Title: Terry v. Read Steel Products

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

430 So. 2d 862 (1983)
Rodney Austin TERRY, a minor, who sues by his parent and next friend, Austin Garland TERRY
v.
READ STEEL PRODUCTS, a Corporation.
81-348.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 1, 1983.
*863 James T. Collins and Edward L. Hardin, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Stanley A. Cash and Frank E. Lankford, Jr. of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
In June of 1977 Rodney Terry, a minor, commenced work on a summer job at Read Steel Products, Inc. (Read Steel). While engaged in this employment, Terry was injured when his hand caught in a machine he was operating. As a result of the injury, Terry sought to receive workmen's compensation benefits from Manpower, Inc., an employment agency which provided Read Steel with temporary laborers.
Subsequently, Terry's father filed a third-party action on behalf of his son against Read Steel and Edsell Pearce, a co-employee of Terry's. We are not here concerned with the co-employee action. CNA Insurance, the insurance carrier for Manpower, was allowed to intervene and seek recovery for the amount paid in settlement of Terry's workmen's compensation claim.
Read Steel filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its immunity as an employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The trial judge ruled in favor of Read Steel. Judgment was made final under Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., and Terry appealed.
The issue presented is whether an employer-employee relationship, within the meaning of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act, existed as a matter of law between Read Steel and the plaintiff's minor son, Rodney Terry. If, when Terry was injured, Read Steel was Terry's "employer" for purposes of workmen's compensation liability, then Terry's tort claim against Read Steel is barred by Code 1975, § 25-5-53. That section provides in pertinent part:
The trial court held as a matter of law that Terry was an employee of Read Steel within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act and that Terry's claim against Read Steel was barred by § 25-5-53. Section 25-5-1(6) defines "employee" as "every person ... in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied...." Courts in this jurisdiction have applied the "reserved right of control" *864 test in determining whether the employer-employee relationship exists. See, e.g., Dennis v. Huff, 406 So. 2d 412 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). We do not find this test dispositive in cases such as the one here, where a general employer such as Manpower merely provides laborers to special employers such as Read Steel and performs clerical payroll tasks.
Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the problem more squarely than this Court. In Wright v. Habco, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 34 (Mo.1967), the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant special employer, observing:
Id., at 37.
Terry's only argument is that Manpower reserved the right of control by requiring Read Steel to obtain prior written permission from Manpower before authorizing Terry to operate machinery or motor vehicles, as set out in the Manpower work ticket filled out by Read Steel:
This argument is answered by the reasoning of the court in Wright, supra. The following quotation from the work ticket drives home the point made in Wright:
Thus, Manpower did not reserve control over Terry's work, but merely informed Read Steel that written permission to operate machinery or vehicles was necessary for liability insurance coverage.
Terry introduced an affidavit of Paul J. McMahon, branch manager of Manpower, in opposition to Read Steel's motion for summary judgment. McMahon stated that "Manpower exercises ultimate control over its employees. In the case of Manpower *865 employees (temporary workers) at the Read premises, Read requested and did receive permission from Manpower for the Manpower employees to operate machinery at Read." Similarly argumentative and conclusory statements of "control" were rejected in view of the facts in St. Claire v. Minnesota Harbor Service, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 521 (D.Minn.1962).
The court in St. Claire, supra, concluded a thorough disposition of a claim such as Terry's with the following:
Id., at 528. (Emphasis in original.)
In several of the cases addressing this question, including Wright v. Habco, supra, and Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J. Super. 129, 201 A.2d 90 (1964), the courts have adopted the tests set out at 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 48 (1980):
1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 48 (1980).
Finding these tests consistent with the well-reasoned decisions in the cases cited above, we will follow these criteria in order *866 to determine whether Rodney Terry's "special employer," Read Steel, was also Terry's "employer" within the meaning of Alabama's Workmen's Compensation Act and, thus, immune from civil suit under Code 1975, § 25-5-53. When interpreting the statutory definitions of "employer" and "employee," Code 1975, § 25-5-1(4) and (6), the courts must use criteria which will help apply these general definitions to the specific situation at bar. See, e.g., Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1127 (Ala.Civ.App.1976).
We find that the most important criterion to be scrutinized is the requirement of a contract of hire, express or implied, between Terry and Read Steel. Certainly, the work being done was essentially that of the special employer, Read Steel, and Read Steel controlled the details of the work.
It is obvious that Terry consented to work for Read Steel and that his consent was pursuant to a contract between them. See, Wright v. Habco, Inc., supra, and Counts v. Monsanto Co., 278 F. Supp. 655 (N.D.Ala.1966). Although placed on Manpower's payroll, Terry was hired by Read Steel to work for Read Steel. As Terry testified:
We hold that Read Steel was an "employer" of Rodney Terry under Alabama's Workmen's Compensation Act and, as a result, cannot be held civilly liable for the personal injury sustained by Terry. Code 1975, § 25-5-53. Presumably, Manpower was also Terry's employer, was liable for workmen's compensation, and was immune from suit, but those questions are not before us.
We further conclude that our holding is consistent with the summary judgment granted below. The rule is as follows:
Scott v. Pizitz, Inc., 406 So. 2d 970, 972 (Ala.Civ.App.1981).
*867 By applying this rule in the present case, the question becomes, "Is there a scintilla of evidence that Read Steel was not an employer of Terry under Alabama's Workmen's Compensation Act?" Our answer to this query is no.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is due to be, and is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.