Title: Michael J. Thorson v. David H. Schwarz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 96 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3380 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J. Thorson,  
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearing & Appeals,  
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 267 Wis. 2d 961, 671 N.W.2d 717 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 24, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Gabler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 96 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3380  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 492) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J.  
Thorson,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, Administrator, Division  
of Hearing & Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Michael J. 
Thorson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a circuit court order denying sentence credit.1  
He argues that he is entitled to sentence credit for time spent 
at the Wisconsin Resource Center while awaiting evaluation and 
trial on a petition to commit him as a sexually violent person 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, No. 02-3380, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. September 3, 2003) (affirming an order 
of the circuit court for Eau Claire County, William Gabler, 
Judge).   
No. 
02-3380   
 
2 
 
under Chapter 980 (1999-2000).2  Because we determine that 
Thorson's detention under Chapter 980 satisfies neither the "in 
custody" nor "in connection with" requirements of Wis. Stat. § 
973.155, the sentence credit statute, we conclude that he is not 
entitled to receive the requested credit.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶2 
On 
November 
1, 
1991, 
Thorson 
was 
convicted 
of 
attempted second-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment.  
He was sentenced to 13 years in prison, with a mandatory release 
date of April 4, 2000. 
¶3 
Shortly before his 
scheduled release, 
the 
State 
commenced an action to commit Thorson as a sexually violent 
person pursuant to Chapter 980.  Thus, instead of being released 
from custody, Thorson was transferred to the Wisconsin Resource 
Center (WRC) for further evaluation.  He remained there awaiting 
trial on the Chapter 980 petition.   
¶4 
On September 16, 2000, a jury determined that Thorson 
was not a proper candidate for a Chapter 980 commitment because 
his mental disorder did not make it substantially probable that 
he would commit future acts of sexual violence.  On September 
20, 2000, Thorson was released on parole after being detained at 
the WRC for 170 days.  
                                                 
2 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version of 
the Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
02-3380   
 
3 
 
¶5 
While on parole, Thorson made substantial progress in 
his rehabilitation.  In April 2002, however, the Department of 
Corrections began revocation of parole proceedings, alleging 
that he had unauthorized contact with a child. 
¶6 
At the revocation hearing, the administrative law 
judge found that Thorson had violated the rules of his 
supervision and revoked his parole.  Accordingly, he ordered 
Thorson to be reincarcerated for a period of ten months.   
¶7 
After the revocation, Thorson requested that he be 
granted 170 days of credit toward his term of reincarceration 
for time spent at the WRC awaiting his Chapter 980 trial.  The 
administrative law judge denied the request.  In doing so, he 
explained that he was not aware of any law that allowed "custody 
credit"3 in a criminal case for detention in a civil commitment 
proceeding. 
 ¶8 Thorson subsequently appealed the decision to the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA).  The DHA administrator 
sustained the conclusion of the administrative law judge.  He 
reasoned that the commitment proceeding was a separate legal 
matter and "[t]he fact that the court ordered [Thorson] confined 
pending the outcome of that proceeding [did] not make that 
                                                 
3 Although the parties, along with the circuit court and 
court of appeals, describe the issue in this case as one of 
"sentence credit," the administrative law judge used the term 
"custody credit" instead.  At oral argument, the State Assistant 
Attorney General explained that because Thorson's proceeding 
arises out of revocation, "this is not a true sentence credit 
case.  This is actually what the Department of Corrections calls 
a custody credit case." 
No. 
02-3380   
 
4 
 
custody part of this case or entitle him to sentence credit for 
that confinement." 
¶9 
On July 23, 2002, Thorson filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari, challenging the denial of sentence credit for his 
time spent at the WRC.  The circuit court concluded that "[t]he 
Chapter 980 proceeding was commenced against Mr. Thorson for a 
wide variety of reasons, only one of which was his conviction 
for second-degree sexual assault in 91CF68.  The reincarceration 
 . . . had its roots in the criminal conviction from 91CF68 and 
had 
nothing 
to 
do 
with 
the 
Chapter 
980 
proceeding."  
Accordingly, the court dismissed the writ on the ground that 
Thorson's Chapter 980 detention was not "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which the sentence was imposed." 
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order.  State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, No. 02-3380, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. September 3, 2003).  Like 
the circuit court, the court of appeals held that Thorson's 
detention "was not in connection with the course of conduct for 
which his sentences were imposed."  Id., ¶3.  It further 
concluded that Chapter 980 commitments are "a separate civil 
matter" and that the evaluation process at the WRC was to 
determine whether Thorson should be civilly committed.4  Id., ¶4.  
                                                 
4 The court of appeals also rejected Thorson's due process 
argument that fundamental fairness required credit for the time 
he was detained at the WRC.  Thorson, unpublished slip op. at 
¶5.  Because Thorson did not pursue this issue on review, we do 
not address it here.  
No. 
02-3380   
 
5 
 
  
II 
¶11 The issue in this case is whether a petitioner, 
reincarcerated for a parole violation, is entitled to claim 
sentence credit for time spent in detention during the pendency 
of a Chapter 980 proceeding.  Both the circuit court and court 
of appeals answered in the negative, affirming the decision of 
the DHA. 
¶12 Our review of a parole revocation by certiorari is 
limited to four inquiries:  (1) whether the agency stayed within 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) 
whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, 
representing its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question.  Van Ermen v. DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 
63, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978). 
¶13 In the present case, our inquiry is focused on whether 
the DHA acted according to law when it rejected Thorson's claim.  
Resolution of this inquiry involves the interpretation and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 973.155, the sentence credit 
statute.  It presents a question of law subject to independent 
appellate review.  See State v. Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 
595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). 
III 
 
¶14 We begin our discussion with an examination of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155.  The statute governs sentence credit and 
provides in relevant part: 
No. 
02-3380   
 
6 
 
973.155 Sentence credit. 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed.  As used in 
this 
subsection, "actual 
days 
spent in 
custody" 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
1. While the offender is awaiting trial; 
2. While the offender is being tried; and 
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
 
¶15 Under the language of the statute, two conditions must 
be met in order for a defendant to receive sentence credit:  (1) 
the defendant must have been "in custody" for the period in 
question; and (2) the period "in custody" must have been "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which the sentence was 
imposed."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  We examine each of these 
requirements in turn. 
A. Custody 
 
¶16 The term "custody" is not defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155.  To fill this void, Wisconsin courts have relied upon 
the definition set forth in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a), the 
escape statute.  See e.g., State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶¶13-
15, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536; State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 
2d 371, 378-79, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983); State v. Cobb, 135 Wis. 
2d 181, 184-85, 400 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1986). 
No. 
02-3380   
 
7 
 
 
¶17 The definition of custody in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) 
provides in relevant part:    
946.42 Escape.  (1) In this section: 
(a) 
"Custody" 
includes 
without 
limitation 
actual 
custody of an institution . . . .  It does not include 
the custody of a probationer, parolee or person on 
extended supervision by the department of corrections 
or a probation, extended supervision or parole officer 
or the custody of a person who has been released to 
aftercare supervision under ch. 938 unless the person 
is in actual custody or is subject to a confinement 
order under s. 973.09(4). 
¶18 Although 
the 
above 
definition 
is 
the 
necessary 
starting point for determining "custody" for sentence credit 
purposes, it is by no means the only consideration.  This court 
has made clear that offenders must also be subject to an escape 
charge in order to be in "custody" for purposes of sentence 
credit.  Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶¶1, 25, 31. 47.    
¶19 In Magnuson, this court considered whether a person 
placed on in-home detention with electronic monitoring was in 
"custody" for sentence credit purposes.  Id., ¶1.  We determined 
that "an offender's status constitutes custody for sentence 
credit purposes when the offender is subject to an escape charge 
for leaving that status."  Id.  Applying this bright line rule, 
we concluded that Magnuson's conditions of release did not 
subject him to an escape charge and therefore did not render him 
in custody.  Id., ¶48.  
 
¶20 In the present case, both parties agree that Thorson's 
detention at the WRC satisfies the broad definition of custody 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  We too subscribe to this conclusion.  
No. 
02-3380   
 
8 
 
While parolees are not normally considered to be in custody 
under the escape statute, Thorson was in actual custody at the 
WRC.  This is supported by the fact that the Department of 
Health and Family Services (DHFS) is required to administer the 
WRC "as a correctional institution."  Wis. Stat. § 46.056(1).   
 
¶21 Where the parties disagree is whether Thorson was 
subject to an escape charge had he left the WRC without 
authorization.  Thorson contends that absconding from the WRC 
would 
have 
subjected 
him 
to 
escape 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.42(3)(a) so as to entitle him to sentence credit under 
Magnuson.  That statute specifies four situations in which the 
crime of escape can occur: (1) the defendant was under arrest 
for a crime; (2) the defendant was lawfully charged with a 
crime; (3) the defendant was lawfully convicted of a crime; or 
(4) the defendant was sentenced for a crime.  State v. Scott, 
191 Wis. 2d 146, 150, 528 N.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1995).  Because 
Thorson had not yet been fully discharged from his sentence, he 
maintains that he could have been charged under the escape 
statute.  
 
¶22 The problem with Thorson's argument is its underlying 
premise.  Thorson was not detained at the WRC because of his 
sentence for attempted second-degree sexual assault and false 
imprisonment.  Rather, he was detained as a result of a separate 
discretionary decision to seek his commitment under Chapter 980. 
¶23 Although a sexually violent offense serves as one of 
the prerequisites for initiating a proceeding under Chapter 980, 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02 specifies additional allegations that must 
No. 
02-3380   
 
9 
 
accompany the petition in order to initiate an independent 
proceeding.  These include allegations that the person suffers 
from a mental disorder and that the disorder "creates a 
substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of 
sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(b) and (c).   
 
¶24 Beyond the text of the statute, Thorson offers two 
more reasons why he was subject to an escape charge.  First, 
Thorson notes that DHFS has adopted rules providing for the use 
of force, including lethal force, to prevent and capture 
escapees from the WRC.  See Wis. Admin. Code §§ HFS 95.04, 95.05 
and 95.06 (March 2004).  He argues that it would be highly 
anomalous to provide that a person who escapes or attempts to 
escape from the WRC could be subject to lethal force but could 
not be charged with escape under Wis. Stat. § 946.42.   
¶25 Second, Thorson contends that because the escape 
statute applies to individuals committed under Chapter 971 
(mental disease or mental defect) or Chapter 975 (Sex Crimes 
Law), none of whom has fully passed through all stages of the 
criminal process, the escape statute must therefore also apply 
to individuals detained or committed under Chapter 980, all of 
whom are still subject to the underlying criminal sentence.  
Neither of these reasons aids Thorson's argument. 
 
¶26 The department's rules on the use of force for 
individuals detained or committed under Chapter 980 do not 
create a contradiction with respect to the escape statute.  Many 
of those housed at the WRC have established records of violent 
behavior.  Because of their characteristics, the legislature has 
No. 
02-3380   
 
10 
 
approved administrative rules that allow, as a last resort, the 
use of lethal force to protect the public.   
 
¶27 If an anomaly does exist, it rests in Thorson's 
insistence 
that 
this 
court 
construe 
the 
escape 
statute 
expansively.  Such a construction would expose himself and other 
similarly situated defendants to a criminal charge that the 
statute does not explicitly contemplate. 
 
¶28 Thorson's 
argument 
concerning 
commitments 
under 
Chapter 971 and Chapter 975 is similarly unpersuasive.  Both 
Chapter 971 and Chapter 975 are specifically referenced in the 
escape statute.  Wis. Stat. § 946.42(3)(g).  Unlike those 
sections, there is no incorporation of Chapter 980 into Wis. 
Stat. § 946.42.  We refuse to create a prosecutable offense for 
escape that the clear language of the statute does not 
authorize.  
 
¶29 In sum, while Thorson's status at the WRC satisfied 
the definition of custody under § 946.42(1)(a), it did not leave 
him vulnerable to an escape charge had he absconded from his 
confinement.  Because the State could not prosecute Thorson for 
escape, his detention at the WRC does not qualify under Magnuson 
as being in custody for purposes of Wisconsin's sentence credit 
statute.   
B. Connection with the Course of Conduct  
¶30 We address next the second requirement of the sentence 
credit statute that the time spent in custody must be "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
No. 
02-3380   
 
11 
 
imposed."5  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  The administrative law 
judge, the DHA, the circuit court, and the court of appeals all 
held that if Thorson were in custody, it was not "in connection 
with" the offense for which he was sentenced because a Chapter 
980 proceeding is a separate civil matter. 
¶31 The 
phrase 
"course 
of 
conduct" 
was 
explicitly 
construed by the court of appeals in Tuescher.  226 Wis. 2d at 
465.  There, the court considered two possible interpretations 
of the phrase.  One was that it should be read broadly to mean 
"criminal episode."  Id. at 471.  The other was that it should 
be construed narrowly to mean "the specific 'offense or acts' 
embodied in the charge for which the defendant is being 
sentenced."  Id.  Based on the history of the statute and prior 
case law, the court adopted the narrower interpretation.  Id. at 
479.   
¶32 In his brief, Thorson contends that the specific 
offense that resulted in his conviction and sentence is the same 
one on which his Chapter 980 petition and custody in the WRC 
were based.  He notes that no new acts were committed that would 
enable 
the 
State 
to 
commence 
a 
Chapter 
980 
proceeding.  
Furthermore, Thorson asserts that his detention at the WRC was 
factually connected to the conduct for which he was sentenced. 
                                                 
5 Additionally, Thorson asserts that his detention at the 
WRC was "related to an offense for which sentence was imposed."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  Because Thorson did not previously 
present this argument to the court of appeals, however, we deem 
it waived.   
No. 
02-3380   
 
12 
 
¶33 Yet, at oral argument, in response to Schwarz's 
description 
of 
the 
predicate 
offenses, 
Thorson's 
counsel 
acknowledged that "there are other predicate acts from sentences 
long ago discharged."  Schwarz noted that in Chapter 980 
petitions the conviction for which a defendant is serving 
operates as a predicate offense, but it is not necessarily the 
only predicate offense.  Chapter 980 petitions often refer to 
other violations that may be qualifying offenses.6  Schwarz 
concluded: "In Mr. Thorson's case, he has another qualifying 
conviction.  Unfortunately the petition is not part of the 
record." 
 
¶34 In either instance, Thorson's "in connection with" 
argument misses the mark.  Even assuming that his time at the 
WRC qualifies as a "sentence," Thorson was not detained for the 
specific offense that caused his original conviction.  Rather, 
the filing of a Chapter 980 petition was the reason for his 
detention.  Chapter 980 commitments are separate civil matters.  
See State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995). 
 
¶35  It 
is 
true 
that 
Chapter 
980 
proceedings 
are 
"enveloped on both sides by criminal conduct."  State v. 
Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶19, 262 Wis. 2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124.  It 
is also true that such proceedings share many of the same 
procedural and constitutional features present in criminal 
                                                 
6 A qualifying offense for purposes of Chapter 980 means 
"sexually violent offense" as the term is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(6). 
No. 
02-3380   
 
13 
 
prosecutions.  State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 417, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999).  However, these facts do not change the reason why 
Thorson was at the WRC.  
¶36 A fundamental problem with Thorson's argument is that 
conceptually there is no way to distinguish time spent in 
pretrial 
detention 
from 
time 
spent 
following 
an 
actual 
commitment.  In addition to the predicate qualifying offenses, 
the detention time is based on a probable cause determination 
that the detainee has a mental disorder, which creates a 
substantial probability that he or she will reoffend.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02(2) and (3).  The commitment time is based upon a 
beyond a reasonable doubt determination that the detainee has a 
mental disorder which creates a substantial probability of 
future reoffense. 
¶37 If this court were to accept Thorson's "in connection 
with" argument, all Chapter 980 confinements, whether for 
detention or for commitment, in effect become an offset to the 
criminal sentence.  His argument integrates Chapter 980 into the 
underlying criminal proceedings, a result which the legislature 
specifically attempted to preclude. 
¶38 In sum, we determine that Thorson's detention at the 
WRC under Chapter 980 satisfies neither the "in custody" nor "in 
connection with" requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.155, the 
sentence credit statute.  We therefore conclude that the DHA 
acted according to law when it rejected Thorson's requested 
credit.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
No. 
02-3380   
 
14 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
¶39 DIANE S. SYKES, J. did not participate. 
 
No.  02-3380.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
conclude that under Wis. Stat. § 973.155, the sentence credit 
statute, Thorson should be granted 170 days for credit toward 
his term of reincarceration for time spent in WRC awaiting 
evaluation and trial under ch. 980.   
¶41 Thorson was involuntarily institutionalized in WRC by 
the State for the 170 days.  WRC is listed as a state prison;7 
the Department of Health and Family Services is required to 
administer WRC as a correctional institution and the employees 
at WRC are employees of the Department of Corrections.8  If 
Thorson was not in custody during this 170 days, who ever is in 
custody?  If Thorson left WRC without permission, the state 
would not look kindly on his move.  The statute should be 
interpreted as written.  
¶42 Although Thorson was held for possible ch. 980 
proceedings, the State failed to prove Thorson a ch. 980 
committee.  Thorson's period in custody at WRC was in connection 
with the course of conduct for which his criminal sentence was 
imposed.  Chapter 980 proceedings rely heavily on the criminal 
justice system.  Chapter 980 proceedings are triggered by a 
criminal conviction for a sexually violent offense.  The 
sexually violent offense was both the course of conduct that 
resulted in his prison sentence and the course of conduct that 
was the basis for the ch. 980 petition.     
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 302.01(1)(a). 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 46.056(1)(2). 
No.  02-3380.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶43 The State sought the opportunity to prove Thorson was 
sexually violent pursuant to ch. 980 and precluded the parole 
board from addressing his case for 170 days.  I agree with 
Justice Roggensack's dissent that "[f]undamental fairness should 
cause the State to be required to grant sentence credit for 170 
days that the State caused Thorson to be held at WRC."9   
¶44 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
 
                                                 
9 Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶65. 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶45 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  In order 
to receive sentence credit for the period of time between the 
filing of the ch. 980 petition and Michael J. Thorson's release 
on parole, which release followed the jury determination that 
the State failed to prove he was a sexually violent person, 
Thorson must show that he was in custody in connection with his 
criminal conviction and that if he walked away from his 
confinement prior to parole, he would have been subject to 
escape charges.  State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d 
40, 606 N.W.2d 536; State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 378, 340 
N.W.2d 511 (1983).  I conclude that the filing of the ch. 980 
petition provided only an additional reason for Thorson's 
continued custody, which reason did not negate the State's 
custody of Thorson in connection with the course of conduct for 
which he was imprisoned.  Accordingly, Thorson would have been 
subject to an escape charge if he left his place of confinement 
without permission.  Therefore, I also conclude that he is 
entitled to sentence credit for the period of time between the 
filing of the ch. 980 petition and his release on parole.  As 
the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶46 In 1991, Thorson was sentenced to a thirteen-year 
prison sentence for attempted second-degree sexual assault and 
false imprisonment.  His mandatory release date was April 4, 
2000.  After serving nine years of that sentence, and within 90 
days prior to his mandatory release date, the State filed a 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
2 
 
petition pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.0210 to have Thorson 
committed as a sexually violent person.  Instead of being 
released on parole, Thorson was transferred to the Wisconsin 
Resource Center (WRC).  The State held Thorson in custody for 
170 days until its ch. 980 petition was resolved.  On 
September 16, 2000, a jury found that the State had not proved 
Thorson was a sexually violent person, and on September 20, 
2000, the State released Thorson on parole. 
¶47 In May 2002, the State revoked Thorson's parole and 
reincarcerated him for a period of ten months.  Thorson asked 
the Division of Hearing and Appeals (DHA) to grant him sentence 
credit for the time he spent at the WRC.  The DHA denied him 
credit.  Both the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed 
that decision.  Thorson petitioned this court for review. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) provides in relevant part: 
A petition filed under this section shall allege 
that all of the following apply to the person alleged 
to be a sexually violent person: 
(a) The person satisfies any of the following 
criteria: 
1. 
The person has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense. 
. . . 
(ag) The person is within 90 days of discharge or 
release, on parole, . . . from a sentence that was 
imposed for a conviction for a sexually violent 
offense . . . . 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶48 Whether Thorson is entitled to sentence credit for the 
time he spent at the WRC requires application of Wisconsin's 
sentence credit statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Statutory 
application is a question of law that we review de novo.  State 
v. Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 468, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155——Sentence Credit Statute 
¶49 Deciding Thorson's appeal requires us to apply Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155.  Section § 973.155(1)(a) provides: 
A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the 
service of his or her sentence for all days spent in 
custody in connection with the course of conduct for 
which 
sentence 
was 
imposed. 
 
As 
used 
in 
this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, 
without limitation by enumeration, confinement related 
to an offense for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of 
the same course of conduct, which occurs: 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
¶50 We previously have concluded that the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 requires that sentence credit be granted 
only for time when an offender is "in custody" that is "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  See Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d at 376-77 (stating that 
"Sec. 973.155(1)(a), Stats., is not susceptible to more than one 
interpretation . . . .").  Our task, then, is to apply the 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
4 
 
concepts of "in custody" and "in connection with," as they have 
been interpreted, to Thorson's case.  Therefore, in order for 
Thorson to obtain sentence credit for the 170 days he spent at 
the WRC, he must show that he was actually confined there in 
connection with the conduct that resulted in his criminal 
conviction, and that he would have been subject to an escape 
charge if he left that confinement without permission. 
1. 
In custody 
¶51 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.155 
does 
not 
define 
"in 
custody."  However, we have examined this portion of the statute 
previously, and have concluded that the phrase "in custody" for 
purposes of the sentence credit statute has the same meaning as 
the definition of "custody" in the escape statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42.  Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d at 378-79; Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 
40, ¶13.  Section 946.42(1)(a) defines "custody" as follows: 
"Custody" 
includes 
without 
limitation 
actual 
custody of an institution . . . .  It does not include 
the custody of a probationer, parolee or person on 
extended supervision by the department of corrections 
or a probation, extended supervision or parole officer 
or the custody of a person who has been released to 
aftercare supervision under ch. 938 [the juvenile 
justice code] unless the person is in actual custody 
or is subject to a confinement order under s. 
973.09(4). 
(emphasis added). 
¶52 There is no question that Thorson was in custody, as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 946.42, as the WRC confined him, and 
therefore he was in "actual custody of an institution."  Id.  
Both parties, and the majority, agree on this point.  Majority 
op., ¶20.  However, the majority points out that Thorson's being 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
5 
 
in actual custody does not end the custody analysis.  Citing 
Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶25, the majority determines that 
Thorson also must be subject to an escape charge for leaving 
that custody.  Majority op., ¶18. 
¶53 In Magnuson, the defendant requested sentence credit 
for the six months that he was subject to home-confinement and 
electronic monitoring as part of his bond conditions.  We agreed 
with the circuit court that Magnuson appropriately was denied 
sentence credit.  Magnuson, 233 Wis. 2d 40, ¶1.  We determined 
that "an offender's status constitutes custody for sentence 
credit purposes when the offender is subject to an escape charge 
for leaving that status."  Id.  The concept of "status" is 
important because it allowed us to expand the definition of 
custody we used in Gilbert so that we could include "other 
custodial and restrictive situations" that are not specifically 
enumerated in the escape statute and that arose after we decided 
Gilbert.11  Id., ¶¶26-31.  Therefore, we concluded that an 
offender is in custody whenever the offender is subject to an 
escape charge under Wis. Stat. § 946.42 or under any "other 
statutory provisions in which the legislature has classified 
certain situations as restrictive and custodial by attaching 
                                                 
11 Among the other "custodial and restrictive situations" we 
named in Magnuson were the community residential confinement 
program (Wis. Stat. § 301.046(1)), the intensive sanctions 
program (Wis. Stat. § 301.048), home detention (Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.425), county work camp (Wis. Stat. § 303.10), the work 
release plan for prison inmates (Wis. Stat. § 303.065), and the 
serious juvenile offender program (Wis. Stat. § 938.538).  State 
v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶¶26-31, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 
536. 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
6 
 
escape 
charges 
for 
an 
unauthorized 
departure 
from 
those 
situations."  Id., ¶26.   
¶54 In my view, we need not use Magnuson to conclude that 
Thorson was in custody for purposes of the sentence credit 
statute because Thorson's custody was of a type specifically 
listed in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).  Thorson's circumstances in 
regard to custody are similar to those in Gilbert, which case 
controls the question before us regarding the definition of "in 
custody" for purposes of sentence credit when the offender is a 
ch. 980 detainee in the actual custody of an institution.  
Therefore, I would apply Gilbert when the offender is in actual 
custody, and Magnuson to circumstances where an offender is not 
in custody of a type listed in § 946.42(1)(a). 
¶55 In Gilbert, the defendants each had been incarcerated 
for short periods of time as part of their probation conditions.  
Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d at 374-75.  We determined for the purposes 
of sentence credit, the common meaning of "custody" was 
applicable to describe the defendants' situation; however, we 
also relied on special materials drafted by the Wisconsin 
Criminal 
Jury 
Instruction 
Committee 
that 
said 
that 
the 
definition of "custody" in the escape statute could be used to 
define "custody" in the sentence credit statute.  Id. at 378-79.  
Further, we concluded that confinement even as a condition of 
probation was still considered "custody."  Id. at 380.  We made 
no mention that the defendant must also be subject to an escape 
charge for leaving custody.  We did not need to do so.  As the 
defendants 
in 
Gilbert 
were 
actually 
confined 
within 
an 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
7 
 
institution, and if they left "without lawful permission or 
authority," they would have been subject to an escape charge.  
Wis. Stat. § 946.42(3).12  Accordingly, I would conclude that 
Gilbert controls the "custody" issue here because Thorson was in 
custody within an institution in two capacities:  as one 
convicted of a crime and also as a ch. 980 detainee. 
¶56 According to our holding in Gilbert, Thorson was in 
custody under Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) and therefore, satisfied 
the "custody" requirement for sentence credit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155.  Furthermore, even though I do not agree that we must 
use 
Magnuson's 
"escape 
requirement" 
to 
analyze 
Thorson's 
situation, were I to apply Magnuson, Thorson would be "in 
custody" because he satisfies that requirement as well. 
¶57 It is true, as the majority asserts, that Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a) 
does 
not 
list 
a 
person 
who 
escapes 
from 
commitment under ch. 980 as being one who is subject to an 
escape charge.  Majority op., ¶28.  However, Thorson was never a 
ch. 980 committee.  This is so because until the ch. 980 process 
is completed, when the court or jury determines that the person 
subject to a ch. 980 petition is a sexually violent person and 
the court actually commits the person to the custody of the 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.42(3) provides in relevant part: 
A person in custody who intentionally escapes 
from custody under any of the following circumstances 
is guilty of a . . . felony: 
(a) Pursuant to a legal arrest for, lawfully 
charged with or convicted of or sentenced for a crime. 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
8 
 
Department of Health and Family Services, that person is not a 
civil committee.  Wis. Stat. § 980.06.   
¶58 Prior to the State's filing a ch. 980 petition, an 
offender's status is as one in custody due to sentencing for a 
crime.  The petition that the State files to attempt to commit 
an offender under ch. 980 is based on the conviction for a 
sexual crime——the very conviction for which the offender is 
serving a sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag).  That Thorson's 
status as an incarcerated felon continued during his detention 
for the ch. 980 proceedings becomes apparent when we notice that 
even after the State failed to prove that he was sexually 
violent, Thorson remained incarcerated.  He was released several 
days after the jury reached its verdict, but only after the 
parole commission authorized the release.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.06(1). 
¶59 The majority views Thorson's status as if he were only 
a committed sexual offender and explains that it fears exposing 
Thorson and those similarly situated to criminal escape charges 
when it believes there is no statutory authority to do so.  See 
majority op., ¶¶27-28.  The basis for exposing violent sexual 
offenders who are detained due to pending ch. 980 petitions to 
escape charges, however, is not the ch. 980 petition, but their 
original criminal convictions.   
¶60 I note that in one effort to show Thorson could not be 
charged with escape, the majority asserts, "the legislature has 
approved administrative rules that allow, as a last resort, the 
use of lethal force to protect the public."  Majority op. ¶26.  
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
9 
 
However, the provision to which I assume the majority refers, 
Wis. Admin. Code § HFS 95.06(1)(c)1.d. (Feb., 2002), authorizes 
the amount of force that can be used to prevent an escape from 
the WRC.  The majority does not address the consequences of a 
successful escape attempt.  That is, if a ch. 980 detainee 
attempts escape from the WRC and succeeds, lethal force 
notwithstanding, the majority cannot argue that the escaped 
detainee would suffer no consequences once he is apprehended.  
Undoubtedly, he would be charged with a criminal offense, which 
I conclude is escape.  Wis. Stat. § 946.42.  Section HFS 
95.06(1)(c)1.d. is no more than a parallel provision to Wis. 
Admin. Code § DOC 306.07(4)(d) (Aug., 2001), which permits the 
use of "deadly force" to prevent an escape of one who is in the 
custody of the Department of Corrections. 
¶61 Accordingly, I would conclude that even under the 
majority's use of Magnuson, Thorson was in custody as he would 
have been subject to an escape charge had he left because he had 
not been released from his original sentence prior to the filing 
of the ch. 980 petition nor during his detention while that 
petition was pending.  Therefore, Thorson satisfies the first 
condition under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 for sentence credit.  
However, in order to receive sentence credit, Thorson's time in 
custody also must be "in connection with the same course of 
conduct" for which sentence was imposed. 
2. 
In connection with 
¶62 "The clear intent of sec. 973.155, Stats., is to grant 
credit for each day in custody regardless of the basis for the 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
10 
 
confinement as long as it is connected to the offense for which 
sentence is imposed."  Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d at 380.13  The 
majority argues that Thorson's time spent at the WRC was not "in 
connection with" his offense because the reason for his 
detention was the filing of the ch. 980 petition, not the 
specific facts of his offense.  Majority op., ¶34.  This 
reasoning fails to acknowledge that the filing of a ch. 980 
petition expressly recognizes that an offender is still serving 
time for a sexual crime.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag) (requiring 
a petition seeking civil commitment against an offender to be 
made within 90 days of an offender's discharge from a sentence 
imposed for the conviction of a sexually violent crime).  
Therefore, the State's ability to file a ch. 980 petition arises 
directly from the same set of facts from which Thorson's 
criminal conviction and incarceration arose.  In holding that 
the only reason an offender is subject to a ch. 980 proceeding 
is because the State filed a petition, the majority's rationale 
inappropriately severs a ch. 980 petition from the original 
                                                 
13 In one instance, this court did provide that a defendant 
who was charged with attempted kidnapping was entitled to 
sentence credit for the time he spent in a state hospital 
pursuant to a court-ordered sex deviate exam under Wis. Stat. 
§ 975.02.  Clark v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 617, 642-44, 286 N.W.2d 
344 (1979).   
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
11 
 
offense.14  See majority op., ¶34.  This severance is contrary to 
the 
explicit 
language 
of 
§ 980.02(2)(ag), 
which 
requires 
connection. 
¶63 The majority also points out that ch. 980 proceedings 
are separate civil matters.  Majority op., ¶34.  See State v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  But why 
this precludes offenders from receiving sentence credit when a 
ch. 980 petition fails is unclear.  Where, as here, the offender 
has met the requirements of the sentence credit statute and the 
petition fails, the State should grant the offender sentence 
credit. 
¶64 Furthermore, the majority fears that granting Thorson 
sentence credit will result in "all Chapter 980 confinement, 
whether it is for detention or for commitment, [to] in effect 
become an offset to the criminal sentence."  Majority op., ¶37.  
Once 
again, 
the 
majority 
demonstrates 
that 
it 
is 
not 
distinguishing between a committed offender and a convicted 
criminal.  See id.  Once a person is committed under ch. 980, 
his or her status as a criminal ends, and that individual's 
                                                 
14 The majority asserts the State's petition was warranted 
because Thorson had committed other predicate offenses, the 
sentences for which had been discharged, which would have 
qualified Thorson for a ch. 980 petition had a petition been 
filed. See majority op., ¶33.  According to the majority, then, 
Thorson's most recent offense was merely another predicate 
offense on which to base the petition and therefore, Thorson's 
detention at the WRC was not sufficiently connected to the 
specific crime for which sentence was imposed.  See majority 
op., ¶¶33, 34.  This logic fails to recognize that the event 
that resulted in Thorson's incarceration was a necessary 
component 
of 
the 
ch. 
980 
petition. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(ag). 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
12 
 
status as a committed sex offender begins.  It is at this point, 
when civil commitment occurs, that sentence credit can no longer 
be offset against the original criminal sentence because the 
offender's confinement is no longer as a criminal, but as a 
committee who is confined for treatment, not punishment.  See 
State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 72, 573 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 
1997).   
¶65 And finally, as a matter of public policy, which 
should always be grounded in fairness, I do not understand the 
State interest that is being served by not crediting the 170 
days to the years remaining on Thorson's sentence.  The State 
had the opportunity to attempt to prove Thorson was sexually 
violent, and in so doing, it precluded the parole board from 
addressing Thorson's case.  Thorson had no say in the matter.  
Fundamental fairness should cause the State to be required to 
grant sentence credit for 170 days that the State caused Thorson 
to be held at WRC.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Thorson 
should have been granted sentence credit for the 170 days he 
spent at the WRC.  I would apply this sentence credit against 
the time remaining on his sentence as a whole.  Because the 
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  02-3380.pdr 
 
1