Title: Hendrix v. Alsop

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

180 S.E.2d 802 (1971)
Walter W. HENDRIX, Jr.
v.
James Richard ALSOP, Charles Pfizer Company, Inc. and J. B. Roerig and Company, a Division of Charles Pfizer Company, Inc.
No. 85.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
May 12, 1971.
*804 Max D. Ballinger, Greensboro, for plaintiff appellant.
Harry Rockwell and J. B. Winecoff, Greensboro, for defendant Alsop, appellant.
BRANCH, Justice.
We first consider the motion of defendants Pfizer and Roerig to dismiss plaintiff's appeal.
*805 The Court of Appeals unanimously, and we think correctly, affirmed Judge Gambill's order of 6 March 1970, which dismissed the action as to Pfizer and Roerig.
On 6 April 1971 this Court refused to exercise its discretionary power of review pursuant to G.S. § 7A-31 and denied plaintiff's petition for certiorari.
G.S. § 7A-30 provides:
Obviously, the record does not present questions under G.S. § 7A-30(1) or G.S. § 7A-30(3); however, plaintiff, without citation of authority, contends that since there was a dissent as to defendant Alsop, he can appeal decision as to Pfizer and Roerig as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. § 7A-30(2).
There are no decisions on this point in North Carolina. Our research indicates that the State of New Jersey has appellate procedures very similar to those provided for in G.S. § 7A-30(2).
The New Jersey Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 5, paragraph 1, in part provides:
Complementing this provision of the Constitution is rule 1:2-1 of the New Jersey Supreme Court which, in part, states: "Appeals may be taken to this Court from final judgments: * * * (b) in causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court."
In Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 89 A.2d 458, the New Jersey Supreme Court, speaking through Justice William Brennan, stated:
In Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 112 A.2d 705, two plaintiffs, Pangborn and Forner, obtained verdicts in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the Pangborn judgment by a divided vote but unanimously affirmed as to Forner. The defendant appealed as to Pangborn and attempted to cross appeal as to Forner under Supreme Court rule 1:2-6, which provided: "Any respondent may appeal from a judgment, order, or determination by serving and filing a notice of cross appeal which shall be governed by the rules relating to notice of appeal."
Justice Brennan, again speaking for the Court, stated:
Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co., supra, differs factually from the case before us for decision. There the defendants sought to appeal by cross-action where there were two separate and distinct actions consolidated for trial. Here, questions presented by plaintiff's attempt to appeal as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. § 7A-30 (2) are entirely different from questions which defendant Alsop raises in his appeal as a matter of right by virtue of Judge Graham's dissent. It is apparent that both the General Assembly of New Jersey and the General Assembly of North Carolina intended to insure a review by the Supreme Court of questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate court; no such review was intended for claims joined or consolidated in the lower appellate court and on which that court rendered unanimous decision.
The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
The remaining question for decision is whether the trial judge erred when he entered his order of 6 January 1970, dismissing the action as to James R. Alsop.
At the threshold of this question we must decide when plaintiff should have filed his complaint.
In Strickland v. Jackson, 260 N.C. 190, 132 S.E.2d 338, defendant demurred to the complaint and Judge Mintz sustained the demurrer, granting plaintiff thirty days in which to file his amended complaint. Plaintiff refused to amend, and appealed to the Supreme Court, where the demurrer was affirmed. On 20 March 1963, the Supreme Court filed its decision affirming the demurrer, and on 3 April 1963 the cause was certified and recorded in the Superior Court of Pitt County. On 19 April 1963, Judge Hubbard, who was then holding courts in Pitt County, entered an order affirming the order of the Supreme Court. Plaintiff attempted to file amendment to the complaint on 13 May 1963, and defendant, on 27 May 1963, moved to strike the complaint upon the ground that it was not filed in time. The judge allowed defendant's motion and plaintiff appealed. Affirming the action of the trial judge, this Court stated:
In instant case the period of twenty days in which the plaintiff was permitted to file his complaint began to run on 1 July 1968, and complaint was filed on 1 August 1969. Thus, the principal issue narrows to whether, when plaintiff had filed his complaint over one year after the time permitted but before the defendant interposed a motion to dismiss, the trial judge erred in allowing defendant's motion to dismiss and, in his discretion, refusing to enlarge the time to file complaint.
*807 Both the summons and the complaint were served before the effective date of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, and decision will be governed by the Rules as they existed immediately prior to 1 January 1970. G.S. § 1-121, in part, provided:
The Court of Appeals relies on the case of Roberts v. Allman, 106 N.C. 391, 11 S.E. 424, for the proposition that further order of court extending time to file the complaint "was not a prerequisite to filing the complaint on that date where no effort has been previously made to dismiss the action.
Roberts v. Allman, supra, was decided under the Code section which provided: "The plaintiff shall file his complaint in the clerk's office on or before the third day of the term to which the action is brought, otherwise the suit may, on motion, be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff." N.C.Code of 1883 § 206.
Roberts is distinguishable from instant case in that there a judgment by default was taken in 1884 and defendants moved on 18 May 1887 to dismiss for the reason that complaint had not been filed in proper time. In Roberts defendants made a general appearance which cured any irregularity in process. It is clear that the decision was based, in a large degree, on defendants' lack of diligence.
Other cases decided under the same Code section hold that failure timely to file complaint is ground to dismiss the action if objection is taken in apt time, but its absence is cured by acquiescence in the judgment. McLeod v. Graham, 132 N.C. 473, 43 S.E. 935; McLean v. Breece, 113 N.C. 390, 18 S.E. 694; McNeill v. Hodges, 105 N.C. 52, 11 S.E. 265; Robeson v. Hodges, 105 N.C. 49, 11 S.E. 263; Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 167; Stancill v. Gay, 92 N. C. 455.
In instant case complaint was filed on 1 August 1969, and defendant Alsop, on 27 August 1969, before the complaint or order directing service had been served on him, moved to strike the complaint and to dismiss the action as to him. It would seem that the crucial factor is that in instant case defendant moved to dismiss in apt time.
In the case of Horney v. Mills, 189 N.C. 724, 128 S.E. 324, we find the following:
The superior court judge's discretionary power to extend time for filing complaint is no different than his power to extend time for filing answer. Hines v. Lucas, 195 N.C. 376, 142 S.E. 319; McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure 2d Ed. § 1115.
Here, the fact that defendant waited until after complaint was filed to move for dismissal is only a matter to be considered by the trial judge in exercising his discretion.
In the case of Deanes v. Clark, 261 N.C. 467, 135 S.E.2d 6, the plaintiff obtained an extension of time to file his complaint. The time elapsed, and before complaint was filed defendant moved that the action be dismissed. The plaintiff filed his complaint on the next day, and the clerk held that the action should be dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to superior court, and the judge of superior court, in affirming the judgment of the clerk, held that the question presented by the appeal from the order of the clerk did not invoke the discretionary authority of the judge of superior court. This Court, finding error and remanding, held that the clerk had no authority to extend the time for filing the complaint, but that the superior court judge was in error in holding the question of his discretion was not invoked when he entered his order. In so holding, this Court stated:
The case of Bailey v. Davis, 231 N.C. 86, 55 S.E.2d 919, was an appeal from denial by the clerk of a motion to set aside a default judgment on the ground that at the time of its rendition a duly filed answer appeared of record. The answer was filed after the statutory time for filing had elapsed. In holding that the superior court acquired jurisdiction of the entire cause, and had power to permit the answer to remain on record even though it was filed after time for answering expired, the Court stated:
The case of Campbell v. City of Asheville, 184 N.C. 492, 114 S.E. 825, nullifies any contention that the trial judge is precluded from exercising his discretion to allow or deny enlargement of time to file a complaint after the clerk has manually filed a complaint before defendant moved to dismiss the action. Under the statutory practice then existing (also applicable to Allman v. Roberts, supra) the plaintiff was required to file his complaint in the clerk's office "on or before the third day of the term to which the action is brought, otherwise the suit may, on motion, be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff." N.C. Revisal Statutes § 466. At that time civil actions were commenced by summons which was returnable to the regular term of superior court of the county from which the summons issued, and which commanded the proper officer to summons the defendant to appear at the next ensuing term of superior court. N.C. Revisal Statutes, §§ 429, 430. In Campbell the summons was returnable at the July 1919 term of Buncombe Superior Court. The complaint was not filed on time, but was filed on 3 November 1921. On 19 November 1921 defendant moved before the clerk to dismiss the action, and the clerk allowed the motion as a matter of law. On appeal, the judge of superior court reversed, holding that the clerk had discretionary power to extend time to file complaint. Defendant appealed, and this Court reversed the trial judge and held that the clerk had no authority to extend the time for filing under the Code, and stated:
Here, the trial judge had the entire cause before him because of plaintiff's appeal. In the exercise of his discretion he did not permit enlargement of time for filing the complaint, and dismissed the action as to defendant Alsop. The discretionary ruling as to enlargement of time to file complaint, in effect, ended the action. The trial judge had full power to deny the motion to enlarge the time to file complaint and to dismiss the action as to defendant Alsop. No abuse of discretion appears.
The decision of the Court of Appeals as to defendant Alsop is reversed.
Plaintiff's appeal: Dismissed.
Defendant Alsop's appeal: Reversed.