Title: Peaks v. Maryland

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Dwayne Antonio Peaks v. State of Maryland, No. 59, September Term, 2010, Opinion by
Greene, J.
HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - COMPETENCY EVALUATION
Once a criminal defendant is determined to be competent pursuant to the procedure outlined
in § 3-104 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Article, a judge has the authority to reconsider an
earlier determination of competence pursuant to § 3-104(c).  If the court elects to reconsider
the defendant’s competency to stand trial, a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion,
must make the determination of whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, on the
basis of evidence on the record, but before final judgment.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 59
September Term, 2010
DWAYNE ANTONIO PEAKS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbara,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Filed:   April 26, 2011
Petitioner, Dwayne Antonio Peaks (“Peaks”) was convicted of multiple offenses
following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.  Peaks argues that the trial
judge did not make an adequate determination of Peaks’s competency to stand trial under Md.
Code (1974, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Section § 3-104
states:
(a) In general. – If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a
criminal case or a violation of probation proceeding appears to
the court to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges
incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on
evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial.
(b) Court action if defendant found competent. – If, after
receiving evidence, the court finds that the defendant is
competent to stand trial, the trial shall begin as soon as
practicable or, if already begun, shall continue.
(c) Reconsideration. – At any time before final judgment, the
court may reconsider the question of whether the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial.
Specifically, the Petitioner presents one question for our review:
Where a defendant’s competency is explicitly called into
question and a competency evaluation is ordered, sua sponte, by
a Circuit Court judge, does § 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure
Article of Maryland’s Annotated Code require the trial judge to
make a proper competency determination prior to the
commencement of trial and before a defendant can be permitted
to discharge his counsel? 
In the present case, the Circuit Court judge acted properly under § 3-104 in
determining that the defendant, Peaks, was competent to stand trial.  Defense counsel first
raised the issue of Peaks’s competency following his arraignment, and the court ordered a
competency evaluation pursuant to Md. Code (1974, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 3-105 of the
1 Section 3-105 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In general. – (1) For good cause and after giving the defendant an opportunity to be
heard, the court may order the Health Department to examine the defendant to determine
whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
(2) The court shall set and may change the conditions under which the examination
is to be made.
***
(d) Duties of Health Department. --
(1) If a court orders an examination under this section, the Health Department shall:
(i) examine the defendant; and
(ii) send a complete report of its findings to:
1. the court;
2. the State's Attorney; and
3. the defense counsel.
2
Criminal Procedure Article, which authorizes a judge to “order the Health Department to
examine the defendant to determine whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.”1 
Based on the results of the evaluation of Peaks and the evidence on the record, when the case
came before Judge Barry G. Williams for trial, he determined that Peaks was competent to
stand trial.  In a subsequent proceeding, however, Judge Williams elected to reconsider that
determination and ordered another evaluation.  Although this second evaluation was never
completed, the trial proceeded before another judge of the Circuit Court, Judge Paul E. Alpert,
and the issue of competency was not raised again by any party.  We shall hold that under the
circumstances, even though Peaks’s trial had already commenced, the trial judge did not
violate § 3-104 in determining again that Peaks was competent to stand trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
2 Peaks was charged with attempted first degree murder, attempted first degree rape,
first and second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a deadly weapon with intent to
injure, in addition to possession and possession with intent to distribute narcotics.
3
On October 12, 2004, Peaks was arraigned in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
on charges relating to events occurring between April and May of 2004.2  Following the
arraignment, defense counsel entered a plea of not criminally responsible on Peaks’s behalf
and requested an evaluation of his competency to stand trial.  On November 4, the Circuit
Court ordered the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to perform a competency
evaluation.  On December 15, Peaks was referred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center
(“Perkins Hospital”) for evaluation of his competency and criminal responsibility.  After
multiple examinations and evaluations performed by various psychiatrists, a Pretrial
Evaluation was submitted to the Circuit Court on April 26, 2005.  The evaluators found that
Peaks was “able to understand the nature and object of the charges against him and to assist
in his own defense,” and therefore concluded that Peaks was “competent to stand trial.”
Defense counsel sought to have Peaks evaluated again, because counsel was not satisfied with
the initial evaluation.  The Circuit Court then ordered a postponement of the trial pending an
additional evaluation.  
After multiple postponements for varying reasons, the case came before Judge John
M. Glynn for trial on March 13, 2006.  Judge Glynn asked why the case was “so old.”
Defense counsel responded that the delay was due to “issues regarding [Peaks’s] competence,
which [have] been resolved.”  The trial was not able to commence on that day due to the
4
absence of a witness for the State.  The case was reset for trial before Judge Williams.  On
November 16, 2006, the parties addressed the outstanding competency concerns:
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:
I’m concerned Judge as far as the
competency, where that - that the
defendant’s competency will have to be
made very clear on the record that he is
acting in contempt of the court but that he
is competent and those issues will be
(inaudible) absentia.
THE COURT:
I understand.
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:
And it has been resolved.
THE COURT:
That was my understanding looking at the
court file, talking to the other judges who
have had him.  That has been my
understanding, litigated extensively.
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
Well it’s never actually gone to a
competency hearing.  He’s only been sent
to the court medicals and Perkins [Hospital]
and had evaluations.
THE COURT:
And . . . 
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
He’s never had a . . . 
THE COURT:
And that Courts having determined,
after reviewing those competency
requests, the courts have determined that
he is competent to stand trial.  So, unless
there is a . . .
[DEFENSE 
5
COUNSEL]:
And the defense is not making a motion . .
. and without revealing anything that would
jeopardize privilege, there is no reason at
this time to question his competency or
his criminal responsibility.
THE COURT:
There are just some people that just decide
to act out.
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
I understand Your Honor.
THE COURT:
And that seems to be what Mr. Peaks has
decided to do.  Hopefully, he won’t do that
today.  But, if so, but I understand the
State’s concern.
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
Well Your Honor, . . . I learned that the
defense withdrew the competency -
contesting the competency issues, back in
the summer, I think it was August was the
last trial date.
THE COURT:
We’re not going to go down that path.
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
And I understand that they are not going to
renew that issue.
THE COURT:
And that’s where it is.
 (Emphasis added.)
Subsequently, the court was informed that Peaks could not attend the hearing because he had
chest pains and was taken back to jail for observation or treatment.  Judge Williams stated
that, “the same thing happened yesterday when Mr. Peaks was here in this courtroom.  He
seemed to this Court to be in fine condition, but when he did not get what he wanted, which
6
was the opportunity to discharge counsel, he then claimed that he had some heart problems
or chest pains.”
The case was scheduled to resume in two weeks.  On November 29, Peaks again
appeared before Judge Williams to begin trial.  Peaks indicated that he wanted to discharge
his counsel and hire a private attorney, and the parties discussed possible plea options.  Peaks,
however, began to act out once more.  He complained that he was being “railroaded” by the
government and was concerned that he was not being adequately represented.  He again
complained of chest pains, to which Judge Williams responded, it “seems that every time that
I don’t do what you want me to do you complain about chest pains” and later, “it has been
found that you didn’t have any chest pains [when you complained about chest pains in the
past].”  When Peaks protested this characterization, Judge Williams stated, “Sir I believe what
you are trying to do is disrupt my court proceedings.  And if you do that, it is contempt of
court.”  Peaks then began to curse and act erratically, and the Judge found him in contempt.
Afterwards, the Court recessed for the day.
Peaks was brought back to court the next day to schedule another trial date.  Judge
Williams informed Peaks that he had a new attorney from the Public Defender’s Office.  The
exchange continued:  
THE COURT:
Sir we are in the position right now where
I have to determine whether or not we can
proceed with trial.  I have made every
attempt I can.  Yesterday you told me that
you have emotional issues.  Do you
remember telling me that sir?
7
PEAKS:
Sure.
THE COURT:
I’m concerned about those issues.  Your
ability to sit in court and assist [your
attorney] has been called into question by
your own actions.  I am not sure that you
can do that.  And like I told you yesterday
and like I told you before it is my desire to
try these cases, because like you said you
have been sitting in jail for a long period of
time.  I am not certain that you are
competent to assist your attorney in your
defense.  And I am not sure about your
responsibility.  So for those reasons based
on actions that you presented to me
yesterday.  Based on your outbursts
yesterday.  Based on reviewing paperwork
of the past.  I’m determining that I am
ordering you to be evaluated for
competency and criminal responsibility.
That will be done hopefully within the next
sixty days sir.
PEAKS:
I had like four of them done, they say that
I’m competent. 
The dialogue continued between Judge Williams and Peaks, Peaks maintaining his
competence and the judge explaining that an evaluation should be done to make sure he was
competent to stand trial.  The latest evaluation ordered by Judge Williams, however, was
never completed, as explained in multiple letters from doctors at Perkins Hospital to the court,
stating that Peaks could not be evaluated because he would not cooperate with them.   
The trial was set to begin on June 4, 2007 before Judge Alpert.  On that date, the issue
of competency was not raised by defense counsel or Peaks, and was not initially addressed
by the court.  After advising Peaks of his rights and engaging in plea discussions, which were
3 Maryland Rule 4-215 (2009 Repl. Volume) applies to the waiver of counsel.  Rule
4-215(a) outlines the specific procedure a court must follow, which ensures that the
defendant is informed and advised of his or her constitutional rights.  Rule 4-215(b) requires
that the judge conduct an examination of the defendant on the record to determine that “the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waiv[es] the right to counsel.”
8
eventually terminated, Judge Alpert began the process of voir dire, bringing in prospective
jurors and asking them questions regarding any possible bias.  During this process, Peaks
requested to discharge his attorney, based on his alleged belief that the attorney was not
adequately representing him, informing the judge he would rather represent himself.  
After performing a Rule 4-2153 inquiry, Judge Alpert allowed Peaks to discharge his
counsel.  Peaks proceeded without counsel; he participated in voir dire and excused jurors
after Judge Alpert asked the prospective jurors questions indicating their bias.  Peaks then
began to act out, yelling in court, using profanities and indicating his belief that the system
was fixed against him.  Once Peaks became completely unruly, Judge Alpert informed him
that he would be removed from the courtroom should his behavior continue.  Peaks did not
heed the warning and was removed from the courtroom when he refused to comply.  
The next day, Peaks was brought back to the court, and given the opportunity to
participate in his defense.  He told the court multiple times that he did not want to participate,
and he was escorted out of the courtroom.  After concluding voir dire in the absence of
defense counsel or Peaks, the judge informed the State that the case would proceed to trial.
The State then said:
[STATE’S 
ATTORNEY]:
I have several pre trial issues Your Honor.
9
The first issue is, the State already brought
this up before as far as his previous plea
which was subsequently withdrawn
(inauditable [sic]) conference hearing.  It is
the understanding of the State that this
Court has had plenty opportunity to
engaged [sic] Mr. Peaks and find him
otherwise to be competent for the purposes
of continuing this trial.
THE COURT:
He’ll participate in the trial.  He
participated to some extent in the jury
selection which the record will reflect, with
the assistance of [his attorneys].  He also
discussed the plea, and he decided not to do
the plea.  I’m satisfied that he is
competent to stand trial.  Without any
doubt am I satisfied.
(Emphasis added.)
The State proceeded with its case and Peaks was convicted, by the jury, in absentia.
Peaks, represented by counsel from the Office of the Public Defender, appealed his conviction
to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that Judge Alpert did not comply with § 3-104
because the judge did not make a proper determination regarding competency prior to trial.
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
“[w]e are satisfied that the court determined on the record that [Peaks] was competent to stand
trial” and that there was sufficient evidence on the record to support a finding of competency.
Subsequently, we granted Peaks’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  Peaks v. State, 415 Md.
114, 999 A.2d 179 (2010).
DISCUSSION
We note at the outset that there is no substantive challenge to Peaks’s competency.
4 Roberts interpreted the precursor to § 3-104, Md. Code (1982, 2000 Repl. Vol.),
§12-103 of the Health-General Article.  Section 3-104 is substantially the same, the only
changes being the change of the heading of (a) from “Hearing” to “In general” and the
addition in (a) of the phrase, “or a violation of probation proceeding.”  As we stated in Gregg
10
The Petitioner does not allege that he was incompetent to stand trial.  Rather, Petitioner’s
claim is that the trial court committed a procedural error by failing to determine the issue of
Peak’s competency prior to the commencement of trial.  With that in mind, we turn to the
requirements of Maryland law.
A defendant is considered incompetent to stand trial if he or she is not able, “(1) to
understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in one’s defense.”  Md. Code
(2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 3-101(f) of the Criminal Procedure Article; see also Thanos v.
State, 330 Md. 77, 85, 622 A.2d 727, 730 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402 (1960)).  Additionally, the substantive prohibition against the criminal prosecution of an
incompetent defendant is protected by certain guarantees of procedural due process.  Trimble
v. State, 321 Md. 248, 254, 582 A.2d 794, 797 (1990). 
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be competent to stand trial.  Ware v. State,
360 Md. 650, 703, 759 A.2d 764, 792 (2000).  Once the issue of competency is raised, the
General Assembly  places the duty to determine the defendant’s competency on the trial court,
in order to ensure that the requirements of due process are satisfied.   Roberts v. State, 361
Md. 346, 363-64, 761 A.2d 885, 895 (2000). The duty of the trial court may be triggered upon
motion of the accused or defense counsel, or upon sua sponte action of the court.  Roberts,
361 Md. at 364, 761 A.2d at 895.  As we stated in Roberts,4 the language of the statute, now
v. State, 377 Md. 515 n. 4, 533, 833 A.2d 1040, 1050 n. 4 (2003), §12-103 was recodified
in § 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure article without substantive change.
11
codified as § 3-104:
[M]andates actions to be undertaken by a trial court, if an
accused’s competency is properly called into question.  These
actions can be broken down into three distinct and simple steps:
(1) First, a determination of competency may be made at any
time before or during a trial; (2) Second, such a determination
must be made if the defendant in a criminal case appears to be
incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence
to stand trial; and (3) Finally, the court must make its
determination on the evidence presented on the record.  
Id.  This mandate “indicates that the Legislature intended for every accused, whose
competency was called into question, to have at least one guaranteed review of his or her
competency status.”  Roberts,  361 Md. at 366, 761 A.2d at 896.  Once the issue of
competency has been raised, a “determination that an accused is competent to stand trial must
be found beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 365, 384 A.2d 91, 98
(1978).  Additionally, competency to stand trial is a factual determination which will not be
reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.  Jolley, 282 Md. at 375, 384 A.2d at 103.
Additionally, the determination of the court need not be in the form of a formal
hearing.  See Roberts, 361 Md. at 368, 761 A.2d at 897.  A judge with no jury present is not
“required to use any magic words to designate as a separate hearing the presentation to him
of testimony and evidence for his determination of the competency of the accused to stand
trial.  It is sufficient if the testimony and evidence are on the record.”  Id.  Further, once the
trial court has determined that the defendant is competent to stand trial, “the court is not
5 Trimble applied the predecessor statute to § 3-104, Md. Code (1982, 1990 Repl.
Vol.), § 12-103 of the Health-General Article.  See Trimble, 321 Md. at 255, 582 A.2d at 797
(quoting § 12-103).
12
required to hold an additional hearing merely because [the defendant] again alleges he is
incompetent.”  Trimble, 321 Md. at 255, 582 A.2d at 798; see also Roberts, 361 Md. at 364,
761 A.2d at 895 (“Once an initial determination has been made, a reconsideration of the
accused’s competency may be made and is controlled by the discretionary language of [§ 3-
104(c)]”).  
In Trimble, we held that the defendant was determined to be competent prior to trial
pursuant to the procedure outlined in the then applicable competency statute.5  Trimble, 321
Md. at 255, 582 A.2d at 797-98.  During the Trimble trial, however, the defendant “behave[d]
strangely” and defense counsel alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct
a supplemental hearing on the issue of his competency.  Trimble, 321 Md. at 255, 582 A.2d
at 798.  We rejected that argument, noting that “any questions posed directly to [the
defendant] at trial were answered appropriately” and holding that the “trial judge could have
concluded that the behavior was designed only to disturb the proceedings and was not the
result of any real incompetency.”  We therefore held that another hearing or determination on
competency was not necessary.  Trimble, 321 Md. at 256, 582 A.2d at 798.  
Having outlined the procedural requirements of a competency determination, we need
to clarify what evidence may be reviewed by a judge in determining competency.  In Jones
v. State, 280 Md. 282, 285, 372 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1977), the trial judge reviewed, in camera,
13
a psychological report that was completed under the jurisdiction of juvenile authorities.  After
reviewing the report, the trial judge determined that the defendant was competent to stand
trial.  Id.  In deciding the case, we stated that “before the trial may properly commence or
continue, given a sufficient allegation of incompetency . . . the trial court is first required to
make a determination of the defendant’s competency” based on evidence presented on the
record.  Jones, 280 Md. at 289, 372 A.2d at 1068; see also § 3-104(b) (“If, after receiving
evidence, the court finds that the defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial shall begin as
soon as practicable or, if already begun, shall continue) (emphasis added).  We noted that
“[f]ailure to determine competency ‘upon testimony and evidence presented on the record’
as required by the statute, nullifies not only the determination itself but also the trial and
resulting conviction.”  Jones, 280 Md. at 289, 372 A.2d at 1068.  We therefore held that the
trial court erred “in resting its determination of competency on matters outside the record in
contravention of the statute.”  Jones, 280 Md. at 287, 372 A.2d at 1067. 
In Roberts v. State, supra, we also held that the trial court erred in failing to comply
with the competency statute.  In Roberts, the defendant was charged with first degree murder
and related offenses.  Roberts,  361 Md. at 349, 761 A.2d at 887.  The defendant requested
a mental examination to determine her competence to stand trial, but the motion was denied
by the trial judge without a hearing.  Id.  We stated that the trial court in Roberts had “no basis
for finding that the examination was or was not necessary,” emphasizing that there was no
evidence on the record regarding Mr. Roberts’s incompetence.  Roberts,  361 Md. at 371, 761
A.2d at 898.  We stated that “[w]hile we do not say that a formal hearing on the merits is
14
required in all circumstances . . . an accused must be afforded an opportunity to present
evidence upon which a valid determination can be made.”  Roberts,  361 Md. at 356, 761 A.2d
at 891.  See also Colbert v. State, 18 Md. App. 632, 642, 308 A.2d 726, 732, cert denied, 269
Md. 756 (1973) (holding that there need not be a separate hearing for the presentation of
evidence).  We held, in Roberts, that the trial court erred in denying the motion without a
hearing, because Mr. Roberts was not provided the opportunity to present evidence regarding
the issue of competency.  Roberts,  361 Md. at 369, 761 A.2d at 897.  
In deciding Roberts, we relied on Sangster v. State, 312 Md. 560, 541 A.2d 637 (1988),
in which we discussed the legislative history of the competency statute in great detail, and we
reiterated that the legislative intent in passing the statute was to “mandate [the] precise actions
to be taken by a trial court when an accused’s competency to stand trial was questioned.”
Roberts,  361 Md. at 363, 761 A.2d at 894.  In Sangster, we discussed what type of evidence
satisfies the statute.  The defense in Sangster moved for a determination of competency, and
the court ordered an evaluation to be performed at Perkins Hospital.  Sangster, 312 Md. at
562-63, 541 A.2d 638.  Mr. Sangster was then evaluated by four psychiatrists, who
determined that he was competent, and dictated their findings in a conference note which was
sent to the court.  Sangster, 312 Md. at 563, 541 A.2d 638.  This note was submitted at a
competency hearing, in addition to the testimony of a defense witness, and the court ruled that
Mr. Sangster was competent beyond a reasonable doubt.  Sangster 312 Md. at 564, 541 A.2d
639.     
The issue in Sangster was whether the statute required the live testimony of examining
6Sangster discussed § 12-103 and 12-104 of the Health-General Article.  See infra,
footnote 6, regarding § 12-103.  Section 12-104 was substantially recodified in the current
Criminal Procedure Article, § 3-105. 
15
physicians, in addition to the report produced by the physicians, in order for the court to rule
on the issue of competency.  Sangster 312 Md. at 566, 541 A.2d 639-40.  In deciding this
issue, we evaluated the meaning of the phrase “evidence presented on the record,” found in
the predecessor to § 3-104.6  Sangster 312 Md. at 566-73, 541 A.2d 640-43.  We determined
that because the statute authorizes the court to order the Health Department to conduct a
competency evaluation, and further directs that the report shall be provided to the court, the
defense counsel, and the State’s attorney, “the statute itself ensures that the arbiter and the
adversaries are equally informed of the report’s content.  In this way, the statute makes the
report ‘evidence on the record’ for consideration at the competency hearing to the same extent
as if the report were formally offered and marked as an exhibit at the hearing.”  Sangster 312
Md. at 568, 541 A.2d 640; see § 3-105(a) and (d) of the current Criminal Procedure Article.
We held that the trial court was able to evaluate Sangster’s competence “not only in the light
of Sangster’s testimony and observed conduct, but also in light of the opinions expressed by
the examining physicians at Perkins in their report” and therefore there was sufficient
evidence on the record to determine Mr. Sangster’s competence to stand trial even absent live
testimony.  Sangster 312 Md. at 576, 541 A.2d 645.
The observation of the defendant’s behavior may also be considered “evidence on the
record” which might support a determination on the issue of competency.  In Gregg v. State,
16
377 Md. 515, 547, 833 A.2d 1040, 1059 (2003), we held that the defendant’s behavior during
the trial did not result in a sua sponte duty to inquire into the defendant’s competency.  We
stated that although the defendant’s behavior was “stubborn and argumentative,” the
defendant “responded appropriately to the judge’s questions . . . [and] he demonstrated both
a rational understanding of the proceedings in which he was involved and of the relevant
facts.” Id.  
Similarly, in Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 87, 622 A.2d 727, 731 (1993), we held that
the court did not err in not conducting a competency hearing.  There, the issue of competency
was never raised or alleged by the defendant or his counsel during the trial.  Thanos,  330 Md.
at 85, 622 A.2d at 730.  Rather, on appeal the defendant alleged that the court had a sua
sponte obligation to question his competency based on his behavior during the proceedings.
 Thanos, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 731 (referencing “whimsical” decisions and strange
remarks in addition to his general history of mental illness).  We stated that, while “Thanos
did make some peculiar remarks to the trial judge, his words on the whole were very lucid.
He appeared to grasp all of his rights as they arose throughout the proceedings.”  Thanos, 330
Md. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.  Therefore, observation of a defendant’s behavior in court can
inform a trial judge’s actions regarding competency.  See also Muhammad v. State, 177 Md.
App. 188, 266, 268, 934 A.2d 1059, 1105, 1106 (2007) (stating “a trial judge's observation
of a defendant in the courtroom can be critical and dispositive evidence on the issue of
competence to stand trial” and concluding that “there were facts and circumstances before [the
judge], including significantly his own firsthand observations, that amply supported that final
17
decision.”).
Turning to the case at hand, the Petitioner alleges that the procedural requirements of
the statute were triggered when Judge Williams ordered a competency evaluation during the
hearing on November 30, 2006.  Because this evaluation was never completed, the Petitioner
claims that a determination regarding competency was not made prior to the start of trial and
thus the trial court violated § 3-104(a).  The Petitioner also contends that the trial court must
make an explicit determination on the record in order to comply with the procedure set forth
in § 3-104, which was not done here.  Petitioner finally argues that even if an explicit
determination is not required, the trial court did not have sufficient evidence upon which to
base a competency determination in this case, and alleges that Judge Alpert made a
determination based solely upon Peaks’s behavior in Judge Alpert’s courtroom.
Conversely, the State contends that there is “no requirement that a competency
determination be explicitly announced on the record.”   The State argues instead that only the
evidence upon which the court bases its determination must be on the record, but the
determination itself may be implied.  The State also argues that the statute only requires that
the defendant have an opportunity to be heard, though not necessarily through a formal
hearing.  Finally, the State argues that the trial court properly relied upon observations of the
defendant’s behavior, in addition to psychological evaluations, in determining that Peaks was
competent to stand trial.
Although we agree with the State that a determination need not be made explicitly in
a separate hearing, in our view, both parties fail to appreciate the significance of certain events
18
in this case.  When Peaks came before Judge Williams on November 16, 2006 for trial, the
defense attorney brought the issue of competency to the judge’s attention.  Defense counsel
asked the judge to make a determination “very clear on the record that [Peaks] is acting in
contempt of the court and that he is competent” and further stated that the issue “has been
resolved.”  The court agreed that the issue was resolved.  Judge Williams stated that, after
“looking at the court file, talking to the other judges who have had him . . . . My
understanding [is that the issue of Peaks’s competency has been] litigated extensively.”
Clearly at this point Judge Williams had reviewed the evidence on the record and had the
opportunity to observe Peaks’s behavior.  The State then pointed out that there had not been
a formal competency hearing conducted.  The court responded by saying that “after reviewing
[the] competency requests, the courts have determined that he is competent to stand trial.” 
Apparently satisfied with this determination, defense counsel then stated that the
defense was not making a motion regarding competency and that “there is no reason at this
time to question [Peaks’s] competency or his criminal responsibility.”  The court then
concluded, “some people just act out.”  At this proceeding before Judge Williams on
November 16, there was significant evidence on the record which, in addition to Judge
Williams’s personal observation of the defendant, provided a sufficient basis to support the
conclusion that Peaks was competent, beyond a reasonable doubt, to stand trial.  Thus, a
separate competency hearing was neither necessary nor required.  This exchange between
Peaks, his counsel and the court, coupled with the ultimate pronouncement by the Judge, in
our view, comprises the “determination” which the Petitioner alleges never occurred, and the
19
opportunity to be heard as required by Roberts.
Notwithstanding his declaration on the record on November 16 that the issue was
resolved and that Peaks was competent to stand trial, subsequently, on November 30, Judge
Williams ordered an additional competency evaluation.  Judge Williams’s order came in the
wake of a hearing on November 29, during which Peaks became extremely unruly, threatened
the court, and was held in contempt.  When Peaks returned to court on November 30, Judge
Williams expressed concern for Peaks’s ability to “sit in court and assist” his attorney and
stated that “based on the outbursts” of the previous day, the court was ordering a competency
evaluation.  The Petitioner, however, mistakenly characterizes this order as the trigger for the
application of § 3-104(a), thus arguing that a subsequent determination, before the
commencement of trial, of competency was required.  
The correct characterization of Judge Williams’s order, however, is that he was simply
reconsidering his previous determination with regard to Peaks’s competency, consistent with
the dictates of § 3-104(c).  Section 3-104(c) states that “at any time before final judgment, the
court may reconsider the question of whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.”
(Emphasis added.)  Specifically, subsection (c) of the statute authorizes a judge to reevaluate
a defendant’s possible incompetence, after the defendant has been determined competent
under § 3-104(a).  A reconsideration entails considering evidence and making a decision
based on that evidence.  Unlike § 3-104(a), however, a reconsideration may be made, within
the court’s discretion, at any time before final judgment.  This allows a judge to observe the
defendant and take into account any evidence presented on the record during the course of the
20
proceedings.  Neither subsection (c) nor the other provisions of § 3-104 specify a time limit
on when the court, after determining that reconsideration is warranted, must render a
determination on the record.  Because subsection (c) is discretionary, that requirement
suggests that a judge must make his or her redetermination of the defendant’s competency to
stand trial, on the evidence presented on the record, but, within a reasonable time before final
judgment.  
Further, within the meaning of subsection (c), it is the obligation of the court, and not
exclusively the judge who requested the evaluation, to make the competency determination.
In this case, Judge Williams requested reconsideration of Peak’s competency by ordering
another evaluation.  Because of scheduling conflicts, the case was then reassigned to Judge
Alpert for purposes of trial.  When Peak’s trial before Judge Alpert commenced, the issue of
reconsideration of Peaks’s competency was still outstanding, and thus needed to be resolved,
within a reasonable time, prior to final judgment. Here, we are satisfied, the trial judges
involved acted within a reasonable time, within their discretion to reconsider, to monitor and,
to rule, on Peaks’s competency on the basis of the evidence on the record.   
Judge Williams made a determination, under § 3-104(a), that Peaks was competent on
November 16.  Judge Williams acted properly in continuing to monitor Peaks’s competence,
and acted within his discretion in ordering another evaluation based upon his observation of
Peaks’s courtroom behavior.  The decision to order another competency evaluation did not
constitute a reversal or vacation of the November 16 determination.  Judge Williams’s order
to reevaluate Peaks’s competency, consistent with subsection (c), merely triggered a review
21
of the issue, which the court could have reconsidered at any time before final judgment.
When the case came before Judge Alpert, the re-evaluation ordered by Judge Williams
had not been completed.  The court was, however, aware of the prior history of the case and
was informed that the evaluation could not be completed because Peaks was uncooperative.
Not unlike Judge Williams, Judge Alpert properly monitored Peaks’s behavior in order to
make his decision as required by § 3-104(c).  Judge Alpert discussed the incomplete
evaluation on the record, stating that “[Peaks] would not cooperate with the people who
wanted to examine him so they couldn’t examine him.”  Judge Alpert continued:
[T]here ha[ve] been efforts to have him plea not criminally
responsible, but then he would not cooperate in order to
determine his mental capacity.  It appears to me based upon what
I know of the record and what I see here that he is really trying
to manipulate the system . . . Because this morning he was quite
coherent.  He was quite coherent. . . . And it is possible that at
some later point depending on what happens, he could possibly
be sent to the Clifton T. Perkins Mental Hospital, possibly I don’t
know that.  But at this point all I can do is go on with trial.
At trial, Peaks participated in voir dire and engaged in extensive discussions with
Judge Alpert, who repeatedly checked to make sure Peaks understood the proceedings.  Peaks
responded affirmatively when asked if he was familiar with the charges, he indicated his
understanding of the judge’s explanation about bench conferences, and he participated in a
discussion regarding a possible plea agreement, including the possibility of an Alford plea,
and the impact of a suspended sentence.  Peaks also exhibited his understanding regarding the
jury selection process in asking follow-up questions during voir dire and striking prospective
jurors.  Peaks even stated that he wanted to discharge his attorney because he believed there
7 Certainly we do not suggest that, in other cases, the lack of a completed evaluation
will result in a sustainable finding of competency.  This case is the exception in that the
defendant previously completed multiple examinations and the court had already made a
determination as to his competency prior to the unsuccessful evaluation attempted here. 
22
was no defense “strategy” being employed.  Peaks was lucid at the start of the proceedings
and after observing the subsequent vacillation in Peaks’s behavior, the judge determined that
Peaks was only attempting to manipulate the court.  
Based on these factors, there was not sufficient evidence on the record to rebut the
presumption of competence, the court having determined Peaks’s competency on November
16.  Despite the lack of the subsequent evaluation ordered by Judge Williams (which was
defeated by Peaks’s refusal to coorperate with the psychiatrists), Judge Alpert did everything
within his authority and abilities to adequately address Judge Williams’s concerns.  When a
defendant prevents an evaluation of competency through his or her behavior, a judge may
make his or her determination based on the evidence on the record, despite the absence of a
formal medical evaluation.  Through no fault of either judge in this matter, there was no
additional psychiatric or psychological evaluation for the court to consider.  Judge Alpert
could observe that Peaks was competent and that Peaks’s unruly behavior was the result of
his desire to manipulate or disrupt the court proceedings, and not sufficient or credible
evidence of incompetence.7
Additionally, the letter sent by Perkins Hospital to Judge Alpert, a copy of which was
sent to both parties, informed the court that the evaluation could not be completed because
Peaks was uncooperative, and further stated that the defense filed a motion to rescind the
8 The letter to Judge Alpert stated, “We have spoken to [the defense attorney].  He
stated that he filed a motion to rescind the order for psychiatric examination.” The assertion
made by the Director of Pretrial services at Perkins, that the defense counsel moved to
rescind Judge Williams’s order, is not substantiated by the record.  It is unclear from the
record whether the defense counsel did in fact make such a motion because we could not find
a copy of the motion in the court file or a docket entry.  The possibility of a mistake,
however, does not affect the outcome of this case.  Defense counsel did not challenge the
statement from the hospital or renew the issue, and, in failing to do so, implicitly affirmed
the understanding of the court that competency and the subsequent evaluation were no longer
at issue.
9 The Petitioner’s question concerns the timing of the competency determination.  In
addition to the timing of the determination that Peaks was competent to stand trial, the
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to make a competency determination
prior to Peaks’s discharge of counsel, stating that where “competency was already at issue,
(continued...)
23
outstanding order for the evaluation.8  The record indicates that Judge Alpert read this letter
prior to the proceedings because he referred to it multiple times throughout the hearing.  On
the day of trial, defense counsel did not make a motion with respect to competency or
challenge the lack of a completed evaluation.  Had defense counsel considered the issue still
outstanding, he had every opportunity to object to the characterization and bring the issue to
the court’s attention at that time.
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that the  “[f]acts indicate that
[Peaks] had ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
understanding’ and a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.’” (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. 402).  Peaks’s actual competence, however, is not at issue.
Thus, we need only decide if Judge Alpert was clearly erroneous in not making an explicit
determination, with regard to Peaks’s competency, until after voir dire was completed.9  Once
9(...continued)
the trial court’s failure to determine Petitioner’s competency prior to allowing him to
discharge counsel” was also error.  This argument rests on the premise that Judge Alpert
failed to properly address Peaks’s competency and in so doing deprived him of a fair trial.
According to Petitioner, we should adopt a higher standard for competency to discharge
counsel, and thus even if a timely determination was made, the court did not use the proper
standard.   Under Maryland law, however, the standard for competency to stand trial and to
discharge counsel are the same.  See Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 537, 833 A.2d 1040
(2003).  Because we conclude that Petitioner’s competency was properly addressed both
before and during trial and that there is no allegation that Peaks was actually incompetent,
we find no merit to this argument in the context of this case.
24
the determination regarding competency was made prior to trial by Judge Williams, Peaks,
effectively, was determined competent to stand trial as a matter of law.  Consistent with § 3-
104(c), Judge Williams sought to reconsider his determination as to Peaks’s competency.
Thus, Judge Alpert, as the presiding judge at trial, had to assess the sufficiency of the
evidence of incompetence, to rebut Judge Williams’s earlier determination that Peaks was
competent to stand trial, and make a determination, prior to final judgment, regarding any
reconsideration of Peaks’s competency prior to final judgement.  The evidence presented on
the record was not sufficient or credible to rebut the earlier determination that Peaks was
competent to stand trial.  Just before opening statements, the State presented the trial judge
with pretrial issues, and stated that the “understanding of the State [is] that this [c]ourt has had
plenty of opportunity to engaged [sic] Mr. Peaks and find him otherwise competent for the
purposes of continuing in this trial.”  Judge Alpert responded, “I’m satisfied that he is
competent to stand trial.  Without any doubt I am satisfied.”  Judge Alpert’s confirmation that
Peaks was competent to stand trial satisfied Judge Williams’s earlier request to reconsider
25
Peaks’s competency and was consistent with § 3-104(c).  We therefore hold that Judge
Williams’s and Judge Alpert’s rulings with regard to Peaks’s competency were proper and
consistent with the requirements of § 3-104.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE
COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.