Title: State v. Herrmann

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP197-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jesse L. Herrmann, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 304, 844 N.W. 2d 665) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Ramona Gonzalez 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., ROGGENSACK, C.J., concur. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
ZIEGLER,J., ROGGENSACK, C.J., GABLEMAN, J., 
concur. (Opinion Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Pamela Moorshead, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Pamela Moorshead. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Robert G. Probst, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2013AP197-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF349) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jesse L. Herrmann, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Petitioner, Jesse Herrmann, 
seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming his judgment of conviction and a circuit court order 
denying postconviction relief.1  The court of appeals determined 
that statements made by the circuit court judge at sentencing 
were insufficient to support a conclusion that she was biased. 
                                                 
1 State v. Herrmann, No. 2013AP197-CR, unpublished slip op.  
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2014) (affirming order of the circuit 
court for La Crosse County, Ramona A. Gonzalez, Judge). 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
On review, Herrmann asserts that the circuit court's 
statements at sentencing revealed that she lacked impartiality, 
in violation of his due process rights.  Specifically, he 
contends that the judge's references to her sister's death in a 
car accident similar to the one involved in Herrmann's case 
created the appearance of bias. 
¶3 
There is a presumption that a judge acted fairly, 
impartially, and without prejudice.  State v. Goodson, 2009 WI 
App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385.  A defendant may 
rebut the presumption by showing that the appearance of bias 
reveals a great risk of actual bias.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009); Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 
¶14; State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶23, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
720 N.W.2d 114; see also Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656 (2015).  Such a showing constitutes a due process 
violation.  Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶23.   
¶4 
We conclude that Herrmann has failed to rebut the 
presumption of impartiality.  When the sentencing court's 
statements are viewed in context, they do not reveal a great 
risk of actual bias.  Because we determine that no due process 
violation has been established, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
The facts in this case are undisputed.  In June 2011 
police were called to the scene of an automobile accident where 
a pickup truck had rear-ended a car stopped in the left-hand 
lane of a road, waiting to make a left turn.  The truck hit the 
car with such force that it pushed the car into oncoming 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
3 
 
traffic.  The grill of the truck ended up in the back seat of 
the car.  There were five passengers in the car, three in the 
back seat and two in the front.  One died at the scene, the 
other four sustained serious injuries.   
¶6 
The driver of the truck ran from the scene into the 
woods toward a nearby bar.  Bystanders pursued the driver and 
kept him there until police arrived.  After their arrival, 
officers identified the driver as Jesse Herrmann and smelled the 
strong odor of alcohol emanating from him.  Upon questioning, 
Herrmann indicated that he did not know where he was or what was 
happening.  He further stated that he had consumed too much 
alcohol to be driving.  Officers also observed an unopened can 
of beer lying on the highway and another unopened can lying on 
the floor of Herrmann's truck.  A subsequent blood test showed 
that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.215. 
¶7 
Herrmann was arrested and charged with two counts of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing injury as a 
second and subsequent offense, along with several repeater 
offenses: homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, two counts 
of injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, hit and run resulting 
in death, hit and run resulting in injury, and first degree 
reckless endangerment.  As a result of a plea agreement, the 
State dropped the hit and run resulting in injury charge and the 
reckless endangerment charge and Herrmann pled guilty to the 
charges that remained.  The plea reduced Herrmann's maximum 
possible sentence from 181.5 years of imprisonment to 134 years 
of imprisonment. 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Prior to sentencing, the circuit court ordered a pre-
sentence 
investigation. 
 
The 
resulting 
report 
detailed 
Herrmann's prior record, including a prior offense of operating 
while intoxicated and possession of an open intoxicant in a 
vehicle.  He also had a conviction for disorderly conduct which 
resulted from his being intoxicated, multiple convictions for 
bail jumping, and a conviction for conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute methamphetamine.  He was one month into a 
five-year period of probation from his drug offense when the 
accident occurred.  The report notes that Herrmann told his 
parole agent that although he was participating in substance 
abuse programs, he thought "it was a waste of time and money."  
Ultimately, the report recommended that Herrmann be sentenced to 
a 40 year period of confinement followed by 20 years of extended 
supervision.   
¶9 
Herrmann requested and obtained an alternative pre-
sentence investigation.  Focusing primarily on statements from 
Herrmann's family members, it recommended a sentence of 12-15 
years confinement followed by 20 years of extended supervision. 
¶10 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the judge 
disclosed that she lost her sister to a drunk driver in 1976.  
She told Herrmann "I don't believe that this will have any 
impact on my ability to set that aside and sentence you based 
upon the information presented on your case."  She then asked 
Herrmann if he had any question about that or problems with it.  
He indicated that he did not and the sentencing hearing 
proceeded. 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
5 
 
¶11 Several individuals spoke at the hearing.  The 
victims, their family members, a pastor, and witnesses who were 
at the scene testified about the long-lasting effects the 
accident has had upon them and the community.  Several asked for 
the court to impose the maximum sentence, citing the fact that 
Herrmann 
had 
not 
learned 
his 
lesson 
from 
his 
prior 
incarceration.  Members of Herrmann's family and his friends 
spoke as well, trying to convey that he was not "a monster" and 
that he needed treatment. 
¶12 Prior to issuing the sentence, the judge acknowledged 
that "there have been a lot of communications today, this 
morning and afternoon, about whether or not Mr. Herrmann is a 
monster."  She then indicated that she felt "compelled to answer 
that" in her statement. 
¶13 First, she made a statement about the problem of 
alcohol in our society, emphasizing that it is not limited to 
Mr. Herrmann: 
 
It is so easy to be in this community, and like [the] 
Pastor indicated, I, too, have been shocked by the 
seeming blasé faire attitude that this community has 
about alcohol use, because it is easy when these 
tragedies occur to paint the person who's behind the 
wheel while intoxicated to be a monster, and so we 
have a lot of grief and a lot of energy and a lot of 
community outrage, and that community outrage is aimed 
and directed at the person behind the wheel, and I 
believe that when we do that, we lose an opportunity, 
we lose an opportunity for raising the consciousness 
of the community because we are not just here because 
of Mr. Herrmann  . . . . 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
6 
 
 
¶14 The judge explained that although people complain 
about drunk driving, individuals do little to actively change 
behavior: 
People that get behind the wheel of a car while they 
have been drinking in my opinion any amount are 
putting themselves and this community at risk, and yet 
day after day, month after month our community just 
says, oh, well.  We complain and we talk about how we 
should challenge the students at the university not to 
continually drink to excess, how kids disappear, and 
how much harm alcohol is, but how many of us actively, 
actively seek to change the behaviors of those in our 
lives?  How many of us go out for that Friday fish fry 
and then not make any arrangements for who's going to 
drive the car home? 
¶15 Next, 
she 
recognized 
factors 
in 
Mr. 
Herrmann's 
background mitigating his culpability: 
Mr. Herrmann, if you look at his history [he] was the 
son of an alcoholic, alcoholism was in his family, the 
product of a broken home, involved in our juvenile 
justice system as a — as a juvenile, involved in our 
criminal justice system as an adult.  He is a failure 
of what we do with children, with adolescents, and 
with adults who suffer and who continue to self-
medicate, if we want to say as [his attorney] says, or 
just simply continue to use alcohol irresponsibly to 
the detriment of our society.  How many other young 
children are on the streets of our community who also 
like Mr. Herrmann come from situations where alcohol 
and the use of alcohol is a readily acceptable thing, 
that the overindulgence in alcohol is in many places 
cheered, where their 21st birthday is looked forward 
to not as a celebration of coming to adulthood but how 
many shots they can drink at the local taverns? 
¶16 The judge then discussed how drunk driving affected 
her own life as her sister had been killed by a drunk driver: 
In 1976 five young women got into a vehicle, and only 
one of them survived. The two gentlemen in the other 
vehicle were 17, drunk out of their minds, and they 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
7 
 
did not survive.  That was my personal story, and I 
will tell you that a day does not go by that I do not 
think of that personal tragedy, and I wish that I 
could tell these victims that that pain will one day 
disappear, but it doesn't.  Time makes it less. We 
redirect ourselves to other things, and a day does go 
by when we don't think of our loved ones and then we 
feel guilty at night because that happened, but life 
does go on, and I am very grateful today that I'm 
looking at four lovely young ladies and that only one 
family has to go through the pain that my family and 
the other three young ladies' families had to endure 
in 1976.  
¶17 She further explained that although she understood the 
pain the families and victims were suffering, she knew from 
experience that no matter what sentence she gave Mr. Herrmann, 
it would not alleviate that pain: 
And so perhaps it is again destiny or a higher power 
or, Pastor, probably the prayers of many others that 
bring me to be the judge on this particular case 
because I probably more than anyone else who would be 
able to sit on this bench in this county understand 
the pain that these victims are feeling, but I have 
had the benefit of all those years since 1976 to 
understand that I have to make Mr. Herrmann pay, but 
that nothing I do to him will lessen that pain, and 
that if I don't do more than just incarcerate Mr. 
Herrmann, if I don't speak out on behalf of my 
community today, then this tragedy will continue to 
happen on our streets, and more families will suffer  
the way these families suffer today. 
¶18 She again emphasized that the accident should not be 
viewed as Mr. Herrmann simply being a monster, rather it is 
indicative of a greater problem that our society has with 
drinking and driving: 
So, Mr. Herrmann, you're going to prison today, but 
that's just part of the story.  I want to make sure 
that the story is not about what a monster Jesse 
Herrmann was and is so that we can then wrap up this 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
8 
 
little episode in a nice neat little box and all go 
about our business as usual, that Mr. Herrmann the 
monster is off the streets, and we don't have to worry 
about this again, because no matter what I do to Mr. 
Herrmann, unless this community begins to take a 
different attitude about drinking and driving, and I'm 
talking about a different attitude, not paying lip 
service, but actually doing, we will see this tragedy 
happen again and again. 
¶19 The judge next reviewed Herrmann's character and his 
poor choices leading up to the accident.  In particular, she 
discussed 
Herrmann's 
recent 
release 
from 
federal 
prison, 
reliance on alcohol, resistance to treatment, and Herrmann's 
reported attitude with authority.  Additionally, the judge 
looked at the gravity of the offense and gave consideration to 
the number of witnesses who testified to the effects that 
Herrmann's crime had and continue to have on them.  As 
mitigating factors, the judge considered Herrmann's guilty plea, 
age, and the fact that he has a family. 
¶20 Weighing 
all 
these 
factors, 
the 
court 
imposed 
consecutive sentences on the various counts totaling 31 years 
initial 
confinement 
followed 
by 
40 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision.  In addition, the court imposed and stayed a 
consecutive sentence of 20 years of confinement for the charge 
of hit and run resulting in death, and ordered 15 years of 
probation. 
¶21 Herrmann 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
seeking 
resentencing by a different judge.  He asserted that the circuit 
court 
described 
a 
personal 
experience 
that 
reflected 
an 
objective bias in sentencing and that the court's emotional 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
9 
 
involvement in the crime amounted to an improper factor on which 
the sentence was based.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
explaining that Herrmann took her remarks out of context. 
¶22 On appeal, Herrmann again argued that the circuit 
court's statements at sentencing supported a conclusion that the 
judge was biased.  The court of appeals disagreed.  State v. 
Herrmann, No. 2013AP197-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 13, 2014).  The court observed that it is not uncommon for 
circuit court judges to have been personally victimized by the 
types of crimes that are before them.  Id., ¶9.  In this case, 
the judge's statements merely reflected that she understood the 
crime's effect on the victims.  Id., ¶10.  Viewing the 
sentencing as a whole, the court of appeals determined that a 
reasonable person would not conclude that the judge was biased.  
Id.   
II 
 
¶23 We are asked to determine whether the circuit court 
judge's 
statements 
at 
sentencing 
establish 
that 
she 
was 
objectively biased in violation of Herrmann's due process 
rights.  "Whether a judge was objectively not impartial is a 
question of law that we review independently."  State v. Pirtle, 
2011 WI App 89, ¶34, 334 Wis. 2d 211, 799 N.W.2d 492; see also 
Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶7 ("Whether a circuit court's 
partiality can be questioned is a matter of law that we review 
independently.").  
  
