Title: NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-9118.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-9118 
NASCAR HOLDINGS, INC., APPELLANT, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-9118.] 
Board of Tax Appeals—Jurisdiction—Notice of appeal filed by attorney not 
licensed in Ohio—BTA not deprived of jurisdiction solely because notice of 
appeal was filed by nonattorney—Lack of authority to practice law is 
irrelevant to question whether jurisdiction was properly invoked―Any 
authorized agent may invoke jurisdiction of BTA by filing appeal on 
taxpayer’s behalf, even if by doing so, agent engages in unauthorized 
practice of law. 
(No. 2015-1157―Submitted August 22, 2017―Decided December 21, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2015-263. 
____________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
I. SUMMARY 
{¶ 1} Appellant, NASCAR Holdings, Inc. (“NASCAR”), challenges the 
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) dismissing NASCAR’s notice of 
appeal solely because it was filed by an attorney who was not licensed to practice 
law in Ohio.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the BTA’s decision and 
remand for further proceedings. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} The Department of Taxation conducted an audit and found that 
NASCAR had failed to file commercial-activity tax (“CAT”) returns and to pay the 
CAT for more than five years, from July 1, 2005, to December 31, 2010.  The 
department issued an assessment against NASCAR for $549,520. 
{¶ 3} NASCAR filed a petition for reassessment with appellee, the tax 
commissioner.  On January 5, 2015, the commissioner issued his final 
determination, rejecting NASCAR’s arguments and affirming the assessment. 
{¶ 4} NASCAR then filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, 
challenging the tax commissioner’s final determination.  The notice of appeal was 
signed by “Michael J. Bowen, POA.”  Bowen is a Florida-based attorney who is 
not licensed to practice law in Ohio. 
{¶ 5} On May 8, 2015, the tax commissioner filed a motion to dismiss. The 
commissioner argued that because Bowen had engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law when he filed the notice of appeal on NASCAR’s behalf, the BTA lacked 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
{¶ 6} NASCAR conceded that Bowen was neither admitted to the Ohio bar 
nor registered for pro hac vice status when he filed the notice of appeal.1  NASCAR, 
                                                 
1 On May 28, 2015, Bowen filed a motion with the BTA in this case for pro hac vice status. The 
BTA never ruled on Bowen’s motion.  NASCAR states that the BTA “ignor[ed]” the motion for pro 
hac vice, but does not claim error with respect to the BTA’s failure to rule.  
January Term, 2017 
 
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however, asserted that Bowen’s lack of authority to practice law in Ohio was 
irrelevant to whether his filing of the notice of appeal properly invoked the BTA’s 
jurisdiction. 
{¶ 7} On June 15, 2015, the BTA granted the motion and dismissed the 
appeal.  The BTA found that Bowen had engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law when he prepared and filed the notice of appeal with the BTA on NASCAR’s 
behalf.  The BTA further held that this rendered the notice of appeal void ab initio, 
thereby depriving the board of jurisdiction over NASCAR’s appeal.  NASCAR 
appealed to this court. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶ 8} In reviewing a decision of the BTA, this court determines whether the 
decision is “reasonable and lawful.”  R.C. 5717.04; Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14.  Although the BTA is 
responsible for determining factual issues, we “ ‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA 
decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ” Id., quoting Gahanna-
Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 
N.E.2d 789 (2001). 
B. Whether the filing of the notice of appeal by an attorney not licensed to 
practice law in Ohio deprives the BTA of jurisdiction 
{¶ 9} NASCAR argues that the BTA erred when it held that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the appeal solely because Bowen was not authorized to practice 
law in Ohio when he filed NASCAR’s notice of appeal.  NASCAR states that under 
R.C. 5717.02(A), appeals from a final determination by the tax commissioner “may 
be taken to the board of tax appeals by the taxpayer.”  NASCAR argues that under 
Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Lindley, 64 Ohio St.2d 365, 415 N.E.2d 292 (1980), any 
authorized agent may file an appeal to the BTA on the taxpayer’s behalf, even if by 
doing so, the agent engages in the unauthorized practice of law.  Since Bowen was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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NASCAR’s authorized agent, NASCAR maintains that the BTA’s jurisdiction was 
properly invoked and the case should be remanded for a decision on the merits. 
1. Background on Jemo 
{¶ 10} In Jemo, a corporate accountant signed a notice of appeal to the BTA 
from a final determination of the tax commissioner.  The BTA had promulgated an 
administrative rule that required that a notice of appeal filed on behalf of a 
corporation be signed by either a corporate officer or an attorney.  The BTA 
dismissed the appeal because Jemo’s accountant was not a corporate officer or an 
attorney, as required by the rule.  Jemo at 365-366. 
{¶ 11} This court reversed in a plurality per curiam opinion.  The plurality 
first noted that R.C. 5717.02 provides that such appeals “may be taken to the board 
of tax appeals by the taxpayer.”  Jemo at 366.  The plurality then found that because 
R.C. 5717.02 articulates no further restrictions, the BTA’s rule unlawfully limited 
who could act on behalf of the taxpayer under the statute.  According to the 
plurality, “[t]here is * * * no merit to an interpretation of R.C. 5717.02 which, for 
jurisdictional purposes, conclusively presumes that a corporate officer or an 
attorney is always competent to sign a corporation’s notice of appeal but that any 
other corporate agent is never competent.”  Jemo at 368.  Rather, “under agency 
law, the authority of any purported agent to act on behalf of a principal is ordinarily 
a question of fact.”  Id. at 367.  Thus, under Jemo, whether the notice of appeal 
properly invoked the BTA’s jurisdiction turns on whether the person filing it was 
authorized by the taxpayer to file it.  See also Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. 
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, 
¶ 23-24 (construing Jemo). 
 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
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2. The BTA erred in not applying Jemo 
{¶ 12} NASCAR relies primarily on Jemo as grounds for reversing the 
order of the BTA.2  In the proceedings below, the BTA noted its long-standing 
practice of relying on Jemo in accepting jurisdiction over appeals when corporate 
officers and other nonattorney agents have prepared and filed the notice of appeal 
on behalf of a corporate taxpayer.  BTA No. 2015-263 at 2, citing cases.  The BTA, 
however, found that this case is distinguishable because unlike in Jemo, the board 
was “faced not with a corporate officer or accountant, but an attorney licensed to 
practice in another state who failed to abide by the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar of Ohio by seeking admission to practice in Ohio prior to 
filing the instant appeal.”  BTA No. 2015-263 at 2.  We find that the BTA erred in 
distinguishing Jemo. 
{¶ 13} The BTA distinguished this case from Jemo because, in its opinion, 
“a non-Ohio attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing and 
filing a notice of appeal with this board.”  BTA No. 2015-263 at 2.  The BTA 
ignores Jemo’s conclusion that R.C. 5717.02 does not require that the corporation’s 
agent be an attorney for purposes of invoking the BTA’s jurisdiction.  The tax 
commissioner raised the attorney issue in Jemo, arguing that R.C. 4705.01 bars 
nonlawyers from commencing legal proceedings on behalf of others. But Jemo 
rejected this argument, stating: “R.C. 4705.01 is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue 
before [the court] since it has no bearing upon whether any particular attorney has 
the authority to represent any particular corporate taxpayer.” Jemo, 64 Ohio St.2d 
at 368, 415 N.E.2d 292, fn. 4.  In Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 124 Ohio St.3d 
490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 23, fn. 4, we explained that footnote four 
                                                 
2 NASCAR’s only other argument claims that the BTA improperly enforced Ohio Adm.Code 5717-
1-02, which requires that attorneys appearing before the BTA be licensed in Ohio or admitted pro 
hac vice.  Because we find in favor of NASCAR, we do not need to address this argument.    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of Jemo “illustrates the court’s narrow focus on the question of an accountant’s 
actual authority as an agent.” 
{¶ 14} Because nonattorney corporate agents filed the appeals in both this 
case and Jemo, the BTA was wrong to distinguish this case from Jemo.  Although 
the Jemo plurality did not address the question, it is clear that the nonlawyer 
corporate accountant in Jemo was also not licensed to practice law in Ohio when 
he filed the notice of appeal to the BTA.  See R.C. 4705.01 (only a licensed attorney 
can commence an action or proceeding on behalf of another person); and Land Title 
Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 28, 193 N.E. 650 (1934) (the 
practice of law includes the preparation of legal documents by which legal rights 
are preserved); Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Misch, 82 Ohio St.3d 256, 259-261, 695 
N.E.2d 244 (1998) (filing a notice of appeal to the BTA on behalf of another 
constitutes the practice of law).  But that issue is separate from the issue of 
jurisdiction. Under Jemo, the corporate agent’s status as a non-Ohio attorney does 
not alter the BTA’s jurisdiction. 
{¶ 15} As to the BTA’s determination that Bowen’s status as a non-Ohio 
attorney rendered the notice of appeal void, this runs counter to Jemo’s central 
point: that R.C. 5717.02 places no limits on the corporate taxpayer’s authority to 
designate an agent to sign the notice of appeal.  Under Jemo, who may properly act 
as the taxpayer’s agent is a question of fact that hinges on whether the person filing 
the notice of appeal was authorized by the taxpayer to file it.  Jemo, 64 Ohio St.2d 
at 367-368, 415 N.E.2d 292.  See also Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 124 Ohio 
St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 23-24. 
{¶ 16} In this case, there appears to be no dispute that NASCAR authorized 
Bowen to file the notice of appeal to the BTA.  So under R.C. 5717.02 and Jemo, 
the notice of appeal filed by Bowen properly invoked the BTA’s jurisdiction.  
Therefore, the BTA erred in dismissing NASCAR’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
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3. The tax commissioner’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive 
{¶ 17} The tax commissioner cites Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Ryan, 138 Ohio 
St.3d 67, 2013-Ohio-5500, 3 N.E.3d 194, and Misch, 82 Ohio St.3d 256, 695 
N.E.2d 244, for the proposition that preparing and filing a notice of appeal to the 
BTA constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  But the dispositive question here 
is whether Bowen’s actions deprived the BTA of jurisdiction over NASCAR’s 
appeal.  On that question, Ryan and Misch are silent. 
{¶ 18} The tax commissioner also argues that Jemo, a plurality opinion, is 
not binding authority.  That is true.  Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Ohio 
St.3d 42, 44, 488 N.E.2d 840 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Martin v. 
Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 639 N.E.2d 438 (1994).  But when 
a court or administrative agency finds a plurality opinion to be persuasive, it is not 
barred from relying on that opinion.  We are persuaded by Jemo. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 19} We find that NASCAR has demonstrated reversible error.  The BTA 
erred in not applying Jemo.  Accordingly, we reverse the BTA’s decision 
dismissing NASCAR’s appeal and remand the cause to the BTA for consideration 
on the merits. 
Decision reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} I respectfully dissent.  Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Lindley, 64 Ohio St.2d 
365, 415 N.E.2d 292 (1980), does not stand for the proposition that the Board of 
Tax Appeals (“BTA”) has jurisdiction to hear an appeal when someone not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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authorized to practice law in Ohio has filed the appeal on behalf of a corporation 
and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by doing so.  Even if the lead 
opinion in Jemo did stand for that proposition, it has been superseded by our 
subsequent case law.  Thus, the BTA correctly dismissed the appeal of NASCAR 
Holdings, Inc., on the grounds that the appeal was filed by an attorney not licensed 
in Ohio and, therefore, did not invoke the BTA’s jurisdiction. 
{¶ 21} In Jemo, three justices signed on to the plurality opinion and a fourth 
justice concurred in judgment only.  Thus, as the majority acknowledges, Jemo is 
not binding authority.  Ohio courts have cited Jemo most often for the proposition 
that cases generally should not be dismissed for violating a procedural rule.  See 
Friendly’s v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 94APH03-347 
to 94APH03-349, 1994 WL 521217 (Sept. 20, 1994); Grenga v. Bank One, N.A., 
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 MA 94, 2005-Ohio-4474; and In re Terrance P., 124 
Ohio App.3d 487, 706 N.E.2d 801 (6th Dist.1997). 
{¶ 22} No court has cited Jemo for the proposition that any authorized agent 
can file an appeal to the BTA on the taxpayer’s behalf, even if the agent is engaged 
in the unauthorized practice of law.  See Toledo Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lucas 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345; Sharon 
Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 78 Ohio St.3d 479, 678 N.E.2d 932 
(1997); State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
80 Ohio St.3d 302, 686 N.E.2d 238 (1997); Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 
51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97 (1990); and Universal Equip. Co. v. Limbach, 6th 
Dist. Sandusky No. S-88-20, 1989 WL 20256 (Mar. 10, 1989). 
{¶ 23} Since Jemo, this court has addressed the unauthorized practice of law 
several times in the state-tax area, primarily in the context of valuation complaints.  
In Sharon Village, this court held that nonattorneys were barred from filing 
valuation complaints on behalf of corporate taxpayers.  The court’s decision in 
Sharon Village rested on the application of three statutes:  R.C. 5715.19(A), 
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5715.13, and 4705.01.  R.C. 5715.19(A), at the time, provided that a property owner 
could file a valuation complaint in the county in which the land was located.  1988 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 603, 142 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4583, 4589.  R.C. 5715.13 
provided that either the owner itself or an “agent” could perform the filing.  1953 
Am.H.B. No. 1.  And R.C. 4705.01 prohibited the practice of law by a nonattorney, 
as it does today.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 219, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 662, 680–681. 
{¶ 24} Based on the interplay among R.C. 4705.01, 5715.13, and 5715.19, 
the court concluded that a nonattorney engages in the unauthorized practice of law 
when he or she files a valuation complaint on behalf of a corporation.  Sharon 
Village, 78 Ohio St.3d at 483, 678 N.E.2d 932.  And because the statutes themselves 
did not authorize a nonattorney to file on behalf of a corporation, the court affirmed 
the BTA’s decision, which dismissed the appeal on the basis that a valuation 
complaint filed by a nonattorney fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the board of 
revision.  See also Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 134 Ohio St.3d 529, 2012-Ohio-5680, 983 N.E.2d 1285, ¶ 13-14 
(explaining the reasoning underlying Sharon Village); State ex rel. Cooker 
Restaurant, 80 Ohio St.3d at 306-307, 686 N.E.2d 238 (rejecting Jemo as 
controlling and finding that the board of elections properly dismissed election 
protest under Sharon Village). 
{¶ 25} In response to Sharon Village, the General Assembly amended R.C. 
5715.19(A) in 1999 to allow certain persons to file valuation complaints on behalf 
of a taxpayer, without regard to whether those persons are attorneys.  147 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 5373, 5373-5374.  This court has upheld the R.C. 5715.19(A)(1) 
amendments.  See, e.g., Marysville Exempted Village Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 136 Ohio St.3d 146, 2013-Ohio-3077, 991 N.E.2d 
1134, ¶ 21-34. 
{¶ 26} Although this court has recognized certain statutory exceptions to 
the prohibition against the practice of law by nonattorneys, Sharon Village has not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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been overruled and remains good law when no such exceptions apply.  Indeed, a 
decade after the statutory amendments that abrogated Sharon Village in part, this 
court delivered a unanimous per curiam opinion in Toledo.  Toledo, 124 Ohio St.3d 
490, 2010-Ohio-253, 924 N.E.2d 345.  In Toledo, the court noted that Sharon 
Village and its progeny are controlling when issues of jurisdiction and unauthorized 
practice of law coexist in a given case.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Compare Richman Properties, 
L.L.C. v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 549, 2014-Ohio-2439, 13 
N.E.3d 1126, ¶ 20-27 (examining unauthorized-practice-of-law issues at the BTA 
through prism of Sharon Village and its progeny); Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 63, 2010-Ohio-4907, 936 
N.E.2d 489, ¶ 13-17 (same). 
{¶ 27} Moreover, Ohio courts have found that when a filing constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law, the court is deprived of jurisdiction to rule on that 
filing.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hadley v. Pike, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 14 CO 14, 
2014-Ohio-3310 (civil complaint filed by an attorney not licensed to practice in 
Ohio should have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Norwalk 
MK, Inc. v. McCormick, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-041, 2005-Ohio-2493 
(municipal court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims filed by nonattorney officer of 
corporation); Bur. of Support v. Brown, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 00APO742, 2001 WL 
1497073 (Nov. 6, 2001) (trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction when it 
granted motion filed by a nonattorney).  But see Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Pearlman, 
106 Ohio St.3d 136, 2005-Ohio-4107, 832 N.E.2d 1193 (nonattorney corporate 
officers may file claims on behalf of corporation in small-claims court). 
{¶ 28} Giving due consideration to the above, I would hold that barring a 
statutory exception, when an appeal to the BTA is filed by a nonattorney, the 
nonattorney has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and the BTA does not, 
therefore, have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  The nonbinding plurality opinion in 
Jemo does not conclude otherwise, and even if it could be read to do so, in light of 
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Sharon Village, it has been superseded.  For these reasons, it was neither 
unreasonable nor unlawful for the BTA to follow Sharon Village and its progeny 
and to not follow Jemo.  Indeed, doing so gave effect to the guidance provided by 
this court in Toledo. 
{¶ 29} I would affirm the BTA’s decision and, therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
_________________ 
 
Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Jeremy A. Hayden, 
and Mark F. Sommer, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Raina 
Nahra Boulos, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
_________________