Title: Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 411, 1999-Ohio-360.] 
 
 
 
 
 
KAISER, APPELLANT, v. AMERITEMPS, INC., APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Kaiser v. Ameritemps, Inc. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 411.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimant may employ Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) to voluntarily 
dismiss an appeal to the court of common pleas brought by an employer 
under R.C. 4123.512. 
A workers’ compensation claimant may employ Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) to voluntarily 
dismiss an appeal to the court of common pleas brought by an employer 
under R.C. 4123.512. 
(Nos. 97-2380 and 97-2510 — Submitted October 27, 1998 — Decided February 
10, 1999.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 
18205. 
 
Ameritemps, Inc., a temporary staffing agency, employed appellant, Paul E. 
Kaiser, as a warehouseman.  While on assignment at Brown-Graves Lumber 
Company, Kaiser began experiencing pain in his hands and wrists, to the point 
where he could no longer continue the heavy hauling and lifting of window frames 
and doors that the job required.  Kaiser was referred to three doctors, all of whom 
diagnosed him as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome.  Kaiser filed a claim with 
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and 
was granted temporary total compensation on October 21, 1994.  The allowance of 
his claim was affirmed at the district hearing officer and staff hearing officer 
levels.  Ameritemps appealed the claim to the Industrial Commission, which 
refused to hear the appeal on September 22, 1995. 
 
Ameritemps appealed the Industrial Commission’s decision to the Summit 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Thereafter, Kaiser timely filed his complaint as 
 
 
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required by R.C. 4123.512.  The parties engaged in discovery; however, Kaiser 
failed to show up at a scheduled deposition taken on September 3, 1996, and at a 
medical examination that was to be taken the next day.  Kaiser told the court at a 
pretrial conference held on September 9, 1996 that he did not attend the deposition 
because he was caring for his sick mother and could not afford a medical expert at 
the time.  On September 10, 1996, Kaiser filed a notice of voluntary dismissal 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
 
Ameritemps filed a motion for judgment in its favor due to Kaiser’s non-
appearance and failure to name an expert witness.  The trial court granted 
Ameritemps’ motion for judgment as a sanction against Kaiser for failure to 
prosecute and vacated Kaiser’s voluntary dismissal.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that Kaiser could not voluntarily dismiss an appeal filed by an 
employer under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  The court of appeals then certified that its 
decision was in conflict with decisions of the Eighth and Eleventh Appellate 
Districts. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon our allowance of a discretionary 
appeal and upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Michael L. McGowan and Paul R. Hoffer, for appellant. 
 
Christopher J. Shaw, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  The court of appeals certified the following 
issue for our determination:  “May a Workers’ Compensation claimant use Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a) to voluntarily dismiss an appeal to the court of common pleas brought 
by an employer appealing an adverse decision by the Industrial Commission 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.512?”  For the following reasons, we answer the certified 
 
 
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question in the affirmative.  A workers’ compensation claimant may employ 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) to voluntarily dismiss an appeal to the court of common pleas 
brought by an employer under R.C. 4123.512. 
 
Initially, appellant argues that this case should be dismissed because 
Ameritemps did not file a proper notice of appeal under R.C. 4123.511(F).  R.C. 
4123.511(F) provides that “[e]very notice of an appeal from an order issued under 
divisions (B), (C), (D), and (E) of this section shall state the names of the claimant 
and the employer, the number of the claim, the date of the decision appealed from, 
and the fact that the appellant appeals therefrom.” 
 
In this case, Compliance Management Consultants (“CMC”), the legal 
representative of Ameritemps, was never notified of Kaiser’s claim against 
Ameritemps.  When it learned that benefits had been awarded, Ameritemps asked 
the bureau for leave to file an appeal under R.C. 4123.522.  The Industrial 
Commission issued a compliance letter, granting Ameritemps the right to file an 
appeal within twenty-one days from receipt of the letter.  However, rather than 
label the letter as a notice of appeal, Ameritemps stated that the letter “will serve 
as the employer’s objection to a BWC Order dated 10/21/94 in this claim.”  The 
letter continued by stating, “We have enclosed for your review a copy of the 
Industrial Commission Order allowing said appeal in accordance with Section 
4123.522 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Please schedule this claim for DHO hearing 
as soon as possible.” 
 
