Title: State ex rel. Coleman v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Coleman v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2406.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2406 
THE STATE EX REL. COLEMAN, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Coleman v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2406.] 
Workers’ compensation—Loss of use of body part—Permanent total disability 
under R.C. 4123.58(C)—Prior determination of loss of use under R.C. 
4123.57(B) not determinative. 
(No. 2011-0972—Submitted February 26, 2013—Decided June 11, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-287,  
2011-Ohio-2006. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The Industrial Commission appeals the judgment of the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to 
grant Mike Coleman’s request for compensation for statutory permanent total 
disability under former R.C. 4123.58(C) for the loss of use of his hand and arm.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
The commission contends that there was evidence to support its decision that 
Coleman’s injury did not rise to the level of a permanent and total loss of use for 
purposes of former R.C. 4123.58(C).  Thus, the commission maintains that it did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied Coleman’s request for compensation for 
statutory permanent total disability. 
{¶ 2} We agree.  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and deny the writ of mandamus. 
Facts and Case History 
{¶ 3} In January 1994, Coleman was employed as a boilermaker 
mechanic.  He was injured when he fell backward off a ladder and struck the back 
of his neck on a propane tank on the ground.  His industrial claim was allowed for 
fractured vertebrae, herniated discs, and various shoulder injuries. 
{¶ 4} In June 2008, Coleman filed a motion requesting compensation for 
a “total loss of the functional use of the right arm.”  In support of his motion, he 
submitted medical reports from Dr. Robert Frank Jr. and Dr. W. Jerry McCloud. 
{¶ 5} According to Dr. Frank, Coleman was able to do housecleaning, 
some cooking, and light yard work and drive a car.  Dr. Frank reported that 
Coleman was able to write with his right hand, though it was difficult at times 
because his arm was prone to spasms.  Dr. Frank also stated that Coleman “can 
use his right arm at his side” but cannot do heavy pulling or lifting or move his 
arm above his head.  Dr. McCloud reported that Coleman had considerable loss of 
motion of his shoulder but had limited function of his right arm. 
{¶ 6} Dr. Ralph Rohner examined Coleman on behalf of the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation and opined that Coleman’s shoulder was useless for all 
practical purposes.  Dr. Rohner’s report stated: 
 
This man is a heavy laborer and requires full motion and strength 
of his right shoulder as well as the ability to move the position of 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
his neck frequently to do those duties.  At the present time, he has 
significant limitation of motion involving both his neck and his 
right shoulder. 
 
 
{¶ 7} On August 1, 2008, the bureau concluded that Coleman had a 
“100% loss of use of the right shoulder ankylosis” and awarded him 225 weeks of 
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B).1  Neither party administratively appealed. 
{¶ 8} A year later, Coleman filed a motion for compensation for 
statutory permanent total disability under R.C. 4123.58(C).  He alleged that based 
upon the commission’s August 1, 2008 award under R.C. 4123.57(B) for loss of 
use, he was entitled to compensation for statutory permanent total disability for 
the loss of use of his right hand and arm. 
{¶ 9} A staff hearing officer denied his application.  The hearing officer 
concluded that there must be an independent evaluation of the facts for an 
application under former R.C. 4123.58(C), even if there has been a prior award 
under R.C. 4123.57(B).  Following a review of the medical evidence and the 
testimony of Coleman, the hearing officer concluded that Coleman had a 
substantial loss of use of his right arm but that his loss did not rise to the level of a 
permanent and total loss for purposes of R.C. 4123.58(C).  The commission 
denied Coleman’s request for reconsideration. 
{¶ 10} Coleman filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals 
seeking an order requiring the commission to award him compensation for 
statutory permanent total disability under former R.C. 4123.58(C). 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals determined that the commission’s prior order 
of August 1, 2008, awarding Coleman 225 weeks of scheduled-loss benefits under 
R.C. 4123.57(B) for the loss of use due to right shoulder ankylosis implicitly 
                                                 
