Title: State v. Martinez

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 15–0671 
 
Filed June 9, 2017 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
MARTHA ARACELY MARTINEZ, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, 
Stuart P. Werling, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant seeks interlocutory review of denial of motion to 
dismiss.  REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 
 
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Alan R. Ostergren, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
APPEL, Justice. 
 
In this case, we are called upon to determine if an undocumented 
noncitizen brought to Iowa as an eleven-year-old child by her parents, 
educated in Iowa public schools, who has lived in Iowa continuously, 
who is a mother of four children who are citizens of the United States, 
and who applied for and was granted deferred action under the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA)1 program, may be prosecuted by State authorities for 
using false documents to obtain federal employment authorization even 
though federal law pervasively regulates employment of undocumented 
noncitizens.  The answer to this question is no. 
 
I.  Factual Background and Proceedings. 
 
A.  Facts Surrounding Martha Martinez.  Martha Martinez came 
to Muscatine with her parents in 1997 when she was eleven years old.  
She attended Muscatine public schools and worked for several different 
employers in Muscatine County. 
 
When she was seventeen years old, Martinez applied for and 
obtained an Iowa driver’s license.  She used a birth certificate in the 
name of Diana Castaneda, a person with a social security number, to 
obtain the license.  She renewed the license in 2008. 
 
In 2013, Martinez used her fictitious driver’s license and a social 
security card in the same name to obtain employment at Packer 
Sanitation, a business located in Muscatine County.  The documents 
were used to obtain what is referred to as I-9 paperwork. 
 
1Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to 
David L. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.; Alejandro Mayorkas, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
                                            
3 
 
Also in 2013, Martinez applied for and received temporary lawful 
immigration status from the Department of Homeland Security pursuant 
to the DACA program.  Because she now had temporary lawful 
immigration status, she was able to obtain work authorization in her 
own name from the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Because of her lawful status, Martinez was now eligible, under 
Iowa law, to obtain an Iowa driver’s license in her own name.  In March 
2014, she applied for a license in her own name, using her newly issued 
social security card. 
 
The Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT), apparently using 
facial recognition software, noted a similarity between her photograph 
taken in 2014 and earlier photographs taken when she obtained her 
driver’s license in 2003 and 2008.  As a result, IDOT commenced an 
investigation. 
 
According to the notes of the IDOT investigator, a woman appeared 
at the Iowa City drivers’ license station on May 2, 2003, with a California 
birth certificate in the name of Diana Casteneda.  She presented two rent 
receipts as proof of residency in West Liberty.  On October 28, 2008, a 
woman appeared at the Iowa City drivers’ license station and applied for 
an Iowa ID using the name of Diana Castaneda. 
 
On March 6, 2014, a woman appeared at the Iowa City drivers’ 
license station and applied for an Iowa driver’s license.  The person 
presented an ID and employment authorization card in the name of 
Martha Martinez.  The photograph of Martinez, however, appeared to 
match the photograph of Diana Castaneda from March 2, 2003, and 
October 28, 2008. 
 
The investigator determined that wages were being obtained by 
Diana Castaneda at Packer Sanitation.  The investigator contacted 
4 
Packer Sanitation and obtained Diana Castaneda’s I-9, copies of her Iowa 
ID, social security card, and payroll history showing she obtained wages 
in excess of $1000.  The investigator contacted immigration authorities 
and learned that Martinez had a valid employment authorization card. 
 
The investigator contacted Martinez by phone.  Martinez admitted 
she had obtained the false IDs in 2003 and 2008.  She told the 
investigator she came to the United States as a child and now had three 
children and was pregnant with a fourth child.  She borrowed a birth 
certificate in the name of Diana Castaneda but did not know her.  She 
had been recently working but had quit due to her pregnancy.  She 
admitted prior employment under the name and social security number 
of Diana Castaneda.  The investigator informed Martinez that he would 
recommend she be charged with identity theft.  The investigator thanked 
Martinez for being honest and cooperative. 
 
B.  Iowa Criminal Proceedings.  The State filed two criminal 
charges against Martinez.  Count I alleged the crime of identity theft 
under Iowa Code section 715A.8 (2013).  This Code provision states, “A 
person commits the offense of identity theft if the person fraudulently 
uses or attempts to fraudulently use identification information of another 
person, with the intent to obtain credit, property, services, or other 
benefit.”  Iowa Code § 715A.8(2).  If the value of the credit, property, or 
services exceeds one thousand dollars, the person commits a class “D” 
felony.  Id. § 715A.8(3).  If the value of the credit, property, or services 
does not exceed one thousand dollars, the person commits an aggravated 
misdemeanor.  Id.  According to the minutes of testimony, the basis for 
the intent to obtain “credit, property, or services” was employment at 
Packer Sanitation earning wages in excess of $1000. 
5 
 
Count II alleged the crime of forgery under Iowa Code section 
715A.2(1).  This Code provision declares that a person is guilty of the 
crime of forgery if, with intent to defraud or injure anyone, a person 
“[m]akes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers a 
writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize 
that act.”  Id. § 715A.2(1)(b).  The provision further provides that forgery 
is a class “D” felony if the writing is or purports to be “[a] document 
prescribed by statute, rule, or regulation for entry into or as evidence of 
authorized 
stay 
or 
employment 
in 
the 
United 
States.” 
 
Id. 
§ 715A.2(2)(a)(4). 
 
Martinez filed a motion to dismiss.  Citing Arizona v. United States, 
Martinez argued that federal law preempted her prosecution under the 
Iowa identity theft and forgery statutes, both on their face and as 
applied.  567 U.S. 387, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).  The State 
resisted.  The State distinguished Arizona, noting that in that case, the 
Arizona statute specifically criminalized failure to comply with federal 
alien registration requirements while the statutes under which Martinez 
was charged are independent of federal law. 
 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.  According to the 
court, the charges of identity theft and forgery were “state crimes 
independent of Defendant’s immigration status.”  In prosecuting 
Martinez, the court stated, the State was not acting to enforce or attack 
federal immigration law.  Therefore, Martinez’s prosecution was not 
preempted by federal law. 
 
Martinez sought interlocutory review.  We granted the application. 
6 
 
II.  Discussion. 
 
A.  Overview 
of 
Federal 
Immigration 
Law 
Related 
to 
Unauthorized Employment of Illegal Aliens. 
 
1.  Introduction.  “The Government of the United States has broad, 
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of 
aliens.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.  This broad authority is in part 
based upon the federal government’s power to “establish a[] uniform Rule 
of Naturalization.”  Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).  It is also 
based upon the federal government’s inherent power as a sovereign to 
control and conduct relations with foreign governments.  Id.  As 
demonstrated by an amicus brief in Arizona filed by sixteen nations, 
immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic 
relations for the entire Nation as well as the perceptions and expectations 
of aliens on this country who seek full protection of its law.  See Mot. of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay for Leave to Join the United 
Mexican States as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp’t at 6, Arizona, 567 U.S. 
387, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11–182), 2012 WL 1114006, at *6.  
Current national and international debate regarding building a wall on 
our southern border and the circumstances under which noncitizens 
from other nations may enter the United States, along with discussions 
about who should pay for the wall, has an impact on domestic 
immigration and international relations. 
 
2.  Early regulation and plenary authority.  The United States 
Supreme Court has observed that the supremacy of national power in 
the general field of foreign affairs—including immigration, naturalization, 
and deportation—is made clear by the United States Constitution.  Hines 
7 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62, 61 S. Ct. 399, 401–02 (1941).  Yet, until 
1891, no comprehensive immigration legislation existed, and a number 
of states enacted discriminatory legislation.  See Kevin J. Fandl, Putting 
States Out of the Immigration Law Enforcement Business, 9 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 529, 530–31 (2015) [hereinafter Fandl].  Responding to 
discriminatory legislation against Chinese aliens, the United States 
Supreme Court in Chy Long v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875), and 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 1019 
(1893), emphasized the need for “absolute and unqualified” power to 
deport aliens in the interest of national sovereignty.  Fandl, 9 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. at 531–32 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707, 13 S. Ct. at 
1019). 
 
3.  Overview of Immigration and Nationality Act.  Congress exercised 
its power over immigration through enactment of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) which, along with other enactments, provides a 
“comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration 
and naturalization” and sets “the terms and conditions of admission to 
the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the 
country.”  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587, 
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 
353, 359, 96 S. Ct. 933, 935, 938 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce, 563 U.S. at 590, 131 
S. Ct. at 1975); see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537. 
 
By way of brief summary, the INA provides criteria by which 
“aliens,” defined as “any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States,” may enter, visit, and reside in the country.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3); see Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 
8 
2010), vacated on other grounds by 563 U.S. 1030, 131 S. Ct. 2958 
(2011). 
 
The 
INA 
establishes 
three 
categories 
of 
aliens: 
(1) nonimmigrants, (2) immigrants, and (3) refugees and asylees.  8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1151, 1157–58; see Lozano, 620 F.3d at 196.  In 
order to be legally admitted to the United States, aliens must meet the 
eligibility criteria of one of these categories.  Lozano, 620 F.3d at 196.  
Certain aliens who have health conditions, have been convicted of certain 
crimes, present security concerns, or have been recently removed from 
the United States are inadmissible.  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
 
Persons in the United States unlawfully are subject to removal, 
with removal proceedings under the INA setting forth the “sole and 
exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to 
the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the 
United States.”  Id. § 1229a(a)(3).  INA removal procedures provide for 
notice, the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel, and the possibility of discretionary relief from removal including 
postponement of removal, cancellation of removal, or even adjustment of 
status to that of lawful permanent residency.  Id. §§ 1229a(c), 1229b. 
 
4.  Immigration Reform and Control Act.  The INA as originally 
enacted contained no specific prohibition regarding the employment of 
aliens which was, as noted by the Supreme Court, at most a “peripheral 
concern.”  De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360, 96 S. Ct. at 939.  That changed, 
however, with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) in 1986.  Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504; see 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324b.  The IRCA established “a comprehensive 
framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens.’ ”  Arizona, 
567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, 122 S. Ct. 1275, 1282 (2002)).  Under 
9 
the IRCA, Congress declared it unlawful to knowingly hire or continue to 
employ an unauthorized alien without complying with the work 
authorization verification system created by the statute.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(a)(1)–(2). 
 
In order to verify work authorization, the employer must attest 
under penalty of perjury that an employee is not an unauthorized alien 
by physically examining documents such as a passport, permanent 
resident card, driver’s license, or other comparable document, and 
confirm that those documents reasonably appear to be genuine.  Id. 
§ 1324a(b)(1)(A)–(D).  On the form known as the I-9, employees must also 
make an attestation of their authorized work status.  Id. § 1324a(b)(2). 
 
