Title: BLOSSOM HAZLE V FORD MOTOR CO

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 3, 2001  
BLOSSOM J. HAZLE,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 116162  
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and FORD-UAW  
RETIREMENT BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE COURT  
YOUNG, J.  
After being denied a promotion, plaintiff filed suit on  
the ground that she had been discriminated against on the  
basis of her race, in violation of the Michigan Civil Rights  
Act.  MCL 37.2101 et seq. 
The trial court granted summary  
disposition in favor of defendants, but the Court of Appeals  
reversed.  
We granted leave in order to further clarify the proper  
  
application of the burden-shifting framework established in  
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36  
L Ed 2d 668 (1973), for the purpose of analyzing proofs in  
discrimination cases.  We now reverse the Court of Appeals  
decision and reinstate the trial court’s order granting  
summary disposition to defendants.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
Plaintiff is a black woman with an undergraduate degree  
in English.  She has also completed a portion of the course  
work required for a master’s degree in industrial relations.  
In July 1980, plaintiff began working as a pension clerk  
for the Ford-UAW Retirement Board of Administration, which  
administers pension benefits for the UAW retirees of Ford  
Motor Company. 
Plaintiff was responsible for processing  
various types of retirement applications, which included  
“filing, typing . . . answering the phone and helping retirees  
and 
surviving 
spouses 
and 
company 
union 
rep[resentatives] 
with  
problems regarding pensions.”  She also set up medical  
evaluations for disability retirement applicants.  
In late 1994, when the longtime manager of plaintiff’s  
office decided to retire, the board placed the following  
advertisement:  
OFFICE MANAGER  
Seeking individual with an Office Manager  
2  
 
background to direct the activities of a 6 person 
office responsible for the administration of  
pension benefits for over 85,000 pensioners of a 
major automotive retirement plan.  
The qualified individual should have a BS 
degree in finance or accounting, have strong 
communication skills, and have office experience 
directing the work of others.  The position is 
responsible for preparation of the payroll and 
accounts payable, maintenance of administrative 
records, and other retirement plan activities.  
Plaintiff applied for the job. 
Among the other  
applicants were Christine Ewald, another of the pension  
clerks,1 and Michelle Block, an outside candidate.2  Each is  
white. Block’s résumé indicated that she recently had been  
employed 
as 
“supervisor 
of 
financial 
and 
management 
reporting”  
at a medical laboratory and, before that, had been “sales  
audit supervisor” for a forty-two store chain of automotive  
parts retailers.  
In a letter on Ford Motor Company stationery, plaintiff  
was informed that she would be given an interview.  The letter  
also stated that her résumé had been “reviewed and determined  
to satisfy the requirements outlined for this opening.”  
Two members of the board, Donald Harris, a UAW employee,  
and Mark Savitskie, who worked for Ford, interviewed the  
1Ewald had been a pension clerk since 1985.  
2According to defendants’ response to plaintiff’s first  
set of interrogatories, there were a total of eighty 
applicants (both internal and external) for the position.  
3  
 
candidates for the office manager position. On the basis of  
the résumés and interviews,3 the two selected Block, whom the  
board then hired.  Plaintiff learned of the board’s hiring  
decision in a second letter from Ford, which thanked her for  
her interest in the position. The Ford letter reiterated to  
plaintiff that “[her] experience and education were in line  
with our expectations and the requirements of the position.”  
Fourteen months after learning that she would not be  
promoted, plaintiff filed the present suit in circuit court.  
Proceeding under the Civil Rights Act, she alleged that  
defendants “did not offer the position of Office Manager to  
Plaintiff because Plaintiff is an African-American.”  
Defendants moved for summary disposition.  Although  
defendants’ motion and brief did not indicate expressly which  
part of the court rule they were relying on, it is evident  
that they were seeking summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(10).  Defendants argued that plaintiff could not  
establish 
a 
prima 
facie case of discrimination under McDonnell  
Douglas, supra. They further argued that, even if plaintiff  
could offer a prima facie case, she failed to offer evidence  
that defendants’ stated reason for hiring Block, that she was  
3Harris and Savitskie did not check references or seek to  
confirm the factual representations made in the candidates’ 
written submissions.  
4  
 
