Title: State v. Lyons

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-163 
State of Indiana, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
Bryan D. Lyons, 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Argued: November 3, 2022 | Decided: June 27, 2023 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court 
No. 47D01-1707-F1-973 
The Honorable John M. Plummer, III, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CR-2187 
Opinion by Justice Molter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 27 2023, 1:04 pm
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Molter, Justice. 
When police were investigating whether Bryan D. Lyons molested his 
daughter, he agreed with the prosecutor that he would sit for a polygraph 
and that the State of Indiana could offer the results into evidence at trial in 
any resulting prosecution. But on the eve of trial, the deputy prosecutor 
disclosed that she would not do so because she had just learned that when 
Sergeant Dan Gress administered the exam years earlier, he had concerns 
about Lyons’ mental state, so he unilaterally changed the exam to a “non-
stipulated,” inadmissible investigatory examination. Sergeant Gress had 
omitted those facts when testifying at a prior suppression hearing about 
the admissibility of the polygraph examination and Lyons’ related 
statements, and he failed to provide prosecutors his notes reflecting that 
change. Based on this late disclosure, the trial court continued the trial and 
released Lyons from custody. And as a discovery sanction for Sergeant 
Gress misleading the parties and the court, the judge suppressed the 
incriminating statements Lyons made to Sergeant Gress immediately after 
the exam.  
Through an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with a 
unanimous, published opinion. The State then requested that we “grant 
transfer and affirm that the exclusion of admissible evidence as a 
discovery violation sanction is just only when that violation has been 
blatant and deliberate or it causes substantial prejudice to the defendant.” 
Pet. to Trans. at 5. We grant transfer today and hold that before excluding 
evidence as a Trial Rule 37 discovery sanction, a trial court must find that 
(1) the exclusion is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial 
prejudice, or (2) that the sanctioned party’s culpability reflects an 
egregious discovery violation. The trial court’s order enforced Trial Rule 
37 within those limits, so we too must affirm.  
Facts and Procedural History  
Three days after Lyons’ young daughter reported to her grandmother 
that Lyons sexually abused her, Bedford Police Detective Kevin Jones 
interviewed Lyons at the police department. Lyons denied the allegation 
and agreed to sit for a polygraph. While polygraph results are generally 
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inadmissible at trial, Lyons, still unrepresented at this point, signed a 
written stipulation with the prosecutor agreeing the results of his 
polygraph would be admissible if the State ultimately charged him with a 
crime.  
The State and Lyons agreed Sergeant Gress would administer the 
polygraph examination at the Jasper Indiana State Police Post a few days 
later. Detective Jones observed from another room, and Sergeant Gress 
began the examination by reviewing the polygraph waiver and consent 
form with Lyons, which advised him of the voluntary nature of the 
polygraph examination and his constitutional rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Both Lyons and 
Sergeant Gress signed the document, and based on the executed 
stipulation, Sergeant Gress wrote “stipulated” at the top of the polygraph 
examination form.  
Sergeant Gress then questioned Lyons to determine his mental and 
physical suitability for the examination. In response to that questioning, 
Lyons revealed he had been diagnosed with generalized anxiety, attention 
deficit, personality, and bipolar disorders. He also explained he saw 
“spiritual shadows” that spoke to him two or three days before the 
examination. Tr. Vol. II at 60–61. While Lyons confirmed he had “a grasp 
for reality,” Sergeant Gress concluded Lyons was not a suitable candidate 
for an “evidentiary polygraph,” the results of which are admissible in 
court under an agreement between the State and the defendant, so he 
unilaterally converted the examination to an “investigatory” polygraph, 
the results of which are not admissible in court. Id. at 61. Yet Sergeant 
Gress did not change the “stipulation” notation on the polygraph 
examination form to reflect a non-stipulated, investigatory polygraph.  
At the end of the examination, Sergeant Gress concluded Lyons’ results 
revealed “significant reactions” to questions about his daughter that were 
“very close to deception.” Id. at 66. Sergeant Gress then interviewed Lyons 
about those reactions, and within minutes Lyons made incriminating 
statements. Once the interview ended, Sergeant Gress scanned his official 
report, the polygraph examination form, and his handwritten notes into a 
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case management system. He placed the original documents in his paper 
file.  
A couple of weeks later, the State charged Lyons with child molesting, 
a Level 1 felony. The trial court appointed a public defender to represent 
Lyons, and defense counsel moved to suppress the polygraph results and 
related statements to the police. Lyons’ motion argued, among other 
things, that he “was illegally coerced into giving an untruthful statement 
to officers as a result of psychological and mental manipulation,” and “[i]n 
addition to being obtained unconstitutionally, the statements are 
inherently unreliable and therefore should not be admitted as evidence” at 
trial. App. Vol. 2 at 108. Counsel also requested a pre-trial hearing to 
determine whether Lyons’ statements “were voluntary and reliable.” Id. 
The trial court set an evidentiary hearing on Lyons’ motion to suppress. 
In preparation, Sergeant Gress reviewed the documents in the case 
management system and the video of the polygraph examination. He 
added handwritten notes to the original polygraph examination form in 
his paper file and, remembering he had changed the exam to a non-
stipulated polygraph, he wrote “non-stipulated” at the top. But he did not 
scan a copy of the document with his new handwritten notes into the case 
management system. Since the prosecutor’s office only had access to those 
documents in the case management system, it was unaware of his paper 
file and new handwritten notes.  
The parties appeared for the hearing on Lyons’ motion, and Sergeant 
Gress was one of the witnesses. As Sergeant Gress testified, he referred to 
his notes. He explained that certain circumstances might lead to a 
determination that a person is not a suitable candidate for a polygraph, 
such as if they suffered from seizures, heart attacks, or mental issues that 
might compromise their ability to understand reality. Sergeant Gress 
recalled that Lyons disclosed his mental health diagnoses and that he saw 
spiritual shadows which spoke to him, but Sergeant Gress was 
nonetheless “comfortable” having Lyons sit for the test. Tr. Vol. II at 64. 
Even though Sergeant Gress testified about the admissible nature of a 
stipulated polygraph, provided a general step-by-step recollection of the 
nearly four-and-a-half hours he spent with Lyons before and after the 
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examination, and relied on his notes while testifying, he never mentioned 
that he had changed the polygraph to a non-stipulated, investigatory 
examination because of his concerns about Lyons’ mental condition.  
After the hearing, and based in part on Sergeant Gress’ testimony, the 
trial court denied Lyons’ motion to suppress. Lyons petitioned for an 
interlocutory appeal, which the trial court certified, but the Court of 
Appeals declined jurisdiction.  
The trial court set a five-day jury trial to begin on July 19, 2021, which 
was roughly four years after Lyons had been charged and a year after the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. As the deputy prosecutor prepared for 
trial, she spoke with Sergeant Gress. For the first time, just a few days 
before trial, Sergeant Gress revealed to the prosecutor that he had 
unilaterally changed the polygraph from a stipulated, evidentiary 
examination to a non-stipulated, investigatory examination based on his 
concerns about Lyons’ mental condition, and he provided a copy of the 
handwritten notes he made in preparation for the suppression hearing, 
which reflected that change. The prosecutor promptly provided this 
information and a copy of the document with Sergeant Gress’ 
handwritten notation to defense counsel.  
In light of these developments, Lyons moved to continue his trial, and 
he asked the trial court to suppress his statements related to the polygraph 
examination based on the State’s untimely disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence. Although the jury was present and ready for trial, the trial court 
granted Lyons’ motion for continuance and scheduled a suppression 
hearing. In the meantime, Lyons was released from custody. The trial 
court also asked the State to investigate whether Sergeant Gress had 
committed perjury during the suppression hearing, emphasizing that the 
court found the late disclosure “very troubling” because “Sergeant Gress 
knew what the issues were when he testified” at the suppression hearing. 
Id. at 103. The court also explained that it believed “there is a substantial 
likelihood that [the court] has been misled by Sergeant Gress” based on 
the information then available to the court. Id. at 126–27. The court was 
especially concerned that when “law enforcement in general[] keep 
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material evidence from the [p]rosecutor,” “[t]hat’s how innocent people 
wind up in prison.” Id. at 127.  
A few weeks later, the trial court held another suppression hearing to 
determine whether Lyons’ rights were violated because the State failed to 
timely disclose that Sergeant Gress “had made a unilateral determination 
that the polygraph stipulation was invalid” after Lyons revealed he had 
recently seen shadows on the wall which spoke to him just days before the 
examination. App. Vol. 3 at 14. At that hearing, Sergeant Gress 
acknowledged that when he testified at the previous suppression hearing 
he understood that questions from the State, defense counsel, and the 
court were all directed at Lyons’ mental state during the polygraph; that 
he referred to his notes during that testimony; and that he never 
mentioned during his testimony that he had unilaterally changed the 
polygraph examination from stipulated to non-stipulated. He testified that 
he assumed the prosecutor was aware of the change because, when he 
changed the exam from stipulated to non-stipulated, he instructed 
Detective Jones to inform the prosecutor.  
Detective Jones also testified at the hearing, but his recollection was 
much different. He did not recall Sergeant Gress informing him of a 
decision to change the examination to a non-stipulated investigatory 
exam, and he believed he likely would have remembered it if that had 
happened. In fact, Detective Jones did not recall any time in his career 
when a polygraph examiner switched an exam from a stipulated 
evidentiary examination to a non-stipulated investigatory examination, 
and he was unsure what he would do in those circumstances. He 
explained that, at a minimum, he would contact the prosecutor’s office for 
guidance because the stipulation is an agreement between the prosecutor 
and the defendant, and the police are not a party.  
Following the hearing, the court entered a detailed order sanctioning 
the State for its discovery violation by “excluding any and all evidence 
generated or acquired by S[ergeant] Dan Gress,” including Lyons’ 
agreement to take a polygraph, the polygraph, and the post-polygraph 
interview. Id. at 17. After the trial court certified the State’s motion for 
interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and 
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affirmed. State v. Lyons, 189 N.E.3d 605, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). In a 
published opinion, a unanimous Court of Appeals explained it was 
“unconvinced by the State’s argument that the discovery violation 
resulted in no significant prejudice to Lyons’s defense because the 
argument fails to acknowledge the broader implications that pretrial 
discovery violations may have on a case.” Id. at 611. For example, the 
court explained, “[i]t is easy to imagine a scenario in which Lyons entered 
into a plea agreement with the State before ever finding out that the 
polygraph results would not have been admissible in a trial.” Id.  
 The State then petitioned our Court for transfer, which we now grant, 
vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
Trial courts maintain broad discretion to manage discovery, and that 
includes sanctioning parties to enforce discovery rules and orders. 
Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999). “We presume that the 
trial court will act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case, 
and thus we will only reverse if the trial court’s decision is clearly against 
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if 
the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 
324, 330 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).  
Discussion and Decision 
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding the State’s evidence as a discovery sanction. We conclude the 
trial court did not because it based its sanction on a finding that Sergeant 
Gress misled the court, and that finding is reasonably supported by the 
record. 
Trial Rule 37 authorizes courts to impose sanctions for discovery 
violations through “such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” Ind. 
Trial Rule 37(B)(2), including orders prohibiting a party “from introducing 
designated matters in evidence,” T.R. 37(B)(2)(b); see also Fields v. State, 679 
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N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997).1 For sanctions addressing a party’s late 
disclosure of evidence, our cases have long recognized three governing 
principles: (1) we generally treat late disclosures the same whether the 
State or the defendant committed the discovery violation; (2) the two 
typical remedies are to continue the trial or to exclude the evidence; and 
(3) we exclude evidence only if (a) that is the sole remedy available to 
avoid substantial unfair prejudice, or (b) the discovery violation was 
intentional, flagrant, in bad faith, or otherwise reprehensible. Wiseheart v. 