¶24 There is a presumption that a judge has acted fairly, 
impartially, and without prejudice.  Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
10 
 
¶8; State v. McBride, 187 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 523 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  The presumption is rebuttable, placing the burden 
on the party asserting the bias to show that bias by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 
189, ¶20; McBride, 187 Wis. 2d at 415.   
III 
¶25 "It is axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'"  Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 876  (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955)); see also Guthrie v. WERC, 111 Wis. 2d 447, 454, 331 
N.W.2d 331 (1983) ("It is, of course, undisputable that a 
minimal rudiment of due process is a fair and impartial 
decisionmaker."). 
 
Thus, 
a 
biased 
decisionmaker 
is 
"constitutionally unacceptable."  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35, 47 (1975).  As the court of appeals has acknowledged, "[t]he 
right to an impartial judge is fundamental to our notion of due 
process."  Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶8. 
¶26 In determining whether a defendant's due process right 
to trial by an impartial and unbiased judge has been violated, 
Wisconsin courts have taken both subjective and objective 
approaches; "[t]he court applie[s] a subjective test based on 
the judge's own determination of his or her impartiality and an 
objective test based on whether impartiality can reasonably be 
questioned."  State v. Rochelt, 165 Wis. 2d 373, 378, 477 N.W.2d 
659 (Ct. App. 1991).  It is the application of the objective 
test which is at issue in this case.  
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
11 
 
¶27 Under 
the 
objective 
approach, 
courts 
have 
traditionally considered whether "there are objective facts 
demonstrating . . . the trial judge in fact treated [the 
defendant] unfairly."  Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶9 (quoting 
McBride, 187 Wis. 2d at 416).  In other words, they inquire into 
whether a reasonable person could conclude that the trial judge 
failed to give the defendant a fair trial. 
¶28 This approach is illustrated by State v. Rochelt, 165 
Wis. 2d 373.  In that case, the defense discovered a letter from 
the circuit court judge in the prosecutor's file which had been 
sent to instructors at Police Training Services, requesting that 
certain officers be released from classes to testify at trial.  
Id. at 377-78.  The letter described the officers as "'two 
individuals, with clean, impeccable records, and with nothing to 
gain 
or 
lose 
by 
their 
testimony,' 
suggesting 
possible 
prejudgment of their credibility."  Id. at 379.   
¶29 The circuit court denied the defendant's recusal 
motion and the court of appeals affirmed.  It agreed that the 
judge's 
letter 
raised 
questions 
about 
his 
impartiality.  
However, in assessing whether there was actual bias, the court 
determined that nothing in the record tended to show that the 
judge had failed to give the defendant a fair trial.  Id. at 
381.  It referenced the fact that the defendant had given no 
examples of unfairness.  Id.  Accordingly, it "conclude[d] that 
even though the trial judge's letter raise[d] a reasonable 
question regarding the judge's impartiality, the fact is that 
[the defendant] received a fair trial."  Id. 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
12 
 
¶30 Courts have since recognized that the right to an 
impartial decisionmaker stretches beyond the absence of actual 
bias to encompass the appearance of bias as well.  In Gudgeon, 
295 Wis. 2d 189, the court of appeals considered the situation 
where a judge had declined a probation agent's request to 
convert the defendant's restitution obligations into a civil 
judgment in a short note stating "No—I want his probation 
extended."  Id., ¶3.  At a subsequent extension hearing, the 
judge extended the defendant's probation.  The defendant alleged 
that the note showed the judge was biased in favor of a 
particular result before listening to the evidence.  Id., ¶1.  
 ¶31  In setting forth the test for objective bias, the 
Gudgeon court acknowledged that it was difficult to discern from 
prior cases whether actual bias was necessary to show a due 
process violation, or merely one method that was sufficient to 
make the showing.  Id., ¶22.  It observed that federal precedent 
suggested that even the appearance of partiality can violate due 
process:  
 
"[E]very 
procedure 
which 
would 
offer 
a 
possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to 
hold the balance nice, clear and true between the 
State and the accused, denies the latter due process 
of law." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).  
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by 
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their 
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties.  But to perform its high 
function in the best way "justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice."  Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
13 
 
Id., ¶21 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).  The 
Gudgeon court recognized that the seemingly divergent cases 
shared a common theme: the appearance of partiality violated due 
process "only where the apparent bias revealed a great risk of 
actual bias."  Id., ¶23. 
¶32 Ultimately, 
the 
Gudgeon 
court 
found 
the 
federal 
jurisprudence persuasive.  Incorporating Murchinson's language, 
it concluded that "the appearance of bias offends constitutional 
due process principles whenever a reasonable person——taking into 
consideration human psychological tendencies and weaknesses——
concludes that the average judge could not be trusted to 'hold 
the balance nice, clear and true' under all the circumstances."  
Id., ¶24.   
¶33  The court of appeals later repeated this test in 
Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶9.  In that case, a judge told a 
defendant during sentencing that if he violated the rules of 
extended supervision "you will come back here, and you will be 
given the maximum, period."  Id., ¶2.  Later, at a reconfinement 
hearing after the defendant's supervision was revoked, the judge 
ordered the defendant reconfined for the maximum period.  Id., 
¶5.  Applying its test for objective bias, the court of appeals 
determined the defendant's due process rights were violated 
because a reasonable person would conclude "that the judge had 
made up his mind about [the defendant's] sentence before the 
reconfinement hearing."  Id., ¶13. 
¶34  Similarly, in Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, the United 
States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that actual bias 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
14 
 
need not be shown to establish a violation of a party's right to 
a fair tribunal.  In that case, the Court considered whether the 
petitioner's due process rights were violated when one of the 
West Virginia Supreme Court justices refused to recuse himself 
after receiving large campaign contributions from the respondent 
corporation's chief executive officer.   
¶35  After observing the difficulties in discerning the 
real motives at work in deciding a case, the Court announced 
that "the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective 
standards that do not require proof of actual bias."  Id. at 
883.  "Due process 'may sometimes bar trial by judges who have 
no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the 
scales of justice equally between contending parties.'"  Id. at 
886 (quoting Murchinson, 349 U.S. at 136).  Like the court of 
appeals in Gudgeon, the Court focused on whether there was a 
serious risk of actual bias.2   
¶36 Its inquiry into whether there was a serious risk of 
actual bias centered on the circumstances of the case, which the 
Court referred to as exceptional.  Id. at 884.  The Court 
acknowledged the large size of the contributions in comparison 
to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals refers to a "great" risk of actual 
bias, State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶23, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
720 N.W.2d 114, and the United States Supreme Court refers to a 
"serious" risk of actual bias, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).  Although stated differently, the 
tests appear to be essentially the same.  
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
15 
 
total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such 
contributions had on the outcome of the election.  It further 
observed the close temporal relationship between the campaign 
contributions, the justice's election, and the pendency of the 
case.  Id. at 886.  Under these circumstances, the Court 
concluded that "there is a serious risk of actual bias——based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions——when a person with a 
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate 
influence 
in 
placing 
the 
judge 
on 
the 
case . . . ."  Id. at 884.   
¶37 Admittedly, the Supreme Court was careful to limit its 
analysis.  Although it ultimately concluded that the appearance 
of bias that it was reviewing violated due process, the Court 
described 
this 
as 
"an 
extraordinary 
situation 
where 
the 
Constitution requires recusal."  Id. at 887.  Like the Gudgeon 
court, it observed that its prior cases requiring recusal "dealt 
with extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probability 
of bias."  Id. 
¶38 However, in determining that there was a serious risk 
of actual bias the Court provided a test that can apply to a 
multitude of scenarios: "Due process requires an objective 
inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on the election 
under all the circumstances 'would offer a possible temptation 
to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true."  Id. at 885.  It embraced that 
framework 
in 
its 
conclusion: 
"We 
find 
that 
Blakenship's 
significant and disproportionate influence——coupled with the 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
16 
 
temporal relationship between the election and the pending case—
—'offer a possible temptation to the average judge to . . . lead 
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.'"  Id. at 886.   
¶39 More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there 
is a "'vital state interest' in safeguarding 'public confidence 
in the fairness and integrity in the nation's elected judges.'"  
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. 
at 889).  It acknowledged that "[t]he concept of public 
confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to 
precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by 
documentary record."  Id. at 1667.  Nevertheless, "justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice."  Id. at 1666 (quoting 
Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14).  There is a compelling interest in 
avoiding "possible temptation[s] . . . 'which might lead [a 
judge] not to hold the balance, nice, clear and true.'"  Id. 
(quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532). 
¶40  We acknowledge the concerns raised by Caperton and 
Williams-Yulee.  A fundamental principle of our democracy is 
that judges must be perceived as beyond price.  Likewise, we 
recognize that the precedent established by the United States 
Supreme Court and our court of appeals provides that in limited 
situations the appearance of bias can offend due process.  
Specifically, the appearance of bias violates due process when 
there is "a great risk of actual bias."  Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 
189, ¶23; see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884 (considering 
whether there is "a serious risk of actual bias").   
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
17 
 
¶41 Lest there be any confusion engendered by the separate 
writings below, Caperton addressed recusal in the context of the 
appearance of bias.  Relying on a case that originated in 
Wisconsin, Caperton specifically announced that it was not 
addressing whether there was actual bias.: 
We 
do 
not 
question 
his 
subjective 
findings 
of 
impartiality and propriety.  Nor do we determine 
whether there was actual bias . . .  
[T]he Due Process Clause has been implemented by 
objective standards that do not require proof of 
actual bias.  In defining these standards the Court 
has asked whether, "under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness," the 
interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the 
guarantee 
of 
due 
process 
is 
to 
be 
adequately 
implemented." 
Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 47).  It 
explained that due process may require recusal even when actual 
bias is not present: 
 
Due process "may sometimes bar trial by judges who 
have no actual bias and who would do their very best 
to weigh the scales of justice equally between 
contending parties."  
Id. at 886 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).  
¶42 As evidenced by the separate writings, this court has 
a difficult relationship with the issue of recusal and its 
controlling precedent in the context of the appearance of bias.3   
                                                 
3 This difficult relationship with the issue of judicial 
recusal appears not only in our opinions but also in our 
administrative function of rule making.    
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 2009 a majority of this court adopted verbatim the 
petition of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and the Wisconsin 
Relators that amended Wisconsin's rules of judicial conduct with 
regard to judicial recusal as it relates to judicial campaigns.  
In the matter of amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct's 
rules on recusal; in the matter of amendment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19. S. Ct. Order 08-16, 08-25, 09-10 & 09-11, 2010 WI 73 
(issued July 7, 2010, eff. July 7, 2010) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting, joined by Abrahamson, C.J., and Crooks, J.).  In 
response, the Brennan Center for Justice, a non-partisan public 
policy and law institute at the New York University School of 
Law, observed that the majority's newly amended recusal rule 
"violated the spirit——if not the very letter" of Caperton.  
Jonathan Blitzer, Vanishing Recusal Prospects in Wisconsin, 
Brennan Center for Justice (Jan. 26, 2010).  It expressed 
additional concern that the recusal rules were "a serious blow 
to the integrity of the Court."  Id. 
A similar concern that the majority's newly amended recusal 
rules 
subverted 
the 
integrity 
of 
the 
court 
was 
widely 
disseminated in editorials across the state: 
• Milwaukee Journal Sentinel: "A breach in reality.  In 
a 4-3 vote, justices thumb their noses at the 
perception 
of 
connections 
between 
large 
campaign 
contributions and the court's integrity, objectivity 
and credibility." (Oct. 29, 2009) 
• Appleton 
Post-Crescent: 
"Supreme 
Court 
rule 
robs 
public trust." (Nov. 1, 2009) 
• Green Bay Press Gazette: "Big Money always finds a 
loophole." (Nov. 5, 2009) 
• Eau Claire Leader Telegram: "High Court in session; 
bring your wallet." (Nov. 1, 2009) 
• Racine Journal Times: "Supreme Court recusal rule is 
disgrace to state." (Nov. 2, 2009) 
• Sheboygan Press: "Is justice for sale in Wisconsin?" 
(Nov. 2, 2009) 
• Oshkosh Northwestern: "Supreme Court fails to clean 
blemished image." (Oct. 30, 2009). 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
19 
 
