Title: State v. Johnson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 30, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff on Review,
v.
MARTIN ALLEN JOHNSON,
Defendant on Review.
(CC C011654CR, C990528CR; SC S48826)
On automatic and direct review of the sentence of death
imposed by the Washington County Circuit Court.
Michael J. McElligott, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 8, 2005.
Eric Johansen, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant on review.  With him
on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson,* Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
GILLETTE, J.
The judgments of conviction and the sentence of death are
affirmed. 
*Chief Justice when case was argued.
**Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
GILLETTE, J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct review
of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence of death. 
Defendant raises numerous assignments of error, none of which are
well taken.  We therefore affirm the judgments of conviction and
the sentence of death.
The case began at 6:30 a.m. on February 24, 1998, when
a young woman's body was discovered in the surf on a beach near
Warrenton.  Within a few days, the Clatsop County Sheriff's
Office positively identified the body as that of Heather Fraser,
a Portland-area teenager.  In the meantime, a forensic
pathologist examined the body and concluded that Fraser had died
by strangulation.  
An investigator (1) interviewed Fraser's family and
friends and learned that Fraser had left her Washington County
home around 2:30 a.m. on February 23, 1998, ostensibly to go to
the home of her friend "Marty" to play on his computer.  No one
in the Fraser home knew much about "Marty," but investigators
found a telephone number for a "Marty" in Fraser's bedroom.  That
telephone number belonged to defendant, whose first name is
"Martin."  Investigators also interviewed Fraser's friend, Tate,
who had met "Marty."  Tate told them that "Marty" was an "older
guy" who always was "hitting on" Fraser and who sometimes
provided Fraser with alcohol and drugs. 
Investigating officers focused on defendant.  They
learned, among other things, that defendant was on probation for
federal drug crimes, that he drove a black Acura with distinctive
vanity plates, and that, at 1:54 a.m. on February 24, 1998, a
police officer had stopped him as he drove south on Highway 30, a
principal road between the Warrenton area and the Portland area
(where defendant lived).  
Investigators sought and obtained warrants to search
defendant's home and car and to obtain DNA samples from his
person.  When the police executed those warrants on February 28,
1998, they took defendant to the local sheriff's office and
attempted to interview him.  Defendant cut the interview short
and asked to go home.  The police did take him home and, after
completing the search of defendant's home, left.  The next
afternoon, the police learned that defendant had absconded with
his brother's car and credit cards and that his whereabouts were
unknown.  Defendant remained missing until police arrested him in
Florida approximately one year later. 
In the meantime, the Fraser murder investigation
continued.  Forensics technicians matched a bloodstain on the
hatchback of defendant's black Acura to Fraser's DNA.
Investigators also obtained evidence that defendant habitually
preyed on underage girls, taking them to nightclubs, providing
them with alcohol and drugs, engaging them in consensual sexual
relations when possible and, most significantly, sexually abusing
them while they were rendered unconscious by drugs that he had
provided to them.  Finally, they learned that Fraser had a
significant amount of morphine in her system when she died and
that her vaginal cavity contained semen whose DNA matched
defendant's DNA.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, a Washington
County grand jury issued an indictment on March 11, 1999,
charging defendant with six counts of aggravated murder.  On June
15, 2001, a grand jury issued a new indictment charging defendant
with eleven counts of aggravated murder.  The case came to trial. 
At the close of the evidence,  the trial court granted
defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to
three of the charges.  The jury convicted defendant of the
remaining eight aggravated murder counts and voted to impose the
death penalty.  After the trial court entered judgment, defendant
filed the present direct appeal, raising 35 assignments of error
in an initial brief and 13 assignments of error in a supplemental
pro se brief.  As we shall explain, we have considered each of
those claims of error and reject them all.
For convenience, we have divided defendant's
assignments of error by topic and have confined our analytical
statements to those assignments of error under each topic that
merit discussion.  
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUES   
A. Background
Defendant's first ten assignments of error pertain to
the trial court's denial of various motions to suppress evidence
that the police obtained pursuant to a series of search warrants. 
Eight of those assignments pertain to motions that the trial
court refused to hear on timeliness grounds.  Defendant offers no
argument to this court that the trial court erred in refusing to
hear the motions and, on this record, that decision appears to
have been well within the trial court's discretion.  We conclude
that the trial court's denials of the eight motions to suppress
are not properly before this court.
We turn to the two suppression motions that were timely
filed and whose merits the trial court did consider.  The factual
background relevant to those motions is as follows.  On February
28, 1998, an investigator executed an affidavit requesting
warrants to search a specified black Acura automobile and a
specified Washington County address for evidence of various
crimes, including murder.  In the affidavit, the officer
described the discovery of Fraser's body; the conclusion of a
forensic pathologist that she had been strangled; reports from
Fraser's mother and other members of the Fraser household of
Fraser's intent to go to "Marty's" to "play on his computer"; a
report that "Marty" had called the Fraser home shortly before
Fraser left on the morning of February 23, 1998; a report by
Fraser's friend, Tate, that "Marty" was an "older guy" who was
always "hitting on" Fraser and who may have raped or sexually
abused Fraser when Fraser was knocked out on drugs that "Marty"
had provided; the discovery of a cellular telephone number for
"Marty" in Fraser's bedroom; the fact that the telephone number
had been traced to defendant; the fact that at least 40 telephone
calls had been placed to Fraser's home from defendant's telephone
in the previous three months; the fact that defendant was on
probation for federal drug offenses; the fact that defendant had
been stopped in his black Acura on Highway 30 a few hours before
Fraser's body was discovered near Warrenton; and the fact that
Highway 30 runs between the Warrenton area on the coast and the
Portland area where defendant lived.  The affidavit ended with a
request for warrants to search a specified address and a black
Acura with the "TIGERL" license plates.  Notably, the affidavit
contained no factual assertions connecting defendant or the
Fraser murder to the specified address.  
A judge issued the requested warrants, authorizing the
police to search the residence and car for evidence, "including
but not limited to: "samples of earth, soil and sand, hair or
other trace evidence," clothing and personal items belonging to
Fraser and "any letters o[r] writing from or belonging to Heather
Fraser, including any computer passwords or other identification
purporting to belong to Heather Fraser."
Investigators immediately went to the specified address
to execute the warrants.  They found the black Acura parked in
the driveway and had it towed to the Washington County sheriff's
office, where they later subjected it to an intensive search that
produced a single piece of evidence -- a small bloodstain on the
car's hatchback that matched Fraser's DNA.  In the course of the
search of the home, investigators discovered and seized a number
of items, including three computers.  
On March 4, 1998, an investigator executed an affidavit
requesting warrants to search the electronic files contained in
the three computers seized from defendant's home.  The warrants
issued on March 5, 1998, and the ensuing search turned up one
important item of evidence:  An electronic record showing that,
at 5:00 a.m. on February 24, 1998, someone had used one of the
computers to access a tide table for the Astoria/Warrenton area.  
 Finally, on March 12, 1998, an investigator executed an
affidavit requesting a second warrant to search defendant's
Washington County residence.  That affidavit repeated much of
what had appeared in the first affidavit described above, but
also contained additional information:  a brief description of
the February 28, 1998, search of defendant's Washington County
residence, including the fact that, in the course of that search,
detectives had observed albums containing photographs of young
girls, sometimes nude; information that, within a few hours of
the February 28, 1998 search, defendant's brother had reported to
police that defendant had absconded with the brother's car and
credit cards; a report that one of defendant's coworkers had
provided police with a copy of a personal "address book" of teen
and pre-teen girls, which the coworker previously had printed
from defendant's work computer; and reports of interviews with a
number of young women and girls who claimed that defendant had
administered drugs to them that made them sick or rendered them
unconscious, and that, in some of those cases, defendant sexually
abused the women while they were incapacitated.  A warrant issued
pursuant to that affidavit and police officers executed the
warrant on March 13, 1998. 
