Title: Stoddard v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Stoddard v. State, No. 24, September Term, 2006
HEADNOTE:
 
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – INDICTMENTS – MULTIPLE COUNTS AS UNIT
– EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS – Md. Code (2001), § 10-105 of the Criminal Procedure
Article, provides that in a criminal case, a defendant may file a petition for expungement of
his or her record in certain situations, including, but not limited to, situations where the State
enters a nolle prosequi.  Section 10-107 of the same article provides that if a person is not
entitled to expungement of one charge in a unit, that person is not entitled to expungement
of any other charge in that unit.  Based on the clear language of § 10-107, a criminal
defendant’s commission of several acts of burglary across a period of weeks, in different
apartments, against different victims, do not constitute a unit, notwithstanding that the State
incorporated all of the charges in the same charging document.  A criminal defendant is
therefore entitled to expungement, under § 10-105, of those charges for which a nolle
prosequi is entered and to which he did not plead guilty.  Those crimes that were committed
as a part of the same incident, transaction, or same set of facts as the burglary to which the
criminal defendant pled guilty, do comprise a unit and therefore may not be expunged. 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Criminal No. 03-K-04-004546
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 24
September Term, 2006 
____________________________________
KEVIN TREMAINE STODDARD
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
____________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
____________________________________
Filed:   December 5, 2006
In this case, we must construe Md. Code (2001), § 10-107 of the Criminal Procedure
Article, to determine whether a multiple count indictment, charging various counts of
burglary and related offenses, which were allegedly committed at different times, in several
locations, and against different people, constitutes a single unit within the meaning of the
expungement statute.  See Md. Code (2001), § 10-101 et seq.  Specifically, we must decide
whether a defendant’s guilty plea to burglary (count 13) of the multiple count indictment
precludes expungement of the remaining charges, which were nol prossed by the State as part
of a plea agreement.  We hold that, consistent with the plain language of  § 10-107, burglary
and theft charges that stem from separate and distinct events, although the charges are
contained within the same charging document, do not comprise a single unit for purposes of
expungement.  Charges arising, however, from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts
as the count to which a criminal defendant pleads guilty comprise a single unit, and therefore
may not be expunged.  Thus, a guilty plea to one count of first degree burglary, contained
within a multiple count charging document, does not preclude expungement of the other
burglary and theft counts which were nol prossed, unless the other charges arise from the
same incident, transaction, or set of facts to which the defendant pled guilty. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2005, at 2:15 a.m., a police officer working as security for the
University Village Apartment Complex in Towson, Maryland, observed a man, later
identified as Kevin Tremaine Stoddard (“Petitioner”), walking around inside apartment 2101,
and then leaving the apartment by removing a window screen.  The officer detained
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Petitioner, a Towson University student, and arrested him after learning that he did not have
permission to be inside that apartment.  After receiving Miranda warnings, Petitioner
admitted to entering apartment 2101 and confessed to a series of other burglaries as well. 
Petitioner was charged with seven counts of first-degree burglary, two counts of
fourth-degree burglary, seven counts of theft under $500, and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia.  The State chose to consolidate all charges in a single, multiple-count
indictment.  All charges stemmed from Petitioner’s involvement in a series of burglaries and
related criminal offenses involving several individual apartments, located within the
University Village Apartment Complex.  The crimes occurred over a period of more than two
months.  A summary of the counts are as follows:
Counts 1 and 2: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2104 on October 9, 2004
Counts 3 and 4: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2310 on October 18 and 22, 2004
Counts 5 and 6: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2106 on October 18 and 22, 2004
Counts 7 and 8: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 412 Campus View Dr., Apartment 6102 on October 25, 2004
Counts 9 and 10: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2211 on October 25, 2004
Counts 11 and 12: First degree burglary and theft under $500
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 3308 on October 25, 2004
Counts 13-15:First degree burglary, theft under $500, and possession of paraphernalia
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2101 on November 12, 2004
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Count 16: Fourth degree burglary
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on November 4, 2004
Count 17: Fourth degree burglary
involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on September 4, 2004 
On April 4, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to count 13,
charging first-degree burglary, in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi as to the
remaining 16 counts.  Counts 13-15 arose from the same incident, transaction, and set of
facts.  Those crimes allegedly occurred on November 12, 2004, and involved the burglary
and theft of personal property from apartment 2101.  The theft of personal property gave rise
to the charge of possession of paraphernalia.  The burglaries listed in the remaining counts,
which were nol prossed, all took place on different days and in different apartment units than
did the burglary in count 13.
