Title: Atkinson v. 2M Company, Inc.

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 45918 
 
 
MATTHEW ATKINSON, 
  
               Claimant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
2M COMPANY, INC., Employer, and 
EMPLOYERS ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Surety, 
 
               Defendants-Appellants. 
_____________________________________ 
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Boise, December 2018 Term 
 
Filed: January 29, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
 
The determination of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
 
Gardner Law Office, Boise, attorneys for Appellant. Michael G.  
McPeek argued. 
 
 
Bradford S. Eidam, PLLC, Boise, attorney for Respondent.  
 
 
 
Bradford S. Eidam argued. 
___________________________ 
BEVAN, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
2M Company Inc. (“2M”) appeals an Industrial Commission (“Commission”) decision 
that determined Matthew Atkinson was entitled to reasonable medical benefits for injuries he 
sustained in an accident on his way to work. The Commission found that an exception to the 
“going and coming” rule applied based on 2M’s intent to compensate Atkinson for his travel 
time while going to or coming from work. 2M and its surety, Employer Assurance Company, 
timely appealed. We affirm on different grounds.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At the time of his accident, Atkinson was a salaried employee of 2M, a wholesaler of 
well drilling and irrigation supplies. Atkinson was a territorial sales person for 2M and was 
responsible for providing 2M’s hallmark “Legendary Service” to customers by supplying 
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technical assistance at the customer’s place of business, running parts to them, and assisting in 
the installation of those parts. 2M provided Atkinson with a pickup truck owned by the company 
so that he had the ability to call on potential and existing customers. Atkinson would respond to 
an average of two or three emergency customer calls per week, often late in the evening. 
Atkinson was issued a company credit card to purchase fuel for the pickup truck, and 2M paid 
for any necessary vehicle servicing and maintenance. 2M also required Atkinson to work one 
Saturday every five weeks staffing 2M’s Meridian office from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 
p.m. Atkinson was scheduled to work on March 11, 2017, after switching Saturday shifts with a 
coworker. 
On March 10, 2017, Atkinson drove his personal vehicle to the Whitewater Saloon for a 
date night with his wife. Neither felt comfortable driving afterwards so they left the car there and 
took a taxi home. The following morning Atkinson’s wife needed to retrieve her car to pick up 
their children who had spent the night at their grandparent’s house. Atkinson planned to drop his 
wife off at Whitewater Saloon and go on to work for his shift; as such, Atkinson and his wife left 
their home together in his company pickup truck the morning of March 11, 2017. Whitewater 
Saloon is on Atkinson’s usual route to 2M’s office.  
However, as the couple was leaving their subdivision, Atkinson noticed he could not see 
clearly out of the front windshield due to frost, so he pulled over to the side of the road to scrape 
the windshield with a credit card. As he was scraping the windshield he was struck by another 
vehicle and sustained significant injuries to his right leg and shoulder.  
On May 24, 2017, Atkinson filed a complaint with the Commission. A hearing was 
conducted on September 13, 2017, to determine the compensability of Atkinson’s claim. The 
Referee found that Atkinson was entitled to benefits because he was injured in the course of his 
employment as he was traveling to work in employer-provided transportation when the accident 
occurred. Specifically, the Referee held that Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 119 Idaho 333, 806 
P.2d 426 (1991) (“Hansen”), was controlling and dispositive.  
 The Commission confirmed that Atkinson was entitled to reasonable medical benefits for 
injuries sustained in the March 11, 2017, accident, but it rejected the Referee’s reliance upon 
Hansen. The Commission issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of law that found Case 
of Barker, 105 Idaho 108, 666 P.2d 635 (1983) (“Barker I”) to be dispositive. 2M and its surety, 
Employer Assurance Company, timely appealed to this Court.  
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III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether the Commission applied the correct legal standards in determining that 
Atkinson’s accident occurred in the course of his employment with 2M.  
2. 
Whether the Commission erred by failing to make a specific factual finding concerning 
whether Atkinson’s accident arose out of his employment with 2M. 
3. 
Whether Atkinson is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free 
review over questions of law.” Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 453, 
111 P.3d 135, 138 (2005) (citing Uhl v. Ballard Medical Products, Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 
P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003)). However, this Court will uphold the Commission’s factual findings so 
long as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. “Substantial and 
competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion.” Id. “To determine whether an accident occurred arising out of and in the course of 
[a] Claimant’s employment, the Court determines whether the Commission correctly applied the 
law of the worker’s compensation to the facts determined by the Commission.” Combes v. State, 
Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 432, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997) (internal citation 
omitted).  
The Court “views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party 
who prevailed before the Commission,” Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc., 133 
Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999), and “liberally construe[s] the 
