Title: Fix v. South Wilderness Ranch Homeowners Ass'n

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIAM R. FIX V. SOUTH WILDERNESS RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND FRANK FORELLE2012 WY 96Case Number: S-11-0260Decided: 07/12/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
WILLIAM 
R. FIX,Appellant(Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Plaintiff),v.SOUTH WILDERNESS RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a 
Wyoming unincorporated non-profit 
association,Appellee(Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant),andFRANK 
FORELLE,Appellee(Third-Party 
Defendant/Counter-Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable James L. Radda, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
William 
R. Fix, William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee South Wilderness Ranch Homeowners Association:
Mathew 
E. Turner of Mullikin, Larson & Swift LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee Frank Forelle:
No 
appearance.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ. 

 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  The South Wilderness Ranch Homeowners 
Association (HOA) filed an action against William R. Fix to recover $2,500 in 
assessments he allegedly owed as a lot owner in the South Wilderness Ranches 
Subdivision.  The HOA also sought 
interest and attorney fees.  Mr. Fix 
denied that he owed the assessments and filed a counterclaim seeking a judicial 
determination that the covenants pursuant to which the assessments were to be 
paid were null and void.  In the 
alternative, he sought damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when the HOA 
failed to enforce the covenants and allowed his neighbor to build a fence that 
violated the covenants.  

 
[¶2]  After summary judgment proceedings, the 
district court entered an order granting judgment in favor of the HOA on its 
claim for the assessments, interest and attorney fees.  Subsequently, the court severed Mr. 
Fix’s counterclaim from the rest of the case and entered judgment for the HOA on 
its complaint in the amount of the $2,500 assessments, plus pre-judgment 
interest, attorney fees and costs, for a total judgment of 
$22,077.38.
 
[¶3]  Mr. Fix appeals, claiming the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment against him on the HOA’s complaint and 
severing his counterclaim.  He also 
claims the attorney fees and costs award is excessive.  We affirm the district court’s order and 
judgment with the exception that we vacate the costs awarded for legal research. 

 
ISSUES
 
[¶4]  Mr. Fix, appearing pro se,1 presents the issues for this 
Court’s determination as follows:
 
I.          
The [district] court erred in granting summary judgment against the 
homeowner.
 
II.         
The [district] court awarded attorney fees that are 
excessive.
 
III.        The 
severance ordered by the [district] court sua sponte constitutes 
error.
 
IV.       The costs 
awarded by the [district] court are not permitted.
 
The 
HOA asserts the district court rulings were proper and seeks leave to submit 
evidence of its fees, costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in 
defending this appeal.
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]  Mr. Fix owns Lot 2 in South Wilderness 
Ranches Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming.  The HOA is responsible for providing 
common services in the subdivision and for making and collecting annual 
assessments from the lot owners.  On 
September 22, 2009, the HOA filed a complaint in circuit court alleging that Mr. 
Fix had failed to pay the 2009 annual assessment of $1,000.  The HOA sought payment of the assessment 
plus interest, costs and attorney fees as provided in the subdivision 
covenants.  
 
[¶6]  Mr. Fix answered the complaint, 
admitting that he owned Lot 2 in the subdivision but denying that he owed the 
2009 assessment.  He also filed a 
counterclaim for breach of contract asserting that the HOA breached the 
covenants by failing to enforce them and seeking a judicial determination that 
the covenants were null and void.2  At a subsequent pre-trial conference, 
Mr. Fix stated that he wished to amend his counterclaim to add as a party Frank 
Forelle, the neighbor who built a fence along one of the boundaries of his 
property in violation of the covenants.  
The HOA likewise indicated it intended to amend its complaint to include 
collection of an additional $1,500 assessment which became due January 1, 
2010.   The district court 
ordered the parties to move to amend their pleadings on or before November 15, 
2010.  
 
[¶7]  Accordingly, on November 15, 2010, the 
HOA filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to include collection of the 
2010 assessment.  The district court 
granted the motion and the HOA filed its amended complaint on December 30, 
2010.  Meanwhile, on November 16, 
2010, without seeking leave of court, Mr. Fix filed an amended answer, amended 
counterclaim and third party complaint.  
In his amended counterclaim and third party complaint, Mr. Fix sought a 
judgment declaring that the covenants were void and unenforceable or, in the 
alternative, that the neighbor’s fence violated the covenants and he was 
entitled to damages.   

 
[¶8]  The HOA filed a motion to strike the new 
pleadings on the ground that Mr. Fix did not obtain the court’s approval before 
filing them.  The court convened a 
hearing at which time Mr. Fix asked the court to accept his amended pleadings 
based upon his recollection that the parties were ordered to amend their 
pleadings without seeking leave of court.  
The court accepted Mr. Fix’s explanation and denied the motion to strike 
as to the amended answer and counterclaim.  
However, the court concluded the neighbor was not a proper third party 
defendant and granted the motion to strike as to the third party complaint.    
 
