Title: Weatherford v. City of San Rafael

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

SEE CONCURRING OPINIONS. 
Filed 6/5/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CHERRITY WEATHERFORD, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
 ) 
S219567 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A138949 
CITY OF SAN RAFAEL et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Marin County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. CIV 1300112 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
In California, concerns about improper government expenditures can give 
rise to more than just criticism in the public sphere or complaints to elected 
officials.  Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a,1 certain individuals and 
corporations also have a right to pursue legal actions enjoining wasteful or illegal 
expenditures by government entities.  Whether someone can use this provision to 
begin a lawsuit depends on whether the person has standing to do so.  At issue in 
this case is whether an individual’s standing to sue under section 526a requires the 
payment of a property tax and — if the payment of a property tax is not required 
— what types of tax payments satisfy the statute.   
 
What we hold is that section 526a does not require the payment of a 
property tax.  An allegation that the plaintiff has paid an assessed tax to the 
defendant locality is sufficient under section 526a.  Because the superior court and 
                                              
1 
All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, 
unless otherwise noted.  
2 
Court of Appeal held that payment of a property tax was required, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.    
I. 
 
Plaintiff Cherrity Weatherford resides in the City of San Rafael and the 
County of Marin.  She does not own real property in the city or county, but she 
lived with her daughter in a rental apartment in San Rafael when she began this 
lawsuit.2  On January 9, 2013, Weatherford filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief challenging the manner in which the City of San Rafael and 
County of Marin enforced Vehicle Code section 14602.6.  According to 
Weatherford, defendants’ practice of impounding vehicles without providing 
adequate notice violates both the state and federal Constitutions.  As Weatherford 
had not been personally subject to this allegedly unconstitutional practice, she 
averred that she had taxpayer standing under section 526a.  According to 
Weatherford, she had paid sales tax, gasoline tax, water and sewage fees, and 
“other taxes, charges and fees routinely imposed” in the City of San Rafael and the 
County of Marin.  Her complaint conceded that she had not paid property taxes.    
 
On April 22, 2013, the trial court filed a stipulated order and judgment of 
dismissal.  In the stipulated order, Weatherford cited two prior Court of Appeal 
opinions that contained language suggesting that section 526a requires a plaintiff 
to pay property taxes to satisfy the taxpayer standing requirement.  (See Torres v. 
                                              
2  
After oral argument, Weatherford’s attorney informed this court that his 
client had recently decided to move from Marin County to Washington State.  This 
information has no effect on our analysis of whether section 526a requires the 
payment of a property tax and — whether or not the case might be thought of as 
moot in light of this information — we elect to retain it to resolve a potentially 
recurring question of public importance.  (See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1114, 1120 fn. 5.)  On remand, the superior court may consider what 
effect, if any, Weatherford’s decision has on her ability to continue this lawsuit.     
3 
City of Yorba Linda (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1035; Cornelius v. Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 (Cornelius).)  
Weatherford averred that those opinions interpreted section 526a to require the 
payment of a property tax and, further, that they had rejected her argument that 
such a requirement is an unconstitutional wealth-based classification.  (See, e.g., 
Torres, at p. 1048, fn. 7.)  Defendants and the trial court agreed with 
Weatherford’s interpretation of those cases, so the parties stipulated to a judgment 
of dismissal on the ground that Weatherford could not amend her complaint to 
cure the defect in standing under existing case law.  Weatherford then appealed the 
stipulated judgment.   
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal.  Although it 
reasoned that some plaintiffs might be able to invoke the statute without paying 
property taxes, it held that an individual plaintiff must be liable to pay a property 
tax within the relevant locality –– or have paid such a tax during the previous year 
–– in order to have standing.   
 
We granted review to address whether section 526a requires an individual 
to have paid or to be liable for the payment of property taxes in order to have the 
necessary standing for a taxpayer action.   
II. 
A.  
Section 526a provides, in relevant part:  “An action to obtain a judgment, 
restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the 
estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the 
state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, 
acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is 
assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of 
the action, has paid, a tax therein.”  At the heart of this case is the question of how 
4 
to read the phrase “who is assessed for and is liable to pay . . . or, has paid, a tax 
therein” — a phrase in section 526a that we have not previously construed.  To 
answer it, we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, 
bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
and effectuate the law’s intended purpose.  (See, e.g., Horwich v. Superior Court 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276.)  We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory 
language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure of the 
statutory scheme.  (See Larkin v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 152, 157-158; see also Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 1378, 1391 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“The statute’s structure and its 
surrounding provisions can reveal the semantic relationships that give more 
precise meaning to the specific text being interpreted, even if the text may have 
initially appeared to be unambiguous”]; Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 201, 209-210.)  As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we 
consider it de novo.  (Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
381, 387.)   
 
