Title: Josh J. v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12286 
 
JOSH J., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2017. - January 31, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Bail.  Delinquent Child.  Due Process of Law, Pretrial 
detainees.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 11, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Eliza Lockhart-Jenks, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the juvenile. 
 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case, here on a reservation and report by a 
single justice of the county court in response to the juvenile's 
petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requires us to consider the 
proper application of G. L. c. 276, § 58, and G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58B, specifically with regard to the number of days an 
2 
 
 
individual may be held without bail after a bail revocation 
hearing.  We conclude that where an individual has been released 
on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is probable 
cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released 
on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either 
§ 58 or § 58B.  The judge must then determine whether the 
Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the particular 
statute, either § 58 or § 58B, under which it sought to revoke 
bail. 
1.  Background and prior proceedings.  On May 6, 2016, a 
delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with breaking 
and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony and 
larceny over $250.  A judge in the Juvenile Court set the 
juvenile's bail at $1,000.  The judge also advised the juvenile, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that the juvenile's bail could 
be revoked if he committed a new crime while on release.  The 
juvenile posted bail and was released. 
 
In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against 
the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while 
on release on the pending charges, including two counts of 
assault and battery on a pregnant victim and one count of 
malicious destruction of property valued over $250.  In 
November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth 
sought to revoke the juvenile's bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
3 
 
 
§ 58.  A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion, 
revoked the juvenile's bail, and set a date for a bail review 
hearing on January 30, 2017, which amounted to a ninety-day bail 
revocation.1 
By January 10, 2017, the charges stemming from the 
juvenile's conduct while he was released on bail had been 
resolved.2  The juvenile continued to be held on the original 
charges, however, so he moved to vacate the bail revocation 
order, but the judge who had revoked bail denied that motion.  
In response, the juvenile filed an emergency petition with this 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  After a hearing, the 
single justice issued an interim order, noting that the issue 
raised by the juvenile in the petition, which he now presses 
before the full court, was not raised in the trial court, and 
concluding that the Juvenile Court judge did not abuse his 
discretion in refusing to vacate the bail revocation order in 
these circumstances.  One day later, there was a disposition in 
the underlying delinquency complaint.  The single justice 
subsequently reserved and reported the matter raised in the 
                                                 
1 The Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion 
to revoke bail in a margin endorsement which did not cite G. L. 
c. 276, § 58, or G. L. c. 276, § 58B, or otherwise reference a 
ninety-day revocation period. 
 
2 Ultimately, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent on one 
count of assault and battery on a pregnant victim.  The juvenile 
received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation until 
his eighteenth birthday. 
4 
 
 
juvenile's petition to the full court, in order to give the 
court an opportunity to address the proper application of G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 58 and 58B, 
 
2.  Discussion.  Although this case is moot, we address the 
issues raised because, as the single justice noted, they are 
"fully briefed and raise matters of importance that are likely 
to arise again, but are unlikely to be capable of appellate 
review in the normal course before they become moot."  Delaney 
v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 490, 492 (1993), quoting Upton, 
petitioner, 387 Mass. 359, 365 (1982). 
 
Bail revocation under §§ 58 and 58B.  The juvenile claims 
that the judge erred in applying the ninety-day revocation 
period under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, as opposed to the sixty-day 
revocation period under G. L. c. 276, § 58, after finding 
probable cause to believe that the juvenile had committed a 
crime while released on bail under § 58.  The crux of the 
juvenile's argument is that because bail can be revoked under 
either § 58 or § 58B, where an individual commits a crime while 
on release, the statutes create an ambiguous bail revocation 
framework, and therefore, the rule of lenity requires the 
application of the sixty-day revocation period under § 58.  To 
resolve this issue, we begin with the pertinent portions of § 58 
and § 58B.  General Laws c. 276, § 58, sixth par., provides in 
pertinent part: 
5 
 
 
 
"If a person is on release pending the 
adjudication of a prior charge, and the court . . . 
finds probable cause to believe that the person has 
committed a crime during said period of release, the 
court shall then determine, in the exercise of its 
discretion, whether the release of said person will 
seriously endanger any person or the community. . . . 
If the court determines that the release of said 
person will seriously endanger any person or the 
community and that the detention of the person is 
necessary to reasonably assure the safety of any 
person or the community, the court may revoke bail on 
the prior charge and may order said person held 
without bail pending the adjudication of said prior 
charge, for a period not to exceed sixty days." 
 
