Title: State v. Hartman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Hartman, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4440.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4440 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HARTMAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hartman, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4440.] 
Criminal law—Other-acts evidence—Evid.R. 404(B)—Other-acts evidence must 
prove something other than a defendant’s disposition or propensity to 
commit certain acts and must be probative of a proper particular purpose 
for which it is offered—Other-acts evidence must be excluded under Evid.R. 
403(A) when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury—A trial 
court’s limiting instruction to a jury regarding its consideration of other-
acts evidence should be narrowly tailored to state the specific purpose for 
which the evidence is being offered. 
(No. 2019-0184—Submitted February 25, 2020—Decided September 22, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 105159, 2018-Ohio-2641. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Mitchell Hartman was accused of raping an adult female acquaintance 
in her hotel room after they had spent the evening out with a group of friends.  He 
claimed that the hotel encounter was consensual.  To counter his claim and support 
its version of events, the state presented “other acts” evidence that Hartman had 
sexually abused his stepdaughter when she was a child.  A jury found Hartman 
guilty of the crimes, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the other-
acts evidence should not have been admitted.  We agree and affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
I.  Hartman Is Charged with and Convicted of Raping E.W. in 2015 
A.  The 2015 Incident 
{¶ 2} Hartman was put on trial for the rape of E.W. based on an incident 
that happened in October 2015.  E.W. had taken a weekend trip to Ohio with her 
boyfriend Chris and another couple, Stephanie and Jeremy.  On the last night of 
their trip, Hartman, a friend of Jeremy’s, joined the group in their hotel room for 
drinks, and then they all went out to a bar together in downtown Cleveland. 
{¶ 3} According to E.W., Hartman started flirting with her and Stephanie at 
the bar.  She described him as “touchy-feely” and coming on too strong.  Though 
E.W. had consumed five drinks and was feeling “a little bit of a buzz,” she said that 
she did not feel intoxicated.  Because Hartman’s behavior made her uncomfortable 
and because they had an early flight the next morning, she decided to leave the bar 
and return to the hotel room.  Chris walked E.W. back to the room and then left to 
rejoin the others.  E.W. climbed into bed and fell asleep. 
{¶ 4} Later, Hartman returned to the hotel, purportedly to retrieve a 
bookbag that he had left in the room.  (Jeremy confirmed that Hartman had a 
bookbag with him when he had first come to the hotel room for drinks.)  Because 
Hartman’s name was not on the reservation, the employee at the hotel desk spoke 
to Stephanie by telephone and obtained her permission to give him a room key. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 5} E.W. testified that she did not hear Hartman enter her room and was 
awakened by him putting his penis in her mouth.  E.W. said that at first, she began 
to reciprocate the act, believing that the person standing next to the bed was her 
boyfriend Chris.  When she opened her eyes and realized it was Hartman, she 
screamed, and he said, “What, you’re not going to finish?”  She told him to get out, 
and he left. 
{¶ 6} Immediately after Hartman left the room, E.W. called Chris, who 
returned to the hotel with Stephanie.  A heated argument took place in the hotel 
room.  Ultimately, the disturbance brought hotel security to the room in response 
to a complaint from another guest.  After hotel security arrived, E.W. reported the 
alleged rape to police. 
{¶ 7} When he became aware of the situation, Jeremy sent Hartman a text 
message confronting him about what had happened between Hartman and E.W.  
Hartman responded with a voicemail saying that he had simply grabbed his bag and 
left the room. 
{¶ 8} The defense’s theory was that the encounter between Hartman and 
E.W. had been consensual and that E.W. had made up the rape allegation only after 
her boyfriend learned that she had cheated on him.  In furtherance of this theory, 
the defense sought to highlight certain inconsistencies in E.W.’s testimony. 
{¶ 9} The defense first tried to undercut E.W.’s account of her interactions 
with Hartman earlier in the evening.  The defense cross-examined E.W. about the 
video footage captured by the bar’s surveillance camera, attempting to establish 
that it did not show any inappropriate behavior by Hartman.  In addition, on cross-
examination, the defense elicited testimony from Jeremy that Hartman had told him 
that Hartman and E.W. had kissed while at the bar. 
{¶ 10} The defense also focused on discrepancies in E.W.’s account of the 
assault itself.  At first, she said she was sleeping with her mouth open and woke up 
to the penis in her mouth, but she later explained that she had thought it was her 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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boyfriend Chris, so she opened her mouth and began to reciprocate.  On direct 
examination, E.W. testified that she had not heard Hartman enter the room.  On 
cross-examination, though, she conceded that she had initially told police that she 
had been awakened by someone entering the room and she had thought it was Chris. 
{¶ 11} There was also some dispute about what happened next.  E.W. 
initially testified that police interviewed her about the incident before she was able 
to see Chris.  But during cross-examination, she conceded that Chris and Stephanie 
had come up to the hotel room before the police were called.  The defense theorized 
that the argument that took place in the hotel room was the result of Chris believing 
that E.W. had been unfaithful.  But Chris said that he had been upset with himself 
for leaving E.W. alone in the hotel room and denied that he had thought that E.W. 
had cheated on him.  E.W. said that she had been worried that Chris would not 
believe her and thought he was angry at her. 
