Title: Hartmann v. Sibbold, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DETLEF F. HARTMANN,   
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
D.L. SIBBOLD et al.,  
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 41, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below-Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  No. 4350 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 16, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 30, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Detlef F. Hartmann (“Hartmann”), filed 
an appeal from the Court of Chancery’s January 7, 2010 order granting the 
motion to dismiss of defendants-appellees D.L. Sibbold et al. (the 
“defendants”).  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
Hartmann filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery seeking 
relief from alleged violations of his rights during the time he was 
incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, 
 
2 
Delaware.1  The record reflects that, at the time Hartmann filed his 
complaint, he already had been released from prison.  The complaint alleged 
that a) prison officials improperly denied him, as a disabled person, access to 
legal materials; b) the prison grievance system was inadequate; and c) his 
rights were violated by the Superior Court by, among other things, barring 
him from access to the Internet.   
 
(3) 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which 
was granted by the Court of Chancery.  The Court of Chancery found that 
Hartmann’s claims against State officials were barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity; that Hartmann’s claims against prison officials were 
moot in light of his prior release from prison; and that the Court of Chancery 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Hartmann’s claim of violations 
of his rights during the Superior Court proceedings leading to his conviction. 
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Hartmann claims that the Court of Chancery 
erred and abused its discretion when it failed to punish prison officials, court 
employees, and employees of the Office of the Attorney General for 
violating his rights, and award him damages. 
 
(5) 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity as set forth in the Delaware 
Constitution, Article 1, § 9, bars actions against the State of Delaware, 
                                                 
1 Hartmann was incarcerated following his conviction of sexual offenses in State v. 
Hartmann, Del. Super, Cr. ID No. 9912000027. 
 
3 
including its agencies and employees, a) if the State has not waived the 
defense of sovereign immunity for the actions outlined in the complaint; and 
b) if the State Tort Claims Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §4001 et seq., bars 
the action.2  A waiver of immunity must be enacted by the General 
Assembly,3 and must be clear and specific.4  In this case, there is no 
evidence of a clear and specific waiver of sovereign immunity by the State.  
As such, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Hartmann’s claims and the 
Court of Chancery properly dismissed them on that basis.5   
 
(6) 
The Court of Chancery also properly invoked Rules 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6)  in dismissing Hartmann’s claims.  Not only did the Court of 
Chancery lack subject matter jurisdiction over Hartmann’s claims of 
improper conduct by State officials during his Superior Court prosecution, 
but also Hartmann failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
by the Court of Chancery because he had an adequate remedy at law through 
                                                 
2 Pauley v. Reinhoehl, 848 A.2d 569, 573 (Del. 2004). 
3 Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175, 1181 (Del. 1985). 
4 Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1376 (Del. 1995) (The State Insurance Coverage 
Program constitutes such a clear and specific waiver of sovereign immunity.) 
5 The State Tort Claims Act also bars Hartmann’s claims, since Hartmann has presented 
no evidence that the acts of which he complains were not undertaken in good faith in the 
course of the defendants’ official duties or that the acts resulted from gross or wanton 
negligence.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §4001. 
 
4 
the appeal process.6  Finally, because, as the record reflects, Hartmann had 
been released from prison approximately 2 months before filing his 
complaint, his claims of impropriety on the part of prison officials were 
moot.7  To the extent that Hartmann asserts claims in this appeal that were 
not raised below, we decline to address any such claims.8   
 
(7) 
In light of all of the above, we conclude that the Court of 
Chancery properly dismissed Hartmann’s claims on the grounds cited in its 
January 7, 2010 order.  In the absence of any legal error or abuse of 
discretion, the judgment of the Court of Chancery must be affirmed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
  
                                                 
6 The record reflects that Hartmann did, in fact, file an appeal from his Superior Court 
conviction, albeit unsuccessfully.  Hartmann v. State, Del. Supr., No. 254, 2009, Jacobs, 
J. (May 27, 2009). 
7 Crist v. State, Del. Supr., No. 48, 1997, Veasey, C.J. (June 23, 1997). 
8 Supr. Ct. R. 8.