Title: Deangelo v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES CHRISTOPHER DEANGELO,
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No. 343, 2000
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for New Castle County
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ID No. 9903023368
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: January 23, 2002
Decided: April 22, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 22nd day of April, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears
to the Court that:
1)  James Christopher DeAngelo appeals from his conviction, following a jury
trial, of second degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon during the
commission of a felony (PDWDCF).   He argues that the trial court erred in:
(i) refusing to grant a mistrial based on purported Brady violations; (ii) refusing to
grant a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and (iii) admitting certain
evidence, including evidence of prior bad acts.  In addition, DeAngelo argues that
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his PDWDCF conviction should be dismissed because he was not prosecuted within
five years after the crime was committed.
2)  On October 2, 1990, DeAngelo was renovating his home when his friend,
William Perez, stopped by, apparently to collect a debt.  DeAngelo’s wife, Peggy
Mitchell, and another friend, Bobby Williams, were present when Perez arrived.
DeAngelo invited Perez to follow him up a ladder to the loft.  Moments later,
Mitchell and Williams heard gunshots and Perez fell to the bottom of the ladder.
Perez had a gunshot in his head and was bleeding profusely.  After DeAngelo
removed money from Perez’s pockets, DeAngelo and Williams moved the body to
the bathtub.  
3)  John McGettigan, another friend, arrived shortly after the shooting.
DeAngelo asked to borrow McGettigan’s pickup truck to get some decking
materials.  DeAngelo and Williams placed a bundle wrapped in a blue tarp into the
back of the pickup truck and drove to a farm in West Chester, Pennsylvania.
During the ride, DeAngelo told Williams that his dispute with Perez was over
approximately $800 that DeAngelo owed Perez for drugs. Williams did not see
DeAngelo dispose of the body, but Mitchell testified that DeAngelo told her that he
chopped up the body and burned the remains.
3
4)  Not long after this incident, two witnesses saw DeAngelo give five $100
bills to a friend at a bar.  One of the bills had the number 1000 written on it, and
one of the witnesses testified that, because of the handwritten number, she
recognized the bill as being the same one she had given to Perez a week earlier. 
5)  Perez’s wife reported him missing several days after he disappeared, and
the police began an investigation.  The police questioned DeAngelo, but did not file
any charges against him.  In 1993, a private investigator hired by Perez’s wife
brought a confidential informant in to speak to Detective William Browne.  The
confidential informant told Browne that she and several others had seen Perez
recently.  Browne took down the names of the potential witnesses and tried to
contact  them.  All the witnesses that Browne was able to locate denied having seen
Perez. 
6)  DeAngelo was arrested in March 1999, after the police obtained statements
from Mitchell and Williams about their involvement in disposing of Perez’s body
and cleaning up the crime scene.  Although he was charged with first degree
murder, the jury found him guilty of second degree murder and PDWDCF.  The
trial court sentenced DeAngelo to 15 years incarceration for each crime.
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055,1057 (Del. 1994), citing U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674
(1985).
4
7)  DeAngelo first argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence that it
was required to produce, as a matter of due process, under Brady v. Maryland.1  He
says that his defense was crippled by the State’s failure to produce: (i) reports
generated in 1990, when the police first questioned DeAngelo and searched his
house; and (ii) the name of the confidential informant who claimed to have seen
Perez in 1993.
8)  In considering alleged Brady violations, the trial court goes through a two-
step analysis.  First, the court must decide whether the non-disclosures involve
evidence that is, in fact, favorable to the defendant.  If so, the court must decide
whether the Brady evidence is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.  The
standard for materiality is whether there is a reasonable probability that the
undisclosed evidence would affect the outcome of the trial.2
9)  After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court was
correct in finding that no Brady material was withheld from DeAngelo.  With
respect to DeAngelo’s 1990 interrogation by the police, the record establishes that
there were no notes or other reports in the file at the time of trial.  David Glose, the
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officer who interviewed DeAngelo in 1990, no longer was on the police force.  But
Detective Jubb, who discussed the matter with Glose, explained that DeAngelo had
requested counsel at the time of his 1990 interview and, therefore, never gave a
statement about the Perez disappearance.  With respect to the 1993 Perez
“sightings,” the record establishes that the police never knew the identity of the
confidential informant who claimed to have seen Perez in 1993. The State, therefore,
had no name to disclose to DeAngelo.  
10)  In short, there were no Brady violations because the State did not have
the information that DeAngelo contends the State withheld.  Moreover, there is no
reasonable probability that the alleged Brady evidence would have affected the
outcome of the trial.  DeAngelo wanted to use the purported 1990 police reports to
show that the police lacked evidence connecting DeAngelo to the crime.  But that
was established by the fact that DeAngelo was not arrested until nine years after the
killing.  Thus, the 1990 police reports, if they ever existed, would have added little
to the mix of information available to the jury.    The “sightings” evidence, like-
wise, had limited value since the witnesses identified by the confidential informant
denied having seen Perez in 1993.
3Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 961 (Del. 1992).
6
11)  DeAngelo alternatively argues that the court should have instructed the
jury to infer that the “missing evidence” would have been exculpatory.3  We
disagree.  As mentioned above, the 1990 police reports and the identity of the
confidential informant were not material and, therefore, did not justify a “missing
evidence” instruction.      
12)  DeAngelo next contends that the State’s alleged misconduct warrants a
new trial.  The first alleged instance of misconduct occurred when the State asked
Mitchell  when she last saw DeAngelo.  She answered that she saw him about a year
and a half before trial, in Philadelphia, when he was going to his methadone
program.  DeAngelo belatedly objected to the reference to methadone.  The trial
court found that the State had not intentionally sought to elicit evidence of
DeAngelo’s involvement with drugs and the court offered to give the jury a curative
instruction.  DeAngelo declined the offer.
13)  The second instance of misconduct, according to DeAngelo, arose when
the State improperly attempted to introduce hearsay testimony from a police
detective about whether the FBI had been able to test a piece of wood for the
presence of bleach.  Since Mitchell testified that she used bleach to clean Perez’s
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blood from the floor of DeAngelo’s house, the absence of any report showing bleach
on the wood sample would tend to discredit Mitchell.  The State, therefore, wanted
to establish that the FBI was unable to test the wood for bleach.  The trial court
sustained DeAngelo’s objections to a series of questions  addressed to the detective,
and it admonished the jury to disregard the line of questioning.  The State later
established the same facts it attempted to elicit from the detective by calling the FBI
agent who determined that the wood could not be tested for bleach.       
14)  DeAngelo contends that the State again acted improperly when, during
closing argument, it attempted to discredit DeAngelo’s testimony that the floor in his
house was bare wood in 1990.  The State held up a piece of wood taken from the
floor in 1999 an effort to demonstrate that the floor had been painted.  There was
no evidence, however, as to when it had been painted.  As a result, the State had no
evidentiary basis on which to suggest that DeAngelo was lying when he said the
floor was bare wood in 1990.  DeAngelo started to object to the State’s closing, but
he withdrew the objection for tactical reasons.
15)  Finally, DeAngelo contends that the State acted improperly by recalling
Detective Cunningham several times to bolster the credibility of the State’s
witnesses.  For example, the State asked Cunningham whether Williams had told
4Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 578 (Del. 1981).
5See: Graves v. State, 1994 WL 416533 (Del. Supr.) (It is improper to bolster another
witness’s testimony by vouching for witness’s credibility.)
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him various details about the crime and the crime scene when Cunningham
interviewed Williams.  Cunningham testified that Williams told him all the details
during the interview, although Cunningham’s report of the interview did not con-tain
any of those details.
16)  We find that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to grant
a mistrial for the several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.4  Two of the
instances DeAngelo complains about did not involve any misconduct or prejudice.
The methadone comment was not intentionally elicited and was not particularly
prejudicial because it related to a time eight years after the murder.  The State’s
questioning of Cunningham was not improper, either, because Cunningham did not
opine as to the witnesses’ credibility.  Cunningham merely testified that the
witnesses told him the same details when he interviewed them as they did on the
witness stand.5  
17)  The attempt to solicit hearsay testimony about bleach in the wood,
although inappropriate after the initial objection had been sustained, was not
prejudicial.  The original witness did not answer any of the objectionable questions
6DeAngelo withdrew his objection to the prosecutor’s comment.  Therefore, the comment
would warrant reversal only if it amounted to error “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as
to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.” Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096,
1100 (Del. 1986).
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and the State then called the proper witness to testify on the same subject.  Finally,
the closing comment about the painted floor, if improper, was not particularly
significant and did not rise to the level of plain error.6
18)  DeAngelo also complains that the trial court erred in admitting:
(i) evidence about the marked $100 bills; (ii) evidence about DeAngelo’s uncharged
criminal conduct; and (iii) a letter DeAngelo wrote while incarcerated.  We find no
merit to any of these claims.
19)  The link between Perez, DeAngelo, and the $100 bills was established
by  Cheryl Kearns, a cook at a bar down the street from DeAngelo’s house.  Kearns
testified that about two days before Perez disappeared, she and her fiancé paid Perez
for cocaine with five $100 bills.  One of those bills had the number 1000 written
across the corner.  A few days after Perez disappeared, Kearns again saw those bills
when the main cook, whose nickname was “Mom,” showed Kearns the money and
explained that DeAngelo had given it to her to hold in case he needed bail money.
By the time of trial, Mom had died and the money had disappeared.  But the bar
7 Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326 (1980).
8Getz. v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
9Id. at 734, quoting Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. 1974).
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owner testified that he was present when DeAngelo came in and gave Mom the
money. 
20)  DeAngelo argues that it was an abuse of discretion to allow testimony
about the $100 bills because the bills are missing and two critical witnesses, Mom
and Kearns’ fiancé, are dead.  At the time of the original police investigation, it was
Kearns’ fiancé who identified the bills as being the same ones they had given Perez.
DeAngelo argues that is “too convenient” that the currently available witnesses now
remember the necessary details about the markings on the money and DeAngelo’s
comments.  We find no abuse of discretion.  In essence, DeAngelo is complaining
about the witnesses’ lack of credibility, but that was for the jury to decide7. The
testimony was properly admitted.
21)  DeAngelo next argues that the evidence of his drug debt to Perez and his
theft of Perez’s money after the shooting should have been excluded under Getz8
because it was not “plain, clear and conclusive.”9 The drug debt was established by
Mitchell’s account of Perez coming to DeAngelo’s house twice, looking for his
10Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 865 (1986).
11
money; and the theft was established by Williams’ eyewitness account of DeAngelo
taking money from Perez’s body.  
22)  It is settled law that an eyewitness’s testimony constitutes clear and
convincing evidence for purposes of the Getz analysis.10  Mitchell’s testimony about
the drug debt, however, was not entirely based on events she witnessed.  She heard
Perez demand money that DeAngelo owed him, but Mitchell never saw Perez give
DeAngelo the cocaine that gave rise to the debt.  Thus, Mitchell’s testimony about
the drug transaction may not have met the Getz standard.  We need not decide this
issue, however, since Williams testified that DeAngelo admitted killing Perez over
a drug debt and DeAngelo testified that he was a cocaine dealer.  Thus, the jury
learned about DeAngelo’s drug dealing from other sources and the admission of
Mitchell’s testimony, if erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23)  DeAngelo next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress a document that was available to DeAngelo through discovery and was
admitted at trial without objection.  During the second week of trial, after the
document had been admitted, DeAngelo told his counsel that the document was
obtained by the police when he was moved from a prison cell in Pennsylvania to
11576 A.2d 1322 (Del. 1990).
12 Id. at 1328.
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Delaware.  DeAngelo moved to suppress the document because the police did not
have a search warrant when they copied it and the other documents in DeAngelo’s
cell.
24)  DeAngelo never explains what was in the document; whether the jury
ever saw the document; whether the trial court ever ruled on its admissibility; or
how the document impacted his case.  Accordingly, we have no basis on which to
consider his claim and we reject it summarily.
25)  Finally, we consider an argument raised after briefing had been
completed on appeal.  DeAngelo belatedly brought our attention to the fact that he
was prosecuted and convicted of PDWDCF more than five years after the crime was
committed.  The State agrees, as it must, that DeAngelo’s prosecution was time
barred pursuant to 11 Del.C.§ 205(b)(1).  The only issue is whether this case should
be remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing.  In White v. State,11 this Court
held that, “[a]fter a related sentence has been vacated on appeal, a trial judge may
resentence a defendant up to the combined duration of the original sentences without
violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.”12  We conclude that
White controls the result here, even though DeAngelo has attacked the conviction
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itself and not just the sentence that was imposed.  DeAngelo’s “related sentence” is
being vacated on appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED with respect to the conviction of second degree murder and
REVERSED with respect to the conviction of possession of a deadly weapon during
the commission of a felony.  This matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for
resentencing on the murder conviction.
BY THE COURT:
Carolyn Berger
Justice