provisions of the worker’s compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to 
serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated.” Murray-Donahue 
v. Nat’l Car Rental Licensee Ass’n, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 900 P.2d 1348, 1351 
(1995). 
Hamilton v. Alpha Servs., LLC, 158 Idaho 683, 688, 351 P.3d 611, 616 (2015) (alteration in 
original). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. 
The Commission applied the correct legal standards in determining that 
Atkinson’s accident occurred in the course of his employment with 2M. 
The crux of 2M’s argument is that the Commission impermissibly expanded the Court’s 
payment-for-travel-time doctrine to hold that Atkinson’s accident arose out of and in the course 
of his employment with 2M.  
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“The applicable standard for determining whether an employee is entitled to 
compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Act requires that the injury must have been 
caused by an accident ‘arising out of and in the course of any employment.’” Dinius, 133 Idaho 
at 574, 990 P.2d at 740; I.C. § 72-102(18)(a). “The words ‘out of’ have been held to refer to the 
origin and cause of the accident and the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and the 
circumstances under which the accident occurred.” Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 
33, 43 P.3d 788, 792 (2002) (quoting Dinius, 133 Idaho at 574, 990 P.2d at 740).  
The “going and coming” rule states that an employee is not within the course and scope 
of his employment on his way to and from work. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 898, 155 P.3d 
695, 699 (2007) (citing Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Companies of America, 98 Idaho 410, 411, 
565 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1977)). As a result, an employee traveling to and from work is usually not 
covered by worker’s compensation protection unless an exception applies. Clark v. Daniel 
Morine Const. Co., 98 Idaho 114, 115, 559 P.2d 293, 294 (1977). The reason an employee is 
generally not awarded compensation for injuries that occur while traveling to and from work is 
that the employment relationship is considered suspended from the time the employee leaves his 
work to go home until he resumes his work the next day. Barker I, 105 Idaho at 109, 666 P.2d at 
636. That said, this Court has identified several exceptions to the going and coming rule, 
“including: (1) the special errand; (2) the traveling employee; (3) peculiar risk, and; [4 the] dual 
purpose doctrine.” Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 328, 360 P.3d 333, 
337 (2015) (internal citation omitted).  
This Court articulated an additional exception in Barker I that expands an employee’s 
course of employment to include instances where the employee can demonstrate that the 
employer regards the employee’s travel as part of his job. In Barker I, a decedent’s wife filed a 
claim for death benefits after the decedent was involved in an accident while driving from a work 
site to a dentist appointment. 105 Idaho at 109, 666 P.2d at 636. Per his union contract, the 
decedent was paid $90 per week as a travel allowance. Id. The Commission denied benefits after 
concluding that the decedent was not engaged in employment for the employer at the time of the 
accident and that payment of travel expenses was irrelevant to whether an exception to the going 
and coming rule should apply. Id.  
The decedent’s wife appealed, arguing that when the employer pays for travel expenses 
the journey should be considered in the course of employment. Id. at 110, 666 P.2d at 637. This 
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Court reversed and remanded the Commission’s decision, holding that “payment of travel 
expenses along with other evidence indicating the employer intended to compensate the 
employee for travel time, will justify expanding the course of employment to include going to 
and from work.” Id. at 110–11, 666 P.2d at 637–38 (emphasis in original). The Court cited 
favorably to two factors that could aid in determining whether an employer intended to 
compensate an employee for travel to and from work: (1) extended cross-country travel to reach 
the employment site; and (2) size of the travel allowance paid. Id. at 110, 666 P.2d at 637. The 
Court then instructed the Commission to consider any potential “other evidence” on remand.  
The parties submitted no additional evidence on remand. The Commission denied 
benefits again, concluding that it “could find no evidence other than the actual payment itself, to 
indicate that the employer intended to compensate the employee for travel time or travel 
expense.” Matter of Barker, 110 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986) (Barker II). On 
appeal, this Court concluded that the Commission correctly applied the standard announced in 
Barker I and affirmed the Commission’s denial of coverage. Id. 
Relying on the exception identified in Barker I, the Commission here recognized that 
2M’s providing Atkinson with a pickup truck and “the gas and maintenance necessary to operate 
the same” was insufficient by itself for Atkinson’s accident to be considered in the course of 
employment. Thus, for the Barker I exception to apply, the Commission determined that 
Atkinson had to adduce additional evidence showing that 2M intended to compensate him for his 
travel time. The Commission found the following “additional evidence” was sufficient to bring 
Atkinson’s accident within the scope of employment: 
25. 
First, Claimant is a 24/7 “on-call” employee. Claimant may be called upon 
to respond to an emergency any time of day, and therefore, it is necessary to his 
work to have immediate access to a company vehicle at all times. Because 
Claimant must have a company vehicle at his home to respond to the needs of a 
customer, it follows that he must use Employer’s vehicle going-to and coming-
from the workplace. Because of the demands of his employment, Claimant is 
effectively denied the option of choosing to use his own vehicle in coming/going 
journeys. 
 
26. 
Second, even though the provision of a company vehicle to Claimant may 
be regarded as an inducement to Claimant, it is also clear that the provision of a 
company vehicle to Claimant serves the Employer’s interest by ensuring that 
Claimant will always have the means available to immediately respond to 
emergency calls.   
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Whether the Commission’s findings are legally sufficient to satisfy the “additional 
evidence” requirement of Barker I is a question of law over which we exercise free review. 
Sundquist, 141 Idaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138. 2M advances several arguments in support of its 
position that the Commission erred in concluding 2M intended to compensate Atkinson for his 
travel time while going to and from work. 
Initially, 2M argues that because Atkinson was a salaried employee, there is no evidence 
that 2M intended to pay Atkinson for the time he incurred in traveling to and from work. Even 
so, the Commission did not use Atkinson’s status as a salaried employee in reaching its ultimate 
conclusion on the compensability of Atkinson’s claim. The Commission did not consider 
whether an employee’s status as a salaried employee had any bearing on whether an employer 
intended to compensate the employee for travel time with respect to the going and coming rule. 
Accordingly, this argument fails. See Izaguirre v. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 155 Idaho 
229, 233, 308 P.3d 929, 933 (2013) (quoting Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 
150 Idaho 231, 236, 245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010) (“[i]t is well established that in order for an issue 
to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an 
assignment of error.”).  
2M also contends that there is no precedent to support the idea that an employer derives a 
benefit from an employee’s on-time arrival at work, even if they are commuting to work in a 
company vehicle. 2M cites a Utah Court of Appeals case in support of its argument that “mere 
arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the employer.” See VanLeeuwen v. 
Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). As with Atkinson’s status as a 
salaried employee, Atkinson’s “on-time arrival” was not identified by the Commission as a basis 
for coverage; thus, it will not be considered on appeal. See Izaguirre, 155 Idaho at 233, 308 P.3d 
at 933. 
2M’s remaining arguments stress that the Commission’s findings were improper because 
they are rooted in speculation rather than the actual circumstances of Atkinson’s March 11, 2017, 
accident. We agree. Finding 25 is flawed because whether Atkinson had the company vehicle so 
he could respond to a customer’s call outside his normal work hours is not relevant when 
Atkinson was injured on his way to 2M’s office for a regularly scheduled workday. In this 
regard, 2M argues that the Commission improperly conflated the focus of Barker I with the 
special errand exception of the going and coming rule. The fact that Atkinson may have been on 
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call to respond to a customer’s needs outside normal working hours would have only been 
relevant under the special errand exception if Atkinson’s accident occurred while he was on a 
special errand, traveling from his home to attend to the customer.1 We find this argument to be 
persuasive. The record contains no discussion of the parties’ expectations about Atkinson’s 
availability, whether he had to remain in any particular place during this on-call time, or whether 
he could engage in his own activities during such time. The record is thus insufficient to support 
the Commission’s conclusion in this regard. Indeed, at the time of the accident, Atkinson and his 
wife were driving to retrieve their personal vehicle left at the Whitewater Saloon from a date 
night the prior evening after he did not feel comfortable driving it home. This would seem to 
conflict with the Commission’s finding that Atkinson was a 24/7 on-call employee. 
Finding 26 is equally problematic. Whether 2M’s interest may have been served because 
use of the company pickup truck meant Atkinson would “have the means to immediately respond 
to emergency calls” was disconnected from Atkinson’s accident, which occurred while he was 
commuting to a regularly scheduled workday at 2M’s office. If we were to accept the 
Commission’s finding, it could be interpreted as transforming all driving activities into work-
related activities simply because the employer provides the employee with a vehicle. The 
Commission’s conclusion does not correlate with the fact that Atkinson’s accident occurred 
while he was on his way to a regularly scheduled day of work at 2M’s office.  
Ultimately, while the Commission acted reasonably in trying to deduce what “additional 
evidence” would be sufficient under Barker I to justify expanding the course of employment to 
include Atkinson’s going to and from work, we decline to adopt such a broad approach, 
particularly when Findings 25 and 26 stem from supposition rather than the facts surrounding 
Atkinson’s accident. That said, we agree with the Commission’s ultimate conclusion that 
Atkinson has a right to medical benefits. We find that the approach under Hansen is more 
straightforward and applicable to the facts here.  
                                                 
1 “The special errand exception is premised on the idea that an employee leaving his normal place of work to 
perform a special job for an employer is, nevertheless, still performing part of his normal job.” Kelly, 159 Idaho at 
328, 360 P.3d at 337 (quoting Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 898, 155 P.3d 695, 699 (2007)).  The special errand 
exception has been held to apply when the employee demonstrates that, while not at his regular place of 
employment, he is performing some special service or errand incidental to the nature of his employment or under the 
direction of his employer. Id. 
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In Hansen, the decedent was driving a company truck to work with two other employees, 
Hansen and Lehman, when the decedent fell asleep at the wheel. Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 
119 Idaho 357, 357–58, 806 P.2d 450, 450–51 (Ct. App. 1990). The truck ran off the road, 
killing the decedent and injuring the other two employees. Id. The accident occurred in 
Washington; thus, the employees received Washington worker’s compensation benefits, based 
on the determination that their injuries arose out of the course of their employment. Id. The 
employees then sued their employer in Idaho, alleging the decedent’s negligence caused their 
injuries. Id. The Idaho district court dismissed the claim after finding their injuries arose out of 
the course of their employment. Id. Relying on Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 4, 235 
P.2d 736, 737 (1951), the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, recognizing 
it is undisputed that Hansen and Lehman were passengers in a vehicle furnished 
by their employer, as they traveled to work in Spokane. It is also undisputed that 
the vehicle was kept and maintained for use in the roofing business. Hansen and 
Lehman have asserted that they were not paid for commuting and that they did not 
always ride in the Harvey vehicle. However, these assertions, even if true, do not 
alter what we deem to be the sole material fact—that they were riding in 
employer-provided transportation when the accident occurred. At that time, the 
employer had extended the risks of employment to include transportation, and the 
course of employment had been extended commensurately. 
Hansen, 119 Idaho at 359, 806 P.2d at 452 (emphasis added). This Court granted a petition for 
review. After affirming based on collateral estoppel, this Court stated:  
We also affirm the district court’s dismissal for the additional reason set 
out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion which adopted the exception to the going and 
coming rule, described in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 
(1951), where this Court stated that “where going [to work] or returning [from 
work] in some transportation facility furnished by the employer,” an employee is 
deemed to be within the course of employment. 72 Idaho at 4, 235 P.2d 736 
(emphasis added). This rule has also been described in Larson’s treatise on 
worker’s compensation law as follows: 
If the trip to and from work is made in a truck, bus, van, car, or 
other vehicle under the control of the employer, an injury during 
that trip is incurred in the course of employment.... The reason for 
the rule in this section depends upon the extension of risks under 
the employer’s control. 
Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 119 Idaho 333, 338, 806 P.2d 426, 431 (1991) (quoting 1 Larson, 
Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 17.11, reprinted in 2 Larson’s Worker’s Compensation Law, 
§ 15.01). The Court went on to say under this approach: 
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[A]ny time an employee is injured while going to or coming from work in 
transportation provided by his employer, he is considered to be within the course 
of employment. The rationale underlying this rule is that “the risks of the 
employment continue throughout the journey” and since the employer is in 
control of those risks by providing the transportation, the employee is considered 
to be within the course of his employment. 1 Larson at § 17.00, reprinted in 2 
Larson’s Worker’s Compensation Law, § 15.00. As Larson points out, “the 
distinction between transportation provided by contract and transportation 
provided without agreement or as a courtesy is being increasingly questioned, 
since the fundamental reason for extension of liability—the extension of the 
actual employer-controlled risks of employment—is not affected by the question 
whether the transportation was furnished because of obligation or out of 
courtesy.” 1 Larson at § 17.30, reprinted in 2 Larson’s Worker’s Compensation 
Law, § 15.03. Furthermore, application of this rule avoids repeated litigation as to 
whether transportation provided by an employer to an employee was in fact a 
customary or contractual incident to employment. The Larson rule also promotes 
a basic policy underlying the concept of worker’s compensation that the worker’s 
compensation act is to be construed liberally in favor of worker’s compensation 
coverage of claimants. See Miller v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 105 Idaho 725, 672 
P.2d 1055 (1983); Jones v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 98 Idaho 458, 567 P.2d 3 
(1977); Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
These principles are directly applicable to the case before us. Here, the Commission 
distinguished Hansen, finding that the employer must furnish both the vehicle used and an agent 
to operate such a vehicle for this exception to apply: 
The rationale for extending the course of employment to travel to and from the 
work site in Hansen is that by providing a transportation facility to the injured 
worker, employer extended the risks under the employer’s control. This rationale 
necessarily depends on the fact that employer provided not only the vehicle used 
to accomplish the journey, but also an agent of the employer to operate the same.   
The Commission erred by limiting Hansen’s application in this way. There is nothing in 
the Hansen holding that restricts it to employee-passengers. Limiting Hansen as the Commission 
did would create inequities by providing workers compensation coverage for passengers, but not 
providing such coverage for drivers, even though all employees are exposed to the same risks 
while traveling to work. Whether a driver or a passenger, such risks are employer-associated 
risks of employment that must be borne by the employer. See Hansen, 119 Idaho at 338, 806 
P.2d at 431.  
We see the more appropriate focus to be whether the vehicle was incidental to Atkinson’s 
duties of employment, or whether it was mandatory as part of his job. 2M not only authorized, 
10 
 
