Title: Eugene F. Ganies v. Lynn Sayne

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95134
____________
EUGENE F. GAINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
LYNN SAYNE, as personal representative
of the estate of CHLODEL H. GAINES,
Respondent.
[July 13, 2000]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review Gaines v. Sayne, 727 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999),
which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in Johnson v. Feeney, 507
So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), on the issue of whether the death of a party after
entry of a final decree of dissolution of marriage but prior to a decision on a timely
motion for rehearing automatically voids the dissolution, abates the dissolution
proceeding, and deprives the court of jurisdiction to render any further orders in the
matter.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the following
1The facts are taken from the opinion below.  See Gaines v. Sayne, 727 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1999).
2The funds in the checking account consisted of the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the
parties' Georgia real estate.  Mrs. Gaines' attorney subsequently withdrew the second claim pertaining
to the funds in the savings account, and therefore that claim ultimately was denied by the trial court.  
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reasons, we approve the decision below, which holds that the dissolution was not
voided by the subsequent death of a party.
MATERIAL FACTS1
The Gaineses were married in 1982.  In January 1996, Mr. Gaines filed for
divorce on the ground the marriage was irretrievably broken.  In April 1996, Mrs.
Gaines filed an answer and a counterpetition seeking alimony and also affirmatively
asserting that the marriage was irretrievably broken.  Following a hearing on the
matter, the trial court entered final judgment dissolving the marriage on October 25,
1996.  
The final judgment also distributed the property held by the parties and
awarded alimony.  Both parties subsequently sought rehearing, but only as to some
of the financial issues resolved.  Neither party challenged the dissolution of
marriage.  Mrs. Gaines raised two issues concerning the equitable distribution; the
first involved funds in the parties' joint checking account and the second involved
funds in the parties' joint savings account.2  Mr. Gaines, on the other hand, argued
3Mr. Gaines filed a premature notice of appeal after the denial of his motion for rehearing but
before the trial court held the hearing on Mrs. Gaines's motion for rehearing.  Mr. Gaines did not inform
the district court that Mrs. Gaines' motion was pending in the trial court.  When the district court
learned of Mrs. Gaines' pending motion it relinquished jurisdiction until the motion was disposed of in
the trial court.     
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that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court erroneously awarded Mrs.
Gaines temporary alimony and because the order was contrary to the findings of
the court as reflected in the transcript of the proceedings.  The trial court summarily
denied Mr. Gaines's motion for rehearing,3 but granted a hearing on Mrs. Gaines's
motion to be scheduled at a later date.  
Before that scheduled hearing took place, Mrs. Gaines died on February 25,
1997.  Lynn Sayne was appointed as the personal representative of Mrs. Gaines's
estate.  Subsequently, a hearing on Mrs. Gaines's motion for rehearing was held on
September 15, 1997.  At that hearing, Mr. Gaines argued that his wife’s motion for
rehearing should be dismissed on the ground that the personal representative had
not been timely substituted of record.  No assertion was made, however, that the
proceedings should be dismissed on the theory that the court no longer had
jurisdiction of the action because of the death of Mrs. Gaines.  The trial court
denied the request to dismiss, and entered an order on rehearing increasing Mrs.
Gaines's equitable distribution by half of the amount in the joint checking account. 
See 727 So. 2d at 352-53. 
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Mr. Gaines then appealed and asserted for the first time that the final
judgment dissolving the marriage was void because Mrs. Gaines died while the
divorce proceeding was pending on rehearing.  The district court held that the issue
was not preserved for review because Mr. Gaines had not made this claim in the
trial court.  See id. at 353.  While recognizing that fundamental error need not be
preserved below, the district court nevertheless declined to consider whether the
alleged error was fundamental, because it concluded “that the marriage was
dissolved with sufficient finality prior to the wife's death and that her death did not
abate the divorce proceeding.”  Id.  
Relying on Reopelle v. Reopelle, 587 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1995), the district court reasoned
that a judgment of dissolution is actually a divisible two-part order:  the first part
dissolves the marriage, and the second part resolves all other financial and familial
issues.  See Gaines, 727 So. 2d at 354.  Because neither of the parties in this case
contested the portion of the order dissolving the marriage, the district court held
that the death of one party to a dissolution proceeding after a judgment of
dissolution, but before disposition of a motion for rehearing limited to property or
other collateral matters, does not void the judgment of dissolution.  See id. at 354. 
