Title: Brown Heating & Cooling v. Williams

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: November 10, 2022 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0480 
_________________________ 
 
T&J White, LLC, d/b/a Brown Heating & Cooling, and Bobby R. 
Morse 
 
v. 
 
Timothy O. Williams 
 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-2018-900078) 
 
 
SELLERS, Justice. 
T&J White, LLC, d/b/a Brown Heating & Cooling ("Brown Heating 
& Cooling"), and its employee, Bobby R. Morse ("the defendants"), appeal, 
SC-2022-0480 
2 
 
challenging the Jefferson Circuit Court's denial of their motions seeking 
a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") and a new trial following the entry 
of judgment on a jury verdict against the defendants and in favor of the 
plaintiff, Timothy O. Williams. We affirm the trial court's judgment.   
Morse, while engaged as an employee of Brown Heating & Cooling, 
rear-ended Williams in a motor-vehicle collision. Thereafter, Williams 
filed a complaint asserting, among other things, negligence and 
wantonness claims against the defendants. The case proceeded to trial, 
during which testimony and other evidence was presented tending to 
show the following: (1) Williams's car was decelerating while approaching 
a yellow or red light at an intersection; (2) Morse, whose vehicle was 
behind Williams's car, saw the traffic light and saw Williams's car; (3) 
Morse accelerated over the speed limit in an attempt to make it through 
the light and rear-ended Williams's car; and (4) Morse was on his cell 
phone at the time of the collision.  
After the trial court instructed the jury but before the jury retired, 
counsel for the parties discussed the verdict form and the jury 
instructions that had been given. Ultimately, the defendants requested, 
and received, an additional blank line on the verdict form to allow the 
SC-2022-0480 
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jury to award compensatory/nominal damages with respect to the 
wantonness claim; this additional line was placed just before the line for 
an award of punitive damages. The court then read the final verdict form 
to the jurors, and no objections were made. The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of Williams, awarding the following: $500,000 in compensatory 
damages for negligence, $250,000 in compensatory damages for 
wantonness, and $750,000 in punitive damages for wantonness.  
After the jury was polled, defense counsel orally renewed its motion 
for a JML based on, among other grounds, the alleged insufficiency of the 
evidence of wantonness and alleged inconsistency of the verdict. The 
court denied the motion, concluded the trial proceedings, and entered a 
final judgment on the verdict. The defendants subsequently filed a 
motion for a new trial, again asserting that the verdict was inconsistent, 
which also was denied. On appeal, the defendants argue that they were 
entitled to a JML on the wantonness claim and that the trial court 
exceeded its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial, asserting 
that the verdict was inconsistent.  
I. Standard of Review 
  
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A. Motion for a JML 
The defendants argue that the trial court erred in failing to enter a 
JML against Williams on his wantonness claim. 
 
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this 
Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in 
deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a JML. Palm 
Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997). 
Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether 
the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the 
case to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter 
v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). The nonmovant 
must have presented substantial evidence in order to 
withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; 
West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 
870, 871 (Ala. 1989). A reviewing court must determine 
whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced 
substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring 
resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353. In reviewing 
a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains 
such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free 
to draw. Id. Regarding a question of law, however, this Court 
indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's 
ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 
1992)." 
 
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Invs. Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 
(Ala. 2003). Our standard of review as to this issue, therefore, requires 
us to determine whether each element of Williams's wantonness claim 
was supported by substantial evidence.  
B. Motion for a New Trial 
SC-2022-0480 
5 
 
The defendants also argue that they were entitled to a new trial 
because, they assert, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
that it could not reach a verdict in favor of Williams on both his 
negligence claim and his wantonness claim because, the defendants 
assert, such a verdict would be internally inconsistent.  
" '[A] party is entitled to proper jury instructions regarding 
the issues presented, and an incorrect or misleading charge 
may be the basis for the granting of a new trial.' Nunn v. 
Whitworth, 545 So. 2d 766, 767 (Ala. 1989). If an objection to 
a jury charge is properly preserved for review on appeal, this 
Court will 'look to the entirety of the trial court's charge to see 
if there was reversible error.' Nelms v. Allied Mills Co., 387 
So. 2d 152, 155 (Ala. 1980). Reversal is warranted only when 
the error is considered to be prejudicial. Underwriters Nat'l 
Assurance Co. v. Posey, 333 So. 2d 815, 818 (Ala. 1976). 
 
