Title: Thomas O'Troy Killings v. Enterprise Leasing Company, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 11/21/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070816
____________________
Thomas O'Troy Killings
v.
Enterprise Leasing Company, Inc.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-06-1654)
STUART, Justice.
After Thomas O'Troy Killings was injured in an automobile
accident in May 2004, he sued in the Mobile Circuit Court the
manufacturer of the van he was driving at the time of the
accident and various other entities that had performed
1070816
Killings 
filed 
a 
worker's compensation 
claim 
against 
CBIZ
1
that was settled in April 2006.  That claim is not involved in
this appeal.
2
maintenance on that van.  Enterprise Leasing Company, Inc.,
owned the van, and when it sold the wrecked van for scrap,
Killings added Enterprise Leasing as a defendant, claiming
that it had negligently allowed evidence crucial to his
pending action against the other defendants to be destroyed.
After the other defendants were dismissed from the case, the
trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Enterprise
Leasing, and Killings appealed.  We reverse and remand.
I.
On May 11, 2004, Killings was driving a 2001 Ford E-150
van on behalf of his employer, CBIZ Network Solutions, LLC,
when the van lost its right rear wheel while traveling
westbound on I-10 in Mobile.  The loss of the wheel caused to
van to leave the roadway, and, in the ensuing accident,
Killings suffered injuries including a broken clavicle and a
broken thumb.  
1
Following the accident, the wrecked van, which CBIZ had
been leasing from Enterprise Leasing, was taken to Duke's
Garage in Mobile.  Several days later, Enterprise Leasing had
1070816
3
the van moved to Cockrell's Body Shop in Theodore.  On June
21, 2004, Shane Lucado, an attorney retained by Killings,
telephoned Enterprise Leasing to request that the van be
preserved for investigative purposes.  A follow-up letter sent
by Lucado to Enterprise Leasing the next day memorialized that
conversation, stating:
"Thank you for taking the time to speak with me
yesterday.  As you are aware, the vehicle in which
Mr. Killings was riding in at the time of his
injuries is very important to our investigation.
Therefore, 
as 
I 
stated 
to 
you 
during 
our
conversation, I would like to inspect the vehicle on
July 2, 2004.
"Additionally, let me take this opportunity to
cover the things I need to cover with regard to the
vehicle.  I ask that you please do not change,
modify, discard, destroy, alter, sell, or remove
this vehicle from Cockrell's Body Shop without first
giving me notice of [your] intentions.  If it
becomes necessary for you to change, modify,
destroy, or alter the vehicle in any way, please
notify 
me 
immediately 
so 
that 
I 
can 
make
arrangements to preserve the evidence needed in my
investigation.  If the subject vehicle is changed in
any manner which compromises the integrity of my
investigation, you may be liable for negligent
spoliation of evidence under Alabama law.  See Brown
Electro 
Mechanical 
Systems, 
Inc. 
v. 
Thompson
Engineering, et al., [848 So. 2d 238] (Ala. 2002)."
Subsequently, on July 2, 2004, Lucado and A.E. Carden, a
mechanical engineer he had hired, visited Cockrell's Body Shop
to inspect the van.  On July 16, 2004, Lucado sent Enterprise
1070816
4
Leasing the following letter, notifying it that further
testing would likely be needed and again requesting that the
van be preserved:
"Please be advised that we need to perform
destructive testing on the van Mr. Killings was
driving at the time of his accident on May 11, 2004.
This testing may take several months to conduct.  As
such, we need to keep the van in its present
condition.  We ask that Enterprise Leasing not
change, modify, discard, destroy, alter, sell, or
remove this vehicle from Cockrell's Body Shop
without first giving me notice of its intentions.
If it becomes necessary for Enterprise Leasing to
change, modify, destroy, or alter the vehicle in any
way, please notify me immediately so that I can make
arrangements to preserve the evidence needed in my
investigation.  If the subject vehicle is changed in
any manner which compromises the integrity of my
investigation, you may be liable for negligent
spoliation of evidence under Alabama law.  See Brown
Electro 
Mechanical 
Systems, 
Inc. 
v. 
Thompson
Engineering, et al., [848 So. 2d 238] (Ala. 2002).
"Should you have any questions, please feel free
to contact me."
Shortly thereafter, Lucado spoke with Jason Leone, a claims
representative from Cambridge Integrated Services, which was
representing Enterprise Leasing in connection with the
accident.  In an affidavit, Lucado recalled that conversation
as follows:
"Mr. Leone said that he would like to have the
van inspected.  I told Mr. Leone that it would be
1070816
5
fine to inspect the van, but that no destructive
testing could be done.  Mr. Leone assured me that no
destructive testing would be done and that the van
would not be moved without first letting us know.
During the conversation, I explained that we were
investigating the cause of the axle breaking, that
we 
had 
inspected 
the 
van 
and 
that 
we 
were
investigating to determine whether there was a
manufacturing defect in the wheel bearing or whether
the van was improperly maintained or serviced.  I
told Mr. Leone that it could take several years
before 
doing 
destructive 
testing 
because 
any
potential defendants would have to be identified
before that testing could occur.  I asked Mr. Leone
what Enterprise's role was in the maintenance and
service of the vehicle and explained that Enterprise
did not seem to be a target as a defendant.  During
the conversation, Mr. Leone assured me that the van
would stay right where it was and would not be moved
without calling first and indicated that there would
be no problem leaving the van at Cockrell's.  I then
received a letter from Mr. Leone indicating that an
engineer would be inspecting the van in early August
2004."
On May 10, 2006, Killings sued Ford Motor Company (the
manufacturer of the van), Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., d/b/a
Treadwell Ford (a Ford dealership that had performed
maintenance on the van), Firestone Tire & Service Center (an
automobile-repair shop that had also performed maintenance on
the van), BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC (the
corporate parent of Firestone Tire & Service Center),
Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. (the corporate parent of
BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC), and various other
1070816
6
fictitiously named parties in the Mobile Circuit Court.
Killings's lawsuit included a product-liability claim made
pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine ("AEMLD"), a breach-of-warranty claim, and various
negligence and wantonness claims.  The discovery process
ensued, during which the trial court issued protective orders
at the request of both Ford and the Firestone defendants
prohibiting the parties, their representatives, or any other
persons from disposing of or materially altering the subject
van.  Nevertheless, on November 27, 2006, Enterprise Leasing,
apparently unaware of those protective orders and without
giving notice to any of the parties, had the van transferred
to Manheim Auto Auction in Mississippi where it was sold for
scrap and subsequently destroyed.  On approximately December
6, 2006, the parties discovered that the van had been moved
and destroyed.
On March 16, 2007, Killings amended his complaint to
include third-party spoliation claims against Enterprise
Leasing and Cockrell's Body Shop.  The original defendants
then all moved to dismiss the claims against them and, on
March 23, 2007, Killings agreed to dismiss its claims against
1070816
A transcript of the January 11, 2008, hearing is not in
2
the record; however, Killings states in his appellate brief
that, at that hearing, the trial court denied both his motion
to continue and Enterprise Leasing's motion to strike. 
7
all the original defendants except Ford.  On June 15, 2007, a
hearing was held, after which the trial court dismissed the
claims against Ford and Cockrell's Body Shop, leaving only the
spoliation claim against Enterprise Leasing to be resolved. 
On December 28, 2007, Enterprise Leasing moved for a
summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to preserve the
van, especially for a period exceeding two and a half years,
that it had no knowledge that there was pending litigation
involving the van, and that the van was not vital to
Killings's case.  The trial court scheduled a hearing on the
motion for January 11, 2008.  On January 9, 2008, Killings
filed his response to Enterprise Leasing's motion and moved
the trial court to continue the scheduled hearing.  On January
11, 2008, Enterprise Leasing moved the trial court to strike
Killings's response.  The January 11, 2008, hearing was
ultimately held as scheduled, and, at its conclusion, the
trial court entered an order granting Enterprise Leasing's
motion for a summary judgment without stating its rationale.2
1070816
Enterprise Leasing served its summary-judgment motion on
3
December 28, 2007.  When, as required by Rule 6(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P., Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays (here, New
Year's Day) are excluded, the January 11, 2008, hearing was
held only nine days after the filing of the motion.
8
On February 10, 2008, Killings filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment, arguing that the
trial court had erred both by entering a summary judgment in
favor of Enterprise Leasing and by failing to continue the
hearing 
on 
Enterprise 
Leasing's 
summary-judgment 
motion 
either
on the basis of Rule 56(c)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., which requires
a hearing on a summary-judgment motion to be held at least 10
days after that motion is served, or pursuant to Rule 56(f),
Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides for a continuance so that the
opposing party can obtain additional evidence.   On March 11,
3
2008, the trial court denied Killings's motion, and, on March
14, 2008, Killings filed his notice of appeal to this Court.
II.
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
1070816
Enterprise 
Leasing 
argues that this Court 
should 
overrule
4
Smith and join the majority of states that do not recognize
third-party spoliation claims.  In support of its argument, it
notes that a California case relied upon by the Smith Court,
Johnson v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 67 Cal. App. 4th
626,  79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234 (1998), was subsequently overruled.
However, as evidenced by Justice See's dissenting opinion in
Smith, this Court was already aware at the time Smith was
decided that California no longer recognized the tort of
spoliation of evidence either by a party or by a third party.
See Smith, 771 So. 2d at 440 (See, J., dissenting) ("Several
years after a California District Court of Appeal, in Smith v.
Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1984), had become the first court to recognize the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence by a third party, the
9
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.  Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39
(Ala. 2004).  
III.
In Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000),
this Court recognized that general principles of negligence
law afford an Alabama plaintiff a remedy when evidence crucial
to that plaintiff's case is lost or destroyed through the acts
of a third party.   We further explained how a claim of
4
1070816
Supreme 
Court 
of 
California 
joined 
the 
majority 
of
jurisdictions and held that California does not recognize the
tort of spoliation of evidence either by a party or by a third
party.  See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.
4th 1, 954 P.2d 511, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (1998); Temple
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 464, 976 P.2d
223, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (1999).").  We decline to reconsider
Smith at this time.
10
spoliation of evidence against a third party fit within the
negligence framework:
"As in all negligence actions, the plaintiff in
a third-party spoliation case must show a duty to a
foreseeable plaintiff, a breach of that duty,
proximate causation, and damage.  Crowne Invs., Inc.
v. Bryant, 638 So. 2d 873, 878 (Ala. 1994).  We
announce today a three-part test for determining
when a third party can be held liable for negligent
spoliation of evidence.  In addition to proving a
duty, a breach, proximate cause, and damage, the
plaintiff in a third-party spoliation case must also
show:  (1) that the defendant spoliator had actual
knowledge of pending or potential litigation; (2)
that a duty was imposed upon the defendant through
a voluntary undertaking, an agreement, or a specific
request; and (3) that the missing evidence was vital
to the plaintiff's pending or potential action.
Once all three of these elements are established,
there arises a rebuttable presumption that but for
the fact of the spoliation of evidence the plaintiff
would have recovered in the pending or potential
litigation; 
the 
defendant 
must 
overcome 
that
rebuttable presumption or else be liable for
damages."
Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432-33.  
The trial court did not state for the record its
rationale for entering a summary judgment in favor of
1070816
11
Enterprise Leasing; however, in its motion for a summary
judgment, Enterprise Leasing argued that Killings's third-
party spoliation claim failed all three additional prongs of
the Smith test.  In their briefs to this Court, both parties
primarily focus on whether Enterprise Leasing had a duty to
preserve the wrecked van, but they nevertheless address all
three prongs of the Smith test.  Accordingly, we will consider
all three prongs in turn.
In regard to whether it had actual knowledge of
litigation involving the wrecked van, Enterprise Leasing does
not, on appeal, deny that it had knowledge of the action filed
by Killings; rather, it argues that Killings failed to present
substantial evidence of that fact.  Specifically, Enterprise
Leasing argues that Killings submitted no evidence in
opposition to its motion for a summary judgment indicating
that Enterprise Leasing was ever informed that an action
involving the wrecked van had been filed at any time during
the approximately two-and-one-half-year period between the
date of the accident and the date the wrecked van was sold.
However, Enterprise Leasing overlooks the fact that Alabama
law requires only that the accused spoliator have "actual
1070816
Enterprise Leasing was apparently also served with a
5
subpoena by BFS Retail and Commercial Operations in October
2006, approximately a month before it sold the wrecked van.
However, Killings failed to introduce evidence of that
subpoena into the record until after the trial court had held
a hearing and had ruled on Enterprise Leasing's summary-
judgment motion.  This evidence is partially the reason for
Killings's argument on appeal that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing.
However, because it is undisputed that Enterprise Leasing had
actual knowledge of potential litigation involving the wrecked
van, which is all the law requires, it is ultimately
irrelevant whether it had knowledge that litigation was
actually pending as well.  Under these circumstances, the
assertion made by Justice Murdock in his dissent that
Enterprise Leasing had "no notice that a lawsuit had ever been
filed" is, at the least, misleading.
12
knowledge of pending or potential litigation."  Smith, 771 So.
2d at 432 (emphasis added).  Even if we accept that Enterprise
Leasing had no actual knowledge of Killings's action, it is
undisputed that Enterprise Leasing had actual knowledge that
there was the potential for litigation involving the wrecked
van; the two letters Lucado sent to Enterprise Leasing in June
and July 2004 are conclusive evidence of that fact.5
Moreover, although Enterprise Leasing highlights the lack of
communication by Killings after the period immediately
following 
the 
accident, 
Killings 
submitted 
evidence 
indicating
that Enterprise Leasing was apprised early on that the process
might take "several years."  See affidavit of Shane Lucado,
1070816
13
quoted supra.  Thus, Killings has established, at the very
least, that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this
point.
We next turn to whether Enterprise Leasing had a duty to
preserve the wrecked van.  In Smith, we recognized that a
third party has no general duty to preserve evidence; however,
we recognized that such a duty may arise if:  1) the third
party voluntarily assumes the duty to preserve evidence; 2)
the third party agrees with the plaintiff that it will
preserve the evidence; or 3) the plaintiff makes a specific
request to the third party to preserve the evidence.  771 So.
2d at 433.   In the present case, Killings argues that a duty
was established in both of the latter two ways –– Enterprise
Leasing agreed with Killings that it would preserve the
wrecked van and Killings made a specific request to Enterprise
Leasing to do so.  
In an affidavit filed in response to Enterprise Leasing's
summary-judgment motion, Killings's attorney, Shane Lucado,
swore that, during a conversation with Enterprise Leasing's
claims representative, "[the representative] assured me that
the van would stay right where it was and would not be moved
1070816
14
without calling first."  Additionally, two letters sent to
Enterprise Leasing by Killings's attorney also requested that
the wrecked van be preserved and stated that "[i]f it becomes
necessary for Enterprise Leasing to change, modify, destroy,
or alter the vehicle in any way, please notify me immediately
so that I can make arrangements to preserve the evidence
needed in my investigation."
Enterprise Leasing argues that Killings's request to
preserve the wrecked van was insufficient to create a duty
because the request was not accompanied by an offer to pay the
cost or otherwise bear the burden of preservation.  See Smith,
771 So. 2d at 433 ("'The specific request to preserve must be
accompanied by an offer to pay the cost or otherwise bear the
burden of preserving.  We do not think a tort duty to preserve
should be created simply by someone specifically requesting a
third party to preserve something.'" (quoting Johnson v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 67 Cal. App. 4th 626, 638, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 234, 241 (1998))).  Killings responds that his
attorney did offer to bear the burden of preservation when he
stated that he would "make arrangements to preserve the
evidence needed in [his] investigation" if it became necessary
1070816
Chief Justice Cobb and Justice Murdock, in their
6
dissents, emphasize that Enterprise Leasing had no duty to
preserve the wrecked van because Killings never offered to pay
it to do so.  However, this Court made it clear in Smith that
the duty to preserve evidence can be imposed even in the
absence of such an offer if a defendant voluntarily undertakes
to do so or agrees with the plaintiff that it will do so.  See
Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432 (stating that the duty to preserve
evidence can be "imposed upon the defendant through a
voluntary undertaking, an agreement, or a specific request"
(emphasis added)).  Because Enterprise Leasing voluntarily
agreed to preserve the wrecked van, it took upon itself the
duty to do so, and Killings's failure to offer to pay the
associated storage costs is wholly irrelevant.
15
"for Enterprise Leasing to change, modify, destroy, or alter
the vehicle in any way."  However, it is ultimately
unnecessary for us to determine whether Killings's request is
viewed as including an offer to bear the burden of
preservation because Enterprise Leasing has not refuted the
other evidence put forth by Killings indicating that it agreed
to preserve the wrecked van.  By making that agreement,
Enterprise Leasing assumed the duty of preserving the van.  
6
Once Enterprise Leasing assumed that duty, it is
ultimately of no import that approximately two and a half
years passed between the date of the accident and the date the
van was sold.  Enterprise Leasing emphasizes this fact
throughout its brief to this Court, arguing that it had no
contact from Killings throughout most of that period and that
1070816
Killings argues that Enterprise Leasing's complaints
7
about the burden associated with preserving the wrecked van
are disingenuous and has submitted an affidavit from the
manager of Cockrell's Body Shop indicating that the wrecked
16
it is too onerous a burden for one to reasonably expect a
third party to preserve evidence for that length of time.
However, as discussed above, the evidence indicates that
Enterprise Leasing was apprised early on that the process
might take "several years" and that Enterprise Leasing
nevertheless agreed that "the van would stay right where it
was and would not be moved without calling first."  
Moreover, 
Enterprise 
Leasing 
initially 
had 
no
responsibility or duty whatsoever to preserve the wrecked van
after the accident.  See Smith, 771 So. 2d at 433 ("If the
third party does not wish to take responsibility for evidence,
it can decline the responsibility, shifting the risk of loss
back to the plaintiff.").  As a corollary to that principle,
Enterprise Leasing could have rid itself of that duty even
once it had assumed it by notifying Killings that it wished to
do so.  It could not, however, unilaterally decide to shed
itself of that assumed duty without even attempting to provide
any notice to Killings, regardless of the length of time or
the burden involved.  
7
1070816
van was being stored at not cost to Enterprise Leasing.
17
Last, we consider whether the missing evidence was vital
to Killings's underlying action.  Among the evidentiary
material accompanying Killings's response to Enterprise
Leasing's motion for a summary judgment was an affidavit from
A.E. Carden, the mechanical engineer who examined the wrecked
van with Killings's attorney in July 2004.  In that affidavit,
Carden stated:
"I was retained by M. Shane Lucado, attorney for
Thomas Killings for the purpose of determining the
cause of Mr. Killings accident that occurred in
Mobile on May 11, 2004.  On July 2, 2004, I met Mr.
Lucado at the Cockrell Body Shop [sic] in Theodore,
Alabama, for the purpose of inspecting the vehicle
involved 
in 
this 
accident, 
a 
Ford 
van, 
VIN
1FTRE14W01HB71346, Alabama License Plate 2B6705L.
Among other things, I visually inspected the
portions of the rear axle that [were] readily
visible, took several photographs, and samples.  I
also read the accident report.  Mr. Lucado had the
wheel-tire which had separated from the vehicle.  I
subsequently prepared a preliminary reported for Mr.
Lucado (see copy attached).  I am of the opinion
that this accident resulted from a major failure of
the right rear axle of the van, which caused the
right rear tire and wheel to separate from the
vehicle, resulting in loss of control and caused the
vehicle to roll over.  The cause of this failure
(whether 
by 
improper 
or 
defective 
design,
manufacture or maintenance) could only be determined
by further testing which never occurred because the
vehicle was disposed of."
1070816
18
(Emphasis added.)  Enterprise Leasing argues that, because
Killings removed and presumably retains possession of the
right rear wheel, tire, and brake assembly of the wrecked van,
he could have continued to pursue his underlying claims;
therefore, it concludes, the van itself was not vital to
Killings's action.  However, Enterprise Leasing has not
supported this argument with any evidence nor has it in any
way responded to Carden's affidavit stating the contrary.
Killings has therefore established the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact in regard to whether the missing
evidence was vital to Killings's underlying action.
IV.
Enterprise Leasing moved for a summary judgment on
Killings's third-party spoliation claim against it, arguing
that it had no knowledge of litigation involving the wrecked
van, that it had no duty to preserve the wrecked van, and that
the wrecked van was not vital to Killings's underlying claims.
Enterprise Leasing could have shown that it was entitled to a
summary judgment by establishing that there was no genuine
issue of material fact in regard to any of those three
arguments; however, it failed to do so.  Killings put forth
1070816
19
evidence establishing at least a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to each argument; therefore, the summary
judgment was erroneous.  It is hereby reversed and the case
remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and See and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
1070816
20
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The record in this case shows that it is undisputed that
no one on Thomas O'Troy Killings's behalf, including his
attorney, ever offered to pay Enterprise Leasing Company,
Inc., to store the van in such a way as to preserve it.  Nor
was Enterprise Leasing kept informed as to whether litigation
involving the van was ever filed or the status of the
investigation, for over two years after Killings's initial
inspection of the van.  This Court has held:
"'The 
specific 
request 
to 
preserve 
must 
be
accompanied by an offer to pay the cost or otherwise
bear the burden of preserving. We do not think a
tort duty to preserve should be created simply by
someone specifically requesting a third party to
preserve 
something. 
Preservation 
may 
entail
significant burdens.'"
Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000)(quoting
Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 67 Cal. App. 4th 626,
627, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 241 (1998)).  Moreover, Killings's
communications 
to 
Enterprise 
Leasing 
concerning 
the 
likelihood
of the need for the evidence in question -- the van -- implied
that that need would be outstanding for a period of months
rather than  two and one-half years.  I believe that this
summary judgment is due to be affirmed because Killings cannot
1070816
21
show that Enterprise Leasing had a "duty," as defined in
Smith, to preserve the evidence in question.  Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
1070816
22
SEE, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Smith
v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000) (See, J.,
dissenting). 
1070816
23
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
As a preliminary matter, I note that a duty cannot be
imposed upon Enterprise Leasing Company, Inc., on the basis of
the request made by Thomas O'Troy Killings unless that request
was "'"accompanied by an offer to pay the cost or otherwise
bear the burden of preserving [the evidence]."'"  ___ So. 2d
at ___ (Cobb, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Atkinson,
771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Johnson v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 67 Cal. App. 4th 626, 627, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 234, 241 (1998)).  In two letters written in the
summer of 2004, Killings's attorney requested that Enterprise
Leasing notify Killings before taking any action "to change,
modify, destroy, or alter the vehicle in any way" in order
that he could make arrangements to preserve any needed
evidence in such an event.  I see nothing in these requests,
or in any other communication made on behalf of Killings, in
the way of an offer to pay the expenses of storage, either
before or after Enterprise Leasing might find it necessary to
"to change, modify, destroy, or alter" the vehicle.
1070816
24
More generally, it is my view that the extended duration
of the period between the last communication between the
parties in the summer of 2004 and the eventual removal of the
van from storage in late November 2006 -- a period of
approximately two and one-half years -- together with the lack
of any communication from Killings or his attorney during this
extended period, is inconsistent with the continued imposition
of a duty upon Enterprise Leasing.
In June 2004, shortly after the accident, Killings's
attorney wrote the first of two letters to Enterprise Leasing.
This first letter makes no mention of any time frame during
which Enterprise Leasing was being requested not to remove the
vehicle from Cockrell's Body Shop.  The second of the two
letters, sent on July 16, 2004, stated only that any testing
that might be needed "may take several months to conduct."  
According 
to 
an 
affidavit 
executed 
by 
Killings's
attorney, he had a conversation with a representative of
Enterprise Leasing shortly after he wrote the July 16, 2004,
letter, in which that representative assured the attorney that
"the van would not be moved without first letting us know."
Later in the same affidavit, the attorney also recalled that,
1070816
The main opinion makes mention of a subpoena supposedly
8
received by Enterprise Leasing in October 2006 and contends
that, "[u]nder these circumstances, the assertion made by
Justice Murdock in his dissent that Enterprise Leasing had 'no
notice that a lawsuit had ever been filed' is, at the least,
misleading." __ So. 2d at __ n.5.  The only factual
25
during that same conversation, he told the representative of
Enterprise Leasing "that it could take several years before
doing destructive testing because any potential defendants
would have to be identified before that testing could occur."
Despite this conversation, the fact remains that Killings did
not file an action against Ford Motor Company or any other
defendant in relation to his accident until May 10, 2006,
almost two years after the last communication with Enterprise
Leasing.  In addition, another six months passed before
Enterprise Leasing had the van transferred to an automobile
auction in Mississippi on November 27, 2006.  During the
approximately two and one-half years following the last
communication between Killings's attorney and Enterprise
Leasing, Killings did not communicate with Enterprise Leasing.
Among other things, Killings did not inform Enterprise Leasing
that a lawsuit finally had been filed, nor did he notify
Enterprise Leasing of the protective orders entered by the
court in that lawsuit.8
1070816
"circumstances" the trial court could properly consider,
however, were those presented to it at the time it held a
hearing and issued a ruling on Enterprise Leasing's summary-
judgment motion.  Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. Edwards Chevrolet,
Inc., 850 So. 2d 259, 265 (Ala. 2002) (noting that on a motion
for a summary judgment "'the trial court can consider only the
material which is before it at the time of submission of the
motion'" (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Coleman,
428 So. 2d 593, 598 (Ala. 1983))).  In evaluating a summary
judgment, this Court is limited to the same evidence that was
presented to the trial court before its ruling on the summary-
judgment motion.  See, e.g., Cleveland v. Central Bank of the
South, 574 So. 2d 741, 743 (Ala. 1990) (stating that this
Court "must review only those matters that were before the
trial court when it made its decision").  Neither the content
of any subpoena that might have been served upon Enterprise
Leasing in October 2006 nor any evidence that Enterprise
Leasing was even served with a subpoena was before the trial
court at the time of its ruling on Enterprise Leasing's
summary-judgment motion.  Concomitantly, neither the content
of any subpoena nor any evidence as to whether any subpoena
was actually served on Enterprise Leasing is part of the
record this Court may properly consider on appeal.
26
Given the particular circumstances of this case --
including Killings's failure ever to offer to pay the expense
of storing the van, the particularly long delay of almost two
and one-half years between the last communication from
Killings's attorney and the eventual removal of the van from
storage by Enterprise Leasing, the failure of Killings to
maintain any communication with Enterprise Leasing during this
time and, in particular, the failure of Killings to apprise
Enterprise Leasing of the fact that Killings had, in fact,
1070816
27
finally proceeded with a lawsuit -- I believe the trial court
correctly concluded that Enterprise Leasing acted reasonably
and that it was not under a duty to continue storing the van
at the time it eventually decided to remove the van to
Mississippi, where it was sold as scrap and destroyed. 
Although Killings's attorney did make a specific request
to Enterprise Leasing to preserve the van and Enterprise
Leasing, through its representative, did represent that it
would leave the van in its present location for an unspecified
period, I cannot conclude that any duty arising from these
facts should persist after an almost two-and-one-half-year
period during which Enterprise Leasing received no further
communications from Killings or his attorney and no notice
that a lawsuit had ever been filed.  In this context, I
particularly disagree with the statement in the main opinion
that a third party, such as Enterprise Leasing, should, under
circumstances such as those presented here, continue to have
a duty to preserve evidence "regardless of the length of time
or the burden involved." __ So. 2d at __.  A majority of
states other than Alabama do not extend a cause of action
against third parties for spoliation of evidence under any
1070816
28
circumstances, see ___ So. 2d at ___ n.4, much less
circumstances of the nature presented here.
Having said the foregoing (which is predicated on the
viability of the cause of action recognized in Smith v.
Atkinson), I would add that I am concerned, as is Justice See,
that the benefits of the cause of action recognized by the
Court in Smith "are outweighed by the burden to litigants,
witnesses, and the judicial system that would be imposed by
potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss."
Smith, 771 So. 2d at 441 (See, J., dissenting) (quoting
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 464, 478,
976 P.2d 223, 233, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 862 (1999)).  In my
opinion, this concern is validated by the fact that this cause
of action is to be applied to the circumstances presented in
a case such as this one.