 
¶43 The concurrence of Justice Ziegler discusses Caperton 
at length, so severely cabining its reach that it appears to 
apply only during a "perfect storm" in West Virginia.  Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶138.  Taking a different approach, the 
concurrence 
of 
Justice 
Prosser 
acknowledges 
that 
it 
is 
uncomfortable with controlling precedent stating "[c]learly, 
this writer is uncomfortable with the decisions in Gudgeon and 
Goodson."  Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶102.  It takes to 
task both District Two and District Three of the court of 
appeals by asserting several inadequacies in the Gudgeon and 
Goodson opinions, including that they are not forthright in 
disclosing all the facts of the cases.  Id. 
¶44 This court has previously and extensively analyzed and 
re-analyzed the issue of judicial recusal in the context of the 
appearance of bias.  See, for example, State v. Allen, 2010 WI 
10, 322 Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863, where our writings covered 
128 pages of the Wisconsin Reports.  See also Ozanne v. 
Fitzgerald, 2012 WI 82, 342 Wis. 2d 396, 822 N.W.2d 67; State v. 
Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In sidestepping the directive of Caperton, some on the 
court announced a heretofore unknown premise——never previously 
enunciated and not since embraced in the annals of this 
country's jurisprudence on judicial recusal.  They advanced that 
the public's right to vote (which the justices found in the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution) justified 
their lack of adherence to Caperton and its due process 
considerations.  In the matter of amendment of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct's rules on recusal; in the matter of amendment 
of Wis. Stat. § 757.19, S. Ct. Order 08-16, 08-25, 09-10 & 09-
11, 2010 WI 73 (Roggensack, J., separate writing). 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
20 
 
¶45 The separate writings today appear to continue that 
discussion, but add little additional insight or argument.  
Rather than re-engage in the debate at length here and skew the 
focus of this opinion, the reader is instead referred to our 
prior lengthy discussion of the issue in the cases cited above. 
¶46 In sum, when determining whether a defendant's right 
to an objectively impartial decisionmaker has been violated we 
consider the appearance of bias in addition to actual bias.  
When the appearance of bias reveals a great risk of actual bias, 
the presumption of impartiality is rebutted, and a due process 
violation occurs.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 885; Goodson, 320 Wis. 
2d 166, ¶9; Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶¶21, 24.  
¶47 We turn next to apply this test to the facts of this 
case. 
IV 
¶48 Herrmann contends that the circuit court judge's 
statements about her sister could cause a reasonable person to 
question her impartiality.  Specifically, he points to the 
judge's statement about her sister's car accident during the 
sentencing hearing: 
 
In 1976 five young women got into a vehicle, and only 
one of them survived.  The two gentlemen in the other 
vehicle were 17, drunk out of their minds, and they 
did not survive.  That was my personal story, and I 
will tell you that a day does not go by that I do not 
think of that personal tragedy, and I wish that I 
could tell these victims that that pain will one day 
disappear, but it doesn't.  Time makes it less. We 
redirect ourselves to other things, and a day does go 
by when we don't think of our loved ones and then we 
feel guilty at night because that happened, but life 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
21 
 
does go on, and I am very grateful today that I'm 
looking at four lovely young ladies and that only one 
family has to go through the pain that my family and 
the other three young ladies' families had to endure 
in 1976.  
¶49 He 
also 
points 
to 
the 
judge's 
statement 
about 
understanding the pain the families and the victims were 
suffering: 
 
And so perhaps it is again destiny or a higher power 
or, Pastor, probably the prayers of many others that 
bring me to be the judge on this particular case 
because I probably more than anyone else who would be 
able to sit on this bench in this county understand 
the pain that these victims are feeling, but I have 
had the benefit of all those years since 1976 to 
understand that I have to make Mr. Herrmann pay, but 
that nothing I do to him will lessen that pain, and 
that if I don't do more than just incarcerate Mr. 
Herrmann, if I don't speak out on behalf of my 
community today, then this tragedy will continue to 
happen on our streets, and more families will suffer  
the way these families suffer today. 
Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we conclude 
that, when viewed in context, a reasonable person would not 
question the court's partiality based on these statements. 
¶50 In this case there was a lengthy sentencing hearing.  
Twenty individuals testified before the judge issued the 
sentence, including each of the four surviving victims.  The 
first victim to testify spoke about the loss of her friend in 
the accident and the trouble she was having coping with that 
loss, in addition to her own injuries.  The next victim 
testified about how Herrmann chose to drink and how selfish it 
was for him to run away after the crash.  She requested that the 
court hold him accountable.  These sentiments were repeated by 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
22 
 
the third victim, who likewise criticized Herrmann for running 
away.  The last victim to testify focused on how long it was 
taking for them to recover, and how much their friend will be 
missed.  
¶51 The victims' testimony was followed by testimony from 
their families.  Several individuals spoke about how beloved the 
deceased victim had been and how devastating the injuries were 
to the surviving victims.  They requested that the court not 
allow Herrmann the opportunity to ever drive drunk again or to 
make similar poor decisions in the future.  They stressed that 
he had chosen to drink and chosen to drive.  They requested that 
justice be done and stated that in this case, there was no 
reason to impose anything but the maximum sentence. 
¶52 A pastor from the community also spoke.  He asked the 
court "to make a clear statement that we will not tolerate the 
abuse of alcohol, that we will not look with leniency upon the 
devastating consequences of the willful abuse of alcohol."  He 
likewise stressed that Herrmann's actions were willful and had a 
devastating impact on the community.  He requested that the 
court impose the maximum penalty. 
¶53 The pastor's testimony was followed by the statement 
of an individual who was present at the scene.  He saw 
Herrmann's truck smash into the car and stopped to help.  He 
spoke about the gruesome nature of the scene and that Herrmann 
just ran away.  Another witness's statement was read into the 
record.  The crash occurred near his house and he ran out to 
help.  He indicated that while he was trying to help the victims 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
23 
 
and waiting for emergency responders to arrive, Herrmann 
appeared not to care how the victims were doing. 
¶54   There were also witnesses who spoke on behalf of 
Herrmann.  His mother expressed her sympathy for the victims and 
stated that this was an accident, not something Herrmann had 
planned.  Although he was being portrayed as a monster, she 
explained that Herrmann was a caring son, grandson, father, 
brother, uncle, and friend.  No amount of prison time was going 
to bring back the deceased or take away any of the victims' pain 
and suffering. 
¶55 Similarly, the mother of Herrmann's son testified that 
he was a good father.  She stressed that this was not an 
intentional act.  One of his friends spoke about how Herrmann 
had assisted her when she needed help.  His sister explained 
that he had been a good brother.  His father testified that 
Herrmann would never intentionally harm anyone and reiterated 
that he was not a monster.  Lastly, Herrmann's grandmother 
spoke.  She expressed her sympathies for the victims and stated 
that Herrmann had been a good grandson. 
¶56 It was after hearing all of these statements that the 
judge apparently felt compelled to answer the assertions about 
Herrmann being a monster.  She began by acknowledging that there 
is a problem of drinking and driving in our society, which is 
not limited to Herrmann.  Then, she recognized multiple factors 
in Herrmann's background mitigating his culpability, including 
the fact that there was alcoholism in his family, he came from a 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
24 
 
broken home, and had been involved in the juvenile justice 
system.   
¶57 She 
suggested 
that 
Herrmann's 
story 
illustrates 
society's failure to help children and to help adults who suffer 
with alcoholism.  She asked "How many other young children are 
on the streets of our community who also like Mr. Herrmann come 
from situations where alcohol and the use of alcohol is a 
readily acceptable thing[?]" 
¶58 It was at this point that the judge brought up her 
sister's accident, assuring the victims and their family members 
that she understood that such an accident is a painful tragedy.  
Her remarks, however, also conveyed that although she understood 
the pain the families and victims were suffering, no matter what 
sentence she gave Mr. Herrmann, it would not alleviate that 
pain: 
I have had the benefit of all those years since 1976 
to understand that I have to make Mr. Herrmann pay, 
but that nothing I do to him will lessen that pain, 
and that if I don't do more than just incarcerate Mr. 
Herrmann, if I don't speak out on behalf of my 
community today, then this tragedy will continue to 
happen on our streets, and more families will suffer 
the way these families suffer today. 
¶59 The judge then emphasized that the accident should not 
be viewed as Mr. Herrmann simply being a monster, rather it is 
indicative of a greater problem that our society has with 
drinking and driving: 
 
So, Mr. Herrmann, you're going to prison today, but 
that's just part of the story.  I want to make sure 
that the story is not about what a monster Jesse 
Herrmann was and is so that we can then wrap up this 
little episode in a nice neat little box and all go 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
25 
 
about our business as usual, that Mr. Herrmann the 
monster is off the streets, and we don't have to worry 
about this again, because no matter what I do to Mr. 
Herrmann, unless this community begins to take a 
different attitude about drinking and driving, and I'm 
talking about a different attitude, not paying lip 
service, but actually doing, we will see this tragedy 
happen again and again. 
¶60 In this context, it is apparent that although the 
judge's statements about her sister were personal, they were 
used in an attempt to illustrate the seriousness of the crime 
and the need to deter drunk driving in our society.  They do not 
appear as an expression of bias against Herrmann.   
¶61 As the judge's statements addressed the seriousness of 
the crime and the need to deter drunk driving, they were 
consistent with the requirements placed on judges to discuss the 
objectives of the sentence.  This court explained in State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, that 
"[c]ircuit courts are required to specify the objectives of the 
sentence on the record.  These objectives include, but are not 
limited to, the protection of the community, punishment of the 
defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to 
others."  The court also identified several mitigating and 
aggravating factors for sentencing courts to consider.4  Id., ¶43 
n.11.    
                                                 
4 These include: 
 
(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
26 
 
¶62 Similar 
requirements 
have 
been 
incorporated 
into 
Wisconsin's statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.017(2) provides: 
When a court makes a sentencing decision concerning a 
person convicted of a criminal offense committed on or 
after February 1, 2003, the court shall consider all 
of the following: 
(ad) The protection of the public. 
(ag) The gravity of the offense. 
(ak) The rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(b) 
Any 
applicable 
mitigating 
factors 
and 
any 
applicable 
aggravating 
factors, 
including 
the 
aggravating factors specified in subs. (3) to (8). 
 Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2) (2009-10).5 
¶63 Here, 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge 
fulfilled 
her 
obligations under the statute and Gallion.  After her statements 
about her sister and the serious problem society has with 
drinking and driving, the judge reviewed elements of Herrmann's 
character.  She observed that he had a habit of running away 
when things got difficult.  She discussed Herrmann's poor 
                                                                                                                                                             
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention 
 
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197 (quoting Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 250 
N.W.2d 7 (1977)).  
 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
27 
 
choices leading up to the accident, including his choice to 
drink and his choice to drive.   
¶64 The judge considered that Herrmann had already been 
given opportunities to adjust his behavior.  He previously had 
been fined and had the benefit of alcohol and drug assessments 
and treatment in the community and in an institutional setting.  
Additionally, he previously had the benefit of supervision.  
Throughout it all, Herrmann resisted treatment.   
¶65 Stressing the gravity of the offense, the judge noted 
how many witnesses testified to the effects that Herrmann's 
crime had and continue to have on them.  Lastly, as mitigating 
factors, the judge considered Herrmann's guilty plea, his age, 
and the fact that he has a family.  It was after weighing all 
these factors that the court imposed Herrmann's sentence of 31 
years initial confinement followed by 40 years of extended 
supervision, a sentence less than the 40 years confinement 
recommended in the PSI.   
¶66 The circuit court's statements were made in compliance 
with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2) and Gallion.  
When viewed in that context, they do not reveal a great risk of 
actual bias.  Accordingly, we determine that Herrmann has failed 
to rebut the presumption of impartiality.   
V 
 
¶67 In sum, there is a presumption that a judge acted 
fairly, impartially, and without prejudice.  Goodson, 320 Wis. 
2d 166, ¶8.  A defendant may rebut the presumption by showing 
that the appearance of bias reveals a great risk of actual bias. 
No. 
2013AP197-CR   
 
28 
 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 885; Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶¶9, 14; 
Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶24, see also Williams-Yulee, 135 
S. Ct. 1660.  Such a showing constitutes a due process 
violation.  Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶23.   
¶68 We conclude that Herrmann has failed to rebut the 
presumption of impartiality.  When the sentencing court's 
statements are viewed in context, they do not reveal a great 
risk of actual bias.  Because we determine that no due process 
violation has been established, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶69 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
bottom line of the lead opinion.  On the basis of the facts set 
out in the lead opinion, I have no difficulty in concluding that 
the sentencing judge in this case was not biased against the 
defendant and that a reasonable person, fully apprised of the 
facts in the record, would not reach a different determination. 
¶70 I do not join the lead opinion because it relies on 
three cases, State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
720 N.W.2d 114; State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, 320 
Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385; and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), that tend to confuse and undermine the 
administration of justice. 
¶71 These cases create "objective" tests of bias that are 
so loose and vague that they are almost impossible for courts to 
apply in a fair and consistent manner.  Consequently, these 
tests can be manipulated by parties, manipulated by non-parties, 
and manipulated by judges, to achieve some desired result.  This 
manipulation is not law; it is gamesmanship. 
¶72 Because the lead has pointed to Gudgeon, Goodson, and 
Caperton as prime examples of controlling authority, these cases 
require a closer look than they have received. 
I. STATE V. GUDGEON 
¶73 State v. Gudgeon was decided by the court of appeals 
in 2006.  The defendant was charged on July 24, 2000, with three 
offenses: (1) operating a motor vehicle without owner's consent, 
(2) fleeing or eluding an officer, and (3) resisting or 
obstructing an officer.  These charges "arose from an incident 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
2 
 
in which Gudgeon took off with another individual's motorcycle 
and attempted to flee from police."  Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 
¶2.  "After Gudgeon abandoned the motorcycle in a ditch, one of 
the officers in pursuit accidentally ran into it.  The bike was 
destroyed."  Id. 
¶74 When Gudgeon entered a plea to the first of the three 
offenses on August 24, 2000, as part of a plea bargain, he was 
given two years of probation, with six months of jail time 
subject to work release privileges.  The six months were then 
stayed.  This withheld sentence was designed to assist Gudgeon 
in paying $8,425 in restitution for the destroyed motorcycle.1  
Id. 
¶75 Unfortunately, Gudgeon did not take advantage of the 
court's leniency.  He violated the rules of probation, then 
stipulated to serving six months of jail time. 
¶76 On May 15, 2002, Gudgeon's probation agent notified 
the court that Gudgeon's probation was about to expire.  She 
advised that Gudgeon was unable to use his work release 
privileges because of pending charges in Kenosha County and 
McHenry County, Illinois.  She recommended that Gudgeon's unpaid 
restitution be converted to a civil judgment.  Id., ¶3.  She 
gave reasons for this recommendation, namely, that a civil 
judgment would earn interest for the victim, while extending 
Gudgeon's supervision would not; and Gudgeon's supervision might 
be difficult if Gudgeon were convicted in Illinois.  Id. 
                                                 
1 Some of the facts outlined in this concurrence are taken 
from Gudgeon's 2005 brief to the court of appeals. 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
3 
 
¶77 In reply, Judge Michael Gibbs——who replaced the judge 
who had sentenced Gudgeon because of judicial rotation——
handwrote at the bottom of the letter, "No——I want his probation 
extended," and he sent copies of the agent's letter "to the 
probation agent, the district attorney, and Gudgeon's last 
attorney of record."  Id. 
¶78 On May 30, 2002, Gudgeon's probation agent sent 
another letter to the court, acknowledging that the court wanted 
Gudgeon's probation extended but asserting that Gudgeon would 
not agree to a probation extension without first discussing the 
matter with a lawyer.  Gudgeon's refusal to permit his extension 
by waiver meant that an extension hearing was required. 
¶79 Gudgeon's refusal to waive the probation extension was 
noted at the August 21 extension hearing.  An assistant district 
attorney pointed out that Gudgeon had outstanding restitution 
and Gudgeon admitted that he had paid only a small portion out 
of the required $8,425, so that he still owed $7,834.53.  He 
also had other court costs to pay.  Gudgeon explained that he 
had not paid more because he had spent a lot of time in custody 
and had not been able to work.  Judge Gibbs extended Gudgeon's 
probation at the hearing, explaining, "The only way I can see 
where we can make sure you are going to pay is to keep the 
hammer over your head, give you an incentive to pay it. . . .  
Your probation is going to be extended for two years.  If you 
pay that off, you get off supervision.  The sooner you pay it 
off, the sooner you get off probation."  Gudgeon did not appeal 
the extension.   
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
4 
 
¶80 The following year Gudgeon's probation was revoked 
because of new violations, and he was sentenced to prison.  He 
did not appeal this sentence either. 
¶81 Gudgeon's next step was to file a postconviction 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  "He alleged [in the motion] 
that his due process rights had been violated during the 
extension proceedings because the presiding judge was not a 
neutral magistrate.  Gudgeon read the court's handwritten 
notation on the letter from his probation agent as prejudging 
the case with respect to whether to extend probation."  Id., ¶5. 
¶82 The court of appeals bought Gudgeon's argument.  It 
assumed a sufficient reason for a collateral attack under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 because of newly discovered evidence, even though 
the court had sent a copy of the letter with notation to 
Gudgeon's last attorney and Gudgeon had obviously discussed the 
judge's thinking with his probation agent.  The court of appeals 
then suggested that the circuit court had deprived Gudgeon of an 
impartial 
and 
unbiased 
tribunal 
and 
deemed 
this 
denial 
equivalent to deprivation of counsel——a "structural error" not 
subject to harmless error analysis.   
¶83 In sum, although the court of appeals was unwilling to 
conclude that Judge Gibbs was actually biased ("We cannot 
conclude that the court's notation on the letter persuasively 
establishes actual bias in and of itself given our experience 
and the reputation of this particular trial judge as a fair and 
just administrator of the law"), it nonetheless detected the 
"appearance of partiality."  Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶25.  The 
court said: 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
5 
 
[T]he appearance of bias offends constitutional due 
process principles whenever a reasonable person——
taking 
into 
consideration 
human 
psychological 
tendencies and weaknesses——concludes that the average 
judge could not be trusted to "hold the balance nice, 
clear and true" under all the circumstances. 
Id., ¶24. 
 
¶84 The court of appeals quoted various opinions to define 
the role of appellate judges.  Appellate judges "determine 
whether 'the potential for bias is sufficiently great' to sway 
the average person serving as judge away from neutrality" and 
"due process is violated . . . [when] the risk of bias is 
impermissibly high."  Id.  The court added: 
We must resolve this case based on what a 
reasonable person would conclude from reading the 
court's notation, not what a reasonable trial judge, a 
reasonable appellate judge, or even a reasonable legal 
practitioner would conclude. 
Id., ¶26. 
¶85 In my view, the Gudgeon case does not provide clear 
guidance to Wisconsin judges.  Appellate judges are supposed to 
determine, not as fact but as a matter of law, whether a 
reasonable person——taking into consideration human psychological 
tendencies and weaknesses——would "conclude" ("conclude" implies 
a legal determination) that the average judge (not the judge who 
is the subject of inquiry) could be trusted to make a fair 
decision, 
given 
certain 
facts. 
 
These 
appellate 
judges 
apparently may not consider such legal realities as the fact 
that judges in Walworth County frequently extended probation 
when a probationer failed to pay off or make good progress in 
paying off restitution, and the law that criminal court judges 
lose 
control 
of 
restitution 
when 
probation 
ends 
and 
a 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
6 
 
probationer's unpaid restitution is converted to a civil 
judgment.  See Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 
N.W.2d 807.  Reasonable trial judges, reasonable appellate 
judges, and reasonable legal practitioners would know that 
circuit judges, "for cause or by order," may extend probation 
for a stated period, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a), especially when 
"The probationer has not made a good faith effort to discharge 
court-ordered obligations or pay fees owed under s. 304.074."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(c)1. 
¶86 Apparently, a "reasonable person" who is not a judge 
or legal practitioner may not consider this information.  It is 
not at all clear what "the reasonable person" is supposed to 
consider beyond his or her psychological hunches. 
¶87 The Gudgeon court said, "Although we may be convinced 
that the circuit court was not prejudging the extension issue, 
that is not the test.  The risk of bias that the ordinary 
reasonable person would discern . . . is the test."  Id., ¶30.  
That "risk" "is simply too great to comport with constitutional 
due process."  Id. 
¶88 The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit 
court for a new probation extension hearing, saying "when a 
tribunal predetermines how it will rule, the error is structural 
and poisons the entire proceeding."  Id., ¶31.  This court 
denied the State's petition for review.  When the Gudgeon case 
was remanded, however, Gudgeon himself waived rights to a new 
hearing——likely knowing that he could not establish "newly 
discovered evidence" or escape from another extension of his 
probation. 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
7 
 
II. STATE V. GOODSON 
¶89 State v. Goodson was decided in 2009, three years 
after Gudgeon.  The court forthrightly acknowledged that "Our 
decision in Gudgeon guides our conclusion."  Goodson, 320 
Wis. 2d 166, ¶10. 
¶90 In Goodson, the defendant was convicted of five 
criminal offenses, including two felony counts of possession of 
a 
short-barreled 
firearm 
and 
fourth-degree 
sexual 
assault 
(reduced from second-degree sexual assault).2  He was given a 45-
month prison sentence by Outagamie County Circuit Judge Harold 
Froehlich.  Goodson's sentence was reversed by the court of 
appeals on grounds that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance at the sentencing hearing. 
¶91 The case was remanded and assigned to Circuit Judge 
Mark McGinnis.  At a new sentencing hearing on October 11, 2005, 
Judge McGinnis described Goodson's abuse of his ex-wife and 
daughter, noting that he had "physically, psychologically, 
emotionally, sexually, you raped her, verbally abused and just 
abused her for many years.  Do I think you are dangerous?  
Absolutely." 
¶92 Judge McGinnis added, "I am tempted to just give you 
the maximum today.  I don't have to go along with joint 
recommendations . . . .  I sit here and read this file over, and 
                                                 
2 Some of the facts in this discussion are taken from 
Goodson's brief in the court of appeals as well as a prior 
unpublished court of appeals decision, State v. Goodson, No. 
2004AP2913-CR, unpublished slip op. (Jul. 6, 2005). 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
8 
 
I say why.  What did your ex-wife ever do to deserve that?  And 
the answer is: She didn't do anything to deserve it, period." 
¶93 Judge McGinnis then imposed sentence: 
On one of the firearm counts, the court sentenced 
Goodson to six years' imprisonment, with three years' 
initial 
confinement 
and 
three 
years' 
extended 
supervision.  On the other firearm count and the 
sexual 
assault, 
it 
withheld 
sentence 
and 
placed 
Goodson 
on 
probation 
consecutive 
to 
the 
prison 
sentence.  On the remaining two misdemeanors, it 
sentenced Goodson to ninety-day jail terms, concurrent 
with 
each 
other 
but 
consecutive 
to 
the 
prison 
sentence.  The court announced it was structuring the 
sentence like this to "[hang the] maximum penalty over 
[Goodson] . . . ."  The court warned Goodson "[I]f you 
deviate one inch from these rules, and you may think 
I'm kidding, but I'm not, you will come back here, and 
you will be given the maximum, period.  Do you 
understand that?"  Goodson replied that he did. 
Id., ¶2 (footnote omitted). 
¶94 Like Judge Froehlich's sentence, Judge McGinnis's 
sentence resulted in 45 months of confinement, but Goodson was 
given 857 days of credit on the sentence because of his time in 
custody.  This resulted in 338 days of remaining confinement——
less than a year. 
¶95 When Goodson completed his confinement time, he was 
inadvertently reincarcerated at the Outagamie County Jail, where 
he was soon charged with battery by a prisoner.  Due to its 
mistake of taking Goodson into custody, the Department of 
Corrections recommended limiting reconfinement to the 113 days 
of 
time 
served 
in 
jail. 
 
Judge 
McGinnis 
accepted 
this 
recommendation, giving Goodson the benefit of the doubt.  Id., 
¶¶3-4.  In other words, Judge McGinnis did not give Goodson "the 
maximum." 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
9 
 
¶96 Five months later, however, after Goodson's extended 
supervision was revoked for numerous violations, Judge McGinnis 
reconfined Goodson for the maximum period of time available——two 
years, eight months, and 17 days.  Goodson had been arrested 
after he threatened a new girlfriend, and attempted to commit 
suicide by driving the girlfriend's truck head-on into a 
concrete pole, causing himself serious injury. 
¶97 The circuit court's sentence seemed to shock the court 
of appeals: "By prejudging Goodson's reconfinement sentence, the 
court was objectively biased.  Therefore, Goodson is entitled to 
a new reconfinement sentence hearing."  Id., ¶1. 
¶98 The court stated that Goodson's appeal "requires us to 
determine whether Goodson was sentenced by an impartial judge.  
Whether a circuit court's partiality can be questioned is a 
matter of law that we review independently."  Id., ¶7. 
¶99 The court of appeals then concluded that the circuit 
court was objectively biased——that is, the court gave "the 
appearance of bias" and the court was actually biased as well, 
although "Goodson concedes he cannot show the court was 
subjectively biased."  Id., ¶8.  As to the appearance of bias, 
the court quoted the Gudgeon passage about the reasonable person 
concluding that "the average judge could not be trusted."  Id., 
¶9 (quoting Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶24).  The court added: 
"[T]he appearance of partiality constitutes objective bias when 
a reasonable person could question the court's impartiality 
based on the court's statements."  Id., ¶9 (citing Gudgeon, 295 
Wis. 2d 189, ¶26). 
¶100 The court continued: 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
10 
 
 
We agree with Goodson that a reasonable person 
would interpret the court's statements to mean it made 
up its mind before the reconfinement hearing. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
Here, 
the 
court 
unequivocally 
promised 
to 
sentence Goodson to the maximum period of time if he 
violated his supervision rules.  A reasonable person 
would conclude that a judge would intend to keep such 
a promise——that the judge had made up his mind about 
Goodson's sentence before the reconfinement hearing.  
This appearance constitutes objective bias. 
Id., ¶¶10, 13 
 
¶101 The court went on to conclude that "There could not be 
a more explicit statement confirming that the sentence was 
predecided.  This is definitive evidence of actual bias."  Id., 
¶16. 
 
¶102 Clearly, 
this 
writer 
is 
uncomfortable 
with 
the 
decisions in Gudgeon and Goodson.  Both courts failed to 
disclose all the facts.  Both courts did not contend that the 
defendants had actually suffered unfair treatment.  Both courts 
left open the question whether there would have been any "bias" 
at all if the judges had kept their thinking to themselves.  The 
Goodson court, following Gudgeon, did not explain why the 
imposition of a heavy penalty in a sentence that is stayed, see, 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), would not be "prejudging" the 
defendant's sentence if his or her probation were revoked.  The 
court's ruling is certainly inconsistent with the practice in 
drug courts. 
 
¶103 More important, the two cases applied their ambiguous 
tests 
for 
bias 
in 
situations——probation 
extension 
and 
reconfinement sentencing——in which the stakes were not very 
high.  One wonders whether the court of appeals would have 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
11 
 
developed and applied the same tests if confronted with a 
situation where the stakes were critical, such as wiping out a 
homicide conviction after a four-week jury trial, even though a 
judge's candid statement may never have been heard by a jury 
trying the facts.  After all, in the Gudgeon court's view, bias—
—and even more, the appearance of bias——may be wholly unrelated 
to any actual unfairness to the defendant. 
III. CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO. 
¶104 The Caperton case is a different animal.  The facts in 
Caperton created the widespread impression that a single 
individual spent more than $3 million to elect a new supreme 
court justice who would overturn a $50 million jury verdict in a 
specific case involving the individual that was soon to come 
before the West Virginia Supreme Court.  The United States 
Supreme Court's decision is completely understandable.  The 
problem in Caperton, like the problem in Gudgeon and Goodson, is 
that its broad language is difficult to cabin and thus invites 
application in materially different fact situations. 
¶105 The Caperton majority said that an appellate court's 
objective inquiry is "whether the average judge in his position 
is 
'likely' 
to 
be 
neutral, 
or 
whether 
there 
is 
an 
unconstitutional 'potential for bias,'" Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
881; whether an interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden," id. at 884, 
whether there is "a serious risk of actual bias."  Id.  The 
Court added: "[O]bjective standards may . . . require recusal 
whether or not actual bias exists or can be proved."  Id. at 
886. 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
12 
 
¶106 The Caperton Court noted that "Massey and its amici 
predict that various adverse consequences will follow from 
recognizing a constitutional violation here——ranging from a 
flood 
of 
recusal 
motions" 
to 
interference 
with 
judicial 
elections.  Id. at 887.  "We disagree."  Id.  The Supreme Court 
may have been correct in Caperton but it was not correct with 
respect to this latter comment, at least in Wisconsin. 
¶107 The 
reality 
of 
contemporary 
life 
is 
that 
the 
appearance of bias can be created for a judge by someone other 
than the judge.  What are judges to do in this situation?  How 
are they supposed to assess the reasonable person's conclusions 
if the reasonable person is basing his conclusions on misleading 
information?   
¶108 My concern with the lead opinion is its veneration of 
the 
"appearance 
of 
bias" 
standard 
without 
providing 
any 
additional guidance as to when or how to apply this imprecise 
standard.  The lead opinion's discussion of the "appearance of 
bias" sharply contrasts with its detailed analysis of the facts 
that properly determine the outcome of this case. 
¶109 Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent in 
Caperton: 
The Court's new "rule" provides no guidance to judges 
and 
litigants 
about 
when 
recusal 
will 
be 
constitutionally required.  This will inevitably lead 
to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, 
however groundless those charges may be.  The end 
result will do far more to erode public confidence in 
judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to 
recuse in a particular case. 
Id. at 890-91 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  I share Chief 
Justice Roberts' concerns about the state of the law as it 
2013AP197-CR.dtp 
13 
 
relates to bias and constitutionally required recusal.  Without 
clarification and guidance, these developments in the law may 
"do 
far 
more 
to 
erode 
public 
confidence 
in 
judicial 
impartiality" than the occasional misstep by a judge. 
¶110 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶111 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶112 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the lead opinion's conclusion that Jesse Herrmann has not 
shown that the sentencing judge, Judge Ramona A. Gonzalez, was 
objectively biased in violation of due process.  I write to 
clarify the due process recusal test. Citing cases including 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the lead 
opinion states that "[a] defendant may rebut the presumption 
[that a judge acted fairly, impartially, and without prejudice] 
by showing that the appearance of bias reveals a great risk of 
actual bias."  Lead op., ¶3. However, due process requires 
recusal only if a judge is actually biased or if a "rare" or an 
"exceptional case" with "extreme facts" creates a "serious risk 
of actual bias."  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 
868, 883-84, 886-88, 890.  
¶113 Caperton concludes that objective proof of actual bias 
or the probability of a serious risk of actual bias must exist 
before recusal is required.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84.  
Stated otherwise, it is not reasonable to question a judge's 
impartiality unless one can prove by objective evidence that 
actual bias or the probability of a serious risk of actual bias 
exists.  See id. at 884. 
¶114 The recusal test to be applied is the test explained 
by the Supreme Court in Caperton, which requires a "rare" or an 
"exceptional case" with "extreme facts" that create a "serious 
risk of actual bias."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84, 886-88, 
890.  If the test were only whether an appearance of bias 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
existed, and nothing more extreme or exceptional were required, 
then this record would support the defendant's contention that 
Judge Gonzalez should have recused herself.  To succeed on a due 
process claim, much more is required.    
¶115 Accordingly, I write to discuss the due process test 
of 
Caperton. 
I 
note 
that 
the 
Judicial 
Code1 
and 
the 
disqualification 
statute 
provide 
for 
specific 
factual 
circumstances under which a judge must recuse, even when that 
judge could be completely fair.  See, e.g., Supreme Court Rule 
("SCR") 60.04(4)(a) to (f); Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) to (f).2  
                                                 
1 "The Code of Judicial Conduct is contained in ch. 60 of 
the Supreme Court Rules.  It was formerly referred to as the 
Code of Judicial Ethics."  State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, ¶21 
n.12, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175.  
2 The provisions of the disqualification statute and Supreme 
Court Rule ("SCR") Ch. 60, which identify specific factual 
circumstances where recusal is required, do not employ an 
analysis about reasonableness. However, "[t]he Judicial Code 
provides no authority to the supreme court to disqualify a 
justice from participating in a particular case when that 
justice has considered and decided a motion to disqualify him or 
her." Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610, ¶23.  "[T]his court does not have 
the power to remove a justice from participating in an 
individual proceeding, on a case-by-case basis."  Id., ¶25.  
When presented with a disqualification motion, a "justice must 
decide 
for 
himself 
or 
herself 
whether 
his 
or 
her 
disqualification [is] required."  Id., ¶11; see also id., ¶¶13, 
26.  In addition, the disqualification statute requires recusal 
"[w]hen a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she 
cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial 
manner."  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).   
Section 
757.19(2)(g), 
[Wis.] 
Stats., 
mandates 
a 
judge's disqualification only when that judge makes a 
determination that, in fact or in appearance, he or 
she cannot act in an impartial manner.  It does not 
require disqualification in a situation where one 
other than the judge objectively believes there is an 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
Caperton makes clear that a judge need not recuse simply because 
someone claims that the judge is partial.  In other words, 
Caperton concludes that a reasonable, well-informed person, 
knowledgeable about judicial ethical standards and the justice 
system and aware of the facts and circumstances the judge knows 
or reasonably should know, would reasonably question the judge's 
ability 
to 
be 
impartial 
because 
of 
actual 
bias 
or 
the 
probability 
of 
a 
serious 
risk 
of 
actual 
bias. 
 
Such 
circumstances are exceedingly rare.3  
¶116 Because we are bound by the Supreme Court precedent in 
Caperton when applying the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution, it is important to clearly set out the 
Caperton test so that those who consider seeking judicial 
recusal will be well-informed, as will the judges who decide 
recusal motions.  Further, because "motions to disqualify a 
justice from participating in a particular case have increased 
                                                                                                                                                             
appearance that the judge is unable to act in an 
impartial 
manner; 
neither 
does 
it 
require 
disqualification . . . in a situation in which the 
judge's impartiality 'can reasonably be questioned' by 
someone other than the judge. 
Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin Inc., 2008 WI 110, ¶24, 314 
Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480 (quoted source omitted) (ellipsis 
added in Donohoo).  Because Donohoo and Henley are controlling 
precedent, I rely on them in this opinion. 
3 For example, the Judicial Code requires recusal "when 
reasonable, well-informed persons knowledgeable about judicial 
ethics standards and the justice system and aware of the facts 
and circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should know 
would 
reasonably 
question 
the 
judge's 
ability 
to 
be 
impartial[.]" SCR 60.04(4) (intro.).   
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
dramatically since the United States Supreme Court decided 
Caperton,"  State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, ¶10, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 
802 N.W.2d 175, it is important to recognize that Caperton's 
holding is very limited.  Caperton will be discussed in more 
detail.  
I. DISCUSSION 
¶117 "A 
fair 
trial 
in 
a 
fair 
tribunal 
is 
a 
basic 
requirement of due process."  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955).  "'Due process requires a neutral and detached judge. If 
the judge evidences a lack of impartiality, whatever its origin 
or justification, the judge cannot sit in judgment.'"  State v. 
Rochelt, 165 Wis. 2d 373, 378, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 4 1991) 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Washington, 
83 
Wis. 2d 
808, 
833, 
266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978)).  "The operation of the due process clause in 
the realm of judicial impartiality, then, is primarily to 
protect the individual's right to a fair trial."  People v. 
Freeman, 222 P.3d 177, 181 (Cal. 2010).  "We presume that judges 
are 
impartial," 
and 
someone 
who 
challenges 
a 
judge's 
impartiality bears a heavy burden to "rebut that presumption."  
State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶103, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 
N.W.2d 207.  
¶118 "[W]hile a showing of actual bias is not required for 
judicial disqualification under the due process clause, neither 
is the mere appearance of bias sufficient."  Freeman, 222 P.3d 
at 178. In a due process recusal challenge, "[i]t is not 
sufficient to show that there is an appearance of bias or that 
the circumstance might lead one to speculate that the judge is 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
biased."  State v. O'Neill, 2003 WI App 73, ¶12, 261 
Wis. 2d 534, 663 N.W.2d 292 (citing State v. McBride, 187 
Wis. 2d 409, 416, 523 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1994)).  
¶119 "Instead, based on an objective assessment of the 
circumstances in the particular case, there must exist 'the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker 
[that] 
is 
too 
high 
to 
be 
constitutionally 
tolerable.'"  Freeman, 222 P.3d at 178 (quoting Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 877) (quotation marks omitted).  In other words, this 
objective assessment "asks whether objective facts show actual 
bias."  O'Neill, 261 Wis. 2d 534, ¶11 (citing McBride, 187 
Wis. 2d at 415-16). "Thus, actual bias——either its presence, or 
the great risk of it——is the underlying concern of objective 
bias [due process] analysis."  State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 
107, ¶14, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385.  The Supreme Court in 
Caperton "emphasized that only the most 'extreme facts' would 
justify judicial disqualification based on the due process 
clause."  Freeman, 222 P.3d at 178 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. 
at 886-89).  Accordingly, when a litigant asserts actual bias, 
he or she must show extreme facts such as those in Caperton.  
See id.  
¶120 "Where only the appearance of bias is at issue, a 
litigant's recourse is to seek disqualification under state 
disqualification 
statutes: 
'Because 
the 
codes 
of 
judicial 
conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most 
disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort 
to the Constitution.'"  Id. (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890).  
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
Wisconsin's Judicial Code and disqualification statute aim to 
prevent 
the 
appearance 
of 
bias 
by 
requiring 
recusal 
in 
specifically described factual situations even though the judge 
is actually unbiased.4  See, e.g., SCR 60.04(4)(a) to (f); Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) to (f); see also Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 
¶97 (holding that the Judicial Code did not require recusal and 
noting that the judge had an "appearance of impartiality"); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 
583-84, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991) (holding that the disqualification 
statute did not require recusal because there was no "appearance 
of a lack of impartiality").  For example, recusal is required 
when "[t]he judge of an appellate court previously handled the 
action 
or 
proceeding 
as 
judge 
of 
another 
court."  
SCR 60.04(4)(b); see also Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) (requiring 
recusal of "a judge of an appellate court [who] previously 
handled the action or proceeding while judge of an inferior 
court").  Specifically defined requirements of recusal in 
SCR Ch. 60 and the disqualification statute are not at issue in 
this case because Herrmann's challenge is under the more general 
notion of reasonableness as it intersects with due process 
protection.  
¶121 Thus, I analyze the circumstances when recusal is 
sought based on what is sometimes referred to as the "reasonable 
                                                 
4 These enumerated situations might require recusal although 
due process does not.  See State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶94, 356 
Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207 ("'[T]he codes of judicial conduct 
provide more protection than due process requires . . . .'" 
(quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890)). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
person" standard. When such a challenge is made, the burden is 
to show a "rare" or an "extraordinary situation" with "extreme" 
facts that create a "serious, objective risk of actual bias," 
such that it is the limited situation where recusal is required, 
as was demonstrated under the unique facts of Caperton.  See 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886-87, 890.  The Supreme Court made clear 
that it is a "rare instance[]" indeed where a judicial officer 
is 
required 
to 
recuse 
when 
no 
rule 
specifies 
factual 
circumstances that call for recusal.  Id. at 890. 
¶122 If due process required a judge to recuse because of 
an appearance of bias, then what is unreasonable about Herrmann 
thinking that Judge Gonzalez appeared biased based on her 
statements such that she must recuse?  In 1976 a drunk driver 
struck a car holding five young women, killing four of them.  
One of the women who died was Judge Gonzalez's sister.  Herrmann 
drove his truck while intoxicated and rear-ended a car carrying 
five young women.  Herrmann's accident killed one of the young 
women and seriously injured the other four.  During Herrmann's 
sentencing hearing, Judge Gonzalez stated: 
In 1976 five young women got into a vehicle, and only 
one of them survived.  The two gentlemen in the other 
vehicle were 17, drunk out of their minds, and they 
did not survive.  That was my personal story, and I 
will tell you that a day does not go by that I do not 
think of that personal tragedy, and I wish that I 
could tell these victims that that pain will one day 
disappear, but it doesn't. 
Judge Gonzalez further stated: 
Perhaps 
it 
is 
again 
destiny 
or 
a 
higher 
power . . . that bring[s] me to be the judge on this 
particular case because I probably more than anyone 
else who would be able to sit on this bench in this 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
county understand the pain that these victims are 
feeling, but I have had the benefit of all those years 
since 1976 to understand that I have to make Mr. 
Herrmann pay . . . .  
¶123 Because a complete understanding of Caperton is so 
important to understanding a judge's obligations upon being 
moved to recuse, I now turn to Caperton. 
¶124 As the following discussion shows, Caperton's very 
limited holding does not allow "an attack on virtually any 
ju[dge] for nearly any reason and [does not] allow litigants to 
'pick their court' by filing recusal motions against certain 
ju[dges] and not others."  State v. Allen, 2010 WI 10, ¶260, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  "Such an 
expansion of Caperton could cause gridlock in the court and 
delay justice being dispensed.  The Supreme Court made clear 
that it did not intend such consequences."  Id.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court noted that "[n]ot every campaign contribution by a 
litigant or [an] attorney creates a probability of bias that 
requires a judge's recusal, but this is an exceptional case."5  
                                                 
5 Although the Supreme Court in Caperton was discussing due 
process when it stated that not every campaign contribution 
requires a judge's recusal, the same principle applies under the 
Judicial Code. Wisconsin's Judicial Code states that "[a] judge 
shall not be required to recuse himself or herself in a 
proceeding based solely on any endorsement or the judge's 
campaign committee's receipt of a lawful campaign contribution, 
including a campaign contribution from an individual or entity 
involved in the proceeding."  SCR 60.04(7). As the comment to 
this rule explains: 
Campaign contributions to judicial candidates are 
a fundamental component of judicial elections. . . .   
The purpose of [SCR 60.04(7)] is to make clear 
that the receipt of a lawful campaign contribution by 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  The exceptional circumstances of 
Caperton demonstrated the probability of a serious risk of 
actual bias that the Court determined that there was a due 
process violation.  The Supreme Court noted that such a 
violation would indeed be "rare."  Id. at 890.  A campaign 
contribution or expenditure alone does not result in a due 
process violation.  Even the large expenditure in Caperton was 
but one of many factors that, collectively, were fundamental to 
the Court's decision.  In Caperton the Court did not conclude 
that, standing alone, a lawful contribution, large expenditure, 
or other significant support in a campaign would require a judge 
to recuse.  
                                                                                                                                                             
a judicial candidate's campaign committee does not, by 
itself, require the candidate to recuse himself or 
herself as a judge from a proceeding involving a 
contributor.  An endorsement of the judge by a lawyer, 
other individual, or entity also does not, by itself, 
require a judge's recusal from a proceeding involving 
the endorser.  Not every campaign contribution by a 
litigant or [an] attorney creates a probability of 
bias that requires a judge's recusal.   
Campaign contributions must be publicly reported.  
Disqualifying 
a 
judge 
from 
participating 
in 
a 
proceeding 
solely 
because 
the 
judge's 
campaign 
committee received a lawful contribution would create 
the 
impression 
that 
receipt 
of 
a 
contribution 
automatically impairs the judge's integrity.  It would 
have the effect of discouraging "the broadest possible 
participation in financing campaigns by all citizens 
of the state" through voluntary contributions, see 
Wis. Stat. § 11.001, because it would deprive citizens 
who lawfully contribute to judicial campaigns, whether 
individually or through an organization, of access to 
the judges they help elect. 
SCR 60.04(7) cmt. 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
¶125 For 
purposes 
of 
clarification, 
in 
Wisconsin, 
a 
judicial candidate may not even solicit or accept campaign 
contributions. In other words, it is fundamental that a judicial 
candidate 
cannot 
ask 
anyone 
for 
any 
campaign 
money.  
SCR 60.06(4) ("A judge, candidate for judicial office, or judge-
elect 
shall 
not 
personally 
solicit 
or 
accept 
campaign 
contributions."). 
¶126 In addition, a judicial candidate certainly cannot 
control whether a third party expends resources in an attempt to 
affect the outcome of a contested seat.  Caperton was decided 
before Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which 
the United States Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional, 
under the First Amendment, a federal law that prohibited 
corporations from making independent expenditures for speech 
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 
(2010).  
¶127 Thus, even if a judicial candidate were to publicly 
request that third parties not spend money to support his or her 
campaign or to discredit an opponent's campaign, the First 
Amendment entitles third parties to do so anyway.  See id.  If a 
campaign contribution or an independent expenditure in a 
campaign were enough to require recusal, no sensible stopping 
point would exist.  Sometimes people support a judicial 
candidate by directly contributing to his or her campaign.  
Sometimes people do not support a judicial candidate and 
directly contribute to an opponent's campaign.  Sometimes third 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
parties exercise their First Amendment rights to either support 
or discredit a judicial candidate.  Should all of these 
circumstances require recusal?  Does one scenario require 
recusal more than the others, if a "reasonable person" says so?  
¶128 The Court in Caperton recognized that the answer to 
those questions is "no" and that it is a rare and exceptional 
circumstance wherein much more must be proved before a judge 
must recuse.  Extreme circumstances must converge so as to 
create the probability of a serious risk of actual bias.  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  If Caperton were to have required 
any less, there would be no sensible stopping point for a 
judge's duty to recuse.  "Caperton involved extreme and 
extraordinary facts which the Supreme Court recognized in its 
majority opinion no less than a dozen times."  Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶261 (Ziegler, J., concurring); see also id., ¶263 
n.4 (identifying a dozen times where Caperton highlighted that 
case's extreme and extraordinary facts); State v. Henley, 2011 
WI 67, ¶33, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175 ("[A]s the United 
States Supreme Court repeatedly said in its decision in 
Caperton, that decision is based on extraordinary and extreme 
facts."). 
¶129 The "extreme facts" that amounted to a due process 
violation in Caperton began with a $50 million jury verdict that 
was entered in favor of Caperton and against A.T. Massey.  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872.  "After the verdict but before the 
appeal, West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections."  Id. at 
873.  Five justices sit on the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
Appeals.  Id. at 874-75.  Whoever won the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals' 2004 election would most certainly be on the 
court when it decided whether to sustain or overturn this $50 
million verdict against A.T. Massey.  Id. at 873.   
¶130 Donald Blankenship, who was A.T. Massey's chairman, 
chief executive officer, and president, "[knew] that the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia would consider the appeal in 
the case."  Id.  Blankenship spent $3 million to support the 
election of Brent Benjamin, an attorney who was running against 
Justice Warren McGraw for a seat on the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals.  Id.  Specifically, Blankenship "contribut[ed] 
the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin's campaign committee"; 
Blankenship 
donated 
almost 
$2.5 
million 
to 
a 
political 
organization that supported Benjamin's campaign and opposed 
Justice McGraw's campaign6; and Blankenship additionally spent 
"just over $500,000 on independent expenditures——for direct 
mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as television 
and newspaper advertisements——to support . . . Brent Benjamin."  
Id. (ellipsis in original) (quotation marks omitted).  
¶131 Blankenship's $3 million of expenditures supporting 
the election of Benjamin, who if elected would be on the West 
                                                 
6 Blankenship's $2.5 million donation to this political 
organization accounted for more than two-thirds of the funds 
raised by this organization during this election.  Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 304 (W. Va. 2008) 
(Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), rev'd and remanded, 556 
U.S. 
868 
(2009) 
("Mr. 
Blankenship 
personally 
contributed 
$2,460,500 [to this organization].  The remaining contributions, 
totaling $1,163,000, were given by other individuals and 
organizations."). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals when it decided the pending 
case involving Blankenship's company, dwarfed all other spending 
in the election.  In particular, Blankenship's $3 million of 
expenditures supporting Benjamin were "more than the total 
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times 
the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee."  Id.  "Caperton 
contend[ed] that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the 
total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates 
combined."  Id.  In short, Blankenship spent $3 million in 
support 
of 
Benjamin, 
all 
of 
Benjamin's 
other 
supporters 
collectively 
spent 
less 
than 
$3 
million 
on 
independent 
expenditures 
in 
support 
of 
Benjamin, 
Benjamin's 
campaign 
committee 
spent 
$828,663,7 
and 
Justice 
McGraw's 
campaign 
committee spent $1,313,861.8  See id.  
¶132 In addition, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that the election results were not a landslide victory.  Id.  A 
total of 716,337 people voted in the West Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals race.  See id.  Benjamin was elected with a narrow 
margin of 53.3% of the votes.  Id.  Benjamin defeated his 
opponent by fewer than 50,000 votes (Benjamin received 382,036 
votes and Justice McGraw received 334,301).  Id.   
                                                 
7 Justice Benjamin's relevant campaign finance filing is 
available 
at 
http://apps.sos.wv.gov/elections/candidate-
search/readpdf.aspx?DocId=5595. 
8 Justice McGraw's relevant campaign finance filing is 
available 
at 
http://apps.sos.wv.gov/elections/candidate-
search/readpdf.aspx?DocId=5627.    
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
¶133 Approximately 11 months after Justice Benjamin won the 
election, and shortly before A.T. Massey filed its petition for 
appeal, Caperton moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin in the 
particular case that was pending the entire election between 
A.T. Massey and Caperton.  Id. at 873-74.  Caperton argued that 
the due process clause required Justice Benjamin's recusal 
"based 
on 
the 
conflict 
caused 
by 
Blankenship's 
campaign 
involvement."  Id. at 874.  Justice Benjamin denied the recusal 
motion.  Id.  The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, by a 
3-to-2 vote, reversed the $50 million verdict against A.T. 
Massey.  Id.  Justice Benjamin joined the majority opinion.  Id. 
¶134 "Caperton sought rehearing, and the parties moved for 
disqualification of three of the five justices who decided the 
appeal."  Id.  In particular, Caperton again moved to disqualify 
Justice Benjamin.  Id. at 875.  Justice Benjamin denied the 
motion.  Id.  Justice Elliot Maynard, who joined the three-
justice majority opinion, granted Caperton's recusal motion 
because "[p]hotos had surfaced of Justice Maynard vacationing 
with Blankenship in the French Riviera while the case was 
pending."  Id. at 874.  Justice Larry Starcher, one of the two 
dissenting justices, "granted [A.T.] Massey's recusal motion, 
apparently based on his public criticism of Blankenship's role 
in the 2004 elections."  Id. at 874-75.  The West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently granted rehearing.  Id. at 
875.  Justice Benjamin, then serving as acting chief justice, 
selected two West Virginia circuit judges to replace the two 
recused justices on the case between Caperton and A.T. Massey.  
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
Id.  Accordingly, unlike a justice in Wisconsin, Justice 
Benjamin could have been replaced had he recused himself.  See 
id. at 874-75.  The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again 
voted 3-to-2 to reverse the $50 million verdict against A.T. 
Massey.  Id. at 875.  Justice Benjamin again joined the 
majority.  Id.  Caperton petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to review Justice Benjamin's denial of its recusal 
motions. 
¶135 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine "whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated when [Justice Benjamin] denied a recusal 
motion."  Id. at 872.  The Supreme Court determined "that, in 
all the circumstances of [that] case, due process require[d] 
recusal."  Id.  
¶136 The United States Supreme Court concluded that there 
was a serious risk of Justice Benjamin's actual bias in sitting 
on Caperton because:  (1) the case had been pending since before 
Justice Benjamin was elected; (2) the jury verdict in that case 
was $50 million; (3) if elected, Justice Benjamin would be 
sitting on the court that would review this $50 million verdict; 
(4) 
Blankenship's 
extraordinary 
$3 
million 
expenditures 
supporting Benjamin dwarfed the amount spent by both campaign 
committees combined; (5) Blankenship's $3 million expenditures 
exceeded the expenditures of all other Benjamin supporters 
combined; and (6) Blankenship's $3 million expenditures had a 
"significant and disproportionate influence" in helping Benjamin 
win a close election.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-86.  The 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he temporal relationship 
between the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and 
the pendency of the case [was] also critical."  Id. at 886. 
¶137 The  Supreme Court  made clear that  no one factor 
alone——or anything short of this combination of factors——would 
have constituted a due process violation so to require recusal.  
In that regard, the Supreme Court noted that its holding was 
based on "all the circumstances of [that] case . . . ."  Id. at 
872.  The Court further noted that "[a]pplication of the 
constitutional standard implicated in [Caperton] will [] be 
confined to rare instances."  Id. at 890.  
¶138 "[N]owhere in the Caperton decision does the Supreme 
Court state that any lesser fact situation would have required 
Justice Benjamin's recusal in that case, and nowhere does the 
Supreme Court conclude that he would be required to recuse 
himself from an unrelated civil case that involved different 
parties." 
 
Allen, 
322 
Wis. 2d 372, 
¶269 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring).  "To suggest that Caperton says otherwise is to 
invent new law and to invite recusal motions based upon 'spin' 
instead of whether a justice can be fair and impartial.  Such 
practice is destructive to the credibility of the court, as 
justices are always presumed to be fair and impartial."  Id.  
"To be clear, nowhere in Caperton does the majority state that 
anything less than this 'perfect storm,' created by those 
extreme and extraordinary facts coupled with the timing of the 
election and the parties' pending case, would be sufficient to 
constitute a due process violation."  Id.  
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
¶139 In short, the Supreme Court in Caperton expressly 
recognized that its holding was limited by the rare nucleus of 
facts presented in that case.  The Court, when considering the 
objective test, which Wisconsin adopted in State v. Asfoor, 75 
Wis. 2d 411, 436, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977),9 stated:  
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual 
bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions——
when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge's election campaign when the case 
was pending or imminent. 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.  In other words, it was not the $3 
million dollar expenditure alone that required recusal.  Id. at 
883-86.  Accordingly, the due process test for judicial recusal 
set forth in Caperton was met because those extraordinary and 
extreme facts converged in a pending case where one person's 
contributions 
had 
a 
"significant 
and 
disproportionate  
influence" on a close election.  See id.; see also Allen, 322 
Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶261-262, 269, 271 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 
(recognizing the limits of Caperton); Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 
¶¶32-33 (same). 
¶140 In accord with Caperton, the "reasonable person" 
recusal standard is controlled by the objective due process 
recusal test explained in Caperton.  Indeed, more than 30 years 
ago this court defined the Judicial Code's reasonable person 
recusal standard as synonymous with the objective due process 
                                                 
9 See 
State 
v. 
Walberg, 
109 
Wis. 2d 96, 
105-06, 
325 
N.W.2d 687 (1982) (recognizing that Asfoor adopted this due 
process recusal test). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
recusal test.  See State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105-06, 325 
N.W.2d 687 (1982) (applying the reasonable person standard from 
the Judicial Code to determine whether a judge's failure to 
recuse himself violated the objective due process recusal test).  
That test has been further explained by Caperton wherein the 
Supreme Court cautioned that the objective due process test 
requires recusal only in an "exceptional case" with "extreme 
facts" that create a "serious risk" of actual bias.  See 
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884, 886-88; see also Freeman, 222 P.3d at 
184 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889-90).   
¶141 If a judge were required to recuse whenever a person 
could conjure a reason to question a judge's impartiality, a 
judge could be attacked without a standard on which to evaluate 
the attack.   We have rejected a loose and standardless test, as 
the Supreme Court in Caperton did, in no small part because it 
would invite mischief and judge shopping.10  See Henley, 338 
Wis. 2d 610, ¶35; Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶260-262 (Ziegler, 
J., concurring); Donohoo v. Action Wisconsin Inc., 2008 WI 110, 
¶¶29-30, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480. As demonstrated by our 
conclusion that recusal was not required in Donohoo, Henley, 
Pinno, and similar cases,11 the recusal standard is the one set 
                                                 
10 A circuit court or court of appeals judge who recuses 
himself or herself may get replaced by a substitution judge.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 757.19(5), 751.03.  A circuit court or court 
of 
appeals 
judge 
may 
be 
replaced 
by 
a 
reserve 
judge.  
§ 751.03(1).  However, a supreme court justice who recuses 
himself or herself from a case cannot be replaced.  See id.  
11 See Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶11-17 (collecting cases). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
forth in Caperton, which requires the challenger to demonstrate 
by objective proof that actual bias or the probability of a 
serious risk of actual bias exists.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
883-84, 886-87.  
¶142 When a recusal motion is brought, the movant bears a 
burden "to overcome the presumption of impartiality."  Pinno, 
356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶97.  Interpreting the reasonable person 
standard more broadly than Caperton's due process recusal test 
would turn the movant's burden of proof on its head.  The 
objective due process recusal test asks whether there are 
"extreme facts" in an "exceptional case" where, "based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions," "there is a serious risk 
of actual bias." Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884, 886-88. 
¶143 In 
Pinno, 
a 
consolidated 
opinion, 
one 
of 
the 
defendants, 
Travis 
Seaton, 
was 
convicted 
of 
first-degree 
reckless homicide as a repeater.  Id., ¶11.  He filed a post-
conviction motion in which he argued "that his sentence was too 
harsh, reasserted his argument that one of the jurors was 
biased, 
and 
argued 
that 
'other 
acts 
evidence' 
was 
used 
improperly."  Id., ¶18.  The circuit court, Judge Richard J. 
Nuss presiding, who also presided over the trial, denied the 
motion.  Id., ¶¶2, 18.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id., 
¶18.  Seaton then filed another post-conviction motion, in which 
he "argued for the first time that his Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial was violated.  In the alternative, Seaton argued 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
closure of the courtroom."  Id., ¶19.  Seaton also filed a 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
motion requesting that Judge Nuss recuse himself from ruling on 
the post-conviction motion.  Id., ¶22.  Judge Nuss denied the 
recusal motion and post-conviction motion.  Id., ¶24.  
¶144 On appeal, we held that "Judge Nuss properly denied 
Seaton's recusal motion."  Id., ¶97.  First, Seaton argued that 
the judicial disqualification statute, Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2), 
required Judge Nuss's recusal.  See id., ¶93.  Because no 
specifically described factual circumstance set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) to (f) was applicable, we concluded that 
"[t]he relevant recusal standard in the Wisconsin Statutes is a 
subjective one," namely § 757.19(2)(g).  See id.  We had to 
determine "objectively whether [Judge Nuss] actually made the 
subjective determination" that he could remain on the case.  Id.  
We concluded that "Judge Nuss determined that he was not biased; 
therefore, he complied with § 757.19(2)(g)."12  Id.  
¶145 Next, we examined Ch. 60 of the Supreme Court Rules 
("SCR")——Wisconsin's Judicial Code——to analyze Seaton's recusal 
claim.  Id., ¶¶95-96.  We concluded that SCR Ch. 60 did not 
                                                 
12 In addition to satisfying Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), a 
judge also satisfies the subjective due process recusal test by 
determining that he or she is impartial.  State v. McBride, 187 
Wis. 2d 409, 415-16, 523 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
State v. Rochelt, 165 Wis. 2d 373, 378-79, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. 
App. 1991)); see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882 ("We do not 
question 
[Justice 
Benjamin's] 
subjective 
findings 
of 
impartiality and propriety. Nor do we determine whether there 
was actual bias.").  In other words, if a judge determines that 
he or she is impartial, that determination is difficult to 
overcome. 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
require recusal because "[n]one of SCR 60.04(4)'s enumerated 
circumstances fits the facts" presented.  Id., ¶96.  
¶146 We also concluded that the due process test from 
Caperton did not require Judge Nuss's recusal.  Id., ¶94.  We 
reasoned that "Judge Nuss's conduct does not approach the 
extreme circumstances that violate due process."  Id.  In other 
words, the defendant-movant did not demonstrate a Caperton-type 
extraordinary circumstance with extreme facts that created a 
strong risk of actual bias.  In short, we held that Judge Nuss 
properly denied the recusal motion because (1) he determined 
that he was not biased; (2) his situation did not match any of 
the specific situations enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) or 
SCR 60.04(4); and (3) there were no "extreme circumstances that 
violate[d] due process" as there were in Caperton.13  See id., 
¶¶93-97. 
¶147 In 
the 
present 
case, 
Judge 
Gonzalez 
expressly 
determined that she could be impartial, and it is undisputed 
that none of the specific situations enumerated in SCR Ch. 60 or 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) to (f) are applicable.  Accordingly, 
in order for Judge Gonzalez to have been required to recuse, 
Herrmann would have had to prove actual bias or the probability 
of a serious risk of actual bias, as explained in Caperton.  See 
                                                 
13 In Pinno we noted the reasonable person recusal standard 
in SCR 60.04(4)(intro.).  State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶96, 356 
Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207.  We did not separately analyze 
whether that standard required Judge Nuss's recusal, apparently 
because we recognized that it is coextensive with the objective 
due process test from Caperton.  See id., ¶¶94-97. 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
also id., ¶¶92-97; Henley, 338 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶10-17, 32-35; 
Allen, 322 Wis. 2d 372, ¶¶260-264 (Ziegler, J., concurring); 
Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶¶19-28. 
¶148 In light of Caperton, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' 
application of the due process test in Goodson and Gudgeon is 
called into question.  Caperton undermines the validity of 
Goodson and Gudgeon and at the very least it tailors those cases 
to the conflict therein which may be otherwise prohibited even 
if not a due process violation.14  The United States Supreme 
Court in Caperton has further refined the Goodson and Gudgeon 
analysis such that we now must review whether recusal is 
required due to extreme and exceptional circumstances as were 
present in Caperton, and we now know that such circumstances 
will rarely be demonstrable.  See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887, 
890. 
¶149 In line with our reasoning today, the California 
Supreme Court recently explained in a unanimous opinion how 
                                                 
