Title: Burton v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARVIN BURTON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 244, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 0410003743 (S) 
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: August 4, 2023 
Decided: 
September 7, 2023  
 
 
ORDER 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.  
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to 
affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Marvin Burton, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence.  The State of Delaware 
has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on 
the face of Burton’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
(2) 
In August 2005, a Superior Court jury found Burton guilty of first-
degree rape, second-degree rape, and second-degree unlawful sexual contact.  After 
granting the State’s motion to declare Burton a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 
 
2 
4214, the Superior Court sentenced Burton to two sentences of life imprisonment 
plus two years.  We affirmed Burton’s convictions on direct appeal.1  After remands 
and evidentiary hearings, we affirmed the denial of Burton’s first and second 
motions for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2     
(3) 
On June 5, 2023, Burton filed a motion for correction of illegal 
sentence.  He argued that his habitual offender sentence was illegal because the 
State’s submission of two habitual offender motions violated Double Jeopardy and 
there was no signed and dated order declaring him a habitual offender.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion, finding that Burton was appropriately declared a habitual 
offender and that the sentence imposed was reasonable in light of the serious nature 
of the offenses.  This appeal followed.   
(4) 
  We review the denial of a motion for sentence correction for abuse of 
discretion.3  We review questions of law de novo.4  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds 
statutory limits, violates Double Jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and 
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required 
 
1 Burton v. State, 2006 WL 2434914 (Del. Aug. 21, 2007). 
2 Burton v. State, 2016 WL 3568189, at *4 (Del. June 22, 2016) (affirming the Superior Court’s 
denial of Burton’s second motion for postconviction relief); Burton v. State, 2011 WL 4342636, 
at *2-3 (Del. Sept. 15, 2011) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Burton’s first motion for 
postconviction relief).   
3 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
4 Id. 
 
3 
to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the 
judgment of conviction did not authorize.5   
(5) 
In his opening brief, Burton argues that the Superior Court erred in 
failing to address his arguments and denying his motion for correction of illegal 
sentence.  The Superior Court did not err in denying his motion.  As the State points 
out in its motion to affirm, Burton is challenging the manner in which his sentence 
was imposed.6  A motion for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 
must be filed “within 90 days after the sentence is imposed.”7  Burton did not file 
his motion until more than fifteen years after his sentence was imposed. 
(6) 
In any event, the record refutes Burton’s claims.   On March 10, 2005, 
the State sent a letter to Burton’s counsel enclosing a draft motion to declare Burton 
a habitual offender under Sections 4214(a) and (b).8  The State copied the 
 
5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2022 WL 121315, at *1 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022) (describing motion that 
alleged sentencing court failed to give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the habitual 
offender petition until the sentencing hearing as a motion for correction of a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b). 
8 At the time of Burton’s crimes, Section 4214(a) provided that “[a]ny person who has been 3 
times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) of 
this section, under the laws of this State…and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent 
felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such 4th or 
subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up 
to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted.”  Section 4214(b) provided that “[a]ny person 
who has been 2 times convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony hereinafter 
specifically named, under the laws of this State…and who shall thereafter be convicted of a 
subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named, or an attempt to commit such specific felony, is 
declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such third or subsequent conviction is 
had, in imposing sentence, shall impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted unless the 
 
4 
Prothonotary’s Office.  The Superior Court took no action on the letter or draft 
motion.   
(7) 
On September 2, 2005, after the jury had convicted Burton, the State 
filed a motion to declare Burton a habitual offender under Sections 4214(a) and (b).  
At the sentencing hearing on October 28, 2005, Burton’s counsel stated that he had 
no basis for objecting to the motion because Burton had the requisite felony 
convictions.9  The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Burton a 
habitual offender.  The Superior Court then sentenced Burton as a habitual offender 
to life imprisonment for each of the rape convictions under Section 4214(b) and two 
years of Level V incarceration for second-degree unlawful sexual contact under 
Section 4214(a).  The sentencing order approved by the judge includes language 
declaring Burton a habitual offender and sentencing him as a habitual offender.   
(8) 
Contrary to Burton’s contentions, there was no violation of Section 
4215(b), which required the State to file a motion to declare Burton a habitual 
offender before sentencing and the Superior Court to grant the order before imposing 
a habitual offender sentence.  Nor was there any Double Jeopardy violation in the 
State’s filing of a draft habitual offender petition that the Superior Court did not act 
 
subsequent felony conviction requires or allows and results in the imposition of capital 
punishment.”  The felonies identified by Section 4214(b) included first-degree rape and second-
degree rape.  
9 The habitual offender motion listed the predicate convictions as third-degree burglary in 1987, 
third-degree unlawful sexual intercourse in 1995, and third degree-unlawful sexual intercourse in 
1998. 
 
5 
upon and the State’s filing of a final habitual offender petition that the Superior Court 
granted before sentencing Burton.  Burton’s sentence is not illegal.     
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice