Title: State v. Ellis

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA14-39 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  31 December 2014 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
Wake County 
No. 11 CRS 218528 
 
 
SHAWN ADRIAN PENDERGRAFT 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 19 July 2013 by 
Judge Paul G. Gessner in Wake County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 11 August 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Phillip K. Woods, for the State. 
 
W. Michael Spivey for Defendant. 
 
 
ERVIN, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant Shawn A. Pendergraft appeals from a judgment 
entered based upon his conviction for obtaining property by 
false pretenses and from his conviction of felonious breaking or 
entering in a case in which the trial court arrested judgment.  
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter judgment against him based upon his 
conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, that the 
trial court erroneously denied his motions to dismiss the 
felonious breaking or entering and obtaining property by false 
-2- 
pretenses charges for insufficiency of the evidence, and that 
the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that 
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant did not attempt to obtain ownership of the property in 
question by adverse possession, erroneously instructed the jury 
that ignorance of the law and a mistake of law did not preclude 
a finding of guilt, and erroneously instructed the jury in such 
a manner as to place the burden of proof on the intent issue 
upon Defendant rather than upon the State.  After careful 
consideration of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s 
judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court’s 
judgments 
should 
remain 
undisturbed. 
I. Factual Background 
A. Substantive Facts 
On or about 27 January 2011, DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., 
acquired title to a tract of property located at 1208 Graedon 
Drive in Raleigh through foreclosure.  On 5 July 2011, Defendant 
filed a deed purporting to convey the same tract of property 
from ONCE International Land Trust to ONCE International Land 
Trust.  In addition, Defendant filed a “Common Law Lien” that 
purported to place a $1,200,000 lien upon the property and 
asserted that the lien could not be removed unless the party 
-3- 
seeking to do so came into court with “clean hands” and proved 
ownership of the property.  Finally, Defendant filed a “Notice” 
asserting that the property was the “private property of ONCE 
International Land Trust.”  Defendant signed each of these 
documents in the capacity as Trustee for ONCE. 
In early July 2011, Lee St. Peter, a real estate broker who 
served as DLJ’s property manager and as listing agent for the 
Graedon Drive property, was informed by another real estate 
agent that someone was occupying another house that Mr. St. 
Peter had listed for sale in a different part of Raleigh.  When 
he checked the real estate records maintained by the Wake County 
Register of Deeds for information concerning the house about 
which he had received the tip, Mr. St. Peter discovered the 
documents that Defendant had filed with respect to the Graedon 
Drive property. 
Upon making this discovery, Mr. St. Peter went to the 
Graedon Drive property and found that the house was unoccupied 
and in good condition.  On 10 July 2011, Mr. St. Peter wrote a 
note to Mike Sanders of Select Portfolio Servicing, an asset 
management company that managed the Graedon Drive property for 
DLJ, for the purpose of informing Mr. Sanders that he believed 
that someone was pretending to own the Graedon Drive property 
-4- 
for the purpose of selling or leasing it without having the 
authority to do so. 
On 7 August 2011, Defendant moved into the house located on 
the Graedon Drive property.  At the time that he entered the 
house, Defendant removed the doorknob and the Realtor’s lockbox.1  
On the following day, Mr. St. Peter stopped by the property to 
confirm that a recent roof repair had been done correctly and 
that no leaks were occurring.  Upon arriving at the property, 
Mr. St. Peter observed that a U-Haul van was parked in the 
driveway and observed, after walking up to the front of the 
house, that the Realtor’s lockbox had been removed and that the 
front door knob had been changed. 
After walking around the house to investigate, Mr. St. 
Peter returned to the front of the house, where he encountered 
Defendant on the sidewalk.  When Mr. St. Peter asked Defendant 
what he was doing on the property, Defendant replied that he had 
“bought [the property] directly from the bank through an 
investment company” and that his ownership of the property was 
                     
1A “Realtor’s lockbox” is a container that is placed on the 
front door of the relevant structure and contains a key that can 
be used to enter the premises.  In the event that a real estate 
agent wishes to show a particular piece of property, he or she 
contacts a call center, identifies himself or herself as a real 
estate agent, and provides an identification code.  After 
confirming the agent’s status, the call center provides the 
agent with the combination to the lockbox, thereby enabling the 
agent to obtain access to the property that he or she wishes to 
show. 
-5- 
evidenced by some documents that he had in his hand.  Mr. St. 
Peter declined to look at the papers that Defendant offered to 
show him and told Defendant that he was calling the Sheriff’s 
Office. 
After speaking with someone at the Sheriff’s Office, Mr. 
St. Peter contacted Mr. Sanders for the purpose of informing him 
that someone was now occupying the property and inquiring of him 
as to whether anything had transpired that would have given 
Defendant the right to be on the property.  In response, Mr. 
Sanders stated that Defendant should not be on the property. 
Deputy Kevin Moore of the Wake County Sheriff’s Office 
responded to Mr. St. Peter’s call.  Upon Deputy Moore’s arrival, 
Mr. St. Peter informed Deputy Moore that no one was supposed to 
be in the house and that the locks had been changed.  At that 
point, Deputy Moore checked the real estate database maintained 
by the Wake County Revenue Department for the purpose of 
ascertaining the identity of the individual or entity listed as 
the owner of the property and spoke with Mr. Sanders for the 
purpose of confirming that the property was supposed to be 
unoccupied.  After engaging in these investigative activities, 
Deputy Moore approached Defendant, who handed a deed and other 
documents to Deputy Moore and explained to Deputy Moore that 
Defendant was named as the grantee on the deed and had the right 
-6- 
to be there on the basis of the doctrine of adverse possession.  
At that point, Deputy Moore and Mr. St. Peter agreed to give 
Defendant 24 hours within which to vacate the property. 
On the following day, Deputy Moore returned to the 
property.  At that time, Defendant continued to occupy the house 
and refused to unlock the door.  Although Deputy Moore left the 
property after failing to gain access to it, he returned with a 
locksmith and additional deputies.  After gaining entry using an 
unlocked side door, Deputy Moore came into the house and placed 
Defendant under arrest. 
B. Procedural History 
On 9 August 2011, a warrant for arrest was issued charging 
Defendant 
with 
felonious 
breaking 
or 
entering, 
obtaining 
property worth more than $100,000 by false pretenses, and second 
degree trespass.  On 11 October 2011, the Wake County grand jury 
returned a bill of indictment charging Defendant with felonious 
breaking or entering, obtaining property worth more than 
$100,000 by false pretenses, and second degree trespass.  The 
charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial 
court and a jury at the 15 July 2013 criminal session of the 
Wake County Superior Court.  At the close of all of the 
evidence, the State voluntarily dismissed the second degree 
trespass charge.  On 18 July 2013, the jury returned verdicts 
-7- 
convicting Defendant of felonious breaking or entering and 
obtaining property worth more than $100,000 by false pretenses.  
The trial court arrested judgment with respect to Defendant’s 
conviction for felonious breaking or entering and entered a 
judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 44 to 62 months 
imprisonment based upon his conviction for obtaining property 
worth more than $100,000 by false pretenses.  Defendant noted an 
appeal to this Court from the trial court’s judgments. 
II. Substantive Legal Analysis 
A. Jurisdictional Claim 
In his first challenge to the trial court’s judgments, 
Defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
the false pretenses charge because the indictment charging him 
with the commission of that offense was fatally defective.  More 
specifically, Defendant contends that the indictment purporting 
to charge him with obtaining property worth more than $100,000 
by false pretenses failed to allege either that Defendant had 
made a false representation or that there was a causal 
connection between any false representation that Defendant might 
have made and Defendant’s ability to obtain the property in 
question.  Defendant’s contentions lack merit. 
1. Standard of Review 
-8- 
Although Defendant never challenged the sufficiency of the 
false pretenses indictment before the trial court, an indictment 
may be challenged on facial invalidity grounds for the first 
time on appeal.  State v. Call, 353 N.C. 400, 429, 545 S.E.2d 
190, 208, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046, 122 S. Ct. 628, 151 L. 
Ed. 2d 548 (2001).  This Court reviews challenges to the 
sufficiency of an indictment using a de novo standard of review.  
State v. Marshall, 188 N.C. App. 744, 748, 656 S.E.2d 709, 712, 
disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 368, 661 S.E.2d 890 (2008).  
“Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and 
freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower 
tribunal.”  State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 
878 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
2. Applicable Legal Principles 
An indictment that fails to allege every element of an 
offense is facially invalid and does not suffice to confer 
jurisdiction upon a trial court.  State v. Kelso, 187 N.C. App. 
718, 722, 654 S.E.2d 28, 31 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 
N.C. 367, 663 S.E.2d 432 (2008).  In light of that general 
principle, “an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient 
when the offense is charged in the words of the statute.”  State 
v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 242, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
-9- 
(a) If 
any 
person 
shall 
knowingly 
and 
designedly by means of any kind of false 
pretense 
whatsoever, 
whether 
the 
false 
pretense is of a past or subsisting fact or 
of a future fulfillment or event, obtain or 
attempt to obtain from any person within 
this State any . . . property . . . with 
intent to cheat or defraud any person of 
such . . . property . . . such person shall 
be guilty of a felony: . . .  Provided, 
further, that it shall be sufficient in any 
indictment for obtaining or attempting to 
obtain any such . . . property . . . by 
false pretenses to allege that the party 
accused did the act with intent to defraud, 
without alleging an intent to defraud any 
particular person, and without alleging any 
ownership of the . . . property . . . and 
upon the trial of any such indictment, it 
shall not be necessary to prove either an 
intent to defraud any particular person or 
that the person to whom the false pretense 
was made was the person defrauded, but it 
shall be sufficient to allege and prove that 
the party accused made the false pretense 
charged with an intent to defraud. 
 
As a result, the elements of the crime of obtaining property by  
false pretenses are “(1) a false representation of a subsisting 
fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated 
and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) 
by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from 
another.”  Cronin, 299 N.C. at 242, 262 S.E.2d at 286. 
3. Validity of Indictment 
a. False Representation 
In his first challenge to the validity of the false 
pretenses indictment, Defendant contends that the indictment 
-10- 
failed to allege that Defendant made a false representation.  We 
disagree. 
“[T]o sustain a charge of obtaining property by false 
pretenses, 
the 
indictment 
must 
state 
the 
alleged 
false 
representation.”  State v. Braswell, __ N.C. App. __, __, 738 
S.E.2d 229, 233 (2013) (citing State v. Linker, 309 N.C. 612, 
614-15, 
308 
S.E.2d 
309, 
310-11 
(1983)). 
 
The 
false 
representation may consist of an action or conduct rather than 
necessarily being made by spoken words.  State v. Ledwell, 171 
N.C. App. 314, 319, 614 S.E.2d 562, 566 (2005), cert. denied, __ 
N.C. __, 699 S.E.2d 639 (2010). 
The indictment returned against Defendant in this case for 
the purpose of charging him with obtaining property by false 
pretenses alleges, in pertinent part, that: 
on or about July 5, 2011 through August 9, 
2011, in Wake County the defendant named 
above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously 
did knowingly and designedly with the intent 
to cheat and defraud, obtain a house located 
at 1208 Graedon Drive, Raleigh, NC, having a 
value 
of 
$836,918.00 
from 
DLJ 
Mortgage 
Capital Inc., by means of a false pretense 
which was calculated to deceive and did 
deceive. 
 
The 
false 
pretense 
consisted 
of 
the 
following:  The defendant moved into the 
house 
located 
at 
1208 
Graedon 
Drive, 
Raleigh, NC with the intent to fraudulently 
convert the property to his own, when in 
fact the defendant knew that his actions to 
convert 
the 
property 
to 
his 
own 
were 
-11- 
fraudulent.  This act was done in violation 
of [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100]. 
 
As Defendant notes, the false pretenses indictment does not 
explicitly charge Defendant with having made any particular 
false representation. 
This Court has previously upheld the sufficiency of an 
indictment charging the defendant with obtaining property by 
false pretenses which, while failing to explicitly state the 
false representation that the defendant allegedly made, did 
sufficiently apprise the defendant about the nature of the false 
representation that he allegedly made.2  In State v. Perkins, 181 
N.C. App. 209, 638 S.E.2d 591 (2007), the indictment alleged, in 
part, that “THIS PROPERTY WAS OBTAINED BY MEANS OF USING THE 
CREDIT CARD AND CKECK [sic] CARD OF MIRIELLE CLOUGH WHEN IN FACT 
THE DEFENDANT WRONGFULLY OBTAINED THE CARDS AND WAS NEVER GIVEN 
PERMISSION TO USE THEM.”  Id. at 215, 638 S.E.2d at 595.  In 
upholding the sufficiency of this allegation, we stated that, 
“[b]y alleging that defendant used a card that was issued in the 
                     
2Although 
our 
dissenting 
colleague 
emphasizes 
the 
allegations 
concerning 
Defendant’s 
acts 
contained 
in 
the 
indictment, the actual requirement set forth in our prior 
decisions is that “the indictment must state the alleged false 
representation.”  Braswell, __ N.C. App. at __, 738 S.E.2d at 
233.  Thus, we believe that the important portion of our 
decision in Perkins is the holding that a sufficient allegation 
that the defendant in a false pretenses case made the required 
false representation can be inferred from the language of the 
indictment even if it is not directly stated. 
-12- 
name of another person, that was wrongfully obtained, and that 
she had no permission to use, the indictment sufficiently 
apprised defendant that she was accused of falsely representing 
herself as an authorized user of the cards.”  Id. 
A careful study of the record reveals that the false 
pretenses indictment returned against Defendant in this case 
sufficiently apprised Defendant that he had been accused of 
falsely representing that he owned the Graedon Drive property as 
part 
of 
an 
attempt 
to 
fraudulently 
obtain 
ownership 
or 
possession of it.3  More specifically, the false pretenses 
indictment returned against Defendant alleges that he wrongfully 
obtained the Graedon Drive property by “mov[ing] into the house 
. . . with the intent to fraudulently convert the property to 
his own.”  The act of moving into a residence or occupying a 
particular tract of property is, under ordinary circumstances, 
tantamount to an assertion that the person owns or is lawfully 
entitled to occupy the premises.  However, that implied 
assertion becomes fraudulent in nature in the event that the 
person who moves into the home or occupies the property while 
taking steps to falsely effectuate his claim of ownership or 
                     
3According to the record, Defendant made this representation 
in a number of ways, including his reliance upon false documents 
in his discussions with investigating officers. 
-13- 
possession knows that he is not lawfully entitled to do so.4  As 
a result, since the indictment sufficiently alleges that 
Defendant obtained the Gradeon Drive property by falsely 
representing that he was lawfully entitled to occupy it, the 
indictment alleges more than mere entry into a building, so that 
                     
 
4According to our dissenting colleague, a decision to uphold 
the validity of the indictment at issue in this case would 
suffice to render anyone committing a theft or trespass guilty 
of obtaining property by false pretenses.  The difference 
between a theft or trespass and a false pretense is, however, 
that the latter, but not the former, involves a false 
representation.  State v. Hines, 36 N.C. App. 33, 42, 243 S.E.2d 
782, 787 (stating that “the essence of the crime is the 
intentional false pretense”) (citation omitted), disc. review 
denied, 295 N.C. 262, 245 S.E.2d 779 (1978); State v. Cummings, 
346 N.C. 291, 326, 488 S.E.2d 550, 571 (1997) (stating that a 
larceny conviction requires “‘proof that defendant (a) took the 
property of another; (b) carried it away; (c) without the 
owner’s consent; and (d) with the intent to deprive the owner of 
his property permanently’”) (quoting State v. White, 332 N.C. 
506, 518, 369 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1988)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1092, 118 S. Ct. 886, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998)); Singleton v. 
Haywood Elec. Membership Corp., 357 N.C. 623, 627, 588 S.E.2d 
871, 874 (2003) (stating that “[i]t is ‘elementary that trespass 
is a wrongful invasion of the possession of another’”) (quoting 
State ex rel. Bruton v. Flying “W” Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 
399, 415, 160 S.E.2d 482, 493 (1968)).  Although we might agree 
with our dissenting colleague’s argument, assuming that the 
taking of property like that at issue here could support a 
larceny conviction, State v. Wilfong, 101 N.C. App. 221, 222, 
398 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1990) (noting that “[t]here must be a 
taking and carrying away of the personal property of another to 
complete the crime of larceny”) (citation omitted), in the event 
that the indictment simply alleged the taking of or entry onto 
the property of another, the present indictment alleges both a 
taking or entry and the existence of an intent to defraud of the 
type commonly characteristic of the crime of obtaining property 
by false pretense.  As a result, the indictment at issue here 
does more than allege a mere taking of or entry onto the 
property of another. 
-14- 
Defendant’s contention that the indictment fails to allege that 
he made a specific false representation lacks merit. 
b. Causal Connection 
In addition, Defendant argues that the false pretenses 
indictment that was returned against him failed to allege the 
existence 
of 
a 
causal 
connection 
between 
any 
false 
representation by Defendant and the attempt to obtain property.  
Once again, we do not find Defendant’s challenge to the validity 
of the false pretenses indictment persuasive. 
As Defendant asserts, a valid false pretenses indictment 
must allege sufficient facts to show the existence of a causal 
connection between the false representation and the defendant’s 
ability to obtain or the defendant’s attempt to obtain property 
from another.  Cronin, 299 N.C. at 236, 262 S.E.2d at 282 
(1980).  On the other hand, “it [is] not necessary to allege 
specifically that the victim was in fact deceived by the false 
pretense when the facts alleged in the bill of indictment are 
sufficient to suggest that the surrender of something of value 
was the natural and probable result of the false pretense.”  Id. 
at 237, 262 S.E.2d at 282 (citing State v. Hinson, 17 N.C. App. 
25, 27, 193 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1972)), cert. denied, 282 N.C. 583, 
194 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S. Ct. 2762, 37 
L. Ed. 2d 159 (1973)).  In addition, this Court has stated that 
-15- 
“no particular form of allegation is required; an allegation 
that the money or property was obtained ‘by means of a false 
pretense’ is sufficient to allege the causal connection where 
the facts alleged are adequate to make clear that the delivery 
of the property was the result of the false representation.”  
State v. Childers, 80 N.C. App. 236, 241, 341 S.E.2d 760, 763 
(quoting State v. Dale, 218 N.C. 625, 12 S.E.2d 556 (1940)), 
disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 337, 346 S.E.2d 142 (1986). 
In this case, the false pretenses indictment alleged that 
the Defendant “did knowingly and designedly with the intent to 
cheat and defraud, obtain [the Graedon Drive property] . . . by 
means of a false pretense which was calculated to deceive and 
did deceive.”  The facts alleged in the indictment are 
“sufficient to imply causation, since they are obviously 
calculated to produce the result” sought to be achieved, Hinson, 
17 N.C. App. at 27, 193 S.E.2d at 416, given that Defendant’s 
conduct in moving into the Graedon Drive home and falsely 
representing to own or be entitled to possess the property made 
it likely that Defendant would be allowed to occupy and, 
possibly, even obtain title to the property.  As a result, 
neither of Defendant’s challenges to the false pretenses 
indictment have merit. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of False Pretenses 
-16- 
Secondly, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to dismiss the false pretenses charge for 
insufficiency of the evidence.  More specifically, Defendant 
contends that the undisputed evidence shows that he honestly, 
albeit mistakenly, believed that he could obtain title to the 
Graedon Drive property by adverse possession and that such a 
showing precluded the jury from convicting him of obtaining 
property by false pretenses.  We do not find Defendant’s 
contention persuasive. 
An appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law 
concerning whether the record contains substantial evidence of 
each essential element of the offense charged, or a lesser 
included offense, and of defendant’s being the perpetrator of 
the offense, State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 
649, 651 (1982), with “substantial evidence” being “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.”  Id. at 66, 296 S.E.2d at 652 (citing 
State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)).  
In examining the sufficiency of the record to support a 
conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  Id. at 67, 296 S.E.2d at 652.  “This 
Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de 
-17- 
novo.”  State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 
(2007).  “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter 
anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the 
lower tribunal.”  Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). 
As Defendant appears to acknowledge, adverse possession has 
not been recognized as an affirmative defense to a criminal 
charge in this jurisdiction.  Although a person who is able to 
establish the elements of adverse possession does, in fact, 
become the owner of the relevant tract of property, nothing of 
which we are aware in any way insulates the person attempting to 
adversely possess a tract of property from the consequences of 
his otherwise unlawful conduct, including criminal prosecution 
for obtaining property by false pretenses.  The ultimate thrust 
of Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his false pretenses conviction is, purely and simply, an 
assertion that anyone who attempts to adversely possess a tract 
of property does not possess the intent necessary for a finding 
of guilt, a position that is tantamount to making an intention 
to adversely possess a tract of property an affirmative defense 
to a false pretenses charge.  As a result of the fact that no 
such defense has previously been recognized in this jurisdiction 
and the fact that recognizing such a defense would have 
-18- 
significant public policy implications,5 we believe that any 
decision to recognize an attempt to adversely possess a tract of 
property as a defense to a false pretenses charge should be made 
by the General Assembly rather than by this Court.  As a result, 
we conclude, contrary to Defendant’s contention, that the mere 
fact that Defendant attempted to adversely possess the Graedon 
Drive property does not insulate him from criminal liability in 
the event that the evidence otherwise shows his guilt of 
obtaining property by false pretenses. 
A 
careful 
examination 
of 
the 
record 
provides 
ample 
justification for the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of 
obtaining property by false pretenses.  Defendant clearly 
intended to occupy and, eventually, own the Gradeon Drive 
property.  In order to achieve that end, Defendant moved into 
and occupied the Graedon Drive property which, as we have 
already noted, constituted an implicit false representation to 
the effect that Defendant had a valid claim to the property.  In 
addition, the record shows that Defendant falsely stated to Mr. 
St. Peter that he had “bought [the property] directly from the 
                     
5In denying Defendant’s dismissal motion, the trial court 
stated, among other things, that “what you’re suggesting is and 
what you have suggested through the evidence is using adverse 
possession, a criminal Defendant can go downstairs to the 
Register of Deeds, file some phony document, go to my house, 
walk through the front door, camp out, set up shop, do whatever 
you want to do, change the locks; and when I walk in, they go, 
It’s mine; I’m taking this property by adverse possession.” 
-19- 
bank through an investment company” and that his right to 
possess the property was evidenced by certain documents that he 
tendered to Mr. St. Peter.  Furthermore, Defendant filed a 
fraudulent deed in the Wake County registry purporting to 
transfer title to the Gradeon Drive property to ONCE.  In 
addition to showing that Defendant made multiple representations 
intended to further his plan to occupy and obtain title to the 
Gradeon 
Drive 
property, 
the 
knowing 
falsity 
of 
these 
representations shows that Defendant made them with an intent to 
deceive. 
 
Finally, 
given 
that 
the 
evidence 
suffices 
to 
demonstrate that the victim relied on the false representation 
in the event that the victim suspected that the representation 
was false, see State v. Simpson, 159 N.C. App. 435, 439, 583 
S.E.2d 714, 716-17, aff’d, 357 N.C. 652, 588 S.E.2d 466 (2003) 
(holding that when the victim, a pawn shop owner, testified that 
he was suspicious that certain cameras brought into the pawn 
shop by the defendant had been stolen, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the victim had, in fact, been deceived), the fact 
that Mr. St. Peter called Mr. Sanders to see if Defendant did, 
in fact, have the right to occupy the Graedon Drive property on 
the theory that, “[h]ypothetically, it could have occurred,” 
sufficed to demonstrate that Mr. St. Peter was, in fact, 
deceived by Defendant’s representations.  As a result, the 
-20- 
record contained ample support for the jury’s decision to 
convict Defendant of obtaining property by false pretenses. 
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Breaking or Entering 
Thirdly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to dismiss the felonious breaking or entering 
charge for insufficiency of the evidence.  More specifically, 
Defendant argues that the undisputed record evidence failed to 
show that he intended to commit a felony or any larceny at the 
time that he entered the Graedon Drive residence.  Defendant is 
not entitled to any relief on appeal based upon this argument. 
As we have already noted, the trial court arrested judgment 
in the case in which Defendant was convicted of felonious 
breaking or entering.  A decision to arrest judgment can have 
one of two effects, with the first being to vacate the 
underlying judgment and the second being to withhold the entry 
of judgment based on a valid jury verdict.  State v. Reeves, 218 
N.C. App. 570, 575, 721 S.E.2d 317, 321 (2012) (citing State v. 
Pakulski, 326 N.C. 434, 439, 390 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1990)).  
Judgment is arrested in the first of these two instances 
“because of a fatal flaw which appears on the face of the 
record, such as a substantive error on the indictment,” with the 
effect of a decision to arrest judgment in this instance being 
to vacate the defendant’s conviction and preclude the entry of a 
-21- 
final judgment which is subject to review on appeal.  Id. at 
575-76, 721 S.E.2d at 321-22 (citations omitted).  On the other 
hand, judgment is arrested in the second of these two instances 
for the purpose of addressing double jeopardy or other concerns, 
such as a situation in which the defendant has been convicted of 
committing a predicate felony in a case in which he or she has 
also been convicted of first degree murder on the basis of the 
felony murder rule, see Pakulski, 326 N.C. at 441, 390 S.E.2d at 
133 (stating that the trial court properly arrested judgment 
with respect to “the offenses of armed robbery and felonious 
breaking or entering, as these offenses formed the offenses upon 
which the convictions of felony murder were predicated”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted), or convicted of a charge 
used to enhance punishment for a related offense.  See Reeves, 
218 N.C. App. at 576, 721 S.E.2d at 322 (finding that “the 
additional conviction of reckless driving was arrested because 
it was used to enhance the DWI”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In the second of these two situations, the underlying 
guilty verdict remains intact so that judgment can be entered 
based on that verdict in the event that (1) the conviction for 
the murder or related charge is overturned in subsequent 
proceedings and (2) the verdict with respect to which judgment 
has been arrested is not disturbed on appeal.  Pakulski, 326 
-22- 
N.C. at 439-40, 390 S.E.2d at 132 (stating that “the guilty 
verdicts on the underlying felonies remain on the docket and 
judgment can be entered if the conviction for the murder is 
later reversed on appeal, and the convictions on the predicate 
felonies are not disturbed on appeal”).  In the event that the 
trial court arrests judgment for the first of these two reasons, 
we lack the authority to review any challenge that Defendant 
might seek to lodge against the underlying conviction on appeal 
given that the underlying conviction has been vacated.  Reeves, 
218 N.C. App. at 576, 721 S.E.2d at 322 (stating that a trial 
court’s decision to arrest judgment based on a defective 
indictment or fatal defect on the face of the record, which has 
the effect of vacating the defendant’s conviction on that 
charge, does not result in the entry of final judgment that is 
subject to appellate review).  As a result, our initial task in 
reviewing Defendant’s challenge to his conviction for felonious 
breaking or entering is to determine the basis for the trial 
court’s decision to arrest judgment in that case. 
A 
careful 
examination 
of 
the 
record 
developed 
at 
Defendant’s trial indicates that the trial court did not explain 
the reasoning underlying its decision to arrest judgment in the 
breaking or entering case.  In such circumstances, this Court 
and the Supreme Court have provided us with guidance in 
-23- 
determining into which of the two categories delineated above a 
particular decision to arrest judgment should be placed.  
Although “[t]he legal effect of arrest of judgment is to vacate 
the verdict and judgment,” State v. Morrow, 31 N.C. App. 592, 
593, 230 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1976) (citing State v. Covington, 267 
N.C. 292, 296, 148 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1966)); see also State v. 
Goforth, 65 N.C. App. 302, 306, 309 S.E.2d 488, 492 (1983) 
(stating that “[t]he legal effect of arresting judgment is to 
vacate the verdict and sentence,” so that “[t]he State may 
proceed against the defendant if it so desires, upon new and 
sufficient bills of indictment”) (citing State v. Benton, 275 
N.C. 378, 382, 167 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1969)), a limited exception 
to this general rule precludes the State from obtaining and 
proceeding upon a new charge in the event that the trial court 
arrests judgment with respect to a particular conviction based 
upon double jeopardy-related concerns.  See State v. Pagon, 64 
N.C. App. 295, 299, 307 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1983) (stating the 
principle that, “[i]n cases in which a defendant is convicted of 
two offenses in violation of the double jeopardy bar, judgment 
must be arrested upon one of the convictions”), overruled on 
other grounds in State v. Hurst, 320 N.C. 589, 591, 359 S.E.2d 
776, 777 (1987), overruled on other grounds in State v. White, 
322 N.C. 506, 518, 369 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1988); Pakulski, 326 
-24- 
N.C. at 439-40, 390 S.E.2d at 132 (noting the general rule that 
an arrest of judgment vacates the verdict while recognizing the 
exception for arrests of judgment necessary “to avoid a double 
jeopardy problem”).  In the event that a trial court arrests 
judgment without stating an express purpose for having done so, 
the arrested judgment will operate to vacate the defendant’s 
conviction with respect to that charge.  See State v. Stafford, 
45 N.C. App. 297, 300, 262 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1980) (stating that, 
“[g]enerally, a judgment is arrested because of insufficiency in 
the indictment or some fatal defect appearing on the face of the 
record” and assuming that judgment was arrested on those grounds 
given that “no reason for the arrest of judgment appear[ed] in 
the record on appeal”).6  As a result, in the absence of some 
indication that the trial court’s decision to arrest judgment 
stemmed from double jeopardy-related concerns, the effect of the 
decision to arrest judgment is to vacate the underlying 
conviction and preclude subsequent appellate review. 
                     
6Similarly, in State v. Casey, 195 N.C. App. 460, 673 S.E.2d 
168, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 144 (unpublished), disc. review 
denied, 363 N.C. 584, 682 S.E.2d 704 (2009), we treated the 
trial court’s decision to arrest judgment as resulting from a 
flaw appearing on the face of the record given that the trial 
court provided no explanation for its decision.  Casey, 2009 
N.C. App. LEXIS 144 at *14.  Although Casey, as an unpublished 
decision, is not binding on this Court, the result reached in 
that decision is consistent with the analysis that we have 
utilized in addressing Defendant’s challenge to this felonious 
breaking or entering conviction. 
-25- 
After carefully reviewing the record, we see no indication 
that the trial court’s decision to vacate the judgment in the 
felonious breaking or entering case rested upon double jeopardy-
related considerations.  The felonious breaking or entering for 
which Defendant was convicted was simply not a predicate or 
basis for Defendant’s false pretenses conviction.  Thus, given 
that the trial court did not explain its decision to arrest 
judgment in the case in which Defendant was convicted of 
felonious breaking or entering and given that judgment does not 
appear to have been arrested in that case to avoid double 
jeopardy-related concerns, the trial court’s decision to arrest 
judgment has the effect of vacating Defendant’s felonious 
breaking or entering conviction and deprives us of the ability 
to review Defendant’s challenge to his felonious breaking or 
entering conviction on the merits.  As a result, Defendant is 
not entitled to any relief from his felonious breaking or 
entering conviction on the basis of the argument advanced in his 
brief. 
D. Jury Instructions 
Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with his written 
request for instructions, by instructing the jury that ignorance 
of the law or mistake of law were not defenses to the crime of 
-26- 
obtaining property by false pretenses, and by instructing the 
jury concerning the issue of his guilt of obtaining property by 
false pretenses in such a way as to shift the burden of proof 
with respect to the issue away from the State and onto himself.  
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s 
judgment based upon these instruction-related arguments. 
1. Adverse Possession and Mistake of Law 
In his first challenge to the trial court’s instructions, 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to 
instruct the jury that the State was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant did not intend to gain ownership 
of property by adverse possession and by instructing the jury, 
instead, about the elements of adverse possession accompanied by 
an instruction that ignorance or a mistake of law did not 
operate 
to 
excuse 
unlawful 
conduct. 
 
More 
specifically, 
Defendant argues that, in the event that the jury concluded that 
he intended to adversely possess the Graedon Drive property, 
then he lacked the intent to deceive necessary for guilt of 
obtaining property by false pretenses and that the trial court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury to that effect.  We do not 
find Defendant’s argument persuasive. 
At trial, Defendant requested the trial court to instruct 
the jury that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a 
-27- 
reasonable doubt that he was not seeking to adversely possess 
the Graedon Drive property.7  Although the trial court declined 
to instruct the jury in accordance with Defendant’s request, it 
did discuss the law of adverse possession while coupling this 
instruction with the statement that “[i]gnorance or mistake of 
law will not excuse an act in violation of the criminal laws.” 
A trial court’s jury instructions are sufficient if they 
present the law of the case in such a manner as to leave no 
reasonable cause for believing that the jury was misled or 
misinformed.  State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 296-97, 610 
S.E.2d 
245, 
253 
(2005). 
 
“A 
charge 
must 
be 
construed 
contextually, and isolated portions of it will not be held 
prejudicial when the charge as a whole is correct.”  State v. 
Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 751-52, 467 S.E.2d 636, 641 (citations 
omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 875, 117 S. Ct. 196, 126 L. Ed. 
2d 133 (1996).  “[W]hen a defendant requests an instruction 
which is supported by the evidence and is a correct statement of 
the law, the trial court must give the instruction, at least in 
                     
7In his request, Defendant asked the trial court to instruct 
the jury that, “[w]hen evidence has been offered that tends to 
show that the alleged offenses were in an attempt to adversely 
possess property and you find that the defendant was in fact 
attempting to adversely possess property, the defendant would 
not be guilty of any crime,” with “[t]he burden [being] on the 
[S]tate to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and in so 
doing disprove the defendant’s assertion of attempting to 
adversely possess the property.” 
-28- 
substance.”  State v. Garner, 340 N.C. 573, 594, 459 S.E.2d 718, 
729 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct. 948, 133 L. 
Ed. 2d 872 (1996).  “[Arguments] challenging the trial court’s 
decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo by 
this Court.”  State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 
S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009).  “[A] trial court’s failure to submit a 
requested instruction to the jury is harmless unless defendant 
can show he was prejudiced thereby.”  State v. Muhammad, 186 
N.C. App. 355, 361, 651 S.E.2d 569, 574 (2007), appeal 
dismissed, 362 N.C. 242, 660 S.E.2d 537 (2008). 
As we have previously determined, an intent to adversely 
possess a tract of property is not a recognized defense to a 
criminal act in North Carolina.  For that reason, the law of 
adverse possession does not, contrary to Defendant’s contention, 
have any bearing on the issue of Defendant’s guilt of obtaining 
property by false pretenses.  For that reason, the trial court 
did not err by failing to instruct the jury that the State was 
required to prove that Defendant did not intend to adversely 
possess the Graedon Drive property beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to return a verdict of guilty or by instructing the jury 
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law would not serve to 
obviate Defendant’s guilt of that offense.  As a result, 
-29- 
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s 
judgment on the basis of this contention. 
2. Intent-Related Burden of Proof 
Secondly, 
Defendant 
contends 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proving that he lacked the 
intent necessary for guilt of the offense of obtaining property 
by false pretenses from the State to himself.  Once again, we do 
not find Defendant’s argument persuasive. 
The trial court instructed the jury with respect to the 
issue of Defendant’s guilt of obtaining property by false 
pretenses in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision 
in 
Cronin 
and 
the 
North 
Carolina 
Pattern 
Jury 
Instructions as follows: 
The 
Defendant 
has 
been 
charged 
with 
obtaining 
property 
worth 
-- 
obtaining 
property worth more than $100,000 by -- or 
more by false pretenses.  For you to find 
the Defendant guilty of this offense, the 
State 
must 
prove 
six 
things 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
First, 
that 
the 
Defendant 
made 
a 
representation to another. 
 
Second, that this representation was false. 
 
Third, 
that 
the 
representation 
was 
calculated and intended to deceive. 
 
Fourth, that the victim was, in fact, 
deceived by this representation. 
 
-30- 
Fifth, that the Defendant thereby obtained 
or attempted to obtain property from the 
victim. 
 
And, sixth, that the property was worth 
$100,000 or more. 
 
If you find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that on or about the 
alleged date that the Defendant made a 
representation and that this representation 
was 
false, 
that 
this 
representation 
-- 
representation was calculated and intended 
to deceive, that the victim was, in fact, 
deceived by it, that the defendant thereby 
attempted or -- excuse me -- the – the 
defendant thereby obtained or attempted to 
obtain property from the victim and that the 
property was worth $100,000 or more, it 
would be your duty to return a verdict of 
guilty of obtaining property worth $100,000 
or more by false pretenses. 
 
If you do not so find or if you have a 
reasonable doubt as to one or more of these 
things, you will not return a verdict of 
guilty of obtaining property worth $100,000 
or more by false pretenses, but you must 
determine whether he is guilty of obtaining 
property by false pretenses.  
 
Obtaining 
property 
by 
false 
pretenses 
differs 
from 
obtaining 
property 
worth 
$100,000 or more by false pretenses in that 
the value of the property need not be worth 
$100,000 or more. 
 
If you find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
that on or about the 
alleged date that the defendant made a 
representation, that this representation was 
false, 
that 
this 
representation 
was 
calculated and intended to deceive, that the 
victim was, in fact, deceived by it, and the 
defendant thereby obtained or attempted to 
obtain property from the victim, it would be 
-31- 
your duty to return a verdict of guilty of 
obtaining property by false pretenses. 
 
If you do not so find or if you have a 
reasonable doubt as to one or more of these 
things, it would be your duty to return a 
verdict of not guilty. 
 
See N.C.P.I.-Crim. 219.10A; Cronin, 299 N.C. at 242, 262 S.E.2d 
at 286.  As we understand them, the trial court’s instructions 
clearly placed the burden of proving that Defendant acted with 
the necessary intent to deceive upon the State.  Although 
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s decision to instruct 
the jury that ignorance and mistake of law did not excuse 
otherwise criminal conduct had the effect of shifting the burden 
of proof with respect to the intent issue, a decision to accept 
that argument would require us to also accept Defendant’s 
contention that an intent to adversely possess property operates 
to preclude a conviction for obtaining property by false 
pretenses, a step that we have declined to take.  With that 
exception, Defendant has failed to identify any language in the 
trial court’s jury instructions that had the effect of shifting 
the burden of proof with respect to the intent issue from the 
State to Defendant, and nothing that has that effect is apparent 
to us based on our review of the trial court’s instructions.  As 
a result, Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial 
court’s judgment on the basis of this argument. 
-32- 
III. Conclusion 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments 
have merit.  As a result, the trial court’s judgments should, 
and hereby do, remain undisturbed. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
Judge McCULLOUGH concurs. 
Judge DILLON concurs in part and dissents in part in 
separate 
opinion.
NO. COA14-39 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 31 December 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 11 CRS 218528 
SWAWN A. PENDERGRAFT 
 
 
DILLON, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority’s holding with respect to 
Defendant’s challenge to the felonious breaking or entering 
judgment.  However, I respectfully dissent from the holding 
finding no error in Defendant’s conviction for obtaining 
property by false pretenses.  Specifically, I believe that the 
indictment is fatally defective because it fails to allege any 
false representation, an essential element of that crime.8  State 
v. Braswell, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 738 S.E.2d 229, 233 (2013) 
(holding that “the indictment must state the alleged false 
representation”). 
The only action by Defendant alleged in the indictment is 
that he “moved into the house[.]”  Otherwise, the indictment 
                     
8 As described by our Supreme Court, “[t]he gist of obtaining 
property by false pretenses is the false representation of a 
subsisting fact [or future event] intended to and which does 
deceive one from whom the property is obtained.”  State v. 
Linker, 309 N.C. 612, 614-15, 308 S.E.2d 309, 310-11 (1983). 
-34- 
 
 
alleges his intent “to fraudulently convert the property to his 
own[,]” this intent being a separate element which also must be 
alleged.  State v. Moore, 38 N.C. App. 239, 241, 247 S.E.2d 670, 
672, disc. review denied, 295 N.C. 736, 248 S.E.2d 866 (1978) 
(holding an indictment to be fatally defective which fails to 
allege that the defendant acted with “the intent to defraud”).  
However, the only action alleged in the indictment - that 
Defendant moved into the house - is essentially just another way 
of stating that he “obtained” the property.  The allegation does 
not identify “the false representation” used to obtain the 
property.  If obtaining property were equivalent to obtaining 
that property by means of a false pretense, every larceny would 
constitute obtaining property by false pretenses.9 
The majority cites State v. Perkins, 181 N.C. App. 209, 638 
S.E.2d 591 (2007), for the proposition that the required false 
                     
9 Though “trespass” is typically a word used to describe the 
unlawful possession of real property, our Supreme Court has 
described larceny - the unlawful taking of personal property - 
as a type of “trespass.”  State v. Bowers, 273 N.C. 652, 655, 
161 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1968).  In Bowers, the Court stated that this 
type of trespass can be either “actual” or “constructive.”  Id.  
“Actual” trespass occurs where the taking does not involve “some 
trick or artifice,” whereas “constructive” trespass occurs where 
the taking involves deceit.  Id.  In the present case, the 
indictment only alleges actions akin to an “actual” trespass – 
Defendant moved into and physically possessed the house – and no 
deceit or falsehood. 
 
-35- 
 
 
representation can be inferred from the actions alleged in an 
indictment.  I agree with this general proposition.  However, 
the action alleged in the present indictment falls far short of 
the language approved by this Court in Perkins. 
The indictment in Perkins alleged that the defendant’s 
actions 
consisted 
of 
obtaining 
“beer 
and 
cigarettes” 
by 
purchasing them with a stolen credit card.  Id. at 215, 638 
S.E.2d at 595.  On appeal, we held that though the indictment 
did not allege that the defendant made an explicit statement, it 
“adequately described [her] actions” to “apprise[] [her] that 
she was [being] accused of falsely representing herself as an 
authorized user of the [stolen] cards.”  Id. at 215, 638 S.E.2d 
at 595-96.  In reaching this conclusion, we cited our Supreme 
Court’s holding in State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 553 S.E.2d 885 
(2001), that a “false pretense need not come through spoken 
words, but instead may be by act or conduct.”  Id. at 215, 638 
S.E.2d at 595. 
Unlike the actions alleged in Perkins, no intent that 
Defendant obtained possession of the house by means of a false 
representation is readily inferable from the action alleged here 
– that Defendant “moved into the house.”  I do not believe the 
General Assembly intended that a defendant who unlawfully 
-36- 
 
 
obtains property by whatever means would be criminally liable 
under G.S. 14-100 for obtaining that property by false pretenses 
simply based on an allegation that he took or retained 
possession of it, which is what was alleged here.  Neither party 
nor the majority cite – nor has my research uncovered – any case 
where G.S. 14-100 has been applied to a defendant who merely 
continues to trespass on land or continues to possess and use 
stolen property, where the property was not otherwise obtained 
by means of a false pretense.  Perkins, on the other hand, 
involved a somewhat routine application of G.S. 14-100, clearly 
intended by the General Assembly, whereby a defendant obtained 
the possession of property (beer and cigarettes) from someone 
else by deceit.  The present case would be more analogous to 
Perkins if there had been an allegation in the indictment that 
Defendant obtained possession of the house through some deceit 
rather than by simply moving in or if Defendant had obtained 
some other property, such as rent money from a prospective 
tenant, by falsely representing himself as the owner of the 
house. 
The State advanced an alternate theory at trial that – 
rather than the property being the house itself which Defendant 
“obtained” by moving in, as alleged in the indictment - the 
-37- 
 
 
property involved was the continued possession of or the clear 
title to the house that Defendant was “attempting to obtain.”  
However, 
even 
based 
on 
this 
alternate 
theory, 
the 
mere 
allegation in the indictment that he moved into the house still 
fails to identify any false representation by which he attempted 
to obtain this property. 
In any event, I do not believe that the General Assembly 
intended that a defendant becomes criminally liable under G.S. 
14-100 based on the mere continuing trespass to property that he 
wrongfully obtained by whatever means, even where his intent was 
– to use the words of the indictment – “to convert the property 
to his own,” whether temporarily or permanently, based on an 
adverse possession/statute of limitations defense.  See, e.g., 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(4) (2013) (three-year statute of 
limitation to bring an action to recover property wrongfully 
converted).  To be sure, the intent of many who criminally 
trespass on real property or steal personal property is to 
convert the property to their own, even if only for a short 
time.  However, having this intent does not elevate the mere 
trespass to a crime of obtaining property by false pretenses.  
Otherwise, everyone who trespassed on land, for no matter how 
long, would be criminally liable for violating G.S. 14-100.  
-38- 
 
 
Similarly, a defendant caught driving a stolen car would also be 
subject to criminal liability under the statute based on an 
indictment which alleged that the defendant “drove the car with 
the fraudulent intent of converting the car to his own use,” 
based on a theory that “the property” was not the car itself but 
rather the temporary or permanent continued use of the car, and 
“the false representation” was that the defendant claimed 
ownership to the car, which could be inferred merely from his 
act of driving it.  Thus, while Defendant’s actions alleged in 
the indictment are sufficient to allege a criminal act, I do not 
believe they allege the crime of obtaining property by false 
pretenses.