Title: State v. Heilman

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  December 30, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROBERT DALE HEILMAN,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 001139142; CA A116697; SC S51479)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 12, 2005.
Eric M. Cumfer, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With
him on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director,
Office of Public Defense Services and Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
David J. Amesbury, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With
him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Frank L. Bearden, Judge. 193 Or App 329, 92 P3d 767 (2004).
DURHAM, J.
In this criminal case, defendant challenges the 20-year
enhancement of his prison sentence as a "dangerous offender"
under ORS 161.725(1)(a). (1)  His primary contention is that
the trial court erred in sentencing him as a dangerous offender
because the state had not pleaded in the indictment the facts
necessary to support such an enhancement.  The trial court
rejected that argument before applying a 20-year enhancement to
his sentence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment without
an opinion.  State v. Heilman, 193 Or App 329, 92 P3d 767 (2004). 
On review, we conclude that the trial court did not err. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the judgment of the trial court.
A grand jury indicted defendant for 30 crimes arising
from a criminal episode that began when he broke into his ex-wife's house.  Once inside the house, he assaulted his ex-wife
and one of their two daughters.  He then fled in his van,
intentionally ramming a string of vehicles, including a police
vehicle.  After he stopped at a convenience store, he attempted
to take a store clerk as a hostage before police subdued him.
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and asserted
that he was guilty except for insanity.  See ORS 161.295(1) ("A
person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of a mental
disease or defect at the time of engaging in criminal conduct,
the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the
requirements of law.").  At his trial to the court, his expert
witness, a psychologist, testified that defendant suffered from
"intermittent explosive disorder." (2)  According to
defendant's psychologist, intermittent explosive disorder is an
impulse control disorder in which persons cannot resist their
aggressive tendencies.  Specifically, the psychologist testified:
"Intermittent explosive disorder is a condition in
which individuals fail to consistently contain or
inhibit their impulses to aggression.  And the
aggression typically may take a variety of forms,
including verbal aggression, physical aggression
against objects, physical aggression against
individuals.
"Typically, these aggressive outbursts are severe
relative to the level of provocation.  So these are
people who are more likely to truly explode in an
extreme fashion over relatively minor provocation." 
In addition, the psychologist testified that defendant had
provided him with "a history of several explosive outbursts in
which he broke or smashed things or assaulted other people."  The
psychologist also testified that defendant's "pattern of assaults
and explosions over the last 15 or 20 years suggest that he's not
consistently able to contain his impulses."  The psychologist
concluded that a combination of alcohol and defendant's condition
had rendered him unable to control his impulses on the night that
the police arrested him.  The trial court, however, rejected
defendant's explanation that he was guilty except for insanity
and convicted him of 21 of the 30 pending criminal charges.   
At sentencing, the state characterized defendant as a
dangerous offender under ORS 161.725(1)(a) and sought a statutory
sentencing enhancement.  One of the state's experts, another
psychologist, underscored many of the same facts on which
defendant had relied in his failed attempt to establish an
insanity defense, such as his anger management problem, his
failure to maintain a treatment regimen, and his history of
abusive conduct toward others.  In particular, the state
psychologist testified that defendant's expert's diagnosis of
intermittent explosive disorder fit within a broader diagnosis of
borderline personality disorder.  The state's psychologist
believed that there was a high risk that defendant would cause
serious harm to others in the future.
Defendant's counsel objected that the state was seeking
to characterize defendant as a dangerous offender, without having
pleaded that characterization in the indictment and without
having given notice that the state would seek an enhanced
sentence.  In making that argument, defendant referred to
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d
435 (2000); however, at the same time, he maintained that
Apprendi did not address the precise issue that he was arguing:
"[I]f the State is planning to [seek a dangerous
offender enhancement, then defendant] has a tactical
strategic decision to make before going to trial about
whether he's going to avail himself of the otherwise
best defense, the most reasonable, most useful and most
appropriate defense at his disposal, if it's going to
cost him, potentially, many years more than he'd be
exposed to by conviction.
"And it puts him in a bind * * * that I think
points out the fundamental unfairness and
unconstitutionality of the dangerous offender scheme.
"Because it would require - When the court in
[Apprendi] brings up the fact and points out that these
things need to be pled and there's a special category
there, but proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that
starts a pretty vicious circle when we're looking at a
statute like the [dangerous offender] statute or the
scheme that's involved in it.
"Because my client or any client similarly
situated is going to be put in a place where he's not
allowed, he's not able to present his best and most
viable defense without, essentially, subjecting himself
to an additional posttrial prosecution, a prosecution
for a sentencing that goes far beyond what would
otherwise be his potential punishment.
"* * * * *
"And it's not a situation that the [Apprendi]
court addressed in particular except in the dicta the
Court mentioned, probably because the situation did not
call for it.  But I think they are raising, not only an
interesting but, in this case, a vital issue.
"There is no notice to [defendant].  If the State
gives him notice and says go on, go ahead, put on your
[guilty except for insanity defense]; but if you do it,
it will cost you 30 years if we can get you later,
aside from the fact of whether or not a jury is going
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that that's -
that they're entitled to that, it puts him in a place
where he cannot assert his defense.  It's stripping him
of the right to defend himself.  So we have a problem
there."
In particular, defendant argued that the state had failed to give
notice in the indictment that it would seek to impose a
sentencing enhancement against defendant as a dangerous offender. 
Defendant did not ask the court to impanel a jury before
sentencing defendant.
The trial court found that defendant qualified as a
dangerous offender and made the following findings:
"I easily can find beyond a reasonable doubt that
ORS 161.725 applies.  The subsection A, he has been
convicted and found guilty of a class A felony.  There
is testimony in the record, not just from expert
witnesses at this hearing, but you -- the severity of
the -- and nature of the incident itself, as [the
prosecutor] pointed out on the record, but also the
testimony at the trial was more explicit in the fact
that these acts started occurring at a very early age
which is -- confirms a personality disorder."
The court sentenced defendant to 37 years' incarceration, 20
years of which represented a dangerous-offender enhancement under
ORS 161.725(1)(a). 
On appeal, defendant asserted that his dangerous-offender sentence violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.  Specifically, defendant argued
that imposition of the enhanced sentence as a dangerous offender
had violated his constitutional rights to (1) notice of the
criminal offense for which he was to be tried; (2) a grand jury
determination of the charges to be brought against him; (3) a
trial limited solely to the crimes charged; and (4) adequate
notice regarding the severity of his penalty.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without opinion. 
This petition for review followed.
On review, defendant focuses his arguments on the same
provisions of the United States Constitution. (3)  In
particular, defendant notes that, under Apprendi, 530 US at 476,
490, any element of a criminal charge that increases punishment
beyond the statutory maximum must be (1) pleaded in the charging
instrument; (2) proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3)
submitted to a jury for its determination.  Defendant maintains
that the trial court disregarded those rights in imposing a 20-year sentence enhancement and contends that this court should
follow Apprendi and overturn the enhanced sentence.
Apprendi involved a defendant who fired several shots
into the home of an African-American family.  The indictment did
not charge a "hate crime" sentencing enhancement under New Jersey
law.  The defendant pleaded guilty to several counts, including
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. 
In the penalty phase, the trial court enhanced that count as a
hate crime and imposed a sentence beyond the statutory maximum
for the underlying crime of second-degree unlawful firearm
possession.  Apprendi, 530 US at 469-71.  The United States
Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and under the Sixth Amendment, the state
must submit to a jury and prove beyond a reasonable doubt any
fact that increases the penalty beyond the applicable statutory
maximum, other than a prior conviction.  Id. at 489.
Defendant, relying on Apprendi, argues that the
dangerous-offender enhancement in this case is invalid because
the state did not (1) submit the necessary facts to a jury for
the jury's determination; or (2) plead it in the charging
instrument. (4)  Defendant argues in support of his first claim 
that, under Apprendi, he lost the right to a jury trial to
determine the facts underlying a dangerous-offender
determination.  That argument fails, as we explain below.
Defendant failed to preserve the argument that the
state should have submitted the dangerous-offender enhancement to
a jury.  The principle of preservation of issues for appellate
review requires a defendant to provide an explanation of his or
her position in the trial court, and that explanation must be
sufficiently specific to ensure that the trial court can address
and correct the alleged error at trial, if correction is
warranted.  State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22
(2000). (5)   The record demonstrates that defendant did not
express a willingness to submit any part of his case to a jury. 
At the threshold of trial, defendant waived a jury and opted for
a trial by the court; neither at that time nor later did he
indicate to the court that he intended to limit his waiver in any
way.
To be valid, a waiver of a jury trial must show "'an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.'"  State v. Harris, 339 Or 157, 173, 118 P3d 236
(2005) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, 58 S Ct 1019,
82 L Ed 1461 (1938)).  Here, defendant's waiver constituted
defendant's agreement to forgo a jury trial on the charges listed
in the indictment.  See Harris, 339 Or at 173 (so stating). 
Defendant therefore intentionally and knowingly relinquished his
right to a jury trial on the pending charges.  Moreover, as
noted, defendant did not purport to qualify his waiver of a jury
trial in any way; neither did he subsequently assert during the
course of the trial that any limits or conditions applied to his
waiver.  We conclude that defendant, once having made an
apparently unqualified waiver of the jury right, had the burden
of objecting in some manner, thereby preserving his argument for
appeal, if he regarded any action by the trial court as a
violation of his right to trial by jury.  See Wyatt, 331 Or at
343 (objection must be sufficiently specific so that the trial
court can identify error and correct it immediately, if
necessary).
Before sentencing, defendant's counsel did not make any
kind of discernible objection or other assertion that defendant
wanted a jury, rather than the court, to determine the facts for
purposes of sentencing.  That fact stands in sharp contrast to
this court's decision in Harris.  In that case, the defendant
expressly objected to the trial court's use of his prior juvenile
adjudication at his sentencing hearing.  As a result, this court
could not conclude that the "defendant's acknowledgment of a
prior juvenile adjudication in filling out his guilty plea
amounted to either an admission or a knowing waiver of his jury
trial right for sentencing purposes."  Harris, 339 Or at 173.  
On review, defendant suggests that his trial counsel
asked for a jury trial for sentencing purposes and maintains that
the request is reflected in the following statement:
"Then I would say, reaching the more central
holding of [Apprendi], that -- and admittedly, they
were talking about a different kind of law and the
statute and they were talking, obviously, a different
kind of proceeding in that it was a jury trial.
"* * * * *
"And the fact that this trial was a court trial,
obviously, puts a new wrinkle into things.  And I can
see there's an argument that can be made that says,
well, since it was a court trial, since Your Honor
heard the entire thing, all the evidence and so forth,
that you could now somehow magically, postconviction,
after the conviction was handed down, now revisit the
issue of whether in fact you're satisfied that the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant]
suffered from a severe personality disorder to the
extent that the dangerous offender statute could be
applied to him constitutionally.
"And I would suggest that the Court can't do that,
that the Court can't make itself into two entities,
even though the Court may at times have two different
functions."
(Emphasis added.)  We cannot construe the foregoing statement as
an objection or assertion that the trial court was required to
empanel a jury to find the requisite facts before sentencing
defendant.  Instead, it appears from the emphasized remarks that,
far from asserting that his client wanted or was entitled to a
jury trial, defendant's counsel merely was noting that the court
was about to embark on a different stage of the proceedings; that
is, after the court had finished hearing the evidence produced
during the guilt phase, the court then would have to recall and
consider that evidence during the sentencing phase.  In no sense
did defendant ask for a jury trial.  We conclude that defendant
failed to preserve the argument that the court should have
empaneled a jury to decide the requisite facts for sentencing.
Ultimately, the state turned defendant's evidence
against him and showed, under ORS 161.725(1)(a), that "defendant
[was] suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating a
propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life or
safety of another."  In producing evidence of his own
psychological condition, then, defendant admitted facts
sufficient to support the trial court's findings that he was
subject to an enhanced sentence as a dangerous offender, thus
foreclosing any relief under Apprendi.
Defendant also contends that, under Apprendi, the state
must plead the elements of the dangerous-offender enhancement in
the indictment.  In other words, he maintains that the indictment
must provide notice of a potential sentence enhancement if the
trial results in a verdict of guilty.  The argument fails,
however, because Apprendi did not establish that the elements of
each offense and sentencing enhancement must be pleaded in an
indictment.  See State v. Sawatzky, 339 Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___
(2005) (slip op at 15) (reaching same conclusion).  Instead, the
Court in Apprendi declined to answer that question:
"[The defendant] has not here asserted a constitutional
claim based on the omission of any reference to
sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment. 
