Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John F. Scanlan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1930-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John F. Scanlan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
John F. Scanlan, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SCANLAN 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 5, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant there were briefs by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton, and oral argument 
by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief by Daniel 
W. Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
2006 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1930-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John F. Scanlan, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
John F. Scanlan, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 5, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
seeks review of a referee's report and recommendation that 
Attorney John F. Scanlan's license to practice law be suspended 
for 180 days, that he pay restitution of $2000 plus interest to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Lawyers' 
Fund 
for 
Client 
Protection 
and 
restitution of $3086.67 plus interest to a former client, and 
that he bear the costs of these proceedings.   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In July 2004 the OLR filed a 22-count complaint 
alleging misconduct during 2000 and 2002 with respect to 
Attorney Scanlan's handling of nine client matters.  Attorney 
Scanlan filed a responsive pleading admitting many of the fact 
allegations and several rule violations, thus eliminating the 
need for a hearing on the admitted matters.  Following a hearing 
on the remaining counts, the referee filed a report and 
recommendation on August 8, 2005, finding misconduct as charged 
in all but four of the counts.   
¶3 
The 
OLR 
appeals 
and 
challenges 
the 
referee's 
conclusions with respect to three dismissed counts and the 
recommended 180-day license suspension.  The OLR claims the 
referee erroneously concluded: (1) because SCR 22.26(1) imposes 
no duties following an administrative license suspension for 
dues nonpayment, the OLR failed to prove Count 2; (2) Attorney 
Scanlan's conversion of $3086.67 of his client's funds did not 
violate SCR 20:8.4(c) and, therefore, the OLR did not meet its 
burden of proof with respect to Count 18; (3) because Attorney 
Scanlan's unauthorized transfer and use of funds from his client 
trust account failed to support a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), 
the OLR did not prove Count 19; and (4) Attorney Scanlan's 
violations justify only a 180-day suspension.  The OLR seeks to 
overturn the referee's dismissal of Counts 2, 18, and 19, and 
seeks a two-year license suspension.  
¶4 
Because we conclude the referee erred in determining 
that the OLR did not meet its burden of proof, we overturn the 
referee's dismissal of Counts 2, 18, and 19.  While we agree 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
3 
 
with the referee's determination that significant mitigating 
factors obviate the need for the two-year suspension sought by 
the OLR, we conclude that the seriousness of Attorney Scanlan's 
misconduct warrants a full six-month license suspension, rather 
than the recommended 180 days.  Consequently, Attorney Scanlan 
will need to petition for reinstatement to practice law in 
Wisconsin.   
¶5 
In all other respects, we agree with the referee's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we adopt them.  We 
further conclude that Attorney Scanlan should make restitution 
of $2000 plus interest to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection, and $3086.67 plus interest to H.V.R., a former 
client, and that Attorney Scanlan should bear the costs of these 
proceedings totaling $14,201.16.1     
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Attorney Scanlan was licensed to practice law in 1992 
and admitted to the Wisconsin State Bar in 1997.  He has not 
previously been disciplined.  In 2002 he closed his solo 
practice in Door County and moved to Illinois where he practices 
as in-house counsel.   
A. 
Misconduct Charges  
1. 
The R.M. Client Matter 
¶7 
Counts 
1—3 
alleged 
that 
while 
subject 
to 
an 
administrative 
law 
license 
suspension, 
Attorney 
Scanlan 
                                                 
1 The OLR incurred costs before the appeal amounted to 
$8774.17.  The appellate costs amounted to $5426.99 as of 
January 19, 2006. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
4 
 
continued to practice law, giving rise to violations of SCR 
20:1.4(a) and (b),2 SCR 22.26(1),3 and SCR 22.03(2).4  In August 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b) state:  Communication. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation. 
3 SCR 
22.26(1) 
states 
in 
relevant 
part: 
 
Activities 
following suspension or revocation. 
 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients 
being represented in pending matters of the suspension 
or 
revocation 
and 
of 
the 
attorney's 
consequent 
inability 
to 
act 
as 
an 
attorney 
following 
the 
effective date of the suspension or revocation. 
 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice 
of their choice elsewhere. 
 
(c) Promptly provide written notification to 
the court or administrative agency and the attorney 
for each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence. 
4 SCR 22.03(2) states:  Investigation. 
(2) 
Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
5 
 
2002 R.M. was charged with second offense operating while 
intoxicated and operating while revoked, and she retained 
Attorney Scanlan to represent her.  The referee found that while 
Attorney Scanlan's law license was administratively suspended 
from October 31, 2002, to November 20, 2002, for failure to pay 
required bar dues and assessments, a scheduled pretrial was held 
on November 18 for R.M.'s matter.  The district attorney's 
office had checked a court or state bar Web site and learned 
that 
Attorney 
Scanlan's 
law 
license 
had 
been 
suspended.  
However, Attorney Scanlan never informed the district attorney's 
office or local judges that he had been administratively 
suspended.   
¶8 
The referee specifically found that Attorney Scanlan 
did not attend R.M.'s scheduled pretrial conference because at 
that point he knew his license had been temporarily suspended.  
R.M. appeared unrepresented at the pretrial conference.  The 
pretrial conference evolved into a plea hearing during which 
R.M. pled guilty to a charge of operating under the influence of 
an intoxicant.   
                                                                                                                                                             