APPEAL
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Appellant argues that the decision below conflicts with the Third District's
decision in Johnson v. Feeney, 507 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), which holds
that the death of a party to a dissolution proceeding while such proceeding is
pending on rehearing terminates the marriage by operation of law and divests the
trial court of jurisdiction to make the judgment final.  In Johnson, the wife died after
the trial court had entered final judgment dissolving the marriage, but before the trial
court had ruled on a timely motion for rehearing filed by the husband.  The opinion
offers very few facts and does not identify the issues raised in the motion for
rehearing.  Thus, it cannot be determined from the face of the opinion whether the
motion challenged the dissolution or was limited to other issues.  Nevertheless, the
district court held that the final judgment dissolving the marriage was void and
should have been vacated upon proper motion by the husband alerting the court to
the wife’s death.  See id. at 723.  
In so holding, the court noted two general principles of law.  First, it stated
that the "death of a party to a marriage dissolution action before a final judgment is
entered terminates the marriage relationship by operation of law and divests the trial
court of jurisdiction to issue a final decree."  Id. (citing Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla.
206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944); Price v. Price, 114 Fla. 233, 153 So. 904 (1934); Jaris
v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McKendree v. McKendree, 139
4We note that with the exception of Price, which dealt with the death of a spouse while a
divorce case was pending on appeal, the cases cited in Johnson involved situations in which one party
to a dissolution proceeding dies after an oral pronouncement of dissolution but before the court has
reduced its findings into a final written decree of dissolution.
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So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)).  Second, the court noted that a judgment of
dissolution is not final while a motion for rehearing is pending.  Id. (citing State ex
rel. Owens v. Pearson, 156 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. 1963), and other cases).  Considering
these rules together, the court concluded that the death of one party to a marriage
dissolution action after the entry of judgment, but before the trial court rules on a
pending motion for rehearing, terminates the marriage by operation of law and
divests the trial court of jurisdiction to make the judgment final.  See id. 
ORIGINS OF ABATEMENT RULE
We now conclude that Johnson’s reliance on the abatement rule as
announced in Sahler and its progeny was misplaced.4  Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla.
206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944), was decided under the Florida divorce law in existence
prior to the enactment of the statutory “no fault” dissolution scheme now
prevailing.  The facts in that case reflect that at a final hearing on July 12, 1943, the
judge orally pronounced that a divorce should be granted but did not state in whose
favor the decree of divorce would be awarded.  Instead, the chancellor asked both
parties to submit a proposed order on the dissolution of marriage concerning the
5As noted above, the case was complicated by the fact the trial court never announced in
whose favor the divorce was to be granted.  Thus, there was no final decision on the issue of dissolution
prior to the death of the husband.  
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division of the parties’ property.  Before this was done, however, the husband died
on July 28, 1943.  On August 17, 1943, the chancellor entered a divorce decree
nunc pro tunc to the date of the hearing.
On appeal, the wife challenged the entry of the nunc pro tunc divorce decree. 
This Court reversed the decree, holding that an oral pronouncement is not effective
until it has been reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and duly recorded.  See id.
at 210, 17 So. 2d at 106.5  The Court held that the trial court erred in entering the
decree nunc pro tunc where one of the parties to the divorce proceedings died
before rendition of the written decree.  See id., 17 So. 2d at 107. 
[T]he weight of authority in this country relative to the
authority of courts to enter “nunc pro tunc” decrees in
divorce suits is to the effect that a “nunc pro tunc”
decree cannot be entered where one of the parties to a
divorce dies before the rendition of a decree.
     In Annotation 3 A.L.R., page 1421, it is stated,
"Where a party to a divorce suit dies before the rendition
of a decree, none can be entered nunc pro tunc".  Citing
Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Mich. 620, 41 N.W. 817; Young v.
Young, 165 Mo. 624; 65 S.W. 1016, 88 Am. St. Rep.
440; and other authorities.
     "Thus where complainant in divorce died after
submission, it was error to enter a decree for him, nunc
pro tunc".  Citing Wilson v. Wilson, supra; and in
Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., § 135, it is stated,
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"Obviously there can be no judgment of divorce rendered
after the death of either of the parties, since that event of
itself terminates the status of marriage.  Consequently
where a party to a divorce suit dies before the rendition of
a decree, none can be entered. . . ."
Sahler, 154 Fla. at 210, 17 So. 2d at 107.  The Court further reasoned that marital
relationships are purely personal in nature and, therefore, a marriage dissolution
proceeding is a personal action which cannot survive the death of one of the
parties.  Id.  Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concluded that the
chancellor erred in entering a divorce decree where one of the parties had died after
the hearing on the divorce suit but before the chancellor had reduced his findings to
writing and signed and recorded the decree.  Hence, Sahler stands for the
proposition that the death of one of the parties prior to the entry of a judgment of
dissolution precludes the trial court from exercising any further jurisdiction over the
matter.  Accord Messana v. Messana, 421 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Jaris v.
Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McKendree v.
McKendree, 139 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962); see also 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce
and Separation § 140 (1998) ("[I]f an action for divorce is commenced and one of
the parties dies thereafter, but before the entry of the final decree, the action
abates.").  Sahler does not support the holding in Johnson.
MOTION FOR REHEARING
6The trial court here entered a final written judgment on October 25, 1996.  That judgment was
recorded in the clerk's office on October 28, 1996.  Mrs. Gaines died on February 25, 1997.
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As noted above, in this case, we are not faced with the death of a party prior
to the entry of a written, final judgment.  Rather, the trial court in this case reduced
its findings and conclusions to a final written order, and signed and recorded the
decree in the clerk's office before one of the parties to the proceedings died.6 
Thus, we find Sahler and its progeny to be inapposite.  Instead, we view the narrow
question before us as whether the death of a party before the disposition of a
pending motion for rehearing limited to financial matters automatically voids the
judgment of dissolution and divests the trial court of authority to adjudicate any
further matters in the case.  We conclude that the judgment should not be voided,
and we find the reasoning and logic of our decision in Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83
So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1955), to be instructive and supportive of this conclusion.
In Berkenfield, the trial court entered a written final decree dissolving the
marriage on June 21, 1954.  The decree was signed and filed in the clerk's office
that same day.  Before the clerk recorded the decree, however, the husband died. 
In deciding what effect the husband's death had on the proceedings, this Court
looked to the history of the statutes requiring rendition of an order or decree and its
prior case law mandating rendition of a decree before subsequent action may be
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taken on the decree.  See id. at 267.  It initially acknowledged the general rule that a
final decree becomes effective only when recorded if it is to form a basis for future
action.  No further proceedings were contemplated, however, in that case.  Thus,
after consideration of the history and purpose of the recordation statutes, the Court
found that "recordation is procedural and ministerial and that a decree when
recorded is but evidence of judicial action already taken; that a failure to perform
the act of recording amounts only to 'a ministerial misprision' which may be
remedied by an order nunc pro tunc."  Id. at 268.
     It seems to us that it would be unjustifiable and
inequitable to hold in the present situation that the decree
was a nullity until the clerk performed the ministerial
service of entering it in the chancery order book despite
the fact that it would not become a foundation for future
proceedings or process . . . .
Id.  Accordingly, the Court rejected the view that no decree is good for any
purpose until it is recorded because "[t]o adopt such an absolute rule would
unquestionably work hardship and injustice in many cases of which this one is a
classic example."  Id.  The Court concluded, therefore, that at the time the husband
died, he had been divorced by reason of the entry of the judgment of divorce, and
his death before the clerk recorded the decree did not affect the trial court's
dissolution of the marriage.  Id.  In so concluding, the Court  expressly
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distinguished Sahler's holding on the ground that Sahler involved the efficacy of an
"indefinite oral pronouncement" by the trial court.  Id.  
Since Berkenfield, numerous courts have considered the effect a party’s
death has on the status of the divorce proceedings and on the courts’ jurisdiction
to resolve matters collateral to the dissolution of marriage in a variety of factual
circumstances.  In Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1995), for
example, the trial court bifurcated the divorce proceedings due to the failing health
of one of the parties, and entered a final judgment of dissolution while reserving
jurisdiction over all remaining matters.  Before the remaining matters could be
resolved, however, the wife died.  The trial court subsequently entered a stipulated
final judgment concerning the marital assets.  Ten days later, the husband
challenged the court’s jurisdiction to enter the dissolution decree because the wife
had not satisfied the residency requirement.  The trial court agreed and set aside the
dissolution decree.  The district court reversed the trial court and remanded for
reinstatement of the final judgments.  Upon review this Court affirmed the district
court’s decision on the residency issue.  We further upheld the district court’s
conclusion that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter the final judgments
concerning the parties’ marital assets despite the wife’s death prior to entry of such
order.  We found that the marriage had been dissolved prior to the wife's death by
7As did the court below, the Fourth District certified conflict with Johnson.  See Barnett, 743
So. 2d at 108.   
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the entry of the final judgment of dissolution.  We reasoned that "[b]y retaining
jurisdiction to deal with the property, the court did not render the final judgment
dissolving the marriage any less final."  648 So. 2d at 714.  In so concluding, we
again expressly distinguished Sahler on the ground that it involved the death of a
party before the entry of a final judgment.  More importantly, as in Berkenfield, we
upheld the validity and efficacy of a dissolution decree where one of the parties to
the proceeding died, despite the fact that at the time of death, the time provided for
rehearing or appeal had not yet expired.
The district courts have reached similar conclusions.  Recently, in fact, the
Fourth District in Barnett v. Barnett, 743 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), review
granted, 751 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2000), held that the death of the husband within the
time allotted for petitioning for rehearing did not void the dissolution decree.  In
reaching its decision, the court relied especially on this Court's decision in
Berkenfield.  Further, the court rejected the holding in Johnson on the ground it
“confuses the finality of a case for appellate purposes with the time a divorce
judgment becomes effective in relation to the death of one of the parties." Barnett,
743 So. 2d at 106.7  
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Similarly, in Reopelle v. Reopelle, 587 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), the
case relied upon by the court below, the Fifth District held that the death of one of
the parties during a pending motion for rehearing did not affect the trial court's
decree dissolving the marriage where the parties did not contest the dissolution
decree and the pending motion involved matters collateral to the adjudication of
dissolution (such as property and financial issues).  In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on Becker v. King, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and Baggett
v. Baggett, 309 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), both of which hold that the death
of one of the parties to a divorce proceeding does not affect the trial court’s
jurisdiction to resolve collateral matters relating to the dissolution of marriage.  
While we agree with appellant that Becker and Baggett are factually
distinguishable from the circumstances presented in this case, we are nevertheless
persuaded by their logic and reasoning.  For example, in Becker, the trial court had
entered a written partial final judgment dissolving the marriage and retained
jurisdiction over all remaining matters to be decided at a later date.  A hearing on
the collateral matters was held, wherein the trial court orally pronounced its findings
and conclusions as to those other matters.  However, before the trial court had
signed and filed a written decree indicating its conclusions, the husband died.  The
Fourth District rejected the wife's argument that the trial court was without authority
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to issue a final order nunc pro tunc to the date the partial final judgment had been
entered.  The court reasoned that the marriage had ended as of the date the partial
final judgment had been entered and that the only matters left unresolved were those
matters collateral to the adjudication of dissolution.
     A purely divorce suit is sometimes made an exception
to this general principle of law permitting rendition and
entry of a nunc pro tunc judgment after death because, it
is said, the death itself has already terminated the marriage
relationship.  If so, the reason for this exception does not
apply in this case because the marriage was not ended by
death but by the written partial final judgment of January
22, 1973, and the matters involved in the appealed
judgment relate only to matters collateral to, and made
necessary and appropriate for legal decision by, the
adjudication of dissolution.
307 So. 2d at 858 (footnote omitted).  The court further concluded that the fact the
final order had not been reduced to writing before the death of the husband did not
affect the validity of the final judgment despite the fact such final judgment had not
yet been "rendered" for purposes of appeal.  It reasoned:
Aside from its definition in the Florida Appellate Rules,
rendition of a judgment generally refers to the judicial act
of the court in giving, returning, pronouncing, or
announcing, orally or in writing, its conclusions and
decision on the matter submitted to it for adjudication,
and is distinct from the signing of a subsequent formal
judgment and from the later recording or filing of the
writing or the entry of judgment in the minutes of the
court.  Aside from the effect of a statute or court rule
8Although Becker involved a partial final judgment of dissolution, we do not find that fact to be
dispositive.  Appellant has not satisfactorily explained to us why a case involving a partial final judgment
of dissolution should be treated any differently than a case, such as the one presented herein, where the
trial court enters an order dissolving the marriage and the parties challenge only the court's ruling on
matters collateral to the adjudication of dissolution.
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requiring the judgment to be written for particular
purposes, a judgment exists as such when it is thus
rendered and is valid and binding as between the parties
and their privies, although the only competent evidence of
such act is the memorial or record in the form of a written
and signed judgment or a clerk's minute book entry.
Id. at 858-59 (footnotes omitted).8  We find this reasoning and logic persuasive, if
not compelling.  