With respect to the I-9, Congress has provided that “any 
information contained in or appended to such form, may not be used for 
purposes other than for enforcement of” the INA and enumerated federal 
laws regarding false statements, identification-document fraud, fraud in 
the 
federal 
employment 
verification 
system, 
and 
perjury. 
 
Id. 
§ 1324a(b)(5).  As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona, 
“Congress has made clear . . . that any information employees submit to 
indicate their work status ‘may not be used’ for purposes other than 
prosecution under specified federal criminal statutes.”  Arizona, 567 U.S. 
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(b)(5)). 
 
Federal employment authorization verification requirements are 
enforced “through criminal penalties and an escalating series of civil 
penalties tied to the number of times an employer has violated the 
provisions.”  Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)–(f).  Congress did not authorize 
criminal penalties for aliens seeking or engaging in unauthorized 
employment. 
10 
 
Congress authorized imposition of a range of penalties on aliens 
who commit employment-authorization-related fraud in the IRCA.  
Congress authorized federal criminal penalties against a person who 
knowingly uses a document not lawfully issued to the person, a false 
document, or a false attestation “for the purpose of satisfying a 
requirement” of the federal employment verification system.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1546(b).  Violators of this criminal provision may be sentenced for up to 
five years in prison.  Id.  Congress also authorized federal criminal 
penalties against a person who uses or possesses an immigration 
document, including one that demonstrates federal work authorization, 
“knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to 
have been procured . . . by fraud or unlawfully obtained.”  Id. § 1546(a).  
Persons convicted under this statute, in most cases, may be imprisoned 
for up to ten years.  Id.  In addition to the criminal penalties, Congress 
authorized civil penalties for document fraud involving immigration 
requirements, include the work authorization requirement.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324c(a)(1)–(4), (d)(3). 
 
Finally, Congress authorized immigration penalties for persons 
involved in document fraud.  For example, Congress authorized removal 
of persons convicted of federal criminal document fraud.  Id. 
§ 1227(a)(3)(B)–(C); id. § 1324c; 18 U.S.C. § 1546.  Further, federal law 
may preclude aliens from becoming a lawful permanent resident if the 
alien was employed while he was an “unauthorized alien.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(c)(2). 
 
5.  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.  In 
1996, Congress amended the INA by enacting the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 
104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in various sections of 8 
11 
U.S.C.).  The IIRIRA called for improvements in the employer verification 
system and required that the Attorney General and later the Director of 
Homeland Security to develop pilot programs designed to improve 
employment eligibility confirmation process.  See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 
200.  Ultimately, only one of the pilot programs, E-Verify, was 
reauthorized and expanded to all fifty states.  Id.  The use of E-Verify 
rather than the ordinary I-9 process remains voluntary, with a few 
exceptions.  Id. 
 
The IIRIRA authorized the Department of Homeland Security to 
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to 
enforce federal immigration law.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).  Under this 
provision, state and local governments may assist federal enforcement if 
(1) there is a written agreement, (2) local cooperating authorities receive 
appropriate training, and (3) local authorities operate under the 
supervision of federal immigration officials.  Id. 
 
6.  Federal penalties for immigration document fraud.  The various 
federal statutes establish a wide range of penalties for document fraud 
related to immigration.  Document fraud in immigration matters is 
prohibited and subject to an administrative enforcement regime.  Id. 
§ 1324c.  Criminal penalties for fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and 
other documents are provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1546.  In addition, the 
Identity 
Theft 
Penalty 
Enhancement 
Act 
imposes 
more 
severe 
consequences on those who use social security numbers, credit card 
accounts, or other information in connection with a felony, including 
violation of immigration law.  18 U.S.C. § 1028A.  However, Congress 
exempted false use of social security numbers for work in certain 
situations from claims of fraud under the Social Security Act.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 408(e). 
12 
 
7.  Discretion in enforcement of immigration laws.  Under federal 
immigration laws, discretion is vested in federal officials in two ways.  
Federal immigration law is replete with statutory provisions explicitly 
vesting discretion in the executive branch. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–84, 119 S. Ct. 936, 943 
(1999) (stating in “the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the 
deportation process . . . [a]t each stage the Executive has discretion to 
abandon the endeavor”). 
 
Congress has also delegated to the executive branch the 
determination of when a noncitizen may work.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) 
(removing from definition of “unauthorized alien” those who the Attorney 
General authorized to be employed even when they are not lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence).  The implementing regulations 
provide that an alien without lawful status may still be granted work 
authorization when the administrative convenience gives cases lower 
priority and an alien establishes economic necessity.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 274a.12(c)(14) (2016). 
 
Further, the United States Supreme Court has “recognized on 
several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to 
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a 
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”  
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 (1985).  In 
exercising discretion, the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that the executive engages in the “balancing of a number of factors which 
are peculiarly within its expertise.”  Id.  As a result, the cases generally 
recognize that immigration laws vest substantial discretion in the 
executive branch with respect to enforcement.  See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. 
13 
v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 85 
U.S.L.W. 3471, (U.S. Mar. 29, 2017) (No. 16–1180). 
 
B.  Implementation of Supremacy Clause Through Principles of 
Preemption.  Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Since the days of 
John Marshall, the Supremacy Clause has been interpreted to mean that 
even if a state statute is enacted in the execution of acknowledged state 
powers, state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of 
Congress” must yield to federal law.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 
(1824).  The United States Supreme Court has implemented the 
Supremacy Clause through the development of its preemption doctrine.  
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152, 102 
S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982). 
 
The contours of the doctrine of preemption, if sometimes difficult 
to apply, are well established.  The United States Supreme Court has 
developed two broad categories of preemption of state law: express and 
implied.  Id. at 152–53, 102 S. Ct. at 3022.  Express preemption occurs 
when the federal statutory text clearly provides that congressional 
authority is exclusive.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 
S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977).  When express preemption is implicated, close 
examination of statutory language is ordinarily required to implement 
congressional intent.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 
664, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993). 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized two types of implied 
preemption—field preemption and conflict preemption—which arise even 
when there is no express provision in the federal statute preempting local 
14 
law.  Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 
(2015).  Field preemption arises when Congress has enacted a 
comprehensive scheme.  Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 
1722 (1983).  In these cases, congressional intent to preempt can be 
inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it” or where there is a “federal 
interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”  Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947). 
 
Conflict preemption occurs when a state law conflicts with a 
federal provision.  Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605, 111 
S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1991).  There are two variations of conflict 
preemption.  Conflict preemption occurs when “compliance with both 
federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility.”  Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 
1217 (1963).  Conflict preemption also is imminent whenever two 
separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.  Wis. Dep’t of 
Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286, 106 
S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1986). 
 
Conflict preemption also occurs when a state law is an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of a federal purpose.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67, 61 
S. Ct. at 404.  In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has said, 
“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by 
examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and 
intended effects.”  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
373, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 (2000). 
15 
 
C.  Application of Preemption Principles to Immigration Law. 
 
1.  Overview of United States Supreme Court preemption precedent 
in immigration cases.  In Hines, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the validity of a Pennsylvania alien registration statute.  312 
U.S. at 59, 61 S. Ct. at 400.  A year earlier, Congress had enacted a 
Federal Alien Registration Act.  Id. at 60, 61 S. Ct. at 400.  The Hines 
Court noted that “the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and 
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it 
acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, ‘the act of [C]ongress 
. . . is supreme.’ ”  Id. at 66, 61 S. Ct. at 403–04 (quoting Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 211).  The Hines court canvassed the various approaches to 
preemption, noting that none of the formulations or expressions 
“provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional 
yardstick.”  Id. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404.  And while the federal law did not 
have an express preemption provision, the Hines Court concluded that 
the Pennsylvania law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. 
 
A more recent immigration case dealing with federal preemption is 
De Canas, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S. Ct. 933.  In De Canas, the Supreme Court 
considered whether federal law prohibited California from enacting a 
statute which forbade an employer from knowingly employing an alien 
who was not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such 
employment would have adverse effect on lawful resident workers.  Id. at 
352–53, 96 S. Ct. at 935.  A California appellate court held that the 
statute was unconstitutional, noting that “in the area of immigration and 
naturalization, congressional power is exclusive.”  De Canas v. Bica, 115 
Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (Ct. App. 1974).  The California court further held 
that state regulatory power was foreclosed when Congress “as an 
16 
incident of national sovereignty” enacted the INA as a comprehensive 
scheme governing all aspects of immigration and naturalization, 
including the employment of aliens and specifically declined to adopt 
sanctions on employers.  Id. 
 
The De Canas Court held that the California statute was not 
preempted by the INA.  424 U.S. at 365, 96 S. Ct. at 941.  The Court 
concluded preemption could not be required because “the nature of the 
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion” nor because 
“Congress has unmistakably so ordained.”  Id. at 356, 96 S. Ct. at 937 
(quoting Fla. Lime, 424 U.S. at 142, 83 S. Ct. at 1217).  The Court was 
unwilling to presume that in enacting the INA, Congress intended to oust 
state authority to regulate the employment of immigrants in a manner 
consistent with federal law.  Id. at 357, 96 S. Ct. at 937.  The Court 
declined to consider whether the California statute was “an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” because the issue was not addressed below.  Id. at 363, 96 
S. Ct. at 940 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404).  In light of 
the vibrancy of obstacle preemption in immigration law, De Canas thus 
was a limited precedent from the outset. 
 
In Hoffman Plastic, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether an unauthorized immigrant could receive back pay when the 
individual was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for participating in 
collective bargaining.  535 U.S. at 140, 122 S. Ct. at 1278.  In a battle 
between federal agencies, the Supreme Court held that a National Labor 
Relations Board remedy for an illegal alien would “unduly trench” upon 
the IRCA.  Id. at 151, 122 S. Ct. at 1284.  Although not a preemption 
case, Hoffman Plastic declared that “combating the employment of illegal 
aliens . . . [is] central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law.’ ”  Id. at 140, 122 
17 
S. Ct. at 1278 (quoting INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 
U.S. 183, 194 n.8, 112 S. Ct. 551, 558 n.8 (1991)). 
 
The most recent and most important United States Supreme Court 
case involving preemption in the context of immigration and employment 
is Chamber of Commerce, 563 U.S. 582, 131 S. Ct. 1968.  In Chamber of 
Commerce, the Court considered a challenge to an Arizona law which 
allowed for the suspension and revocation of business licenses for 
employing illegal aliens and required all employers to verify the 
employment status of all employees using an internet-based system, E-
Verify.  Id. at 587, 131 S. Ct. at 1973.  Unlike De Canas, which involved 
a preemption claim under the INA, the Chamber of Commerce case 
involved preemption under the IRCA.  Id. at 588–89, 131 S. Ct. at 1974.  
The Chamber of Commerce Court ruled, however, that the Arizona 
regulation was within a “savings clause” of the IRCA, which provided that 
federal immigration law preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon 
those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”  Id. at 590, 611, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1975, 1987 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)). 
 
The last case is Arizona, 567 U.S. 387, 132 S. Ct. 2492.  In 
Arizona, the United States challenged four provisions of an Arizona 
statute dubbed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor’s 
Act.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.  Two of the challenged provisions 
created new criminal offenses.  Id.  One relevant provision made failure 
to comply with alien registration requirements a state misdemeanor.  Id.  
Another provision made it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to 
seek or engage in work in the state.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2497–98.  
Two other provisions gave arrest authority and investigative duties with 
18 
respect to certain aliens to state and local law enforcement.  Id. at ___, 
132 S. Ct. at 2498. 
 
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at ___, 132 
S. Ct. at 2497.  Justice Kennedy began with a review of the broad scope 
of federal immigration policy.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–99.  Noting 
the impact of immigration policy on international relations, Justice 
Kennedy stressed that the federal governance of immigration status is 
“extensive and complex.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.  After canvassing 
the broad sweep of immigration provisions, Justice Kennedy emphasized 
that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy explained, 
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law 
embraces immediate human concerns.  Unauthorized 
workers trying to support their families, for example, likely 
pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit 
a serious crime.  The equities of an individual case may turn 
on many factors, including whether the alien has children 
born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a 
record of distinguished military service. 
Id. 
 
Justice Kennedy recognized, however, that states bear “many of 
the consequences of unlawful immigration.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 
2500.  Justice Kennedy cited statistics indicating that hundreds of 
thousands of deportable aliens are captured in Arizona each year.  Id.  
Further, Justice Kennedy acknowledged studies reporting that aliens are 
responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime.  Id. 
 
After surveying traditional categories of federal preemption, Justice 
Kennedy proceeded to evaluate each of the challenged provisions of 
Arizona law.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01.  The first provision 
considered provided a state criminal penalty for failure to complete or 
carry an alien registration document in violation of federal law.  Id. at 
19 
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.  Justice Kennedy wrote that although the statute 
was not identical to that considered in Hines, federal immigration law 
provides “a full set of standards governing alien registration, including 
the punishment for noncompliance.  It was designed as a ‘harmonious 
whole.’ ”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72, 61 
S. Ct. at 407). 
 
According to Justice Kennedy, field preemption foreclosed state 
regulation even if the state regulation is parallel to federal standards.  Id.  
Justice Kennedy emphasized permitting Arizona to impose its own 
penalties for the federal offenses would conflict with the careful 
framework Congress adopted.  Id.  If the provision of state law were 
enforced, Arizona would “have the power to bring criminal charges 
against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances 
where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine 
that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”  Id. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 
2503.  Further, Justice Kennedy noted that the penalties for violation of 
the Arizona law ruled out probation as a possible sentence and 
eliminated the possibility of a pardon, thus conflicting with the plan that 
Congress put in place.  Id. 
 
Justice Kennedy next turned to the provision of Arizona law which 
made it a state misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly 
apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an 
employee or independent contractor.”  Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13–2928(c) (West Supp. 2011)).  This Arizona statutory provision had 
no counterpart in federal law.  Id.  The United States claimed the 
provision upset “the balance struck by the [IRCA] and must be 
preempted as an obstacle to the federal plan of regulation and control.”  
Id. 
20 
 
Justice Kennedy recognized that in De Canas, the Court had held 
the federal government had expressed no more than “a peripheral 
concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360, 96 S. Ct. at 939).  But 
Justice Kennedy noted that in light of the enactment of the IRCA, 
“[c]urrent federal law is substantially different from the regime that 
prevailed when De Canas was decided.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.  
Justice Kennedy noted that IRCA now created “a comprehensive 
framework” for “combating the employment of illegal aliens.”  Id. (quoting 
Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 147, 122 S. Ct. at 1282). 
 
In analyzing the comprehensive framework of IRCA, Justice 
Kennedy stressed that it did not impose criminal sanctions on the 
employee when aliens sought or engaged in unauthorized work.  Id.  
While Justice Kennedy recognized federal law made it a crime for 
unauthorized workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means, 
Congress made it clear that any information employees submitted to 
indicate their work status could not be used for purposes other than 
“prosecution under specified federal criminal statutes for fraud, perjury, 
and related conduct.”  Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F)–(G). 
 
Justice Kennedy recognized the express exemption provision of 
IRCA was silent about whether additional penalties could be imposed 
against employees seeking to engage in unauthorized work.  Id.  But 
Justice Kennedy emphasized that “the existence of an ‘express 
preemption provisio[n] does not bar the ordinary working of conflict 
preemption principles’ or impose a ‘special burden’ that would make it 
more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the 
clause.”  Arizona, 567 at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504–05 (quoting Geier v. Am. 
21 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–70, 120 S. Ct. 1913, 1919–20 
(2000)). 
 
Justice Kennedy continued that the “Arizona law would interfere 
with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized 
employment of aliens.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.  Although the goals 
and methods of Arizona law to achieve deterrence were the same as 
federal law, Justice Kennedy observed, the conflict is in “the method of 
enforcement” and that “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive 
to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.”  Id. (quoting 
Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. 
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287, 91 S. Ct. 1909, 1918 (1971)). 
 
Justice Kennedy next examined the third challenged provision of 
Arizona law which provided that a state officer, “without a warrant, may 
arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the 
person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable 
from the United States.”  Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
3883(A)(5)).  After canvassing federal law related to removal, Justice 
Kennedy observed the Arizona statue gave state officers even greater 
authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than 
Congress gave to trained federal immigration officers.  Id. at ___, 132 
S. Ct. at 2506.  The state authority could be exercised without any input 
from the federal government regarding whether an arrest is warranted in 
a particular case.  Id.  This, according to Justice Kennedy, “would allow 
the State to achieve its own immigration policy.”  Id. 
 
Justice Kennedy further reasoned that allowing state authorities to 
determine whether an alien should be detained for being removable 
violates the principle that “the removal process is entrusted to the 
discretion of the Federal Government.”  Id.  Authorizing state and local 
22 
officials to interfere with this discretion “creates an obstacle to the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 
Finally, Justice Kennedy turned to the fourth challenged provision 
of Arizona law.  Id.  This fourth challenged provision required state 
officers to make a “reasonable attempt” to determine the immigration 
status of any person they stop or arrest if “reasonable suspicion exists 
that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United 
States.”  Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B)).  Further, the law 
provided that the immigration status of any person arrested would be 
determined before release.  Id.  Ordinarily, checking the immigration 
status of a detained person involved a contact to Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), which keeps a database of immigration 
records.  Id. 
 
The Court upheld this provision of Arizona law against preemption 
attack.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.  Justice Kennedy noted that 
cooperation between federal and state officials is an important part of the 
immigration system.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.  Further, Congress 
required ICE to respond to requests for verification from state officials.  
Id. 
 
Justice Kennedy closed his opinion with a melodious endorsement 
of the beneficial aspects of immigration.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.  
He cited an immigration ceremony at the Smithsonian involving a dozen 
immigrants who stood before the tattered flag that inspired the national 
anthem.  Id.  He noted the history of the United States “is in part made of 
the stories, talents, and lasting contributions of those who crossed 
oceans and deserts to come here.”  Id. 
 
2.  Application of preemption principles to immigration law by lower 
federal courts.  After Arizona, lower federal courts have grappled with 
23 
federal preemption questions involving immigrants and employment.  
The closest precedent to the case before us arises from the state of 
Arizona. 
 
In Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, plaintiffs attacked two Arizona statutes 
which criminalized the act of identity theft done with intent to obtain or 
continue employment.  76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842 (D. Ariz. 2015), rev’d in 
part and vacated in part, 821 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2016).  The challenged 
Arizona aggravated identity theft statute provided that “[a] person 
commits aggravated taking the identity of another person . . . if the 
person knowingly takes . . . or uses any personal identifying information 
. . . of . . . [a]nother person, including a real or fictitious person, with the 
intent to obtain employment.”  Id. at 844 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13–2009).  Another Arizona statute provided that a person commits 
identity 
theft 
by 
taking, 
purchasing, 
manufacturing, 
recording, 
possessing, or using personal identifying information with the intent to 
engage in an unlawful purpose or to cause economic loss, or “with the 
intent to obtain or continue employment.”  Id. at 844–45. 
 
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the statutes on preemption grounds.  Id. at 869.  The 
court recognized that the statutes were facially neutral and applied to 
immigrants and nonimmigrants alike.  Id. at 854.  The court noted that a 
state law may not “frustrate the operation of federal law [even if] the state 
legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one 
of frustration.”  Id. at 855 (alteration in original) (quoting Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651–52, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 1712 (1971)).  In any 
event, based on legislative history and common sense, the court 
determined that a primary purpose and effect of the statutes was to 
24 
impose criminal penalties on unauthorized aliens who sought or engaged 
in unauthorized employment.  Id. 
 
Turning to preemption analysis, the district court reasoned that in 
Arizona, the Supreme Court did not conclude Congress had occupied the 
field of “unauthorized-alien employment.”  Id. at 856.  Instead, the 
district court stated the high court applied conflict preemption principles 
in striking down an Arizona law that made it a crime for unauthorized 
aliens to seek employment.  Id. 
 
But in this case, the district court noted, the plaintiffs identified a 
narrower 
field, 
namely, 
“unauthorized-alien 
fraud 
in 
seeking 
employment.”  Id.  This narrower field, according to the court, “ha[d] 
been heavily and comprehensively regulated by Congress.”  Id.  The court 
cited extensive regulations in the IRCA, emphasizing that Congress 
imposed every kind of penalty that can arise from unauthorized alien use 
of false document to secure employment—criminal, civil, immigration—
and had expressly limited states use of federal employment verification 
documents.  Id. at 857; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F)–(G). 
 
The district court turned to conflict preemption.  Puente Ariz., 76 
F. Supp. 3d at 857.  The court noted that in considering conflict 
preemption, direct conflict between federal law and state law is not 
required.  Id.  According to the court, even when state and federal laws 
have the same general objective, an “inconsistency of sanctions” between 
two laws may “undermine[] the congressional calibration of force.”  Id. 
(quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380, 120 S. Ct. at 2298).  The district court 
noted that under the Arizona identity theft law, only a criminal sanction 
was available.  Id. at 858.  In contrast, federal authorities had a range of 
options, including civil penalties.  Id. 
25 
 
The district court concluded the overlapping penalties created by 
the Arizona identity theft statutes which “layer additional penalties atop 
federal law” likely result in preemption.  Id. (quoting Ga. Latino All. for 
Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir. 2012)).  
Like the United States Supreme Court in Arizona, the district court noted 
that conflict is imminent whenever “two separate remedies are brought to 
bear on the same activity.”  Id. (quoting Gould Inc., 475 U.S. at 286, 106 
S. Ct. at 1061).  As a result, the court entered a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the enforcement of the identity theft statutes.  Id. at 869. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court in Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2016).  The Ninth Circuit reversal, however, was on a narrow 
ground, namely, that the facially neutral Arizona statutes were not 
facially preempted.  Id. at 1108.  The Ninth Circuit came to this 
conclusion because the statutes did not intrude on federal authority in 
all its applications, as generally required for a successful facial attack.  
Id. at 1107–08.  The Ninth Circuit expressed no view as to whether the 
statutes were preempted on an as-applied basis.  Id. at 1108. 
 
On remand, the district court considered whether the Arizona 
statutes were preempted as applied.  Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. CV-
14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2016 WL 6873294, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 2016).  
The court found that Congress preempted “a relatively narrow field: state 
prosecution of fraud in the I-9 process.”  Id. at *12.  In light of the 
intruding provisions of state identity theft laws, the court concluded the 
defendants were preempted under field preemption from using the I-9 
form 
and 
accompanying 
documentation 
for 
investigations 
or 
prosecutions of violations of the Arizona identity theft and forgery 
statutes.  Id. at *13. 
26 
 
The district court then turned to conflict preemption.  Id.  The 
court determined the Arizona identity theft and forgery statutes were not 
conflict preempted.  Id. at *15.  The court emphasized that federal law 
only imposed criminal and civil penalties for fraud committed directly in 
the I-9 process, or to satisfy other immigration requirements or receive 
other immigration benefits.  Id. at *13.  But, the court reasoned, to the 
extent state law imposed penalties on fraud committed outside the I-9 
process, the state penalties did not “layer additional consequences on top 
of federal penalties because the federal penalties [did] not address non-I-
9 conduct.”  Id.  The court found that use of a false name on an 
employer’s direct deposit payroll form, for example, is not done for an 
immigration purpose, but rather to obtain the convenience of direct 
payroll deposits.  Id. at *14. 
 
Another case arising out of Arizona dealt with the question of 
conflict preemption of a state policy refusing to allow DACA recipients to 
obtain Arizona drivers’ licenses.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 
F.3d 1053, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2014).  In Brewer, the Ninth Circuit 
considered an appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction restraining 
the state from enforcing the statute.  Id. at 1058. 
 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter for entry of a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing its 
policy.  Id.  The Brewer court declared that the plaintiff’s contention that 
Arizona’s policy was conflict preempted because of its interference with 
Congress’s intent that the executive branch possess discretion to 
determine when citizens work in the United States was plausible.  Id. at 
1061. 
 
The Brewer court then turned to the impact of Arizona law on 
federal policy.  Id. at 1062.  The court reasoned that, as a practical 
27 
matter, the ability to drive is a virtual necessity for people in Arizona who 
want to work.  Id.  The court emphasized it did not matter that the state’s 
policy did not formally prohibit DACA recipients from working, because 
preemption analysis must contemplate the practical result of the state 
law.  Id.  The court reasoned that if the practical effect of the Arizona 
policy “is that DACA recipients in Arizona are generally obstructed from 
working—despite the Executive’s determination, backed by a delegation 
of Congressional authority, that DACA recipients throughout the United 
States may work—then the [state’s] policy is preempted.”  Id. at 1063.  
The court emphasized that state law “is preempted whenever its 
application would frustrate the objectives and purposes of Congress, 
even if the state law’s own application is frustrated by individuals’ 
noncompliance.”  Id.  On remand, the district court granted a permanent 
injunction and the state appealed.  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 81 F. 
Supp. 3d 795, 811 (D. Ariz. 2015).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Ariz. 
Dream Act Coal v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 920, amended by 855 F.3d 957. 
 
Another case involving identity fraud is United States v. South 
Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).  In South Carolina, the Fourth 
Circuit considered the validity of a state statute making it unlawful for 
any person to display or possess a false or counterfeit ID for “purpose[s] 
of proving lawful presence in the United States.”  Id. at 522.  The state 
argued that a presumption against preemption applied because “fraud is 
an area traditionally for state legislation.”  Id. at 532.  The Fourth 
Circuit, however, noted that when the fraud at issue involved federal 
immigration documents, the presumption against preemption did not 
apply.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit further stressed, 
 
As 
with 
other 
immigration-related 
measures, 
prosecution for counterfeiting or using federal immigration 
documents is at the discretion of the Department of Justice 
28 
acting through the United States Attorney, and allowing the 
state to prosecute individuals for violations of a state law 
that is highly similar to a federal law strips federal officials of 
that discretion. 
Id. at 532–33.  Concluding that Congress had occupied the field, the 
Fourth Circuit noted that because enforcement of federal antifraud 
statutes involved the discretion of federal officials, a state’s own law in 
the area, inviting state prosecutions, would “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”  Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404). 
 
3.  Summary of general principles of preemption in the field of 
modern immigration law.  There are two general discernable trends in the 
field of immigration.  First, over time, federal regulation of immigration 
has become increasingly detailed and complex.  Second, as noted by one 
legal expert, the trend in court decisions reflects recognition of broad 
federal control over nearly the entire field of immigration.  Fandl, 9 Harv. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. at 532. 
 
The expansive scope of federal preemption doctrine in the 
immigration 
field 
recognizes, 
among 
other 
things, 
the 
role 
of 
discretionary enforcement.  Discretion has been baked into the cake of 
immigration law for many years through congressional enactment and 
caselaw.  State law regulatory schemes that interfere with the systematic 
implementation of federal enforcement discretion present an obstacle in 
one of the main purposes of federal immigration policy: to speak with one 
voice on immigration matters.  For this reason, state mirror-image 
enforcement of federal immigration law was soundly rejected in Arizona, 
567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 
Finally, through the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), Congress has 
demonstrated an ability to identify areas of potential federal–state 
29 
cooperation in the enforcement of immigration law.  Notably, however, 
such federal–state cooperation must be subject to written agreements, 
involve training of state officials, and be conducted under the supervision 
of federal authorities.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).  Even where federal–state 
cooperation has been expressly authorized, Congress has insisted on 
substantial federal control of the underlying activities.  
 
D.  Application of Preemption Principles to Iowa’s Forgery 
Statute.  Iowa Code section 715A.2(2)(a)(4) is preempted on its face by 
federal immigration law.  The statute provides that forgery arises if the 
writing is or purports to be “[a] document prescribed by statute, rule, or 
regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment 
in the United States.”  Iowa Code § 715A.2(2)(a)(4).  This statutory 
provision is the mirror image of federal immigration law, namely 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
 
Such mirror-image statutes are preempted by federal law.  As 
noted in Arizona when the Supreme Court considered state law imposing 
penalties for federal alien registration violations, “[p]ermitting the State to 
impose its own penalties . . . would conflict with the careful framework 
Congress adopted.”  Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.  
Further, it would impermissibly divest “federal authorities of the 
exclusive power to prosecute these crimes.”  Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 
732 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2013); see Ga. Latino All., 691 F.3d at 
1267 (finding a Georgia statute, which “layer[ed] additional penalties 
atop federal [immigration] law,” preempted).  As noted by the United 
States Supreme Court, under such mirror-image enforcement “the State 
would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for 
violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in 
30 
charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would 
frustrate federal policies.”  Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 
E.  Application of Preemption Principles to Prosecution of 
Martinez Under Iowa’s Identity Theft Statute. 
 