 
"The strength of the jury verdict is based upon the right 
to trial by jury, White v. Fridge, 461 So. 2d 793 (Ala. 1984), 
and a jury verdict is presumed to be correct. Alpine Bay 
Resorts, Inc. v. Wyatt, 539 So. 2d 160, 162 (Ala. 1988). This 
presumption is strengthened by the trial court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial." 
 
King v. W.A. Brown & Sons, Inc., 585 So. 2d 10, 12 (Ala. 1991). 
 
Thus, in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial based on 
an allegedly improper jury charge, we consider first whether an objection 
to the jury charge was properly made, thus preserving the issue for 
further review. If an objection was not properly made, we look no further. 
SC-2022-0480 
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But, even when an objection has been properly made, there is a 
presumption that the jury verdict is correct, and, therefore, to obtain a 
reversal of the judgment and a new trial, the objecting party must 
demonstrate that the jury charge was incorrect or misleading. 
II. Analysis 
A. The JML on the Wantonness Claim 
 
The defendants argue that Williams failed to present substantial 
evidence in support of his wantonness claim and that, consequently, they 
were entitled to a JML on the wantonness claim. "To establish 
wantonness, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with reckless 
indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally did some 
wrongful act or omitted some known duty. To be actionable, that act or 
omission must proximately cause the injury of which the plaintiff 
complains." Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994). 
 
The defendants have cited a case involving a driver who took her 
eyes off the road before veering into oncoming traffic and causing a 
collision, Phillips v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 988 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 2008), 
and a case involving a driver who caused a collision by running a stop 
sign while attempting to squeeze between two oncoming cars that had 
SC-2022-0480 
7 
 
the right-of-way, Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5 (Ala. 2007). In each of 
those cases, this Court held that a JML in favor of the defendant on the 
plaintiff's wantonness claim was appropriate. This case is dissimilar. 
Here, evidence was presented indicating that defendant Morse saw the 
traffic light, which was either yellow or red, saw Williams's car slowing 
at that light, and yet pressed the accelerator of his vehicle.  This case is 
unlike the cases that the defendants have cited, which involved merely 
inadvertence or ill-advised attempts to dodge other vehicles. Here, there 
was substantial evidence showing that Morse accelerated toward 
Williams's vehicle, thus raising the question whether Marsh acted 
consciously and intentionally. This Court has noted that " '[c]redibility 
determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge .…'" 
O'Rear v. B.H., 69 So. 3d 106, 115 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Based on this evidence, we 
cannot say that Williams failed to provide substantial evidence in 
support of the wantonness claim and, thus, that the trial court erred in 
determining that the defendants were not entitled to a JML on that 
claim. 
SC-2022-0480 
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B. The Inconsistency of the Verdict 
The defendants argue that the jury's verdict in favor of Williams on 
both the negligence claim and the wantonness claim was inconsistent. A 
verdict is inconsistent when the "'record in a case does not reveal a 
situation in which the jury's decision can coexist.'" Johnston v. Castles & 
Crowns, Inc., 259 So. 3d 643, 652 (Ala. 2017) (quoting Jones Express, Inc. 
v. Jackson, 86 So. 3d 298, 303 (Ala. 2010)). Although the trial court 
instructed the jury that, "[i]f the plaintiff has proved [his] negligence and 
wantonness claims, you must then decide how much money ... to award 
plaintiff on those claims," Alabama law is well settled regarding the 
mutual exclusivity of negligence and wantonness. Ex parte Essary, 992 
So. 2d at 9-10. This mutual exclusivity arises from the mental state 
required for wantonness, which is incompatible with negligence. 
Thompson v. White, 274 Ala. 413, 420, 149 So. 2d 797, 804 (1963). 
Consequently, an award of compensatory damages for both negligence 
and wantonness relating to a single act is inconsistent. The proper 
remedy for an inconsistent verdict is generally a new trial. Johnston, 259 
So. 3d at 652. However, this court has upheld inconsistent verdicts under 
certain circumstances. See Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 
SC-2022-0480 
9 
 
