Title: Richard Lynch v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
________________________ 
 
No. SC06-2233 
________________________ 
 
RICHARD LYNCH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
________________________ 
 
No. SC07-1246 
________________________ 
 
RICHARD LYNCH,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[November 6, 2008] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Richard Lynch appeals an amended order of the Circuit Court of the 
Eighteenth Judicial Circuit denying his postconviction motion to vacate his 
convictions and corresponding sentences of death and life imprisonment.  Lynch 
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We possess jurisdiction to 
resolve these claims.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  As explained in our 
analysis, we affirm the amended order of the postconviction court and deny each of 
Lynch’s claims.  Furthermore, we deny Lynch’s habeas petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On October 19, 2000, Richard Lynch pled guilty to two counts of first-
degree premeditated murder,1 one count of armed burglary of a dwelling, and one 
count of armed kidnapping.2  See Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 365-66 (Fla. 
2003).   These charges arose from the March 5, 1999, deaths of Roseanna Morgan, 
a woman with whom Lynch had engaged in a “long affair,” and her thirteen-year-
old daughter, Leah Caday.  Id. at 366.  The trial court imposed death sentences for 
both murders and life imprisonment for the burglary and kidnapping charges.  See 
id. at 368.  On direct appeal, we detailed the facts surrounding the murders: 
                                          
 
1.  The trial court recognized in its sentencing order that the murder of Leah 
Caday (the daughter-victim) was not premeditated but otherwise qualified as first-
degree murder based upon the felony-murder rule.  Lynch shot and killed Caday in 
the course of committing a murder (killing Roseanna Morgan, the mother-victim, 
with premeditated intent), an armed burglary (deception and coercion of Caday to 
gain entry to the victims’ apartment with the intent to commit a murder therein), 
and a kidnapping (holding Caday at gunpoint for thirty to forty minutes for the 
purpose of killing Caday’s mother, Roseanna Morgan). 
  
2.  In its sentencing order, the trial court found Lynch guilty of 
“kidnapping,” as opposed to “armed kidnapping.” 
 
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The testimony elicited . . . included a tape of a telephone call 
that appellant made to the “911” emergency assistance service while 
still in the apartment where the murders occurred.  On that tape, 
Lynch is heard admitting to the 911 operator that he shot two people 
at 534 Rosecliff Circle.  He said he initially traveled to the apartment 
only to attempt to have Morgan pay a credit card debt, but resorted to 
shooting her in the leg and in the back of the head.  He told the 911 
operator that he had three handguns with him and that he shot Morgan 
in the back of the head to “put her out of her misery.”  Appellant also 
admitted to firing at the police when they first arrived on the scene. 
As to Caday, appellant informed the 911 operator that he had 
held Caday at gunpoint while waiting for Morgan to return home.  He 
related that she was terrified during the process prior to the shootings 
and asked him why he was doing this to her.  Appellant admitted that 
he shot Caday, and said “the gun just went off into her back and she’s 
slumped over.  And she was still breathing for awhile and that’s it.”  
Appellant told the operator he planned to kill himself. 
During the course of these events on March 5, 1999, appellant 
telephoned his wife three times from the apartment.  His wife testified 
that during the first call she could hear a woman screaming in the 
background.  Appellant’s wife further testified that the screaming 
woman sounded “very, very upset.”  When Lynch called a second 
time, he admitted to having just shot someone. 
Prior to being escorted from the apartment by police, Lynch 
also talked to a police negotiator.  The negotiator testified that Lynch 
told her that during the thirty to forty minutes he held Caday hostage 
prior to the shootings, Caday was terrified, he displayed the handgun 
to her, she was aware of the weapon, and appeared to be frightened.  
He confided in the negotiator that Caday had complied with his 
requests only out of fear.  Finally, appellant described the events 
leading to Morgan’s death by admitting that he had confronted her at 
the door to the apartment, shot her in the leg, pulled her into the 
apartment, and then shot her again in the back of the head.  
Several of Morgan’s neighbors in the apartment complex also 
testified as to the events of March 5, 1999.  Morgan’s neighbor across 
the hall testified that she looked out of the peephole in her door after 
hearing the initial shots and saw Lynch dragging Morgan by the hands 
into Morgan’s apartment.  She further testified that Lynch knocked on 
the door to Morgan’s apartment and said, “Hurry up, open the door, 
your mom is hurt.”  The neighbor testified that Morgan was screaming 
 
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and was bloody from her waist down.  Morgan’s neighbor further 
testified that the door was opened, then after entering with Morgan, 
Lynch closed the door and approximately five minutes later she heard 
the sound of three more gunshots.  A second neighbor in the 
apartment complex also testified that approximately five to seven 
minutes after she heard the initial gunshots, she heard three more. 
Id. at 366-67 (footnote omitted). 
 
In imposing death sentences for the murders, the trial court found three 
aggravating factors as to the murder of Morgan:  (1) the murder was cold, 
calculated and premeditated (CCP) (great weight); (2) Lynch had previously been 
convicted of a prior violent felony (the murder of Caday) (moderate weight); and 
(3) the murder was committed while Lynch was engaged in one or more other 
felonies (little weight).3  See id. at 368.  As to the murder of Caday, the trial court 
also found three aggravating factors:  (1) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC) (great weight); (2) Lynch had previously been convicted of a prior 
violent felony (the murder of Morgan) (great weight); and (3) the murder was 
committed while Lynch was engaged in one or more other felonies (moderate 
weight).  See id.  With regard to mitigation, the trial judge found one statutory 
mitigator and eight nonstatutory mitigators:  
The statutory mitigating factor found was that Lynch had no 
significant history of prior criminal activity (moderate weight).  The 
eight nonstatutory mitigators were:  (1) the crime was committed 
while defendant was under the influence of a mental or emotional 
                                          
 
3.  The trial court considered the kidnapping of Caday and the armed 
burglary of the victims’ apartment as the additional contemporaneous felonies. 
  
 
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disturbance [but the disturbance was not extreme] (moderate weight); 
(2) the defendant’s capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired [but not severely impaired] 
(moderate weight); (3) the defendant suffered from a mental illness at 
the time of the offense (little weight); (4) the defendant was 
emotionally and physically abused as a child (little weight); (5) the 
defendant had a history of alcohol abuse (little weight); (6) the 
defendant had adjusted well to incarceration (little weight); (7) the 
defendant cooperated with police (moderate weight); (8) the 
defendant’s expression of remorse, the fact that he has been a good 
father to his children, and his intent to maintain his relationship with 
his children (little weight).  
Id. at 368 n.5. 
 
A.  Direct Appeal 
 
On direct appeal, Lynch raised the following issues:  (1) the trial court erred 
in finding the HAC aggravator as to the murder of Caday and the CCP aggravator 
as to the murder of Morgan; (2) the sentencing order was unclear with regard to the 
findings of the mental-health mitigators, and this Court was required either to 
construe the findings as statutory mitigators or remand to the trial court for 
clarification; (3) the death sentences were disproportionate; and  (4) Florida’s 
death-penalty scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.  See id. at 368-
379.  We denied relief as to all claims and affirmed Lynch’s convictions and 
sentences.  See id. at 379.  The United States Supreme Court denied Lynch’s 
petition for writ of certiorari on October 6, 2003.  See Lynch v. Florida, 540 U.S. 
867 (2003) (No. 02-11318). 
B.  Rule 3.851 Postconviction Proceedings 
 
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On July 27, 2004, Lynch filed a rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief 
with the circuit court raising the following issues and sub-issues:  (1) Guilt-phase 
ineffective assistance of counsel—(a) failure to move to dismiss count three of the 
indictment (armed burglary of a dwelling), (b) failure to advise Lynch of potential 
defenses to the charged offenses, (c) failure to advise Lynch that his guilty plea 
automatically established certain aggravators (contemporaneous violent felonies—
murder, kidnapping, and armed burglary), (d) failure to advise Lynch of mitigation 
prior to entering a guilty plea due to a failure to investigate, (e) failure to suppress 
evidence seized from Lynch’s home, (f) failure to consult a firearms expert 
concerning the Glock G30 .45-caliber, semi-automatic pistol’s “hair trigger” and 
lack of a manual safety, (g) failure to investigate the relationship of Greg Morgan 
(the estranged husband and stepfather of the victims), Roseanna Morgan, and Leah 
Caday as to each other and as to Lynch (Lynch withdrew this claim before the 
postconviction hearing), (h) failure to advise Lynch of the confidential-marital 
communications privilege and its relevance to Lynch’s murder-suicide letter and 
his phone conversations with his wife, Virginia Lynch, (i) failure to ensure an 
adequate factual basis as to the charged offenses; (2) Penalty-phase ineffective 
assistance of counsel—(a) failure to advise Lynch concerning his waiver of a 
penalty-phase jury, (b) failure to conduct an appropriate mitigation investigation 
and failure to present potentially dispositive mitigation, (c) failure to ensure a 
 
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competent, appropriate mental-health evaluation, (d) failure to suppress evidence 
seized from Lynch’s home, (e) failure to present an accidental-discharge defense 
and failure to adequately cross-examine the State’s firearms expert (Nanette 
Rudolph), (f) failure to investigate the relationship of Greg Morgan, Roseanna 
Morgan, and Leah Caday as to each other and as to Lynch (Lynch withdrew this 
claim before the postconviction hearing), (g) failure to file a motion to suppress the 
murder-suicide letter and Lynch’s phone conversations with his wife based upon 
the confidential-marital communications privilege, (h) failure to effectively cross-
examine the State’s mental-health expert (Dr. William Riebsame), (i) cumulative 
error; (3) Incompetent mental-health assistance:   Lynch was deprived of his due-
process right to develop factors in mitigation because the appointed psychiatrist 
failed to conduct the appropriate tests for organic brain damage and mental illness; 
(4) Alleged Brady4 violations; (5) Alleged Giglio5 violations; (6) Reassertion of 
guilt-phase ineffectiveness contention that Lynch’s plea was involuntary; (7) The 
State’s loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence (Lynch withdrew this claim 
before the postconviction hearing); (8) Newly discovered evidence renders the 
opinion of the State’s mental-health expert unreliable; and (9) Cumulative error.   
                                          
 
4.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
  
5.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  
 
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The State filed a response and an amended response to Lynch’s rule 3.851 
motion.  The postconviction court, which was also the trial court, granted an 
evidentiary hearing for all claims except those that Lynch voluntarily withdrew.  
The court later held a rule 3.851 hearing from July 25-30, 2005.  On April 3, 2006, 
the postconviction court denied relief as to all claims.  On April 10, 2006, the court 
entered an amended order denying relief and an order clarifying the order entered 
on April 3, 2006.   
On April 13, 2006, in response to the statement in the April 10th 
postconviction order that “the Court took the time to inspect the [Glock G30] in 
chambers, and the trigger pull is not even close to being a ‘hair trigger,’ ” Lynch 
filed a motion to disqualify the postconviction judge.  Lynch premised his motion 
on Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160,6 section 38.10, Florida Statutes 
(2006), and Canon 3E(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Specifically, he 
asserted that “[t]he Court test-fired the [Glock G30] in chambers, presumably 
without bullets, . . . to determine the trigger pull of the gun.  This testing was done 
ex parte, without notice to counsel.”  Lynch thus concluded that the postconviction 
court “made itself an expert material witness for the State in these proceedings,” 
was consequently biased, and should have recused itself.   
                                          
 
6.  In 2006, we renumbered rule 2.160 as rule 2.330.  See In re Amendments 
to Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin., 939 So. 2d 966, 1003 (Fla. 2006). 
 
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The State responded on April 19, 2006, contending that (1) the 
postconviction court, as the trier of fact during both the penalty phase and the 
postconviction hearing, had the right to inspect materials in evidence (the Glock 
G30 was unquestionably in evidence and the postconviction court took judicial 
notice of the trial proceedings in their entirety); (2) the judge had not conducted an 
“ex parte testing” because counsel for the State was not present (instead, this was 
an “in camera inspection”); and (3) the postconviction court was not a “material 
witness” because both parties’ firearms experts had previously testified concerning 
the trigger pull of the weapon.  On April 21, 2006, the postconviction court denied 
Lynch’s motion to disqualify as “legally insufficient.”  Lynch then filed an 
emergency petition for writ of prohibition with this Court.  On July 11, 2006, we 
denied this petition without prejudice to enable Lynch to raise this issue along with 
others during his postconviction appeal.   
On October 9, 2006, the postconviction court issued a second amended order 
denying Lynch’s rule 3.851 motion and denying rehearing, in which it addressed 
Lynch’s judicial-bias claim.  The court interpreted our denial of Lynch’s petition 
for writ of prohibition as a signal that it was free to address the merits of this bias 
claim.  The postconviction court concluded that it had not “tested” the gun and that 
it had not acted as a material witness; rather, the court, as the factfinder, simply 
examined a piece of evidence in chambers and corroborated the claims of the 
 
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relevant experts that the trigger pull of this particular Glock G30 fell within the 
normal range. 
C.  Habeas Corpus 
 
On July 3, 2007, Lynch filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this 
Court challenging the legality of his confinement under the United States and 
Florida Constitutions.  Lynch asserts four separate habeas claims.   
We address each of Lynch’s rule 3.851 and habeas claims below. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Guilt-Phase Ineffectiveness 
 
Lynch first alleges that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase 
of his capital proceeding.  With regard to such ineffectiveness claims, we employ a 
mixed standard of review, through which we defer to the circuit court’s factual 
findings so long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
review its legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 
(Fla. 2004).  Under this standard, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel 
performed effectively.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  
Therefore, “the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation 
was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and was not a matter of 
sound trial strategy.”  State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 2001) (citing 
Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313, 319 (Fla. 1999)).   
 
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We explained the standard for guilt-phase ineffectiveness claims with regard 
to pleas in Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004).  First, the defendant 
must specifically identify acts or omissions of counsel that were manifestly outside 
the wide range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional 
norms.  See id. at 1179 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985)).  Second, “[a] defendant who has pleaded guilty who 
claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise of an available 
defense establishes Strickland’s prejudice prong by demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181.  
“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or 
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the 
result unreliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Under the second prong of this 
test, 
[i]t is not necessary for the defendant to show that he actually would 
have prevailed at trial, although the strength of the government’s case 
against the defendant should be considered in evaluating whether the 
defendant really would have gone to trial if he had received adequate 
advice from his counsel.  
  
Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181 (quoting Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1069 
(10th Cir. 2001)).  We will consider 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including such 
factors as whether a particular defense was likely to succeed at trial, 
 
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the colloquy between the defendant and the trial court at the time of 
the plea, and the difference between the sentence imposed under the 
plea and the maximum possible sentence the defendant faced at a trial.   
 
Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181-82.  
Having established the applicable standards, we address each of Lynch’s 
guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaims below.  We find that in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, trial counsel made the reasonable strategic 
determination that this was purely a penalty-phase case and that the soundest 
means of avoiding the imposition of a death sentence was to concentrate on 
presenting compelling mitigation evidence. 
i.  The Charged Offenses 
Lynch contends that his trial counsel did not properly research and inform 
him of the elements of, and defenses to, armed burglary, kidnapping, and first-
degree murder and that, but for these errors, he would not have pled guilty.  We 
disagree and, instead, find that trial counsel properly advised Lynch. 
Based on the nature of the crimes Lynch committed, and the fact that he 
confessed on at least three occasions, trial counsel believed that this was purely a 
sentencing case.  Therefore, lead trial counsel, James E. Figgatt, in conjunction 
with co-counsel, Timothy Caudill, made a strategic decision to recommend that 
Lynch plead guilty and concentrate on mitigating his culpability for these offenses 
during the ensuing penalty phase.  Counsel were particularly concerned with 
 
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exposing Lynch to a jury because this case involved a thoroughly planned double 
murder of a mother and her thirteen-year-old minor daughter (although the murder 
of the daughter was an unintended, felony murder).  During the postconviction 
hearing, Mr. Figgatt testified that he reviewed the indictment for defects and that 
he discussed possible defenses with Lynch before he pled guilty.  Second-chair 
trial counsel, Mr. Caudill, did not believe that the facts of this case reasonably 
supported any theoretical defenses because Lynch had confessed to his actions 
during (1) a thirty- to forty-minute recorded conversation with a 911 dispatcher, (2) 
a discussion with a police negotiator, and (3) a videotaped confession (although 
Lynch characterized the murders as “accidental”).  In Caudill’s mind, the facts of 
this case were wholly inconsistent with accidental discharge, Lynch’s actions 
supported a kidnapping charge, and the testimony of a neighbor—who lived 
directly across the hall from the victims—was extremely damaging to any burglary 
defense.  As we stated on direct appeal, the neighbor 
testified that she looked out of the peephole in her door after hearing 
the initial shots and saw Lynch dragging Morgan by the hands into 
Morgan’s apartment.  She further testified that Lynch knocked on the 
door to Morgan’s apartment and said, “Hurry up, open the door, your 
mom is hurt.”  The neighbor testified that Morgan was screaming and 
was bloody from her waist down.  Morgan’s neighbor further testified 
that the door was opened, then after entering with Morgan, Lynch 
closed the door and approximately five minutes later she heard the 
sound of three more gunshots. 
 
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 367 (emphasis supplied).  
 
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Lynch hinges this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim on his reading of the 
factual proffer Mr. Figgatt presented to the trial court during Lynch’s plea 
colloquy.  In relevant part, Mr. Figgatt stated that Lynch 
went to [Roseanna Morgan’s] new home . . . , he approached her 
daughter [Leah Caday] who was coming home from school, he gained 
entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [(i.e., his initial 
entry)].  Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one of two or 
three firearms.  And at that point in time the kidnapping ensues, as 
well as what we contend or what the State contends and we admit 
was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to be 
there was gone.  Subsequently, Ms. Morgan, . . . arrived at her 
apartment, her home.  She was met at the door, . . . she had a heated 
discussion with [Lynch], and refused to come into the apartment with 
him there. . . .  [Ms. Morgan] was shot on her front stoop or porch 
area in front of the apartment, and then pulled inside. . . .  [Lynch] 
shot [Morgan] with more than one of the guns that he brought. . . .  
Ms. Caday either went to her mother or attempted to leave and got in 
the way of the shooting and she was shot one time and she died. . . .  
While [Lynch] was there he called the Sanford Police Department or 
911 and got the Sanford Police Department dispatcher, who remained 
on the line with him from thirty-five to forty-five minutes.  There is 
no issue of fact.  
  
 (Emphasis supplied.)  Based on his reading of the proffer, Lynch contends that 
counsel and the trial court failed to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.172(a), which states that “[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, the trial judge shall determine that the plea is voluntarily entered and 
that a factual basis for the plea exists.  Counsel for the prosecution and the defense 
shall assist the trial judge in this function.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Lynch asserts 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the factual proffer did not 
 
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legally support his convictions for first-degree murder, armed burglary, or 
kidnapping, and that this deficient performance constitutes fundamental error. 
a.  First-Degree Murder 
We find no deficiency with regard to the factual proffer as it addresses 
Lynch’s two first-degree murder convictions.  The proffer, upon which the trial 
court relied in accepting Lynch’s plea, provided sufficient factual support for each 
first-degree murder conviction.  Cf. Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 271-73 (Fla. 
1975); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(a).  According to the proffer, Lynch arrived at the 
victims’ apartment, held the daughter-victim (Leah Caday) hostage, and then 
subsequently shot and killed both victims after the mother-victim (Roseanna 
Morgan) arrived at the apartment.  There was no deficiency.  Lynch’s killing of 
Morgan was an intentional, premeditated first-degree murder, and his killing of 
Caday was both first-degree felony murder and first-degree murder under the 
doctrine of transferred intent.  See § 782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) 
(premeditated murder); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2 (defining “premeditation” 
and “transferred intent”); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder 
committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson 
v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 951 (Fla. 2007) (“Premeditation can be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence such as ‘the nature of the weapon used, the presence or 
absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the 
 
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manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the 
wounds inflicted.’ ” (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2056 (2008); Lee v. State, 141 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1962) 
(explaining our adherence to the doctrine of transferred intent). 
However, even if we were to conclude that counsel performed deficiently 
with regard to the proffer, Lynch cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this 
deficiency because both he and counsel were well aware that the State possessed 
the necessary evidence to prove his commission of these murders.  The State 
submitted a competing written factual proffer, which was more explicit in 
describing the offenses Lynch committed on March 5, 1999.  Trial counsel offered 
their factual proffer in the hope of softening some or all of the facts for purposes of 
the penalty phase.  As Mr. Figgatt recognized during the postconviction hearing, 
this was a sentencing case, this always was a sentencing case.  When 
Mr. Lynch finished his thirty to forty-five minute conversation with 
the [911] dispatcher and the acts that were done were done, this was a 
sentencing case. . . .  This was not a trial in the sense of guilt or 
innocence.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  The evidence and testimony presented during the penalty 
phase more than adequately support the two first-degree murder convictions.  
Lynch thoroughly planned and executed the murder portion of his murder-suicide 
plot (i.e., the murder of Roseanna Morgan).  As we determined on direct appeal:  
(1) Lynch drafted a murder-suicide letter in which he disclosed his plan to kill 
 
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Roseanna Morgan and then commit suicide; (2) Lynch packed a bag with three 
loaded firearms and brought them with him to the victims’ apartment; (3) Lynch 
concealed his vehicle to prevent the victims from seeing it; (4) Lynch held Leah 
Caday hostage for thirty to forty minutes while he waited for her mother; (5) 
Lynch shot Morgan five times (four times with the Glock G30 and once with 
another weapon); and (6) Lynch shot Caday while in the process of murdering 
Morgan.  Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 366-79.  Additionally, the facts established during 
the penalty phase clearly demonstrated that Lynch had not only exhibited a 
premeditated intent to murder Morgan, but had also exhibited the “heightened 
premeditation” necessary to support the CCP statutory aggravator as we held on 
direct appeal.  See id. at 373.   
The facts also support Lynch’s conviction for the first-degree murder of 
Caday.  The sentencing court found that Lynch did not intend to kill Caday; 
however, the court also recognized that intent is not an issue where one kills 
another in the course of committing an enumerated felony.  See § 
782.04(1)(a)(2)(e)-(f),(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (to kill another while “engaged in the 
perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,” “e.  Burglary,” “f.  Kidnapping,” 
“o.  Murder of another human being,” “is murder in the first degree and constitutes 
a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082” (emphasis supplied)).  Thus, 
the unintentional killing of Caday during the intentional, premeditated killing of 
 
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Morgan renders the killing of Caday a “murder in the first degree” and a “capital 
felony.”  Lynch’s armed-burglary and kidnapping felonies also render the killing 
of Caday first-degree felony murder. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of transferred intent converts the unintentional 
killing of Caday into a first-degree capital murder.  This Court held in Lee v. State 
that 
one who kills a person through mistaken identity or accident, with a 
premeditated design to kill another is guilty of murder in the first 
degree . . . .  The law transfers the felonious intent in such a case to 
the actual object of his assault, and the homicide so committed is 
murder in the first degree.   
 
141 So. 2d at 259 (emphasis supplied).  The indictment alleges that Lynch 
possessed a premeditated design to murder both Morgan and Caday.7  The 
sentencing court found that Lynch only possessed an intent to murder Morgan.  
Competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lynch did not intend 
to kill Caday.  These facts are not defenses to first-degree murder because the 
felony-murder rule and the doctrine of transferred intent apply under these 
circumstances.   
                                          
 
 
7.  The fact that the indictment charged Lynch with the premeditated murder 
of Caday is of no moment because “[w]e have previously held that the State may 
proceed on theories of both premeditated and felony murder when only 
premeditated first-degree murder is charged and that a special verdict form 
demonstrating which theory the jury based its verdict on is not required.”  Bedford 
v. State, 589 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 1991) (citing Young v. State, 579 So. 2d 721, 
724 (Fla. 1991)).   
 
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In sum, the factual proffer was adequate to support each first-degree murder 
conviction.  Further, even assuming that counsel were deficient in this regard 
(which they were not), the facts of this case reveal that any hypothetical prejudice 
Lynch may have suffered from his counsel’s off-the-cuff factual proffer was de 
minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty.  Counsel and 
Lynch were well aware of the wealth of evidence supporting the allegations that 
Lynch committed two first-degree murders on March 5, 1999.  Moreover, the trial 
court was exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch before it allowed him 
to enter his guilty pleas, and trial counsel only submitted Lynch’s competing 
factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase.  Lynch has thus 
not satisfied his burden under Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1179-80.     
b.  Armed Burglary 
Lynch next contends that our decisions in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 
(Fla. 2000), and State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2003), compel the conclusion 
that he did not commit a burglary on March 5, 1999, and that he would not have 
pled guilty had counsel informed him of this case law.  He premises this contention 
on the following portion of his guilt-phase factual proffer: 
[H]e gained entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [(i.e., 
his initial entry)].  Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one 
of two or three firearms.  And at that point in time the kidnapping 
ensues, as well as what we contend or what the State contends and we 
admit was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to 
be there was gone. 
 
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(Emphasis supplied.)  The 1999 version of section 810.02, Florida Statutes, which 
applies to Lynch’s armed burglary, states:  
“Burglary” means entering or remaining in a dwelling . . . with the 
intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time 
open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to remain. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  In Delgado, we held that the rule of lenity (codified in 
section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes) required that the “remaining in” element of 
burglary be limited to situations where the defendant surreptitiously remains after 
having received consent to enter; otherwise, the State could charge that a burglary 
had occurred in any situation in which an individual entered a dwelling with 
consent and later committed an offense therein.  In Ruiz, we stated: 
[T]he essence of Delgado is that evidence of a crime committed inside 
the dwelling, structure, or conveyance of another cannot, in and of 
itself, establish the crime of burglary.  Stated differently, the State 
cannot use “the criminal act to prove both intent and revocation” of 
the consent to enter. 
 
863 So. 2d at 1211 (quoting Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 238).  Delgado applies to 
burglaries committed before February 1, 2000, which had not been finally 
adjudicated at the time this Court issued its opinion in that case (i.e., August 24, 
2000).  See Ruiz, 863 So. 2d at 1212.  Lynch committed this armed burglary on 
March, 5, 1999, and his direct appeal was not finalized until January 9, 2003.  See 
 
- 20 -
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 362.8  Consequently, Delgado applies to Lynch’s armed-
burglary offense. 
 
