Title: STATE EX REL WOODAHL v DISTRICT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12918 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A on t h e r e l a t i o n of ROBERT L. W O O D A H L , Attorney General of t h e S t a t e of Montana, Relator, THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e County of Lewis and Clark, and t h e Honorable Gordon R. Bennett and Peter G. Meloy, Judges thereof, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : For Rela t o r : Hon. Robert L. bloodahl, Attorney General, appeared, Helena, Montana Kichard Dzivi, Special A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Donald N. Eastman, Special A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Roland V. Colgrove argued, Miles City, Montana Submitted: December 16, 1974 Decided : JAN = . 7 1975 This i s an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a writ of supervisory c o n t r o l d i r e c t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e f i r s t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Lewis and Clark County, and t o t h e two judges t h e r e o f , t h e Hon- o r a b l e Gordon R. Bennett and t h e Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy. The a p p l i c a t i o n i s by t h e Attorney General and is w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s formal r e q u e s t t h a t a grand j u r y be empaneled t o i n q u i r e i n t o m a t t e r s r e l a t e d t o t h e Workmen's Compensation Division, Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y , Cause #38354 i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . T h i s Court, on e x p a r t e a p p l i c a t i o n , i s s u e d a n o r d e r c a l l i n g f o r an adversary hearing wherein counsel f o r r e l a t o r a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and respondent d i s t r i c t judges could appear i n o r a l argument. Such o r a l argument was heard on December 16, 1974. The background g i v i n g rise t o t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n , as r e c i t e d t h e r e i n , is: I n 1967 t h e s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted "The L e g i s l a t i v e Audit Act" (Chapter 23, T i t l e 7 9 , R.C.M. 1947) and provided f o r a b i p a r t i s a n a u d i t committee w i t h t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o a p p o i n t a n a u d i t o r whose d u t y it was t o make a u d i t s of "every s t a t e agency a t l e a s t once each biennium." (Section 79-2308, R.C.M. 1947.) S e c t i o n 79-2308 f u r t h e r provided i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) t h a t s a i d a u d i t o r was t o : "Report immediately i n w r i t i n g t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l any apparent v i o l a t i o n of penal s t a t u t e s d i s c l o s e d by t h e a u d i t of a s t a t e agency and f u r - n i s h t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a l l information i n h i s possession r e l a t i v e t o t h e v i o l a t i o n . " In 1973 an a u d i t was performed by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a u d i t o r of the accounts and o p e r a t i o n s of t h e Workmen's Compensation - s i v i s i o n , Department of Labor and I n d u s t r y . The a u d i t of hundreds of i n d u s t r y r e l a t e d i n j u r y claims r e v e a l e d evidence t h a t wide- spread c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y was o c c u r r i n g and had occurred i n Norkrnen' s Compensation i l i v i s i o n r e l a t e d m a t t e r s . These a l l e g e d z r i m i n a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s w e r e t h e r e a f t e r r e p o r t e d and r e f e r r e d by t h e b i p a r t i s a n a u d i t committee -for t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 79-2308, R.C.M. 1947. I n 1974, t h e Montana L e g i s l a t u r e enacted s e c t i o n 79- 2315, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e s t a t e , a l l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e s d i s c l o s e d by a n a u d i t of a s t a t e agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a u d i t o r . I f t h e a t t o r n e y gen- e r a l s h a l l d e c l i n e such p r o s e c u t i o n o r s h a l l f a i l t o commence a c t i o n on a p u b l i c o f f e n s e w i t h i n a reasonable t i m e t h e county a t t o r n e y of t h e appro- p r i a t e county s h a l l conduct on behalf of t h e state such prosecution." The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l assumed t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l - i t i e s imposed upon h i s o f f i c e by t h i s new l e g i s l a t i o n and com- menced t o i n v e s t i g a t e , prepare and p r o s e c u t e t h e apparent crim- i n a l v i o l a t i o n s i n workmen's compensation r e l a t e d m a t t e r s . A s of t h e d a t e of t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f i v e c r i m i n a l prose- c u t i o n s have been i n i t i a t e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l