Title: Shack v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

249 Ind. 67 (1967)
231 N.E.2d 36
SHACK
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,467.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 14, 1967.
*68 Charles G. Castor, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
Consolidated with No. 30,730.
LEWIS, J.
The appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury of Marion County, Indiana, for the offense of Murder in the First Degree. Shack entered a plea of not guilty and after trial by jury a verdict was renderd finding him guilty of Murder in the First Degree and he was sentenced to suffer death.
After the indictment was returned by the Grand Jury, the the Court appointed an attorney, one James Nedeff, to represent Varderman Shack. After the verdict was rendered and judgment entered, Mr. Nedeff prepared and filed a motion for new trial. The motion for new trial was overruled.
Shack then prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana as a pauper and the Trial Court granted the request for appeal as a pauper and appointed Charles G. Castor, an attorney, to represent Shack in his appeal to the Supreme Court. After the appointment of Mr. Castor as appellate attorney for Mr. Shack, and after the transcript of the trial proceedings had been prepared, Mr. Castor filed a petition for permission to file a belated motion for new trial, which petition, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
The substance of the motion for new trial itself is contained in the petition, supra.
In order to have a complete understanding of the petition for permission to file a belated motion, the affidavits of Varderman Shack and James Nedeff, which were attached to such motion for new trial, are incorporated herein.
The affidavit of Varderman Shack, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
The affidavit of James Nedeff, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
Thereafter, the Trial Court conducted a hearing on the petition for permission to file the belated motion for new trial. And, after such hearing, the Trial Court overruled the petition for permission to file a belated motion for new trial. Thereupon, the appellant, by and through his appellate counsel, Mr. Castor, asked this Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 2-40(a), 1964. The petition *75 for writ of certiorari was based upon the circumstances described supra.
By written opinion on May 5, 1965, this Court directed that there be a consolidation of the appeal of Varderman Shack from his conviction then pending in Cause No. 30467 in this Court with the matters pleaded in the petition for writ of certiorari in Cause No. 30730. See Varderman Shack v. State of Indiana (1965), 249 Ind. 60, 206 N.E.2d 614.
After the writ of certiorari was issued, the transcript of the proceedings on the petition for permission to file the belated motion for new trial was prepared and filed in this Court; and this case has been briefed both on the merits of the appeal and also on the alleged error complained of by Varderman Shack in the Trial Court's ruling on the petition for permission to file a belated motion for new trial.
We treat, here, the question of whether or not the Court committed error in overruling the petition for permission to file a belated motion for new trial. The gravamen of appellant's petition for permission to file a belated motion for a new trial alleged that the attorney representing him before the Trial Court was incompetent and that such representation was inadequate, and, therefore, appellant was denied his Constitutional Rights in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and in violation of Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
In order for us to make a determination as to whether or not Varderman Shack had adequate and competent counsel in the defense of this most serious indictment, we look first to what Mr. Nedeff, himself, said concerning his conduct of this case.
He had been graduated from Law School six (6) years prior to the time of this trial. Ninety five (95%) percent of his practice was in civil matters and only five (5%) percent in criminal matters.
*76 In his first tour of duty as a Public Defender, he did not try one case. He started his second tour of duty as a Public Defender at the beginning of the year 1963. It will be noted that he filed his appearance for Varderman Shack in Criminal Court on the 7th day of January, 1963; so it is very obvious that he had very little experience on his second tour of duty as a Public Defender at the time he undertook the duties and responsibilities of defending Mr. Shack.
Prior to the time of the Shack case, Mr. Nedeff had participated in one (1) criminal jury trial  that being a charge of robbery. He had never participated in the trial and preparation of a homicide case.
On the 7th day of January, 1963, Mr. Shack was unable to speak due to an injury that he had received. He was only able to talk two weeks prior to the time the trial was to commence; yet, Mr. Nedeff did not ask for any continuance in order to give him additional time to confer with the defendant or to prepare his case.
Mr. Shack furnished Mr. Nedeff with the names of witnesses to call on his behalf, but Mr. Nedeff was either unable to locate them, or felt they could be of no benefit to Mr. Shack and he did not request a continuance in order to locate any of the witnesses who were not found at that time. He did not call any witnesses for Mr. Shack, and the sole witness, for all practical purposes, was the appellant himself.
The jury trying Mr. Shack deliberated less than one-half hour before finding him guilty and recommending that he suffer death.
Mr. Nedeff devoted approximately eighteen (18) hours to the preparation of the defense of Mr. Shack. Mr. Shack was without knowledge, prior to trial, of Mr. Nedeff's experience or lack of experience. Mr. Nedeff did not, at any time, feel that the jury would recommend a death penalty and he was not concerned, at any stage of the trial, about the defendant receiving the death penalty. Mr. Nedeff was called as a *77 witness and testified that he has made a living out of the practice of law since he was admitted and he has appeared in Courts, and prior to 1963, had not had more than three (3) jury trials which included any civil cases he may have handled. The bulk of his criminal cases had been before a Court and without a jury. He had assisted in the trial of one (1) jury case on a robbery charge and the defendants were found guilty of larceny.
He saw Mr. Shack a number of times between the time of his appointment in January and the trial date.
Mr. Nedeff did not request any instructions on behalf of Mr. Shack from the Trial Court. During part of the eighteen (18) hours of preparation he did research work at the law library on homicides in various degrees. He did visit the scene of the crime. He does not know of any other preparation that he could have made for this case.
On cross-examination, Mr. Nedeff admitted that he freely and voluntarily signed the affidavit that was submitted with the motion for new trial; that he signed the affidavit before the notary.
The Deputy Prosecuting Attorney inquired of Mr. Nedeff whether or not a trip to Michigan City Prison which houses the execution chamber had anything to do with him signing the affidavit, and the following question was asked:
Mr. Nedeff answered:
Later on, by examination by Mr. Castor, Mr. Nedeff again related that the facts in the affidavit were true  that he was not threatened or coerced.
*78 We must first dispose of the question of whether or not James Nedeff committed perjury when he signed the affidavit attached as an exhibit to the motion for permission to file a belated motion for a new trial. Apparently it was the intention of the prosecuting attorney, on cross-examination, to attempt to prove that Nedeff was so influenced by his trip to the penitentiary, and the building that houses the death chamber, that a duly licensed and admitted attorney would perjure himself for and on behalf of his client. From all of the evidence here, we do not adopt that conclusion.
Nedeff reiterated time and again that the matters and facts set forth in the affidavit were true. He may have been willing to tell the truth because of the emotional shock that he suffered as a result of his visit to the Michigan City Penitentiary. He may have been willing to put on paper facts concerning his defense, or lack of defense, for Varderman Shack, that would have a definite effect on Nedeff's professional future  but we conclude that he did not lie.
We must decide, then, as a matter of law, whether or not, under the facts set out in the Nedeff affidavit, Varderman Shack was afforded his Constitutional Rights. The guilt or innocence of Varderman Shack is not an issue.
In many cases it would be impossible for this Court to fix guidelines as to the requisite number of hours that an attorney should spend in preparation of the defense of a case. This Court has written on the subject of adequate preparation and adequate time for preparation, *79 but we must conclude that each case stands on its own facts. However, see Bradley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 131, 84 N.E.2d 580, 582. Lloyd v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 192, 170 N.E.2d 904. In Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848, the following language is used:
Appellant has called our attention to the concurring opinion of Judge Emmert in Hillman v. State (1954), 234 Ind. 27, 123 N.E.2d 180, in which he stated:
We believe it is unnecessary to labor this matter further. Under the affidavit signed by Mr. Nedeff which we believe, Varderman Shack did not have competent counsel in his trial nor did he have an adequate defense. We can decide as a matter of law that Mr. Nedeff did not make adequate preparation when he expended only eighteen (18) hours in factual investigation; legal research; inquiry concerning sanity; and all of the other facets of inquiry properly to be disposed of by an attorney in the preparation of a felony as serious as Murder in the First Degree. This is particularly true since Mr. Nedeff had never tried a homicide case. This would probably be true even with one of the legal giants of trial practice; but, a seasoned trial lawyer would deem it unthinkable *80 to go to trial with only eighteen (18) hours of preparation. He would deem it malpractice not to seek a psychiatric examination of his client in order to determine whether or not a plea of insanity would be interposed. A mature practitioner who had tried many cases would spend several times eighteen (18) hours in legal research alone in order to properly prepare, for the Court's consideration, tendered instructions touching on the various elements of murder.
We have said many times that we should not, in hindsight, second guess the strategy of trial counsel. Varderman Shack's trial was without strategy. To expect Mr. Nedeff, with his inexperience and lack of preparation, to afford Mr. Shack his Constitution Rights may be likened unto a medical graduate who has been licensed for six (6) years, and has been engaged in the general practice, but who has never held a scalpel and is expected to perform a delicate piece of brain surgery. This would be particularly reprehensive if competent neurosurgeons were available.
There are competent trial counsel available for Varderman Shack and one should be furnished.
The Court committed error in denying Varderman Shack the right to file a belated motion for new trial, and this judgment is reversed and the Court is directed to permit the filing of the belated motion for new trial, and in the interest of expediting a re-trial of Varderman Shack, the Court is ordered and directed to grant the belated motion for new trial.
Hunter, C.J., and Jackson and Mote, JJ., concur.
Arterburn, J., concurs with opinion.
ARTERBURN, J.
It is the concern of the bar of this State and this Court, which fixes the standard of competency, to have to set aside a conviction because of incompetency of a member of the bar representing a defendant in a criminal case. I therefore feel the competency of the attorney involved in this case should be referred to the Disciplinary Commission for investigation and report as to whether or not disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action should be taken. See: Shack v. State (1965), 249 Ind. 60, 206 N.E.2d 614, p. 617.
NOTE.  Reported in 231 N.E.2d 36.