Title: Borek Cranberry Marsh v. Jackson County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1144 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Jackson County, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 129 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 437, 773 N.W.2d 522 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 9, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jackson   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Mark B. Hazelbaker and Hazelbaker & Associates, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Mark B. Hazelbaker. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Dan Arndt 
and Arndt, Buswell & Thorn, S.C., Sparta, and oral argument by 
Dan Arndt. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 95
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1144  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV66) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jackson County, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order 
granting summary judgment to Jackson County.2  In 1977, Carl 
Nemitz purchased an easement from the County granting him sand 
                                                 
1 Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson County, 2009 WI App 
129, 321 Wis. 2d 437, 773 N.W.2d 522. 
2 The judge originally assigned to the case, Judge Gerald W. 
Laabs, recused himself because he drafted the easement at issue 
in this case.  Judge John A. Damon presided in Judge Laabs' 
stead. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
2 
 
removal and water flowage rights to County land adjacent to his 
property.  The water flowage rights were granted to "CARL 
NEMITZ, his heirs, and assigns" while the sand removal rights 
were granted to "the Grantee," who is described in the deed as 
"CARL NEMITZ."  Nemitz later transfered his land, along with his 
sand removal rights and water flowage rights, to Julius and 
Darlene Borek (the "Boreks"), who then transfered them to Borek 
Cranberry Marsh, Inc. ("BCM"). 
¶2 
When BCM attempted to exercise the sand removal rights 
(now almost 30 years after the original conveyance to Nemitz), 
the County objected on the grounds that the sand removal rights 
were non-transferable.  BCM brought suit, and the circuit court 
agreed with the County that the sand removal rights were non-
transferable because they had been granted to Nemitz alone, and 
not "Nemitz, his heirs, and assigns" as the water flowage rights 
had been granted.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) 
(1977-78),3 
which 
makes 
words 
of 
inheritance unnecessary and creates a presumption in favor of 
transferability, required the court to interpret the deed as 
conveying transferable sand removal rights. 
¶3 
Thus, the question before us is whether the 1977 
easement granted Nemitz a transferable right to remove sand from 
County land.  We hold that it did.  Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) 
provides that every conveyance of an interest in land conveys 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1977-78 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
3 
 
full title to that interest unless the language of the 
conveyance indicates otherwise by express language or necessary 
implication.  We conclude that the easement does not contain an 
express statement or necessary implication that only a limited, 
non-transferable right to remove sand was conveyed.  We 
therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand 
for the circuit court to enter an order granting BCM's motion 
for summary judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In 1977, Carl Nemitz, who owned marsh land adjacent to 
forest land owned by Jackson County, purchased an easement from 
the County for $500.00.  That easement granted Nemitz water 
flowage rights and sand removal rights to the neighboring County 
land for the purpose of cranberry cultivation on Nemitz's marsh.4 
                                                 
4 Flowage refers to allowing water to flow on and off of the 
adjoining land.  Flowage rights can be very important to 
cranberry cultivation because cranberries are grown in water, 
and at certain points in the process, the water in the bogs has 
to be drained off.  Sand is also important to cranberry 
cultivation.  When the cranberry marsh freezes over in winter, 
the ice on top of the bog is sanded——that is, covered with a 
layer of sand——so that when the ice melts, the sand settles, 
filling in under the cranberry plants so that the plants remain 
at 
an 
appropriate 
harvestable 
height, 
thereby 
optimizing 
production.  Thus, both water flowage and sand are important in 
the cranberry industry. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
4 
 
¶5 
The deed granting Nemitz water flowage and sand 
removal rights is entitled "Easement for Flowage Rights" ("1977 
deed").5  It contains the following relevant language: 
THIS EASEMENT, made this 12th day of May, 1978, 
between 
JACKSON 
COUNTY, 
a 
Municipal 
Corporation, 
Grantor, 
and 
CARL 
NEMITZ, 
of 
RFD 
1, 
Warrens, 
Wisconsin, Grantee. 
WITNESSETH, That for and in consideration of the 
sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) dollars, paid by the 
Grantee to the Grantor, . . . the Grantor does hereby 
grant and convey to CARL NEMITZ, his heirs, and 
assigns, an easement for flowage with full right and 
privilege to flow with water the following described 
lands situated in the Town of Knapp, Jackson County, 
Wisconsin . . . . 
THAT THIS EASEMENT, shall be perpetual providing 
that the flowage rights hereby granted are being used 
for the purpose of cranberry culture. 
AND, the Grantor does hereby grant and convey to 
the Grantee the further right and privilege to remove 
sand from the above described lands to be used for the 
purpose of cranberry culture upon the Grantee's 
adjacent lands. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶6 
In 1978, Nemitz sold the cranberry marsh to the 
Boreks. 
 
Besides 
transfering 
the 
land 
itself, 
the 
deed 
transfering the marsh from Nemitz to the Boreks ("1978 deed") 
                                                 
5 The "Easement for Flowage Rights" in the record before us 
is actually dated May 12, 1978.  That document indicates that it 
was 
"given 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
correcting 
an 
erroneous 
description as recorded in Volume 226 of Records, on page 751 
and as Document #212830."  The original deed is not in the 
record.  However, the parties agree that the original deed was 
executed sometime in 1977, and that the deed in the record is 
identical to the 1977 document in all regards relevant to this 
case. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
5 
 
also transfered the flowage and sand removal rights that Nemitz 
purchased from the County in 1977.6  The Boreks later transfered 
the land and their interest in the flowage and sand removal 
rights to BCM.7 
¶7 
For decades, BCM used sand from its own land to supply 
its cranberry cultivation needs.  At some point prior to the 
commencement of this suit, BCM informed the County that it 
intended to start removing sand from County land pursuant to the 
1977 deed.  The County disputed BCM's right to remove sand, 
arguing that the sand removal rights sold to Nemitz were 
personal to Nemitz and therefore not transferable to the Boreks 
or BCM. 
¶8 
On April 13, 2007, BCM filed suit in Jackson County 
Circuit Court, John A. Damon, Judge, seeking (1) a declaratory 
judgment that BCM is the legal owner of the sand removal rights; 
(2) compensatory damages in the form of lost profits; and (3) 
reimbursement 
of 
expenses 
arising 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
controversy.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit 
court granted summary judgment to the County and dismissed BCM's 
claims.  The court concluded that the necessary implication of 
                                                 
6 The 1978 deed stated in relevant part as follows: "The 
grantors further convey to the grantees, their heirs and 
assigns, all of their rights in and to an easement executed in 
favor of them by Jackson County concerning flowage rights and 
sand rights." 
7 The deed transfering the land and the flowage and sand 
removal rights from the Boreks to BCM is not in the record.  
Nevertheless, the parties agree that the transaction took place. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
6 
 
the inclusion of "heirs and assigns" in the flowage grant and 
the omission of that language in the sand removal grant, is that 
the parties intended for the former to be transferable and the 
latter be personal to Nemitz (and thus not transferable to or 
enforceable by BCM). 
¶9 
BCM appealed.  In a published opinion, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the right to 
remove sand was not personal to Nemitz and was thus transferable 
to the Boreks and thence to BCM.  Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. 
Jackson County, 2009 WI App 129, ¶14, 321 Wis. 2d 437, 773 
N.W.2d 522.  More specifically, the court held that the 
presumption of transferability of interests in Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) applied because there was no express language to the 
contrary, and the omission of "heirs and assigns" in the sand 
removal grant did not create a necessary implication that the 
parties intended that right to be non-transferable.  Id., ¶¶12-
14.  It further held that the instruction in Brody v. Long8 that 
deeds should be construed in favor of municipalities does not 
apply here because this case is not a close call.  Id., ¶16. 
¶10 The County then petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 This case comes before us on summary judgment.  We 
review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and 
apply the methodology specified in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Apple 
                                                 
8 13 Wis. 2d 288, 108 N.W.2d 662 (1961). 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
7 
 
Valley Gardens Ass'n, Inc. v. MacHutta, 2009 WI 28, ¶12, 316 
Wis. 2d 85, 763 N.W.2d 126.  That is, we determine whether there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if not, which 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
¶12 The present case requires us to determine the meaning 
and scope of an easement.  Easements are created by deeds, and 
we construe deeds according to the intentions of the parties to 
the deed.  Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶26, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___.  The proper construction of an easement is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Hunter v. Keys, 229 
Wis. 2d 710, 715, 600 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1999). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶13 The question before us is whether the sand removal 
rights conveyed in the easement between the County and Nemitz 
were 
personal 
to 
Nemitz, 
or 
whether 
they 
were 
fully 
transferable. 
¶14 An easement is an interest in land possessed by 
another.  Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2002 WI App 22, ¶18, 250 Wis. 2d 1, 
640 N.W.2d 178.  "An easement creates a nonpossessory right to 
enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates 
the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the 
easement."  Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2 (1) 
(2000).  Easements may be either appurtenant easements or 
easements in gross.  Gojmerac, 250 Wis. 2d 1, ¶18.  An easement 
appurtenant ties the rights or obligations of a servitude to 
ownership or occupancy of the land, and thus it is transfered 
with the land.  Id.  An easement in gross does not tie the 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
8 
 
benefits or burdens of a servitude to the land, and may be 
personal or transferable.  Id., ¶18 & n.5. 
¶15 At common law, the sand removal rights at issue here 
would be classified as a profit à prendre.  Like an easement, a 
profit à prendre, now generally known simply as a "profit" (see 
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2 cmt. f), is also 
an interest in land that involves the additional power to 
acquire or remove things from the land.  Van Camp v. Menominee 
Enters., Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 332, 343, 228 N.W.2d 664 (1975).  
Rights often associated with a profit include hunting and 
fishing rights, mineral and timber rights, and, as in the case 
at bar, sand removal rights.  Id.; Figliuzzi v. Carcajou 
Shooting Club, 184 Wis. 2d 572, 581, 516 N.W.2d 410 (1994); Gray 
v. Handy, 208 N.E.2d 829, 831-32 (Mass. 1965).  Both an easement 
and a profit were distinguished in the common law from a mere 
license, which did not qualify as an interest in real property 
and was revocable by its very nature.  Van Camp, 68 Wis. 2d at 
344.  In 1994, this court held that there is no meaningful legal 
distinction between an easement and a profit.  Figliuzzi, 184 
Wis. 2d at 583.  The Restatement in fact defines a profit as an 
easement with additional rights.  Restatement (Third) of Prop.: 
Servitudes § 1.2(2) & cmt. e (2000). 
¶16 It is clear that the water flowage rights and the sand 
removal rights in the deed between Nemitz and the County each 
constitutes an interest in the land.  Both parties concede that 
the interpretive instructions in Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) play a 
role in the proper interpretation of conveyances of land and 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
9 
 
interests in land.  The dissent, however, challenges whether the 
statute applies to interests in land at all.  See dissent, ¶¶57-
63. 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) has existed in some form 
since 1874.  The first iteration of the statute abrogated the 
common law rule by providing: "In all conveyances of land 
hereafter made in this state, words of inheritance shall not be 
necessary in order to create or convey a fee . . . ."  § 1, ch. 
316, Laws of 1874. 
¶18 The legislature amended the statute in 1878 to 
provide: 
In conveyances of lands, words of inheritance shall 
not be necessary to create or convey a fee, and every 
grant of lands or any interest therein shall pass all 
the estate or interest of the grantor, unless the  
intent to pass a less estate or interest shall appear 
by express terms or be necessarily implied in the 
terms of such grant. 
Wis. Stat. § 2206 (1878).  The annotated version of the next 
published edition of the statutes (in 1889) states that this new 
statute was composed of the 1874 version, "with addition of 
words from the New York statute to give it full effect." 
¶19 The New York statute upon which ours was based stated: 
The term "heirs" or other words of inheritance, shall 
not be requisite to create or convey an estate in fee; 
and every grant or devise of real estate, or any 
interest therein, hereafter to be executed, shall pass 
all the estate or interest of the grantor or testator, 
unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest 
shall appear by express terms, or be necessarily 
implied in the terms of such grant. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
10 
 
1 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 2, ch. 1, tit. 5, § 1 (1835) (quoted in 
Whitney v. Richardson, 13 N.Y.S. 861, 862 (N.Y. Gen. Term 
1891)).  Faced with the question of whether that statute applied 
to easements, the Supreme Court of New York concluded that it 
did, holding that an easement was an "estate in fee" under the 
statute.  Whitney, 13 N.Y.S. at 862 (interpreting Nellis v. 
Munson, 15 N.E. 739, 741 (N.Y. 1888)); see also N.Y. Jur. 2d 
Easements, § 30 (1997) ("The statute providing that the term 
'heirs' or other words of inheritance are not necessary to 
convey an estate in fee simple also applies to the creation of 
an easement . . . .").9 
¶20 In 
1969, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
revised 
and 
renumbered our statute.  It now reads:  
In conveyances of lands words of inheritance shall not 
be necessary to create or convey a fee, and every 
conveyance shall pass all the estate or interest of 
the grantor unless a different intent shall appear 
expressly or by necessary implication in the terms of 
such conveyance. 
Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  We were unable to find any evidence, 
textual or extra-textual, that these revisions reflected a 
legislative intent to change the meaning of the statute.  
Rather, the changes appear merely stylistic.  For example, the 
legislature changed the phrase, "every grant of lands or any 
                                                 
9 Other states with nearly identical language have similarly 
interpreted their statutes to include easements as well as 
conveyances of land.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Osceola, 
Clarke County v. Harken, 158 N.W. 692 (Iowa 1916); Karmuller v. 
Krotz, 18 Iowa 352 (1865); Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1976). 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
11 
 
interest therein," to simply "conveyance."  A "conveyance" is 
defined as a written instrument evidencing a transaction 
governed by Chapter 706, which would include both a grant of 
land and the conveyance of an interest in land.  See 
§ 706.01(3). 
¶21 Unlike the dissent, we find the statute to be 
sufficiently clear that it applies to easements.  See Dissent, 
¶¶57-63.  We see clues in the second clause of the statute, 
which states, "every conveyance shall pass all the estate or 
interest of the grantor."  The conjunctive "or" means that some 
conveyances contemplated by the statute will include an estate, 
while some may include only interests in the land.  The pre-1969 
version of the statute further makes clear that the current 
statute's use of "conveyance" is meant to be shorthand for 
"every grant of lands or any interest therein."  And if there 
were any doubt, courts in other states with similar statutes, 
including the New York statute upon which ours was based, have 
construed this language to apply to easements as well as 
conveyances of land.  See supra ¶19 & note 9. 
¶22 Thus, though a cursory reading of § 706.10(3) might 
suggest that its provisions do not govern easements, the textual 
clues, statutory history, and the interpretation of its sister 
statutes make clear that the interpretive instructions in this 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
12 
 
subsection apply to conveyances of interests in land like the 
deed here.10 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3), then, provides that every 
transfer of an interest in land conveys full title to that 
interest, including the right to transfer the interest, unless 
the conveyance evinces a different intent "expressly or by 
necessary implication." 
¶24 The County argues that the language of the 1977 deed 
does make clear that the sand removal rights were non-
transferable.  It maintains that the omission of "heirs and 
assigns" in the sand removal grant——in contrast to the inclusion 
of that language in the water flowage grant——constitutes express 
language or at least necessarily implies that the original 
parties intended the water flowage rights to be transferable and 
the sand removal rights to be personal to Nemitz.  The County 
further argues that under Brody v. Long, a deed transfering 
rights away from a government entity must be construed in favor 
                                                 
10 The County argues that the statute is merely a drafting 
guide and not a substantive tool for interpretation.  It further 
argues that the statute is an extrinsic aid only to be 
considered after a deed is first deemed ambiguous. 
The statute rebuts this, however.  It tells us how deeds 
"shall" be construed, and thus provides an interpretive aid for 
all deeds, not just ambiguous ones.  Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  
Moreover, § 706.01(1) states that Chapter 706 "shall govern 
every transaction by which any interest in land is created, 
aliened, mortgaged, assigned or may be otherwise affected in law 
or in equity."  The transfer of interests from the County to 
Nemitz is no exception. 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
13 
 
of the government entity.  13 Wis. 2d 288, 297, 108 N.W.2d 662 
(1961). 
¶25 BCM argues that because property interests are fully 
transferable even in the absence of words of inheritance like 
"heirs and assigns," the absence of "heirs and assigns" in the 
1977 deed's grant of the sand removal rights was immaterial, and 
thus those rights are fully transferable. 
¶26 The County's assertions notwithstanding, the deed 
simply does not provide any express language stating that the 
sand removal rights were not fully transferable.  An express 
limitation on transferability would be manifest in language 
affirmatively limiting the sand removal rights to Carl Nemitz.  
If, as the County argues, the difference in granting language 
indicates an intent to make one grant transferable and the other 
non-transferable, such a conclusion is implied, not express. 
¶27 Thus, the question is whether the non-transferability 
of the sand removal rights is a "necessary implication" of the 
terms of the easement.  In addition to this statute, the 
Wisconsin Statutes use the phrase "necessary implication" three 
other times.  Wis. Stat. § 62.09(8)(c) (relating to mayoral veto 
power); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 702.03(2) 
(relating 
to 
powers 
of 
appointment); Wis. Stat. § 704.09(3) (relating to the transfer 
of an interest owned by a tenant or landlord).11  Each usage 
occurs in the phrase "expressly or by necessary implication."  
                                                 
11 Before the court of appeals decision in this case, it 
does not appear that any published decision interprets the 
phrase "necessary implication" as used in § 706.10(3). 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
14 
 
The legislature's intent for a "necessary implication," then, is 
closely tied to the concept of an "express" statement.  It is 
fair to say that a necessary implication is one that is so clear 
as to be express; it is a required implication.  Said another 
way, where the terms of a conveyance contain a necessary 
implication, an interpretation otherwise would constitute a 
perverse misconstruction of the language. 
¶28 The County maintains that the difference in language 
between the grant of water flowage rights and the grant of sand 
removal rights creates a necessary implication that the sand 
removal rights are non-transferable.  The water flowage rights 
were granted to "CARL NEMITZ, his heirs, and assigns," while the 
sand removal rights were granted to "the Grantee," who is 
defined in the deed as "CARL NEMITZ."  The County argues that 
the omission of the "heirs and assigns" language from the sand 
removal grant evinces a necessary implication that the rights 
were non-transferable.  To read it otherwise, the County 
asserts, would render the "heirs and assigns" language mere 
surplusage.  See Goebel v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of 
Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 680, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978) ("[C]ourts 
must avoid a construction which renders portions of a contract 
meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage."). 
¶29 The County's interpretation of the 1977 deed is 
certainly a reasonable one.  Indeed, we generally interpret the 
use of differing language in similar or related sections as 
intending a different meaning.  Cf. Responsible Use of Rural & 
Agric. Land (RURAL) v. Public Service Commission, 2000 WI 129, 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
15 
 
¶39, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888 (holding that when words 
are used in one subsection of a statute but not another 
subsection, a different meaning is intended).  But this 
interpretation of the easement is not a required or necessary 
one. 
¶30 We find BCM's interpretation to be at least as 
reasonable as the County's reading.  As BCM explains, according 
to the statute's interpretive instructions, the words "heirs and 
assigns" (or any similar language) are unnecessary to indicate a 
transferable interest.  Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) ("[W]ords of 
inheritance shall not be necessary to create or convey a 
fee . . . .").  As a matter of law, "Grantee" therefore has the 
exact same meaning as "Grantee and his heirs and assigns" unless 
another meaning is expressly stated or implied.  Both indicate 
the grant of a fully transferable interest.  Therefore, we need 
not construe that phrase as having any legal effect.  See Weber 
v. Nedin, 210 Wis. 39, 46, 246 N.W. 307 (1933) (determining that 
language in a deed conveying property to one's "assigns" was 
"without legal effect" and therefore superfluous).  Under the 
directive of § 706.10(3), then, the grant of water flowage 
rights to "CARL NEMITZ, his heirs, and assigns" and the grant of 
sand removal rights to "the Grantee" (who is identified in the 
deed as Nemitz) are identical, and each conveys a freely 
transferable interest. 
¶31 The reasonableness of BMC's reading is supported by 
the easement's reference to itself as a single easement.  The 
1977 deed is entitled "Easement for Flowage Rights."  The 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
16 
 
document also speaks of "this easement" when giving the date and 
naming the parties ("THIS EASEMENT, made this 12th day of May, 
1978, between JACKSON COUNTY . . . and CARL NEMITZ"), and when 
explaining that this is a corrected deed (see supra note 5) 
("This easement is given for the purpose of correcting an 
erroneous 
description . . . ."). 
 
An 
additional 
internal 
reference states that "THIS EASEMENT, shall be perpetual 
providing that the flowage rights hereby granted are being used 
for the purpose of cranberry culture" (emphasis added).  The 
County argues that the reference to "this easement" refers only 
to the water flowage rights because this statement immediately 
follows the grant of water flowage.  While this may be a 
reasonable reading, another reasonable reading is that "this 
easement" refers, as it does in its other iterations, to the 
document as a whole, and therefore characterizes the sand 
removal rights as perpetual as well. 
¶32 We find additional support for BCM's reading in the 
fact that the easement contains two express limitations.  First, 
the County "expressly reserved the right of the public for 
access to the [County] land for the purposes of hunting and 
fishing."  Second, the sand removal and water flowage rights 
were conditioned on their being "used for the purpose of 
cranberry culture."  It is reasonable to conclude that had the 
deed been intended to limit the transferability of either the 
flowage or sand removal rights, it would have said so expressly.  
See FAS, LLC v. Bass Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 
N.W.2d 287 ("'[T]he express mention of one matter excludes other 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
17 
 
similar matters that are not mentioned.'") (quoting Perra v. 
Menomonee Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 215, ¶12, 239 Wis. 2d 26, 
619 N.W.2d 123). 
¶33 Thus, both BCM and the County offer reasonable 
interpretations of the easement.  We simply do not agree with 
the County that its reading——that the sand removal rights were 
intended to be personal to Nemitz and non-transferable——is 
expressly stated in or a necessary implication of the terms of 
the easement.  Accordingly, under Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), the 
easement conveyed a fully transferable interest in both the 
water flowage and sand removal rights. 
¶34 The County's final argument12 rests on a single 
sentence in Brody v. Long stating that "a grant of land by a 
public body is to be construed most strongly against the 
grantee."  13 Wis. 2d at 297 (citing 6 Thompson, Real Property 
(perm. ed.) 571, § 3365).  The County argues that this brief 
statement 
in 
Brody 
creates 
a 
top-level 
rule 
of 
broad 
application. 
¶35 We disagree.  The Brody court discussed this rule only 
after having applied ordinary rules of construction.  See id. at 
293-96.  Furthermore, the Brody court did not even rely on the 
                                                 
12 The County also makes a brief and undeveloped argument 
that "[u]nder the County Forest program, sand and gravel 
extraction by private entities such as B[CM] is forbidden."  
That sentence, found in the County's Statement of Facts in its 
main brief, is the extent of its argument on the issue, and we 
need not consider it.  Clean Wis., Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 
N.W.2d 768 ("We will not address undeveloped arguments."). 
No. 
2008AP1144   
 
18 
 
rule in its decision, but added it only as an additional 
independent basis for its decision.  See id. at 298.  We also 
note that no published opinion in this state has cited to or 
relied on this statement in Brody since it was made almost 50 
years ago. 
¶36 To the extent Brody is an accurate statement of the 
law (an issue we need not address here), it would be applied 
only as a rule of last resort after employing the normal methods 
of 
interpretation, 
particularly 
those 
specified 
by 
the 
legislature in Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  We fail to see how the 
rule of construction in Brody can trump the legislative mandate 
in Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶37 In summary, we hold that the 1977 easement granted 
Nemitz a transferable right to remove sand from County land.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) provides that every conveyance of an 
interest in land conveys full title to that interest unless the 
language of the conveyance indicates otherwise by express 
language or necessary implication.  We conclude that the 
easement does not contain an express statement or necessary 
implication that only a limited, non-transferable right to 
remove sand was conveyed.  We therefore affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand for the circuit court to enter 
an order granting BCM's motion for summary judgment. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause remanded with directions. 
 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority chooses not to resolve this case by a determination of 
the intent of the parties from the text of the document.  This 
approach is puzzling, to say the least.1   
¶39 Instead, the majority resolves this case using Wis. 
Stat. §706.10(3).  In doing so, the majority construes the 1977 
document to an end that effectively disregards the otherwise 
apparent intent of the parties as evinced by the written text.   
¶40 Because I conclude that the easement, here a deed and 
referred to hereafter as the document, created a nontransferable 
right to sand removal, personal to Nemitz as the original 
holder, and because I reach this conclusion regardless of 
whether I apply traditional rules for interpreting an easement 
instrument or apply a correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3), I dissent. 
I 
¶41 I begin by interpreting the document and acknowledging 
the rules of interpretation.  When the text of a document is 
plain and unambiguous, the document must be interpreted to 
                                                 
1 See, 
e.g., 
Konneker 
v. 
Romano, 
2010 
WI 
65, 
¶26, 
____Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___("Because the easement in question 
is created by deed, the court must look to that instrument in 
construing the relative rights of the landowners.  Deeds are 
construed as are other instruments; accordingly, the purpose of 
the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties.  The 
primary source of the parties' intent is what is written within 
the four corners of the deed." (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)).  
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
2 
 
effectuate the parties' intent.2  Case law also establishes that 
the primary source of the intent of the parties is "what is 
written 
within 
the 
four 
corners 
of 
the 
deed . . . ."3  
Furthermore, as the majority notes, "we generally interpret the 
use of different language in similar or related sections as 
intending a different meaning."4 
¶42 I therefore begin with the text of the document. 
Applying the rules of interpretation identified above, I 
conclude that the 1977 document granted rights relating to the 
water flowage different from those relating to sand removal.  
Whereas the former (water flowage) is transferable by each 
grantee, the latter (sand removal) is personal to the original 
grantee and thus is not transferable by the original grantee.   
¶43 Regarding the water flowage rights, I conclude that 
the following aspects of the text support the conclusion that 
the 1977 document conveyed an easement for flowage rights and 
that the easement for flowage rights was transferable: (1) the 
title is "Easement for Flowage Rights," phrased in the singular 
                                                 
2 Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 628, 638, 566 N.W.2d 158 
(Ct. App. 1997) ("Construction of the deed to determine the 
grant's terms and purposes is a question of law unless there is 
an ambiguity requiring resort to extrinsic evidence.  Whether an 
ambiguity exists is a question of law . . . ."); Hemmis v. 
Consol. Water Power & Paper Co., 173 Wis. 518, 521, 181 N.W. 743 
(1921) (" . . . in construing deeds every word and clause is to 
be taken into consideration"). 
3 Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 
(1977).  The interpretation of the document is ordinarily a 
question of law without resort to extrinsic evidence. 
4 Majority op., ¶29. 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
3 
 
(an "easement") and specifically referring to flowage rights; 
(2) the phrase "easement . . . with full right and privilege" is 
used; (3) the grant of flowage rights is to "Carl Nemitz, his 
heirs, and assigns," the latter words ordinarily used to 
indicate 
transferability; 
(4) 
the 
easement 
is 
"perpetual 
providing that the flowage rights hereby granted are being used 
for the purpose of cranberry culture."  The only reasonable 
interpretation of this text is that the water flowage provision 
is a grant of a transferable right.  Majority op., ¶¶29-30.  
¶44 In contrast, the grant of sand removal rights presents 
a different text, on its face supporting a different conclusion.  
The sand removal provision must be interpreted according to its 
text and in comparison with the language used to create the 
transferable water flowage easement.  Thus the language that is 
used in the grant of sand removal, as well as language that is 
used in the grant of water flowage but conspicuously omitted 
from the grant of sand removal, are both significant.  Analyzed 
in this way, the text of the sand removal provision contains 
numerous indicia that the parties intended the two rights to be 
different and discrete from one another. 
¶45 The document is structured in a way that makes the 
sand 
removal 
rights 
both 
structurally 
and 
linguistically 
separate from the water flowage rights.   
¶46 With regard to structure, the provisions relating to 
the water flowage rights are listed first and constitute the 
bulk of the document.  The document further enumerates that the 
conveyance is supported by consideration, witnessed by the 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
4 
 
parties, and perpetual.  In contrast, the sand removal rights 
are addressed last, constituting a separate almost ancillary 
paragraph, of one single sentence. 
¶47 With regard to language, the text of the sand removal 
provision, both in the words used as well as those omitted, 
distinguishes the grant of sand removal rights from the 
immediately preceding grant of water flowage rights.  The sand 
removal provision does not use the word "easement;" instead, it 
uses only the words "right and privilege."  The words "heirs and 
assigns," used in the grant of water flowage, are omitted from 
the sand removal provision; sand removal is granted only to "the 
Grantee [Carl Nemitz]."  While the statement that the sand 
removal right is limited to the use for the purpose of cranberry 
cultivation, the word "perpetual" is not used.  Finally, the 
document's title is an "Easement for Flowage Rights."  The title 
makes no mention of sand removal and the grant related to sand 
removal, which is instead set forth as a "further right and 
privilege."5   
                                                 
5 Contrary to the majority's assertion, reading the document 
as creating an easement only in water flowage rights does not 
disrupt the document's syntax.  The sand removal rights may be 
reasonably read as a license rather than as an easement.  It is 
well-established that licenses and easements may involve the 
same type or quantity of use.  Furthermore, licenses may also be 
conveyed in written documents between the original parties and 
using language such as "grant."  When coupled with a writing 
conveying an interest in land, such as the easement for flowage 
rights here, a written license may become an irrevocable 
license.  This reasonably accounts for the parties' inclusion of 
the license in the 1977 document that also grants the easement 
in flowage rights.  Thus, only a single easement is created——one 
easement, one license——which explains the title's reference to a 
singular "Easement for Flowage Rights." 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶48 Thus, 
the 
explicit 
and 
repeated 
terms 
of 
the 
document's sand removal provision distinguish it from the 
transferable water flowage rights.  The sand removal provision 
is a separate ("further") grant, and it is a grant made 
personally to Nemitz. 
¶49 I agree with the County that the cumulative effect of 
these structural and linguistic distinctions is to communicate 
the parties' intent that the grant of the right of sand removal 
be personal to Nemitz and not transferable.6  If this intent is 
not flatly unambiguous, it is certainly the most reasonable 
interpretation of the intent of the parties, based on the 
primary source for determining that intent——what is written 
within the "four corners" of the document itself.   
¶50 Surprisingly then, the majority ultimately concludes 
that this reasonable interpretation of the document cannot be 
controlling because an equally reasonable interpretation is 
gleaned from the majority's (erroneous) application of Wis. 
Stat. § 706.10(3). 
II 
¶51 I turn to Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), which the majority 
concludes is determinative, although the statute plays a 
relatively minor role in the parties' briefs.   
¶52 I began by interpreting the text of the document, and 
I shall now proceed to the text of the statute.  The majority 
places the statutory history before statutory text.  The 
                                                 
6 Schwartz v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y of Wis., 46 
Wis. 2d 432, 438, 175 N.W.2d 225 (1970). 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
6 
 
majority begins its discussion not with the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) but with a recitation of statutory history and 
authority from other jurisdictions.  See majority op., ¶¶15-20.  
I follow the more usual method, beginning with the statutory 
text and then addressing the statutory history and other sources 
of legislative intent. 
A 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) has two clauses, each 
complete by itself and each capable of standing as a separate 
sentence.  The text of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), when properly 
parsed, reads as follows:   
[1] In conveyances of lands words of inheritance shall 
not be necessary to create or convey a fee, and  
[2] every conveyance shall pass all the estate or 
interest of the grantor unless a different intent 
shall appear expressly or by necessary implication in 
the terms of such conveyance (formatting and emphasis 
added.) 
¶54 I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) does not help 
us in interpreting the intent of the parties expressed in the 
document.  However, were I to apply the statute to the present 
facts, I would nonetheless conclude that the County prevails.   
¶55 As written, the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) 
provides that in conveyances of lands, words of inheritance 
(that is, words like "heirs" and "assigns") are not necessary to 
create or convey a fee.   
¶56 The second clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) provides 
that every conveyance shall pass all of the estate or interest 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
7 
 
of the grantor unless a different implication appears expressly 
or by necessary implication in the terms of such conveyance.  
¶57 The first clause governs "conveyances of lands."  It 
does not apply to the document at issue in the present case 
because in Wisconsin an easement is not a conveyance of land, 
and the present case does not involve creation or conveyance of 
a fee.   
¶58 At least in Wisconsin, an easement is only an interest 
in land, not the land itself.  Accordingly, a conveyance of a 
right-of-way, for example, is not a conveyance of the strip of 
land itself.7  This court has repeatedly affirmed that an 
easement "does not create an estate in land," but rather "a 
right to use the land of another for a special purpose not 
inconsistent with the general property in the owner."8  Thus it 
is abundantly clear that the granting of an easement does not 
convey title to the land to an easement holder but only a right 
or privilege.9   
¶59 Therefore, as an easement, the 1997 document (titled 
"Easement for Flowage Rights") is not a conveyance of land.  By 
                                                 
7 Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 
(1977).  
"An easement is a permanent interest in another's land, 
with a right to enjoy it fully and without obstruction."  Id. at 
343 (quoted source omitted).  
8 Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 
(1977). 
9 Polebitski v. John Week Lumber Co., 157 Wis. 377, 381, 147 
N.W. 703 (1914). 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
8 
 
the statute's own terms, this document is therefore not affected 
by the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). 
¶60 Based on the text of the statute, I therefore conclude 
that the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) applies only to 
a subset of conveyances, "conveyances of lands" that "create or 
convey a fee."  The conveyance of the easement for water flowage 
and the conveyance of sand removal rights in the instant case 
are not conveyances of land creating a fee within the scope of 
the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).   
¶61 Furthermore, the phrase "unless a different intent 
shall appear expressly or by necessary implication," contained 
within the second clause of § 706.10(3), does not modify or 
affect the first clause of the sentence, which applies to 
conveyances of lands and creation of fee interests.  
¶62 A final important point.  The fact that the words of 
inheritance are not necessary in a conveyance of land creating a 
fee to convey a transferable estate or interest does not mean 
that words of inheritance are meaningless if they are used.  A 
drafter may use words like "heirs" and "assigns" to manifest the 
intent of the parties, even if their use is not required to 
convey a transferable interest in land.  Indeed the statutory 
form warranty deeds set forth in the 1874 Laws,10 in the 1878 
Statutes11 and in the 1967 statutes12 provide for conveyance to 
                                                 
10 Laws of 1874, ch. 316, § 1. 
11 Wis. Stat. 1878, § 2208. 
12 1967 Wis. Stat. § 235.06. 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
9 
 
the "grantee, his heirs and assigns," even when the statutes 
provide that words of inheritance are not necessary.  
¶63 I turn now to the second clause of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3).  It covers "conveyances."  The use of the word 
"conveyances" can be interpreted as referencing, and thus as 
controlled by, the first clause to address only a conveyance of 
land that creates or conveys a fee.  If so, the second clause of 
the statute is not applicable here for the same reasons that the 
first clause of the statute is not applicable.   
¶64 The majority interprets the word "conveyance" in the 
second clause of the statute more broadly to include a 
conveyance 
of 
any 
interest 
of 
land, 
thus 
including 
the 
conveyance in the instant case.  This interpretation is 
supported by Wis. Stat. § 706.01(4), which states that for 
purposes of chapter 706, the word "conveyance" means "a written 
instrument evidencing a transaction governed by this chapter, 
that satisfies the requirements of s. 706.02, subject to s. 
706.25."   
¶65 Applying 
this 
interpretation 
of 
"conveyance," 
a 
conveyance of an interest in land, that is, a conveyance of an 
easement or right or privilege, shall, under the second clause, 
pass all the estate or interest of the grantor to the grantee 
unless a different intent shall appear expressly or by necessary 
implication.   
¶66 The words "estate" and "interest" are not defined in 
this second clause.  The court has already declared that an 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
10 
 
easement does not create an estate;13 a right or privilege is not 
an estate.  The grantor of an easement is not passing an estate.   
¶67 The grantor of an easement may convey his or her 
"interest" in the easement, however.  Thus if an easement holder 
conveys the easement, the entire interest the grantor holds in 
the easement is transferred, unless there is a different 
expressed intent or necessary implication.  If, however, the 
holder of the easement owns less than a full interest——let us 
say she owns a one-half interest in the dominant estate and thus 
a one-half interest in the easement——she then conveys all of her 
one-half interest unless a different intent shall appear 
expressly or by necessary implication.   
¶68 The 
majority 
bypasses 
the 
precise 
language 
and 
structure of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) and breezily paraphrases the 
two clauses, claiming that the statute "provides that every 
transfer of an interest in land conveys full title to that 
interest . . . unless the conveyance evinces a different intent 
'expressly or by necessary implication.'"  Majority op., ¶23.  
This improper expansion of the statutory language results in an 
erroneous application of the statute to the present case.   
¶69 The majority substitutes "full title" for the words 
"estate" and "interest."  The majority does not explain why the 
words "estate" and "interest" can be transformed into the words 
"full title" and does not explain the significance of the words 
"full title."  
                                                 
13 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶70 Stated another way, the majority mixes and matches 
words from the two clauses of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) to conclude 
(1) that words of inheritance shall not be necessary in any 
conveyance of lands, of an estate, or of an interest in land; 
(2) that every conveyance of an interest in land automatically 
implies words of inheritance (that is, that every conveyance of 
an interest in land includes the right of the grantee to 
transfer the same interest in the future); and (3) that a 
different intent, such as the intent that the conveyed interest 
in land be nontransferable, must appear expressly or by 
necessary implication in the terms of the conveyance.   
¶71 This interpretation contravenes the plain text of the 
statute.  Grammatically, the text is severable so that each 
clause may stand alone.  Neither clause of the statute refers to 
the other, and each clause covers different circumstances.  Yet 
the majority uses words from each clause to modify the other.  
The majority's construction seems to use the words of the first 
clause addressing words of inheritance to modify the second 
clause.  At the same time the majority takes the words "unless a 
different intent shall appear," which appear only in the second 
clause, and construes them to modify the first clause.  
¶72 In addition to these textual problems, the majority 
fails to give effect to the legislature's explicit instruction 
on how to interpret chapter 706.  If a statute within chapter 
706 of the statutes ("Conveyances of Real Property; Recording; 
Titles") is viewed as ambiguous or there is a conflict, the 
legislature has provided a rule of interpretation: interpret 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
12 
 
chapter 706 liberally so as to effectuate the intentions of the 
parties who have acted in good faith.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 706.001(1) and (3) provide in relevant part as follows:  
(1) 
[T]his chapter shall govern every transaction by 
which any interest in land is created, aliened, 
mortgaged, assigned or may be otherwise affected 
in law or in equity. . . .  
. . . . 
(3) 
This chapter shall be liberally construed, in 
cases of 
conflict or ambiguity, so as to 
effectuate the intentions of parties who have 
acted in good faith. 
¶73 In my view, the majority's application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3) violates this specific rule of construction by 
defeating the intent of the parties as manifest in the terms of 
the document itself. 
B 
¶74 Contrary to the majority's brief treatment, my review 
of the statutory history confirms that the two clauses of Wis. 
Stat. § 706.10(3) should be read independently, each given an 
effect of its own.  As the majority explains at ¶17, Wisconsin 
enacted its first form of today's § 706.10(3) in 1874.  Section 
1, Chapter 316 of the Laws of Wisconsin 1874 read as follows:  
In all conveyances of land hereafter made in this 
state, words of inheritance shall not be necessary in 
order to create or convey a fee. 
This is the near-verbatim equivalent of the first clause of the 
present § 706.10(3).   
¶75 In 1878, the legislature then amended the statute.  It 
added additional language that would become the forerunner of 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
13 
 
the second clause of the present version of § 706.10(3).14  The 
legislative history thus confirms that § 706.10(3) is composed 
of two distinct clauses with distinct origins and independent 
operation. 
¶76 The majority's statutory history and its use of 
authority from other states do not contravene that the statute 
has two distinct clauses or provide a persuasive reason why 
words from each should be read into the other.   
¶77 The majority notes that the 1878 amendment added the 
second clause from a New York statute.  The majority cites the 
New York statute, 1 Rev. St. 748 § 1 (quoted in Whitney v. 
Richardson, 13 N.Y.S. 861, 862 (N.Y. 1891).  The Whitney case 
does not interpret the statute.   
¶78 The majority argues that New York case law from the 
same period applied the New York statute to easements.  I agree 
that the second clause can be applied to easements. 
¶79 Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 457 (1888), on which 
the majority relies, does not, however, interpret the New York 
statute, 1 Rev. St. 748 § 1, the provision relied on by the 
Wisconsin legislature.  Rather, Nellis interprets a different 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Statutes Annotated of 1878 provides: 
Section 2206.  In conveyances of lands, words of 
inheritance shall not be necessary to create or convey 
a fee and every grant of lands or any interest therein 
shall pass all the estate or interest of the grantor, 
unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest 
shall appear by express terms or be necessarily 
implied in the terms of such grant. 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
14 
 
provision, New York 3 Rev. St. 137, dealing with execution and 
delivery of documents relating to easements.15 
¶80 Nothing in the majority opinion suggests, much less 
conclusively establishes, that the New York statute (which 
Wisconsin adopted as the second clause) should not be read as 
providing two separate standards affecting separate subject 
matters within conveyances at large.  The cumulative effect is 
that the majority's reliance on the New York statute, 1 Rev. St. 
748 § 1, provides no basis for importing the substance and 
effect of the first clause of § 706.10(3) into the context of 
the second clause or importing the substance and effect of the 
second clause into the context of the first clause. 
C 
¶81 Were I to apply a proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.10(3), assuming the statute should be applied at all, the 
County prevails.   
                                                 
15 The 
majority's 
reference 
to 
case 
law 
from 
other 
jurisdictions is inapposite.  The statutes are not the same as 
Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).  The cases revolve around the words 
"heirs" or "assigns."  The cases stand for the proposition that 
these words need not be used and that the intent of the parties 
controls.  See, e.g., Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa 352 (1865) 
(holding that the use of the term "heirs" is not essential to 
make the right of way transferable; examine intent of parties); 
Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. 1976) (words "heirs" or 
"assigns" not required; examine intent of the parties as 
controlling to determine that an express easement was created 
where the deed required that the easement be appurtenant); 
Presbyterian Church of Osceola, Clarke County v. Harken, 158 
N.W. 692 (Iowa 1916) (citing Karmuller v. Krotz to show that 
intent of the parties determines transferability of an interest 
in land; holding that the reservation at issue was an easement 
appurtenant where intended to benefit the remaining land, not 
the grantor personally). 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶82 The County was transferring not land but an interest 
in land, so the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) does not 
apply.  This is the only clause of the statute that addresses 
words of inheritance.  In any event, as I stated previously, the 
fact that the words of inheritance are not necessary to convey a 
transferable estate or interest does not mean that words of 
inheritance are meaningless when they are used, especially when 
they are used selectively.  A drafter may use such words to 
manifest the intent of the parties, even if their use is not 
required to convey a transferable interest in land.  In my view, 
the drafter of the document at issue deliberately used different 
words to express different intents. 
¶83 The second clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) applies.  
The second clause is silent about the effect of words of 
inheritance on conveyances of an estate or an interest less than 
a conveyance of the land itself.  The second clause simply 
indicates that whatever estate or interest is held by the 
grantor, "all the estate or interest" shall be passed by the 
conveyance.  From the words of the document, I conclude that the 
right to sand removal was nontransferable and passed only to the 
grantee. 
¶84 The "right and privilege to remove sand" was subject 
to two limitations that are apparent from the language of the 
document.  First, it is conditioned on its use "for the purpose 
of cranberry culture upon the Grantee's adjacent lands."  
Second, the transfer is made to the "Grantee," without words of 
inheritance.  In juxtaposition with the Easement for Water 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
16 
 
Flowage, the necessary implication is that the sand removal 
right is only to the "Grantee" and not to the Grantee's "heirs 
and assigns."  The fact that words of inheritance are not 
necessary to convey a fee interest in a conveyance of land 
(covered by the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3)), does 
not make them irrelevant when the parties specifically and 
selectively choose to use or omit such words in a conveyance of 
an interest in land. 
¶85 In summary, I conclude that the conveyance of the sand 
removal to Nemitz was a conveyance of a personal, non-
transferable right or privilege.  I do not see the bearing of 
the statute upon which the majority relies, and I would resolve 
the matter following the usual rule of seeking the intent of the 
parties by interpreting the language contained in the instrument 
itself.  Even if I were to apply Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), I 
cannot agree with the majority's interpretation and application 
of that statute.  Following what I believe to be the proper 
interpretation of the statute, I would conclude that the county 
prevails under Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). 
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2008AP1144.ssa 
 
1