14 In Gudgeon the court of appeals held that due process was 
violated because the circuit court prejudged the issue of 
whether to extend the defendant's probation.  State v. Gudgeon, 
2006 WI App 143, ¶¶25-26, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114. 
Likewise, in Goodson the court of appeals held that due process 
was 
violated 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
prejudged 
the 
reconfinement sentence that it would give to the defendant if 
his probation or extended supervision were revoked.  State v. 
Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶1, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. 
Even if Caperton abrogated Gudgeon and Goodson, prejudgment can 
require recusal.  See SCR 60.04(4)(f) (requiring recusal if a 
"judge, while a judge or a candidate for judicial office, has 
made a public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the 
judge with respect to any of the following: 1. An issue in the 
proceeding.  2. The controversy in the proceeding"). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
23 
 
Caperton's "application is limited" to its probability of actual 
bias and that due process does not require recusal for a "mere 
appearance" of impropriety.  Freeman, 222 P.3d at 178, 184.  I 
agree.  Mere appearance of bias cannot meet the high standard 
set forth in Caperton.  The California Supreme Court reasoned 
that the United States Supreme Court in Caperton "made it 
abundantly clear that the due process clause should not be 
routinely invoked as a ground for judicial disqualification.  
Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting extreme facts 
where a due process violation will be found."  Id. at 184 
(citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889-90).  
¶150 In Freeman the defendant appeared before Judge Robert 
O'Neill for a pre-trial hearing in which she sought new counsel.  
Id. at 179.  At the hearing, the defendant informed Judge 
O'Neill of "rumors" that the defendant was stalking Judge Elias, 
a colleague and long-time friend of Judge O'Neill.  Id.  Judge 
O'Neill stated that Judge Elias "is a friend of mine" and 
therefore recused himself from the defendant's case.  Id.  After 
the stalking rumors proved unfounded, the defendant's case was 
reassigned to Judge O'Neill.  Id. at 180.  Judge O'Neill then 
presided 
over 
the 
defendant's 
trial, 
the 
defendant 
was 
convicted, and Judge O'Neill sentenced her.15  Id.  The defendant 
                                                 
15 We recently held that a circuit court judge, who had been 
properly substituted out of a case pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.20, "erred" in returning to the defendant's case to 
"presid[e] 
over 
the 
defendant's 
trial, 
sentencing, 
and 
postconviction motions."  State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶8, 360 
Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 372.  
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
24 
 
appealed, and "[t]he Court of Appeal reversed defendant's 
conviction on the ground that defendant's due process rights 
were violated by Judge O'Neill's failure to disqualify himself 
when the case was reassigned to him."  Id. 
¶151 On review, the California Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeal's decision, holding that "this case does not 
present 
the 
'extreme 
facts' 
that 
require 
judicial 
disqualification on due process grounds."  Id. at 179.  The 
California Supreme Court noted that it granted review "to 
determine whether the appearance of bias by a judge requires 
recusal 
under 
the 
due 
process 
clause 
of 
the 
federal 
Constitution."  Id. at 178.  It held that "while a showing of 
actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under 
the due process clause, neither is the mere appearance of bias 
sufficient."  Id.  "Where only the appearance of bias is at 
issue, a litigant's recourse is to seek disqualification under 
state disqualification statutes[.]"  Id.  "Less extreme cases——
including those that involve the mere appearance, but not the 
probability, of bias——should be resolved under more expansive 
disqualification statutes and codes of judicial conduct."  Id. 
at 185 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889-90).16  
                                                 
16 In Caperton the Supreme Court noted that "the codes of 
judicial conduct provide more protection than due process 
requires . . . ."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890.  The Court 
reasoned that "States have implemented [judicial reforms] to 
eliminate even the appearance of partiality."  Id. at 888.  As 
noted elsewhere in this opinion, SCR Ch. 60 aims to prohibit the 
appearance of impartiality and articulates specific, defined 
standards for recusal by listing specific instances where 
recusal is required even if a judge actually would be impartial.  
See, e.g., SCR 60.04(4)(a) to (f); Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶¶95-
(continued) 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
25 
 
¶152 The 
California 
Supreme 
Court 
explained 
that 
the 
defendant 
could 
have 
sought 
recusal 
under 
California's 
disqualification 
statute 
because 
"an 
explicit 
ground 
for 
judicial disqualification in California's statutory scheme is a 
public perception of partiality, that is, the appearance of 
bias."  Id. at 181 (citations omitted).  "By contrast, the 
United State Supreme Court's due process case law focuses on 
actual bias. This does not mean that actual bias must be proven 
to establish a due process violation."  Id.  "Rather, consistent 
with its concern that due process guarantees an impartial 
adjudicator, the [United States Supreme Court] has focused on 
those 
circumstances 
where, 
even 
if 
actual 
bias 
is 
not 
demonstrated, the probability of bias on the part of a judge is 
so great as to become 'constitutionally intolerable.'"  Id. at 
181-82 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Although Judge O'Neill was a friend of an alleged 
victim of the defendant's stalking, "[t]his case does not 
implicate any of the concerns——pecuniary interest, enmeshment in 
contempt proceedings, or the amount and timing of campaign 
contributions——which were the factual bases for the United 
States Supreme Court's decisions in which it found that due 
process required judicial disqualification."  Id. at 185.   
                                                                                                                                                             
97.  However, under Wisconsin's Judicial Code, "[a] judge shall 
not be required to recuse himself or herself in a proceeding 
based solely on . . . the judge's campaign committee's receipt 
of 
a 
lawful 
campaign 
contribution, 
including 
a 
campaign 
contribution from an individual or entity involved in the 
proceeding."  SCR 60.04(7). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
26 
 
While it is true that dicta in these decisions may 
foreshadow other, as yet unknown, circumstances that 
might amount to a due process violation, that dicta is 
bounded by repeated admonitions that finding such a 
violation in this sphere is extraordinary; the [due 
process] clause operates only as a 'fail-safe' and 
only in the context of extreme facts. 
Id.  
¶153 A judge should recuse when required to do so and 
should not recuse when recusal is not required.  Wisconsin 
Supreme Court justices need to be particularly mindful of when 
they must recuse and when recusal is not required.  Unlike 
Justice Benjamin in Caperton, Judge O'Neill in Freeman, a 
Wisconsin Circuit Court judge, or a Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
judge, a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice who recuses cannot be 
replaced.  Thus, recusal has far-reaching consequences and 
leaves the citizens of the state without full supreme court 
consideration in a case of statewide significance.  
¶154 Complications that may occur when a full supreme court 
does not consider a case are self-evident.  Citizens of the 
state deserve to have the entire supreme court decide all cases 
unless extreme circumstances require otherwise.  Unlike a 
circuit court or the court of appeals, the supreme court serves 
a law development purpose; therefore, cases before the supreme 
court impact more than parties then before the court.  The Rule 
of Necessity, which requires that justices sit on a case if 
"necessary," 
further 
demonstrates 
the 
heightened 
need 
for 
justices to remain on a case even when the path of least 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
27 
 
resistance may be to recuse.17  The decision to recuse cannot be 
made lightly or out of fear of reprisal.  
¶155 Thus, Wisconsin Supreme Court justices may weigh and 
balance the need for recusal somewhat differently than a trial 
court or intermediate appellate court judge.  As a comment in 
Wisconsin's Judicial Code aptly explains:  
Involuntary recusal of judges has greater policy 
implications in the supreme court than in the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Litigants have a broad 
right to substitution of a judge in circuit court.  
When a judge withdraws following the filing of a 
substitution request, a new judge will be assigned.  
When a judge on the court of appeals withdraws from a 
case, a new judge also is assigned.  When a justice of 
the supreme court withdraws from a case, however, the 
justice is not replaced.  Thus, the recusal of a 
supreme court justice alters the number of justices 
reviewing a case as well as the composition of the 
court.  These recusals affect the interests of non-
litigants as well as non-contributors, inasmuch as 
supreme 
court 
decisions 
almost 
invariably 
have 
repercussions beyond the parties. 
SCR 60.04(7) cmt.  
¶156 Similarly, Chief Justice John G. Roberts has explained 
that justices on the United States Supreme Court should be more 
                                                 
17 "By decisional law, the rule of necessity may override 
the rule of recusal."  SCR 60.04(4) cmt; see also State ex rel. 
Wickham v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 N.W. 513 (1915); State ex 
rel. Cook v. Houser, 122 Wis. 534, 100 N.W. 964 (1904). The rule 
of 
necessity 
is 
not 
without 
limitation. 
 
For 
example, 
"application of the common law Rule of Necessity should not 
result in the defendant, potential defendant, and the witnesses 
also sitting in final judgment of the case."  In re Judicial 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Prosser, 2012 WI 103, ¶5, 343 
Wis. 2d 548, 817 N.W.2d 875 (opinion of Ziegler, J.). 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
28 
 
hesitant to grant recusal motions than federal district and 
federal circuit court judges:  
Although a Justice's process for considering 
recusal is similar to that of the lower court judges, 
the Justice must consider an important factor that is 
not present in the lower courts.  Lower court judges 
can freely substitute for one another.  If an appeals 
court or [a federal] district court judge withdraws 
from a case, there is another federal judge who can 
serve in that recused judge's place.  But the Supreme 
Court 
consists 
of 
nine 
Members 
who 
always 
sit 
together, and if a Justice withdraws from a case, the 
Court must sit without its full membership.  A Justice 
accordingly cannot withdraw from a case as a matter of 
convenience or simply to avoid controversy. Rather, 
each Justice has an obligation to the Court to be sure 
of the need to recuse before deciding to withdraw from 
a case. 
John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 2011 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at 9 (Dec. 31, 2011) 
(emphasis 
added), 
available 
at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf. 
II. CONCLUSION 
¶157 I agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that Jesse 
Herrmann has not shown that the sentencing judge, Judge Ramona 
A. Gonzalez, was objectively biased in violation of due process.  
I write to clarify the due process recusal test. Citing cases 
including Caperton, 556 U.S. 868, the lead opinion states that 
"[a] defendant may rebut the presumption [that a judge acted 
fairly, impartially, and without prejudice] by showing that the 
appearance of bias reveals a great risk of actual bias."  Lead 
op., ¶3.  However, due process requires recusal only if a judge 
is actually biased or if a "rare" or an "exceptional case" with 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
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"extreme facts" creates a "serious risk of actual bias."  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84, 886-88, 890.  
¶158 Caperton concludes that objective proof of actual bias 
or the probability of a serious risk of actual bias must exist 
before recusal is required.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84.  
Stated otherwise, it is not reasonable to question a judge's 
impartiality unless one can prove by objective evidence that 
actual bias or the probability of a serious risk of actual bias 
exists.  See id. at 884. 
¶159 The recusal test to be applied is the test explained 
by the Supreme Court in Caperton, which requires a "rare" or an 
"exceptional case" with "extreme facts" that create a "serious 
risk of actual bias."  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84, 886-88, 
890.  If the test were only whether an appearance of bias 
existed, and nothing more extreme or exceptional were required, 
then this record would support the defendant's contention that 
Judge Gonzalez should have recused herself.  To succeed on a due 
process claim, much more is required.    
¶160 Accordingly, I write to discuss the due process test 
of 
Caperton. 
I 
note 
that 
the 
Judicial 
Code 
and 
the 
disqualification 
statute 
provide 
for 
specific 
factual 
circumstances under which a judge must recuse, even when that 
judge could be completely fair.  See, e.g., SCR 60.04(4)(a) to 
(f); Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) to (f).  Caperton makes clear 
that a judge need not recuse simply because someone claims that 
the judge is partial.  In other words, Caperton concludes that a 
reasonable, well-informed person, knowledgeable about judicial 
No.  2013AP197-CR.akz 
 
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ethical standards and the justice system and aware of the facts 
and circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should know, 
would reasonably question the judge's ability to be impartial 
because of actual bias or the probability of a serious risk of 
actual bias.  Such circumstances are exceedingly rare. 
¶161 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
¶162 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this 
concurrence. 
 
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