Title: DON WHITE v. HA, INC., D/B/A GIOVALE'S BAR

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DON WHITE v. HA, INC., D/B/A GIOVALE'S BAR1989 WY 201782 P.2d 1125Case Number: 88-294Decided: 11/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DON WHITE, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

HA, INC., D/B/A GIOVALE'S 
BAR, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Roy A. Jacobson 
and Sharon M. Rose, of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., 
Kemmerer, for 
appellant.

Richard H. 
Honaker and Michael D. Newman of Honaker & Hampton, Rock Springs, and Roger 
H. Bullock of Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Don White sued HA Inc., 
dba Giovale's Bar (Giovale's), claiming it was responsible for injuries he 
received outside the bar on the night of October 19, 1984, when he was shot in 
the back while attempting to flee a fracas which arose between White and his 
assailant Hank Summers, both bar patrons. The district court granted summary 
judgment to Giovale's, finding it had no duty to protect White from harm. On 
appeal, White asks:

A. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in its finding that there were no genuine issues of fact and 
granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. More particularly, did the court 
err in finding:

1. That there was no 
altercation in the appellee's premises sufficient to put appellee on notice of 
danger to appellant;

2. That there was no 
relationship between the disturbance in the appellee's premises and the 
subsequent events which resulted in appellant's injuries;

3. That there was not 
sufficient opportunity for the appellee to take action to protect 
appellant.

B. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in holding that Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090 
(Wyo. 1987) 
was not applicable to the case at hand, and should only be given a limited 
application.

C. Whether or not the 
trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment without 
giving consideration to appellant's cause of action based upon breach of the 
duty arising from the sale or furnishing of liquor.

Alternatively, 
Giovale's inquires:

1. Whether the trial 
court properly held that the fight which started outside was not reasonably 
foreseeable by Giovale's and there was no duty to protect Don White from the 
unexpected shooting.

2. Whether Don White 
failed to prove that a proximate cause of the shooting was any act or omission 
of Giovale's.

3. Whether Giovale's owed 
a duty to Don White to protect him from his own voluntary 
intoxication.

4. Whether punitive 
damages should be allowed.

5. Whether appellant's 
notice of appeal was timely.

[¶2.]     We affirm. This 
decision renders unnecessary discussion of Giovale's fourth 
issue.

[¶3.]     Don White began 
drinking at Giovale's Bar in the mid-afternoon of October 19, 1984, and 
continued to do so into the evening. Over the course of the afternoon and 
evening, White consumed six or seven mixed drinks and a pizza. In his 
deposition, White testified he "was getting a buzz on," but he was able to talk 
clearly, play pool and walk in a normal manner.

[¶4.]     As the evening wore on, 
the bar became crowded with about forty to seventy bar patrons. One bartender 
was present and responsible for business activities in the bar, including 
serving patrons, selling alcohol through the drive-in, restocking the bar, 
removing trash, and cleaning the bar premises. Hank Summers walked into 
Giovale's carrying a bottle of beer; he was acting very angry and looking for a 
man who he said owed him money. Giovale's did not serve any alcohol to Summers 
the short time he was in the bar. After entering the bar, Summers approached 
White's friend, Steve DePaola, and without provocation, hit him in the back of 
the head, knocking him down. At this time Summers did not speak to or take any 
action toward White, and White did not speak to Summers or take any action 
toward him. During this assault, Giovale's bartender was taking out the garbage 
and did not see what happened. When she returned to the patron area, several bar 
patrons told her what happened, but she noted "everyone was quiet," and "nobody 
was yelling, screaming, everybody had calmed down * * *."

[¶5.]     Shortly after hitting 
DePaola, Summers left the bar through a side entrance. White and DePaola waited 
in the bar for several minutes and then left through the front door. In his 
deposition, White stated it was his intention to walk to DePaola's house to 
smoke some marijuana, but that he delayed leaving the bar so they would avoid 
Summers. White stated that he thought the fighting was over, but upon walking 
out the door DePaola headed for the parking lot to look for Summers, and White 
followed. Summers was not there, so they started to leave. While crossing the 
street DePaola saw Summers nearby, standing behind his car with the trunk lid 
open. DePaola started for Summers and White followed, reaching him first. White 
approached Summers and exchanged a few words which resulted in an exchange of 
several punches. The punching ended when the two fell to the ground. Believing 
the fight was over, White started to get up. As he was doing so he noticed 
Summers had a gun. White jumped up and ran; Summers shot him in the 
back.

