Title: Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90701-Agenda 25-September 2001.
JEREMY ARTEMAN et al., Appellees, v. CLINTON
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 15, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiffs, Jeremy Arteman and his father Steve Arteman,
filed a personal injury complaint against the Clinton Community
Unit School District No. 15 (the School District), alleging, inter
alia, that the School District was negligent in failing to provide
roller-blade safety equipment for Jeremy's physical education
class. The School District moved to dismiss this complaint,
asserting that it was entitled to immunity under sections 2-201 and
3-108(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-201,
3-108(a) (West 2000)). The De Witt County circuit court granted
the School District's motion to dismiss, but the appellate court
reversed (317 Ill. App. 3d 453).
	The central issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs'
allegations that the School District negligently failed to provide
safety equipment fell within the protective scope of the
discretionary immunity provided by section 2-201 of the Act. We
reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	Count I of the plaintiffs' four-count complaint charged the
School District with negligence. According to the plaintiffs, the
School District required all high school students to take a physical
education class. On March 20, 1998, the students in Jeremy's
physical education class were expected to run laps or use roller
blades on the wooden gym floor under the supervision of two
teachers. The students opting to roller blade paid $7, and the
School District provided roller blades with a toe brake, which the
plaintiffs characterized as an experimental design. The School
District did not provide safety equipment such as shin guards,
elbow guards, knee guards, helmets, or gloves. Jeremy chose to
roller blade. During class, he fell and broke two bones in his right
leg. The plaintiffs asserted that the School District was negligent
because it:
			"a. Failed to provide the necessary safety equipment for
rollarblading [sic] such as but not limited to helmets,
shinguards, kneeguards, elbow pads;
			b. Failed to provide rollarblades [sic] that were suitable
for their intended use."
According to the plaintiffs, this purported negligence caused
Jeremy's injury. The plaintiffs' complaint also included a "Wilful
and Wanton Misconduct" count which tracked the allegations of
the negligence count, as well as two corresponding counts under
the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2000)).
	The School District filed a motion to dismiss, contending that
sections 2-201 and 3-108(a) of the Act defeated the plaintiffs'
claims. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding
that section 3-108(a), which provides immunity from claims
alleging a failure to supervise, applied and that the plaintiffs failed
to allege sufficient facts to establish willful and wanton
misconduct, an exception to section 3-108(a) immunity.
	The appellate court held that section 3-108(a) did not apply
because the plaintiffs' complaint did not involve allegations that
the School District failed to supervise Jeremy. 317 Ill. App. 3d at
456. Instead, the appellate court characterized the gist of the
plaintiffs' complaint as negligent failure to provide appropriate
equipment. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 456. The appellate court discussed
discretionary immunity and observed that "section 2-201 of the
Act-standing alone-would provide immunity to the School
District in this case." 317 Ill. App. 3d at 458. However, the
appellate court noted that in Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47 (1978),
Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit
District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415 (1980), and Palmer v. Mt. Vernon
Township High School District 201, 169 Ill. 2d 551 (1996), this
court "recognized a cause of action for a school district's failure
to fulfill its independent duty to provide appropriate safety
equipment to students." 317 Ill. App. 3d at 459-60. The appellate
court reasoned that the policy considerations outlined in Gerrity
and its progeny, which militated against immunity under the
School Code, applied with equal force to immunity under the Act.
317 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate court hesitantly concluded
that section 2-201 did not defeat the plaintiffs' claims, reversing
and remanding "in the hope that the supreme court, in this case or
some other, will address the immunities and duties of school
districts under the Act." 317 Ill. App. 3d at 460.
	We granted the plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal. See 177
Ill. 2d R. 315.(1)

ANALYSIS
	Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits
involuntary dismissal where "the claim asserted against defendant
is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or
defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998).
Affirmative matter in this context means a defense which negates
the plaintiff's cause of action. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum,
159 Ill. 2d 469, 486 (1994); see Kedzie & 103rd Currency
Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115 (1993). Immunity
under the Act is affirmative matter properly raised in a section
2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss. Bubb v. Springfield School District
186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995). Our review of a section 2-619
dismissal is de novo. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997).
	We frequently have discussed the history of sovereign
immunity in Illinois, and we need not reiterate it at length here.
The 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished sovereign immunity,
except as the General Assembly may provide (see Ill. Const. 1970,
art. XIII, §4), and the legislature exercised this prerogative by
retaining the 1965 Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street
Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1998); see Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 375. The Act serves to protect local public entities, including
school boards and school districts (745 ILCS 10/1-206 (West
1998)), and public employees from liability arising from the
operation of government (745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998)).
By providing immunity, the General Assembly sought to prevent
the dissipation of public funds on damage awards. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378.
	The Act grants only immunities and defenses. 745 ILCS
10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998). That is, the Act does not create duties,
but merely articulates which of the delineated immunities apply to
certain common law duties. Vesey v. Chicago Housing Authority,
145 Ill. 2d 404, 412 (1991); see Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 381 ("The
legislature, in the Tort Immunity Act, adopted the general
principle that local governmental units are liable in tort, 'but
limited this with an extensive list of immunities based on specific
government functions' [citations]"). Accordingly, whether a local
public entity owed a duty of care and whether that entity enjoyed
immunity are separate inquiries. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1996). Once we determine a duty exists, we must
then address whether the Act applies. See Village of Bloomingdale
v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001).
	The School District contends that the appellate court erred in
concluding the duty we recognized in Gerrity defeated immunity
under the Act. Before deciding whether the Act provides
immunity, we must discuss the School Code immunity provisions
as construed by Gerrity and its progeny.
	Sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code direct teachers
and other educational employees to maintain discipline in schools.
These sections also provide, "In all matters relating to the
discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children,
[educators] stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the
pupils." 105 ILCS 5/24-24, 34-84a (West 2000). Accordingly,
these sections grant educators the same immunity enjoyed by
parents. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 388
(1998). In Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 173 (1976), we held that "sections 24-24 and 34-84a confer
upon teachers and other certified educational employees immunity
from suits for negligence arising out of 'matters relating to the
discipline in and conduct of the schools and school children.' In
order to impose liability against such educators, a plaintiff must
prove wilful and wanton misconduct."
	We addressed the scope of School Code immunity in Gerrity
v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47 (1978). In Gerrity, a high school student
was severely injured while making a tackle during a junior varsity
football game. The student filed a personal injury complaint
alleging that his school district negligently furnished an ill-fitting
and inadequate helmet. The trial court granted the school district's
motion to dismiss under section 34-84a of the School Code. We
allowed the student's motion to transfer his appeal to this court.
	We stated that sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code
reflect a legislative determination that school discipline depends
upon personal relationships between teachers and students, and we
noted that these relationships would be jeopardized if teachers
were subject to negligence claims for conduct occurring in the
exercise of their disciplinary authority. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 51.
We further noted, however, that the immunity recognized in
Kobylanski concerned a direct teacher-student relationship and the
exercise of the teacher's control over the student's conduct or
physical movement. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 51. We concluded:
			"[The student's negligence complaint] did not allege
negligence arising out of the teacher-student relationship
in matters relating to the teacher's personal supervision
and control of the conduct or physical movement of the
student, but instead alleged negligence in connection with
what we consider to be the separate function of furnishing
equipment which was alleged to be inadequate, ill fitting
and defective and which was known, or which in the
exercise of ordinary care should have been known, to be
liable to cause injury to the plaintiff. The public policy
considerations in authorizing, and indeed encouraging,
teachers to have broad discretion and latitude in the
former situation quite clearly do not apply with as much
force to the latter. On the contrary, public policy
considerations argue rather strongly against any
interpretation which would relax a school district's
obligation to insure that equipment provided for students
in connection with activities of this type is fit for the
purpose. To hold school districts to the duty of ordinary
care in such matters would not be unduly burdensome,
nor does it appear to us to be inconsistent with the
intended purposes of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the
School Code." Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 52-53.
	In Lynch, a high school student fractured her nasal bone when
she was struck in the face and knocked to the ground by an
opposing player during a girls' "powderpuff" football game. The
student filed a personal injury complaint alleging that her local
board of education negligently failed to provide protective
equipment. The jury found the board of education liable, and the
appellate court affirmed.
	Initially, we observed that the parties never raised the
applicability of the Act. Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d  at 423. We then
discussed Gerrity and held that "a school district has an
affirmative duty, where students are engaging in school activities,
whether they are extracurricular, or formally authorized as part of
the school program, to furnish equipment to prevent serious
injuries." Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d  at 434. We reasoned that a contrary
result would encourage the board to skirt liability by not furnishing
equipment and forcing students to provide for their own safety: "In
that way, only students who could afford their own equipment
would be able to engage in school-connected sports activities."
Lynch, 82 Ill. 2d  at 435.
	In Palmer, a high school student was struck in an eye by
another player during a varsity basketball practice. The student
eventually lost vision in the injured eye and filed a personal injury
complaint alleging his school district negligently failed to allow
him to wear protective eyewear. The trial court refused two jury
instructions from the student regarding the school district's
putative duty to warn students that they should furnish their own
safety equipment and the school district's putative duty to allow
students to use safety equipment, and the jury returned a verdict
for the school district. The appellate court reversed.
	We discussed Gerrity and Lynch and held that the trial court
correctly refused the student's instructions: "A duty to warn
students of the advisability of wearing such equipment, and a duty
to allow students to wear such equipment if it is purchased at their
own expense, would be in conflict with a school district's duty to
provide such safety equipment in the first instance." Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d  at 559-60. We concluded that the school district had an
obligation to provide to all students "the safety equipment that was
reasonably necessary in order to protect players from reasonably
foreseeable, serious bodily injury." Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d  at 560. See
also Sidwell v. Griggsville Community Unit School District No. 4,
146 Ill. 2d 467, 473 (1992) (a complaint alleging the independent
negligence of a school district in maintaining its premises is not
barred by sections 24-24 or 34-84a of the School Code).
	As the appellate court here recognized, Gerrity and its
progeny held that school districts have a duty to provide safety
equipment, and the School Code offers no immunity from
allegations of negligent failure to provide such equipment.
However, the tort immunity provisions of the School Code and the
Tort Immunity Act are "independent enactments." Cooney v.
Society of Mt. Carmel, 75 Ill. 2d 430, 434 (1979); accord Henrich,
186 Ill. 2d  at 389 ("the immunity provided by section 24-24 of the
School Code did not derive from the immunity provided by the
Tort Immunity Act"). We now turn to the Act.
	Initially, we agree with the appellate court's holding that
section 3-108(a) of the Act does not apply to the plaintiffs'
allegations. See 317 Ill. App. 3d at 456. Section 3-108(a) provides
immunity for injuries "caused by a failure to supervise an activity
on or the use of any public property." 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a)
(West 1998); see Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 383; Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d 
at 379. Here, the plaintiffs charged that the School District failed
to provide necessary and suitable roller-blade equipment. This
claim does not involve supervision.
	The School District chiefly contends that section 2-201
shielded its decision not to provide roller-blade safety equipment
as a discretionary policy determination. Section 2-201 of the Act
offers the most significant protection afforded to public employees
under the Act. D. Baum, Tort Liability of Local Governments and
Their Employees: An Introduction to the Illinois Immunity Act,
1966 U. Ill. L.F. 981, 994. Section 2-201 provides:
			"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public
employee serving in a position involving the
determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not
liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in
determining policy when acting in the exercise of such
discretion even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201
(West 1994).
Because "[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not
liable" (see 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1998)), this broad
discretionary immunity applies to the entities themselves.
	We have held that section 2-201 immunity is concerned with
both the position held by the municipal employee and the action
performed by that employee. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 341 (1998).
That is, the employee's position may involve either determining
policy or exercising discretion, but the employee's "act or
omission must be both a determination of policy and an exercise
of discretion." Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 341; see West v. Kirkham,
147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992) (policy decisions are "those decisions
which require the municipality to balance competing interests and
to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of
those interests"); Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 474
(1995) ("discretionary acts are those which are unique to a
particular public office"); see also Harrison v. Hardin County
Community Unit School District No. 1, No. 89661 (October 18,
2001).
	Our appellate court previously has addressed whether section
2-201 insulates school districts from allegations of failure to
provide safety equipment. In Bowers v. Du Page County Regional
Board of School Trustees District No. 4, 183 Ill. App. 3d 367
(1989), a student was injured when she fell from a rope ladder
during gym class. The student's mother filed a complaint against
the local board of school trustees, alleging that the board
negligently failed to provide adequate matting and other
equipment. The board filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
discretionary immunity under the Act, and the trial court granted
this motion.
	The appellate court held that section 2-201 provided
immunity because the provision of equipment is a discretionary
act. Bowers, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 379. The court disagreed with
Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education, 60 Ill. App. 3d 729, 734
(1978), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Ill. 2d 165 (1979), which held
that the furnishing of equipment was a separate function from the
exercise of discretionary authority. Bowers, 183 Ill. App. 3d at
379. The court noted that the School Code provides that school
boards have the power to direct what branches of study shall be
taught and what apparatus shall be used (see 105 ILCS 5/10-20.8
(West 2000)), but "it does not direct that the Board is to use or
supply particular equipment." Bowers, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 379.
	In McGurk v. Lincolnway Community School District No.
210, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1059 (1997), a student suffered severe head
injuries during a football game. The student's mother filed a
personal injury complaint against the school district, alleging the
district breached its duty of care when it furnished the student with
a football helmet, but subsequently modified the helmet's existing
safety system and replaced it with a static face guard. The school
district filed a motion to dismiss, claiming immunity under section
2-201 of the Act. The trial court denied the motion but permitted
the school district to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308.
	The appellate court held that section 2-201 provided
immunity because the selection and modification of specific
athletic equipment involve "a degree of discretion." McGurk, 287
Ill. App. 3d at 1062. The court stated that Gerrity and its progeny
addressed school district immunity only under the School Code,
not the Act. McGurk, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1061. The Act and the
School Code are different sources of immunity. McGurk, 287 Ill.
App. 3d at 1062, citing Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d  at 174. See Johnson
v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 809 (1998) (a park
district tumbling coach's decision regarding the necessity of safety
equipment was a discretionary policy decision under Harinek).
	Similarly, the appellate court here held that, pursuant to
Harinek, the School District's decision not to provide roller-blade
safety equipment was a discretionary policy determination. 317 Ill.
App. 3d at 458. The appellate court concluded:
			"[T]he School District's decision regarding the
provision of roller blading equipment during a physical
education class, including the type of roller blades to be
used, involves a determination of policy within the
meaning of section 2-201 of the Act. The School District
must consider a variety of factors, including (1) the cost
and availability of various types of roller blading
equipment; (2) the number of students who may choose to
participate in the activity; and (3) the students' varying
skill levels. The School District must then balance those
interests against its resources and reach a decision that
accomplishes seemingly incompatible objectives-student
safety and cost effectiveness. This is a complex decision-making process that requires the balancing of competing
interests and the making of a judgment that will satisfy
those interests most effectively." 317 Ill. App. 3d at 457-58.
The appellate court also concluded that the School District's
decision regarding the provision of roller-blade equipment was an
exercise of discretion: "the making of a decision about whether or
how to perform an act is generally discretionary." 317 Ill. App. 3d
at 458. Nonetheless, the appellate court ultimately held that the
policy considerations outlined in Gerrity and its progeny trumped
the immunity provided in section 2-201. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 460.
	Though the result it reaches is appealing, the appellate court's
holding impermissibly elevates a common law duty over an
applicable statutory immunity. See Zimmerman v. Village of
Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 50 (1998) (the judicially created "special
duty" exception cannot override the Act without violating, inter
alia, the separation of powers doctrine). Gerrity and its progeny
laudably recognized an obligation for school districts to provide
safety equipment reasonably necessary to protect against serious,
foreseeable injuries (see Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d at 560); but, as we
have repeatedly noted, the existence of a duty and the existence of
an immunity remain separate issues (see CDG Enterprises, 196 Ill.
2d at 490). We agree with the School District and hold that its
decision not to provide roller-blade safety equipment was a
discretionary policy determination. Section 2-201 provides
immunity against the plaintiff's allegations.
	We acknowledge that, under this view of the Act, a school
district would enjoy immunity if, for example, it provided its
football players with leather helmets or, worse yet, no helmets at
all. Public policy considerations weigh strongly against any
interpretation of the Act which would relax school districts'
unstinting, but not unreasonably burdensome, duty to provide
safety equipment to this state's public school children. The plain
language of section 2-201, however, is unambiguous (In re
Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 196 (1997)), and we
lack the power to restrict the Act's protective scope in order to
protect students (see Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 394 ("The
responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests upon
the legislature"); Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1983) (statutes
should not be rewritten by this court to conform to its idea of
public policy)). The inescapable conclusion we reach today
highlights the desperate need for legislative attention to the scope
of discretionary immunity in this context.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the
defendant school district is immune from liability under section
2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West
2000)) for injuries suffered by the minor plaintiff during his
physical education class. I concur with the majority's holding that
section 2-201 of the Act provides immunity to the school district
against plaintiff's negligence claims. However, because the
majority's opinion also affirms the dismissal of those claims in
plaintiffs' complaint which are premised on allegations that the
school district engaged in willful and wanton misconduct, I
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's holding.
	Plaintiffs, Jeremy Arteman and his father Steve Artemen, filed
a four-count personal injury complaint against Clinton Community
Unit School District No. 15 after Jeremy suffered two broken
bones when he fell while participating in a roller blading session
during a physical education class. Plaintiffs generally alleged in
their complaint that the defendant School District provided the
students with roller blades that were of "experimental design," in
that the braking mechanism was located at the toe of the boot
instead of at the heel. Count I of the complaint alleged negligence
on the part of the School District for failing to provide either "the
necessary safety equipment of roller blading such as, but not
limited to, helmets, shinguards, knee guards [and] elbow pads" or
"roller blades that were suitable for their intended use." Count II
of the complaint, also a negligence claim, was brought by Steve
Arteman under the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS
65/15 (West 1996)) and sought recovery of his son's medical
expenses. Count III of the complaint mirrored the allegations in
count I, but alleged that the School District's failure to provide
necessary roller blading equipment constituted willful and wanton
misconduct. Count IV of the complaint mirrored the Rights of
Married Persons Act claim pled in count II, but was premised on
a willful and wanton theory of liability.
	The defendant School District moved to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint in its entirety, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)),
on the basis that it was completely immune from liability under
various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. The circuit court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on
Tort Immunity Act grounds. The appellate court reversed the
judgment of the circuit court.
	Therefore, before this court is the question of the propriety of
the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, including
those counts premised on a willful and wanton theory of liability.
I continue to adhere to my position that willful and wanton
misconduct is not shielded by the immunity contained in section
2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act. For the reasons more fully stated
in my separate opinions in Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 399 (1996) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), In re Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 213 (1997) (McMorrow, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Harinek v. 161 North
Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 353 (1998)
(McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484,
501 (2001) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), there are cogent reasons why the rationale underlying grants
of governmental immunity for simple negligence should not be
impliedly expanded to reach willful and wanton or intentional
misconduct. It remains my belief that where the Tort Immunity
Act is silent on the question of whether intentional governmental
misconduct is exempt from immunity, it should not be concluded
that such silence translates into an affirmative intent on the part of
the legislature to cloak local governmental entities and their
employees with unconditional immunity.
	This is especially true with respect to the grant of immunity
from liability for injuries resulting from an exercise of discretion
afforded under section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act. As I
explained in my separate opinion in In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 214 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), because "good faith is a component of discretionary
immunity,"section 2-201 of the Act does not shield willful and
wanton misconduct. See also Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d 
at 509 n.1 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Accordingly, the two counts in plaintiffs' complaint
premised upon a willful and wanton theory of liability should not
be dismissed, and, instead, should be allowed to go forward.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	The majority's opinion represents a departure from a
previously unbroken line of this court's precedent. We have long
held that a school district has an affirmative duty to provide safety
equipment to protect students from serious injury during school
athletic activities. See Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47, 52 (1978);
Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education, 77 Ill. 2d 165, 170
(1979); Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community
Unit District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 434 (1980); Palmer v. Mt.
Vernon Township High School District 201, 169 Ill. 2d 551, 557
(1996). We have likewise held that a school district does not enjoy
immunity from liability for injuries allegedly arising from a breach
of this duty to provide safety equipment. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 52;
Thomas, 77 Ill. 2d  at 170; Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d  at 558. Through its
decision in this case, the majority has (1) departed from the plain
language of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-201,
3-108(a) (West 2000)); (2) overlooked the parameters of the
individual policymaking requirement of section 2-201 of the Act;
and (3) effectively abrogated a school district's duty to provide
safety equipment for its students. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

PLAIN LANGUAGE
	Section 2-201 provides:
			"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public
employee serving in a position involving the
determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not
liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in
determining policy when acting in the exercise of such
discretion even though abused." (Emphasis added.) 745
ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2000).
	The phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Statute"
indicates that the legislature contemplated the existence of
conflicting statutory mandates that may obviate application of
section 2-201. In this case, such statutory authority exists in
sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code (105 ILCS
5/24-24, 34-84a (West 2000)). As indicated by the majority, we
addressed the scope of immunity under sections 24-24 and 34-84a
of the School Code in Gerrity and determined that those sections
did not affect a school district's obligation to supply safety
equipment. Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 52-53. As we stated in Palmer,
" '[t]o hold school districts to the duty of ordinary care in such
matters [is] not *** unduly burdensome.' " Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d  at
558, quoting Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 52-53. More importantly,
contrary to the majority's assertion (slip op. at 10), the appellate
court decision in this case does not elevate a common law duty
over an applicable statutory immunity.  Immunity pursuant to the
applicable statutory authority (i.e. the School Code) simply does
not exist in this particular factual situation.
	Moreover, the majority has also departed from the plain
language of the Act by allowing the school district to raise section
2-201 immunity when such immunity is specifically afforded to
"public employee[s]," immunizing each individual policy-making
decision. The majority has overlooked this language in the Act and
has allowed the school district to enjoy blanket immunity,
regardless of the acts or omissions of the district's individual
employees. While it is true that a public entity may not be held
liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its
employee where the employee is not liable (745 ILCS 10/2-109
(West 1998), as we stated in Palmer in relation to the School
Code, a school district cannot vicariously claim the immunity of
its employee where it is alleged that the school district's liability
is premised upon the district's independent duty to provide
adequate safety equipment. Palmer, 169 Ill. 2d  at 558. Although
the majority is correct that the School Code and the Act provide
separate immunities to public employees, I can discern no reason
to treat the immunity afforded under the Act differently than that
afforded by the School Code in this context, and neither has the
majority provided such a basis.

POLICYMAKING
	By allowing the school district to raise directly the immunity
defense afforded to its employees under the Act, the majority has
also circumvented a bedrock principle of section 2-201 immunity.
In order to be immune under section 2-201, the policymaking
decisions must be decisions that require the employee " 'to
balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to
what solution will best serve each of those interests.' " Harinek v.
161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342
(1998), quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). Under
the majority's decision, it will never be necessary for a public
entity to present evidence that such reasoned deliberation was
undertaken. In fact, it will not be necessary for the public entity to
show that it even considered the issue at all. Any decision made by
a municipal employee whose responsibilities include the
determination of policy will be automatically immune from
liability. Such blanket immunity is certainly not contemplated by
the Act. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 355 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
	I acknowledge that it would be unduly burdensome for a
public entity to support every one of its policymaking decisions
with evidence of an involved deliberative process. Nonetheless,
the importance of the particular issue at hand simply necessitates
that the school district somehow demonstrate that there was an
affirmative decision not to provide safety equipment for a school-related athletic activity. Otherwise, by conferring blanket
immunity to public entities, we will be encouraging school
districts and other public entities to take no action concerning a
whole host of important safety issues.

DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFETY EQUIPMENT
	The majority acknowledges the disastrous consequences of its
decision, remarking that under its "view of the Act, a school
district would enjoy immunity if, for example, it provided its
football players with leather helmets or, worse yet, no helmets at
all." Slip op. at 10. The majority then attempts to justify that
conclusion as "inescapable" under the existing state of the law.
Slip op. at 11. While I agree with the majority's assessment that
legislative attention to the scope of discretionary immunity is
desperately needed, I take no solace in the fact that the legislature
may remedy the situation. The outcome of this particular case was
controlled by a line of precedent implicitly overturned by the
majority. By its decision, the majority has effectively abrogated a
school district's duty to provide safety equipment to protect
students from serious injury during school athletic activities. For
this reason and for the reasons expressed above, I respectfully
dissent.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
	 
1.      1We granted leave to the Illinois Association of School Boards, the
Illinois Association of School Administrators, the Illinois Governmental
Association of Pools, the Illinois Park and Recreation Association, and
the Chicago Board of Education to file a brief as amici curiae in support
of the School District. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.