Title: MUNOZ v. MUNOZ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MUNOZ v. MUNOZ2002 WY 437 P.3d 390Case Number: 01-64Decided: 01/15/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
     

 

RODOLPHO 
P. MUNOZ, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

TENCIL 
G. MUNOZ, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Rodolpho P. Munoz, Pro Se 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. 
Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Peggy A. Trent, Assistant Attorney 
General  

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Rodolpho P. Munoz 
(the father) appeals from the district court's order which found him in civil 
contempt of court for failing to make child support payments and denied his 
motion to dismiss the order to show cause.  
The father claims his constitutional rights were violated when he was 
twice placed in jeopardy for the same criminal offense because he had previously 
been found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to jail time for failing to 
pay, in part, the same child support.  
We affirm the district court on the basis that the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply in this case because the 
second contempt proceeding was civil in nature and the father was not subjected 
to successive criminal prosecutions. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      The father, 
appearing pro se,  presents a 
somewhat unconventional issue on appeal:

 

The 
double jeopardy constitutional protection attaches when, after being advised of 
the defendant's rights, the not guilty plea is entered followed by I'm going to 
release you on your own recognizance while the case is 
pending.

 

I.  Is 
the District Court's order and judgment dated February 16, 2001, finding [the 
father] guilty of indirect civil contempt for failure to pay child support 
barred by double jeopardy based on a previous indirect criminal contempt 
citation against [the father] on April 21, 1997, for failure to pay child 
support?

 

II.  Did 
the District Court abuse its discretion in finding [the father] guilty of 
indirect civil contempt?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The district 
court entered a decree on August 14, 1981, granting the father and the mother a 
divorce.  The divorce decree 
incorporated a settlement agreement in which the parties agreed the mother would 
have custody of the parties' three minor children and the father would pay $250 
per month in child support.1  The mother assigned her child support 
rights to the State of Wyoming in exchange for public assistance.  On June 3, 1996, the state filed a 
motion for an order to show cause and an affidavit in support of the motion, 
stating the father failed to pay child support in accordance with the divorce 
decree.  The state claimed that, for 
the period of July 1981 through April 30, 1996, the father owed $39,129.69 in 
past due child support.  The 
district court found the father in contempt of court at a June 12, 1996, hearing 
and gave him the opportunity to purge himself of the contempt.  The father failed to purge himself of 
the contempt, and the district court adjudged him guilty of contempt of 
court.  The court sentenced him to 
serve five months and twenty-nine days in the county jail.  

 

[¶4]      On August 22, 
2000, the state filed another affidavit of contempt and a motion for an order to 
show cause, alleging the father failed to pay child support as required by the 
divorce decree.  The state averred 
that the father was now delinquent in his child support payments in the sum of 
$49,379.69 for the period of July 1, 1981, through July 31, 2000.  The district court ordered the father to 
appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing 
to comply with the child support order.  
The district court employed the procedure set forth in the Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure in conducting the father's initial appearance.  The father pleaded not guilty to the 
contempt-of-court charge, and the district court released him on his own 
recognizance.  

 

[¶5]      The father filed 
a motion to dismiss the order to show cause, claiming the second contempt 
proceeding was barred by the constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy.  The district court heard 
arguments on the father's motion to dismiss just prior to the trial on the 
contempt charge.  The state asserted 
the father was not exposed to double jeopardy because the second contempt 
proceeding was civil rather than criminal.  
The district court agreed with the state and denied the father's 
motion.  The court then proceeded 
with the trial and found the father in contempt of court.  It entered a judgment of arrears in the 
amount of $49,399.69.  The district 
court ordered the father to make payments of $50 per month on the judgment and 
to notify the court of his efforts to obtain employment and any changes in his 
address or telephone number.  The 
father appealed.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      Generally, in 
domestic relations contempt cases, "[w]e will not disturb the decision of the 
trial court . . . in the absence of some serious procedural error, a 
violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse of 
discretion.'"  Crites v. 
Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 313 (Wyo. 1989)).  In the 
case at bar, the father presents a constitutional question of law which we 
review de novo.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 929 
(Wyo. 1999); see also Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 924 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Although the 
father's argument is somewhat difficult to understand, he apparently  claims he was twice 
placed 
in jeopardy for the same offense when he was prosecuted on two occasions for 
contempt of court for failing to pay child support.  The Department of Family Services 
maintains the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply 
in this case because the second proceeding was a civil contempt 
action.

 

[¶8]      Under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, a person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same 
criminal offense.  The 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides three protections to 
persons accused of crimes:  "It 
protects the accused who has been acquitted against a second prosecution for the 
same offense; it protects the accused who has been convicted against a second 
prosecution for the same offense; and it protects the accused against multiple 
punishments of the same offense."  
Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864 (Wyo. 1992); see also Lee v. 
State, 2001 WY 129, ¶20; Bilderback 
v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 (Wyo. 
2000); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that nonsummary criminal contempt is a crime for 
the purposes of a double jeopardy analysis.  See, e.g., International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).  

 

[¶9]      The Department of 
Family Services concedes the 1996 proceeding involved a criminal contempt.  A second prosecution for criminal 
contempt involving failure to make child support payments from 1981 through 1996 
would, therefore, be barred by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  The second contempt proceeding 
encompassed a longer time frame (1981 through 2000) which overlapped the time 
frame of the first criminal contempt conviction.  Consequently, we must determine whether 
the second proceeding against the father involved a criminal contempt of court 
or a civil contempt of court.

 

[¶10]   We distinguish between criminal 
contempt and civil contempt by determining the purpose of the contempt 
order.  Anderson v. Anderson, 
667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo. 1983); Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial 
District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 
(Wyo. 1982).  The 
purpose of a civil contempt is to coerce a party into complying with a prior 
court order, while the purpose of a criminal contempt is to punish a party who 
failed to comply with a prior order.  
GN v. 
State (In re C.N.), 816 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Wyo. 1991); Horn, 
647 P.2d  at 1373.  In other 
words:  "If the penalty is intended 
to operate in a prospective manner so as to bring about compliance with an order 
of the court, then it relates to civil contempt.  If, however, the penalty is 
unconditional and imposed to vindicate a prior transgression against the court, 
then criminal contempt is involved."  
Anderson, 667 P.2d  at 662 (citing Shillitani v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966)).

 

 [¶11]  In United 
Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Company, 774 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 1989), we 
summarized Wyoming case law pertaining to contempt and identified certain 
factors which may be considered in determining whether a contempt is civil or 
criminal: 

 

1.  In 
what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to do an 
affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not to 
do;

 

2.  what 
was the substance of the proceeding;

 

3.  what 
kind of punishment was imposed; and

 

4.  for 
what reasons did the court impose that kind of punishment.

 

In the 
case at bar, the contempt proceeding was initiated by the State of Wyoming 
because the father did not pay child support in accordance with the district 
court's earlier order.  Thus, the 
alleged contemptuous conduct was the father's refusal to perform an affirmative 
act which had previously been ordered by the district court.  This factor suggests the action was 
civil rather than criminal.

 

[¶12]   The substance of the contempt 
action is determined by looking at the course of proceedings in the case.  See United Mine Workers, 774 P.2d  
at 1280-81.  The state filed a 
motion for an order to show cause, and the district court issued a show cause 
order.  The district court conducted 
the contempt proceeding by utilizing the procedure set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 
42(c).  At the January 4, 2001, 
hearing, the state declared the purpose of its motion was to collect past due 
child support.  The state's attorney 
stated:

 

Your 
Honor, the state's argument is simply that I want to make it very clear that the 
state is bringing its action for contempt as an indirect civil contempt of 
court.  And that can be 
distinguished from a criminal contempt of court in that [the father] would have 
the ability to purge himself of contempt if indeed this Court finds him to be in 
contempt of court for failing to pay support as ordered.

 

I want 
to make clear to the Court that I am not going to be requesting jail time at 
this hearing . . . .

 

[¶13]   The father claims that, because the 
district court followed the procedure set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 42, the proceeding 
was criminal in nature.  He is, 
however, mistaken.  The Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly recognize the possibility of imposing 
either criminal or civil sanctions for contempt of court.  W.R.Cr.P. 42, 42.1.  W.R.Cr.P. 42.1(b) states in relevant 
part:  "If, after notice and 
hearing, the court finds that a person has failed or refused to perform an act 
that is yet within the person's power to perform, the court may find the person 
in civil contempt of court."  Under 
the clear language of this rule, the fact that the district court afforded the 
father the protections and advisements provided by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not automatically render the proceeding criminal in nature.  Rather, our review of the course of 
proceedings in this case confirms the contempt action was intended to force the 
father to comply with the child support order rather than to punish him for his 
noncompliance.  This factor suggests 
civil contempt.

 

[¶14]   We will consider the last two 
factors outlined in United Mine Workers together; i.e., the kind 
of punishment imposed and the reasons for the punishment.  The district court found the father in 
contempt of court and reduced the child support arrearage to a judgment.  It ordered the father to pay $50 per 
month toward satisfying the judgment.  
The district court also ordered him to provide proof of his efforts to 
find employment and to notify the court of any changes in his employment, 
address, or telephone number.  The 
obvious purpose of the district court's contempt order was to force the father 
to pay his past due child support.  
These factors weigh in favor of finding the character of the contempt 
proceeding was civil.

 

[¶15]   Our application of the United 
Mine Workers factors to this case reveals that the dominant characteristic 
of the second contempt proceeding was remedial rather than punitive.  When a court is seeking to force the 
contemnor to comply with a prior court order  rather than to punish him, the contempt 
is civil and not criminal in nature.  
GN, 816 P.2d  
at 1285; Horn, 647 P.2d  at 
1373.  The constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy was not implicated in this case because the 
father was not subjected to successive criminal prosecutions for the same 
offense.  See Amrein, 
836 P.2d  at 864; Dixon, 509 U.S.  at 696.  The district 
court did not violate the father's constitutional rights.2  

 

[¶16]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1Apparently, a 
fourth child was born to the parties after they were divorced.  The appellate record contains a number 
of documents pertaining to a case involving this child.  That case has no bearing on our decision 
herein.  

  
2The father 
limited his appellate argument to the constitutional issue.  We will not, therefore, address the 
Department of Family Service's second issue in which it argues that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it found the father guilty of indirect 
civil contempt of court.