Similarly, in Baggett, the trial court entered a final judgment of divorce, and
the wife filed a motion for rehearing relating to issues of alimony, child support and
visitation rights.  Like the Gaineses, neither party challenged the dissolution issue
itself.  The trial court held a hearing on the wife's motion and orally pronounced its
findings and conclusions.  Before the court's order was reduced to writing,
however, the husband died.  The court subsequently reduced its order to writing
nunc pro tunc to the date the oral pronouncements were made.  The district court
held that the husband's death did not affect the court’s authority to enter the nunc
pro tunc decree because the final judgment dissolving the marriage had been signed
and recorded prior to the husband’s death.  See Baggett, 309 So. 2d at 225.  
9Although not mentioned in the opinion, the procedural rules in effect at the time Berkenfield
was decided granted parties ten days from the date the decree was recorded to petition the court for
rehearing.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 3.16(a) (1955) ("No rehearing shall be granted unless the petition is
served within 10 days after the recording of the decree.").  
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Petitioner disputes the reasoning of these cases.  For example, petitioner
argues that the reasoning of Berkenfield is inapplicable in this case because
Berkenfield did not involve a pending motion for rehearing.  Indeed, he argues, the
Court in Berkenfield relied in part on the fact that the parties were apparently not
contemplating subsequent proceedings.  We recognize that the situation in the
present case is slightly different from that before this Court in Berkenfield. 
However, we do not find that such distinction renders the rationale of Berkenfield
any less applicable.9  Rather, we interpret Berkenfield to mean that procedural rules
established to determine finality for the purpose of seeking rehearing or appeal do
not necessarily affect the efficacy of a validly entered decree under the
circumstances presented here.  Moreover, we agree with the Fourth District in
Barnett that Johnson appears to confuse a substantive rule of law, which renders
ineffective a divorce decree and divests the courts of jurisdiction over dissolution
proceedings where one of the parties dies before a final judgment has been entered,
with a procedural rule of law, which may dictate the finality of a decree for purpose
10See also Linzenni v. Hoffman, 937 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. 1997).  In that case, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that the rules of procedure were not dispositive of questions involving substantive
law, such as whether the death of a party abates a dissolution proceeding.  Accordingly, the court held
that "the doctrine of abatement is inapplicable where a dissolution of marriage has been ordered prior to
the death of a party, even though the order may be partial, interlocutory or not a final judgment
resolving all issues in the case."  Id. at 726.
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of appeal.  See Barnett, 743 So. 2d at 106.10  The fact that our procedural rules
allow time for parties to seek rehearing or an appeal from a final judgment should
not automatically render the judgment ineffective as to the matters resolved by the
trial court.  More importantly, the fact that matters collateral to the dissolution issue
remain unresolved should not alter a court's unchallenged finding that a marriage is
irretrievably broken.  
Here, we cannot ignore the fact that both parties sought to end the marital
relationship under a statutory scheme for dissolution that does not require any
finding of fault, but rather may be based on a finding that the marriage is
irretrievably broken.  By the very nature of such a scheme it will be the rare
occasion that a dissolution will be subject to attack on rehearing or appeal, and our
experience with the no fault scheme has not demonstrated otherwise.  In this case,
for example, and in accordance with similar requests for dissolution from both
parties, the trial court entered a final judgment on October 25, 1996, dissolving the
marriage.  Subsequently, although the parties raised other challenges to the final
11We decline to address Mr. Gaines' remaining points on appeal because they involve matters
which are outside the scope of the conflict issue.
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judgment in motions for rehearing, neither party contested the finding that the
marriage was broken and the adjudication of dissolution based upon that finding. 
Thus, all judicial labor on the issue of dissolution had ended upon the entry of the
final judgment.  Under these circumstances, to void the dissolution decree on the
basis that Mrs. Gaines died while a motion for rehearing raising other issues was
pending would be contrary to the parties' undisputed intent to be divorced and
could lead to unjust and inequitable results.  Berkenfield.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the entry of a written judgment of dissolution
is not voided by the subsequent death of a party where any remaining issues
properly raised on rehearing or appeal relate solely to matters collateral to the
adjudication of dissolution.  We approve the decision below and we disapprove
Johnson to the extent it is contrary to our opinion herein.11
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
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Second District - Case No. 2D97-00491 
(Hillsborough County)
John B. Gibbons of Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Theodore J. Rechel and Donald A. Foster of Rechel & Associates, Tampa,
Florida,
for Respondent