Title: Belmont Cty. Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Belmont Cty. Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 104 Ohio 
St.3d 568, 2004-Ohio-7106.] 
 
 
BELMONT COUNTY SHERIFF, APPELLEE, v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, 
OHIO LABOR COUNCIL, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Belmont Cty. Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, 
Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 568, 2004-Ohio-7106.] 
Collective bargaining—Arbitration—Issue of arbitrability to be determined by 
arbitrator if agreement unmistakenly gives arbitrator that authority. 
(No. 2003-1947 — Submitted September 14, 2004 — Decided December 30, 
2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County, No. 03 BE 8, 2003-Ohio-
5154. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Where the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement have clearly and 
unmistakably vested the arbitrator with the authority to decide the issue of 
arbitrability, the question of whether a matter is arbitrable is to be decided 
by the arbitrator. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue presented for our review in this appeal concerns the 
scope of the authority of an arbitrator to determine whether or not a grievance is 
arbitrable.  After careful review of the facts as contained in the record presented 
to us and a review of applicable law, we have concluded that where the parties to 
a collective-bargaining agreement have clearly and unmistakably vested the 
arbitrator with the authority to decide the issue of arbitrability, the question of 
whether a matter is arbitrable is to be decided by the arbitrator. 
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{¶ 2} The facts of this case are generally not disputed and arise from the 
provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement that became effective November 
11, 1999, between the Fraternal Order of Police and the Sheriff of Belmont 
County.  Pursuant to that agreement, members of the Fraternal Order of Police 
filed a grievance alleging that the sheriff had failed to make required contributions 
to the Public Employees Retirement System on behalf of employees hired before 
April 1999 and asking that the sheriff make contributions for all service from their 
original hire dates. 
{¶ 3} Following denial of that grievance, the Fraternal Order of Police 
filed for arbitration, which the sheriff opposed with a motion to dismiss, 
contending that the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement precluded the 
arbitrator from entertaining the matter.  According to the arbitrator’s opinion, the 
sheriff relied on the following provision of the agreement:  
{¶ 4} “The arbitrator shall be without authority to recommend any right 
or relief on an alleged grievance occurring at any time other than the contract 
period in which such right originated or to make any award based on rights arising 
under any previous Agreement.” 
{¶ 5} The Fraternal Order of Police argued that its claim involved a 
continuing violation affecting long-term retirement benefits for those involved. 
{¶ 6} The merits of that conflict are not before us in this appeal because 
the arbitrator held any ruling on the merits of that controversy in abeyance 
pending her consideration of the issue of arbitrability as stipulated by the parties: 
“Is the grievance arbitrable?” 
{¶ 7} The arbitrator made an “interim award,” deciding only that the 
grievance could be arbitrated and that the sheriff’s motion to dismiss should be 
denied. 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶ 8} The common pleas court granted the sheriff’s application to vacate 
the arbitrator’s award, and upon review, the court of appeals affirmed that 
determination. 
{¶ 9} We granted discretionary review and concern ourselves with the 
authority of the arbitrator to decide the issue of arbitrability in accordance with 
the terms contained in a collective-bargaining agreement.  The Fraternal Order of 
Police argues that the common pleas court improperly vacated the arbitrator’s 
determination of arbitrability, since the collective-bargaining agreement granted 
the arbitrator the right to decide that issue. 
{¶ 10} In First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan (1995), 514 U.S. 938, 
943,115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985, the court stated: 
{¶ 11} “Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, see, e.g., Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., ante [(1995), 514 U.S. 52] at 57 [115 S.Ct. 1212, 
131 L.Ed.2d 76] ; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 626 [105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444] (1985), so the question ‘who has 
the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed 
about that matter.  Did the parties agree to submit the arbitrability question itself 
to arbitration?  If so, then the court’s standard for reviewing the arbitrator’s 
decision about that matter should not differ from the standard courts apply when 
they review any other matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate.  See AT & T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers [of Am.], 475 U.S. 643, 649 [106 
S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648] (1986) (parties may agree to arbitrate arbitrability)* 
* *.” (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 12} Further, in Council of Smaller Enterprises v. Gates, McDonald & 
Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 661, 687 N.E.2d 1352, we cited AT & T Technologies, 
Inc., v. Communications Workers of Am. (1986), 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 
L.Ed.2d 648, in which the United States Supreme Court summarized four 
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principles delineating a court’s role in reviewing arbitration.  Of particular interest 
is principle two:  
{¶ 13} “The second principle is that ‘the question of arbitrability — 
whether a[n] * * * agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the 
particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless 
the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.’ 
Id. [AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. (1986)], 475 
U.S. [643] at 649, 106 S.Ct. [1415] at 1418, 89 L.Ed.2d [648] at 655. ” (Emphasis 
added.)  Council of Smaller Enterprises, 80 Ohio St.3d at 666, 687 N.E.2d 1352. 
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we next examine the provisions of the collective-
bargaining agreement to determine the extent of agreement or lack thereof on the 
issue of arbitrability.  Article 7, Section 3, states: 
{¶ 15} “The question of arbitrability of a grievance may be raised by 
either party before the arbitration hearing of the grievance, on the grounds that the 
matter is non-arbitrable or beyond the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.  The first question 
to be placed before the arbitrator will be whether or not the alleged grievance is 
arbitrable.  If the arbitrator determines the grievance is within the purview of 
arbitrability, the alleged grievance will be heard on its merits before the same 
arbitrator.” (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 16} In this instance, then, the collective-bargaining agreement clearly 
and unmistakably places the question of arbitrability before the arbitrator for 
determination.  Hence, there can be no dispute with regard to what authority the 
parties have granted the arbitrator. 
{¶ 17} Finally, we note that in Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor 
Council, Inc.  v. Umpleby (Feb. 12, 1996), 5th Dist. No. 1995 CA 00196, 1996 
WL 74031, the court examined an identical  collective-bargaining provision and 
concluded that the trial court erred by vacating the arbitrator’s determination of 
January Term, 2004 
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arbitrability because the collective-bargaining agreement granted the arbitrator the 
power to make that decision. 
{¶ 18} In this case, we have concluded that Article 7 of the collective-
bargaining agreement empowers the arbitrator to determine the issue of 
arbitrability because the parties have clearly and unmistakably provided for the 
arbitrator to hear that matter.  Where the parties to a collective-bargaining 
agreement have clearly and unmistakably vested the arbitrator with the authority 
to decide the issue of arbitrability, the question of whether a matter is arbitrable is 
to be decided by the arbitrator.  Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
hereby reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance 
with this decision. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
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Paul L. Cox, Douglas J. Behringer and Gwen Callender, for appellant. 
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