[¶9]  The court set the case for trial in May 
of 2011.  In April, the HOA filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  After 
a hearing, the court entered an order granting judgment for the HOA in the 
amount of $2,500, the total of the two assessments, plus interest, costs and 
attorney fees.  The court also 
granted judgment for the HOA on Mr. Fix’s counterclaim for breach of the 
covenants.  The court vacated the 
trial date and set for hearing and sought additional briefing on the issue of 
whether it should sever Mr. Fix’s remaining counterclaim for declaratory 
relief.  Upon considering the 
parties’ briefs and arguments on that issue, the court entered an order severing 
the remaining counterclaim.  

 
[¶10]  Subsequently, in September of 2011, the 
district court entered judgment on the complaint in the HOA’s favor and against 
Mr. Fix and awarded the HOA the $2,500 assessments, $787.98 
in prejudgment interest, 
$17,439.00 in attorney fees and $1,350.40 in costs, for a total judgment 
of $22,077.38.   Mr. Fix timely appealed.   
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]  In 
his first issue, Mr. Fix contends the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the HOA on its complaint.  

 
            
We review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  
 
Weber 
v. State, 
2011 WY 127, ¶ 10, 261 P.3d 225, 227 (Wyo. 2011) (citation 
omitted).
 
[¶12]  Mr. Fix asserts in his second and fourth 
issues that the district court’s attorney fees and costs awards were 
excessive.   We review such 
awards for abuse of discretion; the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  Magin v. Solitude Homeowner’s 
Inc., 2011 WY 
102, ¶ 40, 255 P.3d 920, 932 (Wyo. 2011).  

 
[¶13]  In his third issue, Mr. Fix challenges 
the district court’s order severing his counterclaim from the HOA’s claims.  W.R.C.P. 42(b) provides that a court may 
order a separate trial of any claim, including a counterclaim “in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to 
expedition and economy.”  The 
decision to order separate trials is within the discretion of the district court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is found.  Beavis v. Campbell County Mem. Hosp., 
2001 WY 32, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d 508, 514 (Wyo. 2001).
 
DISCUSSION
 
1.    
Summary 
Judgment
 
[¶14]  Mr. Fix contends the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment for the HOA in the face of his affidavit 
which he alleges demonstrated the existence of numerous issues of material fact 
with respect to the affirmative defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, unclean 
hands, selective enforcement and failure of consideration.  In essence, Mr. Fix argues that he was 
justified in withholding payment of the 2009 and 2010 assessments because the 
HOA failed to enforce the covenants prohibiting his neighbor from erecting a 
boundary fence and posting no trespassing signs.  He contends his refusal to pay the 
assessments was warranted because, through its inaction, the HOA interfered with 
his enjoyment of his home.  He 
asserts the HOA’s failure to enforce the covenants constituted a failure of 
consideration excusing his performance.
 
[¶15]  In his brief filed with this Court, Mr. 
Fix cites no authority to support his arguments that he was justified in not 
paying the assessments other than a citation to 42 Am. Jur. POF 3d Circumstances Establishing Equitable Defense 
to Breach of Restrictive Covenant § 463 (1997) for the proposition that “the 
defendant in an action for breach of a restrictive covenant may, depending on 
the circumstances, plead certain equitable defenses to enforcement of the 
covenant at issue.” Mr. Fix makes no reference to the elements necessary to 
prove the affirmative defenses and presents no argument other than the bald 
assertion that his affidavit established the elements of the affirmative 
defenses, the district court ignored those defenses and jury questions 
existed.4  Under these circumstances, we decline to 
consider his first issue.  Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 
1983) (“[The Supreme Court] will not consider issues which are not supported by 
proper citation of authority and cogent argument.”).
 
2.    
Attorney 
Fees
 
[¶16]  Mr. Fix next contends the district 
court’s attorney fees award is excessive.  
He asserts the issues before the court were simple and involved very 
limited written discovery, no depositions and no trial.  Despite the simplicity of the case, he 
points out that the court awarded fees seven times greater than the $2,500 
damage award.  He maintains the 
HOA’s employment of three attorneys was unreasonable and the hours for which 
they billed were excessive and unnecessary.  He further asserts the district court 
abused its discretion in making the award without a hearing to determine the 
reasonableness of the fees claimed, in denying his motion to strike the attorney 
affidavits and in awarding the fees when the HOA failed to designate an attorney 
expert.
 
[¶17]  Generally, Wyoming subscribes to the 
American rule regarding recovery of attorney fees, making each party responsible 
for its own attorney fees unless an award of fees is permitted by contract or 
statute.  Joe’s Concrete and Lumber, Inc. v. Concrete 
Works of Colorado, Inc., 2011 WY 74, ¶ 15, 252 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 
2011).  In the present case, the 
subdivision covenants expressly provided for the recovery of costs, including 
reasonable attorney fees, incurred in enforcing them.  The HOA was, therefore, entitled to a 
reasonable attorney fees award.  In 
awarding fees, the district court was required to consider all attorney fees 
evidence in the record and determine whether:  1) the fee charged represented the 
product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and 2) other factors 
warranted adjusting the fee upward or downward.  Id. at ¶ 19, 252 P.3d  at 449.   
 
[¶18]  In its nearly eleven page discussion of 
the issue, the district court thoughtfully considered each of the arguments Mr. 
Fix advances on appeal.  It 
concluded in essence that Mr. Fix turned what would otherwise have been a 
simple, straightforward case into complicated, drawn-out litigation.   Specifically, the court found that 
the positions Mr. Fix took in his answer, counterclaim and third party 
complaint, gave the HOA attorneys “no choice but to spend significant time 
preparing, researching, filing and arguing” their summary judgment motion, which 
they supported with nine exhibits.  
The court stated that it “thoroughly reviewed the [HOA’s] summary 
judgment motion, brief and supporting documents in preparing its summary 
judgment order” and concluded the time spent on the motion as reflected in the 
itemized schedule of legal services was reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances to secure a judgment for the unpaid assessments.  Addressing the time the HOA’s attorneys 
spent responding to Mr. Fix’s equitable defenses, the court found the issues 
were “novel and difficult and reasonably required significant time, labor and 
skill” on the attorneys’ part and the time spent successfully refuting Mr. Fix’s 
defenses was reasonable.  Likewise, 
the court concluded the time the attorneys spent researching Mr. Fix’s claim 
that his neighbor was a proper third party defendant was reasonable, as was the 
time they spent preparing the motion to strike Mr. Fix’s amended pleadings.  In short, the court concluded the time 
spent was necessitated largely by Mr. Fix and was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  We find nothing in 
the record warranting a conclusion that the court could not reasonably have 
concluded as it did, and we affirm the attorney fees award.     
 
3.    
Severance 
of Counterclaim            

 
[¶19]  Mr. Fix next claims the district court 
erred in severing his counterclaim from the proceedings on the HOA’s 
complaint.  He argues that the 
actions of his neighbor precipitated the litigation; therefore, he properly 
sought to join the neighbor as a party so that the rights of all parties could 
be determined in one action.  Under 
the circumstances, he maintains, the court could not reasonably have concluded 
that severance was appropriate. 
 
[¶20]  W.R.C.P. 42(b) provides in relevant 
part:
 
            
(b)  Separate trials. – The court, in 
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will 
be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim, or of any separate issue . . 
.  .  
 
Addressing 
the rule, we have said that a court may reasonably separate claims when they are 
not so interwoven that independent trials would cause confusion and uncertainty 
and result in the denial of a fair trial.  
Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297 (Wyo. 1992). 
 
[¶21]  This case began as a simple collection 
case with the sole issue being whether Mr. Fix was required and had failed to 
pay a $1,000 lot assessment.  That 
issue was conducive to resolution separate and apart from whether the HOA or Mr. 
Forelle violated the covenants; it was not so interwoven with the issues Mr. Fix 
sought to litigate that an independent proceeding to resolve it caused 
confusion, uncertainty or the denial of a fair trial.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it severed  the 
claims.
 
4.    
Costs
 
[¶22]  In his final issue, Mr. Fix asserts the 
district court erred in awarding $1,228.00 in costs for online legal 
research.  He maintains that online 
legal research is not one of the costs authorized by the rules and awarding them 
here gave the HOA a double recovery for the same effort because the court also 
awarded attorney fees for the hours spent doing legal research.  
 
[¶23]  The rule in Wyoming has been that legal 
research is a component of attorney fees and cannot be taxed as an item of 
costs.  Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1092 (Wyo. 1999).  The rationale for 
the rule is that legal research is a component included in an attorney’s hourly 
rate as overhead; thus, it should not be separately recoverable as a cost.  Some courts, however, have awarded costs 
for computer aided legal research, finding that such research is “reasonable, if 
not essential, in contemporary legal practice.”  Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 
285 (3d Cir. 1980).   The 
parties’ arguments and the district court’s ruling in this case do not mention 
Snyder.  Absent some contention by the parties 
that this Court should reconsider Snyder, we decline to do so in this 
case.  We vacate the award of 
$1,228.00 for legal research.  

 
5.    
Costs 
on Appeal
 
[¶24]  The HOA asks this Court to award it 
attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05:
 
Rule 
10.05.  Costs and penalties on 
affirmance.  
 
            
If the judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee 
shall recover the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed 
at the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys’ fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys’ fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).
 
