Title: Ex parte D.R.J.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: October 30, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1190769
____________________
Ex parte D.R.J. and Dana Sides
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Kathy King and Barry King
v.
D.R.J., a minor; Dana Sides; and State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company)
(Lee Circuit Court, CV-18-900058)
SELLERS, Justice.
D.R.J. and his mother, Dana Sides, petition this Court
for a writ of mandamus directing the Lee Circuit Court to
1190769
vacate its February 7, 2020, and May 15, 2020, orders holding
that a pro tanto release executed in their favor was void,
thus restoring them as defendants in the underlying lawsuit.
We deny the petition. 
Facts
On January 26, 2018, Kathy King and Barry King sued
D.R.J. and Sides (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"the
defendants"), 
seeking 
damages 
for 
injuries 
the 
Kings 
sustained
as a result of an automobile accident allegedly caused by the
negligence of D.R.J., who was driving Sides's vehicle and who,
at the time of the accident, was a minor. The Kings also sued
their 
insurer, 
State 
Farm 
Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company,
seeking to recover underinsured-motorist ("UIM") benefits.
Pursuant to Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309
(Ala. 1988), State Farm opted out of active participation in
the litigation.    
Thereafter, the defendants and their insurer, Alfa Mutual
Insurance Company, offered to settle the Kings' claims for
$95,000. On January 18, 2019, counsel for the Kings notified
State Farm of the settlement offer and requested that State
Farm provide notice within 30 days as to whether it intended
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either to consent to the settlement offer or to advance the
amount of the settlement offer and preserve its subrogation
rights against the defendants.
On February 21, 2019, State Farm responded by offering
the Kings $25,000 to settle the UIM claim. State Farm
explained in its response that, if the Kings rejected the
offer to settle the UIM claim, then it would advance the 
$95,000 settlement offer and preserve its subrogation rights
against the defendants.  The next day, the Kings rejected
State Farm's offer to settle the UIM claim.  There were no
further communications between the parties regarding the
settlement offer or the UIM claim.
On March 21, 2019, the Kings, without State Farm's
consent, accepted the $95,000 settlement offer and executed a
pro tanto release in favor of the defendants, expressly
reserving their UIM claim against State Farm.  The Kings then
filed a motion to dismiss all claims against the defendants,
and, on March 29, 2019, the trial court entered an order
dismissing all claims against the defendants with prejudice
and noting that the Kings' UIM claim against State Farm
remained pending.  When State Farm learned of the settlement
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and the pro tanto release, it moved the trial court for a
summary judgment, arguing that the Kings had forfeited their
rights to UIM benefits by executing the pro tanto release
without its consent as required by the policy the Kings had
with State Farm. Alternatively, State Farm moved the trial
court to set aside its March 29, 2019, order dismissing the
defendants with prejudice and to place the litigation in the
appropriate procedural posture that would have existed but 
for
the Kings' alleged improper conduct. The Kings filed a motion
in opposition, arguing that they were entitled to UIM benefits
under the policy because of State Farm's alleged unreasonable
delay in either consenting to the settlement offer or
advancing the amount of the settlement offer. See Lambert v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991).1 
1In Lambert, this Court stated that a settlement should
not take place without a UIM carrier having a "reasonable
time" within which to investigate the claim and to notify its
insured of its proposed action. The Kings asserted that 62
days had passed between the time State Farm was put on notice
of the settlement offer and the date they accepted the offer.
We express no opinion as to whether the timeliness of State
Farm's response in this case was reasonable.
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On February 7, 2020, the trial court entered an order
finding, as a matter of law, that "an unreasonable amount of
time had not elapsed, after receiving notice, for State Farm
to object to the proposed settlement."  The trial court made
no ruling on State Farm's motion for a summary judgment; 
rather, it declared that the pro tanto release executed by the
Kings was void and that its ruling "restore[d] the status quo"
of the case. 
On May 15, 2020, the trial court entered an order, noting
that its March 29, 2019, order dismissing the claims against
the defendants  was "neither expressly nor impliedly a final
order" and that, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R.  Civ. P., it
was thus subject to revision at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims of all the parties. The
trial court clarified that
"[t]he March 29, 2019, order dismissing the
[defendants] pro tanto is hereby SET ASIDE.  The
intended effect of this order ... is that: (1) [The
defendants] are restored to the action; (2) all of
the [Kings'] claims remain pending as to [the
defendants and State Farm]; and (3) the parties are
welcome to, should they choose, renew previous
settlement offers, resume negotiating, and the
like."
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State Farm thereafter advanced the Kings $95,000, the amount
the defendants and Alfa offered to settle the Kings' claims. 
Standard of Review
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when the petitioner can demonstrate "'(1) a clear legal
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d
541, 543 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So.
2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)). 
Discussion
As indicated, on March 29, 2019, the trial court entered
an order granting the Kings' motion to dismiss all claims
against the defendants with prejudice. On February 7, 2020,
the trial court entered an order holding that the pro tanto
release executed by the Kings was void and stating that its
ruling "restore[d] the status quo." The trial court entered
the May 15, 2020, order to clarify that the intended effect of
its previous order was that the March 29, 2019, order granting
the Kings' motion was set aside because the release executed
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by the Kings, on which that order was based, was void, that
the defendants were restored as parties to the lawsuit, and
that all of the Kings' claims against the defendants and State
Farm remained pending. 
The defendants argue that they have a clear legal right
to an order directing the trial court to set aside its
February 7, 2020, and May 15, 2020, orders because, they say,
in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, the trial court
lacked authority to void the pro tanto release –- the result
of which restores them as parties to the lawsuit. The
defendants further assert that, rather than voiding the pro
tanto release, the trial court should have granted State
Farm's motion for a summary judgment, which, they say, would
have ended the litigation. The defendants, however, make no
attempt to show how the matter complained of comes within any
of the recognized situations appropriate for mandamus review.
It is well settled that mandamus will not be granted for the
purpose of merely reviewing trial-court error; rather,
mandamus review has essentially been limited to well
recognized situations in which the petitioners have a clear
legal right to the relief sought from the trial court but the
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trial court has refused to grant the relief. See Ex parte U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 148 So. 3d 1060 (Ala. 2014) (providing list
of exceptional situations in which this Court has held
mandamus review to be appropriate); see also Ex parte Hodge,
153 So. 3d 734 (Ala. 2014)(same). Accordingly, the defendants
have not met their burden for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus.  
Conclusion
The defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus is
denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart,
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
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