Title: Fearing v. Bucher

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  April 8, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STEVEN FEARING,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

MELVIN BUCHER and ARCHDIOCESE OF PORTLAND IN OREGON,

	Respondents on Review,

	and PROVINCE OF ST. BARBARA, ORDER OF FRIARS MINOR, a California corporation,

and FRANCISCAN FRIARS OF CALIFORNIA,

	Defendants.

(CC9412-08665; CA A89144; SC S44382)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 10, 1998.

	Kelly Clark, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.

	Arden E. Shenker, Portland, argued the cause for respondent
on review Melvin Bucher.

	Karen O'Kasey, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon.

	David Slader, Portland, argued the cause for amici curiae
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, Oregon Coalition Against
Domestic and Sexual Violence, National Alliance of Sexual Assault
Coalitions, and National Association of Counsel for Children. 
With him on the brief was Michael S. Morey.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed
in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.  				

	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court,

	 Lee Johnson, Judge.

	 147 Or App 446, 936 P2d 1023 (1997). 

    **Leeson and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.	

		GILLETTE, J.

		This case arises out of allegations by plaintiff that,
as a minor, he was sexually abused by his priest in the early
1970s.  The case presents two issues.  The first concerns whether
the doctrine of respondeat superior, pursuant to which an
employer can be held vicariously liable for the acts of its
employee, can be applied to a case involving an employee's sexual
abuse of a child.  The second concerns the applicability of an
extended statute of limitations for actions "based on conduct
that constitutes child abuse" to an employer, where liability is
based on respondeat superior.  

		Defendant Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon (the
Archdiocese) was the supervising archdiocese of the priest,
Bucher, during the period in which the child abuse allegedly
occurred.  Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts liability in the
Archdiocese on theories of vicarious liability through
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior and of
negligent retention, supervision, and training of Bucher.(1)  The
case comes before us for review of the trial court's grant of
motions by the Archdiocese under ORCP 21 to dismiss both claims
for relief as time-barred and for failure to state ultimate facts
sufficient to constitute a claim.(2)  The Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal for failure to state a claim, based on that court's
conclusions that:  (1) the complaint did not allege facts from
which it reasonably could be concluded that Bucher's sexual
assaults on plaintiff were within the scope of Bucher's
employment; and (2) the complaint failed adequately to allege
that the Archdiocese "knowingly allow[ed], permit[ted] or
encourag[ed] child abuse" as required by ORS 12.117, the extended
statute of limitations for child abuse actions, thus rendering
that statute inapplicable to plaintiff's negligent retention
claim.(3)  Fearing v. Bucher, 147 Or App 446, 936 P2d 1023 (1997). 
In light of those holdings, the court did not reach the issue
whether the claim of vicarious liability based on application of
the doctrine of respondeat superior is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.  Id.  

   		Plaintiff seeks review of the Court of Appeals'
decision only insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order with
respect to the dismissal for failure to state a claim for
vicarious liability based on application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior.  We limit our review accordingly.  In
reviewing the Court of Appeals' decision in that regard, our task
is not to decide whether the sexual abuse occurred or, if so,
whether the Archdiocese ultimately is liable for it.  Rather, our
only task is to determine whether, in light of the allegations of
the complaint, the trial court could decide as a matter law that
the Archdiocese could not be held vicariously liable for Bucher's
actions.  We conclude that the allegations of the amended
complaint are sufficient to state a claim of vicarious liability
against the Archdiocese based on application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior.  Therefore, we reverse in part the decision
of the Court of Appeals.  We also hold that that claim is not, on
the record before us, time-barred as a matter of law.  

		ORCP 18 A requires a complaint to contain "[a] plain
and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim
for relief without unnecessary repetition."  In determining the
sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, we accept all well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and give plaintiff the
benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the
facts alleged.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 325 Or
185, 196-97, 935 P2d 411 (1997).  Conclusions of law alone,
however, are insufficient.  See Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Or 647, 655-56, 871 P2d 1006 (1994) (allegations in complaint do not state
ultimate facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of warranty
despite inclusion of such conslusory terms as "warranty
agreement").  

		The following facts are alleged in the complaint.  From
1970 through 1972, Bucher, a priest operating out of a local
parish, and an employee of the Franciscan Friars of California,
Inc., and the Archdiocese, acted as youth pastor, friend,
confessor, and priest to plaintiff and his family.  Plaintiff and
his family became close to Bucher, and Bucher was a frequent
guest in their home.  Bucher gained the trust and confidence of
plaintiff's family as a spiritual guide and priest and as a youth
pastor and mentor to plaintiff, then an adolescent.  By virtue of
that relationship, Bucher gained the support, acquiescence, and
permission of plaintiff's family to spend substantial periods of
time alone with plaintiff.  

		Bucher also won the friendship and admiration of
plaintiff himself.  He was his spiritual advisor, mentor, and
confessor.  Bucher began to socialize with plaintiff and to spend
time alone with him.  He used his position of trust to touch
plaintiff physically.  Eventually, Bucher committed a series of
sexual assaults on plaintiff.  At the time of those assaults,
plaintiff was a minor.  

		Plaintiff further alleges in the complaint that, at all
times relevant to the complaint, Bucher was an employee of the
Archdiocese and the abuse was committed in connection with
Bucher's employment as youth pastor and priest.  The complaint
describes Bucher's performance of his priestly and pastoral
duties in developing a trust relationship with plaintiff and his
family, together with the eventual sexual assaults, as
"[m]anipulations."  Plaintiff then alleges: 

	"The [m]anipulations * * * were committed within the
time and space limits of [Bucher's] employment as youth
pastor and priest, were committed out of a desire, at
least initially and partially, to fulfill his
employment duties as youth pastor and priest, and the
[m]anipulations were generally actions of a kind and
nature which Bucher was required to perform as youth
pastor and priest."

		Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
is liable for an employee's torts, including intentional torts,
if the employee was acting within the scope of employment.  See,
e.g., Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, 271 Or 430, 532 P2d 790
(1975) (employer liable for employee's malicious prosecution of
customer because employee's action was within the scope of
employment); cf. G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306
Or 54, 757 P2d 1347 (1988) (dismissal of action for vicarious
liability based on application of doctrine of respondeat superior
proper because plaintiff failed to allege that employee's conduct
was within the scope of employment).  Thus, a complaint generally
is sufficient to state a claim for vicarious liability based on
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior if it states
ultimate facts that, if true, would establish that an employee
was acting within the scope of employment when the employee
allegedly committed the acts that led to plaintiff's injury.  

		In Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or 439, 442, 753 P2d 404
(1988), this court outlined three requirements that must be met
to establish that the employee's conduct was within the scope of
employment:  (1) the conduct must have occurred substantially
within the time and space limits authorized by the employment;
(2) the employee must have been motivated, at least partially, by
a purpose to serve the employer; and (3) the act must have been
of a kind that the employee was hired to perform.  The decision
then explored the proper applicability of those requirements in
the context of vicarious liability premised on an employee's
intentional tort.  

		In Chesterman, the trial court had granted summary
judgment in favor of a defendant corporation whose employee
allegedly ingested a hallucinatory drug to enable him better to
focus his attention on work.  While under the influence of that
drug, the employee broke into the plaintiff's house and sexually
assaulted her.  On review, this court held that the intentional
tort itself, the sexual assault, unquestionably was outside the
scope of employment, but that did not conclude the inquiry.  Id.
at 443.  The court stated that, in cases where there is a "time-lag" between the act allegedly producing the harm and the
resulting harm, it is inappropriate to determine whether
respondeat superior applied as of the time when the injury
occurred.  Id. at 444.  Rather, "[t]he focus should be on the act
on which vicarious liability is based and not on when the act
results in injury."(4)  Id. (emphasis in original). 

		As in Chesterman, Bucher's alleged sexual assaults on
plaintiff clearly were outside the scope of his employment, but
our inquiry does not end there.  The Archdiocese still could be
found vicariously liable, if acts that were within Bucher's scope
of employment "resulted in the acts which led to injury to
plaintiff."  Id. at 443. 

		Whether an employee has acted within the scope of
employment at any given time generally is a question for the
trier of fact, except in cases where only one reasonable
conclusion may be drawn from the facts pled.  Stanfield v.
Laccoarce, 284 Or 651, 655, 588 P2d 1271 (1978).  In the context
of the present case, where, like Chesterman, the employer's
vicarious liability arises out of the employee's commission of an
intentional tort, we must consider whether the allegations
contained in the amended complaint state ultimate facts
sufficient to establish that acts that were within Bucher's scope
of employment resulted in the acts that caused injury to
plaintiff.

		The complaint alleges that Bucher used his position as
youth pastor, spiritual guide, confessor, and priest to plaintiff
and his family to gain their trust and confidence, and thereby to
gain the permission of plaintiff's family to spend large periods
of time alone with plaintiff.  By virtue of that relationship,
Bucher gained the opportunity to be alone with plaintiff, to
touch him physically, and then to assault him sexually.  The
complaint further alleges that those activities were committed in
connection with Bucher's employment as youth pastor and priest,
that they were committed within the time and space limitations of
Bucher's employment, that they were committed out of a desire, at
least partially and initially, to fulfill Bucher's employment
duties as youth pastor and priest, and that they generally were
of a kind and nature that was required to perform as youth pastor
and priest.   

		More than one plausible inference may be drawn from the
foregoing allegations:  The jury could infer that Bucher took the
job solely to gratify his own deviant desires and that all the
activities preceding the sexual abuse were motivated solely to
further his own interests, not those of the Archdiocese.  Or, as
plaintiff contends, a jury could infer that the sexual assaults
were the culmination of a progressive series of actions that
began with and continued to involve Bucher's performance of 

the ordinary and authorized duties of a priest.  Viewing the
complaint in that light, the jury also could infer that, in
cultivating a relationship with plaintiff and his family, Bucher,
at least initially, was motivated by a desire to fulfill his
priestly duties and that, over time, his motives became mixed. 
We conclude that the amended complaint contains allegations
sufficient to satisfy all three Chesterman requirements for
establishing that employee conduct was within the scope of
employment.(5)  

		The Archdiocese argues that the complaint "fails to
identify 'any interest of the employer' that could possibly be
served by the acts of abuse plaintiff alleges were committed by
Bucher," or "any acts which Bucher was hired to perform that are
of the same kind as the acts of abuse alleged to have been
perpetrated by him."  The Court of Appeals was of the same view,
holding in a companion case, Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or App 425,
936 P2d 1011 (1997), which involved a complaint containing
virtually identical allegations of "[m]anipulations," including
the eventual sexual abuse of a child, that "there are no facts
from which it reasonably could be concluded that [the employee's]
sexual assaults were acts" of a kind he was hired to perform. 
Id. at 438. 

		The Archdiocese's position and the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals in this regard suffer from the same defect. 
They both neglect to consider that, in the intentional tort
context, it usually is inappropriate for the court to base its
decision regarding the adequacy of the complaint on whether the
complaint contains allegations that the intentional tort itself
was committed in furtherance of any interest of the employer or
was of the same kind of activities that the employee was hired to
perform.  Such circumstances rarely will occur and are not, in
any event, necessary to vicarious liability.  Rather, the focus
properly is directed at whether the complaint contains sufficient
allegations of Bucher's conduct that was within the scope of his
employment that arguably resulted in the acts that caused
plaintiff's injury.  Chesterman, 305 Or at 443.  In light of the
allegations that we already have described, the trial court erred
in dismissing the complaint.  

		Finally, the Archdiocese argues that the instant case
differs from Chesterman in a material respect.  According to the
Archdiocese, Chesterman requires that the pleading contain
allegations of a causal connection between the acts that are
alleged to be within the scope of employment and the harm to
plaintiff.  The Archdiocese asserts that plaintiff's amended
complaint contains no such allegation.  The Archdiocese correctly
notes that plaintiff does not directly allege that Bucher's
activities in developing a trust relationship with plaintiff and
his family caused plaintiff's injuries but, instead, merely
alleges that Bucher "gained the opportunity to commit the
assaults" by abusing his position.  

		The Archdiocese argues that, if we hold that an
employer can be liable for its employee's alleged sexual assault
on plaintiff simply because it provided the employee with an
"opportunity" to commit the assaults -- which, in the
Archdiocese's view, is all that plaintiff has alleged here --
then all manner of employers that provide their employees with an
opportunity to be alone with third parties can be held liable for
the intentional torts of those employees.  The Archdiocese likens
the facts of the instant case to those of G.L. v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, 306 Or at 61, in which this court upheld
the dismissal of a claim for vicarious liability against a
hospital for the sexual assault of an unconscious patient by a
respiratory therapist, based on the court's conclusion that there
was no allegation that the employee was acting to further an
interest of the employer.  

		We disagree with the Archdiocese's contention that
plaintiff has failed adequately to plead that necessary
connection here.  This is not a case like G.L. in which the only
nexus alleged between the employment and the assault was that the
employment brought the tortfeasor and the victim together in time
and place and, therefore, gave the tortfeasor the "opportunity"
to commit the assaults.  Here, plaintiff alleges that Bucher
"us[ed] and manipulat[ed] his fiduciary position, respect and
authority as youth pastor and priest" to befriend plaintiff and
his family, gain their trust, spend large periods of time alone
with plaintiff, physically touch plaintiff and, ultimately, to
gain the opportunity to commit the sexual assaults upon him.  A
jury reasonably could infer that Bucher's performance of his
pastoral duties with respect to plaintiff and his family were a
necessary precursor to the sexual abuse and that the assaults
thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct
that was within the scope of Bucher's employment.  See
Chesterman, 305 Or at 443-44 (identifying and applying that
standard). 

		The fact that a jury in the present case also could
conclude that Bucher's efforts to cultivate a trust relationship
with plaintiff did not "cause" the alleged harm does not alter
the conclusion that the causation question should be left to the
jury.  In this connection, we note that, in Chesterman, the court
did not decide whether, in fact, the employee's ingestion of a
hallucinatory drug caused the plaintiff's injury, but left that
decision to the jury.  Id. at 444.  The same result is required
here.  

		Having concluded that the allegations of the amended
complaint are sufficient to state a claim of vicarious liability
against the Archdiocese based on an application of the doctrine
of respondeat superior, we turn to the question of the timeliness
of plaintiff's complaint.  

		Plaintiff initiated the present action, which alleges
sexual abuse that occurred more than 20 years before the filing
of the complaint, under the extended limitations period for
claims based on child abuse contained in ORS 12.117.  That
statute provides:

		"(1)  Notwithstanding [statutory sections not
relevant here], an action based on conduct that
constitutes child abuse * * * accruing while the person
who is entitled to bring the action is under 18 years
of age shall be commenced not more than six years after
that person attains 18 years of age, or if the injured
person has not discovered the injury or the causal
connection between the injury and the child abuse, nor
in the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered the injury or the causal connection between
the injury and the child abuse, not more than three
years from the date the injured person discovers or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered
the injury or the causal connection between the child
abuse and the injury, whichever period is longer.  

		"(2)  As used in subsection (1) of this section,
'child abuse' means any of the following:

		"* * * * * 

		"(c) Sexual abuse, as defined in ORS chapter 163,
when the victim is a child."

		At this point in the proceedings, it is undisputed that
Bucher's alleged sexual assaults constitute "child abuse" within
the definition of that term in ORS 12.117(2)(c) and that the
action was brought within three years of plaintiff's discovery of
the causal connection between the child abuse and his injuries. 
The gravamen of the Archdiocese's argument is that the activities
alleged to have been within the scope of Bucher's employment, and
on which vicarious liability is based, are not themselves alleged
to have caused harm and, therefore, are not acts of "child abuse"
as that term is defined in ORS 12.117(2)(c).  Under those
circumstances, according to the Archdiocese, the action against
it is not an "action based on conduct that constitutes child
abuse" under ORS 12.117 and plaintiff is not entitled to avail
himself of the extended limitations period provided in that
statute.  

		The Archdiocese's argument is premised on an unduly
narrow reading of the statute.  The plain wording of the statute
allows for an extended limitations period for "actions based on
conduct that constitutes child abuse."  See PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(first level of statutory interpretation is examination of words
legislature chose to use and the context in which they appear; if
statutory meaning is clear, no further analysis required).  The
action here clearly is based on child abuse:  Were it not for
Bucher's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff, there would be no
action.  Any damages awarded plaintiff at the conclusion of the
case would be in compensation for his injuries resulting from the
child abuse.  The fact that the Archdiocese's vicarious liability
is based on conduct that occurred before the abuse does not alter
the nature of the underlying action.  The action is not, on the
record before us, time-barred as a matter of law.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings. 			

1. Plaintiff's complaint also named as defendants the
Franciscan Friars of California, Inc., and the priest, Bucher. 
Plaintiff settled all claims with those defendants.  The issues
before this court are concerned solely with the Archdiocese's
liability for the acts of the priest.  

2. The trial court apparently granted the Archdiocese's
motions in their entirety.  Accordingly, in his appeal to the
Court of Appeals, plaintiff assigned error to the trial court's
order granting each motion.  

3. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals relied
on its reasoning and decision in a companion case, Lourim v.
Swensen, 147 Or App 425, 936 P2d 1011 (1997), decided the same
day.  We allowed review in Lourim and announce our decision in
that case today.  See Lourim v. Swensen, 328 Or __, __ P2d ___
(April 8, 1999)  

4. Put another way, an employee's intentional tort rarely,
if ever, will have been authorized expressly by the employer.  In
that context, then, it virtually always will be necessary to look
to the acts that led to the injury to determine if those acts
were within the scope of employment.  

5. The Court of Appeals held that the allegation in the
complaint that "the [m]anipulations were * * * generally actions
of a kind and nature which Bucher was required to perform as
youth pastor and priest," simply set out one of the three
Chesterman factors and was nothing more than a conclusion of law. 
Fearing, 147 Or App at 453.  We disagree.  An ultimate fact is a
fact from which legal conclusions are drawn.  A conclusion of
law, by contrast, is merely a judgment about a particular set of
circumstances and assumes facts that may or may not have been
pleaded.  Moore v. Willis, 307 Or 254, 259, 767 P2d 62 (1988). 
Allegations of when particular conduct occurred, of the
motivation behind that conduct, and of the employment-related
nature of that conduct all are assertions of fact, which can be
proved or disproved.