Title: State v. Haines

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393, 2006-Ohio-6711.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HAINES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d 393, 2006-Ohio-6711.] 
Criminal law — Battered woman syndrome — Admissibility during state’s case-
in-chief — Evidence of battered woman syndrome admissible to 
demonstrate the victim’s state of mind when the victim’s credibility has 
been challenged upon cross-examination. 
(Nos. 2005-0853 and 2005-0959 – Submitted February 22, 2006 – Decided 
December 28, 2006.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lake County,  
No. 2003-L-035, 2005-Ohio-1692. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} On January 24, 2003, a jury in the Lake County Court of Common 
Pleas found appellant Bryan Haines guilty of multiple counts of kidnapping, 
abduction, and domestic violence.  All of the counts related to the same victim, 
Haines’s live-in girlfriend, Jacqueline Bohley, and arose from incidents that 
occurred in March and April 2002.  This case concerns whether the trial court 
properly admitted expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome as part of 
the state’s case-in-chief. 
{¶ 2} Haines and Bohley met on December 26, 1997.  By July 1998, 
they had begun living together in the home of Haines’s brother, Ryan, and in 
January 2000, they moved into a condominium that Bohley had purchased.  
Bohley described the relationship as rocky and testified that Haines did not allow 
her to have friends or much freedom.  She had to wear a pager so that he could 
always reach her.  Haines timed how long Bohley’s trip between home and work 
should take and required her to phone him upon leaving for work and arriving at 
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work.  If she was late, he would get very angry, and a fight would ensue. Bohley 
was called into her boss’s office at least three times because her telephone 
arguments with Haines disrupted her work.  Haines also demanded constant 
contact regarding Bohley’s whereabouts outside of work.  Bohley said that she 
complied in order to avoid arguments. 
{¶ 3} On May 6, 2001, Bohley and Haines became engaged.  On October 
8, 2001, Bohley went to police to report an incident of domestic violence that had 
occurred on October 4, 2001.  Haines was convicted of a domestic violence 
charge and served 18 days in jail.  Bohley ended their engagement and got a 
temporary protection order against Haines. 
{¶ 4} On cross-examination, Bohley testified that she was soon seeing 
Haines again.  His 18-day jail term was work-release (Haines spent only evenings 
in jail), and Bohley would visit him during the day.  Later, Haines served a period 
of house arrest at his brother’s home, and Bohley visited him there, too, 
occasionally spending the night and engaging in sexual relations.  Bohley never 
removed all of Haines’s possessions from her home, and by late January 2002, 
they were again living together in Bohley’s condominium. 
{¶ 5} The first event leading to the charges in this case occurred on 
Easter Sunday, March 31, 2002.  Bohley found a card to Haines from another 
woman when she was putting away some of his belongings; she went outside to 
confront him about it.  Haines suggested that they go inside the house to discuss 
the matter, and Bohley complied.  When then were both inside, Haines locked the 
door and the deadbolt.  Haines told Bohley that he would be moving out, but only 
when he wanted to, and that it could take a year for him to do so.  Bohley said that 
she would no longer be sleeping with him in the same bed, which infuriated 
Haines.  Haines picked up a piece of baseboard left from a remodeling project and 
struck Bohley on the arms and legs.  He then began breaking objects in the house.  
Bohley tried to escape by running through a sliding glass door, but she was unable 
January Term, 2006 
3 
to break the glass.  In an effort to divert Haines’s attention, Bohley slit her wrist 
with a piece of broken glass.  She drew blood, and Haines did show some concern 
and helped her wrap the wrist. 
{¶ 6} After helping Bohley with her wrist, Haines told her that he was 
going to show her what it was like to be in jail and ordered her into her 
condominium’s crawlspace.  His jail sentence had become a consistent theme in 
their relationship, and he said that he would make her stay in the crawlspace for 
18 days.  Bohley entered the crawlspace, which was about three feet high and had 
a lid, feeling like she had no other choice.  The lid had a hole in it, and Haines 
ordered Bohley to keep her finger through the hole at all times so that he could be 
sure she was not trying to escape.  Haines screwed eight screws into the lid once 
she was inside.  Periodically, he checked to see if her finger was still in the hole, 
and then released her after 30 to 45 minutes.  Haines was upset and crying when 
he released Bohley and asked her to pray with him.  She prayed with him and told 
him she forgave him in order to appease him. 
