Title: People v. Braggs

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95350-Agenda 16-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MARY 							
BRAGGS, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 18, 2003.-Modified on Denial of Rehearing
April 15, 2004.
 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Mary Braggs, was charged in the circuit court of Cook
County with two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of Connie
Hall and Donald Rudolph. After refusing to conduct a hearing on
defendant's pending motion to suppress statements, the circuit court
determined that defendant was unfit to stand trial due to the severity of her
mental retardation. The court thereafter conducted a discharge hearing,
found the State's evidence sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, and remanded defendant to the Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities for a period of five years.
Defendant appealed.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded. People v. Braggs, 302
Ill. App. 3d 602 (1998). Holding that the circuit court had erred when it
refused to conduct a suppression hearing, the appellate court remanded
the cause for a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. The appellate
court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of the discharge hearing.
	On remand, the circuit court conducted a hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress, hearing testimony from the investigating detective, a
psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, and an assistant State's Attorney who
had interviewed defendant after she was formally arrested. The court
ultimately ruled defendant was not competent to waive her Miranda
rights, and consequently granted defendant's motion with respect to
statements made to the assistant State's Attorney after defendant's arrest.
However, the court did not suppress an inculpatory statement defendant
allegedly made to detectives shortly before she was formally arrested,
concluding that defendant was not then in custody, there was no evidence
of police coercion or misconduct, and the statement was, therefore,
admissible. The circuit court determined that a new discharge hearing was
not necessary and reinstated the original order committing defendant to the
Department of Mental Health. Defendant again appealed.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded, stating:
			"[W]hen the trial court ruled that Braggs' statements to the
police were admissible because she was not in custody and
Miranda was inapplicable, it was in error. Likewise, the court's
ruling that, in the absence of police coercion or the defendant
being in custody, the fact that Braggs was mentally handicapped
was to be considered only as to the weight to be given her
statements and not as to whether those statements were
inadmissible, was in error. The court should have considered
whether Braggs' statement to the detectives was voluntary in a
state-law sense based upon the totality of the circumstances.
[Citation.] One of the factors that the court should have
considered was whether Braggs' mental retardation deprived her
of 'the capacity to understand the meaning and effect of the
confession.' [Citation.] This is particularly important in the
present case, where the trial court found the defendant was
incapable of waiving her rights under Miranda due to her
diminished mental capacity." 335 Ill. App. 3d 52, 65.
The appellate court remanded the cause for a new hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress, directing the circuit court to conduct a new discharge
hearing thereafter. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 69. The appellate court observed,
"much of the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing was
unavailable to the court which conducted the 1996 discharge hearing."
335 Ill. App. 3d at 69.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315), and we now affirm, with modification, the judgment of the appellate
court. We begin with a recitation of the evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing.
	Chicago police detective Edward Winstead testified that he
investigated the deaths of Donald Rudolph and Connie Hall. The victims'
bodies were both found in a first-floor apartment located on South Prairie
Avenue in Chicago on April 28, 1993. Although officers initially thought
that Rudolph had been beaten to death, it was later determined that
Rudolph died as a result of strangulation. Hall died as a result of multiple
stab wounds. During the course of the investigation, Winstead began
looking for defendant.
	On May 7, 1993, Survilla Cameron contacted Winstead and
informed him that defendant lived with her. Cameron represented herself
to be defendant's sister and guardian; however, Winstead admitted he
never saw any documentation to substantiate Cameron's claim. After
Cameron indicated that Winstead could speak with defendant, Winstead
transported defendant and Cameron to Area One and questioned her.
Prior to questioning, Cameron informed Winstead that defendant was
"mentally incompetent." Winstead admitted one could "clearly see that she
was mentally deficient." Cameron agreed to help Winstead in his
interrogation of defendant, but cautioned him that defendant was "slow."
Winstead did not advise defendant of her Miranda rights. The
interrogation took place in an interview room with another detective
present.
	Winstead testified he had difficulty communicating with defendant in
that "sometimes she wouldn't answer questions," and other times she was
"very slow in answering." In Winstead's own words: "She would be very
slow in answering. And her sister would then kind of repeat the question
or if Mary Braggs seemed to be paying attention to me she would then
answer to her sister." If defendant responded, she would generally direct
her answers to Cameron, and Cameron would then "tell [Winstead] what
[defendant] was saying." However, Winstead testified he could hear
defendant as she spoke. During the interrogation, Cameron acted as an
intermediary for Winstead. Defendant's answers were responsive to
Winstead's questions in the sense that defendant would respond to
questions repeated by Cameron and first posed by Winstead.
	Winstead summarized the substance of defendant's statements from
the hour-long interrogation. According to Winstead, defendant told him
that she was in the apartment on South Prairie Avenue when two black
males came to the door. Defendant overheard an argument and hid in the
closet. When she came out, defendant saw Hall dead in the bedroom.
Defendant said Hall had been stabbed and was wearing white. Defendant
said Rudolph was in the front room. He had been hit in the head with a
wrench and had been strangled to death. Winstead testified that
defendant's description was "very accurate as to how the victims died and
where they were found." Following the interrogation, Winstead took
defendant and Cameron home.
	On the morning of May 9, Winstead again questioned defendant, this
time at Cameron's apartment. As in all of the interviews, Cameron was
present. Detective James Redmond was also present. Winstead said
defendant was still very slow in answering questions, or she might not
answer at all, but during this second interrogation, she at least spoke
directly to him most of the time. Winstead testified he went to question
defendant, a mere two days after the first interrogation, "to see if [he]
could get a little bit more information, if she recalled more about the two
black males who came to the door and the argument." Winstead testified
that defendant told him one of the men was named Ron and he was a
friend of Cleo. Defendant described the other man as a tall black male.
Winstead testified that the investigation revealed Ron Thomas was an
acquaintance of Cleo and the victims, and when Winstead located him he
was with a tall black male named Mike.
	Later that same afternoon, Winstead picked up defendant and
Cameron and took them to Area One. Winstead spoke to defendant in an
interview room. He indicated, as previously, it took defendant a long time
to answer questions. "Often times [sic] she would put her head down and
say 'I don't know.' " Winstead showed defendant photographs of Ron
Thomas and Mike. Defendant quickly identified the photograph of Mike
as being the tall black male. Winstead said she was at first uncertain of the
identity of Ron Thomas, then she positively him. Winstead testified that
when he informed defendant the men were at the police station, defendant
changed her story. Defendant then said that these were not the two men
who came to the apartment and that it was two different men. Defendant
reiterated that two men came to the door and she hid in the closet.
	Winstead testified that on that same afternoon he took defendant and
Cameron to the scene of the murders. Defendant pointed out where the
two bodies were found. Winstead testified that her account was consistent
with where the bodies were found by the police. Defendant then showed
Winstead the closet where she hid. Winstead testified he examined the
closet and defendant "couldn't have possibly fit in there." Winstead then
took defendant and Cameron home, having questioned defendant at three
different locations over the course of the day.
	On May 12, Winstead transported defendant and Cameron to the
polygraph unit of the Chicago police department. Although defendant was
cooperative, the polygraph examination was inconclusive because
defendant did not register enough emotion. Again, defendant was returned
to Cameron's apartment. Cameron and defendant subsequently changed
residences.
	On June 25, 1993, Winstead picked up defendant and Cameron
from their new apartment and again took them to Area One for
questioning. Prior to the questioning, Winstead informed Cameron that the
police were looking at defendant as a potential suspect. Despite the
State's representation otherwise, the record is silent as to whether that
information was communicated to defendant. Winstead, another detective,
defendant, and Cameron were present in the interview room. Winstead
advised defendant of her Miranda warnings from a standard form without
additional explanation. Defendant made no verbal response; she merely
nodded her head in an affirmative manner. Although Winstead could not
remember her exact words, he recalled that Cameron said something to
the effect of: "he's telling you that you don't have to talk to me and that
you're not going to be in trouble or something." Defendant nodded her
head in agreement and "seemed to understand what her sister was saying."
Defendant never verbally indicated that she understood, and she did not
sign a waiver form. Indeed, it is unclear to what extent defendant ever
responded to, or communicated with Winstead, He acknowledged that
Cameron "initially" acted as an "interpreter," and it is obvious from the
foregoing testimony that she was still acting in that capacity on June 25,
1993, despite Winstead's suggestion to the contrary: "After a while, after
I talked to [defendant] somewhat, I could begin to understand or she'd
answer me or she wouldn't." The record does not indicate whether
Winstead's questions to defendant were suggestive or leading, or whether
they called for a narrative response.
	Although the transcript of the suppression hearing does not reveal the
substance of statements defendant made during the June 25 interview, the
testimony of another detective from the discharge hearing indicated that
defendant said she and Connie Hall were in an apartment together on
April 28, 1993, when Donald Rudolph returned. Rudolph was drunk and
struck both defendant and Hall. Defendant then knocked Rudolph down
and he struck his head. Hall became upset, accusing defendant of killing
Rudolph, and defendant then stabbed Hall a number of times in her upper
body. Following the hour-long interview, defendant was placed under
arrest. An assistant State's Attorney arrived at the police station and again
advised defendant of her Miranda warnings.
	Dr. Philip Pan, a psychiatrist, testified for the defense. On May 16,
1996, Pan diagnosed the defendant as having moderate mental retardation
and determined defendant was unfit to stand trial. He noted that four other
psychiatrists had reached the same conclusion. In 1996, Pan concluded
it was not likely that defendant could be restored to fitness any time in the
near future. On August 31, 1999, Pan again evaluated defendant. Dr. Pan
testified that defendant was unfit for trial and would not become fit in the
future. Pan also rendered his opinion that defendant was incapable of
understanding Miranda warnings.
	By way of explanation, Dr. Pan testified that defendant could give
simple answers to questions she understood, but she was not capable of
abstract thinking. Although she knew she was born in 1941, defendant
told Dr. Pan, in the course of his 1999 interview, that she was 29 years
old. Her thinking was "idiosyncratic," meaning that she was often "not on
the same page" as the person questioning her. She would frequently
answer questions in a completely irrelevant manner. When asked the
meaning of her right to remain silent, she responded that she already had
an attorney. When Pan asked her what it meant that anything she said
could be used against her in a court of law, she responded, "he know I
didn't do those two crimes. That is something I didn't do."
	Dr. Linda Wertzel, a clinical psychologist, also testified for the
defense. Wertzel had examined defendant in 1994 and testified to her
findings. Wertzel concluded that defendant was mentally retarded with an
IQ of 54. Wertzel described her observations of defendant at that time:
			"[S]he was flat and passive, kind of emotionally blunted, no
affect. She was overweight. She was-her clothing was dirty. Her
hygiene was very poor. She was picking at her skin and nails and
nose and ears. She was nonspontaneous in her speech."
Defendant could provide only "simple answers to direct questions and
really did not provide a narrative of information." She stated her age to be
29. Testing revealed that defendant functioned, mathematically, at a
kindergarten level. Defendant was unsure if she had ever gone to school.
She could not read or write.
	Wertzel administered a test designed to measure a person's ability to
express thoughts accurately and coherently and to comprehend what other
people say. She determined that defendant could only express herself at
a "very simple childish level" and she could not comprehend more than a
one-step command. Wertzel said the test involved asking the subject to
touch colored shapes in sequence. Wertzel first asked defendant to touch
a red square (one-step command), then asked her to touch a red square
and a yellow circle in sequence (two-step command). Defendant could not
get beyond the one-step command. Defendant was inconsistent in her
ability to identify shapes correctly. She displayed impairment on both
motor speed and motor dexterity tests. She could not accurately draw and
number the face of a clock.
	When asked the meaning of various Miranda warnings, defendant
either said she did not know or she offered an irrelevant or inappropriate
response. Eventually, defendant became frustrated and the interview was
terminated. As a result of her 1994 examination of defendant, Wertzel
concluded that defendant was illiterate, mentally retarded, "only minimally
able to care for her basic daily needs, her comprehension of her current
circumstances was marginal, and she was unable to understand her
Miranda rights.
	Wertzel examined defendant again in October 1999 and concluded
she remained unable to understand her Miranda warnings. Dr. Wertzel
testified that defendant's behavior was "pretty similar" to her first
encounter with defendant. Defendant "acted as though she had only been
in jail for about a week." She identified Kennedy as president of the
United States. Wertzel administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test, in which the subject is shown a pictures and is asked to name
activities or pastimes represented therein. Defendant scored the age
equivalent of a five-year-old. After her 1999 examination of defendant,
Wertzel again concluded it was "highly unlikely" that defendant ever had
the ability to comprehend or waive Miranda rights.
	Wertzel described defendant as "sort of like a child, *** unsure of
what is real and what is imagined, what is an actual memory, what is told
to them." Moreover, she stated that defendant does not tolerate stress
very well and is "suggestible." Wertzel described more than one instance
where she was able to lead defendant in the questioning to get the
information desired.
	In rebuttal, the State called Assistant State's Attorney Stan
Gonsalves. Gonsalves testified he went to Area One on June 25, 1993,
to interview defendant. Prior to meeting defendant, detectives told
Gonsalves defendant was "a little slow." Gonsalves advised defendant of
her Miranda warnings. Gonsalves said defendant was "just quiet at that
point." Defendant did not respond verbally when she was asked if she
understood her rights. Defendant nodded her head affirmatively after
Gonsalves finished giving her the Miranda warnings. Cameron was in the
room, but did not say anything. Gonsalves testified that defendant was
responsive to his questions during the interrogation, but he conceded that
communicating with defendant was "difficult" and "slow." The record does
not indicate whether Gonsalves' questions to defendant were suggestive
or leading, or whether they called for a narrative response.
	After hearing testimony in this matter, the circuit court rendered its
ruling. The judge's initial statements indicate that he believed the issue in
this case was the same as that presented in People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349 (1990), cited by defendant. The court perceived the issue as "two
fold": whether defendant's statements were obtained free of police
coercion, misconduct, or overreaching; and whether "a valid Miranda
waiver must be knowing and intelligent."
	Citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986), the circuit court stated that a confession is not
rendered involuntary under the federal due process clause without "some
police overreaching." In the circuit court's view, there was no evidence
suggesting that the police had done anything to coerce the defendant to
give a statement. The court ruled that defendant was not in custody until
after she had confessed to Winstead; consequently, Miranda warnings
were not required prior to that time, and any statements she made before
that point were admissible. The circuit court determined that Winstead had
"gratuitously offered" defendant Miranda warnings on the morning of her
arrest, even though the warnings were not required by the attendant
circumstances. The court said there was "no dispute" that defendant was
mentally handicapped, but ruled "that goes to the weight of those
statements, not to whether those statements were admissible."
	The court concluded that defendant was in custody following her
statement to the Winstead and she did not knowingly and intelligently
waive her Miranda rights. In so ruling, the court relied upon the
uncontroverted testimony of Pan and Wertzel, and that of law enforcement
personnel who observed defendant's actions and demeanor during
periods of interrogation. The court specifically mentioned "the testimony
of Winstead about how she acted and [Assistant] State's Attorney
Gonsalves that she did not respond verbally [when] given her rights. She
merely stood silent."
	Based upon the uncontested testimony of the witnesses, the court
suppressed the statement defendant made to Assistant State's Attorney
Gonsalves following her arrest. The court, however, denied defendant's
motion with respect to any statements made before defendant was in
custody.
	On appeal, the State posits a single issue: whether defendant's final
"statement" or "confession" to Winstead-which, on the basis of the trial
court's ruling, the State assumes was noncustodial-was "constitutionally
voluntary because it was given without police coercion"-a second
assumption based upon conclusions the trial court drew from undisputed
facts. Defendant continues to argue, inter alia, that defendant was in
custody when she gave the allegedly inculpatory statement to Detective
Winstead and that she did not effectively waive her Miranda rights. The
State disputes the former contention, but not the latter.
	We begin our analysis by identifying the relevant standard of review
and the burden of proof. A court of review will accord great deference to
the trial court's factual findings, and will reverse those findings only if they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, the court will
review de novo the ultimate question posed by the legal challenge to a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001); People v. Schoening, 333 Ill. App. 3d 28, 31-32
(2002). Where a defendant challenges the admissibility of his confession
through a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving the
confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. 725 ILCS
5/114-11(d) (West 2000); In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 49 (2000). The
concept of voluntariness includes proof that the defendant made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to counsel. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 54 (1990); People v.
Joya, 319 Ill. App. 3d 370, 378 (2001).
	In this case, the trial court determined that defendant was unable to
effectively waive her Miranda rights, based upon the unrefuted testimony
of the doctors who had examined her and law enforcement personnel who
observed her actions and demeanor. Consequently, the trial court granted
the defendant's motion to suppress as to statements allegedly made by
defendant after she was formally arrested. The court denied defendant's
motion with respect to her earlier statement to Winstead only because the
court believed she was not 'in custody" for purposes of Miranda at that
time. Since defendant continues to argue that she was in custody when she
was interrogated by Winstead at the police station on June 25, 1993, we
first address the custodial issue.
	The determination of whether a defendant is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes involves "[t]wo discrete inquiries ***: first, what were
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995);
United States v. Badmus, 325 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). See also
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 336, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (1984) ( "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"). Thus,
in determining whether a person is "in custody" for purposes of Miranda,
a court should first ascertain and examine the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, and then ask if, given those circumstances, a reasonable
person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave. People v. Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604
(2000). With respect to the latter inquiry, the accepted test is what a
reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or
she been in the defendant's shoes. People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 67
(1994), quoting People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 166 (1977).
