Title: HASVOLD v. PARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 6

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HASVOLD v. PARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 62002 WY 6545 P.3d 635Case Number: 00-344Decided: 04/30/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

 

 

ALAN L. 
HASVOLD and CHERYL L.

HASVOLD, 
husband and wife, 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

PARK 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

NUMBER 6 
and CAROL ROSENCRANSE,

individually, 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County:

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

S. 
Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, WY.

Representing 
Appellee Park County School District No. 6:

Scott 
E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, LLC, Powell, 
WY.

Representing 
Appellee Rosencranse:

Marc 
C. Thompson of Webster & Thompson, LLC, Cody, WY

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants 
Alan and Cheryl Hasvold appeal from the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of appellees Carol Rosencranse and Park County School District 
No. 6.  The effect of the district 
court's order was to uphold the validity of the appellees' easements over the 
Hasvolds' property.  We conclude 
that there are genuine issues of mate­rial fact which preclude granting 
judgments in favor of the appellees at this point in the litigation and, 
consequently, reverse and remand this case for trial as to the validity of the 
easements.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The Hasvolds 
present the following issues on appeal:

 

1.  Whether the 
trial court erred in finding a valid easement appurtenant to property owned by 
Rosencranse when at the time of the granting of the easement the alleged 
appurtenant parcel owner was different than the grantee of the 
easement?

 

2.  Whether the 
trial court erred in finding that the School Dis­trict did not abandon its 
easement over appellants' property?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      This case 
involves two identical easements across the Hasvold property in Cody.1  The dominant estates are owned by 
Rosencranse and the School District.  
The Hasvold prop­erty is located directly east of the Rosencranse 
prop­erty and directly north of the School District property.   Originally, the Hasvold, 
Rosencranse, and School District properties were all owned by William and Marie 
Ellis.  

 

[¶4]      In 1986, the 
Ellises conveyed the Rosencranse property to George and Frances Kramer.  George Kramer apparently died shortly 
thereafter; and Frances, subsequently, con­veyed the property to their son, 
Donald Kramer.  On August 5, 1987, 
the Ellises conveyed an easement over the Hasvold property to Tall Oak Tree, 
Inc.  Donald Kramer was an owner and 
officer of Tall Oak.  On August 20, 
1987, Kramer conveyed the Rosencranse property to Tall Oak.  Tall Oak mortgaged the property to the 
State of Wyoming, the Small Business Administration, and Western Bank of 
Cody.  Although the record is not 
clear on this matter, the Small Business Administration apparently took title to 
the property at some point and then conveyed it to Rosencranse in 1993.  The deed from the Small Business 
Administration to Rosencranse did not expressly mention the easement.  

 

[¶5]      Rosencranse 
operates Roger's Sports Center in a commercial building on her 
prop­erty.  Rosencranse also 
leases part of the building to two other business lessees.  Rosencranse and her lessees used the 
easement across the Hasvold property for business purposes. 

 

[¶6]      The School 
District took title to its property by warranty deed from the Ellises in 
1982.  The deed expressly granted 
the School District an easement across the Hasvold prop­erty for ingress, 
egress, and utilities.  The School 
District constructed a middle school on its property and began holding classes 
in the school in 1994.   

 

[¶7]      The Ellises 
apparently conveyed the Hasvold property to the Deme Company, and the Deme 
Company conveyed it to the Hasvolds in 1996.   The Hasvolds' warranty deed from 
the Deme Company expressly stated that the conveyance was subject to the 
easements of public record or otherwise established.  

 

[¶8]      In March 1999, 
the Hasvolds filed a complaint, requesting that the district court 
termi­nate the appellees' alleged easements over their property.  The Hasvolds alleged in their complaint 
that Rosencranse was wrongfully using their property and that the School 
District had abandoned its easement.  
The appellees filed separate motions for summary judgment.  Rosencranse claimed that, as the 
suc­cessor in interest to Tall Oak, she had a valid easement appurtenant 
over the Hasvolds prop­erty, and the School District asserted that it had 
not aban­doned its easement. 

