Title: Beaubien v. Ryan

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 92701, 92702, 92703, 92704, 92705, 92706, 92707, 
 								92708 cons.-Agenda 29-November 2001.


REPRESENTATIVE MARK BEAUBIEN et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM
RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, et al., Defendants.-KAREN
HOFFEK et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney
General, et al., Defendants.-REPRESENTATIVE ROSEMARY
MULLIGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney  
General, et al., Defendants.-JOHN UPHOFF et al., Plaintiffs, v.
JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, et al., 
Defendants.-REPRESENTATIVE PATRICIA LINDER et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, et al., 
Defendants.-LARRY MASSEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN,
Illinois Attorney General, et al., Defendants.-REPRESENTATIVE RICK WINKEL et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, et al.,
Defendants.-REPRESENTATIVE ANNE ZICKUS et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN, Illinois Attorney General, 								et al., Defendants.


Opinion filed December 27, 2001.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	In Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, No. 92443 (November 28, 2001),
our court considered and rejected a challenge to the validity of the
redistricting plan approved by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting
Commission and filed with the Secretary of State following the
federal decennial census conducted in the year 2000. During the
pendency of Cole-Randazzo, 13 additional cases were filed
challenging the same redistricting plan. Five of those case were
voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs shortly after they filed their
briefs. The remaining eight cases are the subject of the
proceedings before us today.
	As with Cole-Randazzo, each of the eight new cases invokes
this court's original jurisdiction under article IV, section 3, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3).
Plaintiffs are various registered Illinois voters, some of whom are
incumbent members of the Illinois General Assembly.(1) Named as
defendants are the Attorney General of Illinois; the Illinois State
Board of Elections, the Board's executive director and its
members; and the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission
(the Commission) and its members.
	The actions were commenced when plaintiffs filed motions
for leave to file their complaints in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule 382 (155 Ill. 2d R. 382). We granted those motions,
established a briefing schedule, and consolidated the actions for
disposition. We also permitted John Tully, a registered voter, and
Emil Jones, Jr., the Minority Leader of the Illinois Senate, to
intervene as additional defendants. No oral argument was
entertained.
	All eight of the new cases were prepared by a related group of
lawyers and seek the same relief: a declaration that certain of the
representative (House) districts contained in the new redistricting
plan are invalid and an order adopting, in their place, modified
district boundaries as proposed by the plaintiffs. The cases differ
only in the particular districts each attacks. Cause No. 92701
challenges the boundaries established by the Commission for
Representative Districts 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and
64. Cause No. 92702 takes issue with the boundaries for the 99th
and 100th Representative Districts. The 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th,
19th, 20th, 57th, 65th and 66th Representative Districts are the
subject of cause No. 92703. Cause No. 92704 attacks the 75th,
79th and 86th Representative Districts, while the 50th, 83rd, 84th,
and 96th Representative Districts are the subject of cause No.
92705. Cause No. 92706 seeks to invalidate the boundaries for
Representative Districts 113, 114, 115, and 116. The 103rd, 104th,
and 105th Representative Districts are contested in cause No.
92707. Cause No. 92708 pertains to the boundaries for
Representative Districts 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37 and 38.
	Representative Districts 99 and 100 cover the area in and
around Springfield. Representative Districts 103 through 105
include the City of Champaign and nearby areas. Representative
Districts 113 through 116 are located in southern Illinois,
including portions of the St. Louis metropolitan area. The 35 other
districts are all situated in Cook County and the counties near
Cook.
	Some of the districts challenged in the foregoing actions,
including	Representative Districts 15, 18, 35, 36, 75, 99, 100, 113
and 114, were also singled out for scrutiny by the original and
intervening plaintiffs in Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, No. 92443
(November 28, 2001). The balance, though not specifically
identified by the Cole-Randazzo plaintiffs, were implicated in that
case to the extent that the plaintiffs there attacked the new
redistricting plan as a whole.
