Title: Blaine Ross v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-2368 
____________ 
 
BLAINE ROSS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 27, 2010] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Blaine Ross was convicted of the January 7, 2004, robbery and first-degree 
murders of his parents, Richard and Kathleen Ross.  Ross, who was 21 at the time 
of the murders and living with his parents, appeals the judgments of conviction of 
robbery and first-degree murder and sentences of death.  We have mandatory 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
After carefully reviewing the issues raised on appeal, we reverse the 
convictions and sentences of death because of the police conduct in interrogating 
Ross on January 9, 2004.  Specifically, the police, over a period of several hours of 
custodial interrogation, deliberately delayed administration of the warnings 
 
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required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), obtained inculpatory 
admissions, and when the warnings were finally administered midstream, 
minimized and downplayed the significance of the warnings and continued the 
prior interrogation—all of which undermined the effectiveness of Miranda.  In 
accordance with our precedent and the precedent of the United States Supreme 
Court, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the waiver of the 
defendant‘s rights against self-incrimination was not voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent, and the statements were not voluntarily given.  Thus, for the reasons 
addressed below, we conclude that the police interrogation violated both Miranda 
and the defendant‘s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution.  Because the 
admission of the multiple inculpatory statements cannot be considered harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we are compelled to reverse for a new trial. 
FACTS 
In reviewing the facts of this case, we focus on both the circumstances 
surrounding the murder and the police interrogation that produced the inculpatory 
statements.  Richard and Kathleen Ross were murdered on January 7, 2004, in their 
home in Bradenton, Florida.  Their son, Blaine Ross, called 911 after discovering 
them in their bed covered in blood.  
 
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At the time of their deaths, Kathleen Ross was in the process of obtaining a 
divorce from her husband, Richard, after she discovered that he was having an 
affair.  Although Richard had not vacated the premises, he was spending 
considerable time away from the house.  
Ross was living at his parents‘ house, but spent substantial time with his 
sixteen-year-old girlfriend, Erin.  On January 7, 2004, the day of the murder, Ross 
and his girlfriend, Erin, planned to drive to Cape Coral in order to buy drugs.  
According to Erin, Ross was not at her house when she went to sleep around 10:30 
or 11:00 at night on January 6, but he was there when she woke up the next 
morning.  
  
The morning of January 7, before leaving for Cape Coral, Ross and Erin first 
went to the GTE Federal Credit Union where Ross attempted to withdraw money.  
When his attempt was unsuccessful, he went inside and spoke to an employee, 
Barbara Curtis.  Ross gave Curtis an ATM card, claiming that the account was his 
and that his mother changed the personal identification number (PIN).  When 
Curtis looked up the account information, however, Kathleen Ross was the only 
person listed as having access to the account.  Ross told her that his mother was out 
of town, but he could not provide any number for her.  Ross continued to ask 
Curtis to change the PIN, but she refused. 
 
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After Ross was unable to obtain any money at the bank, he stopped by 
Checkers, went by Sam‘s Club and filled his car with gas, and stopped at a 
Circle K where Ross tried again, unsuccessfully, to use the ATM card.  Ross 
returned to his house with Erin and asked her to wait in his room while he talked 
with his parents.  He proceeded to his parents‘ bedroom, where the murders had 
occurred.   
After he discovered his parents‘ bodies, Ross and Erin went outside while 
Ross called 911.  When the police arrived, Ross was in his front yard with Erin, 
who was visibly upset.  The police found the exterior lights on, and all of the 
blinds within the house were closed.  Ross‘s parents appeared to have died while 
sleeping, with significant injuries to their heads.  Blood was splattered across the 
bedroom, all over the walls, and up to the ceiling.  The victims also had ropes 
around their necks.1  Although clothing was scattered around the room, it was still 
folded and partially stacked, which was inconsistent with a typical burglary.  After 
the bodies were moved, police found keys, a checkbook, and a wallet in the 
pillowcase on which Richard Ross was lying. 
                                          
 
 
1.  The medical examiner found no injuries on Richard Ross from the ropes 
and opined that the ropes did not play a part in Richard Ross‘s death.  He was 
unable to make the same determination as to Kathleen Ross because she had a 
significant blunt impact injury to that same area. 
 
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Police found no signs of forced entry, but the kitchen sliding glass door was 
partially open.  Ross‘s fingerprints were found on the inside sliding glass door.  In 
the garage, police found a bag containing baseball equipment; however, the 
compartment that would normally hold bats was unzipped and empty.  Ross‘s 
fingerprints were found on a cigarette lighter, which was on top of the partially 
empty baseball bag. 
  The State also presented evidence that Ross‘s black pants had spots of 
blood on them that was consistent with the blood of Kathleen and Richard Ross.  
Law enforcement officers found his pants in Erin‘s bedroom after Erin‘s mother 
gave the officers permission to search the residence.  The pants were not the ones 
Ross was wearing at the time he discovered his parents‘ bodies and called 911. 
Dr. Vega, the medical examiner, performed an autopsy and determined that 
the cause of death for both victims was blunt impact head injuries.  He estimated 
that the time of death was between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. on January 7.  Dr. Vega 
opined that neither victim moved after the initial injury because there was no blood 
staining beyond the area already uncovered.  He found no defensive injuries and 
opined that the victims were asleep when initially struck.  The injuries were 
consistent with being struck by a bat.  Richard Ross was hit at least twice, but 
possibly more.  Kathleen Ross was struck at least four times, but likely more than 
four.   
 
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 The State presented evidence that Ross had a financial motive for the crime. 
Specifically, shortly before his parents were killed, Ross made several withdrawals 
from his mother‘s account, totaling $1,401.50.  On January 6, 2004, Ross and his 
mother signed a contract which stated, ―I, Kathleen Ross, has [sic] loaned Blaine 
Ross $1400 that will be paid back in full as soon as possible.  Blaine will never ask 
for Sam‘s Club card or any other money.‖ 
On January 7, after the police responded to Ross‘s 911 call, Detective 
William J. Waldron talked to Ross at the scene and described Ross as very quiet, 
calm, and withdrawn.  After Detective Waldron interviewed some neighbors, he 
returned to Ross and found him crouched down near a vehicle to avoid the media.  
Ross appeared particularly stressed based on the media‘s arrival.  Ross asked 
Detective Waldron if they could go somewhere to talk, and Detective Waldron 
suggested the sheriff‘s office, to which Ross agreed.  Ross and Erin were then 
taken to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Manatee County 
Sheriff‘s Office.   
Law enforcement officers interrogated Ross multiple times.2  On January 7, 
after arriving at CID, Detective Waldron interviewed Ross four times throughout 
                                          
 
 
2.  Ross was also interrogated by police on January 9, when he gave 
increasingly inculpatory statements.  On January 12, he was interviewed while he 
was in jail.  All of the interviews were audio recorded, and the interrogation on 
January 9 was also video recorded. 
 
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the day and into the early morning hours of January 8.  Although Ross was at the 
police station for about twelve hours, the total time that he was interviewed on 
January 7 and 8 was a little less than four hours.  In between the interviews, Ross 
was given breaks whenever he asked, was permitted to be alone in a common area 
near the elevator, was not restrained in any manner, and was not supervised.  
Detective Waldron conducted these interviews at a conference table in a large 
room.   
The interviews were very conversational, but on occasion, the detective 
confronted Ross with discrepancies between his statement and statements from 
other witnesses.  In the third and fourth interviews, another detective was also 
present, and the detectives became more direct with portions of Ross‘s story that 
were inconsistent.  During the same day, the police also took statements from Erin 
and her mother, as well as other potential witnesses.   
During the interviews on January 7 and 8, Ross was repeatedly assured he 
was not being arrested.  After Ross finished providing the statements, a detective 
took Ross to Erin‘s house.  After Ross was interviewed on January 7 and 8, he 
called Detective Waldron four times and left messages.  In the last message, he 
stated:  
Hello Detective Waldron, this is Blaine Ross.  I‘m calling in regards 
to what‘s going on.  I have some questions, um, regarding the case 
and then some things that have been brought up to me in the recent 
time.  Please give me a call back . . . .  
 
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On January 9, Ross and his sister arrived at the sheriff‘s office, where the 
victim advocate‘s office was located.  Ross came to see the victim advocate so he 
could buy shoes.  At the time of the visit, he was still barefoot because the police 
had taken his shoes when he was first questioned, and he was not permitted to 
obtain any of his other shoes from his house as it was considered a crime scene. 
When Ross arrived, Detective Waldron asked Ross to come see him when he 
finished with his meeting because he had received Ross‘s messages and had some 
more questions.  Ross met with Detective Waldron as requested.   
Detective Waldron believed that the January 9 interrogation was his last 
chance to talk to Ross without an attorney present, so he decided to change the 
location to a room where the interrogation could be videotaped.  The room was 
much smaller than the room where Ross was initially interviewed.  Inside the 
room, there was a small desk and three chairs.  Detective Waldron sat relatively 
close to Ross.  Ross‘s chair was in the corner of the room and he was, in essence, 
blocked in with a desk at one side and Detective Waldron in front of him.  Ross 
was still barefoot.  At least one other law enforcement officer was in the room, and 
at various times throughout the interview, other officers entered and exited the 
room, passing notes to Detective Waldron. 
Detective Waldron was the primary interrogator throughout the questioning.  
Initially, he answered many of Ross‘s questions concerning the process of an 
 
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investigation.  After they talked about Ross‘s concerns, Detective Waldron 
questioned Ross about his prior statements given on January 7 and 8.  The 
questioning became more accusatory, and at times, Detective Waldron raised his 
voice.  Detective Waldron confronted Ross with evidence that Ross had lied 
regarding significant aspects of Ross‘s prior statements.  He then informed Ross 
that police had found the pants that Ross wore on the night his parents were killed 
and the pants had blood on them that matched the crime scene.  The interrogation 
continued for about four hours in the same small room with Detective Waldron and 
other officers before Miranda warnings were finally administered.  During the 
unwarned portion of the interrogation, Detective Waldron constantly referred to the 
bloody pants and emphasized that this evidence could not be disputed.  Ross 
finally acknowledged that this evidence ―[p]uts me at the crime scene.‖  Shortly 
after that, Ross admitted that it was a possibility that he killed his parents: 
You made me dig inside and think about it, and you‘ve also given me 
hard evidence that puts me at the crime.  And I can‘t—I can‘t—I 
can‘t—I can‘t remember if I did this or not.  I don‘t know.  I mean, 
you—you have solid evidence, blood on my pants and everything, but 
I don‘t remember doing this, if I did it.   
From this point on, Ross repeatedly asserted that he may have committed the crime 
but ―blacked out‖ and had no memory of it.  He further provided additional 
statements that implied he had reason to commit the murders: 
I can tell you that I didn‘t plan to kill my parents.  I can tell you that I 
do bottle things up, and things that you‘ve said does [sic] make sense.  
 
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They do make sense to me, that I can [sic] have done this.  I could 
have been so angry, done this.  But I don‘t—I can‘t put myself there.  
I don‘t remember if I was there, so I can‘t tell you if I did it or not. 
At approximately 7 p.m., Detective Waldron left the interrogation room.  
About fifteen minutes later, he returned and Ross asked, as he had done previously, 
if he could see his sister ―one more time.‖  Detective Waldron left the room again 
and returned shortly telling Ross, ―I can‘t find her.‖  Although Detective Waldron 
left the room for the ostensible purpose of checking if Ross‘s sister was still in the 
building, at trial he testified that he did not believe that she was in the building and 
he personally was not making any efforts to find her.  When Detective Waldron 
returned, he eventually administered Miranda warnings and, under circumstances 
more fully explained in our analysis, Ross signed a written waiver.  After more 
questioning by Detective Waldron based on the prior interrogation and further 
equivocation by Ross, Ross finally confessed that he killed his parents but did not 
remember committing the act.   
Ross: You were right about a couple of things.  I was angry at my dad.  
I wasn‘t angry with my mom, she was trying to help me, she was 
giving me money.  But when—you were right that I didn‘t do this on 
purpose.  I remember dropping Mikey off—[unintelligible]—his 
neighborhood, I remember being in my house.  I didn‘t do this on 
purpose. 
Waldron: I know you didn‘t. 
 
Ross: It was like I had just woken up, and I was standing there, not 
next—not next to my parents, but in front of their bed.  I had a 
[unintelligible]—I don‘t know why, I don‘t know what triggered me 
 
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to do it.  I know I was angry at my dad,[3] but I don‘t know why I did 
this . . . . 
 
He stated that he ―woke up‖ after the murders, realized what he had done, 
and tried to make it look like a robbery.  When he discussed what happened after 
the murders, he also confessed to certain actions that later evidence showed that he 
did not do.  Specifically, when Detective Waldron asked about Kathleen Ross‘s 
missing jewelry, Ross stated that he ―[j]ust grabbed it‖ in order to ―cover [his] 
tracks.‖  In fact, Ross did not take the jewelry.4   
Ross was subsequently arrested for the murder of his parents.  On January 
12, Detective Waldron arrived at the jail to talk to Ross based on a request made by 
Ross.  After an initial discussion, the detective provided new Miranda warnings to 
Ross.  During their discussion, Ross further answered additional questions as to 
where he disposed of the evidence.  However, none of this evidence was ever 
discovered. 
At trial, Ross presented a defense, including the testimony of several 
neighbors who reported that, a few days before the murders, somebody had jiggled 
                                          
 
 
3.  Ross asserted that he was angry at his father because of the affair. 
 
4.  Kathleen Ross‘s jewelry was missing from her house.  Evidence 
presented at trial revealed that a few days before the murder, Kathleen Ross 
stopped by her mother‘s house with a paper bag, which she hid in the crawlspace 
of her mother‘s attic.  After the murder, Ross‘s sister, Kimberly, found the paper 
bag with Kathleen Ross‘s jewelry box and jewelry inside.   
 
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their doors or made noises outside their windows.  Ross also presented an expert in 
false confessions, Dr. Gregory DeClue, to support the theory that the confession he 
made was coerced and unreliable.5  He testified that there are factors that increase 
the likelihood of false confessions, many of which were present in this case.  These 
factors include youth, immaturity, inexperience, low intelligence, mental illness, 
intoxication, and withdrawal from drugs.  Police also use isolation to increase 
anxiety.  Further, the police use certain techniques that increase the risk of a false 
confession, including escalating the pressure exerted on a suspect and the suspect‘s 
anxiety, exaggerating the evidence, providing information about the crime scene, 
and giving justifications why a person should confess, such as closure.  After 
hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted Ross of two counts of first-degree 
murder and one count of robbery. 
Following a penalty phase in which Ross put on mental mitigation from two 
experts as to his substantially impaired mental state at the time of the crime, the 
jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eight to four for each murder. 
The trial court imposed sentences of death after finding two aggravators: a prior 
violent felony conviction (based on the contemporary murder convictions) and that 
the murders were committed during the course of a robbery (merged with 
pecuniary gain).  The court found three statutory mitigating factors: Ross had no 
                                          
 
 
5.  Dr. DeClue also testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
 
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significant criminal history (given little weight); he acted under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance (proven only as to drug use and given 
moderate weight); and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired 
(proven only as to drug use and given moderate weight).  The trial court rejected 
age as a statutory mitigator and found and weighed nonstatutory mitigation, 
including giving moderate weight to his history of substance abuse.  
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Ross raises five issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
denying the motion to suppress Ross‘s statements on January 8 and January 9; (2) 
whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce Ross‘s January 12 
statement; (3) whether the State failed to demonstrate that the FDLE serologist was 
qualified to testify to the statistical significance of the DNA evidence; (4) whether 
the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove robbery and premeditation; and 
(5) whether the death penalty is disproportionate.  In connection with the 
proportionality argument, Ross claims that he has a severe mental illness and that 
the trial court ignored ―uncontroverted evidence‖ regarding his mental state.  
Because we conclude that multiple statements made by Ross during the January 9 
interrogation should have been suppressed and that the admission of those 
 
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statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we address only that issue 
in depth.6   
Prior to trial, Ross filed a motion to suppress.7  Following an evidentiary 
hearing, which included the admission of the recorded interrogation of Ross by the 
police, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.  The trial court‘s findings 
included the following: (1) Ross was not in custody prior to the reading of the 
Miranda warnings on January 9; (2) Ross voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; 
and (3) Ross‘s statements were made voluntarily.  The trial court further found that 
(1) Ross did not confess before being read his Miranda rights; and (2) no evidence 
was submitted to show that the detectives deliberately withheld Miranda warnings 
until Ross confessed.  
                                          
 
6.  We conclude that no extensive discussion is necessary as to the 
January 12 statements, because on that date the Miranda warnings were given once 
interrogation began and the court admitted only statements that were made after 
the Miranda warnings were administered. 
    
 
7.  In the motion to suppress, Ross challenged both the statements made on 
January 7-8 and on January 9.  On appeal, Ross focuses mostly on the January 9 
statements.  As to the January 7 and 8 interviews, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err in finding that Ross was not in custody at that time for the following 
reasons: Ross voluntarily went to the sheriff‘s office; the detective was merely 
obtaining Ross‘s statement as to the events surrounding his parents‘ deaths; 
although the detective did question Ross about conflicting statements, Ross was 
not confronted with the same type of incriminating evidence of his guilt; and Ross 
was often left by himself at the sheriff‘s office when he was not being interviewed, 
thus implying that he was free to leave.  Because this was not an in-custody 
interrogation, the court did not err in admitting these statements.  
 
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On appeal, Ross claims that the ―trial court erred in allowing the state to 
introduce the videotaped in-custody confession obtained by Detective Waldron by 
means of multiple violations of appellant‘s rights protected by the United States 
and Florida Constitution.‖  Both the United States and Florida Constitutions 
provide that persons shall not be ―compelled‖ to be witnesses against themselves in 
any criminal matter.  U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const; see also Traylor 
v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992) (stressing that under the basic contours of 
Florida‘s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, ―a main focus of 
Florida confession law has always been on guarding against one thing—
coercion‖).  Based on these federal and state constitutional guarantees, if a 
defendant confesses during a custodial interrogation, in order for the confession ―to 
be admissible in a criminal trial, the State must prove that the confession was not 
compelled, but was voluntarily made.‖  Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 
1999).   
Prior to Miranda, ―the admissibility of an accused‘s in-custody statements 
was judged solely by whether they were ‗voluntary‘ within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause.‖  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985).  In Miranda, ―the 
United States Supreme Court enunciated a bright-line rule to guard against 
compulsion and the coercive nature and atmosphere of custodial interrogation and 
‗assure that the individual‘s right to choose between silence and speech remains 
 
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unfettered throughout the interrogation process.‘ ‖  Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469).  To protect the right against self-incrimination, 
the Supreme Court required that any individual held for interrogation must be 
clearly informed as to his or her rights, including the ―right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and . . . [the] 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.‖  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444.  ―The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the 
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.‖  Id. 
The Supreme Court in Miranda concluded that ―without proper safeguards 
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime 
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual‘s 
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.‖  Id. at 467.  Therefore, ―unless and until [the Miranda] warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a 
result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant].‖  Id. at 479.   
―The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with 
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to 
existing methods of interrogation.‖  Id. at 476.  The Supreme Court has also 
recognized that the prophylactic Miranda warnings are ―not themselves rights 
protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right 
 
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against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.‖  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 
(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).  As recognized in 
Elstad, the Miranda exclusionary rule sweeps more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself: ―A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather 
affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all 
unwarned statements.‖  Id. at 307 n.1 (emphasis omitted).  This presumption is 
irrebuttable for the purposes of the State‘s case in chief.  Id. at 307.8   
These protections are equally applicable under the Florida Constitution.  As 
this Court has recognized, ―[t]he protections enunciated in Miranda have been part 
of this State‘s jurisprudence for over a century pursuant to the Florida 
Constitution.‖  Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573; see also Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 964-66.  
Traylor explains the contours of our state constitutional law:  
The basic contours of Florida confession law were defined by 
this Court long ago under our common law.  We recognized the 
important role that confessions play in the crime-solving process and 
the great benefit they provide; however, because of the tremendous 
weight accorded confessions by our courts and the significant 
potential for compulsion—both psychological and physical—in 
obtaining such statements, a main focus of Florida confession law has 
always been on guarding against one thing—coercion. . . .  The test 
thus is one of voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by 
an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
confession.  This determination is to be made by the judge, in the 
                                          
 
 
8.  Such statements, however, can be used as impeachment during cross-
examination.  Id. 
 
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absence of the jury, based on a multiplicity of factors, including the 
nature of the questioning itself.  
  
Id. at 964 (footnote omitted). 
In this case, the trial court concluded that Ross was not in custody on 
January 9 prior to the reading of the Miranda warnings, that Ross voluntarily 
waived his rights, and that the statements were made voluntarily.  As we explained 
in Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 2001), when reviewing a trial court‘s 
ruling on a motion to suppress, ―mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately 
determine constitutional rights should be reviewed by appellate courts using a two-
step approach.‖  We defer to a trial court‘s findings of fact as long as they are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo a trial court‘s 
application of the law to the historical facts.  See Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 
160 (Fla. 2007).  
The actual facts of the interrogation in this case are uncontroverted; only the 
application of the law to the facts is at issue.  In reviewing the issues related to the 
January 9 interrogation and statements, we address: (a) whether and when the 
interrogation of Blaine Ross became custodial, necessitating the administration of 
Miranda warnings; (b) whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the waiver 
of the Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and whether the 
statements made after the waiver were voluntary; and (c) whether the error in the 
admission of the statements was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
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A.  Pre-Miranda Statements—Custodial Interrogation  
The first issue centers on whether the interrogation became custodial on 
January 9 prior to the time the Miranda warnings were administered, particularly 
after the detective confronted Ross with evidence that the victims‘ blood was 
found on his pants.  Determining whether the defendant was ―in custody‖ so as to 
require the administration of Miranda warnings involves a mixed question of law 
and fact subject to independent review.  Connor, 803 So. 2d at 605-06.  The United 
States Supreme Court explained why this determination should be subject to 
independent review: 
Classifying ―in custody‖ as a determination qualifying for 
independent review should serve legitimate law enforcement interests 
as effectively as it serves to ensure protection of the right against self-
incrimination.  As our decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of 
independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and 
stabilize the law.   
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995).  If Ross was subjected to 
custodial interrogation, then he should have been administered Miranda warnings. 
Police are not required to give Miranda warnings to every potential suspect.  
Miranda warnings apply only to in-custody interrogations.  Hunter v. State, 8 So. 
3d 1052, 1063 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2005 (2009); see also Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 441-42.  The reason for requiring Miranda warnings at this stage is 
because ―interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and 
. . . statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect 
 
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is specifically warned of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those 
rights.‖  Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989) (quoting Quarles, 467 
U.S. at 654). 
For Miranda purposes, custodial interrogation means ―questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.‖  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444.  The determination of whether a person was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda depends on ―how a reasonable person in the suspect‘s situation would 
perceive his circumstances.‖  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004).  
The United States Supreme Court explained this analysis as follows: 
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what 
were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, 
given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or 
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.  Once 
the scene is set and the players‘ lines and actions are reconstructed, 
the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: 
was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the 
degree associated with a formal arrest. 
Id. at 663 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112). 
This Court has adopted the same objective, reasonable-person framework in 
determining whether a suspect was in custody.  See Connor, 803 So. 2d at 605.  
―[I]t must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable 
person in the suspect‘s position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of 
movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or 
 
- 21 - 
to terminate the encounter with police.‖  Id.  To analyze the case-specific facts that 
are relevant to determining this issue, the Court considers the following four 
factors: 
(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; 
(2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent 
to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; 
[and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave 
the place of questioning. 
 
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574.   
 
With this framework in mind, we now proceed to determine at what point in 
time Ross was in custody.  Although the four factors provide the structure of our 
analysis, the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the ―circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation;‖ and (2) ―given those circumstances, would a reasonable person 
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.‖  
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663. 
 The first of the four factors, the manner in which police summon the suspect 
for questioning, weighs in favor of the State.  Ross voluntarily came to the sheriff‘s 
office for a meeting with a victim‘s advocate.  While he was at the office, 
Detective Waldron requested that Ross see him before he left, and Ross agreed. 
We next turn to the second factor—the purpose, place, and manner of 
questioning.  Initially, Detective Waldron asked Ross to again provide a statement 
of Ross‘s activities regarding the last day he was with his mother and questioned 
 
- 22 - 
him as to inconsistencies in his story.  However, at the point when Detective 
Waldron informed Ross about the bloody pants, the detective‘s focus shifted from 
merely questioning a witness to attempting to obtain a confession and pressuring 
Ross to admit his involvement in the crime.  The detective repeatedly told Ross 
that he knew Ross committed the crime and the only question remaining was why.  
This type of questioning, which was highly confrontational and accusatorial, lasted 
for hours and took place in a very small room at the station with at least two 
officers in the room.  Moreover, at this point, when Ross asked for a smoke break, 
the detective told him to smoke in the room, while the questioning continued.  This 
factor clearly supports a conclusion that the defendant was in custody.  
The third factor to consider is the extent to which Ross was confronted with 
evidence of his guilt.  This factor also weighs in favor of a finding that Ross was in 
custody.  Ross was confronted with very strong evidence of his guilt during the 
January 9 interview—most importantly, that pants Ross wore on the night in 
question had blood on them that matched the crime scene.  Detective Waldron 
referred to the bloody pants throughout the interview and how this evidence could 
not be disputed.  Ross finally acknowledged that this evidence ―[p]uts me at the 
crime scene.‖   
At various points after this time, when Ross denied having any involvement 
in his parents‘ murders, Detective Waldron stressed, ―The evidence says you did.‖  
 
- 23 - 
Detective Waldron constantly referred to the blood on the pants as proof that Ross 
was at the crime scene that night and, throughout the interview, accused Ross of 
killing his parents.  Questioning by Detective Waldron included: 
Waldron:  I know how that blood got there, Blaine.  When you 
brutally, cold-blooded beat your parents to death, when you smashed 
in their heads and beat them to death . . . . 
Waldron:  And then you put that rope that was in the garage and you 
put it around your mother‘s neck, and you put it around your father‘s 
neck, and you slowly methodically, cold-bloodedly pulled it tighter 
and tighter and tighter, Blaine.  After smashing in their heads.  That‘s 
how you got that blood on your pants, those black Dickies that you 
were wearing Tuesday . . . . 
Waldron:  You want to see Erin go to prison now?  . . .  Is that what 
you want?  You want to bring all these people down with you?  For 
what you did?  The time is now to be a man.  And the evidence 
doesn‘t lie. 
Detective Waldron repeated variations of this type of accusatorial questioning over 
a period of hours before the Miranda warnings were given and after Ross was 
confronted with the blood on his pants. 
The fourth and final factor to consider is that Ross was never informed he 
was free to leave.  At the point when Ross was informed that the police had 
evidence that blood on his pants matched the crime scene, a reasonable person 
would not believe he or she was free to leave.  Moreover, all of the circumstances 
after this point conveyed the clear impression that he was not free to leave.  After 
the interview turned accusatory and Ross asked for a cigarette break, Detective 
Waldron told Ross that he could simply smoke in the room.  Ross responded, ―I 
 
- 24 - 
was also going to say you could handcuff me or something to make sure I don‘t 
run.‖  This situation stands in contrast to how Ross was handled in his prior 
interviews, where he was permitted to go outside, take a break from the 
interrogation, and smoke a cigarette.   
Later during the January 9 interrogation, Ross asked to speak with his sister 
who had accompanied him to the station.  He was not permitted to talk to her 
outside the interrogation room—she was brought to Ross.  He asked for her again, 
and he was left in the room while Detective Waldron said that he would try to find 
her.  When Ross asked if he was being charged with the crime, Detective Waldron 
avoided a direct answer by asking Ross what he thought should happen.  Only once 
did Detective Waldron assure Ross that he was not currently being arrested, but 
this was moments before Detective Waldron provided Ross with Miranda warnings 
and after Ross made the admissions that he could have killed his parents.  
Therefore, the final factor weighs in favor of concluding that the interrogation was 
custodial.   
Ultimately, as we have stated, the factors enunciated provide the basis for 
the twofold inquiry: (1) the ―circumstances surrounding the interrogation‖; and (2) 
―given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not 
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.‖  Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663; 
see also Connor, 803 So. 2d at 606.  In considering these factors in conjunction 
 
- 25 - 
with each other, we conclude that the January 9 interview became a custodial 
interrogation.  Although Ross initially went to the sheriff‘s office voluntarily, this 
is the only factor that weighs in favor of finding that the January 9 questioning was 
not an in-custody interrogation.  The January 9 interview was held in a small room 
with multiple officers, and Ross was placed in a corner with Detective Waldron 
sitting in front of him.  The manner and purpose of the interview was not merely to 
interview a witness and obtain his story.  Detective Waldron was attempting to 
obtain incriminating statements or a change in Ross‘s story by confronting him 
with significant evidence that allegedly placed him at the crime scene and insisting 
that the police already knew he committed the crime.   
Once the police informed Ross that they had his bloody pants that matched 
the crime scene, a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.  At this point the officer should have advised Ross as to 
his Miranda rights.   
Our holding here is consistent with our precedent regarding when a 
defendant is in custody.  See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d 568.  In Ramirez, an officer 
transported the suspect, Ramirez, to the police station, where Ramirez was 
questioned in a small interrogation room by two detectives.  Id. at 572.  Ramirez 
was never told that he was free to leave, and the officers clearly indicated that they 
considered him a suspect and knew he was involved in the crime.  See id. at 574.  
 
- 26 - 
After reviewing the four relevant factors, this Court concluded that Miranda 
warnings should have been given because any reasonable person in Ramirez‘s 
position would have believed that he was in custody at the time of the 
interrogation.  Id.  We observed that ―[s]hort of being handcuffed and being told 
that he was under arrest, we cannot perceive of circumstances that would be more 
indicative of a custodial interrogation than the circumstances of the interrogation‖ 
in Ramirez.  Id. 
 Likewise, in Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 644 (Fla. 2000), we 
concluded that the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda where 
consideration of the Ramirez factors ―inevitably‖ led to that conclusion: 
Mansfield was interrogated by three detectives at the police station, he 
was never told he was free to leave, he was confronted with evidence 
strongly suggesting his guilt, and he was asked questions that made it 
readily apparent that the detectives considered him the prime, if not 
the only, suspect. 
 See also Wolliston v. State, 961 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding 
that defendant was in custody, despite the fact that the interrogation occurred in his 
own home, because the defendant was confronted with the presence of illegal 
drugs and was not informed that he was free to leave). 
In accordance with the case law governing when Miranda warnings must be 
given, we conclude that the officers should have provided Miranda warnings 
during the January 9 interrogation before the interrogation turned accusatorial and 
 
- 27 - 
the officers confronted Ross with the bloody pants.  Accordingly, any prewarning 
statements made by Ross after this point should have been suppressed.   
B.  Validity of Statements After Miranda Waiver 
We next address the issue of whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the waiver of the Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent and whether the statements made after the waiver were voluntary.  The 
dissent agrees with our determination that Ross was in custody at the time Ross 
was confronted with evidence of the bloody pants.  The dissent objects to our 
analysis of the validity of the statements given after the Miranda warnings, 
asserting that this Court did not give proper deference to the trial court‘s finding of 
facts that the delay in administering the Miranda warnings was not deliberate.  
However, although deference is to be accorded to credibility findings, the issue of 
the admissibility of the postwarning statements is a mixed question of law and fact.  
See Thomas v. State, 894 So. 2d 126, 136 (Fla. 2004) (holding that regarding 
whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, 
―[a]ppellate courts should . . . accord a presumption of correctness to the trial 
court‘s rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial court‘s determination 
of historical facts, but appellate courts must independently review mixed questions 
of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment[s]‖ (quoting Connor, 803 So. 2d at 608)).  
 
- 28 - 
  As this Court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear, ―the 
ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal rather than factual question.‖  Ramirez, 
739 So. 2d at 575 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).  The State 
bears the burden of showing that ―the confession was not compelled, but was 
voluntarily made.‖  Id. at 573.  Further, where a confession is obtained after the 
administration of Miranda warnings, ―the State bears a ‗heavy burden‘ to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.‖  Id. at 575 (citing 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 
724 (1979); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1991)).   
In the ordinary case, the teachings of Miranda dictate that the warnings will 
be administered once custodial interrogation begins and thus the prophylactic 
effect of Miranda will be served.  This, however, is a case where the administration 
of the Miranda warnings was delayed for several hours into the custodial 
interrogation.  See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (―The technique of interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned 
phases raises a new challenge to Miranda.‖).   
Miranda was intended to address and minimize the coercive effects of 
interrogation and guard against police techniques ―likely . . . to disable [an 
 
- 29 - 
individual] from making a free and rational choice‖ about speaking.  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 464-65.  Whether a defendant validly waived his rights is a twofold inquiry: 
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the 
sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception.  Second, the waiver must have 
been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.  Only 
if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 
reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights 
have been waived. 
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 575 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
In reviewing such challenges, courts must remain vigilant regarding whether 
a defendant was given an actual choice in order to guard against the potential 
danger of violating a defendant‘s constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
Ensuring that police do not use intimidation, coercion, or deception in obtaining a 
waiver also helps to protect the integrity of the truth-seeking process, including 
guarding against the danger of false confessions.  We thus review the United States 
Supreme Court precedent and this Court‘s precedent as to whether the subsequent 
statements were admissible or should have been suppressed as being both a 
violation of the underlying principles of Miranda and a violation of Ross‘s 
constitutional rights under the United States and Florida Constitutions.  
 
 
- 30 - 
1.  Relevant Case Law 
 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the failure to administer the Miranda warnings before eliciting a 
confession does not necessarily render any subsequently warned statement 
inadmissible and that the admissibility of such statements must turn on whether the 
subsequent waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.  Id. at 310-11, 
314-15.  The eighteen-year-old defendant in Elstad first admitted guilt when he 
was questioned without Miranda warnings in the living room of his home while his 
mother was in the kitchen area, a few steps away.  Id. at 315.  After this initial 
confession, he was taken to the sheriff‘s headquarters where, approximately one 
hour later and after a full warning and waiver of his Miranda rights, he gave a 
complete statement detailing his participation in the crime.  Id. at 301, 314-15.  
The officers made no promises or threats during questioning at either the 
defendant‘s residence or the sheriff‘s headquarters.  Id. at 301-02.  In holding the 
second statement admissible, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
Far from establishing a rigid rule, we direct courts to avoid one; there 
is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect‘s initial 
inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was 
voluntary.  The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second 
statement was also voluntarily made.  As in any such inquiry, the 
finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the 
entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in 
evaluating the voluntariness of his statements.  The fact that a suspect 
chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, 
highly probative. . . .  We hold today that a suspect who has once 
 
- 31 - 
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby 
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been 
given the requisite Miranda warnings. 
Id. at 318 (emphasis supplied).   
Elstad thus rejected a rigid rule that would render inadmissible a statement 
given after Miranda warnings were administered solely because Miranda warnings 
were not given earlier.  However, Elstad also cautioned against a rigid rule that 
would simply allow the admission of all statements given after Miranda warnings.  
Rather, courts must examine ―the surrounding circumstances and the entire course 
of police conduct.‖  Id.  ―When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that 
passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change 
in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over 
into the second confession.‖  Id. at 310.  If a suspect made an unwarned but 
―clearly voluntary‖ earlier admission, a subsequent properly warned confession 
need not be suppressed, so long as the careful and thorough administration of the 
Miranda warning is given and the Miranda rights are waived.  Id. at 310-11.  Thus, 
the condition that rendered the initial ―unwarned statement inadmissible‖ is 
―cure[d]‖ as to the subsequent statements after Miranda warnings are properly 
given.  Id. at 311. 
The Court in Elstad limited its holding to situations where police did not 
engage in ―deliberately coercive or improper tactics‖ in obtaining the initial 
 
- 32 - 
statements.  Id. at 314.  A situation in which the police did engage in improper 
tactics was addressed by this Court in Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 
1999), where the police delayed providing a seventeen-year-old defendant with his 
Miranda warnings until after he made incriminating statements, and when those 
warnings were finally provided, the officers undertook a ―concerted effort to 
minimize and downplay the significance of the Miranda rights.‖  Id. at 575.  After 
examining Elstad, this Court held that determining whether a subsequent 
confession is voluntarily given requires an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Id. 
This Court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the statements in 
Ramirez were distinguishable from Elstad.  First, although the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Ramirez at the time of questioning, they delayed providing 
Miranda warnings until after he made incriminating statements.  Then the police 
failed to provide him with a careful and thorough administration of Miranda 
warnings, instead minimizing the significance of the warnings.  This Court found 
that the officers in that case instead employed a concerted effort to minimize and 
downplay the significance of the Miranda rights, thus exploiting the statements 
previously made to the officers so that Ramirez would not exercise his rights.  
Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 576.  This Court noted that Ramirez had just turned 
seventeen years old and that the officers in that case lulled the young defendant 
 
- 33 - 
into a false sense of security by telling the suspect that they were not arresting him 
and did not permit him to contact his parents before questioning.  Id. at 574, 576-
77.  Finally, the officers administered the Miranda rights orally and did not secure 
a written waiver until after Ramirez had fully confessed to his involvement in the 
crime.  Id. at 578.  This Court therefore held that Ramirez‘s confession should have 
been suppressed.  Id. 
In Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 472 (Fla. 2003), the Court applied Elstad 
and distinguished Ramirez to conclude that the postwarning statements were 
admissible.  The facts of Davis involve only brief initial questioning and no 
indication of a concerted effort to undermine the Miranda warnings.  The officers 
informed Davis that they were there to discuss the disappearance of his girlfriend‘s 
mother, Ms. Robinson.  Id.  During the initial ten-minute discussion with the two 
officers, Davis admitted that he killed Ms. Robinson.  Id. at 471.  Upon hearing 
this admission, a detective immediately read Davis his Miranda warnings and 
obtained a signed written waiver.  Id.  Davis then proceeded to draw a map to the 
victim‘s body and gave a recorded confession.  Id.  We concluded that none of the 
circumstances that rendered Ramirez‘s warned confession inadmissible were 
present in Davis.  Relying on Elstad, this Court held that the circumstances 
surrounding Davis‘s warned confession properly ―cured‖ the condition that 
rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.  Id. at 472. 
 
