Title: State ex rel. King v. Summit Cty. Council

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. King v. Summit Cty. Council, 99 Ohio St.3d 172, 2003-Ohio-3050.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. KING ET AL., APPELLEES, v. SUMMIT COUNTY COUNCIL ET 
AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. King v. Summit Cty. Council, 99 Ohio St.3d 172, 2003-
Ohio-3050.] 
Mandamus — Writ sought to compel Summit County Council et al. to implement 
Issue 4 passed at the November 6, 2001 election as a valid Summit 
County Charter amendment — Simultaneous passage of county charter 
amendments — Section 4, Article X, Ohio Constitution — Provisions not 
presented to voters as competing alternatives — Charter amendments to 
be harmonized whenever possible — Court of appeals’ grant of writ 
affirmed. 
(No. 2003-0023 — Submitted May 13, 2003 — Decided June 25, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 21140. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In May 2001, appellant Summit County Council adopted a 
resolution to submit a proposed Summit County Charter amendment to county 
electors at the November 6, 2001 general election.  This proposal, designated as 
Issue 2 on the election ballot, sought to amend the charter by transferring the 
county auditor’s powers and duties to the county treasurer, who would be 
renamed the county fiscal officer.  Issue 2 also specified the qualifications for the 
county fiscal officer as being an elector of the county and not holding or accepting 
other employment or public office: 
{¶2} 
“Election.  The County Fiscal Officer shall be elected beginning at 
the general election held in the County in 2004 and shall hold office for a term of 
four years commencing on the first day of January next following such election.  
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Any candidate for election as County Fiscal Officer shall be an elector of the 
County at the time of the declaration of candidacy, shall be nominated and elected 
in the manner provided by the general law for county officers and during the 
entire term of office shall remain an elector of the County and shall not, except as 
authorized by County Council, hold or accept other employment or public office.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶3} 
Appellees, Summit County Council Member Michael J. King, 
Kristina L. Vickers, and Brian K. Hatfield, who are all Summit County electors 
and residents, proposed a substantially similar charter amendment, which 
specified that the county fiscal officer must be a certified public accountant 
(“C.P.A.”).  This amendment was designated as Issue 4 on the November 6, 2001 
election ballot.  The language of Issue 4 adding the C.P.A. requirement provided: 
{¶4} 
“* * * 
{¶5} 
“(2) County Fiscal Officer. 
{¶6} 
“* * * 
{¶7} 
“(c) Election.  The County Fiscal Officer shall be elected 
beginning at the general election held in the County in 2004 and shall hold office 
for a term of four years commencing on the first day of January next following 
such election.  Any candidate for election as County Fiscal Officer shall be an 
elector of this County and a Certified Public Accountant at the time of the 
declaration of candidacy, shall be nominated and elected in the manner provided 
by general law for county officers and during the entire term of office shall 
remain an elector of the County and shall not, except as authorized by County 
Council, hold or accept any other employment or public office. 
{¶8} 
“(d) Vacancy.  In the event the Office of County Fiscal Officer 
becomes vacant * * * the position shall be filled as provided by general law for 
elected officers, provided that no person shall hold the office of County Fiscal 
Officer who is not a Certified Public Accountant. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶9} 
“* * * 
{¶10} “(g) Eligibility for candidacy for the Office of County Fiscal 
Officer.  No person shall be eligible as a candidate for the office of County Fiscal 
Officer or shall be elected or appointed to such office unless such a person is a 
Certified Public Accountant.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶11} Proponents of Issue 4 recommended that electors vote against 
Issue 2 because its passage would “lower professional qualifications” for the new 
county fiscal officer.  On the November 6, 2001 ballot, however, the issues were 
not presented as competing alternatives: 
“2  PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
A majority affirmative vote is necessary for passage. 
{¶12} “Shall the County Charter be amended to consolidate the Office of 
County Auditor with the County Treasurer and transfer its powers and duties to 
the County Treasurer, to be renamed ‘County Fiscal Officer,’ effective upon a 
vacancy in the county Auditor’s office or on March 10, 2003, whichever is 
earlier?” 
“4  PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
A majority affirmative vote is necessary for passage. 
{¶13} “Shall Sections 2.03(11), 3.03 (10), 4.01, 9.01, 10.01 of the 
Summit County Charter be amended to consolidate the Office of County Auditor 
with the County Treasurer and transfer its powers and duties to the County 
Treasurer, to be renamed ‘County Fiscal Officer,’ and provide that no person 
shall be eligible as a candidate for the office of County Fiscal Officer or shall be 
elected or appointed to such office unless such person is a Certified Public 
Accountant, effective upon a vacancy in the County Auditor’s office or on March 
10, 2003, whichever is earlier?”  (Emphasis added.)  
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{¶14} At the November 6, 2001 election, both issues passed.  Issue 2, 
however, received a higher affirmative vote than Issue 4.  Issue 2 received 60,623 
votes, or 52.59 percent, in its favor, and Issue 4 received 56,693 votes, or 50.52 
percent, in its favor. 
{¶15} King subsequently requested an opinion from Summit County 
Prosecuting Attorney Sherri Bevan Walsh concerning the legal effect of the 
election results.  Walsh advised that only Issue 2 was controlling and should be 
codified.  She concluded that under Section 4, Article X of the Ohio Constitution, 
Issue 2 conflicted with Issue 4 regarding the qualifications for county fiscal 
officer and because it received more votes than Issue 4, Issue 2 prevailed.  In 
March 2002, Summit County Council enacted Ordinance 2002-084, effective 
April 3, 2002, which adopted Issue 2 as an amendment to the county charter.  
King voted against the codification of Issue 2. 
{¶16} Two months later, in May 2002, appellees demanded that Walsh 
“take appropriate legal action” to implement Issue 4, including its requirement 
that the county fiscal officer be a C.P.A.  On May 6, 2002, Walsh denied 
appellees’ request.  On June 12, 2002, the county auditor notified the Summit 
County Council that he was resigning effective June 15.  The county treasurer 
then took office as the first Summit County Fiscal Officer. 
{¶17} On June 13, 2002, appellees filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus and an R.C. 309.13 taxpayers’ suit in the Court of Appeals for Summit 
County.  Appellees requested a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, Summit 
County Council, its clerk, and the Summit County Executive, as well as Walsh, to 
implement Issue 4 as a valid Summit County Charter amendment.  Appellees also 
requested a writ of mandamus compelling these named respondents and the 
county fiscal officer to perform their duties consistent with the approved issues 
and to comply with the charter amendment’s C.P.A. requirement.  Appellees 
further requested an award of costs and attorney fees. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
{¶18} In December 2002, the court of appeals granted appellees a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Summit County Council, its clerk, and the Summit 
County Executive to implement Issue 4 as an amendment to the Summit County 
Charter.  The court of appeals denied the remainder of appellees’ claims, 
including their R.C. 309.13 taxpayers’ claim and their claims against the county 
prosecutor and the county fiscal officer. 
{¶19} This cause is now before the court upon the appeal as of right of 
the county council, its clerk, and the county executive. 
Striking the Reply Brief 
{¶20} Appellants correctly assert that the court of appeals erred in 
striking their November 27, 2002 reply brief in support of their summary 
judgment motion. 
{¶21} The court of appeals sua sponte struck appellants’ reply brief on 
the stated basis that it had earlier ordered that each side file one summary 
judgment motion and one brief in opposition to the other side’s motion, with no 
further reply briefs to be considered.  A review of the court’s previous entry, 
however, establishes that appellants’ reply brief was permitted: 
{¶22} “Respondents shall respond to Relators’ motion for summary 
judgment and may move to dismiss and/or move for summary judgment * * *.  
Relators may respond to a dispositive motion filed by Respondents within twenty 
days of service of the motion upon them.  Both parties may file one reply brief to 
address new matters raised in the opposing parties’ memoranda against any 
dispositive motions filed.  No further reply briefs will be considered.”  (Emphasis 
added.)   
{¶23} Appellees claim that the reply brief did not concern new matters.  
But the court of appeals did not rely on this basis to strike the reply brief. 
{¶24} Therefore, the court of appeals abused its discretion by striking 
appellants’ reply brief.  Nevertheless, this error would not necessarily prejudice 
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appellants if their substantive contentions lack merit.  See State ex rel. Gabriel v. 
Youngstown (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 618, 619, 665 N.E.2d 209, quoting Ohio 
Contract Carriers Assn., Inc.  v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 160, 23 
O.O. 369, 42 N.E.2d 758, syllabus.  Consequently, we must examine appellees’ 
mandamus claim to determine whether the court of appeals correctly granted the 
writ.  State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 
N.E.2d 99, at ¶ 19. 
Laches 
{¶25} Appellants contend that by delaying more than eight months after 
the November 6, 2001 election to file their mandamus action in the court of 
appeals, laches barred their claim.  We have held that “[t]he public interest in 
having election cases decided even * * * after an election has already been held, 
requires extreme promptitude.”  State ex rel. Commt. for the Referendum of 
Lorain Ord. No. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 2002-
Ohio-4194, 774 N.E.2d 239, ¶ 26; In re Election of Member of Rock Hill Bd. of 
Edn. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 601, 606-607, 669 N.E.2d 1116; In re Contested 
Election of November 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 411, 650 N.E.2d 859. 
{¶26} These cases lack relevance because they involve either disputes 
concerning sealed election results where it is unclear whether the election should 
have occurred, see, e.g., State ex rel. Commt for the Referendum of Lorain Ord. 
No. 77-01, or an election contest under R.C. 3515.10, In re Election of Member of 
Rock Hill Bd. of Edn. 
{¶27} Moreover, the remaining election cases cited by appellants in 
support of their laches claim involve an imminent election.  See, e.g., State ex rel 
Carberry v. Ashtabula (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 522, 757 N.E.2d 307. 
{¶28} By contrast, this case does not involve any pending election or 
claim that issues should not have been placed on an election ballot.  The 
placement of Issue 2 and Issue 4 on the November 6, 2001 election ballot and the 
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resulting vote are not at issue.  Instead, this case concerns the legal effect of both 
issues receiving more than a majority of votes at the same election. 
{¶29} Unlike most of the election cases cited by appellants, no statutory 
deadline passed that prejudiced the rights of absentee voters.  Cf. Carberry, 93 
Ohio St.3d at 524, 757 N.E.2d 307.  In addition, there is no discernible prejudice 
to appellants’ ability to defend against appellees’ mandamus claim.  State ex rel. 
Roadway Express v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 510, 514, 696 N.E.2d 
1064 (for laches to apply, “prejudice is ordinarily represented by a respondent’s 
inability to defend due to the passage of time”). 
{¶30} Therefore, the court of appeals correctly held that laches did not 
bar appellees’ mandamus claim. 
Conflicting Charter Amendment Provisions 
{¶31} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in granting the writ 
of mandamus compelling them to implement Issue 4 as a charter amendment.  
Appellants claim that under Section 4, Article X of the Ohio Constitution, Issue 4 
conflicted with Issue 2 and Issue 2 prevailed because it received more votes at the 
November 6, 2001 election. 
{¶32} Section 4, Article X of the Ohio Constitution specifies the exact 
solution to the simultaneous passage of conflicting county charter amendments: 
{¶33} “[I]n case of conflict between the provisions of two or more 
amendments submitted at the same time, that * * * provision shall prevail which 
received the highest affirmative vote, not less than a majority.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶34} The dispositive issue here is whether Issue 2 and Issue 4 conflicted 
concerning the C.P.A. requirement of Issue 4.  This issue is dependent upon the 
meaning of the word “conflict” in Section 4, Article X of the Ohio Constitution.  
Appellees argue and the court of appeals held that there was no conflict, and so 
Issue 4 should have been codified as a valid, complementary charter amendment. 
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{¶35} “The first step in determining the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is to look at the language of the provision itself.”  State ex rel. Maurer 
v. Sheward (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 513, 520, 644 N.E.2d 369.  “Words used in the 
Constitution that are not defined therein must be taken in their usual, normal, or 
customary meaning.”  State ex rel. Taft v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 480, 481, 692 N.E.2d 560; Buckeye Community Hope 
Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 542, 697 N.E.2d 181. 
{¶36} The usual, normal, or customary meaning of “conflict” is “clash, 
competition, or mutual interference of opposing or incompatible forces or 
qualities * * *:  antagonism.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1986) 476; see, also, State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand (1964), 176 Ohio St. 44, 26 
O.O.2d 309, 197 N.E.2d 328 (court uses dictionary definitions to determine 
meaning of undefined constitutional language). 
{¶37} In interpreting “conflict” in a separate constitutional provision,1 we  
acknowledged the dictionary definition and held that the test is whether one 
provision permits that which the other provision forbids, and vice versa: 
{¶38} “In determining whether an ordinance is in ‘conflict’ with general 
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute 
forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.”  Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 
263, 140 N.E. 519, paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, State v. Burnett  
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431, 755 N.E.2d 857; Sheffield v. Rowland  (1999), 87 
Ohio St.3d 9, 11, 716 N.E.2d 1121. 
                                                 
1 Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides, 
“Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local 
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such 
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in 
conflict with general laws.”  (Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2003 
9 
{¶39} In applying the Struthers test, we have further observed that “in 
order for such a conflict to arise, the [provision] must positively permit what the 
[other provision] prohibits.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 
31 Ohio St.2d 163, 169, 60 O.O.2d 117, 285 N.E.2d 714. 
{¶40} Applying this test here, Issue 2 and Issue 4 are virtually identical 
except that Issue 4 adds the C.P.A. qualification requirement for county fiscal 
officer, while Issue 2 is silent on this additional qualification.  Therefore, Issue 2 
does not positively permit that which Issue 4 expressly prohibits, nor does Issue 2 
forbid that which Issue 4 expressly allows. 
{¶41} In reaching a similar result, the Franklin County Court of Appeals 
held that a Columbus ethnic-intimidation ordinance did not conflict with the state 
ethnic-intimidation statute, although the city ordinance prohibited conduct on the 
basis of sexual orientation while the statute did not: 
{¶42} “Columbus City Code 2331.08(A) is not in conflict with the 
general law.  R.C. 2927.12 is the general law prohibiting ethnic intimidation.  The 
state statute is in all material respects identical to the Columbus ordinance 
proscribing the same conduct except that the city ordinance forbids conduct on the 
basis of sexual orientation, while the state statute is silent on sexual orientation.  
The city ordinance does not permit that which the state forbids nor does it prohibit 
that which the state expressly allows.”  Columbus v. Spingola (2001), 144 Ohio 
App.3d 76, 81, 759 N.E.2d 473, appeal not allowed (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1447, 
756 N.E.2d 112. 
{¶43} Moreover, our conclusion is consistent with our duty to harmonize 
charter amendments whenever possible.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Mirlisena v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 597, 599, 622 N.E.2d 329. 
{¶44} Finally, we are persuaded that our interpretation best effectuates 
the will of the majority of the electors who cast votes at the November 6, 2001 
election when the ballot did not specifically present the issues as competing 
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alternatives.  See, e.g., Yoshisato v. Orange Cty. Superior Court (1992), 2 Cal.4th 
978, 988-989, 9 Cal.Reptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327. 
Conclusion 
{¶45} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly granted the 
writ of mandamus ordering appellants to implement Issue 4 as an amendment to 
the Summit County Charter.  Appellants had a clear legal duty under Section 4, 
Article X of the Ohio Constitution to do so.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
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Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Stephen E. Chappelear, Andrew S. Pollis 
and Erica L. Calderas, for appellants. 
 
Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., Betty J. Konen, Jack Morrison Jr., and 
Mark G. Stasitis, for appellees. 
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