Title: Minnie Peterson and Brenda Davis v. Lowndes County Board of Education et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel 09/07/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1051450
_________________________
Minnie Peterson and Brenda Davis
v.
Lowndes County Board of Education et al.
Appeal from Lowndes Circuit Court
(CV-99-153)
COBB, Chief Justice.
This case presents the issue whether Minnie Peterson and
Brenda Davis, who worked with the Lowndes County Head Start
program ("Head Start"), were employees of the Lowndes County
Board of Education ("the Board"). When Peterson and Davis were
1051450
A complete list of all the defendants in this case is as
1
follows: Lowndes County Board of Education; Eli Seaborn,  the
former superintendent of the Lowndes County Board of
Education; and Robert Lane, Ben Davis, Steven Foster, Annie
Hunter, Robert Grant, Head Start director Arthur Nelson, and
Head Start education manager Patricia Stiles, members of the
Lowndes County Board of Education. The individual defendants
were sued in their individual and official capacities. 
2
terminated from their positions with Head Start, they
attempted to contest the termination of their employment to
the Lowndes County Head Start Policy Council ("the Policy
Council") pursuant to the guidelines listed in the Head Start
policy manual. That action proved unsuccessful, and they then
sued the Board and other defendants  in the Lowndes Circuit
1
Court, asserting that they were employees of the Board and
that they were thereby entitled to the procedural protections
and remedies under the Fair Dismissal Act, § 36-26-100 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975, applicable to, among others, employees
of city and county boards of education. After pretrial
litigation and discovery, the parties agreed to file cross-
motions for a summary judgment to resolve the issue whether
Peterson and Davis were employees of the Board.  Pursuant to
their agreement, the parties stipulated to the facts and legal
issue to be considered by the trial court in determining if
1051450
3
Peterson and Davis were employees of the Board.  After
reviewing those facts, receiving briefs, and hearing oral
arguments, the trial court issued an order, stating in part:
"The defining issue before the Court is a legal one
and amounts to a determination by this Court as to
whether or not the Plaintiffs are employees of the
Lowndes 
County 
Board 
of 
Education. 
Upon
consideration of the evidence before it, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs are not employees of the
Lowndes County Board of Education and that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact pertaining
thereto."
Accordingly, the trial court entered a summary judgment for
the Board and the other defendants and denied Peterson and
Davis's motion for a summary judgment. Peterson and Davis
filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment,
pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.  The trial court heard
oral arguments and received briefs on that motion; the motion
was subsequently denied by operation of law.  Peterson and
Davis appealed. 
Our standard of review for a summary judgment is settled:
"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for
summary judgment, 'we utilize the same standard as
the trial court in determining whether the evidence
before [it] made out a genuine issue of material
fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862
(Ala. 1988), and whether the movant was 'entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright,
654 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ.
1051450
4
P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
burden 
shifts 
to 
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present
substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989). Evidence is 'substantial' if it
is of 'such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to
be proved.' Wright, 654 So. 2d at 543 (quoting West
v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.
2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further
subject to the caveat that this Court must review
the record in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of
Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1993); Hanners
v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala.
1990)." 
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344
(Ala. 1997).
The facts as stipulated by the parties are as follows:
Peterson was employed as a Head Start classroom teacher in
Lowndes County.  Davis worked as a classroom assistant in
Peterson's class.  Head Start is a federally funded program
designed 
to 
assist 
underprivileged 
preschool-aged 
children 
and
their families with academic preparedness before the children
begin traditional school.  The Board issues a resolution
annually, delegating the authority to approve policy and
procedure for the operation of Head Start in Lowndes County to
1051450
5
the Policy Council.  Arthur Nelson is an employee of the Board
who serves as the director of Head Start; he recommends the
hiring of employees for Head Start and the termination of
employment to the Policy Council for its review. In July 1999,
Peterson's 
and 
Davis's 
employment 
was 
terminated 
by 
the 
Policy
Council. 
In order to determine whether Peterson and Davis are
employees of the Board, we consider general Alabama law
pertaining to employment relationships. In Davenport-Harris
Funeral Home, Inc. v. Chandler, 38 Ala. App. 463, 88 So. 2d
875 (1956), a minor was injured when his motorcycle collided
with the lead vehicle in a funeral procession.  The minor and
his father sued the funeral home to recover damages under the
theory of respondeat superior. Utilizing the rule set out in
Motor Terminal & Transportation Co. v. Simmons, 28 Ala. App.
190, 193, 180 So. 597, 599 (1938), the Chandler court
determined that the driver of the lead car in the funeral
procession was not an employee, i.e., a servant, of the
funeral home: 
"'The general rule is that to constitute the
relationship between master and servant for the
purpose of fixing liability on the former for the
acts of the latter under the doctrine of respondeat
1051450
6
superior, it is indispensable that the right to
select the person claimed to be a servant should
exist. Furthermore, something more than the mere
right of selection is essential to the relation.
This right must be accompanied with the power and
duty to control the alleged servant while in his
employ; this, it is said, is one of the principal
tests of the relation.'"
38 Ala. App. at 466, 88 So. 2d at 877. Although the theory of
respondeat superior is not presented in this case, we apply
the legal test in Chandler in determining whether an
employment relationship exists between Peterson and Davis, on
the one hand, and the Board, on the other.  According to
Alabama law, whether Peterson and Davis are considered to be
employees of the Board depends upon  the extent to which the
Board had a right to select and control them while they were
employed at Head Start. Chandler, supra. 
It has been long established that to be considered an
employer, one must have the authority to select, control, and
supervise the employee. Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 227
Ala. 162, 149 So. 74 (1933). In Sturgeon this Court examined
the workers' compensation claim of a deceased newsboy,
concluding that the Birmingham Post Company neither held nor
exercised control over the newsboy necessary to constitute a
relationship of employer to employee. In Home Insurance Co. v.
1051450
7
Graydon, 335 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1976), this Court again
discussed the necessity of an employer's right of control over
the 
purported 
employee 
to 
establish 
an 
employment
relationship, stating:
"Generally, whether the injured party was in fact an
employee of the insured is to be determined by the
master servant relationship, and whether the injured
party is an employee of the insured depends upon the
particular circumstances of the case. In accordance
with this general principle of employment law, the
existence of control over the employee is an
essential element in determining by whom he is
employed." 
335 So. 2d at 647.
 
The record indicates that the Policy Council, rather than
the Board, hired and fired Peterson and Davis. However, 45
C.F.R. § 1304.50(d)(1)(xi) identifies the responsibilities of
those operating a Head Start program and specifically
discusses a partnership between the governing body (here, the
Board) and a policy council regarding the hiring and firing of
Head Start personnel: 
"(1) Policy Councils and Policy Committees must work
in partnership with key management staff and the
governing body to develop, review, and approve or
disapprove the following policies and procedures:
"....
1051450
8
"(xi) Decisions to hire or terminate any person who
works primarily for the Early Head Start or Head
Start program of the grantee or delegate agency." 
(Emphasis added.) Federal regulations indicate not only that
a Head Start policy council possesses the authority to work
with a governing body–-the group with the legal and fiscal
responsibility for administering the Head Start program (45
C.F.R. 
§ 
1304.50 
(a)(5))–-regarding 
the 
hiring 
and 
termination
of personnel, but also that the council is encouraged to work
with the governing body to reach decisions regarding the
hiring and termination of Head Start personnel. The Board's
ability to participate in personnel decisions equates to a
"right to select" indicative of a master-servant relationship
under Alabama law. 
The record does not indicate that the Board actively
exercised control over the daily classroom activities of
Peterson and Davis. However, the Code of Federal Regulations
indicates that the governing body (here, the Board) is to be
included in the policy council's decisions regarding program
planning and goals. 45 C.F.R. § 1304.5(d)(1)(ii-iv) reads as
follows: 
1051450
9
"(1) Policy Councils and Policy Committees must work
in partnership with key management staff and the
governing body to develop, review, and approve or
disapprove the following policies and procedures:
"....
"(ii) Procedures describing how the governing body
and the appropriate policy group will implement
shared decision-making;
"(iii) Procedures for program planning in accordance
with this part and the requirements of 45 CFR
1305.3;
"(iv) The program's philosophy and long- and short-
range program goals and objectives ...."
(Emphasis added.) Under these regulations, the Board had the
authority to influence the direction and decisions of Head
Start that impacted the daily employment duties and day-to-
day activities of its instructors. 
The Head Start policy manual, a copy of which is made
available to new employees, also recognizes the intended
cooperation between the governing body or grantee, i.e., the
Board, and Head Start: 
"Head Start personnel policy will be formulated in
compliance with HHS/ACF [Health and Human Services
Department/Administration 
for 
Children 
and 
Families]
and Grantee policies .... [C]hanges in personnel
policies and procedures will be made only by formal
action of the Policy Council with Board approval."
1051450
10
Thus, the policy manual indicates that Board approval is
necessary for formal action of the Policy Council pertaining
to personnel policy changes, which further evidences the
Board's ability to influence the employment of Peterson and
Davis.  
The appeals process for personnel grievances of Head
Start employees, as characterized in the policy manual,
includes the Board's ability to intervene on behalf of the
aggrieved employee.  Chapter XVI, Section XVI.I of the policy
manual states: 
"The 
Director/Supervisor 
shall 
communicate
his/her decision to the aggrieved in writing within
five (5) working days of receipt of the written
grievance.  If the aggrieved is not satisfied with
the disposition of his/her grievance at Level Two,
Step One, he/she may within five (5) working days
present  his/her grievance to the Policy Council.
If this decision is not acceptable to the aggrieved,
the [B]oard of Education (grantee) will intervene."
(Emphasis added.) Again, the record indicates that the Board
retained a right of control over the employment of Peterson
and Davis.   
Nelson, the director of Head Start, made it clear in his
undisputed testimony that the Board directly participates in
1051450
11
the hiring process of the director of Head Start. Nelson
stated: 
"Q. All right. And who hired you for that job
(director of Head Start)?
"A. The Board of Education along with the policy
council. Head Start Policy Council. ...
"Q.
... [E]xplain that for us, please?
