Title: State v. Corey Kleser

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2827-CRAC 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Corey Kleser, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 43 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 825, 768 N.W.2d 230 
(Ct. App. 2009-published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 11, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mary E. Triggiano   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs in part/dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Devon M. Lee, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Sally L. 
Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF5981) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey Kleser, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Kleser, 2009 WI 
App 43, 316 Wis. 2d 825, 768 N.W.2d 230, which reversed an order 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Mary E. Triggiano, Judge.  
The case concerns the "reverse waiver" procedure for a juvenile 
who is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
2 
 
adult criminal court.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.183(1) and 
970.032(1) and (2) (2005-06).1 
¶2 
The defendant, Corey Kleser (Kleser), then 15, was 
charged in adult court with first-degree intentional homicide.  
He 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
§ 970.032(1). 
¶3 
Approximately ten months later, the court conducted a 
reverse waiver hearing under § 970.032(2) to determine whether 
the criminal court should transfer jurisdiction of Kleser's case 
to juvenile court.  At the conclusion of a five-day hearing, 
Judge Triggiano entered an order transferring the case to 
juvenile court. 
¶4 
As noted, the court of appeals reversed.  The court of 
appeals complimented the circuit court on its "comprehensive and 
thoughtful decision," Kleser, 316 Wis. 2d 825, ¶3, but it 
pointedly differed in its interpretation of the reverse waiver 
statute and took issue with several discretionary rulings made 
by the circuit court.  The court of appeals remanded with 
directions for a new reverse waiver hearing.  
¶5 
Kleser filed a petition for review raising two issues: 
(1) Did the court of appeals correctly interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 970.032 to require that any evidence 
concerning the facts of the crime charged be 
introduced only at the preliminary hearing? 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
3 
 
(2) Did the court of appeals improperly conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion in deciding 
to transfer Kleser to juvenile court? 
¶6 
In granting review, this court directed the parties to 
address two additional issues: 
(3) 
Whether the trial court erred when it admitted 
and relied on Dr. Marty Beyer's opinion as to the 
truthfulness of hearsay statements. 
(4) Whether the trial court erred when it considered 
the full testimony of Dr. Beyer, but prohibited 
the state's psychological expert witness from 
interviewing Kleser regarding the facts of the 
relevant incidents prior to the reverse waiver 
hearing. 
¶7 
We conclude, first, that a juvenile has a right to a 
reverse waiver hearing after the criminal court finds probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the exclusive 
original jurisdiction violation or violations of which he is 
accused.  In a reverse waiver hearing, the juvenile must prove 
all elements set out in § 970.032(2)(a), (b), and (c) by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  If the juvenile fails to meet 
his burden of proof, he shall be retained for prosecution in the 
criminal court.  Thus, the juvenile must be given reasonable 
latitude to offer admissible evidence to satisfy his burden on 
the three elements.  This includes evidence about the offense, 
supplementing the facts used to establish probable cause, to put 
the offense in context.  The juvenile may not offer evidence in 
the reverse waiver hearing for the purpose of contradicting the 
offense charged.  The place to offer evidence for the purpose of 
contradicting 
the 
offense 
charged 
is 
the 
preliminary 
examination. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
4 
 
¶8 
Second, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
granting reverse waiver here, for three reasons: (1) the court 
substantively relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony from Dr. 
Beyer describing the events of the offense; (2) the court 
allowed Dr. Beyer to offer inadmissible opinion testimony 
regarding Kleser's truthfulness; and (3) the court erroneously 
prohibited the State's psychologist from interviewing Kleser 
regarding the facts of the offense while permitting Dr. Beyer to 
testify as a conduit for Kleser's account of the facts of the 
offense. 
¶9 
Finally, we conclude that remand for a new reverse 
waiver hearing would not be appropriate under the facts of this 
case. 
¶10 Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals 
reversing 
the 
circuit 
court 
order 
transferring 
jurisdiction of this case to the juvenile court, but we reverse 
the court of appeals' order remanding the case for a new reverse 
waiver hearing, and remand the case to adult criminal court for 
trial. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. 
Facts in Criminal Complaint 
¶11 On November 3, 2006, Ronald Adams (Adams) was found 
dead in his apartment in the City of Milwaukee.  He was in a 
fetal position, covered with blood, and naked except for a pair 
of long underwear around his ankles and a pair of socks.  Adams 
had a large wound on his head with brain matter exposed.  His 
blood was splattered on the walls of the apartment and in a 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
5 
 
trail out of his back bedroom.  The sink in Adams' bathroom 
contained a hammer, a pair of scissors, and standing water that 
was tainted pink.  The head of the hammer carried remnants of 
human skin and brain tissue. 
¶12 A doctor from the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner's 
Office determined that Adams had been dead for more than three 
days.  He also determined that Adams suffered at least 20 blows 
to the head with a blunt object, 30 stab wounds to the neck, and 
various other wounds, including a defense wound on the finger.  
The doctor ruled Adams' death a homicide. 
¶13 Video surveillance from the hallway outside Adams' 
apartment showed that Adams last entered his apartment on 
October 29, 2006, at 1:49 a.m.  The video showed that he entered 
the apartment with Kleser.  It also showed Kleser leaving the 
apartment at 2:48 a.m., while talking on a cell phone.  A 
witness later confirmed seeing Kleser in the hallway around 1:50 
a.m. on October 29, 2006. 
¶14 Two days after the body was found, a detective spoke 
with Kleser's father, Charles, who said that he had received a 
phone call from Kleser between 3:00 and 5:00 a.m. the weekend of 
the homicide.  According to Charles, Kleser had called and asked 
him for a ride home.  When he came to pick up Kleser, he 
observed bloodstains on Kleser's clothes, and Kleser admitted 
that the blood was not his.  Charles asked if he had killed 
someone, and Kleser responded yes, that he hit the victim in the 
head with a hammer and that the victim owed him money. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
6 
 
¶15 When questioned by police, Kleser admitted that he 
killed Adams.  He said that he had hit him in the head with a 
hammer and stabbed him with scissors.  He then attempted to wash 
the scissors and hammer in the sink to clean them.  He said that 
he had gone to Adams' apartment to "display," or pose nude, 
while Adams masturbated, for which Adams would pay Kleser $40 to 
$50.  He said that Adams then wanted to have anal or oral sex 
with Kleser, which Kleser did not want to do.  A physical 
altercation ensued, during which Kleser hit Adams in the head 
with a hammer and continued to hit him after he fell to the 
floor.  Kleser stated that he stabbed Adams in the neck multiple 
times with a pair of scissors after he realized that Adams was 
still alive. 
B. 
Procedural History 
¶16 On November 7, 2006, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's office filed a criminal complaint alleging the facts 
outlined above.  The complaint charged Kleser with first-degree 
intentional homicide.2  Kleser was held in the Milwaukee County 
Children's Court Center.  The Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
scheduled a preliminary hearing for November 29.  Kleser 
ultimately submitted a Preliminary Hearing Questionnaire and 
Waiver form, signed by himself and his attorney.  In this form, 
Kleser declared that he wished to waive the preliminary 
examination.  The form states, in part: "I understand that by 
waiving the preliminary hearing, I am conceding that the State 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
7 
 
can establish probable cause, and that I will be ordered to 
stand trial."  At the November 29 hearing, Kleser acknowledged 
that he had signed the form and understood that he was giving up 
the right to a preliminary examination. 
¶17 Kleser was later charged with substantial battery3 and 
battery by a prisoner4 as a result of an assault he committed in 
the Children's Court detention center against another inmate on 
January 20, 2007.  Kleser also waived his right to a preliminary 
examination on these charges. 
¶18 On October 29, 2006, Kleser was 15 years old.  On 
January 20, 2007, the date of the battery, he was 16 years old.  
Courts 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
have 
exclusive 
original 
jurisdiction 
over 
juveniles 
alleged 
to 
have 
committed 
a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01, first-degree intentional 
homicide, on or after the juvenile's tenth birthday.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1)(am).  Courts of criminal jurisdiction also 
have exclusive original jurisdiction over juveniles who have 
been adjudicated delinquent and are charged with a violation of 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1), battery by a prisoner.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(a).5 
¶19 Juveniles whose cases are charged originally in courts 
of criminal jurisdiction have a statutory right to a reverse 
waiver hearing after the criminal court finds probable cause.  
In late February 2007, Judge Triggiano scheduled a reverse 
waiver hearing for May 24 to determine whether Kleser's case 
should be transferred to juvenile court.  This hearing was 
rescheduled twice to mid-September.  On February 28, Kleser was 
transferred to the Ethan Allen detention center. 
¶20 On March 27, 2007, the circuit court ordered Kleser to 
undergo a psychological examination by the State's expert, Dr. 
Deborah L. Collins, in preparation for the reverse waiver 
hearing, inasmuch as Kleser had engaged his own psychologist, 
Dr. Beyer, and met with her in January.  Kleser objected on 
grounds that the examination violated his right against self-
incrimination and that Wisconsin law does not provide for a 
court-ordered psychological examination prior to a finding of 
guilt.  
¶21 On April 25, 2007, the court held a hearing on 
Kleser's objection.  The State argued that it was entitled to 
                                                 
5 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(a) 
provides 
original 
jurisdiction in battery by prisoner charges over "[a] juvenile 
who 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent." 
 
This 
delinquency 
requirement appears to have been satisfied for Kleser by several 
earlier delinquency adjudications, including theft of movable 
property under $2,500 in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a) 
and operating a vehicle without owner's consent in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3m). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
9 
 
examine Kleser because Kleser would presumably call Dr. Beyer at 
the reverse waiver hearing and it would be unfair to allow the 
defense to present a psychological expert while prohibiting the 
State from doing so.  The court thereafter withdrew its order 
for a psychological examination, and it asked the State to 
present case law or statutory authority allowing it to require 
Kleser to submit to examination by the State's psychologist. 
¶22 On May 1, 2007, the State moved the court to 
reconsider on the grounds that (1) Kleser would waive his 
privilege against self-incrimination by introducing evidence of 
his mental health; and (2) there would be no issue of self-
incrimination because the State would be prohibited from using 
information gathered at the reverse waiver hearing in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding. 
¶23 On May 24, 2007, the court held a hearing on the 
State's motion.  The State argued that, if Kleser intended to 
present psychological evidence, he opened the door to being 
examined by the State's expert.  After hearing arguments, the 
court allowed the examination.  However, in an effort to protect 
Kleser's privilege against self-incrimination, the court ordered 
that the information be sealed after the reverse waiver hearing.  
The court also permitted defense counsel to be present during 
the examination. 
¶24 The State then brought a motion challenging the 
court's decision to permit defense counsel to be present at the 
examination.  On July 12, 2007, the court heard arguments on 
this motion.  The State argued that its expert, Dr. Collins, was 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
10 
 
unwilling to perform the examination if defense counsel were 
present, because defense counsel's presence would compromise the 
examination.  At this hearing, the court ruled that Dr. Collins 
could examine Kleser but required that the examination be 
limited to the three elements in § 970.032(2) and not involve 
discussion of the victim or the events of the alleged offenses. 
¶25 On September 18, 2008, the court began a reverse 
waiver hearing on both the homicide and battery by prisoner 
cases.  The court explained that it would be seeking evidence 
pertaining to whether (1) if convicted, Kleser could not receive 
adequate 
treatment 
in 
the 
criminal 
justice 
system; 
(2) 
transferring jurisdiction to the juvenile court would depreciate 
the seriousness of the offenses; and (3) retaining jurisdiction 
was necessary to deter Kleser or other juveniles from committing 
the offenses charged.  These are the elements set out in 
§ 970.032(2). 
¶26 The parties presented extensive testimony at the 
reverse waiver hearing regarding Kleser's treatment needs and 
the issue of deterrence.  Both Dr. Beyer and Dr. Collins 
submitted assessments of Kleser.  The court also heard testimony 
from the superintendent of Ethan Allen School for Boys, the 
operations director of the Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center, 
and the social services director of the Green Bay Correctional 
Institution, regarding the treatment options available at those 
facilities.  Dr. Beyer's discussion of Kleser's treatment needs 
and susceptibility to deterrence——in both her hearing testimony 
and in her assessment of Kleser——included his alleged history of 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
11 
 
abuse, his diabetes, his impulsiveness and immaturity, specific 
reasons why Kleser can be rehabilitated, and his specific 
rehabilitation 
needs.  Kleser presented additional expert 
testimony describing empirical research on the deterrent effect 
of punishing juveniles in the adult criminal justice system. 
¶27 Kleser 
also 
presented 
evidence 
regarding 
the 
seriousness of the offenses.  This included testimony of a 
detective from the Milwaukee Police Department who recalled what 
Kleser had told him about Adams, and an investigator from the 
State 
Public 
Defender's 
office 
who 
testified 
about 
his 
investigation of Adams.  None of this testimony is at issue in 
this 
case 
and 
the 
State 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
it 
was 
inappropriately introduced at the reverse waiver hearing. 
¶28 The evidentiary issues in this case focus on Dr. 
Beyer's testimony regarding the seriousness of the homicide 
offense.  When Kleser's attorney asked Dr. Beyer, "Did [Kleser] 
act out of fear, out of rage, out of anger?" Dr. Beyer 
responded: "My opinion of the [homicide] offense as [Kleser] 
described it was that it was a rage reaction when he was very 
fearful."  Dr. Beyer then testified to Kleser's account of the 
homicide offense: 
[T]he night of this offense Corey reported drinking a 
huge amount of alcohol and in a drunken state 
answering the phone when the victim called and 
agreeing to pose for him in order to get money because 
Corey said he was broke.  Corey reported that when he 
got to the apartment the usual scenario that he had 
with the victim unfolded, and he was surprised when 
the victim wanted to have sex.  And Corey said that he 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
12 
 
did not want to, that he just wanted to pose and leave 
as he always had in the past. 
 
Corey reported that the victim attacked him and 
tried to rape him and that Corey's pants were down 
around his ankles so that he couldn't really move and 
that in the struggle where after the victim was on top 
of him, as they struggled, that he felt powerless, 
that the victim was choking him and that he felt that 
he couldn't breathe and that he was going to pass out, 
and that he grabbed a hammer and hit the victim until 
he could get out of the victim's grasp. 
¶29 This account of the events paralleled the account 
described in Dr. Beyer's written assessment of Kleser: 
Corey said that night posing nude for the victim 
started as the same routine as it had previously.  He 
was surprised when the victim said he wanted to have 
sex.  Corey said he repeatedly said "No" and told the 
victim he was straight.  Corey said the victim jumped 
on his back, attempting to rape him.  Corey said they 
struggled, and the victim grabbed him around the neck 
and pressed him into the dresser.  Corey said his 
pants were around his ankles, making him unable to 
move.  The victim was larger and had longer arms so 
Corey said he could not push him off.  Corey said he 
could not breathe.  He thought the victim would kill 
him.  He saw a hammer within his reach and hit the 
victim but could not get out of his grasp.  He hit him 
repeatedly until the victim fell.  "I was scared of 
being raped.  Never been scared for my life before.  I 
was going to pass out.  I couldn't reach him to hit 
him.  Had to use the hammer.  He kept lunging at me.  
I was defending myself.  I was the victim." 
¶30 On November 27, 2007, the circuit court filed a 
detailed 11-page Decision and Order granting reverse waiver to 
juvenile court.6  The court found that (1) Kleser could not 
                                                 
6 Just prior to issuing its reverse waiver order, the 
circuit court informed the parties that it would be dismissing 
the criminal complaints and ordering the State to file a 
separate delinquency petition. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
13 
 
receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system; (2) 
transferring jurisdiction to the juvenile court would not 
depreciate the seriousness of the offenses; and (3) retaining 
jurisdiction was not necessary to deter Kleser or other 
juveniles from committing the charged violations. 
¶31 With regard to depreciating the seriousness of the 
homicide offense, the court cited Dr. Beyer's testimony that 
Kleser "acted out of fear and rage when he killed Ron Adams."  
The court cited at length Kleser's account of the homicide as 
described in Dr. Beyer's testimony.  The court also relied on 
Kleser's statement to police that Adams wanted to have sex with 
him and attacked him, as well as the conclusion from a detective 
who investigated the crime scene that "Ron Adams' death appeared 
more personal in nature than what he usually sees."  The court 
then described Adams' troubled personal life in support of 
Kleser's account.  It further noted Dr. Beyer's testimony 
regarding 
scientific evidence——that an adolescent can not 
operate with the maturity and judgment of an adult——lessened 
Kleser's culpability.  The court concluded: 
Based on the evidence and the facts and circumstances 
of 
this 
case, 
I 
conclude 
that 
transferring 
jurisdiction 
to 
the 
juvenile 
court 
would 
not 
depreciate the seriousness of the offense.  Corey 
Kleser killed Ron Adams out of rage and fear after Ron 
Adams tried to assault Corey.  Corey Kleser did not go 
to Ron Adam's apartment that evening to kill him. His 
act was not cold-blooded or premeditated as we see in 
many cases in the criminal justice system; rather, his 
act stemmed precipitously from the trauma he endured 
his entire life. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
14 
 
¶32 The State filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal 
of the reverse waiver order.  It also informed the circuit court 
that it would be filing a delinquency petition to preserve 
juvenile court jurisdiction before Kleser turned 17.  On 
February 15, 2008, the court of appeals granted leave to appeal. 
¶33 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
order and remanded with directions.  It first held that Wis. 
Stat. § 970.032(2) prohibited the admission of facts that 
contradicted those in the criminal complaint.  Kleser, 316 
Wis. 2d 825, ¶36.  The court began by noting that the language 
of the statute did not specify the scope of relevant admissible 
evidence at a reverse-waiver hearing.  Id., ¶24.  It went on to 
examine the statute's placement within § 970.032, concluding 
that the reverse waiver hearing was intended as the second part 
of a two-part process, along with the preliminary examination.  
Id., ¶25.  It held that it would be absurd to allow a defendant 
to stipulate to facts in the first part of the process and then 
challenge them in the second, and that the proper place for a 
juvenile's attack on the charges was the preliminary hearing.  
Id., ¶28.  It also noted that findings such as those in this 
case leave the record in a contradictory state because they 
undermine 
the 
intent 
element 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  Id.  Finally, the court looked at the placement of 
§ 970.032 within Wis. Stat. ch. 970, concluding that the reverse 
waiver hearing was intended to be a summary proceeding, not a 
trial. Id., ¶32. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
15 
 
¶34 The court of appeals also addressed the State's 
argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion. 
 
It 
held 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
by 
substantively relying on Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony regarding 
Kleser's account of the homicide.  Id., ¶47.  It concluded that, 
although Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) does not specifically address 
hearsay, hearsay is prohibited unless specifically authorized.  
Id., ¶46.  The court declined to address the State's argument 
that Dr. Beyer offered impermissible opinion testimony, but 
noted that State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988), and State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 
(Ct. App. 1984), which generally prohibit an expert from 
testifying as to the truthfulness of a witness, apply in a 
reverse waiver hearing.  Kleser, 316 Wis. 2d 825, ¶51.  The 
court also declined to address the circuit court's decision to 
prohibit the State's expert from interviewing Kleser regarding 
the facts of the offense.  Id., ¶52. 
¶35 Kleser petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on July 15, 2009. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶36 The 
petitioner's 
first 
issue 
addresses 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(2). 
 
Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de 
novo.  State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶22, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 
N.W.2d 207. 
¶37 The second issue relates to the circuit court's 
decision to transfer Kleser from criminal court to juvenile 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
16 
 
court.  We review a court's decision to order reverse waiver for 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Verhagen, 198 
Wis. 2d 177, 191, 542 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Ct. App. 1995).  An 
appellate court will affirm a discretionary decision if the 
circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process, 
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  Loy 
v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).   
¶38 The State challenges several of the circuit court's 
evidentiary rulings.  An appellate court will uphold evidentiary 
rulings in the same manner as other discretionary rulings.  
State v. Walters, 2004 WI 18, ¶¶13-14, 269 Wis. 2d 142, 675 
N.W.2d 778; State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 
(1983).  A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if 
it fails to apply a proper standard of law.  We independently 
review whether the circuit court applied the proper standard of 
law.  City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 
659, 664 N.W.2d 584. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶39 This case requires us to take an in-depth look at the 
reverse 
waiver 
procedure 
for 
juveniles 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(2).  In doing so, we are presented with three 
overriding questions.  First, what evidence is admissible at a 
reverse 
waiver 
hearing? 
 
Second, 
did 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it transferred the 
defendant from criminal court to juvenile court?  Third, is 
remand for a new reverse waiver hearing an appropriate course of 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
17 
 
action in this case?  These questions slightly restate the 
issues that were argued to the court. 
A. 
History of Wis. Stat. §§ 938.183 and 970.032 
¶40 The 1990s saw significant changes in Wisconsin's 
treatment of juvenile offenders.  In 1994 the Wisconsin 
Legislature created a Juvenile Justice Study Committee (JJSC) 
"to examine the then-existing Children's Code codified in Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 48" 
and 
"recommend 
suggestions 
for 
change 
in 
Wisconsin's legislation in response to increasing juvenile 
crime."  State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 871, 580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998) (citing Juvenile Justice Study Committee, 
Juvenile Justice: A Wisconsin Blueprint for Change 2 (January, 
1995) [hereinafter JJSC Report]). 
¶41 The JJSC issued its report in January 1995.  The 
Executive Summary of the report outlined several principles on 
which its recommendations were grounded: 
The juvenile justice system should be better able to 
protect the public from violent juvenile offenders. 
The system should operate more efficiently through 
streamlining of processes and improved access to 
information by 
entities that work with juvenile 
delinquents. 
Intervention with juveniles should be earlier and more 
effective to prevent more serious criminal behavior. 
The concept of personal responsibility should be 
expanded and reinforced. 
Punishment and sanctions should be better tailored to 
match the seriousness of the juvenile's offense. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
18 
 
A balance which promotes personal accountability, 
community protection and rehabilitation should be 
established. 
JJSC Report, supra at 8. 
¶42 The 1995 legislature acted on the JJSC Report, 
adopting a comprehensive revision of the Children's Code, 
renaming it the Juvenile Justice Code, and moving it from 
Chapter 48 to a new Chapter 938, next to the criminal code.  
1995 Wis. Act. 77.  Most of the act took effect on July 1, 1996.  
The most relevant part of the Juvenile Justice Code legislation—
—for this case——is the part giving adult criminal courts 
exclusive original jurisdiction over certain offenses alleged to 
have been committed by persons under the age of 18. 
¶43 Prior to the 1995 revision, virtually all persons 
between the ages of 12 and 18 who violated the criminal law were 
subject to the delinquency jurisdiction and procedures of the 
juvenile court.  Before December 25, 1993, the juvenile code 
allowed some juvenile offenders to be waived into adult court.  
For instance, the 1991-92 statutes provided in part: 
(1) If a child is alleged to have violated s. 
940.01 or 940.02 on or after his or her 14th birthday 
or if a child is alleged to have violated any state 
criminal law on or after his or her 16th birthday, the 
child or district attorney may apply to the court to 
waive its jurisdiction under this chapter . . . 7 
                                                 
7 Waiver procedure and criteria were set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.18(2)-(6) (1991-92): 
(2) The waiver hearing shall be brought on by 
filing a petition alleging delinquency drafted under 
s. 48.255 and a petition for waiver of jurisdiction 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
which shall contain a brief statement of the facts 
supporting the request for waiver . . .  
 
