Title: State v. Pond. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Duffy [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 10/11/2007 [pdf], 117 Haw. 336. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/10/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 287.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

PREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

 

o00--=

Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,

    

 

KEVIN FOND, Petitioner/Defendant-App:

 

 

 
 

wo, 27847
CERTIORARE TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEARS
Tee No sstcoeT tal) og
SEPTEMBER 29, 2008 ze 8
a2 8
MOON, C.J., SVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ. sie
ACOBK, iy CONCURRING AND DISSENTING, ANBAE 2
Giger, eoncussras ano crssewtcne a8
g

OPINION OF THE COURT SY NAKAYAMA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant~Appellant Kevin Pond (“Pond”)
crea’ s'

 

seeks review of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’
to its

 

october 30, 2007 judgment on appeal, issued pursua

october 11, 2007 opinion,' see State v. Pond, 117 Hawai'i 236,
181 P.3d 415 (App. 2007), affirming the second circuit family
March 2, 2006 judgment convicting him

 

court's? ("circuit court!

of the offense of abuse of family or household member, in

violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 709-906 (1993 &

Supp. 2004)? and interference with reporting an emergency or

 

+ the publishes opinion was authored by Associate Judge Corinne KAA.
Watanabe and Joined by Associate Judger Deniel R. Foley and Alexa 0.M. Fuj:se.

+ the Honorable Richard T, Bissen presided.

> RS § 709-906, entitled “Abuse of family or household nenbers?

 

   

gaa
 

*#** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

on of HRS § 710-1010.

   

crime ("Interference offense") in viol

 

(2993 & Supp. 2004).
of certiorari, and oral argument was held on June 5, 2008

We accepted Pond’s application for a writ

Pond asserts that the ICA gravely erred by concluding

that the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence ("HRE”) Rule 404(b)* notice

 

) Te shall be unlawful for any person, singly of sn
concert, to physically abuse 9 famsly of nouseheld nenber or to
Tefuse Compliance with the lawfol order of a police officer under
subsection (4). The polsee, in insestsgating any complaint of
Abuse of a family or household menber, upon request, ney transport
the abused person to a hospital or safe shelter

For the purposes of this section, “fanily or household
menber" nesns spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries, former spouses
Or reciprocal beneficiaries, persons who have a child in common,
Parents; children, persons related by consanguinity, and persons
Jointly’ residing or formerly residing in the sane dvelling unit.

Ta}"any police cfficer, with or without a warrant, May
arrest a person if the officer has reasonable grounds £0 believe
that the person is physically abusing, or has physically abused, a
family or household menber and that the person atrested se gutity
theres!

 

 

 

 

is} abise of a family or household menber and refusal to comply with the
Lawful order of @ police officer under subsection (4] are misdemeanors and the
person shell be sentenced a3 follows:
(a) For the firet offense the person shall serve a minimum jail sentence
of foreyreight hours) and
(©) For 2 second offense that occurs within one year of the
fiat conviction, the person shall be termed a "repeat offender”
and serve 2 minimur jail sentence of thirey days.

 

< _RS § 730-2010.5, entitled “Interference with reporting an
emergency or crime,” provided as follows:

 

(3) A person commits the offense of interference with
reporting an emergency oF cine if the perscn intentionally oF
or witness fos criminal act from
phone system, cbtaining medical
‘or making @ report to = law enforcement officer.

  
 
  

 

 

(2) interference witn the reporting of an energency or crine
is a petty misdemeanor.

+ WRE Rute 404(b) provides
Other crimes, wrongs, of acts, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

requirement was a “condition precedent” to (a) admitting
“critical evidence of the complainant's prior attack offered to
establish (Pond’s] justification of self defense and to establish

the complainant as the ‘first aggressor,’” and (b) cross
examining the complainant about her marijuana use on the night of
the incident, because it violated Fond’s constitutional rights to
present a defense and confront adverse witnesses. Pond also
asserts that the ICA gravely erred by affirming the conviction
where “(a) the self-defense jury instructions were incomplete and
misleading and (b) the instructions defining the interference
offense failed to specify that the state of mind requirement
applied to each of these elements.”

Because the circuit court precluded Pond from cross~
examining the complaining witness about whether she used
marijuana on December 12, 2005 to show that her perception was
inaccurate, it committed reversible error. Accordingly, we
vacate Pond’s conviction of abuse of family or household menber
and Interference offense, and remand for a new trial consistent

with this opinion.

 

‘br acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
Sider to prove the character of a person in order to show
Conformity therewith. It may, however, be admiseisle where such
evidence 22 probative of another fact that is of consequence to
the determinstion of the action, such as proof of motive,
Cpportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ident ity, modus
Operands, of absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases,
the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection
Shall provide reasonable notice In advance of trial, or during
tsial ££ the court excuses pretrial notice an good Cause shown, of
the date, Location, and generel nature of any such evidence it
Intends te ineroguce at eral.

   

 

 

 

 

3
 

A. Factual Background

The complaining witness, Miae Russell ("Ms. Russell"),
met Fond in the sunmer of 2005, began dating him, and moved into
Pond’s house in October 2005. Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 339, 181 P.3d
at 418. Ms. Russell and Pond presented conflicting testimony

regarding an incident that occurred on December 12, 2005.

1. Mes Russell's account of Decenber 12, 2005

‘The ICA's published opinion set forth Ms. Russell's
account that Pond physically abused her on December 12, 2005, as

follows:

on the evening of December 12, 2005, (Me. Russell) was alone
in Pond’ s residence: At about 5:20’ p.m., she had. spoken by
telephone with Pond, who was then at’ the’ Outback Steakhouse.

When Pond arrived hone st around 10:30 p.m, she was already
asiesp. she woke up wien she heard noises from the sliding glass
doce in the Living foom, which she had locked. [te. Russell}
testified that she got up and walked co the Living rocm £0 sze who
was outside and Pond "walked in through the bedroom screen door.”
She then gst back in bed and Pond’ “wae jumping on [her] and
climbing on [her], ané-wae kind of like-he was drunk.” (Ss
Russell) testified that she knew Pond was drunk because "(je
Snelled resily bag” and “when [che] spoke to hin at five-thsety he
also told [her] he was drinking.”

(us. Russell) testified that after she told Pond to get off
her, he responded by jumping on her more. Pond "was piling the
Blankets on top of (her), and [2he) was trying to tick them off.
Ang then [Pond) went into the bathroom, and (Me. Russell] was
trying co fix the blankets." (Ms; Russell) then “asked (Pond)
What thst nell nas." in response, Pond “cane walking towards
Uher] and then he slammed (her) face into the bed” with one arm
and “had his knee or something behind .  . [her] arm,” so chat
her arm and face were in a “weird position” and she "wae Just
buried into the bed and [she] couldn't move.” [Ms- Russell]
testified that she “hurt a lot,” “could not breathe[,]” and
thought her Jaw and arm were going to break. She also explained
thet while Pond was holding her down, he told her that “the resson
Why (she) was being punished wae Because [she) didn't. know how to
bevobecient. And that’s the last thing thet ne wanted to co, was
to hurt (her], but that (she] needed to learn how to respect him.”
Ime. Russell} related that “(e]ventually, (Pond) lee golr]” and
after he got off of her, he was "Just renting.” She uss’ crying,
Still on her knees on her bed, and “screaming for help.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Bond,

Pond approached her again, “grabbed the back of (her)
head[,]" tole ner "to shut up, and he Bit down on [Ms. Russell's:
mouth’ and ; ss punctured the Bottom part of (Ms, Ruszell's]
mouth so hard’ that it ‘west all the way through, Ang the other
Bide, it wae ust very awollen and hard. , + and there was
locd.”" She received a sear from Pona’s' bite.

 

 

 

  

 

117 Hawai'i at 339, 181 P.3d at 418. Ms. Russell then

 

explained that she tried to call the police, but Pond fought her

for

her phone:

Ie. Russell] waz then asked how she got loose after Fond
bit her, She Fecpondes, "I think he just let 90, and I got up and
Tuas reaching for my purse snd phone, and 1 tried to call the
police.” Thereafter, [Ms. Russell] testified as follows

Teena] cane over and grabbed the phone frea me and knocked it out
of my hand, because we were fighting for it, and everything

 

 

 
 
 

 

out. And by that tine I was on my hands
and trying to pick everything up. And T =~ my stuff was right to
the left of we, and T'was also grabbing my things so that 1 could
just get ay things and le:

‘Recording to (Ms. Russell), she told Pond she was calling
the police and disled S11 on ner’ phone. she wasn’t Sure iF she
Pushed the enter button, “but [she] think|s she) did, because when
[she] went to the police station, [ehe] lookea at the prone [and]
iE iwaz on there.” She further testified that as she was gathering
her'thinge and crying, Pond “said chat he would help (her) carry,
Se out or something. He was telling (her) to oe quiet and shut up
the whole time.” Pond then “took (her) arm and put it behind her,
and shoved [her] face inte the closet docr, and sort of pushed
Ther} along the door{,]” causing her face and mouth to bleed.

{as. Russell! expressed hat she felt scarea ana she
sfelverywhere.” she algo had bruises, welts, cuts, and fingernail
narks, Sone of which lasted "at least a week” and “were still
visible like ten caye later.” Ker "hair wae (e180) falling out.”
[s, Austell] related that she then gathered sone of her things,
left the apartment, and drove to the Maul police station in Lanaind.

(He, Russell) also related that after the incident,
she didcontifued Living with Pond and stopped dating him

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

ime. "Rsae1a} cestitied that she informed Maui Police
Department (MPO) Officer Jonathan Kaneshiro [Officer Kaneshiro)
that she had told Pong she was calling 911... . «(When Me
Aussell] was chen presented with the statenent written py officer
Kaneshiro to “refresh ther] menory!,]” (t]he statenent did not
mention [her] claim that she had told Pond she was calling S11.

 

Ada at 339-40, 181 P.3d at 418-19, Ms. Russell denied that she
was drinking on December 12, 2005. Ms. Russell also denied
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

biting Pond but admitted that she “strike(d) him in self-defense”
he bed.”

 

when Pond “was climbing all over [her], when he came
2. Pond’s testimony

Pond testified that on December 12, 2005, after running
some errands, he had dinner with a female friend at outback
Steakhouse. He arrived home between ten to ten-thirty p.m., and
he entered through the bedroom door because his normal office
room entrance was locked. He saw Ms. Russell in the office room,
smelled marijuana, and observed a half full bottle of vodka. He
assumed that Ms. Russell bought the alcchol earlier that day and
drank half the bottle because they do not normally keep alcohol
in the house and she was the only person home.

Pond testified that when he walked into the office, he
and Ms, Russell smirked at each other, “kissed for a few
seconds,” and then Ms. Russell bit on his upper left lip, which
resulted in a permanent scar. In response, Pond “bit down on her
to release -- to have her release.”

Pond testified that Ms. Russell attacked him, and he

 

defended hinsel:

A, At that point, (Me. Russel] backed up, she said,
vumere the FV have you been?” Who have you Been with?” And at
thst point, on the Second phrase that she said that, she punched
ne in'the face.

Gr "And what do you meen punch you in the face? where is

 

thie?
A, Well, the first punch was on my Left side-the first
punch; as she was punching me, she says, “where were you?" And
Then f saig, I cola her, "You know that I was cut,” and it was
none of her business at this point. She punched e and continued,
{you know, raising her voice, starting to Scream, "Where the F
have you been?” Punched me agein. And I told her, "Stop it, you

 

 

  

 

can't punch me, you're =~ I don’t think because you're a wonan you
Gan sit Rere and peat me because I'm bigger than’ you =~ you can
best me.”

0 Were you trying to-

é
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

   

 

 

Ac Wot at that point, verbally told her to stop at that
point. "she dia Sf again, ana’ then =~ as she started to do it, I
Btarted to defend, and try to protect ayself from those punche:

9..° “Gan you denonstvate fer the jury bow you're defenaiag
yourself?

"A. Well, she's swinging and I'm trying to block snd

throwing her azne off like this for the first few. She kept
Guinging and she kept swinging, and I kept trying to block then,
And? Blocked a lot of then and 3 lot of then. T blocked myseit
T'nean they were just coming =~ she was frantic and hysterical.
‘gost that point, 1 grabbed ner 3 to grab and take
her arm so she covidn’t continue swinging st me and hitting me in

   

 

 

A." 1. . 1 pushed her back, and she came back towards
jain. "And then'at that point, I cook her ana T pushed her back
Shen further:

 

A." . . and as 1 pushed her, she went falling into,
you know, into’ the corner of the bed.

A.” " She fell backwards. 1 pushed her off of me, she was
facing he, and she went backwards with her back into the bed,

According to Pond, after (Ms. Russell] hit the bed, she
sat on the bed, sobbed for a few seconds, “jumped back up,”
around the office room and threw a candle. Thereafter, when Ms.
Russell was making a phone call, he took the phone and “dropped
it on the bed’:

[sIhe picked up ner telephone, and was making a phone call
I didn’t know what the phone call was.” We pad argued before, and
she had made a phone call, and it was toa friend to go over an
Stay with her friend.

‘and I took the phone, and I was -~ you know, we were
ronmaging to grab the phone, I took the phone and just dropped it
on the bed. I said, "You know what, you just seed fo get sll your
Stuff, and you need’ to get out of here. Let's just get your
things and let’s just end this.”

   

 

 

Pond testified that “as (Ms. Russell) was picking up and
gathering herself, her stuff, she was kind of throwing her things
around,” and theorized that during this time, she may have thrown
her phone and broken it.

Ms. Russell then went into the bathroom and started to
 

‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

cry. Pond joined her in the bathroom to try to clean her lip.
Id. “And then at that point, it was just kind of -- it was

" pond testified that he did

   

obvious that she wanted to leav
not prevent her from leaving and that Ms. Russell did not tell
him that she was going to the hospital or the police.
3. Other accounts produced at trial
officer Jonathan Kaneshiro (“Officer Kaneshiro")

testified that he was working in the Lahaina district on the

  

night of December 12, 2005 at approximately 11:30 p.m. when Ms.

Russell arrived at the police station. Ms. Russell had a

 

difficult time relating to him what had occurred because she “was
still crying and she would break down from time to time."
Officer Kaneshiro observed that Ms, Russell “had an injury to her
mouth, [and] a little bruise around her . . . right eye” and did
not appear to be intoxicated. Officer Kaneshiro testified that
he also noticed that “there was bruising on [Ms. Russell's] left
arm, . . . from her wrist to her elbow, and from her entire right
arm from the wrist all the way to the shoulder(,]” and that she
also sustained an injury to her lip that “wasn’t dripping (blood)
or anything, but it looked fresh.”

After officers arrested Pond at his home, he was
transported to the police station to be processed.

officer Keneshire testified that he did not notice any

+ then Officer Kaneshiro asked Ms. Rus Jin what happened,
she stated that after Pond cane hone, [they] got into 2 verbal argument; he
Degan pushing her, and.» . at one point pushed her against the wall, she
stated that ne hit her in'the head, ané threw her cell iphone) against che
Wall while she was trying to call 911, And he Bit her sn the 1ip cr on the
Routh, something 1ike that.”

   

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

 

Anjuries on Fond’s body when the officers first arrived at Pond’e
Fesidence. .  . Officer Kaneshiro acknowledged that it was
possible that Pond could have bitten nis tongue or Lips when he
haz on the ground lying face down. Officer Kaneshiro recalled
That he hed asked Pong at the police station whether Pond had any
[nluries and Pond responded thet be haa tone.” pond also denied
Shaving any kind of physical altercation with (Ms. Russell)” or
that he “picked up (He. Rossell’s] phone ond threw st."

Pond, 117 Hawai'i at 341, 161 P.3d at 420.

 

 

 

Quetzal Chacon, Pond’s brother, testified that he
picked Fond up on the street on December 13, 2005, and that he

took a picture of Pond’s lip because Pond told his

 

that he wanted
evidence that Ms. Russell bit him. He further stated that the
picture admitted into evidence fairly and accurately depicted
Pond’s lip on December 13, 2005.

B. Procedural History

1. Bond's motion for HRE Rule 404(b) evidence and
continuance denied

on February 27, 2006, minutes before Pond’s jury trial
was scheduled to begin, Pond orally moved for a continuance of
trial in order to submit HRE Rule 404(b) evidence that Ms.
Russell previously assaulted Pond. Pond’s counsel explained that
he only pinpointed the date of the alleged attack that morning
and could not have earlier filed a notice of intent to introduce
such evidence, He algo argued that the evidence “goes to the

heart of our self-defense.”

 

The prosecution argued that defense counsel had the
opportunity to present his defense “weeks ago” and that “he’s

supposed to provide discovery way before trial and not ask for
continuance.” Although the circuit court acknowledged that HRE

Rule 404(b) allows notice of the intent to introduce evidence of

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{+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

bad acts to be given during trial, it ruled against Pond’s motion

 

for a continuance and observed, “I got more than sixty jurors
outside, This is the only trial left.” The circuit court also

denied the ERE Rule 404(b) motion “for failure to provide

 

notice," opining that “[i]f [the evidence) goes to the heart of
the defense, then it should have been something given more
prominence earlier. 1 can’t believe that it's that much to the
heart of it based on the way it’s dribbling in. 1 think that’s
how your client felt.” The case immediately proceeded to trial.
During direct examination, Pond described an argunent

he had with Ma. Russell “a couple wi

 

ks prior” to December 12,
2005, Pond explained that when he came home from work, he saw
Ms. Russell lounging on his bed with her dog, even though he had
previously told her that he was allergic to pets and that she
could not bring any animals into his house. Pond testified as to
the final outcome of the argument:
I asked her to take the dog off the bed and she just continued to
try and argue with me about the dog. so 1 walked over 0 pick up
the dog and take it off the bed, and as I walked over to move ity
the dog ran anc jusped off ana went over ~~ went to ansther part
Of the house. And she cane over to me and started swearing st me
Because, you know, of my stance on ity and you know, proceeded $0.

smack no.

(Emphasis added.) The prosecution objected and the court

 

reminded Pond’s counsel of its HRE Rule 404(b) ruling and ordered
the jury to disregard Pond’s last response.

2. Evidence that Ms. Bu 2 n

December 12, 2005)
During Ms. Russell's cross-examination, defense counsel

asked whether she was smoking marijuana when Pond came home on

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December 12, 2005. ‘The prosecution objected and the parties
approached the bench. Pond’s counsel argued that this evidence
is “impeachable” and “goes to her credibility.” However, the
court ruled “[iJt’s @ prior bad act” because the question asks
hether “she committed a crime that evening before he came hone,”
and thus, required that Pond’s counsel give the prosecution HRE
Rule 404(b) reasonable notice. The court thereafter struck the
last question and ordered the jury to disregard it.

3. dry i _

After the close of evidence, the circuit court
instructed the jury, inter alia, as to when a person acts with
intentional (instruction 18), knowing (instruction 19), and
reckless (instruction 20) states of mind, Then, it instructed
the jury regarding the Interference offense:

Instruction 22. In Count IT of the complaint, the
Defendant, Kevin Pond, is charged with the offense of interference
hich reporting an enelgency of crime. A person commits the
Offense of Interference with reporting [sic] of an enezgency oF
Cline ie chat person intentionally or knowingly prevents a victim
Sr witness to a criminal act from calling a 9li-emergency,
Telephone systen, obtarning medical assistance, or making 2 report
fo a jaw enforcement officer, There are two material elements of
the offense of interference with reporting an emergency or crime,
each of which the [p]rosecuticn must prove beyond reasonable
Soube.

‘Thess elements, these two elements are that on oz, about
pecenber 12, 2005 inthe County of Maui, State of Hawei's, the
Defendant, Kevin Pond intentionally or knowinely engaged in
Conducts and that said conduct resulted in preventing a victim or
Witness to a erininal act from calling a Slivemergency telephone
System, obtaining medical ascistancey or making a report to a law
shtorcement officer. The intentional of keowingly [® of
mind applies to each element of the offense.

 

 

 

 

‘The circuit court also provided the following self-

defense jury instruction:

‘The use of force upon or towards another person is justified when

n
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

4 person reasonably believes that such force is immediately
Retessary to protect Minself on the present occasion against
se of unlawful force by the other person. A person employing
protective force may estimate the necessity thereof unger the

The force
Hetigea wathour retreating. 17, and only af, you fing that the
(Gjefendant was reckless in having a belief that he was justifies
tn using self-protective force againet angther person, of that the
(Slefendant was reckless in acquiring or foiling to aeqeire any
knowledge or Belief which was naterial to the sustifiability of
his use of force against the otner perscn, then che Use of euch
protective force is unavailable as defense to the offente of
Sbuse of family or household member’

 

 

  

 

    

 

Pond appealed his conviction
on March 1, 2006, the jury found Pond guilty of his

 

Charged offenses, and the circuit court filed a judgment
convicting Fond on March 2, 2006. Pond filed a notice of appeal
on March 28, 2006.

on October 11, 2007, the ICA affirmed the circuit
court's judgment in a published opinion and filed a judgment on
appeal on October 30, 2007. The ICA held that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion by precluding evidence that Ms.
Russell allegedly struck Pond on a prior occasion and that Ms.
Russell had smoked marijuana on December 12, 2005 because “the
notice requirement is a condition precedent to the admissibility
of HRE Rule 404(b) evidence.” Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 181 P.3d
at 429, It also concluded that the circuit court’s jury
instruction about the self-protection defense is consistent with
the language of the statute regarding the self-protection
at 351, 181 P.3d at 429, Finally, it observed that

 

defense. 1

 

the jury instructions erroneously combined two elements of the

Interference offense, but that the error was harmless. Id.

2
 

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IT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

certiorari

 

This court considers whether the ICA’s decision
reflects *(1) (g)rave errors of law or of fact } or (2)

[o}bvious inconsistencies . . . with (decisions) of thlis] court,

 

federal decisions, or (the ICA‘s] own decision[s}" and whether

 

“the magnitude of those errors or incor
need for further appeal.” RS $ 602-89 (Supp. 2007).
B. Admissibility of Bad Act Evidence

istencies dictat[es] the

The aduissibility of evidence requires different
standaras of review depending on the particular rule of
Gvidence at issue.” When application of a particular

Gvidentiary rale can yield aly one correct result, the
proper stancard for appellate Teview se the Fight /wrong
Etendara. [TIhe tragitisea! abuse of discretion stancara
Should be applied in the case of those rules of evidence
that require a “Judgment call” on the part of the trial

State v. St. Clair, 101 Hawai"i 280, 286, 67 P.3d 779, 785 (2003)
(citing State v, Pulse, 83 Hawai'i 229, 246-47, 925 P.24 797,
ei4-15 (1996).

Under HRE Rule 404(b), the proponent of “bad act”

 

 

evidence “shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial 4£ the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” HRE Rule 404(b).
Because the trial court’s determination of reasonable notice
involves making @ “judgment call,” the admission of this evidence
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Richie, #8
Hawai'i 19, 37, 960 P.2d 1227, 1245 (1998).

‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the court “clearly

13
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exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of
law to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” sty
Clair, 101 Hawai'i at 286, 67 P.3d at 785 (citing State v
Eucutand, 76 Hawai'i 172, 179, 673 P.2d 51, 58 (1994).

©. Cross-Examination

 

Violation of the constitutional right to confront adverse
Witnesses a subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Scandara. In applying the harsless beyond a resscnable doust
Standard the court is required to examine the record and determine
Whether there isa reasonsble possibility that the srrcr
Complained of might have contributed to the conviction.

State v. Balisbisana, 83 Hawai'i 109, 113-14, 924 P.2d 1215,

1219-20 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

 

D. Jury Instructions

ven jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue
fon appeal, the standara of review is whether, unen read and
Considered asa whole, the instructions given are prejudicsally
insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, of misleading. Erroneous
instructions’ are presumptively harmful and are a ground for
reversal uniess it affirmatively appear fram the record as 3
whole that the error wes Not prejudicial, [iiowever, eleror ie not
fo be viewed in isclation and considered purely in the abstract”
Ft must be examinea In the light of the entire proceedings and
given the effect wich the whole record shows it to be entitled
In that context, the real question becomes whether there 12 ¢
reasonable possibility that error might have cont rsbutes te
Conviction. If there ia such s reasonable possibility ina
eriminal case, then the error ie not harmless beyond a reasonable
Goubt, and the judgaent of conviction on which it may have been
based’ must be set acide.

Tojnce instructional error ie demonstrated, we will
vacate, witnout regard to nnether timely objection was made, if
there is a reasonable possibility that the error contrinuted to
the defendant's conviction, i.e.) that the erroneous jury,
instruction was not harsless Beyond a reasonable doubt

State vs Michols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 335, 337, 141 P.3d 974, 982,
984 (2006).

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

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III. Drscusson

A. The ICA Did Not Gravely Err By Concluding That (1) “The
Notice Requirement Is A Condition Precedent To The
Admissibility Of HRE Rule 404(b) Evidence” And (2) The
Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Precluding
Pond’s HRE Rule 404(b) Evidence That Ms. Russell Struck Him
‘Two Weeks Prior To The Incident.

Pond argues that the ICA gravely erred by con

 

uding
that under HRE Rule 404(b), he was required to give the
prosecution reasonable notice prior to introducing HRE Rule
404 (b) evidence because it violates his constitutional right to

present a defense and examine witnesses. Pond contends that

 

purpose of the notice requirement does not “‘trump’ [his)
constitutional rights, particularly where . . . there was no
prejudice to the prosecution.” Specifically, he asserts that he

sho

 

have been permitted to

 

troduce evidence that Ms. Russell
attacked him two weeks prior to December 12, 2005. We disagree.

1. BRE Rule 404(b)"s notice requirement is not
nconstitutional.

HRE Rule 404(b) was amended in 1994 to provide in

pertinent part,

  

In criminal cases, the proponent (offering) evidence
Efines, wrongs, of acts) shall provide zeasonable asbice ig

Sotios on goed cause show, of the date,
ature of any such evidence it intends to

(Emphasis added.) Legislative history of HRE Rule 404(b)

pro}

 

Toaation, and general
‘ntroduce at eral

 

 

 

les that the notice requirement “was modeled after a change
recently made to the FRE." Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 567-94, in

1994 House Journal, at 1088.

 

‘The Advisory Committee Note to the 1991 Amendnent

 

to

15
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FRE Rule 404(b), the federal counterpart to HRE Rule 404(b),
explains that the notice requirement “is intended to reduce
surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of
admissibility."” “Because the notice requirenent serves as
condition precedent to admissibility of 404(b) evidence, the
offered evidence is inadmissible if the court decides that the
notice requirement has not been met.” FRE Rule 404(b) Advisory

Committee’s Note (emphases added) .
As the ICA pointed out in Pond, HRE Rule 404(b)'s

 

notice requirement differs from its federal counterpart in three
ways. ond, 117 Hawai'i at 348, 181 P.3d at 427. Pond clains

that one distinction is critical to the instant case -- whereas
FRE 404(b) requires the prosecution to provide notice, HRE Rule

404(b) also requires a defendant to give reasonable notice of its

 

7 The Advisory Committee Note to the 198 Amendnents to FRE Fule
408 (b) further explains!

Other than requiring pretrial notice, no specific time Limits are
Stated in recognition that what constitutes s reasonable reqies=
or disclosure will depend largely on the circunstances of each

 

‘ine imgnanent requires the prosecution to provide notice,
regardless of how it intends to use the extrinsic act evidence at
trial, tve., during its case-in-chiet, for impeachment, oF for
possible rebuttal. The court in its discretion may, under the
facts, decide that the particular request of notice was not

 

 

  

ressonable, either because of the lack of timeliness oF
Completeness.
+ ARE Rule 404(b) and the FRE Rule 404(b) also differ because HRE

 

Rule 404(b) requires a more detailed form of notice (date, location, and
general nature of any such evidence”) whereas FAE 404 (b) merely requires
Sreagonable notice . . . of the general nature of any such evidence.” Zand
AT Hawai's at 348, lal P.3a at q27. Further, BRE Rule 404(b), anlike FRE
d0e(o)s does not, require Ehat the cther party request that st give prior

 

 

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intent to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Fond
contends that where the lack of pretrial notice did not prejudice
the prosecution, “there is no basis for applying the requirement
with equal force to defendants without considering the extent to
which exclusion of evidence impinges on the rights to fair trial,
to present a defense and of cross-examination.”

“The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution guarantee a
criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses
*[c)ross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested.’” State v, Sabog, 108 Hawai'i 102, 107, 117 P.3d 834,
839 (App. 2005) (quoting Davis vs Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974)). Because of the policy favoring cross-examination,
“[xlestrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront
adverse witnesses and to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary

or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to

serve.” Michigan v. Lucas, $00 U.S. 145, 181 (1992) (quoting
Rock v, Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987) (holding that a state

rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony impermissibly infringes

 

+ cf, Holmes v south carolina, $47 U.S. 319, 326-31 (2006) (ruling
hat precluding evidente of third-party guilt where the prosecution has
Untrosuced evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict, is
unconstitvtional); Cranes, Kentucky, 476 9.5. 663 (1986) (holding thet
Skclusing evidence of she circumstances of defendant’ s confession is
Unconstitutional); Washineron vw. Zeyas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1976) (holding
that a state statute that prohibited the defendant from calling a witness. who
had been charged and previously convicted of comuitting the same murder is
onal); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410°0.8. 264, 295-96 (1973)
precluding the defendant from impeaching nis own witness unde

 

 

   

uv
4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

on a defendant's right to testify)

 

} see Chambers v, Mississippi,
410 U.S, 264, 302 (1973) (holding that “where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically
to defeat the ends of justice”).

At the sane time, the United States Suprene Court has
ruled that “[tJhe right to present relevant testimony is not
without limitation. The right ‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to
acconnodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process.’" Rock, 483 U.S. at 58 (citation omitted); see State

Faria, 100 Hawai'i 383, 391, 60 P.3d 333, 341 (2002) (noting that

 

despite a defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness,
“relevant evidence ‘may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence’* (quoting HRE Rule 403
(2000))).

‘Thus, “{iJn applying its evidentiary rules a [s]tate
must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the
Limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to
testify.” Bock, 483 U.S. at S67 see also State v, Nizam, 7 Haw.
App. 402, 411-12, 771 P.2d 899, 904-05 (1989) (holding that the
tutional right was not violated where the

 

defendant's cons:
witness's testimony was stricken because the defendant refused to

release his interviews upon which his expert witness based his

 

opinion, and that there is @ legitimate interest in “ensuring

as
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

that a jury is provided with the relevant evidence on both sides
of an issue in order to assist it in determining the truth and
arriving at a just decision") cert, denied, 70 Haw. 666, 796 P.2d
502 (1989).

‘The Supreme Court applied the “legitimate interest”
rule in Lucas. 500 U.S. at 146. Lucas considered whether the
trial court violated defendant Lucas’ right to confrontation when
it precluded his proferred evidence for failure to comply with
the rape shield statute's notice requirements. Id, The rape
shield statute, designed to protect victims of rape from being
subjected to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their
past sexual behavior, permits a defendant to introduce evidence
of his or her own past sexual conduct with the victim if the
Gefendant files a written motion and an offer of proof within ten
days after he is arraigned. Id, at 146-47. The trial court may
also hold “an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed
evidence is admissible.” Id. Lucas was found guilty of criminal

sexual conduct, and on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals

 

reversed, holding that the statute’s notice requirement is per ae
unconstitutional “even where a defendant's failure to comply with

the notice-and-hearing requirement is a deliberate ploy to delay

 

the trial, surprise the prosecution, or harass the victim.” Id.
at 149, The Suprene Court granted certiorari. Ide

The Supreme Court recognized that the rape shield
statute implicates the sixth amendment and that, “[t]o the extent
that it operates to prevent 2 criminal defendant tron presenting

relevant evidence, the defendants ability to confront advers

19
   

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

Witnesses and present a defense is diminished. This does not
hecessarily render the statute unconstitutional.” id. at 149
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted and emphasis
added). iuucag observed that the defendant's right to present
relevant evidence “nay, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Id.
(quoting Bock, 483 U.S. at 55)

Pursuant to this rule, the Suprene Court recognized the
state's interest in the policy underlying the rape shield
statute's procedural prerequisites -- to protect rape victins
from surprise, harassment, and invasions of privacy, and permit
the prosecution to investigate the evidence. Id, at 149-50.
Next, the Court pointed to its previous rulings upholding
jentiary notice requirements even where such requirements
Linited 2 defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. at 150-52
(citing Taylor v. I1linois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988) (rejecting

 

defendant's argunent that “preclusion is never a permissible
sanction for a discovery violation” and holding that the circuit
court did not err by refusing to permit defendant’s undisclosed
witness to testify after violating a state procedural rule);
United States v, Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (affirming the trial
court’s refusal to permit defendant to call a witness where the
defendant refused to comply with the District Court’s order to
submit a copy of the witness's report to the prosecution and
declaring that “(t]he Sixth Amendnent does not confer the right
to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the

adversarial system”); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)

20
 

[FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary development
which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties,
enhances the fairness of the adversary system. . . . [Nlothing
in the Due Process Clause precludes States from experimenting
with systems of broad discovery designed to achieve these
goals."). It further anslogized the notice requirement to the
notice of alibi rule that it upheld in Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970), as follows:

‘me (Suprene] Court observed that the notice requirement ‘by
[ifghe in no wey affected (ehe decendanc!2i crucial decision to
call a1ibs wi ‘At moat, the rule only compelled
{tne defendant] to accelerate the eiming of his dusclosure,
foreing him to divulge at an earlier dave snformation that’ (he)
planned to divulge at trial.’ (Willaans, 399 0.8. at 65.)
Kecelerating the disclosure of this evsdence did fot violate the
Gonstivution, the [Supreme] Court explainea, because a criminal
trial is not ‘a poker game in which players enjoy 2n absolute
Fight always to Conceal their cards uneil played.’ (Jd. at 62.)

 

 

 

 

   

    

1d. at 149. Based on its prior rulings and the state's interest
in the rape shield statute, Lucas ruled that precluding evidence
based on the rape shield statute’s notice requirement is not per
se unconstitutional. Id, at 150, 152-53. However, it remanded
the case to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by precluding Lucas’ evidence. Id. at 182-53.

In determining whether HRE Rule 404(b)‘'s notice
requirenent is also not per se unconstitutional, we next consider
the policy governing the rule's notice requirement. As stated
above, the Lucag court described sound reasons for requiring pre-
trial notice. See Lucas, 500 U.S, at 150-52; cf, Wardius, 412
U.S, at 473 ("Notice-of-alibi rules . . . are based on the

proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a

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system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximun
possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases
and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.”). The
notice requirement pertaining to HRE Rule 404(b) evidence is
Likewise designed to reduce surprise and promote early resolution
of admissibility questions. See Pond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 161
P.3d at 429; FRE Rule 404(b) Advisory Committee's Note.

Moreover, HRE Rule 404(b) is not unconstitutional
merely because it implicates a defendant's constitutional right
to confront witnesses and its federal counterpart does not. As
s Note to FRE Rule 404(b) observed, the

 

the Advisory Committe
notice requirement is “in the mainstrean with notice and
@isclosure provisions in other rules of evidence,” such as FRE
Rules 412 (written motion of intent to offer evidence under
rule), 609 (written notice of intent to offer conviction older
than 10 years), 803(24) and 804(b) (5) (notice of intent to rely
on residual hearsay exceptions). Advisory Conmittee’s Note to
FRE Rule 404(b). These federal rules of evidence, by their plain
language, apply equally to the prosecution and the defense. Like
these rules and other Hawai'i rules of evidence," HRE Rule 404 (b)
is not per se unconstitutional even though it may restrict a
defendant's constitutional right to confront an adverse witness.

“The Sixth Amendment is not so rigid” that the HRE Rule 404(b)

 

RE Rule 422 requires = defendant accused of committing sexal
assault intending to submit evidence of an alleged victin’s past sensal
Behavior to submit written notice fifeeen days pricr to the introdetion of
evidence unless the court determines thst the evidence of an issue is newly
Giscovered, and HRE Rule 803(24) requires a notice of intent to admit hearsay
evidence that has circunstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

22

 

 

 
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notice requirement violates the sixth amendment in all cases
where it is used to preclude HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, see
lucas, 50 U.S, at 151. Accordingly, we conclude that HRE Rule
404(b)'s policy of “reducling] surprise and promot [ing] early
resolution on the issue of admissibility” “justify the limitation
imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify.”

‘The Dissent compares the HRE Rule 404(b) notice
requirenent to statutory privileges that “preclude the admission
at trial of certain classes of confidential communications” and
that may “interfere[] with a defendant's constitutional right to
examine.” State v. Peseti, 101 Hawai'i 172, 181, 65 P.3d
119, 128 (2003); gee Concurring and dissenting opinion

 

 

(“Dissent”) at 16-17, The Dissent argues that the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation trumps HRE Rule 404(b) in
certain circumstances in the sane way that it prevails over
statutory privileges “upon @ sufficient showing by the
defendant.” See Dissent at 16-17 (citing Peseti, 101 Hawai't at
181-82, 65 F.3d at 126-29, The Beseti rule is not outcome
dispositive of the instant issue, however, because HRE Rule
404(b) serves a different purpose than a statutory privilege and
does not per se exclude evidence.

In Peseti, this court considered whether the statutory
victim-counselor privilege violated defendant Peseti’s
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses as guaranteed

by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and

 

article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution. 101 Hawai'i at

174, 65 P.3d at 121, This court recognized the worthy goal of

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this statute: protecting victim-counselor communications assures
victims that “their thoughts and feelings will remain

confidential” and thereby promotes successful counseling. id. at

 

180, 65 P.3d at 127.
of a statutory privilege . . . is tempered by the principle that

Yet, we also recognized that “[t]he scope

‘privileges preventing disclosure of relevant evidence are not
favored and may often give way to 2 strong public interest.”
Id, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Citing te
Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20, which held that a defendant's
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses trunps the
confidentiality of a juvenile’s record, and other courts’ rulings
that statutory privileges may give way to a defendants’
constitutional right, we held that “when 2 statutory privilece
interferes with a defendant's constitutional right to cross-
examine, then, upon a sufficient showing by the defendant, the
witness’ statutory privilege must, in the interest of the truth-
seeking process, bow to the defendant’s constitutional rights.”
Ida at 101-62, 126-29 (emphasis added).

The Dissent contends that defendants should be
permitted to bring forth HRE Rule 404(b) evidence if they satisfy
the statutory privilege test laid out in Beseti because it
“toperate[s} to preclude the admission at trial of certain’

information," gee Dissent at 16-17, but the Eessti rule was not

 

\  pesets declared that a defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation trumps a statutory privilege

When the defendant demonstrates that: “{1) there is 2 legitimate
Reed to disclose the protected information; (2) the information is

24
 

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designed or intended to address evidentiary notice requiremen

 

The adoption of this rule was based on the purposes of statutory

ileges and, accordingly, only applies to “evidence of a

 

pri
statutorily privileged confidential communication.” Peseti,

 

Hawai'i at 180-82, 65 P.3d at 127-29. Moreover, unlike a

 

statutory privilege, HRE Rule 404(b) does not automatically
render evidence inadmissible. Rather, HRE Rule 404(b) evidence

may be admitted where the proponent provided reasonable notice or

 

had good cause for lack of pretrial notice. See HRE Rule 404(b)
(requiring “reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown”
(emphasis added) ); Bond, 117 Hawai‘ at 350, 181 P.3d at 429
(declaring that “the notice requirement is a condition precedent
to the admissibility of BRE Rule 404(b) evidence”).
Although the Dissent indicates that it is not claiming

that a “rule that impinges on a defendant's constitutional right

is unconstitutional per s¢,” see Dissent at 32, applying
the Peseti test to otherwise admissible HRE Rule 404(b) evidence
invariably renders the rule’s notice requirenents
unconstitutional as applied to criminal defendants. The
application of the Peseta test to HRE Rule 404(b) would always

allow defendants to present HRE Rule 404(b) evidence that did not

 

 

Televant and raterial to the issue before the court; and (3) the
forty seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a preponderance of
Eke evigence that no less intrusive source for that information

 

 

eset, 101 Mawas's at 182, 65 P.3d at 129 (quoting State vs LuleB., 270
HedeSuper. 429, 637 A-2d $32, 837 (25841)

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comport with the HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirement. In other
words, it appears that relevant HRE Rule 404(b) evidence would
always satisfy the Beseti test and therefore, be rendered
admissible. Seg Zeseti, 101 Hawai'i at 162, 65 P.dd at 129
(requiring that “(1) there is a legitimate need to disclose the
protected information[,] (2) the information is relevant and
material to the issue before the court[,) and (3) the party
seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that no less intrusive source for that information
exists"), Therefore, to hold that the Beseti rule applies to the
admission of defendants’ HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, on the basis
of protecting defendants’ constitutional rights, would
effectively rewrite HRE Fule 404(b) and render the notice
requirement per se unconstitutional.

As explained above, HRE Rule 404(b), like many
discovery rules, is designed to reduce surprise during the
criminal trial and maintain fairness for both parties. Similar
to the notice of alibi rule, the HRE Rule 404(b) notice
requirement **[a]t most, . . . only compelled [the defendant} to
accelerate at an earlier date information that [he] planned to
divulge at trial."” Williams, 399 0.5. at 85. By precluding
parties from introducing HRE Rule 404(b) evidence during trial
and surprising the opposing party without good cause, this notice
requirement protects parties and the juzy trial system from
falling prey to opposing counsel's trial tactics and strategies
that do not promote a fair trial. Cf, Willjams, 399 U.S. at 82

(The adversary system of trial . . . 4s not a poker game in

26
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

ch players enjoy an absolute right to conceal their cards

1 HRE Rule 404(b) notice requirement comports

 

until played.").

with this court’s interest in promoting the orderly

 

administration of justice and does not interfere with the
Gefendant’s constitutional rights, Cf. Baxter vs State, 522
N.B.2d 362, 369 (Ind. 1988) ("[NJotice rules promote the orderly
administration of justice by preventing unnecessary continuances
and by eliminating trials in those instances where post-notice
investigation reveals an alibi’s merits.” (quoting Alicea v.
Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 917 (Teh Cir. 1982))).

Having concluded that HRE Rule 404(b) is not per se
unconstitutional, we next consider whether the circuit court
abused its discretion by excluding Pond’s HRE Rule 404 (b)
evidence in the present case. See Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544,
1550 (1992) ("Because trial judges have broad discretion both to
determine relevance and to determine whether prejudicial effect
or other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence,
we will find a Sixth Amendment violation only if we conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted.)).

2

‘Thecircuit court did not abuse ite discretion by.
precluding evidence that Ms. Aussell previous:

As discussed above, Pond attempted to introduce “HRE
Rule 404(b) evidence” on the first day of trial by arguing that
it is “highly relevant to the issue of ‘first aggressor,’ but
the circuit court ruled that Pond gave unreasonable notice of
this evidence. ‘The circuit court excluded this HRE Rule 404(b)
evidence, opining, “If it goes to the heart of the defense, then

2
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

it should have been something given more prominence earlier. 1
can’t believe that it's that much to the heart of it based on the
way it?s dribbling in.”

As the Dissent points out, Pond’s proferred evidence

may implicate HRE Rule 404(a)(2). See Dissent at 18 (citing HRE

 

Rule 404(a) (2) (providing that victims’ character traits offered
by an accused may be admitted “to provie] action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion”)). Based on its plain
language, HRE Rule 404(a) (2) evidence is not subject to the
reasonable notice provision of HRE Rule 404(b). Nevertheless,
Pond identified the alleged attack of Pond by Ms. Russell as
“404 (b) evidence” in his opening brief’s points of error section
and argued that the court erred in excluding the HRE Rule 404 (b)
evidence. Thus, the issue of the admissibility of this evidence
under HRE Rule 404(al was not asserted by defendant and is
therefore deemed waived. See Hawai'i Rules of Appellate
Procedure (*HRAP") Rule 28(b) (4) ("Points not presented in
accordance with this section will be disregarded, except that the
appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain error not
presented.”); HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) (providing that the opening
brief must contain an argument section “containing the
contentions of the appellant on the points presented and the
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and
parts of the record relied on. . . . Points not argued may be
deemed waived”).

The record indicates that the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Pond’ s

 

quest to introduce Ms.

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Russell's prior acts under HRE Rule 404(b). On the first day of
trial, defense counsel explained to the court that he was
previously aware of the “(HRE Rule] 404(b) event,” but did not
give the prosecution notice becuse he “wasn’t able to pinpoint
the day until [that] morning." This argument was disingenuous at
best. hen Pond’s counsel attempted to introduce the alleged HRE
Rule 404(b) evidence at trial, both Pond and his counsel merely

approximated the date of the event. On dire

 

examination, the

 

following collequy tock place between Pond and his counsel

‘The reason you're hel
son late Beceaber 12,
3

    

Lath, she had *-"r'nad cone hone from work and she had the dog and
ielae laying up on my bed, and just Lounging on the bed.

 

 

(Emphases added.) Pond’ s argument for excusing pretrial notice
is inconsistent with his testimony, which clearly did not
“pinpoint” the date of the prior incidents. Accordingly, Pond
Gid not establish good cause for delaying the notification of the
HRE Rule 404(b) evidence until the day of trial.

We further note that defense counsel could have given
the prosecution general notice prior to trial to eliminate undue
surprise and allow the prosecution the opportunity to prepare for
thie matter. See Bond, 117 Hawai'i at 350, 161 P.3d at 429
(observing that Pond never explained “why he could not have
provided earlier notice of the approximate tine period of the
alleged bad act, as well as the location and the general nature
of the evidence”). Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion by declining to excuse

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pretrial notice on good cause shown and precluding Pond’s HRE
Rule 404(b) evidence.

B. The Circuit Court Committed Reversible Error By Precluding
Pond From Cross-Examining Me. Russell About Whether She
‘Smoked Marijuana on December 12, 2005.

Pond next argues that the ICA gravely erred by
concluding that he was required to provide reasonable notice of
his intent to cross-examine Ns. Fussell about using marijuana on
December 12, 2005 to attack her perception and recollection. It
is well recognized that a defendant may cross-examine the witness
“as to her drug use and addiction at or near the time of the
incident to the extent that it affected her perception or
recollection of the alleged event.”? Sabog, 108 Hawai'i at 111,
117 P.3d at 843 (citing Wilgon v, United States, 232 U.S. 563
(1914) (concluding that witness’s drug use was admissible to
discredit the witness's reliability); Blumhagen v, State, 11 P.3d

889 (Wyo. 2000) ("A witness’ [sic] use of drugs while she is

 

testifying or during the events about which she is testifying
may, of course, be presented to the jury because the drug use
could have affected the witness’ [sic] observations or
statements.”)). “Subject always to the broad discretion of a
trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing

interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve

 

In Band, the ICA explaine
evidence of acts which are sinttinsse

 

that FRE Rule 40¢(b) "does not extend to
the charged offense.’ bond, 117

 

    

Hawai'i at 248, 181 8.3¢ at 427 (quoting FRE Rule 40s (b) Advisory Committee’ s
Note). However, we have recentiy rejected the extrinsic/intrineic evidence
distinction because it “essentially Aullif(tes) Mule 404(b]'2 restrictions on

     

 

“bad act” evidence.” State vy Fetelee, 117 Hawai'i 53, 81, 175 P.3d 709, 737

(2008)
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into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and

 

memory, but the crogs-exaniner hag traditionally been allowed to
impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316
emphasis added), As further discussed below, evidence

introduced to impeach a witness’s sensory or mental defect does
not fall under the purview of HRE Rule 404(b).

‘The application of HRE Rule 404(b) is limited to other
crimes, wrongs, or acts “[that] is probative of another fact that
4s of consequence to the determination of the action.” HRE Rule
404(b). United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (Sth Cir. 1995)
his point. in Tomblin, the Sth Circuit

 

is instructive on
discussed whether the prosecution was required to give advance
notice of its intent to impeach the defendant through cross-
examining him about other acts. Thomblin, 46 F.3d at 1368. The
prosecution contended that its cross-examination questions were
probative of Tomblin’s character for truthfulness and is
admissible under FRE Rule 608(b)" -- evidence offered to impeach
a witness. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1388. The Sth Circuit agreed
that the admissibility of other acts evidence depends on the

 

PRE 6081) provides,

lb) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a xitness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness’ character for truthfulness, other than conviction of
crime ag provided in rule €08, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. they may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
Drobative of truthulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
Erose-ewanination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’
character for truthfulness or untruthfulnesa, ax (2) concerning
the character for truthfulness or ontrathfalness oF ansther
witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
Testifies!

 

 

 

 

BL
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

purpose for the proffered evidence and noted that FRE Rule 404 (b)
applies “when other-acts evidence is offered as relevant to an
issue in the case, such as identity or intent.” Id, Tomblin
determined that the prosecution intended to question the
defendant about his alleged prior acts to probe his character for
ness. Id, at 1389, Therefore, FRE Rule 608(b), not FRE

Rule 404(b), applied, and “reasonable notice” of this evidence

trut!

 

was not required. Ide

Here, contrary to the conclusion of the ICA and the
ruling of the circuit court, Pond was not required to provide the
Prosecution HRE Rule 404(b) “reasonable notice” prior to cross~
examining Ms. Russell about whether she used marijuana on
December 12, 2005 because he intended to show the jury that her
perception and testimony about the incident were not credible.
See United states v. Backes, 649 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir.1980)
(No rule or rationale guarantees the defense advance knowledge
of legitimate impeachment before it calls a witness.”), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981). Hence, the ICA erred in affirming
the circuit court's ruling that precluded Pond from cross~
examining Ms. Russell about her alleged marijuana use on December
12, 2005 based on HRE Rule 404(b).

