Title: In re Special Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Organic Technologies

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Special Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Organic Technologies, 84 Ohio 
St.3d 304, 1999-Ohio-354.] 
 
 
 
 
IN RE SPECIAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION CONCERNING ORGANIC TECHNOLOGIES. 
[Cite as In re Special Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Organic Technologies 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 304.] 
Public records — Disclosure of grand jury presentence investigation reports in 
violation of Crim.R. 6(E) — Parties entitled to participate in Crim.R. 6(E) 
evidentiary hearing. 
(No. 97-1506 —Submitted September 16, 1998 — Decided January 13, 
1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 96CA155. 
 
Following an explosion at an Organic Technologies plant, the state initiated 
a special grand jury investigation.  Although the investigation did not result in an 
indictment, Organic’s president, David Wiley, entered into a plea agreement with 
the state.  In compliance with Crim.R. 6, the court authorized the state to disclose 
grand jury information as necessary to prepare for the sentencing hearing and to 
prepare a presentence investigation.  Grand jury and other confidential information 
was included in parts of the presentence report and was attached as an appendix to 
the sentencing memorandum which the state subsequently filed with the court.  
Upon filing the memorandum, the state then assumed that it became a public 
record not subject to the secrecy requirements normally imposed on grand jury 
information.  Further, a newsletter entitled Community and Worker Right-to-Know 
News purported to quote from the presentence investigation report.  An attorney 
for Organic stated in an affidavit that the publication’s editor had told him that the 
state had been the source for this report. 
 
In April 1993, Organic filed a motion alleging that the state had disclosed 
grand jury information in violation of Crim.R. 6(E).  The motion was based on the 
public filing of grand jury information attached to the sentencing memorandum 
 
 
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and on other disclosures.  It alleged that the state had directly mailed copies of the 
sentencing memorandum, which included witness identifications and witness 
statements, to a reporter, thereby impermissibly disclosing grand jury information 
in violation of Crim.R. 6(E). 
 
In In re Special Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Organic Technologies 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 30, 656 N.E.2d 329, this court unanimously determined that 
presentence investigation reports are not public records, whether or not they are 
included in a sentencing report filed with the court.  We held that Organic had 
made a prima facie showing that the state had violated Crim.R. 6(E) and was 
entitled to an evidentiary  hearing.  On remand, the state filed a “Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing to be Held Consistent with the Procedure Set Forth in United 
States v. Eisenberg 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir.1988).”  The trial court granted the 
motion, thereby excluding Organic and its counsel from any meaningful 
participation in the hearing process.  After the hearing, the court ruled that the state 
had not violated Crim.R. 6.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Michael S. Holman, Warren I. Grody and 
Kimberly J. Brown; McFadden, Winner & Savage and Mary Jane McFadden, for 
appellant Wiley Organics, Inc., d.b.a. Organic Technologies. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, William A. Klatt, Christopher 
Jones and Robert E. Ashton, Assistant Attorneys General; Robert L. Becker, 
Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kenneth W. Oswalt, Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee state of Ohio. 
 
Lora L. Manon, Hardin County Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  The issues before us are (1) whether the trial court improperly 
excluded Organic and its counsel from the hearing process, and (2) if excluding 
Organic from the hearing was proper, whether the trial court correctly determined 
that the state did not violate Crim.R. 6(E). 
 
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in barring Organic and its 
counsel from the evidentiary hearing and therefore remand the case for a new 
hearing consistent with this opinion. 
 
Both courts below determined that the hearing procedures established in 
United States v. Eisenberg (C.A.11, 1983), 711 F.2d 959, are appropriate and were 
followed in the instant case.  Eisenberg has been adopted by both state and federal 
courts as the model for establishing Crim.R. 6 hearing procedures.  In Eisenberg, 
the two petitioners were targets of an ongoing grand jury investigation.  During the 
investigation, the district court found that highly prejudicial information 
concerning matters before the grand jury had been given to the press.  The targets 
of the investigation alleged that the information had come from government 
officials.  The trial court then ordered the state to provide the targets with extensive 
information, including the substance of every communication it had with members 
of the media.  The appeals court reversed this holding, noting that because the 
grand jury investigation was still under way, such a broad order was improper.  
The appeals court limited any requirement that the government furnish information 
to the targets to the extent necessary to stop publicity and punish offenders, and 
held that even this information should be provided to the court in camera so long 
as grand jury proceedings were still under way.  The Eisenberg court prohibited 
persons who were the targets of a criminal investigation and their counsel from any 
preindictment participation in a Crim.R. 6 investigation, but did not prohibit 
participation once the grand jury proceedings have ended.  See Eisenberg, 711 
 
 
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F.2d at 966 (“The court may subsequently determine  * * * whether counsel for 
targets should be present at the hearing.”).  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Eisenberg court explicitly required a balancing of the target’s interest in 
participation with the harmful effects that could follow from that participation.  Id. 
at 965.  We adopt the Eisenberg balancing test.  When weighing reasons that 
support maintaining secrecy in grand jury proceedings, it is important to consider 
that while these reasons may all weigh against disclosing grand jury information to 
the public, they do not all weigh against allowing the target to participate in a 
Crim.R. 6 hearing.  For example, the secrecy interests that protect the target from 
unnecessary exposure should be weighed in favor of target participation at a 
hearing rather than against it.  No harm relative to this particular concern can occur 
by allowing the target’s counsel to participate in the hearing. 
 
Under the facts of Eisenberg, when the grand jury is still active and no 
decisions have yet been reached, use of this balancing test will nearly always result 
in the exclusion of the target because of the need to maintain secrecy and to protect 
against possible interference with the grand jury proceedings and witnesses. Thus, 
we agree with the holdings of the federal cases that have disallowed adversarial 
hearings when a grand jury investigation is still underway.  See, e.g., In re Sealed 
Case No. 98-3077 (C.A.D.C. 1998), 151 F.3d 1059 (citing several federal cases 
and noting that in camera and/or ex parte hearings are the norm).  However, the 
balance of interests is much different under the facts of this case, when not only 
has the grand jury investigation been closed, but the defendant has pled no contest 
to the charges and has begun serving his sentence. 
 
“[T]he interests in grand jury secrecy are reduced, although not eliminated, 
when the grand jury has ended its investigation.”  In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
Relative to Perl (C.A.8, 1988), 838 F.2d 304, 307.  The secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings continues even after the grand jury investigation is concluded in order 
 
 
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to protect witnesses from retaliation, to prevent tampering with witnesses who may 
be called to testify at a resulting trial, and to prevent publication of unwarranted 
charges against an innocent target.  Of these, only the first concern remains in full 
effect after the target has pled guilty or no contest to the underlying charges, 
thereby eliminating both the presumption of innocence and the need for witnesses 
at trial. 
 
In this case, the only issue remaining as a valid secrecy concern weighing 
against allowing Organic to participate at the Crim.R. 6(E) hearing is the potential 
for retaliation against witnesses who testified during the grand jury investigation.  
This potential for harm is significantly lessened if witness identification is 
unnecessary to determine whether the state made the unauthorized disclosure 
alleged in the prima facie case.  In this case there has been no showing that any 
previously undisclosed information regarding the identity of witnesses would be 
likely to arise at the hearing.  Indeed, the sealed transcripts of the hearing do not 
identify any witnesses against the targets not already disclosed by the state as part 
of the sentencing memorandum.  Further, there was no reason to anticipate that 
such disclosure would be necessary based on the allegations in the prima facie 
case.  The questions at issue here were centered on two types of disclosures.  The 
first was whether disclosed information connected to the sentencing memorandum 
had been authorized by the trial court order.  The grand jury information relevant 
to this question has already been disclosed not only to the target but to the general 
public and the news media.  There is no reason to believe that the resolution of this 
question would involve disclosure of any additional grand jury information. 
 
