Title: In re McCarty

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_MCCARTY.93-372; 162 Vt. 535; 649 A.2d 764

 
[Filed 09-Sep-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-372

 In re William M. McCarty, Jr.                Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Professional Conduct Board

                                              May Term, 1994

 Shelley A. Hill, Bar Counsel, Montpelier, for petitioner-appellee

 Douglas Richards and Sheilla C. Files (On the Brief) of Douglas Richards,
    P.C., Springfield, for respondent-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      PER CURIAM.   William McCarty, a lawyer licensed in Vermont since 1967,
 appeals the Professional Conduct Board's (the Board) decision that he
 violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a matter entrusted to him) and DR 1-
 102(A)(7) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
 practice law).  He claims that (1) the Board lost its authority by the
 hearing panel's failure to comply with the requirement to issue a decision
 within sixty days of hearing; (2) evidence adduced at the hearing did not
 support the Board's findings of fact; and (3) his conduct did not violate DR
 6-101(A)(3) or DR 1-102(A)(7).  We agree that Respondent should not be
 disciplined for a violation of DR 1-102(A)(7).  The hearing panel's
 recommendation of public reprimand is approved for violation of DR 6-
 101(A)(3).
      The Board found a single violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect) and a
 single violation of DR 1-102(A)(7) (unfitness) following a hearing before a

 

 panel convened to consider bar counsel's petition alleging two counts of
 neglect and two counts of unfitness.  Bar counsel charged respondent with
 two code violations for his representation of a client in a post-divorce
 visitation dispute and two code violations for his representation of two
 people who had requested wills.  The Board concluded that respondent's
 representation of all these clients was "unduly prolonged contrary to the
 clients' expressed desire for prompt attention, causing the clients
 unnecessary anxiety, aggravation and expense." This conclusion formed the
 basis of the neglect violation.  The Board also concluded that that neglect
 plus respondent's treatment of the will clients in an undignified manner on
 at least one occasion constituted the unfitness violation.  No issues are
 raised on appeal over the Board's consolidation of four counts into two
 counts.
                                     I.
                                     A.
      The first complainant, Susan Stemm, retained respondent in November
 1988 to resolve visitation disputes following a Wyoming divorce giving her
 custody of the parties' 5-year-old son and visitation to her ex-husband.
 Stemm sought to limit her ex-husband's visitation because, she claimed, he
 had abused the boy.  In February 1989, Stemm expressed her sense of urgency
 because the father had planned a month-long summer visitation at his home in
 Wyoming.  The child was experiencing such anxiety over visitation that he
 required weekly counselling.  Respondent advised Stemm that he would seek
 relief in Vermont on the issue of visitation.
      Respondent's associate, Susan Hatheway, initially worked on Stemm's
 case.  In April 1989, she prepared a motion to modify the Wyoming decree to

 

 be filed in Windham Superior Court.  Shortly after May 15, Hatheway and
 another associate left the firm, leaving respondent as the firm's only
 attorney.
      On June 8, 1989, Stemm expressed impatience with respondent because
 respondent had not yet filed the motion.  Informing respondent that she did
 not intend to allow the summer visitation, Stemm asked whether she should
 seek relief in Wyoming instead of Vermont.  Respondent told her that juris-
 diction should be in Vermont, but did not advise her that simply
 disregarding the Wyoming divorce judgment could result in proceedings
 against her in Wyoming.
      At no time during the summer of 1989 did respondent file the motion to
 modify in any court.  He did nothing further in Stemm's behalf.  After
 respondent failed to return Stemm's phone calls, he finally met with her in
 October 1989, at which time the relationship terminated.  Stemm refused to
 allow her son to visit his father in Wyoming that summer.  The father
 responded by instituting contempt proceedings in Wyoming.  She defended by
 hiring a Wyoming attorney, which cost Stemm approximately $20,000 in
 attorney fees.  As a result of this incident, she notified the Professional
 Conduct Board of respondent's behavior.
                                     B.
      The second complainant, Richard Wysanski, contacted respondent's
 associate, Susan Hatheway, in October 1988, to have wills prepared for
 himself and a friend.  Respondent instructed Hatheway to conduct the intake

 

 interview and charge $130 for the two simple wills, which he would draft
 himself.  Hatheway met with the clients in November.
       In May 1989, the clients provided estate planning information to
 Hatheway, at which time she informed Wysanski that she would be leaving the
 firm.  She indicated she would ask respondent to draft the wills.  Between
 May and September 1989, both clients called respondent's office numerous
 times to find out why their wills had not yet been prepared.  Respondent did
 not return these calls, and when contact was finally made, respondent became
 rude and sarcastic and suggested they hire another attorney.
      The clients then contacted Hatheway to intervene on their behalf.  She
 wrote to respondent.  Rather than prepare the wills, respondent returned
 the $130 retainer to the clients at the end of September, claiming that he
 had been too busy to prepare them.
                                     II.
      Respondent first argues that the Board's decision should be reversed
 because the panel submitted its report to the Board beyond the time set
 forth in A.O. 9 Rule 8(C), which states in part:
 The Hearing Panel shall in every case submit a report
 containing its findings and recommendations . . . to the
 Board within 60 days after the conclusion of its
 hearing.

 The panel submitted its report to the Board about ninety days after the con-
 clusion of the hearing.
      Failure to comply with a statutory deadline does not necessarily
 require a sanction unless the statute creating the limit expressly specifies
 a consequence for failure to meet it.  In re J.R., 153 Vt. 85, 92, 570 A.2d 154, 157, (1989) (court will not imply a consequence in absence of one
 specified by legislature); see also In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 173-74,