Title: Hoang v. Lowery

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Minh-vu Hoang v. Jeffrey Lowery, No. 17, September Term, 2019, Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
Courts & Judicial Proceedings – Statutes of Limitations – Tolling Provisions – 
Petitions in Insolvency.  The tolling provision of the Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial 
Proceedings Article, § 5-202 applies only to actions that are dismissed by a United States 
Bankruptcy Court pursuant to the dismissal procedures of Title 11 of the United States 
Code.  There is nothing in the plain meaning of the statute, or the legislative history, its 
structure or purpose, which would allow us to broadly define the word “dismissal” to 
include any bankruptcy proceeding that ends in a manner unfavorable the debtor’s interest 
regardless of whether the case is dismissed.   
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 223525-V 
Argued: October 4, 2019 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 17 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MINH-VU HOANG 
v. 
JEFFREY LOWERY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
McDonald and Getty, JJ., dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: June 5, 2020 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-06-05 12:12-04:00
 
Perhaps the single most defining feature of federal bankruptcy law in the United 
States is the ultimate discharge of a person’s pre-existing debts.  This discharge of 
indebtedness embodies a deeply-held American ideal—the notion that, despite bad luck or 
bad judgment, people deserve a second chance to build a life for themselves and contribute 
to our great national experiment.   
 
Not all insolvent debtors who seek a fresh start receive one, though.  The federal 
bankruptcy court may deny discharge to debtors who commit egregious misconduct in the 
administration of their cases, such as through acts to defraud their creditors or their court-
appointed bankruptcy trustee; to conceal, alter, or destroy records; or to mislead the court.  
Moreover, entry of an order denying discharge also lifts the stay that federal law provides 
to shield debtors from actions by their creditors while their bankruptcy cases proceed.   
Petitioner Minh-Vu Hoang is an insolvent debtor currently participating in an active 
bankruptcy case pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Maryland.  Respondent Jeffrey Lowery is an unsecured creditor of Ms. Hoang who holds 
a claim in Ms. Hoang’s bankruptcy case arising from a judgment he obtained against her 
in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in 2002.  
Ms. Hoang filed her bankruptcy petition in May 2005 and the matter remains 
pending.  Administration of Ms. Hoang’s bankruptcy estate has taken an unusually long 
time and required a great deal of effort.  Foremost, Ms. Hoang held extensive assets through 
a complex array of entities.  Early in the administration of her estate, the bankruptcy court 
also determined that Ms. Hoang had attempted to hide assets and circumvent federal law.  
2 
 
For those bad acts, the court issued an order denying Ms. Hoang a discharge of 
indebtedness, forfeiting her right to a fresh start, and lifting the stay on actions against her.   
With great difficulty, approximately $19 million of Ms. Hoang’s assets have been 
discovered and claimed by the court-appointed trustee of her bankruptcy estate.  Much to 
the distress of Ms. Hoang’s creditors, though, the administration of her estate has generated 
more than $16 million in legal, accounting, and other related fees.   
Sensing that his unsecured claim would not be satisfied when estate funds are 
ultimately distributed, Mr. Lowery sought to garnish the proceeds of a settlement Ms. 
Hoang received in 2016 that the bankruptcy court segregated from her bankruptcy estate.  
Ms. Hoang challenged the writ of garnishment, arguing that Mr. Lowery’s judgment had 
expired under Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2019 Cum. Supp.), Courts & 
Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 5-102(a)(3) 12 years from its date of entry because 
he had not renewed it pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-625.  Mr. Lowery argued that CJ § 5-
202 (the “Tolling Statute”) tolled the time to renew his judgment until after Ms. Hoang’s 
bankruptcy case was finally closed.   
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County quashed Mr. Lowery’s writ of 
garnishment.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that CJ § 5-202 tolls the 
statute of limitations on a claim against a bankruptcy debtor during the pendency of a 
bankruptcy which results in an “unsuccessful” outcome to the debtor—either through the 
dismissal of a petition or, as in this case, the denial of a discharge but a continuation of the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  
3 
 
Ms. Hoang filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted 
to consider the following question, which we have rephrased and consolidated as follows:   
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that CJ § 5–
202 tolls the statute of limitations running on a claim against a 
bankruptcy debtor, from the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
until the closure of the bankruptcy case, where the debtor is 
denied a discharge in bankruptcy, and which does not result in 
a “dismissal” of the bankruptcy proceeding?1  
 
We hold that under the plain language of CJ §5-202, the statute does not operate to 
toll the statute of limitations on a claim against a bankruptcy debtor that does not result in 
a dismissal of the petition.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. 
Debt Owed to Mr. Lowery  
Mr. Lowery obtained a default judgment against Ms. Hoang in the amount of 
$16,987 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in April 2002.  With interest, Mr. 
                                              
1 The questions as presented in Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari are as 
follows:  
 
1. Did [the Court of Special Appeals] ignore established 
precedent and rules of statutory construction in holding that the 
tolling statute provided for under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-
202 indefinitely tolled, until the closure of the bankruptcy case, 
actions only against debtors denied a discharge in bankruptcy? 
 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the policy of the tolling statute 
should apply to cases where the debtor is denied a discharge, 
did [the Court of Special Appeals] err in holding (1) that the 
statute applied to the creditor’s failure to renew his judgment; 
and (2) that the tolling should continue until the closure of the 
bankruptcy case?  
4 
 
Lowery’s judgment totaled over $41,000 by July 2016.  In Maryland, a money judgment 
expires after 12 years, unless it is renewed before it expires.  See CJ § 5-102(a)(3); Md. 
Rule 2-625.  Under Maryland Rule 2-625, to renew a judgment, Mr. Lowery needed to file 
a “notice of renewal” with the clerk of the court within the 12-year period, “and the clerk 
shall enter the judgment renewed.”  Mr. Lowery did not renew the judgment within the 12-
year period, which expired on April 11, 2014.  Accordingly, the judgment expired unless 
the limitations period was tolled.  
B. 
Ms. Hoang’s Bankruptcy  
Ms. Hoang filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland in 
May 2005.  In October 2005, Ms. Hoang’s bankruptcy case was converted to a liquidation 
under Chapter 7, and a Chapter 7 trustee was appointed.  In March 2006, as a result of Ms. 
Hoang’s attempts to conceal her assets from the government, the bankruptcy court issued 
an order denying Ms. Hoang a discharge of indebtedness pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727.  
Instead of dismissing Ms. Hoang’s bankruptcy case because of her fraudulent and deceitful 
conduct, the Chapter 7 trustee continued to marshal Ms. Hoang’s pre-filing assets for 
eventual distribution to creditors.  The Chapter 7 proceeding is ongoing.   
Upon the entry of the bankruptcy court’s order denying Ms. Hoang’s discharge, 
unsecured judgment creditors such as Mr. Lowery were no longer barred by the “automatic 
stay” provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) that enjoined collection actions against Ms. Hoang.  
In other words, once the automatic stay expired on March 22, 2006, any impediment under 
5 
 
federal bankruptcy law which may have prevented Mr. Lowery from renewing his 
judgment prior to its 12-year expiration was eliminated.  
C. 
2016 Settlement Recovery  
In April 2016, Ms. Hoang received $87,000 in the settlement of an unrelated real 
estate dispute involving a defunct limited liability company (“LLC”) of which she was the 
sole member and manager.  As part of the settlement, the bankruptcy trustee would receive 
$43,500 and the LLC would receive the remaining $43,500, which would pass directly to 
Ms. Hoang and remain separate from the bankruptcy estate.  Ms. Hoang’s settlement funds 
were vulnerable to creditor claims because she had been denied a discharge and had lost 
the protection of the automatic stay.  Mr. Lowery learned of the settlement, and he served 
Ms. Hoang’s attorney (who was holding the settlement funds in escrow) with a writ of 
garnishment in the amount of $41,294.31 for the 2002 judgment plus interest.   
Ms. Hoang moved to quash the writ of garnishment on the basis that Mr. Lowery’s 
judgment was more than 12 years old and had expired pursuant to the 12-year statute of 
limitations set forth in CJ § 5-102(a)(3).  Ms. Hoang contended that the automatic stay 
expired on March 22, 2006, when the bankruptcy court denied the discharge, and Mr. 
Lowery never renewed his judgment, which expired on April 11, 2014, over two years 
prior to the issuance of the writ of garnishment.  Mr. Lowery responded that his time for 
renewing the judgment had been extended by operation of CJ § 5-202.  The circuit court 
agreed with Ms. Hoang and found that CJ § 5-202 did not toll the limitations period on Mr. 
Lowery’s judgment.  Mr. Lowery appealed.   
6 
 
D. 
Court of Special Appeals  
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding that CJ § 5-202 
tolls the statute of limitations for renewing judgments where a debtor’s bankruptcy case 
has been dismissed or where the case is not dismissed, but the bankruptcy court denies the 
debtor a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727 and the case continues.  In reaching its 
holding, the Court of Special Appeals reviewed Maryland’s insolvency laws enacted in the 
1800s and categorized historical insolvency proceedings into “successful” and 
“unsuccessful” proceedings.  Specifically, the court defined a “successful” insolvency 
under traditional Maryland practice as one in which the debtor’s nonexempt assets would 
be marshalled and distributed to their creditors in exchange for a discharge of their debts.  
Lowery v. Hoang, 240 Md. App. 240, 247–48 (2019).  Conversely, the Court of Special 
Appeals determined that an “unsuccessful” insolvency under traditional Maryland practice 
was one in which the creditors did not receive the debtor’s available assets and the debtor 
did not receive a discharge.  Id. at 248.  In such cases, Maryland insolvency law preserved 
creditors’ claims and, through operation of the predecessor statute of CJ § 5-202, all parties 
returned to their pre-petition status.  Id.   
The Court of Special Appeals then similarly characterized the potential outcomes 
of modern bankruptcy actions under federal law.  In the Court of Special Appeals’ view, a 
“successful” bankruptcy action today is one that results in a “closure,” after the bankruptcy 
trustee marshals all of the debtor’s nonexempt assets, distributes them to their creditors, 
and the debtor receives a discharge of remaining indebtedness.  Id.  Likewise, an 
“unsuccessful” bankruptcy action is one that results in a “dismissal” under the relevant 
7 
 
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, resulting in a dissolution of the automatic stay protection 
of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and a restoration of all parties to their pre-petition statuses.  Id.   
In reaching its holding, the Court of Special Appeals classified Ms. Hoang’s denial 
of discharge as an unsuccessful insolvency.  See Lowery, 240 Md. App. at 250.  The court 
defined success from the perspective of the debtor, based on whether the debtor receives a 
discharge and fresh start.  See id. at 248.  After reviewing the legislative history and purpose 
of CJ § 5-202, the intermediate appellate court determined that the Legislature intended to 
protect creditors who get tied up in unsuccessful bankruptcies, where the matter concludes 
but their claims are neither satisfied nor discharged.  Id. at 250.  This way, unscrupulous 
debtors could not manipulate the insolvency process by filing for bankruptcy, waiting for 
the statute of limitations to run on their creditors’ claims, and then withdraw their petitions 
or receive a dismissal.  Id. (quoting Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., 416 Md. 249, 268 (2010)).  
Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals held that the tolling provision of CJ § 5-202 applies 
to both dismissals and denials of discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings under 
Chapter 7, where creditors’ claims remain intact after the bankruptcy matter has concluded.  
Id.  Under the Court of Special Appeals’ holding, CJ § 5-202 will continue to toll the period 
within which to renew a judgment under Md. Rule 2-625 until Ms. Hoang’s bankruptcy 
case finally concludes, which has been ongoing for over a decade.  
Ms. Hoang filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.  
8 
 
II. 
DISCUSSION  
A. Standard of Review  
The Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 
of Washington Cty. v. Perennial Solar, LLC, 464 Md. 610, 617 (2019) (quoting Koste v. 
Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25 (2013) (“When an issue involves an interpretation and 
application of Maryland constitutional, statutory, or case law, an appellate court must 
determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard 
of review.”)) (internal citations omitted).   
B. Analysis  
CJ § 5-202 provides that: 
If a debtor files a petition in insolvency which is later 
dismissed, the time between the filing and the dismissal is not 
included in determining whether a claim against the debtor is 
barred by the statute of limitations.   
 
 
As set forth below, the Tolling Statute was originally enacted as part of Maryland’s 
insolvency law in 1815.2  With the emergence of the modern federal bankruptcy laws, 
Maryland’s tolling statute is one of a few relics of our State’s insolvency laws that remain 
in effect.  As discussed herein, although the General Assembly repealed the State’s 
insolvency law, thereby abolishing Maryland’s judicial insolvency proceeding that pre-
dated modern federal bankruptcy, it retained a tolling provision that tolls any state statute 
                                              
2 The predecessor to the Tolling Statute was passed on February 1, 1815, as an 
amendment to the Act for the Relief of Sundry Insolvent Debtors passed by the General 
Assembly in the Acts of 1805, ch. 110.  Acts of 1814, ch.122 § 2.  Although this amendment 
was adopted in 1815, we shall refer to the Maryland insolvency statute as the 1814 Act 
because it is included among the statutes enacted with the Acts of 1814.   
9 
 
of limitations that arises between the filing of a “petition in insolvency” and its dismissal.  
In this case, we are asked to interpret the meaning of “dismissal” or “dismissed” under a 
tolling provision that refers to an insolvency process that is no longer in existence.  Ms. 
Hoang contends that we should interpret “dismissal” in the same manner as the term is 
used under the federal Bankruptcy Code.  Mr. Lowery contends that we should adopt the 
reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals and determine that “dismissal” encompasses any 
bankruptcy action that concludes in a manner that is unsuccessful from the debtor’s 
perspective.  
As part of our analysis, it is instructive to briefly review the history of Maryland 
insolvency law, and its evolution in the context of the emergence of federal bankruptcy 
laws.  Fortunately, the history of the Maryland insolvency statute and its interaction with 
the later enacted federal bankruptcy statute were summarized in detail by Judge James 
Eyler in Ali v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 188 Md. App. 269 (2009), aff’d 
416 Md. 249 (2010).  We shall provide a cursory review of the history that is 
comprehensively addressed in that opinion. 
Interplay Between Federal Bankruptcy Laws and Maryland’s Insolvency Laws 
Federal Emergence of Bankruptcy Law—Historical Perspective 
 
Clause 4 of Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress 
the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”  Despite this express grant of authority, for over 100 years after its adoption, 
the country continued to debate the meaning of the clause and the extent of Congress’s 
power.  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 278 (citing David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History 
10 
 
of Bankruptcy Law in America 23–47 (2001)).  Throughout the 1800s, a pattern emerged 
where Congress would enact a bankruptcy law during a period of recession or depression, 
only to have the law repealed during a time of prosperity.  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 278–79.   
“All the while, states enacted insolvency laws, generally granting rights to debtors, to 
fill the void left by the lack of a national bankruptcy law.”  Id. at 278 (citing Skeel, supra, at 
24–28).  It was clear by the late 1800s that many state insolvency laws violated the 
Constitution’s prohibition against state “laws impairing the obligations of contracts . . . .”  
See id. at 281; U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.  “Nevertheless, despite that and preemption issues, 
many state insolvency laws remained active simply because they were not challenged.”  Ali, 
188 Md. App. at 281 (citation omitted).   
 
Following the financial crisis of 1893, Congress enacted the first permanent federal 
bankruptcy system with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (also known as the “Nelson Act”), 
which applied to all classes of debtors and provided for involuntary and voluntary 
bankruptcy.  Id.  (citations omitted).  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that Congress possessed plenary power over bankruptcies, which was broadly defined.  Id. 
(citing Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902)).  Since then, bankruptcy law 
has been stable, although it has been repealed and replaced on several occasions, most 
notably in the 1930s and 1970s.  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 281 (citations omitted).   
The Early Maryland Insolvency Act  
During the period of ebb and flow of federal bankruptcy laws, between 1805 and 
1975, Maryland enacted insolvency laws that provided for the discharge of debts.  Under 
the Act for the Relief of Sundry Insolvent Debtors, enacted by the General Assembly with 
11 
 
the Acts of 1805, ch. 110 (the “1805 Insolvency Act”), a debtor’s nonexempt assets were 
gathered, turned over to a court-appointed trustee, and eventually distributed to creditors.  
Acts of 1805, ch. 110, §§ 3–5.  If the debtor complied with the requirements of the 1805 
Insolvency Act and all other procedures were followed, the debtor would receive a 
discharge of debts and a fresh start.  Id. at § 5.  Not all debtors received a fresh start.  Like 
modern federal bankruptcy laws, the 1805 Insolvency Act also provided for the denial of 
discharge for misbehaving debtors, stating that debtors who attempted to defraud their 
creditors or committed various other forms of misconduct in the course of insolvency 
proceedings would be “for ever [sic] precluded from any benefit of this act. . . .”  Id. at § 9.  
The Tolling Statute has its origins in the General Assembly’s 1814 amendments to 
the 1805 Insolvency Act.  Acts of 1814, ch. 122 (“1814 Act”).  The 1814 Act had three 
sections.  Section 1 of the 1814 Act “limited the ability of courts to continue pending 
petitions from one court session to another.”  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 283.  Section 2 of the 
statute addressed renewals of judgment, providing that, “upon dismissal or withdrawal of 
a petition, or a decision adverse to petitioner, it was not necessary for a creditor to revive 
any judgment suspended by the petition.”3  Id. (Emphasis added).  Under the plain language 
in section 2, judgments that could not be enforced during the pendency of an insolvency 
action were automatically valid and enforceable upon dismissal, withdrawal, or a decision 
                                              
3 Specifically, section 2 of the 1814 Act provided that “upon the dismissal or 
withdrawing of any petition for the benefit of said acts, or upon decisions thereon against 
the petitioner, it shall not be necessary to revive by scire facias any judgment which may 
have been suspended by such petition [in insolvency], and process of execution may be 
issued upon such judgments as if no such suspension had taken place.”  Acts of 1814, ch. 
122, § 2.   
12 
 
adverse to petitioner.  The language of the 1814 Act contains similarities to modern federal 
bankruptcy law.  Like the federal Bankruptcy Code, which distinguishes between a 
dismissal of a petition and a denial of discharge, the language of the 1814 Act reflects that 
the “dismissal” of an insolvency petition was different from a “decision adverse to [a] 
petitioner.”   
Section 3 of the 1814 Act contains the first iteration of the Tolling Statute, providing 
“[t]hat the time intervening between the petitioning of any of said debtors and the time that 
any of said petitions may be dismissed, shall not be computed on any plea of limitation so 
as to defeat any claim of any person against such debtor.”  Acts of 1814, ch. 122 § 3.  In 
short, section 3 tolled any statute of limitations running on any claim against a debtor from 
the filing of the insolvency petition to its dismissal where a petition was dismissed.  
Significantly, the language in section 2 and section 3 contain a key distinction that 
assists with our statutory analysis of the current statute.  Like the current Tolling Statute, 
section 3 of the 1814 Act only tolled the statute of limitations where a petition was 
“dismissed.”  By contrast, the automatic reinstatement of judgments under section 2 
occurred “upon the dismissal or withdrawing of any petition for the benefit of said acts, or 
upon decisions thereon against the petitioner, . . . .”  Acts of 1814, ch. 122, § 2.  By the 
plain terms of the 1814 Act, the General Assembly established automatic reinstatement of 
judgments in the event of dismissal, withdrawal, or denial of discharge, but granted tolling 
only in the event of dismissal of the petition.  
13 
 
Modern Revisions to Maryland’s Insolvency Laws  
 
When the General Assembly first consolidated the State’s laws into the Maryland 
Code of 1860, it codified the vast majority of the insolvency laws in Article 48.  See Md. 
Code, Art. 48 (1860).  The General Assembly later moved the insolvency laws to Article 
47, where they remained until 1975.  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 284.  However, the Legislature 
located the Tolling Statute in Article 57, with the other limitations statutes.  See Md. Code, 
Art. 57, § 8 (1860).  The Court of Special Appeals summarized the legislative history of 
the Tolling Statute in Ali as follows:  
At some point prior to 1860, the General Assembly slightly 
changed the wording of the provision to read: “The time 
intervening between the petitioning of an insolvent debtor, and 
the time when his petition may be dismissed, shall not be 
computed on any plea of limitation so as to defeat the claim of 
any person against such debtor.”  See Maryland Code of 1860, 
Art. 57, § 8.  At a later point, the General Assembly moved this 
provision to Art. 57, § 9.   
 
Art. 57, § 9 remained unchanged until 1973, when the General 
Assembly recodified Art. 57, § 9 to CJ[] § 5-202.  Ch. 2, § 1 of 
the Acts of 1973 (1st Sp.Sess.).  When doing so, the General 
Assembly changed the wording of the statute to its current 
form.  A “Revisor’s Note” explained that “[t]his section is new 
language derived from Art. 57, § [] 9.”  Id.  The preface to the 
bill further explained that the bill was meant to “revise, restate, 
and recodify the laws of this State pertaining to courts and 
proceedings therein . . . .”  Id.  CJ[] § 5-202 exists unchanged 
today.   
 
Ali, 188 Md. App. at 284. 
 
Two years later, in 1975, as part of the recodification of the commercial laws into 
our current Commercial Law Article, the General Assembly repealed the insolvency laws 
set forth in Article 47.  The only insolvency law provisions that were recodified consisted 
14 
 
of former-Article 47 §§ 8 and 14, which involve preferences and priorities in insolvency.  
Those sections were recodified in Maryland Code (1975), §§ 15–101, 15–102 of the 
Commercial Law Article (“CL”).  Acts of 1975, ch. 49, § 3.  A General Revisor’s Note 
explained:  
In revising this subtitle, the Commission to Revise the 
Annotated Code concluded that the provisions of present Art. 
47, except those revised and not contained in §§ 15–101 and 
15–102 of this subtitle, are preempted by the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act.  Accordingly, these provisions of Art. 47 are 
proposed for repeal.   
 
A Revisor’s Note to § 15-101 further explained:  
While Art. 47 is proposed for repeal as obsolete, the two 
sections of Art. 47 nevertheless are contained elsewhere in the 
common law, as well as in Art. 23, § [] 81, and therefore should 
be retained.  This section [15-101] sets forth the law as it has 
been applied in insolvency proceedings, whether brought 
pursuant to Art. 23 or Art. 47.   
 
As the Court of Special Appeals explained in Ali, “[a]lthough obviously belated, the repeal 
of Art. 47 reflected a recognition of the pervasive role of federal bankruptcy law, the 
limited role of states in bankruptcy, and the outdated nature of Maryland’s insolvency 
laws.”  188 Md. App. at 285.   
 
As part of the recodification of the limited sections of former-Article 47 involving 
preferences of creditors, the General Assembly recognized the preemptive nature of the 
federal bankruptcy laws and incorporated by reference specific provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act as part of the recodification.4  Title 15 of the Commercial Law Article 
                                              
4 See Revisor’s Note to CL § 15–101, explaining that subsection (d), pertaining to 
the rights of an assignee for the benefit of creditors or a receiver of the insolvent’s assets, 
15 
 
addresses aspects of debt collection.  Section 15-101, which addresses preferences in 
proceedings involving an assignment for the benefit of creditors or receiverships, uses 
bankruptcy terms, including “insolvent” and “void” and “voidable” preferences, all as 
defined in the Bankruptcy Code.  The current version of CL § 15-101 sets forth definitions 
of words “as used in federal bankruptcy laws.”  See CL § 15-101(a).  CL § 15-101(a)(11) 
contains a “catchall” provision, which provides that: “Other words, including ‘insolvent’ 
and ‘insider’, when used in federal bankruptcy law shall have the meanings set forth in the 
definition section of the federal bankruptcy law or as interpreted by the federal courts 
applying the federal bankruptcy law.”  The only remnants of the historic insolvency laws, 
codified at CL §§ 15-101, 15-102 and 15-103, recognize the pervasiveness of the federal 
bankruptcy statute and supplement the federal statute with State procedures, including 
some definitions, but only to the extent not inconsistent with federal bankruptcy law. 
To summarize, in 1975, all of Maryland’s insolvency laws were repealed, with the 
exception of the above-described provisions of Title 15 of the Commercial Law Article 
addressing aspects of debt collection.  Despite the repeal of the historical insolvency laws, 
which had been preempted by the federal Bankruptcy Code, the Legislature kept intact the 
Tolling Statute, CJ § 5-202, which provides a tolling of the pertinent statute of limitations 
on claims against the debtor for a period between the “filing and the dismissal” of a petition 
for insolvency.   
                                              
“is derived from the Bankruptcy Act . . . and [has] been incorporated by reference . . . but 
[is] particularly set forth within the section to avoid problems with respect to incorporation 
by reference of entire bodies of federal law.”  Acts of 1975, ch. 49 § 3.   
16 
 
 
In Ali v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 416 Md. 249 (2010), this Court 
was asked to determine whether, under the plain language of the Tolling Statute, the phrase 
“petition in insolvency” included a federal bankruptcy petition.  Despite the fact that the 
Tolling Statute dates back to the early Republic and predated the enactment of modern 
federal bankruptcy laws, after considering the plain meaning, legislative history, and 
legislative purpose of CJ § 5-202, we held that “a federal bankruptcy petition constitutes a 
‘petition in insolvency’ and the Tolling Statute therefore, “operated to toll any applicable 
statute of limitations from the time the debtor . . . filed his federal bankruptcy petition until 
the time that petition was dismissed.”  Id. at 271.  In analyzing the statute, this Court 
considered the same legislative history outlined above, and also considered the plain 
language of the statute by consulting various 19th century legal and general dictionary 
definitions of “insolvency” and “insolvent.”  Id. at 262–63.  
In addition to considering the plain meaning of the phrase during the early 19th 
century, the Court also looked at the legislative history during the 1963 adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.  Id. at 264.  As part of that code adoption, this Court noted 
that the General Assembly adopted a definition for the term “insolvent,” which it defined 
as one “who either has ceased to pay his debts . . . as they become due or is insolvent within 
the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law.’”  Id. (citing CL § 1-201(23)).  We further 
commented that 10 years later, in 1973, the Tolling Statute was recodified for the last time, 
moving from Art. 57 § 9 to CJ § 5-202.  Id.  We explained that, “had the legislature, during 
its recodification process, desired an alternative definition, it would have enacted one.  Its 
17 
 
silence, however, informs us that the Legislature was content with the definition as codified 
in the Commercial Law Article.”  Id.   
 
We concluded that, “at the time that the [predecessor to the Tolling Statute] was 
enacted, it was understood that a ‘petition in insolvency’ was a petition filed by one in 
relation to his or her inability to pay off his or her debts in full.”  Id. at 264.  We explained 
that, “It seems incontrovertible that the filing of a Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy petition 
is [also] a petition by one in relation to his or her inability to pay off his or her debts in 
full.”  Id. at 265.  Accordingly, we determined that modern day bankruptcy fits “squarely 
within § 5-202’s definition of ‘petition in insolvency.’  As such, a plain-meaning analysis 
. . . compels the conclusion that the filing of a federal bankruptcy petition operates to toll 
Maryland’s generally-applicable three-year statute of limitations.”  Id. at 266.   
 
In addition to undertaking a plain meaning analysis, we also reviewed the legislative 
history and purpose underlying the tolling provision and concluded that the “Legislature 
presumably intended for § 5-202 to apply to what was once segmented into ‘bankruptcy’ 
and ‘insolvency’ proceedings, and to what is now predominantly under the purview of 
federal bankruptcy law.”  Id. at 267.   
 
Finally, we turned to the public policy behind the tolling provision, which buttressed 
our conclusion.  We agreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis that, like the default 
federal tolling provision in 11 U.S.C. § 108, the state tolling provision contained in CJ § 5-
202 “was enacted ‘to address the public’s complaint that debtors manipulated the 
bankruptcy and insolvency processes to avoid paying creditors by entering bankruptcy, 
18 
 
waiting for the statute of limitations to expire, and subsequently dismissing the bankruptcy 
proceeding.’”  Id. at 268 (quoting Ali, 188 Md. App. at 283–84) (citations omitted).   
 
Having concluded in Ali that the tolling provision in CJ § 5-202 applies to the filing 
of a federal bankruptcy petition, we must determine whether the word “dismissal” has the 
same meaning as the term is used under the modern federal Bankruptcy Code, or whether 
it means something different, such as the broad definition supplied by the Court of Special 
Appeals, to encompass all “unsuccessful” bankruptcies, which do not result in a discharge 
of the debtor’s pre-petition debts.  As part of our analysis, it is instructive to consider the 
manner in which the federal Bankruptcy Code uses the term “dismissal” as well as the term 
“denial of a discharge.” 
Modern Federal Bankruptcy Laws—The Automatic Stay, Dismissal of a 
Petition, Denial of Discharge 
 
A bankruptcy case begins when a debtor files a petition under the applicable chapter 
of Title 11 of the “Bankruptcy Code with the appropriate federal bankruptcy court.  11 
U.S.C. § 301(a); § 302.5  Commencing a bankruptcy case creates an estate (the “bankruptcy 
estate” or “estate”) comprised of the debtor’s assets as established under 11 U.S.C. § 541, 
by which all of the debtor’s property becomes the property of the estate except for that 
                                              
5 Creditors may initiate involuntary bankruptcy proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 303, but 
they are exceedingly rare—a report by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
shows that they represented less than one-tenth of one percent of all bankruptcy cases between 
1990 and 2016.  Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 
7.2, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_7.2_0930.2016.pdf (Perma.cc: 
https://perma.cc/ZN4S-R53S).  
19 
 
which the Bankruptcy Code exempts.  The estate is represented by a trustee who has the 
capacity to sue and be sued.  11 U.S.C. § 323.   
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code governs cases in which the debtor’s assets are to 
be liquidated and then distributed to creditors rather than reorganized and their debts 
restructured.  The trustee administers the estate for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors; in 
the case of a liquidation under Chapter 7, this broadly includes marshalling and liquidating 
the assets of the estate for distribution to creditors.  See 11 U.S.C. § 704.  Only creditors 
with an allowed claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502 may participate in the case.  Creditors receive 
assets distributed from the estate (to the extent that they exist) pursuant to established 
priority rules.   
The filing of a petition operates as a stay (the “automatic stay”) of actions against 
the debtor.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  The automatic stay applies to several types of actions, 
including “the commencement or continuation” of an action “to recover a claim against the 
debtor”; enforcement against the debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate of a judgment 
obtained pre-filing; and any act to obtain possession of property of the bankruptcy estate 
or from the estate or to exercise control over the property of the estate.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(1)–(3).  The automatic stay offers strong protection to debtors and applies in all 
but a select set of circumstances.  See Elizabeth Warren, Chapter 11: Reorganizing 
American Businesses 27–30 (2008).  The automatic “stay ‘is designed to provide breathing 
space to the debtor, prevent harassment of the debtor, assure that all claims against the 
debtor will be brought in the sole forum of the bankruptcy court, and protect creditors as a 
class from the possibility that one or more creditors will obtain payment to the detriment 
20 
 
of others.’”  In re Swintek, 906 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burton v. Infinity 
Capital Mgmt., 862 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2017)).   
Section 362(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code identifies three instances when, by 
operation of law, the automatic stay terminates in a bankruptcy case: (1) “the time the case 
is closed”; (2) “the time the case is dismissed”; or (3) “the time a discharge is granted or 
denied” in a case under Chapter 7.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).  Creditors may also petition 
for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).   
The Bankruptcy Code uses distinct terms to describe multiple possible ends to a 
bankruptcy action.  As set forth below, under the federal bankruptcy scheme a “dismissal” 
of a bankruptcy petition does not encompass all “unsuccessful” bankruptcies, as that 
concept was devised by the intermediate appellate court in this case.   
The bankruptcy court “close[s]” what the Court of Special Appeals referred to as 
“successful” bankruptcy actions.  See 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (“After an estate is fully 
administered and the court has discharged the trustee, the court shall close the case.”).  In 
this instance, the creditors recover from available funds at their level of priority while the 
debtor receives a discharge of remaining debts and a fresh start.   
By contrast, a bankruptcy can end “unsuccessfully” by a “dismissal” of the action.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (providing for the dismissal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy); 
§ 1112(b)(1) (providing for the dismissal of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy); § 1307(b) 
(providing for the dismissal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy)).  Under Chapter 7, the court may 
dismiss a case for cause, including if the debtor causes unreasonable delay that prejudices 
21 
 
their creditors, does not pay required fees, or fails to file required information.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 707(a).   
If a bankruptcy case is dismissed, the debtor does not receive a discharge.  Instead, 
“the automatic stay is dissolved and dismissal ‘restores the assets and the parties to their 
prepetition status, as if the case had never been filed.’”  Lowery, 240 Md. App. at 248 
(citing In re Woodhaven, Ltd., 139 B.R. 745, 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992)).   
As the Court of Special Appeals noted, a third option exists in the federal system, 
which is referred to as a “denial of discharge.”  11 U.S.C. § 727(a).  Denial of discharge is 
an extreme sanction—it is “akin to financial capital punishment.  It is reserved for the most 
egregious misconduct by a debtor.”  In re Tauber, 349 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
2006).  If the bankruptcy court issues an order denying the debtor a discharge, the debtor 
remains liable for any unsatisfied debts after the closure of the case.  This is what occurred 
here.  Ms. Hoang originally filed her case under Chapter 11, and the matter was converted 
to a Chapter 7 case on October 28, 2005.  On March 22, 2006, the bankruptcy court entered 
an order denying Ms. Hoang a discharge in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b), 
1112(b)(1) (where a bankruptcy court has denied a discharge, the bankruptcy court has the 
option of dismissal of the case, or conversion to Chapter 7, whichever is in the best interests 
of creditors and the bankruptcy estate).  In connection with Ms. Hoang’s denial of a 
discharge, the bankruptcy court did not dismiss her case—instead, the Chapter 7 
proceeding continued, with Chapter 7 trustee undertaking efforts to marshal and liquidate 
her assets, rather than re-vesting those assets in Ms. Hoang, as if the case had never been 
filed, and without the benefit of a discharge.   
22 
 
Importantly for unsecured creditors such as Mr. Lowery, when the court denied Ms. 
Hoang a discharge, the automatic stay was lifted and there was no impediment under the 
Bankruptcy Code that enjoined collection actions against Ms. Hoang.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
362(c)(2).  
Interplay Between Tolling Provisions Under Federal Bankruptcy Law and 
State Law 
 
 
Finally, as the last piece of our statutory analysis, it is important to analyze our 
Tolling Statute within the context of the federal bankruptcy tolling provisions set forth in 
§ 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), which provides as follows: 
(c) 
Except as provided in [11 U.S.C. § 524], if applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy 
proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period for commencing or 
continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy 
court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual 
with respect to which such individual is protected under [11 
U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1301], and such period has not expired before 
the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not 
expire until the later of— 
 
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of 
such 
period 
occurring 
on 
or 
after 
the 
commencement of the case; or 
 
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration 
of the stay under [11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922, 1201 or 
1301], as the case may be, with respect to such 
claim.   
 
(Emphasis added).  In essence, subsection (c) provides that if state law fixes a period for 
commencing a civil action in a nonbankruptcy court against a debtor, and the period has 
not expired before the date of filing of the petition in bankruptcy, then the period does not 
23 
 
expire until the later of (1) the end of that period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case, or (2) 30 days after the stay is lifted.6  
In this instance, assuming that the automatic stay applied to the renewal of Mr. 
Lowery’s judgment under the federal tolling provision,7 once the stay was lifted in March 
                                              
6 As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Ali v. CIT Technology Financing 
Services, Inc., 188 Md. App. 269, 282 (2009), courts that have interpreted 11 U.S.C. § 108 
“are not in agreement as to its meaning, specifically, whether it tolls a statute of limitations 
during the existence of a stay with a minimum of thirty days after the stay is lifted, e.g., 
Kertesz v. Ostrovksy, 115 Cal. App. 4th 369 (2004), or whether it does not toll but provides 
a minimum of thirty days after a stay is lifted.  E.g., National Bank of Commerce Trust & 
Savings Ass’n, 256 Neb. 679 (1999).”  Ali, 188 Md. App. at 282.  We do not need to wrestle 
with this issue because the outcome of this case turns on our interpretation of CJ § 5-202.  
Mr. Lowery’s attempt to renew his judgment is untimely under any interpretation of 11 
U.S.C. § 108(c) unless under CJ § 5-202, the period of limitations is tolled until the 
“conclusion” of the bankruptcy proceeding.  We approach with caution the complexity of 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and its interplay with state law.  Because it is unnecessary 
to interpret the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code beyond our Tolling Statute for purposes 
of resolving the issue presented in this case, we limit our holding to the application of the 
Maryland statute. 
 
7 We also note that there is a split in authority in the federal circuits over whether a 
renewal of a judgment violates the automatic stay.  Compare In re Smith, 352 B.R. 702, 
707 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (holding, upon the resolution of a certified question to Arizona’s 
Supreme Court, that the renewal of a judgment under Arizona law is a ministerial act not 
implicated by the automatic stay) with In Re Lobherr, 282 B.R. 912 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2002) (holding that California’s statutory scheme for renewing judgments more closely 
resembles a judicial action or proceeding included within the acts prohibited by the 
automatic stay).  In Maryland, the process of renewing judgments under Maryland Rule 2–
625 is ministerial in nature in that it requires no notice to the debtor and is simply 
accomplished by an entry by the clerk of the court upon a notice of a renewal.  Cf. W.D. 
Curran & Assocs., Inc. v. Cheng Shum Enters., Inc., 107 Md. App. 373 (1995) (holding 
that the act of renewing an expiring execution lien is a ministerial act not stayed by the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition).  However, we do not need to decide whether the automatic 
stay prevents the renewal of a state court judgment and decline to provide our interpretation 
of a federal statute on which federal bankruptcy courts are split.  In this case, Mr. Lowery 
had until April 11, 2014 to renew his judgment—over eight years after the automatic stay 
was lifted.  There was ample time within which he could have renewed the judgment 
24 
 
2006, Mr. Lowery was free to renew his judgment at any time.  Because Mr. Lowery did 
not renew his 2002 judgment during the ensuing years between March 2006 and the 
expiration of the judgment in April 2014, the only way his judgment is effective is if we 
hold that CJ § 5-202 operated to toll the requirement that he renew his judgment until Ms. 
Hoang’s pending bankruptcy is concluded.   
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a broad interpretation of the word 
“dismissal” as meaning the conclusion or termination of an “unsuccessful” bankruptcy, 
regardless of whether the proceeding is in fact dismissed, is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the Tolling Statute, its structure and purpose, and its legislative history.  
Additionally, in Ali, 416 Md. 249, we construed the plain language of the Tolling Statute 
in a manner consistent with the federal Bankruptcy Code.  We see no reason to interpret 
the Tolling Statute any differently in this instance by supplying a meaning to the word 
“dismissal” that is inconsistent with the plain language, particularly considering its limited, 
if not exclusive, application to federal bankruptcy petitions, after the repeal of State laws 
concerning judicial insolvency proceedings. 
Under the Plain Language of CJ § 5-202, “Dismissal” Does Not Embrace All 
“Unsuccessful” Bankruptcy Petitions 
 
As discussed above, this case requires us to examine the plain meaning of a single 
word—“dismissal”—in the context of a body of law enacted over 200 years ago, the 
majority of which has been repealed for decades.   
                                              
irrespective of whether he was precluded by the automatic stay from doing so prior to 
March 2006.   
25 
 
Under our case law addressing statutory analysis, the “ultimate objective of our 
analysis is to extract and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature in enacting the 
statute.”  Goshen Run Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 467 Md. 74, 107–08 (2020) 
(quoting Reier v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 397 Md. 2, 26 (2007) (additional 
citations omitted).  “This begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.” 
Id.  “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s 
apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the 
statute as written without resort to other rules of construction.”  Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 
Md. 257, 275 (2010) (citations omitted).  However, we do not analyze statutory language 
in a vacuum.  Id.  Rather, statutory language “must be viewed in the context of the statutory 
scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in 
enacting the statute.”  Id. at 276.  “Where the language is ambiguous and may be subject 
to more than one interpretation, however, we look to the statute’s legislative history, case 
law, purpose, structure, and overarching statutory scheme in aid of searching for the 
intention of the Legislature.”  Koste v. Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 26 (2013) (citing Whitley v. 
Md. State Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 149 (2012) (additional internal citations omitted)).   
Based upon our review of the plain language of the 1814 Act, the word “dismissal” 
did not include all “unsuccessful” insolvency petitions.  As noted above, section 3 of the 
1814 Act, the statute of limitations was only tolled where the insolvency petition was 
“dismissed.”  By contrast, under section 2, the Act permitted the automatic reinstatement 
of judgments in the event of dismissal, withdrawal, or a “decision[] thereon against the 
petitioner.”  Comparing the language of these two sections of the 1814 Act, it is clear that 
26 
 
all unsuccessful insolvency petitions were not treated the same.  The Legislature did not 
treat a “dismissal” of an insolvency petition in the same manner as a “decision . . . against 
the petitioner.”  Had the Legislature intended to treat the actions synonymously, it would 
not have drawn distinctions between the two events in the language of the statute.  Based 
upon our reading of the 1814 Act, it appears that “dismissal” as that term was used in the 
Act had a meaning similar to “dismissal” under the modern Bankruptcy Code.  In other 
words, the term “dismissal” did not encompass all bankruptcy cases which ended in a 
manner unfavorable to the debtor’s interests.   
Our plain language interpretation of “dismissal” is consistent with the ordinary and 
popular meaning of the term as reflected in the contemporary dictionary definitions of that 
era. “In seeking to apply the plain[ ]meaning rule, it is proper to consult a dictionary or 
dictionaries for a term’s ordinary and popular meaning.  In choosing the dictionary or 
dictionaries from which to glean assistance, we consult those editions (in addition to 
current editions) of dictionaries that were extant at the time of the pertinent legislative 
enactments.”  Ali, 416 Md. at 262 (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up).   
A review of various 19th century legal and general dictionaries defined “dismissal” 
as follows:  
• Dismiss: “to send away, discard.”  Dismissed: “sent away, 
discharged.”  JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1804). 
 
• Dismiss: “to send away; to discard.”  SHERIDAN 
IMPROVED. A GENERAL PRONOUNCING AND 
EXPLANATORY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (9th ed. 1804). 
 
27 
 
• To Dismiss a cause: “A term used in chancery courts for 
removing a cause out of court without any further hearing.”  
BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (2nd 1843).   
 
The above definitions make clear that at the time of the enactment of the 1814 Act 
and while it was in effect, a dismissal of an insolvency proceeding meant the discarding of 
a petition.  There is nothing in the plain language of the 1814 Act, as well as the dictionary 
definitions that existed at the time of enactment, which would otherwise cause us to 
conclude that the word “dismissal” was ambiguous, or that it was intended to broadly 
encompass all unsuccessful bankruptcy petitions.  Such a strained interpretation would be 
inconsistent with its plain and unambiguous meaning.   
The Dissent takes issue with our plain meaning analysis, contending that when 
sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Insolvency Act are read together, “there is little doubt that 
[section] 3 was meant to encompass at least a withdrawal of a petition – what otherwise 
might be called a voluntary dismissal – as well as an involuntary dismissal.”  See Dissent 
Slip Op. at 4.  The Dissent asserts that a plain reading of “dismissal” is inconsistent with 
purpose of the statute.  Id.  We disagree. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we accepted the Dissent’s broad 
interpretation of the word “dismissal” under the 1814 Act as encompassing all withdrawn 
or dismissed petitions, here, we are not being asked to examine a “withdrawal” or a 
“dismissal” of a bankruptcy case.  Rather, we are being asked to apply the term “dismissal” 
28 
 
to the opposite scenario—where the bankruptcy court takes the express action not to 
“dismiss” or dispose of the case.   
“Dismissal” is a specific procedural action which disposes of a case without 
adjudication on the merits.  Similarly, a “withdrawal” of a petition accomplishes the same 
result— the case is terminated without final adjudication.  In either instance, the key feature 
is that, after dismissal or withdrawal, the case is over.  By contrast, as set forth below, the 
denial of a discharge does not dispose of a case and does not generate a procedural outcome 
that is in any way analogous to a “dismissal” or a “withdrawal.”8  Here, the denial of a 
discharge resulted in active ongoing bankruptcy proceeding that remains ongoing 14 years 
later and counting.  
Taking it a step further, even if we accept the Dissent’s expansive interpretation of 
“dismissal” under sections 2 and 3 of the 1814 Act in the context of the historic insolvency 
proceeding, such an expansive interpretation still does not support stretching the term to 
encompass to a modern-day bankruptcy proceeding that does not conclude in a timely 
fashion.  As the Dissent points out, under section 1 of the 1814 Act, insolvency proceedings 
were tied to court sessions and were limited in duration.9  Dissent Slip. Op. at 2–3. 
                                              
8 We discuss the alternative interpretation of “dismissal” advanced by the Dissent 
which encompasses “withdrawn” and “dismissed” proceedings not because we agree with 
the Dissent’s interpretation under our plain meaning analysis, but to illustrate how even a 
broad interpretation under 1814 Act falls short of an expansive interpretation that could be 
applied to a modern bankruptcy proceeding that is not dismissed.  
 
9 Section 1 of the Act provided: 
 
That no petition for the benefit of the original act for the benefit 
of sundry insolvent debtors, and the several supplements 
29 
 
Interpreting “dismissal” to include a modern day “non-dismissal” of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, which results in the tolling of claims against a debtor for over a decade, is 
inconsistent with the structure of the 1814 Act, which imposed a limited time-frame or 
duration on insolvency proceedings.  As described infra, such an expansive interpretation, 
which allows for the tolling of claims for over a decade, is also inconsistent with our 
jurisprudence requiring that we narrowly construe statutes of limitations.  See Ceccone v. 
Caroll Home Services, LLC, 454 Md. 680, 691 (2017); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 
359 (1993).  
We also disagree with the Dissent that our interpretation of the word “dismissal,” 
which is rooted in its plain language and common and ordinary meaning, is “inconsistent 
with the purpose of the statute[.]” Dissent Slip. Op. at 3.  Unlike a dismissal or withdrawal, 
which are capable of manipulation by a debtor, as set forth infra, under a modern-day denial 
of a discharge, the debtor is stripped of all control and is incapable of manipulating the 
bankruptcy process for the purpose of waiting for creditor claims to run.   
There is nothing in the plain language of the 1814 Act that supports an interpretation 
of the word “dismissal” to include a “non-dismissal”—the denial of a discharge that results 
                                              
thereto, now depending in any of the county courts of this state 
shall be continued beyond the second session of such court 
next after the passage of this act; unless in cases where the 
court shall be satisfied that a further continuance is necessary 
to procure testimony material and competent on the trial of any 
allegations made against the petitioner’s discharge, nor shall 
any such petition hereafter to be filed, be continued beyond the 
first court next after the filing thereof unless for the causes 
aforesaid.  
30 
 
in the continuation of a bankruptcy proceeding for over a decade.  Such an elastic 
interpretation of the word “dismissal” stretches the definition beyond its logical breaking 
point.   
Dismissal Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code Does Not Include All Unsuccessful 
Bankruptcies and the General Assembly Never Modified the Language to Expand the 
Tolling Provisions to Include All Unsuccessful Bankruptcy Outcomes 
 
Turning to modern definitions, “dismissal” is not synonymous with an unsuccessful 
conclusion of a legal proceeding arising under either Maryland law, or arising under the 
federal Bankruptcy Code.  Modern definitions of the word “dismiss” or “dismissal” are 
consistent with the 19th century definitions.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dismiss” as: 
“To send (something) away; [specifically], to terminate (an action or claim) without further 
hearing, [especially] before the trial of the issues involved.”  Dismiss, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Westlaw). 
Clearly, the bankruptcy court’s denial of a discharge and conversion of Ms. Hoang’s 
bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 proceeding, which is ongoing, did not constitute a dismissal of 
the bankruptcy petition.  The bankruptcy court’s actions are quite the opposite of a 
dismissal—it denied Ms. Hoang a discharge and continued proceedings through the 
Chapter 7 trustee to marshal Ms. Hoang’s assets for the ultimate distribution to creditors.  
These proceedings have continued for over a decade.   
It is also noteworthy that after the emergence of modern federal bankruptcy laws, 
and during the various recodifications of the Tolling Statute, the General Assembly never 
modified the language to encompass scenarios other than the “dismissal” of the insolvency 
petition.  With the repeal of almost the entire body of Maryland insolvency laws, a “petition 
31 
 
in insolvency” only arises in the context of a federal bankruptcy petition.  Given the limited 
application of the Tolling Statute to bankruptcy cases, we have construed the language of 
the Tolling Statute consistently with the Bankruptcy Code.  See Ali, 416 Md. at 249.  As 
we noted in Ali, as part of the repeal of Article 47, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, its subsequent recodification in the Commercial Law Article, and the recodification 
of the Tolling Statute in 1973 for the last time, the Legislature was keenly aware of the 
preemptive force of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Legislature specifically incorporated the 
definitions contained in the Bankruptcy Code into the Commercial Law Article.  As we 
concluded in Ali, “had the Legislature, during its recodification process, desired an 
alternative definition, it would have enacted one.”  Id. at 264.  It is not our role to redefine 
the word “dismissal” in a manner not borne out by the plain and unambiguous meaning to 
reach a different outcome.  “Dismissal” in this instance does not include proceedings which 
are not, in fact, dismissed, and are ongoing.  
Public Policy Does Not Support a Broad Interpretation Not Otherwise Present in the 
Plain Language 
 
Mr. Lowery argues that for policy reasons, we should affirm the Court of Special 
Appeals’ interpretation of “dismissal” to embrace all bankruptcies which ultimately end in 
a manner “unsuccessful” to the debtor’s interest—whether the proceeding results in a 
dismissal of the petition, or the denial of a discharge and an ultimate distribution of the 
debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors.  To be sure, Ms. Hoang’s conduct in her 
bankruptcy proceedings was egregious and the bankruptcy court imposed upon her the 
most draconian sanction available under the Bankruptcy Code—the denial of a discharge.  
32 
 
Although Ms. Hoang is guilty of many misdeeds, this is not a situation where the debtor 
voluntarily manipulated a bankruptcy proceeding, which ultimately resulted in a dismissal, 
and which in turn may have prevented a creditor from filing a claim against her during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.  Here, the opposite occurred.  Ms. Hoang was 
denied the benefit of a discharge.  Once a Chapter 7 trustee was appointed, Ms. Hoang was 
prevented from manipulating the bankruptcy system in a manner that the Tolling Statute 
was designed to prevent.  Ms. Hoang lost control of her assets, which have been seized and 
will be distributed to creditors in the priorities provided under the Bankruptcy Code.   
When the automatic stay was lifted in March 2006, Mr. Lowery had no impediment 
under the Bankruptcy Code preventing the renewal of his judgment, which expired in April 
2014.  We see no policy reason to adopt an interpretation of the term “dismissal” that is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the insolvency law as it was originally enacted, and 
which is inconsistent with the dismissal of a petition under the federal Bankruptcy Code.   
However, there are sound policy reasons that weigh against adopting the Court of 
Special Appeals’ interpretation.  Although this case involves a ministerial act of renewing 
a judgment, our holding concerning the breadth and scope of the Tolling Statute will 
necessarily apply to all “claim[s] against the debtor.”  CJ § 5-202.  Under the Court of 
Special Appeals’ and the Dissent’s interpretation of the Tolling Statute, the statute of 
limitations on any claim against a debtor could be tolled for a considerable time period well 
after the expiration of the automatic stay.  In this case, the time between the expiration of 
the automatic stay and the “closure” of Ms. Hoang’s unsuccessful ongoing bankruptcy 
petition is 14 years and counting.   
33 
 
In Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC, 454 Md. 680, 691 (2017), this Court 
noted that “statutes of limitation are designed to balance the competing interests of 
plaintiffs, defendants, and the public.”  We explained that a statutory period of limitations 
represents a policy judgment by the Legislature that serves the 
interest of a plaintiff in having adequate time to investigate a 
cause of action and file suit, the interest of a defendant in 
having certainty that there will not be a need to respond to a 
potential claim that has been unreasonably delayed, and the 
general interest of society in judicial economy. 
 
Id.  (citations omitted).  This balance is struck ‘“primarily to assure fairness to defendants 
on the theory that claims, asserted after evidence is gone, memories have faded, and 
witnesses disappeared, are so stale as to be unjust.”’  Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 
426 Md. 185, 205 (2012) (quoting Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 367 (1966)).   
Although statutes of limitations are not sacrosanct, see Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692, 
the Court does not craft exceptions to limitations periods without compelling reasons.  We 
apply a “strict construction regarding tolling of statutes of limitations” and, therefore, 
“absent legislative creation of an exception to the statute of limitations, we will not allow 
any ‘implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.’”  Anderson v. United States, 
427 Md. 99, 120 (2012) (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333 (1994) 
(citations omitted)); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 359 (1993) (describing narrow 
construction of statutes of limitations as a “well established principle”) (citations omitted).   
Mr. Lowery’s, the Court of Special Appeals’, and the Dissent’s interpretation could 
lead to results clearly not contemplated by CJ § 5-202.  Consider this hypothetical: Ms. 
Hoang was denied a discharge and the automatic stay was lifted on March 22, 2006.  Under 
34 
 
Mr. Lowery’s desired interpretation, had Ms. Hoang been involved in a fender-bender in 
May 2005, prior to her filing her bankruptcy petition, the standard three-year statute of 
limitations under CJ § 5-101 for the other driver to file a claim against her would still not 
yet have expired 15 years later.  Once the automatic stay has been lifted and a plaintiff has 
no legal impediment to prosecuting a claim against a debtor, there is no reason to allow for 
further delays and invite the inequities of lost evidence, faded memories, and stale disputes.   
In this case, Maryland Rule 2-625 provides a simple means for renewal of that 
period, the judgment holder only needs to file for renewal to place the judgment debtor and 
court on notice.  This is not an onerous burden.  We see no reason to excuse Mr. Lowery 
and other judgment creditors from the minimal diligence and effort required to preserve 
their judgments.  The federal Bankruptcy Code already provides a mechanism for creditors 
who are anxious about violating the automatic stay to determine what actions to protect 
their rights are permissible.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).  We will not distort the language of 
our own statute to provide unwarranted leniency.   
III. 
 CONCLUSION  
We hold that under CJ § 5-202, the word “dismissal” is plain and unambiguous.  
Under the statute, where a debtor files a petition in insolvency which is later dismissed, the 
time between the filing and the dismissal is not included in determining whether a claim 
against a debtor is barred by the statute of limitations.  There is nothing in the plain meaning 
of the statute, the legislative history, or its structure or purpose, which would allow us to 
broadly define the word “dismissal” to include any bankruptcy proceeding that ends in a 
manner unfavorable the debtor’s interest regardless of whether the case is dismissed.  In 
35 
 
order for the tolling provision to apply, there must be a “dismissal” of the bankruptcy 
petition.  To broadly interpret the word “dismissal” to include any “unsuccessful” 
bankruptcy petitions that do not end with a discharge of debts and a fresh start for the debtor 
is inconsistent with the concept of “dismissal” under the federal Bankruptcy Code, and 
inconsistent with the General Assembly’s intent to align the remaining insolvency laws 
with the modern Bankruptcy Code. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 223525-V 
Argued: October 4, 2019 
  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 17 
September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MINH-VU HOANG 
v. 
JEFFREY LOWERY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J., 
which Getty, J., joins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: June 5, 2020 
 
 
The Majority Opinion is very well written, but flawed in its analysis.  Accordingly, 
I cannot join it. 
The Majority Opinion’s analysis of the issue in this case turns on its “plain meaning” 
interpretation of an 1814 Maryland statute that tolled statutes of limitations during an 
insolvency proceeding.  The Majority Opinion equates a term in that statute to a similar 
term in the contemporary federal bankruptcy law – a law that did not exist in 1814, or for 
many years thereafter.  Based on that equation, the Majority Opinion concludes that the 
current version of the State tolling statute had no effect in this case.  Upon closer inspection, 
however, the linchpin of that analysis – the interpretation of the 1814 statute – falls apart. 
The tolling statute is currently codified at Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial 
Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §5-202.  As the Majority Opinion indicates, we are all indebted 
to a prior opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, which took a deep dive into the history 
of that statute – an analysis that was adopted by reference by this Court when it affirmed 
that decision.  See Ali v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 188 Md. App. 269, 277-
81 (2009), aff’d, 416 Md. 249, 266 n.14 (2010).1   
As the courts in the Ali case explained, the General Assembly enacted an insolvency 
law in 1805 that, like the later federal bankruptcy law, was intended to relieve debtors from 
some of the burdens associated with their situation while also devoting what assets they 
                                              
1 Both appellate courts in that case relied on a comprehensive 19th century treatise 
on the Maryland insolvency law – John L. Dorsey, A Treatise on the American Law of 
Insolvency; Containing a Compilation  of the Insolvent Laws of Maryland, and the Laws 
in Relation to Insolvent Debtors of the United States (1832).  See 188 Md. App. at 278, 
283-84; 416 Md. at 268.   
2 
 
had to the benefit of their creditors.  Chapter 110, Laws of Maryland 1805.  There was 
apparently some concern that a debtor might misuse the benefits offered by the insolvency 
act and attempt to defraud creditors.  Accordingly, the insolvency act provided that any 
debtor found to have engaged in “fraud or deceit of his creditors … shall be forever 
precluded from any benefit of this act.”  Id., §9.  That provision apparently proved 
insufficient to the task by itself.  Fraud “is as old as falsehood and as versable as human 
ingenuity”2 and a legislature is always playing catch-up. 
Within a decade, the General Assembly came back to the drawing board and enacted 
the 1814 law to supplement the insolvency act.  Particularly pertinent to this case, §3 of 
that law is the original iteration of CJ §5-202.3  As the Majority Opinion acknowledges, 
the General Assembly enacted this provision “to address the public’s complaint that 
debtors manipulated the bankruptcy and insolvency processes to avoid paying creditors by 
entering bankruptcy, waiting for the statute of limitations to expire, and subsequently 
dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding.”  Majority slip op. at 17-18 (quoting Ali, 188 Md. 
App. at 283-84.).  So far, so good. 
The Majority Opinion takes a wrong turn, however, in construing the language of 
§3 in light of the rest of the 1814 statute.  Section 1 of the 1814 law, which the Majority 
Opinion largely ignores, appeared designed to address delays in cases under the insolvency 
                                              
2 Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 
(1941). 
 
3 The Court of Special Appeals helpfully appended the full text of that law to its 
opinion in this case, and I have done the same. 
 
3 
 
act by setting a time limit for the duration of a case, unless additional time is needed to 
investigate reasons to deny a discharge under the act.  Section 2 of the 1814 statute provided 
for the automatic revival of judgments suspended by an insolvency petition upon “the 
dismissal or withdrawing of any petition” or “decisions thereon against the petitioner.”  
Section 3 of the statute provided for tolling of the “time intervening between the petitioning 
of any of said debtors and the time that any said petitions may be dismissed.”  Comparing 
§2 and §3 of the statute, the Majority Opinion concludes that the “plain meaning” of these 
two sections is that there is “automatic reinstatement of judgments in the event of dismissal, 
withdrawal, or denial of discharge, but … tolling only in the event of dismissal.”  Majority 
slip op. at 12. 
Such a construction is clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, and 
imputes a “plain meaning” to this law without taking account of all of the language of the 
statute in context.   
First, as noted above, the purpose of this law was to defeat “debtor abuse”4 – more 
specifically, the possibility that a debtor would file a petition, wait for the statute of 
limitations to run on a creditor’s claim, and, once limitations expired, terminate the 
insolvency proceeding.  Under the Majority Opinion’s interpretation, §3 was woefully 
inadequate to this task, even in 1814.  Under that interpretation, a debtor who wished to 
manipulate the process could simply file an insolvency petition, let limitations run on a 
creditor’s claim, and then withdraw the petition.  The creditor would have no recourse 
                                              
4 Ali, 416 Md. at 268-69. 
4 
 
because, according to the Majority Opinion, the tolling provision did not apply to 
withdrawals.5  And a debtor intent on manipulating the system would not have to be 
particularly ingenious to see that gaping hole in the anti-manipulation provision.  In my 
view, there is little doubt that §3 was meant to encompass at least a withdrawal of a petition 
– what might otherwise be called a voluntary dismissal – as well as an involuntary 
dismissal.6  In addition, as noted above, §1 of the 1814 law created a specific exception to 
the time limits that the law otherwise set for insolvency proceedings if it appeared that the 
debtor would be denied a discharge.  It would be incongruous to allow such a debtor – 
ultimately deemed unworthy of a discharge – to run out the limitations clock on a creditor’s 
claim during that overtime period.  But that is what would happen under the Majority 
Opinion’s construction of §3. 
Second, the Majority Opinion’s “plain meaning” analysis fails to take account of 
the precise language used in the 1814 law.  Section 1 states that “no petition … shall be 
continued” beyond a specified deadline, except for the purpose of defeating a discharge.  
Section 2 of the law refers to “any petition for the benefit of [the insolvency act].”  By 
contrast, §3 refers to “any of said petitions.”  The use of “said petitions” in §3 seems to be 
                                              
5 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that a debtor bent on defrauding creditors by 
running out the statute of limitations would hope for someone else to seek dismissal of his 
petition rather than withdraw it himself.  Under the Majority Opinion’s “plain meaning” 
interpretation of the 1814 law, the tolling provision would be completely ineffectual.   
 
6 The Majority Opinion appears to recognize that a withdrawal would be at least 
equivalent to a dismissal for purposes of the tolling provision, see Majority slip op. at 27-
28, but is apparently unable to reconcile that insight with the “plain meaning” it otherwise 
wishes to attribute to §3. 
5 
 
a reference back to the broader uses of “no petition” and “any petition” that fall within the 
purview of the previous sections.  We seldom use a cross-reference like “said” these days, 
but that does not mean the word is meaningless.  This connection between §3 and §§1-2 
suggests that the term “dismissed” in §3 should be interpreted in light of §2’s broader 
reference to “the dismissal or withdrawing of any petition” and “decisions thereon against 
the petitioner” and §1’s reference to the denial of a discharge.  At the very least, there is 
ambiguity as to how literally the term “dismissed” in §3 should be understood. 
This Court has often reiterated that the “plain meaning” of a statute prevails 
provided that “the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the 
statute’s apparent purpose.”  Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010).  Here, 
however, the Majority Opinion adopts a “plain meaning” of arguably ambiguous language 
that is clearly inconsistent with the statute’s apparent purpose. 
In my view, the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals in this case is more 
consistent with the purpose of the Maryland insolvency laws that spawned CJ §5-202 – 
that it “was adopted to ensure that creditors, whose debtors failed in obtaining a discharge, 
wouldn’t be worse off for cooperating in the process.”  240 Md. App. 240, 248 (2019).  
Accordingly, I would adopt the analysis set forth in that opinion and affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Special Appeals. 
Judge Getty advises that he joins this opinion. 
 
 
6 
 
APPENDIX 
CHAPTER 122. 
November Session 1814 
An Additional Supplement to the act entitled, An act for the relief of sundry 
Insolvent Debtors. 
 
Sec. 1. BE IT ENACTED by the General Assembly of Maryland, That 
no petition for the benefit of the original act for the benefit of sundry 
insolvent debtors, and the several supplements thereto, now depending in any 
of the county courts of this state, shall be continued beyond the second 
session of such court next after the passage of this act, unless in cases where 
the court shall be satisfied a further continuance is necessary to procure 
testimony material and competent on the trial of any allegations made against 
the petitioner’s discharge, nor shall any such petition hereafter to be filed, be 
continued beyond the first court next after the filing thereof unless for the 
causes aforesaid.  
 
2. That upon the dismissal or withdrawing of any petition for the 
benefit of said acts, or upon decisions thereon against the petitioner, it shall 
not be necessary to revive by scire facias any judgment which may have been 
suspended by such petition, and process of execution may be issued upon 
such judgments as if no such suspension had taken place.  
 
3. That the time intervening between the petitioning of any of said 
debtors, and the time that any of said petitions may be dismissed, shall not 
be computed on any plea of limitation so as to defeat any claim of any person 
against such debtor.