Title: Goldstein v. Secretary of the Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12931 
 
ROBERT GOLDSTEIN1 & others2  vs.  SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 16, 2020. - April 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Elections, Ballot, Validity of nomination papers.  Secretary of 
the Commonwealth.  Constitutional Law, Elections. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 8, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
Robert G. Jones for the plaintiffs. 
 
Anne Sterman, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
Thomas O. Bean & James D. Henderson, for Ranked Choice 
Voting 2020 Committee, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On April 8, 2020, the plaintiffs, each of whom 
seeks to be a candidate for elective office in the primary 
                                                          
 
1 On behalf of himself and others similarly situated. 
 
 
2 Kevin O'Connor and Melissa Bower Smith, on behalf of 
themselves and others similarly situated. 
2 
 
election scheduled for September 1, 2020, brought an emergency 
petition in the county court, seeking relief under G. L. c. 214, 
§ 1, and G. L. c. 231A, § 1.  They requested a declaration that, 
in light of the emergency circumstances arising from the COVID-
19 pandemic, the signature requirements in G. L. c. 53, §§ 7 and 
44 (minimum signature requirements), to be listed on the ballot 
for a party's nomination pose an "unconstitutionally severe 
burden on the fundamental rights" of all Massachusetts would-be 
candidates.  They seek, by means of this declaration, to 
eliminate the minimum signature requirements for the September 1 
primary election.  In the alternative, they asked for various 
forms of equitable relief, such as substantially reducing the 
number of required signatures of certified voters, extending the 
applicable filing deadlines, and permitting electronic 
signatures, as a means of remedying the constitutional 
violation.  A single justice of this court reserved and reported 
this petition to the full court. 
The plaintiffs do not contend that the minimum signature 
requirements in §§ 7 and 44 are facially unconstitutional; that 
is, they do not contend that these requirements unduly burden 
the constitutional right of a candidate to seek elective office 
in ordinary times.  Rather, they contend that these 
requirements, when applied in these extraordinary times of a 
declared state of emergency arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, 
3 
 
create an undue burden on a prospective candidate's 
constitutional right to seek elective office. 
The Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) agrees that, 
"as a practical matter, application of the signature 
requirements in the context of the current public health crisis 
imposes a greater than usual burden on [the plaintiffs], 
triggering heightened scrutiny."  The Secretary also agrees 
that, in this time of pandemic, the justification for the 
current signature requirements cannot survive this scrutiny, and 
that this court must craft a remedy for this constitutional 
violation.  We also agree, and fashion equitable relief intended 
to substantially diminish that burden, while respecting the 
legislative purpose for imposing minimum signature requirements. 
In short, for all candidates seeking to appear on the State 
primary ballot on September 1, we order three forms of relief.  
First, we order that the number of required signatures be 
reduced by fifty percent (50%).  Second, we extend the deadlines 
for candidates running for State district and county offices to 
submit their nomination papers to local election officials for 
certification and for the filing of certified nomination papers 
with the Secretary to May 5, 2020, and June 2, 2020, 
respectively, which are the current due dates for party 
candidates running for Federal and Statewide offices.  Third, 
subject to the restrictions outlined later in this opinion, we 
4 
 
order the Secretary to allow the submission and filing of 
nomination papers with electronic rather than wet-ink original 
signatures ("wet" signatures).  We emphasize that the 
declaration we make and the equitable relief we provide is 
limited to the primary election in these extraordinary 
circumstances, which is the sole subject of the case before us, 
and does not affect the minimum signature requirements for the 
general election this year or for the primary elections in any 
other year.3 
Background.  1.  Ballot access.  This year, 2020, is an 
election year in Massachusetts for certain Federal,4 State,5 and 
county offices.6  The State primary election, in which candidates 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the Ranked 
Choice Voting 2020 Committee. 
 
 
4 Federal offices include electors of President and Vice-
President, United States senator (the seat currently held by 
Senator Edward Markey), and United States representative (all 
nine districts).  See Secretary of the Commonwealth, A 
Candidate's Guide to the 2020 State Election, at 5 (rev. Feb. 
2020) (2020 Candidate's Guide). 
 
 
5 Statewide offices include executive councilor (all eight 
districts), State senator (all forty districts), and State 
representative (all 160 districts).  See 2020 Candidate's Guide, 
supra. 
 
 
6 County offices include the register of probate 
(Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Norfolk, and Plymouth Counties 
only), county commissioner (same), county treasurer (Bristol, 
Dukes, Norfolk, and Plymouth Counties only), council of 
government executive committee (Franklin County only), and 
sheriff (Norfolk County only).  See 2020 Candidate's Guide, 
supra. 
5 
 
affiliated with the various political parties (Democratic, 
Green-Rainbow, Libertarian, and Republican) are nominated to run 
for the offices at issue, is currently scheduled for September 
1, 2020.  See Secretary of the Commonwealth, A Candidate's Guide 
to the 2020 State Election, at 5 (rev. Feb. 2020) (2020 
Candidate's Guide).  The general election, in which the party 
nominees will compete against one another as well as against any 
nonparty candidates for the offices on the ballot, is scheduled 
for November 3, 2020.  See id. 
The three plaintiffs aspire to appear on the State primary 
election ballot in September in an effort to secure their 
respective party's nominations for three different Federal and 
State offices.  Robert Goldstein seeks to be the Democratic 
Party's nominee for the office of United States representative 
for the Eighth Congressional District in Massachusetts.  Kevin 
O'Connor seeks the Republican Party's nomination for the office 
of United States senator.  Melissa Bower Smith aspires to be the 
Democratic Party's nominee for the office of State 
representative for the Fourth Norfolk District. 
a.  Minimum signature requirements.  To appear on the 
ballot, candidates like the plaintiffs are required by statute 
to, among other things, submit nomination papers containing a 
6 
 
minimum number of certified voter signatures.7  See G. L. c. 53, 
§ 44.  The number of certified signatures required differs 
depending on the office the candidate is seeking.  Id.  For 
example, a candidate like O'Connor, seeking election as a United 
States senator, must secure 10,000 certified voter signatures.  
Id.  A candidate like Goldstein, seeking election as a 
representative to the United States Congress, requires 2,000.  
Id.  And a candidate seeking election as a State representative, 
like Smith, must obtain 150.  Id.8 
b.  Certified signatures.  To qualify as "certified," a 
signature must be of a voter registered in the geographic area 
corresponding to the office for which the candidate is seeking 
nomination.  See G. L. c. 53, § 7.  In addition, if the 
candidate is seeking the nomination of a particular political 
                                                          
