Title: In re Carol A. Boardman

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 131 
Docket: 
Cum-16-421 
Submitted 
On Briefs: May 25, 2017 
Decided: 
June 27, 2017 
Corrected: 
July 6, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CAROL A. BOARDMAN 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  Carol A. Boardman appeals from a decision of the Cumberland 
County Probate Court (Mazziotti, J.) denying her petition for a name change 
entered after a hearing.  Boardman contends that the court erred by 
concluding that the potential effect of the name change—others’ 
misunderstanding of Boardman’s marital status—does not demonstrate a 
purpose “of defrauding another person or entity” that supports the court’s 
denial of the petition.1  18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(f) (2015).2  We agree with 
Boardman, and we therefore vacate the judgment. 
                                         
1  We also received two briefs of amicus curiae in this matter—one from Kimberly A. Fredette, a 
similarly situated litigant, and one from the GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, the ACLU of 
Maine, EqualityMaine, and the Trans Youth Equality Foundation.  See M.R. App. P. 9(e). 
2  Section 1-701 has since been amended.  P.L. 2015, ch. 460, § 5 (effective July 29, 2016); 
see infra n.3. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On June 17, 2016, Carol A. Boardman filed in the Cumberland 
County Probate Court an unopposed petition and affidavit seeking to change 
her name to Carol A. Currier.  In her accompanying affidavit, Boardman 
attested to four facts as follows: (1) “I certify that I have notified . . . [a]ny adult 
person who is a relative or with whom I live or work or who is a blood relative 
of a person with whom I live who has the same name which I am seeking to 
adopt”; (2) “I have no minor children”; (3) “I am not involved in any 
bankruptcy proceedings or arrangements among creditors in which my debts 
to others are being affected, nor do I reasonably anticipate that such 
proceedings or arrangements are about to begin”; and (4) “I know of no 
person who has or has reason to have any objection to the change of name I 
am seeking.”   
 
[¶3]  The court conducted a hearing on the petition on August 18, 2016, 
during which it inquired as to whether Currier was Boardman’s “maiden” 
name.  Boardman responded that Currier was not her original family name, 
but was instead the last name of her friend, and that her husband had died in 
2013 and she wanted a “fresh start.”  The court informed Boardman that to 
allow her to take her friend's last name would be a “deception” in that it 
 
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would falsely suggest to others that she and her friend are married.  The court 
explained, “So, if somebody were to extend credit to you, let you sign a lease, 
give you access to records, they would do so under the misapprehension that 
you were a married couple, but you’re not.”  When Boardman asked, “What 
am I supposed to do?” the court replied, “Get married.  That’s your solution, 
I’m afraid.”  The court denied the petition, concluding, “Boardman seeks to 
change her name to the surname of her partner.  She admits that by doing so 
will give the public impression they are a married couple and thus a false 
impression.”  Boardman appeals.  See 18-A M.R.S. § 1-308 (2016); M.R. App. P. 
2(b)(3). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶4]  At the time Boardman filed her petition, the name change statute 
in effect was 18-A M.R.S. § 1-701 (2015).3  Section 1-701 provides that a court 
                                         
3  The applicable version of the name change statute provided in its entirety is as follows: 
§ 1-701. Petition to change name  
(a) If a person desires to have that person’s name changed, the person may 
petition the judge of probate in the county where the person resides. If the person is 
a minor, the person’s legal custodian may petition in the person’s behalf. 
(b) The judge, after due notice, may change the name of the person.  To 
protect the person’s safety, the judge may limit the notice required if the person 
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that:  
       (1) The person is a victim of abuse; and  
       (2) The person is currently in reasonable fear of the person’s safety.  
 
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may grant a name change when a “person [who] desires to have that person’s 
name changed” files a petition in the county in which she resides and provides 
“due notice” of the request along with a forty-dollar fee.  18-A M.R.S. §  
1-701(a), (b), (d).  The court may also order the petitioner to undergo 
background checks to verify criminal history, motor vehicle history, and credit 
history.  18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(e).  Section 1-701 further names the limited 
circumstances in which a name change may not be granted: “The judge may 
not change the name of the person if the judge has reason to believe that the 
person is seeking the name change for purposes of defrauding another person 
or entity or for purposes otherwise contrary to the public interest.”  18-A 
M.R.S. § 1-701(f). 
                                                                                                                                   
(c) The judge shall make and preserve a record of the name change.  If the 
judge limited the notice required under subsection (b), the judge may seal the 
records of the name change.  
(d) The fee for filing the name change petition is $40.  
(e) The judge may require the person seeking a name change to undergo 
one or more of the following background checks: a criminal history record check; a 
motor vehicle record check; or a credit check.  The judge may require the person to 
pay the cost of each background check required.  
(f) The judge may not change the name of the person if the judge has reason 
to believe that the person is seeking the name change for purposes of defrauding 
another person or entity or for purposes otherwise contrary to the public interest. 
18-A M.R.S. § 1-701 (2015).  The 2015 amendment to the statute gives the District Court 
jurisdiction over a name change for a minor when “there is a proceeding involving custody or other 
parental rights with respect to [a] minor pending in the District Court.”  P.L. 2015, ch. 460, § 5 
(effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(a) (2016)).  That amendment is not 
relevant to the current appeal. 
 
5 
 
[¶5]  Here, the record establishes, and there is no dispute, that 
Boardman filed a petition in the Probate Court of the county in which she 
resides, see 18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(a); Boardman is not a minor, see 18-A M.R.S. 
§ 1-701(a); no parental rights dispute regarding a minor was pending, 
see 18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(a); “due notice” of the petition was provided, see 
18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(b); Boardman paid the required fee with her petition, see 
18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(d); and the court did not require Boardman to submit to 
any background checks, see 18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(e).  See In re A.M.B., 2010 ME 
54, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 997 A.2d 754.  No one appeared before the Probate Court to 
oppose her petition.   
 
[¶6]  The Probate Court determined, however, that granting her the 
requested name change might mislead others to believe that she is married to 
a man who has the same last name she wishes to adopt.  This 
misunderstanding, the court apparently concluded, constitutes the type of 
fraud that precludes the grant of a name change pursuant to section 1-701(f).  
 
[¶7]  Boardman challenges this interpretation of the name change 
statute as a matter of law.  Although we generally review for an abuse of 
discretion the court’s denial of a requested name change, In re A.M.B., 
2010 ME 54, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 754, because this matter regards the court’s legal 
 
6 
interpretation of section 1-701, we review de novo the meaning of the statute 
by examining its plain and unambiguous language, see Estate of Gray, 2014 ME 
119, ¶ 9, 103 A.3d 212; Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶¶ 6, 9, 930 A.2d 1088.   
 
[¶8]  Name changes are to be liberally granted.  See 18-A M.R.S. § 1-102 
(2016) (stating that the Probate Code, of which section 1-701 is a part, “shall 
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies”); Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶ 25, 930 A.2d 1088.  By identifying 
those limited instances in which “[t]he judge may not change the name of the 
person,” section 1-701 suggests that a name change must be granted in all 
other circumstances.  The statute provides only two bases for denying a 
requested name change—when it is sought “for purposes of defrauding 
another person or entity” or when it is sought “for purposes otherwise 
contrary to the public interest.”  18-A M.R.S. § 1-701(f).  As we have said, 
“[t]he main purpose of the statute . . . is to provide petitioners with the 
certainty of a judicially-sanctioned name change, as long as the petition is not 
submitted with fraudulent intent and the change of name does not interfere 
with the rights of others.”  In re A.M.B., 2010 ME 54, ¶ 4, 997 A.2d 754. 
 
[¶9]  Although section 1-701 does not define what it means to 
“defraud[],” that term is a legal term of art that has long referred to a 
 
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“depriv[ation] of some right, interest or property by a deceitful device.”  State 
v. Vandenburg, 2 A.2d 916, 919 (Del. Gen. Sess. Ct. 1938) (quotation marks 
omitted); see Motley v. Sawyer, 38 Me. 68, 73 (1854); Moody v. Burton, 27 Me. 
427, 436 (1847); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 593 (2002).  
In the civil context, for example, the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation is 
proved with evidence  
(1) that the defendant made a false representation, (2) of a 
material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless 
disregard of whether it is true or false, (4) for the purpose of 
inducing the plaintiff to act in reliance upon it, and, (5) the 
plaintiff justifiably relied upon the representation as true and 
acted upon it to the plaintiff’s damage. 
 
Rand v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2003 ME 122, ¶ 9, 832 A.2d 771.  Similarly, the 
elements of fraudulent concealment are “(1) a failure to disclose; (2) a 
material fact; (3) where a legal or equitable duty to disclose exists; (4) with 
the intention of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in reliance on 
the non-disclosure; and (5) which is in fact relied upon to the aggrieved 
party’s detriment.”  Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2009 ME 67, 
¶ 30, 974 A.2d 286.  In terms of negotiable instruments as well, a “[f]raudulent 
indorsement” is one in which an instrument is forged.  11 M.R.S. 
§ 3-1405(1)(b) (2016). 
 
8 
[¶10]  Similarly, in the criminal context, “[a] person is guilty of 
defrauding a creditor if . . . [t]he person destroys, removes, conceals, 
encumbers, transfers or otherwise deals with property subject to a security 
interest . . . with the intent to hinder enforcement of that interest.”  17-A M.R.S. 
§ 902(1), (1)(A) (2016).  Home repair fraud is committed by “[i]ntentionally 
misrepresent[ing] a material fact relating to the terms of the agreement or 
contract or misrepresent[ing] a preexisting or existing condition of any 
portion of the property that is the subject of the home repair services.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 908(1)(A) (2016). 
[¶11]  We interpret the plain language of “defraud[]” in section 1-701 
consistently with these definitions.  Although the court expressed concern 
that Boardman’s name change could lead potential creditors, lessors, or 
record holders to believe that she is married, unless and until there is some 
evidence that Boardman has taken or intends to take some action to avoid 
financial or legal obligations, or to represent that she is married in 
circumstances that cause another to justifiably rely on that representation to 
his or her detriment, no fraud is implicated.  See In re McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 
402 (Pa. 1998) (stating that the “necessity for judicial involvement in name 
change petition centers on governmental concerns that individuals not alter 
 
9 
their identity to avoid financial obligations”).  The record in this matter is 
devoid of any such evidence. 
[¶12]  The Probate Court’s reading of section 1-701 also creates absurd 
results that do not comport with other provisions of Maine law.  See Curtis v. 
Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 10, 152 A.3d 605 (stating that courts must avoid 
any interpretation of plain language that creates absurd results).  The Maine 
Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4634 (2016), already precludes 
discrimination based on marital status, including in the provision of credit and 
in the provision of housing.  5 M.R.S. §§ 4552, 4595-4596.  Moreover, 
unmarried domestic partners are already afforded various legal benefits, 
regardless of their names.  See 22 M.R.S. § 2710 (2016) (establishing the 
domestic partner registry); see also 15 M.R.S. § 321(1) (2016) (including 
domestic partners within the definition of “family or household members” for 
protective order purposes); 18-A M.R.S. § 2-102 (2016) (allowing domestic 
partners to inherit under the laws of intestacy); 24-A M.R.S. § 2741-A (2016) 
(requiring that health insurers make coverage available for domestic 
partners).  Thus, by law, it cannot be marital status that dictates the 
availability of credit or leasing options—the transactions about which the 
Probate Court expressed concern. 
 
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[¶13]  Moreover, as a practical matter, given the variety of naming 
conventions in modern society, having the same last name no more indicates 
that a couple is married than having a different last name indicates that a 
couple is unmarried.  Indeed, more than forty years ago, we struck down this 
concomitant notion in holding that a name change may not be denied on the 
ground that it misleads others to believe that a person is unmarried when that 
person is in fact married.  In In re Reben, a woman took her husband’s last 
name when the couple married but she later filed a petition to return to her 
birth name even though she and her husband had no plans to divorce.  
342 A.2d 688, 688-89 (Me. 1975).  The Probate Court denied her petition.  Id. 
at 689.  Because, as here, there was no evidence in In re Reben that the 
petitioner had any fraudulent intent in seeking the name change, we declared 
the court’s denial of the name change petition an abuse of discretion.4  Id. at 
689, 695.   
                                         
4  Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in a variety of circumstances.  See, e.g., 
In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207, 1208, 1211-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that a woman was not 
precluded from adopting the last name of her “life companion”); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 
847-49 (Ohio 2002) (holding that an unmarried same-sex couple wishing to adopt the same last 
name is not a fraudulent basis on which to deny a requested name change); see also In re Bacharach, 
780 A.2d 579, 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (same); In re McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400, 401-03 
(Pa. 1998) (requiring the trial court to grant a name change from a male to a female name in 
anticipation of the petitioner’s sex-reassignment surgery and holding that any confusion about the 
petitioner’s gender created among others as a result of the name change did not constitute the 
financial fraud with which the name change statute was primarily concerned); In re Brown, 
770 S.E.2d 494, 495, 497-98 (Va. 2015) (requiring the trial court to grant the name change petition 
of a federal prison inmate with gender identity disorder in the absence of any evidence of fraud). 
 
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[¶14]  On this appeal, we conclude that a person’s potential 
misunderstanding of another person’s marital status, without more, does not 
qualify as a fraud that precludes the otherwise liberal grant of name change 
petitions in the Probate Court.  Given this conclusion, and in the absence of 
any dispute that Boardman met all the requirements for the change of her last 
name imposed by section 1-701, we vacate the court’s denial of Boardman’s 
petition and remand the matter with instructions to enter a judgment 
granting Boardman’s petition for a name change.  
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded with instructions 
to enter a judgment granting Boardman’s name 
change petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James S. Mundy, Esq., Whitney, Mundy & Mundy, South Berwick, for appellant 
Carol Ann Boardman 
 
Kimberly Ann Fredette, amicus curiae pro se 
 
Mary L. Bonauto, Esq., and Patience Crozier, Esq., GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders, Boston, for amici curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, 
ACLU of Maine Foundation, EqualityMaine, and Trans Youth Equality 
Foundation 
 
 
Cumberland County Probate Court docket number 2016-868 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY