Title: Massey v. Dept. of Corrections

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for Allegany County
Case No. C-02-021277
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 142
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
RICHARD L. MASSEY, JR.
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
            Bell, C.J., Dissents and Concurs
_______________________________________
Filed:   November 21, 2005
The State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the
Division of Correction (DOC), a unit within the Department, have adopted certain
“directives” that (1) create and define administrative offenses for which DOC inmates are
subject to administrative discipline, (2) prescribe the kinds of discipline, including the
revocation of earned diminution credits against the inmate’s sentence, available upon a
finding of guilt, (3) set forth the procedure for charging inmates with offenses, adjudicating
their guilt or innocence of those offenses, and imposing discipline, and (4) establish
procedures for receiving, considering, and adjudicating complaints made by inmates
regarding policies, procedures, and conditions in the prison.
The question before us is whether certain of those directives constitute regulations that
must be adopted in conformance with the State Administrative Procedure Act.  We shall
answer that question in the affirmative, and, because it is undisputed that they were not so
adopted, we shall declare them ineffective.
BACKGROUND
Procedural Construct
The State prison system is under the direction and control of DOC which, as noted,
is a unit within DPSCS.  Subject to the authority vested by law in the Secretary of DPSCS,
the Commissioner of Correction is in charge of DOC.  See Maryland Code, § 3-203 of the
Correctional Services Article (CS).  CS §2-109(c) requires the Secretary to adopt regulations
to govern the policies and management of correctional facilities in the Division of Correction
1 In an attempt to escape from the requirements of the APA, DPSCS sponsored a
departmental bill in the 2005 Session of the General Assembly which would have
amended CS § 2-109(c)(2) to provide that the requirement of compliance with SG, title
10, subtitle 1 did not apply to the classification, discipline, or conduct of DOC inmates. 
See HB 782 (2005).  The bill received an unfavorable report by the House Judiciary
Committee and therefore did not pass.
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in accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article but excepts from that
requirement “a guideline pertaining to the routine internal management of correctional
facilities in the Division.”  CS § 3-205 authorizes the Commissioner to adopt regulations for
the operation and maintenance of the units in DOC and requires that the regulations “shall
provide for . . . the discipline and conduct of inmates, including the character of punishments
for violations of discipline.”  There is no exemption in § 3-205 from the requirements of title
10, subtitle 1 of the State Government Article (SG).  
SG, title 10, subtitle 1 (which comprises §§ 10-101 through 10-117) is the part of the
State Administrative Procedure Act dealing with the adoption of regulations.  It applies to
every unit in the Executive Branch of the State Government, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law.  SG § 10-102.  Neither DOC nor DPSCS is exempted, so the subtitle applies
to both the Department and the Division.1  
The term “regulation” is defined in SG § 10-101(g)(1) as a statement, or amendment
or repeal of a statement, that (1) has general application and future effect, (2) is adopted (i)
to detail or carry out a law that the unit administers, (ii) govern the organization or procedure
of the unit, or (iii) govern practice before the unit; and (3) is in any form, including a
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guideline, rule, standard, statement of interpretation, or statement of policy.  Section 10-
101(g)(2) excludes from the definition, among other things not relevant here, “a statement
that . . . concerns only internal management of the unit [] and . . . does not affect directly the
rights of the public or the procedures available to the public.”
SG, title 10, subtitle 1 imposes procedural requirements on the adoption of
regulations.  With certain exceptions for emergency regulations, it requires that the unit (1)
submit a proposed regulation to the Attorney General or unit counsel for approval as to
legality (§ 10-107), (2) submit the proposed regulation to the General Assembly’s Joint
Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review (AELR Committee) at
least 60 days prior to adoption (§§ 10-110, 10-112), (3) publish the proposed regulation in
the Maryland Register at least 45 days prior to adoption (§ 10-111), and (4) after adopting
a regulation, submit the full text of the regulation to the Administrator of the Division of
State Documents for publication in the Maryland Register and the Code of Maryland
Regulations (COMAR) (§ 10-114).  A regulation is not effective until each of those
requirements has been met.  SG § 10-117.
Pursuant to their  respective authority under CS §§ 2-109 and 3-205, the Secretary and
the Commissioner have adopted a number of regulations in accordance with SG, title 10,
subtitle 1; they appear in COMAR, title 12, subtitle 2.  Most of the rules governing the
operation of the State correctional facilities, however, and especially those dealing with
inmates, are in the form of “directives” adopted either by the Secretary (DPSCSDs) or by the
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Commissioner (DCDs) without any pretense of compliance with SG, title 10, subtitle 1.
Those directives – seven substantial volumes of them – were promulgated “to establish
formal written policy and procedures relating to all aspects of correctional administration and
operation.”  DCD 1-3.  We are concerned principally with DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 and,
to a lesser extent in this case, with DCD 185-001 through 185-403, which are applicable to
all institutions within the Division.
DPSCSD 105-5 does two things.  First, in an appendix, the directive defines the kind
of conduct that will subject inmates to discipline.  Fifty-seven offenses are listed, divided into
five categories of seriousness.  Category I offenses include such things as engaging in
disruptive activities, committing acts of violence, and possessing weapons or other dangerous
contraband.  Category II offenses mostly involve refusals by inmates to participate in
activities that result in their removal from certain programs.  Category III offenses include
gambling, theft, and the possession of certain somewhat less dangerous contraband.
Category IV offenses include disobeying a direct lawful order, refusing to work, giving false
information, making unauthorized phone calls, and possessing any other kind of contraband;
and Category V offenses include such things as failing to display one’s identification badge,
engaging in horseplay, and failing to maintain personal cleanliness.
DPSCSD 105-5 also prescribes a procedure for charging offenses.  It requires a
prompt investigation of conduct that might constitute an offense, preparation of a “rule
violation report” containing certain information, review of the report by a supervisor, the
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shift supervisor, and, if administrative segregation is recommended as a punishment, by the
shift commander.  Under DPSCSD 105-4, the shift supervisor, if convinced that there is only
a Category IV or V violation, may prepare an “incident report” rather than a “rule violation
report” and offer the inmate an informal disposition.  An Appendix to DPSCSD 105-4 lists
the possible sanctions available for an informal disposition, ranging from a reprimand, to loss
of certain privileges, to cell restriction for up to one month.  The inmate may accept the
informal disposition by signing the notice or may reject it and opt for a hearing.  
If the inmate either is not offered an informal disposition or rejects one, he or she is
served with a formal Notice of Inmate Rule Violation and Disciplinary Hearing.  DPSCSD
105-5 sets forth the procedures for a hearing before a DOC hearing officer – when an inmate
may be found to have waived a hearing, when charges may be dismissed on preliminary
review, the authority of a hearing officer to offer an informal disposition, the applicable
standard of proof, consideration of an inmate’s request for representation or for the
attendance of witnesses, preliminary motions, requests for postponement, taking a plea to the
charge, the kind of evidence that may be admitted, presentation of a defense, fact-finding and
decision by the hearing officer, and imposition of a sanction.  The directive also provides for
an appeal to the warden, review by the warden, and the options available to the warden.
DPSCSD 105-4, in addition to providing for an initial offer of informal disposition,
sets forth a matrix of punishments for the various offenses, taking into account the category
of the offense, the inmate’s prior rule-violation history, any aggravating and mitigating
2 CS § 3-709(a) provides that, “[i]f an inmate violates the applicable rules of
discipline, the Division may revoke a portion or all of the diminution credits awarded
under §§ 3-704 (good conduct) and 3-707 (special projects) of this subtitle according to
the nature and frequency of the violation.”
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circumstances involved in the instant violation, and the inmate’s adjustment history.
Sanctions may include segregation, cell  restriction, revocation of good conduct and special
project  program credits (diminution credits), and loss of visitation and other privileges for
various periods of time.  Some of those penalties are mandatory for certain offenses.
Revocation of diminution credits is expressly authorized by CS § 3-709(a) and will usually
result in an increase in the inmate’s period of incarceration.2  A finding of a violation,
whatever the sanction, may also directly or indirectly affect an inmate’s chance for parole or
the sanction to be imposed in the event of any further violation.
The DCD 185 series of directives deal with the processing of inmate complaints about
prison policies, procedures, and conditions – such things as medical services, access to
courts, religious liberties, lost, damaged, stolen, or confiscated property, use of force,
conditions affecting an inmate’s health, safety, and welfare, and the administration of the
Administrative Remedy Procedure.  See DCD 185-002.  It is not available to protest
classification, parole, or adjustment (offense) decisions but may be used to pursue complaints
of formal or informal reprisals.  Id.
DCD 185-100 provides for three aspects of the Administrative Remedy Procedure –
an informal resolution procedure, a formal complaint to the warden for investigation and
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resolution at the headquarters level, and a formal appeal of an adverse decision by the warden
to the Commissioner.  Remedies available include a written change in the substance,
interpretation, or application of a policy, rule, or procedure.  See Appendix 1 to DCD 185-
100.  A formal complaint is initiated by the filing of a Request for Administrative Remedy
on a form attached as an appendix to DCD 185-100.  An administrative remedy coordinator
is required to process all formal complaints, and investigators are responsible for the timely
and sufficient completion of an investigation on each assigned complaint.  
The warden may dismiss a request upon determining that it is frivolous or malicious.
DCD 185-002 limits the number of requests for administrative remedy that an inmate may
file to five a month and authorizes the warden to administratively dismiss any request not
determined to be an emergency that is in excess of that limit.  A decision by the warden may
be appealed to the Commissioner.  A final decision by the Commissioner exhausts the DOC
Administrative Remedy Procedure.  Further administrative review lies with the Inmate
Grievance Office.
The Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) is a statutory unit within DPSCS.  See CS § 10-
202.  After exhausting the Administrative Remedy Procedure provided by DOC, an inmate
who has a grievance against an official or employee of DOC may submit a complaint to IGO.
If, after preliminary review, the IGO Executive Director concludes that the complaint is
“wholly lacking in merit on its face,” the complaint may be dismissed without a hearing and
without making specific findings of fact.  CS § 10-207(b).  Such an order constitutes the final
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decision of the Secretary for purposes of judicial review.  Id. Absent such a conclusion, the
complaint is referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in conformance with the procedures set forth in CS § 10-
208.  The ALJ may dismiss a complaint as “wholly lacking in merit,” and that, too, will
constitute the final decision of the Secretary for judicial review purposes.  CS § 10-209(b)(1).
Otherwise, the ALJ prepares a proposed order for review by the Secretary.  CS § 10-
209(b)(2).  The inmate is entitled to seek judicial review from any final decision of the
Secretary.  CS § 10-210.
Massey’s Complaint
On June 19, 2002, appellant Massey, then an inmate at the Western Correctional
Institution in Cumberland, submitted a Request for Administrative Remedy to the warden of
that institution.  The handwritten request was as follows:
“Current Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services
directives (DPSCSDs) pertaining to disciplinary rules,
procedures and sanctions have been and remain adopted by [the]
Commissioner of Correction, in violation of the Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), State Government Article
(SG), Title 10, Subtitle 1.  Said regulations are unlawful, and I
am currently being punished, i.e., serving additional prison
time, as a result.  (My complaint is singular – the regulations are
unlawful and violate my interest in fairness).
 I request prompt corrective action and any appropriate damages
and attorney fees, etc. in the event of future litigation.”
(Emphasis added).
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On or about June 24, the Institutional Coordinator, apparently acting for the warden,
dismissed the request on the ground that Massey had exceeded the monthly limit of five
requests.  In accordance with DCD 185-100, Massey appealed to the Commissioner who, on
July 1, 2002, dismissed the appeal after concluding that the Institutional Coordinator properly
dismissed the complaint pursuant to DCD 185-205.  We infer from that response that the
Commissioner rejected the appeal because Massey had exceeded the five requests/month
limit allowed by that DCD.  
In accordance with CS § 10-206, Massey submitted a grievance to IGO.  He stated his
grievance to be that “DCD 185-002, which restricts the number of administrative complaints,
is both unconstitutional and ineffective per the Administrative Procedure Act (State Gov’t
Art., § 10-113).”  He made clear in Attachments that the basis of his complaint was that the
directive that contained the five requests/month limitation had not been validly adopted.
On August 27, 2002, the Executive Director administratively dismissed the appeal as “being
on its face wholly lacking in merit.”  He did not base his rejection of the appeal on the five
requests/month limitation, however, and, indeed, stated that it would not be necessary to
address “the procedural issue associated with the dismissal of your ARP [Request for
Administrative Remedy] complaint because I am prepared to address the substantive issue.”
In that regard, he stated:
“Not only did your original ARP complaint fail to adequately set
forth a specific complaint, but more importantly the general
basis which you referred to was erroneous.  While the
documents you mentioned (e.g. disciplinary rules, etc) were
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properly referred to as ‘directives”, you later erroneously
referred to them as ‘regulations’ as falling under the Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act.  ‘Directives’ and ‘Regulations’
are two separate and distinct entities.”
Clearly implicit in that ruling is IGO’s determination that the directives issued by the
Secretary – at least those applicable to Massey’s complaint and grievance – were not
regulations as defined in the APA and did not need to be adopted as such.  Massey then filed
a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Allegany County.  He argued to that
court that his complaint was specific, that he challenged the validity of directives that
subjected him to increased punishment and restricted his access to the courts, that the
directives qualified as regulations that had to be adopted in accordance with the APA, and
that they did not constitute guidelines as to routine internal management.  The State’s
response was that the DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 concerned only internal management and
did not affect directly the rights of the public or procedures available to the public, and that
they therefore did not have to be adopted in conformance with SG, title 10, subtitle 1.
