Title: Tara J. Vanderperren v. Board of Bar Examiners

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 37 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1739-BA 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Tara J. Vanderperren: 
 
Tara J. Vanderperren,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF VANDERPERREN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
December 17, 2002   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and BRADLEY, JJ., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Tamara B. Packard 
and Cullen Weston Pines & Bach LLP, Madison. 
 
For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, and James D. 
Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 37 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1739-BA  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission 
of Tara J. Vanderperren: 
 
Tara J. Vanderperren,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of Board of Bar Examiners' decision.  Decision 
reversed; matter remanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This is a review, pursuant to SCR 
40.08(5),1 of the final decision of the Board of Bar Examiners 
(Board) declining to certify that the petitioner, Tara Jean 
                                                 
1 References to supreme court rules will be to those in 
effect after October 1, 2000.  
SCR 40.08(5) provides that: "A petition to the supreme 
court for review of an adverse determination of the board under 
this rule shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days of the 
date on which written notice thereof was mailed to the 
applicant." 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
2 
 
Vanderperren, satisfied the character and fitness requirement 
for admission to the Wisconsin bar set forth in SCR 40.06(1).2  
We reverse and remand the matter to the Board for further 
proceedings. 
¶2 
We fully appreciate the yeoman's service performed by 
the 
Board 
in 
conducting 
its 
full 
investigation 
of 
Ms. 
Vanderperren's background and circumstances surrounding her past 
conduct, much of which was less than admirable.  The duty to 
examine applicants' qualifications for bar admission rests 
initially on the Board, and this court relies heavily on the 
Board's investigation and 
evaluation; 
however, 
this 
court 
retains 
supervisory 
authority 
and 
has 
the 
ultimate 
responsibility for regulating admission to the Wisconsin bar.  
See In re Bar Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, ¶3, 250 Wis. 2d 
519, 523, 639 N.W.2d 553. 
¶3 
The Board's refusal to certify that Ms. Vanderperren 
satisfied the character and fitness requirements for admission 
to the bar was based primarily on what the Board viewed, 
following its investigation, as her less than forthright and 
                                                 
2 SCR 40.06(1) provides: 
(1) An 
applicant 
for 
bar 
admission 
shall 
establish good moral character and fitness to practice 
law.  The purpose of this requirement is to limit 
admission to those applicants found to have the 
qualities of character and fitness needed to assure to 
a reasonable degree of certainty the integrity and the 
competence of services performed for clients and the 
maintenance of high standards in the administration of 
justice. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
3 
 
complete responses to questions on her application for admission 
to Hamline University School of Law, and her application to be 
admitted to the Wisconsin bar.  Of specific concern to the Board 
were her descriptions of her past alcohol consumption and her 
resulting 
difficulties 
and 
contacts 
with 
the 
police 
and 
university authorities.  These incidents also gave us pause; 
however, on balance, we determine that they were not of 
sufficient gravity to preclude her admission to the Wisconsin 
bar on character and fitness grounds.  We note that all of the 
incidents cited by the Board involved Ms. Vanderperren's alcohol 
consumption and all occurred when she was younger.  In fact, the 
last reported incident identified by the Board involving her 
excessive 
alcohol 
consumption 
occurred 
in 
1997 
when 
Ms. 
Vanderperren was a law student, and the last reported alcohol-
related incident for which she received a citation from the 
police occurred in 1994.  We believe that this dearth of 
reported alcohol problems in the last five years demonstrates 
that, as Ms. Vanderperren claims, she no longer abuses alcohol 
and has rehabilitated herself.  
¶4 
The 
Board's 
adverse 
decision 
regarding 
Ms. 
Vanderperren's application was also based on what the Board 
viewed as her lack of candor in revealing her past difficulties 
with alcohol in the answers she supplied to questions on the bar 
application form as well as her answers to questions on her law 
school application.  We note, however, that Ms. Vanderperren 
corrected those applications and ultimately fully divulged her 
past history in her amended bar applications and supplemental 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
4 
 
materials; she also corrected her law school application shortly 
after she began her classes at Hamline.  We think she satisfied 
SCR 
40.06(3)3 
because 
Ms. 
Vanderperren 
corrected 
any 
misapprehension that she knew about arising in connection with 
her applications.  We believe that to preclude her admission 
based on what might have been a less than complete disclosure in 
her initial bar application or law school application would 
depreciate her subsequent efforts to comply and provide full 
disclosure to the Board.   
¶5 
Here, as was true in the recent Rippl case, the Board 
may have felt constrained to find that this applicant's past 
actions and lack of candor precluded certifying her character 
and fitness for purpose of bar admission; we determine, however, 
that the incidents the Board relied on, now corrected and fully 
disclosed, are not of sufficient gravity to support a conclusion 
that Ms. Vanderperren should be barred from admission to 
practice law in this state.  Again, like in Rippl, while some of 
the incidents cited by the Board are troubling, on balance, we 
                                                 
3 SCR 40.06(3) provides that: 
(3) An 
applicant 
shall 
establish 
to 
the 
satisfaction of the board that the applicant satisfies 
the requirement set forth in sub. (1).  The board 
shall certify to the supreme court the character and 
fitness of qualifying applicants.  The board shall 
decline to certify the character and fitness of an 
applicant who knowingly makes a materially false 
statement of material fact or who fails to disclose a 
fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by 
the applicant to have arisen in connection with his or 
her application. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
5 
 
conclude that they do not demonstrate that she lacks the 
character and fitness for admission to the bar of this state.  
Accordingly, we reverse. 
¶6 
Tara Jean Vanderperren was born and raised in the 
Green Bay area.  She attended Edgewood College in Madison and 
graduated from St. Norbert College in DePere in December of 1995 
with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business.  In December of 1995 
she applied for admission and was accepted at Hamline University 
School of Law in Minnesota.  She obtained her Juris Doctor 
degree from Hamline in December of 1998.  She subsequently took 
and passed the Minnesota bar examination.  After a character and 
fitness investigation in that state, she was admitted to 
practice law in Minnesota in April 2000.4   
¶7 
Ms. Vanderperren moved back to Green Bay in October of 
2000 and applied for admission to the Wisconsin bar on December 
4, 
2000. 
 
She 
passed 
the 
February 
2001 
Wisconsin 
bar 
examination. 
¶8 
The Board subsequently conducted an investigation to 
determine Vanderperren's character and fitness to be admitted to 
the practice of law in this state.  In response to questions 
raised by the Board during its investigation, Vanderperren twice 
amended her application and submitted supplemental material 
including written explanations about certain events that had 
occurred before she was in law school; she also provided further 
                                                 
4 She has also taken and passed the bar examination in 
Florida. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
6 
 
explanations about certain information in her law school 
application and events that had occurred during law school.  
¶9 
The Board's investigator filed a report that disputed 
some of the explanations proffered by Ms. Vanderperren and 
concluded as follows: 
There are many troubling issues in Ms. Vanderperren's 
application.  For example, the sheer amount of 
inconsistencies represents a complete lack of regard 
for the application process and the need for full 
disclosure. 
It 
is 
also 
particularly 
troubling 
that 
Ms. 
Vanderperren seems to shirk responsibility for her 
actions.  Not only did she attempt to conceal or 
greatly minimize her misdeeds to the Board, but she 
makes excuses for her lack of candor.  
¶10 Based on that investigative report, the Board notified 
Ms. Vanderperren by letter dated June 25, 2001, that it intended 
to deny her application for admission to the Wisconsin bar.  The 
Board's "Intent to Deny" letter asserted that Ms. Vanderperren's 
unlawful conduct in the past, and her incomplete and untruthful 
disclosures on her bar application as well as her law school 
application, were relevant to her character and fitness to 
practice law under the provisions of BA 6.02(a), (b), (c), (d), 
(g), and (j) of the Rules of the Board of Bar Examiners.5   
                                                 
5 BA 6.02(a), (b), (c), (d), (g), and (j) provides: Relevant 
Conduct.  
The revelation or discovery of any of the following 
should be treated as cause for further inquiry before 
the Board decides whether the applicant possesses the 
character and fitness to practice law: 
(a) unlawful conduct 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
7 
 
¶11 In addition, the Board's letter cited BA 6.03(a), (b), 
(c), (d), (g), (h), and (i) as the basis for its adverse 
determination in this matter.6   
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) academic misconduct 
(c) false statements by the applicant, including 
concealment or nondisclosure 
(d) acts involving dishonesty or misrepresentation 
(g) neglect of professional obligations 
(j) evidence of drug or alcohol dependency. 
6 BA 6.03 provides, in pertinent part:  Use of Information.  
The Board will determine whether the present character 
and fitness of an applicant qualifies the applicant 
for admission.  In making this determination through 
the processes described above, the following factors 
should 
be 
considered 
in 
assigning 
weight 
and 
significance to prior conduct: 
(a) the applicant's age at the time of the conduct 
(b) the recency of the conduct 
(c) the reliability of the information concerning the 
conduct 
(d) the seriousness of the conduct 
 . . . . 
(g) the applicant's candor in the admissions process 
(h) the 
materiality 
of 
any 
omissions 
or 
misrepresentations 
(i) the number of incidents revealing deficiencies. 
(j)  
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
8 
 
¶12 The Board's Intent to Deny letter signed by its 
executive director informed Ms. Vanderperren that: 
The Board is concerned by your series of citations, by 
the underlying conduct they evince, and by your 
selective disclosure of those incidents to Hamline 
University Law School and to this agency.  It believes 
that you have been at risk with respect to alcohol 
abuse, that you are willing to conceal material facts 
if that concealment can be of benefit to you, and that 
you have repeatedly shown contempt for authority in 
your encounters with law enforcement.  The Board 
believes that it raises substantial doubt that you 
will maintain the high standards in the administration 
of justice which are required of Wisconsin attorneys 
 . . . . 
¶13 In response to this Intent to Deny letter Ms. 
Vanderperren provided additional rebuttal information explaining 
the circumstances surrounding her earlier conduct; she also 
pointed out that the conduct the Board had identified arose out 
of three incidents in her "young adult years" and that the last 
incident had occurred several years previously in 1997.  Ms. 
Vanderperren acknowledged that in all of those prior incidents, 
alcohol had been a significant factor.  She emphasized, however, 
that she had not had any trouble related to alcohol consumption 
since the 1997 incident that had occurred while she was a law 
student, and that after that, she had undergone her first AODA 
evaluation and had attended AA meetings and changed her drinking 
habits.  In addition, she provided the Board with a copy of an 
AODA evaluation that had been conducted by the Minnesota Board 
of Bar Examiners prior to her being admitted to practice in that 
state in 2000.  That evaluation reported that her alcohol abuse 
was "in full remission." 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
9 
 
¶14 At her request the Board conducted a hearing on 
October 25, 2001, at which Ms. Vanderperren testified, under 
oath, 
that 
the 
discrepancies 
and 
omissions 
in 
her 
bar 
application were not intentional but had been caused by her 
haste in preparing the application.  She also explained that she 
had filed a "corrected" law school application amending the 
negative answer she had given on that application to the 
question which asked "[h]ave you ever been convicted of any 
violation of law other than a juvenile offense?"  That 
correction reflected that Ms. Vanderperren had received a 
citation for operating while intoxicated in 1992. 
¶15 In addition, in her testimony before the Board, Ms. 
Vanderperren asserted that now she only occasionally drinks 
alcohol, and no longer drinks to the point of intoxication.  She 
stated that the last time she was intoxicated was in 1997 when 
she had an argument with her law school roommate.  
¶16 Ms. Vanderperren also submitted letters to the Board 
from her parents, her sister, and a longtime friend.  All the 
letters acknowledged that Ms. Vanderperren had made mistakes 
relating to alcohol when she was a young adult but that she had 
learned from those mistakes and that she now had the character 
and fitness needed to be an attorney in Wisconsin.   
¶17 Following that hearing and prior to the next scheduled 
meeting, the Board's executive director submitted his report and 
recommendation that the Board issue findings of fact and 
conclusions consistent with its earlier "Intent to Deny" letter.  
The 
executive 
director 
emphasized 
that 
Ms. 
Vanderperren 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
10 
 
acknowledged that most of her problems stemmed from her alcohol 
use but she nevertheless continued to drink and continued to be 
employed as a bartender.  The director concluded that the risk 
factors presented by her conduct " . . . have not been overcome 
by her apparent remorse for her prior conduct."   
¶18 The 
Board 
considered 
that 
recommendation at its 
December 
13, 
2001, 
meeting. 
 The 
Board 
then 
asked Ms. 
Vanderperren to undergo another AODA evaluation at her own 
expense in Florida where she was then residing.  The Board 
suggested the names of three professionals for her to choose 
from to conduct the evaluation in Florida.  Ms. Vanderperren 
chose Martha E. Brown. M.D., a Florida psychiatrist.  After some 
confusion as to the extent of the evaluation to be conducted, 
Dr. Brown performed a full psychiatric and psychological 
evaluation and an AODA evaluation of Ms. Vanderperren.  Dr. 
Brown's subsequent report submitted to the Board and Ms. 
Vanderperren 
recommended 
that 
Ms. 
Vanderperren 
not 
drink 
alcohol.7  Dr. Brown wrote that "[i]f she decides not to drink, I 
see no reason that she cannot practice law with reasonable skill 
and safety."8  Dr. Brown's report was accompanied by a report 
from a Florida psychologist who found that Ms. Vanderperren did 
                                                 
7 In an affidavit submitted in support of this appeal, Ms. 
Vanderperren asserts that after she received Dr. Brown's report, 
she has "completely abstained from consuming any alcohol." 
8 Dr. Brown also expressed concern about Ms. Vanderperren's 
"minimization" about the past events, her somewhat "dismissive" 
attitude toward her past behavior, and her apparent intolerance 
for the evaluation process.   
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
11 
 
not have significant emotional problems.  The psychological 
report concluded: 
There was nothing to suggest that she is at any 
increased risk to harm her clients at present, and 
testing would suggest that her actual practice of law 
could be unsupervised.  However, as she is at 
increased risk to engage in a pattern of self-
destructive behavior, continued random monitoring by a 
Board approved provider might be appropriate.  
¶19 After 
the 
Board 
received 
the 
Florida 
AODA 
and 
psychological/psychiatric 
evaluation, 
the 
Board 
issued 
its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions declining to certify that Ms. 
Vanderperren met the character and fitness requirements for 
admission to the Wisconsin bar.  The Board's conclusions were: 
The 
applicant 
repeatedly 
conducted 
herself 
in 
violation of law, and selectively disclosed those 
violations to Hamline University School of Law and to 
the Board of Bar Examiners.   
The 
applicant 
concealed 
material 
facts 
when 
concealment was of benefit to her. 
The applicant repeatedly showed contempt for authority 
in her encounters with law enforcement.  
The applicant has not met the burden assigned to her 
under SCR 40.02 to establish that she meets the 
requirements for admission under SCR 40.06. 
¶20 This court applies a two-pronged standard of review 
when reviewing an adverse determination by the Board.  First, we 
will adopt the Board's Findings of Fact if they are not clearly 
erroneous.  In re Bar Admission of Crowe, 141 Wis. 2d 230, 232, 
414 N.W.2d 41 (1987); In re Bar Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, 
¶16, 250 Wis. 2d 519, 529-30, 639 N.W.2d 553.  Second, we then 
determine whether the Board's conclusions of law based on the 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
12 
 
non-erroneous facts, are proper.  Id.  Although the court is 
appreciative of the Board's experience in administering the bar 
admission rules, the court is obligated to make that legal 
determination de novo.  In re Bar Admission of Rusch, 171 
Wis. 2d 523, 492 N.W.2d 153 (1992).   
¶21 A candidate for admission to the bar in this state 
bears the burden of proof to establish that he or she meets the 
qualifications for admission set out in SCR 40.02; those 
qualifications 
include 
meeting 
the 
character 
and 
fitness 
requirements identified in SCR 40.06.  See SCR 40.02(3).  In 
addition, SCR 40.07 provides that "[t]he burden of proof shall 
be on the applicant to establish qualifications under SCR 
40.02. . . . "  Pursuant to SCR 40.06(3), the applicant must 
establish character and fitness to the satisfaction of the Board 
whose duty it is then to certify to the supreme court character 
and fitness of qualifying applicants.  In re Bar Admission of 
Martin, 181 Wis. 2d 27, 29, 510 N.W.2d 687 (1994); In re Bar 
Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, ¶3, 250 Wis. 2d 519, 523, 639 
N.W.2d 553. 
¶22 In making the legal determination of whether the 
Board's conclusions of law based on the facts which are not 
clearly erroneous are proper, this court considers, like the 
Board, "whether the applicant possesses the character and 
fitness to practice law using the guidelines established in BA 
6.02 and BA 6.03."  Id. at ¶16.  Although it is the Board's 
initial duty to examine an applicant's qualifications for bar 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
13 
 