1  Ankylosis refers to total stiffness of a joint.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
established that Coleman had lost the use of two body parts—his hand and his 
arm—citing State ex rel. Thomas v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-
5306, 776 N.E.2d 62, and State ex rel. Internatl. Paper v. Trucinski, 106 Ohio 
St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557, 833 N.E.2d 728. 
{¶ 12} The court concluded that the loss of use of Coleman’s arm could 
not be relitigated and that the commission was bound by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel to issue the award, citing State ex rel. Kincaid v. Allen Refractories Co., 
114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701.  Accordingly, the court 
granted the writ. 
{¶ 13} On June 9, 2011, the commission filed an appeal as of right.2   
Analysis 
{¶ 14} The commission contends that to establish permanent and total 
disability under former R.C. 4123.58(C), the claimant must present evidence that 
the claimant has completely lost the use of each of two body parts, even if there 
was a prior award under R.C. 4123.57(B), because “ ‘what is a total loss of use 
under R.C. 4123.57(B) might not be under R.C. 4123.58(C),’ ” quoting State ex 
rel. Kincaid, 114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 18.  We 
agree. 
{¶ 15} Statutory permanent total disability under R.C. 4123.58(C) arises 
when a claimant is deemed permanently and totally disabled due to the loss of two 
enumerated body parts.  State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 
                                                 
2 Coleman died on December 15, 2011.  When a claimant dies, an action pending at the time of 
death is abated by the claimant’s death.  Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21.  But when benefits have been 
allowed or if a claimant has prevailed in court following the claimant’s death, the claimant’s 
dependents may be entitled to unpaid accrued benefits, if any.  R.C. 4123.60.   Because the court 
of appeals granted the relief Coleman requested, there is no abatement of the action.  State ex rel. 
Gaddis v. Indus. Comm., 133 Ohio St. 553, 15 N.E.2d 146 (1938);  Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 5th 
Dist. No. 2002CA00340, 2003-Ohio-977, 2003 WL 733891.   We exercise jurisdiction over this 
continuing controversy to determine whether Coleman was entitled to the benefits during his 
lifetime.   
 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
2002-Ohio-6664, 780 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 8.  At the time of Coleman’s injury in 1994, 
former R.C. 4123.58(C) provided: 
 
The loss or loss of use of both hands or both arms, or both 
feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this 
section.  Compensation payable under this section for permanent 
total disability is in addition to benefits payable under division (B) 
of section 4123.57 of the Revised Code.3   
 
1993 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3168. 
{¶ 16} On the other hand, R.C. 4123.57(B) provides for scheduled-loss 
compensation that is paid to an injured worker for the loss of a body part as listed 
in the schedule.  State ex rel. Moorehead v. Indus. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 27, 
2006-Ohio-6364, 857 N.E.2d 1203;  State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664, 780 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 7.  For the loss or loss of use of an 
arm, the injured worker is entitled to 225 weeks of compensation. 
{¶ 17} Although both R.C. 4123.57(B) and 4123.58(C) involve the loss of 
or loss of use of one or more body parts, the purposes of the awards differ.  State 
ex rel. Kincaid, 114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 10. 
Thus, the commission must examine the particular provisions of each statute 
when determining whether a claimant may be entitled to compensation.  Id. 
{¶ 18} Nevertheless, the court of appeals determined that Coleman’s 
award under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the “loss of use of the right shoulder ankylosis” 
conclusively established the loss of the arm and hand for purposes of statutory 
                                                 
