Title: Commonwealth v. Fontanez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-12469 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAFAEL FONTANEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2018. - April 16, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Evidence, Testimony at prior proceeding, Previous testimony of 
unavailable witness, Identification.  Identification.  
Practice, Criminal, Appeal by Commonwealth, Interlocutory 
appeal, Confrontation of witnesses, Waiver.  Constitutional 
Law, Identification, Confrontation of witnesses, Waiver of 
constitutional rights.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 25, 2017. 
 
 
The case was considered by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Thomas D. Frothingham for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of a 
single justice of this court denying its petition for relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The Commonwealth petitioned the 
single justice to vacate a Superior Court judge's order allowing 
2 
 
 
the criminal defendant's motion in limine to exclude prior 
recorded testimony.  The single justice denied the petition 
without a hearing, stating, "This is not an exceptional 
circumstance requiring the exercise of the [c]ourt's 
extraordinary power, and in any event, the Commonwealth has not 
shown that the trial judge abused his discretion."  We reverse. 
 
Background.  For purposes of our review, the undisputed 
facts are as follows.  The defendant was indicted for armed 
assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).  The alleged 
victim was stabbed in a bar in Springfield and, when presented 
with a photographic array, identified the defendant as the 
culprit.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress that and 
other out-of-court identifications.  He also moved to remain out 
of view during eyewitness testimony at the hearing on his 
motion.  The defendant's motion to remain out of view was 
allowed, and during witness testimony the defendant sat behind 
the judge's bench.  He did not see the witnesses, and the 
witnesses did not see him.  After the hearing, the defendant's 
motion to suppress identification was denied as to three 
witnesses, including the victim, and allowed as to one witness.  
The victim subsequently died for reasons unrelated to the 
stabbing. 
3 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth moved in limine to introduce at trial a 
transcript of the victim's testimony from the suppression 
hearing, and the defendant filed a motion in opposition.  In a 
written decision, a judge, other than the judge who ruled on the 
defendant's motion to suppress, concluded that admitting the 
transcript in evidence would violate the defendant's right to 
face-to-face confrontation under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights because the defendant sat out of view 
during the suppression hearing.  Accordingly, the judge allowed 
the defendant's motion to exclude the victim's prior testimony 
and denied the Commonwealth's motion to admit the testimony. 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the Commonwealth petitioned 
a single justice of this court to vacate the judge's order 
excluding the victim's prior testimony.1  The single justice 
                     
 
1 We have considered a preliminary procedural question not 
addressed by the parties:  whether, instead of petitioning 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the Commonwealth should have 
sought leave to appeal from the single justice pursuant to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017).  
Although the underlying matter arose on cross motions in limine 
and not on a motion to suppress, the defendant's motion and the 
judge's ruling on it had some of the same characteristics as a 
suppression motion and ruling.  See Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 
Mass. 715, 718 (2016); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 
15-16 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 437, 437-438 (2009), in 
which we considered a nearly identical motion pursuant to Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2). 
 
 
Both sides proceeded in the county court and in the full 
court as if Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 did not apply.  The single 
4 
 
 
denied the petition without a hearing, stating, "This is not an 
exceptional circumstance requiring the exercise of the [c]ourt's 
extraordinary power, and in any event, the Commonwealth has not 
shown that the trial judge abused his discretion."  The 
Commonwealth appealed from this decision to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  "In reviewing the single justice's 
determination to deny the Commonwealth's petition brought under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, this court looks to whether 'the single 
justice abused his or her discretion or made a clear error of 
law.'"  Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 685 (2018), quoting 
Rogan v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 376, 378 (1993).  "An abuse of 
discretion occurs only where the judge makes 'a clear error of 
judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision 
. . . , such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives."  Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 
242 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018), quoting L.L. 
v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
A single justice faced with a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition 
performs a two-step inquiry.  We address each step in turn. 
 
1.  Step 1:  Whether to review petition's merits.  First, 
the single justice must decide, in his or her discretion, 
whether to review "the substantive merits of the . . . 
                     
justice also considered the underlying ruling to be a ruling in 
limine and not a suppression ruling.  We shall do the same. 
5 
 
 
petition."  Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 476 Mass. 1041, 1042 n.2 
(2017).  The single justice does not determine in this initial 
step whether the challenged ruling was erroneous, although a 
cursory look at the merits might help the single justice decide 
whether the petition is suitable for review.  Rather, the focus 
of step one is on answering a threshold question:  whether to 
employ the court's power of general superintendence to become 
involved in the matter.  "This discretionary power of review has 
been recognized as 'extraordinary,' and will be exercised only 
in 'the most exceptional circumstances.'"  Planned Parenthood 
League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 
(1990), quoting Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 
(1978).  The single justice is not required to become involved 
if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the 
single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the 
subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and 
extraordinary as to require general superintendence 
intervention.  "No party, including the Commonwealth, should 
expect this court to exercise its extraordinary power of general 
superintendence lightly."  Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 Mass. 
1005, 1006 (2009), S.C., 469 Mass. 248 (2014). 
 
In criminal cases, defendants' petitions under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, are often denied on the ground that the defendant 
has an adequate alternative remedy, namely, a direct appeal as 
6 
 
 
of right after trial in the event he or she is convicted.  
Petitions brought by the Commonwealth present a different 
situation because, in most circumstances where it receives an 
adverse ruling in the trial court, the Commonwealth has no other 
avenue to obtain appellate review either through interlocutory 
avenues or after trial.  Even if the Commonwealth has no other 
remedy, however, it is not automatically entitled to review as 
of right under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  See Commonwealth v. D.M., 480 
Mass. 1004, 1004 n.2 (2018); Commonwealth v. Yelle, 390 Mass. 
678, 685-687 (1984); Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 319 
(1980) ("that the Commonwealth has no other remedy does not make 
c. 211, § 3, review automatic").  To obtain review the 
Commonwealth must still demonstrate to the single justice that 
its petition presents the type of exceptional matter that 
requires the court's extraordinary intervention.2  Exceptional 
                     
 
2 It is for these reasons, when the Commonwealth appeals 
from single justice denials of its petitions under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, that we routinely remind the Commonwealth in our orders 
allowing its appeals to proceed pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), that it must do more than 
demonstrate to the full court that it had no adequate 
alternative remedy.  Our order in this case is illustrative.  We 
stated: 
 
"The Commonwealth should be mindful . . . as it pursues 
this appeal, that the fact that it has no other remedy does 
not automatically entitle it to consideration of the 
substantive merits of its claim.  See Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 (2009)[, S.C., 469 
Mass. 248 (2014)]; Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 319 
7 
 
 
circumstances might exist if, for example, the Commonwealth's 
petition involves a novel question of law, a systemic issue that 
will have an effect not just on the current case but on numerous 
other cases, or a lower court ruling that, if allowed to stand, 
would have a truly crippling effect on the Commonwealth's case.  
On the other hand, we routinely uphold single justice denials of 
the Commonwealth's petitions where there are no novel, systemic, 
or case-determinative issues, or other aspects that make the 
petitions exceptional.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
471 Mass. 1005, 1006-1007 (2015); Commonwealth v. Samuels, 456 
Mass. 1025, 1027 n.1 (2010); Commonwealth v. Snow, 456 Mass. 
1019, 1019-1020 (2010); Richardson, 454 Mass. at 1005-1006. 
                     
(1980).  It will first be incumbent on the Commonwealth to 
demonstrate that this is the type of 'rare case' and 
'exceptional circumstance' that requires the exercise of 
the court's extraordinary power of general superintendence; 
more specifically, that the single justice abused his 
discretion in declining to employ the court's extraordinary 
superintendence power in these circumstances.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barros, 460 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra.  This being an appeal 
from the single justice's decision, and not a de novo 
review of the petition or second bite at the apple, it will 
not be enough for the Commonwealth simply to repeat the 
same arguments to this court that it pressed unsuccessfully 
before the single justice.  Commonwealth v. Samuels, 456 
Mass. 1025, 1027 n. 1 (2010).  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 
supra at 1017.  The full court will reach the substantive 
merits only if it first determines that the case presents 
the type of extraordinary situation requiring consideration 
of the merits under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and that the single 
justice abused his discretion in ruling otherwise." 
8 
 
 
 
Here, both sides agree that the Commonwealth had no 
alternative avenue to obtain review of the judge's allowance of 
the defendant's motion in limine.  We turn, therefore, to 
whether the Commonwealth's claim is "exceptional" for purposes 
of G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We conclude that the single justice 
abused his discretion in determining that there were no 
exceptional circumstances here. 
 
The Superior Court judge's decision appears at first to be 
"a routine ruling on a relatively routine evidentiary matter."  
Hernandez, 471 Mass. at 1007, and cases cited.  Whether to admit 
prior recorded testimony is, after all, a question regularly 
considered by trial judges.  See id.  It is well within a single 
justice's discretion to decline to review a routine evidentiary 
ruling, regardless of whether the decision was erroneous.  Id. 
at 1006-1007. 
 
However, on closer inspection the petition is more than 
just routine:  the judge's decision to exclude the now deceased 
victim's testimony effectively forecloses the Commonwealth's 
ability to prosecute a serious crime.  This is not a situation 
where the excluded evidence will merely weaken the prosecution.  
The victim's prior testimony is key evidence that is critical to 
the Commonwealth's ultimate success or failure in prosecuting 
the case.  "The Commonwealth, not unreasonably, does not want to 
proceed to trial without it . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Tahlil, 
9 
 
 
479 Mass. 1012, 1014 (2018).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 
Mass. 71, 76 (2000) (single justice "rarely" denies 
Commonwealth's application pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
15 [a] [2], where "Commonwealth's case depends on the evidence 
that has been suppressed"). 
 
At the suppression hearing, the victim described his 
earlier identification of the assailant and identified a 
photograph of the assailant.  If this testimony is admitted at 
trial, then police officers involved in administering the 
photographic array may testify that the victim identified the 
defendant.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(C) (2019) (prior 
identification not hearsay where "declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about" identification).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 313 (2008), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009) ("Prior recorded testimony is . . . 
roughly equivalent to the type of testimony a jury would have 
heard at trial were the witness available . . . .  The party 
against whom the testimony is offered will have had a reasonable 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony 
adequately, either by direct, cross-, or redirect examination").  
But if this testimony is not admitted at trial, then no evidence 
of the now deceased victim's identification will be admissible.  
See Commonwealth v. Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 676 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 130 (2012) ("Had 
10 
 
 
[witness's] prior recorded [identification] testimony been 
excluded, the jury would also not have heard [police officer's] 
testimony regarding [witness's] identification of the defendant 
at the identification procedure, because a witness's pretrial 
identification is admissible for substantive purposes only where 
'the identifying witness testifies at trial and is subject to 
cross-examination'"). 
 
Admittedly, there is some other evidence on which the 
prosecution could conceivably rely.  Surveillance video footage 
captured the incident, and there were two other witnesses to the 
stabbing.  However, witnesses at the hearing described the video 
recording as being of poor quality.  And it is highly unlikely 
that either of the other witnesses to the incident would be 
permitted to identify the defendant at trial.  One of them never 
identified the defendant to the police, but rather described the 
assailant as male and gave a clothing description.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241 (2014) ("Where an 
eyewitness has not participated before trial in an 
identification procedure, we shall . . . admit it in evidence 
only where there is 'good reason'" to do so).  The other witness 
did identify the defendant, but his out-of-court identification 
was suppressed.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 602 
(2016) ("Where a witness's out-of-court identification is 
excluded," in-court identification allowed only if "Commonwealth 
11 
 
 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the subsequent 
identification . . . rests on a source independent of the 
unnecessarily suggestive confrontation").3  The prior testimony 
is important enough, and the other identification evidence 
appears weak enough, that excluding the prior testimony would 
cripple the Commonwealth's case. 
 
We observe also that this case implicates fundamental 
constitutional rights, involves important competing legal 
principles, and arises from an unusual fact pattern.  We do not 
suggest that every confrontation issue is suitable for review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Here, however, the judge 
analyzed the interaction in these unusual circumstances between 
the confrontation right and waiver doctrine, as well as whether 
conflicting constitutional protections were implicated.  The 
importance of these fundamental constitutional concerns weighs 
in favor of reviewing the petition's merits.  Cf. D.M., 480 
Mass. at 1006 (single justice should have reviewed merits of 
petition where "important . . . public policies [were] at 
issue"). 
                     