‘The circuit court committed reversible error in
limiting the cross-examination of Ms. Russell as to her marijuana

use." Pond was deprived of showing that Ms. Russell's

 

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perception of the events was altered through her alleged use of
marijuana, Pond’s testimony that he smelled marijuana upon
entering the house was insufficient to prove that Ns. Russell's
perception on December 12, 2005 was inaccurate. Tf the court

permitted Pond’s counsel to question Ns. Russell on this issue

 

directly, the jury could have observed Ms. Russell's response and
lity. See Lyba v. State, 321 Md. 564, 583 A.2d
1033 (1991) ("[T]he defense could follow up the adm:

judged her cre:

  

 

sion (that

the victim took narcotics on the day in question] by delving the

 

degree of drug influence or alcchol intoxication so that the jury
could decide the credibility of the victim and how much weight to
give her testimony.”).

In convicting Pond of the two offenses, the jury found
Ms. Russell credible and believed Ms, Russell's testimony about
Decenber 12, 2005 over Pond’s testimony, There vas a reasonable
possibility that the errors complained of contributed to Pond’s
conviction. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court's

error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we vacate

 

‘The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the
Central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual
Question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes
Public respect for the crisinal process by focusing on the
Snderlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually
Ihevitable presence of inmaterial error

 

 

 

 

Yan Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, The Suprone Court deemed the following factors

jortant th getermining whether the constitutional error was aarmleas: the
Sinportance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’ e case, nbether the
testimony was cunulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating oF
contradicting the cestinony of the witness on material points, the extent of
Gross-exanination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of
fhe prosecution's case.” Idi at eet.

 

   

 

 

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Pond’s convictions.

©. The ICA Did Not Gravely Err By Concluding That The Circuit
Court Properly Instructed the Jury On Self-Defense Inasmuch
As It Adequately Tracked the Self-Protection Defense
Statute.

 

Next, Pond contends that the ICA gravely erred by

did not err 4

 

concluding that the circuit cou: structing the
jury about the self-protection defense even though it did not
“define for the jury that the reasonableness of [Fond’s] belief
must be viewed from his perspective.”

Under HRS $ 703-304(3) (1995 & Supp. 2006), the statute

regarding the use of force in self-protection as a defense, “a
person employing protective force may estimate the necessity

thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when
the force is used without retreating, surrendering, possession,

doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do, or
abstaining from any lawful action.” (Emphasis added.) See State
v. Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 477, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990) (*(T]he
standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant’ s belief
for the need to use deadly force is determined from the point of
view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the
circumstances as he believed them to be. The jury, therefore,
must consider the circumstances as the Defendant subjectively
believed then to be at the time he tried to defend himself.”

(citation omitted)).

 

‘The self-defense jury instruction provide

‘The use of force upon of tovards another person ia justified unen
2 pergoa reasonably believes that such force ie immediately,
protect himself on the present occasion against the

 

 

 

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se of unlawful force by the other pe A person exploying
fotective force may estimate Thereot unger ing
ra he ees ss sibs when the force
GAGS ithoce retreating. “if, and only if) you tind that the
[ajefendant was reckless 5 having a belicf that he was justifies

   

[nlGsing self-pretactive foree against another person, oF that the
(Sjefendant was reckless in sequiring or failing to acquire any
[nowiedge of belief which vas material co the Justifiapility of
Rie ose of forse against the other person, then the use of such
protective force ia unavailable as a defense to the offense of
Ebise of family or nousenold member

  

 

  

asmuch as

 

‘This instruction sufficiently tracks HRS § 703-304(3)

it informs the

 

jury that the reasonableness of Pond’s belief must

be viewed from his perspective, Because the jury must consider

sonable “under the

 

whether the defendant's belief was ri

circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be,” it

 

necessarily evaluates the situation from the defendant's
ed that the

 

perspective. Therefore, the ICA properly deter
circuit court’s jury instruction was consistent with the language
of the self-protection defense statute.

D. We Clarify that There Are Two Attendant Circumstances: (1)
Me. Russell Was a Victim of a Crime and (2) The Call Was
Made to 911-Emergency Telephone System.

  

Finally, Pond argues that the ICA gravely erred by
ruling that the circuit court erred by combining the elements of

the Interference offense but ruling that this error was harmless.

 

The ICA, in agreement with the prosecution and Pond, ruled th
the jury's instructions as to the Interference offense consisted
of two elements, results of conduct and attendant circumstances.
Bond, 117 Hawas‘i at 352, 161 P.3d at 431. We take this
opportunity to clarify the ICA's analysis of the Interference

offense’s attendant circumstance element.

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Under HRS §§ 702-204 and 702-205 (1993), “{A] person is

 

not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intention

 

knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies,
respect to each element of the offense,” (1) conduct, (2)
attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct.” In State
M.Rivohi, 109 Hawai'i 115, 123 P.3d 1210 (2005), this court
observed that the Model Penal Code does not define an attendant
circumstance, and we adopted the ICA's definition of an
“attendant circumstance” as stated in State v. Moser, 107 Hawai'i
159, 172, 111 P.3d 54, 67 (App. 2005): [a)ny circumstances
defined in an offense that are neither conduct nor the results of
conduct would, by default, constitute attendant circumstances
elements of the offense.” Aiwohi, 109 Hawai'i at 127, 123 P.3d
at 1222. In applying this definition of an attendant
circumstance, we distilled the three elements of the offense of
manslaughter (“recklessly causes the death of another person”).
“the conduct is,any voluntary act or omission, the result is
death, and the attendant circumstance is ‘of another person./”
in

In the instant case, Pond is guilty of the Interference
offense if he “intentionally or knowingly prevents a victim or
witness to a criminal act from calling a 91l-energency telephone
system, obtaining medical assistance, or making @ report toa law
enforcement officer." HRS § 109-906. Applying this court's
definition of attendant circumstances, the conduct is any
voluntary act or omission, the result is preventing Ms. Russell

from making a telephone call, and the attendant circumstances are
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IR. PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE!

   

hat (1) Ms. Russell was a victim of a crime and (2) the call was

 

to Qli-energency. As previously quoted, and worth repeating
here, the jury instruction on the Interference offense mistakenly
stated in pertinent part that the intentional or knowing state of

mind 4g required for two elements:

 

(2) that Pond “engaged in

conduct” and (2) “that said conduct resulted i

 

preventing a
victim or witness to a criminal act from calling a 911-emergency
telephone system, obtaining medical assistance, or making
report to a lew enforcement officer.”

‘hus, on renand, the elements of “results-of-conduct”
(that Pond successfully prevented Ms. Russell from making 2
telephone call) and “attendant circumstances” -- (1) that Ms.
Fussell vas a victim of a criminal act and (2) that the call was
made to 911-emergency telephone system -- should be separately
listed.

Iv. coNcLusrON

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we vacate Fond’s
conviction of abuse of family or household menber and
Interference, and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

Deborah L, Kim and
‘Theresa Marshall, Deputy
Public Defenders, for

petitioner /defendant-

appellant Kevin Pond PEM kim
Richard Minatoya and Seatad

Brandon L.K. Paredes,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys,
for respondent /plaintiff-
appellee State of Hawai'i

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