Title: Bailey v. State

State: south-carolina

Issuer: South Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

309 S.C. 455 (1992) 424 S.E.2d 503 James D. BAILEY, William D. Sussman and James R. Johnson, Respondents v. The STATE of South Carolina and Aiken County, South Carolina, a body politic and corporate and political subdivision of the State of South Carolina, and Louis L. Rosen, Director for Court Administration, Defendants, of whom Aiken County, South Carolina, a body politic and corporate and political subdivision of the State of South Carolina is the Primary Appellant, and The State of South Carolina and Louis L. Rosen, Director for Court Administration are Secondary Appellants. Appeal of Aiken County, South Carolina. 23754 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard May 5, 1992. Decided December 7, 1992. Rehearing Denied January 6, 1993. Robert M. Bell and Dennis M. Gmerek, both of Langley, for appellant Aiken County. Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Edwin E. Evans and Asst. Atty. Gen. Samuel L. Wilkins, Columbia, for appellants The State *456 of South Carolina and Louis L. Rosen, Director of Court Admin. Ronald A. Maxwell, of Aiken, for respondents. Stuart M. Andrews, Jr., and Daniel J. Westbrook, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, for amicus curiae, S.C. Bar. Heard May 5, 1992; Decided Dec. 7, 1992. Reh. Den. Jan. 6, 1993. CHANDLER, Justice: This Court is today called upon to determine whether compensation shall be paid to attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants who are charged with murder for which, upon conviction, the death penalty (capital murder) may be imposed. We reach our decision today fully cognizant of the legal profession's traditional and historic role in the general society. It is a role anchored to the postulate that the practice of law is not a marketplace business or commercial venture but, rather, a profession dedicated primarily to service. This obligation to service is a lifelong commitment of every attorney which finds its noblest expression in the oath administered upon admission to the Bar: Abidance in both letter and spirit to this commitment has been a hallmark of the legal profession from the very earliest history of South Carolina. Indeed, 58 years prior to the formation of the Union, the 1731 Colonial Legislature, recognizing the imperative that defendants charged with capital murder be provided the assistance of competent counsel, enacted Act No. 530: Statutes of South Carolina, Vol. III, 1717-1753, Page 286. South Carolina attorneys now actively and enthusiastically participate in a program sponsored by the South Carolina Bar known as "Pro Bono," which renders free legal services to the poor. The number of attorneys contributing their services to this program places the South Carolina Bar among the top three in the nation. It cannot be overemphasized that the litigation addressed by our decision today is borne not of a purpose to repudiate the historic obligation of the legal profession as described above. Rather, it is borne of a dramatic escalation in the burden of effectively representing a capital case defendant, from the moment of the attorney's appointment to the conclusion of the attorney's responsibility. It is an understatement that the very livelihood of many attorneys appointed to death penalty trials is threatened by this burden, a result fundamentally unfair to those so impacted. The record before us demonstrates that capital trials today, as never before, present a myriad of complexities heretofore unknown. For example, until very recent years, most capital trials were, from beginning to end, completed within four days. Today, selection of the jury alone often consumes a week or more. Notwithstanding, attorneys have never hesitated to fulfill their responsibility to indigent defendants. However, as Justice Newbern of the Arkansas Supreme Court aptly observed in Arnold v. Kemp: "Time changes everything."[1] Indeed it does. On appeal is an Order which declares unconstitutional the statutory scheme[2] setting the amount of attorney's fees allowed to counsel appointed in capital cases, and also the amount allowed for investigative costs and services in such cases. *458 Section 16-3-26(B) provides that in all capital cases, two attorneys shall be appointed to represent an indigent defendant, only one of whom may be the public defender. Fees and costs for these attorneys cannot exceed $5,000 per trial from funds appropriated for the defense of indigents. Section 16-3-26(C) provides a cap of $2,500 from such funds for any expert and investigative services associated with the capital trial. Section 17-3-50 provides that private counsel appointed pursuant to the Defense of Indigents Act shall receive a fee of $15 per hour for in-court time and $10 per hour for out-of-court time for their services, not to exceed the $5,000 cap. State funding for the Defense of Indigents is set by the General Assembly in the annual Appropriations Act, which contains the following provision: 1992 S.C. Acts, 501, § 4.6. Respondents, Attorneys James Bailey and William Sussman, were appointed to represent Leroy Craig, an indigent defendant charged with kidnapping, armed robbery, and murder in a capital prosecution. Respondent James Johnson (now deceased) was a private investigator also appointed to the case. Through the effective representation of Bailey, Sussman, and Johnson, the charges against Craig were dismissed prior to trial. Mr. Bailey expended 243.75 hours in preparation of the case and 5 hours in court. Further, he incurred out-of-pocket expenses for photographs, postage, xerox copies, and expert fees in the amount of $1,254.65. Mr. Sussman expended 118.3 hours in preparation of the case and 5 hours in court, and also incurred out-of-pocket expenses of approximately $500. Mr. Johnson expended 264.25 hours investigating the case, and incurred $1,101 in travel expenses, $93 in long-distance phone calls, $152.55 in film processing, and $248.69 for out-of-pocket expenses. Respondents commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court requesting payment for the above fees and *459 costs incurred in Craig's defense, in excess of those provided by § 16-3-26 and § 17-3-50. The case was referred to the Master-in-Equity for final determination. The Master declared the payment limited by §§ 16-3-26 and 17-3-50 unconstitutional in that it: (1) violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) violates the "takings clause" of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. He awarded Mr. Bailey and Mr. Sussman attorneys' fees at a rate of $85 per hour and Mr. Johnson investigator's fees at a rate of $40 per hour, plus all expenses incurred. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution compel every State to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. (2d) 799 (1963). Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant must have "a fair opportunity to present his defense," thereby requiring the State to provide the "basic tools" for an adequate defense to an indigent defendant. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84, L.Ed. (2d) 53 (1985) (State required to provide defendant access to a psychiatrist where defendant's sanity was in issue at trial). Thus, although the State is not required to provide the indigent defendant with unlimited funding, it must ensure that the defendant has competent counsel and the services of experts necessary to a meaningful defense: Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S. Ct. at 1093, 84 L.Ed. (2d) at 62 [internal quotations omitted]. Given the State's obligation to provide effective legal assistance to an indigent, we direct attention to the problem which arises when an attorney appointed to a capital case receives only nominal compensation: Okeechobee County v. Jennings, 473 So. (2d) 1314, 1328 (1985) (Emphasis supplied). The problem is exacerbated in capital case appointments where the attorney is charged with the awesome responsibility of defending a person's life. A death penalty case, in and of itself, is an extraordinary proceeding. See White v. Board of County Com'rs, 537 So. (2d) 1376 (1989). The attorney must be conversant with constantly new interpretations of constitutional law by not only the United States Supreme Court, but by courts of all jurisdictions, both Federal and State. Moreover, in preparation for trial, he must investigate the facts and circumstances of the alleged crime with no less vigor and thoroughness than the publicly compensated solicitor, who has at his disposal the entire array of state, county, and municipal law enforcement. Dramatic technological advances, such as the science of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis, are employed by prosecutors, requiring defense attorneys to acquire special knowledge and retain expert witnesses. Capital trials are bifurcated, divided into guilt and sentencing phase trials. At the commencement of the guilt phase, a more extensive and time-consuming process for selection of *461 the jury is followed: each juror, individually, must be interrogated by the attorney who, prior to trial, has searchingly researched and probed the background of every prospective juror. A psychologist is frequently employed by both the prosecution and defense to assist and advise in jury selection. While the greater demands now made upon defense attorneys in the guilt phase are severe, it is in the sentencing phase that new and different issues, heretofore unknown, are introduced as a result of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For example, in today's capital trial, the defendant is entitled to produce evidence concerning his childhood and family background in mitigation of his criminal conduct, so that the jury may impose life imprisonment as an alternative to the death sentence. In preparing this evidence the attorney must employ investigators in the course of thoroughly researching the defendant's entire life. Mr. Stephen Bright, an expert witness presented by Respondents, and an attorney who has been defense counsel in three capital cases, testified concerning these differences between capital and noncapital trials: No challenge to Mr. Bright's testimony was offered by either of the Appellants. Additionally, Mr. Bailey, who has himself been appointed to three capital cases since 1980,[3] testified that the very nature of a capital case and the possibility of counsel's performance being scrutinized at the postconviction relief stage enhances the difficulty of defending a capital case: Beyond that, Mr. Bailey was further burdened here with an uncooperative defendant. In addition to these problems, Mr. Bailey's responsibility to keep his private practice viable continued daily. Here, the legal services provided the defendant Craig were exemplary, reflecting great credit upon Messrs. Bailey and Sussman. However, a gross and fundamental unfairness is inflicted upon these attorneys when the fees and compensation fail to cover even the overhead costs of maintaining their law offices. Given the extraordinary time, effort, and commitment required of defense counsel in capital cases, it is unrealistic to *464 expect that token compensation will suffice in the future to provide an indigent defendant with the quality of legal representation mandated by the United States Supreme Court. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. (2d) 1109, 1114 (1986) (Emphasis supplied). Adverting to the controlling statutes here, we hold that they cannot be interpreted as the absolute maximum amount of remuneration for costs and fees, since they clearly do not provide compensation adequate to ensure effective assistance of counsel in capital cases.[4] This Court has long recognized that legislative acts are to be construed in favor of constitutionality and will be presumed constitutional absent a showing to the contrary. Bradley v. Hullander, 277 S.C. 327, 287 S.E. (2d) 140 (1982). Accordingly, we hold that the hourly rates and cap provided in §§ 16-3-26 and 17-3-50 are not absolute allowances in capital cases, but merely limitations upon the State's funds allocated for the Defense of Indigents. It then necessarily falls upon the county to supplement as required in a given case. McMehan v. York County Council, 281 S.C. 249, 315 S.E. (2d) 127 (Ct. App. 1984). The appointed attorney should not expect to be compensated at market rate, rather at a reasonable, but lesser rate, which reflects the unique difficulty these cases present as balanced with the attorney's obligation to defend the indigent. This determination, which shall be made at the conclusion of the trial, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Moreover, a determination of an attorney's costs and expenses for trial preparation shall also be made within the discretion of the trial judge: Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W. (2d) 770, 777 (1991). As has been emphasized in this opinion, the awesome burden placed upon an attorney appointed to represent a capital case defendant is incomparably greater than in a noncapital case. The issue of compensation for attorneys appointed to noncapital case is not before the Court, and we express no opinion at this time. Since we hold that an attorney appointed to a capital case shall be reasonably compensated from funds of the State and County, we need not address the takings issue. We recognize that the current system may not be the most equitable in providing compensation to appointed attorneys in capital cases. This is especially true when capital murder occurs within those counties least able to bear such costs. However, any modification of the present system must be addressed to the General Assembly, which, thus far, has contributed clearly inadequate funding for the defense of indigents. We reverse the Master's findings as to the unconstitutionality of §§ 16-3-26 and 17-3-50. We remand this case for a redetermination of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, utilizing the guidelines set forth in this opinion, rather than the standards for awards of market rate attorneys' fees in other litigation. We affirm the Master's findings relative to Mr. Johnson's fees and costs. HARWELL, C.J., and FINNEY, TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur. [1] 813 S.W. (2d) 770, 780 (1991) (Newbern, Justice, concurring). [2] S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-26(B) and (C) (Supp. 1991), and § 17-3-50 (1985). [3] Mr. Bailey testified that, to his knowledge, there have been only four capital cases in Aiken County since he has been in practice and he was appointed to three out of the four. Mr. Sussman has had one other capital appointment. [4] In fact, the hourly rates are the lowest in the nation.