Title: Krystal D. Downey , et al. v. The Morris and Dixie Vavold Family Trust Appeal of the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to prove boundary by agreement

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33279 
 
KRYSTAL D. DOWNEY, a single person; 
DAVID PRESLEY and DIANA PRESLEY, 
husband and wife; LARRY L. WORTHY 
and NANCY J. WORTHY, husband and 
wife; and WESTON M. LOEGERING and 
ELIZABETH L. LOEGERING, husband and 
wife, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
MORRIS E. VAVOLD, JR. and DIXIE L. 
VAVOLD, trustees of THE MORRIS and 
DIXIE VAVOLD FAMILY TRUST, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
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Boise, May 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No.  89 
 
Filed: June 27, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Canyon County.  The Hon. Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Miller & Downen, Caldwell, for appellants.  Wm. F. Gigray, Jr., argued. 
 
Grober, Gadda & Hart, Homedale, for respondent.  Dan C. Grober argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal challenging the district court’s determination that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove a boundary by agreement.  We affirm. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Morris and Dixie Vavold Family Trust (Trust) owns a parcel of real property that is 
about six and one-half acres in size.  The western boundary of the property is essentially a 
straight, north-south line.  The Plaintiffs, Krystal Downey, David and Diana Presley, Larry and 
Nancy Worthy, and Weston and Elizabeth Loegering are the owners of four contiguous parcels 
that each abuts the western boundary of the Trust’s property. 
 
In 1979 the property now owned by the Trust was owned by Ron Conner.  He 
constructed a north-south fence parallel to his property’s western boundary, but approximately 
six to ten feet on his side of the boundary.  On June 25, 2004, the Plaintiffs brought this action 
seeking to have the fence declared to be the boundary between their properties and the Trust’s 
property. 
From north to south, the owners of the four contiguous parcels are Krystal Downey, 
David and Diana Presley, Larry and Nancy Worthy, and Weston and Elizabeth Loegering.  
Krystal Downey purchased her property in 2000.  She testified that when she purchased the 
property she believed the fence marked its eastern boundary because that is what her realtor said.  
The Presleys purchased their property in 1989.  David Presley testified that when they purchased 
the property he thought the fence marked its eastern boundary.  He later found monuments that 
indicated that the fence was located east of the boundary, but he assumed that the monuments 
marked an easement.  The Worthys took possession of their property in 1998.  Larry Worthy 
testified that when they purchased their property he thought the fence marked its eastern 
boundary, but he could not remember whether he had been told that by the realtor who handled 
the sale.  The Loegerings took possession of their property in 1976.  They were the only parties 
who owned their property when the fence was constructed. 
Mr. Loegering did not testify to any conversations he had with Mr. Conner prior to or 
after the construction of the fence.  He did not testify that there had been any dispute or question 
as to the location of the boundary prior to Mr. Conner erecting the fence.  Mr. Loegering simply 
stated that Mr. Conner built the fence in 1979, and thereafter Mr. Loegering accepted it as the 
boundary between their properties.  He also said that nobody challenged it as being the boundary 
until the Trust took possession of its property in 2002. 
The Trust purchased its property from David Nation.  The Trustees, Morris and Dixie 
Vavold, both testified that Mr. Nation told them that the western boundary of the property was 
located west of the fence.  Mr. Nation purchased the property in 1995 from the Vandenbergs.  He 
testified that the realtors handling the transaction told him that the fence was inside survey pins 
that marked the boundary line.  After he acquired the property, he repaired that portion of the 
 
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fence that was down in order to contain cattle.  When doing so, he noticed that the fence was 
about ten feet to the east of the survey pins. 
The case was tried to the district court.  Plaintiffs relied upon the doctrine of boundary by 
agreement.  The district court found that the evidence showed there was no agreement fixing the 
fence as the boundary and entered judgment in favor of the Trust.  The Plaintiffs filed a motion 
asking the court to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law in a manner that would 
make the fence the boundary, and the court denied that motion.  The Plaintiffs then appealed the 
denial of their motion. 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Did the district court err in finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove a boundary by 
agreement? 
2.  Are the Defendants entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the District Court Err in Finding that the Plaintiffs Had Failed to Prove a 
Boundary by Agreement? 
 
“A trial court’s findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  When deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not 
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court.”  Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 
637, 132 P.3d 392, 394 (2006) (citations omitted).  “It is the province of the trial court to 
determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence.”  KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 
60 (2003).  A motion to amend the findings of fact is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and we will uphold the denial of such motion if the findings are supported by 
competent and substantial evidence.  McGregor v. Phillips, 96 Idaho 779, 537 P.2d 59 (1975). 
“Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements:  (1) there must be an 
uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.”  Luce v. 
Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 271, 127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005).  “Idaho case law demonstrates that an 
agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or 
 