 

[¶9]      The parties 
submitted several briefs and numerous affidavits to the district court.  The district court held a hearing on the 
summary judgment motions and, subsequently, issued an order granting the 
appellees' motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled that the 
undisputed evi­dence showed that the School District has used its easement 
over the Hasvold property in recent time and that such use defeated the 
Hasvolds' claim that the School Dis­trict had aban­doned its 
easement.  The district court also 
ruled that Rosencranse owned a valid easement appurtenant for ingress, egress, 
and utilities over the Hasvold property.  

 

[¶10]   Rosencranse subsequently amended 
its answer and counterclaim by adding a claim for a prescriptive easement.  That issue was not addressed in the 
district court's summary judgment decision.  Rosencranse and the Hasvolds agreed to 
dismiss the prescriptive ease­ment claim without prejudice and stipulated 
that the district court's summary judgment order was a final order.  The district court entered a "Final 
Order and Order Dismissing Prescrip­tive Easement Claim Without 
Preju­dice."  The Hasvolds filed 
a timely notice of appeal.  
Additional facts relevant to specific issues will be set forth in our 
discussion of those issues.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.  Standard 
of Review

 

[¶11]   Our standard for reviewing summary 
judgments was summarized in Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. Heart Mountain 
Irrigation Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 2000), as 
follows:

 

     Summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is enti­tled to judgment as a matter of law.  Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, 
using the same materials and following the same stan­dards.  "We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record."  Four Nines Gold, Inc. 
v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991).  Summary judgment serves the purpose of 
eliminating formal trials where only ques­tions of law are involved.  Blagrove v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997); England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 
(Wyo. 1986).  We review a grant of 
summary judg­ment by deciding a question of law de novo and afford no 
deference to the district court's ruling on that question.  Sammons v. American Auto. Ass'n, 912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996); Blagrove, 934 P.2d  at 
1275.

 

Gray v. 
Norwest Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 1999).  A 
material fact is any fact that, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by a 
party.  Century Ready-Mix Co. v. 
Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

B.  Rosencranse 
Easement

 
[¶12]   The Hasvolds contend that the 
district court erred when it ruled that Rosencranse held a valid easement 
appurtenant over the Hasvold property.  
The Hasvolds claim that the Rosencranse easement was "in gross" and 
personal to Tall Oak because, at the time the Ellises granted it to Tall Oak, 
Tall Oak did not own the dominant estate.   They argue, there­fore, that 
the easement did not follow the land when it was transferred to Rosencranse. 

 

[¶13]   An easement is defined as "an 
interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or 
enjoyment over another person's property."  
Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994); Restatement of 
Property § 450(a) (1944).   In 
construing an easement, we seek to determine the intent of the parties to the 
easement.  R.C.R., Inc. v. 
Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999).  See also Restatement Third, 
Property (Servitudes) §4.1 (2000).  We begin by attempting to glean the 
meaning of the easement from its lan­guage.  R.C.R., Inc., 978 P.2d  at 586; 
Steil v. Smith, 901 P.2d 395, 396 (Wyo. 1995).  If the language of the easement is clear 
and unambiguous, we interpret the easement as a matter of law, without resorting 
to the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent.   Id.  If, however, the language is 
ambiguous, then the court looks to extrinsic evidence to ascer­tain the 
parties' intent.  R.C.R., Inc., 
978 P.2d  at 586; Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1996).  

 

[¶14]   We distinguish between appurtenant 
easements and easements in gross as follows:

 

            
"An easement is appurtenant to the land when the ease­ment is 
created to benefit and does benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the 
land.'"  Weber v. Johnston Fuel 
Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting Restatement of 
Property § 453, at 2914 (1944)).  
In contrast, "[a]n easement is in gross when it is not created to 
benefit or when it does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his 
use of it as such possessor.'"  
Id. (quoting Restatement of Property, supra, § 454, at 
2917).  An easement will not be 
presumed to be in gross when it can fairly be construed to be 
appurtenant.  
Id.

 

R.C.R., 
Inc. 978 P.2d  
at 586.  The principles recently set 
out in the Restatement Third, Prop­erty are consistent with Wyoming case 
law.  Restatement Third, Property 
(Servitudes) § 4.1(2000) states:

 

            
(1)  A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the 
intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, 
or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the 
purpose for which it was created.

 

Restatement 
Third, Property (Servitudes) § 4.5(1) specifically discusses how 
to distinguish between appurtenant easements and easements in 
gross:

 

(1)       Except 
where application of the rules stated in § 4.1 leads to a different result, the 
benefit of a servitude is:

 

(a)  appurtenant 
to an interest in property if it serves a purpose that would be more useful to a 
successor to a property interest held by the original beneficiary of the 
servitude at the time the servitude was created than it would be to the original 
beneficiary after transfer of that interest to a 
successor;

 

(b)  in gross 
if created in a person who held no prop­erty that benefited from the 
servitude, or if it serves a purpose that would be more useful to the original 
beneficiary than it would be to a successor to an inter­est in property held 
by the original beneficiary at the time the servitude was 
created[.]

 

[¶15]   The Hasvolds point to the case of 
Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 779 P.2d 1180 (Wyo. 1989), as supporting their 
position that, in order to create a valid appurtenant easement, the grantee must 
own the dominant estate at the time of the grant.  In the Moorcroft case, we held 
that a common law dedication of streets creates an appurtenant easement in the 
street property for use by the public for public purposes. 779 P.2d  at 
1184.  This court applied the 
"presumed intent" rule and held that the grant of a lot by a developer also 
passes title to the strip of land which runs from the boundary of the lot to the 
middle of the adjoining street, subject to the public's easement.  Id.  The court explained that the result 
was governed by the fact that creation of an appurtenant easement requires a 
servient estate and a dominant estate.  
Id.   

 

[¶16]   We cannot accept the Hasvolds' 
argument that the Moorcroft case dictates that the grantee of an easement 
must own the dominant estate at the time the easement is granted in order for 
the easement to be appurtenant.  The 
facts of the Moorcroft case are vastly different from the facts of this 
case.  Moorcroft was 
concerned with a public easement created by the dedication of streets, while 
this case involves a private easement created by an express grant.  Moreover, the Moorcroft case 
could even be said to support a position contrary to the Hasvolds' in light of 
the fact that the court stated that the easement was appurtenant and the public, 
as the owner of the dominant estate, did not actually own any real property, 
which benefited from the easement.  

 

[¶17]   Of course, in the typical 
situation, the grantee of an appurtenant easement will already have acquired 
title to the dominant estate when the easement is granted.  Nevertheless, the First Restatement 
acknowledged the possibility that "an easement appurtenant may be cre­ated 
to benefit a person as the possessor of certain land contingent upon his 
obtaining posses­sion thereof, or upon his future selection of land to which 
the easement will then become appurtenant."  Restatement of Property, § 453, cm. a 
(1944).   

 

[¶18]   In the case at bar, Donald Kramer 
was the fee owner of the Rosencranse property at the time the Ellises conveyed 
the easement to Tall Oak.  Kramer 
was an owner and officer of Tall Oak.  
Tall Oak needed the easement in order to secure financing from its 
lenders.  Shortly after the easement 
was recorded, Kramer deeded the property to Tall Oak.  At that point, the dominant estate and 
easement right were unified in title to Tall Oak.  

 

[¶19]   Under these circumstances, the fact 
that Tall Oak did not own the dominant estate when the easement was conveyed 
does not, by itself, dictate that the easement cannot be interpreted as being 
appurtenant to the land.  The 
ultimate determinant of whether an ease­ment is appurtenant or in gross is 
the intent of the parties to the easement.  
As we stated, supra, in determining the parties' intent, we look 
first to the language of the easement.  

 

[¶20]   The easement document in this 
case2 states, in relevant 
part:

 

NONEXCLUSIVE 
EASEMENT

 

            
WILLIAM D. ELLIS and MARIE O. ELLIS, husband and wife, Grantors, for and 
in consideration of $10.00 and other good and valuable consideration to them in 
hand paid, the receipt for which is hereby acknowledged, GRANT AND CONVEY, unto 
TALL OAK TREE, INC., a Wyoming corpo­ration, of 2812 Big Horn Avenue, Cody, 
Wyoming 82414, Grantee:

 

A 
60-foot nonexclusive easement for ingress and egress, including utilities, being 
located in Cody, Park County, Wyoming 
. . . .

 

[¶21]   In R.C.R., Inc., this court 
identified certain terms which are "badges" of an appurte­nant easement, 
including language which indicates:  
(1) that the easement was created to benefit a specific tract of 
land; (2) that the grant was for a perpetual right-of-way for ingress and 
egress, (3) that the grantee has the right to inspect and maintain the 
easement; (4) that the right is not limited to the possessor personally; 
(5) that the grant expressly extends the right to the grantees, their 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, assigns and legal 
represen­tatives; and (6) that the easement document does not contain 
any limitations on the transfer­ability of the easement to future transfers 
of both the dominant and servient estates.  
978 P.2d  at 586.

 

[¶22]   The easement document in this case 
incorporates some of the "badges" of an appurte­nant easement, but there are 
others that are noticeably absent.  
The easement document does not state that the easement is intended to 
benefit the Rosencranse property.  
In addition, the document does not expressly state that the right-of-way 
is perpetual in duration or that the dominant estate owner has the right to 
inspect and maintain it.  There is 
no language which expressly states that the easement will pass with the title to 
the property.  The grant was simply 
to Tall Oak Tree, Inc.  There was no 
mention of its successors, heirs, assigns, etc.  The aforementioned terms all suggest 
that the parties may have intended that the easement benefit Tall Oak, 
personally, rather than the real property.   On the other hand, the document 
does not state that the easement was personal to Tall Oak Tree, Inc.  In addition, the docu­ment 
specifically states that the purpose of the easement is for ingress, egress, and 
utilities.  These terms suggest that 
the easement may have been intended to be appurtenant. 

 

[¶23]   The easement document is 
sufficiently ambiguous to require the inspection of extrin­sic evidence to 
determine whether the parties to the conveyance intended for the easement to be 
appurtenant or in gross.  Evidence 
was presented at the summary judgment hearing sug­gesting that the easement 
was created to benefit and does benefit the possessors of the Rosencranse 
property in their use of the property.  
Specifically, Donald Kramer stated in his affidavit that the easement was 
created to benefit the property, and Carol Rosencranse averred that she and her 
lessees use the easement to access the side and back of the building situated on 
the dominant estate as part of their business activities.  In contrast, the Hasvolds presented 
evidence which suggested that the Ellises intended to grant a temporary personal 
easement to Tall Oak to facilitate the company's construction of an addition to 
the building located on the Rosencranse property.  The affidavits of Jerry Mooren and Leroy 
Ellis indi­cate that the Ellises attempted to block use of the easement by 
the owners of the Rosencranse property after the construction project was 
finished.3  

 

[¶24]   Our examination of the evidence 
submitted in the summary judgment proceeding con­vinces us that there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to the intent of the parties to the 
easement.  The district court, 
therefore, erred when it granted a summary judgment in favor of 
Rosencranse.

 

C.  School 
District Easement

 
[¶25]   The Hasvolds maintain that the 
district court erred when it granted a summary judg­ment in favor of the 
School District.  The district court 
ruled that, as a matter of law, the School District had not abandoned its 
easement across their property.  The 
School District contends that the district court correctly held that it was 
entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law, confirming its easement over the 
Hasvold property.

 

[¶26]   An easement holder may abandon his 
easement and relieve the servient estate of the burden of the easement under 
certain circumstances.  Carney v. 
Board of County Comm'rs of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo. 1988). 
  "Abandonment of an 
easement requires an intentional relinquishment indicated by conduct which 
discloses the intention to surrender the right to use the land authorized by the 
easement."  Mueller, 887 P.2d  
at 505.  As such, the determination 
of whether or not an easement has been abandoned turns largely upon the 
intention of the dominant estate owner.  
Id. at 506   
The servient estate owner must prove that the dominant estate owner 
intended to abandon the easement and such intention "may be inferred only from 
strong and convincing evidence."  
Id. (quoting Harrison v. State Highways & Transp. Comm'n, 
732 S.W.2d 214, 221 (Mo.App. 1987)).  
Abandonment can­not be established simply by showing a period of 
nonuse.  Mueller, at 
505.  Abandon­ment may, 
however, be proven by showing a period of nonuse and providing evidence of  "affirmative and unequivocal acts 
indicative of an intent to abandon" which are inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the easement.  
Mueller, 887 P.2d  at 506 (quoting Richards Asphalt Co. v. Bunge 
Corp., 399 N.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Minn.App. 1987)).

 

[¶27]   When viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Hasvolds, the evidence presented in the summary judgment 
proceedings was not sufficient to justify the district court's decision that the 
School District had not abandoned its easement.  School District employees averred that 
they used the easement to access an irrigation ditch to burn vegetation in 1994 
or 1995.    In 1994, the 
School District erected a chain-link fence around the perimeter of the school 
property.   The fence transects 
the easement, but the School District did not construct a gate at the point 
where the fence crosses the easement.  
Consequently, it was impossible for the School District to access the 
ease­ment from the northern boundary of the school property without removing 
the fence.  Additionally, the School 
District created a habitat area on its property adjacent to the easement.  The trees, shrubs, and pond in the 
habitat area may be obstacles to the School District's future use of the 
easement.   There are also 
piles of dirt, abandoned cars, and weeds obstructing part of the southern end of 
the easement.  The School District 
has also developed other accesses to its property, potentially vitiating its 
need to use the easement across the Hasvold property.  

 

[¶28]   Taken together, this evidence was 
sufficient to create material issues of fact regarding the School District's 
intentions as to its future use of the easement.  Consequently, we hold that the district 
court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that the School District did not 
abandon its easement.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]   We conclude that there are genuine 
issues of material fact concerning whether the par­ties to the Rosencranse 
easement intended for it to be appurtenant or in gross.  Likewise, genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether the School District intended to abandon its 
easement.  This case is, therefore, 
reversed and remanded to the district court for trial.    

 

FOOTNOTES

1In order 
to simplify the discussion in this opinion, we will refer to the respective 
properties by the name of the party who currently owns the property, regardless 
of the ownership of the property at the time we are discussing; i.e., "the 
Hasvold property," "the Rosencranse property," and "the School District 
property."  

2We 
recognize that, in their statement of the issues, the Hasvolds narrowly defined 
the issue on appeal as involving the "unity of title" matter.  Nevertheless, the Hasvolds and 
Rosencranse discussed the broader issue of the construction of the easement 
document and the intent of the parties to the easement in their briefs.  Consequently, we are comfortable 
considering those matters in this decision.  

3The 
parties presented some issues to the district court pertaining to the 
admissibility of certain statements in the affidavits of Leroy Ellis and Jerry 
Mooren.  The statements of concern 
were those allegedly made by Marie Ellis prior to her death.  The district court asked the parties to 
address the evidentiary issues in their supplemental briefs, but the court did 
not rule on those issues in its decision.  
We do not need to determine the admissibility of the disputed statements 
at this juncture because, even without considering those statements, we find 
that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the intent of the 
parties to the easement.