Title: Attorney Grievance v. Coppola

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. John Michael Coppola, 
Misc. Docket AG No. 5, September Term 2010.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – FORGERY OF ESTATE PLANNING
DOCUMENTS – NOTARIZATION OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
The Respondent, John Michael Coppola, having been found in violation of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d), was disbarred.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 5
September Term, 2010
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
JOHN MICHAEL COPPOLA
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.,
Murphy, J., Dissents which Bell, C.J.,
joins.
Filed: April 29, 2011
John Michael Coppola, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on October
20, 1997.  On February 24, 2010, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner” or “Bar
Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a),  filed a “Petition for Disciplinary
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or Remedial Action” against Coppola, charging numerous violations of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct (“MRPC” or “Rule”), including Rule 1.2(d) (Scope of
Representation),  Rules 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(2) (Candor Toward the Tribunal),  and Rules 8.4(a),
2
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(b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct),  with regard to estate planning services provided to the
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Rule 16-751(a) provides:
1
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
(1) Upon approval of the Commission. Upon approval or
direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the
Court of Appeals.
Rule 1.2(d) provides:
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(d)  A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
Petitioner withdrew, at the conclusion of the hearing, the charge that Coppola
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violated or attempted to violate Rule 3.3.
Rule 8.4 provides:
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It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
(continued...)
children of Elizabeth West, while Ms. West lay “unconscious or semi-conscious” in the
hospital.  
This Court referred the matter to Judge Ronald H. Jarashow of the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County for a hearing to determine findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757 (Judicial Hearing).   On June 23, 2010, Judge Jarashow
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(...continued)
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misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; . . . .
Rule 16-757 provides:
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(a) Generally. The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court. Unless
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating a judge. Before the conclusion of the hearing,
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination, regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct. A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action.
(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
(continued...)
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held an evidentiary hearing, during which Coppola was represented by counsel, and
thereafter, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which he found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Coppola’s acts and omissions constituted violations of Rules 1.2(d)
and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).  In so doing, Judge Jarashow made the following findings
regarding Coppola’s background:6
I. FINDINGS OF FACT.
A. BACKGROUND FACTS
Respondent, John M. Coppola, was born in 1960.  Mr.
Coppola was admitted to the Virginia Bar in 1989 and to the
Maryland Bar in 1997.  He currently lives in Upperville,
Virginia, and practices law principally out of the Leesburg,
Virginia office of Ryan & Coppola.
Mr. Coppola was raised in Northern Virginia and he
attended Catholic elementary school and high school in that
area.  In 1982, he earned a B.A. in economics from Union
College in Schenectady, New York.  He then attended graduate
school at Boston College, earning an M.B.A. with a
concentration in marketing in 1984, at the age of 23.
After earning his M.B.A., Mr. Coppola returned to
Northern Virginia and worked as the Director of Marketing for
Washington Business School, a trade school then owned by Mr.
(...continued)
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statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record.
(e) Transmittal of record. Unless a different time is ordered by
the Court of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the
Court of Appeals within 15 days after the statement of findings
and conclusions is filed.
We have excluded any references to exhibits or transcripts that are contained
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in the hearing judge’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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Coppola’s parents.  In 1985, Mr. Coppola began attending law
school at night at American University, Washington College of
Law while working full time.  He earned his J.D. from
American University in December 1988, and was admitted to
the Bar of Virginia in 1989.
John Coppola, the Respondent, has been a member of the
Maryland Bar since 1997.  He has practiced law from an office
in Leesburg, Virginia since 2000 and concentrates his practice
in the area of estates and trusts.
After passing the Virginia Bar, Mr. Coppola continued in
his marketing position at Washington Business School, while
also taking on a few legal duties for the School.  In or about
1996, Mr. Coppola formed a partnership with John Ryan, an
estates and trusts lawyer and lifelong friend.  Mr. Ryan had
recently opened a solo practice in Fairfax.  Mr. Coppola audited
courses at American University’s law school to learn the basics
of estates and trusts practice.
In 1997, Mr. Coppola opened an office of Ryan &
Coppola in Towson, Maryland.  He closed the Towson office in
2000 and relocated his practice to Leesburg, Virginia, much
closer in distance from his home.  From 2000 through the
present, Mr. Coppola has worked from the Leesburg office
while Mr. Ryan works from a Fairfax office.
Mr. Coppola was married in 1987 to Patricia DiSalle
Coppola.  The Coppolas have four children, a girl who is now
15, and triplets (two boys and a girl) who are now 13.  The
triplets were born premature and have had significant health
issues, particularly early in life.  Two of the children have
continuing health and developmental issues that consume a
significant portion of Mr. Coppola’s time and income.
The Coppolas were divorced in 2002, but Mr. Coppola
maintains very close ties to his ex-wife and children.  Patricia
Coppola currently works as an assistant for Ryan & Coppola. 
She and the children live in Mr. Coppola’s former home in
Vienna, Virginia.  Although Mr. Coppola lives about an hour
away, he spends a substantial portion of each day with his
children and his ex-wife.  On most weekdays, he leaves the
office in the late afternoon, meets the children at their house,
prepares and serves them dinner, and takes one or more to
various evening activities like boy scouts or sports practices,
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before driving an hour back to his house in Upperville.  On
weekends he also meets with the children and takes them to
various activities.
Mr. Coppola is the principal provider for his children. 
He has alimony and child support obligations in excess of
$36,000 per year.  He also pays health insurance in excess of
$36,000 per year, a consequence of his children’s preexisting
health problems.  Mr. Coppola testified that he is behind in his
health insurance payments as a result of a substantial decrease
in his income, as described in more detail below.
Since 1997, Mr. Coppola has practiced in the area of
estates and trusts.  He estimates that he has represented 950 to
1,000 clients over the course of his practice and that 80 percent
of his clients today are Virginia residents and about 20 percent
are Maryland residents.
Mr. Coppola consciously chose estates and trusts work
because he believed he could help his clients without
simultaneously harming others, unlike the nature of other legal
practice areas, like litigation, which involve clients in dispute
with others.  Mr. Coppola typically represents middle-aged and
middle-income individuals and families in estate planning and
trust matters.  He believes that many people in this demographic
neglect their estate-planning needs in part because of the
expense and difficulty of retaining a lawyer, and he has been
known to reduce or waive his fee for clients who cannot afford
to pay.
Mr. Coppola has never been disciplined by any bar
association or court.
The hearing judge then described Coppola’s contact with Elizabeth West’s daughter,
Jeanne Swink, which ultimately led to the series of events in issue here:
B. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS – ESSENTIAL FACTS.
In 2001, Mr. Coppola represented a Virginia couple
named Jeanne and Richard Swink in preparing a typical estate
plan.  At that time, Ms. Swink mentioned that her mother,
Elizabeth L. West, was getting older and lacked an adequate
estate plan.  Mr. Coppola invited Ms. Swink to have her mother
get in touch with him, but Ms. West did not do so at that time.
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Mr. Coppola stayed in touch with Ms. Swink over the
years.  In approximately December 2007, Ms. Swink mentioned
to Mr. Coppola’s ex-wife that Ms. West needed an estate plan. 
Ms. West, however, did not contact Mr. Coppola at that time.
In or about June 2008, Ms. Swink again contacted Mr.
Coppola about an estate plan for Ms. West.  On this occasion,
Ms. Swink indicated that her mother was ill.  Mr. Coppola
recalls that he spoke by phone with Ms. West on this occasion. 
The Respondent testified that the conversation lasted
approximately fifteen minutes and that Ms. Swink was also
involved in the conference.  This conversation appears to be the
only one that Respondent had with Ms. West concerning her
estate plan.  He learned that Ms. West had an existing Will,
drafted in 1995, that left all her assets in equal shares to her four
adult children.  Mr. Coppola subsequently obtained a copy of the
1995 Will, which was introduced into evidence in this case.
Mr. Coppola also learned that Ms. West had one
significant probatable asset, a house in Prince George’s County,
Maryland, and that Ms. West wanted to leave her estate to her
four children in equal shares, with a minimum of fees and
expenses.  Mr. Coppola recommended that Ms. West enter into
an estate plan that would include a new Will, a trust declaration,
an assignment of property to the trust, and a deed transferring
the house to the trust.  Under Mr. Coppola’s plan, a revocable
“Living Trust” would be created during Ms. West’s lifetime. 
Ms. West would be named as trustee and would have full
control of trust assets during her lifetime.  The Deed would
transfer ownership of the house to the Living Trust, and the
Assignment would pass untitled personal property to the Trust. 
Upon Ms. West’s death, the Living Trust automatically would
be converted to an irrevocable “Family Trust,” whose assets
would be distributed to each child in equal shares.
The principal purposes of this estate plan were to ensure
that Ms. West’s major asset did not become part of her
probatable estate with the goals of (1) avoiding the fees and
expenses chargeable in probate proceedings; (2) allowing the
trustee to sell the house readily and without delay or
complications of probate; and (3) accomplishing the same
distribution as would be carried out in formal probate.
Mr. Coppola also explained to Ms. West that he would
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prepare a general durable power of attorney and related medical
powers of attorney as part of a normal estate plan for a person
in her circumstances.  She did not formally ask him to prepare
the documents at that time.
Ms. West, herself, did not follow up ever again with Mr.
Coppola.
The hearing judge then described what happened on August 25, 2008, when Ms.
Swink asked Coppola to meet with her family at a hospital in Fairfax, Virginia, where
Ms.West was a patient:
On or about August 25, 2008, Mr. Coppola received
another phone call from Ms. Swink.  Ms. Swink said that Ms.
West was in a hospital in Fairfax, Virginia.  Ms. Swink
informed him that Ms. West wanted to go forward with the
estate plan they had previously discussed.  At this time,
however, Mr. Coppola had no direct conversation with Ms.
West.
Based on the phone call from Ms. Swink, on or about
August 25-26, 2008, Mr. Coppola prepared the documents he
had previously described to Ms. West using templates available
in his practice.  Those documents include the 2008 Will; the
Elizabeth L. West Trust Declaration; a Deed transferring the
Prince George’s house to the Trust; an Assignment transferring
personal property to the Trust; and a General Durable Power of
Attorney.  Mr. Coppola also prepared other medical estate-
planning documents, but because of the events described below,
these documents were not signed.
The Court finds that the estate plan designed by Mr.
Coppola was reasonable and appropriate for a person in Ms.
West’s circumstances.  The Court also finds that $2548 (a fee of
$2500 and $48 in expenses), the amount Mr. Coppola charged
for these services, was a reasonable fee for preparing and
implementing the estate plan.  For these findings, the Court
relies in part on the testimony of A. MacDonough Plant, Esq.,
who testified as an expert on estates and lawyers in Maryland. 
He reviewed the estate plan documents and charges and testified
that they were appropriate for an elderly woman who was
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terminally ill, whose estate was dominated by a house worth
approximately $250,000, and who wanted to bequeath her assets
to her children in equal shares.  Petitioner did not present any
contrary evidence.  But Respondent’s expert testified that, in his
opinion, the Respondent was not entitled to a fee given the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents.
In accordance with Ms. Swink’s instructions, Mr.
Coppola took copies of the estate planning documents to the
hospital in Fairfax, Virginia, on August 26, 2008, where he
understood Ms. West was a patient.  Mr. Coppola expected to
review the documents with Ms. West at the hospital, and to have
her execute them after review and consultation.
When Mr. Coppola arrived at the hospital, he found all
four of Ms. West’s children (along with Richard Swink) present
in Ms. West’s hospital room.  Mr. Coppola learned that Ms.
West had taken a sharp turn for the worse, although the date of
her losing competency was not established.  She was either
unconscious or semi-conscious, but undisputedly was in no
condition to review or execute the estate-planning documents. 
Ms. West was in the end stages of a battle with colon cancer and
it appeared unlikely that she would return to consciousness.  The
family was manifestly distraught at their mother’s condition and
several of the children were openly crying.
Mr. Coppola explained to the children why he was there
and what the documents he had drafted were intended to do. 
(Ms. Swink, of course, already knew why Mr. Coppola was
there.)  He explained the purpose of the estate-planning
documents as set forth above, including the fact that the plan
might save the estate approximately $10,000 in probate fees and
expenses, primarily attorney’s fees, by placing the house into a
trust.  He also explained how the trust worked and why it would
not affect the children’s inheritances except to increase the size
of the distribution to the trust beneficiaries (i.e., the four
children) compared to a probated estate that would have paid
attorneys fees and expenses before distribution to the four
children.  Mr. Coppola had drafted the trust declaration to name
Ms. Swink as the successor trustee, but the children requested
that all four of them serve as the successor trustee, and Mr.
Coppola agreed to make this change later, after signing of the
documents.  The trust was drafted, however, to ensure that each
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of the children would be the sole trustee of his or her share upon
reaching age 25 and because all the children were already over
age 25, each child would maintain control over his or her share.
Mr. Coppola estimated $10,000 in savings based on an
estimated value of $250,000 for Ms. West’s house.  Those
savings roughly comport with the allowable statutory
compensation for personal representatives and special
administrators set forth in § 7-601 of the Estates and Trusts
Article of the Maryland Code.  The Court finds that even though
the Personal Representative could have waived this fee, Mr.
Coppola’s savings estimate was reasonable because a fee of
roughly the same amount likely would have been charged by
counsel for the personal representative and counsel’s agents,
such as an accounting firm.
The Court finds that Mr. Coppola reasonably believes
that the personal representative of Ms. West’s estate would have
needed to hire an attorney if the 1995 Will were admitted to
probate.  Ms. Swink, the personal representative under the 1995
Will, was a Virginia resident, and the probate proceedings
would have been in Prince George’s County, Maryland.  In
addition, because Ms. West’s house would have been part of the
probatable estate under the 1995 Will, the probate proceedings
would have been sufficiently complex to require the assistance
of counsel.  The Court relies in part on the testimony of Mr.
Plant for this finding.
Mr. Coppola’s testimony that the August 2008 documents
reflected Ms. West’s intent is bolstered by comparing the
relevant provisions of the 1995 Will and the 2008 Will and Trust
Declaration.  Under both the 1995 Will and the 2008 estate plan,
Ms. West’s assets would be shared in equal proportion by her
four adult children.  Nothing in the 2008 estate plan modifies the
share any beneficiary would have received under the 1995 Will. 
No evidence was presented suggesting that Mr. Coppola’s
proposed estate plan did not reflect Ms. West’s intent, and
whether Mr. Coppola engaged in best practices to determine Ms.
West’s intent is not at issue in this proceeding.  There is no
evidence as to whether this remained Ms. West’s intent in
August 2008.
After learning that Ms. West was not capable of executing the documents, Coppola
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was approached by Ms. West’s four children regarding the possibility of Ms. Swink forging
Ms. West’s signature on the documents, which Coppola facilitated:
Mr. Coppola testified that Ms. West’s children asked
whether they could sign the estate-planning documents on Ms.
West’s behalf as they recognized the cost savings to be gained
if the documents could be utilized.  Mr. Coppola told them that
they could not legally do so.  He explained that some of the
documents needed to be witnessed and certified.
Notwithstanding these explanations, the children pleaded
with Mr. Coppola to certify Ms. Swink’s execution of the
documents in her mother’s name.  He explained that if the
children were not in agreement with the provisions of the estate
plan, then it would be counterproductive to sign Ms. West’s
name to the documents.  He told the children that such a course
would be improper and, if anyone of the children objected, the
documents would not be honored.  The children indicated to Mr.
Coppola that they were, in fact, in agreement.  Mr. Coppola, to
his regret, agreed to have them sign the documents and that he
would certify that they were signed by Ms. West.  Ms. Swink
then signed her mother’s name to the 2008 Will, the Trust
Declaration, the Deed, the Assignment, and the General Durable
Power of Attorney.  All four children were present in the
hospital room and witnessed Ms. Swink’s execution of her
mother’s name on the documents.  Mr. Coppola hand-wrote the
change to the Trust Declaration (naming all four children as
successor Trustees) and Ms. Swink initialed the change.
