Title: Garaman, Inc. v. Williams

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Garaman, Inc. v. Williams1996 WY 35912 P.2d 1121Case Number: 95-219Decided: 03/13/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

GARAMAN, INC., 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

DANNY WILLIAMS, A.I.A., 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County 

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Floyd R. King of King & King, 
Jackson.

Representing 
Appellee: 

Robert W. Horn of Robert W. Horn, P.C., 
Jackson.

 

MACY, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Garaman, Inc. (the owner) appeals from the district court's order which granted 
a judgment in favor of Appellee Danny Williams, a licensed architect, (the 
architect) and which denied the owner's claims against the 
architect.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The owner 
presents three issues for our review:

 

I.

 

Whether professional negligence and the standard of 
care owed by an architect can be established by the defendant architect without 
the testimony of an additional expert witness.

 

II.

 

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
decision of the court that there was no breach of contract and that the 
architect did not cause the delay in opening.

 

III.

 

Did the court err by not dismissing this action and 
ordering arbitration when the architect admitted during trial that the parties 
had agreed by contract that any disputes arising out of or relating to the 
agreement between the owner and architect would be 
arbitrated?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In 1992, the 
owner retained the architect to perform architectural services on the motel 
complex which the owner was constructing in Jackson. The construction project 
was divided into two phases. The architect prepared a standard contract to cover 
Phase I of the project. Although the owner did not execute the contract, the 
architect performed architectural services on Phase I. The architect also 
performed some architectural services on Phase II. 

 

[¶5]      Phase I was 
completed in June 1993. When the owner did not pay the architect the entire 
amount which was due to him for his services, the architect filed a lawsuit in 
the district court against the owner. The owner filed a motion to dismiss the 
lawsuit, claiming that the written contract required the parties to submit the 
controversy to arbitration. After the architect denied that the written contract 
was effective because it had not been executed, the owner dismissed its motion, 
and the lawsuit continued in the district court.

 

[¶6]      The owner filed a 
counterclaim against the architect, claiming that the architect had been 
negligent in performing his architectural services and that he had breached his 
contractual duties to the owner. The district court held a bench trial during 
which it granted the architect's motion for a directed verdict on the owner's 
professional negligence claim. At the conclusion of the trial, the district 
court granted a judgment in favor of the architect for the amount due for his 
services and denied the owner's claim for breach of contract. The owner appealed 
to this Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Care

 

[¶7]      At the close of 
the owner's case, the architect moved for a directed verdict on the owner's 
claim that the architect had been negligent. The architect argued that he was 
entitled to have a directed verdict because the owner failed to present any 
expert testimony which would establish the standard of care applicable to the 
architect as a licensed architect or his breach of that standard of care. The 
district court agreed and granted the architect's motion. On appeal, the owner 
argues that independent expert testimony was not necessary because the 
architect, in his own testimony, established the applicable standard of care. 
The owner also claims that the architect's testimony confirmed its contention 
that the architect violated that standard of care.

 

[¶8]      Under our revised 
rules of civil procedure, motions for a directed verdict are known as motions 
for a judgment as a matter of law. Cargill, Incorporated v. Mountain Cement 
Company, 891 P.2d 57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 50; W.R.C.P. 52(c). 
Since this case involved a bench trial, W.R.C.P. 52(c) governed the architect's 
motion.

 

[¶9]      The relevant 
portion of W.R.C.P. 52(c) states:

 

(c) Judgment on partial findings. - If during a trial 
without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds 
against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law 
against that party with respect to a claim . . . that cannot under the 
controlling law be maintained . . . without a favorable finding on that issue. . 
..

 

When we are reviewing a 
district court's decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law, we must take 
the unsuccessful party's evidence as being true and give it all favorable and 
reasonable inferences. Kaiser v. 
Farnsworth Drilling Co., Inc., 851 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

[¶10]   We have not previously considered 
any cases which pertain to the standard of care applicable to architects. We 
have, however, considered cases which involved claims of negligence against 
attorneys, engineers, and physicians. See, e.g., Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1993) (attorneys); Kemper 
Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball Consulting Engineers, Inc., 
843 P.2d 1178 (Wyo. 1992) (engineers); Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989) 
(physicians). When professional negligence is asserted, we generally require the 
plaintiff to present expert witness testimony which reveals the standard of care 
applicable to the profession and the defendant's compliance with or breach of 
that standard. To that end, we stated in Kemper Architects, P.C. that an engineer 
must exercise such care, skill, and diligence as others who are engaged in the 
engineering profession would ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances. 
843 P.2d  at 1185. We believe that a like standard should apply to architects. See Robert M. Schoenhaus, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Testimony to Show 
Malpractice of Architect, 3 A.L.R. 4TH 1023 (1981). Therefore, testimony 
from an expert architect is generally required to establish the standard of care 
under the circumstances of each case and the defendant architect's compliance 
with or breach of that standard.

 

[¶11]   The owner did not present any 
independent expert testimony to establish the standard of care or the 
architect's breach of that standard. It insists, however, that the architect was 
an expert and that his testimony established the standard of care and his breach 
of that standard. The owner specifically refers to a segment of the architect's 
testimony in which he admitted that he had a duty to know the applicable 
building codes and that, in certain instances, his design of Phase I did not 
comply with the codes as the Town of Jackson subsequently interpreted 
them.

 

[¶12]   We conclude that, under the facts 
of this case, the architect's testimony was not sufficient to establish the 
applicable standard of care. The architect's testimony about an architect's duty 
to comply with the code requirements was simply too general to be considered as 
establishing an appropriate standard of care. We, therefore, do not need to 
decide whether, as a general rule, a defendant's testimony may be used to 
establish the appropriate standard of care.

 

[¶13]   The architect acknowledged that he 
had testified previously as an expert witness and that he possessed the degree 
of care, skill, etc. which a reasonable, careful, and prudent architect would 
commonly possess. He testified that an architect has a duty to know the 
applicable codes when he is designing a building. The architect testified that 
he believed that he had designed the building to meet the applicable code 
requirements but that, in a few instances, the completed building did not comply 
with those requirements. He also acknowledged that an architect may, in certain 
circumstances, be responsible when his design does not comply with building code 
requirements.

 

[¶14]   The architect also indicated, 
however, that code requirements may be difficult to interpret. In the course of 
designing the project, he had gotten the Town's approval for certain aspects of 
the design, but, when the building was completed, the Town officials recanted 
and concluded that the code requirements had not been met.

 

[¶15]   The owner suggests that, when an 
architect fails in any way to comply with an applicable code requirement, he is 
negligent. We do not agree. Much of an architect's work involves the application 
of his professional judgment, and, as we have stated before, we do not require 
professionals to warrant perfect results; we only require that they exercise the 
appropriate degree of care. See Kemper 
Architects, P.C., 843 P.2d  at 1186. The owner failed to question the 
architect in detail about the standard of care which applies when architects are 
faced with specific problems associated with interpreting and complying with 
building code requirements. The owner also did not question the architect about 
how a reasonably prudent architect would handle a situation in which the town 
changes its interpretation of the building codes between the time that the 
project was initially approved and the time that it was presented to the 
officials for final approval. The owner, therefore, failed to establish the 
applicable standard of care through appropriate expert 
testimony.

 

[¶16]   The owner also argues that it was 
not required to present expert testimony because the architect's performance was 
so deficient that laymen could discern the negligence. It is true that under 
Wyoming law expert testimony is not required when the professional's care was 
"so obviously wanting in reasonable skill that laymen would discern it." Id. See also Moore, 855 P.2d  at 1249. We 
conclude, however, that this case did not fall within the exception to the 
expert testimony requirement. A layman simply would not have had sufficient 
experience to understand architectural concepts such as the interpretation of 
building codes without being aided by expert testimony. Since the owner failed 
to present expert testimony about the standard of care, the district court 
properly granted a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
architect.

 

B. Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

[¶17]   At trial, the owner asserted that 
it directed the architect to design the basement area of Phase I so that the 
area could be used as a conference room. The owner insisted that the architect 
breached the contract by failing to design the stairways which led to the 
basement area in accordance with the building code requirements for stairways 
which provide access to large conference rooms.1 The architect maintained that the 
owner did not instruct him to design the area so that it could be used as a 
large conference room.

 

[¶18]   The building code required the 
stairways to be forty-four inches wide for a basement area which was going to be 
used as a conference room for more than forty-nine people and to be thirty-six 
inches wide when the area was going to be used for forty-nine people or less. 
The architect designed the stairways to be thirty-eight inches wide, and they 
were built to that width. The owner had the stairways reconstructed so that they 
would comply with the forty-four-inch width requirement. It claimed that the 
architect was responsible for the cost of the reconstruction and the revenue it 
lost when the motel opening was delayed because of the stairway reconstruction. 
The district court concluded that the architect had not breached his contractual 
duties and that the delay in the motel opening was not the architect's 
fault.

 

[¶19]   The owner contends that sufficient 
evidence did not support the district court's findings.

 

In accordance with W.R.C.P. 52(a), this Court will 
not set aside a district court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). "`A finding is "clearly 
erroneous" when[,] although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)). 
Stated alternatively: "[A] determination that a finding is against the great 
weight of the evidence means a finding will be set aside even if supported by 
substantial evidence." Id. See also Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 
267 (Wyo. 1994). We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 
538.

 

McNeiley v. 
Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 
(Wyo. 1994).

 

ANR Production Company v. Kerr-McGee 
Corporation, 893 P.2d 698, 701 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶20]   The evidence which was presented at 
the trial was inconsistent with regard to the owner's directions to the 
architect about the planned use of the basement area. The architect testified 
that the owner directed him to design the area as a basement in the planning 
phase. The owner did not want to initially make the area accessible to 
handicapped people and did not want to address the parking problem which it 
would encounter if it were to use the area as a large conference room. The 
architect further testified that he, therefore, proceeded to design the 
stairways in accordance with the code requirements applicable to basements and 
small meeting rooms.

 

[¶21]   The architect also stated that the 
owner directed him to designate the area as a basement on the building plans 
which were presented to the Town for approval. The basement designation appeared 
in thirteen different places on the plans approved by the Town. The owner 
claimed that it directed the architect to get Phase I approved with a basement 
rather than with a conference room because it did not want to delay the approval 
of the project by having to address the parking issue at that time. The owner 
stated that the architect and the Town officials were aware of its plan to later 
change the intended use of the area after it addressed the parking problem. The 
architect presented a May 19, 1993, letter at the trial which was in conflict 
with the owner's statement. The Town officials sent that letter to the owner, 
indicating that the Town considered the use of the basement as a conference room 
to be a new use and that the owner needed to get additional approval from the 
Town to make that change in the building plans.

 

[¶22]   The owner asserted that the way the 
area was designed and built confirmed its intention to use the area as a 
conference room. The walls and ceilings were nicely finished, and the ceiling 
was built higher than a normal basement ceiling would be built. In fact, the 
owner showed the architect a conference room in an older portion of the motel to 
demonstrate the need for a higher ceiling in a conference room. The basement 
area was equipped with an elaborate lighting system, a sound system, a 
projection screen, air conditioning, and heating. Two bathrooms were designated 
for future use. The owner's argument was also supported by a letter from the 
architect to the owner in which the architect indicated that he would compensate 
the owner out of his fee for the cost of changing the 
stairways.

