Title: Ex parte Sturbridge Chiropractic et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Alabama State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Sturbridge Chiropractic et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:06/15/07sturbridge
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050980
_________________________
Ex parte Silver Chiropractic Group, Inc., d/b/a
Sturbridge Chiropractic, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Alabama State Board of Chiropractic Examiners
v.
Sturbridge Chiropractic et al.)
(Chilton Circuit Court, CV-06-47)
BOLIN, Justice.
The Alabama State Board of Chiropractic Examiners ("the
Board"), on December 13, 2005, filed administrative complaints
1050980
Section 34-24-166(b) was amended effective July 1, 2006.
1
The amendment deleted some subdivisions and renumbered the
remaining subdivisions, so that the subdivision addressing
advertising is now subdivision (13).
2
against Steve Silver, Dr. Dawn Havel, and Dr. Jason Hart
(collectively referred to as "the defendants"), alleging that
they had violated § 34-24-166(b)(16),  Ala. Code 1975, by
1
advertising in a manner that violated the rules and
regulations established by the Board.  Specifically, the Board
alleged that certain language and phrases used in the
defendants' advertising violated Ala. Admin. Code (Ala. State
Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners) Rule 190-X-5.04(3)(a) through
(f). Silver is the sole stockholder of Silver Chiropractic
Group, 
Inc., 
d/b/a 
Sturbridge 
Chiropractic. 
 
Silver
Chiropractic Group holds the license under which Sturbridge
Chiropractic operates, and its principal place of business is
located in Montgomery County.  Silver is not a chiropractor.
Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart are licensed chiropractors who are
employed by Sturbridge Chiropractic.
The defendants answered the administrative complaints on
January 19, 2006, alleging that the Board's investigative
process is unconstitutionally tainted in violation of the Due
Process Clause; that Rule 190-X-5.04(3)(a) through (f)
1050980
3
violates their right to free speech; that Rule 190-X-
5.04(3)(a) through (f) is unconstitutional because it is
unduly vague; and that Rule 190-X-5.04(3)(a) through (f)
violates their right to due process because it impermissibly
shifts the burden of proof from the Board to the defendants.
Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart each asserted as an additional defense
that as employees of Sturbridge Chiropractic they had no
knowledge of the advertising before its placement and that as
employees they did not have authority to place advertising.
Silver asserted as an additional defense that he is not
subject to the disciplinary rules of the Board because he is
not a licensed chiropractor and therefore is not subject to §
34-24-166, Ala. Code 1975.  He contended that under Rule 190-
X-5.04(3), only a chiropractor who engages in advertising is
subject to discipline.
On February 23, 2006, the Board sued Silver, Dr. Havel,
and Dr. Hart in the Chilton Circuit Court, the county where
the Board's offices are located, seeking the following
injunctive 
relief: 
preventing 
Silver 
from 
practicing
chiropractic medicine without being licensed to do so;
preventing Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart from aiding or abetting
1050980
4
Silver's unlawful practice of chiropractic medicine; and
preventing 
the 
defendants 
from 
disseminating 
any 
advertisement
without 
Dr. 
Havel 
and 
Dr. 
Hart 
first 
approving 
the
advertisement. Although not expressly requested in the
complaint filed in the circuit court, the Board states in its
answer and brief to this Court that it also sought a judgment
declaring whether the Board had jurisdiction over Silver.
On March 10, 2006, the defendants, relying upon § 6-3-2,
Ala. Code 1975, moved the Chilton Circuit Court to dismiss the
Board's complaint for lack of proper venue or, in the
alternative, to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit
Court, where, they alleged, venue was proper.  The defendants
supported their motion with affidavits in which each defendant
testified that he or she resided in Montgomery County; that he
or she was employed in Montgomery County; and that all acts
complained of occurred in Montgomery County.
The Board amended its complaint on March 29, 2006, to
add Silver Chiropractic Group, a domestic corporation, as a
defendant.  The Board at the same time responded to the
defendants' motion to dismiss or to transfer, by arguing that
venue against a domestic corporation is proper in the county
1050980
5
where the plaintiff resides and that if venue is proper as to
one defendant it is proper as to all defendants.  The Board
also asserted that the defendants would not be inconvenienced
by defending the action in Chilton County because applications
for licenses and permits are submitted to the Board's offices
in Chilton County; all the Board's records relating to the
defendants are maintained in Chilton County; all disciplinary
meetings relating to license and permit holders are conducted
in Chilton County; the Board's executive secretary and other
staff who would be witnesses in this  matter reside in Chilton
County; Chilton County is less than an hour's drive from
Montgomery County; and the defendants' affidavits are silent
as to whether any individuals treated by the doctors at
Sturbridge Chiropractic reside or work in Chilton County.
On March 29, 2006, the defendants, which now included
Silver Chiropractic Group, replied to the Board's response to
their motion to dismiss or to transfer, arguing that the
Silver 
Chiropractic 
Group 
did 
not 
regularly 
perform
chiropractic services in Chilton County and, therefore, that
venue was not proper in Chilton County pursuant to § 6-3-
7(a)(3) or (4), Ala. Code 1975. The defendants supported their
1050980
6
motion with Silver's affidavit stating that neither Silver
Chiropractic Group nor Sturbridge Chiropractic conducts
business in Chilton County.
Following a hearing, the trial court, on April 5, 2006,
entered an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action or to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit
Court.
The defendants petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to vacate its order of April 5,
2006, denying the motion to transfer the action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court and to enter a new order transferring
the Board's action to the Montgomery Circuit Court.  
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'The burden of proving a duty to transfer [an
action] is on the party raising the issue.' Ex parte
Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 922 (Ala. 1994),
citing Ex parte Ralston, 519 So. 2d 488 (Ala. 1987),
and Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458
(Ala. 1987).
"'A petition for the writ of mandamus
is the proper procedure for challenging a
trial court's refusal to transfer an action
based on improper venue.  Ex parte Alabama
Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 922 (Ala. 1994).
A writ of mandamus is appropriate when the
1050980
7
petitioner makes a clear showing of error
on the part of the trial court. Id.'
"Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 721 So. 2d
184, 186 (Ala. 1998).  The standard for determining
whether a writ of mandamus will issue is as follows:
"'A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and it will be
"issued only when there is (1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte
United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d
501, 503 (Ala. 1993).  A writ of mandamus
will issue only in situations where other
relief is unavailable or is inadequate, and
it cannot be used as a substitute for
appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co.,
590 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991).'
"Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d
893, 894 (Ala. 1998).  'This Court reviews mandamus
petitions seeking review of a venue determination by
asking 
whether 
the 
trial 
court 
exceeded 
its
discretion in granting or denying the motion for a
change of venue.'  Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc.,
882 So. 2d 307, 310 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ex parte
Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala. 2002))."
Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 901 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion
A. The Individual Defendants
The individual defendants rely on § 6-3-2, Ala. Code
1975, and argue that venue is proper in Montgomery County
1050980
8
because each individual defendant resides in Montgomery
County.  The Board contends that the defense asserted by Dr.
Havel and Dr. Hart in their answers to the administrative
complaints –- each denied any knowledge or control over the
advertising made the basis of the administrative complaints –-
was not applicable and that they had violated Rule 190-X-5.04.
The Board contends that it was the position of Dr. Havel and
Dr. Hart in their answers to the administrative complaints
that prompted the Board to file the action in the Chilton
Circuit Court.  Consequently, the Board claims, the act or
omission that gave rise to the Board's action in the Chilton
Circuit Court was the filing of the answers to the
administrative complaints.  Therefore, the Board contends,
because the answers to the administrative complaints were
filed in Chilton County, the act or omission complained of
occurred in Chilton County, and venue is proper in Chilton
County.
With regard to what constitutes proper venue as to
individual defendants, § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in
part, as follows:
"(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against
individuals:
1050980
9
"....
"(3) All ... personal actions [other
than actions for the recovery of land,
possession thereof, or trespass or actions
on contracts], if the defendant or one of
the defendants has within the state a
permanent residence, may be commenced in
the county of such residence or in the
county in which the act or omission
complained of may have been done or may
have occurred.
"(b) In proceedings of an equitable nature
against individuals:
"....
"(3) 
Except 
as 
may 
be 
otherwise
provided, actions must be commenced in the
county in which the defendant or a material
defendant resides."
It is undisputed that Silver, Dr. Havel, and Dr. Hart all
reside in Montgomery County.  Therefore, venue is proper in
Montgomery County, unless the act or omission complained of
occurred in Chilton County, in which case venue would also be
proper in that county.  
The complaint filed by the Board in the Chilton Circuit
Court sought injunctive relief prohibiting Silver from
practicing chiropractic medicine without being licensed to do
so; preventing Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart from aiding or abetting
Silver's unlawful practice of chiropractic medicine; and
1050980
10
preventing 
the 
defendants 
from 
disseminating 
any 
advertisement
without 
Dr. 
Havel 
and 
Dr. 
Hart 
first 
approving 
the
advertisement. 
 
These 
alleged 
"act[s] 
or 
omission[s]
complained of" necessarily occurred in Montgomery County,
where Sturbridge Chiropractic is located and where Dr. Havel
and Dr. Hart are employed, and not in Chilton County, where
the individual defendants filed their answers to the
administrative complaints.  Therefore, venue as to the
individual defendants is proper in Montgomery County, and not
Chilton County.
B. The Corporate Defendant
The Board amended its complaint in the circuit court to
add as a defendant Silver Chiropractic Group, the holder of
the license for Sturbridge Chiropractic.  Section 6-3-7, Ala.
Code 1975, provides, in part, as follows:
"(a) All civil actions against corporations may
be brought in any of the following counties:
"(1) 
In 
the 
county 
in 
which 
a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or
1050980
11
"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is
an entity other than an individual, where
the plaintiff had its principal office in
this state, at the time of the accrual of
the cause of action, if such corporation
does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence; or
"(4) If subdivision[] (1), (2), or (3)
do[es] not apply, in any county in which
the corporation was doing business by agent
at the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."   
The defendants argue that Silver Chiropractic Group does
not do business in Chilton County; therefore, they argue,
venue is proper in Montgomery County where Silver Chiropractic
Group has its principal place of business.  The Board relies
on § 6-3-7(a)(3) and (4), and argues that Silver Chiropractic
Group does business in Chilton County because its application
for a license and for renewals of its license are submitted to
the Board's offices, which are located in Chilton County; any
funds paid in connection with licensing are sent to and
received at the Board's offices in Chilton County; any
meetings of the Board are conducted at its offices in Chilton
County; and any dealings between the Board and its licensees
–- for example, any letters, telephone calls, and electronic
1050980
12
mail received at or sent from the Board's offices –- are
conducted in Chilton County.
"This Court has stated that '"[a] corporation 'does
business' in a county for purposes of § 6-3-7 if, with some
regularity, it performs there some of the business functions
for which it was created."'" Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc.,
859 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Wiginton,
743 So. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn Ex parte
SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa, N.A., 619 So. 2d 1356, 1358
(Ala. 1993)). The only business function for which Silver
Chiropractic Group was created is to provide chiropractic
services.  The affidavits filed by the defendants indicate
that those chiropractic services are performed only in
Montgomery County.  Once the defendants made a prima facie
showing that they did not do business in Chilton County, the
burden then shifted to the Board to prove that the defendants
did in fact conduct business in Chilton County. The Board
failed 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
defendants 
performed
chiropractic services in Chilton County.  Accordingly, venue
as to Silver Chiropractic Group is proper in Montgomery
County.
1050980
13
We conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion
in denying the defendants' motion to transfer this action to
the Montgomery Circuit Court and that the defendants have
demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they seek.  Ex
parte Sawyer, supra.  Therefore, we grant the defendants'
petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to
vacate its order denying the defendants' motion to transfer
and to enter an new order transferring the Board's action to
the Montgomery Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.