admission, this court is the ultimate arbiter in regulating 
admission to the bar in this state.  Id. at ¶3.  
¶23 After reviewing the record and the Board's findings 
and conclusions we conclude that a few of the findings are 
clearly erroneous, and that while many of the Board's findings 
may not be clearly erroneous, they do not in any event support 
the Board's ultimate conclusion that Ms. Vanderperren does not 
possess the requisite character and fitness for admission to the 
bar of this state.  Even if all of the Board's findings of facts 
were supported by the evidence and hence could not be called 
clearly erroneous, in our opinion, they would not support the 
Board's ultimate conclusion.  
¶24 For example, in its Finding of Fact 3.A., the Board 
wrote: "The applicant [Ms. Vanderperren] has been cited for 
three alcohol-related offenses, six motor vehicle offenses, and 
one offense each for assault, trespass, disorderly conduct, 
fraudulently obtaining a driver's license and using it to 
operate a motor vehicle, and for resisting arrest, all between 
1987 and 1999."   
¶25 The evidence in the record upon which this finding was 
based concerned alcohol-related incidents the first of which 
occurred in 1987 when Ms. Vanderperren received an underage 
drinking citation; next, a 1992 OWI citation in Madison; and, 
third, an incident in 1994 in Minneapolis.  
¶26 In her application for admission to the Wisconsin bar, 
Ms. Vanderperren described the 1992 incident.  She wrote that 
she had attended a Badger football game in Madison and after the 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
14 
 
game, went to bars on State Street.  According to the written 
statement Ms. Vanderperren appended to her bar application, she 
became confused by the one-way streets when leaving a parking 
ramp and a Madison police officer pulled her over and asked her 
to perform sobriety tests; she was then taken to the police 
station for a breathalyzer test.  In her written explanation of 
the incident Ms. Vanderperren wrote "I blew a .10 and was 
arrested.  I know I received a couple other citations that 
evening but I am not exactly sure of the name of the offenses.  
I think one ticket was for driving against traffic and another 
one was for under-age drinking." 
¶27 During the Board's subsequent character and fitness 
investigation the investigator noted certain discrepancies and 
asked Ms. Vanderperren to supply missing details concerning her 
1992 OWI arrest.  Ms. Vanderperren responded by letter and 
submitted an amended application for admission to the Wisconsin 
bar.  In this letter Ms Vanderperren blamed the lack of detail 
in her original application on the ground that it had been 
hastily prepared and submitted at the last minute.  She asserted 
she was not trying to cover up anything about her past or to 
misstate or omit information; she pointed out, however, that the 
1992 arrest had occurred several years before and she could not 
remember all the facts or the specific citations she had 
received as a result of that incident.   
¶28 In 
any 
event, 
in 
her 
amended 
application 
and 
explanatory letter, Ms. Vanderperren wrote that in 1992 she was 
18 or 19 years old and attending college in Madison.  She 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
15 
 
explained that because she and her older sister looked very much 
alike, she had previously gone to the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation in Madison and showed them her sister's expired 
driver's license.  Ms. Vanderperren was then issued a new 
license reflecting her sister's name and birth date.  Ms. 
Vanderperren explained that when she was stopped after the 
football game and the officer asked her to see her license, 
because that was the only license she had with her, she gave it 
to the police; consequently, the citations she received at that 
time were issued under her sister's name.  Ms. Vanderperren 
wrote, however, that the next day she went back to the police 
station and explained what she had done and that she then 
received  
 . . . three or four citations including the OWI, 
obstructing (for not revealing my true identity in 
jail), and maybe one or two other ones.  I went to 
court on the false license and I think it was 
dismissed to a different charge but I can't remember 
the exact name of the charge.  Also, I am not sure if 
the obstructing was read in to the agreement or if I 
was charged with obstructing and paid the fine.  I 
apologize again for this misunderstanding.  I really 
thought that this incident was explained in the 
enclosed documents attached to the application.  
¶29 The Board's investigator subsequently submitted an 
investigative report critical of Ms. Vanderperren for her 
failure to initially disclose pertinent information concerning 
the 1992 incidents including the fact, according to the 
investigator, 
that 
Ms. 
Vanderperren 
had 
"lied 
about 
her 
identity" when she was arrested in 1992 on the OWI charge in 
Madison; that report also noted that Ms. Vanderperren had 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
16 
 
claimed that the breathalyzer test indicated that her blood 
alcohol content was .10 when actually the police reports 
indicated it was .16. 
¶30 The Board's investigator had similar misgivings about 
Ms. Vanderperren's lack of candor in explaining the 1994 
incident in Minneapolis.  In her initial application for 
admission to the Wisconsin bar Ms. Vanderperren revealed that 
she had been arrested in Minneapolis at a Viking/Packer football 
game in the fall of 1994.  On the separate explanatory sheet she 
attached to that bar application Ms. Vanderperren described that 
incident as follows: 
I came to the twin cities to see a Monday night 
football game at the Metro-dome.  This was my first 
time at the Dome.  I went downstairs during the game 
to have a cigarette and I went outside of the gates to 
smoke.  When I proceeded to go back to my seat, a 
security guard saw me and asked for my ticket stub but 
I did not have it.  My boyfriend had it with him in 
the stands.  The security guard kicked me out and I 
then went to a different gate.  The security guard saw 
me and called the cops because he thought I was a 
[sic] intruder who did not have a ticket.  I think I 
was not given the opportunity to show the security 
guard my ticket stub because I was all dressed up in 
Packer attire and it seemed like a clear act of 
prejudice against a fan from the opposite side.  I 
think I was given a disorderly conduct ticket but I am 
not positive.  The charge was expunged and there is no 
longer a record of this offense.  
¶31 The investigative report later submitted to the Board 
by its investigator criticized Ms. Vanderperren for leaving out 
significant 
information 
about 
her 
1994 
arrest 
at 
the 
Viking/Packer game in Minneapolis.  The investigator, relying on 
police reports, disputed Ms. Vanderperren's version that she 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
17 
 
could not get back into the stadium because her ticket stub was 
with her boyfriend inside the stadium.  According to the Board's 
investigative report, the police reports of that incident 
revealed that Ms. Vanderperren had been removed from the game 
for intoxication, and that her arrest followed an altercation 
that occurred when she tried to get back in the game and 
purportedly 
punched 
one 
of 
the 
security 
guards. 
 
The 
investigative report acknowledged that although Ms. Vanderperren 
was eventually convicted on only a municipal disorderly conduct 
charge, she had nonetheless failed to mention that she had also 
been initially charged with fifth degree assault for striking 
the security guard; nor had she mentioned that she had been 
ejected from the game for intoxication and was trying to regain 
entry when the altercation occurred.   
¶32 In addition, the Board's investigative report pointed 
out that Ms. Vanderperren had stated on her Wisconsin bar 
admission application that her disorderly conduct violation had 
been "expunged."  According to the investigator, however, 
Hennepin County criminal court records revealed that Ms. 
Vanderperren's motion for expungement of that conviction had 
been denied.  There was apparently no dispute, however, that one 
year after Ms. Vanderperren's disorderly conduct conviction, it 
had been vacated and the citation dismissed.  
¶33 Although we, like the Board, are troubled by these 
incidents and concerned by the applicant's apparent initial lack 
of candor in revealing the full extent of the incidents in her 
application, 
we 
find 
the 
Board's 
Finding 
of 
Fact 
3.A. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
18 
 
problematic for several reasons.  First, we find no evidence in 
the record to support certain parts of this finding and 
accordingly those parts, at least, are clearly erroneous.  As 
noted, the Board's Finding of Fact 3.A. states that Ms. 
Vanderperren had used a fraudulently obtained license to operate 
a motor vehicle and that she was cited for "resisting arrest."  
The record reveals, however, that the initial charge of 
fraudulently 
obtaining 
a 
duplicate 
operating 
license 
was 
subsequently 
amended 
to 
possession 
of 
underage 
false 
identification to which Ms. Vanderperren pled guilty; moreover, 
the record does not support the conclusion that she used that 
license to operate a motor vehicle.  There is no dispute that at 
the time of the 1992 incident Ms. Vanderperren had her own valid 
driver's license albeit not in her possession at the time of her 
OWI arrest.  However, she was not charged with the separate 
statutory violation of operating a motor vehicle without a valid 
driver's license.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.05 (2001-02).  Moreover, 
as 
the 
Board's 
own 
investigative 
report 
details, 
Ms. 
Vanderperren was charged with "obstructing"——not "resisting"——
after she presented the false identification and was issued the 
citation under her sister's name.  
¶34 In addition, this finding by the Board referred to an 
assault charge in Minnesota that was subsequently amended to a 
municipal disorderly conduct offense.  The Board's finding, 
however, counts both.  Moreover, Ms. Vanderperren apparently 
never was charged with trespass as the Board's finding asserts. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
19 
 
¶35 Also, 
the 
Board's 
investigator 
criticized 
Ms. 
Vanderperren's claim that her disorderly conduct conviction had 
been "expunged" when actually her motion to expunge the 
conviction had been denied.  However, as noted, there is no 
dispute that the disorderly conduct conviction based on Ms. 
Vanderperren's guilty plea was subsequently vacated and the 
citation dismissed after a year.  We think the distinction 
between a conviction being "expunged" versus being "vacated and 
dismissed," is not so great as to warrant a finding of lack of 
candor 
on 
the 
applicant's 
part 
when 
using 
the 
terms 
interchangeably. 
 
 
If 
this 
could 
be 
viewed 
as 
a 
misrepresentation, it is certainly an immaterial one.  See BA 
6.03(h). 
¶36 In addition, we note that Finding of Fact 3.A. refers 
to a time period between 1987 and 1999.  It is undisputed, 
however, that since 1994 Ms. Vanderperren has been cited for 
only two speeding offenses: one in Minnesota in 1998, and 
another in Wisconsin in 1999.  It is not clear if the Board was 
referring to those speeding offenses in its Finding of Fact 
3.A.; in any event, Ms. Vanderperren's last alcohol-related 
citation was actually issued in 1994 and her last reported 
alcohol-related incident was her argument with her law school 
roommate in 1997.  
¶37 We also believe that this broadly written Finding of 
Fact 3.A. unduly emphasizes Ms. Vanderperren's past conduct as a 
basis for the Board's decision declining to certify her current 
character and fitness to practice law in this state. In In re 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
20 
 
Bar Admission of Gaylord, 155 Wis. 2d 816, 456 N.W.2d 590 
(1990), this court upheld the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Competence conclusion denying certification of that applicant's 
character and fitness; that conclusion was based on findings by 
the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility indicating 
that that applicant had not fully answered the question on her 
bar admission application concerning her past criminal and civil 
law violations.  In upholding the Board's decision to refuse to 
certify that applicant's character and fitness, this court in 
Gaylord emphasized that the basis of that decision was not the 
applicant's past conduct that led to three criminal offenses 
which she had revealed, although not fully explained, or to the 
numerous traffic offenses that that applicant had not revealed; 
rather, the applicant in Gaylord was denied admission because 
she failed to meet her burden to establish good moral character 
and fitness to practice law solely because of her inaccuracies 
and omissions in her applications——i.e., her lack of candor.  
The applicant in Gaylord was not denied admission based on her 
past bad conduct; rather, it was that applicant's lack of candor 
in not fully explaining that past conduct that was the basis for 
the Board and this court to reject her request for admission.  
Here 
we 
believe 
Ms. 
Vanderperren 
has 
fully——but 
perhaps 
belatedly——divulged all pertinent information about her past 
alcohol-related problems.  Those past problems should not now 
preclude her admission to the bar of this state on character and 
fitness grounds.  
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
21 
 
