Title: Darr v. Bankston

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

F. Gordon DARR, Jr., as Administrator of the
Estate of Tamara Bankston Darr v. David L.
BANKSTON

96-1417                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 24, 1997


1.   Executors & administrators -- administrator can recover money
     judgment after death of one entitled to that judgment -- Ark.
     Code Ann.  16-65-502 (1987) supports such recovery. -- An
     administrator may recover a monetary judgment after the death
     of one entitled to the judgment; such a recovery is supported
     by Ark. Code Ann.  16-65-502(1987). 

2.   Parent & child -- custodial parent has right to unpaid
     installments of child support -- decree containing provisions
     for child-support payments is final judgment as to any accrued
     payment. -- The custodial parent has a right to unpaid
     installments of child support; a decree containing a provision
     for child-support payments shall be a final judgment as to any
     accrued payment until the time either party moves to set
     aside, alter, or modify the decree. 

3.   Statutes -- court has duty to reconcile statutes to make them
     consistent -- appellee failed to give any authority to support
     his inconsistent interpretation of the code. -- It is the
     supreme court's duty, if possible, to reconcile Arkansas's
     statutes to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible;
     here, appellee offered no citation of authority or convincing
     argument specifying why Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-236 (Supp. 1995)
     could not be read as being harmonious with the state's
     applicable probate provisions; appellee's attempt to construct
      9-14-236 in such a way as to denude the plain language and
     purpose of Arkansas's survival-of-judgment statute,  16-65-
     502, and to strip an administrator from satisfying a deceased
     party's decree where it involved an arrearage in child-support
     payments, was without merit.

4.   Executors & administrators -- appellant was entitled to take
     action to enforce estate's entitlement to any existing accrued
     child-support payment -- case reversed and remanded. --
     Appellant, as appointed representative of the decedent's
     estate, was entitled to take possession of all her personal
     property, Ark. Code Ann.  28-49-101(a) (1987), and to enforce
     her estate's entitlement to any existing money or personal
     property judgment or decree; the decree of divorce constituted
     a final judgment as to all accrued and yet unpaid support; the
     chancellor's decision dismissing appellant's complaint for
     lack of standing was reversed and remanded. 

     Appeal from Faulkner Chancery Court; Charles E. Clawson,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     McNutt Law Firm, by:  Mona J. McNutt, for appellant.
     Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., by:  Gary D. Jiles, for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Tamara and David Bankston were divorced on December 27, 1985,
and the couple's two minor daughters were awarded to Tamara.  David
was ordered to pay Tamara $220 per month child support, plus two-
thirds of the health insurance premiums for the children, and
reimbursement of one-half of the dental and non-covered medical
expenses incurred on the children's behalf.  Over the years, David
failed to make payments and accrued arrearages.  In October of
1995, Tamara died intestate and Gordon Darr, Jr., was appointed
administrator of her estate; in that capacity, Darr brought suit
against David to recover the arrears David owed in child support,
insurance premiums, and medical expenses.  At the time of suit,
David had custody of the children.
     David filed a responsive motion to dismiss Darr's complaint,
alleging Darr had no standing.  The chancellor agreed and dismissed
Darr's suit.  In reaching his decision, the chancellor relied on
Ark. Code Ann.  9-14-236 (Supp. 1995), which defines a "moving
party" who brings suit for child-support arrearages to mean (1) the
custodial parent, (2) any person or agency to whom custody of a
minor child has been given or relinquished, (3) the minor child
through his guardian or next friend, (4) a person for whose benefit
the support was ordered, within five years of his or her obtaining
majority, or (5) the Child Support Enforcement Office under
prescribed circumstances.  Because Darr failed to fall within any
of these five categories, the chancellor held Darr had no standing. 
He specifically mentioned that Darr, as administrator of Tamara's
estate "does not equate" with being the children's guardian under
 9-14-236, and therefore could not enforce any child-support
arrearages.  The chancellor is mistaken, and accordingly we reverse
and remand. 
     Darr correctly submits that, as administrator, he can recover
a monetary judgment after the death of one entitled to the
judgment.  He cites Ark. Code Ann.  16-65-502 (1987), which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
          (a)(1)  If one (1) or more plaintiffs in a judgment
     or decree dies before the judgment or decree is satisfied
     or carried into effect, the judgment or decree, if for
     money or concerning personal property, shall survive to
     the executors or administrators of the deceased party,
     and, if concerning real estate, to his heirs or devisees.
          (2)  In each of the preceding cases, execution may
     be sued out in the name of the surviving plaintiff, for
     the benefit of himself and legal representatives of the
     deceased party, or the judgment or decree may be revived
     in the name of the legal representatives and the
     surviving plaintiff, and execution may be sued out
     jointly.
     This court has recognized the custodial parent's right to
unpaid installments of child support in prior decisions.  See
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 297 Ark. 377,