Title: Commonwealth v. Robinson-Van Rader

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-13329 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL ROBINSON-VAN RADER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2023. - May 15, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Constitutional Law, Search 
and seizure, Reasonable suspicion, Equal protection of 
laws.  Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 28, 2018. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter 
B. Krupp, J., and a conditional plea was accepted by Mary K. 
Ames, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
John P. Warren for the defendant. 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney (Michelle 
Slade, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Chauncey B. Wood, Kevin S. Prussia, Timothy A. Cook, Asma 
S. Jaber, & Douglas J. Plume, for Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
Katharine Naples-Mitchell, Audrey Murillo, & Radha 
Natarajan, for Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School 
& another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In the early evening of April 23, 2018, Boston 
police officers received reports of gunfire in a neighborhood 
near their headquarters.  Approximately seven minutes later, 
three officers patrolling in an unmarked vehicle encountered two 
young Black men, the defendant and J.H. (a juvenile), walking 
away from the location where shots had been fired.  The two were 
less than a mile from police headquarters and matched a bare-
bones description of the shooters.  The officers stopped and 
frisked the defendant and J.H. and discovered that each 
possessed a concealed handgun.  The defendant subsequently was 
indicted on charges of discharging a firearm within 500 feet of 
a building, unlawful possession of a firearm, and related 
offenses. 
 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized from his person, on the ground that the stop was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 
believe that he had committed a crime.  The defendant also 
argued that the stop and frisk was unconstitutional because it 
violated his Federal and State rights to equal protection of the 
3 
 
law.  In support of his argument on equal protection, the 
defendant submitted statistical evidence that two of the police 
officers involved, who were assigned to the Boston police 
department's youth violence strike force, were more likely to 
stop Black members of the community than individuals of other 
races. 
 
A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's motion 
because he concluded that the officers had had reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant to investigate his involvement 
in the shooting, and reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 
dangerous to support the patfrisk for a weapon.  In addressing 
the defendant's equal protection challenge, the judge presumed 
that this court's revised standard for establishing an equal 
protection claim under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
which was adopted in the context of a traffic stop, see 
Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711, 724-725 (2020), applied as 
well to a challenge of a pedestrian stop asserted to be racially 
motivated.  The judge reasoned that, "just as a racially 
motivated motor vehicle stop would be constitutionally 
problematic, a racially motivated stop of a pedestrian would 
also offend the constitutional right to equal protection."  
Notwithstanding the statistical evidence presented by the 
defendant, the judge then determined that the Commonwealth had 
satisfied its burden of establishing that the officers had had a 
4 
 
race-neutral reason for conducting a threshold inquiry, and also 
for pat frisking the defendant for a weapon. 
 
We conclude that the stop did not violate the defendant's 
rights under the Fourth Amendment or art. 14, because the 
officers had had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
defendant had been involved in the shooting.  We emphasize that 
the equal protection clause provides an independent basis upon 
which a defendant may rely in pursuing claims of intentional 
discriminatory application of the law, separate and distinct 
from the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  We agree with the judge that the new standard we 
adopted in Long, 485 Mass. at 724-725, to provide a defendant a 
more accessible path to pursuing an equal protection claim in 
the context of a motor vehicle stop, is applicable not only to 
traffic stops, but also to other police investigations such as 
pedestrian stops.  We also agree with the judge that, in this 
case, at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, the 
Commonwealth demonstrated an adequate, race-neutral reason for 
the stop, sufficient to rebut the defendant's statistical 
evidence of discriminatory policing.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The facts are derived from the 
facts found by the motion judge, supplemented with undisputed 
evidence from the record that is not contrary to the judge's 
5 
 
rulings.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015). 
 
On April 23, 2018, at 7:29 P.M., Boston police received 
reports and ShotSpotter acoustic alerts of gunfire at a 
basketball court near Annunciation Road, an area located not far 
from Boston police headquarters.  Within a minute of the first 
report, police received two 911 calls detailing the incident.  
The first caller, "Manny," reported that "[t]here was a bunch of 
shots just fired," "about . . . eight or so," near a particular 
address on Annunciation Road.  The second caller, "Marie," 
called from a location a few blocks away from Annunciation Road, 
adjacent to the Southwest Corridor Park.  She reported having 
heard "about six" gunshots, and described seeing two Black males 
wearing black "hoodies" (sweatshirts with hoods) riding "off on 
their bikes."  She also reported that the two males on bicycles 
left the area by riding along Prentiss Street, and then turned 
right (southbound) onto Tremont Street.  About fifteen seconds 
after placing the call, Marie was reporting to the 911 operator 
that she could still see the two males on bicycles, when she 
said, "I can see the cop coming now."  In an audio recording of 
the call introduced at the hearing on the defendant's motion to 
suppress, police sirens are audible in the background of the 
call. 
6 
 
 
Following this call, the police dispatcher broadcast a 
description of the suspects.  The first broadcast stated, "I do 
have a description of two males that were seen on bikes take off 
on Tremont from Prentiss."  Subsequent broadcasts detailed 
multiple witness's reports that the two males on bicycles were 
the shooters, and that they were wearing "black hoodies."  
Although the dispatcher had information from one of the 911 
callers that the two males were Black, she did not broadcast the 
reported race of the suspects over the police radio.  The judge 
found the police response to have been "swift and coordinated." 
 
As the investigation was developing, Officer James 
O'Loughlin, Jr., was working a paid detail on New Heath Street, 
slightly more than one-half mile south of the intersection of 
Prentiss and Tremont Streets.  O'Loughlin had been monitoring 
his police radio when he heard the report of shots fired, and 
the description of the suspects as two males on bicycles wearing 
black shirts or sweatshirts.  From where O'Loughlin was standing 
on New Heath Street, he had an "obstructed, distant view of the 
[Southwest Corridor Park] bike path," which was elevated and ran 
perpendicular to his line of sight.  Trees, fencing, and signage 
partially obstructed the view from his position 300 feet away 
from the bicycle path. 
 
