Title: Britton v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Britton v. State1999 WY 30976 P.2d 669Case Number: 97-273Decided: 03/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

EDWARD JOHN BRITTON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

                                

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, 
The Honorable

Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge.

     Representing 
Appellant:

     Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and T. Alan Elrod, 
Assistant Public Defender for Appellant.

      Representing 
Appellee:

     William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; 
and Melissa M. Swearingen, Student Intern, for Appelle.

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, * JJ.

    * 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

     THOMAS, 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     The question raised by Edward John 
Britton (Britton) is a claim of violation of the constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers because of the sua sponte amendment at trial of the 
Information by the trial court. We agree in principle that a court is without 
authority under our constitutional scheme to control the charging of crimes. 
However, the claim that a sua sponte amendment of the Information was made by 
the trial court is not supported by the 
record. Our examination of the record persuades the Court that the suggested 
amendment was requested by the prosecuting attorney, and concurred in by counsel 
for Britton. The amendment did not adversely affect Britton's right to notice of 
the charges against him, and was not prejudicial to any of Britton's rights. The Judgment 
Upon Jury Verdict, the Sentence, and the Nunc Pro Tunc Sentence are 
affirmed.

   [¶2]     Britton presents this statement of the 
issues in his Brief of Appellant:

            Did the 
district court commit plain error with its sua sponte 
amendment?

            a. Was the 
district court's sua sponte amendment of the charging information a clear and 
obvious violation of the Separation 
of Powers principle, which is a clear and unequivocal rule of law stated 
in Wyo. Const. Art. 2, 
1?

   

b. Did the district court's error seriously affect 
the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings by adversely affecting 
Appellant's right to notice of the criminal charges?

            c. Does the 
district court's error require reversal of Appellant's conviction because it is 
materially prejudicial to 
Appellant?

   This statement of the issues is 
found in the Brief of Appellee, filed by the State of 
Wyoming:

            Did the 
district court properly allow modification of the time period specified in the 
original counts of the information 
to permit the jury to find that appellant's criminal conduct occurred during 
the period from June to November, 
1996?

   [¶3]     Britton was charged with four separate 
counts of second-degree sexual assault upon a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (Michie Repl. 1988). In Counts I and II of the Information, 
it was alleged that Britton had inflicted sexual intrusion upon a child under 
the age of twelve by acts of oral and anal intrusion on or about June through July of 1996. 
Counts III and IV alleged that Britton had inflicted sexual intrusion upon a 
child under the age of twelve by acts of oral and anal intrusion on or about 
November 8, 1996.

   [¶4]     The problem that developed at trial 
related to the absence of corroboration of Britton's admission of the conduct 
charged in Counts I and II. The trial court indicated that it might not submit 
those counts to the jury, and the prosecutor expressed concern because Counts 
III and IV were not supported by Britton's admission. The prosecuting attorney 
noted that the jury already had heard the taped interview in which Britton made 
that admission. Further colloquy led to 
the suggestion that only two counts be submitted to the jury with the time frame 
expanded to cover June through November of 1996. The trial court understood that 
colloquy as encompassing a request by the prosecutor to amend the Information. 
In response to an inquiry about prejudice to Britton, Britton's attorney answered 
candidly:

            I don't see 
any, Judge. I don't think the evidence came out any differently than it would - 
I think it's borne out in the 
discovery. I think we were on notice with respect to the allegations, and so 
I don't perceive prejudice being 
done to the defendant if you expanded the time period.

   [¶5]     The trial court then turned to a 
consideration of the proper way to instruct the jury on the remaining charges, 
which included an expansion of the time frame. The trial court suggested it 
would advise the jury that the acts occurred in the June through November, 1996 
time frame * * *. When asked for comments, the prosecutor reported that the State was satisfied, and 
Britton's counsel said he was satisfied.

   [¶6]     The record is somewhat awkward with 
respect to the dismissal and submission of counts because it appears that Counts 
I and II were dismissed and Counts III and IV were submitted to the jury, with 
the time frame amended. The verdict, however, indicates conviction on Counts I 
and II. This discrepancy is not raised as an issue by Britton. Any error would be one of form 
only, because it is clear that the jury found Britton guilty of one count of 
second-degree sexual assault involving fellatio during the time period of June 
through November 1996 and one count of second-degree sexual assault involving 
anal intercourse during the same time frame. We conclude that there was no 
prejudice to any substantial right of Britton's because of this discrepancy 
that should induce the Court to pursue 
the problem any further.

   [¶7]     The trial court then entered a Judgment 
Upon Jury Verdict, and about two-and-a-half months later, a Sentence was entered 
pursuant to which Britton was sentenced to a term of not less than fifteen years 
nor more than life on each count, with the sentences of incarceration to run 
concurrently; he was fined $2,000.00 in each count; a fixed dollar surcharge was 
assessed for each count; and restitution was ordered in the amount of 
$751.68 as well as $3,000.00 to 
reimburse the fees of court-appointed counsel. Britton appealed from the 
judgment and sentence, and after his appeal was taken, the trial court entered a 
Nunc Pro Tunc Sentence which corrected Britton's name because the middle name of 
"James" was used at one point in the original Sentence.

   [¶8]     Britton's argument is primarily premised 
upon his claim that the trial court, of its own motion, amended the charge in 
the Information without the participation of the prosecuting attorney, thus 
violating the separation of powers doctrine found in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1. 
Britton contends that plain error is present, which he must do in light of the 
fact that at trial Britton acquiesced in the amendments. When an issue is not 
raised at trial, the burden is upon the 
appellant to establish that plain error occurred. Lozano v. State, 751 P.2d 1326, 1327 (Wyo. 1988); see also Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 55 (Wyo. 
1985).  The failure to object at 
trial constitutes a waiver of any claimed error unless that error indeed rises 
to the level of plain error. Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Wyo. 
1981); see also Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1979). The criteria for applying the doctrine of plain error 
were adopted by this court in Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 
1977).  As more recently stated, 
those criteria are:

"First, the record must be clear as to the incident 
which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to 
plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been 
denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced."

Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Bradley, 635 P.2d at 1164). The burden of 
establishing that plain error is present is assigned to appellant even when the 
violation of constitutional rights is asserted. Ketcham v. State, 618 P.2d 1356, 
1359 (Wyo. 1980) (quoting Madrid v. State, 592 P.2d 709, 710 (Wyo. 1979)).

   [¶9]     Britton does not dispute the fact that 
no objection was raised at trial. He concedes that plain error must be discerned 
in order for his arguments to prevail. It is clear, in Wyoming, that if the 
charges had been amended by the trial court acting on its own motion, there 
would have been a violation of the doctrine of separation of the powers which are assigned to the 
executive and judicial departments in accordance with Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1. 
Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873 (Wyo. 1984). The facts manifested in the 
record, however, do not support Britton's claim that the trial court acted on 
its own motion. Instead, the record reveals a proper amendment of the Information 
charging Britton with the alleged crimes.

   [¶10]  After the State had rested its case, 
Britton moved for a judgment of acquittal. He specifically attacked the charges 
in Counts I and II, arguing to the trial court that the only evidence with 
respect to those counts was Britton's admission, and that admission was not 
corroborated by any of the State's evidence. At that juncture, the trial court stated that the jury would be 
instructed on two of the four counts that were charged, but the trial judge 
expressed doubt as to whether it would be appropriate to permit the other two 
counts to go to the jury. The trial court then deferred its ruling on the motion 
for judgment of acquittal.

   [¶11]  Subsequently, when the trial court 
resumed its consideration of the motion for judgment of acquittal, the 
prosecuting attorney expressed concern because of the effect that the dismissal 
of Counts I and II would have with respect to Britton's confession.  That concern essentially was that if 
those two counts were dismissed, and the remaining counts were limited to the 
November time frame that was charged, Britton's confession to the crimes charged 
in June and July could not be considered by the jury, although it already had 
received that evidence. The trial court manifested its understanding that the 
concerns expressed by the State effectively constituted a request to amend the 
Information.  The record supports 
the conclusion that the amendment was premised on an initial request by the prosecuting 
attorney.

   [¶12]  The amendment was made consistently with 
the provisions of W.R. Cr. P. 3(e), which provides:

(e) Amendment of information or citation. - Without 
leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend an information or 
citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a case required to 
be tried in district court or until five days before trial for a case not 
required to be tried in district court. The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended:

                        
(1) With the defendant's consent, at any time before 
sentencing.

                        
(2) Whether or not the defendant consents:

         
                           
(A) At any time before trial if substantial rights of the  defendant 
are not prejudiced.

(B) At any time before verdict or finding if no 
additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced.

No additional or different 
offense was charged by virtue of the amendment. It also is clear that Britton's 
counsel acknowledged that Britton would not be prejudiced by the amendment and 
his counsel did not object to it.

   [¶13]  The record demonstrates with clarity 
that the trial court did not make any independent amendment of the Information 
of its own motion. Instead, the record shows that the amendment was suggested by 
the prosecuting attorney, was approved by the trial court, and both the 
prosecuting attorney and Britton's attorney concurred in the amendment. We hold that the 
amendment of the Information was not accomplished by the trial court on its own 
motion, and no error occurred, plain or otherwise.

  [¶14] 
   The Judgment Upon 
Jury Verdict, the Sentence, and the Nunc Pro Tunc Sentence are 
affirmed.