Defendant's first motion to suppress focused on the
seizure of the three computers during the February 28, 1998
search.  He argued that seizure of the computers was unlawful,
because computers were not listed as items to be seized in either
the search warrant itself or in the underlying affidavit. 
Defendant further argued that evidence obtained under the March
5, 1998, warrant to search the computers' electronic files (the
tide table record) and during the second (March 13, 1998) search
of defendant's residence were unlawfully seized in that the
warrants that authorized those searches depended, in one sense or
another, on the initial unlawful seizure of the computers on
February 28, 1998.    
The trial court agreed with defendant that the
computers were outside the scope of the February 28, 1998,
warrant, but concluded that their seizure was proper under a
"plain view" theory, i.e., the police were authorized to be in
the residence, the computers were in plain view, and their
evidentiary value was immediately apparent.  That conclusion
undermined defendant's main theoretical premise and resulted in
denial of his motion.    
Defendant later filed an amended motion to suppress,
seeking suppression of all items seized pursuant to the February
28, 1998, search warrant.  In that motion, defendant argued that
the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not support a
finding of probable cause to search either the residence or the
car.  The trial court rejected defendant's arguments with respect
to the car but ultimately agreed with defendant that the
affidavit did not establish probable cause to search the
residence, apparently because the trial court believed that the
affidavit contained no factual assertions connecting defendant to
the residence to be searched.  However, the trial court concluded
that the evidence obtained from the residence (the computers and,
ultimately, the tide table evidence) nonetheless was admissible
under the "inevitable discovery" doctrine.  Accordingly, the
trial court denied defendant's amended motion to suppress.   
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
each of the described suppression motions.  However, because --
as we have stated -- the trial court abandoned its reasoning for
denying defendant's first motion to suppress, the real fight is
about the second motion. (2)  As we have described, that motion
was directed at the February 28, 1998, warrants that purported to
authorize the search of defendant's residence and car.
B. Search of Defendant's Residence 
As noted, the trial court held that the February 28,
1998, warrant to search defendant's Washington County residence
was defective, and we proceed with our analysis on the premise
that that ruling was correct.  Consequently, any evidence
obtained from the search made pursuant to that warrant would be
subject to suppression, unless the state can "purge the taint" of
that unlawfulness.  See generally State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511,
73 P3d 282 (2003) (explaining methods and burden of proof to
purge taint of unlawful search or seizure).
This court has stated that the taint may be purged,
thus rendering that evidence admissible, by proving that "such
evidence inevitably would have been discovered, absent the
illegality, by proper and predictable police investigatory
procedures."  State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 225, 709 P2d 225
(1985).  To prevail on an inevitable discovery argument, the
state must show, "by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that
certain proper and predictable investigatory procedures would
have been utilized in the instant case, and (2) that those
procedures inevitably would have resulted in the discovery of the
evidence in question."  Id. at 226.  In the present case, the
trial court concluded that, in spite of the defects respecting
the February 28, 1998, search of defendant's home, the evidence
obtained from that search (i.e., the tide table evidence) was
admissible because the state had "purged the taint" of that
unlawful search by showing that the tide table evidence
inevitably would have been discovered.  Specifically, the trial
court found that,
"[h]ad the * * * computers not been seized, or had the
original request for the search warrant been denied,
the investigating officers would have subsequently
sought a separate search warrant for the house,
including a request to seize computers.  The execution
of a search warrant for the house is a proper and
predictable investigation procedure that would have
been utilized. * * * The tide chart information from
the computer of the defendant would not have been
deleted before the seizure of that computer."
Defendant argues that the trial court's "inevitable
discovery" findings are not supported by the evidence.  He
focuses, first, on the finding that, through "proper and
predictable" procedures, investigating officers would have
obtained a lawful warrant to search the house, which warrant
would have listed computers among the evidence to be seized. 
Defendant contends that any subsequent search of that sort
necessarily would have been tainted, because it would have been
based on observations made by the investigating officers during
the illegal search of February 28, 1998. (3) 
We disagree.  Although it is true that investigators
did refer to observations made during the unlawful February 28, 
1998, search when, on March 12, 1998, they swore out an affidavit
seeking a second warrant to search the home, those observations
were not necessary to establish probable cause to search the
residence or to seize computers from the residence.  There can be
no real doubt that, as the evidence showed and the trial court
found, even if the police had not performed the February 28,
1998, search at all, they could have, (4) and ultimately would
have, (5) produced an affidavit that established probable cause
to search defendant's residence for evidence in Fraser's
murder. (6)  Neither is there any doubt that the police quickly
would have recognized the evidentiary potential of any computers
located in defendant's home or that, if their warrant did not
already authorize the seizure of computers, they would have
obtained additional warrants that did.  We find no error. (7) 
C. Search of Defendant's Car
Defendant next contends that the February 28, 1998,
search of his black Acura was unlawful.  He advances several
arguments, only one of which merits discussion.  Defendant
argues, in fact, that the search warrant affidavit improperly
relies on hearsay statements by certain unnamed informants,
(identified only as persons living in the Fraser household)
without establishing the informants' reliability or basis of
knowledge, as ORS 133.545(4) requires. (8)  The short answer to
defendant's concern is that the statements at issue were not
vital for establishing probable cause.
Defendant also questions the reliability of certain
other statements reported in the affidavit -- specifically, those
of Fraser's friend, Tate.  Tate's statements were necessary to
establish probable cause to believe that defendant was involved
in Fraser's death:  She reported that defendant was an "older
guy" who always was "hitting on" Fraser, that "Marty" gave Fraser
fake ID and alcohol and took her to nightclubs, and that Fraser
believed that "Marty" had raped her after giving her some pills
that knocked her out.  Defendant contends that, because many of
Tate's statements were double hearsay (she reported statements
made to her by Fraser), her statements should not be considered
reliable.
Again, we disagree.  The reliability of Tate's
statements can be inferred from the fact that Tate was a citizen
informant who was willing to have her name used and who had no
apparent motive to falsely accuse defendant.  Moreover, her
statements were based either on her own personal observation and
knowledge or statements made to her by Fraser about matters that
would have been within Fraser's personal observation and
knowledge.  There is no statutory or constitutional requirement
that the affidavit contain any more particular proof of the
reliability of Tate's statements.  See, e.g., State v. Farrar,
309 Or 132, 144-45, 786 P2d 161 (1990) (indicating that
constitutional standards for determining sufficiency of warrant
based on information supplied by unnamed informant set out in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 84 S Ct 1509, 12 L ed 2d 723
(1964), overruled by, Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 103 S Ct
2317, 76 L ed 2d 527 (1983), and Spinelli v. United States, 393
US 410, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L ed 2d 637 (1969), overruled by,
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L Ed 2d 527
(1983), and codified at ORS 133.545(4) are inapplicable when
information contained in an affidavit is provided by a named
informant and that, in such cases, court construes affidavit in
"common sense and realistic fashion" to determine if there is
probable cause). 
II. MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS 
Defendant sought to exclude various statements that he
made to the police on the ground that the statements either (1)
were made under either custodial compelling circumstances without
warnings like those required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436,
86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 694 (1966), or (2) were the product of
interrogation after defendant had asserted his right to counsel. 
The trial court found that, with certain specified exceptions,
defendant's various statements were admissible.  Defendant
challenges that ruling in three separate assignments of error. 
Defendant loosely identifies three groups of statements that he
asserts should have been suppressed. 
A. February 28, 1998, Statements 
The first group of statements were made to Washington
County Investigator Bowman and his associates over a nine hour
period on February 28, 1998.  Bowman and the others came to
defendant's home at 8:30 p.m. to execute warrants to search
defendant's home and car and to obtain DNA samples from his
person.  Defendant did not answer the door when the police
knocked and rang, but he did finally respond when the
investigators called to him by means of a police car "hailer." 
When defendant came out of his house, several officers had drawn
their guns.  Defendant was told to get down on his knees and to
keep his hands up.  Defendant was searched and then was advised
that the police were there to execute search warrants, including
a warrant to obtain DNA evidence from his person.  At that point,
weapons holstered, investigators asked defendant if he would come
to the sheriff's office for that purpose and otherwise to assist
in the investigation.  Defendant agreed to do so.  He was driven
to the sheriff's office by a police detective and was told by
another detective that he was not under arrest.        
At the sheriff's office, defendant agreed to be
interviewed and to allow the interview to be recorded.  A few
minutes into the interview, however, defendant said that he
wished to terminate the interview.  The investigators stopped the
interview and the taping and proceeded to take samples of
defendant's hair and saliva.  Midway through that process, the
investigators discovered that their warrant was defective.  They
asked defendant to provide the samples voluntarily, but he
replied that he would not provide them without first talking to a
lawyer.  The investigators then left defendant alone in the
interview room while they attempted to amend the defective
warrant.  After a period of time they returned, reactivated the
tape recorder, and accused defendant of erasing part of the tape. 
Defendant told the investigators that he wanted to go home and
did not want to talk to them.  The investigators left the room
again and then returned and activated the tape in order to
confront defendant about looking through notes that an
investigator had left in the room.  Finally, after assuring
defendant again that he was not under arrest, the investigators
searched and photocopied the contents of defendant's wallet, took
photographs of him, and drove him back to his home, where the
house search still was going on.
Defendant spent the next several hours outside of the
house with an investigator, McKinney, waiting for the house
search to end.  During that time, defendant asked McKinney about
Fraser's death, but McKinney told him that he could not talk to
defendant about it.  Defendant then commented that he "wished
[McKinney] was either a lawyer or a priest." 
Before the trial court, defendant argued that all the
statements that he made to the investigators in the course of the
foregoing events were inadmissible, primarily because he was in
custody or, at least, in "compelling circumstances" and had not
been read the usual Miranda warnings.  The trial court, however,
expressly found that defendant was not in custody on February 28,
1998, that the circumstances were not compelling, that
defendant's statements to police detectives on that date were
freely and voluntarily made, and that his statements to McKinney
were spontaneous and not the result of questioning. 
Significantly, the court also found that defendant was
"sophisticated in the ways of the criminal justice system" and
that "when he didn't want to talk, he didn't talk."
Defendant challenges the foregoing findings, albeit in
very general terms.  However, we have reviewed the record and are
satisfied that the trial court's rulings were correct.  It is
true that defendant reasonably could have -- indeed, may have --
believed that he was in custody when police officers summoned him
from his home with a bullhorn and met him outside with drawn
guns.  However, we think that any such belief (assuming that
defendant even had it) would have been dispelled when the
investigators then presented defendant with apparently lawful
search warrants, asked him to come down to the station to assist
in an investigation, and told him explicitly that he was not
under arrest.  Other aspects of the interlude also support the
conclusion that the circumstances were neither custodial nor
"compelling."  Most telling are the facts that defendant very
actively controlled the interrogation once he was at the station
and that, when he asked the investigators to terminate the
interview and to return him to his home, they did so.  The
evidence also verifies the trial court's conclusion that
defendant's statements to McKinney while waiting outside his home
for the police to finish their search were spontaneous on his
part and not the product of any interrogation.  In sum,
defendant's assignment of error respecting his February 28, 1998,
statements is not well taken.  
B. Defendant's Statements to Bowman on February 24, 1999
Defendant also challenges the admissibility of
statements that he made to Bowman on February 24, 1999. 
Defendant was arrested in Florida on February 20, 1999, on a
parole violation warrant.  Bowman flew to Florida a few days
after that arrest in order to collect body fluid samples from
defendant's person.  When he met with defendant, Bowman did not
question him about the murder but, instead, merely explained to
him that a detainer would be filed in connection with Fraser's
death and that, although the detainer stated that defendant was
charged with murder, it was possible that the charge would be
upgraded to aggravated murder.  As Bowman executed the warrant,
defendant told him that he (Bowman) had made a mistake in
February 1998, by letting defendant go, and he asked Bowman if he
had gotten in trouble for doing so.  Bowman told defendant that
he could not speak to defendant about those matters.  Bowman
acknowledged that he had not given defendant Miranda warnings
during that meeting.
The trial court clearly found Bowman's testimony to be
credible and, according to that testimony, defendant's statements
were made freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously, and were not
the result of questioning by Bowman.  Defendant suggests,
however, that, even if Bowman did not overtly question defendant,
his actions were the "functional equivalent" of interrogation.  
It is true that "interrogation" need not always involve
overt questioning, but may instead be accomplished by other words
or actions by police that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.  See, e.g., Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 300-391, 100 S Ct 1682, 64 L Ed 2d
297 (1980) (for purposes of determining whether police violated a
criminal defendant's right to counsel or right to remain silent
under Fifth and Sixth Amendments, "interrogation" includes words
or actions that police know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response).  However, defendant does not explain how
that principle applies to his February 24, 1999, interaction with
Bowman, and we cannot divine from the record anything that Bowman
did or said that could be deemed a functional equivalent of
interrogation.  We therefore reject defendant's contention that
admission of the statements violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to remain silent. (9) 
C. Defendant's statements to Bowman and McKinney on March 4, 1999
Finally, defendant challenges the admissibility of
statements that he made to police officers on March 4, 1999.  On
that date, Bowman and McKinney accompanied defendant on a flight
back to Oregon from Florida.  Shortly after the three men boarded
the plane, McKinney advised defendant of his Miranda rights. 
McKinney then told defendant a story that obviously was geared
toward inducing defendant to waive those rights.  However,
defendant did not respond to the inducement.  Defendant told the
investigators that he planned to make a statement about the case
"through an attorney" but that he was willing to talk to them
about what he had done after leaving Oregon the year before. 
When pressed, defendant stated unequivocally that he wanted an
attorney before he made any statements.  Thereafter, McKinney and
Bowman did not attempt to talk to defendant about Fraser's murder
and the conversation turned to other topics.  In the course of
the ensuing conversation, defendant made certain comments that
the state sought to introduce at trial, specifically: (1)
defendant told Bowman and McKinney that he wanted to be out of
prison before he reached Social Security age and that he had
worried about his retirement while he was on the run; and (2)
defendant asked McKinney if he (defendant) would be charged with
a sex crime as well as murder, stating that he was concerned
because he knew that people who committed sex crimes often had a
more difficult time in prison.  The trial court concluded that
the statements were admissible.  
Defendant argues that McKinney's and Bowman's actions
were the functional equivalent of interrogation and, more
particularly, of continued interrogation after his invocation of
the right to counsel.  But, again, defendant does not point to
any particular actions or words by Bowman or McKinney as being
aimed at eliciting an incriminating response.  And, as we
previously noted, the trial court earlier had found that
defendant was "sophisticated in the ways of the criminal justice
system" and, "when he didn't want to talk, he didn't talk."  In
sum, we perceive nothing in the record to support defendant's
arguments.  The trial court did not err.
III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS SUBPOENAED RECORDS
Defendant's next assignment of error pertains to his
motion to suppress certain evidence that investigators had
subpoenaed from third parties.  The subpoenaed items included
bank records, medical records, cellular telephone and pager
records, employment records, and the like.  Defendant argues
that, although the records all were created and maintained by
third parties, he had a significant "privacy interest" in them,
in that they pertained to his activities and transactions in
areas that the legislature has recognized as private.  Because of
his privacy interest in the records, defendant argues, the state
could not lawfully obtain them by means of a mere subpoena
directed at the entities that created and maintained the records
but, instead, must obtain a search warrant.  Defendant concludes
that, because police investigators did not obtain search warrants
for the records and there were no exigent circumstance obviating
the need for warrants, the records must be suppressed.
