Title: State of Florida v. J.M., a child

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1.  We would note the difference in the style of these cases, both of which
involved juveniles.  The State filed a motion to restyle in the instant case using
J.M.’s full name.  In cases where juvenile sanctions have been entered, it is
appropriate for courts to use juveniles’ initials in appellate documents and decisions,
even when the cases were initially brought in adult court.  Section 985.233(4)(e),
Florida Statutes (2000), provides for a juvenile in J.M.’s position to obtain appellate
review under section 985.234, Florida Statutes (2000).  Section 985.234(4)
mandates the use of the juvenile’s initials on all documents and decisions filed in the
appeal.  Moreover, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.145(d) governs appeal
proceedings in juvenile delinquency cases and requires all references to the child in
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-1215
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
J.M., a child,
Respondent.
[July 3, 2002]
ANSTEAD, C.J.
We have for review J.M. v. State, 783 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001),
which certified conflict with Payne v. State, 753 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).1 
briefs, other papers, and the decision of the court to be by initials only.  The
committee notes to the rule state that a juvenile’s initials should be used in all
documents in furtherance of the appeal, but the rule does not require deletion of the
child’s name from pleadings or other papers transmitted to the court from the lower
tribunal.  The rule does not distinguish between juvenile delinquency adjudications
entered in adult-file situations and those entered in juvenile court.
2.  J.M. was charged as an adult pursuant to section 985.227(1)(a), Florida
Statutes (1999), which gives the state attorney the discretion to file adult charges
against a fourteen-year-old “when in the state attorney’s judgment and discretion the
public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed and when the
offense charged is for the commission of . . . [s]exual battery.”
After J.M. pled nolo contendere to the sexual battery charge, the trial court
exercised its discretion to adjudicate J.M. delinquent.  Section 985.233(4)(b),
Florida Statutes (1999), allows juvenile sanctions for juveniles who have been
transferred to adult court. 
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We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth  in
this opinion, we approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal that an
adjudication of delinquency does not constitute a felony criminal conviction for
purposes of adjudicating a person to be a sexual predator under the Florida Sexual
Predators Act.  We disapprove the contrary holding in Payne.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
J.M., a fourteen-year-old juvenile, was charged as an adult with sexual
battery in violation of section 794.011(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1999).2  See J.M.,
783 So. 2d at 1204.  J.M. pled nolo contendere to the charge and the trial court
exercised its discretion to adjudicate J.M. as a delinquent, discretion authorized by
3.  Combined, these statutes give the trial court discretion to impose juvenile
sanctions even in cases where a juvenile was originally charged as an adult.
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section 985.227(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1999), and section 985.233(4)(b), Florida
Statutes (1999).3  In imposing juvenile sanctions, the court ordered J.M. to a Level
2, nonresidential treatment program under the supervision of the Department of
Juvenile Justice.  
Three experts testified at the juvenile disposition hearing that J.M.’s offense
was not typical of the type committed by a chronic sexual offender.  The experts
recommended against incarceration, stating that incarceration would serve no
purpose.  They also opined that J.M. was amenable to treatment, did not present a
high risk of reoffense, and would likely be rehabilitated.  Likewise, they
recommended against J.M.’s placement in any higher-level, residential juvenile
sexual offender program that specialized in more serious, older offenders.
Subsequently, after juvenile sanctions were imposed, the State requested that
the court classify J.M. as a sexual predator, pursuant to section 775.21, Florida
Statutes (2000), also known as “The Florida Sexual Predators Act” (“Predator
Act”).  Section 775.21(4)(a) provides, in relevant part, that “upon conviction, an
offender shall be designated as a ‘sexual predator’ . . . if . . . [t]he felony is [a]
4.  J.M. was charged under section 794.011(2)(b) and thus, under the sexual
predator statute, if J.M. were an adult, his criminal conviction would trigger
designation as a sexual predator. 
5.  Once an offender has been deemed a sexual predator, the offender must
comply with the registration and notice provisions of the statute.  See § 775.21(6),
Fla. Stat. (2000) (requiring all sexual predators to register with the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement);  § 775.21(7), Fla. Stat. (2000) (requiring law
enforcement agencies to inform the public of a registered sexual predator’s presence
in the community).   
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capital, life, or first-degree felony violation . . . of chapter 794.”4 (Emphasis added.) 
In the definitions section of the Predator Act, the term “conviction” is defined as
meaning “a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.”  §
775.21(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000).5 
Although the trial court granted the State’s request, the trial court expressed
concerns in its order that classifying J.M. as a sexual predator was inappropriate and
“particularly difficult in light of the uncontroverted evidence in this case.”  The trial
court concluded that it was legally bound to grant the State’s request by the holding
in Payne v. State, 753 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), since no other district court
had ruled on the issue.  In Payne, the Second District, while acknowledging that
section 985.233(4)(b) provides that an adjudication of delinquency should not be
deemed a conviction, nevertheless held that an adjudication of delinquency should
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operate as a conviction for purposes of applying the Predator Act “because of the
unique nature of section 775.21.”  Id. at 130.
On appeal, the First District reversed the order designating J.M. as a sexual
predator, and held that an adjudication of delinquency could not be treated as a
felony criminal conviction for purposes of invoking the Predator Act.  Writing for
the court, Judge Ervin pointed out that section 985.233(4)(b) specifically provides
that an “[a]djudication of delinquency shall not be deemed a conviction, nor shall it
operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction.” 
J.M., 783 So. 2d at 1206.  Judge Ervin also noted that “[t]here is no language in
section 775.21 that demonstrates any legislative intent to abrogate the long-standing
statutory mandate excluding adjudications for delinquency from the consequences of
conviction, unless expressly stated otherwise.”  Id. at 1205.  The First District
vacated the portion of J.M.’s sentence classifying him as a sexual predator and
certified conflict with the Second District’s contrary decision in Payne.  See id. at
1206-07.
ANALYSIS
We approve the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal.  Consistent
with the analysis of the First District, we hold that juveniles who may be charged as
adults, but are actually adjudicated as delinquents, do not stand criminally convicted
6.  The Federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act (“Wetterling
Act”) mandated that every state would have to enact a law governing the
registration of sexually violent offenders by September 13, 1997, or they would
forfeit a certain amount of federal funding that would otherwise be given. See 42
U.S.C. § 14071(g) (Supp. 1999).  The Wetterling Act does not expressly include or
exclude juvenile offenders.  At the time the Wetterling Act took effect, forty-nine
states had enacted some form of sexual offender registration act.  See Mark J.
Swearingen, Megan’s Law as Applied to Juveniles: Protecting Children at the
Expense of Children?, 7 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 526, 569 (1997).  Of those, thirty-
three states did not include juveniles in the class of offender required to register
under sexual offender registration statutes and sixteen states required juveniles to
register.  See id.  In 1997, Florida was one of seventeen states that supplemented
sexual offender registration statutes with community notification provisions.  See id.
at 569-70.  There have been significant changes in almost every state’s statutory
scheme since 1997 and to date there is no clear consensus among the states on how
juveniles should be treated under sexual offender statutes.  However, the majority of
states still do not subject juveniles to the same registration and notification
requirements as adult sexual offenders.  The states that include juveniles in their
sexual offender registration laws generally provide for lesser periods of registration,
special requirements before a juvenile qualifies for registration, or special waiver
mechanisms for juveniles.  See id.  
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for the purpose of designation as a sexual predator under the Predator Act.  In
reaching this conclusion, we note that the Legislature has joined the majority of
states that have chosen not to subject juveniles to the provisions of their adult sexual
offender registration and notification laws.6
Legislative Intent
It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s
statutory construction analysis.  See State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2001);
McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998).  Further, we have
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explained that when the Court construes a statute, “we look first at the statute’s
plain meaning.”  Moonlit Waters Apartment, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898, 900
(Fla. 1996).  
As noted, the trial court elected to treat J.M. as a delinquent child under the
provisions of section 985.227(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1999) which states:
When a child has been transferred for criminal prosecution as an adult
and has been found to have committed a violation of state law, the
disposition of the case may be made under s. 985.233 and may include
the enforcement of any restitution ordered in any juvenile proceeding. 
In turn, the relevant portion of section 985.233 provides:
In order to use this paragraph, the court shall stay adjudication of guilt
and instead shall adjudge the child to have committed a delinquent act. 
Adjudication of delinquency shall not be deemed a conviction, nor
shall it operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting
from a conviction.
§ 985.233(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).  Initially, we note the lack of
ambiguity in the Legislature’s language in section 985.233(4)(b) that an
“[a]djudication of delinquency shall not be deemed a conviction, nor shall it operate
to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction.”  This
unambiguous language must then be considered in conjunction with the
unambiguous language of section 775.21(4)(a), which states that an individual will
be designated a sexual predator only upon conviction of certain crimes.  In the
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definitions section of the Predator Act, the term “conviction” is defined as meaning
“a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.”  § 775.21(2)(c),
Fla. Stat. (2000).  Adjudications of delinquency are simply not included within this
statutory provision.  
Therefore, upon a plain reading of the controlling statutes, it is apparent that
an adjudication of delinquency does not fall under the definition of a felony criminal
conviction required under the Act.  Thus, we conclude that an adjudication of
delinquency does not trigger the sexual predator status provisions of the Predator
Act.
We also note that other language in the Predator Act indicates the Legislature
was fully aware of the unique status of adjudications of delinquency at the time the
Act was drafted.  For example, under the Act a sexual offender can be designated as
a sexual predator in two different ways, based on the severity of the offender’s
“current offense.”  First, in cases involving a serious current offense, an offender
can be designated a sexual predator after a single conviction.  See §
775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2000).  Second, in cases where the current offense is
less serious, the sexual offender can still be designated a sexual predator, if the
offender also has prior felonies.  See § 775.21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2000). 
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Subsection 775.21(4)(b) reads, in relevant part:
In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of this subsection,
the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately, or
an adjudication of delinquency entered separately, prior to the current
offense and sentenced or adjudicated separately from any other felony
conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.
(Emphasis added.)  Although this section was not applicable to J.M., the wording
demonstrates that the Legislature was aware of the distinct status of adjudications of
delinquency in drafting the Predator Act, and that it intended for adjudications to be
counted as “prior felonies” under the provisions of section 775.21(4)(b).  
Obviously, if the Legislature intended an adjudication of delinquency to
operate as a “conviction” under the Act, it could easily have done so in the same
manner provided in section 775.21(4)(b).  The statutory scheme could have included
adjudications of delinquency in the definition of a conviction in the Predator Act or,
alternatively, could have provided in section 775.21(4)(a) that sexual predator status
attached upon conviction or adjudication of delinquency.  
We also note that in other instances when the Legislature intended
adjudications of delinquency to operate in the same manner as a criminal conviction
it has expressly stated so.  See, e.g., § 775.083(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“A county
may adopt an ordinance imposing . . . a fine upon any person who . . .  is convicted
of or adjudicated delinquent for . . . [a crime].”); § 810.14(3), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“A
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person who violates this section and who has been previously convicted or
adjudicated delinquent two or more times of any violation of this section commits a
felony of the third degree . . . .”); § 938.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“When any person
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for,
any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense . . . there shall
be imposed as an additional cost in the case . . .  the sum of $50.”); § 943.0585, Fla.
Stat. (2001) (stating that “[a] criminal history record that relates to a violation of . . .
chapter 794 . . . may not be expunged” regardless of whether defendant was found
guilty or adjudicated delinquent); § 960.003(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (“[T]he court shall
order the offender to undergo HIV testing following conviction or delinquency
adjudication.”).  
On the other hand, to find that J.M. must be classified as a sexual predator
despite the lack of a felony criminal conviction, the Court would have to add
language to the Act that is not there.  Of course, when construing statutes, courts
“are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the
Legislature.”  See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999). 
Effect of Adult Filing
The State notes that J.M. was prosecuted as an adult and that the Court
should find this aspect of the case compelling in determining that an adjudication of
7.  Section 985.03(31) defines a “Juvenile sexual offender” as:
(a) A juvenile who has been found by the court pursuant to s.
