Title: Young v. Arms

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 93678, 93685, 93728 cons.-Agenda 11-September 							2003.
STEPHEN YOUNG et al., Appellees, v. BRYCO ARMS et al., 							Appellants.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The five plaintiffs in these three consolidated actions are the
special administrators, as well as surviving family members, of
individuals who were killed in the City of Chicago in crimes involving
illegal firearms. In each case, the killer was either a minor or a young
adult who had obtained the weapon from a minor. In three instances
(plaintiffs Young, Smith, and Ceriale), the illegal weapons were
recovered and traced to specific defendants. In the two remaining
instances (plaintiffs Macias and Bowman), the guns used in the fatal
shootings were never recovered. Plaintiffs' theories of liability
included negligence and public nuisance.
	Each plaintiff named 21 manufacturers and distributors of
firearms as defendants. This group of 21 defendants included the
manufacturers of the three recovered weapons and two distributors
who handled one of the recovered weapons. In addition, plaintiffs
Young and Ceriale named the retail gun dealers who sold the weapons
used in the shootings of their sons. Plaintiff Smith named the 15-year-old gang member who shot and killed her pregnant daughter. Thus,
the 24 named defendants included 8 who had been involved in the
manufacture, distribution, sale, or use of the specific guns used in the
shootings of Andrew Young, Salada Smith, and Michael Ceriale, as
well as 16 other manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. These 16
others are the so-called "unrelated defendants," who, plaintiffs claim,
are members of a core group of irresponsible businesses that
significantly contribute to the creation and maintenance of the alleged
public nuisance.
 	The negligence counts (counts V and VI of all three complaints)
were dismissed by the circuit court and are no longer at issue. The
circuit court denied defendants' various motions to dismiss the public
nuisance counts, but certified for immediate interlocutory appeal (155
Ill. 2d R. 308) the question of whether the plaintiffs had stated a cause
of action for public nuisance.
	The appellate court held that the two plaintiffs who could not
identify the defendants who manufactured, distributed, or sold the
specific firearms used in the killings of their loved ones lacked
standing altogether because their injury was not " 'fairly traceable' "
to any named defendant. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 948, 972, quoting Glisson
v. City of Marian, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221. These plaintiffs, Macias and
Bowman, did not seek leave to appeal.
	The appellate court also held that the three plaintiffs who could
identify the specific firearms used in the shootings of their decedents
had stated a cause of action for public nuisance in count I of each of
their complaints.(1) 327 Ill. App. 3d at 972-73. Because count I of each
complaint was directed at only the manufacturer of an identified
weapon, this holding does not apply to the distributor defendants. As
a result, none of the distributor defendants are parties to this appeal.
	Count II of each complaint alleged that the "unrelated
defendants" participated in the creation and perpetuation of a public
nuisance. The appellate court held that all five plaintiffs lacked
standing to press their claims against those defendants who did not
manufacture, distribute, or sell the three recovered firearms. 327 Ill.
App. 3d at 972-73. Plaintiffs Young, Smith, and Ceriale did not seek
leave to appeal the dismissal of their claims against the unrelated
defendants.
	In counts III and IV, plaintiffs, as representatives of a class of
similarly situated individuals, sought to impose liability for the alleged
public nuisance upon all named gun industry defendants. Count III
sought damages; count IV sought injunctive relief. The appellate court
did not address counts III and IV or the question of class certification.
However, because the appellate court held that plaintiffs lack
individual standing to press their claims against the unrelated gun
industry defendants, it necessarily follows that they lack standing to
sue as representatives of a class. Plaintiffs Young, Smith, and Ceriale
did not seek leave to appeal the dismissal of their individual claims
against the unrelated defendants. Thus, the question of class
certification is moot.
	Finally, the appellate court held that plaintiffs Young and Ceriale,
in count VII of their complaints, had stated a claim for public nuisance
against the dealer defendants who sold the guns used to kill their sons.
 	Pursuant to Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), we granted leave
to appeal to two of the manufacturer defendants, Bryco Arms, Inc.,(2)
and Smith & Wesson Corporation, and two of the dealer defendants,
Breit & Johnson Sporting Goods, Inc., and Chuck's Gun Shop.
	We have permitted the National Association of Manufacturers
and the Product Liability Advisory Council to file briefs amici curiae
on behalf of the defendants. We have also permitted the Attorney
General of the State of Illinois and the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association to file briefs amici curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. 155
Ill. 2d R. 345.
