Title: Schott v. Chamberlain

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Schott v. Chamberlain1996 WY 120923 P.2d 745Case Number: 95-251Decided: 09/16/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ann 
SCHOTT,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Roxy CHAMBERLAIN and L.E. 
Chamberlain, Jr., 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Ann Schott, 
pro se. 

Loyd E. Smith, 
Lathrop & Rutledge, Cheyenne, for Appellees (Defendants).

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Ann 
Schott appeals an order dismissing her complaint against appellees Roxy 
Chamberlain and L.E. Chamberlain, Jr. for failure to prosecute and entering a 
default judgment against her on appellees' counterclaim.

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part and remand.

[¶3]      Appellant, 
appearing pro se, presents two issues for review:

1.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a default 
judgment and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

2.         
Whether plaintiff had and has a meritorious claim and a meritorious 
defense to defendant's counterclaim.

Appellees 
rephrase the two issues and add a third:

1.         
Whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying a motion 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b) seeking to set aside the default judgment entered against 
Appellant?

2.         
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a motion 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b) seeking to reinstate Appellant's Complaint which had been 
dismissed for failure to prosecute?

3.         
Whether Appellees are entitled to their costs plus attorney's fees on 
appeal because no good cause exists for this appeal and because Appellant has 
failed to supply the Supreme Court with cogent argument or a record?

FACTS

[¶4]      In May 1993, 
appellant filed an action alleging that appellees had breached a verbal 
agreement between the parties. Appellees filed an answer and counterclaim 
asserting that it was appellant who had breached the agreement. There was little 
movement on the case for more than a year. A pretrial conference was finally 
held on July 6, 1994, with the trial being scheduled to begin January 3, 1995. 
In October of 1994, appellant's attorney died, and the trial was continued until 
May 11, 1995, with the trial judge advising appellant to retain counsel as soon 
as possible.

[¶5]      In March 1995, 
appellees filed a motion to compel appellant to answer interrogatories and to 
produce documents requested in discovery. Appellant had answered the 
interrogatories and the request to produce in December 1993, but appellees 
claimed that appellant had done so in a deficient manner. In April 1995, 
appellees filed a motion for entry of default on the basis that appellant had 
failed to defend the action in compliance with W.R.C.P. 55(a). The district 
court entered an order dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to prosecute 
on April 12. On that same day, the clerk of court entered default against 
appellant.

[¶6]      One week later, 
on April 19, appellees moved for a default judgment on their counterclaim, which 
the district court entered the following day in the amount of $8,426.70, citing 
appellant's failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure. Appellant 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the dismissal, entry of default and default 
judgment set aside pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b). Appellant now appeals that 
denial.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends she had good cause for failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 55(a) and, 
consequently, the district court erred in denying her motion to set aside the 
dismissal of complaint and entry of default on appellees' counterclaim. Rule 
55(a) provides:

Entry. - When a party against 
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or 
otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by 
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.

The trial court 
has discretion to impose sanctions, including dismissal or defaulting the 
offending party. Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Wyo. 1986) 
(citing Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493, 498 (Wyo. 1974)). 
Motions to set aside entry of default are reviewed in accordance with W.R.C.P. 
60(b) and are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Id.

[¶8]      In this case we 
find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to set aside either the 
dismissal of complaint or the entry of default on the counterclaim. Appellant 
failed to respond to motions for discovery requests and failed to attend a 
hearing on those motions. She had numerous opportunities to do so, yet she 
continually failed to either respond herself or hire a new attorney. Appellant 
cannot demonstrate good cause for her failure to respond by relying on the death 
of her attorney and the fact that she was then acting pro se. Lack of an 
attorney does not excuse compliance with the rules of civil 
procedure.

[¶9]      Appellant 
additionally contends that the district court failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2) when it entered default judgment against her. We agree and reverse that 
portion of the decision. Rule 55(b)(2) provides that when judgment by default is 
entered by the court against a party who has appeared in the action, that party 
shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 
three days prior to a hearing on the application. In this case, appellees' 
application for default judgment on the counterclaim was made on April 19, 1995. 
Judgment was entered the very next day, on April 20. This clearly is not in 
compliance with the mandatory requirements of our rules and, accordingly, must 
be reversed. This does not mean, however, that a default judgment on the 
counterclaim is foreclosed. We state only that, upon remand, should appellees 
continue to desire to make an application, full compliance with the rules of 
civil procedure is requisite.

CONCLUSION

[¶10]   Appellant has failed to show good 
cause for her failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure; consequently 
there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's sanctions, and they are 
affirmed. However, the district court failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) 
when judgment by default was entered and, therefore, that portion of the 
decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.