	When examining the circumstances of interrogation, the following
factors have been found relevant in determining whether a statement was
made in a custodial setting: the location, time, length, mood, and mode of
the interrogation, the number of police officers present, the presence or
absence of the family and friends of the accused, any indicia of formal
arrest, and the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused. See
People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 417 (1989); People v. Fletcher, 328
Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1073 (2002); People v. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App. 3d
607, 613 (2000); Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 604-05; People v. Rivera,
304 Ill. App. 3d 124, 128 (1999); People v. Savory, 105 Ill. App. 3d
1023, 1028 (1982). Although it is generally irrelevant that the interrogating
officer subjectively viewed the individual under questioning as a suspect,
the officer's beliefs, if conveyed by word or deed to the individual being
questioned, are relevant to the extent that they would affect how a
reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would
have gauged the breadth of his freedom of action. Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 299, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994); Patel, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 604. Moreover, where
the investigating officer is aware of particular characteristics or traits of the
individual that make him or her particularly vulnerable to the impression
that he or she is in custody, and the officer exploits those characteristics
in questioning, that, too, is a relevant  factor in determining whether the
individual is "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.  See United States
v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (limited capacity to
understand, and other particular personality traits,  may be relevant to
custody question where officers are aware of those traits and they
influence the actions of the officers); cf. United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 951 (6th Cir. 1999) (no indication that the police were aware
of defendants' mental deficiencies and the officers repeatedly advised
defendants that they were not under arrest and did not have to answer
questions).
	As we consider the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the
accused-and an investigating officer's awareness and exploitation of those
characteristics-in our examination of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, so those factors are analytically intertwined with the
reasonable-person prong of the custodial question. Indeed, other courts
have incorporated these factors into the reasonable-person standard itself
in varied circumstances involving investigatory interaction between the
police and citizens. See United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 759
(10th Cir. 1993) (notwithstanding reasonable-person standard, attributes
such as age, education and intelligence of the accused have been
recognized as relevant in determining whether consent was voluntary);
United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1994) (in
applying the reasonable-person standard to a consent to search issue, the
"particular personal traits *** of the defendant" may become relevant ***
if the police officer knows of the personal traits or characteristics and they
influence his or her conduct); Commonwealth v. Reid, 571 Pa. 1, 28,
811 A.2d 530, 546 (2002) (when considering whether consent was
voluntarily given, a "reviewing court should evaluate the characteristics of
the accused, the interaction between the accused and the police, and
assess how a reasonable person in the accused's shoes would have
reacted to that interaction"); United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir. 1994) (even when examining a noncustodial
interrogation, a court should look to "the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation" to determine whether a reasonable
person would have felt coerced); United States v. Cichon, 48 F.3d 269,
276 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Oliver, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same).
	The justification for incorporating general and readily
discernible characteristics of the subject-actor into the reasonable-person
standard logically must apply in this situation as well. If, as is the case, we
are concerned with what a reasonable person "in the defendant's shoes"
(see Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 418) would have thought about his or her
freedom of action, the reasonable person we envision must at least wear
comparable footwear; otherwise, we ought to simply abandon the legal
charade that the defendant's characteristics, perspective and perception
matter at all.
	Recognizing this principle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
suggested the applicable standard should indeed be modified in this
context, where a juvenile is concerned, to reflect what a reasonable
juvenile would have thought in defendant's position. Alvarado v.
Hickman, 316 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, ___ U.S.
___, 156 L. Ed. 2d 703, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003). In its analysis, the
Alvarado court first recited the now firmly established legal principle that
"juvenile defendants are, in general, more susceptible to police coercion
than adults; as such, due process demands that a defendant's juvenile
status be taken into consideration when determining the proper procedural
safeguards that attach to a custodial interrogation." Alvarado, 316 F.3d 
at 843. The Alvarado court then reasoned, "If a juvenile is more
susceptible to police coercion during a custodial interrogation, then the
same juvenile is also more susceptible to the impression that he is, in fact,
in custody in the first instance." Alvarado, 316 F.3d  at 843. Next, the
court seemingly sanctioned a reasonable-juvenile standard to be applied
to the determination of custodial interrogation. The Alvarado court
quoted, with special emphasis, from Erving L., 147
F.3d at 1248:
		" 'Given these facts, a reasonable juvenile in E.L.'s position
would not have believed that the officers had curtailed his
freedom of movement to a degree associated with formal
arrest.' " (Emphasis in original.) Alvarado, 316 F.3d  at 848,
quoting Erving L., 147 F.3d  at 1248.
The Alvarado court then observed, "When we survey the landscape of
state court decisions, we note that every jurisdiction that has squarely
addressed the issue has ruled that juvenile status is relevant to the 'in
custody' determination, either as a factor in the totality of circumstances
test, or by way of modification to the reasonable person standard."
(Emphasis added.) Alvarado, 316 F.3d  at 850 n.5 (collecting cases). See
generally State v. Jason L., 129 N.M. 119, 126, 2 P.3d 856, 863
(2000) (characteristics such as whether the person being questioned is a
child or an adult are objective and relevant to the question of whether a
reasonable person would feel free to terminate questioning and leave);
Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999) (applying
"reasonable juvenile" standard to determine whether defendant would
have believed he was in custody at the time of the interrogation); State v.
Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) ("it is appropriate to
consider the age of the defendant as an additional factor in making a
determination as to custody status"); In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505, 511
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("We believe the facts here establish that a
reasonable thirteen-year-old would have believed he was in custody"); In
re Loredo, 125 Or. App. 390, 394, 865 P.2d 1312, 1315 (1993)
(custodial question entailed inquiry into what a reasonable person of the
child's age, knowledge and experience would have thought); In re Robert
H., 194 A.D.2d 790, 791, 599 N.Y.S. 621, 623 (1993) ("[A] reasonable
15-year-old, in the position of Robert, would not have believed he was
free to leave the scene"); In re Rennette B., 281 A.D.2d 78, 85, 723 N.Y.S. 31, 37 (2001) (same). In this context, our own appellate court has
modified the reasonable-person standard, where a juvenile is involved,
considering what a reasonable juvenile would have thought about his or
her custodial status. See In re J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d 951, 960 (1995)
("Although J.W. had not been formally arrested *** a reasonable 14-year-old person would have been entitled to believe *** he was in police
custody and not free to leave"). See also People v. Armstrong, 318 Ill.
App. 3d 607, 614-15 (2000).
	The same rationale that requires modification of the reasonable
person standard to take into account the general characteristics of
juveniles also militates in favor of such a modification where the mentally
retarded are concerned. "[M]ental retardation may have a significant
impact on an individual who finds himself involved with the criminal justice
system, particularly in the context of confessions and interrogations. ***
Many mentally retarded people may be less likely to withstand police
coercion or pressure due to their limited communication skills, their
predisposition to answer questions so as to please the questioner rather
than to answer the question accurately, and their tendency to be
submissive." L. Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty,
52 Ala. L. Rev. 911, 917 (2001). See also P. Hourihan, Earl
Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of
Confessions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1471, 1473 (1995) ("Mentally retarded
persons are more susceptible to coercion, more likely to confess falsely,
and less likely to understand their rights than people of normal intellectual
ability"). Just as they are more susceptible to police coercion during a
custodial interrogation, the mentally retarded are also more susceptible to
the impression that they are, in fact, in custody in the first instance. The
circumstances of the instant case amply demonstrate the point.
	Including the initial interrogation of June 25, 1993, defendant was
questioned by police six times before she was formally arrested: four times
at a police facility, once at her home and once at the scene of the crime.
The police enlisted the aid and consent of Cameron-who apparently
represented herself to be defendant's sister and legal guardian-in order to
question defendant. Cameron acted as a translator of sorts and actually
facilitated the police interrogation. Her role in the process of interrogation
is not what we characterize as that of a family member concerned with
defendant's welfare. It is not evident from the record that defendant ever
verbally assented to police interrogation. On every occasion that she was
questioned outside her home, the police transported defendant. Two
detectives were always present during the interrogations. Although it is not
clear from the record whether defendant was present when Winstead
advised Cameron that defendant was a suspect, even a mentally retarded
suspect might well have regarded herself as such after Winstead had
expressed disbelief of her version of events and had asked her to take a
polygraph examination. We also note that Winstead for the first time read
defendant her Miranda rights on June 25, something he had not done in
previous encounters. We have no doubt whatsoever that a reasonable
person with defendant's mental capacity would have believed he or she
was in custody and not free to leave the police station.
	In fact, our research has disclosed a case involving similar
circumstances, a person of apparently normal intelligence, and a
determination that the interrogation was custodial. In United States v.
Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1985), defendant was questioned by
law enforcement officials on four occasions, three on the day of his
confession. On the first three, he was transported from his residence to a
Bureau of Indian Affairs office by plain clothes agents. When he was
picked up the last time for further questioning, Wauneka was transported
by two armed officers and was placed in a large conference room with
four or five officers who each had an opportunity to question him. The
hour-long interrogation eventually turned accusatory. During a break,
Wauneka, who was then 18 years old, broke down crying. FBI agents
resumed the questioning despite the fact that Wauneka was visibly shaken
by this ordeal and eventually obtained a confession. Wauneka had no
means of transportation, and he was never offered an opportunity to leave
the Bureau's office prior to his confession. On these facts, the court of
appeals upheld a district court ruling that Wauneka was "in custody" for
purposes of Miranda when he confessed. The court stated, "A
reasonable innocent person in such circumstances probably would have
concluded that he was not free to leave." United States v. Wauneka,
770 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1985).
	Like Wauneka, the defendant in this case was repeatedly taken by
officers to a law enforcement facility and questioned. As in Wauneka, the
instant defendant was never told she could leave the station when she
wished; she was taken home by the police when they were finished with
her. By the time of the encounter on June 25, the atmosphere of the
interrogation had turned accusatory: defendant had taken a polygraph
examination and had been designated a suspect by Winstead. However,
defendant, unlike Wauneka, is mentally retarded. She was only at the
police station because her purported guardian/sister agreed to police
requests that she accompany them there. Her options, no doubt, seemed
very limited indeed. 
	Under the circumstances, a reasonable person with defendant's
mental capacity would not have felt free to leave. In this case, the police
knowingly exploited defendant's mental retardation. While the custody
inquiry may not "place upon the police the burden of anticipating the
frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they encounter,"
(Berkemer, 468 U.S.  at 442 n. 35)  neither does it sanction the
exploitation of known frailties or idiosyncracies by the government. 
Modification or refinement of the reasonable person standard is
appropriate where, as here, such exploitation has occurred. We conclude
that the circuit court erred in ruling defendant was not in custody when she
allegedly gave an inculpatory statement to Detective Winstead on June 25,
1993.
	Having determined that Winstead's interrogation of defendant on
June 25 was custodial, we now address the question of whether defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived her Miranda rights. Custodial
interrogation is, of course, inherently coercive and " 'trades on the
weakness of individuals.' " Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
435, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405, 414, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (2000), quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 712, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1618 (1966). As we have noted previously herein, it is
generally recognized that the mentally retarded are considered more
susceptible to police coercion or pressure than people of normal
intellectual ability, they are predisposed to answer questions so as to
please the questioner rather than to answer accurately, they are more
likely to confess to crimes they did not commit, they tend to be
submissive, and they are less likely to understand their rights. See M.
McCloud, Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions
and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495, 503, 538
(2002); L. Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty,
52 Ala. L. Rev. 911, 917 (2001). P. Hourihan, Earl Washington's
Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 Va.
L. Rev. 1471, 1473 (1995).
	However, evidence of a defendant's limited mental or intellectual
capacity at the time of a confession, alone, does not establish that he or
she was incapable of waiving Miranda rights. Limited intellectual capacity
is one of several factors to be considered in this regard. People v. Foster,
168 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1995); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 462
(1995).
	Nevertheless, "[w]aiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is
clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right ***.' " People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180,
187 (1979), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L Ed.
1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). See People v. McClanahan,
191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 (2000). Waivers must not only be voluntary, but
must be knowing and intelligent acts in the sense that they are done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at137; Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d  at
364-65.
	A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be knowingly and intelligently
made. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d  at 364-65. A criminal suspect is not required
to know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privilege for it to be knowingly and intelligently made.
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954, 966, 107 S. Ct. 851, 857 (1987). However, in order to effect an intelligent and
knowing waiver of Miranda rights, a defendant must have " ' "a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it." ' " Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d  at
360, quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 272, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2395 (1988). The defendant need not
understand far-reaching legal and strategic effects of waiving his or her
rights or appreciate how widely or deeply an interrogation may probe;
however, the defendant must at least understand basically what those
rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail. Mahaffey,
165 Ill. 2d  at 462, quoting Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d  at 363. Whether a
waiver is knowing and intelligent is determined by the particular facts and
circumstances of the case, "including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.  at 464, 82 L. Ed. 
at 1466, 58 S. Ct.  at 1023; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 233
(1998).
	It is all too obvious, as the trial court concluded, that the defendant
in this case did not knowingly and intelligently waive her Miranda rights.
The State does not even attempt to argue that point. Winstead advised
defendant of her Miranda warnings from a standard form without
additional explanation. Defendant made no verbal response; she merely
nodded her head in an affirmative manner. Winstead later recalled that
Cameron told defendant something to the effect of: "He's telling you that
you don't have to talk to me and that you're not going to be in trouble or
something." Defendant nodded her head in agreement and "seemed to
understand what her sister was saying." Defendant never verbally
indicated that she understood, and she did not sign a waiver form. Indeed,
it is unclear to what extent defendant ever responded to, or communicated
with, Winstead. He acknowledged that Cameron "initially" acted as an
"interpreter," and it is obvious from his testimony that she was still acting
in that capacity on June 25, 1993, despite Winstead's suggestion to the
contrary: "After a while, after I talked to [defendant] somewhat, I could
begin to understand or she'd answer me or she wouldn't." That statement
is hardly a testament to an acceptable level of communication and
understanding between Winstead and defendant. The record does not
indicate whether Winstead's questions to defendant were suggestive or
leading, or whether they called for a narrative response.
	Assistant State's Attorney Gonsalves testified that he advised
defendant of her Miranda warnings, and she was "just quiet at that point."
Defendant did not respond verbally when she was asked if she understood
her rights. Defendant simply nodded her head affirmatively after Gonsalves
finished giving her the Miranda warnings. Cameron was in the room, but
did not say anything. Gonsalves testified that defendant was responsive to
his questions during the interrogation, but he conceded that communicating
with defendant was "difficult" and "slow." The record does not indicate
whether Gonsalves' questions to defendant were suggestive or leading, or
whether they called for a narrative response. It does not appear from the
record that defendant had any prior experience with the criminal justice
system.
	Dr. Philip Pan characterized defendant's mental impairment as
moderate mental retardation. He determined her condition was profound
to a degree that she was unfit to stand trial. He noted that four other
psychiatrists had reached the same conclusion. Pan rendered his opinion
that defendant was incapable of understanding Miranda warnings. He
noted that her thinking was "idiosyncratic," meaning she was often "not on
the same page" as the person questioning her. She would frequently
answer questions in a completely irrelevant manner.
	Dr. Linda Wertzel, a clinical psychologist, examined defendant in
1994 and testified to her findings. Wertzel concluded that defendant was
mentally retarded with an IQ of 54. Wertzel stated that defendant could
provide only "simple answers to direct questions and really did not
provide a narrative of information." Defendant functioned, mathematically,
at a kindergarten level. Defendant was unsure if she had ever gone to
school. She could not read or write. Wertzel determined that defendant
could only express herself at a "very simple childish level" and she could
not comprehend more than a one-step command. Defendant's
comprehension of her circumstances was marginal, and she was unable to
understand her Miranda rights.
	Wertzel examined defendant again in October of 1999 and
concluded defendant remained unable to understand her Miranda
warnings. Wertzel then administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
to defendant. Defendant scored the age equivalent of a five-year-old.
After her 1999 examination of defendant, Wertzel determined it was
"highly unlikely" that defendant ever had the ability to comprehend or
waive Miranda rights. Wertzel described defendant as "sort of like a
child, *** unsure of what is real and what is imagined, what is an actual
memory, what is told to them." Moreover, she stated that defendant does
not tolerate stress very well and is "suggestible." Wertzel described more
than one instance where she was able to lead defendant in the questioning
to get the response desired.
	The uncontroverted testimony in this case demonstrates that
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive her Miranda rights.
No other conclusion is possible based on the evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing. Defendant was subjected to repeated interrogation
that was actually facilitated by her purported sister/guardian. By
repeatedly taking defendant where they wanted, when they wanted, the
police reinforced their authority and control over her. Defendant
apparently had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. She
was clearly a suspect by the time she took a polygraph test and was
thereafter questioned on June 25, 1993. The experts who testified were
unanimously of the opinion that defendant was incapable of understanding
and waiving her Miranda rights. Aside from the State's testimony
regarding defendant's ambiguous nods, there was no evidence even
suggesting that defendant waived her rights. In fact, the minimal level of
communication between law enforcement officials and the defendant
throughout the investigation of this case is a matter of great concern to this
court and should have been to the officers involved, who proceeded to
repeatedly question defendant despite her obvious impairment and
vulnerability. We note that the degree of defendant's mental impairment
is comparable to that of the defendants in Bernasco and People v.
Robinson, 301 Ill. App. 3d 634 (1998). In both cases, confessions were
suppressed. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d at 350-51; Robinson, 301 Ill. App. 3d
at 643.
	It has been said that "a system of criminal law enforcement which
comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable
and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 985, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (1964). Custodial interrogation trades on the weakness of
individuals (Dickerson, 530 U.S.  at 435, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 414, 120 S. Ct.  at 2331, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 455, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 712, 86
S. Ct. at 1618); the young and mentally infirm are most vulnerable. The
potential for abuse is obvious, as is the need for adequate safeguards. We
believe this case amply demonstrates the point.
	Both confessions defendant allegedly gave on June 25, 1993, were
made under circumstances custodial in nature. As defendant was
incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving her Miranda rights, both
statements should have been suppressed. We express no opinion
regarding the admissibility of statements defendant may have made prior
to that date. The State's argument on appeal concerns only defendant's
"confession to the detectives." We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the
appellate court insofar as we reverse and remand for further suppression
proceedings and a new discharge hearing. We modify the appellate
court's judgment to the extent that we limit the scope of any further
suppression proceedings to statements defendant may have made prior to
June 25, 1993.
	Given our disposition, we need not reach the issue upon which the
appellate court disposed of this case. We may affirm the result below on
any basis that is supported by the record. People v. Huff, 195 Ill. 2d 87,
91 (2001); In re Application of the Cook County Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428, 436 (1998).
	For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court
as modified and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed as modified;
cause remanded.