BACKGROUND
	State law prohibits minors from owning firearms (720 ILCS
5/24-3 (West 2000)), and municipal ordinances generally prohibit
possession of handguns within the City of Chicago. Nevertheless,
numerous violent crimes are committed each year in the City of
Chicago by juveniles armed with illegal weapons.
	On June 10, 1996, Andrew Young, son of plaintiff Stephen
Young, was shot and killed by 19-year-old Latin Kings gang member,
Mario Ramos. Ramos obtained the semiautomatic 9mm Bryco 59
handgun used in the shooting from a juvenile gang member. The
weapon was manufactured by defendant Bryco Arms and shipped to
distributor B.L. Jennings, Inc., and then to distributor Riley's, Inc.(3) In
September 1993, defendant dealer Breit & Johnson Sporting Goods,
Inc., sold the gun to Mariano DiVittorio. Previously, DiVittorio had
purchased over 40 guns from Breit & Johnson. Plaintiff Young asserts
that Breit & Johnson had reason to know that DiVittorio was
engaging in straw purchases for the benefit of Daniel Escobedo, a
convicted felon with ties to the Latin Kings street gang. Escobedo
then allegedly made the gun available to other Latin Kings, including
at least one juvenile gang member.
	Michael Ceriale, a police officer and the son of plaintiff Anthony
Ceriale, was killed while conducting narcotics surveillance in Chicago.
Jonathan Tolliver, the 16-year-old gang member who shot Ceriale,
used a .357 Magnum revolver manufactured by defendant Smith &
Wesson. This gun, after passing through the hands of a distributor, a
retail dealer, and at least two owners, was purchased from a private
party by Chuck's Gun Shop and later resold. Thereafter, the gun
changed hands at least twice, in illegal transactions, before it was used
by Tolliver to kill Michael Ceriale.
	The complaints do not allege that Bryco, Smith & Wesson, Breit
& Johnson, or Chuck's Gun Shop violated any applicable state or
federal law or municipal ordinance governing the manufacture or sale
of firearms. Rather, plaintiffs Young and Ceriale allege that these four
remaining defendants have substantially contributed to the creation of
a public nuisance in the City of Chicago by designing, manufacturing,
marketing, and selling guns that are intended to appeal to criminals in
general and to juvenile gang members in particular.
ANALYSIS
	Interlocutory appeal was taken to the appellate court pursuant
Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). In the certified question, the appellate
court was asked to determine whether plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action for public nuisance. Thus, the certified question was similar in
nature to a motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), which challenges the
legal sufficiency of a complaint by alleging defects on its face. We
review de novo an order granting or denying a section 2-615 motion
(Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003)), and, therefore, we
apply the same standard of review to the appellate court's answer to
the certified question in the present case.
	In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we accept as true all
well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from those facts. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86
(2002). In addition, we construe the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d  at 228.
When the plaintiff's theory of liability is public nuisance, the pleading
requirements are not exacting because the "concept of common law
public nuisance *** elude[s] precise definition." City of Chicago v.
Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295, 306 (1982). The existence of
a nuisance " 'depends on the peculiar facts presented by each case.' "
Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 101
(2002), quoting City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill.
App. 3d 624, 632 (1974). A sufficient pleading in a cause of action for
public nuisance will allege a right common to the general public, the
transgression of that right by the defendants, and resulting injury.
Feder v. Perry Coal Co., 279 Ill. App. 314, 318 (1935). Because the
element of "resulting injury" requires two separate findings-actual
injury and a cause creating this result-the complaint must allege four
distinct elements of a public nuisance claim: the existence of a public
right, defendants' substantial and unreasonable interference with that
right, proximate cause, and injury.
Standing
	Section 821C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the
issue of standing to bring an action for public nuisance and states that
an individual, as opposed to a governmental entity, may recover
damages in an action for public nuisance only if he or she has
"suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members
of the public exercising the right common to the general public that
was the subject of interference." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§821C (1979). This statement is consistent with well-established law
in Illinois. See, e.g., Chicago General Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co., 181 Ill. 605, 610 (1899) (an individual may seek
an injunction against an obstruction of a public highway only when he
has shown that "he will suffer special damage, different in degree and
kind from that suffered by the public at large"); McDonald v. English,
85 Ill. 232, 236 (1877) (a plaintiff must show "special injury" to
maintain an action for an obstruction to the streets).
	We need not, however, determine whether the tragic personal
losses suffered by plaintiffs constitute the type of special injury
necessary to confer standing because we conclude that, as a matter of
law, they cannot state a claim in public nuisance against these
defendants.
Public Right
	As alleged in the "Allegations of Fact" portion of the Ceriale and
Young complaints, defendants substantially and unreasonably interfere
with the right of "the plaintiffs class to use the public spaces of the
City of Chicago without undue risk of injury to themselves and to
their families." As authority for the existence of such a right, plaintiffs
rely on Village of Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 Ill. 348, 351 (1888), in
which this court stated, in dicta, that "the right of the people to be
free from disturbance and reasonable apprehension of danger to
person and property is to be respected and jealously guarded."
	The issue in Poyer, however, was whether the village exceeded
its authority by declaring public picnics and open air dances to be
nuisances per se. Poyer, 123 Ill.  at 350. This court held that although
the village was empowered by statute to declare what would be
deemed a nuisance within its borders, it did not have the power to
declare a nuisance where no nuisance, in fact, existed. Poyer, 123 Ill. 
at 350. The language quoted by plaintiffs does not support their claim
of a public right because, if every sort of conduct that caused a public
disturbance or the reasonable apprehension of danger to person or
property were to be considered a nuisance, the law of nuisance would
swallow the entire law of torts and most of the criminal law.
	Defendant Breit & Johnson suggests that the public right claimed
by plaintiffs is merely a generalized assertion of the individual right not
to be assaulted. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B,
Comment g (1979) (a public right is "not like the individual right that
everyone has not to be assaulted"). Breit & Johnson argues, further,
that even if such a public right were to be recognized, plaintiffs are not
seeking redress for a violation of the public right. Rather, as evidenced
by their prayers for relief seeking damages pursuant to the Wrongful
Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 1998)), they seek a remedy
in tort for injuries to specific individuals.
	In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., Nos. 95243, 95253,
95280, 95286 cons. (November 18, 2004), we expressed reservations
regarding the existence of a public right to use the public space
without undue risk of injury. Although we continue to doubt the
wisdom of recognizing such a broad and ill-defined public right, we
assume without deciding that plaintiffs have properly pleaded the
existence of a public right that is affected by the alleged nuisance and
turn to our consideration of the elements of unreasonable interference
and proximate cause.
Unreasonable Interference
	We held in City of Chicago that when a commercial enterprise is
highly regulated by state or federal law, the operators of the enterprise
may not be held liable in public nuisance for a resulting interference
with a public right unless: (1) the defendant's conduct is not in
compliance with the law; (2) the defendant was otherwise negligent;
or (3) the law permitting the conduct is itself invalid for allowing a
nuisance. City of Chicago, slip op. at 29, citing Gilmore v. Stanmar,
Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661 (1994). In addition, it is implicit in our
adoption of the Gilmore rule that intentional conduct, if nonnegligent
and allowed by the statutes and regulations governing a highly
regulated industry, cannot give rise to liability for public nuisance.
	Both the manufacturer and dealer defendants are engaged in
businesses that are highly regulated by state and federal law. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §921 et seq. (2000) (Gun Control Act); 430 ILCS 65/0.01
et seq. (West 2002) (Firearm Owners Identification Card Act).
Plaintiffs have not alleged that any defendant has violated an
applicable statute or ordinance governing the manufacture or sale of
firearms or that the laws permitting defendants to engage in the
businesses of manufacturing or selling firearms are themselves invalid.
Plaintiffs do allege that defendants have intentionally engaged in
conduct designed to increase their sales of certain types of firearms
that, while legal, are particularly appealing to the criminal element. As
noted above, such intentional conduct cannot be the basis for public
nuisance liability in this case. Thus, the viability of plaintiffs' nuisance
claims depends on whether plaintiffs have properly pleaded that
defendants are "otherwise negligent" in the conduct of their
businesses. City of Chicago, slip op. at 29, citing Gilmore, 261 Ill.
App. 3d at 661.
