Title: Commonwealth v. Martinez

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11657 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAFAEL MARTINEZ. 
 
 
 
Essex.     September 9, 2016. - January 5, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Videotape, Relevancy and materiality, 
Inflammatory evidence, Consciousness of guilt.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Redaction, Voir dire, Opening 
statement, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, J. 
 
 
 
Amy M. Belger for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The victim, Timothy Walker, was shot while 
seated and talking with two friends on the porch of his 
grandmother's house in the Tower Hill section of Lawrence.  
Despite two eyewitnesses, and surveillance video recordings of 
the incident obtained from nearby businesses, police were unable 
2 
 
 
 
to identify a suspect.  Nine months after the victim's death, a 
local television station featured the shooting in an "unsolved 
crime" series news broadcast that included portions of the 
surveillance footage showing the suspect, whose face was not 
discernable.  The defendant watched the news broadcast with his 
girl friend's mother and told her that he had been the shooter.  
At the defendant's trial, the Superior Court judge allowed the 
admission in evidence, over the defendant's objection, of a 
redacted version of the news broadcast.  The jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation. 
 
On appeal, the defendant's principal argument is that the 
news broadcast should not have been admitted in evidence, or, 
alternatively, that it should have been more heavily redacted, 
because much of it was irrelevant, inflammatory, and highly 
prejudicial.  The defendant also claims error in certain aspects 
of the judge's conduct of the voir dire of the venire and two of 
the judge's evidentiary rulings.  Finally, the defendant 
contends that several statements in the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument were improper. 
 
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's decision to allow admission of the news broadcast, and 
no error requiring reversal in the defendant's other challenges.  
Having carefully examined the record pursuant to our duty under 
3 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial 
or to reduce the degree of guilt.  We therefore affirm the 
defendant's conviction. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving other facts for our discussion of specific issues.  On 
July 24, 2010, while the victim was sitting on the porch of his 
grandmother's house with his cousin and a friend, a man 
approached the porch, shot the victim in the head with a 
shotgun, and then fled back the way he had come, shooting as he 
ran.1  The shooter was wearing a dark baseball cap pulled low 
over his face, and neither eyewitness was able to identify him, 
although each gave a similar description of his height, build, 
complexion, and clothing.  The victim died of his injuries 
several days later.  In the months following the shooting, 
police were unable to identify a suspect. 
 
The shooter's movements immediately before and after the 
shooting were captured by four security cameras located at 
nearby business establishments.  The edited footage constituted 
an approximately four and one-half minute video recording, which 
was admitted and played for the jury.  This video recording 
showed an automobile arrive in the vicinity of the crime and 
stop for several minutes.  During that time, the shooter got out 
                                                        
 
1 As the gunman approached the victim, he said, "Here, this 
is for you, nigger." 
4 
 
 
 
of the passenger's side of the vehicle, approached the victim, 
fired a weapon, ran back toward the vehicle, and entered the 
passenger's side, upon which the vehicle was driven away. 
 
In the spring of 2011, the defendant was dating Tesseana 
Wilson and stayed frequently at the home of her mother, Michelle 
Wilson,2 up to five nights per week.3 Approximately nine months 
after the shooting, on the evening of May 2, 2011, sometime 
between 11 and 11:30 P.M., the defendant walked into the living 
room where Michelle was watching television and asked her to 
change the station to a particular channel.  She did so.  The 
station was airing the first broadcast of a new unsolved crime 
series; the program that evening was titled, "Who Killed Timothy 
Walker?"  Michelle recognized the name "Timothy Walker" as a 
"distant cousin" of her children, whom she knew had been shot 
the previous summer. 
 
The defendant watched the broadcast with Michelle.  While 
they were watching, she looked at the defendant and said, 
"That's you" or "Is it you?," while he said, "I killed him."  
The defendant thereafter described his actions, narrating events 
as they were shown on the surveillance footage.  When Michelle 
                                                        
 
2 Because Tesseana Wilson and her mother, Michelle Wilson, 
share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. 
 
 
3 The defendant was living at the home of Dolores Regan.  
Delores was the mother of the defendant's friend, Max Regan, 
with whom he had attended high school and played football.  To 
avoid confusion, we refer to them as "Delores" and "Max." 
5 
 
 
 
asked him why he was shooting as he ran from the scene, the 
defendant said that he had been concerned that he would be shot 
at or pursued.  At another point in the broadcast, when the 
victim's mother described being told of her son's death, the 
defendant said that she was incorrect in stating that the bullet 
had passed through the victim's head, because he had used a 
hollow-point bullet.  The defendant also described the actions 
of the getaway vehicle's driver, and his own efforts to conceal 
evidence of the crime. 
 
Michelle told the defendant to tell Tesseana and then to 
leave her house.  The defendant spoke with Tesseana privately, 
telling her that he had been the shooter, and Michelle then 
drove him to a house in Lawrence where he had requested to be 
taken.  Shortly thereafter, in the early morning hours of May 3, 
2011, Tesseana watched a rebroadcast of the news program and 
recognized the shooter's walk and build as the defendant's.  
Later that day, Michelle contacted police and told them of the 
defendant's confession.  Police also spoke with Tesseana, who 
initially denied recognizing the shooter on the news broadcast.  
She later said that she had recognized the defendant, but did 
not want to believe it was him, and described her conversation 
with the defendant. 
 
Four days after the news broadcast aired, on Friday, May 6, 
2011, police went to Dolores's house; Max was home and spoke 
6 
 
 
 
briefly with them.  Later that day, Max gave the defendant a 
ride home and noticed that the defendant was holding a pair of 
sneakers.  When they arrived at the house, the defendant asked 
Dolores for a plastic bag, which she gave him.  Max later drove 
the defendant to a bridal shower; en route, Max asked the 
defendant why the police had been at the house looking for him.  
The defendant explained that a friend of his from Lawrence had 
shot a gun into the air and then had dropped it, and that the 
defendant had picked it up; he said that the police probably 
wanted to ask why his fingerprints were on the gun. 
 
The next day, Saturday, when taking out the trash,  Dolores 
noticed the bag containing the sneakers in an otherwise empty 
trash can.  On Sunday, she contacted police and gave them the 
sneakers.  Max also identified them as those the defendant had 
with him while in Max's vehicle on May 6. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges the introduction 
of the redacted recording of the news broadcast, the judge's 
decision not to conduct a voir dire of the venire concerning the 
news broadcast, the judge's evidentiary rulings with respect to 
Max's testimony, and several of the prosecutor's remarks in his 
opening statement and closing argument.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
 
a.  The news broadcast.  The defendant argues that the 
audio-video recording of the news broadcast should not have been 
7 
 
 
 
admitted in its redacted form; he contends that it should have 
been excluded, or more heavily redacted, on the ground that much 
of the content was irrelevant, highly inflammatory, and unduly 
prejudicial.  Because the defendant objected to the introduction 
of the recording, we review to determine whether any abuse of 
discretion resulted in prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 239-242 (2014). 
 
A judge has broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings.  
Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 142 (2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016).  In determining whether the judge erred 
in allowing introduction of the redacted recording,4 we consider 
whether the judge took "care to avoid exposing the jury 
unnecessarily to . . . material that might inflame [their] 
emotions and possibly deprive the defendant of an impartial 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 109 (1995).  This 
analysis requires us to review the redactions themselves, the 
limiting instructions, and the probative value of the news 
broadcast in light of its likely prejudicial effect.  Bell, 
supra at 142-143. 
 
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the introduction of the redacted recording, given its 
                                                        
 
4 "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 
the following:  unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence."  Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016). 
8 
 
 
 
significant probative value, the redactions made, and the 
judge's instructions before the recording was played for the 
jury and during his final charge. 
 
i.  Redactions.  The four-minute and twenty-second news 
broadcast, asking for the public's assistance in locating a 
killer, was narrated by a station news reporter.  It contains 
his introductory and closing comments, the surveillance video 
footage of the shooter approaching and running from the scene of 
the shooting, statements made during an interview by the 
district attorney, statements from the victim's mother, and 
photographs of the victim and his belongings. 
 
The judge conducted several hearings during the first two 
days of trial on the Commonwealth's motion in limine to 
introduce the recording.  After having viewed the recording 
several times, the judge provided the parties with a document 
dividing the news broadcast into twenty-one segments, setting 
forth his ruling as to each.  He ordered audio redaction in a 
number of segments, and, in one section, both audio and video 
redactions.  The audio portion was muted approximately fifteen 
times, for a total of two minutes and five seconds 
(approximately forty-eight per cent of the recording) to prevent 
the jury from hearing statements by the district attorney, some 
of the narrator's comments concerning the victim and the crime, 
and certain comments by the victim's mother.  A ten-second 
9 
 
 
 
portion of the video recording was dark, and the audio was 
muted, to exclude a photograph of the victim's mother holding 
her son's hand in the hospital. 
 
The redacted recording of the news broadcast was played for 
the jury during Michelle's testimony, immediately before she 
testified about the defendant's confession.  Before the 
recording was played, the judge gave a limiting instruction on 
the reasons for which the jury could consider the recording, the 
nature of the redactions (both audio and visual), and the 
reasons for the redactions (so that the recording the jury would 
"hear and see is admissible under our rules of evidence"). 
 
ii.  Probative value.  The defendant argued in his 
opposition to the Commonwealth's motion in limine to introduce 
the audio-video recording of the news broadcast that the 
recording included statements by police officers, "commentary" 
from the district attorney, and "heartfelt" pleas from the 
victim's family that "this crime must be solved," all of which 
would be unduly prejudicial and highly "inflammatory."  He also 
argued that the witnesses would be able to provide relevant 
context through their testimony, rendering the news broadcast 
unnecessary.  In addition, counsel argued that the quality of 
the announcer's voice was itself inflammatory.5 
                                                        
 
5 The defendant argued at the hearing that the announcer has 
a "voice like Gregory Peck, like the voice of God, on that 
10 
 
 
 
 
To be admissible, evidence must be both relevant and 
probative.  See Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 386–390 
(2012).  While the audio-video recording of the news broadcast, 
as redacted, well may have tended to arouse an emotional 
response from the jury, that is not the extent of the question.  
Even where relevant, evidence is not admissible if "its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice" to the defendant.  Id. at 387-388, quoting 
Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2012).  The Commonwealth, however, is 
"'entitled to present as full a picture as possible of the 
events surrounding the incident itself,' as long as the 
probative value of the evidence presented is not substantially 
outweighed by any prejudice to the defendant" (quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 473 Mass. 379, 394 (2015).  
See Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158 (2007). 
 
Here, the judge concluded that the audio-video recording 
was relevant and probative to support Michelle's testimony about 
the defendant's statements admitting to having been the shooter.  
Shortly before the broadcast aired, the defendant asked Michelle 
to turn to the channel on which it would air.  The defendant 
confessed to the shooting while he and Michelle watched the news 
broadcast.  During the broadcast, the defendant provided a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
screen which is like being at a drive-in movie, it's just going 
to be so prejudicial and so inflammatory beyond belief." 
11 
 
 
 
detailed narrative of the events unfolding on the surveillance 
video footage, described his actions after the surveillance 
footage ended, and responded to Michelle's questions about his 
reasons for having undertaken some of the actions depicted.  He 
then referenced the news broadcast in his confession to 
Tesseana.  Within a few hours, she saw a rebroadcast of the news 
program and recognized the shooter's walk and build as the 
defendant's.  This evidence was central to a case in which there 
was no physical evidence connecting the defendant to the 
shooting and no apparent motive, and the defendant's confessions 
to Michelle and Tesseana were at the heart of the Commonwealth's 
case.6  Given this, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's conclusion that the redacted recording of the news 
broadcast was relevant and probative. 
 
iii.  Prejudicial effect.  We turn to consider whether the 
judge erred in concluding that the probative value of the news 
broadcast was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  "Relevant evidence is not rendered inadmissible by its 
                                                        
 
6 At the hearing on the motion in limine, the judge observed 
that "[the news broadcast] really is kind of integral to the 
development of the Commonwealth's case.  You know, this has the 
unique set of circumstances [in] that while this was being 
televised live . . . the defendant is in a room with another 
person; and there is a conversation about this broadcast that 
includes, allegedly includes, admissions. . . .  It's not just 
throwing the broadcast up there.  It's throwing it up there in 
the context of an important conversation that occurred as a 
result of and during the course of the broadcast." 
12 
 
 
 
potential to arouse feelings of sympathy in a jury.  The 
evidence remains admissible if its probative value outweighs its 
potential for sympathy."  Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 
467 (2004).  In that case, we concluded that there was no abuse 
of discretion in the judge's decision to allow introduction of 
evidence that the victim, the defendant's wife, had been 
pregnant at the time of her death, because the evidence was not 
offered solely to garner sympathy for the victim or to cast the 
defendant in a bad light.  Id. at 468.  It was relevant to the 
defendant's state of mind and his relationship with his wife, 
which were relevant to establish his motive to kill her.  Id.  
See, e.g., Bell, 473 Mass. at 143-145 (no abuse of discretion in 
allowance of Commonwealth's motion to introduce "graphic" and 
"disturbing" photographs of victim receiving treatment for burn 
injuries, even where photographs "had a tendency to arouse the 
jury's emotions," because of their probative value on issue of 
extreme cruelty or atrocity). 
 
In this case, the audio-video recording of the news 
broadcast was relevant to support Michelle's testimony about the 
defendant's confession to her while watching it, and was 
particularly probative given the absence of physical or 
eyewitness evidence, and the apparent lack of any motive.7  
                                                        
 
7 The defendant argues that only the surveillance footage 
portion of the news broadcast should have been admitted because, 
13 
 
 
 
Because of the extensive redactions, the jury did not hear the 
most inflammatory portions of the broadcast.  The victim's 
mother's remarks during the interview at her kitchen table, 
potentially highly inflammatory, were all muted, with the 
exception of her statement regarding the bullet penetrating her 
son's skull.  This statement corroborated Michelle's testimony 
concerning the defendant's statement about the hollow-point 
bullet used.  Although the news broadcast contained family 
photographs of the victim, they were of a type that we have 
deemed admissible at a murder trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 816, cert. denied sub nom. Mooltrey v. 
Massachusetts, 555 U.S. 947 (2008) ("Commonwealth may properly 
tell the jury 'something of the person whose life [has] been 
lost in order to humanize the proceedings'" [citation omitted]). 
 
Moreover, during cross-examination and in closing argument, 
the defendant relied on the recording of the news broadcast to 
support his theory that Michelle fabricated the confession to 
get the defendant out of the house and out of Tesseana's life.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
during their May 2, 2011, conversation, he and Michelle 
principally discussed the contents of the surveillance footage.  
Michelle testified, however, that the defendant also discussed 
the comment by the victim's mother about the victim's head 
wound.  In addition, the broadcast, with its request for help in 
identifying the shooter, was airing in its entirety when the 
defendant decided to confess. 
 
 
8 For example, in closing, defense counsel argued: 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
The judge twice instructed the jury that they were not to 
consider any of the recorded statements for their truth.  
Immediately before the audio-video recording was played, the 
judge instructed the jury: 
 
"You may only consider the broadcast for a limited 
purpose.  You may not consider the statements that you hear 
for the truth of the matter asserted in those statements.  
You may only consider the statements you hear for the fact 
that they were made and as the context to permit you to 
understand certain testimony that you will then hear from 
this witness." 
 
He reminded them of this instruction during his final charge.9  
He also instructed during his charge that the jury were not to 
base their decision "on sympathy, anger, passion, prejudice or 
pity for or against either party in this case." 
 
"We presume, as we must, that a jury understand[] and 
follow[] limiting instructions."  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 
Mass. 572, 579 (1981).  See Commonwealth v. Stegemann, 68 Mass. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, I respectfully suggest to you 
that the only [way] to fairly evaluate and characterize 
Michelle Wilson's testimony during this trial is that she 
was evasive.  She got caught in [lies], which leads to one 
conclusion.  She was not telling the truth. . . .  And then 
on May 2nd, when there is a [network] [n]ews broadcast, she 
wants you to believe that all of a sudden, out of the blue, 
he volunteers a confession. . . .  Ladies and gentlemen, 
it's the confession of all confessions.  And, if it seems 
too good to be true, it's because it is." 
 
 
9 "As you will recall, I gave you an extensive limiting 
instruction about the [news] broadcast, prohibiting the use of 
that evidence for the truth of the matters asserted and limiting 
the use of that evidence for the purpose of providing context 
for other evidence that you heard from witnesses." 
15 
 
 
 
App. Ct. 292, 306 n.25 (2007) (presuming juries obey 
instructions "to base their verdicts solely on the evidence and 
to exclude emotion or sympathy for either side from their 
deliberations"). 
 
Further, the prosecutor did not seek to exploit the 
emotional effect of the audio-video recording.  His closing 
remarks about the news broadcast were limited to its effect on 
the defendant and the statements he made to Michelle while 
watching it ("when that video aired and [the defendant] was out 
there and he saw it, it came out.  It just all came flooding 
out").  See Holliday, 450 Mass. at 816 (prosecution did not 
emphasize or exploit emotional testimony elicited from family 
members of shooting victims). 
 
In sum, while clearly prejudicial to the defendant, the 
record does not support a conclusion that introduction of the 
audio-video recording was unfairly prejudicial.  In light of the 
extensive redactions of the news broadcast, and the judge's 
limiting instructions, and given its significant probative 
value, the judge's decision to allow the jury to see and hear 
the redacted recording was not "a clear error of judgment in 
weighing the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such that 
the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives."  Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473 Mass. 840, 846 
16 
 
 
 
(2016), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014). 
 
b.  Voir dire.  The defendant argues that the judge abused 
his discretion by failing to question the members of the venire 
regarding the prejudicial impact of seeing the news broadcast at 
trial.  On appeal, the defendant suggests that the judge, sua 
sponte, should have asked potential jurors "whether viewing 
media coverage of this exact case would affect their ability to 
be fair and impartial."  We conclude that the judge was not 
required to make such an inquiry. 
 
"The scope of voir dire rests in the sound discretion of 
the judge . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736 
(2004).  It is well established that "the requirement for 
individual voir dire arises upon the defendant's request for 
such inquiry; it is not automatic."  Commonwealth v. DiRusso, 60 
Mass. App. Ct. 235, 238 (2003).  See Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 
Mass. 404, 412-414 (2000), and cases cited.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 888-890 (2013), and cases 
cited.  Here, while the defendant did submit a request that the 
judge ask nineteen specific questions "on an individual basis," 
he did not request that any questions be posed with regard to 
the news broadcast.10 
                                                        
 
10 The judge inquired of individual members of the venire 
whether the race of the defendant and the nature of the 
17 
 
 
 
 
The defendant argues on appeal that the audio-video 
recording was extraneous and that the judge therefore was 
required to conduct voir dire with respect it.  We do not agree.  
Evidence that does not lie outside the record or that is "fully 
relevant and probative" of an issue at trial is not extraneous.  
Kater, 432 Mass. at 413-414, discussing G. L. c. 234, § 28.  
Here, because the audio-video recording of the news broadcast 
was introduced in evidence at trial (a determination that was 
pending at the time of jury empanelment), and because it was 
probative of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
confession, it is not "extraneous" within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 234, § 28. 
 
That the judge had yet to rule on the admissibility of the 
news broadcast at the time of empanelment is significant.  In 
Kater, 432 Mass. at 413, we concluded that there was no abuse of 
discretion in a judge's decision not to conduct individual voir 
dire regarding prior bad act evidence in part because, "if the 
evidence were ultimately not admitted at trial, the questions 
would have then contaminated the jury."  See Commonwealth v. 
Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553, 554-557 (1990). 
 
Moreover, there is no suggestion that any juror saw the 
news broadcast at any time other than in the court room.  See 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
allegation would render them incapable of being fair and 
impartial. 
18 
 
 
 
Reavis, 465 Mass. at 890 ("The defendant has not indicated, nor 
does the record suggest, that any of the jurors selected were 
not fair and impartial").  Indeed, two members of the venire 
responded affirmatively to the question regarding prior 
knowledge of the case because they each recalled reading an 
article in a local newspaper and one of them had a spouse who 
owned a business in Lawrence.  Although the potential jurors did 
not remember any specifics about the case, and did not state 
that their prior knowledge rendered them unable to be fair and 
impartial, the judge ordered each of them excused.  Accordingly, 
there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision not to 
conduct voir dire of the venire with respect to the news 
broadcast. 
 
c.  Introduction of defendant's statement about handling a 
firearm.  The defendant contends that the judge committed 
reversible error by allowing the jury to hear prejudicial 
evidence about the defendant's handling of a firearm in a prior, 
unrelated incident.  In particular, the defendant objects to the 
introduction of Max's testimony concerning the defendant's 
statement that the police "probably want[ed] to talk to him why 
his fingerprints were on" a gun that he had handled and that a 
friend of his from Lawrence purportedly had fired.  The judge 
allowed this testimony to be introduced, over objection, on the 
ground that it showed consciousness of guilt (i.e., that the 
19 
 
 
 
defendant sought to deceive Max as to the reason for the police 
visit to his house). 
 
Out-of-court statements are not hearsay, and may be 
admissible substantively when offered to show consciousness of 
guilt or liability.  See Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 
191, 207 (2015) (consciousness of guilt evidence is "relevant to 
an assessment of the defendant's mental state and whether he was 
criminally responsible"); Mass. G. Evid. § 1110(a) (2016).  
Evidence "susceptible of a finding" that a defendant "embarked 
on a series of actions consciously designed to deflect attention 
from himself" may indicate consciousness of guilt (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 424 (2009).  
Evidence that a defendant provided false information also may be 
admissible to show consciousness of guilt.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Delaney, 442 Mass. 604, 613 (2004) (defendant's 
lying to coworker to cover up involvement in incident showed 
consciousness of guilt). 
 
Because the defendant preserved the objection, we review 
for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 
387, 399 (2010).  We discern no error in the admission of this 
consciousness of guilt evidence.  The Commonwealth was entitled 
to show the jury that the defendant sought to deceive his friend 
regarding the nature of the police investigation.  Further, even 
if there were error in allowing the introduction of this 
20 
 
 
 
testimony, any error would have had little, if any, effect on 
the jury, given the defendant's other, far more explicit 
statements of guilt.  See Delaney, supra.  In addition, in his 
closing the prosecutor made no mention of the disputed 
consciousness of guilt evidence.  See id. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's opening statement.  At the end of his 
opening statement, the prosecutor said: 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, this crime went unsolved for 
months.  This crime went unsolved for months.  Well, 
judgment day is here.  And, at the end of this case, I'd 
suggest that you will find that on July 24th of 2010, the 
defendant murdered Timothy Walker in cold blood." 
 
The defendant immediately sought a mistrial.  The judge denied 
the motion.  The defendant contends that this denial was error 
because the prosecutor's use of the phrase "judgment day" 
"suggested to the jury the [prosecutor's] long road to victory 
was expected to end with the jury's guilty verdict." 
 
We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 19 (2011).  
The trial judge is in the best position to assess any potential 
prejudice and, where possible, to tailor an appropriate remedy 
short of declaring a mistrial.  See Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 
Mass. 354, 360 (2016).  "[T]he burden of demonstrating an abuse 
of discretion is a heavy one."  Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 
Mass. 336, 351 (1985). 
21 
 
 
 
 
In opening statements and closing arguments, prosecutors 
may not "play . . . on the jury's sympathy or emotions, or 
comment on the consequences of a verdict" (footnote omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516–517 (1987).  "It is 
improper for a prosecutor to equate a guilty verdict with 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140 (2007).  
See Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 328–329 (2000) 
(prosecutor's statement to jury to "do your job" and, 
implicitly, to find defendant guilty was not permissible 
argument). 
 
In framing the defendant's trial as his "judgment day," the 
prosecutor improperly invoked a biblical reference to a day of 
reckoning and created the impression that it was the jury's duty 
to bring closure to a long-unsolved killing by rendering a 
guilty verdict.  This was improper and impermissible.  We 
conclude, however, that the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial in light of his 
repeated instructions to the jury that opening statements and 
closing arguments are not evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
429 Mass. 146, 158 (1999). 
 
e.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that certain unobjected-to statements in the prosecutor's 
closing argument created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  In particular, he maintains that the 
22 
 
 
 
prosecutor improperly vouched for Michelle's credibility, and 
presented three arguments that were not supported by the 
evidence:  that the defendant led a "secret life"; that he did 
not want Tesseana to meet his friends; and that Max recognized 
the defendant when police showed him surveillance footage. 
 
Because the defendant did not object at trial, we consider 
whether any of the challenged statements was improper and, if 
so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 626-627 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016).  We review the 
statements in the context of the entire closing, the jury 
instructions, and the evidence introduced at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 414 Mass. 618, 628 (1993). 
 
i.  Improper vouching.  The defendant argues that certain 
of the prosecutor's statements constituted improper vouching for 
the credibility of a witness: 
 
"You have to believe Michelle is one of the most evil 
people on this planet to think that she's going to set this 
guy up for a murder she knew he didn't commit just so he 
wouldn't see her daughter anymore.  That's what defense 
counsel wants you to believe.  That is almost wors[e] than 
shooting [the victim] yourself, to set this guy up for a 
murder he didn't commit.  For what good reason?  For no 
good reason, no good reason.  But they talked.  And she 
asked questions and he let it out.  That is the reality.  
That's what happened.  It's not pretty but it's true. 
 
 
"And she told you on the stand she was conflicted 
about what to do, too.  And where did we hear that before?  
We heard it just by our last witness, Dolores, when she 
found those sneakers.  She was conflicted.  She didn't know 
23 
 
 
 
what to do.  It's [the defendant].  And she eventually 
called the police. 
 
 
"And so when Michelle sat in front of the Lawrence 
[p]olice [s]tation, not knowing what to do and eventually 
not going in, going home and then going to the police the 
next day, that just made sense to her.  And who can judge 
that?  What do you do?  She ended up doing the right 
thing."  (Emphases supplied.) 
 
 
Prosecutors may "argue forcefully for the defendant's 
conviction."  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  
The jury are presumed to understand that a prosecutor is an 
advocate, and statements that are "[e]nthusiastic rhetoric, 
strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole" will not require 
reversal.  Id. at 351.  Prosecutors may not, however, appeal to 
the jury's sympathy, argue facts not in evidence, or give their 
own opinion of the evidence or the credibility of a witness.  
See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 296-297 (2008).  A 
prosecutor engages in improper vouching if he or she "expresses 
a personal belief in the credibility of a witness, or indicates 
that he or she has knowledge independent of the evidence before 
the jury."  Wilson, supra at 352. 
 
The prosecutor's statements here, while they could have 
been better phrased, do not rise to the level of improper 
vouching.  A prosecutor properly may comment on and urge the 
jury to draw inferences from the trial evidence, Commonwealth v. 
Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 713 (1993), and may state logical reasons 
based on inferences from the evidence why a witness's testimony 
24 
 
 
 
should be believed.  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 816 
(2003).  See Commonwealth v. Caillot, 454 Mass. 245, 259 (2009), 
cert. denied, 559 U.S. 948 (2010) (no improper vouching because, 
"in the context in which the remark was made, the jury would 
have understood that the prosecutor intended to convey not that 
he knew what [the witness] had stated was truthful, but that 
[the witness'] testimony was credible because there was evidence 
corroborating [the witnesses'] testimony"). 
 
In the context of the argument as a whole, the prosecutor's 
remarks here did not express a personal belief in Michelle's 
credibility.  The statements were made in response to the 
defendant's contention, during cross-examination and in closing 
argument, that Michelle was not credible and that she fabricated 
the defendant's confession in order to force an end to the 
defendant's relationship with Tesseana.  Defense counsel argued 
in his closing that Michelle "was not telling the truth," and 
that she had persuaded Tesseana to corroborate her story.  The 
prosecutor permissibly could respond to these challenges.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. 510, 522 (2006) (where 
credibility is at issue, it is proper for counsel to argue from 
evidence why witness should be believed). 
 
ii.  Arguing facts not in evidence.  Prosecutors may not 
"misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in evidence."  
Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516–517.  They may, however, argue 
25 
 
 
 
"forcefully for a conviction based on the evidence and on 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence."  Id. 
at 516.  "Remarks made during closing arguments are considered 
in the context of the entire argument, and in light of the 
judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."  
Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 231 (1992). 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor's statements 
that the defendant maintained a secret life in Lawrence and that 
the defendant did not want to meet Tesseana's friends or allow 
her to meet any of his friends were not supported by the 
evidence.  Evidence was introduced at trial, however, that the 
defendant rarely saw Tesseana other than at her mother's house, 
she rarely met any of his friends, she had not met any member of 
his family, and his mother was unaware that he had a girl friend 
in Lawrence.  There was also evidence that Max, the defendant's 
friend and housemate, whom he had known since high school, never 
met Tesseana or any of the defendant's friends from Lawrence. 
 
With respect to the defendant's challenge to the 
prosecutor's statement that Max had "recognized" the defendant 
on a recording of the video surveillance footage that police 
played for him, Max's testimony supported this inference.  Max, 
the defendant's former football teammate, testified that, when 
police showed him a copy of the surveillance footage, he said 
that the shooter's walk was "similar" to the defendant's, his 
26 
 
 
 
build was a "lot similar," and the way in which the man in the 
footage ran was "very similar."  The interviewing officer also 
testified that Max's "head dropped" when he saw the recording, 
and that he "put his hands up to his head."  In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor referred specifically to Max's 
testimony that the shooter walked, ran, and was built "like" the 
defendant.  Thus, the prosecutor's statements were not 
impermissible inferences, and it is unlikely that the jury would 
have been misled by the use of the word "recognized."11 
 
f.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
carefully reviewed the entire record pursuant to our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no reason to order a new trial 
or to reduce the conviction to a lesser degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                                                        
 
11 We have considered the arguments in the defendant's brief 
filed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 (1981), 
and conclude that they are unavailing.