1.  Facial preemption.  Unlike Iowa Code section 715A.2(2)(a)(4), 
Iowa’s identity theft statute, Iowa Code section 715A.8, does not directly 
track the language of federal immigration law.  Because the identity theft 
statute has a potentially broader application outside the immigration 
context, it is not facially preempted by federal immigration law.  An 
unauthorized alien who committed identity theft outside the field 
occupied by federal immigration law could be prosecuted under state 
law.  For example, identity theft to defraud a bank by an unauthorized 
alien would not be preempted by federal immigration law and 
prosecution of an alien for such a crime would be well within the 
traditional police power of the states.  Further, many persons may be 
prosecuted under the statute who are not aliens but are United States 
citizens.  While enforcement of identity theft may be preempted by federal 
immigration law in some contexts, it is only preempted to the extent it 
intrudes upon, interferes, or is an obstacle to the implementation of 
federal immigration law.  See Puente Ariz., 821 F.3d at 1106. 
2.  Field preemption as applied to Martinez.  While the identity theft 
statute is not preempted in all its applications, that is not the end of the 
analysis.  As noted in Gade v. National Solid Waste Management 
Association, a statute “is not saved from pre-emption simply because the 
State can demonstrate some additional effect outside of the [preempted 
area].”  505 U.S. 88, 107, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2388 (1992).  The notion a 
statute may be preempted in some of its applications was recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. ___, 
31 
133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).  In Hillman, the Court held that a particular 
Virginia statute would be preempted only as applied to federal 
employees.  Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1955.  The notion that state statutes 
may be preempted as applied has been utilized in the immigration law 
context.  See Brewer, 757 F.3d. at 1062. 
We now turn to the question of whether the statute is field 
preempted as applied in this case.  Here, the only factual basis for the 
State’s charge that Martinez used false identity documents “to obtain 
credit, property, and services”—an essential element in the crime of 
identity theft—is the allegation that Martinez obtained unauthorized 
employment. 
The Iowa identity theft statute is preempted to the extent it 
regulates fraud committed to allow an unauthorized alien to work in the 
United States in violation of federal immigration law.  The IRCA is a 
comprehensive statute that brought regulation of alien employment 
under the umbrella of federal immigration policy.  See Hoffman Plastic, 
535 U.S. at 147, 122 S. Ct. at 1282.  Under its comprehensive scheme, 
Congress 
made 
employers 
primarily 
responsible 
for 
preventing 
unauthorized aliens from obtaining employment. 
To the extent federal immigration authorities choose to proceed 
with sanctions against unauthorized aliens, the IRCA establishes a 
comprehensive regime of criminal, civil, and immigration related 
consequences.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324c; 18 U.S.C. § 1546.  These 
multiple sanctions establish a system that can work as a “harmonious 
whole.”  Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1025.  Because the federal immigration 
law occupies the field regarding the employment of unauthorized aliens, 
the State in this case cannot prosecute Martinez for identity theft related 
to false documentation supplied to her employer as an unauthorized 
32 
alien.  She may, of course, be subject to prosecution under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324c and 18 U.S.C. § 1546.  Any such prosecution rests in the 
discretion of federal prosecutors. 
The United States Supreme Court’s approach in Arizona supports 
our analysis.  In Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
federal plan related to alien registration was “a single integrated and all-
embracing system” designed as a “harmonious whole” with a “full set of 
standards . . . including punishment for noncompliance.”  567 U.S. at 
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–02 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72, 74, 61 S. Ct. 
at 407–08).  Here, the same can be said for the field of unauthorized 
employment of aliens.  Congress has dominated the field and because 
Congress has “adopted a calibrated framework within the INA to address 
this issue,” any “state’s attempt to intrude into this area is prohibited.”  
Ga. Latino All., 691 F.3d at 1264.  The federal government occupies the 
field and “even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”  
Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
3.  Conflict preemption as applied to Martinez.  We also conclude 
that enforcement of Iowa’s identity theft statute is conflict preempted in 
this case.  Any prosecution under the Iowa identity theft statute 
frustrates congressional purpose and provides an obstacle to the 
implementation of federal immigration policy by usurping federal 
enforcement discretion in the field of unauthorized employment of aliens.  
See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.  As further noted in Arizona, a conflict 
in technique can be as fully disruptive to the system Congress enacted as 
conflict in overt policy.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.  A state statute is 
preempted when it stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. (quoting 
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404). 
33 
Additionally, the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the 
employment of unlawful immigrants include the establishment of a 
comprehensive federal system of control with a unified discretionary 
enforcement regime.  As noted in South Carolina, it is the prerogative of 
federal officials to police work authorization fraud by aliens.  720 F.3d at 
533.  Federal discretion in the enforcement of immigration law is 
essential to its implementation as a harmonious whole.  The reasons for 
exercise of federal discretion are varied.  Federal officials often rely upon 
unauthorized aliens to build criminal cases involving drugs or human 
traffickers.  The risk faced by unauthorized aliens being subject to 
violations of labor laws by exploiting employers is a discretionary factor 
to be taken into account by federal officials.  Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 
132 S. Ct. at 2504.  Enforcement may be affected by foreign affairs or a 
need to account for reciprocal enforcement in other countries.  Id. at ___, 
132 S. Ct. at 2498.  As Justice Kennedy noted in Arizona, “Discretion in 
the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human 
concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for 
example, likely pose less danger than . . . aliens who commit a serious 
crime.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 
Local enforcement of laws regulating employment of unauthorized 
aliens would result in a patchwork of inconsistent enforcement that 
would undermine the harmonious whole of national immigration law.  
This case is a classic demonstration of why preemption is necessary.  
Federal authorities in this case appear to be willing to defer any potential 
federal immigration action on equitable and humanitarian grounds.  
Martinez came to the United States as a child, an illegal entry for which 
she is not personally responsible.  She was educated in Iowa, has no 
criminal record, is a productive member of the community, and now has 
34 
four children who are citizens of the United States.  Federal immigration 
authorities 
routinely 
take 
these 
equitable 
and 
humanitarian 
considerations into account in the enforcement of immigration law.  
Federal enforcement officials might well weigh the fact that a mother 
would be separated from her four children who are United States citizens 
as a very undesirable result. 
 
Further, Martinez stepped forward as part of a federal program, 
DACA.  She provided relevant immigration authorities with information 
and was granted deferred status.  Federal authorities might blanch at 
prosecuting a person who in good faith responded to their invitation to 
come out of the shadows for deferred action.  See Brewer, 757 F.3d at 
1063 (citing the practical effect of Arizona policy being DACA recipients 
were barred from working). 
 
The state prosecutor in this case, however, seems to have a 
different philosophy and, as reflected in the charging decision to seek 
Martinez’s conviction on two felonies, exposed her to a significant Iowa 
prison term and removal from the country.  If such local exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion were permitted, the harmonious system of 
federal immigration law related to unauthorized employment would 
literally be destroyed. 
 
Allowing Iowa to enforce its identity theft statute in the context of 
the employment of an unauthorized alien conflicts with Congress’s 
chosen method of enforcement.  See Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2505.  Federal prosecution of immigration crimes are brought by the 
appropriate United States Attorney.  United States Attorneys exercise 
their discretion in a manner consistent with the established priorities of 
the administrations they serve.  Ga. Latino All., 691 F.3d at 1265.  
Although federal law allows state–federal cooperative enforcement by 
35 
agreement under certain circumstances, there is no applicable 
agreement here.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).  Allowing state prosecutors to 
pursue identity theft criminal prosecutions in which the crimes are 
based on unlawful employment by unauthorized aliens would threaten 
uniform application of immigration law.  See Ga. Latino All., 691 F.3d at 
1266. 
 
III.  Conclusion. 
 
For the above reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court 
and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 
 
Cady, C.J., Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this opinion.  Cady, C.J., 
files a special concurrence in which Wiggins, J., joins.  Wiggins, J., files a 
separate special concurrence.  Mansfield, Waterman, and Zager, JJ., 
dissent. 
 
 
36 
 
#15–0671, State v. Martinez 
CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).   
 
I join the opinion of the court.  I write separately to elaborate on 
the principles it expresses.   
 
The State uses two criminal laws to prosecute Martha Martinez.  
One is the crime of identity theft.  The other is the crime of forgery.  The 
question is whether the prosecution of an unauthorized alien for these 
crimes in the manner pursued in this case violates the federal 
preemption doctrine.   
 
Without question the authority to regulate immigration is 
“exclusively a federal power.”  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354, 96 
S. Ct. 933, 936 (1976).  Moreover, under the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act, Congress has clearly decided not to impose criminal 
penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment.  
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).  
Any state law contrary to this approach is an impediment to the 
regulatory power of Congress and contrary to the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States.  See id.  Thus, no state may impose criminal penalties 
on unauthorized employees.   
 
The crime of identity theft does not conflict with the federal 
preemption doctrine on its face.  It criminalizes the fraudulent use of 
identification information of another “with intent to obtain credit, 
property, services, or other benefits.”  Iowa Code § 715A.8(2) (2013).  This 
crime is elevated from an aggravated misdemeanor to a felony when the 
value of the credit, property, services, or other benefit obtained exceeds 
$1000.  Id. § 715A.8(3).  Identity theft is a serious crime, and states are 
normally free to prosecute violators, whether citizens or aliens.   
37 
 
Yet, the State in this case has not just prosecuted an unauthorized 
alien for using false information, but has prosecuted the unauthorized 
alien for using the false information to obtain employment and to earn 
wages from that employment.  Consequently, the State has used the law 
in a way to criminalize the conduct of an unauthorized alien who applied 
for and obtained a job with false identification and earned wages from 
the job.  While the State could use the crime to prosecute an 
unauthorized alien for a variety of conduct related to identity theft, the 
conduct here is tied to a narrow area controlled by Congress.   
 
It is important to observe that the United States of America is 
bound together by shared constitutional values.  These national values 
are protected by the preemption doctrine from state laws that directly 
contravene them, just as they are protected from state laws that would 
work against them in less obvious ways.  Courts have played a critical 
role in seeing through state laws that may appear neutral and benign on 
their face, but work subtly or indirectly to violate a fundamental precept 
of our Federal Constitution.  This has been observed in a variety of areas.  
For example, courts have been vigilant to strike down state laws that 
indirectly interfere with the right to vote, just as they would with state 
laws that would attempt to do so directly.  See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–69, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1082 (1966).  Likewise, 
in the area of discrimination, the Court has long held,  
Though the [state] law itself be fair on its face, and impartial 
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by 
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as 
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their 
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the constitution.   
38 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1073 (1886).  
Simply put, “The Constitution does not make judicial observance or 
enforcement of its basic guaranties depend on whether their violation 
appears from the face of legislation or only from its application to proven 
facts.”  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 484, 64 S. Ct. 660, 696 
(1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).   
 
In this case, the crime requires the job applicant to secure 
employment and begin earning wages in order to satisfy the criminal 
element of value.  See Iowa Code § 715A.8(3).  The State argues the law 
is permissibly intended to protect potential victims of identity theft, but 
“any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, 
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”  Free v. 
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S. Ct. 1089, 1092 (1962); see also 
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 272 (1875) (“[N]o definition of 
[the state police power], and no urgency for its use, can authorize a State 
to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided 
exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.”).   
 
The identity theft law may not specifically target unauthorized 
workers or be the full frontal assault on the employment of unauthorized 
aliens found prohibited in Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2505, 
but the outcome, nevertheless, is not saved from the doctrine of federal 
preemption.  See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 
105, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2386–87 (1992) (“Although ‘part of the pre-empted 
field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in 
question, . . . another part of the field is defined by the state law’s actual 
effect.’ ”  (alteration in original) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 84, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2278 (1990)).  As applied to unauthorized 
aliens who use identification information in seeking employment, the law 
39 
interferes with the efforts of Congress to regulate matters governing 
unauthorized alien employees every bit as it interfered in Arizona.   
 
The crime of forgery as used in this case also violates the 
preemption doctrine.  This result is only more obvious.  The holding in 
Arizona discussing a state alien registration statute needs only a few 
words changed to illustrate the conflict with the preemption doctrine in 
this case:  
 
[Iowa] 
contends 
that 
[Iowa 
Code 
section 
715A.2(2)(a)(4)] 
can 
survive 
preemption 
because 
the 
provision has the same aim as federal law and adopts its 
substantive standards.  This argument not only ignores the 
basic premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, 
in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved 
for itself—but also is unpersuasive on its own terms.  
Permitting the State to impose its own penalties for the 
federal offenses here would conflict with the careful 
framework Congress adopted.   
Arizona, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.  By imposing state criminal 
penalties for “forgery . . . to [obtain] employment” on top of the existing 
federal system regulating the employment of aliens, Iowa Code section 
715A.2(2)(a)(4) robs the federal government of the discretion it has so 
carefully reserved.  It may not do so.  That discretion, ever decreasing in 
its availability, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1480 (2010), is crucial to the federal scheme.  See Arizona, 567 
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Discretion in the enforcement of 
immigration law embraces immediate human concerns.”); Gabriel J. Chin 
& Marc L. Miller, Broken Mirror: The Unconstitutional Foundations of New 
State Immigration Enforcement, in Strange Neighbors: The Role of States in 
Immigration Policy 167, 170 (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin, 
eds. 2014) (“[T]he discretion inherent in the federal immigration regime, 
and in federal criminal enforcement more generally—the power to charge 
or not, to decide what to charge, and to choose whether to pursue civil or 
40 
administrative measures—is itself a fundamental part of the law of 
immigration.”).  State authority is limited by “the scope of [its] police 
powers.”  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146, 
83 S. Ct. 1210, 1219 (1963).  No definition of the State of Iowa’s police 
powers would authorize it to regulate immigration.  See Henderson, 92 
U.S. at 272.   
 
These state laws, whether by design or effect, have intruded in an 
area wholly occupied by the federal government.  They are therefore 
preempted by Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution.   
 
Wiggins, J., joins this special concurrence.   
 
 
41 
#15–0671, State v. Martinez 
WIGGINS, Justice (specially concurring). 
I join the majority opinion and write separately to emphasize the 
issue of prosecutorial discretion.   
Martha Aracely Martinez was born in Mexico.  Her parents brought 
her to Muscatine, Iowa, when she was eleven years old.  It was not her 
choice to come here.  Since then, she has lived in Muscatine, attended 
local schools, and worked in the community.  When her parents brought 
her to the United States, she did not have a lawful immigration status.  
Because she had no immigration status, she could not lawfully obtain a 
driver’s license or lawful employment when she became old enough to do 
so.   
When she was seventeen years old, Martinez used fictitious 
documents to acquire an Iowa driver’s license, which in turn, she used to 
obtain employment.  She was a model citizen, contributing member of 
the community, and employed for thirteen years.  After Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)2 protection coaxed Martinez from the 
shadow of deportation to acquire lawful immigration status and work 
authorization, the Muscatine County Attorney charged her with crimes 
for previously using the fictitious documents to obtain a license and 
employment.  Importantly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
her use of the fictitious documents caused anyone harm.   
As Martinez approached adulthood, she had to figure out a way to 
survive in a country her parents brought her to as a child.  This country 
 
2Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to 
David L. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.; Alejandro Mayorkas, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
                                            
42 
is the only country she knew.  She chose to support herself and her 
children by participating in the legal economy.  She did not have any 
other good choices.  One bad choice would be to support herself and her 
family by engaging in illegal activities.  Another would be to support 
herself by participating in the underground economy.  If she did get 
involved in either the illegal or the underground economy, she could have 
become a victim of human trafficking.  See Dina Francesca Haynes, 
Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines Between Trafficked 
Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. 
Pol’y 1, 44–45 (2009).  Yet, another choice would be to return to a 
country that was never her home.   
When DACA became available, Martinez came forward to obtain 
legal immigration status and proper work authorization.  At each step, it 
seems, Martinez attempted to do right in difficult circumstances created 
by her parents when she was only a child.  According to the record and 
by all measures, Martinez has been a valuable contributor to her 
community and our state.  At the time the county attorney decided to 
exercise his discretion to file charges, she had three young children and 
was pregnant with her fourth child.  At the time he filed the charges, the 
county attorney knew there was a good chance Martinez could be 
deported, which would force her children, three American citizens, to 
leave the country or stay here and fend on their own. 
The county attorney “is an administrator of justice, an advocate, 
and an officer of the court.”  ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-1.2(b), at 4 (3d ed. 1993) 
[hereinafter ABA Standards].  As Judge Weinstein noted over thirty years 
ago, 
43 
[a]ny ethical and procedural obligation of a private attorney 
to be fair to opponents and candid with the court is 
enforceable when the litigant is represented by an attorney 
for the government.  As a United States Attorney General put 
it more than a hundred years ago, “in the performance of . . . 
his duty . . . he is not a counsel giving advice to the 
government as his client, but a public officer, acting 
judicially, under all the solemn responsibilities of conscience 
and legal obligations.”  
Zimmerman v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(quoting Office & Duties of Att’y Gen. 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 334 (1854)). 
Further, the county attorney “must exercise sound discretion in 
the performance of his or her functions.”  ABA Standards 3-1.2(b), at 4.  
As an administrator of justice, the county attorney has significant power, 
and with it, must use appropriate restraint.  The county attorney has a 
duty to “seek justice, not merely convict.”  Id. 3-1.2(c), at 4.   
Ultimately, however, Congress vests the United States government 
with the discretion to prosecute persons in similar situations as 
Martinez, not the ninety-nine local county attorneys in our state.  It is up 
to the United States government to exercise its discretion appropriately 
and seek justice. 
 
 
44 
 
#15–0671, State v. Martinez 
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
The court has established an exemption from generally applicable 
Iowa law for the exclusive benefit of unauthorized aliens seeking 
employment in our state.  Under the majority’s ruling, an American 
citizen who works in Iowa under a false name because she is being 
chased by a bill collector and wants to avoid garnishment can be 
prosecuted, but a foreign national who works in Iowa under a false name 
to avoid detection is immune.  That is the wrong reading of federal 
preemption. 
The correct reading comes from the district court, which denied 
Martha Martinez’s motion to dismiss and provided the following 
straightforward explanation: 
[I]dentify theft and forgery are state crimes independent of 
the Defendant’s immigration status.  In this prosecution, the 
State takes no action to enforce or attack [the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act].  The State’s sole interest is the 
protection of citizens from identity theft and to protect 
employers from persons who apply for employment under 
false names and forge signatures of the names of persons 
whose identities they have stolen. 
I agree with the district court’s reasoning and would affirm. 
Although the majority tries to justify its decision based on field 
preemption and conflict preemption, neither doctrine can sustain its 
ruling.  In the critical part of the majority opinion (i.e., the end of it 
where the actual legal analysis occurs), my colleagues quote cases out of 
context and paraphrase cases as saying things they don’t actually say. 
Let me give one example from field preemption and another from 
conflict preemption.  The majority today concludes that Congress has 
occupied the field of employment of unauthorized aliens, thus precluding 
45 
the states from enforcing their generally applicable laws, such as identity 
theft.  I am unaware of any other court that has so held.  From reading 
Part II.E.2 of the court’s opinion, though, one might get the impression 
that Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 
F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012), found field preemption as to employment of 
unauthorized aliens and therefore supports today’s decision. 
One would be wrong.  Georgia Latino actually found that Congress 
had occupied the field of unlawful transport and movement of aliens—
not employment.  Ga. Latino, 691 F.3d at 1264.  That’s a big difference. 
Turning to conflict preemption, in Part II.E.3 the court cites and 
relies upon United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).  
The court asserts that this case holds “it is the prerogative of federal 
officials to police work authorization fraud by aliens.”  But South Carolina 
says no such thing.  The state-law crime there involved displaying or 
possessing false documents “for the purpose of proving lawful presence 
in the United States.”  Id. at 532.  Presence in the United States, 
naturally, is a particular concern of the government of the United States.  
That isn’t what this case is about.  It is about using a false Iowa 
identification card to obtain employment from an Iowa employer. 
To put today’s decision into context, it is helpful to compare it to a 
recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s policy of denying 
drivers’ licenses to all persons protected by the Obama Administration’s 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was preempted 
by federal law.  See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 917 
(9th Cir. 2016), amended by 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017), petition for 
cert. filed, 85 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2017) (No. 16–1180).  This 
has sparked disagreement.  Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
46 
banc, six judges of that court noted that DACA had not been approved by 
Congress but was just the President’s “commitment not to deport.”  Ariz. 
Dream Act Coal., 855 F.3d at 958 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc).  They asked, “Does the Supremacy Clause 
nevertheless force Arizona to issue drivers’ licenses to the recipients of 
the President’s largesse?”  Id.  They characterized the Ninth Circuit panel 
opinion as relying on a “puzzling new preemption theory.”  Id. 
Today’s decision goes much farther than that “puzzling” Ninth 
Circuit decision.  Instead of giving the benefits of preemption to people 
whom the Obama Administration affirmatively exercised its discretion to 
protect, as the Ninth Circuit did in Arizona Dream Act Coalition, the court 
today gives the benefits of preemption to someone on whose behalf the 
Obama Administration declined to exercise its discretion—namely, a 
person who has committed identity fraud and forgery. 
In order to be eligible for deferred status under DACA, an 
individual must not have been convicted of any felony offense (or 
misdemeanor punishable by more than one year in prison) in the United 
States.  See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. to David L. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot.; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 
(June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security’s website, any 
conviction under federal, state, or local law qualifies, and only 
“[i]mmigration-related offenses” are excluded.  See U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration 
Servs., 
Dep’t 
of 
Homeland 
Sec., 
DACA 
Toolkit, 
p. 23-24, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitari
47 
an/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Childhood%20Arrivals/DACA-toolkit. 
pdf (last visited June 2, 2017). 
Thus, under DACA, state-law convictions for identity theft or 
forgery are disqualifying.  Yet if the Department of Homeland Security did 
not believe state-law identity theft or forgery charges should prevent an 
unauthorized alien who arrived as a child from remaining in this 
country, it could have easily so provided in DACA.  It did not.  The court 
thus constructs a preemption theory today on behalf of someone whom 
the federal executive branch exercised its discretion to decline to protect. 
Let me make the same point a different way.  Since “federal 
discretion” appears to be the core basis for the court’s preemption 
decision, one would expect the court to cite some statement, from some 
federal official, in some administration expressing the view that states 
should not prosecute identity theft and forgery by unauthorized aliens 
seeking employment.  That might demonstrate that Iowa was doing 
something at odds with federal law enforcement.  But the court cites no 
such statement. 
Simply stated, the majority’s approach is not preemption under 
any cognizable legal doctrine.  It is not field preemption.  It is not conflict 
preemption.  It is, at best, gestalt preemption.3 
I.  Today’s Decision Is Contrary to Precedent, Including 
Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
and Appellate Courts in Kansas and Missouri. 
Five years ago, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court 
found that several provisions of a recently enacted Arizona law (S.B. 
3In explaining the court’s theory of preemption, the first special concurrence 
analogizes this case to “state laws that indirectly interfere with the right to vote.”  Such 
an analogy is off the mark.  Citizens have a constitutional right to vote.  Unauthorized 
aliens do not have a constitutional right to work in the United States under a false 
name. 
                                            
48 
1070) were preempted by federal immigration law.  See 567 U.S. 387, 
___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).  The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 was 
to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and 
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”  
Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting note following Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 11–1051 (West 2012)).  Two of the four challenged provisions of S.B. 
1070 warrant discussion here.  Section 3 set forth a new state law 
misdemeanor consisting of the “willful failure to complete or carry an 
alien registration document . . . in violation of 8 United States Code 
§ 1304(e) or 1306(a).”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 11–1509(A) (West Supp. 2011)).  Section 5(C) made it a state 
law misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, 
solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or 
independent contractor” in Arizona.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 
(quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–2928(C)). 
The Court found that section 3 was subject to field preemption.  Id. 
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2503.  The Court noted that federal law related to 
alien registration provided a “full set of standards” and was designed as a 
“harmonious whole.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72, 61 S. Ct. 399, 407 (1941)).  The federal 
framework also included criminal punishment for noncompliance.  See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a) (2012).  Accordingly, the Court determined the 
federal government had completely “occupied the field of alien 
registration.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
The Court continued, “Where Congress occupies an entire field, as 
it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state 
regulation is impermissible.”  Id.  Thus, even though Section 3 only 
criminalized activity that was already a federal crime, the federal 
49 
government’s occupation of the field of alien registration meant that 
Arizona “may not enter, in any respect,” that field.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2502 (“Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose 
any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal 
standards.”).4 
As to section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, the federal government argued 
conflict preemption, and the Court agreed.  Id. at ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. at 
2503, 2505.  As the Court explained, persons who violate provisions of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) by engaging in 
unauthorized employment are subject to civil penalties, such as losing 
their eligibility to have permanent status adjusted, or being removed 
from the country.  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (discussing 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1255(c), 1227(a)(1)).  However, the IRCA does not “impose federal 
criminal sanctions on the employee side.”  Id.  In the Court’s view, 
Congress made a “deliberate choice” not to impose criminal penalties on 
persons who merely seek or engage in unauthorized employment.  Id.  
“Although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal 
law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the 
method of enforcement.”  Id. at___, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. 
The Court therefore determined that section 5(C) “interfere[s] with 
the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized 
employment of aliens.”  Id.  The Court found that section 5(C) was 
4The first special concurrence conflates this part of the Supreme Court’s 
decision with the part dealing with employment of unauthorized aliens.  Specifically, to 
support its claim of field preemption, the first special concurrence provides a block 
quotation from the Court’s discussion of section 3 of S.B. 1070, urging that this 
“holding . . . needs only a few words changed to illustrate the conflict with the 
preemption doctrine in this case.”  But the Arizona language in question relates to alien 
registration, not alien employment, and thus has nothing to do with the present case.  
See 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
                                            
50 
preempted by federal law because it was “inconsistent with federal policy 
and objectives” and “an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress 
chose.”  Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2504–05. 
Our case involves neither of the two situations identified in 
Arizona.  The State is not attempting to prosecute either (1) a failure to 
comply with alien registration or (2) a mere attempt by an unauthorized 
alien to secure employment.  The present case involves, rather, the use of 
a false Iowa identification to obtain the benefit of employment in Iowa.5 
Since Arizona was decided, three reported appellate cases, one 
federal and two state, have addressed our situation.  None of them agrees 
with today’s ruling. 
In Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, the plaintiffs mounted a facial 
challenge to two Arizona identity theft laws as preempted by the IRCA.  
See 821 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016).  The first statute prohibited 
“using the information of another (real or fictitious) person ‘with the 
intent to obtain employment.’ ”  Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–2009).  
The second statute was an expansion on the general identity theft 
statute, enacted in order to “also reach employment-related identity 
theft.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit applied a presumption against preemption, 
reasoning that “while the identity theft laws certainly have effects in the 
area of immigration, the text of the laws regulate for the health and 
safety of the people of Arizona.”  Id. at 1104. 
The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that neither statute was field or 
conflict preempted on its face by the IRCA.  Id.  In so holding, the court 
5The first special concurrence relies on Arizona for the proposition that “no state 
may impose criminal penalties on unauthorized employees.”  As I have explained, that 
is not a holding of the case.  Rather, Arizona holds that states may not criminalize the 
mere act of seeking or holding employment by an unauthorized alien.  Id. at ___, 132 
S. Ct. at 2505–06.  The Iowa laws at issue do not do this. 
                                            
51 
emphasized that “the identity theft laws are textually neutral—that is, 
they apply to unauthorized aliens, authorized aliens, and U.S. citizens 
alike.”  Id. at 1105.  In other words, “one could not tell that the identity 
theft laws undermine federal immigration policy by looking at the text 
itself.”  Id.  Because the statutes at issue “make it a crime for ‘any 
person’ to use a false document to gain employment,” the court said that 
cases like Arizona are “easily distinguishable” and “do not control here.”  
Id. at 1107 (emphasis added). 
As a result, the court instead focused on the effect of the statutes 
to determine “if the state encroached on an area Congress intended to 
reserve.”  Id. at 1106.  Considering the statutes were generally applicable 
to any person who uses another’s identity for any reason—immigration 
or nonimmigration—the court reasoned, 
Congress could not have intended to preempt the state from 
sanctioning crimes that protect citizens of the state under 
Arizona’s traditional police powers without intruding on 
federal immigration policy.  Thus, we hold that despite the 
state legislative history, Congress did not intend to preempt 
state criminal statutes like the identity theft laws. 
Id.  The court emphasized that this was not a case where “the statutory 
language singles out unauthorized aliens.”  Id. at 1107. 
After the Ninth Circuit weighed in and rejected the facial challenge, 
the Puente Arizona litigation continued in district court.  On November 
22, 2016, in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court held that Arizona’s laws criminalizing identity theft for purposes of 
obtaining employment were not preempted as applied for the most part.  
Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, No. CV–14–01356–PHX–DGC, 2016 WL 6873294, 
at *10–11, *16 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 2016).  The court excepted only the 
approximately 10 percent of cases where the state had used the Form I-9 
and attached documents to investigate or prosecute the case.  See id. at 
52 
*12–13.6 
Last year, in State v. Ochoa-Lara, the Kansas Court of Appeals held 
that a state prosecution of identity theft, based on the unlawful use of 
another’s social security number to gain employment, was not preempted 
by the IRCA.  362 P.3d 606, 612 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016), review granted 
(Oct. 21, 2016).  The court emphasized that the laws in question were 
neutrally worded and prohibited using the personal identification of 
another with the intent to defraud in order to receive a benefit.  Id. at 
611.  The court recognized “Kansas’ historic police power to prosecute 
identity thieves.”  Id.  The court concluded that “the possible illegal uses 
of another’s Social Security number are myriad” and “[t]here is nothing 
in the IRCA that suggests that Congress intended the comprehensive 
preemption of the police powers of the State to prosecute all such 
instances of identity theft.”  Id. at 612. 
Likewise, in State v. Diaz-Rey, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
rejected a preemption defense to a forgery charge based on the use of a 
false social security card to obtain employment.  397 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2013).  In finding the law not subject to field preemption, the 
court reasoned that it was 
a state law of general applicability that uniformly applies to 
all persons as members of the general public, and makes no 
distinction between aliens and non-aliens.  As a general 
matter, such laws are not preempted simply because a class 
of persons subject to federal regulation may be affected. 
Id. at 9.  The court also concluded that conflict preemption did not apply 
because 
[u]nlike section 5(C) of the Arizona statute, section 
570.090 does not criminalize activity that Congress has 
6I discuss the I-9 exemption below. 
                                            
53 
decided not to criminalize.  Rather, as charged in this case, it 
criminalizes the use of inauthentic writings or items as 
genuine with knowledge and intent to defraud.  Thus, 
section 570.090 does not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s 
purpose in enacting IRCA. 
Id. at 10 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the State charged Martinez with forgery and identity 
theft in violation of Iowa Code sections 715A.2(1)(c) and 715A.8(2) (2013).  
Both charges stemmed from Martinez’s use of Diana Castaneda’s identity 
to work at Packers Sanitation.  Because Martinez had used the 
Castaneda documents to secure employment, the forgery charge was 
elevated to a class “D” felony.  See id. § 715A.2(2)(a)(4).  Furthermore, the 
identity theft charge was treated as a class “D” felony because earnings 
statements from Packers Sanitation indicated Martinez had been paid 
more than $1000 from January to June 2013.  See id. § 715A.8(3). 
Like the statutes at issue in the Kansas and Missouri cases, both 
misdemeanor forgery under Iowa Code section 715A.2 and identity theft 
under Iowa Code section 715A.8 are broad-based, neutral laws.  They 
cover certain categories of fraudulent conduct and operate in an area of 
traditional state police power.  For example, the earliest Iowa Codes 
would have criminalized the conduct that Martinez was alleged to have 
engaged in here.  See Iowa Code § 2627 (1851) (relating to uttering forged 
instruments). 
Notably, our nation has no federal identity card.  Driver’s licenses 
and nonoperator identification cards are an area of traditional state 
concern.  See Koterba v. Commonwealth, 736 A.2d 761, 765 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1999) (“[T]he issuance [and denial] of driver’s licenses is a function 
traditionally exercised by the individual state governments.” (Second 
alteration in original.)).  Iowa has a legitimate state interest in the 
integrity of its own state-issued forms of identification and avoiding their 
54 
misuse.  There is no indication in the IRCA or elsewhere that state 
prosecutions for use of false state identity documents would undermine a 
congressional objective such that persons who use those documents to 
obtain work should receive a “hands off” from state criminal law. 
II.  Express Preemption Based on 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) Does 
Not Apply Here. 
When Martinez began working at Packers Sanitation, she 
completed a Form I-9, titled “Employment Eligibility Verification.”  At 
that time, Martinez provided the Iowa identification card in Diana 
Castaneda’s name but bearing Martinez’s photo as well as the social 
security card in Castaneda’s name.  Copies of these documents were 
retained by the employer and obtained by DOT in their investigation.  
Federal law provides with respect to the I-9, 
Limitation on use of attestation form 
A form designated or established by the Attorney 
General under this subsection [the I-9] and any information 
contained in or appended to such form, may not be used for 
purposes other than for enforcement of this chapter and 
sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of Title 18. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). 
This language clearly prohibits a state prosecution based on false 
statements within the I-9 form itself.  However, two courts have read the 
language as not foreclosing state prosecutions for the display of false 
documents when the I-9 is completed, even if the employer retains copies 
of the false documents and attaches them to the I-9.  In State v. Reynua, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided that a state perjury prosecution 
based on false statements on an I-9 was preempted but declined to find 
preemption of a simple-forgery charge due to presentation of a false 
Minnesota identification card.  See 807 N.W.2d 473, 480–81 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011).  The court concluded, “[W]e cannot read this provision so 
55 
broadly as to preempt a state from enforcing its laws relating to its own 
identification documents.”  Id.  The court reasoned, 
[Section 1324a(b)(5)] does not exhibit a “clear and manifest 
purpose” to bar enforcement of state laws pertaining to state 
identification cards.  It would be a significant limitation on 
state powers to preempt prosecution of state laws prohibiting 
falsification of state-issued identification cards, let alone to 
prohibit all use of such cards merely because they are also 
used 
to 
support 
the 
federal 
employment-verification 
application. 
Id. at 481 (quoting Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77, 129 S. Ct. 
538, 543 (2008)).  In Ochoa-Lara, the Kansas Court of Appeals endorsed 
this analysis.  See 362 P.3d at 610–11. 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona has 
read the scope of the prohibition more broadly.  It found that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(b)(5) bars investigatory use, not merely evidentiary use, of the 
I-9 and attachments in prosecutions other than for the listed federal 
crimes.  Puente Ariz., 2016 WL 6873294, at *12–13.  Hence, the court 
found that the state was “field preempted from using the Form I-9 and 
accompanying documents for investigations or prosecutions of violations 
of the Arizona identity theft and forgery statutes.”  Id. at *13.  In a 
subsequent opinion, the court went on to hold that “documents 
presented solely to comply with the federal employment verification 
system could [not] be used for state law enforcement purposes” even if 
“they were not physically attached to a Form I-9.”  Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 
No. CV–14–01356–PHX–DGC, 2017 WL 1133012, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 
2017).  At the same time, the court concluded that “Congress did not 
intend to preempt state regulation of fraud outside the federal 
employment verification process.”  Id. at *7.  And it concluded that state 
authorities could use the same documents as the basis for a prosecution 
“if they were also submitted for a purpose independent of the federal 
56 
employment verification system, such as to demonstrate ability to drive 
or as part of a typical employment application.”  Id. at *8. 
I agree with the views of the Minnesota and Kansas courts.  “Use” 
is an inherently ambiguous term.  See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2254 (2013) (describing the 
verb use as “elastic”).  In context, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) establishes an 
evidentiary bar on the use of I-9 paperwork other than in certain 
enumerated federal prosecutions.  If Congress had intended the I-9 and 
attachments to be totally off-limits to federal and state agencies other 
than for the listed federal prosecutions it would have worded the statute 
much differently—i.e., as a limitation on disclosure.  For example, given 
the Arizona federal district court’s interpretation, it would be unlawful for 
the FBI to obtain an employee’s I-9 and attachments from an employer in 
the course of a terrorism investigation of that employee, because the 
offenses under consideration were not listed in section 1324a(b)(5).  That 
seems absurd to me.7 
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, the 
Supreme Court indicated that § 1324a(b)(5) does not prohibit an 
employer from showing that it complied with the I-9 process to defend 
against a state criminal prosecution without using “the I-9 form or its 
supporting documents themselves.”  563 U.S. 582, 603 n.9, 131 S. Ct. 
1968, 1982 n.9 (2011).  Similarly, I do not believe § 1324a(b)(5) by its 
terms prohibits Iowa from prosecuting Martinez for using a false state 
identification card to obtain employment, so long as it does not rely on 
7The district court’s latest opinion, in my view, must overcome an additional 
interpretive obstacle.  Section 1324a(b)(5) refers to “information . . . appended to such 
form.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5).  If the document has been submitted to the employer but 
not attached to the I-9, it has not been “appended to such form.” 
                                            
57 
the I-9 paperwork retained by the employer to do so.  And in fact, 
Martinez concedes that “[t]here probably is not express preemption” in 
this case based on § 1324a(b)(5).  And the court today does not rely on 
express preemption. 
Yet, § 1324a(b)(5) highlights another flaw in the majority’s 
preemption ruling.  The fact that Congress included a narrow and 
specific preemption clause in that section limited to the I-9 undermines 
the majority’s view that Congress actually preempted all prosecutions of 
unauthorized aliens (but only unauthorized aliens) for using false 
identities to obtain employment.  Why write a narrow preemption clause 
if the entire field was preempted?8 
III.  Felony Forgery Is Not Preempted Either. 
It is easy for me to conclude that federal immigration law does not 
preempt a prosecution of Martinez for general forgery or identity theft.  
Felony forgery presents a somewhat closer question, however.  Forgery is 
a class “D” felony “if the writing is or purports to be . . . [a] document 
prescribed by statute, rule, or regulation for entry into or as evidence of 
authorized stay or employment in the United States.”  See Iowa Code 
§ 715A.2(2)(a)(4). 
Iowa Code section 715A.2(2)(a)(4) became law in 1996.  See 1996 
Iowa Acts ch. 1181, § 3.  Almost all the changes affected by this 
legislative package relate to the hiring of unauthorized aliens.  See id. 
§ 1–4.  Section 1 requires employers who actively recruit non-English 
speaking residents of other states more than 500 miles away to provide a 
8Additionally, the majority’s suggestion that Martinez would not have needed to 
commit forgery if it hadn’t been for federal law should be rejected.  When Martinez went 
to work at Packers Sanitation, even if the I-9 requirement never existed, she would have 
had to give some identity including a social security number for federal and state tax 
purposes. 
                                            
58 
written statement, signed by the employee, that “possession of forged 
documentation authorizing the person to stay or be employed in the 
United States is a class ‘D’ felony.”  Id. § 1 (codified at Iowa Code 
§ 91E.3(1)(e) (2013)).  Section 2 makes knowing possession of a forged 
document a crime.  Id. § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 715A.2(1)(d)).  Section 
3 adds to the list of documents covered by Class D forgery felony “[a] 
document prescribed by statute, rule, or regulation for entry into or as 
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States.”  Id. § 3 
(codified at Iowa Code § 715A.2(2)(a)(4)).  Section 4 imposes a civil 
penalty on an employer who knowingly hires an employee who is not 
authorized to be employed in the United States or whose documentation 
evidencing authorized stay or employment is known to be false, subject 
to the safe harbor in Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).  Id. § 4 (codified at Iowa 
Code § 715A.2A).  The preamble to the legislation describes it as 
AN ACT relating to the crime of forgery, by prohibiting the 
knowing possession of forged writings, including documents 
prescribed for entry into, stay, or employment in the United 
States, and providing criminal penalties and providing civil 
penalties for employers hiring individuals with forged 
documents regarding the individuals’ entry into, [stay], or 
employment in the United States. 
Id.  The fiscal note for the legislation estimated that the law would result 
in 1000 new criminal convictions annually in Iowa, on the theory that 
“approximately 1,000 deportations of persons apprehended in Iowa occur 
each year and possession of forged documents are applicable to all such 
deportations.”  S.F. 284, 76th G.A., 2d Sess. fiscal note (Iowa 1996). 
This case of course involves Section 3 of the 1996 legislation.  
Section 3 is not a facially neutral law.  It was written to address 
unauthorized immigration, and the law piggybacks verbatim on the 
following federal language: 
59 
Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely 
makes any . . . document prescribed by statute or regulation 
for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or 
employment in the United States, or utters, uses, attempts 
to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any 
such . . . document prescribed by statute or regulation for 
entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in 
the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, 
altered, or falsely made . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
Yet I would conclude that the law does not cross the line set forth 
in Arizona.  Our legislature did not intrude within an exclusively federal 
domain or criminalize conduct that Congress had opted not to 
criminalize; instead, it placed a state criminal sanction on top of a federal 
criminal sanction in an area that states can regulate.  Also, the practical 
applications of the Arizona law upheld in Puente Arizona and the Iowa 
law are probably similar.  Both cover basically the same conduct.  Both 
would apply to an American citizen’s use of forged documents when 
seeking employment—in addition to an unauthorized alien’s use of such 
documents. 
The majority’s discussion of felony forgery in Part III.D rests on 
additional out-of-context case quotations.  As I’ve already explained at 
length, Arizona does not bar states from criminalizing conduct that 
federal immigration law also criminalizes, outside of those areas like 
alien registration and unlike alien employment where field preemption 
applies.  So Arizona does not help the majority.  The majority’s 
quotations from Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting and Georgia Latino are also 
taken out of context and do not aid the majority’s position.  In both 
instances the laws at issue related to alien harboring and transportation, 
an area where Congress has fully occupied the field.  Valle del Sol Inc. v. 
Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013); Ga. Latino, 691 F.3d at 
1256.  That consideration, and only that consideration, prevented the 
60 
states from “layer[ing] additional penalties atop federal law.”  Ga. Latino, 
691 F.3d at 1267; see also Valle Del Sol Inc., 732 F.3d at 1027.  Layering 
is not generally prohibited, though, and we commonly see parallel state 
and federal criminal laws covering the same misconduct.  In the typical 
case, both sets of laws are equally enforceable. 
IV.  Conclusion. 
I accept the representations of defense counsel that defendant 
Martha Martinez was born in Mexico and brought to this country by her 
parents when she was eleven years old.  I accept the further 
representations that she has lived in this country for the last twenty 
years, just wants to work here to make ends meet, and would not 
consider Mexico her home. 
But the majority’s ruling will apply to all unauthorized aliens who 
use a false identity to work in this state, whether they are as sympathetic 
as Martinez or not.  An unauthorized alien who is working under an alias 
to avoid paying taxes or cover up a criminal history will also reap the 
benefit of today’s decision.  At the same time, an American citizen who is 
just as sympathetic as Martinez will not benefit from today’s decision.  
Our job should not be to pick winners or losers but to apply federal law 
as given to us by Congress and state law as given to us by the general 
assembly.9 
I want to close by noting an irony in today’s ruling.  According to 
the majority, federal law preempts criminal fraud committed by an 
unauthorized alien only where the purpose of the fraud is to obtain work.  
Hence, while Martinez cannot be prosecuted for using her false Iowa 
9In my view, we also should not be using our opinions as a platform for 
criticizing a county attorney.  I will leave any response to that criticism to the county 
attorney himself. 
                                            
61 
identification to get herself hired by an Iowa employer, she can be 
prosecuted for using that same false identification to cash her employer’s 
paycheck at a bank.  When a court decision rests on such a diaphanous 
distinction, that is another reason to question it. 
For all the reasons I have stated, I respectfully dissent. 
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.