Title: People v. Debose

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/5/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S080837 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
DONALD RAY DEBOSE, 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. YA035529 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Donald Ray Debose of the first degree murder 
and second degree robbery of, and arson causing great bodily injury to, Dannie 
Kim (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 211, 212.5, 451, subd. (a)),1 and it found 
true special circumstance allegations that Kim‟s murder took place during the 
commission of arson and robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).  The jury convicted 
defendant of the attempted premeditated murder and second degree robbery of 
Vassiliki Dassopoulos.  (§§ 187, subd. (a), 211, 664, subd. (a).)  It also found true 
sentencing enhancement allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in 
committing the murder, attempted murder, and robberies (§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 
former § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury during 
the attempted murder and robberies (former § 12022.7, subd. (a)).  As to victim 
                                            
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
2 
Kim, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on two counts of anal and genital 
penetration by a foreign object, or on alleged special circumstances that her 
murder occurred during the commission of rape by instrument and involved the 
infliction of torture.  A mistrial was declared on these counts and special 
circumstances.   
At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court 
denied defendant‟s motions for modification of the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and 
for a new trial.  For the crimes against Kim, the court sentenced defendant to death 
for the first degree murder with special circumstances and to 10 years‟ 
imprisonment for the gun-use enhancement, one year for the robbery, and nine 
years for the arson.  For the crimes against Dassopoulos, the court sentenced 
defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the attempted 
murder, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year 
eight months for the firearm enhancement, and one year for the second degree 
robbery, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and one year 
eight months for the firearm enhancement.  The court ordered the sentences for the 
crimes against Kim and Dassopoulos to run consecutively.2     
                                            
2  
For the crimes against Kim, defendant was tried with two codefendants, 
Carl Higgins and Anthony Flagg, who were found guilty of first degree murder, 
second degree robbery, and arson causing great bodily injury.  The jury found true 
special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during an arson 
and a robbery.  At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict against each 
codefendant of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The trial court 
sentenced each codefendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for the first degree murder with special circumstances, plus 10 years for the 
robbery and arson.  The Court of Appeal vacated the jury‟s arson-murder special-
circumstance findings, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.  (See People v. Flagg 
(July 17, 2002, B135685) [nonpub. opn.].)   
 
3 
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We vacate the arson-murder 
special-circumstance finding, but otherwise affirm the judgment. 
I. FACTS 
A. 
The Guilt Phase 
During the early morning of December 17, 1997, security cameras at the 
Hollywood Park Casino in Inglewood, California, recorded the movements and 
interactions of defendant and codefendants Carl Higgins and Anthony Flagg.  In 
the video footage shown at trial, the three men appeared to monitor the gambling 
activities of Dannie Kim.  After Kim collected her winnings, the men followed her 
out of the casino.  A few hours later, firefighters called to the scene of a car fire 
discovered Kim alive, locked in the trunk.  She had been shot several times and 
her body was badly burned.  Abrasions and tears found in the genital region 
suggested she had been sexually assaulted.  Kim died five days later from her 
injuries. 
During the early morning of December 23, 1997, Hollywood Park Casino 
security cameras again recorded defendant, this time with Derrick Grey, as the two 
men watched the gambling activities of Vassiliki Dassopoulos.  After Dassopoulos 
cashed in her poker chips, they followed her out of the casino.  As Dassopoulos 
pulled into her home garage, defendant attacked and robbed her, shooting her in 
the head.  She survived.  Three days later, police arrested defendant at the casino.  
He had Dassopoulos‟s credit card on his person.  Later testing of a gun found 
under the front passenger seat of defendant‟s car confirmed that the gun had been 
used in the Kim and Dassopoulos shootings.   
At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense.  Codefendant Higgins 
challenged the prosecution‟s eyewitness testimony, while codefendant Flagg 
 
4 
presented eyewitness and alibi testimony, as well as expert testimony to rebut the 
sexual assault evidence. 
1. 
The prosecution’s case 
a. Crimes against Dannie Kim 
On December 16, 1997, Kim, who was from Washington State, had been 
visiting her sister, Miah Richey, in Los Angeles for several days.  At 3:00 p.m. 
that afternoon, they met at the Hollywood Park Casino, a place that Kim, a 
professional card player, frequented during her visits.  Kim drove her Chrysler 
LeBaron to the casino.  About 11:00 p.m., Kim told Richey “to go home,” saying 
she would be “right behind her.”  Richey left the casino and did not see her sister 
again that night.  The next morning, Richey noted Kim had not come home.  She 
did not consider it unusual because Kim would sometimes spend the entire night at 
the casino, forgetting to call.  Richey called Kim on the cell phone Richey had 
loaned her but did not reach her.   
Around 5:00 a.m. on December 17, 1997, Rosemarie Howard was in her 
home on South Osage Avenue in Inglewood, across the street from Kelso 
Elementary School, when she heard “a woman talking extremely loudly outside.”  
About five to 10 minutes after the woman stopped talking, Howard heard 
approximately five gunshots fired in rapid succession.  Fifteen minutes later, an 
explosion shook her apartment building.  Howard ran outside, saw that a car was 
on fire, and told a neighbor to call 911.   
About 5:15 a.m. that morning, Willard Lewis and a prostitute were parked 
on South Osage Avenue in Lewis‟s car.  Some 20 minutes later, Lewis heard 
people arguing.  He saw two men, whom he identified at trial as defendant and 
codefendant Higgins, arguing with an Asian woman as the three stood near the end 
of a car.  The woman, who looked “beat up in the face,” repeatedly said “no, no, 
 
5 
no.”  Lewis saw defendant grab the woman by the arm and pull her towards him, 
while Higgins stood behind the woman.  Lewis also thought he saw the silhouette 
of a third person leaning into the car.  The argument continued for five to 10 
minutes.  Lewis did not come to the woman‟s aid because he was married and 
should not have been there with a prostitute and therefore did not want to get 
involved.   
As Lewis lay down on his car seat, he heard a door or trunk slam shut, 
followed by three or four gunshots.  When he looked, he saw defendant tuck 
something into his clothing.  Lewis then heard Higgins say, “Come on, Don.”  
Lewis waited a few minutes until he felt it was safe to leave.  He then drove 
around the corner to a telephone, where the prostitute called 911.  When Lewis 
returned 20 minutes later, the car where the shooting had occurred was on fire.   
That same morning, Valerie Hutchinson-Gluck, a teacher at Kelso 
Elementary School, came to work between 6:15 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. and saw a man 
standing outside a car parked near the school‟s entrance.  He was wearing dark, 
baggy clothing and leaning into the driver‟s side window at a 90-degree angle.  It 
struck Hutchinson-Gluck as “peculiar” to see someone there so early in the 
morning.  A short time later, a student told her that a car outside the school was on 
fire and that a body had been found inside it.  Realizing it was the same car she 
had seen the man leaning into, Hutchinson-Gluck went to speak to a police officer 
at the scene.   
Around 6:30 a.m., Inglewood firefighters at the scene in response to 911 
calls saw a parked Chrysler LeBaron on fire.  It took about 10 minutes to put out 
the fire, at which time a semiconscious woman was discovered in the car‟s trunk.  
She had third-degree burns on the left side of her body and had been shot in the 
torso and left arm.  The victim had a pulse and was breathing, but paramedics 
were unable to get a blood pressure reading.     
 
6 
Using the burned car‟s license plates, Inglewood Police Department 
Detective Craig Lawler obtained a copy of Kim‟s driver license, but because of the 
severity of Kim‟s injuries, Lawler was unable to positively identify Kim from the 
photograph on the license.  On December 18, Lawler met with Richey to discuss 
the possibility that the victim might be her sister.  Richey then went to the 
hospital, where she confirmed Kim‟s identity.  She was only able to recognize 
Kim by her fingernails, which Richey had painted a few days before.  
Chris McClung, a registered nurse and sexual assault examiner, examined 
Kim in the hospital two days after the attack, while Kim was unconscious and in 
critical condition.  In McClung‟s opinion, there was a strong possibility Kim had 
been sexually assaulted.  Evidence of vaginal penetration included a healing 
abrasion, possible bruising of the hymen, and redness and swelling of the vaginal 
canal.  McClung conceded, however, that the redness and swelling could also have 
been caused by renal failure and infection.  Based on multiple tears and abrasions, 
redness, and swelling found in the anal area, McClung expressed the opinion that 
Kim had also been assaulted rectally.   
Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department criminalist Don Johnson testified 
that the lack of semen found on Kim did not negate the possibility of sexual 
intercourse.  He explained that the likelihood of detecting semen decreases over 
time, and that hospital personnel had washed Kim‟s body by the time the sexual 
assault kit samples were collected.  Also, the perpetrator might not have 
ejaculated, a condom could have been used, the volume of the ejaculation could 
have been low, or a foreign object could have been used.  Semen, furthermore, is 
less likely to be present in the rectum due to defecation and bacteria.   
Dr. Lee Boohacker of the Los Angeles County coroner‟s office performed 
Kim‟s autopsy.  He testified that Kim died from multiple gunshot wounds and 
thermal burns.  A total of 50 to 55 percent of her body had second and third degree 
 
7 
burns.  A reddish color at the edge of the burned areas indicated Kim was alive 
when she was burned.  Kim‟s right leg had to be amputated above the knee 
because of burn damage.  Her clavicle was fractured in multiple places.  This 
injury, which was not associated with any bullet wound, occurred before death but 
after she left the casino.   
Dr. Boohacker also testified that Kim‟s injuries were consistent with her 
having been sexually assaulted both vaginally and rectally.  He noted five irregular 
tears at different angles in Kim‟s anus as having been produced by a large foreign 
object or by repeated blows from a blunt object.  The possibility that these injuries 
were caused by a rectal thermometer was “extremely remote, almost impossible.”  
He also noted that Kim‟s vulva and labia majora were “quite swollen,” and that 
there were two superficial vaginal tears consistent with blunt force.   
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Michael Cofield, an arson and bomb 
expert, examined Kim‟s car.  He testified that the fire was intentionally set by the 
ignition of gasoline.  The fire originated in the right front passenger floorboard 
area, where the smell of the gasoline was “really strong.”   
A partially burnt Hollywood Park Casino poker chip found on the floor of 
Kim‟s car led detectives to examine the casino‟s surveillance tapes.  The tapes 
showed that Kim drove her car into the casino‟s VIP parking lot at 10:56 a.m. on 
December 16, 1997; that she entered the casino through the VIP entrance; and that 
she then played poker in the VIP area for several hours.  At 2:34 a.m. on 
December 17, a car carrying defendant, Higgins, and Flagg drove into the casino‟s 
parking lot.  The three men entered the casino together.  Starting around 3:00 a.m., 
they appeared to focus their attention on Kim; they took turns walking around the 
VIP area and stopping several times to observe Kim‟s gambling activities.  At 3:50 
a.m., as Kim was cashing in poker chips totaling $1,900, the three men gathered 
 
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less than 100 feet away from her.  When Kim left the casino, so did the men.  Kim 
left the casino parking lot in her car followed by the men in their car.   
b. Crimes against Vassiliki Dassopoulos 
Around 7:00 p.m. on December 22, 1997, professional card player 
Dassopoulos went to the Hollywood Park Casino.  She had $4,000 in cash when 
she arrived and $4,725 when she finished gambling.  She left the casino shortly 
before 5:00 a.m. the next morning and drove to San Bernardino.  It was still dark 
when she arrived at her home.   
After entering the garage and opening her car door, Dassopoulos saw 
something in her peripheral vision, “like a body.”  A person whom she later 
identified at trial as defendant grabbed the door and dragged her out of the car.  He 
then drew a gun from his waistband.  As the two struggled, defendant put his left 
hand and arm across her neck in a chokehold, placed the gun against her head, and 
shot her.  She fell to the floor and passed out.  When Dassopoulos regained 
consciousness, she was bleeding heavily but was able to crawl to the garage door 
and yell for help.   
Paramedics took Dassopoulos by helicopter to the hospital.  A bullet had 
gone into the back of her head behind her right ear and passed through her head to 
the left side of her cheek behind the left corner of her mouth.  As a result of her 
injuries, Dassopoulos could no longer drink without using a straw and her tongue 
was paralyzed.  She had also lost her right vocal cord.  At the time of trial, she 
could only speak in a low voice and suffered from bouts of dizziness.   
Composite videos from casino security cameras showed that at 7:22 p.m. 
on December 22, Dassopoulos walked into the Hollywood Park Casino through 
the VIP entrance and proceeded to play poker for several hours.  At 4:08 a.m. the 
next morning, the same car that a few days earlier had followed victim Kim from 
 
9 
the casino entered the parking lot.  Defendant and Derrick Grey got out of the car 
and went straight into the VIP area.  At that time, Dassopoulos was at a poker 
table with almost $2,000 worth of chips stacked in front of her.  Defendant and 
Grey immediately appeared to focus on Dassopoulos‟s gambling activities, 
walking by and stopping to watch her play several times.  At 4:40 a.m., 
Dassopoulos cashed in her chips and then left in her car, followed by defendant 
and Grey in their car.   
c. Defendant’s arrest 
On December 25, 1997, police officers monitoring the Hollywood Park 
Casino from the security surveillance room saw defendant walk into the casino.  
Around 4:00 a.m., the officers arrested defendant in his car in the casino‟s parking 
lot.  It was the same car that had followed victims Kim and Dassopoulos.  At the 
time of his arrest, defendant had Dassopoulos‟s Visa card on his person.  A .380 
Auto semiautomatic pistol was found under the right front passenger seat of the 
car.  Later, the police arrested codefendants Flagg and Higgins.     
d. Photographic lineups and ballistics evidence 
On January 8, 1998, San Bernardino County Deputy Sheriff Ernie Kopasz 
showed Dassopoulos a photographic “six-pack” containing defendant‟s 
photograph while she was still in the hospital.  She did not identify anyone at first 
— she testified that she was confused by the hairstyles in the photographs because 
her assailant had worn a “beanie cap.”  When Kopasz simulated a beanie cap with 
a piece of paper, Dassopoulos selected defendant‟s photograph as depicting her 
attacker.  She was also shown a photographic six-pack containing Derrick Grey‟s 
photograph, but she did not identify him.  Dassopoulos did not view a live lineup 
because she was unable to stand as a result of her injuries.   
 
10 
On July 15, 1998, Willard Lewis was shown a photographic six-pack.  He 
identified defendant as the person he had seen grabbing victim Kim.     
Los Angeles County Sheriff firearms examiner Richard Catalani test-fired 
the pistol found in the car in which defendant was arrested and compared the test-
fired bullets with the expended bullet and casing from the Dassopoulos shooting.  
He concluded that the expended cartridge case could have been fired from the 
pistol and that the bullet was “positively fired from that . . . pistol, and that pistol 
only.”  Catalani also compared the test-fired bullets with the ballistics evidence 
from the Kim shooting.  He determined that the three expended bullets found at 
the crime scene and the bullet that the coroner removed from Kim‟s body were 
fired from the pistol found with defendant and from that pistol only.  Of the five 
expended cartridge casings found at the crime scene, he determined that three 
were definitely fired from that pistol and two could have been fired from it.   
2. 
Defense case 
Defendant presented an alibi defense with respect to the crimes against 
Kim.  Terri Casey, defendant‟s girlfriend at the time, testified that about 4:30 a.m. 
on December 17, 1997 (the day Kim was attacked), she responded to a call on her 
pager from defendant.  At his request, she went to the City of Hawthorne, 
approximately three miles from Inglewood, to pick him up.  When she arrived 
about 5:00 a.m., defendant was alone.  Casey dropped defendant off at his home 
on 58th Street in Los Angeles at around 5:20 a.m.   
Codefendant Higgins presented evidence to impeach the eyewitness 
testimony of Willard Lewis.  Corrections Agent Erskine Richmond testified that 
on January 27, 1998, he forwarded several documents to Higgins.  The documents 
contained details concerning Kim‟s murder, such as defendant‟s and his 
codefendants‟ names, the location and time of the incident, and the circumstance 
 
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that defendants had been seen at the casino when Kim was there.  Jail records 
showed that Higgins shared a jail cell with witness Lewis, who was in jail on 
charges unrelated to the December 17, 1997 crimes against Kim, from May 4 to 
May 14, 1998.  Inmates were allowed to keep documents in their cells.  Lewis 
denied looking at any papers that Higgins had in the shared jail cell.   
On direct examination by the prosecution at trial, Lewis said he did not tell 
anyone until April 1998 that he had witnessed certain events at the December 
1997 crime scene.  In April 1998, Lewis was in county jail when he saw Higgins.  
Lewis became concerned that Higgins had seen him on the night of Kim‟s 
shooting.  He discussed the matter with the jail chaplain.   
Stephen Moss, the volunteer chaplain at the Los Angeles County jail, 
testified that in June 1998 Lewis told him he had witnessed a murder.  Lewis 
explained that he was with a prostitute across the street from a casino in 
Inglewood when he saw someone shoot a female in a car.  Lewis said he could 
identify the two men involved and that he had seen one of them in jail.  With 
Lewis‟s permission, Moss gave the information to a police detective investigating 
Kim‟s murder.  
On direct examination, Lewis admitted that he was a cocaine user and that 
he supported his habit by stealing.  He described himself as a “functional smoker” 
who could work while under the influence of drugs.  On cross-examination, Lewis 
admitted that on the morning of December 17, 1997, he was in his parked car on 
South Osage Avenue smoking cocaine and having oral sex with a prostitute.   
Lewis said on direct examination that his decision to talk to the authorities 
was not related to a third strike case then pending against him for commercial 
burglary and for petty theft with prior convictions for robbery, theft, and drug 
possession.  The prosecution in that case had told Lewis that it would not consider 
a plea bargain.  On cross-examination, Lewis admitted that he had entered a guilty 
 
12 
plea in his case, and that he hoped to receive a more lenient sentence as a result of 
his testimony.  When Lewis entered his guilty plea, the trial court stated that it 
would dismiss a strike and impose a 10-year prison sentence and that it would 
consider reducing the sentence if Lewis cooperated and testified truthfully at the 
trial of defendant and his codefendants.   
When questioned by the defense, Lewis admitted that when he told his first 
attorney that he had witnessed a murder, he did not provide all of the details.  At 
the time he pled guilty in his case, Lewis had a new attorney whom he did not tell 
about the murder because he assumed the new attorney already had this 
information.  He did ask the new attorney whether he could have his sentence 
reduced if he testified as a witness to a murder.  Lewis testified in defendant‟s case 
on April 30, 1999, approximately a month before the last day to modify his 
sentence under section 1170‟s subdivision (d).  He admitted that he intended to ask 
the court to reduce his sentence based on his testimony in defendant‟s case.   
Deputy Public Defender Charles Cervantes first represented Lewis in his 
case.  According to Cervantes, when he informed Lewis that he was facing a 
potential life sentence because of his prior convictions, Lewis became concerned.  
Cervantes thereafter unsuccessfully tried to find a deputy district attorney or judge 
who was willing to strike some of Lewis‟s prior convictions so as to lessen the 
potential sentence.  When Cervantes appeared with Lewis at his arraignment on 
May 13, 1998, Lewis seemed “desperate.”  On May 20th, Lewis called Cervantes 
saying he had information about a well-known murder and wanted to know if it 
could benefit Lewis.  As Lewis began stating some of the facts, Cervantes realized 
his office represented one of the three defendants, which required the public 
defender to declare a conflict.   
Testimony was presented that Lewis was a sales agent, and not a “senior 
associate” as he claimed, at the company where he was working at the time of 
 
13 
Kim‟s murder.  A coworker from that company testified that Lewis had worked 
there for only three months, during which time he would often “disappear for 
days.”  Lewis, as far as the coworker knew, did not own a car in December 1997.   
Codefendant Flagg presented the testimony of gynecologist Earl Fuller.  
Dr. Fuller, who had reviewed the forensic evidence from Kim‟s autopsy, 
expressed his opinion that Kim had not been sexually assaulted.  He noted that 
Kim‟s temperature was taken rectally four times and said that insertion of a 
thermometer can cause injury to the rectum, particularly in someone who has 
sustained burn damage to the skin.  Dr. Fuller attributed Kim‟s genital injuries to 
wiping of the area by medical personnel, use of a catheter, and burns.  
Additionally, he said Kim‟s broken clavicle could have been caused by her 
thrashing about while locked in the trunk of her car.   
On cross-examination by the prosecution, Dr. Fuller conceded that less than 
1 percent of his practice consisted of treating or observing sexual assault victims.  
He had served as an expert in only four sex abuse cases, he had attended only one 
hour of class regarding sexual assaults of child victims, he was not a proctologist, 
and he did not specialize in burns or fractures.  He also conceded that some of 
Kim‟s genital injuries were consistent with sexual activity, that Kim‟s treating 
physicians had not noted any burns in her genital area, that he never personally 
examined Kim, and that he had not looked at enlargements of the photographs 
taken of her.   
Codefendant Flagg also presented eyewitness and alibi testimony.  Carolyn 
Jackson, who at the time of trial was in a custodial drug treatment program, 
testified that she saw a “tall figure” walk by a car parked on South Osage Avenue 
before it “went up in flames,” and that she called 911.  Jackson told police the man 
was “light-complected” and wore a blue jacket and tan pants.  She thought she saw 
 
14 
him walking earlier with a “short and stubby” woman.  Jackson was unable to pick 
out the man she saw from a photo lineup that included defendant.   
Flagg‟s mother, Gwendolyn Flagg, testified that between 5:00 a.m. and 
5:30 a.m. on the morning of the car fire on December 17, 1997, Flagg was in their 
shared home, which was two blocks from Kelso Elementary School (the area 
where the crimes against Kim occurred).  She confirmed, however, that her son 
was the person in the black leather jacket and the dark pants described as “suspect 
number two” in the casino surveillance videos.   
3. 
The prosecution’s rebuttal 
Defense investigator Joe Brown testified that defendant told him that on 
December 17, 1997, Terri Casey had picked defendant up at a certain location and 
transported him to another location.  When Brown interviewed Casey, Casey did 
not recall the date of the transportation, but she said that she knew it was the day 
on which “an Asian woman was killed at a casino.”  When Brown asked Casey if 
she knew a woman named Tonica Harris (because defendant had said he was at 
Harris‟s house when he called Casey for a ride), Casey replied that defendant had 
paged her from Harris‟s house but left before Casey met him.  
Tonica Harris testified that defendant came to her house once in December 
1997.  She was certain that it was a Saturday because she started work at 8:00 a.m. 
on Saturday mornings and defendant arrived 10 to 20 minutes before she had to 
leave for work. The trial court took judicial notice that December 17, 1997 (the 
date of the crimes against Kim) was a Wednesday.     
B. 
The Penalty Phase 
The prosecution presented aggravating evidence regarding defendant‟s 
additional acts of violence.  Kim‟s family members gave victim impact testimony.  
 
15 
Members of defendant‟s family and several of his friends presented mitigating 
evidence. 
1. 
The prosecution’s case in aggravation 
a. Additional acts of violence 
In March 1994, two Los Angeles police officers were on patrol in a marked 
car when they heard five to seven gunshots.  As they turned their car in the 
direction of the shots, they saw defendant, who appeared to have something in his 
hands, run across the street into a parking lot.  Believing that defendant had fired 
the shots, the officers pursued him.  Defendant tried to scale a fence, but was 
unable to do so.  He then walked to a trash dumpster and discarded something 
underneath it before trying to hide behind the dumpster.  When arrested, defendant 
gave a false name.  Under the dumpster, the officers recovered a loaded .25-caliber 
semi-automatic handgun.  The gunfire the officers had heard earlier was consistent 
with such a small caliber handgun.   
In June 1998, defendant and another inmate, Patrick Griggs, had an 
altercation at the county jail.  After sheriff‟s deputies separated the two, Griggs 
said:  “That guy has a shank.  I‟m going to defend myself.”  A sharpened piece of 
wood, six and one-half inches long, was found in defendant‟s waistband.  In 
September 1998, deputies heard a commotion and then saw defendant and Griggs 
standing face-to-face in a combative stance.  Griggs had a bump on the side of his 
head and scratches on his neck.  Defendant‟s right hand was slightly swollen.  In 
February 1999, a deputy performing a random search for weapons and other 
contraband searched defendant‟s single-man cell and found a metal shank 
underneath his mattress.   
 
16 
b. Victim impact evidence  
The prosecution introduced the testimony of Kim‟s husband, Bruce 
Galbreath, her older sister, Miah Richey, and her younger brother, Han Kim.  Each 
testified about their life with Kim, her qualities, how they learned of the attack on 
Kim and watched her “hang onto life” for five days in the hospital, and the 
devastating impact her murder had on their lives.  Richey further testified that Kim 
left behind two school-age children from a previous marriage.   
2. 
The defense’s case in mitigation 
Defendant was 22 years old at the time of trial.  The defense presented the 
testimony of defendant‟s mother, Kimberley Ashley, who gave birth to defendant 
when she was 14 years old, and his stepfather, Tony Broomfield, who married 
defendant‟s mother when defendant was six years old.  Defendant‟s 18-year-old 
half sister, Irene Broomfield, his second cousin, Billy Ashley, family friend Sylvia 
Thornton, and two of his friends, 18-year-old Mariah Mack and 16-year-old Bryan 
Harris, also testified.  The witnesses described defendant in positive terms — he 
was “a very bright young man” who was respectful to his parents, a sweet and 
caring person who helped family and friends, someone who took care of and 
bought things for other people‟s children, a “hard worker” who was “always 
laughing” and “liked to joke around,” and a regular churchgoer who “made good 
grades in school.”  None of them knew defendant to be a violent person.  All were 
shocked when they heard of the crimes defendant had been accused of 
committing.  They admitted, however, that they did not know everyone defendant 
“hung out” with or what he did all the time.  Defendant‟s mother acknowledged 
that he was expelled from three junior high schools and had wanted her to lie to 
probation authorities about his being fired from a video store job.  But she felt that 
he did not “deserve to die.”   
 
17 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Jury Selection Issues 
1. 
Restriction of voir dire  
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously restricted his counsel‟s 
questioning of prospective jurors regarding the charged crimes in violation of his 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and his rights under the California Constitution.  The claim is without 
merit.  
a. Background 
Jury selection began on April 5, 1999.  The questioning at issue took place 
during combined death qualification and general voir dire.   
Defense counsel first questioned Prospective Juror No. 6265:  “To get to 
the second phase of the trial, you‟d have to find my client guilty of first degree 
murder, and allegations of rape, allegations of robbery, on a named victim.  A 
woman.  Miss Kim.  Then there‟s another . . . charge to my client, another 
attempted murder and robbery.  Assuming you found all those things to be true, 
you get to the penalty phase, you only have two choices:  life without the 
possibility of parole, or the death penalty. . . .  [Based on] what little bit you know 
about this case as of right now, what would you say?”  The juror responded, “Not 
guilty.”  Following up, defendant‟s counsel then asked, “How about in the penalty 
phase?”   
At that point, the trial court conducted a sidebar conference with all 
counsel, at which it expressed concern about asking prospective jurors “to 
prejudge what the potential decision would be in a death penalty case, based on 
the allegations alone.”  (Italics added.)  The court explained:  “I think it‟s certainly 
proper to voir dire as to whether or not they would consider both punishments, as 
 
18 
whether or not they predetermine what an appropriate punishment should be.  But 
my concern is that eventually, we‟re going to now piecemeal it down to what if 
you found this allegation true, or that allegation true, or guilty on this count, or on 
that count, what would your decision then be.”  (Italics added.)   
Defense counsel agreed it would be improper to ask a prospective juror to 
prejudge the question of penalty.  The trial court added that the only thing the 
attorneys could do was ask whether or not the prospective juror had an open mind 
as to either of the possibilities.  Defense counsel countered that he believed he 
could go into “some of the facts of the case” and ask whether, based on these facts, 
the prospective juror would “automatically vote death, and never consider life 
without the possibility of parole.”  The court responded:  “I think that you‟re in 
treacherous waters . . . .  I don‟t think it‟s appropriate to ask them to prejudge that.  
They know what the general allegations are.  If you want to say you‟ve heard the 
general allegations, you know, with those general allegations, in mind, you know, 
are you in a position where you‟re automatically going to go one way or the other.  
But don‟t break it down.  Don’t ask them to prejudge which factors they would 
find aggravating or mitigating.  I think that‟s inappropriate.”  (Italics added.)   
Defense counsel then rephrased his question and asked Prospective Juror 
No. 6265 whether “based on the allegations in this case,” if it went to a penalty 
phase, he would consider both life without the possibility of parole and a death 
sentence.  Prospective Juror No. 6265 responded, “Yes.”   
Defense counsel later asked Prospective Juror No. 2738, without objection, 
whether, at the penalty phase of a case involving “robbery, killing of a woman, 
[and] rape [in which] . . . a woman was put in the trunk of a car alive and burned, 
and . . . lived for awhile,” she could consider both life without the possibility of 
parole and a death sentence.  Prospective Jurors No. 5061 and No. 1589 were 
asked similar questions.  These three prospective jurors each responded that they 
 
19 
could consider both life without the possibility of parole and a death sentence.  
Defense counsel also asked Prospective Juror No. 0985 more generally whether, 
having heard the questions asked of other prospective jurors, any of his answers 
would be different, and whether, knowing “a little bit about the case,” he would 
automatically vote for death.  Similar questions were asked Prospective Jurors 
No. 5217 and No. 5061.  They replied that they would not automatically vote for 
death.  Defendant‟s counsel then passed on the jury for cause.   
b. Analysis 
The purpose of voir dire is to “aid the exercise of challenges for cause.”  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)  “Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the 
criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be 
honored.  Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge‟s responsibility to remove 
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court‟s 
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”  (Rosales-Lopez v. 
United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188.)  The trial court has considerable 
discretion in “the manner in which voir dire is conducted, including any limitation 
on the time which will be allowed for direct questioning of prospective jurors by 
counsel and any determination that a question is not in aid of the exercise of 
challenges for cause.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 223; see People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 900, 990 (Jenkins).)  “[E]ither party is entitled,” however, “to ask 
prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to determine if those jurors 
harbor bias, as to some fact or circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that 
would cause them not to follow an instruction directing them to determine a 
penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating evidence.”  (People v. Cash 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720-721 (Cash).) 
 
20 
Here the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the questions 
that defense counsel could ask prospective jurors.  At no time did the court 
prohibit counsel from questioning prospective jurors about facts of the case that 
were not expressly pleaded in the information.  (Compare with Cash, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at pp. 718-722.)  To the contrary, defense counsel had ample opportunity 
to inform prospective jurors of case-specific facts in soliciting their views on 
capital punishment.  Counsel specifically asked prospective jurors whether, 
assuming defendant was found guilty of the allegations involved in the case — 
which both the court and counsel described in some detail — they would 
automatically vote for death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.  In 
People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1104-1105, we held that the defendant‟s 
voir dire was not improperly limited when the parties were permitted to ask 
prospective jurors whether they would be able to consider both penalties if certain 
facts about the case were proved.  Such questioning is appropriate, but asking the 
prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty phase is not. 
B. 
Guilt Phase Issues 
1. 
Sufficiency of the evidence for the arson-murder special 
circumstance  
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the arson-
murder special circumstance because the arson did not involve an inhabited 
structure or property.  He is correct.  The arson-murder special circumstance 
requires an “[a]rson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.”  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(H).)  Section 451‟s subdivision (b) provides:  “Arson that causes an 
inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or eight years.”  The term 
“inhabited” for this purpose means “currently being used for dwelling purposes 
whether occupied or not.”  (§ 450, subd. (d).)  “The arson special circumstance 
 
21 
thus applies only to arson of an inhabited structure or inhabited property.”  (People 
v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 606, fn. 13.)   
Here, the evidence established that Kim was placed in the trunk of her car 
and shot several times, after which the car was set on fire.  No evidence was 
presented that the car was used for dwelling purposes.  Consequently, as the 
Attorney General concedes, the arson special-circumstance finding for defendant 
must be vacated, as was done by the Court of Appeal for codefendants Flagg and 
Higgins.  (See People v. Flagg, supra, B135685 [nonpub. opn.].)   
This does not affect defendant‟s conviction and sentence for violating 
section 451‟s subdivision (a), which requires only that the arson cause great bodily 
injury, and not that it be of an inhabited structure or property.  Nor does it affect 
the jury‟s true finding of the robbery-murder special circumstance, which, 
standing alone, was sufficient to make defendant eligible for the death penalty. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the penalty verdict must be reversed 
because the jury was told, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, that it could consider the 
arson-murder special circumstance as a factor in aggravation.  As he 
acknowledges, however, the United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. 
Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212 (Brown), that an “invalidated sentencing factor” does 
not “render a death sentence unconstitutional” if “one of the other sentencing 
factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and 
circumstances.”  (Id. at p. 220.)  Included among California‟s sentencing factors 
are “ „[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in 
the present proceeding.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 222.)   
Here, the jury‟s consideration of an invalid eligibility factor in the weighing 
process did not produce constitutional error.  All of the facts and circumstances 
admissible to establish the arson-murder special circumstance “were also properly 
adduced as aggravating facts bearing upon the „circumstances of the crime‟ 
 
22 
sentencing factor.  They were properly considered whether or not they bore upon 
the invalidated eligibility factor[].”  (Brown, supra, 546 U.S. at p. 224.)  Because 
the jury was authorized to give aggravating weight to these facts and 
circumstances, regardless of whether they constituted arson in violation section 
451‟s subdivision (b), our vacation of the arson-murder special-circumstance 
finding does not require reversal of the death penalty.  (People v. Castaneda 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1354.)  As in People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 
1139, in which we vacated a torture-murder special-circumstance finding, there is 
no likelihood that the jury‟s consideration of the mere existence of the arson-
murder special circumstance “tipped the balance toward death.”  
Attempting to distinguish his case, defendant argues that Brown, supra, 546 
U.S. 212, involved four special circumstances, two of which were invalid, while 
his case had only two special circumstances, one of which was invalid.  This is a 
distinction without a difference.  The high court in Brown did not uphold the 
jury‟s penalty verdict because two special circumstances remained valid, but 
because the jury was entitled to consider the facts underlying the invalid special 
circumstances as circumstances of the crimes.   
2. 
Merger doctrine and the arson-murder special circumstance  
Defendant argues the merger doctrine prohibited application of the arson-
murder special circumstance in his case.  We need not address this argument in 
light of our holding that the arson-murder special-circumstance finding must be 
vacated.   
3. 
Dismissal of Juror No. 2  
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in dismissing Juror 
No. 2 during the trial.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
 
23 
in determining that this person could not perform her duties as a juror and 
discharging her as a result.    
a. Background 
On the first day of testimony, the trial court notified counsel in open court, 
but outside the jury‟s presence, that the bailiff had reported that a spectator in the 
courtroom was using a tape recorder.  The court asked the spectator to identify 
herself, and she gave her name as Kimeko Campbell.  The court admonished 
Campbell that audio taping of court proceedings was not allowed unless expressly 
approved in advance by a judge based on a specific petition for that purpose.  
When asked if she was “an interested party, friend, or relative, member of the 
press,” Campbell responded she was “just [a] spectator.”   
A few days later, codefendant Flagg‟s attorney informed the trial court, 
again outside the jury‟s presence, that the previous evening he had learned that 
Campbell‟s father was dating one of the jurors and that Campbell was friends 
with, or had been friends with, Flagg‟s family.  Counsel also said that during the 
trial, Campbell had been intentionally sitting on the other side of the courtroom 
from where Flagg‟s family was seated “because she did not want the jurors to see 
her around the family, or interacting with them.”  That morning, Flagg‟s attorney 
had asked Campbell if she knew Juror No. 2.  Campbell responded that “she may 
have met her one time a long time ago,” but that she did not “know her.”  
Campbell claimed she had not spoken or made eye contact with Juror No. 2 since 
she had been in the courtroom.  In response to further inquiry from counsel, 
Campbell explained that she was there because she was “writing a story for class 
about this case.”  She rejected counsel‟s request to leave.   
The prosecutor said that he recalled Campbell sitting with some of Flagg‟s 
family during the preliminary hearing.  He asked that Juror No. 2 be removed for 
 
24 
cause because of potential bias arising from the circumstances that Campbell was 
close to Flagg and her father was dating the juror. 
The trial court conducted an in-chambers inquiry of Juror No. 2.  When 
asked whether she recognized anyone in the audience section of the courtroom, 
Juror No. 2 responded:  “Just one person. . . .  Her name is Kim.  She‟s doing a 
project, or something for school.”  When asked about their relationship, Juror 
No. 2 said she had been dating Campbell‟s father for “a little over a year” and saw 
him “usually every weekend.”  Campbell did not live with her father and Juror 
No. 2 did not know Campbell “that well,” having only seen her five times, twice at 
Campbell‟s father‟s house and three times in the courtroom since the trial began.  
She was “shocked” to see Campbell in court.  Although Juror No. 2 had not 
discussed the case with her, she had asked Campbell why she was there.  
Campbell responded that she was “doing a school project” and had been 
“following the case since it started.”  When asked if Campbell‟s presence or 
interest in the case would influence her in any way, Juror No. 2 responded, “No.  
Not at all.”  She explained that she did not bring Campbell‟s presence to the 
court‟s attention because “I didn‟t think it really mattered. . . .  I know what my 
part is on this case.”  The juror added:  “I know I am not allowed to talk to her.  So 
it was never an issue, you know, of trying to communicate with her, or her trying 
to communicate with me.” 
The trial court then brought Campbell into chambers.  When asked whether 
she knew one of the jurors, Campbell replied:  “I don‟t know her.  I saw her once.  
I‟ve never been introduced to her.  I have no idea what her name is.  So I‟ve never 
met her.  I just saw her. . . .  At my dad‟s house.”  She said she did not know what 
kind of relationship Juror No. 2 had with Campbell‟s father.  Campbell explained 
that she was interested in the case because she was a self-employed writer, she had 
never observed a murder trial, and Kim‟s murder had occurred close to her house.  
 
25 
She denied having “a major interest” in the case and said she was not “affiliated 
with anyone there.”    
The trial court asked whether Campbell had had any contact with anyone 
involved in the case — the victims‟ families, the families of defendant or his 
codefendants, the attorneys, or law enforcement officers.  Campbell responded, 
“No, I have no involvement whatsoever.”  She then revised her answer, saying that 
during the previous year she had met and talked with a girl at the preliminary 
hearing whose first name was “Tynesha,” but she did not know her last name.  
When asked if she knew why Tynesha was interested in the case, Campbell 
responded that Tynesha‟s “boyfriend, or ex-boyfriend” was a defendant.  The 
court inquired whether she had “any relationship with Tynesha as a friend, or 
anything else,” and Campbell finally acknowledged, “Actually she‟s my niece.” 
In response to questioning by the defense, Campbell stated that she had not 
discussed any of the facts of the case with her father and would abide by a court 
order prohibiting her from discussing the case with him.  In response to 
questioning by the prosecution, Campbell said that Tynesha was her sister‟s 
daughter, that she was close to her sister and Tynesha and lived about 15 minutes 
away from them, and that she spoke to Tynesha frequently.   
The trial court then recalled Juror No. 2 into chambers for further 
questioning.  Juror No. 2 said that she did not know anyone named Tynesha.  She 
confirmed that the man she was dating, Ernie Campbell, had only one child, 
Kimeko, agreeing that “they‟re close.”  She said he also had stepchildren, but she 
did not know how many or what their names were. 
After telling Juror No. 2 to assume that Kimeko Campbell was related to a 
witness who was to testify, the trial court asked, “do you think that would 
influence you one way or the other?”  She responded:  “No.  It wouldn‟t. . . .  I 
have only seen Kim twice.  And . . . we don‟t even really speak. . . .  I don‟t know 
 
26 
any of the other family.  So whatever goes on here, has no relation to whatever 
goes on out there, as far as the case. . . .  It doesn‟t affect me at all, because I don‟t 
have any feelings toward any of them except the father.”  The court, however, 
remained doubtful:  “My concern is how the knowledge that potentially there are 
relationships between Ernie and some of the other people that may be involved, 
either as witnesses or as defendants . . . .  It‟s obviously not [a] brother or sister.  
It‟s more remote than that.  But how are you going to feel if you‟re the person 
that‟s responsible for judgment?  . . .  Are you going to feel awkward if you make 
a decision one way, and it negatively impacts somebody that‟s involved in this 
case?  . . .  I need to know whether or not you‟re comfortable with it, whether or 
not you‟re going to be objective in your evaluation, or whether or not you‟re going 
to be thinking in the back of your mind . . . this is my boyfriend‟s . . . 
stepgranddaughter‟s boyfriend.”  Juror No. 2 replied:  “No . . . I have to let 
conscience be my guide. . . .  If I were closer to them, maybe, yes, it would bother 
me.  But I don‟t even know them.  All I know is Kim, and I only know her just by 
sight. . . .  They might know me, or might know . . . that I‟ve done this.  But — I‟ll 
have to deal with that at a later date . . . after the fact.  And I don‟t think I will 
really have to deal with it too much.  I don‟t think . . . they‟re going to hold 
anything against me, whatever decision I make on the case. . . .  They have to 
understand that this is what had to be done, whatever way it goes.”  She added:  “I 
feel comfortable making the decision.”  
The prosecutor renewed his request that Juror No. 2 be dismissed.  He 
argued that Tynesha Coleman, who was on codefendant Flagg‟s witness list, had 
been in the courtroom for the majority of the proceedings, had an ongoing 
relationship with Flagg, and was the mother of his child.  Coleman‟s aunt, Kimeko 
Campbell, was “very close” to and the “only natural child” of Ernie Campbell, 
Juror No. 2‟s boyfriend.  The prosecutor added that Juror No. 2 was aware, as a 
 
27 
result of the court‟s questioning, that she was being asked “to sit in judgment of 
. . . someone who is related to someone who she . . . has an ongoing relationship 
with.”  The prosecutor argued that these relationships made Juror No. 2‟s bias 
“apparent . . . regardless of what she said in camera.”  Defense counsel argued 
against the dismissal, asserting that Juror No. 2‟s answers to the questions of the 
court and counsel showed that she was unbiased and could be fair. 
The trial court expressed concern that Juror No. 2 had not inquired further 
of Campbell when she saw her in the courtroom and Campbell told her she was 
writing a paper for school:  “Her boyfriend‟s daughter just happens to pick this 
trial . . . in order to write a paper . . . .  Just going to leave it at that?”  The court 
was also concerned that Juror No. 2 had not brought Campbell‟s presence to the 
court‟s attention and was consciously avoiding eye contact with Campbell, who 
sat less than 20 feet away from her in the court:  “If she didn‟t think there was 
anything improper with her being there, why would she not even look at her?  
Why wouldn‟t she bring it to the court‟s attention if she was concerned about it?”  
The court further expressed doubt that Juror No. 2 truly was “absolutely 
comfortable” with making a decision adverse to the defense concerning guilt and 
punishment even if her boyfriend‟s stepgranddaughter was dating one of the 
codefendants. 
Ultimately, the trial court ruled:  “This is not a subjective standard.  This is 
an objective standard, based upon the facts that are produced in this court. . . .  The 
court makes a determination of good cause that the juror is unable to perform her 
duty as a juror. . . .  The mere fact that the juror may indicate that she still feels 
comfortable is not the end of the discussion, or the end of the question.  The 
question is whether or not the court is satisfied on an objective standard that she 
can perform her duty as a juror, based upon the relationship [of] this juror and 
Ms. Campbell, and Ms. Campbell and Tynesha Coleman and the defendant.  I‟m 
 
28 
not satisfied that this juror can perform her services as a juror.  The court finds 
good cause under Penal Code section 1089.  Juror number two is going to be 
discharged.”   
The defense then moved for a mistrial, which the court denied.  Juror No. 2 
was discharged and replaced by an alternate juror. 
b. Analysis 
A trial court may discharge a juror at any time, including during 
deliberations, based on a showing of “good cause” that the juror is “unable to 
perform his or her duty.”  (§ 1089.)  “When a court is informed of allegations 
which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror‟s removal, a hearing 
is required.”  (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051 (Barnwell); 
People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 141.)  The ultimate decision to retain or 
to discharge a juror rests within the court‟s sound discretion.  (People v. Burgener 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 878.)   
“We review a trial court‟s decision to discharge a juror under an abuse of 
discretion standard, and will uphold such decision if the record supports the juror‟s 
disqualification as a demonstrable reality.”  (People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 
26.)  “The demonstrable reality test entails a more comprehensive and less 
deferential review” than is typical under the abuse of discretion standard.  
(Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.)  “It requires a showing that the court as 
trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its 
conclusion” that the juror was unable to perform his or her duties.  (Id. at p. 1053.)  
Although a reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence, we “must be confident 
that the trial court‟s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the 
court actually relied.”  (Ibid.)  In reaching that conclusion, we “will consider not 
just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provides.”  (Ibid.)   
 
29 
Applying these general principles to the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause 
to discharge Juror No. 2.  The totality of the evidence on which the court relied 
supports the conclusion that the juror was unable to perform her duties.   
As detailed in the record, Juror No. 2 was dismissed because of her 
relationship with Kimeko Campbell (the daughter of Juror No. 2‟s long-term 
boyfriend and also a regular courtroom spectator) and Campbell‟s relationship 
with Tynesha Coleman (who was not only Campbell‟s niece and the 
stepgranddaughter of Juror No. 2‟s boyfriend, but also codefendant Flagg‟s 
girlfriend, the mother of his child, and a potential defense witness).  Upon learning 
of the relationship between Juror No. 2 and Campbell, the trial court conducted a 
prompt and thorough investigation to ascertain the extent, nature, and potential 
effect of their association.  The investigation in turn brought to light the 
connection between Campbell, Coleman, and codefendant Flagg.  This 
intertwining web called into question Juror No. 2‟s ability to render a fair and 
unbiased verdict.   
After thoroughly questioning Juror No. 2 and Campbell, hearing their 
responses, and observing their demeanor, the trial court was skeptical of the reason 
Campbell gave for being in the courtroom.  The court also expressed repeated 
concern that Juror No. 2 had not brought Campbell‟s presence to the court‟s 
attention and that the juror appeared to be consciously avoiding eye contact with 
Campbell.  Lastly, the court was not convinced that Juror No. 2 could make an 
impartial decision concerning guilt and punishment in light of the just-revealed 
relationships.   
The trial court‟s concerns regarding the connections among Juror No. 2, 
Campbell, Coleman, and codefendant Flagg and the lack of forthright and candid 
disclosure in regards to these connections, was a sufficient basis for the court‟s 
 
30 
determination that Juror No. 2 could not fulfill her duties as a juror.  Juror No. 2 
was personally, albeit somewhat remotely, connected to a defense witness and one 
of the codefendants, and the court found that the juror‟s demeanor and the manner 
in which these connections were brought to the court‟s attention suggested that the 
juror was not being truthful and forthcoming.  The court reasonably concluded that 
these circumstances presented a demonstrable reality that Juror No. 2 could not be 
a fair and impartial juror, despite her statements to the contrary.   
We do not reweigh the evidence to independently determine whether Juror 
No. 2 was being completely truthful or whether the detailed relationships would 
affect her ability to carry out her duties as a juror.  “Except where bias is clearly 
apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the state of 
mind of a juror . . . .”  (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175.)  It is 
satisfactory for purposes of our review that the evidence, in light of the entire 
record, supports the trial court‟s dismissal of Juror No. 2.     
4. 
Admission of testimony regarding codefendant Higgins’s 
statement identifying defendant  
During the prosecution‟s direct examination, Willard Lewis testified that he 
saw defendant and codefendant Higgins arguing with a captive Asian woman, 
heard a car door or trunk slam shut followed by several gunshots, then saw 
defendant tucking something into his waistband as Higgins walked away.  The 
prosecutor asked Lewis if he heard the men say anything to each other.  Over 
defense counsel‟s hearsay objection, Lewis testified that he heard Higgins say, 
“Come on, Don.”  Defendant‟s first name is Donald.   
Defendant claims that Lewis‟s testimony recounting Higgins‟s out-of-court 
statement was inadmissible hearsay under state law (see Evid. Code, § 1220), and 
that its admission also violated his right, under the federal Constitution‟s Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to confront and cross-examine codefendant 
 
31 
Higgins, who did not testify (see Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36; 
Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
518).  He argues that admission of the statement was prejudicial error, requiring 
reversal of the guilt and penalty phase verdicts.     
Even assuming the trial court erred in admitting the brief three-word 
statement, “Come on, Don,” the error is harmless under any standard.  (See 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)  It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error in light of the other 
evidence overwhelmingly pointing to defendant‟s involvement in Kim‟s robbery 
and murder.  This included (1) eyewitness Lewis‟s in-court identification of 
defendant as a participant in the offenses; (2) the surveillance videos that showed 
defendant monitoring Kim‟s gambling activities and then following her out of the 
casino parking lot; (3) the evidence that a less than a week later, defendant 
similarly followed Dassopoulos from the same casino and then attacked, robbed, 
and shot her in her garage; (4) defendant‟s subsequent arrest in the casino parking 
lot, in the car that had been used to follow Kim and Dassopoulos; and (5) the 
ballistic evidence showing that the gun in defendant‟s possession when he was 
arrested had been used in both the Kim and Dassopoulos shootings. 
5. 
Cautionary instruction regarding codefendant Higgins’s 
statement identifying defendant  
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not 
giving a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding codefendant Higgins‟s 
statement, “Come on, Don.”  More specifically, he argues the court should, on its 
own initiative, have instructed the jury that evidence of out-of-court oral 
admissions must be viewed with caution.  He cites CALJIC Nos. 2.70 and 2.71 as 
examples of the instruction that should have been given. 
 
32 
CALJIC No. 2.70 (6th ed. 1996) provides:  “A confession is a statement 
made by a defendant in which [he] [she] has acknowledged [his] [her] guilt of the 
crime[s] for which [he] [she] is on trial.  In order to constitute a confession, the 
statement must acknowledge participation in the crime[s] as well as the required 
[criminal intent] [state of mind].  [¶]  An admission is a statement made by [a] 
[the] defendant which does not by itself acknowledge [his] [her] guilt of the 
crime[s] for which the defendant is on trial, but which statement tends to prove 
[his] [her] guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.  [¶]  You are the 
exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made a confession [or an admission], 
and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or in part.  [¶]  [Evidence of [an 
oral confession] [or] [an oral admission] of the defendant not made in court should 
be viewed with caution.].”  
CALJIC No. 2.71 (6th ed. 1996) is identical in part.  It states:  “An 
admission is a statement made by [a] [the] defendant which does not by itself 
acknowledge [his] [her] guilt of the crime[s] for which the defendant is on trial, 
but which statement tends to prove [his] [her] guilt when considered with the rest 
of the evidence.  [¶]  You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant 
made an admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in whole or in part.  
[¶]  [Evidence of an oral admission of [a] [the] defendant not made in court should 
be viewed with caution.].” 
Even assuming the trial court erred in omitting a cautionary instruction 
regarding codefendant Higgins‟s statement, “Come on, Don,” the omission was 
harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a 
result more favorable to defendant at the guilt phase had the instruction been 
given.  (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  As discussed in part II.B.4, ante, 
other evidence overwhelmingly pointed to defendant‟s involvement in Kim‟s 
robbery and murder.   
 
33 
6. 
Instructions regarding robbery-felony-murder rule  
Defendant argues the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing 
the jury on the law of robbery felony murder, in violation of his rights under the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  We 
disagree.  The court‟s instruction correctly stated the law, and to the extent a 
portion of the instruction was inapplicable to this case, any error was harmless. 
In discussing with counsel the jury instructions to be given, the trial court 
proposed giving a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.21.1, as follows:  “For the 
purposes of determining whether an unlawful killing has occurred during the 
commission or attempted commission of a robbery, the commission of the crime 
of robbery is not confined to a fixed place or a limited period of time.  [¶]  A 
robbery is still in progress after the original taking of physical possession of the 
stolen property while the perpetrator is in possession of the stolen property and 
fleeing in an attempt to escape.  Likewise it is still in progress so long as 
immediate pursuers are attempting to capture the perpetrator or to regain the stolen 
property.  [¶]  A robbery is complete when the perpetrator has eluded any 
pursuers, has reached a place of temporary safety, and is in unchallenged 
possession of the stolen property after having effected an escape with the property.  
[¶]  A perpetrator has not reached a place of temporary safety if the continued 
control over the victim places the perpetrator’s safety in jeopardy.  A 
perpetrator’s safety is in jeopardy if at any unguarded moment, the victim might 
have managed to escape or signal for help.”  (Addition in italics.)  The court noted 
its reliance on People v. Carter (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1251-1253 
[upholding a substantively identical instruction], People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 72, 101 (Stankewitz), and People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 366-368 
(Fields). 
 
34 
Codefendant Flagg‟s counsel objected to the part of the proposed 
instruction that read “[l]ikewise, [the robbery] is still in progress so long as the 
immediate pursuers are attempting to capture the perpetrator or to regain the stolen 
property,” as well as to the final paragraph of the instruction.  Defendant‟s counsel 
joined in both objections.  The trial court overruled the objections and later gave 
the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.21.1, as set forth above.   
The robbery-felony-murder instruction the trial court gave was a correct 
statement of the law.  “[T]he crime of robbery is not confined to the act of taking 
property from victims.  The nature of the crime is such that a robber‟s escape with 
his loot is just as important to the execution of the crime as obtaining possession 
of the loot in the first place.”  (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 226.)  As a 
result, the commission of a robbery is ongoing “until the robber has won his way 
to a place of temporary safety.”  (Ibid.)  A robber has not reached a place of 
temporary safety while an immediate and active pursuit to recover the property is 
in progress.  (People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 822.)  Similarly, as long as a 
robber holds the victim captive, the robber‟s safety is “continuously in jeopardy” 
during the period of captivity if at “any unguarded moment the victim might . . . 
escape or signal for help.”  (Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 101; see Fields, 
supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 364 [“the jury could properly consider that defendant might 
not have reached a place of temporary safety or attained unchallenged possession 
of the stolen property when he was still encumbered with [the victim], who at first 
opportunity might call the police”].) 
The instruction did not, as defendant contends, give rise to a mandatory 
presumption that the commission of a robbery continues so long as the victim is 
held captive, no matter what period of time has passed.  Rather, it correctly told 
the jury to find that a place of temporary safety had not been reached if the robbery 
victim‟s continued captivity posed a threat to defendant‟s safety, and that 
 
35 
defendant‟s safety was in continued jeopardy if the captive victim might have 
escaped or signaled for help during an unguarded moment.  The instruction was 
not argumentative in this regard:  It made no reference to specific evidence, and it 
was phrased so as to emphasize the jury‟s duty to determine as a matter of fact 
whether continued control of the victim affected defendant‟s safety.  Accordingly, 
we reject the challenge to this portion of the instruction.     
Defendant is correct that the trial court erred in giving the portion of the 
instruction regarding pursuers, because there was no evidence that defendant was 
pursued.  (See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [“It is error to 
give an instruction that, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no 
application to the facts of the case.”].)  “The error of instruction on an inapplicable 
legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836].”  (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681.)  Here, 
any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have 
reached a result more favorable to defendant at the guilt phase had the instruction 
regarding pursuit not been given.  (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)   
The critical concept in the robbery-felony-murder instruction is the 
question of whether the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety — as 
long as that has not occurred, the jury is instructed, the commission of the robbery 
is ongoing.  Here, Kim was held captive before she was killed.  Her captivity took 
place, at least at the end, in full public view on a residential street.  Her pleading 
and arguing with defendant attracted the attention of witnesses who heard the 
commotion.  Defendant‟s continued control over Kim in this manner placed his 
safety in jeopardy.  In light of this evidence, even if the pursuit portion of the 
instruction had been omitted, a reasonable jury would have concluded that 
defendant had not reached a place of temporary safety and that the commission of 
the robbery was not complete until Kim was placed in the trunk of her car, shot, 
 
36 
and set on fire, thus placing the acts that caused her death squarely within the 
parameters of the robbery-felony-murder rule.   
7. 
Cumulative effect of guilt phase errors  
Defendant urges that in combination, the various guilt phase errors he 
alleges caused cumulative prejudice warranting reversal of the guilt verdict.  We 
have found that the arson-murder special circumstance must be vacated, and that 
the trial court erred in giving the portion of the robbery-murder instruction 
regarding pursuers.  We have also concluded that any presumed error in admitting 
codefendant Higgins‟s statement, “Come on, Don” or in omitting a cautionary 
instruction regarding the statement was harmless because other evidence 
overwhelmingly pointed to defendant‟s involvement in Kim‟s robbery and murder.  
We further find that the limited errors and presumed errors had no cumulative 
prejudicial effect.    
C. 
Penalty Phase Issues 
1. 
Jury’s question regarding the consequences of failure to reach a 
penalty phase verdict  
On June 2, 1999, during the penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent the 
trial court a note asking:  “If the jury deadlocks on the verdicts and penalty phase, 
what would happen?  Would (1) the defendant[s] be tried all over again?  
(2) Would defendant[s] be tried over again in penalty phase only with different 
jury?  (3) Would defendants get the lesser degree sentence automatically of life 
without possibility of parole?”  After discussion with counsel, the court proposed 
responding to the jury in writing as follows:  “This is not an appropriate factor for 
your consideration.  You are ordered to disregard this consideration.  The court  
 
37 
 
cannot answer this question.”  All counsel agreed with the proposed response, 
which the court then gave.  
Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in not answering the 
jury‟s questions.  Defense counsel waived this claim by affirmatively agreeing 
with the court‟s actions.  (See, e.g., People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 
1193 (Rodrigues) [similar claim of error waived “[i]nasmuch as defendant both 
suggested and consented to the responses given by the court” to jury‟s inquiries].)   
Anticipating this outcome, defendant argues that the trial court had a duty 
under section 11383 to adequately answer, on its own initiative, the jury‟s 
questions and that the failure to do so violated state law as well as defendant‟s 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution.  The court, however, did adequately answer the jury‟s questions 
when it told the jury that the inquiry was not a proper consideration for the jury‟s 
deliberations.  We have previously held that a trial court is not required to tell the 
jury of the legal consequences in the event of a possible deadlock.  (Rodrigues, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1193.)  This is because an instruction setting forth the 
consequences of a hung jury “would have the potential for unduly confusing and 
misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination 
process.”  (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 814.)  “Penalty phase juries 
are presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of 
death and life without the possibility of parole.  Any further instruction along the 
                                            
3  
Section 1138 provides:  “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there 
be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to 
conduct them into court.  Upon being brought into court, the information required 
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and 
the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.”   
 
38 
lines suggested herein [i.e., informing the jury of the possibility of subsequent 
retrials in the event of a deadlock] could well serve to lessen or diminish that 
obligation in the jurors‟ eyes.”  (Ibid.; see People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 
648 [same]; Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1193 [same]; People v. Waidla 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 746 [as a general matter, some instruction is permissible 
but is not required].)   
2. 
Denial of motion for mistrial when jury indicated it was 
deadlocked  
Defendant claims that by insisting on further deliberations and refusing to 
declare a mistrial after the penalty jury initially declared it was deadlocked, the 
trial court violated his rights under state law as well as his rights under the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  This claim lacks 
merit.   
a. Background 
After further deliberations following the jury‟s question and the trial court‟s 
response described in part II.C.1, ante, the court informed counsel that the jury 
foreperson had told the bailiff that the jury was deadlocked.  The prosecutor 
expressed the view that the jury had not yet had sufficient opportunity to 
deliberate.  Defense counsel disagreed, noting that the jury had deliberated for 
several days at the guilt phase and that, by the time the penalty phase started, most 
of the jurors had probably made up their minds.  The court responded it would 
have the jury brought into the courtroom, observing that the amount of time the 
jurors had spent deliberating in the penalty phase as to the three defendants — a 
day and a half — did not appear sufficient to declare a mistrial, given the length of 
the trial — two months.  
When the jury came into the courtroom, the trial court asked it how many 
votes had been taken.  The foreperson replied that about five ballots had been 
 
39 
taken as to defendant, about five as to codefendant Flagg, and one as to 
codefendant Higgins.  He added that as to defendant, there had been no changes in 
the vote in the last two ballots, and that he did not believe that further 
deliberations, rereading of the jury instructions or the testimony, clarification of 
the instructions, or review of the exhibits would help the jury reach a verdict.  The 
12 jurors were then polled individually as to whether rereading of the jury 
instructions or the testimony, or review of the exhibits would assist them in 
reaching a unanimous verdict.  Each answered in the negative.   
Outside the jury‟s presence, defendant‟s counsel moved for a mistrial.  The 
trial court noted that the jurors were “tired” and “frustrated” but in light of the 
lengthy trial and the limited penalty phase deliberations, the court declared a 
recess for the afternoon to give the jury “a break.”  After calling the jury back in, 
the court ordered the jurors to come back the next morning to continue 
deliberations “when you‟re fresh,” adding that “if it‟s apparent to you after a 
period of time that those discussions are fruitless, and there‟s nothing else that the 
court is going to be able to do to assist you in reaching a decision, then so be it.”  
Late the next afternoon, the jury reached unanimous verdicts as to all three 
defendants.   
b. Analysis 
Defendant argues that section 1140 required the trial court to discharge the 
jury and declare a mistrial when the jurors initially declared themselves 
deadlocked.  Section 1140 allows a trial court to discharge a jury and declare a 
mistrial if the court determines that the proper period of time for deliberation has 
expired and “there is no reasonable probability” that the jurors can agree on a 
verdict.  The decision whether to declare a hung jury or to order further 
deliberations rests in the trial court‟s sound discretion.  (People v. Bell (2007) 40 
 
40 
Cal.4th 582, 616 (Bell); People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 539; People v. 
Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 775.)  “Although the court must take care to 
exercise its power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent 
judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency [citation], the 
court may direct further deliberations upon its reasonable conclusion that such 
direction would be perceived „ “as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their 
understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the 
basis of matters already discussed and considered.” ‟ ”  (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at p. 539.)   
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring an afternoon 
recess and ordering the jurors to return the next morning to continue their 
deliberations.  There was nothing coercive about the court‟s actions.  The court‟s 
main concern was that the jury had not deliberated for a sufficient amount of time 
in light of the length of the trial.  The court did not urge the jury to reach an 
agreement, nor did it pressure the jury to secure a verdict.  The court simply told 
the jury that if after an additional period of time it found further discussions 
fruitless and there was nothing else the court could do to assist the jury in reaching 
a decision, “then so be it.”  In People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 615, we held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered a deadlocked jury, 
which had deliberated for a day and a half, to continue deliberating for the 
afternoon, telling the jurors to “ „try your best‟ ” and “ „if you can‟t [reach a 
verdict], you can‟t.‟ ”  Here, the jury‟s continuation of its deliberations the next 
day after the afternoon recess suggested “that it had overcome whatever impasse it 
had reached” in its previous deliberations.  (Id. at p.  616.) 
Moreover, here the jury had only been deliberating for a day and a half as 
to three defendants, after a trial that had lasted two months.  We have previously 
upheld the denial of a mistrial in similar circumstances.  (See Bell, supra, 40 
 
41 
Cal.4th at p. 617 [jury had deliberated less than two full days, around 10 hours, 
after a month and a half of trial].) 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not inquiring into the jury‟s 
numerical division.  He fails to cite, however, any authority requiring such an 
inquiry.  Although we have expressly approved of inquiring into a jury‟s 
numerical division in the event of a deadlock (see, e.g., People v. Breaux (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 281, 319), we have never held this to be mandatory.   
Defendant argues that ordering the jurors to come back the morning after 
the afternoon recess to continue deliberations may have been coercive if there 
were only one or two holdout jurors.  As the numerical division of the jury was not 
announced in open court, it cannot be said that ordering the jury to return the next 
day had a potentially coercive effect on holdout jurors.  Moreover, the jury was 
given the option of returning the next day and informing the court it was still 
deadlocked.  
Relying on U.S. v. Mason (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 1263, and other 
intermediate federal appellate cases, defendant argues that his constitutional rights 
were violated because the trial court was required to but did not remind the jurors 
of their duty not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs simply to secure a 
verdict.  Not so.  The federal courts require such an admonition if the trial court 
gives the jury an “Allen charge” (Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492) — 
“the generic name for a class of supplemental jury instructions given when jurors 
are apparently deadlocked” that stresses “the importance of securing a verdict” 
and asks “jurors to reconsider potentially unreasonable positions” — to 
counterbalance the excesses of that charge.  (Mason at p. 1265, fn. 1; id. at 
pp. 1267-1268 [noting that the Allen charge “ „stands at the brink of impermissible 
coercion‟ ”]; see also U.S. v. Beattie (9th Cir. 1980) 613 F.2d 762, 765.)  No Allen 
charge was given here.  
 
42 
Lastly, defendant relies on Quang Duck v. United States (9th Cir. 1923) 
293 F. 563, to argue here that requiring the jury to continue deliberations 
impliedly communicated the trial court‟s desire for a unanimous verdict.  Quang 
Duck is inapposite.  The trial judge there told the jury that he did not “ „understand 
. . . why a verdict [had] not been promptly rendered‟ ” and that he hoped the jurors 
would “ „compose [their] differences‟ ” because, in his view, “ „[t]here ought to be 
a verdict reached in this case.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 564.)  The court made no similar 
comments to the jury in this case.  Rather, as noted at page 39, ante, it explicitly 
left open the possibility that the jurors might not reach a verdict when they 
reconvened for deliberations the following morning.  
3. 
Claim of prosecutorial misconduct  
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial based 
upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  Because the prosecutor committed no 
misconduct, the court necessarily did not err in denying defendant‟s motion for a 
mistrial.   
“A prosecutor commits reversible misconduct under California law if he or 
she makes use of „deceptive or reprehensible methods‟ in attempting to persuade 
either the trial court or the jury, and there is a reasonable possibility that without 
such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have 
resulted.  [Citation.]  Under the federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that 
does not result in the denial of the defendant‟s specific constitutional rights — 
such as the denial that ensues from a comment upon the defendant‟s invocation of 
the right to remain silent — but is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a 
constitutional violation unless the challenged action „ “so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ‟  
[Citation.]”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 190.) 
 
43 
Here, in its opening statement to the jury at the beginning of the penalty 
phase, the prosecution outlined the various acts in aggravation that it intended to 
prove, adding that in its view, the factors in aggravation would substantially 
outweigh those in mitigation.  The prosecution then told the jury:  “[A]fter you 
decide that all these factors in aggravation substantially outweigh factors in 
mitigation, the jury will then have the opportunity to then find a verdict of death.  
[¶]  And each of you will have to make that decision.  And then you will have to 
make that decision collectively.  And in making that decision collectively, you will 
be acting as a conscience of the community.”  (Italics added.)  Counsel for 
codefendant Flagg objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  Later, 
codefendant Flagg‟s counsel moved for a mistrial, and defendant‟s counsel joined 
in the motion.  The trial court denied the motion, but invited defense counsel to 
propose additional or admonishing instructions on the matter if they wished to do 
so.  No such proposed instructions appear in the record.   
Defendant argues that the prosecution committed prejudicial misconduct by 
describing the jury as the “conscience of the community” and that the trial court 
therefore erred when it denied the mistrial motion.  We disagree.  The 
prosecution‟s comment accurately described the jury‟s role at the penalty phase.  
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 
U.S. 510, 519, “a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital 
punishment can do little more — and must do nothing less — than express the 
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.”  (See 
Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 333 [the “capital sentencing jury” is 
called upon to decide the issue of punishment “on behalf of the community”].)  
The prosecutor‟s brief mention of this role was not improper.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1178; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
641, 741.) 
 
44 
4. 
Claim of defendant’s death sentence being disproportionate to 
codefendants’ sentences of life without the possibility of parole  
Defendant contends that his death sentence is inconsistent with, and 
disproportionate to, the sentences of codefendants Flagg and Higgins, because 
they each received sentences of life without the possibility of parole despite 
having, according to defendant, “far worse aggravating factors” than he had.  As a 
result, he argues, his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  Not so.  “As we have explained, 
„[p]roperly understood, intracase proportionality review is “an examination of 
whether [a] defendant‟s death sentence is proportionate to his individual 
culpability, irrespective of the punishment imposed on others.” ‟ ”  (People v. 
Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 940-941 (Thomas).)  Here, defendant‟s death 
sentence is proportionate to his individual involvement and culpability.  Coupled 
with the circumstances of the crimes, the evidence strongly points to defendant as 
the shooter of Kim; furthermore, less than a week later, defendant, acting alone, 
viciously attacked, robbed, and shot a second victim, Dassopoulos, in the head at 
point-blank range.  It moreover is reasonable to infer that because defendant was 
the only one involved in both incidents, he planned and orchestrated them.      
5. 
Challenges to California’s death penalty scheme  
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of California‟s death penalty 
scheme, based on the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution.  As he acknowledges, however, we have in previous 
discussions rejected similar claims.  Petitioner has presented no reasons that would 
compel reconsideration. 
We have held that section 190.2 is not impermissibly overbroad.  
Specifically, the special circumstances are not so numerous that they fail to 
perform the constitutionally required narrowing function, and they are neither 
 
45 
unduly broad nor unduly expansive, either on their face or as interpreted by this 
court.  (See, e.g., Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1050; see also Brown, supra, 546 
U.S. at p. 221 [recognizing that the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 
satisfy the narrowing requirement].)   
As to section 190.3‟s factor (a), it does not, on its face or as interpreted and 
applied, permit arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1066; see also Tuilaepa v. 
California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976 (Tuilaepa) [“The circumstances of the crime 
are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to 
consider the circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper under our 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”].)   
We have held that neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires the 
penalty phase jury, before imposing a sentence of death, to (1) make unanimous 
findings concerning the presence of a particular aggravating circumstance; (2) find 
the truth of, and every fact supporting, one or more aggravating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt; or (3) find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
factors outweigh the mitigating factors and that death is the appropriate penalty.  
(See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 949; People v. Howard (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 1000, 1031; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255.)  The 
United States Supreme Court‟s decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‟s jury 
trial guarantee (see Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States 
v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring 
v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2002) 530 U.S. 466, 530 
U.S. 466) do not alter our conclusions.  (See, e.g., People v. Bramit (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 1221, 1249 & fn. 22). 
Also, written or other specific findings by the jury regarding aggravating 
factors are not constitutionally required.  (See, e.g., People v. Friend (2009) 47 
 
46 
Cal.4th 1, 90.)  There is no constitutional requirement that California‟s death 
penalty sentencing scheme provide for intercase proportionality review.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 48; see also Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 
37, 50-51 [the federal Constitution does not require state courts to conduct 
intercase proportionality review in the administration of the death penalty].) 
With respect to the introduction of unadjudicated evidence under section 
190.3‟s factor (b), we have held that this does not offend the state or the federal 
Constitution.  (See, e.g., People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 649; People v. 
Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 534; see also Tuilaepa, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 976.) 
Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital 
defendants, California‟s death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal 
protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but 
not to capital defendants.  (See, e.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681.) 
We have in the past rejected the argument that the use of capital 
punishment “as regular punishment” violates international norms of humanity and 
decency and hence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.  We have explained:  “California does not employ capital 
punishment in such a manner.  The death penalty is available only for the crime of 
first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; 
furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and 
statutory provisions different from those applying to „regular punishment‟ for 
felonies.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43-44.)   
Defendant here contends that, although this court has already rejected each 
of the challenges he now raises, we have not considered the cumulative impact of 
these alleged defects on California‟s sentencing scheme as a whole.  As, however, 
California‟s death penalty scheme is not faulty in any of the respects described by 
defendant and none of the proposed safeguards for those alleged defects are 
 
47 
constitutionally required, no constitutional violation appears even when the 
alleged defects are considered collectively.  (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 692, 741.) 
6. 
Cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase errors  
Defendant argues that the multiple errors that allegedly occurred at the guilt 
and penalty phases, even if not individually sufficient to warrant reversal of the 
death sentence, cumulatively compel reversal.  We have previously rejected 
defendant‟s claim that the errors that we found or assumed to exist for argument‟s 
sake were cumulatively prejudicial at the guilt phase.  (See pt. II.B.7, ante.)  We 
also found the only penalty phase error — the jury‟s consideration of the invalid 
arson-murder special circumstance in the weighing process — to be harmless.  
(See pt. II.B.1, ante.)  Even if considered cumulatively, these errors do not require 
reversal of the judgment. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons given above, we vacate the arson-murder special-
circumstance finding, and otherwise affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J.* 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
                                            
* 
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Debose 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S080837 
Date Filed: June 5, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: James R. Brandlin 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Richard P. Siref, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and David A. 
Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard P. Siref 
250 E. Main Street, 8th Floor 
El Cajon, CA  92020-3941 
(619) 441-6639 
 
David A. Wildman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2359