Title: KIPP v WONG

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12378 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE, O F MONTANA 1973 WILLIAM KIPP, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, BILLY WONG, d/b/a The Standard Bar, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from : D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Joseph P. Hennessey argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent : Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and Gallagher, Billings, Montana Stephen H. Foster argued, Billings, Montana Filed : JAN 10 lq4 - Submitted : November 28, 1973 Decided : JAM 1 0 1 ~ - M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an action for damages brought by plaintiff William Kipp i n the d i s t r i c t court of Yellowstone County against Billy Wong, owner of the Standard Bar, a public bar, a s a result of a gunshot wound received by p l a i n t i f f while he was a patron i n defendant's bar. Plaintiff brings t h i s appeal from a judgment entered by the d i s t r i c t court on a directed verdict i n favor of defendant bar owner. On April 19, 1970, a t about 1:30 a.m., plaintiff William Kipp was a customer of the Standard Bar which i s located on the south side of Billings, Montana. One Gus Gardiner entered the bar, took a gun from h i s pocket and rapidly fired three shots. One shot struck William Kipp i n the l e f t side of the abdomen causing injuries which resulted i n the removal of h i s l e f t kidney. O n e shot struck and injured Charles Linderman, and one shot struck Beverly Linderman, h i s wife, causing her death. The Standard Bar i s a r e t a i l beer and liquor establishment owned by operated by Billy Wong since 1967. O n the night of the shootings eight persons were employed i n the Standard Bar: the defendant Billy Wong, h i s son and a woman as bartenders, two bar- maids, and a three-piece dance band. Billy Wong t e s t i f i e d he personally checked identification and kept order i n the bar; that fights occasionally occurred i n the bar but he was usually able to stop them. I f he was unable t o stop a fight, he would telephone the police, Wong further t e s t i f i e d that he had been a bar operator since 1950, and no shots had been fired i n h i s bars prior t o April 19, 1970. Defendant Wong was 59 years old, five feet seven inches t a l l and weighed 115 pounds a t the time t h i s incident occurred. H e stated that i n h i s experience he was better able t o keep order personally by using nonviolent means than when he had employed a It bouncer", because he could usually gain the respect of customers who would attempt t o fight a bouncer. H e kept a loaded shotgun and pistol behind the bar. Billy Wong t e s t i f i e d he had known Gus Gardiner as a customer for a "couple of years", during which time Gardiner had never caused trouble nor given Wong occasion t o order him t o leave the bar. A t about 1 1 : O O p.m. on the night the shooting occurred, Gus Gardiner had been i n the bar i n the company of two other men, Phillip Holiday and Colvin Kingfisher. According t o William Smith, p l a i n t i f f ' s witness and a customer of the bar, a dispute between Kingfisher and an unidentified man i n the bar resulted i n Kingfisher pushing the unidentified man out the back door and into the alley. Smith t e s t i f i e d he observed a fight which took place i n the alley between Kingfisher and the unidentified man, with Holiday and Gus Gardiner present but apparently not involved i n the fight. The t r i a l court granted an objection t o smith's attempted testimony that shortly a f t e r he reentered the bar he heard a sound l i k e a gunshot from the vicinity of the alley. In t h i s connection, a motion i n limine was f i l e d by defendant prior t o t r i a l seeking to exclude Smith ' s testimony concerning the "gun- shot soundf'. Smith was permitted t o t e s t i f y , over objection, that he had known Gardiner for five t o seven years and h i s repu- tation for peace and quiet i n the community was "pretty bad". Jose Romero, a bartender a t the Arcade Bar located near the Standard Bar, t e s t i f i e d he did not know Gus Gardiner's reputa- tion i n the community, but h i s reputation i n the Arcade was bad. Defendant's objection t o Romerots testimony was sustained. John Nelson, a musician i n the dance band playing a t the Standard Bar the night the shootings occurred, t e s t i f i e d that he had a conversation with Billy Wong a f t e r the shooting and Wong stated that Gus Gardiner was always i n trouble. H