Title: KEITH E. GUINN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEITH E. GUINN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 15201 P.3d 423Case Number: No. S-08-0130Decided: 02/09/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KEITH 
E. GUINN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric 
M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeremy C. 
Schwendiman, Student Intern.  
Argument by Mr. Schwendiman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted by a jury of third-degree sexual assault.  He complains on appeal that, in imposing 
sentence, the district court improperly punished him for exercising his right to 
a jury trial.  Because the record 
reflects that such may have occurred, we affirm the conviction, but reverse the 
sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court improperly punish the appellant for exercising his constitutional right to 
a jury trial?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      Because there was 
no objection below, we review this issue for plain error.  To prove plain error, the appellant must 
prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated; and (3) the violation adversely affected a 
substantial right of the appellant to his material prejudice.  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 8, 180 P.3d 212, 215 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]      
The 
appellant was charged with third-degree sexual assault for having sexual contact 
with a nine-year-old girl, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  He was bound 
over to district court, where he was arraigned on March 12, 2007.  A jury trial was scheduled for June 19, 
2007.  After a scheduling 
conference, the matter was re-set for a change-of-plea hearing.  Prior to the hearing date, however, the 
appellant filed a document entitled "Motion to Strike Re-Arraignment and Set 
Matter for Jury Trial."  The 
appellant was convicted after a three-day jury trial that began September 4, 
2007.

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant 
appeared for sentencing on January 2, 2008.  The maximum penalty for third-degree 
sexual assault under the statute then applicable was imprisonment for not more 
than fifteen years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-306(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).1  The appellant received a sentence of 
eight to ten years.  He now contends 
that the district court imposed that sentence at least in part to punish him for 
going to trial, rather than pleading guilty.  He bases that contention upon the 
highlighted portion of the following comments made by the district court in 
imposing the sentence:

 
 
            
I know that generally speaking when I arrive at a sentence for someone 
[who has] pled guilty, I take into account the acceptance of responsibility. 
 I take into account the saving of 
the effort that the guilty plea represents to the state.  I take into account the saving of 
anxiety of witnesses who would otherwise be expected to testify if a defendant 
does not plead guilty.  I take those 
things into account when I arrive at a sentence for someone who pleads 
guilty.

 
 

            
I 
think the corollary to that benefit to someone who pleads guilty is someone who 
does not plead guilty, someone who does not accept responsibility, somebody who 
one disregards the impact of stepping up into this witness stand and appearing 
in a courtroom [full] of strangers, appearing in a courtroom in front of 
somebody the jury determined had victimized that child.  I think it's appropriate for me to take 
all of those things into consideration.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      The first element 
of plain error is readily met because the record clearly discloses what was said 
at the sentencing hearing.  The 
second element is also met in that there is a clear rule of law allowing courts 
to grant leniency in sentencing to someone who has acknowledged guilt by 
pleading guilty, but forbidding courts from penalizing or punishing someone who 
has exercised his or her constitutional right to a jury trial.  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 27, 
151 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2007); Furtado 
v. State, 623 P.2d 770, 774 (Wyo. 1981).  In other words, the clear rule of law is 
that the first quoted paragraph was proper; the second was 
not.

 
 
[¶7]      The State 
contends that the appellant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by this error 
because the record shows that the district court considered other factors, 
including the appellant's previous conviction, the harm done to the young 
victim, the apparent failure of previous counseling, and the need to protect 
other potential victims.  While 
there is certainly some truth to the State's position, we simply cannot ignore 
the fact that the district court positively declared at sentencing that it was 
appropriate to consider the fact that the appellant chose to go to trial.  At the very least, the record certainly 
leaves open the possibility that the district court's sentencing decision was 
based in part upon that consideration.  
Courts simply may not punish defendants for the exercise of 
constitutional rights.  North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
725, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. 
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989).  Cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434, 
104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984) (the State may not penalize the 
exercise of Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in order to deter exercise of 
that right); United States v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982) 
(prosecutor may not bring more serious charges in retaliation for defendant's 
exercise of his right to attack his conviction); but cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
363, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978) (it is permissible for a 
prosecutor to threaten to bring more serious charges if case is not resolved by 
plea bargain).  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court violated the appellant's constitutional right to a jury trial by 
considering at sentencing his exercise of that right.  The judgment is affirmed, but the 
sentencing order is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for 
a new sentencing hearing.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyoming's 
sexual assault statutes have since been amended and re-codified.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-301 et. seq.  (LexisNexis 
2007).