Title: State v. Harenda Enterprises, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1829 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Harenda Enterprises, Inc., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 230 
Reported at:  297 Wis. 2d 571, 724 N.W.2d 434 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 13, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Kitty Brennan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents. 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there was oral 
argument by Jeffrey M. Gabrysiak, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was also J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Mark W. 
Rattan and Litchfield Cavo, Brookfield, and oral argument by 
Mark W. Rattan. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 16
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1829  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV6540) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Harenda Enterprises, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
reversing a circuit court judgment in favor of the State and 
imposing civil penalties and surcharges on Harenda Enterprises, 
Inc. (Harenda).1 The judgment and sanctions imposed were for 
violations of Wis. Admin. Code Ch. NR 447 in connection with 
Harenda's contract to inspect the Milwaukee Auditorium for 
possible asbestos-containing material (ACM). 
                                                 
1 See State v. Harenda Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WI App 230, 
297 Wis. 2d 571, 724 N.W.2d 434 (reversing judgment of the 
circuit court for Milwaukee County, Kitty K. Brennan, Judge). 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The case centers on the question of the proper method 
for testing whether material constitutes asbestos-containing 
material under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.022 and 40 C.F.R. Pt. 
763, Subpt. E., App. E, § 1.7.2.1. The State asserts that the 
court of appeals erred in concluding that the rule prescribing 
the method of testing clearly requires the averaging of the test 
results. It contends that the rule is ambiguous and that we 
should give deference to the clarifications of the rule issued 
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
which explain that each layer of a multi-layer sample must be 
tested. It maintains that under the rule, ACM is present if a 
single layer of the sample contains greater than one percent 
asbestos.  
¶3 
Harenda argues that the State's interpretation is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the rule, which requires 
averaging 
of 
the 
test 
results. 
It 
maintains 
that 
the 
clarifications issued by the EPA are inconsistent with § 1.7.2.1 
and should therefore be accorded no deference. Harenda further 
argues that the clarifications outlining the single layer test 
method constitute impermissible rule making. Finally, it argues 
that the State's enforcement action violates its substantive due 
process rights.  
¶4 
We determine, first, that the language of § 1.7.2.1 is 
ambiguous. Giving deference to an agency's interpretation of its 
                                                 
2 All references to chapter NR 447 of the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code are to the June 2004 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
3 
 
own 
rule, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
EPA's 
interpretation 
is 
controlling because it is neither inconsistent with § 1.7.2.1 
nor 
clearly 
erroneous. 
We 
further 
determine 
that 
the 
clarifications do not constitute impermissible rule making; 
rather, they are valid interpretive rules. Finally, we determine 
that the circuit court's judgment does not violate Harenda's 
substantive due process rights. We therefore reverse the court 
of appeals.  
I 
A 
¶5 
To better understand the issues presented, it is 
helpful to examine the regulatory framework.  We begin with a 
brief summary of the federal and state regulations at play in 
this case. 
¶6 
Under the federal Clean Air Act, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to publish a 
list of hazardous air pollutants and to establish national 
emission standards (National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants, or "NESHAPs") for each pollutant on the list. 42 
U.S.C. § 7412; United States v. American National Can Co., 126 
F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Asbestos was one of the 
first pollutants  designated as hazardous under the Clean Air 
Act. National Can, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
¶7 
The original asbestos NESHAP was published in 1973, 
and included standards governing removal of asbestos prior to 
building demolition. 38 Fed. Reg. 8,820 (1973). In 1975, the 
asbestos NESHAP was expanded to address the handling of asbestos 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
4 
 
during building renovations. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,293 (1975); 
National Can, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 523. The current asbestos 
NESHAP, which was published in 1990, is found at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 61.140 et seq.  
¶8 
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is 
authorized by the Wisconsin Statutes to promulgate rules 
implementing clean air standards consistent with chapter 285 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes and the federal Clean Air Act. Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 447.01(2);3 Wis. Stat. §§ 285.11, 285.13, 
285.17, 285.27.4 Pursuant to this authority, the DNR promulgated 
rules 
concerning 
asbestos 
inspection, 
identification, 
and 
abatement. These rules are set forth in chapter NR 447 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
¶9 
Chapter NR 447 is patterned after the federal NESHAP 
standards. See note to Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.01. Most 
importantly with respect to the present matter, chapter 447 has 
adopted measures requiring owners and operators to inspect 
facilities prior to demolition or renovation. Wis. Admin. Code 
                                                 
3 Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.01(2) provides: 
(2) PURPOSE. This chapter is adopted under ss. 285.11, 
285.13, 285.17 
and 285.27, Stats., to establish 
emission limitations for asbestos air contaminant 
sources, to establish procedures to be followed when 
working 
with 
asbestos 
materials 
and 
to 
create 
additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
for owners or operators of asbestos air contaminant 
sources in order to protect air quality. 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
5 
 
§ NR 447.06(1). If such an inspection reveals enough asbestos, 
the notification and abatement requirements of sections NR 
447.07 and 447.08 apply to each owner or operator. Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 447.06(2). Violations of the regulations are strict 
liability offenses. United States v. B & W Inv. Properties, 38 
F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1994). 
¶10 As discussed more fully below in Part III A, the 
regulations define ACM as material that contains "more than 1% 
asbestos as determined using the method specified in Appendix E 
to Subpart E, 40 CFR part 763, section 1, Polarized Light 
Microscopy . . . ." Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.02(1)(a). The 
regulations describing the proper way to analyze a multi-layered 
sample include the following instructions:  "When discrete 
strata are identified, each is treated as a separate material so 
that fibers are first identified and quantified in that layer 
only, and then the results for each layer are combined to yield 
an estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample."  40 
C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1.  Wisconsin adopted 
both the definition and the instructions describing the method 
of analysis. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.02; Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
484.04(28)(July 2007). 
¶11 The text of the instructions, however, quickly became 
a source of confusion.  On two occasions the EPA issued notices 
of clarification to address how multi-layered samples are to be 
analyzed. 59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 
(Dec. 19, 1995).  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
6 
 
¶12 The 
December 
1995 
clarification 
explained 
that 
§ 1.7.2.1 continued EPA's past policy that separate layers in 
multi-layered systems were to be analyzed separately, such that 
"no averaging or dilution by combining layers of asbestos-
containing material with nonasbestos-containing material was 
allowed." 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).  
¶13 The clarification allowed that a source sending a 
multi-layered sample to a laboratory for testing may request 
that certain samples first be composited for analysis in an 
effort to reduce time and the costs associated with the sample. 
It advised that when the composite analysis indicates that the 
average of the sample's layers is greater than one percent, the 
sample is deemed to be ACM and an individual analysis of the 
layers is not necessary. However, when the composited sample 
analysis results in less than one percent asbestos, but greater 
than zero, an "analysis by layers is required to ensure that no 
layer in the system contains greater than one percent asbestos." 
Id. 
¶14 Pursuant to its regulatory authority the DNR initiated 
an enforcement action against Harenda. In this case we examine 
whether we owe deference to an agency's interpretation of its 
own rule concerning the testing of multi-layered samples for 
asbestos content. 
B 
¶15 The background facts of this case are not in dispute. 
The circuit court set forth those facts in its Findings of Fact 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
7 
 
and Conclusions of Law entered along with its order granting 
judgment in the State's favor. 
¶16 This case stems from a decision by the Wisconsin 
Center District to renovate the Milwaukee Auditorium. In 2001, 
the Wisconsin Center District retained Harenda to conduct an 
inspection 
of 
the 
Auditorium 
for 
possible 
ACM 
prior 
to 
renovation. Among the areas Harenda inspected were the walls of 
the Auditorium's second floor bowl area (the "disputed area"). 
As part of its pre-demolition inspection, Harenda took samples 
from the disputed area and sent them to a testing laboratory. 
The test results indicated that none of the samples contained 
greater than one percent asbestos. 
¶17 The demolition of the disputed area, which was carried 
out by a contractor, commenced in March 2002 and proceeded 
without following chapter NR 447 asbestos abatement regulations. 
After demolition had started, representatives of the State took 
samples from the walls of the disputed area for testing. The 
laboratory that tested the samples found a layer in a multi-
layered sample that contained greater than one percent asbestos. 
Demolition ceased, and the State collected three further samples 
from the disputed area. The tests on these samples showed that 
the samples each contained greater than one percent asbestos. 
¶18 Two days later, the State collected ten samples of 
plaster 
material 
from 
the 
disputed 
area 
that 
had 
been 
demolished. It provided a "split" of each of these samples to 
Harenda. The laboratory found that four of the State's ten 
samples were multi-layered samples containing a single layer of 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
8 
 
material with one percent asbestos or more, but with an overall 
asbestos content of less than one percent.  
¶19 Harenda sent its split samples to an independent 
laboratory for testing. The laboratory found five of the ten 
samples were multi-layered samples containing a single layer of 
two percent asbestos and one layer of material that was a non-
detect for asbestos. In contrast to the laboratory used by the 
State, Harenda's laboratory did not obtain an overall asbestos 
content for the five multi-layered asbestos-containing samples.5 
¶20 The State, upon the request of the DNR, filed a 
complaint against Harenda. Based on the tests of its samples 
from the disputed area, the State alleged that material from the 
disputed area contained a sufficient amount of ACM for it to be 
considered regulated asbestos-containing material. It alleged 
that Harenda was therefore liable for violations of several 
                                                 
5 We note that all of the tests performed on samples for 
both parties were performed based upon the interpretation of 
regulations advocated by the State. The court of appeals 
decision in this case indicates some confusion in this regard. 
In the first paragraph of its opinion, the court concludes that 
"Harenda's testing for asbestos contamination complied with the 
law, and, accordingly, [we] reverse." Harenda Enterprises, 297 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶1. At oral argument, however, Harenda stated that 
the 
laboratory 
conducting 
the 
pre-demolition 
testing 
was 
instructed 
to 
conduct 
tests 
that 
complied 
with 
EPA's 
clarifications. Thus, the issue is not whether the test on 
Harenda's pre-demolition samples was conducted according to a 
different 
interpretation 
of 
the 
regulations. 
Rather, 
the 
question is whether a single layer in a multi-layer system 
containing greater than one percent asbestos must be treated as 
ACM. 
 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
9 
 
provisions of Wis. Admin. Code Ch. NR 447. These include failure 
to adequately wet ACM in violation of § NR 447.08(6)(a), failure 
to carefully lower ACM in violation of § NR 447.08(6)(b), 
failure to remove ACM prior to demolition activity in violation 
of § NR 447.08(1), discharge of visible emissions to the outside 
air during the disturbance of ACM in violation of § NR 
447.13(1), and failure to file an accurate notice of intent to 
renovate a facility containing ACM in violation of § NR 447.07.  
¶21 The parties entered into a stipulation according to 
which Harenda would owe $37,138.50 in penalties and surcharges 
if it were held liable. They further stipulated that Harenda is 
an "operator" under chapter NR 447 and that the asbestos testing 
results from the various laboratories are "accurate within the 
analytical 
testing 
method that each respective laboratory 
utilized." 
¶22 The circuit court granted a motion for summary 
judgment by the State. It determined that the State satisfied 
its burden of demonstrating that there was ACM under § NR 
447.01(1)(a) and § NR 447.02(1)(b) and the relevant federal 
regulation, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E., App. E, § 1.7.2.1. The 
circuit court further determined that the State met its burden 
in showing that the ACM was stripped or removed without 
complying with the requirements of chapter NR 447 as alleged in 
the complaint. 
¶23 Harenda appealed. The court of appeals determined that 
the State's interpretation of 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E., App. 
E, § 1.7.2.1, which was based upon clarifications of the rule 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
10 
 
issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, was 
inconsistent with the plain language of § 1.7.2.1. State v. 
Harenda Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WI App 230, ¶9, 297 Wis. 2d 571, 
724 N.W.2d 434. It therefore reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court. The State petitioned for review.  
II 
¶24 The 
central 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
concerns 
the 
interpretation of the method used to test for asbestos-
containing material (ACM) pursuant to chapter NR 447 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code. This case is before us on the 
circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. 
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment independently, 
but apply the same methodology as used by the circuit court. 
Wis. Mall Props., LLC v. Younkers, Inc., 2006 WI 95, ¶19, 293 
Wis. 2d 573; 717 N.W.2d 703 (citing Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987)). Summary 
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶25 Administrative 
code 
provisions 
are 
interpreted 
according to principles of statutory construction.6 Orion Flight 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 227.27(1), which states: 
In construing rules, ss. 990.001, 990.01, 990.03(1), 
(2) and (4), 990.04 and 990.06 apply in the same 
manner in which they apply to statutes, except that 
ss. 
990.001 
and 
990.01 
do 
not 
apply 
if 
the 
construction 
would 
produce 
a 
result 
that 
is 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the agency. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
11 
 
Servs., Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 WI 51, ¶18, 290 
Wis. 2d 421, 
714 
N.W.2d 130. 
When 
an 
administrative 
code 
provision is ambiguous, we turn to extrinsic sources in order to 
determine 
agency 
intent. 
Id. 
An 
administrative 
agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations is controlling "unless the 
interpretation 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
language 
of 
the 
regulation or is clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting Bergmann v. 
McCaughtry, 211 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997)).7  Whether 
an agency's interpretation of a regulation is inconsistent with 
the regulation or clearly erroneous is a question of law that we 
review independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals. Bergmann, 211 Wis. 2d at 8. 
 ¶26 In addressing whether the regulation is clearly 
erroneous we consider the intent or purpose of the regulation. 
In resolving ambiguities, "[i]t is fundamental that we must 
favor a construction of a statute or regulation which will 
fulfill the intent of the statute or regulation over one which 
defeats its manifest object." Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, 
¶21, 
245 
Wis. 2d 632, 
629 
N.W.2d 
277 
(citing 
Shands 
v. 
Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 356, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983).  
¶27 It is often difficult to discern the difference 
between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie 
upon a "hazy continuum." American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 
                                                 
7 Pfeiffer v. Board of Regents, 110 Wis. 2d 146, 154-55, 328 
N.W.2d 279 (1983); Beal v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 90 
Wis. 2d 171, 
182, 
279 
N.W.2d 693 
(1979); 
see 
also 
DaimlerChrysler v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2007 WI 15, 
¶11, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
12 
 
F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "Determining whether a given 
agency 
action 
is 
interpretive 
or 
legislative 
is 
an 
extraordinarily case-specific endeavor." Id.; see Harry T. 
Edwards and Linda A. Elliott, Federal Standards of Review, 134-
35. In making such a determination courts "consider the agency's 
own characterization of the particular action and will generally 
give deference to the agency's views." Beverly Health & Rehab. 
Servs. 
v. 
Thompson, 
223 
F. 
Supp. 
2d 
73, 
103 
(D.D.C. 
2002)(quoting American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1056 and British 
Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 
991 
(D.C. 
Cir. 
1978))(internal 
punctuation 
and 
citations 
omitted).   
¶28 In this case we also address the issue of whether the 
circuit court's judgment violated Harenda's constitutional right 
to substantive due process. Such an inquiry presents a question 
of law which we review independently. Kenosha County Dep't of 
Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶22, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 
N.W.2d 845. 
III 
A 
¶29 Under Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.02(1)(b), ACM is 
defined as material "containing more than 1% asbestos as 
determined using the method specified in Appendix E to Subpart 
E, 40 CFR part 763, section 1 . . . ."8 The parties agree that 
                                                 
8 Wis. Admin. Code § NR 447.02 provides in relevant part: 
(1) "ACM" means asbestos-containing material. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
13 
 
the provision of Appendix E, section 1 that is relevant in this 
case is § 1.7.2.1, "Gross Examination." The parties disagree, 
however, as to whether the language is clear or ambiguous. 
Harenda contends that § 1.7.2.1 is clear, and that the State's 
interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of that section. 
To assess Harenda's argument, we begin by examining the language 
of the rule. Section 1.7.2.1 provides as follows: 
Bulk samples of building materials taken for the 
identification and quantitation of asbestos are first 
examined for homogeneity at low magnification with the 
aid of a stereomicroscope. The core sample may be 
examined in its container or carefully removed from 
the container onto a glassine transfer paper or clean 
glass plate. If possible, note is made of the top and 
bottom 
orientation. 
When 
discrete 
strata 
are 
identified, each is treated as a separate material so 
that fibers are first identified and quantified in 
that layer only, and then the results for each layer 
are combined to yield an estimate of asbestos content 
for the whole sample. 
40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1 (emphasis added).  
¶30 The focus of our inquiry is on the last sentence of 
the above rule. It describes two different types of testing 
                                                                                                                                                             
 . . . . 
(b) "Category II nonfriable ACM" means any material, 
excluding Category I nonfriable ACM, containing more 
than 1% asbestos as determined using the method 
specified in Appendix E to Subpart E, 40 CFR part 763, 
section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy that, when dry, 
cannot be crumbled, pulverized or reduced to powder by 
hand pressure. 
See 
also 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
484.04(28)(July 
2007) 
(incorporating by reference 40 C.F.R. part 763, § 1 into § NR 
447.02(1)(b)). 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
14 
 
measurements: (1) a quantification of asbestos fibers in each 
discrete layer, and (2) an "estimate of asbestos content for the 
whole sample" achieved by combining the results from discrete 
layers. However, it is unclear which of these measurements is 
relevant in determining whether material is ACM. 
¶31 The circuit court aptly describes the ambiguity in the 
two main clauses of the sentence, noting that they say different 
things: 
[I]f 
they 
can 
discern 
discrete 
strata, 
they're 
supposed to come up with a number for each layer. It 
says that in the first clause of the final sentence 
that I read. And then it's got a conjunction—and—which 
supports [Harenda's] argument, and the second clause, 
which says, And then you composite or come up with a 
total for all the layers. And the question what does 
it mean? . . . . I'm going to borrow from my early 
life as an English teacher. There's two clauses in one 
sentence, and they say two different things. They 
don't rule each other out, either. They say two 
different things, and they're joined by a linking 
conjunction. . . .  
[I]t doesn't say whether the violation occurs in both 
parts of the sentence, just one, or the other. It is 
not clear. However, I think it's significant that each 
half of the sentence doesn't rule the other out. And 
so then the question becomes, is this interim method 
rule . . . clear? No, it's not clear. And that's 
pretty obvious. 9  
¶32 The second clause of the sentence reveals further 
ambiguity with respect to how to arrive at an "estimate of 
asbestos content for the whole sample." It directs that "and 
                                                 
9 See also In re LVI Envtl. Servs, Inc., 2001 WL 988722, 10 
E.A.D. 99, 106 (Envtl. App. Bd. 2001)(noting lack of clarity in 
the text of 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1 
regarding which measure constitutes violation). 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
15 
 
then the results of each layer are combined." However, it is 
unclear what is meant here by the word "combined." The State 
asserts that it is ambiguous, but posits that a reasonable 
interpretation is that the results are added together. Harenda 
maintains that "combined" means that the results are averaged. 
¶33 The court of appeals, without explanation, concluded 
that "combining" the results from each layer requires that the 
percentage of asbestos for each layer be averaged. Harenda 
Enterprises, 297 Wis. 2d 571, ¶4. An obvious problem with the 
court of appeals' and Harenda's "plain meaning" interpretation 
is that the word "average" cannot be found in the text of the 
rule.  
¶34 Moreover, "combine" means to "bring into a state of 
unity; merge." American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 377 (3rd ed. 1992). "Average" is defined as the 
"arithmetic mean." Id. at 127. However, "arithmetic mean" refers 
to the "value obtained by dividing the sum of a set of 
quantities by the number of quantities in the set." Id. at 99. 
Thus, averaging requires combining quantities and then dividing. 
The language of the rule, however, states only that quantities 
are to be combined. 
¶35 Further, the language of the section leaves unclear 
which layers are combined to yield an estimate of the asbestos 
content 
of 
the 
whole 
sample. 
There 
are 
two 
plausible 
interpretations. The first is that only the results from each 
layer in which there are asbestos fibers are combined to yield 
an estimate of the asbestos content of the whole sample. The 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
16 
 
second interpretation is that the results from every layer 
identified, including those in which no asbestos fibers are 
identified and quantified, are combined to yield the estimate of 
asbestos content for the whole sample. This appears to be the 
interpretation embraced by the court of appeals. 
¶36 In light of these interpretations, we reject Harenda's 
contention that the text of the rule is unambiguous. It is 
unclear how the first clause of the relevant sentence relates to 
the second clause. Likewise, the meaning of the word "combine" 
is uncertain, and there are competing interpretations as to what 
layers are to be combined to yield an estimate of asbestos 
content. We therefore determine that the language of § 1.7.2.1 
is ambiguous.  
B 
¶37 The 
determination 
that 
§ 1.7.2.1 
is 
ambiguous, 
however, does not end our inquiry. We must next examine whether 
the State's interpretation is inconsistent with the regulation 
or clearly erroneous. As we have noted, an administrative 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations is controlling 
unless the agency's interpretation is "inconsistent with the 
language of the regulation or is clearly erroneous." Orion 
Flight Servs., 290 Wis. 2d 421, ¶18.  
¶38 The State maintains that under § 1.7.2.1, material is 
ACM if a single layer from a multi-layered sample contains 
greater than one percent asbestos. It bases its position on the 
interpretations advanced in two clarifications issued by the EPA 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
17 
 
in response to questions regarding the testing of multi-layered 
samples.  
¶39 In the first, issued in January 1994, the EPA stated 
that the clarification was a response to members of the 
regulated 
community 
who 
had 
"frequently 
asked" 
questions 
regarding the analysis of multi-layered samples.  
The Agency has learned that some of the regulated 
community have questions concerning the analysis of 
samples which may contain multiple layers, any or all 
of 
which 
may 
be 
asbestos 
containing 
materials 
(ACM) . . . . Because these questions are frequently 
asked, EPA is making this clarification. 
59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994).  
¶40 The clarification provided that when multi-layered 
samples are tested, the results from each layer should be 
reported. It stated that "[i]n general, when a sample consists 
of two or more distinct layers or materials, each layer should 
be treated separately and the results reported by layer 
(discrete stratum)." Id.  
¶41 Thus, the EPA's interpretation of § 1.7.2.1 is that 
the results of each layer are relevant in determining whether 
material is ACM. This addresses the first ambiguity in § 1.7.2.1 
that we describe above. It sheds light on the circuit court's 
question of "whether the violation occurs in both parts of the 
sentence, just one, or the other." The January 1994 statement 
clarifies that a violation occurs in the first part of the 
sentence. 
¶42 The second clarification in which the EPA interprets 
its rule was issued in December 1995 in response to continued 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
18 
 
questions regarding the testing of multi-layered samples. The 
EPA explains in the second clarification that prior to adopting 
the procedures set forth in 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, 
§ 1.7.2.1, on November 20, 1990, the EPA had informal policies 
of treating each layer in multi-layer systems separately and 
against diluting asbestos-containing layers by combining them 
with layers not containing asbestos:  
EPA's unwritten policy based on the definition of 
"friable asbestos material" was that each layer in a 
multi-layered system was to be analyzed as a separate 
material (no averaging or dilution by combining layers 
of 
asbestos-containing 
material 
with 
nonasbestos-
containing material was allowed). 
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
¶43 Further, the December 1995 statement explained that 
the 
January 
1994 
clarification 
interpreted 
§ 1.7.2.1 
as 
precluding averaging. It states that in multi-layered systems, 
"results were not allowed to be combined to determine average 
asbestos content (continuing the policy that dilution of an 
asbestos-containing material is not allowed)." Id. 
¶44 The 
EPA's 
December 
1995 
clarification 
therefore 
provides 
guidance 
on 
a 
second 
ambiguity 
in 
§ 1.7.2.1. 
"Combining" the results from discrete layers does not mean 
averaging the content of those layers where doing so dilutes the 
results.  
¶45 The document also describes a potentially cost-saving 
method for testing multi-layered samples. It explains that in 
testing multi-layered samples, labs may composite layers first 
in order to determine whether it is necessary to perform 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
19 
 
potentially more costly and time-consuming testing of discrete 
layers:  
Any source sending multi-layered bulk samples to a lab 
may request that certain sample(s) or portions of 
sample(s) 
be 
composited 
for 
analysis 
first 
(to 
potentially reduce time and cost of sampling). 
(Note: A composite sample does not mean that multiple 
samples may be composited into one sample. It means 
that multiple layers of one core sample may be 
composited for analysis.) 
Id.10 
¶46 The clarification then explains that if the analysis 
of composited layers shows that the average content of asbestos 
for the whole sample is greater than one percent, the system 
must be treated as ACM. However, if the analysis shows the 
presence of asbestos, but in a concentration of less than one 
percent, each discrete strata must be treated separately. If a 
single layer is found to contain greater than one percent 
asbestos, then that layer must be treated as ACM. 
If the result of the composite analysis shows that the 
average content for the multi-layered system (across 
the layers) is greater than one percent, then the 
multi-layered system must be treated as asbestos-
containing and analysis by layers is not necessary. If 
the result of the composite sample analysis indicates 
that the multi-layered system as a whole contains 
asbestos in the amount of one percent or less, but 
greater than none detected, then analysis by layers is 
required to ensure that no layer in the system 
contains greater than one percent asbestos. If any 
layer contains greater than one percent asbestos, that 
layer must be treated as asbestos-containing. This 
                                                 
10 The clarification details the procedure for analyzing 
composited layers.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
20 
 
will have the effect of requiring all layers in a 
multi-layered 
system to be treated as asbestos-
containing if the layers can not be separated without 
disturbing the asbestos-containing layer. Once any one 
layer is shown to have greater than one percent 
asbestos, further analysis of the other layers is not 
necessary if all the layers will be treated as 
asbestos-containing. 
Id.  
¶47 The December 1995 statement therefore reiterates the 
position of the January 1994 statement that the measure of 
asbestos content from a single layer may render multi-layer 
material ACM. It also provides an opportunity to perform first a 
composite 
test 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
more 
quickly 
and 
efficiently that a sample is ACM. Notably, it does not imply 
that the "estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample" 
described in § 1.7.2.1 is an average of all layers. Rather, it 
clarifies that averaging may not be used to dilute the measure 
of asbestos content in multi-layer samples. The composite test 
allows averaging, but it is a separate test used to forestall 
the expense of analyzing individual layers and not as a means of 
dilution.  
¶48 The State's argument regarding the testing method is 
therefore supported by the EPA's clarifications, which are not 
inconsistent with § 1.7.2.1. Moreover, the EPA's interpretation 
is not clearly erroneous, as its interpretation is supported by 
the purpose of regulation and basic principles of statutory 
construction.  
¶49 The manifest purpose of chapter NR 447 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code, which incorporates 40 C.F.R. Pt. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
21 
 
763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1, is to protect workers and the 
public from air pollution from asbestos. Prohibiting the 
dilution of ACM by averaging the asbestos content of multi-layer 
systems serves that purpose.11 
¶50 The interpretation suggested by Harenda, and adopted 
by the court of appeals, runs contrary to the purpose of the 
rule. At oral argument, the State explained that averaging 
layers would allow that a layer of wall containing (for example) 
1.9 percent asbestos would constitute ACM if it were standing 
alone, but not constitute ACM if attached to a layer of wall 
with no asbestos. The State explained, however, that whether the 
asbestos-containing 
layer 
is 
attached 
to 
a 
non-asbestos-
containing layer does not diminish the amount of asbestos that 
                                                 
11 The 
dissent 
emphasizes 
the 
importance 
of 
"clear, 
understandable, enforceable testing methods" in "an area as 
crucial as asbestos removal." Dissent, ¶78. It next warns that 
asbestos exposure can lead to a "horrible death." Id., ¶79.  It 
advances that "[t]he current testing methods and procedures are 
dangerously ineffective." Id., ¶95. Finally, it claims that the 
clarifications "do not actually protect the worker." Id., ¶96. 
Despite the dissent's purported concern for protecting the 
worker, and its concerns about clarity, horrible consequences, 
and 
dangerously 
ineffective 
testing 
methods, 
the 
dissent 
nevertheless opts for no meaningful regulation whatsoever. 
Instead it would leave in place an ambiguous rule. It is 
unclear how the State would regulate demolition of ACM if the 
interpretive rule is invalidated. It would appear that under the 
dissent's view, workers would receive no protection in the 
demolition materials in which some layers contain greater than 
one percent ACM. 
The dissent's reply that the majority "invalidates the 
substantive rule" is incorrect. Id., ¶94 n.14. The rule is 
valid, and the clarifications address its ambiguity. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
22 
 
disperses into the air when a worker strikes the wall with a 
hammer or a wrecking ball.12 
¶51 The State's and EPA's interpretation is also required 
in order to harmonize the language of § NR 447.02(1)(b) and 
§ 1.7.2.1. 
It 
is 
a 
basic 
principle 
of 
statutory 
and 
administrative rule construction that "provisions relating to 
the same subject matter should be read together and harmonized 
when possible." State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶21, 268 Wis. 2d 
300, 674 N.W.2d 349.  
¶52 Section 
447.02(1)(b) 
states 
that 
"'Category 
II 
nonfriable ACM' means any material" that contains greater than 
one 
percent 
asbestos 
under 
§ 1.7.2.1. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 1.7.2.1 is explicit that where a sample contains 
discrete strata, "each is treated as a separate material." 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
Reading 
these 
two 
provisions 
together, 
discrete strata must be treated as separate material under 
§ 1.7.2.1, and any material containing greater than one percent 
asbestos is ACM under § NR 447.02(1)(b). It therefore follows 
                                                 
12 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
rejected 
this 
argument. 
It 
determined that the argument led to the "absurd" result that a 
"massively thick wall with an extremely thin coat of paint" 
containing just over one percent asbestos could constitute ACM. 
Harenda Enterprises, 297 Wis. 2d 571, ¶9 n.4. It is not clear 
why this is an absurd result. As the State explained at oral 
argument, if a worker strikes the paint-covered wall with a 
hammer or wrecking ball, the amount of asbestos entering the air 
would not depend on whether the material under the paint is 
thick or thin. Regardless, the difficulty of making such 
determinations demonstrates the value of deferring to an 
agency's expertise in interpreting its regulations.  
 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
23 
 
that a discrete strata containing greater than one percent 
asbestos is ACM.  
¶53 Interpreting the regulations such that a discrete 
strata in a multi-layer sample cannot be ACM would require that 
"material" have different meanings in § 1.7.2.1 and § NR 
447.02(1)(b). 
However, 
it 
seems 
implausible 
that 
§ NR 
447.02(1)(b) uses the word "material" to mean one thing, but 
employs and directly refers to a test for ACM that uses 
"material" to mean something altogether different. 
¶54 Harenda argues, however, that the EPA's interpretation 
of § 1.7.2.1 contradicts the section because it renders the 
second clause of the sentence (estimating the asbestos content 
of the entire sample) superfluous. Construction of statutes and 
administrative 
rules 
should 
avoid 
whenever 
possible 
interpretations that render language superfluous. Hutson v. 
State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 655 
N.W.2d 212. Harenda's argument misses the mark for two reasons.  
¶55 First, its argument assumes that "combining" the 
results from discrete layers to "yield an estimate of asbestos 
content for the whole sample" means averaging the results. The 
EPA was clear in the January 1994 and December 1995 documents 
that layers could not be averaged as a means to dilute layers 
containing greater than one percent asbestos. 59 Fed. Reg. 542 
(Jan. 5, 1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). The 
discussion of averaging the asbestos contents for multiple 
layers 
occurs 
in 
the 
context 
of 
providing 
testers 
the 
opportunity to do a preliminary cost- and time-saving test in 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
24 
 
order 
to 
establish 
whether 
analyzing 
discrete 
layers 
is 
necessary. Id. 
¶56 Second, it is Harenda's interpretation of § 1.7.2.1 
that renders language superfluous. If the asbestos content of an 
entire multi-layer sample is the only measure relevant in 
determining whether material is ACM, there would be no need to 
treat each layer "as a separate material so that fibers are 
first identified and quantified in that layer only." Material 
could be determined ACM without analyzing discrete strata. 
Harenda's argument is unpersuasive.13 
¶57 We therefore conclude that the EPA's January 1994 and 
December 1995 clarifications are not inconsistent with the 
language 
of 
§ 1.7.2.1. 
We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
EPA's 
interpretation 
is 
not 
clearly 
erroneous. 
The 
EPA's 
                                                 
13 The dissent states that we conclude the language in 
§ 1.7.2.1 "is ambiguous because of the word 'combined.'" 
Dissent, ¶83. It further states that the 1994 and 1995 
statements do not "clarify the alleged ambiguity," id., ¶85 
(emphasis added), and "change the analysis from a multi-layered 
approach to a single-layer approach." Id., ¶88. The dissent, 
however, neglects a substantial portion of our analysis.  
As we discuss in the text, there are two significant 
ambiguities in the rule. One concerns the word "combined." The 
other ambiguity, which was aptly described by the circuit court, 
is whether a violation occurs when asbestos content for discrete 
layers is quantified or whether a violation occurs only after 
the results from the discrete layers are "combined" (regardless 
of what "combined" means). While the dissent is correct that the 
clarifications do not fully explain what "combined" means, they 
directly address the ambiguity regarding what aspects of the 
test may give rise to a violation. The dissent's claim that the 
clarifications "do not address the alleged ambiguity" and thus 
"changes" the analysis is therefore mistaken.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
25 
 
interpretation fulfills the purpose of the asbestos regulations, 
whereas the alternative interpretation Harenda proposes defeats 
that purpose. Moreover, the EPA's view is supported by basic 
principles of statutory construction. Giving deference to an 
agency's interpretation of its own rule, we conclude that the 
interpretation of § 1.7.2.1 explained in the EPA's January 1994 
and December 1995 clarifications is controlling. 14 
IV 
                                                 
14 Harenda further maintains that if § 1.7.2.1 is unclear, 
it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. However, its 
argument on this point is broadly stated and not sufficiently 
developed. It contends that the provision is unconstitutionally 
vague under the test set forth in State v. McManus, 152 
Wis. 2d 113, 135, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). According to that test 
the statute or regulation must give "persons of ordinary 
intelligence who seek to avoid its penalties fair notice of the 
conduct required or prohibited," and "must provide standards for 
those who enforce the laws and adjudicate guilt." Id. 
The standard Harenda cites applies to criminal statutes and 
regulations. See State v. Hahn, 221 Wis. 2d 670, 677, 586 
N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998). However, Harenda has failed to explain 
why that standard should apply rather than the standard for 
cases involving civil penalties. See Gross v. Woodman's Food 
Mkt., 2002 WI App 295, ¶¶56-57, 259 Wis. 2d 181, 655 N.W.2d 718 
(citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).  
Additionally, at oral argument Harenda acknowledged that 
the laboratories conducting tests on its behalf were advised to 
use the testing methods set forth in the clarifications (i.e., 
the same tests used by the laboratories conducting tests for the 
State). It is unclear how Harenda can now argue that the 
regulations fail to provide fair notice and standards for 
enforcement when its lab was advised to use the testing method 
set forth in the clarifications. Because Harenda's argument that 
the regulations are unconstitutionally vague is insufficiently 
developed, we need not address it here. Kristi L.M. v. Dennis 
E.M., 2007 WI 85, ¶20 n.7, 302 Wis. 2d 185, 734 N.W.2d 375.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
26 
 
¶58 Harenda also argues that the clarifications impose new 
obligations, and absent the clarifications, there would be no 
basis for the State's enforcement action. It contends that the 
clarifications are therefore legislative rules, and that they 
are unenforceable because they were not enacted through the 
proper administrative rule making procedures pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553. 
¶59 Under the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 
an agency may issue a legislative rule only if it uses the note 
and comment procedure described in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) or 
establishes an exception under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). Hemp 
Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). 
However, an agency need not follow the note and comment 
procedure in order to issue an interpretive rule. Id. A 
legislative 
rule 
promulgated 
without 
complying 
with 
the 
procedures of the APA is invalid. Id. It is not disputed that 
the clarifications were issued without the procedures required 
to issue a legislative rule. Rather, the question is whether the 
clarifications are interpretive or legislative rules.  
¶60 The 
difference 
between 
interpretive 
rules 
and 
legislative rules is, roughly speaking, that interpretive rules 
merely explain substantive law, and legislative rules create 
rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law. 
Yesler Terrace Community Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 449 
(9th Cir. 1994). A rule is legislative if, "in the absence of 
the rule, there would not be an adequate legislative basis for 
enforcement action." Hemp Indus. Ass'n, 333 F.3d at 1087. 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
27 
 
However, as noted above, interpretive rules and legislative 
rules lie upon a "hazy continuum" and distinguishing them is a 
case-specific endeavor. American Hospital Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 
1045. 
¶61 Harenda cites to a recent, unpublished case from 
Southern 
California 
in 
support 
of 
its 
claim 
that 
the 
clarifications are legislative rules. In U.S. v. San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co., 2006 LEXIS 84856 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006) 
(SDG&E), San Diego County sued San Diego Gas and Electric for 
violating asbestos work practice standards. Id. at 4. The 
county's indictment stated that the alleged ACM contained 
multiple layers and was tested for asbestos according to the 
method outlined in the clarifications. That is, the county's 
test would find that the material is ACM if "any of the layers, 
standing 
alone . . . [contains] over 1% asbestos and [is] 
friable." Id. at 9.  
¶62 The court determined that the "single-layer" method 
described in the clarifications conflicts with the test set 
forth in § 1.7.2.1. It interpreted the § 1.7.2.1 test to mean 
that "material is not regulated unless the combined result 
yields more than 1 percent asbestos." Id. at 22. The court 
therefore held that the government's failure to allege that 
multi-layered 
material contained greater than one percent 
asbestos as determined by averaging the asbestos content of the 
layers was fatal to its indictment. Id. at 27-28. 
¶63 The court's conclusion in SDG&E, however, turns on an 
interpretation of § 1.7.2.1 that we have rejected. As explained 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
28 
 
above, it is our determination that a reasonable interpretation 
of § 1.7.2.1 is that multi-layer material is ACM if a single 
layer has an asbestos content of greater than one percent. That 
interpretation 
is 
supported 
by 
EPA's 
clarifications, 
the 
manifest purpose of the rule, and principles of statutory 
construction.15 Further, the SDG&E court uncritically adopts the 
view, which we reject, that in § 1.7.2.1 "combine" means 
average. 
¶64 Moreover, § 1.7.2.1 provides an adequate basis for the 
enforcement action even without the clarifications. As we 
discuss 
above, 
§ 1.7.2.1 
is 
ambiguous, 
and 
the 
EPA's 
interpretation is consistent with the section.  Specifically, 
§ 1.7.2.1 supports the interpretation that if a single layer of 
a multi-layer sample contains greater than one percent asbestos, 
the material is ACM. Also as outlined above, that interpretation 
is supported by the purpose of the regulations and basic 
principles of construction.  
¶65 Finally, we are mindful that the EPA characterized the 
1994 and 1995 statements as "clarifications to the final rule" 
rather 
than 
rules. 
When 
courts 
consider 
an 
agency's 
characterization of its actions they "generally give deference 
to the agency's views." Beverly Health & Rehab., 223 F. Supp. 2d 
                                                 
15 Similarly, the dissent maintains that the clarifications 
do not apply because they have not been formally adopted by the 
DNR. Dissent, ¶¶90-91. However, the dissent's argument rests on 
a faulty premise. The DNR must formally adopt only legislative 
rules. For the reasons outlined in the text, the clarifications 
are interpretive rules that do not require formal adoption.   
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
29 
 
at 103.  The EPA's view supports our conclusion that the 
statements are interpretive rules rather than legislative rules. 
We therefore determine that, contrary to SDG&E, § 1.7.2.1 
provides 
an 
adequate 
legislative 
basis 
for 
the 
State's 
enforcement action.16 The clarifications are not legislative 
rules. Rather, they are valid interpretive rules. 
V 
¶66 We turn finally to Harenda's due process argument. 
Harenda contends that its pre-demolition sampling and testing 
satisfied the applicable regulations and indicated that the 
material in the disputed area was not ACM. It further maintains 
that the differences between the results of its tests on the 
split samples and the State's tests on the split samples create 
an issue of fact as to whether the material from the disputed 
area was ACM. Thus, it argues that the circuit court granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment on the basis of "conflicting 
test results." It maintains that the decision was therefore 
arbitrary, and it violated Harenda's right to due process.  
                                                 
16 Harenda asserts that the "State admits that, without the 
substantive changes . . . effected by the Clarifications, it 
loses this case . . . [and] admits that it can only establish a 
violation if the Clarification testing method is used." At oral 
argument the State rejected this characterization of its view. 
The State's view, it explained, is that the clarifications do 
not effect substantive change at all. Rather, the State admits 
that the average asbestos content of the samples from the 
disputed area is less than one percent.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
30 
 
¶67 Harenda's contention that the circuit court's decision 
was arbitrary is unpersuasive. Its due process argument is thus 
without foundation. 
¶68 The circuit court based its decision on a four-element 
test as set forth in National Can, 126 F. Supp. 2d 521: 
In order to establish liability under the asbestos 
NESHAP, the government must prove that 1) [American 
Can] was an owner or operator of a facility, 2) a 
renovation 
occurred, 3) asbestos was removed or 
stripped without complying with the requirements and 
practices delineated in the asbestos NESHAP, and 4) a 
jurisdictional amount of asbestos was disturbed.  
Id. at 525, note 1 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 61.140 et seq.) 
¶69 Under the above test, owners and operators are 
strictly liable for asbestos abatement regulation violations 
occurring at their regulated facilities. The State does not have 
to prove any negligence or intent to violate the regulation. As 
stated in United States v. B & W Inv. Properties, 38 F.3d 362 
(7th Cir. 1994): 
Having 
been 
deemed 
an 
owner 
or 
operator, 
[the 
defendant] has no valid challenge against application 
of the Act, regardless of how minimal the company's 
responsibilities or knowledge may actually have been. 
The Act imposes strict liability on all owners and 
operators of properties in violation of the Act. 
Id. at 367. 
¶70 The parties have stipulated that Harenda is an 
operator of a facility. There is also no dispute that a 
renovation occurred and that removal of material from the 
disputed area occurred without following the procedures outlined 
in chapter 447. Further, Harenda does not contest that if the 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
31 
 
material removed from the disputed area is ACM, a jurisdictional 
amount of asbestos was disturbed.17 The issue is whether the 
material removed from the disputed area is ACM. 
¶71 Harenda is correct that the State has offered no 
argument that Harenda failed to conduct its pre-demolition 
sampling and testing according to the regulations. In fact, the 
State offers no opinion on the issue. Instead, the State asserts 
that liability does not depend on whether an owner or operator 
conducts pre-demolition sampling testing in accord with the 
regulations.   
¶72 The State is correct. The elements set forth above do 
not 
require that 
the owner or operator sample or test 
improperly, and Harenda offers no argument that sampling and 
testing according to the regulations is a defense. Thus, in the 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Admin. Code § NR 447.06(2) establishes the 
amounts of ACM that trigger measures in §§ NR 447.07 and 447.08. 
It provides in relevant part: 
(2) APPLICABILITY. The requirements of ss. NR 447.07 
and 447.08 apply to each owner or operator of a 
demolition 
or 
renovation 
activity, 
including 
the 
removal of RACM as follows: 
(a) 
In 
a 
facility 
being 
demolished, 
all 
the 
requirements of ss. NR 447.07 and 447.08 apply, except 
as provided in par. (c), if the combined amount of 
RACM meets any of the following: 
1. At least 80 linear meters (260 linear feet) on 
pipes or at least 15 square meters (160 square feet) 
on other facility components; or 
2. At least one cubic meter (35 cubic feet) off of 
facility components where the length or area could not 
be measured previously.  
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
32 
 
present case liability depends on whether the material disturbed 
was ACM, not on the quality of Harenda's pre-demolition sampling 
and testing.  
¶73 Harenda's argument that the circuit court made an 
arbitrary choice between "dueling test results" is similarly 
unpersuasive. It makes much of the fact that the tests of the 
split samples conducted for the State and for Harenda had 
different 
results. 
Harenda 
contends 
that 
such 
"analytic 
variability" in testing results undermines the basis of the 
circuit court's decision and renders it arbitrary. 
 ¶74 It is correct that Harenda's tests indicated that one 
more sample contained ACM than the State's test, and it is also 
correct that the tests differed with respect to the precise 
amount of asbestos in some samples. However, the samples are not 
"dueling" with respect to whether the material was ACM under the 
regulations. The tests on the split samples conducted for 
Harenda and the tests on the split samples conducted for the 
State both came back positive for ACM. Regardless of "analytic 
variability," the two sets of tests were consistent in the 
relevant respect, namely, whether the material was ACM. 
¶75 Harenda's pre-demolition sampling and testing was the 
only set of tests that did not indicate that material from the 
disputed area was ACM. The State's test during demolition 
indicated that the material was ACM, and the State's test after 
demolition was halted indicated that the material was ACM. 
Further, both the State's and Harenda's tests on the split 
samples indicated that the material was ACM. The parties have 
No. 
2005AP1829   
 
33 
 
stipulated that the tests were accurate within their testing 
method. Thus, the array of positive tests is sufficient to show 
the presence of ACM.  
¶76 Accordingly, we determine that there was nothing 
arbitrary in the circuit court's conclusion that the tests 
showed that the material from the disputed area was ACM. Harenda 
therefore has no basis for a claim that the decision violated 
its right to due process.  
VI 
¶77 In sum, we determine, first, that the language of 
§ 1.7.2.1 
is 
ambiguous. 
Giving 
deference 
to 
an 
agency's 
interpretation of its own rule, we conclude that the EPA's 
interpretation is controlling because it is neither inconsistent 
with § 1.7.2.1 nor clearly erroneous. We further determine that 
the clarifications do not constitute impermissible rule making; 
rather, they are valid interpretive rules. Finally, we determine 
that the circuit court's judgment does not violate Harenda's 
substantive due process rights. We therefore reverse the court 
of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
1 
 
¶78 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (dissenting).  In an 
area as crucial as asbestos removal, it is important to have 
clear, understandable, enforceable testing methods.  In general, 
clarifications may be a useful guide, but the "clarifications" 
in this case are inconsistent with the plain language of the 
rule and more than interpretive guidelines.  In fact, the 
"clarifications" effect a substantive change rather than clarify 
the alleged ambiguity in the 1990 rule.  Despite the fact that 
the "clarifications" do not clarify the alleged ambiguity, are 
contrary to the promulgated rule, and were not adopted in this 
state, the majority still gives them the force of law.  As a 
result, I must respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶79 Asbestos is a group of minerals that naturally occur 
as fibers.  It has been widely used in many industrial products 
such as flooring, textiles, and insulation.1  Exposure to 
asbestos can lead to mesothelioma, which is a rare form of 
cancer that affects the protective sac of most internal organs 
such as the lungs.  "Most people who develop mesothelioma have 
worked 
on 
jobs 
where 
they 
inhaled 
asbestos 
particles."2  
Symptoms, however, may not appear until 30 to 50 years after 
exposure.  The incidence of this rare cancer has increased over 
the past 20 years but may be stabilizing now.  Once symptoms 
                                                 
1 National Cancer Institute, U.S. National Institutes of 
Health, Mesothelioma: Questions and Answers, available at 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Sites-
Types/mesothelioma. 
2 Id. 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
2 
 
appear and the cancer is diagnosed, the disease is often very 
advanced.3  Mesothelioma is often associated with a horrible 
death.   
II 
¶80 The Clean Air Act regulates hazardous pollutants, such 
as asbestos.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West 1999).  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) enacted the National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) pursuant to its authority 
under § 7412.  In 1973, the EPA promulgated the first asbestos 
NESHAP regulation.  See 38 Fed. Reg. 8,820, 8,826-30 (Apr. 6, 
1973).  The asbestos NESHAP specifies procedures for removing 
certain asbestos materials.  40 C.F.R. Pt. 61, Subpt. M, 
§ 61.145.  The 1973 regulation underwent significant changes in 
1990 in order to "enhance enforcement and promote compliance 
with the current standard without altering the stringency of 
existing controls."  55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,406 (Nov. 20, 
1990).   
¶81 Following the proper rule-making process, the EPA 
established the "Interim Method" for determining asbestos 
content in bulk samples.4  See id. at 48,415; 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, 
                                                 
3 American Cancer Society, ACS: What are the Key Statistics 
about 
Malignant 
Mesothelioma?, 
available 
at 
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content/CRI_2_4_1X_What_are_th
e_key_statistics_for_malignant_mesothelioma_29.asp?sitearea=, 
revision 10/19/06. 
4 Section 1.7.2.1, Gross Examination, provides: 
Bulk samples of building materials taken for the 
identification and quantitation of asbestos are first 
examined for homogeneity at low magnification with the 
aid of a stereomicroscope.  The core sample may be 
examined in its container or carefully removed from 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
3 
 
Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1, Gross Examination.  The DNR 
incorporated by reference the 1990 testing method, but it did 
not so incorporate the 1994 and 1995 clarifications.5  The 1990 
method seems to require the following: (1) examine the core 
sample for homogeneity; (2) if the sample is homogeneous, 
identify fibers and quantify asbestos content for the sample; 
(3) when discrete strata are identified, the fibers in each 
layer are identified and quantified; "and then" (4) after the 
layers are quantified, the results of each layer are combined to 
yield an estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample.  
See, e.g., State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 2006 WI App 230, ¶4, 
297 Wis. 2d 571, 724 N.W.2d 434.    
¶82 The plain language of the 1990 rule is instructive.  
It does not stop at the analysis of each layer.  It reads: "and 
then the results for each layer are combined to yield an 
estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample." (Emphasis 
                                                                                                                                                             
the container onto a glassine transfer paper or clean 
glass plate.  If possible, note is made of the top and 
bottom 
orientation. 
When 
discrete 
strata 
are 
identified, each is treated as a separate material so 
that fibers are first identified and quantified in 
that layer only, and then the results for each layer 
are combined to yield an estimate of asbestos content 
for the whole sample. 
40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1.7.2.1. (Emphasis 
added.)  
5 The 1990 testing method, unlike the clarifications, was 
incorporated by reference on December 4, 1994.  See Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 484.04(28) (July 2007) (incorporating by reference 40 
C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1 for §§ NR 447.02(1)(a) and 
(b), 
447.02(16), 
447.02(27), 
447.02(36), 
447.09(1)(a) 
and(b)(intro)). 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
4 
 
added.)  If the rule was intended to require removal when any 
one layer was over one percent, the rule would not need the last 
clause, which requires that layers be combined to yield a result 
for the whole sample.   
¶83 The majority, however, concludes that the language in 
§ 1.7.2.1 is ambiguous because of the word "combined."  See 
majority op., ¶¶29-36.  As a result, the majority relies on the 
1994 and 1995 EPA clarifications, which undermine the plain 
language of the properly promulgated 1990 rule.6  The majority 
accepts the two EPA "clarifications" even though they do not 
have the force of law, are contrary to the plain language of the 
rule, and read the "combined" requirement out of existence.  See 
majority op., ¶¶38-49.  Because the clarifications (1) do not 
clarify the ambiguity; (2) were not properly promulgated and are 
not the law of this state; and (3) fail to fully protect the 
worker, I must dissent.  
                                                 
6 The 
majority 
defers 
to 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
stating, "[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of its own 
regulations 
is 
controlling 
'unless 
the 
interpretation 
is 
inconsistent with the language of the regulation or is clearly 
erroneous.'"  See majority op., ¶25 (citing Orion Flight Servs., 
Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 WI 51, 290 Wis. 2d 421, 714 
N.W.2d 130.  Because the agency's interpretation is inconsistent 
with the properly promulgated rule, I give no deference to the 
agency's interpretation.  See part B of this dissent.  However, 
as the court of appeals so aptly stated, "[i]rrespective of what 
level of deference is appropriate, [] an agency interpretation 
may not trump a statute's clear language."  State v. Harenda 
Enters., Inc., 2006 WI App 230, ¶¶8-9, 297 Wis. 2d 571, 724 
N.W.2d 434.  
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
5 
 
 
A 
¶84 Even if we look to the 1994 and 1995 clarifications 
and 
ignore 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
DNR 
did 
not 
adopt 
the 
clarifications 
but 
adopted 
only 
the 
1990 
rule, 
the 
clarifications still do not clarify the alleged ambiguity of 
what "combined" means.  In 1994 and 1995, the EPA produced 
"clarifications" for the 1990 rule.  The January 5, 1994, 
clarification briefly explained, "when a sample consists of two 
or more distinct layers or materials, each layer should be 
treated separately and the results reported by layer (discrete 
stratum)."  59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994).  Even if this is an 
explanation, it still fails to explain what actions should be 
taken to combine layers to yield an estimate for the whole 
sample. 
¶85 To add to the confusion, the second clarification, 
issued in 1995, states that combining layers was never allowed.  
That contention, however, is clearly contrary to the plain 
language of the rule.  The 1995 clarification states that the 
"unwritten policy" of the EPA dating back to the 1970s "was that 
each layer in a multi-layered system was to be analyzed as a 
separate material (no averaging or dilution by combining layers 
of 
asbestos-containing 
material 
with 
nonasbestos-containing 
material was allowed)."  60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).  
While this new test——the single layer approach——may be a better 
approach, it is contrary to the 1990 rule's plain language.  
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
6 
 
Rather than clarify the alleged ambiguity, the clarifications 
create a new and distinct rule.  
B 
¶86 Under our system of government, any enforceable rule, 
however, must be vetted through the proper rule-making process.  
The rule-making process is an important part of our democracy.  
It gives interested parties the opportunity to be heard.  The 
Administrative Procedures Act governs the promulgation of new 
federal agency rules, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553, and chapter 227 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes governs the promulgation of Wisconsin agency 
rules.  Rules must be subjected to a notice and comment period 
before they may take effect.  5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) and (c); Wis. 
Stat. §§ 227.16-227.19.  The notice and comment period occurred 
at the state and federal level for the 1990 rule, but it never 
occurred with respect to the 1994 and 1995 clarifications.  
Because the clarifications effect substantive change and create 
a new rule, the rule-making process was required.     
¶87 When a rule is interpretive rather than substantive, 
the rule is excepted from the notice and comment period 
requirements.  5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c).  Whether a rule is 
substantive rather than interpretive, however, depends upon 
whether it creates rights, assigns duties, or imposes new 
obligations.  See Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 
333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding (1) that a 
legislative or substantive rule promulgated without following 
the rule-making requirements is invalid; and (2) that a rule is 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
7 
 
legislative or substantive if it imposes new obligations or 
changes existing law).7   
¶88 Here, there can be no question that the 1994 and 1995 
clarifications effect a substantive change to the law, impose 
new obligations on companies such as Harenda, and create 
significant civil or criminal liability.  The "clarifications" 
change the analysis from a multi-layered approach to a single-
layer approach.  This changes the rule——without following proper 
rule-making 
procedures——because 
instead 
of 
a 
quantity 
of 
asbestos for the whole sample giving rise to an obligation for 
special removal procedures, a company, such as Harenda, must 
follow special removal procedures when only one layer out of 
many contains greater than one percent asbestos.  Because the 
clarifications impose new obligations upon companies such as 
Harenda, the clarifications change the rules governing asbestos 
                                                 
7 See also Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 
442, 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the difference between 
interpretive and legislative rules); Elizabeth Williams, What 
constitutes "interpretative rule" of agency so as to exempt such 
action from notice requirements of Administrative Procedure Act 
(5 USCS § 553(b)(3)(A), 126 A.L.R. Fed. 347 (1995).   
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
8 
 
testing.8  In fact, the State seems to concede that the 
clarifications change the rule; the State admits that it cannot 
meet its burden of proof if the clarifications are not the law.9  
Thus, 
the 
clarifications 
substantively 
change 
the 
rules 
governing asbestos testing. 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Robert M. Howard, Patricia Guerrero, David B. 
McGrath, Drew R. Van Orden, The EPA's Prosecution of Clean Air 
Act Asbestos NESHAP Cases Based Upon Non-binding Bulk Material 
Test 
Methods, 
44 
San Diego L. Rev. 173, 202-03 (2007) 
(identifying five substantive differences between the 1990 and 
1993 test methods: (1) averaging of multilayered material, which 
has been through federal rulemaking three times, is rejected by 
the 
1993 
test 
method; 
(2) 
the 
1990 
rule 
"mandates 
'representative,' multilayered samples to quantify asbestos 
content layer–by-layer" instead of material becoming regulated 
if any single layer is greater than one-percent asbestos; (3) 
changing the "small quantity" criteria for pipe wrap; (4) unlike 
the 1993 test method, the 1990 "method makes no laboratory 
determination of friability, as a predictor of the material's 
actual condition in the field"; (5) "[u]nlike the 1990 test 
method, the newer 1993 test method requires laboratories to 
report on friability as that term is separately defined" in the 
new test method).  The 1993 method, which this article refers 
to, is the method discussed in the clarifications.  See id. at 
182-86 (referring to R.L. Perkins & B.W. Harvey, Test Method, 
Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Building 
Materials, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA/600/R-93/116 (1993)). 
9 At the summary judgment hearing, the State said: 
Then, question number 2 is whether or not the 
clarifications apply.  Again, every test result that 
the 
State 
submitted 
were--used 
the 
clarification 
method.  Every one. Why?  Because they were all 
certified labs.  And all certified labs under the 
NVLAP procedures have to follow the clarifications.  
They were all analyzed by layer.  I'm first to admit 
that if you throw out the clarifications, you throw 
out the State's test results.  Every one was analyzed 
I believe under the NVLAP approach.  And so this is 
obviously a pivotal aspect. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
9 
 
¶89 The 
EPA 
even acknowledged its responsibility to 
promulgate a new rule so that it could properly enforce the new 
test.  The 1995 clarification itself states that with regard to 
the composite analysis method, the "EPA intends to amend the 
asbestos NESHAP in the near future to refer specifically to 
these procedures."  60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995).  
However, the EPA never took that action.  
¶90 The 1995 clarification devised an alternative cost-
saving test method, which allows one to have the composite 
analyzed first.  Id.  If the "composite analysis shows that the 
average content for the multi-layered" sample is over one 
percent, 
then 
the 
material 
must 
be 
treated 
as 
asbestos 
containing (ACM).  Id. (Emphasis added.)10  However, if the 
composite analysis yields asbestos below one percent but greater 
than zero, then analysis by layers is required to ensure that no 
layer is greater than one percent asbestos content, which would 
deem that layer an asbestos containing layer giving rise to 
precautionary measures for the entire sample without combining.  
Id.  Thus, under this clarification, if one layer is greater 
than one percent, the entire sample is considered ACM.  This, 
however, is contrary to the language of the 1990 promulgated 
rule, and the DNR never adopted the clarifications.  As 
acknowledged by the EPA, new action is required to promulgate 
the 1995 testing method.  
                                                 
10 Presumably, this "averaging" arises out of the last 
sentence 
in 
§ 1.7.2.1, 
Gross 
Examination. 
 
The 
1995 
clarification, thus, appears to try and utilize "combine" from 
§ 1.7.2.1. 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
10 
 
¶91 As we see in this case, the clarifications have been 
enforced by the DNR as if they have the force of a properly 
promulgated rule, despite the fact that our state did not 
incorporate by reference the clarifications11 and they effect a 
substantive change to the rule.  While an agency may interpret 
rules, they cannot 
effect a new rule that changes the 
substantive rule.  In effect, new rules governing asbestos 
testing, which could result in civil or criminal penalties, have 
been imposed without following proper rule-making procedures.  
See United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No. 06-CR-65-
DMS, 2006 WL 3913457, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006) 
(concluding that the clarifications are legislative and thus 
impose new obligations on companies even though the proper rule-
making process was not followed; therefore, a company cannot be 
held liable based on testing methods articulated by the 
clarifications). 
¶92 Proper rule making is important because matters are 
openly debated and people have the opportunity to be heard.  It 
                                                 
11 In 1994, the DNR incorporated by reference the federal 
1990 rule.  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 484.04(28) (incorporating 
only 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763, Subpt. E, App. E, § 1, which does not 
include the "clarifications").  The clarifications have never 
been 
incorporated 
by 
reference. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
1994 
clarification was in place when the DNR incorporated the 1990 
rule by reference.  If the DNR wanted to adopt the clarification 
it could have taken action in 1994 or at a later time.  Cf. Wis. 
Admin. Code § NR 484.04 with Wis. Admin. Code § NR 352.03 
(incorporating by reference "[a]ll of the following federal 
manual, memoranda, guidelines, regulatory guidance letters or 
other provision established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
interpreting the 1987 wetlands delineation manual shall be used 
when delineating nonfederal wetland boundaries"). 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
11 
 
is fundamentally unfair to subject anyone to significant 
liability——especially 
criminal 
liability——when 
proper 
rule 
making did not occur.  Here, Harenda was exposed to $4 million 
in liability.12  If the State intends to hold people or companies 
liable——potentially 
criminally 
liable——the 
rules 
must 
be 
                                                 
12 Violations are contrary to Wis. Admin. Code §§ NR 
447.08(6)(a), 447.08(6)(b), 447.08(1), and 447.13(1).  Potential 
penalties for violations of asbestos regulations are provided in 
§ NR 447.19, Penalties; it reads: 
(1) The department may take appropriate enforcement 
action against any owner or operator of a demolition 
or renovation activity or any owner or operator of an 
active landfill, to which this chapter applies, that 
violates this chapter.  Appropriate enforcement action 
includes 
letters 
of 
non-compliance, 
notices 
of 
violation, 
citations, 
referrals 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
department of justice, and deferral or referrals to 
the United States environmental protection agency. Any 
enforcement action the department may take shall be 
based 
upon 
factors 
such 
as 
severity, 
duration, 
frequency and environmental or health risks of the 
violation. 
 . . . . 
(3) A 
citation 
may 
be 
issued 
which 
requires 
a 
forfeiture of not less than $500, nor more than 
$5,000, for each violation, except as provided in sub. 
(4).  Each day of continued violation is a separate 
offense. 
(4) When any owner or operator is found in violation 
of the regulatory requirements listed in sub. (2) by 
any court of this state, and the violation remains of 
record and unreversed, for any second or subsequent 
violation of the regulatory requirements listed in 
sub. (2) occurring within a 5-year period from the 
date of the prior adjudication, the minimum and 
maximum citation forfeitures shall be doubled.  
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
12 
 
properly enacted.13  Furthermore, it runs counter to our system 
of justice to hold anyone civilly liable, and especially 
criminally liable, when the proper testing method is ambiguous 
as the majority claims.  
¶93 The rule of lenity must be considered.  While the case 
at hand is a civil action, our interpretation of the rule will 
affect those who are subject to criminal prosecution for 
"asbestos violations."  The rule of lenity provides "that 
ambiguous penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the 
defendant."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶67, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 
                                                 
13 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 285.87, 
Penalties 
for 
violations 
relating to air pollution (asserting criminal penalties for 
violations of ch. 285 of the Wisconsin Statutes or any rule 
promulgated under ch. 285).  Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 447 was 
adopted under Wis. Stat. §§ 285.11, 285.13, 285.17 and 285.27).  
Wis. Stat. § 285.87 reads: 
(1) Except as provided in s. 285.57(5) or 285.59(8), 
any person who violates this chapter or any rule 
promulgated, any permit issued or any special order 
issued under this chapter shall forfeit not less than 
$10 or more than $25,000 for each violation. Each day 
of continued violation is a separate offense. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), any person who 
intentionally commits an act that violates, or fails 
to perform an act required by this chapter, except s. 
285.59, or any rule promulgated, any permit issued or 
any special order issued under this chapter, except s. 
285.59, shall be fined not more than $25,000 per day 
of violation or imprisoned for not more than 6 months 
or both. 
(b) If the conviction under par. (a) is for a 
violation committed after another conviction under 
par. (a), the person is guilty of a Class I felony, 
except 
that, 
notwithstanding 
the 
maximum 
fine 
specified in s. 939.50(3)(i), the person may be fined 
not more than $50,000 per day of violation.  
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
13 
 
663 N.W.2d 700.  "More specifically, the rule of lenity comes 
into play after two conditions are met: (1) the penal statute is 
ambiguous; and (2) we are unable to clarify the intent of the 
legislature by resort to legislative history."  Id.  The 
majority concludes that the rule is ambiguous and thus the first 
prong is satisfied.  Perhaps the clarifications could be 
utilized under the second prong to ascertain the intent of the 
EPA, but when the legislative history or "clarifications" change 
the substantive rule's plain language, we cannot rely on it to 
uphold liability. 
¶94 Here, 
the 
clarifications 
do 
not 
merely 
explain 
substantive law.  Rather, they impose new obligations by 
changing existing law.  Thus, the clarifications introduce 
substantive changes in the law without following the proper 
rule-making procedures.14 
C 
¶95 The 
current 
testing 
methods 
and 
procedures 
are 
dangerously ineffective.  Harenda and the DNR both had testing 
completed under the clarifications method, yet they still 
acquired different results.  Not only were the results different 
pre- 
and 
post-demolition, 
but 
the 
tests 
conducted 
post-
                                                 
14 The majority claims the dissent leaves the State of 
Wisconsin without any meaningful regulation, and it claims the 
dissent would invalidate the interpretive rule.  See majority 
op., 
¶49 
n.11. 
 
The 
majority, 
however, 
invalidates 
the 
substantive 
rule. 
 
Here, 
the 
clarifications, 
i.e., 
the 
"interpretive rule," so change the plain language of the rule 
that the clarifications are not entitled to the force of law 
unless they are properly promulgated.  The properly promulgated 
1990 rule, which the State of Wisconsin has incorporated by 
reference, is the only valid rule governing asbestos testing. 
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
14 
 
demolition produced competing results.  Harenda's pre-demolition 
samples did not give rise to special precautions.  Post-
demolition samples, however, which were divided and given to 
both Harenda and the State, were not consistent with each other 
although both results would have required ACM precautions.  When 
the same test yields different results, even on the same sample 
area, how does a court resolve these competing facts at summary 
judgment? 
¶96 While the DNR argues that the clarifications result in 
safer working conditions, they still do not actually protect the 
worker.  Although this court cannot require it, our federal and 
state government should consider implementing guidelines that 
actually protect the worker, such as requiring state authorities 
to conduct testing prior to demolition.  If the clarifications 
are "adopted" by this court, then the DNR should act to properly 
adopt them.  For example, the State of New Jersey enacted 
'emergency 
rules' 
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
adopting 
the 
clarifications.  See Robert M. Howard, Patricia Guerrero, David 
B. McGrath, Drew R. Van Orden, The EPA's Prosecution of Clean 
Air Act Asbestos NESHAP Cases Based Upon Non-binding Bulk 
Material Test Methods, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 173, 207-08 (2007).  
"New Jersey explained that the 1993 test [i.e., the 1994 
clarification] method is preferable to the 1990 test method 
because the enumerated NESHAP 1990 test method underreports 
asbestos content . . . ."  Id. at 208.  Our state has not so 
acted.   
No.  2005AP1829.akz 
 
15 
 
 
III 
¶97 The "clarifications" do not clarify the 1990 rule.  
The 1994 clarification promotes a single-layer test, which is 
not the test articulated in the properly enacted rule.  The 1995 
clarification confuses the issue even more.  The clarifications 
do 
not 
clarify 
what 
"combined" 
means. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
clarifications are inconsistent with the plain language of the 
rule and are more than interpretive guidelines.  In fact, they 
effect a substantive change.  The clarifications and the 
majority's interpretation eliminate the last clause of the rule 
even though the clarifications have not been subjected to the 
proper rule-making process.  The government should be required 
to clearly articulate and enact the lawful test in order to 
ensure that citizens are not exposed to asbestos and put 
companies on notice about potentially, significant liability for 
a violation of the "properly enacted rule."   
¶98 Here, neither the EPA nor the DNR properly promulgated 
the clarifications.  The clarifications effected a substantive 
change to the "Interim Method," and they are not the law of this 
state.  In the case at issue, the State's motion for summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
¶99 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶100 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent.