Title: T.M. v. EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

T.M. v. EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY INC.2002 WY 17959 P.3d 721Case Number: 01-264Decided: 12/16/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
    

T.M., 
a Minor, through R.T. COX, her

Guardian 
Ad Litem; A.O., a Minor,

through 
CHERYL RANCK SCHWARTZ,

her 
Guardian Ad Litem,

Appellants(Intervenors-Defendants),

 

v.

                                                                                    

EXECUTIVE 
RISK INDEMNITY INC.,

a 
Delaware corporation,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing Appellants:

            
W.W. Reeves of Reeves & Miller, Casper, Wyoming 

 

Representing Appellee:

Dan B. Riggs and Jonathan Botten of Lonabaugh & Riggs, 
Sheridan, Wyoming; and Cathy A. Simon, Charles A. Jones, and Vicki E. Fishman of 
Ross, Dixon & Bell, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

KITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion

 

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      T.M. and A.O. 
(children), through their appointed guardians ad 
litem, appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Executive Risk Indemnity 
Inc. (Executive) holding a professional liability policy issued to Beth D. 
Griswold, Ed.D. (Dr. Griswold), a psychologist, provides no coverage for 
injuries sustained by the children as a result of sexual abuse by Dr. Griswold's 
husband while they were in foster care in the Griswold home.  We hold the 
professional services provision and the household member exclusion contained in 
the policy are ambiguous.  Construing those provisions against the 
insurer, we further hold:  (1) there is coverage under the professional 
services provision of the policy if a jury determines Dr. Griswold negligently 
performed or failed to perform psychological services for the children while 
they were under her care; and (2) whether the children "regularly reside[d] 
with" Dr. Griswold is a question of fact precluding application of the household 
member exclusion as a matter of law to deny coverage.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the district court's order and remand for further 
proceedings.

ISSUES

 [¶2]     We address the following 
issues:1

 

1.  Whether there is coverage for Dr. Griswold 
under the professional services provision of the policy if she negligently 
performed or failed to perform professional services for the children while they 
were under her care.

2.  Whether application of the household member 
exclusion as a matter of law to deny coverage is precluded because whether the 
children regularly resided with Dr. Griswold is a question of fact.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Dr. Griswold was a 
licensed psychologist in the State of Wyoming with background and experience 
working with child victims of abuse.  In 1996, the Department of Family Services 
(DFS) recruited and selected Dr. Griswold and her husband as foster parents, and 
it placed the children in their home for foster care.  While the children 
were under the Griswolds' care, Mr. Griswold sexually abused them.2

 

[¶4]      In 1999, the 
children, through their appointed guardians ad 
litem, filed a complaint against Dr. Griswold alleging claims for 
negligence3 and professional negligence.  The complaint 
alleged Dr. Griswold knew, prior to taking the children into her home, that her 
husband had previously been accused of sexually abusing children and yet she 
informed no one at DFS of his prior history.  It further alleged that Dr. Griswold held 
herself out to DFS as being specially qualified to serve as a foster parent and 
DFS relied on her professional expertise and experience in selecting her home 
for foster care and placing the children in her care.  The complaint 
alleged that Dr. Griswold breached her professional duties as a psychologist by 
failing to disclose her husband's history to DFS, taking the children into her 
home when she knew his history,  and failing to recognize and act upon signs 
that abuse was occurring.

  

[¶5]      Executive filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the professional 
liability insurance policy issued to Dr. Griswold provided no coverage for the 
claims against her.  
The children intervened and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment 
requiring Executive to defend and indemnify Dr. Griswold.  Executive responded 
with a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, contending there was 
no coverage because Dr. Griswold had no duty to perform and, in fact, performed 
no professional services for the children and because the policy excludes claims 
by regular residents of the psychologist's household.