- 34 - 
The circumstances of the police conduct in Elstad and Davis stand in stark 
contrast to the circumstances in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), which 
involves the intentionally delayed administration of Miranda warnings.  In Seibert, 
the police in fact engaged in tactics of deliberately and intentionally withholding 
Miranda warnings.  Specifically, the officer who questioned the suspect admitted 
that he intentionally withheld Miranda warnings and relied on an interrogation 
technique he had been taught: ―question first, then give the warnings, and then 
repeat the question ‗until I get the answer that she‘s already provided once.‘ ‖  Id. 
at 606.  In a plurality opinion, four justices agreed that Miranda was violated when 
the officer intentionally elicited an unwarned confession and then used that 
unwarned confession to elicit a second warned confession.  The plurality discussed 
how such intentional techniques strike at the very heart of the purpose of Miranda 
warnings and increase the risk of inducing a coercive confession: 
Just as ―no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda‘s] 
strictures,‖ it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of the 
litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance.  
―The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‗conve[y] to 
[a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.‘ ‖  The threshold issue 
when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it 
would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings 
could function ―effectively‖ as Miranda requires. 
Id. at 611-12 (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981); Duckworth, 
492 U.S. at 203). 
 
- 35 - 
The plurality stated that the following facts were relevant to whether 
Miranda warnings delivered ―midstream‖ could be effective in accomplishing their 
object: ―the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round 
of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and 
setting of the first and the second [interrogations], the continuity of police 
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second 
round as continuous with the first.‖  Id. at 615.  The plurality explained that the 
circumstances of Seibert‘s interrogation ―challeng[e] the comprehensibility and 
efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the 
suspect‘s shoes would not have understood them to convey a message that she 
retained a choice about continuing to talk.‖  Id. at 617.  
Because this was a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy‘s opinion concurring 
in the judgment becomes a pivotal focus in determining the impact and 
ramifications of Seibert.9  Justice Kennedy stressed that he firmly believed in the 
                                          
 
 
9.  While we focus on Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in analyzing the 
holding of Seibert, there is a split in the federal circuits regarding whether the 
plurality rather than his concurrence operates as the controlling precedent.  In fact, 
while the case cited by the dissent, United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079 (7th 
Cir. 2004), relies on Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence as to the holding of Seibert, 
more recent circuit cases have called into question the reliance on Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurrence rather than the plurality. See, e.g., United States v. Heron, 
564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2009) (―[W]e conclude that the Marks [v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)] rule is not applicable to Seibert.  Although Justice 
Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote for the majority, we find it a strain at best 
to view his concurrence taken as a whole as the narrowest ground on which a 
 
- 36 - 
correctness of the decision in Elstad because it ―reflect[ed] a balanced and 
pragmatic approach to enforcement of the Miranda warning.‖  Id. at 620 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment).  Specifically, he expressed concern with extending 
Miranda and did not believe that a subsequent voluntary statement made after 
Miranda warnings was tainted simply because a police officer made a good-faith 
mistake in determining exactly when Miranda warnings were required.  However, 
like the plurality, he was equally concerned about the situation in Seibert where 
police used a two-step interrogation technique ―designed to circumvent Miranda,‖ 
id. at 618, because such a tactic ―simply creates too high a risk that postwarning 
statements will be obtained when a suspect was deprived of ‗knowledge essential 
to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of 
abandoning them.‘ ‖  Id. at 621 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 424).  He concluded: 
The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to 
be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step 
strategy was employed.  If the deliberate two-step strategy has been 
used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of 
                                                                                                                                        
majority of the Court could agree.‖); United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 
420, 427 n.11 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing split in circuits as to whether Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurrence is controlling precedent); United States v. Carrizales-
Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (―Determining the proper 
application of the Marks rule to Seibert is not easy, because arguably Justice 
Kennedy‘s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected by a majority of the 
Court.‖).  In Heron, 564 F.3d at 885, the Seventh Circuit recognized that it had not 
settled on a definitive approach to Seibert and held that its more recent decision in 
United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2005), ―may be in some tension 
with our decision in Stewart and Justice Kennedy‘s intent-based test.‖ 
 
- 37 - 
prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are 
taken before the postwarning statement is made.   
Id. at 622.  These curative measures must ―ensure that a reasonable person in the 
suspect‘s situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning 
and of the Miranda waiver.‖  Id.  Justice Kennedy posited that factors such as a 
―substantial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement 
and the Miranda warning may suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the 
accused to distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has 
taken a new turn.‖  Id.  Alternatively, he posited that ―an additional warning that 
explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be 
sufficient.‖  Id. 
From a review of these cases, a tension emerges between two competing 
principles.  On the one hand, suppression of a statement based on an innocent 
good-faith failure to immediately administer Miranda warnings when a defendant 
is in custody would neither serve the purposes of Miranda nor vindicate Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Suppressing truly voluntary and uncoerced statements would 
also not serve the interests of justice.  On the other hand, allowing police to 
deliberately delay administering Miranda warnings with the hope that the 
defendant will confess or make inculpatory statements and then belatedly warn the 
defendant of the rights frustrates the prophylactic rule of Miranda.  Police tactics 
that subject a defendant to repeated accusatorial custodial interrogation heighten 
 
- 38 - 
the risk not only that the confession will be involuntary but also that it may in fact 
be unreliable.   
Based on these principles and our review of the caselaw, we conclude that 
the issue before us is not only whether the police deliberately withheld the Miranda 
warnings in an impermissible ―question first and warn later‖ technique under 
Seibert but whether under the totality of the circumstances the waiver was 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and whether the statements made after the 
waiver were voluntary under Elstad and our own precedent in Ramirez.  The issue 
of involuntariness and coercion directly implicates the defendant‘s constitutional 
right against self-incrimination under both the Fifth Amendment and article I, 
section 9, of the Florida Constitution.  
Focusing on whether the statements were voluntarily given is consistent with 
the holdings in both Elstad and Seibert.  We agree with the dissent that Seibert 
applies once the determination is made that the police deliberately delayed 
administration of the Miranda warnings.  However, the totality of the 
circumstances analysis under Elstad also includes a multiplicity of factors that 
impacts the ultimate determination of voluntariness.  We thus disagree with the 
dissent that administration of the Miranda warnings alone will suffice to render the 
statements admissible, absent a deliberate delay.  The United States Supreme 
Court‘s opinion in Elstad and this Court‘s precedent in Ramirez support an 
 
- 39 - 
application of a totality of the circumstances analysis when warnings are delivered 
midstream during an ongoing interrogation.10  
The caselaw demonstrates that the analysis of the admissibility of statements 
made following a custodial interrogation and after the delayed administration of 
Miranda warnings is based on the totality of the circumstances, with the following 
being factors important in making this determination: (1) whether the police used 
improper and deliberate tactics in delaying the administration of the Miranda 
                                          
 
 
10.  The dissent asserts that Elstad and Seibert are different, coexisting 
standards.  While it is true that a ―deliberate two-step strategy‖ to circumvent 
Miranda is different from a good-faith mistake, the analysis of the factors to be 
considered overlap.  Elstad itself rejected setting forth a rigid rule but rather 
directed courts to examine ―the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of 
police conduct‖ in determining whether the second statement was voluntary.  
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).  In its decision, the United States 
Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that the relevant inquiry is whether the 
second statement was voluntarily made and provided examples of relevant 
circumstances that courts should consider when a prior statement was coerced, 
including ―the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of 
interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators.‖  Id. at 310.  In 
Seibert, the plurality likewise stressed that courts must determine the voluntariness 
of the second statement and resolve whether Miranda warnings, given midstream, 
could effectively inform a defendant as to whether he had a real choice to not talk.  
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612.  The plurality then set forth additional factors that were 
relevant to such an inquiry.  Id. at 615.  After doing so, the plurality reviewed 
Elstad and held that the factual differences in Elstad showed that questioning that 
occurred at the station house in that case was a ―new and distinct experience‖ from 
the brief conversation that occurred at the defendant‘s house, and thus concluded 
that the Miranda warnings given in Elstad did present a genuine choice to the 
defendant.  Id. at 615-16.   
 
- 40 - 
warnings in order to obtain the initial statement;11 (2) whether the police 
minimized and downplayed the significance of the Miranda rights once they were 
given;12 and (3) the circumstances surrounding both the warned and unwarned 
statements including ―the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in 
the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the 
timing and setting of the first and second [interrogations], the continuity of police 
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second 
round as continuous with the first.‖13  In addition, there are other circumstances to 
                                          
 
 
11.  See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (―We must conclude that, absent 
deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere 
fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a 
presumption of compulsion [as to the later statement].‖ (emphasis supplied)). 
 
12.  See Davis, 859 So. 2d at 471 (noting that under Elstad, ―a careful and 
thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that 
made an unwarned statement inadmissible‖); Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574-75 
(holding that postwarning statements had to be suppressed where officers 
employed a concerted effort to minimize and downplay the significance of the 
Miranda rights). 
 
13.  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (reviewing the following factors: ―the 
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of 
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting 
of the first and the second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and 
the degree to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first‖); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310 (―When a prior 
statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change 
in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on 
whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession.‖). 
 
 
- 41 - 
consider on a case-by-case basis, such as the suspect‘s age, experience, 
intelligence, and language proficiency.14 
2.  Application of Law to Facts 
a.  Improper and Deliberate Tactics in Delaying the Miranda Warnings 
First, we review whether the police used improper and deliberate tactics in 
delaying the administration of the Miranda warnings in order to obtain the initial 
statement.  This record in fact affirmatively establishes that, in marked contrast to 
both the United States Supreme Court opinion in Elstad and this Court‘s opinion in 
Davis, the police conducted the January 9 interrogation in a manner that arose from 
a deliberate decision among numerous officers, including the sheriff himself, to 
delay the administration of the Miranda warnings in order to attempt to elicit a 
confession.  As mentioned above, Detective Waldron believed that this would be 
his last opportunity to question Ross before Ross obtained an attorney.  Before the 
interview, the sheriff spoke to Detective Waldron, informing Detective Waldron 
that he was counting on him to ―get closure on this.‖  Detective Waldron and the 
                                          
 
 
14.  See, e.g., Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 515-16 (Fla. 2008) (reviewing 
intelligence as one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights); Chavez v. State, 832 So. 
2d 730, 750 (Fla. 2002) (reviewing defendant‘s understanding of the English 
language and noting that Miranda warnings were given in Spanish as one of the 
circumstances to be considered in determining whether a defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his rights); Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 576 (reviewing age and 
experience in criminal justice system as one of the circumstances to be considered 
in determining whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights). 
 
- 42 - 
sheriff discussed how the interview should be conducted, and the sheriff, along 
with numerous other officers, watched the entire proceeding from another room.   
Further, Detective Waldron testified at trial that he knew his department‘s 
general orders required him to read Miranda rights to a suspect before the 
questioning turned to an accusatory stage.  However, he deliberately chose not to 
follow this policy, asserting that it was merely a guideline.15  In defending this 
decision, Detective Waldron asserted that while the sheriff did not explicitly tell 
him to violate the general policies, the sheriff gave him guidance on how this 
interview should proceed and since the sheriff was watching the entire interview, 
he would have stepped in if he disagreed with the detective‘s decisions.   
Finally, the manner of questioning before Miranda rights were given and the 
length of time that the highly accusatorial questioning lasted demonstrate that this 
delay was deliberate.  See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01, 314 (holding that the 
postwarning statements were admissible where defendant confessed immediately 
after officer informed defendant why the police were questioning him); Davis, 859 
So. 2d at 471 (holding that the postwarning statements were admissible where the 
initial discussion was only ten minutes).  Prior to the time when the Miranda 
                                          
 
15.  We stress in this regard that the mere fact that Detective Waldron 
violated his department‘s procedures, which would have required the Miranda 
warnings sooner than the law may require, is not dispositive of our inquiry.  
Rather, we focus on whether the tactics used in the interrogation were a deliberate 
attempt to wear down Ross‘s resolve and produce a confession, as opposed to a 
good-faith mistake.   
 