e further t e s t i - fied, however, that Billy Wong said nothing t o indicate Gus Gardiner had ever caused trouble i n the Standard Bar, and that the Standard Bar was peaceful on the evening i n question u n t i l the time of the shooting. Billy Wong t e s t i f i e d he was aware that Gus Gardiner had been i n the Standard Bar on the evening i n question, but was unaware of ~ a r d i n e r ' s involvement i n any altercation, inside or outside the bar. Wong stated Gardiner l e f t the bar around 1 1 : O O p.m. and that he did not see Gardiner again u n t i l 1:30 a.m., when the shooting occurred. The only witness who t e s t i f i e d concerning the amount of time which elapsed between Gardiner's entry into the bar and h i s f i r i n g the shots was Kathryn Rolison, a customer, who stated: "Q. Would you describe what you saw? A. Seeing the man walk in, he walked around the dance floor and stopped a t the table and turned around and smiled, and then turned and pulled a gun out of h i s pocket and started shooting. "Q. The point number 2 [referring t o a diagram] shows about where he was standing when he shot? A. Yes. "Q. And that was right next t o your table? A. Yes. "Q. H o w long did he stand there before he pulled the gun out? A. Just momentarily. Q . Did he look a t you? A. Yes. "Q. What was h i s expression? A. Well, he just kind of smiled and turned around. "Q. What did he do then? A. H e started shooting. "Q. Did he say anything before he started shooting? A. No. "Q. Did there appear t o be anybody with him? A. No. "Q. Did he f i r e the shots i n quick succession? A. Y e s . I I Other witnesses t e s t i f i e d the shooting appeared t o coin- cide with an argument o r fight between two women. However, no connection between the incidents was established. William Kipp, Charles Linderman and Beverly Linderman, the persons struck by the three bullets, did not know Gus Gardiner. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s motion for directed verdict was granted by the t r i a l court a t the close of the evidence. Plaintiff made a subse- quent motion for leave of the court to reopen the case and permit an additional witness to be called, a Miss Devorah Howe. Miss Howe was one of the women fighting at the time the shooting occurred. An excerpt from a written statement she made to the Billings police on June 11, 1970, is contained in the record and indicates Miss Howe heard the shots but did not see the shooting. This motion and plaintiff's motion for a new trial were denied. On appeal, plaintiff assigns six issues for review: Whether the trial court erred: 1 ) In directing a verdict for the defendant. 2 ) By permitting the defendant to make an oral motion on the day of trial to limit the plaintiff's voir dire and proof. 3 ) In limiting the testimony of witness William Smith to what he saw and excluding what he heard. 4 ) In denying la in tiff's motion to reopen his case. 5 ) In denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 6 ) In permitting the dcifendant to voir dire the witness William Smith in the absence of the jury. Concerning the first issue, plaintiff relies on Nevin v . Carlasco, 139 Mont. 512, 514, 365 P.2d 637, wherein the Court stated : I t Turning to the remaining specifications of error, we find in 30 A r n . J u r . , 5 523, p . 823, the general obligation of duty and liability to patrons on the premises as follows: 'It has been held that the proprietor of a liquor establishment for on-premises consumption does not hold himself out as an insurer of the safety of his patrons and is not bound to the same degree of care toward them as devolves on inn- keepers and carriers, although he does owe them the duty of exercising reasonable care to protect them from injury at the hands of a fellow patron, and of seeing to it that a patron is not injured either by those in his employ or by drunken or vicious men whom he may choose to harbor. 1 I I Reviewing leading cases from other'jurisdictions, [citing cases], we find the general rule to be that the duty of a tavern keeper to protect a patron from injury by another arises only when one or more of the following circumstances exist: ( 1 ) A tavern keeper allowed a person on the premises who has a known propensity for fighting. ( 2 ) The tavern keeper allowed a person to remain on the premises whose conduct had become obstreperous and aggressive to such a degree the tavern keeper knew or ought to have known he en- dangered others. ( 3 ) The tavern keeper had been warned of danger from an obstreperous patron and failed to take suit- able measures for the protection of others. ( 4 ) The tavern keeper failed to stop a fight as soon as possible after it started. ( 5 ) The tavern keeper failed to provide a staff adequate to police the premises. ( 6 ) The tavern keeper tolerated disorderly conditions. I1 See also: Ganger v, Zook, 141 Mont. 214, 377 P.2d 101. Nevin was cited by the California court in Slawinski v. Mocettini, 31 Cal.Rptr. 613, 616, 217 C . A . 2 d 192, quoting the six listed circumstances determinative of negligence. The facts in Slawinski were analogous to those in the instant case: Slawinski was in a bar owned by Mocettini and had a scuffle with one Wilson, after which Slawinski remained in the bar and Wilson left. About thirty minutes later Wilson returned with a gun and killed Slaw- inski. The Slawinski case resulted in a jury verdict for slawinski's survivors, after which the trial court granted the bar owner's motion for a new trial. The California District Court of Appeals affirmed the new trial order, stating in pertinent part: "While the standard of care is that of an ordinarily prudent person, yet it must be realized that reason- able care is a relative term in that the amount of care must be commensurate with the risks and danners attending the activity being pursued. * * * The Zest of whether the duty of reasonable care is discharged is the probability or foreseeability of injury to a plaintiff. 1 I In the instant case, although there was conflicting evidence as to whether Wilson had a reputation as a hot tempered person, it was uncontroverted that the respondents and their employees were not aware of this fact and had never experienced any trouble with Wilson. * * * There is no evidence that respondents had any way of knowing that Wilson would return." (Emphasis a d d e d ) . In the instant case, there is the testimony of William Smith, Jose R-omero, and John Nelson tending to indicate that Gus Gardiner had a bad reputation in the community for peace and quiet. However, t h e i r testimony did not directly contradict Billy Wong's testimony that Gus Gardiner had never caused trouble i n the Standard Bar prior t o the night i n question. Even assuming, arguendo, the evidence was sufficient t o create a factual issue a s t o whether Wong should have had notice of Gardiner's dangerous propensities, that issue i s rendered moot i n the face of the uncontradicted evi- dence that Wong had no way of knowing Gardiner would, o r did i n f a c t , return t o the bar; and,that Gardiner commenced shooting with- out any appreciable lapse of time from when he entered the bar and without any threatening words or a c t s which might have constituted a warning t o Wong o r h i s employees. The fundmental principle of t o r t law involved i s analogous t o the body of law s e t forth i n the various "business invitee s l i p and f a l l " cases decided by t h i s Court, i.e.: there i s no negligence unless (1) the dangerous or injury-causing condition was created by the proprietor; (2) the proprietor had knowledge of the dan- gerous or injury-causing condition; o r (3) the dangerous or injury- causing condition was of such nature and duration that the proprietor i s charged with constructive notice thereof. McEnaney v. City of Butte, 43 Mont. 526, 117 P. 893; Demaree v. Safeway Stores, Inc., M o n t . , 508 P.2d 570, 30 St.Rep. 405. ~ i k e w i s e , the factual issue a s t o whether Wong employed an adequate staff t o police h i s premises i s rendered moot under the facts. In Weihert v. Piccione, 273 Wisc. 448, 78 N.W.2d 757,762, cited by t h i s Court i n Nevin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined an analogous issue i n the defendant's favor, stating i n pertinent part : h he [ t r i a l ] court was also of a mind that the f a i l u r e t o have provided 'guards' o r 'bouncers' i n the establishment did not constitute causal negligence, for the reason that had such been ~ r o v i a e d , i t cannot be assumed that they would have prevented the assault which occurred in- stanetly and without warning. " (Emphasis added). In order for the t r i a l court t o submit the issue of l i a - b i l i t y t o the jury, the plaintiff must produce evidence which, i f viewed i n the light most favorable t o p l a i n t i f f , demonstrates that defendant was somehow negligent i n the performance of a duty owed plaintiff and that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. Jackson v. William Dingwall Ca., 145 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236. Here, the record does not reveal facts which would demonstrate