Title: STATE v CAMPBELL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13896 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- MERRILL CAMPBELL, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: J. Brian Tierney, Butte, Montana -.,, - - For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mike McGrath argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: A ~ r i l 28. 1978 Decided : jbn - %, 1978 M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the District Court, Silver B o w County, a f t e r a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. On November 16, 1976, Tom McKenzie, a welfare worker with the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services of the State of Montana, went t o the Head S t a r t Program i n Butte t o follow up a report of child abuse. McKenzie spoke with Pat Sullivan, Head S t a r t Director, and observed Gina Houser, a four year old g i r l who had been beaten. That same day, November 16, 1976, McKenzie took Gina Houser t o D r . Dennis McCarthy, who examined the child and concluded that her injuries had been inflicted by another. The child's natural mother, Cheryl Houser Campbell, contacted the Head S t a r t School a t 2:00 p.m. on November 16, 1976, t o ascertain why Gina had not returned on the school bus. The school advised the mother the welfare department had taken custody of Gina and three other children of Cheryl Houser Campbell. The mother told the welfare department that Gina had fallen from her tricycle. The welfare department, however, advised Cheryl Houser Campbell that ~ i n a ' s bruises were not caused by a f a l l , and directed the mother t o the Silver B o w County attorney. A t 3:00 p.m., November 16, 1976, Cheryl Houser Campbell went t o the county attorney and stated that Gene Houser, her ex- husband, had beaten Gina. Later that evening four of Cheryl Houser campbell's daughters, Gina and Rhonda Houser, and Janet and Kathy Campbell, were placed i n foster care by Tom McKenzie. On the evening of the placement of the children i n foster care, Tom McKenzie spoke by long distance telephone with Gene Houser. McKenzie verified that Gene Houser was i n Los Angeles, California, on the day of the beating and thus could not have beaten the g i r l s . The next day, November 1 7 , 1976, Cheryl Houser Campbell was charged i n justice court with giving false information t o a police officer and endangering the welfare of her children by her failure t o seek medical aid for them. The mother was placed i n j a i l . She then told authorities that defendant, Merrill Campbell, had spanked the children on November 15, 1976, with a bed s l a t . The charges against the mother were l a t e r dropped and on December 6, 1976, the State filed an Information charging defendant with the aggravated assault of Krista Flanigan, Cheryl Houser Campbell's f i f t h daughter, and Gina Houser on November 15, 1976. The four minor children, including Gina, were immediately placed by the welfare department i n the custody of Cheryl Houser Campbell. Krista Flanigan, age s i x , was placed in a Deer Lodge Montana, foster home and talked t o her mother by telephone only once during the s i x months prior t o defendant's t r i a l . Krista identified defendant a s the person who had beaten the g i r l s with a wooden plunger handle, During the investigation Krista picked the handle from among three sticks the deputy county attorney showed her. A t h i s arraignment, defendant moved the court t o order that defendant be allowed t o submit t o a polygraph t e s t , N o arrange- ments were made for a polygraph t e s t , however. Defendant's t r i a l commenced on April 20, 1977. During the s t a t e ' s case, a wooden plunger handle was admitted as an exhibit, over defendant's objection. Also over defendant's objection, the court allowed two Head Start workers and a police officer t o testify to statements made by four year old Gina Houser. A t the close of the state's case, defendant moved the court t o dismiss the Information or i n the alternative, t o direct a verdict for defendant on the grounds that the s t a t e ' s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law and upon the grounds that certain witnesses' testimony was prejudicial to defendant. The motion was denied, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the d i s t r i c t judge sentenced defendant t o five years i n the s t a t e prison. Defendant raises seven issues i n his appeal from the District Court judgment: 1. Did the court e r r i n failing t o order a polygraph t e s t a f t e r defendant had requested one? 2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the verdict? 3. Did the court e r r i n admitting the wooden plunger handle into evidence? 4 . Did the court e r r in allowing three witnesses to testify t o statements made by four year old Gina Houser? 5 . Did the court e r r i n limiting the testimony of a defense witness? 6. Did the s t a t e create reversible error when it asked a rebuttal witness for defendant's general reputation i n the community? 7. Did the s t a t e improperly introduce evidence of other crimes committed by defendant? The d i s t r i c t judge committed reversible error when he allowed the two Head Start teachers and the police officer to testify, over defendant's objection, to statements made by four year old Gina Houser t o the teachers. The alleged statement of Gina that defendant had beaten her and her s i s t e r with a wooden plunger handle went to the very facts which the s t a t e was trying t o prove, was a statement offered t o prove the truth of the matter asserted and was therefore hearsay. The State concedes that the statement was not admissible within the res gestae rule because the statement, made a t least 24 hours a f t e r the beating, " * * * was not made contemporaneously with the a c t complained of nor does it appear to have been made i n a s t a t e of excitement or shock. * * * Narratives of a past transaction do not come within the res gestae rule." State v. Shambo, (1958), 133 Mont. 305, 309, 310, 322 P.2d 657. It i s possible that Gina Houser, although only four years old a t the time of t r i a l , was competent t o testify. Section 93-701-3(2), R.C.M. 1947, the statute i n effect a t the time of defendant's April 20, 1977, t r i a l , excluded from the general rule that a l l persons are qualified to testify: "Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." A four year old witness is not necessarily too young t o perceive correct impressions of the facts he observed, t o remember those impressions, to communicate what he saw, and to understand h i s duty t o t e l l the truth. Other courts have held that children four years old or younger were competent to testify. Love v. State, (1974), 64 Wisc.2d 432, 219 N.W.2d 294, 298; Fields v. State, (Tex.Crim.App. 1973), 500 S.W.2d 500, 502; H i l l v. Skinner, (1947), 81Ohio App. 375, 79 N.E.2d 787, 789. The question of whether the child is competent t o testify i s a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the t r i a l judge. State v. Shambo, supra. In t h i s case, if Gina Houser had been qualified as a witness, had testified that defendant had beaten her and her s i s t e r , and then had her credibility impeached by defense suggestions that since the beating she had been improperly influenced, the state might well rehabilitate her by introducing the alleged statements to the Head Start workers as prior con- sistent statements. Allen v. Moore, (1975), 167 Mont. 330, 338, 538 P.2d 1352. Gina, however, was not a witness, nor was she even present a t the t r i a l . The testimony concerning Gina's statements was not offered to corroborate the testimony of Gina, who was never a witness, but was introduced by the s t a t e to corroborate the testimony of s i x year old Krista Flanigan. The testimony as to Gina's statements corroborated and strengthened Krista Flanigan's testimony and was so damaging to defendant's case that w e are not convinced of the s t a t e ' s contention that the admission of the testimony was harmless. Upon remand, the District Judge shall examine the child's competency t o testify as it relates to the time of the new t r i a l , and not to the time when the crime occurred nor to the time of the previous t r i a l . State v. Gamer, (1977), 116 Ariz. 443, 569 P.2d 1341, 1344. The child may testify i f the judge correctly determines her to be competent. I f the judge rules that Gina is not competent t o testify, testimony concerning statements she made t o others implicating defendant i n the crime are also in- admissible. Coleman v. Higgins, (1960), 137 Mont. 222, 226, 351 P.2d 901. Although this cause is reversed and remanded on the basis of this issue alone, we shall discuss two other issues raised by defendant for the purposes of retrial. The District Court did not err in failing to order that defendant be given a polygraph test. Defendant urges that Montana should adopt the rule set forth in State v . Stanislawski, ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 62 Wis- 2d 730, 216 N . W . 2d 8, wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth criteria for admissibility of polygraph evidence. The Montana rule is that the results of polygraph examina- tions are not admissible as evidence in a criminal trial. State v. Hollywood, (1960), 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 437; State v. Cor, (1964), 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86. We save the issue of whether this Court shall adopt a Stanislawski or similar test for admissibility of polygraph testimony for a case in which the admission or exclusion of polygraph evidence determines the outcome of the case. We do note, however, that defendant could not satisfy the Stanislawski test. The Stanislawski case merely establishes that the use of the polygraph is clearly within prosecutorial discretion; that the test requires a prior written stipulation by all parties, including the prosecution, and that, notwithstanding the stipulation, admissibility of the test results is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. Because neither the prosecution nor the district court concurred in the admission of polygraph evidence, the Stanislawski test was not met. Nor did the court err in admitting the wooden plunger handle into evidence. Physical evidence may be introduced and received into evidence after proof is made connecting it with the accused or the crime. State v . Best, (1972), 161Mont. 20, 25, 503 P.2d 997. Krista Flanigan testified that she and her sister were beaten by defendant and that the plunger handle was the weapon defendant used i n the beating. Officer Miller testified that he had found the plunger handle under the children's bed, had placed his i n i t i a l on the handle and had stored the handle i n the county attorney's office. The officer testified the handle was i n the same condition a t t r i a l , a s it was on the day he received it. Defendant asserts that, because Cheryl Houser Campbell emphatically asserted that a bed s l a t and not a plunger handle was the weapon used i n the beating, the plunger handle should not have been admitted into evidence. Because the state presented sufficient evidence connecting the weapon with the crime and establishing the chain of custody, the contrary testimony of Cheryl Houser Campbell went only to weight and not to admissibility. The judgment of the District Court i s reversed and this cause is remanded for a new t r i a l . A u s t i c e W e Concur: - , Chief Justice