Title: State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 2000-Ohio-142.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CALVARY v. CITY OF UPPER ARLINGTON ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 229.] 
Public records — Mandamus sought to compel city of Upper Arlington to provide 
relator access to a draft collective bargaining agreement being considered 
by city council — Requested draft agreement provided to relator — 
Exception to general mootness rule not established by relator — Attorney 
fees awarded to relator. 
(No. 99-2240 — Submitted April 25, 2000 — Decided June 28, 2000.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
 
In 1999, the solid waste, street, and utility employees of respondent city of 
Upper Arlington, Ohio, exercised their right to organize under Ohio’s Public 
Employees Collective Bargaining Act and elected Teamsters Local 284 as their 
exclusive representative.  Following extensive negotiations between the city and 
the union on a collective bargaining agreement, the union went on strike on 
December 1, 1999.  On December 3, the city and union reached a tentative verbal 
agreement, and as part of the agreement, the striking solid waste, street, and utility 
employees returned to work on December 6. 
 
On December 10, the city attorney’s office prepared a written draft of the 
tentative verbal agreement that city officials thought it had reached with the union 
and delivered copies of the written draft to respondent Upper Arlington City 
Council.  On that same date, the union notified the city that unresolved issues 
remained.  At the December 13 city council meeting, Ordinance No. 221-99, which 
would have authorized and directed respondent Upper Arlington City Manager 
Richard A. King to enter into the collective bargaining agreement with the union, 
was on the agenda, as well as a motion to suspend the three-reading city council 
 
 
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rule.1  The city council did not vote on Ordinance No. 221-99 at the December 13 
meeting, instead giving the ordinance a first reading. 
 
From December 13 through December 17, 1999, the city refused numerous 
requests by relator, Eleanor H. Calvary, a resident elector and taxpayer of Upper 
Arlington, for access to the December 10 draft collective bargaining agreement 
being considered by the city council.  City Manager King directed that the 
December 10 document not be released because it appeared that the city and the 
union were still negotiating the terms of the agreement. 
 
On December 20, 1999, Calvary filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to 
(1) compel respondents, Upper Arlington and its city council, city manager, and 
clerk of council, to produce the December 10 written draft agreement that was 
being considered by the city council, and (2) bar the city council from proceeding 
to consider approval of any ordinance authorizing a collective bargaining 
agreement between the city and the union.  Calvary also requested expedited 
consideration and an award of attorney fees and costs.  On December 21, the court 
granted an alternative writ on Calvary’s public records mandamus claim and 
denied her request for injunctive relief.  87 Ohio St.3d 1473, 721 N.E.2d 119.  On 
the same date that we granted an alternative writ, the city council held another 
meeting at which the ordinance was given a second reading. 
 
On December 29, the union gave its written version of the collective 
bargaining agreement to Upper Arlington officials, and the city released the two 
different versions—the city’s December 10 draft and the union’s December 29 
draft—to the public and invited public comment before council voted on 
Ordinance No. 221-99 at a December 29 meeting.  The city council rejected 
Ordinance No. 221-99, i.e., it approved neither draft version of the written 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
 
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This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
Common Cause of Ohio filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Calvary. 
__________________ 
 
James C. Becker, for relator. 
 
Sharon H. Pfancuff, Upper Arlington City Attorney, for respondents. 
 
Daniel S. Knisley, urging granting the writ for amicus curiae, Common 
Cause of Ohio. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Mandamus 
 
Calvary requests a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to provide her 
with access to the December 10 collective bargaining agreement drafted by Upper 
Arlington and considered by the Upper Arlington City Council at three different 
meetings.  Calvary received access to the records on December 29, the date the city 
released a copy of its December 10 draft, as well as the union’s December 29 draft, 
to the public before council voted on Ordinance No. 221-99. 
 
Under the general rule, the provision of requested records to a relator in a 
public records mandamus action renders the mandamus claim moot.  State ex rel. 
Wadd v. Cleveland (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 52, 689 N.E.2d 25, 27; State ex rel. 
Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 392, 715 N.E.2d 179, 
185; State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 700 N.E.2d 12, 
15. 
 
Calvary contends that respondents’ provision of the requested draft 
agreement does not moot her mandamus claim because the issues she raises are 
capable of repetition, yet evading review.  This exception applies only in 
exceptional circumstances in which the following two factors are both present:  (1) 
the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its 
 
 
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cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.  Spencer v. Kemna 
(1998), 523 U.S. 1, 17-18, 118 S.Ct. 978, 988, 140 L.Ed.2d 43, 56; see, also, State 
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Donaldson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 173, 
175, 586 N.E.2d 101, 102-103; State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaul (1999), 131 
Ohio App.3d 419, 437, 722 N.E.2d 616, 629. 
 
