Title: Bachand v. Walters

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bachand v. Walters1991 WY 59809 P.2d 284Case Number: 91-6Decided: 04/22/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Yvonne K. BACHAND 
(Walters), Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Robert James WALTERS, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Affirmed.

Urbigkit, C.J., dissented and 
filed opinion. 

Stephen M. Kissinger, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Robert J. Walters, 
appellee, pro se.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ.

OPINION

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this case, we are 
called upon to determine whether the district court erred in clarifying its own 
order modifying a decree of divorce.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant Yvonne K. 
Bachand (Walters) states this issue:

     Issue 1. The District 
Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Order on Petition to Modify Divorce Decree 
Entered March 8, 1990.

Appellee Robert James 
Walters counters:

     1. Did the District 
Court Abuse His Discretion By Revising and Clarifying the Parties' Divorce 
Decree to (a) grant the Appellant the ability to visit the Parties' Children 
When they visited the Appellee Out of State During the Summer; and (b) To Extend 
Appellee's Summer Visitation Period By the Amount of Time in Which Appellant 
Visited?

     2. Is Appellant 
subject to costs, penalties and damages pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 for bringing 
a frivolous and meritless appeal?

[¶4.]     The parties were 
divorced by a decree entered on March 15, 1987. The wife was awarded custody of 
the parties' two minor children, who were then about four and one-half years and 
three months of age. The original decree provided for visitation rights, largely 
premised upon the fact that both parents were residing in Cheyenne, but also 
contained this provision:

     If the parties reside 
in different communities which prevents the exercise of the visitation during 
the week, Husband shall be entitled to have the children for six weeks during 
the summer months. Further, during the years in which Husband is entitled to 
have the children on Christmas day, he shall be entitled to have them for one 
week during the Christmas vacation.

In June 1989, the husband 
sought to have the decree modified as to his visitation rights. He premised his 
request for modification upon the fact that he had moved to southern California. The husband 
asked to be given four additional weeks of visitation during the summers as well 
as other periods of visitation which coincided with school vacation periods. The 
wife objected to lengthy summer visitations and introduced expert testimony 
indicating that, because of their ages, the children could be adversely affected 
by being away from their primary caretaker for periods longer than four weeks at 
one time. The district court, acknowledging that it was in the best interests of 
the children, entered an order on March 8, 1990, modifying the visitation 
provisions as follows:

     The visitation 
provisions of the Judgment and Decree of [D]ivorce entered herein on the 15th 
day of May, 1987 should be, and the same are hereby, clarified to provide as 
follows:

a. During the summers of 
1990, 1991 and 1992, Plaintiff's summer visitation with the minor children shall 
be one visitation period of three (3) weeks containing four (4) weekends during 
the first month of summer vacation and a second visitation period of three (3) 
weeks containing four (4) weekends during the third month of summer 
vacation.

b. During the summers of 
1990, 1991 and 1992, Defendant shall be entitled to visit the minor children for 
the Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of the second week of each such visitation 
period. Such Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays shall not be included when 
determining Plaintiff's visitation periods.

c. Beginning in the 
summer of 1993, Plaintiff shall be entitled to seven (7) consecutive weeks 
summer visitation containing no less than eight (8) weekends. During such summer 
visitation, Defendant shall be entitled to visit the minor children for the 
Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of such weeks as she may be able to travel to 
Plaintiff's place of residence. Such Tuesday(s), Wednesday(s) and Thursday(s) 
shall not be included when determining Plaintiff's visitation 
period.

[¶5.]     On May 14, 1990, the 
husband filed a motion for an order to show cause why the wife should not be 
held in contempt of the modified visitation order, claiming that the wife failed 
to abide by the terms and conditions of that order. On June 15, 1990, the wife 
filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that she had fully complied 
with the modified visitation order. The district court denied both motions on 
November 20, 1990, and, because of the parties' disagreement as to the 
interpretation of the March 8, 1990, order, issued a clarifying order, which 
provided in part:

     3. That the Court 
hereby clarifies the Court Order of March 8, 1990 as follows:

a. That the Court hereby 
adds the following to paragraph 3a: "This schedule applies if Mother does not 
exercise any visitation as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c.["]

b. ["]In the event the 
Mother chooses to exercise visitation as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c, then 
Father shall be entitled to an additional visitation with his children for such 
time as the Mother has visited the children. This means that should the Mother 
visit less than the full three days, the Father will not be entitled to three 
additional days but only such additional time as utilized by the Mother in 
visiting the children as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c."

     4. That the Court in 
further clarification of the Court's Order of March 8, 1990 hereby adds the 
following sentence at the end of paragraph 3c o[f] said Order: "The Mother shall 
be limited to two (2) visits under this paragraph."

This appeal 
followed.

[¶6.]     Wyo. Stat. § 
20-2-113(a) (Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part:

Either parent may 
petition the court to enforce or revise the decree. The court has continuing 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires.

Neither party filed a 
motion to revise the visitation schedule. The wife urges us to view this matter 
from the perspective that the district court was construing its order, that such 
a construction is a question of law, and that we should give no particular 
deference to the decision of the district court. It is our view that the parties 
clearly demonstrated, through their actions and pleadings, the existence of a 
profound disagreement about the visitation periods. In the March 8, 1990, order, 
the district court employed language which was subject to misconstruction, 
especially in view of the parties' now rather obvious hostility level. 
Therefore, we conclude that the district court could properly clarify its 
earlier modification order in light of the circumstances of the parents and for 
the benefit of the children. See Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶7.]     The husband asserts 
that the wife's appeal was meritless and asks this Court to so certify and to 
award costs and a penalty pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05. We decline to do 
so.

[¶8.]     Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶9.]     It is with discomfort 
and deep concern for organized and determinate litigative processes that I view 
the pleadings and decisional developments in this case. In apprehension that a 
trial court decision without pleadings in the guise of construction of its prior 
order or decision would deny due process and a fair opportunity to defend, I 
respectfully dissent.

[¶10.]  The intrinsic system of American 
adjudication is notice by pleadings so that an opportunity to contest will be 
afforded. In this case, the trial court amended a prior order on visitation 
without either foundational pleadings or a trial motion to amend to conform to 
the evidence. W.R.C.P. 15(b). I am convinced that the majority directly ignores 
what this court defined as criteria for valid court action before relief can be 
granted in Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶11.]  The divorce decree non-pleading 
modification delineation of Connors, when a pleaded demand for relief was not 
provided to afford notice and opportunity to defend, should not be so lightly 
subjugated as we do in this case in the guise of what is a constructional change 
with amendatory substance. Without regard for the broad perspective of judicial 
discretion in amending an existing divorce decree, we still need to look at what 
the parties plead before determining that the trial court in this case, in good 
faith but without the statutory requirement of pleading, had the power to change 
the original or first amended decree in subsequent hearing. Connors, 769 P.2d  at 
349.

[¶12.]  The record sequence of these post-decree 
proceedings started with a March 8, 1990, "Order on Petition to Modify Divorce 
Decree". In that order, specific and defined child visitation proceedings were 
explicitly stated. No appeal was taken.

[¶13.]  However, we then almost immediately start 
over again. On May 14, 1990, the father filed a "Motion for Order to Show Cause 
Why Defendant Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court for Willful Interference 
of Plaintiff's Visitation Rights and for Willful Failure to Abide by the Terms 
of this Court's Judgment and Decree and for the Reasonable and Necessary Costs 
of this Action." The pleading contended that there had been noncompliance with 
the original decree and order of March 8, 1990. Attached material indicated a 
desire to have the trial court interpret the two month old amendatory decree 
regarding visitation. Specifically what interpretation was desired is not stated 
in the father's motion.

[¶14.]  The mother responded without any 
illumination by her pleadings to define what may have been the specific 
interpretive need. Conjunctive with her response, the mother also moved for 
summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was a "talking pleading" by 
addition of a significant number of factual allegations by briefing which were 
otherwise not factually contained in the record.

[¶15.]  In the flurry of documentary filings, the 
record comes to reveal a two stage contest about visitation involving the mother 
who remained in Cheyenne and the father who lives 
in San Diego, California. The summer visitation for the 
father collapsed from one period of six weeks into two periods of three weeks 
each. At an early stage, it was recognized that the three week visitation 
periods should include weekends on both sides in order then to total three weeks 
and two days.

[¶16.]  That issue was settled out in contested 
detail, but another more pressing question followed. The argument that next 
developed concerned the mother's visitation for three days during the second 
three week period while the children were in San Diego. The father's affidavit of July 12, 
1990 tells us that if the mother is to be given rights during the father's 
summer visitation as a mid-visitation interruption of three days, then the three 
weeks and two days should be extended to three weeks and five days to compensate 
for interruption of his time. We know this because it is stated in the pro se 
affidavit argument by the father, but in no way included as a request for 
pleading relief derived from the case status of a petition to hold the mother in 
contempt.

[¶17.]  The file seems at that stage to present 
nothing more than an application to hold the mother in contempt for failure to 
agree to the father's nonjudicial desire to accomplish a further amendment to 
the visitation decree to assure the compensatory additional visitation time of 
three days.

[¶18.]  Following testimonial argument of counsel 
for the mother and the father pro se, the order was entered from which appeal is 
now taken. Contempt was dismissed, the motion for summary judgment was overruled 
and the trial court stated: 

     3. That the Court 
hereby clarifies the Court Order of March 8, 1990 as follows:

     a. That the Court 
hereby adds the following to paragraph 3a: "This schedule applies if Mother does 
not exercise any visitation as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c.

     b. In the event the 
Mother chooses to exercise visitation as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c, then 
Father shall be entitled to an additional visitation with his children for such 
time as the Mother has visited the children. This means that should the Mother 
visit less than the full three days, the Father will not be entitled to three 
additional days but only such additional time as utilized by the Mother in 
visiting the children as set out in paragraph 3b and 3c."

     4. That the Court in 
further clarification of the Court's Order of March 8, 1990 hereby adds the 
following sentence at the end of paragraph 3c or [sic] said Order: "The Mother 
shall be limited to two (2) visits under this paragraph."

     5. That all other 
terms and conditions of the Order of March 8, 1990 shall remain the same except 
as altered hereby.

[¶19.]  On appeal the mother contends that the 
change was an erroneous interpretation of the prior visitation amendment. The 
father denied abuse of discretion in the clarification modification whereby the 
mother was assured interim visitation and the father an equivalent additional 
time for his period of visitation. Finally, in reply brief, the mother reached 
the real issue, albeit obliquely, which was decree amendment without supporting 
pleading. Neither litigant cited Connors, 769 P.2d 336.

[¶20.]  I would not find Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 
1990), Macy, J., dissenting, cited by both litigants to supercede the pleading 
rule of Connors. Clearly in Gaines, the conflict got to the court as an actual 
pleading request for modification addressing visitation. The dissent denied 
proper evidence on the record of a substantial change and not that there was no 
pleading to establish the litigation controversy. The entire decisional process 
in Gaines was consequently different than the Connors rule which related to the 
foundational requirement of pleading. Furthermore, Connors was not cited in 
Gaines.

[¶21.]  My concern with what we do here is the 
confusion created about orderly processing with adequate notice in these 
sufficiently complex post-decree divorce intricacies. This court and the trial 
bench should remain clearly fixed to the Connors rule that relief by 
modification of a divorce decree can only be provided if a request is made by a 
pleading to provide notice and an opportunity to defend. I do not necessarily 
doubt the justice implicit in giving the father an additional three days for 
visitation as an offset to the mother's mid-term interruption of his visitation. 
I do, however, question the pleading status to justify anything as affirmative 
relief in a case where one party moves for and is denied contempt, and the other 
party moves for and is denied summary judgment.

[¶22.]  This majority, perhaps because counsel 
led the way, now ignores Connors and its jurisdictional character. It is hard to 
conclude that an additional grant of visitation time is interpretive only and 
not a modification or revision.1

[¶23.]  I would find our decision in Connors to 
be peculiarly within the present structures of this appeal.

     Jurisdiction over all 
aspects of divorce actions in Wyoming is conferred upon the district courts 
by W.S. 20-2-101 through 20-2-118. Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1340 
(Wyo. 1988). 
While the general rule is that a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the 
custody and support aspects of its own decree, Graham [v. Fenno], 734 P.2d [983] 
at 985 [(Wyo. 1987)]; Erb [v. Erb], 573 P.2d [849] at 851 [(Wyo. 1978)]; Strahan 
[v. Strahan], 400 P.2d [542] at 543 [(Wyo. 1965)], such jurisdiction is bestowed 
upon the court only through proper petition by one of the parents in the 
underlying action pursuant to W.S. 20-2-113(a). W.S. 20-2-113(a) provides in 
relevant part:

In granting a divorce or 
annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as 
appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. * * * 
On the petition of either of the parents, the court may revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires. [Emphasis 
added.]

The effect of the 
foregoing statute, as it applies to the instant case, is that it authorizes the 
court, "[o]n the petition of either of the parents," to revise and alter its 
decree. The clear language of this section instructs that the court may 
not, of its own initiative, modify its own order with respect to, among 
other things, a child support obligation absent a proper petition by one of the 
parents requesting such modification.

* * * * * *

     Thus, a petition of 
one of the parents seeking modification of an existing order is a statutory 
prerequisite to the court's power to act. W.S. 20-2-113(a).

Connors, 769 P.2d  at 
348-49 (emphasis in original).

[¶24.]  Lacking either a pleading or something in 
the nature of a motion to conform pleading to the evidence, W.R.C.P. 15(b), I 
would remand the case to the trial court for further consideration in accord 
with Connors. If further specificity or additional amendments to resolve the 
squabbling about visitation is needed, then one of the parties should ask by a 
proper pleading which might also provide the trial court the assistance of a 
response by the other party to be directly addressed to the issue 
presented.

[¶25.]  Dismissal of a citation for contempt and 
rejection of summary judgment where a counterclaim had not been presented do not 
appear to be the proper carriers for divorce decree 
amendment.

FOOTNOTES

1 I can understand the 
trial court's obvious frustration. The continued inane squabbling by the parents 
in this case cannot benefit the children and, if continued, may clearly justify 
assessment of substantial attorney fees or other sanctions and particularly so 
since the father appears pro se. The file we are presented following entry of 
the order of November 20, 1990, from which appeal is taken, now shows yet 
another proceeding involving the same disputes which appears to have been 
scheduled for a February 25, 1991 hearing. There is not anything in the record 
that I can find now to be less than clearly defined. Surely the parents should 
be able to read as well and, even if not, to then think of the welfare of their 
children and accept a mutual resolution no matter what inhibitions may exist to 
reading something that is relatively specific.