Title: State of Florida, Et Al. v. Arthur Blair

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1407 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
ARTHUR BLAIR,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 3, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Blair v. State, 15 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).  The district 
court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal in Ricks v. State, 961 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), 
as to whether a trial court may order pretrial detention based solely on a finding 
that the defendant‟s failure to appear was willful without determining whether 
conditions of release are appropriate as delineated in section 907.041, Florida 
Statutes (2008).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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FACTS 
The facts of the underlying case are set out in the Fourth District‟s opinion 
in Blair: 
The trial court ordered petitioner, Arthur Blair, held without 
bond after he failed to appear for a court date on a felony DUI charge.  
Blair had never been arrested on the felony charge and he did not 
receive notice of the court date.  Blair had been arrested for 
misdemeanor DUI and appeared at a scheduled court date for that 
charge.  At that time, he was advised that the court appearance had 
been cancelled and that the misdemeanor case had been nolle prossed.  
Unbeknownst to Blair, the state had filed an information charging 
felony DUI, but the uncontested evidence at the bond hearing showed 
that Blair did not receive notice of the felony charge. 
 
The trial court did not find the failure to appear to be willful.  
The record is devoid of evidence to suggest that petitioner willfully 
failed to appear.  Pretrial detention may not be ordered based on a 
failure to appear unless the court finds that the failure to appear was 
willful.  See Lee v. State, 956 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); 
Johnson v. Jenne, 913 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Winters v. 
Jenne, 765 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). 
 
Further, the trial court improperly ordered pretrial detention 
without finding that “no conditions of release can reasonably protect 
the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the 
presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial 
process.”  Art. I, §14, Fla. Const.  A pretrial detention order must 
contain findings of fact and conclusions of law showing that the 
constitutional and statutory criteria for pretrial detention are met.  See 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.132(c)(2); § 907.041(4)(i), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
 
Id. at 759.  The Fourth District then certified conflict between its decision in Blair 
and the Fifth District‟s decision in Ricks.  We accepted jurisdiction.1  The issue 
                                          
 
 
1.  By the time this case reached this Court, the issue was moot.  Blair filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the trial court ordered pretrial detention.  
The Fourth District granted Blair‟s petition for writ of habeas corpus by order on 
 
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posed in the present case constitutes a pure question of law and is subject to the de 
novo standard of review.  Insko v. State, 969 So. 2d 992, 997 (Fla. 2007). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Our criminal justice system is based on the presumption that every person 
charged with a crime is innocent until proven guilty.  See, e.g., Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).  Article I, section 14 of Florida‟s Constitution 
gives effect to the presumption of innocence and addresses pretrial detention and 
release:  
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable 
by life imprisonment and the proof of the guilt is evident or the 
presumption is great, every person charged with a crime of violation 
of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release 
on reasonable conditions.  If no conditions of release can reasonably 
protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure 
the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the 
judicial process, the accuse may be detained. 
Id.  This sentiment also resonates in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131, 
which states in relevant portion: 
(a) Right to Pretrial Release.  Unless charged with a capital 
offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof 
                                                                                                                                        
June 29, 2009.  Blair, 15 So. 3d at 760 n.1.  On July 9, 2009, the trial court 
reconsidered its decision to detain Blair in light of the Fourth District‟s opinion and 
determined that Blair could be released on his own recognizance.  Moreover, on 
August 17, 2009, the trial court granted Blair‟s Motion to Discharge on speedy trial 
grounds.  A separate State appeal of the order of discharge is currently pending in 
the Fourth District.  However, the mootness doctrine does not destroy our 
jurisdiction in this case.  Because this issue is capable of repetition, yet may evade 
review, we have the authority to retain jurisdiction and decide the issue on the 
merits under the public exception doctrine.  See Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 
So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2002); Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1999). 
 
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of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged 
with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be 
entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. . . .  If no 
conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk 
of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at 
trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be 
detained. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(a).  Based on the above, it is clear that there is a 
presumption in favor of release.  In keeping with the presumption in favor of 
release, Florida‟s Legislature provided comprehensive guidelines for when an 
original application for bail may be denied as codified in section 907.041, Florida 
Statutes (2008).  Before a trial court may order pretrial detention, one of the 
statutory bases must be satisfied.  Section 907.041(4)(c)(7) lists criteria that must 
be used in making a pretrial detention determination, which, in relevant portion, 
provides: 
(c) The court may order pretrial detention if it finds a 
substantial probability, based on a defendant's past and present 
patterns of behavior, the criteria in s. 903.046, and any other relevant 
facts, that any of the following circumstances exists: 
  
. . . . 
7. The defendant has violated one or more conditions of pretrial 
release or bond for the offense currently before the court and the 
violation, in the discretion of the court, supports a finding that no 
conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk 
of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at 
trial. 
 
 
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§ 907.041(4)(c)(7), Fla. Stat. (2008).  Additionally, section 907.041 also prescribes 
a set of procedures relating to pretrial detention.  Some of those procedures have 
also been codified in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132, which states in 
relevant portion, “The court‟s pretrial detention order shall be based solely on 
evidence produced at the hearing and shall contain findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to support it.  The order shall be made either in writing or orally on the 
record.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.132(c)(2).  However, there is no suggestion in either 
section 907.041 or in the procedural rule that a trial court‟s finding of the 
defendant‟s willful failure to appear alone is sufficient to order pretrial detention.  
In the past, Florida courts generally held that “if there is a failure to appear, 
the court may simply commit a defendant to custody without determining whether 
conditions of release are appropriate.  However, implicit in the rule is that the 
failure to appear occurred after reasonable notice, and was willful.”   Wilson v. 
State, 669 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).  Similarly, the Fourth District 
applied this general rule Bradshaw v. Jenne, 754 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). 
 
In recent years, this Court has receded from the general rule that a trial court 
may order pretrial detention based solely on the defendant‟s willful failure to 
appear.  In State v. Paul, 783 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001), we accepted discretionary 
review to address whether a trial court has the inherent authority to deny a 
subsequent application for bail after a defendant breaches a bond condition, or 
 
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whether the trial court‟s discretion to deny a subsequent application for bail is 
circumscribed by the parameters established by the Legislature in section 907.041.  
We adopted the Fourth District‟s reasoning as explained in Paul v. Jenne, 728 So. 
2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), stating: 
[T]he court‟s authority to deny bond pending trial is circumscribed by 
the provisions of Florida Statute section 907.041.  The legislature has 
specifically delineated and narrowly limited those circumstances 
under which bond may be denied.  We have no difficulty divining the 
legislative intent to curtail the court‟s power to deny bail, except in 
certain instances, in light of the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
bail.  To effectuate its express policy of assuring the detention of 
“those persons posing a threat to the safety of the community or the 
integrity of the judicial process,” the legislature enacted a pretrial 
detention statute which sets forth a comprehensive list of conditions 
that will qualify a defendant for detention without bail.  By providing 
clear and reasonable guidelines for courts to follow in considering 
denial of this basic and fundamental right, the legislature may very 
well have been motivated by a desire to achieve uniformity and 
fairness in judicial determinations of bail entitlement, as well as to 
provide trial courts with a means of identifying persons whose 
criminal histories and patterns of behavior signal a danger to society. 
Paul, 783 So. 2d at 1051 (quoting Paul v. Jenne, 728 So. 2d at 1171-72).    
 
Notwithstanding our decision in Paul, the Fifth District recently opined that 
a trial court may commit a defendant to custody based solely on the defendant‟s 
failure to appear without determining whether conditions of release are 
appropriate.  See Ricks v. State, 961 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).  The facts 
of Ricks, as set out in the Fifth District‟s opinion, are as follows: 
The trial court issued a capias for petitioner‟s arrest after he 
failed to appear for his pre-trial conference.  The capias provided that 
 
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petitioner was to be held without bond.  Petitioner subsequently 
surrendered himself voluntarily to the Orange County Jail.  Petitioner 
then filed a motion to set aside the bond forfeiture and to reinstate the 
previously posted bond or, in the alternative, a motion to set a new 
bond.  In his motion petitioner alleged “his non-appearance was not 
the product of a willful decision on his part to disobey the directive by 
this Court, but rather the product of an oversight and poor 
communication with the Office of the Public Defender.”  This motion, 
as well as petitioner‟s renewed motion to set a new bond, was denied 
without a hearing.  The trial court‟s written order included the 
notation “multiple prior F.T.A.‟s.” 
Id. at 1093.  As a result, Ricks filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Fifth 
District.  The Fifth District failed to rely on or even acknowledge existing 
precedent as set out in this Court‟s decision in Paul.  Instead, the Fifth District 
relied on Wilson.2  “Generally, if there is a failure to appear, the court may simply 
commit a defendant to custody without determining whether conditions of release 
are appropriate.”  Ricks, 961 So. 2d at 1093 (citing Wilson, 669 So. 2d at 313).  
“However, if a defendant alleges „a legitimate issue as to whether [his] failure to 
appear was knowing and willful,‟ a trial court is required to conduct a hearing to 
determine that issue.”  Ricks, 961 So. 2d at 1093 (quoting Wilson, 669 So. 2d at 
313).  The Fifth District concluded that Ricks‟ allegations did not present any 
legitimate issue—as to whether his failure to appear was willful or knowing—that 
                                          
 
 
2.  Our decision in Paul did not specifically refer to the Fifth District‟s 
decision in Wilson.  Rather, it referred to the cases as “pre-Paul.”  However, Paul 
in effect overruled Wilson. 
 
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would require the trial court to conduct a hearing.  As a result, the Fifth District 
denied Ricks‟ petition for habeas corpus.  Id. at 1094.   
 
In the instant case, the Fourth District properly relied on our decision in 
Paul.  The Fourth District found that the trial court failed to make a finding that 
Blair‟s failure to appear was willful and further found as follows: 
[T]he trial court improperly ordered pretrial detention without finding 
that “no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community 
from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the 
accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process.”  Art. I, 
§14 Fla. Const.  A pretrial detention order must contain findings of 
fact and conclusions of law showing that the constitutional and 
statutory criteria for pretrial detention are met.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.132(c)(2); § 907.041(4)(i), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
Blair, 15 So. 3d at 759.  In its opinion, the Fourth District explained: 
Although a trial court has discretion in setting reasonable 
pretrial release conditions, a trial court‟s authority to order pretrial 
detention is circumscribed by the state constitution and relevant 
statutes.  Paul makes clear that these requirements apply even where a 
defendant has violated pretrial release conditions, such as through a 
failure to appear.  783 So. 2d at 1051.  Paul effectively overruled the 
majority‟s analysis in Bradshaw, which permitted a court to order 
pretrial detention following a finding of a willful failure to appear 
without also finding that the constitutional and statutory criteria for 
pretrial detention were met. 
The court in Ricks v. State, 961 So. 2d 1093, 1093-94 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2007), appears to have relied on pre-Paul cases to reach the 
same conclusion as Bradshaw, that a court may order pretrial 
detention based solely on a finding of a willful failure to appear 
“without determining whether conditions of release are appropriate.”  
Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 669 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)).  
We certify conflict with this aspect of Ricks.      
 
 
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Blair, 15 So. 3d at 760.  We agree with the Fourth District‟s conclusion that the 
trial court failed to find that Blair‟s failure to appear was willful.  After a careful 
review of the bond hearing transcript, it does not appear that the trial court ever 
made such a determination, either expressly or impliedly.  Although the trial court 
did conduct a bond hearing, it failed to determine whether there were reasonable 
conditions of pretrial release.  The evidence presented at the bond hearing 
established that Blair attempted to attend the misdemeanor DUI court date, but was 
told that the case had been nolle prossed.  He never received notice that the case 
had been refiled as a felony DUI or of the new court date.   Blair also testified that 
he used his ex-wife‟s address because his job as a road worker precluded him from 
maintaining a stable address.  The trial court simply surmised, “Address on the PC 
is 129 Swain Boulevard.  The address on the booking sheet is 129 Swain 
Boulevard.  Be held without bond.  That‟s where the notices were sent.  Now we 
need another date.”  The bond hearing transcript is devoid of any language, either 
express or implied, indicating that the trial court‟s decision to order pretrial 
detention in this case was based on the statutory criteria as codified in section 
907.041 and as required by our decision in Paul. 
Accordingly, we approve the Fourth District‟s decision in Blair, and 
disapprove the Fifth District‟s contrary holding in Ricks. 
It is so ordered. 
 
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QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D09-2335 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and John m. Conway, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio and Myra 
J. Fried, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent