Title: In re J.M.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

On re J.M. (99-374); 170 Vt. 611; 750 A.2d 442

[Filed 22-Feb-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-374

                             JANUARY TERM, 2000

In re J.M.	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
    	                               }	Franklin Family Court
                                       }	
                                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 251-11-94Frjv             
   	
             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Mother and stepfather appeal from a family court judgment terminating
  mother's residual parental  rights and denying stepfather's request for
  custody of the minor, J.M.  Stepfather contends the  court: (1) erroneously
  failed to treat him as a parent; and (2) made clearly erroneous findings of 
  fact.  Mother joins in stepfather's arguments, and further contends the
  court's findings and  conclusions concerning her physical condition were
  clearly erroneous.  We affirm.

       The family court's findings may be summarized as follows.  The family
  has a lengthy history with  the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
  Services dating from December 1992, when SRS filed  a petition alleging
  that J.M., who was then one month old, was a child in need of care and 
  supervision.  Mother and J.M.'s father separated during this period and
  were later divorced.   Mother began living with stepfather in early 1993. 
  They had four children together: two sons,  Se.Y. and Sc.Y., born in August
  1993 and September 1994, respectively, who were also the  subject of the
  TPR proceeding, and two daughters, born in May 1996 and December 1997, who 
  remain with the parents.  Mother and stepfather married in 1998.

       The parties stipulated to CHINS in January 1993, and the court ordered
  protective supervision and  required mother to participate in a variety of
  parent-education programs.  Following a merits  hearing in May 1995, the
  court found that J.M. and his two stepbrothers were CHINS based upon 
  evidence of filthy and unkempt conditions in the home that rendered it
  unsafe for the children.  SRS social workers observed no sheets in the
  cribs, dirty clothes and rotten food covering the  floors, potentially
  dangerous items within reach of the children, and one child with dried
  feces  caked to his lower back and bottom.  The court placed the children
  in stepfather's custody with  protective supervision, ordered mother to
  move out until she could safely transition back into the  home, and
  required both mother and stepfather to participate in parent-education
  services.

       During the next year, the three boys were removed periodically from
  the home as a result of  continued neglect.  They were removed for the last
  time in June 1996, and have remained in foster  care ever since.  Over the
  next year and a half, the caseplan continued to call for reunification and 
  parenting services for mother and stepfather.  SRS workers reported that
  mother did not cooperate  with the parenting program and that mother and
  stepfather were unable to safely supervise the  children during visits. 
  Although stepfather was working fulltime, he served as the primary 
  caretaker.  SRS workers reported that he had progressed in his parenting
  skills, but not enough  to safely parent the children.  

 

       In January 1998, SRS moved to terminate residual parental rights with
  respect to J.M., Se.Y., and  Sc.Y.  In May of that year, J.M. moved into a
  home with foster parents interested in adoption.  The court found that the
  foster parents have been a positive force in J.M.'s life, having 
  demonstrated an ability to deal with his special needs.  

       Stepfather moved to intervene in the proceeding to terminate mother's
  parental rights to J.M.,  noting that he had earlier been granted custody
  of the minor and arguing that he had effectively  functioned as the child's
  psychological parent.  The court consolidated the TPR proceedings 
  involving Se.Y., Sc.Y., and J.M., but denied the motion to grant stepfather
  party status as to J.M.  Pursuant to V.R.C.P. 54(b), the court granted
  stepfather's motion for a final judgment on his  claim for party status,
  and he thereupon appealed the ruling to this Court.  We dismissed the 
  appeal, noting that V.R.C.P. 54 does not apply to CHINS cases, and that the
  issue was not  unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment under V.R.A.P.
  5.1.  

       The TPR hearing took place over six days between January and March
  1999, and included the  testimony of numerous SRS caseworkers, service
  providers, visitation supervisors, foster parents,  a psychologist who had
  evaluated the family, mother, and stepfather.  During the course of the 
  hearing, stepfather moved for custody and guardianship of J.M.  The court
  issued extensive  written findings and conclusions in July 1999, granting
  the petition to terminate mother's residual  parental rights to J.M., and
  denying stepfather's request for custody.  This appeal followed.

       Stepfather renews his claim that the court erred in declining his
  request to be accorded party status  as J.M.'s de facto parent and in
  failing, accordingly, to apply the statutory criteria for the  termination
  of residual parental rights under 33 V.S.A. § 5540.  Because the statutory
  scheme  governing juvenile proceedings does not expressly define "parent,"
  stepfather contends the  common law governs, and that under the common law
  one who stands in loco parentis to a child  acquires the status of a parent
  in a termination proceeding.  The claim overlooks the distinction  between
  parents and stepparents that runs throughout our statutory scheme.  See,
  e.g., 15A  V.S.A. §§ 4-101-113 (setting forth requirements for stepparent's
  adoption of stepchild); 15  V.S.A. § 293 (setting forth provision for
  courts to award custody where parents or stepparents  live separately); 15
  V.S.A. § 296 (setting forth stepparent's duty to support stepchild residing
  in  same household).  Absent a clear legislative directive, we decline to
  judicially expand the meaning  of parent to subsume a stepparent,
  psychological parent, or any other person claiming in loco  parentis
  authority in a TPR proceeding.  See Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 385,