Title: STATE v HALL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13084 IN THE SUPKEMli COURT OF THE STATE OF WNTANA 1976 STATE O F MON'IAXA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - JOSEPH THERON HALL, Defendant and Appellanr. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh Judicia 1 D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record : For Appellant: nonald L. S h a f f e r argued, Libby, Montana For Aespondent : Hon. Robert Td. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 'dilliam J. Anderson, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana 'dilliam A. Douglas argued, County Attorney, Libby, Yontana Submitted: August 30, 1976 !)ecided: ~ t p 2 ; M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Lincoln County, on a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of grand larceny. Sometime during the weekend of August 17 t o August 20, 1973, a food storage t r a i l e r and cookhouse of the Canyon Logging Company, where defendant Joseph Theron Hall had been employed as a cook for some time, were broken into and a large quantity of foodstuffs taken. A t the time of t h i s break i n the camp, located a t Bunker H i l l near Eureka, Montana, was closed due t o f i r e conditions i n the area. The break in was discovered on August 20, 1973, by the logging supervisor who had gone to the camp t o be certain it was closed down properly. Investigation by the Lincoln County sheriff's department resulted i n the f i l i n g of an Information i n d i s t r i c t court, December 5, 1974, charging defendant with the felonies of f i r s t degree burglary and grand larceny. The Infor- mation stated the offenses charged occurred "on or about the 19th day of August, 1973." O n December 6, 1974, defendant's counsel f i l e d a notice of intent t o rely on the defense of a l i b i and a l i s t of supportive witnesses, pursuant t o the requirements of section 95-1803(d), R.C.M. 1947. T r i a l held on t h i s matter was commenced February 24, 1975. A t conclusion of the s t a t e ' s case, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing the charge of burglary i n the f i r s t degree was granted. Defendant also moved for a directed verdict on the charge of grand larceny based on the allegation that the s t a t e ' s evidence was not sufficiently specific as to t i m e of the offense. This motion w a s denied. The s t a t e offered proof indicating t h e offense charged could have taken place anytime between the e a r l y evening, Friday, August 17, t o noon Monday, August 20, 1973. A t t r i a l defendant's defense consisted mainly of testimony of several a l i b i witnesses f o r the period from the night of August 18, 1973 through the morning of August 20, 1973. N o testimony w a s presented regarding the period p r i o r t o t h a t time. Defendant argues on appeal t h a t the s t a t e ' s proof t h a t the offense could have occurred over a three day period was i n variance with the Information date of August 19, 1973, and denied him f a i r notice t o defend with a l i b i witnesses f o r August 17 and 18. This appeal i s from the judgment and the order denying a motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r defendant w a s found g u i l t y of grand larceny. Section 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947, i n pertinent p a r t , s t a t e s a charge s h a l l : " (c) Charge t h e commission of an offense by: "(4) s t a t i n g t h e time and place of the offense a s d e f i n i t e l y as can be done * * *." (~mphasis added.) I n S t a t e ex r e l . Borberg v. D i s t r i c t Court, 125 Mont. 481, 488, 489, 240 P.2d 854, t h i s Court stated: "Perfection i s not required i n the pleading of a criminal cause * * * [and] is seldom attained * * *.I' The Court a l s o s t a t e d i n Borberg: "* * *the use of the phrase 'on o r about' a c e r t a i n day of a c e r t a i n month i n the year 1950 i n charging such offense simply indicates t h a t the time alleged w a s s t a t e d with approximate accuracy. S t a t e v. Terry, 77 Mont. 297, 250 Pac. 612; S t a t e v. Thompson, 10 Mont. 549, 27 Pac. 349." The- use of approximate date language should have served t o put the defendant on notice the s t a t e intended t o prove the crime was committed within a reasonable period of time prior t o or subsequent t o the date on the Information. The location of the break i n and the difficulty i n determining the exact time of the offense dictated the s t a t e ' s use of the less precise "on or about" language. Defendant concedes time is not ordinarily a necessary ingred- ient of the offense of grand larceny. He argues, however, that notice of intent t o rely on a defense of a l i b i a s required by section 95-1803(d), R.C.M. 1947, gives the s t a t e notice time may become an essential fact of the proof required t o convict the accused. Assertion of the a l i b i defense does not change the nature of the crime charged here. Defendant should have rea.lized the s t a t e would present evidence proving the crime took place sometime i n the period between shutdown of the camp and discovery of the break in. Defendant cannot r e s t r i c t the s t a t e ' s case by merely asserting intent t o rely on an a l i b i defense for a limited period of time within which the crime could have occurred. Further, i n requesting a new t r i a l , defendant failed t o seek the proper r e l i e f i f he wished t o protect himself from any prejudice allegedly incurred by use of an approximate date i n the charging Information and the proof offered a t t r i a l . The action suggested i n State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 4, 77 P, 293, would have been appropriate. In that case, under circumstances very similar t o those presented here, the Court said: "* * * the defendant might not be prepared to prove an a l i b i as t o any day except that named i n the information. But the defendant i n such a case may protect himself by asking for permission t o subpoena other witnesses, or, i f necessary, t o ask for a con- tinuance, and the action of the court thereon would then become a proper sQbject for review on appeal." (Emphasis added.) Section 95-1803(d), R.C.M. 1947, provides i n pertinent part: " * * After the t r i a l commences, no witnesses may be called by the defendant i n support of these defenses, unless the name i s included on such l i s t , except upon good cause shown ." (Emphasis added. ) Even though t h i s section requiring advance notice of the de- fendant's intent t o u t i l i z e an a l i b i defense was not enacted u n t i l 1967, it provides for a modification of the witness l i s t upon a showing of good cause by the defendant, and protects him from the type of prejudice alleged t o have occurred here. I f de- fendant f e l t h i s defense of a l i b i was jeopardized a t the close of the s t a t e ' s case, h i s proper course would be t o seek a continuance to have time t o prepare a suitable defense t o meet the charges raised, Defendant cannot have the best of two worlds. Having elected t o l e t the case go t o the jury, he cannot now complain a f t e r the jury has found him guilty. The judgment is affirmed. W e Concur: /