Title: Amino Brothers Co. Inc. v. Twin Caney Watershed District

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

206 Kan. 68 (1970)
476 P.2d 228
AMINO BROTHERS COMPANY, INC., Appellant,
v.
TWIN CANEY WATERSHED (JOINT) DISTRICT No. 34 of CHAUTAUQUA, MONTGOMERY, AND ELK COUNTIES, KANSAS, and QUIVIRA COUNCIL, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Appellees.
No. 45,813

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 7, 1970.
John A. Biersmith, of Biersmith and Walsh, of Kansas City, Mo., argued the cause, and Dana B. Badgerow, of the same firm, and John M. Wall, of Sedan, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Phillip Mellor, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Quivira Council, Boy Scouts of America.
Gary House, of Robbins and House, of Sedan, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Twin Caney Watershed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an action upon a construction contract for recovery of money for extra work performed. Defendants prevailed upon the theory of accord and satisfaction and plaintiff has appealed.
The facts may be briefly stated.
Appellant, Amino Brothers Company, Inc., entered into a written contract with appellee watershed district whereby appellant was to construct an earthen multiple-purpose watershed dam in Chautauqua county, Kansas, on land owned by appellee Quivira Council, Boy Scouts of America, the latter agreeing to pay a portion of the cost because of unique recreational value to be derived from the project.
*69 Appellant commenced construction of the dam, using compacting machines to compress the earth. The dam contained a large concrete draw-down structure. During the course of construction it was feared the use of heavy machinery adjacent to the "green" concrete structure might cause damage, so the parties entered into a contract modification that appellant was to use hand tamping of the earth fill adjacent to the concrete. The amount of extra compensation to be paid appellant because of the increased work of manual tamping was left for later determination after a study of the costs involved.
Appellant completed the job and was paid the amount of the initial agreed contract price which it accepted and concerning which there is no dispute. The watershed district's contracting officer first allowed the sum of $5,859.70 for the additional work, which amount appellant also received and accepted but in some manner (not revealed by the record) excepted from settlement its claim for the extra work occasioned by the contract modification. Appellant then submitted all its records to the contracting officer, claiming a gross amount of $22,342.96 for the extra work. Several months later the contracting officer decided to allow the additional sum of $2,944.72. Accordingly he wrote appellant the following letter:
"Gentlemen:
Later the contracting officer wrote a second letter:
"June 29, 1966.
"Dear Vic:
Enclosed in the letter was the watershed district's check for $2,944.72, payable to appellant. The face of the check bore the following printed statement:
A boxed in space beneath the statement contained this handwritten item: "Increase of cost Boy Scout Dam."
Appellant endorsed and cashed the check. Approximately eleven months later it filed this suit claiming for the extra work the difference between the $8,804.42 received by it and the sum of $22,342.96. Appellees raised the defense of accord and satisfaction.
Trial commenced before a jury. In addition to the facts already related, the following appeared during the course of testimony given by appellant's president, Victor Amino, upon cross-examinations:
"A. I believe that is right.
"A. Right.
..............
"A. Right.
"A. Right.
*71 "Q. All right, Sir.
"A. It says, `Shall be considered closed.'
"A. Right.
"A. He considered it closed, yes.
"MR. BIERSMITH: No objection.
"THE COURT: It will be received.
"A. Right.
"A. Right.
"Q. And, you did cash the check, didn't you, Sir?
"A. Right."
Appellees thereupon moved that the action be dismissed for the reason appellant's testimony and the exhibits evidenced an accord and satisfaction. The trial court sustained the motion and rendered judgment for appellees, hence this appeal.
Appellant asserts the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an accord and satisfaction barred its claim, contending the issue should have been determined by the jury. Its argument largely is there was no express statement by appellees that an offer of settlement was made and there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties upon an accord and satisfaction.
Appellant makes the further argument the contracting officer was only carrying out contractually defined duties in forwarding the $2,944.72 check. However, the provisions of the written contract are not in the record before us. At oral argument appellant stated that because of some defect the trial court did not admit the contract into evidence; further, that the contracting officer acted *72 throughout as the ordinary agent of appellees, and from the facts revealed, the case is to be decided under ordinary principles of contract law.
A general definition of accord and satisfaction appears in Lighthouse for the Blind v. Miller, 149 Kan. 165, 86 P.2d 508:
In 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 1, p. 301, the general rule is stated thus:
And in the same work, § 18, we find this:
Thus a distinction is made between claims unliquidated or disputed and those liquidated or undisputed. Our cases recognize this distinction. In Harrison v. Henderson, 67 Kan. 194, 72 Pac. 875, this court stated:
Where a dispute has arisen a different rule is applied. In Hoop v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 124 Kan. 769, 262 Pac. 544, this court held:
Inasmuch as the case at bar was being tried to a jury, the motion to dismiss was tantamount to, and a more appropriate designation would have been, a motion for directed verdict under K.S.A. 60-250 (a). In considering a ruling sustaining such a motion the evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. Even then, we are forced to the conclusion the check for $2,944.72 was given and accepted under such circumstances as to constitute an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.
Dispute had arisen. The amount of extra pay had been discussed but remained in disagreement. The contracting officer, after reviewing all material submitted, made his decision and so advised appellant in his May 27, 1966, letter. He specifically stated he contemplated no further action and the file would be considered closed when a check for $2,944.72 was forwarded to appellant. Then in his June 29, 1966, letter enclosing the check he buttressed his decision by calling attention to work of a similar nature which he had studied and by characterizing the amount tendered as adequate pay for the particular type of work. The check bore a notation indicating its endorsement would constitute payment in full.
*74 In his oral testimony appellant's president clearly indicated that when he received and cashed appellees' check for $2,944.72 he knew appellees "considered the matter closed". From all these circumstances he was bound to understand the check was offered only on condition it be taken in full payment of the claim.
While appellees' motion to dismiss was still under consideration by the trial court, appellant requested permission to offer further evidence consisting of certain testimony contained in a deposition of the contracting officer. Proffer was made of this testimony, to which appellees objected. Evidently the trial court considered the proffered evidence although the record is not entirely clear upon this point. At most the proffered testimony indicated only that appellant had not previously agreed to the settlement figure of $2,944.72. Giving this testimony its full weight, the result of the lawsuit would not be changed as the evidence went only to show dispute or disagreement over price prior to cashing the check. Nor would further testimony respecting Mr. Amino's particular intention at the time he cashed the check change the result. Any mental reservation he may have had respecting the closure of the matter would be immaterial on the issue of accord and satisfaction. Appellant need not have accepted and cashed the check. The effective way to protest the offer of settlement would have been to decline the check. Not having done so, appellant is estopped to deny settlement of its claim (Burger v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 Kan. 23, 257 Pac. 979).
The trial court's judgment was correct and it is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
O'CONNOR, J., not participating.