Title: Caplan v. Bogard

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
MAX CAPLAN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 011807 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
JEREMY BOGARD, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a personal injury action, we consider 
whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that 
the entrance to a restaurant parking lot was a “highway” within 
the meaning of Code § 46.2-100. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Max Caplan (“Caplan”) filed a motion for judgment against 
Jeremy Bogard (“Bogard”) and Quality Produce Company (“Quality 
Produce”) for personal injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident in Roanoke, Virginia.  Bogard, a delivery truck driver 
for Quality Produce, was exiting the parking lot of the Roanoker 
Restaurant (the “Roanoker”) and was turning west onto Colonial 
Avenue when he struck Caplan’s vehicle.  West of the entrance to 
the Roanoker, Colonial Avenue was marked as a two-lane road 
divided by a double yellow line.  Immediately before the 
entrance, the pavement of the single eastbound lane was marked 
with two arrows, one on the left side of the lane pointing 
straight ahead and one on the right side of the lane pointing 
right, toward the entrance to the Roanoker.*  East of the 
entrance, Colonial Avenue was a four-lane road, divided into two 
lanes in either direction. 
 
Caplan was driving east on Colonial Avenue on the morning 
of the accident, a route he drove every morning on his way to 
work.  Traffic was heavy and, before the accident occurred, cars 
were “bumper to bumper and moving slowly” on his right side.  
Caplan explained that he would “hug the [double yellow] line” in 
order to pass cars that moved to the right side of the roadway 
as he approached the Roanoker.  Caplan testified that as he 
approached the entrance to the Roanoker on the morning of the 
accident, he “passed . . . six or seven cars that were bumper to 
bumper on [his] right.”  Caplan further testified that as he 
passed the entrance to the Roanoker, he saw “something white, 
large in the corner of [his] eye, but [he] didn’t know what it 
was.  And the next thing [he] heard a glass shattering and 
metal.” 
 
Bogard testified that on the morning of August 16, 1999, he 
had completed his daily produce delivery to the Roanoker and was 
preparing to exit the restaurant’s premises to make his next 
delivery.  He stopped his truck at the entrance to the Roanoker, 
in the left turn lane, in order to wait for an opportunity to 
                     
 
* Caplan testified that the eastbound lane became “a little 
bit wider” at the point where the two arrows were located. 
 
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turn west onto Colonial Avenue.  According to Bogard, the 
eastbound traffic on Colonial Avenue was backed up and stopped, 
forming a single line of vehicles.  Bogard testified that he 
waited between thirty seconds to one minute before an eastbound 
vehicle stopped and the driver motioned him into the 
intersection.  Bogard was aware that other vehicles were stopped 
behind the vehicle that stopped for him.  He then looked to his 
right and, discerning that no one was approaching from that 
direction, he proceeded forward, whereupon he struck Caplan’s 
vehicle.  Bogard testified that he did not see Caplan traveling 
east on Colonial Avenue prior to the collision. 
 
William B. Miller (“Miller”), a former police officer, 
witnessed the accident.  Miller was driving east on Colonial 
Avenue toward the Roanoker and was traveling in the right 
portion of the single eastbound lane.  He testified that a 
“vehicle passed [him] on [his] left” and then he saw that 
vehicle, which he later learned was driven by Caplan, collide 
with Bogard’s truck.  According to Miller, the accident occurred 
“straight out” from the entrance to the Roanoker. 
 
Mike Olney (“Olney”), another witness to the accident, was 
also approaching the entrance to the Roanoker from the east when 
he witnessed the collision between Caplan and Bogard.  Olney 
testified that prior to the collision he noticed a vehicle, 
which he later learned was driven by Caplan, “following [him] 
 
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fairly closely.”  Olney explained that he moved over to the 
right portion of the lane “in anticipation of [Caplan] passing 
[him] once [he] got past the Roanoker Restaurant.”  Olney stated 
that after he moved to the right, Caplan passed his vehicle and 
“as Mr. Caplan came around me – I don’t believe there were any 
cars in front of him – he collided with a truck that was pulling 
out of the Roanoker Restaurant.” 
 
Sergeant William M. Babb (“Babb”), a patrol sergeant with 
the Roanoke City Police Department, was assigned to the accident 
scene, and at trial, he described the entrance to the Roanoker.  
He explained that the entrance included a double yellow line to 
separate the entrance lanes from the exit lanes, and also 
included a separate left turn lane.  Babb further testified 
that, to the best of his knowledge, the entrance to the Roanoker 
was a “way that [was] open to the public 24 hours a day,” the 
premises were not posted with “No Trespassing” signs, and there 
was not a chain in place to block access to the premises when 
the Roanoker was closed. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties proposed 
jury instructions to the trial court and disagreed whether the 
entrance to the Roanoker parking lot was a “highway” within the 
meaning of Code § 46.2-100.  Caplan proposed the following 
instruction, which characterized the entrance as a “private 
road”: 
 
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Instruction A: 
 
 
Immediately before entering a highway 
from a private road, the driver of a 
vehicle has a duty to stop and use 
ordinary care to yield the right-of-way to 
any approaching vehicle that is so near 
the intersection that the driver cannot 
safely enter it. 
 
 
If a driver fails to perform this 
duty, then he is negligent. 
 
 
The trial court refused Instruction A and explained: 
 
After much debate, reference to the 
statute definition and much more debate, 
I’m finally satisfied that under the use 
existing on August the 16, 1999 that the 
driveway in and out of the parking lot of 
the Roanoker Restaurant, as shown in the 
overhead photograph which is an exhibit in 
this case, and the other testimony 
surrounding it is that it has unrestricted 
public access and that the unrestricted 
public access is for vehicular traffic. 
 
 
And I’m satisfied that it’s more of a 
highway than a private road since there 
are not limitations to it. 
 
 
As far as the evidence is concerned, 
there are no limitations to going in and 
out with your motor vehicle, although I 
think the logical inference is the only 
reason to go in and out of there is to eat 
a meal at the Roanoker. 
 
 
In any event, it’s more of a highway 
instead of a private road.  I’m going to 
refuse the private road instructions. 
 
 
Caplan objected to the trial court’s refusal of his 
proposed instruction.  The trial court granted the following 
instructions: 
 
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Instruction 13: 
 
 
You are instructed that the 
intersection of Colonial Avenue and the 
entrance to the Roanoker Restaurant is an 
intersection of highways. 
 
Instruction 15: 
 
 
A driver of a vehicle has a duty not 
to pass any other vehicle proceeding in 
the same direction at any intersection of 
highways unless such vehicles are being 
operated on a highway having two or more 
designated lanes of roadway for each 
direction of travel or unless such 
intersection is designated and marked as a 
passing zone. 
 
 
If a driver fails to perform this 
duty, he is negligent. 
 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants, 
Bogard and Quality Produce.  Caplan filed a motion to set aside 
the verdict, which the trial court denied by letter opinion 
dated May 9, 2001.  A final order was entered in favor of both 
defendants on May 24, 2001.  Caplan appeals the judgment of the 
trial court. 
II.  Standard of Review 
This appeal presents a mixed question of law and fact which 
we review de novo.  We give deference to the trial court’s 
factual findings and view the facts in the light most favorable 
to Bogard and Quality Produce, the prevailing parties below, in 
order to review the trial court’s application of the law to the 
 
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facts.  Carmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 234 Va. 198, 201, 361 
S.E.2d 128, 130 (1987). 
III.  Analysis 
On appeal, Caplan maintains that the entrance to the 
Roanoker is part of a privately maintained parking lot and is 
not a highway pursuant to Code § 46.2-100.  Accordingly, he 
argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
the accident occurred at an “intersection of highways” and in 
refusing Instruction A. 
Bogard and Quality Produce maintain that the trial court 
correctly instructed the jury that the accident occurred at an 
“intersection of highways,” and argue that Caplan failed to 
rebut the evidence of unrestricted access to the area, thereby 
raising a presumption that the entrance was a “highway,” in 
accordance with our decision in Kay Management Co. v. Creason, 
220 Va. 820, 263 S.E.2d 394 (1980).  Bogard and Quality Produce 
further argue that even if the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury that the area was an “intersection of highways” and in 
refusing Instruction A, any error was harmless because another 
instruction was given that imposed the same duties on Bogard as 
those imposed by Instruction A. 
At the time of the accident, a “highway” was defined by 
Code § 46.2-100 as: 
 
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the entire width between the boundary 
lines of every way or place open to the 
use of the public for purposes of 
vehicular travel in the Commonwealth, 
including the streets and alleys, and, for 
law-enforcement purposes, the entire width 
between the boundary lines of all private 
roads or private streets which have been 
specifically designated “highways” by an 
ordinance adopted by the governing body of 
the county, city, or town in which such 
private roads or streets are located. 
 
 
We and the Court of Appeals have had numerous opportunities 
to interpret the definition of a “highway” as the term is used 
in Title 46.2 and predecessor provisions of the Code.  In 
Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957), the 
defendant, who was arrested while driving his vehicle in the 
private parking lot of a service station, was convicted for 
operating a motor vehicle after his operator’s license had been 
suspended.  Id. at 402, 100 S.E.2d at 4-5.  We stated that the 
“true test” of whether a “way” is a highway is “whether the ‘way 
or place of whatever nature’ is open to the use of the public 
for purposes of vehicular travel.”  Id. at 407, 100 S.E.2d at 8 
(quoting Crouse v. Pugh, 188 Va. 156, 165, 49 S.E.2d 421, 426 
(1948)).  We stated: 
[t]he premises . . . were open to the 
public upon [the owner’s] invitation.  The 
invitation was for private business 
purposes and for his benefit.  He had the 
absolute right at any time to terminate or 
limit this invitation.  He could close his 
doors and bar the public or any person 
from vehicular travel on all or any part 
 
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of his premises at will.  He had complete 
control of their use. 
 
199 Va. at 407-08, 100 S.E.2d at 8-9.  Accordingly, we held that 
because of the limited invitation to the public to enter the 
premises, the parking lot did not constitute a highway for the 
purposes of the Code.  Id. at 408, 100 S.E.2d at 9. 
 
In Kay Management, 220 Va. 820, 263 S.E.2d 394, which 
involved an action for personal injuries sustained by a 
pedestrian, we considered whether motor vehicle laws applied to 
the roads within a private apartment complex.  Kay argued “that, 
as the streets or roadways in the apartment complex were 
maintained by Kay for the benefit of the tenants, they were not 
highways to which the statutory rules applied.”  Id. at 830, 263 
S.E.2d at 400.  We distinguished the facts in Prillaman and held 
that “evidence of accessibility to the public for free and 
unrestricted use gave rise to a prima facie presumption that the 
streets of [the apartment complex] were highways within the 
definition of [the Code].”  Id. at 832, 263 S.E.2d at 402.  
Because the defendants did not rebut the presumption by showing 
that access to the public was restricted to those with either 
the “express or implied permission from the owners,” we held 
that the roads within the complex were highways within the 
meaning of the Code.  Id.
 
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The Court of Appeals, in Roberts v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. 
App. 401, 504 S.E.2d 890 (1998), considered whether a 
convenience store parking lot was a highway, where the defendant 
was convicted of driving in the parking lot after having been 
adjudicated an habitual offender.  Id. at 402, 504 S.E.2d at 
890.  The Court of Appeals held that 
[t]he 7-Eleven parking lot was privately 
owned property.  The owner of the lot 
. . . issued an invitation to do business 
to the public.  Access by the public to 
the property was restricted to this 
invitation.  The owner and its employees 
retained the right to ask persons to leave 
the property and to have trespassers 
removed by the police.  No traffic signs 
existed on the parking lot.  Based upon 
the restricted public access to the 
premises, the parking lot of the 7-Eleven 
store was not a “highway” as defined by 
Code § 46.2-100. 
 
Id. at 406, 504 S.E.2d at 892.  See also Flinchum v. 
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 734, 737-38, 485 S.E.2d 630, 631-32 
(1997) (holding that the parking lots of a sporting goods store 
and a repair business were open to the public upon the 
invitation of the store owners and the store owners could “close 
[their] doors and bar the public . . . from vehicular travel on 
all or any part of [their] premises at will”; accordingly, the 
parking lots were not “highways” pursuant to the Code.) 
 
