Title: In re Tyler Self-Storage Unit Permits

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 66
  

  


  

  








In re Tyler Self-Storage Unit
Permits (2010-307)
 
2011 VT 66
 
[Filed 23-Jun-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street,
Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be
made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 66
 
No. 2010-307
 
In re Tyler Self-Storage Unit
  Permits
(Angela Arkway, et al., Appellants)
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     
Superior Court, 
Environmental Division
 
 
 
January Term, 2011
 
 
Thomas
  S. Durkin, J.
 
Robert E. Woolmington of
  Witten, Woolmington & Campbell, P.C., Manchester Center, for
  Appellants.
 
David R. Cooper of Kenlan,
  Schwiebert, Facey & Goss, P.C., Rutland, for Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.,
and Crawford, Supr. J., 
           
        Specially Assigned
 
 
¶
1.      BURGESS, J.  A group neighbors in
the Town of Dorset appeal from a Superior Court, Environmental Division
(Environmental Court) decision granting Bradford Tyler’s application for a
zoning permit for the construction of a self-storage facility in the Dorset
Village Commercial District.  Appellants contend that the court erred in
determining the rental storage units to be an authorized land use within the
applicable Dorset zoning district.  We reverse.
¶
2.      Applicant Tyler owns and resides on a 5.6-acre
property located in the Village Commercial District (VC District) of the Town
of Dorset.  He filed for a zoning permit to construct a self-storage
facility on his property.  The proposed facility consists of three
one-story buildings, each twenty feet wide and one hundred feet long and
containing twenty-four individual storage bays for a total of seventy-two
bays.  Applicant intends to rent the bays to customers who, according to
the application, “would place and store belongings in them.”
¶
3.      The Town Planning Commission issued written
approval of applicant’s site development plan.  Following this, the Town
Zoning Administrator issued a zoning permit.  Interested neighbors
appealed to the Dorset Zoning Board of Adjustment, contending that applicant’s
proposed self-storage facility is not a “retail sales/rentals” use, as required
by the town’s Zoning Bylaws for development in the VC District.  See Town
of Dorset Zoning Bylaw [hereinafter Bylaws] § 6.3.4(b)(3) (2005).  By a
vote of four to three, with two members of the nine-member Board not voting,
the Board determined that applicant’s proposed facility was not permitted in
the VC District.
¶
4.      Neighbors, in response to applicant questioning
the validity of a decision rendered by less than a majority of the Board, appealed
to the Environmental Court.  They asserted that, regardless of the
majority vote issue, the earlier approval by the Zoning Administrator
was erroneous and should be voided.  Applicant cross-appealed, arguing
that the Board’s denial was invalid and that the proposed facility was a
permitted use in the VC District.  The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the question of whether a storage facility was
permitted.  The Environmental Court granted applicant’s motion and denied
neighbors’, holding that the proposed use was permissible as a “retail rental.”
¶
5.      Neighbors appeal now to this Court, contending
that the Environmental Court erred: (1) by ignoring a straightforward reading
of the Bylaws and substituting its own construction of “retail rental” to
expand the scope of permitted uses in the VC District in a manner inconsistent
with the zone’s stated purposes; and (2) in finding that applicant’s proposed
facility would provide “retail rentals” serving individual uses when
applicant’s affidavit indicated that most customers interested in renting space
were not individuals, but businesses planning to store equipment and excess
inventory.  Applicant disagrees with both contentions and also argues that
the Bylaws should be interpreted in his favor because they are internally
inconsistent and the ordinance’s reliance on “any readily available dictionary”
to define words not specifically defined in the Bylaws renders them
standardless and unconstitutionally vague.  We hold that the plain
language of the Bylaws precludes applicant’s self-storage facility.
¶
6.      The Environmental Court construed the “retail
sales/rental” language to mean “ 'retail sales or retail rentals’ in the
VC District,” and defined “retail rental” as “a commercial establishment” that
“involve[s] small-quantity rentals directly with a consumer, as opposed to
wholesale rentals.”  “We will uphold the Environmental Court’s
construction of a zoning ordinance if it is rationally derived from a correct
interpretation of the law and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or
capricious.”  In re Pierce Subdiv. Application, 2008 VT 100, ¶ 8,
184 Vt. 365, 965 A.2d 468 (quotation omitted).  When interpreting the
language of a zoning ordinance, we are “bound by the plain meaning of the words
. . . unless the express language leads to an irrational result.”  Id.
¶
7.      Dorset’s Zoning Bylaws permit “retail
sales/rentals” in the VC District, subject to site plan approval and several
restrictions:
  Retail
sales/rentals.  All sales, storage and display of merchandise shall occur
within an enclosed structure, except for temporary display of merchandise
outdoors, on-site during the operating hours of the business or from 8:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m., whichever is later, provided that all such merchandise is stored
in a building or screened storage area at the close of business each day. 
Agricultural products are exempted from the outdoor storage restrictions. 
No sale of automotive or diesel fuel is permitted.
 
Bylaws §
6.3.4(b)(3).
¶
8.      The Environmental Court initially construed
the phrase “retail sales/rentals” to mean “retail sales or retail rentals.”
 This was reasonable.  The virgule (“/”) is used “to separate
alternatives,” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1922 (4th
ed. 2006), and is reasonably understood to be disjunctive, another expression
of the word “or.”  Danco, Inc. v. Commerce Bank/Shore, N.A., 675 A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). The canon of statutory
construction of ejusdem generis dictates that, when words “bearing a
specific description are followed by words of more general import, the sense of
the adjective first used is applied to the words that follow.”  Kalakowski
v. John A. Russell Corp., 137 Vt. 219, 224, 401 A.2d 906, 909 (1979). 
“Retail,” a specific description, is followed by “sales” and “rentals,” words
of more general import.  Thus, the court appropriately concluded that the
phrase “retail sales/rentals” translates to “retail sales or retail
rentals.”  Cf. id. at 223-24, 401 A.2d  at 909 (applying “retail” in
phrase “retail store, stand, sales and sales rooms” to each term following
“retail”).
¶
9.      The court next examined how the Bylaws’ definition
of “retail” informs the term “retail rentals.”  The term “retail” is
defined in the ordinance to mean “a shop or store for the sale of goods,
commodities, products or services directly to the consumer, as opposed to
wholesale.”  Bylaws app. A at 7.  The court noted that to define
retail rentals in terms of sales results in  internal inconsistency within
the Bylaws because sales and rentals are distinctly separate concepts.  To
resolve this conflict, the court first focused on the distinction between
retail sales to individual customers and wholesale sales to business or
industrial customers.  The Bylaws note this distinction, a fact the court
interpreted as indicative of the drafters’ intent to define “retail rentals” as
involving “small-quantity rentals directly with a consumer, as opposed to
wholesale rentals.”  The court then fleshed out its construction of
“retail rentals” based on the inclusion of “shop or store” in the ordinance’s
definition of “retail,” choosing a broad dictionary definition for the terms:
“any commercial or industrial establishment.”  Using this definition, the
court concluded that so long as a facility is a “commercial establishment” and
rents to individuals, rather than to industrial customers or on a wholesale
basis, the facility is permissible in the VC District.
¶
10.    There are several problems with this construction of
“retail rentals.”  The court placed too much emphasis on the distinction
between retail and wholesale and ignored the ordinance’s language defining “retail”
establishments as shops or stores providing goods and services. 
Specifically, the court failed to attend to the most ordinary contexts of
“shop” and “store,” instead choosing a much broader definition that can
encompass virtually all businesses regardless of dimension or purpose. 
“Shop” has several definitions, the first and most common being a “small retail
store or a specialty department in a large store.”  American Heritage
Dictionary, supra, at 1609; see also Webster’s New International
Dictionary 2319 (2d ed. 1961) (defining “shop” as “[a]n artisan’s place of
manufacture and sale . . . . In the United States shop
means esp. a place of manufacture or repair . . . .”).  Applicant’s
facility clearly does not fit this description; it is neither small in scale
nor a specialty department within a larger store.  “Store” likewise has
several definitions, but primarily refers to a “place where merchandise is
offered for sale; a shop.”  American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at
at 1708; see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 2486 (defining “store”
as “[a]ny place where goods are kept for sale, whether by wholesale or retail;
a shop.”).  The centrality of merchandising to this definition combined
with the analogy to a shop suggests that applicant’s proposed facility, which
would offer neither goods nor services for sale or rent, is no more a “store”
than it is a “shop.”
¶
11.    The court’s definition also fails to take into account
the subsections surrounding the ordinance’s “retail sales/rentals” provision. 
The Bylaws list numerous other permitted uses within the VC District, including
“personal service establishments” and “contractors.”  Bylaws
§ 6.3.4(b)5, 9.  The examples of “personal service establishments”
listed in the Bylaws, such as “barber shops, hairdressers [and] shoe repair”
provide an illustration of the difference between applicant’s facility and the
approved uses for the VC District.  Id. § 6.3.4(b)5.  Not only
do these businesses all appear to involve foot-traffic between the street and
the interior of the shop or store to purchase and receive services, they also
involve direct, face-to-face transactions with customers.  Conspicuously
absent from these lists is any mention of storage units or the like, the
ongoing commercial uses of which, except for the initial visit to make the
rental contract, are devoid of customer-merchant foot traffic or interpersonal
interactions to procure goods or services.  
¶
12.    In fact, “personal service establishment” informs not
only our general understanding of the definition of “retail rentals,” but also
our understanding of “services” in the definition of “retail.”  It is
implausible that the Town intended to carefully circumscribe the services
allowed in the VC District under the “personal service establishment” section,
only to permit any and all services, save those of a “wholesale” variety, in
the “retail sales/rentals” section.  Thus, a definition of “retail rental”
that encompasses applicant’s proposed storage facility comprised of what amounts
to a series of mini-warehouses is not in keeping with the total wording and
structure of the Bylaws.[1]
¶
13.    The court’s definition not only tends to contradict the
Bylaws’ language, it is at odds with the zoning district’s purpose.  We
examine not only the plain language of a zoning ordinance, but also “the whole
of the ordinance . . . in order to try to give effect to every
part,” and will adopt an “interpretation that implements the legislative purpose.” 
In re Nott, 174 Vt. 552, 553, 811 A.2d 210, 211-12 (2002) (mem.). 
“The primary purpose of zoning is to bring about the orderly physical
development of a community.”  In re Casella Waste Mgmt., Inc., 2003
VT 49, ¶ 17, 175 Vt. 335, 830 A.2d 60.  As such, it is essential that we
construe a zoning ordinance to determine and give effect to the intent of the
drafters.  “The legislative intent is most truly derived from a
consideration of not only the particular statutory language, but from the
entire enactment, its reason, purpose and consequences.”  Delta Psi
Fraternity v. City of Burlington, 2008 VT 129, ¶ 7, 185 Vt. 129, 969 A.2d 54 (quotation omitted).
¶
14.    The purpose of the VC District is to provide for “a
combination of residential and compatible village-scale commercial uses, which
provide convenience services and incidental shopping . . . while
protecting scenic and environmental qualities . . . and
retaining the residential character of the villages.”  Bylaws § 6.1. 
The permitted uses listed for the Town’s VC District comport with the stated
purpose and include not only the personal service establishments previously
discussed, but also residences, residential businesses, business and
professional offices, and other small-scale retail and repair shops, all promoting
merchandizing, personal, professional or technical services.  Bylaws §
6.3.4(b).  The businesses listed by applicant between the proposed site
and the Dorset Green in the center of the village generally fit these
requirements while preserving the residential character of the village,
providing a wide variety of convenience services and incidental shopping,
including small retail and service establishments, bed and breakfasts, inns,
farmer stands, and art galleries.  While the “retail rental” of tools, housewares,
furniture and equipment would be in keeping with the regulation’s merchandizing
theme, the rental of space for storage would not.
¶
15.    In the same vein, the Environmental Court’s construction
allowing any non-wholesale commercial establishment would provide little
meaningful limitation on the size or type of business facility allowed in the
VC District, except to exclude wholesalers.  Carried to its logical end,
the court’s definition would allow so called big-box stores or other large-scale
businesses to intrude into the village environment, thereby undermining
the VC District’s express purpose.  Applicant’s facility itself provides
an example of how over-inclusive the standard is.  The storage complex
would consist of three stand-alone buildings, with multiple bays and traffic at
potentially any hour of the day or night.  There would be no retail
activity or character, residentially compatible or otherwise, in such a
facility. Permitting this facility is inconsistent with both the language and
purpose of the Bylaws.[2]
¶
16.    Applicant raises two other arguments in his brief,
neither of which is availing.  First, applicant correctly points to the
standard regarding zoning ordinances and common law property rights: “[b]ecause
land use regulation is in derogation of the common law,” if the plain language
of an ordinance is unclear, any “ambiguity is resolved in favor of the
landowner.”  In re Miserocchi, 170 Vt. 320, 324, 749 A.2d 607, 611
(2000).  Applicant argues that we should find in his favor because zoning
ordinances restrict property owners’ common law right to use their property as
they wish, and the Bylaws are internally inconsistent.  However, if
examination of the plain language of the ordinance “resolves the conflict
without doing violence to the [overall zoning] scheme, there is no need to go
further, always bearing in mind that the paramount function of the court is to
give effect to the [drafters’] intent.”  Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning
Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986).
¶
17.    Defining “retail” in terms of sales arguably creates a
conflict when used to define “retail rentals,” but any incongruity
dissolves by reference, again, to the totality of the language in the Bylaws. 
Using the common understanding of the words involved, and in the context of the
overall scheme and purpose of the VC District, it is clear that the Bylaws’
drafters intended “retail sales/rentals” to include only residential and
small-scale commercial establishments trading in services or in goods, for sale
and for rent, as opposed to renting storage space as applicant proposes. 
There is therefore no ambiguity to resolve in favor of applicant.  Miserocchi,
170 Vt. at 324, 749 A.2d  at 611.
¶
18.    Second, applicant argues that the Bylaws’ reference to
“any readily available dictionary” to define any word not otherwise defined
under the Bylaws does not provide proper notice to those governed by them,
rendering them standardless, unconstitutionally vague, and unenforceable. 
Zoning ordinances must establish standards which are “general enough to avoid
inflexible results,” but also specific enough to avoid “leav[ing] the door open
to unbridled discrimination.”  Town of Westford v. Kilburn, 131 Vt.
120, 124-25, 300 A.2d 523, 526 (1973).  Applicant claims that, because
“any readily available dictionary” could include user-created, un-reviewed
online dictionaries, in which anyone can modify the definition, landowners have
no notice of the clear meaning of undefined words in the Bylaws.  However,
it is not clear how this direction in the Bylaws differs from the most basic
tenet of textual interpretation: that words otherwise undefined are ordinarily
defined by reference to the nearest available dictionary.  2A N. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 47:7, at 303-04 (7th ed. 2007).  Because
“[t]he dictionary is merely a compendium of plain and commonly accepted
meanings, which we presume are intended by statutory language,” Route 4
Assocs. v. Town of Sherburne Planning Comm’n, 154 Vt. 461, 464, 578 A.2d 112, 114 (1990), applicant’s argument is unpersuasive.  Fraudulent or
misleading alterations to electronic dictionary definitions should be readily
discernable by comparison to conventional sources.  In any event,
applicant points to no such aberrance here.   That a landowner could
theoretically be confused about the land-use standard because the Bylaws could
be misinterpreted by reference to a rogue definition in a dictionary, print or
electronic, is immaterial to this case.  Absent an actual issue of
competing and confusing definitions, the reliance of the regulations on “any
readily available dictionary” reflects common sense and does not lead to
unfettered discretion on the part of zoning administrators.
Reversed.
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
As neighbors point out, despite the court’s claim that the units were intended
“to rent to individual customers for their personal storage needs,” many
entities interested in storage identified in applicant’s own affidavit were
local businesses hoping to store their equipment and inventory.
[2] 
Because we agree with neighbors’ first argument, we do not address their
second, that the court misapplied its own standard.