Title: People v. Hunt

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2012 IL 111089
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111089)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
TAVARES HUNT, Appellee. 
 
Opinion filed April 19, 2012.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Burke, and
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
On April 14, 2003, defendant, Tavares Hunt, was arrested and
charged with murder in the shooting death of Shakir Beckley. A Cook
County grand jury indicted defendant and charged him with 33 counts
of murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2002)), 6 counts
of attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1(a)(1) (West 2002)), 2
counts of armed robbery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West
2002)), 1 count of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-
4.2 (West 2002)), 7 counts of attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS
5/8-4, 18-2 (West 2002)), 1 count of aggravated discharge of a
firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2002)), and 1 count of
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1)
(West 2002)).
¶ 2
Defendant filed a motion to suppress tape recordings, statements,
and conversations with an informant during court-ordered consensual
overhears, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his fifth
amendment right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. V) and his rights to
counsel and due process under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10), as articulated by this court in People v.
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994). He also filed a motion to exclude
tape recordings of those conversations, arguing that the recordings
were substantially inaudible. The trial court granted both motions,
suppressing defendant’s statements and the recordings.
¶ 3
On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
suppression order. People v. Hunt, 381 Ill. App. 3d 790, 809 (2008).
This court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the
appellate court for its consideration of the suppression of the
statements on fifth amendment and McCauley grounds. People v.
Hunt, 234 Ill. 2d 49, 65-67 (2009). On remand, the appellate court
affirmed the suppression of the statements on McCauley grounds. 403
Ill. App. 3d 802, 830.
¶ 4
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. The sole issue
on appeal is whether the statements were properly suppressed on
McCauley grounds. For the following reasons, we conclude that they
were not. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
¶ 5
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6
While defendant was being held in the Cook County jail on an
unrelated charge, he became a suspect in Shakir Beckley’s murder. In
May 2002, Chicago police detectives took him from the county jail
to a Chicago police station and questioned him about the murder. He
denied any involvement in, or knowledge of, the murder. The
detectives testified that they read him his rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and he waived those rights before he
was questioned. Defendant testified, however, that he told the
detectives he was not speaking to them unless an attorney was
present, but they continued to question him. The detectives denied
that he said he did not want to talk to them or that he requested an
attorney. In fact, they testified that he consented to, and took, a
polygraph test, for which he signed a written waiver. After the
polygraph test, the detectives questioned him again, and he continued
to deny any involvement in the murder. Because the questioning
finished late and they wanted to question him further, they kept him
at the police station overnight. The next day, they questioned him
-2-
again, and he continued to deny any involvement in the murder. The
detectives fingerprinted him before returning him to the county jail
later that day.
¶ 7
On June 28, 2002, an assistant public defender was assigned to
represent defendant in the unrelated case. Defendant testified that he
told counsel that day and on July 12, 2002, that Chicago police
detectives were questioning him about an unrelated, uncharged matter
and, on both days, counsel told him not to talk to the police.
¶ 8
On July 16 or 17, 2002, the detectives took defendant from the
county jail to the police station so Mycal Davis, who was also in the
jail on an unrelated charge, could view him in a lineup. The lineup
had to be rescheduled because defendant and Davis were put in the
bullpen together even though they were supposed to be brought out
at different times so they would not see each other.
¶ 9
After Davis had been in the bullpen with defendant, he told the
detectives that he knew defendant; that defendant was involved in
Beckley’s murder; that he and defendant had a conversation about
Beckley’s murder, in which defendant made incriminating statements;
and that he thought he could get defendant to repeat the statements.
The detectives then decided to set up a judicially authorized overhear,
using Davis as the consenting party.
¶ 10
Defendant testified that on July 18, 2002, the detectives took him
from the county jail to the police station and questioned him about
Beckley’s murder. Defendant testified that he told them he did not
want to talk to them and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer.
¶ 11
On July 31, 2002, guards told defendant that the detectives were
coming to put him in a lineup. He called counsel and left a message,
asking counsel to go to the police station for the lineup.
¶ 12
The detectives then took defendant from the county jail to the
police station, put him in an interview room, and left him alone for
about three hours. During that time, he was not handcuffed and was
given food and water. He was not questioned by any police officer
that day. At about 3 p.m., Davis, who was wearing a concealed wire
pursuant to a court order, was put in the interview room with him.
The detectives recorded the conversation between defendant and
Davis and monitored the conversation from another room. Defendant
allegedly implicated himself in Beckley’s murder.
¶ 13
The lieutenant in charge of the Beckley investigation testified
that, at some point during the overhear, when he took a break from
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monitoring the conversation, he was told that an attorney was there,
asking to speak with defendant. He testified that he met with the
attorney at about 4:02 p.m. The attorney said he represented
defendant on an unrelated charge and asked why defendant was at the
police station. The lieutenant responded that defendant was there for
a lineup in a case under investigation, which was unrelated to the one
for which he was in jail. Counsel asked to meet with defendant and
to be present during the lineups. The lieutenant asked counsel to give
him “about five minutes.” According to the lieutenant, the overhear
ended shortly after 4 p.m., and counsel was then allowed to speak
with defendant.
¶ 14
Counsel testified, from his contemporaneous notes, that, after he
got defendant’s message on July 31, he called the police station and
confirmed that defendant was there. He asked to speak with the
detectives and was told they were “out in the field.” He said he was
coming down to the police station. He arrived at 3:14 p.m., and the
detectives were paged at 3:19 p.m. Counsel testified that he
repeatedly asked to speak with defendant but was not allowed to do
so until sometime between 4:02 and 4:12 p.m. At 4:12 p.m., after
meeting with counsel, defendant invoked his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel present during questioning. According to the
detectives, this was the first time defendant had invoked his rights.
¶ 15
On August 6, 2002, the detectives again took defendant from the
county jail to the police station; put him in an interview room with
Davis, who was wearing a concealed wire; and monitored and
recorded the conversation, during which defendant again allegedly
implicated himself in Beckley’s murder. He was not questioned by
the police that day. The public defender’s office had withdrawn its
representation of defendant in the unrelated case a few days earlier,
and no counsel was present during the overhear that day.
¶ 16
Relying on McCauley, the trial court suppressed those parts of
defendant’s statements and recordings made after counsel arrived at
the police station on July 31, holding that defendant had a right to
speak with counsel within a reasonable time after counsel arrived.
The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the August 6
statements and recordings because counsel was not present that day.
The court later vacated its suppression order sua sponte and allowed
the parties to provide additional arguments about the impact of
counsel’s arrival on July 31.
-4-
¶ 17
Defendant subsequently filed his motion to exclude the
recordings, arguing that they were substantially inaudible. After
listening to the recordings and hearing further arguments of counsel,
the trial court suppressed all of defendant’s statements and all of the
recordings. In doing so, the court relied on McCauley and found that
defendant had a right to speak with counsel within a reasonable time
after counsel’s arrival at the police station at 3:14 p.m. on July 31 but
was not allowed to do so until 4:02 p.m., after the overhear ended.
The court also suppressed the recordings on the alternative ground
that they were substantially inaudible.
¶ 18
On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
suppression order but on grounds not argued by the parties. Hunt, 381
Ill. App. 3d at 809. The court also affirmed the suppression of the
recordings on the alternative ground that they were substantially
inaudible. Id. at 808. This court reversed that part of the appellate
court’s judgment affirming the suppression order on grounds not
raised by the parties, affirmed that part of its judgment affirming the
suppression of the recordings on the alternative ground that they were
substantially inaudible, and remanded the cause to the appellate court
for its consideration of the suppression of the statements on fifth
amendment and McCauley grounds. Hunt, 234 Ill. 2d at 67. On
remand, the appellate court affirmed the suppression of the statements
on McCauley grounds. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 830.
¶ 19
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.
315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
¶ 20
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21
On appeal, the State no longer argues that the recordings should
not have been suppressed as substantially inaudible; nor does
defendant argue that the statements should have been suppressed
under the fifth amendment. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether
the statements were properly suppressed on McCauley grounds.
¶ 22
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is
reviewed under the two-part test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996). People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011). The court’s
factual findings are upheld unless they are against the manifest weight
of the evidence. The reviewing court then assesses the established
facts in relation to the issues presented and may reach its own
conclusions as to what relief, if any, should be allowed. Accordingly,
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the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted is
reviewed de novo.
¶ 23
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which
applies to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment (Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)), provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o
person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. In Miranda, the United
States Supreme Court adopted prophylactic measures to protect a
suspect’s fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination from the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial
interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court noted that
“incommunicado” interrogation in a “police-dominated atmosphere”
(id. at 456-57) involves psychological pressures that “work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely” (id. at 467). Thus, the
Court reasoned, “[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice.” Id. at 458.
¶ 24
To combat this inherent compulsion, and thereby protect the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the Court held that a
prosecutor may not use statements arising from a custodial
interrogation of a defendant unless he can show the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the defendant’s privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 444.