	A claim based on negligence, whether the theory of liability is
nuisance, malpractice, or any other species of tort, may not lie in the
absence of a duty owed by the defendant. Washington v. City of
Chicago, 188 Ill. 2d 235, 239 (1999). According to the complaints,
defendants' duty arises from section 24-3 of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-3 (West 1998)), which makes it a felony to sell
or give a handgun to a minor, and from certain provisions of the
Chicago municipal code, which generally forbid the possession and
use of firearms in the city. The complaints do not describe the nature
of the claimed duty, its scope, or precisely to whom it is owed.
	If the claimed duty is merely the duty to follow the law, plaintiffs'
claim must fail under the Gilmore rule because, as noted above,
plaintiffs do not allege that defendants have violated section 24-3 of
the Criminal Code. With regard to the municipal ordinances, plaintiffs
offer no authority for imposing a duty arising from the existence of a
municipal ordinance on parties doing business outside the
municipality. If the mere enactment of a municipal ordinance were to
give rise to a duty on those outside the municipality, there would be
no end to liability.
	The complaints, however, allege that these defendants have a
duty to go beyond mere compliance with applicable law. The claimed
duty appears to be a duty to implement business practices designed to
minimize the risk of the type of harm that the statutes and municipal
code provisions were designed to address. In essence, plaintiffs' claim
is that because section 24-3 and the municipal code are ineffective in
keeping handguns away from juveniles in the city, these defendants
must have breached a duty owed to the residents of the city.
	Because the briefs and arguments of the parties focus almost
entirely on the element of proximate cause and direct so little attention
to the question of duty, we decline to resolve this case on this basis.
We note, however, that in City of Chicago we held that the
manufacturer and distributor defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff
city or its residents to prevent the illegal possession and use of their
products within the city. City of Chicago, slip op. at 32. Our judgment
is not altered by the present plaintiffs' reliance on section 24-3 of the
Criminal Code and the municipal code of the City of Chicago as the
source of such a duty.
Proximate Cause
	The term "proximate cause" encompasses two distinct
requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). The first requirement, cause in
fact, is present "when there is a reasonable certainty that a defendant's
acts caused the injury or damage." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. In deciding
this question, we first ask whether the injury would have occurred
absent the defendant's conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. In addition,
when, as here, there are multiple factors that may have combined to
cause the injury, we ask whether defendant's conduct was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455.
 	The second requirement, legal cause, is established only if the
defendant's conduct is " 'so closely tied to the plaintiff's injury that he
should be held legally responsible for it.' " Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 558 (2002), quoting McCraw v. Cegielski, 287 Ill. App. 3d
871, 873 (1996). The question is one of public policy-how far should
a defendant's legal responsibility extend for conduct that did, in fact,
cause the harm? Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d  at 558. See W. Keeton, Prosser
& Keeton on Torts §41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) ("As a practical matter,
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law
is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability
for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of
justice or policy"). The proper inquiry regarding legal cause involves
an assessment of foreseeability, in which we ask whether the injury is
of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his
conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 456.
	Although proximate cause is generally a question of fact (Lee,
152 Ill. 2d at 455), the lack of proximate cause may be determined by
the court as a matter of law where the facts alleged do not sufficiently
demonstrate both cause in fact and legal cause (Harrison v. Hardin
County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 476
(2001)).
	With regard to the element of proximate cause, the appellate
court concluded that "a reasonable trier of fact could find that the
criminal misuse of guns killing persons were occurrences that
defendants know would result or were substantially certain to result
from the defendants' alleged conduct." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 970. In
reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied on a comment
accompanying section 824 of the Restatement and rejected
defendants' reliance on Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Illinois would likely
"follow the weight of authority," which holds that criminal misuse of
a handgun is "not a foreseeable consequence of gun manufacturing").
	Because the existence of cause in fact is a question of fact for the
jury, we agree with the appellate court that, in the present case, a
reasonable jury could find that the manufacture of a certain .357
Magnum by Smith & Wesson, its subsequent sale by Chuck's Gun
Shop, along with at least three transfers of ownership in between and
one or more transfers after were causes in fact of the shooting of
Michael Ceriale. That is, if the gun had never been made, or if any of
the intervening possessors of the gun had destroyed it, it would not
have been used by a 16-year-old gang member to murder a police
officer. The same can be said of the Bryco 59 that killed Andrew
Young.(4) We acknowledge the point raised by defendant Breit &
Johnson that the killers of these two young adults would likely have
obtained other guns if these particular weapons had not been available
to them, but conclude that this observation is more relevant to the
legal cause inquiry than to the cause in fact inquiry.
 	As for the question of legal cause, the appellate court's reliance
on section 824 of the Restatement, and comment b thereto, is
misplaced. This section does not address the element of proximate
cause. Instead, it deals with the type of conduct essential to liability
for public or private nuisance. An actor will be held liable for a
nuisance if his conduct consists of: "(a) an act; or (b) a failure to act
under circumstances in which the actor is under a duty to take positive
action to prevent or abate the interference" that constitutes the
nuisance. Restatement (Second) of Torts §824 (1979). In the
"ordinary case," comment b instructs, liability for nuisance "arises
because one person's acts set in motion a force or chain of events
resulting in the invasion." Restatement (Second) of Torts §824,
Comment b (1979). Further, "[s]o far as the actor's liability is
concerned, it is immaterial whether he does the acts solely in the
pursuit of his own interests or whether he is acting for another,
gratuitously, under contract or as the other's servant or agent. It is
enough that his acts are a legal cause of the invasion." (Emphasis
added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §824,Comment b (1979).
	Thus, section 824 and comment b do not provide the answer to
the question of whether the alleged conduct of defendants constitutes
a legal cause of the claimed nuisance. Rather, comment b merely
poses the question-Is the conduct of these defendants a legal cause of
the alleged interference with a public right? The answer to this
question must be found elsewhere.
	The appellate court properly stated the relevant rule regarding the
question of legal cause in the subset of cases involving injuries that are
caused directly by the intervening acts of third parties:
		"In the special case where plaintiff's injuries result not from
defendant's direct actions, but from the subsequent,
independent act of a third person, the issue of legal causation
becomes the following: whether the intervening cause is of
the type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result
of his conduct." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 970, citing First
Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258
(1999).
	In Galman, however, we further explained that if the defendant's
conduct merely furnishes a condition by which injury is made possible,
and a third person, acting independently, subsequently causes the
injury, the defendant's creation of the condition is not a proximate
cause of the injury. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d  at 257-58. More recently, in
Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 259 (2004), we reiterated
that the condition-versus-cause analysis applies to cases in which
injury is caused by the intervening acts of third parties.
	Defendants argue that their lawful manufacture and sale of
nondefective handguns is not the legal cause of any resulting harm,
either wrongful death or public nuisance, brought about by the
independent, intervening, criminal acts of third parties over whom they
have no control. Instead, they assert, their conduct merely furnished
a condition that made the injuries possible, citing Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 257. Cases cited in support of this position include: Hartnett v.
Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331 (1914) (store's sale of rifle and
cartridges to minor, although illegal, was not the proximate cause of
his negligent injury of the plaintiff because the store's negligence
merely furnished a condition that made the injury possible); Riordan
v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642 (1985)
(manufacturers and distributors of guns used in fatal shootings were
not liable for wrongful deaths of victims because they owed no duty
to the victims of crimes committed by third parties); Linton v. Smith
& Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676 (1984) (manufacturer of firearm owed
no duty to plaintiff who was shot by third party); Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (noting, in products
liability case, that every Illinois court considering the issue has
determined that the criminal misuse of firearms is not reasonably
foreseeable to the manufacturer).
	Plaintiffs accurately point out that these cases come from
negligence and products liability law, not from the law of nuisance.
Riordan and Linton, in particular, are not helpful in our legal-cause
inquiry, because both cases were decided on the threshold issue of
duty.
	Plaintiffs offer numerous cases, dating from 1832 to 1963, in
which defendants have been held liable for a public nuisance created
by the criminal or disorderly conduct of third parties, only one of
which, Bucks v. Strawn, 182 Ill. App. 644 (1913), was decided by an
Illinois court. The plaintiffs in Bucks were residents of the
neighborhood surrounding several houses of "ill fame" who sought
injunctive relief to abate the nuisance caused by unruly patrons. The
patrons made loud noises, used obscene and blasphemous language,
and generally conducted themselves in a lewd and riotous manner,
even making "indecent exposures of their persons" at the windows of
the establishments. Bucks, 182 Ill. App. 644. The requested relief was
granted.
	Bucks and the other ancient cases cited by plaintiffs offer little
support for their claim that defendants' conduct should be deemed a
legal cause of a public nuisance created by the subsequent,
independent, criminal acts of third parties. In Bucks, in and each of the
other cited cases, the criminal or disorderly conduct at issue was
inextricably tied to the defendant's use of land in a manner that
unreasonably interfered with the neighboring plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of their own property. See, e.g., Taylor v. Adams, 155 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1963) (unruly tavern); Barrett v. Lopez, 57 N.M. 697,
262 P.2d 981 (1953) (drunk and disorderly conduct by patrons of
dance hall). These cases merely represent the traditional application of
nuisance doctrine in the context of disputes between neighbors and are
not relevant to the present case in which plaintiffs do not claim that
these defendants have encouraged or allowed patrons to engage in
criminal conduct on their premises, or when entering and exiting their
premises.
	In contrast, plaintiffs' theory of legal cause would permit the
imposition of public nuisance liability upon the proprietor of a tavern
not only for the unruly conduct of patrons on the premises, but also
for harm caused by the illegal conduct of patrons after they leave. As
long as the patrons' consumption of alcohol were shown to be a cause
in fact of injury, the serving or selling of alcohol would be deemed the
legal cause, even though the patrons have committed crimes. A tavern
owner could be liable for the creation of a public nuisance if it were
shown that his patrons caused traffic accidents by driving under the
influence, damaged property by driving on lawns or crashing into
garbage cans, or committed criminal assaults while intoxicated. We
reject such an expansive view of legal cause.
 	We also note, parenthetically, that Bucks is a decision of the
appellate court that predates the 1935 amendment of the Courts Act,
which, for the first time, established that decisions of the appellate
court were binding authority upon the lower courts. See Bryson v.
News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 95 (1996); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Vance, 175 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606 (1988). As such,
Bucks is of purely historical interest.
	However,
		"A public nuisance, unlike a private nuisance, does not
necessarily involve an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land, or an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, but encompasses any
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. Thus, an action for public nuisance may lie even
though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the
exercise of private property rights." 58 Am. Jur. 2d
Nuisances §31, at 592 (2002).
Thus, although the cases cited by plaintiffs do not support their
theory, their claim is not foreclosed simply because it is not predicated
on defendants' use of land. See City of Chicago, slip op. at 10.
	Defendants respond that even if liability for public nuisance may
be imposed in the absence of an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land, they still may not be held liable for the criminal acts
of third parties. They invoke a "long-standing rule of Illinois law that
civil liability for the criminal acts of third parties will not be imposed
unless there is a special relationship" between the parties.
	This court has, indeed, recognized such a rule. See, e.g., Estate
of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d 496, 503 (1988)
(stating that, in general, one has no duty to control the conduct of
another to prevent him from causing harm to a third party, absent a
special relationship with either the person causing the harm or the
injured party). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§315 through
321 (1965) (duty to control conduct of third persons). The existence
of a special relationship, however, goes to the question of duty, not to
proximate cause.
	Turning, then, to the question of proximate cause, legal cause will
be found if reasonable persons in the businesses of manufacturing and
selling firearms would have seen the creation of a public nuisance in
the City of Chicago as a likely result of their conduct. City of
Chicago, slip op. at 44, citing Galman, 188 Ill. 2d  at 259. However,
legal cause will not be found where the criminal acts of third parties
have broken the causal connection and the resulting nuisance "is such
as in the exercise of reasonable diligence would not be anticipated and
the third person is not under the control of the one guilty of the
original wrong." City of Chicago, slip op. at 44, citing Merlo v.
Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 317 (1942).
	Even if defendants are guilty of an "original wrong," that is, a
breach of duty, it is clear that the gun-wielding killers of Young and
Ceriale were not under defendants' control. Thus, the question of
legal cause is entirely one of foreseeability-Is the creation of a public
nuisance in the City of Chicago so clearly foreseeable that the business
practices of these defendants should be deemed a legal cause of the
nuisance, even though it results from the cumulative effect of
numerous criminal acts by many third parties? See City of Chicago,
slip op. at 44.
	We conclude not. In City of Chicago, we noted that we had
found no reported cases in which a nuisance claim was dismissed at
the pleading stage based on lack of legal cause. However, we found
the case of Watson v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 914
(2001), in which the theory of liability was negligent entrustment, to
be instructive. City of Chicago, slip op. at 47. The defendant was a
merchant who leased a vehicle to one party with the knowledge that
it was likely to be driven by one or more third parties. The lessor
entrusted the vehicle to a friend, from whom it was taken by a third
person. Eventually, a fourth person-an intoxicated minor-took the
keys and caused an accident that killed his passenger. Watson, 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 917-20. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, the appellate court noted that the element
of cause in fact had been satisfied. Absent the leasing of a car to the
first individual, the death would not have occurred-at least not in an
accident involving this particular vehicle. Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at
924. The intoxicated driver would either not have driven at all and
there would have been no accident, or he would have obtained the
keys to another vehicle and the accident would have occurred, but
would not have involved the defendant's vehicle. Thus, the appellate
court concluded, the "crux of the issue" was "legal cause, which
revolves around foreseeability." Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 924. The
driver who caused the fatal injury, the court noted, was at least two
steps removed from the person to whom Enterprise directly entrusted
the car. In addition, the accident was caused by the criminal act of a
third party. These events were not reasonably foreseeable. Watson,
325 Ill. App. 3d at 925. Although the defendant furnished a condition
that made the resulting injury possible, the creation of this condition
was not the legal cause of the fatal accident because the defendant's
conduct was too remote to constitute legal cause. Watson, 325 Ill.
App. 3d at 925. As the appellate court observed, to "impose foresight
on defendant under the particular circumstances present in this case
would render it liable for anyone who drove the car, thus making it
strictly liable." Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 925.
	The parallels to the present cases are clear. As we noted in City
of Chicago, the defendants, like the car rental company in Watson, are
in the business of providing a lawful product that may be used
unlawfully, causing injury or death. In addition, both the possession
and use of firearms and the driving of motor vehicles are highly
regulated by law. City of Chicago, slip op. at 47-48. Further, the
person whose criminal conduct directly caused the injury in Watson
was several steps removed from the defendant. Similarly, the Smith &
Wesson .357 Magnum used to kill Michael Ceriale passed through at
least eight sets of hands before it reached Tolliver. The Bryco 59 used
to kill Stephen Young passed through at least six sets of hands before
reaching Ramos. Finally, the appellate court in Watson found it
unreasonable to expect a car rental company to foresee a single
accident caused by an intoxicated teenage driver who took car keys
without permission. We conclude that it is equally unreasonable to
expect defendants to foresee that the aggregate effect of the lawful
manufacture and sale of firearms will be the creation of a public
nuisance in a distant city. Therefore, defendants' business practices
merely create a condition that makes the eventual harm possible. As
such, defendants' conduct cannot constitute a legal cause of the
alleged nuisance.
	Ultimately, our conclusion that the doctrine of public nuisance
does not encompass the novel claim made by plaintiffs is a public
policy determination. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §41,
at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (proximate cause is merely a boundary used to
set liability for the consequences of any act and is based upon "some
social idea of justice or policy"). We note that despite the existence of
numerous statutes declaring various practices and conditions to
constitute public nuisances, we have no indication from the legislature
that it would be inclined to impose public nuisance liability for the
manufacture and sale of a product that may be possessed legally by
some persons, in some parts of the state. We are reluctant to interfere
in the lawmaking process in the manner suggested by plaintiffs,
especially when the product at issue is already so heavily regulated by
both the state and federal governments. We, therefore, conclude that
there are strong public policy reasons to defer to the legislature in the
matter of regulating the manufacture, distribution, and sale of
firearms. See Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (1995)
(declining to recognize a cause of action in negligence against social
hosts who serve alcohol to minors on the basis that the "primary
expression of Illinois public and social policy should emanate from the
legislature"); Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 90 (2004) (boundary
setting on the limits of tort liability is "often *** more appropriately
left to the legislative branch").
CONCLUSION
	In sum, we hold that plaintiffs' public nuisance claims against
both the manufacturer and the dealer defendants must be dismissed.
Even granting, arguendo, that plaintiffs can establish that a public
right has been infringed upon by defendants' conduct, their allegations
of negligence are not supported by any recognized duty and we have
declined their invitation to recognize such a duty. Further, their
allegations of intentional conduct are an insufficient basis for public
nuisance liability as a matter of law. City of Chicago, slip op. at 64.
Finally, the defendants' conduct is not a legal cause of the alleged
nuisance because the claimed harm is the aggregate result of numerous
unforeseeable intervening criminal acts by third parties not under
defendants' control.
	We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the appellate court, which
answered the certified question in the affirmative. We remand to the
circuit court with instructions to grant defendants' motions to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
remanded with instructions.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	The majority's recitation of the facts and its discussion of the
current state of the law with respect to the issues raised are both
comprehensive and accurate. The conclusion reached is legally
correct, and I am compelled to join in it. However, some of the more
disturbing allegations in plaintiffs' complaint are not highlighted in the
majority opinion because they do not impact the majority's legal
analysis. I write separately to call attention to these contentions.
	According to plaintiffs' complaint, the Chicago police department
recovered an average of approximately 17,000 illegal handguns in the
City of Chicago in each of the years 1994 to 1997. In each of the
years 1996 to 1998, more than 500 firearm-related fatalities were
recorded within the city limits. More than 10% of the victims were
under the age of 17.
	These facts are both alarming and saddening but, as defendants
argue, they are the results of the actions of third parties unrelated to
defendants. However, plaintiffs' additional allegations about
defendants' conduct, if true, suggest that defendants were not only
aware that their products were used by third parties for criminal acts,
but that defendants affirmatively sought to increase their profit by
pandering to that market. For example, plaintiffs state that defendants
oversaturated markets near Chicago, supplying guns in nearby suburbs
far in excess of the number that the citizens of those suburbs would
ordinarily be expected to purchase. Plaintiffs also contend that
defendant gun manufacturers have not placed restrictions or limits, let
alone oversight, on their distributors and dealers-as opposed to
manufacturers of other potentially dangerous products such as
chemicals and even paints-in order to remain willfully ignorant of the
process by which their products are farmed out into the communities
of Illinois. Plaintiffs also argue that the manufacturers have included
features on some weapons to make them more attractive to the
criminal element. They offer as an example the small, easily concealed
nature of the Bryco "59" semiautomatic handgun, and also note the
fingerprint-resistant coating on the Navegar "TEC-DC9."
	I do not believe that all gun manufacturers should be insurers or
guarantors of the conduct of the users of their product. However, I do
believe that it is disingenuous to place all manufacturers on equal
footing, in light of the allegations of oversaturation of markets, failure
to institute even minimal oversight of the distribution network, and
deliberate inclusion of features designed to make specific products
more attractive for criminal use. It is, of course, impossible for a
manufacturer, distributor, or even, in most cases, a dealer to know
that a particular gun will be used in a crime. But plaintiffs'
allegations, if true, support the conclusion that defendant gun
manufacturers are not only aware of the probability that their wares
might be used in the commission of crimes, but that they actively seek
to exploit that fact to increase their profit margin.
	Notwithstanding the above, I recognize that it would be an
enormous expansion of the doctrine of public nuisance if this court
were to apply the doctrine to these defendants. Other jurisdictions
have reached different conclusions with respect to this question.
Nevertheless, the large number of policy considerations which must
be weighed on this topic lead me to conclude that it is a matter best
left for legislative, as opposed to judicial, action. Given the disturbing
statistical data that I noted at the outset of this separate opinion, it is
my sincere hope that our General Assembly will turn its attention to
the problems this case brings to light.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICES
FITZGERALD, KILBRIDE and RARICK join in this special
concurrence.
1.       The TEC-DC9 used 
to kill Salada Smith, the daughter of plaintiff Obrella Smith, was manufactured 
by defendant Navegar, Inc., distributed by RSR Wholesale Guns, and initially 
sold by Perry=s 
Trading Post, in Greenwood, Mississippi. Navegar, Inc., did not seek leave to 
appeal and we are informed that the company is no longer in business. Neither 
RSR nor Perry=s 
Trading Post were named as defendants in Smith=s 
complaint. As a result, the Smith complaint is apparently moot.
2.       
Bryco Arms= 
appeal has been stayed pending its bankruptcy proceedings.
3.           
Distributors B.L. 
Jennings, Inc., and Riley=s, 
Inc., were named as defendants in all three complaints, but are not parties to 
this appeal.     
            

4.                    
            
           
         
With regard to the Bryco 59, only the dealer, 
Breit & Johnson, is a party to this appeal. The appeal of the manufacturer, 
Bryco Arms, has been held pursuant to a bankruptcy stay. The two distributors 
were not named as defendants in the public nuisance counts of the Young 
complaint.