The hearing judge noted that, after Ms. Swink forged Ms. West’s signature on the
estate planning documents, Coppola returned to his office, changed the identity of the
successor trustee in the Trust Declaration from Ms. Swink alone to all four children acting
together and proceeded to notarize the falsely-executed Will, the Trust Declaration and
Schedule, the Power of Attorney naming Ms. Swink as Ms. West’s  attorney-in-fact, and the
Deed transferring the property from Ms. West to the Elizabeth L. West Living Trust.  He
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thereafter directed two of his employees to falsely attest that they witnessed Ms. West’s Will,
despite the fact that Ms. West’s signature was not on the Will and neither employee was
present to see Ms. West execute her Will, and notarized their attestations despite knowing
that they were false.
Mr. Coppola then returned to his office in Leesburg with
the documents.  There, consistent with the instructions he
received from the children, he changed the identity of the
successor trustee in the trust declaration from Ms. Swink alone
to all of the children acting unanimously.  The Respondent
notarized the falsely executed and initialed Will; he notarized
the falsely executed trust declaration and schedule; he notarized
the falsely executed power of attorney naming Ms. Swink as Ms.
West’s attorney-in-fact and he notarized the falsely executed
deed transferring the property from Ms. West to the Elizabeth L.
West Living Trust.
Respondent’s ex-wife, Patricia Coppola and his mother,
Katherine Coppola, both worked in the Respondent’s law office
on August 26, 2008.  The Respondent admitted that, at his
direction, he had each of them execute Ms. West’s Will as
witnesses despite the fact that Ms. West was not present and
despite the fact that her signature was not on the Will.  His
notarization of the Will included the false recital that stated, in
effect, that Ms. West and the witnesses, Katherine and Patricia
Coppola, appeared in each other’s presence and in the
Respondent’s presence and that Ms. West declared that the
instrument was her Last Will and Testament, that it was
willingly executed in the presence of the witnesses, that the
witnesses stated that they, in the presence of Ms. West, and at
her request, subscribed their names as witnesses.  The witnesses
falsely swore to their attestation and the Respondent notarized
it knowing that those oaths were false.  Mr. Coppola certified or
notarized the signatures by Ms. Swink on the Will, Trust, Deed,
and Durable Power of Attorney.
The hearing judge then described that, after amending the Trust, notarizing the falsely-
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executed Will, Trust Declaration and Schedule, Power of Attorney, and Deed, and directing
his employees to falsely attest regarding Ms. West’s Will, Coppola returned to the hospital
the next day and gave the original documents to Ms. Swink; he then certified that the Deed
was prepared by him or under his supervision and directed his employee to record the falsely-
executed Deed in the land records of Prince George’s County:
The next day, August 27, 2008, Mr. Coppola personally
returned the original documents to the hospital room and gave
them to Ms. Swink.
Respondent certified that the deed was prepared by him
or under his supervision, and he notarized the false signature of
Ms. West.  When he returned to his office, he sent his clerk to
record the deed with the Prince George’s County land records
office.  Although the Respondent’s employee had some initial
difficulty in finding the courthouse, the Clerk of the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County recorded the deed on August
28, 2008, after Ms. Swink paid outstanding property taxes.  He
also had an employee of his office record the Deed in the land
records for Prince George’s County, Maryland.
Ms. West died on August 30, 2008, without having
recovered.
Mr. Coppola testified that he was affected by the
entreaties of the children and that the situation was extremely
emotional.  The emotional character of the hospital room, he
claimed, carried over to his office where he amended the Trust,
had his ex-wife and mother perjure themselves, and directed his
clerk to file a deed he knew was falsely signed and notarized. 
Despite the emotional character of the situation, the Respondent
suffered no cognitive deficits and knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong.  The Respondent never told Ms. Swink,
whom he testified was also his client, of the criminal
implications of the course of action of which he agreed to be a
part.  When asked at trial about the nature of the criminal
implications, he replied, “I guess fraud.”
Finally, the hearing judge described how Bar Counsel became aware of  Coppola’s
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actions:
C. FACTS AFTER DOCUMENT EXECUTION.
On September 12, 2008, Ms. Swink filed the 2008 Will
with the Register of Wills for Prince George’s County,
Maryland, and she simultaneously petitioned for administration
of a regular estate.  Ms. Swink did not retain Mr. Coppola to
represent her in the probate proceedings, nor did she notify him
that she had filed the 2008 Will or opened the estate.
In or about December 2008 or January 2009, Richard
Swink called Mr. Coppola and said that one of Ms. West’s
children, Richard R. West Jr., was contesting the sale of Ms.
West’s house.  Mr. Coppola understood that Richard West
wanted to continue to live in the house and he was threatening
to raise the false signatures as a means of impeding the sale of
the house.  Mr. Coppola was surprised at the position of Mr.
West since Mr. West had been present in the hospital room and
participated in the decision-making.  Nevertheless, Mr. Coppola
understood that Mr. West’s allegations would have serious
implications for the estate and for himself.  He offered to file a
Deed of Correction in the land records for Prince George’s
County, which would have had the effect of undoing the transfer
of the house to the Trust.  Mr. Swink said he would discuss the
matter with the family and get back to him.
Mr. Coppola did not hear from Mr. Swink or from the
family.  Instead, Mr. Coppola was contacted by an attorney for
Ms. Swink, George Meng, Esq.  Ms. Swink hired Mr. Meng to
represent her in the Orphan’s Court after Mr. West began
asserting his position.  Mr. Meng, a member of the Maryland
Attorney Grievance Commission, promptly filed grievances
against Mr. Coppola with the disciplinary authorities in both
Maryland and Virginia.
From the outset, Mr. Coppola did not contest the core
accusations in the grievance filed with the Maryland Attorney
Grievance Commission by Mr. Meng.  Mr. Coppola offered to
assist Mr. Meng in his representation of Ms. Swink in the
probate proceedings, including by authorizing Mr. Meng to
disclose the filing of the grievance and by furnishing Mr. Meng
with a letter that he could use in the proceedings if necessary. 
Through his counsel, Mr. Coppola sent a letter to the
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Commission admitting that he had facilitated Ms. Swink’s
execution of the estate documents in Ms. West’s name and that
he had improperly certified signatures on those documents.  He
stated that he “offers no excuse for his clearly improper
actions,” but instead offered a number of mitigating factors.  Mr.
Coppola has maintained that position throughout these
proceedings.  The Court finds as a fact that Mr. Coppola has
cooperated with Bar Counsel to an extensive degree to his own
detriment and in furtherance of the purposes of the Maryland
Attorney Grievance Commission.
By letter dated June 22, 2010, sent to the attorney for the
Estate of Elizabeth West, Mr. Coppola offered to reimburse the
amount of $2,548 to the Estate as repayment for the amount of
fees and expenses that Mr. Coppola was paid from the assets of
Ms. West for his services performed.
Following his findings of fact, the hearing judge then rendered various conclusions
of law:
II. 
CONCLUSIONS 
OF 
LAW 
AS 
TO 
RULE
VIOLATIONS.
Petitioner has alleged that Respondent violated two Rules
of Professional Conduct: 1.2(d) and 8.4.   Petitioner represented
1
in responses to interrogatories that it would not argue that
Respondent violated any other Rule.  Therefore, the Court will
not consider any other potential violation.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Sapero, 400 Md. 461, 486-87, 929 A.2d
483, 498 (2007) (due process considerations bar court from
finding violations of rules not charged in petition for
disciplinary or remedial action); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550
(1968) (attorneys entitled to notice of disciplinary charges and 
opportunity to present a defense).  In particular, the Court does
not consider whether any of the conduct at issue constituted a
violation of Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.6 (confidentiality), or 1.7
(conflicts of interest).
 ______________________
In closing argument, Petitioner stated that it will not
1
pursue a violation of Rule 3.3.
14
The Petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations of the
petition by clear and convincing evidence.  The Respondent,
however, must prove any defense, matter of mitigation, or
extenuating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Md. Rule 16-757(b).
The hearing judge then outlined the parties’ arguments regarding Coppola’s alleged
violation of Rule 1.2(d):
A. VIOLATION OF RULE 1.2(d).
Rule 1.2(d)  provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer
2
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”  Petitioner
alleges that Mr. Coppola violated Rule 1.2(d) by counseling or
assisting the West family in falsely certifying their mother’s
signature on several estate plan documents and that this conduct
included fraudulent or criminal components and that the
Respondent identified Ms. Swink and all of the four children in
the hospital room of Ms. West as “his clients.”  Petitioner
alleges that the complete scenario of signing the documents and
filing of the 2008 Will by Ms. Swink constituted a fraudulent
scheme and / or the making of a false entry in violation of Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-606, which had the purpose of
fraudulently avoiding probate.
Respondent argues that Rule 1.2(d) does not apply for a
number of reasons.  First, Rule 1.2(d) applies to a lawyer’s
facilitating or assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct
and Coppola’s client was Ms. West – not the children of Ms.
______________________
2
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation and Allocation of
Authority Between Client and Lawyer.
* * *
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
15
Ms. West.  Second, even if Ms. Swink was Mr. Coppola’s client,
Petitioner did not establish that Mr. Coppola assisted her in
committing a criminal or fraudulent act.  In this context,
Respondent argues that Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-
606(b)(1), was not violated.  Third, Petitioner failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Coppola assisted Ms.
Swink or others in conduct that Mr. Coppola knew was criminal
or fraudulent.
The first conclusion of law identified Coppola’s clients as Ms. West’s four children,
relying on various cases, including Attorney Grievance v. Shoup, 410 Md. 462, 979 A.2d 120
(2009), and Attorney Grievance v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 821 A.2d 414 (Md. 2003), the block
quotes from which will be omitted for brevity’s sake:
1. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS.
Respondent relies on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353, 946 A.2d 542 (2008), for the
proposition that no attorney-client relationship was formed when
a woman who had a social relationship with an attorney asked
the attorney if she could avoid the one-year separation
requirement to obtain a divorce.  The attorney told her in writing
that “[y]ou can file whatever you want so long as the parties say
that it has been a year, the court won’t question it so long as the
parties agree to that.”  Id. at 355, 946 A.2d at 544.  The
Commission alleged that the attorney violated Rule 1.2(d)
(among other rules), but the trial court rejected that contention
on the ground that the Commission had not proved that the
attorney represented the woman, even though the woman knew
that the respondent was an attorney and the conversation clearly
involved legal issues.  The Commission did not even except to
that finding, and the Court of Appeals appeared to endorse it. 
See id. at 361 n.10, 946 A.2d at 547 n.10.
Respondent argues that the evidence in this case
established that Mr. Coppola’s client was Ms. West and no
evidence suggested that Mr. Coppola counseled Ms. West to
engage in a crime or fraud, or that he assisted Ms. West in
committing a crime or fraud.   Although Mr. Coppola discussed
16
various matters with Ms. West’s children and he certainly tried
to help them achieve a goal that he believed they shared with
their mother, Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing
evidence that Ms. Swink or her siblings were Mr. Coppola’s
clients in the matter before the Court.3
The question of who was Mr. Coppola’s client is critical. 
He only spoke to Ms. West one time in June 2008 for a very
short phone conversation, but never charged her a fee, never
prepared any documents, and never confirmed her testamentary 
or estate planning wishes in any way that objectively proves her
estate planning intent.  In August 2008, Mr. Coppola only talked 
to Ms. Swink, his former client, who asked that he prepare the
estate planning documents for her hospitalized mother.  It is
impossible to determine from the evidence that this request
actually came from Ms. West or that Ms. West had the same
estate planning intent as of August 25, 2008, as she had during
the June 2008 conversation with Mr. Coppola or as she had in
her 1995 Will.  The issue of the attorney-client relationship or
relationships that were formed can be analyzed in various ways.
The formation of an attorney-client relationship can be
difficult to define.
* * *
The Brooke case sets out a test that is more applicable to the
instant case.  The Court adopted a test that does not depend on
whether a contractual relationship was formed, but relies on
whether the lawyer communicated with a person and gave
advice on a subject that required professional skill and judgment
under circumstances where the purported client relied on the
advice.  In Brooke, the lawyer prepared legal documents and
advice related to the documents for a friend.  The Court
concluded that there was an attorney-client relationship formed.
These principals can be applied in the instant case.  Mr.
Coppola asserts that only Ms. West was his client because he
spoke with her in June 2008, prepared documents in August
2008 at the request of her agent (Ms. Swink, his former client),
______________________
3
Mr. Coppola had previously represented Ms. Swink in
connection with her estate plan, but that matter ended many
years earlier.
17
and invoiced Ms. West on August 28, 2008, for the work
performed.  By implication, he asserts that he did not represent
any of Ms. West’s four children.  But this ignores the totality of
the circumstances.
In the hospital room on August 25, 2008, it was clear to
Mr. Coppola that Ms. West was mentally unable to execute the
estate planning documents or confirm that the documents
expressed her current intent.  At best, he knew that the
documents reflected whatever Ms. West had told Mr. Coppola
in the conversation of June 2008.  But, in August 2008, there
was no way to determine whether the documents which were
much more extensive than her 1995 Will really did meet with
her approval, because she never reviewed any of the details of
those documents.  At a minimum, however, Mr. Coppola
thought that he was acting on behalf of Ms. West when he
created the documents before going to the hospital. The Court
concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was an
attorney-client relationship between Mr. Coppola and Ms. West. 
This does not preclude that he also had an attorney-client
relationship with the four children.
In the hospital, according to Mr. Coppola, he explained
to the four children about the benefits to them that would be
derived from the estate planning documents that he had
prepared.  He advised them that, if they all agreed, then the
documents could be executed.  He permitted the documents to
be executed in all their presence.  He failed to advise them about
any criminal penalty or exposure to fraud that might occur
against them from carrying out this plan even though Ms. West
was incompetent.  He then took the documents and, on behalf of
the four children, made changes to reflect the agreement of the
four children.  He brought copies of the documents back to the
four children the next day.  He then proceeded to take actions to
carry out the plan he created with the four children, i.e., filing
the deed and delivery of the documents to Ms. Swink to carry
out transfers to the Trust and / or probate the estate at the
appropriate time.  In testimony, Mr. Coppola identified not only
Ms. Swink as his client, but all of those in Ms. West’s hospital
room.  Therefore, the court concludes, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mr. Coppola had an attorney-client relationship
with the four children of Ms. West.
18
The hearing judge then concluded that Coppola assisted Ms. West’s children in
committing a criminal or fraudulent act:
2. WHETHER RESPONDENT ASSISTED A
CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACT.
The Petitioner contends that the falsely notarized deed
recorded in the Prince George’s County land record office
violated Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-606.  See Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 491, 850
A.2d 1157, 1164 (2004) (a violation of Section 8-606(b) of the
Criminal Law Article is a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects and thereby violates Rule 8.4 (b)). Petitioner
argues that this also constituted a violation of Rule 1.2(d) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent argues that, even if Respondent had an
attorney-client relationship, he did not assist in a criminal or
fraudulent act.  Respondent focuses his post-trial memorandum
on the filing of the 2008 Will with the Prince George’s County
Register of Wills as the alleged criminal or fraudulent act that
violated Rule 1.2(d).  The Court agrees with the Respondent that
no evidence suggested that Mr. Coppola filed the 2008 Will with
the Register of Wills or that he counseled Ms. Swink to do so. 
The undisputed evidence established that Ms. Swink filed the
2008 Will and opened the probate proceedings without Mr.
Coppola’s knowledge or advice.  Mr. Coppola did not enter an
appearance in the probate proceedings.  The Court will not
address whether it was a violation because of the mandate that
Wills be filed with the Register of Wills and whether Mr.
Coppola knew or should have known that the falsely executed
Will had to be filed.  The Court does not reach the question of
whether the Register of Wills is a tribunal.  The Petitioner does
not argue that this conduct violated Rule 1.2(d), contending
instead that the filing of the deed violated Rule 1.2(d).  It is
noted, however, that the Petitioner does contend that Ms.
Swink’s filing of the Will with the Register of Wills does violate
Rule 8.4(b), discussed below.
Under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-606, making false
entries in public records is a misdemeanor.  A “public record”
19
is defined so that it would include public land records.  Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-606(a)(2).  The prohibition
applicable in the instant case specifically states that the conduct
is to “willfully make a false entry in a public record.” Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Law § 8-606(b).  The relevant inquiry is whether
Mr. Coppola’s actions met this requirement.
The meaning of “willful” in the context of a criminal act
has been addressed in a number of cases.  In a case concerning
aiding and abetting a crime, the trial court added the following
definition: “Willful participation means voluntary and
intentional participation in the criminal act.”  McMillan v. State,
181 Md. App. 298, 335, 956 A.2d 716, 737 (2008).  In a murder
case, the trial court defined “willful” as: “Willful participation
means voluntary and intentional participation in the criminal act. 
Some conduct by the Defendant in furtherance of the crime is
necessary.”  Ayala v. State, 174 Md. App. 647, 677, 923 A.2d
952, 970 (2007).  See also Wagner v. State, 160 Md. App. 531,
562, 864 A.2d 1037, 1055 (2005); Perry v. State, 150 Md. App.
403, 423, 822 A.2d 434, 446 (2002) (same defining words used).
These definitions can be applied to the present facts.  Mr.
Coppola falsely certified that the deed was signed by Ms. West
and notarized her signature that he knew to be false.  His notary
certification states: “Acknowledged before me this 26  day of
th
August, 2008, by Elizabeth L. West, an individual known to me
and described in the foregoing instrument.”  Then, he filed the
deed in the Land Records of Prince George’s County.  These
actions were voluntary and intentional participation in the filing
of the false deed.  Mr. Coppola took an act in furtherance of the
statutory violation by sending his clerk and straightening out the
administrative problem that arose in filing the deed.  The Court
concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr.
Coppola willfully made a false entry in the public record by
filing the deed in violation of Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-
606.
The hearing judge thereafter rejected Coppola’s assertion that he did not intend to
commit a criminal or fraudulent act:
3. WHETHER RESPONDENT KNEW CONDUCT
20
WAS CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT IN PURPOSE.
Respondent argues that there was no violation of Rule
1.2(d) by focusing on whether Mr. Coppola knew that his
conduct was criminal or fraudulent versus a bona fide intent to
carry out the lawful wishes of his client, Ms. West.  Mr.
Coppola argues that a fraud under Rule 1.2(d) ordinarily implies
an intention to deceive a person or entity and resulting injury,
and it requires proof of a misrepresentation of material fact. 
E.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 275,
849 A.2d 423, 444 (2004) (violation of Rule 1.2(d) to advise
client to take out loans with the intent of discharging the loans
in bankruptcy, because that act would be “fraudulent as to both
present and future creditors”).  Since Mr. Coppola was not
intending to deceive or harm any person or entity, but rather,
was trying to accomplish his client’s lawful objective,
Respondent argues that the Court should find that Mr. Coppola’s
acts did not deceive any of Ms. West’s heirs or legatees under
the 1995 Will, nor were they intended to deceive or harm any
other person or entity.
Rule 1.2(d) prohibits assisting a client in conduct the
lawyer knows to be criminal or fraudulent.  Executing false
estate planning documents and filing them on the public records
or knowing the high probability or necessity that those false
documents are going to be filed and relied on in the future as
truthful and accurate violates this Rule.  At a minimum, the
public relies on those records.  Future buyers or transferees of
the real property would rely on the documents.  Although the
heirs appeared to be in agreement and would receive a savings
and higher distribution comparable to the 1995 Will of Ms.
West, there was really no evidence confirming that the August
2008 estate planning intent was, in fact, the same as her June
2008 or 1995 testamentary intent.  Therefore, the court rejects
this defense to a violation of Rule 1.2(d).
With respect to the violation of Rule 8.4, Judge Jarashow noted that Coppola
conceded that he violated of Rules 8.4 (a) and (c) and concluded  that Coppola also violated
Rule 8.4 (b) and (d):
21
B. VIOLATION OF RULE 8.4.
Finally, Petitioner contends that Mr. Coppola violated
Rules 8.4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct.  Respondent concedes that his conduct
constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(c) and that there probably was
also a violation of Rule 8.4(a), but argues that there was no
violation of Rules 8.4(b) or (d).
Rule 8.4 addressed “Misconduct” generally:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland
Lawyers’ 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4.
The parties concede that Rule 8.4(a) and (c) were
violated.  The Court agrees.  The facts establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Coppola engaged in “conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” for all
the reasons stated in the discussion concerning violating Rule
1.2.  He permitted false and fraudulent documents to be
executed and filed on public record, falsely certified that Ms.
West and witnesses had signed various documents and had his
staff falsely certify signing documents.  This is a clear violation
of Rule 8.4(c) which necessarily violates Rule 8.4(a).
As to whether Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b), this is
answered by the discussion above concerning Rule 1.2(d).  The
Court has determined that Mr. Coppola violated Md. Code Ann.,
Crim. Law § 8-606.  Therefore, it necessarily follows that there
is a violation of Rule 8.4(b).  A defense might be that the
criminal act does not reflect “adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
22
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  This
might be the case, for example, if a lawyer gets convicted of a
speeding ticket or Driving While Intoxicated.  But in the instant
case, the Court finds that there is a clear and convincing
evidence that reflects on the lawyer’s honesty or fitness.  Mr.
Coppola permitted others to falsely sign another’s name to
official documents being filed with the public record or on
which others were going to rely.  There were implications for
him and for those falsely signing.  He notarized signatures
falsely.
Rule 8.4(d) covers “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” As the Court of Appeals has
explained, “[o]nly conduct that is criminal or so egregious as to
make the harm, or potential harm, flowing from it patent will be
deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Attorney
Grievance v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 522, 996 A.2d 350, 362
(2010) (citations and internal quotations omitted).  But the Court
of Appeals also has stated that “conduct that impacts on the
image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession . .
. and that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal
profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Id., citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md.
354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998) (citation omitted).  In the
instant case, the Respondent both committed a misdemeanor and
acted in a way that damages the perception of the legal
profession.  See also Attorney Grievance v. Guberman, 392 Md.
131, 896 A.2d 337 (2006) (attorney who prepared fictitious
appellate pleadings, which he supported and certified as true,
violated Rules 8.4 (c) and (d)).  The Court finds that there was
clear and convincing evidence for a violation of Rule 8.4(d).
Following his conclusions of law, the hearing judge presented mitigation findings:
III. FACT FINDINGS AS TO MITIGATION.
The Court finds that Respondent proved the following
mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Court finds that Mr. Coppola cooperated with Bar
Counsel in these proceedings to an exceptional degree.  He
acknowledged from the outset that his conduct was wrong and
he never contested the core allegations made by the complaining
23
witness.  As a result of his cooperation, none of the family
members was required to testify in these proceedings.  The
Commission’s case in chief at the hearing took a short time to
present and was accomplished through documents and
admissions.  From the outset, all parties agreed that this case
primarily focuses on mitigation.
Respondent did not intend to cause harm to a client or to
any other person or entity.  On the contrary, the evidence
established that Mr. Coppola was trying to achieve a good result
for Ms. West’s beneficiaries and what he thought Ms. West
wanted based on his brief conversation with her in June 2008
and in her 1995 Will.  To the extent that Ms. West was his
client, he thought he was carrying out her wishes.  To the extent
that the beneficiaries were his clients, he thought he was
carrying out their wishes.  He had no intent to deprive any
person or entity of assets, tax proceeds, or fees.  He was focused
on benefitting everyone even though he knew that his and their
conduct was wrong.
Respondent did not act out of a selfish motive and was
acting against his self-interest.  The preponderance of the
evidence established that Respondent was not attempting to
benefit his own interests by agreeing to certify the estate-
planning documents.  There is evidence that points to both an
economic benefit for and against Mr. Coppola.  Mr. Coppola
believed that he had earned a fee irrespective of whether he
agreed to certify the documents.  But, in fact, because Ms. West
lacked capacity in August 2008, when he supposedly had
instructions to proceed with preparing the estate planning
documents, there never was an attorney-client relationship
confirmed by Ms. West.  Even though Mr. Coppola believed he
earned his fee by preparing the documents, there is serious
question whether he was entitled to a fee from Ms. West. 
Earning a fee, however, did not appear to motivate Mr. Coppola
as discussed in this mitigation section.  There was evidence that
Mr. Coppola might have financially benefitted from not
preparing, executing and certifying the documents because he
anticipated that his former client, Ms. Swink, was likely to hire
him to probate Ms. West’s estate in Prince George’s County,
through which he would have most likely earned a fee of around
$10,000.  If his motive was selfish, he would have benefitted
24
more by convincing the family that he could probate the estate
for a fee that would have exceeded the $2548 fee he invoiced
for preparing the estate planning documents.
Agreeing to permit the family to execute the documents
and make changes in them also required Mr. Coppola to invest
more of his time beyond the mere preparation of the documents
to his economic detriment.  His invoice reflects that he charged
only for preparing the documents.  He invested substantially
more time in the matter by traveling an hour each way to the
hospital for a second meeting, modifying the Trust Declaration,
arranging to have the documents witnessed, and managing the
filing of the Deed in Prince George’s County.  Mr. Coppola did
not seek or obtain an additional fee for these acts.
Mr. Coppola’s conduct also is mitigated by a lack of
premeditation and by his impulse to help a family in distress. 
No evidence suggested that Mr. Coppola went to the hospital on
August 26, 2008, with the intention of procuring false signatures
and, on the contrary, the Court concludes that he expected to
find Ms. West conscious and available for consultation.  Instead,
he found a distraught family assembled at their mother’s
deathbed.  He correctly informed them that Ms. West’s
condition precluded signing the documents.  The circumstances
became emotional and evoked in Mr. Coppola an emotional
reaction.  The Court finds that his conduct was motivated by
sympathy for the family.
The Court finds, based on the undisputed evidence, that
Respondent has no prior disciplinary record.
The Court finds that Mr. Coppola has expressed genuine
remorse for his conduct.  His testimony and demeanor at the
hearing made clear that he understands and regrets the gravity
of his conduct.  He apologized to the Court and explained how
his conduct violated his own concept of himself as an attorney
who adheres to high moral standards.  His partner and his
brother-in-law both testified that Respondent disclosed his
conduct to them shortly after it came to light and expressed his
remorse.  Respondent apologized to his partner and to his ex-
wife and mother.  He visited a psychologist to try to obtain
insight about his own behavior.
The Court finds that Mr. Coppola has not engaged in a
pattern of misconduct and that the incident at issue in these
25
proceedings was an aberration.  Mr. Coppola testified that he
had never engaged in similar acts either before or after the
August 2008 episode.  Mr. Coppola’s law partner and friend of
40 years testified that he has never had any reason to suspect
that Mr. Coppola engaged in another similar incident.  Mr.
Coppola has represented approximately 1,000 clients in estates
and trusts matters, and no similar instance has emerged.
The Court finds that Mr. Coppola is a person of good
character.  Mr. Coppola has stressful family and personal
circumstances that he manages with dignity and grace.  He is the
father of four children, including three triplets who were born
severely premature and have had substantial health problems. 
Although Mr. Coppola is divorced and the children live with his
ex-wife, Mr. Coppola is intensely involved in raising his
children.  He spends a good part of nearly every day with his
children – preparing dinner for them, supervising their after-
school activities, and accompanying them to various
commitments.  Mr. Coppola has significant financial,
responsibilities to his family, including alimony and child
support obligations in excess of $36,000 per year and health
insurance costs also in excess of $36,000 per year.  Mr.
Coppola’s income from his law practice barely covers these
costs, and he testified that he is currently behind on his health
insurance payments.  Yet Mr. Coppola is known to waive or
reduce his fees for clients who themselves are in difficult
financial circumstances.
Mr. Coppola has made sincere efforts to rectify and
mitigate the effects of his conduct.  He offered to file a deed of
correction in the land records, if the West beneficiaries believed
that would be useful.  He assisted Ms. Swink’s counsel in the
probate proceedings by admitting his conduct and authorizing
counsel to disclose the grievances filed with the disciplinary
authorities.  He testified that, although no one from the West
estate ever asked him to reimburse the fee he charged, he
noticed, while preparing for this hearing, that the successor
personal representative of the West estate had listed Mr.
Coppola’s fee as an asset of the estate.  Mr. Coppola promptly
wrote to the personal representative and offered to reimburse the
fee.  Mr. Coppola also testified that he was willing to consider
other forms of restitution, including reimbursement of legal fees
26
incurred in the probate proceedings.
Mr. Coppola has incurred penalties beyond what is at
issue in these proceedings.  He is also subject to disciplinary
proceedings in Virginia and has had to retain counsel in two
jurisdictions.  During the pendency of these proceedings, he has
limited his practice out of concern that he will not be able to
follow through in his representation of new clients.  His practice
limitations have reduced his income to levels that barely cover
his significant family expenses.
Mr. Coppola has made efforts at rehabilitation to ensure
that the conduct at issue does not recur.  As noted, he consulted
with a psychologist and examined the personality traits,
including his aversion to confrontation, that might have
contributed to his conduct.  He altered his office practices to use
outside notaries for all document certifications.  He disclosed his
conduct to his partner and his family and consulted them for
advise.  The Court finds that the conduct at issue in this
proceeding is unlikely to recur.
The hearing judge concluded: 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO MITIGATION.
Mitigating factors are always considered by the Court in
deciding a disposition in an Attorney Grievance case.  In
Attorney Grievance v. Marcalus, 414 Md. 501, 996 A.2d 350
(2010), the Court said:
Determining a sanction against Marcalus,
however, also requires weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors in order to give context to his
actions. In past disciplinary cases, we have
considered a non-exclusive list of several possible
aggravating and mitigating factors, also derived
from the ABA Manual. See, e.g., Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448,
488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996).  These include
the presence or absence of a prior disciplinary
record; the absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive; timely good faith efforts to make
restitution or rectify consequences of misconduct;
27
full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board
or a cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
inexperience in the practice of law; character or
reputation; physical or mental impairment; any
delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim
rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or
sanctions; remorse; and remoteness of prior
offenses, if they exist. See id. See generally 2
ABA Manual, supra, at 101:3102-101:3105
(discussing 
the 
application 
of 
potential
aggravating and mitigating factors).  Marcalus,
414 Md. at 524, 996 A.2d at 363.
Even though matters raised by a Respondent do not constitute
defenses to the ethical violation, they may be considered as
mitigating factors.  Attorney Grievance v. Ruddy, 411 Md. 30,
78, 981 A.2d 637, 665 (2009).  Only the mitigating factors that
existed at the time of the unethical or criminal behavior, and not
subsequent conduct, are considered.  Attorney Grievance v.
Garcia, 410 Md. 507, 534, 979 A.2d 146, 162 (2009).
In some cases, even though the attorney’s conduct
constitutes dishonesty, deceit, or a crime that normally would
result in disbarment, the mitigating factors may be considered to
reduce the penalty.  See Attorney Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md.
236, 254, 929 A.2d 61, 71 (2007) (omitted information in letter
to the Federal Trade Commission conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation resulted in only a 90-day
suspension due to mitigating factors); Attorney Grievance v.
Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 576-77, 933 A.2d 842, 866 (2007)
(mitigating circumstances included relative youth and
inexperience and his lack of remorse and apprehension of the
wrongness of his actions resulted in indefinite suspension);
Attorney Grievance v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 48, 51, 785 A.2d
1260, 1267, 1269 (2001) (indefinite suspension for intentionally
dishonest conduct based on mitigating factors). The Court
always looks at the nature of the misconduct and the lawyer’s
motives, applies the ABA Standards and the mitigating factors. 
Attorney Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 911 A.2d 440
(2006) (Court considered factors including ethical duty violated
and the lawyer’s state of mind and did not impose the sanction
28
of disbarment).  See Attorney Grievance v. Garcia, 410 Md.
507, 535-37, 979 A.2d 146 (2009).
In light of the mitigating factors, the Court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Coppola did engage in
conduct that was dishonest, deceitful or criminal, but that the
degree of his actions was relatively limited - i.e., falsely
executed deed, Will and trust documents aimed at a purpose of
distributing assets in an efficient way that would save the Estate
and heirs legal fees in an amount of up to an estimated $10,000. 
There are strong mitigating factors consistent with the Court of
Appeals cases that must be balanced against Respondent’s
misconduct.  The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the mitigating factors for Mr. Coppola are consistent with
the decisions that justify a lesser penalty than disbarment.[7]
Standard of Review
This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline proceedings
and conducts an independent review of the record.  Attorney Grievance v. Bleecker, 414 Md.
147, 167, 994 A.2d 928, 940 (2010); Attorney Grievance v. Jarosinski, 411 Md. 432, 448,
983 A.2d 477, 487 (2009) (quotations omitted); Attorney Grievance v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359,
396, 983 A.2d 434, 456 (2009) (quotations omitted); Attorney Grievance v. Gisriel, 409 Md.
331, 364, 974 A.2d 331, 350 (2009).  We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de
novo.  Rule 16-759(b)(1);  Bleecker, 414 Md. at 167, 994 A.2d at 940; Jarosinski, 411 Md.
8
Notwithstanding the hearing judge’s opinion bearing on the sanction analysis,
7
we note that, under Rule 16-759(c), the determination as to the appropriate sanction is within
the sole discretion of this Court.
Rule 16-759(b)(1) provides:
8
Review by Court of Appeals. (1) Conclusions of law. The
Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge’s
(continued...)
29
at 448-49, 983 A.2d at 487; Foltz, 411 Md. at 396, 983 A.2d at 456; Gisriel, 409 Md. at 365,
974 A.2d at 351.  In our review of the record, the hearing judge’s findings of fact will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.  Rule 16-759(b)(2);  Bleecker, 414 Md. at 167, 994 A.2d
9
at 940; Jarosinski, 411 Md. at 448, 983 A.2d at 487; Foltz, 411 Md. at 396-97, 983 A.2d at
456; Gisriel, 409 Md. at 365, 974 A.2d at 351.
Sanction  
Neither party has filed exceptions challenging the hearing judge’s findings of fact
pertaining to Coppola’s alleged violations of Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4 (a), (b), (c), and (d).  We,
therefore,  “treat the findings . . . as established for the purpose of determining appropriate
sanctions . . . .”  Md. Rule 16-759(b).
Coppola, moreover, does not except to any of Judge Jarashow’s conclusions of law,
observing that his case “was always about the context of his admitted misconduct and factors
(...continued)
8
conclusions of law.
Rule 16-759(b)(2) provides:
9
(2) Findings of fact. (A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no
exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as
established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions,
if any. 
(B) If exceptions are filed.  If exceptions are filed, the Court of
Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have been
proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757
(b).  The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact
challenged by the exceptions.  The Court shall give due regard
to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility
of witnesses.
30
supporting mitigation, and the trial court’s mitigation findings are critical to the application
of this Court’s precedents on sanction.”  We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of
law and find that they are supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
We are, thus, only left with the task of determining the appropriate sanction in the
present case for Coppola’s violations of Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4(a), (b), (c), and (d).  Bar
Counsel does take exception to two of the hearing judge’s findings regarding aggravation and
recommends disbarment.  Coppola suggests a public reprimand or a suspension of thirty
days.
In determining an appropriate sanction, we evaluate an attorney grievance matter on
its own merits, taking into account the facts and circumstances involved.  Attorney Grievance
v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176, 994 A.2d 928, 945 (2010).  The goal of attorney discipline
is protection of the public, rather than punishment of the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance
v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 30, 922 A.2d 554, 571 (2007), citing Attorney Grievance v. Mba-Jonas,
397 Md. 690, 702, 919 A.2d 669, 677 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254,
913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 533-34, 876 A.2d 79,
97 (2005).  Imposing sanctions that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
violations and the intent with which they were committed is consistent with, and in fact
furthers, the purpose of protection of the public, Goff, 399 Md. at 30-31, 922 A.2d at 571;
Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 537, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003), in that such
sanctions protect the integrity of the legal profession, Attorney Grievance v. Cassidy, 362
31
Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001), as well as advance the public’s confidence in the
legal profession.  Attorney Grievance v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 639, 861 A.2d 692, 701
(2004); Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375; Powell, 369 Md. at 474, 800 A.2d at 789. 
We must, therefore, consider the nature of the ethical duties violated in light of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Bleecker, 414 Md. at 176, 994 A.2d at 945;
Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 166-67, 939 A.2d 732, 746-47 (2008).
With regard to aggravating factors, we often consult Standard 9.22 of the American
Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution.
Bleecker, 414 Md. at 176-77, 994 A.2d at 945-46, quoting Harris, 403 Md. at 167-68, 939
A.2d at 747.  Bar Counsel excepts to the fact that the hearing judge did not make the requisite
findings regarding (c), a pattern of misconduct,  and (i), substantial experience in the
10
Despite Coppola’s contention that Bar Counsel had waived any exception to
10
the hearing judge’s failure to find that Coppola engaged in a pattern of misconduct, we note
that, in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Bar Counsel clearly proposed
(continued...)
32
practice of law.
We sustain Bar Counsel’s exception to the failure of the hearing judge to find as an
aggravator that Coppola engaged in a pattern of misconduct.  Coppola did, indeed, engage
in a pattern of misconduct, to include: (1) empowering Ms. Swink to forge Ms. West’s
signature on the estate plan documents, (2) notarizing the falsely executed and initialed Will,
(3) notarizing the falsely executed Trust Declaration and Schedule, (4) notarizing the falsely
executed Power of Attorney naming Ms. Swink as Ms. West’s attorney-in-fact, (5) notarizing
the falsely executed Deed transferring the property from Ms. West to the Elizabeth L. West
Living Trust, (6) directing his employees to falsely attest as Ms. West’s witnesses despite the
fact that Ms. West was not present and despite the fact that her signature was not on the Will,
(7) notarizing the Will that included a false recital that stated, in effect, that Ms. West and
the witnesses, Coppola’s employees, appeared in each other’s presence and in Coppola’s
presence and that Ms. West declared that instrument was her Last Will and Testament, that
it was willingly executed in the presence of the witnesses, that the witnesses stated that they,
in the presence of Ms. West, and at her request, subscribed their names as witnesses, (8)
(...continued)
10
that Coppola was involved in a pattern of misconduct:
Beyond the notarizations, however, was his acquiescence in and,
indeed, promotion of a scheme to avoid probate through the use
of falsely executed documents.  Ms. West’s children sought to
achieve probate savings the Respondent told them were possible
if all were agreed to the course of action that they then pursued. 
He was the catalyst for their abuse of the law  . . . .
33
directing the witnesses to falsely swear to their attestation and notarizing the attestations with
knowledge that those oaths were false, and (9) directing his employee to record the
fraudulent Deed in the Prince George’s County land records.  This series of acts clearly
formed a pattern of misconduct, albeit with one goal in mind.  One goal, though, does not
obviate that Coppola engaged in a series of acts over a number of days.
We also sustain Bar Counsel’s exception regarding the hearing judge’s failure to find
Coppola’s experience in the practice of law as an aggravator.  Coppola was admitted to the
Virginia Bar in 1989 and the Maryland Bar in 1997 and has been practicing extensively in
the area of estates and trusts law since 1996, representing “950 to 1,000 clients over the
course of his practice.”  Coppola’s experience in the practice of law, especially in the area
which is the subject matter of this case, is definitely an aggravator.  See Attorney Grievance
v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 263, 950 A.2d 798, 812 (2008) (“Respondent also had
substantial experience in the practice of law having been admitted to the Bar of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland on December 1, 1973, the Bar of the District of Columbia in 1991, and
the Bar of the State of New York in 1997.”);  Attorney Grievance v. Mininsohn, 380 Md.
536, 576,  846 A.2d 353, 376 (2004) (“With almost twenty-five years experience at the bar,
Mininsohn also has ‘substantial experience in the practice of law.’”); Attorney Grievance v.
Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 106, 797 A.2d 757, 769 (2002) (recognizing attorney’s “substantial
experience in the practice of law” as an aggravating factor); Attorney Grievance v. Harris,
371 Md. 510, 556, 810 A.2d 457, 485 (2002) (citing attorney’s substantial experience in the
34
practice of law as an aggravating factor).
In making our determination regarding the appropriate sanction, we also consider
mitigating factors, some of which may include:
“absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.”
Attorney Grievance v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 63, 991 A.2d 51, 61 (2010), quoting Attorney
Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 599, 911 A.2d 440, 448 (2006).  The hearing judge
determined that various mitigating factors were present in this case, including Coppola’s lack
of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a selfish motive in his conduct, that he
cooperated with Bar Counsel to “an exceptional degree,” that he had “genuine remorse for
his conduct” and that he offered to file a deed of correction and has repaid the legal fee
charged to Ms. West’s estate.
With respect to the value of these mitigators, we note that, in Attorney Grievance v.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 397, 773 A.2d 463, 475 (2001), we determined that, in the
absence of compelling extenuating circumstances, “present and associated with the illegal
or improper acts at the time committed,” disbarment is the appropriate sanction for violations
of Rule 8.4(c), in which intentionally dishonest conduct is present:
35
Upon reflection as a Court, in disciplinary matters, we
will not in the future attempt to distinguish between degrees of
intentional dishonesty based upon convictions, testimonials or
other factors. Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence
and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined
with the most important matters of basic character to such a
degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer
almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not,
present in an attorney’s character.  
Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
Id. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.  
The Vanderlinde principles are applicable in the present case, because Coppola
intentionally acted dishonestly.  The Vanderlinde precepts regarding extenuation, however,
do not apply:
[W]e 
will 
not 
accept, 
as 
“compelling 
extenuating
circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from 
any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that
also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her
conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only
if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider
imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in
cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional
misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct,
whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise.
Id. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485.  Since Vanderlinde, we have only found compelling
extenuating circumstances in cases where there was clear evidence that the attorney’s mental
condition was so debilitating that, in addition to being the “root cause” of the misconduct,
it also affected his or her ability to function in normal daily activities.  See Attorney
36
Grievance v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 646, 861 A.2d 692, 705 (2004) (determining that
extenuating circumstances were present when mental condition and impairment arising from
alcoholism and severe depression affected respondent’s ability to function in his normal
day-to-day activities and testimony from doctor indicating that attorney’s “mental conditions
were the root cause of his misconduct”).  In other cases, however, where there was either no
evidence presented as to a mental condition during the misconduct in issue or where evidence
of a mental condition was insufficient, we have declined to find compelling extenuating
circumstances.  See Attorney Grievance v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 212-13, 9 A.3d 37, 53
(2010) (reasoning that, “any alleged psychological issues Respondent was dealing with
contemporaneously with his misconduct do not rise to a level sufficient to meet
Vanderlinde’s requirements, and therefore, without more, do not mitigate the sanction here
to less than disbarment”); Attorney Grievance v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 62, 891 A.2d 1085,
1102 (2006) (determining that, “while Respondent suffered from a severe major depression
at the relevant times, his depression (and related sequelae) was not so great that it satisfied
the Vanderlinde threshold for mitigation of the sanction for his violations of the MRPC”);
Attorney Grievance v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 873 A.2d 1161 (2005) (no compelling
extenuating circumstances where respondent neither presented sufficient evidence of such
extenuating circumstances, nor did she present any supporting testimony from medical
professionals, and medical condition and treatment occurred subsequent to her fraudulent
behavior); Attorney Grievance v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 496, 850 A.2d 1157, 1167 (2004)
37
(finding, despite respondent’s claims that physical problems, emotional problems, or any
other host of problems he noted, caused or mitigated his behavior in this case, that “the
record in this case does not demand or even support a finding that ‘the most serious and
utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions’ caused Respondent’s inability to
conform his conduct in accordance with the law and with the rules.”).  In the present case,
the hearing judge found that, “[d]espite the emotional character of the situation, the
Respondent suffered no cognitive deficits and knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.”   
Coppola, nonetheless, urges us to impose a sanction less than disbarment by pointing
us to various post-Vanderlinde cases in which penalties less severe than disbarment were
imposed.  In addition to the fact that  “[w]e repeatedly have recognized that each attorney
grievance case rests on its own merits,” Attorney Grievance v. Garcia, 410 Md. 507, 529,
979 A.2d 146, 159 (2009), the cases cited by Coppola are not persuasive in our determination
of the appropriate sanction in the present case.  In many of the cases cited by Coppola,
Vanderlinde was not applied.  See Attorney Grievance v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 991 A.2d 51
(2010); Attorney Grievance v. Robaton, 411 Md. 415, 983 A.2d 467 (2009); Attorney
Grievance v. Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353, 946 A.2d 542 (2008); Attorney Grievance v. Kalil,
402 Md. 358, 936 A.2d 854 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Hermina, 379 Md. 503, 842 A.2d
762 (2004); see also Attorney Grievance v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 969 A.2d 1010 (2009);
Attorney Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 929 A.2d 61 (2007); Attorney Grievance v.
38
Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 892 A.2d 533 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Potter, 380 Md. 128,
844 A.2d 367 (2004).
Coppola asserts that he only was attempting to facilitate his clients’ wishes and
respond to a truly sorrowful situation and that he did not benefit from his acts.  We have
already addressed these contentions in Garcia, when we said, “[v]iolations of Rule 8.4 are
not justified by reference to the ends when illegal methods are utilized, nor by whether the
attorney profited from the illicit behavior.”  410 Md. at 522, 979 A.2d at 155.  There can be
no doubt that lawyers deal with situations and circumstances that are tragic, as well as
emotionally intense and vexing for clients, as happiness only may be found with a client who
adopts a child.
Attorneys, however, are not and cannot be hired guns for individuals who seek to
subvert the administration of justice.  Rather, the great strength of our profession lies in the
integrity with which we act and the honor that we bring to our work.  Attorneys are not
permitted to discard their ethical obligations when it becomes difficult or stressful to
maintain them.
To conclude, the dictates of Vanderlinde are applicable in the present case and,
accordingly, we order disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS
COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO RULE 16-761,
FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
39
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
JOHN 
MICHAEL
COPPOLA.
40
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 5
September Term, 2010
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
JOHN MICHAEL COPPOLA
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Murphy, J ., 
which Bell, C.J., joins.
Filed: April 29, 2011
If  I were persuaded that the Respondent had engaged in a “pattern of misconduct”
within the meaning of ABA Standard 9.22(c), I would not dissent from the decision to
disbar.  I am persuaded, however, that this Court should overrule Bar Counsel’s exception
to the  hearing judge’s “failure” to find that the Respondent engaged in a “pattern of
misconduct,” as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oregon in In re
Redden, 153 P.3d 113, 114-15 (Ore. 2007), and by the Supreme Court of Arizona in In re
Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1118-19 (Ariz. 1993).  Because a series of acts undertaken to
accomplish a particular result in a single case does not constitute a pattern of misconduct,
I dissent from the majority’s decision to sustain Bar Counsel’s “pattern of misconduct” 
exception.
  Although the Respondent “engaged in a series of acts over a number of days,”
those acts were engaged in for the sole purpose of carrying out Ms. West’s intent.  The
record shows that the Respondent (1) had never before engaged in the same or similar
wrongdoing, and (2) has never engaged in any misconduct when representing other
clients.  Under these unique circumstances, the public is protected by the imposition of an
indefinite suspension, with the right to petition for readmission no sooner than two years
after the date on which the suspension takes effect.  I therefore dissent from the decision to
disbar the Respondent.
Chief Judge Bell has authorized me to state that he joins this dissenting opinion.