Title: Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11737 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  OLAJUWAN JONES-PANNELL.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2015. - August 14, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Stop and frisk, Reasonable suspicion.  
Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, Reasonable suspicion, 
Threshold police inquiry.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Findings by judge.  
Firearms. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on August 8 and 25, 2011. 
 
 
After transfer to the Central Division of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department, a pretrial motion to suppress 
evidence was heard by Raymond G. Dougan, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Spina, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by that court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
John O. Mitchell for the defendant. 
                                                 
 
1 We follow our practice of spelling the defendant's name as 
it appears in the complaints. 
 
2 
 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant, Olawajuwan Jones-Pannell, fled 
when two Boston police officers attempted to stop and question 
him on Norfolk Avenue, between East Cottage Street and Burrell 
Street, in the Roxbury section of Boston.2  When the officers 
pursued and apprehended him, a handgun containing seven rounds 
of ammunition fell from his pants.  The defendant was charged 
with several firearms offenses, as well as resisting arrest.  
Prior to trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant 
moved to suppress all evidence derived from the encounter.  
After an evidentiary hearing, a Boston Municipal Court judge 
allowed the defendant's motion.  A single justice of this court 
granted the Commonwealth's application for leave to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as 
appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).  The Appeals Court reversed 
the allowance of the motion to suppress, Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 391 (2014), and we allowed the 
defendant's petition for further appellate review.  We affirm 
                                                 
 
2 The judge's findings refer to "Norfolk Street," but it is 
clear from the transcript of the suppression hearing that the 
judge and the parties were in agreement that the incident 
occurred on Norfolk Avenue.  We therefore refer to Norfolk 
Avenue throughout this opinion. 
 
3 
 
the motion judge's order allowing the motion to suppress. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the judge's factual findings, 
which were prefaced with his statement that "[t]he following 
facts are the only ones found by the court based on credible 
testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress." 
 
At approximately 12:37 A.M., two Boston police officers 
were on routine patrol along Norfolk Avenue in an unmarked 
police vehicle.  The officers noticed the defendant, a black 
male, walking on the sidewalk ten to twelve feet away.  Neither 
officer recognized the defendant, although they were "familiar 
with the gang members active in the area."  The judge found 
that, "[a]lthough the officers knew of some crimes that had been 
reported in the area, Norfolk [Avenue] between East Cottage 
Street and Burrell Street was not a high crime area or so-called 
'hot spot.'"  One officer observed the defendant's "right hand 
in his pants between his waist and his crotch but didn't see any 
other bulge in his pants."  The defendant "looked towards the 
police vehicle, looked up and down the street and continued 
walking."  One of the officers twice asked to speak to the 
defendant, but he looked away and kept walking.  The defendant 
accelerated his pace, keeping his hand in his pants, and the 
police vehicle kept pace with him.  As the defendant turned a 
corner, the officers got out of the vehicle.  One of the 
4 
 
officers called, "Wait a minute," in a loud voice.  The 
defendant started jogging.  The officer began chasing the 
defendant, who began running, with the officer in pursuit.  The 
officer could see the defendant's left hand, but not his right 
hand.  The defendant was apprehended twenty to thirty seconds 
later. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "In reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress, 'we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent 
clear error "but conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate 
findings and conclusions of law."'"  Commonwealth v. Ramos, 470 
Mass. 740, 742 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 
207, 214, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007).  Although an 
appellate court may supplement a motion judge's subsidiary 
findings with evidence from the record that "is uncontroverted 
and undisputed and where the judge explicitly or implicitly 
credited the witness's testimony," Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 
448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), it may do 
so only so long as the supplemented facts "do not detract from 
the judge's ultimate findings."  Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 
Mass. 121, 127-128 (2015).  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 52 Mass. 
App. Ct. 486, 492 (2001), S.C., 440 Mass. 642 (2004) (that 
appellate courts have been willing to supplement motion judge's 
findings of fact is based "not only upon the fact that the 
5 
 
evidence was uncontradicted but also upon our conviction that 
the motion judge explicitly or implicitly credited the witness's 
testimony"). 
 
In this case, it appears from the judge's prefatory 
statement that he intended to credit only those portions of the 
testimony that were reflected in his findings.3  "It is therefore 
not implicit in the judge's findings that [the judge] found the 
entirety of the officer's testimony credible."4  Commonwealth v. 
Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 749 (2013).  Compare Commonwealth v. 
Gentile, 466 Mass. 817, 820-822 & n.5 (2014) (supplementing 
judge's findings with testimony that "was controverted and 
disputed," where judge found witness's testimony "credible in 
its entirety," but reversing judge's denial of motion to 
suppress because "even if the judge had explicitly made findings 
                                                 
 
3 The judge's prefatory statement does not, as the 
Commonwealth contends, insulate his findings of fact from 
appellate review.  It is the motion judge's responsibility to 
make credibility assessments, weigh the evidence, and make 
findings of fact; it remains the responsibility of an appellate 
court to evaluate whether those findings are clearly erroneous. 
 
 
4 Where a party contends that a motion judge failed to make 
findings warranted by the evidence, and that supplementation 
with material facts would require reversal of the suppression 
order, a reviewing court will not engage in fact finding, but 
may remand so that the judge may consider whether additional 
findings are warranted.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 
448 Mass. 334, 337-338 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008); 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 495-496 (2001). 
 
6 
 
adopting every factual assertion in [witness's] testimony, the 
findings would still fall short of establishing a reasonable 
belief that the defendant was in the home at the time of 
entry"). 
 
The Commonwealth essentially asks us to do what our case 
law proscribes:  to rely on testimony that was neither 
explicitly nor implicitly credited by the motion judge, 
otherwise put, that we in essence make additional findings, and 
reach a different result, based on our own view of the evidence.  
The Commonwealth argues that the judge wrongly determined the 
points at which the defendant began to jog and run, and 
therefore erred in deciding when the defendant was seized.  The 
Commonwealth asks also that we consider the officer's testimony 
anew and conclude, contrary to the judge's finding, that the 
neighborhood was in fact a "high crime" area.  The Commonwealth 
suggests further that we should supplement the judge's findings 
with additional evidence concerning the officer's training, in 
order to conclude that the officer reasonably suspected the 
defendant was carrying a firearm unlawfully.  This we cannot do.  
After review of the judge's findings and rulings and the record, 
we conclude that the judge's subsidiary findings are not 
erroneous; they amply "support his general findings [and] 
conclusions based thereon."  Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 
7 
 
542, 547 (1972). 
 
a.  Point at which the defendant was seized.  Identifying 
the moment of seizure is a critical question for purposes of 
deciding a motion to suppress.  "A person is seized by the 
police only when, in light of all of the attending 
circumstances, a reasonable person in that situation would not 
feel free to leave."  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 
369 (2007). 
 
Here, the judge concluded that the defendant was seized 
when an officer "exclaimed 'Wait a minute!' and then began 
chasing the defendant."  The Commonwealth contends that the 
defendant was not seized until he was physically apprehended.  
It argues that "the defendant's flight was not prompted by 
anything the police did," Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 
578 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1739 (2012), because he 
already was running when the officer began to chase him.  The 
judge found otherwise, and his findings are not clearly 
erroneous; although the officer's testimony characterized the 
defendant's pace in a number of ways, the judge's factual 
findings resolve the differences.5  In any event, regardless of 
                                                 
 
5 Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the judge's 
finding that the defendant started "jogging," only after the 
officer yelled, "Wait a minute," is clearly erroneous.  We are 
not convinced that there was clear error.  While there is some 
8 
 
when the defendant started "jogging", or what rate of speed was 
meant by that term, the judge found that the defendant increased 
his pace after the officers initially asked to speak to him, and 
that the defendant started to run when the officers got out of 
the vehicle, one officer called out loudly to "[w]ait a minute," 
and the officer then gave chase.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 
435 Mass. 171, 174-176 (2001).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Powell, 
supra (no seizure where flight not prompted by police activity). 
The defendant was free to reject the police officer's 
multiple requests to speak with him, just as he was free to 
respond to the requests by increasing his pace.  Unlike the 
situations in Commonwealth v. Powell, supra, and Commonwealth v. 
Sykes, 449 Mass. 308, 313-314 (2007), the judge's findings in 
this case, which are supported by the evidence, support the 
conclusion that the defendant's eventual running was prompted by 
the officers' actions.  The officer's loud command to "[w]ait," 
and his pursuit, had compulsory aspects that his prior requests 
did not.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, supra at 174-176.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
possibly equivocal testimony about when the defendant started 
jogging, ample testimony in the record supports the judge's 
finding, and the judge clearly indicated that he did not find 
all of the testimony credible.  The judge was not required to, 
and apparently did not, credit equivocal testimony to the effect 
that the defendant was already "jogging" prior to the moment the 
officer yelled at him to "[w]ait," and merely speeded up 
thereafter. 
 
9 
 
evidence amply demonstrated that the defendant was not free to 
leave at that point.  Id. 
 
b.  Suspicion of criminal activity.  The legal question 
then becomes whether, at the time the defendant was seized, the 
officers "had an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, based on specific and articulable facts."  
Commonwealth v. Barros, supra at 176.  The judge found that the 
factors relevant to the reasonableness of the officers' 
suspicion were: 
"flight from police officers and keeping his right hand in 
his pants between his waist and his crotch.  That it was 
just after midnight adds little if anything to the calculus 
of reasonable suspicion.  Other factors that in some cases 
support a finding of a reasonable suspicion are missing:  
this was not a high crime area; the police didn't know the 
defendant; there were no reports or radio calls of a crime 
having been recently committed in the area; the officers 
were on routine patrol." 
 
The judge concluded that the defendant's refusal to respond to 
the officer's initial requests to speak with him did not 
generate an objectively reasonable suspicion and that, while 
flight from police and holding one's hand at one's waist or 
inside one's pants may sometimes indicate that an individual has 
a weapon, it also is consistent with other, nonviolent 
activities.  Although acknowledging these two factors to be 
"important," the judge determined that, without more, they were 
"not enough to support a conclusion of reasonable suspicion." 
10 
 
The Commonwealth contends that testimony concerning the 
character of the neighborhood as "high crime" added 
substantially to the reasonableness of the officers' suspicions.  
Although a characterization that an area is one of "high crime" 
may be relevant in determining whether a police officer's 
suspicion is reasonable, the accuracy of the characterization in 
a particular case depends on specific facts found by the judge 
that underlie such a determination, rather than on any label 
that is applied.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 Mass. 159, 
163 (2009).  And, as we cautioned in that case, whether a 
neighborhood is a high crime area is a consideration that must 
be applied with care. 
 
"The fact that the officers were in a high crime area 
is unquestionably a factor to consider, albeit with 
caution; we recognize that so-called high crime areas are 
inhabited and frequented by many law-abiding citizens who 
are entitled to be protected against being stopped and 
frisked just because of the neighborhood where they live, 
work, or visit.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holley, 52 
Mass. App. Ct. 659, 663 (2001).  The term 'high crime area' 
is itself a general and conclusory term that should not be 
used to justify a stop or a frisk, or both, without 
requiring the articulation of specific facts demonstrating 
the reasonableness of the intrusion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 513, (2009)." 
 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra. 
 
The judge's finding that the stop here did not take place 
in a "high crime" area was not clearly erroneous.  In some 
circumstances, locations where firearms offenses are common, or 
11 
 
where rival gang activity occurs, have been considered "high 
crime" areas.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pagan, 63 Mass. App. 
Ct. 780, 781-783 (2005).  Compare Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra 
at 314-315 (in high crime area where large group congregated, 
attempting to avoid contact with police and clenching waistband 
while running contributed to reasonable suspicion).  Isolated 
incidents of nearby gun activity, or the mere presence of gangs 
in the vicinity, however, does not require a finding that a 
particular street is a "high crime area."  In this case, there 
was no testimony concerning arrests in the area of Norfolk 
Avenue; no testimony about any crime on the street in question; 
and no testimony that police patrolled Norfolk Avenue because of 
any specific criminal activity occurring there.  Indeed, at the 
time of the stop, the officers were on routine patrol and were 
not responding to any radio call.  One officer stated that he 
"knew of some crime that had been reported in the neighborhood," 
but this testimony was supported by few specific facts:  he 
testified only to a radio call of "shots fired" about two weeks 
previously, and a shooting and recovery of a gun sometime in the 
preceding several months.  With respect to his testimony that 
there was "undescribed gang activity in the area," the officer 
articulated no specific facts, and made no statement that 
firearms or violence were involved. 
12 
 
 
That one or more "crimes" occurred at some point in the 
past somewhere on a particular street does not necessarily 
render the entire street a "high crime area," either at that 
time or in perpetuity.  Here, on the evidence before him, the 
judge's determination that "Norfolk [Avenue] between East 
Cottage Street and Burrell Street was not a high crime area" was 
not clear error.6 
 
The same can be said with respect to the judge's findings 
concerning the officer's training and experience.  The judge 
credited the officer's testimony that, nine years earlier, he 
had completed an eight-hour training class titled 
"Characteristics of Armed Gunmen."  The judge was not required 
to conclude that this training -- by itself or in combination 
with other factors -- made the officer's suspicion objectively 
reasonable.  Likewise, the judge was not required to make 
detailed findings about the content of the course.  The judge's 
findings accurately reflect that, apart from the eight-hour 
                                                 
 
6 Nor was there error, as the Commonwealth contends, in the 
judge's determination that the time of night added "little if 
anything to the calculus of reasonable suspicion."  The 
defendant was stopped just after midnight on a summer evening.  
Nothing in the judge's decision suggests that he ignored the 
time or declined to consider it.  To the contrary, the judge 
addressed the question of the time of night explicitly, 
apparently having concluded that, in light of the other evidence 
before him, the time at which these events took place was not a 
significant factor with respect to the reasonableness of the 
officer's suspicion. 
13 
 
training class about which there was testimony, there was "no 
other testimony about [the officer's] training." 
 
c.  Supplementation of judge's findings in future cases.  
We recognize that our decisions have engaged in (and condoned) a 
practice of "minor" or "interstitial" supplementation of a 
motion judge's findings with uncontroverted facts.  At times, 
that practice is benign, simply serving to fill out the story.  
See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), citing 
Commonwealth v. Butler, 423 Mass. 517, 526 n. 10 (1996).  This 
practice also may be appropriate where a judge's findings are 
sparse and additional facts are needed to provide context.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Silva, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 30 (2004); 
Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 278 (1993); 
Commonwealth v. Coy, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 368 (1980).  And, as 
noted, we may affirm a judge's order on a motion to suppress 
based not only on the facts as found, but also on evidence that 
was "implicitly or explicitly credited" by the motion judge.  
See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., supra at 337.  See Commonwealth 
v. Jessup, 471 Mass. at 127-128 (appellate court may supplement 
with additional undisputed facts that "do not detract from the 
judge's ultimate findings"); Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 
616, 617 n.1 (2008) (reviewing court may supplement "with 
uncontested testimony presented at the hearing by a witness 
14 
 
whose testimony largely was credited by the judge and does not 
contradict the judge's findings"). 
 
But the mere absence of contradiction is not enough to 
permit supplementation with facts not found by the judge.  A 
reviewing court should exercise caution in supplementing a 
motion judge's findings of fact with evidence in the record that 
was not included in the judge's findings, and as to which the 
judge made no statement of credibility, on the assertion that 
the judge implicitly credited that testimony.  While, for 
instance, a judge's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
may in some circumstances imply resolution of "factual issues in 
favor of the Commonwealth," see Commonwealth v. Hinds, 437 Mass. 
54, 57 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1205 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 137 (2001), where a 
judge made "careful and detailed findings," we may have "no way 
to tell whether, or to what extent," the judge believed the 
testimony as to which he or she made no findings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Correia, 381 Mass. 65, 76 (1980).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 465, 472 (2007) 
(judicial silence, reflected in absence of finding supportive of 
witness, can suggest that judge rejected witness's testimony). 
 
Where a motion judge's findings of fact are insufficient to 
support the judge's conclusions of law, and it is not apparent 
15 
 
from the judge's decision or the record that the judge credited 
other testimony as to which no findings were made, ordinarily a 
reviewing court will reverse the judge's decision.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. King, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 741-742 (2008).  We 
have on occasion supplemented a judge's findings with additional 
facts necessary to support the judge's conclusion, such as where 
the judge found the witnesses' testimony "truthful and 
accurate."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 
619 n.3, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 433 (2012).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 492 (2001).  In 
the absence of findings on a critical issue, however, or where 
the facts as found are "susceptible of more than one 
interpretation," and there is additional evidence in the record, 
neither implicitly credited nor discredited by the judge, remand 
may be appropriate.  See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., supra at 
338-339 (remanding for further findings where judge made no 
credibility determination concerning detective's testimony, and 
we thus were unable to determine whether omission was error or 
testimony was not credited).  A judge may resolve any 
uncertainty by including in the decision a statement as to 
whether the judge credits, or does not credit, all or a portion 
of a particular witness's testimony.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 749 (2013) (where judge stated that her 
16 
 
findings were based on "credible testimony" of police officer, 
but stated also that she did not find credible officer's 
testimony that he had heightened awareness of danger, "[i]t is 
therefore not implicit in the judge's findings that she found 
the entirety of the officer's testimony credible"). 
 
But, as our long-standing jurisprudence makes plain, in no 
event is it proper for an appellate court to engage in what 
amounts to independent fact finding in order to reach a 
conclusion of law that is contrary to that of a motion judge who 
has seen and heard the witnesses, and made determinations 
regarding the weight and credibility of their testimony.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340-341 (2012) and 
cases cited; Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 381 
(2008), and cases cited.  A motion judge cannot be deemed 
implicitly to have credited testimony that is contrary to the 
judge's ultimate findings and conclusions simply because, as is 
often the case in a criminal proceeding, only one witness 
testified at the hearing, so the testimony is "uncontroverted." 
 
Here, the judge's decision included a detailed statement of 
facts, prefaced by a statement that the facts stated were based 
on the only testimony that the judge found credible.  Such a 
statement leaves no room for supplementation of the judge's 
findings of fact.  Because the judge's findings of fact were not 
17 
 
clearly erroneous, we must accept the judge's subsidiary 
findings of fact, and consider only whether they support the 
judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law.7  See 
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 405 (1999) ("motion 
judge's findings of fact are binding in the absence of clear 
error").  "We cannot properly be asked to revise a judge's 
subsidiary findings of fact, where they are warranted by the 
evidence, or to review the weight (or credibility) of the 
evidence related to the findings."  Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 
Mass. 751, 756 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. 
542, 550 (1972) (Hennessey, J., concurring). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed. 
 
                                                 
 
7  An appellate court is, of course, "free to affirm a 
ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion 
judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is 
supported by the record and the findings."  Commonwealth v. Va 
Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. 
Bartlett, 465 Mass. 112, 117 (2013).