Title: State v. Pinder

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP208-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Johnny K. Pinder, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATOIN FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 16, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Kelly, J., concurs, joined by R.G. Bradley, J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Ltd., Waukesha.  There was 
an oral argument by Michael Holzman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Micha Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on the brief were 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy 
solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Luke Berg, 
deputy solicitor general. 
 
 
2018 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP208-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF84) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Johnny K. Pinder, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 16, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2015-16).1  The court of appeals 
certified the following question: 
If a search warrant issued under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.12 for the placement and use of a GPS tracking 
device on a motor vehicle is not executed within five 
days after the date of issuance per Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.15(1) is the warrant void under § 968.15(2), 
even if the search was otherwise reasonably conducted? 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
2 
 
In short, this question requires the court to decide if an 
otherwise reasonably conducted search warrant issued for the 
placement and use of a Global Positioning System ("GPS") 
tracking device on a motor vehicle is subject to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 968.152 and 968.17(1).3  
¶2 
We conclude that a search warrant issued for the 
placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle, 
but not executed within five days after the date of issuance per 
Wis. Stat. § 968.15 or timely returned under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.17(1), is not void if the search was otherwise reasonably 
conducted, because it is not a warrant issued "for the purpose 
of seizing designated property or kinds of property" under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.12(1).  It is not a warrant that seeks a "document" 
or "electronic data" under the control of the vehicle owner as 
is required under Wis. Stat. § 968.13 and thus, is not subject 
to the execution and return provisions of §§ 968.15 and 
968.17(1).  Such a warrant for GPS tracking is not issued 
pursuant to a statute, but instead is issued pursuant to the 
court's inherent authority and thus, must comply only with the 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin 
Stats. 
§ 968.15, 
"Search 
warrants; 
when 
executable," provides:  "(1) A search warrant must be executed 
and returned not more than 5 days after the date of issuance" 
and "(2) Any search warrant not executed within the time 
provided in sub. (1) shall be void and shall be returned to the 
judge issuing it." 
3 Wisconsin Stats. § 968.17(1), "Return of search warrant," 
states, in relevant part, that "the return of a search warrant 
shall be made within 48 hours after execution." 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
3 
 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Because the GPS 
warrant in this case was otherwise constitutionally sufficient, 
the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant is not subject 
to suppression.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court.4 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 
February 
of 
2015, 
multiple 
businesses 
were 
burglarized in Mequon, Wisconsin.  Detective Cory Polishinski of 
the Mequon Police Department ("Detective Polishinski") was in 
charge of investigating these burglaries.  The burglar stole 
laptop computers, a "SimCube testing device," a stereo, a 
company MasterCard credit card, and cash.  Surveillance cameras 
near one business captured footage of a potential suspect and 
his car, a silver Chevrolet Impala.  The license plates appeared 
to be missing.  MasterCard confirmed that the stolen credit card 
"had five ATM attempts to get cash advances" and that it was 
used on or about February 14, 2015, at multiple gas stations in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Surveillance cameras at two of these gas 
stations captured footage of the suspect burglar, in what 
appeared to be the same silver Chevrolet Impala, filling up 
other vehicles with gasoline.   
                                                 
4 We recognize Pinder also argued that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for other reasons.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984).  As a result, we later address this secondary 
argument and, as will be seen, conclude that counsel was not 
ineffective. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
4 
 
¶4 
On February 19, 2015, Detective Polishinski received 
an e-mail from Detective Brad Mellenthein of the Milwaukee 
Police Department ("Detective Mellenthein").  In his e-mail, 
Detective Mellenthein provided pertinent information he received 
from 
a 
confidential 
informant. 
 
According 
to 
Detective 
Mellenthein, the informant said that a man named "JP," who is "a 
really good lock picker," was "using his skills to get into 
locked areas of hospitals and businesses to steal computers, 
credit cards, and money . . . to support his crack habit."  JP 
bragged to the informant that he would "pick the lock of a 
business and enter to take the items he wanted, then leave 
things like they were prior to the burglary, giving him time to 
move the product or use the credit or gas cards."  The informant 
described JP as having "a bunch of gas cards and [using the 
cards to] fill up vehicles," as well as having "10 to 15 
computers available at one time to sell."  In fact, JP sold one 
of the stolen computers to the confidential informant's aunt 
(the computer had one of the burglarized company's stickers on 
it) and, after it stopped working, JP agreed to "get her another 
one."  The informant also stated that JP just "got out [of 
prison] about two months ago" after serving 18 years.   
¶5 
Detective Mellenthein was able to identify JP as 
Johnny 
K. 
Pinder 
("Pinder"). 
 
According 
to 
Detective 
Mellenthein, Pinder was the known owner of a "2008 Chevrolet 
Impala LT, silver in color with tinted windows and . . . a WI 
temp plate (L6019F) in the front window," VIN 2G1WT58N089144205 
(hereinafter "Pinder's vehicle"); Pinder had been in prison for 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
5 
 
burglary and was released in December of 2014; Pinder was 
currently on probation; and the Milwaukee Police Department 
confirmed Pinder was a suspect in other similar burglaries using 
the Chevrolet Impala.  In addition, surveillance footage of 
these other similar burglaries showed Pinder and an unknown 
female "inside an office taking items." 
¶6 
On February 27, 2015, Detective Polishinski applied to 
the Ozaukee County circuit court for an order to covertly place 
and monitor a GPS tracking device on Pinder's vehicle "for a 
period of time not to exceed 60 days from the date the order is 
signed."  Detective Polishinski's affidavit in support of the 
GPS warrant articulated the above-referenced details of the 
investigation and outlined his training and experience with 
respect to criminal investigations.  In his affidavit, Detective 
Polishinski acknowledged that, "Wisconsin has no explicit 
statute under chapter 968 that addresses the issue of installing 
tracking devices on private property."  Detective Polishinski 
nonetheless detailed how the device would be installed and 
monitored, and that "the use of power to run the [GPS] tracking 
device [would] be taken from [Pinder's vehicle] in order to 
extend the useful monitoring of [Pinder's vehicle]," and enable 
police 
"to 
identify 
locations 
and 
associates 
currently 
unknown . . . as to the location of the fruits or accomplices of 
this violation."  Detective Polishinski further explained in his 
affidavit that a GPS tracking device "periodically records, at 
specified times, the latitude, longitude, date and time of 
readings and stores these readings until they are downloaded to 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
6 
 
a computer . . . for analysis."  Detective Polishinski further 
stated: 
[T]here is probable cause to believe, based upon 
information 
[contained 
in 
his 
affidavit] 
that 
[Pinder's vehicle] is presently being utilized in the 
commission of a crime, to wit, Burglary in violation 
of Chapter 943.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes [and] that 
there 
is 
probable 
cause 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
installation of a [GPS] tracking device on [Pinder's 
vehicle] 
in 
conjunction 
with 
the 
monitoring, 
maintenance and retrieval of information from that 
[GPS] tracking device, will lead to evidence of the 
aforementioned criminal violations, as well as the 
location where the fruits of the violations are being 
stored and the identification of associates assisting 
in the aforementioned violations.   
¶7 
On the same day, the Ozaukee County circuit court5 
granted Detective Polishinski's application with a signed 
warrant entitled "Order" (hereinafter "Warrant").  The circuit 
court concluded that there was "probable cause to believe that 
the installation of a tracking device in [Pinder's vehicle] is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation and that the 
vehicle is being used in the commission of the crime of 
Burglary."  The circuit court authorized the State (the Mequon 
Police Department) to 
place an electronic tracking device on [Pinder's 
vehicle], and . . . surreptitiously enter and re-enter 
the 
vehicle 
and 
any 
buildings 
and 
structures 
containing the vehicle or any premises on which the 
vehicle is located to install, use, maintain and 
conduct surveillance and monitoring of the location 
and movement of a mobile electronic-tracking device in 
the vehicle and any and all places within or outside 
                                                 
5 The Honorable Paul V. Malloy presided. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
7 
 
the jurisdiction of Ozaukee County, including but not 
limited to private residences and other locations not 
open 
to 
visual 
surveillance; 
to 
accomplish 
the 
installation agents are authorized to obtain and use a 
key to operate and move the vehicle for the required 
time to a concealed location and are authorized to 
open the engine compartment and trunk areas of the 
vehicle to install the device.   
¶8 
The 
Warrant 
did 
not 
require 
the 
Mequon 
Police 
Department to install the GPS tracking device within a certain 
time period, but rather mandated that the tracking device be 
removed "as soon as practicable after the objectives of the 
surveillance are accomplished or not later than 60 days from the 
date the order is signed."   
¶9 
On March 9, 2015, ten days after the circuit court 
signed the Warrant, Detective Polishinski installed the GPS 
tracking device on Pinder's vehicle.6  The GPS tracking device 
was programmed to alert the Mequon Police Department when the 
vehicle entered Mequon.7   
¶10 On March 14, 2015, Detective Polishinski received an 
alert that Pinder's vehicle had entered Mequon.  Detective 
                                                 
6 The record does not contain details about how the GPS 
tracking device was installed.   
7 Detective Polishinski explained: 
Once the GPS is placed on the vehicle a geofence is 
established. 
 
In 
this 
case 
the 
geofence 
was 
surrounding the City of Mequon.  So if a vehicle would 
enter or cross the geofence, an alert would be active; 
and myself, along with other detectives and our 
captain would receive a text message and an e-mail 
stating that the vehicle had crossed at a specific 
point on that geofence.   
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
8 
 
Polishinski logged onto the GPS website and monitored the GPS 
tracking device's signal.8  The signal indicated that Pinder's 
vehicle had stopped at a business office complex in Mequon.   
¶11 Detective Polishinski requested that police officers 
respond to the business office complex to investigate a possible 
burglary there.  Police officers arrived at the business office 
complex and ascertained that someone had broken into one suite 
of offices.  Shortly thereafter, the officers confirmed that a 
wallet and two laptops were missing, including a new computer 
that was still in the original box.   
¶12 Mequon police officers also stopped the suspect 
vehicle (Pinder's vehicle) on the highway.  The occupants of the 
vehicle were identified as Pinder and Darnelle Polk ("Polk").  
Officers obtained consent to search the vehicle.  The officers 
found gloves, screwdrivers, "portfolio items,"9 items stolen from 
the burglary scene including a laptop computer box, a wallet, 
and drug paraphernalia.   
                                                 
8 Detective Polishinski explained:  
[Once he] logged onto the GPS website . . . [he] was 
able to view a representation of that vehicle.  On 
that website a map of the area will pop up; and the 
GPS is a little dot, and you're able to follow the dot 
as it is driving along the roadway; or if it stops, 
you're able to find out exactly where on the map it 
is.   
9 The portfolio contained "a hammer-type device," a "metal 
tool with an orange handle," and a laptop.   
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
9 
 
¶13 Pinder and Polk, as well as Pinder's vehicle, were 
then transported to the Mequon Police Department.10  At the 
station "lock-picking style tools" were found on Pinder. 
¶14 Surveillance video footage from the business office 
complex provided further evidence that Pinder was likely the 
burglar.  The footage reflected that Pinder's vehicle was at the 
business office complex, that Pinder was dressed like and fit 
the description of the suspect, and that the suspect was 
carrying "a portfolio" much like the one found in Pinder's 
vehicle which contained burglarious tools.   
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶15 On March 16, 2015, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Pinder with one count of burglary of a 
building or dwelling – as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 943.10(1m)(a), 939.50(3)(f), and 939.05; and one count 
of possession of burglarious tools, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.12 and 939.50(3)(i).11   
                                                 
10 Detective Polishinski then applied for and received a 
search warrant under Wis. Stat. § 968.12 for the vehicle and 
took the items contained therein into evidence.   
11 Pinder, along with Polk, were both charged in the initial 
criminal complaint.  The subsequent information, charging Pinder 
with the same two charges and using the same charging language, 
only contained the counts against Pinder.  The initial criminal 
complaint charged Polk with one count of burglary of a building 
or dwelling – as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.10(1m)(a), 939.50(3)(f), and 939.05; and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.573(1).   
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
10 
 
¶16 On September 14, 2015, Pinder filed a motion to 
suppress on the basis that the "Order obtained by the State in 
this case [was] not a search warrant and thus, the attachment of 
a GPS device to [Pinder's vehicle] was a warrantless search."  
Pinder further argued that, if the order is a warrant, the 
Warrant was not properly executed pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.15(1).  In response, the State argued that the Warrant was 
not a statutory search warrant under Wis. Stat. § 968.12, but 
instead was a warrant that satisfied the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment, because it had:  
(1) prior authorization of by (sic) a neutral and 
detached magistrate, (2) a demonstration upon oath or 
affirmation that there is probable cause to believe 
the 
evidence 
sought 
will 
aid 
in 
a 
particular 
conviction for [a] particular offense, and (3) a 
particularized description of the place to be searched 
and the items to be seized.   
¶17 On November 9, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing 
on Pinder's motion to suppress.12  On November 23, 2015, the 
circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that 
Sveum13 is "on point," and that Sveum's reasoning "controls" in 
this case.  In applying Sveum's test to determine whether the 
Warrant was valid, the circuit court found that the court 
"qualif[ied] as a detached and neutral magistrate in issuing the 
                                                 
12 At the hearing, the State and Pinder stipulated that the 
GPS tracking device was installed ten days after the Warrant was 
signed.   
13 State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 
N.W.2d 317. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
11 
 
warrant" and that the probable cause standard was satisfied 
based on the facts in Detective Polishinski's affidavit.  The 
circuit court added that Pinder's vehicle was "[k]ind of the 
linchpin" of the "rash of burglaries," and that the Warrant 
allowed the Mequon Police Department to "[observe] the vehicle 
when it was in the area where these burglaries had been 
committed."  While the circuit court acknowledged that Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.15 
presented 
"difficulties," 
it 
nonetheless 
concluded that——just as in Sveum——the "constitutional test 
appl[ies] over the statutory requirements."  The circuit court 
concluded that, "under the circumstances . . . the warrant was 
appropriate" and denied the motion to suppress.   
¶18 On November 30, 2015, Pinder and Polk were tried 
before a jury.  Before both sides rested, Pinder moved for a 
directed verdict on the burglary charge arguing that the State 
had charged Pinder under the wrong paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.10(1m).  In response, the State moved to amend its 
pleadings to charge burglary under § 943.10(1m)(f) instead of 
§ 943.10(1m)(a).14  The circuit court denied Pinder's motion and 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.10, "Burglary," in relevant part, 
provides: 
(1m) Whoever intentionally enters any of the 
following places without the consent of the person in 
lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a 
felony in such place is guilty of a Class F felony: 
(a) Any building or dwelling; or 
. . .  
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
12 
 
granted the State's motion.  After granting the State's motion, 
the circuit court explained that it had changed the term 
"building," as well as "dwelling," to "office" throughout the 
Burglary jury instructions.  The circuit court, however, failed 
to change "building" to "office" one time, resulting in the 
Burglary jury instructions containing the word "building" once.  
The circuit court attributed it to an editing mistake.  The 
State had requested the Burglary jury instructions use the 
phrase "room within a building."  No one objected to the jury 
instructions.  The jury found Pinder guilty on both counts.15   
¶19 On December 1, 2015, the circuit court sentenced 
Pinder to five years of initial confinement and five years of 
extended supervision on count 1, and one year of initial 
confinement and one year of extended supervision on count 2, to 
be served concurrently to the sentence imposed on count 1.  Both 
sentences were to be served consecutively to a sentence Pinder 
was serving at the time.   
¶20 On August 24, 2016, Pinder filed a motion for 
postconviction relief seeking a new jury trial on the ground 
that his "trial attorney . . . was prejudicially ineffective."  
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) A room within any of the above. 
§ 943.10(1m)(a), (f). 
15 The jury, however, found Polk "not guilty of burglary of 
an office as a party to the crime as charged in . . . the 
information."  He, nonetheless, was found guilty of possession 
of drug paraphernalia, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1).  
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
13 
 
On January 19, 2017, the circuit court issued its decision 
denying the motion.  After noting that Pinder "might be able to 
meet the first prong of the test [of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim]," the circuit court concluded that "[i]t is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 
convicted [Pinder] . . . if proper instructions had been given."  
The circuit court reasoned that "the quantum of evidence was 
[so] overwhelming that the jury would have convicted [Pinder] of 
the charges" and that the "jury didn't seem to have any 
confusion."   
¶21 On February 2, 2017, Pinder filed a notice of appeal, 
challenging both the judgment of conviction and the circuit 
court's denial of his postconviction motion.  On December 13, 
2017, the court of appeals certified the case to this court 
regarding the application of provisions of Chapter 968 to this 
Warrant.  On March 14, 2018, we accepted the court of appeals' 
certification. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 The certified issue concerns whether the Warrant in 
this case is governed by Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 968.  
Accordingly, we are called upon to consider various provisions 
of Chapter 968 including Wis. Stat. §§ 968.12, 968.13, 968.15, 
and 968.17.   
¶23 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we 
review de novo but benefiting from prior courts' analyses.  
C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 
68, ¶14, 310 Wis. 2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900.  "[T]he purpose of 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
14 
 
statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶24 We are then called upon to review whether this Warrant 
complied with the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  "Whether the language of the warrant satisfies 
the requisite constitutional requirements is a question of law.  
We review such issues of constitutional guarantees de novo."  
State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 744, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998); see 
also State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶17, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 
N.W.2d 317.  "However, we review a warrant-issuing magistrate's 
determination of whether the affidavit in support of the order 
was sufficient to show probable cause with 'great deference.'"  
State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, ¶14, 357 Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798 
(quoting State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 
N.W.2d 24 (1991)).  This "determination will stand unless the 
defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause."  Higginbotham, 162 
Wis. 2d at 989. 
¶25 When we analyze whether police conduct violated the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution's and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution's guarantees against 
unreasonable 
searches, 
"[w]e 
independently 
review 
'whether 
police conduct violated the constitutional guarantee against 
unreasonable 
searches,' 
which 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
15 
 
constitutional fact."  Tate, 357 Wis. 2d 172, ¶14 (quoting State 
v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶11, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748).  
"When presented with a question of constitutional fact, this 
court engages in a two-step inquiry.  First, we review the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact under a deferential 
standard, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Second, we independently apply constitutional principles to 
those facts."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (citations omitted). 
¶26 Finally, 
with 
respect 
to 
Pinder's 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument, review of "[w]hether a defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 
of law and fact."  State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1599 
(2018).  "The factual circumstances of the case and trial 
counsel's conduct and strategy are findings of fact, which will 
not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; whether counsel's 
conduct constitutes ineffective assistance is a question of law, 
which we review de novo."  Id.  "To demonstrate that counsel's 
assistance was ineffective, the defendant must establish that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance was prejudicial."  Id. (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  "To establish that 
counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must show 
that it fell below 'an objective standard of reasonableness.'  
In general, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel's 
conduct 'falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
16 
 
assistance.'"  Id., ¶38 (citation omitted).  "To establish that 
deficient performance was prejudicial, the defendant must show 
that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"  Id., ¶39.  
Whether trial counsel performed deficiently and whether any 
deficient performance was prejudicial are both questions of law 
we review de novo.  Id., ¶¶38-39.  "If the defendant fails to 
satisfy either prong, we need not consider the other."  Id., ¶37 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 968 Does Not Apply. 
¶27 The crux of the issue before the court begins with an 
analysis of certain provisions of Chapter 968 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  We are first called upon to determine whether this 
Warrant must be issued, executed, and returned pursuant to the 
provisions of Chapter 968.  Because the plain language of the 
provisions of Chapter 968 neither addresses nor includes such a 
GPS warrant, we conclude that this Warrant cannot be subject to 
the statutory limitations and requirements therein.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 968.12, 968.13, 968.15, and 968.17. 
¶28 This court begins statutory interpretation with the 
language of the statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry 
and give the language its "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
17 
 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id.  
¶29 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶30 "If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning."  
Id., ¶46.  If statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need 
to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation.  Id. 
¶31 This case requires us to begin with an interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1) which addresses, in part, the purpose 
of a statutory search warrant,16 and Wis. Stat. § 968.13 which 
                                                 
16 Although Chapter 968 of the Wisconsin Statutes describes 
several categories of warrants, in this opinion, we use 
"statutory search warrant" to refer only to warrants issued 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1). 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
18 
 
addresses what property is subject to seizure because of a 
statutory search warrant. 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.12, "Search warrant," provides, 
in pertinent part: 
(1)  Description and issuance.  A search warrant 
is an order signed by a judge directing a law 
enforcement 
officer 
to 
conduct 
a 
search 
of 
a 
designated person, a designated object or a designated 
place for the purpose of seizing designated property 
or kinds of property.  A judge shall issue a search 
warrant if probable cause is shown.   
§ 968.12(1) (emphasis added). 
¶33 Initially, under the plain language interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1), statutory search warrants are "for the 
purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of property."  
Id. (emphasis added).  A GPS tracking device does not seize 
property, it creates data.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 419 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("The Court does not 
contend that there was a seizure [from the attachment or use of 
the GPS device].  A seizure of property occurs when there is 
'some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory 
interests in that property,' and here there was none." (citation 
omitted)); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person's public movements." (emphasis added)); see also United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).  We cannot ignore this 
clear legislative pronouncement that the statutory search 
warrant be for the "purpose of seizing designated property or 
kinds of property."  See § 968.12(1); see also Kalal, 271 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174-79 (2012) ("If possible, 
every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum 
effectu sunt accipienda).  None should be ignored.  None should 
needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate 
another 
provision 
or 
to 
have 
no 
consequence." 
(footnote omitted)).  Instead, "[w]e must assume that the 
legislature has reviewed the legislation and that it intends the 
words used be given their meaning."  State v. MacArthur, 2008 WI 
72, ¶30, 310 Wis. 2d 550, 750 N.W.2d 910; see also 2A Norman J. 
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 46.6 (7th ed. 2018) ("Courts assume that every 
word, phrase, and clause in a legislative enactment is intended 
and has some meaning and that none was inserted accidentally.").  
If the legislature intended that § 968.12 search warrants be 
required for other than the seizure of "property," it would have 
selected different words.  The plain meaning of § 968.12 does 
not support Pinder's argument. 
¶34 Further support for the conclusion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.12 does not apply to GPS warrants is found in the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 968.13, which specifically defines "the 
property" that may be seized by a statutory search warrant.  
Information subsequently generated from a GPS tracking device is 
not "property" that can be "seized" at the time the warrant 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
20 
 
issued.  Moreover, it is not "property" that is under the 
control of Pinder.  
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.13, "Search warrant; property 
subject to seizure," provides: 
A search warrant may authorize the seizure of the 
following:   . . .  
(d)  Documents which may constitute evidence of 
any crime, if probable cause is shown that the 
documents are under the control of a person who is 
reasonably suspected to be concerned in the commission 
of that crime under s. 939.05(2).   
§ 968.13(1)(d) (emphasis added).  Subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.13 defines documents as including but not limited to, 
"books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, photographs, films 
or computer or electronic data."  § 968.13(2). 
¶36 Pinder argues that GPS warrants authorize the seizure 
of "[d]ocuments," specifically "electronic data," under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.13(1)(d).  Pinder's argument, however, fails because 
a document/electronic data is not even in existence at the time 
the GPS unit is installed.  Moreover, this not-yet-created 
information could not possibly be "under the control of" Pinder 
so to be seized from him. 
¶37 Simply stated, Wis. Stat. § 968.13(1)(d) requires that 
the property to be seized be "under the control of a person who 
is reasonably suspected to be concerned in the commission of 
that crime."  GPS tracking devices may create data in the 
future, but that data is not under the control of Pinder.  To 
the extent that a document or data might come into existence 
eventually because of the tracking, it would be created by the 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
21 
 
Mequon Police Department and is under the Mequon Police 
Department's control, not Pinder's. 
¶38 To the extent that Pinder's argument that a future 
electronic 
transmission 
from 
a 
GPS 
tracking 
device 
is 
"electronic data" under his control as the term is used in Wis. 
Stat. § 968.13(2), the other terms of the statute demonstrate 
that the term "documents" pertains to documents already in 
existence and "electronic data" must be considered in context.  
Section 968.13(2) defines documents to include but is not 
limited 
to 
"books, 
papers, 
records, 
recordings, 
tapes, 
photographs, films or computer or electronic data."  The canon 
of noscitur a sociis instructs that "an unclear statutory term 
should be understood in the same sense as the words immediately 
surrounding or coupled with it."  Wis. Citizens Concerned for 
Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 
N.W.2d 612; Scalia & Garner, supra ¶33, at 195-98.  Under this 
canon, "electronic data" should be understood in the same sense 
as the other enumerated "documents."  See, e.g., Book, Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 252 (1976) (defining "book" 
as "a formal written document" or "a collection of written, 
printed, or blank sheets fastened together"); record, id. at 
1898 (defining "record" as "evidence, knowledge, or information 
remaining in permanent form (as a relic, inscription, document)" 
or "an account in writing or print (as in a document)"); 
recording, id. (defining "recording" as "a phonograph record, 
magnetic tape, or some other thing (as film, wire, one of the 
perforated rolls played by a player piano) on which sound or 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
22 
 
visual images have been recorded for subsequent reproduction").  
Read in conjunction with the other types of "documents," it is 
evident that "electronic data" under this statute would be more 
akin to stored documents, music, pictures or videos, not future 
electronic transmissions from a GPS tracking device that are in 
the possession of the Mequon Police Department, not Pinder.  
Instead, if there might eventually be a document containing GPS 
information, it will come into existence at the behest of and 
belong to the Mequon Police Department, and is not something 
under the control of Pinder. 
¶39 Finally, the parties argue about how, if at all, 
Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, informs our analysis.  While it is true 
that Sveum cites to the search warrant statutes in its 
reasonableness analysis and considers a warrant to also be an 
order, the court in Sveum concluded that suppression is not the 
remedy for what it determined was a technical irregularity.  
Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶57-58.  The arguments in Sveum 
centered around the Fourth Amendment.  In Sveum the court 
engaged in a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and turned 
to the Wisconsin Statutes for further validation that the search 
warrant was constitutional.  While Sveum does establish that a 
court has inherent authority to issue a GPS warrant, it does not 
conclude that GPS warrants must be issued under and otherwise 
comply with Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 968.   
¶40 The facts of Sveum were different and the parties' 
arguments were other than they are here.  In Sveum the parties 
neither briefed nor argued whether the warrant was a common law 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
23 
 
warrant.  Sveum in part argued that the "[t]he court order also 
failed requirements of Ch. 968 of the Wisconsin Statutes," and 
the court determined that to the extent there was a departure 
from Wis. Stat. § 968.15(1), it was a "technical irregularity."  
Id., ¶57. 
¶41 As a result, Sveum is far from precedent that GPS 
warrants are controlled by Chapter 968.  Instead, Sveum supports 
the conclusion that courts have the authority to issue GPS 
warrants even though a technical irregularity is present under 
the statute. 
¶42 Therefore, we conclude that the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 968.12(1) and 968.13 foreclose the argument that GPS 
warrants must comport with Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 968.  
Those statutes clearly do not apply to GPS warrants, and 
therefore GPS warrants are not subject to the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 968.15 or 968.17(1).  However, we again take this 
opportunity to urge the legislature to consider enacting a 
specific statutory grant of authority to define parameters and 
requirements with respect to GPS warrants.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
41;17 see also State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶54 n.16, 345 
                                                 
17 Rule 41, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Search and 
Seizure," in relevant part, provides: 
(C)  Warrant for a Tracking Device. A tracking-
device warrant must identify the person or property to 
be tracked, designate the magistrate judge to whom it 
must be returned, and specify a reasonable length of 
time that the device may be used. The time must not 
exceed 45 days from the date the warrant was issued. 
The court may, for good cause, grant one or more 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d 563, 
826 
N.W.2d 369; 
id., 
¶98 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting); 
Sveum, 
328 
Wis. 2d 369, 
¶77 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring); id., ¶¶81-82, 84 (Ziegler, J., concurring); id., 
¶126 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  Had the legislature 
enacted such a statute, we may very well not be confronted with 
the issues now present. 
B.  Fourth Amendment 
¶43 We now turn to the court's authority to issue a GPS 
warrant and whether this Warrant complies with Fourth Amendment 
principles.  Because no statutes control the issuance of a GPS 
warrant, a court is left to rely on its inherent authority.  See 
Tate, 357 Wis. 2d 172, ¶42 (citing Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶69-
72); Meek v. Pierce, 19 Wis. 318 (*300), 321-22 (*302-03) 
(1865); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1334 (2d Cir. 
                                                                                                                                                             
extensions for a reasonable period not to exceed 45 
days each. The warrant must command the officer to: 
(i) complete any installation authorized by the 
warrant within a specified time no longer than 10 
days; 
(ii) perform any installation authorized by the 
warrant during the daytime, unless the judge for good 
cause expressly authorizes installation at another 
time; and 
(iii) return the warrant to the judge designated 
in the warrant. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(C). 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
25 
 
1990).  Several courts have considered this issue, including 
ours, and have concluded that courts do indeed have the inherent 
authority to issue warrants at common law.  
Tate, 357 
Wis. 2d 172, ¶42 (citing Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶¶69-72) ("No 
specific statutory authority is necessary to the issuance of a 
valid warrant . . . ."); Meek, 19 Wis. at 321-22 (*302–03) ("It 
is clear that at common law a justice of the peace had a right 
to direct his warrant to any particular private person by name.  
This 
authority 
extended 
as 
well 
to 
search 
warrants 
as 
others. . . . With us, therefore, the only question is, whether 
this common law power has been restrained or taken away by 
statute.  For when the statute authorizes a magistrate to issue 
a warrant in a proceeding for crime, the presumption is that he 
may do so in the manner authorized by the common law, unless a 
different mode is prescribed by the statute. . . . It is a safe 
and established principle in the construction of statutes, that 
the rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful 
implication.  To give such effect to the statute, the language 
must 
be 
clear, 
unambiguous 
and 
peremptory." 
(citations 
omitted)); Falls, 34 F.3d 
at 678 ("A court of general 
jurisdiction has inherent power to issue a search warrant within 
the limits set forth in the Fourth Amendment.  Although Congress 
can limit the procedural power of the federal courts, federal 
courts retain their traditional powers until Congress chooses to 
limit them with respect to a particular subject." (citation 
omitted)); Torres, 751 F.2d at 879 ("The power to issue a search 
warrant is a common law power in America as well as England, and 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
26 
 
in the federal system as well as in the states." (citations 
omitted)); Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1334 ("Given the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirements, and assuming no statutory 
prohibition, the courts must be deemed to have inherent power to 
issue a warrant when the requirements of that Amendment are 
met.").   
¶44 Pinder makes little, if any, argument that a court 
lacks such authority.  His argument instead focused on this 
Warrant's failure to comply with the above-referenced search 
warrant statutes.  Furthermore, Pinder's counsel at oral 
argument conceded that common law warrants are valid "in certain 
situations."18  However, because we have concluded that Wisconsin 
Statutes Chapter 968 does not control the issuance of a GPS 
warrant and we rely on the inherent authority of courts to issue 
such warrants, we now turn to whether the Warrant complies with 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
                                                 
18 Pinder's counsel's full statement was: "They are trying 
to create a new kind of warrant, a common law warrant, which 
they can do in certain situations, but is not necessary in this 
situation."  He further conceded that this authority was used in 
Tate: 
In Tate, there was-- they got the information from 
somebody, AT&T, who was not suspected of a crime, 
okay, which is not what is provided in Wisconsin 
Statutes.  Because you have to have someone suspected 
of a crime in order to have a valid warrant.  So they 
couldn't go through the warrant provisions, so they 
created this common law situation to avoid having to 
go through the statutory procedures for a warrant.  
You don't have to do that in this case.   
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
27 
 
¶45 The 
"touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness."  State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶32, 274 
Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371.  The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches and seizures."  
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11.19  "A 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable . . . ."  State 
v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 
(citing State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶17, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 
629 N.W.2d 613). 
                                                 
19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
The Wisconsin Constitution's search and seizure provision 
is "interpret[d] . . . consistent[ly] with the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  State 
v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29 n.17, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 
N.W.2d 120 (citing State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24 n.11, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463); but see State v. Eason, 2001 WI 
98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
28 
 
¶46 "Whether a search and seizure pursuant to a warrant is 
constitutionally valid is a two-part inquiry.  First, the 
Warrant Clause demands that all warrants be validly issued.  
Second, the Reasonableness Clause requires that warrants be 
reasonably executed."  Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶19 (citation 
omitted). 
¶47 Pinder's argument focuses on this Warrant's lack of 
compliance with the warrant statutes.  The State argues that the 
search20 pursuant to the Warrant complied with Fourth Amendment 
requirements.  We agree with the State. 
1.  Warrant Clause 
¶48 "The 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
clause 
provides . . . particularized protections governing the manner 
in which search and arrest warrants are issued."  Henderson, 245 
Wis. 2d 345, ¶19.  For a warrant to be validly issued, the 
Warrant Clause requires three things.  Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 
¶20. 
                                                 
20 The installation and monitoring of the GPS tracking 
device on Pinder's vehicle constituted a Fourth Amendment 
"search."  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) 
(footnote omitted) ("We hold that the Government's installation 
of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that 
device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 
'search.'"). 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
29 
 
¶49 First, the warrant must have "prior authorization by a 
neutral, detached magistrate."  Id.  No argument is made that 
the Warrant is anything other than this.21 
¶50 Second, there must be "a demonstration upon oath or 
affirmation that there is probable cause to believe that 
evidence sought will aid in a particular conviction for a 
particular offense."  Id.  Again, no argument supports the 
notion that the Warrant is deficient in this regard.  In the 
search context, to find probable cause the issuing magistrate 
must determine "under the totality of the circumstances, given 
all the facts and circumstances set forth in the affidavit, 
'"there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place."'"  Id., ¶24 (quoting 
State v. Desmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)).  
"We accord great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's 
determination of probable cause and that determination will 
stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are 
clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause."  
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 989.  We will not conclude the 
facts were clearly insufficient if "the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that the probable cause 
                                                 
21 The Warrant signed by the issuing judge on February 27, 
2015, authorized the Mequon Police Department to install and 
monitor a GPS tracking device on Pinder's vehicle.  On March 9, 
2015, Detective Polishinski attached the device on Pinder's 
vehicle. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
Warrant 
has 
prior 
judicial 
authorization from a neutral detached magistrate. 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
30 
 
existed."  Id.  Here, the facts are clearly sufficient to 
support a probable cause determination, and we owe proper 
deference to the judicial determination in that regard. 
¶51 Third, the Fourth Amendment requires that there be "a 
particularized description of the place to be searched and items 
to be seized."  Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶20.  In the context of 
GPS warrants, this requirement is satisfied when "a warrant 
application . . . 'describe[s] 
the 
object 
into 
which 
the 
[tracking device] is to be placed, the circumstances that led 
agents to wish to install the [tracking device], and the length 
of time for which [] surveillance is requested.'"  Id., ¶30 
(quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 718).  Here, again, the parties do 
not meaningfully question this part of the analysis.  In the 
context of a GPS warrant, the parameters set forth are not 
unreasonable. 
¶52 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
Warrant 
authorizing 
the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS tracking device on Pinder's 
vehicle satisfied all three requirements of the Warrant Clause 
and thus was a validly issued search warrant.  
2.  Police conduct 
¶53 "Even if a court determines that a search warrant is 
constitutionally valid, the manner in which the warrant was 
executed remains subject to judicial review."  Sveum, 328 
Wis. 2d 369, ¶53.  "A search 'must be conducted reasonably and 
appropriately limited to the scope permitted by the warrant.'"  
State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 390, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996).  
"The determination of reasonableness is made by reference to the 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
31 
 
particular circumstances of each individual case, and balances 
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."  
Henderson, 245 Wis. 2d 345, ¶18 (citation omitted).  Whether a 
search was reasonably executed is determined by considering "the 
totality of the circumstances."  United States v. Banks, 540 
U.S. 31, 35-36 (2003).  Further, the "burden of proving the 
dissipation of probable cause . . . [is] with the defendant" 
because "[i]t would be an unreasonable and unnecessary burden on 
the [S]tate as well as the courts to force the [S]tate to 
justify the timeliness of every search warrant executed by 
requiring a showing that probable cause had not dissipated."  
State v. Edwards, 98 Wis. 2d 367, 376, 297 N.W.2d 12 (1980). 
¶54 First, there is essentially no argument that the 
installation of the GPS tracking device did not comply with the 
terms of the Warrant.  Instead, Pinder's argument focuses on 
noncompliance with the statute.  In the case at issue, Detective 
Polishinski obtained the Warrant from the issuing judge to 
"install and monitor a [GPS] tracking device on [Pinder's 
vehicle]."  The Warrant was subject to three restrictions: that 
the installation and monitoring be of a "tracking device," that 
the installation of the GPS tracking device be done by the 
Mequon Police Department, and that the GPS tracking device be 
"remove[d] . . . as soon as practicable after the objectives of 
the surveillance are accomplished or not later than 60 days from 
the date the order is signed."  The execution of the Warrant was 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
32 
 
well within the confines of the authority granted by the Warrant 
and did not violate any of the three restrictions.  Initially, 
the Mequon Police Department installed and monitored a GPS 
tracking device on Pinder's vehicle.  Further, the GPS tracking 
device was removed within 60 days, or alternatively "as soon as 
practicable after the objectives of the surveillance [were] 
accomplished."  The surveillance was completed within 20 days of 
the Warrant's issuance——well within the 60-day limit——and the 
surveillance concluded "as soon as practicable" considering the 
objectives of the surveillance were to find evidence of Pinder 
committing burglaries, the location of evidence, and the 
identity of associates.  The monitoring concluded after less 
than a week of surveillance of Pinder's vehicle and on the same 
day as when the GPS tracking device's alert and subsequent 
monitoring led the Mequon Police Department to obtain evidence 
that Pinder had committed a burglary of a suite of offices, to 
find stolen items from the suite of offices in Pinder's car, and 
to determine the identity of an individual, Polk, riding in the 
car with Pinder. 
¶55 Second, 
Pinder 
has 
the 
"burden 
of 
proving 
the 
dissipation of probable cause."  Edwards, 98 Wis. 2d at 376.  He 
did not meet this burden.  In addition, Pinder's counsel 
conceded "the [W]arrant on its face established probable cause," 
and that probable cause did not dissipate.  
¶56 Third, the installation and monitoring of the GPS 
tracking device was reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances.  The Warrant was obtained, installed, and 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
33 
 
monitored in compliance with the court order.  The GPS tracking 
device in this case was in use for only six days, and the 
surveillance was stopped the same day as the Mequon Police 
Department obtained evidence that Pinder had committed a 
burglary of a suite of offices, found stolen items from the 
suite of offices in his car, and determined the identity of one 
of his potential criminal associates.  Further, as the circuit 
court noted, investigating the crime of burglary typically 
necessitates 
prolonged 
surveillance 
because 
of 
the 
unpredictability of when the burglary will occur.  Therefore, 
this is not a case where the use of a GPS tracking device became 
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.  See Brereton, 345 
Wis. 2d 563, ¶¶2, 13, 53-54 (finding that the installation and 
monitoring of a GPS tracking device for four days, as authorized 
by the warrant, in the investigation of "recent burglaries" was 
not unconstitutional). 
¶57 Therefore, the State's conduct in the execution of the 
Warrant complied with the Fourth Amendment.  
C.  Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
¶58 Pinder additionally seeks review of the denial of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Pinder argues that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
Burglary jury instructions because, instead of using the word 
"building" or "office," the court should have used the phrase 
"room within a building."  In this case, this is a distinction 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
34 
 
without a difference.22  This wording choice was not error but 
even if it were to be deemed error, it was not prejudicial. In 
short, Pinder's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
¶59 Pinder argues that the Burglary jury instructions were 
erroneous.  He argues "this present fact situation did not 
involve the Burglary of a Building . . . [because] the entry 
ways into the building were open at the time of the alleged 
entry" and thus the "instruction referred to a situation that, 
under the facts, was not a violation of the law."  He argues 
that "the jury instruction's references to convicting someone 
for entering an 'office,' as an element of Burglary, was also 
legally incorrect" because an "'office' is not one of the places 
indicated in Wis. Stats. 943.10(1m)(a) through (f)," and the 
term "does not describe, or qualify as, any of the statutory 
examples cited in Wis. Stats. 943.10(1m)."  Pinder argues that 
the first two errors in the Burglary jury instructions were not 
harmless because "the instruction[s] advised the jury that it 
could, and should, convict the Defendant improperly."  Pinder 
argues that "the Burglary jury instruction was materially 
erroneous" because it created a "reasonable issue, and concern, 
of juror confusion and error" by "allow[ing] the jury to convict 
[him] of entry into a building or entry into an office."  
                                                 
22 Pinder acknowledges as much, recognizing that "the facts 
of this present matter indicate essentially that the office was 
a room inside of the building."   
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
35 
 
Pinder's arguments do not demonstrate that counsel's performance 
was deficient in not so objecting. 
¶60 At the outset, we acknowledge that the circuit court 
is entitled to some latitude in crafting jury instructions to 
comport with the evidence of the case.  Dakter v. Cavallino, 
2015 WI 67, ¶31, 363 Wis. 2d 738, 866 N.W.2d 656.  While the 
circuit court could have used the phrase "a room within a 
building" instead of the words "office" or "building," the facts 
adduced would not confuse the jury as to what it was called upon 
to decide regardless of which of these words might be used.  The 
jury heard the strong evidence against the defendant.  There 
would be no confusion to the jury that it was to decide whether 
the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pinder 
intentionally entered the locked office suites (prying the 
locked space open) without consent; and that he knew it was 
without consent and with the intent to steal (being videotaped 
at the office building and found shortly thereafter with 
burglarious tools and the stolen items in his car).  See Wis. 
JI-Criminal 1421 (2001).  It was based upon the evidence, 
regarding the locked rooms within the building, that the jury 
determined 
that 
Pinder 
burglarized 
the 
subject 
premises.  
Whether one would consider that an office, a building, or a room 
within a building is of no moment here.  This is not a fact 
situation where any allegation was made that Pinder stole from a 
building open to the public.  See Champlin v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 621, 624-27, 267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).  The testimony was 
overwhelming as to what office area was burgled.  Significantly, 
No. 
2017AP208-CR   
 
36 
 
the jury instructions did not preclude acquittal as the jury 
found the co-defendant, Polk, not guilty of the burglary. 
¶61 In sum, Pinder has failed to demonstrate that his 
trial counsel's performance was ineffective.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶62 We conclude that a search warrant issued for the 
placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle, 
but not executed within five days after the date of issuance per 
Wis. Stat. § 968.15(1) or timely returned under Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.17(1), is not void if the search was otherwise reasonably 
conducted, because it is not a warrant issued "for the purpose 
of seizing designated property or kinds of property" under Wis. 
Stat. § 968.12(1).  It is not a warrant that seeks a "document" 
or "electronic data" under the control of the vehicle owner as 
is required under Wis. Stat. § 968.13 and thus, is not subject 
to the execution and return provisions of §§ 968.15 and 
968.17(1).  Such a warrant for GPS tracking is not issued 
pursuant to a statute, but instead is issued pursuant to the 
court's inherent authority and thus, must comply only with the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Because the GPS 
warrant in this case was otherwise constitutionally sufficient, 
the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant is not subject 
to suppression.  Therefore, we affirm the circuit court. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No.  2017AP208-CR.dk 
 
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¶63 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the court's 
opinion, except to the extent it "urge[s] the legislature to 
consider enacting a specific statutory grant of authority to 
define 
parameters 
and 
requirements 
with 
respect 
to 
GPS 
warrants."  Majority op., ¶42. 
¶64 As a general rule, I think it is inappropriate for the 
judiciary to request the legislature to legislate.  And in this 
specific instance, I think we would have been wise to heed the 
old proverb that one should be careful about one's wishes, 
because they just might be granted.  I have no idea what the 
legislature might do with the court's request, and neither does 
the court.   
¶65 In any event, this is now the third time we have asked 
the legislature to adopt a GPS-warrant statute.  It didn't 
answer the phone the last two1 times2 we called, and it isn't 
particularly likely it will find our latest overture more 
charming.  Indeed, we're starting to look a wee bit desperate.  
Maybe the legislature is being standoffish because it just 
                                                 
1 "We suggest that the legislature address the constantly 
evolving nature of electronic incursions."  State v. Brereton, 
2013 WI 17, ¶54 n.16, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369. 
2 "Second, I echo my colleagues' requests, see Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶79, 84; Chief Justice Abrahamson's 
dissent, ¶126, that the Wisconsin legislature weigh in on this 
issue and enact legislation governing the proper procedures for 
issuing a warrant, executing that warrant, and other procedural 
concerns related to police searches using GPS, such as time 
limits and return on the warrant requirements."  State v. Sveum, 
2010 WI 92, ¶77, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (Crooks, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2017AP208-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
doesn't want to go on this date with us.  Rapid technological 
advances make obsolescence a regular feature of modern life.  
The legislature may have concluded that a GPS-warrant statute 
would be a mere stop-gap measure that would require constant 
updating to keep pace with the latest developments. 
¶66 Or maybe the legislature quizzically quirks its 
collective eyebrow whenever we bring this up because our 
requests are always accompanied by proof we don't need its help.  
Our opinion correctly concluded that our courts have the 
inherent authority to issue GPS warrants.  It also deftly 
considered the warrant's fidelity to constitutional constraints 
and correctly concluded there was no violation.  Those were the 
only two issues we needed to address, and we confidently and 
competently resolved them without any input from the legislature 
whatsoever.  Our work in this case, Brereton, and Sveum all 
prove that we don't need the legislative branch's help in 
evaluating GPS warrants.  As the legislature glances back and 
forth 
between 
our 
several 
requests 
and 
the 
accompanying 
opinions, it would certainly be justified in wondering what, 
exactly, we want it to do. 
¶67 I wonder, too.  Our opinion says:  "Had the 
legislature enacted such a statute, we may very well not be 
confronted with the issues now present."  Majority op., ¶42.  
Maybe.  Maybe not.  A GPS-warrant statute might have saved us 
the effort we expended in this case, but it will do nothing when 
the next case brings us a different type of warrant that does 
not fit within a statutory classification.  We will have to 
No.  2017AP208-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
determine then, just as we did today, whether our inherent 
authority justifies such an exercise of authority.  Will we 
include in that future opinion a request that the legislature 
adopt another statute to cover the new type of warrant?  Will we 
do this every time we encounter a warrant for which there is no 
specific statutory authorization?  If so, then our request is 
really that the legislature completely supplant our inherent 
authority to issue warrants.  If we made a practice of bungling 
the 
exercise 
of 
this 
authority, 
there 
might 
be 
good 
justification for the request.  But we haven't, so this can't be 
the reason we need a GPS-warrant statute. 
¶68 Perhaps the court believes such a statute will reduce 
our workload, saving us from having to consider whether a 
challenged 
GPS 
warrant 
complies 
with 
constitutional 
requirements.  However, a warrant that violates one of our 
constitutions doesn't become less offensive just because a 
statute authorized it.  If the legislature adopts a GPS-warrant 
statute, we will have plenty of opportunities to consider its 
constitutional bona fides in minute detail, most likely in a 
long succession of cases.  And when we have finally and fully 
vetted the requested statute, we will still entertain claims 
that 
the 
statutorily-authorized 
warrant 
was 
executed 
unconstitutionally.  So asking the legislature for a GPS-warrant 
statute cannot be justified as a labor-saving device for the 
judiciary. 
¶69 It is possible that our constitutions allow for 
warrants that offend certain prudential sensibilities.  But 
No.  2017AP208-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
prudence is the realm of public policy, and the people of 
Wisconsin have entrusted public policy to the legislative 
branch.  It is not the judiciary's role to opine on the wisdom 
of any given policy, or even its absence.  It is merely to 
decide whether the parties before us have honored their lawful 
obligations.  Today's opinion could have fulfilled that role 
without asking for new public policy.  That is where we should 
have stopped, and I join the opinion up to that point. 
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
No.  2017AP208-CR.dk 
 
 
 
1