O'Loughlin saw two Black males on bicycles, wearing black 
shirts or sweatshirts, pedaling southward toward Heath Street, 
7 
 
and reported as much to the police dispatcher.  He told the 
dispatcher, "You got two Black males coming down Tremont Street 
right now" toward Heath Street, and he described their 
appearance as one man wearing "a black vest and a Black male in 
a black jacket."  O'Loughlin also reported that the pair 
appeared to be pedaling slowly; he assumed that they were tired. 
 
When the police dispatcher first broadcast the information 
about the incident, three other officers, in an unmarked sport 
utility vehicle (SUV), were approximately one and one-half to 
two miles away from the scene of the shooting.  Officer Korey 
Franklin was driving the SUV in the vicinity of Blue Hill Avenue 
and Columbia Road; Officer Gregory Eunis was in the front 
passenger's seat and Officer Reivilo Degrave was in the rear 
seat on the passenger's side.  The three officers, all members 
of the youth violence strike force, were in plain clothes, but 
were wearing tactical vests that had "Boston Police" printed on 
the fronts and backs.1 
 
Upon hearing the dispatch, Franklin drove quickly in the 
direction of the reported shooting.  After further details about 
the incident were broadcast, the officers stopped at the 
location where O'Loughlin had been speaking to the dispatcher, 
 
1 The officers described the youth violence strike force as 
a city-wide unit tasked with monitoring neighborhood "hot spots" 
that are "plagued" by gun-related violence. 
8 
 
and they talked with him.  O'Loughlin told them that two Black 
males on bicycles, wearing black hoodies, were slowly pedaling 
toward Heath Street.  Based on O'Loughlin's report, Franklin 
drove north along Columbus Avenue, which parallels the bike 
path, to search for the suspects.  At that point, the three 
officers had heard the dispatcher's description of two males on 
bicycles in black hoodies, and O'Loughlin's observations that 
two Black males wearing black hoodies were riding bicycles and 
heading south toward Heath Street.  The officers had no 
information about the suspects' age, height, weight, build, hair 
style, or facial features. 
 
When they reached the area of the Southwest Corridor Park, 
the officers observed two young Black males wearing black 
hoodies walking south on Columbus Avenue on the southbound side 
of the road.  Few other people were outside in the area that 
evening, and the males were the only two individuals wearing 
hoodies whom police saw in that location.2 
 
The officers drove past the two young men and noticed that 
each kept continuously looking back over his shoulder toward 
Boston police headquarters, although nobody appeared to be 
following them.  Franklin turned the SUV around at Cedar Street, 
 
2 The defendant challenges the judge's finding that "[t]here 
were not a lot of people out that evening" as not supported by 
the record and therefore clearly erroneous.  We conclude that it 
was not clearly erroneous.  See note 4, infra. 
9 
 
and headed south on Columbus Avenue, so that he ended up 
trailing the two pedestrians.  Near the corner of Columbus 
Avenue and Heath Street, he pulled up adjacent to the two young 
men, who were on the passenger's side of the SUV.  After 
Franklin stopped the vehicle, Eunis and Degrave got out and 
approached the two men, who later were identified as the 
defendant and J.H.  The young men did not change their pace as 
the officers approached.  Degrave said, "Hold up a second," and 
the two complied.  Degrave spoke with J.H., while Eunis 
approached the defendant.  The officers did not observe any 
indications of hidden firearms, such as noticeably weighted 
pockets or suspicious bulges. 
 
When Degrave asked J.H. whether he had "anything on him," 
J.H. turned sideways in "kind of like a jerk reaction -- like as 
a reflex."  This resulted in J.H.'s right hip being shielded 
from the officer.  Degrave then pat frisked J.H. and found a 
firearm in his waistband.  As Degrave was conducting the pat 
frisk, Eunis had been observing the defendant, who was sweating 
and continuously looking over his shoulder toward Boston police 
headquarters.  Throughout the encounter, the defendant kept his 
right hand in his sweatshirt pocket but, unlike J.H., did not 
make any effort to turn or to shield his body.  After Degrave 
found the firearm on J.H.'s person, Eunis "grabbed [the] 
defendant, pulled him to the ground, secured his arms, and put 
10 
 
him in handcuffs."  A subsequent patfrisk of the defendant 
revealed a firearm in his pants pocket.  The defendant and J.H. 
were arrested between 7:35 and 7:36 P.M., approximately seven 
minutes after the report of shots fired near Annunciation Road.  
The location where they were stopped is approximately eight-
tenths of a mile from Boston police headquarters. 
 
Mary Fowler, a professor of mathematics at Worcester State 
University, testified in support of the defendant's argument 
that the investigatory stop violated his rights to equal 
protection.3  Fowler conducted a statistical analysis of the 
traffic stops Eunis and Degrave had made, which included 
information about the racial distribution of individuals in the 
 
 
3 The defendant moved, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), for discovery 
of statistical data necessary to analyze potential patterns of 
racial profiling by the arresting officers.  In support of this 
request, the defendant cited studies indicating that Black men 
in the city of Boston were more likely to be targeted for police 
investigation than individuals of other races.  See Commonwealth 
v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 539 (2016).  In addition, counsel 
cited an Associated Press report that "at least 71% of all 
street level civilian-police encounters involved minorities 
while minorities make up about 25% of the Boston population," 
and stated that, in his experience, officers assigned to the 
youth violence strike force "consistently stop, search and 
arrest Black and Brown people at higher rates" than the 
department-wide statistics.  A judge ordered the Commonwealth to 
"make available all [field interrogation and observation (FIO)] 
and arrest reports submitted by Officers Reivilo Degrave and 
Gregory Eunis" for a two-year period preceding the incident.  
Fowler utilized this data to "determine if the likelihood of an 
individual being recorded in an FIO [conducted by Eunis or 
Degrave] is related to race." 
11 
 
set of field interrogation and observation (FIO) reports 
submitted by Eunis and Degrave from January 5, 2017, through 
August 31, 2018.  An estimated fifty-one percent of residents in 
the officers' patrol area were Black.  Among the 276 individuals 
who had been subjects of the officers' discretionary stops 
during that period, 248, or ninety percent, were Black, and 
five, or two percent, were "white, non-Hispanic." 
 
Fowler compared those figures to data from the United 
States Census Bureau for the locations of each of the FIOs the 
officers had reported.  The census data contained the racial 
distribution of the residents living within the officers' patrol 
area at the time of the stops at issue, which acted as a 
benchmark.  Within the twenty-month period, Fowler testified, 
Black individuals were more than five times as likely to be 
stopped as other individuals.  Fowler conducted a statistical 
analysis called an "equality of proportions" test, which 
indicated that the difference between the frequency of non-Black 
individuals stopped and the frequency of Black individuals 
stopped was statistically significant.  Fowler explained that 
the frequency of randomly observing differences that extreme was 
less than one in 100,000.  Accordingly, she concluded that the 
stops were consistent with racial profiling. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
charging the defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm, 
12 
 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h); and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a 
building, G. L. c. 269, § 12E.  The defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the contraband found on his person on the ground that 
the officers lacked reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop 
that he had committed a crime and was armed and dangerous.  The 
motion also argued that the stop violated the defendants' rights 
to equal protection.  After a three-day hearing, and additional 
briefing, the motion to suppress was denied.  The defendant then 
entered a conditional guilty plea, conditioned on reserving his 
right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 
(2019).  He filed a timely notice of appeal, and we transferred 
the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Reasonable suspicion.  "To justify a 
police investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment or art. 14, 
the police must have 'reasonable suspicion' that the person has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime."  
Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 514 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 18-19 (1990).  Reasonable 
suspicion "must be based on specific and articulable facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's 
experience" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 
13 
 
Mass. 506, 511 (2009).  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968).  The calculus of reasonable suspicion examines "the 
totality of the facts on which the seizure is based."  
Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235 (2017).  See 
Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 103 (2021) (determining 
whether factors, "when viewed as a whole," gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion).  Reasonable suspicion must be more than a 
hunch.  Lyons, supra at 19. 
 
In this case, we must determine whether the officers had 
reasonable suspicion when Eunis and Degrave, wearing Boston 
police tactical vests, got out of their unmarked SUV, approached 
the two young men, and told them to "[h]old up a second."  See 
Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 699 (2020) ("the naiveté, 
immaturity, and vulnerability of a child will imbue the 
objective communications of a police officer with greater 
coercive power"); Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 
(2019) (seizure occurs when officer "objectively communicate[s] 
that the officer would use . . . police power to coerce [a 
suspect] to stay").  When reviewing the disposition of a motion 
to suppress, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings 
absent clear error, and "make an independent determination 
whether the judge properly applied constitutional principles to 
the facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Lyles, 453 Mass. 811, 814 
(2009). 
14 
 
 
The defendant argues that the officers had only a generic 
description of the suspects as Black males wearing black 
hoodies, which left virtually nothing to distinguish the 
suspects from others in the area.  When they were stopped, the 
defendant and J.H. were on foot, and were not riding bicycles as 
the suspects were reported to have done.  In addition, the stop 
took place "nearly one mile away" from the location where the 
shots were reported, and the context of the stop, in a busy 
residential and retail area, early in the evening, made it less 
reasonable to conclude that the defendant and J.H. were more 
likely to be the shooters than anyone else in the area. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that there was reasonable 
suspicion for the stop because of the defendant's and J.H.'s 
temporal and geographic proximity to the scene of the shooting, 
the similarity between the description of the two shooters and 
the appearance of the defendant and J.H., their nervous and 
evasive behavior, and the ongoing safety concern related to 
multiple shots being fired in a populated area. 
 
i.  Physical description.  The fact that an individual 
matches a broad, general description does not alone amount to 
reasonable suspicion, particularly if that description could fit 
many people in the area where the stop takes place.  See 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 535 (2016) (description 
of suspects as three Black males wearing dark clothing, one 
15 
 
wearing red hoodie, without any description of their facial 
features, hairstyles, height, weight, or other physical 
characteristics, was insufficient to support reasonable 
suspicion that Black male in general area wearing dark clothing 
was involved); Commonwealth v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 492, 496 (1992) 
("the description of the suspect as a '[B]lack male with a black 
3/4 length goose' [jacket] could have fit a large number of men 
who reside in the Grove Hall section of Roxbury"); Commonwealth 
v. Doocey, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 554, 557 (2002) (general 
description that fails to distinguish suspect from others cannot 
alone support reasonable suspicion).  Nonetheless, use of a 
general description is not an insurmountable obstacle to a 
finding of reasonable suspicion.  "[T]he value of a vague or 
general description in the reasonable suspicion analysis may be 
enhanced if other factors known to the police make it reasonable 
to surmise that the suspect was involved in the crime under 
investigation."  Meneus, 476 Mass. at 237. 
 
Prior to the stop of the defendant and J.H., the officers 
knew only that they were searching for two Black male suspects, 
who were wearing black hooded sweatshirts, and were riding 
bicycles in a particular direction.  No information had been 
communicated about the suspects' facial features, hairstyles, 
skin tone, height, weight, or other physical characteristics 
that could have contributed to the officers' ability to 
16 
 
distinguish the suspects from everyone else in the area.  See 
Warren, 475 Mass. at 535.  Moreover, at the time of the stop, 
the defendant and J.H. were walking, and not riding bicycles as 
the suspects were reported to have done.  Thus, the description 
of the suspects, standing alone, was too general to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.  Indeed, the judge 
recognized the description as being "generic."  See id. at 535-
536 ("With only this vague description, it was simply not 
possible for the police reasonably and rationally to target the 
defendant or any other black male wearing dark clothing as a 
suspect in the crime"). 
 
