Title: In re Marriage of Petersen

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2011 IL 110984
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 110984)
In re MARRIAGE OF JANET KELLOGG PETERSEN, Appellant,
 and KEVIN PETERSEN, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 22, 2011.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,
and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Theis took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶ 1
Leave to appeal was granted in this case to determine the
appropriate means by which to apportion postdissolution decree
college expenses where the judgment of dissolution reserved the issue
for future consideration. 
¶ 2
Background
¶ 3
Janet and Kevin Petersen married on September 1, 1983. They
had three sons, Gregory (born August 12, 1984), Ian (born October
21, 1985), and Ellis (born April 19, 1989). In June 1996, Janet and
Kevin separated. The circuit court of Cook County entered a
judgment of dissolution of marriage on August 27, 1999. 
¶ 4
The judgment decree awarded Janet sole custody of the three
children. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the judgment addressed the issue of
the children’s support. Section 3 ordered Kevin to pay Janet monthly
child support. Section 4 ordered Kevin to maintain the children on a
major medical health insurance plan, with the couple to contribute
equally to any medical costs not covered by insurance. Section 5
ordered Kevin to continue his life insurance coverage for as long as
he remained obligated to support Janet or the children. With respect
to Kevin’s obligation to the children, Kevin was to name the children
the irrevocable beneficiaries of the policy “until Kevin’s obligation
to support them (including any obligations for colleges expenses) is
terminated.” Section 6 of the decree included the following language:
“The Court expressly reserves the issue of each party’s
obligation to contribute to the college or other education
expenses of the parties’ children pursuant to Section 513 of
the Illinois Marriage and Marriage Dissolution Act.”
The decree further noted that Janet and Kevin “agreed to and
adopted” a “Custody and Visitation Agreement” which was
incorporated into the final decree. That agreement stated: 
“Janet shall consult Kevin on all issues relating to the
children’s education. Kevin shall be granted at least 48 hours
notice to consult with Janet prior to any decision being made
concerning any said educational issue. Janet shall have the
final decision and authority to make all educational
decisions.”
The decree further stated that the court expressly retained jurisdiction
of the cause for the purpose of enforcing all the terms of the
judgment. 
¶ 5
On May 17, 2007, Janet filed a petition to allocate the college
expenses of the children. In the petition, she asked for contributions
from Kevin for the tuition and expenses incurred by their son
Gregory, who attended Cornell University beginning in 2002, and
who had graduated in 2006. She also asked for reimbursement of the
tuition and expenses of their son Ian, who had started his college
studies at Wake Forest University in 2004. In 2005, Ian transferred to
the University of Texas, where he was pursuing an engineering
degree at the time of the petition’s filing. Janet also sought a ruling on
the future college tuition and expenses of their son Ellis, who was to
graduate from high school in May 2007 and had been admitted to
California Polytechnic State University for the semester beginning in
the fall of 2007.
¶ 6
After a hearing, the circuit court ordered Kevin to pay 75% of the
total college expenses for all three children. Ultimately, the court
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determined the amount Kevin owed was $227,260.68 for past college
expenses, and $46,290.91 for Ian’s and Ellis’s expenses for the 2008-
09 school year. Kevin appealed.
¶ 7
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 403 Ill.
App. 3d 839. The appellate court held that Janet’s 2007 petition
constituted a modification to the parties’ 1999 divorce decree.
Applying section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, the court held that the circuit court could not order
Kevin to pay for those college expenses that predated the filing of
Janet’s petition. The appellate court further held that the circuit court
did not err when it determined that Kevin should pay 75% of his
children’s college expenses. This appeal followed upon our allowance
of Janet’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb.
26, 2010).
¶ 8
Analysis
¶ 9
Janet maintains that the appellate court erred in precluding her
from obtaining contributions from Kevin for expenses that predate the
filing of her petition. She argues that the appellate court improperly
applied section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (the Act) to her. The issue presents a question of law
concerning the interpretation of a statute. Our review is therefore de
novo. In re Andrew B., 237 Ill. 2d 340, 348 (2010).
¶ 10
The Act contains various provisions which govern the numerous
issues that arise during divorce proceedings, such as the distribution
of marital property (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2006)), spousal
maintenance (750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2006)), and child custody (750
ILCS 5/601 (West 2006)) and support (750 ILCS 5/505, 513 (West
2006)). The Act envisions that the parties may amicably agree on
many of these issues and allows for agreements to be incorporated
into the judgment of dissolution entered by the court. 750 ILCS 5/502
(West 2006). The Act also recognizes that because circumstances do
not always remain the same as they were on the date a judgment of
dissolution is entered, modifications may be necessary. 750 ILCS
5/510 (West 2006). Section 510 provides the statutory framework for
modifications, depending on the issue for which the modification is
sought. 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2006). Section 510 also states that
modifications are not retroactive. Specifically, the statute provides:
“Except as otherwise provided ***, the provisions of any
judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified
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only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by
the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification
***.” 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2006).
The appellate court relied on this language in determining that
Kevin’s obligation for college support could not begin prior to May
17, 2007, the date on which Janet filed her petition. 
¶ 11
Janet asserts two different bases as to why section 510 of the Act
is inapplicable. She first contends that section 510 only pertains to
child support payments authorized by section 505 of the Act and not
to education payments, such as those at issue here, ordered pursuant
to section 513. We disagree.
¶ 12
At one point in Illinois law, divorced parents were obligated only
for the “support” of their minor children. “Support” in this statutory
context included the duty to provide for the reasonable and necessary
physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child until the age of
majority. See 750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2006). However, a divorced
parent’s obligation to his or her children increased in 1982, when the
General Assembly amended the Act so that the circuit court, as equity
may require, “may” order “either or both parties” to a divorce to
provide for the educational expenses of nonminor children. 750 ILCS
5/513(a) (West 2006); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, ¶513, Supplement to
Historical and Practice Notes, at 278 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Indeed, section 513 itself speaks in terms of “support” for the parties’
children who “have attained majority.” 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West
2006). 
¶ 13
Given the statute’s express language and its history, it is not
surprising that Illinois courts have consistently held that section 513
expenses are a form of child support to be read in conjunction with
section 505. See In re Marriage of Sreenan, 81 Ill. App. 3d 1025
(1980); In re Marriage of Coram, 86 Ill. App. 3d 845 (1980); In re
Marriage of Waller, 339 Ill. App. 3d 743 (2003). See also In re
Marriage of Truhlar, 404 Ill. App. 3d 176 (2010). “Support” as that
term is used in section 510(a) means amounts required to be paid
under a judgment, decree, or order issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, for the support and maintenance of a child, including a
child who as attained the age of majority under section 513. In fact,
section 510 specifically includes language which references both
section 505 and section 513. We therefore find no merit in Janet’s
argument that college expenses do not constitute “child support” and
that, as a consequence, section 510 is inapplicable. 
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¶ 14
The real dispute amongst the parties, however, is not whether
section 513 expenses are a form of child support, but rather whether
the circuit court “modified” the dissolution decree as that term is used
in section 510, where the original decree reserved the issue of
educational expenses. Janet maintains that because the 1999 decree
did not set out an actual monetary award concerning educational
expenses, her petition did not seek to “modify” the 1999 decree, as
that term is used in section 510. Kevin contends that because the
judgment did not obligate him to provide educational expenses,
Janet’s petition sought to “modify” the 1999 decree so as to come
within the purview of section 510.
¶ 15
The primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to
the legislature’s intent, presuming the legislature did not intend to
create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results (In re Madison H., 215
Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005)). Accordingly, courts should consider the
statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the
legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it (People v. Davis, 199
Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002)). The best indication of legislative intent is the
statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning (People v.
Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581 (2006)). When the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect without resort to other
tools of interpretation (Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 581).
¶ 16
The plain and ordinary meaning of the verb “modify” is to “make
a basic or important change in : ALTER.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1452 (1993). Black’s Law Dictionary also
states the word conveys the notion of “change” or “alteration” of a
term. Black’s Law Dictionary 1095 (9th ed. 2009). Given these
commonly understood usages of the word “modify,” we hold that the
legislature intended the verb “modify” as it is used in section 510 to
connote any action taken to adjust, change or alter the obligations of
one or more of the parties subsequent to entry of the final divorce
decree. 
¶ 17
In our view, the parties’ original 1999 divorce decree did nothing
more than maintain the status quo between the parties with respect to
the issue of college expenses by not making an award at that time,
even though the circuit court was authorized by statute to do so. This
is not unusual in divorce cases. Children are often too young, at the
time of a divorce, to properly anticipate whether college expenses will
be needed. See In re Marriage of Albiani, 159 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1987)
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(acknowledging that colleges expenses may properly be reserved in
case of 14-year-old). 
¶ 18
Prior to the filing of Janet’s petition, Kevin had no concrete
obligation to provide for educational expenses under the decree.
Janet, however, in 2007 sought to change the status quo between the
parties and alter Kevin’s obligations under the decree. That action
brought her within the purview of section 510, which requires only a
showing of a “substantial change in circumstances.” 750 ILCS
5/510(a) (West 2006). The Act provides that provisions of any
judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified “only
as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice” by the party
seeking the change. Id. Under the plain language of the statute, a
retroactive modification is limited to only those installments that date
back to the filing date of the petition for modification. This insures
that the respondent is put on notice prior to any change being made
with respect to the original child support and expense obligations. In
re Marriage of Henry, 156 Ill. 2d 541, 544 (1993). In light of the
statutory language, the appellate court therefore correctly held that
support could not be ordered for expenses which predated the filing
of Janet’s petition. 
¶ 19
In addition to the plain language of the statute, other reasons
support today’s conclusion. As noted earlier, the Act contemplates
that the status quo will change from time to time after a divorce
decree has been finalized, especially where children are concerned.
This court has recognized that a court which has issued a final divorce
decree retains jurisdiction of the proceeding at all times to enforce,
adjust, or modify the original decree in regard to the custody and care
of children, as the changing circumstances may warrant. Sommer v.
Borovic, 69 Ill. 2d 220 (1977) (and cases cited therein). Since section
510 codifies this long held notion and provides the statutory
framework within which to do so, we believe it appropriate to employ
it in these circumstances.
¶ 20
Moreover, although this court has never addressed the
“reservation as modification” issue, our appellate court has, and it has
consistently held such postdecree actions as constituting
modifications under section 510. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kraft,
217 Ill. App. 3d 502 (1991). One of the first cases to address the
issue, Nerini v. Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d 848 (1986), contains a
thorough treatment of the issue, although the case concerned the
reservation of child support for minor children. The court first noted
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that section 505 (like section 513) allows a court the discretion to
enter a college support award against either or both parties. However,
by “reserving” the issue, the court was exercising its discretion to not
make an award at that time, even though the court had personal
jurisdiction over both parents and had the authority to make an award.
Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 854. The court thus distinguished between
in rem and in personam divorce decrees. Under Illinois law, unless
and until there is valid in personam jurisdiction over the support
obligor, no child support order can be entered. See Gleiser v. Gleiser,
402 Ill. 343 (1949) (holding that a decree of divorce requiring the
payment of alimony and child support is a decree in personam, and
therefore the court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant to
order him to pay support and alimony when he was served with
summons outside of Illinois). In Nerini, the court had jurisdiction
over the parents, but chose not to make an award that it was otherwise
authorized to make. Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, the
reservation is necessary as a matter of law. When personal
jurisdiction over both parties exists, however, the reservation serves
as a discretionary decision to not make any award at that time. Id. For
that reason, the procedure contemplated in section 510, which
prohibits retroactive support, had to be followed. Id.
¶ 21
Conner v. Watkins, 158 Ill. App. 3d 759 (1987), is also
instructive. There, the circuit court entered a divorce decree in 1972.
The decree reserved the issues of child custody and support until the
final disposition of a pending juvenile court action concerning the
children. That proceeding ended in December 1973, with the juvenile
court granting the children’s guardian the authority to place them with
their mother. In April 1986, the mother petitioned the circuit court for
an award of child support. She sought reimbursement from the father
for child support expenses dating back to December 1973. The trial
court refused to order support for any period predating the filing of
the petition based upon section 510, which prohibits retroactive
support. The appellate court upheld the order, noting that the petition
served to modify the original decree because no award of support was
made in the original judgment. Conner, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 762. 
¶ 22
These cases establish that Illinois decisional law has since 1986
consistently regarded the actions taken pursuant to reservations
clauses to be modifications under section 510 subject to the
prohibition of retroactive support. It is difficult for this court to gauge
how many couples might have constructed their dissolution decrees
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in reliance of this law, which to date has not been changed by the
legislature in any way.  Given the construction of section 510 by our
1
appellate court, it is reasonable to believe that parties to divorce
actions presume that issues that are reserved in the original
dissolution decree will be adjudicated in the manner set forth in
section 510. Although Janet contends that other courts in other states
do not consider the resolution of reserved issues as a modification of
the original decree, we do not believe those cases are helpful in that
they address different statutory provisions from those contained in our
Act. Principles of settled expectations weigh against overruling the
appellate court cases in the manner Janet suggests. 
¶ 23
Finally, our legislature has stated that the Act is to be liberally
construed so as to promote its underlying purposes. One such purpose
is to “mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children
caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage.” 750 ILCS
5/102(4) (West 2006). A second is to “secure the maximum
involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical,
mental, moral, and emotional well-being of the children during and
after the litigation. “ 750 ILCS 5/102(7) (West 2006). We believe the
purposes of these provisions are met where there is a prompt
resolution of reserved issues of support pursuant to section 510. To
hold as Janet suggests would allow one spouse to wait indefinitely
until seeking to act pursuant to the reservation clause. We fail to see
how creating such an open-ended obligation on a spouse comports
with the purposes of the Act. Rather, we are of the view that the
framework envisioned by section 510 provides the best way to
conduct postdecree proceedings which deal with issues reserved at
the time the final decree is entered.
¶ 24
Conclusion
¶ 25
 When the circuit court ordered Kevin to pay 75% of all college
education expenses, it did so under the mistaken belief that its order
would apply to such expenses that predated the filing of Janet’s
petition. We therefore believe it best to reverse both the circuit
court’s orders, that which referenced expenses that predated the date
Janet filed her petition, and that which referenced expenses incurred
The only change the legislature has made to the Act is to amend
1
section 505 in order to address the in rem decrees noted in the discussion
above.
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subsequent to the filing date.  The reversal of these circuit court
orders in turn requires reversal of that portion of the appellate court
judgment finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
setting Kevin’s share at 75%. As noted throughout this opinion, a
circuit court may order either or both parties to pay educational
expenses “as equity may require.” 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2006).
The factors to be considered include, amongst other things, the
financial resources of both parents. 750 ILCS 5/513(b)(1) (West
2006). We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court with
instructions to recalculate Kevin’s obligation for educational
expenses, taking into account “all relevant factors that appear
reasonable and necessary” (750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2006))
including the fact that Janet’s financial resources may have been
depleted by the cost of Gregory’s four years of college expenses and
Ian’s expenses from 2004 through May 2007. 
¶ 26
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part;
¶ 27
circuit court judgment reversed;
¶ 28
cause remanded with directions.
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