Title: HIGDEM v WHITHAM

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12873 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1975 E L M E R HIGDEM and VERDA HIGDEM, husband and wife, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, WILLIAM R. W H I T H A M and JUNG YUL W H I T H A M , husband and wife, Defendants and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : McGarvey and Moore, Kalispell, Montana James D. Moore argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Fennessy, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana David W. Harman argued, Libby, Montana Submitted: May 9, 1975 Decided: Jbp 1 3 19% Filed : 1.. . 2 , lJj'L ' M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal by defendants W i l l i a m R. Whitham and Jung Yul Whitham from an order and judgment entered i n t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t , Lincoln County, holding t h a t a garage b u i l t by t h e defendants violated c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i v e covenants and ordering t h e garage removed. The matter was t r i e d by t h e c o u r t , s i t t i n g without a jury. The matter was presented t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t on t h e s e agreed f a c t s : "That p l a i n t i f f s [Elmer Higdem and Verda Higdem] and defendants a r e neighbors and owners of adja- c e n t l o t s of r e a l property i n Mountain V i e w Park, a subdivision i n Lincoln County, Montana, which i s located approximately one-half m i l e north of Libby, Montana. P l a i n t i f f s a r e owners of Lot 1, Block 6 of Mountain View Park. Defendants a r e owners of Lot 2 , Block 6 of Mountain View Park. P l a i n t i f f s 1 l o t is bordered on two s i d e s by ded- i c a t e d streets, i n t h e r e a r by an a l l e y and t o t h e w e s t by defendants' l o t . Defendants have frontage on a dedicated s t r e e t , an a l l e y t o t h e rear, p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e e a s t and by McGlumphys, not p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n , t o t h e w e s t . That Lot 1 and Lot 2 of Block 6 Mountain View Park owned by p l a i n t i f f s and defendants, respectively, a r e subject t o c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i v e covenants of record a t Book 109 Page 155 Book of Deeds a t t h e o f f i c e of t h e Lincoln County Clerk and Recorder * * *. "That on o r , about April 2 4 , 1974 defendants com- menced construction on a garage a d d i t i o n on t h e i r l o t , which garage i s 34 f e e t wide, 38 f e e t deep and i t s maximum height w i l l be approximately 15 f e e t 9 inches. The garage addition w i l l contain t h r e e garage doors and w i l l be attached t o t h e dwelling located on t h e l o t . A l l of t h e p e r t i n e n t l o t s a r e 50 f e e t wide by 125 f e e t deep. "That t h e p l a i n t i f f s and defendants share a well system, t h a t t h e well system is enclosed above t h e surface of t h e ground; t h a t t h e water source i s approximately forty-two ( 4 2 ' ) beneath the surface of t h e ground. "That t h e defendants a t one t i m e inquired among neighbors i n t o t h e e f f i c a c y of performing occasional small mechanical jobs, such a s tune-ups, within t h e garage s t r u c t u r e and was informed by neighbors t h a t they would o b j e c t t o such a use of t h e s a i d garage s t r u c t u r e . "That t h e garage i n question does not encroach upon property belonging t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . " The r e s t r i c t i v e covenants r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e agreed statement of f a c t s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t s t a t e : "1. The purchasers, a s t o t h e s a i d l o t s of land hereby conveyed, and with i n t e n t t o bind a l l persons i n whom t h e s a i d l o t s hereby conveyed s h a l l f o r t h e time being be vested, but not so a s t o be personally l i a b l e under t h i s covenant a f t e r having parted with t h e s a i d l o t s , f o r themselves and t h e i r h e i r s and assigns hereby covenant with t h e sellers and t h e i r assigns a s follows: "a. Not t o e r e c t any building other than a s i n g l e detached dwelling house, e i t h e r with o r without a garage o r o t h e r l i k e and necessary out- building, upon t h e s a i d l o t s of land hereby conveyed, o r any p a r t thereof. "b. Not t o e r e c t o r s u f f e r t o be erected upon s a i d l o t s of land hereby conveyed any dwelling house a t a c o s t of l e s s than $10,000.00, such c o s t t o be calculated upon t h e n e t c o s t of labor and m a t e r i a l alone, estimated a t p r i c e s now c u r r e n t . "c. Not t o use any building t o be erected upon s a i d l o t of land hereby conveyed o r any p a r t t h e r e o f , f o r any purpose other than those incident t o t h e use of a p r i v a t e dwelling house only; t h i s provision being intended t o p r o h i b i t t h e use of any housing f o r livestock o r poultry, o r f o r any commercial purpose, provided, however, t h a t nothing herein is intended t o p r o h i b i t use of any such building f o r p r i v a t e workshops, green- houses o r o t h e r l i k e purposes. " With t h e agreed statement of f a c t s and covenants before it, t h e t r i a l c o u r t heard t h e testimony of p l a i n t i f f s and de- fendants and t h a t of one Glenn Mueller, a neighbor. Defendant William Whitham t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had purchased t h e property several years ago and a t t h a t t i m e had considered taking odd jobs when he g o t t h e garage b u i l t , but he encountered such opposition from neighbors t h a t he abandoned t h a t idea and had so informed h i s neighbors; t h a t t h e one c a r garage t h a t came with t h e house was inadequate f o r h i s use and t h a t of h i s family, a wife and t h r e e children, who between them owned t h r e e compact s t a t i o n wagons, two pickups, a Suzuki motorcycle, and two t r a i l Hondas; t h a t one of t h e reasons f o r building a l a r g e garage was t o f u r n i s h storage f o r t h e vehicles, t o o l s , lawn equip- ment, e x t r a tires and firewood; t h a t a f t e r building t h e garage he converted t h e o l d one c a r garage i n t o a den. Whitham's wife t e s t i f i e d e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a s her husband. P l a i n t i f f Elmer Higdem, a l o c a l automobile d e a l e r , t e s t i - f i e d t h a t he and h i s family had l i v e d i n t h e addition over t e n years; t h a t s h o r t l y a f t e r defendants moved i n B i l l Whitham t o l d him of h i s i n t e n t t o build a garage and he might do odd jobs i n it a s a mechanic; t h a t he t o l d Whitham he would object t o any such commercial work; t h a t a s t o t h e garage, he would not have objected t o a two s t a l l garage but when he saw t h e s i z e of t h e a c t u a l garage defendant w a s building, he objected and f i l e d a complaint on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e building violated t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants, and i n t e r f e r e d . with h i s easement of l i g h t and a i r . P l a i n t i f f Verda Higdemls testimony concerned an e x h i b i t she had prepared of t h e p l a t s i n question. The testimony of Mueller, a neighbor, concerned t h e f a c t t h a t defendant had e a r l i e r discussed building a new garage with him and t h a t he was considering taking small mechanical jobs a t h i s home. The t r i a l c o u r t made nine findings of f a c t , none harmful t o defendant and then concluded: "1. The garage addition i s i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants i n t h a t defendants already had an attached garage on s a i d property; and i s not a necessary outbuilding. " l a . That t h e a d d i t i o n a l building, i t s s i z e and t h e purpose intended a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants. " 2 . That s a i d construction apparently w i l l not r e s u l t i n adversely a f f e c t i n g t h e water system. " 3 . That s a i d garage addition does not v i o l a t e any zoning regulations o r City Ordinances, s i n c e none a r e now i n existence. "4. That defendants should remove s a i d garage addition from t h e premises due t o defendants1 v i o l a t i n g t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants. "5. P l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r c o s t s . " Defendants appeal and present two i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Are t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclusions of law support- ed by t h e findings of f a c t ? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r i n construing t h e language of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants so a s t o p r o h i b i t t h e construction of defendants' garage? Regarding i s s u e No. 1, we f i n d t h e conclusions of law, i f t h a t they a r e , a r e not supported by t h e c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t . ~ o n c l u s i o n s 4 and 5 simply s t a t e t h e defendants should remove t h e garage and pay p l a i n t i f f s t h e i r c o s t s . These, we believe, a r e remedies, not proper conclusions. After t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision, defendants moved f o r a new t r i a l , but t h i s was denied,by t h e t r i a l court. Under Montana's Rules of C i v i l Procedure, t h e proper procedure would have been t o proceed under Rule 52 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings and conclusions a r e inconsistent. From t h e c o u r t ' s conclusions it would appear t h e order f o r removal of t h e garage must have been based on i t s conclusion l a : "That the a d d i t i o n a l building, its s i z e and t h e purpose intended a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e res- t r i c t i v e covenants." However, no reference i s made t o a s p e c i f i c covenant and none of t h e covenants r e l a t e t o construction, existence, o r s i z e of any buildings on t h e land. Covenant "c" only r e l a t e s t o t h e use of t h e land and t h e use of t h e s t r u c t u r e s . The only language i n covenant "a" which i n any way might r e l a t e t o s i z e , a l b e i t in- d i r e c t l y , i s t h e phrase "necessary outbuildings". H e r e , we a r e considering a garage. W e note t h e term "necessary" does n o t proceed t h e t e r m "garage", b u t r a t h e r t h e cerm "outbuilding". Assuming t h e t r i a l c o u r t superimposed t h e t e r m "necessary" upon t h e new garage, we look t o a r e c e n t d e c i s i o n a£ t h i s Court, Timmerman v. G a b r i e l , 155 Mont. 294, 298, 470 P.2d 528, t o i n t e r p r e t t h e t e r m "necessary" i n a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant. I n Timmerman t h e Court was r e q u i r e d t o determine whether a "double- wide" t r a i l e r f e l l w i t h i n t h e meaning of a covenant p r o h i b i t i n g t r a i l e r s . The Court s a i d : "The c o n s t r u c t i o n of covenants i n deeds t o prop- e r t y i s n o t u n l i k e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of c o n t r a c t s . "Section 13-710, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "'The words of a c o n t r a c t are t o be understood i n t h e i r o r d i n a r y and popular s e n s e , r a t h e r t h a n according t o t h e i r s t r i c t l e g a l meaning, u n l e s s used by t h e p a r t i e s i n a t e c h n i c a l sense, o r un- less a s p e c i a l meaning i s given t o them by usage, i n which c a s e t h e l a t t e r must be followed."' Montana does n o t have c a s e a u t h o r i t y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t e r m "necessary o u t b u i l d i n g s " w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a r e s t r i c t i v e cove- n a n t , but w e f i n d a number of c a s e s throughout o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o n s t r u i n g t h e word "necessary" t o mean convenient t o t h e dwelling and w e s o hold here. Granger v. Boulls, 21 Wash.2d 597, 152 P.2d 325; Thompson v. P e s t Control Comm., (La. 1 9 5 4 ) , 75 S.2d 406; King v. Kugler, 17 Cal.Rptr. 504; 92 ALR2d 872. Here, t h e new garage i s convenient t o t h e house and is i n conformity w i t h t h e a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t y of t h e a r e a . The c o u r t ' s conclusion t h e garage must be t o r n down and removed i s n o t supported by any of i t s f i n d i n g s . The second i s s u e i s whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e language of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants. The t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n o r d e r i n g t h e garage removed. This Court i n Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151 Mont. 76, 8 0 , 438 P.2d 660, spoke t o t h e r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t a r e a p p l i c a b l e here: "Althougn v a r i o u s r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n have been developed and employed i n diverse cases t h a t have come before t h i s c o u r t i n t h e p a s t , we consider t h e following t o be applicable t o t h e i n s t a n t case i n determining l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The i n t e n t i o n of t h e Legislature must f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, and i f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e can be so determined, t h e c o u r t s may not go f u r t h e r and apply any other means of i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n . [Citing cases.] Where t h e language of a s t a t u t e i s p l a i n , unambiguous, d i r e c t and c e r t a i n , t h e s t a t u t e speaks f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e i s nothing l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o construe. [Citing cases.] The function of t h e c o u r t i s simply t o a s c e r t a i n and declare what i n terms o r i n sub- stance is contained i n t h e s t a t u t e and not t o i n s e r t what has been omitted. [Citing cases.] I n s h o r t , it is simply t h e duty of t h e Supreme Court t o construe t h e law a s it f i n d s it. [Citing cases.] " Applying t h e above p r i n c i p l e s t o construing t h e language of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenants here, w e hold t h a t where t h e words a r e p l a i n , unambiguous, d i r e c t and c e r t a i n and admit of but one meaning, then it is t h e duty of t h i s Court t o declare what t h e t e r m s of t h e cov- enants contain and not t o i n s e r t a l i m i t a t i o n not contained therein. I n t h e i r b r i e f and on o r a l argument, p l a i n t i f f s argued i n t h e support o f / t r i a l c o u r t ' s conclusion of law l a , which r e f e r s t o t h e s i z e of t h e garage. They r e l y on case a u t h o r i t y t o support t h e i r p o s i t i o n , and cite t h r e e cases. Hansen v. Facione, 294 Mich. 473, 293 N.W. 723; Moore v. White, (Okla. 1958), 323 P.2d 352; Bruce v. McClees, 1 1 0 N.J.E. 92, 158 A. 849. W e f i n d these cases d i f f e r f a c t u a l l y from t h e i n s t a n t case. I n Bruce t h e covenant had a set back proviso of a t l e a s t 1 0 0 f e e t from t h e s t r e e t and much of t h e case turned on i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e proviso. Hansen involved a defendant who owned and operated two f i v e ton trucks f o r hauling rubbish and he b u i l t a 4 0 f o o t by 50 f o o t garage, i n a r e s t r i c t e d a r e a , t o accommodate h i s business operations. While Moore i s c l o s e t o t h e i n s t a n t case factwise, t h e r e was a s e t back regula- t i o n and a space requirement t h a t takes Moore o u t of t h e f a c t sit- uation here. The overriding policy of individual expression i n f r e e and reasonable land use d i c t a t e s t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s should not be aided o r extended by implication o r enlarged by construction. Sporn v. Overholt, 175 Kan. 197, 262 P.2d 828; Flaks v. Wichman, 128 Col. 45, 260 P.2d 737; Granger v. Boulls, 21 Wash.2d 597, Three basic r u l e s may be gleaned from these cases: (1) t h a t r e s t r i c t i v e covenants be s t r i c t l y construed, ( 2 ) t h a t ambiguities be resolved i n favor of f r e e use of property, and ( 3 ) t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t court should not have broadly i n t e r p r e t e d and imposed these r e s t r i c t i v e covenants i n t e r m s of what t h e p a r t i e s would have desired had they i n i t i a l l y been confronted with questions l a t e r developing. The judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t is reversed and t h e cause returned t o t h e d i s t r i c t court with d i r e c t i o n s t o e n t e r judgment f o r defendants. ................................ J u s t i c e s M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s cause. M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur i n t h e r e s u l t h e r e b u t do n o t b e l i e v e w e need beyond t h e covenant language f i n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s are n o t c o r r e c t . J u s t i c e