The relevant portion of G. L. c. 276, § 58B, provides: 
 
"A person who has been released after a hearing 
pursuant to [§ 58]. . . shall be subject to a 
revocation of release and an order of detention . . . 
[if] the judicial officer finds (1) that there is 
probable cause to believe that the person has 
committed a [F]ederal or [S]tate crime while on 
release, . . . and (2) the judicial officer finds that 
there are no conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to 
the safety of any other person or the community; or 
the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or 
combination of conditions of release."  
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"A person detained under this subsection . . . 
shall not be detained for a period exceeding ninety 
days excluding any period of delay as defined in 
[Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1978)]." 
 
 
To determine the proper application of §§ 58 and 58B, we 
apply the well-established principles of statutory construction.  
Our fundamental aim is to "discern and effectuate the intent of 
6 
 
 
the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 777 
(2017).  To that end, "[t]he language of the statute is the 
primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature."  
Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300 (2007).  Therefore, 
where the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry into the 
Legislature's intent need go no further than the statute's plain 
and ordinary meaning.  See Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 
Mass. 814, 818 (2006); Shamban v. Masidlover, 429 Mass. 50, 54 
(1999) ("we are constrained to follow statutory language when it 
is plain and unambiguous, unless to do so would lead to an 
absurd result, or be contrary to the Legislature's manifest 
intention").  We also are mindful that where "two or more 
statutes relate to the same subject matter, 'they should be 
construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole,' 
creat[ing] a consistent body of law, and giv[ing] full effect to 
the expressed intent of the Legislature."  Paquette v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 130 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1150 (2004), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 
368 Mass. 511, 513-514 (1975). 
 
The plain language of G. L. c. 276, §§ 58 and 58B, is clear 
and unambiguous, particularly where § 58B explicitly includes 
persons released on bail under § 58; an individual who is 
released on bail pursuant to § 58 may have his or her bail 
revoked under either § 58 or § 58B where, among other 
7 
 
 
requirements, there is probable cause to believe the individual 
committed a crime while on release.  The Legislature's decision 
to provide two bail revocation mechanisms in these circumstances 
does not create ambiguity.  Paquette, 440 Mass. at 130 ("The 
Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it 
amends a statute or enacts a new one").  The Commonwealth's 
discretion to seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B 
does not equate to an ambiguous or otherwise impermissible bail 
revocation scheme.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 
159 (2017) (although two statutes criminalizing identical 
conduct "create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and 
therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no 
greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various 
alternative punishments" [citation omitted]).  Furthermore, 
although the Commonwealth may move to revoke under either § 58 
or § 58B where an individual commits a crime while on release, 
it nonetheless must satisfy the distinct requirements of the 
statute upon which its motion is based.  Compare G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58 (revocation only where continued release "will seriously 
endanger any person or the community"), with G. L. c. 276, § 58B 
(revocation only where "there are no conditions of release that 
will reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the 
safety of any other person or the community; or the person is 
unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions 
8 
 
 
of release").  The Legislature is free to amend these statutes 
to provide a single means of revocation where an individual 
commits an offense while released on bail pursuant to § 58; 
however, the bail revocation scheme is not ambiguous in its 
current form, and therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply.3 
 
b.  Due process.  The juvenile also claims that revoking 
bail under § 58B where an individual has been released on bail 
pursuant to § 58, and subsequently commits a crime while on 
release, violates due process.4  Because pretrial detention 
encroaches on a fundamental liberty interest, we consider both 
substantive and procedural due process.  See Paquette, 440 Mass. 
at 124, 131. 
                                                 
3 We note that although §§ 58 and 58B are not ambiguous, the 
existing bail revocation scheme, as it applies to individuals 
released on bail under § 58, can lead to incongruous results.  
For example, an individual who has been released on bail in 
Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 57, for a serious 
crime may have his or her bail revoked for sixty days under § 58 
if he or she commits another serious crime while on release.  In 
contrast, if an individual commits a less serious crime and is 
released by a District Court judge on bail with conditions of 
release pursuant to § 58, and that person violates a condition 
of release that does not amount to a crime, the only available 
revocation mechanism is § 58B, which results in a revocation 
period not to exceed ninety days, excluding any period of delay 
as defined by Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 
(1979). 
 
