Title: Cassidy v. INDIANA STATE BD. OF REGIS., ETC.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

244 Ind. 137 (1963)
191 N.E.2d 492
CASSIDY
v.
INDIANA STATE BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND EXAMINATION IN OPTOMETRY ET AL.
No. 30,174.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 26, 1963.
*138 John N. Stanton, of East Chicago, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Thomas L. Webber, Deputy Attorney General and F. Laurence Anderson, Jr., of Gary, for appellees.
ACHOR, J.
This is a proceedings for a judicial review of an administrative adjudication wherein the appellant, a licensed optometrist, filed his complaint in the Lake Circuit Court for a review of an order of the Indiana State Board of Registration and Examination in Optometry, by which order the board suspended appellant's license to practice optometry for a period of six months.
As cause for judicial review appellant, among other things, alleged:
The cause was submitted to trial court on appellant's petition for review, which was based upon the transcript of the proceedings before the Board. The court entered special findings of facts and conclusions of law thereon, and entered its judgment, which sustained the decision of the Board.
The facts alleged in the complaint of the Optometry Board against the appellant are substantially restated in the special "Finding of Facts" stated by the trial court, as follows, in part:
The court stated its Conclusions of Law based upon the aforestated finding of facts, as follows:
Two constitutional questions are raised with respect to these proceedings: (1) Is the provision of Acts 1935, ch. 38 § 6, p. 104, being § 63-1010, Burns' 1961 Repl., constitutional, which provides that upon the issuance of a certificate by the clerk of the circuit court granting the right to practice optometry in a county where the optometrist "proposes to reside," upon transfer from another county, "shall entitle the holder of said new license to practice optometry ... only in the county in which the new license was so issued. ..."? [Our italics.] (2) Since the proceedings for revocation of appellant's license was an action judicial in nature [1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law § 181, p. 983] in the trial of that issue, was appellant entitled to be heard by a board consisting of persons whose previous declarations against him were not used as evidence in the proceedings against him?[1]
A decision upon the first issue of constitutionality is necessary because the Conclusions of Law numbered *144 I, II, III and IV in this case are based upon the violation, or assumed violation, of the above cited statute [§ 63-1010]. This section of the statute purports to limit the practice of an optometrist exclusively to the county of his residence.[2]
Such a statutory restriction upon the professional practice of an optometrist, in order to avoid the test of unconstitutionality, must be grounded upon some reasonable exercise of the police power of the state, and must find justification in the public health, welfare, or safety. Frankly, we know of no such justification, and none has been made to appear. This limitation is foreign to the licensing provisions of all other businesses and professions as far as we have been able to ascertain, and no good reason has been stated in support of the above limitation.[3]
Section 63-1010, supra, which contains this restriction and also purports to restrict the practice of an optometrist to a single county is unconstitutional. Therefore, the court's conclusions of law numbered I, II, III and IV, which are based thereon, provide no support in sustaining the decision of the board and the trial court.
In its Conclusions of Law Number V, the court stated:
This conclusion is not supported by any finding of facts. It is asserted that the conclusion is supported by the circumstances recited in Finding of Facts Number VI, which is as follows:
However, there is no evidence to support the italicized portions of the finding. In fact, the evidence upon this point is distinctly to the contrary. Furthermore, all of the evidence is to the effect that appellant was employed by R.W. Turbow, optometrist of St. Joseph County, Indiana.
Finally, we consider the court's Conclusion Number VI. In substance, it stated appellant was guilty of "unprofessional conduct" because he received financial benefits from his association with the Lee Optical Company, Inc., which engaged in "cut-rate" advertising, "which advertising he was prohibited by statute from doing directly." Numerous factors must be considered in arriving at a decision as to the propriety of this conclusion of law. First, we consider the pertinent statutory provisions. Parts of the statute relied upon by appellees provide:
Section 63-1018a, which defines "unprofessional conduct," provides, in part:
We consider the decisions of this court which have construed this statute. In the case of Bennett v. *147 Indiana St. Bd. of Reg. and Ex. in Optom. (1937), 211 Ind. 678, 688, 7 N.E.2d 977, this court upheld a decision of the board which revoked the license of Bennett for "unprofessional conduct." In that case, Bennett had accepted employment to practice optometry from persons who possessed no license to practice optometry and who were not legal residents of the state. This was in violation of § 63-1018 (g), supra. The court, in sustaining the board, held that this provision of the statute was valid exercise of the police power, stating that:
In that case this court also stated that the purport of § 63-1018a (e), supra, which forbids advertising of the cost of glasses by an optometrist, "is to prevent certain advertisements and publications likely to mislead and deceive the public," and was, therefore, a proper exercise of "the police power of the state, for the protection of health and general welfare."
It is not contended that appellant committed any of these prohibited acts which are defined in the statutes as "unprofessional conduct." Neither is it contended that Lee Optical Company, Inc. was not entitled to sell eyeglasses as merchandise,[4]*148 or that it engaged in any advertising which was "likely to mislead or deceive the public." Therefore, appellant's association with the company was not "unprofessional conduct" for either of these reasons. Rather, appellant's alleged "unprofessional conduct" consisted solely in the fact that he entered into an arrangement whereby he occupied adjoining and connected office space with that of the Lee Optical Company, Inc., which advertised its merchandise, and that he received financial benefit from this arrangement: the Lee Optical Company, Inc. generally referring its prospective purchasers to appellant for examination, and appellant generally referring his clients to the Lee Optical Company, Inc. for the purchase of eyeglasses, according to his prescription. The board and the trial court concluded that because appellant indirectly received financial benefits from the advertising of the Lee Optical Company, Inc., which advertising he could not do directly, he was guilty of "unprofessional conduct."
But can it be said that a lawyer, whose office space adjoins the offices of a bank or loan association which advertises its business, with most of his business *149 being related to that establishment, is thereby guilty of "unprofessional conduct"? Or may it be said that a doctor, whose office space adjoins that of an apothecary which advertises its business, has thereby engaged in "unprofessional conduct," although these relationships may operate to their mutual financial benefit?
We note that the board found that "such relationship is detrimental to the general public welfare and its fellow optometrists," but this finding is based upon intangibles not defined by, or clearly within the scope of, the statute. In order that this conclusion by the board could be said to support the further conclusion that appellant was guilty of "unprofessional conduct," it would seem that the board has been required to resort to § 63-1018a, which, in remarkable lanaguage, states that, in addition to the enumerated acts defined as "unprofessional conduct," "any other acts that said board may find to be unprofessional conduct, shall be deemed by said board as unprofessional conduct." This complete abrogation of legislative authority, if relied upon by the board, would be unconstitutional. Ennis v. State Highway Commission (1952), 231 Ind. 311, 108 N.E.2d 687; State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Bd. (1951), 230 Ind. 1, 101 N.E.2d 60.
Laws which are punitive in nature, and which would deprive an individual of the freedom to exercise the skills of his business or profession, should be construed against the denial of this freedom. Before the police power of the state is used to prohibit the conduct of an individual as "unprofessional," it should be explicitly so defined as such conduct, or it should fall clearly within the scope of the act. If either the "public welfare" or "fellow optometrists" *150 require greater protection than the law provides, the statute should be amended by the legislature so as to state clearly the public policy upon the issue.
Because the court's Conclusions of Law Numbered I, II, III and IV are based on an unconstitutional provision in the law, and because finding of facts stated by the trial court upon issues material to the case are not supported by the evidence, and, further, because the other conclusions of law, as stated by the court, upon which the decision is made to rest, are in error as the law is applied to the facts well stated by the court, judgment must be reversed as being contrary to law. Superior Trailer Mfg. Corp. v. J.W. Scatterday (1961), 243 Ind. 473, 185 N.E.2d 417.
Judgment is, therefore, reversed, with instructions that the trial court restate its finding of facts and conclusions of law and enter judgment in accordance herewith.
Myers, C.J., and Landis, J., concur; Arterburn and Jackson, JJ., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 191 N.E.2d 492.
[1]  In the case at bar, one of the members of the board who sat in judgment had previously written the appellant that his proposed acts were illegal.
[2]  The case of Bennett v. Ind. St. Bd. of Reg. and Ex. in Optom. (1937), 211 Ind. 678, 7 N.E.2d 977, cited in Opinions of Attorney General 1955, No. 19, p. 57, did not consider this issue.
[3]  See: Architects, § 63-101; Barbers, § 63-301; Beauty Culturists, § 63-1801; C.P.A.'s, § 63-401; Dentists, § 63-502; Dental Hygienists, § 63-527; Embalmers and Funeral Directors, § 63-717; Nurses, § 63-901; Pharmacists, § 63-1101; Physicians and Surgeons, § 63-1301; Osteopaths, § 63-1316; Chiropractors, § 63-1326; Physical Therapists, § 63-1338; Podiatrists, § 63-1401, Burns' 1961 Repl., and Lawyers, Supreme Court Rule 3-13.
[4]  This court, in the case of State ex rel. v. Beck Jewelry Enterprises (1942), 220 Ind. 276, 285-286, 41 N.E.2d 622, 141 A.L.R. 876, held that the sale of eyeglasses as articles of merchandise does not constitute the practice of optometry and the advertising thereof by persons other than optometrists is not a violation of the Optometry Act. In its consideration of the case, this court stated:

"Truthful price advertising is a legitimate incident to a lawful merchandising business. Deprivation of the right so to advertise has been held to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regal Oil Co. v. State (1939), 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A.2d 495. See also Jones v. Bontempo (1940), 65 Oh. App. 103, 29 N.E.2d 428, affirmed (1941), 137 Oh. S. 634, 32 N.E.2d 17. We cannot assume that the Legislature intended to permit the sale of eyeglasses as merchandise but to deprive the dealer of one of the reasonable and lawful means of procuring purchasers for such merchandise."