Title: State v. Putnam

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 12–0022 
 
Filed June 13, 2014 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
RICKY LEE PUTMAN, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, John J. 
Bauercamper, Judge. 
 
 
A criminal defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals 
decision affirming a district court’s admission of prior-bad-acts evidence 
in the form of two video titles involving child pornography in a trial for 
child sex abuse.  DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT 
OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.   
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. 
Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant 
Attorney General, and W. Wayne Saur, County Attorney, for appellee.   
 
 
 
 
2 
ZAGER, Justice. 
 
Ricky Lee Putman was charged with one count of first-degree 
sexual abuse for allegedly performing a sex act on L.R., a two-year-old 
girl.  Putman filed a motion in limine that sought to exclude evidence of 
child pornography found on his computer and other electronic devices.  
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion in 
limine, with limitations.  The district court allowed the State’s expert to 
testify at trial that child pornography was found on Putman’s computer 
and other electronic devices.  However, it limited the State’s expert to 
testifying only to the file names of two videos.  A jury convicted Putman, 
and he appealed, claiming the district court erred when it admitted the 
evidence of prior bad acts.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Putman 
sought further review, which we granted.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we affirm his conviction.   
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
 
Around 6 p.m. on May 22, 2010, forty-one-year-old Ricky Putman 
came to the home of Lawrence and Holley Robbins in Arlington, Iowa, to 
spend time with the couple and their three children.  One of the children 
was two-year-old L.R.  After joining the family on a trip to a nearby park, 
Putman returned with the family to their home around 9 p.m.  Shortly 
after the group returned from the park, Holley’s cousin, fifteen-year-old 
Alex, came to the house.   
 
Back at the house, the adults drank beer, watched television, and 
listened to music while the children played.  By midnight or 1 a.m., the 
Robbins children had fallen asleep.  The two boys had fallen asleep on 
the couch, and L.R., wearing a blue dress and a diaper, was carried 
upstairs to her crib, which was located in a room just adjacent to the 
bedroom shared by Lawrence and Holley.   
 
 
 
3 
 
Holley spent some more time downstairs with Lawrence, Alex, and 
Putman before going upstairs to go to sleep.  Putman followed Holley up 
the stairs, climbed into bed with her, and became sexually aggressive 
towards her.  Holley got out of the bed, went downstairs followed by 
Putman, and told Lawrence and Alex what had just taken place.  Holley 
demanded that Lawrence get Putman out of the house.  However, this 
did not occur.  Shortly thereafter, Holley again went back upstairs to go 
to bed, this time followed by Putman and Alex.  Putman again crawled 
into bed with Holley, touched her, and told her to leave Lawrence for 
him.  Holley immediately climbed out of bed and went downstairs a 
second time, this time followed by Alex and Putman.  Holley left the 
house with Alex around 4 a.m., again telling her husband to get Putman 
out of the house.   
 
Putman did not leave.  Around 4:30 a.m., at Lawrence’s 
suggestion, Putman went to sleep in Lawrence and Holley’s bedroom.  
Lawrence, after cleaning up the downstairs, went upstairs to check on 
L.R. in her crib.  Lawrence did not notice anything unusual at that time.  
He also observed Putman sleeping in his and Holley’s bed.  Lawrence 
then went downstairs and fell asleep on a chair.  Lawrence awoke around 
7 a.m. on May 23 when Alex’s mother, Marilyn Blackford, came to the 
house looking for Alex.   
 
L.R. came downstairs around 8 a.m.  L.R. was not wearing her 
diaper or the blue dress she had been wearing the previous night.  
Lawrence did not think this odd as L.R. had removed her own diaper on 
previous occasions.  While Lawrence did notice some blood between 
L.R.’s legs, he believed she had merely scratched herself.  Lawrence put a 
fresh diaper on L.R. and sat her on the couch.  After L.R. cried for a 
bottle, Lawrence went upstairs to retrieve it from her crib.  While he was 
 
 
 
4 
upstairs, Lawrence exchanged greetings with Putman and noticed that 
Putman had blood on his shirt and on his hands.  Lawrence believed 
Putman could have cut himself on a broken table beside the bed.  
Lawrence went back downstairs and fixed a bottle for L.R.  Lawrence laid 
L.R. on the couch where she fell asleep, and he sat in a chair.  Lawrence 
did notice that L.R. was lying awkwardly on the couch.   
 
Shortly afterward, Putman came downstairs.  Putman looked at 
the blood on his hands and clothes and asked Lawrence what had 
happened.  Lawrence told Putman he may have cut himself on the 
broken table next to the bed.  L.R. awoke, looked at Putman, and moved 
towards Lawrence.  Putman then put his shoes on and left the house.   
 
Eventually Holley returned home.  When she arrived, Lawrence 
was upset and shaking.  He told Holley that he had to go, and he went to 
the home of Marilyn Blackford, Holley’s aunt, who lived a few houses 
away.  While at Marilyn Blackford’s house, Lawrence asked Marilyn and 
her boyfriend how a person would know if a child had been sexually 
molested.  Meanwhile, while Lawrence was gone, Holley noticed bruising 
on L.R.’s face and neck, what she suspected to be bite marks on her ear, 
and blood on her chest and legs.   
 
Lawrence returned home with Marilyn Blackford.  After observing 
L.R., including opening up L.R.’s diaper, Marilyn Blackford instructed 
Lawrence and Holley to take L.R. to the hospital in Oelwein, and law 
enforcement would be contacted.  The Robbins family went immediately 
to the hospital, and the Fayette County Sheriff was contacted.   
 
After being examined at Mercy Hospital in Oelwein, it was 
determined that the injuries sustained by L.R. were too extensive to be 
properly treated there.  L.R. was subsequently transferred to the 
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics for appropriate treatment.  After 
 
 
 
5 
examinations by pediatric physicians at the University of Iowa Hospitals 
and Clinics, they concluded that L.R. had suffered vaginal penetration 
injuries.  To repair those injuries, L.R. was taken to surgery and put 
under general anesthesia.  Her injuries required numerous stitches to 
repair the damage.   
 
After its preliminary investigation to secure the scene and identify 
possible suspects, the sheriff’s department began conducting interviews 
in the morning hours of May 23.  A sheriff’s deputy went to Putman’s 
home in Arlington.  There, the deputy found Putman, who appeared to 
have recently showered.  Putman was advised of his Miranda rights.  
With Putman’s consent, the deputy began to collect evidence from the 
Putman home.  It became apparent during the investigation that Putman 
had begun to launder some of his clothing.  Ultimately seized from 
Putman’s home was a recently laundered shirt matching the description 
of the one Putman was alleged to have worn the previous night.1  The 
damp shirt hung from a bedroom door handle while a few other items of 
clothing tumbled in the dryer.  The deputy decided to detain Putman.   
 
Putman was eventually arrested and charged by trial information 
with sexual abuse in the first degree, a class “A” felony.  While in jail, 
Putman, who lived alone, asked a friend, Rodney Peterman, to go to his 
house and feed his cat.  Peterman built computers as a side business 
and had built and sold Putman a computer and related electronic 
devices.  Knowing the reason Putman had been arrested, Peterman 
decided to see what was on Putman’s computer while he was at Putman’s 
house.  On the computer, Peterman found what he suspected to be child 
pornography.  Because of this discovery, and the fact that Putman still 
                                                 
1Initially, the deputy seized a different shirt that Putman represented he had 
been wearing the previous night.   
 
 
 
6 
owed him money for the computer, Peterman took the computer, which 
contained a CD and an external hard drive.  Peterman took these items 
to his parents’ house and called the sheriff’s department.  A deputy from 
the sheriff’s department retrieved the computer, CD, and the external 
hard drive.   
 
On another trip to feed Putman’s cat, Peterman took more items 
from Putman’s house.  Among the items Peterman took was a box 
containing miscellaneous tattoo equipment that Peterman had given to 
Putman.  Inside the box, Peterman also found a loose USB drive.  Upon 
returning home, Peterman plugged this USB drive into his own 
computer.  On the USB drive, Peterman found more disturbing materials, 
so he notified the sheriff’s department and dropped off the USB drive at 
the sheriff’s office.  The computer and other electronic devices were later 
turned over to a unit within the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation 
(DCI), the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.  That unit 
performed a forensic evaluation of the computer and related electronic 
devices.   
 
Before trial, Putman filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 
evidence of prior bad acts.  Putman asserted that any information 
obtained from his computer was not admissible, specifically identifying 
evidence of child pornography.  The State also requested a ruling from 
the district court on the admissibility of the child pornography, citing 
motive and identity as potential issues in the case.  The district court 
issued an order permitting the State to offer into evidence images of 
young child pornography seized from Putman’s computer, per rule 
5.404(b) of the Iowa Rules of Evidence.  The district court ruled that such 
evidence of prior bad acts was relevant to the issues of identity, motive, 
and related issues due to the fact the defense theory of the case was that 
 
 
 
7 
another person committed the crime and the two-year-old victim was the 
only witness to the crime as it occurred.  Putman then filed a motion 
requesting the district court reconsider its ruling on the admissibility of 
the child pornography evidence.   
 
An evidentiary hearing on Putman’s motion to reconsider was held.  
An investigator for DCI testified at the hearing regarding his investigation 
of the computer and other electronic devices.  The DCI investigator 
examined the computer’s hard drive, external hard drive, the USB drive, 
and the CD and found thousands of photographs and over one hundred 
videos depicting child pornography.  Contained within these videos, the 
DCI investigator discovered two titles of special note as they specifically 
referenced rapes involving a two-year-old child.  The DCI investigator 
read into the record the two videos’ entire titles and confirmed the videos’ 
titles described the videos’ content.   
 
The defense cross-examined the DCI investigator, drawing from 
him several points.  First, the DCI investigator testified he was unable to 
determine whether the USB drive had ever been inserted into Putman’s 
computer.  In addition, he was unable to conclude Putman’s computer 
had been used to copy files onto the USB drive.  Next, regarding the CD, 
the DCI investigator could not determine that its contents had been 
placed on the disk using the computer.  The DCI investigator also 
testified he was unsure whether the computer, which had multiple user 
accounts, was password protected.  He acknowledged his investigation 
could not reveal who downloaded the files onto the computer or other 
devices.  Finally, he conceded that if the computer’s internal clock were 
altered, then a file’s time stamp would be inaccurate.  He knew of no 
way, however, to determine whether the computer’s clock was accurate 
at the time a file was downloaded.   
 
 
 
8 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the State agreed not to make any 
mention of the child pornography in its opening statement to the jury 
and agreed not to display any of the seized child pornography during 
trial.  After the hearing, the district court denied Putman’s motion, 
finding the State had established Putman’s ownership of the computer, 
use of the computer, and the chain of custody for the evidence.  The 
court also found the evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial.  
Finally, the court bound the State to the agreements it made during the 
hearing, noting the court had “relied on them in making its ruling.”   
 
At trial, the State called Peterman, who testified he built the 
computer for Putman and sold it to Putman.  Peterman testified that 
when he sold the computer to Putman it did not contain child 
pornography.  Peterman also testified regarding his discovery of the child 
pornography on Putman’s computer and other electronic devices.  The 
DCI investigator also testified.  He explained his forensic investigation 
into Putman’s computer and the electronic devices.  He also testified he 
found child pornography on all four items that had been taken from 
Putman’s house.  He was allowed to mention only the two video titles, 
and he did not read the entire video titles to the jury, as he had at the 
hearing.  The DCI investigator testified the video titles matched their 
content, estimating the girls in the videos to be two or three years of age.  
No pornographic images were shown to the jury.  On cross-examination, 
the investigator testified he could not determine who was operating the 
computer or other electronic devices at the time when a file was 
generated.   
 
Putman was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual abuse.  
Putman appealed on several grounds, one of which was the admission of 
the evidence of child pornography, including the two video titles.  We 
 
 
 
9 
transferred the case to the court of appeals, and it affirmed Putman’s 
conviction.  Putman sought further review, which we granted to 
determine whether the admission of the evidence of child pornography 
and, specifically, the two video titles, as limited, was proper.   
 
II.  Issue on Further Review. 
 
On further review, we have discretion to consider all the issues 
raised on appeal.  State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 2012).  We 
may let the court of appeals decision on any particular issue stand as a 
final decision.  Id.  On further review, we address only Putman’s 
challenge to the admission of the evidence of child pornography and the 
two video titles.  With respect to Putman’s challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to convict him, and to the district court’s exclusion of the 
DCI laboratory report, the court of appeals decision stands as final.  See 
id. (allowing court of appeals decision to stand on an issue not addressed 
on further review).   
 
III.  Standard of Review. 
 
We review evidentiary rulings regarding the admission of prior bad 
acts for abuse of discretion.  State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 
2010).  “A court abuses its discretion when its ‘discretion was exercised 
on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly 
unreasonable.’ ”  State v. Long, 814 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2012) 
(quoting State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Iowa 1992)).  “ ‘A ground 
or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence 
or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.’ ”  In re Det. of 
Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Ranes v. Adams 
Labs., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa 2010)).  Even if a trial court has 
abused its discretion, prejudice must be shown before we will reverse.  
State v. Jordan, 779 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Iowa 2010).   
 
 
 
10 
IV.  Discussion. 
 
A.  Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b).  This appeal turns on the 
admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts.  Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 
5.404(b), evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible for purposes of 
proving character: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith.”  Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b).  The 
evidence “may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.”  Id.  The rule “exclude[s] evidence that 
serves no purpose except to show the defendant is a bad person, from 
which the jury is likely to infer he or she committed the crime in 
question.”  State v. Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001).   
 
In determining whether to admit prior-bad-acts evidence, we rely 
on a three-step analysis.2  See State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 
                                                 
 
2There has been persistent confusion in our cases about whether Iowa Rule of 
Evidence 5.404(b) requires clear proof that the person against whom the evidence is 
offered committed the prior bad act.  In some cases, it has been suggested a showing of 
clear proof is required as an independent prong in the prior-bad-acts analysis, in 
addition to finding relevancy and weighing prejudice.  In State v. Sullivan, we explained 
that clear proof and relevancy were the two “conditions” to be established before 
evidence could “be considered admissible.”  679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004).  In State v. 
Jones, we concluded that, because evidence of prior bad acts was relevant and clearly 
proved, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude it.  464 N.W.2d 
241, 243 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Roth, 403 N.W.2d 762, 765 (Iowa 1987) 
(requiring relevancy and clear proof before analyzing evidence’s prejudicial effect), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Iowa 2006).  In 
State v. Johnson, we observed that, in addition to the relevancy requirement, “[p]roof of 
the other offenses must be clear” before explaining the trial court still must balance 
evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial effect.  224 N.W.2d 617, 620, 621 
(Iowa 1974); see also Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 240 (“Since our decision in [State v.] 
Wade, [467 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1991)], we have stated that there must be ‘clear proof’ 
that the defendant committed the prior bad acts.”); State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 
117 (Iowa 1997) (noting that “[i]n at least some cases we have added as a final 
consideration” the clear-proof requirement).  Under this strand of cases, it is necessary 
that the evidence is relevant to some legitimate and disputed issue, that there is clear 
proof the defendant committed the prior act or crime, and that the evidence’s probative 
 
 
 
11 
________________________________ 
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See Sullivan, 
679 N.W.2d at 25. 
 
In other cases, however, we have evaluated whether there was clear proof as one 
factor in the multi-factored weighing process, not as an independent prong in the 
analysis.  In State v. Reynolds, which followed Sullivan, we explained a court must 
determine whether the evidence is relevant to a disputed issue and whether the 
evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
See 765 N.W.2d 283, 289–90 (Iowa 2009).  Rather than expressing the clear-proof 
requirement as an independent analytical step, we explained that, when a court weighs 
the prejudicial effect of evidence, it must consider whether there was clear proof it was 
the defendant who committed the prior bad act.  See id. at 290.  Other recent cases 
have stated the test similarly.  See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Iowa 
2005) (considering the existence of clear proof as one factor in balancing process 
without mentioning the clear-proof requirement as an independent analytical step); 
State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 129–30 (Iowa 2004) (same).  Earlier cases also apply 
the test in this fashion.  See, e.g., Wade, 467 N.W.2d at 284 (including proof the 
accused committed the prior act as a consideration in the balancing process, not as an 
independent analytical step); State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 231–32 (Iowa 1988) 
(considering whether the accused defendant committed the prior act as part of the 
balancing process).  Under this strand of cases, it need only be found that the evidence 
is relevant to a legitimate, disputed issue and that the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant does not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value.  See 
Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 290.   
 
Some requirement of proof the actor against whom the evidence is offered 
committed the prior act is common.  Many jurisdictions consider it as an independent 
analytical step.  See, e.g., State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997); People v. 
Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 373 (Colo. 1991); Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1093 
(D.C. 1996); Rittenhouse v. State, 526 S.E.2d 342, 344 (Ga. 2000); People v. Thingvold, 
584 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ill. 1991); State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146, 149 (La. 1993); State v. 
Faulkner, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (Md. 1989); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 705 N.E.2d 247, 
250 (Mass. 1999); State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. 1991); State v. Floyd, 
763 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Neb. 2009); State v. Kirsch, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (N.H. 1995); State v. 
Hernandez, 784 A.2d 1225, 1232 (N.J. 2001); State v. Holder, 676 S.E.2d 690, 698 (S.C. 
2009); Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Pirtle, 904 
P.2d 245, 257–58 (Wash. 1995).   
 
Still other courts take a slightly different view.  In Huddleston v. United States, 
the United States Supreme Court explained the determination whether proof existed 
that the actor committed the prior act was subsumed under the relevancy prong of the 
prior-bad-acts test: “In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if 
the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the 
actor.”  485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771, 782 (1988).  Some 
states take a similar view.  See, e.g., State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D. 
1993) (“The strength of the evidence offered is already part of the relevancy 
determination.”); State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 524–25 (W. Va. 1994) (“The 
evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably infer that the act occurred and that 
the defendant was the actor.”).  In spite of our divergent caselaw, this court has 
explained that “the State must present clear proof that the defendant was culpable in 
the other acts in question” because the “[c]rimes of third persons are not relevant.”  
Johnson, 224 N.W.2d at 620.  Whether the proof requirement is subsumed under the 
 
 
 
12 
2004).  A court must first determine whether the evidence is relevant to a 
legitimate, disputed factual issue.  Id.  Evidence is relevant if it has “any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.”  Iowa R. Evid. 5.401.  The general test of 
relevancy is “whether a reasonable [person] might believe the probability 
of the truth of the consequential fact to be different if [the person] knew 
of the proffered evidence.”  State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 
1988) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Irrelevant 
evidence is, of course, inadmissible evidence.  Iowa R. Evid. 5.402.   
 
There also “must be clear proof the individual against whom the 
evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime.”  Sullivan, 679 
N.W.2d at 25.  In assessing whether clear proof of prior misconduct 
exists, the prior act need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and corroboration is unnecessary.  State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 130 
(Iowa 2004).  “There simply needs to be sufficient proof to ‘ “prevent the 
jury from engaging in speculation or drawing inferences based on mere 
________________________________ 
relevancy prong or is viewed as an independent prong, the party offering the evidence 
must still show sufficient proof the actor against whom the evidence is offered 
committed the act before a court weighs prejudice.  Thus, the result of failing to show 
sufficient proof will be functionally the same, and the court will not need to weigh the 
danger of unfair prejudice against its probative value.  Cf. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 29 
(finding evidence of prior bad acts not relevant to a noncharacter purpose and thus not 
weighing prejudice against probative value).   
 
After reviewing our cases and the diverse approaches of other jurisdictions, we 
conclude the better approach is to require, as an independent prong in the prior-bad-
acts analysis, “clear proof the individual against whom the evidence is offered 
committed the prior” act or crime.  Jones, 464 N.W.2d at 243.  Requiring clear proof 
accords a defendant protection from the “concern that unduly prejudicial evidence 
might be introduced under [r]ule [5.404(b)].”  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691, 108 S. Ct. at 
1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 783.  Moreover, expressing the requirement of clear proof as an 
independent prong makes the prior-bad-acts test easier for trial courts and juries to 
apply.  Notably, in this case, the trial court instructed the jury the evidence of two 
videos on Putman’s computer must have been shown by clear proof.   
 
 
 
13 
suspicion.” ’ ”  Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 
1997)).  Testimony of credible witnesses can satisfy the clear-proof 
requirement.  See Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 243 (concluding testimony of 
two witnesses was sufficient to support a finding of clear proof).   
 
If the evidence is relevant to a legitimate and disputed factual 
issue, and the clear-proof requirement is satisfied, the court must 
determine whether the evidence’s “probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”  Sullivan, 
679 N.W.2d at 25.  We consider a series of factors in weighing probative 
value against the danger of unfair prejudice.  See, e.g., State v. Martin, 
704 N.W.2d 665, 672–73 (Iowa 2005) (applying factors to analyze 
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed 
probative value).  We consider  
the need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other 
evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear 
proof the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the 
strength or weakness of the evidence on the relevant issue, 
and the degree to which the fact finder will be prompted to 
decide the case on an improper basis. 
Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124.  If the danger of the evidence’s prejudicial 
effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the evidence must be 
excluded.  See State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 12 (Iowa 2005) (holding 
district court abused its discretion in admitting prejudicial prior-bad-acts 
evidence).  Weighing probative value against prejudicial effect “is not an 
exact science,” so “we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who 
must make this judgment call.”  State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 20–21 
(Iowa 2006). 
 
B.  Relevancy.  Putman first attacks the purpose for which the 
two video titles were admitted.  He argues the evidence served no 
purpose other than to prove he acted in conformity with his character.  
 
 
 
14 
In response, the State insists the evidence served to show Putman’s 
motive and identity as the perpetrator, which it claims, were disputed 
factual issues in the case.   
 
The State advances motive as its first noncharacter purpose for 
admitting the child pornography video titles.  “Motive is the impetus that 
supplies the reason for a person to commit a criminal act.”  2 Jack B. 
Weinstein 
& 
Margaret 
A. 
Berger, 
Weinstein’s 
Federal 
Evidence 
§ 404.22[3], at 404-119 to 404-120 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d. ed. 
2014); see also State v. Richards, 809 N.W.2d 80, 92 (Iowa 2012) 
(describing motive as the reason why a defendant would have committed 
murder).  We have observed, for example, that revenge and avoiding 
criminal charges may be motives for committing a crime.  See, e.g., State 
v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010) (finding evidence of 
defendant’s desire to “get back at” his sister probative of his motive to 
steal his sister’s property); State v. Nelson, 791 N.W.2d 414, 425–26 
(Iowa 2010) (finding evidence of drug dealing relevant to accused 
murderer’s motive because a drug dealer would be more likely to shoot a 
buyer if the drug dealer believed the buyer was an undercover police 
officer).  Motive, like any other noncharacter purpose for which evidence 
might be offered, must have been at issue in the case.  See Taylor, 689 
N.W.2d at 124 (explaining that the first step in the prior-bad-acts 
analysis is identifying whether the noncharacter purpose is at issue in 
the case).   
 
The perpetrator’s motive for sexually abusing L.R. was not a 
legitimate or disputed issue in this case.  The State was not required to 
prove Putman’s state of mind as an element of the crime, and Putman’s 
state of mind at the time of the crime was not put in issue.  See Newell, 
710 N.W.2d at 21 (discussing elements of first-degree murder and the 
 
 
 
15 
need for evidence on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the 
crime in making a relevancy determination).  The evidence of child 
pornography therefore could not be admitted for the purpose of proving 
Putman’s motive.   
 
The State further advanced identity as a noncharacter purpose for 
admitting the child pornography evidence.  It is thus essential to decide 
whether identity was at issue in this case.  Cf. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124 
(holding court must determine whether intent, a nonpropensity purpose, 
was at issue in the case).  Identity of the perpetrator was clearly the 
primary issue in the case.  The State was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Putman sexually abused L.R.  Cf. id. (examining 
the first-degree-burglary statute to decide whether intent was at issue).  
Moreover, identity was the only disputed issue in the case as the defense 
sought to shift responsibility for the crime onto the victim’s father, 
Lawrence Robbins.  See Cox, 781 N.W.2d at 771 (explaining identity may 
be put in issue “[w]hen a defendant argues a crime was committed by 
another person”).  Accordingly, we reject Putman’s contention the State 
offered the evidence for no purpose other than to prove he was a bad 
person and that he acted in conformity with his character.   
 
In cases in which evidence of prior bad acts is offered for the 
purpose of proving identity, we have imposed a more demanding test 
than the general relevancy test.  See, e.g., State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 
634, 636 (Iowa 1987) (holding rare burglar’s tool used by the defendant 
in previous crimes and the tool used in the case on appeal were 
sufficiently similar to permit prior-bad-acts evidence for purpose of 
proving identity); State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184, 186–87 (Iowa 1982) 
(finding sufficient similarity between circumstances of a homicide the 
defendant was previously convicted of and the homicide for which 
 
 
 
16 
defendant was on trial to admit evidence for purpose of proving identity).  
“To permit the inference that similar acts establish the same person 
committed both acts, we have required that the other acts must be 
‘strikingly similar’ or of a ‘unique nature.’ ”  In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748, 
753 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 
1987)).   
 
We acknowledge the difference, in broad terms, between Putman’s 
act of allegedly possessing child pornography and the act for which he 
was on trial, sexual abuse of a child.  Strictly applying the requirement of 
similarity between prior acts and the act for which the defendant was on 
trial, one court noted the “wide gulf” separating “the act of possessing 
written descriptions or stories about criminal conduct from the act of 
committing the offenses described.”  See People v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 
1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting magazine articles as prior-bad-acts evidence), overruled in 
part by United State v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 943 n.3 (“Prior acts evidence 
admitted under Rule 404(b) . . . [requires] ‘some connection’ between the 
reason for introducing the prior act and the nature of the crimes 
charged.  Any language in Shymanovitz to the contrary is disapproved.”).  
This court, however, has not applied the similarity requirement so 
strictly.   
 
We have evaluated similarity by comparing the contents of 
materials possessed by a defendant to a criminal act committed by the 
defendant.  See, e.g., Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 189 (comparing “rather 
sketchy plans” in the defendant’s journal to homicides for which the 
defendant was being tried).  In J.A.L., for example, a juvenile faced a 
delinquency adjudication for falsely reporting placement of an explosive 
device in his school.  694 N.W.2d at 750.  We analyzed whether the 
 
 
 
17 
juvenile court should have admitted the defendant’s journal entries, 
which revealed the juvenile’s fascination with “suicide, death, and 
murder,” in spite of the broad dissimilarity between the act of placing a 
bomb threat at a school and authoring or possessing a macabre diary.  
See id. at 753.  Though we held the journal entries should not have been 
admitted, it was because the journal topics did not contain “plans to 
place a bomb threat or to kill any of his fellow students,” not because 
journaling, or possessing a journal, lacks striking similarity with the act 
of placing a bomb threat.  See id.  Thus, when assessing the relevancy of 
prior-bad-acts evidence, we look not only for similarities between two 
acts committed by the defendant, but also for similarities between 
contents of materials possessed by the defendant and acts committed by 
the defendant.  See id.   
 
Our criminal cases evaluating prior-bad-acts evidence are of two 
general categories.  One category is cases in which there are only general 
similarities between the prior bad act and the crime for which the 
defendant is being tried.  See, e.g., Cox, 781 N.W.2d at 759–60 
(identifying “ ‘common threads’ ” between prior acts of sexual abuse and 
the acts the defendant was being tried for); J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d at 753 
(comparing a preoccupation with death in a journal to threats to bomb a 
school); Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 189 (comparing plans to kill a newspaper 
carrier contained in the defendant’s journal to the life-insurance-scheme 
killing for which the defendant was on trial).  Not surprisingly, we have 
held generally similar prior-bad-acts evidence inadmissible.  J.A.L., 694 
N.W.2d at 753; Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 189.   
 
In the other category are cases in which the acts are indeed 
strikingly similar.  See Butler, 415 N.W.2d at 636 (concluding modified 
“nippers” used in defendant’s burglaries were sufficiently similar to admit 
 
 
 
18 
evidence); Walsh, 318 N.W.2d at 186–87 (finding two “bizarre” homicides 
to be sufficiently similar).  Finding striking similarity requires drawing 
out and comparing the peculiar circumstances of the acts.  See Walsh, 
318 N.W.2d at 186 (conceding that some similarities between two 
homicides were “commonplace in crimes of this type” and comparing the 
“not commonplace” similarities).  This case falls into the strikingly 
similar category.   
 
According to the DCI investigator’s report, which was admitted at 
the hearing on admissibility, Putman’s computer hard drive contained 
thousands of photographic images, some of which were images of child 
pornography.  The USB drive contained thirty-five images and fifteen 
videos of child pornography, the external hard drive contained thousands 
of images and ninety-four videos of child pornography, and the CD found 
in Putman’s computer contained 645 images of child pornography.  The 
videos and images show nude children and children engaged in sex acts.  
What is more, the external hard drive contained amateur photographs of 
a teenage girl taken with a digital camera.  The photographs show a man, 
believed to be Putman, performing sex acts on the unconscious teen.   
 
None of this evidence was presented to the jury.  Indeed, evidence 
suggesting only a general preoccupation with child pornography may well 
have been inadmissible in this child sex abuse case.  Cf. J.A.L., 694 
N.W.2d at 753 (holding a journal showing a fascination with death 
inadmissible in a juvenile adjudication proceeding for a threat to bomb a 
school).  The district court, however, winnowed out this mass of child 
pornography evidence, leaving only the evidence of child pornography 
bearing a striking similarity to the crime for which Putman was on trial.  
Thus, Rodney Peterman testified at trial that, understanding the charge 
Putman faced, he observed what he believed to be child pornography on 
 
 
 
19 
Putman’s computer.  He then confiscated the computer and informed law 
enforcement.  The DCI investigator testified he found child pornography 
on all four items he examined, and he told the jury parts of the names of 
two videos he found: “Two YO [year old] getting raped” and “Two YO girl 
getting raped during diaper change.”  The DCI investigator also explained 
the videos showed adult men sexually assaulting girls that he estimated 
to be two or three years of age.   
 
There is undeniable similarity between the two videos and the act 
for which Putman was on trial.  Like the video victims, L.R. was two 
years of age, although it is unclear whether Putman knew L.R.’s exact 
age.  Further, L.R. was put to bed wearing a diaper.  When she came 
downstairs the next day, the diaper had been removed, and there was 
blood on her legs.  In one video, as its title makes clear, the child’s diaper 
figures prominently.  Like the video victims, testimony confirmed L.R. 
was the victim of vaginal penetration, which resulted in serious injuries.  
We conclude there was a striking similarity between the content of the 
two videos found on Putman’s computer, and the act of sexually abusing 
a two-year-old girl.  Putman’s possessing the two videos involving the 
violent sexual abuse of very young children by adult men goes to the 
heart of the disputed issue of identity and makes it more probable he 
was the person who sexually abused L.R. and not the victim’s father.  
Accordingly, the prior-bad-acts evidence was highly relevant to the 
identity of the perpetrator.  If the evidence is determined to be relevant, 
the evidence is “prima facie admissible, even though it illustrates the 
accused’s bad character.”  State v. Elston, 735 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Iowa 
2007).   
 
C.  Clear Proof.  As his next point of contention, Putman insists 
the State failed to clearly prove he was responsible for downloading the 
 
 
 
20 
two videos on his computer.  As noted, proof of prior bad acts is clear if it 
prevents the jury from speculating or inferring from mere suspicion.  See 
Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 130.  Putman points out the DCI investigator 
could not identify who downloaded the material on Putman’s computer.  
Nor could he determine with certainty, from the computer’s internal 
clock, when the videos were downloaded.  Further, Rodney Peterman’s 
testimony indicates the computer was not password protected, meaning 
someone other than Putman could have accessed it.  Putman also notes 
Peterman had the computer and other electronic devices in his own 
possession for some period of time before turning the items over to the 
sheriff.  This evidence, Putman argues, undermines the State’s claim he 
downloaded the two videos whose titles were mentioned at trial.   
 
The State takes a different view.  It argues there was clear proof 
Putman possessed the videos—the videos on Putman’s computer 
belonged to Putman, even if he did not download them.  First, Peterman 
testified he built the computer for his friend Putman, and when he sold it 
to Putman, the computer did not contain any child pornography.  In 
addition, although the computer and hardware were in Peterman’s 
possession before being given to the sheriff’s department, he notified the 
sheriff’s department soon after making the discoveries.  Next, Peterman 
testified Putman lived alone at the time he was arrested, diminishing the 
likelihood the videos on Putman’s computer belonged to or were 
downloaded by someone else.  Also, although Putman denied owning the 
videos on his computer, he never disputed owning the computer or the 
other electronic devices.  Cf. State v. White, 668 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Iowa 
2003) (finding a defendant’s failure to dispute prior bad acts at trial 
supported a finding of clear proof).  Most significant, the DCI investigator 
testified the same external hard drive that contained one of the two 
 
 
 
21 
videos also contained photographs of Putman with his daughter, which 
suggests, at a minimum, that Putman had access to the hard drive, and 
thus its contents belonged to him.  Finally, in its limiting instruction, the 
district court instructed the jury that this evidence must be shown by 
clear proof.  Considering all the evidence, there was clear proof for the 
jury to find Putman possessed the two videos found on his computer 
without speculating or inferring from suspicion.   
 
D.  Balancing Unfair Prejudice Against Probative Value.  Since 
we conclude the evidence was relevant and there was clear proof Putman 
possessed the two videos, we must now decide whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the evidence’s probative value.  
See Richards, 809 N.W.2d at 92.  As explained above, we balance a series 
of factors in weighing evidence’s probative value against the evidence’s 
danger of unfair prejudice.  See, e.g., Henderson, 696 N.W.2d at 11–12 
(finding evidence’s “strong prejudicial impact” substantially outweighed 
its probative value).   
 
First, many of our cases have evaluated the existence of clear proof 
as part of the balancing process.  See, e.g., Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124 
(noting the existence of clear proof is a factor in the balancing process).  
For purposes of clarity and consistency, whether clear proof exists 
should remain as part of the balancing process, in addition to being 
analyzed as an independent analytical step.  As noted above, there is 
clear proof Putman possessed the two videos.  This factor supports 
admission.   
 
We must next consider the need for the evidence that Putman 
possessed the two videos in light of the other available evidence and the 
issues in the case.  See id.  Because Putman denied that he committed 
the crime, the crucial issue in the case was the identity of the 
 
 
 
22 
perpetrator, and as already noted, Putman’s possessing the two videos 
made it more probable he, rather than L.R.’s father Lawrence, sexually 
abused L.R.  See Henderson, 696 N.W.2d at 11 (examining defendant’s 
defense to determine the need for the evidence in light of the case’s 
issues).  Additionally, there was no forensic evidence that linked Putman 
to the crime, and the victim was just two-years old, incapable of 
testifying against her abuser.  The only additional evidence available to 
the State at the time of trial was her observed behavior after the assault.  
Seeing Putman after the assault, L.R. moves towards Lawrence and hides 
her head in her hands.  Thereafter, L.R. is generally afraid of all male 
strangers and clings to Lawrence.  The State’s need to respond to 
Putman’s assertion that it was Lawrence and not him who was the 
perpetrator of this sexual assault on L.R. substantially increased the 
probative value of the evidence of the two videos found in his possession.  
Since the need for the evidence on the identity of the abuser was 
therefore high, this supports admission of the evidence.   
 
We also consider the strength or weakness of the evidence on 
identity.  See Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124.  Again, clear proof Putman 
possessed the videos showing two- or three-year-old girls being sexually 
abused is strong evidence suggesting Putman committed the act similar 
to the one in the videos against L.R.  The most probative evidence on the 
issue of identity is the similar acts found in the two videos.  All of these 
factors favor admission.   
 
However, this does not end our analysis.  We also must determine 
whether the probative value of this evidence “is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  Iowa R. Evid. 5.403.  Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial if it has “ ‘an undue tendency to suggest decisions on 
an improper basis commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional 
 
 
 
23 
one.’ ”  Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231).  
Even highly probative evidence such as this may be excluded if the 
danger of unfair prejudice is too great.  See State v. Reynolds, 765 
N.W.2d 283, 292 (Iowa 2009) (excluding highly prejudicial evidence 
despite its probative value to demonstrate the defendant’s motive).   
 
There is no question child pornography has “a strong tendency to 
produce intense disgust.”  United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 974 
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding danger of unfair prejudice posed by evidence of 
“hard core” child pornography outweighed its probative value in 
prosecution for distribution of “lascivious exhibition” child pornography).  
Accordingly, the district court in this case, mindful of the prejudicial 
nature of the evidence, significantly limited the testimony the State was 
allowed to present to the jury to the two video titles.  We have previously 
indicated that concerns about prejudice to a defendant might be eased 
by narrowing the scope of the prior-bad-acts evidence presented to the 
jury.  See Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 188 (explaining “[i]t would lessen our 
concerns regarding unwarranted prejudice if the statements in the 
journal concerning plans to harm other persons could be excised” so as 
to leave only relevant statements, but ultimately deciding against doing 
so to preserve context).   
 
The district court narrowed the scope of the prior-bad-acts 
evidence in this case.  Consistent with the district court’s ruling on the 
motion in limine, the State’s expert was allowed to mention that child 
pornography had been found on each of the electronic devices.  He also 
testified as to the file names of only two videos which were strikingly 
similar to the sexual assault which occurred here.  The jury was not 
shown any images from these two videos found on Putman’s computer or 
other electronic devices.  The State was not allowed to describe the 
 
 
 
24 
volumes of photographs and videos of child pornography found on the 
electronic devices.  Nor did the State mention the two videos in its 
opening statement.  Aside from the brief testimony, the State made no 
mention of the two videos until its rebuttal closing argument—after being 
brought up by Putman’s counsel.  Even then, the State reminded the 
jury of the “very narrow purpose” for which it could use the evidence of 
the two video titles.  The State thus carefully adhered to the district 
court’s narrowly tailored order.   
 
To the extent any testimony exceeded the district court’s narrowly 
defined scope of permissible testimony, it was necessary to establish a 
context for the discovery of the two videos.  Evidence that reveals the 
context of prior-bad-acts evidence is in some cases permissible.  See id.  
Thus, Peterman testified about his initial discovery of the child 
pornography.  The State’s expert testified that child pornography had 
been found on each of the devices provided to him.  Though these 
references must factor into the balance, under the circumstances of this 
case, they are not alone sufficient to tip that balance in favor of excluding 
the evidence.   
 
Finally, in addition to significantly limiting the testimony presented 
to the jury, the district court gave a limiting instruction informing the 
jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence could be used.  See 
State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 1996) (explaining a limiting 
instruction “help[s] to nullify the danger of unfair prejudice”); see also 
Rodriguez, 636 N.W. 2d at 243 n.2 (advising trial courts to give a limiting 
instruction “explaining the purpose for which the prior acts evidence may 
be used” even if unrequested by the defendant).  The district court 
instructed the jury Putman was “not on trial for” possessing child 
pornography.  It also instructed the jury the evidence could “only be used 
 
 
 
25 
to show motive, intent, or identity of the person charged.”  We have 
explained before that in most cases a limiting instruction such as this is 
an antidote for the danger of prejudice: “It is only in extreme cases that 
such an instruction is deemed insufficient to nullify the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”  Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 232.  This is not one of those extreme 
cases.   
 
The district court’s approach to this highly prejudicial evidence 
“was a model of caution.”  See Richards, 809 N.W.2d at 93 n.4 (praising a 
district court’s efforts in sifting through remote, and thus less relevant, 
prior-bad-acts evidence).  The district court winnowed thousands of 
images and videos of child pornography, leaving only two highly relevant 
video titles for the jurors’ ears.  The district court did not permit the 
videos to be shown, nor did it permit the State to mention the videos in 
its opening statements, conditions with which the State strictly complied.  
Moreover, the district court instructed the jury on the narrow purposes 
for which this evidence could be used.  On balancing the probative value 
of the evidence in this case against the prejudicial impact of such 
evidence, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion 
in allowing into evidence the very limited evidence of the two videos.   
 
V.  Conclusion. 
 
To be clear, not all evidence that a defendant possesses child 
pornography is admissible as prior-bad-acts evidence.  Applying our 
long-standing analysis of the admissibility of prior-bad-acts evidence to 
the circumstances of this case, we hold the district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it admitted evidence that Putman possessed specific 
videos involving child sexual abuse through the admission of the video 
titles in his trial for first-degree sexual abuse.  The evidence was relevant 
to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator, there was clear proof 
 
 
 
26 
Putman possessed the two videos, and the evidence’s probative value was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Finding 
no abuse of discretion, we affirm Putman’s conviction.   
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.   
 
All justices concur except Wiggins, Appel, and Hecht, JJ., who 
dissent; and, writing separately, Hecht, J., who dissents.   
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
#64/12–0022, State v. Putman 
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent.  I agree with the court’s analysis on the 
inadmissibility of the testimony that the police found child pornography 
on four items taken from Putman’s house and the reference to the two 
video titles that the witness read into the record for the reason this 
evidence does not go to motive.  I part company with the court’s opinion 
because this evidence does not go to identity.   
I reach this conclusion for two reasons.  The first reason is the 
court is applying Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) as a rule of inclusion, 
rather than a rule of exclusion.  The second reason is the caselaw does 
not allow a court to use the mere fact of possession of pornography to 
establish identity, no matter how similar the pornography is to Putman’s 
alleged act. 
The court applies rule 5.404(b) as a rule of inclusion.  In People v. 
Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated by United 
States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007), a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held the defendant’s possession of adult gay 
male magazines was not relevant to show the defendant’s intent 
regarding the crimes of assault, child abuse, and criminal sexual 
conduct involving children.  See 157 F.3d at 1155, 1158–60.  I agree with 
the following statement made by the panel in its decision: 
Criminal activity is a wildly popular subject of fiction 
and nonfiction writing—ranging from the National Enquirer 
to Les Miserables to In Cold Blood.  Any defendant with a 
modest library of just a few books and magazines would 
undoubtedly 
possess 
reading 
material 
containing 
descriptions of numerous acts of criminal conduct.  Under 
the government’s theory, the case against an accused child 
molester would be stronger if he owned a copy of Nabokov’s 
Lolita, and any murder defendant would be unfortunate to 
have in his possession a collection of Agatha Christie 
mysteries or even James Bond stories.  Woe, particularly, to 
 
 
 
28 
the son accused of patricide or incest who has a copy of 
Oedipus Rex at his bedside. 
Id. at 1159.  The reasoning in Shymanovitz is consistent with applying 
rule 5.404(b) as a rule of exclusion. 
 
Ten years after Shymanovitz, the Ninth Circuit sat en banc in the 
case of United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 937.  There, the court held 
articles in the defendant’s possession describing sexual acts between an 
adult and minors were admissible on the element of specific intent.  See 
id. at 958–59.  The reason for disapproving of Shymanovitz and allowing 
this testimony was based on the rationale that Federal Rule 404(b) is a 
rule of inclusion, rather than a rule of exclusion.  See id. at 944, 953–54.  
The court applies rule 5.404(b) as the Ninth Circuit did in Curtin; thus, 
the court applied this rule as a rule of inclusion.   
In Iowa, we initially interpreted rule 5.404(b), our state equivalent 
to Federal Rule 404(b), as a rule of inclusion.  See State v. McDaniel, 512 
N.W.2d 305, 308 (Iowa 1994) (“[E]vidence of other illegal activities that 
tend to prove the defendants’ general propensity . . . is relevant and 
should be admitted.”), overruled by State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 28 
(Iowa 2004).  We subsequently overruled McDaniel and recognized rule 
5.404(b) is a rule of exclusion.  See Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 28 (“We think 
the better rule is that unless the prosecutor can articulate a valid, 
noncharacter theory of admissibility for admission of the bad-acts 
evidence, such evidence should not be admitted.”).  As a rule of 
exclusion, the prosecutor must prove a valid, noncharacter theory of 
admissibility for the testimony that the police found child pornography 
on Putman’s computer and the reference to the two video titles that the 
witness read into the record.  The prosecutor claims this evidence goes to 
identity.  I disagree. 
 
 
 
29 
We have held that other-acts evidence can go to identity if the 
other acts are strikingly similar or of a unique nature.  See In re J.A.L., 
694 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 2005).  We require similarity or uniqueness 
to prevent the fact finder from determining “identification based on the 
forbidden inference of propensity.”  Id.  First, the mere possession of 
pornography does not qualify as an act.  Additionally, there is no 
showing in the record the child pornography found on the four items 
taken from Putman’s house, other than the video titles read into the 
record, are similar or unique to this crime.  Thus, the district court erred 
by allowing the DCI investigator’s testimony of finding child pornography.  
The mention of dissimilar child pornography is enough to require a new 
trial.  See State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1987) (finding the 
admission of a journal entry in violation of rule 404(b) (now rule 5.404(b)) 
required a new trial, even though a similar journal entry was admissible 
under rule 404(b)). 
The best argument the prosecutor can make for the admission of 
the video titles is that the video titles read in the record are similar or 
unique to the crime; thus, this evidence goes to identity.  The problem 
with this argument is Iowa caselaw does not support the admissibility of 
these types of written material to show identity without another act or a 
plan.  In J.A.L., the State alleged the juvenile was delinquent for falsely 
reporting the placement of an explosive device in violation of Iowa Code 
section 712.7 (2003).  694 N.W.2d at 750.  The State introduced notes 
from the juvenile’s journal into evidence.  See id. at 750–51.  In holding 
these writings excludable under rule 5.404(b), we said: 
A review of J.A.L.’s journal entries indicates J.A.L. was 
fascinated with suicide, death, and murder.  The journal 
entries, however, do not offer any indication J.A.L. was 
preparing to place a bomb threat at the school.  The entries 
 
 
 
30 
do not contain any plans to place a bomb threat or to kill 
any of his fellow students. 
Id. at 753. 
Another case supporting the exclusion of these video titles is 
Barrett.  There, the State charged the defendant with two counts of 
murder in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 
707.2 (1985).  Barrett, 401 N.W.2d at 185.  The State introduced into 
evidence two journals made by the defendant.  Id.  The first journal 
detailed a plan by the defendant to kill several people, including one for 
whom the defendant was the beneficiary of the person’s life insurance 
policy.  See id. at 185–86.  The State’s theory as to why the defendant 
killed a second person was that it was the defendant’s intent to make the 
police believe the second person killed the first person, then committed 
suicide.  Id. at 185.  The second journal referred to kidnapping and 
ransoming an unidentified woman.  Id. at 186.  It also included plans for 
kidnapping and murdering a newspaper carrier and plans to plant false 
clues about these crimes.  Id.   
The district court admitted both journals into evidence, and the 
defendant was convicted.  Id. at 185–86.  On appeal, we determined the 
first journal was not excludable under rule 404(b) because the defendant 
had, in fact, bought life insurance on one of the murder victims, and the 
journal dispelled the notion the defendant bought the life insurance for a 
legitimate reason.  See id. at 188.  However, we held the second journal 
was excludable under rule 404(b) because the writings were not similar 
to the modus operandi of the murders for which the defendant was tried.  
See id. at 189.  We then reversed the convictions and remanded for a 
new trial.  Id. 
 
 
 
31 
The lesson we learn from J.A.L. and Barrett is that mere writings 
do not in and of themselves make the writings admissible.  There has to 
be some link between the material sought to be introduced and the crime 
charged.  In J.A.L., the juvenile’s journal entries do not support an 
inference he was responsible for falsely reporting the placement of an 
explosive device.  See 694 N.W.2d at 753.  In Barrett, one journal was 
admissible only because the defendant bought life insurance on one of 
the victims.  See 401 N.W.2d at 188.  Here, the possession of videos with 
the specific titles shows Putman’s fascination with child rape.  However, 
these videos do not offer any indication that Putman was the child rapist 
on the night in question or that the crime he allegedly did was in the 
same manner as the acts committed in the videos. 
The court’s opinion also relies on State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634 
(Iowa 1987), and State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1982).  Both 
cases are distinguishable.  In Butler, the burglar’s tool used by the 
defendant in previous crimes and the tool used in the case on appeal 
were strikingly similar to permit admission of the other-acts evidence for 
the purpose of proving identity.  415 N.W.2d at 636.  In Walsh, there was 
a sufficient similarity between circumstances of a homicide for which the 
defendant was previously convicted and the homicide for which the 
defendant was on trial to admit the evidence for the purpose of proving 
identity.  318 N.W.2d at 186–87.  Thus, these cases are distinguishable 
because the act for which the State charged each defendant was similar 
and unique to other acts done by each defendant. 
Here, we have no other act done by Putman.  There is no 
connection between the videos or the crime charged.  Rather the alleged 
other act is merely possessing certain titles of child pornography that, on 
their face, appear to be similar to the crime.   
 
 
 
32 
Other states faced with similar facts would not let the video titles 
or pornography into the record.  Kentucky is one such state.  There, the 
Commonwealth charged a defendant with sodomy in the first degree 
committed on a boy under the age of twelve.  Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 
S.W.2d 647, 648 (Ky. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Baker 
v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1998).  The jury found the 
defendant guilty of the crime.  Id. at 650.  At trial, the court admitted 
evidence that graphically illustrated and described homosexual activity, 
among other sexually explicit materials.  See id. at 648–49.   
The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the defendant’s 
conviction, finding the materials were inadmissible to profile the 
defendant as a pedophile.  See id. at 652–54.  In doing so, the court said, 
“We declare, unqualifiedly, that citizens and residents of Kentucky are 
not subject to criminal conviction based upon the contents of their 
bookcase unless and until there is evidence linking it to the crime 
charged.”  Id. at 652. 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina came to the same 
conclusion.  See State v. Nelson, 501 S.E.2d 716, 724 (S.C. 1998).  There, 
the defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct with a three-year-old child and four counts of lewd act on a 
three-year-old child.  Id. at 717.  The district court admitted materials at 
the defendant’s trial including children’s toys, testimony about certain 
videos, photographs depicting young girls, and other evidence seized 
from the defendant’s bedroom.  Id. at 717–18.  Additionally, the district 
court admitted the defendant’s statements to police that he had fantasies 
about children.  Id. at 723.  The Supreme Court of South Carolina found 
this evidence not only inadmissible to establish identity, but also 
inadmissible to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, 
 
 
 
33 
or a common scheme or plan.  Id. at 718–19, 724.  The court reasoned 
that although the defendant had materials reflecting the defendant was a 
pedophile, the jury did not have the option to infer the defendant was 
acting in conformity with his alleged classification as a pedophile when 
he committed the crimes with which he was charged.  Id. at 719.  The 
court went on to say making such an inference was an improper basis to 
determine guilt; thus, the evidence should not have been admitted.  Id.  
The court cited cases from Florida, Idaho, New York, Texas, Kentucky, 
Ohio, and Tennessee that reached similar conclusions.  Id. at 719–22.  
Some states allow such materials to be admissible as the complete 
story of the crime if the defendant showed the objects to the child.  E.g., 
State v. Ericson, 986 A.2d 488, 496 (N.H. 2009).  Another jurisdiction has 
allowed such materials to be admissible as evidence of intent in a 
prosecution for traveling across state lines with the intent to engage in a 
sexual act with a minor and using an interstate facility to attempt to 
persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts.  See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 936, 
958–59. 
I am unable, however, to find any authority saying the prosecutor 
can use the mere possession of pornography depicting similar acts to 
those of the alleged crime to prove identity.  There is nothing in the 
record to show any connection between the pornography and the video 
titles introduced into evidence in this case.  If this really is the law, 
people of the State of Iowa must be careful in what they watch or read.  
The State can use a person’s reading of the book Lolita to convict that 
person of underage sexual abuse.  The State can use a person’s 
fascination with crime shows to convict that person of murder.   
There is no showing Putman acted upon his fascination with child 
pornography at the time of the crime.  Without that link, the court 
 
 
 
34 
impermissibly allowed the jury to infer Putman was acting in conformity 
with this character trait when he committed the crimes with which he 
was charged.  I would borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky and declare, unqualifiedly, that citizens and residents of Iowa 
are not subject to criminal conviction based upon the contents of their 
bookcase unless and until there is evidence linking it to the crime 
charged.   
Finally, the prosecutor did not limit her final argument to the two 
video titles the court held admissible in her final argument.  Instead, she 
waited until her rebuttal argument and argued the child pornography on 
the defendant’s computer and on every single item taken from the 
defendant’s home linked him to the crime.  By not limiting her argument 
to the two video titles and using in her argument the pornography found 
on the computer and other drives, she used the totality of the 
pornography for propensity rather than identity.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse Putman’s conviction and remand for a new trial.   
Hecht and Appel, JJ., join this dissent.   
 
 
 
35 
#12–0022, State v. Putman 
HECHT, Justice (dissenting). 
 
Although I join the dissent of Justice Wiggins because I am not 
persuaded 
Putman’s 
possession 
of 
the 
pornographic 
materials 
constituted an “act” under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b), I write 
separately because I conclude the evidence should have been excluded 
for another reason.  Even assuming only for the sake of analysis that the 
evidence was offered for the legitimate purpose of proving identity, I 
believe it should have been excluded because the danger of unfair 
prejudice attending its admission substantially outweighed its probative 
value. 
The factors we consider in assessing the probative force of evidence 
in relationship to the resulting danger of unfair prejudice are: 
the need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other 
evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear 
proof the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the 
strength or weakness of the evidence on the relevant issue, 
and the degree to which the fact finder will be prompted to 
decide the case on an improper basis. 
State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004).  I will address each of 
these factors in turn.   
I.  The State’s Need for the Evidence.   
The victim in this tragic case was an infant who could not testify 
and identify the person who brutally injured her.  Yet, I do not believe 
this fact weighs strongly in favor of admission of the challenged evidence.  
There was substantial evidence other than the pornography tending to 
link Putman to the crime.  For example, there was evidence supporting a 
finding that Putman was the only adult who slept upstairs on the same 
level of the house where L.R. slept on the night of the sexual assault.  
The State also offered evidence that Putman had twice behaved in a 
 
 
 
36 
sexually aggressive manner toward L.R.’s mother earlier in the evening 
before the crime occurred.  More importantly, L.R.’s father testified that 
Putman had blood on his hands and shirt in temporal proximity to the 
time when blood was observed on L.R.’s body and the crime was 
discovered.  Other evidence offered by the State tended to prove that 
when L.R. saw Putman after the crime was committed, she cowered from 
him.  These pieces of evidence suggest the State proffered other 
substantial evidence of Putman’s guilt, and thus the prosecution’s need 
of the pornographic evidence was not extraordinarily strong. 
 
It should be noted that even when the State’s need for the evidence 
is great, “the need for the evidence does not make the evidence more 
likely to prove that which it is offered to prove.”  United States v. Stout, 
509 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2007).  My analysis of the probative value of 
the pornographic evidence is found below.    
II.  Clarity of Proof the Defendant Committed the Prior Bad 
Acts.   
The State presented clear evidence that Putman’s computer and 
related devices held a substantial quantity of pornographic images 
including two titles involving rape of infants.  For the reasons stated in 
the dissent of Justice Wiggins, I am not persuaded Putman’s possession 
of pornography is an “act” within the meaning of rule 5.404(b).  
Accordingly, I shall not further address this factor here.  
III.  The Strength or Weakness of the Evidence on the 
Relevant Issue.   
Although Putman’s possession of pornography including two titles 
involving rape of infants might suggest some positive correlation between 
Putman’s interest in a specific genre of pornography and the peculiar 
facts of the crime, social science literature suggests the correlation might 
 
 
 
37 
be weak at best.  See Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child 
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 Stan. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 545, 579–80 (2011) (“Social science studies considering 
the correlation between viewing child pornography and contact sexual 
offenses against children are not consistent, though there is much 
evidence that only a subset of offenders who use child pornography also 
sexually offend against children.  To support this, researchers 
conducting comprehensive reviews of empirical literature often conclude 
there is little evidence of any direct impact of viewing child pornography 
on the commission of contact sexual offenses. . . .  In general, the 
literature supports the view that while child molesters may possess child 
pornography, those that possess child pornography are generally not 
likely to engage in contact offenses against children.  Instead, child 
molesters are merely a small subset of child pornographers.”).  Given the 
available social science, I cannot conclude the evidence of Putman’s 
possession of child pornography is strong evidence identifying him as the 
person who raped L.R. 
IV.  Degree to Which Jurors Will Be Motivated to Decide on 
Improper Basis.   
On this element of the analysis, I share the view of Chief Justice 
Hannah of the Arkansas Supreme Court who characterized the 
overwhelming prejudice occasioned by the admission of evidence that 
pornography was found on a defendant’s computer: “When the circuit 
court erroneously admitted into evidence the repugnant deviant 
pornographic pictures and titles that were found on the appellant’s 
computer, this case was over.”  Johnston v. State, No. CR–13–371, 2014 
WL 1096142, ___ S.W.3d ____, _____ (2014) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting).  It 
is beyond dispute in my view that when the jury heard evidence that 
 
 
 
38 
Putman’s computer held extraordinarily repugnant images of infants 
being raped, Putman’s conviction was guaranteed.  The subject matter of 
this evidence was so repugnant and exquisitely prejudicial that the 
jurors were almost certainly highly motivated to convict Putman on that 
propensity evidence alone.  Cf. State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 251 
(Iowa 1972) (noting risk of inflammatory and corrosive other-crimes 
evidence is its tendency to “stir such passion in the jury as to sweep 
them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime 
on trial” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating 
“the danger of unfair prejudice . . . presented by the ‘unique stigma’ of 
child sexual abuse . . . is one that all propensity evidence in such trials 
presents”).  As Chief Justice Hannah aptly suggested, when that evidence 
was admitted, Putman’s trial was over.     
In my view, this case presents a classic example of the type of 
evidence rule 5.404(b) is intended to exclude in furtherance of a fair trial.  
Even if it is assumed for the sake of analysis that the evidence was 
probative of identity—and not merely of propensity—it should have been 
excluded because it was so uniquely and extraordinarily prejudicial as to 
deny Putman a fair trial on the crime charged in this case.  Cf. United 
States v. Fawbush, 634 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Had the 
testimony been relevant to a material issue, we believe it still should not 
have been admitted.  Under our standard, relevant other act evidence is 
admissible only if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair 
prejudice.  ‘ “Unfair prejudice” . . . means an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one.’  We believe the evidence that Fawbush had sexually 
abused his daughters and had fathered a child with one of them to have 
 
 
 
39 
been so inflammatory on its face as to divert the jury’s attention from the 
material issues in the trial.  Consequently, the prejudicial effect of this 
evidence outweighed any legitimate probative value it may have had.” 
(Citations omitted.)).  Accordingly, I conclude the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the evidence, and I would reverse and remand for 
a new trial.  I therefore respectfully dissent.