Title: Beebe v. Eisemann

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Gene A. Beebe v. Allan D. Eisemann, M.D. et al. (2011-365)
2012 VT 40
[Filed 18-Jun-2012]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 40
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-365
 
APRIL TERM, 2012
 
Gene A. Beebe
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Rutland Unit, 
 
}
Civil Division
Allan D. Eisemann, M.D., Allan
  Eisemann, M.D., PLC, Rutland Hospital, Inc., Paul Daverson, DDS, and Fair
  Haven Dental Clinic, LLC
}
}
}
}
 
 
}
}
DOCKET NO. 733-10-09
  Rdcv
 
 
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
 
In
the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his medical
malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of
limitations.  Plaintiff argues that the Eisemann defendants are equitably
estopped from invoking the statute of limitations.  We affirm. 
¶ 2.            
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Allan D. Eisemann, M.D., practicing
through defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., PLC (collectively "Dr. Eisemann" or
"defendant"), negligently failed to advise plaintiff or his dentist of known
risks associated with a tooth extraction while plaintiff was taking intravenous
doses of a medication called Zometa, prescribed by defendant to treat multiple
myeloma.  Defendant allegedly approved the procedure, and plaintiff's
dentist extracted the tooth on October 9, 2006.  Following the procedure,
plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw.  
¶ 3.            
To the extent that the parties have introduced matters beyond the bare
pleadings into the record, we review those issues pursuant to a summary
judgment standard.  Cavanaugh v. Abbott Labs., 145 Vt. 516, 520,
496 A.2d 154, 157 (1985) ("matters outside the pleadings . . . correctly
considered" under summary judgment standard).  Accordingly, we review the
record in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party.  Chase
v. Agency of Human Servs., 2011 VT 31, ¶ 14, 189 Vt. 613, 19 A.3d 167
(mem.).  From that perspective, the relevant facts are as follows.
¶ 4.            
All parties agree that the limitations period for plaintiff's
malpractice claims pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 521 was due to expire on October 9,
2009.  By letter dated September 16, 2009, plaintiff's counsel proposed to
Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement,
tolling the statute of limitations for ninety days so the parties could pursue
settlement.  Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all of
the defendants did.*
  
¶ 5.            
As a result of plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement on tolling with
all of the defendants, plaintiff filed a summons and complaint on October 7,
2009 against all of the defendants in the trial court.  On October 15,
2009, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to the defendants' lawyers informing
them that a summons and complaint had been filed in the matter, and requesting
that their clients sign and return acceptances of service.  In this
letter, plaintiff's counsel requested that the acceptances be returned at
defendants' "earliest opportunity," but stated that he would not file the
acceptances with the court without notice "so that this lawsuit will not be
open to public inspection given the practice of the [court] not to make the
litigation file open to the public until proof that all defendants have been
served."  
¶ 6.            
Counsel for Dr. Eisemann signed the acceptance of service on October 20,
2009, but apparently did not return the acceptance to plaintiff.  On
December 14, 2009, plaintiff's counsel sent an email to one of Dr. Eisemann's
lawyers stating:
No wonder I couldn't
find the Acceptance.  I had forgotten that Dave[, Dr. Eisemann's
attorney,] was to hold the Acceptance until further notice.  My mistake .
. . sorry.  In any event, Dave should continue to hold the Acceptance as
planned so that you all can evaluate the file.  
¶ 7.            
Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to
plaintiff's counsel on January 13, 2010.  Plaintiff did not file the
acceptance with the court at that time.
¶ 8.            
The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011,
based on plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim; over six months had passed
since plaintiff had filed his complaint and plaintiff had not filed proof of
service with the court.  Three days later, on April 18, 2011, plaintiff
filed the signed acceptances of service.  The court granted plaintiff's
V.R.C.P. 60(b) motion to reopen the case on April 25, 2011, on the basis that
failure to file proof of service with the court is not grounds for dismissal if
service was, in fact, properly effectuated.  Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint on April 27, 2011.  
¶ 9.            
On June 6, 2011, Dr. Eisemann filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint on the ground that because plaintiff had not filed the acceptances of
service within sixty days of filing the complaint, service was not complete
within that time, and the statute of limitations thus barred plaintiff's
claims.  The trial court granted the motion, viewing plaintiff's request
that defendant voluntarily accept service as a request for waiver of service of
summons pursuant to V.R.C.P. 4(l) and citing our decision in Fercenia v.
Guiduli, 2003 VT 50, ¶ 8, 175 Vt. 541, 830 A.2d 55 (mem.) (pursuant to
V.R.C.P. 3 and 4(l), claims of plaintiff who filed complaint within one day of
the expiration of the limitations period, secured a waiver of service within
sixty days, but failed to file that waiver in court within sixty days of filing
the complaint were barred by statute of limitations).  In granting Dr.
Eisemann's motion, the trial court rejected plaintiff's argument that equitable
estoppel overcomes defendant's statute of limitations defense.  Plaintiff
appealed.  
¶ 10.         On
appeal, plaintiff does not argue that he legally satisfied the statute of
limitations, but argues that equitable estoppel precludes defendant from
invoking the statute of limitations.  Specifically, plaintiff argues that
"estoppel by acquiescence" should have prevented Dr. Eisemann from asserting
the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff argues that Dr. Eisemann was aware
that the parties were operating under a de facto agreement to ignore the time
period within which plaintiff was to file the waiver of service, and, in
effect, to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely while the parties
negotiated.  
¶ 11.         In
support of his argument, plaintiff points to a letter that he sent to the trial
court, copying defendant, on March 23, 2010, in which he informed the court of
"an agreement among counsel" to delay the filing of acceptances in order "to
provide sufficient time for review of the facts and settlement discussions;"
plaintiff argues that Dr. Eisemann's failure to dispute, object to, qualify,
correct, or "otherwise challenge[] anything in the March 23, 2010 letter . . .
amounted to an acquiescence about the asserted agreement which memorialized the
extensive document review and analysis time made possible by [plaintiff's]
delay in filing the acceptances."  Plaintiff further alleges "an
understanding between the parties, albeit tacit, that [plaintiff] would refrain
from filing the Acceptances allowing Eisemann extended time to analyze his
claims without having to respond formally to the Complaint and thereby
preserving the possibility of an out-of-court settlement with publicity
unwanted by [plaintiff]." 
¶ 12.         We
review the trial court's conclusions regarding issues of law de novo.  In
re Soon Kwon, 2011 VT 26, ¶ 7, 189 Vt. 598, 19 A.3d 139 (mem.). 
Absent sufficient evidence to  support the claim of equitable estoppel or
equitable tolling, a "plaintiff's failure to file [a defendant's] waiver of
service within the time required by the rules constitute[s] a failure to
properly commence plaintiff's action and toll the applicable statute of
limitations."  Fercenia, 2003 VT 50, ¶ 12.
¶ 13.         Plaintiff
has the burden of establishing four elements in order to prevail on his
equitable estoppel claim: (1) "the party to be estopped must know the facts;"
(2) "the party being estopped must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon
or the acts must be such that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to
believe it is so intended;" (3) "the latter must be ignorant of the true facts;
and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the conduct of the party
to be estopped to his detriment."  Beecher v. Stratton Corp., 170 Vt.
137, 140, 743 A.2d 1093, 1096 (1999) (quotation omitted).  The doctrine
"will not be invoked in favor of one whose own omissions or inadvertences
contributed to the problem."  Id. (quotation omitted).
¶ 14.         With
respect to the second factor, plaintiff does not allege any evidence to show
that defendant undertook some action intended to induce plaintiff's
reliance.  The record reflects that Dr. Eisemann signed the acceptances
sent by plaintiff and that Dr. Eisemann's counsel held the executed acceptance
of service pursuant to plaintiff's request.  Plaintiff does not
allege that Dr. Eisemann withheld the acceptance with promises not to invoke
the statute of limitations, failed to timely sign and return the acceptance
after promising to do so, or took any other affirmative action designed to
induce plaintiff's reliance.   
¶ 15.         Instead,
plaintiff relies heavily on defendant's failure to correct or contradict the
representations in his March 23, 2010 letter to the trial court, copied to
counsel, describing a claimed agreement among the parties to essentially toll
the statute of limitations.  Because, in the absence of estoppel,
plaintiff was required to file waivers of service within sixty days of filing
his complaint, we focus our analysis on defendant's conduct through December 6,
2009.  Insofar as plaintiff sent this letter more than three months after
plaintiff's deadline for filing the waivers with the court, and thus after the
statute of limitations expired, we cannot conclude that defendant's failure to
correct plaintiff's representations in that letter supports plaintiff's
estoppel claim.  
¶ 16.         Moreover,
we conclude that plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel
because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. 
Plaintiff chose to rely on Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l) to effectuate
service of process, and was responsible for complying with the requirements of
the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fercenia, 2003 VT 50, ¶
13 ("We require plaintiffs to strictly comply with the [Rules of Civil
Procedure] when expiration of the statute of limitations is an issue."); Beecher,
170 Vt. at 141, 743 A.2d  at 1096 ("[E]ven if plaintiff's attorney was not
actually aware of the limitations period, he must be charged with that
knowledge.").   Instead of timely filing the acceptance of service
per the rules, plaintiff directed Dr. Eisemann's lawyer to hold on to the
acceptance, rather than return it to plaintiff, memorializing this instruction in
an email sent after the deadline for filing the waivers with the court had
passed.  See Beecher, 170 Vt. at 140, 743 A.2d  at 1096 (Where
plaintiff's attorney did not ask defendant's insurance adjuster, orally or in
writing, to extend or waive the statute of limitations, and adjuster was
seemingly unaware of any statute of limitations problem, we refused to invoke
equitable estoppel in favor of plaintiff: "Given the adversarial nature of the
relationship between plaintiff's attorney and the adjuster, the superior court
properly concluded that the [plaintiff's] attorney acted unreasonably in
allowing the limitations period to expire without confirming that defendant was
willing to waive or extend the period while the parties continued settlement
negotiations.").   In the face of this record, plaintiff cannot
invoke equitable estoppel to avoid the statute of limitations. 
  
¶ 17.         Plaintiff
argues that estoppel-by-acquiescence is a separate legal doctrine, distinct
from that articulated in Beecher.  The cases relied upon by
defendant reflect the notion that estoppel-by-acquiescence arises where the
party being estopped is silent in the face of a duty to speak.  See, e.g.,
Palmer v. Welch, 154 S.W. 433, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913); Mettler v.
Rocky Mountain Sec. Co., 219 P. 243, 245 (Mont. 1923).

¶ 18.         Assuming
that estoppel-by-acquiescence is a sub-species of the general estoppel doctrine
described above, we affirm the trial court's ruling even applying this more
specific formulation advocated by plaintiff.  Dr. Eisemann was under no
"duty to speak" at any time prior to the expiration of plaintiff's deadline for
filing the waivers.  He had no duty to affirmatively remind plaintiff to
secure and file the acceptance within the period prescribed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure.  Moreover, plaintiff's formulation of the doctrine does
not eliminate the omissions or inadvertences that plague plaintiff's
claims.  Plaintiff's failure to enter into a tolling agreement, timely
file Dr. Eisemann's waiver of service, seek judicial relief from the applicable
deadlines, or effectively serve Dr. Eisemann within the limitations period via
other means cannot be cured by Dr. Eisemann's silence in the face of a letter
sent past all conceivable deadlines for perfecting service.
Affirmed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Beth Robinson, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
David A. Howard, Superior
  Judge, 
Specially Assigned
 

* 
Plaintiff ultimately filed suit against other defendants associated with his
care; those defendants are not parties to this appeal.