Calvary has not established that this exception to the general mootness rule 
applies to her mandamus claim.  Calvary has not shown that the time between 
submission of a tentative collective bargaining agreement to a municipal legislative 
authority and that authority’s decision on the agreement is always so short as to 
evade review, nor has she demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that she will be 
unable to obtain subsequent agreements to be voted on by the Upper Arlington 
City Council.  It seems unlikely that a written agreement would be submitted in the 
future to the city council that is subsequently disputed by the other party to the 
agreement. 
 
Moreover, applying the general mootness rule to Calvary’s mandamus claim 
here will not make the issues raised by Calvary evade our review.  As in State ex 
rel. Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Shirey (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 402, 678 
N.E.2d 557, 560, we can address the issues raised by Calvary in the context of her 
request for attorney fees.  And despite her claims to the contrary, she presented no 
evidence to support her assertion that respondents gave the public access to the 
draft agreement only five minutes before the city council’s final vote at its 
December 29, 1999 meeting. 
 
Therefore, because no exception to the general rule applies, we deny 
Calvary’s mandamus claim based on mootness. 
 
 
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Request for Attorney Fees 
 
Calvary requests attorney fees.  “A court may award attorney fees pursuant 
to R.C. 149.43 where (1) a person makes a proper request for public records 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43, (2) the custodian of the public records fails to comply 
with the person’s request, (3) the requesting person files a mandamus action 
pursuant to R.C. 149.43 to obtain copies of the records, and (4) the person receives 
the requested public records only after the mandamus action is filed, thereby 
rendering the claim for a writ of mandamus moot.”  State ex rel. Pennington v. 
Gundler (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 171, 661 N.E.2d 1049, syllabus. 
 
It is uncontroverted that Calvary met the second, third, and fourth 
requirements specified in Pennington.  Respondents refused Calvary’s requests for 
access to the December 10 draft agreement; she filed a mandamus action to compel 
the requested access; and she received a copy of the requested record only after she 
had filed her mandamus action, and that access mooted her mandamus claim.  At 
issue is the remaining Pennington requirement concerning the propriety of 
Calvary’s request. 
 
Respondents contend that because the December 10 draft agreement was not 
in final form and R.C. 4117.11(A)(1), (5), and (8), and 4117.21 exempted the draft 
agreement from public disclosure, Calvary’s public records request was improper.  
Respondents’ contention is meritless. 
 
Even if a record is not in final form, it may still constitute a “record” for 
purposes of R.C. 149.43 if it documents the organization, policies, functions, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of a public office.  Wadd, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 53, 689 N.E.2d at 28 (access to preliminary, unnumbered accident 
reports not yet processed by Cleveland into final form); State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Post v. Schweikert (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 527 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (access 
to preliminary work product that had not reached its final stage or official 
 
 
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destination); State ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Social Serv. Union, SEIU, 
AFL-CIO v. Gulyassy (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 729, 734, 669 N.E.2d 487, 490-
491 (access to drafts of proposed changes to collective bargaining statutes prepared 
by state agency); R.C. 149.011(G).  The December 10 draft agreement is a record 
for purposes of R.C. 149.43 because it documents the activities of respondents 
Upper Arlington and its officials, i.e., it represents the city’s version of what it and 
the union agreed on during collective bargaining, and the city relied on that version 
in submitting the draft to the city council for approval.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Elida Community Fire Co. (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 578, 581, 697 N.E.2d 210, 213; R.C. 149.011(G). 
 
None of the statutes cited by respondents exempts the draft agreement from 
disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  R.C. 4117.11(A)(1), (5), and (8) merely set forth 
various public employer unfair labor practices and do not exempt any records from 
disclosure as public records. 
 
R.C. 4117.21 provides that “[c]ollective bargaining meetings between public 
employers and employee organizations are private, and are not subject to section 
121.22 [open meetings provisions] of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis added.)  In 
construing R.C. 4117.21, we first look at the statutory language, reading words 
used in context and applying rules of grammar and common usage.  See State ex 
rel. Antonucci v. Youngstown City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 
564, 566, 722 N.E.2d 69, 70-71.  A “meeting” is defined as “[a]n assembly of 
persons, esp[ecially] to discuss and act on matters in which they have a common 
interest.”  Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 997. 
 
The manifest language of R.C. 4117.21 exempts only collective bargaining 
meetings from public disclosure.  R.C. 4117.21 authorizes the closure of collective 
bargaining meetings between public employers and employee organizations and 
precludes the disclosure of minutes of those meetings under R.C. 149.43.  State ex 
 
 
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rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 
134, 139, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1226.  But collective bargaining agreements, tentative 
or otherwise, resulting from the negotiations are not shielded from disclosure.  Id.; 
see, also, In re South Euclid-Lyndhurst City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Apr. 21, 
1992), SERB No. 92-005, at 3-15 (“As valuable as [the R.C. 4117.21 provision of] 
privacy is, however, it applies only to the meetings themselves.  This is clear from 
both the words of the statute and its intent.”).  None of the cases cited by 
respondents requires a different result.  See, e.g., Springfield Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School  Emp., Local 530 (1995), 106 Ohio 
App.3d 855, 869, 667 N.E.2d 458, 467. 
 
Therefore, Calvary met the remaining Pennington requirement as well—she 
made a proper request for public records to which she was entitled.  This 
conclusion is consistent with our duty in public records cases to strictly construe 
exemptions from disclosure under R.C. 149.43 and to resolve any doubts in favor 
of disclosure of public records.  State ex rel. Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Assn. v. 
Cleveland (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 310, 312, 703 N.E.2d 796, 797. 
 
Further, under our unanimous holding in Findlay Publishing Co., 80 Ohio 
St.3d at 139, 684 N.E.2d at 1226, we exercise our discretion by awarding Calvary 
attorney fees because she “has established a sufficient public benefit, and 
[respondents] failed to comply with [her] records request for reasons that were 
unreasonable and unjustifiable.”  Id.; State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Hancock 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 34, 37, 693 N.E.2d 787, 788-789.  The 
public benefits when it receives sufficient notice of the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement that is being submitted for a vote of a municipal legislative 
authority in order to provide constructive input to that authority concerning the 
agreement.  And contrary to respondents’ claims, they had no reasonable basis for 
believing that complying with Calvary’s requests might result in unfair labor 
 
 
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practice charges against them.  Cf. Mentor Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 465, 470-471, 602 
N.E.2d 374, 378, and Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (Aug. 15, 1991), Montgomery App. No. 12517, unreported, 1991 
WL 355161, which both involve public employers’ direct communications with 
bargaining unit employees on negotiations with the employees’ exclusive 
representatives and are consequently distinguishable from this case. 
 
Therefore, we award attorney fees to Calvary and order her counsel to 
submit a bill and documentation in support of the request for attorney fees, in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth in DR 2-106(B). 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., separately concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
Section 4, Article IV of the Upper Arlington Rules of Council 
specifies that “[e]xcept as provided in subsections 5 and 6, any ordinance or 
resolution of a general or permanent nature, or granting a franchise, or creating a 
right or involving the expenditure of money, or levying of a tax, or the purchase, 
lease, sale or transfer of property shall not be passed or adopted, unless it has been 
fully and distinctly read by title only on three different days, and with respect to 
any such ordinance or resolution, there shall be no authority to suspend this rule, 
except by an affirmative vote of six members of City Council, on each ordinance or 
resolution and entered in the journal.”  (Emphasis added.) 
__________________ 
 
 
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COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with Justice 
Lundberg Stratton’s conclusion that an award of attorney fees is not warranted in 
this case. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
agree with the majority that Calvary’s mandamus action should be denied because 
it is moot.  However, contrary to the majority’s holding, I would deny Calvary her 
attorney fees. 
 
An “award of attorney fees under R.C. 149.43 is not mandatory.”  State ex 
rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. Sys. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 108, 529 N.E.2d 443, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  An award of attorney fees is justified only if there 
is a sufficient public benefit to having access to the requested document and the 
respondent failed to comply with the relator’s request for reasons that were 
“unreasonable and unjustifiable.”  State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 134, 139, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1226.  In 
addressing the reasonableness of Calvary’s request, the majority concludes that 
even though the request was for the written draft of the collective bargaining 
agreement to which “unresolved issues remained,” the request was proper and 
therefore Upper Arlington must pay Calvary’s attorney fees.  The majority 
supports its determination that the request for the draft of the collective bargaining 
agreement was proper on three bases. 
 
The first basis is that the draft of a public record is still a public record for 
purposes of disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43.  Except for State ex rel. Dist. 1199, 
Health Care & Social Serv. Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Gulyassy (1995), 107 Ohio 
App.3d 729, 734, 669 N.E.2d 487, 490-491, which holds that a draft of a collective 
bargaining agreement is a public record, I do not necessarily disagree with the 
cases cited by the majority in support of the proposition that a draft of a public 
 
 
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record is subject to public disclosure.  However, for reasons I will set out below, I 
believe that a draft of a collective bargaining agreement is distinguishable from 
other draft documents retained by a public office. 
 
The majority’s second basis is that a document that memorializes a public 
office’s official duties is a public record for purpose of disclosure under R.C. 
149.43.  I do not necessarily disagree with this general premise.  Again, however, I 
believe that a draft of a collective bargaining agreement is distinguishable. 
 
The third basis, and primary focus of the majority’s analysis, is upon the 
interpretation of R.C. 4117.21.  The majority holds that R.C. 4117.21 exempts only 
collective bargaining meetings and the minutes of the meetings from public 
disclosure.  Citing Findlay Publishing, 80 Ohio St.3d at 139, 684 N.E.2d at 1226, 
the majority goes on to state that  “collective bargaining agreements, tentative or 
otherwise, resulting from the negotiations are not shielded from disclosure.”  
(Emphasis added in part.) In fact, Findlay Publishing does not declare that a 
tentative collective bargaining agreement is a public record.  Rather, Findlay 
Publishing cites Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Assn. of Pub. 
School Emp., Local 530 (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 855, 667 N.E.2d 458, and states 
that “Springfield Local did not hold that the collective bargaining agreements 
resulting from the negotiations are not subject to disclosure.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Id., 80 Ohio St.3d at 139, 684 N.E.2d at 1226.  In other words, Findlay Publishing 
could be cited for the proposition that a “final” collective bargaining agreement is a 
public record, a conclusion I do not dispute. 
 
I believe that it is the General Assembly’s intent, reflected in R.C. 4117.21, 
to distinguish a draft of a collective bargaining agreement from other public 
records because it makes the meetings in which collective bargaining agreements 
are negotiated private.  Paramount in construing statutes is legislative intent.  State 
ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 340, 673 
 
 
11
N.E.2d 1351, 1353.  It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes 
pertaining to the same general subject matter should be read in pari materia.  
Hughes v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 305, 308, 681 
N.E.2d 430, 433.  In interpreting statutes in pari materia, both statutes should be 
harmonized and given meaning.  See, e.g., Mayfield Hts. Fire Fighters Assn., 
Local 1500 v. DeJohn (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 358, 622 N.E.2d 380. 
 
Both R.C. 4117.21 and 149.43 address the general subject of public access 
to the “business” of a public office.  R.C. 149.43 provides the general rule that 
records kept by public offices are subject to public inspection.  However, the 
Public Records Act recognizes that there may be state law exceptions to disclosure 
of certain public records.  See R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(q).  R.C. 4117.21 expressly 
makes collective bargaining meetings between a public employer and the 
employees’ representative private.  And as the majority correctly recognizes, R.C. 
4117.21 also exempts the minutes of these meetings from public disclosure.  See 
Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., supra. 
 
In promulgating R.C. 4117.21, the General Assembly intended that 
negotiations between a public employer and the employees’ representative 
regarding a collective bargaining agreement should be private.  Springfield Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 106 Ohio App.3d at 869, 667 N.E.2d at 467-468.  The 
exemption from public disclosure benefits both the employees, as well as the 
employer, by enabling candid negotiations.  To interpret R.C. 4117.21, as the 
majority does, making the meetings and minutes from these meetings private but 
allowing public disclosure of a draft agreement of the collective bargaining 
agreement crafted at the meeting defeats the purpose of R.C. 4117.21.  To allow 
disclosure of a draft of a collective bargaining agreement would permit public 
access to, in effect, unfinished negotiations.  This conflicts with the purpose of 
R.C. 4117.21, which keeps negotiations of a collective bargaining agreement 
 
 
12
private.  “This court avoids adopting a construction of a statute that would ‘result 
in circumventing the evident purpose of the enactment.’ “  State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Post v. Cincinnati (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 543, 668 N.E.2d 903, quoting 
Daiquiri Club, Inc. v. Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 52, 55, 50 O.O. 26, 28, 110 
N.E.2d 705, 707. 
 
Therefore, reading R.C. 4117.21 in pari materia with R.C. 149.43, I would 
find that R.C. 4117.21 should exempt not only meetings and minutes from those 
meetings that address collective bargaining but also any drafts of collective 
bargaining agreements that result from these meetings from public access, as long 
as the draft does not yet represent the final agreement. 
 
Because I believe a draft of a collective bargaining agreement should be 
exempt from disclosure, I would find that Upper Arlington’s refusal to provide 
Calvary with the draft collective bargaining agreement was reasonable.  At the 
very least, Upper Arlington had a good-faith reason for its refusal to release the 
draft when requested, fearing an unfair labor practice allegation if it prematurely 
disclosed the collective bargaining agreement.  Thus, I believe that Calvary should 
not be awarded attorney fees. 
 
Accordingly, I concur that Calvary’s complaint seeking a writ of mandamus 
should be dismissed as moot, but I would deny Calvary attorney fees.