that defendant caused the condition or that he had knowledge of it. The injury-causing condition was not of such a nature o r duration that defendant could have been charged with constructive notice. The second, third and sixth appeal issues a l l r e l a t e t o evidence offered by plaintiff through witness William Smith t o the effect that a separate shooting apparently occurred i n the alley behind the Standard Bar a t about 1 1 : O O p.m. on the night i n question. There was no proof offered a s t o whether the sound heard by Smith actually was a gunshot, and, i f so, who fired the shot. W e concur with the t r i a l court's view that p l a i n t i f f failed t o demonstrate the probative value o r relevance of t h i s offered evidence. W e find the t r i a l court acted reasonably and within i t s sound discretion i n granting the p r e t r i a l motion t o exclude, i n examining witness Smith outside the presence of the jury,and i n excluding portions of smith's testimony relating t o gunshot sounds. Concerning the fourth issue on appeal--denial of p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o reopen h i s case-- t h i s Court stated i n Pickett v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 94, 439 P.2d 57: "Plaintiff assigns a s error the refusal of the t r i a l court t o permit her t o reopen her case a t the conclusion of a l l the evidence. The record discloses that t h i s motion was made a f t e r motion for directed verdict had been made and argued by counsel, and that plaintiff sought t o add the testimony of one witness a s an expert on the ex- plosive qualities of gas. This witness's t e s t i - mony was available t o plaintiff before the close of evidence i n the case and no showing was made a s t o the qualifications of the witness or the testimony t o be e l i c i t e d from him. O n t h i s basis, the t r i a l court denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o reopen her case. Ordinarily neither denial of reopening for testimony of a witness available during reception of evidence a t t r i a l nor denial of reopening absent a showing of a witness's qualifications and the materiality of h i s testimony constitutes an abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court. There being no special circumstances shown taking the instant case out of the operation of the general rule, we hold there was no abuse of discretion i n refusing the motion of plaintiff t o reopen. I I See also: Nadeau v. Texas Company, 104 Mont. 558, 69 P.2d The trial record discloses no offer of proof by plaintiff concerning the failure to call Miss Devorah Howe as a witness during the reception of the evidence. Concerning the fifth issue on appeal--denial of plaintiff's motion for new trial--the motion was made on these grounds: 1 ) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court and adverse party, by which plaintiff was prevented from having a fair trial. 2) Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 3) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision. 4 ) Error in law occurring at the trial excepted to by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's arguments in support of his motion for a new trial have heretofore been discussed in this opinion with the exception of ground number 2 which relates to surprise resulting from the testimony of Kathryn Rolison at trial, a portion of which has been quoted heretofore. Kathryn Rolison made a statement to the Billings police department on April 19, 1970, which included this pertinent excerpt: h his male walked very close to our table. I would say from two to three feet from our table. He stood there for approximately one minute and at the time he smiled at me and I smiled back. I saw this male take a small gun from his right pocket. Holding the gun about belt high he started shooting. He held the gun in front of him and I could see the sparks fly every time he shot. He fired them very fast. I would esti- mate that he shot five or six shots. I was stunned and just couldn't believe i t . ' ' The police report was available and Kathryn Rolison was available for interview prior to the trial. Kathryn ~olison's testimony at trial was consistent with her statement to the police. It does not appear in the trial record that plaintiff ever sought to interview this witness or requested a continuance after her testimony was given. We find the trial court acted within its sound discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new t r i a l . Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. Jfistices.