Title: Cleveland v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-86.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-86 
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-86.] 
The General Assembly may not by statute prohibit the municipal home-rule 
authority granted by Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution—
R.C. 4921.25 is a general law that will prevail over conflicting municipal 
ordinances, but the second sentence of the statute purporting to limit 
municipal home-rule authority violates Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 
Ohio Constitution—The second sentence of R.C. 4921.25 is severed from 
the statute. 
(No. 2012-1616—Submitted August 21, 2013—Decided January 21, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97679, 
2012-Ohio-3572. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. The General Assembly may not by statute prohibit the municipal home-rule 
authority granted by Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. 
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2. R.C. 4921.25 is a general law that will prevail over conflicting municipal 
ordinances, but the second sentence of the statute purporting to limit 
municipal home-rule authority violates Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
3. The second sentence of R.C. 4921.25, which reads, “Such an entity is not 
subject to any ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal corporation, 
county, or township that provides for the licensing, registering, or 
regulation of entities that tow motor vehicles,” is severed from the statute. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case arises from a complaint for declaratory judgment brought 
by appellee, the city of Cleveland, challenging the constitutionality of R.C. 
4921.25,1 a law that grants the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) 
authority to regulate towing companies as “for-hire motor carriers.”  Because we 
agree with the city that the second sentence of R.C. 4921.25 violates the Ohio 
Constitution’s Home Rule Amendment, Article XVIII, Section 3, by prohibiting 
the “licensing, registering, or regulation” of entities that tow motor vehicles, we 
sever that portion of the statute.  We further hold that the first sentence of R.C. 
4921.25 is a general law.  Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which held that the entire 
statute was unconstitutional. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Towing companies were not regulated by the PUCO as motor 
carriers under R.C. Chapter 4921 until 2003, when the General Assembly enacted 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 87, 150 Ohio Laws, Part I, 59, 157-158 (enacting R.C. 4921.30 
                                          
 
1 The statute was numbered R.C. 4921.30 when the city’s declaratory-judgment action was filed, 
but as of June 11, 2012, the provision was renumbered by 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 487.  We 
will refer to the current number of the statute throughout this opinion. 
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3 
 
[now R.C. 4921.25], which provides that entities engaged in towing motor 
vehicles are subject to regulation by the PUCO as for-hire motor carriers).  In 
2009, the city of Cleveland filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a 
declaration that R.C. 4921.25 violates the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio 
Constitution, which authorizes municipalities to adopt and enforce ordinances that 
do not conflict with general state laws.  The trial court granted summary judgment 
to the state on the grounds that the statute was a general law that does not 
unconstitutionally infringe on the city’s home rule authority.  The Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s judgment in a two-to-one 
decision, concluding that R.C. 4921.25 failed the general-law test outlined in 
Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963.  
Specifically, the Eighth District determined that the statute is “not part of a 
statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment,” “does not have uniform 
operation throughout the state,” fails to set forth police regulations for the 
operation of tow-truck entities and instead simply curtails the city’s police powers 
in this area, and does not prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.  
2012-Ohio-3572, 974 N.E.2d 123, ¶ 34-41 (8th Dist.).  The court of appeals 
accordingly held that because R.C. 4921.25 is not a general law, it 
unconstitutionally attempts to limit municipal home-rule authority. 
{¶ 3} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on the following 
proposition of law: “Because R.C. 4921.25 is part of a comprehensive, statewide 
legislative framework that regulates tow truck operations, it is a general law that 
displaces municipal tow truck ordinances.” 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 4} The state argues that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that R.C. 4921.25 is not a general law and that it unconstitutionally 
attempts to limit municipal home-rule authority.  It asserts that the statute is a 
general law as defined by this court’s decisions and that the statute displaces local 
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towing ordinances.  On the other hand, the city argues that the preemption 
language within R.C. 4921.25 does not qualify as a general law, is outside the 
recognized regulatory scheme for Ohio for-hire motor carriers established in R.C. 
Chapter 4921, and unconstitutionally attempts to limit the city’s municipal home-
rule authority.  Neither party is entirely accurate, for contrary to the city’s view, 
the entire statute must be examined to determine if the statute is a general law, 
and contrary to the state’s suggestion, a general law may not preempt all local 
ordinances. 
{¶ 5} R.C. 4921.25 provides: 
 
Any person, firm, copartnership, voluntary association, 
joint-stock association, company, or corporation, wherever 
organized or incorporated, that is engaged in the towing of motor 
vehicles is subject to regulation by the public utilities commission 
as a for-hire motor carrier under this chapter.  Such an entity is not 
subject to any ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal 
corporation, county, or township that provides for the licensing, 
registering, or regulation of entities that tow motor vehicles. 
 
{¶ 6} While the city does not challenge the state’s ability to regulate 
towing entities as it does other motor carriers, the city does attack the 
constitutionality of the statute’s second sentence that purports to totally preempt 
local authority to regulate towing entities, even through ordinances that do not 
conflict.  We must examine this legal question using home-rule precedent. 
A.  R.C. 2941.25 as a General Law 
{¶ 7} Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution states, 
“Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
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government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 
and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 
{¶ 8} “A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when ‘(1) 
the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-
government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict 
with the statute.’ ”  Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 
N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.  No one disputes that any city ordinance regulating towing 
entities would be a matter of police power or safety rather than an exercise of self-
government.  Thus, any city ordinance of this type must yield if it conflicts with a 
general state law. 
{¶ 9} We set forth a four-part test for evaluating whether a statute is a 
general law in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 
963: “To constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute 
must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) 
apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) 
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant 
or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, 
or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens 
generally.”  Id. at syllabus.  We agree with the reasoning of the appellate panel’s 
dissenting judge in this case to hold that R.C. 4921.25 meets all four parts of the 
general-law test. 
1.  Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals concluded that there is no comprehensive 
statutory scheme that covered tow-truck companies and that it could not infer an 
intent to preempt local legislation based upon broad regulatory enactment in this 
field.  With respect to the court’s conclusion that the statute violates part one of 
the test because the General Assembly did not enact a separate statutory scheme 
for towing entities but merely redefined “for-hire motor carriers” to include 
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towing companies, we do not agree that the General Assembly was required to do 
more.  R.C. 4921.25 is part of the statewide and comprehensive statutory scheme 
for regulating for-hire motor carriers. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 4921.25 specifically classifies towing entities as for-hire 
motor carriers subject to PUCO regulation.  The PUCO is accordingly tasked with 
a number of duties relating to these entities: supervising and regulating them, 
regulating their safe operation, adopting reasonable rules for highway 
transportation of property in interstate and intrastate commerce, and requiring the 
filing of reports and other data.  R.C. 4905.81.  Clearly, by subjecting towing 
enterprises to the PUCO’s regulations, the General Assembly has made R.C. 
4921.25 a part of statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment.  The statute 
satisfies the first prong of the Canton test. 
2.  Uniform Operation Throughout the State 
{¶ 12} The second prong of the Canton test asks whether the statute 
applies and operates uniformly throughout the state.  There can be no question 
that R.C. 4921.25 applies and operates uniformly throughout Ohio, and the 
determination by the court of appeals that an exception exists for “private motor 
carriers” is inapposite.  R.C. 4921.25 applies to “[a]ny person, firm, 
copartnership, voluntary association, joint-stock association, company, or 
corporation, wherever organized or incorporated, that is engaged in the towing of 
motor vehicles.”  Thus the statute’s scope is statewide, and there are no 
limitations upon the statute’s operation.  The statute applies uniformly to all 
towing entities and thus satisfies the second prong of the Canton test. 
3.  Establishment of Police Regulations 
{¶ 13} In holding that R.C. 4921.25 fails to satisfy the third prong of the 
Canton test, the court of appeals concluded that by enacting this statute, the 
legislature did not establish police regulations but instead merely limited 
municipal legislative power.  Just as with the first prong, however, an in pari 
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materia reading of the statute indicates otherwise.  By placing towing companies 
under the regulation of the PUCO—including but not limited to the PUCO’s 
traffic regulations governing for-hire motor carriers—R.C. 4921.25 is an exercise 
of the state’s police power.  The statute as a whole does not merely limit the 
legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or 
similar regulations, and so satisfies the third prong of the Canton test. 
4.  Establishment of Rule of Conduct upon Citizens Generally 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals relies upon its determination that the statute is 
not part of a system of uniform statewide regulation in finding that R.C. 4921.25 
fails to meet the fourth prong of the Canton test.  As discussed above, the statute 
applies to all entities engaged in towing operations throughout the state, without 
exception.  We accordingly hold that R.C. 4921.25 meets the fourth Canton prong 
and is a general law for the purposes of home-rule analysis. 
B.  Municipal-Home-Rule Violation 
{¶ 15} While we hold that R.C. 4921.25 itself qualifies as a general law 
under the Canton test, we conclude that a portion of the statute does fail as an 
unconstitutional limit upon municipal home-rule authority. 
1.  Unconstitutional Limitation of Home-Rule Authority 
{¶ 16} The second sentence of R.C. 4921.25 provides that “[towing 
entities are] not subject to any ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal 
corporation, county, or township that provides for the licensing, registering, or 
regulation of entities that tow motor vehicles.”  This sentence violates the third 
prong of the Canton test by purporting to limit legislative power of a municipal 
corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations.  Unlike the first 
sentence of R.C. 4921.25, which subjects towing entities to PUCO regulation, the 
second sentence fails to set forth any police, sanitary, or similar regulations.  
Furthermore, the broad language of the second sentence of R.C. 4921.25 directly 
contradicts the language of Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, 
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which provides that “[m]unicipalities shall have authority * * * to adopt and 
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar 
regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”  Although R.C. 4921.25 
places towing entities under the PUCO’s regulation as “for-hire motor carriers,” 
there may be areas in which the PUCO has not regulated, allowing municipalities 
to adopt and enforce regulations in those areas.  We will not speculate by 
identifying these areas, although the city asserts that Cleveland Codified 
Ordinance 677A.11 is an example of an ordinance that may survive.  It is enough 
to say that municipalities may supplement state law in these unregulated areas, 
provided that the city ordinances do not conflict with general laws. 
{¶ 17} The second sentence of R.C. 4921.25 contradicts Article XVIII, 
Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.  We accordingly hold that the second sentence 
of R.C. 4921.25 unconstitutionally limits municipal home-rule authority. 
2.  The Remedy of Severance 
{¶ 18} When this court holds that a statute is unconstitutional, severing 
the provision that causes it to be unconstitutional may be appropriate.  R.C. 1.50; 
see, e.g., State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 94-
99 (severing portions of felony sentencing laws after determining that they 
violated federal law); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 17, 711 N.E.2d 
203 (1999) (severing the portion of a bill that violated the one-subject rule); State 
ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward , 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 523-524, 644 N.E.2d 369 (1994) 
(severing the portion of a statute that violated Article III, Section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution, which at the time of the decision authorized the General Assembly 
to regulate the application process for pardons but not commutations or 
reprieves); State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St.3d 225, 230, 631 
N.E.2d 582 (1994) (severing the portion of a bill that violated the one-subject 
rule); State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 
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149, 580 N.E.2d 767 (1991) (same).  Severance is suitable, however, only when it 
satisfies our well-established standard. 
{¶ 19} The severance test was first pronounced by this court in Geiger v. 
Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927).  Three questions are to be 
answered in determining whether severance is appropriate: 
 
“(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts 
capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by 
itself?  (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the 
general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect 
to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is 
stricken out?  (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in 
order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional 
part, and to give effect to the former only?” 
 
Id. at 466-467, quoting State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407 (1913), 
paragraph nineteen of the syllabus. 
{¶ 20} Applying the severance test to R.C. 4921.25, we hold that severing 
the second sentence of the statute is appropriate.  As to the first question of the 
test, each sentence in R.C. 4921.25 can stand by itself.  The first sentence defines 
towing entities as for-hire motor carriers and places them under the regulation of 
PUCO.  The second sentence places towing entities outside the realm of local 
regulation.  Neither of these sentences depends on the other for any of its 
meaning. 
{¶ 21} Regarding the second question of the test, the second sentence of 
R.C. 4921.25 is not so connected with the general scope of the statute as to make 
it impossible to give effect to the General Assembly’s intention if the second 
sentence is stricken.  If the second sentence is severed, the first sentence of the 
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statute remains fully effective.  Towing entities are placed under the PUCO’s 
jurisdiction as for-hire motor carriers, and state regulations prevail over any 
conflicting municipal regulations. 
{¶ 22} The statute also satisfies the third test question.  The insertion of 
words or terms is not necessary in order to separate the constitutional part of R.C. 
4921.25 from the unconstitutional part and to give effect to the first sentence only.  
We accordingly conclude that severance is a suitable remedy.  The second 
sentence of R.C. 4921.25, which reads, “Such an entity is not subject to any 
ordinance, rule, or resolution of a municipal corporation, county, or township that 
provides for the licensing, registering, or regulation of entities that tow motor 
vehicles,” is severed from the statute. 
C.  Effect of City Ordinances 
{¶ 23} Finally, the city has provided an example of how it may regulate 
towing companies in such a way that does not conflict with existing PUCO 
regulations.  Cleveland Codified Ordinance 677A.11 addresses public safety 
and has no comparable PUCO rule or regulation.  It states: 
 
No person licensed under Section 677A.02, or any of his 
or her agents or employees, shall respond to the scene of an 
accident unless either summoned by a person having a direct 
interest in the vehicle or vehicles involved or dispatched thereto 
as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated by the 
Director of Public Safety pursuant to Chapter 135. 
 
We of course do not decide today whether this ordinance conflicts with any 
general laws, as that issue is not before us.  But at the very least, the Ohio 
Constitution grants municipalities the authority “to adopt and enforce within 
their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in 
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conflict with general laws.”  (Emphasis added.)  Article XVIII, Section 3, Ohio 
Constitution.  The question of which city ordinances survive as nonconflicting 
remains for another day. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 24} The General Assembly may not by statute prohibit the municipal 
home-rule authority granted by Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution.  
R.C. 4921.25 is a general law that will prevail over conflicting municipal 
ordinances, but the second sentence of the statute purporting to limit municipal 
home-rule authority violates Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution and 
so will be severed.  The judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the judgment and in paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
_____________________ 
 
Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Gary S. 
Singletary, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy 
Solicitor, Megan Dillhoff, Deputy Solicitor, and Pearl M. Chin, Associate 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
 
The Ferris Law Group, L.L.C., and David A. Ferris, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Towing & Recovery Association of Ohio, Inc. 
 
John P. Curp, Cincinnati City Solicitor, and Katherine A. Miefert, 
Assistant City Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae city of Cincinnati. 
________________________