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
6 
 
¶9 
R.M. filed a grievance with the OLR.  The referee 
found Attorney Scanlan did not respond to two OLR letters, but 
responded to a third, after he had sought reinstatement from a 
temporary 
suspension occasioned by 
his 
non-cooperation in 
another OLR grievance investigation.   
¶10 As 
to 
Count 
1, 
relating 
to 
Attorney 
Scanlan's 
obligation to keep his client reasonably informed, the OLR 
agreed that because R.M. failed to appear at the disciplinary 
hearing although subpoenaed, the OLR did not meet its burden of 
proof.  Therefore, Count 1 was dismissed.   
¶11 The referee next determined the OLR did not meet its 
burden to show a violation of SCR 22.26(1) as charged in Count 
2.  Count 2 alleged that by failing to notify the court, the 
district attorney's office and his client of his administrative 
license suspension and inability to practice law, Attorney 
Scanlan violated SCR 22.26(1), requiring notification to clients 
and others of his suspension.   
¶12 The referee concluded that because SCR 22.26(1) does 
not apply to an administrative license suspension, the OLR 
failed to meet its burden of proof.  The referee determined:  
"[Attorney] Scanlan argued persuasively that SCR 22.26(1) does 
not apply to administrative suspensions based upon a lawyer's 
failure to pay State bar dues pursuant to SCR 10.03(6) because 
it 
is 
not 
a 
Supreme 
Court 
suspension 
nor 
revocation."  
Therefore, the referee dismissed Count 2.      
¶13 As to Count 3, by not filing timely responses to the 
OLR's requests, the referee concluded Attorney Scanlan violated 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
7 
 
SCR 22.03(2), requiring full disclosure of all facts pertaining 
to alleged misconduct within 20 days of the request.   
2. 
The J.K. Client Matter   
¶14 Counts 4—7 involved Attorney Scanlan's failure to 
deposit an advance fee in his trust account and failure to 
return an unearned fee to his client, J.K., giving rise to 
violations of former SCR 20:1.15(a),5 SCR 20:1.16(d),6 SCR 
22.03(2), and SCR 22.03(6).7  
¶15 The referee found that in October 2001 J.K. retained 
Attorney Scanlan in a divorce matter and paid a $2500 retainer 
                                                 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(a) provided in relevant 
part that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third 
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity." 
6 SCR 
20:1.16(d) 
provides: 
Declining 
or 
terminating 
representation. 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
7 SCR 22.03(6) provides in relevant part:  Investigation. 
 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
8 
 
as an advance toward hourly fees, which Attorney Scanlan 
deposited in his business account.  Approximately one week 
later, J.K. notified Attorney Scanlan that she did not wish to 
proceed with the divorce.  Eventually, J.K. hired another 
attorney to recover the $2500.  Attorney Scanlan told J.K.'s 
attorney he would send a check and an accounting within a week 
but failed to do so.  A grievance was filed on J.K.'s behalf and 
the OLR sent two letters to Attorney Scanlan, to which he did 
not respond.  Attorney Scanlan eventually sent an accounting to 
J.K.'s attorney as well as a refund of $1990.    
¶16 Attorney Scanlan did not respond to the OLR's request 
for information with which he was personally served.  As a 
result, after this court issued an order to show cause, Attorney 
Scanlan's license was temporarily suspended on January 14, 2003.  
The 
OLR 
subsequently 
reported 
that 
Attorney 
Scanlan 
had 
responded to its request for information and Attorney Scanlan's 
license was reinstated on April 29, 2003.  
¶17 In May 2003 the OLR again inquired whether Attorney 
Scanlan had deposited J.K.'s $2500 retainer into his trust 
account.  Attorney Scanlan did not respond until August 2003 
after the OLR had written another letter and Attorney Scanlan 
had asked for two extensions.  Based on hearing testimony the 
referee found Attorney Scanlan never put J.K.'s $2500 retainer 
fee in his trust account.   
¶18 As to Count 4, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Scanlan had an absolute duty to deposit the $2500 advance into 
his trust account and by failing to do so, he violated former 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
9 
 
SCR 20:1.15(a), providing that a lawyer must hold a client's 
property in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property.   
¶19 As to Count 5, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Scanlan was obliged to refund J.K.'s unearned fees and by 
failing to do so for more than a year after termination of the 
client relationship, Attorney Scanlan violated SCR 20:1.16(d), 
providing that upon termination of representation, the attorney 
should take reasonable steps to protect a client's interests, 
including refunding unearned advanced fees.  
¶20 With respect to Count 6, it was stipulated that by 
failing to provide a written response to J.K.'s grievance for 
over seven months after it was due, causing Attorney Scanlan's 
license 
to 
be 
temporarily 
suspended 
for 
non-cooperation, 
Attorney 
Scanlan 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2), 
requiring 
timely 
disclosure.   
¶21 Concerning Count 7, the referee determined Attorney 
Scanlan's failure to respond timely to the OLR violated SCR 
22.03(6), providing it is misconduct to willfully fail to 
provide information during an OLR investigation.   
3. 
The T.V. Client Matter 
¶22 Counts 8 and 9 alleged that Attorney Scanlan practiced 
law during a time that his law license was administratively 
suspended, giving rise to violations of SCR 10.03(6),8 SCR 
                                                 
8 SCR 10.03(6) provides:  Membership. 
 
(6) Penalty for nonpayment of dues.  If the 
annual dues or assessments of any member remain unpaid 
120 days after the payment is due, the membership of 
the member may be suspended in the manner provided in 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
10 
 
20:8.4(f),9 and SCR 22.03(2).  In September 2002 T.V. was charged 
with misdemeanor bail jumping and on September 23, 2002, 
Attorney Scanlan entered a notice of appearance on T.V.'s 
behalf.    
¶23 The referee determined, based on agreed upon facts, 
that due to Attorney Scanlan's failure to pay dues and 
assessments, his license was suspended on November 1, 2002.  
During his period of suspension, on November 6, 2002, Attorney 
Scanlan appeared in court and entered a guilty plea on behalf of 
his client, T.V.  It is undisputed that Attorney Scanlan had not 
received a letter notifying him of his suspension at that time.  
After paying his dues and assessments, Attorney Scanlan's 
license was reinstated on November 20, 2002.  Attorney Scanlan 
did not respond to two investigative requests regarding this 
matter, but responded in April 2003 while seeking reinstatement 
from temporary suspension.   
¶24 The referee concluded as to Count 8 that the OLR 
failed to meet its burden of proof "for the same reasons it 
failed to meet its Burden of Proof in count #2" and therefore, 
dismissed Count 8.10   
                                                                                                                                                             
the bylaws; and no person whose membership is so 
suspended for nonpayment of dues or assessments may 
practice law during the period of the suspension. 
9 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
10 The OLR does not appeal the dismissal of Count 8.   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
11 
 
¶25 As to Count 9, because Attorney Scanlan failed to 
provide information regarding the grievance for over three 
months after a response was due, the referee found that Attorney 
Scanlan violated SCR 22.03(2), requiring timely disclosure.   
4. 
The R.J. Client Matter    
¶26 Count 10 alleged that Attorney Scanlan violated SCR 
20:1.111 involving a collection matter.  The referee determined, 
based on agreed upon facts, that in April 2001 Attorney Scanlan 
had agreed to represent R.J. in a civil lawsuit and made a brief 
appearance but failed to appear at trial, which proceeded in his 
client's absence and resulted in a judgment against R.J. for 
interest, attorney fees and costs, and which assessed fees and 
costs personally against Attorney Scanlan.  The referee found 
the circuit court granted attorney fees and costs on the ground 
that Attorney Scanlan's continuance of R.J.'s defense following 
discovery was frivolous.  The referee concluded that by failing 
to determine whether his client had a viable defense, failing to 
file an amendment to his client's pro se answer and to respond 
to the cross-claim, or alternatively seek settlement, Attorney 
Scanlan failed to provide competent representation, contrary to 
SCR 20:1.1.  
5. 
The District Attorney Matter 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
12 
 
¶27 Count 11 alleged that the Door County District 
Attorney filed a grievance relating to several criminal cases 
that formed a basis for Attorney Scanlan's violation of SCR 
22.03(2).  The Door County Assistant District Attorney reported 
to the OLR that several criminal defendants had complained to 
the 
district 
attorney's 
office 
about 
Attorney 
Scanlan's 
representation.  The OLR wrote four letters of inquiry to 
Attorney Scanlan, who did not respond.  Finally, in April 2002 
the OLR sought temporary suspension for non-cooperation and this 
court issued an order to show cause.  Attorney Scanlan failed to 
respond within the deadline, but did so before the suspension 
order was issued and as a result his license was not suspended.  
Attorney Scanlan agreed, and the referee concluded, this conduct 
violated 22.03(2), requiring full timely disclosure of facts 
regarding misconduct.   
6. 
The M.M. Client Matter  
¶28 Counts 12—14 involved a family law matter in which 
Attorney Scanlan was alleged to have violated SCR 20:1.3,12 
former SCR 20:1.15(a), and SCR 20:1.16(d).  Attorney Scanlan 
agreed to represent M.M. to seek an amendment to an existing 
custody and placement order.  In April 2002 M.M. paid an advance 
of $2000, which Attorney Scanlan placed in his business checking 
account rather than his client trust account.  Attorney Scanlan 
closed his Wisconsin office in July 2002 and moved to Illinois 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
13 
 
without telling M.M., or providing contact information to him.  
Attorney Scanlan took no steps to amend the existing custody and 
placement order and did not contact M.M. or refund any part of 
the $2000 advance fee, or return documents M.M. had left with 
him.   
¶29 The referee found that the $2000 fee was an advance 
against hourly fees and was deposited in Attorney Scanlan's 
business, rather than trust account.  Attorney Scanlan did not 
prepare a fee agreement.  Absolutely no work was done for the 
$2000 and eventually M.M. applied for and received $2000 from 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.    
¶30 Attorney Scanlan agreed, as to Count 12, that his 
conduct violated SCR 20:1.3, requiring counsel to represent a 
client with reasonable diligence and promptness.  As to Count 
13, the referee concluded that by failing to deposit the $2000 
advance in his trust account, Attorney Scanlan violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(a), providing counsel must hold a client's property 
in trust.  As for Count 14, Attorney Scanlan agreed, and the 
referee concluded, that by moving to Illinois without notice and 
without returning papers or the $2000 advance fee, Attorney 
Scanlan violated 20:1.16(d), providing upon termination of 
representation, counsel shall take reasonable steps to protect 
his client's interests.   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
14 
 
7. 
The H.V.R. Client Matter 
¶31 Counts 
15—20 
alleged 
violations 
of 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(a), former SCR 20:1.15(b),13 and SCR 20:8.4(c),14 in 
collection matters that Attorney Scanlan handled for a business, 
H.V.R.  Attorney Scanlan arranged to retain one-third of any 
amount he collected as a fee.  These counts pertain to Attorney 
Scanlan's conversion of client funds, mishandling of payments, 
and his poor recordkeeping.    
¶32 The referee made numerous findings with respect to 
Attorney Scanlan's handling of client funds, including that 
Attorney Scanlan deposited six checks totaling $1000 belonging 
to H.V.R., into his business account, rather than his trust 
account.15  The referee also found that between August 16, 2001, 
and September 14, 2001, Attorney Scanlan made eight telephone 
                                                 
13 Former SCR 20:1.15(b) states:  Safekeeping property. 
 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person in writing.  Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
render a full accounting regarding such property. 
14 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
15 The investigator testified that this amount was "pretty 
much used up within the first four days after it was deposited 
to his business account."   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
15 
 
transfers from his client trust account to his business checking 
account and, although he should have been holding $820 in his 
trust account for H.V.R., the balance in his trust account fell 
to $333.03.16  The referee also found that on August 21, 2001, 
Attorney Scanlan overdrew his business checking account and it 
continued in overdraft status until August 28, 2001.  
¶33 The 
Door 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department 
opened 
an 
investigation regarding Attorney Scanlan's handling of H.V.R.'s 
funds and provided the OLR with a copy of its file.  In May 2003 
the OLR requested Attorney Scanlan to provide an accounting of 
all funds he had received on behalf of H.V.R., and provide 
complete trust account records from January 1, 2001, through May 
30, 2002, but Attorney Scanlan did not respond.  After further 
requests, Attorney Scanlan provided responses, but omitted 
documentation.  At one point the OLR inquired whether Attorney 
Scanlan had disbursed to H.V.R. two-thirds of the trust account 
deposits made for its benefit on three specific dates and 
Attorney Scanlan responded that his records were not clear and 
he did not have copies of correspondence which would permit him 
to answer.     
                                                 
16 The investigator testified to the effect that based on 
her review, between November 1, 2000, and June 30, 2002, 
Attorney Scanlan made 33 telephone transfers from his trust 
account to his business account for which there are no records 
to indicate which client or clients were involved and for which 
there was no indication as to the purpose of those withdrawals.  
Attorney Scanlan does not refute this testimony. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
16 
 
¶34 The referee also found that the trust account records 
Attorney Scanlan did provide revealed among other things that 
some of the deposits to the trust account appeared to represent 
payment of fees that had already been earned and billed, and 
therefore, constituted personal funds belonging to Attorney 
Scanlan.  The referee also found that on October 2, 2001, there 
was an automatic withdrawal from the client trust account to 
U.S. Cellular, constituting a personal payment.17     
¶35 As to Count 15, the referee determined Attorney 
Scanlan deposited six checks, totaling $1000 belonging to 
H.V.R., into his personal business account rather than his trust 
account, contrary to former SCR 20.1.15(a).  As to Count 16, the 
referee concluded that Attorney Scanlan commingled personal and 
client funds by depositing earned fee payments into the trust 
account and paying a personal bill out of the trust account, 
contrary to former SCR 20:1.15(a).   
¶36 With respect to Count 17, the referee concluded by 
failing to notify H.V.R. of the funds he collected and failing 
to 
deliver 
them, 
Attorney 
Scanlan 
violated 
former 
SCR 
20:1.15(b), which provides that upon receiving funds or other 
property in which his client has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client in writing and deliver the funds as 
well as render a full accounting on request.  The referee found 
that $3086.67 was still missing.   
                                                 
17 The investigator testified that the payment to U.S. 
Cellular was $311.71.   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
17 
 
¶37 The referee dismissed Counts 18 and 19, both of which 
charged violations of SCR 20:8.4(c).  Count 18 alleged that by 
converting 
$3086.67 
belonging 
to 
H.V.R., Attorney Scanlan 
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  
Count 19 alleged that Attorney Scanlan made telephone transfers 
of over $48,000 in funds from his client trust account to his 
personal business account, without identifying and knowing the 
purpose of the withdrawals and to whom the funds belonged, and 
therefore 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation. 
 
The 
referee 
found, 
based 
on 
medical 
testimony, that Attorney Scanlan's failure to properly account 
for and turn money over to his client resulted from sloppy 
bookkeeping and ineffective office administration rather than 
intentional wrongdoing.  The referee dismissed Counts 18 and 19. 
¶38 Count 20 alleged that Attorney Scanlan failed to 
maintain trust account records and was unable to produce such 
records for the OLR inspection and unable to identify funds on 
deposit.  Attorney Scanlan agreed, and the referee concluded, 
that by failing to maintain a complete trust account record, 
including individual client ledgers, receipts and disbursement 
journals, and checkbook reconciliation, so that he was unable to 
produce records for the OLR's inspection, and "unable to 
identify the ownership of $49,455.23 in funds un-deposited in 
his client trust account as of December 1, 2000," he violated 
former SCR 20:1.15(a).    
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
18 
 
8. 
The R.P. and R.B. Client Matters 
¶39 Counts 21 and 22 alleged that Attorney Scanlan 
violated SCR 22.03(2) by failing to respond timely to the OLR's 
requests for information.  Two clients, R.P. and R.B., filed 
grievances.  Attorney Scanlan did not respond promptly to a 
number of requests.  The referee concluded that this conduct 
violated 
SCR 
22.03(2), 
for 
failing 
to 
provide 
a 
timely 
disclosure or response.   
B. 
Mitigating Factors 
¶40 Attorney Scanlan offered evidence of mental health 
problems he suffered during the time he committed the rule 
violations.  The referee found that the numerous counts of 
misconduct arose when Attorney Scanlan had been suffering from 
overwhelming personal and psychological problems.  The referee 
determined that during this time, Attorney Scanlan had been 
treated for depression and had undergone a stressful divorce.   
¶41 Dr. 
Patricia 
Mueller, 
a 
psychiatrist 
and 
psychoanalyst, testified at the disciplinary hearing that she 
began treating Attorney Scanlan in June 2003.18  She diagnosed 
Scanlan with: (1) major depression, including recurrent major 
depressive episodes, which left him feeling totally hopeless and 
immobilized; (2) bi-polar II, which means he was hypomanic for 
brief periods and depressed the rest of the time; and (3) adult 
attention deficit disorder, meaning that his emotions interfered 
                                                 
18 Attorney 
Scanlan 
received 
previous 
mental 
health 
treatment but did not present evidence from his former treatment 
provider.   
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
19 
 
with his ability to concentrate.  She stated his divorce added 
to his depression.  
¶42 According to Dr. Mueller, the combination of the three 
diagnoses and the divorce interfered with his ability to 
function as an attorney during the time in question.  She 
testified: 
[B]ecause what he was telling me is the whole sense of 
it he had to face anything that he had to do, he would 
feel overwhelmed and put it off and kind [of] avoid 
and be terribly, terribly anxious, anxious in a way 
that wouldn't empower him to do anything.  
¶43 Dr. Mueller further explained that Attorney Scanlan's 
attention deficit disorder made it difficult for him to focus on 
details and follow through, and many disciplinary problems 
resulted from "not responding to requests from various official 
agencies, 
and 
I 
think 
what 
happened 
was 
he 
just 
was 
overwhelmed."   
¶44 Dr. Mueller acknowledged that she had not been 
treating Attorney Scanlan during the time the allegations of the 
disciplinary complaint arose and she was unfamiliar with the 
misconduct allegations.  She stated, "I think there's something 
else about funds that were supposed to have been put in another 
account got put in his account, but he didn't spend them.  I'm 
not sure quite how that worked."  Dr. Mueller specifically 
stated that she had not looked at the charges relating to 
Attorney Scanlan's handling of the H.V.R. client's collection 
accounts regarding his functioning with respect to those 
accounts.  She noted that because of a change in his job 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
20 
 
responsibilities and a change in medications, Attorney Scanlan 
is not currently at risk.   
¶45 The referee found: "[Attorney Scanlan] was overwhelmed 
with detail which dovetails into his own testimony that during 
some period of time he simply quite [sic] going to the office 
and stayed in bed while telling himself that he would go into 
the office later."  The referee determined that Attorney Scanlan 
was remorseful, embarrassed, and willing to take responsibility 
for his actions.   
¶46 The referee also found that Attorney Scanlan is now 
able to cope due to medical/psychiatric treatment, medications, 
a new job, relocation to Illinois and a lack of family 
pressures.  The referee noted that Attorney Scanlan's responsive 
pleadings eliminated many factual disputes and the need for 
independent determination of several rule violations.    
C. 
Referee's Recommended Discipline 
¶47 In determining the appropriate discipline the referee 
balanced competing factors.  As aggravating factors, the referee 
noted that Attorney Scanlan's misconduct affected nine separate 
clients and numerous proven counts of rules violations.  Also, 
Attorney Scanlan had established a pattern of not responding to 
the OLR, and his license was suspended for not responding 
timely.  Additionally, the referee found there remains a total 
of $5086.67 owing in client restitution and to the Wisconsin 
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.  
¶48 As mitigating factors the referee considered that 
Attorney Scanlan expressed deep remorse and admitted many facts 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
21 
 
alleged, as well as admitting counts of misconduct.   The 
referee observed that Attorney Scanlan suffered from a variety 
of mental disorders that interfered with his ability to function 
as an attorney during the relevant time periods.  The referee 
noted Dr. Mueller's testimony that because of the changes in 
medication and job duties, Attorney Scanlan is currently not a 
risk.  Also, the referee considered Attorney Scanlan went 
through a stressful divorce during the relevant time.   
¶49 The referee found that Attorney Scanlan was an 
otherwise responsible person who, as a sole practitioner, was 
simply overwhelmed with the detail necessary to run his office 
and now that problem is solved by his position as in-house 
counsel for a business.  Further, the referee concluded, by 
moving to Illinois, Attorney Scanlan no longer is a risk to 
Wisconsin public.  Finally, the referee considered that Attorney 
Scanlan had no disciplinary history and if he were to be 
disciplined as requested by the OLR, a reinstatement hearing in 
the state of Wisconsin would be required which, in the referee's 
view, would be an unreasonably harsh result based on the facts.   
¶50 Balancing all these factors, the referee recommended 
that Attorney Scanlan's license to practice law be suspended for 
180 days, that he pay restitution of $2000 plus interest to the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, that he pay 
restitution of $3086.67 plus interest to a former client, and 
bear the costs of these proceedings totaling $14,201.16. 
II. DISPUTED ISSUES 
A. 
Count Two 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
22 
 
¶51 The OLR first challenges the referee's determination 
that the record fails to support Count 2, which alleged that 
Attorney Scanlan failed to notify his client R.M, the court and 
the district attorney's office of his administrative license 
suspension and inability to represent his client, in violation 
of SCR 22.26(1).  While a referee's findings of fact will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  The 
question presented is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate a 
rule violation.  This question requires the application of a 
legal standard to a set of facts, thus presenting a question of 
law we review de novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 130, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981).  We 
conclude the uncontroverted facts demonstrate the violation 
alleged in Count 2.  Accordingly, we overturn the referee's 
dismissal of Count 2. 
¶52 SCR 22.26(1) provides that an attorney whose license 
is suspended or revoked has certain obligations, including, 
(a) notifying by certified mail all clients being represented in 
pending matters; (b) advising the client to seek legal advice 
elsewhere; and (c) providing written notice to the court and the 
attorney for each party in a matter pending before the court of 
the suspension and of the attorney's inability to act.19  
Attorney Scanlan does not dispute the facts underlying his 
                                                 
19 See note 3. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
23 
 
administrative suspension or his failure to comply with SCR 
22.26(1).20  Attorney Scanlan acknowledges he did not provide 
notice to his client, but argues that the duties enumerated in 
SCR 22.26(1) do not apply to administrative suspensions.  He 
contends that because his suspension was administrative rather 
than court ordered, he was under no obligation to comply with 
SCR 22.26(1).   
¶53 We are unpersuaded.  We agree with the OLR that the 
rule's 
plain 
language 
does 
not 
distinguish 
between 
administrative suspensions and court-ordered suspensions.  Its 
application to an administrative suspension is consistent with 
the results in the other cases.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nott, 2003 WI 17, ¶10, 260 Wis. 2d 4, 658 
N.W.2d 438 (failing to notify two clients of CLE suspension 
violated 
SCR 
22.26(1)(a)); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against Engelbrecht, 2000 WI 120, ¶¶2,9, 239 Wis. 2d 236, 618 
N.W.2d 743 (This court approved a stipulation that failure to 
notify 
the 
court 
and 
counsel 
of 
administrative 
license 
suspension for failing to comply with mandatory CLE requirements 
                                                 
20 Attorney Scanlan admitted he received a notice from the 
state bar that his law license would be automatically suspended 
on November 1, 2002, if he did not pay his dues by October 31, 
2002.  He did not pay his dues as required and his license was 
suspended as of November 1, 2002.  The referee found that 
Attorney Scanlan did not appear in court for his client on 
November 18, because he knew by that time his license had been 
suspended.  His client, R.M., appeared in court unrepresented on 
November 18 and informed the court her attorney would not be 
able to appear on her behalf.  Attorney Scanlan's license was 
reinstated November 20, 2002. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
24 
 
while counsel of record for a client in a small claims eviction 
trial violated SCR 22.26(1)(b).).  We conclude that the plain 
language of SCR 22.26(1) encompasses administrative as well as 
court-ordered suspensions. 
¶54 Here, the effect of Attorney Scanlan's failure to 
comply with SCR 22.26(1) was to leave his client unrepresented 
at a pretrial hearing, resulting in entering her plea on her own 
without counsel.  This result could have been alleviated had 
Attorney Scanlan complied with SCR 22.26(1) and notified his 
client, the court and opposing counsel of his inability to 
represent R.M. due to his administrative license suspension.  
¶55 Attorney Scanlan points out that a lawyer practicing 
after administrative suspension may be disciplined under SCR 
20:5.5.21  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nichols, 
193 Wis. 2d 295, 207, 532 N.W.2d 712 (1995)(continuing to 
practice law while suspended for failure to pay dues violates 
SCR 20:5.5).  He also notes that discipline is available under 
SCR 20:8.4(f).22  This argument merely demonstrates that an act 
of misconduct may be addressed by more than one rule.  His 
concession that the continuation of practicing law after an 
administrative license suspension violates SCR 20:5.5 and SCR 
                                                 
21 SCR 20:5.5 states:  Unauthorized practice of law.  "A 
lawyer shall not (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing 
so violates the regulation of the legal profession in a 
jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the 
bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law." 
22 See note 9. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
25 
 
20:8.4(f) fails to demonstrate SCR 22.26(1) is inapplicable to 
an administrative license suspension. 
¶56 Attorney 
Scanlan 
further 
argues that 
the 
prompt 
reinstatement provisions upon compliance demonstrate that SCR 
22.26(1) was unintended to apply to administrative suspensions 
because time sensitive provisions of SCR 22.26(1) would be 
inapplicable or irrelevant once the lawyer was administratively 
reinstated.23  We are not persuaded.  To the extent Attorney 
Scanlan's arguments suggest practical difficulties arising from 
obligations under SCR 22.26(1) as applied to administrative 
suspensions, 
the 
obstacles 
to 
which 
he 
refers 
are 
not 
insurmountable.  For example, SCR 22.26(1)(d)24 provides a 15-day 
window after the effective date of suspension or revocation for 
an attorney to make arrangements for the temporary or permanent 
winding up of his practice.  This provision indicates that an 
attorney is afforded a reasonable time within 15 days after the 
effective 
date 
of 
a 
license 
suspension 
to 
fulfill 
his 
obligations under SCR 22.26(1).     
                                                 
23 In a footnote, Attorney Scanlan also argues it is 
doubtful that all the lawyers reinstated for failure to pay bar 
dues fully complied with SCR 22.26(1).  We conclude that this 
argument, unaccompanied by record citation, fails to demonstrate 
SCR 22.26(1) is inapplicable to administrative suspensions. 
24 SCR 22.26(1)(d) provides that "[w]ithin the first 15 days 
after the effective date of suspension or revocation, make all 
arrangements for the temporary or permanent closing or winding 
up of the attorney's practice.  The attorney may assist in 
having others take over clients' work in progress." 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
26 
 
¶57 We reject Attorney Scanlan's arguments implying that 
an administratively suspended attorney's client must fend for 
herself at court proceedings because the attorney has no duty 
under SCR 22.26(1) to notify her, the court, or opposing counsel 
of his inability to appear on her behalf.  Attorney Scanlan 
points to nothing in the rules' plain language or the cited 
authorities to require the conclusion that SCR 22.26(1) applies 
only to court ordered license suspensions.25 
                                                 
25 In a footnote, Attorney Scanlan points out that the OLR 
does not challenge the referee's dismissal of Count 8, as added 
support that the OLR erroneously challenges the dismissal of 
Count 2.  Count 8 alleged a violation of SCR 20:8.4.(f) 
resulting from Attorney Scanlan's court appearance for his 
client, T.V., after Attorney Scanlan was suspended but before he 
received notice of the suspension.   
Attorney Scanlan's argument does not directly address the 
distinctions in the facts of these two separate client matters 
and the distinct rule violations alleged.  With respect to Count 
8, the referee specifically found that Attorney Scanlan "did not 
actually receive notification that his license was suspended 
until after he appeared in court" for T.V. (Emphasis added.)  In 
contrast, with respect to Count 2, it is undisputed that 
Attorney Scanlan had notice of his suspension before R.M.'s 
court appearance.   
Also, in the T.V. matter (Counts 8 and 9), Attorney Scanlan 
was charged with violating SCR 10.03(6), SCR 20:8.4(f), and SCR 
22.03(2).  He was not charged with violating SCR 22.26(1), as 
charged in Count 2.  We reject Attorney Scanlan's claim that the 
OLR's inconsistent positions as to Counts 2 and 8 justify 
dismissal of Count 2. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
27 
 
B. 
Count Eighteen 
¶58 Next, the OLR challenges the referee's dismissal of 
Count 18, which charged that by converting $3086.67 belonging to 
H.V.R., Attorney Scanlan engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).26  Attorney Scanlan 
does not dispute that he failed to turn over $3086.67 owing to 
his client, H.V.R.  It is undisputed that these funds have not 
yet been repaid.  The referee concluded, nonetheless, that 
"while Scanlan violated his duties as to the $3,086.67 to his 
client" pursuant to former SCR 20:1.15(b), his failure to 
account for and turn the money over to his client was the result 
of "sloppy book keeping and generally ineffective administration 
of his office rather than intentional wrong doing."  The referee 
based this conclusion on Dr. Mueller's testimony that Attorney 
Scanlan was suffering personal problems as well as major 
depression, bi-polar disorder II, and adult attention deficit 
disorder during the time in question. 
¶59 We conclude that under the circumstances presented, 
Attorney Scanlan's admitted conduct violates SCR 20:8.4(c) as a 
matter of law.  The application of undisputed facts to a legal 
standard presents a question of law we review de novo. See 
Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d at 130.  In the context of this proceeding, 
Attorney Scanlan's unauthorized conversion of his client's money 
to his own use is understood to refer to the unlawful 
                                                 
26 See note 14. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
28 
 
appropriation 
or 
misappropriation 
of 
the 
funds.27  
Misappropriation commonly means "to appropriate dishonestly for 
one's own use."28   
¶60 Although Attorney Scanlan's bookkeeping and office 
administration were sloppy and ineffective, he admitted that he 
converted his client's funds to his own use.  In his post-
hearing brief, to his credit, Attorney Scanlan acknowledged that 
"he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by converting $3,086.67 belonging to 
[H.V.R] (Count 18)."  The funds remain unpaid.  Under the 
circumstances presented, the undisputed fact of conversion of 
his client's money demonstrates as a matter of law the element 
of dishonesty, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cassidy, 172 Wis. 2d 600, 603-
06, 493 N.W.2d 362 (1992); See also In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Moran, 165 Wis. 2d 504, 508, 477 N.W.2d 628 
(1991).   
¶61 Attorney Scanlan, nonetheless, cites Methodist Manor 
of Waukesha, Inc., v. Martin, 2002 WI App 130, ¶9, 255 Wis. 2d 
707, 647 N.W.2d 409, to support his contention that "a lawyer 
who mistakenly converted client property would not necessarily 
                                                 
27 See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 
412 
(3d 
ed. 
1992) 
("Conversion: 
The 
unlawful 
appropriation of another's property."); see also The New 
Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary 
175 
(4th 
ed. 
1989) 
("Misappropriate").  
28 See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1153 (3d ed. 1992); see also The New Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary 468 (4th ed. 1989) ("Misappropriate: to appropriate 
wrongly; esp. to take dishonestly for one's own use").  
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
29 
 
violate SCR 20:8.4(c)."  The Methodist Manor case states that 
good faith or a mistake is no defense to liability for the tort 
of conversion.  Id.  Because Attorney Scanlan points to no 
evidence of good faith or mistake, this case is unhelpful.  We 
reject his argument and overturn the referee's dismissal of 
Count 18. 
¶62 To 
the 
extent 
Attorney 
Scanlan 
implies 
his 
psychological 
condition 
is 
a 
defense 
to 
Count 
18, 
a 
psychological 
condition 
may 
constitute 
mitigation 
of 
the 
seriousness of misconduct or of the severity of discipline, if 
shown to be causally related to the misconduct.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 
562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  As we explain later in this opinion, we 
consider Attorney Scanlan's psychological condition when we 
address the seriousness of his misconduct in the context of the 
severity of discipline. 
C. 
Count Nineteen 
¶63 Next, the OLR challenges the referee's dismissal of 
Count 19.  Count 19 alleged that Attorney Scanlan made telephone 
transfers of over $48,000 from his client trust account to his 
personal business account, without identifying and knowing the 
purpose of the withdrawals and to whom the funds belonged, and 
therefore 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).  The referee 
dismissed Count 19 finding: "As to count #19, OLR failed to meet 
its Burden of Proof for the same reasons as discussed in count 
#18 and therefore I conclude that Scanlan did not engage in 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
30 
 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation."     
¶64 The facts supporting Count 19 are uncontroverted.  
This issue, therefore, involves the question whether undisputed 
facts constitute a violation, a question of law we review 
de novo.  See Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d at 130.   The referee found 
that Attorney Scanlan made numerous telephone transfers from his 
client trust account to his business account for which there are 
no records indicating the client or clients involved and for 
which there is no indication as to the purpose of the 
withdrawal.  At the disciplinary hearing, the OLR investigator's 
unrefuted testimony showed numerous telephone transfers from 
Attorney Scanlan's client trust account to his personal account, 
totaling over $48,000, without any identification of whose funds 
were taken and the purpose of the withdrawal.    
¶65 In the decision of In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Britton, 180 Wis. 2d 109, 508 N.W.2d 412 (1993), this 
court held that the unauthorized use of client funds held in 
trust constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c):   
The Board also argued that, on the basis of the 
facts concerning Attorney Britton's handling of his 
client's 
funds, 
the 
court 
should 
reach 
another 
conclusion of law that was absent from the referee's 
report: that Attorney Britton's use of client funds 
held 
in 
trust 
constituted 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). The referee had concluded 
only 
that 
the 
misappropriation 
of 
client 
funds 
violated the trust account rule.  We agree with the 
Board and, noting that in his brief Attorney Britton 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
31 
 
accepted that his handling of the client's funds could 
constitute a violation of that rule, conclude that his 
use of client funds violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
¶66 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
uncontroverted 
facts 
demonstrating Attorney Scanlan's numerous unauthorized transfers 
from his client trust account constitute conduct involving 
dishonesty in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  Therefore, we 
overturn the referee's dismissal of Count 19. 
¶67 Attorney Scanlan argues that his admitted failure to 
maintain appropriate trust account records violated only trust 
account rules.  See former SCR 20:1.15(a).  He also contends, 
the "reason OLR did not prove Count 19 is that OLR failed to 
provide any evidence that the transfers involved client funds or 
to suggest that the transferred funds belonged to anyone other 
than Scanlan."  Attorney Scanlan's argument does not square with 
the referee's findings.  The referee relied on Attorney 
Scanlan's sloppy bookkeeping to relieve him of culpability, not 
on any failure on the part of the OLR to prove that the funds in 
the client trust account funds did not belong to Attorney 
Scanlan.  
¶68 We reject Attorney Scanlan's suggestion that two 
wrongs make a right.  His ongoing failure to maintain trust 
account records is not a defense to a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) 
arising out of numerous unauthorized transfers of client trust 
account funds to a personal account without identifying whose 
funds were taken or the purpose of the withdrawals.  Consistent 
with the Britton case, we conclude that the undisputed facts of 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
32 
 
record support a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), as alleged in Count 
19. 
D. 
Discipline    
¶69 Finally, the OLR contends that a 180-day suspension 
does not adequately address the severity of Attorney Scanlan's 
misconduct and falls just short of the six-month suspension 
period 
requiring 
a 
formal 
petition 
to 
reinstate, 
thus 
eliminating the need to determine that Attorney Scanlan is fit 
to practice law in Wisconsin.    
¶70 The OLR notes the seriousness of Attorney Scanlan's 
misconduct, pointing out that he kept unearned fees and never 
did return the fees advanced by a client, necessitating a claim 
against the State Bar Client Security Fund, (now known as 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection).  It also 
observes that Attorney Scanlan converted his client H.V.R.'s 
funds, which have not been repaid.  The OLR also points out one 
client who appeared unrepresented at a pretrial hearing had to 
enter a plea on her own.  The OLR further contends that the 
evidence of Attorney Scanlan's mental health issues falls short 
of establishing a causal connection to his misconduct and 
thereby should not be considered.  The OLR further argues that 
while Attorney Scanlan was ultimately cooperative and expressed 
remorse for his misconduct, his misconduct is serious and 
includes numerous rule violations.   
¶71 Attorney Scanlan responds that the OLR's recommended 
sanctions are excessive.  Attorney Scanlan argues that because 
the referee found his depression-related illness to be a cause 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
33 
 
of his misconduct, it should be considered in the mitigation of 
discipline.  He claims that while it would be appropriate to 
recommend monitoring of his trust account and medications should 
he return to private practice in Wisconsin, there is no need to 
impose substantial discipline to protect the public from him.   
¶72 It 
is 
this 
court's 
responsibility 
to 
determine 
appropriate discipline and this court may impose discipline more 
or less severe than that recommended.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.  In imposing discipline, this court considers the 
seriousness, nature and extent of misconduct, the level of 
discipline needed to protect the public, the courts, and the 
legal system from repetition of the attorney's misconduct, the 
need to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the 
misconduct and the need to deter other attorneys from committing 
similar misconduct.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 875-76, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  
¶73 We conclude that a six-month license suspension is 
appropriate.  In making this determination, we consider the 
seriousness and extent of Attorney Scanlan's misconduct, which 
involved 
nine 
clients, 
numerous 
rule 
violations, 
and 
an 
extensive time period.  In mitigation, we acknowledge his lack 
of prior discipline, his remorse and ultimate cooperation, as 
well as the significance of his mental health problems, which 
are apparently now being treated successfully.  We agree with 
the OLR, however, that the record is insufficient to demonstrate 
that Attorney Scanlan's mental health problems were causally 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
34 
 
connected to each alleged rule violation.  The evidence supports 
a determination that his psychological problems had the effect 
of immobilizing him, thus indicating a causal connection between 
acts of omission rather than acts of commission.  It is 
apparent, however, that a significant number of counts were 
causally related to Attorney Scanlan's illness and personal 
problems.  We further agree with the referee that proofs 
establish that at the present, Attorney Scanlan appears not to 
be a risk to the public.   
¶74 We conclude, nonetheless, that the need to impress 
upon Attorney Scanlan and other attorneys their obligations 
under the rules calls for no less than a six-month license 
suspension, 
requiring 
a 
formal 
petition 
to 
reinstate 
to 
demonstrate that Attorney Scanlan is fit in the event he chooses 
to return to practice in this state.  We further conclude, 
should Attorney Scanlan return to practice in Wisconsin, that 
his trust account practices and his medications should be 
monitored quarterly for a period of one year.  In addition, 
Attorney Scanlan is required to make restitution to his client, 
H.V.R., in the sum of $3086.67 plus interest and to the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, in the amount of 
$2000 plus interest. 
¶75 Under SCR 22.24(1),29 this court has the discretion to 
assess all or a portion of the costs of the disciplinary 
                                                 
29 SCR 22.24(1) provides:  Assessment of costs. 
 
(1) The supreme court may assess against the 
respondent all or a portion of the costs of a 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
35 
 
proceedings in which misconduct has been found.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ¶32, 279 
Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376.  We conclude that the OLR has 
substantially 
prevailed 
in 
this 
matter 
and 
that 
it 
is 
appropriate for Attorney Scanlan to bear the costs of the 
proceedings both before the referee and on appeal.  Therefore, 
Attorney Scanlan's motion objecting to costs is denied. 
¶76 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John F. Scanlan to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six 
months, commencing June 7, 2006.  Should Attorney Scanlan return 
to practice in Wisconsin, his trust account practices and his 
medications should be monitored quarterly to the satisfaction of 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation for a period of one year. 
¶77 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order John F. Scanlan shall provide evidence to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation that he has fully paid restitution 
to client H.V.R., in the amount of $3086.67 plus interest and to 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection in the amount 
of $2000 plus interest, or that he has entered into a repayment 
agreement for the remaining amounts due.  If the evidence is not 
provided within that time, the license of Attorney John F. 
                                                                                                                                                             
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct is found, 
a medical incapacity proceeding in which it finds a 
medical incapacity, or a reinstatement proceeding and 
may enter a judgment for costs.  The director may 
assess 
all 
or 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
an 
investigation when discipline is imposed under SCR 
22.09.  Costs are payable to the office of lawyer 
regulation. 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
36 
 
Scanlan to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended 
until further order of this court.   
¶78 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 90 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney John F. Scanlan shall pay to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, provided that 
if the costs are not paid within the time specified and absent a 
showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs within 
that time, the license of Attorney John F. Scanlan to practice 
law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of 
this court. 
¶79 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney John F. Scanlan 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.  
 
No. 
2004AP1930-D   
 
 
 
1