Title: The Florida Bar v. Evan Robert Wolfe

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC94226
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
EVAN ROBERT WOLFE,
Respondent.
[March 30, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the complaint of The Florida Bar and the referee’s report
regarding alleged ethical breaches by Evan Robert Wolfe.  The referee has
recommended a ninety-day suspension followed by a five-year probationary period. 
The Florida Bar seeks review, requesting a three-year suspension followed by a
three-year probationary period.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
-2-
FACTS
On November 2, 1998, the Florida Bar filed a complaint against Wolfe.  On
March 29, 1999, Wolfe stipulated to the following facts.
Count I.  On February 23, 1998, a series of tornadoes struck Osceola and
Seminole Counties, Florida, damaging homes and killing or injuring a large number
of people.  Between March 1, 1998, and March 7, 1998, Wolfe approached David
Cignotti, Paul Bruno, Nancy Thomas, and Janet Sharp at their respective homes in
Osceola and Seminole Counties.  The home of each individual had been damaged by
the tornadoes and Thomas’s husband was killed.  Wolfe advised each of these
individuals that he could assist them in obtaining the maximum settlement from their
insurance companies and gave them flyers and brochures advertising his services. 
Wolfe gave the Cignottis and Sharp extra brochures and flyers for them to distribute
to friends and neighbors.  
Wolfe presented all four parties with contingency fee contracts.   After the
Cignottis advised Wolfe that Carmen Rivera, Mrs. Cignotti’s mother, owned the
home where they resided and which had been damaged by the tornadoes, Wolfe
presented them with a completed contingency fee contract to be signed by Rivera. 
Wolfe told the Cignottis that his fee would be 10% of any gross recovery or 25% of
any amount obtained in excess of the insurance company’s current offer, with a
1  The referee does not explain exactly who Rose Serrano is, but it appears that
she was co-owner of a home with Thomas.
-3-
required $350 cost deposit to be provided prior to the rendition of services.  Wolfe
gave Bruno and his wife a contingency contract which provided that Wolfe’s fee
would be 10% of any gross recovery.  Wolfe delivered a contingency fee contract
completed in the names of Thomas and Rose Serrano1 to Thomas, which provided
that Wolfe’s fee would be 20% of the gross recovery, with an initial $250 cost
deposit to be provided.   Wolfe never spoke to Serrano or met Serrano.  All
conversations concerning her interest in the home were conducted through a friend of
Thomas and Serrano.  Thomas executed the contract, but Serrano declined.  Wolfe
gave the Sharps a contingency fee contract which provided that Wolfe’s fee would
be 25% of the gross recovery or 25% of the $84,800 already offered by their
insurance company.
In March, 1998, Wolfe advised Jose Vasquez that he would pay him a referral
fee for each Hispanic client referred to Wolfe in exchange for Vasquez providing
translation services.  Vasquez referred at least one client to Wolfe, Marilyn Escobar,
in connection with the damage inflicted upon her home by the tornadoes.   
Vasquez’ parents retained Wolfe to represent them in obtaining the maximum
settlement from their insurance company.  The Vasquezes paid Wolfe $250 and
-4-
Wolfe’s fee was to be 25% of the recovery.  The Vasquezes’ insurance company did
not receive any communication from Wolfe until approximately May 23, 1998.  The
Vasquezes also had trouble contacting Wolfe by telephone to inquire about the status
of the matter.  
Count II.  Wolfe did not file either his flyer or his brochure with the Florida
Bar’s standing committee on advertising either prior to, or contemporaneously with,
its first dissemination.  Neither the flyer nor the brochure (1) were accompanied by a
statement of Wolfe’s qualifications and experience; (2) were marked
“Advertisement” in red ink; (3) stated that if the recipient had already retained
counsel for representation in the matter, the advertisement should be disregarded; or
(4) disclosed the source from which Wolfe obtained his information regarding the
recipient’s need for legal services.  
The flyer did not disclose whether (1) the client would be liable for any
expenses in addition to the fee, (2) the client would be liable for expenses regardless
of the outcome of the case, or (3) the percentage fee would be computed before
expenses were deducted from the recovery.
Wolfe’s brochure contained numerous testimonials and endorsements
concerning his past representation of clients in negotiating insurance claims.  The
brochure contained statements that were likely to create unjustified expectations
-5-
about the results he could achieve, such as “he knows his business and gets excellent
results.”  The brochure contained self-laudatory statements such as “reliable
performance of superior quality.”  
Count III.  The contingency fee contracts that Wolfe entered into, or
attempted to enter into, with Ms. Rivera, the Brunos, Ms. Thomas, Ms. Serrano, and
the Sharps were obtained through in-person solicitation where Wolfe had no prior
personal, professional or familial relationship with any of the prospective clients. 
The contingency fee contracts (1) were not accompanied by a statement of client’s
rights; (2) contained no language stating that the clients had received and read the
statement of client’s rights; (3) contained no language stating that the client could
rescind the contract, in writing, within three business days after the date of
execution; (4) were not marked “Sample” even though Wolfe did not meet with or
speak to several of the prospective clients in whose names the contracts were
written; namely, Ms. Rivera, Ms. Serrano, and Mrs. Bruno.  
As to Count I, Wolfe stipulated to the following violations:  Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar 4-7.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship . . . .”) and 4-7.4(b)(1)(A),(F) (“A lawyer shall not send     . . . a written
communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
2  The referee incorrectly cited this rule as 4-7.1(p).  
-6-
employment if (A) the written communication . . . relates to an accident or disaster
involving the person to whom the communication is addressed  . . . unless the
accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the
communication; . . . (F) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person
would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.”). 
As to Count II, Wolfe stipulated to violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
4-7.1(b) (prohibiting lawyers from making communications that are “likely to create
an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve”); 4-7.1(d)
(prohibiting lawyers from making communications that contain a testimonial); 4-
7.2(h) (mandating that every advertisement containing information about a lawyer’s
fee shall disclose whether the client will be liable for any expenses in addition to the
fee, whether the client will be liable for expenses regardless of the outcome of the
case, and whether the percentage fee will be computed before expenses are deducted
from the recovery); 4-7.2(j) (prohibiting self-laudatory statements in advertisements
and written communications); 4-7.2(p)2 (mandating that a communication be
submitted to the standing committee on advertising either prior to or
contemporaneously with the advertisement’s first dissemination); 4-7.4(b)(1)(D)-
-7-
(E)(“A lawyer shall not send . . . a written communication to a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining professional employment if . . . (D) the communication
involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue
influence; (E) the communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
or unfair statement or claim or is improper under rule 4-7.1 . . . .”); 4-7.4(b)(2)(A)
(mandating that written communications be marked “advertisement” in red ink); 4-
7.4(b)(2)(B) (mandating that a written communication be filed with the standing
committee on advertising either prior to, or contemporaneously with, its first
mailing); 4-7.4(b)(2)(E) (mandating that written communications be accompanied by
a statement of the lawyer’s qualifications); 4-7.4(b)(2)(G) (mandating that written
communications must state that if the recipient has already retained counsel, the
recipient should disregard the flyer or brochure); and 4-7.4(b)(2)(J) (providing that
“[a]ny written communication prompted by a specific occurrence involving or
affecting the intended recipient of the communication . . . shall disclose how the
lawyer obtained the information prompting the communication.”).
As to Count III, Wolfe stipulated to having violated Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar 4-1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into an agreement for a fee
generated by employment obtained through advertisements or solicitations not in
compliance with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar); 4-1.5(f)(4)(A)(i)-(ii)
-8-
(mandating that a contingent fee contract must contain provisions (i) stating that the
client has read and received the statement of client’s rights and (ii) providing that the
client may rescind the contract, in writing, within three business days after the date
of execution); and 4-1.5(f)(4)(C) (mandating that prior to entering a contingent fee
agreement, the lawyer must provide the prospective client with a statement of
client’s rights).  
REFEREE’S REPORT
In his report, the referee adopted and approved Wolfe’s stipulations.  The
referee also recommended that Wolfe be found guilty of the stipulated rule
violations. 
In recommending discipline, the referee recognized that Wolfe’s solicitations
after the tornadoes damaged the public’s perception of the legal profession and
increased the anguish suffered by the victims of the disasters.  The referee also noted
that Wolfe has a long-term addiction to cocaine, but is currently in the Florida
Lawyers Assistance, Inc., (FLA) drug rehabilitation program.  The referee
recommended that Wolfe be subject to discipline in the form of a suspension for
ninety days, followed by a five-year probationary period.  As part of his probation,
the referee recommended that Wolfe be required to continue his participation in the
FLA program and that during the first two years of his probation he be supervised by
-9-
an attorney acceptable to the Bar.  Finally, the referee recommended that Wolfe be
required to work in a firm with other attorneys and complete ten hours of ethics
credits.
In making this recommendation, the referee considered the following
aggravating factors:  (a) prior disciplinary record (a public reprimand in 1997 for a
trust account violation); (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) multiple offenses
(although the referee noted that these offenses were actually part of the same scheme
and occurred over a short period of time); (d) submission of false evidence (Wolfe’s
former counsel, who was discharged prior to this appeal, submitted a statement of
defense that contained misstatements of fact to the grievance committee; however,
the referee noted that the response was not sworn to and Wolfe did not testify under
oath); (e) vulnerability of the victims; and (f) substantial experience in the practice of
law (the referee found that Wolfe has been in practice for fourteen years; however,
he also considered the fact that Wolfe had been a sole practitioner from the time he
graduated from law school, and had only joined a firm recently).  
The referee considered the following mitigating factors: (a) personal and
emotional problems (a long-term cocaine addition which the referee found would 
impair judgment); (b) cooperation with the disciplinary board (even though Wolfe’s
former counsel, who was discharged prior to this appeal, had previously filed a
-10-
statement of defense with misstatements of fact, Wolfe entered into a stipulation of
facts admitting his wrongdoing); (c) inexperience in the practice of law (Wolfe had
been a sole practitioner since his graduation from law school until just prior to the
hearing; therefore, he never had the benefit of guidance and supervision from senior
partners or other associates); (d) physical or mental impairment (Wolfe’s long-term
cocaine addiction); (e) interim rehabilitation (Wolfe’s voluntary commencement of
an in-house rehabilitation program, his completion of a ninety-day rehabilitation
program in Mississippi, and his active participation in the three-year FLA program);
and (f) remorse.  
In recommending a ninety-day suspension, the referee noted that a ninety-one
day suspension, which requires an attorney to demonstrate rehabilitation before being
reinstated, was not necessary because Wolfe’s rehabilitation in the instant case
consists of the FLA program in which Wolfe is already a participant, but will not
complete for approximately three years.  
The Bar seeks review of the referee’s report.
ANALYSIS
Wolfe has stipulated to the facts along with corresponding rule violations, and
the Bar has not contested the referee’s recommendations of guilt.  Therefore, we find
Wolfe guilty of the rule violations found by the referee in his report.   
-11-
The issue upon which this Court now must focus is whether the referee’s
recommendation of a ninety-day suspension followed by a five-year probationary
period is reasonably supported by existing case law.   See Florida Bar v. Fredericks,
731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999).  The Bar argues that such discipline is far too
lenient and that a three-year suspension followed by a three-year probationary period
would be more appropriate.  
In reviewing a referee’s recommendation of discipline, this Court’s  “scope of
review is somewhat broader than that afforded to findings of fact because, ultimately,
it is [the Court’s] responsibility to order an appropriate punishment.”   Florida Bar v.
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989).  This Court has provided the following
guidelines in imposing discipline:
First, the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting
the public from unethical conduct and at the same time not denying the
public the services of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue harshness
in imposing penalty.  Second, the judgment must be fair to the
respondent, being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the
same time encourage reformation and rehabilitation.  Third, the
judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be prone or
tempted to become involved in like violations.
Florida Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Florida Bar v. Reed,
644 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Fla. 1994)).
In Florida Bar v. Scott, 197 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla.1967) (quoting State ex rel.
-12-
Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427, 431 (Fla. 1959)), this Court found that
direct solicitation by a lawyer is a “serious breach[] of the Canon of Ethics
demanding severe treatment of the offending lawyer.”  In State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Dawson,  111 So. 2d 427, 431 (Fla. 1959), this Court noted that in solicitation
cases, “[t]he exact nature of the disciplinary action to be taken is a problem which
must be resolved on the basis of the factual situation presented by each particular
case.”  As a result, in the past the discipline imposed for improper attorney
solicitation has varied from disbarment to public reprimand.  See Florida Bar v.
Weinstein, 624 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1993) (disbarment); Florida Bar v. Stafford, 542
So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1989) (six-month suspension);  Florida Bar v. Sawyer, 420 So. 2d
302 (Fla. 1982) (eighteen-month suspension);  Florida Bar v. Gaer, 380 So. 2d 429
(Fla. 1980) (public reprimand); Florida Bar v. Curry, 211 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1968)
(six-month suspension);  Florida Bar v. Abramson, 199 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1967)
(public reprimand);  Scott (six-month probation);  Florida Bar v. Britton, 181 So. 2d
161 (Fla. 1965) (three-month suspension); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Swidler, 159
So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1964) (public reprimand); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Bieley, 120
So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1960) (six-month suspension);  Dawson (eighteen-month
suspension);  State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrell, 74 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1954) (one-
year minimum suspension). 
-13-
Despite the mitigating circumstances found to exist in the instant case, we
agree with the Bar and conclude that a ninety-day suspension is too lenient for
Wolfe’s violations.  In our view, the referee’s recommendation is not supported by
existing case law.  We reach this conclusion for three reasons, and address each in
turn.  
First, Wolfe’s primary explanation for his ethical violations is his long-term
addiction to cocaine.  This Court has held that while a substance abuse problem may
explain misconduct, it does not excuse it.  See Florida Bar v. Golub, 550 So. 2d
455, 456 (Fla. 1989).   In addition, for drug abuse to serve as a mitigator, the
addiction must impair the attorney’s ability to practice law to such an extent that it
outweighs the attorney’s misconduct.  In Florida Bar v. Shuminer, 567 So. 2d 430,
431, 432 (Fla. 1990), an attorney with a substance abuse problem misappropriated
client funds.  The Court concluded that disbarment was a more appropriate sanction
because, even though Shuminer had a substance abuse problem, he “failed to
establish that his addictions rose to a sufficient level of impairment to outweigh the
seriousness of his offenses.”  Id. at 432.  In so holding, this Court noted that
Shuminer “continued to work effectively during the period in issue.”  Id.
 According to Wolfe, his addiction intensified his need to “drum up” new
business to feed his habit.  For this reason, he entered two disaster areas and
-14-
approached residents of the areas whose homes had been damaged by the tornadoes
(and one resident whose husband had been killed), offering legal services.  He
presented the residents with prepared pamphlets and brochures, and offered the
residents prepared contingency fee contracts.  Such conduct indicates that Wolfe’s
conduct was not spontaneous or spur-of-the-moment; rather, it appears to have been
carefully planned.  As such, we conclude that Wolfe’s in-person solicitation of
clients, and his preparations in achieving this goal, do not demonstrate such a level
of impairment that his cocaine addiction should serve as a substantial mitigator, or
overshadow the seriousness of his violations, in assessing discipline in this case. 
See id.  
The second reason for our conclusion that a ninety-day suspension is too
lenient is predicated upon the concept that when an attorney affirmatively engages in
conduct he or she knows to be improper, more severe discipline is warranted.  In
Stafford, 542 So. 2d at 1323, the attorney admitted knowing that his solicitation of
clients was wrong, but he continued to engage in the conduct anyway.  This Court
imposed a six-month suspension (rather than the referee’s recommendation of a
ninety-day suspension to be followed by a three-year probationary period), finding
that the attorney’s “blatant disregard of the prohibition against solicitation and his
deliberate engagement in unethical fee splitting dictate the imposition of greater
-15-
discipline.”  Id.  At the hearing in the instant case, Wolfe gave the following
testimony:
Q:  You realized when you were up there that what you were doing
was 
wrong?
A:  Yes.
Q:  Then why were you doing it?
A:  Because I kept telling myself that well, it would be okay.  I could
get 
away with it.  
(Tr. at 140).  Thus, despite Wolfe’s addiction, he comprehended the wrongfulness
of his actions, and elected to invade the sanctity of an area ravaged by a catastrophe
to solicit disaster victims without regard to dignity or decorum.  
The third reason a suspension longer than ninety days is necessary here is
founded on the principle that, in assessing discipline, “this Court also considers
prior misconduct and cumulative misconduct as relevant factors, and ‘deals more
severely with cumulative misconduct than with isolated misconduct.’”  Florida Bar
v. Adler, 589 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Florida Bar v. Greenspahn, 386
So.2d 523, 525 (Fla.1980)).  This is Wolfe’s second disciplinary proceeding in the
last three years.  In 1997, this Court publicly reprimanded Wolfe for a trust account
violation.  See Florida Bar v. Wolfe, 693 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1997).  Further, in the
instant case, Wolfe committed numerous violations, albeit in a short period of time,
by soliciting clients in person, and by presenting them with flyers, brochures and
3  Under Florida Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(c), a set term of probation
cannot be more than three years.   
-16-
contingency contracts which did not comply with the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar.  We must note that we are especially concerned regarding Wolfe’s contingency
fee rule violations.    These rules exist to inform potential clients of their rights,
thereby protecting them from unethical conduct by attorneys or unconscionable
terms in a contract for legal services.   Wolfe disregarded these rules and his
resulting actions not only took advantage of natural disaster victims at a vulnerable
time, but also damaged the public’s trust of attorneys as a whole.  We cannot and
will not tolerate blatant disregard for the rules applicable to fee contracts.
Based on Wolfe’s affirmative and intentional misconduct, his multiple
offenses and his prior disciplinary record, a one-year suspension more adequately
serves the goals of attorney discipline, those being respect for the legal system and
protection of the public, than the referee’s recommended ninety-day suspension. 
See Cibula, 725 So. 2d at 363.   Additionally, a three-year probationary period
thereafter will assist Wolfe in continuing his recovery from his addiction and
preventing a relapse.3  Finally, we agree with and adopt all of the conditions of
probation recommended by the referee in his report.  
In imposing this discipline, we recognize that under Florida Standard for
-17-
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions  9.32(j), interim rehabilitation may be considered as a
mitigating factor.  See Florida Bar v. Jahn, 509 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. 1987)(finding
that  “an addicted attorney who has demonstrated positive efforts to free himself of
his drug dependency should have that fact recognized by the referee and this Court
when considering the appropriate discipline to be imposed”).  Further, we encourage
attorneys with substance abuse problems to seek treatment for their addictions.   See
Florida Bar v. Temmer, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S25 (Fla. Dec. 16, 1999) (commending
attorney on her efforts towards rehabilitation).  We recognize substance abuse to be
a disease process involving factors with great complexity.  Although a one-year
suspension is more severe than the discipline recommended by the referee, we
emphasize that violations of the rules governing contingency contracts are not
looked upon lightly by this Court and, had the mitigating factors found by the
referee in this case not been present, we would have imposed much more severe
discipline on Wolfe.  
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Evan Robert Wolfe is hereby suspended from the practice of
law in Florida for one year, to be followed by a three-year probationary period.  As
part of his probation, Wolfe is required to continue his participation in the Florida
Lawyer’s Assistance, Inc., program, and complete his three-year contract with that
-18-
organization.  Wolfe is further required to be placed under the supervision of an
attorney acceptable to the Bar for the first two years of his probation, and is
required to take ten hours of ethics courses.  Finally, for the duration of his
probation, Wolfe is required to practice in a firm rather than as a sole practitioner. 
Wolfe’s suspension shall be effective thirty days from the filing of this
opinion so that Wolfe can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing
clients.  If Wolfe notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and
does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an
order making the suspension effective immediately.  Wolfe shall accept no new
business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Evan Robert Wolfe in the amount of
$5,301.12, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
-19-
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Jan K. Wichrowski, Bar Counsel, Orlando, Florida,
       for Complainant
Richard B. Marx, Miami, Florida,
       for Respondent