. . . .  
(b) The child has the right to present testimony 
on his or her own behalf including expert testimony 
and has the right to cross-examine witnesses at the 
hearing . . .  
(4) The judge shall determine whether the matter 
has prosecutive merit before proceeding to determine 
if it should waive its jurisdiction. 
(5) If prosecutive merit is found, the judge, 
after taking relevant testimony which the district 
attorney shall present and considering other relevant 
evidence, shall base its decision whether to waive 
jurisdiction on the following criteria: 
(a) The personality and prior record of the 
child, including whether the child is mentally ill or 
developmentally disabled, whether the child has been 
previously found delinquent, whether such delinquency 
involved the infliction of serious bodily injury, the 
child's motives and attitudes, the child's physical 
and mental maturity, the child's pattern of living, 
prior offenses, prior treatment history and apparent 
potential for responding to future treatment. 
(b) The type and seriousness of the offense, 
including whether it was against persons or property, 
the extent to which it was committed in a violent, 
aggressive, premeditated or willful manner, and its 
prosecutive merit. 
(c) The adequacy and suitability of facilities, 
services and procedures available for treatment of the 
child and protection of the public within the juvenile 
justice system, and, where applicable, the mental 
health system. 
(d) The desirability of trial and disposition of 
the entire offense in one court if the juvenile was 
allegedly associated in the offense with persons who 
will be charged with a crime in circuit court. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
20 
 
Wis. Stat. § 48.18 (1991-92). 
¶44 1993 Wisconsin Act 98, effective December 25, 1993, 
amended Wis. Stat. § 48.18(1) to add several additional offenses 
for which a juvenile under the age of 16 could be waived into 
criminal court.  More important, Act 98 created two new 
provisions of special relevance to this case, namely, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.183 and 970.032.8 
¶45 New § 48.183 (1993-94) provided: 
Jurisdiction 
over 
children 
alleged 
to 
have 
committed assault or battery in a secured correctional 
facility. Notwithstanding ss. 48.12 (1) and 48.18, 
courts 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
have 
exclusive 
original jurisdiction over a child who is alleged to 
have violated s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in 
a 
secured 
correctional 
facility. 
Notwithstanding 
subchs. IV to VI, a child who is alleged to have 
violated s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a 
secured correctional facility is subject to the 
procedures specified in chs. 967 to 979 and the 
criminal penalties provided for those crimes, unless a 
court of criminal jurisdiction transfers jurisdiction 
under s. 970.032 to a court assigned to exercise 
jurisdiction under this chapter. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.183 (1993-94) (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(6) After considering the criteria under sub. (5), the 
judge shall state his or her finding with respect to the 
criteria on the record, and, if the judge determines on the 
record that it is established by clear and convincing evidence 
that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child or 
of the public to hear the case, the judge shall enter an order 
waiving jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district 
attorney for appropriate criminal proceedings in the circuit 
court, 
and 
the 
circuit 
court 
thereafter 
has 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
8 1993 Wisconsin Act 98 also amended Wis. Stat. § 48.18(5). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
21 
 
¶46 New Wis. Stat. § 970.032 (1993-94) read: 
(1) Notwithstanding s. 970.03, if a preliminary 
examination is held regarding a child who is accused 
of violating s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a 
secured correctional facility, as defined in s. 
48.02(15m), the court shall first determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the child has 
committed a violation of s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while 
placed in a secured correctional facility, as defined 
in s. 48.02 (15m).  If the court does not make that 
finding, the court shall order that the child be 
discharged but proceedings may be brought regarding 
the child under ch. 48. 
(2) If 
the 
court 
finds 
probable 
cause 
as 
specified in sub. (1), the court shall determine 
whether 
to 
retain 
jurisdiction 
or 
to 
transfer 
jurisdiction 
to 
the 
court 
assigned 
to 
exercise 
jurisdiction under ch. 48.  The court shall retain 
jurisdiction unless the court finds all of the 
following: 
(a) That, if convicted, the child could not 
receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice 
system. 
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction under ch. 48 would 
not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. 
(c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary 
to deter the child or other children from committing 
violations of s. 940.20(1) or 946.43 or other similar 
offenses 
while 
placed in a secured correctional 
facility, as defined in s. 48 02 (15m). 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032 (1993-94) (emphasis added). 
¶47 In sum, 1993 Wis. Act 98 is the source of both (1) 
"exclusive original jurisdiction" over a juvenile in criminal 
court; and (2) the reverse waiver provision in the criminal 
code. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
22 
 
¶48 1995 Wis. Act 77——the Act embodying many of the JJSC 
recommendations——was then passed.  Among its myriad provisions, 
the Act (1) repealed Wis. Stat. § 48.183; (2) created a greatly 
expanded Wis. Stat. § 938.183 in place of § 48.183; and (3) also 
extended Wis. Stat. § 970.032. 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.183(1)(a) and (am) were amended 
again in 2006.  2005 Wis. Act 344, § 165.  The changes were 
effective April 29, 2006.  Consequently, at the end of 2006, 
paragraphs § 938.183(a) and (am) read as follows: 
938.183 Original adult court jurisdiction for 
criminal proceedings. (1) JUVENILES UNDER ADULT COURT 
JURISDICTION. 
Notwithstanding 
ss. 
938.12 
(1) 
and 
938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive 
original jurisdiction over all of the following: 
(a) A 
juvenile 
who 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent and who is alleged to have violated s. 
940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile 
correctional facility, a juvenile detention facility, 
or a secured residential care center for children and 
youth or who has been adjudicated delinquent and who 
is alleged to have committed a violation of s. 940.20 
(2m). 
(am) A juvenile who is alleged to have attempted 
or committed a violation of s. 940.01 or to have 
committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or 
after the juvenile’s 10th birthday. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183 (emphasis added). 
 
¶50 These 
are 
the 
exclusive 
original 
jurisdiction 
provisions that applied to Corey Kleser. 
¶51 This brings us to Wis. Stat. § 970.032.  At the end of 
2006, this statutory section read in full: 
Preliminary examination; juvenile under original 
adult court jurisdiction.  (1) Notwithstanding s. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
23 
 
970.03, if a preliminary examination is held regarding 
a juvenile who is subject to the original jurisdiction 
of the court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183 
(1), the court shall first determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the juvenile has 
committed the violation of which he or she is accused 
under the circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) 
(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c), whichever is applicable. 
If the court does not make that finding, the court 
shall order that the juvenile be discharged but 
proceedings may be brought regarding the juvenile 
under ch. 938. 
(2) If the court finds probable cause to believe 
that the juvenile has committed the violation of which 
he or she is accused under the circumstances specified 
in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), the 
court shall determine whether to retain jurisdiction 
or to transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938.  The 
court shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
following: 
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not 
receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice 
system. 
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 
938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense. 
(c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary 
to 
deter 
the 
juvenile 
or 
other 
juveniles 
from 
committing the violation of which the juvenile is 
accused under 
the circumstances specified in s. 
938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is 
applicable. 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032. 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 970.032 is the principal object of 
our interpretation in this case.  The text of this statute has 
evolved since 1993 to accommodate the great expansion of 
"exclusive original jurisdiction."  In addition, the procedure 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
24 
 
and criteria for reverse waiver clearly have roots in the 
statute on juvenile waiver. 
B. 
Language of Wis. Stat. § 970.032 
¶53 We begin our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 970.032 
with the language of the statute.  State ex. rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Our examination of the language incorporates 
the statutory history of the section and the statutory history 
of related sections, as set out in ¶¶39-52, supra, to establish 
context. 
¶54 When a juvenile under exclusive original jurisdiction 
is charged with one of the offenses set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1), the juvenile has a right to a preliminary 
examination.  The juvenile may waive that right. 
[I]f a preliminary examination is held regarding a 
juvenile who is subject to the original jurisdiction 
of the court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 
938.183(1), the court shall first determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile 
has committed the violation of which he or she is 
accused under 
the circumstances specified in s. 
938.183(1)(a) 
[or] 
(am), . . . whichever 
is 
applicable. 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis added). 
¶55 A 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
§ 970.032(1) 
is 
different from a preliminary examination under Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(1).  Under § 970.03(1), the statutory purpose of the 
hearing is to determine "if there is probable cause to believe a 
felony has been committed by the defendant."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(1) (emphasis added).  The underlying purpose is "to 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
25 
 
protect the accused from hasty, improvident, or malicious 
prosecution and to discover whether there is a substantial basis 
for bringing the prosecution and further denying the accused his 
right to liberty."  State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 544 
N.W.2d 406 (1996) (quoting Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 344, 
222 N.W.2d 871 (1974)). 
¶56 In line with the text of § 970.03(1) and with its 
underlying purpose, the court need not find probable cause as to 
the specific felony charged in the complaint as long as the 
state presents enough evidence to establish probable cause to 
believe that some felony has been committed by the defendant and 
that the defendant should be bound over for trial.  See Wittke 
v. State ex rel. Smith, 80 Wis. 2d 332, 352, 259 N.W.2d 515 
(1977). 
¶57 In contrast, under § 970.032(1), the court must 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
juvenile has committed "the violation" of which he or she is 
accused in the criminal complaint.  This finding is required not 
only to protect the juvenile from hasty, improvident, or 
malicious prosecution, but also to assure that the criminal 
court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the juvenile by 
virtue of the juvenile's probable violation of one of the 
offenses enumerated in Wis. Stat. §§ 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), 
(b), or (c).  The latter purpose is the more important purpose 
under this statute because "[i]f the court does not make that 
finding, the court shall order that the juvenile be discharged," 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
26 
 
although proceedings may be brought regarding the juvenile under 
Chapter 938.  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) (emphasis added). 
¶58 This 
narrow 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1)  
creates a pleading problem for the state.  In 1993 Wis. Act 98, 
newly created § 970.032(1) applied to only two offenses: Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.20(1) and 946.43, corresponding to the two offenses 
in then § 48.183.  In 1995 Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) was made 
applicable to many additional offenses corresponding to the 
contents of newly created § 938.183(1).  Today Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032(1) applies to multiple offenses incorporated into Wis. 
Stat. § 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c), including "any 
state criminal law" under certain circumstances.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.183(1)(ar), (b), and (c). 
¶59 Section § 938.183(1)(am) includes a juvenile "who is 
alleged to have attempted or committed a violation of s. 
940.01."  Significantly, Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2) spells out 
mitigating circumstances.  These are affirmative defenses "which 
mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under 
§ 940.05."  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2).  Paragraph (am) also applies 
to juveniles who allegedly commit a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.02 (first-degree reckless homicide) or a violation of 
§ 940.05 (second-degree intentional homicide). 
¶60 The problem for the state is that if the court must 
find probable cause for the specific offense charged in the 
complaint, the defendant has a strong incentive and should have 
the right to attempt to negate that specific offense during the 
preliminary examination——to prevent the state from prevailing on 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
27 
 
