Title: PACHEK v NORTON CONCRETE CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12084 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 , JOSEPH PACHEK, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - N O R T O N C O N C R E T E CO., a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Elghth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Smith, Ernmons and B a i l l i e , Great F a l l s , Montana. Robert J. Emmons argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. For Respondent : Hoyt and Bottomly and Gabriel, Great F a l l s , Montana. Richard V. Bottomly argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: June 15, 1972 Decided : Jut 2 6 1 9 z Filed : JUL 2 6 1 9 m M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court , This i s an appeal from a verdict and judgment of the eighth judicial d i s t r i c t , county of Cascade, Hon. Truman Bradford, presiding with a jury, i n favor of plaintiff Joseph Pachek and against defendant Norton Concrete Company. Defendant appeals from the judgment and denial of its motion for a new t r i a l . Plaintiff brought the action t o recover for personal injuries resulting from a truck and automobile collision, Joseph Pachek, a man 79 years of age a t the time of the accident on November 25, 1969, was returning t o Great Falls from a cabin located south of the town of Cascade when he became in- volved i n the accident. H e was traveling on a frontage road running parallel t o an interstate highway. This road prior t o the construction of the interstate, had been the main highway between the c i t i e s of Great Falls and Helena. The frontage road has a hard surface some 22 t o 24 feet i n width with a painted center line. The accident occurred about s i x and one-half miles south of Cascade where a gravel road leading t o Tintinger's Gravel Pit intersects the frontage road. The gravel p i t i s located some 1,000 feet from the frontage road. Some 76 feet from the frontage road and between the road and gravel p i t are railroad tracks which run parallel with the road. A gravel road runs from the gravel p i t across the tracks t o intersect the frontage road. O n the day of the accident, November 25, 1969, a Norton Concrete Company vehicle driven by Herbert Garman, was hauling a load of gravel from the p i t and became involved i n the accident with plaintiff. The vehicle was a tractor pulling two t r a i l e r units and was sixty feet long, eight feet wide and eight feet high. On that day three highway employees were putting i n a culvert adjacent t o the frontage road where it intersected with the road t o the gravel p i t . They had cut half of the entrance road i n order t o put i n the culvert and t o do t h i s were using a front end loader. The loader was working i n the borrow p i t and was visible t o both Garman and Pachek. As Garman drove from the gravel p i t he stopped a t the railroad tracks and shifted into "deep under", the tractor's lowest gear. H e t e s t i f i e d he looked up and down the frontage road but he did not see the Pachek car. Garman t e s t i f i e d that from the stop a t the railroad tracks he l e t the truck r o l l forward slowly, not putting h i s foot on the accelerator as he started towards the frontage road. H e estimated h i s speed a t from one t o five miles per hour. H e t e s t i f i e d that from the time he l e f t the railroad tracks u n t i l he turned onto the frontage road he did not look up or down the frontage road, but rather he was working with mirrors on both sides of the cab i n order t o see the wheel of the t r a i l e r s . H e was aware of the cut made by the highway crew and was trying t o f i t h i s vehicle onto the half of the intersection l e f t by the construction crew. As he approached the frontage road he did not turn on any turn signals, and without stopping pulled onto the frontage road turning into the approaching car driven by Pachek, The center of Pachek's 1965 Lincoln Continental h i t the l e f t front wheel of the tractor, which was on or just over the center line. The l e f t front wheel of ~ a c h e k ' s car came t o rest on the yellow l i n e i n i t s lane of traffic. Pachek t e s t i f i e d he was traveling between 35 t o 50 miles per hour a t the time of the accident. H e observed the tractor and t r a i l e r s about half way between the frontage road and the gravel p i t . When the truck was some five feet from the inter- section, he thought the truck was going t o stop but instead it pulled i n front of him and turned into h i s direction of travel. As a result of the collision Pachek received severe injuries conswing of a subdural hematoma and back and body injuries. The head injury resulted in impairment of Pachek's memory, loss of speech, dizzy spells and mental confusion. As a result, Pachek physically and mentally deteriorated and his daughter spent months with him, teaching him to speak. Montana highway patrolman Lewis Hendrickson investigated the accident, arriving at the scene approximately one-half hour after it occurred. He interviewed the two drivers and the three highway employees who were witnesses. On the basis of his