Title: In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-444 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  4 February 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF C.W.F. 
 
 
 
 
Moore County 
No. 12 SPC 364J 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by juvenile respondent from order entered 22 August 
2012 by Judge Don W. Creed, Jr. in Moore County District Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Charlene Richardson and Special Deputy Attorney General Lisa 
Corbett, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender David W. Andrews, for juvenile respondent-appellant. 
 
Miranda R. McCoy, for petitioner-appellee Jackson Springs 
Treatment Center. 
 
 
CALABRIA, Judge. 
 
 
C.W.F. appeals an order concurring with the voluntary 
admission of a minor and authorizing a continued admission for 
inpatient psychiatric treatment for a period of 90 days.  We vacate 
the order and remand to the trial court for findings. 
-2- 
 
 
On 7 August 2012, C.W.F’s mother consented to C.W.F.’s 
evaluation for treatment, services and support provided by Jackson 
Springs Treatment Center (“Jackson Springs”).  Freida Green 
(“Green”), a member of Jackson Springs’ staff, completed C.W.F.’s 
Evaluation for Admission/Continued Stay (“Green’s evaluation”).  
Green described her findings, included C.W.F.’s medications and 
recommended his admission for treatment or rehabilitation.   
On 8 August 2012, Green filed a Request for Hearing to 
determine whether the court concurred with the voluntary 
admission/continued stay.  Green attached her evaluation as well 
as a psychological evaluation prepared by licensed psychological 
associate Daniel Huang, M.A., dated 15 January 2012 (“Huang’s 
evaluation”).  
Dr. Leah McCallum, Ph.D. (“Dr. McCallum”), performed a 
Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (“McCallum’s assessment”) dated 
10 August 2012, which included, inter alia, C.W.F.’s general health 
and behavioral health history, described his removal from home for 
sexually abusing his younger sister, physical abuse by his father, 
and the precipitating events that caused his problems.  McCallum’s 
assessment also included recommendations for C.W.F.’s treatment 
within a structural 24-hour therapeutic environment.  Dr. McCallum 
justified treatment at Jackson Springs because less intense levels 
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of care where C.W.F. remained in the home and received community 
based treatment had been attempted but were unsuccessful.  In the 
less structured treatment environments, C.W.F. continued to 
exhibit emotional and behavioral problems both in the home and 
community settings.   
At the hearing in Moore County District Court on 22 August 
2012 to determine whether C.W.F. should be treated at Jackson 
Springs or whether a less restrictive environment would be 
sufficient, the trial court reviewed Green’s and Huang’s 
evaluations that had been attached to the Request for Hearing.  
C.W.F. was represented by appointed counsel.  Jackson Springs 
presented the testimony of clinical director Teresa McGuire 
(“McGuire”) as well as McCallum’s assessment.  McGuire, a social 
worker and clinical director at Jackson Springs, testified that 
she was providing C.W.F. with individual and group therapy.  
McGuire stated the reason C.W.F. was transferred to Jackson Springs 
from his prior treatment facility in South Carolina.  Specifically, 
during C.W.F’s prior placement, he displayed physical and verbal 
aggression and violated sexual boundaries with peers.  McGuire 
believed that in C.W.F.’s prior treatment facility, he had possibly 
learned the skills he needed to reduce his physical and verbal 
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aggression but had been unable to carry out those skills.  C.W.F. 
objected to McGuire’s testimony.   
When McGuire was questioned regarding the purpose of 
reviewing a patient’s medical records, she answered that it is 
part of the process of familiarizing the staff with a new patient’s 
history, and that to prepare for the hearing she had reviewed 
Green’s and Huang’s evaluations as well as McCallum’s assessment 
(collectively, 
“the 
reports”). 
 