On June 8, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to four-years imprisonment with all but 90
days suspended and the last 30 days to be served on home detention.  He also was placed on
two-years probation, effective upon release, and was ordered to pay restitution to each of the
burglary victims.  In addition, Petitioner was ordered to abstain from alcohol, illegal drugs
and abuse of prescription drugs, submit to random urinalysis, and to seek alcohol and drug
treatment.  The court also ordered that Petitioner have no contact with the victims, their
property, or the University Village Apartments.
On September 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence, in
which he requested that the trial court strike its judgment of guilty and enter probation before
1The Circuit Court failed to rule on Petitioner’s motion, in effect, denying it.
2Petitioner presented the following question in his brief on appeal:
Did the Court err by denying the petition for expungement on
the ground that all counts of the indictment were one criminal
unit, although the crimes alleged took place at different times
and in different places, and involved different victims?
The State presented the following question in its brief:
Where Stoddard was charged in a single indictment with 17
crimes arising out of a burglary spree and possession of drug
(continued...)
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judgment.  Subsequently, on October 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Expungement,
requesting that the court expunge counts 1-12 and 14-17.  In his Petition for Expungement,
Petitioner certified that he had not been convicted of any crime, other than a minor traffic
violation, since the State nol prossed counts 1-12 and 14-17.  On October 25, 2005, the State
filed an Answer to the Motion for Modification of Sentence, requesting that Petitioner’s
motion be denied.1  On November 9, 2005, the State filed an Answer to the Petition for
Expungement.  
The Circuit Court held a hearing on January 19, 2006.  At that hearing, Petitioner
conceded that counts 13-15 all arose from the same incident and that, because he pled guilty
to count 13, counts 14 and 15 could not be expunged.  The State argued that because all 17
of the counts constituted a single unit, Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13 prevented all of the
counts from being expunged.  The Circuit Court denied the Petition for Expungement.
Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.2  On June 7, 2006,
2(...continued)
paraphernalia upon arrest, and pursuant to a plea agreement he
plead guilty to one count of first degree burglary in return for the
entry of a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts, did the trial
court properly apply Section 10-107 of the Criminal Procedure
Article to deny Stoddard’s petition for expungement of the nol
prossed counts in the indictment?
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while the case was pending in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of
certiorari on its own motion.  Stoddard v. State, 393 Md. 242, 900 A.2d 749 (2006).
DISCUSSION
The parties dispute whether, under  § 10-107 of the Criminal Procedure Article, all
of Petitioner’s charges, when consolidated within a single charging document, constitute a
unit, such that Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13 precludes the expungement of any of the
remaining counts.  Notably, because Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, that count cannot be
expunged, and that issue is therefore not before this Court.  See § 10-105(a) (limiting
expungement for charges that resulted in a finding of guilt to a person who has been granted
a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor and who was convicted of only one criminal
act that was not a crime of violence).  The expungement of counts 14 and 15 is also not at
issue in this case because Petitioner conceded that because those counts arise out of the same
incident as count 13 they all constitute a unit, preventing their expungement.  Aside from this
concession, Petitioner contends that the remaining counts do not constitute a single unit
because the other burglaries are separate and distinct units.  The State contends, however,
that because all of the burglaries occurred in a limited time frame, in only two apartment
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buildings, all for the purpose of supporting Petitioner’s drug habit, they constitute a unit
within the meaning of § 10-107.  This issue is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation.
A.
Statutory Interpretation
We recently summarized the rules of statutory interpretation in Walzer v. Osborne,
___Md. ___, ___ A.2d ____ (slip op. at 5-8) (filed November 17, 2006): 
‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the Legislature.’  Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor
of Mt. Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006);
Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citations
omitted); see also Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874
A.2d 439, 445 (2005); Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d
1111, 1114 (2005); O’Connor v. Balt. County, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854
A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Mayor of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128,
756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000).
As this Court has explained, ‘[t]o determine that purpose or
policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural
and ordinary meaning.’  State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v.
Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 13,
702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md.
