Title: Catherine P. Gilhooley v. County of Union

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for a majority Court. The issue before the Court is whether a particular injury constitutes the permanent loss of a bodily function within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act (the Act) so as to justify an award of pain and suffering damages. In 1994, Catherine Gilhooley (Gilhooley) was employed as a clinical social worker for the United States department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Gilhooley supervised the VA's methadone maintenance clinic in Newark. As part of her responsibilities, she accompanied nurses who administered methadone to incarcerated veterans. On December 31, 1994, Gilhooley accompanied a VA nurse to the Union County Jail to administer methadone. As she was leaving the building, Gilhooley slipped and fell, suffering a fractured right knee cap and a broken nose. Gilhooley required open reduction internal fixation surgery on her knee, wherein wires and pins were inserted into her knee to re-establish its integrity. Gilhooley was in the hospital for five days recuperating from the surgery. She then wore a long-leg rehab brace for two-and-a-half months. Gilhooley also has about a four-to five-inch scar running across her right knee. Gilhooley was out of work for a little over three months, returning on April 2, 1995. She has returned to work in her full capacity; however, she claims to experience constant stiffness and pain in her knee. The injury to her nose required no surgery of treatment, although she complains of a nasal drip. On December 23, 1996, Gilhooley filed a complaint alleging negligence against the County of Union and the Union County Sheriff's Department (collectively, Union County). Union County filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Gilhooley's injuries did not overcome the threshold required under the Act, which prohibits recovery of pain and suffering unless the injured party can demonstrate either permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent disfigurement, or dismemberment. The trial court granted Union's motion, but that determination was not based on Gilhooley's claim that the injury to her knee constituted a permanent loss of a bodily function. That claim was not addressed by the court. Instead, the trial court concluded that Gilhooley's scar did not constitute a permanent disfigurement. The Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the objective medical evidence presented in the record did not support a claim for loss of bodily function. Rather, the Appellate Division determined that Gilhooley suffered only a temporary loss of bodily function, evidenced by her return to work at full capacity and the fact that she needed no further treatment or medication for either injury. In addition, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding that the scar did not constitute a permanent disfigurement under the Act. The Supreme Court granted Gilhooley's petition for certification. HELD: The injury to Catherine Gilhooley's knee, requiring the insertion of wires and pins to enable her knee to function, is an aggravated case within the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted the permanent loss of bodily function language, and this injury falls squarely within the substantial requirement of Brooks. Therefore, Gilhooley's knee injury overcame the pain and suffering threshold of the Tort Claims Act. 2. In order to overcome the pain and suffering threshold under the Act, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged standard by proving : (1) an objective permanent injury (temporary injuries, no matter how painful and debilitating are not recoverable); and (2) a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial. (Pp. 7-11) 3. Gilhooley's reconstructed knee is properly characterized as a permanent injury resulting in a substantial loss of bodily function. The accident caused her to forever lose the normal use of her knee, which could not function without permanent pins and wires to reestablish its integrity. There is no doubt that the Legislature intended that pain and suffering damages could be awarded to those whose ability to use their bodily parts efficiently is restored through pins, wires, or any other artificial mechanism or device. The Court is satisfied that the Legislature intended to include within the notion of aggravated cases those involving permanent injury resulting in a permanent loss of a normal bodily function, even if modern medicine can supply replacement parts to mimic the natural function. (Pp. 11-14) 4. In order to be considered a permanent disfigurement, a scar must impair or injure the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person, rendering the bearer unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. Here, the trial court failed to apply the appropriate summary judgment standard. The court erroneously weighed the evidence and applied its own personal standard to decide the merits rather than enabling the jury to decide the merits of a claim of permanent disfigurement. Based on the trial court's own description of the scar, it cannot be concluded that it is so insubstantial that no rational fact-finder could conclude that it impairs Gilhooley's appearance, rendering her unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect. (Pp. 14-18) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO, dissenting, is of the view that the Court has taken a once-integrated standard and divides it into two prongs. In so doing, the Court places insufficient emphasis on the loss of bodily function and thereby alters the focus of the analysis in a manner inconsistent with the Act. According to Justice Verniero, the focus under both the statute and Brooks should be on the loss of bodily function, not on the injury. Viewed from that perspective, Gilhooley's claim is insufficient because her bodily function (the use of her knees) has been fully restored. It is the role of the Legislature to lower the bar of the Act. Until the Legislature does so, the Act's high threshold should be enforced as it was in Brooks. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN and LAVECCHIA join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate dissenting opinion. CATHERINE P. GILHOOLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF UNION and UNION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Respondents, and JOHN DOES 1-4 (said names being fictitious and unknown), Defendants. Argued May 1, 2000 -- Decided July 11, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Richard A. Dunne argued the cause for appellant. John J. Kane argued the cause for respondents (Lynch Martin Kroll, attorneys; Eric Kuper, on the letter in lieu of brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. [Harry A. Margolis and Robert Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, 1972 Task Force Comment on N.J.S.A. 59:9-2 (Gann 2000).] That is the statutory scheme against which the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants must be analyzed. IV. You can see it. There's no question you can see it. It seems to be a resolved scar. There is some indentation on one side, and you can see it. You can see it, and there's nothing wrong with it. It's not ugly. It's not disfiguring in the sense that if this is the standard, that it would attract immediate attention in the sense that it would materially detract from her appearance, I don't find that it does those things. It is something that if you looked for it, you'd have no problem finding it. If I'm looking at her, I wouldn't look at it twice. I wouldn't even notice it or pay attention to it. It's just nothing. It isn't that small to be de minimus that you can't see it if you're looking for it or if you're looking at her knee in particular. But having said that, it doesn't detract from her appearance. There's nothing about where it is on her knee in looking at her general condition that makes anybody focus on that in the sense of drawing back or saying, this is an unpleasantness or it is detracting from her. It's better if you don't have it, I'm sure. But if it's on the crux, if it has to be significant in the sense of detracting from her, it simply doesn't. . . . [I]f the standard is whether it materially detracts from her appearance, I can't fact find that it materially detracts from her appearance. As that reasoning reveals, the trial court resolved a dispute on the merits that should have been decided by a jury. It was not the court's function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome but only to decide if a material dispute of fact existed. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Only when the evidence is utterly one sided may a judge decide that a party should prevail as a matter of law. Ibid. That is not this case. Although we have not had the benefit of photographs of Mrs. Gilhooley's scar, based upon the trial court's own description of it, we cannot conclude that it is so insubstantial that no rational fact-finder could determine that it impairs Mrs. Gilhooley's appearance, rendering her unsightly, misshapen or imperfect. Falcone, supra, 135 N.J. at 145. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate dissenting opinion. CATHERINE P. GILHOOLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF UNION and UNION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Respondents, and JOHN DOES 1-4 (said names being fictitious and unknown), Defendants. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. This dispute centers on the standard to be used in sustaining non-economic damages (i.e., amounts for pain and suffering) against a public entity. The case does not pertain to an award for medical expenses. The critical language in Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 406 (1997), requires that to recover non-economic damages under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3 (the Act), a plaintiff must sustain a permanent loss of the use of a bodily function that is substantial. The Court takes that once-integrated standard and divides it in two: one part focusing on plaintiff's injury, the other part focusing on the loss of the bodily function. In so doing, the Court, in my view, places insufficient emphasis on the loss of the bodily function and thereby alters the focus of the analysis in a manner inconsistent with the Act. I find the proper focus under both the statute and Brooks to be on the loss of the bodily function, not on the injury. Viewed from that perspective, plaintiff's claim is insufficient because her bodily function (the use of her knee) has been fully restored. As the Court in Brooks emphasized, [t]emporary injuries, no matter how painful and debilitating, are not recoverable. Id. at 403. Thus, I agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that summary judgment was the appropriate disposition. The Court arrives at a contrary conclusion by reasoning that the existence of the pin in plaintiff's knee is itself sufficient to show, as a threshold matter, that a permanent loss of a bodily function has occurred. The Court reaches its conclusion notwithstanding that the knee is functioning completely and well. Moreover, the record reveals that plaintiff was fully capable of returning to work, sought no further treatment for her injuries and requires no medication for her condition. Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude with confidence that the Legislature intended taxpayers to be exposed to liability for an award for pain and suffering on these facts. Indeed, the purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to reestablish the general rule of the immunity of public entities from liability for injuries to others. Underlying the reenactment of immunity was the Legislature's concern about that liability on the public coffers. Id. at 402 (citation omitted). In my view, it is the role of the Legislature, not the judiciary, to lower the bar of the Tort Claims Act. Until the Legislature so acts, we must enforce the statute's high threshold, as we did in Brooks. My concern is that the Court's holding may lead to incongruous results in future cases. In Brooks, the plaintiff experienced pain and the limitation of motion in her neck and back was permanent, id. at 406; however, that was not enough to satisfy the Act's pain-and-suffering threshold. Here, plaintiff suffers no loss of movement and her knee is functioning properly; yet, she is found to have satisfied the Brooks standard. Viewing the two injuries solely from the perspective of loss of movement or loss of the respective bodily functions, the Brooks plaintiff arguably suffered more of a permanent loss than did plaintiff in this case. I do not believe that the doctor's insertion of a pin in plaintiff's knee, without more, is sufficient to distinguish this case from a case like Brooks in which recovery was denied. In respect of the scar issue, I do not believe that we should reverse the trial court without first remanding the matter to obtain the benefit of photographs or some other evidence on which to base our disposition. In granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the trial court observed the injury; we have not. Nor have we been provided with any photographic evidence. Under those circumstances, I do not believe that we should substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). If there is a question concerning the validity of the lower court determination, I would remand for purposes of supplementing the record to enable us to better perform our appellate function. For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. NO. A-56 CATHERINE P. GILHOOLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF UNION and UNION COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Respondents, and JOHN DOES 1-4 (said names being fictitious and unknown), Defendants. DECIDED July 11, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz