Title: Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220.] 
 
 
BONACORSI, APPELLANT, v. WHEELING & LAKE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-
Ohio-2220.] 
Civil procedure — Civ.R. 56 — Supreme Court review of summary judgment 
ruling — Court of appeals’ reversal of trial court’s denial of railroad 
company’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s inadequate-
warning-device claim reversed, and trial court’s judgment and jury 
verdict reinstated, when. 
(No. 2000-2278 — Submitted January 29, 2002 — Decided May 22, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 1999CA00407. 
__________________ 
DOUGLAS, J. 
{¶1} 
In July 1996, plaintiff-appellant, Cris A. Bonacorsi, was seriously 
injured1 when the motorcycle he was driving collided with the engine of a freight 
train at a railroad crossing on Howe Road in Brimfield Township, Ohio.  The train 
was owned and operated by defendant-appellee, Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway 
Company (“W&LE”). 
{¶2} 
At the time of the accident, signs were posted along Howe Road 
warning westbound motorists, such as Bonacorsi, of the upcoming crossing.  
Posted approximately eight hundred fifty feet before the crossing was a round, 
yellow sign with a large black X flanked by two Rs.  Next, about seven hundred 
feet from the crossing, the pavement was painted with a large white X flanked by 
two Rs.  Three hundred feet before the crossing, the pavement marking was 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
repeated.  Immediately before the crossing were a red triangular “yield” sign and 
a white, X-shaped sign with the words “RAILROAD CROSSING” written in 
black (“crossbuck sign”).  The signs and pavement markings described above are 
classified as “passive warning devices” because they indicate the presence of a 
crossing but they do not change in any respect when a train is approaching.  
Section 646.204, Title 23, C.F.R.  In contrast, “active warning devices” are traffic 
control devices activated by the approach of a train, such as flashing light signals 
and automatic gates that warn motorists that a train is approaching the crossing.  
Id. 
{¶3} 
On the day of the accident Bonacorsi was aware that he was 
approaching a crossing, but because there were no active warning devices at the 
crossing and because foliage growing near the railroad right-of-way blocked his 
view, he was unaware that a train was also approaching the crossing.2  As 
Bonacorsi neared the tracks his line of sight became less obstructed by the foliage 
and he was able to see the approaching train but he was travelling too fast to avoid 
a collision. 
{¶4} 
Bonacorsi subsequently filed a claim against W&LE alleging that 
the accident was caused by W&LE’s negligence “in failing to install active 
warning devices, failing to eliminate view obstructions caused by the foliage 
surrounding its crossing, failing to operate the train in a safe and lawful manner, 
including maintaining a proper lookout and maintaining control over the train so 
                                                                                                                   
1. 
Among other injuries, Bonacorsi’s left leg was amputated at the hip, his pelvis was 
fractured, and one of his lungs collapsed. 
2. 
Archie Burnham, a professional engineer specializing in traffic safety, testified that at the 
time of the accident when a westbound motorist was three hundred forty feet from the crossing, 
foliage obstructed the motorist’s view of all but twenty-eight feet of the railroad tracks north of the 
crossing.  He further testified that, taking into account the posted speed limit of Howe Road (forty 
miles per hour) and the train speed limit (twenty-five miles per hour), published safety guidelines 
provide that at three hundred forty feet from the crossing, westbound motorists should be able to 
see at least two hundred sixty feet of the track north of the crossing in order to stop their vehicles 
in reaction to seeing a train. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
that it could avoid a collision, and by failing to properly sound the train’s horn 
and bell.”3 
{¶5} 
W&LE moved for partial summary judgment asserting that 
Bonacorsi’s claim that the warning devices were inadequate was preempted by 
federal law.  In this regard, W&LE asserted that federal funds paid for the 
installation of the crossbuck sign posted on Howe Road and that warning devices 
installed using federal funds are adequate as a matter of federal law.4  Thus, 
W&LE argued, the subject of warning-device adequacy with regard to the Howe 
Road signs has been covered, thereby triggering the preemption provision of 
Section 20106, Title 49, U.S.Code.5 
                                          
 
3. 
Bonacorsi further alleged that because W&LE was aware of prior accidents at this 
crossing, its conduct in failing to install active devices and/or failing to eliminate the sight 
obstruction at this crossing constituted willful and wanton misconduct and illustrated a conscious 
disregard for the rights and safety of others.  Thus, Bonacorsi argued that he was entitled to 
punitive as well as compensatory damages.  The trial court refused to submit the punitive damages 
claim to the jury. 
4. 
{¶a} 
Section 646.214(b), Title 23, C.F.R. provides: 
 
{¶b} 
“(3)(i) ‘Adequate warning devices’ * * * on any project where Federal-aid funds 
participate in the installation of the devices are to include automatic gates with flashing light 
signals when one or more of the following conditions exist: 
 
{¶c} 
“(A) Multiple main line railroad tracks. 
 
{¶d} 
“(B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicinity of the crossing which may be occupied 
by a train or locomotive so as to obscure the movement of another train approaching the crossing. 
 
{¶e} 
“(C) High Speed train operation combined with limited sight distance at either 
single or multiple track crossings. 
 
{¶f} 
“(D) A combination of high speeds and moderately high volumes of highway 
and railroad traffic. 
 
{¶g} 
“(E) Either a high volume of vehicular traffic, high number of train movements, 
substantial numbers of schoolbuses or trucks carrying hazardous materials, unusually restricted 
sight distance, continuing accident occurrences, or any combination of these conditions. 
 
{¶h} 
“(F) A diagnostic team recommends them. 
 
{¶i} 
“(ii) In individual cases where a diagnostic team justifies that gates are not 
appropriate, FHWA [Federal Highway Administration] may find that the above requirements are 
not applicable. 
 
{¶j} 
“(4) For crossings where the requirements of §646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, 
the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory 
agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA.” 
5. 
{¶a} 
Section 20106, Title 49, U.S.Code provides: 
 
{¶b} 
“Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally 
uniform to the extent practicable.  A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶6} 
As proof that federal funds were used to install the Howe Road 
crossbuck sign, W&LE submitted an affidavit executed by Bruce Brown, an 
employee of W&LE, stating that prior to the accident the crossbuck sign at the 
Howe Road crossing was installed with federal funds as part of Ohio’s Buckeye 
Crossbuck Program.  Attached as an exhibit to Brown’s affidavit was a pamphlet 
created by the Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”), titled “Ohio’s 
Buckeye Crossbuck Program.”  The pamphlet described an experimental program 
designed to determine the effectiveness of a newly designed crossbuck sign.  
According to the pamphlet, the program required that crossbuck signs at all 
passive crossings in Ohio be replaced with new crossbuck signs.6 
{¶7} 
Also attached to Brown’s affidavit was an agreement between 
ODOT and W&LE, wherein W&LE agreed to replace existing crossbuck signs at 
all of its passive crossings in Ohio by the end of 1993 as part of the Buckeye 
Crossbuck Program.  ODOT agreed to supply the new crossbuck signs and to 
reimburse W&LE for its installation costs.  The agreement indicated that the 
reimbursement money would come from federal funds. 
{¶8} 
In his brief opposing W&LE’s motion, Bonacorsi attacked the 
sufficiency of Brown’s supporting affidavit, arguing that the affidavit was not 
based on Brown’s personal knowledge that federal funds were spent on the 
                                                                                                                   
order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or 
issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.” 
 
{¶c} 
Although the preemption provision contains an exception, it is inapplicable in 
this case. 
6. 
According to ODOT’s pamphlet, there were more than three thousand seven hundred 
passive crossings in Ohio when the Buckeye Crossbuck Program began.  The program required 
that crossbuck signs at one-half of the passive crossings, selected at random, were to be replaced 
with the newly designed Buckeye crossbuck signs (described as a “highly reflectorized red and 
white” crossbuck sign) and the other half with standard black-and-white crossbuck signs that had 
been “upgraded” with reflective tape on all four sides of the post.  The Howe Road crossing fell 
into the latter category, i.e., the crossbuck sign installed at the Howe Road crossing was the 
upgraded standard crossbuck sign.  Once the new signs were in place, ODOT planned to study 
accident statistics and human behavior at the crossings to compare the effectiveness of both types 
of signs. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
installation of the crossbuck sign at the Howe Road crossing.  See Civ.R. 56(E), 
which requires that affidavits in support of motions for summary judgment be 
made on “personal knowledge.”  In addition, Bonacorsi argued that even if 
W&LE could prove that federal funds had been used to install the crossbuck sign, 
that fact alone would not be sufficient to trigger preemption.  Bonacorsi argued 
that W&LE was also required to show that the Federal Highway Administration 
(“FHWA”) had approved the installation. 
{¶9} 
W&LE replied that proof of federal funding was sufficient, in and 
of itself, to trigger preemption because when federal funds are used to install 
warning devices at a railroad crossing it is presumed that the devices meet FHWA 
approval and thus meet the federal standards of adequacy. 
{¶10} The trial court agreed with Bonacorsi and found that W&LE had 
failed to prove that federal funds were used to install the crossbuck sign.  In 
addition, the trial court rejected W&LE’s assertion that federal funding of sign 
installation was, in and of itself, sufficient to trigger preemption of an inadequate-
signalization claim, and held that proof of FHWA approval was also required in 
this case.  Accordingly, the court denied W&LE’s motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
{¶11} Thereafter, W&LE, with leave of court, filed an additional motion 
for partial summary judgment, again arguing that Bonacorsi’s inadequate-
warning-device claim was preempted.  Attached to the motion was an affidavit 
executed by Susan Kirkland, an employee of the Ohio Rail Development 
Commission.7  In her affidavit, Kirkland stated that the crossbuck signs installed 
at all passive crossings in Ohio, including W&LE crossings, were installed with 
federal funds as part of the Buckeye Crossbuck Program. 
                                          
 
7. 
The Ohio Rail Development Commission was created by R.C. 4981.02(A). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶12} In his response to W&LE’s motion, Bonacorsi argued that 
Kirkland, like Brown, did not have personal knowledge of the statements made in 
her affidavit regarding federal funding of the installation of the Howe Road 
crossbuck sign.  In support of his assertion, Bonacorsi referred to Kirkland’s 
deposition testimony in which Kirkland testified that ODOT was responsible for 
handling federal funds, that she did not work for ODOT, and that her knowledge 
of federal funding of sign installation at railroad crossings came from other 
people.  In addition to his argument that Kirkland lacked the personal knowledge 
required by Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi renewed his assertion that proof of federal 
funding alone was insufficient to preempt a state-law claim of inadequate warning 
devices. 
{¶13} The court agreed with Bonacorsi that federal funding alone was not 
sufficient to trigger preemption and, consequently, denied W&LE’s motion.  The 
court did not discuss whether Kirkland’s affidavit was sufficient to establish that 
federal funds were used to install the Howe Road crossbuck sign. 
{¶14} W&LE subsequently moved to vacate the court’s denial of its 
motion for partial summary judgment.8  The court again reviewed W&LE’s 
additional motion for partial summary judgment, and again denied it.  The court 
stated, “While federal funds may have been used in the purchase and/or 
installation of the * * * crossbuck signs at the Howe Road crossing, there is no 
evidence that the Federal Highway Administration approved the * * * crossbuck 
signs as being adequate to protect motorist safety at such crossing.” 
{¶15} Thereafter, the matter proceeded to a jury trial.  The jury found for 
Bonacorsi, but further found that both Bonacorsi and W&LE were negligent and 
determined that each party’s negligence contributed equally to causing the 
                                          
 
8. 
W&LE’s motion to vacate alleged that the order denying its motion for partial summary 
judgment was invalid because Judge Sinclair issued the order after Judge Lile had been assigned 
to preside over the matter. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
accident.  In response to a written jury interrogatory labeled “One-A” that asked, 
“If you find that [W&LE] was negligent, in what respect(s) do you so find?” the 
jury responded in writing, “Two prior accidents; railroad did not initiate change in 
signals and signs.  Proving ordinary care.  Plaintiff unable to see the train.” 
{¶16} The jury determined that Bonacorsi’s compensatory damages were 
$1,664,200.  Reducing the verdict by fifty percent to account for Bonacorsi’s 
contributory negligence, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Bonacorsi in 
the amount of $832,100. 
{¶17} W&LE appealed raising numerous assignments of error.9  The 
assignment relevant to this appeal asserted that the trial court erred in denying 
W&LE’s motion for partial summary judgment. 
{¶18} The court of appeals, upon de novo review of W&LE’s motion for 
partial summary judgment, found that Kirkland’s affidavit established that federal 
funds had been used to pay for installation of the Howe Road crossbuck sign.  In 
addition, the court held that proof of federal funding was, in and of itself, 
sufficient to trigger preemption of Bonacorsi’s inadequate-warning-device claim.  
In support of its holding the court cited Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin (2000), 529 
U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374, which was decided while this case 
was pending in the court of appeals.  Consequently, the court of appeals reversed 
the trial court’s denial of W&LE’s motion for summary judgment on Bonacorsi’s 
inadequate-warning-device claim. 
{¶19} Moreover, the court found that the jury’s response to Interrogatory 
One-A clearly revealed that the jury’s verdict against W&LE was based solely on 
Bonacorsi’s inadequate-warning-device claim.  Accordingly, the court reversed 
the jury’s verdict, vacated Bonacorsi’s award, and entered judgment in favor of 
W&LE. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶20} The cause is before this court upon our allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶21} There are two issues before the court in this case.  The first issue is 
whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of W&LE’s 
motion for partial summary judgment.  Only if we find that the reversal was 
proper do we reach the second issue in this case, which is whether the court of 
appeals erred in interpreting the jury’s response to Interrogatory One-A to mean 
that the jury found W&LE negligent only with regard to Bonacorsi’s inadequate-
signalization claim. 
{¶22} With regard to the first issue, Bonacorsi claims that the court of 
appeals erred in two respects.  First, he argues that the court erred in finding that 
Kirkland’s affidavit proved that federal funds paid for the installation of the Howe 
Road crossbuck sign.  In this respect, Bonacorsi renews the argument he made to 
the trial court and the court of appeals, i.e., that Kirkland lacked personal 
knowledge of the statements made in her affidavit. 
{¶23} Second, Bonacorsi argues that the court of appeals erred in 
applying the holding in Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374, 
to this case.  In this regard, Bonacorsi asserts that Shanklin applies only when 
federal funds are applied toward railroad crossing improvement programs and not 
when applied toward experimental programs such as the program under which the 
crossbuck sign at the Howe Road crossing was installed.  Consequently, 
Bonacorsi argues, even if the court finds that Kirkland’s affidavit does prove 
federal funding, his inadequate-signalization claim was not preempted because the 
federal regulation regarding sign adequacy, interpreted by the court in Shanklin, 
did not apply to the program responsible for installing the Howe Road crossbuck 
sign. 
                                                                                                                   
9. 
Bonacorsi cross-appealed with regard to the trial court’s failure to submit the issue of 
January Term, 2002 
9 
{¶24} Our review of summary judgment rulings is de novo.  Doe v. 
Shaffer (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243.  Accordingly, we apply 
the same standard as the trial court and court of appeals in this case.  Civ.R. 56(C) 
provides that summary judgment shall be granted when the filings in the action, 
including depositions and affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
{¶25} We first review Kirkland’s affidavit to determine whether it 
establishes that federal funds paid for the installation of the Howe Road crossbuck 
sign.  Proof of federal funding is crucial to W&LE’s preemption argument 
because the federal regulation that covers the subject of warning-device adequacy 
applies only to warning devices installed with federal funds.  Section 
646.214(b)(3)(i), Title 23, C.F.R. (see footnote 4); Carpenter v. Consol. Rail 
Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 259, 263, 631 N.E.2d 607 (“Before a state law 
governing warning devices will be deemed preempted, federal funds must 
actually have been committed and spent”). 
{¶26} Civ.R. 56(E) requires that affidavits supporting motions for 
summary judgment be made on personal knowledge.  State ex rel. Cassels v. 
Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 
150.  For obvious reasons, this is the same standard as applied to lay witness 
testimony in a court of law.  Id.; Evid.R. 602.  “Personal knowledge” is 
“[k]nowledge gained through firsthand observation or experience, as 
distinguished from a belief based on what someone else has said.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.1999) 875.  See, also, Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence 
(2002) 213, Section 602.1 (“The subject of a witness’s testimony must have been 
perceived through one or more of the senses of the witness.  * * * [A] witness is 
                                                                                                                   
punitive damages to the jury.  See footnote 3. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
‘incompetent’ to testify to any fact unless he or she possesses firsthand knowledge 
of that fact.”). 
{¶27} Kirkland explicitly states in her affidavit that she had “personal 
knowledge” that federal funds were used to install crossbuck signs at all Ohio 
railroad crossings marked with passive warning devices.  In her deposition, 
however, Kirkland testified that ODOT was responsible for handling federal 
funds, that she did not work for ODOT, and that her knowledge that federal funds 
were used to install signs at railroad crossings came from other people. 
{¶28} After reviewing Kirkland’s deposition testimony we find that she 
clearly lacked the personal knowledge required by Civ.R. 56(E) to support the 
statements in her affidavit regarding federal funding.  Consequently, we find that 
W&LE failed to prove that federal funds paid for the installation of the Howe 
Road crossbuck sign.10  Because, at a minimum, federal funding is required to 
trigger preemption, we hold that W&LE’s motion for partial summary judgment 
should not have been granted. 
{¶29} Our holding renders moot Bonacorsi’s second argument with 
regard to W&LE’s motion for partial summary judgment, i.e., his assertion that 
Shanklin does not apply to this case.  In addition, we do not reach the second issue 
in this case, which was dependent on a finding that partial summary judgment was 
proper. 
                                          
 
10. 
We also note that W&LE failed to tender any documentary evidence to show that the 
state received money from the federal government to pay for the Buckeye crossbuck project or to 
show that there was an agreement executed by the federal government indicating that it would pay 
for the project.  A federal statute that was in effect at the time this project was allegedly funded 
required the Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation to enter into a formal 
project agreement with state transportation departments concerning projects that were to receive 
federal funding under Title 23, U.S.Code.  Former Section 110, Title 23, U.S.Code, 72 Stat. 894.  
Although Kirkland testified in her deposition that there was an executed agreement between the 
state of Ohio and the FHWA regarding the project, and W&LE, in its brief submitted to this court, 
refers to a contract between the FHWA and the state of Ohio, no such agreement is contained in 
the record. 
January Term, 2002 
11 
{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court and the verdict of the jury. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., KLINE and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
ROGER L. KLINE, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
__________________ 
 
KLINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶31} I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the trial court and the court of 
appeals did not err when they considered Susan Kirkland’s affidavit as admissible 
evidence because W&LE presented sufficient evidence to establish that the 
affidavit met the Civ.R. 56(E) “personal knowledge” requirement.  Kirkland’s 
description of her job duties allowed an inference that she would be in a position 
to know if federal funds were used to install the crossbuck signs at the Howe 
Road crossing. 
{¶32} I agree with the majority that a court ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment first must determine what evidence is admissible before it 
may construe that evidence in the opposing party’s favor.  Civ.R. 56(E).  I further 
agree that the “personal knowledge” requirement set forth in Civ.R. 56(E) is the 
same standard contained in Evid.R. 602 for a lay witness testifying at trial.  The 
trial court has discretion in determining whether evidence is admissible.  See, e.g., 
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 616, 687 N.E.2d 735. 
{¶33} 1 McCormick on Evidence (5th Ed.1992) 40, Section 10, addresses 
the personal knowledge requirement by commenting: 
{¶34} “A person who has no knowledge of a fact except what another has 
told him does not, of course, satisfy the requirement of knowledge from 
observation.  When the witness, however, bases his testimony partly upon 
firsthand knowledge and partly upon the accounts of others, the problem is one 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
which calls for a practical compromise.  As a case in point, when a witness speaks 
of his own age or his kinship with a relative, the courts allow the testimony.  * * * 
In short, when the witness testifies to facts that he knows partly at first hand and 
partly from reports, the judge should admit or exclude according to the overall 
reliability of the evidence.”  (Footnotes omitted.) 
{¶35} In Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Oil Serv., Inc. 
(1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 591, 611 N.E.2d 955, the court of appeals upheld the trial 
court’s admission of the testimony of a secretary for the purpose of showing the 
intention of her corporate employer.  The secretary had contact with the managers 
and the corporate employees and, essentially, ran the office.  Her bosses disclosed 
their intentions to her when they gave her instructions to perform the operations 
of the company.  The court concluded that she had based her testimony on 
personal knowledge.  “Her description of her job duties also allowed an inference 
that she would be in a position to know the reasons for the various practices of the 
corporation.”  Id. at 597, 611 N.E.2d 955. 
{¶36} The above McCormick quotation and the holding in Akron-Canton 
Waste Oil led this court in Dublin City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 
Bd. of Revision (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 450, 687 N.E.2d 422, to interpret the 
personal knowledge requirement contained in Evid.R. 602 and find that a trial 
court may admit testimony based partly on firsthand knowledge and partly upon 
the accounts of others.  This court found that a witness who had personal 
knowledge of a taxpayer’s purchase of twelve parcels of property and a taxpayer’s 
strategy in assigning an artificially high purchase price to one parcel could testify 
for the purpose of showing that this allocation did not reflect the true value of the 
parcel in question.  The witness’s job allowed him access to the following 
information: 
{¶37} “[H]e attended and participated in corporate management meetings 
at which the sale and the strategy for allocating the purchase price were discussed.  
January Term, 2002 
13 
He oversaw ‘property taxes, insurance, financial reporting, corporate, federal and 
state income tax filings, among other things.’  His duties included administering 
the purchased properties.  The [Board of Tax Appeals] could infer that he 
collaborated in devising the allocation strategy and could find that he incorporated 
the allocation decision in his reporting and filing duties.”  Id. at 453, 687 N.E.2d 
422. 
{¶38} In this case, the majority summarizes Kirkland’s deposition 
testimony as revealing that “ODOT was responsible for handling federal funds, 
that [Kirkland] did not work for ODOT, and that her knowledge that federal funds 
were used to install signs at railroad crossings came from other people.”  
However, a closer examination of Kirkland’s deposition reveals that she testified 
as follows:  As a manager of the safety programs at the Ohio Rail Development 
Commission, Kirkland was one of many people responsible for carrying out the 
Buckeye Crossbuck Program.  The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(“PUCO”) designed the crossbuck program and sent a directive to Kirkland’s 
employer to implement it.  As manager of the safety section, she was responsible 
for setting up the funds, reviewing the plans, and processing the bills for the 
crossbuck program.  She attended meetings and helped set up the parameters and 
the procedures of the program.  She helped draft an agreement between ODOT 
and W&LE in which ODOT agreed to supply all new crossbuck signs at passive 
crossings and to reimburse W&LE from federal funds for its installation costs. 
{¶39} Kirkland also testified that she helped draft an agreement with the 
FHWA involving the administration of the crossbuck program.  She and her staff 
had to follow the directives of the FHWA when they carried out the crossbuck 
program.  The agreement provided that the federal funds for the signs and 
program would flow from the federal government to the state of Ohio by routing 
the funds from FHWA to ODOT.  Kirkland’s staff was involved in the payments 
made for the standard crossbuck signs at the Howe Road crossing.  However, she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
stated that her knowledge that federal funds were used to install the crossbuck 
signs at the Howe Road crossing was based on what others told her.  While 
administering the crossbuck program, her employer (the Ohio Rail Development 
Commission) was within ODOT and was called the Rail Division.11  The ODOT 
Rail Division distributed an educational brochure for the Buckeye Crossbuck 
Program. 
{¶40} Kirkland’s deposition testimony reveals that her job allowed her 
access to information regarding the crossbuck program similar to that possessed 
by the witness in Dublin Bd. of Edn., 80 Ohio St.3d 450, 687 N.E.2d 422.  As 
manager of the safety section, she set up the funds, processed the bills, and 
reviewed the plans of the program.  She attended meetings where the parameters 
and procedures were established, helped draft agreements involving ODOT, 
W&LE, and FHWA that included funding, and followed the directives of FHWA 
to carry out the program.  Her description of her job duties allowed the trial court 
to infer that she would be in a position to know whether federal funds paid for the 
installation of the crossbuck signs at the Howe Road crossing.  Therefore, 
Kirkland had personal knowledge to state in her affidavit that federal funds were 
used to install crossbuck signs at all passive crossings in Ohio.  Consequently, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering this affidavit,12 and the court 
of appeals did not err in finding that Kirkland had personal knowledge. 
                                          
 
11. 
At the time of her deposition, Kirkland and her attorney stated that her employer is 
affiliated with ODOT but is legally not a division of ODOT.  The Ohio legislature “created the 
Ohio [R]ail [D]evelopment [C]ommission, as an independent agency of the state within [ODOT].”  
R.C. 4981.02(A).  The director of ODOT is an ex officio member of the commission.  Id. 
12. 
The trial court implicitly found that Kirkland had personal knowledge when it overruled 
Bonacorsi’s motion to strike the affidavit.  However, the trial court never found that W&LE had 
established that federal funds were used to install the crossbuck sign at the Howe Road crossing.  
Instead, it denied the partial motion for summary judgment on another ground.  Thus, the court of 
appeals had authority to review the “personal knowledge” issue but did not have the authority to 
find that federal funds were used to install the sign in question because it did not have anything 
from the trial court to review.  See Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360, 604 
N.E.2d 138; see, also, Fulmer v. Insura Prop. & Cas. Co. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 85, 99-100, 760 
January Term, 2002 
15 
{¶41} I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on the “personal 
knowledge” issue and address the other issues in this appeal. 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Linton & Hirshman, Robert F. Linton, Jr., and Mark W. Ruf; Allen 
Schulman & Assoc., Inc., and Allen Schulman, Jr., for appellant. 
 
Howes, Daane, Milligan, Kyhos & Erwin, L.L.P., Philip E. Howes and 
Thomas R. Himmelspach, for appellee. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and Charles F. Clarke, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Association of American Railroads. 
 
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott Co., L.P.A., and Paul O. Scott; and 
Dorothy H. Bretnall, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                   
N.E.2d 392 (Cook, J., dissenting); Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 89, 585 
N.E.2d 384.