Title: State v. Pico

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1799-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Anthony R. Pico, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 376 Wis. 2d 524, 900 N.W.2d 343 
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 19, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by KELLY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents, joined by A.W. 
BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Tracey A. Wood, Sarah M. Schmeiser, and Tracey Wood & 
Associates, Madison.  There was an oral argument by Anthony 
Cotton. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Sarah 
L. Burgundy. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
2018 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1799-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF547) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Anthony R. Pico, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   A jury convicted Anthony R. Pico of 
sexually assaulting a young girl.1  Mr. Pico believes there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent his trial counsel's alleged 
constitutional ineffectiveness, this conviction would not have 
occurred.  The circuit court agreed, and so set aside his 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William J. Domina, Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
2 
 
conviction.2  The court of appeals did not agree, and so 
reinstated the conviction.3 
¶2 
Mr. Pico asked us to review his case because he 
believes the court of appeals did not properly defer to the 
circuit court's findings of fact when conducting the ineffective 
assistance of counsel analysis required by Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The State, on the other hand, 
believes the court of appeals decided the matter correctly and 
that it was the circuit court that erred when it allowed an 
expert to testify about the reasonableness of defense counsel's 
representation.  Finally, Mr. Pico argues that if we agree with 
the State, then we should send the case back to the circuit 
court because his sentence was improperly enhanced based on his 
continued assertion of innocence during the sentencing phase of 
this matter. 
¶3 
These arguments call on us to review the following 
three issues.  First, whether the court of appeals improperly 
substituted the circuit court's findings of fact with its own 
when it assessed the sufficiency of trial counsel's performance.  
Second, whether an expert witness may testify about the 
reasonableness of trial counsel's performance.  And third, 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren, Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, presided over the Machner hearing.  See State v. Machner, 
92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 
3 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, State v. Pico, No. 2015AP1799-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 10, 2017). 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
3 
 
whether the circuit court improperly relied on Mr. Pico's lack 
of remorse when it fashioned his sentence.  With respect to the 
first issue, we conclude that the court of appeals conducted the 
Strickland analysis properly and that Mr. Pico's trial counsel 
performed as required by the constitution.  As to the second, we 
hold that expert testimony at a Machner4 hearing regarding the 
reasonableness of trial counsel's performance is not admissible.  
And finally, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it 
imposed sentence on Mr. Pico.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
D.T., a primary-school student, said Mr. Pico put his 
hand inside her pants and touched her vagina twice while he was 
volunteering in her classroom.  She reported the incident to her 
mother that evening (a Friday), who in turn informed D.T.'s 
school the following Monday.  Upon learning of the incident, 
D.T.'s school contacted the police.    
¶5 
Detective Andrew Rich met Mr. Pico in his home to 
investigate the event.  During at least part of the interview, 
Detective Rich used what is known as the "Reid technique."  This 
technique involves telling the interviewee that law enforcement 
officials have certain incriminating evidence (which they do 
not, in fact, have), in the hope that the interviewee will 
disclose factually accurate details about the event in question.  
For example, while discussing the event with Mr. Pico (and 
                                                 
4 Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
4 
 
without identifying D.T. as the victim), Detective Rich told Mr. 
Pico that there were video cameras in the classroom, that male 
DNA had been found on the victim's clothing in the area she said 
she was touched, and that another student had "partially 
substantiated" the complainant's allegation.  None of that was 
true, but when asked if any of this made sense to him, Mr. Pico 
stated "[y]eah, I remember."  Mr. Pico then provided D.T.'s name 
and described how he "tickled" and massaged her leg.  Further 
questioning resulted in Mr. Pico's acknowledgement that, in the 
course of this behavior, he had moved his hand under her pants, 
but claimed it was inadvertent.  Detective Rich accused Mr. Pico 
of putting his hand down D.T.'s pants twice and that he had done 
so "intentionally rather than just by mistake."  Mr. Pico 
responded "I don't know.  I don't——I don't recall ever doing it 
the second time, but it shouldn't have happened the first time, 
right."  And when Detective Rich suggested that, "[o]nce you 
walked out of that class I bet you were——well, you were probably 
just sick to your stomach," Mr. Pico responded "Yes." 
¶6 
The State charged Mr. Pico with one count of first-
degree 
sexual 
assault 
of 
D.T., 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.50(3)(b) (2011-12).5  The case went to 
trial, following which the jury found Mr. Pico guilty as 
charged.   He received his sentence in due course, during which 
the circuit court commented on Mr. Pico's lack of remorse:  
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
5 
 
What I mean when I say that is acknowledging your 
conduct . . . I will consider whether or not you 
demonstrate remorse as a part of my sentence. 
. . . . 
I'm offended that you don't have the courage to 
recognize, and don't give me a half story of I touched 
her but not enough, I didn't touch her in the way she 
said. I don't accept it, Mr. Pico. That's half a loaf. 
¶7 
Mr. Pico filed a postconviction motion seeking a new 
trial and resentencing, asserting that his trial counsel 
provided constitutionally-inadequate assistance because, inter 
alia, he failed to investigate an old brain trauma.  Twenty 
years before these events, Mr. Pico had suffered a motorcycle 
accident that resulted in an injury to the frontal lobe of his 
brain.  The injury caused Mr. Pico to experience double vision, 
for which he still wears an eyepatch.  The eyepatch, Mr. Pico 
says, should have alerted trial counsel to the need to 
investigate his mental capacity.  That investigation, he claims, 
would have led to his medical records, and the records would 
have caused a reasonable attorney to suggest to his client that 
he may wish to consider a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect.6  Mr. Pico believes the records also would 
have provided support for a motion to suppress the statements he 
made to Detective Rich because the injury left him unusually 
susceptible to the "Reid technique" Detective Rich had used.   
                                                 
6 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect 
the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct 
to the requirements of law."  Wis. Stat. § 971.15(1). 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
Mr. Pico's motion also claimed his counsel was 
ineffective because of several alleged errors during the course 
of his trial.  He says his trial counsel should have presented 
an expert to establish that the "Reid technique" can produce 
false confessions.  Additionally, he faults his counsel for not 
presenting an expert witness in response to Ms. Sarah Flayter, a 
child advocacy interviewer, who testified for the State about 
her forensic interview of D.T.  He also believes his counsel 
should 
have 
objected 
to 
some 
of 
Detective 
Rich's 
trial 
testimony, as well as to some of the statements Detective Rich 
made during Mr. Pico's recorded interview, which were played for 
the jury.  Further, he faulted trial counsel for not introducing 
evidence that D.T. had just learned about "good touches" and 
"bad touches" in school.  And finally, he thinks his counsel 
should have called Mr. Pico's wife as a witness to explain that 
their daughter has a sensory disorder and that they have learned 
that massaging her leg calms her.   
¶9 
The postconviction motion's final assignment of error 
relates to the alleged enhancement of Mr. Pico's sentence for 
failing to show remorse.  He did not show remorse, Mr. Pico 
says, because he is innocent of the crime for which he was 
convicted.  Increasing the sentence of a defendant who does not 
demonstrate remorse because he maintains his innocence, he 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
7 
 
argues, comprises punishment for exercising his right to remain 
silent.7 
¶10 The circuit court conducted a Machner hearing at which 
it received testimony from several witnesses, including Mr. 
Pico's trial counsel and an attorney who testified about the 
reasonableness of trial counsel's representation.  The circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Mr. 
Pico's 
counsel 
had 
performed 
deficiently and, although none of the errors standing alone 
prejudiced Mr. Pico, the cumulative effect was to deny him the 
effective assistance of counsel.  Consequently, the court 
vacated the conviction. 
¶11 The State appealed, arguing that Mr. Pico's counsel 
had not provided ineffective assistance.  The State also 
asserted it was improper for the defendant to introduce expert 
testimony on the reasonableness of defense counsel's performance 
for purposes of the Strickland analysis.  The court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court and reinstated Mr. Pico's conviction 
because it determined that trial counsel's representation was 
not deficient.  However, it did not address the Strickland 
expert testimony question, nor did it address Mr. Pico's 
                                                 
7 His motion further claimed the sentencing court improperly 
considered his California conviction.  However, he did not 
address this issue here, so we will not address it.  A.O. Smith 
Corp. 
v. 
Allstate 
Ins. 
Cos., 
222 
Wis. 2d 475, 
492, 
588 
N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]n issue raised on appeal, but 
not briefed or argued, is deemed abandoned."). 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
8 
 
sentencing claim because he did not raise the issue in a cross-
appeal. 
¶12 We granted Mr. Pico's petition for review, and now 
affirm. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a 
mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Tourville, 2016 WI 17, 
¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735.  We will not reverse the 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  "Findings of fact include 'the circumstances of 
the case and the counsel's conduct and strategy.'"  State v. 
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 
(citation omitted).  We independently review, as a matter of 
law, whether those facts demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Id. 
¶14 The imposition of a criminal sentence involves the 
circuit court's exercise of discretion.  We apply the "erroneous 
exercise of discretion" standard in reviewing such decisions.  
State 
v. 
Loomis, 
2016 
WI 68, 
¶30, 
371 
Wis. 2d 235, 
881 
N.W.2d 749 ("'This court reviews sentencing decisions under the 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard.'" 
(citation 
omitted)).  "An erroneous exercise of discretion occurs when a 
circuit court imposes a sentence 'without the underpinnings of 
an explained judicial reasoning process.'"  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
¶15 "Whether to admit proffered expert testimony rests in 
the circuit court's discretion."  State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
9 
 
¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶10, 288 
Wis. 2d 1, 709 N.W.2d 370).  "[O]ur review of a circuit court's 
use of its discretion is deferential, and we apply the erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard."  LaCount, 310 Wis. 2d 85, ¶15.  
We will not overturn the circuit court's exercise of discretion 
so long as the decision "had 'a reasonable basis,' and if the 
decision was made 'in accordance with accepted legal standards 
and in accordance with the facts of record.'"  Id. (citation 
omitted).  We may also "search the record for reasons to sustain 
the circuit court's exercise of discretion."  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶16 We begin our analysis with Mr. Pico's argument that 
the court of appeals supplanted the circuit court's role as the 
finder of fact in the Machner hearing.  We then consider the 
admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reasonableness 
of defense counsel's performance.  Finally, we address Mr. 
Pico's argument that the circuit court imposed a harsher 
sentence on him because he refused to admit his guilt.  
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶17 We review Mr. Pico's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim because he says the court of appeals did not properly 
distinguish between findings of fact and conclusions of law when 
it conducted the Strickland analysis.  Specifically, he says 
that the court of appeals "disagreed with every one of [the 
circuit court's] findings and substituted its own findings of 
fact and weight to be placed on the evidence."  Of the many 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
10 
 
reasons Mr. Pico believes his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective, the most significant is his insistence that trial 
counsel should have explored Mr. Pico's mental capacity further 
than he did.  We will address this assignment of error in some 
detail as a means of exploring the method by which the court of 
appeals reviewed the circuit court's decision.  Then we will 
consider whether the court of appeals deviated from that 
methodology as it addressed the remaining claims of defective 
performance. 
¶18 The "effective assistance of counsel" is a right 
vouchsafed to every criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.8  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.  A 
defendant is denied that right when his counsel performs 
deficiently, and the deficiency prejudices his trial.  See State 
v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
¶19 The first prong of the Strickland analysis requires us 
to 
compare 
counsel's 
performance 
to 
the 
"wide 
range 
of 
professionally competent assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690.  Only if his conduct falls outside that objectively 
reasonable range will we conclude that counsel performed 
deficiently.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19.  "The question is 
whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence 
under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated 
                                                 
8 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
11 
 
from best practices or most common custom."  Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011).  We presume that counsel's 
assistance fell within that range.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 
("[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance . . . .").  
¶20 To show prejudice (the second prong), a defendant must 
establish "'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been 
different.'" 
 
Pitsch, 
124 
Wis. 2d 
at 
642 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  A lack of confidence arises when 
"'counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'"  Lockhart 
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687).  The court need not address this prong if the 
petitioner fails to satisfy the first prong.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 697 ("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an 
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same 
order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 ("to 
succeed on [a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [the 
defendant] must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test."). 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
12 
 
1. 
Trial Counsel's Duty to Investigate 
¶21 Mr. Pico says his eyepatch, along with his confusion 
during his interview with Detective Rich, should have caused 
trial counsel to investigate his mental capacity.  If he had 
done so, Mr. Pico argues, his counsel would have discovered the 
significance of his head injury, which would have, in turn, 
caused counsel to suspect it may have compromised his mental 
capacity.  Mr. Pico believes his compromised condition may have 
prevented him from forming the intent necessary to support a 
criminal conviction.  If trial counsel had known this, Mr. Pico 
concludes, his counsel would have advised him on the possibility 
of entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect.  Mr. Pico also says his injury makes him unusually 
susceptible to suggestion.  Therefore, even if a plea of not 
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect had not been 
appropriate, this information could have provided support for a 
motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Rich.  
Without the investigation, however, neither of these strategic 
options were available.  
¶22 The duty to investigate is certainly one of the 
components of effective representation.  "Counsel must either 
reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable 
strategic 
decision 
that 
makes 
any 
further 
investigation 
unnecessary."  State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, ¶41, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 
805 N.W.2d 364.  We review the reasonableness of trial counsel's 
decisions not with the benefit of hindsight, but in the context 
of the circumstances as they existed at the time he made his 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
13 
 
decisions.  "We must consider the law and the facts as they 
existed when trial counsel's conduct occurred."  State v. 
Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983) (emphasis 
added); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("A fair assessment 
of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.").  
So we examine the circumstances as if we were encountering them 
just as trial counsel did, making every effort to ensure our 
knowledge of the present does not affect how we assess what was 
known to him at the time.  Therefore, we begin with a précis of 
pre-trial facts. 
¶23 Mr. Pico's counsel acknowledged that he had been aware 
of Mr. Pico's head injury since his first meeting with him.  He 
said the intake process for new clients includes a discussion of 
the client's medical conditions and diagnosis.  During this 
process, he asked Mr. Pico about his eye patch.  Mr. Pico 
described his motorcycle accident and head injury, but indicated 
he had recovered.  His counsel said he subsequently discussed 
this injury with both Mr. Pico and his family.  No one mentioned 
any lingering effects of the accident (other than the double 
vision), nor did anyone say it had affected Mr. Pico's behavior.  
To the contrary, Mr. Pico's family described him as a great 
father and a well-adjusted individual who was productively 
involved in his community.  Trial counsel observed nothing about 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
14 
 
Mr. Pico's conduct to call any of those characterizations into 
question. 
¶24 Mr. Pico now claims his confusion and nervousness 
during the interview with Detective Rich should have been enough 
to inform his counsel that his mental capacity was questionable.  
Trial counsel witnessed that behavior when he reviewed the 
recorded interview, and he discussed it with Mr. Pico.  But Mr. 
Pico did not connect his conduct to his head injury.  Instead, 
he said that when Detective Rich arrived at his home, he was 
confused because he thought perhaps one of his children might 
have been involved in an emergency situation.  So trial counsel 
attributed 
Mr. 
Pico's 
confusion 
and 
nervousness 
to 
the 
surprising nature of Detective Rich's visit and the fact that he 
was being questioned about a very serious crime.9 
¶25 At the Machner hearing, Mr. Pico presented Dr. Horace 
Capote, a neuropsychiatrist, to explain the significance of the 
head trauma he had suffered in the motorcycle accident.  Dr. 
                                                 
9 Mr. Pico's counsel said he actually did consider the 
possibility of a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect, as was his standard practice.  He explained that, in 
evaluating whether such an approach may be appropriate, he 
considers a number of factors, including the client's social 
history, how the client interacts, whether the client is logical 
and makes sense, whether the client has ever had any mental 
health issues, and whether he observed symptoms that caused him 
to believe that a further exploration of mental capacity was 
necessary.  He chose not to pursue this option because he did 
not observe anything suggestive of ongoing symptoms related to 
the brain injury (other than the double vision) that would 
support an NGI defense.  
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
15 
 
Capote said Mr. Pico's records reflect that he had been 
diagnosed with "frontal lobe syndrome," the symptoms of which 
include 
deficits 
in 
cognitive, 
emotional, 
and 
behavioral 
functioning.  Mrs. Pico testified at the Machner hearing that 
Mr. Pico shuts down when faced with frustration, that he often 
tells 
the 
same 
long, 
boring 
stories, 
that 
he 
avoids 
confrontation, and that he often gives in to what others want.  
Dr. Capote said this is consistent with frontal lobe syndrome. 
¶26 Mr. Pico's post-hoc explanations about the seriousness 
of his head injury, however, miss the point.  An investigation 
into a client's mental capacity is unwarranted unless the 
information known before trial suggests the need for such an 
exploration.  Mr. Pico's presentation at the Machner hearing did 
not provide the type of information necessary for the court to 
assess the reasonableness of trial counsel's decision not to 
pursue that investigation.  His expert, Dr. Capote, never 
examined him.  Instead, he based his testimony on a review of 
20-year-old records.  Therefore, Dr. Capote could offer no 
opinion about whether behavior contemporaneous with Mr. Pico's 
criminal charge could have informed a reasonable attorney of the 
need to investigate his client's mental capacity.  Had the 
information presented by Dr. Capote been known to Mr. Pico's 
counsel prior to trial, it may have been enough to require him 
to further investigate Mr. Pico's mental capacity.  But the 
important point here is that it was not known to counsel before 
trial.  If we were to apply that information retrospectively to 
evaluate counsel's pre-trial strategic decisions, we would be 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
16 
 
doing exactly what Strickland prohibits, to wit, evaluating 
counsel's 
performance 
with 
the 
"distorting 
effects 
of 
hindsight[.]"  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.   
¶27 The information available to Mr. Pico's counsel before 
trial was much more limited than what Mr. Pico presented at the 
Machner hearing.  He knew that Mr. Pico experienced double 
vision as the result of a motorcycle accident, and that he was 
flustered when questioned by the police about a very serious 
crime.  Mr. Pico expects these two facts to carry more weight 
than they can bear.  "In evaluating counsel's decision not to 
investigate, 
this 
court 
must 
assess 
the 
decision's 
reasonableness in light of 'all the circumstances,' 'applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.'"   Carter, 
324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).  
Double vision and nervousness during a police interview, alone, 
are insufficient to suggest there may be a need to investigate 
the defendant's mental capacity.  There is nothing in the record 
suggesting double vision interferes with (or impacts or affects 
or alters) mental capacity.  And nervousness under these 
circumstances could be the result of any number of factors that 
have nothing to do with a brain injury. 
¶28 Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel's decision 
not to further investigate Mr. Pico's mental capacity was 
reasonable and fell within the "wide range of professionally 
competent assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  In the 
absence of the investigation, there was no basis for Mr. Pico's 
attorney to counsel Mr. Pico on the advisability of a plea of 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
17 
 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  Nor was there 
a basis for a motion to suppress the statements Mr. Pico made to 
Detective Rich.  This necessarily means trial counsel could not 
have performed deficiently with respect to those topics because 
an attorney does not perform deficiently when he chooses not to 
pursue tactics that lack factual or legal support.  See State v. 
Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, ¶27, 370 Wis. 2d 661, 885 N.W.2d 611 
("It is not deficient performance for counsel not to make a 
pointless objection."); see also State v. Jacobsen, 2014 WI 
App 13, ¶49, 352 Wis. 2d 409, 842 N.W.2d 365 ("An attorney does 
not perform deficiently by failing to make a losing argument."); 
State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, ¶59, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 12 ("Trial counsel's failure to bring a meritless motion 
does not constitute deficient performance."); State v. Toliver, 
187 
Wis. 2d 346, 
360, 
523 
N.W.2d 113 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994) 
("[Defendant] 
has 
failed 
to 
show 
that 
trial 
counsel's 
performance was deficient and thus, we determine his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is meritless."). 
* 
¶29 We arrive at the same conclusion as the court of 
appeals with respect to trial counsel's duty to investigate.  
But more importantly for the issue at hand, we see no error in 
the court of appeals' methodology in reaching that conclusion.   
¶30 As we conducted each step of our analysis, we kept 
careful watch for any of the circuit court's factual findings 
that would impede or contradict our (or the court of appeals') 
reasoning.  We identified only one (more about that in a 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
18 
 
moment).  In all other instances, Mr. Pico's claim that the 
court of appeals simply ignored the circuit court's findings of 
fact in favor of its own is unsupported by the record.  Instead, 
his 
argument 
indicates 
he 
mistook 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusions of law for findings of fact.  Thus, he says the 
circuit court "found" that his counsel should have investigated 
his injury because it would have a significant effect on his 
case, so he concluded the court of appeals improperly rejected 
that "finding" when it concluded no such investigation was 
necessary.  Similarly, he says the court of appeals "found 
because there was no proof the family or Pico told [his counsel] 
about the significance of the brain damage, he had no duty to 
investigate or raise the issue in any way."  Further, he argues 
the court of appeals "disregarded the [circuit court's] factual 
finding that the attorney decided not to investigate, and that 
deficiency led to the conviction."   
¶31 A court's factual findings address the "who, what, 
when, and where" of a case.10  In the specific context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "[f]indings of fact 
include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct 
and strategy.'"  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶21 (citation omitted).  
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Fact, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining a "fact" as including "[s]omething that actually 
exists[,]" "not just tangible things, actual occurrences, and 
relationships, but also states of mind such as intentions and 
the holding of opinions[,]" and "[a]n actual or alleged event or 
circumstance, 
as 
distinguished 
from 
its 
legal 
effect, 
consequence, or interpretation."). 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
19 
 
The court of appeals is duty-bound to defer to those factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.   
¶32 Thiel's reference to "counsel's conduct and strategy," 
however, does not encompass the wisdom or constitutional 
sufficiency of that conduct or strategy.  Thiel contemplates a 
simple accounting of historical events:  What did counsel do, 
and what strategy did he employ?  
Whether the factual 
description of counsel's strategy and conduct add up to 
deficient performance is a question of law that is subject to de 
novo review.  "The questions of whether counsel's behavior was 
deficient and whether it was prejudicial to the defendant are 
questions of law, and we do not give deference to the decision 
of the circuit court."  Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634; see also 
State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 514 n.2, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992) 
("The final determination of whether counsel's performance was 
deficient and prejudiced the defense are questions of law, 
however, and a reviewing court need not grant deference to the 
decisions of the circuit court."). 
¶33 Thus, when Mr. Pico claims the circuit court "found" 
that his counsel should have investigated Mr. Pico's mental 
capacity more extensively than he did, he is not referring to a 
factual finding at all, but to a conclusion of law.  We 
determine whether trial counsel's investigation should have been 
more extensive by applying the legal standard to the known 
facts.  Here, the standard is that counsel must "either 
reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable 
strategic 
decision 
that 
makes 
any 
further 
investigation 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
20 
 
unnecessary."  Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, ¶41.  In applying that 
standard to the known facts, the court of appeals owed no 
deference to the circuit court because this is a question of 
law.  See Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634; see also Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d at 514, n.2.  Likewise, when Mr. Pico complains that the 
court of appeals "found because there was no proof the family or 
Pico told [trial counsel] about the significance of the brain 
damage, he had no duty to investigate or raise the issue in any 
way," he is recasting a legal conclusion as a finding of fact.  
The court of appeals did not, in so concluding, "find" anything.  
It applied the standard (reasonable investigation) to the fact 
(neither "the family [n]or Pico told [trial counsel] about the 
significance of the brain damage") and arrived at its legal 
conclusion (no duty to investigate further).  The same is true 
of Mr. Pico's claim that the court of appeals was obligated to 
defer to the circuit court's "factual finding that the attorney 
decided not to investigate, and that deficiency led to the 
conviction."  The extent of trial counsel's investigation is 
undisputed.  But the circuit court and court of appeals differed 
on whether this comprised a "deficiency" that "led to the 
conviction."  That disagreement, of course, is about whether the 
agreed facts satisfy a legal standard.  As such, it is a 
question of law on which the court of appeals owed no deference 
to the circuit court.  
¶34 Mr. Pico did accurately identify that the court of 
appeals set aside one of the circuit court's factual findings as 
it analyzed his counsel's duty to investigate.  It is the same 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
21 
 
one we were constrained to set aside.  The circuit court said 
trial counsel did not discuss Mr. Pico's head injury with his 
family.  That finding was clearly erroneous because the 
transcript from the Machner hearing unequivocally demonstrates 
that trial counsel did have that conversation with Mr. Pico's 
family.  State v. Pico, No. 2015AP1799-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶46 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. May 10, 2017). 
2. 
Defense Counsel's Trial Performance 
¶35 Mr. 
Pico 
also 
believes 
he 
received 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel because of how his counsel conducted his 
trial.  He is dissatisfied with trial counsel's choice of 
witnesses, his failure to object to certain testimony, the lack 
of motions in limine to prevent the exploration of some topics 
during trial, and his decision not to introduce evidence Mr. 
Pico believes would have been helpful to him.  Much, but not 
all, of Mr. Pico's argument on this score is the same as above, 
to wit, that the court of appeals substituted its own judgment 
for the circuit court's factual findings.  He cites three 
additional instances in which he believes this occurred.  We 
will address each in turn.11 
¶36 First, Mr. Pico says his counsel should have moved to 
suppress the statements he made during the police interview 
because Detective Rich used the "Reid technique."  The circuit 
                                                 
11 Mr. Pico's briefs purport to identify other instances in 
which the court of appeals usurped the circuit court's fact-
finding role.  But close examination reveals them to be repeats 
of allegations already made. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
22 
 
court agreed and said such a motion would have been successful.  
Mr. Pico characterizes that statement as a finding of fact that 
binds the court of appeals unless it was clearly erroneous.  The 
potential success of such a motion, however, is not a matter of 
historical fact.  It is a conclusion of law based on the circuit 
court's exercise of judgment in applying the appropriate legal 
standard to the circumstances comprising Detective Rich's 
interview with Mr. Pico.  The court of appeals owed the circuit 
court no deference on this question.  Mr. Pico's suppression 
argument depends on his injury-induced susceptibility to the 
"Reid technique."  We have already concluded trial counsel had 
no duty to investigate this injury, and without that information 
the suppression motion would have been baseless.  The court of 
appeals correctly concluded such a motion would not have been 
successful.   
¶37 Mr. Pico's second allegation relates to his belief 
that his counsel should have called an expert to challenge Ms. 
Sarah Flayter's forensic interview techniques, to describe 
D.T.'s susceptibility to an interviewer's suggestion, and to 
explain the significance of some of the statements D.T. made 
during the interview.  Mr. Pico says "the trial court found" 
that "an expert should have been consulted" on these subjects, 
and that if his counsel had done so, "it would have helped the 
defense case."  The relevant factual finding here is that Mr. 
Pico's counsel did not introduce an expert witness to provide 
testimony on the identified subjects, a fact the court of 
appeals did not challenge.  What it challenged was whether that 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
23 
 
fact established that trial counsel should have called such an 
expert, an entirely unremarkable question of law.  And how the 
result of the trial might have changed if Mr. Pico's counsel had 
presented expert testimony on these topics is actually the 
opposite of a factual finding——it is, indeed, a contrafactual.  
It is a hypothetical conclusion about a potential outcome 
flowing from the application of a legal standard to an 
alternative set of facts.  It is, in short, informed speculation 
about a trial that never occurred.  As such, it is not possible 
for this to be a matter of fact.  The court of appeals did not 
err in choosing not to defer to the circuit court's conclusion 
about the expected result of a hypothetical trial. 
¶38 Finally, 
Mr. 
Pico 
is 
concerned 
about 
certain 
statements introduced at trial that he believes improperly 
vouched for the credibility of the State's witnesses.  He 
asserts that the circuit court "found" that trial counsel's 
failure to file a motion in limine to protect against such 
testimony was "constitutionally deficient."  And he argues that, 
in disagreeing with the circuit court, the court of appeals 
improperly "substituted its beliefs for those of the judge who 
listened to the testimony at the hearing."  But as we said in 
both Pitsch and Knight, whether an attorney's conduct was 
constitutionally deficient is a question of law, not fact.  
"Listening to testimony" is essential to the project of 
accurately finding facts; deciding questions of law can be done 
just as well by appellate tribunals. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
24 
 
¶39 Our review confirms that the court of appeals properly 
distinguished between findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
Consequently, it did not usurp the circuit court's fact-finding 
role when it concluded that trial counsel did not perform 
deficiently.12  Still, Mr. Pico argued that several additional 
defects in his counsel's performance caused him to suffer the 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The court of appeals wrote 
an extensive and well-reasoned opinion addressing each of those 
claims, and we do not believe we would provide any additional 
value by repeating the good work it has already done.  We adopt 
its reasoning on these claims as our own.  Because trial 
counsel's performance was not deficient, we may conclude that 
Mr. Pico did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel 
without addressing the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland 
analysis.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("[T]here is no reason 
for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach 
the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components 
                                                 
12 The court of appeals did set aside an additional factual 
finding while conducting this part of its review.  However, it 
was justified in doing so.  The circuit court apparently 
misunderstood part of trial counsel's testimony with respect to 
whether Ms. Flayter should have clarified one of D.T.'s 
statements.  Trial counsel testified this task was necessary, 
but that it was for D.T., not Ms. Flayter, to provide the 
clarification.  He also said Ms. Flayter did get D.T. to explain 
her ambiguous statement.  The circuit court appears to have 
missed 
this 
testimony, 
and 
so 
found 
that 
a 
required 
clarification had not been made.  The court of appeals is 
correct that this finding was clearly erroneous because the 
record unequivocally establishes that D.T.'s statement had been 
properly explained. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
25 
 
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one."); Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶21 ("to succeed on [a] claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, [the defendant] must 
satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test."). 
B. Expert Strickland Testimony 
¶40 At the Machner hearing, Mr. Pico called an attorney as 
an expert witness on the Strickland standard "to show what a 
reasonable attorney versed in the criminal law would and should 
do under the circumstances at issue in this case."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 907.02 (2015-16) governs the admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony and provides: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
§ 907.02(1) (2015-16).  "Whether to admit proffered 'expert' 
testimony rests in the circuit court's discretion."  LaCount,  
310 Wis. 2d 85, ¶15 (one set of quotation marks omitted). 
¶41 The expert's task in the Machner hearing was to opine 
on how trial counsel ought to have handled Mr. Pico's defense.  
Presumably, that means he was supposed to do something more than 
argue that Mr. Pico's counsel should have conducted the defense 
differently.  If that had been his function, he should have been 
seated at counsel's table along with Mr. Pico's postconviction 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
26 
 
attorney, not in the witness box.  We presume his role was not 
duplicative.  Nor was his purpose to provide a historical 
recitation of facts relating to trial counsel's conduct of Mr. 
Pico's case.  Nor was he there to explain historical facts that 
the court was incapable of understanding on its own.  That 
leaves only one role for the expert here——informing the court 
that, in his judgment, Mr. Pico's counsel did not perform as a 
reasonable attorney should have under those circumstances. 
¶42 So the question we must answer is whether there is 
room in a Machner hearing for an expert witness's judgment on 
trial counsel's performance.  Expert testimony is admissible to 
address questions of fact, not law.  This is so because "the 
only 'expert' on domestic law is the court."  See Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2000 WI App 
248, ¶8 n.3, 239 Wis. 2d 360, 620 N.W.2d 457 (input from experts 
regarding an attorney's ethical obligations is unnecessary 
because such obligations are questions of law reviewed de novo 
by the court; compiling cases); see also United States v. 
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991) ("As a general 
rule 
an 
expert's 
testimony 
on 
issues 
of 
law 
is 
inadmissible . . . . [A]lthough an expert may opine on an issue 
of fact within the jury's province, he may not give testimony 
stating ultimate legal conclusions based on those facts."); Itek 
Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 274 A.2d 141, 143 (Del. 
1971) ("Testimony from an expert is inadmissible if it expresses 
the expert's opinion concerning applicable domestic law."); In 
re Estate of Ohrt 516 N.W.2d 896, 900 n.1 (Iowa 1994) ("Experts, 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
27 
 
no matter how well qualified, generally should not be permitted 
to give opinions on questions of domestic law."); Jackson v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 600 S.E.2d 346, 355 (W. Va. 
2004) (quoting 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 634, at 503-04 (1996)) ("As 
a general rule, an expert witness may not give his [or her] 
opinion on a question of domestic law [as opposed to foreign 
law] or on matters which involve questions of law, and an expert 
witness cannot instruct the court with respect to the applicable 
law of the case . . . ." (alterations in original)).   
¶43 The court's status as the only expert on domestic law 
is 
not 
a 
descriptive 
statement, 
but 
a 
normative 
one.  
Interpreting and applying the law to the facts of a particular 
case is the judiciary's responsibility, a responsibility it 
shares with no other when acting in its judicial capacity.  
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶37, 376 
Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 ("No aspect of the judicial power is 
more fundamental than the judiciary's exclusive responsibility 
to exercise judgment in cases and controversies arising under 
the law."); see also Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶73, 375 
Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) 
(indicating that "the court's duty to say what the law is" 
constitutes a "core judicial function"); In re Appointment of 
Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 598, 124 N.W. 670 (1910) (stating that 
"it is the exclusive function of the courts to expound the 
laws").  In the context of a Machner hearing, that exclusive 
responsibility encompasses the exercise of its judgment on the 
reasonableness of counsel's performance:  "[A] court . . . must 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
28 
 
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the 
facts of the particular case . . . ."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690 (emphasis supplied).  As we discussed above, this is a 
question of law, not fact.  Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 634 ("The 
questions of whether counsel's behavior was deficient and 
whether it was prejudicial to the defendant are questions of 
law, and we do not give deference to the decision of the circuit 
court."). 
¶44 The court can, and must, reserve to itself the 
exercise of this responsibility in every case.  And when "the 
court . . . is able to draw its own conclusions without the aid 
of expert testimony, 'the admission of such testimony is not 
only unnecessary but improper.'"  Racine Cty. v. Oracular 
Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶28, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 
(quoting Cramer v. Theda Clark Mem'l Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 151, 
172 N.W.2d 427 (1969)).  Therefore, an expert's judgment about 
the reasonableness of how counsel handled the defense is 
superfluous not because he has no insights on the matter, but 
because his opinion is unnecessary as a matter of law.   
¶45 Consequently, we hold that expert testimony about the 
"reasonableness" 
of 
counsel's 
performance 
is 
inadmissible 
because it addresses a question on which the court is the only 
expert.  This is not a matter of first impression in this state.  
Faced with the same question we are addressing here, the court 
of appeals in State v. McDowell said "that no witness may 
testify as an expert on issues of domestic law" such as whether 
trial counsel rendered effective assistance.  2003 WI App 168, 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
29 
 
¶62 n.20, 266 Wis. 2d 599, 669 N.W.2d 204, aff'd, 2004 WI 70, 
272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500.  We are further persuaded this 
is a sound statement of the law for the reasons given by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 
[T]he reasonableness of a strategic choice is a 
question of law to be decided by the court, not a 
matter subject to factual inquiry and evidentiary 
proof. 
Accordingly, 
it 
would 
not 
matter 
if 
a 
petitioner could assemble affidavits from a dozen 
attorneys swearing that the strategy used at his trial 
was unreasonable. The question is not one to be 
decided by plebiscite, by affidavits, by deposition, 
or by live testimony. It is a question of law to be 
decided by the state courts, by the district court, 
and by this Court, each in its own turn. 
Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). 
¶46 Our review of the record confirms that Mr. Pico's 
expert was "judg[ing] the reasonableness of counsel's challenged 
conduct on the facts of the particular case."  See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690.  Upon introducing the expert's testimony, 
postconviction counsel frankly acknowledged the expert witness 
would 
testify 
to 
"what 
a 
reasonable 
criminal 
attorney . . . should and should not" do.  The expert witness 
proceeded to do that very thing, opining (in part) that:  (1) an 
attorney who has been put on notice of an injury should "get the 
[medical] records" and should "chase the records if you know 
they're there"; (2) further investigation into the injury and 
its potential impacts would have been beneficial to the case; 
(3) knowledge of the brain injury and testimony about the 
resulting impact could have impacted strategic decisions; (4) 
experts should have been called to review Detective Rich's taped 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
30 
 
interview of Mr. Pico and Ms. Flayter's forensic interview of 
D.T.; (5) there generally would not have been any downside to 
seeking expert review of or obtaining the good touch/bad touch 
materials D.T. learned in school; and (6) trial counsel should 
have objected to certain statements that amounted to "witness 
vouching."  Ultimately, the expert witness asserted that he did 
not believe trial counsel provided constitutionally adequate 
representation. 
¶47 When we analyzed Mr. Pico's claim that the court of 
appeals usurped the circuit court's fact-finding role, supra, we 
addressed some of the very topics on which the expert witness 
provided testimony.  We said they presented questions of law, 
and there is no reason to reconsider that conclusion in 
determining whether it was appropriate for Mr. Pico's expert to 
opine on them.  What trial counsel should or should not have 
done is not a question of fact.  Nor is the soundness of his 
strategic or tactical decisions.  And as we observed above, the 
likely 
effect 
of 
those 
decisions 
on 
the 
outcome 
of 
a 
hypothetical trial is informed speculation, not a statement of 
fact.  Because this testimony addressed questions of domestic 
law, it was inadmissible.  We conclude that Strickland expert 
testimony is admissible in the Machner context, but only to the 
extent the expert focuses on factual matters and does not offer 
his opinion on the reasonableness of trial counsel's conduct or 
strategy. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
31 
 
C. 
Mr. Pico Is Not Entitled To A New Sentencing Hearing 
¶48 Mr. Pico asserts that the circuit court violated his 
right against self-incrimination by increasing the severity of 
his sentence because he maintained his innocence at the 
sentencing hearing.13  We review a sentencing decision for an 
                                                 
13 Mr. Pico also asserts that his counsel "was ineffective 
for failing to object" to the sentencing court's statements 
related to his maintenance of innocence at sentencing.  Mr. Pico 
does not develop any ineffective assistance of counsel claim as 
to this issue; however, because we conclude that the sentencing 
court did not err, Mr. Pico's counsel could not have been 
ineffective for not having objected. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
32 
 
erroneous exercise of discretion.14  State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, 
¶30, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409.  Such an error occurs if a 
court "imposes its sentence based on or in actual reliance upon 
clearly irrelevant or improper factors."  Id.  To establish such 
                                                 
14 The State says Mr. Pico waived this issue by not filing a 
cross-appeal from the circuit court's order on the motion for 
postconviction relief, which granted him a new trial and vacated 
his sentence.  The State says a cross-appeal was necessary 
because the circuit court vacated the sentence not because of a 
sentencing error, but because it concluded the conviction was 
constitutionally unsound.  Regardless of the circuit court's 
reasoning, the result was an order vacating the sentence.  A 
party appeals from a written order, not a circuit court's 
reasoning.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.10(1)(b)2 (2015-16) (the notice 
of appeal shall identify "the judgment or order from which the 
person filing the notice intends to appeal and the date on which 
it was entered."); see also Neely v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 755, 758, 
279 N.W.2d 255 (1979) (per curiam) (explaining that "[t]he word 
decision, as used in the statutes and the rules, refers to the 
result (or disposition or mandate) reached by the court of 
appeals.");   Ramsthal Advert. Agency v. Energy Miser, Inc., 90 
Wis. 2d 74, 75, 279 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1979) ("An order, to be 
appealable, must be in writing and filed.").  A cross-appeal is 
necessary only when the respondent seeks a modification of the 
order from which an appeal is taken:  "A respondent who seeks a 
modification of the judgment or order appealed from or of 
another judgment or order entered in the same action or 
proceeding shall file a notice of cross-appeal . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.10(2)(b) 
(2015-16). 
 
Mr. 
Pico 
wanted 
no 
modification; to the contrary, he wanted the court of appeals to 
affirm the vacation of his sentence.  His "sentencing error" 
argument is an alternative basis for affirming that part of the 
circuit court's order.  On appeal, a court may "'examine all 
rulings to determine whether they are erroneous and, if 
corrected, whether they would sustain the judgment or order 
which was in fact entered.'"  Auric v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 111 Wis. 
2d 507, 516, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983) (citation omitted).  If Mr. 
Pico were right about the sentencing court's error, correcting 
it would sustain the circuit court's vacation of his sentence.  
Therefore, no cross-appeal was necessary. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
33 
 
error, the defendant must prove "by clear and convincing 
evidence, 
that 
the 
sentencing 
court 
actually 
relied 
on 
irrelevant or improper factors."  State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, 
¶17, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662.  This requires that the 
defendant establish both that the factor was improper or 
irrelevant and that the court relied on it.  Id., ¶¶18-27. 
¶49 The Fifth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right against self-incrimination.  U.S. Const. amend V ("No 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .").  This right extends to 
sentencing, although a defendant may waive his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination in a bid for a lighter 
sentence.  See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 496-97, 219 
N.W.2d 286 
(1974) 
(The 
court 
may 
consider 
"a 
posttrial 
confession of guilt and an expression of remorse" "in mitigation 
of a sentence.").  The failure to express remorse, however, can 
be used at sentencing only if it is one amongst other factors, 
and it receives no undue consideration: 
A defendant's attitude toward the crime may well be 
relevant in considering these things [i.e., Gallion-
type factors15].  In this case we believe the trial 
court considered a variety of factors, giving no undue 
or overwhelming weight to any one in particular.  The 
sentence imposed was well within the maximum for which 
the defendant might have been sentenced, and while it 
is evident that the defendant's failure to admit his 
guilt and his lack of remorse were factors in the 
                                                 
15 See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
34 
 
sentencing decision, we do not believe it was improper 
or an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 459, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981); 
see also Williams v. State, 79 Wis. 2d 235, 239, 255 N.W.2d 504 
(1977) (observing that circuit courts commit reversible error 
when they "[give] undue and almost overwhelming weight to the 
defendant's refusal to admit guilt."). 
¶50 The transcript from Mr. Pico's sentencing hearing 
reflects that the court considered multiple factors——such as Mr. 
Pico's background, his family and support network, his medical 
history, the seriousness of the offense, the presentencing 
report, the impact on the community, and the risk of re-
offending——in formulating the sentence.16  It also reflects the 
court's reference to Mr. Pico's lack of remorse: 
 
A part of the problem that you have is how you're 
gonna go forward and you express yourself, and I 
believe you're to a degree very sincere.  To a degree 
I'm not so sure you're willing to do what you need to 
do to find your way back into a life closer to normal. 
 
What I mean when I say that is acknowledging your 
conduct before this forum, before your family, before 
[D.T.'s family] in order to allow your children to 
hear it and to know what you've done is important, and 
I will consider whether or not you demonstrate remorse 
as part of my sentence. 
. . . . 
                                                 
16 A circuit court must consider three main factors at 
sentencing:  (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the defendant's 
character; and (3) the need to protect the public.  State v. 
Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662.  The 
circuit court may also consider numerous secondary factors.  See 
id. 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
35 
 
I'm offended that you don't have the courage to 
recognize, and don't give me a half story of I touched 
her but not enough, I didn't touch her the way she 
said.  I don't accept it, Mr. Pico.  That's half a 
loaf. 
¶51 Mr. Pico says this commentary is similar to Scales, in 
which we concluded the circuit court had improperly relied on 
the defendant's lack of remorse in imposing sentence.  There, we 
were concerned with the circuit court's statement that "'[i]t is 
my judgment that until you demonstrate some remorse, until you 
acknowledge your responsibility for the crime that you have 
committed, 
probation 
is 
not 
in 
order 
and 
efforts 
at 
rehabilitation will come to naught.  It is for that reason that 
it is my judgment . . . that I can do nothing but order your 
incarceration . . . ."  Scales, 64 Wis. 2d at 494-95.  We said 
"that fact alone [the failure to demonstrate remorse] cannot be 
used to justify incarceration rather than probation," and 
because the court identified no other basis for imposing 
incarceration, we reasoned that the "the procedure utilized at 
sentencing was coercive and in derogation of Scales' Fifth 
Amendment rights."  Id. at 496-97. 
¶52 Mr. Pico's comparison to Scales is not apt.  The 
circuit court in Scales explicitly linked the defendant's lack 
of remorse to the decision to impose incarceration instead of 
probation.  Here, there is quite obviously no explicit link 
between Mr. Pico's lack of remorse and a harsher sentence.  Nor 
is there an implicit link.  The circuit court's operative 
statement on this subject was simply "I will consider whether or 
not you demonstrate remorse as part of my sentence."  Taken at 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
36 
 
face value, that is an entirely appropriate and unremarkable 
statement——remorse is a proper factor to consider in developing 
a sentence.  And as long as the court honors the principles of 
Baldwin and Williams, so is lack of remorse.  The circuit 
court's statement indicates it may have addressed remorse in one 
of three ways.  First, it might have applied no mitigating 
factor in recognition that Mr. Pico had expressed no remorse.  
Second, it might have used Mr. Pico's lack of remorse as the 
north star in developing his sentence.  Last, the court may have 
considered Mr. Pico's lack of remorse as one factor amongst many 
in the exercise of its sentencing discretion.  Of the three 
possibilities, only the second would be inappropriate.  There is 
a strong public policy against interfering with the trial 
court's sentencing discretion, and the trial court is presumed 
to have acted reasonably.  State v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 339, 
354, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1984).  It is Mr. Pico's 
responsibility to demonstrate the circuit court used its 
discretion erroneously in considering his lack of remorse.  
State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 418, 576 N.W.2d 912 ("When a 
criminal defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the 
circuit court, the defendant has the burden to show some 
unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record for the 
sentence at issue."). 
¶53 Mr. Pico says his proof is that the circuit court 
"intimated it might" "send[] him home that day" if he confessed 
at sentencing.  The circuit court intimated no such thing.  Its 
only mention of anything even remotely close to that concept was 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
37 
 
its reference to a letter from D.T. and her family indicating 
they might agree that a "time served" sentence would be 
acceptable if Mr. Pico admitted what he had done to D.T.  In 
commenting on that letter, the court stated: 
 
Now, they [D.T.'s family] wanted to go so far as 
to hinge as to whether or not you'll be in the 
community versus whether or not you'll be housed in 
prison, and our system is more complicated than that.  
I have more things to consider in reaching that 
decision.  Your lawyer referenced the Gallion factors 
and other factors that as a lawyer I have to——as a 
judge I have to consider.  I'll look at all those in 
reaching a conclusion. 
¶54 Not only does this commentary not support Mr. Pico's 
position, it does the opposite.  This passage reflects the 
sentencing court's awareness of the totality of factors it was 
required to consider——and did consider——in ultimately imposing a 
bifurcated sentence of six years imprisonment followed by ten 
years extended supervision——a sentence far less than the 60 
years of imprisonment he faced upon conviction.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.50(3)(b).  We conclude there is no 
evidence the circuit court imposed a longer sentence on Mr. Pico 
because of his continued assertion of innocence.  Therefore, Mr. 
Pico is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶55 We conclude that Mr. Pico's trial counsel did not 
perform deficiently within the meaning of Strickland.  We also 
conclude that expert testimony at a Machner hearing regarding 
the reasonableness of trial counsel's performance is not 
admissible.  Finally, because Mr. Pico did not demonstrate that 
No. 
2015AP1799-CR   
 
38 
 
the circuit court improperly relied on his lack of remorse in 
fashioning his sentence, he is not entitled to resentencing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶56 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority but write separately to clarify part III.B, which 
addresses expert Strickland testimony.1  The majority says that 
Strickland expert testimony is inadmissible at the Machner 
hearing except "to the extent the expert focuses on factual 
matters and does not offer his opinion on the reasonableness of 
trial counsel's" performance.2  Majority op., ¶47.  This 
limitation could be misinterpreted as a total prohibition on 
such testimony.  It is not. 
¶57 The majority stops short of explaining what it means 
by "factual matters" at Machner hearings.  I provide additional 
explanation to avoid any confusion.  When a circuit court 
determines the testimony of a Strickland expert would be 
helpful, the expert may testify as to what actions a reasonable 
attorney could take in the same or similar circumstances.  These 
include 
"factual 
matters" 
such 
as 
alternate 
actions 
the 
defendant's lawyer could have taken and different strategies 
defense counsel could have employed.  The expert lawyer may also 
testify regarding the existence of alternative strategies 
available to defense counsel under the particular facts and 
                                                 
1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
circumstances of the case.3  However, the expert may not testify 
as to the ultimate question of law the circuit court must 
decide.  Specifically, the expert may not offer an opinion on 
whether the trial lawyer performed deficiently.  That is a 
question of law left to the circuit court. 
¶58 Although expert criminal lawyer testimony is not 
required at a Machner hearing, in certain cases the circuit 
court may perceive this testimony to be helpful.  "Whether to 
admit proffered 'expert' testimony rests in the circuit court's 
discretion."  State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 
750 N.W.2d 780.  In most cases, the circuit court will not need 
expert lawyer testimony to decide the legal questions——it will 
simply apply Strickland to the facts and circumstances presented 
at the Machner hearing.  However, if a circuit court is 
unfamiliar with the practice of criminal law or the case 
presents factual features unfamiliar to even an experienced 
judge, Strickland expert testimony at the Machner hearing would 
                                                 
3 While expert testimony on issues of law generally is 
inadmissible, the standard of care applicable to attorneys is 
not an issue of law but one of fact.  For example, in legal 
malpractice cases in Wisconsin, not only is expert testimony 
admissible, it is generally required to establish a breach of 
the standard of care.  See, e.g., Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. 
Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 112, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985) ("Expert 
testimony is generally necessary in legal malpractice cases to 
establish the parameters of acceptable professional conduct, 
given the underlying fact situation."); Pierce v. Colwell, 209 
Wis. 2d 355, 362-63, 563 N.W.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
plaintiff "was obligated to present expert testimony to sustain 
his claim that [lawyer's] alleged negligence caused injury or 
damage"). 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
be helpful and the circuit court retains the discretion to hear 
it.  See LaCount, 310 Wis. 2d 85, ¶15; Wis. Stat. § 907.02. 
¶59 I respectfully concur. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶61 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  In an 
interview with law enforcement, the defendant gave equivocal 
statements regarding whether he touched the vagina of D.T., an 
eight-year-old girl.  Given the circumstances of the instant 
case, advancing a reasonable doubt defense instead of properly 
investigating the defendant's frontal lobe injury amounted to 
deficient performance.  In my view, a reasonable probability 
exists that but for trial counsel's failure to properly 
investigate the defendant's frontal lobe injury, the result of 
the defendant's trial would have been different. 
¶62 Accordingly, I dissent.1 
I 
¶63 In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme 
Court had this to say with regard to counsel's duty to 
investigate: 
[S]trategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.  In other words, counsel 
has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 
make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.  In any ineffectiveness 
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference 
to counsel's judgments. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984). 
                                                 
1 I agree with Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's concurrence 
insofar as it clarifies the "factual matters" about which an 
attorney expert may testify during a Machner hearing. 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶64 Put another way, "[c]ounsel must either reasonably 
investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable strategic 
decision that makes any further investigation unnecessary."  
State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, 
¶41, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 
N.W.2d 364.  The reasonableness of counsel's decisions is judged 
in the context of the circumstances as they existed at the time 
counsel made those decisions.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; 
State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502-03, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983). 
¶65 The following facts were known to the defendant's 
trial counsel at the time counsel made the decision not to 
further investigate the defendant's frontal lobe injury and 
instead pursue a reasonable doubt defense:   
• The defendant was interviewed by a detective four days 
after the defendant visited his daughter's classroom.  
D.T. was a classmate of the defendant's daughter. 
• During that interview, the detective employed the Reid 
technique, a technique that involves law enforcement 
officials lying to the interviewee by claiming to have 
strong incriminating evidence that they do not in fact 
possess in order to induce the interviewee to disclose 
factually 
accurate 
details 
about 
the 
events 
in 
question. 
• Pursuant to the Reid technique and without identifying 
the victim, the detective told the defendant that a 
student in his daughter's class had accused him of 
touching her inappropriately, that there were video 
cameras in the classroom, that male DNA had been found 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
on the victim's clothing in the area she said she was 
touched, and that another student had partially 
substantiated the victim's allegation.  Other than the 
fact 
that 
the 
defendant 
had 
been 
accused 
of 
inappropriately touching a student, none of what the 
detective told the defendant was true. 
• When the detective asked if anything the detective had 
just said made any sense to the defendant, the 
defendant responded by saying, "Yeah, I remember."  
Although the detective never identified D.T. as the 
victim, the defendant provided D.T.'s name to the 
detective and described how he "tickled" and massaged 
D.T.'s leg. 
• Further questioning by the detective resulted in the 
defendant acknowledging that at some point while 
tickling and massaging D.T.'s leg, he had moved his 
hand under her pants.  The defendant claimed that 
moving 
his 
hand 
under 
D.T.'s 
pants 
was 
not 
intentional. 
• The detective told the defendant that D.T. claimed 
that he touched her vagina twice.  The defendant 
responded, "I don't recall.  I don't.  I don't know.  
I didn't.  I don't know, sir.  I don't remember that 
happening, but——."  The detective followed up, "Is it 
possible?"  The defendant responded, "[Y]eah."  The 
detective asked, "Do you know why?" and the defendant 
answered, 
"I 
have 
no 
idea. 
 
I'm 
not 
sexually 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
repressed.  I got a good sex life.  I have kids.  I 
wasn't thinking along those lines at all.  I was just 
playing." 
• In response, the detective accused the defendant of 
having intentionally put his hand down D.T.'s pants 
twice.  The defendant responded by saying "I don't 
know.  I don't——I don't recall ever doing it the 
second time, but it shouldn't have happened the first 
time, right." 
• The detective then suggested that "[o]nce you walked 
out of that class I bet you were——well, you were 
probably just sick to your stomach."  The defendant 
responded "Yes." 
• Upon first meeting the defendant, trial counsel became 
aware of the defendant's brain injury.  The defendant 
wears an eyepatch, and he explained to trial counsel 
that he suffers from double vision as a result of a 
traumatic brain injury to his frontal lobe caused by a 
serious motorcycle accident that occurred 20 years 
before the events giving rise to the instant case. 
• The defendant told trial counsel that he had fully 
recovered from the accident, and neither the defendant 
nor his family told counsel that they had observed any 
behavior on the defendant's part that would indicate 
that 
the 
defendant's 
brain 
injury 
affected 
the 
defendant's behavior. 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
• Trial counsel, without bothering to obtain any of the 
defendant's medical records or consult with an expert 
knowledgeable 
about 
the 
connection 
between 
brain 
trauma and human behavior, chose not to further 
investigate because trial counsel did not observe any 
ongoing symptoms that he believed related to the 
defendant's brain injury. 
¶66 Under these circumstances, I conclude that trial 
counsel's decision not to further investigate the defendant's 
frontal lobe injury and instead pursue a reasonable doubt 
defense constitutes deficient performance. 
¶67 First, as would seem obvious from the recitation of 
facts above, a reasonable doubt defense was doomed to failure.  
Asked about whether the defendant had twice touched the vagina 
of an eight-year-old unidentified girl in her classroom during 
school just four days prior, the defendant identified the 
victim, acknowledged "tickling" her leg, and "[didn't] recall," 
or "[didn't] know" whether he had touched her vagina or not, but 
said that if he did, he did not do so intentionally.  The 
majority is silent regarding the reasonableness of pursuing a 
reasonable doubt defense in light of this damning evidence.2 
                                                 
2 The majority does, however, refer to the defendant's 
equivocation as "nervousness" or being "flustered."  Majority 
op., ¶27.  I find it unlikely that nervousness would cause 
someone to forget whether or not they had twice touched the 
vagina of an eight-year-old girl in her classroom during school 
just four days earlier. 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶68 Second, trial counsel's decision to not conduct 
further investigation into the defendant's brain injury was 
unreasonable under the circumstances.  Both state and federal 
courts have found head injuries to be "red flags" that give rise 
to a duty for counsel to investigate further for neurological 
damage that may impact the client's case.3 
¶69 In the instant case, trial counsel knew that the 
defendant suffered from double vision as a result of a traumatic 
brain injury to his frontal lobe caused by a serious motorcycle 
accident.  Rather than consult with a neurologist about the 
effects of the defendant's brain trauma, or even obtain the 
defendant's medical records, trial counsel instead stopped his 
investigation after being told by the defendant and his family 
that they did not notice anything abnormal about the defendant's 
behavior.  In my view, trial counsel did not do enough to 
discharge his duty to adequately investigate the defendant's 
frontal lobe injury and its impact on the defendant's case.   
¶70 Given the impossible odds of a successful reasonable 
doubt defense, trial counsel's performance was not reasonable 
                                                 
3 See Ellen G. Koenig, A Fair Trial:  When the Constitution 
Requires Attorneys to Investigate Their Clients' Brains, 41 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 177, 211-12 (2013) (collecting cases); Richard 
E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant:  Neuroscience and 
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 
51, Appendix (2006) (listing 45 cases in which counsel was 
deemed ineffective for failing to investigate when counsel 
either knew that the client suffered a traumatic brain injury or 
would have learned that information by conducting a proper 
investigation). 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
under 
prevailing 
professional 
norms 
and 
was 
therefore 
constitutionally deficient.4 
II 
¶71 In 
addition 
to 
proving 
that 
trial 
counsel's 
performance was constitutionally deficient, the defendant must 
also prove that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient 
performance.  This requires the defendant to "show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  "A reasonable probability under 
the Strickland prejudice prong is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Winnebago Cty. v. J.M., 
2018 WI 37, ¶49, 381 Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41.5 
¶72 I conclude that the defendant has shown prejudice in 
the instant case.  Had trial counsel properly investigated the 
defendant's frontal lobe injury, he would have learned that the 
defendant suffered from frontal lobe syndrome.  Trial counsel 
would have learned that as a result of the defendant's frontal 
lobe injury, the defendant suffered from a significant decrease 
in 
IQ; 
deficits 
to 
cognitive, 
emotional, 
and 
behavioral 
functioning; and abnormal impulsivity.  Trial counsel also would 
                                                 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
5 See also Winnebago Cty. v. J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶49, 381 
Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41 ("This statement of the prejudice 
prong 
corresponds 
with 
another 
oft-quoted 
statement 
from 
Strickland about the prejudice prong, namely that the defendant 
was prejudiced if he or she was deprived of a fair trial whose 
result is reliable."). 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
have learned that symptoms of frontal lobe syndrome include the 
tendency to not read social cues well.  Had trial counsel 
consulted a doctor regarding the defendant's brain injury and 
its symptoms, he would have realized (and the defendant's family 
would have corroborated) that, consistent with frontal lobe 
syndrome, the defendant shuts down when faced with frustration, 
and often gives in to what others want in order to avoid 
confrontation.   
¶73 Trial counsel's failure to properly investigate the 
defendant's frontal lobe injury prejudiced the defendant in at 
least two ways.   
¶74 First, the information that would have been obtained 
through a proper investigation would have supported a plea of 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  Given how 
disastrous 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
defense 
was 
under 
the 
circumstances, pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease 
of defect may have been the only reasonable strategy to pursue.   
¶75 Second, even if trial counsel chose to advance a 
reasonable doubt defense, trial counsel should have presented 
evidence of the defendant's frontal lobe syndrome and its 
symptoms to mitigate the effect of the inculpatory statements 
made to the detective during the interview.  Coupled with 
testimony about the unreliable nature of the Reid technique and 
its likelihood of producing false confessions,6 the defendant 
                                                 
6 The defendant presented expert testimony to this effect at 
the Machner hearing. 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
could have significantly mitigated the effect of his equivocal 
statements regarding whether he had inappropriately touched D.T. 
III 
¶76 As our understanding of the connection between brain 
trauma and criminal behavior develops, defense attorneys must be 
on increased alert for red flags indicating neurological damage 
that could have an impact on their clients' cases.  In the 
instant case, the defendant's trial counsel knew that the 
defendant suffered a traumatic brain injury to his frontal lobe 
but failed to properly and adequately investigate whether and to 
what extent that trauma affected the defendant's case.  Trial 
counsel's failure to properly investigate the defendant's brain 
injury prejudiced the defendant by causing him to argue an ill-
fated reasonable doubt defense that was unreasonable under the 
circumstances. 
¶77 I would conclude that the defendant succeeded in 
proving his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and is 
entitled to a new trial. 
¶78 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2015AP1799-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1