Title: State v. Cadorette

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Cadorette (2001-159); 175 Vt. 268; 826 A.2d 101

2003 VT 13

[Filed 07-Feb-2003]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 30-Apr-2003]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 13

                                No. 2001-159

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Terry M. Cadorette		                 March Term, 2002

  Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  David J. Williams of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for
    Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Terry Cadorette appeals his
  conviction for sexual assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(1),
  arguing that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to arraign
  him on a charge carrying a possible life sentence, and over his objection
  on this issue, to put him to trial within six days after he learned of the
  charges at a jury draw.  We agree and reverse. (FN1)  

       ¶  2.  On January 2, 2001, defendant was transported from jail where
  he was serving time on an earlier conviction.  He arrived to find his
  lawyer involved in a jury draw for a trial on a charge that had been
  dismissed two years earlier. (FN2)  He told his lawyer that he wanted to
  speak to the court.  Defendant protested to the court that he had not been
  rearraigned on the charge, that he had thought that the charge had been
  dismissed due to lack of evidence, that he had never met with his court-
  appointed attorney to discuss and develop a defense to the accusation, and
  that his attorney was not prepared to try the matter.  Indeed, he claimed
  he had not seen his lawyer for seven months.  The trial judge dismissed
  defendant's objection with the words "we're not going to go into a
  discussion about . . . every possible legal issue, Mr. Cadorette." 
  Defendant then inquired, "[T]hat's not my right to get into a legal issue
  regarding my life, sir?"  The trial judge reminded defendant that he had an
  attorney to take care of his legal rights, that there was no need for
  defendant to be present at an arraignment, that a not guilty plea had been
  entered, and that no rights had been waived.  The transcript of the alleged
  arraignment hearing reveals, however, that no arraignment had been held and
  no pro forma plea had been entered by the court.  The court elected to
  proceed with the trial, despite assigned counsel's virtual admission that
  he had barely seen defendant in seven months.  Counsel, Harley Brown,
  claimed to have seen defendant once in that time, but also claimed that he
  was ready for trial.  The trial was scheduled for January 8, six days
  later.  Defendant was convicted and sentenced to thirty-five years to life.
   
       ¶  3.  The history prior to the jury draw shows that the present
  charges had been filed previously and dismissed without prejudice on
  January 4, 1999 because the complaining witness had left the area. 
  Defendant had been represented at that time by private counsel, who was
  also representing him on other charges.  On January 10, 1999, private
  counsel was dismissed by the court upon defendant's allegation that counsel
  had been completely unavailable to him.  The state's attorney later
  acknowledged that private counsel had done no discovery on the case. 
  Defendant was directed to apply for a public defender.  Harley Brown was
  assigned to represent defendant on different charges because the charge
  involved in this case was not pending at the time counsel was assigned.  On
  May 5, 2000, the present charges were refiled, and although the docket
  sheet in the refiled charges shows that the arraignment was set for the
  same day, defendant was not transported to court.  In fact, the hearing
  scheduled for that day was for an entirely different charge.  Harley Brown
  appeared for defendant on the other charge.  The prosecutor, however,
  indicated a preference for going forward on the newly refiled charges,
  stating that defendant could be arraigned at a "future status conference." 
  The trial court acknowledged that "first we have to have an arraignment,"
  but the court wanted the discovery clock to start that day.  The court's
  plan was to have the parties proceed with discovery and arraign defendant
  "the next time Mr. Cadorette comes to court."  But no status conference or
  any other event brought defendant to court until the jury draw.  Moreover,
  despite the discovery clock having begun to run on May 5, 2000, Harley
  Brown did not file his appearance in this case until July 7, 2000.  This
  meant that defendant's right to exercise discovery began on May 5, 2000,
  although he did not know it.  Nor did he know that he should begin to
  monitor his lawyer's preparation for the eventual trial.  In fact, no other
  docket sheet entry is made until September 22, 2000, which starts a series
  of notations on rescheduling jury draws until one is actually held on
  January 2, 2001, and trial is commenced on January 8, 2001. 
   
       ¶  4.  One of the most fundamental principles of our criminal
  justice system is that a person charged with a crime must be notified of
  the charges against him.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee,