Title: Dangel v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dangel v. State1986 WY 174724 P.2d 1145Case Number: 85-275Decided: 09/11/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Bruce DeWayne DANGEL, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WashakieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Deputy State Public Defender, 
and Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question raised in 
this case is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of 
Bruce DeWayne Dangel for three counts of vehicular homicide in violation of § 
6-2-106(a), W.S. 1977.1 In addition Dangel relies upon the 
case of Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 
(1942), and asserts that the acceptance of his testimony would require an 
acquittal as a matter of law. We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient 
to sustain the convictions, and that the Eagan rule is not applicable in this instance. 
We affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the trial 
court.

[¶2.]     Dangel was charged with 
three counts of vehicular homicide in violation of § 6-2-106(a), W.S. 1977. The 
three victims were killed in a single accident. The jury, after trial, returned 
a verdict of guilty as to each of the three counts. Dangel then was sentenced to 
one year in the county jail, with the proviso that seven months of that sentence 
be suspended and that he be afforded the possibility of work release after 
having served 90 days. In addition he was fined $15.00. This appeal is taken 
from that judgment and sentence.

[¶3.]     The fatal accident 
occurred at the intersection of 
Gooseberry Road, Wyoming
 Highway 431, and U.S. Highway 20, 
near Worland in WashakieCounty. Dangel was approaching the 
intersection from the west, and a tractor trailer unit was approaching the 
intersection from the south. Dangel failed to stop for the stop sign which 
controlled the intersection, and apparently he failed to observe an approaching 
southbound pickup truck. He avoided a collision with the semi truck, but 
collided with the pickup and killed the three victims.

[¶4.]     The State of Wyoming proceeded under 
alternative theories of criminal negligence. The State contended that Dangel 
either failed to brake and stop his vehicle or that if his brakes failed to work 
he knew they were not working properly. Dangel's theory of defense was that the 
brakes failed suddenly and that the deaths of the victims were due to an 
accident which occurred without criminal negligence. In presenting this appeal 
Dangel raises only the question of "Whether the evidence presented to the jury 
was insufficient to sustain the conviction of three counts of unlawfully and 
with criminal negligence causing the death of another 
person."

[¶5.]     In examining the 
sufficiency of the evidence we must consider the evidence with respect to each 
of the alternative theories presented by the State:

"* * * If one of the 
alternative theories submitted to the jury is unsupported by substantial 
evidence, the general verdict must be set aside * * *." Fife v. State, 
Wyo., 676 P.2d 565, 568 (1984).

 

Dangel focuses 
his challenge upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he 
did not attempt to stop at the intersection, and we shall first consider that 
evidence.

[¶6.]     There is no question 
that Dangel was familiar with the intersection of Gooseberry Road with 
U.S. Highway 20. He had driven it "hundreds of times." On the previous day he 
drove the same route in another truck. Dangel explained at trial, relying upon 
his position that his brakes had failed, that he observed the northbound truck 
trailer unit, but that he did not see the southbound pickup until it was too 
late. He was attempting to beat the truck trailer unit through the intersection 
when he collided with the pickup truck. The highway patrolman who investigated 
the accident, however, testified about swish and skid marks appearing in the 
sand in the vicinity of the intersection. He testified that these marks 
indicated that the brakes had been retarding, that is, the truck was slowing. He 
testified that he found no evidence that the brakes were engaged more than 66 
feet from the stop sign. Dangel swerved into the left lane between that point 
and the intersection. The swish marks found by the highway patrolman indicated 
that Dangel had attempted to turn to the south which, if successful, would have 
been a maneuver that would have avoided the collision with the semi 
truck.

[¶7.]     With respect to the 
State's theory that Dangel knew the brakes were not operating properly and that 
he continued to drive a defective vehicle, the evidence discloses that Dangel 
was assigned by his employer, Triple A Trucking of Worland, to pick up a load of 
waste water from the Ralston Processing Plant about 100 miles to the north. 
Dangel performed a routine inspection of his truck prior to leaving the shop, 
and that included road testing the air brakes. According to Dangel's testimony 
he noticed on his way to the Ralston Processing Plant that the brakes "seemed a 
little soft, but I was able to stop the truck, no problem." He testified that 
the brakes were softer than they had been at the shop, but that he had no 
concern about them. He stopped for lunch at Meeteetse on the return trip, and he 
was able to stop so he wasn't concerned about the brakes at that point. He 
testified that they then were about the same, "a little soft." Dangel then 
testified that as he approached the intersection of Gooseberry Road with 
U.S. Highway 20 he suffered a brake failure and he then attempted to outrun the 
northbound truck trailer. He said that he did not see the southbound pickup 
until it was too late to apply the maxi brakes successfully. He also denied in 
his testimony that he had been riding the brakes on the 
trip.

[¶8.]     Other testimony 
disclosed that a new brake system had been installed on the truck Dangel was 
driving about three months prior to the accident. A mechanic who worked for 
Triple A Trucking testified that the braking efficiency was 100 per cent. Expert 
witnesses for the State explained the operation of the air brake system on the 
truck and testified that the system and the warning buzzer were operational. One 
of these witnesses agreed that the air system was at 100 per cent, and that the 
foundation brakes were in typical shape, that is 65 to 75 per cent effective. 
That witness stated that overheated brakes were the only thing which would have 
prevented the truck from stopping. Employees of Triple A Trucking who testified 
provided conflicting evidence with respect to the condition of the brakes on the 
truck. The expert witness for Dangel testified that the braking efficiency at 
the time of the accident was less than 50 per cent, and he testified with 
respect to defects that he found in the system.

[¶9.]     The instruction given 
to the jury explained by way of definition that:

"`[C]riminal negligence' 
is much more than ordinary negligence and must be of a great or excessive 
deviation from that standard of care which a reasonable, prudent person would 
exercise under the same or similar circumstances to avoid a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm."

 

It is this 
element of the offense that Dangel contends the evidence is not sufficient to 
support, conceding that substantial evidence would support all other elements of 
the offense.

[¶10.]  The standard of review with respect to 
the sufficiency of evidence when that challenge is raised in a criminal case 
is:

"[T]his court is to 
examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine 
if there is sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict. Broom v. State, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 640 (1985)." Aden v. State, Wyo., 717 P.2d 326 (1986) 
at 327.

This standard 
has been adopted because of its consistency with the standard required in 
federal post-conviction review of state proceedings as set forth in Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh. denied 444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979).

[¶11.]  When the evidence is examined in the 
light most favorable to the state it is apparent that the jury reasonably could 
have concluded that Dangel knew that the brakes on the truck were not operating 
effectively and could further have found that his failure to check the system, 
adjust his driving or simply park the truck was criminally negligent conduct. On 
the other hand the jury reasonably could have disbelieved Dangel and his expert 
witness with respect to the brake failure and could have found that the brakes 
were functioning properly but that Dangel failed to apply the brakes in order to 
stop at the intersection. Applying the proper standard there is sufficient 
evidence under either theory to support the verdicts of guilty returned by the 
jury. The jury clearly could have found criminal negligence because of Dangel's 
failure to stop at the intersection or, if it concluded that there had been a 
brake failure, it could have found knowledge that the brakes were not 
functioning properly and criminal negligence in continuing to operate the truck 
with defective brakes.

[¶12.]  Dangel also contends that even though 
there might be sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts he still is 
entitled to a reversal based upon the language of the court in Eagan v. State, 
58 Wyo. 167, 198, 128 P.2d 215, 225-226 (1942), in which the court 
said:

"[W]hile the jury are 
ordinarily the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses, the rule has its 
limitations, and many cases have announced modifications thereof, the composite 
of which seems to be substantially as follows:

Where an accused is the 
sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case at bar, his 
testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been 
impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his 
testimony should be accepted."

[¶13.]  The court over the years has dealt with 
reliance by defendants upon the proposition articulated in Eagan v. State, supra, 
almost on an ad hoc basis. We have set forth the requirement that the defendant 
must be the sole witness to the events in issue in order to rely upon the 
Eagan rule. 
Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888, 890 
(1983); Searles v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 386, 
390 (1979); Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 448, at 453 (1977). In 
this instance Dangel was not the sole witness of the event charged as a crime, 
nor was he the only one who could testify about the condition of the brakes at 
the time of this incident. His own expert testified with respect to the 
condition of the brakes at the time of the accident. The fact that Dangel cannot 
satisfy this condition to invoking Eagan v. State, supra, would be sufficient to 
dispose of his contention.

[¶14.]  We also have held, however, that the rule 
of Eagan v. 
State, supra, does not pertain in an instance in which the credibility of the 
accused is questionable or his testimony is inconsistent or improbable. Cutbirth 
v. State, supra; Gore v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1384, 1387 (1981); Cullin v. State, supra, 565 P.2d  at 453; Dickey v. State, 
Wyo., 444 P.2d 373, 374 (1968); and State v. 
Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 158 P.2d 865, 879 (1945). At the 
trial Dangel's testimony that the brakes failed was impeached by expert 
testimony concerning the brakes and their capacity to function and by 
investigative reports admitted into evidence. His own testimony is inconsistent. 
He claimed both to have attempted to stop and to have intended to outrun the 
northbound truck trailer. He also would have turned onto Highway 20, but his 
positioning of his truck in the left lane made that maneuver impossible. 
Although Dangel's version of the circumstances surrounding the collision was not 
improbable it was controverted or impeached directly and by fair inference from 
the evidence. For this additional reason he could not invoke the Eagan rule. Leitel v. 
State, Wyo., 
579 P.2d 421 (1978).

[¶15.]  While Dangel's reliance upon the language 
of Eagan v. State, supra, could be decided for 
these reasons it perhaps is appropriate to afford some further analysis to the 
viability of the proposition articulated in Eagan v. State, supra. In Cutbirth v. State, 
supra, the court pointed out that the rule does have its limitations. While not 
all of the cases which discuss this language have mentioned an instruction 
(Eagan v. State, supra; Cutbirth v. State, supra; Gore v. State, supra; Doe v. 
State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1276 (1977); Buckles v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 518, cert. 
denied 409 U.S. 1026, 93 S. Ct. 475, 34 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1972); Dickey v. State, 
supra; Nunez v. State, Wyo., 383 P.2d 726 (1963); and Helton v. State, 73 Wyo. 
92, 276 P.2d 434 (1954)), a number of cases in which the rule of Eagan has been 
discussed did involve jury instructions. Searles v. State, supra; Leeper v. 
State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 379 (1979); Leitel v. 
State, supra; Cullin v. State, supra; Raigosa v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1009 (1977); State v. Alexander, 78 
Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831 (1958); State v. 
Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506 (1957); and State v. 
Goettina, supra. In State v. Lindsay, supra, the court indicated that a proper 
instruction must be in the words of Eagan v. 
State, supra, and the court has further stated that such an instruction should 
be given only where the conditions of the language of Eagan v. State, supra, are 
met. Searles v. State, supra; Cullin v. State, supra; Raigosa v. State, supra; 
and State v. Alexander, supra. In Leeper v. State, supra, the court refused to 
address an Eagan 
claim of error because the defendant failed to object to the trial court's 
refusal to give the instruction and plain error was not 
asserted.

[¶16.]  An analysis of the language of Eagan v. State, supra, 
leads to the conclusion that its sole utility is to assist the jury or the 
finder of fact in evaluating the evidence. It would follow that the correct 
application of this concept requires that the defendant who wants to rely upon 
this language request that an instruction incorporating the language be given. 
In the future this court will follow the holding in Leeper v. State, supra, and 
will not consider a claim of error based upon Eagan v. State, supra, unless a request for an 
instruction is made in the trial court. As we have stated above, in this 
instance, even if Dangel had made such request the trial court would have been 
justified in refusing to give the instruction; Dangel was not the sole witness 
and his testimony was not unimpeached and uncontradicted.

[¶17.]  Even in light of the rule of Eagan v. State, supra, the 
inquiry upon review remains as to whether there is sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty. Leitel v. State, 
supra; Doe v. State, supra; and Cullin v. State, supra. There was sufficient 
evidence in this case to sustain the conclusion of the jury, represented by its 
verdicts of guilty, that Dangel was guilty of criminal negligence under either 
of the alternative theories presented by the State.

[¶18.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially concurring opinion in 
which MACY, J., joins.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-2-106(a), W.S. 
1977 provides as follows:

"(a) Except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section, a person who unlawfully and with criminal 
negligence causes the death of another person while operating a vehicle is 
guilty of homicide by vehicle and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for 
not more than one (1) year, or both. Evidence of a violation of any state law or 
ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of 
traffic, except for evidence of a violation of W.S. 31-5-233, is admissible in 
any prosecution under this subsection."

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring, with whom MACY, Justice, 
joins.

[¶19.]  I concur with the majority in affirming 
appellant's conviction. However, while I agree that the so-called Eagan rule 
articulated in Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942), has no 
application to this appeal, I disagree with the portion of the opinion which 
would determine that the rule in future cases will be considered a rule of 
construction rather than a rule of law as a matter of basic proof by now 
directing that all future appeals premised upon the principle can only be based 
upon rejection of an offered instruction at trial.

[¶20.]  Specifically, I believe the court states 
a new application in countervention of prior precedents when it 
concludes:

"An analysis of the language of Eagan v. State, supra, leads to the conclusion that [the 
Eagan rule's] 
sole utility is to assist the jury or the finder of fact in evaluating the 
evidence. It would follow that the correct application of this concept 
requires that the defendant who wants to rely upon this language request that an 
instruction incorporating the language be given. In the future this court will 
follow the holding in Leeper v. State, [Wyo., 
589 P.2d 379 (1979)] and will not consider a claim of error based upon Eagan v. State, supra, 
unless a request for an instruction is made in the trial court." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶21.]  It is obvious that the author of 
Eagan v. State, 
Justice Blume, considered the rule to be a rule of law and not a rule of 
construction. 128 P.2d  at 225-226. Importantly, after articulating the Eagan rule, Justice Blume 
states:

"We turn then to consider 
the facts and circumstances immediately connected with the homicide, in the 
light of these rules of law." (Emphasis added.) 128 P.2d  at 
227.

It is this 
fundamental aspect of the rule that the court now reverses sub 
silentio.

[¶22.]  This court formulated the Eagan rule when it set aside a murder conviction and 
ordered the trial court to resentence Eagan for manslaughter. The facts were these: 
Eagan and his 
wife were alone at home. He was sitting in a chair examining a revolver. She was 
sitting quite close to him, on an ottoman. The gun discharged, killing her. The 
State charged Eagan with murder, and sought to 
prove malice by calling numerous witnesses who testified Eagan sometimes berated 
his wife, talked about divorce, and shook her. The jury returned a guilty 
verdict. This court set aside the conviction on the grounds that there was no 
reason as a matter of law for the jury to have disbelieved Eagan when he testified 
the shooting was an accident. This was so because Eagan was the sole witness of the crime, his 
credibility had not been impeached, and his testimony was not improbable or 
inconsistent. Interestingly, there was no 
jury instruction at issue in Eagan.

[¶23.]  It is the rare case where the elements 
requisite for the application of the Eagan rule coalesce. We have examined the rule 
in the following 17 cases, but have applied it in only two. See Cheatham v. 
State, 719 P.2d 612 (1986); Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983); Gore 
v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1384 (1981); Searles v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 386 
(1979); Leeper v. State, supra, 589 P.2d 379; Leitel v. State, Wyo., 579 P.2d 421 (1978); Doe v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1276 (1977); Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445 (1977); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194 (1977); Raigosa v. State, 
Wyo., 562 P.2d 1009 (1977); Buckles v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 518, cert. denied 
409 U.S. 1026, 93 S. Ct. 475, 34 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1972); Dickey v. State, Wyo., 444 P.2d 373 (1968); Nunez v. State, Wyo., 383 P.2d 726 (1963); State v. Alexander, 
Wyo., 324 P.2d 831 (1958), cert. denied 363 U.S. 850, 80 S. Ct. 1630, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1733 (1960); State v. Lindsay, Wyo., 317 P.2d 506 (1957); State v. Helton, Wyo., 
276 P.2d 434 (1954); and State v. Goettina, Wyo., 158 P.2d 865 (1945). We found the rule 
applicable in State v. Helton, supra, and Nunez v. State, supra. In both cases, 
as in Eagan, 
this court set aside a murder conviction because, as a matter of law, the jury 
should not have found the defendant guilty of any crime greater than 
manslaughter.

[¶24.]  The majority in this case have now 
reached the surprisingly new conclusion that Eagan is a rule of construction. In every prior 
instance where the court has examined the rule it has unequivocally indicated it 
to be a rule of law - not construction. Today's decision files in the face of 
this uniform precedent and is completely at odds with Justice Blume's original 
articulation.

[¶25.]  In defining the Eagan rule in Doe v. 
State, supra, 569 P.2d  at 1279, this court reemphasized:

"* * * The Eagan rule is an important 
one, and a diligent search of the record is required to ascertain whether it 
should be applied. Where the rule is 
applicable, the defendant's version of a homicide must be accepted - even in the 
face of a jury verdict to the contrary. In [appeals from murder 
convictions], our duty is neither to substitute our opinion for that of the 
jury, nor to blindly accept the jury's determination as correct. We are 
required, in order to sustain the conviction, to find that there is sufficient 
probative evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove intent and malice beyond 
a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.)

[¶26.]  In Cutbirth v. State, supra, 663 P.2d  at 
890, we said:

"We therefore cannot say 
as a matter of law that appellant's assertion that the shooting was accidental 
was unimpeached, nor can we say that his various accounts were inconsistent or 
probable. These determinations are conditions precedent to a reversal under 
Eagan."

We addressed the 
Eagan rule in 
Leitel v. State, supra, 579 P.2d at 424-425:

"The Eagan Rule is, of 
course, helpful to a defendant only in those circumstances where his explanation 
remains uncontradicted either directly or by fair inferences from the testimony 
and evidence. * * Under the facts of this case, we cannot employ the Eagan Rule 
to negate the jury's finding of intent and malice.

* * * * * 
*

"When deciding whether a 
set of facts call for reversal under the Eagan Rule, we must invoke the concept 
reannounced in Doe:

"`* * * we must accept as 
true the evidence favorable to the prosecution and give the State the benefit of 
every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn. * * 
*'

* * * * * 
*

"* * * We cannot, 
therefore, say, as a matter of law, that appellant's version of the shooting 
remained unimpeached by other and credible evidence - a condition precedent to a 
reversal under the Eagan Rule."

[¶27.]  And in State v. Helton, supra, 276 P.2d  
at 443 this court stated:

"* * * [A]pplying [Eagan] 
to the facts of this case, we may fairly say, that the defendant, being the sole 
living witness to the shooting, her testimony, including that portion describing 
her condition nd the antecedent reasons for it, all tending to show that she was 
in a highly upset, frightened, and confused emotional and impassioned condition, 
should not have been rejected by the 
jury. Her credibility had not been successfully impeached, her story was not 
shown to be improbable nor inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, 
but it was in fact shown to be reasonably consistent with such facts and 
circumstances and, therefore, the jury 
had no right to convict her of a greater crime than that of voluntary 
manslaughter." (Emphasis added.)

[¶28.]  The above cases plainly illustrate that 
the application of the Eagan rule to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a crime is a matter of law. It is the trial court, and in the 
appropriate instance the appellate court, which determines whether Eagan applies. This 
remains true whether or not any jury instruction incorporating Eagan is offered at 
trial.

[¶29.]  The majority opinion in this case 
states:

"In Leeper v. State, 
supra, the court refused to address an Eagan claim of error because the defendant 
failed to object to the trial court's refusal to give the instruction and plain 
error was not asserted."

My reading of 
Leeper suggests that the majority is mistaken when they conclude that this was 
the ratio decidendi of the case. Accordingly, the court is wrong to adopt this 
reasoning as part of the holding here in asserting that henceforth this court 
"will not consider a claim of error based upon Eagan v. State, supra, unless a request for an 
instruction is made in the trial court."

[¶30.]  The court's mistake in analysis of 
Leeper, supra, is manifest from the language of that case:

"Appellant claims error 
in the failure of the court to give a requested instruction based on the rule of 
the Eagan case * * to the effect that as Judith [the appellant] was the sole 
witness to the event, her testimony should be accepted if not improbable or not 
inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably 
consistent therewith, and if her credibility has not been impeached. The court 
refused.

* * * * * 
*

"Here, we cannot say that 
the appellant did demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law. The Eagan 
rule requires the defendant to be the sole witness to the crime. Both Judith and 
[someone else] witnessed the incident here and survived to testify. Others in 
the bar testified to preliminary matters, the warning, and the shot. We cannot 
find that the Eagan rule should have been 
applied, and we are unwilling to extend Eagan to cover the facts of this case. * * * 
The Eagan rule 
is not to be applied unless all of the conditions are fulfilled. * * * Here, 
Judith was not the sole witness." 589 P.2d  at 382.

[¶31.]  If an instruction requirement was 
dispositive in the case, the substantive consideration of Eagan in that case was at 
best obiter dictum. A careful reading would not attribute that intent to the 
author, Justice McClintock.

[¶32.]  In summary it is suggested that we do 
violence to both established Wyoming criminal 
law principles and the philosophy of stare decisis in this dictum announcement 
challenging the Eagan rule for the result intended. I would 
strongly deny the propriety of "redefining" in a case where the rule itself does 
not apply, but even more forcefully submit that the court should retain its 
conception and construction in Doe v. State, supra, 569 P.2d  at 1279, and 
reaffirm that "[t]he Eagan rule is an important one" and not to be similarily 
discarded by this emasculation.