Title: Abrahamson v. Wilson

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

284 P.2d 662 (1955) J. F. ABRAHAMSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. Woodrow WILSON and E. Louise Wilson, Defendants in Error. No. 17346. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. May 31, 1955. Rehearing Denied June 27, 1955. *663 R. T. Thomas, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff in error. Foard, Foard & McCarty, Colorado Springs, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. We will herein refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiff in error was plaintiff and defendants in error were defendants. In the complaint filed by plaintiff he sought a decree of specific performance upon an option granted to him by defendants for the purchase of real estate in El Paso county, Colorado. The case was tried to the court; judgment was entered in favor of defendants; and plaintiff, seeking reversal of the judgment, brings the case to our Court for review by writ of error. The pertinent facts giving rise to the controversy are as follows: April 11, 1953, defendants executed an instrument which contained the following: Plaintiff undertook to secure a rezoning of the premises and the Board of County Commissioners, on May 4, 1953, adopted a resolution, the purpose of which was to rezone the property in question. The minutes of this meeting of the Board were not transcribed until May 6, 1953, and were not filed for record until May 21, 1953. May 26, plaintiff called defendant Woodrow Wilson on the phone, at which time he was informed by Wilson that the option had expired and that he no longer intended to be bound by the provisions thereof. On the following day, May 27, plaintiff made a tender of $6,500 in cash, and made formal demand for performance on the part of defendants. The tender was refused. If we *664 accept May 4, 1953, as the date on which the rezoning of the property was consummated, more than twenty days had elapsed before the tender of the cash and demand for the deed. Counsel for plaintiff contends that, under the circumstances disclosed by the record, he was not required to offer the cash and demand the deed within that period of time. It is clear from the record in this case that after the property was rezoned through the efforts of plaintiff, defendants were looking for some means by which any rights under the option might be deemed terminated. The testimony on behalf of defendants on the question as to whether plaintiff sought delivery of an abstract for examination is most evasive. Grave doubt exists whether any real issue was taken with the testimony of plaintiff and another witness that demand for an abstract was made upon defendants within the twentyday period of time. It is clear that no abstract was offered by defendants, although it is admitted by them that conversations were had with reference thereto, in which they stated the abstract was at a bank in Colorado Springs and that they preferred to go down "on Saturday" and get it. Counsel for plaintiff argues, in seeking reversal of the judgment, that under the fourth paragraph of the option, the following interpretation should be given: With reference to the third above-quoted interpretation for which plaintiff's counsel contends, we quote the following pertinent testimony of defendant Woodrow Wilson, who admittedly acted with full authority from his codefendant: * * * * * * * * * * * * *665 "Q. Are you saying yes? The reporter can't put it down unless you speak up. A. Yeah, I know. I understand that. Ask that question again. Although other matters are argued at some length in the briefs, the above is sufficient to present the issue which we believe controls the determination to be made of this case. "Upon the undisputed testimony in this case, must we hold that plaintiff had given timely "notice of intention to exercise this option," and that under the express terms of the option defendants were obliged to tender an abstract of title and warranty deed and permit a reasonable time to elapse thereafter for title examination before attempting to cut off plaintiff's rights under the option?" The question is answered in the affirmative. It will be noted that the instrument which defendants signed does not define the particular acts to be performed to constitute an exercise of the option to buy. It does provide that $6,500 of the purchase price is to be paid "when the option is exercised." It also provides that an abstract of title is to be tendered by defendants on demand of plaintiff after the property has been rezoned, and an abstract and deed must be tendered by defendants whether or not a demand is made therefor, in the event that the "buyer gives notice of intention to exercise this option." It would be unreasonable for our Court to construe this instrument to mean that the purchaser should pay the sum of $6,500 to the sellers before an opportunity had been afforded to examine the abstract of title to the property involved. We think that the evidence in this case, without dispute, establishes that plaintiff gave notice of intention to exercise the option prior to the date on which the zoning resolution was adopted by the Board of County Commissioners, and that defendants could not thereafter terminate the option without tendering an abstract of title and warranty deed to the premises, and permitting a reasonable time to elapse thereafter for examination of the title. This conclusion disposes of the entire controversy and necessitates reversal of the judgment of the trial court. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in compliance with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint.