Title: In re Kisiel

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Kisiel (98-371); 172 Vt. 124; 772 A.2d 135

[Filed 29-Dec-2000]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 22-Mar-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-371

In re Mark and Pauline Kisiel	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from

                                                 Environmental Board

                                                 November Term, 1999

Marcy Harding, Chair

Paul Gillies of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, and William H. Meub of 
  Keyser Crowely, P.C., Rutland, for Appellants.

Joseph S. McLean of Stitzel, Page & Fletcher, P.C., Burlington, for Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Landowners Mark and Pauline Kisiel appeal the
  Environmental Board's  decision denying their application for an Act 250
  permit to subdivide and develop a 158-acre tract of  land into five
  residential lots in the Town of Waitsfield.  The permit was denied on
  several grounds,  but landowners challenge only the Board's conclusion that
  their project was not in compliance with  two provisions of the Town plan. 
  We conclude that, in reaching its challenged decision, the Board 
  erroneously focused on the plan's vague and ambiguous language, while
  ignoring the Town's prior  actions with respect to the project - which
  represented the local community's interpretation of, and  response to, the
  plan's broad language.  Accordingly, we reverse the Board's determination
  that the  project did not comply with the Town plan, and remand the matter
  for further proceedings.

 

       The property in question is located at the end of Bowen Road, an
  unmaintained class 4 town  highway, in the Town of Waitsfield on the
  western side of the Northfield Range.  At the time  landowners submitted
  their application for the five-unit subdivision, the Town's zoning
  ordinance  permitted minimum five-acre residential lots on the subject
  parcel, which is situated within the  Town's Forest Reserve District -
  defined as land in the Northfield Range with an elevation in excess  of
  1500 feet. (FN1)  The elevation of the project tract ranges from 1500 to
  2000 feet, with the  proposed construction occurring between 1500 and 1700
  feet.  To provide vehicular access to the  project tract, landowners
  proposed improving 2400 feet of Bowen Road.

       In February 1996, the Waitsfield Planning Commission granted
  subdivision approval for the  proposed project.  The Commission noted that
  its decision to grant a permit followed public  discussions of the proposal
  on four occasions, a site visit, two public hearings, and deliberations by 
  the Commission on four separate dates in late 1995 and early 1996.  The
  subdivision permit  contained more than twenty specific conditions, several
  of which concerned the proposed  improvements to Bowen Road.  The permit
  required landowners to pay for the upgrade and  maintenance of the road. 
  Further, to preserve the historic use of the trails that accessed Scrag 
  Mountain Municipal Forest through landowners' property, the permit required
  landowners (1) to  grant an unrestricted public trail easement through
  their property from the end of the road to the  municipal forest, (2) to
  construct a trail along the easement that would allow public recreational
  uses  such as hiking, biking, horseback riding, snowmobiling, and
  cross-country skiing, and (3) to  construct a designated parking area for
  six to eight cars at the terminus of the improved road.

 

       In January 1997, the Waitsfield Selectboard approved landowners'
  request to improve Bowen  Road by granting them a Permit for Work in the
  Public Right of Way.  Once again, the permit  contained several conditions
  that reflected the Town's concern with preserving the historic uses of  the
  roadway.  The permit required landowners (1) to provide a public trail
  easement that would allow  access to the municipal forest for various
  recreational uses, (2) to provide easements for logging and  natural
  resources management, and (3) to construct a public parking lot that would
  facilitate public  access to the forest through their property.  The permit
  also stated that the improvements to the road  would not "require the Town
  to upgrade Bowen Road's town highway classification."  See 19 V.S.A.  §
  708(b) ("A class 4 highway need not be reclassified to class 3 merely
  because there exists within a  town one or more class 3 highways with
  characteristics similar to the class 4 highway."). 

       In November 1997, the District No. 5 Environmental Commission issued a
  land-use permit   authorizing the subdivision under Act 250, 10 V.S.A. §§
  6001-6108.  Notwithstanding the earlier  permits granted by the Town, the
  Town appealed the Commission's decision to the Board, which  received
  extensive prefiled testimony, conducted a site visit, and held an
  evidentiary hearing.  In June  1998, the Board issued  its decision, ruling
  that the application complied with several of the criteria  contained in 10
  V.S.A. § 6086(a), but failed to comply with others, including criterion
  (10), which  requires "conformance with any duly adopted local or regional
  plan."  Id. § 6086(a)(10).  The Board  found, in this regard, that the
  proposal to upgrade Bowen Road was not in compliance with the plan's  goal
  of maintaining the "status" of class 4 roads, and further found that the
  proposal was inconsistent  with the goal of precluding development on
  "steep" slopes.  In response to a subsequent motion to  alter, the Board
  amended several of its findings, but otherwise reaffirmed its decision
  denying the  application.  This appeal followed.

 

       We have decided a number of cases involving the compliance of a
  development proposal  with criterion 10 of Act 250, which requires that the
  proposed development be "in conformance with  any duly adopted local or
  regional plan."  10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(10).  Before we examine the specifics 
  of the plan provisions before us, we find it instructive to review two of
  those decisions, which we  find central to the resolution of this case.

       The first is In re Green Peak Estates, 154 Vt. 363, 577 A.2d 676
  (1990), in which we upheld  a decision of the Environmental Board that the
  second and third phases of a subdivision development  were not in
  conformance with either the town or regional plan.  The facts of Green Peak
  Estates have  some similarities to the facts of this case because the
  developer was attempting to develop residential  lots in a higher-elevation
  undeveloped area.  Unlike this case, however, the Town had no subdivision 
  regulations, and the planning commission opposed the development as
  inconsistent with the town  plan.  Moreover, the regional plan specifically
  provided that "[o]n slopes greater than 20%,  residential development
  should not be permitted."  Id. at 368, 577 A.2d  at 679.  The Board found
  that  this specific provision of the regional plan was consistent with the
  more general provisions of the  town plan that established an objective of
  keeping the "rugged and poorly accessible mountain and  forest areas free
  from development."  Id.  Because at least half of the proposed subdivision
  was to be  located on a slope exceeding 20 percent, the Board found that
  the development did not conform with  the regional plan.  We affirmed,
  holding that "the Board's commonsense interpretation of the plan's  policy
  on this point is consistent with the overall approach to use of the
  region's intermediate  uplands."  Id. at 369, 577 A.2d  at 679.

       The second decision is In re Molgano, 163 Vt. 25,