Title: Portwood v. Ford Motor Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., No. 84488 (10/1/98) 
                              Docket No. 84488--Agenda 39--May 1998. 
           GWENDOLYN PORTWOOD et al., Appellants, v. FORD 
                         MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee. 
           Opinion filed October 1, 1998. 
 
             JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
             Gwendolyn Portwood and 51 other plaintiffs appeal the 
           following holdings of the circuit and appellate courts: (1) the 
           filing in federal court of a complaint seeking certification of a 
           class action does not toll, or suspend, the Illinois statute of 
           limitations during the pendency of that complaint; and (2) 
           plaintiffs whose breach of warranty claims are dismissed by a 
           federal court for lack of jurisdiction have six months to refile 
           those claims in Illinois state court. We affirm both holdings. 
 
                     BACKGROUND 
             On August 21, 1981, a group of plaintiffs filed a complaint 
           in United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
           seeking certification of a nationwide class action against 
           defendant Ford Motor Company. The complaint alleged that 
           thousands of people who purchased Ford automobiles between 
           1976 and 1979 sustained property damage as a result of 
           collisions which occurred when the vehicles' transmissions 
           shifted from "park" to "reverse" without warning. The district 
           court initially certified a class action, but was reversed on 
           appeal. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 
           1986). On remand, the district court found class certification 
           unwarranted, and also dismissed the plaintiffs' individual claims 
           for lack of federal jurisdiction. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260 (D.D.C. 1990). The district court denied 
           reconsideration on May 14, 1990. 
             On May 14, 1991, plaintiffs filed this action in the circuit 
           court of Cook County seeking certification of a nationwide class 
           similar to that sought in Walsh. Of the named plaintiffs in the 
           instant case, 47 were also named as plaintiffs in Walsh; the 
           other five were unnamed members of the potential Walsh class. 
             The circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the 
           complaint as untimely. The court ruled that the statute of 
           limitations for bringing suit in Illinois was not tolled, or 
           suspended, by the filing in federal court of the Walsh class 
           action complaint, and hence the claims of the five plaintiffs not 
           named in Walsh were untimely. The court also ruled that under 
           section 2--725 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
           1991, ch. 26, par. 2--725), the 47 plaintiffs named in Walsh had 
           six months to bring suit in Illinois following dismissal by the 
           federal district court. Because the instant complaint was not 
           filed until one year after the dismissal of Walsh, the circuit court 
           ruled that the claims of the 47 Walsh plaintiffs were also 
           untimely. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's 
           dismissal of the complaint. Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 292 
           Ill. App. 3d 478 (1997). We granted leave to appeal, and now 
           affirm. 
 
                      ANALYSIS 
           I. Cross-Jurisdictional Class Action Tolling 
             In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,  414 U.S. 538 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 713, 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974), the United States 
           Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action in federal 
           district court tolls the running of the statute of limitations for all 
           purported members of the class who make timely motions to 
           intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for 
           class action status. American Pipe, 414 U.S.  at 553, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 726, 94 S. Ct.  at 766. This court subsequently adopted the 
           American Pipe rule for class actions filed in Illinois state court. 
           Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School,  69 Ill. 2d 320 , 342 
           (1977). The Supreme Court then extended American Pipe by 
           holding that the filing of a class action in federal district court 
           tolls the statute of limitations not just for those who move to 
           intervene in the original suit after class status is denied, but also 
           for those who subsequently file their own individual suits in 
           federal court. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,  462 U.S. 345 , 
           350, 76 L. Ed. 2d 628, 633, 103 S. Ct. 2392, 2395-96 (1983). 
             The five instant plaintiffs who were not named as parties in 
           the prior federal suit urge this court to apply the holding of 
           Crown, Cork to toll the Illinois statute of limitations during the 
           pendency in federal court of a complaint seeking class 
           certification. These plaintiffs argue that when a federal court 
           denies class certification, the tolling principle of Crown, Cork 
           should apply to all purported class members who subsequently 
           file individual suits, regardless of whether they file in federal or 
           state court. 
             Statutes of limitation rest upon the premise that the right to 
           be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to 
           prosecute them. Golla v. General Motors Corp.,  167 Ill. 2d 353 , 
           369 (1995). Limitation periods are designed to encourage 
           claimants to pursue causes of action before memories have 
           faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has 
           been lost. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,  325 U.S. 304 , 
           314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142 (1945). 
           Statutes of limitation thus promote predictability and finality. 
           Golla, 167 Ill. 2d  at 370. 
             In American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court 
           reasoned that tolling the statute of limitations for all purported 
           class members upon the filing of a class action complaint would 
           best promote the purposes of the class action procedure, which 
           are efficiency and economy of litigation. American Pipe, 414 U.S.  at 553-54, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 726-27, 94 S. Ct.  at 766. 
           Without such a tolling rule, the Court explained, class members 
           not named in the original complaint would feel compelled to file 
           motions to intervene in the action before the expiration of the 
           limitation period in order to prevent loss of their claims in the 
           event class status was ultimately denied after the limitation 
           deadline. American Pipe, 414 U.S.  at 553, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 726, 
           94 S. Ct.  at 766. The Court asserted that such "protective" 
           filings would be unnecessarily duplicative and thus detrimental 
           to the class action's goal of litigative efficiency. American Pipe, 
           414 U.S.  at 553-54, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 726-27, 94 S. Ct.  at 766. 
           Similarly, in Crown, Cork, the Court reasoned that tolling the 
           statute of limitations for purported class members who file 
           separate, individual suits after the denial of class status was 
           likewise essential to prevent needless "protective" filings of such 
           suits during the pendency of the class action complaint. Crown, 
           Cork, 462 U.S.  at 350-51, 76 L. Ed. 2d  at 634, 103 S. Ct.  at 
           2396. 
             Plaintiffs concede that both American Pipe and Crown, 
           Cork concerned individual suits filed in federal court after denial 
           of class certification in federal court. Plaintiffs nevertheless 
           contend that the tolling principles of those cases are applicable 
           as well to individual suits filed in Illinois state court after denial 
           of class certification in federal court. We disagree. 
             Tolling the statute of limitations for individual actions filed 
           after the dismissal of a class action is sound policy when both 
           actions are brought in the same court system. In such instances, 
           failing to suspend the limitation period would burden the subject 
           court system with the protective filings described by the 
           Supreme Court in American Pipe and Crown, Cork. American 
           Pipe, 414 U.S.  at 553-54, 38 L. Ed. 2d  at 726-27, 94 S. Ct.  at 
           766; Crown, Cork, 462 U.S.  at 350-51, 76 L. Ed. 2d  at 634, 103 S. Ct.  at 2396. Tolling the statute of limitations for purported 
           class members who file individual suits within the same court 
           system after class status is denied therefore serves to reduce the 
           total number of filings within that system. 
             Tolling a state statute of limitations during the pendency of 
           a federal class action, however, may actually increase the burden 
           on that state's court system, because plaintiffs from across the 
           country may elect to file a subsequent suit in that state solely to 
           take advantage of the generous tolling rule. Unless all states 
           simultaneously adopt the rule of cross-jurisdictional class action 
           tolling, any state which independently does so will invite into its 
           courts a disproportionate share of suits which the federal courts 
           have refused to certify as class actions after the statute of 
           limitations has run. Although plaintiffs assert that the majority 
           of courts which have considered this issue have chosen to adopt 
           cross-jurisdictional tolling to preserve claims under state law, 
           our research indicates precisely the opposite. See Barela v. 
           Showa Denko, K.K., No. CIV--93--1469 (D.N.M. February 28, 
           1996) (concluding that class action brought in another 
           jurisdiction does not toll New Mexico statute of limitations); 
           Bell v. Showa Denko, K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 
           1995) (holding that pendency of federal class action does not 
           toll Texas statute of limitations); In re Agent Orange Product 
           Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding 
           that Hawaii statute of limitations is not tolled by pendency of 
           federal class action); but see Lee v. Grand Rapids Board of 
           Education, 148 Mich. App. 364, 369-70, 384 N.W.2d 165, 168 
           (1986) (holding that Michigan state claims were preserved by 
           prior federal suit). At any rate, it is apparent that very few states 
           to date have even considered the issue of cross-jurisdictional 
           tolling, let alone adopted it. Given this state of affairs, it is clear 
           that adoption of cross-jurisdictional class tolling in Illinois 
           would encourage plaintiffs from across the country to bring suit 
           here following dismissal of their class actions in federal court. 
           We refuse to expose the Illinois court system to such forum 
           shopping. 
             Furthermore, because state courts have no control over the 
           work of the federal judiciary, we believe it would be unwise to 
           adopt a policy basing the length of Illinois limitation periods on 
           the federal courts' disposition of suits seeking class certification. 
           State courts should not be required to entertain stale claims 
           simply because the controlling statute of limitations expired 
           while a federal court considered whether to certify a class 
           action. 
             Our concerns with forum shopping and with the delay 
           occasioned by the pendency of a class action in federal court are 
           well illustrated by the instant case. Most of the current plaintiffs 
           originally filed suit against defendant in federal court in 
           Washington, D.C., in 1981. After numerous orders and appeals, 
           that suit was finally dismissed in March of 1990. Plaintiffs 
           thereafter brought two similar suits, one in the local courts of 
           the District of Columbia and the other in Pennsylvania state 
           court. Each of those suits was also dismissed. The fourth 
           incarnation of this action in Illinois thus follows three 
           unsuccessful forays by plaintiffs elsewhere, spanning a period 
           now approaching two decades. 
             Plaintiffs contend that our rejection of cross-jurisdictional 
           tolling will necessitate numerous protective filings in Illinois by 
           plaintiffs who have class actions pending in other jurisdictions, 
           thus burdening our state court system and inconveniencing the 
           affected litigants. We are convinced, however, that any potential 
           increase in filings occasioned by our decision today would be 
           far exceeded by the number of new suits that would be brought 
           in Illinois were we to adopt the generous tolling rule advocated 
           by plaintiffs. By rejecting cross-jurisdictional tolling, we ensure 
           that the protective filings predicted by plaintiffs will be 
           dispersed throughout the country rather than concentrated in 
           Illinois. 
             Furthermore, early filings in state court by plaintiffs who 
           are pursuing a class action elsewhere would not be entirely 
           undesirable, as such filings would put that state's court system 
           on notice of the potential claim. If necessary, the state suit could 
           be stayed pending proceedings elsewhere. Certainly, the instant 
           plaintiffs would be much better off if they had instituted such a 
           protective filing years ago in an appropriate jurisdiction. 
             For all of these reasons, we affirm the circuit and appellate 
           courts' holding that the Illinois statute of limitations is not tolled 
           during the pendency of a class action in federal court. 
 
           II. Applicable Savings Provision 
             Next, the 47 plaintiffs in the instant case who were also 
           named as plaintiffs in the prior federal litigation contend that the 
           circuit and appellate courts erred in holding that the complaint 
           herein was untimely filed. These plaintiffs argue that the lower 
           courts erroneously applied section 2--725(3) of the Uniform 
           Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 26, par. 2--725(3)) 
           rather than section 13--217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. 
           Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 13--217) in calculating the time 
           allowed for refiling this action after it was dismissed in federal 
           court. 
             Section 2--725 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides, 
           in relevant part, as follows: 
               "(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must 
                        be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has 
                        accrued. 
               *** 
               (3) Where an action commenced within the time limited 
                        by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a 
                        remedy by another action for the same breach such other 
                        action may be commenced after the expiration of the time 
                        limited and within 6 months after the termination of the 
                        first action ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 26, par. 2--725. 
           In contrast, section 13--217 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
           provides as follows: 
               "In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or 
                        any other act or contract where the time for commencing an 
                        action is limited, if *** the action is dismissed by a United 
                        States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, then, whether 
                        or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires 
                        during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff, his or her 
                        heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new 
                        action within one year or within the remaining period of 
                        limitation, whichever is greater ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, 
                        ch. 110, par. 13--217. 
             Plaintiffs contend that because section 13--217 of the Code 
           of Civil Procedure applies to "any ** act *** where the time for 
           commencing an action is limited," its one-year savings period 
           takes precedence over that contained in section 2--725(3) of the 
           Uniform Commercial Code. We disagree. 
             Where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is 
           general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other 
           particular and relating to only one subject, the particular 
           provision must prevail. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction 
           Co.,  149 Ill. 2d 190 , 195 (1992). Section 13--217 of the Code 
           of Civil Procedure explicitly governs a wide variety of actions, 
           both real and personal. Conversely, UCC section 2--725(3) 
           governs only actions for breach of contracts for sale. As the 
           more specific provision, section 2--725(3) controls the instant 
           case. 
             In addition to the specificity of the provision, another 
           compelling reason to apply section 2--725(3) herein is to 
           maintain the interjurisdictional uniformity sought by the 
           Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2--725 was written "[t]o 
           introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, 
           thus eliminating the jurisdictional variations and providing 
           needed relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide 
           scale." 810 ILCS Ann. 5/2--725, Uniform Commercial Code 
           Comment (1993). Failure to apply the explicit language of 
           section 2--725(3) in this instance would defeat this goal of 
           uniformity. 
             Plaintiffs cite a number of cases ostensibly supporting the 
           priority of section 13--217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 
           Limer v. Lyman, 241 Ill. App. 3d 125 (1993); Roth v. Northern 
           Assurance Co.,  32 Ill. 2d 40  (1964); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
           Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1988). Unlike 
           the instant case, however, none of the cited cases involved two 
           conflicting savings provisions, and we therefore deem the cases 
           inapplicable. 
             For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit and appellate 
           courts did not err in holding that those plaintiffs who 
           participated in the prior federal litigation of this matter failed to 
           timely file their complaint in Illinois pursuant to section 2-- 
           725(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
 
                     CONCLUSION 
             For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the 
           appellate court, affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the 
           instant complaint as untimely filed. 
 
                                            Affirmed.