State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988–92 (Ind. 1986);2 see also Armstrong v. State, 499 
N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. 1986) (discussing the exclusion of evidence for 
discovery violations which are “flagrant and deliberate,” “misleading,” or 
in “bad faith”); Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264, 274 (Ind. 1986) 
(discussing violations which are “grossly misleading” or “demonstrate[] 
bad faith”).  
Courts treat defendants and the State the same because “the office of 
criminal discovery in Indiana is reciprocity,” the discovery rules must “be 
fairly balanced between the State and the defendant,” and the discovery 
rules are “most effective” through equal treatment. Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d 
at 990. Courts exclude evidence only as a last resort because that remedy 
frustrates a trial’s truth-seeking function. Id. Thus, “[w]hile sanctions for 
failure to comply with discovery are within the trial court’s discretion, the 
primary factors which a trial court should examine are whether the breach 
was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has 
resulted.” Id. at 988.  
 
1 Criminal Rule 21 provides that Indiana’s “rules of trial and appellate procedure shall apply 
to all criminal proceedings,” so long as they do not conflict with any other rules from our 
Court. Ind. Crim. Rule 21; see also Minges v. State, 192 N.E.3d 893, 899 (Ind. 2022) (noting the 
amendment to Criminal Rule 21, effective March 1, 1997, which incorporated the trial rules 
into the criminal rules).  
2 At oral argument, defense counsel argued Wiseheart does not apply because it predates our 
amendment to Criminal Rule 21 incorporating Trial Rule 37 into our criminal rules. But we 
have continued to embrace these governing principles long after we published amended 
Criminal Rule 21 in 1997. Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. 2011); Rohr v. State, 866 
N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2007); S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635–36 (Ind. 2002); Warren v. State, 725 
N.E.2d 828, 832–33 (Ind. 2000); Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997).  
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Here, the State acknowledges its disclosure to Lyons that Sergeant 
Gress had unilaterally changed the polygraph examination to a non-
stipulated, investigatory polygraph based on concerns about Lyons’ 
mental condition was exceedingly late under the local rules governing 
discovery and was therefore a discovery violation. But it argues any 
prejudice was cured by releasing Lyons from custody and continuing the 
trial. As for the trial court’s concern that the State was on the cusp of 
admitting the polygraph at trial, and the Court of Appeals’ concern that 
Lyons could have been misled into pleading guilty, the State argues these 
sorts of “hypothetical” prejudice are not enough to exclude evidence. Pet. 
to Trans. at 14. 
We agree with that much. When considering whether an order 
excluding evidence is the sole remedy to avoid substantial prejudice, a 
court can only consider real—not hypothetical—prejudice. And 
continuing the trial in this case cured the prejudice to Lyons. But the trial 
court did not base its sanction solely on prejudice to Lyons; it also 
concluded that Sergeant Gress’ conduct amounted to an egregious 
discovery violation.  
The State acknowledges a trial court may exclude evidence where the 
“discovery violation was blatant and deliberate.” Id. at 5. That is because 
“[a] trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner which 
facilitates the ascertainment of truth, ensures fairness, and obtains 
economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society 
and the criminal defendant.” Armstrong, 499 N.E.2d at 191. And “the 
purpose of sanctioning discovery violations is not merely to penalize 
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to 
deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such 
a deterrent.” Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012) (quotations 
omitted). So even when there is no remaining prejudice, a trial court may 
reasonably conclude that excluding evidence is necessary to deter 
egregious discovery misconduct.  
That is what the trial court concluded here. In particular, the court 
found that Sergeant Gress intentionally “misled” all the parties and the 
court. App. Vol. 3 at 14. The court based its conclusion on Sergeant Gress’ 
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acknowledgment that when he testified in the first suppression hearing, 
he understood that defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court 
were all asking him questions about Lyons’ mental state during the 
polygraph examination, and that was a key focus of the hearing. 
