Title: Garner v. Hickman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Garner v. Hickman1985 WY 186709 P.2d 407Case Number: 85-27, 85-114Decided: 11/12/1985MARY JANELL GARNER AND CHARLES GARNER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

GAYLE HICKMAN AND SUNDANCE STATE BANK, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

SUNDANCE STATE BANK, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

CHARLES E. GARNER AND MARY JANELL GARNER AS ASSIGNEES OF GAYLE HICKMAN, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

GAYLE HICKMAN D/B/A TOWER HOMES CENTER, (DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARY JANELL GARNER AND 
CHARLES GARNER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

GAYLE HICKMAN AND 
SUNDANCE STATE BANK, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

SUNDANCE STATE BANK, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

CHARLES E. GARNER AND 
MARY JANELL GARNER AS ASSIGNEES OF GAYLE HICKMAN, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

GAYLE HICKMAN D/B/A 
TOWERHOMESCENTER, (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for Mary Janell Garner and Charles 
Garner, appellants in No. 85-27 and appellees in No. 
85-114.

Rex O. Arney of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for Sundance State Bank, appellant in No. 
85-114, and appellee in No. 85-27.

Robert J. 
O'Neil, Gillette, for Gayle Hickman, appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     These appeals involve a 
breach of contract action for defective construction of a modular home. The 
appellants, Mary Janell Garner and her father, Charles Garner (hereinafter the 
Garners), brought a breach of contract action against appellee Gayle Hickman 
(hereinafter Hickman) in Case No. 85-27. The Garners also brought an action 
alleging fraud, bad faith and unfair dealing against appellee Sundance State 
Bank (hereinafter the bank). The cases were consolidated below and on appeal. 
Trial was had to the court resulting in a $6,621 judgment for the Garners in 
their breach of contract action against Hickman. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the bank in the Garners' case of fraud against the bank. 
The court, however, found that the bank was liable for contribution to Hickman 
equal to two-thirds of the judgment against Hickman. In Case No. 85-114, the 
bank appeals the court's ruling that it was liable to Hickman for 
contribution.

In Case No. 
85-27, the Garners appeal the summary judgment granted in favor of the bank and 
raise the following issues:

"1. Was the defendant 
Bank entitled to Summary Judgment, as a matter of law, upon the issue as to 
whether or not it was liable to appellants, Garners, upon the issue of 
fraud.

"2. Was the defendant 
Bank entitled to Summary Judgment, as a matter of law, upon the issue of whether 
or not it was liable to appellants upon the issue of good 
faith."

 

[¶2.]     In Case No. 85-114, the 
bank appeals that part of the district court's judgment finding the bank was 
liable for contribution to Hickman for the judgment rendered in favor of the 
Garners and against Hickman and states the issue thusly:

"Did the lower court err 
in awarding judgment for contribution in favor of Hickman and against Sundance 
State Bank?"

[¶3.]     We will affirm the 
summary judgment granted in favor of the bank in Case No. 85-27, but reverse the 
court's finding of contribution by the bank to Hickman in Case No. 
85-114.

[¶4.]     The facts in these 
cases are complex. The Garners filed a complaint against Hickman alleging a 
breach of contract for negligent construction of a modular home. Hickman 
cross-claimed against the bank for contribution of any judgment rendered against 
him. Subsequently, the Garners filed a separate action against the bank, 
alleging fraudulent misrepresentation of Hickman's qualifications as the general 
contractor for the home, and breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
The two actions were consolidated and merged for trial.

[¶5.]     The Garners and Hickman 
entered into an agreement whereby Hickman agreed to construct a modular home for 
the Garners. Hickman advised the Garners and helped them choose a plan for the 
modular home. Hickman, however, never told the Garners that he was the general 
contractor as well as the dealer, but the bank treated Hickman as if he were. 
This was evidenced in a number of ways. First, the construction debt notes were 
signed by both Hickman and Janell Garner. Second, the bank designated Hickman as 
the "builder" to the Federal Home Administration in support of the bank's 
application for an F.H.A. guarantee. Third, Hickman was described by the bank as 
"essentially" the general contractor. Fourth, the bank required Hickman to sign 
the required F.H.A. warranty. Apparently Hickman did not believe that he was the 
general contractor since he protested the bank's request that he execute the 
warranty. And finally, all funds from the bank were paid to Hickman who then 
paid the plumbers, carpenters, electricians and other needed contractors. 
Throughout this entire process the bank acted as if Hickman was the contractor 
and never said anything to the contrary. Subsequently, the Garners were damaged 
due to the negligent construction of the modular home.

[¶6.]     The trial court granted 
the bank's motion for summary judgment as to the Garners' complaint of fraud and 
unfair dealing against the bank. Additionally, as noted above, the court ruled 
the bank liable for contribution to Hickman equal to two-thirds of the judgment 
entered in favor of the Garners. Hickman conditionally assigned his rights under 
the judgment for contribution to the Garners, so now the Garners are the real 
parties in interest.

I

[¶7.]     We will address both of 
the Garners' issues together regarding the propriety of granting the bank 
summary judgment on the Garners' allegations of fraud and bad faith. 
Specifically, the Garners alleged that the bank fraudulently induced them to 
contract with Hickman to build a modular home. Additionally, the Garners alleged 
the bank was guilty of bad faith by failing to advise them that Hickman was not 
qualified to act as a general contractor and for failing to advise the Garners 
that the bank was not treating Hickman as a general contractor. 

[¶8.]     When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same information. Randolph v. Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 142 (1985); and Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983). A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the 
nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge Development 
Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 (1985). Material fact has 
been defined as one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985). Upon examination of a 
summary judgment, we view the record from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, giving him all favorable inferences which may be 
drawn from the facts. Bancroft v. 
Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980).

[¶9.]     The elements in a cause 
of action of fraud are false representation made by the defendant which the 
plaintiff relies upon to his detriment. Duffy v. Brown, Wyo., 708 P.2d 433 (1985); and Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, Wyo., 674 P.2d 232 
(1984). The false representation must be one which induces action and is 
reasonably believed by the plaintiff to be true. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 
542 P.2d 867 (1975). Therefore, in order for the Garners to make a prima facie 
case of fraud, they must show the bank made a material representation which was 
false, with intent to induce action by the Garners to their detriment. 
Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 504 (1983).

[¶10.]  We have also stated that in order to 
establish fraud, the alleged false representations must be made before execution 
of the contract upon which the action is based:

"* * * In connection with 
the requirement of reasonable reliance we have recognized that false 
representations in order to constitute actionable fraud must occur prior to the 
execution of the contract which is sought to be avoided or for which damages are 
sought to be recovered. [Citations.]" Schepps v. Howe, supra, at 
508.

[¶11.]  The Schepps case involved an action by 
purchasers of real property against the sellers based upon fraudulent 
misrepresentation. The buyers complained that the house had not been built by 
qualified contractors and was incomplete, all contrary to the sellers' claims. 
However, the sellers did not make such representations until after the parties 
had already entered into their sales contract. This court affirmed the district 
court's finding that there could be no cause of action for fraudulent 
misrepresentation when the alleged misrepresentation occurred after the contract 
was executed.

[¶12.]  Similarly, the alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation by the bank in this case did not occur, if at all, until after 
Janell Garner and Hickman had already agreed that Hickman would construct the 
modular home. In her deposition, Janell Garner testified she worked out the 
agreement with Hickman before Jim Viergets of the Sundance State Bank ever 
became involved:

"Q. When was your first 
contact with Mr. Hickman?

"A. I'm not sure I can 
really give you an exact date. I know we started discussing around November and 
December of '79.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Okay. How many 
conversations did you have with Mr. Hickman regarding a home in 
'79?

"A. I can't really give 
you an exact amount. I know we've talked on several occasions and on the phone 
regarding the building of a modular home.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. And about when would 
you say you really came up with the plans that you wanted to purchase from 
Rushmore Homes?

"A. In January of 1980. 

"Q. And this was before 
you had met with Jim Viergets?

"A. We met with him that 
same month at the end of the month.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. - but you'd made a 
decision who you were going to buy a home from, the kind of home you 
wanted?

"A. 
Yes.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Other than the order 
form I guess the Rushmore order form, was there anything else in writing 
describing your arrangement with Gayle Hickman?

"A. 
No.

"Q. It was all 
verbal?

"A. 
Yes.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. Isn't it true that 
all of the arrangements, everything from purchasing of the home to the plumbers, 
electricians, all the finish people, the carpenters, all of that was arranged 
for between you and Mr. Hickman?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. Mr. Viergets had 
nothing to do with the selection of the Rushmore home or any of the people who 
were going to complete it; did he?

"A. 
No."

[¶13.]  There is no evidence which shows the 
Garners relied upon any alleged misrepresentations by the bank made before they agreed with Hickman to have 
the modular home constructed. The agreement was completed before the bank was 
contacted. Therefore, the bank's alleged fraud, if indeed there was any, is of 
no consequence to the agreement between the Garners and Hickman, and is 
therefore nonactionable.

[¶14.]  The same is true regarding the Garners' 
claim that the bank breached its duty of good faith in failing to advise the 
Garners that Hickman was not qualified to act as a general contractor and by 
failing to advise the Garners that the bank was not treating Hickman as a 
general contractor.

[¶15.]  "Good faith" is defined under § 
34-21-120(a)(xix), W.S. 1977, as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned." We have previously addressed the issue of good faith in its relation 
to real estate contracts in Stockton v. 
Sowerwine, Wyo., 690 P.2d 1202 (1984); and Wendling v. Cundall, Wyo., 568 P.2d 888 
(1977).

[¶16.]  In the present case, there is simply no 
persuasive evidence which supports the Garners' claim that the bank did not 
exercise good faith in its dealings with the Garners and Hickman. Although the 
Garners claim the bank breached its duty of good faith by failing to inform them 
that Hickman was not acting as a general contractor, it appears the notion that 
Hickman was acting as a general contractor was solely that of the Garners. 
Janell Garner testified that neither Hickman nor Jim Viergets (of the bank) told 
her that Hickman would be acting as a general contractor.

"Q. In that meeting that 
the three of you had, Jim [Viergets], Gayle [Hickman] and yourself, that was in 
January of 1980?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. At that time did Jim 
Viergets tell you that Gayle Hickman would be a general 
contractor?

"A. That term wasn't 
used, no.

"Q. He merely told you 
that you'd have to have people finish the construction; didn't 
he?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. And it was Gayle 
Hickman that volunteered that he would help you.

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. Did Gayle Hickman 
ever tell you at any time during the construction or before it started that he 
would be a general contractor on this project?

"A. 
No."

[¶17.]  The Garners further claim the bank 
breached its duty of good faith by failing to inform them that Hickman did not 
believe he was the general contractor. We can see no merit to the Garners' claim 
in this regard.

[¶18.]  Viewing all the evidence in the same 
light as did the district court, we must also conclude that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and summary judgment was therefore 
proper.

"* * * The judgment 
sought [by a motion for summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. * * *" Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

II

[¶19.]  The only issue in the bank's appeal (Case 
No. 85-114) is whether the district court erred in holding the bank liable to 
Hickman by way of contribution. As noted earlier, the Garners obtained judgment 
against Hickman for $6,621. The district court ordered the bank liable for 
contribution to Hickman equal to two-thirds of the judgment.1

[¶20.]  One authority has defined contribution 
thusly:

"The principle or 
doctrine of contribution is one of equality in bearing a common burden. 
Contribution has been defined as a payment made by each person, or by any of 
several persons, having a common interest or liability, of his share in the loss 
suffered or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the 
others. The right of contribution has also been variously described as the right 
of one who has discharged a common liability or burden, to recover of another, 
also liable, the portion which he ought to pay or bear; as the right enjoyed by 
a person who is jointly liable with others and has paid more than his proper 
share in discharge of the joint liability to force them to reimburse him to the 
extent of their liability; and as an equity which arises when one of several 
parties liable on a common debt discharges the obligation for the benefit of 
all." 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 1, pp. 7-8 (1985).

[¶21.]  Contribution in this state is governed by 
statute:

"(a) Except as otherwise 
provided in W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, where two (2) or more persons become 
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or 
for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even 
though judgment has not been recovered by all or any of 
them.

"(b) The right of 
contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro 
rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the 
amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled 
to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability." 
Section 1-1-110, W.S. 1977.

As our statute 
indicates, contribution comes from those jointly or severally liable for the same injury to person or property 
arising out of a common 
liability.

"* * * [T]he general rule 
is that one who is compelled to pay or satisfy the whole or to bear more than 
his just share of a common burden or 
obligation, upon which several 
persons are equally liable or which they are bound to discharge, is entitled 
to contribution against the others to obtain from them payment of their 
respective shares. In other words, when any burden ought, from the relationship 
of the parties or in respect of property held by them, to be equally borne, contribution is due if 
one has been compelled to pay more than his share. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 18 
Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 1, p. 8 (1985).

[¶22.]  We have already concluded in Part I of 
this opinion that there is no plausible evidence to prove the Garners' claims of 
fraud and lack of good faith on the part of the bank and therefore the district 
court's granting summary judgment in favor of the bank on these issues was 
proper. We think it was inconsistent, and, therefore improper for the district 
court to first of all grant summary judgment in favor of the bank, and then turn 
around and hold the bank liable for contribution equal to two-thirds of the 
judgment. To be liable for contribution, a party must be a joint tortfeasor who 
acted in concert with one or more other joint tortfeasors, thereby creating a 
common liability to be shared by them. There must be a sense of commonality 
between the tortfeasors to make them jointly liable for the resultant injury or 
damage caused.

[¶23.]  Such element is indeed lacking here. We 
have previously concluded, as did the district court, that there is no plausible 
evidence of the bank's alleged fraud and lack of good faith. However, even if we 
could substantiate such allegations, we would be hard-pressed to find a sense of 
commonality between the bank's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and 
Hickman's negligent construction of the modular home.

[¶24.]  Black's Law Dictionary pp. 752-753 (5th 
ed. 1979), contains the following definitions of "joint tort" and "joint 
tort-feasors":

"Joint tort. Where two or more persons 
owe to another the same duty and by their common neglect such other is injured, 
the tort is `joint.'"

"Joint tort-feasors. Term refers to two 
or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to 
person or property. [Citation.] Those persons who have acted in concert in their 
tortious conduct and are, accordingly, jointly and severally liable. Those who 
act together in committing wrong, or whose acts if independent of each other, 
unite in causing single injury. * * *"

[¶25.]  In ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981), we held that intervening house owners could not be held 
liable for negligence or any resultant contribution to a builder who was 
negligent with the city and liable for damage to a house from a landslide. The 
intervening owners were granted summary judgment, but were nevertheless included 
on the verdict form. We stated:

"* * * A tortfeasor is a 
wrongdoer; one who commits or is guilty of a tort. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth 
Edition, 1979. Generally speaking, and without attempting an all-inclusive 
definition, a tort has a meaning similar to wrong and is an unlawful act 
injurious to another, independent of contract. Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 396, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (1946). Not being tortfeasors, the Kasters had no liability either 
jointly or severally to the appellees for injury to appellees' property and 
therefore had no liability to ABC for contribution, even though they may have 
unconsciously created a condition which may have contributed to appellees' 
loss.

"Since the Kasters were 
not negligent as properly determined by the summary judgment, their names should 
never have been on the verdict form as actors in appellees' loss. No liability 
can be grounded on negligence if no duty exists on the part of an individual. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 
Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974); Guinand v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, 485 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1973). Once it has been 
determined that a person has no liability in connection with the occurrence, no 
reason remains for that person's name to appear on the verdict form for a 
determination of a percentage of negligence." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 934.

[¶26.]  Here, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the bank on the Garners' claims of fraud and bad faith. It 
was error then to hold the bank liable for contribution to a judgment it was not 
liable for. The district court did not find that the bank and Hickman were joint 
tortfeasors and therefore there can be no liability for contribution by the bank 
to Hickman.

[¶27.]  In sum, the summary judgment granted in 
favor of the bank on the Garners' claims of fraud and lack of good faith is 
affirmed. The district court's judgment finding the bank liable to Hickman by 
way of contribution for two-thirds of the judgment is reversed. 

[¶28.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the district court to enter judgment 
accordingly.

1 It is noted that the 
district judge signed two separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. This 
is unusual, especially since the two documents are not entirely 
consistent.