He relies entirely on the fact that the 'due process of
law' that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the States
to provide to persons accused of crime encompasses the
right to a trial by jury, and the right to have every
element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.  That Amendment has not, however, been construed
to include the Fifth Amendment right to 'presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury' that was implicated in our
recent decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 US 224, 118 S Ct 1219, 140 L Ed 2d 350 (1998).  We
thus do not address the indictment question separately 
today."
530 US at 477 n 3, 120 S Ct at 2356 n 3 (some citations omitted). 
In State v. Cox, 337 Or 477, 499, 98 P3d 1103 (2004), this court
recognized that neither Apprendi nor Blakely v. Washington, 542
US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), held that the
indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that a criminal indictment in a state
prosecution contain facts necessary for the state to obtain a
sentencing enhancement.  Applying Apprendi, this court in Cox
stated that, "if defendant has a federal constitutional right to
have a fact plead in the indictment, that right derives solely
from the Fifth Amendment[, and t]he decision in Blakely does
nothing to change that suggestion."  Cox, 337 Or at 499.  The
indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to only federal
prosecutions, because the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
that it apply to the states.  Hurtado v. State of California, 110
US 516, 534-38, 4 S Ct 111, 28 L Ed 232 (1884).
Defendant asserts alternatively that, if he is not
entitled to specific notice in the indictment, then the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires some other
kind of notice of matters that may enhance a criminal sentence. 
This court has rejected a similar argument.  In State v. Terry,
333 Or 163, 185, 37 P3d 157 (2001), the defendant contended that
an indictment in a death-penalty prosecution must charge that the
defendant acted deliberately because the jury was asked during
the penalty phase to determine "whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of
the deceased or another would result" (emphasis added).  This
court concluded that, under Apprendi, the failure to plead the
element that a defendant committed a capital crime deliberately
was not error.  Terry, 333 Or at 186.  As this court previously
had determined, "[t]here is no requirement of pleading an
indictment that requires the indictment to set forth possible
penalties that the law may fix for guilt on a particular charge." 
State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 172, 752 P2d 1136 (1988), vac'd and
rem'd on other grounds, 492 US 914, 109 S Ct 3235, 106 L Ed 2d
583 (1989).  
Defendant maintains that the state must give notice
that the statute would be used in his specific case.  We
disagree.  We think that this is a matter for cautious legal
advice.  In counseling a client on the advisability of seeking a
finding of guilty except for insanity, and providing the facts to
the trier of fact that might support such a determination,
defense counsel would be wise to explain to the client the
possibility that the state might seek to use admitted facts
against the defendant.  As we noted above, Apprendi and Blakely
do not foreclose the state's use of facts that the defendant
chooses to admit at trial.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. ORS 161.725 provides, in part:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of ORS 161.737, the maximum term of an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a dangerous offender is 30 years, if
the court finds that because of the dangerousness of the defendant an extended
period of confined correctional treatment or custody is required for the protection
of the public and if it further finds, as provided in ORS 161.735, that one or more
of the following grounds exist:
"(a) The defendant is being sentenced for a Class A felony, and the court
finds that the defendant is suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating a
propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life or safety of another."
2. The psychologist's diagnoses of defendant were manifold:  "alcohol dependence that was
in remission as a function of his incarceration, intermittent explosive disorder, major depressive
disorder, recurrent and severe, dysthymic disorder, and polysubstance dependence that reportedly
had been in sustained remission."  The psychologist also diagnosed a borderline personality
disorder. 
3. Defendant cited, but developed no argument under, Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution before the Court of
Appeals.  Moreover, defendant did not demonstrate that he had
asserted any argument under that provision in the trial court. 
Those same problems recur in defendant's briefs in this court. 
We decline to search the record to determine whether defendant
preserved a state constitutional claim in the trial court.  
4. Defendant also argues that the factfinder at sentencing must find the pertinent facts by a
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.  Here, the trial court did just that.  The trial court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant qualified as a dangerous offender under the elements of
ORS 161.725.
5. Defendant raises additional arguments based on Apprendi for the first time in his brief on
the merits.  We decline to address those arguments because he did not preserve them, ORAP
5.45(1), and they do not constitute error apparent on the face of the record, in part because we
conclude that Apprendi does not apply to this case in light of defendant's decision to abandon his
right to a trial of the facts by a jury.