the specific offense charged, or possibly, to deprive the 
criminal court of its "exclusive original jurisdiction." 
¶61 Two examples will illustrate the point.  In this case, 
the State charged Kleser with a violation of § 940.01(1), first-
degree intentional homicide.  Kleser waived his preliminary 
examination.  If he had not waived his preliminary examination, 
he might have tried to introduce evidence of mitigating 
circumstances to move the charge from a violation of § 940.01(1) 
to a violation of § 940.05. 
¶62 In 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(1), a defendant should be able to introduce evidence 
in an effort to get the charge reduced.  Correspondingly, the 
state should be able to amend the complaint to reflect the 
evidence adduced, if it desires to do so, rather than lose 
jurisdiction because it has failed to establish probable cause 
of "the violation" charged.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.29(1). 
¶63 It must be recognized that if the state establishes 
probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated either 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1) or 940.05, the criminal court would 
still have exclusive original jurisdiction over the juvenile. 
¶64 The second example is more problematic.  Suppose the 
state charged a juvenile with first-degree reckless homicide.  
Wis. Stat. § 940.02(1) ("Whoever recklessly causes the death of 
another human being under circumstances which show utter 
disregard for human life").  This statute is one of the offenses 
listed in § 938.183(1)(am), and the criminal court is given 
"exclusive original jurisdiction" over a juvenile charged with 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
28 
 
this offense if the juvenile was 10 years old at the time of the 
offense.  In contrast, second-degree reckless homicide ("Whoever 
recklessly causes the death of another human being") is not one 
of the offenses enumerated in § 938.183(1)(am) and does not give 
the criminal court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over the 
juvenile.  Hence, if the court were to find probable cause to 
believe that the juvenile violated § 940.06 but not § 940.02, 
the statute would require the court to "order that the juvenile 
be discharged," Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1), subject to a new 
proceeding under Chapter 938, because the court did not find 
probable cause for "the violation" charged and the state could 
not amend the charge and still qualify under § 938.183(1)(am). 
¶65 The point is that because the preliminary examination 
under Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) is quite different from the 
preliminary examination under § 970.03, the defendant must be 
given some latitude in attacking the specific offense charged if 
a successful attack would alter the crime charged or negate the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of the criminal court. 
¶66 In this case, the defendant waived his preliminary 
examination.  As a result, the circuit court found probable 
cause to believe that Kleser had committed a first-degree 
intentional homicide under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1).  We see no 
basis for contradicting that finding after the preliminary 
examination except at trial.  When Kleser waived his preliminary 
examination, he conceded the State's right to try him for first-
degree intentional homicide, either in criminal court or in 
juvenile court. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
29 
 
¶67 This brings us to the reverse waiver procedure set out 
in Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).  This procedure gives a juvenile 
under adult court jurisdiction an opportunity to prove that 
notwithstanding the court's finding of probable cause of the 
offense or offenses charged, the juvenile's case should be 
transferred to juvenile court for disposition.  To achieve this 
objective, the burden is upon the juvenile to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence all three elements outlined in 
subsection (2). 
¶68 Subsection (2)(b) requires the juvenile to prove that 
transferring 
jurisdiction 
to 
juvenile 
court 
"would 
not 
depreciate the seriousness of the offense."  This requirement, 
by its very nature, suggests that § 970.032(2) permits the 
juvenile to supplement the facts offered by the state about the 
charged offense so that the criminal court is able to evaluate 
the "seriousness of the offense" in considering reverse waiver.  
Stated differently, the purpose of permitting additional factual 
evidence is not to contradict the previous finding of probable 
cause for "the violation" but rather to put the established 
"violation" in a factual context in an effort to prove that 
transferring jurisdiction to juvenile court would not depreciate 
the seriousness of that offense. 
¶69 Nothing in § 970.032(2) places a limitation on the 
evidence at a reverse waiver hearing so long as the evidence is 
admissible under the rules of evidence and is relevant to one or 
more of the three elements set out in the subsection.  Having 
said that, it appears to us that the legislature did not intend 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
30 
 
the reverse waiver hearing to be a minitrial.  Accordingly, the 
court has authority to control the admission of evidence to 
assure that a juvenile adheres to the statutory scheme——such as 
recognition of "the violation" already established——and to 
prevent 
the 
hearing 
from 
consuming 
unnecessary 
time 
and 
resources.  
¶70 The State argues that in a reverse waiver hearing, the 
evidence with respect to "the seriousness of the offense" should 
be limited to the specific facts brought out at the preliminary 
examination or stated in the complaint.  We are unable to agree.  
State v. Dominic E.W., 218 Wis. 2d 52, 579 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 
1998), sheds light on this contention. 
¶71 In Dominic E.W., the circuit court ordered reverse 
waiver on a charge of battery to a correctional officer.  Id. at 
55.  The circuit court considered various factors regarding the 
"seriousness of the offense," including the fact that Dominic's 
battery was neither premeditated nor confrontational and that 
Dominic had few, if any, behavioral issues prior to the battery.  
Id. at 57-58.  In a footnote, the court of appeals noted: 
The 
State 
takes 
issue 
with 
the 
trial 
court's 
consideration of the seriousness of the offense. The 
State seeks to equate all batteries from misdemeanor 
battery to a battery causing substantial bodily harm 
as equally serious and exposing vulnerable officers to 
increased violence. As with the first criterion, the 
court must decide under the specific facts and 
circumstances of the case how serious the offense was—
—whether it was an egregious type of battery, like the 
"vicious major attack" in State v. Verhagen, 198 
Wis. 2d 177, 192-93, 542 N.W.2d 189, 193-94 (Ct. App. 
1995), or some lesser type of battery. Again, such 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
31 
 
weighing of the facts by the trial court is implicit 
in the reverse waiver statute. 
Id. at 58 n.6. 
¶72 Dominic 
E.W. 
noted 
that 
the 
determination 
of 
seriousness is based on "the specific facts and circumstances of 
the case" and that "weighing of the facts by the trial court is 
implicit in the reverse waiver statute."  Id. We believe this 
interpretation is correct.  Dominic E.W. did not address whether 
the weighing is restricted to the facts used to establish 
probable cause, but the discussion implicates a more expansive 
interpretation of the word "offense" than that offered by the 
State.  We see nothing in the plain language of § 970.032(2) 
that precludes the admission of evidence supplementing the facts 
used to establish probable cause, as long as the evidence is 
offered for the limited and proper purpose of proving that (1) 
if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment 
in the criminal justice system; (2) transferring jurisdiction to 
juvenile court would not depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense; and (3) retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to 
deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the 
violation of which the juvenile is accused. 
¶73 We believe Wis. Stat. § 938.18, which sets out the 
procedure for waiver of a juvenile into adult court, was a model 
for Wis. Stat. §§ 970.032(2) and supports our interpretation of 
it. 
¶74 As mentioned previously in ¶¶43-44, supra, Wisconsin 
law provided a mechanism for waiver of a juvenile into adult 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
32 
 
court long before the present reverse waiver procedure was 
adopted.  Under the current version of the waiver statute, a 
juvenile may be waived into adult court if the juvenile is 
alleged to have (1) committed certain felonies after the 
juvenile's 14th birthday; (2) committed a violation at the 
request or for the benefit of a gang after the juvenile's 14th 
birthday; or (3) violated any criminal law after the juvenile's 
15th birthday.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(1) (2007-08).  In these 
circumstances, the juvenile or the district attorney may file a 
petition for waiver.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2). 
¶75 The procedure employed and criteria established for 
waiver into criminal court under § 938.18 (2007-08) are more 
detailed than the procedure and criteria [elements] for reverse 
waiver to juvenile court under § 970.032(2).  Nevertheless, the 
parallels are too obvious to ignore. 
¶76 First, § 938.18(4) (2007-08) requires the juvenile 
court to determine whether the petition ("the matter") has 
prosecutive merit before proceeding to determine if it should 
waive jurisdiction.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(a).  The statute 
then specifies: "If a petition for waiver of jurisdiction is 
contested, 
the 
district 
attorney 
shall 
present 
relevant 
testimony and the court, after taking that testimony and 
considering other relevant evidence, shall base its decision 
whether to waive jurisdiction on the criteria specified in 
[§ 938.18(5)]."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶77 Second, § 938.18(3) (2007-08) sets out a juvenile's 
rights at a waiver hearing.  It specifies that the juvenile has 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
33 
 
the right to counsel and provides specific notice requirements 
for the hearing.  Id.  The statute then provides: "The juvenile 
has the right to present testimony on his or her own behalf 
including expert testimony and has the right to cross-examine 
witnesses."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶78 Third, Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5) (2007-08) provides more 
detailed criteria to consider in determining waiver than is set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).  These criteria include the 
personality of the juvenile, prior record of the juvenile, 
adequacy and suitability of treatment facilities, services, and 
procedure, and desirability of trial and disposition of the 
entire offense in one court.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5).  Although 
each of these criteria is described in detail, one factor is 
particularly relevant to the inquiry in this case: "The type and 
seriousness of the offense, including whether it was against 
persons or property and the extent to which it was committed in 
a violent, aggressive, premeditated or willful manner."  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.18(5)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶79 Fourth, § 938.18(6) (2007-08) requires that the court 
state its "finding" with respect to the waiver criteria on the 
record and waive jurisdiction "if the court determines on the 
record that there is clear and convincing evidence that it is 
contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public 
to hear the case."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6).  The burden is on 
the state to prove the case for waiver by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Id. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
34 
 
¶80 Both the state and the juvenile are accorded broad 
latitude to present their respective positions in a waiver 
hearing.  In a contested hearing, the state is given the right 
to "present relevant testimony," which the court must consider 
along with "other relevant evidence" when deciding whether the 
waiver criteria have been met.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(b) (2007-
08).  The juvenile also may present evidence, including expert 
testimony.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(3)(b).  The statute's reference 
to the "type and seriousness of the offense" requires the court 
to consider the facts surrounding the alleged offense.  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.18(5)(b).  Taken together, these provisions suggest 
a broad scope of inquiry at a waiver hearing. 
¶81 We recognize that Wis. Stat. § 938.18 (2007-08) and 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) address different proceedings.  The fact 
that the legislature included certain details in § 938.18 that 
it did not include in § 970.032(2) gives rise to a plausible 
inference that it did not intend to include all the details of 
one inquiry in the other.  Nonetheless, we think such an 
interpretation would lead to an unreasonable result. 
¶82 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 938.18 (2007-08) and 970.032(2) 
provide for essentially analogous procedures.  The primary 
distinction between the two is in the allocation of burden.  The 
state must prove the case for waiver by "clear and convincing 
evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6).  The juvenile must prove 
reverse waiver by "preponderance of the evidence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.032(2).  It does not make sense to us that the legislature 
would permit the state to present all necessary evidence at a 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
35 
 
juvenile waiver hearing to meet its burden, but tie the hands of 
a juvenile in a reverse waiver hearing so that the juvenile did 
not have an equal opportunity to meet his burden in a comparable 
situation. 
¶83 "Waiver 
of 
juvenile 
court 
jurisdiction 
is 
a 
'critically important' decision that entails depriving the 
juvenile and the public of the substantial protections the 
juvenile court system provides to the juvenile accused of 
committing a crime."  T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 179, 190-91 
325 N.W.2d 329 (1982) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 
541, 553, 556-57 (1966)).  Reverse waiver is not less important 
to the juvenile offender or the community.   We decline to 
interpret § 970.032(2) in a way that unduly restricts the 
juvenile's ability to meet his burden. 
¶84 We conclude that the juvenile must be given reasonable 
latitude to offer admissible evidence for the purpose of meeting 
his burden to prove the three elements for reverse waiver under 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).  This includes evidence of "the 
violation" or the offense charged that supplements the facts 
used to establish probable cause.  Stated differently, the 
defendant may offer additional factual evidence to put "the 
offense" in context so that the court can make an informed 
judgment on whether transferring the matter to juvenile court 
would "depreciate the seriousness of the offense."  However, the 
juvenile may not offer evidence for the purpose of contradicting 
the offense charged because that offense has already been 
established in the preliminary examination. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
36 
 
C. 
Erroneous Exercise of Discretion 
¶85 We next address whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in granting the reverse waiver to 
juvenile court.  The State points to three different grounds on 
which the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.  
First, it argues that the circuit court substantively relied on 
hearsay testimony presented by Dr. Beyer.  Second, it argues 
that the circuit court erred by permitting Dr. Beyer to imply 
that she believed Kleser's account of the offense was truthful.  
Third, it argues that the circuit court erred by allowing Dr. 
Beyer to testify as to Kleser's account of the offense while 
prohibiting the State's expert, Dr. Collins, from interviewing 
Kleser regarding the offense.  The court of appeals held that 
the circuit court erred by substantively relying on hearsay, but 
did not address the two other issues.  Kleser, 316 Wis. 2d 825, 
¶¶47, 51-52. 
¶86 We agree with the court of appeals that Dr. Beyer's 
testimony regarding the facts of the offense constituted 
inadmissible hearsay and that the circuit court improperly 
relied upon it.  We also hold that Dr. Beyer's testimony 
constituted improper vouching testimony.  Finally, we hold that 
the circuit court erred by allowing Dr. Beyer to testify 
regarding Kleser's description of the offense while prohibiting 
Dr. Collins from interviewing Kleser regarding the offense. 
1. 
Substantive Reliance on Hearsay 
¶87 Kleser argues that the court of appeals incorrectly 
held that the circuit court erred by substantively relying on 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
37 
 
Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony.  Kleser concedes that "to the 
extent the trial court relied upon inadmissible hearsay, it 
erred."  He reasons, however, that this error was harmless 
because other evidence in the record supported the circuit 
court's conclusion that Kleser acted out of rage and fear when 
he killed Adams. 
¶88 The admissibility of evidence at a reverse waiver 
hearing is subject to the rules of evidence.  "Chapters 901 to 
911 [the rules of evidence] govern proceedings in the courts of 
the state of Wisconsin except as provided in ss. 911.01 and 
972.11."  Wis. Stat. § 901.01.  Wisconsin Stat. § 911.01(2) 
provides that the rules of evidence "apply generally to 
proceedings in civil and criminal actions."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 911.01(4) then enumerates a list of situations in which the 
rules of evidence do not apply.  Because a reverse waiver 
hearing is not listed as one of the specific circumstances in 
which the rules of evidence do not apply, we see no reason why 
the rules do not apply at a reverse waiver hearing. 
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(1) also provides that "the 
rules of evidence and practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different construction."  
Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) manifestly requires a 
different construction.  Against this background, the court of 
appeals correctly held that "[w]here a statute does not 
specifically authorize hearsay, it is generally prohibited."  
Kleser, 316 Wis. 2d 825, ¶46 (citing Wis. Stat. § 908.02).  The 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
38 
 
rules of evidence, including the general prohibition on hearsay, 
apply to reverse waiver hearings. 
¶90 Because the general prohibition on hearsay applies to 
reverse waiver hearings, we conclude that Dr. Beyer's testimony 
regarding the facts of the offense was inadmissible and that the 
circuit court erred in relying upon it.  Dr. Beyer, both in her 
testimony at the hearing and in her assessment of Kleser, 
extensively described the facts of the offense.  Her assessment 
described the events of the night, prefacing these events with: 
"Kleser said . . . "  Her testimony at the hearing regarding the 
events surrounding the homicide was in response to Kleser's 
attorney's request, "if you could explain what happened that 
night as far as you understand it." (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Dr. 
Beyer's testimony was presented in terms of what actually 
happened.  Kleser, however, did not take the stand, and there is 
no suggestion that Dr. Beyer had personal knowledge of the 
events.     
¶91 We note that Dr. Beyer used Kleser's description of 
the offense to formulate her opinion that Kleser acted out of 
rage and fear.  An expert may rely on inadmissible evidence in 
formulating an opinion, if the evidence is "of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject."  Wis. Stat. § 907.03.  
Even assuming that Kleser's hearsay was reasonably relied upon 
by an expert in Dr. Beyer's field, Wis. Stat. § 907.03 is not a 
hearsay exception, State v. Weber, 174 Wis. 2d 98, 107, 496 
N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993), and it does not render the 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
39 
 
underlying inadmissible testimony admissible, see State v. 
Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 199, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999).  By 
allowing Dr. Beyer to present Kleser's description of the 
offense, the court permitted Dr. Beyer to act as a conduit for 
inadmissible hearsay.9  This type of testimony is prohibited by 
the rules of evidence.  See State v. Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 
399, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an expert may 
not "act as a conduit for inadmissible evidence"). 
¶92 Kleser appears to argue that admission of this hearsay 
evidence was appropriate because it was used for the limited 
purpose of determining whether the transfer would depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense.  We disagree.  Although Kleser's 
                                                 
9 There is no dispute that the court was permitted to 
consider Dr. Beyer's opinion and that Dr. Beyer's opinion could 
be based on inadmissible evidence.  See Wis. Stat. § 907.03.  
But this does not permit the court to rely on the underlying 
inadmissible evidence.  In State v. Watson, this court warned 
that "[t]he danger in permitting inadmissible hearsay to serve 
as the basis for expert opinions is that hearsay may reach the 
trier of fact through 'the back door' of cross-examination if 
experts are asked to explain the bases for their opinions."  
State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 199, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999).  
Professor Daniel Blinka has stated that "it cannot be gainsaid 
that Wis. Stat. § 907.03 is not a hearsay exception."  7 Daniel 
D. 
Blinka, 
Wisconsin 
Practice 
Series: 
Wisconsin 
Evidence 
§ 702.604, at 622.  He contrasts the federal rule permitting the 
otherwise inadmissible bases to go before a jury, which "creates 
some 
horrendous difficulties," with Wisconsin's rule that 
entrusts the circuit court with discretion.  Even when the 
circuit court uses its discretion, it may allow inadmissible 
bases for expert opinions into evidence only "subject to a 
limiting instruction informing the jury that (if hearsay) the 
basis may not be used for substantive purposes."  Id. at 624.  
This rule, applied when the judge is the trier of fact, 
prohibits the judge (as fact-finder) from relying on the 
substance of the inadmissible hearsay. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
40 
 
brief accurately describes the ultimate issue for which the 
evidence was presented, there is no question that Dr. Beyer's 
testimony was presented for the truth of the matter asserted.  
See Wis. Stat. § 908.01(3) ("hearsay" is an out-of-court 
statement made by a person not testifying at a trial or hearing, 
offered at a trial or hearing "to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted").10  Although the circuit court was asked to make a 
narrow legal determination about the seriousness of the offense, 
the court's determination was based on the purported "facts" of 
the offense as Dr. Beyer described them.  Dr. Beyer acted as a 
conduit through which Kleser put these facts into evidence.  
¶93 We have previously determined that details of the 
offense may be relevant to a determination of whether, under 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2), transferring jurisdiction of the case 
to juvenile court would depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense.  These details, however, may reach the trier of fact 
only in accordance with the rules of evidence, whether through 
the testimony of the defendant, the testimony of another person 
with personal knowledge of the events, or a recognized exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
¶94 Kleser contends that the court's reliance on any 
inadmissible hearsay constituted harmless error.  Again, we 
disagree.  An error will not warrant reversal if the error does 
                                                 
10 The fact that Dr. Beyer's testimony was used for the 
truth of the matter asserted is emphasized by the fact that her 
testimony was provided in response to Kleser's attorney's 
request to "explain what happened that night as far as you 
understand it."  (Emphasis added.)   
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
41 
 
not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18; see State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶69, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (harmless error statute applies in 
criminal proceedings).  An error affects the substantial rights 
of a party if there is a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome, 
meaning 
a 
"probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 
545, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  
¶95 A reasonable probability exists that the outcome would 
have been different without Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony for 
two reasons.  First, the circuit court clearly used Dr. Beyer's 
testimony as a basis for its findings.  The court found that 
"Corey Kleser killed Ron Adams out of rage and fear after Ron 
Adams tried to assault [Kleser]."  This finding closely 
parallels Dr. Beyer's testimony that the offense "was a rage 
reaction when [Kleser] was very fearful," as well as the account 
provided in Dr. Beyer's assessment of Kleser. 
¶96 More important, Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony and 
hearsay in her assessment of Kleser were the principal bases for 
the circuit court's finding that Kleser acted out of fear and 
rage, which in turn was the basis for her conclusion that 
transferring jurisdiction would not depreciate the seriousness 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
42 
 
of the offense.11  Kleser points to the circuit court's reliance 
on Kleser's statement to the police and a detective's testimony 
regarding the personal nature of the crime.  These additional 
facts, by themselves, are not an adequate basis for the circuit 
court's conclusion that Kleser acted out of fear and rage.12   In 
light of the close parallels between the circuit court's 
decision and Dr. Beyer's testimony, it is clear that the 
testimony of the officers played a relatively minor role in the 
court's conclusion that Kleser acted out of fear and rage, 
compared to Dr. Beyer's testimony. 
¶97 Kleser argues that the court exercised its discretion 
properly, even without the erroneous bases for its decision, 
because "there is no requirement that the court consider one 
                                                 
11 Dr. Beyer's testimony closely parallels her written 
report.  Dr. Beyer testified on November 6, 2007.  Detective 
Louis Johnson, who interviewed Kleser, and Lieutenant Terrence 
Gordon, who investigated the crime scene, did not testify until 
the following day.  Consequently, Dr. Beyer could not and did 
not rely on Detective Johnson's testimony as a basis for her 
testimony. 
12 Although 
Detective 
Johnson 
testified 
regarding 
his 
interview with Kleser, the circuit court did not rely on this 
testimony in its decision.  In the decision, virtually the 
entire description of the facts of the offense was taken from 
Dr. Beyer's written report. 
As noted repeatedly, the burden of proof is on the 
defendant in a reverse waiver hearing.  We can only speculate 
what would have transpired if Dr. Beyer had given nothing more 
than her opinion.  The State might not have called Detective 
Johnson to testify, or it might have attempted to limit the 
detective's testimony in cross-examination.  The admission of 
Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony of Kleser's version of the offense 
changed the hearing. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
43 
 
factor more than any others."  While this is true, the reverse 
waiver statute requires the juvenile to prove each of the three 
elements 
by 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.032(2) (requiring the juvenile to prove by preponderance 
of the evidence "all of the following").  If the juvenile fails 
to prove one of these elements, the court cannot grant the 
reverse waiver, no matter how compelling the other two elements 
may be.  Based on the circuit court's decision, it is clear that 
without Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony, Kleser would not have 
sustained his burden of proving that transferring jurisdiction 
would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense.  Therefore, 
the court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting 
reverse waiver. 
2. 
Dr. Beyer's Testimony Regarding Kleser's Truthfulness 
¶98 We next address whether the circuit court erred by 
relying on Dr. Beyer's testimony as to the truthfulness of 
Kleser's hearsay.  The State argues that this testimony violated 
the principles articulated in Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, and 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92.  The court of appeals did not address 
this issue but assumed that Jensen and Haseltine would apply in 
a reverse waiver hearing.  Kleser, 316 Wis. 2d 825, ¶51.  We 
agree with the court of appeals that the principles articulated 
in those cases apply, and hold that the circuit court erred by 
relying on Dr. Beyer's impermissible vouching testimony. 
¶99 In Haseltine, the defendant was charged with sexual 
contact with his daughter.  Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d  at 93.  The 
state presented testimony of a psychiatrist who opined that 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
44 
 
there "was no doubt whatsoever" that the daughter was an incest 
victim.  Id. at 96.  The court of appeals held that this 
testimony was impermissible vouching testimony because a jury 
can determine credibility without the help of expert opinion.  
Id. at 96.  It explained: 
The opinion that Haseltine's daughter was an incest 
victim is an opinion that she was telling the truth.  
There is no indication that Haseltine's daughter had 
any physical or mental disorder that might affect her 
credibility.  No witness, expert or otherwise, should 
be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally 
and physically competent witness is telling the truth. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶100 In Jensen, the defendant was charged with sexually 
assaulting his stepdaughter, L.J.  Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 243.  
The state called the guidance counselor at L.J.'s school, who 
testified that L.J.'s behavior in school was consistent with 
children who were the victims of sexual abuse.  Id. at 247.  The 
defendant argued that this testimony was inadmissible for 
several reasons, one of which was that it amounted to testimony 
about whether L.J. was telling the truth.  Id. at 249.  The 
court disagreed.  It held that the testimony did not constitute 
impermissible vouching evidence, but was instead offered to (1) 
explain the context in which L.J. told the guidance counselor 
about the assault; and (2) rebut the defense's theory that L.J. 
fabricated the charges.  Id. at 250.  Because a sexual assault 
victim's behavior "may not conform to commonly held expectations 
of how a victim reacts to sexual assault," such expert testimony 
may be helpful to a jury.  Id. at 252. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
45 
 
¶101 We agree with the State that Dr. Beyer's account of 
the homicide offense here cannot be distinguished from the core 
principles of Jensen and Haseltine.  Dr. Beyer testified: "My 
opinion of the offense as [Kleser] described it was that it was 
a rage reaction when he was very fearful."  While she did 
preface many of her statements with "Kleser reported," she also 
described the offense in response to defense counsel's request 
that she "explain what happened that night as far as you 
understand it."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶102 We are not persuaded that the vouching rule becomes 
inapplicable simply because a witness does not use specific 
words such as "I believe X is telling the truth," or is 
inapplicable because X never testified as a witness.  There is 
no requirement that an expert explicitly testify that she 
believes a person is telling the truth for the expert's opinion 
to constitute improper vouching testimony.  In Haseltine, for 
example, the expert testified only implicitly that the victim 
was telling the truth.  Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96.  A 
requirement that specific words be used would permit the rule to 
be circumvented easily.   
¶103 Nor is there any reason to exclude the Haseltine rule 
in situations where a person like Kleser, whose story is vouched 
for by a witness, never actually testifies.  Permitting a 
witness to testify, implicitly or explicitly, that hearsay is 
true would aggravate an already bad situation. 
¶104 The essence of the rule prohibiting vouching testimony 
is that such testimony invades the province of the fact-finder 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
46 
 
as the sole determiner of credibility.  Id. ("The credibility of 
a witness is ordinarily something a lay juror can knowledgeably 
determine without the help of an expert opinion.").  This 
concern applies even when the expert vouches for the credibility 
of someone who does not testify.  When the evidence vouched for 
is a hearsay declaration, the fact-finder has already been 
deprived 
of 
the 
opportunity 
to 
personally 
witness 
the 
declarant's testimony.  Allowing an expert to present hearsay 
testimony and then give an opinion as to the credibility of that 
hearsay invades the province of the fact-finder even more than 
allowing an expert to testify to the credibility of an in-court 
witness.  In sum, the principles underlying the rule from Jensen 
and Haseltine apply where an expert vouches for an out-of-court 
declarant. 
¶105 Dr. Beyer had no specialized ability to assess the 
truthfulness of Kleser's account.13  Although she described the 
events of the offense, there is no question that she had no 
personal knowledge of those events.  Thus, her testimony 
impermissibly suggested both that she believed Kleser's account 
                                                 
13 The Arizona Supreme Court has explained: "Psychologists 
and psychiatrists are not, and do not claim to be, experts at 
discerning truth. Psychiatrists are trained to accept facts 
provided by their patients, not to act as judges of patients' 
credibility."  State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986) 
(citing People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984)). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
47 
 
and that the events actually unfolded as Kleser had portrayed 
them.14 
¶106 Kleser suggests that the State's vouching argument is 
essentially indistinguishable from its argument that Dr. Beyer's 
testimony was hearsay, because both are premised on the fact 
that Dr. Beyer acted as a "conduit" for Kleser's testimony.  As 
we see it, Dr. Beyer's objectionable testimony was inadmissible 
for two distinct reasons: (1) because it was hearsay; and (2) 
because Dr. Beyer implicitly vouched for that hearsay.  Thus, 
her description of what Kleser said was inadmissible for one 
reason, and her explanation of what happened the night of the 
events, which implied that Dr. Beyer believed what Kleser said, 
is inadmissible for another reason.    
¶107 Finally, Kleser argues that, if the circuit court 
erred by relying upon Dr. Beyer's opinion as to the truthfulness 
of the statements, such error was harmless.  Although we are 
unable to ascertain fully what weight the circuit court gave to 
Dr. Beyer's implied vouching of Kleser, the court clearly relied 
on the testimony enough to believe that the story was true.  
Therefore, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
reliance 
on 
Dr. 
Beyer's 
inadmissible vouching testimony was not harmless error. 
                                                 
14 In other words, besides implicitly testifying that she 
believed Kleser's description, Dr. Beyer also testified that 
certain events, of which she did not have personal knowledge, 
occurred.  Such testimony is clearly impermissible.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 906.02 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence 
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness 
has personal knowledge of the matter."). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
48 
 
3. 
Refusal to Allow the State's Expert to Interview Kleser 
Regarding the Facts of the Offense 
¶108 We next address whether the circuit court erred by 
allowing Dr. Beyer to testify as to the facts of the homicide 
offense without permitting the State's expert, Dr. Collins, to 
examine Kleser regarding the facts of the offense.  Kleser 
argues that the circuit court's decision, attempting to balance 
the State's interests against Kleser's privilege against self-
incrimination, 
was 
within the circuit court's discretion, 
particularly in light of the fact that there was no established 
law for the circuit court to follow. 
¶109 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion by refusing to allow Dr. Collins to 
interview Kleser regarding the facts of the offense.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we conclude first that Kleser waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination by putting his account 
of the offense into issue through his expert.  We conclude 
second that principles of fair play entitled the State to an 
opportunity to rebut Kleser's uncorroborated account of the 
offense. 
¶110 This court addressed a defendant's waiver of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in State v. Davis, 2002 WI 
75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913.  In Davis, this court 
addressed 
whether 
a 
defendant 
may 
present 
Richard 
A.P. 
testimony, which is "expert testimony to show that the defendant 
lacks the characteristics of a sexual offender and is therefore 
unlikely to have committed the alleged sexual assault."  Id., 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
49 
 
¶9.15  After setting out the requirements for the admission of 
Richard A.P. evidence, the court focused on whether a defendant 
who intends to introduce Richard A.P. evidence waives his 
privilege against self-incrimination and may be compelled to 
undergo an examination by the state's expert.  Id., ¶27. 
¶111 The court looked at two approaches to the issue of 
whether a defendant may be compelled to undergo an examination 
by a state expert.  The court noted that some courts conclude 
that a compulsory examination is constitutionally permissible, 
not because the defendant has waived the right to be free from 
self-incrimination, but because the state must be afforded the 
same opportunity to obtain the type and quality of psychological 
evaluation as the defendant when the defendant raises the issue 
of his mental capacity.  Id., ¶34.  "The overriding concern in 
such cases is that the finder of fact must be given a fair and 
full 
assessment 
of 
the 
defendant's 
culpability 
when 
the 
defendant raises this issue."  Id.  In contrast, other courts 
have held that a compulsory examination by the state is 
permissible because the defendant has waived the privilege 
against self-incrimination by showing his intent to introduce 
expert psychiatric testimony in support of a defense related to 
his mental capacity.  Id., ¶35. 
                                                 
15 The name of this evidence derives from State v. Richard 
A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 791, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998), in 
which the court of appeals permitted an expert to testify that 
the defendant "did not show any evidence of any diagnosable 
sexual disorder." 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
50 
 
¶112 The Davis court approved State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 
(N.H. 1988), a New Hampshire case involving a defendant who 
raised battered woman's syndrome, to conclude that a compulsory 
examination could occur only after the defendant waived her 
right against self-incrimination.  Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.  
The Davis court quoted the New Hampshire court: 
Because the expert's testimony is thus predicated on 
the defendant's statements, the latter are explicitly 
or implicitly placed in evidence through the testimony 
of the expert during his direct and cross-examination.  
Since a defendant would waive his privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination if he took the stand and 
made those same statements himself, his decision to 
introduce his account of relevant facts indirectly 
through an expert witness should likewise be treated 
as a waiver obligating him to provide the same access 
to the State's expert that he has given to his own. 
Id., ¶36 (quoting Briand, 547 A.2d at 239). 
¶113 The court held that Davis did not waive his right 
simply by presenting Richard A.P. evidence, because such 
evidence was not a direct challenge to an element of the crime.  
Id., ¶37.  But the court, echoing Briand, held that waiver may 
occur if the introduction of evidence amounts "to nothing more 
than the defendant's own denial of the crime through a 
surrogate."  Id., ¶39.   
¶114 The facts of this case are closer to Briand than to 
Davis, in that Kleser waived his privilege against self-
incrimination by putting his account of the offense into issue 
through his expert.  We find Davis's explanation of the 
circumstances in which a defendant (introducing Richard A.P. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
51 
 
evidence) waives his privilege against self-incrimination to be 
particularly apt here: 
If [the defendant's] disclosure statement shows that 
the 
expert will either explicitly or implicitly 
provide testimony regarding relevant facts surrounding 
the alleged crime that amounts to the defendant's own 
denial of the crime, the court may then order the 
defendant to undergo a reciprocal examination from the 
state based on the fact that the defendant has waived 
his or her right against self-incrimination.  In this 
way, the defendant is permitted to introduce expert 
opinion 
testimony 
pursuant 
to 
Richard 
A.P. 
but 
restricted from introducing statements that amount to 
nothing more than the defendant's own statements on 
the crime. 
Id., ¶40. 
¶115 Kleser argues that this reasoning from Davis is not 
applicable because Davis specifically pertained to Richard A.P. 
evidence as it implicated the defendant's guilt or innocence.  
We disagree.  Although the issue at a reverse waiver hearing is 
not guilt or innocence, we see no reason why a different rule 
should apply when the defendant is seeking reverse waiver under 
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).  The reasoning from Davis is not 
limited to cases where the defendant was presenting Richard A.P. 
evidence to prove his innocence.  Rather, the relevant inquiry 
from Davis is whether "the defendant uses the expert as a 
surrogate to assert his or her own statements about facts on the 
crime and thereby waives the right against self-incrimination."  
Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶3. In Davis, because the expert evidence 
was "circumstantial evidence of [the defendant's] innocence," 
the state could adequately rebut the testimony without a 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
52 
 
reciprocal examination.16  Id., ¶38.  Here, on other hand, Kleser 
waived his right against self-incrimination by using Dr. Beyer 
as a surrogate to assert his own statements about the crime, and 
the State was put at an unfair disadvantage when the court 
prohibited Dr. Collins from interviewing Kleser regarding the 
offense. 
¶116 Kleser 
contends 
that, 
because 
Dr. 
Collins 
had 
sufficient bases for her opinion, the State was not harmed by 
the circuit court's ruling.  But the State had no practical 
opportunity to rebut Kleser's account of what happened the night 
                                                 
16 A number of courts, generally addressing the situation in 
which a defendant places his mental state at issue, have 
reasoned that the state would be at a disadvantage if it were 
not allowed to independently examine the defendant.  See Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981) ("When a defendant asserts 
the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric 
testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only 
effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue 
that he interjected into the case."); State v. Shackart, 858 
P.2d 639, 645 (Ariz. 1993) ("To hold otherwise would deprive the 
state of the only adequate means to contest the conclusions of a 
defense psychiatric expert."); Mitchell v. State, 192 P.3d 721, 
723 (Nev. 2008) (not allowing the state to examine "would permit 
[the defendant] to enjoy the unfair asymmetry of being able to 
introduce defense expert witness testimony based upon personal 
interviews while denying State expert witnesses the same 
access"). 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
53 
 
of the offense.17  Because Kleser was not on the stand, the State 
could not cross-examine him.  The State was limited to rebutting 
Dr. Beyer's conclusions——which were based on Kleser's first-hand 
account of the offense——using only Dr. Beyer's examination of 
Kleser, the criminal complaint, and the testimony of police 
officers.  Thus, the State was at a serious disadvantage in 
attempting to rebut Dr. Beyer's conclusion that Kleser committed 
the offense out of rage and fear. 
¶117 In sum, because Kleser waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination by putting the facts of the offense at issue 
through Dr. Beyer, and because this put the State at a serious 
disadvantage, the State was entitled to have an expert examine 
Kleser regarding those facts.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by allowing 
Dr. Beyer to testify regarding the offense while prohibiting Dr. 
Collins from interviewing Kleser regarding the same events.  We, 
of course, are not suggesting that a person like Kleser must 
submit to an examination by a state expert in situations where 
                                                 
17 Thus, the facts here are distinguishable from the facts 
in State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913.  
In Davis, the court ultimately found that the expert's testimony 
"did not require [the expert] to inquire into the relevant facts 
surrounding the case," id., ¶41, and therefore the state could 
effectively rebut the Richard A.P. evidence without allowing the 
state's expert to personally interview the defendant.  Dr. 
Beyer's testimony is clearly unlike the testimony in Davis, 
because Dr. Beyer both based her opinion on Kleser's description 
of the offense and testified as to that description.  This is 
precisely the situation that Davis held would constitute a 
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
54 
 
the 
person 
has 
not 
waived 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination. 
D. 
Appropriateness of Remand for a New Reverse Waiver Hearing 
¶118 Finally, the State argues that the court of appeals 
decision to remand for a new reverse waiver hearing is moot 
because Kleser is now over the age of 18, and therefore no 
juvenile dispositions could be imposed upon him.  Kleser argues 
that there is no mootness problem because the State filed a 
delinquency petition before Kleser turned 17, and therefore the 
juvenile court retains jurisdiction. 
¶119 Under the Juvenile Justice Code, no dispositional 
options would be available for Kleser if the circuit court chose 
to order reverse waiver.  Kleser correctly points out that the 
juvenile court would retain jurisdiction because a petition 
alleging Kleser delinquent was filed before he turned 17.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 938.12(2).  However, we do not see the juvenile 
court's authority to issue a dispositional order after the 
juvenile turns 18, as the statute repeatedly uses the phrase 
"made before the juvenile attains 18 years of age."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 938.355(4).   
¶120 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34(4h) provides for a "serious 
juvenile offender program" that allows a juvenile to remain in 
custody until the age of 25.  However, the statute providing for 
termination of dispositional orders states, in relevant part: 
Except as provided in s. 938.368, an order under s. 
938.34(4h) made before the juvenile attains 18 years 
of age shall apply for 5 years after the date on which 
the order is granted, if the juvenile is adjudicated 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
55 
 
delinquent 
[for 
certain 
offenses] 
or 
until 
the 
juvenile reaches 25 years of age, if the juvenile is 
adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that 
would be punishable as a Class A felony if committed 
by an adult. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶121 The 
fact 
that 
this 
statute 
explicitly 
permits 
placement in the program by a dispositional order "made before 
the juvenile attains 18 years of age," but contains no provision 
for a dispositional order made after 18 years of age, indicates 
that this dispositional option is not available after a juvenile 
turns 18.  Therefore, if, somehow, Kleser's case were tried in 
juvenile court, he would not be eligible for placement in the 
serious juvenile offender program. 
¶122 The fact that Kleser is no longer eligible for the 
serious offender program does not render this case moot.  A case 
is moot when "a decision in the matter will not have any 
practical effect upon an existing legal controversy."  Roth v. 
Lafarge School Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2004 WI 6, ¶13, 268 
Wis. 2d 335, 677 N.W.2d 599.  Clearly, a decision in this matter 
would have a practical effect upon the legal controversy.  This 
decision still affects whether Kleser goes free, is given 
another chance at a reverse waiver hearing, or remains in adult 
criminal court. 
¶123 Although we conclude that this matter is not moot, we 
conclude that a remand for a new reverse waiver hearing is not 
appropriate under these facts.  Remand is the appropriate course 
of action "[w]hen an appellate court is confronted with 
inadequate findings and the evidence respecting material facts 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
56 
 
is in dispute."  Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 
N.W.2d 155 (1980).  That situation is not present here.  Kleser 
was given a full opportunity to present evidence at the reverse 
waiver hearing.  The circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by admitting inadmissible evidence and relying on 
that evidence, but these errors did not render the record 
inadequate for us to make a determination. 
¶124 To us, the record demonstrates that Kleser failed to 
meet his burden of proving that (1) if convicted, the juvenile 
could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice 
system; (2) transferring jurisdiction to juvenile court would 
not depreciate the seriousness of the offenses; and (3) 
retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or 
other juveniles from committing the violations of which the 
juvenile is accused.  We do not perceive any error that 
prejudiced Kleser; rather, we see errors that prejudiced the 
State.  Remanding for a new reverse waiver hearing would serve 
only to give Kleser another opportunity to meet a burden of 
proof that he failed to meet when given a full, fair opportunity 
to do so.  This is not an appropriate reason to remand.  See 
State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1, 32, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990) 
("The rule permitting remand should not be used simply to give a 
party the opportunity to do what it should have done before.").  
Therefore, we conclude that remand is not appropriate under 
these facts. 
¶125 As previously stated, the defendant in a reverse 
waiver hearing must prove three statutory elements by a 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
57 
 
preponderance of the evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2).  Kleser 
was required to prove, notwithstanding probable cause that he 
committed 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1)(a)), substantial battery (§ 940.19(2)), and battery 
by a prisoner (§ 940.20(1)), that his transfer from criminal 
court to juvenile court "would not depreciate the seriousness 
of" the offenses or undermine deterrence.   
¶126 In 1997 Dominic E.W. struck a counselor at the Ethan 
Allen School for Boys.  Waukesha County Circuit Judge Lee 
Dreyfus Jr. conducted a reverse waiver hearing and transferred 
Dominic E.W. to juvenile court.  The persuasive arguments of 
Dominic E.W.'s counsel at that time help us to put this case in 
perspective.  Dominic's counsel argued: 
 
Superintendents at Ethan Allen and Lincoln Hills 
Schools report that about 120 batteries to staff 
members have occurred since December, 1993.  This is 
the first case in which a trial court exercised its 
discretion to transfer a battery to juvenile court. 
 
. . . .  
As 
the 
trial 
court 
also 
correctly 
noted, 
sec. 
970.032(2) is discretionary, not mandatory.  It does 
not require all juveniles charged with battery to 
correctional officers to be tried in adult court.  By 
its unambiguous terms, it expressly gives judges the 
discretion to transfer jurisdiction over some of those 
cases back to juvenile court. 
 
. . . .  
 
With regard to the seriousness of the offense, at 
sec. 
970.032(2)(b), 
the 
court 
expressed 
its 
sensitivity to the concerns addressed by the statute, 
when it stated "clearly it has to be viewed as a 
serious offense any time a staff member is injured or 
otherwise battered."  On the other hand, when one 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
58 
 
considers the range of actions encompassed by the term 
"battery," there was ample evidence that this was a 
less serious battery than others. 
 
[A]s the court noted, this battery was a simple 
battery which would have been a misdemeanor, had it 
not 
involved 
a 
staff 
member 
of 
a 
correctional 
facility.  It did not cause substantial bodily harm or 
great bodily harm, and it did not involve a victim who 
was elderly or physically disabled, . . . 
 
The "seriousness of the offense," must also be 
considered in the context of the type of crime which 
results in adult charges being filed pursuant to sec. 
938.183 (1), Stats.  Dominic's offense was clearly 
less serious than first-degree intentional homicide, 
first-degree 
reckless 
homicide, 
second-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
and 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, the offenses charged in adult 
court 
pursuant 
[to] 
sec. 
938.183(1)(am), 
Stats.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶127 In this case, Kleser did not dispute that the deceased 
suffered at least 20 blows to the head, 30 stab wounds to the 
neck, and various other wounds.  He admitted to a police officer 
that he stabbed the deceased in the neck multiple times with a 
pair of scissors after he realized that the man was still alive.  
He is charged with two additional felonies involving violence to 
a fellow prisoner.  We conclude that transferring this 19-year-
old defendant to juvenile court would depreciate the seriousness 
of the offenses and undermine deterrence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶128 We conclude, first, that a juvenile has a right to a 
reverse waiver hearing after the criminal court finds probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the exclusive 
original jurisdiction violation or violations of which he is 
accused.  In a reverse waiver hearing, the juvenile must prove 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
59 
 
all elements set out in § 970.032(2)(a), (b), and (c) by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  If the juvenile fails to meet 
his burden of proof, he shall be retained for prosecution in the 
criminal court.  Thus, the juvenile must be given reasonable 
latitude to offer admissible evidence to satisfy his burden on 
the three elements.  This includes evidence about the offense, 
supplementing the facts used to establish probable cause, to put 
the offense in context.  The juvenile may not offer evidence in 
the reverse waiver hearing for the purpose of contradicting the 
offense charged.  The place to offer evidence for the purpose of 
contradicting 
the 
offense 
charged 
is 
the 
preliminary 
examination. 
¶129 Second, we conclude that the circuit court erred in 
granting reverse waiver here, for three reasons.  (1) The court 
substantively relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony from Dr. 
Beyer describing the events of the offense; (2) the court 
allowed Dr. Beyer to offer inadmissible opinion testimony 
regarding Kleser's truthfulness; and (3) the court erroneously 
prohibited the State's psychologist from interviewing Kleser 
regarding the facts of the offense while permitting Dr. Beyer to 
testify as a conduit for Kleser's account of the facts of the 
offense. 
¶130 Finally, we conclude that remand for a new reverse 
waiver hearing would not be appropriate under these facts. 
¶131 Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals 
reversing 
the 
circuit 
court 
order 
transferring 
jurisdiction of this case to the juvenile court, but we reverse 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC 
60 
 
the court of appeals' order remanding the case for a new reverse 
waiver hearing, and remand the case to adult criminal court for 
trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
1 
 
