Title: Kelley v. Broce Construction Co., Inc.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

205 Kan. 133 (1970)
468 P.2d 160
F. DEAN KELLEY, Appellee,
v.
BROCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., and the STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellants.
No. 45,602

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1970.
Byron G. Larson, of Williams, Larson, Voss and Strobel, of Dodge City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the Broce Construction Company, Inc., appellant.
John H. Morse, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Barton E. Griffith, Roger K. Weatherby and Thomas H. Bornholdt, Staff Attorneys, and A.E. Kramer, of Kramer, Nordling and Nordling, of Hugoton, were with him on the brief for the State Highway Commission of Kansas, appellant.
Gene H. Sharp, of Vance, Hobble, Neubauer, Nordling and Sharp, of Liberal, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment in an action for injuries resulting from a defect in a highway.
The facts must be stated at some length. For the purpose of some brevity F. Dean Kelley, the plaintiff and appellee, will be referred to as Kelley; the State Highway Commission of the State of Kansas, defendant and appellant, will be referred to as Highway Commission, and the Broce Construction Company, Inc., defendant and appellant, will be referred to as Broce.
*134 The allegedly defective highway located in Stevens County Kansas was designated U.S. 56 and was undergoing realignment construction at the time of the accident.
During the summer of 1965, Broce began work under its contract with the Highway Commission to surface the new realigned segment of U.S. 56. This contract contemplated a partial acceptance of the segment located between Moscow, Kansas and the Cimarron River Bridge prior to the completion of the road. This segment was to be opened at the request of the contractor so that shoulder material from the old road could be used to complete the new road. On October 1, 1965, a segment of the new road was opened by the resident engineer of the Highway Commission in response to a request made by the contractor two or three days prior thereto.
On the morning of October 1, 1965, the resident engineer and the maintenance department district foreman, who was in charge of placing signs on the segment of newly opened highway, met on the job and discovered that traffic could not be channeled as contemplated in the plans. It was decided that traffic could be routed onto the new highway at Moscow, Kansas and then carried on the realignment or new highway in a northeasterly direction until it reached the point where the two roadways intersected. At that point traffic would be diverted back onto existing, or old, U.S. 56. During the daylight hours of October 1, 1965, the maintenance crew completed the signing of this route. At a point 600 feet to the southwest of the intersection of the two roadways a State Highway Commission employee placed a right reverse curve sign with a 50 MPH speed plate attached to it. The same crew added a 10 foot barricade to an existing 10 foot barricade of the contractor across the surfaced portion of the new road 50 feet north of the intersection of the two roads. They attached to this 20 foot barricade a "Road Closed" sign, a red arrow pointing to the right, and three delineators or hazard markers. This work was completed shortly before 5 P.M. on October 1, 1965.
*135 
Without pride in our artistry or a claim of accuracy we present above a drawing which tends to depict the situation at the scene of the accident.
In the afternoon of October 1, 1965, Kelley left his home in rural Guymon, Oklahoma on his way to Satanta, Kansas to attend a football game. Kelley drove to Moscow, Kansas in his pick-up truck where he came upon a clearly marked detour which put him on what he recognized as a new blacktop highway. He followed this new road until he hit the barricade constructed across the new highway just north of the intersection with the old highway. Kelley testified he did not see the curve sign which was located 600 feet southwest of the intersection of the two roadways.
Kelley estimated his speed immediately prior to the accident at 45 to 50 MPH. When he saw the barricade, he applied the brakes and swerved to the right. The left side of his truck hit the barricade and the truck continued on into the ditch on the right side of the new roadway.
There was a difference in the elevation of the two roadways at this intersection of one foot or more. A ramp was built sloping from the elevation of the new road down to the old road. The ramp was 50 to 100 feet long. Prior to October 1, 1965, traffic had *136 been carried exclusively along old U.S. 56. Where the old highway was intersected by the newly constructed roadway traffic crossed over the new road and continued on old U.S. 56 until it crossed the Cimarron River.
Jess Parum testified he was a passenger in a car proceeding east on the new highway and came upon the accident scene after it had happened but before the investigating officers arrived. He was going to the same football game that plaintiff was attending. He further testified:
"Q. Did you come back to the accident scene then?
"A. Yes.
"Q. It was a left curve?
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. No, I didn't.
"A. No."
There were no lights on the barricades.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Kelley in the amount of $10,000 against the Highway Commission and Broce. They have appealed.
As the liability of the Highway Commission and Broce is based on different legal grounds, the appeals will be considered separately. We will first consider the appeal of the Highway Commission.
*137 The Highway Commission presents several grounds as to why judgment should not have been rendered against it. Among them is the contention that there was no notice of the defect five days before the accident. Our attention is called to K.S.A. 68-419 which provides insofar as material here:
The petition was in general form and left the specifics open. We look to the preliminaries of the trial for the specific defect claimed. In an answer to an interrogatory the appellee stated:
At pretrial conference appellee described the defect as follows:
In its opening statement to the jury appellee again described the defect:
The jury answered special questions involving the Highway Commission as follows:
"ANSWER: Resident Engineer, Mr. Winters."
The Highway Commission contends that there could not have been five days notice of the defect in the highway because the condition had only been created in the late afternoon and the accident occurred in the early evening.
Kelley contends the Highway Commission, through its agents, knew of the conditions which created the defect for more than five days and this was sufficient even though the highway had been open for but only a few hours.
The right of the action against the Highway Commission is not based on negligence. The liability is purely statutory. There can be no liability except as expressly provided by the legislature although the results may sometimes appear harsh and unjust.
In Rosebaugh v. Allen County Comm'rs., 120 Kan. 266, 243 Pac. 277, in considering a similar statute, we stated:
Again in Payne v. State Highway Comm., 136 Kan. 561, 16 P.2d 509, we said:
In order to create liability under the statute the defective condition must have existed for as much as five days. In Arnold v. Coffey County Comm'rs., 131 Kan. 343, 291 Pac. 762, we said:
Again in Rockhold v. Board of County Commissioners, 181 Kan. 1019, 317 P.2d 490, we stated:
..............
The five days notice should be of the particular defect which caused the accident, and not merely of conditions naturally productive of such defect and subsequently in fact producing it. (40 C.J.S., Highways, § 263, p. 312.)
In considering a similar statute, in Backstrom v. Ogallah Township, 149 Kan. 553, 88 P.2d 1026, we said:
Applying the facts in this case to the law as stated, we do not believe the notice was sufficient to fall within the five day requirement of the statute.
All of the conditions pleaded and relied on by the plaintiff to constitute a defect were created and established on October 1, 1965, the same day as the accident. The signs were erected on October 1, 1965; the barricade to the northeast of the intersection *140 which had been maintained by Broce Construction Company was enlarged by the addition of signs, markers and a second barricade of equal size on October 1, 1965; the failure to establish warning lights was an act of omission occurring on October 1, 1965, and the condition where the road appeared to turn left when in fact it turned right was established October 1, 1965. Not even the plan to do these things had been in existence the requisite five days. The request to open the construction project to traffic was made to the resident engineer only two or three days prior to October 1, 1965, and at that time the request was to open the entire route of the construction project. The condition found by the jury to be a defect was not in existence to affect the road as a means of transit for five days. Prior to October 1, 1965, traffic was carried on existing U.S. 56 straight across the ramp on both sides of the construction project. It was not until October 1, 1965, that traffic was routed so that it was placed on the new highway from Moscow to the intersection and thence diverted off the new highway back to the old road and thence eastward along the old road as before.
The judgment against the State Highway Commission must be reversed for lack of five days notice of the specific defect.
We now approach the appeal of the Broce Construction Company, Inc., referred to as Broce.
Kelley contends that Broce was in negligent violation of K.S.A. 68-2102 which provides:
The jury's answer to a special question also fixed liability of Broce as insufficient lighting at the barricade 
Broce attempts to refute liability on several grounds.
It is first contended that the action of the Highway Commission relieved Broce of any statutory liability.
We cannot agree with this contention. The statute places the *141 responsibility on the contractor making improvements to place barricades and warning lights advising the public that the highway is closed or impassable or dangerous to travel.
The word "improvement" as used in K.S.A. 68-2102 is defined in K.S.A. 68-2101 (c) as follows:
The undisputed facts are that Broce had not completed the work east or beyond the barricade. Broce had had a barricade at the point where the accident occurred for some time before the accident to keep traffic from going east on the new road. All the Highway Commission did to the barricade was place another section beside it so that the whole road was blocked instead of just one lane. The barricade that Broce had up and knew about was to keep traffic from going east on the new highway. Broce's engineer and general superintendent testified he was supervising the job in question and that his company, in the past, had taken the responsibility for this barricade and he did not send anyone to the crossover to check on their barricade on the day of the accident.
The Highway Commission had not established a detour as provided by K.S.A. 68-2103 but permitted use of the new road for the accommodation of the contractor.
We have no precedents to guide us in the interpretation of the statute but we are forced to conclude that under the facts and circumstances Broce was a contractor engaged in the improvement  building  of a highway and obligated to provide a barricade and warning lights at the place of the accident.
Broce contends that the evidence proves Kelley guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The facts heretofore presented refute this contention.
Broce stresses the rule that the operator of a motor vehicle is required to so articulate his speed that he can stop or turn aside within the range of the vision of the headlights.
This rule has many exceptions. Under modern traveling conditions it would appear that the exceptions have become the rule. In Secrist v. Turley, 196 Kan. 572, 412 P.2d 976, we held:
In the opinion we stated:
We believe the same rule should apply to a construction contractor working on a highway.
The Secrist case also lists the cases setting out the exception to the rule. They will not be repeated here.
Under modern traveling conditions we do not believe the rule should be applied where there is an unlighted obstruction left on the highway after it has turned dark.
Other alleged errors, most of which appear to be duplicates of the first contention, have been examined and found to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed as to the Broce Construction Company, Inc., and reversed as to the State Highway Commission of the State of Kansas.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.