We 
are reluctant to grant sanctions and will do so only in rare circumstances.  Grynberg v. L & R Exploration 
Venture, 2011 WY 134, ¶ 30, 261 P.3d 731, 739 (Wyo. 2011).  Given that we have vacated the award of 
costs for legal research, we are not willing to certify that there was no 
reasonable cause for this appeal.  
We decline the HOA’s invitation to award it attorney fees and costs.  
 
[¶25]  We affirm the district court’s order and 
judgment with the exception that we vacate the costs awarded for legal research. 

FOOTNOTES
1Mr. Fix is an attorney and has been licensed to practice law in Wyoming 
since 1981.
2At a scheduling conference convened after Mr. Fix filed his response to 
the complaint, a question arose concerning whether the circuit court was the 
proper forum for the case.  After 
input from the parties, the circuit court issued an order certifying the case to 
the district court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-102 (LexisNexis 2011), 
which provides as follows:
 
§ 
1-21-102. Proceedings when title or boundaries to land in 
question.
 
            
If it appears from the pleadings or the evidence of either party at the 
trial of any case in circuit court that the title or boundaries to lands are in 
question, the judge shall immediately make an entry thereof in the docket, cease 
all further proceedings, and certify to the district court of the county a 
transcript of all entries made in the docket relating to the case in the same 
manner and within the same time as upon appeal.  The case shall then be conducted in the 
district court as though appealed to the district court for trial de novo, 
except that no bond as on appeal or payment of costs in the circuit court is 
required for the transfer to the district court.
 
Subsequently, with the consent of the parties and the circuit court, the 
district court assigned the case to the circuit court that originally had the 
case pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-112 (LexisNexis 2011), which provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
§ 5-3-112. Assignment to circuit court 
judge.
 
     (a) A 
judge of the district court may assign to a circuit court judge any case or 
proceeding within the jurisdiction of the district court subject only to the 
following restrictions:
            
(i) Rules promulgated by the supreme court;
            
(ii) Acceptance of the judge to whom the assignment of the case or 
proceeding is to be made;
            
(iii) Consent of each plaintiff and each defendant in a civil action 
wherein the amount in controversy is fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) or 
greater;  
and
            
. . . .
     (b) The 
law and rules governing district court and appeals therefrom shall apply to a 
case or proceeding assigned pursuant to this 
section.
 
In ruling on the various motions and entering judgment in this case, the 
circuit court acted on behalf of the district court and district court 
jurisdiction of the case continued despite assignment to the circuit court.  Therefore, we treat those rulings as 
having come from the district court.
 
 
 
3After Mr. Fix filed his appeal, his severed counterclaim proceeded in the 
district court against the HOA and Mr. Forelle as counter-defendants.  Mr. Fix and Mr. Forelle filed cross 
motions for summary judgment.  After 
the parties filed their appellate briefs in this court, the district court 
convened a hearing on the summary judgment motions and entered an order pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 56(d) holding that Mr. Forelle’s fence violated the covenants and 
ordering him to remove it.  Mr. Fix 
filed a motion asking to supplement the appellate record with, and for this 
Court to take judicial notice of, the district court’s order.  We granted the motion.     

4Mr. Fix’s brief contains the following argument, in its entirety, with 
respect to each affirmative defense:
 
1.     
Laches and Equitable Estoppel.
The elements of laches and equitable estoppel were sufficiently 
established in appellant’s affidavit. Each of these elements were fairly raised 
in the homeowner’s.
According to the appellant, all reasonable inferences these factual 
issues should have been submitted to a jury for its 
determination.
 
2.     
Unclean Hands.
The doctrine of unclean hands was fairly raised in appellant’s 
affidavit.  Richard McDaniel, the 
president of the HOA, had for years engaged in a campaign of interference with 
the appellant’s quiet and peaceful enjoyment of his 
home.
No affidavit from McDaniel was ever submitted.  McDaniel was the president for 10 years 
and was the force behind the decision to do nothing about the fence or 
signs.
If there ever was a case for application of the unclean hands doctrine, 
this is the case.
 
3.     
 Selective 
Enforcement
The unlawful structures affected only the appellant’s property.  McDaniel elected to not enforce a 
blatant violation of the covenants.  
No vote of any homeowners was taken.  It just left up to the sole discretion 
of the president to enforce or not to enforce a given 
covenant.
The jury should have been able to consider evidence of McDaniel’s 
selective enforcement of the covenants.  
This is an issue which should have been presented to the trier of 
fact.
 
4.     
Failure of Consideration.
When the HOA failed to enforce the covenants against Forelle, there was a 
failure of consideration, thereby excusing the homeowners’ performance.  The HOA cannot fail to enforce blatant 
violations of the covenants and still insist upon payment of 
assessments.
At a minimum, there existed genuine issues of material fact.