Title: Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2018-17)

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45884 
 
 
In the Matter of:  JANE DOE, 
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
  
               Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2018-17), 
  
               Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, August 2018 Term 
 
Filed: September 7, 2018 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Ralph L. Savage, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The judgment of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
 
Trent A. Grant, St. Anthony, for appellant. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
_____________________ 
 
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS 
BRODY, Justice. 
This is an expedited appeal from a magistrate court’s order terminating John Doe’s 
parental rights as to his minor child, J.G. We affirm the judgment of the magistrate court because 
there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s determination that 
Doe will likely be incarcerated during a substantial period of time during J.G.’s minority and that 
termination is in the child’s best interests. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
John Doe is the biological father of minor child, J.G. J.G. was conceived in Oklahoma 
about a month before Doe began serving a thirty-five year prison sentence. J.G. was born in 2011 
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and is presently seven-years-old. Doe saw J.G. one time when she was less than twenty months 
old. Someone brought the child to the prison to see him. 
J.G. and her mother moved to Idaho in approximately 2013. In August 2016, law 
enforcement removed J.G. and her half-brother from their mother’s care and placed them in 
shelter care after determining they were in imminent danger. After an adjudicatory hearing, the 
magistrate court determined it was in the best interest of the children to vest legal custody in the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Eventually the Department and the guardian ad litem 
for J.G. recommended termination of Mother and Doe’s parental rights. Doe’s termination 
hearing took place on January 12 and 19, 2018. The magistrate court determined that Doe will 
likely be incarcerated for a substantial period of time during J.G.’s minority and that termination 
is in the child’s best interest. The magistrate court entered a judgment terminating Doe’s parental 
rights. Doe appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in family autonomy and in maintaining a 
relationship with their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Idaho Dep’t of 
Health & Welfare v. Doe (2015–01), 158 Idaho 764, 767, 351 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2015). Thus, a 
court must be provided clear and convincing evidence before it may terminate a parent’s rights. 
“Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing 
to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” Doe (2015–01), 158 Idaho at 767, 351 
P.3d at 1225. This Court will not disturb a lower court’s decision to terminate parental rights if 
substantial, competent evidence in the record supports the decision. Id. “Substantial, competent 
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.” Id. This Court must independently review the magistrate court record, but is 
required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgments since “the 
magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, 
to detect prejudice or motive, and to judge the character of the parties.” Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that John Doe 
will likely remain incarcerated for a substantial period of J.G.’s minority. 
 
Doe admits that he is currently incarcerated. Doe argues, however, that the magistrate 
erred in determining that Doe was likely to remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time 
during J.G.’s minority. We reject Doe’s argument. 
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Idaho Code section 16-2005(1) authorizes a court to grant an order terminating parental 
rights if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child, and one of five additional statutory 
grounds exists, including that “[t]he parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain 
incarcerated for a substantial period of time during the child’s minority.” I.C. § 16-2005(1)(e). 
Though what constitutes a “substantial period of time” is undefined, a trial court “may consider 
factors including, but not limited to: the age of the child; the relationship, if any, that has 
developed between the parent and the child; and the likely period of time the parent will remain 
incarcerated.” In re Doe (2014-26), 158 Idaho 548, 552, 348 P.3d 163, 167 (2015). The court 
must consider the expected length of future incarceration, not the amount of time the parent has 
spent incarcerated in the past. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-4), 162 Idaho 266, 
269, 396 P.3d 695, 698 (2017). Here, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate court’s determination that Doe will likely remain incarcerated during a substantial 
period of time during J.G.’s minority. 
In July 2010, the state of Oklahoma charged Doe with felony drug trafficking in cocaine 
base and felony possession of PCP with intent to distribute.  Doe had previously served a seven-
year sentence in California on a serious drug charge. Doe entered a formal written guilty plea, 
agreeing to a thirty-five year sentence on each count to be served concurrently. He began his 
period of incarceration on October 15, 2010, about a month after J.G. was conceived. He did not 
appeal his judgment of conviction.  
Since his conviction, Doe has filed a wide array of claims for relief in Oklahoma. One of 
his initial efforts resulted in an amendment of the Plea of Guilty and Summary of Facts. The 
document was changed to show that the range of punishment for the trafficking count should 
have been fifteen years to life (the lower end of the possible punishment was reduced) and the 
range of punishment for the possession with intent to distribute count should have been four 
years to life (again, the lower end of the possible punishment was reduced). The fines also should 
have been suspended. Importantly here, the Oklahoma court did not change the original sentence 
of thirty-five years on each count to be served concurrently. Doe’s other claims for relief have 
been unsuccessful. One court described one of his attempts at relief as “frivolous, vexatious and 
without merit.”  
 
Doe challenges the magistrate court’s decision based primarily on his contention that the 
nature and length of his sentences are erroneous, and that he could be released at any time once 
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corrected. Doe admits, however, in the face of numerous fruitless challenges over the course of 
many years, that “[u]nfortunately, the Oklahoma plea agreement, judgment and sentencing 
documents do not reflect” an agreement with the prosecutor to amend the charges or his 
sentence. The magistrate court reasoned that it was not in a position to judge the merits of Doe’s 
challenges to his sentence. Doe did not present legal authority to support the relief he sought and 
there was no opinion testimony in the record from a lawyer concerning the likelihood of success 
on the merits of a post-conviction relief motion. Ultimately, the magistrate concluded that the 
likelihood of Doe’s early release is pure speculation. Doe testified that in the absence of post-
conviction relief, he believed his parole date would be 2022. The magistrate concluded that this 
was the earliest Doe could possibly be released, which would place Doe behind bars for at least 
half of J.G.’s minority.  
The magistrate court supported its decision to terminate parental rights with substantial 
and competent evidence throughout its March 2018 findings—evidence that Doe did not dispute. 
Rather, Doe “simply seek[s] to have this Court reweigh the evidence and reach a different 
conclusion than the trial court.” Doe (2015–01), 158 Idaho at 769, 351 P.3d at 1227. However, 
“[t]he trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to terminate parental rights, and this 
Court does not reweigh the evidence.” Id. Thus, we reject Doe’s contentions that the magistrate 
erred in determining that he was likely to remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time 
during J.G.’s minority.   
B. Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that termination 
is in J.G.’s best interest. 
The magistrate’s conclusion that termination was in the best interest of J.G. is likewise 
supported by substantial evidence. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been 
established, the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to 
terminate the parent-child relationship.” In re Doe (2014-15), 157 Idaho 765, 772, 339 P.3d 
1169, 1176 (2014). A court may consider numerous factors when considering whether 
termination is the best interest of the child, including the stability and permanency of the home, 
parental employment, parental financial contribution while the child is in the State’s custody, the 
child’s improvement in foster care, parental efforts to improve his or her situation, and the 
biological parent’s ongoing problems with the law. In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 111, 
320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). The magistrate court addressed many of these factors throughout its 
32-page opinion. 
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The magistrate court heard testimony from the current foster father, foster mother, 
counselor, initial foster placement parent, the state’s licensed social worker, the guardian ad 
litem, Doe, and his aunt and mother. Based on the testimony, the court noted J.G.’s improvement 
in foster care in a stable and safe home. The home is pre-adoptive, so she is unlikely to be further 
traumatized by another move. Additionally, J.G. is with her half-brother, to whom she has a 
significant connection and attachment that she would lose if Doe’s parental rights are not 
terminated. The magistrate court also determined that J.G. has a significant need for the 
attention, consistency, and support she receives from her pre-adoptive family. Also, despite 
Doe’s expressed love for J.G., he is unable to contribute meaningfully in a real and positive way 
toward her development. 
Doe’s challenge to the magistrate court’s determination regarding J.G.’s best interests 
suffers the same defect as his challenge to the magistrate’s incarceration determination: findings 
supported by substantial evidence are competent despite conflicting evidence, and this Court 
does not reweigh the same facts in the face of that substantial evidence simply to substitute its 
opinion for that of the trial court. 
The Court thus determines that the magistrate court’s decision that termination is in 
J.G.’s best interest is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Additionally, because 
this Court finds at least one statutory ground for termination—Doe’s likelihood to remain 
incarcerated—we need not address the other grounds. See In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 
P.2d 310, 315 (1991) (“[T]he statutory grounds for termination under I.C. § 16-2005 are 
independent and if any one or more of the grounds for termination are found, termination may be 
granted.”).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the magistrate court’s decision to terminate 
Doe’s parental rights to J.G. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices HORTON, BEVAN, and STEGNER CONCUR.