Our prior decisions dictate that the party seeking to 
establish that a particular way is a highway has the initial 
 
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burden of presenting evidence of unrestricted access to the 
public.  A sufficient showing of unrestricted access gives rise 
to the presumption that the way is a highway.  Once this 
presumption is found to be applicable, the opposing party has 
the burden to rebut the presumption by showing that the area was 
open only to those with “express or implied permission from the 
owner[].”  Kay Management, 220 Va. at 832, 263 S.E.2d at 402. 
In the present case, Bogard and Quality Produce had the 
initial burden to establish that public access to the Roanoker 
was unrestricted.  Bogard and Quality Produce presented evidence 
that there was not a chain, or any other barrier, to physically 
block the entrance to the Roanoker when the restaurant was 
closed. 
On this record, we hold that Bogard and Quality Produce 
failed to establish the required element of unrestricted access, 
and consequently no presumption that the driveway was a highway 
arises.  Merely presenting evidence that access to the public is 
not blocked by a physical barrier is not sufficient to 
demonstrate unrestricted access to the public and does not give 
rise to the presumption.  To hold otherwise would have 
unintended and unreasonable consequences.  If such a presumption 
could arise upon such limited proof, then it would be implicated 
in any case involving the intersection of a highway and most 
 
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commercial establishments and private residences.  Such a result 
is contrary to both common sense and reason. 
 
We note a critical factual distinction between Kay 
Management and the present case.  In Kay Management, the “roads” 
at issue were actual named streets within the apartment complex 
that featured traffic signs, curbs, and sidewalks.  220 Va. at 
830, 263 S.E.2d at 400.  In the present case, the entrance to 
the Roanoker from Colonial Avenue was merely an access way to 
the parking lot. 
Bogard and Quality Produce argue that this case is 
controlled by our opinion in Furman v. Call, 234 Va. 437, 362 
S.E.2d 709 (1987).  Furman is distinguished from this case by 
its unique facts and evidentiary posture.  In Furman, a 
collision occurred at an intersection of roadways within an 
office condominium complex consisting of numerous buildings.  
The network of roadways was complimented by two entrances on 
separate streets.  We observed that 
[t]he roads around and in the complex, 
however, have never been closed to the 
public; the complex is open for vehicular 
traffic 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  
No guard or barricade system prevents the 
public from driving at will through the 
complex. 
 
Id. at 438, 362 S.E.2d at 710.  Although a sign indicating that 
the property was private was posted at each entrance, the signs 
read “Private Property, No Soliciting.”  We held that “the 
 
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purpose of the signs is to prohibit soliciting, not the entry of 
motor vehicles operated by members of the public.”  Id. at 441, 
362 S.E.2d at 711. Call offered sufficient evidence of free and 
unrestricted access and use of the roadways to give rise to the 
presumption that they were highways.  Furman’s evidence 
concerning the posted sign was insufficient to rebut the 
presumption.  In this case, the evidence offered by Bogard of 
absence of a chain or barrier is insufficient to give rise to a 
presumption that the entrance to the Roanoker is a highway. 
Accordingly, we hold that the private parking lot of the 
Roanoker, including its entrance, is not a “highway” pursuant to 
Code § 46.2-100.  The trial court erred in holding that the 
accident occurred at an “intersection of highways,” and by 
granting Instructions 13 and 15, and in refusing Instruction A. 
 
Bogard and Quality Produce maintain that any error in the 
refusal of Instruction A was harmless because a granted 
instruction imposed the same duties on Bogard as the duties 
imposed by refused Instruction A.  We agree that the two 
instructions imposed the same duties; however, the trial court’s 
error was not harmless.  As a result of the trial court holding 
that the intersection was an “intersection of highways,” it 
granted Instruction 15, which imposed a duty upon Caplan that 
otherwise would not have existed, namely the duty not to pass a 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction at the intersection of 
 
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two highways.  The jury was instructed that if Caplan violated 
this duty, he was negligent.  We have held that “a misdirection 
or other mistake of the court appearing in the record is to be 
presumed to have affected the jury, and the judgment will be 
reversed, unless it plainly appears from the whole record that 
the error did not affect, and could not have affected, their 
verdict.”  The American Tobacco Co. v. Polisco, 104 Va. 777, 
781, 52 S.E. 563, 565 (1906).  On this record, we are unable to 
determine whether the jury found for the defendants based upon 
lack of primary negligence or based upon contributory 
negligence.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the error in 
refusing Instruction A, and in granting Instructions 13 and 15, 
was harmless. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand for a new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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