¶132 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the 
juvenile must be given reasonable latitude to offer admissible 
evidence for the purpose of meeting his burden to prove the 
three elements for reverse waiver.  Majority op., ¶84.  I also 
agree with the majority that the juvenile may offer evidence at 
the reverse waiver hearing that contradicts the offense charged 
as long as the proffered evidence is relevant to any of the 
three elements for reverse waiver under Wis. Stat. § 970.032.  
Id.   
¶133 Although the majority correctly sets forth the law in 
much of its discussion, I disagree with the majority in its 
application of the law.  Specifically, I part ways with the 
majority when it concludes that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
its 
evidentiary 
rulings.  
Additionally, I disagree with the majority when it substitutes 
its judgment for that of the circuit court on the discretionary 
determination of whether a transfer to juvenile court would 
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.   
I 
¶134 The majority concludes that the circuit court erred by 
(1) relying on inadmissible hearsay testimony from Dr. Beyer 
describing the events of the offense; (2) permitting Dr. Beyer 
to vouch for Kleser's credibility; and (3) prohibiting the 
State's psychologist from interviewing Kleser about the facts of 
the offense.  It further concludes that the circuit court 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
2 
 
erroneously exercised its discretion because, as a matter of 
law, Kleser failed to prove that transferring the case to 
juvenile court would not unduly depreciate the seriousness of 
the offense.  Id., ¶124.  
¶135 Unlike the majority, I determine that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion: (1) even if 
the circuit court erroneously relied on hearsay testimony 
presented by Dr. Beyer, such reliance was not harmful because 
essentially the same information was presented through the 
testimony of another witness; (2) the record does not support 
the majority's conclusion that Dr. Beyer impermissibly vouched 
for Kleser's credibility; (3) the majority erroneously limits 
the flexibility of the circuit court to balance the competing 
interests of protecting the juvenile's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and the need of the State to present 
rebuttal testimony; and (4) the majority improperly substitutes 
its judgment for that of the circuit court when it concludes 
that the transfer would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense.   
¶136 I conclude that this case should be remanded to the 
circuit court for a determination of whether, given the current 
age of the "juvenile," reverse waiver is appropriate or even 
feasible.  If not, I agree with the majority that jurisdiction 
should remain in adult criminal court.    
II 
¶137 The majority correctly states that the court was 
permitted to consider Dr. Beyer's opinion and that Dr. Beyer's 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
3 
 
opinion could be based on inadmissible evidence.  Id., ¶91, n.9.  
Further, it explains that Wis. Stat. § 907.03 is not a hearsay 
exception, and an expert's reliance on inadmissible evidence to 
form an opinion does not render that evidence admissible.  Id.  
These statements accurately describe the law.    
¶138 However, in applying the law to these facts, the 
majority determines that "without Dr. Beyer's hearsay testimony, 
Kleser would not have sustained his burden of proving that 
transferring jurisdiction would not depreciate the seriousness 
of the offense."  Id., ¶97.  I do not necessarily agree with the 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
Dr. 
Beyer's 
opinion 
contained 
inadmissible hearsay.1  However, even if it did, I conclude that 
the error was harmless and that without this evidence, Kleser 
would have sustained his burden.   
¶139 The majority takes issue with the circuit court's 
reliance on facts presented by Dr. Beyer.  It concludes that Dr. 
Beyer's hearsay testimony and report "were the principal bases 
for the circuit court's finding that Kleser acted out of fear 
and rage."  Id., ¶96.  This assertion is not supported by the 
record.   
                                                 
1 See Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence, § 803.04 at 754-58 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing Wis. 
Stat. § 908.03(4), statements for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment).  "Put differently, the fact that an expert was 
consulted solely for the purpose of giving testimony affects 
only the weight to be given the statement, not admissibility."  
Id. at 756.  "The rule expressly permits some latitude regarding 
statements which relate how the condition occurred, provided the 
cause of the affliction is reasonably pertinent to the diagnosis 
or treatment."  Id. at 757. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
4 
 
¶140 As the majority sets forth, Dr. Beyer testified that 
Kleser related the following facts about the night of the 
incident: Kleser drank a lot of alcohol that night.  He received 
a phone call from Adams, who offered to pay him to pose nude, as 
he had done before.  Kleser agreed.  The "usual scenario" 
unfolded when he got to the apartment.  Kleser was surprised 
when Adams wanted to have sex, and he told Adams no.  Adams 
attacked him and tried to rape him.  Kleser's pants were around 
his ankles, and he could not really move.  Adams was on top of 
Kleser as they struggled.  Adams was choking Kleser, who could 
not breathe. Kleser felt powerless and felt like he was going to 
pass out.  Kleser grabbed a hammer and hit Adams until he could 
escape.  Id., ¶28.   
¶141 These facts closely parallel the facts that Kleser 
provided to Detective Johnson during a custodial interview.  
Both parties deemed Johnson's testimony admissible evidence.  He 
testified that Kleser related the following facts: Kleser had 
met Adams several months before and had gone to Adams' apartment 
five or six times previously.  Kleser would disrobe and "pose 
nude basically for Mr. Adams[.]".     
¶142 Johnson testified that the night of the incident, 
"upon coming over to Mr. Adams' apartment, [] Mr. Adams wanted 
to engage in some type of sexual intercourse with him."  Kleser 
"did not want to engage in having any type of sex with Mr. 
Adams."  Kleser said that Adams "tried to force himself in him 
and he actually put his hands on Corey[.]"  Adams "approached 
him and tried to stick his dick in his ass[.]"  "[I]t was a 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
5 
 
physical altercation and struggle and something[.]"  "[T]here 
was a point in time when Mr. Adams had grabbed him and tried to 
choke at him[.]"  Kleser "said he grabbed a hammer" and that he 
was able to "fend [him] off."  
¶143 The facts of the offense, as testified to by Dr. 
Beyer, are nearly identical to the facts later testified to by 
Detective Johnson.  If the circuit court erred by permitting Dr. 
Beyer to testify about Kleser's account of the incident, I 
conclude that error was harmless.  
¶144 The majority also takes issue with the circuit court's 
conclusion that Kleser killed Adams out of fear and rage.  Id., 
¶96.  Yet, there is no reason that the circuit court should not 
have relied on Dr. Beyer's expert opinion that Kleser acted out 
of fear and rage.  An expert is allowed to base an opinion on 
inadmissible evidence, and that expert can testify as to her 
opinion in court.2  The conclusion that Kleser acted out of fear 
and rage is an expert opinion.  The majority acknowledges that 
the court was permitted to rely on Dr. Beyer's expert opinion.  
Therefore, the circuit court did not err by relying on Dr. 
Beyer's expert opinion that Kleser acted out of fear and rage.   
III 
                                                 
2 In a footnote, the majority indicates that Dr. Beyer could 
not have relied on Detective Johnson's testimony in formulating 
her conclusion that Kleser acted out of fear and rage.  Majority 
op., ¶96, n.11.  In making this assertion, the majority confuses 
the issues.   Dr. Beyer did not need to rely on Detective 
Johnson's account of the facts.  Because experts may rely on 
inadmissible evidence in formulating an opinion, Dr. Beyer was 
entitled to rely on Kleser's own description of the facts. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
6 
 
¶145 The majority also accurately explains that an expert 
cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness and that the 
expert need not explicitly state that she believes a person is 
telling the truth for the opinion to constitute improper 
vouching testimony.  Id., ¶102.  However, the majority errs in 
its application of these rules. 
¶146 As the majority reports, Dr. Beyer never explicitly 
testified about the credibility of Kleser's account.  Unlike the 
majority, I conclude that there was no implicit vouching, 
either.  In fact, the majority treads on dangerous territory 
when it concludes as a matter of law that this type of expert 
testimony is a violation of the longstanding rule that prohibits 
a witness from testifying about the veracity of another witness.  
See State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
¶147 The majority acknowledges that Dr. Beyer prefaced many 
of her statements with the phrase, "Kleser reported."  Majority 
op., ¶101.  The only phrase the majority points to as improper 
vouching is actually a statement from Kleser's attorney, who 
requested that Dr. Beyer "explain what happened that night as 
far as you understand it."  Id.  It this context, it is clear 
that the attorney was asking Dr. Beyer to relate the events that 
Kleser had described, rather than asking her to offer an opinion 
about Kleser's truthfulness.  The majority has not pointed to 
any portion of Dr. Beyer's testimony that offered an opinion on 
Kleser's credibility.  
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
7 
 
¶148 The questions asked by Kleser's attorney and the 
responses provided by Dr. Beyer are similar to questions and 
answers routinely made in courtrooms around the state.  To 
elevate a question prefaced with "as you understand it" and the 
response "Kleser reported" to the height of a Haseltine 
violation sets up an unworkable evidentiary standard for 
litigants, attorneys, and the circuit courts.  
IV 
¶149 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by refusing to allow the 
State's psychologist to interview Kleser about the facts of the 
offense.  Id., ¶109.  It explains that "Kleser waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination by putting his account of 
the offense into issue through his expert."  Id.  
¶150 The United States Supreme Court has explained "if a 
defendant 
requests 
[a psychiatric] evaluation or presents 
psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution 
may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of 
the examination that the defendant requested."  Buchanan v. 
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987).  "The defendant would 
have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of 
this psychiatric testimony by the prosecution."  Id. at 423. 
¶151 Here, the primary purpose of expert testimony from 
both psychologists was to assess whether Kleser's treatment 
needs could be met in adult court.  The record reflects that the 
circuit court was cognizant of the need to balance the State's 
right to present rebuttal testimony and Kleser's privilege 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
8 
 
against self-incrimination.  It fashioned a solution where the 
State's psychologist could interview Kleser, without an attorney 
present, and ask him questions about any subject except for the 
facts of the offense.   
¶152 Courts need the flexibility to fashion a solution to 
address these competing interests given the facts and procedure 
of the individual case.  Here, I applaud the efforts of the 
circuit court judge in fashioning a solution to address the 
competing interests.  The majority, instead, finds as a matter 
of law that it was an erroneous exercise of discretion.    
¶153 The State's psychologist had access to the interview 
conducted by Detective Johnson and the interview conducted by 
Dr. Beyer.  She was also permitted to examine Kleser, without an 
attorney present, about any subject except the facts of the 
offense.  Based on her examination of Kleser and other sources, 
the State's psychologist was able to provide diagnoses "to a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty."     
¶154 Given the competing interests of the State's right to 
rebut Dr. Beyer's conclusions and Kleser's privilege against 
self-incrimination, courts should be permitted flexibility to 
use their discretion and fashion a reasonable solution.  I 
conclude that the balance struck by the circuit court was not an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.      
V 
¶155 Finally, 
the 
majority 
concludes——apparently 
as 
a 
matter of law——that transferring the case to juvenile court 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
offense.  
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
9 
 
Majority op., ¶127.  In so concluding, it substitutes its own 
judgment for the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 
¶156 There 
are 
some 
determinations 
that 
seem 
quintessentially within the province of the circuit court's 
sound exercise of discretion, and a circuit court should be 
accorded 
great 
latitude 
when 
making 
these 
discretionary 
determinations.  I conclude that the determination of whether 
transfer 
to 
juvenile 
court 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness of the offense is one such determination.  "A 
decision to retain or transfer jurisdiction in a reverse waiver 
situation [under Wis. Stat. § 970.032] is a discretionary 
decision for the trial court."  State v. Dominic E.W., 218 
Wis. 2d 52, 56, 579 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶157 Each day, courts around this state make a similar 
determination.  During sentencing, a court must consider 
probation as the first alternative, but may reject probation if 
it finds that it would "unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense."  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶44, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
678 N.W.2d 197.  I find no principled distinction between the 
degree 
of 
latitude 
that 
should 
be 
accorded 
to 
these 
discretionary determinations.  If an appellate court can 
substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court and 
determine as a matter of law that transfer to juvenile court 
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense, an 
appellate court can do likewise when assessing whether probation 
unduly depreciates the seriousness of the offense.  This could 
invite countless appeals. 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
10 
 
¶158  An appellate court should sustain a discretionary 
decision if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, 
applied a proper standard of law, and using a demonstrated 
rational process, reached a decision that a reasonable judge 
could reach.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982).  I conclude that is what the circuit court 
did here.  Absent an erroneous exercise of discretion, an 
appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that 
of the circuit court——even if it would have decided the issue 
differently.  See Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 
WI 112, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58.  
¶159 Because I conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion, I would affirm its reverse 
waiver determination.  However, given the passage of time and 
the current age of the "juvenile," I recognize that reverse 
waiver may no longer be appropriate or even feasible.  On 
remand, I would instruct the circuit court to determine if 
reverse waiver is still appropriate.  If the circuit court 
determines that it is not, jurisdiction should remain in adult 
criminal court.  For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part.    
¶160 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence/dissent.  
 
 
No.  2007AP2827-CRAC.awb 
 
 
 
1