Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: State of Alabama vs. James Bonard Fowler)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/04/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
____________________
1081021
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama v. James Bonard Fowler)
(Perry Circuit Court, CC-07-17)
STUART, Justice.
The State of Alabama petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order
of September 23, 2009, directing the State to "provide to
[James Bonard Fowler] a witness list of possible witnesses the
1081021
2
State intends to call at trial, together with a summary of the
testimony of the witnesses."  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
Facts
On February 18, 1965, a group of Alabama State Troopers,
including the defendant in this case, James Bonard Fowler,
assisted local city and county law-enforcement officers in
dispersing an assembly of persons protesting the jailing of a
civil-rights worker in Marion.  During the confrontation,
Fowler shot Jimmie Lee Jackson; Jackson died a few days later.
In the fall of 1965 a Perry County grand jury and a
federal grand jury, after hearing testimony concerning
Jackson's shooting, returned "no bills" in the case, thus
declining to indict Fowler.  In January 2005 or soon
thereafter the Jackson "cold case" was reopened, and in May
2007 a Perry County grand jury indicted Fowler for Jackson's
murder.
In preparation for trial, Fowler has filed numerous
discovery requests and motions.  In his motion to dismiss on
the grounds of preindictment delay, Fowler raised due-process
concerns over the delay between the alleged offense and the
1081021
The date and contents of this article are not disclosed
1
in the materials before this Court.
3
date of the indictment (some 42 years).   On June 6, 2008, to
assist in determining the validity of these concerns and yet
not violate the sanctity of the grand-jury proceeding, the
trial court ordered the State to produce for in camera
inspection, the following:
"1.  For all persons presently known to the district
attorney's office to have personal knowledge of any
facts relevant to this prosecution, but who were
unknown to the State prior to January 15, 2005,
their names and addresses and a copy of all written
and recorded materials reciting or memorializing any
of these facts communicated to the State since
January 15, 2005."
To comply with the order, the State provided the trial court
with a document entitled "District Attorney Michael W.
Jackson's brief notes on Grand Jury testimony on Jimmie Lee
Jackson's death investigation and other newly discovered
evidence."  The list contained the names of six individuals
and included a brief description of their testimony.  The
State also submitted a newspaper article for the trial court's
consideration.   
1
On September 19, 2008, the trial court conducted a
hearing at which the State's compliance with its June 6, 2008,
1081021
4
order was discussed.  On September 29, 2008, the trial court
issued the following order:
"The State of Alabama is ordered to provide to
[Fowler] any and all statements in its possession of
any and all witnesses the State intends to call at
the trial of this case, and is further ordered to
provide the defendant, a witness list of possible
witnesses the State intends to call at the trial of
this case, together with a summary of the testimony
of the witnesses.
"The State was ordered on June 6, 2008, to
provide to the Court for in camera inspection,
information in the possession of the State ....  The
State failed to adequately comply with the Court's
order ....
"Given the extraordinary nature of this case,
that two separate Grand Juries returned 'No Bills,'
and the delay in prosecution since the shooting on
February 18, 1965, the State shall be required to
provide [Fowler] any and all newly discovered
evidence in its possession which has been obtained
since January 15, 2005."
At the hearing the trial court explained the reason for the
above order, stating:
"I want the record to be very clear that [the above
order] was precipitated by the lack of response from
the district attorney's office in response to my
order.  And I had given the district attorney's
office a full 30 days in my order to respond to my
request for an in camera inspection.  And on the
30th day I was given a one-page summary of six
witnesses and a magazine article or a newspaper
article."
1081021
The State does not object to the portion of the trial
2
court's order directing that the State produce "any and all
newly discovered evidence in its possession which has been
obtained since January 15, 2005."
5
The State moved the trial court to vacate its order.  The
trial court denied the motion.
The State then petitioned the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to
vacate its order directing the State to disclose to Fowler its
witness list and a summary of the testimony of the witnesses.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition in
an order, citing Rule 16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., and Ex parte
King, [Ms. 1071540, January 9, 2009] ___ So. 3d ___(Ala.
2009).  State v. Fowler (No. CR-07-2281, April 30, 2009), ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)(table).
The State now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its discovery
order insofar as it requires the State to "provide [Fowler] a
witness list of possible witnesses the State intends to call
at the trial of this case, together with a summary of the
testimony of the witnesses."  
2
Standard of Review
1081021
6
"'"The writ of mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be 'issued only
when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.'  Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see
also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995)."  Ex parte Carter, [807 So. 2d
534] at 536 [(Ala. 2001)].'
"Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.
2001).  'A petition for a writ of mandamus is the
appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's
ruling on a discovery motion.'  Ex parte Steiner,
730 So. 2d 599, 600 (Ala. 1998)."
Ex parte Perkins  941 So. 2d 242, 245 (Ala. 2006).  A writ of
mandamus will not issue to compel a trial court to change its
discovery order unless the appellate court concludes, based on
all the facts that were before the trial court, that in the
discovery order the trial court clearly exceeded the scope of
its discretion.  Ex parte Fuller, 600 So. 2d 214 (Ala. 1992).
Discussion
The State contends that it has a clear legal right to the
relief it seeks because, it says, the trial court exceeded the
scope of its discretion by ordering the State to produce for
Fowler its witness list for trial and a summary of the
1081021
7
testimony of the witnesses.  According to the State, witness
lists and summaries of witness testimony are excluded from
discovery by the defendant.  See Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P.
Before we address the merits of the State's argument, we
must first determine whether the State is entitled to mandamus
review of the trial court's discovery order in this case,
which, as discussed below, was issued to sanction the State
for not complying with a prior discovery order.  In Ex parte
King, supra, this Court addressed whether the State was
entitled to seek mandamus review of a trial court's pretrial
denial of the State's motion in limine.  In Ex parte King, the
State moved in limine to bar King from admitting at trial
evidence that it considered irrelevant and confusing.  The
trial court denied the State's motion.  The State then
petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying
the State's motion in limine and to enter an order granting
it.  The Court of Criminal Appeals issued the writ. State v.
King, [Ms. CR-07-0693, July 25, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Crim. App. 2008).  King then petitioned this Court for a writ
of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate
1081021
8
its order.   We held that even though the trial court's order
denying the State's motion in limine was not an appealable
order the State was not entitled to mandamus relief, stating:
"'The Court of Criminal Appeals has authority to
issue such remedial and original writs as are
necessary to give it a general superintendence and
control of the circuit courts in criminal matters,
over which it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.'
Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 876 (Ala. 1981).
However, '[m]andamus cannot be used as a substitute
for appeal, when no appeal is authorized by law or
court rule ....'  Nice, 407 So. 2d at 879 (emphasis
omitted).  Instead, mandamus 'is appropriate in
exceptional circumstances which amount to judicial
usurpation of power.'  Nice, 407 So. 2d at 878
(emphasis omitted).  Moreover, 'mandamus can be used
to prevent a gross disruption in the administration
of criminal justice.'  Nice, 407 So. 2d at 879
(emphasis omitted). Thus, when the trial court has
acted without lawful authority, the State has been
afforded mandamus relief. See, e.g., State v. Blane,
985 So. 2d 384 (Ala. 2007)(directing circuit court
to vacate order expunging criminal record); D.B.Y.
v. 
State, 
910 
So. 
2d 
820 
(Ala. 
Crim. 
App.
2005)(directing trial court to reinstate juvenile's
probation 
and 
direct 
that 
juvenile 
undergo
sexual-offender 
risk 
assessment 
before 
being
released from probation).
"King argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals,
by granting the State's petition for a writ of
mandamus, 'has granted to the State ... the ability
to file what amounts to an interlocutory appeal
under the guise of mandamus relief.'  King's
petition, at 4. On the other hand, the State argues
that it was entitled to the writ of mandamus,
because, according to the State, the trial court's
denial of its motion in limine 'presents a gross
disruption in the administration of criminal justice
1081021
9
that justified the appellate court's exercise of its
supervisory authority.'  State's brief, at 15. We
agree with King.
"It is beyond cavil that the trial court acts
within its lawful authority in deciding issues
concerning the admissibility of evidence.  Indeed,
'[w]e review issues concerning the admission of
evidence [only] to determine whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion.'  Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d
1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003).  Obviously, 'simply because
an order may have been erroneous does not mean that
an inferior court lacked the power to enter it.'
Nice, 
407 
So. 
2d 
at 
878. 
 
Consequently,
'circumstances involving alleged errors of judgment,
or errors in the exercise of judicial discretion,
[do] not constitute grounds for invoking supervisory
mandamus.'  Nice, 407 So. 2d at 882.
"According to the State, if the trial court
allows the jury to consider the evidence at issue,
there 
will 
be 
'a 
gross 
disruption 
in 
the
administration of criminal justice.'  State's brief,
at 15. Although the trial court denied the State's
motion in limine, '"'the material against which the
objection has been made has not yet been heard by
the jury and may never be heard by them.'"'  Parks
v. State, 587 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Ala. 1991)(quoting
White v. State, 527 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988), quoting in turn Brooks v. State, 443 So.
2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)).  If the trial
court allows the jury to consider the evidence the
State seeks to keep out, it will be acting within
its lawful authority, and the State will have no
right of appellate review.  Such an outcome would
reflect the ordinary and proper administration of
criminal justice, not a disruption thereof."
Ex parte King, ___ So. 3d at ___.
1081021
10
Like the State in Ex parte King, the State in this case
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
appeal 
the 
trial 
court's 
order.
Additionally, just as the trial court in Ex parte King acted
within its lawful authority in deciding admissibility-of-
evidence issues, the trial court in this case acted within its
lawful authority in resolving discovery issues. Ex parte
Harwell, 639 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (Ala. 1993)("Discovery matters
are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this
Court will not reverse a trial court's rulings on discovery
issues unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.).
However, unlike Ex parte King, in which the trial court's
determination with regard to the admissibility of evidence did
not present "a gross disruption of the administration of
criminal justice" or judicial usurpation of the executive
branch's power, here the trial court's order requiring the
State to produce its witness list for trial and a summary of
each witness's testimony will result in a gross disruption in
the administration of justice.  Indeed, this Court has
recognized 
the 
crucial 
role 
discovery 
plays 
in 
the
administration of justice and has held that a trial court's
decisions resolving discovery matters may be challenged by the
1081021
11
State in a petition for a writ of mandamus.  See State v.
Isbell, 985 So. 2d 446 (Ala. 2007)(holding the trial court
exceeded its discretion in ordering the State to produce
certain documents and issued a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate its pretrial order requiring the State
to produce various documents).  
Additionally, this case provides an example of the
acknowledgment in the law of the role of discovery in the
administration of justice.  The Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure recognize the importance of the witness list to the
prosecution of a case and specifically provide that that
information is not discoverable by a defendant.  Rule 16.1,
Ala. R. Crim. P., provides, in pertinent part:
"(c) Documents and Tangible Objects.  Upon
written request of the defendant, the prosecutor
shall, within fourteen (14) days after the request
has been filed in court as required by Rule 16.4(c),
or within such shorter or longer period as may be
ordered by the court, on motion, for good cause
shown, permit the defendant to analyze, inspect, and
copy 
or 
photograph 
books, 
papers, 
documents,
photographs, 
tangible 
objects, 
controlled
substances, buildings or places, or portions of any
of these things, which are within the possession,
custody, or control of the state/municipality and:
"(1) Which are material to the preparation of
defendant's defense; provided, however, that the
defendant shall not be permitted to discover or to
1081021
12
inspect reports, memoranda, witness lists, or other
internal state/municipality documents  made by the
prosecutor or the prosecutor's agents, or by law
enforcement 
agents 
in 
connection 
with 
the
investigation or prosecution of the case, or
statements made by state/municipality witnesses;
"....
"(e) Information Not Discoverable. ... [T]he
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda,
witness lists, or other internal state/municipality
documents made by the prosecutor or the prosecutor's
agents, or by law enforcement agents, in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of the case,
or 
of 
statements 
made 
by 
state/municipality
witnesses 
or 
prospective 
state/municipality
witnesses, is not authorized."
(Emphasis added.)  
We recognize that the trial court did not order the
discovery of the State's witness list for trial and a summary
of the testimony of the witnesses in response to a request
made by Fowler.  The materials before us clearly establish
that the trial court's order that the State produce its
witness list for trial and a summary of the testimony of the
witnesses was issued as a sanction for the State's failure to
comply with a prior discovery order.
Rule 16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., states:
"If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this
1081021
13
rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule,
the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection; may grant a continuance if
requested by the aggrieved party; may prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed; or
may enter such other order as the court deems just
under the circumstances.  The court may specify the
time, place, and manner of making the discovery and
inspection 
and 
may 
prescribe 
such 
terms 
and
conditions as are just."
However, the fact that the order was issued pursuant to Rule
16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., does not negate the fact that it
ordered the production of discovery and that it impacted the
administration of criminal justice.  Therefore, the State is
entitled to mandamus review of this discovery issue.
We now address the merits: Whether the trial court
exceeded the scope of its discretion in ordering the State to
produce its witness list and a summary of each witness's
testimony.  The trial court has filed an answer to the State's
petition.  In its answer, the trial court admits that the
production of the State's witness list for trial and a summary
of the testimony of the witnesses was ordered as a sanction,
under Rule 16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., for the State's failure to
comply with the trial court's June 6, 2008, order.  The trial
court explains: 
1081021
14
"When employing the sanction chosen by the
[trial court] in this case, the [trial court] was
well aware that it 'should not impose a sanction
which is harsher than necessary to accomplish the
goals of the discovery rules.'  McCrory [v. State],
505 So. 2d [1272,] 1279 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1996)].
The [trial court] did not dismiss the case nor
forbid the State from using any evidence or
witnesses it has at trial.  The [trial court], as a
sanction for not complying with the [trial court's]
June 6, 2008, order, merely required the State to
produce to Fowler statements in its possession, a
list of the State's witnesses and a summary of their
expected testimony and any newly discovered evidence
in the State's possession.  The [trial court]
believed that this remedy was the least harsh
sanction 
possible 
and 
that 
pursuant 
to 
the
discretion granted in Rule 16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
the September 29, 2008, order was 'just under the
circumstances.'   Because of the unique nature of
this case, the [trial court's] action was not
'unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.'"
The trial court further states:
"Had this case been tried in 1965 when the alleged
crime occurred, it would have been a capital case.
However, because of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Fowler can no
longer receive the death penalty.  However, this
circumstance does not diminish the uniqueness of
this case or the seriousness of the offense with
which Fowler is charged and the fact that he was
charged some 42 years after the offense occurred and
after most of the critical witnesses had died and
much of the critical evidence had been destroyed.
Rule 16.1(f), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that
'[n]othing in this Rule 16.1 shall be construed to
limit the discovery of exculpatory material or other
material to which a defendant is entitled under
constitutional provisions or other provisions of
1081021
15
law.'  The commentary to the rule recognized the
trend throughout the country toward more extensive
discovery in criminal cases 'to assure that justice
be done.'
"Because of the uniqueness of this particular
case and the due process concerns of [the trial
court, the trial court] certainly did not abuse
[its] discretion by entering the September 29, 2008,
order directing the State to produce certain
documents to Fowler as a sanction for its failure to
comply with the Court's June 6, 2008, order.
Further, even if the [trial court] had not entered
the September 29, 2008, order as a sanction, the
[trial court] would not have abused its discretion
by entering the September 29, 2008, discovery order
based on the [trial court's] inherent power to
compel discovery based on the concerns of the [trial
court] that a fair trial be conducted in the case
below." 
Initially, 
we 
note 
that 
"[t]here 
is 
no 
general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case ...; ...
'the  Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the
amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....'"
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (quoting
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).  This Court
views with disfavor any failure by a party to comply with Rule
16, Ala. R. Crim. P., and we recognize that a trial court has
broad discretion in imposing sanctions on a party who fails to
comply with the trial court's discovery order.  The sanction,
however, should not be harsher than necessary to satisfy the
1081021
16
discovery rules.  McCrory v. State, 505 So. 2d 1272 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986).
Like 
the 
trial 
court, 
we 
recognize 
the 
unusual
circumstances surrounding this case, and, after reviewing the
materials submitted by the trial court with its answer, we
agree that the trial court's due-process concerns are genuine.
We conclude, however, that the trial court exceeded the scope
of its discretion in imposing the sanction of ordering the
State to produce to Fowler a list of possible witnesses the
State intends to call at trial and a summary of each witness's
testimony.  Rule 16.5, Ala. R. Crim. P., clearly authorizes a
trial court to issue relief for noncompliance with a discovery
order; Rule 16.5, however, does not authorize a trial court to
provide relief that is specifically prohibited by the
discovery rules.  Our rules and caselaw clearly establish that
the names of prosecution witnesses for trial are not
discoverable.  See Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P.; Ex parte Bell,
475 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1985); Jackson v. State, 650 So. 2d 593
(Ala. Crim. App. 1994).  A defendant is not constitutionally
entitled 
to 
the 
State's 
witness 
list 
before 
trial.
1081021
We disagree with the State that the order required the
3
State to produce the names and testimony of witnesses before
the grand jury.  The State on its own accord decided to
provide for in camera inspection the district attorney's notes
from the grand-jury proceeding.  Although the trial court did
order for in camera inspection the production of the evidence
upon which the indictment was based, the trial court's order
did not violate of the sanctity of the grand-jury proceeding.
See State v. Matthews, 724 So. 2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1998)(holding that defendant was not entitled to
discovery of names and addresses of grand-jury members).
17
Weatherford, supra; Gowens v. State, 639 So. 2d 524, 527 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993).
Here, the trial court concluded that the State violated
its order when it failed to produce for in camera inspection
any evidence newly discovered since January 15, 2005, with
regard to statements made by witnesses communicated to the
State.    We agree with the trial court that the discovery
3
provided by the State for in camera inspection was inadequate
to address the trial court's due-process concerns and to
provide a basis for determining the merits of Fowler's motion
to dismiss.  Rule 16.5 permits the trial court to enter a
"just" sanction, not one that is prohibited by rule.  Because
the trial court ordered the production of information
specifically prohibited from production by the Alabama Rules
1081021
18
of 
Criminal 
Procedure, 
the 
trial 
court 
exceeded 
its
discretion. 
We recognize that this case is unusual and that the
challenges to the defense in light of the 42-year delay are
unique.  However, the unusual nature of this case does not
authorize the trial court to order discovery that is
prohibited by the rules.  A sanction for the State's violation
can be imposed that is just, that is not prohibited by our
rules, and that meets the needs of discovery.
Conclusion
The State has satisfied the requirements for mandamus
relief; therefore, we issue the writ and direct the Perry
Circuit Court to vacate that portion of its discovery order
directing the State to provide Fowler with its witness list
and a summary of each listed witness's testimony. 
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.