In Mullins v. Whiteway Mfg. Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 18, 15 OBR 15, 471 
N.E.2d 1383, we held that a notice of appeal under R.C. 4123.519 (now 
renumbered R.C. 4123.512) will be determined sufficient if it is found that 
appellant has substantially complied with the statutory appeal provisions.  Id. at 
21, 15 OBR at 17, 471 N.E.2d at 1386.  See, also, Wells v. Chrysler Corp. (1984), 
 
 
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15 Ohio St.3d 21, 15 OBR 18, 472 N.E.2d 331.  Although stated as an “objection” 
rather than a “notice of appeal,” we find that CMC’s letter substantially complied 
with all the requirements set forth in R.C. 4123.511(F).  Not only did the letter 
name the claimant and employer, the number of the claim, and the date of the 
decision appealed from, but it also contained sufficient information conveying the 
fact that Ameritemps was appealing from the order dated October 21, 1994.  
Therefore, appellant’s argument lacks merit. 
 
Turning our attention to the certified issue, R.C. 4123.512 provides a unique 
process for an appeal to the court of common pleas regarding a claimant’s right to 
participate in the State Insurance Fund.  It gives the claimant or the employer the 
right to appeal a decision of the Industrial Commission to the court of common 
pleas.  However, regardless of whether the claimant or the employer appeals the 
decision of the Industrial Commission, it is the claimant’s responsibility to file a 
petition showing a cause of action to participate or continue to participate in the 
fund and setting forth the basis for the jurisdiction of the court over the action.  
“Thus, where an employer appeals an unfavorable administrative decision to the 
court the claimant must, in effect, re-establish his workers’ compensation claim to 
the satisfaction of the common pleas court even though the claimant has 
previously satisfied a similar burden at the administrative level.”  Zuljevic v. 
Midland-Ross Corp. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 116, 118, 16 O.O.3d 140, 142, 403 
N.E.2d 986, 988. 
 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) provides that a plaintiff may dismiss an action without 
order of court “by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the 
commencement of trial * * *.”  The court of appeals found that Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) 
did not apply to workers’ compensation appeals under R.C. 4123.512.  It reasoned 
that under Civ.R. 1(C), an appeal from the Industrial Commission under R.C. 
 
 
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4123.512 is a “special proceeding” where the Civil Rules are inapplicable.  It also 
held that an employer’s appeal under R.C. 4123.512 is analogous to a 
counterclaim, which precludes voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) 
because the employer’s appeal cannot be independently adjudicated apart from the 
claimant’s complaint.  Finally, it reasoned that where an employer files an appeal 
in the court of common pleas, the claimant is not a “plaintiff” for purposes of 
Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
 
However, we recently held in Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors 
Corp. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 361, 691 N.E.2d 667, in determining a similar issue, 
that “[w]hen an employer has appealed a decision of the Industrial Commission to 
a court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512, the court of common pleas may 
subsequently grant a motion to voluntarily dismiss the employee’s complaint 
without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(2).”  Id. at syllabus.  Civ.R. 41(A)(2) 
provides that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (1) an action shall not be 
dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance except upon order of the court and upon such 
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.”  In the course of determining that 
Civ.R. 41(A)(2) applied to R.C. 4123.512 appeals, we held that (1) an R.C. 
4123.512 petition filed by a claimant is a “complaint,” (2) the “action” is 
prosecuted by the claimant regardless of who brings the appeal, (3) the claimant is 
considered the plaintiff under an employer-initiated R.C. 4123.512 appeal, (4) an 
employer’s appeal in a workers’ compensation case is not analogous to a 
counterclaim in a civil action, and (5) the Civil Rules are applicable to an R.C. 
4123.512 appeal, as such an appeal is not considered a special proceeding under 
Civ.R. 1(C)(7).  Id. at 364-370, 691 N.E.2d at 670-674.  We reasoned that a 
dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2) was justified because a claimant could not 
arbitrarily delay the adjudication of the common pleas court proceeding, as the 
 
 
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dismissal was conditioned upon court approval.  Thus, we stated, “In considering 
whether to grant the dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), the trial court is able to 
assess the claimant’s reasons for dismissal and to gauge whether, and to what 
extent, the claimant stands to receive more compensation or benefits at the time 
the dismissal is sought.  Thus, the employer’s right to an expeditious appeal would 
not be altered by the claimant’s use of Civ.R. 41(A)(2).”  Id. at 371, 691 N.E.2d at 
674. 
 
Appellee argues that pursuant to Robinson, a claimant can only dismiss an 
action pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2) and may not voluntarily dismiss it under Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a).  Robinson did not address whether Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) applied, 
because the case was limited to Civ.R. 41(A)(2) and “[w]hatever reasoning may be 
advanced as justification for denying a claimant the unilateral ability to dismiss his 
or her action loses its potency with respect to dismissals under Civ.R. 41(A)(2),” 
as such dismissals require court approval.  Id. at 370, 691 N.E.2d at 674.  Appellee 
now advances that unlike a dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), the denial of a 
voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) is justified because it unfairly 
burdens an employer, as a claimant can dismiss his or her claim while continuing 
to receive benefits until the claimant refiles another petition. 
 
However, appellee overlooks R.C. 4123.512(H), which guarantees that if, in 
a final judicial action, it is determined that the payments of compensation or 
benefits or both paid to a claimant should not have been made, then the amounts 
paid are to be charged to the state’s Surplus Fund.  Likewise, if the employer is a 
state risk, the amounts will not be charged to the employer’s experience, or in the 
event of a self-insured employer, the self-insured employer may deduct the 
amounts of compensation paid on its statutory reporting forms.  Thus, the 
employer ultimately suffers no prejudice, as any illegitimate benefits paid during 
 
 
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the interim between the original filing and the refiling of a voluntarily dismissed 
action are repaid if the employee’s claim does not prevail. 
 
Furthermore, an employee cannot perpetually delay refiling after a voluntary 
dismissal because the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, precludes claims refiled 
beyond a year from the time of the dismissal of the original complaint.  Lewis v. 
Connor (1985), 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 21 OBR 266, 487 N.E.2d 285;  Ross v. Wolf 
Envelope Co. (Aug. 2, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57015, unreported, 1990 WL 
109082.  If an employee does not refile his complaint within a year’s time, he can 
no longer prove his entitlement to participate in the workers’ compensation 
system.  Rice v. Stouffer Foods Corp. (Nov. 6, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 72515, 
unreported, 1997 WL 691156.  The voluntary dismissal of the claimant’s 
complaint does not affect the employer’s notice of appeal, which remains pending 
until the refiling of claimant’s complaint. 
 
Pursuant to Robinson, a claimant is considered the plaintiff regardless of 
who brings the appeal under R.C. 4123.512 and can dismiss the complaint 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(2).  Likewise, we believe in this case that a claimant, as 
the plaintiff, may also voluntarily dismiss his complaint under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).  
It would be inconsistent to imply that a workers’ compensation claimant is a 
plaintiff for purposes of Civ.R. 41(A)(2) but not a plaintiff under Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a).  See, e.g., Robinson, 81 Ohio St.3d at 367, 691 N.E.2d at 671-672.  
As plaintiff, a claimant under R.C. 4123.512 should be afforded all of the rights 
provided to him or her by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
Because Kaiser could properly dismiss his complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 
41(A)(1)(a), the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment in favor of 
Ameritemps as a sanction for Kaiser’s failure to prosecute.  Therefore, we reverse 
 
 
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the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting 
opinion in Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors Corp. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 
361, 373, 691 N.E.2d 667, 675. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  For the reasons more fully set forth 
in my dissenting opinions in Robinson v. B.O.C. Group, Gen. Motors Corp. 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 361, 371, 691 N.E.2d 667, 674, and Keller v. LTV Steel Co. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 55, 666 N.E.2d 225, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Despite the majority’s reassurances, an employer is prejudiced by a 
claimant’s dismissal of the employer’s appeal.  For an indeterminate period of 
time, the employee continues to receive what may prove to be unmerited payments 
of compensation or benefits.  Although R.C. 4123.512(H) provides that 
adjustments may be made when final adjudication proves that the claimant should 
not have received the payments, the employer nevertheless has been held legally 
responsible for compensation or benefits to which the claimant is not entitled.  
During that period of time, the claimant continues receiving compensation or 
benefits without being required to prove his or her entitlement.  If the claimant 
 
 
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fails to prove entitlement, he or she is not required to return what was wrongly 
paid. 
 
The majority reasons that a “voluntary dismissal of the claimant’s complaint 
does not affect the employer’s notice of appeal.”  Yet the employer’s right of 
appeal is being controlled by the claimant.  The employer is prevented from 
proceeding with the exercise of its statutory right by the claimant’s inability to 
proceed.  Should a claimant neglect to refile within one year, how does the 
employer proceed with the appeal? 
 
The majority’s approach is shortsighted.  A claimant should not be 
permitted to voluntarily dismiss a petition filed in an appeal perfected by an 
employer pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.  Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.