Title: Phipps v. Liddle

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN REX PHIPPS 
 
v.  Record No. 030800     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 5, 2004 
CECILA RENE LIDDLE 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CARROLL COUNTY 
Duane E. Mink, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider the applicable limitations 
period for refiling a previously non-suited action when the 
order granting the non-suit was appealed to, and affirmed by, 
this Court. 
FACTS 
 
John Rex Phipps filed a personal injury action against 
Cecila Rene Liddle on May 2, 2000.  By order entered December 
15, 2000, the circuit court granted Phipps a voluntary non-
suit.  Liddle appealed the December 15, 2000 non-suit order to 
this Court.  On March 1, 2002, this Court issued its mandate 
affirming the trial court's December 15, 2000 order granting 
the non-suit.  The mandate was entered by the trial court on 
March 22, 2002 pursuant to Code § 8.01-685. 
 
Phipps re-filed his personal injury action against Liddle 
on August 15, 2002.  Liddle filed a special plea asserting 
that Phipps' motion for judgment was untimely.  Following 
briefing and argument of counsel, the trial court sustained 
Liddle's plea and dismissed Phipps' motion for judgment 
holding that Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) required Phipps to re-file 
his non-suited action within six months of the December 15, 
2000 order of non-suit.  We awarded Phipps an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) provides in pertinent part: 
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit . . . 
the statute of limitations with respect to such 
action shall be tolled by the commencement of the 
nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may 
recommence his action within six months from the 
date of the order entered by the court. . . . 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Liddle argues that the only order by which Phipps 
suffered a non-suit was the December 2000 order, in which the 
trial court dismissed his action without prejudice.  Thus, 
Liddle concludes, without a specific statutory provision 
tolling the limitations period, Phipps had to re-file his non-
suited action within six months of the December 2000 order. 
Relying on Code § 8.01-685, Phipps responds that the 
phrase at issue "the order entered by the court," refers to 
the March 22, 2002 order entering the mandate of this Court 
affirming the December 2000 order of non-suit.  Code § 8.01-
685 states in relevant part that the court "from which any 
case may have come to an appellate court shall enter the 
decision of the appellate court as its own."  Thus, Phipps 
maintains, the trial court's March 22, 2002 order entering the 
 
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decision of this Court "as its own" is the order identified in 
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) as the order from which the six-month 
refiling period commences. 
We resolve the conflict in this case by applying a well-
established principle of statutory construction.  If possible, 
we must harmonize apparently conflicting statutes to give 
effect to both.  Lake Monticello Owner's Assoc. v. Lake, 250 
Va. 565, 570, 463 S.E.2d 652, 655 (1995); Albemarle County v. 
Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975).  If 
the language at issue in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) refers to the 
trial court's December 2000 order of non-suit, as Liddle 
contends, it conflicts with Code § 8.01-685, which by its 
terms required the trial court to enter the mandate of this 
Court affirming the order of non-suit "as its own" order. 
This conflict can be avoided by construing the "order 
entered by the court" in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) as the order 
entered "as its own" by the trial court on March 22, 2002.  
This construction harmonizes these statutes and gives each 
meaning.  It also reflects the fact that, although Phipps was 
granted a non-suit by the December 2000 order, that order was 
subject to change because of Liddle's appeal.  Phipps was not 
finally entitled to the non-suit until the appeal was resolved 
in his favor in March 2002.  Finally, by so construing these 
two statutes we avoid the incongruity of a simultaneous appeal 
 
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and trial of a single cause of action, a circumstance Liddle's 
construction of the statute would permit. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3) required Phipps to re-file his non-suited action 
within six months of March 22, 2002, the date the trial court 
entered "as its own" the mandate of this Court affirming the 
trial court's December 15, 2000 order.  Because Phipps re-
filed his action within that time period, the trial court 
erred in dismissing his action as untimely.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.