- 43 - 
warnings were administered, Detective Waldron constantly accused Ross of 
committing the crimes based on blood found on Ross‘s pants.  After hours of 
intense and highly accusatorial questioning, the police eventually wore down 
Ross‘s will until Ross responded to repeated questioning: ―This is the scary part, 
now I think that I did do it.‖16  The detective repeatedly attempted to elicit a full 
confession from Ross, telling him that confessing to a crime that happened in the 
heat of the moment was different from confessing to a premeditated murder.   
The length of time this interrogation continued without Miranda warnings 
distinguishes this case from Elstad and from Davis.  While the length of time is not 
determinative, it bears noting that cases in which no intentional conduct was found 
involved what appeared to be relatively brief initial interrogations and certainly 
nothing approximating the several hours of custodial interrogation without 
Miranda warnings involved in this case.  
In arguing that the above conduct does not violate either Elstad or Seibert, 
the State relies on the fact that Ross had not made a full confession before Miranda 
warnings were given, asserting that if Detective Waldron was intentionally 
attempting to avoid Miranda, he would have waited until after Ross fully 
                                          
 
 
16.  For example, during this portion of the interrogation, Ross stated, ―You 
made me dig inside and think about it, and you‘ve also given me hard evidence 
that puts me at the crime, and I can‘t—I can‘t—I can‘t—I can‘t remember if I did 
this or not.  I don‘t know.  I mean, you—you have solid evidence, blood on my 
pants and everything, but I don‘t remember doing this, if I did it.‖ 
 
- 44 - 
confessed.17  We have already rejected this argument.  See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 
572, 578 (finding that a midstream Miranda warning violated the defendant‘s 
constitutional rights even though the defendant had only confessed to breaking into 
the victim‘s house prior to the warnings and, subsequent to the warnings, 
confessed to being involved in the murder).  While the detective certainly would 
have preferred to have obtained a complete confession before he administered the 
Miranda warning, he had already obtained multiple damaging admissions over the 
many hours prior to the time the Miranda warnings were given.18  He may have 
believed that Ross would not make any further inculpatory statements. 
A violation of Elstad or Seibert depends not solely on whether a full 
confession was obtained before the warnings were given but also on whether the 
continuing custodial interrogation and delayed administration of Miranda was a 
deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating statements in a coercive manner, 
                                          
 
 
17.  Under the State‘s theory, it could be argued that Ross never actually 
―confessed,‖ since he always maintained that he had no memory of actually 
committing the murders.  His ultimate confession addressed acts that happened 
only after his parents were murdered. 
 
18.  Ross made numerous admissions during this time, each of which was 
followed by denials that he murdered his parents.  For example, he stated, ―I can 
tell you that I didn‘t plan to kill my parents.  I can tell you that I do bottle things 
up, and things that you‘ve said does [sic] make sense.  They do make sense to me, 
that I can have done this.  I could have been so angry, done this.  But I don‘t—I 
can‘t put myself there.  I don‘t remember if I was there, so I can‘t tell you if I did it 
or not.‖ 
 
- 45 - 
undermining the very purpose of Miranda.  Miranda itself addressed ―interrogation 
practices . . . likely . . . to disable [an individual] from making a free and rational 
choice‖ about speaking and prohibited the State from using ―statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination.‖  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 464-65. 
The State also asserts that Detective Waldron did not delay Miranda 
warnings, but merely waited until he received additional incriminating evidence: 
the discovery of a ski mask with blood on it.  This claim of an innocent good-faith 
mistake on the part of Detective Waldron in delaying Miranda warnings until more 
incriminating evidence was received is inconsistent with the facts in the record.  
This case does not involve a situation where only one officer was involved and, 
contrary to the dissent‘s assertion, this determination is not a question solely of 
Detective Waldron‘s credibility but rather a totality of the circumstances inquiry.  
See United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006).19   
                                          
 
19.  The dissent relies on United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 
2008), for its statement that the issue of whether the warnings were deliberately 
withheld is solely a question of credibility, which is a factual finding of the trial 
court entitled to deference.  However, even Stewart acknowledges that there is ―not 
yet a general consensus among the circuits about the standard of review that 
applies to Seibert-deliberateness determinations.‖  Id. at 719. 
 
 
- 46 - 
Further, even under the case law cited by the dissent, the government bears 
the burden of establishing that the delay in administering the Miranda warnings 
was not deliberate.  See United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 741 (2008).  In this case, the trial court determined only that 
there was no evidence submitted to show that the detectives deliberately withheld 
Miranda until after Ross confessed, thus impermissibly shifting the burden of 
proof.  Further, the trial court did not determine the credibility of Detective 
Waldron‘s explanation in light of the totality of the relevant circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation.20   
Even if the trial court had assessed Detective Waldron‘s credibility, a 
finding which would be entitled to deference,21 a determination of the 
deliberateness in delaying warnings does not turn solely on the reasons Detective 
Waldron gave for delaying the administration of the warnings.  Detective Waldron 
                                          
 
 
20.  The majority of the trial court‘s order addresses the January 7 and 
January 8 interviews and whether Ross was in custody prior to being given his 
Miranda warnings.  The trial court concluded that Ross was not in custody, a 
finding with which we disagree. 
 
21.  Although the trial court issued an extensive order regarding the motion 
to suppress, the trial court‘s factual findings as to this issue are minimal.  
Specifically, the court stated, ―There is no evidence that the detectives deliberately 
withheld Miranda until Defendant confessed.‖  The court based this conclusion on 
two statements: (1) Waldron recognized that he was taught to provide Miranda 
warnings when a person is no longer free to leave; and (2) he read Ross his 
Miranda warnings after he learned of the ski mask. 
 
- 47 - 
was the only officer who testified as to why the law enforcement officers failed to 
give Miranda warnings.  However, he was not the only officer involved in the 
decision as to when the Miranda warnings were to be administered.  He consulted 
with his supervisors, was told how to proceed, and conducted the interview as 
requested.  Although he knew his actions in delaying the Miranda warnings were 
contrary to his department‘s general orders, he did not believe that he violated the 
law because he knew the sheriff was watching the interview and relied on his 
belief that the sheriff would stop the interview if the detective‘s interrogation 
violated Ross‘s Miranda rights.     
In addition, this improper questioning lasted for several hours after this point 
and continued in an extremely accusatorial manner where Ross was repeatedly told 
that his denials were not accepted.  Other officers at times entered the room during 
the interrogation and also watched the interrogation from a separate video room.  
In addition, prior to receiving the ski mask, the police had the following 
incriminatory evidence: Ross‘s recent admissions that it was possible that he killed 
his parents, Ross‘s bloody pants, evidence that Ross was attempting to take his 
mother‘s money, and prior incriminating statements from Ross.  
 
- 48 - 
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that rather than merely making a 
good-faith mistake, the police used improper and deliberate tactics in delaying the 
administration of the Miranda warnings in order to obtain the initial statement.22   
b.  Significance of Miranda Rights Minimized and Downplayed 
                                          
 
22.  Our conclusion is further supported by decisions of other courts that 
have been similarly troubled by clear custodial interrogations that occurred without 
providing Miranda warnings first and thus have concluded that police deliberately 
delayed providing Miranda warnings in order to obtain incriminating statements.  
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that after law enforcement detains a suspect and subjects him to interrogation, 
―there is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason to delay giving a Miranda warning until 
after the suspect has confessed‖ unless the interrogator wants to weaken the 
warning‘s effectiveness); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 
2006) (holding that the delay in not providing Miranda warnings was deliberate 
where police chief interrogated suspect until obtaining a confession and an 
agreement to provide a written confession and only then provided Miranda 
warnings); Edwards v. United States, 923 A.2d 840, 849 (D.C. 2007) (holding that 
the delay was deliberate where the detective acknowledged that suspect was in 
custody, asked questions he knew could lead to incriminating answers, and knew 
the suspect had not been given his Miranda warnings); People v. Lopez, 892 
N.E.2d 1047, 1070-71 (Ill. 2008) (holding that although the detectives explicitly 
denied using the ―question first, warn later‖ technique, they deliberately engaged in 
an improper two-step interrogation by questioning a suspect without providing 
Miranda warnings when they acknowledged that the suspect would not have been 
free to leave the police station if he had attempted to do so); State v. Dailey, 273 
S.W.3d 94, 109-10 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that the delay was deliberate despite the 
fact that officers testified that they did not provide Miranda rights because they 
were not yet arresting the suspect based on the following factors: (1) police called 
the suspect to the police station under false pretenses; (2) although the officers 
asserted the suspect was not under arrest, they failed to advise the defendant that he 
was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time; and (3) after he 
confessed and was provided with Miranda rights, they failed to inform him that his 
initial statement was inadmissible against him). 
 
- 49 - 
We next review whether the police minimized and downplayed the 
significance of the Miranda rights once they were given.  This factor is important 
to ensure that a suspect who is provided with a tardy administration of the Miranda 
warnings truly understands the importance and the effect of the Miranda warnings 
in light of the problems faced when warnings are delivered midstream.  While a 
―careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the 
condition that made an unwarned statement inadmissible,‖ Davis, 859 So. 2d at 
471, where police minimize and downplay the significance of the warnings, the 
very purpose of Miranda is undermined.  See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 576. 
As Justice Kennedy explained in Seibert, if a deliberate two-step strategy is 
employed, then the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative 
measures are taken that will ―ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect‘s 
situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the 
Miranda waiver.‖  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis supplied).  As the Seibert plurality similarly stated, when 
Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing 
interrogation, ―they are likely to mislead and ‗depriv[e] a [suspect] of knowledge 
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences 
of abandoning them.‘ ‖  Id. at 613-14 (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (first alteration 
in original) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 424). 
 
- 50 - 
For the reasons addressed below, we conclude that the significance of the 
Miranda rights was minimized and downplayed based on the following facts: (1) 
prior to providing Ross with his Miranda rights, Detective Waldron minimized the 
significance of the rights by asserting they were only a matter of procedure; (2) 
prior to the warnings, the detective lulled Ross into a false sense of security by 
asserting that he was not arresting him at that time; (3) when Ross indicated a 
hesitancy in talking, the detective did not stop the interrogation immediately; and 
(4) rather than informing Ross that his prior incriminating statements could not be 
used against him, Ross was reminded about his earlier admissions, implying that 
exercising the right to remain silent would be futile. 
Immediately prior to providing Ross with his Miranda rights, Detective 
Waldron stated to Ross:  
Waldron:  There‘s a couple of things that I need to go over with you 
real quick.  There‘s a couple of things I discovered, and before we go 
any further I want to cover this with you, it‘s just a matter of 
procedure, um, based on everything we‘re talking about.   
 
 
Ross:  So am I being arrested? 
Waldron:  Nope.  At this time you and I are talking, okay?  And I 
would like to talk to you some more.  But before I can do that I need 
to go over this.  You‘re not in handcuffs or anything like that, okay?  
  
This strategy, employed after the hours of unwarned interrogation, de-
emphasized the significance of the Miranda warnings.  By referring to it as a 
matter of procedure, the detective conveyed the clear impression that the warnings 
 
- 51 - 
were merely a bureaucratic formality.  After making the remarks to Ross, 
Detective Waldron then showed Ross a written Miranda form and told Ross, ―I got 
to read this to you, Blaine.‖  The following colloquy ensued:  
Waldron: Having these rights in mind you wish to talk to us now? 
Ross: I don‘t—I can‘t tell you anything different.[23] 
Waldron: And that‘s up to you. 
Ross. So, I‘m –  
Waldron: I can‘t make your decision for you.  
Ross: I want—I‘d really like to talk to my sister, and since she‘s not 
here—  
Waldron: We tried to get in touch with her, get her back here. 
Ross: I don‘t know what I‘m going to do. I don‘t know what‘s going 
to happen, and— 
Waldron: Well, I‘m willing to talk to you if you want. We‘re trying to 
get in touch with your sister now[24] so—you‘re indicating that you do 
want to talk to me; correct? 
Ross: Yes. 
                                          
 
 
23.  Although Ross raised the claim that police failed to abide by his 
invocation of the right to remain silent, he did not raise this particular incident, but 
points to a later portion in the interrogation where he alleges that he invoked his 
right to remain silent.  However, we consider how Detective Waldron responded to 
this statement as a part of our determination of whether Detective Waldron 
minimized or downplayed the significance of the Miranda rights, as addressed 
below.  
24.  In actuality, as Waldron testified at trial, he was not trying to get in 
touch with Ross‘s sister.  
 
 
- 52 - 
Waldron: Okay, if you would, please sign right there.  
After having Ross sign the waiver of Miranda warnings, Detective Waldron then 
asked Ross about a ski mask that they found in his car with blood on it, and Ross 
provided an innocent explanation for the ski mask.25  At that point, the interview 
turned back to their prior discussion.  Detective Waldron reminded Ross of his 
prior statements as follows: 
Like I was saying before, earlier, there‘s a lot of things that happened 
today, and there‘s a lot of things that have come at you, and a lot of 
things that you‘ve admitted to now, that you‘ve kept bottled up inside 
before, hidden, that you‘re now having to deal with.  I know this is 
very difficult.  I do know that you loved your parents. 
(Emphasis supplied.)   
Detective Waldron continued his prior line of questioning that was 
established before the warnings without any break in the interrogation.  He asked 
many of the same or similar questions.  He played on the same themes and 
employed many of the same techniques, such as stressing that he would not think 
less of Ross and that he had compassion and understanding because he knew 
people have tempers and can hurt those they love.26   
                                          
 
25.  The ski mask in fact was not related to the murder and was not used at 
trial. 
 
 
26.  For example, shortly after reminding Ross as to his prior admissions, he 
told Ross: 
 
- 53 - 
Ross initially asserted that he did not believe that he committed the murders 
and asserted that he did not think he had anything else to say: 
Ross: Well, I told you—you—you‘re right, about a lot of things.  I, I, 
I don‘t think I did this.  I don‘t know—(unintelligible) 
Waldron: I know you say you don‘t think you did this, but there‘s the 
blood on your pants.  This wasn‘t a burglary, somebody who broke 
into that house. 
Ross: I don‘t think I can help you anymore.  I don‘t think I have 
anything else to say.[27] 
In response, Detective Waldron stressed that Ross had to make this ―right,‖ 
that the evidence already told a story as to what happened, and that Ross had to 
make it right by accepting responsibility for his actions.  After he brought up the 
                                                                                                                                        
And that‘s why I‘m capable of having some understanding and 
feelings and compassion.  And that‘s why I‘m talking to you this way.  
Okay?  You‘re a human being.  As human beings we make mistakes.  
Unfortunately we hurt people, and we hurt people we don‘t mean to.  
We have tempers, we lose control, we do things that we later regret.  
And also being human, we‘re allowed to go forward from those 
mistakes. . . .  And I know what it is to hurt, the same as you do. 
 
27.  Ross asserts that this was an attempt to invoke his right to remain silent.  
This statement in isolation would be an equivocal invocation of his right to remain 
silent, which does not require the interrogation to stop.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 
696 So. 2d 715, 717 n.4, 718 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the statements ―I‘d rather 
not talk about it‖ and ―I don‘t want to talk about it‖ were equivocal and, thus, the 
police had no duty to clarify the suspect‘s intent and could proceed with the 
interrogation).  However, we consider Ross‘s statements and Detective Waldron‘s 
responses as part of the totality of the circumstances as to whether Ross‘s waiver 
was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
   
 
- 54 - 
bloody pants again and discussed additional inferences that he could make based 
on the crime scene, Ross confessed that he killed his parents. 
 As the record establishes, Detective Waldron minimized the significance of 
the warning when it was given by telling Ross that reading the rights was ―just a 
matter of procedure.‖  Further, when Ross asked whether he was going to be 
arrested, Detective Waldron told him not at that time.  However, based on 
statements made during the evidentiary hearing, Detective Waldron clearly knew 
he had probable cause to arrest Ross at that time and thus his statements to the 
contrary were an attempt to lull Ross into a false sense of security.  Specifically, 
Detective Waldron stated that he did not provide Miranda warnings earlier because 
he did not believe that he had probable cause to arrest Ross, and that once he had 
probable cause it would have been necessary to administer the Miranda warnings.28  
According to Detective Waldron, it was the discovery of the ski mask that 
allegedly provided this probable cause and prompted Detective Waldron to advise 
Ross as to his rights.  Yet at this very point during the interrogation, when Ross 
asked if he was being arrested, Detective Waldron explicitly denied it, telling Ross 
that he was not being arrested at that time but that they were merely ―talking.‖   
                                          
 
 
28.  Of course, administration of the Miranda warnings does not depend on 
whether there is probable cause to arrest the individual, but on whether the 
interrogation is custodial. 
 
- 55 - 
We have previously found troubling such attempts to lull a defendant into a 
false sense of security.  See Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 576-77 (finding that the police 
had lulled a young defendant into a ―false sense of security‖ which was ―calculated 
to delude him as to his true position‖ when officers denied they were arresting the 
defendant at the time Miranda warnings were given, despite having ―ample 
probable cause‖).  In addition, when Ross first hesitated about his desire to talk to 
the detective and said he did not wish to talk, Detective Waldron did not 
immediately stop the interrogation.29  Instead, the detective continued in his 
request for Ross to talk with him, letting him know that he understood that the 
decision belonged to Ross, that he would not make Ross‘s decision for him, that he 
was attempting to locate Ross‘s sister, and that he was still ―willing‖ to talk to him.  
Finally, prior to resuming the interrogation relating to the bloody pants, 
rather than informing Ross that his prior admissions could not be used against him, 
Detective Waldron did the opposite, reminding Ross about everything that 
happened that day and that there were ―a lot of things that [Ross] admitted to 
now.‖  Detective Waldron continued his prior questioning without any break from 
the prewarning interrogation, playing on the same themes and using the same 
tactics as earlier.  Based on the tactics used and the fact that Detective Waldron 
                                          
 
29.  As addressed above, after Detective Waldron finally provided Ross with 
his Miranda rights, he asked Ross whether Ross wished to talk to police, and Ross 
replied, ―I don‘t—I can‘t tell you anything different.‖  
 
- 56 - 
reminded Ross about his admissions immediately after providing him with his 
Miranda warnings, Ross would likely have had the misimpression that his prior 
incriminating statements could be used against him.  Such a tactic downplayed the 
significance of the Miranda warnings.  
We conclude that in contrast to Davis and more similar to Ramirez, the 
police minimized and downplayed the significance of the Miranda rights once they 
were finally administered.  In Seibert, the plurality stressed the danger of providing 
Miranda warnings in the middle of an interrogation, particularly after incriminating 
statements have already been made: 
Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just 
after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a 
genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once 
the police began to lead him over the same ground again.  A more 
likely reaction on a suspect‘s part would be perplexity about the 
reason for discussing rights at that point, bewilderment being an 
unpromising frame of mind for knowledgeable decision.  What is 
worse, telling a suspect that ―anything you say can and will be used 
against you,‖ without expressly excepting the statement just given, 
could lead to an entirely reasonable inference that what he has just 
said will be used, with subsequent silence being of no avail.   
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 (footnote omitted). 
Similarly in this case, when Ross was finally given his Miranda warnings, he 
was told, ―Anything you say may be used against you in a court of law.‖  Ross 
could have reasonably believed that all of his prior statements would be admissible 
regardless as to what he said in the future.  Thus, providing Miranda warnings at 
 
- 57 - 
this point to Ross could have misled Ross about the consequences of the decision 
to abandon his rights.  If Ross believed that what he stated in the previous few 
hours could have been used against him, any attempt to invoke his ―right‖ to 
remain silent would have been futile.   
As we have made clear, any waiver must be ―the product of free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception . . . and must 
have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.‖  Ramirez, 739 So. 
2d at 575 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421).  Based on all of the circumstances 
regarding the delay in administering Miranda and the manner of administering 
Miranda, we conclude that the officers minimized and downplayed the significance 
of the warnings so as to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda. 
c.  Circumstances Surrounding Both the Warned and Unwarned Statements 
Finally, as addressed in both Elstad and Seibert, courts review the 
circumstances surrounding both the warned and unwarned statements including 
―the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of 
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting 
of the first and second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and the 
degree to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second round as continuous 
with the first.‖  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615; see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310 (also 
 
- 58 - 
directing that courts examine the surrounding circumstances when the initial 
statement is actually coerced, including ―the time that passes between confessions, 
the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the 
interrogators‖).   
The circumstances surrounding the warned and unwarned circumstances in 
Elstad are different from those in this case.  In Elstad the defendant had first been 
questioned in the living room of his house with his mother close by.  He was then 
taken to the sheriff‘s headquarters where full Miranda warnings were given and 
where no threats or promises were made. 
In contrast to Elstad, in this case, the accusatory questioning on January 9 
took place in the same small room where Ross had previously been for hours, 
during which he had already made incriminatory statements.  He was questioned 
not only in the same place, but by the same law enforcement officer, and the 
substance of the questioning was the same.  The questioning was nothing more 
than one continuous round of interrogation with no meaningful break.  Moreover, 
as emphasized above, after providing Miranda warnings, Detective Waldron again 
reminded Ross of his prior admissions, which also shows that the second round of 
questioning was treated as continuous with the first round.  Thus, the first and 
second interrogations (if they can be divided) were conducted in the same manner, 
 
- 59 - 
in the same room, with the same officers, with only a very short break in between.  
This is the very problem noted by the Seibert plurality: 
Thus, when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated 
and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and ―depriv[e] 
a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the 
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.‖ 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986).  By the same token, it 
would ordinarily be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and 
proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations 
subject to independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings 
formally punctuate them in the middle. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613-14.  This danger was present under the facts of this case, 
particularly in light of the fact that the interrogation consisted of ―integrated and 
proximately conducted questioning‖ with no meaningful break and with constant 
reminders of the preceding multihour interrogation. 
d.  Conclusion as to Whether Confession Was Voluntary 
While police eventually provided Ross with his complete Miranda warnings, 
the timing and circumstances of the warnings undermined the intent and 
effectiveness of Miranda, particularly in light of the following: (1) the initial 
Miranda warnings were deliberately delayed and no warnings were given until 
after Ross made incriminating statements; (2) police downplayed the significance 
of the Miranda rights and misled Ross by assuring him that he was not being 
arrested ―at the time‖ despite the incriminating evidence and Ross‘s prior 
statements; (3) before continuing the postwarning interrogation, the police 
 
- 60 - 
reminded Ross about his earlier admissions; (4) police did nothing to counter the 
probable misimpression that Ross‘s prior incriminating statements could be used 
against him; and (5) police treated the pre- and postwarning interrogation as one 
continuing round of questioning with only a minimal break but no change in 
circumstances.  In addition, we also take into account that Ross was only twenty-
one at the time with no indication of any prior experience with the criminal justice 
system. 
As we explained, the danger of police engaging in the type of tactics 
exhibited in this case is not only that the prophylactic purpose of Miranda is 
undermined but that the confession itself is unreliable.  Dr. DeClue, Ross‘s false 
confession expert, explained the factors that increase likelihood of false 
confessions, many of which were present in Ross‘s case, such as increasing the 
pressure, exaggerating evidence, challenging a person‘s memory, continuing an 
interrogation for a lengthy amount of time, showing photographs of the crime 
scene, and using isolation.  The very fact that Ross confessed that he might have 
taken his mother‘s jewelry when in fact the evidence reveals that Kathleen Ross 
herself had actually taken the jewelry from her house and placed it in her mother‘s 
house highlights this danger.  
Miranda was designed to combat pressures in custodial interrogations and 
holds that ―to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
 
- 61 - 
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his 
rights.‖  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  The inquiry when Miranda warnings are 
delayed, after a lengthy custodial interrogation, is whether the warnings functioned 
effectively to apprise the defendant that he or she has the ―right to choose between 
silence and speech.‖  Id. at 469.  When the Miranda warnings are purposely 
delayed after hours of custodial interrogation, when Miranda warnings are given in 
such a way as to minimize and downplay their significance, and when the 
postwarning interrogation is treated as a continuation of the prewarning 
interrogation, the risk is that the suspect will not understand the rights and the 
consequences of waiving the rights.  The risk is that the very purpose of Miranda is 
undermined and that the warnings will not function effectively as Miranda 
requires.  
In conclusion, the State must prove that the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that the postwarning 
statements were voluntary.  Here, the State did not meet that burden based on an 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.  We reach this conclusion both under 
an analysis of Elstad and Seibert and under our precedent in Ramirez.  Thus, the 
statements provided after the Miranda warnings were likewise required to be 
suppressed. 
C. Harmless Error Analysis 
 
- 62 - 
The conclusion that the multiple statements given by Ross on January 9 
should have been suppressed does not end our inquiry.  Our caselaw provides that 
―[t]he erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights is 
subject to harmless error analysis.‖  Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 644 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1988)). 
 In State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), this Court set forth the 
harmless error test, which 
places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.  
Application of the test requires an examination of the entire record by 
the appellate court including a close examination of the permissible 
evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied, and in 
addition an even closer examination of the impermissible evidence 
which might have possibly influenced the jury verdict. 
Id. at 1135 (citation omitted).  As DiGuilio emphasizes, ―harmless error analysis 
must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for the 
jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and 
determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on 
the permissible evidence.‖  Id. at 1136.  In fact, DiGuilio emphasizes that 
constitutional errors such as comments on the right to remain silent are ―high risk 
errors because there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will 
vitiate the right to a fair trial by influencing the jury verdict.‖  Id.  
 
