Title: Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc. and Warrior Gardens, LLC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:  03/04/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
_________________________
1141196
_________________________
Ex parte Hubbard Properties, Inc., and Warrior Gardens, LLC
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Elizabeth W. McElroy, as administratrix of the
Estate of Louis Chatman, deceased
v.
Hubbard Properties, Inc., and Warrior Gardens, LLC)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-13-902489)
PER CURIAM.
Hubbard Properties, Inc., and Warrior Gardens, LLC ("the
defendants"), filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
1141196
requesting that this Court direct the Jefferson Circuit Court
to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary
judgment and to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the
ground that the action filed against them is a nullity.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ.   
Facts and Procedural History
Louis Chatman was married to Carolyn Chatman and was a
resident of the Warrior Gardens Apartments, which the
defendants owned and operated.  On June 27, 2011, there was a
fire in the apartment where Louis resided.  He was not able to
escape and ultimately died in the fire.  
The 
Jefferson 
Probate 
Court 
issued 
letters 
of
administration regarding Louis's estate to Elizabeth W.
McElroy, the county administrator, on June 11, 2013. 
Nevertheless, on June 26, 2013, Carolyn, purporting to act as
the "attorney in fact for Louis Chatman, an individual," filed
a wrongful-death action against Hubbard Properties, Inc.,
Warrior 
Gardens, 
LLC, 
and 
various 
fictitiously 
named
defendants.  The complaint alleged that, as a proximate result
of the defendants' negligence and/or wantonness, Louis
suffered injuries that resulted in his death.  
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On January 23, 2014, Carolyn filed a motion to substitute
parties, seeking to substitute Elizabeth W. McElroy, as
administratrix of the estate of Louis Chatman, as the
plaintiff.  The trial court granted the motion that same day. 
On January 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  After McElroy responded, the trial court
denied the motion for a summary judgment.  This petition
followed. 
Standard of Review
"'"'The writ of mandamus is
a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be "issued only when there is: 
1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought;
2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent 
to 
perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court."  Ex parte United Serv.
Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501,
503 (Ala. 1993); see also Ex
parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995).'  Ex parte Carter,
[807 So. 2d 534,] 536 [(Ala.
2001)]."
"'Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321
(Ala. 2001).
"'"Subject 
to 
certain 
narrow
exceptions ..., we have held that, because
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an 'adequate remedy' exists by way of an
appeal, the denial of a motion to dismiss
or a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable 
by 
petition 
for 
writ 
of
mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala. 2002).'
"Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 78
So. 3d 959, 965–66 (Ala. 2011).  'Mandamus review is
available where the petitioner challenges the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court based
on the plaintiff's alleged lack of standing to bring
the lawsuit.'  Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So.
2d 288, 292 (Ala. 2007)."
Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So. 3d 316, 317-18 (Ala. 2013).  
  
Discussion
The defendants argue that the trial court should have
granted their motion for a summary judgment alleging that the
action Carolyn filed is a nullity.  Specifically, they contend
that only the administrator or executor of a decedent's estate
can maintain a wrongful-death action and that Carolyn had
never been appointed Louis's administrator or executor.  In
fact, the defendants point out that McElroy was appointed the
administratrix of Louis's estate before Carolyn filed the
action.  Therefore, they conclude that, because Carolyn did
not have the requisite authority to pursue a wrongful-death
action on behalf of Louis's heirs, see § 6-5-410, Ala. Code
1975, the action she filed is a legal nullity and a
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1141196
substitution of McElroy as the plaintiff was not sufficient to
overcome that fatal error.
In Waters v. Hipp, 600 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. 1992), this
Court explained:
"A 
wrongful 
death 
action 
is 
purely 
statutory; 
no
such action existed at common law.  Simmons v.
Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp., 471 F. Supp. 999
(S.D. Ala. 1979).  Section 6–5–410 provides that the
personal representative of the deceased may bring a
wrongful death action.  A 'personal representative,'
for the purposes of § 6–5–410, is an executor or an
administrator.  Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 175
So. 2d 759 (1965).  One who sues under this section
without 
having 
been 
appointed 
executor 
or
administrator does not qualify under this section as
a personal representative, and the suit is a
nullity.  Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375
So. 2d 465 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930,
100 S. Ct. 1318, 63 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980)."
In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that
McElroy was appointed the administratrix of Louis's estate 15
days 
before Carolyn 
filed 
the 
wrongful-death 
action. 
Therefore, Carolyn was without the authority to file the
wrongful-death action, and that action is a nullity.  See Ex
parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 146 So. 3d 1041, 1042-43 (Ala. 2013)
("The statute providing for a wrongful-death action, §
6–5–410(a), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
allows 
only 
a 
personal
representative of the deceased's estate to bring such an
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1141196
action."); see also Waters, supra.  Finally, because the
action is a nullity, McElroy could not be substituted as the
plaintiff.  See generally Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool,
375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1979) ("In the present case, Johnnie
E. Parker filed suit without having been appointed executor or
administrator.  Since he did not qualify under § 6-5-410 as a
personal representative this suit was a nullity.  Therefore,
the doctrine of relation back, found in Rule 15(c), [Ala. R.
Civ. P.], does not apply.").  
  
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the action
Carolyn filed is a nullity and that the substitution of
McElroy as the plaintiff was not sufficient to overcome that
fatal error.  Therefore, we grant the petition for the writ of
mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its order
denying the defendants' motion for a summary judgment and to
enter a summary judgment in their favor.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Main, JJ., concur.  
Shaw, J., concurs specially.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
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1141196
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).  
I concur to grant the petition and issue the writ.
Citing the authority relied upon by the main opinion, the
petitioners contend that the wrongful-death action was not
commenced because Carolyn Chatman, who filed the complaint in
the action, was not the personal representative of the estate
of Louis Chatman.  I agree.  See Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd,
[Ms. 1140706, January 29, 2016] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2016) (Bolin, J., concurring specially).  See also Wood v.
Wayman, 47 So. 3d 1212, 1213 (Ala. 2010); Waters v. Hipp, 600
So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. 1992); and Downtown Nursing Home, Inc.
v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1979).  
The respondent cites Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 146 So.
3d 1041 (Ala. 2013), for the proposition that Carolyn merely
lacked capacity to commence the action and, therefore, that 
the substitution of the personal representative of Louis's
estate as the plaintiff "relates back" to the filing date of
the complaint.  Tyson dealt with whether the proper person had
commenced a wrongful-death action under the additional
strictures found in the Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code
1975, § 25-5-1 et seq.  In that case, the personal
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1141196
representative filed the complaint, which would properly
commence the action under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410, the
wrongful-death statute.  However, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-11,
a part of the Workers' Compensation Act, requires that a
"dependent" 
file 
the 
complaint; 
the 
personal 
representative 
in
that case was not a dependent.  A dependent was not
substituted as a plaintiff until after the two-year "nonclaim
bar to recovery" in the wrongful-death statute had expired.
See Ogle v. Gordon, 706 So. 2d 707, 708 (Ala. 1997) (noting
that "this Court has held that the wrongful death statute,
which provides a two-year limitations period, is a statute of
creation, otherwise known as a nonclaim bar to recovery, and
that it is not subject to tolling provisions").  
The 
issues 
in 
Tyson 
were 
whether 
the 
personal
representative simply lacked capacity under the Workers'
Compensation Act and whether a dependent could be substituted
as the proper plaintiff and, if so, whether the substitution
would "relate back" to the date the complaint was filed. 
Nevertheless, the action had been properly commenced for
purposes of the wrongful-death statute.
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In the instant case, unlike in Tyson, the action was not
commenced by the personal representative and the filing
requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act are not at
issue.  Because the action was not properly commenced, the
doctrine of relation back does not apply.  Downtown Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d at 466.  See also Alvarado v.
Estate of Kidd, ___ So. 3d at ___ (refusing to apply the
relation-back doctrine in a wrongful-death action).  Cf. City
of Birmingham v. Davis, 613 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Ala. 1992)
(holding generally "that 'relation back' and other procedural
rules designed to 'heal' violations of the statute of
limitations cannot 'heal' violations of" a nonclaim bar to
recovery).  The rationale of Tyson is inapplicable; I
therefore concur.  
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