Title: Jett v. DeGaetani

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
F. TALMADGE JETT, ET AL. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 991589 
April 21, 2000 
 
PETER J. DEGAETANI 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 
Joseph E. Spruill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment which ordered specific 
performance of an oral agreement, we consider whether the 
judgment is unenforceable because the chancellor ordered the 
defendants to convey an interest in real property to a person 
who is not a party to this litigation. 
 
Plaintiff, Peter J. DeGaetani, filed a bill of complaint 
seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract.  He 
claimed that the defendants, F. Talmadge Jett and Annie May 
Jett, husband and wife, agreed to convey a parcel of land with 
improvements to him and his former wife, Joyce Lynn Jett, who 
was not a party to this litigation.  
 
The following relevant facts were adduced during an ore 
tenus hearing.  The plaintiff and Joyce Jett were married in 
1968.  F. Talmadge Jett and Annie May Jett (collectively the 
Jetts) conveyed by deed of gift an unimproved parcel of land 
in Northumberland County to DeGaetani and Joyce Jett 
DeGaetani, then husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety.  
In August 1974, DeGaetani and Joyce Jett borrowed $25,000 from 
Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association to finance the 
construction of a house on the property.  The loan was secured 
by a first deed of trust on the property.  In June 1975, 
DeGaetani and Joyce Jett borrowed an additional sum of $10,000 
from Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association to complete 
construction of the house.  This loan was secured by a second 
deed of trust upon the property.  In 1976, DeGaetani and Joyce 
Jett were deemed in default of the deeds of trust. 
 
According to DeGaetani, a conversation occurred among the 
Jetts, Joyce Jett, and DeGaetani.  The Jetts agreed to pay the 
amounts due under the deeds of trust, and DeGaetani and Joyce 
Jett agreed to convey the property to the Jetts.  Talmadge 
Jett testified that he was not present when this conversation 
occurred, but he was aware of the agreement and he was willing 
to honor it.  DeGaetani testified that the Jetts agreed to 
convey the property to Joyce Jett and DeGaetani at a future 
date for $36,300, the amount the Jetts paid to Franklin 
Federal Savings & Loan Association.  DeGaetani and Joyce Jett, 
by a deed recorded in February 1977, conveyed the real 
property, including the house constructed thereon, to the 
Jetts. 
 
DeGaetani and Joyce Jett divorced and DeGaetani 
remarried.  DeGaetani, who lives with his wife on the 
 
2
property, testified that he was ready, willing, and able to 
pay the Jetts $36,300 for the property.  
 
The chancellor held that DeGaetani proved with clear and 
convincing evidence that he had a contract with the Jetts that 
required them to convey the property to him and Joyce Jett for 
$36,300.  The chancellor entered an order which required, 
among other things, that DeGaetani satisfy certain conditions 
and pay the Jetts $36,300 before a date certain.  DeGaetani 
satisfied the conditions set forth in the order, and the Jetts 
were ordered to "convey to the plaintiff, Peter J. DeGaetani, 
and to Joyce Lynn Jett, as tenants in common, the property 
which is the subject of this suit." 
 
The Jetts argue that the chancellor erred by ordering 
them to execute a deed conveying the property to DeGaetani and 
Joyce Jett because Joyce Jett is a necessary party to this 
suit, and DeGaetani failed to make her a party to the 
proceeding.  Responding, DeGaetani asserts that Joyce Jett is 
not a necessary party and, therefore, he was not required to 
include her as a party in this proceeding.  We disagree with 
DeGaetani. 
 
We have held that a court cannot render a valid judgment 
when necessary parties to a suit are not before the court.  
Atkisson v. Wexford Associates, 254 Va. 449, 455, 493 S.E.2d 
524, 527 (1997); Asch v. Friends of Mt. Vernon Yacht Club, 251 
 
3
Va. 89, 91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1996); Schultz v. Schultz, 
250 Va. 121, 124, 458 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1995); Allen v. 
Chapman, 242 Va. 94, 99, 406 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1991); McDougle 
v. McDougle, 214 Va. 636, 637, 203 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1974). 
 
We have also stated the following principles which are 
equally pertinent here: 
 
" 'Necessary parties include all persons, 
natural or artificial, however numerous, materially 
interested either legally or beneficially in the 
subject matter or event of the suit and who must be 
made parties to it, and without whose presence in 
court no proper decree can be rendered in the cause.  
This rule is inflexible, yielding only when the 
allegations of the bill state a case so 
extraordinary and exceptional in character that it 
is practically impossible to make all parties in 
interest parties to the bill, and, further, that 
others are made parties who have the same interest 
as have those not brought in, and are equally 
certain to bring forward the entire merits of the 
controversy as would the absent persons. 
 
'This cardinal principle governing as to 
parties to suits in equity is founded upon the broad 
and liberal doctrine that courts of equity delight 
to do complete justice by determining the rights of 
all persons interested in the subject matter of 
litigation, so that the performance of the decree 
rendered in the cause may be perfectly safe to all 
who are required to obey it and that further 
litigation touching the matter in dispute may be 
prevented.' " 
 
Kennedy Coal Corp. v. Buckhorn Coal Corp., 140 Va. 37, 49, 124 
S.E. 482, 486 (1924) (quoting The Buchanan Company v. Smith's 
Heirs, 115 Va. 704, 707-08, 80 S.E. 794, 795 (1914)); accord 
Atkisson, 254 Va. at 455-56, 493 S.E.2d at 527-28. 
 
4
 
We have also stated that "'[necessary parties'] interests 
in the subject matter of the suit, and in the relief sought, 
are so bound up with that of the other parties, that their 
legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute 
necessity, without which the court cannot proceed.  In such 
cases the court refuses to entertain the suit, when these 
parties cannot be subjected to its jurisdiction.'"  Bonsal v. 
Camp, 111 Va. 595, 597-98, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911) (quoting 
Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 284 (1867)). 
 
We hold that the chancellor lacked the power to proceed 
with DeGaetani's bill of complaint because Joyce Jett was a 
necessary party to that litigation.  The chancellor's order 
directed the Jetts to execute and deliver a deed that conveyed 
the property to DeGaetani and Joyce Jett as tenants in common.  
The chancellor's order made a determination that Joyce Jett 
has an interest in the real property as a tenant in common.  
This order, without question, imposed certain duties and 
obligations upon her because of her property interests as a 
tenant in common.  Yet, she was not before the court even 
though she had a material legal interest in the subject matter 
of the suit. 
 
Contrary to DeGaetani's assertions, no exception exists 
which would have permitted the chancellor to enter a valid 
judgment in this suit without Joyce Jett's presence.  We held 
 
5
in McDougle that a court may adjudicate a suit when it is 
practically impossible to join all parties in interest and the 
absent parties are represented by others having the same 
interest or when an absent party's interests are separable 
from those of the parties before the court so that the court 
may enter an order without prejudice to the rights of the 
absent party.  214 Va. at 637, 203 S.E.2d at 133.  Here, it 
was not practically impossible to join Joyce Jett as a party, 
and her interests are not separable from DeGaetani's interests 
to the extent that the chancellor could enter an order without 
prejudice to her rights.  Indeed, the challenged final order 
conferred upon her the real property rights of a tenant in 
common with the related duties and obligations. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the chancellor's order, and 
we will remand this proceeding to the circuit court with 
instructions that it issue an order requiring that DeGaetani 
convey the property to the Jetts.  The Jetts shall be required 
to return the $36,300 to DeGaetani.  The remand will be 
without prejudice to the rights, if any, that DeGaetani may 
have to join Joyce Jett as a party to any further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
6