C.W.F. 
objected 
to 
the 
introduction of the reports.  The trial court overruled C.W.F.’s 
objections to McGuire’s testimony and also admitted the reports.  
The trial court found as fact all matters that had been set 
out in Green’s evaluation, which included Green’s opinion that 
C.W.F. was mentally ill, and incorporated it by reference as 
findings.  Based on the findings, the trial court concluded that 
C.W.F. was mentally ill and in need of continued treatment at 
Jackson Springs because less restrictive measures would not be 
sufficient.  In addition, the court concurred with C.W.F.’s 
voluntary admission and authorized C.W.F.’s continued admission at 
Jackson Springs for 90 days.  C.W.F. appeals. 
C.W.F. argues that the court erred by admitting and relying 
on three reports prepared by non-testifying witnesses because the 
reports violated his right to confrontation.  We agree. 
-5- 
 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(f) (2011) provides the criteria 
for the trial court to determine whether a minor should remain in 
a voluntary admission:   
For an admission to be authorized beyond the 
hearing, the minor must be (1) mentally ill or 
a substance abuser and (2) in need of further 
treatment at the 24-hour facility to which he 
has been admitted.  Further treatment at the 
admitting facility should be undertaken only 
when lesser measures will be insufficient.  It 
is not necessary that the judge make a finding 
of dangerousness in order to support a 
concurrence in the admission. 
 
On appeal from an order of involuntary commitment, the questions 
for determination are (1) whether the court’s findings of fact 
“are indeed supported by the ‘facts’ which the court recorded in 
its order as supporting its findings, and (2) whether in any event 
there was competent evidence to support the court’s findings.”  In 
re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 433, 232 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977).  These 
same issues must be addressed in an appeal from the voluntary 
commitment of a minor. 
 
C.W.F. disputes the trial court’s findings of mental illness 
and that further treatment at Jackson Springs was based upon 
competent evidence.  Specifically, C.W.F. argues that the 
admission of all three reports deprived him of his right to 
confrontation.  
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3, which addresses hearings for 
review 
of 
voluntary 
admissions 
of 
minors, 
provides 
that 
“[c]ertified copies of reports and findings of physicians, 
psychologists and other responsible professionals as well as 
previous and current medical records are admissible in evidence, 
but the minor’s right, through his attorney, to confront and cross-
examine witnesses may not be denied.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
224.3(c) (2011).  Thus, the plain language of this statute not 
only permits admission of relevant medical records into evidence, 
but also ensures the minor’s right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses.  Id.  The juxtaposition of these two points in a single 
sentence indicates the legislature sought to protect the minor’s 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses regarding those 
admissible records. 
In the instant case, McGuire was Jackson Springs’ sole witness 
at the hearing.  C.W.F.’s counsel specifically objected to 
McGuire’s reliance on the reports “on the grounds of hearsay, lack 
of confrontation, and foundation” and later objected to the 
admission of the reports themselves on the same grounds.  The court 
overruled the objections and admitted Green’s report as well as 
Huang’s evaluation and McCallum’s assessment.  McGuire indicated 
that the purpose of all three reports was for the professionals at 
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Jackson Springs to acquaint themselves with C.W.F.’s specific 
needs and individual conditions as a new patient.  
The trial court found as fact all matters in Green’s 
evaluation, and incorporated it by reference as findings.  The 
court made no additional findings of fact.  While Green’s 
evaluation was certified as a true and exact copy of the Evaluation 
for Admission/Continued Stay, and therefore admissible under N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(c) as a certified copy of a report by a 
“psychologist [or] other responsible professional,” Green was not 
available to testify at the hearing.  In addition, Green was not 
subject to cross-examination regarding her evaluation and opinions 
regarding C.W.F.’s mental health.  Therefore, the trial court erred 
in relying solely on Green’s evaluation, since C.W.F. had no 
opportunity to cross-examine her. 
The court’s conclusions of law that C.W.F. was mentally ill, 
in need of continued treatment, and that less restrictive measures 
than a voluntary commitment would not be sufficient, are based 
solely upon Green’s report.  However, Green did not testify at the 
hearing, and C.W.F. was unable to confront or cross-examine Green 
regarding the findings and opinions she recorded in her evaluation.  
Since N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-224.3(c) protects a minor’s right to 
cross-examine witnesses regarding relevant medical records, we 
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vacate the trial court’s order, remand for further findings, and 
need not address C.W.F.’s remaining arguments. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Judges ELMORE and STEPHENS concur.