Title: ESTRADA-SANCHEZ v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ESTRADA-SANCHEZ v. STATE2003 WY 4566 P.3d 703Case Number: 01-154Decided: 04/09/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JORGE 
ESTRADA-SANCHEZ,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Thomas 
B. Jubin of Jubin & Zerga LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and Carrie Dawn Tate-Meyer, 
Student Intern, and Meri Ramsey, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Ramsey.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; 
HILL, C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion in which LEHMAN, 
J., 
joins.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Jorge 
Estrada-Sanchez appeals his convictions on two counts of conspiracy with intent 
to deliver methamphetamine.1  He challenges subject matter 
jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the evidence that permitted his conduct in 
California to form the basis of a Wyoming prosecution; he contends that the 
Information improperly varied from the evidence at trial; and he complains of 
prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
reject the State's assertion that a detailed affidavit cured a constitutionally 
defective Information, or that the failure to obtain a bill of particulars 
waived it.  We reverse and remand 
for a new trial.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
The 
parties agree that the issues are:

 

1.  Was the evidence insufficient to support 
the convictions because there was no evidence of the Defendant's specific intent 
agreement that the controlled substances be further distributed by anyone in 
Park County, Wyoming?

 

2.  Did the Court permit an improper 
variance from the Information filed, because the Defendant was charged with 
conspiring in Park County, but the Court instructed the jury that it could 
convict the defendant for conspiring elsewhere with intent to have an effect in 
Park County, Wyoming?

 

3.  Did the prosecutor's misconduct of 
seeking and obtaining an instruction to the jury that a witness had refused to 
testify for the state and was held in contempt therefore require 
reversal?

 

4.  Did the prosecutor's misconduct of 
falsely stating to the jury that there were no deals, when, in fact, the Court 
had ordered immunity for 14 witnesses  every non-law enforcement witness in the 
case, require reversal?

 

5. 
Were the Defendant's constitutional due process and confrontation rights were 
[sic] violated because the Court failed to swear the 
interpreter?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
Between 
March 1997 and February 1998, two women, Chandel Smith and Lisa Lee, both of 
whom were romantically involved with Sanchez, made seven trips to California to 
see him.  On two of those trips, the 
women returned to Wyoming with methamphetamine supplied to them by Sanchez, and 
they were later arrested for that possession.  Those two trips formed the basis of two 
counts of conspiracy charged against Sanchez for which he was tried before a 
Park County, Wyoming, jury.  Another 
five trips were admitted into evidence as W.R.E. 404(b) evidence to show a 
course of conduct.  The first two 
trips occurred in March 1997 and June 1997.  On the third trip, in September 1997, 
Chandel Smith was arrested with two pounds of methamphetamine, outside of 
Meeteetse, Wyoming, and this trip formed the basis for the first charge against 
Sanchez.  The fourth, fifth and 
sixth trips involved Lisa Lee and occurred between November of 1997 and January 
of 1998.  On her seventh trip in 
February 1998, which formed the basis of Count II, Lee testified that Sanchez 
sold her one pound of methamphetamine for $8,000.00, and gave her two weeks to 
pay him for the drug.  She used 
about a half-pound, and weighed out some quantity to sell in Cody, but got 
arrested.  The half-pound was 
retrieved by friends, sold in Montana, and money sent back to Sanchez in 
California. 

 

[¶5]           
Sanchez 
was tried by jury, testified on his own behalf, but was convicted and sentenced 
to eight to ten years in the Wyoming state penitentiary.  On appeal, Sanchez contends that 
insufficient evidence exists to show that he conspired to distribute drugs in 
Wyoming; a fatal variance exists between the Information and the evidence 
adduced at trial; and prosecutorial misconduct occurred, all errors that require 
reversal.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶6]           
In 
his first issue, Sanchez contends that when the evidence is insufficient to 
prove that Sanchez intended for any purchasers to possess and deliver 
methamphetamine in Wyoming, then Wyoming does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over a crime committed in California.  The standard of review for sufficiency 
of the evidence issues is well established.  We assess whether all the evidence 
presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State.  
We leave out of consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party which conflicts with the successful party's evidence, and afford every 
favorable inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from that evidence.  
Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence 
presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence.  We will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty 
is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, 
or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did.  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶4, 
46 P.3d 298, ¶4 (Wyo. 2002); Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1228 
(Wyo.  2000); Harris v. 
State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1123 (Wyo. 1997); Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 
480 (Wyo. 1997).  

 

[¶7]           
The 
trial courts of Wyoming have subject matter jurisdiction over drug conspiracies 
when the conspirators intend for the conspiracy to have an effect within the 
State of Wyoming.  Marquez v. 
State, 12 P.3d 711, 715 (Wyo. 2000).  
While in New Mexico, Marquez agreed with a person there to deliver 
drugs to someone in Wyoming in exchange for cash.  Marquez was arrested in Colorado before 
reaching Wyoming.  In this case, 
Sanchez sold drugs to a purchaser in California, and that purchaser then drove 
the drugs back to Wyoming and sold them.  
Sanchez first contends that the Information does not charge him with 
extraterritorial conduct that caused a result in Wyoming and, therefore, Wyoming 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  
At trial, however, the jury was instructed to convict if the State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez had entered into a conspiracy 
specifically intended to have an effect in Park County, Wyoming.  He contends, however, that this evidence 
demonstrated only that a sale occurred in California, and, without evidence of 
any specific intent to sell in Park County, insufficient evidence exists to 
support a conviction under the jury instructions.

 

[¶8]           
"When 
determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a verdict, it is not 
our function to assess the facts or reweigh the evidence.  We must assume that the jurors believed 
only the evidence adverse to the defendant."  Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 
988 (Wyo. 1998).  Sanchez correctly 
states that a sale of drugs to a purchaser without any agreement that the 
purchaser will further distribute them to others is not a conspiracy, and, 
therefore, in this case, the jury had to first decide whether Sanchez and a 
purchaser conspired to possess drugs with the intent to distribute them, and 
then had to decide whether the conspiracy was intended for the possession and 
distribution of drugs in Park County, Wyoming.  The evidence must have demonstrated that 
any conspiracy was not intended to occur in California.  As Sanchez points out, the record shows 
that several attempts by the State failed to elicit direct statements from 
co-conspirators that Sanchez knew the drugs would be resold in Park County, 
Wyoming, on the trips that formed the basis of the two charges; however, these 
same witnesses testified to conduct by Sanchez that supports the jury's 
verdict.  Witnesses testified that, 
on several occasions, Sanchez sold drugs to them in California, hid the drugs 
somewhere on their vehicle, and then followed them to Wyoming and removed the 
drugs for them.  The witnesses were 
provided these drugs on condition that they would pay him from proceeds earned 
from selling them, and later the witnesses traveled back to California with 
thousands of dollars paid to Sanchez.  
Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict based on the instructions 
to the jury that required a guilty verdict if the evidence showed a conspiracy 
that intended the drugs would be distributed in Park County, 
Wyoming.

 

 

 

[¶9]           
The 
Information filed in this case states:

 

Comes 
Now the State of Wyoming . . . and informs the Court and gives the Court to 
understand that the above-named Defendant:

Count 
I:  On or between August 1, 1997 and 
September 9, 1997, in Park County, Wyoming, did conspire to commit any offense 
within the State of Wyoming or conspired to commit an act beyond the State of 
Wyoming, namely: did deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, 
a controlled substance . . . in violation of Wyoming Statute § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii)(Michie 1997), all in violation of Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1042 
(Michie 1997) . . . .  

 

Count 
II is identical, except that the dates alleged are "[o]n or between January 1, 
1998 and February 13, 1998."  

 

[¶10]      
Sanchez 
contends that the Information is unequivocal: it alleges that the conspiratorial 
agreement occurred in Park County or Sanchez conspired to commit an act beyond 
the State of Wyoming; however, as the jury instructions discussed above 
indicate, the jury determined his guilt on another charge, and this guilty 
verdict is the product of a fatal variance between the crime charged and that 
proved, and thus must be reversed.

 

[¶11]      
"An 
indictment to be legally sufficient must fairly indicate the crime charged, must 
state the essential elements of the alleged crime and be sufficiently definite 
so that the defendant can prepare his defense and be granted protection from 
further prosecution for the same offense (double jeopardy)."  Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 
933 (Wyo. 1976).  A defendant has a 
constitutional right when charged with a crime to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the charge against him.  
Id. at 930.  The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states in pertinent part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation[.]"  Similarly, 
Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution provides in pertinent part:  "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation."

  

[¶12]      
The 
purpose of these constitutional requirements is to assure adequate notice of the 
accusations to the defendant to enable him to prepare a defense.  Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 
1351 (Wyo. 1996).  The 
constitutional requirements are implemented in W.R.Cr.P. 3(b)(1), which provides 
that the information must be a "plain, concise and definite written statement of 
the essential facts constituting the offense charged."  Id.  

 

[¶13]      
Under 
the constitutional requirements and the criminal procedure rule, an information 
is sufficient if it:  1) contains 
the elements of the offense charged; 2) fairly informs a defendant of the charge 
against which he must defend; and 3) enables a defendant to plead an acquittal 
or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.  Id. at 1351 (citing Stewart v. 
State, 724 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Wyo. 1986)).  A variance arises when the evidence 
presented at trial establishes facts that are different from those alleged in 
the indictment.  Capshaw v. 
State, 11 P.3d 905, 910 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 
442 U.S. 100, 105, 99 S. Ct. 2190, 2193-94, 60 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1979); and United 
States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1431 (10th Cir.1992)).  Similarly, a shift in the government's 
theory from the one set out in the indictment to that presented at trial may 
also constitute a prejudicial variance. United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 2000).   We will not reverse unless the 
variance affects the defendant's substantial rights.  Capshaw, 11 P.3d  at 910.    Even in cases where an appellate 
court determines the existence of a variance, such a 
variance

 

"is 
not fatal unless the defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment 
what evidence would be presented at trial or unless the conviction based on an 
indictment would not bar a subsequent prosecution."  3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 516 at 27 (2d ed.1982); see Stoner [United States 
v.] 98 F.3d [527] at 536 [(10th Cir.1996)].  

 

Id.  

 

[¶14]      
In 
Capshaw, this Court determined that a detailed affidavit attached to the 
Information adequately informed the accused of the nature of the charge and 
allowed him to present his defense, and further found that his failure to obtain 
a bill of particulars required this Court to decide that his substantial rights 
were not affected.  Id. at 
910-11. Here, the State points to a detailed affidavit and Sanchez' failure to 
obtain a bill of particulars as well as the jury instruction as permitting this 
Court to decide that any error in the Information did not affect substantial 
rights.  

 

[¶15]      
The 
State's position assumes that the presence of any or all of these is 
significant, although the Information did not contain an element of the offense 
charged, specifically, a conspiracy occurred that was intended to have an effect 
in Wyoming.  Our general rule, 
however, is that the failure to include an element of the offense causes the 
Information to be constitutionally defective.  We, therefore, must consider whether the 
detailed affidavit and the jury instructions cured the defective Information, or 
whether by failing to obtain a bill of particulars, Sanchez waived his right to 
challenge the Information.  We 
conclude that the error was not cured or waived.

 

[¶16]      
The 
affidavit attached to the Information describes the conspiracy in great detail 
but only confirms the Information's statement that the agreement forming the 
basis of the conspiracy charge occurred in Park County, Wyoming, and acts 
intended to further its objective occurred outside of the state.  In short, it supports Sanchez' assertion 
that the Information contains a fatal variance, and does not cure any 
error.  Sanchez filed a motion for a 
bill of particulars.  The issue was 
discussed at a hearing; however, no resolution was reported, and we must agree 
with Sanchez' assessment that the district judge gave it short shrift.  Ultimately, the State did not file a 
bill of particulars, but, instead proceeded under the original information.  A bill of particulars, however, is not a 
part of an Information and cannot cure an Information that is fundamentally 
defective for the reason that it lacks an element of the offense.  Also, although Sanchez might waive his 
right to contest an insufficient Information by failing to request a bill 
of particulars, he cannot be said to waive challenging a fundamentally defective 
Information where he has requested a bill of particulars, but failed to 
obtain one.   Similarly, 
the purpose of a jury instruction differs, and, therefore, cannot cure this 
defective Information because it was not a part of the Information nor did it 
serve to amend that Information. State v. Vangerpen, 888 P.2d 1177, 
1180-81 (Wash. 1995).

 

[¶17]      Having 
decided that the Information in this case was fundamentally defective, the 
remaining issue is the appropriate remedy.  
The parties seem to agree that this court should reverse and remand for 
new trial; however, it would seem that the appropriate remedy is reversal of the 
conviction, and dismissal of the charges without prejudice to the State.  Reversed with instructions to reverse 
the conviction and dismiss without prejudice.

  

HILL, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, in which LEHMAN, J., 
joins.

 

[¶18]   I concur with the majority's 
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict.  However, I must 
respectfully dissent because I do not believe that there was fatal variance 
between the crime charged in the Information and that proved at 
trial.

 

[¶19]   The Information charged that 
Sanchez conspired "to commit an offense within the State of Wyoming, or 
conspired to commit an act beyond the State of Wyoming."  The instruction presented to the jury at 
trial stated that to convict Sanchez, the State needed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Sanchez had entered into a conspiracy specifically 
intended to have effect in Park County, Wyoming.  The majority concludes that the failure 
to include an element of the offense charged in the Information  namely, that a 
conspiracy occurred that was intended to have an effect in Wyoming  was a fatal 
variance mandating reversal.  I 
cannot agree with this analysis.  
Although the language in the Information and the instructions to the jury 
did not mesh perfectly, there can be no question that the Information "fairly 
indicate[d] the crime charged, [stated] the essential elements of the alleged 
crime and [was] sufficiently definite so that the defendant [could] prepare his 
defense" and granted protection from prosecution for the same offense. 
Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929, 933 (Wyo. 1976); 15A C.J.S. 
Conspiracy § 162 (2002).

 

[¶20]   While the Information says that 
Sanchez conspired "to commit an offense in Wyoming," and the jury instruction 
says he committed an act "intended to have an effect in Park County, Wyoming," I 
fail to see where there is a practical difference between the two.  The factual basis for charging Sanchez 
in a Wyoming jurisdiction was that he conspired with others to possess drugs 
with the intent to distribute them in Park County, Wyoming.  Obviously, conspiring to possess drugs 
with the intent to distribute them is an offense in Wyoming and was intended to 
have an effect in Wyoming  the successful sale of an illegal substance in Park 
County.  The two statements are 
merely logical corollaries of each other, not 
contradictory.

 

[¶21]   The majority opinion cites the 
factors set out in Gonzales but does not analyze them within the context 
of this case.  This is not a 
situation where the Information charged the defendant with one crime but the 
jury was instructed on another.  
Sanchez makes no serious argument that the language difference impaired 
his ability to prepare or make an effective defense or that it left him open to 
future prosecution for the same offense.  
In fact, the only reasonable reading of the record is that Sanchez was 
well aware of the charges against him and presented an adequate, if not 
necessarily effective, defense.  In 
short, there was no prejudice to Sanchez.  
The majority's conclusion has elevated form over substance while failing 
to give due regard to the actual practical effect of the alleged variance in 
light of our decision in Gonzales.

 

[¶22]   I would affirm Sanchez' conviction 
in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

1§ 
35-7-1031. Unlawful manufacture or delivery; counterfeit substance; unlawful 
possession.

(a) 
Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance.  Any person who violates 
this subsection with respect to:

(i) 
A controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 
is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than 
twenty (20) years, or fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars 
($25,000.00), or both;

(ii) 
Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, 
fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both[.]

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (Michie 1997).

 

§ 
35-7-1042. Attempts and conspiracies.

            
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this 
article within the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the 
state of Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable 
under this article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may 
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of 
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (Michie 1997).