Title: STATE v RITCHSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 80-340 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . JAMES T H O M A S RITCHSON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Sandra K. Watts argued, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana C h r i s Tweeten argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: June 11, 1981 Decided : JuL 2 - 198 F i l e d : JUL C - 1 9 @ =amwp.* Clerk M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . James Thomas R i t c h s o n w a s c o n v i c t e d of one c o u n t of aggra- v a t e d a s s a u l t and one count of robbery f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e District Court of Cascade County. H e was sentenced to con- c u r r e n t terms of 20 y e a r s imprisonment on each c o u n t and was d e c l a r e d a dangerous o f f e n d e r . R i t c h s o n a p p e a l s from t h e judgment of c o n v i c t i o n . W e a f f i r m . R i t c h s o n robbed t h e D a i l y Double Bar i n Great F a l l s i n t h e e a r l y morning on December 17, 1979. H e had been i n t h e b a r f o r s e v e r a l h o u r s d r i n k i n g and p l a y i n g pool. A t c l o s i n g t i m e , he p u l l e d a sawed-off shotgun from underneath h i s j a c k e t and s h o t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e b a r behind which s t o o d t h e b a r t e n d e r , J i m Heaney. The d e f e n d a n t demanded t h e money from t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r . The owner of t h e b a r i n s t r u c t e d t h e b a r t e n d e r t o g i v e t h e man t h e money, whereupon t h e drawer of t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r was placed on t h e b a r . The d e f e n d a n t took most of t h e money and t h e n proceeded t o back o u t toward t h e f r o n t door. The s w a m p e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he heard t h e s h o t he l e f t t h e b a r through t h e f r o n t d o o r , l o c k i n g it behind him. The d e f e n d a n t t h e r e f o r e broke down t h e f r o n t door to make h i s e x i t . H e w a s s e e n g e t t i n g i n t o a car w i t h two o t h e r people and l e a v i n g . The i n v e s t i g a t i n g police o f f i c e r found a g l o v e i n t h e street i n t h e area where d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d t h e getaway car. A f t e r f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , R i t c h s o n w a s a r r e s t e d a t h i s home on December 21, 1979, w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t . A t t h e t i m e of arrest t h e o f f i c e r s s a w i n h i s house a j a c k e t f i t t i n g a d e s c r i p - t i o n g i v e n by t h e w i t n e s s e s . The p o l i c e r e t u r n e d w i t h a s e a r c h w a r r a n t and s e i z e d t h e j a c k e t , i n t h e p o c k e t of which w a s found t h e matching glove. The d e f e n d a n t w a s charged w i t h aggravated a s s a u l t , sect i o n 45-5-202 ( l ) ( c ) , MCA, and f e l o n y robbery, s e c t i o n 45-5-401(1)(b), MCA. Notice of i n t e n t to r e l y on t h e d e f e n s e of mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t was f i l e d on J a n u a r y 11, 1980. The District Court o r d e r e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t be t r a n s p o r t e d to t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n to undergo a 45-day p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n . The r e p o r t a p p a r e n t l y persuaded t h e d e f e n d a n t and h i s counsel to abandon t h e d e f e n s e o f mental i l l n e s s . S e v e r a l times d u r i n g t h e proceedings, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l moved to d i s m i s s t h e aggravated a s s a u l t c h a r g e on t h e b a s i s t h a t a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t is a lesser included o f f e n s e of robbery under s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA. The d e f e n s e also moved to r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e to elect s p e c i f i c e l e m e n t s of r o b b e r y under s e c t i o n 45-5-401 (1) ( b ) . Both motions were d e n i e d . A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e t h e d e f e n s e moved t o d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t due t o t h e i l l e g a l arrest of d e f e n d a n t . T h i s motion was also d e n i e d . On a p p e a l t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1) Whether s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, p r o h i b i t s t h e convic- t i o n of t h i s d e f e n d a n t of both aggravated a s s a u l t and robbery. 2 ) Whether t h e S t a t e must elect t h e s p e c i f i c e l e m e n t s of r o b b e r y , as d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 45-5-401 (1) ( b ) , which t h e S t a t e would a t t e m p t to prove. 3 ) Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n p r o h i b i t i n g d e f e n s e c o u n s e l from propounding q u e s t i o n s to p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s o n t h e i r t h o u g h t s about s e v e r i t y of t h e s e n t e n c e i n t h i s case. 4 ) Whether i n l i g h t of t h e r e c e n t United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n i n Payton v. New York, t h e r e was an i l l e g a l arrest o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . 5 ) Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d a p r o p e r p s y c h i a t r i c e x a m i n a t i o n p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA. The d e f e n d a n t f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t aggravated a s s a u l t is a lesser included o f f e n s e of robbery and t h a t it w a s error to impose s e n t e n c e s for b o t h o f f e n s e s . S e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : "When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of more t h a n one o f f e n s e , a person charged w i t h such conduct may be p r o s e c u t e d f o r each such o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however, be con- v i c t e d of more t h a n one o f f e n s e i f : "1) one o f f e n s e is included i n t h e o t h e r . . ." The term "included o f f e n s e " is d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 46-11-501 ( 2 ) , MCA, as f o l l o w s : " ( 2 ) An o f f e n s e is an ' i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e ' when: " ( a ) it is e s t a b l i s h e d by proof of t h e same o r less t h a n a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e charged; " ( b ) it c o n s i s t s of an a t t e m p t to c o m m i t t h e o f f e n s e charged o r to commit an o f f e n s e o t h e r - w i s e included t h e r e i n ; or " ( c ) it d i f f e r s from t h e o f f e n s e charged o n l y i n t h e r e s p e c t t h a t a less s e r i o u s i n j u r y or r i s k of i n j u r y to t h e same p e r s o n , p r o p e r t y , or p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or a lesser kind of c u l p a b i l i t y s u f f i c e s to e s t a b l i s h its commission ." Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e relies upon t h e same act t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c a u s i n g of r e a s o n a b l e apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y , an element of aggravated a s s a u l t , and t h e t h r e a t or f e a r of b o d i l y i n j u r y , an element of robbery. The act of f i r i n g t h e shotgun i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e b a r t e n d e r is t h e "same t r a n s a c t i o n " w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, a c c o r d i n g to d e f e n d a n t . H e a r g u e s t h a t i n t h i s c a s e robbery c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d by proving t h e e l e m e n t s of aggravated a s s a u l t p l u s t h e added i n g r e d i e n t of o c c u r r e n c e i n t h e c o u r s e of committing a t h e f t . While t h i s Court h a s n o t addressed t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e of whether a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t is a lesser included o f f e n s e w i t h i n r o b b e r y , t h e r e are s e v e r a l r e c e n t o p i n i o n s concerning t h e analy- sis to be followed i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f an o f f e n s e is included w i t h i n a n o t h e r o f f e n s e . S t a t e v. Close ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . I 623 P.2d 940, 38 St.Rep. 177; S t a t e v. Coleman (1979), Mont . , 605 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 1134; S t a t e v. P e r r y ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 590 P.2d 1129, 36 St.Rep. 291; S t a t e v. Davis ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 196, 577 P.2d 375; and S t a t e v. Radi ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169. These cases c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l y t h e test set f o r t h i n Blockburger v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 304, "The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e is t h a t where t h e same act or t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of t w o d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e test t o be a p p l i e d to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e are two o f f e n s e s or o n l y one, is whether each p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s p r o o f --- o f a f a c t which t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t . " (Emohasis added.) I n S t a t e v. Close, s u p r a , it was s t a t e d t h a t t h e Blockburger ana- l y s i s must be a p p l i e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e s t a t u t e s d e f i n i n g e a c h o f f e n s e and n o t w i t h r e f e r e n c e to t h e f a c t s of t h e i n d i v i - d u a l case. See also Brown v. Ohio ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 161, 97 S e c t . 2221, 53 L.Ed. 2d 187, h o l d i n g t h a t t h e emphasis of t h e Block- b u r g e r test is on t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e two crimes. The s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g "included o f f e n s e " speaks i n terms of " t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e charged." S e c t i o n 46-11-501 ( 2 ) ( a ) , MCA. T h i s language is a r e f e r e n c e to t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s of t h e crime r a t h e r t h a n to t h e i n d i v i d u a l f a c t s of each case. The Arizona, C a l i f o r n i a and Oregon cases r e l i e d upon by d e f e n d a n t are i n a p p o s i t e . Those states, e i t h e r by s t a t u t e or case l a w , have adopted an approach whereby t h e f a c t s of t h e i n d i - v i d u a l case r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s of t h e crimes d e t e r m i n e whether m u l t i p l e punishment is a l l o w a b l e . See S t a t e v. S t e e l e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 33 0r.App. 491, 577 P.2d 524; S t a t e v. J o r g e n s o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 108 A r i z . 476, 502 P.2d 158; People v. Beamon ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 0 5 C a l . R p t r . 681, 8 Cal.3d 625, 504 P.2d 905. In t h o s e j u r i s - d i c t i o n s t h e test is to e l i m i n a t e t h e f a c t s i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l case which are needed to prove one o f f e n s e and t h e n to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e remaining f a c t s w i l l prove t h e o t h e r o f f e n s e . See S t a t e v. M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 106 A r i z . 