Title: State v. Troisi

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Troisi, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3582.] 
  
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3582 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TROISI ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Troisi, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3582.] 
Criminal law—Drug trafficking—R.C. 2925.03—R.C. Chapter 4729—Due Process 
Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions—Due process requires 
that wholesale distributors of dangerous drugs charged with drug 
trafficking under R.C. 2925.03 for acting “not in accordance with R.C. 
Chapter 4729” be given notice in the indictment or by subsequent 
elucidation of the specific violation of R.C. Chapter 4729 that makes the 
wholesale distributor susceptible to indictment on charges of drug 
trafficking—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and causes remanded to 
the trial court. 
(No. 2021-1182—Submitted June 16, 2022—Decided October 11, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Case Nos. 109871, 109874, 109875, and 109876, 2021-Ohio-2678. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, we are asked to determine what constitutes adequate notice to 
inform a wholesale distributor of the charges brought against it under Ohio’s drug-
trafficking laws.  Wholesale distributors are protected from prosecution for drug 
trafficking as long as they comply with the requirements of several chapters of the 
Revised Code, including R.C. Chapter 4729.  R.C. 2925.03(B)(1).  Here, we are 
asked to determine whether the state must provide a wholesale distributor charged 
with drug trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2) notice of the specific 
violation of R.C. Chapter 4729 that makes it susceptible to indictment on charges 
for drug trafficking.  We hold that under the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and 
United States Constitutions, the state must identify in an indictment, or by 
subsequently elucidating the indictment, the specific violation of R.C. Chapter 
4729 that makes the accused susceptible to prosecution under R.C. 2925.03(A).  
The state’s failure to do so in these cases led the trial court to properly dismiss the 
indictment.  We hold, however, that the trial court erred when it dismissed the 
indictment with prejudice.  Because the Eighth District reversed the trial court’s 
holding on the adequacy of the notice, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The indictment 
{¶ 2} Appellants are Martek Pharmacal Company, a wholesale distributor 
of prescription weight-loss drugs; its owner, Andrew Steck; and two of its 
employees, Jon Troisi and Nicholas Troisi.  It is undisputed that Martek conducts 
business with pharmacies and physicians nationwide and that it does not sell its 
weight-loss medications directly to any patient or consumer.  At all relevant times, 
Martek was a properly licensed wholesale distributor in Ohio.  See R.C. 
4729.01(O).  As agents or employees of Martek, the remaining appellants were also 
considered wholesale distributors under the statutory scheme. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 3} In September 2019, in a seven-count indictment, appellee, the state of 
Ohio, charged appellants with drug trafficking from February 1, 2014, to February 
28, 2017.  Five counts alleged violations of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), which prohibits 
any person from knowingly selling or offering to sell a controlled substance.  Those 
counts involved the sale of Adipex Phentermine 37.5 mg, a Schedule IV drug 
(Count 1); Adipex Phentermine 30 mg, a Schedule IV drug (Count 2); 
Phendimetrazine 105 mg, a Schedule III drug (Count 4); Diethylproprion 75 mg, a 
Schedule IV drug (Count 6); and Benzophetamine Hydrochloride 50 mg, a 
Schedule III drug (Count 7).  Two other counts alleged violations of R.C. 
2925.03(A)(2), under which no person shall “[p]repare for shipment, ship, 
transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance * * * 
when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled 
substance * * * is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.”  
Those counts involved the intended sale or resale of Phendimetrazine 35 mg, a 
Schedule III drug (Count 3) and Diethylproprion 25 mg, a Schedule IV drug (Count 
5).  Count 7 alleged sales at or over 5 times the bulk amount; all other counts alleged 
sales over 50 times the bulk amount.  The state’s crucial allegation, which is the 
focus of this appeal, was that appellants’ activities were “not in accordance with 
Chapter 4729 of the Ohio Revised Code.” 
{¶ 4} Because appellants are in the business of wholesale distribution, they 
were necessarily involved in selling or offering to sell controlled substances, R.C. 
2925.03(A)(1), and preparing to distribute or distributing controlled substances, 
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2).  The allegation that appellants acted “not in accordance with 
Chapter 4729” is central to this appeal because R.C. 2925.03(A) does not apply to 
“[m]anufacturers, licensed health professionals authorized to prescribe drugs, 
pharmacists, owners of pharmacies, and other persons whose conduct is in 
accordance with Chapter[] 4729 * * * of the Revised Code,” R.C. 2925.03(B)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 5} Therefore, in order for R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2) to apply to 
appellants, they had to have acted not “in accordance with Chapter 4729,” R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1).  The state did not pinpoint in the indictment how appellants had 
opened themselves up to criminal liability under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2) by 
failing to comply with Chapter 4729.  It alleged only that appellants had failed to 
be “in accordance with Chapter 4729 of the Ohio Revised Code.” 
B.  Bill of particulars 
{¶ 6} The state provided a bill of particulars to appellants, but it essentially 
rephrased the language of the indictment and contained no specifics regarding how 
appellants had failed to comply with R.C. Chapter 4729.  Appellants moved for a 
more specific bill of particulars, arguing that the state had “fail[ed] to describe the 
nature of the offenses charged or the conduct of each [appellant] it believes 
constitute[d] a violation of Ohio law.” 
{¶ 7} On March 9, 2020, at the hearing on the motion for a more specific 
bill of particulars, appellants argued that the state had “not met its burden to provide 
a bill of particulars that properly informs each [appellant] of the nature of the crimes 
they’re charged with, as well as the specific acts and instances that make up that 
criminal activity.”  The trial court asked the state what part of R.C. Chapter 4729 
appellants had violated.  The state referred to “the one that says that prescribers 
cannot give out more than 2,500 pills a month.  That’s the law in the State of Ohio.”  
The state alleged that appellants were providing up to 30,000 pills a month to five 
doctors who were under investigation for overprescribing the drugs.  R.C. 
4729.291(C)(1)(a) does prohibit prescribers from furnishing to patients over 2,500 
dosage units a month of a controlled substance—but it does not address the amount 
that wholesale distributors may furnish to its consumers.  At the hearing, the state 
pledged to provide further information to appellants about the individual drug sales 
at issue.  In April 2020, the state provided a breakdown of the drug sales from 
Martek to five doctors. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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C.  Motion to dismiss 
{¶ 8} Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on March 3, 2020.  
Among other arguments, they asserted that the state had violated their rights to 
notice of the accusations against them, a fair trial, and due process of law.  They 
argued that they had the “right to be informed of the nature and cause of an 
accusation, including the elements of the offense charged.” 
{¶ 9} The court held a hearing on the motion on June 22, 2020.  Again, the 
state had difficulty informing the court how appellants had failed to comply with 
R.C. Chapter 4729.  The state represented that it would identify and make known 
to the court a statute that makes wholesale distributors responsible for abiding by 
R.C. Chapter 4729 and also the administrative rules and regulations related to that 
chapter of the Revised Code.  But the state did not provide that statutory connection 
in its posthearing brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 10} Instead, it pointed to R.C. 4729.26, a statute that enables the Board 
of Pharmacy to create rules.  But that statute places no responsibility on wholesale 
distributors.  The state also referred to R.C. 4729.56, which authorizes the Board of 
Pharmacy to impose on wholesale distributors civil sanctions relating to licensure 
and fines for failing to abide by any rule of the board.  But that statute does not 
place any affirmative duty on wholesale distributors to abide by those rules.  The 
state also cited R.C. 4729.10, which allows the Board of Pharmacy to adopt rules 
requiring “a licensee or registrant under [R.C. Chapter 4729] to report to the board 
a violation of state or federal law, including any rule adopted under [that] chapter.”  
But that statute did not come into effect until after the period covered by the 
indictment.  See 2017 Sub.S.B. No. 319.  The state identified no statute in R.C. 
Chapter 4729 that appellants failed to act in accordance with during the relevant 
period. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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D.  Trial court’s entry 
{¶ 11} On July 28, 2020, the trial court granted appellants’ motion to 
dismiss, stating: 
 
The issue here is whether the state has provided to 
defendants the specific statute under Chapter 4729 that defendants 
have allegedly violated.  That is not something that defendants 
should be surprised about at trial.  It must be included in the 
indictment or in combination with the bill of particulars which has 
been requested on more than one occasion by defendants.  The state 
has been unable to produce the applicable statutory authority, even 
when this court gave additional time after the hearing on the motion 
to dismiss the indictment to supplement the record with the statutory 
provisions defendants allegedly violated and that are applicable to 
defendants. 
The court finds that the state’s failure to provide defendants 
with sufficient notice of the charges violates defendants’ 
constitutional right to due process. 
For the foregoing reason, case is dismissed with prejudice. 
 
E.  Appeal to the Eighth District 
{¶ 12} The state appealed as of right under R.C. 2945.67.  A split panel of 
the Eighth District reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that “[t]he 
allegations in this case constitute an offense under Ohio law.”  2021-Ohio-2678, 
176 N.E.3d 1160, ¶ 10.  The court of appeals stated that the indictment recited the 
language of R.C. 2925.03(A) and (B) and that that is generally “sufficient to survive 
a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  The court noted that “there 
is no constitutional mandate that the state present the specific provisions implicated 
January Term, 2022 
 
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by the predicate element under R.C. 2925.03(B) within the indictment itself.”  Id. 
at ¶ 12.  Instead, the state must allege “the exception to application of the drug-
trafficking statute under R.C. 2925.03(B)” in general terms and prove it at trial. 
{¶ 13} The Eighth District noted that the state’s failure to provide 
specificity within the bill of particulars is not generally grounds for dismissal.  In 
order to prevail on a motion to dismiss for lack of specificity in the bill of 
particulars, appellants were required to show prejudice—i.e., that the lack of 
specificity kept them from preparing and presenting a defense.  Id. at ¶ 15.  The 
court stated: “Until trial, it is purely speculation as to whether the defendants would 
be prejudiced by the alleged lack of specificity in the bill of particulars.”  Id. 
{¶ 14} The appellate court opined that, to prove appellants’ noncompliance 
with wholesale distributors’ reporting requirements under R.C. Chapter 4729, the 
state would attempt to show at trial that appellants failed to report their sales of 
Schedule III, IV, and V drugs to the Board of Pharmacy.  The Eighth District 
concluded that “the state provided [appellants] the level of detail necessary to 
provide sufficient notice of the illegal conduct to be proven at trial.”  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 15} One judge, dissenting in part, concentrated on the shifting theories 
of the state: 
 
The defendants should not be expected to defend against an 
entire chapter of the Revised Code and all of the administrative code 
regulations promulgated thereto.  The state presumably knows what 
code section or regulation it presented to the grand jury as evidence 
of the defendants’ alleged violation of R.C. Chapter 4729, but it did 
not provide that information in a “to wit” clause in the indictment, 
and when given an opportunity to provide the information in a more 
specific bill of particulars, it again did not do so.  The only logical 
question is “why not”?  The idea, as posited by the majority, that a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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defendant facing a felony charge may be denied the ability to defend 
against the specific allegations against him because the state 
complied with some other procedural burden (here, discovery) 
cannot be squared with the Ohio Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process. 
 
2021-Ohio-2678 at ¶ 30 (Keough, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 16} This court accepted jurisdiction over appellants’ discretionary 
appeal.  Appellants raise two propositions of law: 
 
Proposition of Law I: The Ohio and United States 
Constitutions require notice of the statute that a wholesale 
distributor allegedly violated to lose its exemption from drug 
trafficking laws in order for the State to charge the distributor with 
drug trafficking. 
Proposition of Law II: For a wholesale distributor to lose its 
exemption from drug trafficking laws, its conduct must violate a 
statute in Chapter 4729 of the [Revised Code]. 
 
See 165 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2021-Ohio-4289, 177 N.E.3d 993. 
II.  LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of review 
{¶ 17} Generally, this court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to 
dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion.  State v. Keenan, 143 Ohio St.3d 397, 
2015-Ohio-2484, 38 N.E.3d 870, ¶ 7.  But appellants raise a question of law—
whether the state failed to provide notice of the charges against them in violation 
of the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions—so we 
January Term, 2022 
 
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review the trial court’s decision de novo.  See State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 
2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 13. 
B.  The role of R.C. Chapter 4729 in drug-trafficking cases 
{¶ 18} For those involved in the wholesale drug industry, R.C. Chapter 
4729 and the other statutory chapters listed in R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) define the line 
between legally engaging in business and regularly committing felonies.  R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1) states that the offenses set forth in R.C. 2925.03(A) for selling and 
distributing controlled substances are excepted from prosecution if the person or 
company committing those acts complies with R.C. Chapter 4729, as well as R.C. 
Chapters 3719, 4715, 4723, 4730, 4731, and 4741.  Therefore, a wholesale 
distributor that fails to comply with R.C. Chapter 4729 may face serious 
consequences.  Compliance with R.C. Chapter 4729 keeps the business activity 
legal.  But noncompliance with R.C. Chapter 4729 can be the basis of a drug-
trafficking charge under R.C. 2925.03(A). 
{¶ 19} If the wholesale distributor fails to meet the requirements of R.C. 
Chapter 4729, it  exposes itself to criminal liability.  In State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 332, 2009-Ohio-792, 904 N.E.2d 512, this court considered whether the 
exemptions from liability contained in R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) are an affirmative 
defense or an element of the crime of trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A).  
That is, did the state have to prove that the exemption did not apply, or did the 
defendant have to prove that an exemption did apply?  Nucklos involved a physician 
who was prescribing drugs for chronic pain, allegedly in violation of R.C. Chapter 
4731.  This court held: 
 
The state cannot convict a licensed health professional of 
trafficking in drugs under R.C. 2925.03(A) unless the licensed 
health professional has failed to comply with applicable statutory or 
regulatory 
requirements. 
 
R.C. 
2925.03(B)(1). 
 
Proving 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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noncompliance is therefore necessary to prove the offense of drug 
trafficking when a licensed health professional is charged. * * * [A] 
licensed health professional’s failure to comply with statutory or 
regulatory requirements is an element of the offense of drug 
trafficking that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Nucklos at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, the state must prove in this case that appellants’ conduct 
was not in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729.  The issue here is whether the state 
was required to provide notice to appellants of why they had lost their exempt status 
under R.C. Chapter 4729, leading to their prosecution for drug trafficking.  In other 
words, can the state plead an essential element of its case by citing a chapter of the 
Ohio Revised Code, rather than a specific statute?  We hold that under the facts 
presented here, it cannot, and we determine that a criminal charge against a 
wholesale distributor for failing to act in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729 does 
not provide adequate notice to that wholesale distributor of its having violated R.C. 
2925.03(A)(1) and (2).  Here, the state’s citation to a chapter of the Revised Code 
failed to provide appellants with notice of the nature and causes of the charges 
against them as required by the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions. 
C.  The requirements of an indictment 
{¶ 21} Under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a person accused of a felony is 
entitled to an indictment setting forth the “nature and cause of the accusation.”  This 
serves two purposes.  First, “[b]y compelling the government to aver all material 
facts constituting the essential elements of an offense, an accused is afforded with 
adequate notice and an opportunity to defend.”  State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 
169, 170, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985).  Second, “[a]n indictment, by identifying and 
January Term, 2022 
 
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defining the offense, also enables an accused to protect himself from any future 
prosecutions for the same offense.”  Id.  We are concerned in this case with the first 
purpose, the state’s duty to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to defend. 
{¶ 22} “An indictment meets constitutional requirements if it ‘first, contains 
the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge 
against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or 
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’ ”  State v. Childs, 88 
Ohio St.3d 558, 564-565, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000), quoting Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). 
{¶ 23} Crim.R. 7(B) sets forth the following requirements for an 
indictment: 
 
The statement may be made in ordinary and concise language 
without technical averments or allegations not essential to be 
proved.  The statement may be in the words of the applicable section 
of the statute, provided the words of that statute charge an offense, 
or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the elements 
of the offense with which the defendant is charged. 
 
{¶ 24} This court has held that generally, 
 
an indictment that tracks the language of the charged offense 
and identifies a predicate offense by reference to the statute number 
need not also include each element of the predicate offense in the 
indictment.  The state’s failure to list the elements of a predicate 
offense in the indictment in no way prevents the accused from 
receiving adequate notice of the charges against him. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 11.  In 
Buehner, this court held that an indictment’s reference to the statute number of a 
predicate offense provides sufficient notice to a defendant. 
{¶ 25} The state may amend an indictment to provide the necessary 
information.  “Under Crim.R. 7(D), a court may amend an indictment ‘at any time’ 
if the amendment does not change ‘the name or identity of the crime charged.’ ”  
State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537, 903 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 1.  “As 
long as the state complies with Crim.R. 7(D), it may cure a defective indictment by 
amendment, even if the original indictment omits an essential element of the 
offense with which the defendant is charged.”  State v. Pepka, 125 Ohio St.3d 124, 
2010-Ohio-1045, 926 N.E.2d 611, ¶ 15.  “Courts cannot grant new trials based upon 
imperfection or inaccuracy in an indictment if the charge is sufficient to fairly and 
reasonably inform the defendant of the essential elements of the crime.”  State v. 
Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 119, 559 N.E.2d 710 (1990), citing Crim.R. 33(E)(1). 
D.  The purpose of a bill of particulars 
{¶ 26} The state did provide a bill of particulars to appellants in this case.  
“A bill of particulars has a limited purpose—to elucidate or particularize the 
conduct of the accused alleged to constitute the charged offense.”  Sellards, 17 Ohio 
St.3d at 171, 478 N.E.2d 781.  A bill of particulars can put a defendant on notice of 
the charges he or she faces.  See State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-
6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 32.  “[W]hen the indictment sufficiently tracks the wording 
of the statute of the charged offense, the omission of an underlying offense in the 
indictment can be remedied by identifying the underlying offense in the bill of 
particulars.”  Buehner at ¶ 10, citing Skatzes at ¶ 30.  “A bill of particulars * * * is 
appropriately supplied where the indictment, although legally sufficient in 
describing the elements of the charged offense, is so general in nature that the 
accused is not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.”  State 
v. Gingell, 7 Ohio App.3d 364, 367, 455 N.E.2d 1066 (1st Dist.1982). 
January Term, 2022 
 
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E.  The indictment failed to notify appellants of the charges against them 
{¶ 27} The state had ample opportunity to amend the indictment against 
appellants.  The indictment let appellants know the drug-trafficking laws they were 
accused of violating, R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2), but it did not inform them of what 
they had done to render themselves noncompliant with R.C. Chapter 4729.  That is 
an element that is essential for the state to prove.  See Nucklos, 121 Ohio St.3d 332, 
2009-Ohio-792, 904 N.E.2d 512, at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 28} The indictment told appellants only that they had acted in 
contravention of R.C. Chapter 4729.  There are dozens of sections in R.C. Chapter 
4729.  In Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 11, 
this court held that the indictment need not do more than list the statutory number 
of a predicate offense.  Here, the state did not meet even that minimal standard.  
Not only did the state not list the elements of the offense in regard to appellants’ 
alleged failure to act in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729, but it also did not state 
what the appellants’ offense was.  It provided no statute number.  And “[f]ailure to 
allow a defendant to know what [is] necessary for his defense [is] reversible error.”  
State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 149, 512 N.E.2d 962 (1987), citing State v. 
Fowler, 174 Ohio St. 362, 189 N.E.2d 133 (1963). 
{¶ 29} This case presents a question similar to the one we addressed in State 
v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 197, 724 N.E.2d 781 (2000).  In that case, the state 
alleged that Childs had engaged in a conspiracy to commit aggravated trafficking.  
For a conspiracy charge, the state must prove that “ ‘subsequent to each defendant’s 
entrance into said conspiracy, a substantial overt act was done by each defendant 
or a person with whom they conspired; contrary to the form of the statute.’ ”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id., citing former R.C. 2923.01(B). 
{¶ 30} Although the indictment alleged that “a substantial overt act was 
done by each defendant or a person with whom they conspired,” it did not 
specifically detail any overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Id. at 197-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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198.  Instead, the phrase “a substantial overt act was done” merely recited the 
generic words of the statute.  Id. at 198.  This court found the indictment in Childs 
was “fatally defective” because the state needed to “allege some specific, 
substantial, overt act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  Id. at 197. 
{¶ 31} Likewise here, the state accused appellants of acting “not in 
accordance with Chapter 4729”—a nonspecific reference to a lengthy statutory 
chapter.  It failed to notify appellants what they had done to be noncomplaint with 
R.C. Chapter 4729.  This court has stated that “inexactitude * * * may * * * prove 
fatal to prosecution.  Such would be the case if the absence of specifics truly 
prejudices the accused’s ability to fairly defend himself.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  
Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d at 172, 478 N.E.2d 781. 
{¶ 32} The burden was on the state to prove that the exception from criminal 
liability in R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) was inapplicable.  But since the state did not or could 
not identify a statute that appellants had violated in R.C. Chapter 4729, appellants 
were left to defend against that entire chapter of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 33} Although the omission of an underlying offense in an indictment can 
be remedied by identifying the underlying offense in the bill of particulars, that did 
not occur in this case.  Neither the bill of particulars nor the limited amount of 
discovery provided information about which provision of R.C. Chapter 4729 
appellants failed to act in accordance with.  The state produced a list of the 
dangerous drugs appellants had sold and to whom, but it did not produce anything 
that was responsive to appellants’ requests for clarification regarding their alleged 
failure to act in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729. 
{¶ 34} Further, the state’s failure to identify how appellants failed to act in 
accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729 prejudiced appellants in their ability to mount 
a defense.  The lack of specificity in the indictment and in the bill of particulars 
allowed the state to continue to explore new theories of potential violations once 
others had not panned out.  The state theorized at the hearing on appellants’ motion 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
for a more detailed bill of particulars that appellants had failed to act in accordance 
with R.C. Chapter 4729 by violating R.C. 4729.291 by selling dangerous drugs to 
doctors beyond the amount that those doctors could legally prescribe.  But the state 
was forced to admit that R.C. 4729.291 applies to prescribers, not wholesale 
distributors. 
{¶ 35} At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the state argued that 
appellants had the duty to report suspicious purchases under Ohio Adm.Code 
4729:6-3-05.  But the regulation cited by the state at the hearing did not take effect 
until after the period of alleged trafficking by the appellants had ended.  See 2018-
2019 Ohio Monthly Record 2-1839, effective Mar. 1, 2019.  Further, the state 
represented to the trial court that it would provide the court with a statute stating 
that wholesale distributors violate R.C. Chapter 4729 when they fail to abide by 
administrative rules promulgated in connection with that chapter.  But no statute or 
case law in support of that representation appeared in the state’s posthearing brief. 
{¶ 36} Instead, in its posthearing brief, the state cited R.C. 4729.10, which 
empowers the Board of Pharmacy to adopt rules requiring “a licensee or registrant 
under this chapter to report to the [Board of Pharmacy] a violation of state or federal 
law, including any rule adopted under this chapter.”  But that statute also did not 
come into effect until after the period covered in the indictment.  See 2017 Sub.S.B. 
No. 319.  The state also referred to R.C. 4729.26, a statute that enables the Board 
of Pharmacy to create rules but places no affirmative duty on wholesale distributors.  
None of the other statutes cited by the state in its posthearing brief established the 
state’s contention that wholesale distributors violate R.C. Chapter 4729 when they 
contravene administrative rules promulgated in connection with that chapter. 
{¶ 37} “Where one of the vital elements identifying the crime is omitted 
from the indictment, it is defective and cannot be cured by the court * * * as such a 
procedure would permit the court to convict the accused on a charge essentially 
different from that found by the grand jury.”  State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 478, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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478-479, citing Harris v. State, 125 Ohio St. 257, 264, 181 N.E. 104 (1932); State 
v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 520, 178 N.E.2d 800 (1961); see also Article I, 
Section 10, Ohio Constitution.  The indictment in this case let appellants know they 
were accused of violating a drug-trafficking statute, which would be a crime for 
appellants only if they had become noncompliant with R.C. Chapter 4729. 
{¶ 38} The state did not notify appellants of what they had done to become 
noncompliant with Chapter 4729.  As a result, appellants lacked information 
regarding the “nature and cause of the accusation” against them.  They were 
therefore prejudiced by the lack of specificity in the indictment and the failure of 
the bill of particulars to provide any further information about the charges brought 
against them. 
F.  Dismissal with or without prejudice 
{¶ 39} “Pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A), the state may appeal the dismissal of 
an indictment whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.”  State v. Craig, 
116 Ohio St.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-5752, 876 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 16.  Therefore, regardless 
of whether dismissal of the indictment at issue here was made with or without 
prejudice, this court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
{¶ 40} Here, the trial court erred when it dismissed the indictment with 
prejudice.  “It has been held that ‘since neither Crim.R. 48(A) nor Crim.R. 48(B) 
expressly provides for a dismissal with prejudice, a dismissal * * * with prejudice 
may be entered only where there is a deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional or 
statutory rights, the violation of which would, in and of itself, bar further 
prosecution.’ ”  State v. Mills, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2020-T-0046 and 2020-T-
0047, 2021-Ohio-2722, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 
22521, 2009-Ohio-1957, ¶ 13; see also State v. Sutton, 64 Ohio App.2d 105, 108, 
411 N.E.2d 818 (9th Dist.1979).  Although appellants’ constitutional rights are 
involved here, the state could reindict appellants and further prosecution would not 
be barred.  Dismissals with prejudice are more appropriate for cases involving the 
January Term, 2022 
 
17 
deprivation of a defendant’s rights to a speedy trial or against double jeopardy, 
which would preclude further proceedings.  See State v. Michailides, 2018-Ohio-
2399, 114 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.); State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
101648, 2015-Ohio-3138, ¶ 22. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 41} “ ‘No door, however remote and uncertain, ought to be closed to an 
accused engaged in the task of preparing a defense to a criminal charge.  Clearly it 
is wisest to err on the side of openness and disclosure.’ ”  Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 
at 171, 478 N.E.2d 781, quoting Gingell, 7 Ohio App.3d at 368, 455 N.E.2d 1066. 
{¶ 42} “The exercise of good faith on the part of the prosecution is essential 
in maintaining public trust and confidence in the integrity of our criminal justice 
system.  Adherence to the above-stated rule will insure that no constitutional right 
of an accused to due process or a fair trial will be transgressed.”  Id. at 171-172. 
{¶ 43} The Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions require a felony indictment to set forth the “nature and cause of the 
accusation.”  In a drug-trafficking case against a wholesale distributor under R.C. 
2925.03(A)(1) and (2), the state must prove that the wholesale distributor has failed 
to act in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4729.  To adequately set forth the nature 
and cause of the accusation, the state must notify the wholesale distributor of the 
specific section or sections in R.C. Chapter 4729 that the wholesale distributor has 
failed to act in accordance with. 
{¶ 44} Because the state failed to identify the nature and cause of the 
accusation against appellants in these cases, the indictment must be dismissed 
without prejudice.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals, and we remand the matters to the trial court with instructions that it 
vacate its dismissal with prejudice and enter a dismissal without prejudice. 
Judgment reversed 
and causes remanded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Michael O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James A. 
Gutierrez, Katherine Mullin, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 
for appellee. 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Charles A. Bowers, Aaron M. Herzig, 
William E. Braff, David H. Thomas, and Kathryn S. Wallrabenstein, for appellants 
Martek Pharmacal Company and Andrew Steck. 
Brian Radigan, for appellant Nicholas Troisi. 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., and John R. Mitchell, for appellant Jon 
Troisi. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Office of the Public Defender. 
_________________