Title: Lenhart v. Desmond

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lenhart v. Desmond1985 WY 128705 P.2d 338Case Number: 85-46Decided: 08/29/1985ELIZABETH A. LENHART, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

EDWARD V. DESMOND, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
ELIZABETH A. LENHART, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

EDWARD V. DESMOND, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Jack Gage of 
Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

William Bagley 
of Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment in favor of Edward V. Desmond in which the district court declared a 
deed recorded by Desmond's daughter, Elizabeth A. Lenhart, invalid and restored 
real property to him.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant states her 
issues on appeal as:

"First, given the burden 
of proof in cases challenging the delivery of a deed where the grantee is in 
possession of the deed was there enough evidence in the District Court to 
support the Judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff/Appellee Edward V. 
Desmond?

"Second, even assuming 
that there was enough evidence to support the trial court's result, was there 
either an actual or constructive delivery of the deed from the 
Plaintiff/Appellee Edward V. Desmond to the Defendant/Appellant Elizabeth A. 
Lenhart under the law dealing with delivery of deeds so that the trial court's 
result is contrary to law?

"Third, should the Court 
reform the deed to vest a life estate in Desmond with the remainder in 
Lenhart?"

THE 
FACTS

[¶4.]     In 1974 Mr. Desmond 
executed a warranty deed to his daughter and only child, Elizabeth A. Lenhart. 
This was done because Mr. Desmond was then in his 80's and he thought that he 
had "better make arrangements, that in case of my death, why, Elizabeth can have all of 
my earthly possessions." Mr. Desmond executed the deed and placed it in his 
safety deposit box. Then he informed Mrs. Lenhart of his intentions of her 
getting the house when he passed on. To facilitate this he gave her access to 
the box through a signature card. Further, at the time of signing of this card, 
Lenhart became explicitly aware of the deed in the box. Subsequently, Desmond 
was injured in an automobile accident in July of 1983 and hospitalized. Lenhart 
returned to Cheyenne to help her father which required her 
to retrieve some insurance policies from the safety deposit box. After his 
release from the hospital, Desmond checked his box and found the deed was 
missing, although it had been there before the accident. The facts of exactly 
who removed the deed are in dispute. Mrs. Lenhart, however, recorded the deed in 
October of 1983.

[¶5.]     The complaint in this 
action, asking that the deed recorded by appellant be declared invalid, was 
filed on May 22, 1984, by Edward Desmond. Mrs. Lenhart counter-claimed asking 
that the deed be held valid as a gift of the property. The trial court without a 
jury found generally in favor of Mr. Desmond entering a judgment invalidating 
the deed to appellant and dismissing her counterclaim.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶6.]     It is well established 
that this court on appeal must accept the evidence of the successful party as 
true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party 
in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably drawn from it. Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank & 
Trust, Co., Wyo., 680 P.2d 471, 473 (1984); 
Sowerwine v. Nielson, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 295, 301 (1983). It is also firmly established that the trial judge is 
in the best position to weigh and judge credibility of witnesses and to weigh 
the evidence. State, ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Colvin, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 269, 271 (1984). Further, the findings of the trial judge must be 
sustained unless they are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of 
the evidence. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1326 (1984); Salt River 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, Wyo., 
663 P.2d 518, 522 (1983).

[¶7.]     In the case at bar 
there was a direct conflict in the testimony concerning the delivery of the deed 
and whether Edward Desmond intended that the property should pass to Lenhart 
immediately or upon his death. Mrs. Lenhart claimed that her father physically 
handed her the deed saying, "I went down and got the deed for you." Mr. Desmond 
testified that he did not give the deed to his daughter nor did he intend for 
her to have the property before his death. Mr. Desmond was the successful party 
and his testimony must be taken as true.

[¶8.]     Appellant argues, 
nevertheless, that the decision below must be reversed because the great weight 
of evidence is against appellee's position. Further, appellant claims that 
possession and recordation of the deed make out a prima facie case of delivery 
and that appellee must then establish nondelivery by clear and convincing 
evidence, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. The appellant claims 
that the trial court used an inappropriate standard to judge the evidence when, 
in its decision letter, the court, recognizing a presumption of delivery from 
the fact of possession and recording of the deed, stated:

"This presumption may be 
rebutted by credible evidence going to the intent of the 
grantor.

* * * * * 
*

"For the reasons cited 
herein, the Court is of the opinion that there was no delivery of the deed and 
the Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 
entitled to judgment against the Defendant and is entitled to the return to him 
of the subject property." (Emphasis added.)

[¶9.]     We said in Forbes v. Volk, Wyo., 
358 P.2d 942, 945 (1961):

"The question then 
remains as to whether or not the deed was delivered. It came into possession of 
the grantee and it was recorded. These facts raise a presumption that it was 
delivered."

