Title: MICHAEL W. SARR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MICHAEL W. SARR V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 67113 P.3d 1051Case Number: No. 02-17Decided: 06/13/2005
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

                                                                                                                        

 
 
MICHAEL 
W. SARR,            

Appellant 
(Defendant),         

 
 
 v.        

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,           

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).   

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofHot SpringsCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. Fetsco, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., and SANDERSON, 
D.J.

 
 
HILL, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Michael W. Sarr (Sarr), appears before this Court for the third time, upon 
further proceedings called for by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sarr 
v. Wyoming, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 297, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2004).  He contends that his convictions were 
obtained in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States 
Constitution, that he may not be retried where a conviction is reversed because 
of the insufficiency of the evidence, and that the district court's restitution 
order must be reversed.  In 
accordance with the Memorandum Decision of the United States Supreme Court and 
its mandate, we too vacate the judgment and sentence of the district court.  Thus, we reverse Sarr's convictions on 
Counts I, V, and VI of the complaint and remand those matters for new 
trial.  We previously reversed Count 
III and remanded it for new trial.   
Because the district court's judgment has been vacated and because we 
remand all remaining counts for new trial, we must also vacate the district 
court's sentence, including the restitution order, for reconsideration in light 
of any additional proceedings.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sarr provides 
this statement of the issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether [Sarr's] rights under the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment were violated when prejudicial, testimonial tape-recorded hearsay of 
the unavailable victim was admitted at trial, requiring reversal of all of 
[Sarr's] convictions.

 
 

II.          
Whether jeopardy attaches to the reversal of [Sarr's] conviction for 
Count IV, prohibiting the State from retrying [Sarr] on that count. 1

 
 
III.         
Whether the district court's order requiring [Sarr] to pay restitution is 
erroneous and requires reversal.

 
 
The State 
proposes the issues to be decided in this form:

 
 
I.          
Was introduction of the testimonial hearsay of the unavailable victim 
harmless error as to Count I?

 
 
II.          
Would retrial of [Sarr] on all remaining counts place him twice in 
jeopardy under the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions?

 
 
III.         
Should [Sarr] be required to pay restitution on Count I and, upon 
retrial, any restitution attributable to Counts III, V, and 
VI?

 
 
FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      In February of 
2001, Sarr was charged with seven counts of aggravated assault and battery.  Those charges arose from acts of 
domestic violence committed by Sarr against Ann Wing.  Throughout this opinion, as was the case 
with our prior opinions, we will differentiate between the seven counts by 
referring to them as Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII.  In Sarr v. State , 2003 WY 42, 65 P.3d 711 (Wyo. 2003) (Sarr I) we set out the facts pertinent to this 
case.  Sarr I, ¶¶3-11.  Of central significance to this 
protracted litigation was the fact that Ann Wing drowned in her bathtub shortly 
after she gave a statement to the police concerning the acts of assault.  Those statements incriminated Sarr with 
respect to all counts for which he was convicted.  It is the admission of her statements, 
both in tape recorded form and as related to the jury by those who heard her 
give the statements, that implicate the Confrontation Clause 
here.

 
 
[¶4]      After trial, Sarr 
was found guilty of Counts I and III-VI, but was found not guilty with respect 
to Count VII, thus that count is no longer at issue.  Sarr I, ¶11.  Count II was dismissed for reasons not 
evident of record, and thus it too is no longer at issue.  In that same opinion we reversed the 
conviction for Count IV because of insufficient evidence and held that it could 
not be retried for reasons of double jeopardy, thus Count IV is also no longer 
at issue.  We also reversed Count 
III, but remanded it for new trial.  
We affirmed the convictions for Counts I, V, and VI.  Id. at ¶47.  Upon his motion, we granted a rehearing 
to Sarr, and in that opinion clarified our reasoning as to why Sarr could be 
retried on Count III.  The case was 
then remanded to the district court for those purposes.  Sarr I; Sarr v. State, 
2004 WY 20, 85 P.3d 439 (Wyo. 2004) (Sarr II).

 
 
[¶5]      On June 8, 2004, 
Sarr filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U. S. Supreme Court.  In a memorandum decision entered on 
October 4, 2004, that court granted the petition and vacated the judgment of the 
Wyoming 
court.  The U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision also remanded Sarr's case to this Court for us to further consider it 
in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).  Sarr, 
___U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 297.  
Boiled down to its essence, the  Crawford case stands for this 
proposition:

 
 
            
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with 
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 
hearsay lawas does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such 
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.  Where testimonial evidence is at issue, 
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:  unavailability and a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.  We leave for 
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial." 
 Whatever else the term covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at a formal trial; and to police interrogations.  These are the modern practices with 
closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed.

 
 
            
In this case, the State admitted Sylvia's testimonial statement against 
petitioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine 
her.  That alone is sufficient to 
make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Roberts notwithstanding, we 
decline to mine the record in search of indicia of reliability.  Where testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:  confrontation.  [Footnote 
omitted.]

 
 

Crawford, 124 S. Ct. 
at 1374 (Crawford also reversed that court's decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980)).  In the interim, we have embraced the 
rule articulated in Crawford, although we also held that such errors are 
subject to a harmless error analysis under the standard applicable to errors of 
constitutional magnitude.  Vigil 
v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶¶18-26, 98 P.3d 172, ¶¶18-26 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶6]      It is agreed by 
the parties that the evidence at issue here was testimonial, and that it was 
admitted as substantive evidence to support Sarr's convictions as to all 
remaining counts, and with respect to Counts III, V, and VI, it was the only 
evidence of Sarr's guilt.  Thus, 
Crawford mandates that all of Sarr's convictions be reversed, unless the 
admission of that evidence is deemed harmless.  It is only with respect to Count I that 
harmless error is pursued by the State.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Count I and 
Harmless Error

 
 
[¶7]      As noted earlier 
in the opinion, we have held that constitutional errors, such as those at issue 
here, may be analyzed to determine if, despite the presumption that such errors 
are prejudicial, the reviewing court is able to declare its belief that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Vigil, ¶19.  In this instance, Sarr's conviction on 
Count I rested on two sources of evidence.  
Daniel Bryan recited his eyewitness account of what occurred.  The second source was the victim's 
tape-recorded statements, which we have now held to be inadmissible.  The latter testimony was, of course, the 
most compelling evidence of Sarr's guilt with respect to that count.  As was the case in Vigil, given 
the circumstances of this case, "we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the admission of the hearsay statements did not contribute to the 
conviction[.]"  Vigil, 
¶25.  Thus, we are compelled to 
reverse Sarr's conviction on Count I, and it is remanded to the district court 
for retrial. 

 
 
Counts III, 
V, VI

 
 
[¶8]      In Sarr II 
we held that a defendant is not subjected to double jeopardy if he is retried 
after his conviction is reversed for trial error.  This holds true even where, leaving out 
of consideration erroneously admitted evidence, the evidence was not sufficient 
to sustain the conviction.  The test 
has been described in these terms:  
"The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a retrial when a review of 
all of the evidence presented at trial, including the improperly admitted 
evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction." Sarr II, ¶8.  This case is unusual in the sense that 
the only evidence so far presented to sustain these three convictions is the 
evidence that we now hold to be inadmissible.  Nonetheless, consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's holding in Lockhart, and our holding in Sarr II, 
Sarr may be retried on these counts.  
Thus, we reverse Sarr's convictions on Counts III, V, and VI, and they 
are remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
Sentence

 
 
[¶9]      Because we have 
reversed all of the judgments of guilt, we must also vacate the district court's 
sentence, including the order of restitution.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶10]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1   In our original opinion we held 
that Count IV could not be retried.  
The status of that count remains the same and the State, for good reason, 
does not contend that Count IV may be retried.  Thus, this issue need not be 
addressed.