Title: State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-539.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-539 
THE STATE EX REL. DIFRANCO, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF  
SOUTH EUCLID ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-539.] 
Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)—Attorney fees. 
(No. 2012-1893—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided February 19, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97823,  
2012-Ohio-5158. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is the appeal of a public-records mandamus case, filed 
initially in the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  Appellant, Emilie DiFranco, 
made a public-records request to which the clerk of appellee city of South 
Euclid’s council responded, stating that he would forward the requested 
information after review by the finance and law departments.  However, because 
of an internal breakdown in communication, the city did not fulfill the request for 
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nearly six months.  Upon DiFranco’s filing of a claim for a writ of mandamus in 
the court of appeals, the oversight was discovered, and the city immediately 
produced the requested records.  All parties agree that the writ action is now 
moot, but DiFranco requests mandatory attorney fees.  The court of appeals 
denied the motion for fees without engaging in the analysis required by R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b).  The court, in denying attorney fees, gave the reason that 
DiFranco had “failed to establish any viable public benefit.”  2012-Ohio-5158, 
¶ 7.  DiFranco appealed. 
{¶ 2} Because the court did not have to render a judgment ordering the 
city to produce the records within a reasonable time, DiFranco is ineligible for 
mandatory attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b).  In considering the question, 
the court of appeals should have followed R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) rather than 
looking to public benefit, which is irrelevant to the application of the statutory 
criteria for a mandatory award of fees.  We therefore affirm for reasons other than 
those given by the court of appeals. 
Facts 
The request and the response 
{¶ 3} On July 20, 2011, DiFranco sent a public-records request by e-mail 
to the city of South Euclid in care of appellee Keith Benjamin, clerk of the city 
council.  On July 25, Benjamin responded, indicating that he had received the 
request and that he had forwarded the request to the director of finance for the 
city, who was on vacation at the time.  Benjamin stated, “I will forward the 
information to you as requested in electronic format as soon as the information is 
compiled and reviewed by the Finance Director and Law Director.” 
Request not fulfilled until mandamus case filed 
{¶ 4} However, because of what the city called a “communications 
breakdown” between Benjamin and the finance department, the request went 
unfulfilled for nearly six months.  DiFranco filed a mandamus action in the court 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
of appeals on January 11, 2012.  The city provided the records responsive to her 
request on January 13, 2012. 
DiFranco requests mandatory fees 
{¶ 5} DiFranco moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that 
although the mandamus action itself was mooted by the production of records, she 
was still entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees.  The city did not respond 
to that motion except to file its own motion for summary judgment, in which it 
argued only that the mandamus action had been mooted.  In response to that 
motion, DiFranco acknowledged again that the mandamus case had been mooted 
but pointed out that the claim for mandatory attorney fees remained and had not 
been opposed by the city. 
Court of appeals denies fees 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals granted the city’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied DiFranco’s motion for partial summary judgment.  The 
court held that the mandamus case had become moot and that DiFranco had failed 
to prove any public benefit permitting attorney fees. 
{¶ 7} DiFranco appealed to this court. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 8} The relevant statute, R.C. 149.43, was amended in 2007 to provide 
specific criteria for the award of mandatory attorney fees.  Sub.H.B. No. 9, 151 
Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8219, 8236-8239. However, the court of appeals ignored this 
statutory language and denied DiFranco’s request for mandatory attorney fees.  
We therefore affirm, but on the basis of the factors prescribed by the statute. 
The court decides the case de novo. 
{¶ 9} DiFranco argues that the court should exercise its plenary authority 
to treat this case de novo, that is, to treat it as if it had been filed in this court 
originally.  She states that the court of appeals “erred in its analysis on the purely 
legal issue concerning the mandatory nature of the award of attorney fees.” 
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{¶ 10} “[W]e have consistently held, ‘ “In an appeal of a judgment 
granting or denying fees in a public records case, we review whether the court 
abused its discretion.” ’ ”  State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-
Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159 ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 
Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 24, quoting State ex rel. 
Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 750 N.E.2d 156 (2001). 
{¶ 11} However, this case presents the an issue of mandatory attorney 
fees under specific statutory criteria; the entitlement to damages and fees under 
these circumstances is not a discretionary decision of the court below, but rather a 
legal determination that lies within this court’s authority to review legal issues de 
novo on appeal. 
Amendments to R.C. 149.43 fees provisions 
{¶ 12} “Effective September 29, 2007, R.C. 149.43 was amended, and 
subsection (C) now provides new standards for awarding attorney fees in public-
records mandamus cases.” State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 48.  The 
statute now specifies circumstances under which a court may award reasonable 
attorney fees and other circumstances under which the court must award 
reasonable attorney fees to the aggrieved person in a mandamus action.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b).  These fees may be reduced or eliminated on the consideration of 
other statutory factors.  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c). 
After the 2007 amendments, attorney fees are either mandatory or discretionary, 
but the public-benefit test applies only to the latter 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals did not consider any of the statutory factors in 
its analysis but stated only that the award of fees depends on demonstrating that 
the release of the requested records “provides a public benefit that is greater than 
the benefit that enures to the requester.”  2012-Ohio-5158, ¶ 5.  This language 
apparently refers to preamendment cases in which the court held that “[i]n 
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exercising its discretion” to determine the propriety of a fee award, “a court 
considers the reasonableness of the government’s failure to comply with the 
public-records request and the degree to which the public will benefit from the 
release of the records in question.”  State ex rel. Beacon-Journal Publishing Co. 
v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557,  819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 59.  See also 
State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 
N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 26 (no attorney fees awarded because the records requested “were 
mostly beneficial to [the relator], and he ultimately received the records in time 
for his civil service commission hearing”). 
{¶ 14} Although we have applied the public-benefit test in determining 
whether to award attorney fees, after the amendments, the use of that test must be 
squared with the provisions of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b).  Because the statute 
explicitly states the criteria for awarding and reducing attorney fees, the Eighth 
District erred by applying a public-benefit test that is not set forth in the statute. 
{¶ 15} Discretionary attorney fees under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b) may 
continue to be subject to a public-benefit test.  See State ex rel. Laborers 
Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 500 v. Summerville, 122 Ohio St.3d 
1234, 2009-Ohio-4090, 913 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 5, 8; State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 
Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159 ¶ 33-34.  However, this case 
involves a claim for mandatory fees.  We conclude that the legislature decided 
against the use of a public-benefit test for mandatory fees under R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(b) when it failed to specify it as a condition for granting fees. 
Mandatory vs. discretionary fees 
{¶ 16} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b), a court must first determine whether 
attorney fees are discretionary or mandatory:  
 
(b) If the court renders a judgment that orders the public 
office or the person responsible for the public record to comply 
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with division (B) of this section, the court may award reasonable 
attorney’s fees subject to reduction as described in division 
(C)(2)(c) of this section. The court shall award reasonable 
attorney’s fees, subject to reduction as described in division 
(C)(2)(c) of this section when either of the following applies: 
 
(i) The public office or the person responsible for the public 
records failed to respond affirmatively or negatively to the public 
records request in accordance with the time allowed under division 
(B) of this section. 
(ii) The public office or the person responsible for the 
public records promised to permit the relator to inspect or receive 
copies of the public records requested within a specified period of 
time but failed to fulfill that promise within that specified period of 
time. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 
{¶ 17} The first sentence covers discretionary fees, which are to be 
awarded “[i]f the court renders a judgment that orders” production of records.  
Mandatory fees are covered in the second sentence and are awarded if one of two 
conditions exists.  See State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-
4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 23-32.  The question therefore arises whether the if 
clause of the first sentence applies to the second sentence as well.  This is 
especially important here, because the court below did not have to “render a 
judgment”; rather, the city produced the records immediately on discovering that 
DiFranco had filed a mandamus case. 
{¶ 18} We hold that the if clause applies to both sentences.  If the General 
Assembly had intended for mandatory attorney fees to be independent of the 
prerequisite of a judgment, it would have included them as a separate paragraph.  
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Because the two sentences are in the same subdivision and the same paragraph, 
they are connected.  The subdivision contemplates that in a public-records case in 
which a court renders a judgment, attorney fees are generally discretionary except 
that in certain circumstances, they are mandatory.  Subdivisions (C)(2)(b)(i) and 
(ii) describe the exceptions to the otherwise discretionary fees. 
{¶ 19} At least two policy reasons support this reading of the statute.  
First, it encourages people requesting public records to remind the government 
entity that the request remains unfulfilled without resorting to litigation.  This 
allows the requester to receive the records without burdening the public purse.  
DiFranco has done this many times without incident, though she did not do so in 
this case. 
{¶ 20} Second, this interpretation reins in attorneys.  R.C. 149.43 is 
designed to ensure that public agencies and employees timely and reasonably 
respond to public-records requests, not to ensure a livelihood for attorneys who 
scour the state hoping for a failure to respond.  Making the award of both 
discretionary and mandatory attorney fees dependent on a court order makes it 
more likely that the attorney was required to provide a real service beyond the 
filing of a complaint. 
{¶ 21} Here, DiFranco is asking for mandatory attorney fees, but under 
our holding here, she is not eligible for them because the court did not issue a 
judgment ordering the city to produce the requested documents. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} The court of appeals erred in not engaging in the statutory analysis 
required by R.C. 149.43(C) before deciding not to award attorney fees to 
DiFranco.  We therefore affirm, but on the basis that the court did not order the 
city to produce the requested records, and under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b), that 
precludes an award of fees. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} The majority holds that DiFranco was not entitled to attorney fees, 
because the court had not “render[ed] a judgment that orders the public office or 
the person responsible for the public record to comply with” the public-records 
law pursuant to the first sentence of R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b).  For the reasons set 
forth in my separate opinion in No. 2012-1704, I believe that Emilie DiFranco 
was entitled to mandatory fees under the second sentence and that the “if” clause 
in the first sentence does not apply to the second sentence.  State ex rel. DiFranco 
v. S. Euclid, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2014-Ohio-___, ___ N.E.3d ___. 
{¶ 24} Like No. 2012-1704, this case involves unreasonable conduct by 
South Euclid under either R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b)(i) or (ii), and that misconduct  
delayed the production of records and forced DiFranco to initiate litigation to 
enforce her public-records request.  By denying the fees, the court again defeats 
the purpose of mandatory fees:  to make the requester whole when unreasonable 
delay has necessitated litigation.  I respectfully dissent. 
____________________ 
 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman; and Finney, 
Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson Co., L.L.P., and Christopher P. Finney,  for appellant. 
Michael P. Lograsso, South Euclid Law Director; and Nicola, Gudbranson 
& Copper, L.L.C., and Vincent A. Feudo, for appellees. 
_________________________