26A C.J.S. Deeds 
§ 184(b), cited in Forbes v. Volk, 
supra, in support of its holding, states further:

"The presumption of due 
delivery arising from possession by the grantee is disputable and not 
conclusive, and the evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption is noted in § 
204 infra." (Footnote omitted.)

The presumption 
of delivery arising from possession and recording of a deed is not conclusive, 
but may be rebutted by showing there was no delivery in fact or that possession 
was gained without the knowledge or consent of the grantor, 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 
159. The proof necessary to rebut the presumption of delivery of the deed, as 
stated in 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 204, is

"at least as between the 
grantor and the grantee, should ordinarily be determined by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence. Clear proof is required, however, where a gift is claimed; and 
where the rights of third persons have intervened, the proof of nondelivery 
should be clear and positive." (Footnotes omitted.)

[¶10.]  Here the rights of third parties had not 
intervened. The trial judge undoubtedly viewed this contest as being between 
grantor and grantee, both living and presenting their case. The court in its 
decision letter found that "Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence" that "there was no delivery of the deed." In support of this statement 
the court stated,

"Defendant testified that 
the Plaintiff had, of his own accord, gone to retrieve the deed from the 
safe-deposit box on a Saturday and had given the same to her with instructions 
to record it. The Court is skeptical of this testimony when it is coupled with 
the fact that the Plaintiff has requested that Defendant deed the property back 
to him and she refuses to do so. Her reason for not deeding the property back to 
the Plaintiff was that he would mortgage the property and spend the money on 
strong drink."

In essence, the 
court rejected appellant's testimony leaving only that evidence of appellee 
which clearly shows nondelivery.

[¶11.]  Reviewing the record, we find that Mr. 
Desmond's testimony that he never intended Mrs. Lenhart to have the property 
before his death and that she took and recorded the deed without his knowledge 
or consent, was sufficient, persuasive and clear to rebut the presumption of 
delivery. This is true especially when Mr. Desmond's unequivocal testimony is 
compared to Mrs. Lenhart's. We do not believe the trial court applied an 
incorrect burden of proof to the facts; but, were it so, it would not affect the 
result in this case for we view the evidence supporting the judgment as clear 
and sufficient and as we have said:

"Generally, if the trial 
court arrives at the correct result, no matter how incorrectly it reasons, 
errors occurring at the trial, if not prejudicial, are cured by a proper final 
decision." Anderson v. Bauer, supra 
at 1325.

CONSTRUCTIVE 
DELIVERY

[¶12.]  To effect a conveyance transferring 
title, a deed must be both executed and delivered. Hein v. Lee, Wyo., 
549 P.2d 286, 292 (1976). At the time of the delivery the grantor's intent is of 
primary and controlling importance. Rosengrant v. Rosengrant, 
Okla.App., 629 P.2d 800, 802 (1981). Further, the controlling issue in 
determining if delivery was effective is whether the grantor manifested an 
intention to presently divest himself of title. Matter of Estate of Courtright v. 
Robertson, 99 Idaho 575, 586 P.2d 265, 269 
(1978); Yunghans v. O'Toole, 224 
Kan. 553, 581 P.2d 393, 396 (1978). Not only is intent a controlling factor, it is also the 
crucial one when constructive delivery is claimed.

"The intention of the 
parties is an essential and controlling element of delivery of a deed. Intention 
has been called the `essence of delivery,' and not only is it often the 
determining factor among other facts and circumstances, but is the crucial test where constructive 
delivery is relied upon. Categorically stated, the rule is that it is 
essential to the delivery of a deed that there be a giving of the deed by the 
grantor and a receiving of it by the grantee, with a mutual intention to pass 
the title from the one to the other." (Emphasis added.) 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 
123.

[¶13.]  In the case at bar, appellant claims that 
delivery occurred when the deed was placed in the safety deposit box and Mr. 
Desmond provided Mrs. Lenhart access to it. Appellant fails to realize that 
these actions alone do not constitute delivery since they fail the crucial test. 
According to Mr. Desmond's testimony, he did not possess the present intent to 
divest himself irretrievably of his property. Rather, he intended that Mrs. 
Desmond have the property upon his death. He believed he had put his affairs in 
order.

[¶14.]  Appellant points to a number of cases 
from other jurisdictions which she believes hold that these actions alone can 
constitute constructive delivery. The reliance on these cases is unfounded 
because they refer to similar action coupled with an uncontroverted intent or an 
intent to immediately pass title inferred from other evidence. In the case at 
bar, the intent was very much controverted. In fact, Mr. Desmond stated that he 
never manifested the intent necessary to pass the title of his property to his 
daughter while he was alive. Without the requisite intent there can be no 
delivery.

[¶15.]  We need not address the third issue on 
appeal, the reformation of the deed, because we affirm the trial court's 
judgment that the deed was ineffective to pass title, it not being delivered. 
Thus, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to declare the deed invalid and 
the property was properly restored to Mr. Desmond.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.