Title: Matter of SAJ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of SAJ1997 WY 92942 P.2d 407Case Number: C-96-8Decided: 07/17/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of SAJ, a Minor Child.

 

JLJ, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

AFM, Appellee (Petitioner).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

      

 

Nyla Murphy and Andrew F. 
McConnell, Student Intern, Laramie, for Appellant.

Richard H. Peek, Casper, 
for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

        
LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]              JLJ 
(Mother), a non-custodial parent of a minor child (Child), appeals the district 
court's order modifying her visitation rights. We find the actions of the court, 
refusing parties their right to present testimony and evidence regarding issues 
of child visitation, violate due process. We therefore 
reverse.

 

  [¶2]          Appellant Mother 
submits the following issues:

 

        
    1. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion by denying due process in modifying the 
appellant's visitation 
order:

 

          
              
A. Without allowing the appellant to present witnesses and evidence at a 
hearing?

 

          
              
B. Without providing sufficient notice that the court would consider 
modifying the visitation order at a 
hearing to enforce the visitation order?

 

        
    2. Did the 
District Court lack subject matter jurisdiction when, on its own volition, it 
modified a visitation 
order?

 

      Appellee AFM 
(Father) responds with three issues of his own:

 

1. Whether this appeal should be dismissed because 
the Order appealed from is not an appealable Order pursuant to Rules 1.04 and 
1.05, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

 

        
    2. Whether this 
appeal should be dismissed because the Appellant has failed to provide a settled 
and approved Statement of Evidence 
as required by Rule 3.03, Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.

 

        
    3. Did the Trial 
Court abuse its discretion[?]

 

FACTS

 

 [¶3]            This 
controversy came before the district court when Mother filed a motion to enforce 
visitation rights, alleging that the custodial parent, Father, was denying 
visitation. The court set a hearing on the motion. The day before the hearing, 
Mother moved the court to include in the hearing her motion to vacate an ex 
parte restraining order issued three 
weeks previously which prohibited Mother from visiting Child at Child's 
school.

 

 [¶4]            The 
district court conducted an unreported hearing, the proceedings of which are not 
entirely clear. Mother submitted a proposed statement of the proceedings 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  The 
court, however, found Mother's statement of proceedings incorrect and sustained 
the objection Father had filed in response.

 

 [¶5]            While the 
court made no other effort to settle or approve the events of the hearing as 
contemplated by W.R.A.P. 3.03, we find the record and Father's objections to 
Mother's proposed statement of the 
proceedings sufficiently revealing to support the following facts. The court, 
over the objections of both parties, 
refused testimony by any witnesses  including the parties  only allowing the 
parties' attorneys to make a statement which included representations of what 
witnesses would say. The court reviewed exhibits the parties had with them, and 
then it issued its ruling. The court entered an order modifying Mother's 
visitation from reasonable to supervised visitation and, in passing, denied all 
other requested relief. The Order recognized that Child had a counselor, and that the 
court would "revise the visitation schedule * * * upon recommendation" of the 
counselor. This timely appeal follows.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

 [¶6]            The award 
and scheduling of visitation rights is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and we will not disturb that determination unless the court acts in a 
manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Goff v. Goff, 
844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 1993). The party attacking the trial court's ruling has the burden of establishing the 
abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

      A. APPEALABLE 
ORDER

 

  [¶7]          Relying on our 
holdings in Stone v. Stone, 842 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1992) and Madden v. Madden, 558 P.2d 669 (Wyo. 1977), Father contends that we should dismiss this appeal because 
the Order is not a final appealable 
order under W.R.A.P. 1.04. Father points to the district court's reservation of 
jurisdiction to "consider" the visitation rights upon further information from 
the child's counselor. We determine the finality of an order, however, on the 
"effect the order has on the parties' rights." Stone, 842 P.2d  at 548. If an 
order affects the substantial rights of a party, it is appealable. 
Id.

 

   [¶8]        Father claims that 
Mother's right to reasonable visitation with her daughter was not affected, but 
merely "clarified" by the district court's determination that "reasonable 
visitation" was supervised visitation. We disagree. Common sense counsels that 
the words "reasonable visitation" in a custody determination do not contemplate that visitation be supervised by the 
Department of Family Services. Cf. Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d  at 1092 (district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that parents who allowed 
only supervised visitation denied the grandparents reasonable visitation). The 
potential effect of this order was to indefinitely deny Mother visitation with 
her child except under supervised conditions. We cannot characterize such a 
drastic modification as an interlocutory "interpretation" of the custody and 
visitation order.

 

      B. ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION

 

[¶9]              
Father also contends that we should dismiss the appeal because Mother 
failed to get court approval of the proposed record on appeal as contemplated by 
W.R.A.P. 3.03. He similarly asserts that 
this court cannot find an abuse of discretion because the record is insufficient 
to determine whether the district court's findings are 
unsupported.

 

 [¶10]         
Modification of visitation must be based upon evidence conspicuous in the 
record. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 899 P.2d 46, 48 (Wyo. 1995). Father is correct that 
where no transcript exists, we will not review allegations requiring an 
inspection of a transcript when an appellant fails to submit a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings to the court. See Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996). As previously indicated, however, we find the objections filed by 
Father and sustained by the court sufficiently revealing of the facts which 
support our ultimate conclusions. According to Father's statement of the 
proceedings as provided in his objections:

 

        
    [T]he Court did 
accept and look at exhibits, * * * considered the representations as to the 
testimony of the witnesses as 
expounded by the attorneys, and considered the record herein, including the 
Affidavit of the Appellant filed in 
support of her Motion.

 

 [¶11]         Parents 
are entitled to due process in custody and visitation matters, which includes 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924 P.2d 419, 422 (Wyo. 1996); cf. also In 
Interest of BLM, 902 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Wyo. 1995) (procedural due process is 
satisfied if a person is afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner). We have previously stated that 
notice given must provide a party with "a reasonable opportunity to know the 
claims of the opposing party and to meet them." White v. Board of Trustees of 
Western Wyoming Community College Dist., 648 P.2d 528, 535 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting 
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18, 58 S. Ct. 773, 776, 82 L. Ed. 1129 
(1938)). It is undisputed that neither Father nor Mother filed a petition for 
modification of visitation. The hearing was set to determine Mother's motion to 
enforce visitation. Neither party in this case could reasonably know the court 
would consider modifying visitation.

 

[¶12]           
Further, the court did not provide the parties with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard or to develop the evidentiary record. We have held 
that:

 

          
  One of the basic elements of 
due process is the right of each party to be apprised of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with 
the right to examine, explain or rebut such evidence.  And, the right to hear and controvert 
all evidence upon which a factual adjudication is to be made includes the right 
to hear and cross-examine witnesses.

 

In Interest of BLM, 902 P.2d  
at 1291 (quoting Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1965)). The district 
court in this case refused to hear testimony from witnesses, despite the fact 
that Mother, Child and Father were present to testify. Instead, the court 
determined that Mother would be allowed supervised visitation based primarily on 
a letter written  at Father's request  to Father from the child's counselor. 
Mother had no opportunity to 
cross-examine the counselor or in any other way rebut the evidence. The letter 
is also an inappropriate basis for the district court's decision because it 
impermissibly relies on hearsay in reaching the conclusions therein contained. 
The letter acknowledged that, in making the recommendation, the information 
on which the counselor relied was 
obtained from Father and "from what you [Father] and your lawyer have told me." 
The letter also contained the following specific caveat:

 

        
    To the reader of 
this letter, be it known that much of the information that has been provided to 
me, I have accepted at face value. 
[The child's] mother has not been seen by the undersigned.

 

Thus in making its decision, 
the district court failed to provide proper notice, prevented development of the 
record and inappropriately relied on hearsay to reach its 
conclusions.

 

CONCLUSION

 

 [¶13]         The 
district court abused its discretion in modifying Mother's visitation from 
reasonable to supervised visitation without affording a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard or otherwise providing for development of the evidentiary record. 
The lack of competent evidence on which the district court's decision may be 
based compels us to reverse. Wolfe, 899 P.2d  at 48. Because of our holding, it 
is unnecessary to address other issues raised.

 

[¶14]           
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.