[¶6.]     White filed a complaint 
against Giovale's on February 24, 1986, alleging two counts: (1) Giovale's 
failure to exercise reasonable care to provide safe premises for its customers; 
and (2) Giovale's negligent sale or furnishing of liquor to an intoxicated 
person, White.1 On July 25, 1988, Giovale's filed a 
motion for summary judgment. In its September 12, 1988 decision letter, the 
trial court granted Giovale's motion, finding in pertinent 
part:

In the present case, the 
only disturbance which occurred in the bar was not between White and Summers so 
the defendant [Giovale's] had no reason to give White any protection, nor was 
there any relationship between the disturbance in the bar between Summers and 
DePaola and the disturbance outside the bar between Summers and Richmond 
[murdered by Summers that night] that would put the defendant on notice. It all 
happened so fast that no one could have averted the result. Calling the police 
would have been a waste of time, even if the defendant could have anticipated 
what was going to happen. I find nothing in this record which showed "a 
relationship between the particular disturbance which was relied upon as warning 
defendant of the impendence of danger to his invitees and the subsequent 
violence which caused plaintiff's injury."

This appeal 
followed.2

[¶7.]     In this case, we are 
asked to extend the established scope of tavern keeper liability to encompass 
injuries received by a bar patron off bar premises resulting from another bar 
patron's criminal acts. Earlier cases have suggested liability will lie in two 
instances: (1) when a tavern keeper serves intoxicating liquor to a minor or a 
person obviously intoxicated who later injures a third party either on or off 
the tavern premises, McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983)3; and (2) when a third party is 
injured in the tavern by other patrons of the tavern who have exhibited behavior 
such as to alert the tavern keeper that danger or injury to the third party is 
imminent, Mayflower Restaurant Company v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1987). In 
each of these cases, liability attached because of the tavern keeper's breach of 
some responsibility owed to the public, the collective third party. See 
McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 413 (discussing the legislative establishment of a duty 
owed to the general public through the enactment of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 
12-6-101(a)). White's action against Giovale's cannot be squeezed into either of 
the two pigeonholes suggested by McClellan and Mayflower, and we decline the 
invitation to peck out yet another to accommodate this fact situation, for to do 
so would make all of us our brothers' keepers, a result the law of Wyoming does 
not support.

[¶8.]     As a preliminary 
procedural matter, we disagree with Giovale's contention that White's notice of 
appeal was untimely filed; we agree with White's correct statement that pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 54(b), the summary judgment order in this case could "only be deemed 
final upon an express determination that there was no just cause for delay." 
Only when the determination was made that there was no just cause for delay did 
the time for the filing of an appeal begin to run. See Olmstead v. Cattle, Inc., 
541 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1975). The 54(b) certification was 
entered in the form of a nunc pro tunc order on September 29, 1988. White filed 
his notice of appeal on October 6, 1988, well within the fifteen day time limit. 
Giovale's argues that as a nunc pro tunc order, the time for appeal began to run 
from the date of the original summary judgment, September 20, 1988, in that nunc 
pro tunc orders relate back to the date of the original order. That the order 
was entitled "Nunc Pro Tunc," does not alter our determination that the time for 
appeal began to run only upon its entry. The thrust of the order was a 54(b) 
certification that there was no just cause for delay. To dismiss this appeal 
based on the title of the order would be to assert form over substance. We find 
that White's notice of appeal was timely filed.

[¶9.]     We analyze the 
substance of this appeal by noting our well-established standard of review for 
summary judgments which need not be reiterated. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Wyo. 1989); Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 190 (Wyo. 1989); Johnston v. 
Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566, 568 (Wyo. 1988). See also W.R.C.P. 
56.

[¶10.]  As in all tort actions, negligence 
consists of a breach of a duty owed by the defendant that proximately causes 
injury to the plaintiff. McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 411 (citing ABC Builders, Inc. 
v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981)). Whether a duty exists is a 
question of law for the court to decide. McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 411. This court 
has held a liquor vendor is bound to exercise the degree of care required of a 
reasonable person in light of the circumstances. Id. at 412.

[¶11.]  The paradigmatic Wyoming case addressing tavern keeper liability is Fisher 
v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957). There, a bar 
patron was injured as a result of an altercation between two or three other 
patrons. A fifteen to twenty minute argument occurred in the bar between the 
other patrons culminating in one patron breaking a beer bottle over another's 
head. A particle of broken glass from the bottle flew into the plaintiff's eye; 
the plaintiff's eye later had to be removed. The plaintiff successfully brought 
a negligence action against the bar. In overturning the jury's verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff, this court articulated the rule to be applied 
here:

[I]n order to recover 
from the * * * defendant, the burden [is] upon the plaintiff to prove: (1) a 
disturbance occurred which either did or should have attracted defendant's 
attention; (2) defendant had an opportunity to act; (3) defendant permitted the 
disturbance to continue without reasonable effort to quell the same; (4) 
defendant failed to give plaintiff reasonable protection; (5) there was some 
relationship between the disturbance and the subsequent violence; and (6) 
plaintiff was injured as a result of the violence.

Fisher, 78 
Wyo. at 57, 
319 P.2d  at 118. Under Fisher, the duty to protect a third party from danger, 
above and beyond the general landowner duty to provide reasonably safe premises 
to all invitees, arises when the disturbance in the bar is sufficient to alert 
the tavern keeper that there is imminent danger of injury to a third party. If 
the disturbance is of such a dangerous nature to create the duty of protection, 
the tavern keeper breaches that duty if he permits the disturbance to 
continue.

[¶12.]  The evidence presented at the Fisher 
trial about the disturbance indicated an argument developed between two bar 
patrons; a police officer entered the bar and was talking to the two patrons 
when a third patron approached the talking group, yelled a "cuss" word at one of 
the other patrons, and almost immediately, broke a beer bottle over the head of 
one of the other patrons. The plaintiff testified that the argument, occurring 
before the glass breaking incident, attracted his attention but that he did not 
continually direct his attention toward the two. Id. 78 Wyo. at 59, 319 P.2d  at 118. Other witnesses 
testified they did not notice that two patrons were quarreling or anything else 
out of the ordinary. Id. 78 Wyo. at 63, 319 P.2d  at 
120. Characterizing the activities in the bar before the glass breaking incident 
as a battle of words, this court found the evidence insufficient upon which to 
attach liability to the bar, stating:

[W]e do not consider it 
is a reasonable inference that when people become angry and argue violently with 
each other that such disagreement portends they will break bottles over each 
other's heads or otherwise resort to unlawful assaults and batteries. A mere 
battle of words, no matter how violent, unaccompanied by action, threat of 
action or some type of demonstration which gives warning that violence is 
impending, usually causes no concern of those present, any more than it seemed 
to have alarmed the plaintiff.

Id. 78 Wyo. at 64, 319 P.2d 120.

[¶13.]  In two later cases involving tavern 
keeper liability, McClellan and Mayflower, this court assigned liability to the 
tavern keepers in two very limited circumstances. In McClellan a tavern keeper 
sold liquor to a minor who later became intoxicated on the liquor and killed a 
third person in an automobile accident. The district court entered an order 
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against the tavern keeper for failure to 
state a claim, based on this court's holding in Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 
(Wyo. 1971), that there was no established common law cause of action in Wyoming 
against a vendor who unlawfully sells liquor to a minor who becomes intoxicated 
and injures a third party. When the Parsons case was decided, there was also no 
Wyoming 
dramshop statute changing the common law rule of nonliability. In the absence of 
such legislation the Parsons court was unwilling to create such a cause of 
action on its own, despite the emerging trend among other jurisdictions. In 
accordance with this court's long-standing deference to the 
legislature,

[t]he legislature of 
Wyoming has 
not seen fit to change the common law rule as it applies in this case. Whether 
legislation in the nature of a dramshop act or civil damage statute should be 
included as a part of our liquor control code is within the province of the 
legislature.

Parsons, 480 P.2d  at 397-98.

[¶14.]  In overturning the district court's order 
dismissing the decedent's complaint and overruling Parsons in McClellan, this 
court no longer felt constrained to await the legislature's abrogation of the 
common law rule of nonliability.4 It further acknowledged the 
enactment of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), which established a duty on 
the part of tavern keepers toward the general public to protect them from 
intoxicated persons and minors who have consumed alcohol, recognizing "that 
these people are more likely to be unable to handle alcohol, that they need 
protection from themselves, and that society needs protection from them." 
McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 413.5 Liability was premised on the 
illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of the above statutes, which was 
some evidence of negligence to be considered in the determination of liability. 
The court found it was the sale of the liquor to the minor or intoxicated person 
and not its consumption, as in Parsons, that was the proximate cause of the 
injury. McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 409-10.

[¶15.]  Perhaps the facts in Mayflower present a 
situation more analogous to this one, although detailing a much more egregious 
factual scenario in the bar. In Mayflower, a bar patron approached the 
plaintiff, threatened him in a loud and vulgar manner, and although unclear from 
the factual description, proceeded to physically attack him. Bouncers broke up 
the affray, but not before plaintiff's jaw was broken. Testimony at trial by 
other patrons in the bar and the assailant himself indicated the argument was of 
such a nature as to attract the attention of those in the bar, including the bar 
employees. Mayflower, 741 P.2d  at 1114. The trial court determined, under a 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis, that the actions exhibited by the 
assailant were sufficient to provide the bar with notice the plaintiff was in 
imminent danger. This court affirmed the trial court's determination that the 
bar has a duty to protect a plaintiff in light of the known dangerous nature of 
an assailant's actions. In doing so, it factually distinguished Fisher where the 
altercation was characterized as "[a] mere battle of words, * * * unaccompanied by action, threat of action or 
some type of demonstration which gives warning that violence is impending * 
* *." Id. 
1113-14. The court concluded the altercation failed to put the bar on notice of 
any danger to the plaintiff. In comparison, the physical actions in Mayflower, 
following a conversation containing threats of physical violence between the 
plaintiff and his assailant, were held sufficient notice to the 
bar.

[¶16.]  In both McClellan and Mayflower, the 
court recognized a duty to protect the respective plaintiffs. In McClellan, that 
duty arose by virtue of the existence of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), 
creating a duty to protect the general public against intoxicated persons and 
minors who consumed alcohol illegally sold to them. In Mayflower, the duty arose 
because the nature of the disturbance occurring in the bar placed the bar on 
notice that danger to the plaintiff was imminent. In Fisher, however, the nature 
of the disturbance was not such as to place the bar on notice that plaintiff was 
in danger of being injured; the evidence presented did not prove that the 
violence resulting in plaintiff's injury was caused or inspired by the argument 
between the other patrons. Accordingly, no duty on the part of the bar to 
protect the plaintiff arose on the part of the bar. The same is true 
here.

[¶17.]  In Fisher, this court held it is "not 
enough merely to prove there was a disturbance and that the plaintiff was 
injured." Fisher, 78 Wyo. at 58, 319 P.2d  at 118. Rather, "[P]roof 
of defendant's actual or implied knowledge of impending danger to his invitees 
and that he had reasonable opportunity to avert it [is] indispensable to entitle 
plaintiff to recovery." Id. Here, White failed to make even the 
threshold showing that Giovale's was placed on notice of impending danger to 
him. Such a showing is necessary to create a duty in Giovale's to protect him 
from harm. Absent this duty to protect there can be no breach by failing to 
avert the disturbance.

[¶18.]  White relied upon the altercation in the 
bar between Summers and DePaola as the disturbance that should have warned 
Giovale's of impending danger to White. Evidence presented by White demonstrates 
that a brief altercation occurred between two bar patrons, Summers and DePaola; 
any disturbance in the bar created by the altercation ended when the assailant, 
Summers, voluntarily left the bar; DePaola remained in the bar with a third 
party, White, for several minutes after Summers left; at no time while in the 
bar did White and Summers talk to each other, or exhibit any aggressive behavior 
against one another. It was after leaving the bar to go to DePaola's house that 
White encountered Summers some distance away from the bar. White approached 
Summers and engaged in fisticuffs with him; immediately following the fight, 
White was shot in the back by Summers. This evidence, even taken in the light 
most favorable to White, is not sufficient to give rise to a duty on the part of 
Giovale's to protect White from danger.6 Without sufficient notice of 
impending danger, no duty arose on the part of Giovale's to protect 
White.

[¶19.]  White next asserts that the rule 
established in Mostert v. CBL and Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987), is applicable 
here to create Giovale's liability. We disagree. This case is distinguished from 
Mostert because no duty exists here. In Mostert, a child died in the 1985 flash 
flood in Cheyenne. Just before her death, the child and 
her parents were watching a movie at the defendant's movie theatre. Outside the 
theatre a severe thunderstorm developed causing the National Weather Service, 
civil defense authorities and local law enforcement officials to issue severe 
thunderstorm, flash flood and tornado warnings. As the storm progressed, the 
authorities ordered that Cheyenne citizens stay indoors and off city 
streets in order to avoid injury or death. Id. at 1091. Despite its actual knowledge of 
the storm and the warnings, the defendant movie theatre failed to warn its 
business invitees, including the child, of the storm. As a result, the child 
left the theatre with her parents, traveled into the streets of Cheyenne and drowned. In 
this limited circumstance this court departed from the traditional rule that a 
business owner has no duty to warn an invitee of risks off the business owner's 
premises, and concluded that the movie theatre had a duty to advise its patrons 
of off-premises danger that might reasonably be foreseeable. Id. at 1096. This holding 
was premised on the foreseeability of harm to the child, due to the severe 
nature of the storm and the several public warnings. Here, however, we do not 
have such a case. The facts surrounding the disturbance in Giovale's were not 
sufficient to place the bar on notice that White was in imminent danger of being 
shot by Summers outside the bar. Consequently, no duty to warn or protect White 
arose.

[¶20.]  White also contends the trial court erred 
in failing to consider his cause of action based upon a breach of duty arising 
from Giovale's sale or furnishing of liquor to him; we shall style this as a 
"first party dramshop cause of action." White attempts to find foundation for 
this cause of action in the statement from dicta in McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 413, 
that intoxicated persons need protection from themselves:

When alcoholic beverages 
are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the 
unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but 
also the members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen 
* * *.

McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 414-15 (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 6, 75 
A.L.R.2d 821 (1959)). We disagree with White's contention that the language in 
McClellan creates a cause of action on the part of intoxicated persons against 
tavern keepers who sell or furnish alcohol to them. McClellan was concerned with 
a very specific fact situation, an injury occurring to a third person resulting 
from the sale of alcohol to a minor through a liquor drive-in business in 
violation of W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v). Its holding did not create a cause of action 
on behalf of intoxicated minors in general against a tavern keeper for its sale 
of alcohol to them. Nor did it create a cause of action for intoxicated persons 
in general against the tavern keeper. Instead, the holding in McClellan itself 
created a very limited cause of action for injured third parties against tavern 
keepers who negligently or illegally sell liquor to a minor or intoxicated 
person through a drive-in. "We hold that both § 12-5-301(a)(v), supra, and § 
12-6-101(a), supra, establish a duty toward the general public." Id. at 
413.

[¶21.]  By this decision we join the majority of 
jurisdictions in holding that the tavern keeper has no duty to protect the 
intoxicated habitue from injuries he causes to himself, the rationale being that 
an individual should not be able to profit from injuries arising from his own 
voluntary intoxication. See Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Sup. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Wright v. 
Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del.Supr. 1981); Bertelmann v. Taas Associates, 735 P.2d 930 (Hawaii 1987); Trujillo v. Trujillo, 104 
N.M. 379, 721 P.2d 1310 (1986); Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985); Sager v. McClenden, 296 Or. 33, 672 P.2d 697 (1983). See also cases 
cited in Annotation, Liability of Persons Furnishing Intoxicating Liquor for 
Injury to or Death of Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil Damage Act, 98 
A.L.R.3d 1238-42. Cf. Porter v. Ortiz, 100 N.M. 58, 665 P.2d 1149 (N.M.App. 
1983) (recognizing minor's cause of action against a tavern keeper who knowingly 
sells alcohol to the minor when the sale proximately results in injury or death 
of the minor. This case specifically notes, however, that no such cause of 
actions extends to intoxicated adults.). Dramshop statutes have not generally 
been perceived as extending to injuries to the intoxicated person himself. See 
Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383, 385 (1967). We quote 
from a case cited by Giovale's that captures our thinking on this 
issue:

A duty should not be 
imposed upon the tavern keeper, and protection should not be extended, because 
the adult voluntarily created the vulnerability that is the problem. See Allen 
v. County of 
Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1985). "To allow recovery in favor of one who has 
voluntarily procured a quantity of liquor for his or her own consumption with 
full knowledge of its possible or probable results `would savor too much of 
allowing * * * [said] person to benefit by his or her own wrongful act.'" 
Id. at 480, 492 N.Y.S.2d  at 776 (quoting from 
Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199).

Trujillo, 721 P.2d  at 
1313.

[¶22.]  In summary, we conclude that Giovale's 
had no duty to protect White from being shot by Summers, as Giovale's had no 
notice that White was in imminent danger of injury. Summary judgment in favor of 
Giovale's was proper. There being no cause of action for an intoxicated consumer 
to recover from the tavern keeper who furnished the intoxicants, the trial court 
did not err in failing to consider White's second count premised on this 
theory.

[¶23.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 White also sued Summers 
for his injuries. In the meantime, Summers was convicted of first degree murder 
for the slaying of another bar patron occurring the same night and for the 
attempted first degree murder of White. White's personal injury action against 
both Giovale's and Summers was stayed pending the outcome of Summer's appeal 
from those convictions. This court affirmed Summers' convictions. Summers v. 
State, 725 P.2d 1033 (Wyo. 1986), aff'd on 
rehearing, 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1987). Thereafter, Summers failed to 
answer White's complaint and default was entered against 
him.

2 Although default had 
been entered against Summers, default judgment had not. As such, White requested 
a Rule 54(b) certification of the summary judgment granted to Giovale's 
believing that any "determination of damages should await the final decision of 
this appeal inasmuch as inconsistent results might arise if a determination of 
damages was made for purposes of the action against Hank Summers and another 
determination of damages made in the event this Court reverses the trial court's 
order and sends the case back for trial on the merits against Appellee." Finding 
no just cause for delay the trial court granted White's motion in the form of a 
Nunc Pro Tunc order on September 29, 1988.

3 McClellan is what has 
typically been called a "dramshop" case. Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam Company (1966)) instructs that the word 
"dramshop" is an archaic usage for the term barroom. A typical dramshop act or 
civil damage act imposes liability on liquor vendors in certain situations. See 
§ 30-102, Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958, Revised to 1981, which 
imposes limited liability on a seller who sells to an intoxicated person who 
injures another. Section 6-5-71, Code of Alabama, 1977, provides a right of 
action for every person injured by an intoxicated person "against any person who 
shall, by selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the 
provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such 
person for all damages actually sustained, plus exemplary 
damages."

4 See Adkins v. Sky Blue, 
Inc., 701 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1985), for a critical discussion of the 
McClellan decision.

5 W.S. 12-5-301(a)(v) 
provides:

(a) Upon approval of the 
licensing authority, a drive-in area adjacent or contiguous to the licensed room 
may be used by the holder of a retail liquor license for taking orders, making 
delivery of and receiving payment for alcoholic liquor or malt beverages under 
the following conditions:

* * * * * 
*

(v) No order shall be 
received from nor delivery made to a minor or intoxicated person in the 
area.

W.S. 12-6-101(a) 
provides:

(a) Every person who 
sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19), 
who is not his legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate 
family, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

6 In his brief on appeal, 
White suggests that Giovale's had notice that Summers had a gun, based on the 
bartender's deposition testimony that "someone had mentioned something about him 
[Summers] having a gun in his trunk * * *." White fails to mention, however, 
that the bartender later clarified her statement about her knowledge of Summers 
having a gun by indicating that any mention of gun was made only after the 
shooting:

Q. Do you remember any 
threats or talk about Hank Summers on the night of the shooting that he had a 
gun, or he could get a gun, or he would shoot somebody, or he would hurt 
somebody with a gun?

A. Something to that 
effect, I remember him saying something about a gun, I think, I'm not sure. I 
don't remember, I really don't remember.

Q. You don't 
remember.

A. I don't remember, no, 
I don't remember him saying anything about having a gun with him or in his car 
or anything like that, no. I heard someone else telling me that but I didn't 
hear him say that.

Q. Can you identify that 
mention by somebody else as being before the shooting, or is that something that 
people were hashing out after the shooting?

A. That was after the 
shooting, they said they knew he had a gun in his trunk because they said he had 
a massive amount of cocaine in his trunk, or something to that effect, and 
that's why he had the gun there.

Q. So up until that time 
of the shooting, why, you had heard nothing about any gun?

A. 
No.

Q. And you heard nothing 
about Hank Summers having a gun in his trunk?

A. 
No.

Q. Did you see a firearm 
or any other weapon on Hank Summers inside Giovale's on the night of the 
shooting?

A. 
No.

Q. Did you see a gun or 
any other weapon on anyone inside Giovale's on the night of the 
shooting?

A. 
No.

Q. Until you walked 
outside and saw Hank Summers firing the gun did you have any knowledge or notice 
that there would be any gunplay by anybody?

A. No, I did 
not.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶24.]  I dissent for the reason first offered in 
O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 
(Wyo. 1985) and most recently stated in Baros 
v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. We again 
fail to give to the party appealing an adverse summary judgment the benefit of 
all favorable inferences which can be drawn from the record.1 The majority again weighs the 
evidence to affirm summary judgment. In summary judgment review, we should 
confine the review to considering whether 
an issue of negligence is presented by the evidence and any fair inferences 
to be derived from that evidence. Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 
779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989); Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987); Greenwood v. 
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987). The majority weighs the evidence 
when it presents an uncompleted analysis of the first prong under the Fisher v. 
Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (1957) test. A completed 
analysis would explore all inferences fairly drawn for appellant against the 
fact that a bar owner's duty may arise when an altercation should have attracted 
attention.

[¶25.]  Another point lost in the majority's 
analysis, in deploying Fisher, 319 P.2d 116 and the relevant sections of 
Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1987), is that those 
cases allowed the plaintiff access to a jury and did not deal with review of 
summary judgment. By contrast, appellant here is denied a jury decision 
following trial.

[¶26.]  The majority follows the district court 
in adopting appellee's characterization of the evidence and then seems to search 
for the most favorable inferences available to the bar. Because this court 
should consider the evidence only in the light most favorable to appellant 
during summary judgment review and because such a review mandates a contrary 
result, I must dissent from this procedure which denies a jury the decision of 
whether or not Giovale's Bar breached a duty under these circumstances. 
Obviously, a bar owner owes a duty of some nature to its patrons. This case 
calls into question whether that duty was violated under these factual 
circumstances. One man was shot dead, appellant was permanently injured after 
being shot in the back and Hank Summers is serving two concurrent thirty-five 
year to life terms for murder and attempted murder, Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033 (1986), confirmed on reh'g 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1987). I would leave it to 
the jury to decide where responsibility is located. Viewing the depositions of 
appellees, bartender Marsha Carter and owner/manager Richard Hiner, in the light 
most favorable to appellant and giving to him the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences, a far different story emerges.

[¶27.]  It was Friday night when Summers pushed 
through Giovale's crowded bar. That crowd parted like the Red Sea when they saw him coming through the bar. They 
knew him to be an ex-boxer with a lightning quick temper and equally quick 
fists. From the evidence in the record, Carter was well acquainted with Summers' 
reputation for heavy drinking, bad temper and uncontrolled violence. Summers was 
again drunk and obviously angry because he was threatening to hurt someone named 
Dennis who he said owed him drug money. While the majority says the bar should not have been on alert by any of 
this, Summer's presence was so threatening even an off duty employee of the bar 
offered to pay him for that drug debt from money in the bar's till. When Summers 
and appellant had both gone outside, Carter not only knew there could be trouble 
going down but knew that Summers might have gone to get a 
gun.

[¶28.]  Carter would not call the police until 
the lives of three men had been shattered - one dead, one incarcerated for 
murder and appellant seriously injured. Why did she fail to call the police when 
the smell of danger overpowered the smell of alcohol in the bar? This question 
is answered by this record that it was because the bar owner considered the 
presence of police not to be terribly good for business. House rules informed 
bartenders not to first call police when there was a threat of danger or harm to 
customers. The house rules were simple - profits before police and death and 
injury before patron protection. I dissent under the facts of this case because 
the bar designed its managerial system to neglect reasonable preventive care for 
the customers invited in to purchase a legal drug which robs the senses - 
alcohol.

[¶29.]  Giovale's bar averaged one physical 
altercation a week during Hiner's tenure as manager. Yet, he instructed Carter 
to placate rather than chastise troublemakers. She was told never to call the 
police until she called him when trouble threatened or erupted. Out of the 
seventeen months Carter worked at Giovale's prior to the shooting, she recalled 
ten to twenty episodes of threatened violence, directed at either herself or her 
customers, serious enough for her to consider calling for police assistance. On 
none of those occasions did she actually call the police. When she asked Hiner 
to provide a bouncer for weekend security, he refused. So she was left alone on 
the night of the shooting to cater to fifty to sixty rowdy, mostly male bar 
patrons and various take-out customers. That was the bar into which Summers 
walked.

[¶30.]  Carter knew Summers could be a 
troublesome drinker. Hiner had even warned her of his reputation for violence. 
That night, Summers was nothing but drunken trouble. Before briefly leaving the 
bar, he started shoving around another bar customer, Albert Carillo. Before his 
return to the bar, someone told Carter that Summers might have a gun in his car. 
Summers, himself, made mention of a gun to Carter, but she could not recall him 
stating he had one on his person or in his vehicle.

[¶31.]  Carter was also aware that Summers, 
sometime after his return, had struck Steve DePaola from behind without 
provocation. Although she did not witness the assault, she observed Summers 
storm out of Giovale's shortly after the incident. As Summers was leaving, 
DePaola challenged him loudly to continue the fight outside the bar. Carter 
observed appellant's uncharacteristic anger over Summers' attack on DePaola, but 
noted that both appellant and DePaola remained in the bar for almost five 
minutes following Summers' departure. The incident worried Carter, but she took 
no immediate action. When she finally followed her initial inclination to summon 
the police, they arrived within one to two minutes of her 
call.

[¶32.]  One may reasonably infer from the 
depositions that Giovale's accorded its patrons by policy and practice a "serve 
'em and leave 'em" standard of care. Relevant as the mere existence of that 
policy might be to Giovale's culpability, the deposition testimony further 
suggests appellant was indeed victimized by Carter's implementation of that 
policy on the evening appellant was shot by Summers. The deposition testimony 
places in issue each of the six factors deemed necessary and material to 
appellant's recovery by the Fisher test. It indicates: (1) Giovale's bartender 
had, or at the very least should have 
had, notice of a serious and violent disturbance involving appellant and 
Summers; (2) that Carter had five minutes available to call the police for 
appellant's protection; (3) and (4) Carter utterly failed during that time to 
seek any help despite being very aware a violent and possibly armed assailant 
might be waiting for appellant and his companion to leave Giovale's; (5) 
subsequent violence occurred which involved the same participants as the earlier 
disturbance, solely in response to DePaola's challenge to continue that 
disturbance; and (6) appellant was injured by Summers' continued violence. What 
does it take to satisfy the Fisher test if not this?

[¶33.]  The trial court and a majority of this 
court focused on the many discrepancies in Carter's deposition testimony and 
resolved them in the manner suggested by appellee. Such evidentiary 
interpretations, however, are matters for the jury after a full presentation of 
witnesses. They are wholly inappropriate when made by the trial court as a 
prelude to summary disposition. Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110. Contrary to the 
majority's use of Fisher, that case can provide no support for this judicial 
incursion into the jury's domain. In Fisher, this court reversed a jury decision 
that an argument provided notice to a tavern operator sufficient to establish a 
duty to protect a patron. In Fisher, neither the party breaking the bottle which 
caused the plaintiff's injury nor the plaintiff were involved in the argument 
which allegedly notified the bar of impending violence. The Fisher court found 
the plaintiff's evidence regarding that disturbance insufficient to establish 
the bar had been forewarned of any potential harm to the plaintiff. Such is not 
the case here. Appellant presented evidence that he and his assailant were 
involved both in the initial disturbance and the resultant gunplay. Additional 
evidence indicates a jury could have found that the appellee should have known 
violence was likely to occur when appellant stepped outside. Granted, were we 
now faced with a challenge by appellant under a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim after a trial, the present record might not support appellant's challenge 
because then all inferences would be given to the prevailing party.2 However, we are reviewing a granted 
summary judgment and appellant carries a different burden. He has met that 
burden.

[¶34.]  Tort litigation often warns that certain 
behavior will not be encouraged or condoned. This holding will do the opposite 
and announce to tavern keepers that while "an individual should not be able to 
profit from injuries arising from his own voluntary intoxication," the tavern 
should be able to profit from income arising from the sale of such an 
intoxicating drug. When bar owners put profits ahead of reasonably exercised 
caution for the patron's or society's protection, Mayflower Restaurant Co., 741 P.2d 1106; McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); Fisher, 319 P.2d 116, they should face a jury as to who should pay. Surely here, the jury as the 
conscience of the community, should be given the right to analyze duty and 
resulting economic responsibility for factually ignoring reasonable safety 
precautions. I refuse to accept the tale of this tragedy including violence, 
firearm use, death and injury magnified by evidence of a bar owner's mandate 
that the police should be called last as justification for adverse summary 
judgment. To me, indisputably, these events cannot foreclose finding at least 
some evidence from which negligence could be inferred with which a jury trial 
should be provided.

[¶35.]  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 "We examine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be 
drawn from the record." Baros, 780 P.2d  at 342.

2 "As a reviewing court, 
we assume the evidence of the successful party is true, [leave] out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith, and [give] to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference which may reasonably be drawn from it." Mayflower Restaurant Co., 741 P.2d  at 1113; accord Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank & Trust Co., 680 P.2d 471, 473 (Wyo. 1984).