Title: Commonwealth v. Beal

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11938 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAUNTE BEAL.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 10, 2015. - May 24, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  
Assault by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Practice, 
Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Sentence.  Evidence, 
Prior violent conduct.  Due Process of Law, Vagueness of 
statute. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 14, 2008, and January 30, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas E. Connolly, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jessica L. LaClair for the defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph F. 
Janezic, III, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  This case arises from a shooting that occurred 
                                                 
 
1 As is our custom, we refer to the defendant by the name 
appearing in the indictments. 
2 
 
at a cookout in the Dorchester section of Boston on a summer 
night in 2008.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury on indictments charging unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265,§ 15A; and two 
counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15B (b).2  The indictments charging unlawful possession of a 
firearm also alleged that the defendant previously had been 
convicted of two violent crimes and thus was subject to enhanced 
penalties under the Massachusetts armed career criminal act, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G (ACCA).  In a separate trial following these 
convictions, the same jury found the defendant guilty of the 
subsequent offender portions of the indictments. 
The defendant appealed from his convictions, and we allowed 
his application for direct appellate review.  The defendant 
argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious 
bodily injury; (2) the convictions of two counts of assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon were duplicative of the conviction 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
                                                 
 
2 The jury acquitted the defendant of armed assault with the 
intent to commit murder. 
3 
 
serious bodily injury; and (3) the conviction of possession of 
ammunition is duplicative of the conviction of possession of a 
loaded firearm.  He also contends that the evidence presented by 
the Commonwealth in support of his prior convictions was 
insufficient to establish that he had committed a "violent 
crime," and therefore he cannot be convicted under the 
subsequent offender portion of the indictments.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving additional facts for later discussion.  On the 
night of the shooting, Joao Pereira, the shooting victim, and 
his brother, Ovidio Pereira,3 were celebrating a friend's 
birthday at a cookout at a house on Howard Avenue in Dorchester.  
As some of the guests were standing on the front porch, a man 
who was walking past the house on the opposite side of the 
street said to "Nelito," one of the partygoers, "Oh, what are 
you looking at?"  Nelito responded, "Oh, you are looking at me, 
I'm just looking at you."  The man continued walking down the 
street, but returned with another man, who asked Joao if he 
"[had] a problem."  The two men eventually walked away and had a 
conversation with two other men in a Toyota Corolla automobile 
that was driving past.  The Toyota continued up the street, 
                                                 
 
3 Because the two brothers share a last name, we will refer 
to Ovidio Pereira and Joao Pereira by their first names. 
4 
 
turned around, and stopped in front of the house where the 
cookout was taking place.  By that time, there were 
approximately eight people standing in front of the house, and 
another round of verbal exchanges occurred between the occupants 
of the Toyota and the guests at the party. 
As the vehicle idled in the street, the driver said, "Oh, 
you guys are still looking at us funny."  Joao responded, 
"Nobody's looking at you," to which the driver retorted, "Oh, if 
you keep looking at me funny, I'm going to get out the car and 
slap you."  Joao replied, "You don't have no right to slap 
nobody."  Joao and another partygoer then threw beer bottles at 
the Toyota; one bottle hit the driver in the head and another 
bottle broke the rear side window on the driver's side. 
The driver, later identified as the defendant,4 got out of 
the vehicle, aimed a gun at the group on the porch, and fired 
two shots.  The partygoers scattered in different directions.  
Joao and Ovidio ran to the back of the house with the defendant 
chasing after them; they tried to get inside, but the door was 
locked.  They ran back to the front porch where the defendant, 
standing on the first step, fired several more shots at them.  
One bullet struck Joao in the lower back. 
                                                 
 
4 This identification was through circumstantial evidence 
and not witness identification; the identity of the driver was 
vigorously contested at trial, as the defendant pursued a 
defense of misidentification. 
5 
 
The defendant ran back to the Toyota and jumped in, and the 
vehicle sped away.  Police responded to a 911 call that had been 
placed by a neighbor, who had seen the events unfold from his 
bedroom window.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant was arrested 
at his house.  He was bleeding from the side of his head, and 
had dried blood on his hands and face.  The defendant's mother 
provided police with a key to the Toyota that the defendant had 
given her.5  Investigating officers found a firearm on the floor 
of the Toyota and broken glass scattered throughout the vehicle.  
Swabs of reddish brown stains were collected from the firearm, 
the ground in front of the Howard Avenue house, and the floor of 
an apartment the defendant had visited shortly before his 
arrest.  Tests performed on the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that 
was recovered from these locations included the defendant as a 
possible contributor to each of the samples.6 
                                                 
 
5 After the shooting, the defendant was driven in the 
Toyota, which belonged to his mother, to a nearby apartment 
building.  He left the Toyota in the parking lot of that 
building. 
 