and h i s s t a f f : S t a t e v. McKeon, Cause number 3868, L e w i s and Clark County; S t a t e v. L. R. Bretz and G l o r i a Eusek Carden, Cause number 6537 B, Cas- cade County; S t a t e v. Frank P r e i t e , Cause number 2724, H i l l County; S t a t e v. Thomas Powers, Cause number 2814, Deer Lodge County; S t a t e v. Merril C l i n e , L. R. B r e t z and S h i r l e y (Lankford) C l i n e , Cause number 3921, Lewis and Clark County. Through c o n s t a n t review of t h e f r u i t s of t h e ongoing a u d i t and d u r i n g t h e prosecu- t i o n of t h e above-entitled m a t t e r s and o t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , much evidence has been uncovered demonstrating t h a t p u b l i c o c f i c e r s and/or employees, p a s t o r p r e s e n t , most of whom have o r had t h e i r o f f i c i a l b u s i n e s s o f f i c e s i n Helena, a c t e d i n c o l l u s i o n w i t h p r i v a t e persons such a s a t t o r n e y s , d o c t o r s , r u n n e r s , etc., i n t h e commission of p u b l i c o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e of Montana, the Indus c r i a l Accident Board, now t h e Workmen ' s Compensation Uivision (hereinafter r e f erred t o a s "IAB/WCD1') thereof, and i n d u s t r i a l accident victims who were claimants i n t h e IAB/WCD eases audited by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e auditor. Additionally, it i s alleged t h a t t h e r e a r e strong i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t c e r t a i n persons a r e d e f i n i t e l y involved; t h a t o t h e r individuals a r e probably involved; and t h a t s t i l l other individuals a r e possibly involved. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n led t h e attorney general and h i s s t a f f i n t o p r i v a t e and public s e c t o r s ; persons connected therewith r e s i s t e d and refused t h e requests and demands of t h e a t t o r n e y general and h i s s t a f f t o reveal and d i s c l o s e material f a c t s and evidence r e l a t i n g t o t h i s i n v e s t i - gation. It was t h e r e f o r e determined by t h e attorney general t h a t a grand jury must be empaneled t o c a l l and command r e l u c t a n t witnesses t o appear and produce evidence so t h a t t h e responsible individuals can be prosecuted and t o exonerate those individuals who a r e suspected of committing criminal offenses but who have not done so, according t o the evidence, o r where evidence i s inadequate t o merit i n i t i a t i o n of criminal proceedings. O n October 18, 1974, a p e t i t i o n was f i l e d with respond- o n t s erein in asking t h a t a grand jury be promptly empaneled i n L e w i s and Clark County, s t a t e of Montana: " * * * f o r t h e purpose of inquiring i n t o public criminal offenses, committed o r t r i a b l e i n L e w i s and Clark County which r e l a t e t o Workmen's Comp- ensation Division matters; and a l s o , f o r t h e pur- pose of inquiring i n t o a l l e g a t i o n s of w i l l f u l and corrupt misconduct i n o f f i c e by public o f f i - c e r s within t h e county of Lewis and C l a r k , which relate t o Workmen's Compensation Division m.atters." After studying t h e matter f o r s i x weeks, t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s request f o r t h e empaneling of a grand jury was denied on November 2 7 , 1974, by respondent Judges Gordon R. Bennett and Peter G. Meloy. Respondent d i s t r i c t judges based t h e i r de- c i s i o n on several premises, a l l of which purport t o support t h e contention t h a t a grand jury i s not necessary. The o r d e r denying t h e request s t a t e s : "We have before us t h e P e t i t i o n of t h e Attorney General f o r t h e summoning of a grand jury under t h e provisions of 95-1401, R.C.M. 1947. That s t a t u t e , and t h e 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e 11, Section 2 0 , a s well a s t h e 1889 C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e 111, Section 8 , provides t h a t a grand jury may be drawn and summoned only a t t h e d i s - c r e t i o n of t h e Court. That s t a t u t e s p e c i f i e s t h a t t h i s d i s c r e t i o n be exercised only when t h e Court f i n d s a grand jury 'necessary! It is t h e r e f o r e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a grand jury t h a t rnust be of paramount concern i n considering t h e P e t i t i o n . "In Montana, indictment by grand jury has been replaced, i n p r a c t i c e , almost e n t i r e l y by t h e d i r e c t f i l i n g of a.n information. The reason was b e s t s t a t e d by Chief J u s t i c e Brantley of t h e Xontana Supreme Court s i x t y y e a r s ago. Referring t o prosecution by information a s authorized by t h e 1889 Constitution he s a i d : "'One of t h e purposes of t h e convention i n formulating it, and t h e people i n adopting it, was t o dispense with t h e slow, expensive, and t h e r e f o r e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y procedure by i n d i c t - ment, and t o s u b s t i t u t e a procedure expeditious and inexpensive, t o be availed of by t h e prosecu- t i n g o f f i c e r s a t t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n , s u b j e c t t o c o n t r o l by t h e c o u r t , t o guard a p a r t i c u l a r de- fendant a g a i n s t oppression and malice, and pre- v e n t abuse of power by t h e county a t t o r n e y . ' S t a t e v. Vinn, 50 Mont. 27, 34. "The question becomes, then, what n e c e s s i t y j u s t i f i e s t h e e x t r a expenditure of time and money t h a t would undoubtedly be occasioned by t h e c a l l - i n g of a grand jury t o consider t h e matters r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e P e t i t i o n . "We believe t h a t t h e most compelling reason f o r c a l l i n g a grand jury would be t h e f a i l u r e of those charged with prosecution t o c a r r y out t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . N o such reason appears i n t h e P e t i t i o n o r i n t h e circumstances as we under- stand them. The P e t i t i o n i t s e l f i s r e p l e t e with d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t t h e prosecution assigned t o t h e Attorney General by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e (Ch. 4 , L. 1974) i s n o t f a i l i n g and w i l l be d i l i g e n t l y , even ' r u t h l e s s l y " , pursued i f no jury i s impaneled. Prosecutions have begun i n four counties, Cascade, H i l l , Lewis & Clark and Deer Lodge. One conviction by p l e a has been obtained. A n i n v e s t i g a t i v e and p r o s e c u t o r i a l s t a f f has been assembled and is operating throughout t h e s t a t e . W e a r e f u r t h e r assured by t h e same a c t t h a t i f t h e Attorney General declines or f a l l s to ?rosecute within a reason- able time t h e appropriate county attorney may conduct t h e prosecution. "The P e t i t i o n suggests t h a t prosecution may he o r is f e t t e r e d by lack of subpoena power. W e find no such detriment. The l e g i s l a t u r e has chosen t o make t h e Attorney General its s p e c i a l agent f o r t h e prosecution of 'public offenses disclosed by an a u d i t of a state agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a u d i t o r . ' (Ch. 4 , L. 1 9 7 4 ) . I n discharging t h i s extraordinary and peculiar function t h e Attorney General may draw on t h e subpoena power of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . The Legislative Council has subpoena power (Sect. 43-713, R.C.M. 1947), a s does t h e Legis- i a t i v e F i s c a l Review Committee (Sect. 43-1105, R.C.M. 1947). F u l l access t o a l l s t a t e govern- ment records and t h e records of a l l those receiv- ing s t a t e government grants is provided t h e Legislative Auditor (Sects. 79-2314 and 79-2310(7), R.C.M. 1947). I n addition, t h e Attorney General has f u l l s t a t u t o r y powers t o subpoena witnesses and require them t o t e s t i f y under oath, a s well a s compel t h e production of documents (Sect. 95-1801 and 95-1802, R.C.M. 1947). even from out of s t a t e (Sect. 94-9001 e t s e q . ) . "It i s suggested t h a t a grand jury i s necessary t o ' s i f t ' t h e mass of evidence uncovered and t o be uncovered i n t h e Workmen's Compensation Divi- sion investigation. These matters have been under investigation by t h e Department of Administration, t h e Legislative Audit Committee and t h e Attorney General's o f f i c e f o r more than a year and a h a l f . W e have been informed by t h e Attorney General i n t h e p r e s s and i n h i s P e t i t i o n t h a t t h e s e matters a r e t e c h n i c a l , complex, widely ramified, involve l a r g e numbers of people and voluminous documenta- t i o n and a r e v a s t i n scope. The information has been developed and evaluated by experts. W e see no necessity o r purpose t o be served by having it s i f t e d and evaluated by eleven people summoned from ordinary walks of l i f e with l i t t l e o r no,. f a m i l i a r i t y with t h e subject matter. O n t h e con- t r a r y , t h e process would impede t h e prosecution r a t h e r than expedite it. "'i'he grand jury, a s c o n s t i t u t e d by s t a t u t e s of Montana, i s a l o c a l county function designed t o d e a l with a f f a i r s within t h e county. W e f i n d i n the s t a t u t e s authorizing a grand jury no inten- t i o n t o use a grand jury t o d e a l with statewide a f f a i r s . The matters assigned by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o t h e Attorney General f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n and prosecution a r e c l e a r l y not l o c a l county matters but a r e l e g i s l a t i v e l y recognized statewide matters. "We find t h a t it is not necessary t o impose upon t h e people of Lewis and Clark County t h i s extra- ardinary burden. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n and prosecution a r e already financed by an appropriation of t h e s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e t o t h e Attorney General i n t h e amount of $183,191.00, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e funding provided t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Auditor. The Attorney General has a l l of t h e necessary l e g a l t o o l s t o pursue, a s he has, any criminal m a t t e r s d i s c l o s e d by t h e Workmen's Compensation a u d i t . "'The P e t i t i o n is denied." There is no s t a t u t o r y means provided f o r appealing t o t h i s Court from t h e adverse decision of t h e respondent d i s t r i c t court. However, when t h e f a c t s c l e a r l y show t h a t a p a r t y has no p l a i n , speedy o r adequate remedy a t law, and when t h e r e i s ilo r i g h t of appeal from a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r , a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l may i s s u e so t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t may be reviewed by t h e Montana Supreme Court. S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 159 Mont. 1 1 2 , 495 P.2d 182(1972); Art V I I , Sec . 1972 Constitution of Montana. I n S t a t e v. Superior Court i n and f o r County of Pima, 4 Ariz.App. 562, 4 2 2 P.2d 393, t h e Arizona c o u r t reviewed t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t of one superior c o u r t judge empaneling and dismissing a grand jury a f t e r t h e grand jury had been c a l l e d another judge. The Arizona Court held t h a t it had t h e power t o review d i s c r e t i o n a r y a c t s of t h e judge and reversed. C i t i n g Pennsylvania a u t h o r i t y , t h e c o u r t s t a t e d c l e a r l y t h a t d i s c r e t i o n of a lower c o u r t p e r t a i n i n g t o a grand jury i s s u b j e c t t o appel- l a t e review a s t o abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . This Court on previous occasions has reviewed and checked t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n a r y functions by means of super- visory c o n t r o l and has found an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o invoke t h e supervisory c o n t r o l of t h i s Court. S t a t e ex r e l . John C. Harrison v. D i s t . C t . of F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , 135 Mont. 365, 340 P.2d 544 (1959); S t a t e ex rel. Thomas J. Hanrahan v. D i s t . C t . of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , 145 Mont. 501, 4 0 1 'rhe L37L Montana Constitution, A r c . 11, Sec. 2 0 ( 2 ) , provides t h a t d i s t r i c t judges may empanel a grand jury: "A grand jury s h a l l c o n s i s t of eleven persons, of whom e i g h t must concur t o find an i n d i c t - ment. A grand jury s h a l l be drawn and summoned only a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n and order of t h e d i s t r i c t judge. " Statutory provisions r e l a t i n g t o grand j u r i e s r e i t e r a t e t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y aspect of empaneling a grand jury. Section 95-1401, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p a r t : "A grand jury must only be drawn and summoned when the d i s t r i c t judge i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n consid- e r s a grand jury necessary and s h a l l so order. * * * I 1 However, although j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y , t h i s i s not an absolute, unbridled d i s c r e t i o n . The question then becomes whether t h e d i s t r i c t judges abused t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n . I n the language of S t a t e ex r e l . Harrison, supra, and S t a t e ex r e l . Hanrahan, supra, t h i s Court inquired a s t o whether t h e r e was a manifest abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Since, a s previously r e l a t e d , t h e two judges, a f t e r s i x weeks of d e l i b e r - a t i o n and having before them not only t h e a p p l i c a t i o n r e c i t i n g rnuch alleged criminal a c t i v i t y , but t h e f i l e s i n t h r e e criminal cases already f i l e d , c a r e f u l l y expressed t h e i r reasons f o r t h e d e n i a l , an examination of those reasons w i l l be made. Such examination w i l l illuminate whether t h e r e has been an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , and whether t h e reasons given were erroneous a s a matter of law. 1. The attorney general i s " d i l i g e n t l y " i n v e s t i g a t i n g and prosecuting alleged v i o l a t i o n s . This, i n a l e g a l sense, i s no reason. The f a c t remains t h a t t h e attorney general made t h e application f o r a grand jury because of h i s a s s e r t e d and confessed i n a b i l i t y t o g e t answers, cooperation, and yea--results. To deny t h e request on t h i s b a s i s would r e q u i r e a prosecutor t o plead incompetence i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a grand jury. Such a reason would deny t h e use of a grand jury t o a " d i l i g e n t " p r o s e c u t o r . S u r e l y it was n o t t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , i n p l a c i n g t h e grand j u r y c h a p t e r i n Montana's s t a t u t e s , t o deny a grand j u r y t o a " d i l i g e n t " p r o s e c u t o r should t h e u s e of t h i s t o o l of c r i m - i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , f o r o t h e r v a l i d r e a s o n s , be deemed necessary t o enhance t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n h i s i n v e s t i g a - t i o n and prosecution. 2. c The p r e v i o u s l y quoted o r d e r states t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s " s p e c i a l agent" and t h a t it i s an " e x t r a o r d i n a r y and p e c u l i a r f u n c t i o n " . W e a r e a t a l o s s t o f i n d wherein a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o f f i c e r under A r t . V I , Sec. 4 , 1972 Montana Con- s t i t u t i o n named a s t h e l e g a l o f f i c e r of t h e s t a t e i n t h e execu- t i v e branch of government t o have t h e d u t i e s and powers provided by law, i s e i t h e r " s p e c i a l " o r doing a " p e c u l i a r f u n c t i o n " . Rather, he i s t h e proper o f f i c e r and doing a proper and necessary duty. The o r d e r a l s o s t a t e s t h a t he may draw on t h e subpoena power of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Indeed! L e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s are d i s t i n c t . N o person charged w i t h t h e e x e r c i s e of any power p r o p e r l y belonging t o t h e o t h e r s h a l l e x e r c i s e it. A r t . 111, Sec. 1, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The u s e of l e g i s - l a t i v e subpoena power would be c l e a r l y and m a n i f e s t l y erroneous. The o r d e r then s t a t e s t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l has f u l l s t a t u t o r y powers t o subpoena under s e c t i o n s 95-1801 and 95-1802, R.C.M. 1947, and even from o u t of s t a t e under s e c t i o n s 94-9001, e t seq., R.C.M. 1947. I n 1967 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e p e a l e d sec- t i o n s 94-8901 through 94-8909. S e c t i o n 94-8901, sub. 3 , had provided : " * * * It [ a subpoena] may be signed and i s s u e d by * * * . L'he zounty dccorney, f o r witnesses i n t n e s c a t e , i n support of an indictment o r information, t o appear before t h e c o u r t i n which it i s t o be t r i e d ; * * *. I' In t h e year 1916, t h i s Court i n S t a t e ex rel. Wolfe v. D i s t . C t . , 52 Mont. 556, 557, 160 P. 3 4 6 , i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t s t a t u t e t o mean: " I t is p e r f e c t l y obvious t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e reposes i n t h e county a t t o r n e y a power which is s u b j e c t t o no r e s t r a i n t , save h i s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under t h e sanction of h i s o f f i c i a l o a t h , and subpoenas issued by him oursuant t o t h i s s t a t u t e a r e i n para materia with those issued by t h e c l e r k . * * *" That provision was not c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e new code of criminal procedure i n s e c t i o n 95-1801. Therefore, even i f t h e a u t h o r i t y e x i s t e d f o r t h e prosecutor p r i o r t o indictment o r information, t h i s c l e a r c u t provision was s p e c i f i c a l l y repealed. Accordingly, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t order is manifestly wrong a s a matter of law. Further, s e c t i o n 95-1801 ( a ) provides: "Upon t h e request of t h e prosecuting a t t o r n e y o r t h e defendant o r h i s a t t o r n e y , t h e c o u r t o r t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t s h a l l i s s u e subpoenas. The subpoena s h a l l s t a t e t h e name of t h e c o u r t and t h e t i t l e , i f any, of t h e proceeding, and s h a l l command each person t o whom it i s d i r e c t e d t o a t t e n d and give testimony and produce o b j e c t s and documents a t t h e time and place s p e c i f i e d t h e r e i n . " From a reading of subsection ( a ) , a l l of t h e language, t a K e n t o g e t h e r , means t h a t a case must be a c t u a l l y f i l e d . Re- spondents argue t h a t t h e words " t i t l e [of t h e cause] i f any, of t h e proceeding, * * *" under subsection ( a ) , i n d i c a t e s a l e g i s - l a t i v e i n t e n t t o have subpoenas a v a i l a b l e i n o t h e r than a c t u a l cases. This does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y follow. The p o i n t i s t h a t it must be issued by a c o u r t and i s not a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a t t o r n e y general o r o t h e r prosecuting a t t o r n e y s independent of a c o u r t o r grand jury. Looking now t o o u t of s t a t e witnesses under s e c t i o n s 34--9001, e t seq., it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e language r e q u i r e s more than j u s t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , it r e q u i r e s a " c r i m i n a l a c t i o n , p r o s e c u t i o n o r proceeding" and an a p p l i c a t i o n t o a c o u r t of record. Accordingly, t h e reasoning of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s a m a t t e r of law on t h e subpoena powers a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s i n e r r o r . 3 . The information h a s been evaluated by " e x p e r t s " and o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s would "impede" t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r a t h e r than "expedite" it. W e need only say h e r e t h a t t h e people, t h a t i s o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s , have reserved t o themselves t h e r i g h t of government. L i t i g a n t s have long placed t h e i r f a i t h i n o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s s i t t i n g a s a t r i a l jury. So g r e a t i s t h i s f a i t h i n t h e competency of o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s t h a t t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y has been given c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u r e . The jury system g e n e r a l l y does, i n our view, an admirable job i n a system of a f r e e s o c i e t y . W e cannot and do n o t a c c e p t t h e thought t h a t o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s would "impede" t h e investiga.tion. The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , whose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y d u t y it i s , i s seeking t h e h e l p and s c r u t i n y of t h e o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n . H e does n o t f e a r t h a t o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s w i l l impede h i s work--nor should t h e c o u r t s . This was n o t r a i s e d a s a l e g a l i s s u e , and t h e r e a s o n given i s n o t a l e g a l reason. 4 . A grand j u r y would be a f i n a n c i a l burden on t h e people of L e w i s and Clark County. A p r i c e t a g should n o t be p u t on j u s t i c e . Also, a grand jury may n o t r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e d f i n a n c i a l burden. Lewis and Clark County i s where t h e s e a t of government is by our C o n s t i t u t i o n ( A r t . 111, sec. 2 ) . Matters a r i s i n g o u t of t h a t government's o p e r a t i o n w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t L e w i s and Clark County. Criminal p r o s e c u t i o n s involving a c t s committed i n L e w i s and Clark County w i l l be t r i e d here. It may w e l l be t h a t a grand j u r y would r e s u l t i n a better c a s e being prepared, thus resulting in less trial expense rather than more. But, conceding that it may cost more, the same thoughts are expressed by the citizens of other counties where state govern- inental activities or institutions are located. Powell County, where the state prison is located, has, and always has had, an extra burden as well as some benefits. The legislature has, and may well again, in good conscience attempted to equalize this burden. In any event, district judges are judicial officers of state government, and their considerations are to state govern- ment. The cost of a grand jury is not a sufficient legal reason. 5. A county grand jury cannot investigate a state- wide matter. This last reason is palpably erroneous. The appli- cation made related to the practices of state officials and/or ernployees of the Workmen's Compensation Division whose offices are located in Lewis and Clark County. The application asked that a grand jury be empaneled "for the purpose of inquiring into public criminal offenses, committed or triable in Lewis and Clark County * * * and also, for the purpose of inquiring into allega- tions of willful and corrupt misconduct in office by public offi- cers within the County of Lewis and Clark * * *." (Emphasis added.) Obviously the seat of government and the headquarters of the agency are the hub of the wheel. Crimes committed in a county are crimes against the state and are proper subjects of a grand jury convened in that county. Problems of venue and juris- diction may arise, but that is no concern at this state. During the oral presentation of counsel for the re- spondent judges, the merits and demerits of the grand jury system were alluded to. It, the grand jury, is a part of our govern- mental structure. We need not debate its strengths and weaknesses. 'Then too, counsel for respondents argued that sufficient detailed facts were not presented to the district judges to cause them to cxerclse > : h e i r discretion. 7 - t is seen chat t h e order gives d e t a i l e d reasons f o r denial--not one of which suggests a lack of f a c t s . Had t h e judges desired f a c t s more than they had, it seems c l e a r t h a t they would have s a i d so. A reading of t h e order, heretofore quoted, seems t o bring f o r t h t h e thought t h a t t h e respondent judges believed t h a t a showing of "necessity" had t o be made i n a sense of "absolute necessity". But a reading of t h e e n t i r e Chapter 1 4 , T i t l e 9 5 , R.C.M. 1947, and considering t h a t grand j u r i e s a r e constituti.ona1 bodies, A r t . 11, Sec. 2 0 , providing an a l t e r n a t i v e method of i n i t i a t i n g criminal charges, t h e word "necessary" does not mean absolutely "necessary". Now, heretofore we have examined each of t h e reasons given f o r denying t h e request f o r a grand jury; w e have found each reason l e g a l l y wanting. But, because t h e reasons a r e wrong, does it follow t h a t t h e r e has been an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n s u f f i - c i e n t t o invoke t h e supervisory c o n t r o l of t h i s Court? A s heretofore indicated, t h i s Court has, on a t l e a s t two p r i o r occasions, reviewed the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n a r y functions and found an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o invoke t h e supervisory c o n t r o l of t h i s Court. S t a t e ex r e l . Harrison v. D i s t . C t . , supra; S t a t e ex r e l . Hanrahan v. D i s t . Court, supra. Respondents' counsel argued t h a t a reasonable man test should be used. The reasons given by t h e respondent judges are erroneous a s a matter of law, and t h e "reasonable man" t e s t does not apply. This application by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g a l o f f i c e r of t h e s t a t e , a f t e r a year of i n v e s t i g a t i v e e f f o r t , with 3 wealth of i n v e s t i g a t i v e findings and a s s e r t i o n s , e s t a b l i s h e s the riecessity f o r a grand jury a s t h e t e r m "necessary" i s used ~ o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y and by s t a t u t e . The a t t o r n e y general confesses dn i n a b i l i t y t o achieve a successful investigatory conclusion whetner it r e s u l t i n incriminations o r exonerations. This a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e a t t o r n e y general i n al-1 its d e t a i l , a l b e i t no narnes were s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned, e s t a b l i s h e s a showing of t h e need f o r a grand jury. On December 2 6 , 1974, t h e two respondent judges f i l e d a praecipe requesting t h i s Court t o t a k e note of Lewis and Clark Zounty D i s t r i c t Court Causes #3937 and 3938, e n t i t l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y , S t a t e v. John J. Carden and S t a t e v. John J. Carden and Gloria Eusik Carden. The praecipe was t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h e question of t h e a b i l i t y of t h e a t t o r n e y general t o subpoena witnesses under s e c t i o n 95-1801 was now moot, and apparently respondent judges f e l t t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e i r order of November 24, 1974, heretofore quoted, was even more j u s t i f i e d . This Court has obtained copies of a l l t h e p e r t i n e n t papers i n t h e above mentioned d i s t r i c t c o u r t causes, including t n e supporting a f f i d a v i t s and t h e l e g i s l a t i v e a u d i t r e p o r t , t h i s cime with names, d a t e s and places. A reading of those p e r t i n e n t papers r e v e a l s a sordid web of e t h i c a l and criminal v i o l a t i o n s involving numerous i n d i v i d u a l s , both o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l . Included t h e r e i n a r e a l l e g a t i o n s of involvement of t h e j u d i c i a l branch of government, a judge and a t t o r n e y s a s o f f i c e r s of t h i s Court. With p a r t i c u l a r reference t o matters a r i s i n g during and o u t of t h e case of Gazette P r i n t i n g Co. v. Carden, - Mont . - I 517 P.2d 361, 30 St.Rep, 1 1 6 1 , decided by t h i s Court on December 2 6 , 1973, i f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s be t r u e , even t h i s Court has been deceived; while w e w e r e deceived, we a r r i v e d a t t h e c o r r e c t r e s u l t by reversing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t order. These matters - a r i s i n g s i n c e t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n makes it even more imperative t h a t t h e e n t i r e matter be subjected t o t h e s c r u t i n y of a grand jury t o a i d t h e a t t o r n e y general i n h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; and t h u s t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t judges nua at be exercised favorably t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y general. Finding no l e g a l reasons f o r t h e d e n i a l of t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a grand jury, we f i n d t h a t it was, i n law, an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o deny t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n . Accordingly, a w r i t s h a l l i s s u e from t h i s Court d i r e c t i n g the judges of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t t o empanel a grand jury c o n s i s t e n t with t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n t h e r e f o r . ................................. Chief J u s t i c e