Title: Word v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HUBERT MARTY WORD, 
§ 
No. 195, 2001 
§ 
     
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr.A. No: 
IN99-06-0975 
§ 
 
 
IN99-06-0978 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
IN99-02-1365 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  April 17, 2002 
Decided:   July 3, 2002 
 
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN 
PART, and REMANDED. 
 
Charles M. Oberly, III, Esquire, of Oberly & Jennings, P.A., Wilmington, 
Delaware, for Appellant. 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VEASEY, Chief Justice: 
 
In this appeal, we review the scope of the statutory element of first degree robbery 
that requires a finding that the defendant “displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon.”1  We clarify and reaffirm that to support a conviction for first degree robbery, 
the victim not only must have the subjective belief that the defendant possesses a deadly 
weapon but also this belief must be “accompanied by an objective physical 
manifestation that the robber appears to be displaying a deadly weapon.”2   
Although the victim in this case believed the defendant possessed a deadly 
weapon, her belief was not based on any objective physical manifestation of a weapon.  
Rather, her belief was based solely on a note the defendant gave her that stated, “I am 
armed.”  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court  
                                                 
111Del. C. § 832(a) states, in relevant part: 
 
 A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the person commits the crime of robbery in the 
second degree and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight 
therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime: . . . (2) Displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon; . . . . 
 
Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony. 
2DeShields v. State, 706 A.2d 502, 507 (Del. 1998). 
 
 
3 
sentencing the defendant for first degree robbery and remand for a new sentencing on 
the lesser included offense of  robbery in the second degree.3 
Facts 
                                                 
311 Del. C. § 831(a) sets forth the elements of robbery in the second degree.  That statute provides, in relevant 
part:  
 
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the course of committing  theft, the person 
. . . threatens the immediate use of force . . . with intent to:  (1) Prevent or overcome resistance to the 
taking of the property . . . or (2) Compel the owner of the property or another person to deliver up the 
property. . . . 
 
Robbery in the second degree is a class E felony. 
On January 4, 1999, Hubert Word entered a Sovereign Bank branch and passed 
to the bank teller a note that read: “This is a holdup.  Give me all of the strapped 
money.  No dye packs.  I am armed.”  The words “I am armed” were underlined twice.  
The bank teller testified that Word carried a black, briefcase-size bag over his shoulder 
with one hand over the top of it, and that he placed the bag on the counter and 
through the teller window after he passed her the holdup note.  The bank teller stated 
that she did not hear “a thud” when the bag hit the counter, that the bag did not appear 
heavy, and that she could not remember whether Word’s hand was inside the bag when 
 
 
4 
he placed it on the teller counter.  Nevertheless, the bank teller testified that she 
thought Word had a gun because of the note stating, “I am armed.”  She handed Word 
the money from her teller station, but Word demanded more.  She then went to the 
next teller station and retrieved more money.  When the bank teller returned, Word 
was gone and she called the police. 
Detective Timothy Morris interviewed the bank teller within twenty minutes after 
the robbery.  Detective Morris testified under 11 Del. C. § 35074 that the bank teller 
told him that when Word placed the bag on the teller counter, his hand was inside it.  
                                                 
411 Del. C. § 3507 states, in relevant part: “(a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value.” 
 
 
5 
Word was apprehended by police and confessed to the robbery.  He was charged 
with first degree robbery and second degree conspiracy.  Word waived his right to a jury 
trial, and the only issue at the bench trial was whether Word’s actions constituted 
robbery in the first degree or second degree.  Specifically, the trial judge had to decide 
whether Word displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during the robbery.5  
The trial judge found that the bank teller “testified that she thought that the defendant 
had a gun” and that it was “reasonable . . . for her to think about a gun because . . . the 
note said ‘am armed’ and it was underscored twice.”  Although the bank teller could 
not remember at trial whether Word had his hand in the bag when he placed it on the 
counter, the trial judge found that “the essence of her testimony, as I heard it in court, 
was that she saw his hand in the bag and that . . . he could have been holding 
something.” 
On November 29, 2000, the trial judge convicted Word of robbery in the first 
degree and conspiracy in the second degree.  On April 20, 2001, the Superior Court 
issued an order sentencing Word for all his outstanding convictions, which included 
                                                 
5As noted in footnote one, 11 Del. C. § 832(a) states, in relevant part:  
 
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the person commits the crime of robbery in the 
second degree and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight 
therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime: . . . (2) Displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon; . . . . 
 
 
6 
first degree robbery, second degree conspiracy, and second degree forgery.  Word was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison as an habitual offender for his first degree robbery 
conviction, to one year in prison, suspended for probation, for his second degree 
conspiracy conviction, and to one year in prison, suspended for probation, for his 
second degree forgery conviction.  This is Word’s direct appeal. 
Whether the Trial Court Erred By Finding  
Word Displayed What Appeared To Be A Deadly Weapon 
 
Word’s one claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by finding that he 
displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during the robbery of the Sovereign 
Bank.  Word asserts that his actions constituted only second degree robbery and that 
this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing for second degree robbery.   
The sole issue in this case requires us to review the trial court’s factual findings 
and its legal application of those facts to the statutory definition of first degree robbery. 
 This Court reviews the trial court’s legal determinations for errors in formulating or 
applying legal precepts, and reviews the trial court’s factual findings to determine 
whether they are supported by sufficient evidence and are the result of a logical and 
orderly deductive process.6  This Court will sustain Word’s conviction for first degree 
robbery if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
                                                 
6Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990). 
 
 
7 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”7 
                                                 
7Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  See also Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991) 
(stating that a conviction will stand if “any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”) (emphasis in original). 
 
 
8 
A person is guilty of robbery second degree when, in the course of committing 
theft, he threatens the immediate use of force against another to compel that person to 
surrender or deliver up the property.8  To elevate that offense to robbery first degree, 
the State must prove the elements of second degree robbery plus one additional 
statutory element.9  For example, a defendant may be convicted of first degree robbery 
if, in the course of committing the robbery, the defendant  “displays what appears to be 
a deadly weapon.”10  Accordingly, in seeking a conviction for first degree robbery, the 
State had to prove that Word displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during 
the robbery of the Sovereign Bank. 
After viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the State, we 
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
(1) Word passed the bank teller a note stating “I am armed,” and (2) Word’s hand was 
hidden in the bag that he placed on the teller’s counter.11  But, the element that Word 
                                                 
8DeShields, 706 A.2d at 507 (citing 11 Del. C. § 831(a)(2)). 
9Id. 
10Id. 
11At trial, the bank teller could not remember whether Word’s hand was inside the bag when he placed it on the 
teller counter and testified that she thought it was on the outside and on top of the bag.  Detective Morris then testified to 
the bank teller’s statements to him twenty minutes after the robbery in which she said that Word’s hand was inside the 
bag when he placed it on the counter.  Word argues on appeal that the trial judge should have given greater weight to the 
bank teller’s in-court testimony than her prior statements to the detective.  But, it is well established that the trier of fact 
is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony.  Chao v. State, 
604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992).  The trial judge, as the trier of fact in this case, had the discretion to accredit more 
weight to the bank teller’s contemporaneous statements to police than to her in-court testimony more than a year after the 
 
 
9 
"displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon" is not supported by this record.  The 
bank teller never testified that she believed Word had a weapon in the bag or that she 
perceived an objective manifestation of a weapon by Word.  Rather, the bank teller 
merely testified that she thought Word had a weapon only because Word’s note stated, 
“I am armed.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
robbery.  Therefore, we will not disturb the trial judge’s finding that Word’s hand was inside the bag when he placed it 
on the teller counter. 
 
 
10 
In 1998 in DeShields v. State,12 this Court issued its most recent opinion analyzing 
the “displays what appears to be a deadly weapon” element of first degree robbery.13  In 
the process of robbing a convenience store, DeShields asked for the money in the cash 
register, “reached underneath his tee-shirt and belt with his right hand” and “then 
pointed something heavy and bulky at [the store clerk] from under his shirt.”14  As a 
result of DeShields’ actions, the store clerk testified that she “thought he had a gun.”15  
In finding that DeShields displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon, this Court 
reaffirmed “that the terms ‘displays’ and ‘appears’ must be construed with a view toward 
the victim’s perception.”16  Thus, because “‘display’ includes . . . that which is 
manifested to any of the victim’s senses,”17 those terms “encompass the robber who 
actually physically displays a deadly weapon to the victim” as well as “the robber ‘who 
intimidates by otherwise manifesting the presence of such a weapon even though it is 
                                                 
12DeShields, 706 A.2d at 502. 
1311 Del. C. § 832(a)(2). 
14DeShields, 706 A.2d at 505. 
15Id. 
16Id. at 507 (citing Smallwood v. State, 346 A.2d 164, 166 (Del. 1975) (reinstating a jury verdict convicting the 
defendant of first degree robbery where the defendant “had placed a hand in his jacket pocket and pointed it in the 
direction of one of the victims in such a manner as to appear that the robber possessed a weapon”)).  
17Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 167. 
 
 
11 
not seen by the victim.’”18  But, as we stated in DeShields, there “must be more than the 
victim’s fear of the existence of a deadly weapon”19 to establish the “displays what 
appears to be a deadly weapon” requirement of first degree robbery.  The “victim’s 
subjective belief that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon” must be “accompanied 
by an objective physical manifestation that the robber appears to be displaying a deadly 
weapon.”20  Accordingly, in this case, the State had to prove that: (1) the bank teller 
subjectively believed that Word was armed, and (2) the bank teller’s belief was 
objectively reasonable because the defendant either actually produced what appeared to 
be a deadly weapon or made another objective physical manifestation of such a weapon.  
                                                 
18DeShields, 706 A.2d at 507 (quoting Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 167). 
19Id. 
20Id.  
 
 
12 
The State disagrees and relies on our order in McKamey v. State, in which we  
found that “the State demonstrated that McKamey ‘displayed’ a gun while robbing the 
[victim] cab driver by showing that McKamey sat behind the driver in the moving cab 
and told the driver that he had a gun.”21  This Court upheld McKamey’s conviction for 
first degree robbery.  The State argues that, under McKamey, Word committed first 
degree robbery because Word’s note read, “I am armed” and the victim reasonably 
believed or feared that Word actually had a weapon.  We do not, however, read our 
summary order in McKamey that was entered before our DeShields opinion as reliable 
precedent to permit a finding of the element of “displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon” where the victim did not perceive any display or physical manifestation of a 
weapon. 
                                                 
21McKamey v. State, 1997 WL 45060 (Del. Supr.), at *2. 
 
 
13 
This Court has consistently addressed the “displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon element” of first degree robbery, we have interpreted 11 Del. C. § 832(a)(2) to 
require an objective physical manifestation of a weapon, in addition to the victim’s 
subjective belief that the defendant had a weapon, to support a conviction.22  
                                                 
22See Scott v. State, 1999 WL 652054 (Del. Supr.) (sustaining a conviction for first degree robbery where 
defendant held object to victim’s head from behind and said “I will shoot you, this is a gun,” and where the victim 
believed the defendant had a gun); DeShields, 706 A.2d at 507 (stating a first degree robbery conviction requires an 
objective physical manifestation of a weapon by the defendant as well as the victim’s subjective belief that the defendant 
has a weapon ); Wright v. State, 1997 WL 317409 (Del. Supr.), at *2 (sustaining a conviction for first degree robbery 
where the victim believed the defendant had a weapon and the defendant physically manifested a weapon by concealing 
his hand inside his coat and saying, “Don’t make me use this”); Johnson v. State, 1991 WL 28889 (Del. Supr.), at *2 
(stating a first degree robbery conviction requires an objective physical manifestation of a weapon by the defendant as 
well as the victim’s subjective belief that the defendant has a weapon); DeShields v. State, 1988 WL 71442 (Del. Supr.), 
at *1 (sustaining a conviction for first degree robbery where defendant threatened to blow the victims’ heads off as he 
reached into his coat pocket and where the victims believed the defendant had a weapon); Mercado v. State, 1986 WL 
17411 (Del. Supr.), at *1 (sustaining a conviction for first degree robbery where the defendant stated “Open your [cash 
register] drawer, give me your money or I am going to pull this piece” and then tapped his waistline which bulged with a 
solid object, and where the victim believed the defendant had a weapon); Williams v. State, 495 A.2d 1237, 1241-42 
(Del. 1985) (sustaining a conviction for first degree robbery where the defendant appeared to be holding a gun between 
his hands and the victim believed the defendant held a gun); Harrigan v. State, 447 A.2d 1191, 1192-93 (Del. 1982) 
 
 
14 
Accordingly, the two-pronged standard we apply to determine whether Word displayed 
what appeared to be a deadly weapon is not new but rather is based on clear precedent 
dating back to our first interpretation of this statutory element of first degree robbery in 
Smallwood v. State.23 
                                                                                                                                                             
(sustaining a first degree robbery conviction where  the victims believed the defendant had a handgun and where the 
defendant had one hand in his coat pocket, as if he had a handgun, and the other arm around a victim’s neck, and 
threatened to shoot if the other victims did not give him money); Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 167 (reinstating a first degree 
robbery conviction where the defendant placed his hand in his jacket pocket and pointed it in the direction of the victim 
so that the victim believed the defendant had a weapon). 
23Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 167 (reinstating a first degree robbery conviction where the defendant placed his hand 
in his jacket pocket and pointed it in the direction of the victim so that the victim believed the defendant had a weapon). 
 
 
15 
While the State proved in this case that the bank teller subjectively believed that 
Word was armed with a deadly weapon, the undisputed evidence shows that the bank 
teller based this belief solely on Word’s note stating, “I am armed,” not on any objective 
physical manifestation of a weapon.  This case thus is analogous to Johnson v. State,24 
which we cited favorably in DeShields.25  In Johnson, we reversed the Superior Court’s 
judgment convicting the defendant of attempted first degree robbery, because we found 
the defendant had not displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon.26  Johnson had 
told the manager of a jewelry department to “give me those diamonds” and, “This is a 
holdup, give me the rings.”27  The victim testified that Johnson had one hand down 
where she could not see it, but that she thought his hand was inside his jacket.28  The 
victim also stated: “I just thought he had something in–afraid he had something in his 
hands, a knife or gun or something.  I was afraid he had something there because he 
said ‘This is a holdup.’”29  The State argued that even though the victim never actually 
                                                 
24Johnson, 1991 WL 28889.  
25DeShields, 706 A.2d at 507 (“However, there must be more than the victim’s fear of the existence of a deadly 
weapon.”) (citing Johnson, 1991 WL 28889, at *2). 
26Johnson, 1991 WL 28889, at *2. 
27Johnson, 1991 WL 28889, at *1. 
28Id. 
29Id. 
 
 
16 
saw a weapon, Johnson’s use of the term “holdup” accompanied by the victim’s 
subjective reaction was sufficient to establish the first degree robbery element of 
“displays what appears to be a deadly weapon.”30  This Court disagreed and held: 
“While we agree that a mere physical appearance [of a weapon] will suffice, there must 
be more than the victim’s belief in the existence of a weapon.  Here there was no 
evidence that the victim saw any bulge or other suggestion that the defendant’s clothing 
contained a weapon.  Indeed, the evidence is clear that the victim never saw the 
defendant’s hand but only ‘thought it was inside his jacket.’”31 After noting that “the 
sole suggestion of a weapon in this case was in the victim’s apprehension that a weapon 
existed,”32 this Court overturned the defendant’s conviction and held that “subjective 
belief, unaccompanied by a physical manifestation of a weapon, is insufficient to 
establish that necessary element of Robbery First Degree.”33 
As in Johnson, the bank teller did not perceive any objective manifestation of a 
weapon but rather believed that Word had a gun solely because his note read, “I am 
armed.”  Likewise, the sole suggestion of a weapon in this case was the victim’s 
                                                 
30Id. 
31Johnson, 1991 WL 28889, at *2. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
 
 
17 
apprehension that a weapon existed.  Such a subjective belief unaccompanied by a 
physical manifestation of a weapon is insufficient to establish the “displays what appears 
to be a deadly weapon” element of first degree robbery. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court as to Word’s 
conviction for first degree robbery and remand for a new sentencing for second degree 
robbery.  Because Word has limited his claims on appeal to his conviction and sentence 
for first degree robbery, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court as to his 
convictions and sentences for second degree conspiracy and second degree forgery.