{¶ 7} After the prayer, Haines told Bohley that they were going to take 
an Easter gift to his daughter.  While driving home from making that delivery, 
Haines became agitated again, and when they arrived back home, Bohley refused 
to leave the vehicle.  Haines told her that she could trust him and that he would 
not hurt her if she went inside the house, so Bohley reluctantly accompanied him 
inside.  Once inside, he locked the doors and told her that she was going to die 
that night.  Bohley screamed, and Haines covered her mouth and nose.  He 
punched and then kicked Bohley in the ribs and stepped on her ankle.  After that, 
they went to bed. 
{¶ 8} The next day, Bohley told Haines’s family members what had 
happened the night before.  That evening, Haines and Bohley met with his father 
to discuss the situation.  They all agreed that Haines should move out of Bohley’s 
condominium. 
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{¶ 9} Upon cross-examination regarding the March 31 incident, Bohley 
testified that she and Haines had engaged in sexual relations that evening.  She 
also testified that she had gone to the emergency room on April 5 to have her 
painful ribs checked, but that she had lied to the people caring for her about the 
cause of her injury, claiming that she had fallen over a fence while rollerblading.  
Haines’s counsel also elicited testimony from Bohley on cross-examination that 
she did not tell any of her co-workers or any doctors what had happened on 
March 31, 2002, and that she did not report that incident to police until after the 
April 18 incident. 
{¶ 10} Despite the earlier agreement that Haines would move out, he did 
not, and the situation deteriorated.  In the early evening of April 17, 2002, Haines 
and Bohley engaged in what she called “abnormal” sexual relations involving the 
Internet, which Bohley said Haines knew disgusted her.  Haines immediately left 
the house for a couple of hours.  When he returned at about 10:30, he was upset.  
He blamed Bohley for his jail term and wanted her to apologize.  For self-
preservation, she told him what he wanted to hear.  Haines twisted her wrist and 
stuck his fingers in her eyes.  He ripped her nightgown and got a belt from the 
closet, commenting that he was going to hit her like a child with the belt because 
that was the only way she would understand that what she had done was wrong.  
He told he to lie on her stomach, and he hit her five times on the buttocks with the 
belt. 
{¶ 11} Haines became concerned that Bohley might tell someone what 
had happened and began swinging the belt again with more force.  He hit her 
multiple times in the shoulder and arm.  He then cried out that Bohley had ruined 
his life, and she comforted him in an effort to diffuse the situation.  He took some 
sleeping pills, but before he fell asleep, he told her to keep her hand on him at all 
times so that he would know whether she was trying to get away.  He allowed her 
to go to the bathroom, but warned her to not try to go downstairs. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 12} The next morning, Haines refused to allow Bohley to go to work.  
Fearing that her work colleagues would be concerned by her absence, Haines 
directed Bohley to phone the office and leave a message.  As she made the call, 
Haines held his fist against her face.  Soon after, Haines ordered Bohley to place 
another call to work, begging to not be fired.  Haines held a knife to her throat as 
she made that call. 
{¶ 13} During her initial call to work, Bohley left a message using a pre-
arranged code-phrase, “Red Eye Printing,” to indicate to her co-workers that she 
was in trouble.  On her message, she asked her co-workers to check the “Red Eye 
Printing” envelope on her desk.  The co-workers opened the envelope, which 
contained a document that gave instructions to call the police.  Bohley’s co-
workers called police, and officers arrested Haines at the condominium. 
{¶ 14} The state called as its last witness in its case-in-chief Dr. James 
Eisenberg, a board-certified forensic psychologist.  His testimony is at the crux of 
this case.  Dr. Eisenberg testified about battered woman syndrome, stating that “it 
refers to a woman * * * that is the subject of repeated psychological, physical, or 
sexual abuse by one’s partner.  The syndrome itself speaks to the individuals who 
remain in relationships in spite of those beatings.”  He explained the syndrome’s 
three-part process – the tension stage, the acute battering stage, and the stage of 
contrition.  He stated that the batterer exerts extreme control over the woman’s 
entire life, leading to her isolation.  He explained that a woman in a relationship 
with a batterer sees the world “through a very small opening and all that she sees 
is this guy. * * * The threat is always there, whether you leave or whether you 
stay. * * * So the threat is always there, it doesn’t matter if they go anywhere.  
[She thinks], If I leave he’s gonna beat me. If I stay he’s gonna beat me.  Let me 
just – let’s just get it out.” 
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{¶ 15} Eisenberg spoke mostly in generalities about battered woman 
syndrome and its symptoms.  Toward the end of his direct examination, however, 
the following exchange occurred: 
{¶ 16} “Q. Now, Doctor, in this particular case, are you familiar with 
some of the facts and circumstances surrounding the criminal charges in this case? 
{¶ 17} “A. Yes. 
{¶ 18} “Q. All right. And as a result of that, do you have an opinion, 
within a reasonable degree of forensic certainty, as to whether or not you see any 
features of the investigation of this case that would parallel a Battered Woman's 
Syndrome? 
{¶ 19} “Mr. M. DiCello: Objection. 
{¶ 20} “Judge Lucci: Overruled. 
{¶ 21} “A. Yes. 
{¶ 22} “Q. Okay. And what is - is that opinion within a reasonable degree 
of forensic certainty? 
{¶ 23} “A. Yes. 
{¶ 24} “Q. And what is that opinion? 
{¶ 25} “A. My opinion is that, as I understand the facts of the case, and 
again I'm not a fact finder, but as I understand the facts of the case in front of us, 
and from my review of the records, it's very consistent with what we see in a 
Battered Woman's Syndrome scenario.” 
{¶ 26} The jury returned a verdict convicting Haines of all seven counts 
with which he was charged – kidnapping, abduction, and domestic violence 
relating to the March 31, 2002 incident; kidnapping, abduction, and domestic 
violence relating to the incident of April 17, 2002; and one count of kidnapping 
relating to the events of the morning of April 18, 2002. 
{¶ 27} Haines appealed.  The Lake County Court of Appeals reversed one 
of the kidnapping convictions relating to the April 17-18 incident, holding that the 
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7 
two counts resulted from an act that constituted a single course of conduct.  
Haines sought reversal on all counts due to the trial court’s admission of 
Eisenberg’s testimony regarding battered woman syndrome, arguing that such 
evidence was “irrelevant, prejudicial, inflammatory, and prohibited by the Ohio 
Legislature, the Supreme Court of Ohio and this honorable appeals court.”  The 
court affirmed the trial court’s admission of the testimony, stating that “[t]his 
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome was properly admitted to explain 
the victim’s state of mind, i.e., why she continued to return to appellant.  This was 
quite relevant, as it went to her credibility, which had been challenged.”  The 
court further held that the testimony complied with Evid.R. 403(A) because its 
probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that it 
did not constitute “other acts” evidence prohibited by Evid.R. 404(B). 
{¶ 28} The appellate court certified that its decision conflicted with the 
decision of the Fifth Appellate District in State v. Pargeon (1991), 64 Ohio 
App.3d 679, 582 N.E.2d 665.  This court granted jurisdiction by accepting a 
discretionary appeal and determining that a conflict as to the following question 
existed: “When the victim's credibility is challenged upon cross-examination 
during the state's case-in-chief, may the state introduce evidence of battered 
woman syndrome to demonstrate the victim’s state of mind, i.e., to explain why 
she returned to the defendant despite his aggressions toward her?” 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 29} In State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970, this 
court first recognized the admissibility of expert testimony regarding battered 
woman syndrome.  In that case, the defendant had killed her husband, and the 
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome was offered by the defendant in 
support of her affirmative defense of self-defense.  Today’s certified question asks 
whether that holding should be extended to allow expert testimony concerning 
battered woman syndrome in the state’s case-in-chief to help a jury understand a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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victim’s reaction to abuse in relation to her credibility.  We hold that such 
testimony is admissible. 
{¶ 30} In allowing the admission of expert testimony regarding the 
battered woman syndrome in Koss, this court “[did] not establish a new defense or 
justification.” Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 217, 551 N.E.2d 970.  Rather, such 
testimony was allowed as evidence to prove one element of self-defense.  “In 
Ohio, to prove self-defense it must be established that the person asserting this 
defense had ‘ * * * a bona fide belief that he [she] was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm and that his [her] only means of escape from such 
danger was in the use of such force.’ (Emphasis added.) ” (Bracketed material 
sic.)  Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215, 551 N.E.2d 970, quoting State v. Robbins 
(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Koss recognized that since Ohio has a subjective test to determine 
whether a defendant properly acted in self-defense, the defendant’s state of mind 
is a crucial issue. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215, 551 N.E.2d 970. 
{¶ 31} In Koss, this court considered whether testimony on battered 
woman syndrome would assist the trier of fact in finding the truth and whether, 
pursuant to Evid.R. 702, such testimony provided “specialized knowledge” that 
would “assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue,” particularly, the defendant’s state of mind.  The court concluded: 
{¶ 32} “Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be 
admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman syndrome but 
also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest 
belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the issue of self-defense. 
‘Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the 
ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to 
leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any “common sense” 
conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would 
January Term, 2006 
9 
have left her husband much earlier.  Popular misconceptions about battered 
women would be put to rest, including the beliefs that the women are masochistic 
and enjoy the beatings and that they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits 
of rage. See Walker, The Battered Woman, 19-31 (1979).’ State v. Hodges 
(1986), 239 Kan. 63, 68-69, 716 P.2d 563, 567. See, also, Smith v. State [1981], 
247 Ga. [612,] 618-619, 277 S.E.2d [678]; Hawthorne [v. State (Fla.App.1982), 
408 So.2d 801]; [People v.] Torres [1985], 128 Misc.2d [129,] 133-134, 488 
N.Y.S.2d [358].” Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 216, 551 N.E.2d 970. 
{¶ 33} Koss overruled State v. Thomas (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 521, 20 
O.O.3d 424, 423 N.E.2d 137, in which this court had held that expert testimony 
relating to battered woman syndrome “is inadmissible because it is not distinctly 
related to some science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken of 
the average lay person.”  In Koss, this court noted that the development of the 
scholarship on battered woman syndrome had increased since Thomas and that 
other courts had begun to allow testimony on the syndrome. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 
at 215, 551 N.E.2d 970.  The court wrote, “We believe that the battered woman 
syndrome has gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility.” 
Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 217, 551 N.E.2d 970.  The court also revisited its holding 
from Thomas that battered-woman-syndrome testimony was not so distinctly 
related to science that it is beyond the ken of the jury: 
{¶ 34} “ ‘The difficulty with the expert's testimony is that it sounds as if 
an expert is giving knowledge to a jury about something the jury knows as well as 
anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of imminent serious 
danger. That is not at all, however, what this testimony is directly aimed at. It is 
aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very 
much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experience, 
may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would 
enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths 
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rather than common knowledge.’ (Emphasis sic). ” Id., citing State v. Kelly 
(1984), 97 N.J. 178, 206, 478 A.2d 364. 
{¶ 35} Thus, this court in Koss concluded that expert testimony on 
battered woman syndrome is admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 702: “Where the 
evidence establishes that the woman is a battered woman, and when an expert is 
qualified to testify about the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony 
concerning the syndrome may be admitted to assist the trier of fact in determining 
whether the defendant acted in self-defense.”  Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 218, 551 
N.E.2d 970. 
{¶ 36} The same year of this court’s decision in Koss, the General 
Assembly enacted R.C. 2901.06, which recognizes the value of battered-woman-
syndrome testimony and sets forth that it may be employed in self-defense cases: 
{¶ 37} “(A) The general assembly hereby declares that it recognizes both 
of the following, in relation to the ‘battered woman syndrome:’ 
{¶ 38} “(1) That the syndrome currently is a matter of commonly accepted 
scientific knowledge;  
{¶ 39} “(2) That the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not 
within the general understanding or experience of a person who is a member of 
the general populace and are not within the field of common knowledge. 
{¶ 40} “(B) If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of 
force against another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises 
the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony 
of the ‘battered woman syndrome’ and expert testimony that the person suffered 
from that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of the 
affirmative defense, to justify the person's use of the force in question.  The 
introduction of any expert testimony under this division shall be in accordance 
with the Ohio Rules of Evidence.” 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 41} The General Assembly also enacted R.C. 2945.392, which allows 
battered-woman-syndrome testimony to be admitted by a defendant that pleads 
not guilty by reason of insanity. 
{¶ 42} Koss and R.C. 2901.06(A) establish that battered-woman-
syndrome testimony meets the requirements of Evid.R. 702 in regard to scientific 
validity and the requirement of specialized knowledge.  Neither Koss nor R.C. 
2901.06 nor R.C. 2945.392 limits the use of such testimony to self-defense or 
insanity cases.  Koss and the statutes do recognize that testimony on the syndrome 
is properly admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 702 as expert testimony that can assist 
the trier of fact in search of the truth.  Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 216, 551 N.E.2d 
970.  But admissibility under Evid.R. 702 is only part of the picture — as R.C. 
2901.05 and 2945.392 both require, any battered-woman-syndrome testimony 
must be admitted in conformance with the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  Thus, our 
consideration of admissibility does not end with Evid.R. 702. 
{¶ 43} Further consideration is especially needed when the testimony is 
not offered by a defendant, but by the state against a defendant.  Prior to 1990, 
“appellate courts in only a handful of jurisdictions had considered whether 
prosecutors may use expert testimony on battering and its effects in a domestic 
violence prosecution,” but since that time, the courts in an overwhelming majority 
of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that such evidence is 
admissible under the proper circumstances. Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert 
Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: from Recantation to Refusal to Testify 
(1998), 8 Colum.J.Gender & L. 67, 68.  See, also, Barnes, Annotation, 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Domestic-Violence Syndromes to 
Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim’s Testimony or Behavior (2006), 57 A.L.R.5th 
315, Section 2(a).  The courts that have held admissible expert testimony 
regarding battered woman syndrome have so held “while operating under rules of 
evidence that mirror Ohio’s.” Hawes, Removing the Roadblocks to Successful 
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Domestic Violence Prosecutions: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on the 
Battered Woman Syndrome in Ohio (2005), 53 Clev.St.L.Rev. 133, 144.  We find 
the holdings of those other courts instructive. 
{¶ 44} Relevance under Evid.R. 401 is the first hurdle to clear.  
“Generally, battered woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when 
needed to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of 
physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing the abuse, 
delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting allegations of abuse.” People v. 
Christel (1995), 449 Mich. 578, 580, 537 N.W.2d 194.  Such seemingly 
inconsistent actions are relevant to a witness’s credibility.  “Because the victim’s 
credibility can be attacked during cross-examination of the victim or even during 
opening statements, the prosecution need not wait until rebuttal to present expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome.  Rather, such testimony may be 
presented as rehabilitative evidence during the state’s case-in-chief.” State v. 
Grecinger (Minn.1997), 569 N.W.2d 189, 193. 
{¶ 45} In this case, Bohley’s behavior after incidents of alleged abuse was 
a focus of Haines’s cross-examination.  During cross-examination of Bohley, 
Haines attempted to demonstrate that Bohley would become intimate with Haines 
after he allegedly abused her, that she broke off their relationship only 
temporarily, that she did not report the abuse, and that she gave differing 
explanations regarding some of her injuries.  In short, the testimony tended to 
show that Bohley not only never reported the abuse but that she remained in the 
relationship. 
{¶ 46} For the reasons stated in Koss, expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome could address those supposed anomalies.  But, while such 
testimony can be relevant for explaining a victim’s behavior, it cannot be 
considered relevant if there is no evidence that the victim suffers from battered 
woman syndrome.  “Expert testimony on the subject of battered woman’s 
January Term, 2006 
13 
syndrome is not relevant unless there is some evidentiary foundation that a party 
or witness to the case is a battered woman, and that party or witness has behaved 
in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert testimony providing an 
explanation for the behavior.” State v. Borrelli (1993), 227 Conn. 153, 172, 629 
A.2d 1105, fn. 15, citing Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 218, 551 N.E.2d 970. 
{¶ 47} Like the court in State v. Stringer (1995), 271 Mont. 367, 378, 897 
P.2d 1063, we hold that a set of rigid foundational requirements is unnecessary 
but that “the party seeking to introduce battered woman syndrome evidence must 
lay an appropriate foundation substantiating that the conduct and behavior of the 
witness is consistent with the generally recognized symptoms of the battered 
woman syndrome, and that the witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury 
would be aided by expert testimony which provides a possible explanation for the 
behavior.” 
{¶ 48} Evidence generally establishing the cycles of a battering 
relationship is an appropriate foundation for battered-woman-syndrome expert 
testimony.  “The battering relationship itself is often described as cyclical in 
nature, with three distinct phases: tension building, confrontation, and contrition. 
During the ‘tension building’ phase, the woman is generally compliant, often 
feeling as though she deserves the abuse. Once the tension reaches a boiling point, 
the batterer will erupt uncontrollably, committing a violent act.  Next, in an abrupt 
about-face, the abuser will exhibit seemingly intense love and affection towards 
his victim.  The victimized women are then led to believe that the violence was an 
isolated incident and that it will not continue.  This cycle of violence may leave 
the victim with feelings of learned helplessness, low self-esteem, depression, 
minimization techniques, self-isolation, and passivity.” (Footnotes omitted.) 
Hawes, 53 Clev.St.L.Rev. at 137. 
{¶ 49} Further, as this court held in Koss, “ ‘in order to be classified as a 
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.  
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Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once.  If it 
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered 
woman.’ ” Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 216, 551 N.E.2d 970, quoting Walker, The 
Battered Woman (1979) xv. 
{¶ 50} The evidence against Haines generally established the cycles of a 
battering relationship.  The prosecution established through testimony about the 
October 2001 incident and the March 2002 incident that Haines’s psychological 
abuse and controlling behavior were followed first by an outburst of violence and 
then by Haines’s supposed regret and a reconciliation.  The admission or 
exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 68, 723 N.E.2d 1019, and the trial court 
did not abuse that discretion in finding that expert testimony on battered woman 
syndrome was relevant in this case. 
{¶ 51} Haines argues that, even if relevant, the battered-woman-syndrome 
testimony violated Evid.R. 404(B), which states: 
{¶ 52} “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.” 
{¶ 53} First, testimony on battered woman syndrome is not offered to 
prove anything about the defendant, but is instead offered as background for 
understanding the victim’s behavior.  Second, the foundation testimony employed 
in this case did not constitute “other acts” evidence.  All three incidents 
comprising the bulk of the state’s foundation evidence — the October 2001 
incident, the March 31, 2002 incident, and the April 17-18 incident — were 
central to the charges against Haines.  The domestic violence counts against 
Haines required a prior conviction in order to be charged as felonies, and the 
January Term, 2006 
15 
parties had stipulated that Haines had been convicted of domestic violence for the 
October 2001 incident.  That conviction was made known to the jury from the 
outset, during the trial judge’s pretrial instructions.  The other two incidents were 
the focus of the trial. 
{¶ 54} Haines argues that even the term “battered woman syndrome” 
suggests that the accused committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  We believe 
that this issue is more properly addressed by considering the possible prejudicial 
nature of the testimony.  Even when its relevance is shown through a proper 
foundation, a court must carefully weigh whether the expert testimony violates 
Evid.R. 403(A), which states, “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of 
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” 
{¶ 55} An expert witness who diagnoses a victim as a battered woman 
essentially concludes that the defendant is a batterer.  In a case where the 
underlying charges involve domestic violence, such a conclusion by an expert 
witness is prejudicial to the defendant and usurps the jury’s role as finder-of-fact.  
A diagnosis can prejudice a defendant further because the expert is presenting a 
conclusion regarding the victim’s credibility, which again is a conclusion to be 
made by the jury.  In cases where domestic violence is not the underlying charge, 
but battered-woman-syndrome testimony is offered to explain the conflicting 
statements or activities of a witness, a defendant can again be prejudiced by being 
labeled as a batterer.  Thus, courts must carefully balance the admission of expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome under Evid.R. 403. 
{¶ 56} An acceptable balance is best achieved through a tailoring of the 
expert’s testimony.  Limitations placed upon the expert’s testimony – “the expert 
cannot opine that complainant was a battered woman, may not testify that 
defendant was a batterer or that he is guilty of the crime, and cannot comment on 
whether complainant was being truthful”— dispel concerns about unfair 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prejudice. Christel, 449 Mich. at 591, 537 N.W.2d 194.  The rule in most 
jurisdictions is that general testimony regarding battered woman syndrome may 
aid a jury in evaluating evidence and that if the expert expresses no opinion as to 
whether the victim suffers from battered woman syndrome or does not opine on 
which of her conflicting statements is more credible, such testimony does not 
interfere with or impinge upon the jury's role in determining the credibility of 
witnesses. State v. Townsend (2006), 186 N.J. 473, 496-498, 897 A.2d 316.  
“[T]he prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the battered woman syndrome 
must be in accordance with the applicable Ohio Rules of Evidence.  The best way 
to approach this is by utilizing the limited format advocated by the courts in [State 
v. Ciskie (1988), 110 Wash.2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165] and [Arcoren v. United States 
(C.A.8, 1991), 929 F.2d 1235].  Under this approach, experts who are called to 
testify in domestic violence prosecutions must limit their testimony to the general 
characteristics of a victim suffering from the battered woman syndrome. The 
expert may also answer hypothetical questions regarding specific abnormal 
behaviors exhibited by women suffering from the syndrome, but should never 
offer an opinion relative to the alleged victim in the case.” Hawes, Clev.St.L.Rev. 
at 158. 
{¶ 57} Trial courts should tailor the scope of the state’s questioning and 
should also ensure that jurors are instructed as to the limits of the expert’s 
testimony.  The trial court failed to do so in this case, and the direct examination 
of the battered-woman-syndrome expert crossed the line.  The prosecutor asked 
Dr. Eisenberg, “[D]o you have an opinion, within a reasonable degree of forensic 
certainty, as to whether or not you see any features of the investigation of this 
case that would parallel a Battered Woman's Syndrome?”  Haines’s counsel 
objected to the question; the trial court overruled the objection.  Eisenberg 
responded, “My opinion is that, as I understand the facts of the case, and again 
I'm not a fact finder, but as I understand the facts of the case in front of us, and 
January Term, 2006 
17 
from my review of the records, it's very consistent with what we see in a Battered 
Woman's Syndrome scenario.” 
{¶ 58} The prosecutor’s question essentially solicited a diagnosis, and the 
doctor’s response provided one.  A reasonable juror would conclude that 
Eisenberg believed that Bohley suffered from battered woman syndrome.  Such 
testimony went beyond the providing of a context for a witness’s testimony into 
the area of determining credibility.  The testimony also went to the very 
conclusion that the jury was asked make – whether Haines committed domestic 
violence against Bohley – and answered it. 
{¶ 59} Defendant’s counsel then elicited more testimony from Eisenberg 
that called for a specific diagnosis of Bohley as well as a discussion of further 
facts about her.  Eisenberg testified on cross-examination that he had diagnosed 
Bohley with “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder secondary to the Battered Woman’s 
Syndrome.”  He testified that he was familiar with the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the criminal charges in this case, and he testified that he had 
reviewed the prior treatment records from Ms. Bohley's therapist, documents left 
at her place of employment, the police reports, letters from Mr. Haines to Ms. 
Bohley, the psychological testing that had been done on Ms. Bohley, and a 
document called “Recorded Acts,” described by Eisenberg as “a stack of dates in 
which Ms. Bohley had listed incidents of violence in the last three or four years in 
the relationship.” 
{¶ 60} Defense counsel also asked whether, in considering Bohley’s 
history, Eisenberg concluded that the abuse had occurred.  After answering, “Yes, 
I did,” Eisenberg later added, “I’m assuming that it occurred.  I’m not the fact 
finder.  My assumption is that it occurred based on the history, the evaluation of 
Ms. Bohley, her credibility in taking the psychological testing.  So all those things 
led to my assumption that they did occur.  I don’t know if they actually did.” 
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{¶ 61} The state argues that the bulk of the battered-woman-syndrome 
testimony that addresses Bohley’s specific case was brought to light by Haines.  
However, the key testimony solicited by the state thrust Haines into the situation 
where he had to defend himself against a diagnosis.  The evidence admitted in 
cross-examination did not change the fact that Eisenberg’s testimony on direct 
examination was prejudicial. 
{¶ 62} The state argues that admission of the testimony from Eisenberg 
specifically tying Bohley to battered woman syndrome constituted harmless error.  
Haines’s counsel did object to Eisenberg’s diagnostic testimony on direct 
examination, and thus a harmless-error analysis, rather than a plain-error analysis, 
is appropriate.  “Whether [the] error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is 
not simply an inquiry into the sufficiency of the remaining evidence. Instead, the 
question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained 
of might have contributed to the conviction.” State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 
214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 78. 
{¶ 63} Haines was charged with multiple counts based upon the events of 
March 31, 2002 and April 17-18, 2002.  Counts One through Three relate to the 
incident on March 31, 2002.  The evidence regarding that incident is almost 
entirely based upon Bohley’s testimony and therefore relies on her credibility.  
Bohley did not report that incident to the police for weeks.  She continued to 
reside with Haines after it occurred.  There is a reasonable probability that 
evidence concerning her credibility might have contributed to the jury’s verdict 
on those counts — a juror might question Bohley’s response to the abuse and then 
find a consistent explanation for it in Eisenberg’s testimony.  We thus find that 
the trial court’s error in admitting Eisenberg’s testimony attributing battered 
woman syndrome to Bohley was not harmless as to Counts One through Three. 
{¶ 64} The evidence concerning the counts relating to the incident of 
April 17-18 was more varied.  The jury saw photographs of Bohley’s injuries, 
January Term, 2006 
19 
heard testimony from her co-workers regarding her telephone calls to her office 
on the morning of April 18, and heard testimony from the police officers 
responding to the scene.  Jurors were not confronted with questions about why 
Bohley had not reported the incident, as they were with the March 31, 2002 
incident.  Thus, we find Eisenberg’s testimony harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt on Counts Four through Six; there is not a reasonable possibility that his 
testimony contributed to those convictions. 
{¶ 65} Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the holding of the 
appellate court.  In regard to the certified question, we respond in the affirmative 
and hold that when a victim’s credibility is challenged upon cross-examination 
during the state's case-in-chief, the state may introduce expert testimony regarding 
battered woman syndrome to aid the trier-of-fact in determining the victim's state 
of mind, e.g., to explain why she returned to the defendant despite his aggressions 
toward her. 
Judgment affirmed in part  
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 66} I dissent from the majority’s holding allowing the state’s use of 
battered woman syndrome in its case-in-chief as an unwarranted extension of 
State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970.  In Koss, which 
authorized the presentation of the battered woman’s syndrome by a defendant to 
establish self-defense, this court noted: “A defendant attempting to admit expert 
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome must offer evidence which 
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establishes herself as a ‘battered woman.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id., paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  Furthermore, “[a]dmission of expert testimony regarding the 
battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or justification. It is 
to assist the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant acted out of an honest 
belief that she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the 
use of such force was her only means of escape.” (Emphasis added.)  Id., 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 67} The General Assembly codified similar limitations on the 
admission of the battered woman syndrome when it enacted R.C. 2901.06(B), 
which states:  "If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force 
against another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises the 
affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony of 
the ‘battered woman syndrome’ and expert testimony that the person suffered 
from that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of the 
affirmative defense, to justify the person's use of the force in question. The 
introduction of any expert testimony under this division shall be in accordance 
with the Ohio Rules of Evidence." (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 68} It is mystifying that the majority cannot see the limiting language 
within Koss and the statute.  Other appellate courts have held that expert 
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted by a 
defendant only when the affirmative defense of self-defense has been raised.  See 
State v. Pargeon (1991), 64 Ohio App.3d 679, 582 N.E.2d 665; State v. Sonko 
(May 22, 1996), 9th Dist. No. 95CA006181; State v. Dowd (Jan. 19, 1994), 9th 
Dist. No. 93CA005638; State v. Lundgren (Apr. 22, 1994), 11th Dist. No. 90-L-
15-125. 
{¶ 69} This is not a situation of admitting rebuttal evidence under Evid.R. 
404(A)(2).  In the hands of the state during its case-in-chief, an expert witness 
January Term, 2006 
21 
who presents the battered woman syndrome as evidence does more than bolster 
the credibility of the victim.  The witness establishes prior bad acts of the 
defendant from which the jury may infer that he had the propensity to engage in 
those acts and acted in accord with that propensity on the current charge.  This is 
precisely the inference Evid.R. 404(B) excludes:  "Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith.”   Furthermore, expert witnesses may 
have particular power over the minds of jurors.  Perhaps recognizing this, the 
Koss court limited the use of testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome 
to cases where defendants employ it in establishing self-defense. 
{¶ 70} The majority opinion acknowledges the prejudice to the defendant 
that occurs through this new evidentiary expansion.  “An expert witness who 
diagnoses a victim as a battered woman essentially concludes that the defendant is 
a batterer.  In a case where the underlying charges involve domestic violence, 
such a conclusion by an expert witness is prejudicial to the defendant and usurps 
the jury’s role as finder-of-fact.” ¶ 55.  Yet in spite of this understanding, because 
it can “aid the trier-of-fact in determining the victim’s state of mind, e.g., to 
explain why she returned to the defendant despite his aggressions toward her,” 
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is allowed.  ¶ 65.  Even if an 
expert is confined to providing only a general overview of the syndrome, as we 
see in this case, the bounds are easy to overstep.  Dr. Eisenberg did more.  He 
gave an opinion, to a reasonable degree of forensic certainty, that the facts of the 
case were “very consistent with what we see in a Battered Woman's Syndrome 
scenario.” 
{¶ 71} The majority’s expansion of Koss and R.C. 2901.06(B) is justified 
by citations to other jurisdictions and secondary sources.  A more liberal 
admission of expert testimony of this nature may be a worthy goal, but until the 
General Assembly determines it to be good policy for Ohio, I believe we should 
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follow precedent as it stands and the statute as it is written.  I would hold that the 
state may not introduce evidence of battered woman syndrome to demonstrate the 
victim's state of mind, i.e., to explain why she returned to the defendant despite 
his aggressions toward her, when her credibility is challenged upon cross-
examination. 
{¶ 72} To do otherwise is to transform a shield for the defense into a 
sword for the prosecution.  I would answer no to the certified question. 
__________________ 
Charles Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Karen A. 
Sheppert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Ian N. Friedman & Associates, L.L.C., Ian N. Friedman, John A. Powers, 
Ronald L. Frey, and Erik S. Dunbar, for appellant. 
Jason A. Macke, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_____________________