obser- vations and the statements given to him, Hendrickson testified that, in his opinion, the cause of the accident was a right-of-way violation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Pachek and awarded him $20,00O,p;i-- ,&GI 2 - $2,- . Defendant Norton Concrete Company raises 23 issues on appeal. Issues 6 through 23 all concern instructions given or refused and they will be considered together. Issue 1 . The court erred in allowing the highway patrolman to state his opinion as to the cause of the accident. We find no merit in this issue. Here, the driver,Garman, had already admitted he was negligent in entering the highway. This is not a case where there is a close question on the issue of violation of the right-of-way, and where an unfounded opinion of an expert might sway the jury one way or another. The patrolman did not testify to the ultimate question of negligence of Garman or that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to Pachek, We find no invasion of the jury's province in allowing this testi- mony, In re ~ickich's Estate, 114 Mont. 258, 136 P.2d 223. This Court has repeatedly held that expert opinion evidence is admissible in explaining the cause of a particular accident. Demarais v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 366, 3 P,2d 283; Lamb v, Page, 153 Mont. 171, 455 P.2d 337. Issue 2 . Pachek was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and the court erred i n denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. This issue also has no merit for the evidence n u l l i f i e s it. Here, Garman, the truck driver, t e s t i f i e d that s i t t i n g up i n h i s cab he had an unobstructed view of the frontage road; that a f t e r reaching the tracks he never once looked t o see i f there was t r a f f i c on the frontage road; and that he pulled onto that frontage road without looking. Too, he was aware that vehicular t r a f f i c on the frontage road would have the right-of-way but he failed t o anticipate such t r a f f i c . Under these facts Pachek, who saw the slow moving vehicle coming up t o the intersection, had every right and reason t o expect it t o stop and yield the right-of- way and he received no visual or sound warnings from Garman that he was going t o pull directly out onto the road. The t r i a l court properly refused t o grant defendant's motion. Issue 3. Defendant alleges it was error t o permit D r . McGregor t o t e s t i f y as to any brain damage of Pachek when he was not qualified and that such statements by D r . McGreor were hearsay and incompetent, D r . ~ c ~ r e g o r ' s testimony indicated that he had been ~ a c h e k ' s physician for some fifteen years; that he treated him as soon a s he arrived a t the hospital and throughout h i s period of recovery, Upon Pachek's a r r i v a l a t the hospital, D r . McGregor diagnosed the subdural hematoma and called i n a neurologist for consultation. The neurologist, D r . Syrenne, confirmed the diagnosis and operated t o relieve the subdural hematoma. Throughout Pachek' s hospitalization Dr. McGregor conferred with D r . Syrenne; he kept a l l the hospital records except for the surgery and he examined those for post-operative treatment. H e t e s t i f i e d he knew the surgical procedures used and by the records knew the size of the hematoma. D r . ~cGregor's testimony was properly admitted. This Court recently held i n Klaus v. Hillberry, 157 Mont. 277, 286, 485 P.2d 54: It Medical testimony must of necessity in many instances be based on information acquired from outside sources, examinations by other doctors, nurses notes and observations, X-rays, and other tools of the profession used in making a diagnosis," We reaffirm this statement and in so holding, find no merit in defendant's issue 3 . Issue 4 . The court erred in denying the motion for a new trial in that the damages of $20,000 were excessive; the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict; and the court erred in denying defendant's motion to alter or amend the judgment. We find this issue to be without merit, Plaintiff suffered grievous injuries that necessitated surgery and considerable hospitalization, Lengthy post-hospital therapy was necessary to partially return him to some state of existence, In Wilson v . Gehring, 152 Mont. 221, 226, 448 P.2d 678, this Court set down the rule concerning this type of argument: I t It has been our position in reviewing damages based on conflicting evidence, that the amount thereof to be paid for personal injury is peculiarly within the province of the jury, and we will not disturb such finding unless the result is such as to shock the conscience and understanding of the court. Such is not the case here, this judgment has reasonable sup- port in the evidence and it should not be disturbed. (Citing c a s e s ) . I I Issue 5, The court erred in refusing defendant's proposed instruction based on the doctrine of last clear chance, We find no error for such an instruction should not be given in a case involving the collision of moving vehicles where the act creating the peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident, and where neither party can fairly be said to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. Story v, Cox, 130 Cal.App.2d 231, 278 P . 2 d 720. In addition, it is obvious from the facts that Pachek never knew of his perilous situation so that he could avoid the collision, Here, the doctrine of last clear chance has no applicability. Issues 6 through 23, Instructions given or refused, Defendant argues that instructions given in regard t o entering a highway from a private road were i n error, but also argues the d i s t r i c t court erred i n refusing t o give defendant's proposed instructions on the same issue, W e find the instructions given by the d i s t r i c t court were proper. Pachek was the driver of the automobile traveling on the frontage road and the driver of the truck entered onto t h i s highway i n the face of the oncoming 1947, Pachek car, Section 32-2173, R,c.M,/ s t a t e s : "The driver of a vehicle about t o enter or cross a highway from a private road, driveway or ublic approach ramp shall yield the right of way E-f t o a 1 vehicles approaching on said highway . " (Emphasis supplied) Defendant contends the e x i t onto the frontage road was not a private roadway because it was part of the s t a t e right-of-way. Under the statute t h i s would make no difference, because it would be certainly a public approach ramp. As the statute clearly s t a t e s , it was the duty of the driver of the truck, not Pachek, t o yield the right-of-way. The court's instructions on (1) contributory negligence, (2) duty of the plaintiff t o keep a reasonable lookout for possible danger t o himself, (3) duty of plaintiff using the public highway t o the effect that one who has the right-of-way nevertheless must use ordinary care t o avoid causing an accident, and ( 4 ) that a violation of the law i s of no consequence unless proximately causing the accident, a l l gave the jury opportunity t o determine whether or not Pachek used due care i n driving h i s automobile a t the point and time i n question. Defendant objects t o the refusal of h i s instruction which went t o the failure t o produce stronger evidence when it was available. This was i n reference t o D r . Syrenne who operated on the subdural hemetoma. D r . McGregor was the attending and treating physician throughout the e n t i r e case. H e fully and completely explained the injury, the damage, the surgical procedures in- volved, the treatment, and the prognosis. Nothing more was needed. Defendant alleges error i n denying h i s proposed instruc- tions requiring and binding plaintiff t o an absolute duty t o exercise h i s intelligence t o discover and avoid dangers that may threaten him. Plaintiff was not under an absolute duty, but only a duty t o use reasonable care. Defendant objects t o the refusing of h i s instructions i n regard t o the duty of a motorist t o discover danger that may threaten him; that he must look and see; and that he cannot ignore an obvious danger and reasonable care. W e find no evi- dence was submitted t o substantiate the claim that plaintiff knew he was i n danger, nor was evidence introduced t o indicate plaintiff did not use reasonable care. Defendant alleges the d i s t r i c t court erred i n refusing give h i s instruction i n regard t o the f a i l u r e of Pachek sound h i s horn t o warn the truck driver of h i s approach. The section involved i s 32-21-145, R.C.M. 1947, which i n pertinent part provides: "The driver of a motor vehicle s h a l l when reasonably necessary t o insure safe operation give audible warning with h i s horn but s h a l l not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway. I I The rule of law on sounding a horn requires that the driver have some reason t o believe that safe operation requires the sounding of the horn, Here, plaintiff believed the driver would stop before entering the highway. H e had a right t o anticipate he would stop by law. I f the driver, under these circumstances, has a duty t o blow h i s horn, it would require every driver a t every intersect road i n the s t a t e t o blow h i s horn, believilig that the driver approaching the intersection was going to violate the law. It was only a f t e r the truck was on the highway that Pachek would have any duty i n t h i s regard and by that time the sudden emergency he faced did not require him to do a useless act. Any instruction in this regard was inapplicable to the factual situation in this case. Next, defendant argues the district court erred in refusing to give his proposed instruction preemptorily instructing the jury that it must consider ( 1 ) negligence, ( 2 ) contributory negli- gence, ( 3 ) damages, and ( 4 ) proximate cause, in that order. Objectimto this proposed instruction was that it takes from the jury its constitutional right to determine which issue it wants to discuss or determine in the manner it decides, and the court does not have the province to instruct the jury in what ordek it should take up its deliberations. Since the proposed instruction was not mandatory, no error was committed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 3 Associate Justice -- -------- ~ssociate Justices.