B.  The Other-Acts Evidence 
{¶ 12} The state’s final witness was B.T., who had been victimized by 
Hartman—her former stepfather—as a child.  (Hartman’s conduct with B.T. had 
resulted in a plea agreement in which Hartman pleaded guilty to abduction and 
attempted felonious assault.)  Prior to the start of trial, defense counsel sought to 
have B.T.’s testimony excluded as improper character evidence.  He argued that the 
allegations involving B.T. were too distinct from those involved in the current case 
to have any probative value.  The state countered that both assaults had occurred 
while the victims were sleeping and that this amounted to a “behavioral fingerprint” 
identifying Hartman as the perpetrator.  The prosecutor also asserted that the 
evidence was probative of Hartman’s “motive, intent, plan or scheme and absence 
of mistake.”  The crux of the state’s argument was that the fact that Hartman had 
molested his stepdaughter while she was sleeping provided evidence that 
Hartman’s motive for returning to the hotel room was to assault E.W.  
January Term, 2020 
 
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Alternatively, the state contended that the evidence rebutted any “mistaken 
impression that this was consensual sexual activity.” 
{¶ 13} The trial court issued a preliminary ruling allowing the state to 
present the evidence.  The court concluded that because both allegations involved 
“vulnerable, asleep victims,” B.T.’s testimony was probative to show absence of 
mistake, Hartman’s plan or scheme, and that he acted with criminal intent in this 
instance.  The court considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence but determined 
that its impact could be reduced by limiting both the scope of B.T.’s testimony and 
the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence. 
{¶ 14} Defense counsel renewed his objection to B.T.’s testimony prior to 
her taking the stand.  He again asserted that the purpose of the evidence was to 
create an impermissible character inference that Hartman has a propensity to assault 
sleeping females.  This time, the court concluded that the evidence was probative 
of virtually every one of the permissible purposes listed in Evid.R. 404(B); the court 
cited the relevance of the evidence to “the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, 
absence of mistake, purpose, preparation, plan to commit the offense, [and] 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the offense.”  Before B.T. testified, 
the court explained to the jury that her testimony could not be considered as 
evidence of Hartman’s character or that he acted in conformity with that character, 
and the court further instructed: 
 
If you find that this evidence of other acts is true, and that 
the defendant committed them, you may consider that evidence only 
for the purpose of deciding whether it proves these limited things: 
A, the absence of mistake or accident; or B, the defendant’s motive, 
opportunity, intent; or C, purpose, preparation or plan to commit the 
offense charged in this trial, or knowledge of circumstances 
surrounding the offense charged in this trial; or D, the identity of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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person who committed the offense in this trial.  That evidence 
cannot be considered for any other purpose. 
 
{¶ 15} B.T. then took the stand.  She explained that Hartman is her mother’s 
ex-husband.  Roughly four years earlier, when she was 12, Hartman began coming 
into her bedroom at night while she was sleeping.  On one occasion, he started 
touching her chest and woke her up.  Another time, he entered the room and began 
touching her vagina.  And in one instance, he pulled his pants down and forced her 
to touch his penis with her hand.  When this happened, she asked him, “[W]hat are 
you doing?”  He responded, “[W]hat are you doing?”  And then he left. 
C.  Conviction and Reversal on Appeal 
{¶ 16} Following B.T.’s testimony, the state rested its case and the trial 
court again instructed the jury that her testimony was offered for a limited purpose.  
Hartman did not testify or present any witnesses.  The trial court then gave the jury 
its final instructions—providing for a third time the same instruction it had 
previously given about the other-acts evidence.  Four counts were presented to the 
jury: rape by force in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), with a sexually-violent-
predator specification; rape of a substantially impaired person in violation of R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(c), with a sexually-violent-predator specification; one count of 
burglary pursuant to R.C. 2911.12(A)(1); and one count of kidnapping under R.C. 
2905.01(A)(4), with a sexual-motivation specification.  The jury returned guilty 
verdicts on the two rape counts and not-guilty verdicts on the burglary and 
kidnapping counts.  After hearing additional testimony, the jury also found Hartman 
to be a sexually violent predator. 
{¶ 17} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, 
concluding that the evidence of Hartman’s abuse of B.T. in 2012 constituted 
improper other-acts evidence and was inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B).  The 
court of appeals acknowledged that “there are several uses for other acts evidence” 
January Term, 2020 
 
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but went on to say that such evidence “is typically applied to questions of identity.”  
2018-Ohio-2641, ¶ 39.  The court characterized the state’s primary justification for 
the use of the other-acts evidence as being to establish Hartman’s identity through 
evidence of his modus operandi.  Id.  The problem with this purported justification, 
the court of appeals held, was that Hartman’s identity as the alleged perpetrator was 
not in dispute.  The court also rejected the state’s contention that the evidence 
established motive, reasoning that the motive in a sexual-assault case is self-
evident.  Consequently, the court determined that the other-acts evidence was not 
relevant to the purposes for which the state had sought to admit it and held that it 
had been improperly admitted.  The court of appeals also concluded that the trial 
court had improperly given a flight instruction to the jury and decided that the 
cumulative effect of the errors was prejudicial to Hartman.  The court therefore 
reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. 
{¶ 18} We accepted the state’s appeal on the following proposition of law: 
“In sexual assault cases, other acts evidence offered to prove the intent of the 
offender or the offender’s plan is admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), even when 
the identity of the offender is not at issue.”  See 155 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2019-Ohio-
1536, 121 N.E.3d 409.  We agree that other-acts evidence can be admitted for 
purposes other than identity, so we acknowledge that the proposition is a correct 
statement of law.  But because the other-acts evidence in this case was not relevant 
to any proper purpose, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the other-
acts evidence was improperly admitted at Hartman’s trial. 
{¶ 19} We also use this case—as well as State v. Smith, __ Ohio St.3d __, 
2020-Ohio-4441, ___ N.E.3d ___, another case decided today—to help clear up 
some of the confusion that exists regarding the use of other-acts evidence.  Thus, 
we endeavor to provide trial courts with a road map for analyzing the admission of 
other-acts evidence and guidance as to appropriate instructions for the jury when 
such evidence is admitted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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II.  The Admission of Other-Acts Evidence, Generally 
{¶ 20} “A hallmark of the American criminal justice system is the principle 
that proof that the accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on 
trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused’s propensity or 
inclination to commit crime.”  State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720 
(1975), citing 1 Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, Section 205, at 595 (6th Ed.1973).  
That philosophy is premised on our understanding of human nature: the typical 
juror is prone to “much more readily believe that a person is guilty of the crime 
charged if it is proved to his satisfaction that the defendant has committed a similar 
crime.”  State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 167, 174-175, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). 
{¶ 21} This common-law principle is embodied in Evid.R. 404(B).  State v. 
Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994).  That rule provides: 
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  This type of evidence 
is commonly referred to as “propensity evidence” because its purpose is to 
demonstrate that the accused has a propensity or proclivity to commit the crime in 
question.  See Curry at 68.  Evid.R. 404(B) categorically bars the use of other-acts 
evidence to show propensity. 
{¶ 22} Evid.R. 404(B) does, however, allow evidence of the defendant’s 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admitted “for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.”  (Emphasis added.)  The key is that the evidence must prove 
something other than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.  Thus, 
while evidence showing the defendant’s character or propensity to commit crimes 
or acts is forbidden, evidence of other acts is admissible when the evidence is 
probative of a separate, nonpropensity-based issue.  The admissibility of other-acts 
evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) is a question of law.  See Leonard, The New 
Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events, Section 4.10 (2d 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Ed.2019) (because “[d]etermining whether the evidence is offered for an 
impermissible purpose does not involve the exercise of discretion * * *, an 
appellate court should scrutinize the [trial court’s] finding under a de novo 
standard” of review); State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 
N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 17 (the trial court is precluded by Evid.R. 404(B) from admitting 
improper character evidence, but it has discretion whether to allow other-acts 
evidence that is admissible for a permissible purpose). 
{¶ 23} Courts have long struggled with differentiating between the two 
types of evidence.  This is in large part because “other-act evidence is usually 
capable of being used for multiple purposes, one of which is propensity.”  United 
States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir.2014) (en banc) (applying Fed.R.Evid. 
404(b), which is substantively analogous to Ohio’s Evid.R. 404(B)).  For that 
reason, it is “not enough for the proponent of the other-act evidence simply to point 
to a purpose in the ‘permitted’ list and assert that the other-act evidence is relevant 
to it.”  Id. at 856.  The rule is concerned not only with the ultimate justification for 
admitting the evidence but also “with the chain of reasoning that supports the non-
propensity purpose for admitting the evidence.”  Id.  To properly apply the rule, 
then, courts must scrutinize the proponent’s logic to determine exactly how the 
evidence connects to a proper purpose without relying on any intermediate 
improper-character inferences.  Id. 
A.  Relevance for a Nonpropensity Purpose 
{¶ 24} As with all evidence, the threshold question for determining 
admissibility asks: is the evidence relevant?  Evid.R. 402 succinctly states, 
“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”  Evidence is relevant if it tends 
“to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  
Evid.R. 401. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 25} The rule governing the admissibility of other-acts evidence does not 
bypass the relevancy determination.  Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-
5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, at ¶ 20 (in reviewing other-acts evidence, the “first step” 
is to consider the relevance of the evidence under Evid.R. 401).  It is almost always 
true that propensity evidence will have some relevance.  Indeed, such evidence is 
excluded “not because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too 
much.”  1A Wigmore, Evidence, Section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers Rev.1983). 
{¶ 26} But in Evid.R. 404(B) cases, the inquiry is not whether the other-acts 
evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination of guilt.  Rather, the court must 
evaluate whether the evidence is relevant to the particular purpose for which it is 
offered.  See Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 73, 330 N.E.2d 720.  That is to say, the other-
acts evidence must be probative of a “purpose other than the person’s character or 
propensity to behave in a certain way.”  Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860.  Evid.R. 404(B) 
provides a nonexhaustive list of the permissible nonpropensity purposes for which 
other-acts evidence may be introduced.  In section III of this opinion, we will 
discuss in some detail the most common nonpropensity purposes for which other-
acts evidence may be permissibly used. 
{¶ 27} Trial courts must keep in mind that it is not enough to say that the 
evidence is relevant to a nonpropensity purpose.  The nonpropensity purpose for 
which the evidence is offered must go to a “material” issue that is actually in dispute 
between the parties.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 
1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 
{¶ 28} One other aspect of the relevance inquiry bears mentioning.  The 
supposition that proposed other-acts evidence, if true, would be relevant is not a 
license for courts to allow the jury to consider every unsubstantiated accusation.  
Rather, there must be some threshold showing that the act for which the evidence 
is offered occurred.  “[S]imilar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can 
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.”  Id. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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at 689.  This principle flows from Evid.R. 104(B), which addresses issues of 
relevance conditioned on the existence of a fact.  See Huddleston at 689-690 
(applying Fed.R.Evid. 104(b), which at that time was identical to Ohio’s Evid.R. 
104(B)).  Thus, we have held that for the evidence to be admissible, there must be 
“substantial proof that the alleged similar act was committed by the defendant.”  
State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 83, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971). 
B.  Weighing the Probative Value and the Danger of Unfair Prejudice 
{¶ 29} The analysis does not end once a proponent has established a 
permissible nonpropensity purpose for the admission of other-acts evidence.  In 
every instance, the trial court must determine whether the proffered evidence—
though admissible under Evid.R. 404(B)—is nevertheless more prejudicial than 
probative.  Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, at 
¶ 20.  Our rules require exclusion of evidence when its probative value “is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the 
issues, or of misleading the jury.”  Evid.R. 403(A).  The trial court’s analysis under 
this rule should be robust, and courts should be mindful of “[t]he natural and 
inevitable tendency * * * to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime 
thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to 
take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the accused’s guilt 
of the present charge.”  1A Wigmore, Section 58.2, at 1212. 
{¶ 30} Weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial 
effect is a highly fact-specific and context-driven analysis.  Balancing the risks and 
benefits of the evidence necessarily involves an exercise of judgment; thus, the trial 
court’s determination should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See Leonard 
at Section 4.10 (because the trial court is in the best position to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses and jurors, “the appellate court should defer to the trial 
court’s judgment of the weight of the various dangers as applied to each piece of 
evidence”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 31} Nevertheless, there are some important considerations for trial courts 
in making those determinations.  The first is the extent to which the other-acts 
evidence is directed to an issue that is actually in dispute.  “[S]ensitivity to the real 
factual disputes in the case is critical to meaningful Rule 403 balancing.”  Gomez, 
763 F.3d at 860.  The probative value of the evidence, as well as whether any 
prejudice is unfair, will generally depend on the degree to which the fact is actually 
contested.  If the fact that the proponent seeks to prove by way of other acts is not 
genuinely disputed or material to the case, then it has little probative value and the 
risk of prejudice is high.  See Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s 
Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to 
Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St.L.J. 593, 598 (1990); 
Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 70-71, 330 N.E.2d 720.  As the importance of the factual 
dispute for which the evidence is offered to the resolution of the case increases, the 
probative value of the evidence also increases and the risk of unfair prejudice 
decreases. 
{¶ 32} Courts should also consider whether the prosecution is able to 
present alternative evidence to prove the same fact through less prejudicial means 
and whether the other-acts evidence is probative of an essential element of the crime 
or an intermediate fact in the case.  1 Imwinkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan, Lederer & 
Richter, Courtroom Criminal Evidence, Section 908 (6th Ed.2016). 
{¶ 33} Because other-acts evidence “almost always carries some risk that 
the jury will draw the forbidden propensity inference,” Gomez at 857, it will often 
present the dangers that Evid.R. 403(A) seeks to protect against.  Thus, when such 
evidence is only slightly probative of a nonpropensity theory but has a high 
likelihood of unfairly prejudicing the defendant or confusing or misleading the jury, 
the evidence must be excluded. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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C.  Minimizing the Risks of Unfair Prejudice 
{¶ 34} When a court determines that other-acts evidence should be 
admitted, it must take steps to minimize the danger of unfair prejudice inherent in 
the use of such evidence and to ensure that the evidence is considered only for a 
proper purpose.  Thus, a court should explain both the specific purpose for which 
the evidence may be considered and the rationale for its admission on the record.  
Doing so will ensure that trial participants—as well as reviewing courts—are aware 
of the permitted use of the other-acts evidence.  Further, as we explain in more 
detail below, an appropriate jury instruction geared toward the specific purpose for 
which the evidence has been admitted will help reduce the risk of confusion and 
unfair prejudice. 
III.  The Trial Court Improperly Admitted Evidence of Hartman’s Abuse of 
His Stepdaughter 
{¶ 35} In this case, the state asserted numerous bases for admitting B.T.’s 
testimony about Hartman’s abuse—that the evidence established Hartman’s modus 
operandi, his plan or scheme, his motive, his intent, and an absence of mistake—
and the trial court found the evidence probative on all of those grounds.  We take 
up each of these purported rationales for admission of the evidence. 
A.  Modus Operandi 
{¶ 36} Early on, the state contended that Hartman’s alleged conduct in both 
the 2012 and 2015 incidents was “so similar as to be called a behavioral 
fingerprint,” thereby reflecting a modus operandi “identifiable with the defendant.”  
The state went on, “We’re not introducing this evidence to say * * * he is the kind 
of person who would go around assaulting sleeping females, rather that he is the 
person that did it.”  Similarly, in its briefing in this court, the state argues that the 
evidence was admissible to show “Hartman’s modus operandi to sexually assault 
females while they were asleep.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 37} “Modus operandi” literally means method of working.  See People 
v. Barbour, 106 Ill.App.3d 993, 999, 436 N.E.2d 667 (1982).  It is evidence of 
signature, fingerprint-like characteristics unique enough “to show that the crimes 
were committed by the same person.”  Weissenberger, Federal Evidence, Section 
404.17 (7th Ed.2019).  Evidence of modus operandi is relevant to prove identity: 
“Evidence that the defendant had committed uncharged crimes with the same 
peculiar modus tends to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged 
crime.”  1 Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, at Section 907.  To 
be admissible, both the other-acts evidence and the charged crime must involve 
“the same distinctive, one-of-a-kind modus.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} Here, B.T.’s testimony did not provide evidence of a modus 
operandi.  There is nothing fingerprint-like about molesting a child in a bed during 
the night.  Nor do the circumstances of the child molestation in this case contain 
any idiosyncratic features also present during the alleged rape.  That both crimes 
were committed against a female sleeping in a bed is hardly unique to Hartman as 
a perpetrator. 
{¶ 39} Furthermore, as the court of appeals correctly noted, identity was not 
an issue at trial.  This is an acquaintance-rape case.  E.W. knew who Hartman was 
before the assault.  And during opening statements, Hartman’s attorney made clear 
that the theory of the defense was that the sexual encounter between Hartman and 
E.W. had been consensual.  Thus, even if B.T.’s testimony could have been labeled 
modus operandi evidence, it still would not have been admissible because identity 
was not an issue in this case. 
B.  Common Scheme or Plan 
{¶ 40} In addition to arguing that it was Hartman’s modus operandi to target 
sleeping females, the state argues that he had a common “plan or scheme” to target 
sleeping women.  The state uses the two concepts—modus operandi and common 
scheme or plan—largely synonymously, a mistake often made by litigants.  In 
January Term, 2020 
 
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reality, though, these two sometimes-permissible uses of other-acts evidence are 
distinct concepts.  The utility of modus operandi evidence comes from its 
connection with the current crime through shared characteristics that make the 
conduct unique to the perpetrator.  In contrast, plan evidence need not share any 
common characteristics with the current crime; rather, the other acts are linked to 
the present crime because they are carried out in furtherance of the same overall 
plan.  Evidence of a plan or common design “refers to a larger criminal scheme of 
which the crime charged is only a portion.”  Barbour, 106 Ill.App.3d at 999, 436 
N.E.2d 667.  Thus, while modus operandi evidence is “most useful in showing that 
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime charged,” id., evidence of a common 
design will more often be relevant to show the motive for the crime charged, see 
McCormick, Evidence, Section 190, at 448-449 (2d Ed.1972). 
{¶ 41} Common-plan evidence generally concerns events that are 
“inextricably related” to the crime charged.  Weissenberger at Section 404:18; 
Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 73, 330 N.E.2d 720.  The other acts form the “immediate 
background” of the present crime: they are typically either part of the “same 
transaction” as the crime for which the defendant is on trial or they are part of “a 
sequence of events” leading up to the commission of the crime in question.  
Weissenberger at Section 404:18.  As one authority has explained, this type of 
other-acts evidence is admitted 
 
[t]o prove the existence of a larger, continuing plan, scheme, or 
conspiracy, of which the present crime on trial is a part.  This will 
be relevant as showing motive, and hence the doing of the criminal 
act, the identity of the actor, and his intention, where any of these is 
in dispute. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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McCormick at 448-449.  Thus, plan evidence generally supports one of the 
following possible conclusions: “(1) the occurrence of the act in issue; (2) the 
identity of the person who committed the act; or (3) the existence of the required 
mental state in the actor.”  Leonard at Section 9.1. 
{¶ 42} A defendant’s plan might be demonstrated through evidence of 
“prior preparatory acts,” such as the prior theft of an instrumentality used in the 
commission of the current crime.  1 Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal 
Evidence, at Section 907.  For instance, in a prosecution for illegally manufacturing 
drugs under R.C. 2925.04, evidence that the defendant recently robbed a warehouse 
to steal a barrel of the ingredient methylamine could be admissible to show the 
defendant’s scheme to produce methamphetamine.  See “A No-Rough-Stuff-Type 
Deal,” Breaking Bad, AMC (Mar. 9, 2008).  Or consider a case in which the 
defendant is slated to inherit an estate if two other heirs are no longer living.  See 1 
Imwinkelried et al. at Section 907.  In a trial for the murder of one heir, evidence 
showing that the defendant killed the other would not be admissible to demonstrate 
that he was a cold-blooded killer, but it could be admitted to show that he had a 
plan to kill the other heirs to attain the inheritance.  See id. 
{¶ 43} Here, the evidence plainly does not fit into the common 
understanding of plan evidence.  Hartman’s alleged assault of his stepdaughter was 
not part of a larger scheme involving the rape of E.W.  Nonetheless, the state 
contends that the evidence was admissible as a result of our decision in Williams, 
134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278. 
{¶ 44} In Williams, we considered whether other-acts evidence tending to 
show a plan may be admitted when the identity of the assailant is not at issue.  
Although we had previously indicated that such evidence will most often be 
relevant to illustrate the immediate background of the offense or identify the 
perpetrator, see Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 73, 330 N.E.2d 720, we confirmed in 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
Williams that plan evidence is not necessarily limited to those scenarios and may 
be admitted for other purposes, Williams at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 45} While the other-acts evidence in Williams tended to show that the 
defendant, who had been charged with the rape of a 14-year-old boy, had a pattern 
of grooming teenage boys to take advantage of them sexually, that fact alone is not 
what overcame the propensity bar.  Rather, the result in Williams turned on the 
state’s use of the other-acts evidence for the purpose of refuting the defendant’s 
claims that he was not sexually attracted to teenage boys and establishing that the 
defendant had acted with the specific intent of achieving sexual gratification.  Id. 
at ¶ 22, 25. 
{¶ 46} There may be instances in which seemingly unrelated but highly 
similar crimes could be evidence of a common scheme to commit the charged 
crime—perhaps, for instance, a string of robberies occurring close in time and 
location.  We stress, however, that plan evidence should show that the crime being 
charged and the other acts are part of the same grand design by the defendant.  
Otherwise, proof that the accused has committed similar crimes is no different than 
proof that the accused has a propensity for committing that type of crime.  The 
takeaway for the jury becomes, “The accused did it once recently; therefore, the 
accused did it again.”  Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve 
the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b), 43 U.Kan.L.Rev. 1005, 1012 (1995). 
{¶ 47} Here, Hartman’s molestation of his stepdaughter four years prior 
was not linked to any overarching plan to commit rape against E.W.  The incidents 
are wholly distinct, and unlike the common-scheme evidence demonstrated in 
Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, the other-acts 
evidence in this case contains few similarities to the crimes charged.  Thus, the 
evidence was not relevant to show a common scheme or plan. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
C.  Motive 
{¶ 48} The state also contends that the other-acts evidence was relevant to 
show Hartman’s motive.  Motive evidence establishes that the accused had a 
specific reason to commit a crime.  Weissenberger at Section 404.16.  For instance, 
“if the state argues that a defendant committed murder to cover up an earlier crime, 
evidence of that earlier crime may be admitted to show the motive behind the 
murder.”  State v. Cobia, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140058, 2015-Ohio-331, ¶ 19.  
Or a defendant’s motive in committing a theft might be to sell the stolen item to get 
money to buy drugs.  There need be no similarity between the other-acts evidence 
and the crime charged under a motive theory; “a dissimilar prior act is just as 
feasible in supplying a motive for committing a crime as is a similar prior act.”  
Weissenberger at Section 404.16. 
{¶ 49} Here, the evidence plainly was not admissible for purposes of 
establishing motive.  Hartman’s molestation of his former stepdaughter does not 
reveal a specific reason for raping E.W. and thus does not provide evidence of any 
motive to commit rape beyond that which can be inferred from the commission of 
any rape.  See Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d at 71, 330 N.E.2d 720 (“A person commits or 
attempts to commit statutory rape for the obvious motive of sexual gratification.  
Since motive cannot be deemed to have been a material issue at appellee’s trial, 
‘other acts’ testimony was not admissible to prove this matter”). 
{¶ 50} The state contests the court of appeals’ acknowledgment that the 
motive in most rape cases is sexual gratification, asserting that the court ignored 
the extent to which the motive of a sexual perpetrator is to achieve sexual 
gratification by force.  But however it is characterized, the point is that in most 
cases of this type, there is no motive beyond that implicit in the commission of the 
offense itself. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
D.  Intent and Absence of Mistake 
{¶ 51} The trial court found the evidence admissible for purposes of 
showing intent and absence of mistake.  The state’s argument is essentially that the 
evidence was relevant to Hartman’s defense of consent: according to the state, the 
prior conduct with his stepdaughter tended to prove that Hartman didn’t mistakenly 
believe that E.W. was consenting to a sexual encounter but rather that Hartman 
intended to rape E.W.  Because the concepts of intent and absence of mistake are 
similar in this formulation, we take them up together. 
{¶ 52} Other-acts evidence is admissible to negate a defendant’s claim of 
mistake or accident with respect to the commission of the alleged crime; such 
evidence tends “[t]o show, by similar acts or incidents, that the act in question was 
not performed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty 
knowledge.”  McCormick, Evidence, Section 190, at 804 (4th Ed.1994).  In the 
criminal context, there are generally two ways in which the accused may raise a 
claim of accident.  Imwinkelried, 51 Ohio St.L.J. at 593.  The first involves whether 
a criminal act occurred at all.  For example, suppose a defendant is accused of 
poisoning his fourth wife but claims she died of a certain natural cause.  Evidence 
that his first three wives died with nearly identical symptoms might be permissible 
to show that the fourth wife’s death was the result of a poisoning.  Under this theory, 
the evidence could be admissible because the circumstances of the wives’ deaths 
are so similar that it is improbable all four women died of natural causes. 
{¶ 53} The second scenario implicates the intent of the accused.  The 
question here is not whether the act occurred but whether the defendant acted with 
a criminal intent.  Say, for instance, the fourth wife died from a gunshot wound at 
the hand of her husband during a hunting trip, and he defends against the murder 
charge by claiming that the shooting was accidental.  Evidence that he shot his other 
wives under similar circumstances might be probative of his intent to kill.  The 
inference is that because it is so unlikely that the defendant accidentally shot four 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
women under similar circumstances, it is highly likely that he acted with the intent 
to kill. 
{¶ 54} It is this second usage of “mistake” evidence that is at issue here.  
There is no dispute that the oral-sex incident occurred; the question is whether it 
was consensual.  In this context, the purpose for which the other-acts evidence was 
offered can be similarly described both in terms of mistake and intent.  The state 
offered the evidence for purposes of rebutting Hartman’s suggestion that even if 
E.W. did not consent to oral sex, he mistakenly thought that she had.  Or the state 
offered the evidence for purposes of rebutting Hartman’s assertion that he did not 
intend to commit rape because he believed the sex was consensual. 
{¶ 55} Intent is an element of most crimes, but it typically is not a material 
issue for other-acts purposes unless it is genuinely disputed—in most cases, “the 
act speaks for itself.”  Leonard at Section 7.5.3.  Thus, intent evidence is not 
admissible when “the requisite intent is presumed or inferred from proof of the 
criminal act itself,” or when intent is not in issue at all, such as when the defense 
theory is that the act never occurred.  1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Section 4:31 
(15th Ed.2019).  When a defendant is charged with a specific-intent crime, 
however, the specific intent becomes a material issue in the case.  Gomez, 763 F.3d 
at 859.  Consider a theft offense, which requires proof that the defendant take 
property with the purpose of depriving the owner of it; evidence that the defendant 
immediately pawned the property might be probative of his specific intent to 
permanently deprive.  See 1 Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom Criminal Evidence, at 
Section 907(g).  Regardless, to be admissible, the other-acts evidence must be 
relevant to the specific intent and relevant in a permissible way.  Gomez at 859. 
