Title: MICHAEL H. GREEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MICHAEL H. GREEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 231784 P.2d 1360Case Number: 89-47Decided: 12/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL H. GREEN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Steven E. 
Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gay Woodhouse, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Karen Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Michael H. 
Green appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, W.S. 6-2-401(c)(ii), and 
the imposed sentence which was enhanced by the habitual criminal statute, W.S. 
6-10-201.

[¶2.]     Green raises the 
following issues:

"I. Whether the trial 
court erred by failing to enforce appellant's rights under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers.

"II. Whether appellant's 
constitutional right of silence was violated by a law enforcement officer's 
impermissible comments during trial.

"III. Whether the trial 
court erred by failing to dismiss the habitual criminal 
allegation."

[¶3.]     The State frames these 
issues as follows:

"I. Whether or not 
appellant's motion to dismiss based upon rights in the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act was properly denied. 

"II. Whether or not 
appellant's constitutional right to silence was violated by a witness' testimony 
that the appellant refused to speak to the first two officers but did speak to 
the witness.

"III. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the habitual criminal 
charge."

[¶4.]     We affirm the 
conviction on the aggravated robbery charge but reverse and remand for 
resentencing under the habitual criminal sentencing 
statute.

FACTS

[¶5.]     In the late evening of 
August 11, 1987, a man armed with a knife grabbed the clerk of a convenience 
store in Laramie, Wyoming and demanded money. The assailant took 
about $300.00 in cash and 13 blank money orders. The clerk identified Green as 
his assailant. Prior to this robbery, the clerk had noticed a person sitting in 
a car behind the store wearing clothing similar to that worn by the assailant. 
Near where this car had been parked, the Laramie police found a discarded cigarette 
package which contained Green's fingerprints. On August 14, 1987, Green was 
arrested in Butte, 
Montana. A car in which Green was 
riding contained the stolen money orders.

[¶6.]     The episode in 
Laramie was not 
the only event during this short period of time that resulted in criminal 
charges against Green. Green was charged with three counts of aggravated 
assault, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal 
sodomy for crimes he committed on August 11, 1987, in Saline County, Kansas. He was convicted on these charges on 
February 26, 1988, and was sentenced to prison for two consecutive prison terms 
of 15 years to life, one consecutive life sentence, and three concurrent 
sentences of three to ten years. Green was also found guilty of aggravated 
robbery for the August 12, 1987, robbery of a Rawlins, Wyoming convenience 
store, for which he received a sentence of 20 to 25 years in prison. See Green 
v. State, 776 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶7.]     Pursuant to the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, W.S. 7-15-101, 18 U.S.C.Appx. (1982), Green 
was brought to Wyoming from Kansas to stand trial on the charges arising from the 
Rawlins and Laramie robberies. A jury convicted Green for 
the Rawlins robbery on November 9, 1988. On January 24, 1989, a jury convicted 
Green for the Laramie robbery and in that same proceeding 
also found him to be habitual criminal. Because the jury found Green to have 
been previously convicted of four felonies, the court sentenced Green to life in 
prison.

DISCUSSION

1. Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers

[¶8.]     Wyoming's version of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is contained in W.S. 7-15-101 through -105. 
W.S. 7-15-101 states in pertinent part:

Article 
III

"(a) Whenever a person 
has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution 
of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of 
imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged 
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial at the next term of court after he shall 
have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court 
of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open 
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction 
of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." (emphasis 
added)

[¶9.]     The federal act, 18 
U.S.C.Appx., requires a state participating in the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers to adopt its statutes "in substantially" the same form as the federal 
act. Id. at § 
2. Wyoming's version of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, cited above, is 
the same as the federal act except that the federal government's version 
requires the time for trial to be "within one hundred and eighty days" instead 
of "at the next term of court" required by the Wyoming statute, W.S. 
7-15-101.

[¶10.]  Green contends that this difference in 
wording is unconstitutional. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, however, is 
merely a statutory set of procedural rules that do not rise to the level of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Camp v. United States, 
587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978); Perry v. Carter, 514 F. Supp. 19, 21 
(W.D.Okla. 1980). The right that Green apparently here argues as being violated 
due to the language difference may be his right to a speedy trial. Although we 
have a well-settled analysis to determine whether a defendant received a speedy 
trial, Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1989), we need not 
apply that analysis here. If another appropriate ground exits to resolve an 
issue, we need not discuss constitutional questions. K N Energy, Inc. v. City of 
Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 1988). We need not 
discuss the speedy trial question in this case because, when only the days 
countable are computed, Green was brought to trial within 180 
days.

[¶11.]  The Albany county attorney's office received notice 
of Green's desire to face trial on this charge on May 31, 1988. Green's trial 
was conducted on January 23, 1989, a span of 236 days after his request. 
However, from June 29, 1988, until November 9, 1988, he was unavailable for 
trial in this case in AlbanyCounty because he was preparing for and 
standing trial on the CarbonCounty charge. The time he was detained 
for trial in CarbonCounty tolls the time used to determine 
the number of days between his request and trial. Commonwealth v. Petrozziello, 
22 Mass. App. 
71, 491 N.E.2d 627, 633, cert. denied 479 U.S. 852, 107 S. Ct. 182, 93 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1986). Subtracting the 133 days during which he was held in CarbonCounty from the total 236 days leaves only 
103 days, well within the 180-day limit that the federal act and other 
jurisdictions impose on interstate detainers. The trial court, thus, properly 
denied Green's motion to dismiss based on any delay in bringing him to 
trial.

2. Green's Constitutional Right of 
Silence

[¶12.]  Green contends that his right to silence, 
based on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 
of the Wyoming Constitution, was violated during trial. The following 
examination by the Deputy Albany County Attorney of Lt. Donald Butler of the 
Butte/Silver Bow, Montana Law Enforcement Agency sparks this 
contention:

"Q. Do you remember when 
it was that you came in contact with the Defendant?

"A. On the early morning 
hours of August 14, 1987.

"Q. In the contact you 
had with the Defendant, did you ever have a conversation with 
him?

"A. Yes, I 
did.

"Q. What was that 
conversation about?

"A. He was involved in an 
incident in our city, and two of the officers on my crew had him in custody, and 
he refused to identify himself in any way or any manner, so as shift commander, 
they had contacted me and I went up to talk to the 
subject.

"Q. Did you talk to the 
Defendant?

"A. Yes, I 
did.

"Q. What did you say to 
the Defendant, do you recall?

"A. Well first, I 
reviewed his Miranda rights, his constitutional rights with him, and then due to 
the situation he was involved in in Butte, I explained to him that he was not 
helping himself at all by trying to remain anonymous, or not giving his name or 
anything like that, and that we would eventually find out who he was. We would 
positively identify him. It would just be a matter of time for us, and extra 
inconvenience for him, but we would eventually know who he was, and I explained 
that he was doing himself no good by remaining silent as far as identity 
goes.

"Q. Did the Defendant 
ever give you his name? 

"A. Yes, he did. * * * He 
had refused to talk to Sergeant Henrich and Officer Bury, but with me he opened 
right up - "

At this point 
Green's attorney moved for a mistrial.

[¶13.]  Not every reference to a defendant's 
failure to respond to a question put forth by law enforcement authorities will 
result in reversal of a conviction. Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53, 55 (Wyo. 1986); Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1381 
(Wyo. 1981), 
cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981). The instant 
case does not present a situation where the prosecutor has made an impermissible 
comment on Green's right to remain silent which must result in reversal. 
Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). Rather, at issue here is the 
answer of the witness to an innocuous question about Green identifying himself. 
Green was advised of his Miranda rights, which include the right to remain 
silent during interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). The gathering of booking information such as a 
suspect's name does not, however, reach the level of interrogation that the 
process enunciated in Miranda was intended to cover. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 
1986); United 
States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1986). 
See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689, 
64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). Where silence carries no penalty, there is no error. 
Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 1382. Butler's testimony "does not rise to the level 
of prohibited comments on silence." Id.

[¶14.]  Finally, it is clear that Butler's answer did not 
create "an inference of guilt." Rather the record contains overwhelming evidence 
of guilt that resulted in his conviction. Not only did the store clerk identify 
Green as the assailant, but a cigarette package found at the scene had Green's 
fingerprints on it, and the car in which Green admitted riding contained the 
stolen money orders. We find it clear that there was not any error committed in 
asking appellant his identity.

3. The Habitual Criminal 
Sentence

[¶15.]  Following a jury finding of guilt on the 
aggravated robbery charge, the trial court proceeded to determine whether Green 
was subject to sentencing under the habitual criminal statute, W.S. 6-10-201, 
which states:

"(a) A person is an 
habitual criminal if:

"(i) He is convicted of a 
violent felony; and

"(ii) He has been 
convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous charges separately brought and 
tried which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere.

"(b) An habitual criminal 
shall be punished by imprisonment for:

"(i) Not less than ten 
(10) years nor more than fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) previous 
convictions;

"(ii) Life, if he has 
three (3) or more previous convictions."

[¶16.]  The instructions given the jury included 
the following:

Instruction No. 
4

"The term `separately 
brought' means that the charges must have been brought separately from this 
aggravated robbery charge of which the defendant has just been found 
guilty."

Instruction No. 
5

"The term `previous 
charges' means charges that were brought and tried before today's 
verdict."

Instruction No. 
6

"The term `separate 
occurrences' means occurrences which are separate from the aggravated robbery 
charge of which the defendant has just been found guilty."

The jury found 
Green to have been convicted of four previous felonies based on evidence 
concerning three of Green's Kansas convictions 
and his CarbonCounty 
conviction.

[¶17.]  Green takes issue with instructions four 
and six because they allowed the jury to consider the three Kansas convictions 
individually. We agree that these instructions were in error. Green takes issue 
with instruction five because it allowed the jury to consider the CarbonCounty 
conviction despite the fact that the crime from which the charge arose was 
committed after the AlbanyCounty crime. This instruction was 
proper.

[¶18.]  In order to determine whether these 
instructions were proper, we must determine the meaning of the words "separately 
brought," "previous charges," and "separate occurrences" as used in W.S. 
6-10-201(a)(ii). When called upon to interpret a statute, we give words their 
ordinary and plain meaning unless otherwise indicated. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶19.]  The ordinary and plain meaning of the 
terms "separately brought" and "separate occurrences" required for sentence 
enhancement refers to more than just the conviction. These terms refer as well 
to charges and occurrences separate from each other. Nothing in the statute 
indicates any other meaning is to attach to these terms. This interpretation is 
in harmony with the constitutional mandate that the penal code is to be humane. 
Wyoming 
Constitution, Art. 1, § 15. Further, we find this to be the better reading and 
the one followed in a majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Annotation, 
Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting 
Enhancement of Penalty for Subsequent Offense under Habitual Criminal Statutes, 
24 A.L.R.2d 1247 § 6 (1952); Rezin v. State, 95 Nev. 461, 596 P.2d 226 (1979); 
State v. Robinson, 388 N.W.2d 43 (Minn.App. 1986). The Kansas convictions arose 
out of one occurrence, the August 11, 1987 convenience store robbery, and were 
brought in one trial. They were not "separately brought and tried" nor did they 
arise out of "separate occurrences" as required by the habitual criminal 
statute, W.S. 6-10-201. The Kansas convictions can, therefore, only count 
as one previous conviction under the habitual criminal 
statute.

[¶20.]  The trial court did instruct the jury 
properly on the meaning of "previous charges." This is clear when we consider 
the entire section of the statute from where these words come. Story v. State, 
755 P.2d 228 (Wyo. 1988). W.S. 6-10-201 permits an enhanced 
sentence if a person "has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more previous 
charges." The statute does not require that a crime be previously committed, 
only that there be previous convictions. State v. Dixon, 126 Ariz. 613, 617 P.2d 779, 784 (1980). Thus, the 
CarbonCounty conviction may count 
toward a habitual criminal statute sentence enhancement. The CarbonCounty 
conviction occurred previous to the AlbanyCounty 
conviction; it matters not that Green committed the CarbonCounty 
robbery following the AlbanyCounty one.

[¶21.]  We remand for resentencing because the 
jury was erroneously allowed, under the instructions which were given, to count 
each Kansas conviction separately, thereby resulting in four prior convictions 
and Green's receipt of a life sentence under W.S. 6-10-201(b)(ii). The record 
contains evidence of only two prior convictions that can count toward enhancing 
the aggravated robbery penalty.

[¶22.]  The conviction is affirmed and the 
sentence reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.