Title: Advanced Towing v. Fairfax County Board

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Mims, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
 
ADVANCED TOWING COMPANY, LLC, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091180 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
                               June 10, 2010 
FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Bruce D. White, Judge 
 
 
This appeal challenges the validity of a county ordinance 
under the Equal Protection guarantee contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution and under the 
Dillon Rule.  Because the case comes before us on demurrer, no 
facts are in dispute and the appeal presents pure questions of 
law.  See e.g., Dreher v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 272 Va. 390, 
395, 634 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2006) (decision whether to grant 
demurrer involves issues of law subject to de novo review). 
 
Code § 46.2-1232(A) provides: 
 
§ 46.2-1232.  Localities may regulate removal 
or immobilization of trespassing vehicles. – A.  The 
governing body of any county, city, or town may by 
ordinance regulate the removal of trespassing 
vehicles from property by or at the direction of the 
owner, operator, lessee, or authorized agent in 
charge of the property.  In the event that a vehicle 
is towed from one locality and stored in or released 
from a location in another locality, the local 
ordinance, if any, of the locality from which the 
vehicle was towed shall apply. 
 
 
Pursuant to that section, the Fairfax County Board of 
Supervisors (the Board) adopted, as a part of the county code, 
an ordinance regulating the towing of vehicles.  Section 82-5-
32(e) of the ordinance provides, in pertinent part:  
"Every site to which trespassing vehicles are towed 
shall comply with the following requirement:  (1) A 
tow truck operator must tow each vehicle to storage 
site located within the boundaries of Fairfax County 
. . . ." 
 
Proceedings 
 
Advanced Towing Company, LLC, a firm having its principal 
place of business in Arlington County, Roadrunner Wrecker 
Service, Inc., a firm having its principal place of business 
in Loudoun County, and King’s Towing, Inc., a firm having its 
principal place of business in the City of Fairfax 
(collectively, the Towing Companies) filed a complaint for 
declaratory judgment in the circuit court against the Board, 
contending that the territorial restriction contained in the 
ordinance violated their Equal Protection rights secured by 
the federal and state constitutions. 
 
The Towing Companies alleged that they had contractual 
obligations to property management companies in Fairfax County 
for the removal of trespassing vehicles, that they were 
exposed to possible prosecution for towing vehicles to their 
storage lots located outside the county, that the ordinance 
unfairly discriminated against them and in favor of businesses 
located within the county, and that there was no rational 
basis for such discrimination. 
 
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The Board filed a demurrer, contending that the ordinance 
was entitled to a strong presumption of validity and that the 
complaint set forth no facts sufficient to overcome the 
presumption.  The court sustained the demurrer but gave the 
Towing Companies leave to amend.  The Towing Companies filed 
an amended complaint, the Board again demurred and the court 
again sustained the demurrer.  The Towing Companies filed a 
motion to reconsider in which they asserted an additional 
ground for relief, challenging the ordinance as ultra vires 
under the Dillon Rule, contending that the ordinance exceeded 
the authority granted the county by the General Assembly. 
 
The Board objected to the late assertion of the Dillon 
Rule, but both parties briefed and argued it before the 
circuit court, which considered and decided that question.  
The court denied the motion to reconsider, adhered to its 
previous rulings sustaining the Board’s demurrer, and entered 
final judgment for the Board.  We awarded the Towing Companies 
an appeal. 
Analysis 
A. Equal Protection 
 
 
Respect for the separation of the powers of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government is an 
essential element of our constitutional system.  See Va. 
Const. art. I, § 5 (providing that "the legislative, 
 
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executive, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should 
be separate and distinct").  Unless a suspect classification 
or a fundamental constitutional right is involved, 
considerable deference must be accorded by the courts to 
legislative policy choices. 
 
Here, the Towing Companies and the Board agree that the 
ordinance does not involve any suspect classification or 
fundamental constitutional right.  The territorial limitation 
under consideration does not, therefore, require heightened 
judicial scrutiny, but rather is subject to the most 
deferential standard of judicial review, the “rational basis” 
test.  Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983). 
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to 
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative 
choices.  In areas of social and economic policy, a 
statutory classification that neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against [an] 
equal protection challenge if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification. 
 
. . . . 
 
[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom 
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data. 
 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 
(1993). 
 
A legislative territorial limitation does not in itself 
offend the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cavalier Vending Corp. v. 
 
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State Bd. of Pharmacy, 195 Va. 626, 634, 79 S.E.2d 636, 640 
(1954).  The courts must defer to such a legislative choice if 
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification.  Beach 
Communications, 508 U.S. at 313.  Our analysis, therefore, is 
limited to ascertaining whether such a state of facts could 
have been within the rational contemplation of the Board when 
framing its ordinance. 
 
The Towing Companies point out that if the Board's 
concern was the convenience of owners seeking to retrieve 
their towed vehicles, such owners would be better served if 
vehicles removed from the eastern part of Fairfax County, 
which has an area exceeding 400 square miles, were towed to 
nearby Arlington County, vehicles in the western part of the 
county were towed to nearby Loudoun County, and vehicles towed 
from the central part of the county were towed to the City of 
Fairfax.  Therefore, the Towing Companies argue, because all 
their storage lots are located within 5 1/2 miles of the 
Fairfax County line, any such basis for the territorial 
restriction would be irrational. 
 
The Board points to another basis justifying the 
territorial limitation.  The Fairfax County ordinance in 
question contains a number of provisions regarding the 
safeguarding of stored vehicles, including nighttime 
 
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illumination, fencing, posted signs, and the like.  The second 
sentence of the enabling statute, Code § 46.2-1232(A), quoted 
above, expressly contemplates that a locality may permit 
vehicles to be towed to another locality for storage, and 
provides in such event that the ordinance "of the locality 
from which the vehicle was towed shall apply."  The Board 
points out that, notwithstanding that authorization, the 
statute makes no provision for the enforcement of any of its 
protective regulations in any other locality.  Thus, the Board 
argues, the only way to ensure that its regulations are 
enforced is to confine the towing of vehicles to the area in 
which its own officers have the authority to enforce them. 
 
The Board’s argument, based entirely on the pleadings 
before the court on demurrer, posits a “reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification” made by the ordinance under review.  The 
territorial limitation therefore survives analysis under the 
Equal Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.* 
B. The Dillon Rule 
 
Dillon’s Rule stipulates that municipal corporations have 
only those powers expressly granted by statute, those 
                     
* The Towing Companies’ complaint also referred to the 
anti-discrimination provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  Because no argument was presented 
 
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necessarily implied therefrom, and those that are essential 
and indispensable to the exercise of those expressly granted.  
In Virginia, a corollary rule provides that boards of 
supervisors of counties are similarly limited to those powers 
conferred expressly or by necessary implication by statute.  
Our cases refer to these principles collectively as the Dillon 
Rule.  See Arlington County Bd. v. White, 259 Va. 708, 710 
n.1, 712, 528 S.E.2d 706, 707 n.1, 708 (2000); City of 
Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217, 221, 518 S.E.2d 314, 316 
(1999); Commonwealth v. Arlington County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 
573-74, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977). 
 
Further, our cases recognize the “reasonable selection of 
method” rule, which permits local governing bodies to exercise 
discretionary authority when a statutory grant of power has 
been expressly made but is silent upon the mode or manner of 
its execution.  Arlington County Bd., 217 Va. at 574-75.  
 
In the present case, the power to regulate towing is 
expressly granted to localities by Code § 46.2-1232(A).  
Although that section clearly implies that localities may 
permit vehicles to be towed outside their borders, it falls 
far short of compelling them to do so.  Subsection (B) of the 
statute prohibits any requirement in a local towing ordinance 
                                                                
to the circuit court concerning that provision, we do not 
consider it on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
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that a towing business engage in any business other than a 
towing and recovery business.  Subsection (C) of the statute 
contains an extensive list of requirements that a local towing 
ordinance may impose on towing and recovery operators for the 
protection of the public, but none of those are mandatory upon 
the local governing bodies.  All are permissive and none 
relate to the locations to which vehicles may be towed.  See 
e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 250 Va. 184, 194, 
462 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1995) (explaining that "the word 'may' is 
prima facie permissive, importing discretion . . ."). 
With respect to the territory within which vehicles are 
to be stored after being towed, the statutory grant of power 
to regulate towing is silent as to the manner of its 
execution.  It follows that the localities may exercise 
reasonable discretion in prescribing, by ordinance, the 
territory within which towed vehicles shall be stored without 
contravening the Dillon Rule. 
Conclusion 
Because the circuit court correctly held that the 
ordinance in question did not offend the Equal Protection 
guarantee contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal 
constitution and did not contravene the Dillon Rule, we will 
affirm the judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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