Lynch is correct that during his guilt-phase proceeding trial counsel 
misapprehended the then-existing nature of burglary.  The facts counsel proffered 
during the plea colloquy would not support a burglary conviction under Delgado 
because counsel stated Lynch entered the victims’ apartment with the consent of 
Leah Caday.  The State could not have used the kidnapping of Caday and the 
murders of Caday and Morgan to prove the burglary elements of (1) lack of 
consent or revocation of consent and (2) intent to commit an offense within the 
dwelling.  See Ruiz, 863 So. 2d at 1211.  However, any deficiency in this regard 
did not prejudice Lynch because trial counsel and Lynch were well aware that he 
exited the apartment and thereafter sought a non-consensual reentry after having 
wounded Morgan with three shots from the Glock G30.  “Lynch knocked on the 
door to Morgan’s apartment and said [to Caday], ‘Hurry up, open the door, your 
mom is hurt.’ ”  Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis supplied).  Consent to enter 
induced through fraud or deceit is illusory as a matter of law, and we conclude that 
the same rationale applies to consent induced through coercion or implied threat of 
force.  Cf., e.g., Andrews v. State, 973 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) 
                                          
 
8.  As explained in Ruiz, the Legislature statutorily abrogated our Delgado 
decision as applied to burglary offenses committed after February 1, 2000.  See 
Ruiz, 863 So. 2d at 1205-12.    
 
- 21 -
(holding that consent obtained through fraud or deceit (i.e., false pretense) is a 
legal nullity).  Lynch compelled a minor to open the door of her apartment by 
shooting her mother and then using her mother’s injuries to gain access to the 
dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein (i.e., the murder of Roseanna 
Morgan).  This is not a consensual entry.  Lynch and his trial counsel knew that the 
State possessed facts sufficient to establish burglary.  Therefore, the facts of this 
case reveal that any prejudice Lynch alleges that he may have suffered from his 
counsel’s off-the-cuff factual proffer would not have altered his decision to plead 
guilty to the offense of armed burglary.       
c.  Kidnapping 
In the final portion of this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch 
contends that the factual proffer is legally insufficient to support a kidnapping 
conviction under our decisions in Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983), and 
Berry v. State, 668 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1996).  Lynch cannot demonstrate prejudice 
and, for this reason, we need not address whether the performance of counsel was 
deficient.  See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (“A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling 
on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice 
component is not satisfied.”). 
 
- 22 -
In Faison, we recognized that the plain text of section 787.01, Florida 
Statutes, could lead to potentially absurd results.  To limit the scope of this statute, 
and to prevent any crime that involves some level of confinement or detention 
from also constituting a kidnapping, we adopted the three-part test articulated by 
the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720 (Kan. 1976): 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate 
the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting 
movement or confinement:  
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to 
the other crime;  
  
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other 
crime; and  
  
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime 
in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or 
substantially lessens the risk of detection. 
  
Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (emphasis supplied).  
We also explained that we had previously “adopted the view that subsection 
787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were 
merely incidental to other felonies, but [had] recognized an exception in the case of 
hostages.”  426 So. 2d at 966 (emphasis supplied) (explaining the holding of 
Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1036-37 (Fla. 1982)).  In Berry, we reaffirmed 
our adherence to the Faison/Buggs test and stated that “the inquiry into whether a 
kidnapping has occurred does not end with an examination of the statute. . . . 
[T]here can be no kidnapping where the only confinement involved is the sort that, 
 
- 23 -
though not necessary to the underlying felony, is likely to naturally accompany it.”  
Berry, 668 So. 2d at 969 (emphasis supplied). 
 
Here, Lynch maintains that his confinement of Caday was wholly incidental 
to the murders of Caday and Morgan.  This assertion is inconsistent with the facts 
of this case.  Lynch approached Caday and lured her into her apartment by stating 
that he wished to speak with her mother.  Once inside, Lynch withdrew a number 
of firearms from his bag, and he has subsequently admitted that (1) Caday was 
aware of the firearms, (2) he “technically” held Caday hostage, (3) she was 
“terrified,” and (4) she only complied with his demands based on fear.  Under the 
three-part Faison test and the hostage exception from Mobley, Lynch committed a 
kidnapping on March 5, 1999.  First, his movement of Caday was not 
inconsequential.  He wanted access to Caday’s apartment to kill her mother, 
Roseanna Morgan, and he lured Caday there by stating that he wanted to speak to 
Morgan.  Second, Lynch’s kidnapping and confinement of Caday was not inherent 
in his intentional murder of Morgan and his erstwhile unintentional killing of 
Caday.  Lynch could have killed Morgan without ever holding Caday hostage, as 
evidenced by his frequent trips to Morgan’s place of business prior to the events of 
March 5, 1999, and Lynch did not intend to kill Caday.  Third and finally, Lynch’s 
kidnapping of Caday made his murder of Morgan “substantially easier . . . [and] 
substantially lessen[ed] the risk of detection,” because Caday otherwise could have 
 
- 24 -
warned her mother or notified neighbors and law enforcement that an armed man 
was stationed in her apartment waiting for her mother to return home.  Faison, 426 
So. 2d at 965; Berry, 668 So. 2d at 969.  Trial counsel and Lynch were well aware 
that the facts of this case supported a kidnapping charge and conviction.  
Therefore, any prejudice Lynch allegedly suffered from his counsel’s factual 
proffer was de minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty to 
the offense of kidnapping. 
Trial counsel’s verbal factual proffer in response to the State’s written 
proffer was not deficient with regard to the first-degree murder charges.  With 
regard to the remaining charges, the proffer did not materially prejudice Lynch 
because counsel and Lynch knew that the facts of this case clearly supported 
convictions for both offenses.  Furthermore, as stated above, the trial court was 
exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch, and trial counsel only submitted 
a competing factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase.  
Consequently, we deny relief with regard to this guilt-phase ineffectiveness 
subclaim. 
ii.  The Confidential Marital-Communications Privilege 
In his second guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch contends that trial 
counsel were ineffective by failing to advise him with regard to the confidential 
marital-communications privilege codified in section 90.504, Florida Statutes 
 
- 25 -
(2000).  Lynch claims that had counsel adequately researched this privilege and 
informed him of its application, he would not have pled guilty.  Specifically, 
Lynch states that the timely assertion of this privilege would have allowed him to 
suppress (1) the murder-suicide letter he wrote to his wife, Virginia Lynch, on 
March 3, 1999, and (2) the phone calls he placed to her on March 5, 1999.  
Without these central pieces of evidence, Lynch claims that it would have been 
much easier for counsel to establish the defense theory that these killings were 
purely accidental and that, as a result, he would have proceeded to trial.  We 
disagree because Lynch cannot demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as the 
result of this alleged deficiency. 
Lead trial counsel, Mr. Figgatt, testified during the postconviction 
proceeding that he elected not to file a motion to suppress the murder-suicide letter 
based on his belief that the letter was a nonprivileged communication.  Counsel 
testified that he consulted a Florida evidence treatise and spoke to an appellate-
division public defender concerning the potential suppression of the letter.  “[The 
treatise] basically told me that if the communication was intended to be distributed 
to third parties, I was sort of stuck. . . .  [Mr. Lynch] directed [his wife] to send this 
information that he was providing in the letter to the parents of his estranged 
girlfriend, Miss Morgan.”  Figgatt’s co-counsel, Mr. Caudill, testified that he and 
 
- 26 -
Figgatt believed that they lacked any valid privilege-based legal argument to 
suppress the letter, but could not recall whether they reviewed any specific cases.   
Based on the content of the letter, counsel may have possessed a 
nonfrivolous basis to contend that Lynch did not intend to disclose all of the 
information he related to his wife and did not intend that his wife distribute the 
letter itself.  See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 793 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 2001) (“If . . . the 
trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was sent and from 
the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a voluntary consent to such 
disclosure, then the marital privilege would be waived pursuant to section 90.507. . 
. .  If the court determines, however, that the circumstances together with the 
content of the letter do not indicate that [the defendant] voluntarily consented to 
disclosure . . . , then there was not a waiver.” (footnote omitted)) (quoting and 
reaffirming the totality-based test articulated in Bolin v. State, 650 So. 2d 19, 24 
(Fla. 1995)).   
In relevant part, Lynch’s March 3, 1999, murder-suicide letter stated: 
[Y]ou will find copy of a letter she gave me Jan 11, and a card she 
gave me Feb 2, a week before it ended.  You can see how 
[unreadable] we were and how animalistic she was sexually in card.  
She loved [Lynch’s son] Steven too, [unreadable] fed him bottle, 
changed his diaper, gave him banana.  Make copies of the letter and 
card for me and copies of photos, just print them out on printer, don’t 
have to be full page just 4 X 6 or so.  I want you to send copies of 
letter + card and pictures to her family, Mom + dad in Hawaii, address 
is [statement of address].  [Repetition of address in ALL-CAPS text] – 
her SS# was [***-**-****] born 4/1/68.  I want them to have a sense 
 
- 27 -
of why it happened, some decent closure, a reason and understanding, 
they are good parents like yours.  I want them to know what she did, 
the pain she caused, that it was not just a random act of violence.   
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Mr. Figgatt conceded during the postconviction proceeding 
that one reading of the letter could support the interpretation that Lynch only 
wanted his wife to make copies of the January 11 and February 2 correspondence 
from Roseanna Morgan, along with copies of the nude photographs he had taken of 
Morgan, and to send these materials to Morgan’s family in Hawai’i.  
Notwithstanding this very debatable interpretation of the murder-suicide letter, the 
postconviction court correctly interpreted the letter, and its more persuasive 
interpretation is supported by competent, substantial evidence: 
The Court has carefully read the three exhibits in question and 
concludes that mere disclosure of Exhibits 24 and 25 [Roseanna 
Morgan’s correspondence dated January 11, 1999, and February 2, 
1999] would not have accomplished Lynch’s stated purpose of 
providing the victim’s parents and Virginia Lynch’s parents [with] “a 
sense of why it happened, some decent closure, a reason and 
understanding . . . .  I want them to know what she did, the pain she 
caused, that it was not just a random act of violence. . . .”  Those two 
exhibits contain expressions of affection and . . . a sense of frustration 
over the break up of the relationship with Roseanna Morgan, but they 
do not provide a “reason and understanding” of why “it happened.”  
Nor do they explain “the pain she caused.”  Only the disclosure of the 
contents of the murder-suicide letter, Exhibit 11, would accomplish 
that purpose.  For that reason, the Court concludes that Lynch 
intended for the contents of Exhibit 11 to be disclosed. . . .  
 
 
- 28 -
(Emphasis supplied.) (The postconviction court based its analysis on section 
90.507, Florida Statutes.)9   
The postconviction court’s reasoning focused upon waiver under section 
90.507, Florida Statutes (2000), and there is a threshold issue with regard to the 
murder-suicide letter:  Based on the totality of circumstances, did Lynch ever 
intend that the letter constitute a confidential communication?  Section 90.504(1), 
Florida Statutes (2000), the subsection codifying the confidential marital-
communications privilege, states:  “A spouse has a privilege during and after the 
marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, 
communications which were intended to be made in confidence between the 
spouses while they were husband and wife.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Therefore, 
despite the fact that we broadly construe this privilege to protect spousal 
confidences,10 the confidential marital-communications privilege only applies to 
                                          
 
9.   Section 90.507, Florida Statutes (2000), states: 
 
A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a 
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the 
person, or the person’s predecessor while holder of the privilege, 
voluntarily discloses or makes the communication when he or she 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, or consents to 
disclosure of, any significant part of the matter or communication.  
This section is not applicable when the disclosure is itself a privileged 
communication. 
 
 
10.  “There is a strong public policy supporting the marital privilege.  The 
courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is 
 
- 29 -
communications that were originally intended to be confidential.  Here, the letter 
itself represented Lynch’s entreaty to his wife that she disclose all of this 
information to the victims’ family in Hawai’i.  Therefore, Lynch never intended 
for this message to constitute a confidential marital communication. 
 
With regard to Lynch’s phone calls to his wife during the commission of 
these offenses, at least one of these conversations occurred in the presence of Leah 
Caday.  We found on direct appeal: 
During the course of these events on March 5, 1999, appellant 
telephoned his wife three times from the apartment.  His wife testified 
that during the first call she could hear a woman screaming in the 
background [Leah Caday].  Appellant’s wife further testified that the 
screaming woman sounded “very, very upset.”  When Lynch called a 
second time, he admitted to having just shot someone. 
 
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 366 (emphasis supplied).  At a minimum, Caday was alive 
during Lynch’s first phone call and may have been bleeding to death during 
Lynch’s second and third phone calls.  Therefore, competent, substantial evidence 
supports the postconviction court’s finding and reasoning that the first 
conversation was nonprivileged because it occurred in the presence of a third 
person (Leah Caday) and was not intended to be privileged.  See § 90.507, Fla. 
                                                                                                                                        
‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, 
and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private 
communications are exactly that—private.”  Jackson v. State, 603 So. 2d 670, 671 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (citations omitted) (citing Smith v. State, 344 So. 2d 915, 919 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). 
 
- 30 -
Stat. (2000) (“A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential 
matter or communication waives the privilege if the person . . . makes the 
communication when he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy . 
. . .”  (emphasis supplied)); see also Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 27 n.30 (Fla. 
2003) (noting in persuasive dicta that “[a]s a general rule, when third party 
eavesdroppers hear otherwise privileged communications, the communications are 
not privileged unless the communicating parties had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy” (emphasis supplied)).   
As to the subsequent phone conversations, the postconviction court found 
that Lynch repeated his statements to Joyce Fagan, the 911 dispatcher; therefore, 
“Lynch apparently did not intend it to be privileged since he repeated it, but even if 
it was intended to be privileged, it was cumulative to his later statement and not 
prejudicial.”  In Koon v. State, 463 So. 2d 201, 204 (1985), we held that a 
defendant who confessed to his wife concerning a murder—and repeated this 
statement to his son and mother-in-law—had not waived the confidential marital-
communications privilege.  Thus, repetition (in and of itself) does not 
automatically indicate that the privilege-holder consents to his or her spouse (as 
opposed to a third party) revealing the contents of the repeated marital 
communication.  Nevertheless, Virginia Lynch stated during a sworn statement on 
March 16, 1999, that her sister Juliette participate in the third phone call with 
 
- 31 -
Richard Lynch.  Therefore, the record contains evidence that the third phone call 
was not a confidential marital communication because it occurred in the presence 
of a third party who actually participated in the conversation.  See § 90.507, Fla. 
Stat. (2000); Taylor, 855 So. 2d at 27 n.30.   
Conversely, assuming that Caday and Morgan were dead during the second 
phone call, this call may have been a confidential marital communication.  Trial 
counsel thus could have objected to Virginia Lynch’s penalty-phase testimony 
concerning her second phone conversation with Lynch.  Despite this arguable 
contention, competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court’s 
finding that the subsequent phone calls were cumulative to Lynch’s 911 phone 
conversation with Joyce Fagan.  During the 911 call, Lynch stated:  (1) that he had 
shot two people, that he did not intend to do it, and that they had begun to scream; 
(2) that he accidentally shot Caday; (3) that the Glock accidentally discharged; (4) 
that he planned to commit suicide; (5) that he shot Morgan with two different 
firearms and that he “put her out of her misery”; (6) that he wanted Morgan to 
repay his $6,000 credit-card debt; (7) that Morgan “drove me to it”; (8) that he 
brought three loaded firearms to the victims’ apartment; (9) that Morgan was still 
breathing when he executed her and that “this is not cold blooded,” “this was not a 
thing of if I can’t have her no one else will”; (10) that this was a moment of rage; 
(11) that he planned to leave his wife; (12) that Morgan had endured some “body 
 
- 32 -
hits” before he shot her in the back of the head, and that he had dragged her into 
the apartment to speak with her; (13) that Caday was “terrified” throughout this 
ordeal; (14) that he intentionally parked his vehicle in a concealed location to 
prevent the victims from seeing it and panicking; (15) that he was not a “cold-
blooded executioner”; and (16) that “this was just one of these lover things, you 
know”; and (17) that he wanted to speak with a police negotiator to arrange his 
surrender.  (Emphasis supplied.)  Lynch also repeated many of these statements to 
Stephanie Ryan, the Sanford Police negotiator, and Kristin Ziegler, an investigator 
with the Sanford Police Department.  Therefore, the material substance of Lynch’s 
phone conversations with his wife would have been placed in evidence through the 
testimony of other witnesses, and Lynch has suffered no prejudice in this regard. 
We deny relief on this subclaim. 
iii. Suppression and the Plain-View Doctrine 
 
Lynch’s third guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim is that trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the items seized from his home 
on March 5, 9, and 17, 1999.  We deny this claim because Lynch cannot 
demonstrate that he has suffered any prejudice.  Cf., e.g., Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 
932 (explaining that the Court need not address Strickland’s deficient-performance 
prong if the defendant-appellant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong). 
 
- 33 -
As a preliminary matter, Lynch’s warrant-overbreadth ineffectiveness 
subclaim fails to the extent that he challenges evidence which the police seized but 
which the State never presented during his trial.  See, e.g., Doorbal v. State, 983 
So. 2d 464, 500 (Fla. 2008) (holding that defendant’s claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to seek suppression of certain statements was “without merit 
because the State ultimately did not introduce the statements into evidence”).  
Further, the majority of the allegedly objectionable items did not directly relate to 
Lynch’s guilt (e.g., additional correspondence between Lynch and the victims, 
photos, credit-card statements and receipts, a computer, media-storage devices 
(CDs, diskettes, etc.), a grey lockbox, Lynch’s firearms collection, Lynch’s 
firearms-periodical collection, Lynch’s cameras and photography collection, and 
Lynch’s pornography collection).  On at least three separate occasions, Lynch had 
previously admitted that he killed the victims: (1) a recorded conversation with a 
911 dispatcher, (2) a conversation with a police negotiator, and (3) a videotaped 
interrogation with police investigators.  Therefore, it is improbable that any 
knowledge of the hypothetical ability to suppress these items would have altered 
Lynch’s decision to plead guilty. 
Second, with regard to trial counsel’s supposed failure to seek suppression 
of the murder-suicide letter, we need not address whether counsel rendered 
deficient performance because the letter was plainly admissible under established 
 
- 34 -
Fourth Amendment precedent, viz., decisions outlining the plain-view doctrine.   
As this Court has explained: 
[A] warrantless seizure of evidence found in plain view is admissible 
if at the time of the search:  (1) the seizing officer was legitimately in 
a place where the object could be plainly viewed; (2) the 
incriminating nature of the seized object was immediately apparent to 
the police officer; and (3) the seizing officer had a lawful right of 
access to the object itself.  See Horton [v. California], 496 U.S. [128, 
136-37 (1990)].  With regard to the third requirement, the [High] 
Court explained that the seizing officer may lawfully seize an 
incriminating object if the officer has probable cause prior to the 
seizure and it was discovered within the parameters of a validly 
executed search warrant or one of the exceptions to the [Fourth 
Amendment’s general] warrant [requirement].  See id. at 138; accord 
Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 669, 676 (Fla. 1994).  Indeed, “seizure of 
property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is 
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to 
associate the property with criminal activity.”  Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983) (quoting 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 
639 (1980)). 
 
Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 313 (Fla. 2002).   
In this case, Mrs. Lynch provided sworn deposition testimony disclosing that 
(1) police officers were present in the Lynch home on a consensual basis11 shortly 
following the March 5, 1999, murders of Roseanna Morgan and Leah Caday; (2) 
the police officers were already independently aware of the murder-suicide letter; 
and (3) Mrs. Lynch was in the process of reading this letter in the officers’ 
                                          
 
 
11.  Consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement.  See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
 
- 35 -
presence.  Based upon our independent review, it is abundantly clear from the 
record that these officers requested that Mrs. Lynch relinquish the letter because of 
its evident connection to these murders.  Therefore, we conclude that the police 
officers—who were then present in the Lynch home on a consensual basis—
possessed probable cause to seize the murder-suicide letter, which Mrs. Lynch was 
reading in plain view.  Cf., e.g., Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (“[P]robable cause is a 
flexible, common-sense standard.  It merely requires that the facts available to the 
officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ that certain items 
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.  A 
‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all 
that is required.” (citation omitted) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
162 (1925))).  Lynch has thus suffered no prejudice because the murder-suicide 
letter was plainly admissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.  The nonexistent 
ability to suppress this evidence could not have affected Lynch’s decision to plead 
guilty. 
Accordingly, we deny relief on this subclaim. 
iv.  Accidental Discharge 
 
- 36 -
In his fourth and final guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch alleges 
that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate an accidental-discharge 
defense and that he would have proceeded to trial had he been aware of this 
defense.  We disagree. 
The evidence presented during both the penalty phase and postconviction 
proceedings is clearly inconsistent with an accidental-discharge defense.  
Consequently, as a matter of sound strategy, trial counsel elected not to waste finite 
time and resources preparing such a defense.  “[T]rial counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise an issue that, as illustrated in the evidentiary hearing 
testimony, is clearly unsupported by the record.”  Power v. State, 886 So. 2d 952, 
959 (Fla. 2004) (emphasis supplied).  Competent, substantial evidence supports the 
postconviction court’s analysis of this issue: 
The Glock in question is a large semiautomatic handgun.  It is 
inconceivable that a person could accidentally fire such a weapon 
seven times for a number of reasons.  First, this weapon makes a lot of 
noise when it is fired.  The noise would alert a person who 
accidentally pulls the trigger once and the person would not continue 
to pull the trigger a number of times.  Second, because this weapon is 
a semi-automatic pistol, the trigger must be pulled each time the 
weapon is fired.  Third, large caliber semi-automatic pistols deliver a 
recoil “kick” when fired that tends to throw the barrel upwards and 
away from the target.  It is necessary to re-aim this type of weapon 
towards the general direction of the target each time the trigger is 
pulled unless the weapon is being fired in a totally random manner.  
The evidence in this case does not support random firing.  Fourth, 
there is no mistaking when the firearm is discharging a round.  The 
noise, the recoil, the smoke, and the smell of gunpowder immediately 
brings to the shooter’s attention the fact that a round has been 
 
- 37 -
discharged.  Fifth, it stretches the imagination to think that a person 
could accidentally discharge a semi-automatic weapon seven times 
and accidentally hit the same person four of the seven times.  In such 
a situation, the person is a target and not the unintended victim of an 
accidental discharge.  Sixth, the Court took the time to inspect the 
weapon in chambers, and the trigger pull is not even close to being a 
“hair trigger.”  Seventh, it is undisputed that Lynch carried several 
firearms to Roseanna Morgan’s apartment and fired a 9mm Luger in 
addition to the Glock. 
There was considerable ballistics testimony about the Glock 
pistol during the penalty phase hearing.  Officer Doug Bottalico 
testified he found several projectiles at the crime scene.  One 
projectile was located in the living room.  Another projectile was 
located in the inside of the front door frame.   There was also a bullet 
hole in the wall of the foyer.  Thus, in order to find Mr. Ruel’s 
[Lynch’s postconviction firearms expert] testimony credible, the 
Court would have to believe Lynch accidentally discharged the 
firearm while he was positioned at different locations throughout the 
apartment and then accidentally shot Leah Caday in the back. 
Moreover, Nanette Rudolph, who is employed with the firearms 
department of the Orlando Regional Crime Lab for the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, testified during the penalty phase.  
Ms. Rudolph testified that she completed a two-year formal training 
program in firearms identification.  She explained that her training 
and work experience included examination of projectiles to match 
them with weapons.  Ms. Rudolph testified that she tested the Glock, 
and the Glock was operating correctly and that the trigger pull was 
within normal specifications.  She also explained that the Glock was a 
semi-automatic weapon which requires an individual to release the 
trigger each time before firing the next shot.  She testified that a semi-
automatic will fire only once if a person tenses up and pulls the trigger 
without releasing it.  Automatic weapons will continue to fire as long 
as the trigger is pulled or until the weapon runs out of ammunition.  
Additionally, during the penalty phase, Dr. Seiber, the medical 
examiner, testified that the projectile that caused injury to Roseanna 
Morgan’s eye, entered her eye and exited from her neck, and not the 
other way around as Mr. Ruel testified. 
. . . . 
 
- 38 -
The Court concludes that calling a ballistics expert to testify 
about the murder weapon would not have benefited the defendant at 
trial.   
 
(Record references omitted.)  The only “evidence” contained in the record 
supporting an accidental-discharge claim consisted of (1) Lynch’s self-serving 
rationalization that he accidentally shot Roseanna Morgan four times, accidentally 
shot Leah Caday in the back, and then switched weapons to “put [Morgan] out of 
her misery” by intentionally shooting her in the back of the head; and (2) Roy 
Ruel’s unsubstantiated assertion during the postconviction proceeding that one can 
unintentionally discharge a properly functioning Glock G30 seven separate times, 
while striking an unintended target with nearly sixty-percent accuracy (Lynch fired 
seven shots from the Glock and struck Morgan four times).  Trial counsel made a 
strategic decision not to assert a baseless defense, and “[c]ounsel’s strategic 
decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack.”  Johnson v. State, 769 
So. 2d 990, 1001 (Fla. 2000) (citing Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 
1993)). 
The strategic decision of trial counsel not to pursue an accidental-discharge 
defense did not affect Lynch’s election to plead guilty because the facts of this case 
are simply inconsistent with accidental discharge.  Moreover, this analysis applies 
with equal force to Lynch’s penalty-phase accidental-discharge claim. 
B.  Penalty-Phase Ineffectiveness 
 
 
- 39 -
 
“To succeed in an ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel claim, the 
claimant must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and that such 
deficiency prejudiced his defense.”  Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1124 
(2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  “Prejudice, in the context of penalty 
phase errors, is shown where, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability 
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been 
different or the deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the 
proceedings.”  Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 n.14 (Fla. 1999), receded from 
on other grounds by Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 582-83 (Fla. 2004).  As 
previously stated, ineffectiveness claims present mixed questions of law and fact.  
With regard to factual questions, we defer to the findings of the trial court so long 
as they are based upon competent, substantial evidence.  In contrast, we review de 
novo related questions of law.  See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031-
33 (Fla. 1999).  We presume that counsel acted effectively and we likewise 
endeavor to avoid the pitfalls of hindsight bias.  Thus, the burden is on the 
defendant to affirmatively satisfy both prongs of the Strickland framework.  See 
Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 376-77 (Fla. 2007); Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.   
i. The Strategic Decision to Waive a Penalty-Phase Jury 
 
This claim primarily consists of a recrafted version of Lynch’s first guilt-
phase ineffectiveness subclaim combined with allegations related to mental-health 
 
- 40 -
mitigation, through which Lynch contends that he would not have waived a 
penalty-phase jury had counsel adequately informed him of the elements of and 
defenses to the charged offenses along with his diagnosis of “mild cognitive 
impairment.”  However, as previously stated, trial counsel did discuss the elements 
of and legal defenses to first-degree murder, armed burglary, and kidnapping with 
Lynch.  Competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that no valid 
defenses existed in this case.  See analysis in Part II.A.i, supra.  Additionally, as 
explained in later portions of our analysis, Lynch’s “mild cognitive impairment” 
has not affected his ability to lead an otherwise normal life, he is of average overall 
intelligence, and he has never connected this “impairment” to his actions on March 
5, 1999, or his decisions with regard to how to best proceed in this case.  See 
analysis in Parts II.B.ii and II.E.ii, infra.  Therefore, Lynch’s asserted ignorance of 
hypothetical, unsupported defenses and a comparatively minor mental-health 
diagnosis could not have affected his decision to waive a penalty-phase jury.  
Moreover, Mr. Figgatt testified that he discussed potential aggravators with Lynch 
before Lynch pled guilty and waived a penalty-phase jury.  Second-chair trial 
counsel, Mr. Caudill, corroborated this statement.  As explained above, trial 
counsel’s less than complete guilt-phase factual proffer did not prejudice Lynch 
because both he and trial counsel were well aware of the fact that the State 
 
- 41 -
possessed the necessary evidence to prove his guilt for each charged offense.  See 
analysis in Part II.A.i, supra. 
Counsel were justifiably concerned that this case involved a thoroughly 
planned and executed murder of a former lover and the accompanying murder of 
her minor daughter.  Trial counsel’s recommendation was a strategic decision to 
conduct the penalty phase with the court sitting as the factfinder.  In the words of 
trial counsel, they were “presenting this to a judge who wasn’t going to be 
emotional about the fact that there was a death of a child, and the jury was going to 
be.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Lynch has not demonstrated prejudice, and it is unclear 
how further discussion of hypothetical defenses, which did not exist in this case, 
and a comparatively minor mental-health diagnosis would have altered his decision 
to forgo a penalty-phase jury in favor of a potentially less emotional, highly 
experienced jurist. 
Accordingly, we deny relief on this subclaim.   
ii.  Mitigation 
Lynch also presents a penalty-phase subclaim that counsel failed to conduct 
a reasonably competent mitigation investigation and present evidence of cognitive 
impairment.  We deny relief on this subclaim because Lynch cannot demonstrate 
that he has suffered any prejudice. 
 
- 42 -
With one major exception (Lynch’s mild cognitive impairment) and several 
minor exceptions, the mitigation evidence and testimony that he presented during 
the postconviction proceedings “may generally be described as only a more 
detailed presentation of the mitigation that was actually presented during the 
penalty phase.”  Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007).  During the 
postconviction proceedings, Lynch presented the lay testimony of Eugene Cody 
(his barber in Sanford, Florida), Edward Corso (Lynch’s cousin by marriage), 
Danelle Pepe (Lynch’s cousin), Vesna Lovsin (a former coworker who did not 
remember Lynch, but whom Lynch claimed was a former lover), Joseph Joyce 
(Lynch’s landlord when he resided in New York), and George Kabbaz, Jr. (an 
acquaintance from New York whose father also knew Lynch).  The testimony with 
regard to Lynch’s personal history and background merely corroborated or slightly 
expanded upon penalty-phase testimony, and this Court has held that  “even if 
alternate witnesses could provide more detailed testimony, trial counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.”   Darling, 966 So. 2d at 377 
(citing Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002); Sweet v. State, 810 
So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002)).  For the most part, the postconviction lay 
witnesses simply provided slightly more detail concerning the fact that Lynch was 
(1) a geeky, weird kid, a “Little Lord Fauntleroy,”12 which referred to Lynch’s 
                                          
 
12.  A late nineteenth-century children’s novel by Frances Hodgson Burnett 
 
- 43 -
perpetually fastidious mode of dress; (2) Lynch did not have many friends; (3) 
Lynch did not have any girlfriends until he met his wife, Virginia Lynch; (4) 
Lynch was a “peculiar,” “weird,” “quirky,” “strange” adult; (5) Lynch’s father was 
a strict disciplinarian; (5) Lynch was extremely close to his mother and spent much 
of his time with her; and (6) Lynch lived with his mother until his thirties and slept 
in a bedroom with his parents—and later his widowed mother—into early 
adulthood (Lynch had his own bed, and for most of this time, he and his parents 
resided in a one-bedroom apartment in Brooklyn, New York).    
During the penalty-phase proceedings, Dr. Jacquelyn Olander—a forensic 
neuropsychologist and Lynch’s mental-health expert—provided comparable 
testimony that (1) Lynch’s father was a security guard who was laid off due to a 
disability and became a stay-at-home father, (2) Lynch’s father was a very strict 
disciplinarian and required Lynch to report to him every thirty minutes, (3) if 
Lynch was outside playing, his father required him to check in at excessively 
frequent intervals, (4) if Lynch’s father was not home, he required Lynch to sign a 
sheet evidencing his check-ins, (5) neighborhood children teased Lynch 
concerning his check-ins with his father, (6) Lynch’s father inflicted significant 
abuse, (7) Lynch’s aunt, cousins, and next-door neighbor reported a lack of 
                                                                                                                                        
about an American-born commoner of noble lineage who eventually becomes a 
British aristocrat and reconciles his American mother with his grandfather, a 
British earl.     
 
- 44 -
positive interaction between Lynch and his father, (8) the family described Lynch 
as a caring individual but “weird,” “strange,” and “rigid” (9) Lynch’s cousin, 
Danelle Pepe, described one instance in which Lynch was reading a magazine 
upside-down, (10) Lynch washed his hands and automobile excessively, (11) 
Lynch had a very close relationship with his mother, (12) when Lynch’s mother 
attempted to “run interference between” Lynch and his father, the father would 
physically abuse the mother in Lynch’s presence, and (13) Lynch lived with his 
mother into his thirties, and even for a short time after his marriage to Virginia 
Lynch.  Dr. Olander’s psychological report and penalty-phase testimony 
demonstrated a thorough understanding of Lynch’s history and idiosyncrasies.    
Mr. Caudill testified that he and Mr. Figgatt made a strategic decision to 
present all mitigation through a mental-health expert because an expert possesses 
the ability to synthesize all of this information and to present it as one coherent 
whole, in a manner that is specifically tied to the events that led to the charged 
offenses.  In contrast, trial counsel explained that presenting mitigation through lay 
witnesses has the potential to create a disconnect between a defendant’s 
background or history and the events at issue (i.e., the charged offense(s)).  Mr. 
Figgatt also testified that presenting mitigation evidence through Dr. Olander was 
beneficial to Lynch because the court “likes to get to the point.”  As we have 
previously held, “[c]ounsel’s strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on 
 
- 45 -
collateral attack.”  Johnson, 769 So. 2d at 1001 (citing Remeta, 622 So. 2d 452).  
Further, even assuming that counsel performed deficiently by not personally 
contacting some of the witnesses suggested by Lynch, he was not prejudiced 
because Dr. Olander contacted and spoke with Lynch’s immediate family before 
testifying during the penalty-phase proceedings, and Lynch’s postconviction lay 
witnesses merely corroborated much of Dr. Olander’s prior testimony.   
 
The remainder of the lay-witness testimony was irrelevant, cumulative, 
disputed, or contradicted.  For example, (1) Danelle Pepe testified that Lynch and 
his mother bit their nails and that when Lynch’s mother passed away, and hospital 
staff removed an IV from her hand, Lynch took a tissue, dabbed the blood from his 
mother’s hand, and held the blood-soaked tissue next to his face like a “snuggly” 
(irrelevant and remote in time to the events of March 5, 1999); (2) Gene Cody 
testified that Lynch dyed his hair and was “very sick” when he visited Cody’s 
barbershop during early March 1999 (Lynch offered this testimony as evidence of 
“decompensation” (i.e., stress-induced psychological deterioration); however, Dr. 
Olander testified during the penalty phase that Lynch was decompensating at the 
time of these offenses (cumulative)); (3) Edward Corso testified that Lynch’s 
father was a racial bigot and that Lynch grew up in a safe Brooklyn neighborhood 
(irrelevant; cumulative); (4) Vesna Lovsin testified that although she worked at the 
same New York bank where Lynch was previously employed, she did not know or 
 
- 46 -
remember Lynch, and that she never had sex with or lived with Lynch (Lynch 
offered this testimony to support his claim that he suffers from delusions; however, 
Lynch never mentioned Lovsin to anyone, including the mental-health experts 
involved in this case, until 2005 (i.e., after this Court affirmed his convictions and 
sentences on direct appeal), and Dr. Olander testified during the penalty phase that 
Lynch suffers from delusional thinking (disputed; irrelevant; cumulative)). 
 
With regard to the non-mental-health documentary evidence that Lynch 
submitted during the postconviction proceedings, much of it was irrelevant or 
merely corroborated the personal, biological, and employment histories that Lynch 
self-reported during the penalty-phase proceedings.  For example, (1) the trial court 
was already aware of Lynch’s credit-card debt at the time of the offenses and how 
that debt related to the offenses (Lynch wanted to force Roseanna Morgan to repay 
the debt); therefore, the documentary evidence concerning credit-card receipts and 
statements was unnecessary; (2) Lynch’s citizen’s-arrest commendations were 
remote in time to the offenses involved in this case (early 1980s versus 1999); (3) 
the trial court was already aware of Lynch’s employment history; therefore, his 
employment records were cumulative; and (4) the trial court was aware that Lynch 
was formerly a devout Catholic; therefore, his Catholic Church confirmation 
photograph was at least partially cumulative. 
 
- 47 -
 
The mental-health mitigation Lynch presented during the postconviction 
hearing is the only truly new mitigation evidence that he has provided.  However, 
the mental-health experts agree that Lynch’s frontal-lobe and right-hemispheric 
developmental cognitive impairment is “mild,” and that his condition is constant 
and static (i.e., he has likely suffered from this impairment throughout his life and 
he is not becoming progressively worse).  Moreover, Lynch has not connected any 
cognitive impairment to the events of March 5, 1999, which, in contrast, reveal a 
carefully crafted murder plot.   
Lynch and the State disagree concerning whether this case is more similar to 
Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2005), or Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 
2007).  In Orme, we stated that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary,” that “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion 
of a capital case cannot be overstated,” and that “the failure of counsel to 
investigate and present available mitigating evidence is a relevant concern along 
with the reasons for not doing so.”  896 So. 2d at 731(brackets omitted) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002); 
Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000))).  However, in Darling the Court 
stated: 
[D]efense counsel is entitled to rely on the evaluations conducted by 
qualified mental health experts, even if, in retrospect, those 
 
- 48 -
evaluations may not have been as complete as others may desire.  
Even if the evaluation by [a retained mental-health expert], which 
found no indication of brain damage to warrant a neuropsychological 
workup, was somehow incomplete or deficient in the opinion of 
others, trial counsel would not be rendered ineffective for relying on 
[the expert’s] qualified . . . evaluation. 
 
Darling, 966 So. 2d at 377 (citation omitted) (citing State v. Sireci, 502 So. 2d 
1221, 1223 (Fla. 1987)). 
 
In the instant case, Lynch’s trial counsel originally retained Dr. David Cox, a 
neuropsychologist.  Dr. Cox concluded that Lynch suffered from cognitive 
disorder NOS (not otherwise specified) and a possible paranoid personality 
disorder.  Dr. Cox recommended further neuropsychological testing to determine 
the degree of Lynch’s impairment.  Trial counsel were not pleased with the style of 
this expert’s report, which they felt (1) was “amateurish” and (2) did not properly 
connect the diagnosis to the events of March 5, 1999.  Trial counsel later dismissed 
Dr. Cox in favor of another neuropsychologist, Dr. Jacquelyn Olander.  Trial 
counsel did not inform Dr. Olander that Dr. Cox had previously diagnosed some 
level of cognitive impairment.  However, trial counsel did inform Dr. Olander that 
they had previously retained Dr. Cox.  Dr. Olander respected Dr. Cox, and she 
assumed that if Lynch suffered from a cognitive impairment, it would have already 
been discovered and reported by the previous expert.  Dr. Olander also assumed 
that trial counsel would have informed her if Lynch had received an impairment 
diagnosis.  Based on these assumptions, Dr. Olander did not conduct 
 
- 49 -
neuropsychological testing with Lynch, but rather conducted only psychological 
testing.  Dr. Olander diagnosed Lynch with schizoaffective disorder, which is a 
combination of schizophrenic symptoms and a mood disorder.  She specifically 
testified at trial that Lynch did not have any brain impairment.  Consequently, in 
sentencing Lynch, the trial court was unaware of the fact that Lynch suffered from 
some level of cognitive impairment.   
 
During the postconviction hearing, Mr. Figgatt and Mr. Caudill conceded 
that they were aware that Dr. Cox had diagnosed Lynch with a cognitive 
impairment.  Further, they admitted that they did not follow up on this diagnosis, 
did not inform Dr. Olander, and did not obtain Lynch’s school records or other 
background information to corroborate that Lynch suffered from some level of 
cognitive impairment.  Lynch’s school records might have been helpful in this 
regard because they reflect a disparity between his verbal and mathematic abilities 
(verbal exercises are predominately left-brain tasks, whereas math exercises are 
predominately right-brain tasks).  Thus, Lynch’s relatively good grades in English 
and religion, as compared to his low grades in mathematics courses and 
mechanical drawing, could have assisted his mental-health experts in diagnosing 
and attempting to corroborate a developmental cognitive impairment.  Relatedly, 
Lynch’s standardized test scores also reflect a disparity. 
 
- 50 -
 
Orme is somewhat similar to this case in that Orme’s trial counsel was aware 
that he had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder.  896 So. 2d at 733.  
Despite this knowledge, trial counsel did not present any penalty-phase evidence 
concerning Orme’s bipolar diagnosis.  See id. at 733-35.  Counsel also “did not 
conduct follow-up interviews with Orme’s family and friends to determine if Orme 
had exhibited behavior in accord with a bipolar diagnosis.”  Id. at 733.  Finally, 
counsel “did not inform his trial experts that Orme had been diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder and . . . did not provide the experts with the prison medical records 
that would have shown the medications prescribed to Orme indicating such a 
diagnosis.”  Id.  “Orme’s experts never knew that such a diagnosis had been 
made.”  Id.  In Orme, we reversed the defendant’s death sentence and remanded for 
a new penalty-phase proceeding.  Id. at 736. 
 
The facts of this case are similar to Orme in some respects.  With regard to 
mental-health mitigation, this case is not similar to Darling because, here, counsel 
were aware that a nontestifying neuropsychologist had diagnosed Lynch with a 
cognitive impairment, and they did not transmit this information to their testifying 
mental-health expert; whereas, in Darling, counsel chose between the competing 
opinions of two properly informed mental-health experts.  See 966 So. 2d at 377.  
Based on the fact that trial counsel knew Lynch suffered from some type of 
cognitive impairment and never fully investigated this condition, counsel were 
 
- 51 -
deficient during the penalty phase in failing to address and utilize evidence related 
to Lynch’s frontal-lobe and right-hemispheric cognitive impairment.   
However, this determination does not end our ineffectiveness inquiry 
because counsel’s error must have prejudiced Lynch.  See, e.g., Orme, 896 So. 2d 
at 735 (citing Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001)).  During the 
postconviction hearing, seven mental-health experts testified and agreed that 
Lynch suffers from a “mild” cognitive impairment.  This included both the State 
and Lynch’s experts (Lynch:  Dr. David Cox (neuropsychologist), Dr. Jacquelyn 
Olander (neuropsychologist), Dr. David McCraney (neurologist), Dr. Joseph Sesta 
(neuropsychologist), and Dr. Joseph Chong-Sang Wu (psychiatrist); State:  Dr. 
William Riebsame (psychologist), and Dr. Jeffrey A. Danziger (psychiatrist)).  
However, the experts differed as to whether Lynch’s frontal-lobe and right-
hemispheric impairment, in combination with his alleged mental illness 
(schizoaffective disorder), qualified him for the mental-health mitigators codified 
in section 921.141(6)(b), (f), Florida Statutes (2001) (“(b) The capital felony was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. . . .  (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired.” (emphasis supplied)).  Drs. Cox, 
Olander, McCraney, and Sesta (Dr. Wu was not offered for this purpose) believed 
 
- 52 -
that Lynch qualified for the statutory mitigators, and Dr. Sesta stated that Lynch’s 
frontal-lobe impairment is such that some neuropsychologists might have opined 
that Lynch was legally insane at the time of the crime, although he would not do 
so.  Dr. Wu testified that Lynch’s PET-scan results were consistent with frontal-
lobe and right-hemispheric impairment because these areas of Lynch’s brain 
exhibited reduced metabolic activity.   
Conversely, Drs. Riebsame and Danziger expressed the opinion that Lynch 
does not qualify for the statutory mental-health mitigators.  Of these two State 
experts, Dr. Danziger’s opinion is of much greater value because Dr. Riebsame 
eventually conceded that some of his psychological testing of Lynch was invalid 
due to the nonstandardized fashion in which the tests were administered.  Dr. 
Danziger’s explanation of Lynch’s mindset on the date of the murders is the most 
persuasive of those offered during the postconviction proceedings: 
[Lynch] is someone who did not act in an impulsive fashion. . . .  
What we have here is two days before [the offenses,] the letter shows 
a murder/suicide plot.  Earlier that day, according to his wife, he acted 
perfectly normal, he took care of his children, he dropped his son off.  
Nothing in his behavior suggested disorganization, psychotic thinking, 
agitation, a perfectly unremarkable morning in the life of Mr. Lynch 
taking care of his children and waiting for his wife to come home. . . .  
He then takes three guns in a bag, all of them loaded, drives over to 
the apartment complex, puts his car somewhere [Roseanna Morgan] 
can’t see it as she’s coming in[to] her apartment.  What does this 
suggest?  Planning, forethought, organization, not impulsive action, 
not a, I caught you in bed with somebody so I strangled you in the 
heat of the moment or without thinking.  This is something planned 
and organized.  He then waits, sees [Leah Caday], essentially follows 
 
- 53 -
her up the stairs and somehow either forces or cajoles his way in, 
holds her hostage, waiting however long, thirty, forty minutes, all of 
which at any time he could have changed his mind.  This was not 
something that happened instantly but went on over this extended 
period of time.  Of course then Roseanna appears at the door, shots 
are fired, he drags her in, administers the coup de grace, and then 
Leah gets hit.  He then changes his mind on the suicide plan and then 
decides that he wishes to live.  As I put all of this together, we have a 
man with no significant prior psychiatric history, no evidence of 
psychosis, no evidence of dementia, functioning perfectly 
unremarkably in his life.   
 
Thus, Lynch displayed organized, methodical planning in his perpetration of these 
offenses.  Further, he displayed critical impulse control in electing not to inflict 
self-harm.  During and after the offenses, Lynch explained his actions in a detailed, 
specific fashion.  In this regard, this case is totally distinguishable from Orme.  
Orme had an extensive history of abusing alcohol and illegal drugs (cocaine and 
barbiturates), and he was under the influence of these substances at the time he 
strangled his victim.  See 896 So. 2d at 729-30.  Further, these drugs interacted 
with his bipolar disorder.  Id. at 733-36.  In Orme, we concluded that 
[a]dditional testimony in support of the intoxication and its causes and 
effects may have warranted greater weight, and the resulting weighing 
of mitigation and aggravation would have been different. Thus, the 
fact that the jury did not hear the evidence of Orme’s bipolar disorder 
combined with the jury’s penalty phase vote of seven to five 
undermines our confidence in the result of the penalty phase. 
Therefore, we remand this case for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
  
896 So. 2d at 736 (emphasis supplied).  The Orme decision hinged on the facts 
related to the defendant’s bipolar disorder, which supported his claim that he was 
 
- 54 -
less culpable for the murder.  The interaction of a bipolar disorder with the 
defendant’s intoxication—at the moment he killed the victim—was the dominant 
and significant factor leading to our decision in Orme.  In contrast, here, Lynch 
was completely sober when he killed the victims, and a mass of evidence 
demonstrates that he methodically planned the murder-suicide plot. 
 
Finally, with regard to a related demonic-presence argument, which Lynch 
raised as a basis for demonstrating emotional disturbance and hallucination, Dr. 
Danziger testified that Lynch stated: 
[H]e felt the presence of something evil or devilish.  When [Dr. 
Danziger] asked him about it he said he really did not see anything, 
didn’t hear anything, just had a feeling as if the hairs on the back of 
his neck were standing up. . . .  That’s not an unusual reaction with 
two deceased people in the room that you’ve just shot. . . .  [B]ased 
upon what he told me, as well as all of the data I reviewed, I did not 
see anything suggestive of a psychotic process or any sort of 
psychotic diagnosis. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Lynch’s reaction to the murders is thus wholly consistent 
with a realization that he had committed terrible acts.  
Lynch has simply failed to present any evidence connecting any cognitive 
condition to his behavior.  Even if we fully accepted the testimony of his 
postconviction mental-health experts, there has been little to no testimony 
establishing that any impairment or schizoaffective symptoms contributed to his 
actions on March 5, 1999.  Lynch had no prior history of criminal activity but by 
all defense accounts has always had this condition.  Furthermore, he thoroughly 
 
- 55 -
planned and carried out his memorialized intent to murder Roseanna Morgan and 
then demonstrated critical impulse control by refusing to commit suicide.  Cf., e.g., 
Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 17-18 (Fla. 2007) (affirming death sentence and 
stating, “the facts show an element of planning [and] are inconsistent with a claim 
that [the defendant] was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. . . .  [Further,] there was no evidence that because of the frontal lobe 
impairment [the defendant] could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct at 
the time of the murder.”); Robinson v. State, 761 So. 2d 269, 277-79 (Fla. 1999) 
(affirming death sentence despite evidence of mild brain damage where no 
evidence existed that the defendant committed the murder as a result of his 
condition). 
Consequently, we deny relief with regard to this subclaim because Lynch 
has not demonstrated that the mitigation investigation and penalty-phase 
presentation of trial counsel prejudiced him.  These factors do not satisfy the legal 
requirements necessary to produce the requested relief.  The death sentences 
imposed by the trial court remain legally sound even after careful consideration of 
the mitigation evidence presented during both the penalty-phase and 
postconviction proceedings. 
iii.  The Confidential Marital-Communications Privilege 
 
- 56 -
This claim also fails when couched in terms of penalty-phase ineffectiveness 
because Lynch cannot establish the prejudice required by law.  We have concluded 
that the postconviction court’s reading of the murder-suicide letter is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and is more persuasive than that of postconviction 
counsel.  See analysis in Part II.A.ii, supra.  Lynch has not, and cannot, establish 
prejudice because a proper interpretation of the murder-suicide letter reveals that 
Lynch never intended for the transmitted communication to be confidential.  To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 
(emphasis supplied).  Even assuming that counsel had sought to suppress the 
murder-suicide letter, there is no reasonable probability that the result would have 
differed because, under an appropriate reading, the letter is nonprivileged and 
admissible. 
With regard to Lynch’s phone calls to his wife during his commission of the 
charged offenses, the first phone call was not privileged because Caday was 
present during the conversation, the third phone call was similarly not privileged 
because Lynch’s sister-in-law was present during, and participated in, the 
conversation, and the second and third phone calls were cumulative to other 
 
- 57 -
evidence and testimony.  See analysis in Part II.A.ii, supra.  Therefore, Lynch was 
not prejudiced in this regard, and we deny relief for this subclaim. 
iv.  Accidental Discharge 
Our analysis in Part II.A.iv, supra, explains that the facts of this case are 
wholly inconsistent with accidental discharge and, therefore, we deny relief on this 
claim. 
C.  Alleged Judicial Bias 
 
A motion to disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.10, Florida 
Statutes, and procedurally by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330.  See 
Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1995); In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of 
Jud. Admin., 939 So. 2d 966, 1003 (Fla. 2006).  The rule provides that a motion to 
disqualify shall show that “the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial 
or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge”; or that 
the judge is either an interested party to the matter, related to an interested party, 
related to counsel, or “is a material witness for or against one of the parties to the 
cause.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(d).  In Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 
2005), we addressed the standard of review applicable to a denial of a motion to 
disqualify: 
Whether a motion to disqualify the judge is legally sufficient is 
a question of law we review de novo.  See, e.g., Chamberlain v. State, 
881 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2004); Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 842 
(Fla. 2002).  Such a motion will be deemed legally insufficient if it 
 
- 58 -
fails to establish a “well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that 
he will not receive a fair hearing.”  Arbelaez[ v. State], 775 So. 2d 
[909, 916 (Fla. 2000)] (citing Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 524 
(Fla. 1997)).  A mere “subjective fear[ ]” of bias will not be legally 
sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable.  Fischer v. 
Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986).  The primary consideration is 
whether the facts alleged, if true, would place a reasonably prudent 
person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.  Id. 
Arbelaez, 898 So. 2d at 41.  A petition for writ of prohibition is the proper means 
through which to challenge a lower court’s denial of a motion to disqualify.  See 
Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978); see also Carrow v. Fla. Bar, 848 
So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
Lynch contends that the conduct of the postconviction court after the 
conclusion of the rule 3.851 hearing and the court’s analysis and commentary in its 
second amended order denying postconviction relief and rehearing rendered the 
court a material expert witness for the State and demonstrated palpable judicial 
bias.  Specifically, Lynch maintains that the postconviction court “test-fired the 
[Glock G30] in chambers, presumably without bullets, . . . to determine the trigger 
pull of the gun.  This testing was done ex parte,[
]
13  without notice to counsel.”   
Lynch further asserts that there is no way of ascertaining (1) the conditions under 
which the postconviction court conducted this testing, (2) whether the 
postconviction court possessed the proper “background, expertise and knowledge” 
                                          
 
13.  The State is correct that “ex parte” is a misnomer in this context and that 
in camera is the proper terminology.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (8th ed. 
2004) (“in camera inspection.  A trial judge’s private consideration of evidence.”). 
 
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to test the gun, or (3) whether the Glock G30 had been altered in any fashion since 
Lynch’s firearms expert last examined the weapon.  Therefore, Lynch claims that 
the court improperly denied his motion to disqualify, and he requests that we 
remand for a new postconviction hearing before a different judge.   
We deny relief as to this judicial-bias claim because the judge, sitting as the 
factfinder, merely examined an item in evidence (i.e., the Glock G30) and drew 
nonscientific conclusions from his manual manipulation of the weapon, which 
were consistent with the testimony of the firearms experts.  Cf.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.400(a)(3) (“The court may permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take 
to the jury room . . . all things received in evidence other than depositions.”).  As 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently observed: 
Several jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of 
permissible juror experimentation have generally concluded that 
recreation or testing of testimony adduced at trial on objective 
evidence items is acceptable.  “Jurors, during deliberations, may 
engage in experiments which amount to no more than a careful 
evaluation of the evidence presented at trial.” 
 
Castillo v. Visual Health & Surgical Ctr., Inc., 972 So. 2d 254, 255-56 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008) (citations omitted) (quoting 89 C.J.S. Trial § 798 (2007)) (citing Carol 
J. Miller, Annotation, Propriety of Juror’s Tests or Experiments in Jury Room, 31 
A.L.R.4th 566 (1984)), review denied, No. SC08-425 (Fla. Aug. 14, 2008).  Here, 
the judge was the factfinder during both the trial and postconviction proceedings 
and merely conducted “a careful evaluation of the evidence presented” without 
 
- 60 -
supplying additional facts or evidence of which the parties were unaware.  Further, 
the judge only did so after taking judicial notice of all the evidence and testimony 
admitted during Lynch’s trial. 
We originally considered this bias claim after the postconviction court 
denied the disqualification motion as legally insufficient.  As a result of that denial, 
Lynch filed an emergency petition for writ of prohibition with this Court.  On July 
11, 2006, we denied this petition without prejudice to enable Lynch to raise this 
claim during his postconviction appeal.  On October 9, 2006, the postconviction 
court issued a second amended order denying Lynch’s rule 3.851 motion and 
denying rehearing, in which it addressed Lynch’s judicial-bias claim.  The court 
interpreted our denial of Lynch’s petition for writ of prohibition as a signal that it 
was free to address the merits of this bias claim.   
We would have preferred that the postconviction court refrain from 
personally refuting claims of bias that it had previously rejected as legally 
insufficient in a prior order.  Nevertheless, in the first instance, the court properly 
denied the disqualification motion as legally insufficient without commenting on 
the facts or the veracity of the defendant.  Cf. MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain 
Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1339 (Fla. 1990); Bundy, 366 So. 2d at 442.  
Furthermore, in its second amended order denying relief and rehearing, the 
postconviction court properly concluded that it had not “tested” the gun and that it 
 
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had not acted as a material witness; rather, the court, as the factfinder, simply 
examined a piece of evidence in chambers and corroborated the claims of the 
relevant experts that the trigger pull of this particular Glock G30 fell within the 
normal range.   
In reaching this holding, we do not rely upon or endorse the 
extrajurisdictional precedent relied upon by Lynch, the State, or the postconviction 
court.  We merely hold that the postconviction court’s in-camera manual 
manipulation of the Glock’s trigger to corroborate the claims of the firearms 
experts that (1) the gun was properly functioning, and (2) that the trigger pull was 
within the normal range, was not improper and did not display judicial bias.  The 
judge did not engage in any independent scientific or ballistics testing.  Rather, he 
simply held the weapon—which had been admitted into evidence—and pulled the 
trigger.  None of his conclusions required any specialized training or knowledge 
beyond that which had been imparted by the testifying firearms experts; further, all 
of his conclusions were drawn from and supported by the testimony of these 
experts. 
In this respect, it is important to outline the testimony of the relevant 
firearms experts.  During the penalty-phase proceedings, the State’s firearms 
expert, Nanette Rudolph, concluded:  (1) that the Glock G30 was operating 
correctly; (2) that the trigger pull was within normal specifications; and (3) that the 
 
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Glock is a semiautomatic weapon which requires the shooter to release the trigger 
each time before firing the next shot.  Similarly, during the postconviction hearing, 
Lynch’s firearms expert, Roy Ruel, testified that he examined the Glock G30 at the 
Sanford Police Department and concluded: (1) that the trigger safety, the firing-pin 
safety, and the drop safety were all in proper working order; (2) that the weapon 
was in good overall condition and was properly functioning; (3) that “[t]he 
interference was completely in accord with Glock specifications, meaning that the 
gun would only fire with the pull of the trigger”; (4) that the trigger pull on the 
Glock was 5 to 5.5 pounds as tested by the State’s firearms expert; (5) that the 
Glock did not have a modified trigger or connector; and (6) that after that first shot, 
the Glock would have recoiled and produced “one hellish [muzzle] flash and loud 
noise.”  The findings of the postconviction court mirror this testimony, and the 
court merely rejected as incredible Ruel’s unsubstantiated assertion that one can 
unintentionally discharge a properly functioning Glock G30 seven separate times, 
while striking an allegedly unintended target with nearly sixty-percent accuracy.   
In sum, we conclude that recusal or disqualification was unwarranted in this 
case because the judge, sitting as the factfinder, did not exhibit any bias when he 
examined a murder weapon that was indisputably in evidence.  The postconviction 
court thus properly denied Lynch’s motion to disqualify as legally insufficient.  
However, in the future, we caution that judges should not interpret our denial of an 
 
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emergency petition for writ of prohibition here as a license to address the merits of 
the underlying recusal or disqualification motion.  
D.  Expert Witnesses and the Prevailing Norms of Capital Defense Counsel 
 
Lynch contends that the postconviction court erred in excluding the 
testimony of attorney Robert Norgard concerning the standards of practice and 
prevailing norms of Florida capital defense counsel during 1999-2001 (i.e., the 
timeframe during which trial counsel represented Lynch).  The decision of a 
postconviction court to exclude the testimony of an expert is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  See Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 813 (Fla. 2007).   This standard is 
satisfied when “the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is 
another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.”  Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 
1249 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 
1980)).   
Lynch asserts that the refusal of the court to permit this testimony 
constituted an abuse of discretion because this judicial action infringed upon his 
right to due process.  However, a review of the portion of the record that addresses 
the testimony of attorney Norgard does not reveal a due-process objection.  
Further, in his reply brief, Lynch does not direct our attention to any location in the 
record where such an objection may be found.  Accordingly, Lynch did not present 
 
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a germane, specific due-process claim below.   See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 
332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (“[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the 
specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion 
below.”). 
Nonetheless, even if Lynch had properly presented a due-process objection 
below, he would not be entitled to relief.  In Strickland, the United States Supreme 
Court explained the role of prevailing professional norms in determining whether 
the conduct of counsel in a specific case fell below the objective standard of 
reasonableness: 
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance 
inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.  Prevailing norms of practice as 
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) 
(“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides.  No particular set of detailed 
rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant.  Any such set of rules would interfere with the 
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the 
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 
466 U.S. at 688-89 (emphasis supplied).  Lynch contends that the emphasized 
language “and the like,” encompasses and envisions expert testimony as a source 
of evidence with regard to the professional norms in existence for capital counsel 
at the time of a defendant’s trial.  According to Lynch, because expert testimony is 
 
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an available medium through which to introduce evidence of prevailing 
professional norms, the refusal of a postconviction court to receive such evidence 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.   
 
Lynch’s reasoning is unpersuasive.  Lynch provides no decision which has 
held that a postconviction court abuses its discretion when it precludes expert 
testimony with regard to the prevailing norms of capital representation.  The High 
Court’s explicit reference in Strickland to the ABA guidelines demonstrates that 
expert testimony is not the only source of evidence to establish standards of capital 
representation.   Indeed, during the evidentiary hearing, Norgard stated that “there 
are a number of ways that Capital Collateral Counsel can present to the Court 
information about what is expected of a criminal defense attorney.”  Further, the 
Strickland Court noted that the ABA standards “and the like” are “only guides,” 
which indicates that such evidence is not something that must be received into 
evidence for a postconviction court to properly evaluate trial counsel’s 
effectiveness during a capital case.  466 U.S. at 688 (emphasis supplied).   
 
Finally, even if the refusal to admit expert testimony concerning the norms 
of capital representation constitutes an abuse of discretion under certain discrete 
circumstances, it does not here.   Under section 90.702, Florida Statutes, expert 
testimony is admissible only where “specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.”  
 
- 66 -
Hypothetically, a situation could exist in which a judge presiding over a 
postconviction case could receive the testimony of an expert to assist the court in 
determining whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.14    
Conversely, here, the presiding postconviction judge has been adjudicating 
capital cases in Florida for many years.   He is extremely seasoned in this field, and 
even the testifying expert conceded this point.  During his testimony, attorney 
Norgard was of the opinion that a judge who has recently left the bench would not 
meet the minimum qualifications to serve as lead capital counsel.  When the 
postconviction judge asked Norgard, “You don’t think I could get away with it?,” 
Norgard responded, “You probably could.  I’d agree with that.”  (Emphasis 
supplied.)  Thus, expert testimony was not an essential element to assist the 
postconviction court in addressing this issue.   
Expert testimony is not the sole means through which the norms of capital 
representation are to be established, and this particular postconviction judge is 
sufficiently familiar with these standards.  Therefore, the judge did not abuse his 
discretion by excluding attorney Norgard’s testimony here concerning the 
standards of capital representation at the time of Lynch’s trial.  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
                                          
 
 
14.  Attorney Norgard stated that he has testified as an expert witness in 
approximately fifteen capital cases. 
 
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E.  Brady and Giglio Claims 
 
Lynch next contends that the State withheld potentially exculpatory evidence 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the State 
knowingly presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150 (1972).  However, Lynch cannot satisfy the requisite elements of these 
claims, and we accordingly deny relief. 
i.  Brady 
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) 
favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the State, and that (3) because the evidence was 
material, the defendant was prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 
281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To satisfy 
the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that 
had the suppressed evidence been disclosed, the factfinder would have reached a 
different verdict or judgment.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See 
Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  In this context, we 
defer to the trial court on questions of fact, but review de novo associated questions 
of law.  See Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 169 (Fla. 2004); Way, 760 So. 2d at 
913.   
 
- 68 -
Here, Lynch claims that during the penalty-phase proceedings the State 
possessed (1) Lynch’s school records, which suggested brain damage; (2) two 
citizen’s-arrest commendations for thwarting a robbery and assault; (3) notes from 
Lynch’s mother regarding his low birth weight; (4) letters from Lynch’s mother to 
Lynch evidencing the excessive closeness of their relationship; (5) a childhood 
photo of Lynch during his Catholic confirmation holding a rosary and a bible; (6) a 
death certificate corroborating Lynch’s claim that Roseanna Morgan ended their 
relationship on the anniversary of the death of Lynch’s mother; (7) marriage 
certificates evidencing Lynch’s justice-of-the-peace marriage to his wife and the 
considerable age difference between Lynch’s parents.  Lynch further claims that 
the State’s decision to withhold this evidence prejudiced his ability to present 
relevant, potentially dispositive mitigation evidence.  Lynch attributes particular 
significance to his school records because his postconviction mental-health experts 
testified that these records were mitigating in that they further demonstrated his 
frontal-lobe and right-hemispheric impairment.  Lynch contends that these school 
records revealed a marked disparity between his verbal abilities and his math 
abilities.  In the opinion of his mental-health experts, the degree of this disparity is 
evidence of cognitive impairment. 
Despite his extensive listing of the mitigation evidence that the State 
allegedly withheld, Lynch neglects to mention that he stored much of the allegedly 
 
- 69 -
withheld mitigation in a grey lockbox that the Sanford Police Department seized 
from his home pursuant to a search warrant.  During the postconviction hearing, 
collateral counsel extracted items from this lockbox to question trial counsel.  This 
lockbox was listed on the evidence receipt that the State provided to Lynch during 
pretrial discovery.  The search-warrant inventory lists “gray lock box recovered 
from side of night stand containing bank papers, birth certificates, lawyer 
paperwork, collectible coins.”  Further, Lynch wrote trial counsel expressing his 
desire that counsel locate the personal items seized from his home.  Lynch 
referenced his “mother’s fireproof safe box,” which contained “many irreplaceable 
items.”  
Lead trial counsel’s testimony shows that he was aware of the lockbox and 
its location.  When questioned about the search warrant, Mr. Figgatt stated that it 
included a grey lockbox seized from Lynch’s nightstand.  Trial counsel did not 
visit the Sanford Police Department to examine the lockbox.  Lynch had written 
trial counsel asking them to retrieve items from the lockbox, and trial counsel were 
aware that the lockbox was stored at the Sanford Police Department.  Further, 
Lynch was aware of all of this mitigation evidence because he either knew of its 
existence or it was his personal property.  Consequently, this evidence is not Brady 
evidence because Lynch and defense counsel were aware of its existence and 
location and simply did not examine it.  This claim lacks merit and the 
 
