Title: Peyton v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
TYRONE ORLANDO PEYTON 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 032464 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 5, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia erred in determining that a trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in revoking the suspended sentence of a defendant 
who had been placed in an alternative sentencing program 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2, but was unable to complete the 
program due to an unforeseen medical condition. 
BACKGROUND 
The material facts are not in dispute.  On April 3, 2001, 
Tyrone Orlando Peyton was convicted of possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248 in the 
Circuit Court of Henrico County (the trial court).  On July 12, 
2001, the trial court sentenced Peyton to ten years in prison 
and suspended seven years of that sentence.  The trial court 
further ordered that the Department of Corrections (the 
Department) evaluate Peyton to determine his suitability for 
participation in the Detention Center Incarceration Program 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2.  Upon the favorable 
recommendation of the Department and the determination by the 
 
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trial court that Peyton would benefit from the program, the 
trial court suspended the balance of Peyton’s sentence and 
placed him on probation conditioned upon his entry into and 
successful completion of the program.  On October 1, 2001, he 
was transferred from local confinement to a designated 
residential detention center maintained by the Department. 
On January 11, 2002, Peyton began vomiting blood while at 
the detention center and was taken to the hospital.  At that 
time, approximately one month remained for Peyton to complete 
the requirements of the program.  When Peyton returned from the 
hospital, he continued to have abdominal pain.  Peyton was 
removed from the program by the Department on January 15, 2002 
for “medical/psychological reasons.” 
The trial court subsequently held a show cause hearing on 
February 7, 2002 and determined that Peyton had violated the 
terms and conditions of his suspended sentence by not completing 
the program.  Although the trial judge acknowledged that he did 
not question the “sincerity” of Peyton’s desire to complete the 
program, he stated that “I don’t think there’s anything I can 
do” because the alternative sentencing program “didn’t work 
out.”  By order entered on February 11, 2002, the trial court 
revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the original three 
year active sentence, crediting Peyton with time served.  By 
 
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order entered on February 27, 2002, the trial court denied 
Peyton’s motion to reconsider. 
Peyton timely filed a petition for appeal in the Court of 
Appeals in which he contended that the trial court abused its 
discretion in revoking his suspended sentence because his 
discharge from the detention center was not due to his willful 
conduct or behavior.  The Court of Appeals granted Peyton an 
appeal. 
In a decision by a divided three-judge panel, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Peyton v. 
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 356, 362, 585 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2003).  
Initially, the majority of the panel noted that trial courts are 
granted broad discretion by Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspended 
sentences and probation.  It then further noted that, with 
respect to the detention center program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(2) 
requires a prospective participant to meet certain physical and 
emotional requirements as a condition for acceptance and 
participation in the program and that Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(4) 
permits the trial judge to revoke all or part of a suspended 
sentence upon a finding that a defendant has been removed from a 
detention center program by the Department for “intractable 
behavior” as such is defined in Code § 19.2-316.1.  Id. at 358-
60, 585 S.E.2d at 346-47.  Reasoning that the record supported 
the conclusion that Peyton no longer met the physical and/or 
 
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emotional requirements for participation in the detention center 
program and, thus “did not have the ability to conform his 
behavior to that necessary to complete the program,” the 
majority of the panel held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when it revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence.  Id. 
at 361, 585 S.E.2d at 347. 
The dissenting judge initially noted that while broad, the 
power of a trial court to revoke a suspended sentence is not 
unlimited because “[b]y well established rules of decision the 
cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a 
suspension must be a reasonable cause.”  Id. at 362, 585 S.E.2d 
at 348 (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Reasoning that Peyton’s failure to complete the 
detention program resulted from a medical inability to continue 
in the program rather than from an unwillingness or refusal to 
do so, the dissenting judge concluded that Peyton’s illness was 
not a reasonable cause for revocation and, thus, the trial court 
abused its discretion in revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence.  
Id. at 364, 585 S.E.2d at 349. 
We awarded Peyton an appeal from the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
DISCUSSION 
Before considering the specific statutes applicable to the 
facts of the present case, we briefly review the general 
 
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statutory scheme relating to the suspension of sentence, 
probation, and revocation that operates in conjunction with 
those statutes.  In essence, Code § 19.2-303 permits the trial 
court, after conviction, to suspend all or part of a sentence 
and to place the defendant on probation “under such conditions 
as the court shall determine.”  Code § 19.2-306 addresses the 
trial court’s authority to respond to a violation of those 
conditions by the defendant and permits it to revoke the 
suspended sentence “for any cause the court deems sufficient” 
that occurs within the probation period, within the period of 
suspension, or, if neither is fixed, within the maximum period 
for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to 
be imprisoned. 
Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives 
to incarceration, such as probation or conditionally suspended 
sentences, are highly remedial and should be liberally construed 
to provide trial courts valuable tools for rehabilitation of 
criminals.  See, e.g., Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684, 
292 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1982); Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478, 
484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952).  Accordingly, we have held 
consistently that “revocation of a suspended sentence lies in 
the discretion of the trial court and that this discretion is 
quite broad.”  Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 
S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976).  Nonetheless, we have required that 
 
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“[t]he cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a 
suspension must be a reasonable cause. . . .  The discretion 
required is a judicial discretion, the exercise of which 
‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’ ” 
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 220, 116 S.E.2d 270, 273 
(1960) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38 
S.E.2d 479, 484 (1946)); see also Hamilton, 217 Va. at 327, 228 
S.E.2d at 556; Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136 
S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964). 
Consistent with the above described statutory scheme, the 
General Assembly has enacted additional statutes providing 
alternative sentencing sanctions to the trial courts in the form 
of a state-wide community based system of programs established 
and maintained by the Department.  Code § 53.1-67.3.  One such 
program consists of residential detention centers designed “to 
provide a highly structured, short-term period of incarceration 
for individuals committed to the Department under the provisions 
of § 19.2-316.2.  The program shall include components for 
military-style management and supervision, physical labor in 
organized public works projects, counseling, remedial education, 
substance abuse testing and treatment, and community re-entry 
services.”  Code § 53.1-67.8. 
As pertinent to the present case, before a defendant who 
otherwise would have been sentenced to incarceration for a 
 
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nonviolent felony, such as the felony for which Peyton was 
convicted, can be accepted into the Detention Center 
Incarceration Program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(1) requires that he 
undergo “evaluation and diagnosis by the Department to determine 
suitability for participation in the Detention Center 
Incarceration Program.  The evaluation and diagnosis shall 
include a complete physical and mental evaluation of the 
defendant.”  The statute further provides that upon receipt of a 
favorable recommendation by the Department and a determination 
by the trial court that the defendant will benefit from the 
program and “is capable of returning to society as a productive 
citizen,” the court “shall impose sentence, suspend the 
sentence, and place the defendant on probation . . . .  Such 
probation shall be conditioned upon the defendant’s entry into 
and successful completion of the Detention Center Incarceration 
Program.”  Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(3). 
Consistent with the authority granted to the trial court 
under Code § 19.2-306 to respond to a violation of the 
conditions of a suspended sentence by the defendant, Code 
§ 19.2-316.2(A)(4) provides that: 
Upon the defendant’s (i) voluntary withdrawal 
from the program, (ii) removal from the program by the 
Department for intractable behavior as defined in 
§ 19.2-316.1, or (iii) failure to comply with the 
terms and conditions of probation, the court shall 
cause the defendant to show cause why his probation 
and suspension of sentence should not be revoked.  
 
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Upon a finding that the defendant voluntarily withdrew 
from the program, was removed from the program by the 
Department for intractable behavior, or failed to 
comply with the terms and conditions of probation, the 
court may revoke all or part of the probation and 
suspended sentence and commit the defendant as 
otherwise provided in this chapter. 
 
The Commonwealth does not contend, nor does the record 
support, that Peyton voluntarily withdrew from the detention 
center program.  The Department, however, is permitted to remove 
a defendant from this program for intractable behavior.  In 
pertinent part, Code § 19.2-316.1 defines “intractable behavior” 
to mean “that behavior which, in the determination of the 
Department of Corrections, . . . indicates an inmate’s 
unwillingness or inability to conform his behavior to that 
necessary to his successful completion of the program.”  By 
reference, this definition is incorporated into the provisions 
of Code § 19.2-316.2(4).  Stressing the term “inability,” the 
Commonwealth contends that this definition of intractable 
behavior does not require a finding of willfulness.  Rather, 
because the detention center program requires a defendant to 
meet certain physical and mental requirements for acceptance 
into the program, the Commonwealth contends that a defendant “is 
expected to maintain that physical and emotional suitability for 
the duration of the program.”  Because the Department removed 
Peyton from the program upon its determination that for 
“medical/psychological reasons” he was unable to conform his 
 
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behavior to that necessary for the successful completion of the 
program, the Commonwealth maintains that the trial court had the 
authority to revoke his suspended sentence, and the Court of 
Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s judgment to do so. 
We do not disagree with the Commonwealth’s basic premise 
that a defendant, such as Peyton, who receives the benefit of 
having his sentence suspended and being placed on probation 
conditioned upon entering and completing an alternative 
sentencing program, such as a detention center program, has a 
responsibility to comply with the terms and conditions of his 
suspended sentence.  Moreover, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals’ conclusion that neither the Department nor the trial 
court was required to continue Peyton in the detention center 
program when Peyton at no fault of his own was no longer 
physically, or mentally, suited for the program.  Peyton, 41 Va. 
App. at 360, 585 S.E.2d at 347.  However, Peyton’s removal from 
the program under such circumstances does not resolve the 
question whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence without considering 
reasonable alternatives to imprisonment. 
There is surely a distinction between the willful failure 
of an inmate to comply with the requirements of the detention 
center program and the conditions of his suspended sentence 
permitting his participation in that program and the subsequent 
 
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inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen 
medical condition.  While in either case the inmate necessarily 
will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the trial 
court has the discretion to revoke all or part of the inmate’s 
suspended sentence, the proper exercise of that discretion in 
the latter case requires the trial court to consider all the 
circumstances, including recognition that the inmate’s removal 
from the program was not the result of the inmate’s behavior or 
conduct. 
Here, the record shows that the trial court either merely 
considered Peyton’s medical condition as satisfying the 
definition of intractable behavior or presumed that it had no 
option but to revoke Peyton’s suspended sentence because the 
detention program “didn’t work out.”  Clearly, however, the 
trial court revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence without 
considering reasonable alternatives to imprisonment even while 
expressly finding that Peyton’s failure to complete the program 
was caused by his medical condition and was contrary to his 
desire to continue in the program.  Under those circumstances, 
the trial court’s action was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the judgment of the trial court.  We will reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will remand the 
 
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case to that Court with direction to remand the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with the view 
expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.