Title: Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2067   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Mary E. Marlowe and Leslie R. Marlowe, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 340 Wis. 2d 594, 811 N.W.2d 894 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 51     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 5, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., concur (opinion 
filed).   
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Ralph J. Tease Jr. and Rhonda L. Lanford, and Habush, 
Habush & Rottier, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by Mr. 
Tease.   
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Michael 
P. Konz and Erik L. Fuehrer, and Gabert, Williams, Konz & 
Lawrynk, LLP, Appleton, and oral argument by Mr. Konz. 
 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James Friedman and 
Dustin B. Brown, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and oral argument by Mr. 
Brown. 
  
 
 
2013 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2067 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV502) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mary E. Marlowe and Leslie R. Marlowe, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
 
IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 5, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded to the arbitration 
panel with instructions.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the Brown County 
Circuit Court's declaratory judgment2 limiting discovery in an 
arbitration proceeding to that allowed by Wis. Stat. § 788.07 
                                                 
1 Marlowe v. IDS Property Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 51, 340 
Wis. 2d 594, 811 N.W.2d 894.   
2 The Honorable Donald R. Zuidmulder presiding. 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
2 
 
(2009-10).3  Mary E. Marlowe and Leslie R. Marlowe (the Marlowes) 
filed a claim with their insurer, IDS Property Casualty 
Insurance Company (IDS), for underinsured motorist benefits 
after a car accident.  The parties were unable to agree on a 
settlement and, pursuant to a provision of the insurance policy, 
submitted the dispute to an arbitration panel.  Prior to the 
anticipated arbitration hearing a conflict over discovery arose,4 
in which IDS sought broad discovery under Wis. Stat. ch. 804, 
the general civil procedure chapter, while the Marlowes refused 
to comply with such discovery on the grounds that § 788.07, the 
discovery 
provision 
designed 
specifically 
for 
arbitration, 
controlled, 
and 
permitted 
only 
the 
taking 
of 
certain 
depositions.5  Interpreting the policy's arbitration provision in 
light of our decision in Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, 
291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42, the arbitration panel decided 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to state and federal statutes 
are to the versions in effect in 2010, when the dispute giving 
rise to this case began, unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Due to the conflict and the subsequent appeals, the 
hearing never took place. 
5 The differences between Wis. Stat. § 788.07 and Wis. Stat. 
ch. 804 are significant.  Section 788.07, which pertains only to 
arbitration, limits discovery in arbitration to "the taking of 
depositions to be used as evidence before the arbitrators, in 
the same manner and for the same reasons as provided by law for 
the taking of depositions in suits or proceedings pending in the 
courts of record in this state."  By contrast, ch. 804, which 
applies to civil litigation in the circuit courts, allows for a 
wide 
range of discovery tools, including interrogatories, 
production of documents, physical and mental examinations of 
parties, inspection of medical documents, and requests for 
admissions.  See generally ch. 804.     
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
3 
 
that IDS was entitled to ch. 804 discovery.  Unsatisfied, the 
Marlowes successfully filed for declaratory judgment in the 
circuit court, obtaining an order reversing the arbitration 
panel's determination and directing that arbitration discovery 
would proceed within the narrow parameters set by § 788.07.  The 
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Marlowes were not 
permitted to pursue relief from the circuit court before the 
panel rendered a final decision on the award, and that full ch. 
804 discovery was available to IDS.           
¶2 
We consider two issues: 1) whether the Marlowes were 
permitted 
to 
seek 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
concerning 
the 
discovery dispute before the arbitration panel ruled on whether 
an award was appropriate and, if so, its amount; and 2) whether 
the panel properly established discovery procedures outside 
those outlined in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  Because no unusual 
circumstances justified an interlocutory appeal, we hold that 
the Marlowes' action in circuit court was premature.  As to the 
second question, the legislature has set forth, in the form of 
§ 788.07, 
a 
narrow 
scope 
of 
discovery 
for 
arbitration 
proceedings in the absence of an explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted arbitration clause to the contrary.  IDS failed to 
include any such language in its policy and we therefore 
instruct the panel to limit discovery to that provided for in 
§ 788.07.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals insofar 
as it declined to allow the Marlowes an interlocutory appeal.  
However, insofar as the court of appeals granted IDS the benefit 
of full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery, we modify its decision and 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
4 
 
instead direct the panel to cabin discovery to the depositions 
contemplated in § 788.07, i.e., "depositions to be used as 
evidence before the arbitrators."  Thus, the decision of the 
court of appeals is modified, and as modified, affirmed, and the 
cause is remanded to the arbitration panel with instructions.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The relevant facts are few and straightforward.  In 
2007, Mary Marlowe was involved in a car accident with an 
underinsured driver.  At the time of the accident, she was 
insured by IDS, under a policy that contained a section 
providing underinsured motorist coverage.  Within that section, 
under the heading, "Arbitration," the policy provided that 
"[u]nless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take 
place in the county in which the insured lives.  Local rules of 
law as to procedure and evidence will apply."  (Bold in 
original.)  The Marlowes submitted a claim to IDS and, after 
fruitless 
settlement 
discussions, 
the 
parties 
agreed, 
in 
accordance with the policy, that an arbitration panel would 
determine whether an award was appropriate and, if so, its 
amount.   
¶4 
To prepare for the arbitration hearing, IDS requested 
various types of discovery materials, including interrogatories, 
the production of documents, the procurement of medical, 
employment, and income tax records, several depositions, and an 
independent medical examination.  As IDS read the policy, it was 
entitled to such materials because the "local rules" referred to 
in the arbitration provision were located in Wis. Stat. ch. 804, 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
5 
 
which authorizes each of the aforementioned discovery tools.  
The Marlowes refused to comply with the request, explaining that 
they believed the "local rules" provision was ambiguous, and 
consequently understood Borst to limit discovery to the far 
narrower boundaries drawn in Wis. Stat. § 788.07, a provision 
allowing only for "the taking of depositions to be used as 
evidence before the arbitrators."6   
¶5 
After considering the parties' arguments on the issue, 
the arbitration panel ruled in IDS's favor, giving it the 
benefit of the broad arsenal of discovery devices described in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 804.  In the unanimous view of the three 
arbitrators, "[t]he term 'local rules of procedure[,'] as the 
policy employs it, is both clear and informative.  It denotes 
the civil rules of procedure that govern court proceedings daily 
in local courtrooms."  After the panel denied a motion to 
reconsider, the Marlowes filed an action in circuit court 
seeking a declaration under Wisconsin's Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04, that they had a legal right 
not to be subjected to the expansive discovery of ch. 804.  The 
circuit court agreed and issued the requested order.  At the 
                                                 
6 At one point during the clash over the proper scope of 
discovery, the Marlowes offered, "in the spirit of attempting to 
reach an amicable resolution," to provide, in addition to the 
depositions mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 788.07, authorizations for 
all of Mary Marlowe's medical records dating back ten years from 
the accident, and to make her available for a two hour 
deposition.  That concession has no bearing on our resolution of 
the case, which hinges only on the type of discovery the law 
requires, not that which it may allow parties to offer to avoid 
unnecessary discord and delay.   
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
6 
 
hearing where it reached its determination, the circuit court 
explained that IDS should have included a more specific 
reference to the discovery it desired in its policy if it wanted 
to later take advantage of the breadth of ch. 804.     
¶6 
When the case reached the court of appeals, the tide 
returned to IDS's favor.  In its decision, the court of appeals 
prohibited the Marlowes from turning to the courts before the 
arbitration proceedings were complete.   Marlowe v. IDS Property 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 51, ¶¶8-18, 340 Wis. 2d 594, 811 
N.W.2d 894. Despite that prohibition, however, the court of 
appeals decided to reach the merits of the discovery dispute and 
affirmed both the panel's reading of the policy as well as its 
understanding of the panel's authority to shape the scope of 
discovery as it saw fit.  Id., ¶¶19-27.  On the first point——
that of the interlocutory appeal——the court of appeals looked 
for guidance to federal cases addressing similar issues.  Id., 
¶¶10-17.  The court of appeals discerned in those cases a rule 
that "interlocutory review of arbitration panels' intermediate 
decisions" 
is 
available 
only 
"under 
limited 
and 
unusual 
circumstances."  Id., ¶14.  Seeing no such circumstances in the 
Marlowes' case, the court held that the circuit court should 
have waited until the panel rendered its final decision before 
weighing in on the discovery dispute.  Id., ¶18.   
¶7 
The court of appeals framed the second issue as the 
scope of the arbitration panel's authority.  According to the 
court, the panel had the "exclusive authority" to interpret the 
"local rules" provision because it "arguably refer[red] to the 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
7 
 
scope of discovery," a procedural matter within the sole 
province of the panel under our opinion in Borst and that of the 
court of appeals in Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 202 Wis. 2d 673, 552 N.W.2d 420 
(Ct. App. 1996).  Id., ¶27.     
 
¶8 
The Marlowes petitioned this court for review.  In 
order to clarify several important features of the arbitration 
system and its relationship to the courts, we granted that 
petition. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
The first issue before us is whether the Marlowes' 
action for a declaratory judgment constituted an interlocutory 
appeal and, if so, whether it was permissible.  Such an issue 
presents a purely legal question, and we thus consider it 
independently of the opinions by the circuit court and court of 
appeals, though benefitting from their analyses.  See generally 
State ex rel. Hass v. Wis. Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, 248 
Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707. 
¶10 With 
respect 
to 
the 
second 
issue——whether 
the 
arbitration panel was entitled to establish discovery procedures 
outside those outlined in Wis. Stat. § 788.07——"[t]he scope of 
judicial review of an arbitration decision is," generally 
speaking, "very limited."  Orlowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 2012 WI 21, ¶13, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775 
(citation omitted).  As such, "[t]here is a strong presumption 
of arbitrability where the contract in question contains an 
arbitration clause," and "[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
8 
 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."  
Cirilli v. Country Ins. & Fin. Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶14, 322 
Wis. 2d 238, 776 N.W.2d 272 (citation omitted).  Pursuant to the 
same deferential standards, an arbitrator's decision concerning 
an award will not be overturned unless "perverse misconstruction 
or positive misconduct is plainly established, or if there is a 
manifest disregard of the law, or if the award itself is illegal 
or violates strong public policy."  City of Madison v. Madison 
Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 425 N.W.2d 8 
(1988) 
(internal 
quotation 
marks, 
brackets, 
and 
citation 
omitted).  But where, as here, a dispute implicates the scope of 
an arbitration panel's authority concerning discovery, an issue 
the legislature has spoken on, the standard of review is less 
deferential.  As we explain in detail below, an arbitration 
panel's decision will be reversed when it allows for discovery 
different from that granted in § 788.07 unless the agreement 
between the parties contains an explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted clause adopting or spelling out a different set of 
discovery guidelines.  See generally Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361.   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶11 We hold as follows.  As no unusual circumstances were 
present to justify an interlocutory appeal, the circuit court 
erred in declaring the Marlowes' rights on a procedural matter 
before the arbitration panel satisfied its responsibilities and 
settled the question of compensation.  However, given that there 
was no explicit, specific, and clearly drafted agreement in the 
policy detailing the discovery procedures to follow, the panel 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
9 
 
should not have granted IDS the use of Wis. Stat. ch. 804's full 
range of discovery mechanisms.  Consequently, we return the 
action to the panel with instructions to limit discovery to the 
section 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature 
for 
precisely 
these 
situations: Wis. Stat. § 788.07. 
A. The Interlocutory Appeal 
¶12 We consider first whether the Marlowes improperly 
sought interlocutory relief.  The Marlowes contend that they did 
not seek such relief and, if they did, that it was permitted.  
Consistent with well-reasoned precedent from other jurisdictions 
and with the fundamental and crucial purposes of arbitration, we 
find that they did seek interlocutory relief, and that it was 
barred. 
1. The Marlowes Sought Interlocutory Relief 
¶13 To ascertain whether the Marlowes improperly pursued 
interlocutory relief, we must, as a threshold matter, determine 
whether they pursued interlocutory relief at all.  Applying 
basic principles of appellate procedure, we have no difficulty 
in answering that they did. 
¶14 The Marlowes' argument for why their filing in circuit 
court did not represent an interlocutory appeal hinges on their 
belief that the arbitration panel was not empowered to order 
Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery.  As the Marlowes see it, since the 
panel had no authority to issue that order, its order was null 
and void ab initio, that is, from the beginning, and the circuit 
court was not reviewing the order at all, let alone on an 
interlocutory basis.  The Marlowes' position is founded on 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
10 
 
several fundamental misunderstandings of the law, and we cannot 
accept it.   
¶15 First, the Marlowes' premise flows from an untenably 
theoretical 
and 
impractical 
characterization 
of 
judicial 
mechanics.  Even if we suspend disbelief and assume with the 
Marlowes that an order exceeding an arbitration panel's power 
vanishes when the order is questioned in court, that does not 
change the fact that the filing in circuit court interrupts an 
ongoing proceeding before the panel.  That is, regardless of 
whether the panel's discovery order was null or not, there was 
nevertheless an arbitration in progress at the time it was 
issued.  It is this fact——not the correctness or validity of the 
order——that renders the action interlocutory.  See, e.g., Brown 
v. Argosy Gaming Co., L.P., 360 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(defining an interlocutory action as "one that merely gives 
pause to the ongoing proceedings to resolve one issue in a 
larger, ongoing dispute . . . .") (Emphasis added.)   
 
¶16 In any event, the arbitration panel indisputably had 
the authority to issue an order relating to discovery, the only 
complaint the Marlowes raise is whether it issued the correct 
discovery order.  Throughout the course of this controversy, it 
has never been suggested by any party or decision-maker that the 
arbitration panel was forbidden from determining the boundaries 
of discovery.  Rather, the Marlowes simply assert that the panel 
erroneously set those boundaries in accordance with one chapter 
of the statutes instead of another.  It follows, then, as amicus 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance helpfully points out, that from the 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
11 
 
Marlowes' perspective, the panel would have acted within its 
jurisdiction if it had ordered discovery in line with Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.07 but exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering discovery in 
line with Wis. Stat. ch. 804.  If that were true, a panel would 
have jurisdiction only if the outcome happened to turn out to be 
right in the judgment of the courts.  That is not how 
jurisdiction works.  See, e.g., Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. Mo.-
Kan.-Tex. R.R Co., 320 U.S. 323, 337 (1943) ("When a court has 
jurisdiction it has of course authority to decide the case 
either way.") (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  For the foregoing reasons, there can be no 
doubt that the circuit court's declaration of the Marlowes' 
rights granted them interlocutory relief. 
2. Interlocutory Relief Was Not Available to the Marlowes 
¶17 Having shown why the Marlowes' action in circuit court 
was interlocutory, we must now confront the question of whether 
they were permitted to seek such relief.  In view of the 
important and well-established purposes of arbitration, they 
were not so permitted.   
¶18 We start, as the court of appeals before us did, with 
the recognition that this issue is one of first impression in 
Wisconsin.  Fortunately, though, it is far from that elsewhere.  
In the absence of binding authority construing the Wisconsin 
Arbitration Act, we look for guidance to decisions from other 
jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions of their own 
arbitration acts.  Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶30.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§§ 788.10 and 788.11 set forth the circumstances in which a 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
12 
 
court can take action on an arbitrator's decision, and thus form 
the bases for our inquiry into the availability of interlocutory 
relief on an arbitration ruling.  The same role is performed in 
the Federal Arbitration Act by 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11, which 
contain nearly identical language to the corresponding Wisconsin 
provisions. 
 
We 
therefore 
consult 
the 
non-binding 
cases 
addressing the issue as persuasive authority, and in this 
instance we find them especially persuasive.   
¶19 A number of other jurisdictions have held that 
intermediate relief from arbitrators' decisions is not typically 
available.  See Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator 
"Sneeze"?--Do 
Federal 
Courts 
have 
Jurisdiction 
over 
"Interlocutory" Awards in Class Action Arbitrations?, 34 Vt. L. 
Rev. 493, 506 (2010) ("The courts, when usually confronted with 
non-final awards, claim that they should generally refrain from 
intervention and allow arbitration to run its course.").  These 
decisions are based on the sound theory that the courts must 
facilitate as much as possible the primary aims of arbitration: 
providing a forum to resolve disputes more quickly, efficiently, 
and cheaply than courts can.  See Compania Panemena Maritima San 
Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286, 289 (2d 
Cir. 1957)(noting that challenges to intermediate arbitration 
decisions "result only in a waste of time, the interruption of 
the arbitration proceeding, and encourage delaying tactics in a 
proceeding that is supposed to produce a speedy decision."); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536, 544 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(declining to allow an interlocutory appeal of an interim 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
13 
 
arbitration 
decision 
because 
"[p]iecemeal 
litigation 
would 
result").  In Wisconsin, as much as in the federal system, 
arbitration is designed to facilitate the speedy, efficient 
resolution of disputes without encumbering parties with all of 
the expenses and formalities associated with civil litigation in 
the courts.  See, e.g., Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶24, 268 
Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 ("[P]ublic policy favors arbitration 
as promoting the efficient resolution of disputes, and as giving 
the parties what they bargained for, that is, an arbitrator's, 
not a court's decision.").  Those advantages accrue not only to 
parties but to the circuit courts, which experience a lightening 
of their substantial dockets, saving the taxpayers money and 
litigants both money and time.  See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio Chi. 
Terminal R.R. Co. v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 154 F.3d 404, 409 (7th 
Cir. 
1998) 
(Posner, 
J.) 
(remarking 
that 
one 
purpose 
of 
arbitration "is to lighten the pressure on the courts") 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
It 
is 
self-evident 
that 
any 
rule 
encouraging parties to shuttle their cases to and from court in 
the midst of an arbitration proceeding would substantially slow 
down the arbitration process and impose significant costs on the 
parties, thereby defeating the most central objectives of 
arbitration.  We therefore adopt the sensible rule followed by 
the authorities cited above, and hold that in Wisconsin a party 
involved in an arbitration proceeding must ordinarily wait until 
the arbitrators have reached a final decision on the award to be 
given, if any, before turning to the circuit courts.  
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
14 
 
 
¶20 Those courts that have permitted interlocutory review 
during an arbitration proceeding have done so only in rare 
circumstances that present a compelling reason to depart from 
the normal practice.  For instance, interlocutory appeals have 
been entertained when the intermediate ruling could subject the 
aggrieved party to irreparable harm, Aerojet-General Corp. v. 
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(regarding the fixing of venue), or when such review is 
necessary to preserve assets pending a final ruling from the 
arbitrator on the award.  Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Cont'l Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345, 347-48 (7th Cir. 1994).  Again, we 
embrace the unassailable logic underlying these cases, as they 
properly balance the need for efficient and orderly arbitration 
proceedings with the need for an occasional exception to 
accommodate 
especially 
urgent 
or 
potentially 
irreparably 
prejudicial matters that demand the immediate attention of the 
courts.   
 
¶21 The Marlowes do not suggest that the discovery dispute 
at arbitration was unusual in such a way as to justify 
intermediate intervention by the circuit court, and we see no 
evidence to that effect.  On the contrary, there has been no 
showing that the request for limited discovery was either 
especially urgent or that it posed the threat of irreparable 
injury.  Tellingly, in the only Wisconsin case involving a 
similar discovery dispute, we remanded the cause back to the 
arbitration panel after it had allowed overbroad discovery and 
issued an award, Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶4, thus indicating 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
15 
 
that such disputes can be effectively resolved within the course 
of 
the 
ordinary 
appellate 
process, 
without 
resorting 
to 
inefficient, time-consuming practices which defeat the very 
purpose of arbitration.  While certainly not dispositive of the 
matter, this precedent underscores why the arbitration panel 
here was entitled to fully discharge its duties before being 
second-guessed on an intermediate matter by the circuit court.7  
As a result, we affirm the court of appeals decision insofar as 
it correctly held that the Marlowes' action for declaratory 
relief constituted an improper interlocutory appeal. 
B. The Discovery Dispute 
¶22 Although it seems at first blush incongruous for us to 
first hold that the Marlowes were not permitted to seek 
interlocutory relief and then grant such relief, we do so 
because the court of appeals unnecessarily and incorrectly 
addressed the merits of the discovery dispute before us.  The 
court of appeals elected to address the discovery dispute while 
recognizing that it did not need to reach the question after 
holding that an intermediate appeal was barred.  Marlowe, 340 
                                                 
7 As it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case, we do 
not demarcate today the full range of situations in which 
intermediate relief may be available to a party challenging an 
adverse decision made at arbitration.  See State v. Smith, 2012 
WI 91, ¶62 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 (reminding 
"that the court resolves the facts before it, and does not issue 
advisory opinions or address hypothetical facts") (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 635 (2012).  We 
caution that other circumstances may arise in which such appeals 
may be appropriate, and they should be considered on their own 
facts, under the same broad principles we enunciate here.   
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 n.8.  As we will show, the court of appeals 
erred in concluding that the arbitration panel had the exclusive 
authority to dictate the discovery procedures to follow, and the 
arbitration panel erred in ordering full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 
discovery.  Therefore, if we were to limit our review to the 
issue of interlocutory relief, we would allow an erroneous rule 
to retain the force of law, not only in this case, but in all 
others.  Moreover, further delay of the issue's ultimate 
resolution would impede even further the efficient disposition 
the parties bargained for by agreeing to arbitration.  Lastly, 
we will be required to answer the important question presented 
by the discovery dispute sooner or later.  It would only 
frustrate judicial economy were we to unnecessarily put the 
question off for another day, particularly when we would thereby 
cause arbitration in this case to proceed under the wrong 
statute in violation of a clear legislative dictate.  With that 
in mind, we choose to take up the question sooner rather than 
later.8   
                                                 
8 As the concurrence sees it, our reasoning on this point 
"justif[ies] judicial intervention by the circuit court . . . ."  
Concurrence, ¶67 (emphasis added).  Phrased differently, the 
concurrence believes that the unusual circumstances present here 
warranted interlocutory relief at every level of the court 
system.  As should be clear from our analysis, though, the 
reasons requiring us to reach the discovery dispute——the fact 
that the court of appeals erroneously reached and decided the 
question, the gross and perverse inefficiency of further delay, 
and the inevitability of our ultimate consideration of the 
issue——are reasons that apply with special force here, and have 
little to no relevance to the circuit court.  That court, unlike 
our own, was not required to correct an erroneous, published 
appellate opinion, because the case had not yet arrived at the 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
17 
 
¶23 As we demonstrate below, a fair reading of the policy, 
under our binding and well-reasoned case law, prohibited the 
arbitration panel from ordering full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 
discovery.  That same case law allows for judicial correction of 
the panel's error.  Accordingly, we instruct the arbitration 
panel to limit discovery to that provided for in Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.07. 
1. Discovery Should Have Been Limited to Wis. Stat. § 788.07 
¶24 From the onset of this dispute, the central importance 
of one decision has been acknowledged by all involved: our 
opinion in Borst.  Upon review of that case, we find its 
                                                                                                                                                             
appellate level and because it would not have been empowered to 
do so.  In addition, there was far less of a demand for 
expeditiousness in the circuit court's disposition than ours, as 
the case had been pending for a significantly shorter period at 
that time and was undergoing its first stage of judicial review, 
not its third.  Finally, it was not so urgent as a state-wide 
matter for the circuit court to resolve the question, as its 
opinion bound only the parties and not, like our own, all 
Wisconsin contract-drafters, contract-signers, and courts.  See 
Raasch v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI App 54, ¶8, 310 
Wis. 2d 230, 
750 
N.W.2d 492 
(Ct. 
App. 
2008) 
("[A]lthough 
circuit-court opinions may be persuasive because of their 
reasoning, 
they 
are 
never 
'precedential.'") 
(emphasis 
in 
original) (citation omitted).  To the extent the concurrence 
believes that some unique circumstance justified the circuit 
court's 
interlocutory 
intervention, 
we 
see 
no 
persuasive 
reasoning to that effect in the concurrence itself, and no 
reasoning to justify that result at all in our own discussion, 
in the briefs, or in any authority that has been brought to our 
attention.  The concurrence observes that it is incongruous not 
just at first blush, but at "second[] or third blush" to find 
judicial relief from the circuit court premature while granting 
it here.  Concurrence, ¶67.  That may be, but the concurrence 
cannot resolve the incongruity either, no matter how much 
blushing it does.      
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
18 
 
application here clear.  If IDS desired to utilize Wis. Stat. 
ch. 804 discovery, it was required to expressly, clearly, and 
specifically say so in its policy.  Because it did not, the 
panel erred in ordering such discovery and Borst compels us to 
correct the error. 
a) Borst Is Clarified and Reaffirmed 
¶25 Although we do not share IDS's view that the facts of 
Borst are particularly helpful to our decision here, in light of 
its unequivocal holding, we briefly recite the relevant details 
to provide context and to address IDS's argument.  In Borst, the 
plaintiff was injured in a car accident with an uninsured 
motorist and filed a claim for compensation with his insurer, 
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).  291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶5.  
After settlement negotiations failed, the claim was submitted to 
arbitration pursuant to a provision in the policy that was 
silent on the question of the scope of discovery.  Id., ¶8.  In 
anticipation of the arbitration hearing, Allstate asked Borst 
for answers to written interrogatories, document production, and 
medical authorizations.  Id., ¶10.  Borst refused to comply, 
instead 
filing 
a 
motion 
to 
quash 
the 
discovery. 
 
Id.  
Eventually, Borst sued Allstate in circuit court on claims of 
breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud and misrepresentation.  
Id., ¶12.  Borst also sought a permanent injunction enjoining 
further arbitration.  Id.  After the circuit court remanded the 
matter back to the arbitrators, the panel allowed Allstate's 
requested broad discovery and decided the award, the circuit 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
19 
 
court confirmed that award, and the court of appeals then 
certified the case to this court.   
¶26 As for the most important aspect of Borst——its 
holding——this court unanimously ruled in that case that the 
panel erred in permitting extensive discovery and should instead 
have confined it to the depositions afforded in Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.07.  We began our consideration of the issue with a 
summary, in a paragraph worth quoting in full for reasons that 
will soon be apparent, thusly: 
We 
conclude 
that 
arbitrators 
have 
no 
inherent 
authority to dictate the scope of discovery, and 
absent an express agreement to the contrary, the 
parties are limited to depositions as spelled out in 
Chapter 788.  We agree with the State Bar that parties 
would be well-served to either: (1) explicitly address 
the scope of discovery and the procedures to resolve 
disputes regarding discovery; or (2) reference a set 
of 
established 
[Alternative 
Dispute 
Resolution] 
provider rules that specify how discovery should be 
handled. 
Id., ¶56. 
¶27   To reach that result, the Borst court first examined 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 788.07 and the Wisconsin Arbitration 
Act as a whole, concluding that neither mentioned any type of 
discovery other than "depositions to be used as evidence before 
the arbitrators."  Id., ¶58 (quoting § 788.07).  "To allow for 
the amount of discovery Allstate seeks," the court went on, "we 
would have to read more into § 788.07 than is present in the 
statutory 
language," 
an 
approach 
that 
would 
transgress 
established rules of statutory construction.  Id. (citation 
omitted).   
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
20 
 
