Title: Grimes v. Saban

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 12/12/14
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130758
____________________
Sarah Grimes
v.
Kristen Saban
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CV-12-900538)
BRYAN, Justice.
Sarah Grimes appeals a summary judgment entered by the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court in favor of Kristen Saban in Grimes's
civil action against Saban seeking damages for assault and
battery.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Grimes, the nonmovant, as we must when reviewing a summary
1130758
judgment, we conclude that there are genuine issues of
material fact in this case.  Therefore, we reverse the summary
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
In the early morning hours of August 29, 2010, Grimes, 
Saban, and others were gathered in the kitchen at Saban's
apartment after returning from Rounders, a bar located in
Tuscaloosa.  Both Saban and Grimes had been drinking alcohol. 
At one point, Grimes offended Saban by telling her to "shut
up" and saying that Grimes and the others were tired of
listening to her.  Saban went to her bedroom and, according to
Grimes, as she did so, Saban shouted that no one liked Grimes
and that Grimes did not have any friends.  Grimes told Saban
that Saban needed to get therapy, to which Saban replied: 
"Because that worked really well for you."  According to
Saban, Grimes then called Saban a "psycho."
Saban locked herself in her bedroom.  Some time later,
Hannah Muncher went to Saban's bedroom to check on her.  Saban
let Muncher into her bedroom and locked the door behind her. 
Grimes, McKinnon Moultrie, and Courtney Reigel, one 
of 
Saban's
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roommates, were all sitting in Reigel's bedroom, which was
across the hall from Saban's bedroom.
While Saban was locked in her bedroom, she posted the
following statement on her Facebook social-medium page: "No
one likes Sarah, Yayyyyy!"  When Grimes saw the Facebook post,
she got up and moved toward Saban's door, saying "I'm done." 
Reigel told Grimes not to confront Saban.  Grimes replied: 
"[I]f she touches me, I'll kill her."  Grimes testified that
this statement was a figure of speech, that it was not a
threat directed at Saban, and that she did not know whether
Saban even heard it.  Grimes went to Saban's door, with her
telephone in her hand, and began banging on the door with her
hand, shouting to Saban to remove the post from her Facebook
page.
A few seconds later, Saban opened the door and showed
Grimes her telephone, stating that she had removed the post. 
A physical altercation ensued.  The facts as to how the
altercation began and the extent of it are disputed.  Grimes
testified that Saban came out of her bedroom to show Grimes
that she had removed the post and that Grimes replied
"something to the effect of, okay, that's fine, we're done,
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and ... called [Saban] crazy."  According to Grimes, Saban
then "used both of her hands and shoved [Grimes] into
[Reigel's] open door frame" and that Grimes "hit [her] head on
the door when [Saban] threw [her] back."  Grimes testified
that she then put "[o]ne hand on [Saban's] throat, one hand on
her chest, and threw her back ... toward the door to get her
away."  Grimes testified further that "immediately 
after 
[she]
threw [Saban] back [Saban] start[ed] punching [her]" in the
face.  Grimes testified that Saban hit her in the face more
than five times and that Grimes "did not swing back" but put
her arm up to defend herself.
The two women were eventually separated.  Grimes
testified that, after they were separated, Saban threw
Grimes's telephone against the wall and went into her room. 
Grimes followed her to talk to her. Grimes testified that she
was bleeding and that blood was "all over the floor and all
over [her]" and that it had run down her face and into her
bra.  Grimes testified that Saban was not bleeding.  After a
brief conversation with Saban, Grimes determined that she
needed to go the hospital.  Reigel and Beth Terry, another of
Saban's roommates, drove her there and stayed with her until
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Grimes's parents arrived.  She testified that her injuries
were "extensive," including considerable swelling on her left
temple and a black eye.
Saban, on the other hand, testified that after she put
the post about Grimes on Facebook:
"[Grimes] came banging on my door.
"....
"She banged on my door for a few seconds, maybe
almost a minute.  I wasn't answering the door.  I
didn't want to until I -– she was screaming at me to
take it off and cursing, and I finally took it off,
and I opened the door, and I showed her.  I had my
phone out, and I said, 'It's off. It's off.'
"....
"And then she took both of her hands and put
them around my throat.
"....
"I believe we both had a hold of each other's
hair at that point after she grabbed me."
Saban went on to testify that after Grimes grabbed her throat
there was "[j]ust a lot of slapping and punching, not many
landing, and scratching."  Saban testified that she had not
touched Grimes before Grimes "put her hands on [Saban's] neck"
and that, when Grimes had her hands on Saban's neck, Saban
"put[] [her] arms out to try to push [Grimes] off of [her]." 
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Saban testified that Terry pulled Saban and Grimes apart and
that she, Saban, went back to her bedroom, crying.  Saban
testified that her nose was bleeding and that she had
scratches on her back.  She did not remember seeing any blood
on Grimes, but she did testify that Grimes's eye was a little
swollen.  Saban testified that Grimes said she needed to go to
the hospital to document her injuries.
In June 2012, Grimes sued Saban, alleging assault and
battery.  Grimes argued, among other things, that, "[a]s a
result of the beating and the head injuries [she] sustained by
Kristen Saban, [Grimes] has had repeated night terrors,
anxiety, physical trembling, fears of dying from brain
injuries, 
trouble 
sleeping, 
and 
intrusive 
recollections 
of 
the
event."  Grimes also alleged that her migraine headaches had
increased since 
the altercation with Saban, that she 
sustained
"severe emotional trauma," and that "the middle of [Grimes's]
nose was deformed, was shifted, and it was a direct result of
the beating that [Grimes] received from [Saban]."
Saban moved the circuit court to dismiss the action,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and shortly
thereafter filed an answer to the complaint.  Saban argued,
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among other things, that "Grimes instigated, or otherwise
brought on this altercation by uttering hateful words to
[Saban]" and that "Saban acted in self defense."  On July 18,
2012, the circuit court denied Saban's motion to dismiss.  In
December 2013, Saban moved the circuit court for a summary
judgment.  She included with her motion, among other things,
affidavits from Reigel, Moultrie, Muncher, Terry, and Meaghan
Williams, who had also been at the apartment on the morning of
August 29, 2010, giving their account of events related to
Grimes's and Saban's altercation.  Grimes opposed 
the 
summary-
judgment motion and attached, among other items, as evidence
in support of her arguments in opposition the deposition
testimony of Grimes and Saban; photographs that Grimes 
alleged
were of the injuries she received during the altercation with
Saban; and medical records from Grimes's hospital visit after
the altercation.  Saban moved to strike those exhibits.  The
circuit court did not rule on Saban's motion before it entered
a summary judgment in Saban's favor on the assault and battery
claims.
In its summary-judgment order, the circuit court stated:
"Findings
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"In the early morning hours of August 29, 2010,
[Grimes] and [Saban], along with some mutual
girlfriends, returned to [Saban's] apartment after
a night of socializing at a local bar.  As they sat
in the kitchen discussing the night's events, an
argument ensued between [Grimes] and [Saban], which
prompted [Saban] to leave the room, go upstairs to
her bedroom, and lock her door.
"While in her room, [Saban] posted on Facebook,
'No one likes Sarah, yayyyyy!' apparently in
reference to [Grimes].  Sometime later, [Grimes] saw
this post, became angry, went to [Saban's] bedroom
and began yelling and pounding on the locked door,
demanding the post be removed.  When [Saban] opened
the door to her bedroom and attempted to show
[Grimes] her phone and that the post had been
removed, [Grimes] advanced toward [Saban], got
within inches of [Saban's] face, and continued
yelling.  As [Saban] pushed [Grimes] away, [Grimes]
grabbed [Saban] by the throat, and the physical
altercation began.
"Conclusions
"[Saban] was in her home, locked in her bedroom,
when [Grimes] sought out [Saban] and initiated the
confrontation. [Grimes's] response to [Saban's]
Facebook post was unreasonable and excessive.
[Grimes] initiated the confrontation when she sought
out [Saban] after [Saban] had left the room where
the argument had taken place, and by going to
[Saban's] locked bedroom door yelling and demanding
the post be taken down.  When [Saban] opened the
door to an angry [Grimes] within inches of her face,
it was reasonable for [Saban] to believe imminent
use of unlawful physical force by [Grimes] was about
to be used against her.  [Saban] had a right to be
in her home, had no duty to retreat and had the
right to stand her ground.  Therefore, [Saban] was
justified in using physical force to defend herself
from what she reasonably believed to be the use of
8
1130758
unlawful physical force by [Grimes].  Furthermore,
[Saban] was justified in using a degree of force
that she reasonably believed was necessary to repel
[Grimes's] use and threat of physical force.
"Due to these facts, Alabama Code [1975,] § 13A-
3-23[,] 
presumes 
that 
[Saban's] 
actions 
were
justified and necessary to repel the use of physical
force against her.  [Grimes] failed to present
evidence to rebut this presumption.  Therefore, it
is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that [Saban's]
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED with
costs taxed as paid."
(Capitalization in original.)
Grimes moved the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate
its judgment.  The circuit court denied that motion on March
18, 2014, and Grimes appealed.
Discussion
"'The 
standard 
of 
review 
applicable 
to 
a 
summary
judgment is the same as the standard for granting
the motion ....'  McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor
Flea Market, Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992).
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The burden is on
the moving party to make a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to a
judgment 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law. 
 
In
determining whether the movant has carried
that burden, the court is to view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable
9
1130758
inferences in favor of that party.  To
defeat 
a 
properly 
supported 
summary
judgment motion, the nonmoving party must
present "substantial evidence" creating a
genuine issue of material fact -- "evidence
of such weight and quality that fair-minded
persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the 
existence
of the fact sought to be proved."  Ala.
Code 1975, § 12–21–12; West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'"
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935
(Ala. 
2006) 
(quoting 
Capital 
Alliance 
Ins. 
Co. 
v.
Thorough–Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994)).
Grimes argues that the circuit court erred in entering a
summary judgment in favor of Saban because, she says, genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether Saban acted in
self-defense, under § 13A-3-23, Ala. Code 1975.  Section 13A-
3-23 provides, in pertinent part:1
"(a) A person is justified in using physical
force upon another person in order to defend himself
or herself or a third person from what he or she
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of
unlawful physical force by that other person, and he
or she may use a degree of force which he or she
reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose.
...
"....
Section 13A-3-23 was amended effective August 1, 2013. 
1
That amendment affected parts of § 13A-3-23 not quoted above.
10
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"(b) A person who is justified under subsection
(a) in using physical force, including deadly
physical force, and who is not engaged in an
unlawful activity and is in any place where he or
she has the right to be has no duty to retreat and
has the right to stand his or her ground.
"(c) 
Notwithstanding 
the 
provisions 
of
subsection (a), a person is not justified in using
physical force if:
"....
"(2) He or she was the initial
aggressor, except that his or her use of
physical force upon another person under
the circumstances is justifiable if he or
she withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to the other
person his or her intent to do so, but the
latter person nevertheless continues or
threatens the use of unlawful physical
force.
"....
"(d) A person who uses force, including deadly
physical force, as justified and permitted in this
section is immune from criminal prosecution and
civil action for the use of such force, unless the
force was determined to be unlawful."
The circuit court determined that Grimes "sought out
[Saban] and initiated the confrontation"; that Saban "was
justified in using physical force to defend herself from what
she reasonably believed to be the use of unlawful physical
force by [Grimes]"; 
and "that [Saban's] actions 
were justified
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and necessary to repel the use of physical force against her." 
These conclusions were apparently based on the 
circuit 
court's
findings that, after she saw Saban's Facebook post about her,
Grimes 
"became angry, went to [Saban's] bedroom and began
yelling and pounding on the locked door, demanding
the post be removed.  When [Saban] opened the door
to her bedroom and attempted to show [Grimes] her
phone and that the post had been removed, [Grimes]
advanced toward [Saban], got within inches of
[Saban's] face, and continued yelling.  As [Saban]
pushed [Grimes] away, [Grimes] grabbed [Saban] by
the throat, and the physical altercation began."
These findings are supported by Saban's deposition
testimony and by the affidavits of Reigel, Moultrie, Muncher,
Terry, and Williams, which she attached to her motion for a
summary judgment.  However, they are disputed by Grimes's
deposition testimony, which was attached to Grimes's brief
filed in opposition to Saban's summary-judgment motion.  As
noted previously,
"[i]n determining whether the movant has carried
that burden [of showing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law], the court
is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party."
Capital Alliance Ins., 639 So. 2d at 1350 (emphasis added).
12
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Grimes testified in her deposition that after she banged
on Saban's door, insisting that Saban take down the Facebook
post, Saban opened the door and came out of her bedroom to
show Grimes that the post had been removed.  Grimes testified
that Saban was in the hall when she showed Grimes her
telephone and that "[Grimes] had backed away from [Saban's]
door when [Saban] came out of her room."  Grimes also
testified that she and Saban were "in close proximity" and
"[c]loser than [arms' length]," but her testimony does not
indicate that she was "within inches of [Saban's] face" or
that she continued yelling or threatening Saban once Saban
told her the post had been removed.2
Grimes also testified in her deposition that, after Saban
told her that the Facebook post had been removed, she said to
Saban "something to the effect of 'I don't care, okay, but
we're done,' and I called her crazy."  Grimes testified that
Saban then "used both of her hands and shoved [Grimes] into
[Reigel's] open door frame."  Grimes testified that, after
Saban pushed her, she grabbed Saban, putting one hand on her
throat and one hand on her chest "and threw [Saban] back ...
The statement that Grimes was yelling at Saban "within
2
inches of Saban's face" appears only in Reigel's affidavit.
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toward the door to get her away."  According to Grimes, when
she put her hands on Saban's throat and chest to push her
away, Saban started punching her and hit her in the face
"[m]ore than five times."
Grimes testified that, after the first punch, she told
Saban that "[she] was calling the cops."  Grimes stated:
"I'm not sure how many blows were after that.  I did
not swing back.  I know I had my arm up to defend
myself.  She had a grip on my hair.  And we were
somehow moving along the wall ....  [Muncher] at
this point ... tried to pull her off, and it wasn't
working.
"And at some point, the closer we got towards
the living room, [Terry], who was asleep, got up out
of bed and they somehow managed to pull [Saban] off
of me."
Grimes also testified in her deposition that she may have
scratched Saban and pulled her hair to "get away from her and
get her off of me."
When viewed in the light most favorable to Grimes and
when all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of Grimes,
see Pritchett, supra, Grimes's deposition testimony raises
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Saban reasonably
believed the use of force was necessary to defend herself
against Grimes, whether Saban used a degree of force she
14
1130758
reasonably believed was necessary, and whether Saban was the
initial aggressor in the altercation.  See § 13A-3-23(a) and
(c)(2), supra.  Thus, Saban was not entitled to a summary
judgment pursuant to § 13A-3-23 on the ground that she acted
in self-defense.
Saban argues that Grimes's deposition testimony alone is
not "substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Saban acted in self-defense.  She
cites Blackburn v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 652
So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1994), Mitchell v. Torrence Cablevision USA,
Inc., 806 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), and Walsh v.
Douglas, 717 So. 2d 807 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), in support of
that argument.  Her reliance on those cases is misplaced.
In Blackburn, this Court noted that the undisputed
evidence in the record disproved the plaintiff's claim that
the defendant had acted in bad faith.  In Mitchell, the Court
of Civil Appeals determined that the plaintiff's 
own 
testimony
supported the defendants' claim that there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to their affirmative defenses. 
Here, the evidence related to Grimes's assault and battery
claims and Saban's claim that she acted in self-defense is
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highly disputed and raises genuine issues of material fact as
to whether Saban is entitled to protection under § 13A-3-23.
In Walsh, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the
"unsupported allegations" in the testimony of one of the
defendants "[did] not constitute substantial evidence" and
that that testimony "was insufficient to create a factual
issue precluding summary judgment."  717 So. 2d at 810.  The
Court of Civil Appeals stated: "Mere conclusory allegations
that a fact exists will not defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion."  Id.  Grimes's 
deposition 
testimony,
however, is not composed of "[m]ere conclusory allegations." 
Instead, she sets forth specific facts that, when viewed in
the light most favorable to Grimes, as they must be, see
Pritchett, supra, constitute substantial evidence of genuine
issues of fact as to whether Saban acted in self-defense,
pursuant to § 13A-3-23, see Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., i.e.,
evidence from which "fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."  Pritchett, supra.  Thus, the
circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in Saban's
favor based on § 13A-3-23.  In so holding, we should not be
16
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understood as expressing a view as to the merits of the
underlying claims or affirmative defenses; we merely 
hold that
there remain genuine issues of material fact for resolution by
the fact-finder so as to preclude the entry of a summary
judgment.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, and Main, JJ., concur.
17