Title: Brown v. Michael Pryor, M.D., P.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Brown v. Michael Pryor, M.D., P.C.1998 WY 23954 P.2d 1349Case Number: 96-315Decided: 02/27/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Lura A. 
BROWN and Ivan Brown, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

MICHAEL PRYOR, M.D., P.C., a Wyoming Professional 
Corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

 

Juline Christofferson, 
Jackson, for Appellants.

Robert M. Shively of Shively 
Law Offices, Casper, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellants Lura and Ivan Brown (Browns) sued Dr. 
Michael Pryor, appellee, for medical negligence. After a five-day trial, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Pryor and against the Browns. The Browns 
timely appeal the judgment entered on the jury verdict, claiming they were 
prejudiced by the improper admission of a videotaped deposition of Pryor's 
expert witness.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

[¶3] The Browns present a 
single issue for review:

 

Did the trial court err in allowing presentation to 
the jury of the videotaped deposition of appellee's sole expert witness, when 
the deposition did not qualify for admission under W.R.C.P. 
32(a)?

 

[¶4] Pryor states the issue 
as:

 

Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
allowing the jury to view the videotaped deposition of Dr. Pryor's expert 
witness?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶5] The Browns' complaint 
alleged that Pryor negligently breached the standard of medical care when he 
performed two hip replacement surgeries on Lura Brown. In the spring of 1995, 
Pryor retained Dr. Christopher Smith and designated him as an orthopedic expert 
who would testify on Pryor's behalf at trial. At that time, no trial date had 
been set, but a final pretrial conference had been scheduled for August 4, 1995. 
However, in June, the Browns requested and received a six-month continuance due 
to the illness of their attorney. The court subsequently issued an amended 
scheduling order which set trial for May 28, 1996, and extended the discovery 
deadline to March 15, 1996.

 

[¶6] In the meantime, Dr. 
Smith had made arrangements for a fishing trip to the Bahamas which conflicted 
with the rescheduled trial date. Upon learning of the conflict, Pryor notified 
the Browns that a videotaped trial deposition of Dr. Smith would be conducted on 
May 10, 1996. During the pretrial conference on May 7, the Browns objected to 
the use of Dr. Smith's deposition in lieu of live testimony at trial. The court 
overruled the objection. Dr. Smith was deposed on May 13, 1996; counsel for both 
parties were present, and Dr. Smith's testimony was developed through direct, 
cross, and redirect examination.

 

[¶7] The Browns filed a 
motion in limine in a second attempt to exclude Dr. Smith's videotaped 
deposition from trial on the basis that the deposition was taken after the close 
of discovery and was not admissible under W.R.C.P. 32(a). In chambers before 
trial, the court denied the Browns' motion without explanation; and, during 
Pryor's case-in-chief, the videotape was played for the jury. At the close of 
the five-day trial, the jury entered a verdict against the Browns. The Browns 
timely appeal the final judgment entered by the district court in this matter.

 

                                       
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8] Admission of evidence, 
including the admission of depositions, is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court; and we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820, 828 (Wyo. 
1992); Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo. 1989). "A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances." Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. 
Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 923 (Wyo. 1989). The ultimate issue is whether 
the court could reasonably conclude as it did. Id. An abuse of discretion has 
been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances. Waggoner, 771 P.2d  at 1201. 

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] The Browns claim the 
jury's verdict rested largely upon inadmissible hearsay, in the form of Dr. 
Smith's deposition testimony, which they were unable to discredit or contradict 
because Dr. Smith was not present at trial. They contend that the deposition did 
not fall within the hearsay exceptions found in W.R.E. 804 and W.R.C.P. 32(a) 
and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Dr. 
Smith's videotaped deposition in lieu of live testimony.

 

[¶10] Deposition testimony, 
because it is taken outside the presence of the court and jury, is generally 
hearsay within the meaning of Rule 801 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. To the 
extent that it is hearsay, deposition testimony is not admissible except as 
provided by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence or by other rules prescribed by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court or by statute. W.R.E. 802.

 

[¶11] The former testimony 
exception provided in Rule 804(b)(1) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence removes 
the hearsay objection from depositions of unavailable deponents in many 
circumstances. Another exception for deposition testimony is found in Rule 32(a) 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the use of depositions in 
civil cases if certain criteria are satisfied. While there is some overlap 
between W.R.E. 804(b)(1) and W.R.C.P. 32(a), and in many cases the same result 
would obtain under either rule, the two exceptions are independent bases for 
admitting depositions. Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 
962-63 (10th Cir. 1993) (interpreting F.R.E. 804 and F.R.C.P. 32(a), upon which 
Wyoming's rules are modeled). See also WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2143 (1994), 7 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 32.02[1], [3] (3d ed. 1997), and cases cited therein. 
Therefore, a deposition which satisfies either exception can be properly 
admitted without violating the rule against hearsay.

 

[¶12] The district court did 
not provide reasons for overruling the Browns' objections to the deposition 
testimony. However, because the Browns' motion in limine sought to exclude the 
deposition on the basis that it did not meet the criteria of Rule 32(a), we turn 
our attention first to that exception.1

 

[¶13] "Deposition testimony 
is admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 32(a) if it satisfies a three-part 
test." MOORE, supra, § 32.02. First, the testimony must satisfy the "rules of 
evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying" at 
trial. Id. § 32.02[2][a]. This requirement eliminates "technical" hearsay 
objections based on a deponent's mere absence from trial, but permits objections 
based on the content of the testimony, for example, on grounds of relevancy, 
privilege, or competency. See Advisory Committee Note to F.R.C.P. 32 (1970). 
Second, the party against whom the deposition is offered must generally have 
been "present or represented at the taking of the deposition" or "had reasonable 
notice" of it. MOORE, supra, § 32.02[2][b]. These first two criteria are not at 
issue; the Browns made no objection to the content of Dr. Smith's testimony, and 
the record establishes that they were represented at the taking of the 
deposition. 

 

[¶14] The third requirement 
is that the deposition testimony must fall within one of the four categories set 
out in Rule 32(a). MOORE, supra, § 32.02[2][c]. Relevant for our purposes is 
subsection 32(a)(3), which establishes conditions for the use of depositions of 
nonparty witnesses. Rule 32(a)(3)(B) permits such use if the court finds "that 
the witness is absent from the state, unless it appears that the absence of the 
witness was procured by the party offering the deposition." The Browns assert 
that physical absence due to vacation does not make a deposition admissible 
under Rule 32(a)(3)(B). They also suggest that Dr. Smith's absence was procured 
by Pryor because by taking Dr. Smith's deposition, Dr. Smith was free to leave 
on vacation. We disagree on both counts.

 

[¶15] The Browns rely on 
Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330 (Wyo. 1983), where we determined that a 
nonresident witness was absent within the meaning of Rule 32(a)(3)(B). However, 
we did not limit application of that subsection to nonresident witnesses, id. at 
334, and we decline to do so now. The plain language of W.R.C.P. 32(a)(3)(B) 
allows for the admission of depositions when "the witness is absent from the 
state." We hold that absence of the deponent at the time the deposition is 
offered is sufficient to allow the deposition into evidence, and the party 
offering the deposition need not proffer an excuse for the failure of the 
deponent to appear.2 MOORE, supra, § 32.24[4][a]; see 
also Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D.Md. 1962). Dr. 
Smith's deposition testimony, given under oath, sufficiently established that he 
would be absent from the state at the time of trial.

 

[¶16] Neither do we find 
that Pryor procured Dr. Smith's absence by taking his deposition so that he 
could leave the state on vacation.  
"[P]rocuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite 
different things." Houser, 202 F. Supp.  at 189. The word "procured," in the 
context of Rule 32(a)(3)(B), connotes that a party has collusively instigated or 
induced a witness to be absent from trial. MOORE, supra, § 32.24[4][b]. To 
exclude a deposition on this basis requires a showing that the party offering 
the deposition "took steps to keep the deponent[] from setting foot in the 
courtroom." Houser, at 189; see also Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 
204 (1st Cir. 1988). In this case, Dr. Smith testified that his Bahamian 
vacation had been planned since late 1995, before the trial date had even been 
established. Further, had the proceedings not been continued for six months, at 
the Browns' behest, this conflict would not have arisen. The Browns have made no 
showing that Pryor induced Dr. Smith into making his vacation plans or took 
steps to keep Dr. Smith from the courtroom, and this argument is without 
merit.

 

[¶17] The circumstances here 
fit squarely within the language of Rule 32(a)(3)(B). It is undisputed that on 
the date of the trial Dr. Smith would be absent from the state, and no evidence 
was presented to suggest that Pryor procured Dr. Smith's absence within the 
meaning of the rule. Further, the court retains broad discretion to permit 
parties to take additional depositions after the discovery cut-off date, whether 
for discovery or for trial testimony purposes. See Nowotny v. L & B Contract 
Indus., Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 461 (Wyo. 1997); Contreras v. Carbon County School 
Dist. No. 1, 843 P.2d 589, 592 (Wyo. 1992); MOORE, supra, § 32.02[5]. The court 
was presented with an unfortunate situation resulting from a delay in trial due 
to the illness of the Browns' attorney and a key witness' vacation, scheduled 
months in advance, which inadvertently conflicted with the delayed trial date. 
Dr. Smith was Pryor's only expert, and his testimony was essential for Pryor's 
defense against the allegations of the Browns' two experts. We cannot say the 
court's decision to allow the videotaped deposition to proceed exceeded the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In sum, the Browns have failed to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Dr. 
Smith's videotaped deposition into evidence.

 

[¶18] Because we hold that 
Dr. Smith's deposition was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3)(B) of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, we need not consider whether it was independently 
admissible under other subsections of Rule 32(a)(3) or Rule 804 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence.

 

[¶19] 
Affirmed.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1Rule 
32(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant 
part:

 

(a) Use 
of depositions - At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an 
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the 
taking of the deposition or who had

reasonable 
notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions: . . . . 
.

 

(3) The 
deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for 
any purpose if the court finds:

 

          
(A) That the witness is dead;

 

(B) That 
the witness is absent from the state, unless it appears that the absence of the 
witness was procured by the

          
party offering the deposition;

(C) That 
the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, 
or imprisonment;

 

(D) That 
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of 
the witness by subpoena; or

 

(E) Upon 
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it 
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of 
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the 
deposition to be used[.]

  

2The 
Browns also rely on our recent case of Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 
1996), where we held that vacation plans do not amount to an exceptional 
circumstance which justifies the use of a deposition in lieu of live testimony. 
Bloomquist is inapposite to our analysis here for two reasons. First, Bloomquist 
required us to interpret unavailability for purposes of W.R.E. 804 and W.R.Cr.P. 
15, not W.R.C.P. 32(a). Second, the admission of hearsay in criminal cases is 
more strictly scrutinized because a defendant's confrontation rights are 
implicated. Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 887 (Wyo. 
1986).