but required Atkinson to drive the company pickup truck to and from 2M’s office to ensure he 
could provide “Legendary Service” to 2M’s customers. Applying the principles set forth in 
Hansen, and construing them liberally “in order to ensure certain recovery for injured workers, 
regardless of fault,” Kelly, 159 Idaho at 328, 360 P.3d at 337, 2M extended the risks of 
Atkinson’s employment to include transportation, and the course of employment was extended to 
match.  
We therefore affirm the Commission’s holding that Atkinson’s March 11, 2017, accident 
occurred within the course of employment by applying Hansen rather than Barker I. In doing so, 
we recognize that we have moved to a bright-line rule in these going and coming cases. When an 
employee, while going or coming from work, is injured while operating or riding in an 
employer-provided vehicle, such an accident arises in the course of employment. This rule 
provides ease of application and it adheres to the “basic policy underlying the concept of 
worker’s compensation that the worker’s compensation act is to be construed liberally in favor of 
worker’s compensation coverage of claimants.” Hansen, 119 Idaho at 338, 806 P.2d at 431.   
B. 
The Commission did not err by failing to make a specific finding of fact about 
whether Atkinson’s accident arose out of his employment.  
The proceedings before the Commission were solely related to whether Atkinson’s 
accident arose “in the course of” his employment with 2M. For the first time on appeal 2M now 
argues that (1) the Commission committed reversible error by failing to make a specific factual 
finding about whether Atkinson’s accident arose out of his employment; and (2) that Atkinson’s 
accident did not arise out of his employment because the risk that caused his accident was one 
common to the traveling public.  
An injury is only compensable under worker’s compensation law if it is caused by an 
accident 1) arising out of and 2) in the course of any employment. I.C. § 72-102(18)(a). This 
Court has held that “[t]he words ‘out of’ . . . refer to the origin and cause of the accident and the 
words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and the circumstances under which the accident 
occurred.” Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788, 792 (2002) (quoting 
Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999)). An injury is 
considered to “arise out of the employment when a causal connection is found to exist between 
the circumstances under which the work must be performed and the injury of which the claimant 
complains.” Dinius, 133 Idaho at 575, 990 P.2d at 741. “This prong of the compensability test 
11 
 
examines the origin and cause of the accident.” Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 254, 
16 P.3d 926, 930 (2000). 
The Commission concluded as a matter of law that Atkinson’s March 11, 2017, accident 
arose out of and in the course of his employment with 2M; however, the Commission never 
made a specific factual finding about whether Atkinson’s accident “arose out of” his 
employment with 2M. We hold that the Commission’s failure to make a specific factual finding 
that Atkinson’s accident arose out of his employment does not hamper its ultimate conclusion.  
“The Industrial Commission does not need to ‘make detailed findings on every fragment of 
evidence presented to it.’ . . . [but only] findings sufficient to enable meaningful appellate 
review.” Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 190, 207 P.3d 162, 166 (2009) (quoting 
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 338, 870 P.2d 1292, 1297 (1994)). Thus, “[i]t is 
not required to make a specific finding with regard to every fact; rather, a finding is only 
necessary for those facts which support the award.” Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 
515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).  
The Commission made several findings that pertain to the connection between 
Atkinson’s employment and the accident that caused his injuries. Findings 6–9 describe that 
Atkinson had to staff 2M’s Meridian office once every five Saturdays from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 
p.m.; that Atkinson was working on March 11, 2017; and that Atkinson was traveling to 2M’s 
office at the time of the accident that caused his injuries. We hold that this is sufficient evidence 
the Commission appropriately relied on to conclude that Atkinson’s March 11, 2017, accident 
arose out of his employment with 2M. See id. 
2M also contends that Atkinson’s accident did not arise out of his employment because 
“the risk that caused his accident was one common to the traveling public . . . .” However, this 
Court has specifically overruled the need to prove that a claimant’s employment exposed him to 
a greater risk of injury. See Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 908, 318 P.3d 
893, 898 (2014). Further, 2M’s argument analyzes the “arose out of employment” requirement in 
the context of this Court’s application of the peculiar risk exception to the going and coming 
rule.2 The Commission did not address the peculiar risk exception, and there is no requirement 
                                                 
2 The peculiar risk doctrine extends the course of employment where travel to and from work involves a “special 
exposure to a hazard or risk peculiarly associated with the employment” which is the cause of the injury. Trapp v. 
12 
 
that some heightened risk be linked to an employee’s work for the injury to arise out of his 
employment. Instead, for Atkinson’s injury to arise out of his employment with 2M, there must 
be a causal connection between him going to work, and being hit by another vehicle while on his 
way to work. We find that such a connection exists here and the Commission correctly 
concluded that Atkinson’s accident arose out of and in the course of his employment with 2M.  
C. 
We decline to award Atkinson attorney fees on appeal. 
Atkinson requests attorney fees under Idaho Code section 72-804, arguing that 2M has 
merely asked this Court to reweigh the evidence considered by the Commission. Idaho Code 
section 72-804 allows a party to recover attorney fees if “the employer or his surety contested a 
claim for compensation made by an injured employee . . . without reasonable ground . . . .” I.C. § 
72-804. Although Atkinson is the prevailing party, 2M has provided a reasonable argument on 
appeal. While we have affirmed the Commission’s ultimate decision, we have agreed with 2M’s 
arguments on the speculative nature of the Commission’s reasoning in its application of Barker I. 
Accordingly, we decline to award Atkinson attorney fees on appeal.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Commission’s determination that Atkinson’s March 11, 2017, accident 
arose out of and in the course of his employment with 2M applying Hansen rather than Barker I. 
Costs on appeal to Atkinson.  
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices BRODY, STEGNER and HORTON, CONCUIR. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sagle Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 122 Idaho 655, 658, 837 P.2d 781, 784 (1992) (citing Clark v. Daniel Morine Const. 
Co., 98 Idaho 114, 559 P.2d 293 (1977)).