Part of our difficulty with this assignment of error is
the fact that defendant adverts generally to the denial of his
motion to suppress, but does not specify which of the myriad
items described in the motion were erroneously admitted during
his trial.  Our only hint in that respect comes from the state's
brief:  It describes five items that were admitted at trial that
potentially are relevant to defendant's motion:  (1) photographs
from a bank surveillance camera showing defendant withdrawing
money from an automatic teller machine (ATM) at 8:54 p.m. on
February 24, 1998; (2) evidence that defendant drove a black
Acura with "TIGERL" vanity plates; (3) records provided by
defendant's employer of telephone calls made from defendant's
work station in February 1998; (4) testimony by a personnel
specialist from defendant's workplace that defendant's employment
records listed defendant's home as being at a specified address
in Washington County; and (5) records of telephone calls made in
1997 and 1998 on defendant's account with a cellular telephone
provider.  We dismiss the first four items without discussion: 
We reject any claim that defendant might have a cognizable
privacy interest in the license plates on his car, photographs
taken of him in a public place, the address that he provided to
his employer for tax and payroll purposes, or the telephone usage
records of his employer.                     
In considering whether the prosecutor needed a warrant
to obtain defendant's own cellular telephone records, we begin
with this court's observation in State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312,
319-20, 745 P2d 757 (1987), that, under the Oregon Constitution,
a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches extends to
those places and things in which the person has a "privacy
interest," even when there is no physical or sensory invasion
into the person's own possessions or space.  Whether a person has
a cognizable privacy interest in an item is an issue of law.  
Defendant clearly had a cognizable privacy interest in
the content of his telephone calls.  See ORS 133.724 (setting out
requirement that police obtain judicially issued warrant to
intercept a telephonic communication).  However, we cannot
identify a source of law that establishes that defendant also had
some interest in keeping private any records kept by a third
party, his cellular telephone provider, respecting his cellular
telephone usage.  The cellular telephone provider generated and
maintained those records from the provider's own equipment and
for the provider's own, separate, and legitimate business
purposes (such as billing).  Cf. State v. Meredith, 337 Or 299,
96 P3d 342 (2004) (defendant, whose location and on-the-job
activities were monitored via transmitter attached to her
employer's vehicle, had no protected privacy interest in being
free from that type of observation by her employer).  Neither are
we aware of any principle that would prevent the cellular
telephone provider from responding to a proper subpoena. 
Defendant's assignment of error is not well taken.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS TESTIMONY 
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's
decision to admit certain testimony that defendant challenged as 
"prior bad act" or "propensity" evidence.  Before trial,
defendant filed a motion in limine regarding the admissibility of
the testimony of 98 persons whom the state had identified as
potential witnesses.  The motion was directed primarily at
limiting or excluding testimony about defendant's prior crimes or
bad acts.  Before the trial court decided the motion, the state
indicated that it intended to use only 32 of the 98 witnesses
identified in the motion.  Thereafter, the trial court issued an
order denying the motion, with certain exceptions.  Defendant
assigns error to that order, arguing that all the testimony
should have been excluded. (10)  
Defendant's challenges pertain to testimony in both the
guilt phase and the penalty phase of his trial.  The challenged
guilt phase testimony falls roughly into four categories: (1)
testimony by various young women that defendant gave them
alcohol, morphine, or other drugs that caused them to black out
or become ill, some of whom further stated that defendant had
sexually abused them while they were incapacitated by the drugs
defendant had administered; (2) testimony of witness Franklin
that a female friend had told him that defendant had drugged and
raped her; (3) testimony of witness Robinson about two
interactions with defendant; and (4) testimony of a witness that
he was defendant's probation officer and that defendant was
living at his mother's Washington County residence in February
1998. (11) 
Although defendant describes the foregoing categories
of witnesses in his arguments to this court, he does not make
separate arguments regarding the purposes served by the testimony
of each category of witnesses.  Instead, he argues, generally,
that all the testimony from those witness had only one
conceivable purpose -- to prove his bad character and that he had
acted in accordance with that character.  We consider, first, how
that argument pertains to the witnesses who testified in the
guilt phase of defendant's trial. 
As a general proposition, evidence of a defendant's
other crimes, wrongs or bad acts is not admissible in a criminal
case to prove the defendant's antisocial or criminal
propensities.  OEC 404(3). However, such evidence may be
admissible to prove other facts that are relevant in the case, as
long as the chain of logical relevance connecting the evidence to
the "other" fact or facts does not ultimately rely on an
inference relating to the defendant's character or propensities. 
Id.  See also State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 105 n 11, 806 P2d 110
(1991) (OEC 404(3) "provides an avenue for admitting evidence
that proves guilt without any inference to character").      
Notably, this court has observed that the rule stated
in OEC 404(3) employs an "inclusionary" approach to the prior bad
act problem.  See State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 548, 725 P2d 312
(1986) (so stating).  That means that, while the rule sets out a
list of possible "exceptions" to the general prohibition on prior
bad act evidence ("motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident"),
the rule does not purport to cover every imaginable purpose to
which prior bad act evidence might logically and lawfully be
applied.  Id. at 549.  Thus, the essential inquiry under OEC
404(3) is not whether the testimony can be made to fit into one
of the listed categories, but whether and how it is logically
relevant to a noncharacter issue in the case.  Id. 
We begin with the first category of witnesses described
above, viz., young women who claimed that defendant had drugged
them to the point of incapacitation with morphine or other
substances.  Some of those witnesses also claimed that defendant
had taken advantage of them sexually while they were under the
influence of the drugs that defendant had administered or
supplied.  The state argued that the testimony of those witnesses
was relevant to prove several elements of its case against
defendant -- most notably, that defendant had raped Fraser before
he murdered her.  In that regard, we note that the state had
strong direct evidence that defendant had had sexual intercourse
with Fraser shortly before she died but had no way of proving
directly that that defendant's sexual contact with Fraser was
nonconsensual. (12)  However, when combined with the toxicology
report showing a significant level of opiates in Fraser's system,
the testimony at issue would be powerful circumstantial evidence
that defendant's sexual contact with Fraser occurred after he had
drugged her, and that he took advantage of her incapacitated
state.  The inferences that the state wished to rely on would not
include a general subjective assessment of defendant's character
or involve any allegation that defendant had a propensity to
commit rape.  Instead, the evidence made the state's explanation
of the facts (defendant's seminal fluid in Fraser's vaginal
cavity and a high level of morphine in Fraser's body) more
likely, and thereby made defendant's guilt both of rape in the
first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree more likely.    
 We still must consider whether the evidence is
sufficiently probative with respect to that theory.  In past
cases, this court has described the different factors that trial
courts must consider when deciding whether to admit prior bad act
or crime evidence for purposes of a particular theory.  Our cases
suggest that, if evidence of prior crimes is to be admitted to
prove identity based on modus operandi, the trial court must find
a very high degree of similarity between the charged and
uncharged crimes, as well as a methodology that is highly
distinctive.  Pinnell, 311 Or at 109-10.  On the other hand, when
prior crime evidence is to be admitted to prove intent, this
court has indicated that a high degree of similarity is helpful
but is not essential, and that a distinctive methodology is
entirely irrelevant.  See Johns, 301 Or at 555-56 (so stating).
In our view, the analysis of the prior crime evidence
in the present case falls somewhere in between Pinnell and Johns. 
There is no requirement that the evidence of the uncharged crime
demonstrate a distinctive methodology or "signature" crime, as
when such evidence is used to establish the identity of the
perpetrator.  However, it is essential that the uncharged crimes
evidence involve a method of incapacitation (administration of an
intoxicating substance) that would support the narrow inference
that the state seeks to draw from it -- that sexual contact
between Fraser and defendant occurred while Fraser was
incapacitated by morphine that defendant had administered. (13) 
And, although there is no requirement that the uncharged crime
closely replicate the crime that is charged (as there is when
prior crime evidence is used to establish identity), any
similarity in the circumstances increases the probative value of
the prior crime evidence and enhances the argument for
admissibility under OEC 404(3).  Likewise, the timing of
uncharged crimes vis-à-vis the charged crime and the number of
instances that are shown may affect the question of
admissibility.  No categorical rule exists, but timing,
repetition, and similarity of both the act and the surrounding
circumstances all are important considerations. 