953 So. 2d 1196 (Ala. 2006); BIC Corp. v. Bean, 669 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1995); 
and Tombrello v. McGhee, 282 Ala. 408, 211 So. 2d 900 (1968). 
C. The Defendants' Failure to Properly Object at Trial 
 
The trial court noted that unchallenged jury instructions become 
the law of the case. Beiersdoerfer, 953 So. 2d at 1209. The defendants, 
however, argue that they did object to the trial court's jury instructions. 
To support this contention, the defendants point to statements made by 
their counsel both before and after the jury retired to deliberate. The 
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure clearly state that a party must object 
"before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection." Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, 
the defendants' counsel's statements made in this case after the jury 
retired were untimely under Rule 51 and thus insufficient to prevent the 
jury's instructions from becoming the law of the case. To support their 
argument that they properly lodged objections before the jury retired, the 
defendants point to two statements their counsel made: 
"[I]t's just clarification so that [the jurors] don't go back there 
and make any mistakes. … I just want to make sure that they 
have to do a negligence verdict or a wantonness verdict and 
that they can't come back with negligence and wantonness." 
_____________________ 
 
SC-2022-0480 
10 
 
 
"I just want to make sure that I've got it on the record I will 
have an objection if they return both a negligence and a 
wantonness verdict." 
 
(Emphasis added.) Neither of those statements is an objection under Rule 
51. 
In the second statement, the defendants' counsel made a 
conditional promise to object in the future. That is not a timely objection. 
As the defendants note in their reply brief, Rule 51 requires 
predeliberation objections in order to give the trial court "'an opportunity 
to correct any error in its charge before it becomes error with injury to 
reversal.'" Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545, 559 (Ala. 2006) (quoting 
Coleman v. Taber, 572 So. 2d 399, 402 (Ala. 1990)). The second statement 
does nothing to serve that purpose. Additionally, "[a] party may not … 
await the jury's verdict before challenging an instruction that invites an 
inconsistency." BIC Corp., 669 So. 2d at 844. If the defendants wanted to 
preserve a claim of error for appeal, the proper action was to object to the 
purported error, not promise to do so if the jury rendered an unfavorable 
verdict.  
 
Likewise, the defendants' counsel's "clarification" statement is not 
an objection under Rule 51. As noted, Rule 51 requires three things: (1) 
SC-2022-0480 
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that the objection be made before the jury retires, (2) that the objector 
make a statement of the matter objected to, and (3) that the objector 
provide the grounds for the objection. It would require significant 
squinting to see "just [a] clarification" as an objection. The clarification 
statement has more in common with the "discussion" offered by the 
counterclaim defendants' counsel in Beiersdoerfer than with a proper 
objection under Rule 51. In Beiersdoerfer, the counterclaim defendants' 
counsel stated:  
 
"'It seems to me that [the counterclaim plaintiff] should 
... elect between his remedies, fraud and breach of contract, 
since they're based upon the same facts. And there's the 
potential for the jury, if they rule his way on both of those 
claims, to award double damages. But I admit to you I have 
not researched that as of yet.'" 
 
953 So. 2d at 1209. We held that this "discussion" did not give rise to an 
objection. Id. Like the "discussion" in Beiersdoerfer, the clarification 
statement offers no authority to support the objection -- it merely 
recognizes a potential issue. Additionally, the clarification statement is 
not sufficiently clear in its intent. Although Rule 51 does not require any 
magical language, something stronger than "just clarification" is 
necessary. Accordingly, the clarification statement was not an objection 
under Rule 51. Because the defendants failed to make a timely objection, 
SC-2022-0480 
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instructions in the jury charge became the law of the case. Beiersdoerfer, 
953 So. 2d at 1209-10. 
D. The Defendants' Objection to the Inconsistent Verdict 
To avoid the preservation-of-error issue, the defendants argue that 
the alleged error relates solely to a substantive inconsistency in the 
verdict -- not to the instructions provided in the jury charge. This 
distinction is vital to the defendants. If a timely objection was not made 
at trial, an inconsistent verdict cannot be attacked on the ground that it 
was the result of erroneous instructions provided in the jury charge. 
Target Med. Partners Operating Co. v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 177 So. 3d 
843, 862 (Ala. 2013); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sheridan, 630 
So. 2d 384, 389 (Ala. 1993). However, the issue of a substantive 
inconsistency in the verdict generally can be raised for the first time in a 
motion for a new trial. See Barnes v. Oswalt, 579 So. 2d 1319 (Ala. 1991); 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc. v. Williams, 517 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1987); 
Stinson v. Acme Propane Gas Co., 391 So.2d 659 (Ala. 1980); and Lewis 
v. Moss, 347 So. 2d 91 (Ala. 1977). Citing those authorities, the 
defendants argue that if their claim of error relates solely to an alleged 
substantive inconsistency in the verdict, not to the instructions provided 
SC-2022-0480 
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in the jury charge, then their failure to object at trial does not preclude 
them from attacking the substantive inconsistency. However, this 
argument ignores the cases in which we have upheld inconsistent 
verdicts under circumstances similar to those in this case. 
Both the trial court's order denying the defendants' motion for a 
new trial and Williams's appellate brief cite to our holding in Tombrello 
v. McGhee, 282 Ala. 408, 211 So. 2d 900 (1968). In Tombrello, a trial court 
provided erroneous jury instructions, and the defendant failed to object. 
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on both his 
wantonness claim and his negligence claim, which was substantively 
inconsistent but in accord with the court's instructions. The defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, the defendant 
attacked the verdict as being contrary to law, correctly pointing out that 
wantonness and negligence cannot exist in the same act. This Court 
noted that, "as a general rule, a verdict based in part on [both wantonness 
and negligence] is contrary to the law." 282 Ala. 410, 211 So. 2d at 902. 
However, this Court upheld the inconsistent verdict because the jury had 
followed the trial judge's erroneous instructions, as "they were bound to 
do." Id. We noted that the defendant's silence indicated that "he assented 
SC-2022-0480 
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to the charge, which was the law of the case and by which the jury was 
bound." Id. The substantive inconsistency of the verdict was not enough 
to overcome this fact. In this case, the defendants' failure to object at trial 
similarly represents their assent to the jury charge. 
Our jurisprudence does not explicitly speak to the interplay 
between the rule set forth in the cases relied upon by the defendants and 
our holding in Tombrello. However, an analysis of those cases illuminates 
both 
the 
rationale 
behind 
allowing 
objections 
to 
substantive 
inconsistencies in a verdict for the first time in a motion for new trial and 
the reasons why that rationale does not apply in this case. In Barnes, the 
plaintiff sued the estate of the driver of a motor vehicle who had caused 
a motor-vehicle accident that injured the plaintiff and resulted in the 
death of the plaintiff's wife.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff as to his personal-injury claim, but not as to the wrongful-death 
claim, even though both his injuries and his wife's death had resulted 
from the same accident. This Court held that the verdict was therefore 
inconsistent. Williams involved myriad inconsistencies in a verdict 
stemming from a jury's findings that an employer was liable, but that its 
employee was not, when the employer's liability depended upon the 
SC-2022-0480 
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employee's liability. Additionally, in Williams the jury's finding for the 
plaintiff's wife on her loss-of-consortium claim was inconsistent with the 
jury's other findings. In Stinson, the jury found negligence but awarded 
no damages. Finally, the jury in Lewis awarded damages to the plaintiff 
but did not award any damages to her husband for medical expenses that 
he had incurred as a result of the plaintiff's injuries.  
Unlike Tombrello, none of those cases involved application of the 
law of the case or a failure to timely object so as to preserve the relevant 
claim of error for appellate review. That is because the error in those 
cases was not detectable or contemplated by the parties before the jury's 
deliberation. As those cases show, juries sometimes reach verdicts that 
are contrary to law but that could not have been anticipated or 
reasonably foreseen. Under those limited circumstances, allowing 
objections to inconsistent verdicts to be raised for the first time in a 
motion for new trial is appropriate.  
 
However, the defendants in this case attack an inconsistency that 
was contemplated well before the jury's deliberation and that the verdict 
form arguably invited. Thus, the holding in Tombrello applies, and 
defendants bore a duty to prevent such a foreseeable inconsistency by 
SC-2022-0480 
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timely objecting. See Tombrello, 282 Ala. at 410, 211 So. 2d at 902 
(stating that the appellant "should have taken an exception to the oral 
charge or requested an explanatory charge"). The defendants' counsel's 
statements to the court demonstrate knowledge that the eventual 
inconsistency was possible. The defendants thus had a duty to prevent 
the unnecessary confusion that their failure to properly object caused. 
Because the defendants failed to timely and properly object to the jury 
charge, the instructions in that charge became the law of the case. The 
defendants could not raise their objection for the first time in a motion 
for a new trial. 
This result is supported by this Court's holding in BIC Corp. v. 
Bean, 669 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1995), which the trial court cited in its order 
denying the motion for a new trial but the defendants fail to distinguish 
or discuss. In BIC Corp., the trial judge received a question from the jury. 
None of the parties' attorneys were present, so the judge answered the 
question and then notified the attorneys of what had happened. Neither 
party objected. Only after the jury returned an inconsistent verdict did 
the defendant challenge the instruction that invited the inconsistency. 
Noting that "'[u]nchallenged jury instructions become the law of the 
SC-2022-0480 
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case,'" this Court held that the defendant's inconsistent-verdict 
argument would "not serve as grounds for reversal." BIC Corp., 669 So. 
2d at 844 (quoting Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 1993)).  
The defendants in this case contend that they are not challenging 
the instructions in the jury charge but, rather, are challenging only the 
substantive inconsistency in the verdict. However, their appellate briefs 
are replete with excerpts from the instructions, seemingly provided to 
demonstrate error, and are filled with statements that they claim were 
objections to the instructions. It seems disingenuous for the defendants 
to assert that they are contesting only the substantive inconsistency of 
the verdict while supporting their argument with examples of what they 
contend were objections to the instructions at the root of that 
inconsistency. The fact remains that the defendants did not properly 
object to the instructions that they themselves say gave rise to the 
inconsistency. Those instructions became the law of the case, and the 
jurors acted accordingly.1 For this reason, the defendants' inconsistent-
 
 
1This Court does not find it necessary to discuss whether the trial 
court erred in following the Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions ("APJI") 
for negligence and wantonness without clarifying the mutual exclusivity 
of the two torts. However, given the frequency with which the torts are 
 
SC-2022-0480 
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verdict argument cannot provide a basis to reverse the trial court's 
judgment entered on the verdict and award them a new trial. 
III. Conclusion 
 
Williams met his burden of presenting substantial evidence of 
wantonness, and, therefore, the trial court's denial of the defendants' 
motion for a JML on that claim was proper. Additionally, the record 
shows that all the parties considered the possibility of an inconsistent 
verdict before the jury began deliberating. Despite that knowledge, the 
defendants did not object to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury 
that it could not render a verdict for Williams on both his negligence 
claim and his wantonness claim. As a result, the unchallenged jury 
instructions became the law of the case. The jury acted in accord with the 
court's unchallenged instructions, as they were bound to do, and the 
judgment entered on their verdict, though inconsistent, cannot be 
reversed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.   
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
litigated in tandem, we would recommend that the APJI be amended to 
include an instruction on their mutual exclusivity, which could be given 
when applicable. 
 
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Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.   
 
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion, 
which Bolin, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., join. 
 
 
SC-2022-0480 
20 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I concur with the main opinion as to the sufficiency of the evidence 
of wantonness. But as to the inconsistency of the verdict, I believe that 
the defendants sufficiently objected to the incompleteness of the jury 
instructions.  
After instructing the jury on the law, the circuit judge sent the jury 
into the hallway and conferred with the parties' counsel:  
"THE COURT: All right. What says the plaintiff? 
"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: No objections to your jury.  
"THE COURT: What says the defendant? 
"[DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL]: Judge, I do have two areas 
that I would like to talk about.  
"THE COURT: Sure, sure. 
"[DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL]: May I approach? 
"THE COURT: Absolutely. 
"[DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL]: And I don't -- it's just 
clarification so that they don't go back there and make any 
mistakes. One, I don't know if you have anything in there -- if 
there's any in pattern jury instructions that talk about the 
fact that negligence and wantonness are distinct. I just want 
to make sure that they have to do a negligence verdict or a 
wantonness verdict and that they can't come back with 
negligence and wantonness. 
"[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: I think the Court made that 
clear. 
SC-2022-0480 
21 
 
"THE COURT: I think so too. And I have a tendency -- well, 
no, I never, unless everybody agrees on something outside the 
[Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions], I just don't do it. I find 
that it's just easier. My record is cleaner when I don't do that, 
so I think that was pretty well covered."  
To preserve an error involving the incompleteness of jury 
instructions, a party must "object[] thereto ..., stating the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection." Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P. The purpose 
of requiring an objection is to "'afford[] the trial court an opportunity to 
correct any error in its charge,'" Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545, 559 
(Ala 2006) (citation omitted). Thus, all the law requires is that the party 
apprise the judge of the reason why the instructions are incomplete. See 
Robinson v. Harris, 370 So. 2d 961, 965-66 (Ala. 1979). The party must 
"adequately inform[] the trial court of its error[] and afford[] an 
opportunity for that court to correct the error." Nelms v. Allied Mills Co., 
387 So. 2d 152, 154 (Ala. 1980). Magic words such as "objection" or "the 
instructions are incomplete" are not required. See Rule 46, Ala. R. Civ. 
P. ("[I]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling ... of the court is 
... sought, makes known to the court the action which the party desires 
the court to take or the party's objection to the action of the court and the 
grounds therefor ...."); 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
SC-2022-0480 
22 
 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2553 (3d ed. 2008) ("An objection stating 
distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds for objection is 
sufficient; particular words or phraseology need not be employed."); id. § 
2554 ("Rule 51 is not top-heavy with technical reasons for concluding that 
an objection is insufficient under the rule. No particular formality is 
required of the objection so long as it is clear that the trial judge was 
informed of possible errors in the charge and was given an opportunity 
to correct them."); cf. 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 5036.1 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that 
informing a trial judge of an evidentiary objection "does not mean that 
the lawyer must utter the magic word 'objection'; it is enough that the 
trial judge understands that an objection is being made"). Nor is the 
objecting party required to propose an additional instruction. Robinson, 
370 So. 2d at 966.  
As seen from the above exchange, the defendants' counsel met this 
standard. In context, the judge clearly invited the parties' counsel to 
make any objections to the jury instructions. The plaintiff's counsel 
responded that he had none. The defendants' counsel then said, "I do 
have two areas" to discuss. He then expressed concern that the 
SC-2022-0480 
23 
 
instructions as they have been given would not prevent the jury from 
finding both negligence and wantonness. The discussion that followed 
makes clear that both the plaintiff's counsel and the judge understood 
the defendants' counsel's statement as an objection to the incompleteness 
of the instructions. The plaintiff's counsel countered that he thought the 
instructions were clear on the negligence/wantonness point. The judge 
said, "I think so too," and explained that she never gave outside-pattern 
instructions unless they were stipulated. In context, the parties and the 
judge clearly understood that as an overruling of the defendants' 
counsel's objection. The purpose of the objection requirement -- fair notice 
to the judge, see Ware, 954 So. 2d at 559 -- was thus satisfied here. 
Moreover, when the defendants' counsel said, "[I]t's just 
clarification," in context he was requesting that the judge provide a 
clarification to the jury, in the form of an instruction about the mutual 
exclusivity of negligence and wantonness. Contrary to the main opinion's 
characterization, he was not merely making a clarification to the judge 
(or, for that matter, requesting that the judge clarify something to him). 
Indeed, the defendants' counsel's use of "clarification," in the sense of 
making something clear to the jury, is precisely the way the main opinion 
SC-2022-0480 
24 
 
itself uses the word. See ___ So. 3d at ___ n.1 ("This Court does not find 
it necessary to discuss whether the trial court erred in following the 
Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions for negligence and wantonness 
without clarifying the mutual exclusivity of the two torts." (emphasis 
added)). 
Moreover, when understood in context, the defendants' counsel's 
objection is unlike the mere "discussion" in Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal 
& Hamilton Co., 953 So. 2d 1196 (Ala. 2006). There, the attorney's 
language did not object to the incompleteness of the instructions: 
"'It seems to me that [the counterclaim plaintiff] should 
... elect between his remedies, fraud and breach of contract, 
since they're based upon the same facts. And there's the 
potential for the jury, if they rule his way on both of those 
claims, to award double damages. But I admit to you I have 
not researched that as of yet.'" 
 
Id. at 1209. The attorney's comment was directed to what he thought the 
counterclaim plaintiff should do -- elect between causes of action -- rather 
than what the trial court should do -- give an additional jury instruction. 
And the attorney took no definitive position on the verdict-inconsistency 
issue, admitting that he had not researched it.  
In contrast, here the defendants' counsel both took a position on the 
verdict-inconsistency issue and expressed concern that the issue should 
SC-2022-0480 
25 
 
be clarified for the jury. This objection was similar to the one held 
sufficient in Robinson. There, the plaintiff's counsel pointed out that the 
judge had instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to prove that a 
particular service company was not an independent contractor of the 
defendant. Counsel then summarized evidence of the defendant's own 
negligence and said that that instruction was " 'very wrong and unfair to 
the Plaintiff, because we haven't pinned our case ... on what was done 
that day when [the alleged independent contractor] was there.'" 370 So. 
2d at 965-66 (emphasis omitted). We held that that explanation "was 
sufficient to call the court's attention to this omission to charge on 
plaintiff's other theories for recovery." Id. at 966. Likewise, here the 
defendants' counsel made clear his concern about the incomplete jury 
instructions sufficiently to apprise the court.  
Further, the defendants' counsel's remark, two transcript pages 
after the above-quoted exchange, that "I just want to make sure that I've 
got it on the record that I will have an objection if they return both a 
negligence and a wantonness verdict," did nothing to undermine the 
sufficiency of his previous objection. First, it is not clear that that later 
comment was an expression of intent to object postverdict. In context, it 
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appears more likely that, by the word "objection," counsel meant "an 
issue preserved for appeal." In other words, he was probably simply 
explaining why he had earlier objected to the incomplete jury 
instructions regarding negligence versus wantonness: to have the 
objection on the record in order to preserve the issue for appeal, just in 
case the jury were to find both. Second, and more importantly, by the 
time of that comment, the judge had already unequivocally overruled the 
defendants' counsel's objection. Logically, then, the comment cannot alter 
the fact that the issue had already been preserved. 
The preservation requirement of Rule 51 is not a game of magic 
words or stilted technicalities. See Rule 46; Wright & Miller, supra, §§ 
2553, 2554. Here, during the time for objecting to jury instructions, the 
defendants' counsel communicated to the judge his (legally correct) 
concern that, under the instructions given, the jury might inconsistently 
find both negligence and wantonness; counsel said he "want[ed] to make 
sure" that did not happen, and he received a ruling on that objection. 
Accordingly, the issue was preserved, and I would reverse the judgment 
based on the inconsistent verdict. 
Bolin, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.