Title: Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C.1996 WY 12910 P.2d 566Case Number: 95-110Decided: 01/23/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Richard A. HILTZ, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

ROBERT W. HORN, P.C. and Robert W. Horn, 
individually, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County: 
Hunter Patrick, Judge.

Georg Jensen of Law Offices of Georg Jensen, 
Cheyenne, for Appellant.

Richard E. Day of Williams, Porter, Day 
& Neville, P.C., Casper, for Appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Richard 
Hiltz appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of Appellees 
Robert W. Horn, P.C. and Robert Horn, individually. The district judge found 
that Hiltz's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that no genuine 
issue as to any material fact existed, and that the appellees were entitled to 
have a judgment as a matter of law.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Hiltz presents 
the following issues for our review:

1. Did the district 
court err in concluding that Wyoming has declined to adopt the continuing 
representation doctrine for legal malpractice actions?

2. Did the district 
court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff knew or had 
reason to know that he had a cause of action against the defendant for 
malpractice when there exists a clear dispute as to the material facts which 
would make up such knowledge?

3. Did the district 
court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff knew or had 
reason to know that he had a cause of action against the defendant for 
malpractice when there exists [a] dispute as to whether the defendant concealed 
or failed to disclose material facts which would have given rise to any such 
knowledge on behalf of the plaintiff?

FACTS

[¶4]      This case began 
as a legal malpractice action which was filed on November 29, 1993, against the 
appellees. The action arose out of Horn's legal representation of Hiltz on a 
1983 post-divorce matter.

[¶5]      Hiltz and his 
ex-wife divorced in 1982. The divorce decree required Hiltz to pay child support 
for the couple's two children in the amount of $250 per month per child with 
annual increases of $25 per month per child. Late in August of 1983, Hiltz 
contacted Horn about a petition for an order to show cause which Hiltz's ex-wife 
had served upon him and which alleged that he was in arrears on his child 
support obligations. Hiltz sought Horn's assistance in this matter as well as in 
having the amount of his child support payments reduced. On September 2, 1983, 
Hiltz and Horn entered into an attorney-client relationship by executing a 
contract for legal services.

[¶6]      During the course 
of this representation, Horn communicated orally and in writing with the 
ex-wife's attorney. After some negotiating, Hiltz and his ex-wife orally agreed 
to decrease the amount of the child support payments and to have the ex-wife's 
attorney reduce this oral agreement to writing. An agreement was prepared, 
signed by the ex-wife, and transmitted to Horn. Horn forwarded the agreement to 
Hiltz, requesting that Hiltz sign the agreement, have it notarized, and return 
it to Horn as soon as possible.

[¶7]      The proposed 
agreement would have decreased the amount of the child support payments to $200 
per month per child, and the annual increase in support payments of $25 per 
month per child would have been terminated. Although it is not clear as to what 
discussions took place between Hiltz and Horn with regard to this agreement, 
Hiltz ultimately returned the agreement to Horn along with the following 
handwritten notation: "Bob, I circled the section I do not agree with, please 
take care of this and let me know how it comes out. Thanks. Rich Hiltz." The 
referenced section provided:

3. If Defendant 
violates the terms of this Agreement to Modify Decree of Divorce, all original 
terms concerning child support ordered by the Court in that Decree of Divorce 
granted to Plaintiff on the 23rd day of July, 1982, shall be reinstated, 
effective on the date of violation.

[¶8]      On December 13, 
1983, Horn wrote to the ex-wife's attorney, advising him that Hiltz had very 
strong objections to paragraph three of the agreement and, as a result, had 
refused to sign the agreement unless the paragraph was deleted. The letter 
showed that a copy was sent to Hiltz. Nothing in the record indicates that any 
further communication occurred between Horn and the ex-wife's attorney with 
regard to this matter following the December 13th letter. Although Hiltz was 
aware that the agreement to modify the divorce decree had not been finalized, he 
nonetheless began paying the reduced child support amount.

[¶9]      The next time 
Horn apparently communicated with Hiltz was on December 29, 1983, when in a 
telephone conversation they discussed a divorce which Hiltz wanted to get from 
his third wife. The only evidence of any further contact between Hiltz and Horn 
prior to December of 1990 was a telephone record which indicated that a 
five-minute telephone call had been made to Horn's office on April 28, 1984. 
Neither party could recall what the subject matter of that conversation 
was.

[¶10]   While nothing in the record 
indicates that Hiltz communicated with Horn about this matter subsequent to 
December 13, 1983, until December of 1990, evidence was presented which revealed 
that Hiltz had directly communicated with his ex-wife's attorney during this 
period. In letters dated April 16, May 2, June 13, and July 12, 1984, his 
ex-wife's attorney advised Hiltz that he had failed to comply with the terms of 
the divorce decree by not carrying medical insurance for the children. Rather 
than notifying Horn, Hiltz dealt with his ex-wife's attorney himself. The 
ex-wife's attorney again wrote to Hiltz on September 24, 1984, with regard to 
his failure to abide by the divorce decree as he was behind in his child support 
payments.

[¶11]   Hiltz also communicated with his 
ex-wife on numerous occasions during this same period on the subject of child 
support payments. His ex-wife was of the opinion that Hiltz was not paying the 
proper amount of child support.

[¶12]   The State of Utah commenced an 
action in December of 1990 for the recovery of child support which was in 
arrears (a URESA action) against Hiltz, who was a Utah resident at that time. 
Between December of 1990 and April of 1991, the State of Utah served numerous 
documents upon Hiltz, advising him that his child support payments under the 
original divorce decree were delinquent.

[¶13]   Having received initial notices 
from the State of Utah, Hiltz contacted both the State of Utah and his ex-wife 
about the URESA action. Hiltz contacted Horn as well. Hiltz and Horn entered 
into a new attorney-client relationship by executing a new contract for legal 
services on February 14, 1991.

[¶14]   Horn filed a petition in the 
district court on Hiltz's behalf, seeking a modification of the original divorce 
decree to reflect the agreement previously reached by the parties as represented 
in the proposed 1983 agreement to modify the divorce decree. The judge found 
that Hiltz had rejected the proposed agreement and that the terms of the 
original divorce decree were still in effect. The district judge awarded the 
ex-wife a judgment in the amount of the child support arrearage, calculating the 
amount under the original divorce decree. The State of Utah ultimately dismissed 
the URESA action.

[¶15]   Hiltz thereafter brought a legal 
malpractice action against the appellees. The appellees moved for a summary 
judgment on the grounds that no genuine issues as to any material fact existed 
and that they were entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Particularly, 
the appellees argued that the statute of limitations barred Hiltz's claims. The 
district court granted the appellees' motion for a summary judgment, and Hiltz 
makes this appeal from that order.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶16]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing 
party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Kahrs v. Board of 
Trustees for Platte County School District No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995); 
see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed 
fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 
essential element of the cause of action or defense which has been asserted by 
the parties. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 1995). We examine the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los 
Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995). We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court. Adkins, 892 P.2d  at 130. We do not accord 
any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 406.

The party moving 
for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 
for a summary judgment. If the movant carries this burden, the party opposing 
the summary judgment must come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that a 
genuine issue of material fact does exist.

Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992). General allegations 
and conclusory statements are not sufficient. Board of County Commissioners of 
County of Laramie v. Laramie County School District Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 
956 (Wyo. 1994). Ordinarily, entering a summary judgment on the issue of when a 
statute of limitations commences to run would be inappropriate. Palmer v. 
Borg-Warner Corporation, 818 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska 1990). However, if 
uncontroverted facts exist which specify when a reasonable person should have 
been placed on inquiry notice, we can resolve the question as a matter of law. 
Id.; see also Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 556 (Wyo. 
1989).

B. Statute of 
Limitations

[¶17]   Hiltz alleges that Horn committed 
legal malpractice when he failed to properly advise Hiltz about the law with 
regard to modifying child support obligations. He further contends that "Wyoming 
does recognize[] the doctrine that a malpractice claim does not run until the 
attorney-client relationship has ceased as to the matters on which the claim is 
based." Hiltz claims that the attorney-client relationship ceased in this case 
in December 1991.

[¶18]   Legal malpractice actions are 
governed by a two-year limitation specified in WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107(a)(i) 
(1977). That statute provides:

(a) A cause of 
action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or 
certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the 
greater of the following times:

(i) Within two (2) 
years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of 
action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the 
alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged 
act, error or omission was:

(A) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

(B) The claimant 
failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year 
period despite the exercise of due diligence.

Wyoming is a "discovery" state, which means 
that the statute of limitations is not triggered until such time as the 
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of the cause of action. 
Bredthauer, 824 P.2d  at 562; Mills, 768 P.2d  at 555. However, "[d]issatisfaction 
with an attorney's services or with an agreement is not `inherently 
unknowable,'" and ignorance of the facts which constitute a cause of action does 
not toll the operation of the statute, except in the cases of infancy, 
incapacity, and certain types of fraud. Began v. Dixon, 547 A.2d 620, 623 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1988).

[¶19]   Hiltz argues that genuine issues of 
material fact existed which should have precluded a summary judgment from being 
entered. Specifically, Hiltz claims that he and Horn discussed the child support 
payments which Horn had advised Hiltz to make under the proposed agreement and 
that Horn continued to reassure Hiltz that his ex-wife could not claim 
additional support. Hiltz maintains that these factual disputes should prevent 
the entry of a summary judgment because they show that he neither knew nor 
should have known of the accrual of a cause of action.

[¶20]   We conclude that, even assuming 
such a factual dispute existed, the statute of limitations issue is still a 
question of law within the province of the court. See Schoenrock v. Tappe, 419 N.W.2d 197, 200-01 (S.D. 1988). The record does not support the factual dispute 
claimed by Hiltz. Furthermore, these facts are not material in terms of the 
statute of limitations matter. They might have been important in the malpractice 
issue, but they are of little or no consequence to the statute of limitations 
issue. Rather, the material facts in the statute of limitations matter are the 
dates on which the various activities occurred between the 1983 representation 
and the November 1993 filing of the lawsuit, and those facts are not disputed in 
this case. If all parties were allowed to toll the statute until they learned of 
the legal theory of a proposed action or until they pursued such an action, the 
statute of limitations would not have any purpose. Began, 547 A.2d  at 
623-24.

[¶21]   We agree with analysis provided by 
the district court in its conclusions of law:

Clearly, Hiltz knew 
or had reason to know of the existence of a cause of action against Horn as 
early as September 24, 1984, when [his ex-wife's] attorney . . . advised Hiltz 
that he had failed to abide by the terms of the "Divorce Decree." Further and 
consistent with the finding of Judge Hamm in his letter decision of December 2, 
1991, Hiltz['] deposition testimony is that from 1984 through 1990 he and his 
former wife argued about the fact that the amount of child support he was paying 
was not in accordance with the original Divorce Decree. Upon being served with 
the Utah URESA action in November or December of 1990, Hiltz' first response was 
to call his former wife . . . and the Utah Recovery Services. By those calls, 
Hiltz was advised that the Utah URESA action was based upon the child support 
obligations contained in the original Divorce Decree. It was only after those 
calls that Hiltz again contacted attorney Horn.

Hiltz was aware of 
the absolute necessity that in order to modify a Decree of Divorce there must be 
a written agreement between the parties and a modification of the original 
Decree by the District Court. The Plaintiff knew or should have known of those 
requirements at the time that he was served with a "Petition to Show Cause 
Order" in 1983 and when he received the "Agreement to Modify Divorce Decree" 
prepared by his former wife's attorney. The fact that the Plaintiff objected to 
paragraph three (3) of that agreement demonstrates his awareness of the need for 
a written agreement in order to modify the original Decree. Hiltz' concern about 
the lack of a written signed Agreement and a formal modification is further 
demonstrated by his deposition testimony and his Affidavit that he made a number 
of telephone calls to Horn in 1984 expressing concern over the fact that there 
was no written agreement between [him] and his former 
wife.

Due diligence on 
the part of Hiltz ". . . would certainly require a determination as to the 
reason for . . ." [his ex-wife's] attorney['s] . . . September, 1984 letter that 
Hiltz was not complying with the child support obligation of the Divorce Decree, 
[his ex-wife's] complaints from 1984 through 1990 that Hiltz was not paying 
child support in accordance with the original decree and the 1990 Utah URESA 
action based upon the original Decree. Even assuming that the Statute was not 
triggered until the 1990 Utah URESA action, this legal malpractice action should 
have been filed no later than November or December, 1992.

The Court finds 
that the applicable Statute of Limitations pertaining to legal malpractice 
actions has clearly run and that the Plaintiff's claim is barred by the running 
of that Statute.

(Citation omitted.) The uncontroverted facts 
in this case support the district court's conclusion that a reasonable person 
would have realized he had a cause of action at the very latest when he was 
served with the URESA documents and that he likely would have realized it even 
before that time.

[¶22]   Hiltz claims that this Court has 
adopted the doctrine of "continuous representation" in the context of legal 
malpractice actions and that Horn continuously represented him until December of 
1991. We disagree with the assertion that we have adopted the continuous 
representation doctrine and note that the cases which Hiltz relies upon to 
support this assertion do not have anything to do with legal malpractice claims. 
The continuing representation doctrine is absent from our legal malpractice 
statute, and we decline to judicially adopt such a provision. The district court 
was correct in refusing to apply this doctrine to toll the statute of 
limitations in this matter.

[¶23]   Even if Wyoming did recognize the 
continuing representation doctrine, application of such a doctrine to the facts 
in this case would not save Appellant's cause of action.

[T]he continuous 
representation doctrine applies only to malpractice actions when there is a 
"clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship 
between the client and the attorney. . . ." Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 
485, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 208 (1981). This relationship is one "which is not 
sporadic but developing and involves a continuity of the professional services 
from which the alleged malpractice stems." Muller, supra 437 N.Y.S.2d  at 208. 
Furthermore, the application of this doctrine should only be applied where the 
"professional's involvement after the alleged malpractice is for the performance 
of the same or related services and is not merely continuity of a general 
professional relationship." Muller, supra 437 N.Y.S.2d  at 
207.

Schoenrock, 419 N.W.2d  at 201 (some 
citations omitted).

[¶24]   Since the parties did not 
communicate with each other for a six-and-one-half-year period, an ongoing, 
continuous, developing, and dependent relationship did not exist. An 
attorney-client relationship does not continue indefinitely just because it has 
not been formally terminated. 419 N.W.2d  at 202. Furthermore, the fact that 
Hiltz directly communicated with his ex-wife's attorney without notifying Horn 
supports the finding that the attorney-client relationship between Hiltz and 
Horn was not a continuing relationship from 1983 through 
1990.

[¶25]   We are not convinced that Horn's 
services amounted to a continuing relationship. The URESA representation 
activities were severable from those of Horn's previous representation of Hiltz, 
and, consequently, even the continuous representation doctrine could not save 
Hiltz's claims from the statute of limitations bar.

C. Concealment or Failure to Disclose 
Material Facts

[¶26]   Hiltz argues that a dispute existed 
as to whether Horn concealed or failed to disclose material facts which would 
have given rise to an issue of whether Hiltz knew or should have known of a 
cause of action against Horn. He did not present this issue to the district 
court but raised it for the first time in this appeal. We will not consider 
issues which are raised for the first time on appeal. Stuckey v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 890 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wyo. 1995). We, 
therefore, decline to address this issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶27]   We hold that the statute of 
limitations had run on Hiltz's claims against the appellees and that, therefore, 
summary judgment was appropriate.

[¶28]   Affirmed.