Title: Franconia Associates v. Clark

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
FRANCONIA ASSOCIATES, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 942034         November 3, 1995 
 
ALGERNON CLARK 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
Jane Marum Roush, Judge 
 
 
The primary issue we consider in this appeal from a 
judgment in a premises liability action is whether the 
plaintiff, who was injured on the defendants' premises, 
exceeded the scope of his status as an invitee by pursuing a 
robber on those premises.  
 
Algernon Clark filed a motion for judgment against 
Franconia Associates, a Virginia limited partnership, and 
the Fisher Group, Inc.  Franconia Associates owns the 
Springfield Mall Shopping Center located in Fairfax County, 
and the Fischer Group provides professional management 
services at the mall.  The plaintiff alleged that he was 
injured as he exited through a door at the mall in pursuit 
of a robber.  The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants 
breached certain duties owed to him in failing to inspect, 
maintain, and repair the door, and that they failed to warn 
him of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the door.  The 
jury returned a verdict of $120,000 in favor of the 
plaintiff, the trial court entered a judgment confirming the 
verdict, and we awarded the defendants an appeal. 
 
In accordance with well-settled principles, we will 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences it raises in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, who comes to this 
Court with a favorable jury verdict, confirmed by the trial 
court. 
 
The plaintiff was employed at a hair stylist shop 
located in Springfield Mall.  One afternoon as the plaintiff 
was standing in front of the shop, the manager of a 
restaurant in the mall told the plaintiff, "[t]hat guy just 
robbed me.  Stop him."  The robber ran and exited the mall. 
 As the plaintiff was running in pursuit of the robber, the 
plaintiff approached a glass door in the mall.  The 
plaintiff, still running, slowed down to push open the door. 
 As the plaintiff went through the door, it closed very 
rapidly, hitting his leg, thereby rupturing his Achilles 
tendon.   
 
The plaintiff and defendants agree that the plaintiff 
was an invitee immediately before he began to chase the 
robber.  The defendants contend, however, that as a matter 
of law, the plaintiff exceeded the scope of his status as an 
invitee and became a trespasser because he "voluntarily 
undertook a dangerous venture solely for the purpose of 
rescuing a non-party's money."  Therefore, the defendants 
assert that because the plaintiff was a trespasser, they are 
liable only for injuries caused by their "willful and wanton 
acts."  The plaintiff argues that he retained his status as 
an invitee under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
 
The owner of premises is not an insurer of his 
invitee's safety.  Rather, the owner must use ordinary care 
to render the premises reasonably safe for the invitee's 
visit.  Holcombe v. NationsBanc Financial Services, 248 Va. 
445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1994); Tate v. Rice, 227 Va. 
341, 345, 315 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1984); Gumenick v. United 
States, 213 Va. 510, 515, 193 S.E.2d 788, 793 (1973); Knight 
v. Moore, 179 Va. 139, 146, 18 S.E.2d 266, 270 (1942).  The 
owner's duty, however, "does not extend to places beyond the 
invitation and to which the invitee is not reasonably 
expected to go."  City of Suffolk v. Hewitt, 226 Va. 20, 24, 
307 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1983). 
 
By contrast, the duty that a property owner owes to a 
trespasser or bare licensee is limited. 
 
 
Speaking generally, the duty owing by the 
owner 'to a trespasser on his premises is to do 
him no intentional or wilful injury.'  There must 
be such notice of the trespasser's danger as would 
put a prudent man on the alert before the duty of 
protection arises. 
 
 
 
So also with respect to a bare licensee (that 
is to say one who is permitted by the passive 
acquiescence of the owner to come on his premises 
for his own convenience).  'He takes upon himself 
all the ordinary risks attached to the place and 
the business carried on there.'  The owner must 
not intentionally or wilfully injure him, but he 
owes him the active duty of protection only after 
he knows of his danger, or might have known of it 
and avoided it by the use of ordinary care. 
 
Appalachian Power Co. v. LaForce, 214 Va. 438, 441, 201 
S.E.2d 768, 770 (1974) (quoting Lunsford v. Colonial Coal 
Co., 115 Va. 346, 348-49, 79 S.E. 348, 349 (1913)).  In 
Pettyjohn & Sons v. Basham, 126 Va. 72, 79-80, 100 S.E. 813, 
815 (1919), we observed:  "Usually, an invitation will be 
inferred where the visit is of common interest or mutual 
advantage to the parties, while a license will be inferred 
where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the 
visitor." 
 
Here, we hold that the plaintiff did not exceed the 
scope of his status as an invitee.  The plaintiff's pursuit 
of the robber on the defendants' premises was an activity 
which conferred a benefit upon the defendants.  Certainly, 
such act was not for pleasure or benefit of the plaintiff.  
Additionally, it is not unreasonable that the defendants may 
expect that an invitee would undertake such an act on their 
premises.  Furthermore, the plaintiff was not injured by 
chasing the robber; rather, the plaintiff was injured by the 
defective condition of defendants' door. 
 
The defendants assert that even if the plaintiff was an 
invitee, "[t]here was no evidence of actual knowledge by the 
Mall of any dangerous condition" and, therefore, the 
plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case against them. 
 The plaintiff argues that the evidence of record is 
sufficient to show that the defendants did have notice of 
the defective condition of their door. 
 
In Roll "R" Way Rinks v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 327, 237 
S.E.2d 157, 161 (1977), we stated: 
 
 
[I]n order to hold the owner of property 
liable for injuries sustained by an invitee due to 
the unsafe condition of the premises, it must be 
shown that the owner had knowledge of the alleged 
unsafe condition, or that it had existed for such 
a length of time as to make it the owner's duty in 
the exercise of ordinary care to have discovered 
it. 
 
See Cannon v. Clarke, 209 Va. 708, 712, 167 S.E.2d 352, 355 
(1969). 
 
Steven Wayne Johnson, a postman, had entered 
Springfield Mall on numerous occasions and used the door 
that is the subject of this litigation.  He testified that 
about "a couple [of] weeks" before the plaintiff's injury, 
"if you opened the door to a certain point . . . halfway or 
not quite halfway, there was some tension on the door, and 
if you pulled it anymore, it would spring back."  Johnson 
also testified that he had observed patrons of the mall who 
experienced difficulty using the same door.  Brian Embrey, 
one of the defendants' maintenance employees, testified that 
he checked the door twice each week and that he had 
performed repair work on the door before the plaintiff was 
injured.  We are of opinion that this evidence, taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to 
permit the jury to find that the defendants had, at the very 
least, constructive knowledge that the door closed too 
rapidly. 
 
Next, the defendants argue that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.  The 
defendants assert that "[r]unning through a door is reckless 
behavior regardless of the reason for running.  Running 
through a door when there is no compelling necessity to do 
so is even more reckless."   
 
Normally, whether a plaintiff is guilty of contributory 
negligence is a jury issue unless reasonable minds could not 
differ.  Holland v. Shively, 243 Va. 308, 311, 415 S.E.2d 
222, 224 (1992); Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equipment Co., 240 Va. 
354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1990).  As we have stated, 
"[t]he essence of contributory negligence is carelessness 
and involves an objective test, i.e., whether a plaintiff 
failed to act as a reasonable person would have acted for 
his own safety under the circumstances."  Id., 397 S.E.2d at 
823-24.  Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on the issue of the plaintiff's alleged contributory 
negligence.  And, there is ample evidence of record to 
support the jury's finding that the plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence.  Thus, we will not disturb that 
finding on appeal. 
 
The defendants assert that "[t]he door could not have 
hit Clark as he says it did."  We find no merit in the 
defendants' contention.  The plaintiff testified:  "As I was 
running down the hallway, I slowed down to push the door.  I 
put both hands up.  I pushed with my left hand, and I 
stepped out with my left foot, and before I could get all 
the way out the door, the next thing I know I heard a boom, 
and I was looking at the pavement."  While on the pavement, 
the plaintiff saw the door "balancing" against his right 
leg.  We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the 
plaintiff's testimony regarding how his injuries occurred 
was either "inherently incredible, contrary to human 
experience or to the laws of nature."  Simpson v. Broadway-
Manhattan Taxicab Corp., 203 Va. 892, 897, 128 S.E.2d 306, 
310 (1962).   
 
Next, the defendants contend that the trial court erred 
by admitting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Alan 
R. Funk.  The defendants assert that Funk's testimony was 
improperly admitted because "[the testimony] was premised on 
the assumption of a fact which was not in evidence, namely, 
that the door was used in a normal manner by [the 
plaintiff]" and "Mr. Funk's opinion is not based on any 
specialized knowledge of door operation beyond the ken of 
laymen, but merely on his evaluation of Clark's version of 
events."  The plaintiff contends that the trial court did 
not err by admitting Funk's testimony. 
 
Funk is the president and owner of Atlantic Door 
Control, Inc., a distributor for sales, service, and 
installation of automatic and manual door closers.  He was 
president and activities chairman of the Door & Hardware 
Institute, a professional organization for the door hardware 
industry.  He was qualified as an expert witness on the 
subject of doors without objection from the defendants.  
Funk opined that the door which caused the accident did not 
operate properly because it closed too rapidly.  Funk also 
opined that the speed at which the door is opened should not 
affect the speed at which the door would close. 
 
Contrary to the defendants' contention, we hold that 
Funk's opinion was admissible because, according to Funk, 
the fact that the plaintiff was running when he pushed the 
door open would not have affected the speed at which the 
door, if properly operating, would have closed.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Funk to 
render this opinion because his testimony could "assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact 
in issue."  Code § 8.01-401.3; see also Swiney v. Overby, 
237 Va. 231, 233, 377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989). 
 
The defendants also contend that the trial court erred 
by admitting in evidence the testimony of Dr. Ruben D. 
Cabrera, the plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon.  The defendants 
assert that Dr. Cabrera had no medical foundation for his 
opinion on the cause of the plaintiff's injury.  We find no 
merit in the defendants' argument. 
 
Dr. Cabrera testified, within a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, that the plaintiff suffered a complete 
tear or rupture of his Achilles tendon when the door hit his 
leg.  Dr. Cabrera, who performed the surgery to repair the 
plaintiff's Achilles tendon, based his opinion upon the 
medical history that he had taken from the plaintiff and an 
examination of the plaintiff's leg.  Therefore, we hold that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
this opinion in evidence.  See Swiney, 237 Va. at 233, 377 
S.E.2d at 374. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.