 

[¶23]   Taking into account the conflict in 
the evidence, we cannot say that the district court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. The owner's decision not to initially make the basement area 
accessible to handicapped people in Phase I and its insistence on getting the 
Town's approval of the project with a basement rather than with a conference 
room supported the architect's assertion that the owner had not planned to use 
the area as a conference room when the project was being designed. Further, the 
special improvements which were included in the plans for the basement area were 
just as consistent with a plan to use the area as a small meeting room as they 
were with a plan to use the area as a large conference room. We also conclude 
that the letter in which the architect offered to pay the cost for changing the 
stairways was just one piece of evidence and that the letter could be 
interpreted as simply being an effort by the architect to keep peace with the 
owner so that the owner would employ him to design Phase II of the 
project.

 

[¶24]   In determining which of the two 
conflicting stories was accurate in this case, the trial judge had to decide 
which witnesses were more credible. She was obviously in the best position to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and, on this record, we must defer to 
her decision. Since we conclude that the district court properly found that the 
architect did not breach his contractual duties to the owner by designing the 
stairways to comply with the code requirements for basements and small meeting 
rooms, the delay associated with reconstructing the stairways so that they would 
meet the requirements for large conference rooms cannot be attributed to the 
architect.

 

C. Arbitration

 

[¶25]   The owner filed a motion to dismiss 
the lawsuit and a demand for arbitration, claiming that the parties' agreement 
required that they submit any disputes to arbitration. The architect contested 
the owner's motion, contending that the owner had never executed the agreement 
which included the arbitration provision. The owner subsequently dismissed its 
motion.

 

[¶26]   At the trial, the architect 
admitted that he prepared the written contract which the owner did not execute. 
He stated that the contract contained the terms of the parties' agreement and 
that all the terms in the agreement governed the parties' relationship. The 
owner claims that the architect's admissions confirmed the parties' agreement to 
arbitrate their disputes and that the district court erred by failing to dismiss 
the case and order it to arbitration. The architect argues that the owner waived 
its right to demand that the parties' disputes be arbitrated.2

 

[¶27]  We must closely scrutinize a claim that 
a party has waived its arbitration right. 
Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1992). Waiver of a 
right is "`the intentional relinquishment of a known right and must be manifest 
in some unequivocal manner.'" Id. 
(quoting Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 392 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶28]   We conclude that the owner waived 
its right to have the parties' disputes arbitrated. When the architect denied 
that an agreement to arbitrate existed, the owner could have made a request 
under WYO. STAT. § 1-36-104(a) (1977)3 for the district court to summarily 
decide whether the parties were bound by the arbitration agreement. See Pioneer Water and Sewer District v. 
Civil Engineering Professionals, Inc., 905 P.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Wyo. 1995); 
Hot Springs County School District No. 1 
v. Strube Construction Company, 715 P.2d 540, 546 (Wyo. 1986). The owner did 
not, however, take advantage of its right under § 1-36-104(a). Further, the 
owner presented evidence at the trial of its intent to relinquish its right to 
have the parties' disputes arbitrated. The owner declared in its opening 
statement that, even though the architect acknowledged that the contract and 
arbitration clause were valid, it was willing to proceed with the 
trial.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   We hold that the district court 
properly granted a directed verdict against the owner on its professional 
negligence claim, that sufficient evidence supported the district court's 
decision, and that the owner waived its right to have the parties' disputes 
arbitrated.

 

[¶30]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 The owner has included a short 
discussion in its brief in which it claims that the architect breached his 
contractual duties by using a certain type of exterior finish material and by 
designing the building height and the balcony ceilings incorrectly. The owner 
does not, however, explain how the district court erred in its findings with 
regard to these issues. In the absence of a more comprehensive explanation of 
the owner's allegations of error, we refuse to address those issues on appeal. 
McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 n. 2 (Wyo. 1994).

2 The architect asserts several other 
arguments in support of his claim that arbitration was not appropriate in this 
case. Since our decision with regard to the waiver is dispositive, we do not 
need to address the architect's other arguments.

3 Section 1-36-104(a) 
provides:

(a) On 
application of a party showing an arbitration agreement and the opposing party's 
refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with 
arbitration. If the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to 
arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to determine the issue raised and 
shall order or deny arbitration accordingly.