4 Based on the facts in the record and the issue that was 
reserved and reported, we narrow our focus to determine whether 
revocation under § 58B satisfies due process requirements only 
where an individual is released on bail under § 58. 
9 
 
 
 
i.  Substantive due process.  "'"[S]ubstantive due process" 
prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks 
the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), 
or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).' 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)."  
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164 (2004), quoting Aime 
v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993).  Where, as here, the 
statute imposes a restriction on a fundamental right -- freedom 
from physical restraint -- the statute "will be upheld only if 
it is 'narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest.'"  Paquette, 440 Mass. at 125, quoting 
Aime, supra.  It is well established that the State "may impose 
a regulatory restraint on the individual in narrowly-
circumscribed situations."  Aime, 414 Mass. at 677-678.  See 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749 ("government's interest in preventing 
crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling"). 
 
We held in Paquette, 440 Mass. at 131, that the bail 
revocation provision contained in § 58 survived due process 
scrutiny because it "is narrowly tailored to further the 
Commonwealth's legitimate and compelling interests in assuring 
compliance with its laws, and in preserving the integrity of the 
judicial process by exacting obedience to its lawful orders."  
Similarly, the bail revocation procedure contained in § 58B is 
10 
 
 
narrowly tailored to further the purpose of ensuring that an 
individual who is released on bail pursuant to § 58 complies 
with the court's lawful orders, particularly that the individual 
refrain from committing a new crime while released on bail.  We 
further emphasized in Paquette that revoking bail does not 
violate substantive due process because "the liberty interest of 
a person admitted to bail is conditional; if the person violates 
the explicit condition of his release, then his liberty can be 
curtailed."  Id. at 126 ("the keys to continued freedom are left 
in the pocket of the accused" [citation omitted]).5  Accordingly, 
we are satisfied that the revocation provision of § 58B, as it 
applies to individuals who have been released on bail under § 58 
and subsequently commit a crime, survives substantive due 
process scrutiny. 
ii.  Procedural due process.  Even where government action 
survives substantive due process scrutiny, procedural due 
process protections require that the governmental action be 
implemented in a fair manner.  Paquette, 440 Mass. at 131, 
quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.  "The core of procedural due 
                                                 
5 Moreover, we observed that a "defendant cannot be heard to 
complain that his constitutional right to liberty has been 
violated when continued freedom was entirely within his own 
control, and the deprivation thereof was an inevitable 
consequence of his alleged failure to conform his conduct to the 
laws of this Commonwealth and to the explicit condition of his 
earlier release."  Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 129 
(2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). 
11 
 
 
process is the adequacy of the hearing provided before a 
deprivation of liberty or property occurs."  Aime, 414 Mass. at 
683.  "In determining what process is due . . . this court 'must 
balance the interests of the individual affected, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of those interests and the government's 
interest in the efficient and economic administration of its 
affairs.'"  Paquette, supra at 131, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 112, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1020 (1982). 
 
We conclude that G. L. c. 276, § 58B, contains adequate 
procedural safeguards to protect against erroneous deprivations 
of liberty that are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
procedural due process.  A critical component of our holding in 
Paquette was that, prior to releasing a defendant on bail, § 58 
requires that the judge explicitly advise the defendant that 
bail may be revoked if the defendant commits a new crime while 
on release. Paquette, 440 Mass. at 126, discussing G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58, first par.  This constitutionally significant prerelease 
protection is afforded to all defendants released on bail 
pursuant to § 58, regardless of whether bail is eventually 
revoked under § 58B. 
 
The procedures applied where bail is revoked under § 58B 
are also constitutionally adequate.  As relevant here, a court 
"shall" revoke bail under § 58B only after a hearing where the 
Commonwealth (and the defendant) present evidence, and two 
12 
 
 
requirements are satisfied.6  First, there must be "probable 
cause to believe that the person has committed a [F]ederal or 
[S]tate crime while on release."  G. L. c. 276, § 58B.  We hold, 
as we did in Paquette, that the probable cause standard for 
determining whether a defendant committed a crime while on 
release survives constitutional scrutiny in the context of a 
bail revocation hearing.  See Paquette, 440 Mass. at 131-132. 
 
Second, "the judicial officer" has to "find[] that there 
are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 
person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person 
or the community; or the person is unlikely to abide by any 
condition or combination of conditions of release."  G. L. 
c. 276, § 58B.  This is a significantly weightier showing to 
revoke bail than under § 58.  Section 58 requires a showing that 
the defendant "will seriously endanger any person or the 
community."  Revocation under § 58B requires not only a showing 
that the person will pose a danger to any other person or the 
community, but also "that there are no conditions of release 
                                                 
6 Because G. L. c. 276, § 58B, relates to "[a] person who 
has been released after a hearing pursuant to section[] . . . 
58," we interpret the procedural requirements of a revocation 
hearing under § 58B to be equivalent to those when the 
Commonwealth seeks to revoke bail for the commission of a 
subsequent offense while the person is on release pursuant to 
§ 58.  See Jake J. v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 70, 79 (2000) 
("requirements of § 58B for revoking bail appear no less 
rigorous than any other requirement that may have obtained in a 
bail revocation"). 
13 
 
 
that will reasonably assure the person" will not pose such a 
danger.  Only after determining that there is no set of 
conditions that would allow the release of the individual under 
§ 58B "shall" the judge revoke bail.  Id.7  The dual bail 
revocation mechanisms established by §§ 58 and 58B are 
constitutionally sufficient, in part, because the Commonwealth 
can move for a sixty-day revocation, with a reduced showing, 
under § 58, or for a ninety-day revocation, with a heightened 
showing -- providing greater procedural protections to prevent 
erroneous deprivations of liberty -- under § 58B.8  Additionally, 
                                                 
7 The parties did not argue, and we do not decide, whether 
the rebuttable presumption in § 58B is constitutional in the 
context of a revocation under § 58B when bail was granted under 
§ 58.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58B, second par. ("[i]f there is 
probable cause to believe that" defendant committed crime while 
on release, "a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition 
or combination of conditions will assure that the person will 
not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community").  We note, however, that the rebuttable presumption 
in § 58B may be difficult to reconcile with the presumption 
recognized in § 58 that an individual will be released on bail 
or personal recognizance.  Cf. Delaney v. Commonwealth, 415 
Mass. 490, 495 (1993). 
 
8 We are cognizant that the potential deprivation of liberty 
implicated by a bail revocation under § 58 or § 58B can be 
substantial.  We held in Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 315, 
322 (2005), that the revocation period under § 58 "shall be 
valid for a period of sixty days."  The ninety-day revocation 
period under § 58B, however, includes excusable delay under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), which means that the period of 
pretrial detention can extend well beyond ninety days.  Even 
though the statutory scheme is clear that bail may be revoked in 
this circumstance under either § 58 or § 58B, the heightened "no 
conditions" analysis under § 58B provides the requisite 
14 
 
 
requiring that bail be revoked only after finding that there is 
no combination of conditions that would allow the defendant's 
release furthers the bail statute's purpose of "establish[ing] 
the right of the accused, in most circumstances, to be admitted 
to bail." Paquette, 440 Mass. at 126, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Finelli, 422 Mass. 860, 863 (1996).9  Consonant with our holding 
in Paquette, supra, the bail revocation inquiries under § 58B 
are left to the sound discretion of the judge, and they provide 
the necessary procedural protections to satisfy procedural due 
process.  Accordingly, the revocation procedure set forth in 
§ 58B complies with both substantive and procedural due process 
in the context of a bail revocation hearing where an individual 
was released on bail pursuant to § 58 and where the Commonwealth 
seeks to revoke bail under § 58B because the defendant allegedly 
committed a crime while on release.10 
                                                                                                                                                             
procedural protections to support the longer period of 
revocation. 
 
9 "The principal legislative purpose of § 58 is 'to protect 
the rights of the defendant by establishing a presumption that 
he or she will be admitted to bail on personal recognizance 
without surety and by delineating carefully the circumstances 
under which bail may be denied.'"  Pagan, 445 Mass. at 319, 
quoting Delaney, 415 Mass. at 495. 
 
10 The juvenile's claim that the Juvenile Court judge erred 
in denying his motion to reconsider the bail revocation order 
exceeds the parameters of the issue before us, and thus we 
decline to address it. 
15 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that where an individual has been 
released on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is 
probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while 
released on bail, a trial court judge may revoke bail under 
either § 58 or G. L. c. 276, § 58B, if the Commonwealth is able 
to make the requisite showing under the respective statute. 
 
The matter is remanded to the single justice of the county 
court, where an order shall enter dismissing the petition as 
moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.