 
3 Based on the motion decisions and hearing transcript, the 
only other evidence is an anonymous tip to police that the 
defendant stabbed the victim and identifications placing the 
defendant at the bar on the night of the incident.  We do not 
comment on the admissibility of this evidence. 
12 
 
 
 
Because the Commonwealth does not have an alternative 
remedy, and because the Commonwealth's petition presents an 
exceptionally important matter, the single justice abused his 
discretion in determining that the Commonwealth's petition did 
not require the court's consideration of the merits. 
 
2.  Step 2:  Reviewing petition's merits.  When review of a 
petition is appropriate, the single justice moves to the second 
step and reviews the petition's merits.  The single justice 
"must then correct" the challenged trial court ruling if it was 
wrong.  D.M., 480 Mass. at 1004 n.2.  Here, the Commonwealth 
claims in its petition that the judge erred in excluding the 
victim's prior recorded testimony.  We agree. 
 
Prior recorded testimony is admissible as an exception to 
the rule against hearsay where the declarant is unavailable at 
trial as a matter of law, and where "the prior testimony was 
given by a person . . . in a proceeding addressed to 
substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding, with 
reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior 
occasion for cross-examination of the declarant by the party 
against whom the testimony is being offered."  Commonwealth v. 
Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 355 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 638 (1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 804(a), (b)(1) (2019). 
13 
 
 
 
Similarly, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12, "[a]dmitting prior testimony does not 
violate the defendant's confrontation rights when the declarant 
is unavailable, as a matter of law, to testify and 'the 
defendant has had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.'"  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 293 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 60 (2009).  
The initial inquiry is whether the declarant is unavailable as a 
matter of law.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a).  A judge should 
then consider five factors in determining "whether the defendant 
had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at 
the prior proceeding:  (1) the declarant was under oath, (2) the 
defendant was represented by counsel, (3) the proceeding took 
place before a record-keeping tribunal, (4) the prior proceeding 
addressed substantially the same issues as the current 
proceeding, and (5) the defendant had reasonable opportunity and 
similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-examination 
of the declarant" (footnote omitted).4  Caruso, supra. 
                     
 
4 The defendant asks us to require also that the prior 
testimony be from a hearing at which the Commonwealth bore and 
satisfied a burden of proof.  We have stated that, for prior 
recorded testimony to be admissible, the trier of fact must have 
"a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement."  Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 62-63 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Roberio, 440 Mass. 245, 251 (2003), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 
822 (2004).  According to the defendant, the fact finder cannot 
14 
 
 
 
Applying this constitutional rubric, the judge concluded 
that the victim was unavailable and that the defendant had had 
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the 
earlier suppression hearing.5  We agree. 
                     
evaluate the truth of the prior statement unless a burden was 
satisfied at the prior hearing.  But whether an earlier fact 
finder credited the testimony has no bearing on the current fact 
finder's own credibility determination.  Accordingly, we have 
allowed the admission of prior recorded testimony against a 
defendant at trial where the Commonwealth did not satisfy a 
burden of proof at the earlier proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. 
Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 635-636, 640 (1986) (testimony from 
hearing on defendant's denied motion to suppress admissible when 
offered by Commonwealth).  And under Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) 
(2019), the hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony 
includes testimony given "at a . . . lawful deposition."  See 
Hasouris v. Sorour, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 607, 607-608 (2018).  The 
proponent of former testimony taken at a deposition cannot have 
satisfied a burden of proof at the prior proceeding. 
 
 
The defendant also argues that we should require "a direct 
accusation against the defendant" at the prior proceeding that 
"matches the risk to follow at trial."  Otherwise, a defendant 
might avoid at the earlier hearing issues relevant to trial, not 
realizing that the hearing testimony will later be admitted.  
Our inquiry into whether "the defendant had reasonable 
opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for 
cross-examination of the declarant" addresses this concern.  
Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 293-294 (2017). 
 