The Legislature conditioned taxpayer standing under section 526a by using 
language strongly implying a limitation on the type of tax contemplated by the 
statute.  The statute begins by describing the type of action and relief available 
under section 526a, before listing the categories of jurisdictions that may be held 
liable under the statute.  (§ 526a [listing cities and counties, among others].)  
Within that same sentence, section 526a also defines the persons who are eligible 
to bring suit:  a “citizen resident therein” and a corporation that is “assessed” for 
and liable to pay or has paid a “tax therein.”  The statutory language itself thus 
defines two particular classes of taxpayers that may maintain an action under 
section 526a, and further specifies the type of tax that they must be liable to pay 
and where they must pay it.  
5 
 
To further illuminate the scope and significance of section 526a, we 
consider its provisions in light of the statute’s larger legal context –– a context 
encompassing the evolution of standing in California from its common law roots 
to its various statutory incarnations.  (See, e.g., Carsten v. Psychology Examining 
Com. of the Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 798-802 
[considering scope of standing in light of prudential and separation of powers 
concerns]; see generally Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 
Cal.App.4th 980, 990-993 [comparing history of standing under California and 
federal law].)  At its core, standing concerns a specific party’s interest in the 
outcome of a lawsuit.  (See, e.g., Carsten, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 798; Harman v. 
City and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 159 [“The propriety of a 
private person’s judicial challenge to legislative or executive acts depends upon 
the fitness of the person to raise an issue (‘standing’) and the amenability of the 
issue raised to judicial redress (‘justiciability’)”].)  We therefore require a party to 
show that he or she is sufficiently interested as a prerequisite to deciding, on the 
merits, whether a party’s challenge to legislative or executive action independently 
has merit.  (See, e.g., § 1086 [standing to seek writ of mandate].)  In making this 
threshold determination, our inquiry differs somewhat from the standing analysis 
employed in the federal courts.  Unlike the federal Constitution, our state 
Constitution has no case or controversy requirement imposing an independent 
jurisdictional limitation on our standing doctrine.  (See Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1100, 1117, fn. 13 [noting the absence of a case or controversy 
requirement in the California constitution].)   
 
Our standing jurisprudence nonetheless reflects a sensitivity to broader 
prudential and separation of powers considerations elucidating how and when 
parties should be entitled to seek relief under particular statutes.  While a plaintiff 
is generally required to have a direct and substantial beneficial interest in order to 
6 
seek a writ of mandate under section 1086, for example, we have long allowed 
petitioners to seek relief where “ ‘ “the question is one of public right and the 
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty.” ’ ”  (Save 
the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166 
(Save the Plastic Bag Coalition); see also Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los 
Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 101 [concluding that a party’s interest “ ‘in having 
the laws executed and the duty in question enforced’ ” is sufficient even absent a “ 
‘legal or special interest’ ”].)  This exception to the beneficial interest requirement 
protects citizens’ opportunity to “ensure that no governmental body impairs or 
defeats the purpose of legislation establishing a public right.”  (Green v. Obledo 
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144.)   
 
Notwithstanding the arguments for broad “public interest” standing, 
though, we have continued to recognize the need for limits in light of the larger 
statutory and policy context.  For instance, in Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 442, we rejected the petitioner’s claim that a private citizen had either a 
“ ‘beneficial interest’ ” or public interest standing to challenge a criminal 
defendant’s resentencing.  (Id. at p. 451.)  Though the petitioner-victim argued that 
the prosecutor’s decisions in the resentencing proceeding implicated a “ ‘public 
duty,’ ” we rejected the invitation to infringe upon a core aspect of prosecutorial 
discretion.  (Id. at p. 453.)  Even if one might plausibly understand a prosecutor’s 
duties under the law as public, construing public interest standing to authorize 
such suits would be at odds with both the executive decision making role of 
prosecutors, as well as the deference we ordinarily afford them.  (Id. at p. 451 
[“The prosecutor ordinarily has sole discretion to determine whom to charge, what 
charges to file and pursue, and what punishment to seek”]; see also Manduley v. 
Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 552 [“ ‘The prosecution’s authority in this 
7 
regard is founded, among other things, on the principle of separation of powers, 
and generally is not subject to supervision by the judicial branch.’ ”].)   
 
Our decision in Dix thus illustrates the type of analysis required in 
determining standing’s scope under a statutory right to relief.  While this analysis 
is grounded in the statutory text, the text read in isolation can be insufficient to 
adequately capture the other prudential and separation of powers considerations 
that have traditionally informed the outer limits of standing.  This sensitivity to the 
larger context of standing is not only a method to better effectuate the 
Legislature’s purpose in providing certain statutory remedies, but also marks a 
recognition of the sometimes competing interests at issue when considering 
whether a party may seek a judicial remedy against government officials.   
 
Section 526a provides a mechanism for controlling illegal, injurious, or 
wasteful actions by those officials.  That mechanism, moreover, remains available 
even where the injury is insufficient to satisfy general standing requirements under 
section 367.  (See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268 (Blair) 
[describing the “primary purpose” of section 526a to be “ ‘enabl[ing] a large body 
of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go 
unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement’ ” ]; see also § 367 
[“Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except 
as otherwise provided by statute”].)  Unlike public interest standing under section 
1086, which we have described as a judicially recognized “exception to, rather 
than repudiation of, the usual requirement of a beneficial interest [under section 
1086],” (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 170, fn. 5), section 
526a represents a legislative decision to create judicial access for parties that 
would not otherwise be eligible to seek relief under sections 367 or 1086.  
Moreover, section 526a makes plaintiffs eligible to seek a range of remedies 
beyond mandamus.  (See, e.g., Love v. Keays (1971) 6 Cal.3d 339, 343 
8 
[declaratory and injunctive relief]; Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 204, 226-227 
[damages]; see also Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 448-449 (Van Atta), 
undercut by subsequent change in Cal. Const. as stated in In re York (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 1133, 1143, fn. 7.)   
 
Yet because the Legislature’s enactment of section 526a marked a 
departure from the common law approach to taxpayer standing, our  
case law therefore recognizes both the breadth and corresponding limits of 
who may bring suit pursuant to section 526a.  Prior to the 1909 adoption of section 
526a, we held that, as a general matter, taxpayers had “such an interest in the 
proper application of [public] funds” that they could “maintain an action” to enjoin 
the illegal expenditure of public funds.  (Winn v. Shaw (1891) 87 Cal. 631, 636; 
see also Soule v. McKibben (1856) 6 Cal. 142, 142 [describing plaintiff as a “tax 
payer” of the city in an action to enjoin public payment to a city clerk].)  As we 
explained in Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13 (Irwin), the 
language of section 526a explicitly indicates the Legislature’s intent to “limit the 
right to sue in this kind of case, for it clearly altered the common law, which 
required only that the plaintiff be a taxpayer supporting the governmental entity 
whose act is sought to be challenged” and did not impose a residency requirement.  
(Id. at p. 19, citing Thomas v. Joplin (1910) 14 Cal.App. 662, 664-665.)  Section 
526a’s requirement that an individual plaintiff be a “citizen resident therein,” thus 
narrowed the scope of taxpayer standing relative to the common law.  
 
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s apparent objective in enacting section 
526a, in Irwin we had no choice but to conclude that section 526a’s residency 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to a nonresident property owner.  
Irwin concerned a comparison between two persons –– but only one was a natural 
as opposed to a corporate person.  The Irwin plaintiff was a nonresident who paid 
assessed property taxes for property within the city she sought to sue, but the plain 
9 
language of section 526a’s residency requirement denied her standing to sue.  
(Irwin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 16, 19.)  In contrast, a similarly situated 
nonresident corporate real property owner would have standing to sue under 
section 526a.  (Irwin, at p. 19.)  Under those circumstances, we concluded that the 
Legislature’s attempt to limit standing to residents of the relevant locality ran afoul 
of the federal equal protection clause.  (Id. at pp. 19-20.)   
 
But our conclusion in Irwin addressed a specific constitutional question, 
and did not reforge section 526a into a statute granting unfettered standing.  
Notwithstanding our holding in Irwin, our initial observation that section 526a 
represented a legislative effort to codify a more limited version of the common 
law right remained valid.  We therefore understand section 526a not only as a 
means for certain people to pursue an action enjoining some expenditures of 
public funds even when those people have not been injured, but also as a measure 
narrowing the category of taxpayers that are eligible to commence such actions 
relative to what the common law allowed.  
B. 
 
Section 526a does narrow the category of taxpayers able to sue to enjoin 
certain expenditures of governmental funds.  But the Court of Appeal traveled a 
step too far when it held that the statute requires individual plaintiffs to pay a 
property tax.  Although we need not delineate the precise outer limits of the 
statute’s operation, we can conclude with confidence that limiting its application 
to property taxpayers reflects an unduly constrained view of the statute’s 
requirements.  To begin, nothing in the statute’s language suggests such a cramped 
conception of taxpayer standing.  It is no doubt true that the statute’s conception of 
an “assessed” tax encompasses property taxes.  (See Cornelius, supra, 49 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1775.)  Yet the conclusion that property taxes satisfy the 
statute’s requirement for standing does not suggest that only such taxes suffice.  
10 
As a matter of statutory drafting, the Legislature could easily have written the 
statute to restrict standing only to those who pay property taxes.  That no such 
limitation appears in the statute is a strong indication that the statute’s invocation 
of an “assessed” tax is a general description, not a proxy for the term “property 
tax.”   
 
Nor would it be at all consistent with the statute’s “primary purpose”  to 
hold that payment of a property tax is required.  (See Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 
267.)  We have previously described this purpose as “ ‘enabl[ing] a large body of 
the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go 
unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 267-
268.)  In light of this purpose, it is crucial that the statute provide a “broad basis of 
relief.”  (Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 450.)  Accordingly, we have always 
construed section 526a liberally –– though not in a manner inconsistent with the 
explicit statutory limits it imposes on taxpayer standing –– in light of its remedial 
purpose.  (Van Atta, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 447-448 [discussing Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at 
pp. 267-278 and White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 763].)  Limiting individual 
plaintiffs’ use of the statute to those who pay property taxes is simply 
incompatible with the recognized need to construe the statute broadly.  The Court 
of Appeal erred in holding to the contrary.3       
 
But because section 526a does not confer unrestricted standing to 
taxpayers, the question remains:  Which taxes are sufficient to establish standing 
under the statute?  The statute allows for suit against governmental entities “either 
by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable 
                                              
3 
Because we hold that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the payment of 
property taxes is not required under section 526a, we need not reach 
Weatherford’s argument that construing the statute to apply only to property 
owners violates equal protection.  
11 
to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax 
therein.”  The parties’ principal dispute centers on the term “therein,” which can 
conceivably mean either “in” or “into.”  (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. 
(11th ed. 2004) at p. 1296.)  Weatherford argues that all forms of taxes assessed by 
state and local governments qualify so long as the plaintiff resides in the defendant 
locality.  Defendants, by contrast, argue that a plaintiff must be “assessed for and 
liable to pay” a tax which the defendant imposes directly onto the plaintiff, and 
thus that the plaintiff pays directly into the defendant.  In developing their 
theories, the parties cite various state and local taxes that each side contends either 
do or do not satisfy each side’s respective criteria.      
 
Our ability to consider these theories fully, however, is limited by this 
case’s procedural posture.  At the trial court, the parties entered into a stipulated 
judgment of dismissal under Norgart v. Upjohn Company (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383.  
In Norgart, we approved a procedure whereby the parties agree to a stipulated 
judgment solely for purposes of facilitating the appeal of a controlling legal 
question.  (Id. at p. 401.)  Here, the parties and trial court read Torres and 
Cornelius as foreclosing Weatherford’s argument that payment of property taxes is 
not required under section 526a.  But because the parties consented to dismissal 
before any factual development, basic factual questions — including which taxes 
the defendants actually impose — are unresolved.  Such information about local 
governments’ tax structures might shed some light on the consequences of a 
requirement that taxes be directly assessed against a plaintiff.  (See Dyna-Med, 
Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 
[“[C]onsideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a 
particular interpretation” of a statute.].)     
 
In light of these limitations, we conclude that it is sufficient for a plaintiff 
to allege she or he has paid, or is liable to pay, to the defendant locality a tax 
12 
assessed on the plaintiff by the defendant locality.  Such an allegation satisfies the 
more stringent version of the requirement that a tax be paid “therein,” and is 
consistent with prior holdings recognizing taxpayer standing under section 526a.  
(See Irwin, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 18-20; Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 268-269, 
285.)  An allegation of direct tax payment to the defendant locality also does not 
implicate the competing interests underlying our approach to standing.  In sum, we 
can be certain that the Legislature’s purpose, at a minimum, was for the statute to 
apply where plaintiffs are directly taxed by the defendant locality. 
 
 
Here, Weatherford alleged in her complaint that she has paid “in and to the 
City of San Rafael, County of Marin, and State of California” taxes “routinely 
imposed by municipalities, counties and the state[].”  But as the parties stipulated 
to judgment for the purpose of challenging the decisions in Cornelius and Torres, 
the record is devoid of information regarding which taxes defendants actually 
impose, or whether Weatherford has, in fact, paid any assessed taxes to San Rafael 
or Marin County.  Under these circumstances, we cannot determine whether the 
general statements in Weatherford’s complaint satisfy the above standard.  So we 
remand to the Court of Appeal with directions to reverse the stipulated judgment 
and remand to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
13 
 
III. 
 
The Court of Appeal erred when it held that payment of a property tax was 
required under section 526a.  The statute’s text, context, and broad remedial 
purposes preclude such an interpretation.  But this case’s procedural posture limits 
our ability to fully consider the parties’ other contention about taxpayer standing.  
We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal and remand with 
instructions that the Court of Appeal reverse the stipulated judgment and remand 
to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
I concur in the court’s decision that the payment of a property tax is not the 
sole basis, under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a,1 to confer standing on a 
party in order to pursue a taxpayer action.  I write separately to urge the 
Legislature to revisit section 526a and amend the statute in a manner that makes 
clear what kinds of taxes are sufficient to establish standing to sue a particular 
government entity for alleged wasteful or illegal expenditures. 
The provision of section 526a at issue in this matter reads:  “An action to 
obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, 
or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and 
county of the state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or 
other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a 
corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before 
the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.”  (Italics added.) 
In this single sentence are 87 words parsed by 19 commas.  It is not a model 
of clarity.  As this court today acknowledges, the parties dispute the meaning of 
the italicized language, especially the meaning of the word “therein.”  As the 
majority notes, the second word “therein” could mean either “in” or “into.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Defendants, the City of San Rafael and the County of Marin, 
                                              
1 
All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.   
2 
contend the word “therein” in section 526a means “into,” which would require 
payment of a tax “into” the coffers of a city or county, signifying that Weatherford 
has standing to sue only if she has paid a tax directly into their coffers.  
Weatherford contends the word “therein” simply means “in,” and that, therefore, 
she need show only that she paid any kind of tax while she resided in the 
defendant localities.  Amici also contend that the statute’s commas mean that only 
unpaid taxes for which an individual is liable must be “assessed”; on this view, 
Weatherford need not prove she paid a tax directly assessed on her so long as she 
can prove she paid a qualifying tax in the past. 
This sentence in section 526a was drafted and enacted by the Legislature in 
1909.  (Stats. 1909, ch. 348, p. 578.)  In the 108 years since, it has not been 
amended.  Yet the system of state and local taxation in California has changed 
dramatically over the last century. 
Numerous new taxes have been imposed by state and local governmental 
entities since 1909.  For example, in 1923, the state first enacted the “Gasoline 
Tax Act” to help defray the costs of maintaining state and local roads and 
highways.  (Stats. 1923, ch. 267, p. 571; Oswald v. Johnson (1930) 210 Cal. 321, 
322 [citing 1925 amendments]; People v. Ventura Refining Co. (1928) 204 
Cal. 286, 287.)  The state enacted the Retail Sales Tax Act of 1933 in that year 
(Stats. 1933, ch. 1020, § 1, p. 2599; National Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Pacific 
Fruit Express Co. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 283, 285.)  The Legislature adopted a state 
system of income tax in 1935.  (Stats. 1935, ch. 329, p. 1090; Weekes v. Oakland 
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 386, 403.)  That same year, the state enacted the Motor Vehicle 
License Fee Act, which distributed money collected from motorists to the state’s 
general fund as well as to cities and counties.  (Stats. 1935, ch. 362, p. 1312; 
Ingels v. Riley (1936) 5 Cal.2d 154, 158.)  In 1950, this court endorsed the ability 
of cities to impose business license taxes.  (Martin Ship Service Co. v. Los Angeles 
3 
(1950) 34 Cal.2d 793.)  In 1955, the state enacted a uniform local sales and use tax 
system and permitted counties to adopt such taxes.  (Stats. 1955, ch. 1311, 
p. 2381; Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 834.)  In 1971, this 
court endorsed the ability of cities to impose utility users’ taxes on providers of 
telephone and energy services.  (Rivera v. Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132.)  In 1976, 
the Legislature enacted the Emergency Telephone Users Surcharge Act to fund 
state and local agencies’ costs associated with providing and administering 911 
emergency services.  (Stats. 1976, ch. 443, p. 1155; Bay Area Cellular Telephone 
Co. v. City of Union City (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 686, 699.)   
Following the enactment of section 526a in 1909, the methods by which 
these taxes are assessed, collected, and distributed by state and local government 
entities have become increasingly complex.  For example, even if a local 
government entity enacts a local sales tax, such taxes are collected by a state 
entity, the State Board of Equalization, which then remits the revenues to the local 
entity.  (City of Palmdale v. Board of Equalization (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 329, 
332.)  In 1978, Proposition 13, and its implementing legislation enacted in 1979, 
transferred control over the imposition and allocation of property tax revenue from 
individual localities to a state-mandated formula that directed counties to 
permanently fix the tax rate for all real property statewide at 1 percent of assessed 
value and directed how the counties could allocate that revenue among local 
governmental entities, as determined by the Legislature.  (City of Scotts Valley v. 
County of Santa Cruz (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9, 49.)  In City of Alhambra v. 
County of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, we addressed an administrative cost 
dispute arising out of the complex tax-shifting measures created by the enactments 
of the “Triple Flip” and “Vehicle License Fee Swap,” which diverted some local 
sales, use, and property taxes to fund state obligations and provided compensation 
4 
to local government entities for reduced revenues created by a state-mandated 
lowering of vehicle license fees.  (Id. at pp. 715-716.) 
These complex systems of government financing highlight the need for 
clarity regarding the meaning of section 526a.  Even if defendants’ interpretation 
of the word “therein” is correct, these complications concerning how government 
agencies impose and collect various taxes and how they are ultimately distributed 
to fund local government entities further cloud the parameters of taxpayer standing 
under section 526a.  This in turn leads to questions such as whether a resident like 
Weatherford, who pays an otherwise locally imposed tax, is really paying that tax 
directly into that local government entity, even though the tax is actually imposed 
or collected by another agency or is diverted for purposes unrelated to that local 
government. 
In order for a law to have its full intended effects and benefits, it should be 
framed to reflect circumstances as they exist now.  If “the primary purpose of 
section 526a was to give a large body of citizens standing to challenge 
governmental actions” (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 269), the statute’s 
lack of clarity would seem to thwart that very purpose.  The archaic language of 
section 526a has not evolved alongside the increasing complexities concerning 
how residents are taxed and how those proceeds fund local government entities.  
Accordingly, I encourage the Legislature to revisit section 526a in order to clarify 
the criteria necessary to confer taxpayer standing.   
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
I CONCUR: 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
 
 
I agree that taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a 
(section 526a) is not limited to plaintiffs who have paid property taxes in the 
relevant jurisdiction.  Indeed, the parties before us appear to agree on this point:  
Defendant localities acknowledge that, even as they read section 526a, it confers 
standing on at least some plaintiffs who pay taxes other than property taxes — for 
example, hotel guests who pay local taxes on the cost of room rental.  (Cf.  In re 
Transient Occupancy Tax Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 131, 133.)  The stipulated 
judgment in this case, however, rests on the premise that payment of property 
taxes was required.  And other than a conclusory allegation that plaintiff Cherrity 
Weatherford paid taxes “routinely imposed by municipalities, counties and the 
state,” the record contains no information about what other kinds of taxes, 
precisely, Weatherford might have paid.  We therefore must send the case back for 
further consideration of her standing to bring this challenge to defendants’ 
impoundment practices.  
I write separately, however, to call attention to a question that today’s 
decision does not resolve.  Defendants argue that the “plain language” of section 
526a requires proof that the plaintiff has paid a tax assessed directly against her, 
and, further, that the tax must be assessed by the defendant localities, rather than 
by state authorities.  The ultimate conclusion may or may not be correct, but the 
2 
notion that the statute “plainly” imposes a direct-assessment requirement certainly 
is not. 
Section 526a provides that a taxpayer action may be maintained against a 
local government entity “by a citizen resident therein . . . who is assessed for and is 
liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, 
a tax therein.”  As the Chief Justice notes, this century-old provision is not a 
“model of clarity.”  (Conc. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., ante, at p. 1.)  It is 
certainly possible to read the statute, as defendants do, to confer standing on “two 
classes of persons who have been assessed for taxes:  (1) those who are liable to 
pay an assessed tax but who have not yet paid, and (2) those who paid an assessed 
tax within one year before the filing of the lawsuit.”  But as a grammatical matter, 
it is equally possible to read the statute to confer standing on any “citizen resident” 
(1) who is assessed for and is liable to pay a tax therein, or (2) who, within one year 
before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein.1  The first 
interpretation would eliminate the possibility of standing based on, for example, 
payment of local sales taxes, which are assessed on retailers, although almost 
invariably passed through in full to consumers.  (See Civ. Code, § 1656.1, subd. (a) 
                                              
1  
To illustrate the point, imagine the Legislature had numbered the clauses and inserted line breaks 
as follows: 
“An action . . . may be maintained . . . by a citizen resident therein . . . who 
“[1] is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, 
“[2] within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, 
a tax therein.” 
Defendants’ proposed reading of the statute, by contrast, would place the 
imaginary clause numbers and line breaks as follows: 
“An action . . . may be maintained . . . by a citizen resident therein . . . who 
 
is assessed for and 
“[1] is liable to pay, or, 
“[2] within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, 
a tax therein.” 
3 
[establishing a presumption that a customer agrees to “reimburse[]” the retailer for 
the sales tax if, among other possibilities, the amount of the tax is shown on the 
customer’s receipt]; Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1108-1109.)  
The second interpretation would confer taxpayer standing based on past payment of 
such taxes, but not based on future liability to pay. 
Today’s decision, focused as it is on the narrow issue before us, does not 
address this fundamental interpretive question.  Nor does it address the further 
question whether the statute’s reference to the payment of taxes “therein” should 
be understood in a fiscal sense (did the taxpayer pay the taxes directly to the 
defendant jurisdiction?) or a geographic one (was the taxpayer physically located 
in the jurisdiction when she paid state or local taxes?).  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 10-11.)  The answers to these broader questions must lie in broader 
considerations of the history and purposes of section 526a — a statute designed to 
give certain persons who have contributed to governmental coffers the ability to 
challenge governmental expenditures that “ ‘would otherwise go unchallenged.’ ”  
(Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268; see Mays v. City of Los Angeles 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321 [when interpreting ambiguous statutory text, California 
courts “ ‘ “may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be 
achieved and the legislative history” ’ ”].)  The words of the statute, considered in 
isolation, provide no clear instruction.   
4 
 
 
With these observations, I join the court’s opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
I CONCUR: 
LIU, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Weatherford v. City of San Rafael 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 226 Cal.App.4th 460 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219567 
Date Filed: June 5, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Marin 
Judge: Roy O. Chernus 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark T. Clausen for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Alan L. Schlosser; Richard A. Rothschild; Barbara A. Jones; Arnold & Porter and Steven L. Mayer for 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Legal Aid 
Association of California and AARP as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Bertrand, Fox & Elliot, Bertrand, Fox Elliot, Osman & Wenzel, Thomas F. Bertrand and Richard W. 
Osman for Defendant and Respondent City of Rafael. 
 
Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel, Renee Giacomini Brewer, Valerie R. Boughey and Ellen Obstler, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent County of Marin. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Thomas B. Brown and Matthew D. Visick for League of California Cities, 
California State Association of Counties and California Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark T. Clausen 
100 Sage Street, Building C, Apt. 111 
Davis, CA  95616 
(707) 235-3663 
 
Steven L. Mayer 
Arnold & Porter 
Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94111-4024 
(415) 471-3100 
 
Richard W. Osman 
Bertrand, Fox Elliot, Osman & Wenzel 
The Waterfront Building 
2749 Hyde Street 
San Francisco, CA  94109 
(415) 353-0999 
 
Renee Giacomini Brewer 
Deputy County Counsel 
3501 Civic Center Drive, Suite 275 
San Rafael, CA  94903 
(415) 473-6117