Title: Johnson v. Montgomery

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Johnson v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7445.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7445 
JOHNSON, APPELLANT, ET AL. v. MONTGOMERY;  THIRTY-EIGHT THIRTY, INC., 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Johnson v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7445.] 
The phrase “intoxicated person” in Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, includes 
not only patrons but also workers, independent contractors, and others 
served by the permit holder—Dram Shop Act applies to determine liability 
of permit holder who sold intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker 
or independent contractor whose intoxication caused an injury. 
(No. 2016-0790—Submitted April 6, 2017—Decided September 6, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
Nos. 26319 and 26322, 2016-Ohio-1472. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Under Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, someone injured by an 
“intoxicated person” may sue a liquor-permit holder for an off-premises injury only 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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when the permit holder or its employee served the person knowing her to be 
intoxicated or underage.  This case, which has reached us by way of a discretionary 
appeal, involves a dancer at a strip club who left the club intoxicated and caused an 
accident on her way home.  The question is whether the dancer qualifies as an 
“intoxicated person” under the statute or whether the term encompasses only the 
permit holder’s patrons.  The plain language of the statute provides the answer: the 
ordinary meaning of “person” includes not only patrons but also dancers, workers, 
independent contractors, and others served by the permit holder.  Thus, the accident 
victim may pursue a claim against the club only under the Dram Shop Act. 
I.  An Intoxicated Strip-Club Dancer Causes an Accident 
{¶ 2} Nichole Johnson was severely injured when the car in which she was 
a passenger was struck by another car.  The other car was driven by Mary 
Montgomery, who had just finished her shift as a dancer at a strip club known as 
The Living Room.  Montgomery admitted that she was intoxicated when she left 
the club:  she had ingested cocaine that day, and while working, she had drunk “a 
few” beers that had been purchased for her by customers. 
{¶ 3} Drinking while working was not unusual at The Living Room.  
Although not required to drink, the dancers did so as a matter of course, often to 
embolden themselves to perform.  The practice was encouraged by the club’s 
waitresses, who urged customers to buy drinks for the dancers.  Thirty-Eight Thirty, 
Inc., which operated The Living Room, benefited from the dancers’ drinking: the 
club charged a higher price for drinks purchased for dancers.  According to Michael 
C. Ferraro, the sole officer and shareholder of Thirty-Eight Thirty, 95 percent of 
the club’s profits came from alcohol sales, and 30 to 40 percent of the alcohol sold 
was purchased by customers for the dancers. Virtually no limits were placed on 
how much a dancer could drink while working.  And while Ferraro claimed that a 
dancer’s husband or boyfriend would be called in the event the dancer became too 
January Term, 2017 
 
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intoxicated to drive, Montgomery testified that no one had ever arranged a ride 
home for her. 
{¶ 4} Under a contract with Thirty-Eight Thirty, Montgomery paid $30 a 
night to lease space for her dancing.  In return, she kept all the tips from customers.  
She received no wages or compensation from Thirty-Eight Thirty or Ferraro. 
II. The Proceedings Below 
{¶ 5} Johnson filed a complaint asserting common-law-negligence claims 
against Montgomery, Ferraro, and Thirty-Eight Thirty and a claim for violation of 
the Dram Shop Act against Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro.  A default judgment 
was rendered against Montgomery.  The claims against Thirty-Eight Thirty and 
Ferraro were tried to a jury.  At the conclusion of Johnson’s case, a magistrate 
directed a verdict in favor of Ferraro as to his personal liability and in favor of 
Thirty-Eight Thirty as to its liability under the Dram Shop Act.  Thirty-Eight 
Thirty’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of common-law negligence was 
denied.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson for $2,854,645.55 on the 
negligence claim.  The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered 
judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. 
{¶ 6} Johnson appealed the trial court’s judgment directing a verdict for 
Ferraro on the issue of personal liability.  Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro cross-
appealed.  They argued that outside the Dram Shop Act, Ohio did not recognize a 
cause of action based on negligently furnishing a tortfeasor with intoxicating 
beverages and that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on common-
law negligence.  The Second District agreed and concluded that because the Dram 
Shop Act provided the exclusive cause of action against Thirty-Eight Thirty, the 
trial court had erred when it allowed the issue of common-law negligence to go to 
the jury.  Thus, the judgment against Thirty-Eight Thirty on the common-law-
negligence claim was reversed.  The reversal of that verdict rendered moot the 
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question of Ferraro’s personal liability.  We accepted Johnson’s discretionary 
appeal.  146 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2016-Ohio-5792, 58 N.E.3d 1173. 
III.  Ohio’s Dram Shop Act 
{¶ 7} “The Ohio Dramshop Act, R.C. 4399.18, embodies [the] general, 
common-law rule that a person (or his representative) may not maintain a cause of 
action against a liquor permit holder for injury resulting from the acts of an 
intoxicated person.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 86 Ohio 
St.3d 419, 421, 715 N.E.2d 536 (1999).  Liability attaches only under the limited 
circumstances prescribed by the statute.  Johnson maintains that the Dram Shop Act 
does not apply under the facts of this case and that Thirty-Eight Thirty’s liability 
for her injuries should be determined under common-law-negligence principles.  
The gist of Johnson’s argument is that the statute determines a permit holder’s 
liability only with respect to acts by its patrons, not by its workers or independent 
contractors.1   
{¶ 8} Our starting point is the language of the statute: 
 
Notwithstanding division (A) of section 2307.60 of the 
Revised Code and except as otherwise provided in this section, no 
person * * * who suffers personal injury, death, or property damage 
as a result of the actions of an intoxicated person has a cause of 
action against any liquor permit holder or an employee of a liquor 
permit holder who sold beer or intoxicating liquor to the intoxicated 
person unless the personal injury, death, or property damage 
occurred on the permit holder’s premises or in a parking lot under 
the control of the permit holder and was proximately caused by the 
negligence of the permit holder or an employee of the permit holder. 
                                                 
1 Johnson does not suggest that Montgomery was an employee of Thirty-Eight Thirty. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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A person has a cause of action against a permit holder or an 
employee of a permit holder for personal injury, death, or property 
damage caused by the negligent actions of an intoxicated person 
occurring off the premises or away from a parking lot under the 
permit holder’s control only when both of the following can be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(A) The permit holder or an employee of the permit holder 
knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to at least one of the 
following: 
(1) A noticeably intoxicated person in violation of division 
(B) of section 4301.22 of the Revised Code; 
(2) A person in violation of section 4301.69 of the Revised 
Code. 
(B) The person’s intoxication proximately caused the 
personal injury, death, or property damage. 
 
R.C. 4399.18. 
{¶ 9} The statute is straightforward.  The only cause of action against a 
liquor-permit holder for off-premises injuries caused by an intoxicated person 
arises when the permit holder (or an employee) knowingly sells alcoholic drinks to 
a noticeably intoxicated person or an underage person.  What constitutes a sale is 
defined broadly:  “ ‘[S]ale’ and ‘sell’ include exchange, barter, gift, offer for sale, 
sale, distribution and delivery of any kind, and the transfer of title or possession of 
beer and intoxicating liquor either by constructive or actual delivery by any means 
or devices whatever * * *.”  R.C. 4301.01(A)(2).  So the Dram Shop Act applies 
even if the beer or liquor was not purchased directly by the intoxicated person but 
was purchased by someone else and given to her. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10} Johnson does not dispute that when the Dram Shop Act applies to a 
given set of facts, it provides the exclusive basis for relief again a permit holder.2  
But she maintains that the statute does not apply here, because Montgomery was 
not the club’s customer; she was its worker or its independent contractor.  Thus, 
she argues that Thirty-Eight Thirty’s liability is based in common-law negligence, 
not the Dram Shop Act.  In Johnson’s view, “intoxicated person” really means 
“intoxicated patron”—a reading she claims is supported by the language and 
legislative history of the statute. 
A.  “Person” Means Person, and a Dancer Is a Person 
{¶ 11} Johnson insists that the Dram Shop Act’s limitation of a permit 
holder’s liability to situations in which it “knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage 
to * * * [a] noticeably intoxicated person” means that the statute covers claims 
involving only a permit holder’s patrons, not its workers or independent 
contractors.  She notes that this court and others have referred to “patrons” when 
discussing the Dram Shop Act.  For example, in Klever, 86 Ohio St.3d at 421, 715 
N.E.2d 536, we noted that the appellee’s claim was that “the Ohio Dramshop Act 
allows a cause of action by an intoxicated, underage patron (or his representative) 
against a liquor permit holder for injuries (or death) that the intoxicated, underage 
patron inflicts upon himself.”  And we held in that case that “in Ohio there is no 
cause of action against a liquor permit holder by a voluntarily intoxicated patron 
(or his representative) who is ‘underage’ pursuant to R.C. 4301.22(A)(1) and 
4301.69, but who has attained the age of majority, for self-inflicted injury (or death) 
due to being intoxicated.”  Id. at 423. 
                                                 
2 Amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk Driving of Ohio does challenge the Second Appellate 
District’s conclusion regarding the exclusivity of the Dram Shop Act as a remedy, but we will not 
address the issue because it has not been raised by a party to this appeal.  See Wellington v. Mahoning 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 53. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 12} But the decisions cited by Johnson do not squarely address the issue 
whether “intoxicated person” should be interpreted to include only intoxicated 
patrons.  The word “patron” was used in those cases because the allegedly 
intoxicated person was in fact a patron; the word was not intended as a limitation 
on the class of persons covered by the statute.  Notably, the court in Klever did not 
use the word “patron” exclusively when discussing the act.  See Klever at 421 (the 
Dram Shop Act reflects the common-law rule barring suit “against a liquor permit 
holder for injury resulting from the acts of an intoxicated person”). 
{¶ 13} Nothing in our precedents dictates that the word “person” be limited 
to patrons.  When words are not defined in a statute, we give them their “plain, 
everyday meaning.”  Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 
N.E.2d 1386 (1988).  The plain, everyday meaning of “person” is not limited to 
patrons.  A patron or a customer is a person, as is a dancer or a worker or an 
independent contractor.  The statute does not limit the definition of “person” based 
on the individual’s relationship to the permit holder.  We conclude “intoxicated 
person” includes an “intoxicated worker.” 
B.  No Need to Look Beyond the Plain Words of the Statute 
{¶ 14} Despite the plain language of the statute, Johnson urges us to 
interpret it more narrowly to apply only to acts of permit holders’ patrons.  She 
insists that such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the 
Dram Shop Act and with the strong public policy against drunken driving.  But the 
case is determined by the plain language of the statute. 
{¶ 15} When a statute is unambiguous, we need go no further to ascertain 
the legislature’s intent; we apply the statute as written.  State ex rel. Savarese v. 
Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 
(1996).  Here, the statute is unambiguous: liability is imposed upon a permit holder 
only when it knowingly sells beer or liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person.  
Moreover, while we are not indifferent to the steep toll exacted by drunken driving, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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it is not for us to determine whether public policy would be better served by a Dram 
Shop Act that applied only to a permit holder’s sales to its patrons.  “The role of 
this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other 
approach might ‘accord[ ] with good policy. ’ ”  Burrage v. United States, __ U.S. 
__, ___, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014), quoting Badaracco v. Commr. 
of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398, 104 S.Ct. 756, 78 L.Ed.2d 549 (1984).  
Arguments for narrowing the application of the statute are more properly addressed 
to the legislature.  Our review starts and stops with the unambiguous language of 
the statute. 
C.  No Liability Under the Dram Shop Act 
{¶ 16} The Dram Shop Act applies to this situation: Johnson’s injury was 
proximately caused by the negligent actions of an intoxicated person—
Montgomery—away from Thirty-Eight Thirty’s premises.  Under the statute, then, 
neither Thirty-Eight Thirty nor Ferraro could be held liable unless the club (or one 
of its employees) knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to Montgomery when 
she was noticeably intoxicated.  The trial court found that Johnson was not 
noticeably intoxicated—a determination that was not challenged on appeal.  Thus, 
Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro were not liable under the Dram Shop Act. 
{¶ 17} The dissenting justice agrees that we have answered the legal 
question here correctly but doesn’t like the outcome of the case.  Like the dissenting 
justice, we are sympathetic to Johnson’s suffering as a result of her terrible injuries.  
And like the dissenting justice, we do not condone The Living Room’s distasteful 
business practices.  But it is not the role of the court to create out of whole cloth the 
case we want to resolve.  We review the issues that are raised by the appellant.  
Here, the magistrate presiding over Johnson’s jury trial concluded, as a matter of 
law, that she had no cause of action under the Dram Shop Act.  Nowhere—not in 
her objections to the magistrate’s decision, nor in her appeal to the Second District, 
nor in her argument to this court—has Johnson argued that that conclusion was 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
error—plain or otherwise.  To suggest that absent such argument from Johnson, 
this court could sua sponte find plain error here ignores the constraints of appellate 
review.  The dissenting justice’s real quarrel is with the language of the Dram Shop 
Act—its requirement that one “knowingly” sell alcohol to a “noticeably intoxicated 
person” in order to be held liable.  But that fight belongs in the General Assembly. 
{¶ 18} As even the dissenting justice acknowledges, the Dram Shop Act 
applies here.  Because the act applies, Ferraro and the club may not be held liable 
under common-law-negligence principles.  The court of appeals properly vacated 
the judgment against Thirty-Eight Thirty. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 19} As used in Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, the phrase 
“intoxicated person” includes any person, not just a permit holder’s patrons.  Thus, 
the Dram Shop Act applies to determine the liability of a permit holder who sold 
intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker or independent contractor whose 
intoxication causes an injury.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and FRENCH, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Respectfully, I must dissent. 
{¶ 21} I agree with the majority’s answer to the legal question raised in this 
case.  Mary Montgomery was most certainly an “intoxicated person” within the 
meaning of the Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, when she drove home from the strip 
club where she had worked for the night, and caused an accident.  However, under 
the plain language of the first paragraph of the statute, appellant, Nichole Johnson, 
did not have a cause of action against the strip club or its employees, except as 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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provided in R.C. 4399.18.  And that answers the issue raised in this case.  Because 
I believe that the trial court committed plain error when it directed a verdict in favor 
of appellees, Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., and Michael Ferraro, with regard to 
Johnson’s Dram Shop Act claim, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the trial court. 
{¶ 22} In Montgomery’s drunken state, she nearly killed two people.  She 
caused Johnson permanent substantial physical deformities, and the jury found that 
Johnson will ultimately have more than one million dollars in medical costs as a 
result of the accident.  But because a Dram Shop Act claim requires the plaintiff to 
show that the liquor-permit holder or one of its employees knowingly sold an 
intoxicating beverage to a noticeably intoxicated person and the magistrate in this 
case found that there was no “testimony of indicia of intoxication” from a witness 
who saw Montgomery on the night of the accident, the court directed a verdict 
against Johnson on her Dram Shop Act claim. 
{¶ 23} That finding by the magistrate is directly contrary to the evidence 
presented.  Montgomery testified that she was drunk on the night of the accident.  
Montgomery’s intoxication was proven beyond doubt when she was asked, “Now 
while you were working [on the night of the accident] did you become drunk from 
alcohol?” and she answered, “I would think so.”  That answer standing alone was 
sufficient to make the Dram Shop Act claim a question for the jury. 
{¶ 24} A directed verdict is only proper when “the trial court, after 
construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the 
motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could 
come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is 
adverse to such party.”  Civ.R. 50(A)(4).  So the real question here is: Did the 
liquor-permit holder or its employees sell an intoxicating beverage to Montgomery 
when she was noticeably intoxicated?  It is that simple.  And the nonmoving party 
is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 25} Much like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Civ.R. 
12(B)(6), or a motion for summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C), a motion for a directed 
verdict asks a court to terminate litigation without sending fact questions to a jury.  
“This does not involve weighing the evidence,” which “connotes finding facts from 
the evidence submitted; no such role is undertaken by the court in considering a 
motion for a directed verdict.”  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 
68-69, 430 N.E.2d 935 (1982). 
{¶ 26} The facts of this particular case are that Montgomery was 
encouraged by the liquor-permit-holder’s employees to drink while she worked and 
she drank until she was drunk on the night of the accident.  Those are the facts that 
were testified to under oath in front of the jury.  A jury could make a reasonable 
inference that her drunkenness was noticeable to the bartenders who served drinks 
intended for her.  The jury—not the magistrate—was in the best position to decide 
whether to make that inference.  But the magistrate ignored Montgomery’s 
admission that she had been drunk and presumed from the lack of other witness 
testimony that she had not been noticeably intoxicated.  In making that 
presumption, the magistrate determined what “conclusions [could] be drawn from 
the evidence.”  Id. at 69.  That is not permissible when considering a motion for a 
directed verdict.  Id. 
{¶ 27} But to really understand what happened here, one must look at why 
Montgomery was driving drunk that night.  It is beyond comprehension that the 
majority does not address the fact that this entire sordid fact pattern was predictable, 
planned, intentionally created, and designed into a business plan.  Tragically, that 
business plan is now ratified by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Simply stated, the 
liquor-permit holder designed a business that profited when its patrons bought 
intoxicating beverages for the dancers stripping in the bar.  Clearly, the dancers 
were going to have to get home after working, and no arrangements were made to 
ensure that they did not drive drunk.  It is preposterous to suggest that the owner of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the bar had no knowledge, whether actual or imputed, that some of the dancers were 
served drinks when they were noticeably intoxicated. 
{¶ 28} The facts in this case show that the strip club operated on a business 
model that is as unbelievable as it is unconscionable.  The club made 1 percent of 
its revenue by leasing use of the space to dancers for $30 a night to draw and 
entertain clientele.  Four percent of the club’s revenue came from a cover charge 
paid by the clientele.  But a whopping 95 percent of the club’s revenue came from 
alcohol sales.  In addition to the clientele and the dancers, every one of the club’s 
employees was permitted and indeed encouraged to drink, including the security 
guard, the bartenders, and the waitstaff.  Eighty to 85 percent of the dancers drank 
while working, and collectively, the dancers drank between 30 and 40 percent of 
the alcohol consumed on the premises.  Whether a dancer bought a drink for herself 
or a client bought it for her, the bar charged significantly more for drinks sold for 
dancers to drink.  As a result of the upcharge, the drinks sold to or for dancers 
brought upward of half the club’s total revenue.  It is not surprising then that the 
club did not limit the number of drinks a dancer could drink and that no workers at 
the club kept track of how much they drank. 
{¶ 29} The owner of the club even admitted in his testimony that it was 
possible that the staff, who were purportedly trained to identify and deal with 
intoxicated individuals, might be impaired in doing so if they were also drinking.  
The owner of the club testified that there could be as many as 172 dancers on a 
weekly basis driving themselves home from the club after drinking alcohol.  The 
inference is that this dancer, on this night, was intoxicated at the club when she 
received drinks, and drove herself home.  That knowledge, on behalf of the permit 
holder through his employees, is an issue for a jury. 
{¶ 30} It is a high bar for plaintiffs to prove that liquor-permit holders or 
their employees “knowingly” sold alcohol to a “noticeably intoxicated person.”  
R.C. 4399.18(A)(1).  But the bar has crept too high if a person injured by an 
January Term, 2017 
 
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admittedly drunk individual cannot recover under the Dram Shop Act in 
circumstances such as these.  I think the absurdly high burden of proof on Dram 
Shop Act claims operates as an unmistakable poison pill for one of the Dram Shop 
Act’s purposes: “to place a duty on a person selling alcoholic beverages to observe 
and know when a patron is intoxicated.”  Gressman v. McClain, 40 Ohio St.3d 359, 
363, 533 N.E.2d 732 (1988).  Under the current law, bar owners can stick their 
heads in the sand and expect the Dram Shop Act to protect them from liability.  
Instead of allowing bar owners to choose blissful ignorance, we should return to 
the classic method by which society has placed duties on its citizens, best embodied 
in the eloquent words of Judge Cardozo: “The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to 
others within the range of apprehension.”  Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., 248 
N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).  That is the law in Ohio, apparently except 
when liquor-permit holders are involved. 
{¶ 31} These are remarkable circumstances.  Given the business model of 
the club—patrons encouraged to buy drinks for the dancers and dancers encouraged 
to drink—the bartenders had a duty to pay attention to the number of drinks 
provided to the dancers and to their level of intoxication.  After reviewing the 
record, I cannot believe that Montgomery was not a “noticeably intoxicated person” 
when the strip club sold the alcohol that it knew was for her.  R.C. 4399.18(A)(1).  
Selling alcoholic beverages for dancers was how the club made most of its money.  
There was at least enough evidence in the record for a jury to infer that Montgomery 
had been a noticeably intoxicated person when she was served, and therefore, the 
trial court erred in issuing a directed verdict on Johnson’s Dram Shop Act claim. 
{¶ 32} I cannot join the majority, because I am shocked that the law would 
sanction the conduct of this permit holder prior to the accident in which Nichole 
Johnson was injured.  In this extreme case, I would hold that the magistrate’s order 
directing a verdict on Johnson’s Dram Shop Act claim was plain error.  This is one 
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of the “extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require” that we find 
plain error in order “to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Goldfuss v. 
Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997).  I believe that the 
injustice of not holding the liquor-permit holder liable in this case will “have a 
material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial 
proceedings.”  Id.  Contrary to the position the majority takes regarding the 
constraints on our review, we have recognized for nearly 30 years that we “retain 
power to sua sponte consider particular errors under exceptional circumstances,” 
and we conduct that review “under our plain error standard of analysis.”  State v. 
Greer, 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 244, 530 N.E.2d 382 (1988).  It is not that this court 
lacks the authority to avoid an injustice today, it merely lacks the will. 
{¶ 33} I find it hard to believe that the Supreme Court of Ohio is allowing 
this outcome to stand.  This court should not take away a negligence verdict and 
look the other way regarding a Dram Shop Act claim that we can see was 
wrongfully taken away early in the lawsuit.  To do so is to absolve the club entirely 
of responsibility.  I am unable to join a majority decision that absolves from liability 
a liquor-permit holder who encourages the dancers in its club to drink alcohol in 
order to reap enormous profits from the drinks purchased for the dancers, does not 
monitor the intoxication level of the dancers, and then sends them out on the roads 
without ensuring that they are fit to drive. 
{¶ 34} Respectfully, I dissent. 
_________________ 
 
Organ Cole, L.L.P., Douglas R. Cole, Erik J. Clark, and Sean M. Stiff; 
Dennis Mulvihill; and Wright & Schulte, L.L.C., and Stephen D. Behnke, for 
appellant. 
 
Altick & Corwin Co., L.P.A., Jonathan B. Freeman, and Steven E. Bacon; 
and Jeffrey D. Slyman, for appellees, Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., d.b.a. The Living 
Room, and Michael C. Ferraro. 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
state of Ohio. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
Traska Law Firm, L.L.C., Peter D. Traska, Bernadette Matheson, and 
Michelle Molzan Traska, urging reversal for amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving of Ohio. 
_________________