Applying the foregoing points to the first category of
witnesses, we conclude that the trial court permissibly concluded
that the witnesses' testimony was admissible for the non-character purpose of showing that Fraser did not consent and, in
fact, was incapable of consenting to the sexual contact that she
had with defendant.  All but one of the witnesses testified that
defendant had either offered them or slipped them a drug that
caused them to pass out or become ill. (14)  One of the
witnesses learned from a drug screen that the drug she had taken
was an opiate -- the same substance found in Fraser's system. 
She testified that defendant later had acknowledged that he had
slipped some morphine into her drink and had told her that the
morphine was left over from a supply that hospice staff had
provided to his father, who had suffered from cancer.  Another
witnesses testified that defendant also had acknowledged giving
her morphine that he had gotten from "his dad." 
The testimony of most of the other witnesses strongly
suggests that the drug involved was liquid morphine. (15)  One
witness indicated that defendant had poured a liquid from a brown
bottle onto a rag and held it over her mouth until she passed
out.  Another witnesses also spoke of a liquid poured from a
bottle onto a rag, but said that defendant had given her the rag
to smell.  Still another testified that she passed out after
defendant gave her a capful of a liquid, which he told her was
Ecstasy, to drink. 
Four of the witnesses testified that defendant had
sexually abused them in some fashion while they were passed out
from the intoxicants that defendant had administered.  One awoke
to find defendant next to her and her underwear pulled down, two
awoke to find defendant feeling their breasts, and another awoke
to find defendant having intercourse with her.  The testimony of
those witnesses demonstrated that defendant had developed a
method for obtaining sexual access to women without their consent
(which method involved administration of incapacitating drugs,
commonly liquid morphine) and permitted the jury to infer that
the victim, like others, had not consented to the sexual contact
with defendant that other evidence all but conclusively
established had occurred. (16)  It also permitted the jury to
draw another inference that was relevant to the state's theory --
that defendant had administered the morphine that was found in
Fraser's system.  
That inference is strengthened by the multiplicity of
similar incidents (suggesting a pattern), the fact that all the
incidents occurred within the year preceding Fraser's murder, and
the fact that the victims of those uncharged crimes all were
teenage girls who moved in the same circles as Fraser.  In short,
the testimony in the first of defendant's guilt-phase categories
is relevant to a significant noncharacter issue in the case and
therefore passes muster under OEC 404(3). (17)  
Defendant also appears to challenge the trial court's
decision to admit the testimony of a young man, Franklin, to the
effect that one of the young women who testified about being
drugged and sexually assaulted by defendant had reported the
incident to him at the time that it occurred.  We conclude that,
although the testimony referred to prior bad acts by defendant
and contained hearsay, it served a purpose other than
establishing defendant's bad character or the truth of the matter
asserted.  On cross-examination of the young woman in question,
defense counsel brought out that she willingly had taken some
drugs from defendant, that her memory may have been impaired by
drugs and alcohol, and that she had not reported the incident to
the police.  Franklin's testimony was admissible for the purpose
of rehabilitating a witness whose truthfulness and accuracy of
memory had been challenged in cross-examination.  OEC
801(4)(a)(B).
Defendant also appears to be challenging the guilt-phase testimony of Robinson, a young woman who was acquainted
with defendant.  Robinson testified that, a week before Fraser
died, defendant had come to her home, had shown her that Fraser
was passed out in the back seat of his car, and had referred to
Fraser as a "lesbian" and a "model."  Robinson also testified
that, on February 28, 1998, defendant had arrived at her home
early in the morning, had gotten into her bed uninvited, and had
asked her if he could stay at her apartment.  Robinson reported
that she had refused defendant's request and that she also had
berated defendant for getting her 15-year-old sister drunk.  
In the hearing on defendant's motions in limine,
defendant argued that Robinson's testimony was inadmissible
"prior bad act" evidence.  However, and assuming that the first
incident that Robinson described even qualifies as a "prior bad
act," it is clear that it was relevant to other facts at issue in
the case.  Robinson's description of the incident suggested the
nature of defendant's relationship with Fraser -- that, even if
defendant were attracted to Fraser, he knew that she was a
lesbian and, therefore, less likely to be attracted to him.
Robinson's testimony about the second incident fits
more easily into the "prior bad act" mold, in that it showed that
defendant had provided alcohol to a minor.  However, that aspect
of Robinson's testimony was a relatively minor part of her
overall story, which was relevant to show that, as of February
28, 1998, defendant was trying to avoid his own home (a possible
indication of guilty knowledge).  Moreover, defendant did not
separately object to it, as he was required to do if he wished to
have it excluded.  We find no error.        
Defendant also challenged the guilt-phase testimony of
his probation officer, Crocker, on the ground that it necessarily
informed the jury of his criminal past.  However, Crocker's
testimony was relevant to the issue of defendant's residency in
Washington County -- an issue that defendant chose to contest and
that was vital to an element (venue) of the state's case. 
Crocker's testimony was limited to that issue:  Crocker reported
what he knew about where defendant was residing in February 1998,
when the murder occurred and avoided any mention of defendant's
past crimes.  Crocker's testimony was relevant to a noncharacter
issue and its admission did not violate OEC 404(3).
Defendant also suggests that, even if relevant for some
noncharacter purpose, all the foregoing testimony was unfairly
prejudicial and, as such, was inadmissible under OEC 403.  We
disagree.  Although the testimony clearly was prejudicial, it
also was strongly probative with respect to issues that were
vital to the state's case, viz., whether Fraser consented to
sexual contact with defendant, whether defendant had administered
the opiates that were found in Fraser's system, whether defendant
intended to take advantage of Fraser's incapacitated state,
whether defendant had access to morphine, and whether defendant
resided in Washington County at the time of the murder.  None of
the testimony is of such a character that OEC 403 necessarily
would require its exclusion.  We conclude that the trial court
did not err in admitting the testimony. (18) 
V. HEARSAY -- FRASER'S STATEMENTS OF INTENT 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
allowing various witnesses to testify that Fraser had told them,
on the evening of February 23, 1998, that she was going to
Marty's to "play on the computer."  Defendant sought to exclude
testimony about Fraser's statements in the two motions in limine
already described, but the issue further crystallized when the
state filed what it styled a "Notice of OEC 804(3)(f) Evidence." 
In that filing, the state theorized that, although Fraser's
statements were hearsay, they were admissible under OEC 803(3) as
evidence of her state of mind and, particularly, of her intent to
go to "Marty's" house later that night.  Defendant argued that
the statements were not admissible under the "state of mind"
exception to the hearsay rule.  The trial court rejected
defendant's argument and ruled that the testimony was admissible,
although it acknowledged that the evidence should be "heavily
circumscribed" and indicated that the parties should work out the
details. 
Before this court, defendant argues that, even if
Fraser's hearsay statements theoretically were admissible to show
her state of mind at the time that she made them, they could not
lawfully be admitted for that purpose because Fraser's state of
mind was not relevant to any issue in the case.  Defendant
suggests that the state's real purpose in introducing the
statements and their only real relevance was to show defendant's
state of mind and, ultimately, his future conduct.  Defendant
contends that, according to the Legislative Commentary to OEC
803(3), the statements should have been excluded.
We disagree.  The Legislative Commentary to OEC 803(3)
shows that the legislature's intent, in adopting that rule, was
to "render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to
prove the declarant's future conduct, not the future conduct of
another person."  Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, Art
VIII-77 (4d ed 2002).  That commentary does not mean that a
hearsay statement of intent is automatically inadmissible because
the jury might use it as a basis for inferring the intentions and
future actions of some person in addition to the declarant.  It
merely means that such statements are inadmissible for such a
purpose and that, to the extent that they can serve no other
purpose in the context of the case, they may be inadmissible
altogether. 
In the present case, the trial court clearly recognized
the foregoing distinction.  It concluded that, even excluding any
implication about defendant's intentions that might arise from
Fraser's statements, her intention to "go to Marty's" (and the
implication that she carried through with that plan) was relevant
to the issue of where she was when she was murdered -- in other
words, venue.  Having concluded that the statements fell within
the exception set out at OEC 803(3), for that limited purpose,
the trial court left it to the parties to work out how to keep
the testimony within those confines or otherwise to limit its
effect. 
Defendant contends that, even if Fraser's statements
were admissible for the limited purposes of establishing her
state of mind and future conduct, allowing them to come in at all
was unfairly prejudicial, in that jurors necessarily would draw
inferences about defendant's state of mind and conduct.  But
defendant made no request for a limiting instruction warning the
jury against drawing such inferences -- a fact that we find to be
dispositive.  Had defendant made such a request, the trial court
either would have allowed it (hence obviating any potential
error) or would have denied it.  Defendant is not entitled to
profit from the fact that he never gave the trial court the
opportunity to rule either way.
Defendant also contends that, regardless of its
admissibility under the evidence rules, admission of hearsay
reports that Fraser was planning to go to "Marty's" violated his
constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article I,
section 11, to confront all witnesses against him.  Defendant
largely relies on the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36, 124 S Ct 1354, 158
L Ed 2d 177 (2004).  Crawford overruled earlier federal case law
holding that out-of-court statements of declarants who do not
testify at trial may be admitted if the trial court finds
"adequate indicia of reliability."  Crawford held, instead, that
out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in nature are
absolutely inadmissible, unless the defendant has had an
opportunity to test the reliability of those statements through
cross-examination.  Id., 541 US at 68.
Crawford did not definitively explain what kind of
statements fall within the "testimonial category," but indicated
that the category might include "material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 
Id. at 51.  Defendant asserts -- as he must -- that Fraser's
statements to various parties that she was "going to Marty's"
would fall into that category.  The state argues, on the other
hand, that Fraser's statements were not "testimonial"; that, for
confrontation clause purposes, "testimonial" statements are only
those that are made under circumstances that would lead a witness
to believe the statement was intended for use at a later trial,
such as affidavits and statements made to the police.  
Although we are unsure at this juncture of the precise
scope of the term "testimonial" as the Supreme Court used it in
Crawford, we agree with the state that the concept does not
include "the statements made by an unsuspecting victim of a crime
before that crime has even occurred."  We note, in that regard,
that the statements at issue are wholly unlike the ones that
Crawford describes as testimonial, viz., "affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."  Id.  We
conclude, in short, that admission of Fraser's statements does
not create the Sixth Amendment issue that defendant
asserts. (19) 
VI. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
denying his various requests for appointment of new counsel.  He
cites to various "relevant" portions of the transcript, but is
otherwise unspecific about what motions were made, which rulings
were objectionable, and which facts support his claim.  We assume
that defendant's challenge is directed at two "rulings": (1) the
trial court's May 4, 2001, refusal to accept defendant's pro se
motion for substitute counsel and its comment, after hearing
defendant's complaints, that, "[b]ased on what I've heard there,
I wouldn't remove [counsel]"; and (2) the trial court's failure
to act on an "affidavit" that defendant filed on July 23, 2001,
asking the court to replace defendant's lawyers or "instruct them
to follow [his] legitimate requests." (20)  
In his argument to this court, defendant does not rely
on or even advert to any particular inadequacies of trial
counsel.  Instead, he focuses on the broader proposition that the
trial court erred by failing to make a sufficient inquiry into
his complaints.  He notes that, under State v. Langley, 314 Or
247, 257, 839 P2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 318 Or 28, 861
P2d 1012 (1993), a defendant's request for new counsel "requires
a factual assessment of whether the complaint is 'legitimate.'"
Defendant acknowledges that a trial court's denial of a request
for substitute counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion, id.
at 258, but he contends that, in his case, the trial court erred
by exercising its discretion without inquiring adequately into
the legitimacy of his complaints.  
This court recently considered a similar claim in State
v. Smith, 339 Or 515, 123 P3d 261 (2005).  There, the defendant
indicated to the trial court, on the day of trial, that he was
dissatisfied with his trial lawyer.  The trial court listened to
the defendant's complaints and ultimately concluded that trial
counsel was adequate.  Upon his conviction, the defendant
appealed and argued, inter alia, that the trial court had erred
by not holding a hearing or otherwise inquiring into the basis of
the defendant's dissatisfaction with his lawyer.  The Court of
Appeals agreed with that argument, State v. Smith, 190 Or App
576, 90 P3d 145 (2003), and remanded the defendant's case for a
hearing about defendant's complaints.  On review, we held that,
contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, there is no rule of
law requiring a trial court to conduct an inquiry into, and make
a factual assessment of, a defendant's complaints about appointed
counsel.  Smith, 339 Or at 530.  We also held that a trial
court's failure to inquire into the facts underpinning a
complaint about counsel does not violate a defendant's
constitutional right to assistance of counsel, because post-conviction procedures provide a constitutionally sufficient
mechanism for obtaining relief when trial counsel has been
inadequate.  Id. at 530.  Finally, we held that, where the
defendant had expressed general concerns about "fair
representation" and had suggested that defense counsel had not
investigated his case sufficiently, the trial court had not
abused its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that
the defendant had not advanced any legitimate reasons for
appointing substitute counsel.  Id. at 531.
Our decision in Smith resolves much of defendant's
assignment of error.  Specifically, it disposes of his claim that
the trial court erred in failing to hold an inquiry into
defendant's complaints and to make a "factual assessment" based
on that inquiry.  That leaves us to consider whether, on the
record that was before it, the trial court abused its discretion
in denying defendant's requests for substitute counsel. 
Defendant's claim is directed at two specific decisions by the
trial court denying such requests.  We turn to those decisions. 
On May 4, 2001, the trial court indicated that
defendant must make any request for substitute counsel through
his lawyers, but also allowed defendant at that time to describe
his concerns orally.  Defendant indicated that trial counsel had
refused to file motions that defendant wished them to file, on
the ground that such filings would be a waste of time.  Defendant
also indicated that he had asked his lawyers to research various
issues and implied that they had declined to do so.  The trial
court suggested that the lawyers had been right about certain of
defendant's requests being a waste of time.  It also explained
that most of defendant's complaints were about strategic
decisions that were for the lawyers, and not defendant, to make. 
Ultimately, the court told defendant that the two lawyers were
"the best that I can give you" and that he would not remove them
based on what he had heard.  In sum, the trial court considered
defendant's complaints and -- on this record, at least --
reasonably concluded that those complaints did not present a
legitimate reason for appointing new counsel.  The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's May 4, 2001,
request for substitute counsel.  
On July 23, 2001 -- in the midst of voir dire --
defendant again asked the court to appoint new counsel "or
instruct them to follow my legitimate requests."  Trial counsel
explained, at that time, that defendant was unhappy about
counsel's "inability or refusal to carry out a wide variety of
legal tasks that he has asked us to do that he feels are
appropriate."  The trial court reiterated its earlier position --
that defendant was complaining about legal and strategic
decisions that were not his to make.  The trial court then
invited defendant to compile and file a list of complaints, which
it would consider and then seal for purposes of appeal.  In
response to that invitation, defendant presented the court with a
large folder on August 9, 2001, which purportedly contained a
"list of items" relating to his complaints about trial counsel. 
Apparently, the trial court found nothing in the material that
defendant presented to suggest a legitimate reason for granting
defendant's request for new counsel.  The court did not grant
defendant's request. 
We have reviewed the material that defendant presented
to the trial court and find it to be more of the same -- i.e.,
complaints that trial counsel failed to file motions that
defendant wished to file, failed to pursue issues and strategies
that defendant wished to pursue, and generally failed to follow
defendant's instructions.  Neither the materials, nor defendant's
similar oral complaints to the trial court, constitute a basis
for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's request for new counsel.      