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acquiescence.”   Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495, 50 P.3d 987, 990 (2002).  “A long period 
of acquiescence by one party to another party’s use of the disputed property provides a factual 
basis from which an agreement can be inferred.”  Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 400, 34 
P.3d 1080, 1083 (2001).  The period of acquiescence need not continue for the amount of time 
necessary to establish adverse possession because acquiescence is merely competent evidence of 
the agreement.   Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001). 
The Plaintiffs had the burden of proving a boundary by agreement.  They admit that there 
was no express agreement establishing the fence as the boundary.  They also admit that there was 
no dispute as to the true boundary.  They contend the evidence showed that the location of the 
true boundary was uncertain and that there was an implied agreement establishing the fence as 
the boundary. 
 There was no testimony that Mr. Conner was uncertain as to the true boundary when he 
erected the fence in 1979.  There was testimony that the first recorded survey of the boundary at 
issue was done in 1980, but it was done at the request of someone other than Mr. Conner.  The 
record does not indicate whether that person had any interest in any of the properties at issue.  
Whether an earlier survey had been done is also unknown.  If the survey pins seen by Mr. 
Presley and Mr. Nation were placed when the 1980 survey was done, they would not have been 
there when the fence was erected.  The district court could have inferred from the evidence that 
Mr. Conner was uncertain as to the true boundary when he erected the fence and that he placed it 
on what he understood to be the boundary.  However, the district court was not required to draw 
that inference.  Even if Mr. Conner was uncertain as to the precise location of the boundary, he 
may have erected the fence at a location clearly on his property so that he did not have to risk 
moving it if his understanding of the boundary was off by a few feet.  He certainly was not 
required to erect the fence on what he understood to be the boundary line.  The mere act of 
erecting the fence inside his boundary line did not constitute an abandonment of his land lying 
outside the fence, nor did it constitute an agreement that the adjoining landowners can have that 
land. 
There was also no evidence that Mr. Conner’s neighbors were uncertain as to the location 
of the true boundary when Mr. Conner erected the fence.  The Loegerings did not testify that 
they were uncertain as to the true boundary.  Mr. Loegering simply stated that after the fence was 
erected, he accepted it as the boundary.  Mr. Loegering testified that a gentleman owned the 
 
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property that was later divided into the parcels subsequently purchased by the other Plaintiffs.  
There was no evidence that that gentleman was uncertain as to the true boundary or that he had 
any conversations with Mr. Conner. 
The Plaintiffs argue, “On the basis of the Wells case,1 and the twenty-five years of 
acquiescence, the court should have found an implied agreement as to the fence being the 
boundary between the parties.”  Acquiescence, by itself, does not constitute a boundary by 
agreement.  As we explained in Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626 (1990), 
“boundary by acquiescence” is simply another name attached to the doctrine of boundary by 
agreement; it is not a separate legal theory.  “[T]here must be an uncertain or disputed boundary 
and a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.”  Id. at 41, 794 P.2d at 630.  The agreement 
can be express or implied.  “In situations where no express agreement has been made, our cases 
have viewed a long period of acquiescence by one party to another party’s use of the disputed 
property merely as a factual basis from which an agreement can be inferred.”  Id.   
Although an agreement can be inferred from a long period of acquiescence, the trial court 
is not required to draw that inference.  “Acquiescence in the location and maintenance of a line 
fence for a great length of time may be presumptive evidence of an agreement as to the true 
boundary line, but is not conclusive evidence.”  Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 357,  110 P. 269, 
273 (1910); accord Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005) (specific facts of the 
case can prevent this presumption from operating). 
In this case, any agreement establishing an uncertain boundary would have to be inferred 
from the conduct of the parties viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances.  Id.  Since 
acquiescence is evidence of an agreement establishing the boundary, the relevant conduct to 
show acquiescence would be that of the parties to the alleged agreement.  The conduct of 
subsequent owners, or their understandings as to the boundary, would not prove or disprove an 
implied agreement between Mr. Conner and his neighbors at the time he erected the fence. 
In order for Mr. Conner to have acquiesced in his neighbors’ claims that the fence was 
the boundary, they must have done something that would put him on notice that they were 
claiming the fence was the boundary.  At the time Mr. Conner built the fence, the land abutting 
his property to the west was unimproved.  Mr. Loegering did not testify that he did anything after 
                                                 
1 Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626 (1990). 
 
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the erection of the fence to take possession of the strip of Mr. Conner’s property lying west of 
the fence.  Likewise, he did not testify to any such conduct by the gentleman owning what later 
became the other Plaintiffs’ properties.  Mr. Loegering’s testimony that he has accepted the fence 
as being the boundary does not show acquiescence by Mr. Conner where there is no evidence 
that such acceptance was ever conveyed to Mr. Conner.  Mr. Loegering also testified that the 
prior owners of the other Plaintiffs’ properties had also accepted the fence as the boundary.  The 
district court did not give any weight to that testimony, however, because Mr. Loegering 
admitted on cross-examination that he had never talked to them about whether they accepted the 
fence as the boundary. 
After considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the long existence of 
the fence, the district court did not infer a boundary by agreement.  “It is the province of the trial 
court to determine . . . the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  KMST, LLC v. County of 
Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003).  The district court’s conclusion that the 
Plaintiffs had failed to prove a boundary by agreement is not clearly erroneous. 
 
B.  Are the Defendants Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-121? 
The Defendants seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121.  Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under that statute only if the appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 
57 P.3d 775 (2002).  An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the appellant simply invites the 
appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence.  Gustaves v. Gustaves, 
138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002).  That is all that the Plaintiffs in this case have requested us to 
do.  We therefore award the Defendants reasonable attorney fees in defending this appeal. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court and award costs on appeal, including a 
reasonable attorney fee, to the respondents. 
 
 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, and Justices TROUT, BURDICK and JONES CONCUR. 
 
 
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