 
 
7 Candidates for Federal and Statewide offices who are not 
affiliated with a party also must satisfy certain minimum 
signature requirements to appear on the general election ballot 
in November.  The deadlines for the submission and filing of 
their nomination papers, however, do not expire until July 28 
and August 25, 2020.  See 2020 Candidate's Guide, supra at 6-9.  
Federal and Statewide nonparty candidates, therefore, are not 
similarly situated to the plaintiffs.  Nor has anyone appeared 
in this action and challenged the signature requirements and 
deadlines for nonparty candidates for Federal or Statewide 
offices.  Therefore, we do not address the constitutionality of 
those requirements and deadlines. 
 
 
8 The number of certified voter signatures required for the 
other offices at issue in the upcoming State primary election 
are as follows:  Executive councilor, 1,000; State senator, 300; 
Barnstable and Franklin County offices, 500; and all other 
county offices, 1,000.  See G. L. c. 53, § 44. 
7 
 
party, as is the case with the plaintiffs, the voter must be 
registered with the same party or as "unenrolled," meaning 
registered to vote, but with no party affiliation.9  See G. L. 
c. 53, § 37; 2020 Candidate's Guide, supra at 13.  Accordingly, 
for a candidate like O'Connor, seeking the Republican Party 
nomination for United States senator, a Statewide office, 
signatures may be secured from voters registered anywhere in 
Massachusetts as either Republicans or unenrolled.  For a 
candidate like Goldstein or Smith, seeking the Democratic Party 
nomination to represent a specific district in Massachusetts, 
the signatures must be from voters registered in that district 
as either Democrats or unenrolled. 
c.  Nomination papers.  The process for obtaining and 
certifying the required number of signatures commences when the 
Secretary prepares the nomination papers and furnishes them to 
candidates.  See G. L. c. 53, § 47.  This year, the nomination 
papers were furnished on February 11, 2020.10  Before obtaining 
any signatures, candidates must fill in the top of the 
nomination papers with certain information, including their 
                                                          
 
 
9 Unenrolled voters are commonly referred to as 
"Independents."  See 2020 Candidate's Guide, supra at 4. 
 
 
10 The Secretary is required to furnish the nomination 
papers on or before the fifteenth Tuesday preceding the deadline 
established in G. L. c. 53, § 48, for filing certified 
nomination papers.  See G. L. c. 53, § 47. 
8 
 
name, address, and party affiliation (if any), and the office 
they are pursuing.  See G. L. c. 53, § 8.  The candidates, or 
others working on their behalf, must then gather voter 
signatures on the nomination papers or on "exact copies" of such 
forms.  See G. L. c. 53, § 17.  Voters are required to sign the 
nomination papers "in person as registered or substantially as 
registered" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 53, § 7.  The Secretary 
interprets this combination of requirements, that the voter sign 
"in person" on the original nomination papers or on "exact 
copies" thereof, to mean that the signatures eventually 
submitted and filed must be original handwritten or "wet" 
signatures.  However, "any voter who is prevented by physical 
disability from writing may authorize some person to write his 
or her name and residence in his or her presence."  Id.  Voters 
also must indicate the address where they are currently 
registered on the nomination papers.  Id. 
d.  Certification and filing deadlines.  The statutorily 
driven timeline that follows the receipt of the nomination 
papers from the Secretary has two major deadlines, which can 
differ depending on the office a candidate is pursuing.  The 
first is the deadline by which the candidate must submit the 
nomination papers to local election officials for certification.  
At least twenty-eight days before the deadline for the 
submission of the certified nomination papers to the Secretary, 
9 
 
the candidates must submit their nomination papers to local 
election officials in each city and town where the individuals 
who signed the papers are registered to vote.11  See G. L. c. 53, 
§§ 7, 46.  For a candidate like Smith, pursuing a seat as a 
State representative, this deadline falls on or before April 28, 
2020.  For candidates like O'Connor and Goldstein, seeking 
Federal offices, this deadline falls on or before May 5, 2020. 
Applying regulations promulgated by the Secretary, see 950 
Code Mass. Regs. § 55.03(1) (2004),12 local election officials 
then review each signature on the nomination papers.  See G. L. 
c. 53, §§ 7, 46.  Signatures can be disallowed for a variety of 
reasons, including that the voter is not registered at the 
address provided, the voter's name as signed does not match the 
voter's name as registered, the voter's signature or address is 
illegible, the voter is enrolled in the wrong party, or the 
voter's signature already appeared on the candidate's nominating 
papers.  See 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 55.03(1).  Due to the 
potential for the disallowance of numerous signatures, prudent 
candidates collect more signatures than are required, see 2020 
Candidate's Guide, supra at 16 (encouraging candidates to do 
                                                          
 
 
11 "Each nomination paper should contain signatures of 
registered voters from only ONE city or town."  2020 Candidate's 
Guide, supra at 16. 
 
 
12 The regulations were promulgated by the Secretary 
pursuant to authority granted in G. L. c. 53, § 7. 
10 
 
just that), and local election officials are required to certify 
two-fifths more signatures than are required to make the ballot, 
G. L. c. 53, § 7.  Local election officials are required to 
complete the certification process no later than the seventh day 
before the deadline for the submission of the papers to the 
Secretary.  G. L. c. 53, §§ 7, 46.  There then follows a short 
period for candidates to seek a review of disallowed signatures.  
See G. L. c. 55B, § 6. 
The second major deadline, from which the first is 
calculated, is the date by which nomination papers certified by 
local election officials must then be filed with the Secretary.  
For candidates seeking election to State district and county 
offices, this deadline is on or before the last Tuesday in May 
of an election year, which, this year, means on or before May 
26, 2020.  See G. L. c. 53, §§ 10, 48.  This is the deadline by 
which Smith, seeking election as a State representative, must 
file her certified nomination papers with the Secretary.  
Meanwhile, for candidates who are seeking election to Federal or 
Statewide offices, as are O'Connor and Goldstein, the deadline 
is on or before the first Tuesday in June, which, in this 
election year, is on or before June 2, 2020.  See G. L. c. 53, 
§ 48. 
e.  Objection process.  Registered voters from the district 
in which a candidate seeks nomination have three days from the 
11 
 
filing deadlines with the Secretary to file objections to 
nomination papers with the State Ballot Law Commission (SBLC).  
See G. L. c. 55B, § 5.  The SBLC then has twenty-one days from 
the closure of the objection periods to render a decision on any 
objections.  See G. L. c. 55B, § 10.  Given the aforementioned 
filing deadlines with the Secretary, therefore, objections to 
nomination papers would have to be decided by the SBLC on or 
before June 19 and 26, 2020, as applicable. 
f.  Preparation of ballots.  For any election in which a 
Federal office is at issue, Federal law mandates that ballots 
must be transmitted to military and overseas voters no later 
than forty-five days in advance of the election.  See 52 U.S.C. 
§ 20302(a)(8)(A).  For the upcoming September 1 primary 
election, this means that local election officials must transmit 
the ballots to military and overseas voters by July 18.  In 
turn, this means the Secretary's office may have as little as 
eighteen days from the June 26 SBLC decision deadline to the 
July 14 date when ballots must be in the hands of local election 
officials to prepare, proofread, and finalize the 2,200 
different ballot styles required for the different jurisdictions 
in the Commonwealth.  According to the Secretary's office, this 
timeline is already tight, since the process usually takes three 
weeks to complete. 
12 
 
2.  COVID-19 pandemic.  On March 10, 2020, the Governor 
declared a state of emergency throughout the Commonwealth in 
response to the spread of COVID-19, where he invoked his 
statutory authority to "from time to time issue recommendations, 
directives, and orders as circumstances may require."  See 
Executive Order No. 591.  The following day, the World Health 
Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic.  On 
March 15, 2020, the Governor issued orders closing all public 
and private elementary and secondary schools, prohibiting public 
and private gatherings of more than twenty-five people, and 
prohibiting the on-premises consumption of food and drink at 
restaurants, bars, and other food establishments.  Then, on 
March 23, 2020, he issued another executive order, further 
limiting public and private gatherings to no more than ten 
people and requiring all nonessential businesses to close their 
physical workplaces and facilities.  See COVID-19 Order No. 13.  
See also COVID-19 Order No. 21.  At his direction, the 
Department of Public Health (DPH) issued a "Stay-at-Home 
Advisory" the following day, declaring that it was "critically 
important" for everybody to "[o]nly leave home for essential 
errands such as going to the grocery store or pharmacy," and 
that, when people do leave home, to "practice social distancing 
by staying [six] feet away from others."  DPH Public Health 
Advisory:  Stay-at-Home Advisory (Mar. 24, 2020).  On April 10, 
13 
 
DPH issued another advisory recommending that people wear face 
coverings or masks when social distancing is not possible.  See 
DPH Advisory Regarding Face Coverings and Cloth Masks (Apr. 10, 
2020).  All of these restrictions on everyday life, which will 
remain in effect until at least May 4, 2020, have been imposed 
in an effort to mitigate the spread of the virus, which can 
occur at an alarming rate.  Even with these restrictions in 
place, as of April 16, 2020, there have been 32,141 confirmed 
cases of COVID-19 in Massachusetts, resulting in 1,245 deaths.  
See Department of Public Health, Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19) Cases in MA, as of April 16, 2020, https://mass.gov 
/doc/covid-19-cases-in-massachusetts-as-of-april-16-2020 
/download [https://perma.cc/FR75-PDFY]. 
With the onset of the pandemic and the imposition of 
restrictions that followed, the plaintiffs and other candidates 
could not safely and reasonably gather voter signatures in the 
usual ways, namely, going to places where large numbers of 
potential registered voters are likely to be, such as town 
centers, malls, grocery stores, or political meetings.  In the 
face of this predicament, the plaintiffs and other candidates 
wrote to the Secretary, seeking relief from the minimum 
signature requirements.  The Secretary, however, maintained that 
he lacked the authority to act, and that only the Governor and 
14 
 
Legislature could provide such relief.13  The Governor and 
numerous legislators have expressed their willingness to 
consider a legislative "fix" to the predicament, but bills that 
were introduced in the Legislature that would reduce the number 
of required signatures for those offices requiring 1,000 or more 
signatures by fifty percent, see 2020 Senate Doc. No. 2632, or 
by two-thirds for all offices, see 2020 House Doc. No. 4981.  
The Senate has engrossed its bill, but, as of the time this 
opinion was submitted, neither legislative "fix" had been 
enacted. 
Discussion.  The right to seek elected office, like the 
related right to vote, is a fundamental constitutional right in 
Massachusetts.  Article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights provides, with impressive brevity and clarity, that 
"[a]ll elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of 
this commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall 
establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to 
elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments."  
                                                          
 
 
13 The Secretary issued an advisory recommending, among 
other things, that candidates and volunteers "take appropriate 
precautions as they continue to gather signatures.  If you are 
interacting with voters, be sure to have hand sanitizer or 
disinfectant wipes available and wash your hands frequently.  If 
possible, consider providing signers with fresh pens and sheets 
of paper."  See Secretary of the Commonwealth, COVID-19 
Elections Updates, https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/covid-
19/covid-19.htm [https://perma.cc/ZM2J-GBY8]. 
15 
 
Over the ensuing 240 years since the adoption of our Declaration 
of Rights in 1780, art. 9 has served to protect the 
"fundamental" and "intertwine[d]" rights of candidates to gain 
access to the ballot and of voters to cast their ballots as they 
see fit.  See Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 538, 560 (2012) (LAM). 
As with many fundamental rights, the "court has sustained 
statutes which reasonably regulate elections and access to a 
place on the ballot."  Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 819, 
821-822 (1975).  See Opinion of the Justices, 413 Mass. 1201, 
1209 (1992), quoting Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 811 
(1978) ("the right to be elected, preserved in art. 9, is not 
absolute but 'is subject to legislation reasonably necessary to 
achieve legitimate public objectives'").  In fact, the court has 
previously considered the same minimum signature requirements at 
issue here and concluded that they withstood constitutional 
scrutiny.  LAM, 462 Mass. at 567.  In that case, the plaintiff 
Libertarian party sought to transfer the certified voter 
signatures obtained by one candidate to another candidate in 
order to qualify the latter to be on the general election 
ballot.  See id. at 545-546.  The present case comes before the 
court under an entirely different set of facts and 
circumstances.  The framework through which we analyze it, 
however, remains the same. 
16 
 
When we evaluate the constitutionality of a restriction on 
access to the ballot, we apply a "sliding scale approach, . . . 
through which [we] weigh the character and magnitude of the 
burden the State's rule imposes on the plaintiffs' rights 
against the interests the State contends justify that burden, 
and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the 
burden necessary" (quotations, citations, and alterations 
omitted).  Id. at 560.  "Regulations imposing severe burdens on 
plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a 
compelling state interest.  Lesser burdens . . . trigger less 
exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests 
will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions" (quotations and citations omitted).  Id.  More 
recently, recognizing that the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights may be more protective of voting rights than the Federal 
Constitution, we have declared that we do not use the phrase 
"severe burden," which arises from Federal constitutional 
jurisprudence, in determining whether strict scrutiny applies 
but instead apply strict scrutiny to a voting requirement that 
"significantly interfere[s]" with the fundamental right to vote.  
See Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 27, 35, 36 n.21, 40 (2018).  We need not 
decide here whether the Massachusetts Constitution provides 
greater protections for the art. 9 rights at issue, because it 
17 
 
is undisputed that, under the circumstances arising from this 
pandemic, we should apply strict scrutiny to the minimum 
signature requirements regardless of whether we apply a "severe 
burden" or "significant interference" formulation. 
In ordinary times, the minimum signature requirements to 
appear on the ballot in Massachusetts only impose "modest 
burdens" on prospective candidates for public office, so "there 
need be only a rational basis undergirding the regulation in 
order for it to pass constitutional muster" (citation omitted).  
LAM, 462 Mass. at 567.  And in ordinary times the rational basis 
threshold is "easily" met, as the "State's interest in ensuring 
that a candidate makes a preliminary showing of a substantial 
measure of support before appearing on the ballot is legitimate" 
(quotation, citation, and alteration omitted).  Id.  Minimum 
signature requirements ensure "that the candidates who appear on 
the . . . ballot have demonstrable support among the voting 
public."  Barr v. Galvin, 626 F. 3d 99, 111 (1st Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 929 (2011).  In doing so, they "safeguard 
the integrity of elections by avoiding overloaded ballots and 
frivolous candidacies, which diminish victory margins, 
contribute to the cost of conducting elections, confuse and 
frustrate voters, increase the need for burdensome runoffs, and 
may ultimately discourage voter participation in the electoral 
18 
 
process."  Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365, 
371 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 917 (1993). 
But, as we have recognized, statutory requirements that 
were once considered constitutionally permissible may later be 
found to interfere significantly with a fundamental right as 
societal conditions and technology change.  See Chelsea 
Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 37, citing Goodridge v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 341 n.33 (2003).  And 
similarly, statutory requirements that in ordinary times impose 
only modest burdens on prospective candidates for public office 
may significantly interfere with the fundamental right to run 
for political office in a time of pandemic. 
We need not dwell long on how dramatically conditions have 
changed in Massachusetts since the Governor first announced a 
state of emergency arising from the COVID-19 pandemic on March 
10.  All who presently live in the Commonwealth have seen it 
(and lived it), and, for additional details, posterity can look 
to our recent decision in Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. 
Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431, 433-434 (2020).  
Suffice it to say that, during the state of emergency, the 
traditional venues for signature collection are unavailable:  
few people are walking on public streets in town centers; malls 
are closed, as are all but essential businesses; restaurants 
provide only take-out food or delivery; public meetings, if held 
19 
 
at all, are conducted virtually; and the vast majority of people 
are remaining at home.  See Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., 
Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 762 (2014) (recognizing candidates' 
constitutional right to solicit nominating signatures outside 
entrance to supermarket); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 
Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 92 (1983) ("a person needing signatures for 
ballot access requires personal contact with voters"). 
When people do encounter each other, they do so only by 
maintaining a "social distance" of at least six feet, and 
attempt to keep such encounters as brief as possible.  Because 
it has been shown that one can carry and spread the COVID-19 
virus without any apparent symptoms, every encounter with 
another person, especially a stranger, poses a risk of 
infection.  Because it is not altogether clear how long the 
COVID-19 virus may "survive" on various surfaces and objects, 
people are reluctant to touch any pen or piece of paper that has 
been touched by another, at least unless they quickly can wash 
or sanitize their hands.  Accordingly, if a candidate seeks to 
obtain signatures on nomination papers in the traditional ways, 
he or she reasonably may fear that doing so might risk the 
health and safety not only of the person requesting the 
signature but also of the persons who are signing, of the 
families with whom they live, and potentially of their entire 
community. 
20 
 
In short, as the Secretary rightly and readily 
acknowledges, the minimum signature requirements, which may only 
impose a modest burden on candidates in ordinary times, now 
impose a severe burden on, or significant interference with, a 
candidate's right to gain access to the September 1 primary 
ballot, and the government has not advanced a compelling 
interest for why those same requirements should still apply 
under the present circumstances.  See LAM, 462 Mass. at 560.  
Indeed, it concedes that there is none.  The minimum signature 
requirements, therefore, in this time of pandemic are 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, and other 
similarly situated candidates. 
If the Legislature had enacted a law on March 23 imposing 
harsh new requirements that made it substantially more difficult 
for candidates to obtain the required signatures to get on the 
September 1 primary ballot, we no doubt would declare the law 
unconstitutional.  The Legislature, of course, did not do this, 
but it is fair to say that the pandemic did.  To be sure, "wet" 
signatures can still be obtained, but the ability to do so 
safely has been greatly diminished or been made significantly 
more laborious.  No fair-minded person can dispute that the 
fundamental right to run for elective office has been 
unconstitutionally burdened or interfered with by the need to 
21 
 
obtain the required "wet" signatures in the midst of this 
pandemic.  See LAM, 462 Mass. at 560. 
The burdens imposed by the statutory minimum signature 
requirements are not inevitable.  There are alternatives that 
could preserve the legislative purpose that a candidate 
demonstrate a certain level of support in order to win a place 
on the ballot and yet protect the public from the health risks 
associated with obtaining "wet" signatures. 
As a general matter, the principle of separation of powers 
set forth in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
prevents the "judiciary [from] substituting its notions of 
correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Leno, 415 Mass. 835, 841 
(1993).  But where fundamental constitutional rights are 
violated, and where the Legislature fails to remedy the 
constitutional deficiencies after having had the opportunity to 
do so, and where an aggrieved litigant files suit seeking 
remedial relief for the constitutional violation, the judiciary 
must provide such a remedy.  See Cepulonis v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930, 938 (1983), citing Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).  Here, where the filing deadline 
for nomination papers fast approaches, and the Legislature has 
yet to take decisive action, we have little choice but to 
provide equitable relief, pursuant to G. L. c. 214, § 1, to 
22 
 
protect the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and those 
similarly situated.  See Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 
Mass. 765, 781 (1978) ("In order to avoid the unconstitutional 
aspects of the statute, and to achieve the basic legislative 
purpose, we conclude that the judge must have discretion to 
fashion the judgment in this case . . .").  "It is a well 
settled principle that, in fashioning appropriate relief, the 
issuance and scope of equitable relief rests within the sound 
discretion" of the court.  Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 
784, 794 (1978), citing Martin v. Murphy, 216 Mass. 466, 468 
(1914).  We recognize, though, that where these extraordinary 
circumstances require us to make policy judgments that, in 
ordinary times would be best left to the Legislature, our remedy 
must be "no more intrusive than it ought reasonably be to ensure 
the accomplishment of the legally justified result."  Perez v. 
Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 730 (1980).14 
                                                          
 
 
14 The action we take here is by no means unprecedented.  
Other States, addressing the potential for voter 
disenfranchisement in the face of natural disasters, have 
similarly provided narrowly tailored equitable relief to protect 
the constitutional rights of voters.  See, e.g., Florida 
Democratic Party v. Scott, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1257-1259 (N.D. 
Fla. 2016) (ordering Statewide extension of voter registration 
deadline in response to Hurricane Matthew); Georgia Coalition 
for the People's Agenda, Inc. v. Deal, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 
1345-1346 (S.D. Ga. 2016) (ordering extension of voter 
registration deadline for one county in response to Hurricane 
Matthew).  In addition, at least one court has declared minimum 
signature requirements to be unconstitutional in light of the 
pandemic and, as a result, reduced the numbers.  See Omari 
23 
 
The plaintiffs have requested various alternative forms of 
relief.  Before we discuss the relief that is granted, we take a 
moment to address the requests for relief that we do not believe 
are justified. 
The plaintiffs first request that we not only declare the 
minimum signature requirements unconstitutional as applied to 
them and similarly situated candidates during this primary 
election, but also declare the minimum signature requirements 
void.  In effect, the plaintiffs seek to avoid the minimum 
signature requirements altogether and proceed directly to the 
September 1 primary ballot.  We decline to order this remedy; 
the justification for the current statutorily prescribed 
signature requirements is outweighed by the burden those 
requirements impose under the present conditions, but there is 
still merit to having some signature requirements.  Even in the 
midst of the pandemic, the State has a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that a candidate makes a preliminary showing of support 
among the electorate before appearing on the ballot.  In 
addition, the pandemic has not completely deprived candidates of 
the ability to gather signatures.  Between February 11, 2020, 
when the nomination papers were first made available, and March 
                                                          
 
Faulkner for Va. vs. Virginia Dep't of Elections, CL2000-1456, 
Cir. Ct. of Richmond (Mar. 25, 2020) (order reducing signature 
requirement for candidates seeking to be Republican Party 
nominees for United States Senate from 10,000 to 3,000). 
24 
 
23, 2020, when the first significant restrictions were imposed 
in response to the pandemic, candidates had forty-one days in 
which to gather signatures without any constraint.  Since March 
23, the process has become unconstitutionally burdensome, but 
not impossible.  And the remedies we provide in this decision 
will permit additional signatures to be safely obtained.  It 
would not be equitable, therefore, to declare the minimum 
signature requirements void altogether. 
Given the looming deadlines, the plaintiffs also request, 
in the alternative, that we extend the deadlines for submitting 
nomination papers to local election officials and for filing the 
certified nomination papers with the Secretary.  The Secretary, 
however, maintains that an extension beyond May 5 for 
submissions to local election officials and May 26 for filing 
with the Secretary is not workable, given the time needed for 
the SBLC to deal with any objections to the nomination papers, 
for the Secretary's office to prepare the 2,200 different styles 
of ballots required for the different jurisdictions in the 
Commonwealth, and for local election officials to then transmit 
the ballots by July 18 to military and overseas voters, as 
required by Federal law.  The plaintiffs have not disputed the 
Secretary's timeline or his analysis of the problems that would 
arise from a greater extension, and we defer to his experienced 
judgment in this regard.  Therefore, we will extend the 
25 
 
deadlines only for candidates running for State district and 
county offices, and extend their deadlines only to match the 
deadlines that apply to party candidates running for Federal and 
Statewide offices:  from April 28 to May 5 to submit nomination 
papers to local election officials for certification, and from 
May 26 to June 2 to file the certified nomination papers with 
the Secretary. 
The plaintiffs have further requested, as alternative 
relief, that we "substantially" reduce the number of signatures 
required to get on the primary election ballot.  The Secretary 
agrees, but suggests that the reductions should only apply to 
offices for which 1,000 or more certified voter signatures are 
currently required.  This would preclude any reduction of the 
required minimum signatures for candidates for State senator and 
representative, who currently must secure 300 and 150 
signatures, respectively, and for offices in certain counties 
(e.g., Barnstable County register of probate and Barnstable 
County commissioner), who currently need to obtain 500 
signatures.  We agree that, in light of the prevailing 
circumstances, the most equitable alternative is to reduce the 
number of signatures required.  We do not agree, however, that 
it would be equitable to do so only for some candidates and not 
others. 
26 
 
Presumably, the number of signatures required for each 
office was established to reflect a balance between the number 
of people represented by the elected office and the burden 
involved in obtaining the signatures.  Hence, a Statewide office 
such as United States senator warrants burdening a candidate 
with a requirement of gathering 10,000 signatures, while an 
office representing fewer people, such as a State senator, 
warrants a signature requirement of 300.  It seems only just 
that the same rationale should apply when it comes to reducing 
the minimum numbers in response to the pandemic, and that the 
same percentage decrease should apply to all offices.  To hold 
otherwise would alter the relative ratio of the minimum 
requirements chosen by the Legislature.  For instance, a primary 
candidate for the State Senate must gather only three per cent 
of the signatures that a primary candidate for the United States 
Senate must gather; that ratio should not be altered by the 
remedy we devise. 
In determining the percentage of the across-the-board 
reduction, the Secretary has suggested a reduction of fifty 
percent (50%), the same amount that has been proposed in one of 
the bills currently pending in the Legislature.15  We agree with 
                                                          
 
 
15 We note that both the Secretary and 2020 Senate Doc. No. 
2632 would limit this fifty percent (50%) reduction to offices 
requiring 1,000 or more signatures. 
27 
 
that suggested percentage decrease.  Fifty percent (50%) has a 
rational connection to the underlying constitutional violation.  
As noted supra, the candidates had forty-one days after the date 
when nomination papers were first made available (February 11) 
to gather signatures without any significant restrictions 
related to the pandemic.  That all changed on March 23, when the 
Governor issued the order limiting public and private gatherings 
to no more than ten people, requiring all nonessential 
businesses to close their physical workplaces and facilities, 
and directing DPH to issue the Stay-at-Home Advisory, urging 
people to leave home only for essential errands and to practice 
social distancing when they did.  Forty-one days is almost 
exactly fifty percent (50%) of the time between February 11 and 
May 5, which is now the deadline by which all primary candidates 
have to collect signatures and submit them to local election 
officials.  Even if candidates were slow to start, it was 
significantly challenging, but not impossible, to gather 
signatures after March 23, and as discussed infra, candidates 
will now have some opportunity to obtain electronic signatures 
through May 5, so it should not be unfairly burdensome for a 
serious candidate to obtain one-half of the required signatures.  
The number of certified registered voter signatures required to 
get on the September 1 primary ballot, therefore, is reduced by 
fifty percent (50%) for all candidates. 
28 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs also request that we order State 
officials to explore "less stringent strategies" for the 
collection and submission of signatures, such as through the 
electronic collection of signatures.  They note that a few 
States have implemented the use of electronic signatures and 
submissions for purposes of securing access to the ballot, 
including at least two that did so in response to the current 
pandemic.16  In the order reserving and reporting this case to 
the full court, the parties were asked to address the logistics 
of, and potential problems with, collecting and verifying 
electronic signatures.  Their submissions have convinced us that 
there are too many issues and unanswered questions to allow us 
confidently to impose a remedy that would transform a nomination 
system that required "wet" signatures into one that permitted a 
broad range of electronic signatures, including a printed name.  
To name just a few, there are the inherent time constraints 
discussed supra; there are potential logistical, legal, and 
cyber-security related concerns; and, of course, there is the 
                                                          
 
 
16 Arizona already had adopted an electronic candidate 
nominating system called "E-qual," which allows voters to show 
support for candidates "from the comfort of [their] home[s] or 
anywhere [I]nternet access is available."  See https://apps 
.azsos.gov/equal [https://perma.cc/2HDB-YHSF].  New Jersey and 
Florida, meanwhile, have taken some action in this regard in 
response to the pandemic.  See New Jersey Governor, Executive 
Order No. 105 (Mar. 19, 2020); Florida Secretary of State, 
Emergency Rule No. 1SER20-2 (Apr. 3, 2020). 
29 
 
fact that local and State governments are already operating 
under severe constraints, and often with skeletal staffing, due 
to the pandemic. 
The Secretary, however, has suggested one modest means to 
include electronic signature collection among our equitable 
remedies, which the plaintiffs find attractive, as do we.  
Specifically, the Secretary proposes that we order that 
candidates seeking to be on the ballot for the September 1 
primary election be allowed to scan and post or otherwise 
distribute their nomination papers online.  Voters may then 
download the image of the nomination papers and either apply an 
electronic signature with a computer mouse or stylus, or print 
out a hard copy and sign it by hand.  The signed nomination 
paper can then be returned to the candidate, or a person working 
on the candidate's behalf, either in electronic form (by 
transmitting the "native" electronic document or a scanned paper 
document) or in paper form (by hand or mail).  The candidates 
will still have to submit the nomination papers to local 
election officials in hard copy paper format, but the proposed 
process will alleviate the need for, and the risk associated 
with, obtaining "wet" signatures.  The Secretary is ordered 
forthwith to provide clear guidance to prospective candidates as 
to how this electronic signature collection process may be 
30 
 
accomplished effectively, although candidates need not await 
that guidance to get started. 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, the plaintiffs' 
application for declaratory relief is allowed to the extent that 
we declare, in the limited context of the current pandemic, that 
the minimum signature requirements in G. L. c. 53, §§ 7 and 44, 
for candidates in the September 1, 2020, primary election are 
unconstitutional.  As a remedy for this constitutional 
violation, we order that (1) the number of required signatures 
be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for all offices; (2) the 
deadlines for candidates running for State district and county 
offices to submit their nomination papers to local election 
officials for certification and for the filing of certified 
nomination papers with the Secretary be extended to May 5, 2020, 
and June 2, 2020, respectively, which are the current due dates 
for party candidates running for Federal and Statewide offices; 
and (3) subject to the restrictions outlined in this decision, 
the Secretary shall allow the submission and filing of 
nomination papers with electronic rather than "wet" signatures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
KAFKER, J. (concurring).  Given the pressing need for 
immediate action during the pandemic, and the technological 
limitations in our existing electoral infrastructure identified 
by the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary), I concur in 
the court's multifaceted remedy.  I write separately, however, 
to express concern that those responsible for our electoral 
process have concluded that they are unable to solve the problem 
of in-person signatures with the more straightforward and 
targeted solution of electronic filing of signatures, and 
therefore have required the court to temporarily rewrite the 
election laws.  Those responsible for our elections must have 
the technological tools to respond to the pandemic that 
confronts us, which has fundamentally changed the world as we 
know it.  Leaving these electoral problems for the courts to 
solve should be a last resort. 
When we declare an act unconstitutional, we must do so in 
the least intrusive and most judicious manner possible.  See 
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167 
(1998) ("We must construe statutory provisions, when possible, 
to avoid unconstitutionality, . . . and to preserve as much of 
the legislative intent as is possible in a fair application of 
constitutional principles").  Even as these extraordinary 
circumstances require us to fashion judicial remedies for such 
constitutional violations, we must do our utmost to avoid making 
2 
 
policy decisions that are the responsibilities of other branches 
of government.  See Commonwealth v. Leno, 415 Mass. 835, 841 
(1993) (recognizing "the undesirability of the judiciary 
substituting its notions of correct policy for that of a 
popularly elected Legislature" [quotations and citation 
omitted]).  Our duty is to do the minimum of what is necessary 
to conform those statutes to the Massachusetts Constitution, and 
not to rewrite those statutes more extensively.  See id.  See 
also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) 
("Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation 
so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and 
will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of 
a statute or judicially rewriting it" [quotation, citation, and 
alteration omitted]). 
The fundamental issue here is the statutory requirement 
that nomination signatures be obtained "in person."  See G. L. 
c. 53, § 7.  As the court highlights, and as we have previously 
stated, the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
candidates have a "substantial measure of support" before they 
may appear on the ballot.  See Libertarian Ass'n of Mass. v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 538, 567 (2012), 
quoting Barr v. Galvin, 626 F.3d 99, 111 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 929 (2011).  Otherwise, the ballot would be 
overcrowded and confusing.  See id. at 567 & n.29.  Moreover, 
3 
 
the requirement that candidates obtain a minimum number of 
signatures in order to qualify for the ballot is reasonably 
related to this interest.  See id.  Rather, it is the in-person 
aspect of the signature requirement that renders it unduly 
burdensome in light of the current pandemic and quarantine, as 
this requirement presents public safety risks for both the 
campaign and individual signatories.  An in-person signature 
simply cannot be obtained without endangering the health of 
those collecting the signatures and those signing their names. 
The least intrusive remedy to this constitutional 
deficiency would be one that carves out the in-person 
requirement and replaces it with its nearest equivalent:  
electronic signatures.  This solution should be technologically 
feasible and relatively straightforward in the midst of a 
pandemic:  use electronic nomination papers that can be 
electronically signed by voters and electronically submitted to 
local election officials. 
Electronic signatures are the norm in the private sector 
and many areas of government.  Even before automatic voter 
registration took effect, the Secretary maintained an online 
portal that allowed citizens to complete an online affidavit 
using an image of their electronic signature from the registry 
of motor vehicles to register to vote.  See G. L. c. 51, § 33A.  
The Legislature has also already laid the groundwork for the 
4 
 
verification of registered voters' electronic signatures.  The 
Legislature has expressly determined that, as a general matter, 
"[a] record or signature may not be denied legal effect or 
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form," and, 
"[i]f a law requires a signature, an electronic signature 
satisfies the law."  G. L. c. 110G, § 7 (a), (d).  The 
Legislature and the Secretary have also facilitated certain 
business filings by allowing both electronic signatures and 
electronic submissions.  See G. L. c. 156D, §§ 1.40 et seq. 
(including electronic signatures in definition of "sign" or 
"signature" for purposes of incorporation); 950 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 113.06(4) (2006) (requiring "original" signature on corporate 
filings unless documents are submitted "by authorized electronic 
or facsimile transmission").  If this trend toward acknowledging 
electronic signatures is acceptable for the registration of 
voters and the creation of businesses, it should also be 
sufficient to meet ballot signature requirements. 
One would think that, had electronic signatures been 
expeditiously approved for use on nomination papers by the 
Legislature and the Secretary, nothing more would be necessary 
to remedy the unconstitutional burden here.  In an age dominated 
by social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, and one that 
requires sophisticated digital political campaigning, it is 
difficult to imagine that a viable legislative candidate for the 
5 
 
State house or State senate would be unable to electronically 
alert and engage the 150 or 300 followers that the candidate 
needs to obtain electronic signatures to appear on the ballot.  
Those seeking Statewide office should also be able to satisfy 
their reasonable signature requirements if a readily accessible 
electronic signature process were adopted.  Indeed, this would 
presumably be the norm if the technical capacities of our 
election infrastructure were anywhere near as sophisticated and 
adaptable as those of the private sector and other areas of 
government. 
Unfortunately, according to the Secretary, election 
officials lack the technological capacity at this time to 
readily accept electronic signatures for ballot nominations.  
The Secretary contends that there are significant limitations on 
the capacity of local and State election officials to receive 
and verify such electronic signatures for the purposes of 
satisfying the signature requirements, even when those 
requirements involve a manageable numbers of signatures, ranging 
from 150 to 10,000, plus the additional number of signatures 
necessary to create a margin of error for the candidates.  
Specifically, the Secretary contends that individual 
municipalities may not be able to open large e-mail attachments 
containing voter signatures, and may be unable to access online 
file storage sites due to cybersecurity concerns.  Why this 
6 
 
remains so difficult in the modern era is somewhat inexplicable.  
Why a simple e-mail attestation that includes the name, address, 
and party registration of the voter is insufficient is also not 
obvious.  The process for verifying even "wet" signatures 
appears to consist primarily, if not completely, of a comparison 
of the name, address, and voter registration on the "wet" 
signature with the name, address, and voter registration on 
record.  See 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 55.03(1) (2004).  Why a 
simple e-mail is more suspect than a "wet" signature remains 
unclear. 
Nevertheless, because of the current technological limits 
on our election capabilities and the procedural requirements of 
the current process, candidates will be forced to continue to 
submit their nomination papers in hard copy form.  According to 
the Secretary, we are limited to the following process for 
allowing electronic signatures.  First, candidates will be 
permitted to electronically post or distribute their nomination 
papers.  Then, voters must download the papers and either 
electronically sign, or print and physically sign, the document 
and return it to the candidate in electronic or paper form.  The 
candidate will then be tasked with producing all voter 
signatures in hard copy paper format, and physically submitting 
his or her nomination papers to local officials for 
certification.  At minimum, this awkward, multistep process will 
7 
 
require candidates or campaign volunteers to risk exposure to 
the virus by venturing out, either to the post office or a local 
official's physical office, in order to deliver the nomination 
papers to election officials. 
Allowing voters to submit their signatures electronically 
as part of this cumbersome process, by itself, is not enough to 
fix the problem.  Indeed, the parties agree that this stilted 
approach to electronic signatures is not enough.  Rather, given 
the apparent lack of technological capacity to readily accept 
and verify electronic signatures in a more straightforward 
manner –- even in the midst of a global pandemic -- this court 
is instead forced to impose alternative remedies, such as 
reducing the statutorily prescribed signature threshold and 
extending the time limits for gathering signatures. 
Unfortunately, these alternative remedies raise other 
constitutional issues.  When we start to alter the numbers of 
signatures required to qualify for the ballot, we begin to stray 
into territory reserved for the Legislature.  See Kenniston v. 
Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 Mass. 179, 189 (2009).  While 
reducing the signature threshold by fifty percent may be a sound 
Solomonic solution, and roughly corresponds to the amount of 
time candidates have lost, this appears to be more of a policy 
choice best left to the Legislature, which can act with great 
8 
 
dispatch when it chooses to do so.1  Nonetheless, in the instant 
case, at this last minute in the signature gathering process, 
and in the absence of legislative action, this court is forced 
to impose these alternative remedies itself to conform the 
election laws to constitutional requirements during the pending 
emergency.  These remedies also appear to be the least intrusive 
ones available, in light of the deficient technological 
capabilities identified by the Secretary and the imminent 
approaching deadlines for submitting nomination papers. 
In this "high tech" era, and in the midst of a global 
pandemic that severely restricts close personal contact, the 
failure to be able to solve manageable technological problems on 
the eve of an election is confounding and distressing.  At a 
time when we need to be fundamentally rethinking what must be 
done in person and what can instead be done electronically, our 
electoral process seems dangerously unequipped to adapt to a new 
paradigm. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically changed our current 
reality, not only in the Commonwealth, but across the globe, and 
not simply for a month or two.  Despite the significant negative 
                                                          
 
 
1 We recognize that elected officials are presently 
operating under the same quarantine restrictions as the rest of 
the Commonwealth.  This makes the enactment of major substantive 
changes more difficult to accomplish, particularly where such 
changes require collaborative efforts among significant numbers 
of people. 
9 
 
effects of this lockdown, health officials have urged the 
importance of maintaining quarantine efforts for the foreseeable 
future.  Tozzi and Bloomberg, "Social distancing until 2022?  It 
may be necessary, according to Harvard coronavirus researchers," 
Fortune (Apr. 14, 2020) https://fortune.com/2020/04/14 
/social-distancing-until-2022-coronavirus-end-date-spread-covid-
19-harvard-researchers/ [https://perma.cc/HQJ5-4257].  It 
remains to be seen when the current measures will no longer be 
necessary.  The Governor has indicated that the existing 
lockdown will remain in place until at least May 4, 2020.  See 
COVID-19 Order No. 21.  Even to the extent that the spread of 
the virus slows in the coming months, there are indications it 
may again surge in the fall.  See Tozzi and Bloomberg, supra.  
In any event, it is clear that the effects of COVID-19 will be 
felt for years to come, and that we must adapt to face the long-
term logistical challenges that this new reality poses to our 
society, particularly for in-person interactions. 
Other States have adapted their election machinery to 
address the electronic signature problem.  As the court 
observes, ante at note 16, Arizona has adopted a centralized 
system for allowing voters to electronically sign candidates' 
nomination papers, called "E-Qual."  See 
https://apps.azsos.gov/equal/ [https://perma.cc/2HDB-YHSF].  The 
E-Qual website prompts voters to provide select personal 
10 
 
information, which is then used to access their voter 
registration record.  See id.  Once their voter registration 
record has been identified, voters may electronically sign a 
candidate's nominating petition.  See id.  As the website 
boasts, this system allows voters to show their "support for a 
candidate from the comfort of [their] home[s] or anywhere 
[I]nternet access is available."  See id. 
Despite the apparent lack of technological solutions 
available for purposes of the current election cycle, it would 
appear that the Commonwealth has the means to ameliorate this 
issue going forward, though not in time to address the issue 
before the court.  As explained by the amicus, the Commonwealth 
is already expanding its acceptance of electronic signatures in 
other areas of election administration.  Pursuant to legislation 
passed in 2018, the Commonwealth began implementing an automatic 
voter registration process on January 1, 2020.  See G. L. c. 51, 
§ 42G½; St. 2018, c. 205, § 4.  As a part of this process, 
automatic voter registration agencies, such as the registry of 
motor vehicles,2 must transmit a voter's electronic signature to 
the Secretary, who transmits the same to the board of registrars 
                                                          
 
2 An "automatic voter registration agency" is defined as "a 
location at a state agency where an eligible citizen may 
register to vote."  G. L. c. 51, § 42G½ (a), (b). 
11 
 
or election commission of the city or town where the voter 
resides.  G. L. c. 51, § 42G½ (e). 
Municipal registrars therefore already have at least a 
growing database of electronic signatures of voters registered 
in the Commonwealth.  It follows, then, that they should have 
the capability to compare electronic signatures submitted for a 
candidate's nomination papers with electronic signatures 
submitted by automatic voter registration agencies.  See G. L. 
c. 51, § 42G½; 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 55.03(1)(b).  They should 
therefore be able to scale up to wider use of electronic 
signatures in the near future.  That future, however, is 
apparently not now.  For that reason, I am forced to concur. 
In sum, while I agree with the court that the technological 
limitations described by the Secretary prevent us from replacing 
the in-person requirement with electronic signatures alone in 
the short time before the signatures are due, and require the 
multifaceted remedy the court proposes, I feel compelled to 
emphasize that those responsible for our election process must 
have the necessary tools to quickly adapt to the current 
pandemic and the future crises to follow.  Absent such 
technological adaptability, our elections will be imperiled and 
our election laws may themselves have to be rewritten in the 
midst of a crisis, as was done here.  That is an invitation to 
conflict and confusion that must be avoided.