VII. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACCESS TO LAW LIBRARY, LEGAL MATERIALS, AND OTHER RESOURCES
Defendant argues, next, that the trial court erred in
denying his "Motion for Defendant Access to Police Reports, Law
Library, Research Materials and Grievance Procedures," filed on
August 4, 2000.  The motion asked the trial court to issue an
order requiring the Washington County Sheriff's Department to,
among other things, allow defendant access to the law library
eight hours per day, allow defendant to keep pleadings, research,
and other materials relating to his case in his cell without
interference by jail personnel, and allow defendant access to a
computer and to the internet.  Defendant attached to the motion
an affidavit by one of his trial lawyers averring that Washington
County jail personnel had repeatedly searched and confiscated
defendant's trial materials, had never allowed defendant to keep
more than a quarter inch of legal paperwork in his cell, and had
severely restricted defendant's use of the law library.     
Defendant did not ask for a hearing on the motion at
the time that it was filed.  However, defense counsel subpoenaed
several employees of the Washington County jail to appear in
court on October 24, 2000, apparently with the intent of arguing
defendant's motion for access at that time.  The court previously
had reserved that date for an omnibus hearing on defendant's
various suppression motions.  
At the October 24, 2000, proceeding, defense counsel
began to set out the factual background relating to defendant's
"access" motion.  The prosecutor indicated that he objected to
proceeding any further with the matter because (1) defense
counsel had failed to follow the trial court's previous direction
that the motion be set for a separate hearing; (2) the District
Attorney's office was not responsible for and was not prepared to
litigate issues relating to defendant's treatment in jail; and
(3) defense counsel had failed to serve a copy of the motion on
the jail's proper representative, the County Counsel for
Washington County.  The trial court then questioned County
Counsel (who had moved to quash defendant's subpoenas and had
come to the proceeding to argue that motion) about when and how
he had learned about defendant's motion and why he had failed to
respond to it.  Eventually, the trial court threw up its
figurative hands, declaring that "confusion is rampant."  The
trial court granted the motion to quash defendant's subpoenas and
told defense counsel to schedule a separate hearing on the motion
in front of another judge.  Defendant's lawyers apparently did
not follow through on that instruction, i.e., they did not
schedule a hearing on the motion in front of the designated
judge.  Consequently, the trial court never actually ruled on the
motion that defendant has identified. (21)
It should be clear from the foregoing summary that the
essential factual premise for defendant's claim of error -- that
the trial court denied his motion for access -- is absent.  It
follows that the trial court did not and could not have erred in
the way that defendant has suggested.
VIII. CHALLENGES TO THE INDICTMENT
At trial, defendant filed a "Demurrer and Alternate
Motion to Bar Capital Trial," arguing that the indictment was
defective in that it failed to allege two elements of the crime
of "capital aggravated murder."  Defendant asserted that "capital
aggravated murder" constitutes a different crime from "simple
aggravated murder," the distinction being that the former crime
involves additional "elements" not relevant to the latter crime,
viz., that (1) defendant acted deliberately; and (2) with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased would
result.  Defendant then argued that, because, in the present
case, the state had failed to allege those two statutory
"sentencing factors" in the indictment, defendant never was
charged with "capital aggravated murder" and neither the judge
nor the jury could convict him of or sentence him for that crime. 
The trial court rejected that argument and denied the motion.
We see no error in the trial court's decision.  This
court has rejected the idea that the crime defined in ORS 163.095
-- aggravated murder -- somehow imports additional elements from
ORS 163.150, the death penalty sentencing provision.  See, e.g.,
State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 171-72, 752 P2d 1136 (1988), vac'd
and rem'd on other grounds, 492 US 914 (1989) (Wagner I). 
Although defendant suggests that Wagner I conflicts with more
recent federal and Oregon cases pertaining to the constitutional
right to jury trial, we see no conflict.  The cases that
defendant cites suggest or hold that a jury must decide the
"deliberateness" and "reasonable expectation of death" questions
set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) because, depending on how they
are answered, they may increase the punishment for the underlying
offense.  However, nothing in those cases suggests that those
questions necessarily define a separate crime of capital
aggravated murder and, as such, that they must be set out in the
indictment.  See State v. Sawatzky, 339 Or 689, 698, 125 P3d 722
(2005) (no authority exists for defendant's claim of a federal
constitutional right to have aggravating or enhancing factors
alleged in indictment).    
Defendant also mounts various "global" challenges to
the constitutionality of Oregon's death penalty scheme in three
separate assignments of error.  The various constitutional issues
that defendant raises in those three assignments of error all
have been examined and rejected by this court in previous cases. 
Defendant acknowledges as much, but he argues that those cases
were wrongly decided and that the constitutional issues should be
decided anew. (22)  However, nothing that defendant has offered
persuades us that those earlier decisions were wrong.  We
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motions and rejecting his demurrer. 
IX. VOIR DIRE ISSUES
A. Defendant's Motion to Subpoena Jury Pool Materials
On March 20, 2001, defendant filed a motion asking the
trial court to issue subpoenas duces tecum to the Washington
County Trial Court Administrator and the State Court
Administrator, directing those officers to produce a lengthy list
of documents and records -- virtually everything produced,
utilized, or collected by the state and Washington County that
pertained to jury selection.  A supporting memorandum set out the
reasons for the subpoena, i.e., to obtain information needed to
determine whether the jury panel for defendant's case met the
fair cross-section requirement of ORS 10.215(1) and the impartial
jury requirements of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution.  The trial court denied the motion, but suggested
to defendant that it might change its mind if presented with some
preliminary factual showing that the method of selecting the jury
pool is or was constitutionally suspect.  
Defendant challenges that denial.  We have considered
defendant's arguments and concluded that they are either not well
taken or are unpreserved.  None merits discussion here. 
B. Excusal of Potential Jurors for Cause
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
granting the state's request to excuse, for cause, ten potential
jurors who indicated that they could not, under any
circumstances, vote to impose the death penalty.  A more complete
discussion of this assignment of error would not benefit the
public, bench, or bar.  It is not well taken. 
C. Denial of Motions to Excuse Pro-Death Penalty Jurors for Cause
In the next six assignments of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse six different
potential jurors for cause.  Again, we have concluded that none
of these assignments is well taken, and that a more complete
discussion of them is not warranted. 
X. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
At the close of the state's case, defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal on various counts charged in the
indictment.  He argued that the state had failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that (1) defendant
had kidnapped Fraser (a fact underpinning three of the aggravated
murder counts); (2) defendant had raped Fraser (a fact
underpinning three more of the aggravated murder counts); and (3)
the murder occurred in Washington County or, in the alternative,
defendant resided in Washington County at the time of the murder
(facts necessary to establish venue for all of the aggravated
murder counts).  The trial court granted defendant's motion with
respect to the three kidnapping-based aggravated murder counts,
but otherwise denied the motion.  Ultimately, defendant was
convicted of the remaining aggravated murder counts.  
Before this court, defendant argues that the trial
court erred in denying his motion with respect to those remaining
aggravated murder counts because (1) there was insufficient
evidence to support a jury finding that defendant had raped
Fraser; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a jury
finding that the murder occurred in Washington County or that
defendant's residence was in Washington County at the time of the
murder.  We already have explained how the state's evidence would
permit the jury to conclude that defendant drugged Fraser and had
sexual contact with her while she was unconscious, acts which
would constitute rape in the first degree.  We shall not repeat
that discussion here.  Defendant's arguments on this point are
not well taken.  The arguments in the second category also are
not well taken and do not merit discussion.  We find no error.
XI. OTHER ISSUES
Defendant raises several other assignments of error,
some through the brief filed by counsel and others raised by
defendant pro se.  We have considered each assignment and find
none either to be well taken or to merit discussion.
The judgments of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed. 
1. Various Clatsop and Washington County law enforcement
agencies, as well as the Oregon State Police, took part in the
investigation of Fraser's murder.  Unless more specificity
appears to be called for, we refer to those officers as
"investigators," without identifying their particular law
enforcement agency.
2. Our choice to deal with this issue on the basis of the doctrine of "inevitable discovery"
should not be understood as an expression of approval by this court of the trial court's conclusion
that the first warrant was invalid.  We express no opinion on that issue.
3. Defendant does not appear to be arguing that the investigators never would have
submitted an affidavit that contained facts showing a connection between defendant and the
residence to be searched.  
4. In that regard, we note that the February 28, 1998, affidavit contained everything that was
needed to establish probable cause to search defendant's home except -- arguably -- for
information establishing that the address in question was, in fact, defendant's home (and Fraser's
likely destination on the morning of February 23, 1998).  It appears, moreover, that, by February
28, 1998, the police had information establishing that fact.
5. A police investigator testified at the first of two omnibus hearings held with respect to
defendant's motion to suppress that, had the initial request for a warrant to search the home been
denied, he would have sought and obtained another warrant. 
6. We acknowledge that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the present case
is different from its typical application, as exemplified in State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 709 P2d
225 (1981).  There, the defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained when a dead body was
discovered in his hotel room, on the ground that the police had entered the hotel room illegally. 
The court concluded that the evidence was admissible in spite of the illegal search because the
body inevitably would have been discovered by an entirely independent third party -- specifically,
the hotel maid -- who would have called in the police.  Here, in contrast, the state seeks to excuse
the failure of police investigators to obtain a proper warrant on the ground that the same
investigators could have and eventually would have obtained a proper warrant. 
Obviously, in cases like the one at hand, some question arises respecting how
independent a subsequent lawful warrant application and search would be when the people who
"inevitably" would pursue those ends are the same ones who were involved in the initial
illegality.  Some jurists have suggested, in fact, that using the inevitable discovery doctrine in
such cases cannot be justified, because it creates an incentive to police to engage in warrantless
searches and could effectively swallow the warrant requirement.  See, e.g,, Murray v. United
States, 487 US 533, 544-552, 108 S Ct 2529, 101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(so stating).  However, the United States Supreme Court has concluded, and we agree, that the
inevitable discovery doctrine is available in such circumstances, at least to the extent that the
state affirmatively shows not only that there was an independent basis for obtaining a lawful
warrant but that investigators would have sought a lawful warrant regardless of the unlawful
search.  Murray, 487 US at 543-44.  In the present case, the trial court was careful to make
findings on both of those points and its findings are supported by the evidence.
7. Defendant separately takes issue with the trial court's finding that, when the police
obtained a proper warrant, the tide table information still would have been on one of the
computers.  That argument does not merit extended discussion.  In our view, the record fully
supports the trial court's finding.
8. ORS 133.545(4) provides, inter alia, that "[i]f and affidavit is based in whole or in part
on hearsay, the affiant shall set forth facts bearing on any unnamed informant's reliability and
shall disclose, as far as possible the means by which the information was obtained."
9. Defendant makes one other argument in this respect that we do not consider to require
discussion.
10. Although defendant's motion focused on "prior bad acts" issues, it also sought to exclude
certain witnesses on hearsay grounds.  We deal with those arguments separately, post.   
11. Defendant also challenged three categories of witnesses who
testified only in the trial's penalty phase: (1) testimony by
witness Freeman that he had known defendant in the 1970's and had
observed him experimenting with "date rape" drugs, including
putting a substance on a cloth and putting it over a young
woman's face until she blacked out; (2) testimony of various
young women that, when they were under the age of 18, defendant
obtained their telephone numbers and addresses from a phony
petition and began calling them and discussing sexual matters or
sending them items of a sexual nature through the mail; and (3)
testimony of two young women that they had lived with defendant,
had obtained drugs and alcohol from him, and had had consensual
sexual relations with him, when they were under the age of 18.
Those challenges do not require an extended discussion.  We note
only that a defendant's future dangerousness is directly at issue
during the penalty phase of a capital trial and that other bad
acts generally are relevant to that issue. 
12. Count I of the indictment alleged that defendant intentionally caused Fraser's death "in the
course of and in furtherance of" the crime of rape in the first degree; Count II made the same
allegations respecting the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree; Count IV alleged that
defendant killed Fraser to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of the crime of rape in the first
degree; Count V made the same allegations respecting the perpetrator of the crime of sexual
abuse in the first degree; Count VIII alleged that defendant killed Fraser to conceal the fact of the
commission of the crime of rape in the first degree; and Count IX made the same allegation
respecting the commission of the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree.  Both rape in the first
degree and sexual abuse in the first degree may be proved by showing the "[t]he victim [was]
incapable of consent by reason of * * * mental incapacitation or physical helplessness."  See ORS
163.375(1)(d) (rape in the first degree); ORS 163.427(1)(a)(C) (sexual abuse in the first degree).
13. Evidence that defendant had raped women or sexually abused
women in the past would not be sufficient.  Such evidence
ultimately would rely on the idea that defendant had raped Fraser
because he had a propensity to commit rape or sexual abuse. 
14. The remaining witness testified that she passed out after drinking alcohol that defendant
had supplied and that, when she awoke, defendant told her that "we had fooled around" and that
he had stuck his finger inside her.  There was nothing in her testimony, other than the fact that
she had passed out, that would suggest that she had been given morphine or any other drug. 
15. A hospice nurse who assisted defendant's family when defendant's father was dying of
cancer in the fall of 1997 testified that the hospice team had provided the family with liquid
morphine to help defendant's father with "breakthrough pain."  She testified that the morphine
was a colorless, odorless liquid with a bitter taste that usually comes in a brown bottle that
protects it from light.      
16. The trial court also allowed two of the witnesses to
describe a drugging incident that did not involve sexual abuse. 
Those two witnesses testified that, in December 1997, while
attending a concert with defendant, they drank a beverage that
defendant had offered to them that made them very ill and that
they later learned had contained liquid morphine.  Although
neither of the women indicated that defendant had sexually abused
them in any way during that incident, their description of the
event suggests that that may have been only for lack of an
opportunity.  In any event, the testimony was consistent with the
drugging aspects of the testimony of the other witnesses in the
category and also was relevant to show that, shortly before
Fraser's death, defendant possessed some quantity of liquid
morphine. 
17. Although this case has certain superficial similarities to State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 785
P2d 350 (1990) (both are aggravated murder cases involving underlying sex crimes), the cases
present wholly different issues under OEC 404(3).  In Pratt, the state wished to present evidence
that defendant had raped a different victim some years earlier and sought to avoid the prohibition
on propensity evidence on the theory that the defendant's intentional rape of another woman
made it more probable that he intended to commit the crime of attempted rape on the murder
victim.  We did not question that theory of relevance.  However, we concluded that the evidence
was not sufficiently probative of the defendant's intent, based on our application of the six part
test set out in State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 548, 725 P2d 312 (1986)(which test is specific to the
issue of intent).
In the present case, the state also wishes to put on evidence of defendant's past sex
crimes.  However, the state's primary theory of relevance (to prove Fraser's incapacity to consent)
is very different from the state's theory in Pratt.   Pratt, therefore, plays no part in our present
analysis.
18. Our ruling in this regard makes it unnecessary to consider what role is played by OEC
404(4), which provides:
"In criminal actions, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by the
defendant is admissible if relevant except as otherwise provided by [certain other
rules of evidence and the state and federal constitution]."
19. Although defendant alludes to Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, in his
argument to this court, he makes no separate argument under that provision, and we decline to
address it.   
20. Defendant alludes to other instances when the issue of substitute counsel arose, but none
of those other instances appear to involve a reviewable decision by the trial court denying a
request for substitute counsel.          
21. Defendant asserts that the access issue "came up" in later proceedings -- specifically, in
the course of discussions of defendant's motion for appointment of substitute counsel on May 4,
2001, and in similar discussions on July 23, 2001.  It is clear, however, that the trial court never
would have understood defendant's complaints about his lawyers to be, instead, a complaint
about lack of access.
22. Defendant also raises the issues to preserve potential challenges to Oregon's death penalty
scheme in federal court.