Discussing Lyons’ mental condition specifically, Sergeant Gress testified at 
that hearing that Lyons did not say “anything different that [Sergeant 
Gress had not] heard from twenty-five percent of [the] people that take a 
test,” and Sergeant Gress confirmed he “felt comfortable giving [Lyons] a 
polygraph examination.” Tr. Vol. II at 64. Sergeant Gress also testified 
polygraphs are admissible in court if the defendant and the prosecutor 
stipulate to their admissibility. Yet Sergeant Gress never divulged that he 
had unilaterally changed the polygraph to a non-stipulated, inadmissible 
investigatory examination based on his concerns about Lyons’ mental 
condition, and he never provided the prosecutor his notes to the same 
effect, until roughly a year later on the eve of trial. 
The State downplays this as a case of misfeasance rather than 
malfeasance. But that is not what the trial court concluded. Instead, the 
trial court concluded that Sergeant Gress’ misleading omissions were so 
egregious that the State should undertake a perjury investigation. And the 
trial judge explained to the State:  
I hope that the Prosecutor understands that this is not a 
personal ruling against the State but it is a professional decision 
that the Court [makes] to protect the rights of the accused, to 
make sure that the trial has integrity, to make sure that the 
lawyers have integrity in this court, to make sure that we don’t 
have false testimony presented at any time in this court, 
especially by people as powerful as Sergeant Gress. And I 
would hope that the prosecutors understand that ruling 
because the integrity of these proceedings is—means 
everything. 
Id. at 127.  
From the trial court’s perspective, part of what made this an egregious 
discovery violation warranting the exclusion of Lyons’ statements to 
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Sergeant Gress was the highly unusual context for both the statements 
and Sergeant Gress’ subsequent omissions. Lyons, who was not 
represented by counsel, signed the stipulation around the same time he 
believed shadows were speaking to him. The court credited the testimony 
of a defense polygraph expert concluding “that when a polygraph 
examiner determines in the pre-polygraph interview that the examinee 
has mental issues to such an extent as to render the stipulation invalid, the 
polygraph examiner should immediately terminate the encounter and end 
the meeting.” App. Vol. 3 at 15. After all, as the court explained, Sergeant 
Gress “changing the terms of the contract unilaterally without the 
permission of the prosecutor or the Defendant frustrated the entire 
purpose of the Defendant meeting with [Sergeant] Gress.” Id. at 17. And 
“but for the Defendant entering into the stipulated agreement (i.e. the 
contract), he would have never spoken to [Sergeant] Gress.” Id.  
While the State has not concluded Sergeant Gress’ omissions rose to the 
level of perjury, it has acknowledged its own frustration and concerns 
with Sergeant Gress’ failure to timely share information with the 
prosecutors. Sergeant Gress’ only explanation was that he was relying on 
Detective Jones to relay to the prosecutor that the polygraph was no 
longer a stipulated evidentiary exam, but Detective Jones testified he does 
not recall any such conversation. Just the opposite, Detective Jones does 
not recall any point in his career—including this incident—when a 
polygraph examiner informed him that the examiner was changing a 
stipulated, evidentiary exam to a non-stipulated, investigatory exam. And 
counting on Detective Jones to relay the information to the prosecutor still 
does not explain why Sergeant Gress omitted this critical fact from his 
own testimony at the first suppression hearing, which was all about his 
polygraph examination. 
In sum, our prior cases have explained that trial courts may exclude the 
State’s evidence when a discovery violation is “grossly misleading or 
demonstrates bad faith.” Thompson, 492 N.E.2d at 274. Because the trial 
court found that level of culpability here, and the record supports (even if 
it does not compel) that conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. See, e.g., Whitaker, 960 N.E.2d at 117 (holding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence when a party provided 
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“false and misleading” responses to discovery requests); Cameron v. State, 
274 Ind. 436, 444, 412 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1980) (“Where the violation is 
grossly misleading or demonstrates bad faith, exclusion of the evidence 
may be required.”).  
Conclusion  
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order excluding the State’s 
evidence as a discovery sanction.   
 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
 
 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T   
Theodore E. Rokita  
Attorney General of Indiana  
Angela Sanchez 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
Andrew Kobe 
Office of the Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LL E E 
Joel C. Wieneke 
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
Brooklyn, Indiana