Title: Commonwealth v. Morris

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  ALL THE JUSTICES 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 092163  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 13, 2011 
EMMANUEL MORRIS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
Donald M. Haddock, Judge 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 092346 
 
WELLYN FLORES CHAN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 
 
In these two appeals in which criminal defendants were 
convicted and sentenced pursuant to guilty pleas, we consider 
whether each of the trial courts erred by granting motions for 
writs of error coram vobis1 and audita querela to modify the 
criminal sentences imposed several years previously.  
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
A.  Commonwealth of Virginia v. Emmanuel Morris 
Emmanuel Morris (“Morris”) was charged with grand larceny 
pursuant to Code § 18.2-95 in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Alexandria.  Prior to trial, Morris’ attorney asked whether he 
                     
1 For purposes of this opinion, we use the term “coram 
vobis,” as recognized in Code § 8.01-677.  We previously have 
deemed coram vobis to include the term “coram nobis” and noted 
that both shall be considered to be the same proceeding in 
modern pleading and practice.  Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 274 
Va. 503, 509 n.5, 650 S.E.2d 514, 517 n.5 (2007). 
was a U.S. citizen.  Morris responded by showing him a “green 
card,” indicating that he was a lawful permanent resident.  
Morris’ attorney replied, “good, then [I] can pursue [sic] the 
Judge to give [you] a lesser sentence based upon [your] 
pleading Guilty to the charge instead of prolonging the trial.”  
Upon his guilty plea, Morris was convicted of one count of 
petit larceny and sentenced to 12 months in jail with 11 months 
suspended. 
Morris later applied for United States citizenship in 
2004, but his application was not approved; rather, Morris 
became subject to removal proceedings under the federal 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) because of his 1997 
conviction for “a crime involving moral turpitude . . . for 
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)&(II) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  
Consequently, in December 2008, an immigration judge2 ordered 
that Morris be deported. 
Following the order of deportation, Morris filed a motion 
in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria for a writ of 
error coram vobis or, alternatively, a writ of audita querela, 
requesting the trial court to modify his criminal sentence.  
The trial court issued an opinion letter holding that the writs 
                     
2 The immigration court is an administrative court run by 
the United States Department of Justice’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review. 
 
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of error coram vobis and audita querela are appropriate to 
review and modify a criminal sentence in Virginia under the 
facts of Morris’ case.  Accordingly, the trial court reduced 
Morris’ sentence by one day, which decreased his total sentence 
to 364 days.3   
B.  Commonwealth of Virginia v. Wellyn Flores Chan 
Wellyn Flores Chan (“Chan”) was convicted, pursuant to a 
guilty plea, of misdemeanor assault and battery in the Circuit 
Court for the City of Norfolk in 2005.  Chan was sentenced to 
12 months’ imprisonment with all 12 months suspended, 
conditioned upon good behavior for 12 months. 
In 2009, Chan applied for a duplicate legal permanent 
resident card with the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) to begin the process to become a 
naturalized American citizen.  At that time, USCIS learned of 
Chan’s prior conviction and determined that she was subject to 
mandatory detention and deportation under the INA, because she 
had been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which carried a 
sentence of at least one year.  The INA definition of an 
“aggravated felony” includes crimes that are neither 
“aggravated” nor “felonies” under state criminal law.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).  In relevant 
                     
3 Significantly, 364 days is less than one year (or 12 
months) for purposes of the INA.  See Bayudan v. Ashcroft, 298 
F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
3
part, the INA definition of an “aggravated felony” includes a 
conviction for any “crime of violence” that carried a sentence 
of “at least one year,” including suspended time.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).  Consequently, immigration agents detained 
Chan in April of 2009, at which time she became subject to 
deportation proceedings. 
Chan moved to dismiss the action for her deportation in 
the immigration court but her motion was denied.  However, the 
immigration court granted Chan additional time to seek relief 
from the courts of the Commonwealth.  Chan filed a petition for 
writs of audita querela and coram vobis in the Circuit Court 
for the City of Norfolk.  The trial court subsequently heard 
oral argument on Chan’s petition, granted her petition, and 
amended her sentence to “360 days as opposed to 12 months” by a 
nunc pro tunc order. 
The Commonwealth timely filed its notice of appeal in both 
cases, and we granted an appeal in each case on the following 
assignments of error: 
For Morris, Record No. 092163: 
 
1. 
The Trial Court erred in its decision finding 
authority to apply the Writ of Coram Vobis, or 
alternatively the Writ of Audita Querela, as an 
appropriate remedy. 
 
2. 
The Trial Court erred in granting Appellee relief 
under the Writ of Coram Vobis. 
 
 
 
4
For Chan, Record No. 092346: 
 
1. 
The trial court erred in holding that it possessed 
jurisdiction to modify a criminal defendant’s 
sentence over four years after the trial court’s 
entry of the final sentencing order in the case, 
where the 21-day period proscribed by Rule 1:1 had 
elapsed and where there were no applicable exceptions 
to the rule. 
 
2. 
The trial court erred in holding that the traditional 
equitable Writ of Error Audita Querela is an 
available remedy in criminal cases. 
 
3. 
Even if the Writ of Error Audita Querela is 
applicable to criminal proceedings, the trial court 
erred in issuing a Writ of Error Audita Querela under 
the circumstances of this case because it has 
provided the defendant with a secondary, non-
statutory remedy for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
4. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court relied upon 
the alternative relief requested, the trial court 
erred in modifying the defendant’s finalized sentence 
through a Writ of Error Coram Vobis. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
“We review questions of law de novo, including those 
situations where there is a mixed question of law and fact.”  
Westgate at Williamsburg Condo. Ass’n v. Philip Richardson Co., 
270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005).  Similarly, 
an issue of statutory interpretation is a pure 
question of law which we review de novo.  When 
the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are 
bound by the plain meaning of that language.  
Furthermore, we must give effect to the 
legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of 
the language would result in a manifest 
 
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absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more than 
one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted). 
B.  Rule 1:1 
Rule 1:1 provides that, “[a]ll final judgments, orders, 
and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under 
the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, 
vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of 
entry, and no longer.”  We previously have stated that “[t]here 
are strong policy reasons favoring certainty of results in 
judicial proceedings. Accordingly, we attach a high degree of 
finality to judgments, whether obtained by default or 
otherwise.  Rule 1:1 implements that policy, and we apply it 
rigorously, unless a statute creates a clear exception to its 
operation.”  McEwen Lumber Co. v. Lipscomb Brothers Lumber Co., 
234 Va. 243, 247, 360 S.E.2d 845, 848 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
Therefore, “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute . . . 
Rule 1:1 prohibits the modification of a final order more than 
21 days after the date of entry.”  Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 
Va. 14, 17 n.*, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 n.* (2005).  Accordingly, 
“Rule 1:1 and long standing case law applying that rule 
 
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preclude a trial court from entering a second sentencing order 
altering an original sentencing order that has become final.”  
Id. at 19, 613 S.E.2d at 434 (citing Robertson v. 
Superintendent of the Wise Correctional Unit, 248 Va. 232, 236, 
445 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1994); Conner v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 
455, 457, 150 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1966)).   
However the policy of finality contained in Rule 1:1 is 
not absolute.  “The General Assembly has enacted various 
exceptions to this policy, [including] Code § 19.2-303 (court 
may modify unserved portion of sentence at any time before 
defendant is transferred to Department of Corrections) [and] 
Code § 8.01-428 (court may modify final order in certain listed 
circumstances)” Charles, 270 Va. at 17 n.*, 613 S.E.2d at 433 
n.*, including fraud on the court, see Code § 8.01-428(D).  
Additionally, Code § 8.01-654, providing for the writ of habeas 
corpus, is an exception to the policy of finality contained in 
Rule 1:1. 
Perhaps most notably for the purposes of these cases, the 
writ of audita querela and Code § 8.01-677 (error coram vobis) 
also provide exceptions to Rule 1:1 under proper circumstances.  
However, these cases do not fall within the contemplated 
circumstances required by Code § 8.01-677 for error coram 
vobis, and audita querela is not available for use to modify 
criminal sentences in Virginia. 
 
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C.  Writ of Error Coram Vobis 
In Dobie v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 762, 769, 96 S.E.2d 747, 
752 (1957), we explained the origin and function of the ancient 
common law writ of coram vobis: 
The principal function of the writ is to afford 
to the court in which an action was tried an 
opportunity to correct its own record with 
reference to a vital fact not known when the 
judgment was rendered, and which could not have 
been presented by a motion for a new trial, 
appeal or other existing statutory proceeding.  
It lies for an error of fact not apparent on the 
record, not attributable to the applicant’s 
negligence, and which if known by the court 
would have prevented rendition of the judgment.  
It does not lie for newly-discovered evidence or 
newly-arising facts, or facts adjudicated on the 
trial.  It is not available where advantage 
could have been taken of the alleged error at 
the trial, as where the facts complained of were 
known before or at the trial, or where at the 
trial the accused or his attorney knew of the 
existence of such facts but failed to present 
them. 
 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.)  However, “[a]s a common 
law writ, coram vobis has been substantially limited by the 
General Assembly through Code § 8.01-677.”  Neighbors v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 503, 508, 650 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2007).  
Code  § 8.01-677 states that “[f]or any clerical error or error 
in fact for which a judgment may be reversed or corrected on 
writ of error coram vobis, the same may be reversed or 
corrected on motion, after reasonable notice, by the court.”  
We specifically recognized the restriction of a writ of error 
 
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coram vobis only to clerical errors and certain errors of fact 
when we reviewed the nearly identical statutory predecessor to 
Code § 8.01-6774:  
Our statute is in simple, clear and unambiguous 
language, and we read it to mean what it says.  
It does not provide that it may be used to 
obtain a writ of error, or an appeal, or for any 
purpose other than to correct a “clerical error 
or error in fact.”  . . . If its provisions 
should be widened, the enlargement should be 
effected by the legislature. 
 
Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 74, 155 S.E.2d 351, 356 (1967).  
We recognized this restriction of coram vobis again in 
Neighbors, 274 Va. at 511, 650 S.E.2d at 518.  As these cases 
involve no allegations of clerical error below, we will focus 
our analysis on whether the circumstances of these cases 
include “errors of fact” for which coram vobis would lie.  
Specifically, we have held that such errors of fact 
include cases “ ‘where judgment is rendered against a party 
after his death, or who is an infant.’ ”  Dobie, 198 Va. at 
770, 96 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Richardson v. Jones, 53 Va. (12 
Gratt.) 53, 55 (1855)).  Significantly, such errors of fact do 
not merely render the judgment voidable upon a certain showing, 
as in cases where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged 
                     
4 Former Code § 8-485 (1957), which we reviewed in Blowe, 
stated: “For any clerical error or error in fact for which a 
judgment or decree may be reversed or corrected on writ of 
error coram vobis, the same may be reversed or corrected on 
motion, after reasonable notice, by the court, or by the judge 
thereof in vacation.” 
 
9
or where required notices have not been given.  See Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984); Nelson v. Warden, 
262 Va. 276, 280, 552 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2001). 
Accordingly, the essential question in the cases before us 
is whether there was an “error of fact not apparent on the 
record, not attributable to the applicant’s negligence, and 
which if known by the court would have prevented rendition of 
the judgment.”  Dobie, 198 Va. at 769, 96 S.E.2d at 752 
(emphasis added).  To answer this question, we must focus on 
the moment when Morris and Chan entered their guilty pleas to 
determine whether such an error of fact existed that would have 
prevented the court from having the authority to enter 
judgment.  We hold that there was no such error of fact.  
Chan asserts that the error of fact that would have 
prevented the trial court from proceeding to judgment in her 
case is that “counsel for Ms. Chan never made the trial court 
aware of the facts that Ms. Chan was not born in the United 
States and that she was not a citizen of the United States.”  
We cannot agree that this “error” is the kind contemplated by 
Code § 8.01-677 for the purposes of coram vobis.  While the 
trial court might have been inclined to impose a lesser 
sentence had it known of Chan’s non-citizen status, it still 
had the authority to render judgment against Chan.  
 
10
Accordingly, the trial court erred in relying upon the writ of 
error coram vobis to amend Chan’s original sentencing order. 
 
Similarly, Morris asserts that “ineffective assistance of 
counsel resulting in dire immigration consequences [should] be 
deemed an error in fact[,]” that would have prevented the trial 
court from rendering judgment in his case.  The trial court 
agreed.  Specifically, the trial court in Morris’ case 
identified the error of fact as the “misinformation” provided 
to Morris in response to Morris’ indication of his immigration 
status, when Morris’ attorney replied, “good, then [I] can 
pursue the Judge to give [you] a lesser sentence based upon 
[your] pleading Guilty to the charge instead of prolonging the 
trial.”  The trial court included in the identification of 
“error of fact,” the “failure to inform the [c]ourt” of the 
“fact of misinformation to [Morris].”  The trial court in 
Morris concluded in its letter opinion of June 26, 2009, “a 
conviction entered by the Court without full knowledge of the 
facts either by the Court or by the defendant at the time of 
his plea due to misadvice by his counsel would qualify as ‘an 
error of fact for which a judgment may be reversed or 
corrected.’ ” 
However, the trial court did not consider the type of 
error for which coram vobis will lie.  As we previously have 
held, the proper test is whether the alleged error constitutes 
 
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“an error of fact not apparent on the record, not attributable 
to the applicant’s negligence, and which if known by the court 
would have prevented rendition of the judgment.”  Dobie, 198 
Va. at 769, 96 S.E.2d at 752 (emphasis added).  While 
ineffective assistance of counsel may render a judgment 
voidable upon the necessary showing, it does not render the 
trial court incapable of rendering judgment, as do the errors 
of fact in cases “ ‘where judgment is rendered against a party 
after his death, or who is an infant.’ ”  Dobie, 198 Va. at 
770, 96 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Richardson, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 
at 55). 
Accordingly, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
does not constitute an error of fact for which coram vobis will 
lie under Code § 8.01-677, because such a claim would not “have 
prevented rendition of the judgment.”  Dobie, 198 Va. at 769, 
96 S.E.2d at 752.  The trial court erred in relying upon coram 
vobis to modify Morris’ original sentencing order. 
It should be noted that in making his ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument, Morris relied in large part 
upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010), 
regarding the obligation of counsel to advise non-citizen 
criminal defendants whether a particular plea carries the risk 
of deportation.  In Padilla, the Supreme Court stated that it 
 
12
is the Court’s “responsibility under the Constitution to ensure 
that no criminal defendant – whether a citizen or not – is left 
to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’ ”  Id. (citation 
omitted; emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel who represent non-citizen criminal defendants to 
“inform [their] client whether his [or her] plea carries a risk 
of deportation.”  Id. 
While Chan asserts a different “error of fact,” she made a 
similar argument regarding the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Padilla.  Morris’ and Chan’s reliance on Padilla is misplaced.  
While Morris and Chan may have suffered ineffective assistance 
of counsel according to Padilla, and may have been successful 
had they timely filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-654, neither did so.  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel does not constitute an error of fact for 
the purposes of coram vobis under Code § 8.01-677. 
D.  Writ of Audita Querela 
The common law writ of audita querela originated in 
England in the early 14th century to provide relief to civil 
judgment debtors.  See Ira P. Robbins, The Revitalization of 
the Common-Law Civil Writ of Audita Querela as a Post-
Conviction Remedy in Criminal Cases: The Immigration Context 
and Beyond, 6 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 643, 646 (1992) (citing 
 
13
Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 
394 (5th ed. 1956)).5 
Code § 1-200 states that, “[t]he common law of England, 
insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of 
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in 
full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except 
as altered by the General Assembly.”  Additionally, Code § 1-
201 states that,  
[t]he right and benefit of all writs, remedial 
and judicial, given by any statute or act of 
Parliament, made in aid of the common law prior 
to the fourth year of the reign of James the 
First [1606-1607], of a general nature, not 
local to England, shall still be saved, insofar 
as the same are consistent with the Bill of 
Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth and 
the Acts of Assembly. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
The fourth year of the reign of James the First coincided 
with the founding of Jamestown.  Consequently, our adoption of 
English common law, and the rights and benefits of all writs in 
aid of English common law, ends in 1607 upon the establishment 
of the first permanent English settlement in America, 
Jamestown.  From that time forward, the common law we recognize 
is that which has been developed in Virginia.  More simply 
                     
5 See also Black’s Law Dictionary 150 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining audita querela as “[a] writ available to a judgment 
debtor who seeks a rehearing of a matter on grounds of newly 
discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses”). 
 
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stated, English common law and writs in aid of it prior to the 
settlement of Jamestown (insofar as the same are consistent 
with the Bill of Rights and Constitution of the Commonwealth 
and the Acts of Assembly), together with common law developed 
in Virginia thereafter, constitute the corpus of common law 
that guides our analysis. 
Accordingly, the writ of audita querela, which was part of 
the common law prior to 1607, is the law of the Commonwealth.  
Because the General Assembly has never abolished the writ of 
audita querela in Virginia, it continues in force today by 
virtue of Code §§ 1-200 and 1-201. 
However, while the General Assembly has not abolished the 
writ, we have noted that “[i]t seems to be true that in our 
practice the motion to quash is a summary remedy in use in all 
cases where by the ancient practice the party would be entitled 
to a writ of audita querela.”  Lowenbach v. Kelley, 111 Va. 
439, 443, 69 S.E. 352, 354 (1910) (citing Steele v. Boyd, 33 
Va. (6 Leigh) 547, 552-53 (1835)).  Accordingly, while audita 
querela may still exist in Virginia, it has fallen into disuse 
in civil practice.  See Steele, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) at 552-54; 
Smock v. Dade, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 639, 644-45 (1826) (“[W]e are 
satisfied . . . that the more summary, and less expensive mode 
of proceeding by motion [is] proper, and that relief may be 
given in this way in all cases, where by the ancient practice 
 
15
the party would be entitled to an Audita Querela.”); Nicolson 
v. Hancock, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 491, 501 (1810) (observing 
that audita querela “has long since given way to a summary mode 
of relief upon motion”). 
What is certain is that the writ of audita querela has 
never been applicable to modify a criminal sentence in 
Virginia.  The only cases in which this Court has considered 
audita querela have involved civil judgments.  See, e.g., 
Lowenbach, 111 Va. at 443, 69 S.E. at 354; Steele, 33 Va. (6 
Leigh) at 547; Smock, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 644-45. 
The practice in Virginia is the same as it was in England.  
The writ was only available at common law in England for use by 
civil judgment debtors.  See Turner v. Davies, 85 Eng. Rep. 
871, 878-79 (1670).  Specifically, the writ was available for 
use by judgment debtors to release them from judgment where the 
judgment “ought not to have issued,” such as in cases “where 
the party has a good defence [sic], but had not, nor has any 
other means to take advantage of it,” id. at 878-79, or where 
the debtors had paid the debt or otherwise been discharged from 
the obligation.  See, e.g., Ognel v. Randol, 79 Eng. Rep. 23 
(1701); Corbett v. Barnes, 79 Eng. Rep. 985 (1792).  There does 
not appear to be any case in England prior to 1607 in which the 
writ was used to seek post-conviction relief from a criminal 
sentence.   
 
16
Some jurisdictions have held that audita querela is 
available as a remedy to modify a criminal sentence.  See Keith 
v. State, 163 So. 884, 885 (Fla. 1935); Balsley v. 
Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).  
However, neither this Court nor any English court prior to the 
writ’s adoption in this Commonwealth has ever applied the writ 
of audita querela in this manner.  We will not do so now. 
Based upon the purpose and history of audita querela at 
common law in both England and Virginia, we hold that the writ 
of audita querela is not available to seek post-conviction 
relief from criminal sentences in Virginia. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the errors of fact 
alleged by Morris and Chan in the cases before us do not 
constitute “errors of fact” for the purposes of coram vobis, as 
contemplated by Code § 8.01-677.  Also, we hold that the writ 
of audita querela may not be used to seek post-conviction 
relief from criminal sentences in Virginia.  Accordingly, the 
trial courts erred in their reliance upon the writs of error 
coram vobis and audita querela to modify the criminal sentences 
imposed in these cases, and we will reverse the judgment of the 
Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria and the judgment of 
the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk in these cases, and 
dismiss the petitions.  
 
17
Record No. 092163 - Reversed and dismissed. 
Record No. 092346 - Reversed and dismissed. 
 
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