 
6 A deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) criminalist from the Boston 
police crime laboratory testified that she extracted the same 
DNA profile from each of the three samples, and that she was 
able to "get a full complete profile [of] characteristics at all 
[sixteen] locations."  When asked about the statistical 
significance of her findings that the defendant was a "possible 
source of the DNA," she explained that the DNA profiles 
extracted from the three samples were "the same exact profile" 
extracted from a DNA swab taken from the defendant, and that the 
profile "could be found in 1 in 110 quintillion Caucasians, 1 in 
120 quintillion African-Americans, and 1 in 1.6 quintillion 
6 
 
The defendant testified in his own defense and admitted to 
having been in the Toyota on the night of the shooting, but 
claimed that another occupant of the vehicle had fired the 
shots.  In support of this contention, the defendant asserted 
that he was not wearing the white T-shirt and dark baseball hat 
that a witness testified the shooter had been wearing. 
At the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the 
close of all the evidence, the defendant filed motions for 
required findings of not guilty; the motions were denied.  After 
the jury returned their verdicts, a trial was conducted on the 
subsequent offender portion of the indictments.  The same jury 
heard evidence that the defendant previously had been convicted, 
pursuant to his guilty pleas, of assault and battery upon a 
public employee and assault and battery.  Certified copies of 
these convictions were introduced, and the defendant stipulated 
that he was the individual who had been convicted of those 
crimes.  After the Commonwealth rested, the defendant filed a 
motion for a required finding, arguing that the Commonwealth had 
failed to establish that both prior offenses constituted 
"violent crimes" within the meaning of the ACCA.  The judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
Southeastern Hispanics."  The criminalist testified that the DNA 
profile was "very rare," and that the statistics describing the 
probability that a randomly chosen person would have the same 
DNA profile include people of all races, although only three 
racial categories are identified by name.  The defendant is from 
Cape Verde. 
7 
 
denied the motion, and the jury found him guilty. 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence of assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon resulting in serious bodily injury.  
We review the denial of a motion for a required finding to 
determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  The defendant 
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
resulting in serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i), 
because the Commonwealth did not introduce testimony from Joao, 
testimony from medical personnel who treated his injuries, or 
his medical records. 
"Serious bodily injury" means "bodily injury which results 
in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily 
function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death."  G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (d).7  We have said that "impairment of a limb 
occurs when, because of significant damage to its structure, its 
capacity to perform its usual function is compromised."  
                                                 
 
7 General Laws c. 265, § 13A (b) (i), establishes enhanced 
penalties for an assault and battery that causes "serious bodily 
injury," and uses the same definition of "serious bodily injury" 
as does G. L. c. 265, § 15A (d).  See G. L. c. 265, § 13A (c).  
Therefore, we look to cases interpreting G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13A (c), for guidance. 
8 
 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 359 (2013).  Clearly, "the 
loss of a limb . . . would have a substantial impact on a victim 
on a par with injuries causing permanent disfigurement or 
risking death."  Id.  But the impairment "need not be permanent 
to meet the definition of 'serious bodily injury.'"  
Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 118 (2013). 
Here, the evidence established that the defendant shot Joao 
in the lower back.  Ovidio testified that Joao spent two months 
in a Boston hospital, where he was taken immediately following 
the shooting, and then spent six months at an inpatient 
rehabilitation hospital.  Upon returning home, Joao used a 
wheelchair; he was unable to walk without the use of crutches 
and braces on his legs; he had to be carried up and down the 
stairs leading to his second-floor apartment; and he was unable 
to get in and out of the shower stall without assistance.  One 
witness testified that Joao has not been able to walk properly 
since the shooting. 
Jurors are permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence based on their common sense and life experience.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536 (1976).  Based on the 
evidence presented in this case, the jury were permitted to find 
that the gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant caused Joao to 
suffer an impairment of his limbs, which resulted in 
"significant damage" to the structure of his legs, and that the 
9 
 
capacity of his legs "to perform [their] usual function [was] 
compromised."  See Commonwealth v. Scott, supra.  The impairment 
of Joao's legs plainly meets the definition of substantial 
bodily injury as set forth in the statute.  See id.; G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (d).  Moreover, Joao was able to walk without 
impediment before he was shot in the back, and after the 
shooting he was at first unable to walk and later unable to walk 
without assistance.  It would have been reasonable for the jury 
to infer that the gunshot caused the impairment, based on the 
chronology of events following the shooting, and in the absence 
of any other theory presented to explain the cause of Joao's 
injuries.  See Commonwealth v. Marinho, supra at 119 
(Commonwealth must prove "that the defendant either directly 
caused or 'directly and substantially set in motion a chain of 
events that produced' the serious injury in a natural and 
continuous sequence"). 
The defendant maintains that the jury could not reach this 
conclusion absent medical evidence or testimony from the victim.  
In these circumstances, we do not agree.  Although the evidence 
did not explain the precise biological mechanism by which the 
gunshot wound could have impaired Joao's ability to walk or to 
use his legs without assistance, the jury were permitted to 
conclude, based on common sense, that the gunshot wound to 
Joao's back compromised his ability to use his lower limbs.  The 
10 
 
defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Scott, supra, is 
misplaced.  There, the victim's medical records established that 
she suffered from "a 'grade II' laceration of the liver," id. 
at 357, but the Commonwealth did not introduce medical testimony 
to explain the "technical terminology" used in the reports or to 
establish whether such a laceration "affected the liver's 
ability to fulfil its functional role."  See id. at 362, 364.  
Absent such evidence, we determined that the jury could not have 
reached the conclusion that the victim's injury constituted an 
impairment of her liver "based on information that was within 
the ordinary, common experience of a reasonable juror."  Id. 
at 364.  By contrast, the evidence of the injuries presented 
here -- the inability to use one's legs, the need to use a 
wheelchair, and the necessity of crutches and braces in order to 
walk -- was within the ordinary, common experience of a 
reasonable juror.  The jury could have concluded, without undue 
speculation, that the gunshot wound caused Joao's injuries.  
Thus, the evidence supports the conviction of assault and 
battery resulting in "serious bodily injury." 
3.  Duplicative convictions.  The defendant contends that 
his convictions on two indictments charging assault by means of 
a dangerous weapon (one assault against Joao and the other 
against Ovidio) were duplicative of his conviction of the 
greater offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
11 
 
weapon causing serious bodily injury against Joao.  The 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant fired 
shots at Joao and Ovidio in two distinct episodes:  one when the 
defendant got out of the Toyota and fired two shots, and another 
after the defendant chased Joao and Ovidio to the rear of house 
and back around to the front porch, at which point he fired 
several more shots, one of which hit Joao in the back.  The 
judge did not instruct the jury that these offenses must be 
based on separate and distinct acts, nor did the judge explain 
which of the alleged acts corresponded to each of the charges. 
Because the defendant did not raise the issue of 
duplicative convictions in the Superior Court, we review his 
claim to determine whether there was an error that created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697-698 (2015).  As the defendant 
argues, assault by means of a dangerous weapon is a lesser 
included offense of assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 529 (2010).  "Convictions of both greater 
and lesser included acts are permitted only when they 'rest on 
separate and distinct acts.'"  Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 
787, 798 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 80 Mass. App. 
Ct. 528, 529 (2011).  The jury must determine whether a 
defendant's acts "constitute separate and distinct acts or must 
12 
 
be considered a single crime."  Commonwealth v. Kelly, supra at 
699, quoting Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 435 n.16 
(2009). 
We examine the convictions of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury based on the actions 
against Joao.  As we explained in Commonwealth v. Kelly, supra, 
even if "there was evidence of separate and distinct acts 
sufficient to convict with respect to each . . . charge, the 
judge's failure to instruct the jury that each charge must be 
based on a separate and distinct act create[s] a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice."  Id. at 702.  Accordingly, 
although the prosecutor argued in closing that the defendant's 
shooting at Joao occurred in two separate episodes that could 
support two distinct convictions, and the facts might support 
that conclusion, we are unable to determine on which facts each 
conviction rested.  Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, the 
judge's instruction that each charge must be considered 
separately does not cure the error.  See id. at 701.  Therefore, 
because we have "serious doubt" whether the jury impermissibly 
based the convictions of the greater and lesser included 
offenses on the same act, the conviction of assault by means of 
a dangerous weapon against Joao must be vacated.  See id. at 
700-701. 
13 
 
