Title: FLOYD v. TACO MAYO

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

FLOYD v. TACO MAYO  FLOYD v. TACO MAYO 2002 OK 58 58 P.3d 197 Case Number: 96723 Decided: 06/25/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA LINLEY LYNAE FLOYD, Petitioner v. TACO MAYO/ACCORD HUMAN RESOURCES, CREDIT GENERAL GUARANTY FUND, and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT , Respondents CERTIORARI TO THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION NO. 2 ¶0 The Court of Civil Appeals, Division 2, reversed an order of the Workers' Compensation Court that had denied benefits to Petitioner, Linley Lynae Floyd, which the trial court had entered based on its finding that when she was injured Floyd had concluded her employment duties and was engaged in personal activities not related to her employment responsibilities. In reversing, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that Floyd was entitled to benefits because she was injured within the period of her employment while fulfilling a duty of employment or something incidental thereto. We granted certiorari on April 8, 2002. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED, ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT AFFIRMED. Michael E. Utter, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner H.A. Carter III, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents OPINION Watt, Vice Chief Justice FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶1 Respondent, Accord Human Resources, owns and operates a Taco Mayo restaurant in Tecumseh, Oklahoma. The restaurant is managed by Pat McConnell, who co-owns it with his father, Phil McConnell. Petitioner, Linley Lynae Floyd, is Pat McConnell's sister and Phil McConnell's daughter. Floyd worked part time for the McConnells in their restaurant and the McConnells allowed Floyd to eat free meals there at any time. The McConnells also provided meals for their other employees at half price, provided the meals were eaten within thirty minutes before their shifts began or thirty minutes after they ended. ¶2 Floyd had a full time day job in an insurance business but also worked at the Taco Mayo as a part time employee. Although she was not scheduled to work on the day she was injured, Floyd went to the restaurant to eat at about 6:00 p.m. that day, May 6, 1999. When she arrived, her brother asked her if she could work because they were busy. Floyd agreed and worked from 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., at which time she [58 P.3d 197] signed out on a time sheet form used by the restaurant to account for its employees' time. ¶3 Floyd testified that she was free to leave the restaurant after her shift but that she chose to stay and eat. As she was completing her meal at about 9:15 or 9:20 p.m., Floyd went to the self-serve drink machine to refill her drink. She slipped on a wet place on the floor, fell and injured her left knee. The dining room was closed at 9:00 p.m. and there were apparently no customers there when Floyd fell. Sometime after 9:00 p.m. another restaurant employee had apparently removed a mat from in front of the drink machine while cleaning the restaurant's floor. ¶4 After Floyd fell, her brother called an ambulance and she was taken to a Shawnee hospital for treatment. Floyd was treated and released, returned to work within a few days, and later took a full time job at the restaurant. Floyd did not initially file a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court. Instead, she filed a common law negligence claim against the restaurant under its liability policy. Floyd was paid $1,000.00 in medical pay by the restaurant's insurance carrier as a result of her claim. On October 2, 1999, while she was working for the restaurant on a full time basis, Floyd had another accident and re-injured her left knee, which injury was followed by arthroscopic surgery on October 25, 1999. Floyd filed a Form 3, Employee's First Notice of Accidental Injury and Claim for Compensation, for the injury at issue here on January 24, 2001 and filed another Form 3, apparently at or near the same time, for the later October 2, 1999 injury. ¶5 Respondents claim and Floyd does not deny that Floyd's knee surgery was paid for by compensation benefits flowing from her claim for compensation from her second knee injury of October 2. Floyd resigned from her job in her family's restaurant sometime after her October 2 injury and before she filed her claims for compensation under circumstances that her brother described as having generated "ill will or problems." ¶6 In its order the Workers' Compensation Court found: 1. THAT at the time of the incident causing injury to the claimant's LEFT LEG (KNEE), she was "clocked out" and was performing personal activities (eating) which were not related to her work duties. 2. THAT the claimant failed to establish that she sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment to her LEFT LEG (KNEE) on or about May 6, 1999. Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court denied Floyd's claim for compensation. ISSUE ¶7 Does the record support the trial court's finding that Floyd was engaged in a personal task when she was injured and that her injury was, therefore, not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act? We hold that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Floyd's activity, eating, at the time of her injury was "purely personal," under DISCUSSION ¶8 Floyd relies on our opinion in Turner v. B Sew Inn, ¶9 In Turner we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act requires that in order to [58 P.3d 198] be compensable an injury must be one "arising out of and in the course of employment." ¶10 In Fox v. National Carrier, ¶11 We considered the legislative change to the Workers' Compensation Act in American Management Systems v. Burns, ¶12 We again examined the issue of what conduct is "purely personal" in Corbett v. Express Personnel, ¶13 Given the legislative changes that followed Fox and our responses to them the record support for the trial court's factual finding that Floyd's activity when she was injured was personal makes its conclusion that her injury was not compensable "impervious to vacation." Corbett at ¶11; Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, ¶14 Floyd seeks to distinguish this case from Burns, Corbett, and Parks and place it within the ambit of Turner by arguing that her injury was work related because it occurred within the thirty minute period after her shift ended during which the restaurant furnished discounted meals to its employees. We find no analogy to Turner here, however. In Turner the plaintiff's employer required her to be in the shop and ready to greet customers when the doors opened. Thus, she had to be in the parking lot at a time earlier than the shop was scheduled to open in order to fulfil the requirements of her job. Here, however, the record reveals that Floyd was free to leave her employer's premises immediately after her shift ended and remained there only to eat the meal available to her should she decide to eat it. By staying in the restaurant in order to eat a free meal, Floyd was in no way carrying out a requirement of her job. ¶15 We reject the notion that the fringe benefit provided by Floyd's employer, a free meal, converted her personal decision to stay and eat that free meal into a duty of her employment or an incident to it, which would subject her employer to liability. We hold, therefore, that the trial court's order finding that at the time Floyd was injured she "was performing personal activities (eating) which [58 P.3d 199] werenot related to her work duties" is supported by the record and its conclusion that her injury was not compensable is supported by the law. ¶16 Finally, we note that the trial court's finding of fact that Floyd was performing a purely personal activity when she was injured is supported by competent evidence. Thus, that finding is "conclusive and binding" on this Court and not subject to reversal. Corbett at ¶11, Parks at ¶12. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's order denying Floyd's claim. [ 58 P.3d 200 ] CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED, ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT AFFIRMED. ¶17 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, OPALA, KAUGER, BOUDREAU, and WINCHESTER, JJ. - concur.