Title: Miller v. Rissler & McMurry Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Miller v. Rissler & McMurry Co.1990 WY 63794 P.2d 91Case Number: 89-201Decided: 06/13/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEONARD E. MILLER, 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LARRY EUGENE MILLER, DECEASED, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

RISSLER & McMURRY 
CO., A WYOMING CORPORATION, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Converse County, William A. Taylor, J.

Fred W. Phifer 
and Leonard E. Lang, Wheatland, for appellant.

Judith A. Studer 
and Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Larry Eugene 
Miller was killed when the vehicle in which he was riding failed to negotiate a 
curve in a service road north of Douglas, Wyoming. Appellant, the personal 
representative of the deceased's estate, brought this wrongful death action, 
alleging that Rissler & McMurry Company (Rissler) was negligent in erecting 
traffic signs on the service road which were inadequate to warn travellers of 
the abrupt curve. He now appeals from a summary judgment in favor of 
Rissler.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

"1. Is a Construction 
Company liable for injuries to, or the death of, third persons occurring after 
completion of its work and its acceptance by the 
contractee?

"2. Is a contractor who 
constructed a road according to the plans and specifications designed by the 
Wyoming Highway Department immune from liability for any subsequent injuries 
which may occur as a result of apparent defects in those 
plans?

"3. Were the plans and 
specifications for the service road connecting with Wyoming Highway 59 so 
obviously dangerous and likely to cause injury to others that an ordinary and 
reasonable contractor of ordinary prudence in his field would or should not 
follow them.

"4. The Court erred in 
finding there was no genuine issue of material fact."

Rissler states 
the issues thusly:

"A. Is a construction 
contractor who has followed the plans and specifications provided by the state 
liable to third persons for any defect in those plans and 
specifications?

"B. Is a contractor 
liable for lack of adequate signing on a highway where the state highway 
department knew or should have known what signs were 
needed?

"C. Is a contractor 
immune from liability for complying with the plans and specifications provided 
by a state agency? Or is any negligence on the part of a state agency imputed to 
a contractor hired by that agency?"

FACTS

[¶4]      The curve on 
which Miller's accident occurred is on Wyoming Highway 59 Service Road near its 
intersection with the 59 Bypass, approximately one mile north of Douglas, 
Wyoming. Rissler was the general contractor on the state highway construction 
project which included the Highway 59 Bypass and the curve and intersection 
where this accident occurred. On September 14, 1987, the Wyoming State Highway 
Department conducted a final inspection of the project and determined that 
Rissler had satisfactorily fulfilled the terms of its construction contract and 
had completed its work in accordance with the plans, specifications, and special 
provisions of that contract. Rissler received the highway department's notice of 
completion and acceptance of work the following day.

[¶5]      At approximately 
2:15 a.m., on October 3, 1987, Miller and Billy Joe Cook were travelling north 
on the Highway 59 Service Road in Cook's pickup truck. The two men had just left 
a local tavern where they had been drinking for nearly three hours. As they 
entered the disputed curve, at a speed estimated to be between 55 and 65 miles 
per hour, Cook lost control of the vehicle. The truck shot off the road, flew 80 
feet in the air and bounced another 46 feet. Miller was ejected from the 
vehicle, landing over 50 feet from where the truck came to rest, and sustained 
fatal injuries. Investigators discovered two packets of cocaine on his 
body.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      In reviewing the 
propriety of a summary judgment, we examine the affidavits, exhibits and 
material presented to the district court according to the same standard applied 
by that court. Matthews v. Fetzner, 768 P.2d 590, 592 (Wyo. 1989); Thomas v. 
South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District, 702 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 1985). Such a 
judgment is proper if, viewing those materials from the viewpoint of the party 
opposing the motion, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 
1135 (Wyo. 1986); Thomas, 702 P.2d  at 1304. Although the drastic remedy of 
summary judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence actions, we have 
recognized an exception to the general rule where a party fails to establish a 
genuine factual issue with respect to a necessary element of his cause of 
action. Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1137; DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 651 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶7]      Appellant 
initiated this action against Rissler, alleging in his 
complaint:

"7. That the Defendant 
negligently constructed said curve so that it could not be negotiated at the 
posted speed limit of Fifty-five (55) miles per hour.

"8. That the Defendant 
negligently constructed the curve and intersection in such a manner that there 
was an apparent continuation of the tangent section of the highway so that at 
night automobile headlights coming from the north make it appear that the road 
is continuous. A driver would be unaware of the need to negotiate a sharp curve, 
stop and then make a right turn to continue on the same road. Defendant was 
negligent in failing to correct this line of site either by placing a mound of 
dirt where the old Highway 59 was obliterated to eliminate it or by installing a 
large enough turn sign to adequately warn the driver and to blot out the 
driver's view in vehicles that are traveling north on the Service Road 
approaching the curve.

"9. Defendant was also 
negligent in failing to install adequate warning signs so that the drivers of 
vehicles moving in a northerly direction on the Service Road would be aware that 
they were approaching a sharp left-hand turn which could not be negotiated at 
the posted speed limit of Fifty-five (55) miles per hour or in the alternative 
of reducing the speed limit well ahead of the curve.

"10. That the Defendant 
negligently constructed the curve with a steep embankment on the north side of 
the curve so that vehicles which failed to negotiate the curve could not recover 
without overturning."

[¶8]      Rissler moved for 
summary judgment and submitted supporting affidavits and exhibits which 
established the following facts:

1. Neither its contract 
with the Wyoming Highway Department, nor the customs and practices of the 
construction industry, imposed upon Rissler any responsibilities with respect to 
the design of either the roadway or the warning signs to be installed on the 
roadway.

2. Such designs were 
contained in the plans and specifications for the project, which were prepared 
by the highway department and which Rissler was contractually obligated to 
follow in performing work on the project. Such an arrangement is the usual and 
customary practice in the highway construction industry.

3. Those plans and 
specifications required Rissler to place two warning signs on the north end of 
the Highway 59 Access Road: a "Stop" sign at that road's intersection with the 
Highway 59 Bypass; and a four feet wide by two feet tall "Large Arrow" sign 
pointing to the left, located on the north side of the curve, 175 feet from the 
intersection.

4. Rissler completed all 
of its responsibilities under its contract with the highway department in 
accordance with the plans and specifications provided for the project and in a 
workmanlike manner. The construction of the curve and the installation of the 
warning signs followed the design of the highway 
department.

5. Both the "Stop" sign 
and the "Large Arrow" sign were in place prior to the 
accident.

[¶9]      In opposition to 
the motion, appellant offered the affidavits of three individuals who had either 
experienced or observed a number of near accidents on the curve in question and 
the affidavit of appellant's expert, a civil engineer, who specialized in the 
investigation and reconstruction of motor vehicle accidents. The three laymen 
offered little more than their observations that accidents were frequent on the 
curve. Appellant's expert made no claim in his affidavit that there are 
deficiencies in the design or construction of the roadway itself. Consequently, 
appellant's opposition to the summary judgment motion rests largely on the 
opinion of his accident reconstruction expert that the warning signs installed 
by Rissler were inadequate to warn northbound travellers of the abrupt change in 
direction of the Highway 59 Service Road. He observed that the Wyoming Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the statutorily mandated standard for the 
placement of highway signs, called for additional warning signs on such severe 
curves.

[¶10]   The statutes upon which appellant's 
expert relied read:

W.S. 
31-5-112:

"The commission shall 
adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control 
devices consistent with this act for use upon highways within this state. The 
uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible conform to the system 
set forth in the most recent edition of the `Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for Streets and Highways' and other standards issued or endorsed by the 
federal highway administrator."

W.S. 
31-5-113:

"(a) The highway 
department shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices, conforming to 
the commission's manual and specifications, upon all state highways as it 
deems necessary to indicate and to carry out this act or to regulate, warn 
or guide traffic.

"(b) No local authority 
shall place or maintain any traffic-control device upon any highway under the 
jurisdiction of the highway department except with the highway department's 
permission." (emphasis added)

Under these 
statutes, the highway department's duty to conform its placement of warning 
signs to the standards of the Wyoming Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(Manual) is tempered by a grant of discretionary authority. We have, therefore, 
rejected the notion that the above statutes require the highway department to 
strictly comply with the Manual. Accordingly, we have held that neither the 
department nor its general contractor was negligent where the department's 
practices were in "substantial compliance" with the Manual and the contractor's 
placement of warning signs conformed to the department's directions. Randolph v. 
Gilpatrick Const. Co., Inc., 702 P.2d 142, 146 (Wyo. 
1985).

[¶11]   The above statutes impose no duty 
on highway contractors with respect to the placement of traffic control devices. 
Neither do the past decisions of this court support the imposition of such a 
duty. Phelan v. Read Const. Co., 379 P.2d 829 (Wyo 1963), presented a factual 
situation nearly identical to that of the present case. In Phelan, a contractor, 
engaged in a highway construction project, built a curve in an access road 
leading to a state highway. During construction of the curve, the contractor had 
blocked off access to that portion of the roadway. Subsequently, the highway 
department's project engineer had the contractor remove the barricades and open 
the access road to travel. The plans and specifications for the project required 
neither a guardrail nor a curve warning sign to be placed on the curve. Shortly 
after the removal of the barricades, a car ran off the curve killing one of the 
passengers and seriously injuring another. Testimony established that it was the 
highway department's statutory and contractual duty to locate traffic control 
devices and determine where they should be placed. It was also established that 
the contractor had fully complied with the plans and specifications and with all 
other directions of the department with respect to the placement of such 
devices. We upheld a judgment in favor of the contractor in that case because no 
testimony was adduced tending to show that the contractor had either violated 
his contract with the department or was negligent in his construction and 
maintenance of the roadway or the warning signs required by the department. Id. 
at 831-32.

[¶12]   We reached a similar result in 
Reiman Const. Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985). In that case, 
suit was filed against a contractor, an architect, and a structural engineering 
firm to recover for damages to a commercial building when water seeped under the 
foundation and floor slab of the structure, expanding the underlying soil and 
causing cracks to form in the building. Prior to designing and drawing up the 
plans for the building, the architect commissioned a soils engineering firm to 
conduct certain tests and provide a report on soil conditions at the prospective 
construction site. That report noted that the soil possessed a high potential 
for swelling when wet and recommended a number of design features to be included 
in the building plans, so as to avert any potential problems arising from that 
condition. Nevertheless, the plans and specifications for the structure did not 
incorporate those recommended features. We observed that neither the usual 
practices of the construction industry, nor his contract, placed any design 
responsibilities on the contractor. However, we also noted that he did have a 
duty to exercise skill and care in his selection of materials and in the 
performance of his work. Accordingly, we held that a contractor could not be 
held liable for damages caused by defects in the plans and specifications for 
his job if he completed that job in a workmanlike manner and in substantial 
compliance with those plans and specifications. Id. at 
1275-76.

[¶13]   Recognizing that the present case 
differs little from Phelan and Reiman, appellant asks us to modify the rule 
enunciated in those cases to result in contractor liability when, 
notwithstanding his skillful and careful compliance with a project's plans and 
specifications, he knew or should have known such compliance would create a 
dangerous condition. We do not decide whether contractor liability should be 
modified as contended by appellant, for nothing was presented in this case by 
affidavit or otherwise that raised the issue of whether Rissler knew or should 
have known of the alleged danger.

[¶14]   Appellant does not contend that 
Rissler had actual knowledge that compliance with the department's plans and 
specifications would create a hazard. He merely asserts that Rissler should 
have known that such was the case, i.e., that Rissler should be charged with 
the skill and knowledge necessary to determine from the plans and specifications 
that the signs were insufficient to warn travellers of the curve. Appellant, 
however, provides us with no factual or legal basis for that assertion. He cites 
no authority requiring highway construction contractors to possess or exercise 
the expertise in highway safety design and engineering necessary for the proper 
placement of traffic control devices. Likewise, he has failed to demonstrate 
either that such expertise is customary in the trade or that Rissler in fact 
possessed such knowledge and skills.

[¶15]   Appellant failed to demonstrate 
that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Rissler's 
knowledge that its compliance with the contract would create a danger to the 
travelling public. Since it is uncontested that Rissler installed the signs in 
compliance with the project's plans, and that it did so in a skillful and 
workmanlike manner, appellant raised no genuine issue of material facts which 
would entitle him to relief.

[¶16]   Appellant's expert concluded, 
though not provided for in the highway department design, specification and 
contract, that Rissler nevertheless should have installed additional signs prior 
to the opening of the road to the public. No rational basis is stated for this 
conclusion. The affidavit of appellant's expert will not suffice to overcome 
Rissler's summary judgment motion. Bare conclusory statements of an expert, 
regarding the existence of a duty, are insufficient to prevent a summary 
judgment. Thomas, 702 P.2d  at 1307. Rissler was, therefore, entitled to a 
summary judgment as a matter of law.

[¶17]   The order of the district court is 
affirmed.