985.228 to have committed a violation of chapter 794, chapter 796,
chapter 800, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0133;
(b) A juvenile found to have committed any violation of law or
delinquent act involving juvenile sexual abuse.  “Juvenile sexual
abuse” means any behavior which occurs without consent, without
equality, or as a result of coercion. . . . 
. . . .
Juvenile sexual offender behavior ranges from noncontact
behavior such as making obscene phone calls, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, and the showing or taking of lewd photographs to varying
degrees of direct sexual contact such as frottage, fondling, digital
penetration, rape, fellatio, sodomy, and various other sexually
aggressive acts.
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delinquency should operate as a conviction.  However, we note the Legislature has
enacted a separate and specific notification and registration scheme for “juvenile
sexual offenders” under chapter 985, Florida Statutes (2000).7  See § 985.04(3)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2000) (requiring Department of Juvenile Justice to inform school
superintendent of juvenile sexual offender’s presence); § 985.308(1)(d), (6), Fla.
Stat. (2000) (expressing legislative intent for Department of Juvenile Justice to
develop strategies regarding notification of schools, parents or legal guardians of
victims, and law enforcement agencies of juvenile sexual offenders’ return to the
community).  This express mechanism for registration and notification of juvenile
sexual offenders clearly implies the Legislature’s intent not to subject juveniles who
8.  We also note that neither the Second District in Payne nor the State
provides an adequate explanation for how juvenile sexual offenders, who are
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, would be exempted from the Predator Act
if we accept the State’s contention that an adjudication of delinquency should be
treated as a felony criminal conviction.  The State argues that the Payne reasoning
will only apply to children who have been charged as adults.  The Payne court
determined that a juvenile was “convicted” at the time a plea was entered to adult
charges.  See Payne, 753 So. 2d at 130.  However, the Second District gave no
reason under the statutes why an adjudication of delinquency that stemmed from a
plea in juvenile court would not have the same effect under its interpretation.  If
adjudications of delinquency are considered convictions in the adult-filed juvenile
context, arguably adjudications of delinquency would be convictions no matter
where the juvenile was tried.
9.  The district court also noted that “[T]his general rule especially holds true
when both laws are passed during the same legislative session.”  J.M., 783 So. 2d at
1206.  As the State correctly points out, the pertinent parts of section 985.233 and
section 775.21 were not passed in the same legislative session.  While similar
language was used in earlier versions of the Predator Act, the term “conviction” was
first defined in the Predator Act in 1996.  In 1997, the statutes pertaining to juvenile
delinquency were moved from chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1995) to chapter 985. 
Nevertheless, although the two laws were not passed in the same session, the
statutory canon of construction that requires courts to find that a more specific
statute would control over a general statute still applies.
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are adjudicated delinquent to designation under the adult Predator Act.8
Specific vs. General 
The First District also relied on the rule of statutory construction that the
specific statute controls over the general statute and found that section 985.233 was
more specific than the general provisions of the Predator Act.9  See J.M., 783 So. 2d
at 1206.  We find the First District’s analysis sound.  Under that analysis, even if we
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were to find conflict between the provisions of section 985.233 and the Predator Act
(which we do not), we would apply the long-recognized principle of statutory
construction that where two statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific statute
controls over the general statute.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So.
2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1969).
In this instance, we agree with the First District that the specific language of
section 985.233(4)(b) stating that adjudications of delinquency are not convictions
should control over the general use of the term “conviction” in other statutes,
because to hold otherwise would effectively render the limitation in section
985.233(4)(b) meaningless.  Moreover, as the First District noted:
Section 985.227(3)(c) specifically authorized trial courts to enter
dispositions under section 985.233 for juveniles found to have
committed certain offenses; section 985.233 specifically dealt with the
courts’ powers of disposition of cases involving juveniles tried as
adults and found to have violated the law.  Accordingly, the provisions
in section 985.233(4)(b) excluding adjudications of delinquency from
the definition of “conviction,” takes precedence over the definition of
“conviction” in section 775.21(2)(c), which generally applies to all
sexual offenders.
J.M., 783 So. 2d at 1206.  To accept the State’s argument, any statute providing that
a “conviction” triggers a criminal or civil penalty would trump the specific language
in section 985.233 that states that juvenile delinquency adjudications are not
convictions.  However, that argument would have us virtually ignore the
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Legislature’s mandate that juvenile dispositions not be treated as criminal
convictions and the case law recognizing the distinction.  Logically, where a
juvenile is involved, the statutes specifically related to juvenile offenders should
control over statutes that deal generally with the conduct of all offenders.
Other Contexts
Indeed, Florida courts have consistently recognized that adjudications of
delinquency do not operate as convictions in a variety of contexts.  For example, in
Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939, 943 (Fla. 1995), the trial court found that a prior
adjudication of delinquency supported the “prior violent felony” death penalty
aggravator.  See id. at 943.  On appeal, we noted that it was improper to use an
adjudication of delinquency in this manner, because a “juvenile adjudication was not
a conviction within the meaning of section 921.141(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)”
and because section 39.053, Florida Statutes (1993), the precursor to the current
juvenile delinquency statutes, “expressly mandated” that adjudications of
delinquency were not convictions.  Id. at 944.  Although Merck involved a criminal
statute and the Predator Act is ostensibly a civil penalty that does not involve
punishment, the reasoning in Merck is still instructive, particularly given the
similarity between the definition of “conviction” in the Predator Act and the
10.  Section 921.0011(2), Florida Statutes (2000), states that “‘[c]onviction’
means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of
whether adjudication is withheld.”
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definition in the sentencing statute.10  
Several courts have noted that under Florida’s evidence code, adjudications
of delinquency, unlike certain types of convictions, cannot be used to impeach
witnesses.  See § 90.610(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (stating that adjudications of
delinquency are not to be used as convictions for purpose of impeachment); Rivers
v. State, 792 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Martin v. State, 710 So. 2d 58,
59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Goodman v. State, 567 So.2d 37, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
Furthermore, Florida courts have held that adjudications of delinquency cannot be
used as “convictions” for the purpose of sentencing a defendant as a habitual
offender.  See Cotton v. State, 652 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Gahley
v. State, 605 So.2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Shook v. State, 603 So. 2d
617, 617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see also City of Jacksonville v. Caverly, 727 So. 2d
307, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding statute that permitted state and local
subdivisions to recover per diem charges for incarceration from convicted offenders
did not allow for recovery from juveniles in detention based on an adjudication of
delinquency); Moody v. Campbell, 713 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
(holding previous adjudications of delinquency were not “convictions” for purposes
11.  Section 775.21(6)(l) reads, in pertinent part:
A sexual predator must maintain registration with the department for
the duration of his or her life, unless the sexual predator has received a
full pardon or has had a conviction set aside in a postconviction
proceeding for any offense that met the criteria for the sexual predator
designation. . . .  A sexual predator who was designated a sexual
predator by a court on or after October 1, 1998, who has been lawfully
released from confinement, supervision, or sanction, whichever is later,
for at least 20 years, and who has not been arrested for any felony or
misdemeanor offense since release may petition the criminal division of
the circuit court in the circuit in which the sexual predator resides for
the purpose of removing the sexual predator designation.
§ 775.21(6)(l), Fla. Stat. (2000).
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of determining pretrial bail); Wilson v. State, 696 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997) (holding adjudications of delinquency are not “convictions” for purposes of
determining whether a sentence in excess of sentencing guidelines could be justified
by an escalating pattern of offenses).
Civil Disabilities
We also note that section 985.233(4)(b) specifically states that adjudications
of delinquency should not “operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily
resulting from a conviction.”  Section 775.21(6)(l) of the Predator Act requires a
sexual predator to register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
for life, with a limited right to petition for removal of predator status after twenty
years.11  Moreover, FDLE is required to notify the community where a registered
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predator is living of his or her presence.  Clearly, requiring J.M. to register as a
sexual predator and subjecting him to public notice of this status for a lifetime would
impose serious civil disabilities upon J.M. contrary to the provisions of section
985.233(4)(b).
Adjudications of Delinquency
As discussed above, the First District’s recognition that a juvenile
adjudication of delinquency will not give rise to the same consequences as an adult
conviction unless the Legislature has expressly stated otherwise is supported by a
long line of case law.  The distinction between adjudications of delinquency and
criminal convictions stems, in large part, from the consistent historical view that
delinquent juveniles are not considered adult criminals.  As this Court has
recognized, the juvenile and criminal justice systems are separate and distinct and
serve different purposes:
A child offender, even after being adjudicated delinquent, is never held
to be a criminal, even if the act would be considered a crime if
committed by an adult.  The key difference in approach lies in the
juvenile justice system’s ultimate aims.  Juveniles are considered to be
rehabilitatable.  They do not need punishment.  Their need lies in the
area of treatment.
P.W.G. v. State, 702 So. 2d 488, 491 (Fla. 1997) (quoting In re C.J.W., 377 So. 2d
22, 24 (Fla. 1979)).  It also appears that J.M.’s case illustrates the concerns
12.  J.M. cites several authorities that set forth the problems associated with
treating juveniles and adults the same for purposes of sexual offender notification
and registration.  Generally, the authors’ concerns are that juveniles are being
needlessly stigmatized at an early age in the same way as adult sexual offenders. 
The authors note that in many instances, juveniles commit sexual offenses for
different reasons than adults and can be more easily rehabilitated.  According to the
authors, requiring registration of juvenile sexual offenders under adult registration
schemes and public notification jeopardizes rehabilitation and actually creates an
increased risk that the juveniles will develop into adult sexual offenders.  Some of
the authors’ concerns would ring true in the instant case, where the judge clearly
thought predator status was unwarranted.  See Stacey Hiller, The Problem with
Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Detrimental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 271 (1998); Mark J. Swearingen, Megan’s Law as Applied to
Juveniles: Protecting Children at the Expense of Children?, 7 Seton Hall Const. L.J.
526 (1997); Michael L. Skoglund, Note, Private Threats, Public Stigma? Avoiding
False Dichotomies in the Application of Megan’s Law to the Juvenile Justice
System, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1805 (2000).
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underlying the judicial and legislative policy of treating juveniles differently.  For
example, the uncontroverted expert testimony presented to the trial court indicated
that J.M. does not fit the profile of a sexual predator and that he has good prospects
for rehabilitation.  Obviously, subjecting him to the requirements of adult sexual
predator notification and registration could jeopardize the attempt to rehabilitate
him.12  All of the experts who examined J.M., some of whom also performed civil
commitment evaluations of adult sexual offenders for the State, testified that J.M. is
likely to be rehabilitated and is unlikely to commit another sexual offense.  From its
order, it is also apparent the trial court had concluded that sexual predator
13.  If the prosecutor had been required to adult file J.M. or if he had been
older at the time of his crime, the court would have had to subject J.M. to adult
sanctions regardless of the expert’s testimony.  See § 985.233(4), Fla. Stat. (2000).
In the case of older, more dangerous juvenile sexual offenders that exhibit the same
types of repetitive behavior associated with adult sexual offenders, trial courts are
required to enter adult sanctions, which would trigger the Predator Act.  See id. 
Further, in cases where the trial court has the discretion to impose juvenile
sanctions, the trial court also has the discretion to enter adult sanctions.  See id.
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designation was inappropriate in this case.13  
CONCLUSION
As the First District noted, “[t]here is no language in section 775.21 that
demonstrates any legislative intent to abrogate the long-standing statutory mandate
excluding adjudications of delinquency from the consequences of conviction, unless
expressly stated otherwise.”  J.M., 783 So. 2d at 1205.  Because the Predator Act
does not expressly include adjudications of delinquency as convictions, the language
of section 985.233 excluding juvenile adjudications from being considered criminal
convictions controls.  
Accordingly we approve the First District’s decision in J.M. and disapprove
of the Second District’s decision in Payne.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 1D00-2709
(Leon County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer,  Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent