Title: Pettiford v. Aggarwal

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pettiford v. Aggarwal, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3237.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South 
Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal 
errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the 
opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3237 
PETTIFORD, APPELLEE, v. AGGARWAL, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pettiford v. Aggarwal, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3237.] 
Civil procedure — Summary judgment — Contradiction between affidavit and 
deposition testimony of expert witness — Explanation required. 
(No. 2009-1602 — Submitted May 11, 2010 — Decided July 14, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 22736, 
2009-Ohio-3642. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition 
testimony of that expert and submitted in opposition to a pending motion 
for summary judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact to 
prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the 
reason for the contradiction.  (Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-
Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, applied.) 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether an affidavit of a nonparty expert 
that contradicts the expert’s deposition testimony can be used to create a genuine 
issue of material fact and defeat summary judgment.  Appellant, Rajendra 
Aggarwal, M.D., asserts that appellee, Barbara Pettiford, submitted a sham expert 
affidavit1 in opposition to Dr. Aggarwal’s motion for summary judgment.  Dr. 
Aggarwal urges us to extend our holding in Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 
2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, to contradictory affidavits of nonparty expert 
witnesses and hold that a sham affidavit may not be used to create a triable issue 
of material fact and thereby defeat summary judgment. 
{¶ 2} Conversely, Pettiford contends that her expert’s affidavit was not a 
sham affidavit, because it merely supplemented, and did not contradict, the 
expert’s deposition testimony.  In addition, Pettiford argues that the Byrd doctrine 
should not be applied to nonparties, because of the differing interests between 
parties and nonparties. 
{¶ 3} We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert 
contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in 
opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine 
issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently 
explains the reason for the contradiction. 
{¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Relevant Background 
                                          
 
1.  The term “sham affidavit” is used by federal courts to describe “a contradictory affidavit that 
indicates only that the affiant cannot maintain a consistent story, or is willing to offer a statement 
solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment.”  Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc. 
(C.A.3, 2007), 503 F.3d 247, 253. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 5} Dr. Aggarwal is a family-practice physician, and Pettiford was his 
patient.  In June 1999, Pettiford underwent chest x-rays and an MRI that Dr. 
Aggarwal allegedly interpreted as “clear and normal.”  In July 2002, a second 
MRI was performed, and a tumor was discovered on Pettiford’s right lung. 
{¶ 6} Pettiford filed a medical-negligence action against Dr. Aggarwal, 
alleging that Dr. Aggarwal had misinterpreted Pettiford’s chest x-rays by failing 
to recognize the tumor.  Dr. Aggarwal moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that no genuine issues of material fact remained for trial.  Dr. Aggarwal 
submitted an affidavit in which he testified that he had conformed to all 
applicable standards of care in his treatment of Pettiford and that he had not 
caused any injury to her. 
{¶ 7} In response, Pettiford presented the affidavit of her expert, Trent 
Sickles, M.D., a family-medicine physician.  Dr. Sickles affirmed that Dr. 
Aggarwal had deviated from accepted standards of care by failing to recognize a 
lung mass on Pettiford’s x-ray.  Dr. Sickles’s affidavit did not include any 
testimony on the issues of proximate causation or damages. 
{¶ 8} The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding 
that a genuine issue of material fact was present. 
{¶ 9} Dr. Aggarwal’s counsel subsequently deposed Dr. Sickles to 
discover all of the opinions that he held in this case.  Dr. Sickles testified that he 
had reviewed everything that was necessary to form his full and final opinions 
and that he was prepared to give those opinions.  Dr. Sickles testified consistently 
with his affidavit and reiterated that Dr. Aggarwal had deviated from acceptable 
standards of medical care by failing to recognize the lung mass on Pettiford’s 
June 1999 x-ray.  Dr. Sickles further testified that he did not intend to render any 
opinions about (1) the treatment Pettiford may have undergone if a diagnosis had 
been made in June 1999, (2) the effect of the alleged three-year delay upon 
Pettiford’s treatment or course, or (3) causation.  Later in the deposition, Dr. 
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Sickles stated that he had determined that he could not give any opinions about 
causation.  At the conclusion of the deposition, Dr. Sickles confirmed that he had 
covered all of the opinions that he had formed. 
{¶ 10} Shortly before trial, Dr. Aggarwal renewed his motion for 
summary judgment, alleging that Pettiford had conceded that she would be unable 
to provide expert testimony on causation.  In response to the motion, Pettiford 
submitted a new affidavit from Dr. Sickles.  In this affidavit, Dr. Sickles testified 
as follows: 
{¶ 11} “1.  My name is Trent Sickles.  I am a licensed physician in the 
state of Ohio and I have given sworn testimony regarding the negligence of Dr. 
Aggarwal by Barbara Pettiford. 
{¶ 12} “2.  I further agree to testify as an expert for the Plaintiff, Barbara 
Pettiford regarding damages she has suffered as a direct and proximate result of 
Dr. Aggarwal’s negligence. 
{¶ 13} “3.  Specifically, I believe that Ms. Pettiford endured pain and 
suffering for an extensive period of time as a direct and proximate result of Dr. 
Aggarwal’s negligence in failing to diagnose the tumor in her right lung. 
{¶ 14} “4.  I further believe that Ms. Pettiford suffered the crisis of a 
collapsed lung, and extended hospital stay as a direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of Dr. Aggarwal.” 
{¶ 15} In response to Dr. Sickles’s new affidavit, Dr. Aggarwal filed a 
reply memorandum and a motion to strike the affidavit.  Dr. Aggarwal contended 
that affidavits contradicting former deposition testimony may not be used to 
create, without sufficient explanation, genuine issues of material fact and defeat 
summary judgment.  Without offering any rationale, the trial court granted Dr. 
Aggarwal’s motion for summary judgment and did not rule on the motion to 
strike. 
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{¶ 16} On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed in a 
divided opinion.  The lead opinion stated that contradictions existed between the 
deposition of Dr. Sickles and his subsequent affidavit.  2009-Ohio-3642 at ¶ 38.  
However, the court concluded that the rule espoused in Byrd prohibiting the use 
of a contradictory affidavit to defeat summary judgment did not control, because 
the rule applied only to contradictory affidavits of parties, not nonparty witnesses.  
Id. 
{¶ 17} The concurring opinion agreed that Byrd was limited in its 
application to parties but, unlike the lead opinion, found that Dr. Sickles’s 
affidavit was “not unambiguously inconsistent with his prior deposition 
testimony.”  Id. at ¶ 46-47. 
{¶ 18} The dissenting judge found that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit completely 
contradicted his deposition testimony.  Id. at ¶ 58.  The dissenting judge also 
disagreed with the majority’s narrow reading of Byrd and would have applied its 
analysis and rule to retained, expert witnesses.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
{¶ 19} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary 
appeal to determine whether an affidavit of a nonparty expert witness submitted in 
opposition to summary judgment that, without sufficient explanation, contradicts 
deposition testimony of that witness may create a genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat summary judgment.  123 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2009-Ohio-6210, 917 N.E.2d 
810. 
Analysis 
A.  The Rule Adopted in Byrd v. Smith 
{¶ 20} In Byrd, we were called upon to resolve a certified conflict over 
whether a party’s affidavit that is inconsistent with or contradictory to the party’s 
deposition testimony should be considered by the trial court in deciding a motion 
for summary judgment.  Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 
N.E.2d 47, ¶ 1.  The plaintiff, Bryan Byrd, sought uninsured/underinsured-
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motorist coverage related to injuries he sustained while driving a van owned or 
leased by his employer.  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  Byrd submitted an affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment in which he outlined facts that were arguably inconsistent 
with his deposition testimony.  Id. at ¶ 5 and 14-19.  Without addressing the 
supposed inconsistency, the trial court granted summary judgment, and the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. at ¶ 6–7. 
{¶ 21} In answering the certified question, we were mindful of the 
purpose of summary judgment.  We recognized that the procedure set forth in 
Ohio Civ.R. 56 is modeled after the corresponding federal rule and observed that 
the federal rules “are ‘designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1 * * *.  Rule 56 must be 
construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and 
defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried 
to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to 
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and 
defenses have no factual basis.’  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 
327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265.”  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 22} Bearing in mind the purpose of summary judgment, we turned our 
attention to the substantive issue.  We noted our holding in Turner v. Turner 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 617 N.E.2d 1123, that “a moving party’s contradictory 
affidavit may not be used to obtain summary judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  We 
acknowledged that “[w]hether Turner’s rule against a moving party’s benefiting 
from an inconsistent affidavit should be applied to nonmoving parties is a matter 
of some dispute.”  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 23} In Byrd, we were cognizant that moving and nonmoving parties 
hold different positions and are afforded different standards during the summary-
judgment analysis.  Most notably, during the trial court’s review of the evidence 
January Term, 2010 
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for genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party receives the benefit of all 
favorable inferences.  In light of that dynamic, we adopted the following rule: 
{¶ 24} “[W]hen determining the effect of a party’s affidavit that appears 
to be inconsistent with the party’s deposition and that is submitted either in 
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must 
consider whether the affidavit contradicts or merely supplements the deposition.  
Unless a motion to strike has been properly granted pursuant to Civ.R. 56(G), all 
evidence presented is to be evaluated by the trial court pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C) 
before ruling.  If an affidavit of a movant for summary judgment is inconsistent 
with the movant’s former deposition testimony, summary judgment may not be 
granted in the movant’s favor.  * * * 
{¶ 25} “With respect to a nonmoving party, the analysis is a bit different.  
If an affidavit appears to be inconsistent with a deposition, the court must look to 
any explanation for the inconsistency.  We do not say that a nonmoving party’s 
affidavit should always prevent summary judgment when it contradicts the 
affiant’s previous deposition testimony.  After all, deponents may review their 
depositions and correct factual error before the depositions are signed.”  Byrd, 110 
Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, at ¶ 26-27. 
{¶ 26} We therefore held, “An affidavit of a party opposing summary 
judgment that contradicts former deposition testimony of that party may not, 
without sufficient explanation, create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
B.  Application of Byrd v. Smith 
{¶ 27} Dr. Aggarwal urges us to extend the holding in Byrd to 
contradictory affidavits of nonparty experts.  Conversely, Pettiford contends that 
the differing nature of the testimony and interests between a party and a nonparty 
renders the Byrd doctrine inapplicable to the affidavit of a nonparty expert.  
Additionally, Pettiford likens expert witnesses to nonparty lay witnesses and 
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argues that counsel cannot prevent a nonparty expert from deliberately or 
inadvertently misstating facts during a deposition.  We find Pettiford’s positions 
unpersuasive. 
{¶ 28} The rationale supporting the rule set forth in Byrd is germane to an 
affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert that contradicts former deposition 
testimony of that expert without sufficient explanation.  Pettiford’s reasoning 
overlooks both the critical distinctions between a lay witness and a retained expert 
witness and the similarities between a party and a retained expert witness. 
{¶ 29} A nonparty lay witness offers testimony only on facts and receives 
no compensation for his or her testimony.  Because the issue is not before us 
today, we are not deciding whether the Byrd analysis can be applied to a 
contradictory affidavit of a nonparty lay witness.  Similarly, we are not deciding 
whether the Byrd analysis can be applied to a nonparty expert witness who is not 
retained and compensated by a party or his or her attorney.  An example of this 
type of nonparty expert would be the plaintiff’s treating physician in a medical 
negligence case who has not been engaged by any party and is not being 
compensated for his or her testimony. 
{¶ 30} These types of witnesses, however, are readily distinguishable 
from a nonparty expert witness who is retained and compensated by a party or his 
or her attorney.  The retained expert witness is engaged to review the facts and 
offer opinion testimony on the essential, material elements of the claim at issue.  
In essence, the expert is an extended voice of the party and the proponent of the 
party’s claims.  Expert witnesses are also subject to more-restrictive discovery 
and evidentiary rules than fact witnesses.  See, e.g., Evid.R. 601(D) and 702; 
Civ.R. 26(B)(5). 
{¶ 31} Unlike an attorney’s limited contact with a fact witness or a 
treating physician, an attorney’s direction of a retained, nonparty expert is 
significant, akin to the attorney’s direction of a party.  The attorney directs the 
January Term, 2010 
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expert as to the subject matter upon which an opinion is needed, helps to 
determine what evidence the expert reviews, and works closely with the expert 
throughout the litigation to prove or defend against the causes of action.  Because 
the expert’s testimony is required to prove or defend against the claims, it is 
paramount that the attorney exercises a significant degree of control over the 
expert. 
{¶ 32} While the attorney technically does not represent the expert during 
the expert’s deposition, the attorney customarily prepares the expert for the 
deposition and supports the expert during the deposition just as he or she would 
with a party.  And the attorney often acts during an expert’s deposition as he or 
she would act during a party’s deposition, objecting to opposing counsel’s 
questioning and rehabilitating the expert if necessary.  If the attorney is 
dissatisfied with the expert’s deposition testimony or believes that a misstatement 
has been made, the attorney has the ability to clarify the deposition on the record.  
Moreover, as we noted in Byrd, Civ.R. 30(E) provides the deponent with the 
opportunity to correct errors in form or substance and give a statement of reasons 
for any corrections, Byrd, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 
27, which is often done in conjunction with the party’s attorney.  Thus, Pettiford’s 
assertion that a nonparty witness does not have the benefit of counsel to protect 
him from misstatements is unavailing. 
{¶ 33} In light of the fact that there is a process for reviewing and 
correcting deposition transcripts, we rejected the assertion in Byrd that the limited 
purpose of depositions and the manner in which they are taken excuse a 
deponent’s cavalier treatment of facts established through deposition testimony.  
Id. at ¶ 27.  This rationale holds equally true when a retained, nonparty expert 
deponent attempts to change or contradict the opinions established in deposition 
testimony in a subsequent affidavit. 
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{¶ 34} The numerous parallels between the degree of control an attorney 
has over a party and over a retained, nonparty expert lead us to the conclusion that 
Byrd’s ruling should apply to contradictory affidavits of retained, nonparty 
experts to prevent the use of a self-serving affidavit to defeat summary judgment.  
If a retained, nonparty expert is permitted to defeat summary judgment at the 
eleventh hour by changing his or her opinions without a sufficient explanation, 
summary judgment will be rendered meaningless. 
{¶ 35} We are further persuaded by the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in extending the comparable federal sham-affidavit doctrine to 
retained, nonparty experts: 
{¶ 36} “We can think of no reason, however, not to apply this rule to the 
present case involving the testimony and affidavit of the plaintiff’s sole expert 
witness.  The purpose of summary judgment motions—‘to weed out unfounded 
claims, specious denials, and sham defenses,’ Babrocky [v. Jewell Food Co. 
(C.A.7, 1985)], 773 F.2d [857] at 861—is served by a rule that prevents a party 
from creating issues of credibility by allowing one of its witnesses to contradict 
his own prior testimony.  Id. (quoting Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 
719 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1983)).”  Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos. (C.A.7, 
1988), 859 F.2d 517, 521. 
{¶ 37} Similarly, we can think of no reason that the Byrd doctrine should 
not be applied to retained, nonparty experts. 
{¶ 38} We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert 
contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in 
opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine 
issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently 
explains the reason for the contradiction. 
C.  Application of Byrd to Dr. Sickles’s Testimony 
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{¶ 39} Dr. Aggarwal asks this court to apply the Byrd analysis in this case 
and hold that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit contradicted his deposition testimony without 
sufficient explanation for the inconsistency.  Pettiford counters that Dr. Sickles’s 
affidavit merely supplemented his deposition testimony. 
{¶ 40} The determination of whether Dr. Sickles’s affidavit contradicted 
his deposition without a sufficient explanation for the alleged contradiction is a 
factual determination that is properly made by the trier of fact.  The trial court did 
not expound on its reasoning for granting Dr. Aggarwal’s motion for summary 
judgment and never ruled on the motion to strike Dr. Sickles’s affidavit, and the 
appellate court declined to apply the Byrd analysis.  In light of our clarification of 
Byrd’s applicability, the appropriate course is to remand this matter to the trial 
court to apply the analysis set forth herein.  Accordingly, we remand this cause to 
the trial court to now engage in that analysis. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an affidavit of a retained, 
nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and 
submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not 
create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the 
expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.  We reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this court’s opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
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BROWN, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 42} I agree with the majority that this matter should be remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings.  However, because I find that the majority’s 
consideration of whether to extend Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-
3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, is premature, I dissent from the majority’s extension of 
Byrd to retained, nonparty experts. 
{¶ 43} The parties disagree as to whether Dr. Sickles’s affidavit 
contradicted or merely supplemented his deposition testimony.  The trial court’s 
summary judgment decision completely fails to address this issue.  The trial court 
also failed to rule upon Dr. Aggarwal’s motion to strike Dr. Sickles’s affidavit, 
which was based upon Dr. Aggarwal’s assertion that the affidavit contradicted the 
deposition testimony. 
{¶ 44} Because the court of appeals held that Byrd was inapplicable to 
nonparties, a finding of whether Dr. Sickles’s affidavit contradicted his deposition 
testimony was unnecessary to the appellate decision.  Pettiford v. Aggarwal, 
Montgomery App. No. 22736, 2009-Ohio-3642, at ¶ 38.  However, each of the 
appellate opinions expressed a view regarding the nature of Dr. Sickles’s affidavit 
and deposition testimony.  The lead opinion recognized that “contradictions do 
exist between the deposition of Dr. Sickles and his subsequent affidavit.”  Id.  The 
concurring opinion stated that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit statements were “not 
unambiguously inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony.”  Id. at ¶ 46.  The 
dissenting opinion stated that Dr. Sickles’s affidavit was “a complete 
contradiction.”  Id. at 67. 
{¶ 45} From the record, it is clear that the nature of Dr. Sickles’s affidavit 
and deposition testimony has not been addressed explicitly by the lower courts.  I 
agree with the majority that the determination of whether a contradiction exists 
should be made by the trial court.  Therefore, I would remand this matter to the 
trial court for a determination of whether a contradiction exists.  I find that no 
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discussion of whether to extend the holding of Byrd to retained, nonparty experts 
is warranted until there has been a clear determination that the affidavit 
contradicts, not merely supplements, the deposition testimony. 
__________________ 
 
Lawrence J. White, for appellee. 
Arnold, Todaro & Welch Co., L.P.A., and Kevin W. Popham, for 
appellant. 
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