 
5 The judge also concluded that the victim's prior testimony 
was not unreliable.  However, if prior testimony meets the 
above-mentioned requirements for unavailability, see Mass. G. 
Evid. § 804(a) (2019); the prior recorded testimony exception to 
the rule against hearsay, see Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1); and 
the confrontation clause, then it is for the jury, not the 
judge, to decide whether the out-of-court declarant's testimony 
is reliable.  The judge's approach is understandable considering 
our decision in Arrington, 455 Mass. at 442, in which "we 
focus[ed] on the reliability of [a declarant's] testimony" from 
a prior hearing when deciding whether the prior testimony 
15 
 
 
 
The victim was unavailable to testify at trial because he 
was deceased.  See Commonwealth v. Rosado, 480 Mass. 540, 549 
n.8 (2018), citing Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a)(4).  At the 
suppression hearing, the victim was under oath, the defendant 
was represented by counsel, and the hearing was before a record-
keeping tribunal.  Although the issue at the suppression hearing 
and the defendant's motive for examining the victim at that 
hearing were not precisely the same as they would be at trial, 
the issue was "substantially the same" and the motive was 
"similar."  Caruso, 476 Mass. at 293. 
 
We agree with the judge that "the issue was [the victim]'s 
identification of [the defendant], regardless of whether it 
consisted of attacking the procedure the police utilized or 
attacking [the victim]'s credibility, which, in fact, defense 
                     
"qualifie[d] as an exception to the hearsay rule."  We observed 
that, due to the declarant's "fragile" health "and the effects 
of her medication," the judge in the prior hearing "did not deem 
[her] testimony reliable."  Id. at 443.  However, we also 
concluded that "defense counsel did not have a reasonable 
opportunity at the [prior] hearing to cross-examine" the 
declarant.  Id. at 445.  We based our decision to exclude the 
prior recorded testimony on this lack of a reasonable 
opportunity to cross-examine, not on the prior testimony's 
unreliability.  Id. at 446 (prior recorded testimony not 
admissible as exception to hearsay rule because "although the 
defendant had a similar motivation for cross-examining [the 
declarant] at the [prior] hearing, he lacked a reasonable 
opportunity to conduct that cross-examination").  We disavow 
Arrington to the extent it suggests reliability is a separate 
factor when analyzing the hearsay exception for prior recorded 
testimony. 
16 
 
 
counsel attempted to do."  Cf. Hurley, 455 Mass. at 63 n.9 
("there may be circumstances in which a defense counsel's motive 
to cross-examine a declarant at a pretrial detention hearing may 
differ from her motive to cross-examine at trial, such as where 
the defense counsel did not challenge the declarant's accuracy 
or credibility at cross-examination in the prior hearing").6 
 
Although the defendant technically examined the victim on 
direct rather than on cross-examination at the suppression 
hearing, the purpose of calling the victim as a witness was to 
discredit his out-of-court identification.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 433 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Echavarria, 428 Mass. 593, 596 (1998) (to succeed on motion to 
suppress out-of-court identification, defendant must prove "the 
identification procedures were so unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the 
defendant due process of law" [quotations omitted]).  
Accordingly, defense counsel asked the victim leading questions, 
emphasized the victim's intoxication on the night of the 
stabbing, suggested the victim had only seconds to view the 
                     
 
6 We do not mean to suggest that there must be cross-
examination at the prior proceeding for the prior recorded 
testimony exception to apply.  "Actual cross-examination at the 
prior [proceeding] is not required, but the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered must have had an adequate 
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired."  
Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500 (1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 933 (1978). 
17 
 
 
defendant in the bar, used the victim's past drug addiction to 
refute the victim's testimony that he was clear-headed when he 
identified the defendant in a photographic array, and impeached 
the defendant with prior inconsistent statements.  This 
questioning "partook of cross-examination as a matter of form" 
(emphasis omitted).  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980), 
overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004).  See Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 605 Pa. 325, 358, 
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 933 (2010) ("rationale [in Roberts] that 
the preliminary hearing questioning served the function of 
cross-examination remains persuasive for purposes of evaluating 
whether Crawford's cross-examination requirement has been met").  
See also Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) (prior recorded testimony 
not excluded by rule against hearsay where, inter alia, it is 
"offered against a party who had . . . an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect 
examination" [emphasis added]). 
 
