Title: GEORGE E. FAILING CO. v. WATKINS

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

GEORGE E. FAILING CO. v. WATKINS  GEORGE E. FAILING CO. v. WATKINS 2000 OK 76 14 P.3d 52 71 OBJ 2662 Case Number: 93026 Decided: 10/24/2000 Mandate Issued: 11/30/2000 Supreme Court of Oklahoma GEORGE E. FAILING CO. and NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO., Petitioners v. GENE C. WATKINS and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II ¶0 Proceeding by employer (and insurance carrier) to review a Form 19 order of the Workers' Compensation Court, Jim D. Filosa, trial judge, which awarded the claimant medical expenses according to the authorized tariff that was in effect at the time he entered the hospital. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the trial tribunal's order. On certiorari previously granted upon the employer's petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION AND THE TRIAL TRIBUNAL'S ORDER ARE VACATED; THE FORM 19 CLAIM IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. David J. L. Frette, McGivern, Gilliard & Curthoys, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for petitioners Walt Brune, Fred L. Boettcher, Boettcher Law Offices, Inc., Ponca City, Oklahoma, for respondents OPALA, J. [14 P.3d 53] ¶1 The dispositive issue tendered on certiorari is whether the trial tribunal erred by failing to dichotomize the claimant's medical and hospital bill, pressed for employer's payment on Form 19, and to apply to each separated section that version of the authorized schedule of fees2The changes in the 1997, 1998 and 2000 versions of § 14(E) do not affect the issues in contest here. [tariff] I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION Antecedent Litigation ¶2 Gene C. Watkins [Watkins or claimant], an employee for George E. Failing, Co. [Failing or employer], sustained an injury to his lungs in April 1989. The trial tribunal initially granted him temporary total disability [TTD] compensation and later permanent partial disability [PPD] benefits. History of Present Litigation ¶4 The employer disputed the hospital's claim on various grounds, II THE EMPLOYER'S THEORY OF ITS LIABILITY ¶5 The employer concedes that the trial judge correctly applied the 1991 version of the authorized tariff to the expenses incurred between 29 December 1995 and 31 December 1995, but argues that there was error in applying the same tariff to the expenses incurred after 1 January 1996. This is so, it urges, because the then_governing statute (85 O.S.Supp.1995 § 14(E)) ¶6 COCA rejected this argument, focusing instead solelyon the date of Watkins' change of condition for the worse as a basis for sustaining the trial tribunal's order. The appellate court reasoned the law in effect at the time the changed condition made itself manifest must govern the reopening claim and hence the entirety of all treatment covered by this Form 19. For this proposition the opinion of the intermediate appellate court relies on Wolfenbarger v. Safeway Stores, Inc. AFTER-INCURRED EXPENSES ¶7 When called upon to determine whether a statute applies to a given scenario, this court must focus on legislative intent.17 It is presumed that the law_making body has expressed its intent in the language of a statute and that it intended what it there expressed.18 An enactment should be viewed as aimed to attain that purpose and end.19 In the process of giving meaning to any statute, the starting point is the plain and ordinary significance of the language employed in the text.20 Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of the enactment's text - as in instances of ambiguity or conflict with other enactments - are rules of statutory construction to be utilized.21 When employed, these rules have as their primary goal the ascertainment of legislative intent,22 which is to be gleaned from the text in light of its general purpose and object.23 ¶9 Our view also finds support in § 14(E)'s legislative history. ¶10 Basing our conclusion, as we must, on the plain and unambiguous language found in 85 O.S.Supp.1995 § 14(E), we hold today that the revised tariff for medical and hospital services in contest here was intended entirely to supersede, effective 1 January 1996, the tariff which remained in force through the end of 1995. IV SUMMARY ¶11 The trial tribunal erred in failing to dichotomize Watkins' medical expenses (pressed in the instant Form 19 claim) by separating those he incurred before 1 January 1996 from those that were incurred after 31 December 1995. The tariff in force during each period must be applied to the exclusion of any other tariff. Expenses incurred after 31 December 1995 are to be compensated solelyby the tariff that took effect on 1 January 1996. The dichotomy we mandate in today's opinion is textually demonstrable by the 1994 text of § 14(E). That statute must be applied to the Form 19 claim under review. ¶12 On certiorari previously granted upon the employer's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and the trial tribunal's order are vacated and the Form 19 claim is remanded for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement. FOOT