Title: State v. Lawrence

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 585A97
FILED 16 JUNE 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JIMMIE WAYNE LAWRENCE
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Bowen
(Wiley F.), J., on 11 December 1997 in Superior Court, Harnett
County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of
first-degree murder.  Defendant’s motion to bypass the Court of
Appeals as to his appeal of additional judgments was allowed by
the Supreme Court on 1 September 1999.  Heard in the Supreme
Court 17 April 2000.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Gail E. Weis,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
M. Gordon Widenhouse for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Defendant Jimmie Wayne Lawrence was indicted on
10 February 1997 for first-degree murder in the killing of victim
Dale Jerome McLean.  On 3 March 1997 defendant was indicted for
first-degree burglary.  On 15 September 1997 defendant was
indicted for conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit
kidnapping, and first-degree kidnapping for the kidnapping of
victim Gwen Morrison.  Defendant was tried capitally and found
guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and
-2-
deliberation and under the felony murder rule.  He was also found
guilty of first-degree kidnapping, first-degree burglary,
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit murder. 
Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a
sentence of death for the murder; and the trial court entered
judgment accordingly.  The trial court also sentenced defendant
to consecutive sentences of 125 to 159 months’ imprisonment for
defendant’s convictions of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and
conspiracy to commit murder, 51 to 60 months’ imprisonment for
the first-degree burglary conviction, and 58 to 79 months’
imprisonment for defendant’s conviction of first-degree
kidnapping.  For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that
defendant’s trial was free from prejudicial error.
The State’s evidence tended to show that defendant and
Gwen Morrison dated for almost two years and that their
relationship ended in early December 1996.  Morrison began living
with Dale McLean in late December 1996.  On 18 January 1997,
Morrison and McLean were at home with McLean’s two children, ten-
year-old Chastity McLean and five-year-old Dale “Junior” McLean,
when someone knocked on the back door.  McLean looked out the
window and said, “It’s Jimmie.”  Morrison opened the door and
stood on the top step in her nightgown and slippers.
Defendant was standing on the ground in front of the
mobile home; and a man that Morrison had never seen before,
William Rashad Lucas, was standing behind defendant holding a
sawed-off shotgun.  Defendant asked Morrison to leave with him. 
When Morrison refused, defendant pulled a nine millimeter handgun
-3-
from the front of his pants.  Morrison then told defendant that
she did not want any trouble and that she would leave with him,
but that she needed to get her shoes and coat first.  Morrison
turned toward the door and defendant ran up the steps, pushing
Morrison through the door into the mobile home.  As defendant and
Morrison came through the door, Chastity and Junior were sitting
in the living room and McLean was walking empty-handed down the
hallway toward the door.  Defendant pushed Morrison away and shot
McLean, who grabbed his head and fell to the floor.  Defendant
stood over McLean and fired several more rounds.  Defendant then
grabbed Morrison by the arm and said that he would also kill her
if she did not leave with him.
Defendant led Morrison outside and put her into the
backseat of his vehicle.  Lucas drove to defendant’s house. 
Lucas told defendant that he should have shot Morrison, too,
because she “was going to tell everything.”  Morrison, defendant,
and Lucas then got into Lucas’ car; and Lucas drove to the
Comfort Inn in Sanford, North Carolina, where Lucas stayed in the
car with Morrison while defendant rented a room.  Once inside the
room, Lucas put his shotgun on a bed and left; he returned thirty
minutes later with a pair of jeans that belonged to his
girlfriend.  Lucas left again, and defendant took a shower after
telling Morrison that he would kill her if she tried to leave.
Morrison sat on the bed while defendant showered.  When
defendant came out of the bathroom, he lay on the bed next to
Morrison and fell asleep with his arm or leg over her body so
that she could not leave the room.  Defendant awoke later and
-4-
asked Morrison to have sex with him.  Morrison agreed out of fear
that defendant would kill her if she refused him.  Sometime
thereafter, defendant returned a call to his mother and told her
to have his father pick him up.  He then told Morrison to put on
the jeans that Lucas had brought earlier.  Someone arrived at the
Comfort Inn driving defendant’s vehicle; defendant put the
shotgun under the mattress and left.  Morrison then called her
cousin to come get her.
Meanwhile, after defendant and Lucas had driven away
with Morrison, Chastity called her grandmother, who instructed
Chastity to call the police.  Shortly thereafter, members of the
Harnett County Sheriff’s Department arrived.  The officers found
no signs of life in McLean.   A detective carried the children
away from the crime scene, and Chastity calmed down enough to
give a statement that defendant had shot her father.
The Lee County Sheriff’s Department subsequently took
defendant into custody; and with defendant’s consent, several
agents from the State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”) searched
defendant’s room at the Comfort Inn.  The agents found the
shotgun in the hotel room, and Lucas’ girlfriend later turned
over the nine-millimeter handgun to the Harnett County Sheriff’s
Department.
The pathologist who performed the autopsy on McLean
found a total of nine gunshot wounds on McLean’s body, all fired
at a close range of no more than three feet.  The gunshot wounds
on McLean’s right arm, nose, and forehead were not the fatal
injuries.  The cause of death was any one of the four bullets
-5-
that entered McLean’s brain through the right side of his skull.  
A forensic firearms examiner from the SBI determined that the
shell casings collected at the scene from around McLean’s body
had been fired from defendant’s nine-millimeter pistol.
Additional facts will be presented as needed to discuss
specific issues.
PRETRIAL ISSUES
By two separate assignments of error, defendant
contends that the short-form indictment used to charge him with
first-degree murder is constitutionally inadequate.  We initially
address whether this issue is properly before this Court. 
Defendant did not contest the murder indictment at trial and, in
fact, filed numerous motions stating that he was charged with
first-degree murder and would be tried capitally.  This Court has
previously stated that “a constitutional question which is not
raised and passed upon in the trial court will not ordinarily be
considered on appeal.”  State v. Hunter, 305 N.C. 106, 112, 286
S.E.2d 535, 539 (1982).  A defendant waives an attack on an
indictment when the validity of the indictment is not challenged
in the trial court.  See State v. Wallace, ___ N.C. ___, ___, ___
S.E.2d ___, ___, 2000 WL 543396, at *13 (May 5, 2000) (No.
241A97); State v. Robinson, 327 N.C. 346, 361, 395 S.E.2d 402,
411 (1990).  “However, where an indictment is alleged to be
invalid on its face, thereby depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction, a challenge to that indictment may be made at any
time, even if it was not contested in the trial court.”  Wallace,
-6-
___ N.C. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, 2000 WL 543396, at *13. 
Therefore, this issue is properly before this Court.
Defendant contends that the short-form murder
indictment violated his right to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in two
respects.  First, defendant argues that the United States Supreme
Court’s recent ruling in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
232, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 319 (1999), requires a finding that the
short-form indictment was unconstitutional in that it failed to
allege all of the elements of the crime charged.  Specifically,
defendant argues that the short-form indictment failed to allege
those elements that differentiate first-degree murder from
second-degree murder.  Second, defendant argues that Jones
requires a finding that the short-form indictment was
unconstitutional in that it failed to charge the aggravating
circumstances that would increase the maximum penalty for first-
degree murder from life imprisonment to the death penalty.  See
id. at 243 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 326 n.6.
The indictment against defendant for murder contained
the following language:
The jurors for the State upon their oath
present that on or about the date of offense
shown and in the county named above [Jimmie
Wayne Lawrence] unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously and of malice aforethought did
kill and murder Dale Jerome McLean.
This indictment complied with N.C.G.S. § 15-144, which provides
for a short-form version of an indictment for murder as follows:
In indictments for murder and
manslaughter, it is not necessary to allege
matter not required to be proved on the
-7-
trial; but in the body of the indictment,
after naming the person accused, and the
county of his residence, the date of the
offense, the averment “with force and arms,”
and the county of the alleged commission of
the offense, as is now usual, it is
sufficient in describing murder to allege
that the accused person feloniously,
willfully, and of his malice aforethought,
did kill and murder (naming the person
killed), and concluding as is now required by
law; . . . and any bill of indictment
containing the averments and allegations
herein named shall be good and sufficient in
law as an indictment for murder or
manslaughter, as the case may be.
N.C.G.S. § 15-144 (1999).  This Court has consistently held that
indictments based on this statute are in compliance with both the
North Carolina and United States Constitutions.  See, e.g., State
v. Kilpatrick, 343 N.C. 466, 472, 471 S.E.2d 624, 628 (1996);
State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 12-14, 337 S.E.2d 786, 792-93 (1985). 
Further, this Court recently reconsidered the constitutionality
of the short-form murder indictment in light of Jones and noted
that Jones “‘announce[d] [no] new principle of constitutional
law, but merely interpret[ed] a particular federal statute in
light of a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged
through a series of our decisions over the past quarter
century.’”  Wallace, ___ N.C. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, 2000 WL
543396, at *16 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52 n.11, 143 L.
Ed. 2d at 331 n.11).  We further emphasized our “overwhelming
case law approving the use of short-form indictments and the lack
of a federal mandate to change that determination” in reaffirming
our previous holdings regarding the constitutionality of the
short-form murder indictment.  Id.
-8-
Similarly, Jones did not impose a requirement that the
indictment for first-degree murder set forth aggravating
circumstances.  As noted in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 228, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 358 (1998), an indictment
“need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an
offender found guilty of the charged crimes.”  “Aggravating
circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are
‘standards to guide the making of [the] choice’ between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment.”  Poland v.
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156, 90 L. Ed. 2d 123, 132 (1986) (quoting
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270, 278
(1981)).  The aggravating circumstances set forth in N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e) are not elements of first-degree murder but are
circumstances to be considered by the jury in making its
recommendation for a sentence of life imprisonment or death.  No
statutory or constitutional mandate requires the inclusion of
aggravating circumstances in the short-form indictment.  
Therefore, defendant’s arguments concerning the validity of his
indictment for first-degree murder are without merit and are
overruled.
JURY SELECTION
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erroneously permitted the State to pass a
panel of fewer than twelve jurors to defendant.  Defendant
contends that this violated the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214
and entitles him to a new trial.
-9-
The North Carolina jury selection statute provides, in
pertinent part:
(d)  The prosecutor must conduct his
examination of the first 12 jurors seated and
make his challenges for cause and exercise
his peremptory challenges.  If the judge
allows a challenge for cause, or if a
peremptory challenge is exercised, the clerk
must immediately call a replacement into the
box.  When the prosecutor is satisfied with
the 12 in the box, they must then be tendered
to the defendant.  Until the prosecutor
indicates his satisfaction, he may make a
challenge for cause or exercise a peremptory
challenge to strike any juror, whether an
original or replacement juror.
. . . .
(f)  Upon the calling of replacement
jurors, the prosecutor must examine the
replacement jurors and indicate satisfaction
with a completed panel of 12 jurors before
the replacement jurors are tendered to a
defendant. . . .  This procedure is repeated
until all parties have accepted 12 jurors.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(d), (f) (1999).
In this case, the number of jurors who reported for
jury duty was significantly lower than the number of jurors
summoned.  On the afternoon of the first day of jury selection,
the trial court postponed further voir dire and recessed for the
day when defendant expressed concern at being tendered a panel of
less than twelve jurors.  The trial judge noted, though, that
“the fact that we’re handling it this way today does not
necessarily mean that we’ll handle it this way tomorrow or the
next day, depending -- you know, it depends on how tight it
gets.”  The following colloquy then took place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
Is it my understanding there’s a
possibility that, if we run out
-10-
tomorrow, then they would be passed
to me with what we’ve got?
[THE COURT]:
There’s a possibility.  We’ll talk
about that tomorrow.
The next morning, the State and defendant proceeded with voir
dire until there were no more replacement jurors in the jury
pool.  The State then passed a panel of ten jurors to defendant
composed of nine jurors that defendant had already accepted and
one new prospective juror, Sam Altman.  Defendant questioned
juror Altman without objecting to the incomplete panel. 
Defendant expressed his satisfaction with juror Altman, and voir
dire concluded until the next day when jury selection continued
according to the statutory requirements.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-1214.
When a trial court acts contrary to a statutory
mandate, the defendant’s right to appeal is preserved despite the
defendant’s failure to object during trial.  See State v. Jones,
336 N.C. 490, 497, 445 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1994).  Although the jury
selection procedure violated the express requirement of N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1214(d) that the State pass a full panel of twelve jurors,
defendant has failed to show prejudice.  Defendant, without
objection, questioned and accepted juror Altman.  Defendant did
not exhaust his peremptory challenges and did not request removal
of juror Altman for cause.  Thus, defendant was not forced to
accept an undesirable juror; and he cannot establish any
prejudice as a result of the jury selection procedure.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(c) (1999); State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663,
681, 455 S.E.2d 137, 147, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed.
-11-
2d 169 (1995); State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 312, 500 S.E.2d
668, 680 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113
(1999).
Defendant further argues that the improper jury
selection procedure violated his constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury.  However, defendant did not raise this
constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did
not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue.  N.C.
R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve
this assignment of error for appellate review.  See State v.
Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 122, 512 S.E.2d 720, 730 (holding that
defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and
thus waived appellate review of that issue), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999); see also State v. King, 342
N.C. 357, 364, 464 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1995); State v. Frye, 341
N.C. 470, 493, 461 S.E.2d 664, 675 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996).
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
overruling of defendant’s objection to the State’s impermissible
use of a peremptory challenge to strike from the jury a black
prospective juror, Milton Monk, solely on account of his race. 
Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina
prohibits the use of peremptory challenges for racially
discriminatory reasons, see Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 312, 500 S.E.2d
at 680, as does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 83 (1986).
-12-
In Batson the United States Supreme Court established a
three-part test to determine if the prosecutor has engaged in
impermissible racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. 
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395,
405 (1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-
89).  First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case that
the State has exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of
race.  See id.  Second, once the prima facie case has been
established by the defendant, the burden shifts to the State to
rebut the inference of discrimination by offering a race-neutral
explanation for attempting to strike the juror in question.  See
id. at 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405; see also State v. Gaines,
345 N.C. 647, 668, 483 S.E.2d 396, 408, cert. denied, 522 U.S.
900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997).  The explanation must be clear and
reasonably specific, but “‘need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause.’”  State v. Porter, 326 N.C.
489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at
97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88).  The prosecutor is not required to
provide a race-neutral reason that is persuasive or even
plausible.  See Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 313, 500 S.E.2d at 680. 
