Title: State v. Snowder

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Snowder, 87 Ohio St.3d 335, 1999-Ohio-135.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SNOWDER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Snowder (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 335.] 
Criminal law — Defendant in a community-based correctional facility is in 
detention pursuant to R.C. 2921.01(E) and (F), and is subject to conviction 
for escape pursuant to R.C. 2921.34. 
(No. 98-2044 — Submitted September 14, 1999 — Decided December 29, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 98CA22. 
 
Appellant, Steven E. Snowder, was convicted of one count of drug abuse in 
the Licking County Court of Common Pleas on July 30, 1996.  The court 
sentenced Snowder to a definite term of one and one-half years at the Orient 
Correctional Reception Center, suspended the sentence, and placed him on 
probation for a period of five years.  The terms of his probation required Snowder 
to enter and successfully complete the Licking/Muskingum Community Based 
Correctional Facility (“CBCF”) program. 
 
Snowder failed to return to the CBCF on November 24, 1996, and was 
terminated from the program.  (Snowder was not located until arrested in Portland, 
Oregon, on June 13, 1997.)  As a consequence of his termination from the CBCF 
program, the trial court revoked probation and reimposed the original sentence.  
Snowder received no jail time credit for the days he spent in the CBCF. 
 
Subsequently, Snowder was convicted of escape, R.C. 2921.34, based on 
stipulated facts.  Snowder appealed, arguing that it was error to convict him of 
escape for failure to return to the CBCF because he did not receive credit for time 
served toward a subsequently imposed prison sentence.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the conviction. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Kenneth W. Oswalt, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Stephanie G.  Gussler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Law Offices of Kristin Burkett and Andrew T. Sanderson, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  The issue in this case is whether Snowder was required to 
return to detention pursuant to R.C. 2921.01(E).  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that he was.  Accordingly, we conclude that he was properly convicted of 
escape. 
 
R.C. 2921.34(A) provides that “[n]o person, knowing the person is 
under detention or being reckless in that regard, shall purposely break or attempt to 
break detention, or purposely fail to return to detention * * *.” 
 
R.C. 2921.01(E), as amended October 4, 1996, defined “detention” to 
include “confinement in any facility for custody of persons charged with or 
convicted of crime in this state.”  146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2214. 
 
R.C. 2921.01(F) defined “detention facility” as “any place used for the 
confinement of a person charged with or convicted of any crime.”  Id. 
 
R.C. 2967.191, as amended July 1, 1996, stated that “[t]he adult parole 
authority shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner by the total number of 
days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for 
which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced * * *.”  146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 
11014-11015.  Prior to July 1, 1996, R.C. 2967.191 had a provision that required 
time spent confined in a CBCF to be included when determining a reduction in the 
stated prison term.  See 139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 582. 
 
Snowder argues that the deletion of this provision indicates the General 
Assembly’s intent not to provide credit for time served in a CBCF.  He further 
 
 
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argues that if he does not receive credit for time served, then he was not in 
confinement or detention and that therefore he cannot be convicted of escape. 
 
It is possible that the General Assembly intended to do exactly what 
Snowder argues.  It is also possible that it intended something entirely different.  
Whatever was intended by the deletion with respect to the escape statute is not 
clear on the statute’s face. 
 
If it had been the intention of the General Assembly to change the status of 
CBCF residents, the statute could have been amended to specifically reflect that 
intention.  The deletion of the specific reference to CBCFs does not render 
amended R.C. 2967.191 unclear or ambiguous.  Accordingly, our role is to apply 
the amended statute.  See Meeks v. Papadopulos (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 187, 190, 
16 O.O.3d 212, 213, 404 N.E.2d 159, 161, citing Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 
Ohio St. 312, 28 O.O. 270, 55 N.E.2d 413, paragraph five of the syllabus 
(unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted). 
 
The statute states that a defendant shall receive credit when that defendant 
has been confined “for any reason arising out of the offense.”  The statute’s 
specific inclusions following the “any reason” statement clarify certain, otherwise 
possibly ambiguous, situations that are not applicable here. 
 
Snowder correctly argues that criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
against the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused.  R.C. 2901.04(A).  
“Nevertheless, courts do not have the authority to ignore the plain and 
unambiguous language of a statute under the guise of either statutory interpretation 
or liberal construction; in such situation, the courts must give effect to the words 
utilized.”  Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 
N.E.2d 939, 942.  Accordingly, we turn to the relevant statutes to determine 
whether Snowder was confined. 
 
 
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A CBCF must include “a physical facility that will be used for the 
confinement of persons * * * sentenced to the facility.”  R.C. 2301.52(A); 146 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7231.  By the terms of his probation, Snowder was required to 
enter the CBCF.  A CBCF must “[b]e a secure facility that contains lockups and 
other measures sufficient to ensure the safety of the surrounding community.”  
R.C. 2301.52(A)(1).  Snowder stipulated that he was not allowed to leave the 
CBCF without permission.  It appears beyond doubt that entry into a CBCF 
constitutes confinement. 
 
We hold that a defendant in a CBCF is in detention pursuant to R.C. 
2921.01(E) and (F), and is subject to conviction for escape pursuant to R.C. 
2921.34.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.