Title: Michigan v. Pinkney (Opinion on Application)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

PEOPLE v PINKNEY 
 
Docket No. 154374.  Argued on application for leave to appeal November 7, 2017.  
Decided May 1, 2018. 
 
 
Edward Pinkney was charged in Berrien County with five felony counts of election 
forgery under MCL 168.937 and six misdemeanor counts of making a false statement in a 
certificate-of-recall petition under MCL 168.957 for having submitted petitions with falsified 
dates in connection with an effort to recall the mayor of Benton Harbor.  After defendant was 
bound over to the Berrien Circuit Court for trial, he moved to quash the charges, arguing that 
MCL 168.937 was a penalty provision and not a substantive, chargeable offense.  The court, 
Sterling R. Schrock, J., denied the motion.  Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in the 
Berrien Circuit Court of all five counts of election forgery but acquitted of all six counts of 
making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition.  Defendant was sentenced as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 120 months.  The 
Court of Appeals, O’BRIEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ., upheld defendant’s 
convictions, holding that MCL 168.937 created the substantive offense of election-law forgery.  
316 Mich App 450 (2016).  Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which 
ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory 
action.  500 Mich 990 (2017). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave 
to appeal, held: 
 
 
MCL 168.937, by its plain language, is only a penalty provision; it does not set forth a 
substantive offense.  As a result, defendant was not properly charged under that provision with 
the substantive offense of election-law forgery.  Therefore, his convictions must be vacated and 
the charges dismissed.   
 
 
1.  MCL 168.937 provides that any person found guilty of forgery under the provisions of 
the Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq., shall, unless otherwise provided, be punished by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not exceeding 5 years, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.  Nothing in the plain language of 
§ 937 suggests that the Legislature intended it to be a chargeable offense; instead, the language 
indicates that it provides the penalty for the crime of forgery enumerated elsewhere in the 
Election Law.  Section 937 does not set forth or describe any conduct that is prohibited, and the 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
Legislature’s use of the past tense verb “found” presupposes that an individual has already been 
convicted of the crime of forgery under the Election Law.  Consequently, by its clear terms, the 
provision does nothing more than provide the punishment for that already-committed offense.  A 
review of the surrounding provisions further indicates that § 937 does not create a chargeable 
offense, but is instead one of a series of penalty provisions for offenses delineated elsewhere in 
the Election Law. 
 
 
2.  The statutory text of MCL 168.937 contains no evidence that the Legislature intended 
to incorporate the common-law definition of forgery when the previous version of § 937 was 
first enacted or when it was recodified.  The term “forgery” is not used to describe a type of 
conduct that is prohibited.  Instead, it describes the punishment for someone who has already 
committed the crime of forgery.  In other statutes that have been found to codify a common-law 
crime, the commission of the common-law crime itself is the subject of the statute, which 
generally expressly criminalizes the crime; the common-law term is simply a shorthand for how 
the crime is committed.  By contrast, the subject of MCL 168.937 is an individual found guilty of 
a crime, and § 937 itself merely prescribes the punishment for such an individual; it does not 
mention the commission of forgery or state that a person who forges is guilty of a crime.  Simply 
plugging the common-law definition of “forgery” into § 937 does not transform the provision 
into a substantive offense.  While the common law can provide the definition of “forgery,” the 
common law cannot supply the elements of “forgery under the provisions of this act”; rather, a 
reasonable person would believe that “forgery under the provisions of this act” suggests that one 
could only be found guilty of a forgery crime defined elsewhere under the Election Law. 
 
 
3.  The statutory history of the Election Law provides further support for the conclusion 
that MCL 168.937 is a penalty provision.  For more than 80 years, the only statute in Michigan 
criminalizing election-related forgery was narrowly drawn to prohibit falsification of a “register 
of electors” (later called a “registration book”).  In this statute, the Legislature confusingly 
combined two offenses in one statute: the first was labeled “larceny,” and the second was labeled 
“forgery.”  The penalty for these crimes was included at the end of the section, making both 
crimes felonies.  Notably, the statute was designed to protect a document that was in the custody 
of election officials.  In 1917, the Legislature made two changes to this statute that are of note: it 
dropped the “larceny” label from the first grouping of prohibited conduct and instead provided 
that a person who violated that clause “shall be deemed guilty of a felony,” and it deleted the 
penalty provision from the statute defining these substantive offenses and created a separate 
penalty provision for the crime of election-related forgery.  The latter provision was nearly 
identical to § 937, the present-day penalty provision at issue in this case.  In 1948, these 
provisions were recodified as 1948 CL 195.8 and 1948 CL 198.3, respectively.  During a rewrite 
of the Election Law in 1954, the Legislature enacted MCL 168.932(c), which essentially 
combined the two offenses from 1948 CL 195.8 into one.  But MCL 168.932(c) explicitly 
focused on the actions of election officials and those who have custody of election records.  In 
addition, instead of applying only to a registration book or copy thereof filed for preservation 
like its predecessor, the new offense was expanded to cover any record, election list of voters, 
affidavit, return, statement of votes, certificates, poll book, or of any paper, document, or vote of 
any description, which pursuant to this act is directed to be made, filed, or preserved.  Finally, 
the new statute dropped the reference to “forgery,” presumably because the newly combined 
statute also included some of the former so-called “larceny” activities.  The statute also made it 
clear that a person who violates § 932(c) is guilty of a felony.  This obviated the need for § 937, 
given that the general felony penalty provision, § 935, applies as the penalty provision.  Despite 
these changes, however, the 1954 amendments recodified 1948 CL 198.3 as MCL 168.937.  
Thus, in 1954 the Legislature retained the forgery penalty as the new § 937, but the Legislature 
omitted the only provision in the Election Law to which that penalty pertained.  At the same 
time, the Legislature enacted yet another statute, MCL 168.957, with potential applicability to 
the conduct at issue in this case.  The Legislature also recodified a provision making it unlawful 
to affix a forged name to an initiative or referendum petition, MCL 168.484.  Finally, in 1995, 
the Legislature added another narrow forgery offense to the Election Law, MCL 168.759(8), 
which provides that a person who forges a signature on an absent voter ballot application is 
guilty of a felony.  It would be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature would have made 
these changes if it considered § 937 an omnibus forgery offense covering all election-related 
documents, and it would also be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature would have 
chosen to create such a vast and far-reaching offense out of an existing penalty provision by 
making no substantive changes to its language. 
 
 
4.  Generally, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause of a statute and 
avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.  
However, the canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.  Rather, it assists only when a 
competing interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.  In this case, 
construing MCL 168.937 as creating the separate offense of forgery would appear to render all or 
part of two other statutory provisions surplusage.  Both MCL 168.932(c) and MCL 168.759(8) 
prohibit forgery of certain Election Law documents.  Section 932(c), in particular, prohibits 
forgery of an expansive list of documents by certain election officials or other persons having 
custody of such documents.  Had the Legislature intended § 937 to be a general forgery 
provision prohibiting forgery of any document in the Election Law, there would have been no 
need to include two other forgery provisions describing how forgery is committed.  Therefore, 
reading § 937 as creating a substantive offense of forgery renders all or part of §§ 932(c) and 
759(8) surplusage.  Furthermore, using the surplusage canon—or any rule of construction—to 
create a criminal offense is impermissible. 
 
