Title: ASHLIE CHURCHILL V. CAMPBELL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ASHLIE CHURCHILL V. CAMPBELL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL2010 WY 86234 P.3d 365Case Number: S-09-0195Decided: 06/25/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ASHLIE 
CHURCHILL,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.CAMPBELL COUNTY 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Nicholas 
H. Carter and Stephanie M. Humphrey of The Nick Carter Law Firm, P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Billie 
LM Addleman of Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion, in which BURKE, J., joins.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      On March 12, 
2009, Appellant Ashlie Churchill filed a complaint, pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.  The 
complaint alleged that Ms. Churchill was injured on March 17, 2006, while 
awaking from a tonsillectomy and adenotonsillectomy performed at Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital. The district court granted the Hospital's motion to dismiss 
the complaint.  The district court 
relied on two grounds.  First, it 
ruled that the complaint should be dismissed because Ms. Churchill did not file 
a claim with the Medical Review Panel, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
9-2-1518(a) (LexisNexis 2009).1  Second, the district court ruled that 
Ms. Churchill's cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations applicable to a "cause of action arising from an act, error or 
omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care 
services."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  Ms. 
Churchill appealed to challenge the district court's order dismissing her 
complaint with prejudice.

 
 
[¶2]      Our disposition 
of this appeal is controlled by Beaulieu 
v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II).  There, we held that a complaint in a 
governmental claims action must allege compliance with the signature and 
certification requirements of Wyo. Const. Art. 16, § 7, in addition to alleging 
compliance with the statutory filing requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113.  Without such allegations, 
a district court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action.  Id., ¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d  at 866-69.  Since then, we have followed the Beaulieu II rule in a number of 
cases.  Uptown Caf© v. Town of Greybull, 2010 WY 
58, 231 P.3d 257 (Wyo. 2010); Motley v. 
Platte County, 2009 WY 147, ¶¶ 2-3, 220 P.3d 518, 519-20 (Wyo. 2009); McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, ¶¶ 
7-8, 210 P.3d 1078, 1081-82 (Wyo. 2009); Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 WY 126, ¶¶ 
17-19, 193 P.3d 1159, 1163-64 (Wyo. 2008).  
We must do likewise here.

 
 
[¶3]      In her complaint, 
Ms. Churchill alleged:

 
 
6.         
A Notice of Claims was prepared and served upon the Defendant pursuant to 
the Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 through § 
1-39-121.  A copy of the Notice of 
Claims is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and incorporated herein.  

 
 
7.  Mr. Bob Morasko, of the Campbell County 
Memorial Hospital, was served on March 13, 2008.  The original Return is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit B" and incorporated herein.  

 
 
While 
these allegations indicate compliance with the statutory notice of claim 
requirements, the complaint does not allege that Ms. Churchill complied with the 
signature and certification requirements of Wyo. Const. Art. 16, § 7.2  In addition, to the extent Ms. 
Churchill's Notice of Claims was incorporated into the complaint, the Notice of 
Claims itself does not allege compliance with the constitutional 
requirements.  See Gose, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d  at 1164; W.R.C.P. 
10(c) ("[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is 
a part thereof for all purposes").

 
 
[¶4]  Because Ms. Churchill's complaint did 
not allege compliance with the constitutional requirements, the district court 
never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over this action.  Motley, ¶ 3, 220 P.3d  at 520; McCann, ¶ 8, 210 P.3d  at 1082; Gose, ¶¶ 18-19, 193 P.3d  at 1164.  This Court, having no better 
jurisdiction than the district court, is without jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal.  We therefore dismiss this 
appeal.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice, specially 
concurring, in which BURKE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶5]      I concur in the 
majority opinion to the extent it affirms the district court's dismissal of the 
complaint.  However, I would affirm 
on the basis that the district court properly concluded the applicable statute 
of limitations was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 (LexisNexis 2009) and the complaint 
was not filed within two years of the alleged act, error or omission as required 
by that statute.  I disagree that 
the judicially created requirement that the complaint must allege compliance 
with Art. 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution prevented the district court from 
acquiring jurisdiction over the matter.  
See Uptown Cafe, Inc. v. Town of Greybull, 
2010 WY 58, ¶ 4, 231 P.3d 257, 258 (Wyo. 2010); Motley v. Platte County, 2009 WY 147, ¶ 
5, 220 P.3d 518, 520 (Wyo. 2009); McCann 
v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, ¶ 9, 210 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Wyo. 2009).  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 9-2-1518. Claims to be reviewed by panel; prohibition on filing claims 
in court; tolling of statute of limitation; immunity of panel and witnesses; 
administration.

 
 
            
(a) The panel shall review all malpractice claims against health care 
providers filed with the panel except those claims subject to a valid 
arbitration agreement allowed by law or upon which suit has been filed prior to 
July 1, 2005.  Unless submission to 
the panel is waived in accordance with W.S. 9-2-1519(a), no complaint alleging 
malpractice shall be filed in any court against a health care provider before a 
claim is made to the panel and its decision is rendered.  The running of the applicable limitation 
period in a malpractice action is tolled upon receipt by the director of the 
claim and does not begin again until thirty (30) days after the panel's final 
decision, or seventy-five (75) days after the panel's last hearing, whichever 
occurs earlier.

 
 

2As we noted in Uptown Caf© v. Town 
of Greybull, 2010 WY 58, ¶ 3 n.1,  
231 P.3d 257, 257 n.1 (Wyo. 2010), the Wyoming Legislature has amended § 
1-39-113 to codify the allegation requirements established by case law.  Effective July 1, 2010, "the complaint 
shall state . . . the claim was in compliance with the signature and 
certification requirements of article 16, section 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(d)(iii) (HEA0016).