3 In 2006, R.C. 4123.58(C) was amended to exclude the loss of a single limb as a basis for 
statutory permanent total disability.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
permanent total disability under R.C. 4123.58(C).  2011-Ohio-2006, ¶ 29.  The 
court relied on State ex rel. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-5306, 776 
N.E.2d 62, in which this court “declared the hand and arm to be distinct body 
parts for purposes of 4123.58(C).  * * * Consequently, the loss of an entire single 
extremity can equate to the loss of two body parts and statutory [permanent total 
disability].”  Id. 
{¶ 19} The court of appeals also relied on State ex rel. Internatl. Paper v. 
Trucinski, 106 Ohio St.3d 203, 2005-Ohio-4557, 833 N.E.2d 728, in which we 
affirmed an award for statutory permanent total disability for the total loss of 
Trucinski’s leg and foot following a previous award under R.C. 4123.57(B) for 
the total loss of his leg due to amputation.  Based on the reasoning in Thomas, the 
loss of his leg equated to loss of the leg and foot. 
{¶ 20} Finally, the court of appeals relied on State ex rel. Kincaid, 114 
Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-3758, 870 N.E.2d 701.  In that case, Kincaid suffered 
intermittent episodes of total vision loss as a result of his workplace injury, and 
we addressed whether his scheduled-loss award for loss of vision under R.C. 
4123.57(B) compelled an award for permanent total disability under R.C. 
4123.58(C) for the same loss.  Kincaid noted that implicit in both statutes was that 
the loss of use must be permanent but that in R.C. 4123.58(C), the loss of use 
must also be total.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Noting the differences in the statutes, Kincaid 
independently evaluated the evidence in light of the particular requirements for 
R.C. 4123.58(C) because what may constitute a loss of vision under R.C. 
4123.57(B) may not equate to a loss under R.C. 4123.58(C).  This is because the 
same workers’ compensation term can have different meanings depending on the 
context, and “what is a total loss of use under R.C. 4123.57(B) might not be under 
R.C. 4123.58(C).”  Id., ¶ 17-18.  We concluded that Kincaid’s medical evidence, 
not merely the prior award under R.C. 4123.57(B), supported an additional award 
under R.C. 4123.58(C). 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 21} In Thomas, as well as Internatl. Paper and Kincaid, the 
commission’s analysis included, as it must, an evaluation of the facts and medical 
evidence presented.  In each case, the medical evidence clearly demonstrated the 
loss of the two body parts under R.C. 4123.58(C), independently of any previous 
award under R.C. 4123.57(B). 
{¶ 22} Here, the commission independently evaluated the facts.  
Following a review of the reports of Drs. Frank, McCloud, and Rohner, and the 
testimony of Coleman, the commission determined that Coleman had some use of 
his right arm and hand.  Consequently, the evidence did not demonstrate a 
permanent and total loss of use of both body parts for purposes of former R.C. 
4123.58(C). 
{¶ 23} We hold that for purposes of former R.C. 4123.58(C), the evidence 
must demonstrate the actual loss or loss of use of each of the two body parts at 
issue, and the commission must conduct an independent evaluation of the facts 
because “what is a total loss of use under R.C. 4123.57(B) might not be under 
R.C. 4123.58(C).”  State ex rel. Kincaid, 114 Ohio St.3d 129, 2007-Ohio-7358, 
870 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 24} Finally, in reaching its result, the court of appeals in this case 
misapplied Kincaid when it held that collateral estoppel compelled the 
commission to base an award for statutory permanent total disability on the 
finding of a prior order.  Although Kincaid had argued for the application of 
collateral estoppel, the court did not apply that doctrine.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} We hold that the commission must conduct an independent 
evaluation of the facts when considering an application for statutory permanent 
total disability under R.C. 4123.58(C), even in the presence of a prior award 
under R.C. 4123.57(B) for the same body part or parts. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 26} Because there was evidence in the record to support the basis for 
the commission’s decision, the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied the award.  Therefore, a writ of mandamus is not warranted.  State ex rel. 
Avalon Precision Casting Co. v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 2006-Ohio-
2287, 846 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 9;  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio 
St.3d 18, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987);  State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 
Ohio St.2d 64, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975). 
{¶ 27} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ 
of mandamus. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Agee, Clymer, Mitchell & Laret and Robert M. Robinson, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
________________________