Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael R. Inglimo

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 126 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP718-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael R. Inglimo, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant-Cross-
Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael R. Inglimo, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INGLIMO 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 18, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2007 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the complainant-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by Matthew F. Anich, Ashland, and oral argument by 
Matthew F. Anich. 
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross-appellant, there were 
briefs filed by Michael R. Inglimo, Superior, and oral argument 
by Michael R. Inglimo. 
 
 
2007 WI 126
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP718-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael R. Inglimo, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant- 
          Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael R. Inglimo, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent- 
          Cross-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 18, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   In this disciplinary proceeding, the 
referee concluded that the OLR had proven violations on 10 of 
the 15 counts contained in the complaint filed by the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR).  Based on those violations, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Michael Inglimo's license to practice 
law in Wisconsin be suspended for 18 months.  Both the OLR and 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
2 
 
Attorney 
Inglimo 
appeal 
from 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation. 
¶2 
After independently reviewing the record, we determine 
that the facts as found by the referee demonstrate violations of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct for 14 of the 15 counts 
alleged by the OLR.  We conclude that Attorney Inglimo's 
professional misconduct requires a three-year suspension of his 
license to practice law in this state.  We agree with the 
referee's 
recommendation 
that 
Attorney 
Inglimo 
should 
be 
required to submit to random drug tests for a period of one year 
prior to the reinstatement of his license.  Finally, we disagree 
with the referee's recommendation that the amount of the costs 
of this disciplinary proceeding to be paid by Attorney Inglimo 
should be reduced by one-fifteenth.  We determine that Attorney 
Inglimo should be required to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding, which were $42,400.96 as of May 10, 2007. 
¶3 
After a lengthy period of investigation, on March 18, 
2005, the OLR filed a 15-count complaint against Attorney 
Inglimo.  Attorney Curry First was subsequently appointed as 
referee.  After the parties conducted discovery, the OLR filed a 
motion for summary judgment.  Ultimately, the referee granted 
summary judgment to the OLR on seven counts, granted summary 
judgment to Attorney Inglimo on one count and denied summary 
judgment to either party on seven counts.  An evidentiary 
hearing was held on November 29, 2005.  Both parties submitted 
post-hearing briefs, as well as proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The referee submitted a lengthy report containing his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as his 
recommendations for discipline.  The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are summarized as briefly as possible below. 
¶5 
When reviewing the referee's report, we will affirm 
the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 
209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  We review the 
referee's conclusions of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 
¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  
¶6 
Attorney Inglimo was admitted to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin in September 1985.  He practiced in the Superior 
area.   
¶7 
Counts 
1 
and 
2 
relate 
to 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
representation of L.K in a criminal case between April 2000 and 
January 2001.  During this representation in October 2000, 
Attorney Inglimo had sexual relations with L.K.'s girlfriend in 
L.K.'s presence and with L.K. also engaging in sexual relations 
with his girlfriend during the sexual encounter.  The referee 
further found, however, that there was no evidence that during 
the encounter there was any intimate physical contact between 
Attorney Inglimo and L.K.   
¶8 
Count 1 of the OLR's complaint alleged that by having 
sexual relations with L.K.'s girlfriend in L.K.'s presence and 
with L.K. participating in the encounter, Attorney Inglimo had 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
4 
 
violated SCR 20:1.8(k)(2).1  Although the referee found that 
there had been a three-way sexual encounter involving L.K., his 
girlfriend and Attorney Inglimo, he concluded that there was no 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) because there was no evidence that 
Attorney Inglimo and his client, L.K., had "sexual relations" as 
that term is defined in the rule.  Specifically, there was no 
evidence that Attorney Inglimo and L.K. engaged in sexual 
intercourse or intentionally touched each other's intimate 
parts. 
¶9 
One of the conditions of bail in L.K.'s criminal case 
was that he could not use or possess any controlled substances.  
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 969.03(2) (1999-2000)2 provided that 
"[a]s a condition of release in all cases, a person released 
under this section shall not commit any crime."  Possession and 
use of marijuana were criminal acts in the State of Wisconsin.  
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).  Beginning in 1998, Attorney Inglimo 
and L.K. regularly went out drinking at various taverns.  In 
addition 
to 
drinking, 
Attorney 
Inglimo 
occasionally 
used 
marijuana with L.K.  Specifically, in October 2000 while L.K. 
was out on bail, L.K. went to Attorney Inglimo's house, where 
the two of them used cocaine and smoked marijuana.   
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not have 
sexual relations with a current client unless a consensual 
sexual relationship existed between them when the lawyer-client 
relationship commenced." 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
5 
 
¶10 A couple of months later, a week or two before his 
criminal trial, L.K. returned to Attorney Inglimo's house to 
discuss the upcoming trial.  L.K. testified that Attorney 
Inglimo was under the influence of drugs at the time, because 
his eyes were dilated, he could not focus, and he was "antsy."  
L.K. stated that he could tell when Attorney Inglimo had used 
drugs because he had previously used drugs with Attorney Inglimo 
on past occasions. 
¶11 The referee found, based on L.K.'s testimony, that 
Attorney Inglimo had been high on drugs during L.K.'s trial, 
that Attorney Inglimo was not prepared, and that he had not 
represented L.K. adequately at the trial. 
¶12 The referee concluded that this conduct by Attorney 
Inglimo constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).3  The referee 
acknowledged that using marijuana is a crime under Wisconsin 
law, but he did not believe that marijuana use, by itself, 
reflected adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.  He believed that the OLR 
had to prove a nexus between Attorney Inglimo's criminal act of 
marijuana use and his provision of legal services to L.K.  With 
respect to Count 2, the referee concluded that the evidence 
showed that Attorney Inglimo had been high during L.K.'s 
criminal trial and that Attorney Inglimo's performance as an 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects." 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
6 
 
attorney had been affected thereby.  He did not base his legal 
conclusion of a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) on the fact that 
Attorney Inglimo, by using marijuana with L.K., had aided and 
abetted L.K. to violate a condition of his bail.  The referee 
stated that Count 2 was drafted as alleging a criminal act of 
using drugs, rather than as alleging a criminal act of aiding 
and abetting L.K. to violate his bail condition. 
¶13 Counts 3 through 6 relate to Attorney Inglimo's use of 
his client trust account and his failure to maintain proper 
trust account records.  The referee's factual findings on these 
counts include that Attorney Inglimo wrote two checks out of his 
client trust account totaling $1,327 to purchase a car for 
himself.  Attorney Inglimo claimed that these funds belonged to 
his mother, for whom he had previously handled a real estate 
matter, and that she gave the funds to him so that he could 
purchase the car.  Based on the OLR's reconstruction of Attorney 
Inglimo's 
client trust account transactions, however, the 
referee found that Attorney Inglimo's trust account checks for 
the car had exceeded any trust account funds belonging to his 
mother by at least $150.  Thus, Attorney Inglimo had drawn on 
funds belonging to other clients. 
¶14 In addition, OLR's reconstruction demonstrated that as 
of December 31, 2001, several clients and Attorney Inglimo 
himself had negative balances in the trust account.  Indeed, 
between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2001, Attorney Inglimo 
used funds on deposit for clients with positive balances to 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
7 
 
cover at least $386.05 of disbursements for those with negative 
balances.   
¶15 For many years Attorney Inglimo maintained personal 
funds in his client trust account to act as a "cushion" against 
overdrafts.  Prior to May 2004, Attorney Inglimo kept no written 
records that would show what amounts of personal funds were in 
the client trust account.  He made more than $1,500 in 
disbursements from his trust account for personal expenses when 
he had no way to determine whether he had sufficient personal 
funds in the trust account to cover those disbursements.   
¶16 Attorney Inglimo also did not maintain subsidiary 
client ledgers for individual clients and did not keep a running 
balance of receipts, disbursements and the amount remaining in 
the trust account for each client.  He did not record deposits 
in the trust account checkbook register and kept no other 
receipts journal showing the sources and dates of deposits.  
Attorney Inglimo did not keep a running balance for his trust 
account and did not perform monthly reconciliations between his 
trust account balance and the bank statements.   
¶17 Despite his failure to keep the trust account records 
required by former SCR 20:1.15(e),4 Attorney Inglimo certified on 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.15 applies to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former SCR 20:1.15(e) provided:  
 
(e) Complete records of trust account funds and 
other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and 
shall be preserved for a period of at least six years 
after termination of the representation.  Complete 
records shall include: (i) a cash receipts journal, 
listing the sources and date of each receipt, (ii) a 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
8 
 
his annual state bar dues statements for fiscal years 1999-2004 
that he had complied with each of the trust account record-
keeping requirements.  Each of these certifications was false.   
¶18 Based on these factual findings, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Inglimo had violated former SCR 20:1.15(a)5 (Counts 
                                                                                                                                                             
disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of 
each disbursement, with all disbursements being paid 
by check, (iii) a subsidiary ledger containing a 
separate page for each person or company for whom 
funds have been received in trust, showing the date 
and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of 
each disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a 
monthly schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating 
the balance of each client's account at the end of 
each month, (v) a determination of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) at the end of each month, taken 
from the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals 
and a reconciliation of the cash balance (checkbook 
balance) with the balance indicated in the bank 
statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including 
canceled 
checks, 
vouchers 
or 
share 
drafts, 
and 
duplicate deposit slips.  A record of all property 
other than cash which is held in trust for clients or 
third persons, as required by paragraph (a) hereof, 
shall also be maintained.  All trust account records 
shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to 
the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(a) provided:  Safekeeping property. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c).  The 
trust account shall be maintained in a bank, savings 
bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
9 
 
3 and 4) by failing to hold in trust at least $386.05 in funds 
belonging to clients or third persons and by depositing and co-
mingling his personal funds with client funds in his trust 
account.  The referee also concluded that Attorney Inglimo had 
failed to keep the necessary trust account records, in violation 
of former SCR 20:1.15(e) (Count 5).  Further, the referee 
determined that Attorney Inglimo had violated former SCR 
20:1.15(g)6 (Count 6) by falsely certifying on his state bar 
                                                                                                                                                             
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin.  The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import.  No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account.  Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin.  The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import.  Other property 
of a client or third person shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded.  If a lawyer also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
6 Former SCR 20:1.15(g) provided: 
 
(g) A member of the State Bar of Wisconsin shall 
file with the State Bar annually, with payment of the 
member's State Bar dues or upon such other date as 
approved by the Supreme Court, a certificate stating 
whether the member is engaged in the private practice 
of law in Wisconsin and, if so, the name of each bank, 
trust company, credit union or savings and loan 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
10 
 
annual dues statements that he was in compliance with the trust 
account record-keeping requirements. 
¶19 Count 
7 
related 
to 
improper 
trust 
account 
disbursements made by Attorney Inglimo between 1999 and 2001.  
Based 
on 
the 
OLR's 
reconstruction 
of 
the 
trust 
account 
transactions, 
during 
that 
time 
period 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
disbursements to himself and to third parties on behalf of 
clients P.K. and K.K. exceeded the funds on deposit for them in 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
trust 
account 
by 
at 
least 
$2,661.47.  
Attorney Inglimo also disbursed $33 for client T.P. when he knew 
there were no funds on deposit for her in his trust account.  He 
likewise 
disbursed 
$94 
to 
obtain 
a 
preliminary 
hearing 
transcript in L.K.'s criminal case when he knew that there were 
no funds on deposit for L.K. in the trust account. 
                                                                                                                                                             
association in which the member maintains a trust 
account, safe deposit box, or both, as required by 
this section.  Each member shall explicitly certify 
therein that he or she has complied with each of the 
record-keeping requirements set forth in paragraph (e) 
hereof. 
 
A 
partnership 
or 
professional 
legal 
corporation may file one certificate on behalf of its 
partners, associates, or officers who are required to 
file under this section.  The failure of a member to 
file the certificate required by this section is 
grounds for automatic suspension of the member's 
membership in the State Bar in the same manner as 
provided in SCR 10.03(6) for nonpayment of dues.  The 
filing of 
a 
false certificate is unprofessional 
conduct and is grounds for disciplinary action.  The 
State Bar shall supply to each member, with the annual 
dues statement or at such other time as directed by 
the Supreme Court, a form on which the certification 
must be made and a copy of this rule. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
11 
 
¶20 The referee concluded that these facts demonstrated 
that 
Attorney 
Inglimo 
had 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty and misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).7 
¶21 Count 8 involved Attorney Inglimo's representation of 
M.S. in a divorce matter between September 27, 2001, and 
August 7, 2002.  M.S.'s wife, K.S., was not represented by 
counsel.  The divorce proceeding was a fairly simple matter 
because the couple had been separated for several years, they 
had no children, they had very little property to divide, and 
apparently the only real dispute involved possession of a 
camper. 
¶22 The referee found that during the course of the 
divorce case Attorney Inglimo developed at least a significant 
social relationship with K.S.  Attorney Inglimo not only met 
with K.S. at the public library multiple times, but he went to 
K.S.'s residence on multiple occasions and she came to his house 
on multiple occasions.  Specifically, the referee found that 
Attorney Inglimo went to a party at K.S.'s residence, that he 
asserted the Fifth Amendment when asked about using a controlled 
substance at the party, and that he did not tell his client 
about attending this party.  The referee also found, based on 
the testimony of P.K. and K.K., who were living on Attorney 
Inglimo's property and were in his home watching a movie on the 
relevant date, that Attorney Inglimo and K.S. returned to 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
12 
 
Attorney Inglimo's home late one evening, immediately went into 
Attorney Inglimo's bedroom, and did not leave the bedroom until 
morning.  The referee further found, based on Attorney Inglimo's 
admission, that he engaged in a three-way sexual encounter with 
K.S. and another woman within two weeks after M.S. fired him in 
August 2002.  The cause of the firing was M.S.'s belief that 
Attorney Inglimo and K.S. were seeing each other and that 
Attorney Inglimo was not being loyal to him. 
¶23 The referee also found that M.S. had instructed 
Attorney Inglimo to provide copies of all communications between 
Attorney Inglimo and K.S.  Attorney Inglimo admits that there 
were e-mails sent between him and K.S. that were not given to 
M.S.  Attorney Inglimo claims that the e-mails were all 
business-related and that he deleted them immediately after they 
were sent or received.  He asserted that M.S. never asked to 
receive copies of the e-mails until after they had been deleted. 
¶24 The referee did not make a finding that Attorney 
Inglimo and K.S. were engaging in a sexual relationship during 
Attorney Inglimo's representation of M.S. because no one 
testified that they had personally witnessed the two engaging in 
sex.  He did find, however, that Attorney Inglimo's admission of 
sex with K.S. within a few days after being fired by M.S. showed 
at least a substantial social relationship during Attorney 
Inglimo's representation of M.S. and a desire on Attorney 
Inglimo's part to pursue his own selfish interests. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
13 
 
¶25 Based on these factual findings, the referee concluded 
that Attorney Inglimo had violated SCR 20:1.7(b)8 because his 
representation of M.S. may have been materially limited by his 
own interests and because he never consulted with his client or 
obtained his client's written consent to his social relationship 
with K.S. 
¶26 Count 9 relates to Attorney Inglimo's conviction for 
misdemeanor 
possession 
of 
tetrahydrocannabinols 
(THC 
or 
marijuana) on January 22, 2003.  This conviction was based on 
Attorney Inglimo's use of marijuana with clients P.K. and K.K. 
in June 2002.  Although Attorney Inglimo was originally charged 
with several additional counts, he pled guilty to misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana pursuant to a plea agreement. 
¶27 The referee concluded that since the conviction was 
only for possession of marijuana, he did not believe that the 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides: Conflict of interest: general 
rule. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of that client may be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
 
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
 
(2) the 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation.  When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
14 
 
conviction by itself supported finding a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b).  The referee believed that under SCR 20:8.4(b) the 
OLR was required to prove a nexus between the criminal act of 
which Attorney Inglimo was convicted (possession of THC) and 
dishonesty, untrustworthiness or unfitness as a lawyer.  He did 
not believe that there was any such nexus shown in this case.  
The referee stated that he did not know if his legal conclusion 
would be different if the conviction had been for marijuana use 
as opposed to possession, although the referee made a specific 
factual finding that the conviction was based on a June 2002 
videotape showing Attorney Inglimo using marijuana with clients 
P.K. and K.K. 
¶28 Count 10 also related to the June 2002 incident.  The 
referee found that during the June 2002 videotaped incident, 
Attorney Inglimo, P.K. and K.K. also had snorted cocaine using a 
straw and a mirror.  Attorney Inglimo admitted that he had used 
cocaine occasionally since becoming an attorney, although he 
said he wasn't sure whether the substance shown on the June 2002 
videotape was really cocaine.  He claimed that it may have been 
flour or salt.  P.K. and K.K. testified that the substance was 
indeed cocaine and K.K. stated that she had used cocaine with 
Attorney Inglimo on other occasions.  The referee also found 
that P.K. and K.K. were clients of Attorney Inglimo. 
¶29 The referee concluded that Attorney Inglimo's use of 
cocaine, which he considered more serious than marijuana, with 
two clients demonstrated that he had committed a criminal act 
that reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, in 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
15 
 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).  Attorney Inglimo has not appealed 
this violation. 
¶30 Count 11 alleged a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) for 
using marijuana with R.W., an adult client, and T.R., a minor.  
The referee's findings and legal conclusions on this count are 
somewhat contradictory.  The referee essentially found that 
Attorney Inglimo and R.W. smoked marijuana together at the 
apartment of J.S., and that during that evening R.W. engaged 
Attorney Inglimo to represent her.  The referee's factual 
findings also include a statement that "[T.R.] used marijuana 
with [J.S.], [R.W.] and Inglimo at [J.S.'s] apartment."  He also 
made a finding that "[J.S.] testified at the time [T.R.] came 
over in the summer of 2001, there was marijuana exchanged 
between [T.R.] and Inglimo."   
¶31 Despite these findings of fact, when discussing his 
legal conclusions on this count, the referee stated that while 
he believed that the OLR had met its burden of proof to show 
that Attorney Inglimo had used marijuana with an adult client, 
R.W., it had not met its burden of proving marijuana use with 
T.R.  In addition, the referee concluded that marijuana use with 
an adult client by itself does not constitute a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b) and that because the OLR had not proven that Attorney 
Inglimo's marijuana use with R.W. had affected any legal 
services he provided to her, there was no violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b) in this instance. 
¶32 Count 12 alleged that Attorney Inglimo had violated 
SCR 20:8.4(b) by supplying THC to P.K.  The referee found that 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
16 
 
Attorney Inglimo had in fact supplied marijuana to P.K., one of 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
clients, 
citing 
P.K.'s 
testimony 
that 
Attorney Inglimo had provided marijuana to him on "quite a few" 
occasions.  The referee also noted that Attorney Inglimo had 
admitted that he had used marijuana with P.K., but when asked at 
the hearing about supplying marijuana to P.K., Attorney Inglimo 
asserted his Fifth Amendment rights. 
¶33 With respect to whether this conduct constituted a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b), the referee repeated his belief that 
using marijuana, even with a client, may be a criminal act, but 
it does not constitute a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) because it 
does not, by itself, reflect adversely on the lawyer's fitness.  
The referee's report continued, however, by stating "But doing 
so—supplying—to 
a 
client 
is 
unfitness." 
 
Despite 
this 
conclusion, the referee nonetheless later indicated that he 
believed that SCR 20:8.4(b) requires proof that the attorney 
provided 
deficient 
legal services "in circumstances where 
marijuana use and/or supplying was a primary or secondary 
cause."  Because the OLR did not show how Attorney Inglimo's 
provision of marijuana to P.K. had affected the legal services 
Attorney Inglimo rendered, the referee concluded that the OLR 
had not proven a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) in Count 12. 
¶34 Count 13 alleged that Attorney Inglimo's use of 
marijuana with clients P.K. and K.K. constituted a violation of 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
17 
 
SCR 20:8.4(b).9  Since this incident was videotaped, Attorney 
Inglimo admitted that he had smoked marijuana with P.K. and 
K.K., and the referee so found. 
¶35 The referee concluded, however, that because the OLR 
had not proven that the marijuana use had affected Attorney 
Inglimo's rendition of legal services to P.K. and/or K.K., there 
was no adverse reflection on his fitness as a lawyer and no 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶36 Count 14 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.7(b) due to 
Attorney Inglimo having sexual intercourse with K.K.  Attorney 
Inglimo admitted and the referee found that Attorney Inglimo had 
sexual intercourse with K.K. in the presence of her husband P.K.  
Attorney Inglimo suggested the arrangement.  The encounter was 
videotaped, with Attorney Inglimo supplying and setting up the 
videotape equipment.  Attorney Inglimo admitted that he had 
represented P.K., K.K. or both in numerous matters beginning in 
at least 1997 and that at the time of the videotaped sex act, he 
had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with P.K.  K.K. had 
clearly been a client of Attorney Inglimo prior to the incident, 
although Attorney Inglimo contended that she was not a client at 
the time of the sexual encounter. 
                                                 
9 This usage of marijuana occurred just prior to Attorney 
Inglimo engaging in sexual intercourse with K.K., which formed 
the basis for Count 14.  Although it was not definitively 
settled as to when this incident occurred, it was a different 
incident than the June 2002 occasion referenced in Counts 9 and 
10, when Attorney Inglimo also smoked marijuana and used cocaine 
with P.K. and K.K. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
18 
 
¶37 Both 
P.K. 
and 
K.K. 
testified 
that 
the 
sexual 
intercourse was payment for prior legal services that Attorney 
Inglimo had rendered to K.K.  P.K. testified that the 
videotaping was done to ensure that there was no dispute that 
the bill for legal fees had been paid in full.  The referee 
implied that he believed the sex was indeed payment for prior 
legal services, but he did not make a specific finding of fact 
to that effect.  The referee noted that Count 14 had not charged 
Attorney Inglimo with obtaining sex as payment for legal 
services. 
¶38 The referee did find that K.K. felt terrible about 
having sex with Attorney Inglimo and that P.K. had not 
consented.   
¶39 The referee concluded that Attorney Inglimo's act of 
sexual intercourse with K.K. was for his own personal interests 
and that his personal interests may have materially limited his 
ability to represent P.K.  Thus, Attorney Inglimo violated SCR 
20:1.7(b). 
¶40 Count 15 alleged that Attorney Inglimo had failed to 
notify the OLR and this court within five days of his 
January 22, 2003 conviction for possession of THC, in violation 
of SCR 21.15(5)10 and 20:8.4(f).11  It is undisputed that neither 
                                                 
10 SCR 21:15(5) provides: Duties of attorneys. 
 
(5) An attorney found guilty or convicted of any 
crime on or after July 1, 2002, shall notify in 
writing the office of lawyer regulation and the clerk 
of the Supreme Court within 5 days after the finding 
or conviction, whichever first occurs.  The notice 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
19 
 
