Title: State ex rel. Romero v. River City Drywall Supply, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Romero v. River City Drywall Supply, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-
1194, 2015-Ohio-1194.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-1194 
THE STATE EX REL. ROMERO, APPELLANT, v. RIVER CITY DRYWALL SUPPLY, 
INC., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Romero v. River City Drywall Supply, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-1194.] 
Workers’ compensation—Permanent partial disability—Sufficiency of evidence—
Nonexamining 
physician 
is 
not 
required 
to 
accept 
Industrial 
Commission’s finding of percentage of disability—Nonexamining 
physician is not required to name examining physicians in report adopting 
their findings—Commission does not abuse discretion in adopting 
percentage of disability that falls within range suggested by two doctors. 
(No. 2014-0171—Submitted January 13, 2015 — Decided April 2, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 13AP-76. 
_______________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Moses Romero, appeals the judgment of the Franklin 
County Court of Appeals denying his request for a writ of mandamus that would 
order appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order awarding 
Romero a 4 percent increase in his permanent-partial-disability compensation and 
instead grant him a higher percentage of increase. 
{¶ 2} Romero’s appeal alleges that the evidence, in particular the report of 
V.P. Mannava, M.D., was insufficient to support the commission’s decision.  
Because Romero did not demonstrate that the commission had abused its 
discretion, mandamus was not warranted.  We affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
{¶ 3} Romero was injured while working on January 14, 2008.  His 
workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for sprain of his left leg and 
knee.  In 2010, the commission found that Romero had a 6 percent permanent 
partial disability and granted him compensation accordingly.  In 2011, the 
commission allowed the additional condition of medial meniscus tear of the left 
knee and increased the award by 4 percent for a total of 10 percent permanent 
partial disability. 
{¶ 4} In October 2011, the commission again amended Romero’s claim to 
include the additional condition of substantial aggravation of preexisting 
chondromalacia medial femoral condoyle of his left knee.  Romero then requested 
another increase in his permanent-partial-disability award based on the newly 
allowed condition. 
{¶ 5} At the commission’s request, V.P. Mannava, M.D., reviewed 
Romero’s medical file.  Based on his review, Dr. Mannava opined that Romero 
had a whole-person impairment of 5 percent, which was less than his current 
percentage of 10 percent.  Matt Murdock, D.C., performed an independent 
medical examination.  Dr. Murdock concluded that Romero had a 14 percent 
January Term, 2015 
 
3
whole-person impairment based on the newly allowed condition that, when 
combined with his previous award, resulted in a total of “23 [sic, 24] percent 
whole person impairment.” 
{¶ 6} Following a hearing, a district hearing officer approved an increase 
of 4 percent for a total of 14 percent, based on the medical reports of Dr. Mannava 
and Dr. Murdock.  A staff hearing officer affirmed.  The commission refused 
Romero’s appeal. 
{¶ 7} Romero filed a complaint in mandamus in the Franklin County 
Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission’s order awarding only a 4 percent 
increase was not supported by the evidence and that he was entitled to a 14 
percent increase of permanent partial disability.  Romero argued that the 
commission abused its discretion by relying on the report of Dr. Mannava. 
{¶ 8} The court referred the matter to a magistrate, who concluded that the 
commission did not abuse its discretion when it relied on the reports of Dr. 
Mannava and Dr. Murdock.  The magistrate concluded that Dr. Mannava had 
reviewed the file and accepted the objective findings of the examining physicians 
as stated in his report.  The magistrate further determined that Dr. Mannava was 
not required to accept the commission’s previous finding of 10 percent 
impairment in reaching his opinion based on the medical evidence.  The 
magistrate concluded that it was within the commission’s discretion to fashion an 
increase of 4 percent in the permanent-partial-disability award. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and denied the writ. 
{¶ 10} Romero’s appeal is before the court as of right. 
{¶ 11} The issue before us is whether the report of Dr. Mannava 
constituted some evidence upon which the commission could rely in support of its 
decision to increase Romero’s permanent-partial-disability award. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 12} A nonexamining physician who provides a medical opinion is 
required to review all the relevant medical evidence and accept the objective 
findings of all the examining physicians.  State ex rel. Dobbins v. Indus. Comm., 
109 Ohio St.3d 235, 2006-Ohio-2286, 846 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 4;  State ex rel. 
Wallace v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.2d 55, 59, 386 N.E.2d 1109 (1979).  
Contrary to Romero’s contention, there is no requirement that the nonexamining 
physician identify the other physicians by name.  State ex rel. Sturgill v. P & G 
Sheet Metal, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-649, 2009-Ohio-3749. 
{¶ 13} Romero raises the same arguments as those addressed and rejected 
by the court of appeals.  First, Romero maintains that Dr. Mannava failed to 
accept the findings of the physicians who had previously examined him, and thus, 
his report cannot qualify as evidence to support the commission’s decision.  But 
in his report, Dr. Mannava expressly stated that he had reviewed the file and 
accepted the objective findings.  His report set forth the findings of examining 
physicians Dr. Forte and Dr. Boyer and those of Dr. Nobbs, a chiropractor.  Based 
on those findings, Dr. Mannava opined that Romero was not entitled to an 
additional percentage award.  Because it was within the commission’s discretion 
to rely on Dr. Mannava’s report, Romero’s argument fails. 
{¶ 14} Next, Romero argues that Dr. Mannava ignored the commission’s 
prior finding granting a 10 percent permanent-partial-disability award.  According 
to Romero, Dr. Mannava decided to reduce the percentage of permanent 
impairment the commission had already granted for the allowed conditions in the 
claim.  But Romero cites no case law that requires a physician to make a finding 
at least as great as a prior award. 
{¶ 15} Instead, Dr. Mannava based his opinion on the medical evidence 
and opined that Romero was entitled to only a 5 percent permanent-partial-
disability award rather than the 10 percent he was then receiving.  It was within 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
the commission’s discretion to rely on Dr. Mannava’s report.  Romero’s argument 
fails. 
{¶ 16} Finally, Romero contends that Dr. Mannava’s report failed to refer 
to the evidence supporting the additional condition of substantial aggravation of 
Romero’s preexisting chondromalacia of the left knee.  But Dr. Mannava’s report 
clearly referred to the newly recognized condition.  Dr. Mannava recognized the 
existence of this condition, accepted the examiners’ findings, and based his 
opinion on those findings.  His failure to comment on that condition specifically 
does not call into question the value of his report as evidence. 
{¶ 17} Thus, Romero fails to establish that the commission abused its 
discretion when it relied on the reports of Dr. Mannava and Dr. Murdock to 
support its decision. 
{¶ 18} The commission has exclusive discretion to determine the weight 
and credibility of the evidence, as well as all disputed facts.  Dobbins, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 235, 2006-Ohio-2286, 846 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 8.  This court may not disturb a 
commission order that is supported by some evidence, even if the record includes 
other evidence that is greater in quality or quantity supporting a contrary decision.  
State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 
1055 (1996). 
{¶ 19} Here, the commission relied on the reports of Dr. Mannava, who 
opined that Romero had only a 5 percent whole-person impairment, and Dr. 
Murdock, who concluded that there was a 14 percent impairment.  The 
commission, acting within its discretion, chose a figure within the range 
suggested by both doctors.  State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 179, 2002-Ohio-5811, 777 N.E.2d 241, ¶ 9;   State ex rel. 
Core Molding Technologies v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-443, 
2004-Ohio-2639, ¶ 7. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 20} Romero failed to meet his burden in mandamus, i.e., to show that 
he has a clear right to the relief requested and that the commission has a clear duty 
to provide such relief.  State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 
228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.  We affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Law Office of James A. Whittaker, L.L.C., Laura I. Murphy, and James A. 
Whittaker, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and LaTawnda N. Moore, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
___________________