Title: DUMONT v WICKENS BROS CONSTRUCTIO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 14564 IN THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MXIYiP7A 1979 PIERRE DUO?T (deceased) VIRGINIA m, C l a h t and Appellant, and AE;TNA FIRE - , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: Wrkers ' Ccanpensation Court Hon. W i l l i a m E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Torger S. Oaas argued, Lewistuwn, Mntana For Respondent : Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Mntana Sulmnitted: June 6, 1979 Decided : AU G - 9 1 9 7 9 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Through a hearing b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation Court on December 1, 1977, claimant, V i r g i n i a Dumont, sought compensation b e n e f i t s f o r t h e d e a t h of h e r husband which she a l l e g e d was t h e r e s u l t of an i n j u r y he r e c e i v e d i n t h e c o u r s e and scope of h i s employment by Wickens Bros. Construc- t i o n Company on October 12, 1976. The Workers' Compensation Court denied t h e c l a i m . Claimant p e t i t i o n e d f o r a r e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e lower c o u r t , and o r a l argument was heard a s t o whether a rehearing should be granted. By o r d e r dated and f i l e d on September 29, 1978, t h e Workers' Compensation Court denied c l a i m a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r a rehearing. On October 31, 1978, 31 days a f t e r t h e d a t e of d e n i a l of t h e r e h e a r i n g , t h e Workers' Compensation Court received and f i l e d c l a i m a n t ' s n o t i c e of appeal t o t h i s Court. Respondent insurance company moved t o d i s m i s s t h i s appeal on t h e ground t h a t t h i s Court l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n because claimant f a i l e d t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal w i t h i n t h e t i m e allowed by law. This Court ordered t h e appeal set f o r o r a l argument and t h e motion t o d i s m i s s a s w e l l as t h e m e r i t s of t h e appeal were argued. P i e r r e (Pete) Dumont d i e d on o r about October 12, 1976, of a h e a r t a t t a c k i n h i s bed i n h i s trailer home which had been moved t o a job s i t e near Forsyth, Montana, from ~ u m o n t ' s home i n Lewistown. H i s body was discovered i n bed by o t h e r s who i n v e s t i g a t e d when he d i d n o t r e p o r t f o r work. On Octo- b e r 14, 1976, a n autopsy w a s performed on t h e body of t h e deceased. The f i n a l anatomical d i a g n o s i s contained i n such autopsy r e p o r t r e v e a l s t h e following f i n d i n g s : " I . Marked s t e n o s i n g a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s of coronary arteries with: "A. Recent thrombosis of p o s t e r i o r r i g h t coronary a r t e r y . "B. Old occlusion, a n t e r i o r descending branch o f l e f t coronary a r t e r y . "C. N o g r o s s evidence of r e c e n t o r p a s t myo- c a r d i a l i n f a r c t i o n . "11. Hyperemia of lungs and l i v e r . "111. Chronic pulmonary emphysema. " I V . Obesity. "V. Compression f r a c t u r e of f i r s t lumbar v e r t e b r a , c l i n i c a l . " I n h e r claim, claimant a l l e g e d t h a t t h e deceased was subjected by h i s job t o unusual s t r a i n and s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y a s defined i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA, and t h a t such i n j u r y a r o s e o u t of and w a s i n t h e course of h i s employment. The claim f o r compensation l i s t e d t h e d a t e of such a l l e g e d i n j u r y a s October 12, 1976. A t t h e hearing s e v e r a l l a y witnesses w e r e c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y concerning t h e deceased's job a c t i v i t i e s and p a r t i c u - l a r l y concerning h i s a c t i v i t i e s on October 1 2 , 1976. I n g e n e r a l such witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s a c t i v i t i e s on t h e day of h i s d e a t h w e r e q u i t e normal. Claimant, who w a s n o t p r e s e n t on t h e job site on Octo- b e r 1 2 , 1976, attempted t o p a i n t an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t pic- t u r e . She t e s t i f i e d i n considerable d e t a i l about t h e d u t i e s , t h e long hours, and stresses and s t r a i n s t h a t t h e deceased was subjected t o during t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n season of 1976. However, on cross-examination she admitted t h a t t h e deceased, a n employee of Wickens Bros. Construction Company f o r many y e a r s , was subjected i n preceding y e a r s t o s i m i l a r stresses and s t r a i n s and worked long hours, i n c l u d i n g weekends. Claimant f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e deceased, on J u l y 21, 1976, s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y t o h i s back and l e g i n an on- the-job i n c i d e n t and was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r about t h r e e days following which he remained home f o r one week. Claimant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e deceased returned t o work before he was released by h i s physician and worked with pain. She s t a t e d t h a t she spent t i m e on t h e job site s o she could a s s i s t with d r i v i n g and t r e a t h i s i n j u r e d leg. She s t a t e d t h a t during September 1976 t h e deceased had been having problems with h i s s l e e p and on occasions when he could n o t s l e e p would a r i s e i n t h e n i g h t and go o u t on t h e job. On October 12, 1976, claimant was n o t on t h e job s i t e a t Forsyth. Over o b j e c t i o n of t h e respondent, claimant w a s allowed t o t e s t i f y t h a t on t h e morning of October 12, 1976, her husband c a l l e d her a t Lewistown about two hours l a t e r than usual p r i o r t o h i s t r i p t o B i l l i n g s . She s t a t e d t h a t he seemed upset and had s t a t e d t o her t h a t " a l l h e l l broke loose." When asked what had happened, he s t a t e d t h a t it would take t o o long t o explain and he would do so on t h e weekend. She f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he departed from h i s customary statement i n c l o s i n g a telephone conversation by saying goodbye without saying t h a t he loved her. Claimant was unable t o explain what t h e deceased w a s r e f e r r i n g t o i n h i s phone coversation. She s t a t e d t h a t she had attempted t o determine from o t h e r employees what had occurred t o g i v e r i s e t o t h e statement made t o her by h e r husband on t h e telephone b u t had learned nothing. Respondent insurance company s t a t e s t h a t t h e c r u c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e events of October 1 2 , 1976, was explained by t h e medical witness. D r . H o l l i s K. Lefever, t e s t i f y i n g on behalf of claimant, was provided with a copy of t h e autopsy r e p o r t . H e was asked, over respondent's continuing o b j e c t i o n , t o respond t o a hypothetical question based i n l a r g e degree on c e r t a i n disputed f a c t s of t h e case and, respondent contends, on c e r t a i n f a c t s which were n o t i n evidence. The hypothetical question asked of D r . Lefever contained reference t o t h e deceased's back i n j u r y of J u l y 2 1 , 1976; it contained reference t o an a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t n i n e days before t h e d e a t h when t h e deceased loaded some a n t i - f r e e z e i n t o h i s pickup; it contained reference t o an a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t two days before t h e death when t h e deceased a l l e g e d l y h u r t himself while loading a r a d i a t o r i n t o h i s pickup; and it contained reference t o c l a i m a n t ' s version of t h e events of October 12, 1976, and t h e deceased's t r i p t o B i l l i n g s f o r p a r t s . On cross-examination, D r . Lefever s t a t e d : "Q. Doctor, i n t h e hypothetical t h a t M r . Oaas asked you t o assume, i s t h e r e any one i n c i d e n t o r any one day i n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n given t o you, t h a t you could p o i n t t o a s t h e cause of t h i s death, o r i s it j u s t a build-up of a l l of t h e s e things? A. W e l l , I think t h e only day s t a t e d i n t h e hypothetical question i n which t h e r e was any chain of events t h a t I might re- l a t e t o t h i s is, i f I r e c a l l t h e hypothetical question c o r r e c t l y , concerning t h e hasty t r i p t o B i l l i n g s and t h e handling of heavy equip- ment. . ." Thus, argues respondent, D r . Lefever, c l a i m a n t ' s e x p e r t witness, made t h e events of October 12, 1976, c r i t i c a l t o t h e case. Throughout t h e r e b u t t a l testimony of D r . Lefever, he k e p t r e f e r r i n g t o t h e events of " t h a t day"--referring t o October 12, 1976. D r . Stephen Cade, respondent's e x p e r t witness, when asked t h e same hypothetical question a s had been asked of D r . Lefever, d i d n o t f e e l t h a t t h e r e was any probable r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e events of October 1 2 and t h e death. However, he d i d explain t h a t t h e c l o s e r i n t i m e t h a t events of physical o r emotional stress were t o t h e death, t h e more l i k e l i h o o d t h e r e was of some r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two. Based on t h e above, t h e hearings examiner summarized t h e testimony surrounding t h e events of October 12, 1976, a s follows: "18. That f o u r witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t they had seen and t a l k e d with P e t e Dumont on t h e day o f h i s death b u t t h a t none of them observed him t o be showing any s i g n s of stress o r s t r a i n , p h y s i c a l o r emotional. None of t h o s e witnesses w e r e aware o f any unusual problems a t t h e job, and none of them r e c a l l Pierre Dumont having mentioned any unusual problems. "19. That t h e only evidence t h a t t h e deceased was undergoing unusual stress o r s t r a i n i s t h a t from t h e testimony of t h e claimant, t h e widow of Pierre Dumont, who s t a n d s t o g a i n , and t h a t l i t t l e o r none of t h a t testimony i s corroborated by o t h e r evidence." The following i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on appeal: 1. Should t h i s appeal be dismissed s i n c e t h i s Court l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n because claimant f a i l e d t o timely f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal? 2. Did t h e Workers' Compensation Court err i n denying b e n e f i t s t o claimant under t h e Workers' Compensation Act? The f i r s t i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t c l a i m a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o timely f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal. This Court has never been c a l l e d upon t o r u l e i n a c a s e involving t h e i s s u e of t h e t i m e l i n e s s o f f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal from a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court. S e c t i o n 39-71-2904 MCA provides: "Notwithstanding 2-4-701 through 2-4-704, an appeal from a f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e workers' compensation judge s h a l l be f i l e d d i r e c t l y with t h e supreme c o u r t of Montana i n t h e manner pro- vided by law f o r appeals from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n c i v i l cases." A s t o what c o n s t i t u t e s a " f i n a l d e c i s i o n " of t h e Workers' Compensation judge, Rule 19 of t h e Workers' Compensation Court Rules ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s WCCR) provides: "19A. The Court w i l l , a f t e r t h e hearing, i s s u e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law and a n o r d e r s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e C o u r t ' s d e t e r - mination of t h e disputed i s s u e s . The p a r t i e s t o t h e d i s p u t e may consider t h i s o r d e r as a f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e Court f o r appeals pur- poses. However, any p a r t y t o t h e d i s p u t e may r e q u e s t a rehearing before t h e Court w i t h i n twenty (20) days a f t e r a p a r t y r e c e i v e s a copy of t h e o r d e r , and i f any p a r t y submits a re- q u e s t f o r rehearing, t h e order i s s u e d by t h e Court s h a l l n o t b e considered a f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e Court f o r appeals purposes. "19B. I f a r e q u e s t f o r a rehearing i s f i l e d , t h e p a r t i e s requesting t h e rehearing s h a l l set f o r t h s p e c i f i c a l l y and i n f u l l d e t a i l t h e grounds upon which t h e p a r t y c o n s i d e r s t h e o r d e r t o be i n c o r r e c t . I f t h e Court denies t h e r e q u e s t f o r rehearing, t h e o r i g i n a l order i s s u e d by t h e Court s h a l l be considered t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e Court as of t h e day t h e rehearing i s denied. I f a rehearing i s granted t h e matter w i l l b e set f o r hearing. The matter w i l l be determined by t h e testimony taken a t t h e i n i t i a l hearing and a t t h e rehearing. Af- ter t h e rehearing, t h e Court w i l l i s s u e an o r d e r s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e C o u r t ' s f i n a l determination of t h e disputed i s s u e s . " F i n a l l y , Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "The t i m e w i t h i n which an appeal from a judg- ment o r an o r d e r must b e taken s h a l l b e 30 days from t h e e n t r y thereof . . ." The f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w i n t h i s m a t t e r w e r e adopted by t h e Workers' Compensation Court by o r d e r dated June 19, 1978. Claimant had 30 days t h e r e a f t e r w i t h i n which t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal (Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P.) o r 20 days w i t h i n which t o f i l e a r e q u e s t f o r rehearing (Rule 19, WCCR). O n June 29, 1978, according t o t h e certi- f i c a t e of mailing, claimant mailed t o t h e c l e r k of t h e Workers' Compensation Court, a r e q u e s t f o r rehearing. The f i l i n g of a r e q u e s t f o r rehearing suspended t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appeal. T h e r e a f t e r , respondent f i l e d formal o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of c l a i m a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r rehearing, and claimant, i n response t o such o b j e c t i o n s , f i l e d an amendment t o her r e q u e s t f o r rehearing. On August 23, 1978, t h e Workers' Compensation Court heard o r a l argument on whether a rehear- i n g should be granted. The Workers' Compensation Court e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r denying rehearing and r e t u r n i n g t h e f i l e t o t h e Division of Workers' Compensation on September 29, 1978. I n a d d i t i o n t o denying t h e r e h e a r i n g , t h i s o r d e r had t h e e f f e c t of making t h e o r i g i n a l o r d e r of t h e Workers' Compensation Court t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t f o r appeal purposes a s of t h e day t h e r e h e a r i n g was denied-- September 29, 1978. Thus, t h e l a s t suspended day f o r t h e f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appeal was September 29, 1978, and c l a i m a n t ' s f i r s t day t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal was, and t h e t i m e l i m i t t o f i l e t h e n o t i c e of appeal commenced running, a s of September 30, 1978. Since September has only 30 days, t h e 30-day t i m e l i m i t of claimant t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal expired on October 29, 1978. However, s i n c e October 29, 1978, was a Sunday, it i s n o t counted and t h e 30-day t i m e l i m i t t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal would e x p i r e on October 30, 1978. I t was n o t u n t i l t h e f i n a l day of t h e appeal p e r i o d , on October 30, 1978, t h a t claimant mailed h e r n o t i c e of appeal f o r f i l i n g , and t h e same was n o t received by t h e c l e r k of t h e Workers' Compensation Court u n t i l Tuesday, October 31, 1978. Under Rule 2 0 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., a n o t i c e of appeal i s n o t deemed f i l e d u n l e s s t h e n o t i c e i s a c t u a l l y received by t h e c l e r k w i t h i n t h e t i m e f i x e d f o r f i l i n g . Thus, t h e n o t i c e of appeal w a s n o t received f o r f i l i n g by t h e c l e r k of t h e Workers' Compensation Court u n t i l t h e day a f t e r t h e appeal t i m e expired. Accordingly, it i s r e s p o n d e n t ' s posi- t i o n t h a t claimant has n o t timely p e r f e c t e d h e r appeal; t h a t t h i s Court i s w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n t h e appeal; and t h a t claimant i s barred from seeking t o have t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n changed o r i n any way reversed o r modified. Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., which i s made a p p l i c a b l e t o a Workers' Compensation Court proceeding by s e c t i o n 39-71- 2904 MCA, provides: ". . . An appeal s h a l l be taken by f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . F a i l u r e of an a p p e l l a n t t o t a k e any s t e p o t h e r than t h e timely f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appeal does n o t a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e appeal, b u t i s ground only f o r such a c t i o n a s t h e Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include d i s - missal of t h e appeal." Rule 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P., i s patterned a f t e r Rule 3 of t h e Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The second sentence of Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., is i d e n t i c a l t o a l i k e provi- s i o n of Rule 3 ( a ) of t h e Federal Rules. 9 Xoore's Federal P r a c t i c e 11203.10 s t a t e s : "The n o t i c e of appeal i s f i l e d with t h e c l e r k when it i s received i n t o h i s custody and c o n t r o l . Since timely f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e i s held t o be e s s e n t i a l t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t of appeals, t h e p r e c i s e t i m e t h a t t h e n o t i c e was f i l e d can be of overwhelming importance. The most c e r t a i n way t o e f f e c t timely f i l i n g i s t o d e l i v e r t h e n o t i c e t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e c l e r k personally on o r before t h e d a t e f i x e d f o r f i l i n g . But s i n c e personal d e l i v e r y i s o f t e n inconvenient and expensive, mailing i s very frequently r e s o r t e d t o . When d e l i v e r y i s t o be e f f e c t e d by mail, it must be borne i n mind t h a t t h e n o t i c e must be received by t h e c l e r k w i t h i n t h e t i m e allowed f o r i t s f i l i n g . This i s q u i t e contrary t o t h e usual r u l e respecting t h e s e r v i c e of papers required t o be served, which i s t h a t timely mailing c o n s t i t u t e s timely service. " I t i s likewise s t a t e d i n 9 Moore's Federal P r a c t i c e 11204.02: "Discussion of t h e time f o r appeal must begin by d i r e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o a h o s t of cases hold- i n g with unanimity t h a t unless a n appeal i s timely taken t h e reviewing c o u r t lacks j u r i s - d i c t i o n t o hear it. Although t h a t holding i s n o t a s l o g i c a l l y compelling a s it once was, t h e n e c e s s i t y of providing a p r e c i s e l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e p o i n t of t i m e a t which l i t i g a t i o n comes t o an end s t r o n g l y m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t i t s overthrow. A s t h e Committee Note accompanying Rule 3 [of t h e F e d e r a l Rules] admonishes: " ' R u l e 3 and Rule 4 combine t o r e q u i r e t h a t a n o t i c e of appeal be f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r e s c r i b e d f o r t a k i n g an appeal. Because t h e timely f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appeal i s "mandatory and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l " , United S t a t e s v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960), compliance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h o s e r u l e s i s of t h e utmost importance.' "So c a r e must b e taken t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e n o t i c e of appeal i s f i l e d with t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h i n t h e t i m e f i x e d f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r appeal by Rule 4 . . ." T h i s is l i k e w i s e t h e l a w of Montana. The above-mentioned a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e c i t e d w i t h approval and s p e c i f i c a l l y adopted by t h e Montana Supreme Court i n connection w i t h a Workers' Compensation appeal b e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation judge i n L e i t h e i s e r v. Montana S t a t e P r i s o n (1973), 161 Yont. 343, 505 P.2d 1203, where t h i s Court dismissed a n appeal f i l e d by t h e defendant upon t h e grounds t h a t t h e n o t i c e of appeal had been f i l e d t h r e e days l a t e . Respondent argues t h a t t h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y followed t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e above-stated r u l e s many t i m e s . S t a t e v. Wibaux County Bank (1929), 85 Mont. 532, 281 P. 341; Reid v. District Court (1953), 126 Mont. 489, 255 P.2d 693; McVay v. McVay (1954), 128 Mont. 31, 270 P.2d 393; Jackson v. Tinker (1972), 161 Mont. 51, 504 P.2d 692; F i r s t National of Lewistown v . Fray (1978), Mont . I Claimant contends t h a t respondent has f a i l e d t o compute t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of appeal c o r r e c t l y . Claimant i n i t i a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e Montana Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1968, approximately e i g h t y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e p r e s e n t day Workers' Compensation A c t ( e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1975). Therefore, claimant argues, t h e r e i s no i n t e r p l a y between t h e Rules of Appellate C i v i l Procedure and t h e Workers' Compensation A c t even though appeals from a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court a r e taken d i r e c t l y t o t h e Supreme Court i n t h e manner pro- vided by l a w f o r appeals from a District Court i n c i v i l c a s e s . S e c t i o n 39-71-2904 MCA. The obvious example of t h i s i s t h a t it i s n o t even e x a c t l y c l e a r from a reading of Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., where t h e n o t i c e of appeal is t o be f i l e d i n t h e case of an a p p e a l from a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court. Of course, t h e reasonable and common s e n s e understanding and p r a c t i c e i s t o f i l e it w i t h t h e Workers' Compensation Court, t r e a t i n g it, i n e f f e c t , a s a " D i s t r i c t Court" w i t h i n t h e scope and purpose of Rule 4 ( a ) . Respondent c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t proceedings i n t h e Workers' Compensation Court a r e n o t governed by t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure and t h e r e f o r e is t e c h n i c a l l y c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t Rule 77(d) and Rule 5, M.R.Civ.P., have no a p p l i c a t i o n here. Respondent's argument i g n o r e s t h e f a c t t h a t proceedings i n t h e Workers' Compensation Court a r e governed by t h e Montana Administrative Procedure A c t by d i r e c t mandate of s e c t i o n 39-71-2903 MCA. Thus, s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA of t h e Administrative Procedure A c t a p p l i e s . The p e r t i n e n t p a r t of t h i s s t a t u t e s t a t e s : ". . . P a r t i e s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d e i t h e r per- s o n a l l y o r by m a i l of any d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r 11 . . . This p r o v i s i o n o f t h e above-cited s t a t u t e is i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 7 7 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., i n s o f a r a s r e q u i r i n g n o t i c e of d e c i s i o n s i n Workers' Compensation c a s e s . W e hold, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a person who appeals from a f i n a l decision of t h e Workers' Compensation Court should i n a l l fundamental f a i r n e s s be given t h e same b e n e f i t of t h a t provision of Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., which s t a t e s t h a t : ". . . except t h a t i n cases where s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment is required by Rule 77(d) of t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Proce- dure t h e t i m e s h a l l be 30 days from t h e s e r v i c e of n o t i c e of e n t r y of judgment." This would mean, a s i s already t h e c a s e where Rule 7 7 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., i s a p p l i c a b l e , t h a t when s e r v i c e of t h e n o t i c e of t h e f i n a l decision of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s made a s mandated by s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA and t h a t s e r v i c e was made by mail, t h e provisions of Rule 2 1 ( c ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., a r e automatically p u t i n t o play adding t h r e e days t o t h e prescribed 30-day t i m e l i m i t f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of appeal. Thus, when one c o r r e c t l y adds t h e t i m e l i m i t s e t by Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., a s extended by Rule 2 1 ( c ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., t h e 30th day from September 29, 1978, i s October 2 9 , 1978. Since t h a t day happened t o be a Sunday, Rule 2 1 ( a ) , M.R.App. Civ.P., comes i n t o play making t h e 30th day October 30, 1978. However, a s previously s t a t e d , Rule 2 1 ( c ) comes i n t o play adding t h r e e days t o t h e prescribed period and t h e 33rd and f i n a l day f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of appeal was November 2 , 1978. Thus, c l a i m a n t ' s appeal was timely--not one day l a t e as respondent c l a i m s . The second i s s u e concerns t h e m e r i t s of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i n denying c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s . This Court s t a t e d , a t an e a r l y d a t e , i n Birdwell v. Three Forks Portland Cement Co. (1935), 98 Mont. 483, 495, " I n order f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e v a i l it was necessary f o r her t o prove by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t Birdwell s u f f e r e d an indus- t r i a l accident, and t h a t t h e i n j u r y w a s t h e proximate cause of h i s death." Perhaps t h e most s u c c i n c t statement of t h e r u l e i s found i n Aho v. Burkland Studs (1969), 153 Mont. 1, 7, 452 P.2d 415, 418, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The claimant has t h e burden of proving h i s c a s e . . ." Not only must claimant prove h e r c a s e by a preponderance o f t h e evidence, she must do s o by a preponderance of t h e p r o b a t i v e c r e d i b l e evidence. I n LaForrest v. Safeway S t o r e s , Inc. (1966), 147 Mont. 431, 437, 414 P.2d 200, 203, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The claimant has t h e burden t o e s t a b l i s h by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t h e r condi- t i o n r e s u l t e d from a n i n j u r y and n o t from a d i s e a s e . [ C i t a t i o n omitted.] She has n o t sus- t a i n e d t h e burden of proof . . . By a d r o i t questioning, c l a i m a n t ' s counsel was a b l e t o g e t D r . Davidson t o admit t o a ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' of a supraspinatus tendon tear. However, such a ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' i s n o t probative c r e d i b l e testi- mony and w i l l n o t , without more, supply evi- dence. " The burden was upon claimant t o e s t a b l i s h by a pre- ponderance of t h e probative c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t h e r husband had died a s t h e r e s u l t of an i n j u r y which he sus- t a i n e d i n t h e course and scope of h i s employment. The Workers' Compensation Court heard extended testimony from many witnesses. The testimony was c o n f l i c t i n g . The lower c o u r t had t h e opportunity t o observe t h e demeanor of t h e witnesses and t o judge t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . Following t h e hearing, t h e Workers' Compensation Court e n t e r e d very de- t a i l e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w . A f t e r c a r e f u l l y considering t h e evidence, t h e lower c o u r t r u l e d i n favor of t h e i n s u r e r and denied b e n e f i t s t o claimant. That d e c i s i o n comes t o t h i s Court with t h e presumption t h a t it i s c o r r e c t . Sedlacek v . Ahrens (1974), 165 Mont. 479, 485, 530 P.2d 424, 427; Montana Farm Service Co. v. Marquart (1978), Mont. , 578 P.2d 315, 316, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068. The scope of review of a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court upon appeal has been s t a t e d many t i m e s . The r u l e i s w e l l summarized i n Jensen v . Argonaut Insurance Company (1978), Mont . , 582 P.2d 1191, 1193, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068, i n t h e following language: "The s t a n d a r d of review a p p l i c a b l e i n d e t e r - mining t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o sup- p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Workers' Compensation Court has been s t a t e d i n t h i s language: "'Our f u n c t i o n i n reviewing a d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation Court i s t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o sup- p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions of t h a t c o u r t . W e cannot s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o t h e weight of evidence on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . Where t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Workers' Compensation Court, t h i s Court cannot o v e r t u r n t h e d e c i s i o n . ' S t e f f e s v. 93 Leasing Co. I n c . (U.S.F.&G.) (1978), Mont. , 580 P.2d 450, 452, 35 St.Rep. 816, 818." Applying t h i s standard t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e respondent argues it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t must b e affirmed. There was a sharp c o n f l i c t i n t h e f a c t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e e v e n t s of October 12, 1976. I n i t s statement of t h e c a s e , respondent set f o r t h a summary of t h e testimony of each witness t o t h e e v e n t s of October 12, 1976, taken almost verbatim from t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t of t h e lower c o u r t . Following each sentence a r e c i t a t i o n s t o t h e record which support t h e f i n d i n g . Each and every f a c t found by t h e lower c o u r t i s amply supported i n t h e record. A t t h e bottom l i n e , t h e lower c o u r t chose t o b e l i e v e t h e testimony of Tom Wickens, Joseph Wickens, Myron Oakland, and Arlyn McJunkin r a t h e r than t h a t of claimant. The d e c i s i o n as t o t h e weight of t h e evidence on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t i s w i t h i n t h e province of t h e Workers' Compensation Court and where, as here, it i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, t h i s Court cannot o v e r t u r n t h a t d e c i s i o n . The d e c i s i o n of t h e lower c o u r t was a l s o c o r r e c t i n its conclusion t h a t claimant f a i l e d t o prove a compensable i n j u r y and t h a t such a n i n j u r y caused t h e d e a t h of h e r husband. For an i n j u r y t o be compensable under t h e Workers' Compensation A c t , it must m e e t t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements of t h e s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA d e f i n e s i n j u r y a s : " ' I n j u r y ' o r ' i n j u r e d ' means: " (1) A t a n g i b l e happening of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e from an unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n , r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l phy- s i c a l harm, and such p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n a s a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding d i s e a s e n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y . . ." A d i s c u s s i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s an i n j u r y has r e c e i v e d a g r e a t d e a l of a t t e n t i o n . Lupien v. IYlont. Record Publishing Co. (1964), 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455; M i l l e r v . C i t y of B i l l i n g s (1976), 171 Mont. 91, 555 P.2d 747; Hurlbut v. V o l l s t e d t Kerr Co. (1975), 167 Mont. 303, 538 P.2d 344; E r h a r t v. G r e a t Western Sugar Co. (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 546 The medical evidence i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e supports t h e conclusion t h a t t h e deceased died as t h e r e s u l t of a d i s e a s e process, p r o g r e s s i v e i n n a t u r e , t h a t i s n o t " t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y . " I n h i s r e b u t t a l testimony, D r . Lefever a c c u r a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e testimony of D r . Cade as follows: ". . . The f a c t o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h a t D r . Cade s a i d t h a t t h e d e a t h r e s u l t e d from t h e normal sequence of e v e n t s from t h e d i s e a s e . " When pressed on t h i s p o i n t , D r . Lefever s t a t e d : "Q. What evidence i s t h e r e i n t h e record--by t h e record, I mean t h e testimony t h a t you w e r e a b l e t o observe and hear a t t h e hearing on De- cember lst, t o s u p p o r t a medical opinion t o a reasonable degree of medical c e r t a i n t y t h a t M r . Dumont's d e a t h w a s merely t h e t e r m i n a l e v e n t i n t h e series of d i s e a s e processes? A. Well, t h e o r i g i n a l testimony showed t h e e x t e n t of t h e a t h e r o s c l e r o t i c process i n h i s a r t e r y , t h e presence of a t h e r o s c l e r o t i c plaques and previ- o u s l y d i s e a s e d v e s s e l s , and I t h i n k t h a t it would be a l o g i c a l conclusion t h a t a t some t i m e t h i s d i s e a s e process would have progressed t o t h i s e v e n t o r a s i m i l a r event a t sometime. "Q. Is t h e r e any way t h a t medical s c i e n c e can p o i n t a f i n g e r a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e and say when t h i s w i l l occur? A. No, I d o n ' t b e l i v e so. I t h i n k t h a t f r e q u e n t l y w e see t h i s d i s e a s e a s ad- vanced o r more advanced than t h i s and see peo- p l e who s u r v i v e many years. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e i s any way of p r e d i c t i n g w i t h c e r t a i n t y what t h e outcomes a r e . . ." D r . Cade was a l i t t l e more emphatic. H e t e s t i f i e d : ". . . it seems abundantly c l e a r t o m e t h a t he d i e d of a d i s e a s e process t h a t had been occurring f o r y e a r s and y e a r s and t h a t he had reached t h e t y p i c a l end of t h a t d i s e a s e process." Respondent b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t case i n t h e i n s t a n t m a t t e r is Hurlbut v. V o l l s t e d t Kerr Co., supra. Hurlbut was decided a f t e r t h e 1967 amendment t o t h e i n j u r y d e f i n i t i o n which added t h e words " o r unusual s t r a i n " t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of an i n j u r y contained i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA. The f a c t s of Hurlbut a r e s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e and respondent submits t h a t Hurlbut i s c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Hurlbut t h e claimant was about 59 y e a r s o l d and had been employed by t h e lumber m i l l f o r t e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e a l l e g e d accident--the l a s t e i g h t of t h o s e t e n y e a r s a s a superintendent. The p o l i c y of t h e employer was t o n o t o p e r a t e t h e m i l l when t h e temperature was t o o c o l d f o r t h e men and t h e machinery, and, i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of December 1972, t h e m i l l had been s h u t down due t o t h e cold f o r more t h a n a week. O n t h e afternoon of January 5, 1973, t h e temperature r o s e t o about -12OF and t h e owner of t h e m i l l ordered claimant t o s t a r t up t h e o p e r a t i o n t h e n e x t day, and t h e claimant began c o n t a c t i n g men t o r e p o r t f o r work. The n e x t morning, January 6, 1973, claimant a r r i v e d a t work and waited i n t h e o f f i c e f o r telephone c a l l s from t h e employees t o determine how many men would r e p o r t . The temperature i n t h e o f f i c e was 50°F and claimant had h i s c o a t on. The o u t s i d e temperature was -6OF, with low wind v e l o c i t y . While s i t t i n g i n t h e o f f i c e , t h e claimant became d i z z y and went o u t s i d e t o see i f a l i t t l e f r e s h a i r would h e l p , b u t then became nauseated. H e went home and h i s w i f e drove him t o t h e h o s p i t a l where h i s d o c t o r diagnosed a myocardial i n f a r c - t i o n ( h e a r t a t t a c k ) . The claimant argued t h a t he was en- t i t l e d t o compensation because t h e m i l l had never b e f o r e been operated i n weather a s c o l d as it was t h a t morning. H e maintained t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d "unusual s t r a i n " because it was a unique, new, d i f f e r e n t and unusual demand placed upon claimant by t h e company. This Court, speaking through J u s t i c e Daly, affirmed a d e n i a l of compensation b e n e f i t s , s t a t i n g : "Any i n j u r y , t o be compensable under t h e Work- men's Compensation A c t , must m e e t t h e d e f i n i - t i o n a l requirements of t h e s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, d e f i n e s i n j u r y a s " ' a t a n g i b l e happening of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e from a n unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n , r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l phy- s i c a l harm, and such p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n a s a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding d i s e a s e n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y * * * ' "Thus, t h e r e are two elements i n t h e s t a t u t e which must b e m e t (1) t h e r e must be a t a n g i b l e happening of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e , and ( 2 ) t h i s must be shown t o be t h e cause of p h y s i c a l harm. "Aside from t h e testimony t h a t it was a few degrees c o l d e r than normal s t a r t i n g temperature and t h e m i l l had n o t previously operated i n temperatures t h a t c o l d , t h e r e was no testimony t h i s imposed upon claimant any duty which was unusual i n kind o r amount. The d u t i e s performed by claimant on t h e day b e f o r e h i s a t t a c k and on t h e day of t h e a t t a c k , January 6, 1973, w e r e d u t i e s h e had performed f o r t h e previous e i g h t y e a r s a s p l a n t superintendent. Simply opening a m i l l on a day c o l d e r than w a s custo- mary, w i t h no i n o r d i n a t e kind o r amount of work on h i s p a r t , cannot be s a i d t o c o n s t i t u t e 'a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e . ' Claimant has f a i l e d t o c a r r y t h e burden of proof t h a t he was i n j u r e d , w i t h i n t h e meanins of t h e s t a t u t e . " Hurlbut, 167 Mont. a t 306-07, 538 P.2d a t 346. Applying t h e test enunciated i n Hurlbut t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , it would seem t h a t weak a s t h e f a c t s were i n Hurlbut, they w e r e s t r o n g e r than t h o s e i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Claim- a n t ' s own medical witness s t a t e d : "Well, I t h i n k t h e only day s t a t e d i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n i n which t h e r e was any chain of e v e n t s t h a t I might relate t o t h i s i s , i f I r e c a l l t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n c o r r e c t l y , concerning t h e h a s t y t r i p t o B i l l i n g s [which occurred on October 12, 19761 . . ." Thus, D r . Lefever r u l e d o u t any p o s s i b l e c a u s a l connection between t h e d e a t h and any of t h e e v e n t s which a l l e g e d l y preceded October 12, 1976. A s e a r c h of t h e e n t i r e record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e anything unusual t h a t occurred t o t h e deceased on October 12, 1976, o r even, f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h a t t h e deceased's t r i p t o B i l l i n g s was "hasty." The only testimony t o t h e c o n t r a r y w a s t h e widow's testimony con- cerning h e r husband's phone c a l l t o h e r . I n her b r i e f , claimant relies on t h e c a s e s of Jones v. B a i r ' s Cafe (1968), 152 Mont. 13, 445 P.2d 923; Robins v. Ogle (1971), 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692; and Love v. Ralph's Food S t o r e (1973), 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598. Claimant argues, i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t t h e s e c a s e s only r e q u i r e a showing of some "unusual s t r a i n , " e i t h e r from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of a cause o r e f f e c t , t o m e e t t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements of an i n j u r y under t h e a c t . Claimant's a n a l y s i s t o t a l l y i g n o r e s t h e independent requirement t h a t a s t r a i n must r e s u l t from a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e . The following language from E r h a r t v. G r e a t Western Sugar Co. (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 380-81, 546 P.2d 1055, 1058, q u i c k l y d i s p o s e s of c l a i m a n t ' s argument: "Not only must claimant show an unusual s t r a i n , b u t t h a t t h e s t r a i n must r e s u l t from a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic nature. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] I n Love v. Ralph's Food S t o r e , 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598, w e s t a t e d t h a t Jones and Robins made t h i s r u l e c l e a r . See, a l s o , t h e e a r l i e r cases: Lupien v. Montana Record Publishing Co., 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455; James v. V.K.V. Lumber Co., supra: M i l l e r v - - - Sundance Recreation, I n c . , l ~ l - ~ o n t . 223, 4 4 1 P.2d 194." Claimant must s t i l l prove t h a t h e r husband's d e a t h was t h e r e s u l t of a " t a n g i b l e happening of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e " , which she t o t a l l y f a i l e d t o do. F i n a l l y , i n h e r b r i e f , claimant t a k e s i s s u e w i t h t h e lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s i n connection w i t h t h e medical testi- mony i n t h e c a s e a s it r e l a t e s t o t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between stress and sudden coronary d e a t h . She cites some passages from D r . L e f e v e r ' s o r i g i n a l testimony a t t h e December 1, 1977, hearing which, when taken o u t of c o n t e x t a s they a r e , appear t o support h e r p o s i t i o n . Respondent contends, and w e a g r e e , t h a t claimant i g n o r e s D r . L e f e v e r ' s testimony i n r e b u t t a l which, a s quoted p r e v i o u s l y , was d i f f e r e n t from h i s o r i g i n a l testimony when confronted w i t h t h e testimony of D r . Cade. O n r e b u t t a l , D r . Lefever ad- m i t t e d : " . . . t h e r e i s more than one opinion about t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of stress i n sudden death." On r e d i r e c t exam during t h e r e b u t t a l d e p o s i t i o n , D r . Lefever s t a t e d : "Q. And going back t o what M r . Utick s a i d , i s t h e r e a n a c u t e d i f f e r e n c e of opinion among t h e medical community a s t o t h e cause of t e n s i o n between stress and t h e i n i t i a t i n g e v e n t s and t h e o r i g i n a l hemorrhage? A. Y e s . "Q. There a r e thoughts on t h a t both ways? A. There are more than one opinion about t h e s i g - n i f i c a n c e of stress w i t h r e l a t i o n t o i n t i m a l hemorrhage." A s D r . Cade summarized: ". . . It i s n o t c l e a r what t h e r o l e of chronic stress i s on t h e c a r d i o v a s c u l a r system. I t i s n o t c l e a r whether stress can p l a y a r o l e i n sudden death, i n a c c e l e r a t i o n of coronary a r t e r y d i s e a s e process. The s t u d i e s a r e c o n f l i c t i n g o r t h e problem has n o t been adequately s t u d i e d o r no good study shows t h i s and t h a t o r t h e o t h e r thing. " I n summary, t h e testimony of both d o c t o r s agree t h a t t h e medical community j u s t does n o t know whether stress p l a y s a r o l e i n sudden d e a t h o r a c c e l e r a t e s coronary a r t e r y d i s e a s e . The lower c o u r t had a l l t h e medical testimony b e f o r e it. A review of t h e e n t i r e testimony of both d o c t o r s r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t q u i t e adequately summarized such testimony i n i t s f i n d i n g s and d i d n o t err i n i t s f i n d - i n g s . There was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e c o u r t i n denying b e n e f i t s t o claimant. The judgment of t h e c o u r t is affirmed. W e concur: