeping superiors informed of the status of each grievance and, 
if necessary, request guidance, advisory committees, or other assistance 
consistent with departmental policy.  If either the employee or the department 
head or chairman or designee feels the need for aid in arriving at a solution, 
the campus personnel department may be requested to provide resource staff 
or any other available resource personnel may be invited to participate in 
further discussions.  The addition of such participants does not relieve the 
department head or chairman or designee and the employee from 
responsibility for resolving the problem.  
 
ED § 13-203(c) sets forth step two of the grievance procedure—appeal of the initial 
written decision—stating: 
Step Two.  The appeal shall be submitted to the president of the constituent 
institution or the president’s designated representative within 5 days after the 
receipt of the written decision at step one.  The president or the president’s 
designated representative shall hold a conference with the aggrieved or the 
employee’s designated representative within 10 days of receipt of the written 
grievance appeal and render a written decision within 15 days after the 
conclusion of the conference.   
 
ED § 13-203(d) sets forth step three of the grievance procedure, which involves 
arbitration or an administrative hearing before an ALJ, stating:  
Step Three.  In the case of any still unresolved grievance between an 
employee and the constituent institution, the aggrieved employee, after 
exhausting all available procedures provided by the constituent institution, 
may submit the grievance to either arbitration or to the Chancellor who may 
delegate this responsibility to the Office of Administrative Hearings in 
accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article.  In 
either case, the appeal shall be submitted within 10 days after the receipt of 
any written decision pertaining to that grievance and issued by the constituent 
institution.  If the grievance is arbitrated, the parties shall select an arbitrator 
by mutual agreement.  If they are unable to reach a mutual agreement, an 
arbitrator shall be supplied by the American Arbitration Association by their 
procedures.  Any fees resulting from arbitration are assessed by the arbitrator 
- 12 - 
 
equally between the two parties.  The arbitration award is advisory to the 
Chancellor or administrative law judge, as appropriate, and an additional 
appeal or hearing may not be considered.  The Chancellor or administrative 
law judge, as appropriate, shall make the final decision that is binding on all 
parties.  
 
ED § 13-204 provides:  
A decision may not be made at any step of the grievance procedure that 
conflicts with or modifies a policy approved by the Board of Regents of the 
University System of Maryland or with any applicable statute or with any 
administrative regulation issued under appropriate statutory authority or that 
otherwise delimits the lawfully delegated authority of University officials 
unless prior approval has been obtained from the responsible official.  
 
The Holiday Leave Dispute 
In a memorandum to sworn personnel of the University’s police department dated 
November 7, 2017, the department’s chief, Samuel D. Tress, stated that, effective January 
3, 2018, the department would transition from eight-hour shifts to ten-hour shifts.8  Chief 
Tress explained that each officer would still work forty hours per week, or eighty hours per 
pay period.  The memorandum also explained that the new schedule cycle would run for 
49 days (7 weeks) and that, out of the 49 days, an officer would work for 28 days and be 
off for 21 days.  The change was made pursuant to Article 6, Section 5 of the MOU, which 
provides that work schedules may be changed by the University at its discretion as needed 
upon fourteen days’ notice.  The memorandum did not mention any adjustment concerning 
holiday leave or any other form of leave.  It is undisputed that the University had the right 
to make the schedule change; what is at issue is whether the University was required to 
 
8According to testimony at the hearing before the ALJ, the University made the 
schedule change to address officer safety, crime trends, and calls for service.  
- 13 - 
 
increase the hours allotted for holiday leave.  
In a letter to Chief Tress dated January 25, 2018 (after the schedule change went 
into effect), on behalf of himself and all other members of the Union, Merryman submitted 
a Step 1 Grievance pursuant to Article 11 of the MOU.  Merryman stated that the University 
had violated Article 15 of the MOU by failing to credit employees with the appropriate 
amount of holiday leave.  Merryman indicated that, by moving employees from eight-hour 
shifts to ten-hour shifts, the University had redefined a “workday” as ten hours.  Merryman 
argued that, because the University had exercised its prerogative to increase an employee’s 
workday from eight hours to ten hours, the University was obligated to credit all holidays 
and any makeup dates at a rate of ten hours per holiday.9  On behalf of the Union, 
Merryman requested that the University acknowledge, among other things, that a holiday 
is defined as ten hours and that any officer who worked on a prescheduled holiday was 
entitled to ten hours of holiday leave.   
In a letter to Merryman dated February 7, 2018, at Step 1 of the Grievance 
procedure, Chad R. Ellis, the Acting Chief of Police, responded that, after consideration, it 
 
9Merryman explained that, as a result of the transition to ten-hour shifts, if an 
employee was off on a prescheduled holiday, the employee should be granted ten hours of 
holiday leave.  But, under the schedule change, if an employee worked ten hours on a 
prescheduled holiday and was granted a makeup holiday pursuant to Article 15, the 
employee would be granted only eight hours of holiday leave, and would be required to 
use up to two hours of another type of leave to be entitled to a day off to make up for the 
worked holiday.  Or if an employee wanted to be off on a scheduled holiday, the employee 
would be granted only eight hours of holiday leave and would be required to use two hours 
of another type of leave to have the entire holiday off.  Merryman contended that this 
outcome was illogical, and that holidays should be credited the same number of hours as 
workdays for all employees.  
- 14 - 
 
had been determined that the Union’s complaint about holiday leave pertained to fringe 
benefits and staffing, and thus was not a grievable issue under the MOU.  
In a letter to Mary L. Maher, the Assistant Vice President of Human Resources of 
the University, dated February 9, 2018, on behalf of himself and all other members of the 
Union, Merryman submitted a Step 2 Grievance.  In addition to repeating the contentions 
that he made in his January 25, 2018 letter to Chief Tress, Merryman argued that the dispute 
was a grievable issue under the grievance procedure set forth in Article 11 of the MOU.  
Specifically, Merryman asserted that Article 11 indicated that the University and the Union 
agreed to make any disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the MOU subject 
to the grievance procedure.  Merryman maintained that ED §§ 13-201 to 13-207 merely set 
forth the procedural requirements for presenting a grievance and did not prohibit “grieving 
issues regarding the interpretation of the MOU.”  
In a letter to Merryman dated March 5, 2018, Beth Amyot, Chief Finance Officer 
and Vice President for Administration & Finance of the University, responded that, per 
Article 11 of the MOU and ED § 13-201(c), the dispute about holiday leave was not a 
grievable issue because holiday leave is a fringe benefit.  Amyot stated that the University 
could not “increase the maximum holiday hour accrual authorized by [the University 
System of Maryland] and the Board of Regents, and as outlined” by the University’s 
Human Resource website.10   
 
10Amyot noted, though, that, in response to recordkeeping issues associated with the 
change to ten-hour shifts, the University would be modifying its recordkeeping procedures 
as to leave.  
- 15 - 
 
Proceedings before the ALJ 
On March 15, 2018, the Union filed a Step 3 Grievance with the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, requesting a hearing before an ALJ.  
On April 23, 2018, the University filed with the ALJ a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that the complaint about holiday leave was not a grievable issue because it pertained to 
fringe benefits and that, as such, the complaint must be dismissed.  The ALJ conducted a 
hearing on the motion to dismiss.  At the hearing, the University’s counsel contended that 
the complaint about holiday leave was a complaint about the level of fringe benefits. 
Among other things, the University’s counsel maintained that the amount of fringe benefits 
in the form of holiday leave is set by the University System of Maryland policy, namely, 
Policy VII-7.30, and that, if the ALJ were to decide the dispute in the Union’s favor, it 
would be changing a policy set by the University System of Maryland.  The University’s 
counsel acknowledged that Policy VII-7.30 addresses holiday leave in terms of days, not 
hours, but stated that police officers, as State employees, are aware that leave is accrued in 
hours.  The University’s counsel contended that the Union sought to have the ALJ grant its 
members something (an increase in holiday leave) that the policy does not allow other 
nonexempt employees.11  
The University’s counsel also argued that the change in work schedule did not affect 
the total number of hours that officers work in a year—forty hours per week or 2,080 hours 
per year—and that, as such, the change in work schedule did not change the amount of any 
 
11According to Maher’s testimony before the ALJ at the evidentiary hearing, 
nonexempt employees are eligible for overtime pay.   
- 16 - 
 
form of leave, including the eighty-eight hours of holiday leave.  The University’s counsel 
pointed out that the schedule change did not change the amount of any type of leave—sick 
leave, annual leave, personal leave, or holiday leave. 
By contrast, the Union’s counsel contended that the complaint about holiday leave 
concerned a disagreement about the interpretation of the MOU and Policy VII-7.30, not a 
dispute about the general level of benefits, and, as such, presented a grievable issue.  The 
Union’s counsel argued that a holiday consists of a complete day that an employee has to 
take off and although an employee accrues “holidays in hours, [] they should accrue it 
based on their shift scheduled[.]”  According to the Union’s counsel, the Union was not 
asking for more holidays as the Union was not seeking an increase from eleven holidays 
to, for example, thirteen holidays.  The Union’s counsel reasoned that the disagreement 
concerned “what a holiday is” and that if a workday is ten hours rather than eight hours 
and officers are receiving eighty-eight hours of holiday leave, then the officers are “now 
only getting 8.8 days of holiday leave, which is a decrease[.]”   
On June 7, 2018, the ALJ issued a written ruling denying the motion to dismiss.  In 
agreement with the Union’s counsel, the ALJ determined that the issue raised by the Union 
was “an issue of contract interpretation,” and was “included in the definition of [a] 
grievance cited by the University and used in Article 11 of the MOU.”    
On July 16, 2018, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on the merits.  During 
opening statements, the Union’s counsel recognized that the University had the right to 
make the schedule change, but argued that a holiday is a day off, and that a holiday should 
equate to a workday, which had been changed to ten hours.  The University’s counsel 
- 17 - 
 
contended that the change in the work schedule neither changed the number of hours 
officers were required to work nor changed the nature of the amount of fringe benefits that 
officers received.  The University’s counsel argued that, like other nonexempt employees 
of the University, officers continued to receive eighty-eight hours of holiday leave in a 
non-election year.  The University’s counsel asserted that the Union sought to have holiday 
leave increased to 110 hours, which would be a departure from the University System of 
Maryland’s policy and would require approval from the Board of Regents.  
As the sole witness for the Union, among other things, Merryman testified that, after 
the schedule change but before the Step 2 Grievance decision, a holiday had to be taken in 
an eight-hour increment and officers “had to find additional two hours somewhere to use.”  
After the Step 2 Grievance decision, holiday leave was placed into a leave bank and “could 
be used in any increments [an officer] wanted: two, three hours, ten hours, whatever you 
decided to take, eight hours.”  Merryman testified that the change did not alleviate his 
concern because, after using eighty-eight hours of holiday leave, officers still needed to 
use additional hours from other forms of leave “for the ten-hour days to get 110 hours.”  
Merryman testified that, in the Union’s view, a holiday is a ten-hour day because it is 
equivalent to a workday.  On cross-examination, Merryman acknowledged that both before 
and after the schedule change, officers received eighty-eight hours of holiday leave and 
agreed that the Union was essentially asking the University to give officers ten hours of 
holiday leave for each of the eleven holidays granted to them.  When asked, Merryman 
acknowledged that other nonexempt employees do not get 110 hours of holiday leave per 
year. 
- 18 - 
 
As a witness for the University, Chief Ellis, then the Chief of Police, testified that 
both before and after the schedule change officers worked forty hours per week and 2,080 
hours per year.  Chief Ellis testified that the schedule change did not affect the amount of 
holiday leave that officers receive, which is eighty-eight hours of holiday leave.  Chief Ellis 
explained that leave has always accrued and been measured in terms of hours and that an 
officer’s time sheet reflects how many hours of each type of leave the officer has accrued 
at any given time.  Chief Ellis testified that, after the schedule change, upon discussions 
with Human Resources and Merryman, holiday leave had been placed in a leave bank to 
be used in hourly increments.  When asked what an officer would put on a time sheet if the 
officer was taking, for example, the Fourth of July off on July 10th, Chief Ellis responded 
that it would depend on what leave the officer has in the officer’s leave bank: “If the officer 
has ten hours of holiday leave, he can . . . surely put ten hours of holiday leave.  If they 
have ten hours of annual [leave], they could do that.  If they only had four hours of holiday 
. . . then they need to complement it with the other six, that’s what they would do.”  On 
redirect examination, Chief Ellis testified that the schedule change only amounted to less 
time of holiday leave if a holiday was defined in terms of days, not hours, but he reiterated 
that leave has always accrued and been measured in hours.   
As a witness for the University, Maher, formerly the Assistant Vice President and 
Chief Human Resources Officer for the University and then Special Assistant to the Chief 
Financial Officer, testified like Chief Ellis, that before and after the schedule change 
officers worked forty hours a week or 2,080 hours per year.  Maher testified that both 
before and after the schedule change the various types of leave continued to be accrued in 
- 19 - 
 
the same amount per year, for example: eighty-eight hours of sick leave, which accrued at 
the rate of 4.61 hours biweekly and could be taken in increments of thirty minutes; eighty-
eight hours of annual leave (increasing by eight hours with each year of service), which 
could be taken in increments of thirty minutes; twenty-four hours of personal leave, which 
could be taken in increments of thirty minutes; and eighty-eight hours of holiday leave, 
plus twenty-four hours of administrative-holiday leave, in a non-election year.  Maher, too, 
testified that officers could now take holiday leave in increments from thirty minutes up to 
ten hours in a shift.  Maher confirmed that time sheets have always reflected the accrual of 
leave on an hourly basis, as opposed to a day.  Maher testified that the University System 
of Maryland also has leave policies “that are more general” that the University is required 
“to be aligned with[.]”   
Maher testified that, if the officers were to receive ten hours of holiday leave for 
each of the eleven designated holidays, the result would be an increase of twenty-two hours 
of holiday leave or 110 hours of holiday leave instead of eighty-eight hours.  Maher 
testified that the twenty-two-hour difference “would be a fringe benefit impact” and the 
University would need “to redefine their fringe benefits to be inclusive of more holiday 
leave.”  Maher explained: 
Typically, through that process, we would need to -- obviously, 
there’s a financial increase, benefit cost increase, or fringe benefit cost 
increase for the university per officer, but we would also need to get support 
from [the University System of Maryland] and [] approval from the Board of 
Regents and support from the State Attorney General’s Office. . . . Because 
the [University System of Maryland] policy, although it’s not spoken in 
hours, it refers to a holiday in the traditional sense of eight hours, plus the 
88-hour increments that institutions have to award their workforce. 
And so it would require our getting their support and approval from 
- 20 - 
 
the Board of Regents because it would increase the cost to the institution, and 
then it would provide a different fringe-benefit program for a subset of 
employees than any other employee in that institution.  
 
Maher testified that no other nonexempt employee at the University receives 110 hours of 
holiday leave. 
Maher acknowledged that Policy VII-7.30, which is binding on the University, does 
not define the number of hours in a holiday and instead “refers to earning 11 holidays 
and/or 12 holidays, . . . but there’s nothing that speaks specifically to eight hours.”  On 
cross-examination, Maher again described the impact of eighty-eight hours of holiday 
leave versus 110 hours of holiday leave as an increase of twenty-two additional hours and 
testified that the University would need “preapproval from the Board of Regents.”  Maher 
reiterated that the University would need “to get university system approval if there’s 
additional costs[.]”   
In closing argument, the Union’s counsel contended that University policy does not 
define holidays in terms of hours and instead provides for eleven holidays per year.  The 
Union’s counsel requested that the ALJ award two hours of holiday leave for any days that 
officers were required to use other leave “to fill the gap between eight and ten hours.”  By 
contrast, the University’s counsel asserted that the MOU did not define a holiday as the 
same number of hours in a work shift and that time sheets had always shown that leave 
was accrued and taken in hours.  The University’s counsel maintained that if there were to 
be a deviation from the standard policy of eighty-eight holiday leave hours, there would 
need to be “a series of approvals” that could not “be done in a grievance proceeding because 
it will be contrary to [University System of Maryland] policies.”   
- 21 - 
 
On October 15, 2018, the ALJ issued a written decision in favor of the Union.  In 
the decision, among other things, the ALJ reasoned: 
The University argued the change would increase the number of annual 
holidays and increase a fringe benefit.  The reasoning provided is illogical 
since the MOU permits contract changes to foundational terms such as 
workday.  Further, the [Union is] not requesting an additional holiday beyond 
what is already provided by the [University System of Maryland].  The 
[Union] simply request[s] the same allocation previously provided – eight 
hours meant eight hours, including for holiday leave allocation.  In light of 
the new schedule, the [Union] argue[s] ten hours should mean ten hours, 
including the holiday leave allocation, and not anything less.  To require the 
[Union] to supplement holiday leave with additional leave to equal ten hours 
is in contrast to the signed MOU[.] . . . Under the MOU, when an officer 
works on a prescheduled holiday the officer should be receive ten hours of 
pay, if a regular workday is now defined by the change in contract terms as 
ten consecutive hours.  Per the MOU, the definition of workday and the 
meaning of regular straight time now means ten hours instead of eight hours.  
 
The ALJ concluded “as a matter of law” that the University changed the definition 
of a workday to ten hours and that the change applied “to the allocation of holiday leave[.]”  
The ALJ determined that the change applied to the application and accrual of holiday leave 
for officers who used holiday leave or who worked on a prescheduled holiday after the 
schedule change.  The ALJ ordered: (1) that the University define a workday for sworn 
police officers as ten hours; (2) that the parties work to determine the officers affected by 
the schedule change and to determine the number of non-holiday leave hours used by the 
officers; and (3) that, once the parties determined the non-holiday leave hours used, the 
University “credit the applicable hours to the affected officers.”  
Proceedings in the Circuit Court 
On November 14, 2018, the University filed in the circuit court a petition for judicial 
review.  On April 25, 2019, the circuit court conducted a hearing.  At the conclusion of the 
- 22 - 
 
hearing, the circuit court ruled from the bench, concluding that Article 11 of the MOU, 
which authorized the right to file a grievance in the event of an alleged violation or 
disagreement over any provision of the MOU, placed the dispute outside of the fringe 
benefit clause and made it proper for the ALJ to hear the dispute about holiday leave.  As 
to the merits of the dispute, the circuit court ruled that the police department had the 
authority to make the schedule changes, but ruled in favor of the Union, stating “that the 
[MOU] says that a day is a day is a day.”  The circuit court stated that the only remaining 
matter was whether it had the authority to grant additional hours of holiday leave—i.e., 
whether it had the authority to grant the Union the relief that it requested—or whether only 
the Board of Regents had the power to do so.  The circuit court indicated that it would issue 
its ruling on that matter after additional research. 
On May 2, 2019, the circuit court issued an order affirming in part and reversing in 
part the ALJ’s decision.  In the order, the circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision with 
respect to the conclusion that the University unilaterally changed the definition of 
“workday” to ten hours, and that the change affected the allocation of holiday leave for the 
officers.  The circuit court reversed the ALJ’s decision with respect to all other 
determinations.  The circuit court found that, pursuant to ED § 12-105, the Board of 
Regents had “the sole authority to propose budgetary changes” that affect the University 
and that neither it nor the ALJ could “issue an order that ha[d] the effect of increasing the 
budget of the University System.”   
On May 29, 2019, the Union noted an appeal.   
- 23 - 
 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
On May 5, 2020, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the 
circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court with instruction to 
remand to the ALJ to dismiss the grievance proceeding.  See Keith Merryman and Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge 146 v. University of Baltimore, No. 649, Sept. Term, 2019, 2020 
WL 2128840 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 5, 2020).  On May 28, 2020, the University moved 
to have the opinion reported.  On July 13, 2020, the Court of Special Appeals issued a 
reported opinion.  See Merryman, 246 Md. App. 544, 231 A.3d 498.  
The Court of Special Appeals held that the ALJ lacked the authority to make any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law because the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over the dispute 
regarding holiday leave.  See id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508.  The Court of Special Appeals 
rejected the Union’s contention that, although the dispute did not meet ED § 13-201’s 
definition of “grievance,” other language in the MOU expanded the scope of grievances to 
include the dispute about holiday leave.  See id. at 556, 559, 231 A.3d at 505, 507.  
According to the Court of Special Appeals, the Union’s argument “centered on its belief 
that the parties could and did confer jurisdiction upon the [ALJ] by expanding the scope of 
grievances subject to the statutory procedures incorporated into the parties’ agreement.”  
Id. at 559, 231 A.3d at 507.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected that argument, 
explaining: 
The scope of the dispute-resolution mechanism provided for in the 
[MOU] between [the Union] and the University was fixed by the General 
Assembly.  [The Union]’s suggestion that the parties’ memorandum 
effectively “amended” Educ. § 13-201(c) to expand the scope of issues 
grievable under the Educ. § 13-203 procedure is conceptually untenable.  It 
- 24 - 
 
is “widely acknowledged” that “parties cannot confer jurisdiction, in its 
fundamental sense, upon a court by consent.”  Stewart v. State, 287 Md. 524, 
527–28, 413 A.2d 1337 (1980); see also State v. Walls, 90 Md. App. 300, 
305, 600 A.2d 1165 (1992) (“Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be 
conferred by consent of the parties ....”).  For the same fundamental reasons, 
it seems clear that parties cannot expand the jurisdiction of an administrative 
agency by contract.  We have no reason to believe that the legislature 
intended that a state college or university could modify by contract the limits 
imposed upon the grievance process by Educ. § 13-201(c).  If the General 
Assembly had intended to make these statutorily prescribed limits a mere 
default, it could have said so. 
 
Merryman, 246 Md. App. at 559, 231 A.3d at 507-08 (ellipses in original). 
The Court of Special Appeals observed that, even if the parties could, by agreement, 
expand the jurisdiction given by the General Assembly to the ALJ, the Union agreed that 
it could not grieve a complaint about the general level of fringe benefits, as set forth in ED 
§ 13-201(c).  See id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508.  The Court of Special Appeals determined 
that, “[c]learly, a dispute about the number of holiday-leave hours to which University 
police are entitled ‘pertains to the general level of . . . fringe benefits’ provided to the 
officers.”  Id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508 (ellipsis in original).  The Court of Special Appeals 
was unpersuaded by the Union’s “attempt to recast the dispute—stressing that the officers 
seek only ‘to determine how many hours are in a holiday[.]’”  Id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508.  
The Court of Special Appeals explained: 
What [the Union] sought—and what the [ALJ] ultimately awarded—was that 
University police officers would receive twenty-two more hours of annual 
paid holiday leave than the University currently awards employees.  To 
repurpose a phrase from Justice Elena Kagan, “[i]f that does not count as 
[‘pertain[ing] to the general level of . . . fringe benefits,’] we are hard pressed 
to know what would.”  Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 353, 133 S.Ct. 
1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013). 
 
Merryman, 246 Md. App. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508 (some alterations in original).  Because 
- 25 - 
 
the Court of Special Appeals held that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, 
the Court did not address the merits of the ALJ’s decision or the propriety of the remedy 
that the ALJ ordered.  See id. at 560, 231 A.3d at 508.   
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
On August 28, 2020, the Union petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following two issues: 
1. 
Does the Office of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction when 
the parties have contractually agreed to submit grievances regarding the 
interpretation of their collective bargaining agreement to the Office for 
adjudication? 
 
2. 
Did the Court err in finding that because the remedy would involve 
awarding additional leave hours, the grievance constituted a complaint 
pertaining to the “general level of fringe benefits” prohibited by ED § 13-
201(c)?   
 
On October 6, 2020, this Court granted the petition.  See Merryman, 471 Md. 101, 240 
A.3d 852. 
DISCUSSION12 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Before this Court, the Union and the University repeat the arguments made before 
the ALJ, in the circuit court, and before the Court of Special Appeals.  The Union argues 
that it did not seek to dispute the general level of fringe benefits, but rather challenged the 
University’s interpretation of the number of hours in a holiday, which is a dispute about 
the terms of the contract.  The Union acknowledges that “there is no dispute that holiday 
 
12Although the Union raised two issues in the petition for a writ of certiorari, we 
address the issues together.  
- 26 - 
 
leave is a term and condition of employment and a fringe benefit subject to the collective 
bargaining process.”  (Cleaned up).  The Union argues, though, that, rather than seeking an 
increase in holiday leave, it has alleged that, under the MOU, the number of hours in a 
holiday should be the same as the number of hours in a workday.   
The University responds that the complaint brought by the Union is prohibited 
because it is a dispute concerning the general level of fringe benefits to which members of 
the Union are entitled.  The University argues that it is undisputed that if the ALJ’s decision 
is affirmed, the result is an increase in paid holiday leave, i.e., that “the general level of 
holiday leave hours, a fringe benefit, would be increased for every officer.”  The University 
maintains that the Union’s characterization of the complaint as one involving a contractual 
dispute concerning the meaning of the term “holiday” does not alter the circumstance that 
the complaint is a dispute about the general level of fringe benefits. 
Standard of Review 
On appeal of a judgment rendered on judicial review of a decision of an 
administrative agency, this Court “review[s] directly the action of the agency, rather than 
the decision of the intervening reviewing courts.”  Md. Ins. Comm’r v. Central Acceptance 
Corp., 424 Md. 1, 14, 33 A.3d 949, 957 (2011) (citation omitted).  “This Court reviews an 
administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory standards as the [c]ircuit 
[c]ourt.”  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Barrett, 467 Md. 61, 68, 223 A.3d 589, 594 (2020) 
(cleaned up).  “It is not this Court’s role to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those 
persons who constitute the administrative agency.”  Id. at 69, 223 A.3d at 594 (cleaned up).  
Ordinarily, “the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency shall 
- 27 - 
 
determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence 
from the record as a whole to support the decision.”  Id. at 69, 223 A.3d at 594 (cleaned 
up).  This Court reviews an agency’s legal conclusions without deference “for correctness.”  
Schwartz v. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005) (citation 
omitted).  We have stated, though, that “[t]he legal conclusions of an administrative agency 
that are premised upon an interpretation of the statutes that the agency administers are 
afforded great weight.”  Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 437 
Md. 492, 505, 87 A.3d 1263, 1270 (2014) (cleaned up). 
Analysis 
Here, we hold that, under Article 11 of the MOU, which incorporates the grievance 
procedures set forth in ED §§ 13-201 to 13-207, including the definition of a “grievance” 
set forth in ED § 13-201(c), the complaint brought by the Union concerning holiday leave 
does not present a grievable issue because it is a dispute that “pertains to the general level 
of . . . fringe benefits, or to other broad areas of financial management and staffing[.]”  
Holiday leave is a fringe benefit and the complaint concerning the number of hours of 
holiday leave to which officers are entitled—which essentially requested that each officer 
receive an additional twenty-two hours of holiday leave per year—is a complaint pertaining 
to the general level of fringe benefits provided to officers and as such is not a grievable 
issue.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals—which remanded the case 
to the ALJ to dismiss the grievance proceeding—albeit for a slightly different reason. 
As an initial matter, we note that the issues in this case are not issues of jurisdiction 
in a traditional sense.  See, e.g., Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli, 430 Md. 348, 362-63, 61 
- 28 - 
 
A.3d 21, 29 (2013) (“Jurisdiction embraces two distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court 
to render a valid decree, and (ii) the propriety of granting the relief sought.  Whether a court 
has fundamental jurisdiction, or the power, or authority, to render a valid final judgment, 
is determined by the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.”  (Cleaned up)).  At 
issue in this case is whether the dispute about holiday leave constituted a grievable issue 
under the MOU and the statutory grievance procedures, which were incorporated into the 
MOU.  Although the first question raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari is phrased 
in terms of whether the Office of Administration Hearings had jurisdiction over the 
complaint and the Court of Special Appeals held that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over the 
dispute, the question is really whether the complaint about holiday leave constituted a 
grievable issue.  The short answer to that question is no—the complaint about holiday leave 
does not constitute a grievable issue, as we explain.  
With respect to grievances between employees and the University, ED § 13-203(d), 
which outlines the Step Three grievance procedure, expressly provides that an aggrieved 
employee may submit a grievance either to arbitration or to the Chancellor, who can 
“delegate this responsibility to the Office of Administrative Hearings in accordance with 
Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article.”  In other words, ED § 13-203(d) 
provides an ALJ with jurisdiction to hear a grievance at Step Three.  The power or 
authority, i.e., jurisdiction, of an ALJ to hear a grievance is different from the question of 
whether a dispute involves a grievable issue under ED § 13-201(c).  As part of the ALJ’s 
authority to hear a dispute that has gone through Step One and Step Two of the grievance 
process and reached Step Three, upon review, an ALJ has the authority to determine 
- 29 - 
 
whether or not the dispute in fact involves a grievable issue and, if not, dismiss the 
complaint.   
On a different matter, it is worth noting that the definition of “grievance” set forth 
in ED § 13-201(c) is expressly adopted and incorporated into the MOU, i.e., the definition 
of “grievance” is the same under both the statute and the MOU.  ED § 13-201(c) defines a 
“grievance” as “any cause of complaint arising between a classified employee or associate 
staff employee and his employer on a matter concerning discipline, alleged discrimination, 
promotion, assignment, or interpretation or application of University rules or departmental 
procedures over which the University management has control.”  ED § 13-201(c) also 
provides that, “if the complaint pertains to the general level of wages, wage patterns, fringe 
benefits, or to other broad areas of financial management and staffing, it is not a grievable 
issue.”  In the MOU, the parties did not create a new definition of “grievance” or purport 
to otherwise depart from the statutory grievance procedure that excludes issues related to 
the general level of fringe benefits and broad area of financial management as not 
grievable.  As such, a complaint may well involve a dispute that arises between an 
employee and the University on a matter concerning discipline, alleged discrimination, 
promotion, and the like, but may nonetheless possibly be excluded because the complaint 
involves, for example, the general level of fringe benefits or other broad area of financial 
management. 
Herein, we address primarily the exclusionary language contained in ED § 13-
201(c), namely, that a complaint “is not a grievable issue” subject to the grievance 
procedure “if the complaint pertains to the general level of . . . fringe benefits, or to other 
- 30 - 
 
broad areas of financial management and staffing[.]”  In this case, the question is what 
constitutes a fringe benefit.  Neither the MOU nor ED §§ 13-201 to 13-207 specifically 
define the term fringe benefit.  Black’s Law Dictionary, though, defines a “fringe benefit” 
as “[a] benefit (other than direct salary or compensation) received by an employee from an 
employer, such as insurance, a company car, or a tuition allowance.”  Fringe Benefit, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines a “fringe 
benefit,” in pertinent part, as “an employment benefit (such as a pension or a paid holiday) 
granted by an employer that has a monetary value but does not affect basic wage rates[.]”  
Fringe Benefit, Merriam-Webster (2021), available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/fringe%20benefit [https://perma.cc/HX6R-338S].  It is clear that holiday leave 
is a fringe benefit because it is a benefit, other than wages, received by an employee from 
an employer.  Indeed, even the Union acknowledges this basic premise, stating on brief in 
this Court that “there is no dispute that holiday leave is a term and condition of employment 
and a fringe benefit subject to the collective bargaining process.”  (Cleaned up).  
Although the Union acknowledges that holiday leave is a fringe benefit, the Union 
nonetheless contends that it is not challenging the general level of fringe benefits accorded 
police officers but rather is engaged in a contractual dispute about the interpretation of the 
terms of the MOU.  The very substance of the Union’s complaint, though, demonstrates 
that it is a complaint about the general level of fringe benefits provided to its members.  
According to the Union, after the schedule change, the University did not credit officers 
“with the appropriate amount of holiday leave” and the Union sought to have a workday 
(and by extension, a holiday) defined as ten hours.  In essence, the Union sought twenty-
- 31 - 
 
two additional hours of holiday leave per year for all officers (from eighty-eight hours of 
holiday leave to 110 hours), i.e., an increase in the general level of a fringe benefit.  We 
are not persuaded by the Union’s characterization of the dispute as seeking only to 
determine how many hours are in a holiday and not seeking to challenge the general level 
of fringe benefits.  It is plain that what the Union sought, and what the ALJ actually 
awarded, was an increase in the number of hours of paid holiday leave that officers receive 
annually—not merely a determination as to the number of hours in a holiday or the number 
of hours in a workday.  
More specifically, to the extent that the Union contends that its complaint concerned 
days, not hours, and that crediting holidays at the same rate as workdays is the relief 
requested, this is undoubtedly a request for an increase in the amount of paid holiday leave 
per year across the board for all officers—an increase of twenty-two additional hours per 
year per officer.  To be sure, Section 1 of Article 15 of the MOU states that officers are 
eligible to earn eleven holidays per year, or twelve holidays during a general or 
congressional election year.  Policy VII-7.30 provides the same.  In other words, it is 
accurate that a holiday in the MOU and Policy VII-7.30 is referred to as a day, and not in 
hours.  And, we are aware that the Union has contended that in order to take a holiday off, 
an officer may be required to supplement holiday leave time with some other form of leave 
time to take a full ten hours off and that at some point after exhausting the eighty-eight 
hours of holiday leave an officer will be required to use some other form of leave.  
Nevertheless, at bottom, what the Union sought—to have a holiday defined as consisting 
of ten hours—would have had the effect of increasing holiday leave by an additional 
- 32 - 
 
twenty-two hours per year for all officers of the Union.  Unless the number of hours an 
officer was required to work or the hours allotted to other types of leave were reduced (and 
they were not), this change would have increased the number of paid hours per year over 
the 2,080 paid hours that currently exist and would have affected the general level of fringe 
benefits provided to the officers and, indeed, would have resulted in increased cost to the 
University and the University System of Maryland.13  
Just as the schedule change did not result in a decrease in the number of hours an 
officer is required to work a year, it also did not result in an increase in the number of hours 
an officer is required to work in a year, which is a circumstance that may have supported 
an argument that increasing the number of holiday leave hours was equitable.  Even under 
this potential scenario, though, the Union’s request would still have been a request for an 
increase in the general level of a fringe benefit.  But this is not what occurred; the officers 
were not required to work additional hours under the schedule change.  Instead, due to the 
schedule change, officers now have an additional fifty-two days off per year—they work 
four ten-hour shifts per week rather than five eight-hour shifts and now have the 
opportunity for three days off per week.   
We are wholly unpersuaded by the Union’s contention that the complaint involved 
 
13By seeking an increase of holiday leave hours annually for the officers, the 
complaint obviously concerned an area of financial management, as it involved increasing 
paid time off for all officers and would likely have implicated adjustments involving the 
budget and financial management of the University.  Under ED § 13-201(c) and the MOU, 
a complaint pertaining to either “the general level of . . . fringe benefits, or to other areas 
of financial management and staffing[]” is not a grievable issue.  
  
- 33 - 
 
a contract dispute and that a dispute about the interpretation of a provision of the MOU is 
grievable regardless of whether it concerns the general level of fringe benefits.  Casting the 
complaint as one involving a contractual dispute concerning the interpretation of the terms 
“workday” and “holiday” does not change the circumstance that the substance of the 
complaint seeks an increase in holiday leave hours for all officers and as such concerns the 
general level of fringe benefits and is excluded under ED § 13-201(c) as not a grievable 
issue.  From our perspective, although Article 11 of the MOU provides that “[i]n the event 
of an alleged violation or disagreement over any of the provisions of this MOU,” officers 
“shall have the right to file a grievance in accordance with” ED §§ 13-201 to 13-207, this 
general language would not supersede the definition of what constitutes a grievance under 
ED § 13-201(c), which is expressly incorporated into the MOU.  To hold as the Union 
urges would be to permit a party to bring a complaint about the general level of fringe 
benefits, yet avoid the applicability of the exclusionary language in ED § 13-201(c) and in 
this case the MOU, by simply alleging that the complaint is really a contract interpretation 
dispute.  This would not be a logical or permissible result.  Simply because a party 
characterizes a complaint as a dispute about an agreement’s terms should not permit the 
party to make an end run around express statutory exclusions adopted in the agreement.  
To do so would render the exclusions pertaining to the general level of fringe benefits and 
other areas meaningless. 
In addition to being expressly excluded as a grievable issue, we observe that the 
dispute about holiday leave raises an issue as to whether it is a complaint concerning the 
“interpretation or application of University rules or departmental procedures over which 
- 34 - 
 
the University management has control.”  ED § 13-201(c).  We are aware that, in its 
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals noted: 
The University contends the reason why holiday-leave hours are a 
matter beyond its management’s control is because the University System’s 
board of regents establishes the number of holiday-leave hours awarded to 
university police.  On the record before us, we cannot accept this assertion.  
This seemingly simple issue—whether the board or the management of 
member institutions determines the number of leave hours employees accrue 
for each holiday—does not appear to have been resolved anywhere in the 
three-step grievance procedure. 
In its brief, the University asserts that, at the administrative hearing, 
counsel for [the Union] conceded, in the University’s words, “that the 
[University System of Maryland] board of regents sets holiday leave for the 
entire [University System of Maryland].”   We read the record differently.  
As we understand the portion of the administrative law judge’s decision cited 
by the University for support, [the Union] conceded that the board of regents 
determines when the guaranteed eleven holidays are observed each year.  To 
agree that the board of regents sets the dates on which holidays are observed 
is not to agree that the board of regents sets the number of holiday-leave 
hours awarded for each holiday.  
 
Merryman, 246 Md. App. at 558 n.6, 231 A.3d at 507 n.6 (emphasis in original).  We agree 
with the Court of Special Appeals that the issue of whether the Board of Regents or the 
University determines the number of holiday leave hours does not appear to have been 
decided by the ALJ at Step Three of the grievance procedure.   
Despite the record demonstrating that there was testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
concerning the necessity for approval by the Board of Regents for an increase in the number 
of holiday leave hours for the officers, the ALJ did not make a factual finding concerning 
the matter.  At the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, Chief Ellis testified that, both before 
and after the schedule change, officers worked forty hours per week and 2,080 hours per 
year.  Maher testified to the same.  Maher also testified that officers continued to accrue 
- 35 - 
 
leave in the same amount (at the same rate) as before the schedule change.  What can be 
gleaned from this testimony is that there are 2,080 total hours (work and leave hours) set 
aside by the University and the Board of Regents for which all officers of the Union must 
be paid per year. 
Maher testified that increasing holiday leave by twenty-two hours constitutes “a 
fringe benefit impact” for which there would be “a financial increase, benefit cost increase, 
or fringe benefit cost increase for the university per officer,” and the University would 
necessarily be required to get approval from the Board of Regents (and support from the 
University System of Maryland and the State Attorney General’s Office).  Maher explained 
that approval from the Board of Regents would be required “because it would increase the 
cost to the institution, and [] would provide a different fringe-benefit program for a subset 
of employees than any other employee in that institution.”    
With Maher’s uncontradicted testimony about the need for Board of Regents’s 
approval and the financial impact of increasing the number of holiday leave hours, it seems 
clear that granting the Union’s request for additional holiday leave hours would implicate 
a budgetary matter necessary for approval by the Board of Regents.  But, the ALJ did not 
make a factual finding on this point one way or the other.  On this issue, in the written 
decision, rather than making a factual finding, the ALJ summarized Maher’s testimony, 
stating: “[T]he holiday leave hours increase would redefine fringe benefits and cause a 
financial increase that can only be changed by the [University System of Maryland] Board 
of Regents.  However, [] Maher also testified the allocation of holiday leave hours in eight-
hour increments is not a [University System of Maryland] policy.”  The observation by 
- 36 - 
 
Maher that the allocation of holiday leave in eight-hour increments is not a policy of the 
University System of Maryland does not mean that the Board’s approval is not necessary 
to increase holiday leave hours.  Rather, Maher’s observation is consistent with the change 
that the University made at Step Two of the grievance procedure permitting the officers to 
use holiday leave in increments fewer or greater than eight hours.  Nonetheless, in the 
absence of a factual finding on the matter, like the Court of Special Appeals, we will 
exercise restraint and not explicitly conclude that an increase in holiday leave for officers 
was a matter beyond the control of University management. 
As a final matter, we observe that the Union appears to suggest that if we conclude 
that the complaint about holiday leave involves a dispute about the general level of fringe 
benefits and thus does not involve a grievable issue, officers will be prevented in the future 
from raising a grievance involving wages, hours, or benefits.  The Union contends that 
“[a]lmost any grievance that arises out of a disagreement between the [Union] and the 
University about the MOU’s provisions will involve wages, hours, and benefits, since these 
are the necessary subjects of bargaining that the MOU memorializes.”  The Union argues 
that it should be permitted to use the grievance procedure to challenge the University’s 
interpretation of the MOU because to hold otherwise would permit the University to 
unilaterally interpret a contract “so long as some wage or benefit is at issue.”  We do not 
agree.  Our holding in this case—that the dispute about holiday leave is not a grievable 
issue—does not prevent officers from raising a complaint about wages, hours, or benefits 
through the grievance procedure.  A complaint by an officer “concerning discipline, alleged 
discrimination, promotion, assignment, or interpretation or application of University rules 
- 37 - 
 
or departmental procedures over which the University management has control” remains a 
“grievance” under ED § 13-201(c) and the MOU and is subject to the three-step grievance 
procedure.  Contrary to the Union’s suggestion, our holding in this case does not prohibit, 
for example, an employee from bringing a grievance concerning a demotion and an 
attendant pay decrease.  Such grievances concern an employee’s specific circumstances 
and do not “pertain[] to the general level of wages, wage patterns, fringe benefits, or to 
other broad areas of financial management and staffing” like a complaint seeking an across 
the board increase in holiday leave does. 
For all of the reasons explained above, we hold that the complaint about holiday 
leave does not present a grievable issue under ED § 13-201(c) and the MOU.  As such, we 
need not address the merits of the complaint.  We affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals, which remands the case to the ALJ for the ALJ to dismiss the grievance 
proceeding. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  PETITIONERS TO PAY 
COSTS.