Title: Murry v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
RONALD STUART MURRY, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131137       CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
The defendant, Ronald Stuart Murry, Jr., is subject to a 
probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless, 
suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and 
vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer.  
The probation condition is not reasonable in light of the 
offenses for which Murry was convicted, his background, and the 
surrounding circumstances.  We will therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, 
Murry was convicted of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61;1 
four counts of aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-67.3(A)(1); and one count of aggravated sexual battery, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3(A)(3).  The victim, B.W., was 
Murry's stepdaughter.  At trial, she testified about sexual 
abuse starting at the age of five and culminating in rape after 
she reached the age of 13.  Murry denied the allegations of 
                                                        
1 The sentencing order contains a clerical mistake.  It 
lists the Code section for rape as Code § 18.2-261 instead of 
Code § 18.2-61. 
2 
sexual battery but admitted to having sexual intercourse with 
B.W. when she was 13 years old.  He claimed, however, that the 
intercourse was not against B.W.'s will and that he did not use 
any threats, force, or intimidation against her.  The circuit 
court rejected Murry's testimony, finding it to be "incredible" 
and concluding that the "ongoing relationship and the grooming 
behavior . . . he encouraged from the time she was five years 
old [was] a much more credible explanation for how [the rape] 
occurred when she was thirteen." 
At sentencing, the circuit court imposed terms of 
incarceration for each of the convictions, totaling 156 years 
and 7 months.2  The court suspended 140 years of the sentences 
for the period of Murry's "natural life," leaving a term of 
active incarceration of 16 years and 7 months.  The court 
further ordered that upon release from incarceration, Murry 
would be on supervised probation for an indefinite period.  As a 
condition of Murry's probation, the court ordered, inter alia, 
that Murry "shall submit his person, property, place or 
residence, vehicle, and personal effects, to search at any time, 
with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or 
                                                        
2 The sentencing order has an additional clerical mistake.  
In the sentencing summary, it recites the total sentence imposed 
as 156 "dollars" and 7 months instead of 156 "years" and 7 
months. 
3 
reasonable cause by any Probation Officer or Law Enforcement 
Officer." 
Murry objected to this probation condition, arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment waiver was "not really necessarily 
appropriate" because the convictions did not involve illegal 
substances or firearms.  The circuit court overruled the 
objection, stating: 
I agree with the Commonwealth that [Murry] 
groomed this child from an early age to accept his 
physical advances and that he manipulated her into 
this at the same time that he was presenting to 
everyone in his family and everyone in the community 
what a good person he would be . . . to have with 
children.  I mean it's classic predatory behavior . . 
. .  And, even at this point . . . , he does not 
accept responsibility for that, he exhibits distorted 
behavior about his own role in this . . . .  And, in 
order to protect the community at the time that he's 
finally released, I want . . . law enforcement to have 
the ability to go directly into his house at any time 
to see what he's doing. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Murry 
challenged the probation condition requiring waiver of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Murry v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 
179, 181, 743 S.E.2d 302, 303 (2013).  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that the 
challenged probation condition "is reasonable under the facts of 
this case."  Id. at 189, 743 S.E.2d at 307. 
We awarded Murry this appeal.  As he argued in the Court of 
Appeals, Murry asserts that the condition of probation requiring 
4 
him to submit to searches of his person, property, residence, 
and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement 
officer with or without a search warrant or reasonable cause 
throughout the term of his probation is both unreasonable under 
Virginia law and unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
ANALYSIS 
We review conditions of probation imposed by a trial court 
as part of its sentencing determination for abuse of 
discretion.  Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735, 652 
S.E.2d 109, 111 (2007).  A trial court abuses its discretion 
"when a relevant factor that should have been given significant 
weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor 
is considered and given significant weight; [or] when all proper 
factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in 
weighing those factors, commits a clear error of 
judgment."  Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., 
Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 
Va. 203, 260, 661 S.E.2d 415, 445 (2008) ("The abuse-of-
discretion standard includes review to determine that the 
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Probation is a form of criminal sanction, like 
incarceration, imposed by a trial court after a verdict, 
5 
finding, or plea of guilty.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 
874 (1987).  Pursuant to Code § 19.2-303, "[a]fter conviction, 
whether with or without jury, the court may suspend imposition 
of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part and in 
addition may place the defendant on probation under such 
conditions as the court shall determine."  This statute 
authorizes a trial court to impose such reasonable terms and 
conditions of probation as it deems appropriate.  Dyke v. 
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478, 484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952) 
(decided under predecessor statute, former Code § 53-272).  The 
only statutory limitation on the court's exercise of its 
discretion is "one of reasonableness."  Anderson v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 580, 585, 507 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1998).  
Probation conditions must be reasonable in light of the nature 
of the offense, the defendant's background, and the surrounding 
circumstances.  Id. at 585, 507 S.E.2d at 342; see also State v. 
Allah, 750 S.E.2d 903, 911 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing that 
probation conditions must bear a reasonable relationship to the 
offenses committed by the defendant, tend to reduce the 
defendant's exposure to crime, and assist in the defendant's 
rehabilitation) (citing State v. Cooper, 282 S.E.2d 436, 438 
(N.C. 1981)); Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1258 (Wyo. 2002) 
(holding that "probation conditions must be reasonably related 
to rehabilitation, to the criminal conduct for which the 
6 
probationer was convicted, and to the deterrence of future 
criminal conduct"). 
Murry argues that the circuit court abused its discretion 
because the probation condition is not reasonably related to the 
offenses for which he was convicted, his background, or any 
surrounding circumstances and amounts to a "lifetime waiver" of 
his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.3  The Commonwealth responds that the probation 
condition is reasonable in light of the circuit court's findings 
that Murry groomed his victim from an early age, was able to 
conceal his reprehensible conduct from his family and the 
community, and never accepted responsibility for his behavior.  
According to the Commonwealth, the probation condition is 
                                                        
3 The Court of Appeals concluded that in the circuit court 
Murry only objected to the reasonableness of the probation 
condition at issue and did not assert that the condition was 
unconstitutional.  Murry, 62 Va. App. at 181 n.1, 743 S.E.2d at 
303-04 n.1.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 5A:18, the Court of Appeals 
did not address the merits of that argument.  Id.  Murry now 
also challenges the Court of Appeals' failure to address the 
constitutionality of the probation condition. 
In ruling on Murry's objection to the required waiver of 
his Fourth Amendment rights, the circuit court referenced the 
decision in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).  The 
court thus understood Murry's argument and ruled on it.  See 
Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 442, 689 S.E.2d 716, 727 
(2010) (holding that trial court was aware of defendants' 
arguments and ruled on them).  We therefore conclude that the 
Court of Appeals erred in refusing to address the constitutional 
challenge to the probation condition.  Although we do not need 
to specifically address whether the probation condition violates 
Murry's Fourth Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment principles 
are, nevertheless, relevant to determine if the probation 
condition is reasonable under our jurisprudence. 
7 
necessary to verify Murry's compliance with other probation 
conditions and to protect the public.  Because the probation 
condition here implicates Murry's Fourth Amendment rights, to 
determine whether it is reasonable we must measure Murry's 
privacy interests against the Commonwealth's interests in 
imposing the condition in light of Murry's offenses, his 
background, and the surrounding circumstances.  See Carswell v. 
State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
when a defendant contends that a probation condition is "unduly 
intrusive on a constitutional right," a review of the condition 
must balance the constitutional rights enjoyed by the 
probationer and the legitimate needs of law enforcement); Jones, 
41 P.3d at 1258 (determining the reasonableness of a probation 
condition waiving Fourth Amendment rights "requires a balancing 
of the interests of the state and the privacy interests of the 
probationer"). 
Probation is "one point . . . on a continuum of possible 
punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-
security facility to a few hours of mandatory community 
service."  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.  "Inherent in the very 
nature of probation is that probationers 'do not enjoy the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,'" United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin, 
483 U.S. at 874), "but only . . . conditional liberty properly 
8 
dependent on observance of special [probation 
conditions]."  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).  
Because "[a] [s]tate's operation of a probation system . . . 
presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement" to 
ensure that probation restrictions are followed, "departures 
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements" for 
searches may be justified.  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74.  The 
permissible range of departure, however, "is not 
unlimited."  Id. at 875. 
In Knights, the Supreme Court of the United States 
determined the reasonableness of a search of a probationer by 
balancing "'on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes 
upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.'"  534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 337 (1985) (determining reasonableness of a search requires 
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails") (internal quotation marks omitted).  There, the 
probationer was subject to a probation condition that was 
virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment waiver required of 
Murry.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 114.  In addition, the probationer 
had signed a probation order that stated the following above his 
signature:  "I RECEIVED A COPY, READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE 
9 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY 
SAME."  Id.  The defendant subsequently challenged the legality 
of a search conducted pursuant to the probation condition.  Id. 
at 116. 
The Court concluded that the probationer's acceptance of 
the clear and unambiguous probation condition "significantly 
diminished" his reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 119-
20.  Weighing that fact against the government's legitimate 
interests with regard to probation, the Court held that "the 
balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a search of [the] probationer's 
house."  Id. at 121.  The Court concluded that "the warrantless 
search of [the probationer], supported by reasonable suspicion 
and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."4  Id. at 
122; see also United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 755-58 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that, where the defendant "was on probation 
and subject to a search condition permitting the warrantless 
search of her apartment," law enforcement officers must have, at 
a minimum, "reasonable suspicion[] that an item to be searched 
is owned, controlled, or possessed by [the] probationer, in 
                                                        
4 The trial court found and the probationer conceded that 
the law enforcement officer who conducted the search had 
"reasonable suspicion" that the probationer was engaged in 
criminal activity.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 122. 
10 
order for the item to fall within the permissible bounds of [a] 
probation search"); Carswell, 721 N.E.2d at 1262 (upholding a 
probation condition authorizing warrantless searches of the 
defendant, provided the searches are "conducted only upon 
reasonable cause"); State v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655, 662 (Vt. 
1993) (holding that, although the probation condition 
authorizing warrantless searches without reasonable cause was 
flawed, the search at issue was upheld "because the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search").  But see Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (holding that "the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 
suspicionless search of a parolee"). 
The Court did not address "whether the probation condition 
so diminished, or completely eliminated, [the probationer's] 
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law 
enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would 
have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment."  534 U.S. at 120 n.6; see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 
849 (explaining that "[b]ecause the search at issue in Knights 
was predicated on both the probation search condition and 
reasonable suspicion, [the Court] did not reach the question 
whether the search would have been reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment had it been solely predicated upon the condition of 
11 
probation").  Neither did the Court address whether the 
probation condition itself violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Murry, however, is challenging the reasonableness of the 
probation condition.  In contrast to the defendant in Knights, 
he is not challenging the legality of an actual search.  As we 
already stated, the balancing test used in Knights and other 
cases is, nevertheless, the appropriate framework to address the 
reasonableness of the probation condition because it affects 
Murry's Fourth Amendment rights.  See Carswell, 721 N.E.2d at 
1258 (when a defendant contends that a probation condition is 
"unduly intrusive on a constitutional right," a review of the 
condition must balance the constitutional rights enjoyed by the 
probationer and the legitimate needs of law enforcement); State 
v. Bennett, 200 P.3d 455, 463 (Kan. 2009) (balancing 
probationer's expectation of privacy against state's legitimate 
interests to decide whether probation condition authorizing 
suspicionless searches violated probationer's Fourth Amendment 
rights); Jones, 41 P.3d at 1258 (determining the reasonableness 
of a probation condition waiving Fourth Amendment rights 
"requires a balancing of the interests of the state and the 
privacy interests of the probationer").  Murry's future status 
as a probationer "informs both sides of that balance."  Knights, 
534 U.S. at 119. 
12 
On Murry's side of the balance, it is apparent from the 
decision in Knights that probationers retain some expectation of 
privacy, albeit diminished.  See id. at 121 ("When an officer 
has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search 
condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough 
likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion 
on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests 
is reasonable.") (emphasis added); see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 
850-52 & n.2 (explaining that parolees have fewer expectations 
of privacy than probationers and that, in Knights, the 
probationer's acceptance of the probation condition there 
significantly diminished his expectation of privacy); Griffin, 
483 U.S. at 875 ("Supervision . . . is a 'special need' of the 
[s]tate permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that 
would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.  
That permissible degree is not unlimited, however."); United 
States v. Stewart, 468 F.Supp.2d 261, 278 (D. Mass. 2007) 
("[T]here must be some privacy rights that a probationer retains 
and from which he can exclude the government unless it comes 
armed with a warrant or individualized suspicion."); People v. 
Johns, 795 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (explaining that 
a probationer's expectation of privacy is diminished but not 
extinguished); Bennett, 200 P.3d at 463 ("[A]lthough 
probationers' privacy rights are more limited than are the 
13 
rights of free citizens, probationers do enjoy some expectation 
of privacy in their persons and property."); People v. Hale, 714 
N.E.2d 861, 863 (N.Y. 1999) ("[A] probationer loses some privacy 
expectations and some of the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, but not all of both."). 
The probation condition challenged in this appeal subjects 
Murry to searches of his person, property, residence, and 
vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer.  
Neither a search warrant nor even reasonable cause is required.  
Furthermore, the probation condition not only authorizes 
suspicionless searches but also allows such searches for both 
probation and investigative purposes.5  See Hale, 714 N.E.2d at 
862, 865 (upholding search conducted pursuant to a probation 
condition that allowed only searches for specific items by 
probation officers).  There is no question that the degree of 
intrusion on Murry's expectation of privacy as a probationer is 
                                                        
5 In determining the reasonableness of suspicionless 
searches authorized by probation conditions, courts have 
distinguished between searches conducted for probationary 
purposes and those conducted for investigative purposes.  The 
former "must be related to the rehabilitation or supervision of 
the defendant," State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 541 
(N.H. 1997), and "should advance the goals of probation, the 
overriding aim of which is to give the [probationer] a chance to 
further and to demonstrate his rehabilitation while serving a 
part of his sentence outside the prison walls."  United States 
v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The latter serves as "a mere subterfuge 
enabling the police to avoid having to obtain a search warrant."  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 
significant.  In reality, it extinguishes any Fourth Amendment 
rights Murry may have as a probationer. 
On the other side of the balance, the Commonwealth has the 
expectation that a probationer will successfully complete the 
term of probation and be integrated back into society as a 
productive, law-abiding person.  See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-
21; see also Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 160, 195 S.E. 
723, 726 (1938) ("The Commonwealth is interested not only in the 
preservation of peace and good order, but in reformation of the 
criminal, so that he may be restored to a useful place in 
society and be self-sustaining thereafter.").  At the same time, 
the Commonwealth has the legitimate concern that a probationer 
is more likely to engage in criminal activities than an ordinary 
citizen.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.  This concern is heightened 
when, as here, a probationer is a sex offender.  See United 
States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing that sex offenders are a serious threat and that 
states have a vital interest in rehabilitating them); Carswell, 
721 N.E.2d at 1263 (recognizing elevated public safety concerns 
with "the crime of child molestation," which all too often goes 
unreported).  "[T]he very assumption of the institution of 
probation [is] that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation 
and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the 
law."  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880.  Thus, probation conditions and 
15 
supervision are necessary to ensure both that probation "serves 
as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is 
not harmed by the probationer's being at large."  Id. at 875. 
The circuit court convicted Murry of rape and several 
counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The victim, a family 
member, was between the ages of five and 13 at the time of the 
offenses.  Although Murry had no prior convictions, the circuit 
court imposed the probation condition because it concluded that 
Murry had groomed his victim from an early age and had 
successfully concealed his behavior from his family and the 
community for many years.  As a result, the court wanted "law 
enforcement to have the ability to go directly into [Murry's] 
house at any time to see what he's doing." 
Although the Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that Murry completes a meaningful period of 
rehabilitation and that society not be harmed by Murry's being 
at large as a sex offender, we conclude that those interests do 
not justify the total surrender of Murry's Fourth Amendment 
rights.  See State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 (Haw. 1984) 
("[A] near-total surrender of privacy could [not] be reasonably 
related to rehabilitation, and . . . the deprivation would be 
inconsistent with even the limited freedom afforded someone who 
but for the grace of the sentencing court would be in 
prison."); Bennett, 200 P.3d at 463 (holding that a probation 
16 
condition requiring defendant to submit to nonconsensual, 
suspicionless searches violated his Fourth Amendment rights).  
Nothing in the record establishes that a complete waiver of 
Murry's Fourth Amendment rights is necessary to facilitate his 
rehabilitation and protect the public. 
Furthermore, the probation condition authorizes any law 
enforcement officer, even one without knowledge of the 
condition, to search Murry's person, property, residence, and 
vehicle at any time and for any reason.  In other words, the 
condition enables a law enforcement officer to avoid the warrant 
requirement, or even having reasonable suspicion, for a purely 
investigative search.  Law enforcement officers, however, do not 
have the same responsibility as probation officers with respect 
to rehabilitating probationers.  Compare Code § 53.1-145 (powers 
and duties of probation and parole officers) with Code § 15.2-
1704 (powers and duties of police officers); see also State v. 
Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 541 (N.H. 1997) (probation 
officers, unlike law enforcement officers, are charged with 
assisting probationers "in establishing law-abiding lives while 
monitoring their behavior").  The probation condition, 
therefore, could sanction intimidating and harassing searches 
that are unrelated to Murry's rehabilitation or public safety, 
thus undermining the purpose of probation conditions. 
17 
Relying on this Court's decision in Anderson, the 
Commonwealth, however, questions how Murry can contend that the 
probation condition is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
when he accepted the circuit court's suspension of part of his 
sentence.  The Commonwealth's argument overlooks significant 
factual differences between Anderson and the present case. 
The defendant in Anderson pled guilty pursuant to a written 
plea agreement.  256 Va. at 582, 507 S.E.2d at 340.  The plea 
agreement provided that the defendant's sentence would be 
suspended upon certain terms and conditions, including a waiver 
of the defendant's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures for one year from the date of 
sentencing.  Id.  The plea agreement stated: 
BY HIS SIGNATURE BELOW, [THE DEFENDANT] ACKNOWLEDGES 
THAT, IF THIS AGREEMENT IS ACCEPTED BY THE COURT, HE 
UNDERSTANDS HE IS WAIVING HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES DURING THE 
PERIOD SPECIFIED ABOVE. 
 
Id. at 582-83, 507 S.E.2d at 340.  The trial court found that 
the defendant had entered his plea freely and voluntarily and 
incorporated the terms of the plea agreement into the sentencing 
order.  Id. at 583, 507 S.E.2d at 340. 
Approximately five months after sentencing, police officers 
searched the defendant and found cocaine, marijuana, and a 
handgun.  Id. at 583-84, 507 S.E.2d at 340-41.  After being 
charged with various felonies, the defendant moved to suppress 
18 
the evidence recovered from the search, contending that the 
Fourth Amendment waiver in his plea agreement was invalid and 
that the officers had no grounds otherwise to support a 
warrantless search.  Id. at 584, 507 S.E.2d at 341.  On appeal, 
the defendant asserted, inter alia, that conditioning the 
suspended sentence upon a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights was 
unreasonable.  We disagreed, stating "it is difficult to 
understand how [the defendant] can now contend that this 
condition of his suspended sentence was unreasonable when he 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it."  Id. at 585, 507 S.E.2d 
at 342. 
The waiver of constitutional rights in a plea agreement is 
not an uncommon practice.  See United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 
752, 756 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Generally, constitutional rights can 
be waived as part of a plea agreement."); Jones v. United 
States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).  "[I]t is 
well settled that plea bargaining does not violate the 
Constitution even though a guilty plea waives important 
constitutional rights."  Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 
393 (1987); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) 
(discussing standards for waiver of such constitutional rights 
as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers).  
Nor is it uncommon for defendants to agree to search conditions 
19 
of probation in exchange for a more lenient term of 
incarceration, as in Anderson.  See United States v. King, 711 
F.3d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a search where "the 
probationer agreed to a search condition that permits 
warrantless, suspicionless searches of the probationer's 
'person, property, premises and vehicle[] [at] any time of the 
day or night'").  However, unlike the defendant in Anderson, 
Murry did not agree to a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights 
pursuant to a signed plea agreement.  Murry pled not guilty, and 
the circuit court imposed the probation condition, sua sponte, 
after finding Murry guilty.  Murry objected to the probation 
condition in the circuit court and is likewise doing so on 
appeal.  Furthermore, Murry is not yet on probation and has not 
signed any document agreeing to terms of 
probation.  But see King, 711 F.3d at 990-91.  Murry clearly has 
not consented to the probation condition at issue here. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the probation condition subjecting Murry, his 
property, residence, and vehicle to warrantless, suspicionless 
searches at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer 
is not reasonable in light of Murry's offenses, his background, 
and the surrounding circumstances.  The degree to which the 
probation condition is needed to promote the Commonwealth's 
legitimate interests with regard to Murry's rehabilitation and 
20 
the protection of society does not outweigh the degree of 
intrusion on Murry's diminished yet legitimate expectation of 
privacy as a probationer.  Therefore, the circuit court abused 
its discretion because in weighing the relevant factors, it 
committed "a clear error of judgment."  Landrum, 282 Va. at 352, 
717 S.E.2d at 137 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case 
to the Court of Appeals with directions that it remand the case 
to the circuit court to conduct a new sentencing hearing. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE MIMS, concurring. 
The circuit court was motivated by a genuine concern that 
Murry will pose a danger to public safety upon release.  It 
therefore imposed several probation conditions to ameliorate 
that concern.  I concur that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by requiring Murry to “submit his person, property, 
place or residence, vehicle, and personal effects, to search at 
any time, with or without . . . reasonable cause by any 
Probation Officer or Law Enforcement Officer.”  Although the 
underlying concern is justified, this condition is too broad.  I 
write separately to consider this condition in context with the 
others, rather than in isolation. 
The circuit court found that Murry raped his stepdaughter 
when she was 13.  It found that he had committed repeated 
21 
aggravated sexual batteries upon her since she was five years 
old.  It found the aggravated sexual batteries constituted 
“grooming behavior” and facilitated the rape.  It found that 
Murry successfully concealed this sexual abuse for many years.  
It found that he failed to accept responsibility for his crimes 
upon conviction. 
Based on these offenses, background, and surrounding 
circumstances, Anderson v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 580, 585, 507 
S.E.2d 339, 341 (1998), the court imposed a probation condition 
prohibiting Murry from having “contact with any minors under the 
age of eighteen without adult supervision.”  Murry does not 
challenge the reasonableness of this condition. 
Probation conditions “are meant to assure that the 
probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that 
the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.  
These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision 
to assure that” a probationer complies with the conditions after 
release.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, Virginia probation officers 
have a duty to ensure that probationers comply with their 
probation conditions.  See Code § 53.1-145 (requiring probation 
officers to “furnish every such person with a written statement 
of the conditions of his probation and instruct him therein” and 
22 
to “[a]rrest [probationers] for violation of the terms of 
probation”). 
While probation officers may attempt to ascertain whether a 
probationer is complying with his probation conditions after 
release by questioning him and his family, friends, neighbors, 
co-workers, and other associates, “[i]nvestigation of [his] 
home, possessions, and body may also be required.  In such 
situations, . . . probation officers believe that they need to 
be able to make unannounced home visits and searches.”  Neil P. 
Cohen, The Law of Probation and Parole § 17:7 (2d ed. 1999).  
Accordingly, the authority to do so is often included as a 
separate condition of release.  Id. 
In this case, the circuit court could reasonably fear that 
the customary investigative technique of interviewing Murry and 
his associates would be insufficient to reveal any violation of 
the condition prohibiting him from unsupervised contact with 
minors.  Probationers in general have a propensity to “to 
conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of 
incriminating evidence.”  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 120 (2001).  The court’s findings suggest that Murry could 
be particularly adept at doing so.  It found that he concealed 
his repeated aggravated sexual batteries for years.  It was 
especially disturbed by his ability to persuade his family and 
others in the community who knew him that he was “a good person 
23 
. . . to have with children” at the same time he was sexually 
abusing his stepdaughter.  Consequently, the circuit court’s 
findings are sufficient to establish the need for a separate 
search condition in this case. 
Nevertheless, such a condition must be reasonable not only 
in its justification but in its scope.  For example, former N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b1)(7) permitted North Carolina courts to 
require a probationer to submit to warrantless searches by a 
probation officer of his home, vehicle, and person “at 
reasonable times . . . while the probationer is present, for 
purposes specified by the court and reasonably related to his or 
her probation supervision, but the probationer may not be 
required to submit to any other search that would otherwise be 
unlawful.”1  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit upheld this condition, ruling that “[t]hese criteria 
impose meaningful restrictions, guaranteeing that the searches 
are justified by the State’s ‘special needs,’ not merely its 
interest in law enforcement.”  United States v. Midgette, 478 
F.3d 616, 624 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1157 (2007). 
The court also rejected the argument that the condition was 
defective because it did not require individualized suspicion 
that the probationer possessed contraband.  The court noted that 
                                                        
1 The North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute in 
2009, making this condition mandatory for all probationers 
rather than discretionary.  2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 372. 
24 
the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld suspicionless 
searches in furtherance of a special need when the search was 
reasonably tailored.  Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822 (2001) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of 
students involved in extracurricular activities); Michigan Dep’t 
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (affirming 
suspicionless sobriety checks of motorists in order to reduce 
the safety hazards posed by drunk drivers); Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding 
suspicionless urine and blood tests of certain railroad 
employees); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding 
suspicionless visual body-cavity searches of detainees following 
contact visits)).  Thus, a search condition need not be 
predicated on individualized suspicion when a special need 
“justifie[s] the ‘degree of impingement upon privacy’ authorized 
by” the condition.  Id. 
As noted above, the circuit court’s particularized findings 
in this case (specifically Murry’s ability to conceal his sexual 
crimes against his stepdaughter from his family and associates 
for several years) could lead the court reasonably to conclude 
that suspicionless searches are necessary to ensure Murry’s 
compliance with the unchallenged condition prohibiting his 
unsupervised contact with minors.  If it were to do so on 
remand, it might determine that former N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
25 
1343(b1)(7) provided a roadmap for imposing a constitutionally 
tailored search condition.2 
Finally, I emphasize that a criminal defendant has no right 
to suspension of any part of the sentence imposed by the trial 
court.  As the majority notes, Code § 19.2-303 permits that 
“[a]fter conviction, whether with or without jury, the court may 
suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole 
or part and in addition may place the defendant on probation 
under such conditions as the court shall determine.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
Accordingly, while a defendant may appeal a probation 
condition on the grounds that it is unreasonable, Anderson, 256 
Va. at 585, 507 S.E.2d at 341, nothing prevents a trial court 
from declining to suspend any part of a valid sentence in the 
first place (thereby requiring the defendant to serve the entire 
                                                        
2 The probation condition set out in former N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A-1343(b1)(7) did not require probationers to submit to 
searches of their personal effects.  However, predatory adults 
often use mobile phones for illicit contact with minors.  E.g., 
Klewer v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0791-11-3, 2012 Va. App. 
LEXIS 315, at *5-6 (Oct. 9, 2012) (unpublished) (upholding the 
conviction for electronic solicitation of a minor, in violation 
of Code § 18.2-374.3(C), of teacher who exchanged text messages, 
photographs, and videos with a minor former student by mobile 
phone).  Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014), that 
officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such 
a search of mobile phone data, it may not be unreasonable to 
require that a probationer subject to a condition prohibiting 
unsupervised contact with minors submit to searches of mobile 
phones and similar devices to ensure that they have not been 
used to facilitate the proscribed contact. 
26 
term in confinement) if it determines that no reasonable 
conditions would make suspension “compatible with the public 
interest.”  See Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136 
S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964). 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
I dissent for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals 
opinion, Murry v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 179, 743 S.E.2d 302 
(2013).