  

[¶6]      After a hearing, the 
district court denied the motion, finding "a reasonable person might conclude 
that Dr. Griswold was providing professional services to the [children] and that 
they were not regular residents of the household."  The parties 
proceeded with discovery and then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  After a hearing, 
the district courta different judge presidinggranted Executive's motion for 
summary judgment, holding there was no coverage under the professional liability 
policy for Dr. Griswold's alleged negligence.  The decision letter states, "a reasonable 
person would probably conclude that Dr. Griswold exhibited negligence in her 
dealings with [the children], D.F.S., and her husband."  However, the 
district court concluded that, as a matter of law, the professional services 
provision did not apply because Dr. Griswold did not have a solely professional 
relationship with the children and the household member exclusion did apply 
because the children regularly resided with her.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Matlack v. Mountain West 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 2002 WY 60, ¶6, 44 P.3d 73, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2002).  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were 
proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element 
of the cause of action or defense which the parties have asserted.  Id.  We examine the record from the vantage point 
most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment using the same standards and materials as the lower court used.  Id.  We do not accord deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.  Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      An insurance policy 
is a contract and is subject to the general rules of contract construction.  First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Jackson Hole v. Continental 
Insurance Company, 860 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Wyo. 1993).  Where the contract is clear and unambiguous, 
our inquiry is limited to the four corners of the document.  Principal Life Insurance Company v. Summit Well Service, Inc., 2002 WY 172, ¶17; Evans v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 2001 WY 
110, ¶8, 34 P.3d 284, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2001); Sierra Trading Post, Inc. v. Hinson, 996 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 2000).  We interpret an unambiguous contract in 
accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of its terms.  St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Albany County 
School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Wyo. 1988).  It is only when a contract is ambiguous that 
we construe the document by resorting to rules of construction.  Evans, 2001 WY 
110, ¶9; Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Republic 
Insurance Company, 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); Martin v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 
1995).  Whether 
a contract is ambiguous is for the court to decide as a matter of law.  Evans, 2001 WY 
110, ¶9; Martin, 894 P.2d  at 620.  A contract is 
ambiguous if indefiniteness of expression or double meaning obscure the parties' 
intent.  Evans, 2001 WY 
110, ¶9; Hansen v. Little Bear Inn 
Company, 9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 
2000).  Because 
insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion where the insured has little or no 
bargaining power to vary the terms, we strictly construe ambiguities against the 
insurer.  Evans, 2001 WY 
110, ¶9.  
In the case before us, two particular provisions of the Executive 
insurance policy are at issue:  the professional services provision and the 
household member exclusion.

  

A.        
Professional Services Provision

 

[¶9]      The policy provides 
that it covers claims made against Dr. Griswold for her wrongful acts.  The term "wrongful 
act" is defined in the policy as follows:

 

"Wrongful Act" means any actual or alleged negligent act, error or omission, or any actual 
or alleged Defamation solely in 
the performance of, 
or actual or alleged failure to perform, professional services for others in Your profession as a 
psychologist, including Your services as a member of a formal 
accreditation or professional review board of a hospital or professional 
society, or professional licensing board.

            

(Emphasis added.)  The children argue there is insurance 
coverage pursuant to this provision because, in failing to recognize the risk of 
or prevent the sexual abuse, Dr. Griswold negligently performed or failed to 
perform professional services in her profession as a psychologist within the 
meaning of the policy.  Executive disputes this reading of the 
policy, arguing there is no coverage because Dr. Griswold was acting as a foster 
parent, not a psychologist, to the children and any wrongful acts or omissions 
she may have committed were not solely in the performance of or failure to 
perform professional services as the policy requires.  

 

[¶10]   In interpreting the professional 
services provision, as with any other contract provision, we look first to the 
four corners of the document and interpret the language, if possible, according 
to its plain and ordinary meaning.  The provision states there is coverage for 
any negligent act or omission or any defamation solely in the performance of or 
failure to perform professional services to others as a psychologist.  The most striking 
feature of the provision is that it does not lend itself easily to reasonable 
interpretation.  
When read literally as it is written, the provision suggests there is 
coverage for:  
(1) any negligent acts and omissions, whether or not in the performance 
of professional services; and (2) defamations solely in the performance of 
professional services.  We do not find this to be a reasonable 
interpretation given the policy is a psychologist's professional liability 
policy implying coverage not for any and all negligence but for only 
professional negligence.  We mention this possible interpretation 
merely to illustrate the provision's poor draftsmanship.  The difficulty of 
interpretation does not end there.

 

[¶11]   The provision can be read to suggest 
rather broad coverage is intended.  The provision does not, for example, restrict 
coverage to negligence in providing professional services to "patients" or 
"clients" but provides coverage for negligence in performing professional 
services for "others."  The provision likewise suggests there is 
coverage for "any" negligent act or omission in the performance of or failure to 
perform professional services rather than delineating specific acts or omissions 
for which coverage is available.  It also appears from the last clause of the 
provision that the intended scope of coverage goes beyond actual therapy or 
counseling servicesit expressly includes service on professional boards within 
the phrase "professional services for others in [y]our profession as a 
psychologist."  
Use of the word "including" implies the existence of a range of other 
professional services not specifically enumerated in the policy.  Viewed in this 
light, the provision seems to provide coverage for a rather broad spectrum of 
psychological services.

 

[¶12]   However, as Executive points out, the 
use of the word "solely" in the provision suggests a narrower scopeone limiting 
coverage to acts or omissions committed by Dr. Griswold while acting exclusively 
as a psychologist in a formal professional relationship with a patient or client 
and not in some broader capacity.  Executive asserts that, because Dr. Griswold 
was acting as a foster mother for the children and DFS throughout the period of 
abuse and not solely, if at all, as the children's psychologist, the 
professional liability policy does not cover her acts.

 

[¶13]   "Solely" is defined as "1 : without an associate (as a companion or assistant) : singly, alone 2 : to the 
exclusion of alternate or competing things (as persons, purposes, duties)."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 2168 (1961).  Giving the word "solely" its plain and 
ordinary meaning and reading it in isolation from the other language in the 
provision, one might interpret the provision as excluding coverage for all but a 
narrow category of negligent acts or omissions occurring exclusively in the 
context of a psychologist-patient relationship.  Taken to its extreme, the word "solely" might 
even be read to require such a complete nexus between the negligent act and the 
performance of professional services as to exclude coverage if professional 
services are provided to anyone with whom the psychologist also happens to be 
friends, attends church, or has some other nonprofessional relationship.  Given the broad 
language used elsewhere in the provision, we are not convinced such a strict, 
literal interpretation was intended or is reasonable.

 

[¶14]   Instead, presented with language which 
lends itself to such vastly different interpretations, we are compelled to 
conclude the provision is ambiguous.  We apply the rule that ambiguity in an 
insurance policy is construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.  Application of this 
rule leads us to reject Executive's interpretation of the provision as excluding 
coverage because the alleged acts of professional negligence occurred while Dr. 
Griswold was also acting as a foster parent for the children and DFS.  Rather, construing 
the provision against the drafter, we hold there is potential coverage under the 
policy for professional negligence if Dr. Griswold negligently performed or 
failed to perform psychological services for the children even though she was 
also acting as a foster parent.  

 

[¶15]   In reaching this result, we point to 
the rule that we will not construe a contract of insurance so strictly as to 
thwart the general object of the insurance.  Eisenbarth v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 840 P.2d 945, 950 (Wyo. 1992).  This policy was intended to protect Dr. 
Griswold from liability in the event she negligently performed or failed to 
perform services for others as a psychologist.  When the ambiguities in the provision are 
construed in favor of coverage, the policy protects Dr. Griswold from liability 
if, in the course of agreeing to act or acting as a foster parent, she utilized 
her skills as a psychologist and did so in a negligent manner.  If Executive 
intended to narrowly limit coverage to those situations where Dr. Griswold was 
providing formal psychological services to patients or clients with whom she had 
no other nonprofessional relationship, it could have easily done so.  It did not, and we 
will not rewrite the policy to limit coverage in that manner. 

  

[¶16]   We remand the case for trial on the 
factual question of whether Dr. Griswold negligently performed or failed to 
perform professional services for the children.  In answering this question, the jury should 
consider the following principles:

First, a "professional service" is generally defined as one 
arising out of a vocation or occupation involving specialized knowledge or 
skills, and the skills are mental as opposed to manual.  Second, the 
determination of whether a particular act or omission falls within the scope of 
a professional services exclusion depends upon the nature of the activity rather 
than the position of the person responsible for the act or omission.

 

Duke University v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company, 386 S.E.2d 762, 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (citation 
omitted).  If, 
upon application of these principles to the facts presented, the jury finds Dr. 
Griswold provided services to the children arising out of her specialized 
knowledge or experience as a psychologist, it must consider whether her acts or 
omissions in doing so fell below the applicable standard of care for 
psychologists.  
If, however, the jury finds Dr. Griswold merely performed services for 
the children as any other foster parent would have doneservices which did not 
arise from her specialized knowledge or skills as a psychologist, the 
professional negligence claim must fail. 

  

[¶17]   The parties spend considerable time in 
their briefs addressing whether Dr. Griswold owed a professional duty to the 
children.  
Executive asserts that Dr. Griswold owed no duty to the children because 
she did not have a therapist/client relationship with them, a necessary 
prerequisite, Executive contends, to the existence of a duty.  The children argue 
Dr. Griswold did owe a duty to them because she used her professional expertise 
while serving as a foster parent and, having done so, must be held to the same 
level of competence as any other psychologist in the performance of professional 
services.   

 

[¶18]   The determination of whether a duty 
exists is for the court to decide as a matter of law.  JK ex rel. DK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782, 792 n.2 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

A duty exists where, "upon the facts in evidence, such a 
relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal 
obligation upon one for the benefit of the other--or, more simply, whether the 
interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal 
protection at the hands of the defendant."

 

Id. (quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 
870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 
1994)).  The 
existence of a physician-patient type relationship is one "such relation" which 
establishes a duty.  
Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 513 (Wyo. 
1995); Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 
1981).  The 
determination of whether a physician-patient relationship exists is typically a 
question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary judgment.  Meyer, 889 P.2d  at 513-14.  In this case, the 
jury must determine whether a professional relationship existed between Dr. 
Griswold and the children; that is, whether, in the course of serving as a 
foster parent, Dr. Griswold performed professional services for the 
children.  If 
the jury decides, based upon the facts presented, that a professional 
relationship existed between Dr. Griswold and the children, that finding 
establishes the duty, and the standard is fixed as that which is required of a 
reasonable person in light of the circumstances.  Roybal v. Bell, 
778 P.2d 108, 111 (Wyo. 
1989).

  

B.        Household 
Member Exclusion

 

[¶19]   The policy contains the following 
exclusion for claims brought by household members of the insured:

 

IV.  EXCLUSIONS  CLAIMS NOT COVERED:

We will not cover any Claim:

. . . .

H.  by any other person or organization covered 
under this policy, or for injury or damage sustained by any spouse or Household 
Member of any individual covered under this policy.

 

The policy defines household member as "any person who 
regularly resides with" the named insured.

 

[¶20]   Executive claims, and the district 
court found, that the children regularly resided with Dr. Griswold within the 
meaning of the policy, so there was no coverage.  The children argue they did not regularly 
reside with Dr. Griswold within the policy's meaning because their placement in 
her home was a formal, temporary arrangement which the state regulated and 
controlled pursuant to contracts of varying lengths subject to termination when 
they were able to return to their permanent homes.  The children also 
contend that whether they "regularly reside[d] with" Dr. Griswold is a question 
of fact for a jury to determine. 

            

[¶21]   We begin our discussion by noting that 
part of the claim in this case is that Dr. Griswold should never have agreed to 
the children being placed in her home.  To the extent the children allege claims for 
negligence occurring before their actual placement in the Griswold home, we hold 
their injuries are not excluded under the household member exclusion.  We are not willing 
to read the provision so broadly as to exclude claims for injuries which, 
although occurring while the children resided with Dr. Griswold, were set in 
motion by allegedly negligent acts or omissions preceding their placement in the 
home.

            

[¶22]   Wyoming has not previously considered 
the meaning of the phrase "regularly resides with" in an exclusionary clause of 
an insurance policy.  
The court has considered, however, the meaning of the words "resident" 
and "residence" as used in Wyoming statutes.  In that context, the court has said that, for 
purposes of the divorce statutes, the question of residence is one of fact.  Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 1249 (Wyo. 
2000).  The 
court has also said that, in construing the Wyoming Insurance Guaranty 
Association Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-31-101 through 26-31-117 (LexisNexis 
2001), failure to define the term "resident" in the statute "makes it an 
ambiguous term which is subject to varying interpretations."  Wyoming Insurance Guaranty Association v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 197 (Wyo. 
1994).  While 
these cases are not directly relevant to the issue presented here, they do 
illustrate the broader point that the question of residency is generally factual 
in nature and, left undefined, the term is subject to differing 
interpretations.

  

[¶23]   Among the jurisdictions that have 
considered the word "resident" or the phrase "regularly resides with" in an 
insurance policy, the results have varied.  Finding the term "resident" to require more 
than temporary placement and to require an element of permanency, the court in 
Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Watson, 274 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1971), held there was coverage for injuries sustained by a foster child 
temporarily residing in the insured's home despite an exclusion for injuries 
sustained by residents of the insured's household.  Several other 
courts have found coverage in the face of similar exclusions, holding that the 
words "resident" or "regularly resides with" are ambiguous and must be construed 
in favor of the insured.  Zulakis v. 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, No. 221948, 2001 
WL 1480713, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 1874 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2001); Vanguard Insurance Company v. Racine, 568 N.W.2d 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), appeal dismissed by 601 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. 1999); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Diehl, 768 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Napier v. Banks, 250 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969).  

 

[¶24]   We find this approach persuasive.  Just as the failure 
to define the term "resident" in the statutes makes it an ambiguous term subject 
to varying interpretations, Wyoming Insurance Guaranty 
Association, 888 P.2d  at 197, the failure to define "regularly resides with" 
in an insurance policy leaves the phrase open to differing interpretations.  We hold the 
undefined phrase "regularly resides with" as used in the policy is 
ambiguous.  
Construing it in favor of coverage, we reject Executive's contention that 
the children resided with Dr. Griswold as a matter of law and hold the issue is 
a question of fact for determination at trial. 

  

[¶25]   We are aware that, in construing 
similar policy language, other courts have reached the result Executive would 
have this court reach.  Executive cites Jenks 
v. State, 507 So. 2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 1987), for example, in which the 
court construed a homeowner's policy containing an exclusion for bodily injury 
to residents of the insured's household.  In that case, however, the policy expressly 
limited the term "residents" to the insured's relatives and "any other person 
under the age of 21 who is in the care of" any insured.  507 So. 2d  at 
879.  Other 
courts have upheld policy exclusions containing the same or similar 
language.  Merchants Mutual Insurance Co. v. Artis, 907 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Allstate Insurance Company v. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. 
Ind. 1991), aff'd, Allstate 
Insurance Company v. Desjarlais, 980 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1992).  Unlike the exclusions at issue in those 
cases, the policy in this case contains no limitation on the phrase "regularly 
resides with," nor does it attempt to define the phrase in any other way.  On that basis, we 
find the exclusion in this case distinguishable from those in the above cited 
cases.

 

[¶26]   Executive also cites A.G. by Waite v. Travelers 
Insurance Company, 331 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), as support for 
upholding the exclusion.  In that case, the court held that, as a 
matter of law, a child placed in a family operated foster home for one year 
pursuant to court order was a resident of the household for insurance 
purposes.  The 
court based its holding on three factors:  (1) state precedent; (2) evidence the family 
considered the foster care situation in contracting for insurance; and (3) 
"commonsense policy considerations," including a state statute suggesting the 
legislature intended foster children to be considered residents for insurance 
purposes.  331 N.W.2d  at 648.  
None of these factors is present in this case, and, for that reason, we 
do not find the court's rationale in A.G. 
persuasive.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶27]   The professional services provision and 
the household member exclusion contained in the policy are ambiguous.  Construing the 
language against the drafter, we hold:  (1) there is coverage under the professional 
services provision if a jury finds Dr. Griswold provided professional 
psychological services to the children while they were under her care, and (2) 
whether the children regularly resided with Dr. Griswold is a question of fact 
precluding application of the household member exclusion as a matter of law to 
deny coverage.

 

[¶28]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

LEHMAN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶29]   I respectfully dissent.  The definition of 
"wrongful act" in the insurance contract in this case appears to clearly set 
forth coverage for the insured while providing professional services for others 
as a psychologist.  
I am, therefore, unable to join the majority in finding ambiguity in that 
paragraph and, upon review of the analysis, am reminded of Doctors' Co. v. Ins. Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1024 (Wyo. 
1993) in which we said:  "The language of an insurance policy is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation . . . the 
language will not be tortured' to create an ambiguity."  (Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶30]   The majority's reading and 
interpretation of the policy language seems to, if not torture, at least stretch 
the meaning of the words to arrive at an unreasonable and confusing 
interpretation.  
I read the policy language much more plainly.  In my reading of 
the provision in question, I see only instances where the wrongful act is tied 
entirely to performance of a psychologist.

 

            
"Wrongful Act" means any actual or alleged negligent act, error or 
omission, or any actual or alleged Defamation solely in the performance of, or actual or alleged 
failure to perform, professional 
services for others in 
Your profession as a psychologist, including Your services as a member 
of a formal accreditation or professional review board of a hospital or 
professional society, or professional licensing board.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶31]   It seems clear that the only reasonable 
interpretation of this provision leads to the conclusion that the covered 
"wrongful acts" are those that arise solely out of Dr. Griswold's profession as 
a psychologist.  
When I read this provision literally, I see that "wrongful acts" under 
this provision are any of the following that arise solely out of the performance 
of professional services in the doctor's profession as a psychologist:  actual or alleged 
negligent acts, actual or alleged errors, actual or alleged omissions, or actual 
or alleged defamations.  "Wrongful acts" also includes any actual or 
alleged failure to perform professional services for others in the doctor's 
profession as a psychologist.  The reason the last "wrongful act" must be 
separated from the rest of the list is to avoid contradiction.  It would make 
little sense to say a "wrongful act" is an actual or alleged failure to perform 
professional services, solely in the performance of professional services.  If the doctor has 
"failed to perform," then the doctor would not be "in the performance of" 
professional services.  Such language style choices do not render the 
provision ambiguous.

 

[¶32]   Furthermore, the meaning of the terms 
is determined by considering the document as a whole, not by considering small 
phrases in isolation as the majority opinion seems to do.  "[W]e consider the 
contract as a whole, reading each part in light of all the other parts; 
. . . in other words, we analyze the tenor' of the contract."  Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 
1996).  The 
insurance policy in question was Dr. Griswold's psychologist malpractice 
insurance.  The 
"tenor" of the contract was that of malpractice insurance covering Dr. Griswold 
for acts as a psychologist not as a foster parent.

 

[¶33]   I come closer to agreement with the 
majority when the discussion turns to the question whether Dr. Griswold was 
providing professional services for the children.  However, the evidence shows that the Griswold 
home was certified for regular foster care, rather than specialized or 
therapeutic foster care in which a foster parent would be expected to utilize 
his or her special training and expertise during the course of the foster care 
relationship.  

 

[¶34]   Further, in accordance with the 
understanding between Dr. Griswold and DFS, because Dr. Griswold was not acting 
as a specialized or therapeutic foster care provider, the children were 
receiving psychological counseling and therapy from psychologists other than Dr. 
Griswold.  In 
fact, at trial, another psychologist testified that she was unaware of any 
professional relationship between Dr. Griswold and the children.  

 

[¶35]   Clearly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-205(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) requires any person who has knowledge or reasonable cause to 
believe that a child has been or may be abused or neglected to report the 
situation to the appropriate authorities.  I also do not dispute that, because of her 
education and experience, Dr. Griswold could have been more aware than the 
untrained person to observe signs of abuse.  I agree with the district court decision 
letter that "a reasonable person would probably conclude that Dr. Griswold 
exhibited negligence in her dealings" with the children.  However, for me 
that does not automatically cause the transposition from providing foster care 
to providing professional services to the children as a psychologist.

 

[¶36]   I would, therefore, affirm the district 
court which considered at length the actual relationship between Dr. Griswold 
and the children.  
The district court was not given the opportunity to decide the issue of 
ambiguity within the contract because it was not raised below; however, I do 
agree with that court's understanding of the clear meaning of the contract 
language.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1The children present these issues:

  

            
1.  Whether a licensed psychologist has a duty to act for the 
benefit of two small girls placed as foster children with the psychologist and 
her husband by the State in reliance on the professional skill of the 
psychologist, when a reasonably competent psychologist in the same line of 
practice would have recognized, based upon professional training and standards 
under similar circumstances, that the two children were at high risk of sexual 
abuse by the psychologist's husband, or were being abused by him.

            
2.  Whether a licensed psychologist regularly engaged by the 
Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) to provide counseling, training and 
assessment for families in need, including those where sexual abuse has occurred 
or is suspected, has a professional duty based upon the ongoing professional 
relationship to warn DFS of the risk of sexual abuse to children in DFS' custody 
by a foster father candidate where knowledge of the risk came to the 
psychologist from outside any DFS assignment?

            
3.  Whether a licensed psychologist who uses her training as a 
psychologist in the care of foster children in her temporary custody has a duty 
to apply that professional skill with ordinary care.

            
4.  If there is a duty as posed in Issue 1, 2 or 3, whether a 
breach of the duty is a "Wrongful Act' defined in 
the psychologist's professional liability insurance policy as "any actual or 
alleged negligent act, error or omission, or any actual or alleged Defamation solely in the performance of, or actual or 
alleged failure to perform, . . . services for others in Your 
profession as a psychologist, . . ."

            
5.  Whether foster children placed temporarily with a 
psychologist and her husband by DFS, with the intention of restoring them to the 
home of their natural parents as soon as possible, "regularly" reside with the 
psychologist so that the Household Member exclusion of the psychologist's 
professional liability policy applies to the claim of the foster children.

Executive phrases the issues as:

            
1.  Whether a psychologist['s] professional 
liability policy provides coverage for a claim brought on behalf of two foster 
children against their former foster mother where there was no professional 
relationship between the insured foster mother and either her foster children or 
any other relevant person or entity.

            
2.  Whether a household member exclusion in a psychologist['s] 
professional liability policy precludes coverage for a claim brought on behalf 
of two foster children against their former foster mother for negligence that 
allegedly occurred while the children resided for ten and twenty months, 
respectively, in the home of their insured foster mother.

2Mr. Griswold was 
convicted of ten counts of second-degree sexual assault and two counts of taking 
indecent liberties with the children.  Griswold v. 
State, 994 P.2d 920, 924 (Wyo. 
1999).

3The children voluntarily 
dismissed the negligence claim during the litigation, leaving only the 
professional negligence claim.