¶ 25
Miranda requires law enforcement officers to warn a suspect
before a custodial interrogation that: he has the right to remain silent;
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; he has the
right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him before questioning if he so desires. Id.
at 479. The Miranda Court defined “custodial interrogation” as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 444.
¶ 26
On remand in the present case, as both the State and defendant
acknowledge, the appellate court properly concluded that “if we
followed United States Supreme Court case law interpreting the fifth
amendment, no Miranda warnings are required when a defendant is
talking to an undercover agent or an informant; therefore, [defendant]
would not have to be informed about his counsel being present at the
-6-
police station.” 403 Ill. App. 3d at 821. It reached this conclusion by
analyzing the foundational doctrines within the prophylactic Miranda
regime, which demonstrate that defendant’s conversation with Davis,
an undercover informant and fellow inmate, was not a “custodial
interrogation.” Id. at 815-19; see Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,
296-97 (1990) (Perkins I).
¶ 27
The appellate court found, however, that, under Illinois’s
constitution and statutes, as interpreted by the courts in McCauley and
People v. Perkins, 248 Ill. App. 3d 762 (1993) (Perkins II),
defendant’s conversation with Davis, an undercover informant and
fellow inmate, was a “custodial interrogation.” 403 Ill. App. 3d at
823-24. As we will explain below, that finding is erroneous.
¶ 28
In Perkins, the defendant was arrested on a Saturday for
aggravated battery. Perkins II, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 763. While he was
in jail over the weekend, an undercover officer and an undercover
informant were placed in his cellblock and elicited incriminating
statements from him about an unrelated, uncharged murder. His
statements were suppressed, and the appellate court affirmed. People
v. Perkins, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 450 (1988) (Perkins I). The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that “an undercover law
enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda
warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may
elicit an incriminating response.” Perkins I, 496 U.S. at 300. In
Perkins I, the Court held that the statements at issue were voluntary
and that there was no federal obstacle to their admissibility at trial.
The Court explained as follows:
“Conversations between suspects and undercover agents
do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The
essential ingredients of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ and
compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person
speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow
inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the
suspect. [Citations.] When a suspect considers himself in the
company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive
atmosphere is lacking. [Citations.] ***
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion
results from the interaction of custody and official
interrogation. ***
Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by
taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he
-7-
supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As we recognized in
Miranda: ‘Confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily
without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in
evidence.’ [Citation.] Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of
compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s
concerns. [Citations.]
Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting
about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they
believe to be their cellmates.” Id. at 296-98.
¶ 29
On remand to the trial court, the defendant filed a second motion
to suppress, alleging, for the first time, that he had asserted his right
to counsel after his arrest for aggravated battery. Perkins II, 248 Ill.
App. 3d at 764. His statements were again suppressed. The appellate
court stated that the crux of the case was: “Where a suspect has
asserted his fifth amendment right to counsel, can he be questioned
by undercover agents on a separate, unrelated, and uncharged offense
while in jail, without the presence of an attorney, and without an
opportunity to waive his right to counsel?” Id. at 767-68. The
appellate court affirmed the suppression of the defendant’s
statements, holding that the undercover agents’ actions violated his
“fifth amendment right to counsel.” Id. at 768.
¶ 30
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court in Perkins II relied
on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, the defendant
was arrested for murder. Id. at 293-94. After he was advised of his
Miranda rights, he requested an attorney. Id. at 294. On the way to
the police station, the two transporting officers engaged in a
conversation with each other about a gun missing from the murder
scene and how terrible it would be if one of the children from the
nearby school for handicapped children found the gun and was hurt.
Id. at 294-95. The defendant immediately told the officers to turn the
car around so that he could show them where the gun was located. Id.
at 295. He then led them to the spot where the gun was hidden. When
the defendant made the incriminating statements, he was in custody
and had invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 298. The issue in Innis
was whether the defendant was “interrogated” by the officers in
violation of his fifth amendment right to remain silent until he had
consulted with a lawyer. The Innis Court explained as follows:
-8-
“It is clear *** that the special procedural safeguards outlined
in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken
into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is
subjected to interrogation. ‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized
in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the
term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter
portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.
This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure
of protection against coercive police practices, without regard
to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police.” Id.
at 300-01.
¶ 31
The Innis Court concluded that the defendant was not
“interrogated” within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 302. The Court
noted that the first prong of the definition of “interrogation” was not
satisfied because the conversation between the officers included no
express questioning of the defendant. Moreover, the Court concluded
that the defendant was not subjected to the “functional equivalent” of
questioning because it could not be said that the officers should have
known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the defendant.
¶ 32
Relying on Innis, the appellate court in Perkins II held that the
police knew or should have known that their actions in using an
undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and that, because
the defendant had invoked his right to counsel, their actions amounted
to the functional equivalent of direct questioning and violated the
Court’s rulings construing the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Perkins II, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 771.
¶ 33
In so concluding, the appellate court in Perkins II totally
disregarded the fact that, in Perkins I, the United States Supreme
-9-
Court had already determined that “an undercover law enforcement
officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to
an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an
incriminating response.” Perkins I, 496 U.S. at 300. Implicit in this
holding is that questioning by an undercover law enforcement officer
posing as a fellow inmate is not an “interrogation” under Miranda.
¶ 34
The fact that the defendant in Perkins II requested counsel when
he was arrested for aggravated battery did not change the fact that
Miranda warnings were not required before he spoke to an
undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate about
an unrelated, uncharged murder. Because, as the United States
Supreme Court decided in Perkins I, Miranda warnings were not
required before the defendant was questioned, it follows that he had
no fifth amendment right to counsel, and it was irrelevant that he had
requested counsel when he was arrested for the unrelated aggravated
battery. Accordingly, the appellate court’s decision to the contrary in
Perkins II, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 769, is hereby expressly overruled.
¶ 35
It is also interesting to note that the appellate court’s decision in
Perkins II was based on federal, not Illinois, constitutional law. See
also People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 206 (1998) (“Miranda is not
implicated in conversations between suspects and undercover agents.
The essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and
compulsion are not present when a prisoner speaks freely to an
undercover agent.”).
¶ 36
We turn now to McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414. In McCauley, the
defendant was brought to the police station for questioning about a
murder, was advised of his Miranda rights, and did not request an
attorney. Id. at 417-18. However, unbeknownst to the defendant, his
family had retained an attorney for him, and the attorney had gone to
the police station and asked to speak with him. Id. at 418-19. The
police refused to allow the attorney access to the defendant and failed
to inform the defendant that his attorney was present at the police
station asking to speak with him. Id. at 419. The defendant
subsequently gave a statement to the police in response to their
questioning. Id. at 420. The trial court suppressed the statement, and
this court affirmed.
¶ 37
The McCauley court noted that, in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986), the United States Supreme Court had rejected the
argument that similar police conduct violated a defendant’s right to
counsel under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
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McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 422-23. The McCauley court then considered
whether such conduct violated the defendant’s right to counsel under
article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which
provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to give evidence against himself” (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, § 10). McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 423.
¶ 38
In holding that the police conduct in McCauley violated the
defendant’s rights under the Illinois Constitution, the court explained:
“The day is long past in Illinois *** where attorneys must
shout legal advice to their clients, held in custody, through the
jailhouse door. In this case, we determine that our State
constitutional guarantees afforded defendant a greater degree
of protection [than their federal counterparts]. Our State
constitutional guarantees simply do not permit police to
delude custodial suspects, exposed to interrogation, into
falsely believing they are without immediately available legal
counsel and to also prevent that counsel from accessing and
assisting their clients during the interrogation.” McCauley,
163 Ill. 2d at 423-24.
¶ 39
 The McCauley court held that, under Illinois law, “ ‘when police,
prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed
or retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no
knowing waiver of the right to counsel if the suspect has not been
informed that the attorney was present and seeking to consult with
him.’ ” Id. at 424-25 (quoting People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189
(1982)). The McCauley court also held that “due process is violated
when police interfere with a suspect’s right to his attorney’s
assistance and presence by affirmatively preventing the suspect,
exposed to interrogation, from receiving the immediately available
assistance of an attorney hired or appointed to represent him.”
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 444. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 (“[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law”). Thus, the court concluded that the police conduct
violated the defendant’s privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and his right to due process. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at
446.
¶ 40
However, the McCauley court did not eschew the Miranda regime
itself; instead, it superimposed a state-specific right onto the existing
Miranda framework. The constitutional justification for the Miranda
regime is police custodial interrogation. Contrary to the appellate
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court’s conclusion, McCauley did not reject this foundation by taking
the police out of the equation. Accordingly, we hold that, like a
suspect’s Miranda rights, his McCauley right to an immediately
available attorney arises only during police custodial interrogation.
¶ 41
In the present case, because defendant was not subjected to police
custodial interrogation when he had a conversation with Davis, an
undercover informant and fellow inmate, during the overhears,
Miranda and McCauley are inapplicable. See Perkins I, 496 U.S. at
300; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467; McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 424-25,
444. Accordingly, the detectives were not required to give defendant
Miranda warnings before the overhears; defendant had no
constitutional right to counsel during the overhears; the detectives
were not required to inform defendant that his counsel in an unrelated
case was at the police station, asking to speak with him during the
first overhear; and the appellate court erred in upholding the
suppression of the statements on McCauley grounds. We also decline
to extend the McCauley right to protect the attorney-client
relationship outside the context of police custodial interrogation.
¶ 42
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive on appeal, we
need not address the State’s other arguments—that the appellate court
erred in finding that (1) defendant had invoked his right to counsel on
July 18; and (2) he was in “Miranda custody” during the overhears.1
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howes v. Fields, 
1
__ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012),  addressing the issue of the appropriate
standard for determining whether a prisoner was in Miranda custody during
police questioning, is consistent with our interpretation of “custodial
interrogation.” As the Court explained: “As used in our Miranda case law,
‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at
1189. The Court noted that “standard conditions of confinement and
associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily implicate the same
interests that the Court sought to protect when it afforded special
safeguards to persons subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus, service of
a term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda
custody.” Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1191.
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¶ 43
CONCLUSION
¶ 44
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
appellate court and the trial court and remand to the circuit court of
Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 45
Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 46
Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 47
Cause remanded.
¶ 48
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
¶ 49
I agree with the majority’s holding that statements made by
defendant to an informant during a court-ordered overhear were not
obtained in violation of his rights to counsel and to due process under
the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10), as set forth
by this court in People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994). I
therefore concur in its judgment. I write separately, however, to
emphasize that our decision today should not be construed as a
departure from McCauley. 
¶ 50
As noted by the majority, the trial court, relying upon McCauley,
suppressed statements made by defendant to police informant Mycal
Davis during judicially authorized overhears. The majority correctly
points out that “the sole issue on appeal is whether the [defendant’s]
statements were properly suppressed on McCauley grounds.” Supra
¶ 21. On that point, the majority notes:
“[T]he McCauley court did not eschew the Miranda regime
itself; instead, it superimposed a state-specific right onto the
existing Miranda framework. The constitutional justification
for the Miranda regime is police custodial interrogation.
Contrary to the appellate court’s conclusion, McCauley did
not reject this foundation by taking the police out of the
equation. Accordingly, we hold that, like a suspect’s Miranda
rights, his McCauley right to an immediately available
attorney arises only during police custodial interrogation.”
Supra ¶ 40.
¶ 51
I believe that the better approach to resolving this case is to point
out that McCauley and this case are not close factually. 
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¶ 52
McCauley involved a situation where a defendant, though
Mirandized, was interrogated by police without having been told that
his lawyer had arrived at the station and was prevented from seeing
him. 
¶ 53
In affirming suppression of the defendant’s statements, this court
rejected the argument that the interpretation of a defendant’s right to
counsel under the Illinois Constitution must be in complete lockstep
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986). Instead, we agreed with the defendant that Burbine
“represent[ed] a regressive interpretation of fifth amendment
protections” (McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 421), and refused to apply the
federal constitutional analysis developed in that case. 
¶ 54
Rather, we looked to the safeguards provided to the defendant
under our state constitution, and held that they “afforded defendant a
greater degree of protection” than did federal law. Id. at 423. In
holding that the conduct of the police violated the defendant’s state
rights against self-incrimination and to due process (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §§ 2, 10), we underscored that “[o]ur State constitutional
guarantees simply do not permit police to delude custodial suspects,
exposed to interrogation, into falsely believing they are without
immediately available legal counsel and to also prevent that counsel
from accessing and assisting their clients during the interrogation.”
McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 423-24 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2,
10).
¶ 55
It is my position that the fundamental, factual differences between
these two cases renders McCauley inapplicable here. Unlike in
McCauley, where counsel arrived at the station while the defendant
was being interrogated by two police officers and the police prevented
the attorney from consulting with his client, in this case, when
counsel arrived defendant was engaged in a judicially sanctioned,
overheard conversation with a fellow inmate who was operating as an
informant. Id. 
¶ 56
That being said, I wish to underscore that today’s decision in no
way erodes McCauley’s holding that the police conduct which
occurred there remains a clear violation of a defendant’s rights under
our state constitution. Indeed, this court has unanimously held that
“the McCauley decision represents this court’s refusal to allow this
state’s counterpart to the fifth amendment right to counsel to diminish
the way the federal right had in Burbine” (Relsolelo v. Fisk, 198 Ill.
2d 142, 152 (2001)), and has observed that “the police conduct at
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issue [in McCauley] implicated state due process concerns” (People
v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 301 (2006)). Accordingly, the force and
effect of McCauley remains unchanged.
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