¶28 Continuing its analysis, Borst observed that because 
arbitration is a matter of contract, the "parties can contract 
to allow arbitrators a wide amount of latitude in managing the 
arbitration, subject to the constraints of the law."  Id., ¶59 
(citing Employers, 202 Wis. 2d 673).  Justice Wilcox, speaking 
for the court, therefore determined that "absent a contractual 
provision specifying how discovery will be handled, the parties 
are limited to the discovery procedures provided in" Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.07.  Id.  In support of that conclusion, the court 
reasoned that a grant of inherent authority to arbitrators to 
order broader discovery where the policy is silent on the scope 
of discovery "would give us pause as we do not want to turn the 
arbitration process into another trial system," with all of its 
attendant formalities and expenses.  Id., ¶¶60, 61.  Stated 
differently, "[a]rbitrators have no inherent authority to 
dictate the scope of discovery and absent an express agreement, 
the parties are limited to the procedure for depositions, as 
described in Wis. Stat. § 788.07."  Id., ¶63.  "[T]he better 
approach," we therefore concluded, "is to leave it to the 
parties, in the future, to ensure arbitration agreements are 
clearly drafted, and detail the necessary components and 
procedures of the desired arbitration."  Id., ¶60.  Turning to 
the facts at hand, we explained that "there were no set 
provisions in the insurance contract that detailed the terms of 
the discovery in the arbitration.  Therefore, if the parties 
decide to conduct another arbitration, discovery will be limited 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
21 
 
to depositions as detailed in Wis. Stat. § 788.07."  Id., ¶62 
(footnote omitted).   
¶29 Given the overwhelming significance of Borst to the 
case at bar, we pause to clarify its holding and reaffirm its 
soundness.  Borst was not as precise as it might have been on 
what is required of an arbitration clause in order for the 
parties 
to 
have 
access 
to 
discovery 
broader 
than 
that 
contemplated in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  To be sure, the opinion 
did use a number of terms with roughly similar, if not 
identical, 
meanings: 
"express," 
"explicitly," 
"specify," 
"clearly drafted," "detail," and so on.  Yet as IDS fairly 
observes, most of these terms are not presented as formulations 
of 
the 
holding, 
and 
some 
are 
not 
even 
formulated 
as 
requirements.  For example, the Borst court indicated "that 
parties would be well-served to . . . explicitly address the 
scope of discovery," id., ¶56 (emphasis added), not that they 
had to.  Likewise, the court advised that "the better approach 
is to leave it to the parties, in the future, to ensure 
arbitration agreements are clearly drafted," id., ¶60 (emphasis 
added), but stopped short of announcing that inferior approaches 
would necessarily deprive parties of Wis. Stat. ch. 804's 
discovery tools.   
¶30 We need not be detained by such ambiguity long, for we 
conclude that Borst's several formulations of the standard 
cohere to form a single holding: for a party in arbitration to 
enjoy discovery outside of Wis. Stat. § 788.07, the insurance 
policy must provide for it expressly, explicitly, specifically, 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
22 
 
and in a clearly drafted clause.  To begin, the various 
iterations of the standard set forth in Borst are plainly not in 
conflict with one another.  That is to say, a provision may 
plainly be express, explicit, specific, and clearly drafted all 
at the same time.  More importantly, if an arbitration panel has 
no inherent authority to order Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery in 
the absence of a policy provision to the contrary, and if that 
is in part because the legislature has enacted a statute to 
address this narrow area of law, it naturally follows that the 
discovery provision must be "express," "explicit," "specific," 
and "clearly drafted."9  Without that requirement, as we explain 
shortly, § 788.07 would lose all force, and we cannot treat 
legislative commands so cavalierly.  For purposes of summary and 
clarification, everything we said in Borst about how a policy 
can 
authorize 
discovery 
broader 
than 
that 
envisioned 
by 
§ 788.07, whether hortatory or mandatory, is the law: to permit 
such discovery, the policy must provide for it explicitly, 
specifically, and in a clearly drafted clause.10                    
                                                 
9 Because the words "express" and "explicit" have similar 
meanings, and because we believe "explicit" covers the same 
ground as "express" and more, in the interest of simplicity we 
henceforth omit the word "express" from the standard.  See The 
American Heritage Dictionary 626 (5th ed. 2011) (indicating that 
"express" is synonymous with "explicit").    
10 The concurrence/dissent characterizes these requirements 
as "tough new conditions" set by today's opinion.  Dissent, 
¶114.  They may be tough, but they are certainly not new, as 
each word appears in Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, 291 
Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42.  For ease of reference, we will 
henceforth refer to the concurrence/dissent as simply "the 
dissent." 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
23 
 
¶31 Understood in these terms, the holding of Borst is as 
vital today as it was at the time the case was decided.  In 
short, 
arbitration 
must 
remain 
a 
speedy, 
cost-efficient 
alternative to conventional litigation, not an equally slow, 
cumbersome process that simply happens to take place in front of 
an arbitration panel rather than a circuit court judge.  Id., 
¶60 ("[W]e do not want to turn the arbitration process into 
another trial system."); cf. Franke, 268 Wis. 2d 360, ¶24 
("[P]ublic policy favors arbitration as promoting the efficient 
resolution of disputes, and as giving the parties what they 
bargained 
for, 
that 
is, 
an 
arbitrator's, 
not 
a 
court's 
decision.").  With Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery, arbitration 
proceedings become, quite literally, the mirror image of civil 
litigation, 
at 
least 
as 
respects 
discovery. 
 
As 
Borst 
recognized, arbitration is a creature of contract, and if 
parties desire to engage in the same time-consuming and 
burdensome discovery tactics that lengthen delays and increase 
costs in the circuit courts, that is their prerogative.  291 
Wis. 2d 361, ¶59 ("[P]arties can contract to allow arbitrators a 
wide amount of latitude in managing the arbitration . . . .") 
(Emphasis added.)  But that is a far cry from an ever-present 
legal entitlement to such tactics in a proceeding designed to do 
without them.11   
                                                 
11 In its ruling on the discovery dispute, the arbitration 
panel insisted that, "[if] the purpose of arbitration is to 
achieve 
an 
expedited, 
efficient 
decision 
that 
ultimately 
determines the truth, more, not less, preparation for hearing is 
the most sensible way to achieve that . . . ."  We do not grasp 
the panel's reasoning.  Certainly an argument could be made that 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
24 
 
¶32 The 
second, 
and 
related, 
strain 
of 
reasoning 
underpinning Borst is equally persuasive to us now: the 
legislature has provided a boundary for the scope of discovery 
in arbitration to serve as the default, and, in the absence of 
any contractual agreement to the contrary, that boundary should 
be given effect.  We fully agree with Borst that we would 
insufficiently respect our co-equal branch were we to allow 
arbitrators to ignore a legislative dictate at will.  291 Wis.2d 
361, ¶58 ("To allow for the amount of discovery Allstate seeks, 
we would have to read more into § 788.07 than is present in the 
statutory language.").  If arbitrators could order discovery 
outside the confines of § 788.07 whenever they chose, regardless 
of what the policy provided, the statute would lose all force, 
an outcome we are loath to sanction.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 ("It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the 
judiciary to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the 
legislature . . . .").  And, as should be evident already, we 
believe the legislature's approach to discovery in arbitration 
was eminently reasonable, as it is entirely in keeping with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
more expansive discovery better facilitates a search for the 
"truth," but we fail to understand how broader discovery could 
possibly be regarded as more "expedited" or "efficient."  
Similarly, the panel took pains to note that Wis. Stat. ch. 804 
does 
"not 
contemplate 
unfettered 
discovery," 
but 
rather 
discovery "that is quick and efficient, [and] cost effective."  
That may be, but it surely does contemplate discovery that is 
less fettered than that authorized by Wis. Stat. § 788.07, as 
well as less quick, less efficient, and less cost effective, 
which is exactly the point. 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
25 
 
fundamental 
goals 
of 
the 
system: 
efficient, 
inexpensive 
resolution of disputes.   
¶33 There is one other aspect of Borst that requires 
clarification.  To repeat language we have already quoted, the 
Borst court remarked that "parties would be well-served to 
either: (1) explicitly address the scope of discovery and the 
procedures to resolve disputes regarding discovery; or (2) 
reference a set of established [Alternative Dispute Resolution] 
provider rules that specify how discovery should be handled."  
291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶56 (emphasis added).  As suggested by our 
emphasis, it is important that Borst phrased this as an 
either/or proposition.  That is, parties can make available 
discovery that differs from the depositions contemplated by Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07 without necessarily referring to a set of 
discovery guidelines established elsewhere, so long as the 
parties spell out the discovery guidelines themselves in the 
arbitration agreement.  In other words, rather than providing, 
say, that "Wis. Stat. § 788.07 will govern all discovery in 
preparation for the arbitration hearing," a policy could instead 
enumerate the types of discovery the parties would have access 
to 
in 
arbitration, 
such 
as 
interrogatories, 
medical 
examinations, and so on.  However, if a policy takes that 
approach, it must meet the same standard that applies when an 
arbitration clause adopts a set of guidelines articulated 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
26 
 
elsewhere: it must express the types of discovery explicitly, 
specifically, and in a clearly drafted clause.12        
  
¶34 Before turning to the application of Borst here, one 
final 
point 
must 
be 
made. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 788.06(2) 
authorizes arbitrators and parties' representatives to issue 
subpoenas under Wis. Stat. § 805.07, the general subpoena 
statute in the code of civil procedure.  In contradistinction to 
the dissent, we do not understand § 788.06(2) to expand the 
scope of arbitration discovery because the provision relates to 
the arbitration hearing itself, not the discovery that may 
precede 
it. 
 
The 
heading 
of 
the 
statute 
confirms 
our 
interpretation, as it reads, "Hearings before arbitrators; 
                                                 
12 The dissent rejects this rule, but it is not clear 
exactly why or in favor of what.  In places, the dissent 
suggests that Borst was wrongly decided.  Dissent, ¶111 
("Borst's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 788.07 created a 
restrictive rule, but that rule disregarded the adjacent 
statute . . . .").  Elsewhere, the dissent instead pins the 
blame on today's majority, accusing it of injecting a novel 
misunderstanding into the law.  See, e.g., id., ¶114 (describing 
the "explicit, specific, and clearly drafted" test as imposing 
"tough new conditions . . . .") (emphasis added); ¶88 ("[T]he 
majority 
opinion 
undercuts 
the 
contractual 
authority 
of 
arbitrators and creates a serious disincentive for parties to 
agree to arbitration.") (Emphasis added.)  Both cannot be true.  
Although the dissent somewhat ambiguously proposes that the 
"court 
should 
pursue" 
the 
"options" 
of 
"clarify[ing], 
modif[ying], or distinguish[ing]" Borst "on the facts," dissent, 
¶100, the dissent's bottom-line, that the "explicit, specific, 
and clearly drafted" test be discarded, is fundamentally 
incompatible with Borst's unequivocal holding and its underlying 
reasoning.  We see no way in which those words and the rationale 
behind them can be "clarified, modified, or distinguished" out 
of the opinion.  However it chooses to couch the issue, the 
dissent would essentially have us overrule Borst, and for the 
reasons stated, we decline to do so.                   
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
27 
 
procedure."13  (Emphasis added.)  See Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. 
Nat'l Farmers Org., 64 Wis. 2d 241, 253, 219 N.W.2d 564 (1974) 
("Although the title is not part of the statute it may be 
persuasive of the interpretation to be given the statute.").  
Presumably, the parties, the arbitration panel, and the court of 
appeals 
all 
acknowledged 
this 
fact, 
as 
none 
mentioned 
                                                 
13 In a passing footnote, the dissent intimates that the 
appearance 
of 
the 
word 
"Hearings" 
in 
the 
heading 
is 
inconsequential on account of the semicolon and text that 
follow: "Hearings before arbitrators; procedure."  Dissent, ¶106 
n.7.  According to the dissent, the "Hearings" goes with Wis. 
Stat. § 788.06(1), whereas the "procedure" goes with (2).  Id.  
In line with that reading, the dissent flatly asserts that 
"[t]he procedure applies to more than hearings because of the 
references to Wis. Stat. § 805.07."  Id.  But the following 
sections are as much about arbitration procedure as are the 
subpoena provisions.  See Wis. Stat. § 788.07 (dealing with 
depositions in arbitration); Wis. Stat. § 788.08 (requiring that 
awards be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitration 
panel); Wis. Stat. § 788.09 (setting forth the procedure for 
confirming arbitration awards in court); Wis. Stat. § 788.10 
(establishing the mechanisms for vacating awards and obtaining a 
rehearing by the arbitrators).  And as the dissent implies, at 
least some of § 788.06(2) is unquestionably about hearings, 
namely its references to "the circuit court for the county in 
which the hearing is held" and to "[w]itnesses and interpreters 
attending before an arbitration." (Emphasis added.)  If the 
legislature intended to enact two unrelated provisions, one 
about hearings and one covering subpoenas with no connection to 
hearings, it presumably would have made § 788.06(1) its own 
section, and entitled it "Hearings before arbitrators," and 
given § 788.06(2) its own section and entitled it "Subpoenas," 
much as it did with the very next section, which is entitled 
"Depositions" and discusses, unsurprisingly, depositions.  We 
prefer to begin with the assumption that the legislature's 
organizational scheme and choice of headings matters, rather 
than discounting it out of hand.  See, e.g., State v. Leitner, 
2002 WI 77, ¶33, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (reiterating 
that the court presumes that the legislature acted carefully in 
drafting laws).     
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
28 
 
§ 788.06(2) or 
the 
subpoena power at any stage of the 
proceedings.14  Borst did not consider § 788.06(2) either, we 
assume for the same good reasons, namely, that everyone involved 
in the case tacitly recognized that the provision dealt with 
hearings, not discovery.15   
¶35 The 
statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 788.06(2) 
confirms our interpretation of its significance.  See State v. 
Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶16, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 215 ("[A] 
review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning 
analysis.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 560 (2012).  The first 
version of the statute appeared in 1931.  Compare Wis. Stat. ch. 
298 (1929) with Wis. Stat. ch. 298 (1931).  At that time, only 
the arbitrators, not the parties, were empowered to issue 
subpoenas.  See Wis. Stat. § 298.06 (1931).  Moreover, the 
statute contained several indications that the subpoena power 
related only to the hearing, not to pre-hearing discovery.  For 
example, § 298.06 authorized the arbitrators to "summon in 
writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a 
                                                 
14 The circuit court did refer to Wis. Stat. ch. 788's 
subpoena powers at several times during the hearing, but chiefly 
to make the point that IDS never applied to the panel to use 
such powers. 
15 In its briefs here and in the court of appeals in Borst, 
Allstate mentioned Wis. Stat. § 788.06(2) in passing, purely so 
as to distinguish the dispute from a federal case addressing the 
question of whether arbitration panels are empowered to subpoena 
third parties.  Allstate, like IDS, never asked us to construe 
§ 788.06(2) as expanding the scope of discovery at arbitration. 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
29 
 
witness . . . ."  Id. (Emphasis added.)  The statute also 
instructed that subpoenas in arbitration would "be served in the 
same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the 
court."  (Emphasis added.)  Such language strongly reinforces 
the view that the subpoena power related to hearings, not to 
discovery.   
¶36 In 1985, the arbitration subpoena statute, by then 
renumbered Wis. Stat. § 788.06, took on its current form.  See 
1985 Wis. Act 168, § 1.  The principal substantive change in the 
statute was the extension of the subpoena power from solely the 
arbitrators to the arbitrators and the parties (through their 
representatives). 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.06(2) 
(1985).  
Presumably as part of the effort to modernize, condense, and 
clarify 
the 
statute, 
however, 
the 
language 
quoted 
above 
referring to hearings was removed.  However, two significant 
additions 
were 
made 
that 
demonstrate 
the 
subpoena 
power 
continued to relate only to hearings.  First, the statute was 
now entitled, "Hearings before arbitrators; procedure."  Id. 
(Emphasis added.)  Equally importantly, the legislature inserted 
the following sentence into § 788.06(2): "If any person so 
served neglects or refuses to obey the subpoena, the issuing 
party may petition the circuit court for the county in which the 
hearing is held to impose a remedial sanction . . . in the same 
manner provided for witnesses in circuit court."  Id. (Emphasis 
added.)  It would be peculiar, to say the least, for a discovery 
statute to refer to a hearing that might never occur as though 
it were inevitable.  See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
30 
 
550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (noting that "the threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.").16          
                                                 
16 Because Wis. Stat. § 788.06 is unambiguous, we need not 
consult any extrinsic sources to ascertain the intent behind it, 
such as legislative history.  See, e.g., State v. Lamar, 2011 WI 
50, ¶23, 334 Wis. 2d 536, 799 N.W.2d 758 ("If the language [of a 
statute] is ambiguous, however, we look beyond the language and 
examine extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation, such as 
the legislative history of the statute.") (citation omitted).  
Even if it were accepted, arguendo, that the statute was 
ambiguous, however, the legislative history would reaffirm our 
reading.  Concededly, the language from the 1931 statute more 
directly conveyed the fact that it was limited to hearings than 
does the current statute, given that it explicitly cabined the 
subpoenas to summons to "any person to attend before [the 
arbitrators] . . . as a witness . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 298.06 
(1931) (emphasis added).  By contrast, the current incarnation 
of the statute does not so precisely define the proceedings to 
which the subpoenas apply.  See § 788.06.  Nevertheless, the 
only notes in the sparse legislative materials for 1985 Wis. Act 
168, § 1 that shed any light on the purpose of the alterations 
focus exclusively on the expansion of the subpoena power to 
parties' representatives; they say nothing about an expansion of 
the statute from hearings to discovery.  See Drafting File, 1985 
Wis. Act 168, Judicial Council Note on A.B. 498, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. ("The revised section permits 
arbitration subpoenas to be issued by any arbitrator or by an 
attorney for a party who has been delivered blank subpoenas by 
an arbitrator.  It conforms arbitration subpoena practice to 
that followed in circuit court.") (emphasis added); Drafting 
File, 1985 Wis. Act 168, Fiscal Estimate by the Director of 
State Courts on A.B. 498, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis. ("This bill would allow arbitration subpoenas to be issued 
by any arbitrator or by an attorney for a party who has been 
delivered blank subpoenas by an arbitrator.  Presently, a 
majority of the arbitrators sitting at the hearing must sign the 
summons.") (Emphasis added.)  It can only be inferred from this 
single-minded focus that the legislature had no desire to expand 
subpoenas from the hearing context to that of discovery.               
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
31 
 
¶37 There is no cause to apply Wis. Stat. § 788.06(2) 
here, and there was no cause to do so in Borst.17          
¶38 For the stated reasons, Borst was rightly decided and 
it remains good law.  We now apply it to the present case.   
b) The Policy Did Not Satisfy Borst's Requirements 
¶39 Reviewing the policy under the well-reasoned Borst 
decision, we hold that the arbitration panel erred in ordering 
broad discovery when the policy contained no explicit, specific, 
and clearly drafted clause making such discovery available. 
¶40 There are two pertinent passages from the policy.  As 
noted, the one that has been at the crux of this dispute, and 
therefore the one on which most of our analysis will focus, 
provides that "[l]ocal rules of law as to procedure and evidence 
will apply" at arbitration.  Before we get to that clause, 
however, there is another provision that warrants examination.  
That provision indicates that "[a] person seeking any coverage 
must: 
. . . [c]ooperate 
with 
[IDS] 
in 
the 
investigation, 
settlement or defense of any claim or suit" and "[s]ubmit, as 
often as [IDS] reasonably require[s] . . . [t]o physical exams."  
IDS does not contend in its brief here that this provision 
                                                 
17 The dissent complains that it "makes little sense" that 
Wis. Stat. § 788.06 is confined to hearings.  Dissent, ¶106.  
Maybe so, but it was the legislature's decision, not ours, and 
we do not sit in judgment of its wisdom.  See, e.g., Progressive 
Northern 
Ins. 
Co. 
v. 
Romanshek, 
2005 
WI 
67, 
¶60, 
281 
Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 ("When acting within constitutional 
limitations, the legislature settles and declares the public 
policy of a state, and not the court.") (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
32 
 
imposes 
a 
freestanding 
requirement 
independent 
of 
the 
arbitration clause that the Marlowes violated by refusing to 
engage in full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery.  Asked at oral 
argument whether that was his position, counsel for IDS 
responded that such an argument had been made to the arbitration 
panel, and that if IDS had sought a medical examination pursuant 
to the provision that the Marlowes "would have" refused.  We 
decline to entertain an argument that has not been properly 
submitted to our consideration, and we decline to base our 
ruling on a hypothetical series of events.  State v. Smith, 2012 
WI 91, ¶62 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 (reminding 
"that the court resolves the facts before it, and does not issue 
advisory opinions or address hypothetical facts") (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 635 (2012).   
¶41 Nevertheless, 
for 
purposes 
of 
illuminating 
and 
clarifying the rule established by Borst, we note that such a 
provision would not, even if properly preserved and argued, 
allow 
for 
full 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
804 
discovery. 
 
Most 
significantly, the language gives no indication, either by 
content or context, that it speaks to discovery, let alone to 
discovery preceding arbitration.  Such an omission is even more 
fatal juxtaposed with the fact that the policy does contain a 
provision under the explicit heading of "Arbitration," a 
provision that says nothing about physical examinations or 
anything of the sort.  For a policy to adequately describe the 
discovery mechanisms to be used at arbitration it must, at the 
very least, indicate in the policy that the mechanisms are in 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
33 
 
fact discovery mechanisms, and that they are meant to be 
available at arbitration.  Anything short of that plainly does 
not qualify as explicit, specific, or clearly drafted, and thus 
does not satisfy the Borst standard.18             
¶42 Moving to the heart of the dispute, we next review the 
arbitration clause itself, which provides that "[l]ocal rules of 
law as to procedure and evidence will apply."  The arbitration 
panel thought this cursory clause "clear and informative."  It 
is neither, and it consequently does not come remotely close to 
satisfying the bar established by Borst.   
¶43 Beginning with the most obvious point, the sentence 
says nothing about discovery whatsoever, let alone which 
discovery rules the drafter had in mind; it mentions only 
"procedure and evidence."  Such broad and amorphous terms could 
connote any number of things.  Perhaps most problematically, 
                                                 
18 "[I]t is imperative" to the dissent "for the majority to 
explain why the discovery sought by IDS was not explicitly 
authorized" by this language in the policy.  Dissent, ¶123.  It 
is imperative to us as well, and that is why we have explained 
it in detail: because IDS is not relying on the language 
(something the dissent neglects to mention) and because the 
language 
says 
nothing 
about 
discovery 
in 
a 
policy 
that 
specifically addresses the issue.  The language may represent 
"explicit, specific, and clear" guidelines, id., ¶43, but they 
are 
far 
from 
"explicit, 
specific, 
and 
clear" 
guidelines 
governing discovery, and that is precisely what the law 
requires.  See Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶62 ("[T]here were no set 
provisions in the insurance contract that detailed the terms of 
the discovery in the arbitration.  Therefore, if the parties 
decide to conduct another arbitration, discovery will be limited 
to depositions as detailed in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.") (emphasis 
added); ¶63 ("Arbitrators have no inherent authority to dictate 
the scope of discovery and absent an express agreement, the 
parties are limited to" § 788.07) (emphasis added).          
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
34 
 
they could easily be understood to relate only to the hearing 
itself, not to anything that preceded it.  We begin, therefore, 
with the uncontested premise19 that the language in question is 
ambiguous.  See Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶13, 264 
Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857 ("Insurance policy language is 
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.") 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).         
¶44 The ambiguity is deepened by the fact that the phrase 
"local rules of law as to procedure and evidence" does not, 
contrary 
to the assumption shared by both IDS and the 
arbitration panel, give any indication that those rules are to 
be found in one particular chapter of the statutes rather than 
another.  In fact, the phrase gives no indication that the rules 
are to be found in the statutes at all.  Quite to the contrary, 
"local rules" might easily and plausibly be read as a reference 
to the rules of the circuit court of the county in which the 
claim is brought, or the local federal district court, both of 
                                                 
19 In its brief, IDS repeatedly notes that the Marlowes have 
"conceded" that the arbitration clause is ambiguous, and IDS 
nowhere asserts that the phrase "local rules" is unambiguous.  
Amicus Wisconsin Insurance Alliance likewise suggested at oral 
argument that it believes the clause to be ambiguous.  We 
therefore assume that it is now undisputed that the clause is 
ambiguous.      
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
35 
 
which may promulgate such rules.20  See, e.g., Drow v. Schwarz, 
225 Wis. 2d 362, ¶16, 592 N.W.2d 623 (1999) (referring to 
circuit court rules as "local rules"); State ex rel. Mitsubishi 
Heavy Indus. Am., Inc. v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cnty., 2000 WI 
16, ¶37, 233 Wis. 2d 1, 605 N.W.2d 868 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) (referring to federal district court rules as "local 
rules").  This possibility is especially likely given that we 
read the disputed ambiguous provision, as always, within the 
context of the policy as a whole.  See, e.g., Wadzinski v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶16, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 
N.W.2d 819.  Outside the disputed arbitration clause, the policy 
twice refers to Wis. Stat. ch. 34421 with specific, formal legal 
citations.22  If the drafters intended to refer to ch. 804, they 
                                                 
20 In 
its 
opinion 
denying 
the 
Marlowes' 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, the panel dismissed this possibility because 
circuit court rules are meant only to supplement the statutes 
and because the Brown County Circuit Court happened not to have 
promulgated any rules regarding evidence.  Neither explanation 
is persuasive.  A party may well want the benefit of the more 
comprehensive set of procedures that court rules, in conjunction 
with the statutes they supplement, provide.  Moreover, policies 
are presumably drafted to cover a wide range of circumstances, 
and the fact that this particular dispute wound up in a circuit 
court with no local rules concerning evidence is neither here 
nor there when it comes to the provision's significance.   
21 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 344 is a chapter of Wisconsin's 
Financial Responsibility law concerning vehicles. 
22 It may be instructive to note that the policy's reference 
to Wis. Stat. ch. 344 is a good example of an explicit, 
specific, and clearly drafted arbitration clause within the 
meaning of Borst.  Had the policy referred to ch. 804 in a 
similar fashion, there would be no question that IDS was 
entitled to employ the discovery devices described in the 
chapter. 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
36 
 
obviously knew how to use similarly clear and comprehensible 
language, rather than the opaque phrase, "local rules."23     
¶45 Even if we take the considerable leap IDS asks of us 
and accept, for the sake of argument, that "local rules" refers 
to the Wisconsin statutes, we are still left with an even more 
difficult and even more important question, the question that 
lies at the root of this entire case: which statute?  There is 
                                                 
23 Without citation or explanation, the dissent posits that 
"it is not plausible that the" parties "intended to mean that 
arbitrators are bound by rules of procedure and evidence 
established by the circuit courts——county by county——but need 
not follow the procedural and evidentiary rules embodied in 
state law."  Dissent, ¶130.  There are two problems with this 
argument.  First, it proposes a choice that does not exist.  
Circuit court rules cannot conflict with state law, see, e.g., 
Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶46, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 
N.W.2d 820, and there is no contention here that anyone is free 
to disregard the Wisconsin statutes.  Second, we do not find it 
so implausible that a policy might adopt local court rules 
concerning arbitration discovery.  Implausibility may be partly 
in the eye of the beholder, but if such a tack is implausible, 
there are at least a few parties around the country behaving 
implausibly.  See, e.g., Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 
S.E.2d 550, 553 n.1 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting an arbitration clause 
that included the provision that "[e]ach party shall be entitled 
to full discovery in accordance with the local rules of court in 
the 
event 
that arbitration is invoked . . . .") (emphasis 
added); Shainin II, LLC v. Allen, No. C06-420P, unpublished slip 
op., 2006 WL 2473495, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2006) (making 
reference to arbitration agreements that "provide for discovery 
'as provided by the United States Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as modified by the Local Rules for the Western 
District of Washington.'") (quoting the agreements); Sprint 
Commc'ns Co. L.P. v. Mushahada Int'l USA, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-
2168-KHV, unpublished slip op., 2005 WL 1842845, at *1 (D. Kan. 
July 29, 2005) (paraphrasing an agreement which provided "that 
in the event a dispute under the agreement is submitted to 
arbitration . . . , any discovery would be governed by the local 
rules of the District of Kansas.").   
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
37 
 
nothing in the clause at issue even intimating that "local 
rules" means Wis. Stat. ch. 804 and not Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  It 
is axiomatic that where a more specific law on a given subject 
is potentially in conflict with a more general one on the same 
subject, the former controls.  See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 16 
Wis. 2d 169, 173, 114 N.W.2d 148 (1962).  Although this case 
presents a somewhat atypical example of that rule (because we do 
not have a statutory conflict so much as uncertainty as to which 
of two consistent statutes apply), we believe the canon still 
cuts against IDS's interpretation.  Chapter 804 applies to all 
civil litigation in the Wisconsin courts.  By contrast, ch. 788 
applies to arbitration only.  In the literal sense, then, 
§ 788.07 is the local rule as respects discovery in arbitration 
proceedings, if the "locality" is considered the entire state, 
as IDS itself contends.24  
¶46 Resisting 
that 
conclusion, 
the 
arbitration 
panel 
wrote, in its ruling on the motion for reconsideration, that 
"[t]he few courts which have interpreted the phrase [i.e., 
"local rules of law as to procedure and evidence,"] have 
                                                 
24 In its denial of the Marlowes' motion to reconsider, the 
arbitration panel discounted the suggestion that "local rules" 
could signify Wis. Stat. § 788.07 because that statute "is 
certainly no more a 'local rule' than [Wis. Stat. ch.] 804 is."  
We could not agree more with the premise, but we do not see how 
the panel used it to draw its conclusion.  If Borst means 
anything, it means that there is a presumption in favor of 
§ 788.07.  For reasons it did not articulate, the arbitration 
panel appeared to apply the opposite presumption.  The question 
is whether Wis. Stat. ch. 804 is "any more a 'local rule'" than 
§ 788.07, not vice versa, and the answer is indisputably no.            
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
38 
 
suggested, as this panel has, that it means the rules of civil 
procedure as applied in state courts."  In support, the panel 
cited five cases, none of which are apposite.  Beginning with 
the citation least helpful to the panel's position, Workman v. 
Superior 
Court 
reaches 
the 
opposite 
conclusion 
from 
the 
arbitrators here, holding that an arbitration clause providing 
that "local rules of law as to procedure and evidence" would 
apply did not require compliance with the state's code of civil 
procedure.  176 Cal. App. 3d 493, 501 n.3 (Ct. App. 1986).  
Three of the remaining cases relied upon by the panel to 
interpret the phrase "local rules" are distinguishable from the 
present matter, as those cases examined only the phrase so as to 
resolve disputes concerning choice of law or forum.  They did 
not even purport to determine whether a court statute prevailed 
over an arbitration statute.  See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
763 A.2d 401, 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Costello v. Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 876 N.E.2d 115, 120-21 (Ill. App. 2007); 
Brown v. Great N. Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 3:05-CV-1791, 2006 WL 
538186, unpublished slip op. at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2006).25   
¶47 The only Wisconsin precedent cited by the arbitration 
panel is just as easily distinguishable.  As the arbitrators saw 
it, Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994) 
                                                 
25 Brown does make a passing reference to "state procedural 
rules" in two cursory sentences that include no analysis or 
citations, and does not, at any rate, say anything about 
favoring trial procedure over arbitration procedure.  Brown v. 
Great N. Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 3:05-CV-1791, 2006 WL 538186, 
unpublished slip op. at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2006).  
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
39 
 
confirmed that "Wisconsin procedural rules" should be applied in 
circumstances like these.  At the risk of repeating ourselves, 
Wis. Stat. § 788.07 is a Wisconsin procedural rule, as evidenced 
by the fact that it is found in the same code as Wis. Stat. ch. 
804.  Additionally, Lukowski made only one statement regarding 
"local rules of law," namely, that it created "a legitimate 
expectation that the governing law would be followed and applied 
properly."  Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).  In finding that the 
panel acted within its discretion, the Lukowski court did not 
suggest that there was any dispute between the parties as to 
what the governing law was, the issue at the heart of the 
present matter.  We have no quarrel with this uncontroversial 
statement by Lukowski but it is, like all of the cases cited by 
the panel, off-point.26  To summarize, none of the decisions 
relied upon by the panel involved a statute designed to 
                                                 
26 We are uncertain as to what significance the dissent 
ascribes to Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 515 N.W.2d 883 
(1994).  It includes a fairly lengthy exposition of the case, 
but places it in a section denominated "Factual Background."  
Dissent, ¶¶84-87.  Like the arbitration panel, the dissent 
emphasizes that the Lukowski court interpreted the phrase "local 
rules of law as to procedure and evidence" as a reference to 
Wisconsin law.  Id., ¶85 ("All parties in Lukowski interpreted 
this language to refer to Wisconsin law.") (emphasis in 
original); id., ¶86 ("The governing law on procedure and 
evidence was deemed to be Wisconsin law in statutes and 
cases.").  We do not disagree, but cannot perceive the relevance 
of this fact.  As in Lukowski, it is obvious that Wisconsin law 
governs the instant matter.  That gets us nowhere, however, as 
the real question is which Wisconsin law.  Lukowski happened to 
involve the same few words in an arbitration contract, but it 
did not consider any remotely similar legal question and 
consequently does not assist our inquiry here.     
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
40 
 
delineate the discovery procedures available at arbitration.  
Deference to the legislature was consequently not a factor in 
those cases, and it is a factor we cannot dismiss out of hand 
here in light of § 788.07's clear directive.   
¶48 Lastly, we consider all of the above with reference to 
another well-established rule of contract law, that ambiguities 
are resolved against the drafter.  See, e.g., Hirschhorn v. 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶23, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 
N.W.2d 529 ("[A]mbiguities are construed against the insurer, 
the drafter of the policy.") (citations omitted).  That rule has 
particular force here, as Borst specifically requires the 
drafter to use care in making clear its intention to resort to 
arbitration discovery more expansive than that provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07. 
¶49 In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the 
"local rules" provision was an explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted reference to Wis. Stat. ch. 804, or to any other 
discovery rules, as required by Borst.  The clause was none of 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
41 
 
those things.27  The panel erred in ruling to the contrary, and 
should instead have limited discovery to the confines of Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07.       
2) The Arbitration Panel Did Not Have the Exclusive Authority To 
Determine the Discovery Procedure 
 
¶50 The court of appeals held that the "local rules" 
provision "arguably refers to the scope of discovery," Marlowe, 
340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27, thereby endowing the arbitration panel 
with the "exclusive authority," id., ¶22, to control discovery, 
free from any judicial review.  To justify that conclusion, the 
court of appeals misconstrued our precedent, and we therefore 
hold that the panel did not have the sole power to regulate 
discovery. 
 
¶51 As with the preceding issue, our examination of the 
arbitration panel's authority vis-à-vis the courts centers on 
Borst.  The court of appeals discerned in Borst the proposition 
that the construction of an arbitration provision that "arguably 
                                                 
27 At oral argument, counsel for amicus Wisconsin Insurance 
Alliance suggested that "express," as used in Borst, "doesn't 
mean that it's not ambiguous, it means that there is some 
language, direct language in the contract . . . that addresses 
this issue."  If that were true, the word would have no real 
meaning.  "Express" has a far stronger connotation: "directly 
and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or left 
to inference: not dubious or ambiguous."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 803 (2002) (emphasis added).  Of 
course, the "local rules" provision was by no stretch of the 
imagination "directly and distinctly stated," at least not in 
any sense relating to its supposed reference to Wis. Stat. ch. 
804.  Thus, even under the narrowest reading of Borst's holding, 
the policy would not suffice to entitle IDS to ch. 804 
discovery.  
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
42 
 
refers to the scope of discovery" lies within the exclusive 
province of the panel.  Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27.  Borst 
said no such thing.  The policy at issue there was "silent as to 
the terms of discovery."  Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶53.  Neither 
the word "arguably" nor any other synonym appears in the 
decision.  The Borst court declared, emphatically, "that 
arbitrators have no inherent authority to dictate the scope of 
discovery, and absent an express agreement to the contrary, the 
parties are limited to depositions as spelled out in Chapter 
788."  Id., ¶56 (emphasis added).  The court of appeals turned 
that clear directive on its head in this case by creating a rule 
that an ambiguous policy that arguably demonstrates an agreement 
to go outside of Wis. Stat. § 788.07 insulates the panel's order 
from judicial review.  For reasons we have already surveyed, the 
Borst rule is a sensible one and, at any rate, it is not for the 
court of appeals to insert a qualification into our decision 
that we did not place there ourselves.   
 
¶52 Part of the court of appeals' confusion on this point 
stemmed from its reading of Employers.  In that case, an 
arbitration agreement provided that each party was to "'submit 
its case' to the arbitrators within thirty days of the 
arbitrators' appointment."  Employers, 202 Wis. 2d at 684.  
After 
the 
thirty 
days 
elapsed, 
Employers 
sought 
further 
discovery, which the panel declined to grant.   When the matter 
reached it, the court of appeals considered the question of 
whether "submit its case" meant "submit all factual materials 
and arguments" or just "submit all arguments."  As the court of 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
43 
 
appeals read the agreement, if the phrase "submit its case" 
signified "submit all arguments," the panel would have enjoyed 
the discretion to allow discovery after the lapsing of the 30-
day deadline.  In a passage that caught the attention of the 
court of appeals in this case, the Employers court wrote: 
Because the language in the agreement is vague and 
indefinite as to exactly what procedures should be 
used to arrive at that determination, it is within the 
province of the arbitration panel, as the interpreter 
of the contract language, to devise such procedures as 
it considers necessary to reach a decision, as long as 
those procedures are compatible with the contract 
language and do not violate the law.   
Id. at 686.   
¶53 In the present matter, the court of appeals collapsed 
the quoted rule from Employers with the rule articulated in 
Borst, holding that "under Borst and Employers, the panel was 
entitled to interpret the phrase and determine the scope of 
discovery it allowed."  Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27 (emphasis 
added).  Borst and Employers, however, set forth very different 
rules, almost diametrically opposed rules, and only one applies 
here.  We resolved the question implicated by the dispute 
between the Marlowes and IDS in Borst.  That question was, in a 
nutshell, what does a policy need to say in order to allow for 
discovery outside of Wis. Stat. § 788.07?  The answer, we 
repeat, is: an explicit, specific, and clearly drafted reference 
to another set of discovery guidelines.  When such language is 
not included in the policy, we made clear in Borst, the courts 
have not just the option, but the duty to correct a panel that 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
44 
 
refuses to apply the statute, lest the judiciary neglects its 
responsibility 
to 
enforce 
the 
duly-enacted 
laws 
of 
the 
legislature. 
¶54  Employers answered a different, narrower question, 
and with substantially different facts before it: can an 
arbitration panel extend the time for submissions when the 
contract is ambiguous on the subject?  Crucially, the court of 
appeals in Employers was not addressing an issue that the 
legislature had already addressed, so there was no default rule 
to apply in the case of ambiguity.  The court of appeals 
therefore properly resorted to the more deferential standard 
that governs judicial review of arbitration rulings in the 
absence of any legislation on point.  Equally importantly, the 
arbitration clause under review in Employers informed the panel 
that it was "relieved of all judicial formalities and may 
abstain from following the strict rules of law," a factor the 
court emphasized in its opinion.  Id. at 686 ("Given the broad 
power the clause gives to the panel in controlling procedure, we 
will defer to its interpretation of an ambiguous phrase 
regulating procedure.") (Emphasis added.)   
¶55 Seen in this light, the Employers court correctly fell 
back on the general principle that an arbitration panel should 
have 
exclusive 
authority 
to 
dictate 
procedure 
where 
the 
arbitration clause allows it to and where the legislature has 
provided no on-point default rule.  See, e.g., City of Madison, 
144 Wis. 2d at 586 (holding that the courts will uphold an 
arbitrator's decision on whether an award is warranted, and if 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
45 
 
so, its size, unless "there is a manifest disregard of the law, 
or if the award itself is illegal or violates strong public 
policy.").  Notwithstanding the dissent's protestations to the 
contrary, the panel here had no such luxury.  For the 
arbitration clause under consideration, far from relieving the 
panel of "judicial formalities and . . . strict rules of law," 
required the panel to apply such rules, it simply did not 
specify which rules.  Furthermore, the legislature has addressed 
the type of discovery procedure to be employed in arbitration 
proceedings and we must defer to its choice.  Simply put, 
Employers answered a different question, under different facts, 
and with far different legal considerations being brought to 
bear.  Both Borst and Employers were rightly decided, and there 
is no tension between them.  Borst controls this case, and it 
requires us to instruct the panel to apply Wis. Stat. § 788.07, 
as the legislature has directed. 
¶56 Following a similar path to that of the court of 
appeals, the dissent takes exception to our treatment of the 
panel's decision, opining that we "misstate[]" the standard of 
review and accord its ruling insufficient deference.  Dissent, 
¶¶124-132.  To the dissent, the more deferential Employers-type 
standard applies, and under that standard we "would be hard 
pressed to argue that there is no reasonable basis for the 
panel's construction of the" policy.  Id., ¶130.  For starters, 
the question under the approach advocated by the dissent would 
not be whether there was a "reasonable basis for the panel's 
construction," it would be the far narrower and more restrictive 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
46 
 
question of whether it constituted a "perverse misconstruction."  
Id., ¶133.  It is true, as the dissent maintains, that the 
answer would be negative, and that proves our point.  Borst did 
not mention, let alone employ, the "perverse misconstruction" 
test.  Instead, Borst taught, by example, that an arbitration 
panel can order full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery only when the 
agreement contains an explicit, specific, and clearly drafted 
clause allowing for such discovery, and that courts will reverse 
where they disagree after exercising their own independent 
judgment.  291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶62 ("In this case, there were no 
set provisions in the insurance contract that detailed the terms 
of the discovery in the arbitration.  Therefore, if the parties 
decide to conduct another arbitration, discovery will be limited 
to depositions as detailed in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.") (footnote 
omitted).   
¶57 Imaginatively, the dissent endeavors to tie its 
recommended standard of review to Borst itself, declaring that 
it is proper "because Borst permits the scope of discovery to be 
set out in the contract."  Dissent, ¶128.  Borst did permit as 
much, but it also reversed a panel for ordering full discovery 
while paying no deference to the panel's ruling.  In the 
pertinent section of its analysis, the Borst court did not even 
mention the panel's reasoning.  291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶¶53-62.  
Although Borst declared the contract "silent as to the terms of 
discovery," it was debated in the briefs, the certification, and 
the supreme court decision itself as to whether the policy 
incorporated 
rules 
drawn 
up 
by 
the 
American 
Arbitration 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
47 
 
Association ("AAA"), which arguably would have provided some 
parameters for discovery.  Id., ¶62 n.10.  Notably, Borst did 
not 
discuss 
whether 
it 
might 
have 
been 
a 
"perverse 
misconstruction" or a "manifest disregard of the law" for the 
panel to rely on the AAA rules, but rather said that "there were 
no set provisions in the insurance contract that detailed the 
terms of the discovery in the arbitration" and that it was 
"unclear which set of arbitration rules promulgated by the AAA 
would be applicable."  Id., ¶62 & n.10 (emphases added).  These 
are not the words of a court looking for a "perverse 
misconstruction" or a "manifest disregard of the law."  They are 
the words of a court doing exactly what it purports to be doing: 
evaluating, for itself, whether a policy contains an explicit, 
specific, and clearly drafted discovery clause.   
¶58 Perhaps most to the point, if Borst really did share 
the dissent's view of the law, it would have said something 
about how a panel is largely insulated from judicial review in 
fashioning discovery so long as the policy contains a provision 
arguably on point, but enjoys no such insulation when the policy 
is silent.  It would have been wholly unnecessary to set a bar 
for how a policy should address discovery.  What is more, it 
would be especially odd to set that bar with reference to its 
own judicial analysis, rather than with reference to the 
arbitration panels that supposedly enjoy an almost unlimited 
freedom to interpret discovery clauses as they see fit.  Surely 
the seven members of the Borst court would have foreseen that 
their opinion would be taken at face value, and that the 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
48 
 
Wisconsin courts, our own included, would obey its instructions, 
which 
offer no inkling that they are directed only at 
arbitration panels and not also at the judiciary.  Those 
instructions are to look for explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted discovery clauses, and we follow them today.  As before, 
the dissent's critique of our standard of review is in reality a 
call to overrule Borst, using one element of the decision, taken 
out of context, as a reason to eviscerate the rest of it.  We 
are not persuaded by the call, and do not overrule Borst, either 
explicitly or, as the dissent requests, sub silentio.                      
¶59 As a final point, it warrants mention that Borst's 
requirement is far from onerous and that there is no reason to 
fear the dissent's dark warnings about the dire consequences to 
arbitration let loose by our decision.  Dissent, ¶88 ("[T]he 
majority 
opinion 
undercuts 
the 
contractual 
authority 
of 
arbitrators and creates a serious disincentive for parties to 
agree to arbitration."); ¶123 (under the majority decision, 
"insurers will face a powerful disincentive to agree to 
arbitration, and the arbitration of contractual disputes will 
suffer a major setback.").  Had IDS wanted the benefit of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 804 discovery, it could simply have said, in the 
policy it drafted, "discovery will be governed by Wis. Stat. ch. 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
49 
 
804," or any number of equally clear and concise alternatives.28  
Unlike the dissent, we do not believe contract-drafters are so 
unskilled in their craft that the demand for these nine simple 
words or other equally straightforward formulations poses any 
danger of "supersed[ing] the parties' intentions."  Id., ¶114.29  
Borst placed IDS, along with all other Wisconsin insurers, on 
notice that ambiguous provisions would not suffice to grant 
recourse to expansive ch. 804 discovery.  Such a modest demand 
for clarity is not too much to ask when the legislature has 
unequivocally expressed its own reasonable preference on the 
matter.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
                                                 
28 At the hearing where it announced its ruling, the circuit 
court opined that the Marlowes would "be in the mud if [the 
arbitration clause] said local discovery rules," rather than 
just "local rules of law as to procedure and evidence."  
(Emphasis added).  We respectfully disagree.  As stated, Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07 is as much a "local discovery rule" as Wis. Stat. 
ch. 804.  Indeed, it is more of a local discovery rule as 
respects arbitration than ch. 804, which says nothing about 
arbitration.  The phrase "local discovery rules" would have 
suffered from the same fatal ambiguity as the phrase IDS 
selected.      
29 If the call we first issued in Borst and now reiterate 
today——for clear statements about the scope of discovery in 
arbitration agreements——does in fact have an adverse impact on 
the ability of an insurer to resolve disputes in arbitration, as 
the dissent worries, one can only conclude that it is because 
the insured is hesitant to consent to the type of discovery 
desired by the insurance company.  And if that is the case, it 
would not be so regrettable as the dissent alleges for fewer 
claims to be arbitrated, as the reduction would simply reflect a 
greater 
number 
of 
parties 
knowledgeably 
exercising 
their 
independent bargaining power, a change we should welcome, not 
dread.     
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
50 
 
¶60 We consider two issues: 1) whether the Marlowes were 
permitted 
to 
seek 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
concerning 
the 
discovery dispute before the arbitration panel ruled on whether 
an award was appropriate and, if so, its amount; and 2) whether 
the panel properly established discovery procedures outside 
those outlined in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  Because no unusual 
circumstances justified an interlocutory appeal, we hold that 
the Marlowes' action in circuit court was premature.  As to the 
second question, the legislature has set forth, in the form of 
§ 788.07, 
a 
narrow 
scope 
of 
discovery 
for 
arbitration 
proceedings in the absence of an explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted arbitration clause to the contrary.  IDS failed to 
include any such language in its policy and we therefore 
instruct the panel to limit discovery to that provided for in 
§ 788.07.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals insofar 
as it declined to allow the Marlowes an interlocutory appeal.  
However, insofar as the court of appeals granted IDS the benefit 
of full Wis. Stat. ch. 804 discovery, we modify its decision and 
instead direct the panel to cabin discovery to the depositions 
contemplated in § 788.07.  Thus, the decision of the court of 
appeals is modified, and as modified, affirmed, and the cause is 
remanded to the arbitration panel with instructions.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed, and, as modified, the cause is remanded 
to the arbitration panel with instructions. 
 
No. 
2011AP2067   
 
51 
 
       
          
      
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2067.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶61 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 788.07 
sets 
forth 
a 
narrow 
scope 
of 
discovery 
for 
arbitration 
proceedings in the absence of an explicit, specific, and clearly 
drafted arbitration clause to the contrary. 
¶62 I also agree with the majority opinion's conclusion 
that parties to an arbitration can seek judicial intervention 
prior to the arbitrators' rendering an award only under special 
circumstances. 
 These special circumstances are variously 
described in the majority opinion as "unusual circumstances," 
"compelling 
reason(s)," 
circumstances 
that 
"subject 
the 
aggrieved party to irreparable harm," "urgent or potentially 
irreparably prejudicial matters that demand the immediate 
attention of the courts," "especially urgent" circumstances, and 
circumstances 
that 
pose 
a 
"threat 
of 
irreparable 
harm."  
Majority op., ¶¶2, 20, 21, 60.   
¶63 The majority then applies this rule to the present 
case and concludes that the Marlowes' action in the circuit 
court (and here) was premature because "no unusual circumstances 
justified an interlocutory appeal."  Majority op., ¶¶2, 11, 22, 
60.   
¶64 Indeed, the majority goes so far as to say that the 
Marlowes 
did 
not 
suggest 
that 
the 
discovery 
dispute 
at 
arbitration was unusual in such a way as to justify intermediate 
intervention by the circuit court.  Majority op., ¶21.  On the 
contrary, the Marlowes made the logical and convincing argument 
that the arbitration panel's erroneous grant of broad discovery 
No.  2011AP2067.ssa 
 
2 
 
subjected them to the full-blown, time-consuming and costly 
burdens of litigation without the benefit of a jury trial and 
without an adequate remedy.    
¶65 The majority decides at ¶21 that the Marlowes' 
judicial action is premature.  As a matter of logic, the opinion 
should end there.  Surprisingly, it does not.  It goes on for 
another 39 paragraphs grappling with numerous issues, some 
briefed and some not briefed. 
¶66 The 
majority 
opinion's 
reasoning 
is 
internally 
inconsistent.  Or, as the majority opinion prefers to put it, it 
"seems at first blush incongruous" to hold that Marlowe's court 
action is premature and no relief should be granted and then to 
give Marlowe the relief requested.  Majority op., ¶22.   
¶67 The inconsistency, or if you prefer, the "incongruity 
at first," second, or third blush, is evident because the 
reasons 
the 
majority 
uses 
to 
justify 
its 
deciding 
the 
substantive discovery issue also justify judicial intervention 
by the circuit court according to the rule set forth in the 
majority opinion: the case presents "special circumstances," 
"unusual or especially urgent circumstances," and "compelling 
reasons." 
¶68 And what are the special, unusual or especially urgent 
circumstances or compelling reasons the majority gives for 
deciding the substantive issue in this premature action?  To use 
the majority opinion's own words, if we did not decide this 
issue,  
we would allow an erroneous rule to retain the force 
of law, not only in this case, but in all others.  
No.  2011AP2067.ssa 
 
3 
 
Moreover, 
further delay of the issue's ultimate 
resolution would impede even further the efficient 
disposition the parties bargained for by agreeing to 
arbitration.  Lastly, we will be required to answer 
the important question presented by the discovery 
dispute sooner or later.  It would only frustrate 
judicial economy were we to unnecessarily put the 
question off for another day, particularly when we 
would thereby cause arbitration in this case to 
proceed under the wrong statute in violation of a 
clear legislative dictate.   
Majority op., ¶22 (emphasis added). 
¶69 Prohibiting the Marlowes from obtaining immediate 
judicial intervention at the circuit court on a clearly 
erroneous arbitration decision relating to discovery, to use the 
words of the majority opinion, "would allow an erroneous rule" 
to have the force of law in the Marlowes' case; would cause 
"further delay of the issue's ultimate resolution"; "would 
impede even further the efficient disposition the parties 
bargained for by agreeing to arbitration"; "would frustrate 
judicial economy"; and would "cause arbitration . . . to proceed 
under the wrong statute in violation of a clear legislative 
dictate."  Furthermore, the circuit court "will be required to 
answer the important question presented by the discovery dispute 
sooner or later."  Majority op., ¶22.   
¶70 For the very reasoning and analysis set forth in the 
majority opinion, I conclude that the Marlowe matter presents 
special 
circumstances 
and 
that 
the 
adjudication 
was 
not 
premature at the circuit court or here.  
¶71 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶73 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding that a party in an arbitration "generally may not 
seek immediate circuit court review of an arbitration panel's 
intermediate decision.  Instead, the party must wait and 
challenge that decision by seeking to vacate the panel's final 
award, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.10."1  The majority opinion 
affirms this determination, and I join that portion of the 
majority opinion that discusses the issue under the heading "The 
Interlocutory Appeal." 
¶74 The court of appeals also reversed the circuit court 
by approving the arbitration panel's interpretation of a 
sentence in the arbitration provision of an insurance contract 
that arguably related to discovery.  The majority opinion 
rejects this part of the court of appeals determination.  
Although I do not necessarily agree with all the language in the 
court of appeals opinion, I believe the holding on the second 
issue was essentially correct.  Because the majority opinion 
comes to a different conclusion, I respectfully dissent from 
"The Discovery Dispute" portion of the opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶75 Mary and Leslie Marlowe (the Marlowes) were involved 
in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist.  They made 
a claim for uninsured motorist coverage from their insurer, IDS 
Property Casualty Insurance Company (IDS).  The Marlowes and IDS 
                                                 
1 Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 51, ¶18, 
340 Wis. 2d 594, 811 N.W.2d 894 (footnote omitted). 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
agreed to arbitrate the claim as provided in the Marlowes' 
insurance policy, and thereafter a three-member arbitration 
panel was selected. 
¶76 A discovery dispute soon developed.  IDS says that it 
sought discovery "to verify the existence and extent of the 
Plaintiffs' various alleged injuries."  It explained that: 
Such discovery is necessary because it goes to the 
essence of the claims that the Marlowes have put in 
issue, namely the existence and extent of their 
alleged injuries.  The alleged injuries arise from a 
rear-end vehicle accident with minimal damage to the 
vehicle, but with claimed medical specials already 
exceeding $60,000.00, and with a claim for permanent 
injury. 
¶77 The Marlowes asserted in the complaint that started 
this case that IDS "attempted to pursue discovery of the 
plaintiffs through the use of written interrogatories, requests 
for 
production 
of 
documents, 
medical 
and 
employment 
authorizations, income tax return releases, depositions of the 
plaintiffs 
and 
treating healthcare providers, and defense 
medical examinations."  IDS admitted these allegations in its 
answer. 
¶78 The Marlowes refused to comply with IDS's discovery 
demands. 
¶79 IDS then asked the arbitration panel to interpret 
language in the arbitration provision in relation to the 
discovery dispute.  IDS claimed that a sentence in the 
provision——namely, "Local rules of law as to procedure and 
evidence will apply"——authorized discovery pursuant to the 
procedures in Wis. Stat. ch. 804, which is the chapter, in 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
Wisconsin's code of civil procedure, on "Depositions and 
Discovery." 
¶80 In October 2010 the arbitration panel issued a 
unanimous decision interpreting the "Local rules of law" 
sentence as applying to Chapter 804 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
The panel recognized that this court's decision in Borst v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 2006 WI 70, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 
N.W.2d 42, "drastically circumscribe[d] the discovery that can 
be taken in arbitration proceedings."  However, the panel relied 
upon an approved exception to the limited-discovery rule that 
permits expanded discovery when the parties' contract expressly 
provides for it.  The panel concluded that the "Local rules of 
law" sentence denoted "the civil rules of procedure that govern 
court proceedings daily in local courtrooms."  The panel 
asserted that Chapter 804 does "not contemplate unfettered 
discovery" but rather "discovery that is quick and efficient, 
but cost effective."  The panel put limitations on future 
depositions and noted that a formal advance order would be 
required for any physical examination of Mary Marlowe. 
¶81 Significantly, 
the 
arbitration 
panel 
declared: 
"Nothing in Borst, or any other decision cited, deprives the 
panel of authority to implement the clear terms of the agreement 
that govern the parties' relationship.  Indeed, that is the 
panel's responsibility."   
¶82 Through their attorneys, the Marlowes filed a lengthy 
and well-argued letter brief seeking reconsideration of the 
panel's decision.  Many of the points made in the brief are 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
adopted by the majority opinion.  However, the Marlowes' brief 
conceded that the panel's "construction of this ambiguous policy 
language is one that could be reasonably made."   
¶83 The 
panel 
responded 
by 
issuing 
a 
supplementary 
decision affirming its ruling and answering the points in the 
Marlowes' brief.  The supplementary decision relied in part on 
Lukowski v. Dankert, 184 Wis. 2d 142, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994). 
¶84 In Lukowski, the plaintiff suffered personal injuries 
when the truck in which she was riding overturned and she was 
ejected through the sunroof.  Id. at 146.  When the plaintiff 
made a claim against her insurer for uninsured motorist 
coverage, her claim was submitted to arbitration.  Id. at 146–
47.  The arbitration panel determined the full extent of the 
plaintiff's damages but reduced her award by 40 percent because 
the plaintiff had not been wearing a seatbelt.  Id. at 147.  In 
other words, the panel found the plaintiff 40 percent causally 
negligent for her injuries——and it did so without expert 
testimony presented by the insurer, as was normally required 
under Wisconsin case law.  Id. at 147–48. 
¶85 Ms. 
Lukowski's 
insurance 
policy 
contained 
the 
identical language contained in the Marlowes' policy: "Local 
rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply."2  Id. at 
152.  All parties in Lukowski interpreted this language to refer 
to Wisconsin law.  The plaintiff asserted that the arbitration 
                                                 
2 The "Local rules of law" language was not present in the 
policy at issue in Borst v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2006 WI 70, 
291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42. 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
panel had not followed Wisconsin case law.  Id. at 151.  The 
insurer insisted that the panel had acknowledged Wisconsin law 
but distinguished the plaintiff's case from other cases on 
grounds that expert testimony was not required when a party's 
injuries resulted from her ejection from the vehicle because she 
did not wear a seatbelt. 
¶86 This court ratified the parties' interpretation of the 
sentence on "Local rules of law": "[T]he parties had a 
legitimate expectation that the governing law would be followed 
and applied properly."  Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).  The 
governing law on procedure and evidence was deemed to be 
Wisconsin law in statutes and cases.  See id. at 154. 
¶87 In the present case, the arbitration panel construed 
the "Local rules of law" sentence the same as the arbitration 
panel, the court of appeals, and this court had construed it in 
Lukowski.  The Brown County Circuit Court overturned the panel's 
construction, and the court of appeals then reversed the circuit 
court.  The majority now sides with the circuit court.   
II. DISCUSSION 
 
¶88 The majority opinion is grounded on the premise that 
arbitrations are different from civil court trials.  This 
premise is unassailable.  However, the majority uses the premise 
to severely restrict arbitration discovery not only under the 
arbitration statutes but also under the parties' insurance 
contract——notwithstanding applicable language to the contrary.  
In the process, the majority opinion undercuts the contractual 
authority of arbitrators and creates a serious disincentive for 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
parties to agree to arbitration.  In sum, despite its good 
intentions, the majority opinion goes too far.   
A. The Borst Certification 
 
¶89 In the Borst case, the court of appeals certified 
three questions including the following: "Other than the 
deposition procedure outlined in Wis. Stat. § 788.07, is the 
nature and extent of discovery during the arbitration process 
governed by contract, the arbitrators' inherent authority, or a 
combination of the two?"  Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶2.  The Borst 
court summarized its answer as follows:  "Arbitrators have no 
inherent authority to dictate the scope of discovery, and absent 
an express agreement, the parties are limited to the procedure 
for depositions, as described in Wis. Stat. § 788.07."  Id., ¶3.   
 
¶90 The question posed in the Borst certification was 
provocative because of its reference to the "inherent authority" 
of arbitrators.  In Lukowski, the court had declared that "[a]n 
arbitrator obtains authority only from the contract of the 
parties and therefore is confined to the interpretation of that 
contract."  Lukowski, 184 Wis. 2d at 152; see also Nicolet High 
Sch. Dist. v. Nicolet Educ. Ass'n, 118 Wis. 2d 707, 714, 348 
N.W.2d 175 (1984); Milwaukee Prof'l Firefighters, Local 215 v. 
City of Milwaukee, 78 Wis. 2d 1, 21, 253 N.W.2d 481 (1977).  
Thus, the certified question posited an option that this court 
had rejected repeatedly. 
 
¶91 The certified question appears to have diverted the 
court's attention from the possibility that the arbitration 
statutes themselves provide authority for other discovery, and 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
led to the court's creation of non-statutory obstacles for 
arbitrators 
in 
construing 
contracts 
that 
provide 
for 
arbitration.  These conclusions are admittedly much clearer to 
me in hindsight than they were when I joined the Borst opinion 
in 2006.  They require explanation. 
B. The Borst Decision 
 
¶92 Looking solely at the arbitration statutes, one 
perceives two sections that bear on discovery: Wis. Stat. 
§§ 788.06 and 788.07.  All the attention has been focused on 
§ 788.07, which reads: 
Depositions. 
Upon 
petition, 
approved 
by 
the 
arbitrators or by a majority of them, any court of 
record 
in 
and 
for 
the 
county 
in 
which 
such 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may 
direct the taking of depositions to be used as 
evidence before the arbitrators, in the same manner 
and for the same reasons as provided by law for the 
taking of depositions in suits or proceedings pending 
in the courts of record in this state. 
 
¶93 The Borst court explained the factual background of 
that case when it interpreted Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  Plaintiff 
Borst was injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist.  
Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶5.  The insurer believed that Borst was 
50 percent liable for the accident.  Id., ¶6.  It requested that 
all medical records related to the plaintiff's claim be 
transmitted to it after Borst finished his treatment.  Id.  
Borst provided these records as well as records of his wage 
loss.  Id., ¶7. 
 
¶94 After an arbitration panel was created, Allstate 
served Borst with "a set of written interrogatories, a request 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
for document production, and medical authorizations."  Id., ¶10.  
These requests were resisted and challenged in a motion to the 
arbitration panel to quash the discovery.  Id.  Allstate then 
raised the stakes, asking the panel to approve a deposition and 
to authorize a release of records.  Id.  The panel ultimately 
ordered Borst to (1) give a deposition, (2) supply medical 
authorizations, 
and 
(3) 
cooperate 
with 
other 
appropriate 
discovery.  Id.  In its argument to the panel, Allstate relied 
heavily on the proof of claim provisions in the insurance 
policy.  Id.   
 
¶95 Borst refused to submit to a deposition, and Allstate 
elected not to press that issue, although it did not waive its 
"right" to a deposition of Borst.  Id., ¶11.  It did depose the 
other driver involved in the accident, while Borst provided a 
list of damages and confirmed the accuracy of all pre-
arbitration discovery.  Id.   
 
¶96 The Borst court summarized the parties' arguments: 
Borst essentially contends that discovery in 
arbitration is the exception and not the rule.  Borst 
argues that in an arbitration of a first party 
insurance 
claim, 
and 
absent 
extraordinary 
circumstances, the parties should simply submit their 
cases to the arbitrators.  Unfettered discovery, Borst 
argues, defeats the general purposes of arbitration to 
be faster, less formal, and less expensive. . . .  
Furthermore, in this particular case, Borst maintains 
that there was no real need for discovery, given that 
there was no claim of permanent injury, the medical 
records and bills had been supplied, and Allstate 
claimed to have fully assessed liability before it 
made its offer [of $5,000 to settle the case]. 
Id., ¶54 (emphasis added).   
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
 
¶97 Allstate argued that inasmuch as the legislature 
allowed for the taking of depositions during arbitration, it 
must have allowed for other less costly forms of discovery and 
that 
arbitrators 
should 
have 
discretion, 
based 
on 
their 
evaluation of the facts of the case, to determine the extent of 
the discovery permitted.  Id., ¶55. 
 
¶98 The Borst court then said: 
We conclude that arbitrators have no inherent 
authority to dictate the scope of discovery, and 
absent an express agreement to the contrary, the 
parties are limited to depositions as spelled out in 
Chapter 788. . . .  
In our view, arbitrators do not have the inherent 
authority to determine the necessity and scope of 
discovery allowed because, quite simply, there is no 
statutory authority providing for discovery outside of 
the procedures for depositions enumerated in Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07. 
Id., ¶¶56–57. 
 
¶99 The court asserted that Wis. Stat. § 788.07 did not 
speak to "interrogatories, requests for production, or medical 
authorizations.  Indeed, even looking beyond this particular 
section, the Wisconsin Arbitration Act does not speak to any 
other form of discovery."  Id., ¶58.3   
                                                 
3 Attorney Mark Frankel submitted an amicus brief in the 
Borst case on behalf of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin.  After the Borst decision 
was issued, Frankel wrote an analysis of the case for the 
Wisconsin 
Lawyer, 
observing 
that 
Borst's 
holding 
that 
"arbitrators have no inherent ability to determine the necessity 
and scope of allowable discovery" was a "surprise" to many 
practitioners in the field of ADR.  Mark A. Frankel, Borst 
Clarifies Arbitration Procedures, Wis. Law., Dec. 2006, at 8, 
11. 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
 
¶100 There is no dispute that the Borst case is the 
controlling law in Wisconsin and applies here unless it is 
clarified, modified, or distinguished on the facts.  In my view, 
this court should pursue all these options.   
C. The Applicable Statutes 
 
¶101 The 
court 
should 
carefully 
review 
Borst's 
interpretation of the arbitration statutes vis-á-vis discovery.  
Borst did not consider any alternative interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 788.07 and it did not interpret Wis. Stat. § 788.06 at 
all. 
 
¶102 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.07, by its terms, requires a 
party to petition for a deposition.  The petition must be 
"approved by the arbitrators or by a majority of them," and then 
submitted to "any court of record in and for the county in which 
such arbitrators . . . are sitting."  Wis. Stat. § 788.07.  The 
statute appears to set up a very rigorous process for obtaining 
the deposition of either a party or a non-party because it 
requires the party seeking a deposition to go to court. 
 
¶103 In Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 
Wis. 2d 597, 610, 613, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995), this court 
observed that the basic tenet of arbitration is avoiding the 
courts.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 788.07 can be viewed as setting up a 
barrier to one of the most intrusive and expensive forms of 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
discovery, rather than precluding less costly forms that might 
obviate the need for a deposition.4   
 
¶104 This alternative view of the statute is arguably 
inconsistent with the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius ("the express mention of one matter excludes other 
similar matters [that are] not mentioned").  See FAS, LLC v. 
Town of Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 
N.W.2d 287.  But it is perfectly consistent with insurance 
contracts that give an insurer broad authority to obtain "proof 
of claim" information from its insured in processing a claim.5  
That form of "discovery" does not require statutory authority.  
In my view, it is difficult to explain why the law would permit 
depositions but prohibit more modest, less costly means of 
obtaining pre-hearing discovery.6 
 
¶105 This alternative view also is consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 788.06(2), a provision 
of the arbitration statutes that has heretofore been ignored.  
That subsection provides: 
                                                 
4 See Carlson Heating, Inc. v. Onchuck, 104 Wis. 2d 175, 
180, 311 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that adequate 
preparation by counsel, "with full knowledge of the facts before 
them[,]" will result in more orderly trials and in many 
instances will avoid needless trials).  The same principle 
applies to depositions and to arbitration hearings.    
5 See subpart D, infra.   
6 Query: Does Wis. Stat. § 788.07 contemplate depositions 
upon written questions, as authorized under Wis. Stat. § 804.06?  
If it does, why would interrogatories be prohibited?   
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
(2)  Any arbitrator may issue a subpoena under 
ch. 885 or may furnish blank forms therefor to a 
representative for any party to the arbitration. The 
representative may issue a subpoena under s. 805.07. 
The 
arbitrator 
or representative who issues the 
subpoena shall sign the subpoena and provide that the 
subpoena is served as prescribed in s. 805.07(5).  If 
any person so served neglects or refuses to obey the 
subpoena, the issuing party may petition the circuit 
court for the county in which the hearing is held to 
impose a remedial sanction under ch. 785 in the same 
manner provided for witnesses in circuit court. 
Witnesses 
and 
interpreters 
attending 
before 
an 
arbitration shall receive fees as prescribed in s. 
814.67. 
¶106 The majority contends that neither an arbitrator nor 
the representative of a party may issue a subpoena or a subpoena 
duces tecum for anything connected with discovery.  Majority 
op., ¶34.  It contends that all subpoenas issued under Wis. 
Stat. § 788.06 must be for the hearing itself.  Id.  This makes 
little sense.  The attendance of witnesses at a deposition may 
be compelled by subpoena.  Wis. Stat. §§ 804.05(1), 805.07.  A 
subpoena may be served requiring a person to produce designated 
materials.  Wis. Stat. § 804.05(2)–(3).  Although a deposition 
may proceed without a subpoena, a subpoena may be necessary if a 
witness fails to comply with other notice.  If a subpoena may be 
issued for a deposition, then Wis. Stat. § 788.06 is not limited 
to subpoenas for hearings.7 
                                                 
7 The 
title 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.06——"Hearings 
before 
arbitrators; 
procedure"——covers 
two 
subsections, 
the 
first 
subsection related to hearings and the second subsection related 
to procedure.  The procedure applies to more than hearings 
because of the references to Wis. Stat. § 805.07. 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
¶107 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.06 twice refers to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07, which specifically includes subpoenas for depositions, 
§ 805.07(1), as well as subpoenas requiring the production of 
materials such as books, papers, and documents, § 805.07(2).  
Section 788.06 also provides that if a subpoena is not obeyed, 
"the issuing party [that is, the party that issued the subpoena] 
may petition the circuit court for the county in which the 
hearing is held to impose a remedial sanction." (Emphasis 
added.)  The emphasized language implies that the circuit court 
does not normally issue the subpoena for a deposition.  In 
addition, it would be curious if arbitrators who had issued 
subpoenas for the hearing had to petition the circuit court for 
a remedy if their subpoenas were not obeyed.   
¶108 The present Wis. Stat. § 788.06 became law in 1986.  
See 1985 Wis. Act 168.  The revised law, championed by the 
Wisconsin Judicial Council, created a much more expansive 
subpoena provision than the previous statute and was intended to 
"conform[] arbitration subpoena practice to that followed in 
circuit court."  Judicial Council Committee Note, 1985, Wis. 
Stat. § 788.06.  Subpoena practice in circuit court includes 
discovery. 
¶109 Once again, the present section refers twice to Wis. 
Stat. § 805.07; the previous section, Wis. Stat. § 788.06 (1983–
84), made no such reference.  The present section extends the 
subpoena power to the representative of a party (including but 
not limited to an attorney), in addition to arbitrators.  The 
present section is not limited by its terms to the hearing, as 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
the previous section was.8  In short, the majority's conclusion 
that the statute applies only to subpoenas for hearings is 
strained at best.   
¶110 The previous Wis. Stat. § 788.06 mirrored 9 U.S.C. 
§ 7, which is narrowly written.9  Nonetheless, § 7 of the Federal 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. 788.06 (1983–84) provided: 
 
When more than one arbitrator is agreed to, all 
the arbitrators shall sit at the hearing of the case 
unless, by consent in writing, all parties shall agree 
to proceed with the hearing with a less number.  The 
arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this 
chapter or otherwise, or a majority of them, may 
summon in writing any person to attend before them or 
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring 
with the person any book, record, document or paper 
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.  
The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the 
fees of witnesses in courts of general jurisdiction.  
The summons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator 
or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be 
signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority 
of them, and shall be directed to the said person and 
shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to 
appear and testify before the court; if any person or 
persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect 
to obey said summons, upon petition the court in and 
for the county in which such arbitrators, or a 
majority 
of 
them, 
are 
sitting 
may 
compel 
the 
attendance of such person or persons before said 
arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or 
persons for contempt in the same manner now provided 
for securing the attendance of witnesses or their 
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the 
courts of this state. 
(Emphasis added.) 
9 9 U.S.C. § 7 provides: 
 
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in 
this title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may 
summon in writing any person to attend before them or 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
Arbitration Act has been interpreted to permit discovery, unless 
the discovery involves non-parties.10  This could explain why 
Wis. Stat. § 788.07, which has no parallel in the Federal 
Arbitration Act, was created——namely, to make depositions more 
difficult to obtain than other discovery.   
¶111 In sum, Borst's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 788.07 
created a restrictive rule, but that rule disregarded the 
adjacent statute and may have misinterpreted the purpose of the 
deposition statute.   
                                                                                                                                                             
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring 
with him or them any book, record, document, or paper 
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.  
The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the 
fees of witnesses before masters of the United States 
courts. Said summons shall issue in the name of the 
arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and 
shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of 
them, and shall be directed to the said person and 
shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to 
appear and testify before the court; if any person or 
persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect 
to obey said summons, upon petition the United States 
district 
court 
for 
the 
district 
in 
which 
such 
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may 
compel the attendance of such person or persons before 
said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person 
or persons for contempt in the same manner provided by 
law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their 
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the 
courts of the United States. 
10 See, e.g., Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at 
Lloyd's of London, 549 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2008); Stanton v. Paine 
Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 
1988); Gabriel Herrmann, Note, Discovering Policy Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 791–92 (2003) 
("[C]ourts 
have 
generally 
construed 
[§ 7 
of 
the 
Federal 
Arbitration Act] as granting arbitrators the power to order the 
parties to submit to pre-hearing discovery.").    
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
D. Insurance Contract Provisions 
¶112 The Borst case does not explain the relationship 
between statutory authority for discovery in an arbitration 
proceeding and contractual provisions that require an insured to 
provide information to its insurer.  In Borst, the plaintiff's 
medical records and bills and wage loss records were supplied to 
the insurer.  Borst, 291 Wis. 2d 361, ¶¶7, 54.  Borst's initial 
position 
was 
to 
resist 
a 
deposition, 
which 
was 
clearly 
authorized by statute.  The Borst court stated that "absent a 
contractual provision specifying how discovery will be handled, 
the parties are limited to the discovery procedures provided in 
the statutes."  Id., ¶59.  But the decision does not explain 
whether contractual provisions requiring such items as medical 
records 
and 
even 
a 
medical 
examination 
are 
included 
in 
"discovery." 
¶113 The majority opinion in this case goes beyond Borst 
because it appears to nullify clear and sensible requirements in 
the insurance contract for the insured to supply information to 
the insurer in those situations where the parties agree to 
arbitration.  The majority directs the arbitration panel, on 
remand, "to cabin discovery to the depositions contemplated in 
§ 788.07, i.e., 'depositions to be used as evidence before the 
arbitrators.'"  Majority op., ¶2; see also id., ¶11 ("[W]e 
return the action to the panel with instructions to limit 
discovery to the section enacted by the legislature for 
precisely these situations: Wis. Stat. § 788.07."); id., ¶23 
("[W]e instruct the arbitration panel to limit discovery to that 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
provided for in Wis. Stat. § 788.07.").  The majority opinion 
sums up its second holding: 
[T]he legislature has set forth, in the form of 
§ 788.07, a narrow scope of discovery for arbitration 
proceedings in the absence of an explicit, specific, 
and 
clearly 
drafted 
arbitration 
clause 
to 
the 
contrary.  IDS failed to include any such language in 
its policy and we therefore instruct the panel to 
limit discovery to that provided for in § 788.07. 
Id., ¶2 (emphasis added). 
¶114 The majority opinion appears to preclude the insurer 
from resorting to any provision outside the arbitration section 
of the insurance contract to obtain information that may be used 
to prepare for a possible arbitration hearing, i.e., prehearing 
discovery.  Moreover, its tough new conditions——"explicit, 
specific, and clearly drafted" authority in the arbitration 
clause——provide 
a 
test 
that 
may 
supersede 
the 
parties' 
intentions.   
¶115 The IDS insurance contract with the Marlowes is 
explicit, specific, and clear in this case: 
 
What To Do In Case Of An Auto Accident Or Loss 
 
. . . .  
 
1. 
We must be notified promptly of how, when 
and where the accident or loss happened.  Notice 
should also include the names and addresses of any 
injured persons and any witnesses. 
 
2. 
A person seeking any coverage must: 
 
 
a. 
Cooperate with us in the investigation, 
settlement or defense of any claim or suit. 
 
 . . . . 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
c. 
Submit, 
as 
often 
as 
we 
reasonably 
require: 
 
 
 
(1) To physical exams by physicians we 
select.  We will pay for these exams. 
 
 
 
(2) To answer questions under oath 
when asked and by anyone we name.  They shall do so 
separately, outside the presence of any other person 
who may be requested to answer questions under oath in 
connection with the loss.  They must also sign copies 
of the answers. 
 
 
d. 
Authorize us to obtain medical reports 
and other pertinent records. 
 
 
e. 
Submit a proof of loss when required by 
us. 
 
. . . .  
Medical Expense Coverage 
 
We will pay reasonable expenses for necessary 
medical 
(including 
chiropractic) . . . services 
incurred because of bodily injury sustained by an 
insured and caused by an accident. 
 
. . . .  
 
We have the right to: 
 
1. 
Obtain and use: 
 
 
a. 
Peer reviews; and 
 
 
b. 
Medical bill reviews 
of the medical expenses and services to determine if 
they are reasonable and necessary for the bodily 
injury sustained. 
 
2. 
Use a medical examination of the injured 
person to determine if: 
 
 
a. 
The bodily injury was caused by a motor 
vehicle accident; and 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
b. 
The medical expenses and services are 
reasonable 
and 
necessary 
for 
the 
bodily 
injury 
sustained. 
¶116 Here, IDS sought: 
 
(a) written interrogatories. 
 
(b) requests for production of documents. 
 
(c) medical and employment authorizations. 
 
(d) income tax return releases. 
 
(e) depositions of the plaintiff. 
 
(f) depositions of treating healthcare providers. 
 
(g) defense medical examinations. 
¶117 Depositions of the plaintiffs and of the treating 
healthcare providers are explicitly authorized by Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.07. 
¶118 A defense medical examination is authorized by the 
contractual requirements to submit to "physical exams by 
physicians we select" and "a medical examination of the injured 
person." 
¶119 Requests for production of documents and "medical and 
employment authorizations" appear to overlap.  These demands are 
grounded in the contractual authority "to obtain medical reports 
and other pertinent records," "proof of loss," and "[m]edical 
bill reviews." 
¶120 Requests for income tax return releases may be related 
to plaintiff's medical expense deductions and/or plaintiff's 
income over time.  Such returns would have to be relevant and 
might require justification to the arbitrators but they are 
certainly not irrelevant per se. 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
20 
 
¶121 Written interrogatories can be construed as falling 
under the requirement to "answer questions under oath when 
asked." 
¶122 This case is factually different from the Borst case.  
Plaintiff Borst maintained that "there was no real need for 
discovery, given that there was no claim of permanent injury, 
the medical records and bills had been supplied, and Allstate 
claimed to have fully assessed liability" before it made a 
settlement offer.  See ¶96, supra.  Here, purportedly, there is 
a claim of permanent injury, and a request for medical records 
and bills that have not been supplied; furthermore, causation is 
at issue.  See ¶76, supra. 
¶123 Consequently, I believe it is imperative for the 
majority to explain why the discovery sought by IDS was not 
explicitly authorized by the insurance contract.  If an 
insurer's agreement to participate in arbitration serves to 
nullify the insurer's contractual rights to obtain information 
from its insured, insurers will face a powerful disincentive to 
agree to arbitration, and the arbitration of contractual 
disputes will suffer a major setback. 
E. Standard of Review 
¶124 There is one additional concern.  I believe the 
majority opinion misstates the standard of review in relation to 
the arbitration panel's discussion of discovery. 
¶125 The arbitration panel based its discovery ruling on a 
sentence in the arbitration provision of the insurance contract, 
namely, "Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
21 
 
apply."  As the majority opinion notes, the panel declared that: 
"The term 'local rules of [law as to] procedure[,'] as the 
policy employs it, is both clear and informative.  It denotes 
the civil rules of procedure that govern court proceedings daily 
in local courtrooms."  Majority op., ¶5.  The panel added that, 
"If the purpose of arbitration is to achieve an expedited, 
efficient decision that ultimately determines the truth, more, 
not less, preparation for hearing is the most sensible way to 
achieve that, a goal the contract contemplates." 
¶126 When an arbitration panel interprets a provision in an 
applicable 
contract, the panel's interpretation should be 
afforded some deference in review by a court.  Such deference is 
captured by the concept of "perverse misconstruction." 
¶127 "Courts will vacate an award when arbitrators exceeded 
their 
powers 
through 
'perverse 
misconstruction,' 
positive 
misconduct, a manifest disregard of the law, or when the award 
is illegal or in violation of strong public policy."  Baldwin-
Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ. Ass'n, 2009 WI 51, 
¶21, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 766 N.W.2d 591 (citations omitted).  A 
court must apply the standard of review that is appropriate for 
the facts of the case. 
¶128 An arbitration award involving the interpretation of a 
contract will not be disturbed unless it is the product of a 
perverse misconstruction of the contract, City of Oshkosh 
(Public 
Library) 
v. 
Oshkosh 
Public 
Library 
Clerical 
& 
Maintenance Employees Union Local 796-A, 99 Wis. 2d 95, 106, 299 
N.W.2d 210 (1980) (citing cases), or unless the contract itself 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
22 
 
violates the law.  Here, the appropriate standard is the 
"perverse misconstruction" standard because Borst permits the 
scope of discovery to be set out in the contract. 
¶129 In Baldwin-Woodville, the court stated: 
 
[W]e do not determine which construction——the 
arbitrator's or the District's——is more reasonable.  
See Lukowski, 184 Wis. 2d at 153 ("[T]his court will 
not upset the award even if this court might have 
decided the matter differently.").  Instead, we will 
uphold 
an 
award 
if 
there 
is 
"some 
reasonable 
foundation for the interpretation of the contract 
offered in the decision."  Id. 
Baldwin-Woodville, 317 Wis. 2d 691, ¶22. 
¶130 The majority would be hard pressed to argue that there 
is no reasonable basis for the panel's construction of the 
"Local rules of law" sentence in the arbitration provision of 
the contract.  After all, the Marlowes' attorney conceded that 
the construction was "reasonably made."  Moreover, the sentence—
—which is not unique to the Marlowes' insurance contract——must 
mean something, and it is not plausible that the sentence was 
intended to mean that arbitrators are bound by rules of 
procedure and evidence established by the circuit courts——county 
by county——but need not follow the procedural and evidentiary 
rules embodied in state law. 
¶131 The majority's standard of review cites the perverse 
misconstruction standard but then disregards it.  Majority op., 
¶10. 
¶132 Clearly, a contract may authorize prehearing discovery 
in an arbitration proceeding.  It is not manifest disregard of 
the law or a violation of strong public policy to do so.  The 
No.  2011AP2067.dtp 
 
 
23 
 
issue here is whether the contract's reference to "Local rules 
of law" achieved this purpose.  This court is required to give a 
deferential review of the arbitration panel's construction of 
the contract language, not rely on extraneous law. 
¶133 Proper application of the perverse misconstruction 
standard would put this case in a different light. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
¶134 Once again, the theme that permeates the majority 
opinion is that arbitrations are different from civil court 
trials and thus discovery in arbitration should be wholly 
different from discovery in court cases. 
 
¶135 I agree that arbitration discovery should normally be 
simpler and more streamlined than civil court discovery.  
Arbitrators have a vested interest in making arbitration work as 
intended. 
 
Thus, 
depriving 
arbitrators 
of 
virtually 
all 
authority to manage prehearing discovery, consistent with the 
goals of arbitration, and forcing the parties to discover 
evidence and present evidence primarily at the arbitration 
hearing, strike me as undercutting arbitration, not facilitating 
it.  After this decision, time will tell.   
¶136 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
 
 
 
 
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