more qualified, was a mere pretext for discrimination.  
Plaintiff 
responded that Block was in fact not qualified,  
and that she committed “résumé fraud” in representing her  
educational and employment background.4  
Noting that Block’s alleged misrepresentations did not  
surface until after discovery began in this case, the trial  
court granted defendants’ motion, concluding as follows:  
The Court is satisfied that I don’t have to  
get to the pretext issue, because we haven’t  
established a prima facie case of discrimination. 
The Court’s going to kick it under (C)(10).  
The Court of Appeals reversed over the dissent of Judge  
Kelly.5  
We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal.  
463 Mich 928 (2000).  
II. Standard of Review  
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion  
for summary disposition.  A motion for summary disposition  
4Block’s résumé suggests that she took classes at Henry 
Ford Community College over an extended period.  As noted, her 
stated work experience included time as a “supervisor of 
financial and management reporting” at a medical laboratory 
and as “sales audit supervisor” at an automotive-parts 
retailer.  Relying on materials obtained during discovery, 
plaintiff maintains that Block’s transcript shows little 
academic progress, that she was only a temporary clerical 
employee at the medical laboratory, and that she was fired by 
the automotive-parts retailer for poor performance.  
5Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 27, 1999, 
reh den December 21, 1999 (Docket No. 204496).  
5  
brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a  
claim.  After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable  
to the nonmoving party, a trial court may grant summary  
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine  
issue concerning any material fact and the moving party is  
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life  
Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 453; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).  
III. Analysis  
A. Direct Versus Indirect Evidence of Discrimination  
Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against  
her on the basis of race in violation of MCL 37.2202(1)(a),  
which provides, in relevant part:  
(1) An employer shall not do any of the 
following:  
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an 
individual 
with 
respect 
to 
employment, 
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment, because of religion, race, color, 
national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or 
marital status.  
In some discrimination cases, the plaintiff is able to  
produce direct evidence of racial bias.  In such cases, the  
plaintiff can go forward and prove unlawful discrimination in  
the same manner as a plaintiff would prove any other civil  
case. DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand),  
463 Mich 534, 537-539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001); Matras v Amoco Oil  
6  
  
Co, 424 Mich 675, 683-684; 385 NW2d 586 (1986).  For purposes  
of the analogous federal Civil Rights Act, the Sixth Circuit  
Court of Appeals has defined “direct evidence” as “evidence  
which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful  
discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the  
employer’s actions.”  Jacklyn v Schering-Plough Healthcare  
Products Sales Corp, 176 F3d 921, 926 (CA 6, 1999); see also  
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 610; 572  
NW2d 679 (1997).  
In 
many 
cases, 
however, 
no 
direct 
evidence 
of  
impermissible bias can be located.  In order to avoid summary  
disposition, the plaintiff must then proceed through the  
familiar steps set forth in McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802­
803. The McDonnell Douglas approach allows a plaintiff “to  
present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs  
from which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the  
victim 
of 
unlawful 
discrimination.”  DeBrow, 
supra at 537-538.  
Although originally created for use in race discrimination  
cases, we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas approach for use  
in age and gender discrimination cases brought under the  
Michigan Civil Rights Act as well.  See Lytle v Malady (On  
Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-178; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).  
Because plaintiff here has offered no direct evidence of race  
discrimination, she is constrained to rely on the McDonnell  
7  
 
Douglas framework.  
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first offer a  
“prima facie case” of discrimination.  Here, plaintiff was  
required to present evidence that (1) she belongs to a  
protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment  
action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the  
job was given to another person under circumstances giving  
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  Lytle, supra  
at 172-173; see also Texas Dept of Community Affairs v  
Burdine, 450 US 248, 254, n 6; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207  
(1981); McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802.6  
When the plaintiff “has sufficiently established a prima  
facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises.” Lytle,  
supra at 173. In Furnco Construction Corp v Waters, 438 US  
567, 577; 98 S Ct 2943; 57 L Ed 2d 957 (1978), the Court  
explained that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case raises  
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination “because we presume these acts,  
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on  
the consideration of impermissible factors.”  
6We utilize here a formulation of the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie case approach that is consistent with the facts of 
this case.  As the Supreme Court explained in McDonnell  
Douglas, the facts will necessarily vary in discrimination  
cases.
 Thus, the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie case should be tailored to fit the factual situation at  
hand.  
8  
 
 
 
However, the fact that a plaintiff has established a  
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas  
does not necessarily preclude summary disposition in the  
defendant’s favor.  As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine,  
supra at 254, n 7:  
The phrase “prima facie case” not only may 
denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by 
courts to describe the plaintiff’s burden of  
producing enough evidence to permit the trier of 
fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas 
should have made it apparent that in the Title VII 
context we use “prima facie case” in the former 
sense. [Citation omitted.]  
In other words, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does  
not describe the plaintiff’s burden of production, but merely  
establishes a rebuttable presumption.  
Thus, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of  
discrimination, 
the 
defendant 
has 
the 
opportunity to  
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its  
employment decision in an effort to rebut the presumption  
created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Lytle, supra at  
173; McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802.7
 The articulation  
7In determining whether an employment decision is a 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” one, it must be noted that 
courts must not analyze the “soundness” of that decision.  In  
other words, courts must not second guess whether the 
employment 
decision 
was 
“wise, 
shrewd, 
prudent, 
or 
competent.” 
Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 704; 568 NW2d 
64 (1997).  Instead, the focus is on whether the decision was 
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
 
 
requirement means that the defendant has the burden of  
producing evidence that its employment actions were taken for  
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.8  “Thus, the defendant  
cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the  
complaint or by argument of counsel.”  Burdine, supra at 256,  
n 9; see also St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 506­
507; 113 S Ct 2742; 125 L Ed 2d 407 (1993). If the employer  
makes such an articulation, the presumption created by the  
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case drops away.9  
At that point, in order to survive a motion for summary  
disposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence  
in the case, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, is  
7(...continued) 
“lawful,” that is, one that is not motivated by a  
“discriminatory animus.”  Burdine, supra at 257.  
8While the burden of production shifts to the defendant 
at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, “[t]he nature 
of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be  
understood in light of the plaintiff’s ultimate and  
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the 
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the  
plaintiff.” Burdine, supra at 253.  
9If the defendant does not articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, the 
presumption created by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
stands unrebutted.  However, this does not mean that the 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Rather, 
in such a case, judgment in favor of the plaintiff would be 
appropriate only if the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s 
evidence. See Burdine, supra at 254.  
10  
“sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude  
that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse  
action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.”  Lytle,  
supra at 176.10  As we first held in Town v Michigan Bell  
Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 698; 568 NW2d 64 (1997), and then  
reaffirmed in Lytle, supra at 175-176, a plaintiff “must not  
merely raise a triable issue that the employer’s proffered  
reason was pretextual, but that it was a pretext for  
[unlawful] discrimination.”  
The inquiry at this final stage of the McDonnell Douglas  
framework is exactly the same as the ultimate factual inquiry  
made by the jury:  whether consideration of a protected  
characteristic was a motivating factor, namely, whether it  
made a difference in the contested employment decision. See  
SJI2d 105.02.11  The only difference is that, for purposes of  
10At one point in Lytle, supra at 174, we used some 
imprecise language in describing the plaintiff’s burden at 
this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. We stated that  
a plaintiff must show “by a preponderance of admissible direct  
or circumstantial evidence, that there was a triable issue 
that the employer’s proffered reasons were not true reasons, 
but were a mere pretext for discrimination” (emphasis added). 
This reference in Lytle to the term “preponderance” is 
suggestive of a plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion.  We  
wish to make clear that, in response to a motion for summary 
disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the nonmoving 
party’s obligation is only to show the existence of a “genuine 
issue as to any material fact.”  
11The standard jury instruction is consistent with the 
(continued...)  
11  
  
a motion for summary disposition or directed verdict, a  
plaintiff need only create a question of material fact upon  
which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether  
discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s  
decision.  
As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine, supra at 256,  
n 
8, 
the 
McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework is merely  
intended “to progressively sharpen the inquiry into the  
elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” It  
is important to keep in mind, therefore, that for purposes of  
claims brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, the  
McDonnell Douglas approach merely provides a mechanism for  
assessing 
motions 
for 
summary 
disposition 
and 
directed 
verdict  
in 
cases 
involving 
circumstantial 
evidence 
of 
discrimination.12  
It is useful only for purposes of assisting trial courts in  
determining whether there is a jury-submissible issue on the  
ultimate fact question of unlawful discrimination.  The  
McDonnell Douglas model is not relevant to a jury’s evaluation  
11(...continued) 
statutory prohibition against discrimination “because of” a 
protected characteristic. MCL 37.2202(1)(a).  
12As stated, the McDonnell Douglas approach is not  
applicable 
in 
cases 
involving 
direct 
evidence 
of  
discrimination. 
DeBrow, supra at 539, citing Trans World  
Airlines, Inc v Thurston, 469 US 111, 121; 105 S Ct 613; 83 L  
Ed 2d 523 (1985).  
12  
 
 
of evidence at trial.  Accordingly, a jury should not be  
instructed on its application.  See Gehrig v Case Corp, 43 F3d  
340, 343 (CA 7, 1995) (explaining that, in federal  
discrimination cases, “[o]nce the judge finds that the  
plaintiff has made the minimum necessary demonstration [the  
‘prima facie case’] and that the defendant has produced an  
age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus has  
served its purpose, and the only remaining question–the only  
question the jury need answer–is whether the plaintiff is a  
victim of intentional discrimination”).  
B. Plaintiff’s McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case  
As noted, in order to establish a prima facie case of  
discrimination 
under 
McDonnell 
Douglas, 
plaintiff 
was 
required  
to present admissible evidence that (1) she belongs to a  
protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment  
action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the  
job was given to another person under circumstances giving  
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  Lytle, supra  
at 172-173; McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802.13  There is no  
dispute in this case regarding the first two elements:  
13Although Lytle states that a plaintiff must “prove” 
these four elements “by a preponderance of the evidence,” we 
again emphasize that a plaintiff does not have to prove 
anything to the trial court at the summary disposition stage.  
13  
Plaintiff is black, and she did not receive the promotion for  
which she applied.  
At issue here are the third and fourth elements of a  
prima facie case.  The third element requires proof that  
plaintiff was qualified for the position she sought.  The  
fourth element requires proof that the job was given to  
another 
person 
under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference  
of discrimination.  
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to establish  
the third and fourth elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima  
facie case. They contend that, even if minimally qualified,  
plaintiff had “neither supervisory experience nor training or  
experience in financial or accounting matters–two crucial  
preferred qualifications of the Office Manager position,” and  
that, in any event, she was far less qualified than Michelle  
Block.
 In defendants’ view, a plaintiff alleging a  
discriminatory failure to promote or hire can only establish  
a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas by providing  
evidence that he is at least as qualified as the successful  
candidate. We disagree.  
As an initial matter, nothing in the Supreme Court’s  
decision in McDonnell Douglas suggests that a plaintiff is  
required 
to 
offer 
evidence of relative qualifications in order  
14  
 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Nor have  
the 
Court’s 
subsequent 
decisions 
identified 
such 
a  
requirement.  In fact, we believe that at least one of the  
Court’s post-McDonnell Douglas decisions suggests that a  
plaintiff 
is 
never 
required 
to 
establish 
relative  
qualifications.  
In Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164; 109 S Ct  
2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132 (1989), the Court addressed a  
plaintiff’s burden of persuading a jury of intentional  
discrimination. The federal district court in that case had  
instructed the jury that the plaintiff, in order to prevail on  
her claim that the defendant failed to promote her because of  
race discrimination, was required to show that she was better  
qualified than the employee who received the promotion.  In  
determining that this was error, the Supreme Court emphasized  
that a plaintiff  
is not limited to presenting evidence of a certain 
type. . . .  The evidence which petitioner can  
present 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
establish 
that  
respondent’s stated reasons are pretextual may take 
a variety of forms.  Indeed, she might seek to 
demonstrate 
that 
respondent's 
claim 
to 
have  
promoted 
a 
better 
qualified 
applicant 
was  
pretextual by showing that she was in fact better 
qualified than the person chosen for the position. 
The District Court erred, however, in instructing 
the jury that in order to succeed petitioner was 
required to make such a showing.  There are  
certainly other ways in which petitioner could seek 
to prove that respondent’s reasons were pretextual.  
15  
 
Thus, for example, petitioner could seek to  
persuade the jury that respondent had not offered 
the true reason for its promotion decision by 
presenting evidence of respondent’s past treatment 
of petitioner, including the instances of the 
racial 
harassment 
which 
she 
alleges 
and  
respondent’s failure to train her for an accounting 
position.  While we do not intend to say this 
evidence necessarily would be sufficient to carry 
the day, it cannot be denied that it is one of the 
various ways in which petitioner might seek to 
prove intentional discrimination on the part of 
respondent.  She may not be forced to pursue any 
particular means of demonstrating that respondent's 
stated reasons are pretextual.  [Id. at 187-188  
(citations omitted).]  
Because a plaintiff has no obligation to prove relative  
qualifications to a jury, it can hardly be disputed that a  
plaintiff cannot be required to offer evidence that he is at  
least as qualified as the successful candidate in order to  
establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. 
See  
Walker v Mortham, 158 F3d 1177, 1192 (CA 11, 1998) (“We cannot  
imagine that the Supreme Court would speak so strongly  
regarding 
the 
lack 
of 
any 
burden 
to 
prove 
lesser  
qualifications and still leave available to the defendant at  
summary judgment the argument that the plaintiff failed to  
prove equal qualifications”).  
Nor does anything in the language of the Civil Rights Act  
itself suggest a requirement that a plaintiff prove relative  
qualifications in order to succeed on a discrimination claim,  
let alone require that a plaintiff offer such evidence in  
16  
order to survive a motion for summary disposition or directed  
verdict.  As stated, the ultimate factual inquiry in any  
discrimination case is whether unlawful discrimination was a  
motivating factor in the employer’s decision.  We think it  
beyond question that, although relative qualifications  
certainly may be relevant in a discrimination case,  
particularly, as explained below, if a defendant relies on  
them to rebut the presumption of discrimination created by the  
plaintiff’s prima facie case, the fact that a plaintiff was  
“less qualified” than the successful applicant would not  
necessarily preclude a jury from finding that unlawful  
discrimination was nevertheless a motivating factor in the  
employer’s decision. Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff is  
not required to provide evidence that he is at least as  
qualified as the successful candidate in order to establish a  
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.  
By this holding, we do not mean to suggest that a  
plaintiff can establish the third and fourth elements of a  
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case merely by showing that he  
was qualified for the position and that a nonminority  
candidate was chosen instead.  While a plaintiff is not  
required to show circumstances giving rise to an inference of  
discrimination in any one specific manner, the plaintiff’s  
burden of production remains to present evidence that the  
17  
 
 
employer’s 
actions, 
“if 
otherwise 
unexplained, 
are 
more 
likely  
than 
not 
based 
on 
the consideration of impermissible factors.”  
Burdine, supra at 253. 
In short, a plaintiff must offer  
evidence showing something more than an isolated decision to  
reject a minority applicant. See Teamsters v United States,  
431 US 324, 358, n 44; 97 S Ct 1843; 52 L Ed 2d 396 (1977).  
As a matter of law, an inference of unlawful discrimination  
does not arise merely because an employer has chosen between  
two qualified candidates.14
 Under such a scenario, an  
equally–if not more–reasonable inference would be that the  
employer simply selected the candidate that it believed to be  
most qualified for the position. See id.  
In this case, plaintiff met the third element of a  
McDonnell 
Douglas 
prima facie case by presenting evidence that  
she was qualified for the office manager position.  Indeed, as  
stated, 
defendants 
themselves 
twice 
confirmed 
in 
writing 
their  
belief that plaintiff was among those who had the necessary  
qualifications for the position.  
14Largely because the issue was undisputed, we assumed in  
Lytle, supra at 177, that the plaintiff established a prima 
facie 
case 
under 
McDonnell Douglas by presenting evidence that 
“she was replaced by a younger person.”  We caution the bench  
and bar not to rely on Lytle for the proposition that a prima 
facie case of unlawful discrimination can be established  
merely by providing evidence that a qualified minority 
candidate was rejected in favor of a qualified nonminority 
candidate. As opposed to this case, Lytle did not involve a  
choice between two qualified candidates for an open position.  
18  
 
Finally, plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury,  
if unaware of defendants’ reasons, could infer unlawful  
discrimination. Although she was not required to proceed in  
this manner, plaintiff presented evidence suggesting that she  
was rejected in favor of a less qualified white applicant.  
There was evidence that (1) only plaintiff had a college  
degree and credits toward a master’s degree in industrial  
relations, and (2) only plaintiff had substantial work  
experience with defendants.  Thus, we conclude that plaintiff  
presented evidence supporting the fourth and final element of  
a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, and that the burden then  
shifted 
to 
defendants 
to 
articulate 
a 
legitimate,  
nondiscriminatory reason for their decision to hire Michelle  
Block instead of plaintiff.  
C.  Defendants’ Justification for their Employment Decision  
Defendants cited several reasons for their decision to  
hire Michelle Block rather than plaintiff.  Among them were  
plaintiff’s lack of experience in supervision, finance, or  
accounting.
 By contrast, Block’s application materials  
indicated that she had supervised an audit department of six  
persons and had significant financial experience.  
Defendants also expressed their desire to change the  
manner in which business would be conducted in the office;  
19  
 
they wanted to hire what is customarily known as a “change  
agent.”  
Deposition 
testimony indicates that the former office  
manager allowed the pension clerks great autonomy with regard  
to their work and even their work schedules. Petty cash was  
handled informally, and a simple matter like the office’s no­
smoking policy was routinely ignored.  As the number of Ford- 
UAW retirees continued to grow, defendants wanted the office  
to improve the service it was providing.  In this regard, Mark  
Savitskie testified that he was looking for someone “who would  
be able to identify problems and effect change and processes  
that would correct problems.”  
When asked why he believed Block to be more qualified  
than plaintiff, Savitskie testified as follows:  
I believe that Michelle’s experience, her 
practical experience, her business experience, her 
work experience, gave her a broad number of skills 
that would help her meet my requirement.  
Compared 
to 
Block, 
Savitskie felt that plaintiff was “somewhat  
isolated in terms of comparing the dealings with outsiders,  
written responsibilities, dealing with processes and data and  
correcting problems.”  Savitskie testified that he saw  
plaintiff as a person who did not seem to appreciate the need  
for change. 
Donald Harris expressed a similar view,  
testifying that he believed Block to be a person “who could  
make 
changes, 
incorporate those changes and motivate people to  
20  
accept those changes.”  
We conclude that defendants made a sufficient showing  
that they had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for  
choosing Michelle Block over plaintiff. This means that the  
presumption of discrimination created by plaintiff’s prima  
facie case dropped away, and the burden of production returned  
to plaintiff to show the existence of evidence “sufficient to  
permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that  
discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action  
taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.”  Lytle, supra at  
176.  
D. Was Race a Motivating Factor in Defendants’ 
Employment Decision?  
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to  
plaintiff and drawing any reasonable inferences in her favor,  
we conclude that she has failed to create a triable issue for  
the jury concerning whether race was a motivating factor in  
defendants’ employment decision.  
While plaintiff maintains that the office manager  
position did not in fact require knowledge of finance or  
accounting principles, it is fatal to plaintiff’s claim that  
she has offered no record evidence that actually supports this  
position. We also note plaintiff’s repeated assertion that,  
21  
 
 
when she asked for an explanation for why she was not selected  
for the office manager position, she was told that Michelle  
Block “had a Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting.”  This, of  
course, would have been a false explanation, given that Block  
had no college degree at all and that she never claimed to  
have one.  Such evidence very likely would have provided a  
basis for a reasonable jury to infer unlawful discrimination.  
However, again, plaintiff has offered no evidence to support  
her claim.  Instead of record evidence, plaintiff relies on a  
statement made by her attorney during the hearing on  
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. That clearly is  
an inappropriate means of opposing a motion for summary  
disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10).  See Maiden v  
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  
Furthermore, even if, as plaintiff claims, Block’s  
application 
materials 
contained 
exaggerated 
and 
false  
information calling into question her qualification for the  
office manager position, there is no record evidence that any  
of this was known to defendants when they made their  
employment decision. Therefore, any subsequently discovered  
shortcomings in Block’s credentials cannot possibly serve as  
a basis for an inference of unlawful discrimination.15  
15In McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co, 513 US 
(continued...)  
22  
 
 
 
For 
its 
part, 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
held 
that  
discriminatory animus was shown by defendants’ decision to  
hire Michelle Block despite the fact that she did not have a  
college 
degree, 
and 
by defendants’ knowledge that Block “would  
require considerable training in order to do her job.”  
However, we fail to see how either observation could possibly  
support a jury finding that race was a motivating factor in  
defendants’ employment decision.  There is no dispute that  
Block did not have a college degree, and there is no evidence  
that defendants ever claimed that she did.  Moreover, although  
plaintiff did have a college degree, it was in English, not in  
finance or accounting.  The bottom line is that both plaintiff  
and Block lacked the preferred qualification of a degree in  
finance or accounting.  Thus, the mere fact that defendants  
hired Block despite her lack of a college degree does not give  
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.  Finally, no  
15(...continued) 
352, 360; 115 S Ct 879; 130 L Ed 2d 852 (1995), the Supreme 
Court held that an employer may not rely on after-acquired 
evidence of an employee’s wrongdoing in order to avoid 
liability 
for 
a 
discriminatory 
employment 
decision, 
explaining 
in part that “[t]he employer could not have been motivated by 
knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the 
employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason.”  
We believe a logical corollary of this principle to be 
that an employee cannot establish discriminatory intent by 
offering evidence of facts that were unavailable to the 
employer when it made its employment decision.  
23  
 
record evidence suggests that plaintiff would have been able  
to assume the office manager position with any less training  
than Block required.  
Plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals for that matter,  
would 
have 
the 
jury 
second-guess 
defendants’ 
business 
judgment  
concerning whether Block or plaintiff was better qualified.  
However, as we explained in Town, supra at 704:  
“A plaintiff cannot simply show that the 
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since 
the 
factual 
dispute 
at 
issue 
is 
whether  
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not 
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or 
competent.” [Citation omitted.]  
The only requirement is that, “when evaluating its employees,  
employers are to evaluate them on the basis of their merits,  
in conjunction with the nature of their businesses at the time  
of the evaluation, and not on the basis of any discriminatory  
criterion.” Id. at 710 (Riley, J., concurring).  
The essence of defendants’ stated reasons for their  
decision to hire Michelle Block over plaintiff was that they  
did not believe that plaintiff was as qualified as Michelle  
Block for the office manager position.  While plaintiff was  
not required to seek to show that she was in fact more  
qualified than Block in order to survive summary disposition,  
plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the evidence in  
24  
  
this case would permit a jury to find that defendants’  
explanation was a pretext for race discrimination.  Other than  
her subjective claim that she was more qualified than Michelle  
Block, plaintiff has offered nothing to support her claim that  
defendants acted with racial animus.  In our view, the  
following testimony from plaintiff’s deposition accurately  
captures the dispute in this case:  
Q. 
Why do you believe that your race had 
anything to do with the selection of [Michelle 
Block] over you?  
A. 
Well, because I felt I was very qualified 
for the position and just from my own observation I 
just feel that I’m a better qualified person.  They 
hired a Caucasian woman.  So I felt it was a racial  
issue.  
Q. 
Do you have any other reason, any reason 
at all for thinking that your race had anything to 
do with the selection of [Block] over you?  
A. 
No.  
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of  
material fact concerning whether defendants relied on any  
discriminatory animus in making their employment decision.  
IV. Conclusion  
The record in this case contains evidence sufficient to  
create a prima facie case of race discrimination under  
McDonnell Douglas. 
In response, defendants articulated a  
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their action.  
25  
 
 
 
Plaintiff, however, was unable to offer any evidence that the  
defendants’ stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination,  
that is, that race was a motivating factor in their employment  
decision.  Defendants were therefore entitled to summary  
disposition as a matter of law.  
Because the trial court properly granted summary  
disposition to defendants, we reverse the decision of the  
Court of Appeals, and reinstate the trial court’s order.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with YOUNG, J.  
26