Title: JAY v. ROBINSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAY v. ROBINSON2003 WY 3365 P.3d 374Case Number: 02-104Decided: 03/06/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
    

R. 
JAY and TWYLA K. OWSLEY,

husband 
and wife,

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

EDWARD 
W. and JOYCE E. ROBINSON,

husband 
and wife,

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
William R. Shelledy, Jr. of Scott, Shelledy and Luhm, P.C., Worland, 
Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Kevin D. Huber of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming  

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

            
KITE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Appellants R. Jay 
and Twyla K. Owsley appealed from the district court's summary judgment voiding 
their road easement across property owned by Appellees Edward W. and Joyce E. 
Robinson.  The district court 
concluded the Owsleys' predecessor-in-interest did not have authority to grant 
the road easement because the property had already been dedicated to public use 
as a utility easement.  We conclude the district court erred by 
ruling the property was dedicated to public use and, consequently, 
reverse.

 
  
              
 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The Owsleys state the 
issue for review as follows:

 
   
     

            
Whether the owner of a subservient estate to a platted utility easement 
is prohibited from additionally burdening said estate with a subservient 
easement which is not inconsistent with the uses permitted by the initial 
easement?

 
            
          
            

The Robinsons restate the issues on appeal as 
follows:

 
 
       

1.  Was 
the [Owsleys'] Notice of Appeal timely filed?[1]

2.  Was the District Court correct in ruling as a 
matter of law that the grant of the easement to the [Owsleys] was 
void?

 
 
                
     

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Russell and Hazel 
Sorenson owned real property in Hot Springs County.  On September 3, 1987, they filed an 
official plat with the county clerk.  
The plat created three separate tracts of land collectively referred to 
as the Sorenson Tracts and individually labeled as Tracts 1, 2, and 3.  The plat also identified three 
easements:  (1) a twenty-foot wide 
utility easement along the western side of Tract 2 (Easement A); (2) a 
fifteen-foot wide road and utility easement along the southern side of Tracts 2 
and 3 (Easement B); and (3) a thirty-foot wide utility easement along the 
eastern boundary of Tract 3 (Easement C).  
The general notes on the plat stated in relevant part:  "The utility easements shown hereon are 
intended for all utilities, including but not limited to, electric, telephone, 
cable television, water, sewer and gas service lines and facilities."

 
      
           
         

[¶4]      The Sorensons 
conveyed Tracts 2 and 3 to Theodore Fisher.  The deed expressly restated Easements A 
and B and granted an additional fifteen-foot wide easement for road and utility 
purposes south of the southern boundary of Tracts 2 and 3 on other property 
owned by the Sorensons (Easement D).  
On April 13, 1991, Mr. Fisher sold Tract 3 to the Owsleys.  The Owsley/Fisher deed restated 
Easements A, B, and D.  The deed also 
included

 
  
 

a 
non-exclusive easement 20 feet in width along the West side of Tract 2 of the 
Sorens[o]n tracts, Town of East Thermopolis, Hot Springs County, State of 
Wyoming, for a road and utility easement [(Easement E)], and which is shown on 
the official plat of Sorens[o]n Tracts, Town of East Thermopolis, filed in the 
Office of the Hot Springs County Clerk and Ex-Officio Register of Deeds, said 
easement shall be used in connection with the above described real property and 
be appurtenant to said real property.  
Grantees, in 
accepting said easement, agree[] to use the same in a careful and prudent 
manner.

 
            
   

Easement E was, therefore, granted for the same portion of 
Tract 2 which was encumbered by Easement A.

 
 
              
  

[¶5]      On November 27, 
1995, Mr. Fisher conveyed Tract 2 to the Robinsons.  The Robinsons objected to the Owsleys' 
use of Easement E as a driveway and, accordingly, filed an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the easement and to quiet title.  The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  After a hearing, 
the district court granted the Robinsons' summary judgment motion.  The district court specifically ruled 
that, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-104 (LexisNexis 2001), the recording 
of a plat is the equivalent of granting the public a fee simple interest in the 
portions set aside for streets or other public use.  The court held, therefore, that the 
Sorensons did not have authority to grant the Owsleys a road and utility 
easement over the land which was formerly dedicated as a utility easement on the 
plat map.  The district court ruled 
Easement E was void and the Robinsons were entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.  The Owsleys 
appealed after the district court denied their motion to reconsider.

 
     
      

DISCUSSION

 

 [¶6]     The Owsleys contend the 
district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Robinsons.  In particular, the 
Owsleys claim the district court's determination that Easement A was dedicated 
to public use and the filing of the plat created a fee simple interest in favor 
of the public on the property covered by Easement A was incorrect.  They maintain the grant created a mere easement and it was, therefore, 
within the rights of the servient property owner to grant another easement on 
the same property so long as the grant did not interfere with the rights of the 
dominant estate.

 
       
             
               
       

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  The court considers the record in the 
perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and gives that party 
the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the 
record.  Anderson 
v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 
3 P.3d 236, 238 (Wyo. 2000).  A material fact is any fact that, if 
proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element 
of a claim or defense asserted by a party.  
Hasvold 
v. Park County School District Number 6, 
2002 WY 65, ¶11, 45 P.3d 635, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002); 
Century 
Ready-Mix Company v. Campbell County School District, 
816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991).  We review questions of law de 
novo.  Hasvold, 2002 WY 
65, 
¶11.

 
 

[¶8]      The district 
court ruled that, pursuant to § 34-12-104, the public owned a fee simple 
interest in the property covered by Easement A.  Section 34-12-104 states:

 
  

 
The acknowledgement and recording of such [subdivision] plat, is equivalent to 
a deed in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as is on such 
plat set apart for streets, or other public use, or is thereon dedicated to 
charitable, religious or educational purposes.  

 

[¶9]      The plat 
identified Easement A as a utility easement and stated the utility easements 
identified on the plat were "intended for all utilities."  In ruling that the public held a fee 
simple interest in Easement A, the district court necessarily determined the 
plat "set apart [Easement A] for . . . other public use."  Section 
34-12-104.

 
 

[¶10]   The dedication of property by 
filing a plat is known as statutory dedication.  Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 761 P.2d 96, 98 (Wyo. 1988), reh'g granted, 779 P.2d 1180 (Wyo. 1989).  A 
dedication of property is defined as

 
      

the 
devotion of property to a public use by an unequivocal act of the owner, 
manifesting an intention that it shall be accepted and used presently or in the 
future.  The intention of the owner 
to dedicate and acceptance thereof by the public are the essential elements of a 
complete dedication.  Thus it is vital to a dedication of property to public use that it is to 
be forever and irrevocable after acceptance, and that it be for a public 
use.

 
   
                
          

11 
Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 33.02 at 636 (3d ed. 
1983), quoted in Sare v. Sheridan County Board of County 
Commissioners, 784 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 1989); City of Evanston v. 
Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 1985).  "The intention of the owner to set 
aside lands or property for the use of the public is the foundation and life of 
every dedication.'"  Lang, 
761 P.2d  at 99 (quoting City of Phoenix v. Landrum & Mills Realty Co., 
227 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Ariz. 1951)).  
Thus, it is critical to a valid dedication that the owner intends to 
dedicate the property to public use.  

 

[¶11]   As is apparent from the plain 
language of § 34-12-104, the primary application of the statute is in the 
dedications of streets, alleys, and other means of access.  In fact, until now, every one of our 
cases applying the statute addressed access issues.  See, e.g., Sare, 784 P.2d  
at 595; Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 779 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Wyo. 1989); 
Lang, 761 P.2d  at 99; Robinson, 702 P.2d  at 1286; Ruby Drilling 
Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, 660 P.2d 377, 380 (Wyo. 1983).  In those cases, the intent to dedicate 
at least the surface of the property to public use for access was apparent.  Id.  Other examples of typical 
dedications for public use include dedications for cemeteries, schools, bridges, 
and parks.  Lang, 761 P.2d  at 
99.  

 

[¶12]   We are faced in this case with the 
question of whether the identification of Easement A on the plat as a utility 
easement amounts to a dedication of that property to public use.  We look first to the plain language of 
the plat.  See generally 
Sare, 784 P.2d  at 594.  The 
plat identifies Easement A as a "utility easement." The easement is contained 
within Lot 2 and not set aside as a separate parcel.  The plat does not indicate the Sorensons 
intended to dedicate the area to the use of the general public but indicates 
they only intended to allow use of the easement for utility purposes.  Therefore, the clear and unambiguous 
language of the plat seems to indicate the Sorensons intended to grant a simple 
utility easement.  

 

[¶13]   The Alaska Supreme Court addressed 
a similar issue in Chugach Electric Association, Inc. v. Calais Company, 
410 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1966).  
That court stated public areas and open spaces, which are often dedicated 
to public use by plat, are by their nature "subject to being used by the public 
at large, and not merely by a particular segment of the public."  410 P.2d  at 510.  In contrast, utility easements are not 
"subject to general or common use by the public at large, but only by a limited 
number of persons or corporations who are engaged in the business of providing 
public utility services for the residents of [a particular subdivision]."  Id.  Thus, utility easements are "public" 
only to the extent they are used by a few residents of the subdivision who are 
members of the public and are specifically entitled to derive benefits from the 
utility easement.  Id.  Residents making use of a utility 
easement do not use that easement in the same manner as they would use areas 
typically regarded as public, such as streets, alleys, and parks.  Id.

 

[¶14]   We conclude, therefore, the utility 
easements identified in the Sorenson plat were not set apart for public 
use.  Consequently, Easement A is 
subject to our general rules pertaining to easements.  An easement is "an 
interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or 
enjoyment over another person's property.'"  Hasvold, 
2002 WY 65, ¶13 
(quoting Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994)).  Provided the easement does not clearly 
indicate it is exclusive to the dominant owner, the owner of the servient estate 
retains the right to use the easement area.  Mueller, 887 P.2d  at 504; 
Wilkoske v. Warren, 875 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Wyo. 1994).  The servient owner's use of the easement 
area must not, however, interfere with the dominant use as articulated in the 
easement language.  See 
Hasvold, 2002 WY 65, ¶13; Mueller, 887 P.2d  at 504.  In other words, "[b]oth owners possess 
rights and each must as far as possible respect the other's use."  Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 
730 (Wyo. 1976).

 
  
    

[¶15]   Mr. Fisher granted Easement E to 
the Owsleys in the 1991 deed. The easement was expressly made appurtenant to 
Tract 3.  Accordingly, Tract 3 was 
the dominant estate, and Tract 2 was the servient estate.  The Robinsons were, therefore, on notice 
when they purchased Tract 2 that Easement E burdened it.  The record does not contain any 
indication that the Owsleys used the easement in a manner inconsistent with the 
grant.  In other words, there is no 
evidence that the Owsleys' use of the easement exceeded the scope of the 
easement or caused an undue burden upon the Robinsons' servient estate.  As long as the 
Owsleys use the easement in the manner allowed by the grant in the Fisher/Owsley 
deed, the Robinsons may not limit the Owsleys' use of Easement E.

 
        
              
        

[¶16]   Having reached the conclusion that 
the utility easements in the Sorenson plat were not set aside for public use, we 
must also conclude the Robinsons could not maintain an action for a judgment 
declaring the easements were set aside for public use.  This is so because, if the easements 
were set aside for public use, the public authority would hold title to the 
easements in trust for the public's benefit and the Robinsons would have no 
individual possessory interest in the easements and thus no standing to contest 
the Owsleys' use of Easement E.  
Ruby Drilling Co., Inc., 660 P.2d  at 381; Morad v. Brown, 
549 P.2d 312 (Wyo. 1976). 

            

[¶17]   Reversed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1This issue was previously decided in an order denying the Robinsons' 
motion to dismiss the appeal and will not, therefore, be revisited here.