Title: Tavares v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12580 
 
DANIEL D. TAVARES  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
February 26, 2019. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Daniel D. Tavares, appeals from a judgment 
of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm. 
 
 
Tavares was convicted by a jury "of possessing counterfeit 
currency, uttering a counterfeit note, and larceny by false 
pretenses of property not exceeding $250 in value."  
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 471, 471 (2015).  The 
Appeals Court affirmed his convictions, id. at 475, and this 
court denied further appellate review, Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
472 Mass. 1106 (2015).  Years later, Tavares filed a petition in 
the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief 
from the convictions.  He alleged that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, and that his 
convictions were wrongful in myriad aspects.  The single justice 
denied the petition without a hearing.1 
 
 
The single justice correctly denied relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, because there are adequate alternative routes 
available to Tavares to seek and obtain review of his claims.  
See, e.g., Norris v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2006); 
                     
 
1 The single justice also denied Tavares's motion for 
appointment of counsel.  Tavares alleges no abuse of discretion 
or other error by the single justice in denying the requested 
relief. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996).  The errors 
raised in the petition either were or could have been raised in 
his direct appeal from his convictions in the Appeals Court.  
See Tavares, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 471.  See Doyle v. 
Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1002, 1003 (2015).  The fact that he did 
not receive relief does not render the ordinary appellate 
process inadequate for purposes of G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See Saade 
v. Price, 480 Mass. 1024, 1024 (2018); Votta v. Commonwealth, 
435 Mass. 1013, 1013 (2002).  Tavares also may raise challenges 
to his convictions, including his claims concerning the 
constitutional effectiveness of counsel, jury instructions, and 
violation of his right against double jeopardy because the same 
evidence or conduct formed the basis for multiple convictions, 
by filing a motion for postconviction relief in the District 
Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), and by appealing from any adverse ruling.2  
See Sabree v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2018); Souza 
v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1016, 1016 (2015); Doyle, supra at 
1002-1003.  See also Commonwealth v. Cowie, 404 Mass. 119 
(1989).  "The fact that the petitioner 'failed to pursue the 
alternative route or pursued it unsuccessfully' does not create 
a right to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Wilborn v. 
Commonwealth, 448 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2007), quoting Tavares v. 
Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 1011, 1011 (2006). 
 
                     
 
2 Tavares's claim that double jeopardy principles excuse him 
from pursuing the alternative remedy provided by Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 30 is unfounded.  With exceptions not relevant here, a 
defendant who prevails on direct appeal or through allowance of 
a motion for a new trial is placed "under continuing jeopardy 
during the pendency of the prosecution, rather than  . . . at 
risk of double jeopardy."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 
141, 146-147 (2017).  See Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 
366 (1980), quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 
(1978) (requiring "a criminal defendant to stand trial again 
after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to 
upset his first conviction . . . is not an act of government 
oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was intended to protect").  Tavares's direct appeal having been 
concluded, a motion for postconviction relief under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 provides an avenue to raise any further challenge to 
the conviction.  See Doyle v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1002, 1003 
(2015). 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
The "general superintendence power under G.L. c. 211, § 3, 
is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a 
substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide 
an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process 
has run its course."  Votta v. Police Dep't of Billerica, 444 
Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005).  The single justice neither erred nor 
abused his discretion in denying the petition.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Daniel D. Tavares, pro se. 
 
Elizabeth M. Carey, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
 
3 We decline to consider on appeal Tavares's requests for 
relief, including production of documents, information, or 
things, and transmission of records, that were not before the 
single justice.