Title: Hall v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GRAYLIN L. HALL,
Defendant Below,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below,
Appellee.
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No. 555, 2000
Court Below:  Superior Court
of the State of Delaware in and
for Sussex County
Cr. A. Nos. S-00-01-0161
S-00-01-0162
S-00-01-0163
Submitted:  November 21, 2001
Decided:  
December 26, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Neil F. Dignon, Esquire, of Brown, Shiels, Beauregard & Chasanov,
Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, of the Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
This case concerns two questions.  The first is whether the introduction of
a prior statement of a witness who is physically present for cross-examination,
but has only a limited recall of the facts contained in his prior statement, violates
the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.  The second is
whether, when the State is using a guilty plea from a Delaware court to establish
a prior predicate offense necessary for habitual offender status, it must produce
the text of that plea.
There was no violation of the Confrontation Clause here.  First, the failure
of the witness’ memory was not so complete and sustained as to be comparable to
cases involving Confrontation Clause violations.  Second, the United States
Supreme Court has categorically rejected the idea that a witness’ failure to
remember the reasons for a past belief can constitute a violation of the
Confrontation Clause.
Substantial evidence supported the Superior Court’s conclusion that the
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite predicate offenses for
Hall’s habitual offender status.  Here, the State did prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the guilty plea in question constituted a predicate offense even without
the text of that plea.  The State need not provide the text of a guilty plea
whenever it offers a guilty plea to establish a predicate offense.  The guilty plea
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occurred in a Delaware court, so there was no danger that the conduct underlying
the plea did not constitute a predicate offense under Delaware law.  In addition,
the docket sheet was perfectly clear that the defendant had pleaded guilty to two
counts of burglary in the second degree, a conviction that qualifies as one of the
enumerated offenses of Delaware’s habitual offender statute.  Thus, unlike our
decision in Morales v. State,1 there was no reasonable doubt that Hall had
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense not constituting a predicate offense.
Facts
The victim, 72-year-old Alicia McDermott, lived in a condominium in
Bethany Beach.  On December 29, 1999, McDermott returned home from a trip
to the post office at about 12:30 in the afternoon.  As she did so, she noticed a
maintenance truck by a pond near her property.  She attended to various activities
in her condominium, and then decided to go to bed.  She put a space heater in
her upstairs bathroom to warm it up, resting on her bed in the meantime.  After
enough time had passed to warm the bathroom, she entered it again and sat on
the toilet to change her clothes.
A person jumped out at her from behind the shower curtain and placed a
hand over her face.  The hand was that of an African-American person.
                                   
1   Del. Supr., 696 A.2d 390 (1997).
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McDermott bit the thumb twice and the person ran down the stairs.  McDermott
followed the person, calling out, “Graylin.”  Graylin Hall, the appellant and
defendant below, worked for Kelly Maintenance, a company that did
maintenance work for McDermott’s condominium complex.  Hall was also the
only African-American individual she knew to have access to her home.  After
McDermott shouted the name “Graylin” three times, the intruder grunted.  The
person then opened the door and fled.  McDermott called the police.  When they
arrived, she discovered that $40 was missing from her wallet.
The State charged Hall with first degree robbery, second degree assault,
second degree burglary, and possession of burglars’ tools.2  After his trial, a jury
found Hall guilty on all of the counts except first degree robbery.  The Superior
Court granted the State’s motion to sentence Hall as an habitual criminal based
on Section 4214(b) of Delaware’s habitual offender statute.3  Accordingly, the
Superior Court sentenced Hall to life imprisonment at Level V for the second
degree burglary charge, three years for the possession of burglars’ tools, and
three years for the second degree assault.
                                   
2 The Superior Court granted Hall’s motion to sever two other charges, possession of drug paraphernalia and
possession of marijuana.
3 See 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) (requiring a judge to impose life imprisonment on “[a]ny person who has been 2 times
convicted of a felony . . . hereinafter specifically named . . . and who shall thereafter be convicted of a
subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named”).
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The Confrontation Clause and the Admission of the Pre-Trial Statement
of a Witness with Limited Recall
Hall’s first argument is that the repeated failures of memory of William
Bronson, one of the State’s witnesses at trial, together with the admission of his
pre-trial statement, violated Hall’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution.4  The State argues that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees only the opportunity to cross-examine and not the effectiveness of that
cross-examination, and that Hall did indeed receive this opportunity.
William Bronson also worked for Kelly Maintenance.  Hall would often
pick him up from work.  During their investigation of Hall, the police spoke with
Bronson.  Bronson made a statement to police that incriminated Hall in several
ways.  First, Bronson said that when Hall picked him up from work that day, his
thumb had been injured.  Second, Bronson’s description of a jacket Hall was
wearing that day matched McDermott’s description of her attacker’s jacket.  Hall
and the State both agree that Bronson is mentally challenged.5
The State called Bronson as a witness for two reasons: to let the jury hear
his testimony and to establish his availability in order to admit his prior statement
                                   
4 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
5 See Appellant’s Op. Br. at 11 (referring to “Mr. Bronson’s mental disabilities”); Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 5
(characterizing Bronson as “[a]pparently of limited intelligence”).
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to police.6  Bronson answered all the questions readily and to the best of his
abilities.  He remembered giving a statement to police and voiced his intention to
“stick to” that statement.  His testimony, however, was equivocal and confused.
For example, in response to a question about what Hall was wearing on the day
in question, Bronson said, “Well, I don’t look at people’s clothing,” and, “[H]e
wore a maroon sweatshirt a lot.”  Later, he asserted that Hall had been wearing
“a new Christmas jacket,” but then promptly agreed with the State that it was a
gray and black jacket.  Bronson asserted first that Hall came to pick him up in a
blue pick-up truck, then said it was green, then responded to the State’s question
about this inconsistency by equivocating:  “Yeah.  I recall -- it was a while back,
but I think that’s what happened.”  At one point, the State commented that
Bronson was having difficulty remembering these events, and Bronson
responded, “I didn’t think I’d have to come to court and go over every little
thing.”  Bronson evinced an intention to “stick to” his prior report “because it
was more fresh in my mind at the time.”  Bronson’s testimony had the same
character on direct examination as it did on cross-examination.
The State then moved to introduce Bronson’s prior statement to police.
Hall objected that Bronson’s failure of memory violated Hall’s right to cross-
                                   
6 See 11 Del. C. § 3507 (permitting the introduction of a witness’ voluntary, out-of-court prior statement as
substantive evidence in the case so long as the witness is “present and subject to cross-examination”).
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examine Bronson under the Confrontation Clause of the United States
Constitution.  The Superior Court ruled that Bronson was available for cross-
examination for the purposes of both Section 3507 and the Confrontation Clause.
This Court reviews de novo claims of violations of the United States or
Delaware constitutions.7  Both the Delaware and United States constitutions
guarantee the basic right of cross-examination, which has aptly been
characterized as the “‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth. . . .’”8  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution gives a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”9  The Delaware Constitution provides that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused hath a right . . . to meet the witnesses in their
examinations face to face.”10  The Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution
                                   
7 Warren v. State, Del. Supr., 774 A.2d 246, 251 (2001) (addressing the Confrontation Clause specifically).
8 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (John H.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)); cf. Capano v. State, Del. Supr., 781 A.2d 556, 615-16, 626-27 (2001) (discussing
whether the Confrontation Clause barred testimony otherwise admissible under the state of mind and medical
diagnosis exceptions to the hearsay rule).  Capano concerned the analytically distinct issue of whether the
admission of a statement that falls within an exception to the hearsay rule violates the Confrontation Clause.  Id.
at 615-16, see United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (rejecting an inquiry into whether testimony
possesses indicia of reliability or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness when “a hearsay declarant is present
at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination”).
9 U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
10 Del. Const. art. I, § 7.  Hall did not make any argument based on the Delaware Constitution.
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represents the floor of protection due a defendant, not the ceiling, and states are
free to provide more protection.11
The U.S. Constitution’s Confrontation Clause guarantees only the
opportunity to cross-examine, not “cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”12  It does not
guarantee that a witness will “refrain from giving testimony that is marred by
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.”13  There are some circumstances, however,
in which a defendant has so little opportunity to cross-examine that the
Confrontation Clause has been violated even though the witness is physically
present.  For example, courts have ruled that “limitations on the scope of
examination by the trial court14 or assertions of privilege by the witness15”16 can
be so limiting as to constitute a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
                                   
11 McGriff v. State, Del. Supr., 781 A.2d 534, 538-42 (2001) (holding that application of the “tender years”
statute, 11 Del. C. § 3513, did not violate either the U.S. or Delaware constitutions).  There is no need, for
purposes of this case, to discuss the differing language of the U.S. and Delaware constitutions, as Hall does not
invoke the Delaware constitution, only the U.S. constitution.
12 Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1978) (quoting Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1987))).
13 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22.
14 See United States v. Vargas, 9th Cir., 933 F.2d 701, 705 (1991) (finding a violation of the Confrontation
Clause when a trial court did not allow the defendant to cross-examine the witness about a prior statement).
15 See United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 10th Cir., 184 F.3d 1128, 1132 (1999) (finding a violation of the
Confrontation Clause based on a witness’ “obstinate and repeated assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination”).
16 Owens, 484 U.S. at 562.
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Thus, determining whether a defendant has had so little opportunity to
cross-examine that his or her Confrontation Clause rights have been violated is,
to some extent, an exercise in line-drawing.  This case, however, does not come
close to that line.  Cases in which courts have found a violation of the
Confrontation Clause when the witness was physically present have involved
witnesses who do not answer questions to an entire area of necessary inquiry.17
By contrast, here Bronson answered readily and willingly all of Hall’s questions
relating to his prior statement and gave a fair amount of detail.
The normal remedy for testimony that is “marred by forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion” is impeachment.18  Hall was free to highlight the fact that
Bronson could not independently verify the details of his statement that had
incriminated Hall.  Hall was also free to highlight Bronson’s mental condition.
These factors would have reduced Bronson’s reliability as a witness in the eyes of
the jury.  Furthermore, Hall could have argued at closing that Bronson seemed
suggestible and eager to please, factors that could further have reduced the value
of his initial statement to police.  Hall’s proper remedy was not to exclude
                                   
17 Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1132; Vargas, 933 F.2d at 705.
18 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22 (holding that an expert witness’ inability to recall his opinion’s basis “went to the
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility”).
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Bronson’s prior statement but, rather, to attack its credibility.  Such issues of the
weight of evidence, as distinct from its admissibility, are for the jury.
In Johnson v. State,19 this Court addressed the issue of a witness’ “limited
recall.”20  In that case, the victim, a seventy-five year old woman, was assaulted
and raped.21  The State sought to introduce various prior statements by the victim
in which she gave a description of her attacker.22  On the witness stand, however,
the victim “indicate[d] that she did not recall anything during a time which
included the first three [out of four of her] out-of-court statements. . . .”23
Furthermore, the victim was not able to describe her attacker.24  This Court noted
that the issue of whether limited recall implicated the Confrontation Clause was
then unsettled in the federal courts.25  We held, however, that the issue was a
matter of weight for the jury, not a constitutional violation.26  Unlike the victim
                                   
19 Del. Supr., 338 A.2d 124, 127 (1975).
20 Id. at 127.
21 Id. at 125.
22 Id. at 126.
23 Id. at 127.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. (“The jury can make a judgment in the light of all the circumstances presented, including any claim by the
witness denying the prior statement, or denying memory of the prior statement or operating events, or changing
his report of the facts.”).
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in Johnson, Bronson was able to recall his prior statement to the police, and that
it was accurate at the time he gave it.  Moreover, unlike the victim in Johnson,
Bronson was able independently to describe some of the facts described in his
prior statement.  Thus, Bronson’s recall was less limited than that of the victim in
Johnson, a case in which this Court failed to find a Confrontation Clause
violation.
United States v. Owens,27 a United States Supreme Court case decided after
Johnson, supports our opinion in Johnson and our conclusion in this case.
Owens involved the testimony of a prison counselor who had been the victim of a
brutal prison attack in which his assailant beat him in the head with a metal
pipe.28  The FBI obtained a statement from the victim in which he identified his
attacker as the defendant.29  At trial, however, the victim admitted that he could
not remember whether he saw his assailant during the attack, nor whether any
visitor had suggested that the defendant was his attacker.30  Defense counsel tried
unsuccessfully to refresh the victim’s memory with hospital records, including
                                   
27 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988).
28 Id. at 555.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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one in which he identified another as his assailant.31  Owens characterized an
earlier case, Delaware v. Fensterer,32 as addressing the Confrontation Clause
implications of a witness who testified to a current belief but could not recall the
basis on which he had formed that belief.33  In contrast, Owens concerned the
related issue of the witness who “is unable to recollect the reason for [a] past
belief.”34  The United States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of
the Confrontation Clause in Owens because “successful cross-examination is not
the constitutional guarantee.”35
Thus, Owens supports our holding in Johnson because the witnesses in
both cases had testified to a past belief for which they were unable to recall their
reasons.  It also forecloses Hall’s argument in this case, for two reasons.  First,
like the witnesses in Johnson and Owens, Bronson’s failure of memory here went
to the reasons for a past belief.  The United States Supreme Court has held that
this fact alone may not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation of the
                                   
31 Id.
32 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
33 Owens, 484 U.S. at 558.
34  Id. at 559.
35 Id. at 559-60.
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Confrontation Clause.36  Second, Bronson’s failure of memory was not as total
and sustained as that of the witness in Owens.
A Delaware Guilty Plea as a Predicate Offense
For Habitual Offender Status
Hall argues that the Superior Court erred when it allowed the State to
introduce a docket sheet, rather than the text of Hall’s guilty plea, to establish a
predicate offense required for habitual offender status.37  Hall argues that
Morales v. State38 requires the State to produce the text of any guilty plea when
the State offers a guilty plea to establish a predicate offense.  The State argues
that the Superior Court did not err because the docket sheet in question clearly
identified the crimes to which Hall pleaded guilty.
Following the verdict, the State moved to sentence Hall as an habitual
offender.  Section 4214(b) of the habitual offender statute requires a court to
impose a life sentence upon a defendant who “has been 2 times convicted of a
felony . . . hereinafter specifically named . . . and who shall thereafter be
convicted of a subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named. . . .”39  Such a
                                   
36 Id.
37 11 Del. C. § 4214.
38 Del. Supr., 696 A.2d 390 (1997).
39 § 4214(b).
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sentence is not subject to probation or parole.  The “subsequent felony” the State
offered was Hall’s conviction for second degree burglary in this case, which is
indeed one of the felonies enumerated in Section 4214(b).  The two prior
convictions the State offered under Section 4214(b) were also for burglary in the
second degree, one from 1981 and one from 1988 and both from Delaware
courts.  The 1981 conviction was based upon a guilty plea.  To prove the 1981
conviction the State provided the sentencing order and the docket sheet.  The
docket sheet lists the entry of nolle prosequi for three charges and a guilty plea
for two.  The docket sheet specifically records that Hall pleaded guilty to two
counts of burglary in the second degree.
In Morales v. State,40 the State offered Morales’ guilty plea from a
Massachusetts court as one of the predicate offenses for habitual offender
status.41  The State offered certified copies of two indictments, and two docket
entries.42  The two indictments were for possession with intent to deliver in 1977
and trafficking in 1985, respectively.43  Morales had initially pleaded not guilty to
                                   
40 Del. Supr., 696 A.2d 390 (1997).
41 Id. at 392-93.
42 Id. at 393.
43 Id.
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the second charge.44  The docket entry for the first charge read, “Defendant
offers to plead guilty-After hearing Court accepts defendant’s offer.”45  The
second docket entry read, “Plea Retracted and Plea Guilty Offered and Accepted
by the Court.”46  The State also introduced into evidence a National Crime
Information Center report that Morales had been convicted of both trafficking
and possession with intent to deliver.47  We concluded that “it is not apparent
from the sparse record before this Court what offenses and statutes were the
bases for Morales’ prior convictions.”48  This Court was clearly concerned with
the 1985 plea, which contained an ambiguity.  One possible explanation for the
language of that plea was that Morales had initially decided to plead guilty, later
retracted his plea for some reason, and then offered a plea to the same offense
again upon reconsideration.  This interpretation would have qualified Morales for
habitual offender status under Delaware law because trafficking is indeed an
enumerated offense within Section 4214(b).
                                   
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 395.
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On the other hand, another interpretation was that Morales initially decided
to plead guilty, retracted his plea, and then accepted a plea bargain to a lesser
offense.  This interpretation might have disqualified Morales from habitual
offender status because his conviction might not have been for an enumerated
offense.  Furthermore, the National Crime Center report was no help because
there was no evidence to suggest that it was based upon a correct interpretation of
the docket entry’s ambiguous language.  Thus, this Court set aside Morales’
sentence as an habitual offender because the State had failed to prove habitual
offender status “beyond a reasonable doubt.”49
Hall argues that Morales stands for the proposition that the State must
produce the text of a guilty plea whenever the State uses a guilty plea as a basis
for habitual offender status, regardless of whether the plea is from a foreign
jurisdiction or from a Delaware court.50  Morales stands only for the proposition
that the State must show a guilty plea offered as a predicate offense for habitual
offender status beyond a reasonable doubt, not that it must necessarily do so with
the text of that guilty plea.  Both this Court and the Superior Court have favored
                                   
49 Id.
50 See Morales, 606 A.2d at 395 (observing that “many courts require the prosecution to provide not only the
underlying indictment or information, but also the text of the guilty plea, in order to determine whether the
defendant was charged with and admitted to conduct that would establish the felony conviction”).
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this narrower reading.51  In fact, we are aware of no other jurisdiction, state or
federal,52 that categorically requires the text of a guilty plea to show habitual
offender status.53  Finally, some jurisdictions may not keep records of the text of
every guilty plea offered for decades.  Given that guilty pleas are a significant
percentage of all convictions, such a rule might significantly reduce the utility of
the habitual offender statute in a way that the Delaware General Assembly did
not intend.  Therefore, we decline to adopt it.
Morales holds that the State has the burden of proof in establishing that
each predicate offense meets the requirements of Section 4214 and that the State
                                   
51 See Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 462, 1999, Walsh, J. (May 2, 2000) (ORDER at 9) (holding that the docket
sheets at issue were sufficient “[a]bsent any evidence raising questions concerning the accuracy of the docket
sheets”); Gatewood v. State, Del. Supr., No. 489, 1999, Berger, J. (July 14, 1999) (ORDER at 7) (holding that
the docket sheet at issue was “more detailed” than the one in Morales and thus constituted “prima facie evidence”
of the predicate conviction); Karim v. State, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN82-09-0053, Toliver, J. (Mar. 16, 2001)
(Op. and Order) (holding that the docket sheet at issue did not establish reasonable doubt of the commission of a
predicate offense), aff’g, Del. Supr., No. 148, 2001, Steele, J. (Oct. 25, 2001) (ORDER at 2) (referring to
Morales as “factually distinguishable”).
52 In United States v. Hill, 10th Cir., 36 F.3d 978 (1994), the Tenth Circuit did indeed require the government to
produce the text of any guilty pleas used in establishing armed career criminal status, id. at 981, albeit over a
vigorous dissent.  Id. at 982 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (refusing to read prior caselaw as requiring the text of all
guilty pleas).  This holding lasted a scant seven months, however, because the Tenth Circuit reversed itself in an
en banc hearing, with the dissenting judge in the prior opinion authoring the new one.  United States v. Hill, 10th
Cir., 53 F.2d 1151, 1152 (1995).
53 Indeed, a defendant may always introduce the text of a guilty plea, or indeed any other evidence, to rebut the
State’s prima facie evidence that the defendant has committed the requisite predicate offenses.
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must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.54  The extent of the holding in
Morales was that the patent ambiguity of the record there created a reasonable
doubt.
We hold that the State need offer only unambiguous documentary evidence
of a prior predicate conviction, not live witnesses,55 and not a particular or
exclusive type of documentary evidence.  Once the State has offered evidence of
the prior conviction that is regular on its face, the State has met its burden of
establishing a prima facie case.56  The State need not anticipate every possible
difficulty in that proof that a defendant might raise.57
When the State offers a conviction based upon a guilty plea as a predicate
offense for habitual offender status, there are at least two problems that might
                                   
54 See Morales, 696 A.2d at 395 (“We adopt this standard of proof . . . that the charge and the conviction of the
prior predicate felony must match beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  This standard of proof appears to be the
majority rule among the states.  See Linam v. Griffin, 10th Cir., 685 F.2d 369, 372 (1982) (“The majority rule
appears to require that proof under the habitual offender statute be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see
also State v. Hennings, Wash. Supr., 670 P.2d 256, 257 (1983) (observing that, in an habitual criminal
proceeding under Washington law, the “State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt several facts,”
including “the existence of two prior valid felony convictions along with the present conviction”); People v.
Reese, N.Y. Ct. App., 179 N.E. 305, 308 (1932) (Cardozo, J.) (“The genius of our criminal law is violated when
punishment is enhanced in the face of a reasonable doubt as to the facts leading to enhancement.”).
55 Oney v. State, Del. Supr., 446 A.2d 389, 395 (1982); Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 629, 634-35
(1979).
56 See Gatewood v. State, Del. Supr., No. 489, 1999, Berger, J. (July 14, 1999) (ORDER at 8) (ruling that a
Maryland docket sheet was “prima facie evidence of Gatewood’s prior conviction” and was sufficient “[a]bsent
any evidence raising questions as to the accuracy of the docket sheet or the identity of the perpetrator”); see also
United States v. Paleo, 1st Cir., 967 F.2d 7, 13 (1992) (“Unless it reveals unconstitutionality on its face, a
certified copy of a court record of conviction, or a presentence report’s account of a past conviction, will
normally prove the fact of a valid conviction.”).
57 Paleo, 967 F.2d at 13.
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arise.  One is whether the defendant’s conduct actually constituted a predicate
offense within the meaning of Section 4214(a) (requiring that the predicate
offense be a “felony”) or Section 4214(b) (requiring that the predicate offense be
one in a list of felonies).  The other is whether the defendant pleaded guilty to all
of the charged offenses, some of the charged offenses, or to a lesser included
offense of one of the charges.
As to the first problem, Delaware courts have said that in order to qualify
as a predicate offense, the conduct leading to an out-of-state judgment must be
such that it would have supported a conviction for the appropriate predicate
offense in Delaware.58  Thus, a court must “look at the prior conduct of the
defendant as it relates to the felonies in the Delaware Criminal Code, rather than
to rely on technical classifications of other jurisdictions over which our
legislature has no control.”59  One of the reasons Morales vacated the defendant’s
sentence in that case was that the State had offered no evidence that the conduct
underlying Morales’ guilty plea constituted a predicate offense under Delaware
law.60  Here, however, Hall’s guilty pleas were all in Delaware courts, to
                                   
58 Fletcher v. State, Del. Supr., 409 A.2d 1254, 1255 (1979).
59 Id. (holding that a defendant’s prior conviction could not qualify as a predicate offense if, under Delaware law,
the defendant would have been guilty of a juvenile offense and not a felony).
60 696 A.2d at 395.
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offenses charged under Delaware law.  Thus, this problem does not apply to this
case.
The State must also establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
actually pleaded guilty to, or was found guilty of, a predicate offense, and not
merely that the defendant was charged with one.  In Morales, because of the
patent ambiguity, it was unclear whether the defendant had been convicted of
trafficking or of a lesser offense that would not constitute a predicate offense.61
Thus, the State had not met its burden of proof.  Here, by contrast, it is clear that
Hall pleaded guilty to two of his five original charges and that the State entered a
nolle prosequi as to the rest.  It is also clear that Hall pleaded guilty to two
specific counts of burglary in the second degree, which are indeed enumerated
offenses under Section 4214(b).
The Superior Court’s determination of habitual offender status must be
supported by substantial evidence, and free from legal error and any abuse of
discretion.62  Here, there was substantial evidence to support the Superior Court’s
conclusion that the State had met its burden of proof in establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt the predicate offenses required under Section 4214(b).
                                   
61 Id.
62 Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 629, 635 (1979).
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Conclusion
Although the testimony of witness William Bronson was sometimes
confused and equivocal, admission of his out-of-court statement did not constitute
a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  There was
sufficient evidence to support the Superior Court’s conclusion that the State had
shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hall had pleaded guilty to a predicate
offense under Section 4214(b).  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.