Title: Blackstone v. Moore

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Blackstone v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4959.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4959 
BLACKSTONE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MOORE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Blackstone v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4959.] 
Marketable Title Act—R.C. 5301.47 et seq.—A reference in a deed to an oil-and-
gas royalty that includes the type of interest created and to whom the 
interest was granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest in the 
record title. 
(No. 2017-1639—Submitted July 17, 2018—Decided December 13, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Monroe County, 
No. 14 MO 0001, 2017-Ohio-5704. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Ohio’s Marketable Title Act generally allows a landowner who has 
an unbroken chain of title to land for a 40-year period to transfer title free of any 
interests that existed prior to the beginning of the chain of title.  Under the act, 
however, an earlier-created interest is preserved if sufficient reference is made to 
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the interest within that chain of title.  The question we must answer is what type of 
reference is sufficient to preserve that interest. 
{¶ 2} The landowners here seek to extinguish an oil-and-gas royalty interest 
created in 1915.  A deed in their chain of title references the royalty interest as well 
as the original holder of the interest.  The landowners argue that this reference is 
not sufficient to preserve the interest because it does not include either the volume 
and page number of the record in which the interest is recorded or the date on which 
the interest was recorded.  We conclude that the plain language of the act does not 
require such specificity.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ decision that the 
landowners’ title remains subject to the royalty interest. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} In 1915, Nick and Flora Kuhn conveyed a 60-acre tract of property to 
W.D. Brown and his wife.  The Kuhns reserved a royalty interest in the property by 
including the following language in the deed (the “Kuhn deed”):   “Except Nick 
Kuhn and Flora Kuhn, their heirs and assigns reserve one half interest in oil and gas 
royalty in the above described Sixty (60) acres.”  Each succeeding conveyance of 
the property included language excepting the Kuhn royalty interest.  Alfred 
Carpenter conveyed the property to David Blackstone in 1969, and as with the past 
conveyances, the deed included language about the royalty-interest reservation:  
“Excepting the one-half interest in oil and gas royalty previously excepted by Nick 
Kuhn, their [sic] heirs and assigns in the above described sixty acres.”  Nine or ten 
years later, Blackstone attempted to purchase the royalty interest from the Kuhn 
heirs, but negotiations failed.  In 2001, Blackstone conveyed the property to himself 
and his wife Nicolyn Blackstone, again including the language excepting the 
royalty interest. 
{¶ 4} In 2012, the Blackstones filed a complaint against the Kuhn heirs, 
seeking to quiet title and a declaration that the oil-and-gas royalty interest reserved 
in the Kuhn deed had been abandoned under the former and current versions of the 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56.  Later, the Blackstones amended the 
complaint to seek a declaration that the rights also had been extinguished under the 
Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq. 
{¶ 5} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Blackstones 
with regards to both the former version of the Dormant Mineral Act and Marketable 
Title Act claims, concluding that the Kuhns’ royalty interest was extinguished 
under both acts.  The Kuhn heirs appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, 
which reversed the judgment of the trial court as to both claims.1  2017-Ohio-5704, 
94 N.E.3d 108.  Regarding the Marketable Title Act, the court concluded that the 
royalty interest had been preserved by the reservation language in the 1969 deed.  
Id. at ¶ 39. 
{¶ 6} The Blackstones appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction over two 
propositions of law: 
 
 
I.  The specific identification contemplated in R.C. 
5301.49(A) requires sufficient reference that a title examiner may 
locate the prior conveyance by going directly to the identified 
conveyance record in the recorder’s office without checking 
conveyance indexes. 
 
II.  The exception to a person’s marketable record title under 
R.C. 5301.49(A) does not include interests and defects, created by a 
recorded title transaction prior to the root of title, of which the 
person has actual knowledge, if the reference to such recorded title 
transaction is general rather than specific. 
                                                 
1.  With respect to the Dormant Mineral Act, the court of appeals concluded that the current version 
of the act applied, that the Kuhn heirs had acted to preserve their interests, and that therefore the 
Kuhn interest could not be deemed abandoned under the act.  The Blackstones do not challenge this 
conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(Underlining sic.)  See 152 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 878. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Marketable Title Act 
{¶ 7} The Marketable Title Act was enacted to “simplify[] and facilitat[e] 
land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title.”  R.C. 
5301.55.  Thus, the act provides that a person “who has an unbroken chain of title 
of record to any interest in land for forty years or more, has a marketable record 
title to such interest.”  R.C. 5301.48.  The marketable record title “operates to 
extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root 
of title.”  R.C. 5301.47(A).  (A “root of title” is “that conveyance or other title 
transaction in the chain of title of a person * * * which was the most recent to be 
recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being 
determined.”  R.C. 5301.47(E).)  The act facilitates title transactions, as the record 
marketable title “shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear 
of all interests, claims, or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon 
any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of 
the root of title.”  R.C. 5301.50. 
{¶ 8} Balanced against the desire to facilitate title transactions is the need 
to protect interests that predate the root of title.  To this end, the act provides that 
the marketable record title is subject to interests inherent in the record chain of title, 
“provided that a general reference * * * to * * * interests created prior to the root 
of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be 
made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates such * * * interest.”  R.C. 
5301.49(A).  It is the operation of this section that is at issue in this case. 
B.  The 1969 Deed Sufficiently Identifies the Royalty Interest 
{¶ 9} The Blackstones’ root of title is the 1969 deed conveying the property 
from Carpenter to Blackstone.  They argue that the reference in the 1969 deed to 
January Term, 2018 
 
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the Kuhn royalty interest—“[e]xcepting the one-half interest in oil and gas royalty 
previously excepted by Nick Kuhn, their [sic] heirs and assigns in the above 
described sixty acres”—is not sufficiently specific to preserve the interest.  Thus, 
the Blackstones maintain that their title is not subject to the interest.  The question 
is what makes a reference to an interest sufficient to preserve that interest under the 
Marketable Title Act. 
{¶ 10} The Blackstones urge us to create a bright-line rule prescribing what 
must be included in such a reference.  They suggest that we require that a reference 
include the volume and page number of the record of the instrument that created 
the interest.  Alternatively, they say that we should require, at the very least, a 
reference that includes the names of the grantor and the grantee and the date on 
which the instrument was recorded.  The Blackstones contend that such a rule 
would be consistent with the act’s purpose of simplifying title transactions, as it 
would shorten the length of time required to track down interests. 
{¶ 11} To answer the question before us, we look to the plain language of 
R.C. 5301.49: 
 
Such record marketable title shall be subject to  
(A) All interests and defects which are inherent in the 
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed; provided 
that a general reference in such muniments * * * to * * * interests 
created prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve 
them, unless specific identification be made therein of a recorded 
title transaction which creates such * * * interest. 
 
The statute thus starts with a limitation making title subject to all “interests and 
defects” in the muniments of the chain of title.  (A deed constitutes “a muniment 
within the record marketable title.”  Toth v. Berks Title Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 338, 
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341, 453 N.E.2d 639 (1983).)  The initial limitation is then qualified by the 
provision that a “general reference” to an interest is not sufficient unless that 
“general reference” includes “specific identification” of the “recorded title 
transaction” that created the interest. 
{¶ 12} The statute presents a three-step inquiry: (1) Is there an interest 
described within the chain of title? (2) If so, is the reference to that interest a 
“general reference”? (3) If the answers to the first two questions are yes, does the 
general reference contain a specific identification of a recorded title transaction?  
Here, the answer to the first question is yes: the 1969 deed that constitutes the root 
of title recites that it is subject to the royalty interest.  Thus, we turn to the second 
question: is the reference a “general reference”?      
{¶ 13} Because the term “general reference” is not defined in the act, we 
look to the ordinary meaning of the term.  Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 
2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 26.  “General” is defined as “marked by broad 
overall character without being limited, modified, or checked by narrow precise 
considerations:  concerned with main elements, major matters rather than limited 
details, or universals rather than particulars: approximate rather than strictly 
accurate.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 944 (2002). 
{¶ 14} Our caselaw distinguishes between a general reference and a specific 
reference: if a reference is specific, it is not a general reference.  See Toth, 6 Ohio 
St.3d at 341, 453 N.E.2d 639.  “Specific” is defined as “characterized by precise 
formulation or accurate restriction (as in stating, describing, defining, reserving):  
free from such ambiguity as results from careless lack of precision or from omission 
of pertinent matter.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 2187. 
{¶ 15} The reference to the Kuhn royalty interest includes details and 
particulars about the interest in question.  And the interest is accurately referenced.  
Moreover, the reference is “free from * * * ambiguity.”  Id.  The exception that is 
noted in the 1969 deed includes information about the type of interest created—
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“one-half interest in oil and gas royalty” and specifies by whom the interest was 
originally reserved—“Nick Kuhn, their [sic] heirs and assigns.”  There is no 
question which interest is referenced in the 1969 deed.  Thus, it is a specific 
reference.  Because the reference to Kuhn heirs was not a general reference, there 
is no need to proceed to the third question—that is, whether a general reference 
contains a specific identification of a recorded title transaction. 
{¶ 16} Much of the Blackstones’ argument that the reference is insufficient 
is premised upon policy justifications for reading into R.C. 5301.49(A) a 
requirement that a reference include either the volume and page number where the 
interest was created or the date that the interest was recorded.  They cite the burden 
of lengthy title searches, pointing out that to locate the Kuhn royalty interest, an 
examiner would have to review 11 or 12 volumes of conveyance indexes.  But 
notably, the Blackstones do not suggest that the language used in the 1969 deed 
made it impossible to find the original exception.  They would be hard pressed to 
do so, as they in fact located the 1915 deed with the original language.  Indeed, we 
have declined to view the act’s purpose as solely to limit the length of time required 
for title searches.  Heifner v. Bradford, 4 Ohio St.3d 49, 53, 446 N.E.2d 440 (1983), 
fn. 4.  As one commentator put it shortly after the act was passed, “The Act is 
designed to assure a reasonable title search, not to serve as a cure-all for title 
matters.”  Smith, The New Marketable Title Act, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 712, 717 (1961). 
{¶ 17} The Blackstones’ policy arguments regarding specificity are best 
directed to the legislature.  That body, if it desired, could ordain that an interest 
created prior to the root of title is preserved only if a reference is made to the volume 
and page number where the interest was created.  The legislature did just that in the 
Dormant Mineral Act when it provided that notice to holders of mineral interests 
must include the “volume and page number of the recorded deed or other recorded 
instrument under which the owner of the surface of the lands claims title or 
otherwise satisfies the requirements established in [R.C. 5301.52(A)(3)].”  R.C. 
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5301.56(F)(2).  Our role is to apply statutes as they are written, and nowhere does 
the Marketable Title Act require reference to the volume and page number or the 
date that the interest was recorded. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 18} We reject the Blackstones’ first proposition of law and hold that a 
reference that includes the type of interest created and to whom the interest was 
granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest in the record title.  The court 
of appeals therefore correctly held that the Kuhn royalty interest was preserved.  
Because our rejection of the Blackstones’ first proposition of law is dispositive, we 
need not consider their second proposition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and FISCHER, JJ., 
concur. 
DEGENARO, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
DEGENARO, J., concurring. 
{¶ 19} I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court.  However, I write 
separately to emphasize the narrow scope of our holding, which is simply that under 
the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq., “a reference that includes the type 
of interest created and to whom the interest was granted is sufficiently specific to 
preserve the interest in the record title,” majority opinion at ¶ 18.  Although this 
case happens to involve a mineral interest—more specifically, an oil-and-gas 
royalty interest—the result we have reached did not hinge on the nature of the 
interest.  Therefore, our opinion should not be read to implicitly hold that the more 
general Marketable Title Act continues to apply to mineral interests following the 
enactment of the Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56—a more specific statute 
providing for the termination of those interests. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 20} I question the Marketable Title Act’s continued applicability in the 
context of this specialized real-property interest.  On this point, the review of the 
evolution of the Marketable Title and Dormant Mineral Acts set forth in Corban v. 
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 
1089, is instructive:   
 
When initially enacted, the Marketable Title Act did not “bar 
or extinguish any right, title, estate, or interest in and to minerals, 
and any mining or other rights appurtenant thereto or exercisable in 
connection therewith.” Former R.C. 5301.53(E), 129 Ohio Laws 
[1040] 1046.  However, the General Assembly amended former 
R.C. 5301.53 and former R.C. 5301.56 in 1973 “to enable property 
owners to clear their titles of disused mineral interests.” Am.S.B. 
No. 267, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 942-943.  Thus, the Marketable 
Title Act extinguished oil and gas rights by operation of law after 40 
years from the effective date of the root of title unless a saving event 
preserving the interest appeared in the record chain of title—i.e., the 
interest was specifically identified in the muniments of title in a 
subsequent title transaction, the holder recorded a notice claiming 
the interest, or the interest “[arose] out of a title transaction which 
has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of 
title.” R.C. 5301.48 and 5301.49. 
* * * 
The General Assembly again amended the Marketable Title 
Act in 1989 when it enacted the Dormant Mineral Act, Sub.S.B. No. 
223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 981, 985-988 * * *, “to provide a 
method for the termination of dormant mineral interests and the 
vesting of their title in surface owners, in the absence of certain 
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occurrences within the preceding 20 years.”  142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
at 981. 
 
(Second brackets sic.)  Corban at ¶ 18-19. 
{¶ 21} However, “[d]ormant mineral interests did not automatically pass by 
operation of law to the surface owner pursuant to the 1989 law.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  
Accordingly, the General Assembly further amended the Dormant Mineral Act in 
2006 to “provide[] a method for the surface holder to obtain marketable record title 
to an abandoned mineral interest without having to resort to litigation to have that 
interest declared abandoned.”  Id. at ¶ 35.  “The 2006 amendment to R.C. 
5301.56(B) provides that a dormant mineral interest ‘shall be deemed abandoned 
and vested in the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest if the 
requirements established in division (E) of this section are satisfied.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 29, 
quoting 2006 Sub.H.B. No. 288. 
{¶ 22} The fact that the legislature amended the more general Marketable 
Title Act to include the Dormant Mineral Act, which provides a distinct process 
specifically for the termination of mineral interests, strongly suggests that the 
Dormant Mineral Act should be the controlling law and the exclusive remedy for 
this discrete class of real-property interests.  See MacDonald v. Cleveland Income 
Tax Bd. of Rev., 151 Ohio St.3d 114, 2017-Ohio-7798, 86 N.E.3d 314, ¶ 27 (“when 
there is a conflict between a general provision and a more specific provision in a 
statute, the specific provision controls”), citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012) and R.C. 1.51. 
{¶ 23} However, the continued applicability of the Marketable Title Act in 
light of the more specific Dormant Mineral Act was not raised as a proposition of 
law in this appeal, and our review is generally constrained by the arguments raised 
by the parties.  See State ex rel. Twitchell v. Saferin, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-
3829, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring), citing Sizemore v. Smith, 6 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2; see also State ex rel. Maxcy v. 
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 154 Ohio St.3d 1401, 2018-Ohio-4419, __ N.E.3d __ 
(DeGenaro, J., dissenting).  Given that this question is not squarely before us, we 
cannot reach its merits.  For now, it remains an open issue that is ripe for this court’s 
future review. 
{¶ 24} Quieting title to severed mineral interests, especially oil-and-gas 
interests, is a significant matter that impacts the overall economy of this state—
especially southeast Ohio.  Thus, I write separately to highlight this issue and to 
stress the narrow scope of our holding today. 
_________________ 
 
Theisen Brock, Daniel P. Corcoran, and Kristopher O. Justice, for 
appellants. 
 
Stubbins, Watson, Bryan, & Witucky, L.P.A., Mark Stubbins, Kyle S. 
Witucky, and Grant J. Stubbins, for appellees Carolyn Kohler, Rebecca Englehart, 
Susan Moore, and Charles Franklin Yontz. 
 
Plunkett Cooney, P.C., and Amelia A. Bower, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Land Title Association. 
_________________