Title: Greene v. Bell

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Greene v. Bell (99-070); 171 Vt.280; 762 A.2d 865 

[Filed 20-Oct-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-070

Kelly R. Greene, et al.	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Rutland Superior Court

Michael R. Bell, M.D.,	                         June Term, 2000
Castleton Health Associates, Inc. and
Rutland Regional Physicians' Group

Mary Miles Teachout, J.

Karl C. Anderson of Anderson & Eaton, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Karen S. Heald of Cleary Shahi Associates, P.C., Rutland, for 
  Defendant-Appellee Bell.

John D. Monahan, Jr. of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for 
  Defendant-Appellee Castleton Health Associates, Inc.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Skoglund, JJ., and Toor, Supr. J., 
          Specially Assigned

       SKOGLUND, J.   Plaintiff Abby Greene, individually and on behalf of
  the estate of her  deceased husband, Kelly Greene, and the couple's three
  minor children, appeals from a judgment   based upon a jury verdict in
  favor of defendants Michael R. Bell, M.D. and his employer, Castleton 
  Health Associates, Inc. (FN1) Plaintiff contends the court committed
  numerous evidentiary and  instructional errors.  We affirm.     

       In July of 1993, Kelly Greene visited the office of Dr. Bell, a family
  practice physician, to 

 

  have a mole on his back examined and assessed.  Precisely what transpired
  during that visit was the  subject of vigorous dispute and conflicting
  evidence at trial.  Dr. Bell testified that, after obtaining a  history and
  examining Mr. Greene, he made the clinical assessment that the mole was
  either one of  two types of benign lesions - seborrheic keratosis or
  compound nevus (nevus is a general term for a  congenital growth on the
  skin), and, with Mr. Greene's concurrence, scheduled him for a follow-up 
  visit for surgical removal of the mole.  Dr Bell disputed plaintiff's claim
  that he (Dr. Bell) had been  informed the mole had recently changed in
  appearance, a warning sign for melanoma. Mr. Greene, in  a videotaped
  deposition to preserve testimony, recalled that Dr. Bell indicated the mole
  was nothing  to worry about, and that it could be removed if it became
  uncomfortable.    

       Mr. Greene did not return for the scheduled surgery.  Nearly two years
  later, in April 1995,  Mr. Greene made another appointment to have the mole
  examined, complaining that it was bothering  him.  Dr. Bell removed the
  mole and had it biopsied, which revealed an advanced malignant nodular 
  melanoma.  Despite subsequent surgery and treatment, the cancer continued
  to spread.  Mr. Greene  died of melanoma in November 1997.              

       Plaintiff, Mr. Greene's wife, subsequently filed suit on behalf of the
  estate and her three  minor children, claiming that Dr. Bell had
  negligently failed to educate Mr. Greene about the risk   factors for
  melanoma that were indicated during the July 1993 visit and the importance
  of surgical  removal of the mole, and that but for Dr. Bell's negligence
  Mr. Greene would not have died.   Following a week-long trial, in which
  numerous medical experts testified for each side, the jury  returned a
  special verdict in favor of  defendants, finding that Dr. Bell had not been
  negligent.  The  trial court denied a subsequent motion for judgment as a
  matter of law.  This appeal followed.

 

                                     I.

       Plaintiff first contends the trial court committed prejudicial error
  by precluding one of their  experts, Dr. Sober, from explaining the risk
  factors present in Mr. Greene.

       Our discovery rules permit one party to compel the other to "identify
  each person whom the  other party expects to call as an expert witness at
  trial,  to state the subject matter on which the expert  is expected to
  testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
  expert is  expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each
  opinion."   V.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).  A  trial court has inherent authority
  to enforce the discovery requirements of V.R.C.P. 26 by excluding 
  evidence, granting a continuance, or by taking other appropriate action. 
  See White Current Corp. v.  Vermont Elec. Coop., 158 Vt. 216, 223, 609 A.2d 222, 226 (1992).  Absent an abuse of discretion, a  trial court's
  imposition of discovery sanctions will not be disturbed.  See id.; see also
  Agency of  Natural Resources v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 169 Vt. 426, 434,