Title: Powell v. Erb

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF  MARYLAND
                         MISC. NO. 39
              SEPTEMBER TERM, 1997
_________________________________________
               CANDACE POWELL et al.
                                      v.
                       EDITH B. ERB et al..
_________________________________________
           Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
         Raker
           Wilner
           Cathell
JJ.
________________________________________
          Opinion by Bell, C.J.
_________________________________________
         FILED:   May 22, 1998
Then, see Maryland Code (1957, 1975 ) Art. 101, § 58; Hauch v. Conner, 295 Md.
1
120, 121, 453 A.2d 1207, 1208 (1983); Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Services, 289 Md. 204, 208,
424 A.2d 336, 337 (1981); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 232, 249 A.2d 449, 452 (1969),
as now, see Maryland Code (1991) §9-901 of the Labor and Employment Article; Hastings,
et ux. v.Mechalske, 336 Md. 663, 673, 650 A.2d 274, 279 (1994), the Maryland Workers’
Compensation Act permitted an employee who suffered a compensable injury because of the
negligence of a co-employee to sue that co-employee in respect of that injury.   The
Delaware Act prohibited such actions, see Groves v. Marvel, 213 A.2d 853, 855 ( Del.
1965), and it still does.  See Young v. O.A. Newton, 477 A.2d 1071(Del. 1984); Farrell v.
Armstrong Cork Co.,  457 A.2d 763 (Del. 1983)  
1
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,  Maryland
Code (1974,1989 Repl. Vol.), §§12-601 to 12-609 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has certified to this
Court a question concerning the scope of our holding in Hauch v. Conner, 295 Md.  120, 295
A.2d 1207 (1983).   Presented in that case was a choice of law question, “whether Maryland
residents, who sustained injuries in an automobile accident in Delaware while temporarily
there in furtherance of their employer's business, and who claimed no benefits under the
Delaware workmen's compensation law, may maintain in Maryland courts a personal injury
action against the co-employee who operated the employer's automobile in which the
plaintiffs were passengers.”  Id. at 121, 295 A.2d at 1208.    We answered the question in the
affirmative.   Faced with the situation in which Maryland  permitted an employee injured
because of the negligence of a fellow employee, to bring a personal injury action against that
co-employee where Delaware did not,  the Court made clear that the relevant choice of law
1
principles were those of workers’ compensation law, rather than tort law, and that the choice
of law decision turned on the determination of which jurisdiction had the greater interest. Id.
The United States District Court also certified another question for our consideration,
2
namely:  “If the Hauch balancing and interest analysis test does apply, what weight, if any,
should be ascribed to the various factors in this case and especially to the following facts:
(i) the defendant resided in Pennsylvania; (ii) the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, and (iii)
the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, Pa.  Stat., Ann.  tit.  77, Section 1 et seq.
(West 1992) prohibits fellow servant suits?” This question applies, in any event, to the
claims brought by Cooper for personal injury and loss of consortium, as they fall squarely
within the Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983) analysis.   What the
question seeks is this Court’s application of the Hauch balancing and interest analysis test.
We answered a similar question, except that Delaware law was implicated, in Bishop v.
Twiford, 317 Md. 170, 176-77, 562 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1989).  As in Hauch, we stressed
Maryland’s public policy, as the forum state, in allowing co-employee actions. Id. at 176,
562 A.2d at 1241.  Since what is required is the application of the test that we hold is
dispositive, it is more appropriate that it be done by the federal court after trial and on its
own findings of fact and independent determinations.   We are satisfied that Hauch and
Twiford provide the necessary and adequate guidance.
2
at 133, 295 A.2d at 1214.  Accordingly, the certified question seeks to determine whether the
legal analysis applied in Hauch is equally applicable  in wrongful death actions.  
2
I
The litigation in the federal court arose out of an airplane crash in Pennsylvania.
Frederick G. Erb, a pilot for K & L Microwave, Inc., (“K & L”) a company based in
Salisbury, Maryland,  piloted a private airplane belonging to that company’s parent
corporation.  On March 18, 1994, the plane, a Piper Aerostar  601P,  departed from the
Salisbury Airport in Maryland, where it was regularly hangered and routinely kept for the
business use of K & L,  on a scheduled trip to a temporary work site in Pennsylvania.  John
Powell, Sr. and James Cooper, also employees of K & L, were passengers.   The plane
landed at the Airport in Pottstown, Pennsylvania  uneventfully; however, the plane crashed
while attempting a take off from that Airport, in bad weather, for the return to Maryland,
3
apparently the  result of  ice adhering to one or both of the wings of the plane.  Erb and
Powell were killed.   Cooper was seriously injured, but he survived the crash.
Powell is survived by a wife and two children who, along with Powell’s estate, filed
a wrongful death action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
against Erb’s estate, K&L and its parent corporation.   Cooper and his wife sued the same
parties for personal injury.   Central to both cases were allegations that Erb’s negligence was
the cause of the injuries suffered, the death of Powell and the serious personal injuries
suffered by Cooper.  The cases were consolidated for trial.   Pursuant to the plaintiffs’ Joint
Motion for Determination of Applicability of Maryland Law, opposed by the defendants,
the District Court signed the Certification Order forwarding the certified questions presently
being considered by this Court.
At the time of his death, Powell was a resident of the State of Maryland.   So, too,
were, and are, his wife and children.   Although they initially applied for benefits from the
Pennsylvania State Workers’ Compensation Commission, they  withdrew that application
and  subsequently applied for and received Maryland State Workers’ Compensation benefits.
On the date of the airplane crash, Cooper and his wife were residents of the State of
Delaware; however, Cooper daily reported to work at K&L’s office in Salisbury, Maryland.
Like Powell’s survivors, Cooper applied for and received Maryland workers’ compensation
benefits.  Erb, although a resident of Pennsylvania, lived in an apartment in Maryland during
the week, paid for by K&L and used by other K&L pilots. In addition, Erb maintained a local
phone listing for the apartment and commuted to his home in Pennsylvania on the weekends.
4
As we have seen, the flight originated in Maryland.  Moreover, the preparation for the
round trip flight occurred in Maryland.  And, of course, the home base for the airplane that
crashed  was the Salisbury Airport, also in Maryland. 
II
As indicated the question certified to this Court requires that we revisit the analysis
in Hauch with a view towards determining whether it is applicable in wrongful death cases.
In that case, during the relevant period, all of the parties, the two plaintiffs and the defendant,
were employees of the Hertz Corporation, an automobile rental company.  Not only was each
of them a resident of the State of Maryland, but the regular place of employment for each of
them was also Maryland.  Maryland was also the place where their employment contracts
were executed.   The issue in that case arose when the parties were injured in an accident that
occurred in Delaware.  They were in Delaware on company business, in a company owned
car, when the collision with another car took place.  The passengers in the car applied for and
received workers’ compensation under the Maryland law.  They also brought a personal
injury action in Maryland against their co-worker who was the driver at the time of the
accident, alleging negligence in the operation of the automobile. 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Delaware
workers’ compensation act applied to bar the plaintiffs’ action against him, their co-
employee.  In response, the plaintiffs maintained that Maryland’s act applied.  The trial court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  It treated the matter as a question
of tort choice of law and, thus, applied the doctrine of lex loci delicti.  
5
Acknowledging that the issue of which of two states’ compensation laws applies when
the co-employee action is brought in one state and the act causing the injury occurred in
another, the Court nevertheless pointed out that, in co-employee actions, the choice of law
question is not simply a matter of tort conflict of laws, “Maryland public policy [being] an
important consideration.” Id. at 132, 453 A.2d at 1213-14, citing Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md.
227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969).  At issue in Hutzell was the applicability of the Maryland
workers’ compensation law to a co-employee action filed in Maryland in respect to an
accident occurring in Maryland and involving Maryland residents, employed, however, in
Virginia and the accident occurred as the co-employees were returning home from their job
site in Virginia.  Virginia’s workers’ compensation law, contrary to Maryland’s,  barred co-
employee suits.   Discussing Hutzell, this Court pointed out that the reference to the rule of
lex loci delicti did not represent the principal basis of the decision.  Rather, the Court
explained: 
“As pointed out by the Court of Special Appeals in the present case, [Connor
v. Hauch, 50 Md.App. 217, 223, 437 A.2d 661, 664 (1981)] and by Professor
Larson, [4 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 88.22, 16-149 (1982)]
the principal basis for the decision in  Hutzell was Maryland public policy. 
In that case, the defendant argued that the Maryland allowance of co-employee
suits did not represent ‘a formulated or defined public policy against granting
immunity to fellow employees from tort action, as provided in the Virginia
statute,’. . . . This Court's response was that the defendant's ‘argument has not
persuaded us.’    The Court expressly disagreed with the New Jersey case of
Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952), which had attached little
importance to the policy of the forum state in allowing co-employee suits. 
The  Hutzell opinion stated that ‘we are unable to make a similar finding with
regard to ... the public policy of Maryland."’  
Hauch, 295 Md. at 132-33, 453 A.2d at 1214 (footnotes and citations omitted).  
6
Having established the applicability and importance of public policy to the decision
in Hutzell, we recognized that resolution of the choice of law issue would determine
“whether the court is open to a particular litigant,” a threshold inquiry.  Id. at 133, 453 A.2d
at 1214.   With respect to that inquiry, we said, “the policy of the forum state is extremely
important,” and we analogized the presence or absence of a bar in the state’s workers’
compensation law to a state’s statute of limitations, which also “is controlled by the law of
the forum.” Id.
Noting that, on public policy grounds, specifically with respect to its workers’
compensation law,  a co-employee suit has been allowed in Maryland even though the place
of employment was in another state, the Court concluded that the Maryland workers’
compensation law also should resolve the threshold question in that case.   It explained:
“In the instant case, although the injury did not occur in Maryland, there are
greater Maryland interests.   Here, in addition to the parties being Maryland
residents, their normal place of employment is in Maryland with the Hertz
Corporation.   Moreover, the plaintiffs and the defendant made claims for and
received benefits under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act.”        
       
Id. at 133-34, 453 A.2d at 1214. 
III
The defendants argue that the Hauch analysis does not apply to the case sub judice.
They reason, first, that Hauch was a personal injury case, while wrongful death is the subject
of this one and, second, the Maryland wrongful death statute, Maryland Code (1974, 1995
"§ 3-903.  When wrongful act occurs outside of Maryland.
3
(a) Application of substantive law of another state.-  If the wrongful act
occurred in another state, the District of Columbia, or a territory of the United
States, a Maryland court shall apply the substantive law of that jurisdiction.
(b)Maryland court to apply own rules of pleading and procedure.-
Notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful act occurred in another jurisdiction,
a Maryland court in which the action is pending shall apply its own rules of
pleading and procedure."
 
The defendants argue, specifically, in that regard that in deciding the personal injury
4
tort cases like Hauch, Hutzell, and Bishop, this Court did not have the benefit of a statute
which mandated which state’s law to apply; each of those cases were decided under common
law workers’ compensation choice of law rules because there were no statutory guidelines.
For this reason, they submit, Hauch, Hutzell and Bishop do not provide guidance with
respect to a wrongful death claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Wrongful Death Act.
7
Repl. Vol.) § 3-903 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,  itself prescribes the
3
choice of law to be applied when the  wrongful death which is the subject of the Maryland
case occurred outside the State.   That section, they point out, requires the court to apply the
substantive law of the state where the incident occurred, in this case, Pennsylvania.  The
defendants contend that the right to bring an action against a co-employee is a matter of
substantive law and, since the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation law prohibits co-
employee actions, see 77 P.S. § 72 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act; Apple
v. Reichart, 278 A.2d 482 (Pa.1971); Ducjai v. Dennis, 636 A.2d 1130 ( Pa.  Super.1994);
Fern v. Ussler, 630 A.2d 896 (Pa.  Super.1993), there is no need to probe further into the
choice of law provisions of Maryland’s workers’ compensation law, nor to look to Maryland
public policy and its interest balancing test.    
4
“Employer” is defined, in § 9-201, as a person, a governmental unit, or a quasi-public
5
corporation having  at least 1 covered employee.
  
8
The plaintiffs take the contrary position, arguing the Hauch analysis is fully applicable
to wrongful death cases,  there being no basis to distinguish such cases  from  personal injury
cases  in the workers’ compensation context.  Also, the plaintiffs argue that the rationale
supporting  application of workers’ compensation conflict of law principles in personal
injury actions is equally applicable to cases involving wrongful death.  Moreover, they
continue, workers’ compensation law conflict issues present distinct policy questions,
distinct from tort or contract matters for choice of law purposes; thus, those matters ought
to be treated differently.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs maintain that the Maryland Wrongful
Death statute does not address the threshold issue of a co-employees right to sue a fellow
employee under applicable workers’ compensation statutes and, in any event,  must be read
in  para materia with Maryland’s workers’ compensation law.
IV
The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act provides for compensation not simply for
personal injury suffered by a “covered employee,” as the result of an accidental personal
injury, but also for the dependents of a covered employee when death is the result.   A
"covered employee" is an individual listed in Title 9, Subtitle 2 of the Labor and
Employment Article,  for whom an employer  is required by law to provide coverage.  §
5
9-101(f).   Generally, coverage is required to be provided when “an individual, including a
9
minor, ... [is] in the service of an employer under an express or implied contract of
apprenticeship or hire.”  § 9-202(a).   And, pursuant to § 9-501, “Accidental Personal
injury”:
“(a) ...Except as otherwise provided, each employer of a covered
employee shall provide compensation in accordance with this
title to:
(1) the covered employee for an accidental
personal injury sustained by the covered
employee; or
(2) the dependents of the covered employee for
death of the covered employee:
(i) resulting from an accidental
personal injury sustained by the
covered employee; and
(ii) occurring within 7 years after
the date of the accidental personal
injury.
(b) ...An employer is liable to provide compensation in
accordance with subsection (a) of this section, regardless of
fault as to a cause of the accidental personal injury.”
 
See also § 9-678, which provides:
“A dependent of a covered employee who is entitled to compensation
for the death of the covered employee resulting from an accidental personal
injury or occupational disease shall be paid compensation in accordance with
this Part XII of this subtitle.” 
The referenced "accidental personal injury" means “ (1) an accidental injury that arises out
of and in the course of employment; and (2) an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of
a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the
covered employee.” See § 9-101(a).  
Section 9-901, “Choice of proceeding against third party or employer,” is the
This Court has made clear that a co-employee ordinarily is not the employer. 
6
Although “[l]ogically, the term ‘coemployees’ includes supervisors and corporate officers
as well as fellow employees with similar rank,” only such employees who are performing the
non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work which the employer owes the employees
have been equated with the employer and, so, been held to be entitled to the employer’s
immunity from suit. Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 148, 476 A.2d 710, 718 (1984).
 
“§ 9-902. Action against third party after award or payment of compensation.
7
           
                                  *       *       *       *
 
(c) If the self-insured employer, insurer, Subsequent Injury
Fund, or Uninsured Employers' Fund does not bring an action
against the third party within 2 months after the Commission
makes an award, the covered employee or, in case of death, the
dependents of the covered employee may bring an action for
damages against the third party.”
 
10
provision that is critical to the question whether one co-employee may sue another co-
employee for negligence in causing the injury for which compensation is payable.  It
provides: 
“When a person other than an employer  is liable for the injury
[6]
or death of a covered employee for which compensation is
payable under this title, the covered employee or, in the case of
death, the personal representative or dependents of the covered
employee may:
(1) file a claim for compensation against the
employer under this title; or
(2) bring an action for damages against the person
liable for the injury or death or, in the case of
joint tort feasors, against each joint tort feasor.”
See also § 9-902 (c),  which gives the insurer the exclusive right for 2 months to proceed
7
 
Section 9-903(a) is the successor to the Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl. Vol)
8
Article 101, § 58.
11
against the third party for claims for both personal injury and for death.  
As we have seen, § 9-903(a)  has been interpreted as permitting co-employee suits.
8
See Athas v. Hill,  300 Md. 133, 137, 476 A.2d 710, 712 (1984); Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop
Servs, 289 Md.  204, 208, 424 A.2d 336, 337 (1981) Gray v. State Rds.  Comm’n, 253 Md.
421, 424-425, 252 A.2d 810, 812 (1969).   More significant, however,  is the fact that this
provision, like those just rehearsed, also speaks of actions for both personal injury and death.
 There does not appear to be any principled basis on which to distinguish personal injury and
wrongful death cases under the Hauch analysis.  In that case, this Court was concerned with
the determination of the rights of litigants under the different workers’ compensation laws
of two states.   We resolved the issue by looking to the public policy of the forum state and
weighing its interest against that of the state in which the wrongful act occurred.   That the
injury in this case resulted in death and  personal injury was involved in Hauch simply does
not affect the analysis.
V
The Maryland Wrongful Death Act does not, by its terms, directly or explicitly,
address wrongful death in the workers’ compensation context.   Nor does it purport to deal
with what Hauch denominated a threshold issue, “whether the court is open to a particular
litigant.”   Indeed, all CJ § 3-903 (a), the applicable provision, provides is that Maryland
courts apply the substantive tort law of the state in which the wrongful act, i.e. “. . .an act,
12
neglect, or default including a felonious act which would have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued,” see CJ § 3-901 (e),
occurred.  See Hauch, 295 Md. at 123, 453 A.2d at 1209.    Consequently, so construed,   it
conflicts with neither the Hauch analysis nor the interpretation this Court has given § 9-903.
 
On the contrary, it is well settled that there is nothing in conflict between the
Workers’ Compensation Act and the Wrongful Death Act.  They both unquestionably deal
with recovery for injuries resulting in death.  McKeon v. State for Use of Conrad, 211 Md.
437, 445, 127 A.2d 635, 639 (1956).  The two acts are in pari materia and must be construed
together.  Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 458, 385 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1978);  State v.
Sherman,  234 Md. 179, 184, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); Taylor v. State, Use of Mears, 233
Md. 406, 407-413, 197 A.2d 116, 116-119 (1964); Storrs et al. v. Mech et al., 166 Md. 124,
129, 170 A. 743, 745 (1934).   In fact, to interpret CJ § 3-903 as the defendants advocate
would render meaningless that portion of § 9-903 addressing wrongful death actions
whenever the act causing the death occurs in another state.  The canons of statutory
construction counsel against such interpretations. Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery
County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180-81, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996)  ("Nor
should we interpret a statutory scheme so as to render any part of it meaningless or
nugatory.”).  See Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901
(1995) (quoting GEICO v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 714 (1993)).
  The defendants point out that the United States District Court for the District of
13
Maryland, in Wilson v. Fraser, 353 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (D.Md.1973), reached the contrary result,
relying on  the Maryland Wrongful Death Statute and its express requirement that the
substantive law of the place of death govern.   The court was not persuaded by  the argument,
premised on Hutzell, that Maryland would reject the Virginia bar against co-employee suits
“as being contrary to the State’s public policy." Id. at 3.  It read Hutzell as “holding only that
where the accident occurred in Maryland a claim for injuries sustained could not be defeated
by the fact that the injured workman was covered by the workmen’s compensation law of
another state which would have barred the claim had it been brought in the other state.” Id.
at 3-4.  The public policy to which the court responded was that reflected in the Wrongful
Death Statute.  It was also persuaded by Harford Mutual v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d
115 (1968) and White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), both lex loci delecti
cases, that this Court would not reach a contrary result. Id. at 3.
The Hauch Court commented on the federal court’s holding, but  declined, because
not presented, “to decide whether the choice of law provision of the wrongful death act
extends beyond substantive tort issues and encompasses the question of entitlement to bring
an action in light of workmen's compensation law.” 295 Md. at 131, n.7,  453 A.2d at 1213,
n.7.  Nor did we have an occasion to address the issue in Twiford, in which, again, only
personal injuries were involved.  That issue is now squarely before us and we expressly
reject the Wilson analysis, reaffirming, as we have seen, that applied in Hauch.   When there
is a conflict between the workers’ compensation laws of two states, the Wrongful Death
statute is not dispositive.
14
                                                     
 
 
CERTIFIED 
QUESTION
ANSWERED AS HEREIN SET
FORTH. COSTS IN THIS COURT
TO BE EVENLY DIVIDED.