- 63 - 
Certainly, in this case, there was evidence of the defendant‘s guilt, including 
physical evidence.  However, the statements that the defendant made on January 9 
were relied on by the State to prove his guilt and repeatedly emphasized.  The 
defendant, in his defense, attempted to show that the confession was a product of 
coercion by introducing the testimony of Dr. DeClue.  In this case, we are unable 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that 
the substantial admissions heard by the jury did not contribute to the first-degree 
murder convictions.  Compare Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 571-72, 577 (concluding 
that erroneous admission of confession could not be deemed harmless error despite 
strong evidence against Ramirez, including that the codefendant had confessed and 
identified defendant and the police recorded a call where the codefendant and 
Ramirez discussed the physical evidence and planned to destroy it), and Thompson 
v. State, 595 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1992) (concluding that erroneous admission of 
confession could not be deemed harmless error because based on the evidence, the 
court could not state beyond a reasonable doubt that the impermissible admission 
of the confession did not affect the jury‘s verdict), with Alvord v. Dugger, 541 So. 
2d 598, 600-01 (Fla. 1989) (finding the erroneous admission of statements based 
on an improper Miranda warning was harmless because the statements were not 
the principal part of the State‘s case but were cumulative to significant evidence 
from numerous witnesses, including ―primary evidence‖ presented by the 
 
- 64 - 
defendant‘s girlfriend, who testified that the defendant admitted that he killed all 
the victims and described the crime).  Under the circumstances of this case, the 
State is unable to sustain its heavy burden.  We thus find that the convictions for 
robbery and first-degree murder must be reversed.   
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse Ross‘s convictions for robbery and 
first-degree murder and vacate his sentences of death.  We remand this case to the 
trial court with directions that a new trial be conducted without introducing the 
portions of the statements of January 9 after the officers confronted Ross with the 
bloody pants. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion. 
POLSTON J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
QUINCE, C.J., specially concurring, 
 
I concur in the majority opinion because the police interrogation technique 
used in this case was a deliberate attempt to get an admission/confession before the 
defendant exercised his rights.  The Seibert-type technique used in this case is one 
that we have been seeing with more frequency.  I believe it is a technique that may 
 
- 65 - 
put in jeopardy prosecutions that might otherwise not be reversible on appeal.  In 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion), the United States 
Supreme Court explained the significance of Miranda30 warnings.  The Court 
indicated that a tactic that is designed ―to get a confession the suspect would not 
make if he understood his rights,‖ Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613, was unconstitutional 
because such tactics thwart the purpose for which Miranda was designed — to 
reduce the risk of coerced confessions.  See id. at 611-12. 
 Recently, in McWatters v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly S169 (Fla. Mar. 18, 
2010), we addressed another situation where the police used a similar albeit 
different kind of technique to attempt to undermine the effectiveness of the 
Miranda warnings.  In McWatters, the police read the suspect his Miranda rights in 
conjunction with questioning for an offense unrelated to the murder and sexual 
battery case.  McWatters was not questioned after the warnings were given but was 
instead taken to the police station and placed in a room which contained evidence 
relating to the murder case.  He was later told that he had been taken to the wrong 
room; he was then paraded through the police station past witnesses related to the 
murder case.  Although we found that the defendant knowingly waived his rights, 
it was of concern that the police used this technique, especially given the fact that 
                                          
 
 
30.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
- 66 - 
the officer admitted that the ruse was being used to keep McWatters from invoking 
his rights. 
 
In this case, the officer likewise testified that he knew the interview on 
January 9 would be his last opportunity to get an uncounselled statement from the 
defendant.  Therefore, the officer boxed the defendant into a small interrogation 
room with other officers coming in and out, he would not allow Ross to leave, and 
all the while the officer was telling Ross he was not under arrest.  Yet at the same 
time the officer was continually confronting Ross with evidence against him.  It is 
obvious that under the circumstances the defendant was NOT free to leave; thus 
Miranda warnings should have been given at that point.  It was only after Ross 
made some incriminating statements that Miranda warnings were given.  And even 
after the warnings were given, the officer downplayed their significance by making 
it seem as if the warnings were only a formality that the officer had to comply 
with.31  
 
Seibert recognized that this type of ―question-first‖ tactic is in direct conflict 
with the underlying purpose of the Miranda warnings.  See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 
                                          
 
 
31.  Although the defendant does not challenge his statement based on the 
invocation of his rights, there is also some question here as to whether or not the 
defendant invoked his right to silence after the reading of the warnings.  When 
asked if he wished to waive the rights and talk with the officer, the defendant said, 
―I don‘t – I can‘t tell you anything different.‖  However, the officer continued to 
talk with Ross, and Ross thereafter gave other incriminating statements. 
 
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611.  It is worth noting that both the interrogation here and the interrogation in 
McWatters took place before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seibert.  
However, if police continue to use these types of techniques in circumstances 
where it is clear that the focus of any investigation has turned to the defendant and 
Miranda warnings should be given, I fear that we will have more cases that will be 
reversed on appeal. 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
After holding an evidentiary hearing that produced more than 1,000 pages of 
transcript, the trial court found that the police officers in this case did not 
deliberately withhold Miranda warnings.  This finding of fact is supported by 
competent substantial evidence in the record.  Because of this finding of fact, the 
standard enunciated in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), applies here.  The 
majority‘s holding is contrary to the well-settled Florida law that Elstad applies in 
these circumstances.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 990 So. 2d 459, 466 (Fla. 2008).  
Under the Elstad standard, Ross‘s confession after the Miranda warnings is 
admissible.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.32 
                                          
 
 
32.  I agree with the majority that the statements made by Ross on January 9, 
once he was confronted with the evidence of blood on his pants, but before the 
Miranda warnings were given, are inadmissible.  However, that error was 
harmless.  Before the Miranda warnings on January 9, Ross did not confess.  
Rather, Ross merely admitted that, because he could not remember, it was possible 
that he killed his parents, but that he did not believe that he had done so.  There is 
 
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I.  The Officers Did Not Deliberately Withhold Miranda 
 
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accurately explained, ―[t]he 
question of whether the interrogating officer deliberately withheld Miranda 
warnings will invariably turn on the credibility of the officer‘s testimony in light of 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.  This is a factual 
finding entitled to deference on appeal . . . .‖  United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 
714, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2008).  Moreover, as this Court has explained, ―[a]n 
appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress presumes that a trial 
court‘s findings of fact are correct and reverses those findings only if they are not 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.‖  Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 
160 (Fla. 2007) (citing Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001)). 
 
Here, the trial court‘s finding that the officers did not deliberately withhold 
Miranda warnings is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.  
For example, Detective Waldron testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was 
trained by the Manatee County Sheriff‘s Office to read a suspect the Miranda 
warnings ―[a]t a point in time where a person‘s not going to be free, their 
movements are restricted and they‘re not just free to get up and walk out.‖  And, 
                                                                                                                                        
not a reasonable possibility that these equivocal statements affected the verdict 
given the admissible evidence in this case, including his parents‘ blood on his 
pants and his confession after the Miranda warnings.   
 
- 69 - 
when asked on cross-examination why he waited until the latter part of January 9 
to read Ross his Miranda rights, Detective Waldron responded as follows: 
Earlier on there still was insufficient evidence or enough in my mind 
probable cause to charge Blaine Ross.  And he had requested to talk 
about what had been discussed on the news and the news media, so 
my intention was to answer his questions and to try to see if his 
statement wavered at all from what his previous statement was.  And 
then if there was any indication or inconsistencies or anything 
incriminating, then at that point in time I felt there would be probable 
cause to arrest him, which would necessitate the reading of Miranda. 
Additionally, the record reflects that Detective Waldron read Ross the 
Miranda warnings after learning that a bloody ski mask had been discovered in 
Ross‘ car, evidence that Detective Waldron thought provided probable cause at the 
time.  After a break and immediately before advising Ross of his Miranda rights, 
Detective Waldron reentered the interview room and stated to Ross, ―There‘s a 
couple of things that I discovered, and before we go any further I want to cover this 
with you . . . .‖  Once Detective Waldron fully explained Ross‘ rights, ensured that 
Ross understood his rights, and Ross waived those rights, Detective Waldron 
immediately proceeded to ask Ross about the ski mask that the police found in his 
car.  Accordingly, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to support 
the trial court‘s factual finding that the officers did not deliberately delay Miranda 
warnings and did not engage in a calculated strategy to secure an unwarned 
confession that could then be used to secure a warned confession. 
 
- 70 - 
Instead of deferring to this factual finding, the majority extensively reweighs 
the evidence and reevaluates the credibility of Detective Waldron.  For example, 
the majority recognizes that at the evidentiary hearing ―Detective Waldron stated 
that he did not provide Miranda warnings earlier because he did not believe that he 
had probable cause to arrest Ross.‖  Majority op. at 54.  However, despite this 
testimony that supports the trial court‘s finding of fact, the majority concludes that 
―Detective Waldron clearly knew he had probable cause to arrest Ross at that 
time.‖  Id.  The majority reaches its contrary finding, which evaluates the 
credibility of Detective Waldron‘s testimony, by focusing upon a supposed conflict 
between Detective Waldron telling Ross during questioning that Ross was not 
under arrest and Detective Waldron‘s evidentiary hearing testimony that that he did 
not believe he had probable cause until the discovery of the bloody ski mask in 
Ross‘ car.  Id.  (―According to Detective Waldron, it was the discovery of the ski 
mask that allegedly provided this probable cause and prompted Detective Waldron 
to advise Ross as to his rights.  Yet at this very point during the interrogation, 
when Ross asked if he was being arrested, Detective Waldron explicitly denied it . 
. . .‖).  Of course, a police officer‘s intent during questioning a suspect often 
conflicts with what the police officer actually tells the suspect.  See, e.g., Davis v. 
State, 859 So. 2d 465, 472 (Fla. 2003) (finding a confession voluntary even though 
defendant claimed officers stated that they were investigating a missing person‘s 
 
- 71 - 
case when the officers were actually investigating a murder).  However, in this 
case, the conflict that the majority reaches is not even a conflict.  A police officer 
can have probable cause to arrest a suspect, but not formally place the suspect 
under arrest.   
Further, the majority gives great weight to testimony that it was the 
department‘s policy to administer Miranda warnings once questioning took on an 
accusatory nature.  See majority op. at 42.  However, the majority apparently 
discounts other testimony regarding the policy that was before the trial court 
charged with making factual findings.  Specifically, while both Detective Waldron 
and another officer testified that there was a ―general order‖ that stated that 
Miranda warnings were to be provided once accusatory questioning occurred, both 
also testified that ―general orders‖ are guidelines and not requirements.  In fact, 
when specifically asked on cross-examination whether he had been trained to 
administer Miranda warnings once accusatory questioning took place, Detective 
Waldron stated that he was taught that it depends upon the particular 
circumstances.  Detective Waldron also testified that the manner in which he 
questioned Ross did not violate department policy.   
It was improper for the majority to discard the trial court‘s factual finding 
regarding deliberateness and reevaluate the evidence for itself, particularly since 
this factual finding is heavily based upon a determination of Detective Waldron‘s 
 
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credibility.  See Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976) (―[T]he function of 
the trial court is to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based upon its 
observation of the bearing, demeanor and credibility of the witnesses appearing in 
the cause.  It is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence . . . .‖).  
Whether this Court properly defers to the trial court‘s deliberateness finding is 
important in this case because it determines whether this Court properly applies the 
standard from Elstad or erroneously applies the standard from Missouri v. Seibert, 
542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
II.  Elstad Applies, Not Seibert 
In Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
failure to provide Miranda warnings before an uncoerced confession does not 
necessarily render a second and warned statement inadmissible.33  Rather, the 
admissibility of the second statement is governed by whether the subsequent 
waiver was voluntary and knowing.  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.  If a defendant is fully 
informed of and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights, the statement after the 
Miranda warnings is admissible.  See Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1189 (Fla. 
                                          
 
 
33.  In this case, on January 9, Ross went to the police station on his own 
and voluntarily met with Detective Waldron.  In fact, prior to this meeting, Ross 
had left several phone messages for Detective Waldron indicating his desire to 
discuss the case with the detective.  Therefore, Ross‘ statements on January 9 prior 
to the Miranda warnings were uncoerced.   
 
- 73 - 
1997) (―Shortly after confessing in his holding cell, Davis gave a taped statement 
in which he voluntarily gave the same information contained in his prior statement 
. . . .  This [second] statement was clearly admissible because Davis was fully 
informed of (and waived) his Miranda rights before the start of the taping session.‖ 
(citing Elstad, 470 U.S. 298)).  Whether the second statement was voluntary 
requires a review of the totality of the circumstances.  See Ramirez v. State, 739 
So. 2d 568, 575-76 (Fla. 1999) (applying Elstad).  
The United States Supreme Court addressed this area of the law again in 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600.  The United States Supreme Court held that a second 
confession was inadmissible when a police officer intentionally questioned a 
suspect without administering Miranda in order to elicit an unwarned confession 
that was then used to elicit a second warned confession.  The plurality explained 
the following: 
The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is 
. . .  whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances 
the warnings could function ―effectively‖ as Miranda requires.  Could 
the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice 
about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?  Could they 
reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had 
talked earlier? 
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12.  The plurality then listed several factors to assist in 
determining whether the Miranda warnings were effective:   
the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first 
round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, 
 
- 74 - 
the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of 
police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator‘s questions 
treated the second round as continuous with the first. 
Id. at 615.  However, Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert is dispositive as he 
provided the necessary fifth vote and the narrowest grounds.  See Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).  Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence 
that he ―would apply a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case.‖  
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy set forth the following test: 
The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to 
be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step 
strategy was employed.  If the deliberate two-step strategy has been 
used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of 
prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are 
taken before the postwarning statement is made.  Curative measures 
should be designed to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect‘s 
situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda 
warning and of the Miranda waiver.  For example, a substantial break 
in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement and the 
Miranda warning may suffice in most circumstances, as it allows the 
accused to distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that the 
interrogation has taken a new turn.  Cf. Westover v. United States, 
decided with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Alternatively, 
an additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the 
prewarning custodial statement may be sufficient. 
Id.  
 
 
The majority is improperly mixing the Elstad and Seibert standards together; 
rather, these are separate standards applicable in different circumstances.  See, e.g., 
majority op. at 57 (―[A]s addressed in both Elstad and Seibert, courts review the 
circumstances surrounding both the warned and unwarned statements including 
 
- 75 - 
‗the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of 
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting 
of the first and the second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and 
the degree to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second round as 
continuous with the first.‘ ‖ (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (plurality opinion) 
and citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310); majority op. at 39-40 (―The caselaw 
demonstrates that the analysis of the admissibility of statements made following a 
custodial interrogation and after the delayed administration of Miranda warnings is 
one of the totality of the circumstances, with the following being factors important 
in making this determination:  (1) whether the police used improper and deliberate 
tactics in delaying the administration of the Miranda warnings in order to obtain 
the initial statement; (2) whether the police minimized and downplayed the 
significance of the Miranda rights once they were given; and (3) the circumstances 
surrounding both the warned and unwarned statements including ‗the completeness 
and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the 
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and 
the second [interrogations], the continuity of the police personnel, and the degree 
to which the interrogator‘s questions treated the second round as continuous with 
the first.‘ ‖ (footnotes omitted) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314; Davis, 859 So. 2d at 
471 and quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (plurality opinion)). 
 
- 76 - 
It is important to recognize that the standard enunciated in Elstad and the 
standard enunciated in Seibert are different, coexisting standards.  As Justice 
Kennedy‘s opinion in Seibert explains, ―[t]he admissibility of postwarning 
statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the 
deliberate two-step strategy was employed.‖  Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Elstad solely requires an inquiry into whether the 
defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before the second 
confession.  See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (―Though Miranda requires that the 
unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent 
statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and 
voluntarily made.‖).  In contrast, the Seibert standard presumes that the Miranda 
warnings before the second confession were ineffective.  See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 
617 (―These circumstances must be seen as challenging the comprehensibility and 
efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the 
suspect‘s shoes would not have understood them to convey a message that she 
retained a choice about continuing to talk.‖); Id. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(―As Justice Souter points out, the two-step technique permits the accused to 
conclude that the right not to respond did not exist when the earlier incriminating 
statements were made.‖).  Due to this presumption, the Seibert standard as 
enunciated in Justice Kennedy‘s dispositive concurrence includes an inquiry into 
 
- 77 - 
the additional ―curative‖ factors listed above (such as the break in time and 
circumstances between the first and second statements), which are beyond the 
voluntariness inquiry required by Elstad.   
It is well-settled under Florida law that we apply Elstad as distinct from 
Seibert.  This Court held in Davis v. State, 990 So. 2d 459, 466 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)), that 
we apply Elstad unless officers used ―the question-first method ‗in a calculated 
way to undermine the Miranda warning.‘ ‖  Specifically, in Davis, 990 So. 2d at 
464-66, this Court addressed the postconviction argument that the defendant‘s 
confession was taken in violation of Seibert.  However, because the officers did not 
deliberately withhold Miranda in a calculated attempt to undermine the warnings, 
this Court held that Elstad applied to the defendant‘s confession, not Seibert.  
Davis, 990 So. 2d at 466; see also Tengbergen v. State, 9 So. 3d 729, 735 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2009) (―[U]nless the officers deliberately withheld warnings, Elstad controls 
Tengbergen‘s Miranda claim.‖); Jump v. State, 983 So. 2d 726, 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2008) (―[T]hese principles of Elstad continue to control ‗unless the deliberate two-
step strategy was employed.‘ ‖ (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment)); State v. Lebron, 979 So. 2d 1093, 1096-97 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2008) (―Justice Kennedy went on to say, ‗The admissibility of postwarning 
statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the 
 
- 78 - 
deliberate two-step strategy was employed.‘  That portion of Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurrence is decisive here, for there was no deliberate use of the two-step 
strategy under the circumstances of the present case.‖ (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 
622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))); State v. Pitts, 936 So. 2d 1111, 
1136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (―When we consider the interrogation of Pitts under the 
test articulated in Seibert by Justice Kennedy, we can readily conclude that Pitts‘ 
post-Miranda statements should not be suppressed.  The record before us does not 
show that ‗the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to 
undermine the Miranda warning.‘ ‖ (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment))).   
The Seventh Circuit aptly summarized the state of the law regarding two 
confessions with an intervening Miranda waiver as follows: 
What emerges from the split opinions in Seibert is this:  at least 
as to deliberate two-step interrogations in which Miranda warnings 
are intentionally withheld until after the suspect confesses, the central 
voluntariness inquiry of Elstad has been replaced by a presumptive 
rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, 
place, and circumstances from the first statement to the second.  
According to the plurality, the multifactor test—timing and location of 
interrogations, continuity of police personnel, overlapping content of 
statements, etc.—measures the ―effectiveness‖ of midstream Miranda 
warnings and applies in all cases involving sequential unwarned and 
warned admissions.  In Justice Kennedy‘s view, however, an inquiry 
into change in time and circumstances between the prewarning and 
postwarning statements—what he called ―curative steps‖—is 
necessary only in cases involving the deliberate use of a two-step 
interrogation strategy calculated to evade the requirements of 
Miranda.  Justice Kennedy thus provided a fifth vote to depart from 
 
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Elstad, but only where the police set out deliberately to withhold 
Miranda warnings until after a confession has been secured.  Where 
the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to 
undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert. 
Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1090;34 see also United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 
(4th Cir. 2005) (―The admissibility of postwarning statements is governed by 
Elstad unless the deliberate ‗question-first‘ strategy is employed.  If that strategy is 
deliberately employed, postwarning statements related to the substance of 
prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before 
the postwarning statements are made.‖ (citation and footnote omitted)). 
As the majority explains in footnote nine, there is a split among the federal 
circuits regarding the applicability of Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert.  
However, no such split exists in the State of Florida.  This Court as well as four 
district courts of appeal have all held that Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert 
is the law in Florida.  Stated otherwise, prior to this decision, this Court and the 
First, Second, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal have all applied the 
                                          
 
 
34.  The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide exactly how it will apply Seibert.  
In its most recent opinion on the subject, the Seventh Circuit decided that the 
statements at issue would be admissible under any possible rule from Seibert.  
United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir.  2009) (―We have no need here 
to resolve once and for all what rule or rules governing two-step interrogations can 
be distilled from Seibert.  This is because Heron‘s May 11 statements would be 
admissible under any test one might extract.‖).  However, the Seventh Circuit in 
Heron repeated its prior statement that Elstad survives Seibert and again deferred 
to the trial court‘s finding of fact that the delay in Miranda warnings was not 
deliberate.  Id. at 885-86.    
 
- 80 - 
standard enunciated in Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert, not the standard 
enunciated in the plurality‘s opinion.  Davis, 990 So. 2d at 465-66 (quoting and 
applying Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert and recognizing that ―Justice 
Kennedy stated that he would apply a narrower test than the plurality‖); 
Tengbergen, 9 So. 3d at 735 (―Florida courts have heretofore applied Justice 
Kennedy‘s rule [in Seibert], as it represents the narrower view.‖); Jump, 983 So. 2d 
at 728 (applying Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seibert—not the plurality 
opinion—because, ―[a]s our sister courts have recognized, Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurring opinion in Seibert offers the narrowest grounds‖); Lebron, 979 So. 2d 
at 1096 (―Justice Kennedy‘s opinion concurring in the judgment is the dispositive 
opinion.  Addressing the exact issue now before us, Justice Kennedy stated that ‗it 
would be extravagant to treat the presence of one statement that cannot be admitted 
under Miranda as sufficient reason to prohibit subsequent statements preceded by a 
proper warning.‘ ‖ (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment)); Pitts, 936 So. 2d at 1136 (―[T]he holding of Seibert should be 
viewed as the position taken by Justice Kennedy, which articulates the ‗narrowest 
grounds‘ for the judgment of the Court.‖).   Consequently, the majority opinion is 
receding from this Court‘s precedent as well as overruling the four district courts‘ 
 
- 81 - 
decisions by improperly mixing together the standard in Elstad, Justice Kennedy‘s 
standard in Seibert, and the plurality‘s standard in Seibert.35   
                                          
 
 
35.  The majority cites the following language from Elstad as its support that 
Elstad requires an examination of the same factors as the plurality in Seibert would 
require:  ―When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between 
confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the 
interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second 
confession.‖  Majority op. at 31 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310 (citing Westover 
v. United States, decided together with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 494)).  However, this 
language does not apply every time there are two confessions with an intervening 
Miranda waiver.  Rather, this language referencing Westover only applies after a 
determination that the pre-Miranda statements were coerced, which was not the 
case in Elstad.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in Elstad, 
[t]he failure of police to administer Miranda warnings does not mean 
that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that 
courts will presume the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination has not been intelligently exercised.  See New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S., at 654, and n. 5; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457.  
Of the courts that have considered whether a properly warned 
confession must be suppressed because it was preceded by an 
unwarned but clearly voluntary admission, the majority have 
explicitly or implicitly recognized that Westover‘s requirement of a 
break in the stream of events is inapposite.  In these circumstances, a 
careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to 
cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.  
The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the 
suspect‘s choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent 
should ordinarily be viewed as an ―act of free will.‖  Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S., at 486. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11 (footnote omitted).  Indeed, in Elstad, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Oregon court‘s holding that, despite the fact that the 
pre-Miranda statements were uncoerced, ―lapse of time, and change of place from 
the original surroundings are the most important considerations‖ in determining the 
admissibility of the post-Miranda statements.  Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Elstad, 
 
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In this case, because of the trial court‘s factual finding that the withholding 
of Miranda warnings was not deliberate, Elstad applies.  See Mashburn, 406 F.3d 
at 309 (―Here, the district court found no evidence that the agents‘ failure to 
convey Miranda warnings to Mashburn was deliberate or intentional.  Therefore, 
the admissibility of Mashburn‘s statements is governed by Elstad.‖ (citations 
omitted)).  Applying Elstad‘s voluntariness inquiry, I believe this case is analogous 
to Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2003).   
In Davis, this Court applied Elstad and held that a second confession given 
after Miranda warnings was voluntary and therefore admissible.  Davis, 859 So. 2d 
at 471-72.  The defendant admitted that he killed the victim in an initial discussion 
with officers.  Id. at 471.  Then, an officer administered Miranda warnings, and 
Davis signed a written waiver.  Id.  Thereafter, Davis gave a recorded confession.  
Id.  In ruling that the recorded confession was admissible, this Court stressed that 
the officers ―carefully read Davis his Miranda rights, explaining each section of the 
waiver form, clearly reading aloud and explaining each right, and confirming after 
each right that Davis understood.‖  Id. at 472.  This Court also noted that Davis 
signed a written waiver and that the officers did not attempt to downplay the 
Miranda warnings.  Id.   
                                                                                                                                        
658 P.2d 552, 554 (Or. App. 1983), rev‘d, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), which cited 
Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 496 (1966)). 
 
- 83 - 
As in Davis, here, Detective Waldron carefully read Ross‘ Miranda rights to 
him, asked if he understood those rights, obtained a written waiver, and then asked 
if Ross wished to talk to him.  Ross stated that he did.36  Only then did the 
interview proceed.  ―In these circumstances, a careful and thorough administration 
of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned 
statement inadmissible.‖  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11.  Therefore, like the second 
confession in Davis, Ross‘ post-Miranda confession was voluntary and admissible.  
See id. at 311 (―The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the 
suspect‘s choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily 
be viewed as an ‗act of free will.‘ ‖ (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 486 (1963)). 
III.  Conclusion 
I would defer to the trial court‘s factual finding that the officers in this case 
did not deliberately withhold the Miranda warnings because this finding is 
supported by competent substantial evidence.  As a result, I would employ the 
Elstad standard, which applies to nondeliberate delays in Miranda warnings.  See 
                                          
 
 
36.  Contrary to the majority‘s characterization of this conversation on pages 
51 and 55, it is clear from the transcript that Ross was not attempting to invoke his 
right to remain silent.  Ross initially stated, ―I can‘t tell you anything different.‖  
(Emphasis added.)  He did not say that he would not talk.  Instead, after he was 
directly asked, ―You‘re indicating that you want to talk to me; correct?‖  Ross 
responded, ―Yes.‖  Ross then signed the written waiver.    
 
- 84 - 
Davis, 990 So. 2d at 466 (holding that we apply Elstad unless officers used ―the 
question-first method ‗in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.‘ ‖ 
(quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))).  
Under a proper application of the Elstad standard, Ross‘ post-Miranda confession 
is admissible.  The trial court did not err in denying Ross‘ motion to suppress it. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
CANADY and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County,  
Edward Nicholas, Judge – Case No. 2004-CF-106 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee