Title: CRB v. State, Dept. of Family Services

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CRB v. State, Dept. of Family Services1999 WY 19974 P.2d 931Case Number: C-98-5Decided: 02/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CRB, 
Appellant (Respondent),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES; State of Wyoming, ex rel., Unborn S, minor child, 
Appellees (Petitioners), and LS, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

G. Kevin Keller, 
Cheyenne, WY, Representing Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Harry D. Ivey, 
Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Ivey, Representing Appellee State 
of Wyoming.

Alexander K. 
Davison and Peter C. Nicolaysen, Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, WY. Argument by 
Mr. Nicolaysen, Representing Appellee LS.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant CRB 
appeals from an order of the district court determining paternity and setting 
child support payments. Appellant challenges the efficacy of the service of 
process and the service of a notice to appear on his 
attorney.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      CRB presents two 
issues for our consideration:

I. The trial 
court erred in entering judgment against the Appellant after he failed to appear 
at a hearing for which he was never served with notice of such 
hearing.

II. The trial 
court erred in determining that jurisdiction exists when service of process is 
not performed in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

[¶4]      Appellee 
Department of Family Services (DFS) rephrases the issues 
thus:

I. Whether 
proper service occurred where Appellant attempted to avoid service by refusing 
to open his apartment door and where the process server placed the summons and 
complaint in Appellant's mailbox and told Appellant that he had been 
served?

II. Whether the 
Defendant was properly served when the Appellant's attorney was served after the 
attorney had provided representation for over six months and had not withdrawn 
from representation?

[¶5]      Appellee mother 
LS's statement of the issues is substantially similar to those presented by 
DFS:

1. Whether 
proper service occurred where Appellant attempted to avoid service by refusing 
to open his apartment door resulting in the process server placing the summons 
and complaint in Appellant's mailbox and telling Appellant that he had been 
served.

2. Whether the 
notice to appear was valid when it was not served on Appellant personally, but 
was served on Appellant's attorney who had appeared in this matter to contest 
jurisdiction and had not withdrawn.

FACTS

[¶6]      On June 3, 1997, 
the State of Wyoming, through the DFS, filed a Petition to Establish Paternity 
and Support in the First Judicial District Court. The Petition alleged that CRB 
was the putative father of the then unborn child of LS. An order was issued by 
the district court requiring LS and CRB to appear at an informal hearing on 
August 25, 1997.

[¶7]      At the time, CRB 
was residing in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Personal service of the summons, 
petition for paternity and the order to appear at the informal hearing was 
attempted on July 9, 1997. The process server tried to serve CRB at his 
apartment, but CRB refused to open the door to accept service. Confronted with 
the refusal of CRB to open his door, the process server telephoned CRB and, 
while observing CRB through the apartment window, advised CRB he was being 
served and the documents were being placed in CRB's 
mailbox.

[¶8]      Counsel for CRB 
filed a special appearance on August 6, 1997 for the purpose of contesting 
personal jurisdiction on the grounds of insufficient service of process. Neither 
CRB nor his counsel appeared at the August 25, 1997, informal hearing and the 
district court commissioner subsequently issued a report proposing that service 
of process was sufficient and that the paternity petition be set for 
hearing.

[¶9]      While the record 
is not clear, CRB apparently filed a motion to dismiss at some point after the 
commissioner's report was issued. In response, the district court found that a 
prima facie showing had been made that CRB was subject to the court's 
jurisdiction and CRB had failed to present facts proving otherwise. The district 
court, however, gave CRB until September 30, 1997, to file affidavits in support 
of his contention that there was a lack of jurisdiction. On September 29, 1997, 
CRB filed an Objection to Jurisdiction along with supporting affidavits. The 
district court issued a decision letter on October 8, 1997, concluding that, in 
light of the circumstances, service of process was sufficient. CRB filed a 
motion for reconsideration on the issue, which was denied by the district court 
on January 13, 1998.

[¶10]   The paternity petition was then set 
for hearing and an order requiring CRB to appear was issued on February 10, 
1998. The order to appear was served on CRB's counsel on February 27, 
1998.

[¶11]   An informal hearing on the 
paternity petition was held on March 9, 1998, and neither CRB nor his counsel 
appeared. The district court commissioner issued his report with recommendations 
on March 12, 1998. The district court issued its Judgment and Order for 
Paternity and Child Support on April 15, 1998, finding CRB to be the father of 
the child and setting custody, visitation and child support. CRB takes this 
appeal from that Judgment and Order.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   Our standard of review for 
jurisdictional issues, including sufficiency of process, should be familiar to 
every litigant. The Wyoming Supreme Court "has the inherent power, and the duty, 
to address jurisdictional defects on appeal even though they have not been 
called to our attention by a litigant." Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water and 
Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wyo. 1990). "The first and fundamental 
question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question cannot be 
waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is 
raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own motion." 
Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 599 (Wyo. 1962). When a lower court acts 
without jurisdiction, this court will notice the defect and have jurisdiction on 
appeal, not on the merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of 
the lower court in maintaining the suit. United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 
440, 56 S. Ct. 829, 832, 80 L. Ed. 1263, reh'g denied 298 U.S. 692, 56 S. Ct. 951, 
80 L. Ed. 1410 (1936).

Gookin v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992). Service of process 
must strictly comply with the requirements set forth in W.R.C.P. 4. MN v. CS, 
908 P.2d 414, 415 (Wyo. 1995). Proper service of process is a necessary 
condition precedent to the acquisition of personal jurisdiction under the 
Wyoming and federal Constitutions. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1; Gookin, 826 P.2d  at 232.

DISCUSSION

Service of 
Process

[¶13]   CRB contends that service of 
process was insufficient under W.R.C.P. 4(d) because the summons and complaint 
were not delivered either to him personally or to another person over the age of 
fourteen years residing at his dwelling house or usual place of abode. 
Additionally, CRB argues that even accepting the District Court's finding that 
"in hand" delivery is not required so long as the person to be served is in 
close proximity to the process server, service was still insufficient because 
the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that it was CRB who was in the 
apartment at the time service was attempted.

[¶14]   The requirements for personal 
service of process over an individual are set forth in W.R.C.P. 4(d)(1) 
(emphasis added):

(d) Personal 
service - . . . Service shall be made as follows:

(1) Upon an 
individual other than a person under 14 years of age or an incompetent person, 
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual 
personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person over the age of 14 years then residing 
therein, or at the defendant's usual place of business with an employee of the 
defendant then in charge of such place of business, or by delivering a copy of 
the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law 
to receive service of process[.]

[¶15]   We are confronted with the question 
of what constitutes delivery of "a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 
the individual personally" in a situation where the defendant is aware that 
service is being attempted and seeks to avoid service by refusing to open his 
door to accept service. While this Court has not directly addressed this issue 
in this context, other authorities have:

While personal 
service of process does not require "in hand" delivery, it should not become a 
game of wiles and tricks and a defendant should not be able to defeat service 
simply by refusing to accept the papers or by instructing others to reject 
service. Even though a defendant refuses physical acceptance of a summons, 
service is complete if a defendant is in close proximity to a process server 
under such circumstances that a reasonable person would be convinced that 
personal service of the summons is being attempted. . . . A process server may 
leave the summons outside of the door of a structure, informing the defendant 
that he is so doing, where the defendant interposes the door between himself and 
the process server.

62B Am.Jur.2d, 
Process, § 204 (1990) (citations omitted). Several state courts have also held 
that where the defendant attempts to avoid service by interposing a door between 
the defendant and the process server, service is sufficient if the summons is 
left in close proximity to the defendant. The Georgia Court of Appeals, under a 
statute with language substantially similar to W.R.C.P. 4, held that where 
service was avoided by refusing to open a door to accept it and the summons was 
left on the ground outside of the door service was sufficient. Jacobson v. 
Garland, 227 Ga. App. 81, 487 S.E.2d 640 (1997).

It is the duty 
of a defendant to accept and submit to the service of process when he is aware 
of the process server's purpose . . . It is generally held that if the process 
server and the defendant are within speaking distance of each other, and such 
action is taken as to convince a reasonable person that personal service is 
being attempted, service cannot be avoided by physically refusing to accept the 
summons.

Jacobson at 642 
(citations omitted); see also Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 
1987); Bossuk v. Steinberg, 58 N Y2d 916, 460 N.Y.S.2d 509, 447 N.E.2d 56 
(1983). Many federal courts have reached a similar conclusion. See 4A Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 
1095 (1987 & 1998 Supp.) and cases cited therein.

[¶16]   In this instance, CRB refused to 
open his apartment door to accept service1. In response, the process server 
called CRB while still outside the apartment and informed him that he had papers 
to serve on him. When CRB continued to refuse to open the door, the process 
server informed CRB that he would deposit the summons and complaint in CRB's 
mailbox.

[¶17]   CRB engaged in conduct within the 
State of Wyoming which carried with it certain potential consequences, including 
legal obligations. See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-101, et seq. (Michie 
1997). CRB cannot attempt to evade those obligations by avoiding service of 
process. The record is clear that CRB knew service was being attempted and he 
deliberately attempted to avoid that service. Under these circumstances, the 
process server took appropriate action by informing CRB at that time that he was 
being served and then leaving the summons and complaint in a location where CRB 
was likely to find them. The rules governing service of process are intended to 
give a defendant reasonable notice that an action has been brought against them. 
Gookin, 826 P.2d  at 233 quoting Kulko v. Superior Court of California In and For 
City and County of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 3127, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (1978). 
In this instance, despite the best efforts of CRB, he was given reasonable 
notice of the action against him and, therefore, service under the circumstances 
of this case was sufficient.

Service on 
Attorney

[¶18]   After the district court found that 
it had personal jurisdiction over CRB through sufficient service of process, an 
order was issued setting an informal hearing on the substantive issues contained 
in the paternity petition. CRB contends that service of the notice of the 
informal hearing on his attorney was improper since the attorney had entered a 
limited appearance strictly for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction and that 
once the motions contesting personal jurisdiction had been denied, the attorney 
had completed his representation. Consequently, CRB asserts that he was denied 
due process since he did not have notice of the hearing and could not contest 
the merits of the paternity petition.

[¶19]   Historically under code pleading, a 
party contesting service of process was required to make a special appearance to 
assert such a defense. UMWA Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1282 
(Wyo. 1989) quoting State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court of Fourth Judicial 
District, in and for Johnson County, 426 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wyo. 1967). Following 
the adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the distinction between 
special and general appearances was eliminated. Colley v. Dyer, 821 P.2d 565, 
567 n. 2 (Wyo. 1991). Today, W.R.C.P. 12(b) allows a defendant, at his option, 
to assert the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by motion and, indeed, he 
must do so or it is waived. State ex rel. Sheehan, 426 P.2d  at 436. Thus there 
no longer exists, under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, provision for 
special or limited appearances for the purposes of challenging 
jurisdiction.

[¶20]   In this case, once CRB's attorney 
had made an appearance on his behalf in the district court, the Uniform Rules 
for District Courts of the State of Wyoming came into play. Specifically, Rule 
102 sets forth the following:

Appearance and 
withdrawal of counsel.

(a)

(1) An attorney 
appears in a case:

(A) By attending 
any proceeding as counsel for any party;

(B) By 
permitting the attorney's name to appear on any pleadings or motions; 
or

(C) By a written 
appearance.

(2) An appearing 
attorney shall be considered as representing the party or parties for whom the 
attorney appears for all purposes.

(b) All 
pleadings shall contain the name, address and telephone number of counsel or, if 
pro se, the party. All notices shall be mailed to the address provided. Each 
party or counsel shall give notice in writing of any change of address to the 
clerk and other parties.

(c) Counsel will 
not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order. Except in the 
case of extraordinary circumstances, the court shall condition withdrawal of 
counsel upon the substitution of other counsel by written appearance. In the 
alternative, the court shall allow withdrawal upon a statement submitted by the 
client acknowledging the withdrawal of counsel for the client, and stating a 
desire to proceed pro se. (Emphasis added).

By filing a 
written appearance in the district court, CRB's attorney appeared for all 
purposes related to this particular proceeding, and, under Rule 102, he could 
not withdraw without the approval of the district court. There is nothing in the 
record, and CRB has not alleged, that his attorney ever made any request to the 
district court to withdraw. Therefore, after the district court had ruled 
adversely on the jurisdictional question, CRB's attorney was still his counsel 
for all matters related to this proceeding.

[¶21]   Since CRB was still represented by 
counsel, the service of the notice of the informal hearing upon that counsel was 
appropriate under W.R.C.P. 5(b). In fact, W.R.C.P. 5(b), which secures the due 
process right to notice, mandates service on the attorney for a party. Loghry v. 
Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Wyo. 1996). Therefore, proper notice was provided 
to CRB and there is no due process violation.

CONCLUSION

[¶22]   Service of process on CRB by 
leaving the summons and complaint in his mailbox was sufficient given that CRB 
had refused to accept service and CRB was told that the summons and complaint 
would be left in close proximity to CRB such that he could easily retrieve the 
documents. In addition, once CRB's attorney had made an appearance, it was for 
all purposes related to this proceeding until the district court allowed CRB's 
attorney to withdraw. Therefore, under W.R.C.P. 5(b) subsequent service of the 
notice of an informal hearing was appropriately served on that 
attorney.

[¶23]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In his 
brief, CRB contends that the process server could not be certain that the person 
he talked to at the apartment was CRB or someone over 14 who resided there at 
the time and, given that uncertainty, service was not sufficient. However, in 
CRB's affidavit filed in the District Court, he admits that it was he who talked 
to the process server.