Title: State v. Remy

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Remy  (97-152); 167 Vt. 541; 711 A.2d 665

[Filed 17-Apr-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 97-152

State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont
                                                  Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit

Darlene A. Remy                                   February Term, 1998

Robert Grussing, III, J.

       William D. Wright, Bennington County State's Attorney, David R.
  Fenster, Deputy State's Attorney, and Mary Pat Murphy, Law Clerk (on the
  Brief), Bennington for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       David A. Howard and Joyce Brennan of Cormier & Howard, Bennington, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       MORSE, J.   In these consolidated appeals defendant Darlene Remy
  challenges her conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating
  liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), and the related civil
  suspension of her license under 23 V.S.A. § 1205.   She contends that the
  trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress all evidence relating
  to the DUI because the police: (1) lacked the statutory authority to stop
  and detain her under V.R.Cr.P. 3(c); and (2) lacked a reasonable suspicion
  of wrongdoing necessary to effectuate the stop.  We affirm.

       On February 1, 1997, at approximately 5:40 p.m., Officer Rowland of
  the Bennington Police Department responded to an assault complaint from
  Stephen Woodie.  Woodie informed the officer that he had been on a service
  call for AAA in the parking lot of the Apple Valley Inn when a van driven
  by defendant approached.  Woodie's former wife, Elaine Palmer, was a

 

  passenger in the van.  Both women were yelling at Woodie.  Palmer
  eventually got out of the van and punched Woodie in the mouth.  At that
  point, Woodie left in his truck and returned to the service station.  The
  women followed him in the van yelling and flashing the van's headlights. 
  They pulled in behind Woodie's truck and defendant got out and yelled and
  spit at him.  Woodie asked defendant and Ms. Palmer three times to leave
  and then called 911, at which point the women reentered the van and drove
  away.  Woodie detected a strong odor of alcohol on defendant.

       Woodie described the van to the police and reported that it had a
  distinctive license plate, "RUNAWAY."  The van became the subject of a
  Bennington Police Department "attempt to locate" call.  Later that evening,
  at approximately 9:17 p.m., Officer Rowland spotted the van, activated his
  blue lights, and pulled it over.  The officer's purpose in stopping the
  vehicle was to issue a citation and to investigate the report that the
  women had been drinking.  In speaking with defendant, the officer detected
  a strong odor of alcohol and noted that her speech was slurred.  Defendant
  refused the officer's request to perform field sobriety tests and was
  transported to the station for processing.  She subsequently refused to
  submit to any tests to determine her blood alcohol content.

       Defendant moved to suppress all evidence relating to the DUI in the
  criminal action and to dismiss the civil suspension proceeding, claiming
  that the stop was illegal.  Following a consolidated hearing, the trial
  court denied the motion to suppress and entered a judgment of suspension in
  the civil action.  Defendant appealed the civil suspension, and entered a
  conditional plea of guilty to DUI, reserving her right to appeal the
  suppression issue.  The two appeals were consolidated for review.

       The trial court concluded that the stop was authorized under V.R.Cr.P.
  3(c)(1).  Under that provision, a law enforcement officer who is authorized
  to arrest a person for a misdemeanor without a warrant under V.R.Cr.P.
  3(a):

    shall, except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision, issue
    a citation to

 

    appear before a judicial officer in lieu of arrest.  In such circumstances,
    the law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain such person for the
    purpose of determining whether any of the exceptions in paragraph (2)
    applies, and issuing a citation .  .  .  .
  
  V.R.Cr. P. 3(c)(1).  The exceptions set forth in paragraph (2) include a
  variety of exigent circumstances in which an immediate arrest rather than
  issuance of a citation may be necessary.

       Under V.R.Cr.P. 3(a)(2)(C) an officer may make a warrantless arrest
  when there is probable cause to believe "that a person has committed a
  misdemeanor which involves an assault against a family or household member,
  as defined in Chapter 21 of Title 15, or a child of such person."  As the
  former spouse of Ms. Palmer, the victim here met the definition of a
  "household member" under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(2) ("persons who have lived
  together in a sexual relationship"). Based upon the information supplied to
  the officer earlier that day, the officer had probable cause to believe an
  assault against a household member had occurred, and therefore was
  authorized to arrest under V.R.Cr.P. 3(a).  See State v. Phillips, 140 Vt.
  210, 217, 436, A.2d 746, 750 (1981) ("For probable cause to exist in a
  warrantless arrest situation, it is necessary that some facts
  substantiating the commission of an alleged crime be communicated to the
  arresting officer or to an officer with whom he is in communication.").

       Clothed with the authority to arrest Ms. Palmer, Officer Rowland was
  entitled, indeed was required, under V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(1) to stop the van in
  which she and defendant were riding to issue a citation or, if one of the
  exceptions in 3(c)(2) applied, to make an arrest.  V.R.Cr.P. 3(c)(1). 
  Having lawfully stopped and detained defendant, and having detected clear
  signs of intoxication, the officer was then authorized to investigate
  further "`in order to confirm or negate his suspicions regarding probable
  cause to arrest'" for DUI.  State v. Caron, 155 Vt. 492, 500, 586 A.2d 1127, 1132 (1990) (quoting State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 330,