Title: State ex rel. Hassan v. Marsh Bldg. Products

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Hassan v. Marsh Bldg. Products, 100 Ohio St.3d 300, 2003-Ohio-6022.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. HASSAN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. MARSH BUILDING 
PRODUCTS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hassan v. Marsh Bldg. Products, 100 Ohio St.3d 300, 
2003-Ohio-6022.] 
Workers’ compensation — Voluntary departure from former position of 
employment after industrial injury — Application for temporary total 
disability compensation denied by Industrial Commission — Court of 
appeals’ grant of limited writ of mandamus directing return to 
commission for consideration of medical evidence affirmed — State ex 
rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., applied. 
(No. 2003-0097 — Submitted October 7, 2003 — Decided November 26, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-153, 2002-
Ohio-6564. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant, Abdikarim Hassan, concedes that ten days after 
his industrial injury, he voluntarily abandoned his former position of employment 
with the appellant, Marsh Building Products.  Approximately seven weeks later, a 
temporary employment agency placed claimant with Airborne Express.  For the 
next three weeks, he worked eight, nineteen and one-half, and 24 hours 
respectively.  He allegedly could no longer continue after the third week due to 
his allowed conditions. 
{¶2} 
Evidence establishes that since the summer of 2001, claimant’s 
condition had worsened.  Later that year, claimant successfully moved for the 
additional allowance of “tear of right anterior talofibular ligament, osteochondritis 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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dessicans of right medial talar dome.”  Surgery was also recommended by two 
doctors. 
{¶3} 
Claimant ultimately moved appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio for temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”).  He submitted two C-
84 physicians’ reports supplemental from his chiropractor, Dr. Bernard J. Miller 
Jr.  The commission, however, never examined these forms.  Instead it found that 
claimant’s voluntary departure from his former position of employment 
foreclosed the need for any such evaluation, as well as any chance of TTC. 
{¶4} 
While claimant’s mandamus action was pending before the Court 
of Appeals for Franklin County, State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 
97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, was decided. McCoy ruled 
that voluntary abandonment of a job—whether by quitting or getting fired—did 
not bar TTC if the allowed conditions removed the claimant from later 
employment.  Id. at syllabus.  The court of appeals in the instant case applied 
McCoy and determined that a return to the commission for consideration of the 
medical evidence was warranted.  A limited writ directing that return was 
accordingly issued. 
{¶5} 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶6} 
The commission and employer cumulatively raise three objections 
to further administrative consideration of TTC entitlement.  The employer 
criticizes the C-84s as too flawed to support payment.  The commission joins the 
employer in asserting that TTC is barred because claimant’s medical problems 
began before he joined Airborne Express.  Finally, they propose that claimant’s 
less-than-full-time hours in July 2001 contradict claimant’s assertion of a return to 
work sufficient to trigger McCoy. 
{¶7} 
The first two arguments are quickly resolved.  As to the first, the 
commission alone evaluates evidence.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  Since it has not yet 
January Term, 2003 
3 
examined the medical evidence, it would be premature for us to do so.  As to 
point two, the employer and the commission contend that unless there is a specific 
identifiable event on the later job that aggravates the original injury, no TTC is 
payable.  This is incorrect, as neither McCoy nor State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. 
Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 732 N.E.2d 355, contain this requirement. 
{¶8} 
The final objection to TTC payment involves the extent of 
claimant’s subsequent employment with Airborne Express.  In this case, we are 
persuaded by claimant’s assertion that because any employment—no matter how 
insubstantial—bars TTC, see State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 
Ohio St.3d 113, 717 N.E.2d 336, then any employment should be sufficient to 
invoke McCoy. 
{¶9} 
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Jonathan H. Goodman and William A. 
Thorman III, for appellee Abdikarim Hassan. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP and Michael L. Squillace, for appellant. 
__________________