Title: Yugler v. Myers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: May 30, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
RICHARD S. YUGLER,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General for the State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S055746)
En Banc
On petition to review
ballot title filed February 25, 2008; considered and under advisement on April
30, 2008.
Helen M. Hierschbiel,
Tigard, filed the petition to review ballot title and the reply to respondent's
answering memorandum for petitioner.
Laura S. Anderson,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the answering memorandum for
respondent.  With her on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
LINDER, J.
Ballot title referred
to the Attorney General for modification.
LINDER, J.
Petitioner seeks review of the
Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 17 (2010).  See
ORS 250.085(2) (specifying requirements for seeking review of certified ballot
title).  This court reviews the certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2).  See ORS 250.085(5) (stating
standard of review).  For the reasons explained below, we refer the ballot
title to the Attorney General for modification.
If enacted, Initiative Petition 17
(IP 17) would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that requires
judges to give juries the following instruction:
"The courts of the United States of America
have long held that a jury may stand in judgment of both the facts of the case
and the law itself.  Sometimes a judge is wrong.  Sometimes a prosecutor or
other attorney is over-zealous or unequally eloquent.  Sometimes a law is
unjust.
"As a juror in
this case, you have not only the right, but also the duty to judge not only the
facts of this case, but also the law.  You have the right to disregard the
instructions of the judge and the language of the law.  You have the right to
exercise your common sense and conscience and find in favor of the defendant,
if you believe that following the judge's instructions or applying the language
of the law in this case will result in an unjust verdict or judgment."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for
IP 17:
"REQUIRES
INSTRUCTING JURY OF RIGHT/DUTY TO DISREGARD LAW IF VERDICT AGAINST DEFENDANT IS
'UNJUST'
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote requires
judge to instruct jurors of right to disregard applicable law if juror's
'common sense'/'conscience' say verdict against defendant would be 'unjust.'
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote maintains
current law, which commits issues of law to the judge and requires juries to
apply the law as instructed by the judge.
"SUMMARY: 
Current Oregon law requires jury to apply the law as instructed by the judge. 
The measure changes existing law by requiring that a specified statement be
read and handed or displayed to jury, stating that a judge may be wrong, an
attorney over-zealous, or a law unjust, and that jurors have a right and duty
to judge both facts and law applying to the case.  The statement informs jurors
that they may disregard judge's jury instructions and the language of the law;
informs the jurors of their 'right' to exercise 'common sense' and 'conscience'
and to find in favor of the defendant if they believe following judge's
instructions or language of the law would result in 'unjust' verdict (quoted
terms not defined).  Other provisions."
Petitioner challenges the caption, the "yes" vote
result statement, and the summary.
A ballot title caption must contain
"not more than 15 words that reasonably identif[y] the subject matter of
the state measure."  ORS 250.035(2)(a).  The caption serves as the
"cornerstone for the other portions of the ballot title" and therefore
must identify the proposed measure's true subject matter "accurately and
in terms that will not confuse or mislead potential petition signers and
voters."  Green v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 169, 174-75, 903 P2d 366
(1995).  Petitioner argues that the certified caption is inaccurate because it
suggests that jurors currently have "the unequivocal right and duty to
disregard the law and acquit a defendant, when in fact, no such right clearly
exists."  See Fauvre v. Roberts, 309 Or 691, 696, 791 P2d 128
(1990) ("[i]t is not the law in this state that a jury has the 'right' --
as opposed to the undoubted power --" to return a verdict that is
contrary to the evidence and the applicable law).  Petitioner points out that
whether IP 17 would effectively give rise to such a right, and thereby change
current law, is open to question.  As a result, according to petitioner,
referring to a "right/duty" to disregard the law is "confusing
at best and misleading at worst," because it is not true that such a right
currently exists and it is debatable whether one would come into existence if
IP 17 were enacted.
The Attorney General agrees that,
under current law, a jury does not have a right to disregard applicable law in
reaching a verdict.  The Attorney General also agrees that whether IP 17 would
create such a right is an open question.  The Attorney General disagrees,
however, that the plain wording of the caption suggests to voters that jurors
either now have or under IP 17 would have such a right or duty. Petitioners
have the better of the argument.  The wording in the certified caption declares
that IP 17 requires trial courts to instruct a jury "of right/duty
to disregard law."  (Emphasis added.)  That phrasing suggests that such a
right or duty exists, when in fact it does not.  See Fauvre, 309 Or at
696 (jury does not have the right to return a verdict that is contrary to the
evidence and the law).  Whether IP 17 creates such a right is debatable.  On
the one hand, the proposed measure does not expressly create such a right.  On
the other hand, it characterizes a jury's power to disregard the law as a right
or duty, and requires the jury to be advised that it has the right or duty to
disregard the law, thus leaving it open to argument whether the proposed
measure gives rise to such a right inferentially.  Consequently, for the
caption to parrot the "right/duty" characterization from the proposed
initiative in a way that suggests that the characterization is accurate is
misleading.
Petitioner makes the same challenge
to the "yes" result statement; for the same reasons, we conclude that
the "yes" result statement is not accurate.  See ORS
250.035(2)(b) (ballot title must contain a simple and understandable statement
of not more than 25 words that describes the result if a state measure is
approved).  Again, by explaining that a "yes" vote requires a judge
to instruct jurors "of right to disregard applicable
law" (emphasis added), the statement suggests the existence of a right
that does not now exist and that IP 17 may or may not create. (1)
The final prong of petitioner's
challenge is to the Attorney General's summary.  ORS 250.035(2)(d) requires
"[a] concise and impartial statement of not more than 125 words
summarizing the state measure and its major effect."  The goal of the
summary is to "help voters understand what will happen if the measure is
approved" and the "breadth of its impact."  
Mabon v. Myers,
332 Or 633, 640, 33 P3d 988 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Petitioner's
argument is similar to, but not the same as, his challenges to the certified
caption and "yes" result statement.  Specifically, petitioner argues
that the summary is inaccurate or misleading because it fails to tell voters
explicitly that current law does not give jurors the right to disregard the
law.  According to petitioner, the summary must explain that point if voters
are to understand how the proposed measure changes or is contrary to existing
law.  The Attorney General responds that the first sentence of the summary --
"Current Oregon law requires jury to apply the law as instructed by the
judge"-- sufficiently advises voters of the state of current law.  We
agree.  The fact that the Attorney General chose to capture the same idea in
different terms does not mean that the summary fails to substantially comply
with ORS 250.035(2)(d).  See Novick/Crew v. Myers, 337 Or 568, 574-75,
100 P3d 1064 (2004) (a petitioner does not demonstrate a failure to
substantially comply with statute "merely by showing that some other
choice by the Attorney General would have been appropriate"). (2)
Ballot title referred to the Attorney
General for modification.
1. We have considered other challenges that petitioner makes
to the certified caption and to the "yes" results statement, and we
reject them without further discussion.
2. On referral, the Attorney General is free to further
consider petitioner's argument in this regard, if he wishes.