492, 478 P.2d 517. I f such an approach were followed i n t h i s c a s e , t h e act of f i r i n g t h e s h o t g u n could be used to e s t a b l i s h o n l y one of t h e o f f e n s e s . Montana h a s never used t h e f a c t u a l approach, however, and such a n approach is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y and case l a w of t h i s state. The u l t i m a t e g o a l is to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d to a l l o w m u l t i p l e punishment where t h e same act v i o l a t e s t w o s t a t u t e s . Examination and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r e l e v a n t s t a t u t e s a l o n e w i l l p r o v i d e t h e answer t o t h e m u l t i p l e punishment q u e s t i o n . Aggravated a s s a u l t is committed a c c o r d i n g to s e c t i o n 45-5-202, MCA, when a person " . . . p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s e s : " ( a ) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y to a n o t h e r ; " ( b ) b o d i l y i n j u r y to a n o t h e r w i t h a weapon; " ( c ) r e a s o n a b l e apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r by use of a weapon; or " ( d ) b o d i l y i n j u r y to a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . " The o f f e n s e of r o b b e r y is d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA, as f o l l o w s : "(1) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e of robbery i f i n t h e c o u r s e of committing a t h e f t he: "(a) i n f l i c t s b o d i l y i n j u r y upon a n o t h e r ; " ( b ) t h r e a t e n s t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y upon a n y person or p u r p o s e l y or knowingly p u t s any p e r s o n i n f e a r of immediate b o d i l y i n j u r y ; or " ( c ) commits o r t h r e a t e n s immediately to c o m m i t any f e l o n y o t h e r t h a n the£ t .I1 I n o r d e r to e s t a b l i s h t h e o f f e n s e of robbery, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t t h e i n j u r y or t h r e a t o c c u r r e d i n t h e c o u r s e of committing a t h e f t . I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h aggravated a s s a u l t , t h e S t a t e must prove s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y and/or t h e use of a weapon under s u b s e c t i o n s ( a ) , ( b ) and ( c ) . S u b s e c t i o n ( d ) r e q u i r e s proof o f i n j u r y to a p o l i c e o f f i c e r . One can c o m m i t robbery w i t h o u t i n f l i c t i n g s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y and w i t h o u t using a weapon. A s n o t e d i n MONTCLIRC1s Montana Criminal Code Annotated, pp. 182-184, one can commit r o b b e r y w i t h a t o y gun. A t o y gun does n o t q u a l i f y as a "weapon," as d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 45-2-101(65), MCA, and as used i n t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e . A s t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s proof of a t least one e l e m e n t t h a t is n o t needed to e s t a b l i s h t h e o f f e n s e of robbery, it is n o t a lesser included o f f e n s e i n t h e crime of robbery. Two o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e o f f e n s e s of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and robbery on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e former r e q u i r e s s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y w h i l e t h e l a t t e r r e q u i r e s mere b o d i l y i n j u r y . S t a t e v. Stepney ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 280 N.C. 306, 1 8 5 S.E.2d 844 and People v. Newton ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 6 1 App.Div.2d 1051, 403 N.Y.S.2d 277. W e f i n d t h a t a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t as d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-5-202, MCA, is n o t a lesser included o f f e n s e of r o b b e r y as d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-5-401, MCA. T h e r e f o r e t h e District Court d i d n o t err i n imposing s e n t e n c e s f o r b o t h o f f e n s e s . D e f e n d a n t ' s second c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g to r e q u i r e t h e S t a t e to elect between t h e alter- n a t i v e means of committing r o b b e r y set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 45-5-401 (1) ( b ) . The i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s i n c l u d e d both t h e o r i e s of s u b s e c t i o n ( b ) . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t f a i l u r e to elect d e p r i v e s him of n o t i c e and due p r o c e s s because h e h a s no way of knowing which set of e l e m e n t s and which proof w i l l be r e q u i r e d . F u r t h e r d e f e n d a n t claims t h a t o n l y one of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s r e q u i r e s t h e mental state " p u r p o s e l y or knowinglyf1 and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e S t a t e was allowed t o prove t h e o f f e n s e of r o b b e r y w i t h o u t proving i n t e n t . N e i t h e r of d e f e n d a n t ' s arguments h a s any merit. It was e s t a b l i s h e d i n S t a t e v. K l e i n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e crime of r o b b e r y r e q u i r e s proof t h a t t h e accused must have a c t e d p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly, r e g a r d l e s s of which a l t e r n a t i v e element is proved. The j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s as a whole make t h e i n t