After a hearing, at which Massey appeared (as he had throughout) without counsel,
the court, on March 10, 2003, entered an order affirming the IGO decision.  No reasons were
given.  Massey then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
That court eventually granted the application and transferred the case to its regular docket,
but, before argument, we granted certiorari on our own initiative to review the two issues
raised in Massey’s brief – whether the directives relevant to this case are subject to SG, title
10, subtitle 1, and whether the IGO should have set the matter in for hearing.  We need not
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address the second issue.
DISCUSSION
The Issue Before Us
The first thing we need to do is determine more precisely what is before us.  Massey
filed a request for administrative remedy pursuant to the DCD 185 series.  He was thus
invoking a “directive” adopted by the Commissioner pursuant to CS § 3-205.  His complaint
was that he had been subjected to discipline and had lost diminution credits pursuant to the
substantive and procedural provisions of DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5, which he believed to
be invalid, in part, at least, because they had not been adopted in conformance with the APA.
His initial challenge, as he made clear, was not to whether he was guilty of an infraction that
called for the discipline imposed but only to the Secretary’s directives pursuant to which the
matter was adjudicated. 
Massey’s complaint was dismissed by the Institutional Coordinator and ultimately by
the warden solely because he had exceeded the five requests/month limit established in DCD
185-002.  That was not the basis for the dismissal of his complaint by the IGO, however.
The IGO expressly did not reach the procedural impediment issue but instead ruled on the
merits of Massey’s initial request, holding that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 were not
regulations that needed to be adopted in conformance with the APA and that they were
therefore valid and effective.  
3 It is important to note that we are not dealing here with all of the directives issued
by the Secretary, but only those applicable in this case – DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5.  We
do caution the Secretary and the Commissioner to review very carefully all of the
directives that they have issued, however, and determine, at least from their perspective,
whether, in light of this Opinion, they need to be adopted in the form of regulations.
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Judicial review in this instance is of the IGO decision, which was a summary
dismissal and, under CS § 10-207(b)(2)(ii), constituted the final decision of the Secretary.
See CS §10-210(b) (“The complainant is entitled to judicial review of the final decision of
the Secretary under § 10-207(b)(2)(ii) . . . of this subtitle.”).  The final decision of the
Secretary, in other words, was that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 were not regulations that
needed to be adopted in conformance with the APA.  We are therefore not concerned here
with the application or validity of the DCD 185 series, but only whether DPSCSD 105-4 and
105-5 are legally effective.
The State does not contest that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 fall within the definition
of “regulation” in SG § 10-101(g)(1), and clearly that is the case.3   They constitute
statements that have general application throughout all of the correctional institutions in
DOC and apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have future effect; they were adopted
by a “unit” to carry out laws that the unit administers; and they are in the form of rules,
standards, statements of interpretation, and statements of policy.  
The only defense posed by the State is that the Secretary is excused from complying
with the procedural requirements of SG title 10, subtitle 1 because (1) the directives concern
“only internal management of the unit [and do] not affect directly the rights of the public or
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the procedures available to the public” and therefore are excluded by SG § 10-101(g)(2) from
the definition of “regulation,” and (2) they constitute a “guideline pertaining to the routine
internal management of correctional facilities in the Division of Correction” and, even if
deemed to be a regulation under SG § 10-101(g), they need not be adopted in conformance
with SG, title 10, subtitle 1 by virtue of CS § 2-109. 
As to both provisions, the State’s position is that the Secretary’s directives govern
how DOC maintains order and manages the inmate population, which are matters of internal
management for which great flexibility is required.  It refers, in that regard, to some of the
more mundane provisions, such as how the correctional staff is to prepare notices of
disciplinary infractions and the manner in which inmates may waive a hearing.  Massey
points out, of course, that the directives do a great deal more than that – that they define both
the substantive and procedural construct under which inmates may have their incarceration
extended and thus affect Constitutionally-protected liberty interests.  Both parties cite out-of-
State cases to support their respective positions.
Authority of the Secretary
Before we address the particular arguments of the parties, we need to consider a more
fundamental matter that bears directly on the validity, rather than merely the effectiveness,
of the two directives.  DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 are directives adopted by the Secretary,
presumably pursuant to CS § 2-109(c).  They are not directives adopted by the Commissioner
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pursuant to CS §3-205.  That is why, in clear contrast to the DCD 185 series and many other
DCDs in the seven volumes of directives, they are denominated as DPSCSD (Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services Directives) rather than DCD (Division of
Correction Directives).   A preliminary question thus arises whether, if DPSCSD 105-4 and
105-5 are, indeed, guidelines that pertain only to “the routine internal management of
correctional facilities in the Division of Correction,” as the State so ardently contends, the
Secretary had any statutory authority to adopt them.  
CS § 2-109 states, in full:
“(a) Office of Secretary. – The Secretary shall adopt regulations
for the office of the Secretary.
 (b) Review of regulations of units. – (1) The Secretary shall
review regulations proposed by a unit in the Department.
(2) The Secretary may approve, disapprove, or revise
regulations proposed by a unit in the Department.
 (c) Correctional facilities. – (1) Except as provided in
paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Secretary shall adopt
regulations to govern the policies and management of
correctional facilities in the Division of Correction in
accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 1 of the State Government
Article.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a
guideline pertaining to the routine internal management of
correctional facilities in the Division of Correction.”
In presenting its argument, the State necessarily assumes a rather limited construction
of subsection (c)(2) – that it simply means that regulations adopted by the Secretary pursuant
to subsection (c)(1) that pertain to the routine internal management of DOC correctional
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facilities need not comply with the regulation-making requirements of the APA.  That is not
the construction we perceive, however.  Both the language of subsection (c)(2) and the
immediate legislative history of that subsection, especially when read in harmony with CS
§ 3-205, lead rather to the conclusion that regulations that pertain only to the routine internal
management of DOC facilities are to be adopted by the Commissioner and not by the
Secretary.  The Secretary has the power to approve, disapprove, or revise proposed
regulations of the Commissioner, but there is no clear grant of authority to adopt internal
management regulations as regulations of the Secretary.
Subsection (c)(2) states that paragraph (1) “does not apply” to routine internal
management guidelines.  It is paragraph (1), however, that is the source of the Secretary’s
authority to adopt regulations for the management of DOC facilities in the first instance, and
if that paragraph “does not apply” to routine internal management guidelines, there would
seem to be no authority for the Secretary to adopt such guidelines.  That impediment is even
more apparent from the legislative history of the provision.
The Revisor’s Note to CS § 2-109 states that it was derived “without substantive
change” from former Art. 41, § 4-104(b) and (h).  Former § 4-104(b) made the Secretary
responsible for promulgating regulations “for his office” and empowered the Secretary to
approve, disapprove, or revise regulations of the various units in the Department.  Section
4-104(h) was the direct predecessor of CS § 2-109(c).  It contained three paragraphs:
“(1) [The Secretary] shall adopt regulations governing the
policies and management of correctional facilities within
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[DOC].