- 70 -
postconviction court properly denied relief.  See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 
954 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the 
evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence 
cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant.” (quoting 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000))). 
ii.  Giglio 
To establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the 
prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew 
the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material.  See Guzman v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006).  Giglio claims present mixed questions of 
law and fact.  See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 785.  We thus defer to those factual 
findings supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review de novo related 
questions of law.  See id.  In this case, the State’s penalty-phase mental-health 
expert, Dr. William Riebsame, testified that Lynch was a fairly bright individual 
who did well in school, except for some problems in mathematics, and that he 
withdrew from school during the eleventh grade due to fears of school violence 
and his desire to earn money.  During the postconviction hearing, Dr. Riebsame 
conceded that based upon the school records postconviction counsel provided him, 
Lynch did not do so well in school and had, in fact, failed a number of courses 
during his high-school years.  However, Lynch neglects to include the detail that 
 
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Dr. Riebsame was merely repeating what Lynch had self-reported concerning his 
academic performance.  Therefore, Dr. Riebsame’s testimony was not false, as he 
couched his evaluation in terms of what Lynch concededly self-reported during his 
December 5, 2000, interview. 
Lynch also contends that the prosecutor knew of the falsity of Dr. 
Riebsame’s testimony because he had Lynch’s school records in his case file 
during the penalty-phase proceedings, and that the prosecutor failed to correct Dr. 
Riebsame.  However, even if this assertion is accurate, Lynch cannot establish that 
he suffered any prejudice.  Under Giglio, false testimony is material if there is a 
“reasonable possibility” that it could have affected the judgment of the factfinder.  
See Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1049-50 (Fla. 2006); Guzman v. State, 868 
So. 2d 498, 507-08 (Fla. 2003).  First, Lynch knew that he had failed several 
courses during the eleventh grade and he chose not to alert his trial counsel, or the 
court, that Dr. Riebsame’s testimony was “false.”  Hence, if the prosecutor failed 
to correct false testimony, Lynch was complicit in this alleged falsification effort.  
Second, Lynch’s postconviction mental-health experts testified that his school 
records corroborated their belief that Lynch suffers from a “mild cognitive 
impairment.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Lynch did not have a prior history of 
diagnosed mental illness, is of average overall intelligence (IQ of 101-111), and 
meticulously planned and executed the murder portion of his murder-suicide plot.  
 
- 72 -
Therefore, it is unlikely that revelations of low performance in algebra and 
mechanical drawing during his junior year of high school during the late 1960s, 
and information related to poor performance on standardized tests, would have 
altered the factfinder’s determination that Lynch did not qualify for the statutory 
mental-health mitigators.  The facts of this case simply do not support Lynch’s 
contention that his mild cognitive impairment was material. 
For these reasons, we reject Lynch’s Brady and Giglio claims as 
unsubstantiated.       
F.  Habeas Claims 
 
i.  The Factual Basis of Lynch’s Guilty Pleas 
In his first habeas claim, Lynch asserts that the facts trial counsel proffered 
during his plea colloquy were legally insufficient to support convictions for (1) 
armed burglary; (2) kidnapping; and (3) first-degree murder.  Therefore, Lynch 
maintains that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue 
this point during his direct appeal. 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000); Smith v. State, 400 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1981).  
Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas relief based on 
ineffectiveness of counsel, we must determine 
 
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first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In asserting such 
a claim, “[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 
1981).  Habeas petitioners may not use claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel to camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in 
a postconviction motion.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 
2000).  “If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be without 
merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel 
to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance 
ineffective.”  Id. (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
As explained in Parts II.A.i and II.B.i, supra, this claim lacks merit.  Trial 
counsel and Lynch were aware at the time of his plea that the State possessed more 
than enough evidence to prove Lynch’s guilt for all four counts of the indictment, 
and the facts elicited during the penalty-phase proceedings establish Lynch’s 
commission of these offenses.  Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing 
 
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to raise a meritless issue on appeal.  See Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121, 135 
(Fla. 2002); see also Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 138, 142 (Fla. 1998) (“Appellate 
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise a nonmeritorious claim.”).  
Furthermore, Lynch could have, and actually did, include the substance of this 
habeas claim in his rule 3.851 motion; therefore, habeas relief is an improper 
remedy in this instance.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.   
We thus deny relief on Lynch’s first habeas claim. 
ii.  Alleged Incompetency 
Lynch claims that his eventual execution may be unconstitutional due to 
incompetency.  However, he concedes that this claim is not ripe for review because 
the Governor has not issued his death warrant.  Lynch responds that he is merely 
raising this issue for preservation purposes.  We have repeatedly held that no relief 
is warranted under similar circumstances.  See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 
538, 556 (Fla. 2007) (concluding that capital-incompetency claim is not ripe for 
review where the Governor has not signed the defendant’s death warrant); Morris 
v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 837 n.15 (Fla. 2006) (same); Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 
882, 888 (Fla. 2002) (same); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811-3.812. 
Thus, Lynch is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
iii.  Charging Statutory Aggravators in the Indictment 
 
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Lynch presented this same constitutional challenge during his direct appeal.  
With regard to the State’s failure to charge aggravating circumstances in the 
indictment, we stated: 
Appellant’s first claim—that Florida’s death penalty scheme is 
unconstitutional because it fails to provide notice as to aggravating 
circumstances—is rejected based on the ruling of Vining v. State, 637 
So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994).  There this Court wrote: “The aggravating 
factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a death 
sentence are limited to those set out in section 921.141(5), Florida 
Statutes (1987).  Therefore, there is no reason to require the State to 
notify defendants of the aggravating factors that it intends to prove.”  
Vining, 637 So. 2d at 928.  
Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 378; see also Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 103 (Fla. 2007) 
(failure to charge aggravating factors in the indictment does not violate the Florida 
and United States Constitutions).  Further, because Lynch litigated this claim on 
direct appeal, the instant challenge is procedurally barred.  See Grim, 971 So. 2d at 
103 (“[C]laims raised in a habeas petition which petitioner has raised in prior 
proceedings and which have been previously decided on the merits in those 
proceedings are procedurally barred in the habeas petition.” (quoting Porter v. 
Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2003))). 
Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim. 
 
iv.  Cumulative Error 
Finally, Lynch contends that the cumulative range of error that occurred 
during his trial, appeal, and postconviction proceedings unfairly and 
 
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unconstitutionally dictated the imposition of the death penalty and that he is 
accordingly entitled to habeas relief.  However, we have consistently held that 
“where individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without 
merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.”  Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 
(Fla. 2003); see also Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 65 (Fla. 2005) (“[The 
appellant] is not entitled to relief on his cumulative error claim because the alleged 
individual claims of error are all without merit, and, therefore, the contention of 
cumulative error is similarly without merit.”).  All of the claims that Lynch has 
presented are either procedurally barred or without merit.   
Therefore, we deny the requested relief. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons provided in our analysis, we affirm the lower court’s denial 
of Lynch’s rule 3.851 motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., 
concurs. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
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PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the postconviction motion and 
deny the habeas petition.  I write only to address the postconviction court’s 
decision refusing to allow expert testimony to support Lynch’s ineffective 
assistance claim.  As the majority points out, attorney Robert Norgard has testified 
as an expert in approximately fifteen capital cases, most recently in Morton v. 
State, 995 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2008).   
In this case, the trial court allowed a complete proffer of Norgard’s expert 
testimony but then disallowed all of it.  The State essentially argued that, due to his 
vast experience in death penalty cases, the trial judge, Judge Eaton, did not need an 
expert to assist him in determining whether the attorney was deficient in his 
performance.  I certainly agree that Judge Eaton is among the most knowledgeable 
judges in Florida on the death penalty.  My concern, however, is that we do not 
appear to predicate the admissibility of expert testimony in postconviction 
proceedings on a particular judge’s level of experience in the area of the death 
penalty.  Ultimately it is this Court’s decision, as a mixed question of law and fact, 
as to whether the attorney’s conduct was deficient.15  While expert testimony is not 
                                          
 
15.  To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show that 
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 
and that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Id. at 688.  Following the United States Supreme Court’s 
 
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necessary to establish a violation of Strickland, it is certainly one more useful 
source of evidence in allowing the court to make this all-important decision.   
 
In several cases since its landmark decision in Strickland, the United States 
Supreme Court has set forth guidelines for how courts should analyze and review 
the deficiency and prejudice prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
As to deficiency, which involves an examination of whether counsel’s performance 
fell below the norms of professional conduct, the Court has indicated that “[n]o 
particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account 
of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.”  Id. at 688-89.  
Therefore, as articulated by the Court in Strickland and quoted by the majority in 
this case, a postconviction court is not limited to a defined body of rules, but may 
look to any number of sources to determine whether counsel’s performance was 
reasonable in light of the “[p]revailing norms of practice.”  Id. at 688.  For 
instance, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has relied on the American Bar 
Association Standards for Criminal Justice as “guides” for what is reasonable 
capital representation.  See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) 
(“Counsel’s conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work 
articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—standards to which we long 
                                                                                                                                        
decision in Strickland, this Court has held that the claimant must first “identify 
particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad 
range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional 
standards.”  Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986). 
 
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have referred as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’”) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing 1 ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed. 1980), in concluding that 
counsel failed to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and was therefore 
deficient); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected 
in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining 
what is reasonable . . . .”).  Further, in determining that counsel’s mitigation 
investigation was unreasonable in Wiggins, the Court also relied upon the fact that 
defense counsel failed to prepare a social history report even though counsel 
acknowledged that this was standard practice in capital cases at the time of the 
trial.  539 U.S. at 524.  
 
The “proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  In this case, the defendant sought to 
introduce the testimony of Norgard, a criminal defense attorney with extensive 
experience in capital cases, to establish the “the standard of practice by a Florida 
capital defense attorney in the years 1999 to 2001,” when Lynch’s trial took place.  
Although Norgard was not admitted as an expert, the trial judge personally 
questioned him about the subject matter of his proposed testimony and then 
 
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allowed the defense to proffer Norgard’s testimony for this Court’s review.   
Initially, Norgard explained the reasons for his testimony: 
I’ve been called as a witness . . . to testify as to what would be 
expected of reasonably competent counsel in a capital case, basically 
establishing a baseline as to what attorneys are expected to do in a 
capital case, how they go about investigating a capital case, such as 
mitigation, the use of mental health experts, other experts, decisions 
such as guilt phase strategy tactics and other considerations, things of 
that nature. 
For example, in the Wiggins case by the United States Supreme 
Court, one of the facts that the court hinged their decision on was that 
there was a social history routinely done by criminal defense lawyers 
in that area in capital cases.  The attorneys in that case had failed to do 
a routine social history consistent with what other attorneys in the area 
of capital defense perform.  And, so, basically, unless there was 
evidence as to what reasonably competent counsel does in capital 
cases, you have no baseline within which to measure the performance 
of the attorneys in a particular case. 
Typically in the cases in which I have been testifying, I’m 
asked those type of questions. 
In many instances there are questions as to whether or not a 
particular area of performance by defense counsel was something that 
was routinely known at a particular point in time. 
 
 
When the trial judge allowed the defense to proffer his testimony for the 
record, Norgard was questioned about what competent counsel must consider in 
advising a defendant to plead guilty or waive a jury trial, such as whether there had 
been a full investigation into the case and the possible defenses that could or 
should be waived, both as to the murder charge and any underlying felony charges.  
Norgard also proffered testimony about the reasons for requiring counsel to consult 
with a forensic expert and how detailed a mitigation investigation should be, 
 
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including researching background and character, prior criminal history, facts 
surrounding the crime, and family history—“essentially familiarizing yourself with 
a person’s entire life.”  Norgard also discussed how counsel must be able to utilize 
mental health experts and know the difference between a psychologist and a 
neuropsychologist.  A review of his proffered testimony indicates that he was not 
attempting to interpret the prongs of Strickland, which is an issue of law within the 
purview of the postconviction court, but rather was seeking to explain the 
prevailing standards of competent counsel at the time of the trial.   
 
Though Norgard conceded that there are other “guides” that could be 
introduced to establish the prevailing norms of representation, such as the Florida 
Public Defender Death Penalty Manual and other seminar materials, he noted one 
benefit of using expert testimony over written materials is that it provides “a live 
person who can answer questions that are potentially hypothetical or, you know, 
about things relevant to the particular case.” 
 
 I agree that no harmful error occurred in this case in excluding the expert’s 
testimony since prejudice rather than deficiency is the ultimate reason for denying 
the claim.  However, I would urge trial judges, as they have done in the past, to 
allow expert testimony on these issues if the witness is qualified, prepared and 
available to testify.  Such testimony may not be the key element in establishing 
 
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deficiency but it certainly provides a useful “guide” in determining whether 
counsel’s performance was reasonable.   
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
O. H. Eaton, Jr., Judge - Case No. 99-0881-CFA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, 
Nathaniel Plucker and Maria DeLiberato, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent