Title: Smith v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Sublette

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Smith v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Sublette1995 WY 35891 P.2d 88Case Number: 94-45Decided: 03/09/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Roland SMITH, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF 
SUBLETTE; Sublette County Sheriff Jack N. Cain, in his official capacity; and 
Jack N. Cain, personally, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sublette County, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Ken M. McLaughlin, Pinedale, 
for appellant.

Sara E. Van Genderen and R. 
Michael Mullikin of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for appellees Bd. of County Com'rs, 
Sublette County, and Sublette County Sheriff Jack N. Cain in his official 
capacity.

Jeffrey A. Donnell of Davis, 
Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, Worland, for appellee Jack N. Cain 
personally.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, a 
former deputy sheriff who voluntarily resigned following the placement of a 
letter of reprimand in his personnel file, appeals the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment to the Sublette County Sheriff and the Sublette County 
Commissioners on his due process and equal protection violation claims. 
Appellant also challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment against 
his claim that the county wrongfully denied him compensation for the overtime 
and mileage expenses he incurred traveling to and from his duty 
station.

[¶2]      We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our review:

I.          
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to appellees 
regarding appellant's   claims 
for violation of his right to equal protection of law?

II.          
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to appellees 
regarding appellant's claims for violation of his right to due process of 
law?

III.         Did 
the district court err in granting summary judgment to appellees regarding 
appellant's claims for overtime and mileage incurred in traveling to and from 
his duty station?

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant, Roland 
Smith (Smith), was first appointed deputy sheriff in 1986 by Sublette County 
Sheriff Slatter. Following the 1986 election, appellee, Sheriff Jack Cain 
(Cain), reappointed Smith to the position of deputy sheriff. Smith and three 
other employees of the Sublette County Sheriff's Office unsuccessfully opposed 
Cain in his 1990 bid for re-election, and Smith continued in his position as 
deputy sheriff under Cain after the 1990 election.

[¶5]      In July, 1991, 
Cain reorganized the Sublette County Sheriff's Office, resulting in the 
elimination of Smith's position in rural patrol. Cain subsequently offered two 
deputies, Smith being one of them, the option of accepting a position at the Big 
Piney/Marbleton duty station or being terminated. Smith lived in Pinedale, the 
county seat, but opted to work at the Big Piney/Marbleton station, requiring him 
to commute seventy miles round trip. Cain informed Smith, when he accepted the 
assignment in Big Piney, that Smith would have to use his own vehicle and 
commute on his own time, as would the other deputy who accepted the Big 
Piney/Marbleton assignment.

[¶6]      On December 31, 
1991, Cain informed Smith, by letter, that Cain had ordered an investigation of 
Smith for alleged misuse of county telephones. The letter further informed Smith 
that he would be suspended from patrol duty while the investigation was ongoing. 
Smith was assigned to detention and other non-patrol duties during his 
suspension and continued to receive his regular pay and 
benefits.

[¶7]      Upon receiving 
the letter advising him of the investigation, Smith became ill and requested 
sick leave which was granted for the remainder of his shift. Later that evening, 
while still on sick leave, Smith went to a bar where he drank until two or three 
o'clock the next morning. Smith incorrectly logged this time on his time sheet 
as holiday leave, rather than sick leave.

[¶8]      On February 2, 
1992, Cain issued to Smith a letter of reprimand which was being placed in 
Smith's personnel file. The letter cited four grounds for the reprimand: misuse 
of county telephones, misuse of sick leave and falsification of time sheets 
(relating to the December 31, 1991 incident), and inappropriate conduct in a 
public place. The letter of reprimand contained a form on which Smith could 
acknowledge receiving the letter and on which he could respond in writing to the 
matters alleged. Smith refused to sign or write anything and was returned to 
regular duty on February 2, 1992.

[¶9]      After receiving 
the letter of reprimand, Smith filed a petition for hearing under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act and the Sublette County Sheriff's Department 
regulations. On February 24, 1992, Cain issued a letter denying the petition for 
hearing. On September 25, 1992, Smith filed a complaint against Cain, personally 
and in his official capacity as sheriff, and against the Board of County 
Commissioners of Sublette County alleging numerous claims, including violations 
of Smith's rights to due process and equal protection of the law and wrongful 
refusal to compensate Smith for his expenses incurred in traveling to and from 
his work station.

[¶10]   On January 11, 1994, the trial 
court issued an order granting summary judgment on all counts to appellees Cain 
and the Board of County Commissioners. This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of 
Review

[¶11]   Summary judgment is proper only 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. WYO.R.CIV.P. 56(c). This Court reviews 
a summary judgment in the same light as the trial court, using the same 
materials. Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994). We 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, affording that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which 
may fairly be drawn from the record. Mountain Cement Co., 884 P.2d  at 
32.

[¶12]   A motion for summary judgment 
places an initial burden upon the movant to make a prima facie showing that no 
genuine issues of material fact exist. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987). Once the movant makes that initial 
showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present specific facts showing 
that genuine issues of fact do exist. Boehm, 748 P.2d  at 
710.

2. Equal 
Protection Claims

[¶13]   Smith's complaint set forth three 
causes of action premised upon equal protection violations. The three claims 
were based upon Cain's alleged disparate enforcement of Sublette County 
Sheriff's Office regulations and upon the alleged disparate compensation of 
travel expenses. Smith contends his opposition of Cain in his 1990 bid for 
re-election motivated Cain's disparate treatment of him.

[¶14]   This Court has held that an equal 
protection violation requires the claimant to demonstrate that "the state has 
made a classification that treats similarly situated people differently and that 
the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate state end." Kautza 
v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 147 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1982)). When a fundamental 
right is involved in the classification, we apply a strict scrutiny analysis 
which requires a showing that the classification is necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest. Kautza, 812 P.2d  at 147; Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. 
1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980).

[¶15]   In Kautza, this Court found the 
complainant had failed to allege a classification and had thus failed to 
sufficiently state an equal protection claim. Kautza, 812 P.2d  at 147. Smith 
likewise failed in his complaint to allege any type of classification, suspect 
or otherwise. On appeal, though, Smith has clarified somewhat his position and 
has alleged that the classification is based upon the exercise of his 
fundamental right to seek elected office.

[¶16]   Smith cites no direct authority for 
his proposition that the right to seek elected office is a fundamental right. 
However, we need not reach that question. We find that Smith, as the nonmovant, 
failed to carry his burden of demonstrating the existence of a question of fact 
concerning his classification based upon the exercise of his right to seek 
elected office.

[¶17]   In support of their motions for 
summary judgment, Cain and the County Commissioners presented, as evidence that 
the alleged classification did not exist, Smith's deposition testimony that he 
had no personal knowledge that Cain's treatment of Smith was motivated by a 
desire for revenge. Smith submitted no evidence in opposition to his own 
testimony; he contends his lack of personal knowledge did not resolve the 
question because he pointed out in his deposition testimony that others did have 
knowledge of Cain's motivations.

[¶18]   We do not find Smith's argument 
persuasive. This court has held that "the evidence that is relied upon to 
sustain or defeat a motion for summary judgment must be such as would be 
admissible at trial." Equality Bank v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992). 
Smith, therefore, could not rely upon hearsay to defeat the summary judgment 
motion; he could have, however, presented competent evidence in the form of 
affidavits or deposition testimony by individuals with personal knowledge of 
Cain's motivations. In light of Smith's failure to present competent evidence in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, we uphold the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment on the equal protection claims. 

3. Due Process 
Claims

[¶19]   In his complaint, Smith alleged 
several violations of his right to due process arising from Sheriff Cain's 
failure to provide notice of the allegations against him and an opportunity to 
be heard. Smith acknowledges that to establish a violation of his due process 
rights, he must show the deprivation of a protected property or liberty 
interest. See Farnsworth v. Town of Pinedale, 968 F.2d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 
1992).

[¶20]   Smith contends that placement of 
the letter of reprimand in his personnel file jeopardized his continued 
employment with the Sublette County Sheriff's Office because any future 
disciplinary action would result in his automatic suspension or termination. 
Smith argues that because the letter of reprimand placed him at risk of 
subsequent deprivation, his property interest in continued employment was 
implicated and he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.

[¶21]   Because we find Smith's due process 
claims moot, we need not decide whether the placement of the letter of reprimand 
in Smith's personnel file implicated a protected property interest. A question 
is moot "when it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased 
to exist." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 909 (5th Ed. 1979). This court will not 
consume its time deciding moot questions and will dismiss issues on appeal which 
are moot. Northern Utilities v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶22]   Smith's complaint requested as 
relief, not damages, but removal of the letter from Smith's file to prevent his 
automatic suspension or termination upon further discipline. Because Smith has 
since voluntarily resigned from his position with the Sublette County Sheriff's 
Office, the letter no longer creates the risk of subsequent deprivation of 
Smith's employment with that office. Whether a due process violation existed or 
not, the relief requested is no longer necessary. We thus dismiss Smith's due 
process claims as moot.

4. Overtime 
and Mileage Expenditures

[¶23]   In his final claim of error, Smith 
contends the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against him on 
requests for payment of overtime and mileage. Smith claims WYO. STAT. § 18-3-110 
entitles him to reimbursement for his expenses incurred in commuting to and from 
his work station in Big Piney.

WYO. STAT. § 18-3-110 (Supp. 
1994) provides:

Any county officer whose official duties require him 
to travel away from the county seat shall be reimbursed by the county for his 
actual and necessary traveling expenses and mileage as provided by W.S. 9-16 [§ 
9-3-103]. No officer requesting mileage expenses shall claim additional 
transportation expense. The board of county commissioners shall not allow 
payment for traveling expenses unless there are receipts for all monies 
expended.

[¶24]   We affirm the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment without determining whether this provision addresses itself 
to expenses incurred in commuting between home and work. The provision applies 
only to expenses incurred by a county officer. In specifying the bond each 
county officer must execute, WYO. STAT. § 18-3-102 (Supp. 1994) lists all county 
officers. WYO. STAT. § 18-3-102 does not designate a deputy sheriff as a county 
officer. Because Smith was not a county officer, he was not entitled to 
reimbursement of any expenses under WYO. STAT. § 18-3-110 and the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment against him on his claim under that 
provision.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   The decision of the trial court is 
affirmed.