{¶ 56} State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156, 900 P.2d 284 (1995), provides a 
useful illustration of a permissible use of such evidence.  In that case, the defendant 
owned a game farm and was charged with unlawfully possessing wild elk.  He 
defended against the charges by asserting that he had left a pasture gate open, 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
inadvertently allowing the elk to wander onto his property.  Id. at 159.  The state 
presented other-acts evidence showing that the defendant had on prior occasions 
failed to maintain his fence and subsequently captured the elk that rambled onto his 
property as a result.  The Supreme Court of Montana held that this evidence was 
admissible to show a lack of mistake or accident with respect to the charged 
incident.  Id. at 165-167.  The other-acts evidence was admissible not to show that 
the defendant had a propensity to capture elk but to negate his explanation for how 
the elk came to be on his farm.  The permissible inference in this situation is that 
“ ‘the oftener a like act has been done, the less probable it is that it could have been 
done innocently.’ ”  (Emphasis deleted.)  State v. Evers, 139 Wis.2d 424, 437, 407 
N.W.2d 256 (1987), quoting 2 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, Section 
404[12], at 404-84 to 404-87 (1985). 
{¶ 57} There is a thin line between the permissible use of other-acts 
evidence to show intent and the impermissible use to show propensity.  Allowing 
other-acts evidence to prove the defendant’s state of mind “flirt[s] dangerously with 
eviscerating the character evidence prohibition” altogether.  Leonard at Section 7.4.  
Evidence that a husband shot three previous wives in “hunting accidents” does 
allow a jury to (permissibly) reason that it is unlikely that the fourth shooting was 
committed accidentally, but it also enables a jury to (impermissibly) reason that he 
likely killed his fourth wife because he is a killer. 
{¶ 58} For this reason, courts should use caution when evaluating whether 
to admit other-acts evidence for the purpose of showing intent or absence of 
mistake.  To determine whether other-acts evidence is genuinely probative of the 
intent of the accused to commit the charged crime, rather than merely the accused’s 
propensity to commit similar crimes, the question is whether, “under the 
circumstances, the detailed facts of the charged and uncharged offenses strongly 
suggest that an innocent explanation is implausible.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Id. at 
Section 7.5.2.  Or to put it another way, the other-acts evidence “must be so related 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
to the crime charged in time or circumstances that evidence of the other acts is 
significantly useful in showing the defendant’s intent in connection with the crime 
charged.”  1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence at Section 4:31. 
{¶ 59} Here, the state’s argument is that Hartman’s abuse of his 
stepdaughter in the past establishes that he obtained access to E.W.’s room with the 
intent of raping her and negates Hartman’s consent defense.  In essence, the state’s 
theory is that because Hartman had previously abused his stepdaughter, it is 
unlikely that he had consensual sex with E.W. 
{¶ 60} The state correctly notes that because Hartman defended against the 
charges involving E.W. on the grounds that their encounter had been consensual, 
he placed his intent at issue.  But even though Hartman’s intent was a material issue, 
it does not follow that B.T.’s testimony about Hartman’s prior conduct was 
probative of his intent in this case. 
{¶ 61} The state relies on our decision in State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 
14, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979), in support of its contention that the other-acts evidence 
used here tended to prove intent.  The crimes in that case involved a victim who 
claimed to have been abducted by two men and forced to perform oral sex upon 
one of them at gunpoint.  Id. at 20.  The defendant who was charged with rape 
defended by claiming that the sex was consensual.  Id.  To rebut the evidence of 
consent, the state presented evidence that the two defendants had engaged in 
remarkably similar conduct the night before.  Two women testified that the previous 
evening, the defendants had forced them to engage in oral sex at gunpoint.  The 
prior incident occurred at the same apartment where the abduction of the victim had 
taken place.  Id. at 19-20.  In addition, the victim testified that she was present and 
witnessed the events of the night before.  Id. at 20.  This court held that the evidence 
of the prior events was “so closely related in nature, time and place to the offense 
charged” as to be probative of intent.  Id. at 21.  We explained that for evidence of 
the prior night’s acts to be probative of intent, it “ ‘must have [had] such a temporal, 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
modal and situational relationship with the acts constituting the crime charged’ ” 
that it “ ‘disclose[d] purposeful action in the commission of the offense in 
question.’ ”  Id. at 20, quoting State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 159, 311 N.E.2d 
526 (1974). 
{¶ 62} There is no such relationship between the two incidents in this case.  
Evidence that Hartman, while in his own residence, had molested his 12-year-old 
stepdaughter by touching her chest and vagina and placing her hand on his penis 
does not support an inference that Hartman entered E.W.’s hotel room with the 
intent to rape her while she was intoxicated.  E.W. and B.T. are not in the same 
class of victims: one is an adult acquaintance, the other was a child relative.  The 
acts Hartman allegedly forced E.W. to perform bear no similarities to the acts 
involving B.T. other than being sexual in nature.  Without more, the fact that all the 
acts occurred at night in the victims’ sleeping quarters does not provide the degree 
of similarity necessary to infer intent.  The child-molestation evidence presented in 
this case simply was not probative of Hartman’s intent with respect to the hotel-
rape allegations. 
{¶ 63} Moreover, it is not enough to say that the ultimate purpose for which 
other-acts evidence is offered is a permissible one; rather, we must ensure that any 
intermediate inferences are also free of impermissible character purposes.  Gomez, 
763 F.3d at 855.  Hartman’s having entered the bedroom of his 12-year-old 
stepdaughter to molest her does not directly support an inference that Hartman 
entered E.W.’s hotel room with the intent to rape her.  Rather, there is an 
intermediate inference—that, as the state puts it, Hartman preys on sleeping or 
impaired women and girls.  That is precisely the propensity inference that Evid.R. 
404(B) forbids. 
{¶ 64} We therefore conclude that the evidence of Hartman’s other acts 
constituted improper propensity evidence, and the trial court erred in admitting it.  
And because we have determined that the other-acts evidence was inadmissible, we 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
need not reach the question whether the trial court abused its discretion in otherwise 
permitting the evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 403. 
IV.  The Court’s Instructions to the Jury Did Not Cure the Prejudicial Effect 
of the Other-Acts Evidence 
{¶ 65} The state also argues that any risk of unfair prejudice was mitigated 
by the cautionary instructions provided by the court.  It notes that on three 
occasions—before and after B.T.’s testimony and in the final instructions—the 
court reminded the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted. 
{¶ 66} In determining whether to admit other-acts evidence, a court should 
consider the extent to which a limiting instruction to the jury might reduce the risk 
of unfair prejudice.  Such an instruction does not automatically cure all prejudice 
concerns.  Rather, the trial court must decide whether the prejudicial effect of the 
other-acts testimony is such that it can be sufficiently mitigated by a well-tailored 
limiting instruction or, to the contrary, whether the effect of the testimony is so 
prejudicial that no instruction can temper its sway.  If the latter is the case, the 
evidence must be excluded.  Evid.R. 403(A). 
{¶ 67} The court must give a limiting instruction upon request.  Evid.R. 
105.  But that does not mean the court should sua sponte issue such an instruction 
any time other-acts evidence is used.  Depending on the nature of the other-acts 
evidence and the context in which it is used, defense counsel may as a matter of 
strategy wish to avoid highlighting the evidence for the jury.  State v. Schaim, 65 
Ohio St.3d 51, 61, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992), fn. 9 (“the decision not to request a 
limiting instruction is sometimes a tactical one, and we do not wish to impose a 
duty on the trial courts to read this instruction when it is not requested”). 
{¶ 68} Here, after choosing to admit the other-acts evidence, the court 
instructed the jury that the evidence could be used only for “deciding whether it 
proves these limited things: A, the absence of mistake or accident; or B, the 
defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent; or C, purpose, preparation or plan to 
January Term, 2020 
 
25 
commit the offense charged in this trial, or knowledge of circumstances 
surrounding the offense charged in this trial; or D, the identity of the person who 
committed the offense in this trial.”  The court later gave this instruction two more 
times. 
{¶ 69} Unfortunately, an instruction of this type is of only limited value to 
the jury.  As this case illustrates, the analytical distinctions between the different 
types of evidence that may be admitted under Evid.R. 404(B) can be difficult.  
Courts struggle with these concepts; it is not realistic to simply list all the 
permissible uses and expect jurors to go through each one and determine the use 
for which the evidence is properly considered.  To tell a jury that a certain piece of 
evidence may be considered as evidence of “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” Evid.R. 
404(B), imparts nothing meaningful and is akin to telling the jurors that the 
evidence may be considered for any purpose. 
{¶ 70} Thus, when a court issues a limiting instruction with respect to other-
acts evidence, the instruction should be tailored to the facts of the case.  The 
boilerplate language contained in the Ohio Jury Instructions addressing other-acts 
evidence is merely a template.  Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 401.25 (2008).  
Going forward, courts should explain, in plain language, the purposes for which the 
other acts may and may not be considered.  Rather than recounting to the jury every 
purpose listed in Evid.R. 404(B), our pattern jury instructions direct trial courts to 
state the specific purpose for which the other-acts evidence is being admitted in that 
case.  See Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 401.25.  It is important that judges 
do so. 
{¶ 71} In addition, jury instructions should be tailored to better enable 
jurors to understand the prohibition on the use of other-acts evidence to make 
inferences about the defendant’s disposition to commit criminal acts.  “Lay people 
are capable of understanding the foundational principle in our system of justice that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
‘we try cases, rather than persons.’ ”  Gomez, 763 F.3d at 861, quoting People v. 
Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 566, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988).  Rather than simply telling 
jurors that they may not consider certain evidence “to prove the character of the 
defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity with that character,” Ohio 
Jury Instructions, CR Section 401.25, the court may explain that the reason for this 
rule is that “it does not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he committed the 
particular crime charged in this case,” Gomez at 861.  And jurors would be well 
served by guidance connecting the limiting instruction to the state’s burden of 
proof: the government has the burden of proving each element of this particular 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and its burden is not satisfied by an inference that 
the defendant committed this crime because his past acts suggest a propensity to 
commit crimes.  See id. 
{¶ 72} In this case, the defense did not object to the court’s instruction.  And 
we decline to find plain error.  But we do conclude that the generic nature of the 
instruction that was given severely reduced its import in mitigating the prejudicial 
effect of the other-acts evidence. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 73} We conclude that the other-acts evidence introduced in this case was 
not admissible for any proper purpose under Evid.R. 404(B).  Each of the purported 
rationales relied upon by the trial court either invited an improper character 
inference or was irrelevant to a material issue in the case.  Further, the jury 
instructions provided did not mitigate the prejudicial effect of the evidence.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and 
SADLER, JJ., concur. 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
STEWART, J. 
January Term, 2020 
 
27 
_________________ 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary 
M. Frey, Daniel T. Van, and Maxwell Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
Patituce & Associates, L.L.C, Joseph C. Patituce, and Megan M. Patituce, 
for appellee. 
Russell S. Bensing, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________