516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994); see also Chow, 393 Md. at 443,
903 A.2d at 395 (stating that ‘[s]tatutory construction begins with the
plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of
the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology’)
(citations omitted).    We do so ‘on the tacit theory that the Legislature
is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.’  Witte
v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002).  ‘When the
statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory
language to determine the Legislature’s intent.’ Marriott Employees
Fed. Credit Union v. MVA., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458
(1997).  ‘If the words of the statute, construed according to their
common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and
express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is
written.’  Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07
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(1994).  In addition, ‘[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and
unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words
the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an
attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’  Taylor v.
NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001); see
Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395.  ‘If there is no ambiguity in
th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws
or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. . . .’  Chow,
393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d at 395.
If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then
‘courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but
their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and
purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].’  Fraternal Order
of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996)
(quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517
A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).  We have said that there is ‘an ambiguity
within [a] statute’ when there exist ‘two or more reasonable
alternative interpretations of the statute.’  Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903
A.2d at 395 (citations omitted).  When a statute can be interpreted in
more than one way, ‘the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity
in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of
statutory construction at our disposal.’  Id.
If the true legislative intent cannot readily
be determined from the statutory language
alone, however, we may, and often must,
resort to other recognized indicia – among
other things, the structure of the statute,
including its title; how the statute relates to
other laws; the legislative history, including
the derivation of the statute, comments and
explanations  regarding it by authoritative
sources during the legislative process, and
amendments proposed or added to it; the
general purpose behind the statute; and the
relative rationality and legal effect of
various competing constructions. 
Witte, 369 Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165.  In construing a statute,
‘[w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical,
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or inconsistent with common sense.’  Blake v. State, ____Md. ____,
___A.2d ___  (slip op. at 12) (filed October 24, 2006) (citing Gwin v.
MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005)); see Frost v.
State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).
In addition, ‘the meaning of the plainest language is controlled
by the context in which it appears.’ State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129,
133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citations omitted).  As this Court
has stated, 
[b]ecause it is part of the context, related
statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly
bears on the fundamental issue of
legislative purpose or goal must also be
considered.  Thus, not only are we
required to interpret the statute as a
whole, but, if appropriate, in the context
of the entire statutory scheme of which it
is a part.
Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d
753, 757 (1997)  (citations omitted). 
We now turn our attention to the statute at issue in this case.
B. 
The Criminal Record Expungement Statute
The General Assembly enacted the Criminal Record Expungement Statute, § 10-101
et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article, in 1975 “[for] the purpose of providing for the
expungement of certain police and court records, providing procedures for such
expungement, prohibiting certain practices concerning criminal charges not resulting in
conviction, and relating generally to criminal records.”  1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 260; See also
In the Matter of the Expungement of Records of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 653, 566 A.2d 108
(1989).  In the context of the statute, “‘[e]xpungement’ with respect to a court record or
3Section 10-109, entitled “Prohibited Acts,” states as follows:
   (a) Applications for employment or admission. – (1)
Disclosure of expunged information about criminal charges in
an application, interview, or other means may not be required:
  (i) by an employer or educational institution of a person
who applies for employment or admission; or
 (ii) by a unit, official, or employee of the State or a
political subdivision of the State of a person who applies for a
license, permit, registration, or governmental service.
(2) A person need not refer to or give information
concerning an expunged charge when answering a question
concerning:
  (i) a criminal charge that did not result in a conviction;
or
  (ii) a conviction that the Governor pardoned.
(3) Refusal by a person to disclose information about
criminal charges that have been expunged may not be the sole
reason for:
  (i) an employer to discharge or refuse to hire the person;
(continued...)
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police record” means “removal from public inspection.”  § 10-101(e).  This removal can be
achieved in one of three ways:
(1) by obliteration;
(2) by removal to a separate secure area to which persons who
do not have a legitimate reason for access are denied access; or
(3) if access to a court record or police record can be obtained
only by reference to another court record or police record, by the
expungement of it or the part of it that provides access.
Id.  One of the General Assembly’s purposes in providing for an expungement procedure was
to help protect individuals seeking employment or admission to an educational institution,
by entitling them to expungement of unproven charges, so that those individuals could avoid
being unfairly judged during their application processes.  § 10-109.3  To further this purpose,
3(...continued)
or
  (ii) a unit, official, or employee of the State or a political
subdivision of the State to deny the person's application.
    (b) Penalties. – (1) A person who violates this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or
both for each violation.
(2) In addition to the penalties provided in paragraph (1)
of this subsection, an official or employee of the State or a
political subdivision of the State who is convicted under this
section may be removed or dismissed from public service.
4In addition, no one may open or review an expunged record or disclose to another
person any information from that record without a court order from either the court that
ordered the record expunged or, in the case of a police record when no charge is filed, the
District Court that has venue.  § 10-108.
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the General Assembly expressly prohibited potential employers and academic institutions
from requiring applicants to disclose information about expunged criminal charges, subject
to a heavy penalty for violation.  Id.4 
Section 10-105 provides the authority for expungement of criminal records, and
outlines the situations in which a criminal defendant may petition for such expungement.
Section 10-105, entitled “Expungement of record after charge is filed,” states, in relevant
part:
(a) Petition for expungement. -- A person who has been charged
with the commission of a crime, including a violation of the
Transportation Article for which a term of imprisonment may be
imposed, may file a petition listing relevant facts for
expungement of a police record, court record, or other record
maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State if:
(1) the person is acquitted;
   
(2) the charge is otherwise dismissed;
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(3) a probation before judgment is entered, unless the
person is charged with a violation of § 21-902 of the
Transportation Article or Title 2, Subtitle 5 or § 3-211 of the
Criminal Law Article;
     (4) a nolle prosequi or nolle prosequi with the
requirement of drug or alcohol treatment is entered;
          (5) the court indefinitely postpones trial of a criminal
charge by marking the criminal charge “stet” or stet with the
requirement of drug or alcohol abuse treatment on the docket;
       (6) the case is compromised under § 3-207 of the
Criminal Law Article;
         (7) the charge was transferred to the juvenile court
under § 4-202 of this article; or
     
 (8) the person;
                 (i) is convicted of only one criminal act, and that
act is not a crime of violence; and
                 (ii) is granted a full and unconditional pardon by
the Governor. 
*     *     *   
(Emphasis added.)
Most relevant to our analysis in this case is § 10-107, entitled “Charges arising from same
incident, transaction, or set of facts,” which provides:
 (a) Multiple charges as unit. --
   (1) In this subtitle, if two or more charges, other than one for
a minor traffic violation, arise from the same incident,
transaction, or set of facts, they are considered to be a unit.
   (2) A charge for a minor traffic violation that arises from the
same incident, transaction, or set of facts as a charge in the unit
is not a part of the unit.
(b) Effect on right to expungement. --
   (1) If a person is not entitled to expungement of one charge in
a unit, the person is not entitled to expungement of any other
charge in the unit.
   (2) The disposition of a charge for a minor traffic violation
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that arises from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts as
a charge in the unit does not affect any right to expungement of
a charge in the unit.
(Emphasis added.)  To resolve the issue now before us, we must discern the General
Assembly’s meaning of the word “unit,” as used in § 10-107(a)(1),  at the time that it enacted
this statute.  Specifically, we must determine whether several burglaries, committed on
various days, in several apartments, against different victims, constitute a single unit within
the contemplation of § 10-107, such that a guilty plea to one charge would preclude the
expungement of the other charges under § 10-107(b)(1). 
The State’s main argument rests on the premise that if Petitioner’s burglary charges
arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, or were part of a continuing scheme,
his guilty plea to count 13 precludes expungement of the rest of the charges because the
charges then constitute one unit.  The State first contends that the General Assembly’s
“expungement scheme” was not designed to expunge charges that were consolidated with,
or related to, the charge on which a guilty finding was made.  According to the State, the
term “unit” must be read broadly so that when a person is found guilty of one charge, he or
she is not entitled to have expunged other charges that are consolidated with the charge on
which he or she was found guilty.  The State avers that the plain language of § 10-107
“compels the conclusion that if a petitioner is found guilty of one charge, and then seeks
expungement of the other consolidated charges which have been dismissed, he is not entitled
to expungement.”  The State finds additional support for this argument in the language of
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Maryland Rule 4-203(a), which provides, in relevant part:
Two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or any
combination thereof, may be charged in separate counts of the
same charging document if the offenses charged are of the same
or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
The State also cites to Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606 (2000), for the proposition
that this Court recognized that a transaction is not limited to a single act, but may be in the
nature of a continuing transaction involving more than one act.  The State argues that we
should therefore read the language of § 10-107 to preclude expungement when charges are
part of a continuing scheme, in addition to when they constitute a single unit.
  Petitioner contends that the face of the charging document demonstrates clearly that
the crimes charged do not all stem from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, but
rather that each burglary constituted a separate unit within the contemplation of § 10-107.
Petitioner argues that grouping charges in one indictment, in and of itself, does not mean that
the crimes charged amount to one unit.  Further, Petitioner asserts that “continuing scheme”
does not have the same meaning as “same incident, transaction, or set of facts,” and that §
10-107 does not preclude expungement of counts, to which a nolle prosequi has been entered,
that are part of a continuing scheme.  Petitioner concedes, for purposes of analysis of the
issue, that the burglaries could possibly be considered a part of a continuing scheme.
Petitioner asserts, however, that the Legislature did not use the phrase “continuing scheme”
in enacting § 10-107, and that Maryland Rule 4-203 used disjunctively the phrases “same act
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or transaction” and “transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan,” demonstrating that the two phrases have different meanings.  According to
Petitioner, Rule 4-203(a)’s use of the disjunctive also demonstrates that the State’s decision
to list all of the charges in the same indictment does not mean that all of the charges are part
of one unit.
To address these contentions, we begin our analysis with the language of § 10-107 to
discern the Legislature’s meaning of the word “unit.”  See Walzer, ____ Md. at ____, ____
A.2d. at ____ (citing State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 348 Md. at 13, 702 A.2d at
696; Montgomery County, 333 Md. at 523, 636 A.2d at 452).  Section 10-107 states expressly
that “if two or more charges . . . arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, they
are considered to be a unit.”  In examining the facts of this case, we reject the proposition
that Petitioner’s alleged burglaries, committed over a period of more than two months, and
involving different apartments, constituted a single unit.  In our view, each alleged burglary
constituted a separate incident, transaction, and involved a different set of facts.  In this
respect, it is the Legislature’s use of the words “incident,” “transaction,” and the phrase “set
of facts,” that are dispositive in our analysis.
When interpreting a statute, the “ordinary, popular understanding of the English
language dictates interpretation of its terminology.”  Walzer,  ____ Md. at ____, ____ A.2d.
at ____  (citations omitted).   Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incident” as “[a] discrete
occurrence or happening,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 777 (8th ed. 1999), and “discrete” as
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“[i]ndividual; separate; distinct.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 1999).  By reading
these two definitions together, it becomes clear that the General Assembly included the word
“discrete” in its definition of “incident” because it intended an “incident” to be something
that occurred at a specific point in time and not something that transpired over a period of
time or lasted indefinitely.  Each of Petitioner’s alleged burglaries occurred at a specific point
in time; each occurred on a single date.  Moreover, those nine burglaries, as a whole, did not
occur at a specific point in time; they occurred over a period of time lasting for more than
two months.  We therefore hold that the nine burglaries charged do not represent a single
incident, within the clear meaning of § 10-107.  
The meaning of the word “transaction” is also unambiguous.  Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “transaction” as either “[t]he act or an instance of conducting business or other
dealings . . . ,” or “[s]omething performed or carried out . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1535 (8th ed. 1999).  Within the contemplation of this definition, we conclude that each of
the alleged burglaries also represents a separate transaction.  For each burglary, Petitioner
performed a separate action and carried out a separate plan.  There exists nothing in the
record to suggest that Petitioner’s plan was to burglarize the eight apartments over the course
of two months on those specific dates, such that each burglary would represent a step within
a single ongoing transaction.  Instead, the burglaries each had a specific start time and end
time and therefore represent individual transactions.  We find guidance for this conclusion
in our prior case law as well.  
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In Cooksey, 359 Md. at 11, 752 A.2d at 611, we discussed that “criminal acts may
combine to create one separately punishable offense . . . when the acts are committed as part
of a single incident or transaction.”  There, we stated that what was dispositive for the
“‘single transaction’ theory” was whether the offenses contained in the same charge were
committed “at the same time,” Id. (discussing State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500
(1893)), and therefore it did not matter that the theft involved the taking of several articles
of property or that the crimes were committed against many different victims.  In the present
case, however, Petitioner acted alone and therefore could not have committed a burglary in
more than one apartment at the same time.  Because Petitioner is charged with committing
each burglary at a different time, the burglaries do not constitute a single incident or
transaction.
Lastly, each burglary contained a different set of alleged facts.  For example, in counts
1 and 2, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2104 on October 9, 2004, and stole a baggie of
marijuana from Claire Hammond at that location.  In counts 3 and 4, however, Petitioner
burglarized apartment 2310 and stole money from Stephanie Yanke at that residence on
October 18 and 22, 2004.  In counts 9 and 10, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2211 on
October 25, 2004, and, from that apartment, stole Ritalin pills from Claire Steinbraker.  In
counts 13-15, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2101 on November 12, 2004, and stole a glass
pipe from Sherri Magaraci.  While the State suggests that Petitioner may have committed all
of the burglaries for the same purpose, to support his drug habit, the language of § 10-107
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does not contain the word “purpose;” it contains the phrase, “set of facts.”  None of the
burglaries had the same set of facts.  While Petitioner allegedly visited some of the
apartments more than once over the two-month period, and allegedly visited more than one
apartment on certain dates, the facts as alleged differed, at least to some degree, for each
burglary.  Petitioner allegedly committed nine separate burglaries at eight different
apartments on seven different days, over a period of time lasting more than two months.  We
therefore conclude that the burglaries contained different sets of facts.  Because each of the
burglaries charged in counts 1-12 and 16-17 constitutes an incident that was separate from
that in counts 13-15, we hold that they did not comprise a single unit. 
The State asserts that the Legislature intended to include continuous crimes in § 10-
107, when it stated that if a person is not entitled to expungement of one charge in a unit, he
or she is not entitled to expungement of any other charge in the unit.  We conclude, however,
that the Legislature clearly articulated, in § 10-107, that a unit consists only of charges that
arise out of the same incident, transaction, or set of facts.  We therefore reject the State’s
claim that the Legislature intended for a continuing scheme to also constitute a unit for
purposes of expungement because nowhere in that provision does the Legislature mention
the phrase “continuing scheme” or use any language to imply such a meaning.  Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “continuing” as “[u]ninterrupted; persisting.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
339 (8th ed. 1999).  If the Legislature intended to limit expungement of charges in cases
where the charges were part of a continuing scheme, then it certainly could have included
5We note that our research reveals no cases where this Court has ever concluded that
burglary could constitute a continuing crime or transaction.  We need not reach the merits on
this point because we conclude that the plain language of § 10-107 is unambiguous, and the
Legislature made no mention of a continuous scheme when it enacted § 10-107.
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such language.  Instead, it included language to the contrary, because, as explained above,
an “incident” means a separate, distinct occurrence.  The  Legislature even chose to title §
10-107 “Charges arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts,” which provides
additional support for this conclusion.  “‘We cannot assume authority to read into the
[Statute] what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out.  Judicial construction should
only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.  Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of
statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text.’”  Chow, 393
Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted).  Because the Legislature spoke of a unit only
as charges arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts and made no mention
of a continuous scheme, we will not read such an assumption into the language of the
statute.5  
The language of § 10-107 is clear and its meaning unambiguous, such that we need
not, and should not, look beyond that provision.  See Jones v. State, 336 Md. at 261, 647
A.2d at 1206-07.  Nonetheless, we will address the parties’ contentions that Maryland Rule
4-203(a) provides support for their views.  Maryland Rule 4-203(a) provides guidance for
the State as to the manner in which offenses should be joined in a charging document.  That
Rule provides that the State can choose to charge two or more offenses in separate counts of
the same charging document “if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or
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are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan” (emphasis added).  We again
agree with Petitioner and conclude that Maryland Rule 4-203(a) is written in the disjunctive,
and therefore distinguishes between charges arising out of the same act or transaction and
charges that are part of a continuing scheme.   We do not agree with the State that the
language of Rule 4-203(a) somehow demonstrates that the Legislature intended for a unit and
continuing scheme to be synonymous or to suggest that because of this Rule, we must
construe broadly the Legislature’s use of the word “unit.”  
The State argues that Petitioner does not, and cannot, contend that the charges against
him were not properly joined into a single charging document.  The State contends that the
burglaries were properly consolidated and that they also constituted a unit that arose from the
same incident, transaction, or set of facts.  To support this contention, the State asserts that
all of the burglaries occurred within two months, in only two apartment buildings, that
Petitioner took from each burglarized apartment either drugs, drug paraphernalia or money
to support his drug addition, and that he confessed to the burglaries.  We reject this
contention because Maryland Rule 4-203(a) provides that the State may list all of the counts
in one indictment if the counts were “of the same or similar character.”  Permission to
consolidate offenses of the same or similar character does not necessarily satisfy the
definition of “unit” for purposes of expungement.  We also are not persuaded by the State’s
argument that M aryland Rule 4-203(a) provides the State with the authority to determine
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whether the charges comprise a unit, simply based on how the State chooses to organize the
charges – together in one indictment, or separately.  Petitioner asserts that if we read § 10-
107 to mean that all charges contained in one indictment constitute one unit, then we would
be allowing the State to affect whether a defendant would be entitled to an expungement
simply by changing the grouping of counts, and charging under one indictment when it would
be just as permissible to charge under more than one charging document.  Petitioner contends
that giving the State such power would abrogate the principles of § 10-107 and Maryland
Rule 4-203(a) and would usurp the legislative power.  We agree with Petitioner on this point.
Whether the State should have consolidated all of the charges in one indictment is neither an
issue before this Court nor is it relevant to our analysis.  Whether the State chose to list the
charges separately or consolidate them in one indictment does not change our analysis.  If the
charges do not comprise a unit, then a guilty plea to one count does not preclude
expungement of the other counts, regardless of how the State chose to organize the charges.
In addition, the State argues that because we recognized in Cooksey, 359 Md. 1, 752
A.2d 606, that a transaction is not limited to a single act, but may be in the nature of a
continuing transaction involving more than one act, we should read the language of § 10-107
to preclude expungement when charges are part of a continuing scheme.  As we already
mentioned, the principles of statutory interpretation direct us to end our inquiry with the clear
language of the statute when the statute is not ambiguous.  Marriott Employees Fed. Credit
Union v. MVA., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997).  In any event, this case is
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distinguishable from Cooksey for three reasons.  Thus, Cooksey is not dispositive to our
analysis.  
First, Cooksey dealt specifically with sexual child abuse and other related sexual
offenses, not burglary offenses.  Second, Cooksey did not involve the criminal expungement
law.  Furthermore, Cooksey focused on whether the State could bundle a number of single-
act offenses into the same count.  To the contrary, this case hinges on whether the State’s
inclusion of numerous burglary and theft counts in one indictment, means that a guilty plea
to one count precludes expungement of the other counts.  The State did not try to bundle all
of the burglary and theft charges and the one possession of paraphernalia charge into one
count; the State separated each of Petitioner’s alleged offenses into individual counts.
Cooksey neither addressed nor resolved the problem at issue in this case.  We therefore reject
the State’s argument that Cooksey provides guidance to us on this point because it does not
discuss whether numerous counts of burglary could constitute a single transaction and did
not involve expungement of charges from a criminal record.
Lastly, the State suggests that because Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, his record
has already been marred by a criminal conviction for purposes of employment and applying
for admission to academic institutions, so that he no longer needs to have the remaining 14
counts expunged.  On these grounds, the State contends that the purpose of § 10-109 is
rendered nugatory by Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13.  We do not agree.  While
Petitioner’s guilty plea to count 13 may have already “marred” his record, we do not believe
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that the purpose of § 10-105, § 10-107, or § 10-109 is as the State suggests.  Nowhere in the
context of these provisions does the Legislature provide that once an individual has a
criminal record, he is no longer entitled to have expunged any other criminal charges because
his record is “marred” for purposes of employment or applying for admission to an
educational institution.  Instead, the clear language of § 10-107 demonstrates that Petitioner
is still entitled to have expunged the remaining 14 counts, from his record, so that those
additional charges will not affect negatively his job search or application for admission to an
educational institution in the future.  It is obvious that a record with 17 criminal counts will
be more detrimental to a person’s job search or application to an academic institution than
a record with 3 criminal counts.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Circuit Court was incorrect to reject Petitioner’s request for
expungement of counts 1-12 and 16-17 and was correct to reject Petitioner’s request for
expungement of counts 14 and 15.  Because the burglary charges were separate incidents,
transactions, or involved different facts, they constitute nine separate units.  Based on the
plain language of § 10-107, it is clear that the General Assembly intended that a unit be
comprised only of charges that arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, and
not a continuous scheme.  When the charges do not comprise a single unit, a guilty plea to
one of the counts precludes expungement only of those counts contained in the same unit,
and does not preclude expungement of the counts contained in any other units.
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JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
R E V E R S E D  
I N  
P A R T  
A N D
AFFIRMED 
IN 
PA RT. 
C ASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
W I T H  
I N S T R U C T I O N S  
T O
EXPUNGE COUNTS 1-12 AND 16-17
OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT.
BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE
COSTS IN THIS COURT.