¶38 In the instant matter the Board's Finding of Fact 3.A. 
stands alone; it is not part of the subsequent Finding of Fact 
3.C. which is the Board's "lack of candor" finding against Ms. 
Vanderperren and which we discuss later in this opinion.  The 
fact that Ms. Vanderperren may have in her past received 
municipal or criminal citations stemming from her excessive 
consumption of alcohol does not mean that she does not meet the 
character and fitness requirement for admission to the Wisconsin 
bar.  To the extent that the Board's Finding of Fact 3.A. is not 
supported by evidence in the record we conclude it is clearly 
erroneous.   
¶39 A similar criticism may be lodged against the Board's 
Finding of Fact 3.B. where the Board found: "The applicant has 
been involved in misconduct towards her roommate while at 
Hamline University School of Law, resulting in the requirement 
that she attend AA meetings and counseling."   
¶40 This finding was based on a 1997 incident, also 
alcohol induced, in which Ms. Vanderperren and her African-
American roommate argued and Ms. Vanderperren made disparaging 
racial comments.  In response to her roommate's complaint that 
Ms. Vanderperren had violated the law school's code of conduct, 
the dean of the Hamline University School of Law appointed a law 
professor to investigate and file a report.  That professor 
later met with Ms. Vanderperren and, at his request, she then 
met with the law school's director of counseling for an 
evaluation. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
22 
 
¶41 The counselor assessed Ms. Vanderperren for possible 
alcoholism and determined that she was "borderline."  At the 
counselor's suggestion, Ms. Vanderperren attended AA meetings 
and continued counseling during the ensuing semester.  After 
reviewing 
Ms. 
Vanderperren's 
progress, 
the 
investigating 
professor submitted his report to the dean.  The professor 
stated  that he had investigated the roommate's allegation 
against Ms. Vanderperren and found "no probable cause and [I] 
recommend dismissal of the matter."  The investigating professor 
explained that his no probable cause finding was based on the 
fact that the roommate had agreed with the recommendation, that 
Ms. Vanderperren had participated in continuing counseling and 
had attended AA meetings regularly, and that she was willing to 
apologize to her roommate.  The dean accepted the recommendation 
and that matter was dismissed.  The dean sent letters to Ms. 
Vanderperren and her roommate stating that the university had 
determined that there was "no cause" to proceed.  
¶42 During the Board's subsequent character and fitness 
investigation it asked Ms. Vanderperren for more information 
concerning 
this 
1997 
roommate 
incident. 
 
As 
noted, 
Ms. 
Vanderperren filed an amended application for admission to the 
Wisconsin bar and included the following explanation of the 1997 
incident: 
Once again, I wasn't trying to be misleading and don't 
believe I was misleading the Board.  My understanding 
was if I were to send my roommate an apology, attend 
meetings, and continue to see the school therapist, 
that her allegations against me would be dropped.  
That is the only reason why I agreed to the above 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
23 
 
terms. 
 
Also, 
if 
I 
followed 
these 
terms, 
the 
allegations were not to be part of my file at Hamline.  
This 
is 
another 
indication 
that 
I 
thought 
the 
allegations were dropped.  I guess [I thought] the 
above conditions resolved the allegations.  However, 
my roommate did not file a formal complaint (to the 
best 
of 
my 
understanding) 
and 
I 
thought 
the 
allegations were no longer pursued and thus dropped.  
Before I graduated from Hemline [sic], I did check on 
these allegations and I asked Dean Martin to show me 
my file.  Dean Martin showed my file to me and there 
wasn't any mention of this incident.  
¶43 After 
reviewing 
the 
record, 
we 
agree 
with 
Ms. 
Vanderperren that based on the undisputed facts, the Board's 
Finding of Fact 3.B. that she had been involved in "misconduct" 
toward her roommate is clearly erroneous.  We are not persuaded 
by the Board's argument that although the university may have 
made no finding that Ms. Vanderperren had engaged in misconduct 
toward her roommate, the Board could make its own determination 
that she had been involved in "misconduct."  Nor are we 
convinced by the Board's argument that the law school actually 
made a "tacit" finding that Ms. Vanderperren had engaged in 
misconduct toward her roommate because otherwise there would 
have been no need for her to apologize or undergo alcohol and 
psychological testing.  We think the determination made by the 
university of no probable cause cannot be transmuted into a 
finding that Ms. Vanderperren had engaged in "misconduct" toward 
her roommate.  We observe that the Board cited no specific 
university code provision that Ms. Vanderperren's conduct had 
violated; rather, it was the Board's subjective assessment that 
Ms. Vanderperren's actions, which were never substantiated by 
the university's investigation, constituted misconduct.  Because 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
24 
 
the Board's Finding of Fact 3.B. that Ms. Vanderperren had been 
involved 
in 
"misconduct" 
toward 
her 
roommate 
is 
clearly 
erroneous, that finding cannot be used to support the Board's 
ultimate conclusions regarding her character and fitness.  
¶44 The Board's Finding of Fact 3.C., as noted above, is 
actually its "lack of candor" determination.  In that finding 
the Board stated: "The applicant provided incomplete and false 
statements in her application to Hamline University School of 
Law and to the Board."   
¶45 As 
noted, 
however, 
most 
if 
not 
all 
of 
Ms. 
Vanderperren's 
initial 
statements 
and 
explanations 
were 
subsequently corrected by her in her additional materials and 
her testimony before the Board and her amended applications.  
Apparently, the "false" statement the Board referred to was her 
negative answer to the question on her December 1995 law school 
application asking "[h]ave you ever been convicted of any 
violation of law other than a juvenile offense?" 
¶46 When the Board subsequently asked for additional 
information from Ms. Vanderperren about this answer, she filed a 
second 
amended 
bar 
application 
accompanied 
by 
another 
explanatory letter.  In this second explanatory letter Ms. 
Vanderperren wrote that she had answered "no" to that question 
on the law school application because she had misunderstood the 
question.  She further explained that shortly after classes 
began 
the 
dean 
and 
other 
law 
school 
faculty 
held 
an 
informational meeting with the student body and emphasized the 
importance of providing accurate information on the law school 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
25 
 
application form.  Ms. Vanderperren wrote that after that 
meeting she went to the dean and amended her application to 
reflect her earlier citation.  In her explanatory letter 
accompanying her second amended bar application Ms. Vanderperren 
wrote: 
To the best of my understanding at the time I filled 
out the [Hamline] application the OWI I [had] received 
was considered a civil misdemeanor and the question 
was worded in a criminal context.  It was early into 
the first semester of law school, when the Dean and 
Professor Butterfoss addressed the issue of omission 
of incidents on law school applications.  I made an 
appointment 
with 
the 
Dean 
and 
explained 
the 
misinterpretation and asked how I would go about 
amending my application.  I then amended my law school 
application.  This should be noted in my file at 
Hamline.  
¶47 Although the Board's Finding of Fact 3.C. that Ms. 
Vanderperren 
had 
provided 
incomplete 
statements 
in 
her 
application forms may not be clearly erroneous, we believe this 
finding discounts the alternative directive in SCR 40.06(3), 
that "[t]he board shall decline to certify the character and 
fitness of an applicant who knowingly makes a materially false 
statement of material fact or who fails to disclose a fact 
necessary to correct a misapprehension . . . ."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Here, Ms. Vanderperren, in fact, disclosed the facts 
necessary to correct the misapprehension.  She voluntarily did 
so with respect to the law school application form and she 
likewise corrected her bar admission application when questioned 
by the Board.  
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
26 
 
¶48 In an effort to avoid unduly lengthening this opinion, 
we think it necessary to briefly discuss only three additional 
findings of the Board.  
¶49 In Finding of Fact 3.D. the Board referred to two AODA 
assessments of Ms. Vanderperren, one by Hamline Law School and 
the other by the Minnesota Board of Law Examiners.  In its 
Finding of Fact 3.D. the Board wrote:  "The applicant was asked 
to undergo AODA assessments by Hamline University School of Law 
and the Minnesota Board of Law Examiners, which assessments 
concluded that your alcohol use had been problematic in the past 
but that it appeared to be in remission."   
¶50 In fact, the Board only had before it the Minnesota 
Board of Law Examiners' AODA assessment of Ms. Vanderperren.  
The record before this court now has been supplemented with 
Hamline's AODA report.  Both AODA assessments are favorable to 
Ms. Vanderperren, and contrary to the Board's finding that her 
alcohol use "appeared to be in remission," neither report uses 
that equivocal phrase.  The Minnesota report states that Ms. 
Vanderperren's alcohol abuse is "in full remission," and the 
Hamline AODA report states that the Law school assessor found 
"insufficient signs . . . to make a positive determination of 
[alcohol] dependency or abuse." 
¶51 We find the Board Finding of Fact 3.D. to be generally 
irrelevant because it does not support the determination that 
Ms. Vanderperren does not possess the appropriate character or 
fitness to practice law in this state.  This finding does not 
relate to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
27 
 
Board's ultimate determination because it is not a finding that 
she is alcohol dependent.  See BA 6.02(j).  Moreover, it has 
little probative value concerning Ms. Vanderperren's character 
and fitness to practice law in this state.  See State v. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  Even if 
it were true that two AODA assessments——one in 1997 and the 
other in 2000——concluded that Ms. Vanderperren's alcohol use had 
been "problematic in the past" but now "appeared to be in 
remission," that would not be of consequence in determining her 
current character and fitness.  
¶52 Similarly, the Board's Finding of Fact 3.E. is also 
generally irrelevant.  That finding states: "The applicant 
continued to work as a bartender from September 1993 through 
January 2002 (with a 3/99 to 9/00 hiatus, when she worked as a 
server)."  That finding, even if not clearly erroneous, has 
nothing to do with Ms. Vanderperren's character or fitness to 
practice law.  Even if one is alcohol dependent, working as a 
bartender is not blameworthy. 
¶53 We observe, however, that that finding is related to 
the Board's fourth Finding of Fact which the Board mislabeled as 
Finding of Fact 3.  In that fourth finding the Board stated: 
"The applicant was afforded opportunities to demonstrate that 
she had rehabilitated herself and failed to do so, for the 
reason that she continued to seek and obtain employment in 
alcohol-related 
settings 
despite 
having 
undergone 
AODA 
evaluations, counseling and participation in AA."   
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
28 
 
¶54 Again, this court concludes that that finding, clearly 
erroneous or not, is irrelevant.  Moreover, Ms. Vanderperren 
claims that she no longer drinks alcohol.  We believe that 
claim, supported by the fact that she has not had any reported 
alcohol-related 
incidents 
since 
1997, 
belies 
the 
Board's 
determination that she has failed to rehabilitate herself.  
¶55 In summary, after our de novo review of the record, we 
conclude that even if all of the Board's findings could be 
described as not clearly erroneous, we think the findings do not 
support the Board's ultimate conclusion that Ms. Vanderperren 
has failed to establish the requisite character and fitness to 
be admitted to the practice of law in this state.9  On the 
contrary, even if all the Board's findings are unassailable, we 
conclude that Ms. Vanderperren has the appropriate character and 
fitness to be admitted to practice in this state based on the 
guidelines set out in BA 6.02 and BA 6.03.  We note, for 
example, that: (1) she was relatively young when she received 
the various alcohol-related citations, see BA 6.03(a); (2) her 
last alcohol-related incident for which she was cited occurred 
in 1994 and her alcohol-related difficulty with her roommate 
                                                 
9 In this respect, we also note that there is no finding by 
the Board relating to paragraph 3 of its conclusions that Ms. 
Vanderperren " . . . repeatedly showed contempt for authority in 
her encounters with law enforcement."  We acknowledge that the 
Board's investigative report detailed some of Ms. Vanderperren's 
comments to the police officers at the time of her arrests, 
however, the Board made no specific findings of fact that would 
support this conclusion that she repeatedly showed contempt for 
authority.   
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
29 
 
occurred in 1997, see BA 6.03(b); (3) on a continuum of 
"seriousness," the offenses for which she has been cited were at 
most misdemeanors and most were traffic offenses, see BA 
6.03(d); (4) the lack of any recent alcohol-related incidents——
or for that matter the lack of any recent incidents at all——
demonstrate that she has been rehabilitated and is, as she 
claims, no longer drinking, see BA 6.03(f); and (5) Ms. 
Vanderperren's initial lack of candor in the admission process, 
see BA 6.03(g), and the materiality of any omissions or 
misrepresentations by her in her applications, see BA 6.03(h), 
when compared to prior cases such as In re Bar Admission of 
Gaylord and In re Bar Admission of Heckman, 206 Wis. 2d 280, 556 
N.W.2d 746 (1996), support a conclusion that her past conduct 
was neither shocking nor of great significance in determining 
her current character and fitness.  
¶56 Although this case is factually distinguishable from 
In re Bar Admission of Rusch, 171 Wis. 2d 523, 492 N.W.2d 153 
(1992), we conclude here, as we did in Rusch, that incorrect 
answers on a bar admission application, all of which were 
subsequently corrected, are generally an insufficient basis for 
a conclusion that the applicant has failed to establish the 
requisite character and fitness to be admitted to the bar in 
this state.  
¶57 Moreover, we find it significant that this applicant 
has been admitted to the bar of the State of Minnesota after 
that 
state 
conducted 
its 
own 
character 
and 
fitness 
investigation.  Under BA 6.02(k), the Board of Bar Examiners is 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
30 
 
instructed to consider as relevant conduct, the denial of the 
applicant's admission to the bar of another jurisdiction on 
character and fitness grounds.  If denial of admission on those 
grounds in another state is relevant, then we believe the 
converse is also true; a favorable determination by another 
state that the applicant possesses the character and fitness to 
be admitted to the bar in that other jurisdiction should also be 
considered relevant.   This is especially true when, as here, 
the admission in the other state was recent and there have been 
no new or intervening facts to impugn the other jurisdiction's 
determination that the applicant possesses the appropriate 
character and fitness to be admitted to the bar of that 
jurisdiction.  Here, Minnesota admitted Ms. Vanderperren to the 
bar of that state in April of 2000.  There is no evidence of any 
subsequent untoward events involving Ms. Vanderperren which 
would cast doubt on that jurisdiction's admission determination.  
¶58 We fully 
appreciate 
the 
time-consuming 
and 
very 
difficult job the Board of Bar Examiners performs in conducting 
its character and fitness investigation pursuant to SCR 40.06.  
We conclude, however, after our own mandated de novo review, 
that the incidents from Ms. Vanderperren's past cited by the 
Board to support its fact-driven determination that she lacks 
the character and fitness to be admitted to the bar of this 
state, are not of sufficient gravity for us to adopt that 
conclusion.  Indeed, we hold that the record evidence, taken as 
a whole, does not support the ultimate conclusion that Ms. 
No. 
02-1739-BA   
 
31 
 
Vanderperren has failed to establish the requisite character and 
fitness to be admitted to the bar in this state.  
¶59 Because we reverse the decision of the Board declining 
to certify Ms. Vanderperren's character and fitness requirement 
for bar admissions for the reasons identified above, we deem it 
unnecessary to address the other arguments, including her due 
process claims as set out in her brief.  
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners declining to certify that Tara Jean Vanderperren has 
satisfied the requirements for admission to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board 
for further action consistent with this order.  
No.  02-1739.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶61 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case raises 
troubling questions about our procedures for reviewing an 
applicant's request for admission to the Wisconsin bar. 
¶62 Under SCR ch. 40, the Board of Bar Examiners screens 
each applicant.  A candidate must satisfy the legal competence 
requirements set out in SCR 40.03, SCR 40.04, or SCR 40.05, and 
also satisfy the character and fitness requirements in SCR 
40.06.  The burden is on the applicant.  The Board certifies its 
favorable findings to this court. 
¶63 The Board is in a delicate position when certification 
of an applicant's character presents a close call.  In re Bar 
Admission of Rippl, 2002 WI 15, ¶3, 250 Wis. 2d 519, 523, 639 
N.W.2d 553.  "If the Board admits a questionable candidate, that 
admission effectively deprives this court of the opportunity to 
review the Board's decision because, obviously, a successful 
applicant will not seek review of the Board's decision."  Id.  
On the other hand, if the Board declines to certify a 
questionable candidate, it opens itself to reversal on appeal 
and even to published criticism. 
¶64 This criticism is linked to our standard of review.  
We adopt the Board's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Majority op. at ¶20.  However, if the court comes to 
a different ultimate conclusion on admission, we are almost 
bound to take issue with the Board's findings of fact.  This 
puts the Board in not only a delicate position but also a 
vulnerable position.  If the Board certified all applicants 
regardless of their indiscretions, it would never be reversed or 
No.  02-1739.dtp 
 
2 
 
criticized, for the court would be oblivious to what was 
happening.  The Board's dilemma is disconcerting. 
¶65 In this case, I concur in the judgment that Tara J. 
Vanderperren should be admitted to practice law in Wisconsin.  
In my view, the applicant clearly established her competence: 
she was graduated from a recognized law school and then passed 
the Minnesota, Florida, and Wisconsin bar examinations.  In 
addition, she is admitted to practice in Minnesota.  With 
respect to her character and fitness, the incidents described 
are serious but they are mostly youthful excesses and mistakes, 
and cannot block her admission forever.  All in all, I believe 
the applicant deserves the benefit of the doubt.  She should 
have the opportunity to begin the practice of law with a clean 
slate——with an understanding of the importance that courts 
attach to character and ethics and a warning that this court has 
a long memory. 
¶66 I reach this conclusion without criticism of our 
Board.  I write separately to emphasize that the Board was doing 
its job to protect the bar and the public when it flagged this 
case. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
 
No.  02-1739.dtp 
 
 
 
1