The issue at this stage is the facial validity of the
prosecutor’s explanation; and unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed
race-neutral.  See State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 209-10, 481
S.E.2d 44, 57, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134
(1997), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473
(1998).  Our courts also permit the defendant to introduce
-13-
evidence at this point that the State’s explanations are merely a
pretext.  See Gaines, 345 N.C. at 668, 483 S.E.2d at 408.
Third, and finally, the trial court must make the
ultimate determination as to whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.  See Hernandez,
500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405; Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 313,
500 S.E.2d at 680.  As this determination is essentially a
question of fact, the trial court’s decision as to whether the
prosecutor had a discriminatory intent is to be given great
deference and will be upheld unless the appellate court is
convinced that the trial court’s determination is clearly
erroneous.  See Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 313, 500 S.E.2d at 680;
State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 434-35, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 894, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).  “‘Where there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’”  State v.
Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 433, 407 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1991) (quoting
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518,
528 (1985)).
With respect to prospective juror Monk, defendant makes
two arguments that the trial court erred when it failed to find
that the State’s peremptory strike was the result of purposeful
discrimination.  First, defendant contends that the trial court
erroneously concluded its analysis upon finding that defendant
failed to establish a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination.  Defendant argues that the trial court should
have required the prosecutor to state his reasons for challenging
-14-
juror Monk, the first African-American and the first venire
member called into the box.  However, defendant concedes this
Court has previously held that the challenge of an African-
American prospective juror when the defendant is also an African-
American does not, standing alone, establish a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination or a Batson violation.  See,
e.g., State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 551, 500 S.E.2d 718, 720-21
(1998); State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 462, 496 S.E.2d 357, 362,
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845, 142 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1998); State v.
Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 146, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189 (1995).  Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s
Batson challenge based on defendant’s failure to make a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination.
Second, defendant argues that the prosecution accepted
other jurors, who were white, even though their answers to
questions about capital punishment were essentially the same as
prospective juror Monk’s responses.  Defendant contends that
differentiation shows purposeful racial discrimination.  The
acceptance by the prosecution of white prospective jurors
similarly situated to black prospective jurors who have been
peremptorily stricken is a factor to be considered in determining
whether there has been purposeful racial discrimination.  See
Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 317, 500 S.E.2d at 683; Kandies, 342 N.C.
at 435, 467 S.E.2d at 75.  But defendant’s approach in this
argument involves finding a single factor observed by defendant,
not one articulated by the prosecutor, and matching that factor
to the three white jurors who were passed by the prosecutor.  See
-15-
State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 19, 409 S.E.2d 288, 298 (1991). 
As we have said previously, “This approach ‘fails to address the
factors as a totality which when considered together provide an
image of a juror considered . . . undesirable by the State.’” 
Id. (quoting Porter, 326 N.C. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152). 
Further, defendant has failed to acknowledge that, although
prospective juror Monk initially indicated that he could impose
the death penalty, after listening to the prosecutor question
several other prospective jurors about their views, he later
expressed uncertainty about his ability to impose the death
penalty in light of his religious views.  For these reasons we
are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in not finding
that prospective juror Monk was peremptorily stricken for
impermissible, racially discriminatory reasons.
GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the absence of a complete transcript of the proceedings
violated his constitutional rights to appellate review and to
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.  We disagree.
Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-450, an indigent defendant is
entitled to receive a copy of the trial transcript at State
expense when necessary to perfect an appeal.  See N.C.G.S. §
7A-450 (1999); see also State v. Rankin, 306 N.C. 712, 716, 295
S.E.2d 416, 419 (1982).  Further, where, as here, new counsel
represents the indigent on appeal, counsel cannot effectively
represent his client or assign plain error without the benefit of
a complete transcript.  See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277,
-16-
279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 331, 334 (1964).  However, the absence of a
complete transcript does not prejudice the defendant where
alternatives are available that would fulfill the same functions
as a transcript and provide the defendant with a meaningful
appeal.  See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 400, 403-04 (1971); State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 747-48,
445 S.E.2d 917, 928 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 130 L.
Ed. 2d 661 (1995); Rankin, 306 N.C. at 716, 295 S.E.2d at 419.
In this case a mechanical malfunction resulted in the
elimination of a portion of Detective Bernice Smith’s testimony
and all of Special Agent Tom Trochum’s testimony from the record. 
In its amendments to the proposed record on appeal, the State set
out the unrecorded testimony in narrative form as permitted under
N.C. R. App. P. 9(c)(1).  The trial court held a settlement
conference at which Detective Smith and Agent Trochum both
testified that the State’s summary was an accurate reflection of
their testimony at trial.  The court reporter from defendant’s
trial also testified that, according to her handwritten notes, no
objections were made during the omitted portion and that
defendant did not ask Agent Trochum any questions on cross-
examination.  The trial court subsequently settled the record as
proposed by the State.
While the trial court did not comply with the
requirement of N.C.G.S. § 7A-450 to provide defendant with a
complete transcript of his proceedings, we hold that defendant is
not entitled to any relief as a result of this omission.  The
State’s narrative constitutes an available alternative that is
-17-
“substantially equivalent” to the complete transcript, as
demonstrated by Detective Smith’s and Agent Trochum’s testimony
that the State’s narrative accurately summarizes their testimony
at trial.  Rankin, 306 N.C. at 717, 295 S.E.2d at 419. 
Additionally, defendant did not object at trial or ask Agent
Trochum any questions on cross-examination.  The charge
conference and jury instructions were fully recorded and
available for review.  Inasmuch as defendant admitted shooting
the victim, the focus of his defense was his intent.  The missing
part of the transcript was not relevant to this issue.  This
assignment of error is overruled.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
not allowing defendant’s expert witness to give his opinion as to
defendant’s state of mind at the time of the homicide.  Defendant
argues that the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s
constitutional rights to present evidence and to confront the
witnesses against him.  However, defendant did not raise the
constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did
not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue.  N.C.
R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve
this constitutional issue for appellate review.  See Fleming, 350
N.C. at 122, 512 S.E.2d at 730; King, 342 N.C. at 364, 464 S.E.2d
at 293; Frye, 341 N.C. at 493, 461 S.E.2d at 675.
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly
excluded Dr. Strahl’s relevant, admissible expert witness
testimony under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401.  Evidence is relevant
if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
-18-
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
than it would be without the evidence.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
401 (1999).  Any relevant evidence is generally admissible unless
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.  See State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 421, 402
S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 402, 403 (1999). 
Expert testimony is admissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702,
“if it will assist ‘the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue.’”  State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152,
164, 367 S.E.2d 895, 903 (1988) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
702 (1986)).  In determining the admissibility of expert opinion,
the test is “whether the opinion expressed is really one based on
the special expertise of the expert, that is, whether the witness
because of his expertise is in a better position to have an
opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.”  State v.
Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-69, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978).
In the present case, the trial court admitted a
substantial portion of the proffered testimony of defendant’s
expert witness related to defendant’s mental condition at the
time of the homicides.  Dr. Nathan Strahl, a forensic
psychiatrist, testified on direct examination that defendant
developed “paranoid thinking” following an incident at a party in
which someone held a gun to defendant’s head.  Dr. Strahl further
testified that defendant had a history of alcohol problems and
had suffered a head injury in a motorcycle accident.  Dr. Strahl
also opined that defendant’s ability to make or carry out plans,
to reflect on potential conduct, to consider alternative conduct,
-19-
and to consider the full range of consequences of his action was
markedly reduced by the combination of the brain injury, alcohol
problems, and paranoid thinking.  In addition to this testimony,
however, defendant attempted to have Dr. Strahl testify that
defendant was reacting to a potential fear that he was about to
be harmed when defendant killed McLean.  The trial court
sustained the prosecutor’s objection to this last testimony and
refused to admit it into evidence.
The purpose of such testimony was for the expert to
tell the jury that certain legal standards had not been met,
namely, that defendant did not act with deliberation and that, as
a result of his paranoid thinking, alcohol problems, and brain
injury, defendant was responding to a threat he genuinely
perceived.  We are not convinced that Dr. Strahl was in any
better position than the jury to make such determinations. 
Having the expert testify as requested by defendant would tend to
confuse, rather than help, the jury in understanding the evidence
and determining the facts in issue.  See Weeks, 322 N.C. at 167,
367 S.E.2d at 904.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in refusing to admit this testimony.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit misdemeanor breaking or entering as a lesser-
included offense of first-degree burglary.  First-degree burglary
is the breaking and entering of an occupied dwelling of another
in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein.  See
N.C.G.S. § 14-51 (1999); see also State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 52,
436 S.E.2d 321, 350 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L.
-20-
Ed. 2d 881 (1994).  Misdemeanor breaking or entering does not
require intent to commit a felony within the dwelling.  See
N.C.G.S. § 14-54(b) (1999); see also State v. Peacock, 313 N.C.
554, 558, 330 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1985).
An indictment for burglary need not specify the
particular felony that the accused intended to commit at the time
of the breaking or entering if “‘the indictment . . . charges the
offense . . . in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner and
contains sufficient allegations to enable the trial court to
proceed to judgment and to bar a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense,’” and if it “‘informs the defendant of the charge
against him with sufficient certainty to enable him to prepare
his defense.’”  State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 281, 443 S.E.2d
68, 74 (1994) (quoting State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436, 333
S.E.2d 743, 746 (1985)).  The accused must intend to commit the
felony at the time of entrance, and intent can be inferred from
the defendant’s subsequent actions.  See Peacock, 313 N.C. at
559, 330 S.E.2d at 193.
The indictment for first-degree burglary charged that
defendant “broke and entered with the intent to commit a felony
therein, to wit:  murder.”  The trial court instructed the jury
that it could find defendant guilty of first-degree burglary if
it found that defendant broke and entered into an occupied
dwelling house during the nighttime without the tenant’s consent
and that at the time of the breaking and entering defendant
“intended to commit murder.”  No lesser-included offenses were
submitted to the jury despite defendant’s timely request. 
-21-
Defendant argues that because substantial evidence was presented
from which the jury could have inferred that defendant possessed
some intent at the time of the break-in other than to commit
murder, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the
lesser-included offense of misdemeanor breaking or entering. 
Defendant contends that the failure to do so warrants a new
trial.
A trial court must give instructions on all lesser-
included offenses that are supported by the evidence, even in the
absence of a special request for such an instruction; and the
failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error that cannot
be cured by a verdict finding the defendant guilty of the greater
offense.  See State v. Montgomery, 341 N.C. 553, 567, 461 S.E.2d
732, 739 (1995); State v. Whitaker, 316 N.C. 515, 520, 342 S.E.2d
514, 518 (1986).  The trial court may refrain from submitting the
lesser offense to the jury only where the “evidence is clear and
positive as to each element of the offense charged” and no
evidence supports a lesser-included offense.  Peacock, 313 N.C.
at 558, 330 S.E.2d at 193.
Defendant, relying on State v. Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 368
S.E.2d 627 (1988), contends that an instruction should have been
submitted to the jury for the lesser-included offense of
misdemeanor breaking or entering since the evidence revealed
that, in addition to shooting McLean, defendant drew a gun and
forcibly removed Morrison from the premises.  Thus, defendant
argues that, from the foregoing evidence, a rational jury could
have found that, at the time of the breaking and entering,
-22-
defendant intended to assault or kidnap Morrison rather than to
murder McLean.
The question in this case is whether there was any
evidence of misdemeanor breaking or entering.  In Gray, 322 N.C.
at 458, 368 S.E.2d at 628, the defendant was tried for first-
degree rape and felonious breaking or entering.  This Court held
that misdemeanor breaking or entering should have been submitted
to the jury since “[t]he jury was not compelled to find from the
evidence that the defendant intended to commit rape at the time
he entered the building.”  Id. at 461, 368 S.E.2d at 630.
In contrast, this Court held that the trial court
properly refused to submit the lesser-included offense of
breaking or entering in Montgomery, 341 N.C. at 569, 461 S.E.2d
at 740.  The indictment for burglary in that case charged that
the defendant intended to commit the felonies of larceny and rape
when he broke into the victim’s apartment.  Id. at 567, 461
S.E.2d at 739.  However, the trial court instructed the jury
that, to convict the defendant of first-degree burglary, it must
find that the defendant intended to commit larceny, not rape, at
the time of the breaking and entering.  Id.  This Court held that
“the evidence was clear and positive that defendant entered the
apartment with the intent to commit larceny, and the fact that he
also may have intended to commit the felonies of rape and murder
does not constitute evidence that he entered the apartment
without the intent to commit a felony therein.”  Id. at 568, 461
S.E.2d at 740.
-23-
In the present case, the State’s evidence that
defendant killed McLean after he entered the mobile home was
substantial evidence that he had the intent to commit murder when
he entered the mobile home.  See id.  The State’s evidence at
trial showed that defendant went to McLean’s house and insisted
that Morrison leave with him.  Lucas stood behind defendant
holding a sawed-off shotgun.  When Morrison refused to leave with
defendant, he pulled out a gun.  As Morrison turned to go back
into the house to get shoes and a jacket, defendant ran up the
steps, pushed her through the door, and immediately began
shooting at McLean.  Defendant continued to shoot McLean after he
had fallen to the floor, firing a total of nine rounds. 
Defendant then forced Morrison to leave with him, telling her
that he would kill her, too, if she refused to go with him. 
Thus, the evidence was clear and positive that defendant entered
the mobile home with the intent to commit murder; the fact that
defendant also may have intended to commit the felonies of
assault and kidnapping does not constitute evidence that he
entered the mobile home without the intent to commit a felony
therein.  This assignment of error is overruled.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by excluding evidence from defendant’s
expert witness and by allowing the State to cross-examine
defendant’s expert witness concerning fees charged by the
witness.  Defendant further contends that the trial court
permitted the prosecutor to distort the expert’s testimony by
characterizing the witness as biased in favor of defendant.  The
-24-
trial court limited defense expert Dr. Strahl’s testimony on
direct examination as follows:
Q.
Have you had occasion to testify in
court before, Dr. Strahl?
A.
Yes, I have.
Q.
Have you testified for the State of
North Carolina in cases?
A.
Yes, I have.
Q.
You were appointed in this case by this
Court to assist in preparation of the case?
[PROSECUTOR]:
Objection.
[THE COURT]:
Sustained.
Q.
Did you have occasion, Dr. Strahl, in
your involvement in this case, to know or see
Jimmy [sic] Wayne Lawrence?
A.
Yes, I did.
Defendant did not make an offer of proof developing the
witness’ response to the questioning.  Accordingly, defendant has
failed to preserve this issue for appellate review according to
the standard set forth in N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2).  See
State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 79, 505 S.E.2d 97, 108 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999).  We do
not agree with defendant’s contention that the relevance and
content of the excluded testimony was necessarily apparent from
the context within which questions were asked and that,
therefore, no offer of proof was necessary to preserve this issue
for appeal.  See id.; State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 96, 478
S.E.2d 146, 157 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d
43 (1997).  Although the initial thrust of the questioning
-25-
related to Dr. Strahl’s experience and his knowledge of this
specific defendant, nothing in the record on appeal indicates
whether Dr. Strahl was court-appointed or privately retained. 
Therefore, for this Court to attempt to presume the content of
Dr. Strahl’s excluded testimony or its relevance would be
speculation.
With respect to the fees charged by the expert witness,
defendant argues that the following exchange during the State’s
cross-examination of Dr. Strahl was misleading since Dr. Strahl
was court appointed:
Q.
I take it you were retained by the
Defense to evaluate the defendant and, of
course, to come to court and testify in this
case; is that right?
A.
That is correct.
Q.
I assume you are being paid or you’re
hoping to be paid for your work in this case;
are you not?
A.
Yes, sir, I am.
Q.
What hourly rate is it that you’re
charging or you hope to be paid?
A.
$150 an hour, which is the standard,
average rate in North Carolina, and, in fact,
in the nation, as well.
Q.
How many hours do you have in this case
up to this moment?
A.
At least 20, perhaps more.
The State appropriately attempted to illustrate a potential
source of bias.  The subject of compensation of a defendant’s
expert witness is an appropriate matter for cross-examination. 
Rule 611(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence permits
cross-examination of a witness “on any matter relevant to any
-26-
issue in the case, including credibility.”  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
611(b) (1999).  This Court has additionally stated that the scope
of cross-examination is subject to the control of the trial court
and that “questions must be asked in good faith.”  State v.
Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971). 
Further, “this Court has consistently held that ‘an expert
witness’ compensation is a permissible cross-examination subject
to test partiality towards the party by whom the expert was
called.’”  State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 493, 439 S.E.2d 589,
598-99 (1994) (quoting State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 195, 367
S.E.2d 626, 636 (1988)); see also State v. Wilson, 335 N.C. 220,
226, 436 S.E.2d 831, 835 (1993).  Even where the expert witness
was court-appointed and paid with state funds, as defendant
alleges is the situation in this case, the State may properly
cross-examine the expert about any potential bias resulting from
compensation as a defense witness.  See Brown, 335 N.C. at 493,
439 S.E.2d at 599.  Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor’s
cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Strahl was proper.
With respect to mention of the expert’s compensation
during the prosecutor’s closing argument, we further conclude
that the argument did not violate the scope of permissible
prosecutorial conduct.  During closing argument, the prosecutor
argued as follows:
But again, the psychiatrist simply relied
upon the word of the defendant.  He bases his
opinion upon four hours of talking to him
while he’s collecting $150 an hour for doing
so.  The psychiatrist never talked to the
investigating officers in this case.  None. 
Never talked to Gwen Morrison.  But he talked
to the defendant.
-27-
Preliminarily, we note that defendant in this case did not object
to the prosecutor’s questions or closing argument; and where a
defendant fails to object, an appellate court reviews the
prosecutor’s arguments to determine whether the argument was “so
grossly improper that the trial court committed reversible error
in failing to intervene ex mero motu to correct the error.” 
State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 482, 346 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1986). 
As we have stated previously, “only an extreme impropriety on the
part of the prosecutor will compel this Court to hold that the
trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and
correcting ex mero motu an argument that defense counsel
apparently did not believe was prejudicial when originally
spoken.”  State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 786, 467 S.E.2d 685,
693, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 890, 136 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1996).
When viewed in context of the conflicting evidence
concerning defendant’s intent and state of mind at the time of
the murder, we conclude that it was not a “gross impropriety” to
argue Dr. Strahl’s potential bias related to his compensation. 
We have consistently held that “‘counsel must be allowed wide
latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.  He may argue
to the jury the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom together with the relevant law so as to
present his side of the case.’”  Allen, 322 N.C. at 195, 367
S.E.2d at 636 (quoting State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 327-28,
226 S.E.2d 629, 640 (1976)); see also Atkins, 349 N.C. at 83, 505
S.E.2d at 110.  In State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 147-48, 449
S.E.2d 371, 379 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1100, 131 L. Ed.
-28-
2d 752 (1995), this Court found no error in the prosecutor’s
closing argument that the defendant’s mother shaded her testimony
in favor of her son.  Similarly, in State v. Murillo, 349 N.C.
573, 604, 509 S.E.2d 752, 770 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
145 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999), we found no error in the prosecutor’s
argument regarding the defendant’s forensic expert “that when you
need someone to say something, you can find them.  You can pay
them enough and they’ll say it.”
In light of our previous holdings, we cannot conclude
that the prosecutor’s passing reference to Dr. Strahl’s fee was
so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene ex
mero motu when, at trial, defense counsel apparently did not
believe the argument was prejudicial.  See id. at 606, 509 S.E.2d
at 771; State v. Campbell, 340 N.C. 612, 630, 460 S.E.2d 144, 153
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 133 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1996).  
This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motions to dismiss the charges of conspiracy to
commit murder, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and first-degree
burglary.  Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence
of these charges to go to the jury; thus, defendant submits that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss these
three charges.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and give the State every reasonable inference to be drawn
therefrom.  See State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 488, 501 S.E.2d 334,
-29-
343 (1998).  The State must present substantial evidence of each
element of the offense charged.  See id.  “[T]he trial court
should consider all evidence actually admitted, whether competent
or not, that is favorable to the State.”  State v. Jones, 342
N.C. 523, 540, 467 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1996).  “If there is
substantial evidence -- whether direct, circumstantial, or both
-- to support a finding that the offense charged has been
committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for
the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied,” State v.
Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988); however,
if the evidence “is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or
conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to
dismiss must be allowed,” State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179, 305
S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983).
First, the offenses of conspiracy to commit murder and
conspiracy to commit kidnapping require, inter alia, an agreement
between defendant and Lucas to kidnap Morrison and to murder
McLean.  See State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 615, 220 S.E.2d 521,
526 (1975).  The parties do not necessarily have to reach an
express agreement.  “‘A mutual, implied understanding is
sufficient, so far as the combination or conspiracy is concerned,
to constitute the offense.’”  State v. Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 16, 74
S.E.2d 291, 301 (1953) (quoting State v. Conner, 179 N.C. 752,
755, 103 S.E. 79, 80 (1920)).  The existence of a conspiracy may
be shown with direct or circumstantial evidence.  See Bindyke,
288 N.C. at 616, 220 S.E.2d at 526.  The proof of a conspiracy
-30-
“may be, and generally is, established by a number of indefinite
acts, each of which, standing alone, might have little weight,
but, taken collectively, they point unerringly to the existence
of a conspiracy.”  State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 712, 169
S.E. 711, 712 (1933).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we
conclude that substantial evidence exists to support a finding
that defendant and Lucas conspired to kidnap Morrison and to
murder McLean.  The State’s evidence at trial tended to show that
defendant and Lucas drove together to McLean’s home.  Both
defendant and Lucas were carrying weapons.  When defendant
knocked on the door and demanded that Morrison leave with him,
Lucas stood behind defendant holding a sawed-off shotgun.  When
defendant pushed Morrison into the house and starting shooting
McLean, Lucas climbed the stairs and stood in the doorway holding
the shotgun.  Lucas drove defendant and Morrison to defendant’s
house where Lucas stood guard over Morrison while defendant went
inside the house.  Lucas then drove defendant and Morrison to the
hotel where Lucas stayed in the car with Morrison while defendant
rented a room.  Later, Lucas left his shotgun in the room while
he went to his girlfriend’s house to get clothing for Morrison
and to hide defendant’s handgun.  The mutual, implied
understanding between defendant and Lucas is apparent from the
effortless manner in which they supported each other throughout
the commission of the murder and the kidnapping.  Based on this
evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
-31-
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges for conspiracy to
commit murder and conspiracy to commit kidnapping.
Second, the offense of first-degree burglary requires,
inter alia, that defendant intended to commit a felony -- in this
case, murder -- at the time of the breaking and entering.  See
State v. Barlowe, 337 N.C. 371, 377, 446 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1994). 
“The criminal intent of the defendant at the time of breaking or
entering may be inferred from the acts he committed subsequent to
his breaking or entering the building.”  State v. Williams, 330
N.C. 579, 585, 411 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1992).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we
conclude that substantial evidence exists that defendant intended
to commit murder at the time of the breaking and entering.  The
State’s evidence at trial tended to show that defendant had
recently ended a long-term relationship with Morrison.  Defendant
went to McLean’s home at night, uninvited, and accompanied by a
friend.  Both defendant and his friend were carrying weapons. 
Defendant’s friend stood behind him while defendant talked with
Morrison.  When Morrison turned to go back inside the mobile
home, defendant pushed her through the door and immediately
attempted to shoot McLean.  Defendant’s gun initially jammed, and
Morrison pulled on defendant’s arm to stop him from shooting
McLean; but defendant pushed Morrison away and shot McLean. 
Defendant stood over McLean’s fallen body and continued to shoot
him numerous times in front of his young children.  Based on this
evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
-32-
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree
burglary.
SENTENCING HEARING
Defendant next assigns error to the trial court’s
submission of the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the murder
was committed during the course of a burglary.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5) (1999).  The trial court submitted and the jury
found this aggravating circumstance.  In support of his argument,
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the burglary charge; thus, it was error to submit burglary as an
aggravating circumstance.  Having previously determined that the
evidence supported the submission of burglary, we find
defendant’s argument to be without merit.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by failing to exercise its discretion under
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233, thereby entitling defendant to a new trial. 
In this case the jury sent a note to the trial judge requesting
the transcript of prosecution witness Gwen Morrison’s testimony. 
The trial court instructed the jury that its duty was to recall
the evidence as it was presented and thereby denied the request.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233 provides, in pertinent part:
(a)  If the jury after retiring for
deliberation requests a review of certain
testimony or other evidence, the jurors must
be conducted to the courtroom.  The judge in
his discretion, after notice to the
prosecutor and defendant, may direct that
requested parts of the testimony be read to
the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine
in open court the requested materials
admitted into evidence.  In his discretion
the judge may also have the jury review other
evidence relating to the same factual issue
-33-
so as not to give undue prominence to the
evidence requested.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a) (1999).  As this Court has previously
explained, “[t]he statute’s requirement that the trial court
exercise its discretion is a codification of the long-standing
common law rule that the decision whether to grant or refuse a
request by the jury for a restatement of the evidence lies within
the discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Barrow, 350 N.C.
640, 646, 517 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1999).
“When a motion addressed to the discretion of the trial
court is denied upon the ground that the trial court has no power
to grant the motion in its discretion, the ruling is reviewable.” 
State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 124, 484 S.E.2d 372, 375-76
(1997); see also Barrow, 350 N.C. at 646, 517 S.E.2d at 378. 
“‘In addition, there is error when the trial court refuses to
exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no
discretion as to the question presented.  Where the error is
prejudicial, the defendant is entitled to have his motion
reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter.’”
Johnson, 346 N.C. at 124, 484 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting State v.
Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980)); see also
Barrow, 350 N.C. at 646, 517 S.E.2d at 378.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury, without
objection from the parties, as follows:
As to the second question, members of the
jury, it is your duty to recall the evidence
as the evidence was presented.  So you may
retire and resume your deliberation.
-34-
From these instructions, we are convinced that the trial judge
did not impermissibly deny the request based solely on the
unavailability of the transcript.  See Barrow, 350 N.C. at 648,
517 S.E.2d at 378-79 (holding that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the
ability to present the transcript to the jury); State v. Ashe,
314 N.C. 28, 35, 331 S.E.2d 652, 656-57 (1985) (holding that the
trial court failed to exercise its discretion in merely stating
that the request could not be granted because there was “no
transcript at this point”).  Instead, the trial judge plainly
exercised his discretion in denying the jury’s request. 
Defendant does not contend that the trial court abused its
discretion.  Moreover, defendant acquiesced in the instruction
and cannot now complain that he was prejudiced by the trial
court’s action.  This assignment of error is without merit.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
not instructing the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment
means a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  In
response to the jury’s question about the meaning of “life
imprisonment,” the trial court gave the following instruction:
In considering whether to recommend death or
life imprisonment without parole, you should
determine the question as though life
imprisonment without parole means exactly
what the statute says “imprisonment for life
without parole in the state’s prison.”
Defendant argues that the trial court’s use of the phrase “as
though” was misleading and violated defendant’s statutory and
constitutional rights.
-35-
First, defendant asserts that the trial court’s
erroneous instruction resulted in an arbitrary death sentence in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  However, defendant did not raise this
constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did
not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue.  N.C.
R. App. P. 10(b)(1).  Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve
this assignment of error for appellate review.  See Fleming, 350
N.C. at 122, 512 S.E.2d at 730; King, 342 N.C. at 364, 464 S.E.2d
at 293; Frye, 341 N.C. at 493, 461 S.E.2d at 675.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court’s
instruction violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, which provides, in
pertinent part:
The judge shall instruct the jury, in
words substantially equivalent to those of
this section, that a sentence of life
imprisonment means a sentence of life without
parole.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002 (1999).
In State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 653, 477 S.E.2d 450,
457 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824, 139 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997),
we rejected the argument that the trial court’s instruction
regarding life imprisonment, that the jury “should determine the
question as though life imprisonment means exactly what the
statute says:  imprisonment for life in the State’s prison,”
violated the requirement of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002.  In this case,
the trial court gave nearly identical instructions regarding the
meaning of life imprisonment.  Thus, having found no compelling
-36-
reason to depart from our prior holdings, we reject this
assignment of error.
In his next assignment of error, defendant contends the
trial court erred by submitting to the jury as aggravating
circumstances both that the murder was committed during the
course of a felony (burglary), N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), and
that the murder was part of a course of conduct which involved
commission of other crimes of violence against other persons,
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  The trial court then instructed the
jury “that the same evidence can not be used as a basis of
finding more than one aggravating fact.”  Defendant argues that
submission of both aggravating circumstances constituted
impermissible and unconstitutional duplication in the evidence of
aggravation.  According to defendant, the evidence potentially
overlapped such that the jury might have used the evidence
supporting the former circumstance to find the existence of the
latter circumstance.  We do not find defendant’s argument
persuasive.
In a capital case the trial court may not submit
multiple aggravating circumstances supported by the same
evidence.  See State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 29, 257 S.E.2d 569,
587 (1979) (finding error where same evidence supported two
circumstances submitted, that the murder was committed to
(i) avoid or prevent arrest, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(4); and
(ii) to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental
function or the enforcement of laws, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(7)). 
“Aggravating circumstances are not considered redundant absent a
-37-
complete overlap in the evidence supporting them.”  State v.
Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 54, 449 S.E.2d 412, 444 (1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995).  Further, this
Court has approved submitting the course of conduct aggravating
circumstance where more than one victim is killed or injured. 
See State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 512, 422 S.E.2d 692, 706
(1992) (defendant killed woman and twenty-six months later killed
her sister); State v. Jones, 327 N.C. 439, 452, 396 S.E.2d 309,
317 (1990) (defendant fired shots endangering store customers,
killed one, seriously wounded another, and committed armed
robbery against store clerk).  In addition, when a jury finds a
defendant guilty on theories of both premeditation and
deliberation and felony murder, and both theories are supported
by the evidence, the felony underlying the felony murder may
properly be submitted as an aggravating circumstance.  See Gibbs,
335 N.C. at 59, 436 S.E.2d at 354; State v. Jennings, 333 N.C.
579, 626, 430 S.E.2d 188, 213, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 126
L. Ed. 2d 602 (1993).
In Gibbs, 335 N.C. at 58, 436 S.E.2d at 354, a
burglary-murder case, the trial court submitted as aggravating
circumstances that the murder was committed during the course of
a felony, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), and as part of a course of
violent conduct, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).  This Court held the
two circumstances were not supported by the same evidence.  Gibbs
335 N.C. at 61, 436 S.E.2d at 355.  The (e)(5) circumstance was
supported by evidence that defendant murdered the victim while
engaged in the commission of a burglary.  Id. at 60, 436 S.E.2d
-38-
at 355.  However, the (e)(11) circumstance neither required nor
relied upon proof of burglary; instead, the course of conduct
circumstance was supported by evidence that defendant murdered
the victim, then killed two other people.  Id. at 60-61, 436
S.E.2d at 355.  Thus, the Court concluded that “Defendant need
not have engaged in a violent course of conduct in order to have
committed a capital felony in the course of the burglary.”  Id.
at 61, 436 S.E.2d at 355.
Similarly, in this case, each aggravating circumstance
was based on evidence not required to prove the other.  The
(e)(5) circumstance is based on evidence that defendant murdered
McLean during the commission of the burglary.  The (e)(11)
circumstance is based on entirely separate evidence that,
following the murder of McLean, defendant kidnapped Morrison by
brandishing a handgun and demanding that she leave with him. 
Concluding that the trial court properly instructed the jury not
to consider the same evidence as the basis of more than one
aggravating circumstance, that different evidence supported each
aggravating circumstance, and that the two circumstances were not
inherently duplicative on the peculiar facts of this case, we
hold the trial court did not err in submitting both.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that it could refuse to find uncontroverted
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances if the jury deemed the
evidence to have no mitigating value.  Defendant argues that a
jury in a capital case may not refuse to consider any relevant
mitigating evidence and that, by instructing the jury to consider
-39-
if a submitted nonstatutory mitigating circumstance has
mitigating value, the trial court allowed the jury to disregard
relevant mitigating evidence.  Defendant argues that all eleven
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted to the jury were
inherently mitigating and that the jury should not have been
allowed to reject any of the mitigating circumstances.  Defendant
argues the jury should have been required to consider and give
effect to all the circumstances supported by uncontroverted
evidence when recommending sentence because the jury “may not
refuse to consider[] any relevant mitigating evidence offered by
the defendant as the basis for a sentence less than death.” 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 277
(1989).  Defendant argues that once a peremptory instruction is
given as to a mitigating circumstance, the only question that
remains is how much weight the jury will give the circumstance. 
Defendant argues that, contrary to the jury instructions given in
this case, the jury cannot decide a nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance has no weight after being given a peremptory
instruction which states that all of the evidence tends to show
the existence of the mitigating circumstance.
The trial court instructed the jury that all the
evidence tended to show each particular mitigating circumstance
but that the jury must determine if the circumstance existed and
had value.  We conclude that the trial court’s peremptory
instructions for nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were
correct.  See State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 475, 459 S.E.2d 679,
699 (1995) (holding that identical jury instructions regarding
-40-
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were not erroneous), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996).  In State v.
Green, 336 N.C. 142, 172, 443 S.E.2d 14, 32, cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994), the defendant argued that
the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to consider and
give weight to an uncontroverted nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance.  This Court held that a juror may find that a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance exists but may give that
circumstance no mitigating value.  Id. at 173, 443 S.E.2d at 32. 
The Court noted that in State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 493, 434
S.E.2d 840, 855 (1993), the Court held that peremptory
instructions could be given for nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  Green, 336 N.C. at 173, 443 S.E.2d at 32.  This
Court in Green went on to note that “nothing we stated in Gay
supports the notion that the peremptory instructions to be used
with regard to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances should be
identical to those used with regard to statutory mitigating
circumstances.”  Id.  The Court held that “even if a jury finds
from uncontroverted and manifestly credible evidence that a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance exists, ‘jurors may reject
the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance if they do not deem it
to have mitigating value.’”  Id. at 173-74, 443 S.E.2d at 32-33
(quoting Gay, 334 N.C. at 492, 434 S.E.2d at 854).
Defendant, in essence, argues that the jury should have
been instructed to consider and give weight to uncontroverted
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  We conclude that the
trial court’s peremptory instructions for nonstatutory mitigating
-41-
circumstances were correct.  For each nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance, the trial court first set out a mitigator and then
instructed as follows:
[B]ecause the evidence is unrebutted as to
[named mitigating circumstance], I instruct
you to find the existence of that mitigating
circumstance if one or more of you find the
facts to be as all the evidence tends to
show.  If one or more of you deems this
mitigating circumstance to have mitigating
value, you would so indicate by having your
foreperson write yes in the space provided. 
If none of you finds the facts to be as all
the evidence tends to show or if none of you
deem it to have mitigating value, you would
have your foreperson write no in the space
provided.
“[J]urors are allowed to reject any nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance which they do not deem to have mitigating value.” 
State v. Basden, 339 N.C. 288, 304, 451 S.E.2d 238, 247 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152, 132 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1995); see also
State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 661, 452 S.E.2d 279, 306 (1994),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995).  Defendant’s
argument is contrary to our prior decisions on this issue, and
defendant has demonstrated no reason why we should reverse or
alter our precedent.  See, e.g., Lynch, 340 N.C. at 476, 459
S.E.2d at 700.  This assignment of error is without merit and is,
therefore, overruled.
PRESERVATION ISSUES
Defendant raises nine additional issues that he
concedes have been decided contrary to his position previously by
this Court:  (i) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s
motion to question prospective jurors about their understanding
of the meaning of a life sentence for first-degree murder and of
-42-
parole eligibility for a life sentence of first-degree murder;
(ii) the trial court erred by instructing jurors that they must
be unanimous to answer “no” for Issues One, Three, and Four, and
to reject the death penalty in their punishment recommendation;
(iii) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce
victim-impact evidence; (iv) the trial court’s capital sentencing
jury instructions defining defendant’s burden to prove mitigating
circumstances to the satisfaction of each juror did not
adequately guide the jury’s discretion about the requisite degree
of proof; (v) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to
refuse to give effect to mitigating evidence if the jury deemed
the evidence not to have mitigating value; (vi) the trial court
erred in allowing death qualification of the jury by excusing for
cause certain jurors who expressed an unwillingness to impose the
death penalty; (vii) the trial court erred in instructing the
jurors in accordance with the pattern jury instructions that they
“may” consider the mitigating circumstances found when balancing
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in Issue Three and
in determining the substantiality of the aggravating
circumstances in Issue Four; (viii) the trial court erred by
instructing each juror to consider only the mitigation found by
that juror at Issue Two in deciding Issues Three and Four; and
(ix) the trial court erred by sentencing defendant to death
because the death penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad and is imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner.
-43-
Defendant raises these issues for purposes of urging
this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also for the
purpose of preserving the issues for any possible further
judicial review.  We have considered defendant’s arguments on
these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our
prior holdings.  These assignments of error are overruled.
PROPORTIONALITY
Finally, defendant argues that the sentence of death in
this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or other arbitrary considerations and that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, the death penalty is disproportionate.  We
are required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) to review the record
and determine (i) whether the record supports the jury’s findings
of the aggravating circumstances upon which the court based its
death sentence; (ii) whether the sentence was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
and (iii) whether the death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.  See State v.
McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 239, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161 (1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994).
After a thorough review of the transcript, record on
appeal, and briefs and oral arguments of counsel, we are
convinced that the jury’s findings of the two aggravating
circumstances submitted were supported by the evidence.  We also
conclude that nothing in the record suggests that defendant’s
-44-
death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Finally, we must consider whether the imposition of the
death penalty in defendant’s case is proportionate to other cases
in which the death penalty has been affirmed, considering both
the crime and the defendant.  See State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78,
133, 443 S.E.2d 306, 334 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130
L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).  The purpose of proportionality review is
“to eliminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to
die by the action of an aberrant jury.”  State v. Holden, 321
N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988).  Proportionality review also
acts “[a]s a check against the capricious or random imposition of
the death penalty.”  State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259
S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d
1137 (1980).  Our consideration is limited to those cases which
are roughly similar as to the crime and the defendant, but we are
not bound to cite every case used for comparison.  See State v.
Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 400, 428 S.E.2d 118, 146, cert. denied,
510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993).  Whether the death
penalty is disproportionate “ultimately rest[s] upon the
‘experienced judgments’ of the members of this Court.”  Green,
336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based
upon premeditation and deliberation, and under the felony murder
rule.  Defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, first-degree burglary
-45-
and first-degree kidnapping.  The jury found both aggravating
circumstances submitted:  (i) that the murder was committed while
defendant was engaged in the commission of a burglary, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(e)(5); and (ii) that the murder was part of a course of
conduct in which defendant committed other crimes of violence
against another person, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(11).
Five statutory mitigating circumstances were submitted
for the jury’s consideration:  (i) defendant has no significant
history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1);
(ii) the murder was committed while defendant was under the
influence of mental or emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(2); (iii) defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6);
(iv) defendant’s age at the time of the crime, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(7); and (v) the catchall mitigating circumstance that
there existed any other circumstance arising from the evidence
which the jury deemed to have mitigating value, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(9).  The jury found all of the statutory mitigating
circumstances to exist except N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7).  The
trial court submitted eleven nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances; and the jury found one of these to exist and to
have mitigating value:  “the defendant is the father of two
daughters and has a loving and supportive relationship with his
children.”
We begin our analysis by comparing this case to those
cases in which this Court has determined the sentence of death to
-46-
be disproportionate.  This Court has determined the death
sentence to be disproportionate on seven occasions.  State v.
Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319
N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341
S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines,
345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181
(1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State
v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v.
Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).  This case is not
substantially similar to any of the cases in which this Court has
found that the death sentence was disproportionate.
This case has several features which distinguish it
from the cases in which we have found the sentence to be
disproportionate.  First, the jury convicted defendant on the
basis of both the felony murder rule and premeditation and
deliberation.  “The finding of premeditation and deliberation
indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.”  State v.
Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence
vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1990).  Second, the victim was killed in his own home during the
nighttime.  A murder in the home “shocks the conscience, not only
because a life was senselessly taken, but because it was taken
[at] an especially private place, one [where] a person has a
right to feel secure.”  State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358
S.E.2d 1, 34, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406
-47-
(1987).  Finally, defendant repeatedly shot McLean to death in
front of McLean’s two small children.  See State v. McNeill, 346
N.C. 233, 243, 485 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1997) (noting that the
defendant killed the victim in front of her children in affirming
the death sentence), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 139 L. Ed. 2d
647 (1998); State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 404, 373 S.E.2d 518,
538 (1988) (relying on the fact that the defendant killed the
victim in front of several small children as one basis for
finding the death sentence proportionate), sentence vacated on
other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990). 
Therefore, we conclude that the present case is distinguishable
from those cases in which we have found the death penalty
disproportionate.
We also consider cases in which this Court has found
the death penalty to be proportionate.  We note that defendant’s
sentence is not disproportionate simply because the jury found
four mitigating circumstances and only two aggravating
circumstances.  See Lynch, 340 N.C. at 483-84, 459 S.E.2d at
704-05.  Even a “single aggravating circumstance may outweigh a
number of mitigating circumstances and . . . be sufficient to
support a death sentence.”  State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 110, 446
S.E.2d 542, 566 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed.
2d 1083 (1995).  Additionally, we emphasize that while two of the
statutory mitigating circumstances found in this case, that
defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance when he committed the murder, N.C.G.S. §
15A-2000(f)(2), and that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
-48-
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6),
are often persuasive to the jury in recommending life
imprisonment, they are not conclusive.  See State v. McDougall,
308 N.C. 1, 36 nn.9-10, 301 S.E.2d 308, 329 nn.9-10, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983); see also State v.
Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 298, 439 S.E.2d 547, 576 (affirming the death
sentence where the jury found the existence of the (f)(2) and
(f)(6) mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130
L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994); State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 236, 283
S.E.2d 732, 754 (1981) (affirming the death sentence after
assuming that the jury found the (f)(2) and (f)(6) mitigating
circumstances), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 72 L. Ed. 2d 155
(1982).  The jury could have reasonably given these two statutory
mitigating circumstances less weight in making the ultimate
decision of life imprisonment or death.
Further, this Court has deemed four statutory
aggravating circumstances, standing alone, to be sufficient to
sustain death sentences; the (e)(5) and (e)(11) circumstances are
among them.  See Bacon, 337 N.C. at 110 n.8, 446 S.E.2d at 566
n.8.  As we said earlier, the evidence introduced at trial was
sufficient for the jury to find that defendant committed the
murder during the commission of first-degree burglary and as part
of a course of violent conduct.  Thus, we conclude that the
present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have
found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which
we have found the sentence disproportionate or those in which
-49-
juries have consistently returned recommendations of life
imprisonment.
We conclude that defendant received a fair trial and
capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error, and
that the death sentence in this case is not disproportionate. 
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are left
undisturbed.
NO ERROR.