Title: State ex rel. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 149, 2004-
Ohio-2114.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC., APPELLEE, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO; KINSLER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 102 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 2004-Ohio-2114.] 
Workers’ compensation — Wage-loss compensation — Calculation of average 
weekly wage — Seasonal unemployment — Court of appeals’ decision 
returning cause to Industrial Commission for further explanation 
pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., affirmed. 
(No. 2003-1242 — Submitted March 15, 2004 — Decided May 12, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-989, 2003-
Ohio-2883. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant-claimant, Edward Kinsler, was industrially injured on 
December 16, 1997, while employed by appellee, Baker Concrete Construction, 
Inc.  When the time came to set claimant’s average weekly wage (“AWW”), 
controversy arose over how to handle the 16 weeks of unemployment that 
followed Baker’s yearly seasonal slowdown and accompanying layoffs.  The 
claimant sought to have both the amount of unemployment compensation and the 
16 weeks of unemployment excluded from the calculation.  Baker urged their 
inclusion. 
{¶2} 
An Industrial Commission district hearing officer ruled in Baker’s 
favor: 
{¶3} 
“The District Hearing Officer finds that special circumstances exist 
in this claim which warrant the inclusion of both the Claimant’s actual earnings 
and unemployment in the Average Weekly Wage calculation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶4} 
“Specifically, the Claimant is employed as a union construction 
worker.  As such, the Claimant expects to work 8 months out of a year and he 
expects to receive unemployment compensation for 4 months out of a calendar 
year.  The Claimant testified that this pattern repeats itself every year.  The 
Claimant works when the weather permits and goes on unemployment during the 
winter months. 
{¶5} 
“Accordingly, the District Hearing Officer finds that the best way 
to calculate the Claimant’s Average Weekly Wage for the year prior to injury is to 
include both the Claimant’s actual earnings and unemployment compensation and 
divide the total by 52 weeks. 
{¶6} 
“The Claimant argues that the weeks during which the Claimant 
received unemployment compensation should be excluded from the Average 
Weekly Wage calculation for the reason that the Claimant was unemployed for 
reasons beyond his control for these weeks. 
{¶7} 
“The District Hearing Officer rejects this argument because these 
weeks of unemployment were not beyond the Claimant’s control.  Specifically, 
the Claimant planned to go on unemployment for the winter months and has done 
so every year.” 
{¶8} 
A staff hearing officer reversed on appeal: 
{¶9} 
“The average weekly wage is set at $673.04 ($24,319.58 divided 
by 36), based on figures supplied by counsel for the claimant.  This calculation 
excluded 16 weeks, and the unemployment compensation paid for those weeks, 
due to circumstances beyond the claimant’s control and the nature of the 
construction business.  This calculation is found to provide ‘substantial justice’.” 
{¶10} Further appeal was denied. 
{¶11} Baker petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a 
writ of mandamus. Rather than a full writ, the court of appeals issued a limited 
one that returned the cause to the commission.  Adopting the report of its 
January Term, 2004 
3 
magistrate, the court found that the staff hearing officer’s order failed both to 
adequately explain its reasoning and identify the evidence on which it relied. 
{¶12} This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶13} AWW is typically set by dividing the claimant’s total earnings for 
the year preceding injury by 52.  R.C. 4123.61.  Periods of unemployment 
attributable to “sickness, industrial depression, strike, lockout, or other cause 
beyond the employee’s control,” however, must be omitted from the computation.  
Id. 
{¶14} At issue is the excludability of claimant’s 16 weeks of seasonal 
unemployment.  Claimant maintains that unemployment was beyond his control 
as demonstrated by his receipt of Ohio Bureau of Employment Services 
(“OBES”) benefits.1  Baker counters that the annual, as opposed to one-time, 
occurrence of claimant’s seasonal layoff removes it from the realm of unforeseen 
and hence involuntary unemployment. 
{¶15} To date, foreseeability of job loss has not rendered seasonal 
unemployment voluntary.  In State ex rel. The Andersons v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 539, 597 N.E.2d 143, the claimant knew up front that his job would 
only last six to eight months.  The employer contested exclusion of the subsequent 
unemployment from the AWW calculation, asserting that because claimant 
accepted the job knowing that he would be released at season’s end, the 
unemployment that followed could not be considered beyond his control. 
{¶16} The employer did not prevail.  In upholding exclusion, we cited the 
principle of encouraging gainful employment, observing that the claimant may 
have taken the position because it was all that he could find. 
{¶17} The Andersons’ precepts obviously do not transfer seamlessly to 
this case.  There is no evidence in this case that claimant took this job because it 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i) premises these benefits on proof that the individual is actively seeking 
work. 
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was the only one available.  Likewise, there is no proof that claimant has stayed at 
this job over the years because other options did not exist.  Herein lies the 
dilemma.  It is one thing to work a seasonal job because no alternatives are 
present.  It is perhaps another when seasonal employment becomes a pattern.  At 
that point, it is legitimate to ask whether such employment has become a lifestyle 
choice. 
{¶18} We have decisively declared that workers’ compensation benefits 
are not intended to subsidize lifestyle choices.  Over a decade ago, in State ex rel. 
Pauley v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 263, 559 N.E.2d 1333, we declined 
to award impaired-earning capacity benefits to a claimant who left the labor 
market to stay home with her children.  Even where the claimant has remained in 
the work force, extra scrutiny is given to employment that is not regular full-time 
work.  This now includes part-time and self-employment and, because of the 
potential lifestyle benefits of seasonal work, may include this new category as 
well.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 210, 648 N.E.2d 827; State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 
Ohio St.3d 171, 718 N.E.2d 897;  State ex rel. Ooten v. Siegel Interior Specialists 
Co. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 255, 703 N.E.2d 306. 
{¶19} While the phrase “lifestyle choice” has been applied only to benefit 
eligibility and not the amount thereof, it may very well be relevant in calculating 
AWW.  AWW cannot provide a windfall to claimants.  State ex rel. Wireman v. 
Indus. Comm. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 286, 551 N.E.2d 1265.  It follows, therefore, 
that if seasonal unemployment springs from a lifestyle choice, then those weeks 
of unemployment are not beyond a claimant’s control and omitting those weeks 
from the AWW contradicts both the statute and case law. 
{¶20} Determining whether a particular employment pattern is a lifestyle 
choice relevant to calculating a claimant’s AWW is logically a question of intent, 
which, in turn, derives from words and actions.  Here, there is no evidence on the 
January Term, 2004 
5 
question of intent.  We know only from a claimant statement cited by the district 
hearing officer that claimant had grown to expect the yearly seasonal layoff. 
{¶21} The court of appeals, speaking through its magistrate, found this 
statement insufficient to support a finding of intent — or lack thereof — and 
returned the cause to the commission for further consideration on the issue.  The 
necessity of a return, however, should first be evaluated within the context of 
claimant’s receipt of OBES benefits.  Receipt of those benefits hinges on proof 
that the individual is actively seeking work.  R.C. 4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i).  Neither 
the magistrate nor the court of appeals was persuaded by this evidence, stating: 
{¶22} “[W]here the claimant produces documents showing that he 
received unemployment benefits for certain weeks, the commission may accept 
the implicit determination by the unemployment bureau that the claimant was 
unable to find work for those weeks despite a good-faith search, but the 
commission is not bound by that implicit determination as a matter of law.  In 
short, evidence of receiving unemployment benefits is ‘some evidence’ on which 
the commission may rely, but such evidence is not conclusive in that the 
commission is not required to accept that evidence as determinative of 
involuntary unemployment as a matter of law.  The commission may or may not 
find it persuasive for purposes of setting the AWW.” 
{¶23} We, too, recognize the independence of the commission from the 
Bureau of Employment Services.  A job search sufficient to satisfy OBES might 
not satisfy the commission.  For this reason, we believe that the staff hearing 
officer’s fleeting reference to claimant’s unemployment benefits reflects a lack of 
analysis of the critical question of whether claimant’s 16 weeks of unemployment 
were actually beyond his control.  Accordingly, we agree with the court of 
appeals’ decision to return the cause for further explanation pursuant to State ex 
rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶24} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Michael J. Hickey and Sandee E.B. Reim, for 
appellee. 
Butkovich, Schimpf, Schimpf & Ginocchio Co., L.P.A., and Stephen P. 
Gast, for appellant. 
__________________