Title: LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5458.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5458 
LEBLANC ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, L.L.C.; 
BURCHFIELD, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5458.] 
Civil procedure—Interpleader—Contract—When the custodian of an individual 
retirement account files an interpleader action against the parties 
claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, the custodian waives its 
contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and a person who proves 
that the owner clearly intended to designate him or her as the beneficiary 
does not need to also prove that the owner substantially complied with the 
change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover.  Instead, the 
account owner’s clearly expressed intent controls. 
(Nos. 2011-2160 and 2011-2073—Submitted July 11, 2012—Decided  
November 28, 2012.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
No. 24348, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553. 
__________________ 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When the custodian of an individual retirement account files an interpleader 
action against the parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, 
the custodian waives its contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and 
a person who proves that the owner clearly intended to designate him or 
her as the beneficiary does not need to also prove that the owner 
substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary procedures in order 
to recover.  Instead, the account owner’s clearly expressed intent controls. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the decisions of the 
Ninth District Court of Appeals and the Second District Courts of Appeals 
concerning the effect of an individual retirement account (“IRA”) custodian’s 
filing of an interpleader action against competing claimants.  We hold that when 
the custodian of an individual retirement account files an interpleader action 
against the parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, the custodian 
waives its contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and a person who proves 
that the owner of the account clearly intended to designate him or her as the 
beneficiary does not also need to prove that the owner substantially complied with 
the change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover.  Instead, the account 
owner’s clearly expressed intent controls. 
{¶ 2} Because our holding rejects the analysis adopted by the Second 
District Court of Appeals in this case and because there exists a genuine issue of 
fact as to the intent of the account owner, John F. Burchfield, we reverse the court 
of appeals’ judgment and remand this case to the common pleas court for trial. 
 
 
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RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
The disputed accounts 
{¶ 3} This is a dispute over money that Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C., 
was holding in two IRAs for John F. Burchfield when he committed suicide on 
December 16, 2009.  In 2002, John designated his mother, appellant Gloria 
Welch, and his stepfather, Bruce Leland, as beneficiaries, 75 percent and 25 
percent respectively. 
{¶ 4} On May 5, 2007, John married appellee Cynthia Burchfield.  
Shortly before the marriage, John designated Cynthia as the sole beneficiary on 
both accounts. 
The disputed intent 
{¶ 5} On October 28, 2009, John sent an e-mail to his Wells Fargo 
advisor, Aaron Michael, stating that he and Cynthia were getting divorced and 
requesting paperwork to remove Cynthia as the beneficiary on his IRAs.  
Thereafter, by telephone, John gave Michael specifics regarding a change in the 
beneficiary designation for the IRAs.  Michael prepared change-of beneficiary 
forms that again designated Welch and Leland as the beneficiaries, 75 percent and 
25 percent respectively.  In addition, John’s sister, appellant Lori LeBlanc, was 
listed as the contingent beneficiary.  Michael predated the forms “November 2, 
2009” and mailed them to John, along with a self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
{¶ 6} On November 2, 2009, Cynthia filed a divorce complaint against 
John.  Around the same time, John spoke with Michael and informed him that the 
change-of-beneficiary forms were “already taken care of.”  Approximately six 
weeks later, John committed suicide.  He left a note that contained a postscript in 
which he expressed his love for Cynthia. 
{¶ 7} After John’s death, Leland and LeBlanc asked Michael to look 
through John’s financial documents to wind up John’s affairs.  Around January 
25, 2010, Michael and one of John’s co-workers discovered the signed change-of-
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beneficiary forms in an envelope among John’s papers.1  Id. at 22.  That same 
morning, Michael gave the forms to his manager at Wells Fargo.  Cynthia, 
LeBlanc, and Welch made conflicting demands of Wells Fargo for the IRA 
proceeds. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 8} In March 2010, LeBlanc2 and Welch filed a complaint against 
Wells Fargo and Cynthia3 seeking a declaratory judgment4 that Cynthia was not 
entitled to the proceeds of John’s IRAs.  In turn, Cynthia sought a contrary 
declaration that she, as the beneficiary named on the form in Wells Fargo’s 
possession at John’s death, was solely entitled to the proceeds. 
{¶ 9} In response, Wells Fargo filed an action in interpleader against 
LeBlanc, Welch, and Cynthia, in which it represented that it was “unable to 
determine the validity of the conflicting demands.”  Wells Fargo disclaimed any 
interest in the proceeds of John’s IRA accounts and offered to deposit the funds 
with the court’s clerk or to maintain the account until the dispute was resolved.  
The trial court granted summary judgment to Cynthia, the beneficiary designated 
on the form in Wells Fargo’s possession at the time of  John’s death. 
{¶ 10} The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed.  LeBlanc v. Wells 
Fargo Advisors, L.L.C., 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872.  
In doing so, it emphasized that John had not complied with the Wells Fargo 
policy, which required that change-of-beneficiary forms be returned to the 
company.  Id. at ¶ 12.  And it concluded that Wells Fargo had not waived 
                                                          
 
1 The parties dispute whether the signatures on the forms are John’s.   
 
2 LeBlanc filed suit on behalf of John’s estate and in her individual capacity. 
 
3 Leland was also named as a defendant but he disclaimed any interest in the IRAs, along with all 
of John’s other probate and nonprobate assets.  The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Leland as a 
party.   
 
4 The complaint set forth a number of other causes of action that are not relevant here.  
January Term, 2012 
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compliance with its change-of-beneficiary procedure by filing an action in 
interpleader against the claimants.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 11} In reaching that conclusion, the Second District rejected the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals’ decision in Kelly v. May Assoc. Fed. Credit Union, 9th 
Dist. No. 23423, 2008-Ohio-1507, which held that an IRA custodian waives 
compliance with its change-of-beneficiary procedures  when it interpleads 
disputed funds. 
{¶ 12} The Second District further held that, even if Kelly’s holding on 
this narrow legal point was correct and the custodian’s filing an interpleader 
action waived its right to enforce the change-of-beneficiary procedure, the parties 
claiming to be the “clearly intended” beneficiaries must still prove that the 
decedent had substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary procedure .  
LeBlanc at ¶ 13.  In doing so, it again rejected yet another Kelly holding—that the 
account holder’s clearly expressed intent controls. 
{¶ 13} Accordingly, the Second District concluded that John’s failure to 
return the forms to Wells Fargo before his death constituted a failure to 
substantially comply with Wells Fargo’s procedure and that that failure was fatal 
to Welch and LeBlanc’s claims, without regard to John’s actual intent.  It 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Cynthia. 
{¶ 14} We granted LeBlanc and Welch’s discretionary appeal, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 1456, 2012-Ohio-648, 961 N.E.2d 1135, and certified that a conflict exists 
between the Second District’s decision in this case and the Ninth District’s 
decision in Kelly, 131 Ohio St.3d 1455, 2012-Ohio-648, 961 N.E.2d 1134.  We 
consolidated the actions, which present the same legal question. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
{¶ 15} The question certified by the Second District is: “In a dispute 
between (1) a specifically designated and (2) a clearly intended beneficiary of an 
individual retirement account (IRA), where the account custodian files an 
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interpleader action and purportedly waives compliance with its change of 
beneficiary procedure, is the ‘clearly intended’ beneficiary required to show that 
the owner of the IRA account substantially complied with the change of 
beneficiary procedure in order to recover?”  
{¶ 16} We answer the certified question in the negative. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 17} Resolution of the issues before us requires that we answer two 
unsettled questions.  First, when an IRA custodian files an interpleader action 
against competing claimants, does it waive its contractual change-of-beneficiary 
procedures?  And if so, what is the test for determining who is entitled to the 
disputed funds? 
{¶ 18} Because we agree with the Ninth District’s analysis and holding, 
we first turn our discussion to its opinion in Kelly, which squarely dealt with both 
questions.   
The Ninth District Opinion 
{¶ 19} Barbara Kelly opened an IRA at May Associates Federal Credit 
Union in 1992 and named her nephew, Richard Wachter, as the beneficiary.  
Kelly,  2008-Ohio-1507, at ¶ 4.  She also granted Richard a general power of 
attorney and named him co-owner of a number of certificates of deposit. 
{¶ 20} Barbara later granted a power of attorney to her daughter, Janice 
Kelly, and revoked the one she had given Richard.  Barbara also made Janice the 
co-owner of her certificates of deposit and told Richard that she was going to 
make Janice the beneficiary of her IRA.   
{¶ 21} On November 19, 1998, Barbara telephoned May Associates to 
name Janice the beneficiary of her IRA.  Even though May Associates required 
that a beneficiary could be changed only by the member completing and signing 
an IRA beneficiary-designation form, the teller with whom Barbara spoke 
completed the change-of-beneficiary form and wrote “per member” on the 
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signature line.  The teller mailed a copy of the form she had completed to 
Barbara, placed a copy in the credit union’s file, and sent a copy to the third-party 
administrator handling the IRA.  Barbara was not told that she needed to sign the 
form. 
{¶ 22} Barbara died in 2003.  By that time, May Associates was using a 
different third-party administrator for the IRA.  The new company had the 
designation of Richard on file that Barbara made when she opened the account 
but had no information about the form the teller filled out in 1998.  The 
administrator told Richard that he was the beneficiary.  Janice and Richard made 
competing claims for the IRA proceeds.  No money was paid out. 
{¶ 23} Janice filed a complaint against Richard and May Associates, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to the IRA proceeds.  May 
Associates filed an interpleader action against Janice and Richard.  The trial court 
granted summary judgment to Janice on the ground that Barbara had clearly 
expressed her intent that Janice be the beneficiary of the IRA. 
{¶ 24} The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed.  Kelly, 2008-Ohio-
1507, at ¶ 2.  In doing so, it acknowledged that Barbara had not complied with the 
May Associates’ procedures, which required that changes to beneficiaries “be 
made by completing and signing an IRA beneficiary designation form.”  Id. at ¶ 5.  
But it concluded that May Associates waived the signature requirement when it 
filed the interpleader action.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 25} To reach that conclusion, the Kelly court applied our holdings in 
cases dealing with life-insurance-policy proceeds and justified doing so because 
life insurance policies and individual retirement accounts share a salient feature—
they both “typically include a procedure for designating and changing 
beneficiaries.”  Id.  The court then explained that “[i]t has long been the rule in 
Ohio that those procedures are intended to protect the insurer from duplicate 
liability and the insurer is free to waive them.”  Id., citing Rindlaub v. Traveler’s 
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Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 303, 305, 194 N.E.2d 577 (1963), and Atkinson v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N.E. 748 (1926), paragraph four of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 26} Indeed, “if, in the face of conflicting claims to insurance proceeds, 
the insurer interpleads those proceeds, it has waived any interest in the resolution 
of the claims, including enforcement of the procedure set forth in its policy for 
designating and changing beneficiaries.”  Id., citing Rindlaub and Atkinson.  “In 
such a case, if the insured communicated to the insurer her ‘clearly expressed 
intent’ to change beneficiaries, the proceeds will be paid to the newly designated 
beneficiary rather than the originally designated beneficiary * * *.”  Id., citing 
Rindlaub at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} There was no question that Barbara had telephoned May 
Associates and told a teller to change her beneficiary designation.  “Based on [the 
teller’s] testimony, coupled with the change of beneficiary form completed by the 
teller,” the Ninth District concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact 
whether Barbara had clearly expressed to May Associates her intent to change her 
beneficiary.  Kelly, 2008-Ohio-1507, at ¶ 27.  Accordingly, it affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of Janice.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
The Second District opinion 
{¶ 28} The Second District refused to apply our holdings in the life-
insurance cases to the dispute over John’s IRA proceeds, and it therefore 
concluded that Wells Fargo did not waive its change-of-beneficiary procedures by 
interpleading the disputed funds.  See LeBlanc, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-
5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 23.  In its view, an IRA is fundamentally different from a 
life insurance policy because an IRA is a present asset of the account holder 
during her life but a life insurance policy—in one form—has no value to the 
insured during the insured’s life.  But in so holding, the Second District conceded 
that “there are many and varied financial products that come under the heading of 
January Term, 2012 
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‘life insurance’ * * * some of which have a cash value that the owner of the 
policy can withdraw or borrow against.”  Id. at fn. 5. 
{¶ 29} The appellate court concluded that IRAs are more akin to joint and 
survivorship accounts.  Id.  It reasoned that both are present assets of an account 
holder and both transfer outside of probate upon the death of the account holder.  
Id.  For that reason, the Second District applied our holding in Wright v. Bloom, 
69 Ohio St.3d 596, 635 N.E.2d 31 (1994), which is the leading case law 
applicable to disputes over joint bank accounts. 
{¶ 30} In Wright, we held that in the absence of fraud, duress, undue 
influence, or lack of capacity, the opening of a joint and survivorship account was 
conclusive evidence of an intent to transfer the balance of the account upon the 
death of an account holder.  Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  And 
there is “no need to go beyond the account contract to ascertain the creator’s 
intent.”  Id. at 605.  Instead, the dispositive question is simply whether the 
signature card or account documents specify that the joint account holders have 
survivorship rights.  Id. at 606. 
{¶ 31} In deciding LeBlanc, the Second District conceded that joint and 
survivorship accounts transfer purely by virtue of contract while IRA proceeds 
transfer by virtue of the Uniform Transfer-On-Death Security Registration Act, 
which provides:   
 
“Any transfer-on-death resulting from a registration in beneficiary 
form is effective by reason of the contract regarding the 
registration between the owner of the security and the registering 
entity and by reason of sections 1709.01 to 1709.11 of the Revised 
Code and is not testamentary.” 
 
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LeBlanc, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 16, quoting 
R.C. 1709.09(A).  It therefore justified applying the contracts rule developed in 
the joint-and-survivorship-account cases by emphasizing that the transfer of IRA 
proceeds “derives its effectiveness from the contract.”5  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Second District concluded that Wells Fargo’s requirements for a change of 
beneficiary controlled, and “because John did not comply with them, he did not 
change the beneficiary before his death.”  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 32} The Second District also held, in the alternative, that even if 
insurance law applies and an IRA custodian waives its change-of-beneficiary 
procedures when it interpleads disputed funds, a party claiming that the account 
holder clearly intended to designate him or her as beneficiary is nonetheless 
required to prove that the account holder substantially complied with the 
custodian’s change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover.  Id. at ¶ 25.  The 
appellate court concluded that John’s failure to return the forms naming LeBlanc 
and Welch as beneficiaries was also a failure to substantially comply with the 
policy, even if John had otherwise clearly expressed his intent to change his 
beneficiary.  Id. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 33} The Second District’s holding rejected the substantial-compliance 
test often used in disputes between life insurance companies and claimants.  Id. at 
¶ 25.  See State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am. v. Holmes, 10th Dist. No. 88AP-377, 
1988 WL 92435 (Aug. 30, 1988) (holding that in a dispute between an insurance 
company and a life-insurance claimant, the insured, before his death, substantially 
complied with the insurance company’s procedures  in converting a whole-life 
policy to a universal-life policy, and thus the insurance company was required to 
                                                          
 
5 On that point, the Second District warned: “[I]f a transfer upon death is effective by reason of the 
‘clearly expressed intent’ of the insured, * * * R.C. 1709.09(A) does not save it from being 
included in the estate, subject to the formalities of the statute of wills and subject to the statutory 
benefits and elections that a surviving spouse may choose to receive.”  LeBlanc at ¶ 16.  Our 
decision here makes clear that that result would be improper. 
January Term, 2012 
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pay the insured’s beneficiary and not the insurance company’s beneficiary under 
the temporary insurance agreement); see also Benton v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 
110 Ohio App. 151, 159 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist.1959) (holding that in a dispute 
between an insurance company and a life-insurance claimant, the insurance 
company was required to pay the party whom the account holder clearly intended 
to designate as his beneficiary because the insured had substantially complied 
with the insurance company’s change-of-beneficiary procedures). 
{¶ 34} The Second District also claimed that its holding was not 
inconsistent with our decision in Rindlaub, because “substantial compliance with 
the rules for a change of beneficiary was a part of the Rindlaub result.”6  LeBlanc, 
196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 26.  We do not agree 
with either assertion. 
{¶ 35} In Rindlaub, Bruce Rindlaub purchased two life insurance policies 
from the Travelers Insurance Company.  Rindlaub, 175 Ohio St. at 304-305, 194 
N.E.2d 577.  Travelers’ procedures provided that a change of beneficiary had to 
be made in writing and had to be approved in writing by Travelers. 
{¶ 36} Initially, Bruce designated his wife, Alice Rindlaub, as his primary 
beneficiary and his daughter, Cornelia, as the contingent beneficiary.  Thereafter, 
Bruce and Alice divorced and Bruce sent Travelers a witnessed statement “clearly 
indicating his intention to cancel all previous designations of beneficiaries,” to 
name Margaret Walker as the new primary beneficiary, and to rename Cornelia as 
the contingent beneficiary.  Id. at 306. 
{¶ 37} Travelers responded by letter inquiring as to the relationship 
between Bruce and his newly designated primary beneficiary.  The letter stated 
that the contracts had been issued in a community-property state and therefore 
                                                          
 
6 The Second District also relied on Magruder v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 507 
(6th Cir.1975), a federal court of appeals’ decision applying Tennessee law.  In Magruder, the 
insured completed a change-of-beneficiary form but did not mail it to the insurer before his death.  
We find its reliance on Magruder unpersuasive. 
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Alice had certain rights under the policies unless she had waived those rights or a 
court action had disposed of them.  
{¶ 38} There was no proof that Bruce ever received the letter.  Nothing 
further was done, either by Bruce or by Travelers.  Six months later, Bruce and 
Margaret married.  Thirteen years later, Bruce died.  At the time of Bruce’s death, 
the life insurance policies listing Alice as the primary beneficiary were in his 
possession.  Alice and Margaret made conflicting demands of Travelers for the 
IRA proceeds.  No money was paid out. 
{¶ 39} Margaret sued Travelers for the proceeds, and Travelers responded 
by filing an interpleader action against Margaret and Alice.  We rejected Alice’s 
claim to the proceeds, which was based on the fact that she was the beneficiary 
named on the policies.  In describing the strength of Margaret’s claim that she 
was the clearly intended beneficiary, we noted that absent evidence that Bruce 
had received the insurer’s letter, it was “entirely reasonable to infer that [Bruce] 
believed he had done all that was necessary to effectuate a change of beneficiary.”  
Id. at 306.  We explained, therefore, that there was “no basis for inferring that 
[Bruce] abandoned his purpose * * * to change the beneficiary,” as Alice had 
contended.  Id. 
{¶ 40} But we made clear that change-of-beneficiary procedures are for 
the benefit of the insurance company only.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Indeed, they are “a means of establishing the fact that the insurer has received 
notice of the change of beneficiary.”  Id. at 305. 
{¶ 41} We explained that such procedures may be determinative in 
litigation between an insurance company and the insured or a single beneficiary, 
but when “the insurer ‘washes its hands’ by interpleader,” the controversy is 
between the parties who claim to be the rightful beneficiary.  Id.  “In such case the 
relative rights of the litigants should depend upon the expressed intention of the 
January Term, 2012 
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insured.  If he has clearly indicated to the insurer his intention to change 
beneficiaries, his intention must be given effect.”  Id.   
We adopt the Ninth District’s view 
{¶ 42} The Ninth District’s rationale and holdings represent the better-
reasoned view. 
{¶ 43} We agree that it is material that life insurance policies and IRAs 
both typically have a procedure for designating and changing beneficiaries.  We 
recognize that the Uniform Transfer-On-Death Security Registration Act, which 
the parties agree governs distribution of IRA proceeds, establishes that a security 
may be registered in beneficiary form.  R.C. 1709.03; see R.C. 1709.01(A) 
(defining “beneficiary form” as “a registration of a security that indicates the 
present owner of the security and the intention of the present owner regarding the 
person who will become the owner of the security upon the death of the present 
owner”).  And we recognize that the Act establishes how a security registered in 
beneficiary form is transferred upon the death of the account holder.  R.C. 
1709.07 (upon the death of the account holder, ownership of a security registered 
in beneficiary form “shall pass to the beneficiary”). 
{¶ 44} But the transfer of IRA proceeds derives its effectiveness from the 
contract, as the Second District emphasized, and “from R.C. 1709.01 to 1709.11.”  
R.C. 1709.09(A).  And R.C. 1709.01 through 1709.11 provide protections to the 
custodian.  R.C. 1709.08(A) (“If a registration in beneficiary form is offered by a 
registering entity, the owner requesting registration in beneficiary form assents to 
the protections given to the registering entity by sections 1709.01 to 1709.11 of 
the Revised Code”). 
{¶ 45} For all these reasons, we conclude that IRA change-of-beneficiary 
procedures are intended to protect the IRA custodian, and the custodian alone.  
Id.; see also Rindlaub, 175 Ohio St. at 305, 194 N.E.2d 577 (change-of-
beneficiary procedures are “a means of establishing the fact that the insurer has 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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received notice of the change of beneficiary,” thereby avoiding duplicate liability 
for the insurer).  Therefore, a custodian is free to waive the procedures by filing 
an action in interpleader against the claimants. 
{¶ 46} We also adopt the “clearly expressed intent” test from our 
insurance cases.  See Rindlaub at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Therefore, if an 
IRA custodian files an interpleader action, and the account owner’s intent to 
change beneficiaries was clearly communicated to the custodian, the proceeds 
will be paid to the newly designated beneficiary rather than to the original 
beneficiary.  Id.  In such a case, proof of substantial compliance with the 
custodian’s procedures for changing the beneficiary is not required. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 47} We answer the certified question in the negative and, therefore, 
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.  Because there is a genuine issue of fact as 
to the clearly expressed intent of the account owner, this case is remanded to the 
trial court for trial. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Brannon & Associates and David D. Brannon, for appellants. 
 
Dungan & LeFevre Co., L.P.A., and James D. Brookshire, for appellee. 
______________________