The second major issue arises from the state’s disclosure of alleged grand 
jury documents to other governmental entities and civil attorneys.  This issue 
revolves around documents which were provided by the target to the state and 
which were in existence prior to the commencement of the grand jury proceedings.  
 
 
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Where the materials to be disclosed are independently generated, as opposed to 
grand jury minutes or transcripts of testimony, there is a reduced need for secrecy.  
Id., 838 F.2d at 308.  Further, there is no need to keep documents secret from the 
target and its counsel when these documents were provided to the state by the 
target itself with the understanding that they would be used in the grand jury 
investigation. 
 
Absent any showing by the state that previously undisclosed information not 
already known to the target is likely to be elicited at the hearing, there is nothing 
weighing against allowing the target’s counsel to participate in the hearing.  Even 
if it is possible that previously undisclosed information may arise, this still must be 
weighed against the target’s interest in participation and the state’s interest in 
ensuring that there is a full and fair investigation into any alleged leaks of grand 
jury information.  The federal courts have recognized that “[t]he advantage of 
cross-examining government agents  * * * about whether a ‘leak’ of grand jury 
information has occurred cannot be overstated, particularly in cases of large-scale 
public interest.”  In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d at 1071.  There is no 
question that the events leading up to this hearing were a matter of large-scale 
public interest in Ohio.  We are not unmindful of the Attorney General’s incentive 
to publicize the events from which the investigation derived.  It is particularly 
important under such circumstances that a process be afforded to a party who has 
suffered harm resulting from a breach of grand jury secrecy.  It is also important to 
protect against any appearance of impropriety surrounding disclosures that may 
have been authorized for legitimate purposes. 
 
Balancing the need to prevent unauthorized disclosures of grand jury 
information and to sanction the source of such disclosures against the continued 
preservation of secrecy during subsequent investigations of alleged disclosures 
defies a bright-line test.  Trial courts have wide discretion in weighing these 
 
 
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competing interests and fashioning ways to allow target participation or to 
otherwise provide for a thorough investigation of the prima facie claim.  However, 
the court can abuse this discretion when it prohibits target participation despite the 
absence of any factors weighing against such participation. 
 
Under the facts of this case, the state did not establish a potential for harm 
that could have resulted from allowing Organic’s counsel to participate in the 
Crim.R. 6 hearing.  Any residual possibility that previously undisclosed 
information regarding witness identification might arise clearly did not outweigh 
the benefit to Organic and to the grand jury process.  Once the hearing was under 
way, if either the trial court or the state believed that previously undisclosed 
information regarding the identity of grand jury witnesses was necessary to the 
investigation of the prima facie violation of Crim.R. 6, protective measures could 
have been implemented to preserve the secrecy of that information without totally 
banning Organic from participating in the hearing. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 
holding an ex parte Crim.R. 6 hearing when the state did not establish any 
potential for harm that could result from allowing Organic to participate.  We 
therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with the 
majority’s adoption of the Eisenberg balancing test, but I differ with the majority 
as to the scope of the remand. 
 
 
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I analyze differently than the majority the role that Eisenberg played in the 
decision of the trial court.  The majority holds that the trial court abused its 
discretion in applying the Eisenberg balancing test.  I believe instead that the trial 
court erred by deciding that the target had no valid interests to balance. 
 
Though the trial court’s opinion acknowledged the Eisenberg balancing test, 
it went on to conclude incorrectly that a target does not have standing to participate 
in a Crim.R. 6(E) evidentiary hearing.  Eisenberg teaches that a target’s interests in 
participation are to be balanced against the harmful effects that may result from 
that participation; standing is presumed. 
 
Because the trial court assumed that lack of standing obviated the analysis 
and weighing of the target’s interests, it never properly engaged in the balancing 
assigned to it under Eisenberg.  I would, therefore, remand the cause to the trial 
court for that purpose, thus leaving to that tribunal the initial judgment as to 
whether such balancing favors the target’s participation in the evidentiary hearing. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.