Title: Tobin Constr. Co. v. Kemp

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

239 Kan. 240 (1986)
718 P.2d 302
J.A. TOBIN CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellant,
v.
JOHN B. KEMP, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
No. 58,497

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 2, 1986.
Frederick G. Thompson, IV, of Gould & Moore, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Thomas M. Moore, of the same firm, and James T. Wiglesworth, of Perry & Hamill, of Overland Park, were with him on the briefs for appellant.
Kris E. McKinney, of Kansas Department of Transportation, argued the cause, and Michael B. Rees, of the same department, was with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is a dispute between plaintiff J.A. Tobin Construction Co. and defendant Secretary of Transportation concerning which should bear the cost of corrective work on a defective concrete culvert.
Plaintiff was the general contractor on a highway construction project. As a part of its performance under the contract, plaintiff (through a subcontractor) constructed a concrete box culvert. The contract required that, prior to the pouring of the concrete, a Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT) inspector was to inspect the work. One of the items to be inspected was the placement of the reinforcing steel (rebar). This inspection occurred in October of 1982 and was accomplished by two inspectors who were also present during the subsequent pouring of the concrete. Neither inspector noticed that the rebar had been *241 improperly placed. A year later, and prior to final acceptance of the project, a KDOT inspector observed cracks in the top concrete mat. An investigation revealed the cause was the improperly placed rebar. The cost of the corrective work was $21,501.00. Had the improper placement of the rebar been discovered prior to the pouring of the concrete, the corrective work would have cost $1,000.00. Plaintiff sought a KDOT change order before proceeding. Plaintiff's position (then and now) was that it was the fault of the inspectors that the error had not been discovered and hence it should only be held responsible for $1,000 of the cost. KDOT declined to issue a change order on the basis the work had not been formally accepted at the time of the discovery of the defect and the correction was, therefore, the contractor's responsibility. Plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies. Plaintiff did the corrective work and seeks, in this action, to recover $20,501.00 of the cost thereof. The district court entered summary judgment, on stipulated facts, in favor of KDOT and plaintiff appeals therefrom.
Pertinent portions of the contract and specifications are set forth as follows:
"704.03  CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS  ....
The plaintiff contractor admits the culvert was defective as a result of its improper placement of the rebar. However, it contends that it is only responsible for that portion of the cost of replacement attributable to cost of correction had the error been discovered prior to the pouring of the concrete ($1,000.00 of the total $21,501.00). Plaintiff, in essence, claims:
3. KDOT is estopped to deny the work change order.
The arguments of the contractor are without merit. Section 105.11 states an inspector is not authorized to alter or waive any requirements of the plans or specifications or act as foreman for the contractor. Section 105.13 clearly places responsibility for correcting defective work discovered prior to final acceptance on the contractor despite the failure of the inspector to discover it or even with the inspector's knowledge thereof. Section 107.16, again, places the responsibility on the contractor for damages as a result of faulty workmanship. Section 105.17, relied upon by plaintiff, is inapplicable. The plaintiff did not request, nor did the engineer inspect or make, a final acceptance of the work.
Plaintiff claims it relied on the inspectors' inspection of the rebar, and KDOT should be estopped from refusing to issue the change order.
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a person whereby he is precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights against another person relying on such conduct. A party asserting equitable estoppel must show that another party, by its acts, representations, admissions, or silence when it had a duty to speak, induced it to believe certain facts existed. It must also show it rightfully relied and acted upon such belief and would now be prejudiced if the other party were permitted to deny the existence of such facts. There can be no equitable estoppel if any essential element thereof is lacking or is not satisfactorily proved. Estoppel will not be deemed to arise from *244 facts which are ambiguous and subject to more than one construction, and nothing can be supplied by mere intendment. Ram Co. v. Estate of Kobbeman, 236 Kan. 751, 696 P.2d 936 (1985).
The inspections required by the contract were for the benefit of KDOT, not the contractor. The inspectors were without authority to waive the specified placement of the rebar (§§ 105.11 and 105.13). Their failure to notice the error and call it to the attention of the contractor was not something upon which the contractor could have "rightfully relied" so as to give rise to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Approval by the inspectors is not the equivalent of final acceptance by the engineer.
The judgment is affirmed.