e n t r e q u i r e m e n t clear, s i n c e I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3 w a s g i v e n as f o l l o w s : "To s u s t a i n t h e c h a r g e of Robbery, t h e S t a t e must prove t h a t each element of t h e o f f e n s e was done p u r p o s e l y or knowingly. " Any c o n f u s i o n caused by t h e wording of t h e s t a t u t e which w a s r e p e a t e d i n t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n was cured by I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 3. Cf. S t a t e v. Dess ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 231, 462 P.2d 186. The i n f o r m a t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t i f y d e f e n d a n t of t h e c h a r g e s brought a g a i n s t him. T h i s Court s p e c i f i c a l l y approved t h e p r a c t i c e of c h a r g i n g i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h i n s e p a r a t e c o u n t s i n S t a t e ex rel. McKenzie v. D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1211. S e c t i o n 46-11-404(1), M C A , e x p l i c i t l y states t h a t a c h a r g e may c o n t a i n d i f f e r e n t s t a t e m e n t s of t h e same o f f e n s e , and f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n is n o t r e q u i r e d t o elect between t h e d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e s . Defendant n e x t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to a l l o w h i s c o u n s e l d u r i n g v o i r d i r e to inform t h e j u r o r s of t h e p e n a l t y f o r robbery and t h e n to i n q u i r e whether t h e y f e l t t h e p e n a l t y w a s too s e v e r e . The c o u r t allowed counsel t o i n q u i r e whether t h e j u r o r s were aware of t h e p e n a l t y , and none o f t h e j u r o r s responded i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . Defendant complains t h a t h i s r i g h t s under s e c t i o n 46-16-304(2) ( i ) , MCA, were v i o l a t e d . A similar argument was r a i s e d i n S t a t e v. H a l l a m ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s 1 b e l i e f s on c a p i t a l punishment. T h e r e i n it was noted t h a t a j u r y having c o n s c i e n t i o u s o p i n i o n s a g a i n s t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y would n o t be more l i k e l y to c o n v i c t d e f e n d a n t . S i m i l a r l y , i f any o f t h e j u r o r s i n t h i s case f e l t t h e p e n a l t y f o r robbery was too s e v e r e , t h i s b e l i e f could o n l y work to t h e b e n e f i t of d e f e n d a n t . The S t a t e might complain about t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of v o i r d i r e i n t h i s area, b u t t h e d e f e n d a n t cannot show t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n r e s u l t e d i n p r e j u d i c e to him. On A p r i l 15, 1980, p r i o r to t h e t r i a l i n t h i s case, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t decided Payton v. New York (1980 ), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, wherein a w a r r a n t l e s s , nonconsensual e n t r y i n t o a s u s p e c t l s home to make a r o u t i n e f e l o n y arrest w a s h e l d v i o l a t i v e of t h e Fourth Amendment to t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . R i t c h s o n a r g u e s t h a t h i s w a r r a n t l e s s arrest a t h i s home f o u r days a f t e r t h e robbery v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t s as e n u n c i a t e d i n Payton, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him should have been d i s m i s s e d . The f l a w i n d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is t h a t an i l l e g a l arrest h a s n e v e r been a b a r to p r o s e c u t i o n . The Court i n Payton noted t h a t t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d f o r d e c i s i o n was whether c e r t a i n e v i - d e n c e s e i z e d as a r e s u l t of or i n c i d e n t to t h e arrest was a d m i s s i b l e , and n o t whether d e f e n d a n t must s t a n d t r i a l , because he must s t a n d t r i a l even i f t h e arrest is i l l e g a l . Payton v. New York ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 445 U.S. a t 592, 100 S.Ct. a t 1383, 63 L.Ed.2d a t , c i t i n g U.S. v . C r e w s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed. 2d 537. Defendant concedes t h a t t h e coat and g l o v e s e i z e d from h i s home under t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t were p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . The d e f e n d a n t s last c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t t h e p s y c h i a t r i c e x a m i n a t i o n a t t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n d i d n o t conform to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n 46-14-202, MCA. Defense c o u n s e l b a s e s h e r argument on an a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t by a member of t h e p r i s o n s t a f f t h a t t h e p r i s o n is n o t equipped to handle f o r e n s i c p s y c h i a t r i c examinations and t h a t t h e y conduct merely d i a g n o s t i c e v a l u a t i o n s f o r placement purposes. N o o b j e c t i o n a p p e a r s i n t h e r e c o r d to t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r sending d e f n d a n t to t h e p r i s o n f o r e x a m i n a t i o n , and t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n d e f e n d a n t ' s b r i e f are based upon h e a r s a y r e c o r d s o u t s i d e of t h e r e c o r d . E r r o r cannot be pre- d i c a t e d on f a c t s n o t a p p e a r i n g i n t h e r e c o r d . S t a t e v. Puzio (19791, Mont . , 595 P.2d 1163, 36 St.Rep. 1004. Affirmed . Chief J u s t i c e