Title: Beck v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

107 Ariz. 476 (1971) 489 P.2d 710 Elmer BECK, Petitioner, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Respondent. No. 10501. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 4, 1971. *477 Spencer K. Johnston, Phoenix, for petitioner. Mesch, Marquez & Rothschild by Alfred C. Marquez, Tucson, for respondent. CAMERON, Justice. This is a petition for special action by Elmer Beck, an injured workman within the scope of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Law, requesting that the respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, be ordered to continue making compensation payments to petitioner pending a determination of a Writ of Certiorari brought by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. We are called upon to determine whether an insurance carrier or employer may discontinue compensation payments under a first award of the Commission after an appeal by Writ of Certiorari from a second award of the Commission. On 17 June 1968, petitioner sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. On 12 November 1969, the Industrial Commission of Arizona issued its "Decision Upon Hearing and Findings and Award and Order Pending Determination of Earning Capacity." The findings included: The order included the following: The 12 November 1969 decision was an award within the meaning of our Workmen's Compensation Law, Russell v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 548, 456 P.2d 918 (1969), and because not timely protested it became a final award. Stevens v. Industrial Commission, 11 Ariz. App. 1, 461 P.2d 177 (1970). On 5 June 1970, the Industrial Commission issued its "Decision Upon Hearing and Findings and Award For Unscheduled Permanent Partial Disability." The findings included: The award was as follows: The award of 5 June 1970 is presently pending before the Court of Appeals. The respondent in compliance with the order of 12 November 1969 advanced partial permanent benefits up to the time of filing the petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the award of 5 June 1970. Since the filing of the writ the respondent has refused to make compensation payments for petitioner. Our statute reads as follows: This statute, § 23-952 A.R.S., provides that when there is an appeal from an order increasing compensation or refusing to increase compensation, that the previous payments should continue pending appeal. The legislative intent is apparent and the statute is not unclear. Whatever the decision of the court, the original (lesser) amount would continue to be due to the workman and to deprive him of this minimum amount pending review would not be in keeping with the humanitarian purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law. It does not, however, apply to the case now before the court. Although the determination of petitioner's earning capacity was continued until the second award, it would appear the amount actually paid petitioner in the first award was the same amount ordered by the second award and therefore we are not concerned with an "increase in the previous order or award." The payments are the same ($550.00 per month). This brings us to the question of what effect the filing of a timely petition for Writ of Certiorari and the issuance of the writ has upon the order and award sought to be reviewed. We have stated that a timely motion for rehearing has the effect of setting aside an award. Russell v. Industrial Commission, supra; Motorola v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz. App. 395, 477 P.2d 269 (1970). We have also stated that a Writ of Certiorari to review the lawfulness of an award divests the Commission *479 of jurisdiction to proceed further. Godwin v. Industrial Commission, 10 Ariz. App. 532, 460 P.2d 203 (1969); Wammack v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ariz. 321, 320 P.2d 950 (1958). It logically follows that an award from which a party is appealing by way of a Writ of Certiorari should at least be suspended pending that review. When a Writ of Certiorari is timely taken from a second award, that award does not become final until the court affirms that award. Lowery v. Transport Insurance Co., (Tex. Civ.App.), 451 S.W.2d 595 (1970). The previous award being final, it may not be superceded by the second award until that second award is itself a final award. To hold otherwise would mean that the person seeking review would have to seek a stay pending review, a procedure not followed here, if indeed the Workmen's Compensation Law allows such procedure. To allow a respondent to discontinue payment of compensation when respondent appeals the order or award is contra to the general purpose of workmen's compensation: And: Upon the issuance of the mandate herein the respondent is ordered to make and continue to make compensation payments to petitioner pursuant to this opinion. HAYS, V.C.J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., concurs in the result.