Title: State v. Fair

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 5, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

DAVID WENDELL FAIR, JR.,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 94-10-37301; CA A90430; SC S43900)

		On review from the Court of Appeals.*

		Argued and submitted September 4, 1997.

		Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With
him on the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, former
Attorney General, Hardy Myers, Attorney General,
Virginia L. Linder, former Solicitor General, and
Eleanor E. Wallace, Assistant Attorney General.

		Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

		Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, 

	Van Hoomissen, Graber, and Durham, Justices.**

		GRABER, J.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings.

	    *Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

		William J. Keys, Judge (judgment); Robert W. Redding, 		Judge (demurrer).

		145 Or App 96, 929 P2d 1012 (1996).

	   **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not 	participate in this decision; Kulongoski, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.		 

		GRABER, J.

 		The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in
denying defendant's first demurrer to the indictment that charged
him with violating the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (ORICO), ORS 166.715 et seq.  We hold that the
trial court did not err and, accordingly, reverse the contrary
decision of the Court of Appeals.  State v. Fair, 145 Or App 96,
929 P2d 1012 (1996).

		Defendant was convicted of racketeering in violation of
ORS 166.720(3), which provides in part:

		"It is unlawful for any person * * * associated
with[] any enterprise to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity * * *."

Other sections supply pertinent definitions for the terms used in
ORS 166.720(3).  At the time of the charged conduct, ORS 166.715
(1993)(1) provided in part:

		"(2)  'Enterprise' includes any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business
trust or other profit or nonprofit legal entity, and
includes any union, association or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and
both illicit and licit enterprises and governmental and
nongovernmental entities.

		"* * * * *

		"(4)  'Pattern of racketeering activity' means
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering
activity that have the same or similar intents,
results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics, including a nexus to the same
enterprise, and are not isolated incidents * * *.

		"* * * * *

		"(6)  'Racketeering activity' means to commit, to
attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to
solicit, coerce or intimidate another person to commit:

		"(a)  Any conduct that constitutes a crime, as
defined in ORS 161.515, under any of the following
provisions of the Oregon Revised Statutes:

		"[List omitted.]"

		An indictment charged defendant (as well as several
other persons) with racketeering.  The indictment alleged that,
during a stated period of time, defendant knowingly, and while
associated with

	"an enterprise, to-wit: the Woodland Park Bloods, a
street gang not a legal entity but an association in
fact, participate[d] directly or indirectly in said
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity
consisting of two or more incidents of racketeering
activity described as follows * * *."

The indictment then went on to list the crimes of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance, unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, unauthorized use of a vehicle, attempted
murder, and attempted first-degree assault.  The indictment
described with particularity the date, place, and manner of
committing each of those five predicate offenses.  The delivery
and possession allegations involved the same controlled
substance, cocaine.  The attempted murder and assault allegations
involved the same date, the same accomplice, the same victim (a
member of a rival gang), and the same weapon (a handgun).

		The racketeering count concluded with this paragraph:

		"The above constituting at least two incidents of
racketeering activity that have the same or similar
intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of
commission or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the
same enterprise and are not isolated incidents."

The sufficiency of that paragraph is the focus of this case.

		Defendant demurred to the indictment on several
grounds, first among them that the indictment "is not definite
and certain," ORS 135.630(6), because the quoted allegation of a
"pattern" of racketeering activity is too conclusory. 
Specifically, defendant argued that facts demonstrating
particular kinds of similarities, distinguishing characteristics,
or nexus among predicate offenses must appear in the indictment.

		The trial court disagreed, reasoning that the
indictment tracks the statutory definition of "pattern of
racketeering activity."  Accordingly, the trial court denied
defendant's first demurrer.

		The Court of Appeals reversed.  That court said that
the statutory definition of "pattern" allows proof of several
kinds of possible relationships that may exist among predicate
offenses, that the relationship among the predicate offenses "is
not self-evident" here, and that "the indictment's failure to
allege the relationship renders it insufficiently specific to
allow [defendant] to defend against the charge."  Fair, 145 Or
App at 102.  The court then reversed and remanded with
instructions to the trial court to allow the demurrer.  Id. at
103.  The state petitioned for review, and we allowed the
petition.

		An indictment must contain, in substance, a "statement
of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repetition, and in such manner as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended."  ORS
132.550(7).  An indictment serves three main functions:

	"(1) to inform the defendant of the nature of the crime
with sufficient particularity to enable him to make his
defense, (2) to identify the offense so as to enable
the defendant to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal thereof if he should be prosecuted further
for the same cause, and (3) to inform the court of the
facts charged so that it may determine whether or not
they are sufficient to support a conviction."

State v. Cohen, 289 Or 525, 529, 614 P2d 1156 (1980), cited with
approval in State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 596-97, 789 P2d 1352
(1990), appeal after remand 324 Or 343, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert
den 117 S Ct 1830 (1997).  See also Or Const, Art I, § 11 (the
accused has a right "to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him").

		Generally, an indictment is sufficient to serve those
functions and to withstand a demurrer if it tracks the pertinent
wording of the statute defining the crime.  See, e.g., Montez,
309 Or at 597 ("An indictment in the language of the statute
generally is sufficient."); State v. Nussbaum, 261 Or 87, 91, 491
P2d 1013 (1971) ("It has always been the general rule in Oregon
that an indictment in the language of a statute is good on
demurrer."); State v. Tracy, 246 Or 349, 354, 425 P2d 171 (1967)
("We have repeatedly held that an indictment in the language of a
statute is good on demurrer.").  Here, the challenged paragraph
in the indictment contains the statutory definition of a pattern
of racketeering activity, verbatim except for commas.

		Of course, it also is true that "a statement of the
particular circumstances of the crime is necessary in order to
charge the defendant with having committed specific acts bringing
him within the condemnation of the statute."  State v. Smith, 182
Or 497, 502, 188 P2d 998 (1948).  See also State v. Burke et al.,
126 Or 651, 676, 269 P 869, 270 P 756 (1928) ("An indictment for
a statutory offense is sufficient if the crime be charged in the
words of the statute * * * [so long as] the words of the statute
directly and expressly inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.").  For example, in an indictment
for burglary, the state must specify the crime that it alleges
that the defendant intended to commit when entering the premises. 
State v. Sanders, 280 Or 685, 687, 572 P2d 1307 (1977).  The
precise question here is whether an indictment for racketeering
that states the "particular circumstances" of the enterprise and
the "particular circumstances" of each of the predicate offenses
also must specify the "particular circumstances" of the state's
theory or theories of nexus, instead of using the statutory
definition of "pattern."  We hold that the indictment need not do
so.

		In Oregon, an indictment may allege means of committing
a crime in the alternative.  See, e.g., ORS 132.560(1)(a) ("Where
the offense may be committed by the use of different means, the
charging instrument may allege the means in the alternative.");
State v. Boots, 315 Or 572, 582 & n 1, 848 P2d 76 (1993) (Unis,
J., dissenting) (the defendant was charged in a single-count
indictment with two theories of aggravated murder); State v.
Laundy, 103 Or 443, 466-67, 204 P 958, 206 P 290 (1922) ("The
general rule is that where a single offense may be committed by
several means it may be charged in a single count to have been so
committed, if the ways or means are not repugnant * * *.  It is a
generally recognized rule of criminal pleading that when an
offense against a criminal statute may be committed in one or
more of several ways specified by the statute, the indictment may
in a single count charge the commission of the offense in any or
all of the ways specified by the statute * * *.").

		Had the indictment spelled out each of the six kinds of
alternative relationships separately,(2) in the very words of the
statute, defendant could not complain under his present theory
that the indictment "is not definite and certain," ORS
135.630(6).(3)  The mere fact that the indictment uses instead a
summary paragraph, containing all six statutory alternatives,
does not render it defective.

		At its core, defendant's argument is that the charged
crime is complex, making the indictment difficult to defend
against.  But complex is not the same as uncertain, and difficult
is not the same as indefinite.  Even if it is complex or
difficult to defend against, an indictment may allege multiple
theories of committing the same crime in the words of the statute
defining the crime.  The racketeering indictment in this case was
sufficiently definite and certain to fulfill the constitutional
and statutory functions that this court has identified.

		It follows that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's first demurrer.  We therefore reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and return the case to that court for
further proceedings.

		Defendant raised other assignments of error that the
Court of Appeals did not reach.  Ordinarily, we would simply
remand the case to that court to consider the remaining issues. 
We are informed, however, that defendant fled the state after the
Court of Appeals issued its opinion, which was favorable to him,
but while another criminal case was pending against him.  We
instruct the Court of Appeals to determine whether defendant
remains a fugitive at the time this matter returns to it.  If so,
the Court of Appeals shall dismiss the appeal.  See State v.
Smith, 312 Or 561, 822 P2d 1193 (1992) (when a criminal defendant
is a fugitive from justice, review is dismissed).  If not, the
court shall consider defendant's remaining assignments of error.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

1. 	Since 1993, the legislature has amended the quoted
definitions in some particulars, but none of those amendments is
relevant to the disposition of this case.

2. 	ORS 166.715(4), defining "pattern of racketeering
activity," provides that the predicate offenses must not be
isolated and must have (1) the same or similar intents, (2) the
same or similar results, (3) the same or similar accomplices, (4)
the same or similar victims, (5) the same or similar methods of
commission, or (6) another form of interrelationship "by
distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same
enterprise."

3. 	Or, taking a different approach, the indictment might
have alleged that the predicate offenses of attempted murder and
attempted assault had similar intents (physical harm or death to
the victim) and methods of commission (handgun) and the same
accomplice and victim; that the two drug offenses, involving
possession and delivery of cocaine, had similar intents, results,
and methods of commission; that all five predicate offenses had a
nexus to the same enterprise, the associates of which committed
similar crimes; and so on.