Attorney Inglimo nor his lawyer sent written notice to the OLR's 
office in Madison or to the clerk of this court.  Attorney 
Michael Ganzer, who represented Attorney Inglimo at the time, 
did send a facsimile transmission concerning the conviction to 
Attorney Daniel Snyder, who was a member of the District 11 
Professional Responsibility Committee at the time. 
¶41 There was a dispute between the parties as to whether 
Attorney Snyder had told Attorney Ganzer to notify only him when 
the conviction was entered because the OLR and the supreme court 
were already aware of the criminal charges against Attorney 
Inglimo.  There were multiple affidavits filed on this issue in 
connection with the summary judgment process before the referee. 
¶42 The referee ultimately found that Attorney Snyder was 
not an agent of the OLR who could accept written notice of the 
conviction on the OLR's behalf.  The referee further found that 
Attorney Snyder had never discussed with Attorney Ganzer the 
obligation of Attorney Inglimo to send written notice of the 
conviction to the OLR and this court under SCR 21.15(5).  In any 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall include the identity of the attorney, the date 
of finding or conviction, the offenses, and the 
jurisdiction.  An attorney's failure to notify the 
office of lawyer regulation and clerk of the supreme 
court of being found guilty or his or her conviction 
is misconduct. 
11 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
20 
 
event, even Attorney Inglimo acknowledged that no written notice 
was ever sent to the clerk of the supreme court. 
¶43 The referee concluded that Attorney Inglimo's failure 
to provide written notice to the OLR and the clerk of the 
supreme court had violated SCR 21.15(5), thereby also violating 
SCR 20:8.4(f).  He stated, however, that this was only a 
technical violation, for which no additional discipline should 
be imposed. 
¶44 With respect to the discipline to be imposed, the 
referee categorized the violations he found into three levels of 
seriousness.  He considered Count 2 (marijuana use with L.K. and 
impact of drug use on trial performance), Count 8 (improper 
social relationship with K.S. while representing M.S. in divorce 
proceeding), and Count 14 (conflict of interest due to sexual 
encounter with K.K.) as serious violations.  He considered the 
counts relating to Attorney Inglimo's trust account (Counts 3 
through 7) to be "less serious violations."  He also placed in 
this "less serious" category Count 10, which charged a violation 
of SCR 20:8.4(b) for using cocaine with adult client P.K.  
Finally, as noted above, the referee believed that Count 15 
concerning the failure to notify the OLR and this court of his 
criminal conviction was a technical violation for which no 
discipline should be imposed. 
¶45 Ultimately, 
although 
he 
provided 
a 
series 
of 
individual disciplines for each of violations he found, the sum 
of which added up to at least a two-year suspension, the referee 
recommended a total suspension of 18 months.  The referee 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
21 
 
indicated that he believed that Attorney Inglimo's suspension 
should be lessened somewhat from what would otherwise be 
appropriate because he is a solo practitioner in the Superior 
area whose practice will be greatly impacted by any suspension.   
¶46 The referee also recommended that Attorney Inglimo 
should be required to submit to random drug tests for one year 
prior to the reinstatement of his license.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Broadnax, 225 Wis. 2d 440, 444, 
591 N.W.2d 855 (1999). 
¶47 The 
OLR 
appeals 
from 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation.  The OLR first challenges the referee's legal 
conclusions 
that 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
use 
of 
controlled 
substances, as alleged in Counts 9, 11, 12, and 13, did not 
constitute violations of SCR 20:8.4(b).  The OLR contends that 
the referee found as a matter of fact that Attorney Inglimo had 
been convicted of possession of THC, that he had used marijuana 
with clients R.W., P.K., and K.K., and that he had supplied 
marijuana to P.K.  The OLR argues that the criminal acts of 
possessing, using 
and supplying marijuana, by themselves, 
reflect adversely on an attorney's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 130, 310 N.W.2d 789 
(1981).12  It asserts that the referee made an error of law when 
                                                 
12 The OLR also correctly notes that an attorney's criminal 
act can support a SCR 20:8.4(b) violation even if the attorney 
is never charged or convicted.  Broadnax, 225 Wis. 2d at 442; In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sandy, 200 Wis. 2d 529, 546 
N.W.2d 876 (1996). 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
22 
 
he required the OLR to prove a nexus between the attorney's 
drug-related activities and particular legal services provided 
by the attorney. 
¶48 First, we address the referee's interpretation of SCR 
20:8.4(b) as requiring that there be a nexus between the 
attorney's criminal act and the provision of specific legal 
services.  We conclude that this construction is too restrictive 
a reading of the rule.  The language of the rule contains no 
such requirement of a nexus between the criminal act and legal 
services rendered by the lawyer.  It states only that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness 
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."    
¶49 Our cases have also repeatedly found violations of SCR 
20:8.4(b) even though there has been no connection established 
between the attorney's criminal act and the attorney's legal 
services to particular clients.  E.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Washington, 2007 WI 65, __ Wis. 2d __, 732 
N.W.2d 24 (criminal conviction for personal income tax evasion 
due to failure to report income constituted violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b)); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Phillips, 
2007 WI 63, __ Wis. 2d __, 732 N.W.2d 17 (criminal conviction 
for tax evasion due to hiding of loan proceeds to avoid 
attachment by Internal Revenue Service violated SCR 20:8.4(b)); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chvala, 2007 WI 47, 300 
Wis. 2d 206, 730 N.W.2d 648 (accepting stipulation that criminal 
acts of misconduct in public office and making a campaign 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
23 
 
contribution exceeding the lawful limit violated SCR 20:8.4(b)); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Burke, 2007 WI 46, 300 
Wis. 2d 198, 730 N.W.2d 651 (violations of SCR 20:8.4(b) found 
for misconduct in public office and obstructing an officer).  
The connection required for a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) is not 
between a criminal act and the lawyer's provision of legal 
services, but rather is between a criminal act and a lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects.  A criminal act can reflect adversely on a lawyer's 
fitness even if the act did not cause the attorney to provide 
deficient legal services. 
¶50 With respect to the OLR's argument on appeal, we need 
not decide in this case whether every instance of the use of a 
controlled 
substance 
reflects 
adversely 
on 
an 
attorney's 
honesty, integrity or fitness as a lawyer.13  There are 
additional facts present for each of the counts in the present 
case to conclude that Attorney Inglimo's possession, use or 
supplying of marijuana to others reflected adversely on his 
fitness as a lawyer. 
¶51 Count 9 of the complaint alleged and the referee found 
that Attorney Inglimo had been convicted in Douglas County 
Circuit Court of possessing THC, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(e).  Attorney Inglimo did not contest the fact of 
                                                 
13 We have previously affirmed violations of SCR 20:8.4(b) 
where the factual basis was an attorney's simple possession or 
use of cocaine.  E.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Peterson, 2006 WI 41, 290 Wis. 2d 74, 713 N.W.2d 101; Broadnax, 
225 Wis. 2d at 442. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
24 
 
his conviction.  The referee also made a specific finding of 
fact that this conviction "was based on Inglimo's use of THC 
with clients [P.K. and K.K.] as depicted in a June 2002 
videotape."  We conclude that using an illegal drug with clients 
reflects adversely on an attorney's fitness as a lawyer.  A 
lawyer has a professional obligation to support the enforcement 
of the law and the administration of justice.  See Preamble to 
SCR 
ch. 
20 ("A 
lawyer's conduct should conform to the 
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients 
and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. . . . A 
lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for 
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public 
officials.")  This obligation is especially important when 
clients are involved because clients gain their impression of 
the law and the legal system primarily from their lawyer.  A 
lawyer's use of illegal controlled substances with a client 
contradicts this obligation by showing the client that the 
lawyer has a disregard for the law.  That reflects adversely not 
only on the lawyer's fitness, but on the profession as a whole.  
Thus, based on the referee's factual findings, we reverse the 
referee's conclusion of no violation on Count 9 and determine 
that Attorney Inglimo's possession and use of marijuana in June 
2002 with clients P.K. and K.K. constituted a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b). 
¶52 For the same reason, we conclude that the referee 
erred in finding no violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) on Count 11.  
With respect to that count, the referee found that Attorney 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
25 
 
Inglimo had admitted that he had smoked marijuana with R.W. 
while she was a client.  This is sufficient to support a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶53 The OLR's second argument on appeal also relates to 
Count 11.  That count alleged that Attorney Inglimo had used THC 
not only with R.W., but also with T.R., who was a minor at the 
time.  As noted above, the referee's report was not consistent 
on this subject.  Although the report contains a finding of fact 
that Attorney Inglimo used marijuana with T.R., R.W., and J.S. 
at J.S.'s apartment, the referee concluded that there was no 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).  We conclude that the referee's 
finding of marijuana use with T.R. further supports a conclusion 
that Attorney Inglimo violated SCR 20:8.4(b), as alleged in 
Count 11.  Attorney Inglimo's use of marijuana with a client, 
R.W., was enough to support finding such a violation.  The fact 
that Attorney Inglimo also used illegal drugs with a minor 
simply confirms that legal conclusion and renders it a more 
serious violation. 
¶54 Count 12 of the complaint similarly alleged that 
Attorney Inglimo had supplied marijuana to client P.K.  Delivery 
of marijuana (THC) is a felony in this state. Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1)(h).  The referee found that Attorney Inglimo had 
used marijuana with P.K. "countless times" and that Attorney 
Inglimo had supplied marijuana to P.K. "[q]uite a few" times.  
Just as using marijuana with a client violates SCR 20:8.4(b), 
delivering marijuana to a client also reflects adversely on a 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
26 
 
lawyer's fitness.  Thus, we reverse the referee's conclusion of 
no violation as to Count 12. 
¶55 Count 13 alleged a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) due to 
Attorney Inglimo's use of marijuana with clients P.K. and K.K.  
Although the referee found that the marijuana use had occurred, 
he concluded that there was no professional misconduct because 
of the lack of the nexus he erroneously believed was required 
under the rule.  As with Count 9, we reverse the referee's 
conclusion of no violation and determine that Attorney Inglimo's 
use of marijuana with clients constituted a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b). 
¶56 The OLR's next argument focuses on Count 1.  It 
asserts that the referee erred in concluding that there was no 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) for Attorney Inglimo engaging in a 
three-way sexual encounter with client L.K. and his girlfriend.  
The OLR does not challenge the referee's factual findings.  
Rather, it argues that the facts as found by the referee provide 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:1.8(k)(2). 
¶57 The relevant language of SCR 20:1.8(k) is as follows: 
(k)(1) In this paragraph: 
 
(i) "Sexual relations" means sexual intercourse 
or any other intentional touching of the intimate 
parts of a person or causing the person to touch the 
intimate parts of the lawyer. 
 . . .  
(2) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with 
a 
current 
client 
unless 
a 
consensual 
sexual 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
27 
 
relationship existed between them when the lawyer-
client relationship commenced. 
¶58 The referee found that Attorney Inglimo engaged in 
sexual relations with L.K.'s girlfriend while she was doing the 
same with L.K.  The OLR essentially argues that the word "with" 
in SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) connotes a temporal and spatial connection.  
According to the OLR, as long as the lawyer and the client are 
both participating in a sexual act at the same time in the same 
place, they are having sexual relations "with" each other.  In 
response, Attorney Inglimo relies on the plain language of the 
rule and argues that the OLR's interpretation would expand the 
rule beyond its terms. 
¶59 On 
this 
issue, 
we 
concur 
with 
the 
referee's 
conclusion. 
 
The 
definition 
of 
sexual 
relations 
in 
SCR 
20:1.8(k)(1) connotes conduct directly between the lawyer and 
the client.  When the definition refers to touching, the rule 
speaks of the lawyer intentionally touching the intimate parts 
of "a person," but the subsequent alternative definitional 
phrase uses the more definitive "the person" when referring to a 
situation in which the lawyer causes the touching to be done to 
him/her.  In addition, to the extent that sexual intercourse 
also qualifies as "sexual relations" under the definition, such 
conduct is likewise done intentionally (i.e., not by accident).  
Further, SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) prohibits a lawyer from having "sexual 
relations" "with a current client."  Thus, the definitional 
language of SCR 20:1.8(k)(1) and the prohibition of SCR 
20:1.8(k)(2) together clearly indicate that the prohibited 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
28 
 
"sexual relations," whether intercourse or touching, must be 
intentionally done between the lawyer and one particular person, 
namely the client. 
¶60 Without commenting on the applicability of other Rules 
of Professional Conduct, we agree with the referee's conclusion 
that the evidence in the present case did not show that Attorney 
Inglimo had engaged in "sexual relations" with client L.K in 
violation of SCR 20:1.8(k)(2).  There was no testimony as to 
precisely what occurred during Attorney Inglimo's encounter with 
L.K. and his girlfriend.  There was no testimony that Attorney 
Inglimo ever intentionally touched L.K.'s intimate parts or 
caused L.K. to touch his intimate parts.  Moreover, there was no 
testimony that Attorney Inglimo engaged in any form of sexual 
intercourse with L.K.  Thus, because it does not appear that the 
definitional elements of "sexual relations" have been satisfied, 
the simple term "with" in the prohibitional phrase in SCR 
20:1.8(k)(2) cannot transform this situation into a violation of 
the rule. 
¶61 The OLR next asserts that on Count 15 the referee 
should have considered some level of additional discipline for 
Attorney Inglimo's failure under SCR 21.15(5) to provide proper 
notification of his criminal conviction to the OLR and the clerk 
of this court.  The OLR and Attorney Inglimo spend a 
considerable amount of time arguing about the facts of this 
issue and their reasons for litigating the issue.  As to the 
OLR's claim on appeal, however, the issue is relatively 
straightforward.  The referee found that Attorney Inglimo failed 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
29 
 
to provide the required written notice of his conviction to the 
OLR and to the clerk of this court within five days after the 
conviction, thereby violating SCR 21.15(5) and SCR 20:8.4(f).  
Having found a violation of the rule, the referee was not free 
to disregard the violation in his consideration of discipline.  
The referee should have added that violation to the mix when 
considering the proper level of discipline to recommend.  The 
amount of weight to be given to the violation, however, depends 
on the facts of the specific case.  In any event, it is this 
court 
that 
ultimately 
decides 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline, independent of the referee's recommendation.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  We have factored this violation 
into our consideration of the proper level of discipline. 
¶62 Attorney Inglimo has also filed a cross-appeal from 
the referee's report and recommendation.  He asserts that the 
referee erred in finding (1) that he had failed to produce his 
client files and (2) that the testimony of other potential 
witnesses that did not testify might have supported his 
arguments.   
¶63 With respect to the client files, Attorney Inglimo 
asserts that the referee mistakenly believed that Attorney 
Inglimo had failed to produce his client files to the OLR and to 
cooperate fully with the OLR's investigation.  Attorney Inglimo 
also states that the referee never made any request to see the 
files so he should not have faulted Attorney Inglimo for not 
submitting them as evidence at the disciplinary hearing. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
30 
 
¶64 Attorney Inglimo misunderstands the referee's comments 
about his client files.  The referee was not finding an ethical 
violation because of a failure to produce the relevant client 
files.  He simply was commenting that if Attorney Inglimo had 
wanted to support some of the factual arguments he was making, 
he could have submitted portions of his client files.  For 
example, Attorney Inglimo argued that he had properly prepared 
for L.K.'s criminal trial (Count 2) and that his contacts with 
K.S. during his representation of M.S. (Count 8) were only 
business-related.  The referee noted that Attorney Inglimo's 
files on these client matters could potentially have supported 
these claims.  Since Attorney Inglimo never offered into 
evidence his files on these matters, however, he had no evidence 
to support his bald assertions on these points. 
¶65 Although Attorney Inglimo challenges the referee's 
comments about his client files, there is no legal issue for 
this court to resolve.  The referee did not find that Attorney 
Inglimo had failed to turn over requested files, thereby 
violating an ethical rule.  The referee also had no obligation 
to request Attorney Inglimo's client files.  If Attorney Inglimo 
had wanted parts of those files to be considered by the referee, 
he had the obligation to offer them into evidence. 
¶66 The same reasoning holds true with respect to Attorney 
Inglimo's challenge to the referee's comments (1) on the lack of 
testimony from judges who had presided over cases handled by 
Attorney Inglimo or from opposing counsel and (2) on the lack of 
Attorney Inglimo's probation/treatment records following his 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
31 
 
criminal conviction.  Attorney Inglimo asserts that he provided 
names and documents to his counsel in this disciplinary 
proceeding, but for whatever reason his counsel failed to ensure 
that the evidence was submitted to the referee. 
¶67 Again, this argument does not raise a legal issue that 
needs to be resolved by this court.  Whether or not Attorney 
Inglimo's 
counsel 
could/should 
have 
produced 
additional 
evidence/testimony at the disciplinary hearing, it was Attorney 
Inglimo's responsibility to make sure that everything he wanted 
the referee and this court to consider was entered into 
evidence.  Moreover, the referee did not use the lack of such 
evidence as a basis for finding a violation.  He simply 
commented 
that 
Attorney 
Inglimo 
had 
not 
produced 
evidence/testimony to back up certain arguments that he made to 
justify or to mitigate his conduct. 
¶68 Attorney Inglimo also argues that the referee erred in 
his factual findings and legal conclusion as to Count 2 
regarding his use of marijuana with client L.K.  Because the 
referee believed that he had to find a "nexus" between marijuana 
usage and legal services provided by Attorney Inglimo to L.K., 
the referee focused on L.K.'s testimony that Attorney Inglimo 
had been high during L.K.'s criminal trial and had consequently 
provided poor representation.  Attorney Inglimo argues that 
expert testimony was necessary as to whether his representation 
of L.K. was adequate and that L.K. should not have been allowed 
to testify on that subject because he had no legal expertise.  
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
32 
 
Attorney Inglimo asserts that he had in fact adequately prepared 
for the trial and had provided competent representation. 
¶69 This argument is no longer legally relevant.  As 
discussed above, we have concluded that a violation of SCR 
20:8.4(b) for using an illegal controlled substance with a 
client does not require a nexus with deficient legal services.  
Thus, the fact that Attorney Inglimo used marijuana with client 
L.K. was sufficient to support a violation.  Thus, the referee's 
conclusion of a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) on Count 2 is 
affirmed. 
¶70 Attorney Inglimo challenges the referee's finding that 
he had a substantial social relationship with K.S. while he was 
representing M.S. in a divorce proceeding.  Attorney Inglimo's 
arguments on this subject, however, are basically factual 
arguments.  He does not claim that there was no factual basis 
for the referee's factual findings.  He simply argues that the 
referee should have believed his version of events.  We conclude 
that the referee's findings of fact regarding Count 8 are not 
clearly erroneous.   
¶71 Attorney Inglimo also challenges the referee's finding 
that his sexual intercourse with K.K. may have materially 
limited his ability to represent P.K.  Attorney Inglimo focuses 
his argument on his claim that K.K. was not his client at the 
time of the sexual encounter.  He argues that there was no 
evidence as to any conflict that this encounter created.  
Attorney Inglimo also asserts that his having sex with K.K. was 
suggested by P.K. and K.K.  He denies the testimony of P.K. and 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
33 
 
K.K. that K.K. had sex with Attorney Inglimo to pay off an 
outstanding legal bill. 
¶72 We find no basis to overturn the referee's factual 
findings with respect to Count 14.  Even if K.K. was not a 
client at the time that Attorney Inglimo had sexual intercourse 
with her, it is undisputed that her husband P.K. was a current 
client at that time.  Whether or not the sexual intercourse was 
payment for prior legal services, we agree with the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Inglimo engaged in sexual intercourse 
with a client's wife in the client's presence for his own 
personal interests.  Attorney Inglimo has not shown that his 
conduct with K.K. somehow benefited his client P.K.  It is self-
evident that an attorney's personal interest in having sex with 
the spouse of a client may materially limit the attorney's 
representation of that client.  Whether or not the client 
initially approved of the encounter, there is a substantial 
possibility that the episode is likely to create conflicts 
between the attorney and the client going forward.  Since SCR 
20:1.7(b) 
requires 
only 
that 
the 
representation 
"may 
be 
materially limited" by the lawyer's personal interests, we agree 
with the referee's conclusion that Attorney Inglimo's conduct 
constituted a violation of the rule. 
¶73 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
the OLR and Attorney Inglimo both object to the referee's 
recommendation of an 18-month suspension.  The OLR asserts that 
a three-year suspension is required in this case.  It argues 
that the referee's 18-month suspension was premised on the 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
34 
 
number of violations he found and would have been greater if 
additional violations had been considered.  The OLR also argues 
that Attorney Inglimo's misconduct exhibited a serious disregard 
of the trust placed in him as an attorney on three different 
fronts: his violation of the drug laws with clients, his failure 
to treat trust account funds properly, and his engaging in 
social/sexual relationships with the wives of clients.  It notes 
that prior cases involving drug use have warranted substantial 
suspensions.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Rabideau, 
102 
Wis. 2d 16, 306 N.W.2d 1 (1981) (three-year 
suspension 
following 
convictions 
for 
contributing 
to 
the 
delinquency of a minor and possession of marijuana involving 
supplying marijuana to a former juvenile client); Broadnax, 225 
Wis. 2d at 442-44 (two-year suspension for using cocaine while 
subject to order not to do so, misappropriating slightly less 
than $1,000 from his former law firm, and stealing several 
compact discs from an employee of his former law firm).  
Moreover, trust account violations, by themselves, have also 
resulted in suspensions of more than a few months.  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther, 2005 WI 133, 
285 Wis. 2d 587, 700 N.W.2d 260 (eight-month suspension imposed 
for multiple trust account violations, as well as failure to 
keep a client reasonably informed and making a misrepresentation 
to a client).  Likewise, a six-month suspension was warranted in 
a case involving an attorney's sexual relations with a client 
and the mother of another client and his false denials of that 
conduct to a court and the OLR.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
35 
 
Against Gamino, 2005 WI 168, 286 Wis. 2d 558, 707 N.W.2d 132.  
The OLR argues in light of these and other similar prior 
precedents that an 18-month suspension in the current case, 
given the number and nature of ethical violations, would unduly 
depreciate the seriousness of Attorney Inglimo's professional 
misconduct. 
¶74 On the other side, Attorney Inglimo argues that we 
should consider alternatives to suspension.  He asserts that all 
or most of his misconduct is connected to his past use of 
controlled substances.  Therefore, he argues that disciplinary 
measures 
focusing 
on 
rehabilitation 
and 
confirming 
his 
abstinence from controlled substances would be appropriate here.  
Attorney Inglimo asserts that he has been able to remove from 
his life both controlled substances and the persons who 
connected him to that lifestyle.  He also claims that a 
suspension would place an unreasonable burden on him due to 
limited opportunities for other employment and that he has 
endured a four-year ordeal relating to his criminal conviction 
and the current disciplinary investigation and proceeding.  
Finally, Attorney Inglimo notes that he has demonstrated his 
ability to practice in conformity to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct during that four-year period. 
¶75 After 
considering 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
the 
arguments of the parties, we conclude that a three-year 
suspension is necessary to protect the public in this case.  
Attorney Inglimo showed a disturbing pattern of disregard for 
the laws of this state and his professional obligations as an 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
36 
 
attorney.  His conduct of using illegal drugs with his clients 
and supplying them with drugs encouraged his clients to disobey 
the law.  Moreover, it is also clear that Attorney Inglimo 
failed to comprehend or appreciate the fiduciary obligation an 
attorney has to hold the funds of clients or third parties in 
trust.  He routinely used funds belonging to certain clients to 
cover the expenses of another client or his own personal 
expenses.  Finally, he put his own interests above his duty to 
promote and protect the interests of his clients, thereby 
violating one of the core principles of the legal profession.  A 
substantial period of suspension is necessary in this case to 
impress upon Attorney Inglimo and other lawyers in this state 
the seriousness of the professional misconduct at issue here and 
to protect the public from similar misconduct in the future. 
¶76 We agree with the referee that as a condition of 
reinstatement Attorney Inglimo should be required to abstain 
from the use of illegal drugs and to submit to random drug 
screenings for a period of one year prior to reinstatement.  We 
believe that this is a necessary step to ensure Attorney 
Inglimo's rehabilitation and to protect the public due to the 
fact that the use of controlled substances was a substantial 
factor in the misconduct in this case.  We will require as a 
condition of the reinstatement of his license to practice law 
that Attorney Inglimo at his own expense submit to monthly 
random drug screenings for a period of one year prior to the 
filing of a petition for reinstatement and that he provide the 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
37 
 
results of those screenings to the OLR.  See Broadnax, 225 
Wis. 2d at 444; Sandy, 200 Wis. 2d at 535-36. 
¶77 We now turn to the issue of costs.  On May 1, 2006, 
this court issued an order in response to Rule Petition 05-01 
(Order 05-01), which related to the assessment of costs against 
attorneys 
in 
disciplinary 
proceedings, 
medical 
incapacity 
proceedings, and reinstatement proceedings under SCR 22.24.  In 
Re 
Amendments 
to 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules 
Relating 
to 
Cost 
Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System, S.Ct. Order 05-01, 
2006 WI 34, 287 Wis. 2d xiii, 714 N.W.2d Ct.R-21.  In that order 
we amended subpart (2) of SCR 22.24.  We also created SCR 
22.24(1m), which reads as follows: 
22.14(1m)  The court's general policy is that 
upon a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to 
impose all costs, including the expenses of counsel 
for 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation, 
upon 
the 
respondent. 
 
In 
cases 
involving 
extraordinary 
circumstances the court may, in the exercise of its 
discretion, reduce the amount of costs imposed upon a 
respondent.  In exercising its discretion regarding 
the assessment of costs, the court will consider the 
submissions of the parties and all of the following 
factors: 
 
(a)  The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
 
(b)  The nature of the misconduct. 
 
(c)  The 
level of discipline sought by the 
parties and recommended by the referee. 
 
(d)  The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
 
(e)  Prior discipline, if any. 
 
(f)  Other relevant circumstances. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
38 
 
¶78 Order 05-01, however, expressly stated that the new 
rule would "apply prospectively to disciplinary proceedings, 
medical incapacity proceedings, or reinstatement proceedings 
filed on or after July 1, 2006."  Thus, the new rule does not 
apply to the present disciplinary proceeding, which was filed in 
March 2005, although the provisions of the new rule may be 
instructive in how we approach the cost issue in the present 
matter. 
¶79 Moreover, the court's rulings under the version of the 
rule in effect prior to Order 05-01 are generally consistent 
with the language of what has now become SCR 22.24(1m).  This 
court 
has 
traditionally imposed all of the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding on a respondent attorney, even in cases 
in which the attorney prevailed on some of the counts against 
him/her.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ¶32, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36, ¶¶29-30, 
279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Trewin, 2004 WI 116, ¶49, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 
121; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 
440, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998). 
¶80 In this case, the OLR has submitted a request for the 
imposition of costs in the total amount of $42,400.96.  Of that 
amount, $8,687.49 relate to the referee's time and expenses in 
presiding over the disciplinary proceeding, which included 
handling 
pretrial 
matters, 
deciding 
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment, presiding over an evidentiary hearing, and preparing a 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
39 
 
lengthy report.  The OLR seeks $24,751.54 for counsel fees and 
disbursements for pre-appellate work and $8,043.04 for counsel 
fees and disbursements related to the appeals in this matter.  
The remainder of the costs relate to court reporting fees and 
other miscellaneous expenses. 
¶81 The 
referee 
recommended 
that 
the 
costs 
of 
the 
disciplinary proceeding to be assessed against Attorney Inglimo 
should be reduced by one-fifteenth because he viewed Count 15 as 
only a technical violation of the Supreme Court Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  We decline to follow this recommendation.  
Although Count 15 was a relatively minor violation in the 
context of this case, it is clear that Attorney Inglimo did not 
comply with the rule requiring written notification of his 
criminal conviction.  Nonetheless, he chose to deny the count 
and to litigate the matter, inviting the OLR's efforts to prove 
the violation.  Consequently, we conclude that the cost amount 
we approve should not be reduced by one-fifteenth. 
¶82 Attorney Inglimo has filed an objection to the cost 
request filed by the OLR.  In addition to seeking the one-
fifteenth reduction advocated by the referee, which we have now 
rejected, Attorney Inglimo also seeks an across-the-board one-
half reduction of the referee's fees and the OLR's fees and 
disbursements.  Attorney Inglimo's objection incorrectly assumes 
that the new provisions of SCR 22.14(1m) apply to the present 
proceeding and argues that the various factors listed there 
favor a reduction in the amount of costs that should be assessed 
against him. 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
40 
 
¶83 With regard to his specific arguments for a one-half 
reduction in costs, Attorney Inglimo asserts that the OLR over-
charged and over-litigated the case against him.  He points to 
the fact that he did not dispute the counts related to trust 
account violations, which were resolved in the OLR's favor on 
summary judgment and which the referee did not view as 
particularly serious.  In addition, he notes that the referee 
found no violation on five of the fifteen counts charged and 
believed that Count 15 was only a technical violation that did 
not require any sanction. 
¶84 Attorney Inglimo also argues that the nature of his 
misconduct was not very serious, since it involved the use of 
controlled substances and sexual behavior, as opposed to the 
conversion of client funds or other offenses directly related to 
the practice of law.  He further asserts that the referee 
recommended only half of the discipline sought by the OLR and 
that he has cooperated fully with the disciplinary process. 
¶85 Although Attorney Inglimo asserts that the OLR over-
litigated this matter, he does not cite specific examples of 
ways in which the OLR excessively litigated this proceeding.  
For example, he does not identify which motions, depositions, 
etc. were unnecessary.  Tied to this general claim is his 
assertion that the OLR did not try to reach a resolution of this 
matter by agreement prior to the evidentiary hearing, although 
he had directed his own counsel to seek a negotiated settlement.  
In this regard, we note that the OLR is not authorized to plea 
bargain disciplinary matters, although it may enter into 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
41 
 
stipulations of fact and law and jointly request the imposition 
of a certain level of discipline that is supported by the 
particular facts of a matter.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Barrock, 2007 WI 24, ¶5, 299 Wis. 2d 207, 
727 N.W.2d 833; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Robinson, 
2007 WI 17, ¶5, 299 Wis. 2d 49, 726 N.W.2d 896; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Paul, 2007 WI 11, ¶22, 298 
Wis. 2d 629, 726 N.W.2d 253; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Morissey, 2005 WI 169, ¶27, 286 Wis. 2d 579, 707 N.W.2d 
142; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Malloy, 2002 WI 52, 
¶13, 252 Wis. 2d 597, 644 N.W.2d 663. 
¶86 Attorney Inglimo does cite several specific items that 
he asserts should not be recoverable as expenses.  For example, 
he claims that he should not be required to pay for the travel 
expenses of OLR's retained counsel to travel to Superior, 
Wisconsin, for meetings that he alleges did not occur.  He also 
argues that he should not have to pay for attorney time for 
telephone conferences between OLR's retained attorney and its 
in-house attorneys.  Additionally, he claims, without any 
citation of legal authority, that he should not have to pay for 
the OLR's retained attorney's mileage, meals and lodging or for 
photocopies of documents that were used during the prosecution 
of the matter but were not filed with the referee or this court. 
¶87 In response, the OLR cites this court's prior cases in 
which we have said that our general practice is levy the full 
costs of the disciplinary proceeding on the respondent attorney.  
It states that this court has rejected on multiple occasions 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
42 
 
Attorney Inglimo's claim that the cost amount should be reduced 
because the referee did not find violations on some counts.  
See, e.g., Konnor, 279 Wis. 2d 284, ¶32; Polich, 279 Wis. 2d 
266, ¶¶29-30; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988).  The OLR argues that 
there is no basis for a claim that any of the counts alleged by 
the OLR were wholly without prosecutorial merit.  See Konnor, 
279 Wis. 2d 284, ¶72 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (noting that 
the respondent attorney's conduct had caused the prosecution to 
proceed on all counts and questioning why the costs stemming 
from the respondent attorney's conduct should be shifted to 
other attorneys in this state).  At bottom, the OLR asserts that 
there are no "extraordinary circumstances" here that would 
justify a departure from the court's standard practice of 
imposing full costs against the respondent attorney. 
¶88 With respect to the individual items identified by 
Attorney Inglimo, the OLR notes that counsel's travel to 
Superior to meet with witnesses was justified.  On one occasion, 
only one of the two witnesses appeared at the scheduled time.  
Counsel, however, subsequently located the other witness at her 
home later that same day.  On the other occasion, counsel had 
scheduled a meeting with another witness and traveled to 
Superior with the reasonable expectation that the witness would 
appear for the meeting.  Although the witness ultimately failed 
to appear, the OLR asserts that this was a justifiable expense.   
¶89 The OLR also argues that it should be entitled to 
obtain 
reimbursement 
for 
retained 
counsel's 
time 
spent 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
43 
 
conferring with OLR in-house litigation counsel.  It asserts 
that these telephone conferences were necessary for retained 
counsel to receive guidance and instruction from OLR's in-house 
attorneys.  Moreover, it notes that, pursuant to its custom, it 
did not seek reimbursement for any of the time spent by its in-
house attorneys during these conferences. 
¶90 With respect to Attorney Inglimo's objection to the 
mileage, meals and lodging expenses of OLR's retained counsel, 
the OLR states that such expenses fall within the definition of 
"costs" in SCR 22.001(3).  That provision defines "costs" as 
including "fees and expenses of counsel for the office of lawyer 
regulation." 
¶91 After considering the submissions of the parties on 
the cost issue, we conclude that Attorney Inglimo should be 
required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
Attorney Inglimo has not demonstrated why we should deviate in 
this case from our practice of assessing full costs.  He has not 
shown that the OLR over-litigated any part of this case.  He has 
not pointed to particular actions taken by the OLR's counsel 
that were unnecessary at the time.  While we recognize that the 
total amount of costs in this case is quite large, and while we 
urge the OLR to be mindful of the impact of its actions on a 
respondent attorney who will ultimately be faced with a large 
cost assessment, we have not found a reason to reject any part 
of the cost request in this case as unnecessary or excessive. 
¶92 Moreover, much of Attorney Inglimo's support for 
reducing the amount of costs stems from his assertion that the 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
44 
 
OLR failed to prove a large number of the counts in its 
complaint and that other counts on which the OLR prevailed 
(e.g., Counts 3 through 7 relating to trust account violations) 
were relatively insignificant violations.  First, we have 
determined that the OLR did prove violations on 14 of the 15 
counts in its complaint.  With respect to the single count on 
which we have not found a violation, relating to Attorney 
Inglimo's three-way sexual encounter with a client and his 
girlfriend, we cannot say that the OLR's position was without 
merit.  We have simply interpreted the rule at issue in a 
narrower fashion than the OLR sought.  Moreover, we disagree 
with 
Attorney 
Inglimo's 
position 
that 
the 
professional 
misconduct at issue in this proceeding was not serious.  Failing 
to hold client trust account funds properly, drawing clients 
into violations of the criminal laws of this state, and engaging 
in sexual/social conduct that conflicts with the attorney's duty 
of loyalty to a client are serious breaches of an attorney's 
professional obligations. 
¶93 In addition, we do not believe that the specific items 
identified by Attorney Inglimo fall outside the reasonable 
expenses that the OLR may incur during its prosecution of a 
disciplinary matter.  Retained counsel traveled to meetings in 
Superior as a necessary part of obtaining evidence and preparing 
for an eventual evidentiary hearing.  That a witness failed to 
appear for a scheduled meeting does not mean that retained 
counsel's actions were unreasonable or unnecessary.  Similarly, 
we find no fault with charging for retained counsel's reasonable 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
45 
 
amounts of time spent receiving direction from OLR's litigation 
attorneys.  The OLR is charged by this court with enforcing the 
Rules of Professional Conduct in a fair and consistent manner.  
It must be able to ensure that its retained counsel is 
prosecuting a particular action in an appropriate manner, 
consistent with the office's obligations.  Moreover, costs in 
disciplinary proceedings are not limited to items that could be 
properly taxed as costs in a civil proceeding.  We have no 
hesitation in allowing the OLR to obtain reimbursement for 
photocopies that were reasonably made in the normal course of 
prosecuting a disciplinary action.   
¶94 At bottom, we note once again that the instant 
proceeding arose from Attorney Inglimo's own conduct.  Thus, it 
is appropriate that he should shoulder, to the extent he is 
able, the costs of the proceeding rather than transfer those 
costs to the other attorneys practicing in this state who have 
not engaged in misconduct. 
¶95 Finally, Attorney Inglimo asserts that the amount of 
costs to be imposed against him greatly exceeds his annual 
income over the last several years.  He argues that since he 
lives in a rural area and faces the suspension of his license to 
practice law in this state, he will not have the ability to 
obtain employment that will allow him to pay such a large cost 
amount in a reasonable amount of time.  Moreover, he states that 
he already faces substantial attorney fees from his own counsel 
in this proceeding and will incur additional expenses in 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
46 
 
disciplinary proceedings in other states in which he has had a 
license to practice law. 
¶96 We will not adjust the amount of costs imposed against 
Attorney Inglimo based on a claim of lack of assets at this 
time.  It is premature to address that issue now.  We first 
direct Attorney Inglimo to work out an agreement with the OLR by 
which the cost assessment may be paid over time.  See Konnor, 
279 Wis. 2d 284, ¶50 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("If a 
lawyer cannot pay the full costs immediately, an agreement may 
be reached to enable the lawyer to pay the costs over time.")  
If such an agreement cannot be reached or if Attorney Inglimo is 
too indigent to be able to make any payments toward the cost 
assessment, then he may seek relief from the court.  We will 
address a motion premised on an indigency claim only after 
Attorney Inglimo has attempted in good faith to reach an 
agreement with the OLR on a payment plan.  We are extending the 
time period for paying the costs in this case from 60 to 180 
days to give Attorney Inglimo additional time to work out such 
an agreement. 
¶97 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael R. Inglimo 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of three 
years, effective November 19, 2007. 
¶98 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 180 days of the date 
of this order, Michael R. Inglimo shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay those costs within that time, 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
47 
 
the license of Attorney Inglimo to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶99 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael R. Inglimo shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶100 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael R. Inglimo abstain 
from using, possessing, manufacturing or delivering illegal 
controlled substances during his suspension and that Attorney 
Inglimo at his own expense submit to monthly random drug 
screenings for a period of one year prior to the filing of a 
petition for reinstatement and that he provide the results of 
those screenings to the OLR. 
¶101 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2005AP718-D   
 
 
 
1