Title: VASSAR v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VASSAR v. STATE2004 WY 12599 P.3d 987Case Number: 03-99Decided: 10/29/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

PETER 
B. VASSAR,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Daniel G. Blythe, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Carisa Acker, Student Intern, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      The appellant, 
Peter B. Vassar, appeals from the denial of his suppression motion.  The district court found that a law 
enforcement officer properly seized a wooden "marijuana stash box" from the 
appellant's automobile pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine.  The district court also upheld the 
officer's search of the wooden stash box (wherein the officer observed marijuana 
residue and smelled the odor of marijuana) and the subsequent search of the 
automobile's contents.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented in this appeal are as follows:

 

1.         
Whether a law enforcement officer properly seized a wooden "stash box" 
from the appellant's automobile pursuant to the "plain view" 
doctrine?

 

2.         
Whether the officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
the wooden stash box?

 

            
3.         
Whether the officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
the automobile's contents?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On April 21, 
2002, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Kleif Guenther (Trooper Guenther) responded 
to a single-vehicle rollover on southbound Interstate 25 in Laramie County.  The driver of a Jeep Wrangler (the 
appellant's vehicle) had apparently lost control of the vehicle, causing it to 
exit the roadway, travel through a right-of-way fence, across a frontage road 
and through another fence, where it overturned.  According to Trooper Guenther, the 
weather that day was "very sunny, nice, a few clouds, fairly warm," the road was 
"[d]ry and clear," and the appellant's vehicle left the roadway for "no apparent 
reason . . .."

 

[¶4]      When Trooper 
Guenther arrived at the scene, the appellant (the vehicle's driver and only 
occupant) remained trapped in the vehicle.  
Trooper Guenther described the appellant at the scene as 
follows:

 

[W]henever 
law enforcement appeared to exit his vision he would calm down some, and the 
minute an officer in uniform would re[appear] in his vision . . . he would 
become agitated and aggressive towards EMS personnel and 
firefighters.

 

[¶5]      While standing 
beside the appellant's vehicle1 ("maybe two or three feet away from 
it"), Trooper Guenther observed a wooden box just behind the driver's seat 
"propped up in the rear area of the vehicle" and in "plain view."  A gold-colored image of a leaf, possibly 
made out of brass, appeared on the wooden box.  Based on his knowledge, training and 
experience, Trooper Guenther testified that the leaf was a "marijuana leaf"2 and the wooden box was "what is 
commonly known as a marijuana stash box . . .."  A "stash box" is, according to Trooper 
Guenther, "a container to hold . . . illegal substance[s]" and a "marijuana leaf 
on a wooden box is commonly associated with a stash box."  Trooper Guenther testified that in his 
five-year career as a highway patrolman, he had "seen many kinds of stash 
boxes," and had seized "[m]aybe 50 to 75" stash boxes, approximately a dozen of 
which boxes were made of wood.  
According to Trooper Guenther, stash boxes come "in all sizes . . . and 
shapes.  Some have associated 
paraphernalia pictures such as a marijuana leaf on them.  I've found some with that before.  I've found some with marijuana 
paraphernalia such as a glass pipe or a bong."

 

[¶6]      Trooper Guenther 
reached into the appellant's vehicle, pulled out the wooden box, and opened the 
box.  He observed marijuana residue 
in the box and smelled the odor of marijuana in the box.  Based on this discovery, and considering 
that "it was a nice, sunny day, and this vehicle for no apparent reason drove 
off the road and wrecked" and the appellant's "behavior" at the scene, Trooper 
Guenther concluded that "something else was going on here other than a standard, 
unexplained rollover."

 

[¶7]      The vehicle's top 
was "open," and items from inside the vehicle, as well as "pieces of the 
vehicle," were "scattered" within a fifty to seven-hundred-fifty foot radius of 
where the vehicle came to rest.  
Trooper Guenther noticed "some bags [that] appeared to be involved in the 
crash had been placed in somewhat of a pile which wasn't standard with the rest 
of the debris that was scattered about the . . . crash scene."  Civilian passersby likely had placed the 
luggage in that position sometime after the rollover.  Trooper Guenther had no reason to 
believe that the luggage did not come from the appellant's vehicle or that the 
luggage belonged to anyone other than the appellant.

 

[¶8]      Trooper Guenther 
opened one of these bags and discovered the "hardware" or equipment for a 
clandestine methamphetamine lab.  A 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent responded to the scene to 
investigate and process the suspected methamphetamine lab.  At the scene, the DCI agent observed a 
black folder containing what appeared to be an "elaborate" recipe for 
manufacturing methamphetamine (including a price list for items and where the 
items could be purchased),3 a quantity of suspected ephedrine, 
blenders, Pyrex bowls, a "heating type source," tubing, hot plates, tube 
cutters, and filters.  These items 
were, in the DCI agent's experience, "common items that we find at 
methamphetamine labs."  The 
equipment, according to the DCI agent, would probably produce a "use" amount of 
methamphetamine under the circumstances, but the equipment itself could be used 
"over and over."

 

[¶9]      After discovering 
the clandestine lab equipment, Trooper Guenther went to the hospital to verify 
the appellant's condition, continue the investigation, and arrest the appellant 
for "driving under the influence of a controlled substance and also with 
possession of clandestine lab material."4  During a search of the appellant's 
belongings at the hospital, Trooper Guenther found a list of chemicals commonly 
used in manufacturing methamphetamine written on a 
matchbook.

 

[¶10]   The appellant was charged with 
possessing laboratory equipment or supplies with intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(ii) and (b) (LexisNexis 2003), a felony.  In June 2002, the appellant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his automobile and his belongings 
(at the hospital), which motion the district court denied.  In denying the motion, the district 
court made the following findings relevant to the issues on 
appeal:

 

            
1.         
The district court did not attach any particular significance to the 
evidence that the appellant "was involved in a one-car accident on dry pavement 
during sunny weather" or that the appellant appeared agitated at the 
scene.

 

            
2.         
The district court found that while

 

investigating 
the accident patrolman Guenther observed a small wooden box inside the jeep 
behind the front seats.  A likeness 
of a leaf is imposed on the lid of the box.  Patrolman Guenther immediately 
recognized the leaf as a marihuana leaf and concluded that the wooden box was a 
"stash box."  (According to 
patrolman Guenther, a "stash box" is a container used to store controlled 
substances and related paraphernalia.)  
He seized it and discovered that it smelled like marihuana.  He also noticed a substance in the box 
that he recognized as marihuana residue.

 

            
3.         
The district court found that the wooden box's "incriminating character 
was immediately apparent" to the officer, as based

 

upon 
both his previous experience with stash boxes and the unique style of the wooden 
box in question, patrolman Guenther concluded that it was a "stash box."  Since a "stash box" is a product used 
for illegally storing controlled substances it is "drug paraphernalia."  . . . The Court finds patrolman 
Guenther's testimony credible and it finds that due to his experience and 
training he immediately recognized the wooden box as a "stash box" and hence of 
an incriminating character.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  The marihuana leaf gives the 
box distinctive characteristics that would reasonably lead someone to believe it 
contained contraband.

 

            
4.         
The district court concluded that the wooden box was properly seized 
pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the surrounding circumstances 
further gave the officer "reason to believe that contraband would be found 
within the jeep and its contents."  
According to the district court, a

 

reasonable 
and likely inference to draw from the evidence of marihuana within the box is 
that associated drug paraphernalia would be located within the vicinity of the 
"stash box."  In this case that 
would be within the contents of the jeep.  
Therefore patrolman Guenther's search of the bags that fell out of the 
jeep was appropriate.

 

[¶11]   Pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
appellant later conditionally pled guilty to the amended charge of conspiring 
with another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(iv), also a felony, and the prosecution agreed to 
"cap" its sentencing recommendation at imprisonment for four to eight 
years.  In so pleading, the 
appellant preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of the 
suppression motion.  The district 
court ultimately sentenced the appellant to imprisonment at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary for twenty-two to twenty-eight months and to pay a $10,000.00 
fine.  The district court stayed the 
imposition of the sentence pending this appeal and the appellant was released on 
an appeal bond.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶12]   Our standard of review is as 
follows:

 

Findings 
on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
218 (Wyo.1994).  Since the district 
court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo.1997).

 

McChesney 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).  In his appellate brief, the appellant 
states that in the instant case, the district court's factual findings "are not 
clearly erroneous.  The conclusion 
of law reached by the district court based on the facts was in 
error."

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶13]   On appeal, the appellant claims 
that Trooper  Guenther's actions 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 4.5

 

Neither 
the federal nor the state constitution forbids all searches and 
seizures; rather, they prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Guerra v. State, 
897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo.1995).  
Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable per se, with 
but a few exceptions.  Gehnert v. 
State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo.1998); Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 
935 (Wyo.1995).  Those exceptions 
include:

 

"1) 
search of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search 
conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure 
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of 
an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; 
and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent 
loss of life or property."

 

Morris, 
908 P.2d  at 935 (quoting Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940-41 
(Wyo.1983), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Jones [v. State], 902 
P.2d [686] at 692 [(Wyo.1995)]).  
When a proper objection or motion is made by a defendant, the state bears 
the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies.  Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Wyo.1995); Dickeson [v. State], 843 P.2d [606] at 610 
[(Wyo.1992)].

 

Lancaster 
v. State, 
2002 WY 45, ¶ 61, 43 P.3d 80, 102-03 (Wyo. 2002) (emphasis in original).  The fourth and fifth of these listed 
exceptions are at issue in the instant appeal.

 

[¶14]   The appellant's analysis under the 
Wyoming Constitution is essentially that because Article 1, Section 4 includes 
an "affidavit" requirement, the probable cause necessary to justify a 
warrantless search under the Wyoming Constitution "may be more important" and/or 
"should be stronger."  While we 
appreciate the appellant's effort in attempting to present an independent state 
constitutional analysis, we conclude that the analysis presented does not 
constitute the "precise, analytically sound approach [required] when advancing 
an argument to independently interpret the state constitution."  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 
484 (Wyo. 1999).  A failure to present a sufficient 
argument supporting "adequate and independent state grounds,' . . . prevents 
this court, as a matter of policy, from considering other than the federal 
constitutional principles at issue . . .."  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 
(1983)).  See also Fender v. State, 2003 WY 
96, 74 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Wyo. 2003) and Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 7 
n.2, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 n.2 (Wyo. 2002).  Accordingly, we will analyze the issues 
in this case pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.

 

[¶15]   The district court concluded that 
Trooper Guenther's warrantless seizure of the wooden "stash box" was valid under 
the "plain view" doctrine.  We have 
previously set forth the three requirements for a valid seizure of evidence in 
plain view:  "(1) the officer must 
not have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the 
evidence could be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating character of the 
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (3) the officer must have a lawful 
right of access to the object itself."  
Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 21 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶16]   The appellant focuses his argument 
on the second requirement.  He 
argues that the wooden "stash box" at issue in the instant case was "not so 
unique or . . . such a limited or single purpose item to justify the opening of 
the box or the [warrantless] seizure of the box."  In other words, there was "nothing about 
this box that is so readily apparent that anyone would know that the box was 
criminal in nature" and "no foundation was provided to show that this was a 
stash box as opposed to some other type of container."  To support this argument, the appellant 
primarily relies upon two cases:  
People v. Evans, 259 Ill.App.3d 650, 197 Ill.Dec. 650, 631 N.E.2d 872 (1994) and State v. Runge, 8 Neb.App. 
715, 601 N.W.2d 554 (1999).

 

[¶17]   We agree with the district court 
that Trooper Guenther's warrantless seizure of the wooden box he observed in the 
appellant's vehicle was justified under the plain view doctrine.  The use of the phrase "immediately 
apparent" was "very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to 
imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character 
of evidence is necessary for an application of the plain view' doctrine."  Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 
741, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983).  "[T]he seizure of property in plain 
view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, 
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity.'"  Id. at 
741-42 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)) 
(emphasis in original).  The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated the requirement as follows:  "[t]he officer['s] discovery of the 
object must so galvanize [his] knowledge that [he] can be said, at that very 
moment or soon thereafter, to have probable cause to believe the object to be 
contraband or evidence.'"  United 
States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 997 (1993) (quoting United States v. 
Rutkowski, 877 F.2d 139, 142 (1st Cir. 1989)).  However, probable 
cause

 

is 
a flexible, common-sense standard.  
It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would "warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief" . . . that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false.  A "practical, nontechnical" 
probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is 
required.

 

Brown, 
460 U.S. at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925) and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).  See also Naugle, 997 F.2d  
at 823.

 

[¶18]   In the instant case, the district 
court found that Trooper Guenther was a credible witness, which finding the 
appellant does not question on appeal.  
Trooper Guenther observed a small wooden box "propped up" amongst other 
belongings behind the driver's seat of the appellant's vehicle.  Emblazoned in gold on the top of the 
wooden box was what Trooper Guenther "immediately" recognized as an "exact 
replica" of a marijuana leaf.  A 
photograph of the image clearly lends objective support to Trooper Guenther's 
assessment.  Likewise, Trooper 
Guenther deduced from his knowledge, training, and experience as a law 
enforcement officer that the wooden box was a "stash box" or container used to 
store illegal controlled substances such as marijuana.6  Trooper Guenther testified that he had 
seen many kinds of stash boxes, having seized between fifty and seventy-five of 
them.  Some of these boxes had 
pictures such as a marijuana leaf on them and a marijuana leaf on a wooden box 
was, according to Trooper Guenther, "commonly associated" with such a stash 
box.7  The wooden box's incriminating character 
was therefore immediately apparent and Trooper Guenther had probable cause to 
seize the wooden box.

 

[¶19]   For the same reasons, we also find 
that Trooper Guenther had probable cause to search the wooden stash box.  The "seizure" of a container pursuant to 
the plain view doctrine "does not compromise the interest in preserving the 
privacy of its contents because it may only be opened pursuant to either a 
search warrant . . . or one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement."  Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 n.11, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 
(1990).  However,

 

where 
the contents of a seized container are a foregone conclusion, this prohibition 
against warrantless searches of containers under the plain view doctrine does 
not apply. We have held that when a container is "not closed,' or 
transparent,' or when its distinctive configuration . . . proclaims its 
contents,' the container supports no reasonable expectation of privacy and the 
contents can be said to be in plain view."  
[United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1427 (10th 
Cir.1991)] (citations omitted).  
See also United States v. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435, 440 
(7th Cir.1984) (police may open envelope that clearly contained key) 
. . .; United States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215, 1222 (6th 
Cir.1984) (police may open bottle without a warrant where label on bottle made 
it apparent that the bottle contained contraband).  . . . [W]here the police already possess 
knowledge approaching certainty as to the contents of the container, the search 
of the container does not unreasonably infringe upon the individual interest in 
preserving the privacy of those contents.

 

United 
States v. Corral, 
970 F.2d 719, 725-26 (10th Cir. 1992).  See also Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Wyo. 1985) (police knew car was stolen, car itself 
"was contraband" and "it very possibly could also contain contraband, i.e., the 
personal belongings which were stolen along with the car").  The distinctive configuration of the 
wooden stash box at issue in the instant case was such that it essentially 
proclaimed the box's contents.

 

[¶20]   The aforementioned cases relied 
upon by the appellant are distinguishable because the characteristics of the 
containers seized in those cases are dissimilar to the wooden stash box seized 
in the instant case.  In 
Evans, 631 N.E.2d  at 873-75, 
an officer seized from the defendant's person what is described as a small 
unmarked wooden box (the officer did not "notice any writing on the outside of" 
the box), which box "measured about 1 ½ inches by 2 ½ inches and was closed on 
all sides."  The court concluded 
that such a box was not "sufficiently distinctive so as to announce its 
contents" and in the absence of other circumstances, the officer lacked probable 
cause to conduct a warrantless search of the wooden box and, therefore, the 
defendant's vehicle.  Id. at 
877-78.  In Runge, 601 N.W.2d  
at 558, 
an officer seized a baggie and a film canister from the defendant's person; the 
officer could not see what, if anything, was in these containers.  The court concluded that the containers 
were "not distinctive enough, standing alone, to announce drug contents" and the 
officer was not justified in seizing them.  
Id. at 563-64.

 

[¶21]   The appellant further argues that 
Trooper Guenther did not have probable cause to then conduct what he 
characterizes as a warrantless "general search of the automobile, luggage, 
containers or personal papers."  
According to the appellant, Trooper Guenther did not possess the 
requisite probable cause to search the vehicle's remaining contents based on 
"the suggestion of a personal use quantity of marijuana . . 
.."

 

"The 
search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause is one of the 
recognized exceptions [to the warrant requirement].  . . . [T]his court [has] recognized that 
differences exist between motor vehicles and other property, which permit 
warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless 
searches would not be reasonable in other contexts.'"

 

Borgwardt 
v. State, 
946 P.2d 805, 807 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1996)).

 

"Probable 
cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality of the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or 
evidence."  United States v. 
Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted).  "The 
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is defined by the object of the 
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be 
found.'"  United States v. 
Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 
(1982)).

 

United 
States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 
258 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2001).

 

A 
lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which 
the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that 
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.  . . .  When a legitimate search is under way, 
and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice 
distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or 
between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in 
the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient 
completion of the task at hand.

 

. 
. .

 

            
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by 
the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted.  Rather, it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it 
may be found.  Just as probable 
cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not 
support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that 
undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a 
warrantless search of a suitcase.  
Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi 
contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire 
cab.

 

            
. . .

 

. 
. .  We hold that the scope of the 
warrantless search authorized by [the automobile] exception is no broader and no 
narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant.  If probable cause justifies the search 
of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the 
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.

 

United 
States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 820-25, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982) (footnotes omitted).  See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999) and Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 
716-17.

 

[¶22]   We conclude that the circumstances 
of the instant case would lead a person of ordinary caution to believe that 
there was a fair probability that the appellant's automobile contained marijuana 
and/or paraphernalia associated with the use of marijuana.  We have previously detailed the facts 
surrounding Trooper Guenther's seizure of the wooden stash box he observed among 
the contents of the vehicle's passenger compartment.  In searching the stash box, Trooper 
Guenther discovered what he believed to be marijuana residue in the box, and 
also detected the odor of marijuana.  
The appellant does not question Trooper Guenther's reliability in 
arriving at either of these conclusions.  
Trooper Guenther also testified that he had previously (in other cases) 
seized stash boxes with marijuana paraphernalia such as a glass pipe or a 
bong.

 

[¶23]   In applying the above-cited legal 
principles, several other courts have found probable cause to search an 
automobile in its entirety based on the presence of marijuana, even in small 
quantities.  See, for example, 
United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 690-92 (10th Cir. 
2002); 
United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 
1995) (probable cause to search entire 
automobile where officers smelled marijuana in the automobile and found a 
rolled-up dollar bill with white powder residue and a marijuana cigarette on the 
defendant's person); United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 
(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1070 
(1990) (probable cause to search entire 
automobile where officer first smelled the odor of burnt marijuana and observed 
what he believed to be marijuana seeds or residue in the car's interior, and 
then located marijuana in a cracker box and the automobile's ashtray, floorboard 
and seat, and later smelled raw marijuana coming from the trunk and located 
sixty-eight pounds of marijuana in the trunk); People v. Moore, 900 P.2d 66, 70-71 (Colo. 1995) (probable cause to search automobile for 
contraband or evidence of a crime based on marijuana cigarette produced by 
vehicle occupant and knowledge that occupants were suspected of drug activity); 
State v. Longo, 243 Conn. 732, 708 A.2d 1354, 1357-59 (1998) (probable cause to search entire 
automobile after officer smelled marijuana and saw marijuana seeds and 
cigarettes in plain view inside car"traces of marijuana observed in plain view 
provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle, and any containers, for 
additional marijuana"); Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d 1125, 1127-29 (Del.Supr. 
1989) (probable cause to search entire 
automobile based on discovery of small bag of green plant material later 
identified as marijuana in glove compartment); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Minn. 1983) ("discovery of marijuana in the ashtray 
gave [officer] probable cause to believe that he would find marijuana elsewhere 
and justified his searching anywhere in the car that he might reasonably expect 
to find more marijuana" and "discovery of some marijuana in a car gives probable 
cause to search for more"); Fleming v. State, 502 So. 2d 327, 329 (Miss. 
1987) (probable cause to search entire 
automobile when marijuana seeds and parts of marijuana observed in automobile's 
passenger compartment and odor of marijuana emanating from passenger 
compartment); Hall v. State, 1988 OK CR 286, 766 P.2d 1002, 1005 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1988) ("having found a marijuana cigarette 
which fell from appellant's clothing during a lawful pat down search incident to 
arrest, the officer was further justified in searching the car because probable 
cause existed that the vehicle contained other illegal drugs and 
paraphernalia"); Hill v. State, 516 S.W.2d 361, 366 (Tenn.Crim.App. 
1974) ("search of the glove compartment of the 
car can be justified as reasonable on the ground that [officer] could have 
insisted that by finding the plastic bag of marihuana in plain view on the seat 
of the defendant's car it was reasonable for him to conclude that in all 
probability there was other marihuana in the glove compartment"); and 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(c) (3rd ed. 1996 and Supp. 
2004) (citing cases).  See also People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Colo. 1995) (probable cause to search automobile for 
"contraband or evidence of criminal activity" where driver had prior record for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a syringe was observed between the driver's 
seat and the center console, and driver stated that no one who drove or used car 
was diabetic).

 

[¶24]   Some courts have also directly 
refused to limit the scope of such a search based on the discovery of claimed 
"personal use" amounts of marijuana.8  In United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 209 (10th Cir. 1986), 
Loucks was stopped for speeding in Wyoming.  The officer, based on his experience 
with marijuana arrests, noticed a strong odor of marijuana on Loucks and what 
the officer thought was still-burning marijuana in the vehicle's passenger 
compartment.  The officer searched 
the vehicle's interior and discovered a small wooden box containing what 
appeared to be marijuana, marijuana cigarette butts in the vehicle's ashtray and 
a small brown paper bag containing marijuana.  The officer proceeded to search the 
vehicle's trunk, finding twenty-five pounds of marijuana.  Id.

 

[¶25]   On appeal, Loucks conceded that the 
officer had probable cause to search the vehicle's passenger compartment for the 
marijuana Loucks was "personally using," but argued that the officer did not 
have probable cause to search the entire vehicle.  Id. at 210.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
citing United States v. Burnett, 791 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 
1986), 
rejected Loucks' "personal use" argument and concluded that the officer in 
Loucks had probable cause under the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Ross to search Loucks' entire vehicle.  Loucks, 806 F.2d  at 
210-11.  See also United States v. 
Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1173-75 (10th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting "personal use" argument that 
smell of burnt marijuana emanating from car, torn cigar paper, and ziploc bag of 
green weed material on floor behind driver's seat did not give officer probable 
cause to search entire vehicle, and finding that the evidence supported probable 
cause that defendant "might have hidden additional drugs not necessary for his 
current consumption in areas out of plain sight, including the trunk of the 
car").

 

[¶26]   In Burnett, 791 F.2d  at 
65-66, 
an officer observed a plastic bag containing a green, leafy substance on a 
vehicle's floorboard, and subsequently discovered 245 grams of cocaine in a 
champagne box in the vehicle's trunk.  
On appeal, Burnett argued that "two ounces of marijuana found on the 
floorboard of the car indicates that the appellant is only a casual user of 
narcotics as opposed to a dealer" and the officer therefore did not have 
probable cause to search the entire vehicle.  Id. at 67.

 

The 
appellant is asking this Court to burden the police with having to make another 
judgment callwhether a certain amount of marijuana, cocaine, or other drug 
found on a person or in some container makes the person a casual user or a 
dealer.  Determining the existence 
of probable cause to search on the amount of contraband initially found is a 
line which need not and should not be drawn.  Probable cause has never been defined 
quantitatively and the appellant's theory that "smaller is not necessarily 
bigger" must be rejected.  From the 
long history of litigated drug cases, it is evident that neither the casual user 
nor the dealer fits any precise description or category.

 

. 
. .

 

            
Under the Ross rationale, the search of the appellant's trunk, 
resulting in the discovery of the champagne box, was lawful and justified.  . . .  The marijuana package on the floorboard 
of the vehicle was in plain view and was legally seized by the officer.  Once the contraband was found, [the 
officer] had every right to search the passenger area of the car, the trunk, and 
any and all containers which might conceal contraband.

 

Id. 
at 67-68 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶27]   Searches of this nature, of course, 
are limited in scope to areas or containers which may contain the object of the 
search.  "Drug evidence can readily 
be concealed in small containers . . .."  
Moore, 900 P.2d at 71 (search of wallet).  In the instant case, Trooper Guenther 
proceeded to search luggage that was ejected from the appellant's vehicle.  In that luggage, Trooper Guenther 
discovered clandestine methamphetamine lab equipment.  The appellant does not argue that the 
luggage at issue was incapable of concealing marijuana or paraphernalia 
associated with the use of marijuana.  
The appellant does argue that law enforcement exceeded the permissible 
scope of the search by searching the "folder" wherein the elaborate 
methamphetamine recipe was discovered.  
While witnesses characterized the item as a "folder," it is apparent from 
a photograph of the item that the "folder" was a zippered case containing what 
appear to be several magazines, the approximately 8 ½" x 11" methamphetamine 
recipe and a similarly-sized notepad.  
We conclude that this item clearly was capable of concealing the objects 
of the search.

 

[¶28]   The appellant also suggests that 
because he was hospitalized and his vehicle was damaged and allegedly immobile, 
the exigencies underlying the automobile exception did not exist in the instant 
case.  This argument is not 
supported by citations to pertinent legal authority.  We note that 
although

 

the 
automobile exception is based in part on exigency, "the justification to conduct 
such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor 
does it depend upon a reviewing court's assessment of the likelihood in each 
particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents 
would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to 
obtain a warrant."

 

United 
States v. Ludwig, 
10 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 
1993) (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S. Ct. 3079, 3081, 73 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1982)).  See also Sparks, 291 F.3d  at 
690; 
Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1212-13; 
Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Wyo. 1998); 
and 3 Wayne R. LaFave, supra, § 7.2(b) at 476 ("if it appears that the car has only 
recently and suddenly become disabled (perhaps as a result of an accident while 
pursued by police), then it seems likely that the Carney doctrine 
is applicable") (emphasis in original).   In other words, if "police have 
probable cause to search a car, they need not get a search warrant first even if 
they have time and opportunity."  
Ludwig, 10 F.3d  at 1528.  See generally also State v. 
Williams, 2004 WY 53, 90 P.3d 85 (Wyo. 2004).

 

[¶29]   Finally, the appellant states that 
the search of his belongings at the hospital was improper because Trooper 
Guenther did not have probable cause to arrest the appellant for driving while 
under the influence of a controlled substance.  This argument was not accompanied by 
citations to pertinent legal authority.  
We further note that Trooper Guenther testified at the suppression 
hearing that after he discovered the clandestine methamphetamine lab equipment, 
he proceeded to the hospital to arrest the appellant for "driving under the 
influence of a controlled substance and also . . . possession of clandestine lab 
material."  On appeal, the appellant 
does not question Trooper Guenther's probable cause to arrest the appellant for 
the second offense.  In addition, 
the appellant states in his appellate brief that the district court did not 
specifically rule on the seizure of items from the appellant's belongings and 
that "in light of the court's ruling on the Motion for Suppression the personal 
clothing search is not an issue on appeal."

 

[¶30]   Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Trooper Guenther was "looking at the 
damage, the crush damage of the Jeep, seeing if there was anything in the Jeep 
that I should be aware of" as part of his investigation of the 
rollover.

 

  2Trooper Guenther testified that the 
image was an "exact replica of what a marijuana leaf looks 
like."

 

  3According to Trooper Guenther, the 
black folder was located "in the same general area of where the lab contents 
were [at the] scene of the crash."

 

  4According to Trooper Guenther, a 
blood sample obtained from the appellant that day subsequently tested negative 
for "drugs or alcohol" and the appellant was actually "not 
impaired."

 

  5The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides:

 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 4 provides:

 

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, 
particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 

  6We note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1002(a)(xxvii) (LexisNexis 2001) defines "[d]rug paraphernalia" to include 
"all equipment . . . when used . . . or designed for use for . . . storing, 
containing, concealing . . . a controlled substance in violation of this act . . 
.."

 

  7We are not left to review these 
circumstances in a vacuum.  A 
"police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and 
expertise" and a "police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience 
in deciding whether probable cause exists."  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 700, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996) ("[t]o a layman the sort of loose panel 
below the back seat armrest in the automobile involved in this case may suggest 
only wear and tear, but to Officer Luedke, who had searched roughly 2,000 cars 
for narcotics, it suggests that drugs may be secreted inside the panel" and an 
"appeals court should give due weight to a trial court's finding that the 
officer was credible and the inference was reasonable").  See also Brown, 460 U.S. at 
746 (Powell, J., concurring) (even "if it 
were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for carrying 
illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on 
his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might 
well elude an untrained person"); United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 
688-89 (10th Cir. 2002); 
and Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 522 (Wyo. 2000) (in evaluating probable cause to support 
a search warrant, the "experience and expertise of the arresting officer are 
factors that can be considered").  
Indeed, from objective information,

 

a 
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductionsinferences and deductions 
that might well elude an untrained person.

 

The 
process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.  Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense 
conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the 
sameand so are law enforcement officers.  
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in 
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the 
field of law enforcement.

 

. 
. .

 

. 
. .  [W]hen used by trained law 
enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be 
combined with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis 
for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that 
suspicion.

 

United 
States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 418-19, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 923 (1982). 
 See also Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683-84 (Wyo. 1982) and Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 8 
(Wyo. 1981).

 

  8It is worth noting that even in some 
cases that do impose such a limitation, courts have found that a search of the 
vehicle's passenger compartment (and its contents) was justified.  See, for example, Wimberly v. 
Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P.2d 417 
(1976) and 3 Wayne R. LaFave, supra, § 
7.2(c) (citing cases).