A different analysis applies to the defendant's conviction 
of assault by means of a dangerous weapon against Ovidio.  As to 
this charge, the judge instructed that the defendant's acts must 
have been directed against Ovidio.  The defendant was not 
charged with the greater offense of assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon against him.  In this context, even if the 
jury convicted the defendant of the assault against Ovidio based 
on the gunshot that hit Joao, which is the same act underlying 
the defendant's conviction of assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon against Joao, those two convictions are not 
duplicative.  "'[W]henever a single criminal transaction gives 
rise to crimes of violence which are committed against several 
victims, then multiple indictments (and punishments)' for the 
crime against each victim 'are appropriate.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Traylor, 472 Mass. 260, 268 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 31 (1985).  Consequently, the judge was 
not required to instruct the jury on separate and distinct acts 
with respect to this charge. 
The defendant also contends, and the Commonwealth now 
concedes, that his conviction of unlawful possession of 
ammunition under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h), is a lesser offense 
included within his conviction of unlawful possession of a 
loaded firearm under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  See Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 52-54 (2011).  We agree that where all 
14 
 
of the ammunition was loaded in the firearm, these convictions 
are duplicative, and conclude that the conviction under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h), cannot stand. 
4.  Conviction under the Massachusetts armed career 
criminal act.  The ACCA imposes an enhanced sentence on an 
individual who is convicted of possession of a firearm if that 
person previously has been convicted of a "violent crime" or a 
serious drug offense.  See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 
809, 814 (2012) (Eberhart); G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  Under the 
ACCA, a "violent crime" is "any crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year . . . that:  (i) has as an element 
the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a 
deadly weapon against the person of another; (ii) is burglary, 
extortion, arson or kidnapping; (iii) involves the use of 
explosives; or (iv) otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious risk of physical injury to another."  G. L. c. 140, 
§ 121.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (e) (defining "violent crime" as 
having meaning set forth in G. L. c. 140, § 121, for purposes of 
enhanced sentences for firearms and ammunition convictions).  
Thus, to constitute a violent crime under the ACCA, the crime 
must fall within the scope of either (1) the force clause; 
(2) the enumerated crimes provision; or (3) the residual clause.  
Eberhart, supra at 815. 
15 
 
The defendant previously was convicted of assault and 
battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a), and assault and battery upon a 
public employee, G. L. c. 265, § 13D.  As he did at trial, the 
defendant argues that the certified copies of convictions, which 
were the only evidence the Commonwealth introduced, were 
insufficient to prove that he committed two "violent crimes" 
within the meaning of the ACCA.  After the case was fully 
briefed, the United States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555-1556, 2563 (2015) 
(Johnson), holding that the residual clause of the "violent 
felony" provision of the Federal armed career criminal act 
(Federal ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In terms of its definitions of predicate crimes, 
the Massachusetts ACCA "largely replicates" the Federal ACCA, 
and, as a consequence, we often look to the Federal courts for 
guidance on issues relating to the meaning and scope of this 
statute.  See Eberhart, supra.  The parties submitted 
supplemental briefs setting forth their positions on how 
Johnson, supra, affects the inquiry in this case. 
Under the invalidated residual clause in the Federal ACCA, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012), a crime constituted a "violent 
felony" if it was punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year and "otherwise involve[d] conduct that present[ed] a 
16 
 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."8  The 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, supra at 
2557, began by acknowledging the well-established rule that 
courts must use the "categorical approach" to determine whether 
an offense constitutes a violent felony by "pictur[ing] the kind 
of conduct that the crime involves in 'the ordinary case,' 
and . . . judg[ing] whether that abstraction presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury" (citation omitted).  The 
Court then concluded, based largely on the arbitrariness of 
hypothesizing the "ordinary case" of any given crime, that 
"[i]ncreasing a defendant's sentence under the clause denies due 
process of law" because "the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging 
inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice 
to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges."  Id.  
                                                 
 
8 At the time the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) 
(Johnson), a "violent felony" under the Federal armed career 
criminal act (Federal ACCA) was defined as: 
 
"any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year . . . that --  
 
"(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another; or 
 
"(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).  Congress does not yet appear 
to have amended the language of the Federal ACCA to remove the 
residual clause that the Court concluded was invalid. 
17 
 