 
Court of Appeals’ judgment reversed; case remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
 
 
Justice CLEMENT took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
FILED  May 1, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 154374 
 
EDWARD PINKNEY, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CLEMENT, J.) 
 
VIVIANO, J.  
The issue in this case is whether defendant can be convicted of election-law 
forgery under MCL 168.937.  The Court of Appeals upheld defendant’s convictions 
under that provision, holding that MCL 168.937 creates the substantive offense of 
election-law forgery.  We disagree and hold that MCL 168.937 is nothing more than a 
penalty provision—it does not create a substantive offense.  Because defendant cannot be 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
convicted under a statute that does not set forth a crime, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Between November 2013 and January 2014, Edward Pinkney participated in a 
recall effort against the mayor of Benton Harbor, James Hightower.  In order to force a 
recall election, defendant Pinkney needed to obtain 393 signatures on petitions supporting 
the recall.  Defendant had a 60-day window within which to collect the required number 
of signatures.1  On January 8, 2014, defendant presented the Berrien County Clerk’s 
office with 62 petitions containing 728 signatures supporting the recall election.  The 
clerk’s office certified 402 of these signatures and scheduled the recall election. 
Prior to the election, the clerk’s office transferred the petitions to the Berrien 
County Sheriff’s Department for examination of perceived irregularities in the signatures 
on the petitions.  After reviewing the petitions, the sheriff’s department identified several 
signatures for which the dates appeared to have been altered.  The Michigan State Police 
Crime Laboratory also examined the petitions and confirmed that five of the petitions 
contained signatures with altered dates.  In each case, the dates had been altered so as to 
fall within the 60-day window for valid signatures. 
Defendant was charged with five counts of election-law forgery under MCL 
168.937 and six counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition under 
MCL 168.957.  After being bound over to the Berrien Circuit Court on these charges, 
                                              
1 Under MCL 168.961(2)(d), signatures on a recall petition are not valid if obtained 
“more than 60 days before the filing of the recall petition.”  
 
 
 
3 
defendant filed a motion to quash arguing, inter alia, that § 937 is a penalty provision, 
not a substantive, chargeable offense.  The circuit court denied the motion to quash, and 
the case proceeded to trial.  After an eight-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on 
the five felony counts and not guilty on the six misdemeanor counts.  In a motion for a 
directed verdict, defendant again argued that § 937 is a penalty provision and not a 
substantive offense. The circuit court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 
concurrent prison terms of 30 to 120 months.  
On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that § 937 does not create a 
substantive offense and that the admission of certain evidence under MRE 404(b) was 
improper and requires reversal.2  The Court of Appeals unanimously upheld defendant’s 
convictions.3  Regarding § 937, the Court of Appeals held that the statute does create the 
substantive offense of election-law forgery.4  In reaching this conclusion, the panel relied 
heavily on the reasoning of People v Hall,5 which considered the same issue. 
The Court of Appeals in Hall concluded that § 937 created a substantive offense 
for two reasons.  First, the Court explained that interpreting § 937 as a penalty provision 
would render it surplusage because another provision, MCL 168.935,6 already sets forth 
                                              
2 People v Pinkney, 316 Mich App 450, 461; 891 NW2d 891 (2016).   
3 Id. at 462.   
4 Id. at 462-465.   
5 People v Hall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 
23, 2014 (Docket No. 321045). 
6 “Any person found guilty of a felony under the provisions of this act shall, unless herein 
otherwise provided, be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000.00, or by imprisonment 
 
 
 
 
4 
an identical penalty for felonies under the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq.7  
Second, the Court reasoned that interpreting § 937 as a penalty provision would 
contravene the Legislature’s intent in enacting the Election Law, which the Court 
described as “ensur[ing] the fairness and purity of the election process in part by 
proscribing misconduct that would foster such unfairness and impurity.”8  Based on this 
reasoning, the Hall Court determined that § 937 creates a substantive offense and is not 
merely a penalty provision.9 
The Court of Appeals in the present case adopted the Hall panel’s reasoning and 
again held that § 937 constitutes a substantive offense.10  The Court further noted that 
 
                                              
in the state prison for a term not exceeding 5 years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment in the discretion of the court.”  MCL 168.935. 
7 Hall, unpub op at 6.  The Legislature has directed that the act containing our election 
laws “shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Michigan election law.’ ”  MCL 168.1. 
8 Id. at 7.  
9 Following this decision, the Hall prosecutor appealed a separate, unfavorable ruling in 
our Court.  In response, the defendant did not challenge the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that § 937 created a substantive offense, but instead argued that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that the prosecution could only charge him with violating MCL 168.544c 
(falsifying electoral nominating petitions) and not MCL 168.937.  Accordingly, in 
deciding the case, we declined to reach this question and instead presumed, for purposes 
of the appeal, that § 937 did create a substantive offense.  See People v Hall, 499 Mich 
446, 449 n 2, 453, 456, 461; 884 NW2d 561 (2016).  Then, we reversed the Court of 
Appeals, holding that the prosecutor had discretion to charge the defendant under both 
§ 937 and § 544c.  Id. at 449. 
10 Pinkney, 316 Mich App at 463-465.   
 
 
 
5 
interpreting § 937 solely as a penalty provision would create an absurd result.11  The 
Court explained: 
[U]nder defendant’s interpretation of MCL 168.937, only “[a]n 
inspector of election, clerk, or other officer or person having custody of any 
record, election list of voters, affidavit, return, statement of votes, 
certificates, poll book, or of any paper, document, or vote of any 
description,” MCL 168.932(c), or “[a] person who is not involved in the 
counting of ballots as provided by law and who has possession of an absent 
voter ballot mailed or delivered to another person,” MCL 168.932(e), could 
be guilty of election forgery.  There is simply nothing—express, implied, or 
otherwise—in the Michigan Election Law to support the idea that the 
Legislature intended such a peculiar result.  People v Stephan, 241 Mich 
App 482, 503; 616 NW2d 188 (2000) (explaining that this Court will not 
read anything into a statute that is “not plainly expressed” by the 
Legislature).  Furthermore, interpreting MCL 168.937 in that manner, that 
is, as only a penalty provision, would create an absurd result by permitting 
individuals who do not meet the definitions set forth in MCL 168.932 to 
commit common-law forgery in the election process without recourse under 
the Michigan Election Law.  People v Lewis, 302 Mich App 338, 341-342; 
839 NW2d 37 (2013), quoting People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 741; 790 
NW2d 354 (2010) (“ ‘Statutes must be construed to prevent absurd 
results.’ ”).[12] 
The Court concluded that it could not interpret § 937 in a way that would render the 
provision surplusage and create such an absurd result.13 
The panel went on to reject defendant’s arguments that § 937 violates the 
vagueness doctrine and the rule of lenity.14  The statute is not unconstitutionally vague, 
                                              
11 Id. at 464.   
12 Id.   
13 Id. at 465. 
14 Id. at 466.   
 
 
 
6 
the panel explained, because it can be clearly understood by reference to the common-law 
definition of forgery.  Similarly, the panel concluded that the statute does not implicate 
the rule of lenity because it is not ambiguous.15   
Defendant has now sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We scheduled oral 
argument on the application, directing the parties to address: 
(1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence 
under MRE 404(b) that related to the defendant’s political and community 
activities other than the mayoral recall effort for the purpose of showing the 
defendant’s motive to commit the instant crimes, and (2) whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in determining that MCL 168.937 creates the substantive 
offense of election forgery and is not merely a penalty provision for the 
specific forgery offenses set forth in other provisions of the Michigan 
election law.[16] 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.17 
III.  ANALYSIS 
It has long been our rule that “[a] criminal statute ought to be so plain and 
unambiguous that ‘he who runs’ may read, and understand whether his conduct is in 
violation of its provisions.”18  In this case, after reviewing the plain language of § 937, 
                                              
15 Id.  We need not address defendant’s vagueness and rule-of-lenity arguments in light of 
our holding that MCL 168.937 does not create a substantive offense; however, we will 
discuss whether the statute may be understood as incorporating the common-law 
definition of forgery because we believe that is important to determine its meaning. 
16 People v Pinkney, 500 Mich 990, 990-991 (2017). 
17 People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 16-17; 869 NW2d 204 (2015). 
18 People v Ellis, 204 Mich 157, 161; 169 NW 930 (1918).  The phrase “he who runs may 
read” is derived from the Bible, Habakkuk 2:2, and has been interpreted by a leading 
 
 
 
 
7 
together with its context and history, we are convinced that § 937 does not create a 
substantive crime.  Instead, it is an inoperative penalty provision.  We reach this unusual 
conclusion for the reasons that follow. 
A.  ANALYSIS OF MCL 168.937  
When interpreting a statute, “our goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, 
focusing first on the statute’s plain language.”19  “In so doing, we examine the statute as a 
whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative 
scheme.”20  “When a statute’s language is unambiguous, . . . the statute must be enforced 
as written.  No further judicial construction is required or permitted.”21   
The prosecution charged defendant with six counts of violating § 937, which 
reads: 
Any person found guilty of forgery under the provisions of this act 
shall, unless herein otherwise provided, be punished by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000.00, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not 
exceeding 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion 
of the court. 
 
                                              
scholar of the early 20th century to mean “[w]rite plainly . . . that it may be read 
runningly, i.e. without pause and hesitation.”  Brief Communications, He Who Runs May 
Read, 40 J Biblical Lit 166, 181 (1921). 
19 Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
20 Id.  
21 Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
 
 
8 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that § 937 clearly sets forth the 
offense of forgery under the Election Law, nothing in the plain language of § 937 
suggests that the Legislature intended it to be a chargeable offense.  Instead, as defendant 
argued below, it reads like a penalty provision—i.e., a provision providing the penalty for 
the crime of forgery enumerated elsewhere in the Election Law.  Section 937 does not set 
forth or describe any conduct that is prohibited.  Instead, the Legislature’s use of the past 
tense verb “found” (in the phrase “found guilty of forgery under the provisions of this 
act”) presupposes that an individual has already been convicted of the crime of forgery 
under the Election Law.  Consequently, by its clear terms, the provision does nothing 
more than provide the punishment for that already-committed offense.22 
                                              
22 This accords both with logic and the Legislature’s usual practice—when the 
Legislature uses the phrase “found guilty” in a statute that does not describe the 
prohibited conduct, the statute typically prescribes penalties or consequences for conduct 
that is criminalized or made punishable elsewhere.  For example, MCL 600.3830(2) 
states, “Any person found guilty of maintaining a nuisance under the provisions of this 
chapter shall forfeit the benefit of all property exemptions . . . .”  Nothing in that 
provision could reasonably be construed as suggesting that it creates a general crime of 
nuisance.  Instead, an individual trying to determine how to commit a nuisance “under the 
provisions of this chapter” would have to look elsewhere in the chapter.  Unsurprisingly, 
MCL 600.3801 specifically provides what conduct constitutes a nuisance, and further 
explains that “[a] person . . . who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains a building, vehicle, 
or place described in subsection (1) is guilty of a nuisance.”  Thus, based on its plain 
language, MCL 600.3830(2) is exactly what § 937 appears to be—a penalty provision.  
See also, e.g., MCL 28.468 (criminalizing conduct in Subsection 1 and providing, in 
Subsection 2, that “a person that is found guilty of a violation of this act shall be required 
to reimburse the appropriate governmental agency”); MCL 28.723a(1) (“If an individual 
pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a listed offense . . . .”); MCL 32.1085 (describing the 
offense of “desertion” and then providing, in a separate subsection, that “[a] person found 
guilty of desertion shall be punished as a court-martial directs”); MCL 752.102 (“Any 
person . . . who shall be found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 1 of this 
act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”).  According to at least one 
commentator, this is a preferred practice.  See 1A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
 
 
 
 
9 
A review of its surrounding provisions further indicates that § 937 does not create 
a chargeable offense, but is instead one of a series of penalty provisions for offenses 
delineated elsewhere in the Election Law.  The three sections of the Election Law 
immediately preceding § 937 provide as follows:   
Any person who shall be found guilty of a misdemeanor under the 
provisions of this act shall, unless herein otherwise provided, be punished 
by a fine of not exceeding $500.00, or by imprisonment in the county jail 
for a term not exceeding 90 days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the 
discretion of the court.[23]   
Any person found guilty of a felony under the provisions of this act 
shall, unless herein otherwise provided, be punished by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000.00, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not 
exceeding 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion 
of the court.[24]   
Any person found guilty of perjury under the provisions of this act 
shall, unless herein otherwise provided, be punished by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000.00, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not 
exceeding 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion 
of the court.[25]   
One treatise describes these provisions, along with § 937, as “penalties for offenses 
where no other penalty is provided by the Act[.]”26   
 
                                              
Construction (7th ed), § 20:18, p 147 (“The better practice [when drafting criminal 
penalties] is to place a general penalty section at the end or near the end of the act and 
provide that any violation of the provisions of the act is punishable according to the terms 
of the penalty section.”). 
23 MCL 168.934. 
24 MCL 168.935. 
25 MCL 168.936. 
26 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 71:18, p 555. 
 
 
 
10 
Certainly, no one would suggest that § 934 and § 935 create chargeable offenses 
for misdemeanors and felonies under the Election Law.  Instead, they merely define the 
punishment for misdemeanor and felony offenses under the Election Law, where no 
penalty is “otherwise provided.”  Section 937 is nearly identical to §§ 934 and 935, 
except for the use of the word “forgery” in place of “misdemeanor” and “felony,” 
respectively, thereby leaving no room to distinguish the provisions.   
Section 936 is most akin to § 937, in that it specifies a penalty for a recognized 
type of crime—“perjury” rather than “forgery.”  Yet the Legislature described how an 
individual commits “perjury” in MCL 168.933, which reads: 
A person who makes a false affidavit or swears falsely while under 
oath under section 848 or for the purpose of securing registration, for the 
purpose of voting at an election, or for the purpose of qualifying as a 
candidate for elective office under section 558 is guilty of perjury. 
The only reasonable reading of these two provisions is that the Legislature 
intended § 933 to be the substantive offense of perjury and § 936 to set forth the 
punishment for a conviction of perjury under the Election Law.  And, since it contains 
language nearly identical to § 936, it would be exceedingly odd to assume that the 
Legislature intended § 937 to operate not as a penalty provision like § 936, but as a 
provision creating the substantive offense of forgery under the Election Law.  In short, 
the plain language of § 937, in context with its surrounding provisions in the Election 
Law, strongly indicates that it is only a penalty provision. 
 
 
 
11 
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals erred by first looking to 
the purpose of the Election Law instead of focusing on its plain language.27  After noting 
that the purpose of the Election Law is “to regulate primaries and elections, provide for 
the ‘purity’ of the election process, and guard against abuse,” the Court summarily 
concluded that interpreting § 937 as a substantive offense would further that purpose.28  
The Court then made the rather remarkable assertion that it would be “peculiar” or 
“absurd” if someone could only be found guilty of election-related forgery if they 
engaged in conduct specifically prohibited by two other statutory subsections, MCL 
168.932(c) and (e).29  However, “[t]he Court of Appeals’ reliance on the perceived 
purpose of the statute runs counter to the rule of statutory construction directing us to 
discern legislative intent from plain statutory language.”30  We determine the scope of a 
statute based on its plain language—here, the words of § 937 give no indication that it 
was intended to cover all possible election-related forgery crimes.31   
                                              
27 See Madugula, 496 Mich at 696 (“As with any statutory interpretation, our goal ‘is to 
give effect to the Legislature’s intent, focusing first on the statute’s plain language.’ ”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  
28 Pinkney, 316 Mich App at 463-464.   
29 Id. at 464. 
30 Perkovic v Zurich American Ins Co, 500 Mich 44, 53; 893 NW2d 322 (2017).   
31 Cf. People v Boscgalia, 419 Mich 556, 563-564; 357 NW2d 658 (1984) (“There is no 
indication that the present statute was intended to cover all the possible crimes dealing 
with transfer of title or theft of automobile parts.  To the contrary, this statute is only one 
part of an overall statutory scheme dealing with automobiles and stolen goods in 
general.”). 
 
 
 
12 
B.  INCORPORATING THE COMMON-LAW DEFINITION OF FORGERY  
Our statutory interpretation would not be complete without consideration of 
whether it is possible to interpret the plain language of § 937 as creating a substantive 
crime by reference to the common law.32  The rule is well established that “[w]ords and 
phrases that have acquired a unique meaning at common law are interpreted as having the 
same meaning when used in statutes dealing with the same subject matter as that with 
which they were associated at the common law.”33  Therefore, “[w]here the statutory 
provision describes by name, but does not clearly and explicitly state the definition of a 
criminal offense, courts will construe the statutory crime by resorting to the common-law 
definition.”34 
                                              
32 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals did state that “the meaning of [§ 937] can be fairly 
ascertained by reference to the common law.” Pinkney, 316 Mich App at 466.  See 
generally 2B Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 50:1, p 143 
(“All legislation is interpreted in the light of the common law . . . .”).  However, as noted 
above, the Court of Appeals made this observation only after concluding that § 937 
created a substantive offense.  See note 15 of this opinion. 
33 People v Reeves, 448 Mich 1, 8; 528 NW2d 160 (1995), superseded by statute on other 
grounds by 1996 PA 20.  See also MCL 8.3a (instructing that while statutory terms 
generally are accorded their ordinary meaning, “technical words and phrases, and such as 
may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and 
understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”); and People v 
Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 100; 185 NW 770 (1921) (“A well recognized rule for 
construction of statutes is that when words are adopted having a settled, definite and well 
known meaning at common law it is to be assumed they are used with the sense and 
meaning which they had at common law unless a contrary intent is plainly shown.”), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by People v Williams, 491 Mich 
164, 171-173; 814 NW2d 270 (2013). 
34 Reeves, 448 Mich at 8.   
 
 
 
13 
In this case, however, the statutory text contains no evidence that the Legislature 
intended to incorporate the common-law definition of forgery when the previous version 
of § 937 was first enacted or when it was recodified.35  As noted above, the statutory text 
does not use the term “forgery” to describe a type of conduct that is prohibited.  Instead, 
it describes the punishment for someone who has already committed the crime of 
forgery.36  In other statutes that we have found to codify a common-law crime, the 
                                              
35 The statutory history of this provision is discussed in detail below. 
36 By comparison, the general forgery statute, MCL 750.248(1), clearly sets forth the 
conduct (i.e., “a person who . . . forges”) and enumerates documents that, if forged, can 
result in a conviction under MCL 750.248(1).  Likewise, every other forgery statute 
contains a description of what is necessary to commit forgery under those acts—and what 
documents are covered.  For example, MCL 432.30(1) of Michigan’s Lottery Act, MCL 
432.1 et seq., provides, “A person, with the intent to defraud, shall not falsely make, alter, 
forge, utter, pass, or counterfeit a state lottery ticket or share.”  And, not surprisingly, the 
provision is followed by a penalty provision akin to § 937—“A person convicted of 
violating this section is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
5 years or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.”  MCL 432.30(3).  See also 
MCL 205.428(7) (“A person who falsely makes, counterfeits, or alters a license, vending 
machine disc, or marker . . . is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than 
$5,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.”); MCL 257.310(7) 
(subjecting to punishment “a person who intentionally reproduces, alters, counterfeits, 
forges, or duplicates a license photograph, the negative of the photograph, image, license, 
or electronic data contained on a license . . . .”); MCL 257.905 (“Any person who shall 
forge, or without authority, sign any evidence of ability to respond in damages as 
required by the secretary of state . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”); MCL 
257.222(6) (“A person who intentionally reproduces, alters, counterfeits, forges, or 
duplicates a certificate of title . . . shall be punished as follows . . . .”); MCL 259.176a(a) 
(allowing the punishment of an individual under the act who “[k]nowingly forges, 
counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes a certificate authorized to be issued under this act or 
the rules promulgated under this act”); MCL 324.52908(5) (“A person who forges a bill 
of sale or other evidence of title prescribed by the department or the federal agency that 
has jurisdiction is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than 90 days, or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both.”); MCL 324.80319(1)(a) (“A 
person shall not . . . [a]lter or forge a certificate of title . . . .”); MCL 324.81112(4) 
(subjecting to punishment “[a] person who intentionally reproduces, alters, counterfeits, 
 
 
 
 
14 
commission of the common-law crime itself is the subject of the statute, which generally 
expressly criminalizes the crime; the common-law term is simply a shorthand for how the 
crime is committed.37  Here, by contrast, the statute’s subject is an individual “found 
guilty” of a crime, and the statute itself merely prescribes the punishment for such an 
 
                                              
forges, or duplicates an [off-road vehicle] certificate of title”); MCL 333.7407(1)(c) (“A 
person shall not knowingly or intentionally . . . [a]cquire or obtain possession of a 
controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.”); 
MCL 333.17766(c) (stating that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she 
“[f]alsely makes, utters, publishes, passes, alters, or forges a prescription”); MCL 
436.1919 (“A person who falsely or fraudulently makes, simulates, forges, alters, or 
counterfeits a document, label, or stamp prescribed by the commission under this 
act . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .”); MCL 168.759(8) (“A person who forges a signature 
on an absent voter ballot application is guilty of a felony.”); MCL 28.422(14) (“A person 
who forges any matter on an application for a license under this section is guilty of a 
felony . . . .”); MCL 28.295(1) (subjecting to punishment “[a] person who intentionally 
reproduces, alters, counterfeits, forges, or duplicates an official state personal 
identification card photograph”); MCL 324.43558(1)(f) (“A person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor if the person . . . [f]alsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits a sportcard 
or a hunting, fishing or fur harvester’s license . . . .”). 
37 An example is the manslaughter statute, MCL 750.321, which provides, “Any person 
who shall commit the crime of manslaughter shall be guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison, not more than 15 years or by fine of not more than 
7,500 dollars, or both, at the discretion of the court.”  Because the term “manslaughter” is 
not statutorily defined, this Court found it appropriate to incorporate its common-law 
meaning into the statute.  See People v Couch, 436 Mich 414, 419-420; 461 NW2d 683 
(1990).  The focus of that statute is criminalizing the commission of certain conduct.  
Another example is MCL 750.356(1), which states that “[a] person who commits larceny 
by stealing any of the following property of another person is guilty of a crime as 
provided in this section . . . .”  The statute makes the commission of larceny a crime, i.e., 
an individual who commits larceny “is guilty of a crime.”  Because there is no full 
statutory definition, the common-law definition is used to help describe how an 
individual commits larceny.  See People v March, 499 Mich 389, 399-400; 886 NW2d 
396 (2016). 
 
 
 
15 
individual; it does not mention the commission of forgery or state that a person who 
forges “is guilty” of a crime. 
Simply plugging the common-law definition of “forgery” into § 937 does not 
transform the provision into a substantive offense.38  While the common law can provide 
the definition of “forgery,” the common law cannot supply the elements of “forgery 
under the provisions of this act.”39  In other words, a reader of the statute who sees 
“forgery under the provisions of this act” would not assume that “forgery” means 
common-law forgery.  Instead, a reasonable person would believe that “forgery under the 
provisions of this act” suggests that he or she could only be found guilty of a forgery 
crime defined elsewhere in the Election Law.40   
A review of the statutory history of the Election Law provides further support for 
our conclusion that § 937 is a penalty provision.41  For more than 80 years, the only 
                                              
38 As we noted in Hall, “ ‘[t]he common-law definition of forgery is a false making, or a 
making malo animo of any written instrument with intent to defraud.’ ”  Hall, 499 Mich 
at 456, quoting People v Warner, 104 Mich 337, 340; 62 NW 405 (1895). 
39 Emphasis added. 
40 The Court of Appeals in Hall, unpub op at 9, interpreted “forgery under the provisions 
of this act” to mean forgery of documents “required to be submitted under the Michigan 
election law.”  Even assuming the statutory text could bear this meaning, it would not be 
a reasonable interpretation, for the reader would first need to incorporate the common-
law definition of “forgery” and then canvass the entire Election Law to determine what 
conduct could potentially result in a felony conviction.  This construction is far from the 
clear and concise delineation of the elements of a crime that the Legislature is required to 
provide.  People v Goulding, 275 Mich 353, 359; 266 NW 378 (1936).   
41 Unlike legislative history, statutory history—the narrative of the “statutes repealed or 
amended by the statute under consideration”—properly “form[s] part of the context of the 
statute . . . .”  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: 
Thomson/West, 2012), p 256.  
 
 
 
16 
statute in Michigan criminalizing election-related forgery was narrowly drawn to prohibit 
falsification of a “register of electors” (later called a “registration book”).42  In this 
statute, the Legislature confusingly combined two offenses in one statute: the first was 
labeled “larceny,” and the second was labeled “forgery.”  The penalty for these crimes 
was included at the end of the section, making both crimes felonies.  Notably, the statute 
was designed to protect a document that was in the custody of election officials.43 
In 1917, the Legislature made two changes to this statute that are of note.44  It 
dropped the “larceny” label from the first grouping of prohibited conduct, and instead 
                                              
42 That statute, 1859 PA 177, § 20, provided as follows: 
Whoever shall willfully cut, burn, mutilate or destroy any such 
register of electors, or copy thereof filed for preservation, or shall 
unlawfully take and carry away the same, or unlawfully conceal or refuse or 
neglect to surrender the same, with intent to prevent its being used as 
authorized by law, shall be deemed guilty of larceny; and whoever shall 
falsify any such register or copy, by unlawfully erasing or obliterating any 
name or entry lawfully made therein, or by unlawfully inserting therein any 
name, note or memorandum, with intent thereby to influence or affect the 
result of any election or to defraud any person of an election to office, shall 
be deemed guilty of forgery; and the person so offending shall, for every 
such offence, be punished by imprisonment in the State Prison not more 
than five years, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and 
imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year, nor less than ninety 
days. 
43 See 1859 PA 177, § 1 (imposing a duty on city and township officials to provide one 
register or book of electors for each township or ward); 1917 PA 126, ch 2, § 5 (“The 
registration book or books of any township or city shall remain in the custody of the 
township or city clerk, as the case may be, at all times except when they are in use by 
boards of registration or boards of inspectors of an election or an official primary 
election, as provided by this act.”). 
44 That statute, 1917 PA 126, ch 2, § 8, provided as follows: 
Whoever shall wilfully cut, burn, mutilate or destroy any registration 
 
 
 
 
17 
provided that a person who violated that clause “shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”  
And it deleted the penalty provision from the statute defining these substantive offenses 
and created a separate penalty provision for the crime of election-related forgery.45  The 
latter provision was nearly identical to § 937, the present-day penalty provision at issue in 
this case.46  In 1948, these provisions were recodified as 1948 CL 195.8 and 1948 CL 
198.3, respectively.47 
 
                                              
book, or copy thereof filed for preservation, or shall unlawfully take and 
carry away any such registration book or copy, or shall unlawfully conceal 
or refuse or neglect to surrender the same with intent to prevent its being 
used, as authorized by law, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.  Whoever 
shall falsify such registration book, or copy thereof, by unlawfully erasing 
or obliterating any name or entry lawfully made therein, or by unlawfully 
inserting therein any name, note or memorandum, shall be deemed guilty of 
forgery. 
45 See 1917 PA 126, ch 2, § 8 (substantive offense); 1917 PA 126, ch 11, § 7 (“Any 
person found guilty of forgery under the provisions of this act shall be punished by a fine 
not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the State Prison for a term not 
exceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the 
court.”). 
46 In another public act passed the same year, Public Act 203, the Legislature enacted a 
penalty provision identical to the one in 1917 PA 126 except for the amount of the fine.  
1917 PA 203, ch 25, § 16.  It appears that this penalty provision was unaccompanied by 
any substantive offense, as PA 203 nowhere defined forgery.  The Legislature corrected 
this oversight by combining multiple election provisions into a more comprehensive 
scheme a few years later in 1925 PA 351.  That act defined the substantive offense of 
forgery, 1925 PA 351, part 5, ch 1, § 8, just as it had in 1917 PA 126.  The act also 
provided the penalty for forgery—in the chapter called “Penalties”—using the same 
structure as the penalty provisions in 1917 PA 126 and 203.  1925 PA 351, part 5, ch 4, 
§ 3. 
47 Another election-related forgery statute, 1941 PA 246, § 14 (later codified at 1948 CL 
200.14), made it unlawful to affix a forged name to an initiative or referendum petition.  
Id. (retained as MCL 168.484 after 1954 PA 116 and repealed by 1965 PA 312, § 2).  
While 1948 CL 200.14 did mention forgery, it has no relationship to § 937 because it 
 
 
 
 
18 
During a rewrite of the Election Law in 1954, the Legislature expanded the scope 
of this election-related forgery prohibition when it enacted MCL 168.932(c), which 
essentially combined the two offenses from 1948 CL 195.8 into one.48  But § 932(c) 
continued to focus (now explicitly) on the actions of election officials and those who 
 
                                              
provided its own punishment.  See id. (“Any person found guilty of violating the 
provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
48 See 1954 PA 116.  As enacted, MCL 168.932(c) provided: 
No inspector of election, clerk or other officer or person having 
custody of any record, election list of voters, affidavit, return or statement 
of votes, certificates, poll book, or of any paper, document or vote of any 
description, in this act directed to be made, filed or preserved, shall wilfully 
destroy, mutilate, deface, falsify or fraudulently remove or secrete the 
whole or part thereof, or fraudulently make any entry, erasure or alteration 
therein, or permit any other person to do so. 
This statute, which has since been amended in style but not substance, does not list all of 
the same items as its predecessor.  Thus, for example, it does expressly prohibit cutting, 
burning, or unlawfully taking and carrying away a registration book.  And it adds some 
items to the list that were not included previously, such as “deface” and “alter[].”  But, 
especially as it relates to the forgery-type conduct, the new statute appears to encompass 
most, if not all, of the same conduct. 
Our conclusion that § 932 is a direct descendant of the original, independent 
substantive forgery offense is further confirmed by the official compiler’s notes to its 
predecessor, 1948 CL 195.8.  Those notes indicate that 1948 CL 195.8 originated in 1917 
PA 126, ch 2, § 8, the first statute in which the substantive forgery crime was 
independent of the penalty provision.  In other words, § 932(c) hails from the original 
substantive forgery offense.  While the compiler’s notes are not necessary to our 
conclusion, which follows from the plain text, the notes offer a form of support 
contemplated by the Legislature, which instructs that official compilations shall include 
“notes, references, and other materials” the compiler “considers necessary.”  MCL 
8.41(3); cf. Camaj v S S Kresge Co, 426 Mich 281, 289; 393 NW2d 875 (1986) (noting 
that marginal notations in a statute can provide persuasive, but not conclusive, proof of 
meaning). 
 
 
 
19 
have custody of election records—it applies to “[a]n inspector of election, clerk, or other 
officer or person having custody” of the enumerated documents.49  In addition, instead of 
applying only to “a registration book or copy thereof filed for preservation” like its 
predecessor, the new offense was expanded to cover “any record, election list of voters, 
affidavit, return, statement of votes, certificates, poll book, or . . . any paper, document, 
or vote of any description, which pursuant to this act is directed to be made, filed, or 
preserved . . . .”50   
Finally, the new statute dropped the reference to “forgery,” presumably because 
the newly combined statute also includes some of the former so-called “larceny” 
activities, so it no longer made sense to use the term “forgery.”  Perhaps because of this 
change, the statute also now makes it clear (in its introductory clause) that a person who 
violates § 932(c) “is guilty of a felony.”  This, of course, obviated the need for § 937, 
since the general felony penalty provision (§ 935) applies as the penalty provision.  
Despite these changes, the 1954 amendments recodified 1948 CL 198.3 as § 937.51  Thus, 
the Legislature retained § 937, but omitted the only provision in the Election Law to 
which it pertained.   
To summarize, the previous statute defining “forgery”—1948 CL 195.8—was 
extremely limited, applying only when an individual falsified a registration book.  In 
1954, the Legislature combined two offenses into one, dramatically expanded the scope 
                                              
49 MCL 168.932(c). 
50 Id. 
51 See 1954 PA 116. 
 
 
 
20 
of documents covered, dropped the label “forgery,” and made the combined offense a 
felony (thus obviating the need for a separate forgery penalty provision).   
At the same time, the Legislature enacted another statute, MCL 168.957, with 
potential applicability to the conduct at issue in this case.52  And, as noted above, the 
Legislature also recodified a provision making it unlawful to affix a forged name to an 
initiative or referendum petition.  See MCL 168.484.53  Finally, in 1995, the Legislature  
                                              
52 See 1954 PA 116.  MCL 168.957, which governs the conduct of petition circulators, 
was amended by 1976 PA 66 and currently provides: 
A person circulating a petition shall be a qualified and registered 
elector in the electoral district of the official sought to be recalled and shall 
attach thereto his certificate stating that he is a qualified and registered 
elector in the electoral district of the official sought to be recalled and shall 
state the city or the township wherein he resides and his post-office address; 
further, that signatures appearing upon the petition were not obtained 
through fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that he has neither caused 
nor permitted a person to sign the petition more than once and has no 
knowledge of a person signing the petition more than once; that all 
signatures to the petition were affixed in his presence; and that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief, the signers of the petition are 
qualified and registered electors and the signatures appearing thereon are 
the genuine signatures of the persons of whom they purport to be. A person 
who knowingly makes a false statement in the certificate hereby required is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Defendant was acquitted of six misdemeanor counts under this statute for 
allegedly permitting six individuals to sign the recall petition twice.  He was convicted of 
five felony counts under MCL 168.937 for altering the dates of some petition signatures 
so they would count for the recall.  Amicus curiae the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Michigan makes the interesting point that § 957 may also be a potential avenue of 
prosecution for altering dates.  We, of course, offer no opinion on the validity of this 
argument because the issue is not before us and involves a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
53 See note 47 of this opinion. 
 
 
 
21 
added another narrow forgery offense to the Election Law.  In that provision, MCL 
168.759(8), the Legislature provided that “[a] person who forges a signature on an absent 
voter ballot application is guilty of a felony.”54   
Why, one might ask, would the Legislature go to all this trouble if it intended to 
transform § 937, the prior penalty provision, into an omnibus forgery offense covering all 
election-related documents?  And would the Legislature really choose to create such a 
vast and far-reaching offense in an existing penalty provision by (drumroll 
please) . . . making no substantive changes to its language? 
We think it unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature signaled its intention to 
convert § 937 from a penalty provision to a stand-alone crime by making no meaningful 
changes to its language.55  Instead, our review of the statutory history of § 937 confirms 
that it was previously, and remains now, a penalty provision. 
C.  THE CANON AGAINST SURPLUSAGE 
The Court of Appeals also declined to read § 937 as a penalty provision because of 
its fear that doing so would render it “mere surplusage.”56  That is, § 937 would be a 
                                              
54 See 1995 PA 261.  MCL 168.759(8), like § 932(c), does not rely on § 937 to define the 
scope of the punishment for a violation of its provisions.  Instead, it also designates the 
forgery offense it creates as a felony, making it punishable under the general felony 
penalty provision (§ 935), not under § 937.  
55 If it is true (and we think it is) that “a change in the language of a prior statute 
presumably connotes a change in meaning,” Reading Law, p 256, the converse seems 
even more obviously true: namely, that no change in the text connotes no change in its 
meaning.   
56 In particular, the Court of Appeals opined that interpreting § 937 as a penalty provision 
would render it surplusage because § 935 already “sets forth the penalties for a felony 
conviction under the provisions of the Michigan Election Law . . . .”  Pinkney, 316 Mich 
 
 
 
 
22 
penalty provision without a crime.  This is a serious concern because, as a general rule, 
“we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that 
would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”57  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals was justifiably reluctant to declare an entire statutory section meaningless.  But 
we are even more reluctant to use the surplusage canon to create a crime when a plain-
language reading of the statute and consideration of its history provide no evidence that 
the Legislature intended to do so. 
The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.  As Justice THOMAS COOLEY 
explained 150 years ago: 
The rule applicable here is, that effect is to be given, if possible, to 
the whole instrument, and to every section and clause. If different portions 
seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in 
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than 
one which may make some idle and nugatory.[58] 
More recently, our Court has stated that “[w]hen possible, we strive to avoid 
constructions that would render any part of the Legislature’s work nugatory.”59 
 
                                              
App at 464.   
57 Miller, 498 Mich at 25 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
58 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1868), p 58 (some emphasis added).  The roots of 
the surplusage canon may be traced even further.  See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, pp *379-380 (“That the construction be made upon the entire deed, 
and not merely upon disjointed parts of it. ‘Nam ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit 
optima interpretatio.’  And therefore that every part of it, be (if possible) made to take 
effect; and no word but what may operate in some shape or other.”).   
59 People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 123; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (emphasis added).  
Although we have sometimes stated the canon in absolute terms, see, e.g., Miller, 498 
Mich at 25, we have also articulated the canon in nonabsolute terms, see, e.g., Seewald, 
 
 
 
 
23 
Logically, “the canon against superfluity assists only where a competing 
interpretation gives effect to every clause and word of a statute.”60  However, in this case, 
construing § 937 as creating the separate offense of forgery appears to render all or part 
of two other statutory provisions surplusage.  Both § 932(c) (prohibiting most of the 
forgery-type conduct contained in 1948 CL 195.8, the previous election-law forgery 
offense)61 and § 759(8) (prohibiting forgery of a signature on an absentee voter ballot 
application) prohibit forgery of certain Election Law documents.  Section 932(c), in 
particular, prohibits forgery of an expansive list of documents by certain election officials 
or other persons having custody of such documents.  But if the Legislature intended § 937 
to be a general forgery provision prohibiting forgery of any document in the Election 
Law, why would it have included two other forgery provisions describing how forgery is 
 
                                              
499 Mich at 123; State Bd of Ed v Houghton Lake Community Sch, 430 Mich 658, 671; 
425 NW2d 80 (1988) (“[E]very word of a statute should be given meaning, and no word 
should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible.”) (emphasis 
added); Baker v Gen Motors Corp, 409 Mich 639, 665; 297 NW2d 387 (1980) (“Every 
word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or 
rendered nugatory if at all possible.”).  The latter formulation comports with the canon’s 
historical roots, the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, and outside 
authorities. Marx v Gen Revenue Corp, 568 US 371, 385; 133 S Ct 1166; 185 L Ed 2d 
242 (2013) (“The canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule . . . .”); Lamie v United 
States Trustee, 540 US 526, 536; 124 S Ct 1023; 157 L Ed 2d 1024 (2004) (“Surplusage 
does not always produce ambiguity and our preference for avoiding surplusage 
constructions is not absolute.”); Reading Law, p 174 (“If possible, every word and every 
provision is to be given effect[.]”) (emphasis added; formatting altered). 
60 Microsoft Corp v i4i Ltd Partnership, 564 US 91, 106; 131 S Ct 2238; 180 L Ed 2d 
131 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
61 Section 932(c) is discussed in detail in Part III(B) of this opinion. 
 
 
 
24 
committed?  There would, of course, be no need to do so because § 937 would cover all 
such conduct.  Therefore, reading § 937 as creating a substantive offense of forgery 
renders all or part of §§ 932(c) and 759(8) surplusage.  As a result, the canon against 
surplusage cannot help us, because both proffered interpretations of the text leave some 
sections of the Election Law without meaning.62 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is not based on the plain 
language of § 937—instead, it is an attempt to salvage that provision and give it some 
current legal effect.  But this goes beyond the work of the surplusage canon.63  Using the 
surplusage canon—or any rule of construction—to create a criminal offense is 
impermissible.64   
Even though interpreting § 937 as a penalty provision means that it lacks effect 
because it has no corresponding substantive offense, we cannot disregard the historical 
textual clues and supplement the otherwise plain text of § 937 to reach a different 
                                              
62 See Microsoft Corp, 564 US at 106. 
63 See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v Germain, 503 US 249, 253-254; 112 S Ct 1146; 117 L 
Ed 2d 391 (1992) (stating in relation to the surplusage canon that “canons of construction 
are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, 
and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before 
all others.  We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is 
complete.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
64 Goulding, 275 Mich at 359-360 (“The statute may not be extended beyond its plain 
terms by judicial construction, and defendant convicted, by showing acts which ought to 
have been within the terms of the statute but are not.  There are no constructive criminal 
offenses.”) (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
25 
result.65  This is true even when enforcing the plain language of the statute may frustrate 
its purpose.66  Even if we believed—contrary to the analysis above—that the Legislature 
mistakenly omitted a forgery offense from the Election Law, it is not the job of a court to 
supply the omitted provision.67  And this is true even if interpreting the statute according 
                                              
65 Another lens through which to view this case is the unintelligibility canon.  That canon 
applies when statutory language makes no sense because it is intractably ambiguous or 
because two provisions are irreconcilable.  Reading Law, pp 134-135.  In such cases, the 
unintelligible text is inoperative and cannot be given effect because it is meaningless.  In 
this case, § 937 has a clear semantic meaning—it is a penalty provision.  When viewed in 
its larger statutory context, however, it could be considered meaningless because, as a 
penalty with no corresponding substantive offense, it has no effect.  Considered thusly, 
we agree with Justice Scalia and Professor Garner that “[t]o give meaning to what is 
meaningless is to create a text rather than to interpret one.”  Id. at 134.  Although the 
unintelligibility canon contains parallels to this case, we take no position on whether it 
applies here because no party has raised the issue.   
66 See People v Oakland Co Bank, 1 Doug 282, 287 (1844) (“We cannot, in order to give 
effect to what we may suppose to be the intention of the legislature, put upon the 
provisions of a statute a construction not supported by the words, though the consequence 
be to defeat the object of the act[.]”).  See also King v Barham, 108 Eng Rep 980, 982; 8 
B & C 100 (1828) (“Our decision may, perhaps, in this particular case, operate to defeat 
the object of the [statute]; but it is better to abide by this consequence than to put upon it 
a construction not warranted by the words of the Act, in order to give effect to what we 
may suppose to have been the intention of the Legislature.”). 
67 See Malpass v Dep’t of Treasury, 494 Mich 237, 251; 833 NW2d 272 (2013) (“ ‘[T]o 
supply omissions transcends the judicial function.’ ”), quoting Iselin v United States, 270 
US 245, 251; 46 S Ct 248; 70 L Ed 566 (1926).  See also Hobbs v McLean, 117 US 567, 
579; 6 S Ct 870; 29 L Ed 940 (1886) (“When a provision is left out of a statute, either by 
design or mistake of the legislature, the courts have no power to supply it. To do so 
would be to legislate and not to construe.”); Jones v Smart, 1 Term Rep 44, 52 (1785) 
(“[W]e are bound to take the act of parliament, as they have made it: a casus omissus can 
in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws; nor can I 
conceive that it is our province to consider, whether such a law that has been passed be 
tyrannical or not.”); Crawford v Spooner, 18 Eng Rep 179, 6 Moore, PC 1 (1846) (“The 
construction of the Act must be taken from the bare words of the Act. We cannot fish out 
what possibly may have been the intention of the Legislature; we cannot aid the 
Legislature’s defective phrasing of the Statute; we cannot add, and mend, and, by 
 
 
 
 
26 
to its plain language, context, and history leads us to the conclusion that it is 
inoperative.68 
But alas, it does not appear to us that the Legislature left something out when it 
overhauled the Election Law in 1954; instead, it appears that it left something in—a 
 
                                              
construction, make up deficiencies which are left there.”); Reading Law, p 93 (“Nothing 
is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso 
habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”) (formatting 
altered); Crawford, Construction of Statutes (1940), § 169, p 269 (“Omissions in a statute 
cannot, as a general rule, be supplied by construction. . . .  As is obvious, to permit the 
court to supply the omissions in statutes, would generally constitute an encroachment 
upon the field of the legislature.”). 
68 See Endlich, Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes (1888), § 22, p 29 (“It has 
been seen that the plain meaning of the language used in a statute will not be departed 
from in its construction, though the purpose of the enactment be defeated by following it.  
Upon the same principle, courts cannot supply legislative defects and omissions, 
although, by reason of such, the statute becomes, in whole or in part, practically 
unenforceable or inoperative.”), citing In re Willis Ave, 56 Mich 244, 250; 22 NW 871 
(1885) (holding that a statute, through the oversight of the Legislature, failed to provide a 
procedure to effectuate the expressed intent of the statute, rendering that portion of the 
statute inoperative).  See also CN Ray Corp v Secretary of State, 241 Mich 457, 461; 217 
NW 334 (1928) (holding that an act that expressly purported to repeal prior statutes failed 
to repeal anything because it lacked a necessary repealing clause); People v Boothe, 16 
NY3d 195; 944 NE2d 1137 (2011) (holding that where the legislature added a new 
definition of criminal conduct without amending the substantive provision to make that 
conduct unlawful, no crime was created and the charges were properly dismissed); 
Farmers’ Bank of Fayetteville v Hale, 59 NY 53, 57-58 (1874), overruled on other 
grounds by Hintermister v First Nat’l Bank of Chittenango, 64 NY 212 (1876) (“It is said 
that this [interpretation] renders the statute inoperative, and that this result must be 
avoided.  This is a plausible but not a valid or sound position.  There is nothing in the 
Constitution nor in any legal principle to prevent the legislature from passing an act with 
provisions which render it inoperative.  When different constructions may be put upon an 
act, one of which will accomplish the purpose of the legislature and the other render the 
act nugatory, the former should be adopted; but when the provisions of an act are such 
that to make it operative would violate the declared meaning of the legislature, courts 
should be astute in construing it inoperative.”). 
 
 
 
27 
penalty provision that was no longer needed.  Regardless, courts do not have the power to 
rewrite statutes to ensure they have some substantive effect.  After focusing on the plain 
language, context, and history of § 937, we conclude that it is nothing more than an 
inoperative penalty provision. 
As noted at the outset, we recognize that our conclusion that § 937 is an 
inoperative penalty provision is an unusual one, and it is not one that we reach lightly.  
To be clear, a statute should only be deemed inoperative after the most careful 
consideration of alternative interpretations and rigorous application of the interpretative 
tools at our disposal, including the necessity of “reading individual words and phrases in 
the context of the entire legislative scheme.”69  This finding has historically been—and 
will continue to be—exceedingly rare.  Indeed, as we have already stated, “[e]very word 
of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or 
rendered nugatory if at all possible.”70  Ultimately, however, we must here, as in every 
case, give effect to the will of the Legislature by scrupulously examining the statutory 
text to determine its plain meaning.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We hold that § 937, by its plain language, does not set forth a substantive offense.  
As a result, defendant was not properly charged under § 937 with the substantive offense 
of election-law forgery.  Therefore, his convictions must be vacated and the charges 
                                              
69 Madugula, 496 Mich at 696.  
70 Baker, 409 Mich at 665 (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
28 
dismissed.  We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary and remand to the 
trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.71  
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
 
CLEMENT, J., took no part in the decision of this case. 
                                              
71 Because we hold that § 937 does not create a substantive offense, we do not reach 
defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly admitted other-acts evidence under 
MRE 404(b).  Additionally, because we hold that § 937 unambiguously sets forth a 
penalty provision and not a substantive offense, we do not reach defendant’s additional 
arguments that the rule of lenity precludes enforcement of § 937 against defendant or that 
§ 937 is void for vagueness.