Title: Application of Gjini to the Bar

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Matter of the Application of Otion Gjini to the Bar of Maryland, Misc. No. 32, 
Sept. Term, 2015. Opinion by Battaglia, J. 
 
Bar Admission – Duty of Immediate and Full Disclosure 
 
Applicant’s failure to disclose a Petition to Violate Probation on his Bar Application in 
the face of his known obligations to candidly, accurately and currently disclose impinged 
upon his character and fitness to practice law warranting denial of his application for 
admission to the Bar of Maryland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date argued: May 10, 2016 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
Misc. Docket No. 32 
 
September Term, 2015 
 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF OTION GJINI TO THE BAR OF 
MARYLAND 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts  
Hotten 
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned) 
  
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Battaglia, J. 
Barbera, C.J., Adkins and McDonald, JJ. 
dissent. 
 
 
 
Filed: July 7, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 5(d) of the Maryland Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland 
renders this Court the final arbiter of character and fitness of an applicant1:  
                                              
1 Rule 5 of the Maryland Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland provides: 
(a) Burden of Proof. The applicant bears the burden of proving to the 
Character Committee, the Board, and the Court the applicant's good moral 
character and fitness for the practice of law. Failure or refusal to answer 
fully and candidly any question set forth in the application or any relevant 
question asked by a member of the Character Committee, the Board, or the 
Court is sufficient cause for a finding that the applicant has not met this 
burden. 
(b) Investigation and Report of Character Committee. (1) On receipt of 
a character questionnaire forwarded by the Board pursuant to Rule 2(d), the 
Character Committee shall (A) through one of its members, personally 
interview the applicant, (B) verify the facts stated in the questionnaire, 
contact the applicant's references, and make any further investigation it 
finds necessary or desirable, (C) evaluate the applicant's character and 
fitness for the practice of law, and (D) transmit to the Board a report of its 
investigation and a recommendation as to the approval or denial of the 
application for admission. 
(2) If the Committee concludes that there may be grounds for 
recommending denial of the application, it shall notify the applicant and 
schedule a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted on the record and the 
applicant shall have the right to testify, to present witnesses, and to be 
represented by counsel. A transcript of the hearing shall be transmitted by 
the Committee to the Board along with the Committee's report. The 
Committee's report shall set forth findings of fact on which the 
recommendation is based and a statement supporting the conclusion. The 
Committee shall mail a copy of its report to the applicant, and a copy of the 
hearing transcript shall be furnished to the applicant upon payment of 
reasonable charges. 
(c) Hearing by Board. If the Board concludes after review of the 
Committee's report and the transcript that there may be grounds for 
recommending denial of the application, it shall promptly afford the 
applicant the opportunity for a hearing on the record made before the 
Committee. The Board shall mail a copy of its report and recommendation 
to the applicant and the Committee. If the Board decides to recommend 
denial of the application in its report to the Court, the Board shall first give 
the applicant an opportunity to withdraw the application. If the applicant 
withdraws the application, the Board shall retain the records. Otherwise, it 
(continued . . . ) 
2 
 
(d) Review by Court. (1) If the applicant elects not to withdraw the 
application, after the Board submits its report and adverse recommendation 
the Court shall require the applicant to show cause why the application 
should not be denied. 
(2) If the Board recommends approval of the application contrary to an 
adverse recommendation by the Committee, within 30 days after the filing 
of the Board's report the Committee may file with the Court exceptions to 
the Board's recommendation. The Committee shall mail copies of its 
exceptions to the applicant and the Board. 
(3) Proceedings in the Court under this section shall be on the records made 
before the Character Committee and the Board. If the Court denies the 
application, the Board shall retain the records. 
 
Our responsibility to regulate the conduct of attorneys is highlighted in this matter as we 
will not grant the application for admission of Otion Gjini who received a probation 
before judgment in 2013 for driving while impaired and thereafter failed to disclose on 
his application that he had received a Petition to Violate Probation and an attendant Show 
Cause Order.  
I. Background 
 
Otion Gjini filed an application with the State Board of Law Examiners (“Board”) 
for admission to the Maryland Bar pursuant to Rule 2 of the Maryland Rules Governing 
Admission to the Bar.2 In Gjini’s Application, dated May 19, 2014, in response to 
                                                                                                                                                  
( . . . continued) 
shall transmit to the Court a report of its proceedings and a 
recommendation as to the approval or denial of the application together 
with all papers relating to the matter. 
* * * 
(e) Continuing Review. All applicants remain subject to further Committee 
review and report until admitted to the Bar. 
2 Rule 2(a) provides: “(a) By Application. A person who meets the requirements of 
Rules 3 and 4 may apply for admission to the Bar of this State by filing an application for 
admission, accompanied by the prescribed fee, with the Board.” Rule 5(a) provides that, 
(continued . . . ) 
3 
 
Question 12, which asks for “a complete record of all criminal proceedings” he reported, 
among a number of other offenses, that on August 7, 2013 he had been charged with 
“driving while impaired by alcohol” and had received a probation before judgment 
(“PBJ”).3 Gjini answered “No” to Question 18, which asked: 
Have there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your life, 
whether at school, college, law school, business, or otherwise, which may 
have a bearing upon your character or your fitness to practice law, not 
called for by the questions contained in this questionnaire or disclosed in 
your answers? 
If so, give full details, including any assertions or implication of dishonesty, 
misconduct, misrepresentation, financial irresponsibility, and disciplinary 
measures imposed (if any) by attaching a supplemental statement. You are 
not required to disclose, in response to this question, any juvenile 
proceeding or any criminal proceeding expunged pursuant to Maryland law. 
Maryland law does not permit expungement of convictions. 
 
Gjini also affixed his signature on the application immediately beneath Question 20 
which informs applicants of their continuing responsibility to disclose changes to the 
information sought by the application: 
Affirmation of Applicant's Duty of Full, Candid Disclosure and 
Applicant's Continuing Duty to Submit Written Notice of Changes to 
Information Sought by the Application: I understand that the required 
disclosures in this questionnaire are of a continuing nature. I hereby 
acknowledge my duty to respond fully and candidly to each question or 
required disclosure and to ensure that my responses are accurate and 
current at all times until I am formally admitted to the Bar of the State of 
Maryland. I will advise the Board immediately and in writing of any 
                                                                                                                                                  
( . . . continued) 
“Failure or refusal to answer fully and candidly any question set forth in the 
application . . . is sufficient cause for a finding that the applicant has not met [his] 
burden” of proving “his good moral character and fitness for the practice of law.” 
3 Gjini’s probation was supervised and included a condition that he “Attend and 
successfully complete local Health Department alcohol treatment program and pay any 
required costs.” 
4 
 
changes in the information disclosed in or sought by this questionnaire, 
including any pertinent facts developed after the initial filing of this 
application and the facts of any incident occurring subsequent to the 
initial filing of this application. 
 
I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury, that the 
matters and facts set forth in the foregoing application are true and 
correct. 
 
I have made and retained a copy of this entire application for my records 
and for use in the event that the original is lost in the mail or during the 
character investigation. 
 
(Italics, underlining and emboldening in original). 
In accordance with Rule 5(b)(1),4 Gjini’s Bar application was forwarded to a 
member of the Character Committee for the Seventh Appellate Circuit, David DeJong, 
Esquire, because Gjini reflected a Montgomery County address. Mr. DeJong interviewed 
Gjini on September 9, 2014 and October 23, 2014 and concluded that Gjini had failed to 
bear his burden of proving his character and moral fitness for the practice of law in 
Maryland because of Gjini’s August 13, 2013 driving while impaired charge as well as 
his extensive driving record which included another alcohol related offense for which 
                                              
4  Rule 5(b)(1) provides: 
(b) Investigation and Report of Character Committee. (1) On receipt of 
a character questionnaire forwarded by the Board pursuant to Rule 2(d), the 
Character Committee shall (A) through one of its members, personally 
interview the applicant, (B) verify the facts stated in the questionnaire, 
contact the applicant's references, and make any further investigation it 
finds necessary or desirable, (C) evaluate the applicant's character and 
fitness for the practice of law, and (D) transmit to the Board a report of its 
investigation and a recommendation as to the approval or denial of the 
application for admission. 
5 
 
Gjini was not prosecuted.5 In addition, Mr. DeJong was concerned about on-line 
comments he found that Gjini had written on internet message boards while in law 
school. After Mr. DeJong forwarded his recommendation to the Character Committee for 
the Seventh Appellate Circuit and before it conducted a hearing under Rule 5(b)(2),6 
Gjini received a Petition to Violate Probation filed by his probation officer on December 
30, 2014 alleging that Gjini had “failed to verify attending and successfully completing a 
local Health Department alcohol treatment program” with a corresponding Show Cause 
Order in which Gjini was required to appear on February 18, 2015 in the District Court 
for Montgomery County. Gjini’s hearing was postponed due to weather, and Gjini 
appeared before a district court judge in Montgomery County on March 23, 2015, just a 
                                              
5 Gjini’s driving record reflected that his license was suspended in 2012 for an alcohol 
related driving offense, but the offense was not prosecuted. The description on Gjini’s 
driving record dated March 10, 2012 stated, “A/R – Suspended – 1st Offense Alcohol 
Content .08 or More.” The docket entry for district court dated March 10, 2012, however, 
described the incident as “Driver Failure to Stop at Stop Sign Line” and indicated a 
disposition of nolle prosequi. 
6 Rule 5(b)(2) provides: 
(2) If the Committee concludes that there may be grounds for 
recommending denial of the application, it shall notify the applicant and 
schedule a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted on the record and the 
applicant shall have the right to testify, to present witnesses, and to be 
represented by counsel. A transcript of the hearing shall be transmitted by 
the Committee to the Board along with the Committee's report. The 
Committee's report shall set forth findings of fact on which the 
recommendation is based and a statement supporting the conclusion. The 
Committee shall mail a copy of its report to the applicant, and a copy of the 
hearing transcript shall be furnished to the applicant upon payment of 
reasonable charges. 
The Character Committee conducted a hearing on March 30, 2015, during which Gjini, 
represented by counsel, testified and presented the testimony of two additional witnesses. 
The Committee called Mr. DeJong as a witness, but he did not participate as a Hearing 
Committee member. 
6 
 
few days before his Character Committee hearing. The district court judge determined 
that Gjini had not satisfied the alcohol education program requirement and gave him sixty 
days to complete another program at which time Gjini would need to reappear. Gjini did 
not supplement his Bar Application with any of this information at any time.  
Prior to the Character Committee Hearing on March 30, 2015, its Chair, Benjamin 
S. Vaughan, discovered Gjini’s Petition to Violate Probation on Case Search;7 the 
Character Committee members questioned Gjini during the hearing about the omission of 
information related to the Petition to Violate Probation. In a split decision, months later, 
the Committee recommended Gjini’s admission to the Bar, over the objection of Mr. 
Vaughan and another member of the Committee, Victor M. Del Pino.  
Pursuant to Rule 5(c),8 the State Board of Law Examiners reviewed the Character 
Committee’s Report and notified Gjini that a hearing would be held to afford him the 
opportunity to support his admission. The hearing was held on December 11, 2015. 
Following the hearing, the Board voted unanimously to adopt the recommendation of the 
Character Committee that Gjini be admitted. 
                                              
7 
Case 
Search 
provides 
access 
to 
information 
on 
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/ from case records listed by civil, traffic 
and criminal cases in the State. Maryland Courts, Case Search – Frequently Asked 
Questions, 
http://mdcourts.gov/casesearch2/faq.html 
(June 
6, 
2016), 
(https://perma.cc/UKZ9-3666). 
8 Rule 5(c) provides in relevant part: 
(c) Hearing by Board. If the Board concludes after review of the 
Committee's report and the transcript that there may be grounds for 
recommending denial of the application, it shall promptly afford the 
applicant the opportunity for a hearing on the record made before the 
Committee. The Board shall mail a copy of its report and recommendation 
to the applicant and the Committee. 
7 
 
The Board relied on the findings of the Character Committee to reach its decision, 
but none of the findings references Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition to Violate 
Probation, although in the hearings before the Character Committee and the Board 
Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition was explored. The Character Committee Report 
reflected: 
A. ON-LINE POSTINGS: 
 
During his investigation of Mr. Gjini's application, Mr. DeJong 
discovered, rather serendipitously, several statements which Mr. Gjini had 
posted to various chat-rooms on the internet as recently as his last semester 
in law-school. Those postings included commentary upon martial arts 
videos and similar matters and are set forth, verbatim, as follows: 
“This guy is a dipshit.” 
“Yo, shut the fuck up so we can watch the video.” 
“The both fight like hoes.” 
“The bully kid was a pussie.” 
“That girl is hot as fuck.” 
“Who is the faggot that made this video?” 
“Just keep games like they are with a PS3 controller. None of this gay shit.” 
“Straight NUTT in that bitch.” 
 
Mr. Gjini admitted that he posted the statements, above. He 
admitted, further, that the statements were posted while he was in law-
school and, in fact, many were placed during his last semester in law 
school.  
 
While the undersigned find these postings to be troubling, we do not 
believe that they are of sufficient magnitude to preclude Mr. Gjini from the 
practice of law. 
 
The substance and nature of the postings may reflect something of a 
chasm between persons of Mr. Gjini's generation and the undersigned 
members of the Hearing Committee. The language employed by Mr. Gjini 
certainly is not to be applauded and the undersigned would not encourage 
its use. Nonetheless, it appears no worse than that which is commonly 
found on the internet, and that which is regularly employed by pop-music 
stars and sports figures. 
 
Further, we note that Mr. Gjini expressed what we believe was 
sincere regrets with respect to the use of such language in his sworn 
testimony before this Committee. Thus, Mr. Gjini testified as follows: 
8 
 
[C]ertainly, this whole process, beginning with Mr. DeJong pointing it 
out, was the catalyst that I think is going to make me change my 
ways. I've deleted every one of those comments, because I am 
legitimately ashamed of them. I'm not - I don't want to give off the 
impression that I'm trying to explain or trivialize these comments, but 
there is a distinction to what I meant, because it bothers me 
profoundly, not just in this context, but generally. Like, I almost cried 
when my Mom was talking, because I am not a homophobe and I'm 
certainly not anti-women or anything like that. And the fact that these 
comments can be interpreted, can be correctly interpreted as such is 
what bothers me and is why I'm trying to save some face. But the fact 
is that I made these comments and I am utterly ashamed of them. 
 
On balance, we do not believe that the postings, however unsavory 
they may be, should prevent Mr. Gjini from practicing law in the State of 
Maryland. 
B. ALCOHOL-RELATED OFFENSES: 
Mr. Gjini admitted that he had been charged with Driving While 
Impaired by Alcohol in response to Question 12 (a) of his application for 
Admission to the Bar. He further admitted to receiving probation before 
judgment. He did not disclose any prior or subsequent alcohol-related 
driving offense. 
Mr. Gjini did, however, provide a copy of his rather impressive 
Maryland driving record. That record reflects a number of suspensions for 
various reasons. Notably, it appears that Mr. Gjini's driving privileges were 
suspended on April 25, 2012. The suspension was described on Mr. Gjini's 
driving record as “A/R – Suspended – 1st Offense Alcohol Content .08 or 
More.” The suspension was associated with ticket No. AJQ96389. The 
alcohol-related driving offense identified by Mr. Gjini in his application 
was associated with ticket No. 00000000PN0DNG. The date of that offense 
was August 7, 2013. This clearly followed the initial alcohol-related 
suspension of Mr. Gjini's driving privileges in April, 2012. 
Thus, it would appear that Mr. Gjini was at least investigated for 
more than one alcohol-related driving offense in a relatively short period of 
time (roughly 18 months), the latter of which was less than a year before he 
made application for admission to the Bar. His driving record from the 
MVA contains no reference to either offense other than an entry dated 
August 7, 2013 (the date of the second offense) regarding an “Order of 
Suspension Issued - Refusal 1st Chemical Test.” 
With regard to the earlier of the events referenced above, Mr. Gjini 
testified as follows: 
9 
 
A. I didn't know what the stop sign was about. I did not immediately 
link the stop sign with the actual alcohol charge until after the second 
meeting when I confessed, when I told him what happened. 
And I was going under the impression that we were addressing the 
things that I had reported and the things that I had to report, it wasn't - 
this was not an attempt, I mean, to hide from Mr. DeJong something 
that was expunged, which I didn't think I had to report anyways. I 
wasn't trying to steer him another way so he wouldn't catch on to me. 
I'm admitting it right now, even though I wasn't prosecuted. 
Q. So, I want to make sure if Mr. DeJong - and I questioned him 
about this earlier. He makes a statement in his memorandum, which 
I'm sure has been provided to you at some point, “Mr. Gjini is unsure 
and the record does not indicate whether he was actually charged with 
an alcohol-related offense. 
A. Yeah, I am not - I was not sure about that until afterwards. What 
happened was in my first charge I got a bunch of papers and I gave it 
to my lawyer at the time, and him and I went to court, and it was - I 
mean, I'm not going to say it was a blur to me, but I certainly wasn't 
as familiar with the process as I am now. And it's something that he 
said-like he came to me, my lawyer, and said, the cop didn't show up, 
you’re free to go. I was, like, really? I was surprised. He's like, yeah. 
So I left.  
In any event, it appears that while Mr. Gjini may have been charged 
with an alcohol-related offense in March, 2012, the charge was not 
prosecuted. He was charged a second time with an alcohol-related driving 
offense in August, 2013 to which he pled guilty and was granted probation 
before judgment. He would not have been legally entitled to such a 
disposition on the latter charge if he had received probation before 
judgment on the first charge. See, Md. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 6-220 
(d)(1) (2015). Accordingly, we do not have any reason to question Mr. 
Gjini's explanation regarding the disposition of the first alcohol-related 
event. Given that that charge was never prosecuted, the simple fact that he 
was so charged should not serve as an impediment to his admission to the 
Bar. 
Mr. DeJong testified that he would not have recommended against 
Mr. Gjini's admission to the Bar based solely upon his alcohol-related 
offense. We agree. 
 
(Internal citations omitted).  
10 
 
The Character Committee Chair, Benjamin S. Vaughan, however, disagreed with 
his colleagues and issued separate findings and recommendations at the Character 
Committee level in which he stated that, “I do not believe Mr. Gjini has met his burden of 
proving his fitness for the practice of law and I cannot recommend his admission.”9 Mr. 
Vaughan found Gjini’s on-line comments “patently offensive” but felt that the comments 
implicated First Amendment concerns such that they would not preclude his admission to 
the Bar. Mr. Vaughan also expressed concern that Gjini’s Petition to Violate Probation 
was only disclosed at Mr. Vaughan’s request and then only after Mr. Vaughan found it on 
Court Search, that Gjini’s DWI occurred while he was entering his final year of law 
school and that Gjini had attempted to satisfy one of his conditions of the probation 
before judgment by taking an on-line alcohol treatment course: 
Mr. Gjini's on-line postings are patently offensive. 
I am not impressed with the fact that similar language may find its 
way into the lexicon of popular music or celebrity-based magazines or may 
resemble that which trickles from the mouths of various sports figures and 
                                              
9 Committee member Victor M. Del Pino also recommended against admission. Although 
Mr. Del Pino did not submit separate written findings and recommendations, he raised 
several concerns during the hearing. With regards to the Petition to Violate Probation Mr. 
Del Pino was concerned with the lack of communication between Gjini and his probation 
officer: 
[Mr. Del Pino]: So the way that I read this is that you really weren’t 
communicating with your probation officer. I mean, is that accurate? 
[Gjini]: That is, to an extent it is accurate. 
Mr. Del Pino also expressed concern that Gjini was not taking accountability for what 
could be construed as his lack of candor: 
So you’re a college graduate, a law school graduate, and it appears as if 
many of your responses here to us today is to me sort of passing the buck. 
It’s the probation officer or me didn’t know this, or Mr. DeJong must have 
misunderstood that. And, you know, you made a statement regarding 
candor a moment ago. 
11 
 
pop-culture icons. I am not willing to have the question of character as it 
may pertain to the practice of law be defined by the purveyors of pop-
culture. 
It is not simply a statement of sanctimony to suggest that members 
of the legal profession should endeavor to elevate the practice of law above 
the transient vulgarities of contemporary society. One can only wonder how 
the history of this country might have fared had members of the legal 
profession refused to accept as somehow legitimate the culture which 
legalized slavery or which institutionalized segregation or anti-Semitism, 
all of which were accepted practices and expressions at one time, and all of 
which were then, and are now reprehensible. Mr. Gjini's postings continued 
a hideous practice of relegating certain persons within our community – in 
this instance, women and homosexuals – to second-class status and 
subjecting them to derision and exclusion. The very fact that such 
expressions directed at any person within our community would continue to 
find any degree of acceptance in our culture, pop or otherwise, might be the 
most compelling reason why they should not be tolerated among members 
of the legal profession. The legal profession cannot aspire to justice on 
behalf of just some members of the community to the exclusion of others. If 
the profession is going to serve its proper function at all, all members of the 
community must be secure in the belief that the law will afford justice to 
each of them or the profession will fail altogether. Mr. Gjini's postings were 
the antithesis of such a belief. 
To suggest that because statements such as those posted by Mr. Gjini 
are not uncommon among members of his generation, Mr. Gjini should not 
be held to any greater moral standard is to subjugate the question of 
morality and character to the whims of pop-culture. I do not believe this is 
appropriate. 
That said, as offensive as Mr. Gjini's on-line drivel may be, and as 
offended as I may be in reading the postings, I am equally concerned about 
the prospect of the State denying a citizen the right the practice the 
profession of his choosing based upon his speech, absent some exception to 
the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
I note that the Court of Appeals dealt with a similar issue in the case 
of Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 
A.2d 660 (1989). In that case, the Respondent, a Maryland attorney, faced 
suspension of his license to practice law following a string of incidents 
involving his estranged wife. The Respondent's behavior was, at times, 
threatening and violent on a repeated basis. It also involved profane 
language which was directed at his wife, police officers, a Court Clerk, at 
least one and perhaps two judges, opposing counsel and a prosecuting 
attorney who refused to pursue forgery charges which the Respondent had 
brought against his wife. 
12 
 
The Court of Appeals found that suspension of his license to practice 
was appropriate. In so doing, the Court responded at length to the 
Respondent's claim that suspension based upon speech, however offensive, 
would be violative of his First Amendment rights. The Court disagreed, 
given the facts of that case. The Court first noted that “Resort to epithets or 
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or 
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal 
act would raise no question under that instrument.” This finding, alone, 
might suggest that Mr. Gjini's use of epithets on the internet could serve as 
the basis for precluding him from practicing law without offending the First 
Amendment. The Court in Alison, supra, went on to point out, however, 
that the context of Mr. Alison's profanity and use of epithets resulted in the 
disruption of the courts. Thus, the Court stated: 
Alison's conduct in directing epithets toward the opposing 
attorney in Judge Cameron's court and later in Judge Harlan's 
chambers is clearly inimical to the time honored standards for the 
conduct of attorneys. Conduct of this kind has rightfully resulted not 
only in disciplinary sanctions, but in attorneys being found in 
contempt of court. 
Moreover, conduct of this kind is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. That such conduct does not at the moment of 
its occurrence delay the proceedings or cause a miscarriage of justice 
in the matter being tried is not the test. Conduct of this type breeds 
disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession. Dignity, 
decorum, and respect are essential ingredients in the proper conduct of 
a courtroom, and therefore in the proper administration of justice. 
. . . Where restrictions on the speech of those permitted to 
practice before this State's courts are necessary for their orderly 
functioning, and where regulations are content-neutral in restricting 
the time, place and manner of speech, they do not violate the First 
Amendment's guarantee of free speech.  
See, Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Alison, 317 Md. at 536, 
565 A.2d at 666 (1989) 
The speech at issue, here, did not take place in a courtroom and was 
not directed to other attorneys, clerks, judges or police officers, unlike the 
speech in Alison, supra. It was not speech which was uttered during a legal 
proceeding under the auspices of professional conduct. It cannot be said to 
have impeded the administration of justice, per se. It is not nearly as clear 
in this case as it was in Alison, supra, that the restriction on this type of 
speech would be necessary for the orderly functioning of those persons 
practicing before the State's courts. For this reason, I am hesitant to 
conclude that Mr. Gjini's on-line postings, alone, would justify his 
preclusion from admission to the Bar. 
13 
 
That said, the speech in this case, certainly would tend to “breed 
disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession” if associated with an 
attorney, in or out of the courtroom and whether or not it was uttered in a 
professional setting. 
Bearing those considerations in mind, the on-line postings were just 
one factor to be considered with regard to Mr. Gjini's application for 
admission to the Bar. 
In addition to the postings, Mr. Gjini was arrested on two fairly 
recent occasions for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The first 
of those charges, from 2012, was not prosecuted. The second event, in 
2013, while Mr. Gjini was entering his final year in law school, resulted in 
a guilty plea and a probation-before-judgment disposition. Thus, while Mr. 
Gjini was not convicted of either offense, nonetheless, he is currently on 
probation to the Court stemming from the criminal behavior of operating a 
motor vehicle while impaired by the consumption of alcohol. 
As a condition of probation, Mr. Gjini was required to participate in 
an appropriate alcohol education program. He chose to take an on-line 
course. This resulted in the filing of a Petition to Violate his Probation. This 
Petition was prepared on December 29, 2014 and approved on December 
30, 2014, some three months before the hearing in this matter. A Show 
Cause notice was issued on January 8, 2015. The Petition was not disclosed 
to the Board of Law Examiners or to Mr. DeJong. Indeed, it was disclosed 
to the Hearing Committee only at the request of the undersigned and then 
only after the undersigned found the Violation of Probation on Court-
Search. 
(A hearing was scheduled on June 1, 2015. We have been advised by 
Mr. Gjini's counsel that the Petition to Violate Probation was “dismissed 
due to Mr. Gjini's completing all that was required of him.” His counsel 
provided additional documents with respect to Mr. Gjini's attendance at AA 
and MADD meetings, his participation in, and completion of an alcohol 
counseling program and the dismissal of the Petition to Violate Probation. 
Those additional documents have been included in the exhibits attendant to 
this hearing.) 
I am troubled by the fact that Mr. Gjini’s involvement with the 
criminal justice system occurred while he was about to begin his final year 
in law school. I am troubled by the fact that his approach to the 
requirements of his probation resulted in a petition to violate his probation. 
His approach to the requirements of his probation - to take an on-line 
alcohol education course rather than participate in a program with a live 
instructor/counselor - suggests a cavalier attitude toward the instructions of 
the Court and the requirements of Mr. Gjini's probation. This is far less than 
I would expect of a law-school graduate making application for admission 
14 
 
to the Bar while on probation to the Court for a serious driving - and 
criminal - offense. 
I am equally troubled that Mr. Gjini did not disclose the fact that he 
was facing a charge of violating his probation until that charge was found 
by the undersigned. This lack of candor is less than I would hope to see in 
an applicant for admission to the Bar who bears the burden of proving his 
character and moral fitness for the practice of law. See, e.g., In the Matter 
of the Application of Gregory John Strzempek for Admission to the Bar of 
Maryland, 407 Md. 102, 962 A.2d 988 (2008). 
All of the factors combined lead me to conclude that Mr. Gjini has 
not borne his burden of proving his character and moral fitness. 
Accordingly, I cannot recommend his admission to the Bar. 
 
(Internal citations omitted.) 
 
Mr. Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition and its attendant hearing, which had 
been discovered by Mr. Vaughan, had been the subject of questioning of Gjini by his 
counsel at the hearing: 
[GJINI’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And now with regard to your current DUI, 
you have an outstanding violation of probation; is that correct? 
[GJINI]: Yes, sir. 
[GJINI’S COUNSEL]: You did have a hearing on March the 23rd, 2015, 
just a few days ago? 
[GJINI]: Yes, sir. 
 
Gjini did not supply, however, the Character Committee with any documentation 
regarding his hearing in the district court nor with a copy of Gjini’s Petition to Violate 
Probation; the latter was only provided at the request of Mr. Vaughan during the hearing. 
The issue of Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition also was raised and explored during 
Gjini’s testimony when Nancy Fey, a member of the Character Committee, asked Gjini if 
he had been aware of his obligation to supplement his Bar application: 
[MS. FEY]: Are you aware that the application is continuing in nature and 
that you have an obligation to report situations, so that when this came up 
15 
 
you at the very least could have reported it to Mr. DeJong or perhaps Mr. 
Vaughan, the violation of probation situation? 
[CHAIRMAN VAUGHAN]: Actually, the requirement is that the 
application be amended at the Board, so the notification would have to go 
to the Board. 
[GJINI]: Okay. No, I wasn’t aware of that. I told [my attorney] about it, and 
I figured – he said that it would have to be addressed at this hearing, so I 
figured it was all taken care of. You know, not taken care of, but that it 
would be addressed here. 
And at first, the first date was the same day, I had – I would have 
had both hearings the same day, and I figured since he said that it would 
have to be addressed here, I figured that if nothing was pushed I could have 
sorted that out and come here with it sorted out. 
 
 
During the hearing before the State Board of Law Examiners, Gjini’s counsel 
raised the issue of Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition to Violate Probation: 
 [GJINI’S COUNSEL]: The other issue that came up regarding the candor 
in a bar admission matter is the issue with the violation of probation that 
Mr. Gjini was – he was – there was a petition for a violation of his 
probation that the character – at the character committee was confused as to 
why he did not mention it to them prior to the hearing. And if you can 
elaborate on the issue as to what happened – why was there a violation of 
probation and what you could – why it was not disclosed to the character 
committee prior to the hearing that took place on March 30th? 
* * * 
[GJINI]: Right. So as soon as I received the letter – my violation of 
probation hearing was actually scheduled the same day as my initial 
interview, but they were both postponed because there was that huge snow 
storm last year that we had, they were both postponed, but two different 
days. So as far as I was concerned, I was going to go to my probation 
hearing first and then go to my character and fitness, so I figured that – I 
was under the impression this was all some sort of huge misunderstanding, 
because like I said earlier, Ms. Howell[10] would always come up with a 
different reason as to why my program wasn’t good enough, culminating 
with the judge needs to okay it because it’s on-line. 
 
So I sent her all the information . . . and I thought that she kind of 
realized that I shouldn’t be violated. And I even sent her an e-mail saying, 
oh, like are we still going to court, because I thought that it was going to be, 
                                              
10 Talaya Howell was Gjini’s probation officer. 
16 
 
like, totally resolved prior to my court date, and that was my goal because 
obviously I don’t want to go to court for something that I didn’t think that I 
did. And she said, yeah, something to that effect, but I still have to show up 
to court because the judge has to approve the course. 
 
So that day I went to court, the day came after it was postponed. The 
date came and I went to court and this was probably like April, like early 
April, April 1st or maybe, like, late March. Then I went there with my 
documents all by myself and I thought that it was just going to be, here you 
go, Judge, like I completed the course, so this is baseless, basically. And 
Ms. Howell said, oh like, to the judge, it was like oh, Your Honor, I have 
asked him repeatedly for this and that and he finally gave it to me, et cetera, 
et cetera. So even she – she wasn’t really against me either, but the judge 
essentially concluded that because my course was online that it might be 
like a bogus course, so to speak, because I think the impression that he got 
was you could just click play, and go do something else and then come 
back and you’d be done with the course, but the course actually had like a 
safeguard for that. . . . But the judge ultimately said that it wasn’t a good 
course. 
 
Additional questions relative to Gjini’s failure to disclose were raised by Matthew T. 
Mills, a member of the Board, to which Gjini responded that his assumption was that he 
did not have to disclose the Petition: 
[MR. MILLS]: And can you explain to me again, I’m confused as to why 
the committee felt that you had not been up front about the violation? 
[GJINI]: I mean, I guess the committee wanted me to edit my – this is my 
best guess, I’m not sure, but I think they wanted me to edit my application 
to I guess, say that I’d been charged with a violation of probation, but I was 
under the impression . . . that I don’t have to make this change until the 
matter is resolved[.] 
* * *  
[MR. MILLS]: Yeah, I mean, I – so you assumed that because you had not 
actually been found guilty of the violation that you didn’t have to tell us? 
[GJINI]: Well, I assumed that and also I assumed that it would be 
withdrawn  and that it wasn’t going to be something that I would even have 
to go to court for.  
* * * 
[MR. MILLS]: I guess what I’m trying to figure out is if you read our 
application, it is abundantly clear that we basically want to know 
everything about you and everything you have ever done and anything and 
everything that anyone has ever said about you, so why would you make 
17 
 
this assumption? Even if it was withdrawn, even if it was a complete and 
total mistake, why would you assume that you didn’t have to tell us? 
[GJINI]: Well, I can certainly accept that that assumption was incorrect, 
absolutely I definitely should have, but I didn’t think that I had done 
anything wrong and I didn’t think that it was going to be an issue at all. 
And I also told my lawyer and he said, oh we’ll just talk about it at the 
character and fitness hearing. So I figured that it was going to be addressed 
there. 
[MR. MILLS]: Okay. 
[GJINI]: Sorry. 
 
Although an issue, obviously, before the Board the Board did not issue any findings 
relative to Gjini’s failure to disclose his Petition to Violate Probation and its attendant 
proceedings.  
 
During the show cause hearing before this Court,11 Gjini’s counsel explained 
Gjini’s failure to disclose the Petition as follows: 
                                              
11 Rule 5(c) and (d) provide in relevant part: 
(c) Hearing by board. * * * If the Board decides to recommend denial of 
the application in its report to the Court, the Board shall first give the 
applicant an opportunity to withdraw the application. If the applicant 
withdraws the application, the Board shall retain the records. Otherwise, it 
shall transmit to the Court a report of its proceedings and a 
recommendation as to the approval or denial of the application together 
with all papers relating to the matter. 
(d) Review by Court. (1) If the applicant elects not to withdraw the 
application, after the Board submits its report and adverse recommendation 
the Court shall require the applicant to show cause why the application 
should not be denied. 
(2) If the Board recommends approval of the application contrary to an 
adverse recommendation by the Committee, within 30 days after the filing 
of the Board's report the Committee may file with the Court exceptions to 
the Board's recommendation. The Committee shall mail copies of its 
exceptions to the applicant and the Board. 
(3) Proceedings in the Court under this section shall be on the records made 
before the Character Committee and the Board. If the Court denies the 
application, the Board shall retain the records. 
18 
 
He was aware that you have to update your Bar application until it is 
approved by this Court. However, he was under the impression, and this is 
where he might have made a calculated error in the fact that, he felt that it 
was just a mistake—the probation of violation was a mistake. . . . In 
hindsight Mr. Gjini made an error in not notifying the Character Committee 
right away of the possibility of a violation of probation even though it was a 
mistake—that was a calculated error on his part. 
 
 
II. Discussion 
 
Based upon our review of the record, contrary to the recommendation of the State 
Board of Law Examiners based upon the omission of any consideration to address Gjini’s 
failure to disclose his Petition to Violate Probation and its attendant Show Cause Order 
and the hearing that followed, we determine that Gjini does not possess the present good 
moral character to practice law in Maryland; Gjini completely failed to supplement his 
Bar application with any of the facts developed solely through the efforts of Mr. 
Vaughan, the Chair of the Character Committee.12  
 
We are not persuaded that Gjini’s failure to disclose is mitigated in any way by his 
various excuses which varied from initially not knowing he had to disclose, then with his 
assumption that he did not have to disclose and finally, that his failure was a calculated 
error. We have consistently stated that disclosure on the Bar application and 
supplementation is mandatory: 
[W]e emphasize that disclosure on the Bar application and immediate and 
full supplementation after an incident warranting exposition is mandatory, 
                                              
12 The Court, consistent with its practice, has recounted, in full, the procedural history of 
the character committee proceedings, including the discovery of the applicant's electronic 
commentary and the character committee's expressions of concern. The Court's decision 
to deny Gjini's admission to the Bar, however, is not, in any way, premised on that 
commentary. 
19 
 
not voluntary. It is not the choice of a candidate for admission whether to 
disclose and under what conditions. 
 
 Application of Strzempek, 407 Md. 102, 113, 962 A.2d 988, 994.  
 
In Application of Strzempek, 407 Md. at 115, 962 A.2d at 995, we determined that 
disclosure must be made “immediately and fully” and that a delay in disclosing relevant 
matters may result in the denial of admission to the Bar. Strzempek pled guilty to driving 
while intoxicated after submitting his application for admission to the Bar and 
subsequently served four days in jail. Strzempek then failed to supplement his admission 
application and only disclosed his arrest several months later after receiving his Bar 
Examination results and Affirmation Form. Strzempek argued that he intended to 
eventually disclose the conviction, but we stated that, “His choice not to disclose in the 
face of these known obligations, however, impinges upon his character and fitness to 
practice law, irrespective of any purported ultimate intent” and denied his application for 
admission to the Bar of Maryland. Id. at 114, 962 A.2d at 995. We explained that 
“absolute candor is a requisite for admission to the Maryland Bar” and this requirement 
includes “immediate and full disclosure”: 
Question [20] on the Bar Application clearly emphasizes the requisites of 
immediate as well as full disclosure. The Rule governing the purpose of the 
Character Committee interview, which charges its attorney members with 
“verifying the facts stated in the questionnaire . . . and making any further 
investigation . . . necessary or desirable,” also is dependent upon immediate 
and full disclosure by the applicant, for otherwise, the process of 
investigation is stymied. . . . In our recent cases involving bar admission, 
especially, Application of Stern, 403 Md. at 634, 943 A.2d at 1258, and 
Application of Brown, 392 Md. at 58, 895 A.2d at 1058, we also have 
emphasized that, “it is a given that good moral character includes 
truthfulness and candor, and absolute candor is a requisite of admission to 
the Maryland Bar.”  
20 
 
 
Id. at 113-14, 962 A.2d at 994-95 (emphasis in original). 
 
Gjini made a choice not to disclose not only the Petition to Violate Probation but 
the court proceedings that followed. We are only able to evaluate Gjini’s lack of candor 
because a Character Committee member was doing his “job” and found information that 
was material to the evaluation of Gjini’s character and fitness. Gjini never supplemented 
his Bar application with any of the information related to a process in which his probation 
before judgment was the subject of a Petition to Violate Probation and in which a hearing 
before a district court judge was held. Gjini’s disregard of his obligation to disclose, 
whether because of ignorance or calculated error does not warrant his admission to the 
Bar of Maryland; Gjini has failed to bear the burden to prove his present good moral 
character and fitness, and we deny his application for admission to the Bar of Maryland. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
 
 
   
Argued: May 10, 2016 
   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misc. Docket No. 32 
September Term, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF OTION GJINI TO THE BAR OF 
MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Battaglia, Lynne A., (Retired, 
     Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., which 
Barbera, C.J. and McDonald, J., join. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  July 7, 2016 
 
 
Respectfully, I dissent from the decision of the Majority to deny admission to Mr. 
Gjini to the Maryland Bar for lack of character and fitness.  The Majority finds offensive 
his failure to disclose to the State Board of Law Examiners the fact that he received a 
Petition to Violate Probation and an attendant Show Cause Order after he chose to take an 
online course, instead of an appropriate in person course, to satisfy a condition of his 
probation. 
 
The State Board of Law Examiners has recommended that we admit Mr. Gjini, 
notwithstanding his Petition to Violate Probation and the hearing that followed.  The 
Board unanimously adopted the recommendation of the Character Committee for the 
Seventh Appellate Circuit.  The Character Committee concluded as follows: 
The undersigned are satisfied that this testimony confirms a 
proper degree of contrition and understanding as to the impact 
of such behavior upon one’s character and fitness for the 
practice of law.  We do not believe the charges or the conduct 
behind the charges should prevent Mr. Gjini from entering the 
practice of law. 
 
Report and Recommendation of the Hr’g Comm., In the Application for Admission to the 
Maryland Bar of Otion Gjini 7 (2015). 
I agree with the Board of Law Examiners and the Character Committee that he 
should be admitted.  His alleged violation of probation—the taking of an online course 
rather than participating in an appropriate course in person—is a rather minor 
transgression, and less consequential than the conduct in In the Matter of the Application 
of Gregory John Strzempek for Admission to the Bar of Maryland.  407 Md. 102, 104 
(2008) (considering the applicant’s failure to update his application to reflect that he pled 
2 
 
guilty to driving while intoxicated).  Although Mr. Gjini clearly was under the obligation 
to supplement his Application for Bar Admission, not doing so under these circumstances 
should not constitute the basis for denying him the privilege of practicing law for which he 
has studied. 
Chief Judge Barbera and Judge McDonald have authorized me to state that they join 
in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.