The Court was particularly concerned with the "grave 
uncertainty" regarding "how to estimate the risk posed by a 
crime" and "how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a 
violent felony."  Id. at 2557-2558.  The Court looked no further 
than its own cases to find a level of uncertainty that was 
constitutionally impermissible.  See id. at 2558-2560.  The 
Court in Johnson thus invalidated the residual clause of the 
Federal ACCA.  Id. at 2557. 
The language of the residual clause in the Massachusetts 
ACCA is almost identical to that in the Federal ACCA; the only 
difference is that the Federal ACCA uses the term "potential" to 
qualify the level of risk required.  Compare 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B) ("conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk"), with G. L. c. 140, § 121 ("conduct that presents a 
serious risk").  We think the additional term does not create a 
meaningful difference between the two provisions.9  We agree with 
the Court's analysis in Johnson, supra, and conclude that the 
residual clause of the Massachusetts ACCA is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
We turn next to the defendant's argument that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction under the ACCA 
                                                 
 
9 We note also that, in its supplemental brief, the 
Commonwealth supports the position that Johnson renders the 
residual clause of the Massachusetts ACCA unconstitutionally 
vague, on the same reasoning as the United States Supreme Court. 
18 
 
because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that his two 
predicate offenses were "violent crimes."  As noted, the only 
evidence the Commonwealth introduced relative to those 
convictions was the copies of the certified convictions of the 
defendant's prior offenses (assault and battery, and assault and 
battery on a public employee). 
Our decision in Eberhart resolves this issue.  In that 
case, we explained that we use the "modified categorical 
approach" to determine whether a defendant had been convicted of 
a violent crime when the defendant was "convicted under a broad 
statute that encompasses multiple crimes," not all of which are 
categorically "violent crimes."  Eberhart, supra at 816.  Unlike 
the Federal ACCA, under Massachusetts law a defendant is 
entitled to a jury trial to determine whether a sentence 
enhancement for being an armed career criminal is applicable.10  
See id.  The evidence presented at that trial "must suffice to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the [previous] crime for 
which [the defendant] was convicted was a violent crime."  Id. 
                                                 
 
10 Under Federal law, a judge determines whether a 
defendant's prior offenses are considered predicate felonies 
under the Federal ACCA; the judge's inquiry is limited to trial 
records of the prior felonies.  See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 
461 Mass. 809, 816 (2012).  In applying the modified categorical 
approach under Federal law, courts are permitted to examine "the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime."  Descamps v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013). 
19 
 
Applying this analysis, in Eberhart, supra at 818, we 
concluded that only two of the three variants of common-law 
battery encompassed by G. L. c. 265, § 13A -- harmful battery 
and reckless battery -- qualify as "violent crimes" under the 
force clause, which requires that the crime "has as an element 
the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force."11  
See G. L. c. 140, § 121.  Offensive battery, which "can be 
committed through such de minimis touchings as tickling and 
spitting," is not a violent crime.  Eberhart, supra at 818-819.  
Because not all of the crimes encompassed within the battery 
statute are violent crimes, we concluded that "a certified 
conviction of assault and battery is insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed a 'violent 
crime' for the purpose of sentencing enhancement under [the 
ACCA]."  Id. at 819.  Here, as discussed, the only evidence 
presented to establish that the defendant's prior conviction of 
assault and battery was a violent crime was a certified copy of 
the conviction.  The Commonwealth now concedes that, for the 
reasons set forth in Eberhart, supra, this evidence was 
insufficient to support the defendant's conviction under the 
ACCA based on the predicate offense of assault and battery.  Id. 
                                                 
 
11 In Commonwealth v. Eberhart, supra at 819, we also 
reached the same determination under the residual clause.  In 
light of our conclusion today that the residual clause is 
unconstitutionally vague, we do not consider the defendant's 
prior acts under the residual clause. 
20 
 
The determination that assault and battery is not 
categorically a "violent crime" leads to the conclusion that 
assault and battery upon a public employee also is not a violent 
crime.  The offense of assault and battery upon a public 
employee, G. L. c. 265, § 13D, differs from assault and battery, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13A, in three respects.  First, the crime must 
be committed "upon any public employee when such person is 
engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of such 
assault and battery."  G. L. c. 265, § 13D.  Second, the offense 
carries a minimum punishment of imprisonment for ninety days, 
while assault and battery carries no minimum punishment.  Id.  
Third, a person who commits that offense may be arrested upon 
probable cause without a warrant if the victim is a public 
employee operating a public transit vehicle.  Id. 
These differences, however, do not change the underlying 
acts that constitute an assault and battery.  Like the general 
crime of assault and battery, assault and battery upon a public 
employee can be committed through a harmful battery, a reckless 
battery, or an offensive battery.  Therefore, the same reasoning 
underlying our conclusion that assault and battery is not a 
violent crime, see Eberhart, supra at 818-819, leads to the 
conclusion that assault and battery on a public employee is not 
categorically a violent crime.  See id. at 814, 818, quoting 
21 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 121, and Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. 
Ct. 8, 12-22 (2011). 
Pointing to cases from Federal courts and the Appeals Court 
that have concluded that assault and battery on a police officer 
(not public employee) is categorically a violent crime under the 
now-defunct residual clause, see, e.g., United States v. Dancy, 
640 F.3d 455, 469-470 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 564 
(2011), and Commonwealth v. Colon, supra at 22-23, the 
Commonwealth urges us to conclude that the offense is 
categorically a violent crime under the force clause.  We 
decline to adopt this approach.  General Laws c. 265, § 13D, 
encompasses all assault and batteries against "any public 
employee," and is not restricted to police officers.  It would 
be contrary to the "categorical approach" to determine that a 
single subset of a particular offense is categorically a violent 
crime.  See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2285 (2013) (describing categorical approach and modified 
categorical approach). 
More importantly, however, we do not think that the 
reasoning employed by courts that have concluded that assault 
and battery against a public employee, when committed against a 
police officer, constitutes a violent crime under the residual 
clause is applicable to the inquiry under the force clause.  For 
instance, in Commonwealth v. Colon, supra at 22, the Appeals 
22 
 
Court concluded that an assault and battery committed against a 
police officer, even if of the offensive battery type, is a 
violent crime under the residual clause because "even a minor 
dispute with a civilian distracts from the officer's duties" and 
"creates a public risk."  This line of reasoning is not relevant 
to our inquiry in light of the conclusion we adopt today 
concerning the constitutional infirmity of the residual clause.  
The question we must answer is whether assault and battery upon 
a public employee qualifies as a "violent crime" under the force 
clause.  For the reasons set forth with respect to our analysis 
of assault and battery, we conclude that it does not.  
Consequently, because the Commonwealth failed to introduce 
evidence other than the certified copies of the defendant's 
convictions to support the charge under the ACCA, the evidence 
was insufficient for a conviction, where the predicate offense 
was assault and battery against a public official. 
Finally, we decline the Commonwealth=s request that we 
remand the matter so that the Commonwealth may present at a 
second trial evidence sufficient to establish that the defendant 
violated the ACCA.  The prohibition against double jeopardy 
"forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the 
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it 
failed to muster in the first proceeding."  Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).  See Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 
23 
 
Mass. 793, 797-798 (1985).  As the Commonwealth argues, "the 
double jeopardy principle does not automatically bar retrial 
'where an insufficiency of evidence appeared only when material 
held on appellate review to have been erroneously admitted was 
notionally removed from the case'" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 45 (1992), S.C., 427 
Mass. 414 (1998).  But that principle is not applicable in this 
case.  Here, the jury convicted the defendant based on evidence 
properly introduced by the Commonwealth, and our reversal of the 
conviction rests on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to support it.  There was no improper receipt or 
exclusion of evidence, only a failure to marshal the evidence 
necessary to support a conviction.  In such a context, remand is 
not appropriate.12  Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 
(2012) ("The State . . . generally cannot retry a defendant 
                                                 
 
12 We also decline the Commonwealth's suggestion that remand 
is appropriate because the judge incorrectly instructed the 
jury.  Before trial, the defendant asserted that the 
Commonwealth's reliance on the certified copies of his 
convictions would be insufficient because neither of his prior 
offenses is categorically a "violent crime."  The prosecutor 
countered that the Commonwealth was not required to submit 
evidence other than the certified convictions on the issue of 
"violent crime."  The judge agreed with the Commonwealth, and 
the prosecutor chose to rely solely on the certified convictions 
at trial.  The judge then incorrectly instructed the jury that 
the defendant's prior convictions were "violent crimes by 
definition" under Massachusetts law.  However, the dispositive 
issue here is sufficiency of the evidence; even if the judge had 
instructed the jury properly, the result on appeal would be no 
different because the evidence the Commonwealth introduced was 
insufficient. 
24 
 
'when an appellate court overturns a conviction because of 
insufficient evidence'" [citation omitted]). 
5.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction of assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon against Joao Pereira, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15B (b), and the judgment of conviction under the armed career 
criminal act, G. L. c. 269, § 10G, are reversed.  The remaining 
convictions are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.