"A. Well, the Lowndes County Board of Education is
the legal-–has the legal responsibility for the Head
Start Program.  They are the grantee.  The Lowndes
County Head Start Program is a federally funded
program, and, of course, all decisions that are made
as related to the Head Start Director, it must be in
conjunction with the Board and policy council both
agreeing to the hiring of the director."
The Board is integral to the hiring of the director of Head
Start, and it is undisputed that the director, Nelson, is an
employee of the Board. The Board's control over Nelson's
employment, 
and 
his 
direct 
involvement 
with 
the 
Policy 
Council
as director of Head Start is indicative of the Board's
resulting ability to influence, or control, the employment of
other Head Start workers such as Peterson and Davis. 
 We will not address Peterson and Davis's additional
arguments on appeal because these arguments were not raised at
the trial level. This Court has stated: "Our review is limited
to the issues that were before the trial court–-an issue
1051450
12
raised on appeal must have first been presented to and ruled
on by the trial court." Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So. 2d 1210,
1214 
(Ala. 
1992)(citation 
omitted). 
See 
also 
Bosarge 
Offshore,
LLC v. Compass Bank, 943 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 2006), and Shewmake
v. Estate of Shewmake, 940 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 2006). 
Under the circumstances presented by this case, we
conclude that no genuine issue of fact exists with respect to
the Board's right to hire and its right of control over
Peterson and Davis. Because the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment for the Board and the other defendants, we
reverse its judgment and remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with our holding in this
opinion that Peterson and Davis are employees of the Board and
thus are entitled to the procedural protections and remedies
under the Fair Dismissal Act.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Smith, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
See and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1051450
Although the parties in this case refer to "stipulated"
2
facts, the record contains no formal document setting forth
stipulated facts; indeed, the parties appear to dispute what
facts they actually agreed to and whether a stipulation of
facts was even appropriate in this case.  However, I note that
the trial court's summary-judgment order indicates that it
considered "the evidence before it," and from all that
appears, the trial court considered the evidence in the entire
record.  
13
SMITH, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I believe that the evidence  in this case demonstrates
2
that Peterson and Davis were employees of the Board.  Although
the Board did not actively exercise control over Peterson and
Davis's daily activities, the evidence indicates that an
employee of the  Board--Arthur Nelson--served as the director
of Head Start.  In this capacity, Nelson made recommendations
to the Head Start Policy Council on the hiring and firing of
Head Start employees.  Additionally, Peterson and Davis
attached to their complaint portions of a document titled
"Lowndes County Board of Education Project Head Start
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual," dated as "Approved
by Policy Council Feb. 1996."  This document states in
"Chapter I.2," as the main opinion notes, that "Head Start
personnel policy will be formulated in compliance with ...
1051450
14
Grantee [Board] policies," and in "Chapter I.4" that changes
in personnel policies and procedures "will be made only by
formal action of the Policy Council with Board approval."
On appeal, the Board argues that this portion of the
manual appears in an "outdated" 1996 version of the policy
manual and was never presented as an exhibit during the
consideration of the summary-judgment motions.  Additionally,
the Board argues that the 1999 version of the manual, portions
of which appear as an exhibit to the Board's summary-judgment
motion, contradicts the 1996 version of the manual.  Board's
brief at 24.  
I believe that the portions of the 1996 manual referred
to in the main opinion were properly before the trial court.
In its motion for a summary judgment, the Board specifically
relied on "[a]ll pleadings of record in this case," including
its own exhibits attached to the motion. "Chapter I.2" of the
1999 version is very similar to the 1996 version and likewise
states that "Head Start personnel policies will be formulated
in compliance with ... Grantee policies."  "Chapter I.4" of
the 1999 manual is not found in the exhibit presented by the
Board; therefore, I cannot conclude that the 1999 manual
1051450
15
contradicts the 1996 manual in this regard.  Based on the
evidence establishing Nelson's duties as director and the
policies contained in the "manuals," I concur with the main
opinion that Peterson and Davis were employees of the Board.
The main opinion relies on certain federal regulations to
reach its holding; however, I am not convinced that this
authority had been cited to the trial court before it ruled on
the summary-judgment motions.  Therefore, as to that
discussion I express no opinion.    
1051450
My comments are limited to a discussion of this criterion
3
because of the emphasis given it by the Board.  To the extent,
as 
the 
main 
opinion 
correctly 
notes, 
an 
employment
relationship also depends on the existence of control over the
employee, I agree with the result reached by the main opinion
in regard to this additional criterion, but not with all the
analysis in that opinion in regard to it.
16
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
In its brief to this Court, the Board emphasizes that it
is the "right" to select employees that should be dispositive
in this case.   The Board was and is the "grantee" under
3
Lowndes County's Head Start program.  It therefore was the
Board that had the legal right to select the employees of the
Head Start program.  In this case, however, the Board
acquiesced in the selection of employees made by the director
of the Lowndes County Head Start program.  The fact that it
did so does not make those selections employees of that
director or any other entity except the Board.  I therefore
agree with the conclusion in the main opinion that Peterson
and Davis must be deemed employees of the Board.