The judge's conclusions should have led him to decide that 
the transcript was admissible because it satisfied the hearsay 
exception for prior recorded testimony and the constitutional 
restraints on that exception.  However, the judge excluded the 
victim's prior testimony because the defendant and the victim 
"did not meet face to face in the prior proceeding."  Article 12 
provides defendants with the right to confront face to face at 
18 
 
 
trial the witnesses against them.  Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 
Mass. 618, 632 (1997), S.C., 430 Mass. 169 (1999).  We do not 
address whether there is a right to face-to-face confrontation 
at a motion to suppress, see SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 
Mass. 324, 330 (2017) ("courts should, where possible, avoid 
unnecessary constitutional decisions"), because the defendant 
waived any such right by asking to avoid a face-to-face 
confrontation.  See Amirault, supra at 651 n.23 ("right to face-
to-face confrontation is not unwaivable"). 
 
In an affidavit supporting his motion to remain out of 
view, the defendant expressly waived his right to be present at 
the suppression hearing.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 18 (a), 378 
Mass. 887 (1979) (criminal defendant has right to be present "at 
all critical stages of the proceedings").  See also Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 280, 286 (2005) ("defendant may waive 
the right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings").  
In doing so, he chose to avoid confronting face to face the 
witnesses who testified against him at the hearing.  See 
Amirault, 424 Mass. at 651 n.23.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Spear, 43 
Mass. App. Ct. 583, 589 n.8 (1997), citing Amirault, supra at 
623, 626, 645-646 ("confrontation issue [was] waived [in 
Amirault] where . . . defense counsel participated in designing 
special seating configuration and specifically declined to 
challenge the arrangement on confrontation clause grounds").  
19 
 
 
The judge erred in precluding the prior testimony despite this 
waiver. 
 
We disagree with the judge's conclusion that the defendant 
"cannot be deemed to have freely waived one constitutional right 
because he properly chose . . . to exercise another" by sitting 
out of view.  Even if we were to decide that there is a right to 
sit out of view at a hearing on a motion to suppress, which we 
decline to do here, exercising that right would not prevent the 
defendant from waiving his right to face-to-face confrontation.  
"[T]he right to confront witnesses is not absolute."  Amirault, 
424 Mass. at 633, quoting Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 
534, 546 (1988).  It "may, in appropriate cases, bow to 
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial 
process."  Commonwealth v. Farley, 443 Mass. 740, 748, cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1035 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Francis, 
375 Mass. 211, 214, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 872 (1978).  The 
defendant's interest in remaining out of view during the hearing 
on his motion to suppress his identification superseded any 
right he might have had to face-to-face confrontation. 
 
The defendant suggests that he needed to sit out of view to 
challenge the constitutionality of various out-of-court 
identifications.  He analogizes, as did the judge, to cases in 
which a defendant waived the right under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution against compelled self-
20 
 
 
incrimination in order to assert the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 389-394 (1968); Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 
Mass. 592, 596-600 (1990).  But those cases addressed situations 
in which a defendant had to give up one constitutional right to 
assert another.  See Simmons, supra at 381 (to establish 
standing for motion to suppress evidence, defendant testified 
that suitcase with incriminating items belonged to him); 
Amendola, supra at 600 (discussing "self-incrimination 
dilemma").  Here, the defendant could have challenged the out-
of-court identifications without giving up any right he might 
have had to face-to-face confrontation.  The decision to sit out 
of view was merely tactical. 
 
Finally, to the extent the judge was influenced by the 
defendant having chosen to remain out of view "on his counsel's 
advice," we observe that the "right to face-to-face 
confrontation" is not on the "very short list of rights . . . 
that must be waived personally by a defendant and cannot be 
waived by his counsel."  Amirault, 424 Mass. at 651 n.23.  See 
Commonwealth v. Myers, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182-183 (2012).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102, cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 356 (2014) ("trial counsel may waive the right [to an 
21 
 
 
open court room] on his own as a tactical decision without 
informing his client").7 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
single justice is set aside, and the case is remanded to the 
county court for entry of a judgment vacating the order allowing 
the defendant's motion in limine to exclude the victim's prior 
recorded testimony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
7 The defendant asserts that a waiver of the right to 
confrontation should always require a knowing and voluntary act 
by the defendant.  We decline to adopt such a rule.