Title: Rinaldi v. Aaron

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

314 So. 2d 762 (1975)
Alfred RINALDI and Allstate Insurance Company, a Foreign Corporation, Petitioners,
v.
Larry AARON, Respondent.
No. 45935.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 30, 1975.
Joseph A. McGowan, Petersen, McGowan & Feder, Miami, for petitioners.
Sanford H. Kramer and Linda Dakis, Kramer & Telander, Miami, for respondent.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on writ of certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Aaron v. Rinaldi, reported at 296 So. 2d 632 (Fla.App.3, 1974), which purportedly conflicts with International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 675 v. Lassiter, etc., 295 So. 2d 634 (Fla.App.4, 1974), (now pending before us on petition for writ of certiorari). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Respondent filed a complaint for both compensatory and punitive damages for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident with the petitioner who allegedly had operated his motor vehicle in such a reckless manner as to evidence a flagrant, malicious and wanton disregard for the values and safety of human life. At *763 the trial, respondent called defendant as an adverse witness, but did not make inquiry into the financial ability of the defendant to pay punitive damages. At the conclusion of respondent's case, petitioner moved to strike respondent's claim for punitive damages on the ground that respondent did not present any evidence of the petitioner's financial ability to pay an award of punitive damages. The trial judge granted this motion to strike and thereby withdrew from the jury's consideration the issue of punitive damages. Respondent filed motion for new trial. After argument and submission of memoranda of law by the parties, the trial court certified the following question to the District Court of Appeal, Third District:
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, opined:
We agree with the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, that in determining the amount of punitive damages, the jury may consider the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing it and all circumstances attending the particular incident, as well as any mitigating circumstances which may operate to reduce without wholly defeating such damages, including financial position of defendant but that the evidence of financial position may not be considered in passing upon the question of law as to whether the case is one in which punitive damages may be allowed.
This Court has consistently held that evidence of defendant's financial ability to pay punitive damages is admissible, that is to say that it is permissible when considering punitive damages to allow the introduction of evidence of financial worth. Cf. Buie v. Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville, 266 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1972); Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1966); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957); Dr. P. *764 Phillips & Sons, Inc. v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So. 2d 465 (1943); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936); Jones et al. v. Greeley, 25 Fla. 629, 6 So. 448 (1889). Cf. Florida Standard Jury Instruction 6.12, Punitive Damages. See also: Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Pogue, 280 So. 2d 512 (Fla.App.1, 1973); Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262 So. 2d 258 (Fla.App.1, 1972); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla.App.3, 1971); Lewis v. Moody, 195 So. 2d 260 (Fla.App.3, 1967); Mendoza v. Farrell, 199 So. 2d 750 (Fla.App.3, 1967); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App.1, 1959); Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg. of Fla., Inc., 106 So. 2d 233 (Fla.App.3, 1958). Although this Court has held that in determining punitive damages such evidence of financial worth is admissible, the question presented sub judice as to the necessity of showing financial worth has not been answered by this Court. In the above cited cases, the question before the reviewing courts was the admissibility as contrasted to the necessity of such evidence.
We are constrained to the view stated in 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 322 that "evidence of the financial condition of the defendant is admissible and may be considered by the jury in determining the amount of exemplary or punitive damages to be allowed and what amount of punishment would be inflicted thereby on the theory that the allowance of a given sum would be a greater punishment to a man of small means than to one possessing larger wealth.... But evidence of the defendant's financial position may not be considered in passing upon the question of law as to whether the case is one in which punitive damages may be allowed." and as expressed by the California Appellate Court in Fletcher v. Western National Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970), as follows:
Relative to the proving of punitive damages, Dobbs in his treatise on damages, Dobbs, Remedies at 218, 219, explained:
Cf. Wisner v. Kresge Co., 465 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. App. 1971); Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 144 S.E.2d 151 (1965); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961); Phelan v. Beswick, 213 Or. 612, 326 P.2d 1034 (1958).
In Charles v. Texas Co. et al., 199 S.C. 156, 18 S.E.2d 719 (1942), involving an action *765 for conspiracy wherein the appellant asserted that the verdict for punitive damages against him could not stand for lack of evidence of his financial worth, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held:
Cf. Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958), and Parker v. Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 100 A.2d 434 (1953).
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court of Appeal, Third District, sub judice in answering the certified question posited by the trial court in the negative and we hold that evidence of financial worth is admissible and may be considered by the jury in its determination of the amount to be awarded as punitive damages, but evidence of worth is not a requisite to such award. If defendant's financial worth is meager, it would be to his advantage to introduce such evidence in order to mitigate the damage award. As was stated by Sutherland in his Treatise on Damages, § 404 at 1315, "In cases where it is competent for the plaintiff to prove the wealth of the defendant to increase the damages, it is equally competent for the defendant to show a want of it to diminish them."
Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is approved and the writ is discharged.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., McCAIN and ENGLAND, JJ., and ORLANDO, Circuit Judge, concur.