The inquiry, however, does not end there.  The judge also 
properly considered whether other pieces of information allowed 
the officers to narrow the range of suspects from a generic 
description fitting many members of the community to particular 
individuals.  See Meneus, 476 Mass. at 237.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 246-247 (2010) (general 
description that was insufficiently detailed and particularized 
to provide police reason to stop any person matching that 
description was bolstered by "accompanying circumstances"); 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 371 (1996) (general 
description combined with other relevant factors may provide 
adequate narrowing of description such that police have 
reasonable suspicion). 
17 
 
 
Thus, we turn to consider whether the bare-bones 
description of the suspects as Black men wearing black hoodies 
was enhanced by other factors relevant to a determination of 
reasonable suspicion. 
 
ii.  Nervous or evasive behavior.  The judge noted that the 
defendant and J.H. were exhibiting nervous behavior when the 
officers saw them walking approximately one mile from the scene 
of the shooting.  The officers testified, and the judge found, 
that the two young men "repeatedly look[ed] back 'over their 
shoulders' toward Boston [p]olice [h]eadquarters, although no 
one was following them."  The judge determined that this nervous 
behavior was an additional factor that could be considered in 
the calculus as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion 
at the time of the stop. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's finding of 
nervousness "added little, if anything, to the suspicion 
equation."  The officers would have been limited only to 
speculating that "the teenagers' head movements were related to 
the shots-fired incident, which took place nearly one mile 
away." 
 
In Commonwealth v. Karen K., 491 Mass. 165, 179 (2023), we 
considered whether evidence that a juvenile was "repeated[ly] 
looking over her shoulder and . . . attempt[ing] to avoid police 
officers" was properly factored into the analysis of reasonable 
18 
 
suspicion.  We observed that, although "nervous or furtive 
movements do not supply reasonable suspicion when considered in 
isolation," taken together with other factors, they may be 
considered as supporting reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 179, 
quoting Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372 (2007).  See 
Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 584 (1997) (reasonable 
suspicion was supported by observation of three men "walking 
rapidly away from the crime scene while glancing over their 
shoulders"). 
 
At the same time, caution must be exercised in considering 
nervous or evasive behavior in the calculus of reasonable 
suspicion.  "[I]n some instances, the fact that members of 
certain groups -- such as Black males in Boston -- have been 
disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for police encounters 
suggests a reason" for flight or evasive conduct unrelated to 
any possible consciousness of guilt (quotations and alterations 
omitted).  Karen K., 491 Mass. at 179-180.  See Evelyn, 485 
Mass. at 708-709 (nervousness and evasive behavior must be 
considered in context of unwillingness to engage in conversation 
with police); Warren, 475 Mass. at 540 (flight of Black man from 
Boston police officers, based on reports of racial profiling, 
was "not necessarily probative of . . . consciousness of 
guilt"); Commonwealth v. Martin, 457 Mass. 14, 21 (2010) (in 
19 
 
light of his young age, defendant's nervousness around police 
officer added little to determination of reasonable suspicion). 
 
There was no error in the judge's decision to consider the 
defendant's act of repeatedly glancing over his shoulder toward 
Boston police headquarters in the analysis of reasonable 
suspicion.  See Barros, 425 Mass. at 584.  Notably, the concerns 
expressed in Karen K., 491 Mass. at 179-180; Evelyn, 485 Mass. 
at 708-709; Warren, 475 Mass. at 540; and Martin, 457 Mass. 
at 21, are not present here.  The officers were driving an 
unmarked vehicle, and there was no evidence that the defendant 
and J.H. were aware that the car that drove past them in the 
opposite direction was a police vehicle.  In particular, the 
judge found that the defendant and J.H. were nervously glancing 
over their shoulders "before they were aware of . . . Franklin's 
unmarked vehicle."  Thus, the officers' approach cannot be 
considered the source of the defendant's nervousness. 
 
iii.  Geographic and temporal factors.  The judge also 
relied on the defendant's geographic and temporal proximity to 
the location of the shooting to bolster his view of the 
officers' ability to distinguish the defendant and J.H. from 
other Black men wearing black hooded sweatshirts.  The judge 
determined that the "[d]efendant and J.H. were moving in the 
direction of flight from the scene where shots were fired and 
were observed there only a few minutes after the shots were 
20 
 
reported.  As in Evelyn[, 485 Mass. at 708-709,] and Depina[, 
456 Mass. at 246-247,] [the] defendant's location and direction 
of travel were consistent with the expected location and 
direction of travel of the suspects at that time." 
 
The defendant contends that his proximity to the location 
of the crime, minutes after the reports of shots fired, did not 
support a finding of reasonable suspicion.  Relying on Warren, 
475 Mass. at 536-537, he argues that the officers had limited 
information concerning the direction of the suspects' flight.  
In the defendant's view, the officers, "could only guess where 
the suspects went . . . .  On bicycles, within minutes, the 
suspects could have been in any number of neighborhoods in the 
dense city of Boston."  See Meneus, 476 Mass. at 233-234, 240 
(no reasonable suspicion despite report that young men ran into 
courtyard of housing complex).  The defendant notes that, while 
he was stopped only minutes after the shooting, the distance of 
one mile from the scene, on a spring evening where Degrave 
testified that "a lot of people" were "walking around," but 
according to Eunis, no one "stood out," did not support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion.4 
 
 
4 As stated, see note 2, supra, the defendant challenges the 
judge's finding that "[t]here were not a lot of people out that 
evening" as clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous 
"only if the reviewing court has a firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed" (citation and quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Bresnahan, 462 Mass. 761, 775 (2012).  Eunis 
21 
 
 
The presence of a suspect in geographic and temporal 
proximity to the scene of the crime under investigation 
appropriately may be considered as a factor in the calculus of 
reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., Henley, 488 Mass. at 103 
(officers had reasonable suspicion where defendant was stopped 
two blocks away from, and five minutes after, shooting); Evelyn, 
485 Mass. at 704-705 (defendant being stopped thirteen minutes 
after shooting, one-half mile away from scene, weighed in favor 
of reasonable suspicion); Depina, 456 Mass. at 246 (defendant 
being within three blocks of crime scene ten minutes after 
shooting added to calculus of reasonable suspicion).  "Proximity 
is accorded greater probative value in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus when the distance is short and the timing is close."  
Warren, 475 Mass. at 536. 
 
In Warren, 475 Mass. at 536-537, the defendant was stopped 
one mile from the scene of the crime, approximately twenty-five 
to thirty minutes after a breaking and entering had taken place.  
 
testified that he did not see any other pedestrians that stood 
out to him that night, that he did not remember seeing other 
individuals, and that the defendant and J.H. "were the only two 
people I seen walking in that area."  The judge apparently 
credited this testimony, rather than Degrave's testimony that 
"[i]t's a very commonly-traveled area.  Some people were on 
foot.  A lot of people were just walking around . . . ."  The 
fact that Eunis's testimony was contradicted by his partner's 
testimony does not render the judge's finding clearly erroneous.  
"A judge may accept or reject, in whole or part, the testimony 
offered on a motion to suppress."  Commonwealth v. Harvey, 390 
Mass. 203, 206 n.4 (1983). 
22 
 
We determined that the broad time frame, combined with 
speculative evidence concerning the path of flight, could have 
placed the suspect anywhere in multiple neighborhoods within a 
two-mile radius of the crime scene.  Id. at 536-537.  The 
location and timing of that stop, therefore, were "no more than 
random occurrences . . . where the direction of the 
perpetrator's path of flight was mere conjecture."  Id. at 536. 
 
Here, by contrast, the defendant and J.H. were stopped 
seven minutes after the initial report of shots having been 
fired, approximately one mile from the scene of the shooting.  
The location of the stop was not a "random occurrence."  
Multiple reports by witnesses and police officers followed the 
path of the suspects as they traveled from near the scene on 
Annunciation Road to Columbus Avenue near the Southwest Corridor 
Park.  The first person who called 911 told the emergency 
operator that multiple shots had been fired on Annunciation 
Road.  The second caller provided another relevant location when 
she said that, from her position at a corner near the Southwest 
Corridor Park, a few blocks away from Annunciation Road, she saw 
two men wearing black hoodies riding bicycles, and heading south 
on Tremont Street in the direction of Heath Street.  Within one 
minute, O'Loughlin saw two men, wearing dark hoodies, riding 
bicycles on the Southwest Corridor bike path, heading south 
toward Heath Street.  A short time after speaking with 
23 
 
O'Loughlin, Degrave and Eunis spotted the defendant and J.H. on 
foot at the corner of Columbus Avenue and Heath Street, walking 
south. 
 
Accordingly, here, unlike in Warren, 475 Mass. at 536-537, 
the judge properly considered the defendant's geographic and 
temporal location relative to the scene of the crime under 
investigation as factors in his calculus of reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
iv.  Nature of the crime.  The judge observed that "the 
officers were looking for suspects in a shooting that had 
occurred nearby, a very short time before."  The shooting took 
place in a dense residential and commercial area, near a 
university and a train station.  The judge concluded that the 
"gravity of this crime and the fact that the shooters were at 
large further supports the officers' stop." 
 
The seriousness of the offense, and the danger presented to 
the community, are factors that properly may be considered in 
assessing whether police had reasonable suspicion at the time of 
a stop.  Depina, 456 Mass. at 247.  See, e.g., Henley, 488 Mass. 
at 104 ("we consider that the circumstances of this crime, a 
shooting that left one victim dead, presented ongoing risk to 
public safety"); Evelyn, 485 Mass. at 705 ("circumstances 
indicated a potential ongoing risk to public safety, and 
therefore weighed in favor of reasonable suspicion"); Meneus, 
24 
 
476 Mass. at 239 ("fact that the crime under investigation was a 
shooting, with implications for public safety, was relevant but 
not dispositive in determining the reasonableness of the stop"); 
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455 Mass. 147, 157-159 (2009) (in 
evaluating reasonable suspicion to justify stop, court 
considered report that van had been involved in homicide). 
 
Given the facts found by the judge, we conclude that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant to 
investigate the shooting.  As in other cases discussed supra, 
reasonable suspicion in this case was "based on a convergence of 
supporting factors," including the defendant's nervous or 
evasive behavior, his geographic and temporal proximity to the 
area of the shooting, the location of a likely flight path, and 
the ongoing threat to public safety.  See Henley, 488 Mass. 
at 105.  While the description of the two suspects was, as the 
judge described it, "generic" and, standing alone, was 
insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for an 
investigatory stop, the additional factors narrowed the search 
for suspects such that the officers did have reasonable 
suspicion when they stopped the defendant.  Accordingly, the 
stop did not violate the defendant's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 
b.  Equal protection.  In addition to his argument that he 
had been subject to an unreasonable search and seizure, the 
25 
 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of 
the stop on the ground of equal protection.  He argued that the 
officers violated his right to be protected from selective 
enforcement of the laws, and urged the judge, in analyzing this 
contention, to apply the less-stringent equal protection 
standard set forth in Long, 485 Mass. at 723-725, rather than 
the traditional three-part test elucidated in Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 894-895 (1978).  Under the Long 
standard, the defendant argued, "once the low bar of a 
reasonable inference of discriminatory motive has been 
established -- a burden of production -- the burden of proof of 
non-discrimination shifts to the Commonwealth."  See Long, supra 
at 735.  The defendant maintained that the Commonwealth had 
failed to rebut the inference of discriminatory motive, which 
was supported by Fowler's statistical evidence. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that the Long standard is limited 
to traffic stops, and therefore is inapplicable to a pedestrian 
stop.  In the Commonwealth's view, a selective enforcement claim 
arising out of a pedestrian stop requires evaluation under the 
more rigorous, three-part test set forth in Franklin, 376 Mass. 
at 894.  In any event, the Commonwealth maintained, whatever the 
applicable standard, it had presented an adequate, race-neutral 
justification for the stop. 
26 
 
 
The judge agreed with the defendant that the Long standard 
applies with equal force to pedestrian stops as to traffic 
stops.  He reasoned, "just as a racially motivated motor vehicle 
stop would be constitutionally problematic, a racially motivated 
stop of a pedestrian would also offend the constitutional right 
to equal protection."  Under the Long standard, the judge 
explained, "[o]nce a defendant raises a reasonable inference 
that a stop was racially motivated, the burden shifts to the 
Commonwealth 'to provide a race-neutral explanation for such a 
stop.'"  See Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 426 (2008).  
See also Long, 485 Mass. at 723-725.  The judge then concluded 
that he "need not address the question of a threshold showing 
because the officers had a race-neutral motivation for stopping 
the defendant." 
 
In reviewing the judge's decision, we first must determine 
whether the judge erred in applying the Long standard to a 
challenge to a pedestrian stop.  We then must decide whether 
there was error in the judge's conclusion that the Commonwealth 
met its burden of rebutting an inference of selective 
enforcement by articulating an adequate, race-neutral reason for 
the stop. 
 
i.  Selective enforcement and selective prosecution.  Equal 
protection jurisprudence encompasses two broad categories of 
rights, which protect people against selective prosecution and 
27 
 
selective enforcement.  Selective prosecution refers to the 
decision to charge a person with a crime based upon 
impermissible criteria such as race, national origin, or gender, 
resulting in a greater number of convictions of persons who 
share that characteristic compared to similarly situated persons 
who do not.  See Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 
167-169 (2009).  Selective enforcement refers to law enforcement 
practices that unjustifiably target an individual for 
investigation based on the individual's race or other protected 
class.  See Lora, 451 Mass. at 436-437.  These categories are 
often confused, and the terms used interchangeably.  See United 
States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 713 (2018).  In this case, we refer to claims 
of discriminatory police investigative practices as selective 
enforcement. 
 
ii.  Burden of proof.  Prior to our decision in Long, 485 
Mass. at 724-725, all equal protection challenges under arts. 1 
and 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights required 
review under a tripartite burden.  See Lora, 451 Mass. at 437-
438.  See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 
(1996) ("ordinary" equal protection claim brought under 
Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution requires 
proof of discriminatory effect, motivated by discriminatory 
purpose, and that similarly situated individuals were not 
28 
 
prosecuted); Washington, 869 F.3d at 214 (substantive claims of 
selective prosecution and selective enforcement are evaluated 
under same test).  Under this standard, the defendant bears the 
initial burden of demonstrating selective enforcement by 
presenting some evidence that raises at least a reasonable 
inference of impermissible discrimination.  This must include 
evidence that a broader class of persons than those prosecuted 
or investigated has violated the law.  See Lora, supra at 437.  
Second, the defendant must establish that failure to enforce the 
law was either consistent or deliberate.  Id.  Third, the 
evidence must show that the decision not to enforce or prosecute 
was based on membership in a protected class, such as race.  Id.  
If a defendant is able to raise a reasonable inference of 
selective enforcement by presenting credible evidence that, 
deliberately or consistently, similarly situated individuals who 
are not members of the protected class have not been prosecuted, 
the Commonwealth must rebut that inference of discrimination.  
Id. at 438.  The remedy for a selective enforcement violation is 
suppression of the evidence that was obtained in violation of 
the defendant's constitutional right to equal protection.  Id. 
at 439. 
 
In Long, 485 Mass. at 723-725, we revised the standard by 
which a defendant can establish a claim of selective 
enforcement, in the context of the traffic laws.  In deciding 
29 
 
that such a change was necessary, we explained, "it is clear 
that Lora has placed too great an evidentiary burden on 
defendants.  The right of drivers to be free from racial 
profiling will remain illusory unless and until it is supported 
by a workable remedy."  Id. at 721. 
 
Under the revised standard, it is the defendant's burden to 
demonstrate that the decision to make the traffic stop was 
motivated by race or another constitutionally protected class.  
A defendant may do so by producing "evidence upon which a 
reasonable person could rely to infer that the officer 
discriminated on the basis of the defendant's race or membership 
in another protected class."  Id. at 723-724.  The defendant 
must point to specific facts that support such an inference, 
which are known to the defendant based on "personal knowledge, 
the defendant's own investigation, evidence obtained during 
discovery, and other relevant sources."  Id. at 724.  A bald 
allegation of selective enforcement, based only on membership in 
a constitutionally protected class, would not suffice.  See id. 
at 723.  If the defendant does raise an inference of 
discrimination, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to rebut 
the inference by establishing a race-neutral reason for the 
stop. 
 
Our decision in Long, 485 Mass. at 721-723, noted 
explicitly that we had revised the standard by which to 
30 
 
establish an equal protection claim involving allegations of 
discriminatory traffic stops, given the difficulties defendants 
had experienced in establishing claims for selective enforcement 
based on race under the Lora framework.  See Long, supra, and 
cases cited.  We did not address whether this standard was to 
extend to all claims of selective enforcement, a question we had 
no need to reach.  The issue having been squarely raised here, 
we conclude that the equal protection standard established in 
Long for traffic stops applies equally to pedestrian stops and 
threshold inquiries, as well as other selective enforcement 
claims challenging police investigatory practices. 
 
In Long, 485 Mass. at 722, we determined that the first two 
parts of the three-part Franklin standard are not necessary in 
the context of motor vehicle stops.  We explained that, 
"because of the ubiquity of traffic violations, only a tiny 
percentage of these violations ultimately result in motor 
vehicle stops, warnings, or citations.  Thus, it is 
virtually always the case that a broader class of persons 
violated the law than those against whom the law was 
enforced.  Similarly, in stopping one vehicle but not 
another, an officer necessarily has made a deliberate 
choice."  (Quotation and citation omitted.) 
 
Id.  Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry is restricted to 
whether the traffic stop was motivated by the driver's race or 
membership in another protected class.  Id. at 723. 
 
For similar reasons, the three-part Franklin standard is 
equally ill-suited to other claims of discriminatory law 
31 
 
enforcement practices.  There is no reason to anticipate, for 
example, that a defendant challenging a threshold inquiry on the 
sidewalk in front of a public housing complex would be better 
able to prove a negative -- that similarly situated suspects of 
other races were not investigated.  See Washington, 869 F.3d 
at 216 (revising Federal discovery standard in selective 
enforcement cases because "there are likely to be no records of 
similarly situated individuals who were not arrested or 
investigated").  "Asking a defendant claiming selective 
enforcement to prove who could have been targeted by an 
informant, but was not, or who the [investigating agency] could 
have investigated, but did not, is asking [the defendant] to 
prove a negative; there is simply no statistical record for a 
defendant to point to."  United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 
853 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
The inaccessibility or unavailability of relevant data in 
such situations stands in contrast to cases of selective 
prosecution, which occur "when, from among the pool of people 
referred by police, a prosecutor pursues similar cases 
differently based on race" or another protected class.  See 
Conley v. United States, 5 F.4th 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2021).  In 
Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 173, for example, we considered a 
selective prosecution claim arising from a district attorney's 
practice of declining to bring statutory rape charges against 
32 
 
female complainants, "where the facts described by the girls 
could be viewed as contravening those same laws by them."  See 
Franklin, 376 Mass. at 896-897 (selective prosecution claim 
alleging that white residents of housing project were not 
arrested for violent crimes, and that "police, prosecutors, and 
court officials assigned to work in that area insulated whites 
from being punished for their participation in those 
incidents").5 
 
Moreover, a claim of selective prosecution implicates the 
discretionary authority of the executive branch to enforce the 
criminal laws.  See Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 160 
(2017) ("the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to 
judicial review" [citation and quotation omitted]); Bernardo B., 
453 Mass. at 161 (judicial review of decisions to prosecute 
"must proceed circumspectly lest we intrude on a function 
constitutionally vouchsafed to another branch of government").  
The presumption of regularity, a deference doctrine, limits 
judicial scrutiny of certain executive branch decisions.  See 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 161; The 
 
5 We note that the decision to conduct a pedestrian stop, or 
to investigate a suspect, is a "deliberate choice," thus 
satisfying the requirement under the second part of the three-
part Franklin test, see Franklin, 376 Mass. at 894, that a 
defendant show that the failure to prosecute was deliberate. 
33 
 
Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of the Executive 
Branch, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2431, 2432 (2018). 
 
In Massachusetts, the presumption of regularity encompasses 
charging decisions by both police officers and prosecutors.  See 
Lora, 451 Mass. at 437.  "An arrest or prosecution based on 
probable cause . . . ordinarily [is] cloaked with a presumption 
of regularity.  Because we presume that criminal prosecutions 
are undertaken in good faith, without intent to discriminate, 
the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating 
selective enforcement" (citation and quotation omitted).  Id.  
See Franklin, 376 Mass. at 894 ("prosecutors and other law 
enforcement officers enjoy considerable discretion in exercising 
some selectivity for purposes consistent with the public 
interest . . . [b]ecause we presume that criminal prosecutions 
are undertaken in good faith, without intent to discriminate"); 
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 22 (1977) ("we presume that 
criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, 
without intent to discriminate"). 
 
The presumption of regularity, however, applies to 
decisions by prosecutors and police officers to charge an 
individual with a crime; it does not apply to street-level 
police investigations.  See Conley, 5 F.4th at 791 (presumption 
of regularity did not shield police "sting" operation from 
scrutiny because doctrine "is driven by separation of powers 
34 
 
concerns, which increase as courts venture closer to core 
executive activity").  While decisions by police officers 
"certainly reflect law enforcement priorities, judicial inquiry 
into their motives is routine."  Id.  See Sellers, 906 F.3d at 
853 (Federal agents "are not protected by a powerful privilege 
or covered by a presumption of constitutional behavior" 
[citation omitted]).  "Unlike prosecutors, agents [of the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation] regularly testify in criminal cases, 
and their credibility may be relentlessly attacked by defense 
counsel.  They also may have to testify in pretrial proceedings, 
such as motions to suppress evidence, and again their honesty is 
open to challenge."  United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720-
721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 
iii.  Application.  As discussed supra, a defendant raising 
a claim of selective enforcement based on alleged discriminatory 
policing practices bears the initial burden of establishing a 
reasonable inference that the investigation was motivated by 
race or membership in another constitutionally protected class.  
See Long, 485 Mass. at 724.  The defendant must point to 
"specific facts" about the police investigation that support 
such an inference.  Id.  If the defendant succeeds in doing so, 
the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to rebut the inference of 
discrimination.  Id. 
35 
 
 
In examining a claim of selective enforcement, a reviewing 
judge must consider the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the claim.  See Long, 485 Mass. at 724-725.  In the 
context of police investigations such as pedestrian stops, the 
totality of the circumstances may include patterns of 
enforcement actions by the particular officer; the events 
preceding the investigation, i.e., the reasons the officer 
decided to target the defendant; the seriousness of the crime 
being investigated; and whether the defendant's race or 
ethnicity, or membership in another protected class, was part of 
a description of the suspect.  See, e.g., State v. Nyema, 249 
N.J. 509, 530 (2021), quoting New Jersey Attorney General, 
Directive Establishing an Official Statewide Policy Defining and 
Prohibiting the Practice of "Racially-Influenced Policing" (June 
28, 2005) (directive prohibiting racially influenced policing 
allowed officers to take into account "a person's race or 
ethnicity when race or ethnicity is used to describe physical 
characteristics that identify a particular individual . . . 
being sought by a law enforcement agency in furtherance of a 
specific investigation or prosecution").  See also Brown v. 
Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338-339 (2nd Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 816 (2001) (where police possess description of suspect 
consisting primarily of race and gender, they are permitted to 
act on basis of that description, absent evidence of racial 
36 
 
animus); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 354 n.5 (6th Cir. 
1997) (use of race as descriptive factor is not prohibited under 
equal protection clause, provided that police do not engage in 
dragnet tactics). 
 
A decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey is 
illustrative of a case where the court considered a defendant's 
selective enforcement claim arising out of an allegedly racially 
motivated threshold inquiry.  See State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 
471 (2001).  In that case, undercover police officers confronted 
two young Black men, who were arriving at a train station along 
with numerous other rush-hour commuters.  Id. at 477, 485.  The 
officers approached and asked to speak to the men.  A struggle 
ensued when the defendant turned his body and reached into his 
waistband, and several bags of marijuana fell to the ground.  
Id. at 478.  In reviewing the defendant's claim for selective 
enforcement, the court concluded that there had been no 
violation of a Federal or State right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, because the officers were 
entitled to approach and ask questions "without grounds for 
suspicion" (citation omitted).  Id. at 483. 
 
Nonetheless, the court went on to consider whether the 
decision to target the defendant for investigation constituted 
selective enforcement in violation of the defendant's right to 
equal protection of the laws.  Id. at 485-486.  The court 
37 
 
observed that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "requires that the selection of a person for a field 
inquiry . . . may not be based solely on that person's race 
absent some compelling justification that pre-existed the police 
approaching the individual."  Id. at 485.  The court then 
determined that the officers' hunch that the defendant had 
possessed narcotics was based, at least in part, on "racial 
stereotyping."  Id. at 486.  The undercover officers were 
patrolling the train station to prevent vandalism and graffiti.  
They were not conducting a narcotics investigation, and the 
officers had no reason to suspect that drugs were being carried 
through the train station.  Nor had they observed anything to 
suggest that the defendant was involved in a drug deal.  Id. 
at 488.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the government 
had "failed to overcome the inference . . . that this was a 
proscribed race-based field inquiry."  Id. at 489. 
 
Here, by contrast, we discern no error in the judge's 
conclusion that the Commonwealth rebutted an inference of 
selective enforcement raised by the statistical evidence.  The 
Commonwealth demonstrated that the police officers had a race-
neutral reason to have conducted a pedestrian stop of the 
defendant and J.H., the suspects in the case of reported shots 
fired.  The second 911 caller introduced the suspects' race to 
the investigation when she reported that she heard multiple 
38 
 
gunshots and then saw two Black men on bicycles wearing black 
hoodies.  Within minutes of the 911 call, O'Loughlin told the 
responding officers that he had seen two Black males, on 
bicycles, wearing black hooded sweatshirts, heading towards 
Heath Street.  In short order, the officers located the 
suspects, who were walking in a direction "consistent in time 
and direction with two individuals fleeing from a shooting on 
bicycles." 
 
The defendant contends that, in denying his motion to 
suppress on the ground of equal protection, the judge conflated 
the requirements of art. 14 and the equal protection analysis.  
The defendant argues that the "equal protection question was not 
answered by the motion judge's art. 14 determination that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop -- that 
analysis is simply inapposite to rebutting the defendant's prima 
facie statistical case, apples and oranges."  According to the 
defendant, "Long's plain language dictates that the Commonwealth 
cannot ignore or sidestep a defendant's statistical case," and 
therefore the judge "erroneously absolved the Commonwealth of 
its equal protection rebuttal burden." 
 
We emphasize that the Federal and State constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection of the laws provide residents of 
the Commonwealth a degree of protection separate and distinct 
from the prohibition against unreasonable searches and searches 
39 
 
under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14.  See Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (constitutional basis for 
objecting to discriminatory application of law is guarantee of 
equal protection, not violation of Fourth Amendment); Lora, 451 
Mass. at 436 (same).  See also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 
1715, 1731 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (detention based on 
race, even where detention otherwise would be permissible under 
Fourth Amendment, violates equal protection). 
 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
has explained, the guarantee of equal protection "does not fit 
neatly into the various stages of Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure analysis."  Avery, 137 F.3d at 355.  Because the equal 
protection clause is intended to prevent discriminatory 
governmental conduct, the particular "stage" of an investigation 
is not relevant.  See id.  "[T]he heart of the [e]qual 
[p]rotection [c]lause is its prohibition of discriminatory 
treatment.  If a government actor has imposed unequal burdens 
based upon race, it has violated the [equal protection] clause" 
(citation omitted).  Id.  See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 529 
(investigative techniques that do not qualify as searches or 
seizures requiring reasonable suspicion "must still comport with 
the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause").  See also Marshall v. 
Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1166 (10th Cir. 
2003) ("That [the plaintiff's] stop and arrest were based on 
40 
 
probable cause does not resolve his more troubling claim that he 
was targeted by [a police officer] on account of his race"). 
 
That does not mean, however, that the Commonwealth is 
precluded from explaining why a police officer stopped a motor 
vehicle or conducted a threshold inquiry.  See Long, 485 Mass. 
at 724-725.  There may be substantial overlap between an inquiry 
into the reasonableness of a stop and the officer's motivation 
for stopping a suspect.6  To be sure, the constitutional basis 
for the stop is not sufficient, standing alone, to rebut an 
inference of selective enforcement.  See id. at 726 ("To meet 
its burden, the Commonwealth would have to do more than merely 
point to the validity of the traffic violation that was the 
asserted reason for the stop").  The burden shifts to the 
Commonwealth to "grapple with all of the reasonable inferences 
 
6 In Long, 485 Mass. at 725, we included within the totality 
of circumstances a judge could consider "the safety interests in 
enforcing the motor vehicle violation."  For example, a police 
officer may stop a vehicle traveling at 110 miles per hour on a 
highway.  The driver's excessive and unsafe speed would be both 
the reason for the stop and most likely an adequate, 
nondiscriminatory reason to stop the vehicle.  By contrast, a 
police officer is permitted to stop a vehicle traveling at 
sixty-six miles per hour on a highway as a violation of the 
speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644 (1980) (police were warranted in 
stopping vehicle based on observation of traffic violation).  
This latter, nominal traffic violation, however, would not 
suffice as an adequate, race-neutral reason to rebut an 
inference of racial profiling. 
41 
 
and all of the evidence that a defendant presented and would 
have to prove that the stop was not racially motivated."  Id. 
 
Here, the judge was required to determine whether the 
Commonwealth had rebutted the reasonable inference that the stop 
or investigation was not "motivated at least in part by race" or 
another impermissible classification.  Id.  We conclude that the 
evidence supported the judge's determination that police stopped 
the defendant to investigate his involvement in a recent 
shooting, and not because of his race. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  As there was no violation of the 
defendant's rights to be protected against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and against selective enforcement of the laws, 
there was no error in the judge's denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.