Title: State v. Ross

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Ross, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6282.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6282 
STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. ROSS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Ross, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6282.] 
Criminal procedure — Crim.R. 29(C) — Crim.R. 29 and 45(B) do not permit a 
defendant to file a motion to renew an already denied motion for acquittal 
outside the Crim.R. 29(C) time frame — Cause remanded. 
(No. 2009-1619 ⎯ Submitted September 15, 2010 ⎯ Decided 
December 28, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 21906, 184 Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal presents the issue of whether a trial court, having 
denied a timely filed Crim.R. 29(C) motion for acquittal, may reconsider its ruling 
and grant the motion based on the defendant’s renewed motion filed after the 14-
day time period in Crim.R. 29(C) has expired. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} In this case, the trial court denied appellee Denny Ross’s timely 
filed motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(C).  However, well after the 
expiration of the time period for making a motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 
29(C), Ross filed a supplemental memorandum urging the trial court to grant him 
an acquittal. The trial court then purported to grant what it characterized as Ross’s 
motion for reconsideration of the court’s previous order denying Ross’s motion 
for acquittal.  The state appealed, contending that the court of common pleas lacks 
jurisdiction to grant an untimely Crim.R. 29(C) motion for acquittal because 
Crim.R. 45(B) bars any action not expressly provided for by Crim.R. 29(C), and 
any order purporting to grant acquittal outside the confines of Crim.R. 29(C) is 
void and unenforceable.  The court of appeals affirmed.  State v. Ross, 184 Ohio 
App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 25.  We granted review.  State v. 
Ross, 124 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2009-Ohio-3561, 921 N.E.2d 244. 
I. Procedural History 
{¶ 3} In 1999, a Summit County grand jury indicted Denny Ross for the 
kidnapping, rape, murder, and aggravated murder of Hanna Hill and for tampering 
with evidence and abuse of a corpse. The indictment, as supplemented, alleged 
two aggravating circumstances — committing murder during a rape and 
committing murder during a kidnapping — making Ross eligible for the death 
penalty.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  During Ross’s trial, the court granted in part 
Ross’s motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A), ordering dismissal of the 
kidnapping charge and the related death-penalty specification.  At the close of all 
evidence, Ross again moved for acquittal on the remaining charges under Crim.R. 
29(A), but that motion was denied. 
{¶ 4} Before the jury trial concluded, the trial judge granted a mistrial 
because of juror misconduct. The jury was discharged on October 28, 2000. The 
trial court then discovered that the jury had filled out some of the verdict forms 
January Term, 2010 
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(with regard to the charges of aggravated murder, murder, and rape), but the court 
did not accept those verdicts because the jury already had been discharged. 
{¶ 5} Within 14 days of the trial court’s discharge of the jury, Ross 
renewed his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(C) on the remaining charges of 
aggravated murder, murder, rape, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse.  
He also filed a motion to perfect the verdicts of acquittal and a motion to dismiss 
the case on double-jeopardy grounds.  A different judge was appointed to preside 
over the case after the recusal of Judge Bond, the original trial judge. The new 
trial judge granted the motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds and 
declined to rule on the other motions, including the Crim.R. 29(C) motion for 
acquittal.  On direct appeal of the trial court’s double-jeopardy ruling, the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded the case for retrial. State v. Ross, 9th Dist. No. 
20980, 2002-Ohio-7317, 2002 WL 31890088.1  
{¶ 6} On September 10, 2003, after the court of appeals’ decision and 
before the federal courts’ final resolution of Ross’s separate challenge to the 
mistrial in federal habeas proceedings, the common pleas court in a one-page 
order denied Ross’s motions for acquittal and to perfect the jury verdicts and 
scheduled the case for trial on November 17, 2003. 
{¶ 7} On September 12, 2003, almost three years after the jury had been 
discharged after the mistrial, Ross filed a document entitled “defendant’s 
                                                 
1.  In federal habeas corpus proceedings, Ross also challenged the decision to grant a mistrial, 
asserting that any retrial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal 
district court granted habeas relief, Ross v. Petro  (N.D.Ohio 2005), 382 F.Supp. 967, but the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. See Ross v. Petro (C.A.6, 2008), 
515 F.3d 653, certiorari denied, Ross v. Rogers (2009), ___ U.S., ___, 129 S.Ct. 906, 173 L.Ed.2d 
109. The Sixth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not bar 
reprosecution of Ross after the mistrial. Id. at 671.  The Sixth Circuit determined that the Ohio 
court of appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s conclusion that there was a manifest 
necessity for the mistrial did not contravene clearly established federal law. Id.  The issues 
regarding the propriety of the mistrial are not before us in this appeal. 
 
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supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to perfect the three 
unanimous verdicts of acquittal.”2  On October 3, 2003, the trial court issued an 
order to grant the state additional time to respond to Ross’s September 12, 2003 
filing and to permit oral argument and a hearing on the merits of Ross’s motion to 
perfect verdicts.  In its October 3, 2003 entry, the trial court characterized Ross’s 
September 12, 2003 filing as a motion to reconsider its order of September 10, 
2003. A week later, the trial court then issued an order granting Ross’s motion to 
continue the trial and setting a scheduling conference for October 15, 2003. 
{¶ 8} On November 6, 2003, Ross filed a supplemental memorandum in 
support of his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. 
This was the first time after the September 10, 2003 order denying his motion for 
acquittal that Ross sought to renew his acquittal motion. In this filing, Ross urged 
dismissal of the rape charge and the aggravating circumstance of killing the 
victim in the course of committing a rape and requested the court to consider the 
state’s recent posttrial advisement to Ross pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963), 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, casting doubt on some of the state’s 
expert testimony at trial regarding the apparent bite marks found on the victim. 
{¶ 9} The trial court held a hearing on Ross’s motions, including his 
renewed motion for acquittal, on November 12, 2003. At that hearing, and in a 
written response to Ross’s renewed motion, the state objected to the trial court’s 
consideration of Ross’s renewed motion filed well after the 14-day deadline for 
such motions in Crim.R. 29(C). On November 26, 2003, Ross then filed a second 
supplemental memorandum in support of his renewed motion for acquittal 
pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The trial court issued a written opinion purporting to 
                                                 
2.  Any reliance by Ross on statements allegedly made by the trial court judge during an ex parte 
conversation between counsel for Ross and the judge on September 11, 2003, regarding the 
court’s direction to file a motion to permit argument on the just-denied motions for acquittal and 
to perfect verdicts, or to the effect that the trial court characterized its September 10 ruling as 
inadvertent, is misplaced, because any such statements do not appear in the record as having taken 
place at a conference or hearing of the trial court.  
January Term, 2010 
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reconsider its previous denial of Ross’s motion for acquittal and granting Ross an 
acquittal of the rape charge and the related death-penalty specification. 
{¶ 10} The state filed both an appeal as of right and a motion for leave to 
appeal. In the motion, the state sought leave to appeal the judgment entry 
“granting Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the court’s Previous Denial of 
Defendant’s Criminal Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, and specifically 
granting the Defendant Judgment of Acquittal of the offense of Rape and the 
Death Specification.” (Emphasis sic.) The court of appeals, in a brief order, 
granted without discussion the state’s motion for leave to appeal under R.C. 
2945.67(A). 
{¶ 11} After the federal appellate court rejected Ross’s double-jeopardy 
claims in his habeas petition, the Ninth District Court of Appeals considered the 
state’s appeal of the order reconsidering denial of Ross’s acquittal motion. The 
court of appeals held that the trial court’s initial denial of Ross’s motion for 
acquittal under Crim.R. 29(C) was not a final judgment under R.C. 2505.02(B), 
and that as an interlocutory order, it could be reconsidered and granted.  Ross, 184 
Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 12, 17, 25. The state 
appealed from that decision, and we granted review.  Ross, 124 Ohio St.3d 1472, 
2010-Ohio-354, 921 N.E.2d 244. The state asserts the following proposition of 
law: “The court of common pleas lacks jurisdiction to grant an untimely Crim.R. 
29(C) motion for acquittal because Crim.R. 45(B) bars ‘any action’ not expressly 
provided for by Crim.R. 29(C), and any order purporting to grant acquittal outside 
the confines of Crim.R. 29(C) is void and unenforceable.” 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 12} This appeal requires us to determine whether a trial court may 
reconsider a timely made, but previously denied, motion for acquittal pursuant to 
Crim.R. 29(C), if the defendant, after the 14-day deadline in that rule, renews the 
motion. Before we discuss that question, we address whether the state’s appeal of 
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the trial court’s order reconsidering its denial of Ross’s motion for acquittal was 
proper under R.C. 2945.67(A), which addresses state appeals in criminal cases. 
A 
{¶ 13} The first question presented in this appeal is whether the trial 
court’s order purporting to reconsider and grant Ross an acquittal on the rape 
charge and related death-penalty specification is an order from which the state 
may appeal pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A).  The state contends that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to enter an acquittal, so it was not a “final verdict” that R.C. 
2945.67(A) prohibits the state from appealing. R.C. 2945.67(A) provides:  
{¶ 14} “A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right any 
decision of a trial court in a criminal case, * * * which decision grants a motion to 
dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or information, a motion to 
suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized property or grants post 
conviction relief pursuant to sections 2953.21 to 2953.24 of the Revised Code, 
and may appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other 
decision, except the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
1. 
{¶ 15} In addition to the orders that the statute specifies are appealable as 
of right, R.C. 2945.67(A) allows the state, by leave of court, to appeal “any other 
decision” in a criminal case “except the final verdict.”  In State v. Keeton (1985), 
18 Ohio St.3d 379, 18 OBR 434, 481 N.E.2d 629, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
this court concluded that a “directed verdict of acquittal by the trial judge in a 
criminal case is a ‘final verdict’ within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) which is 
not appealable by the state as a matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to 
that statute.” 
{¶ 16} In State ex rel. Yates v. Court of Appeals for Montgomery Cty. 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 33, 512 N.E.2d 343, syllabus, we held that a judgment 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
of acquittal entered by the trial court pursuant to Crim.R. 29(C) is a final verdict 
within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67 and is not appealable by the state as a matter 
of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute. That was so even though the 
jury in that case had returned a guilty verdict so that a reversal of the acquittal, 
and resulting retrial of the defendant, would not have been prohibited by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. at 31-32, citing United States v. Scott (1978), 437 
U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65; United States v. Wilson (1975), 420 U.S. 
332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232. See also United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co. (1977), 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (an 
acquittal is an order that “represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of 
the factual elements of the offense charged”). The court in Yates explained:  “The 
issue under Ohio law is not one of double jeopardy but rather whether a judgment 
of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(C) is a final verdict.”  32 Ohio St.3d at 32, 
512 N.E.2d 343. 
{¶ 17} In Yates, this court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
court of appeals from exercising jurisdiction over the state’s attempted appeal of 
the acquittal.  Because the appellate court was patently and unambiguously 
“without jurisdiction to act” to consider the state’s appeal, the availability of a 
remedy by appeal did not prevent issuance of a writ of prohibition. See id. at 33. 
{¶ 18} Among orders that are included within “any other decision, except 
the final verdict,” and which the state may appeal by leave of court under R.C. 
2945.67(A), are certain evidentiary rulings, see State v. Arnett (1986), 22 Ohio 
St.3d 186, 22 OBR 272, 489 N.E.2d 284, syllabus, orders granting a new trial on 
motion of a defendant, State v. Matthews (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 375, 691 N.E.2d 
1041, syllabus, and “substantive law rulings in a criminal case which result in a 
judgment of acquittal so long as the judgment itself is not appealed,” see State v. 
Bistricky (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644, syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 19} In Bistricky, the trial court dismissed drug-trafficking charges 
against five police officers on the basis that they were entitled to the exemption in 
R.C. 3719.14(B) (police officer is exempt from drug-sale prohibitions when sale 
is a job duty).  The state sought leave to appeal the determination that R.C. 
3719.14(B) is not an affirmative defense and the trial court’s ruling that the 
statutory exemption covered the sale and delivery of drugs.  The state expressly 
conceded that double-jeopardy principles prohibited the retrial of defendants, but 
asserted that the court of appeals under R.C. 2945.67(A) could grant leave to 
appeal the legal bases of the acquittal ruling. The court of appeals dismissed the 
appeal. 
{¶ 20} On review, this court agreed that double-jeopardy principles 
prohibited retrial of the defendants, but noted that resolution of the legal issue of 
whether the appeal was permitted would not affect the bar to retrial. Bistricky, 51 
Ohio St.3d at 158, 555 N.E.2d 644.  We first concluded that the issue of whether a 
substantive legal determination underlying an acquittal was appealable by the 
state under R.C. 2945.67(A) was capable of repetition, yet evading review, so was 
not moot despite the bar against retrying the defendant. Id. at 159. On the 
authority of Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379, 18 OBR 434, 481 N.E.2d 629, and Arnett, 
22 Ohio St.3d 186, 22 OBR 272, 489 N.E.2d 284, both of which allowed a state to 
file a discretionary appeal of certain evidentiary rulings in a criminal case, this 
court in Bistricky held that the state may seek leave to appeal the legal 
determination on the application and scope of the exemption statute, R.C. 
3719.14, even though that determination led to the defendants’ acquittals.  We 
held that “a court of appeals has discretionary authority pursuant to R.C. 
2945.67(A) to decide whether to review substantive law rulings made in a 
criminal case which results [sic] in a judgment of acquittal so long as the verdict 
itself is not appealed.”  51 Ohio St.3d at 160. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 21} The question here is whether the prosecutor’s appeal of the trial 
court’s December 22, 2003 order is authorized under R.C. 2945.67(A) as “any 
other decision, except the final verdict.”  The state’s motion for leave to appeal 
provided that the state appealed from the common pleas court’s “Judgment Entry 
of December 22, 2003, granting Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider the court’s 
Previous Denial of Defendant’s Criminal Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, and specifically granting the Defendant Judgment of Acquittal of the 
offense of Rape and the Death Specification.”  (Emphasis sic.)  The state did not 
expressly disavow an appeal of the judgment of acquittal itself. To the contrary, 
the state included the trial court’s “granting the Defendant Judgment of Acquittal” 
within the description of its appeal and contends that although an acquittal 
otherwise would be a “final verdict” and thus not appealable under R.C. 
2945.67(A), here the acquittal order was not a final verdict at all, because the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.  Cf. Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 
644, syllabus.  The court of appeals granted the state’s motion for leave to appeal, 
stating only: “The motion for leave to appeal is granted.” 
2. 
{¶ 22} The state argues that Carlisle v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 
416, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613, which construes Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), 
shows that the trial court’s order granting Ross an acquittal is without jurisdiction 
and thus a nullity — not a true “final verdict” within the meaning of R.C. 
2945.67(A)3. The defendant in Carlisle had filed a postverdict motion for 
acquittal one day after the federal rule’s seven-day deadline.  Id. at 418. The trial 
court initially denied the motion, but before sentencing, reconsidered the motion 
                                                 
3.  Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c) is in all relevant respects pertinent to this case identical to Ohio Crim.R. 
29(C).  See State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 263, 9 O.O. 401, 381 N.E.2d 184 (“The 
federal counterpart of Crim.R. 29(A) is Fed.R.Crim.P. 29”).  The only difference is that motions 
under the federal rule must be made within seven days after dismissal of the jury and within 14 
days under the comparable Ohio rule. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and granted it. Id.  The United States Supreme Court held that the untimely filed 
motion for acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c) did not authorize the trial court to 
grant an acquittal.  Id. at 433.  But the court in Carlisle did not consider whether a 
trial court had authority to reconsider an initial denial of a timely filed motion for 
acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c).  In this case, unlike in Carlisle, Ross initially 
filed a timely motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(C). 
{¶ 23} Contrary to the state’s argument, the United States Supreme Court 
in Carlisle did not cast its ruling in jurisdictional terms.  See Kontrick v. Ryan 
(2004), 540 U.S. 443, 454-455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (“this Court [in 
Carlisle] did not characterize [Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)] as “jurisdictional”).  Carlisle 
thus does not support the state’s argument that an order reconsidering a timely 
filed Crim.R. 29(C) motion is a “nullity” and “void and unenforceable.” 
{¶ 24} Eberhart v. United States (2005), 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 
L.Ed.2d 14, sheds further light on the nature of the time limits in Crim.R. 29(C). 
In Eberhart, at 16, the court held that the time periods for motions in 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 and 33 provide “rigid claims-processing rules” but not a 
jurisdictional bar. In that case, the defendant submitted a supplemental 
memorandum in support of his pending motion for acquittal or a new trial, 
including several new grounds for relief. Id. at 13.  Eberhart’s supplemental 
memorandum was filed well after the federal rule’s seven-day time period for 
such motions. Instead of opposing the supplemental memorandum on 
untimeliness grounds, the government in the trial court opposed the new 
memorandum on the merits. The trial court granted a new trial based in part on 
the new, untimely raised grounds in Eberhart’s supplemental memorandum, but 
the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the government could raise the 
untimeliness of the new trial motion for the first time on appeal, because the 
rule’s timelines were jurisdictional. 
{¶ 25} The Supreme Court reversed:  
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 26} “Rule 33, like Rule 29 * * *, is a claim-processing rule—one that 
is admittedly inflexible because of [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 45(b)’s insistent demand for a 
definite end to proceedings. These claim-processing rules thus assure relief to a 
party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits 
them. Here, where the Government failed to raise a defense of untimeliness until 
after the District Court had reached the merits, it forfeited the defense.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 19. Thus, in Eberhart, the rule’s strict time limitation 
could have prevented the trial court from considering the untimely supplemental 
material had the government timely objected to the fact that it had been filed out 
of rule. 
{¶ 27} The state also contends that United States v. Gupta (C.A.11, 2004), 
363 F.3d 1169, shows that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider and 
grant Ross’s renewed motion for acquittal.  In Gupta, the trial court had initially 
denied a timely filed Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c) acquittal motion, but defendants, over a 
year later, moved to reconsider the denial of that motion, or in the alternative, for 
a new trial based on information not previously available. Months later, 
defendants filed supplemental materials in support of their renewed motion for 
acquittal or a new trial, and a year after that, the trial court granted the motion. 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals in Gupta reasoned that when the trial court 
denied the timely filed motion for acquittal, “nothing remained to be done,” 
except sentencing the defendants. Id. at 1174. The court of appeals treated the 
renewed motion as an untimely filed motion for acquittal or a new trial, which the 
appellate court concluded was beyond the trial court’s authority to grant. Id. 
Gupta predated Eberhart, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14, which 
undercuts Gupta’s characterization of Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)’s time limitation as 
“jurisdictional.” 
{¶ 29} The state has not pointed to an independent reason under Ohio law 
to believe that Crim.R. 29(C)’s time limitations impose a jurisdictional bar as 
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distinct from a rigid claim-processing rule. We accordingly decline to characterize 
the 14-day time limitation in Crim.R. 29(C) for making a motion for acquittal as 
jurisdictional. 
{¶ 30} Therefore, the state’s contention that the trial court’s acquittal of 
Ross on the rape charge and related death-penalty specification is a nullity 
because the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to enter it is 
incorrect. The question remains whether the state’s appeal in this case was proper. 
3. 
{¶ 31} As discussed above, an appeal of the judgment of acquittal itself is 
not authorized under R.C. 2945.67(A). Yates, 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 512 N.E.2d 343, 
syllabus. Additionally, “subjecting a defendant to postacquittal factfinding 
proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause,” 
and “[w]hen a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to 
proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no 
proper purpose.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986), 476 U.S. 140, 145, 106 S.Ct. 
1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116; see also Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571, 97 S.Ct. 
1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (an acquittal is an order that “represents a resolution, 
correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged”). 
{¶ 32} Pursuant to Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644, 
syllabus, the state’s appeal, which is limited to the legal issue of the propriety of 
the trial court’s reconsideration of its denial of a timely motion for acquittal under 
Crim.R. 29(C) based on a renewed motion filed after the rule’s 14-day time 
period, is properly before us. This question is one that is capable of repetition, yet 
evading review. Id. at 159. The court of appeals exercised its discretion to hear 
and decide the state’s appeal on that issue. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we will answer the question whether the trial court 
properly reconsidered its previous decision to deny Ross’s Crim.R. 29(C) motion 
January Term, 2010 
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for acquittal based on Ross’s renewed motion for acquittal submitted more than 
14 days after the jury was discharged. 
B 
{¶ 34} The court of appeals held that the trial court’s September 10, 2003 
order denying Ross’s timely made motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(C) was 
not a final order under R.C. 2505.02, but an interlocutory order. The appellate 
court reasoned that as an interlocutory order, the order denying the acquittal 
motion could be reconsidered and granted.  Ross, 184 Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-
Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 12, 17, 25. 
1. 
{¶ 35} To determine whether a renewed motion for acquittal may be made 
outside the time limitations of Crim.R. 29(C), we begin by examining the 
language of that rule.4  
{¶ 36} The divisions of Crim.R. 29 set forth specific times when motions 
for acquittal may be made and decided. For example, Crim.R. 29(A) provides that 
the trial court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made 
                                                 
4.  {¶ a} Crim.R. 29 provides: 
     {¶ b} “(A) Motion for judgment of acquittal 
     {¶ c} “The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either 
side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in 
the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of 
such offense or offenses. The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal 
made at the close of the state's case. 
     {¶ d} “(B) Reservation of decision on motion 
     {¶ e} “If a motion for a judgment of acquittal is made at the close of all the evidence, the court 
may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either 
before the jury returns a verdict, or after it returns a verdict of guilty, or after it is discharged 
without having returned a verdict. 
     {¶ f} “(C) Motion after verdict or discharge of jury 
     {¶ g} “If a jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a 
motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within fourteen days after the jury is 
discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the fourteen day period. If a 
verdict of guilty is returned, the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment 
of acquittal. If no verdict is returned, the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be a 
prerequisite to the making of such motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the 
submission of the case to the jury.” 
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at the close of the state’s case.  Crim.R. 29(B) provides that if a motion for 
acquittal is made at the close of all evidence, the court may reserve decision on 
the motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion before the jury 
returns a verdict, or after it returns a verdict of guilty, or after it is discharged 
without having returned a verdict. 
{¶ 37} Crim. R. 29(C) provides that if a jury returns a guilty verdict or is 
discharged without having returned a verdict, “a motion for acquittal may be 
made or renewed within fourteen days after the jury is discharged or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the fourteen day period.” Crim.R. 45(B) 
further specifies that notwithstanding that rule’s provision allowing trial courts to 
grant enlargements of time in a criminal case, “[t]he court may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rule 23 [dealing with demand for a trial by jury], 
Rule 29 [motions for acquittal], Rule 33 [motions for a new trial], and Rule 34 
[motions for arrest of judgment] except to the extent and under the conditions 
stated in them.” 
{¶ 38} While Crim.R. 29(C) does not expressly preclude reconsideration 
of an initial denial of a motion for acquittal, it provides a specific, limited (14-
day) time frame within which to make a motion for acquittal after the jury is 
discharged or to renew an acquittal motion previously made during the trial.  In 
conjunction with Crim.R. 45(B), Crim.R. 29(C) provides for enlargement of the 
14-day time period specified in the rule for a posttrial motion for acquittal only 
when the trial court—acting within that 14-day period—grants a specific 
extension of that time period for making such a motion. No specific extension of 
time was made by the trial court in this case within the 14-day time period. 
2. 
{¶ 39} The strict time limitations in Crim.R. 29 and 45(B) convince us 
that the rules do not permit a defendant to file, outside Crim.R. 29(C)’s limited 
time frame, a motion to renew a previously denied motion for acquittal.  The court 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
of appeals in this case concluded otherwise, holding that an original timely filed 
Crim.R. 29(C) motion, once denied, may be reconsidered and granted because a 
denial of such a motion is an interlocutory order subject to revision before final 
judgment. 
{¶ 40} The court of appeals determined that Crim.R. 57(B) permitted 
resort to footnote one in Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 
379, 21 O.O.3d 238, 423 N.E.2d 1105, in which we opined that Civ.R. 54(B) 
allows revision of civil-case interlocutory orders before final judgment.  Ross, 184 
Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 17.  Crim.R. 57(B) 
provides: “If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may 
proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules of criminal 
procedure, and shall look to the rules of civil procedure and to the applicable law 
if no rule of criminal procedure exists.”  In the court of appeals’ view, Crim.R. 29 
does not “specifically authorize” or “prohibit” reconsideration of an initial denial 
of a Crim.R. 29(C) motion, so Pitts, which authorizes reconsideration of civil 
interlocutory orders under certain circumstances, applies.  Ross, at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 41} In Pitts, we held that a motion for reconsideration of a final 
judgment in a civil case is a nullity. A footnote in Pitts noted in dicta that 
interlocutory civil orders are subject to motions for reconsideration, based on 
Civ.R. 54(B), which specifies the procedure for judgments in civil cases involving 
multiple claims or parties.  Id. at 379, fn.1.  Civ.R. 54(B) states that absent a 
determination that there is no just reason for delay, “any order or other form of 
decision [involving multiple claims or parties], however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties.” (Emphasis added.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 42} In our view, Crim.R. 29, viewed in conjunction with Crim.R. 
45(B), sufficiently specifies the procedure for motions for acquittal such that 
Crim.R. 57(B) does not permit resort to the Rules of Civil Procedure to fill the 
gap. For Crim.R. 57(B) to authorize resort to the rules of civil procedure for a 
particular matter in a criminal case, there must be “no procedure * * * specifically 
prescribed by [criminal procedural] rule.” See also State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 
153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12 (it is not necessary to look to the Civil 
Rules or other applicable law for guidance pursuant to Crim.R. 57(B) when a 
procedure “specifically prescribed by rule” exists). But Crim.R. 29 provides a 
detailed, specific procedure governing the time that motions for acquittal must be 
made, and Crim.R. 45(B) disallows any extensions of time for such motions other 
than those expressly set forth in Crim.R. 29. Even though Crim.R. 29(C) does not 
specifically address reconsideration of a denial of a motion for acquittal made 
pursuant to that division of the rule, it can hardly be said that “no procedure is 
specifically prescribed by rule” regarding the timing of Crim.R. 29(C) motions. 
{¶ 43} The court of appeals’ ruling in this case also provides no endpoint 
for a trial court’s ability to reconsider its denial of a Crim.R. 29(C) motion for 
acquittal. Indeed, at oral argument before this court, counsel for Ross answered 
“yes” when asked if it was his view that a trial court may reconsider its denial of 
an acquittal motion at any time before the sentencing in the defendant’s second 
trial.  But that result would be at odds with the inflexible time limitations peculiar 
to Crim.R. 29(C) and Crim.R. 45(B)’s “insistent demand for a definite end to 
proceedings.” Cf. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 
(construing Fed.R.Crim.P 29(c)). 
{¶ 44} We thus conclude that Crim.R. 29 specifies the only time frame 
within which a motion for acquittal may be made and the procedure by which a 
trial court considers and rules upon such a motion.  Accordingly, Crim.R. 57(B) 
does not authorize resort to the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
reconsideration of an order denying a motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 
29(C) is permitted based on a renewed motion filed after the 14-day time period 
in Crim.R. 29(C). 
3. 
{¶ 45} Ross filed his supplemental memorandum in support of his 
renewed motion for acquittal in November 2003 — over three years after the jury 
had been dismissed following the mistrial, and thus well after the 14-day time 
frame specified in Crim.R. 29(C).  The state objected to the untimeliness of the 
supplemental memorandum and renewed motion. The supplemental memorandum 
did not relate back to any pending motion for acquittal, because the trial court had 
denied Ross’s earlier, timely filed motion in September 2003. When the trial court 
denied that timely filed motion, that motion was no longer pending before the trial 
court. Cf. Gupta, 363 F.3d at 1174. 
{¶ 46} In the renewed motion, Ross urged the trial court to determine that 
information provided by the state after the trial (which cast doubt on the state’s 
expert testimony at trial concerning bite marks on the victim) undercut the rape 
charge and the related death-penalty specification. At the November 12, 2003 
hearing on the “renewed” motion for acquittal, defense counsel conceded that the 
new bite-mark evidence was not relevant to a Rule 29 motion. It is unclear the 
extent to which Ross’s argument about the new information concerning the bite-
mark evidence influenced the trial court to grant the acquittal, but in reciting the 
evidence presented in support of the rape charge, that court noted in a footnote of 
the acquittal order that the “state has since conceded that the bite-mark expert 
testimony presented at trial was inaccurate.” Regardless of whether or not the new 
information formed a basis for the trial court’s decision, Ross’s renewed motion 
presented that new information in a filing well outside Crim.R. 29(C)’s 14-day 
time limitation. Ross’s earlier timely Crim.R. 29(C) motion had been denied and 
was no longer pending. 
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{¶ 47} We conclude that Ross’s renewed motion for acquittal was 
effectively a new motion untimely filed outside the 14-day time period in Crim.R. 
29(C). Because the state objected to the untimeliness of Ross’s supplemental 
filings in the trial court, the renewed motion was not properly before the trial 
court and should have been denied. 
{¶ 48} Accordingly, the trial court in this case erred in reconsidering its 
initial denial of Ross’s motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(C) based on Ross’s 
renewed motion filed well after the rule’s 14-day time limitation for motions for 
acquittal. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 49} For the above reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in granting 
reconsideration of its initial denial of Ross’s Crim.R. 29(C) motion for acquittal 
based on Ross’s renewed motion filed outside the rule’s time limit. Ross’s 
supplemental memorandum in support of his renewed motion for acquittal, filed 
over three years after the jury had been dismissed in his first trial, was a new 
motion for acquittal filed well outside the 14-day-after-jury-dismissal time 
limitation in Rule 29(C) for such motions. The motion should have been denied 
for untimeliness under Crim.R. 29(C). Accordingly, the court of appeals erred to 
the extent that it concluded that the trial court properly reconsidered Ross’s 
renewed motion for acquittal filed outside the 14-day time limitation of Crim.R. 
29(C). 
{¶ 50} Consistent with Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644, 
syllabus, we have answered the substantive legal question presented in the state’s 
proposition of law. However, pursuant to Bistricky and Yates, 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 
512 N.E.2d 343, syllabus, we do not disturb the trial judge’s acquittal order 
because that order — as distinct from the substantive legal rulings underlying it 
— is not appealable under R.C. 2945.67(A). 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
{¶ 51} Because the trial court granted Ross an acquittal only on some of 
the charges remaining against him, we remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Massachusetts (2005), 543 U.S. 462, 469, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 914, fn. 3 
(“our case establishes that jeopardy may terminate on some counts, even as it 
continues on others”). 
Cause remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
BROWN, C.J., dissents. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
JOHN A. CONNOR, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, J. 
__________________ 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 52} The court of appeals cogently summarized the issue now before 
this court as follows:  “[W]hether, once a trial court has denied a motion for 
acquittal that was properly filed within 14 days after the jury was discharged 
following a mistrial, the trial court has authority to reconsider that denial.”  State 
v. Ross, 184 Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 16.  The 
majority holds that the answer to this inquiry is “no.”  I disagree.  In my view, the 
court of appeals correctly recognized that the trial court’s initial denial of a timely 
filed Crim.R. 29(C) motion (motion for acquittal after verdict or discharge of 
jury) was an interlocutory order and that the trial court had inherent authority to 
subsequently reconsider that denial and grant the motion at any time before final 
judgment. Ross at ¶ 1.  I therefore would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
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{¶ 53} It has long been the law in Ohio that “a trial court has inherent 
power and authority to reconsider its own interlocutory rulings.” Goldman v. 
Transp. Leasing, Inc. (Feb. 19, 1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 42480, citing Wayne 
Cty. Natl. Bank v. Predmore-Henry Motor Co. (1928), 7 Ohio Law Abs. 425, 
1928 WL 2686.  See also Olson v. Watson (1936), 22 Ohio Law Abs. 118, 1936 
WL 2084.  “Where reconsideration of an interlocutory ruling is in the interests of 
justice, no rule of law, either statutory or court made, precludes a trial court from 
reconsidering rulings made during the course of a trial.”  Goldman.  This long-
established doctrine applies to both civil and criminal cases.  Stow v. Sexton (Jan. 
10, 1996), Summit App. No. 17263, 1996 WL 11985. 
{¶ 54} The majority’s analysis focuses on “whether a renewed motion for 
acquittal may be made outside the time limitations of Crim.R. 29(C).”  But that is 
not the issue.  A timely filed motion for acquittal had been filed in this case, and 
the court had authority to reconsider its initial ruling on that motion at any time 
before final judgment. 
{¶ 55} The fact that the defense filed a renewed defense motion or motion 
for reconsideration does not change that conclusion. Surely the trial court’s 
authority to reconsider an interlocutory order cannot be divested simply because a 
party submits a supplemental written filing—which the trial court arguably may 
in its discretion disregard entirely as not being specifically authorized by the Civil 
or Criminal Rules.  But neither the Civil nor the Criminal Rules bar a trial court 
from agreeing to consider a motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling—to do so 
is within its inherent authority. 
{¶ 56} Assume, hypothetically, that defense counsel for Ross had 
suggested orally during a court proceeding, rather than in a written filing, that 
counsel continued to believe that there was insufficient evidence to prove Ross’s 
guilt and that the earlier denial of a timely filed motion for acquittal had been 
wrongly decided.  Under the majority’s ruling, the trial court could not thereafter 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
review its previous decision, and it would lack the authority to correct a ruling it 
believed to be erroneous.  In fact, the majority would preclude a trial judge from 
changing its interlocutory ruling sua sponte to correct what it believes to be a 
mistake.  As a trial judge, I sometimes recognized an error in a previous 
interlocutory ruling, and in that event, I would bring the matter to the attention of 
counsel and provide an appropriate correction.  In my view, when a trial judge 
realizes it has erred, it is preferable for the judge to correct its mistake promptly 
rather than to continue with proceedings only to have that error corrected later by 
the court of appeals. The majority appears to preclude that result, depriving a trial 
court of appropriate discretionary authority and failing to promote judicial 
economy. 
{¶ 57} It is true that pursuant to Crim.R. 45(B), a trial court may not 
“extend the time for taking any action” authorized by Crim.R. 29.  But Crim.R. 
29(C) limits only the time for filing a motion, not for ruling on it:  “[A] motion for 
judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within fourteen days after the jury 
is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the fourteen 
day period.”  Thus, Crim.R. 45’s prohibition against “extend[ing] the time for 
taking action under * * * Rule 29” means only that a trial court may not enlarge 
the time for filing a motion.  The trial court did no such thing in this case. 
{¶ 58} In summary, Crim.R. 29 itself does not provide any time period for 
ruling on motions.  Thus, there is no deadline for ruling that the court is 
prohibited from extending under Crim.R. 45(B), and trial courts have inherent 
authority to reconsider interlocutory orders.  Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 
67 Ohio St.2d 378, 21 O.O.3d 238, 423 N.E.2d 1105, fn.1.  As the court of 
appeals recognized, the denial of Ross’s motion for acquittal was not a final order, 
as it did not “determine[] the action and prevent[] a judgment,” R.C. 
2505.02(B)(1), nor did the denial fall within any of the other subparts of R.C. 
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22 
 
2505.02(B).  Ross, 184 Ohio App.3d 174, 2009-Ohio-3561, 920 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 12.  
It was, therefore, an interlocutory order, subject to trial court reconsideration.  Id. 
{¶ 59} There is no convincing policy justification for creating an 
exception to this general rule.  To the contrary, today’s decision unnecessarily 
opens the door to future attacks on a trial court’s inherent authority to control its 
own docket and correct its own interlocutory mistakes in criminal cases. One can 
only speculate where the slippery slope beginning with today’s decision might 
end. 
{¶ 60} Accordingly, I dissent. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney and Summit 
County Special Prosecutor, and Matthew E. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney, for appellant. 
Burdon & Merlitti and Lawrence J. Whitney; and Jacob A. Cairns, for 
appellee. 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________