	The plaintiffs in the cases before us today make no claim that
the process employed by the Commission in formulating the new
redistricting plan was in any way improper. No procedural
irregularities are cited. No assertion is made that the Commission
failed to consider relevant evidence or took into account evidence
it should not have considered. As in Cole-Randazzo, the sole issue
is whether the particular districts challenged by plaintiffs comport
with the compactness requirement set forth in our state's
constitution.
	We undertake our consideration of plaintiffs' claim mindful
that under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, establishing
boundaries for legislative and representative districts is a
legislative function, not a judicial one. The duty to redistrict
legislative and representative districts is expressly vested in the
General Assembly. It does not become a judicial function merely
because the members of the General Assembly are unwilling or
unable to enact a new map within the time prescribed by law.
When that occurs, as it did in the matter before us, establishing
new district boundaries becomes the responsibility of the
Commission, not this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b).
	Where the Commission subsequently approves and files a
redistricting plan, as it did here, the plan is presumed to be valid
and must be given the force and effect of law. Ill. Const. 1970, art.
IV, §3(b). In that respect, redistricting plans are directly analogous
to statutory enactments, which are also cloaked with the
presumption of validity. The presumption of validity means that
courts must uphold a statute's constitutionality whenever
reasonably possible. Correspondingly, a party challenging the
statute's constitutionality bears the burden of clearly establishing
the law's constitutional infirmity. People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 528-29 (1998). So it is with a duly approved and filed
redistricting plan. The proponents of the redistricting plan before
us today therefore have no obligation to prove to our court that the
districts formulated under the plan pass constitutional muster.
Rather, the burden is on plaintiffs, who are challenging the plan,
to clearly establish that the map is not constitutional.
	Where, as here, challengers to a redistricting plan allege that
districts formulated by the Commission fail to meet our
constitution's compactness requirement, the applicable burden of
proof requires those challengers to establish that the plan is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 4.
Under Illinois law, a decision is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.
That other conclusions might be reasonable is of no consequence.
If there is evidence to support the decision, it should not be
disturbed. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
	The redistricting plan before us today was the product of a
series of meetings and public hearings held in September of 2001,
following the selection of a ninth Commission member pursuant
to the provisions of our state's constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IV, §3(b).(2) During those proceedings, the Commission
considered various plans. It heard testimony and took other
evidence regarding the plans' strengths and weaknesses. Expert
witnesses, community groups, and others were permitted to
present their views. Among those whose voices were heard were
the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, the African-American
Working Group on Reapportionment (which included the Chicago
Urban League and the NAACP), the Independent Voters of
Illinois/Independent Precinct Organizations, the Midwest
Community Conference, and the Asian-American Redistricting
Coalition. A voluminous record was created.
	In its final form, the plan ultimately adopted and filed by the
Commission is not discernibly different, in terms of compactness,
from the plan approved by this court in People ex rel. Burris v.
Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992), following the last federal
decennial census. The similarity of compactness was confirmed by
quantitative analysis. Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 3. While some of
the districts are certainly less compact than others, we pointed out
in Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 3, that the same was true of districts
drawn under the previous map, which this court approved in
People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan. Overall, the level of compactness
has changed little.
	In each of the eight cases now before us, plaintiffs contend
that the districts drawn by the Commission after the latest census
should nevertheless be rejected because alternative boundaries can
be formulated that would be more compact. Our court has
expressly held, however, that the ability to devise more compact
formulations is not a sufficient basis for invalidating a map duly
approved and filed according to law. Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 3.
	Under Illinois law, the issue of compactness cannot be
considered in isolation. The formulation of redistricting plans
involves complicated considerations requiring careful study and a
weighing of factors. Donovan v. Holzman, 8 Ill. 2d 87, 93 (1956).
As we noted in Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 3, compactness is but
one of several different criteria that legislative and representative
districts must satisfy. Districts must also be substantially equal in
population, they must be configured in such a way as to provide
adequate representation to minorities and other special interests
protected by state and federal law, and they must meet all legal
requirements regarding political fairness. Cole-Randazzo, slip op.
at 2, citing People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296
(1992). No matter how compact a proposed district may be
geographically, it will not suffice under the law unless it also
complies with each of these additional factors. Cole-Randazzo,
slip op. at 3.
	Geography, climate, commerce and human behavior being
what they are, the population of Illinois is not distributed in
homogenous, evenly spaced cells or grids. Because of that, an
insistence on narrow, exact or inflexible measures of compactness
would make adherence to the additional requirements we have
recognized virtually impossible. Accordingly, perfect or maximum
compactness is not required. Districts need only be "reasonably
compact." People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 282; People
ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166 (1971).
	In setting the boundaries for the redistricting plan at issue in
this case, the Commission rigorously adhered to the equality of
population requirement. That the Commission's plan also provides
adequate representation to minorities and other special interests
protected by state and federal law is not questioned, nor is there
any question that the plan conforms to legal requirements
regarding political fairness. Under these circumstances, and
considering the contours of some of the districts in the map
previously approved by our court in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan,
we have no basis for holding that the districts challenged here are
not reasonably compact.
	Plaintiffs complain that the Commission's plan will result in
some units of local government being split into different districts,
but a district does not fail the "reasonably compact" standard
simply because its boundaries cut through or across local units of
government, such as municipalities, villages, townships, cities and
counties. Our court has long recognized that the boundaries of
such units do not necessarily reveal communities of interest and
that such units may have to be split for redistricting purposes in
order for the resulting districts to meet the other requirements of
law, particularly the requirement of equality of population. See
Grivetti, 50 Ill. 2d  at 166-67. We note, moreover, that the plan
adopted by the Commission here actually resulted in far fewer
splits of counties, townships and municipalities, on balance, than
the map favored by the Commission's Republican members and
unsuccessfully offered to the Commission as an alternative to the
map ultimately adopted.
	Redistricting is a difficult and often contentious process. A
balance must be drawn. Trade-offs must be made. In the end, the
question turns on who is to make those assessments. Our
predecessors on this court answered that question more than a
century ago:
		"Who, then, must finally determine whether or not a
district is as compact as it could or should have been
made? Surely not the courts, for this would take from the
legislature all discretion in the matter and vest it in the
courts, where it does not belong; and no apportionment
could stand unless the districts should prove as compact
as the judges might think they ought to be or as they could
themselves make them. As the courts cannot make a
senatorial apportionment directly, neither can they do so
indirectly. There is a vast difference between determining
whether the principle of compactness of territory has been
applied at all or not, and whether or not the nearest
practical approximation to perfect compactness has been
attained. The first is a question which the courts may
finally determine; the latter is [not]." People ex rel.
Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 480 (1895).
	For the foregoing reasons, the requests by plaintiffs for a
declaratory judgment invalidating the redistricting plan approved
and filed by the Commission and for an order adopting the
modified district boundaries proposed by plaintiffs are hereby
denied. Judgment is entered for defendants. The mandate of this
court shall issue immediately.
So ordered.
	The majority denies the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory
judgment invalidating the redistricting plan approved and filed by
the Commission and denies plaintiffs' request for an order
adopting the modified district boundaries proposed by plaintiffs.
In reaching its decision, the majority concludes that "[i]n its final
form, the plan ultimately adopted and filed by the Commission is
not discernibly different, in terms of compactness, from the plan
approved by this court in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992), following the last federal decennial census." Slip
op. at 5. Assuming, arguendo, that this is an accurate statement,
the fact remains that the proceedings ultimately leading to the
adoption of the plan in Ryan were markedly different from the
proceedings in this case. Consequently, I find comparisons to the
plan approved in the Ryan case to be disingenuous.
	In reaching its decision, the majority observes that our
predecessors on this court more than a century ago recognized
that:
		"There is a vast difference between determining whether
the principle of compactness of territory has been applied
at all or not, and whether or not the nearest practical
approximation to perfect compactness has been attained.
The first is a question which the courts may finally
determine; the latter is for the legislature." People ex rel.
Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 480 (1895).
While the majority characterizes these cases as raising the latter
question, I believe that these cases, like Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan,
No. 92443 (November 28, 2001), raise questions concerning
whether the principle of compactness of territory has been applied
at all or not.
	Certainly, a cursory review of the challenged districts raises
questions of compactness. As noted, in denying plaintiffs'
compactness challenges, the majority states that the overall level
of compactness in this plan has changed little when compared with
the plan in Ryan. Slip op. at 5. However, before approving the map
at issue in Ryan, this court remanded the case to the Commission
for hearings to address questions with regard to those districts that
did not appear to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements
of compactness and of free and equal elections. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 
at 285-86. Remand was necessary because the parties had
presented insufficient evidence for the court to ascertain whether
the district lines met legal guidelines. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 284.
Both sides had thwarted any type of hearing on their proposed
maps by submitting their plans and amendments on the last two
days. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 284-85. Absent any evidence, this court
declined to "approve or disapprove any plan no matter how fair,
compact or contiguous and substantially equal the districts have
been formed." (Emphasis added.) Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 285. To
review the maps without sufficient evidence would "circumvent
the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Constitution." Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 285.
	In approving the map following remand, the majority in Ryan
expressed its "hope that this situation will not again be before this
court and place in jeopardy the voting rights of the people of this
State." Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d  at 294. Unfortunately, this situation again
is before this court. Justice Garman and I noted in our dissents to
the Cole-Randazzo decision that the process through which the
plan in this case was drawn was at variance with the constitutional
mandate. The map that was approved in this case was presented in
the last few days, thereby thwarting any type of hearing that would
ensure that constitutional requirements were met. Cole-Randazzo,
slip op. at 5-6 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). The
proceedings culminating in the adoption of the map included
surprise expert witnesses, secret witness lists, lack of opportunity
for meaningful cross-examination, and minimal findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 12 (Garman, J.,
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
	Despite the infirmities in the process leading to the adoption
of this map, the majority in Cole-Randazzo did not address that
process, choosing instead to accord the map a presumption of
validity. Here too, the majority glosses over the procedural
shortcomings in the creation of the map by noting that the
plaintiffs in these cases "make no claim that the process employed
by the Commission in formulating the new redistricting plan was
in any way improper." Slip op. at 3. Nonetheless, the majority later
seems to suggest that the hearings were proper, indicating that the
"redistricting plan before us today was the product of a series of
meetings and public hearings held in September of 2001 ***.
During those proceedings, the Commission considered various
plans." Slip op. at 4. This statement is misleading, as the majority
of those proceedings did not address the map ultimately adopted,
because that map was introduced in the last days of the
proceeding. See Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 7 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Garman, J.).
	Absent a remand in this case directing the Commission to
hold a hearing consistent with the spirit and purpose of the Illinois
Constitution, it is inappropriate to approve this plan on the ground
that the plan is "not discernibly different, in terms of compactness,
from the plan approved" in Ryan. Until the Commission has been
presented with and has considered evidence justifying departures
from the constitutional requirements of compactness, it is
premature to presume the validity of such departures.
	Because I believe the map should be returned to the
Commission for further proceedings, I respectfully dissent from
the majority opinion.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
	The Illinois Constitution of 1970 requires legislative and
representative districts to "be compact, contiguous, and
substantially equal in population." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a).
The majority goes to great lengths to stress that the redistricting
process requires a careful weighing of factors, and that
compactness is but one of several different factors to be
considered. Slip op. at 5-6. Compactness is not optional; it is
mandated by the Illinois Constitution. Legislative districts need
not be perfect, but "reasonably compact." People ex rel. Burris v.
Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 282 (1991) (Ryan I); Schrage v. State Board
of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1981), People ex rel. Scott v.
Grivetti, 50 Ill. 2d 156, 166 (1971).
	Plaintiffs here, much like plaintiff intervenors in Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, No. 92443 (November 28, 2001), have
proposed modifications to certain districts in the Commission's
map that would result in districts that are not only equally
populated but also substantially more compact. Although, as the
majority correctly notes, it is not the function of this court to
compare maps to determine whether districts were formulated to
be as compact as possible, it is this court's function to determine
whether " 'the principle of compactness of territory has been
applied at all.' " Slip op. at 7, quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v.
Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 480 (1895). From a visual inspection of
the Commission's map-the final version of which was adopted
less than 24 hours after being proposed-it appears that the
Commission did not attempt to apply the constitutional principle
of compactness to certain districts.
	For example, plaintiffs challenge, in part, Representative
Districts 99, 100, 113, and 114, districts I concluded in Cole-Randazzo were severely gerrymandered and appear to violate the
compactness requirement. Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 11 (Garman,
J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.). District 114 "is a bizarrely
drawn U-shaped district that substantially wraps around
Representative District 113. Similarly, Representative District 100
wraps around the 99th Representative District on three sides."
Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 11 (Garman, J., dissenting, joined by
Thomas, J.). Further, plaintiffs challenge the 104th Representative
District, which includes parts of Champaign and Vermilion
Counties and, much like the above districts, encircles the 103rd
Representative District almost in its entirety. The 103rd District
spans only eight miles from north to south and nine miles from
east to west, and includes the cities of Champaign and Urbana in
Champaign County. In contrast, adjacent Representative District
105 runs approximately 73 miles from north to south, 61 miles
from east to west, and includes six counties. Plaintiffs also
challenge the 75th Representative District, a district also
challenged by the plaintiff intervenors in Cole-Randazzo. This
district presents the classic gerrymander in that it is shaped much
like a dragon, with its head situated in the northern part of La Salle
County and a tail that swoops down into Iroquois County.
	In Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 98, this court invalidated a
representative district that was "a tortured, extremely elongated
form which [was] not compact in any sense." We noted that equal
population of the invalidated district and an adjacent
representative district could be achieved without "doing violence
to the concept of compactness." Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 98.
Supporters of the challenged district were unable to advance any
reason to justify the departure from the compactness requirement.
Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 98. I see no distinction between the district
invalidated in Schrage and several of the districts challenged by
plaintiffs in the cases at bar. Further, the record of proceedings
indicates no evidence of neutral criteria to support the apparent
departure of certain districts from the constitutional requirement
of compactness. As noted by Justice Thomas in his dissent in
Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Garman, J.), the majority of the record and witness testimony does
not even address the constitutional validity of the final version of
the Commission's map.
	Finally, in Cole-Randazzo, the majority failed to address the
plaintiff intervenors' challenge to the proceedings that led to the
adoption of the redistricting map challenged today. There, plaintiff
intervenors alleged that the proceedings were flawed because,
inter alia, the final redistricting plan was proposed and passed
within a 24-hour period and expert witnesses were presented
without advance notice or a meaningful time to prepare cross-examination. Here, the majority notes that "plaintiffs in the cases
before us today make no claim that the process employed by the
Commission in formulating the new redistricting plan was in any
way improper." Slip op. at 3. Nevertheless, the majority later states
that the Commission held "a series of meetings and public
hearings," "considered various plans," received "evidence
regarding the plans' strengths and weaknesses," and heard
testimony from several expert witnesses and others. Slip op. at 4.
Again, the majority fails to address the heart of the matter and
attempts to cloak the proceedings with validity. The court has
avoided its duty. Whether plaintiffs expressly challenge the
validity of the proceedings, this court has a duty to ensure that the
process that ultimately results in a redistricting map that will
represent the people of Illinois for the next decade will be
"equitable, balanced, and fair." Cole-Randazzo, slip op. at 8
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.).
	For the reasons stated above, I would remand this map to the
Redistricting Commission; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
 



 



1.      1The legislators participating as plaintiffs are Rep. Mark Beaubien
(R., 52nd Rep. Dist.), Rep. Raymond Poe (R., 99th Rep. Dist.), Rep.
Rosemary Mulligan (R., 55th Rep. Dist.), Rep. Patricia Linder (R., 65th
Rep. Dist.), Rep. Mike Bost (R., 115th Rep. Dist.), Rep. Rick Winkel
(R., 103rd Rep. Dist.), Rep. Tom Berns (R., 104th Rep. Dist.), and Rep.
Anne Zickus (R., 48th Rep. Dist.).

2.      2A challenge to the constitutionality of the procedure by which the
ninth member of the Commission was selected was considered and
rejected by a three-judge panel of federal judges in Barnow v. Ryan, No.
01-CV-06566 (N.D. Ill., September 28, 2001).