 (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, and
notwithstanding the provisions of § 10-101(e)(2)(i) of the State
Government Article, the regulations described in paragraph (1)
of this subsection shall comply with Title 10, Subtitle 1 of the
State Government Article (Administrative Procedure Act –
Regulations).
 (3) The requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection do not apply to guidelines pertaining to the routine
internal management of correctional facilities within [DOC].”
(Emphasis added).
Section 4-104(h)(3) could not be clearer: neither ¶ (1) nor ¶ (2) applied to routine
internal management guidelines.  It was not just compliance with the APA requirements –
subsection (h)(2) – that was exempted; the authority conferred in subsection (h)(1) to adopt
regulations also was inapplicable to routine internal management guidelines.  All that the
code revision of that section did was to combine what had been paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2)
into one paragraph – § 2-109(c)(1) – without any substantive change.
There is nothing illogical about such a construction.  The law gives the Commissioner
control over the management of the prisons within DOC and specifically gives the
Commissioner independent authority in CS § 3-205 (and its predecessor, Art. 27, § 676) to
adopt regulations for the operation and maintenance of the facilities within DOC, including
the discipline and conduct of inmates.  Routine internal management is left to the
4 We are aware of CS § 2-113 which, with exceptions not relevant here, authorizes
the Secretary to “exercise any power, duty, responsibility, or function of any unit, unit
head, or appointing officer in the Department.”  If the Legislature had not, in CS § 2-
109(c), dealt specifically with regulations concerning the routine internal management of
DOC facilities and expressly withdrew the power from the Secretary to issue regulations
of that kind, § 2-113 would most likely permit the Secretary to adopt such regulations. 
The question is one of legislative intent, and we have long followed the rule that, when
there is a conflict between a general statute and one dealing specifically with the issue at
hand, the specific statute controls.  See Smack v. Dept. of Health, 378 Md. 298, 306, 835
A.2d 1175, 1179-80 (2003) and cases cited there.  “[W]here the statute to be construed is
a part of an entire statutory scheme, construction of the provisions of the scheme must be
done in the context of that scheme.  When, in that context, two statutes conflict and one is
general and the other specific, ‘the statutes may be harmonized by viewing the more
specific statute as an exception to the more general one.’”  Id. at 306, 835 A.2d at 1179
(citations omitted) (quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm’r, 332
Md. 124, 133, 630 A.2d 713, 718 (1993)).  See also State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 116,
695 A.2d 143, 150 (1997).
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Commissioner and is not to be micro-managed by the Secretary.4  Accordingly, if the State
is correct in its vigorous assertion that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 are merely guidelines
pertaining to the routine internal management of the DOC correctional facilities, they are
ultra vires and invalid for that reason.  The fact is, however, that those directives are not
merely guidelines pertaining to internal management, routine or otherwise.  Both the nature
and the history of those directives make that clear.
Internal Management
In 1970, eighty-two DOC inmates, after being transferred from medium and minimum
security facilities to the segregated confinement unit at the Maryland Penitentiary, filed suit
in U.S. District Court, complaining about the procedures used to implement the transfer and
5 Seventy-two of the inmates were transferred from the Maryland House of
Correction by reason of their alleged involvement in a non-violent work stoppage that
was called to protest medical conditions at the prison and the punishment of eight inmates
who had complained about those conditions.  After the work stoppage had continued for
three days, correctional officials decided to transfer a large number of inmates to the
Penitentiary.  Two officers were directed to prepare lists of those to be transferred.  Those
on the lists were brought before a disciplinary board consisting of three persons, including
one of the officers who compiled the lists.  They were not advised in advance of any
charge, nor, until a few hours before, the time of the “hearing.”  Seventeen of the 72
inmates were notified at the “hearing” that they were being transferred because of specific
acts of misconduct; the other 55 were told that they were being transferred because they
were not “amenable to the program security level” at the House of Correction.  The
inmates were permitted to respond but were not allowed representation, the right to
confront their accusers, or the right to call witnesses in their defense.  The only evidence
consisted of the written reports of the correctional officers.  The 17 charged with specific
misconduct were indefinitely confined in the segregation unit at the Penitentiary and they
lost 105 days of good conduct credit.  The situation with respect to the ten inmates
transferred from the minimum security facility, due to a work stoppage and formation of
an unauthorized inmate association, was similar.
At the time, there was no handbook setting forth any detailed prison rules.  There
was a published list of ten general rules of conduct and a list of possible sanctions for the
violation of those rules.  In addition, there was an administrative directive setting forth
administrative adjustment procedures for disciplining inmates due to infractions and for
transferring them because of their inability to adjust to lesser security status.  See Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 168-70 (D. Md. 1971).
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the additional punishment meted out to them.5  The court agreed with the thrust of the
prisoners’ complaint and concluded, as a matter of Federal due process requirements, that,
when the loss of diminution credits was at risk, the inmates were entitled to notice of the
charges against them and a fair hearing on those charges, and that the procedures used by
DOC were Constitutionally deficient.  See Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md.1971).
Following announcement of the court’s intention to enter an order providing relief,  DOC
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agreed to adopt new procedures that had been drafted by amicus in the case and that were
attached as an appendix to the court’s opinion.  Id. at 174-77.  Those procedures, which
defined and dealt with both minor and major violations, were obviously intended, and were
regarded by the court, as minimally necessary to bring DOC into compliance with the due
process requirements enunciated by the court.  The initial procedures were amended pursuant
to consent orders on two subsequent occasions.  See Bundy v. Cannon, 453 F. Supp. 856 (D.
Md. 1978) and Bundy v. Cannon, 538 F. Supp. 410 (D. Md. 1982).  See also Michael A.
Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process – The Requirement
of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27 (1971). They are the predecessors of
DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5.
The due process underpinning of the Bundy procedures, at least when the revocation
of earned diminution credits is at risk, was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed.2d 935 (1974).  The Court there held that,
where a State provides for diminution credits and their revocation, a due process liberty
interest is triggered – that “the State having created the right to good time and itself
recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s
interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment
‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and
required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily
abrogated.”  Id. at 557, 94 S. Ct. at 2975, 41 L. Ed.2d at 951.  Compare Meachum v. Fano,
6 In Sandin, the Court reviewed its past decisions regarding prison disciplinary
regulations and procedures and reaffirmed the approach it had taken in Wolff  that “States
may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause.  But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 
Sandin, supra, 515 U.S. at 483-84, 115 S. Ct. at 2300, 132 L. Ed.2d at 429-30 (citations
omitted).
-20-
427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed.2d 451 (1976) (no liberty interest involved in transfer
of inmate to maximum security prison) and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293,
132 L. Ed.2d 418 (1995) (placement of inmate in segregated confinement did not trigger due
process liberty interest).6
The first Bundy case was decided within a year after the creation of the Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services as a principal department of the State Government
and the reorganization of the structure and governance of the State correctional system.  See
1970 Md. Laws, ch. 401.   At the time, Maryland Code, Art. 41, § 204C (b) authorized the
Secretary to promulgate “rules and regulations for his office” and to review, approve,
disapprove, or revise the “rules and regulations” of all of the units in the Department,
including DOC.  Art. 41, § 204D(a) created DOC, to perform the functions and exercise the
powers previously vested in the Department of Correctional Services.  The office of
Commissioner of Correction was created by Art. 27, § 673.  Section 676 of that article
authorized the Commissioner to adopt “rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the operations and maintenance of the several institutions and agencies in the Department,
7 The APA in effect at the time, adopted initially in 1957 and substantially
rewritten in 1961, used the term “rule,” rather than “regulation,” but “rule” was defined as
including a regulation and essentially as “regulation” is now defined.  See 1957 Maryland
Code, Art. 41, § 244(c) (1982 Repl. Vol.).  The definition, as it had since the 1957
enactment, excluded from its scope “regulations concerning only the internal management
of the agency and not directly affecting the rights of or procedures available to the
public.”  
-21-
for the discipline and conduct . . . of prisoners, and for the duties, discipline and conduct of
officers and employees of the several institutions and agencies.”  There was nothing in any
of those statutes that created any distinction between “rules” and “regulations” or between
rules or regulations that concerned only “internal management” and those that had a broader
reach.7  Nor, although likely implicit, was there any specific mandate that rules or regulations
be adopted in conformance with other statutory procedural requirements.
Requirements for the adoption of regulations were much less rigorous then than they
are now.  Art. 41, § 9 required an agency to submit proposed regulations to the Attorney
General for approval as to legality; § 245(c) of that Article required the agency, prior to
adoption, to publish or otherwise circulate a proposed regulation and afford interested
persons an opportunity to comment on them, orally or in writing; and § 246 required the
agency to file a certified copy of the regulation with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary of State, and certain other depositories.  
Although we may presume from the fact that the Attorney General represented the
State in the Bundy case that he approved the agreed-upon procedures attached as an
Appendix to the court’s opinion, there is no indication that  the Secretary or the
-22-
Commissioner complied with any of the other requirements then in the law.  The Clerk of
this Court has no record of a certified copy of the procedures being filed.  Perhaps the
Secretary and the Commissioner assumed that, as the procedures formed part of a Federal
court order, it was not necessary to comply with State statutory requirements, minimal though
they were.
The new requirements for adopting regulations were enacted in 1972 and 1974.  The
1972 law (1972 Md. Laws, ch. 699) created the AELR Committee and required that agencies,
at least 30 days prior to the adoption of any “rule, regulation, or standard,” submit a copy to
the committee.  The 1974 Act – the State Documents Law (1974 Md. Laws. ch. 600) –
created COMAR and the Maryland Register and required agencies to send a copy of any
proposed rule or regulation to the Administrator of State Documents at least 60 days prior
to adoption, for publication in the Maryland Register.  The current organization and
terminology of the APA provisions were enacted as part of the State Government Article –
a Code Revision product – in 1984.  See 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 284.
The current versions of DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 were adopted in January, 2002.
Although the Secretary and the Commissioner are obviously still bound to respect the due
process requirements enunciated in Bundy, Wolff, and Sandin, it seems clear that those
directives were not adopted pursuant to, and did not become part of, any extant Federal court
order.  There is no indication that they were ever submitted to or approved by the Federal
court.  They are purely State regulations.  Nonetheless, the fact that they proceeded from, and
-23-
were designed to implement, basic Federal due process requirements is powerful evidence
that they are not merely guidelines for routine, or even non-routine, internal management,
subject to change at the whim of the Secretary or the Commissioner. At least where discipline
may serve to lengthen an inmate’s period of incarceration or subject an inmate to other
“atypical” punishment, regulations of that kind are required to protect the Constitutionally-
based liberty interest of prisoners.  Neither the Secretary nor the Commissioner could simply
abrogate them and put nothing in their place, or amend them in a manner as would cause
them not to provide the Constitutionally-required protection.
The Court of Special Appeals essentially confirmed that view in Hopkins v. Md.
Inmate Griev. Comm’n, 40 Md. App. 329, 391 A.2d 1213 (1978), cert. dismissed sub nom.,
Secretary v. Hopkins, 285 Md. 120 (1979).  At issue there was a predecessor of DPSCSD
105-5, requiring that an inmate charged with a rule violation be afforded a hearing within 72
hours after the alleged infraction unless prevented by exceptional circumstances.  The
hearing afforded Hopkins occurred five days, rather than three days, after the infraction.  IGO
rejected Hopkins’s complaint, holding that the delay was justified by exceptional
circumstances and was not prejudicial, and the Circuit Court, on judicial review, affirmed
that decision.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the record did not support a finding of
exceptional circumstances and that the time requirement was not merely directory, but was
mandatory.  Applying then the principle enunciated in Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
-24-
74 S. Ct. 499, 98 L. Ed. 681 (1954), the court held it to be well-established, as a general rule,
that regulations adopted by an administrative agency cannot be waived, suspended, or
disregarded in a particular case so long as those regulations remain in force.  The court
recognized that there were exceptions to that general principle, one of which was an agency’s
departure from “procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of agency business.”
Hopkins, supra, 40 Md. App. at 336, 391 A.2d at 1217.  It concluded, however, that the
regulation at issue was not of that type:
“It is clear that [DOC Rule 105-2(c)(1)], which is couched in
unambiguous, mandatory language, was not intended to govern
internal agency procedures but was specifically adopted to
confer important procedural benefits and safeguards upon
inmates . . . .”
Id. at 337, 391 A.2d at 1217.
We dealt with an allied matter in Pollock v. Patuxent, 374 Md. 463, 823 A.2d 626
(2003).  At issue was a directive adopted by Patuxent Institution, a correctional institution
that is not part of DOC and that adopts its own directives, dealing with the handling of urine
specimens collected from inmates.  We expressly adopted the “Accardi doctrine,” that an
agency must ordinarily comply with the rules and regulations that it has adopted, along with
the exception recognized in Hopkins permitting departures from “procedural rules adopted
for the orderly transaction of agency business,” although, in contrast to one of the
pronouncements in Hopkins, we held that, to be entitled to relief by reason of an
unauthorized departure, the claimant must show prejudice.  In discussing Accardi and its
-25-
progeny, we pointed out that, as a minimum, an agency’s failure to comply with its own
regulations “automatically nullifies its action where the regulation is promulgated to affect
fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute” and that nullification
had been required even when “‘less fundamental’” rights were involved.  Pollock, supra, at
489, 823 A.2d at 642.  
Our ultimate conclusion was that, in determining whether the “Accardi doctrine”
applies, a court must 
“scrutinize the agency rule or regulation at issue to determine if
it implicates Accardi because it ‘affects individual rights and
obligations’ or whether it confers ‘important procedural
benefits’ or, conversely, whether Accardi is not implicated
because the rule or regulation falls within the ambit of the
exception which does not require strict agency compliance with
internal ‘procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of
agency business,’ i.e., not triggering the Accardi doctrine.”
Id. at 503, 823 A.2d at 650.
We are not dealing here, of course, with Accardi, but the analysis is pertinent in its
distinction between regulations that affect “fundamental rights,” especially those that are
Constitutionally derived, and those governing merely the “orderly transaction of agency
business.”  The clear implication is that, if the regulation in question affects fundamental
rights, it is not one that can be characterized as for the orderly transaction of agency business
and thus not one that pertains only to routine internal management.
An exemption from many of the requirements for adopting regulations that pertain
only to the internal management of an agency has been part of the Model APA for nearly five
-26-
decades and appears in the law of nearly every State that has adopted a version of the Model
APA.  Although there have been many cases determining whether a particular rule or
regulation falls within the ambit of the exemption, there has been surprisingly little comment
on the general meaning and scope of that exemption.  
The few commentators who have addressed the matter agree that the exemption was
a pragmatic and balanced one – that to carry the procedural rule-making requirements “too
far into the internal workings of the agency would completely stifle agency activities if it
were enforced.”  See Gary M. Haman & Robert P. Tunnicliff,  Idaho Administrative Agencies
and the New Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, 3 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 79 (1966); see also
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction,
Applicability, Public Access To Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 IOWA L. REV. 731
(1975) [hereinafter Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act]; ARTHUR EARL
BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 6.17.2 (1986 & Supp. 1993); Carl A.
Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 241-42 (1979).
Bonfield noted the inefficiency and expense of requiring agencies to comply with the
statutory requirements “every time they gave an instruction of any sort to their employees,
no matter how internal,” and pointed out, as well, that the public benefit “would be doubtful
because the public is not really affected in any cognizable way by a large portion of the
agencies’ internal housekeeping matters.”  Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act,
supra, at 833.  Bonfield also observed, however:
-27-
“On the other hand, agencies could too easily subvert public
rulemaking requirements if they could avoid those procedures
for anything they called an internal directive to staff.  After all,
the public’s rights can as easily be defined by statements
formally addressed to the agency staff – ‘Punish any person who
litters a public park’ – as by statements formally addressed to the
public – ‘Any person who litters a public park will be
punished.’”
Id.
In his book, Bonfield viewed the internal management exclusion as “a very narrowly
drawn provision with several important qualifications.”  ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE  RULE MAKING § 6.17.2, at 402.  It is meant, he asserts, “to assure that
matters of internal agency management that are purely of concern to the agency and its staff
are effectively excluded from normal rule-making and rule-effectiveness requirements.”  Id.
(Emphasis added). In his law review article, Bonfield agreed that “no exclusion will be
allowed if the agency statement substantially affects rights of the public of a sort that are
cognizable as a matter of law; that is, rights which are normally enforceable against the
agency or other parties through legal processes.”  Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act, supra, at 834.  The kinds of statements falling within the ambit of the
exemption, he concluded, “face inwards” and do not “substantially affect any legal rights of
the public or any segment of the public,” giving as examples “purely internal personnel
practices and directions.”  Id.   
The question of whether policies and procedures like DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5
should be exempt from the normal rules governing the adoption of regulations is not new.
-28-
At the time the Iowa and Minnesota law review articles were written, both Iowa and
Minnesota had expressly addressed the issue by statutorily expanding the “internal
management” exemption to include policies relating to inmates in State correctional
institutions, thus indicating that those policies would not otherwise come within the
exemption.  A stylistically different but substantially similar approach was taken in the 1981
version of the Model APA drafted by the  Uniform Law Commissioners.  Section 3-116 of
that Model Act not only excludes from the procedural requirements rules concerning only
internal management that do not substantially affect procedural or substantive rights of any
segment of the public but separately excludes rules “concerning only inmates of a
correctional or detention facility.”  Bonfield’s and Auerbach’s articles are cited in the
Comment to that section.  Some States have adopted that approach.  See Jensen v. Little, 459
N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1990) and Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 718 A.2d 487 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1998), noting the North Dakota and Connecticut laws to that effect.
One thing of particular interest is that the separate exclusion suggested in the 1981
Model APA, recently rejected by the Maryland Legislature, covers not just inmates in
correctional facilities but also students enrolled in  public educational institutions and
patients admitted to public hospitals, for the same reason: “The sheer burden of subjecting
to usual rule-making and rule-effectiveness requirements the thousands of rules concerning
the details of these agencies’ daily relationships with inmates, students, and patients would
be intolerable.”  ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 6.17.7,
-29-
at 415-16.  In that regard, we note that the basic requirements regarding the disciplining of
students in the public schools were adopted by the State Board of Education in conformance
with the APA and appear in COMAR 13A.08.01.  The Board obviously did not regard those
procedures as mere internal management.
At least four States have considered the issue judicially.  New York had a
Constitutional requirement that no rule or regulation of any State agency “except . . . as
relates to the organization or internal management of [the agency]” was effective until filed
with the State Secretary of State.  The Commissioner of Correction suspended existing
regulations pertaining to inmate disciplinary hearings and adopted, in their place, new
regulations intended to be temporary.  He did not file them with the Secretary of State, and
several inmates who were disciplined in proceedings conducted under the new regulations
challenged their validity.  The Commissioner sought to justify them as relating to the internal
management of the prison.  In Jones v. Smith, 478 N.E.2d 191, 192 (N.Y. 1985), the court
rejected that defense, holding:
“Rules and regulations of correctional institutions that affect a
prisoner’s ‘liberty’ interests, as here, may not properly be said
to involve matters of ‘organization or internal management’,
thus exempting them from the filing requirements . . . .  Such
rules and regulations affect the entire prison population, that
segment of the ‘general public’ over which the Department of
Correctional Services exercises direct authority, and constitute
a ‘kind of legislative or quasi-legislative norm or prescription
which establishes a pattern or course of conduct for the future.’”
(Citations omitted).
-30-
In Michigan, there was an exclusion for intra-agency directives that did not affect the
rights of, or procedures and practices available to, the public.  An inmate sued to declare the
prison disciplinary rules invalid because they had not been adopted in conformance with the
State APA, and the question arose whether the rules constituted procedures affecting the
rights of the public – whether inmates were part of the public.  In Martin v. Department of
Corrections, 384 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1986), the court held that inmates were part of the
public and that the exclusion did not apply.  The court rejected the Department’s argument
that prison discipline rules affect only the inmates and that public comment on those rules
would be of little benefit, noting that “[t]his belief seems to overlook the obvious public
concern of humanitarian and civil rights groups [and] completely overlooks the concern of
the Legislature.”
Rhode Island and Tennessee have ruled to the contrary.  See L’Heureux v. State Dept.
of Corrections, 708 A.2d 549 (R.I. 1998); Mandela v. Campbell, 978 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn.
1998).  Neither decision is persuasive.  
In Rhode Island, the procedural rules governing prison disciplinary proceedings were
promulgated to comply with a Federal court decree.  The rules were eventually reissued as
part of a permanent injunction issued by the Federal court, and both the rules and the
injunction remained in effect at the time of L’Heureux.  A prisoner sued the Department of
Corrections in State court, complaining of violations of those rules.  Neither the nature of the
alleged violations nor the relief sought is explained.  The thrust of the Rhode Island Supreme
8 That proposition is founded, at least in part, on the holdings in Wolff v.
McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed.2d 935 and Sandin v. Conner,
supra, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed.2d 418 that, unless diminution credits are
revoked, thereby extending a prisoner’s incarceration, or some similar kind of significant
deprivation is imposed, a prisoner has no Constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the
outcome of prison disciplinary proceedings, those leading merely to temporary
segregation or the loss of privileges.  The theory seems to be that (1) if there is no
Constitutional interest at stake, there is no Constitutional right to a hearing, (2) if there is
no Constitutional or statutory right to a hearing, the proceeding is not a contested case
under the APA, and (3) if the proceeding is not a contested case, absent a statute, there is
no right of judicial review.  In Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
concluded that Congress did not intend for the contested case requirements of the Federal
APA to apply to inmate disciplinary proceedings in the Federal prisons.
-31-
Court opinion was that the contested case provisions of the State APA did not apply to
inmate disciplinary proceedings and that decisions made in those proceedings were therefore
not subject to judicial review.  Several cases were cited for that proposition.8  Without the
benefit of any analysis, the court then simply concluded that, if the contested case part of the
APA did not apply, neither did the rule-making requirements: “We are persuaded by the
rationale of the foregoing federal and state cases [all of which involved only the contested
case provisions of the APA] that the intricate structure of our APA provisions relating both
to contested cases and to the exercise of the rule-making power would be ill suited to the
management of the often volatile population of the ACI.”  L’Heureux, supra, 708 A.2d at
553.  In sweeping with such a broad brush, the Rhode Island court did not seem to take into
account the prospect that the revocation of diminution credits might be at risk in disciplinary
proceedings – perhaps Rhode Island did not provide for such credits.  
The Tennessee decision was influenced in part by L’Heureux, which the court quoted,
-32-
and in part by the court’s observation that the Legislature had delegated “considerable
deference and broad discretion” to the Tennessee DOC, from which it concluded that “[t]his
broad grant of discretion also envisions that those persons intimately involved with the
intricacies of the prison system and not the voting public are best equipped to establish
policies and procedures for inmate discipline.”  Mandela, supra, 978 S.W.2d at 534.  With
due respect to the Tennessee court, that is not the issue.  Clearly, control over prison
management is vested in DOC, subject to the Secretary’s overall supervision, and not the
“voting public” or, indeed, the Judiciary.  See State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 134, 297 A.2d
265, 277 (1972); see also Lumumba v. Morton, 655 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995) (holding that prison rule prohibiting inmates from wearing shirts that could show
military rank or group membership was not subject to formal APA rule-making
requirements).  The question is simply whether inmate discipline procedures adopted by the
Secretary that can directly or indirectly affect an inmate’s actual length of incarceration
qualify as merely internal management guidelines, and, to us, they do not.
The basic regime of identifying prohibited conduct, setting ranges of discipline for the
various offenses, and establishing due process-compliant procedures for charging offenses,
informing inmates of the offenses charged, and adjudicating culpability has been in place,
with occasional modifications, for over 30 years.  It is the framework within which much of
the discretion accorded to DOC in dealing with inmates operates.  It is not the myriad of rules
governing the details of prison life – what inmates may wear, what they may or may not keep
-33-
in their cells or on their persons, the rules governing security, sanitation, hygiene, phone
calls, mail, and visits, for example – or the discretionary calls available to correctional
officers when confronting inmate misbehavior that must be adopted as regulations,  but only
the framework.  Upon this analysis, we hold that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 constitute
regulations under SG § 10-101(g), that they are not exempt from the APA requirements, and
that, to be legally effective, they must be adopted in conformance with those requirements.
Delayed Effect
Although there may be a fine line here between substance and procedure, the legal
deficiency in DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 is essentially a procedural one – they were not
adopted in conformance with the procedural requirements of the APA.  Massey may or may
not be entitled to relief on his basic claim, but he is entitled to have his claim resolved in
accordance with validly adopted procedures.  The Legislature has made clear that regulations
are not effective unless and until there has been compliance with the statutory requirements,
and we have enforced that legislative determination.  See Delmarva Power v. PSC, 370 Md.
1, 803 A.2d 460 (2002), on reconsideration, 371 Md. 356, 809 A.2d 640 (2002).  On the
other hand, there are some important practical considerations that must be taken into account.
As we observed, the directives at issue were put into place in order to comport with Federal
due process requirements, so simply declaring them immediately ineffective and leaving
nothing in their place is not an option.  That would bring prison disciplinary proceedings to
9 It is not our function to advise the Secretary how to proceed.  We do call her
attention, however, to SG § 10-111(b).
-34-
a halt.
Under Maryland Rule 8-606, the disposition of an appeal is evidenced not by the
Court’s opinion but by a mandate issued by the clerk in conformance with the opinion.  It is
the mandate, which is ordinarily issued 30 days after the filing of the opinion, that constitutes
the judgment of the Court.  Rule 8-606(b) permits the Court to advance or delay the issuance
of the mandate, and, although we rarely exercise that discretion, this case is one in which a
delay is appropriate, in order to give the Secretary time to comply with the APA
requirements.9  To that end, we shall direct the clerk to withhold the mandate for 120 days.
Massey is entitled to have his claim, unless it has become moot, considered in accordance
with valid and effective regulations. 
JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR ALLEGANY
COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE
DECISION OF INMATE GRIEVANCE OFFICE AND TO
REMAND CASE TO THAT OFFICE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO MASSEY’S
COMPLAINT; MANDATE TO ISSUE 120 DAYS AFTER
FILING OF THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 142
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
RICHARD L. MASSEY, JR.
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by Bell, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed:   November 21, 2005
1 Maryland Code (1984, 2005 Replacement Volume) § 10-101(g)(1) of the State
Government Article provides:
“‘Regulation’ means a statement or an amendment or repeal of a statement
that:
(i) has general application;
(ii) has future effect;
(iii) is adopted by a unit to:
1. detail or carry out a law that the unit
administers;
2. govern organization of the unit;
3. govern the procedure of the unit; or
4. govern practice before the unit; and
(iv) is in any form, including:
1. a guideline;
2. a rule;
3. a standard;
4. a statement of  interpretation; or
5. a statement of policy.”
Subsection (g) (2) excludes from the definition of “regulation,” inter alia:
“(i) a statement that:
(continued...)
In a thoughtful, thorough, and well reasoned opinion, the majority addresses the
validity of certain of the “directives,” adopted by the State Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (DPSCS), the appellee, and pursuant to which Richard L. Massey, Jr.,
the appellant, having been found to have violated them, was serving additional prison time.
The appellant argued that the “directives” at issue in this case are in actuality “regulations,”
and, therefore, were required to be promulgated in conformance with the State
Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), Maryland Code (1984, 2005 Replacement
Volume) §§ 10-101 – 10-117 of the State Government Article.. After conducting the
appropriate analysis, the majority, agreeing with the appellant, concluded that the
“directives” are indeed “regulations,”as defined in § 10-101 (g) (1)1 of the State Government
(...continued)
“1. concerns only internal management of the unit; and
“2. does not affect directly the rights of the public or the
procedures available to the public.”
-2-
Article, because they “constitute statements that have general application throughout all of
the correctional institutions in DOC and apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have
future effect; they were adopted by a “unit” to carry out laws that the unit administers; and
they are in the form of rules, standards, statements of interpretation, and statements of
policy,” ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A. 2d ___, ___ (2005) [slip op. at 12].   Moreover, continued
the majority, the “regulations” were not statements concerning only internal management of
the unit, that do not affect directly the rights of the public or the procedures available to the
public, thus rejecting the appellee’s contention in that regard, that the exception, contained
in § 10-101 (g) (2) applied.  Then,  noting the absence of a dispute with respect to the
appellant’s allegation that these “regulations” were not adopted in conformance with the
APA, the majority declared the “regulations” to be invalid and ineffective.  Id. at ___, ___A.
2d at ___ [slip op. at 2].   Specifically, the majority holds “that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5
constitute regulations under SG § 10-101(g), that they are not exempt from the APA
requirements, and that, to be legally effective, they must be adopted in conformance with
those requirements.”  Id. at ____, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 33].   With these holdings and
conclusions, I am in complete agreement, and so concur in the opinion to this point.
   Having enforced the legislative mandate with respect to the manner of promulgating
-3-
regulations, the majority, noting the motivation for, and the history of, the adoption of the
regulations in this case - to comply with Federal due process requirements - and  concerned
about “bring[ing] prison discipline proceedings to a halt,” delays the issuance of the Court’s
mandate for 120 days in order that the appellee will have time to comply with the APA.   ___
Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 34].   To justify this result, it  characterizes the
deficiency in the challenged regulations as “essentially a procedural one.” Id. at ___, ___ A.
2d at ___ [slip op. at 33].   
As to the appellant’s claim, the majority concludes that it remains alive, but that the
appellant is not entitled to any specific relief.  While it pointedly and expressly refrains from
opining  on the merits, the majority acknowledges that the appellant has the right to have his
claim resolved in accordance with validly adopted procedures. Id. Implicit in the majority’s
decision is either that the appellant did not raise a challenge entitling him to dismissal of the
charges against him or any such relief and/or that, in any event, he was not prejudiced by the
appellee’s failure to act in conformity with the APA. According to the majority,  
“[The appellant’s] complaint was that he had been subjected to discipline and
had lost diminution credits pursuant to the substantive and procedural
provisions of DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5, which he believed to be invalid, in
part, at least, because they had not been adopted in conformance with the
APA.  His initial challenge, as he made clear, was not to whether he was guilty
of an infraction that called for the discipline imposed but only to the
Secretary’s directives pursuant to which the matter was adjudicated.”
Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 11].   In effect, it says: unless an appellant, at the
least, disputes his or her guilt or states precisely that he or she believes both the charge and
-4-
the punishment to be deficient, the substantive sufficiency of the one not mentioned has not
been challenged and, thus, need not be addressed.  It is, therefore, apparently the majority’s
position that the appellant failed to preserve the issue of his culpability for the infractions
with which he was charged and punished.   In reaching this conclusion, it gives the
appellant’s complaint the narrowest possible construction, not to mention an untenable and
a strained one. 
I have no serious quarrel with the decision to delay the mandate in this case.   In fact,
in view of the purpose of the regulations, specifically pointed out by the majority, see ___
Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 34]– to ensure that prisoners are afforded due
process, as required by the Constitution– sensitivity to there being such regulations in place,
without a gap, is not simply commendable, it is essential.
Whether the charges and the punishment meted out to, and challenged by, the
appellant should be subject to retrial upon the adoption of new, valid regulations is quite
another matter.  I do not share the majority’s view that the appellant failed to raise the issue
of his guilt of the infractions with which he was charged, having chosen, altruistically,
perhaps, to chide the appellee only as to its procedural default, neglecting entirely to
challenge the substantive deficiency.   The record does not support that view as a matter of
fact.   
The appellant’s initial complaint was that the “regulations are unlawful,” as a
consequence of which, in violation of his interest in fairness, he was being punished by being
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required to serve additional prison time.   And, although the grievance he filed following the
denial of that complaint addressed only the ground of the denial– that the appellant’s
complaint exceeded the number of requests for administrative remedy that the appellee
permitted by regulation, as to which he argued that such regulation suffered from the same
deficiency as those he initially challenged, it was not validly promulgated– the appellant’s
petition for judicial review reverted to his original ground: he contended that the regulations
subjecting him to increased punishment and limiting his access to court were not validly
adopted because they were not adopted in accordance with the APA. 
I do not believe, as the majority does and seems to require, that where there are
various objections to regulations that could be made, separately and seriatim, in a complaint,
a prisoner expressly must make each one he intends to pursue to preserve that objection.
That is simply not necessary. By challenging the validity of the regulations pursuant to which
he had received additional punishment, it is clear beyond cavil that the appellant was doing
more than simply raising whether the regulations were properly promulgated as a procedural
issue: he was contending that the entire process, from his being charged, found guilty and
punished, was a nullity.    If the regulations forming the basis for an infraction are invalid,
it seems to me clear that the proceedings pursued pursuant to those regulations can be no
more valid.   There is, in that circumstance, therefore no necessity  that a complainant would,
or should, address the particulars of those proceedings; discussing the issue of his guilt or the
appropriateness of the punishment imposed, under these circumstances, is simply irrelevant
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and unnecessary. 
I agree with the majority that the appellant “is entitled to have his claim resolved in
accordance with validly adopted procedures.” ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at
33].    On the other hand, this Court’s holding that the regulations pursuant to which the
appellant was charged, convicted and punished were not validly promulgated answered fully
and adequately the appellant’s concern.   Because the regulations were invalidly
promulgated and  thus are a nullity, the effect of that holding necessarily is that the actions
taken pursuant thereto are  nullities, as well.   The appellant’s additional punishment
therefore is of no effect and this Court should clearly and unhesitatingly say so.