Title: Dunn v. Rescon Technology Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dunn v. Rescon Technology Corp.1994 WY 126884 P.2d 965Case Number: 94-28Decided: 11/10/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
James P. DUNN, d/b/a 
Rocky Mountain/Eastern,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

RESCON TECHNOLOGY CORP., 
a/k/a Rocky Mountain Chemical Company,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court of Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald E. Chapin of 
Crowell and Chapin, P.C., Casper.

Representing 
Appellee:

Les Bowron of Beech 
Street Law Offices, Casper.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant James 
P. Dunn appeals from the district court's judgment in favor of Appellee Rescon 
Technology Corp. for the amount of $38,736.24 plus costs and post-judgment 
interest.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Dunn presents 
three issues for review:

1. Did the plaintiff 
(Appellee) meet its burden of proof in establishing a balance on an open 
account?

2. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in entering a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
the defendant in the amount of $38,766.24?

3. Was the allowance of 
pre-judgment interest justified by the evidence produced?

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1982, Dunn 
became a distributor for Rescon Technology, selling its construction materials 
for concrete repair. Rescon Technology allowed Dunn to make purchases for his 
distributorship of up to $50,000 on an open-account basis.

[¶5]      After Dunn began 
purchasing products from Rescon Technology, a dispute arose about how much Dunn 
owed Rescon Technology. Dunn contested Rescon Technology's method of applying 
his payments toward the oldest unpaid invoices. The parties also disagreed about 
when discounts had been permitted and about the interest which Rescon Technology 
had applied to the unpaid balances.

[¶6]      Despite the 
parties' disputes, Dunn continued to purchase and distribute Rescon Technology 
products until January 1991. On January 17, 1991, Rescon Technology demanded 
that Dunn pay the outstanding balance on his Rescon Technology account in the 
amount of $14,649.54 plus interest. Dunn did not pay the amount. Rescon 
Technology filed a complaint in the district court on February 13, 1991, which 
prayed for a judgment against Dunn for the balance he owed on his open account 
plus interest.

[¶7]      Rescon 
Technology's demand and complaint both claimed that Dunn owed $14,649.54 plus 
interest as of January 1986. Before trial, Rescon Technology submitted copies of 
its invoices and account ledgers to Dunn. After he had reviewed those records, 
Dunn discovered two canceled checks which Rescon Technology had failed to credit 
toward his account. Dunn sent copies of the checks to Rescon Technology, and 
Rescon Technology reexamined its records of Dunn's account.

[¶8]      Rescon Technology 
confirmed that it had failed to credit the two checks to Dunn's account. Rescon 
Technology also found that it had failed to add interest to some of Dunn's late 
payments, that it had awarded some discounts which Dunn had not earned, that it 
had compounded interest on some of Dunn's late payments, and that Dunn had 
failed to pay for two additional purchases. Rescon Technology recalculated the 
amount which Dunn owed and found that the amount due, including interest, was 
$38,736.24.

[¶9]      The district 
court granted a partial summary judgment on January 22, 1993, in favor of Rescon 
Technology as to the interest which it had applied to Dunn's unpaid invoices. In 
its decision letter, the district court stated: 

[T]he Court finds that 
there is a genuine dispute as to the principal amount owed. There is no genuine 
dispute concerning the [interest] which should apply to this amount. The parties 
agreed on [interest] of 1.75% per month on balances over 30 days. It was not 
part of the agreement that this interest should be compounded.

[¶10]   The district court held a bench 
trial on October 7, 1993. At the trial, Rescon Technology moved to amend its 
prayer for relief in its complaint so that the complaint would conform to the 
evidence. See W.R.C.P. 15(b). After the trial, the district court entered a 
judgment generally in favor of Rescon Technology in the amount of $38,736.24 
plus costs and post-judgment interest. Dunn appealed from the district court's 
judgment.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶11]   Dunn asserts that the district 
court's judgment was contrary to the evidence, that the district court abused 
its discretion when it entered the judgment, and that Rescon Technology did not 
meet its burden of proof. We are convinced, however, that these arguments raise 
only one issue: Whether sufficient evidence supported the district court's 
judgment in favor of Rescon Technology.

The standard for 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. On review, this 
court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true. We 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party that conflicts with the evidence of the successful party, and we afford to 
the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it.

Kadrmas v. 
Valley West Homeowner's Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 
1993) (citation omitted), quoted in Sannerud v. Brantz, 879 P.2d 341, 344 
(Wyo. 1994). See also Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, 
Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 915 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶12]   In a claim arising from an account, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving the items of the account. See Edmonds 
v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 518 P.2d 7, 10 (Wyo. 1974).

In connection with these 
contentions, it is important to note that an action on account (distinguished 
from that on an account stated) refers to the type of relation between the 
parties and not to any specific record; that its purpose is to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits, each based on a separate item or transaction; that it is 
founded on implied or express contract or contracts for the purpose of balancing 
a series of transactions between the parties; that admissibility of records, 
etc., are subject to the usual hearsay rule and exceptions thereto, e.g., 
business records; and that the elements for proof are substantially the same as 
in any other contractual or quantum meruit action.

. . . .

In an action on an 
account, identifiable charges and payments (debits and credits) together with 
beginning and ending balances of the account must be available to the party 
against whom the obligation is claimed in order that such party can contest one 
or more of such items.

Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc., 773 P.2d  at 
921-22.

[¶13]   The evidence presented at the trial 
disclosed that the accountants went through a lengthy accounting process in 
calculating the amount owed. Rescon Technology's former office manager and its 
president both testified that Rescon Technology's account ledgers accurately 
reflected the amount owed by Dunn. Rescon Technology made its invoices and 
account ledgers available to Dunn prior to the trial. As we stated in Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc.:

Under the circumstances 
of this case, the trial court could properly find that the items upon which the 
open account was based were available to [the defendants], and that, in fact, 
they had reviewed them during discovery and had been made aware of correcting 
computations. The trial court had evidence in favor of the successful party on 
this issue in the form of oral testimony as to the balance of the account. . . 
.

773 P.2d  at 
922-23. The district court's judgment in favor of Rescon Technology is supported 
by sufficient evidence. 

PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST

[¶14]   Dunn contends that the district 
court should not have awarded prejudgment interest because the amount of Rescon 
Technology's claim was not readily computable by performing a basic mathematical 
calculation and, therefore, it was unliquidated.

[¶15]   "Prejudgment interest is 
recoverable in Wyoming on liquidated claims but not on unliquidated claims, with 
a liquidated claim being defined as one that is readily computable by basic 
mathematical calculation." O's Gold Seed Company v. United Agri-Products 
Financial Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 677 (Wyo. 1988). See also Bueno 
v. CF & I Steel Corporation, 773 P.2d 937, 940 (Wyo. 1989). "Mere 
differences of opinion as to the amount due do not preclude prejudgment interest 
nor do disputes as to liability." Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, 559 P.2d 25, 33 (Wyo. 1977). "`The fact that a skilled 
accounting may be necessary, involving a determination of amount of sales, 
prices received, and overhead expenses does not prevent the allowance of 
interest.'" 559 P.2d  at 34 (quoting 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 1046 at 286-87 (1964)).

[¶16]   Dunn does not deny that he agreed 
to pay the interest on his late payments.1 Rescon Technology added the 
agreed-upon interest to the amount due on each unpaid invoice when the amount 
had not been paid within thirty days after the date of the invoice. While Dunn 
disputes the total amount due, his dispute does not render Rescon Technology's 
claim unliquidated. The amount due on each of Dunn's purchases was readily 
computable by performing a basic mathematical calculation. Rescon Technology's 
claim was, therefore, liquidated, and the district court did not err by 
including interest in its judgment.

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   The district court did not err by 
entering a judgment in favor of Rescon Technology in the amount of $38,736.24 
plus costs and post-judgment interest.

[¶18]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Dunn's argument implies 
that the applicable rate of prejudgment interest is the statutory rate defined 
in WYO. STAT. § 40-14-106(e) (1993). Section 40-14-106(e), however, does not 
apply when the parties have agreed upon an interest rate which is different from 
the statutory rate. Rissler & McMurry Company, 559 P.2d  at 31. See 
also Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1028 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that 
parties had no agreement to pay interest).