Title: Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Sav. Bank

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Sav. Bank1997 WY 132948 P.2d 896Case Number: 97-26Decided: 12/04/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
FRANCIS B. AHEARN,

 Appellant (Defendant),

 

v. 

 

TRI-COUNTY FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, 

formerly known as Tri-County Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County, 

The 
Honorable Barton R. Voigt, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Eric M. 
Alden, Wheatland.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Rex E. 
Johnson of Sherard, Sherard and Johnson, Wheatland.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Francis 
Ahearn appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of Appellee 
Tri-County Federal Savings Bank (the bank).

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Ahearn presents 
the following issues for our review:

 

I. In granting Summary Judgment, may a Court rely 
upon pleadings and affidavits filed after the Summary Judgment 
hearing?

II. If after-filed pleadings are considered, do the 
time limits for notice and opportunity to respond apply?

III. Even if the after-filed pleadings are 
considered, has Tri-County Federal Savings Bank proven it is the record holder 
of the subject mortgage?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Ahearn defaulted 
under the terms of a promissory note and mortgage which he and his ex-wife had 
signed in favor of the bank. The bank sued Ahearn, his ex-wife, and three junior 
lien holders, demanding immediate payment of the entire unpaid 
balance.

 

[¶5]      The bank moved 
for a summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issues of material fact existed 
and that, as a matter of law, it was entitled to be awarded a judgment against 
the Ahearns because they had defaulted on the promissory note and mortgage. 
Ahearn failed to timely respond to the bank's motion for a summary judgment. He 
did, however, appear at the October 30, 1996, hearing during which the district 
court allowed him to address the court. Although Ahearn did not oppose the 
granting of the summary judgment, he was concerned that the bank changed its 
name in 1993 from Tri-County Federal Savings and Loan Association to Tri-County 
Federal Savings Bank. The district court, therefore, ordered the bank to file a 
motion to amend the caption.

 

[¶6]      The bank 
subsequently filed a motion to amend the caption together with an affidavit from 
its vice president/branch manager in which she averred that the bank changed its 
name in 1993. Ahearn responded by sending a letter to the district court, 
stating that "a simple amendment of the caption was not adequate to resolve the 
problem presented in this case." He claimed that the bank was required to 
present documentation to prove that it held an interest in the mortgage. After 
considering the materials before it, the district court granted the motion to 
amend the caption and also granted the motion for a summary judgment. Ahearn 
appeals from the summary judgment order.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual Insurance 
Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Kirkwood, 937 P.2d  at 208. We evaluate 
the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using 
the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Id. We do not accord any deference to 
the district court's decisions on issues of law. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      Ahearn 
essentially claims that the district court improperly granted the bank's motion 
for a summary judgment and that he was, therefore, denied due process of law. 
The bank replies that the district court acted properly and that, even though 
the district court could have granted the summary judgment once Ahearn failed to 
respond to the bank's motion, it gave Ahearn the opportunity to be heard at the 
hearing.

 

[¶9]      The thrust of 
Ahearn's complaint is that the district court should not have considered the 
affidavit which was attached to the motion to amend the caption and that it 
should have conducted a formal hearing on this motion. We disagree. Although the 
district court did not have to hear from Ahearn at the hearing, it chose to do 
so in order to find out what Ahearn's concerns were. In an attempt to assuage 
Ahearn's concern over the bank's name change, the district court ordered the 
bank to move to amend the caption, and the bank did so. The district court 
considered a letter which was sent by Ahearn in response to the motion to amend 
the caption before making its final decision. We do not perceive a denial of due 
process in this case. On the contrary, the district court went out of its way to 
provide Ahearn with an adequate opportunity to be heard. 

 

[¶10]   Furthermore, Ahearn has failed to 
demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced. "`An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.'" Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 
439-40 (Wyo. 1995)). "An error, to be prejudicial, must `cause a miscarriage of 
justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the 
judicial process [or possess] a clear capacity to bring about an unjust 
result.'" Id. (quoting Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wyo. 1994)).

 

[¶11]   The simple fact of the matter is 
that Ahearn defaulted on the promissory note and mortgage to the bank. The 
procedural motion to amend the caption did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact which prevented a summary judgment from being entered. Ahearn has 
failed to present issues which, if they were specifically addressed, would 
justify a reversal of this case. We, therefore, cannot determine that the 
summary judgment was improperly granted.

 

[¶12]   
Affirmed.