Title: Commonwealth v. Hernandez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12501 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON J. HERNANDEZ. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     November 8, 2018. - March 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Death.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Death of party, Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 22, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before E. Susan Garsh, J., and a 
motion to abate prosecution ab initio, filed on April 24, 2017, 
was heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas M. Quinn, III, District Attorney (Shoshana Stern, 
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Eric A. Haskell, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this appeal, the Commonwealth asks us to 
reconsider the viability of the common-law doctrine of abatement 
ab initio, whereby, as was the case here, a criminal conviction 
is vacated and the indictment is dismissed after the defendant 
dies while his direct appeal as of right challenging that 
conviction is in process.  The justification for the adoption of 
the doctrine has never been explicated, and several compelling 
arguments weigh against it.  Indeed, many other jurisdictions 
have, with increasing frequency in recent years, rejected the 
doctrine and followed alternative approaches.  The Commonwealth 
urges us either to abandon the doctrine altogether or to 
recognize an exception to the doctrine where, as has been 
suggested may have been the case here, a defendant commits 
suicide to prevent the application of the doctrine and thereby 
collaterally to benefit surviving family members, heirs, or 
other beneficiaries.1 
 
We conclude that the doctrine of abatement ab initio is 
outdated and no longer consonant with the circumstances of 
contemporary life, if, in fact, it ever was.  Rather, when a 
defendant dies irrespective of cause, while a direct appeal as 
of right challenging his conviction is pending, the proper 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief jointly submitted by the 
Attorney General and Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance 
Board. 
3 
 
 
course is to dismiss the appeal as moot and note in the trial 
court record that the conviction removed the defendant's 
presumption of innocence, but that the conviction was appealed 
and neither affirmed nor reversed because the defendant died.  
We conclude that this approach, which otherwise applies only 
prospectively, should apply in the present case. 
 
1.  Background.  Following a jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted of, among other things, murder in the first degree and 
sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment with no 
eligibility for parole.2  About two years later, the defendant 
died3 while awaiting assembly of the record for his appeal.4 
 
The defendant's appellate counsel filed a suggestion of 
death and motion to abate in the trial court, requesting that 
the court dismiss the defendant's appeal,5 vacate his 
                                                          
 
 
2 He also was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm 
and unlawful possession of ammunition. 
 
 
3 There are suggestions that the cause of death was suicide 
and that the defendant may have been aware of the doctrine of 
abatement ab initio and its potential financial implications for 
his family, but, given our ruling, we need not, and do not, 
reach any conclusions in that regard, including as to the 
sufficiency of any such evidence. 
 
 
4 As the record was still being assembled, the defendant's 
appeal had not yet been docketed in this court. 
 
 
5 The defendant maintains that a notice of appeal from the 
convictions was timely filed, but no such filing is reflected on 
the trial court docket.  As such, the defendant has filed a 
motion with this court requesting that we order the trial court 
4 
 
 
convictions, and dismiss the underlying indictments.  The 
Commonwealth opposed the latter two requests.  After hearing, 
the judge, who was also the trial judge, issued a thorough and 
reasoned memorandum of decision concluding that she was bound by 
precedent emanating from this court to apply the doctrine of 
abatement ab initio.  Consequently, she allowed defense 
counsel's motion, dismissed the defendant's notice of appeal, 
vacated his convictions, and dismissed the indictments.  We 
granted the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate 
review.6 
 
2.  State of the law.  The doctrine of abatement ab initio 
provides that the death of a defendant "pending direct review of 
a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all 
proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception."  Durham 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam).  "That 
is, the appeal does not just disappear, and the case is not 
merely dismissed.  Instead, everything associated with the case 
is extinguished, leaving the defendant as if he had never been 
indicted or convicted" (quotation and citation omitted).  United 
                                                          
 
to correct the docket.  The Commonwealth has not filed any 
opposition and, other than noting that there does not appear to 
have been a "formal" notice of appeal filed, has not argued that 
the convictions were not properly appealed.  Accordingly, we 
allow the defendant's motion to correct the docket. 
 
 
6 The Commonwealth has not challenged defense counsel's 
continued representation of the defendant in this matter. 
5 
 
 
States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2004).  
The doctrine "is not grounded in the constitution or in statute, 
but is instead a court-created common law doctrine" (citation 
omitted).  People v. Griffin, 328 P.3d 91, 92 (Colo. 2014).  See 
Bevel v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 468, 478 (2011) ("It does not 
appear that abatement of a criminal case is addressed by statute 
in any jurisdiction in the United States"); State v. Webb, 167 
Wash. 2d 470, 474 (2009) (lack of "authority holding as a 
constitutional matter that abatement of a conviction is required 
when a defendant dies pending an appeal"). 
 
The origin of the doctrine "is unclear, with little or no 
evidence of its application prior to the late nineteenth 
century. . . .  These early decisions were occasionally quite 
terse and provide little insight into the reasons the courts 
elected to abate a case or not, or even as to what aspect of the 
case was being abated -- the appeal only or the entire 
prosecution" (citation omitted).  Bevel, 282 Va. at 475.  
"Despite the common acknowledgement that abatement ab initio is 
well-established and oft-followed . . . , few courts have 
plainly articulated the rationale behind the doctrine."  Estate 
of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413.  Or, as another court put it, the 
"rule that an action abates with the death of a party is one of 
antiquity" and "[t]he reason for the rule has been lost in 
antiquity" (citations omitted).  People v. Ekinici, 191 Misc. 2d 
6 
 
 
510, 516-517 (N.Y. S. Ct. 2002).  In many respects, this 
describes the evolution of the doctrine of abatement ab initio 
in Massachusetts. 
 
a.  Abatement in Massachusetts.  It has been suggested on 
several occasions, including by the trial judge in her 
memorandum of decision, by a commentator on appellate procedure, 
see J.F. Stanton, Appellate Procedure § 5:56 (3d ed. Supp. 
2017), and even by this court in a recent summary disposition, 
see Commonwealth vs. Luke, SJC-11629, order (July 21, 2016), 
that the doctrine of abatement ab initio represents the 
"longstanding" practice in Massachusetts.  The first reported 
appellate case acknowledging the doctrine in Massachusetts, 
however, was issued in 1975.  See Commonwealth v. Eisen, 368 
Mass. 813, 813-814 (1975).  It strains credulity then to suggest 
that the doctrine has been a long-standing or historic staple of 
Massachusetts common law, especially when contrasted with other 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Griffin, 328 P.3d at 93 (doctrine 
first recognized by Supreme Court of Colorado in 1904); State v. 
West, 630 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (tracing doctrine to 
Supreme Court of Missouri case from 1874). 
 
It also would be a stretch to suggest, as the defendant 
does here, that the doctrine of abatement ab initio was 
"formally" adopted by this court in Eisen, 368 Mass. at 813.  
That decision, a rescript, is more notable for brevity than 
7 
 
 
insight.  We did not declare that we were adopting the doctrine, 
nor did we comment on the potential benefits or shortcomings of 
its approach or that of any other approach.  We simply stated 
that "[w]hen a criminal defendant dies pending his appeal, 
normally the judgment should be vacated and the indictment 
dismissed.  This is the general practice elsewhere" (emphasis 
added).  Id. at 813-814, and cases cited.  We concluded: 
"The asserted general importance of certain issues and 
counsel's able presentation of his client's appeal do not 
justify a different result.  Any personal interest in 
vindication which a member of the defendant's family may 
have is not sufficiently substantial to warrant our 
deciding the appeal. . . .  Although given an opportunity 
to do so, neither the Commonwealth nor the defendant's 
counsel has advanced any other reason why a decision on 
this appeal should be made" (citations omitted). 
 
Id. at 814.  We remanded for dismissal of the indictment.  Id. 
 
In the ensuing forty-four years, we have applied the 
doctrine to a direct appeal as of right from a conviction in two 
reported decisions, both rescripts, both even terser than Eisen.  
First, in Commonwealth v. Harris, 379 Mass. 917 (1980), we 
essentially restated our holding and reasoning from Eisen and 
remanded for dismissal of the indictment.  In Commonwealth v. 
Latour, 397 Mass. 1007 (1986), again citing Eisen, we stated 
that, "[w]hen a criminal defendant dies pending his appeal, the 
general practice is to dismiss the indictment" (emphasis added), 
and concluded, in even briefer terms than either Eisen or 
Harris, that "[t]here is nothing about the issues raised in this 
8 
 
 
appeal that leads us to vary this general rule."  Id.  
Accordingly, we remanded for dismissal of the complaint.  Id. 
 
Those cases make up the universe of appellate jurisprudence 
on the doctrine before us.7  In sum, abatement ab initio is 
"normally" or "generally" the rule, although it appears to be so 
for no other reason than because that was the practice 
elsewhere. 
                                                          
 
 
7 We discussed the doctrine in two other cases in which the 
defendant died after this court had granted an application for 
further appellate review, but before oral argument could be 
held.  See Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 416 Mass. 247 (1993); 
Commonwealth v. Squires, 476 Mass. 703 (2017).  In De La Zerda, 
supra at 250-251, we concluded that the interests of justice had 
been served because the defendant's appeal had already undergone 
direct review by the Appeals Court, and vacated the order 
granting the application for further appellate review, dismissed 
the application, and allowed the Appeals Court decision to 
stand.  In Squires, supra at 706-707, we departed from the 
practice in De La Zerda and addressed the appeal on the merits 
because the appeal of a codefendant was pending and he had, 
through incorporation by reference, raised the same arguments as 
the deceased defendant.  In short, those cases involved a 
decidedly different issue:  whether abatement ab initio should 
apply when a defendant, whose appeal already has undergone 
direct review as of right, dies during the pendency of a 
subsequent, discretionary appeal.  That issue, unlike the one 
decided in Eisen, Harris, and Latour and under consideration 
again here, has been resolved in fairly uniform fashion in other 
jurisdictions.  See De La Zerda, supra at 249-250.  See also 
Surland v. State, 392 Md. 17, 19 (2006) ("The law throughout the 
country seems clear, and by now mostly undisputed, that, if the 
defendant's conviction has already been affirmed on direct 
appeal and the death occurs while the case is pending further 
discretionary review by a higher court, such as on certiorari, 
the proper course is to dismiss the discretionary appellate 
proceeding and leave the existing judgment, as affirmed, 
intact"). 
9 
 
 
 
b.  Federal approach.  The Federal courts apply the 
doctrine of abatement ab initio when a defendant dies during the 
pendency of an appeal as of right.  In Durham, 401 U.S. at 481, 
which we cited in Eisen, 368 Mass. at 814, the defendant filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision 
of a Federal Court of Appeals affirming his criminal conviction.  
While the petition was pending, he died.  Durham, supra.  The 
United States Supreme Court, after noting that lower Federal 
courts had been "unanimous" and "correct" in holding that 
abatement ab initio applies when a defendant dies while direct 
review of a criminal conviction is pending, granted the writ, 
vacated the conviction, and remanded with directions to dismiss 
the indictment.  Id. at 483.  Five years later, the Court 
overruled Durham in another per curiam decision that became 
known for its brevity: 
"The Court is advised that the petitioner died at New Bern, 
N.C., on November 14, 1975.  The petition for certiorari is 
therefore dismissed.  To the extent that Durham . . . may 
be inconsistent with this ruling, Durham is overruled." 
 
Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam).  See 
United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Dove overruled Durham in "42 cryptic, enigmatic words").  The 
United States Courts of Appeals have, with the exception of one 
that has not addressed the issue, continued to apply the 
doctrine when a defendant dies pending a direct appeal as of 
10 
 
 
right, having either expressly or implicitly concluded that Dove 
overruled Durham only with respect to the disposition of 
petitions for certiorari, a discretionary form of appeal.8  There 
has been some divergence among the Federal courts concerning 
whether there should be an exception to abatement for 
restitution orders imposed for compensatory, as opposed to 
penal, purposes,9 and whether the doctrine requires reimbursement 
of fines that have been paid prior to the defendant's death,10 
                                                          
 
 
8 See United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 296-297 
(3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908-909 
(2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 665 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 995 (1992); United States v. 
Schumann, 861 F.2d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Wilcox, 783 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dudley, 
739 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pauline, 625 
F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Littlefield, 594 
F.2d 682, 683 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 
F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bechtel, 547 
F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).  Even in the 
circuit where the United States Court of Appeals has not 
addressed the issue in a published opinion, abatement ab initio 
appears to be the practice.  See United States v. Sheehan, 874 
F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Mass. 1994) ("appellate courts customarily 
order, as did the First Circuit here, that the judgment appealed 
from be vacated and the indictment be dismissed" upon death of 
defendant). 
 
 
9 Compare Christopher, 273 F.3d at 294 (restitution order 
not abated upon death of defendant), with United States v. 
Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Dahod, petitioner, 522 U.S. 953 (1997) (restitution order 
abated). 
 
 
10 Compare United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1346-1347 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Marcello v. United States, 522 
U.S. 998 (1997) (fines paid prior to death of defendant 
11 
 
 
although both issues have been the subject of renewed scrutiny 
after the Supreme Court held in Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 
1249, 1252 (2017), that due process requires the refund of fees, 
court costs, and restitution paid by a defendant when the 
underlying conviction has been invalidated and no retrial will 
occur.11 
 
c.  Other jurisdictions.  Although it may have been 
arguable when Eisen was decided in 1975 that the doctrine of 
abatement ab initio was the majority approach, the "more recent 
trend offers courts options in deciding how an appeal should be 
handled upon the death of an appellant."  State v. Salazar, 123 
N.M. 778, 785 (1997).  Abatement ab initio is far from the 
"general practice" now, there being, depending on how granular 
one chooses to define the categories, anywhere from three to 
seven different approaches followed when a defendant dies during 
the pendency of a direct appeal of a conviction.  Compare State 
                                                          
 
"analogous to time served and are not refundable"), with 
Sheehan, 874 F. Supp. at 35 (paid fines must be refunded to 
defendant's estate). 
 
 
11 See United States v. Brooks, 872 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 171 (2018) (after Nelson v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1252 [2017], restitution order also 
must be abated upon death of defendant); United States v. 
Libous, 858 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 2017) ("at a minimum, the logic 
of Nelson strongly supports abating" and reimbursing fine paid 
prior to death of defendant); United States v. Ajrawat, 738 Fed. 
Appx. 136, 139 (4th Cir. 2018) (after Nelson, "can no longer say 
an order of restitution is an exception to [the abatement] 
rule"). 
12 
 
 
v. Hollister, 300 Kan. 458, 465-466 (2014) (discussing three 
general approaches), with Surland v. State, 392 Md. 17, 19-20 
(2006) (identifying five "basic choices on the menu of 
options"), and Bevel, 282 Va. at 477 ("there are at least seven 
categories of policies on abatement"). 
By our count, eighteen States and the District of Columbia 
apply the doctrine of abatement ab initio, with some, like the 
above-mentioned Federal circuits, carving out an exception for 
restitution orders imposed for compensatory purposes.12  A 
                                                          
 
 
12 See State v. Griffin, 121 Ariz. 538, 539 (1979) (upon 
death of defendant, appeal dismissed, conviction vacated, 
indictment dismissed, but request for reimbursement of fine and 
restitution must be pursued in separate civil procedure); People 
v. Schaefer, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1287-1288 (2012) (appeal, 
conviction, indictments, fines, and restitution order all 
abated); People v. Griffin, 328 P.3d 91, 92 (Colo. 2014) 
(abatement ab initio applies when defendant dies during pendency 
of "direct appeal [i.e., first appeal as of right]"); Howell v. 
United States, 455 A.2d 1371, 1372-1373 (D.C. 1983) (preferable 
approach to dismiss appeal and remand with directions to vacate 
conviction and abate prosecution); People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 
2d 461, 462-463 (1999) (all criminal proceedings abate ab initio 
from inception); State v. Kriechbaum, 219 Iowa 457, 465 (1934) 
(criminal action, including appeal, conviction, and costs, 
deemed "abated in toto"); State v. Rose, 250 So. 3d 1236, 1237 
(La. 2018) (conviction vacated and all proceedings in 
prosecution abated from inception); State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 
891, 894-895 (Me. 1973) (absent "showing of special 
circumstances," appeal dismissed, conviction vacated, and 
prosecution abated ab initio); State v. Burrell, 837 N.W.2d 459, 
470 (Minn. 2013) (prosecution should abate ab initio from 
conviction in which restitution is not at issue); State v. West, 
630 S.W.2d 271, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (appeal abates and 
"judgment entered below becomes nonexistent"); State v. 
Campbell, 187 Neb. 719, 720 (1972) (death abates appeal and 
proceedings in prosecution from inception); State v. Poulos, 97 
13 
 
 
majority of others follow one of several different approaches.  
Some have opted to allow the appeal to proceed, although most 
limit the issues that can be considered.13  Others have opted not 
to allow the appeal to proceed and, although not all have stated 
                                                          
 
N.H. 352, 354 (1952) (death abates appeal and State's case 
against deceased defendant); People v. Matteson, 75 N.Y.2d 745, 
747 (1989) (death abates appeal and all proceedings in 
prosecution from inception); State v. Dixon, 265 N.C. 561, 562 
(1965) ("Action abated; appeal dismissed" where defendant died 
after appeal docketed and argued); Nott v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 
316, 316 (1950) (purpose of criminal prosecution being to punish 
accused, action must necessarily abate upon death); State v. 
Marzilli, 111 R.I. 392, 393 (1973) (adopting "majority rule" 
that death abates appeal and all proceedings since inception); 
State v. Clark, 260 N.W.2d 370, 370 (S.D. 1977) (death abates 
not only appeal but all proceedings in prosecution from 
inception); Carver v. State, 217 Tenn. 482, 486 (1966) (all 
proceedings abated ab initio); State v. Free, 37 Wyo. 188, 188 
(1927) (all proceedings abate, whether punishment consists of 
imprisonment, fine, or both). 
 
 
13 See Hollister, 300 Kan. at 465-468 (upon death of 
defendant, no abatement and direct and subsequent discretionary 
appeals, both provided for by statute, can proceed, but only as 
to issues [1] of Statewide interest and of such nature that 
public policy demands decision, like where issue would exonerate 
defendant; [2] that remain real controversy; or [3] capable of 
repetition); State v. Benn, 364 Mont. 153, 156-158 (2012) 
(abandoning abatement, but only allowing for appeal of issues 
not rendered moot by defendant's death, like challenge to 
restitution order); Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 147 
(1972) ("it is in the interest of both a defendant's estate and 
society that any challenge initiated by a defendant to the 
regularity or constitutionality of a criminal proceeding be 
fully reviewed and decided by the appellate process"); State v. 
Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 535-537 (Utah 1993) (conviction not 
abated and "remains intact," with case remanded to court of 
appeals to address issue not mooted by defendant's death; i.e., 
challenge to restitution order); State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 
531, 532 (1988) (right to appeal continues). 
14 
 
 
so or stated so with clarity, the underlying conviction and any 
related fines and restitution orders remain fully or partially 
intact.14  Still others follow an approach whereby, usually 
                                                          
 
 
14 See State v. Trantolo, 209 Conn. 169, 170 (1988) (given 
lack of allegation or evidence that fine levied against 
defendant would be collectible from estate or that conviction 
would otherwise affect estate's interests, appeal dismissed as 
moot upon death of defendant); Perry v. State, 575 A.2d 1154, 
1156 (Del. 1990) (because statute provided that cause of action 
does not survive defendant, court no longer had jurisdiction and 
"ultimate disposition" would be determined by "status quo" at 
time of death); Harris v. State, 229 Ga. 691, 692 (1972) (appeal 
dismissed); State v. Korsen, 141 Idaho 445, 450 (2005) (appeal 
dismissed, conviction and any attendant order requiring payment 
of court costs, fees, restitution, or other sums to victim 
remain intact, and only provisions of judgment of conviction 
pertaining to custody and incarceration are abated); Whitehouse 
v. State, 266 Ind. 527, 529-530 (1977) (because guilty verdict 
is presumed valid and ends presumption of innocence, appeal 
dismissed and underlying conviction unabated); Royce v. 
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. 1979) (appeal dismissed 
as death of defendant renders case moot, while conviction, 
whether it be regarded as legally final or not, is history and 
cannot be expunged); People v. Peters, 449 Mich. 515, 517 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1048 (1996)  (absent collateral 
consequences, appeal should be dismissed and underlying 
conviction and accompanying compensatory sanctions should stand, 
but purely penal sanctions should be abated ab initio); State v. 
Kaiser, 297 Or. 399, 402 (1984) (appellate rules allow 
substitution of party in civil case, but require dismissal of 
appeal from conviction of crime upon death of defendant); State 
v. Anderson, 281 S.C. 198, 199 (1984) (death of appellant abates 
appeal and constitutes grounds for its dismissal; rule providing 
for substitution of party in interest does not apply in criminal 
appeal); Vargas v. State, 659 S.W.2d 422, 422-423 & n.1 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1983) (because death of defendant deprived court of 
jurisdiction, appeal and further proceedings in court below 
ordered "permanently abated," thereby effectively rendering them 
"as forever pending"); Bevel v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. at 479-
481(2011) (after concluding only Legislature could adopt 
doctrine of abatement, appealed dismissed as moot given specific 
15 
 
 
pursuant to an appellate rule, the appeal can continue if a 
motion to substitute a new party is made either by a 
representative of the defendant's estate, the defendant's 
attorney of record, the State, or another party and, in the 
absence of such a motion, either the appeal is dismissed and the 
conviction stands or the appeal, conviction, and indictment are 
abated.15  The Commonwealth urges us to adopt this "substitution" 
                                                          
 
facts and procedural posture of case, including that no party 
was seeking to prosecute appeal). 
 
 
15 See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) 
("defendant's conviction will stand unless the defendant's 
personal representative elects to continue the appeal"); State 
v. Clements, 668 So.2d 980, 982 (Fla. 1996) (appellate court 
may, upon showing of good cause by State or defendant's 
representative, determine appeal should proceed, but if showing 
not made appeal dismissed and conviction and sentence, including 
fines or penalties, stand); State v. Makaila, 79 Haw. 40, 45 
(1995) (by rule appellate court has discretion to allow for 
substitution of proper party-defendant and, absent such motion, 
to dismiss appeal as moot, vacate conviction, and dismiss all 
related criminal proceedings, or enter any other appropriate 
order); Surland, 392 Md. at 34-35 (because conviction presumed 
to be valid, it remains in effect unless substituted party 
appointed by defendant's estate elects to continue appeal and 
secures reversal, vacation, or modification of judgment); 
Gollott v. State, 646 So.2d 1297, 1304-1305 (Miss. 1994) 
(adopting abatement ab initio as default rule unless defendant's 
personal representative, defendant's attorney of record, or, 
more likely, State files motion, allowed by existing rule, for 
substitution); Brass v. State, 130 Nev. 318, 322 (2014) 
(although deceased not entitled to have conviction vacated and 
prosecution abated, personal representative may, by existing 
rule and when justice so requires, file for substitution and 
continue appeal); Newark v. Pulverman, 12 N.J. 105, 116 (1953) 
(by rule, legal representative can pursue appeal to establish 
conviction was wrongful); State v. Salazar, 123 N.M. 778, 785-
786 (1997) (by rule, court has discretion to allow or provide on 
16 
 
 
approach or, in the alternative, the so-called "Alabama rule," 
which provides that, when an appellate court abates an appeal 
upon the death of the defendant, as it may under an existing 
appellate rule, it "shall instruct the trial court to place in 
the record a notation stating that the fact of the defendant's 
conviction removed the presumption of the defendant's innocence, 
but that the conviction was appealed and it was neither affirmed 
nor reversed on appeal because the defendant died while the 
appeal of the conviction was pending and the appeal was 
dismissed."  Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 464 (Ala. 2005); 
Ala. R. App. P. 43 (a) (providing for substitution and stating:  
"When the death of a party has been suggested, the proceeding 
shall not abate, but shall continue or be disposed of as the 
appellate court may direct"). 
 
Of the different approaches followed at the State level, 
abatement ab initio may still qualify as the plurality approach, 
but a majority of State courts have rejected it and chosen to go 
                                                          
 
its own for substitution and continuation of appeal, barring 
which criminal proceedings "completely abate" to inception); 
State v. McGettrick, 31 Ohio St. 3d 138, 142 (1987) (by rule, 
either appointed personal representative of decedent or State 
may motion for substitution, whereupon court shall proceed to 
determine appeal, but barring such motion appeal dismissed as 
moot, conviction vacated, and all related criminal proceedings, 
including indictment, dismissed);  State v. Webb, 167 Wash. 2d 
470, 478 (2009) (existing rule permits party to be substituted 
on appeal, but if no substitution motion filed, appeal dismissed 
and conviction and all financial obligations remain in effect). 
17 
 
 
in another direction.16  Therefore, although it may have been 
arguable when Eisen was decided in 1975 that the doctrine of 
abatement ab initio was the preferred or majority approach, it 
is no longer the case.  See Salazar, 123 N.M. at 785. 
 
Still, Eisen represents precedent, and, as this court 
reaffirmed only recently, 
"adhering to precedent is our preferred course because it 
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process. . . . It also 
reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, 
saving parties and courts the expense of endless 
relitigation. . . . Parties should not be encouraged to 
seek reexamination of determined principles and speculate 
on a fluctuation of the law with every change in the 
expounders of it" (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
Shiel v. Rowell, 480 Mass. 106, 108-109 (2018).  "Overruling 
precedent requires something above and beyond mere disagreement 
with its analysis."  Id. at 109. 
                                                          
 
 
16 As one State court recently noted, while in the process 
of overruling an earlier decision adopting the doctrine, "the 
law which has developed since [that prior case was decided] has 
challenged the wisdom of the policy of abating criminal 
proceedings upon a defendant's death."  Benn, 364 Mont. at 157.  
See id. at 156 (concluding that it "manifestly erred" in earlier 
case, State v. Holland, 288 Mont. 164 [1998]).  Another State 
court, also in the process of overruling an earlier decision 
adopting the doctrine, similarly noted that "it is clear that 
the legal landscape is very different than it was when [that 
prior case] was decided."  Carlin, 249 P.3d at 754 (overruling 
Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282 [Alaska 1967]).  A number of 
other State courts also have chosen either to abandon or narrow 
the application of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Makaila, 79 Haw. at 
45-46; Korsen, 141 Idaho at 445; Surland, 392 Md. at 34-35; 
McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d at 536-539. 
18 
 
 
 
The principle of stare decisis, however, "is not absolute.  
No court is infallible, and this court is not barred from 
departing from previous pronouncements if the benefits of so 
doing outweigh the values underlying stare decisis."  Stonehill 
College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 
Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied sub nom. Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. 
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 
(2004).  This is particularly true when the rule at issue is one 
of common law, of judicial creation: 
"[I]t is within the power and authority of the court to 
abrogate this judicially created rule; and the mere 
longevity of the rule does not by itself provide cause for 
us to stay our hand if to perpetuate the rule would be to 
perpetuate inequity.  When the rationales which gave 
meaning and coherence to a judicially created rule are no 
longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with the 
needs of contemporary society, a court not only has the 
authority but also the duty to reexamine its precedents 
rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula." 
 
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628 (1976).  "One of the great 
virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it 
adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its 
application in court."  Id., quoting State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 
495, 505, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1957). 
 
Because the doctrine of abatement ab initio "is largely 
court-created and a creature of the common law, the applications 
of abatement are more amenable to policy and equitable 
arguments."  Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 414.  Furthermore, 
19 
 
 
we never have examined the policies and arguments for and 
against the doctrine or considered any alternative approaches.  
To date, the justification for adopting the doctrine was the 
simple fact that it was perceived to be the favored approach 
elsewhere.  Considering the consequences of abatement ab initio 
to victims and family members of the defendant, it is 
appropriate that we examine reasons underlying the doctrine. 
 
4.  Analysis.  Historically, the two reasons advanced in 
favor of abatement ab initio are referred to as the "finality 
principle" and the "punishment principle."  See State v. 
Burrell, 837 N.W.2d 459, 468 (Minn. 2013), quoting Estate of 
Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413.  We examine both, as well as the 
countervailing arguments that have been made with increasing 
frequency. 
 
a.  Finality principle.  The finality principle has been 
described in many ways, all of which rest upon the premise that 
a trial and appeal are essential parts of our system of justice 
and that a conviction should not stand until a defendant has had 
the opportunity to pursue both.  See, e.g., Surland, 392 Md. at 
24-25 ("when a conviction is appealed, it loses finality until 
the appeal is resolved and should not be permitted to stand when 
the defendant's death prevents the appellate court from 
adjudicating [its] validity"); Brass v. State, 130 Nev. 318, 322 
(2014) (alternative of "[o]utright dismissal could prevent a 
20 
 
 
defendant's family from potentially clearing a loved one's 
name"); Ekinici, 191 Misc. 2d at 517 ("rationale of abating the 
appeal and dismissing the indictment after the death of a 
defendant is that defendant's . . . right to appeal has been 
violated [albeit not by the State]"); Estate of Parsons,  367 
F.3d at 413 ("[S]tate should not label one as guilty until he 
has exhausted his opportunity to appeal").  No doubt, "[t]he 
condemnation and punishments of the criminal justice system are 
awesome and devastating.  That is why their imposition is hedged 
about with presumptions and procedural safeguards that heavily 
weight the risk of error in favor of the accused and are 
designed to assure both the appearance and the reality that the 
accused had every fair opportunity of defense."  Commonwealth v. 
Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 636-637 (1997) ("once the process has 
run its course -- through pretrial motions, trial, posttrial 
motions and one or two levels of appeal -- the community's 
interest in finality comes to the fore"). 
 
Nevertheless, "[t]here is no constitutional right to appeal 
from a criminal conviction" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Bruneau, 472 Mass. 510, 513 (2015) ("due process clause does not 
require a State to afford any appellate process whatsoever" 
[citation omitted]).  The right arises in Massachusetts by 
statute.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 278, § 28 (authorizing appeal by 
persons aggrieved by judgment of District or Superior Court); 
21 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E (direct appeal to Supreme Judicial Court for 
defendants, like defendant here, convicted of murder in first 
degree).  One can be deprived of that right, therefore, so long 
as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.  See Aiello v. 
Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 358 Mass. 91, 93-94 (1970) (no 
equal protection violation where appeal available to all and no 
invidious discrimination).  See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 
305, 310 (1966) (States not required to establish avenues of 
appellate review, but once established, those avenues must be 
"free of unreasoned distinctions . . . impeding open and equal 
access" to court). 
 
Moreover, "a defendant is no longer presumed innocent after 
a conviction; rather a convicted defendant is presumed guilty 
despite the pendency of an appeal, and the conviction is 
presumed to have been validly obtained" (footnote omitted).  
State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762 (Alaska 2011).  See Williams, 
petitioner, 378 Mass. 623, 626 (1979) ("presumption of innocence 
will have been abraded by the fact of the initial conviction 
from which the appeal is being taken").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Martinez, 480 Mass. 777, 784 (2018) (only overturned 
conviction restores presumption of innocence and erases any 
State claim to funds paid in form of costs, fees, or 
restitution).  In Massachusetts, the rendering of a guilty 
verdict and the resulting imposition of a sentence essentially 
22 
 
 
constitute a final judgment in a criminal case, immediately 
whereupon the consequences may be imposed on the defendant, even 
if an appeal is taken.  See DiMasi v. State Bd. of Retirement, 
474 Mass. 194, 201 (2016).  See also G. L. c. 279, § 4 
("Sentence shall be imposed upon conviction of a crime, 
regardless of whether an appeal has been taken").17  At that 
point in the process, a conviction also may have potential 
consequences in collateral proceedings, which are discussed 
further infra.  In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, a trial court 
judgment is final for purposes of res judicata or issue 
preclusion regardless of the fact that it is on appeal.  See 
O'Brien v. Hanover Ins. Co., 427 Mass. 194, 200-201 (1998) 
(adopting rule followed federally and in majority of other 
States). 
 
As many of the courts that have rejected the doctrine have 
noted, abatement ab initio runs counter to these well-settled 
principles, effectively treating a defendant's appeal as though 
it has been successful, when, in fact, it was never decided.  
See, e.g., State v. Clements, 668 So. 2d 980, 981 (Fla. 1996) 
(death of defendant does not extinguish presumably correct 
                                                          
 
 
17 A convicted defendant can seek a stay of execution of a 
sentence.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a), as appearing in 454 
Mass. 1501 (2009); Mass. R. A. P. 6, as appearing in 454 Mass. 
1601 (2009).  See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (c), as appearing in 
454 Mass. 1501 (2009) (fines and costs shall be stayed if appeal 
diligently perfected). 
23 
 
 
conviction and restore presumption of innocence which conviction 
overcame); Surland, 392 Md. at 34 ("automatic abatement of the 
entire criminal proceeding ab initio . . . disregards entirely 
the presumptive validity of the conviction"); People v. Peters, 
449 Mich. 515, 521 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1048 (1996) 
(abatement rejected because conviction destroys presumption of 
innocence regardless of existence of appeal of right); State v. 
McGettrick, 31 Ohio St. 3d 138, 141 (1987) (refusing to ignore 
that defendant was convicted and, thus, no longer "cloaked with 
the presumption of innocence" during appellate process).  See 
also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Caton's Estate, 540 F. Supp. 
673, 683 (N.D. Ind. 1982), overruled on other grounds, Ashland 
Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ind. 1987) 
(suggesting that issue preclusion would not apply to defendant 
whose conviction was abated for simple reason that "no 
underlying previous decision now exists"). 
 
Of course, as has been acknowledged by many courts, 
allowing a conviction to stand where a defendant has taken a 
direct appeal as of right, without deciding the appeal, 
effectively treats the appeal as meritless.  See, e.g., Griffin, 
328 P.3d at 92-93; State v. Makaila, 79 Haw. 40, 45 (1995) ("it 
seems unreasonable automatically to follow the abatement ab 
initio rule and pretend that the defendant was never indicted, 
tried, and found guilty[, but] outright dismissal of the appeal 
24 
 
 
-- without the possibility of a review of the merits -- seems 
equally unacceptable"); Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 
(Miss. 1994) ("if the abatement ab initio rule is perceived to 
be unjust, it is equally unjust to allow a conviction to stand 
and be used against the deceased's estate for various collateral 
matters as if the appeal had been heard and the conviction 
affirmed"); Howell v. United States, 455 A.2d 1371, 1372 (D.C. 
App. 1983) ("[w]hile trial court's judgment carries a 
presumption of validity, the very essence of a presumption is 
its vulnerability to refutation").  The finality principle 
remains fundamental to our system of justice, yet other well-
settled principles regarding the effect of a conviction and the 
scope of the right to an appeal remind us that it is not 
altogether inviolable. 
 
b.  Punishment principle.  The punishment principle, which 
is often framed in terms of mootness or loss of jurisdiction, 
"focuses on the precept that the criminal justice system exists 
primarily to punish and cannot effectively punish one who has 
died."  Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 414.  See State v. 
Kriechbaum, 219 Iowa 457, 465 (1934) ("Death withdrew the 
defendant from the jurisdiction of the court"); Carver v. State, 
217 Tenn. 482, 486 (1966) ("The defendant in this case having 
died is relieved of all punishment by human hands and the 
determination of his guilt or innocence is now assumed by the 
25 
 
 
ultimate arbiter of all human affairs").  Some courts have 
further stated the principle in terms of not visiting 
"punishment" upon the innocent family, heirs, or beneficiaries 
of the deceased defendant.  See State v. Campbell, 187 Neb. 719, 
720 (1972) ("there appears to be no sufficient reason to make a 
decedent's estate as distinguished from the decedent himself 
liable for costs of prosecution where there is no final judgment 
of conviction"); Webb, 167 Wash. 2d at 473 ("object of criminal 
punishment is to punish the offender, not his or her heirs or 
beneficiaries"). 
 
Some courts have questioned the punishment principle and 
whether the interests of others, not just of the defendant, 
should be considered.  For example, even though the defendant is 
deceased and can no longer be punished, the State, as the 
representative of the community, continues to have an interest 
in maintaining a conviction.  See Makaila, 79 Haw. at 45 ("The 
State has an interest in preserving the presumptively valid 
judgment of the trial court"); Ekinici, 191 Misc. 2d at 518 
(same); McGettrick, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 141 (abatement ab initio 
"would not be fair to the people of this state who have an 
interest in and a right to have a conviction, once entered, 
preserved absent substantial error").  In addition, through 
State Constitutions, statutes, and other avenues, the justice 
system acknowledges the rights and interests of the victims of 
26 
 
 
crime.  See, e.g., Wheat, 907 So. 2d at 463-464 (rights of 
victims have been recognized in Alabama Constitution and through 
extensive statutory protection); Carlin, 249 P.3d at 759 
("Alaska's statutes and its constitution now also require the 
criminal justice system to accommodate the rights of crime 
victims.  The abatement of criminal convictions has important 
implications for these rights"); State v. Korsen, 141 Idaho 445, 
449 (2005) ("In recent years, the state of Idaho has . . . 
provided substantial constitutional and statutory rights and 
protections for victims of crime"); Brass, 130 Nev. at 322 
("Vacating the judgment and abating the prosecution from its 
inception undermines the adjudicative process and strips away 
any solace the victim or the victim's family may have received 
from the appellant's conviction"). 
 
In this regard, Massachusetts is no exception, having, 
among other things, enacted a bill of rights for victims, G. L. 
c. 258B, § 3 (o) (right, among others, "to request that 
restitution be an element of the final disposition of a case"), 
and created the Domestic and Sexual Violence Prevention and 
Victim Assistance Fund, G. L. c. 17, § 20.  And, as we have 
recognized, "[w]hen a serious crime has been committed, the 
victims and survivors, witnesses, and the public have an 
interest that the guilty not only be punished but that the 
27 
 
 
community express its condemnation with firmness and 
confidence."  Amirault, 424 Mass. at 637. 
 
Courts and commentators also have taken note of the 
potential impact abatement ab initio can have on collateral 
matters, including undermining the potential application of 
issue preclusion.  See Gollott, 646 So. 2d at 1301-1302 
(doctrine of issue preclusion will hinder if not destroy defense 
of civil suit if jury verdict is allowed to stand);  State v. 
McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537 (1988) (if murder conviction 
stands it can prevent defendant from, among other things, 
receiving money from victim's estate under intestacy statute, 
inheriting under victim's will, receiving benefits from life 
insurance policy on life of victim, and receiving victim's 
interest jointly held property); Bierer, The Importance of Being 
Earned:  How Abatement After Death Collaterally Harms Insurers, 
Families, and Society at Large, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 1698, 1702 
(2013) (substitution approach is ideal approach "because of the 
important and resounding primary and collateral effects felt by 
victims, insurers, families, and society at large"). 
 
Similar issues have the potential to arise in Massachusetts 
depending on whether the conviction stands or abates upon the 
death of the defendant.  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 742 (1985) (party to civil action 
against former criminal defendant may invoke doctrine of 
28 
 
 
collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of issue decided in 
criminal prosecution); Campos v. Van Houtum, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 
918, 918-919 (1998) (same even where conviction is on appeal); 
Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 303 (1st Cir. 1990); G. L. 
c. 265, § 46 ("The court shall prohibit any person charged with 
the unlawful killing of the decedent from taking from the 
decedent's estate through its distribution and disposition, 
including property held between the person charged and the 
decedent in joint tenancy or by tenancy in the entirety");18 
G. L. c. 190B, § 2-803 (b) ("An individual who feloniously and 
intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits under 
this article with respect to the decedent's estate, including an 
intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or 
child's share, exempt property, and a family allowance").19 
 
As with the finality principle, the fundamental premise of 
the punishment principle is still just, and likely will remain 
so.  As more recent cases remind us, however, a criminal 
                                                          
 
 
18 General Laws c. 265, § 46, further provides, in relevant 
part:  "No court shall distribute the accused's share of the 
decedent's assets until a verdict or finding on the charge has 
been rendered in open court." 
 
 
19 General Laws c. 190B, § 2-803 (g), provides that a person 
can conclusively be established as the decedent's killer (1) 
following a conviction and the exhaustion of all right to 
appeal, or (2) upon the court's determination, under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, that the person would be 
found guilty. 
29 
 
 
prosecution does not take place in a vacuum.  There are a host 
of potential other interests than can be affected by the outcome 
of that prosecution and, although we must be mindful not to let 
any one of those other interests override a defendant's rights, 
they are worthy of recognition when considering the best 
approach to follow when a defendant dies during the pendency of 
a direct appeal. 
 
c.  Massachusetts approach.  As we have been unable to 
discern a reasoned analysis for the adoption of the abatement ab 
initio doctrine, and in any event, we are presented with 
substantial reasons it should be changed, we conclude that we 
will no longer follow the doctrine when a defendant dies during 
the pendency of a direct appeal as of right challenging a 
conviction.  Instead, upon the death of the defendant, the 
appeal shall be dismissed as moot and the trial court shall be 
instructed to place in the record a notation stating that the 
defendant's conviction removed the defendant's presumption of 
innocence, but that the conviction was appealed and it was 
neither affirmed nor reversed on appeal because the defendant 
died while the appeal was pending and the appeal was dismissed. 
30 
 
 
 
We take a moment to explain our reasons for rejecting the 
substitution approach advocated by the Commonwealth.20 
 
First, we have a practical reservation regarding the 
substitution approach.  Most of the States using this approach 
have an appellate rule allowing for party substitution upon the 
death of a defendant in a criminal proceeding.  We do not.21  It 
has been suggested that we could exercise our superintendence 
authority to direct the standing advisory committee on the rules 
of civil and appellate procedure to propose an appropriate 
                                                          
 
 
20 The Commonwealth, by way of alternative, also had 
requested that we adopt a suicide exception to the doctrine of 
abatement ab initio in circumstances where the defendant commits 
suicide for the purpose of taking advantage of the abatement.  
Having rejected the doctrine, however, there is no need for such 
an exception.  We note, however, that the other courts that have 
been asked to consider such an exception have either rejected it 
or, like us, not had to reach that issue.  See Matteson, 75 
N.Y.2d at 747 ("We are unpersuaded by and accordingly reject the 
People's contention that defendant's suicide should be deemed a 
waiver or forfeiture of the right to appeal"); McDonald, 144 
Wis. 2d at 538 ("Permitting an appeal to continue eliminates the 
myriad of problems which would arise from requiring courts to 
determine whether the defendant's death was voluntary or 
involuntary"). 
 
 
21 Rule 30 (a) of the Massachusetts Rule of Appellate 
Procedure, as amended, 378 Mass. 925 (1979), provides, in 
relevant part:  "If a party dies after a notice of appeal is 
filed in the lower court or while a proceeding is pending in the 
appellate court, the personal representative of the deceased 
party may be substituted as a party on motion filed by the 
representative or by any party with the clerk of the appropriate 
court."  The rule, however, only applies in civil cases, which 
maintain their viability as an action after the death of a 
party. 
31 
 
 
amendment to Mass. R. A. P. 30 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 925 
(1979), to make it applicable in criminal cases and eventually 
to adopt such a new rule.  We question the wisdom of doing so, 
or, at least, of our doing so.22  There are certain practical 
considerations that cause us pause, such as if and how we would 
provide for the appointment of counsel in the event that the 
deceased criminal defendant was indigent and there are 
insufficient assets in the estate to pay for one.  There are 
existing mechanisms to handle such an appointment, but the 
people who do that work, not to mention the Legislature, may 
well ask us how it is that we propose they fund such an 
undertaking should we choose to authorize it. 
 
More importantly, as other courts have noted, because the 
doctrine of abatement ab initio is a judicially created, common-
law rule, the Legislature has the authority to adopt or replace 
it.  See People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 464 (1999) 
(abatement ab initio has been Illinois law for over twenty years 
and "should be deemed controlling until and unless the General 
Assembly provides otherwise" [citation omitted]); Bevel, 282 Va. 
                                                          
 
 
22 If we were inclined to adopt a new rule, we could have it 
provide, as other States have, that only the appeal is abated 
upon death of the defendant.  See, e.g., Ind. R. App. P. 17(B) 
("death of the appellant abates a criminal appeal"); Tex. R. 
App. P. 7.1(a)(2) (where "the appellant in a criminal case dies 
after an appeal is perfected but before the appellate court 
issues the mandate, the appeal will be permanently abated"). 
32 
 
 
at 479-480 (if abatement is to be policy in Virginia, with good 
cause exception, "the adoption of such a policy and the 
designation of how and in what court such a determination should 
be made is more appropriately decided by the legislature, not 
the courts").  Given the practical considerations involved in 
the substitution approach, we are of the opinion that the 
Legislature would be the appropriate body to adopt that 
particular approach, and it is free to do so, regardless of our 
decision here today. 
 
We also have certain fundamental, substantive reservations 
about the advisability of adopting the substitution approach.  
In arguing in favor of that approach, the Commonwealth, like the 
courts that have adopted it, suggests that it is the fairest 
approach to all of the various parties that potentially have a 
direct or indirect interest in the outcome of that prosecution.  
Although in some situations that may be, beyond the State as the 
representative of society, and, to the extent permitted, the 
victim, we do not see that there are any other surviving 
interests that are rightly pursued within the context of a 
criminal prosecution.  The deceased defendant, of course, has 
his or her reputation, but if Eisen, Harris, and Latour made 
anything clear, it was that the vindication of a deceased 
33 
 
 
defendant is not a sufficient basis for considering a criminal 
appeal.23 
 
It also has been suggested that other surviving third 
parties with interests in the outcome of an appeal could 
conceivably include, among others, next-of-kin, an heir, a 
creditor, or somebody else who shares the interest of the 
deceased defendant's estate. 
"Undoubtedly, in some cases, the standing conviction may be 
consequential to such interests.  Such, however, could not 
have been a factor for consideration in the trial 
proceedings and could not have been a factor in the appeal, 
had it been concluded. . . .  It, therefore, is our opinion 
that it would be unwise for us to reach out to adopt a 
policy favoring survivor interests of questionable 
validity." 
 
Whitehouse v. State, 266 Ind. 527, 529-530 (1977).  Id. at 530 
("Whether or not the bona fides of a conviction may yet be 
tested by survivors in cases where the appeals were aborted by 
death is a question best left for litigation confined within the 
parameters of the interests claimed").  Or, as another court put 
it, "the mere potential impact of a conviction upon other civil 
obligations or proceedings does not make an appeal [of a 
                                                          
 
 
23 As the defendant here has argued, abatement ab initio 
would not serve to vindicate the decedent, either.  See Gollott, 
646 So. 2d at 1300 (defendant "does not have his 'good name' 
restored when the majority approach is followed.  Abatement ab 
initio is not the same as being found innocent by a jury.  
Rather, the conviction is simply vacated because the defendant 
appealed as of right, and until the appellate Court has heard 
that appeal, the matter has not been fully adjudicated"). 
34 
 
 
criminal conviction] a 'definite and concrete' dispute which 
would satisfy justiciability requirements."  State v. Benn, 364 
Mont. 153, 158 (2012).24 
 
The approach we have chosen takes into consideration and 
accommodates the interests of those with a direct interest in 
the criminal prosecution itself. 
"We do not see that the dismissal of the appeal, without 
more, denies any rights granted or protected by the 
statutes or the constitutional provisions.  Such rights 
were personal to and exclusively those of the defendant.  
Although a criminal conviction carries a definite 'fall-
out' that extends beyond the person of the defendant, we 
are aware of no right to be free of such, even if such 
conviction be erroneous.  I may no more appeal my brother's 
conviction than I may enter his guilty plea." 
 
Whitehouse, 266 Ind. at 529.  Under our approach, a convicted 
defendant is not denied any appellate rights, and especially is 
not deprived of such rights in a discriminatory manner.  A 
convicted defendant's appeal and the criminal prosecution of 
which it is a part come to an end for the simple reason that, by 
whatever cause, the defendant died.  The record will accurately 
reflect the case as it was at the time of death; it will reflect 
the status quo. 
 
d.  Application to this and future cases.  "When announcing 
a new common-law rule, a new interpretation of a State statute, 
                                                          
 
 
24 We have not been made aware of any existing or potential 
civil obligations or proceedings that might be affected by the 
ultimate fate of the defendant's conviction and appeal. 
35 
 
 
or a new rule in the exercise of our superintendence power, 
there is no constitutional requirement that the new rule or new 
interpretation be applied retroactively, and we are therefore 
free to determine whether it should be applied only 
prospectively."  Commonwealth v. Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 
(2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 (2005).  Here, the 
Commonwealth objected at the time to the trial judge's abatement 
ab initio order and then pursued this appeal and successfully 
urged us to abandon and replace that doctrine.  Therefore, we 
see no reason why the Commonwealth should not have the benefit 
of that new rule in this case.  Otherwise, the new rule shall 
only apply prospectively.25 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the trial 
judge's order allowing the defendant's motion to abate 
prosecution, dismissing the defendant's notice of appeal, 
vacating his convictions, and dismissing the indictments is 
reversed.  The defendant's notice of appeal is dismissed as moot 
and we instruct the trial court to record a notation stating 
that the defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree, 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of 
ammunition removed the defendant's presumption of innocence as 
                                                          
 
 
25  The question of the application of issue preclusion going 
forward is not currently before us.  Therefore, we decline to 
speculate on its potential impact and reserve that discussion 
for the appropriate case. 
36 
 
 
to those charges, but that the convictions were appealed and 
were neither affirmed nor reversed on appeal because the 
defendant died while the appeal was pending and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.