Title: Wood v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRUCE WOOD, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 579, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0512020169 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 3, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 22, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 22nd day of November 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, 
the record on appeal, as well as the appellant’s motion to remand, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Bruce Wood, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  Wood enumerates two 
issues in his opening brief on appeal.  We find no merit to his arguments.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in February 2007, a Superior Court jury 
convicted Wood of sixteen counts of first degree rape and two counts of 
continuous sexual abuse of a child.  The charges stemmed from multiple incidents 
 
2
involving two minor victims, both of whom testified against Wood at trial.  The 
Superior Court sentenced Wood to a total period of 290 years at Level V 
incarceration.  This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1  
In April 2009, Wood filed his first motion for postconviction relief, which was 
referred to a Superior Court Commissioner for consideration.  The Commissioner 
obtained Wood’s trial counsel’s affidavit and the State’s response thereto.  The 
Commissioner recommended denial of Wood’s motion.  The Superior Court 
adopted the Commissioner’s report and recommendation.  This appeal followed. 
(3) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Wood contends that: (i) the Superior 
Court erred in failing to appoint counsel and in failing to hold a hearing on his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (ii) the Superior Court erred in 
rejecting his prosecutorial misconduct claim.  To the extent Wood raised additional 
issues in the postconviction motion he filed in the Superior Court, those claims are 
deemed to be waived due to Wood’s failure to brief them on appeal.2 
(4) 
In reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief, this 
Court first must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing 
any substantive issues.3  Rule 61(i)(3) bars litigation of any claim that was not 
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction unless the 
                                                 
1 Wood v. State, 956 A.2d 1228 (Del. 2008). 
2  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
3Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
 
3
defendant can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice.  In this case, 
Wood could have raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal but 
failed to do so. To the extent that Wood asserts that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing raise this claim on appeal as cause for his procedural default, 
we still must reject his claim because Wood does not allege with any specificity 
what statements were allegedly improper or how those statements allegedly 
affected the outcome of his trial.4  Accordingly, we fail to find prejudice sufficient 
to overcome the procedural hurdle of Rule 61(i)(3). 
(5) 
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Wood 
was required to establish that (i) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different.5  Wood was required to 
set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice6 in order to 
overcome 
the 
“strong 
presumption” 
that 
counsel’s 
representation 
was 
professionally reasonable.7 
(6) 
In this case, Wood contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate Wood’s use of psychotropic medications before and during 
                                                 
4 See id. at 556. 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556. 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
4
trial and for failing to conduct an adequate investigation and call additional 
witnesses on Wood’s behalf.  Wood also argues that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these claims. 
(7) 
We disagree.  First, Wood did not raise his complaint that his attorney 
failed to investigate his use of psychotropic medications to the Superior Court in 
his motion for postconviction relief.  Accordingly, we will not review this claim 
for the first time on appeal in the absence of plain error.8 
An error is “plain” when it is “apparent on the face of the record” and “so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the 
trial process.”9  In this case, Wood suggests that his use of medication made him 
incompetent to stand trial because he could not participate in his own defense.  
There is simply no support in the record for this contention.  A review of the trial 
transcript, in fact, reflects that Wood understood the proceedings against him and 
was able to actively participate in his own defense by consulting with his counsel 
and testifying on his own behalf.10  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
 
(8) 
Moreover, we reject Wood’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate his case by subpoenaing documents and for failing to call 
                                                 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2010). 
9 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
10 See Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500, 502 (Del. 1979) (noting that the standard for legal 
competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him). 
 
5
additional defense witnesses.  Contrary to Wood’s assertion, defense counsel did 
subpoena school records and counseling records for both of the victims.  To the 
extent Wood argues that additional witnesses should have been called in his 
defense, he fails to explain what these witnesses would have told the jury and how 
it could have impacted the outcome of his trial.  Wood’s failure to make concrete 
allegations of cause and prejudice is fatal to his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.11 Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of the Superior Court’s 
discretion in denying Wood’s postconviction motion without a hearing.12   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to remand is DENIED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
11 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556. 
12 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).