Title: Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp.1988 WY 103760 P.2d 974Case Number: 87-247Decided: 08/24/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM W. STRATMAN, AS 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF KATHY ANN STRATMAN, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

ADMIRAL BEVERAGE 
CORPORATION AND FREMONT BEVERAGES, INC., APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS), CROWN CORK AND SEAL CO., INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION AND 
CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, INC., (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WashakieCounty, Gray P. Hartman, 
J.

Terry J. Harris 
of Southeast. Wyoming Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Patrick R. Day 
and Marcelle Shoop of Holland & Hart, 
Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Ret.*

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Kathy Ann Stratman 
(Stratman) was killed by being pulled into a canning machine while employed at a 
Pepsi-Cola plant in Worland, 
Wyoming. A wrongful death action 
was brought by her surviving husband, appellant William W. Stratman, 
individually and as administrator of the estate. Appeal is taken from summary 
judgment given to appellees Admiral Beverage Corporation (Admiral), the owner of 
the canning machine, and Fremont Beverages, Inc. (Fremont), the owner of the 
franchise, plant facility, and bottling operations. Although other defendants 
and undecided issues remain, the district court certified the summary judgment 
in favor of appellees as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, with a finding of no just reason for delay for appeal. At issue 
is the decision by the district court that Admiral, as a closely affiliated 
corporation with Fremont, was a joint employer of Stratman and 
was immune from this employee wrongful death suit pursuant to the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act and the Wyoming Constitution. Although Fremont is also designated 
as an appellee, appellant does not now contest its favorable grant of summary 
judgment.

[¶2.]     Appellant identifies 
the issues as whether the district court erred:

"I. * * * in granting 
summary judgment to both Admiral Beverage Corporation and Fremont Beverages, 
Inc., upon their claimed common defense of employer immunity under the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act and Article 10, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

"II. * * * in failing to 
grant appellant partial summary judgment on Admiral Beverage Corporation's 
claimed affirmative defense that Admiral Beverage Corporation was Kathy Ann 
Stratman's employer, and further that Admiral Beverage Corporation was entitled 
to employer immunity under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act and Article 10, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?"1

[¶3.]     Appellees phrase the 
issues in this manner:

"1. Did the District 
Court correctly find that Kathy Stratman was jointly employed by Admiral 
Beverage Corporation and Fremont Beverages, Inc.?

"2. Is Admiral Beverage 
Corporation entitled to immunity from suit under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation 
Act?"

[¶4.]     We 
reverse.

I. 
FACTS

[¶5.]     Stratman was killed on 
January 17, 1986 while working as a "sanitizer" at the plant. Although no one 
witnessed the accident, she apparently became entangled in the "accelerator 
fingers" on the can-filling machine and was consequently pulled into the 
machine, suffering dismembering injuries and immediate 
death.

[¶6.]     By original complaint 
and three amendments, appellant initiated wrongful death claims against Crown 
Cork and Seal Co., Inc., the manufacturer of the can-filling machine; 
Continental Can Company, Inc., the manufacturer of the "seamer" machine 
incorporated into or assembled with the can-filling machine; and Admiral, as 
owner of the can-filling machine. Alternatively added was Fremont, if the court 
should determine that Admiral was Stratman's employer rather than plant owner 
Fremont. Various cross-claims were filed by the 
defendants.

[¶7.]     Pertinent to this 
appeal, appellant, by last complaint, alleged liability against Admiral for 
strict products liability, negligence, and willful and wanton misconduct. The 
products liability claim emanated from the relationship of Admiral as lessor of 
the can-filling machine to Fremont as lessee. Liability was asserted 
against Fremont 
on the grounds of negligence and willful misconduct. In answering appellant's 
complaints, Admiral and Fremont both raised the affirmative defense of employer 
immunity under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and moved for summary 
judgment.

[¶8.]     In its order granting 
those motions for summary judgment as favoring Admiral and Fremont on the 
employer-immunity defense, the district court observed:

"The question of joint 
employer immunity has statewide ramifications to employers and should be 
addressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court. In addition, the judgments granted here, 
combined with the dismissal by stipulation of the cross-claims, terminates all 
claims against Admiral and Fremont. The issues of fact and law involved in the 
Worker's Compensation issues are unrelated to the general liability issues which 
form the basis of the Plaintiff's complaint. * * *"

Understanding the 
immunity issue requires some detailed analysis of the origin and interrelated 
internal functioning of Fremont and Admiral as affiliated corporations. Fremont 
Beverages, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, was founded in 1947 by 
Newell Sargent as a franchise bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola products. In 
1960, Forrest L. Clay was brought into the company as a partner and as 
secretary-treasurer. In the late 1960's, management perceived that cans would 
eventually replace bottles in the soft drink market. Consequently, Admiral 
Beverage Corporation was formed in 1970 to operate a canning operation with 
similar but not identical ownership, with the same management and control from 
Newell and Clay. Admiral's canning operations were placed in Fremont's plant in Worland with Admiral leasing space from 
Fremont. The 
companies remained distinct legal entities with Fremont retaining title to the physical plant 
and the bottling equipment, while Admiral owned the can-filling equipment. Plant 
employees worked as needed in either bottling or canning.

[¶9.]     In 1977, the 
arrangement was formalized by the execution of a Management and Operating 
Services Agreement by which Fremont assumed responsibility for all plant 
employees, including wages, taxes and worker's compensation fund payments. 
Admiral would reimburse Fremont for its share of these expenses based 
on a monthly apportionment of the time each employee spent working in the 
canning operation.2

[¶10.]  Forrest Kelly Clay,3 vice-president of both Fremont and 
Admiral, in deposition, described the working relationship. Relevant portions of 
his testimony is contained in the following exchanges and 
excerpts:

"Q. Generally, how are 
operations divided between the two companies in this 
plant?

"A. Fremont Beverage is 
responsible for the bottling operations of their respective franchise. Admiral 
Beverage cooperative is responsible for canning beverages only in owning 
equipment for their respective members.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. And does Admiral 
Beverage issue any paychecks with respect to individuals employed in Worland, Wyoming?

"A. No, sir. Admiral 
reimburses Fremont on a pro rata basis for the amount of 
work that is done for the Admiral companies by the employees who spend their 
time on that job duty.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. With respect to 
worker's compensation premium payments, is there a similar reimbursement to 
Fremont for the 
expense of those payments by Admiral?

"A. Yes, 
sir."

Forrest Kelly 
Clay further testified that under the agreement,

"* * * Fremont employees 
will perform the duties needed to run the operation of the can line; to provide 
the Admiral members with their cans; and Fremont's duties will include the 
training, selection and supervision and all aspects of running that equipment, 
and in turn, Admiral will reimburse Fremont for a fair value of what that time 
is, * * *."

Additionally, 
Forrest Kelly Clay testified that, as vice-president of both companies, he was 
paid by Fremont who, in return, would be reimbursed by Admiral on a pro-rata 
basis. In this respect, his treatment as an employee was the same as that of 
Stratman.

[¶11.]  Of additional relevance to the issues 
presented in this appeal is the "Employee Handbook" received by Stratman when 
she began her employment. The handbook, which on its front cover is identified 
as "Fremont Beverages, Inc., Employee Handbook" and displays a Pepsi-Cola logo, 
discusses company history, rules, benefits and safety policies. The handbook 
repeatedly alludes to Fremont as the employer, and, although it 
refers to both the plant bottled and canned production, it does not otherwise 
refer to Admiral. In addition, it specifically welcomes the employees to 
"Fremont Beverages." (Emphasis added.)

[¶12.]  Evidence includes copies of Stratman's 
weekly time cards with notations on them indicating that on various weeks her 
time was allocated to Admiral's can line and on other weeks to Fremont's bottle line. 
These time cards reflect that just prior to her fatal accident, she was 
transferred to the building night clean-up crew. The record does not clearly 
reveal when notations on the time cards were actually made as either during or 
after the work week.

[¶13.]  Although Admiral had an account with the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division (Division), it had been inactive since 
the early 1970's and Stratman was listed only on Fremont's payroll reports. Included in 
evidence, as drafted by "company and counsel," is a copy of the accident report 
listing Fremont 
as employer which was submitted to the Division to report her 
death.

II. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶14.]  Disposition by summary judgment requires 
the dual findings that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Farr v. Link, 
Wyo., 746 P.2d 431 (1987). In reviewing a summary judgment, we examine the same evidence in the 
same light as the district court. Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., Wyo., 750 P.2d 1321 
(1988). A material fact is one which would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of a cause of action or a defense asserted by the 
parties. Baldwin v. Dube, 
Wyo., 751 P.2d 388 (1988). We also 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
be drawn from the facts. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 
728 P.2d 1137 (1986). Once the movant has made a prima facie showing that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must come 
forward with specific facts to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Davenport v. Epperly, Wyo., 744 P.2d 1110 
(1987).

[¶15.]  The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment with both supporting and opposing evidentiary materials 
presented for review. As characterized in the Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 636 (1986) analysis, this case involves stage three, substantive 
sufficiency of the affidavits to initially support the motion; stage five, 
dispositive legal principles; and stage six, substantive sufficiency of 
responsive affidavits to establish an issue of fact. The decision of the trial 
court was essentially defined within the stage five resolution that lacking 
relevancy of any disputed issues of fact, a decision as a matter of law was 
appropriate as applying the principle that whether the relationship between the 
parties will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other is 
a determination to be made by the court. Naidu v. Laird, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 1064 (1988).

III. 
IMMUNITY

[¶16.]  Consistently, this court and courts 
generally have held that immunity provisions in the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act should be narrowly construed. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., Wyo., 752 P.2d 1363 (1988); Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., Wyo., 742 P.2d 198 (1987); Bence v. 
Pacific Power and Light Co., Wyo., 631 P.2d 13 (1981). In Bence, we said 
that the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act was not intended to abrogate 
common-law remedies and that amending legislation must contain clear and precise 
language in order to supersede common-law rights. Id. at 15. Of similar 
effect is the statement by the Sixth Circuit Court in Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal 
Co., 590 F.2d 655, 660 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 836, 100 S. Ct. 71, 62 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1979) that, absent compelling statutory language or social policy 
justification, "every presumption should be on the side of preserving common law 
rights." See 2A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72.50 at 14-228.33 (1987). 
See also, Choate v. Landis Tool Co., 486 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.Mich. 
1980).

[¶17.]  In Wyoming, employer immunity from suit by an 
injured employee is provided by constitution and statute. Our constitution 
directs the legislature to establish a state fund to compensate employees or 
their dependents for injuries occurring in extra-hazardous employments and 
provides that:

"* * * The right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the 
place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as 
required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any 
such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.) Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 
4.

Correspondingly, 
§ 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977 (1983 Replacement)4 provides:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any 
employer making contributions required by this act, or his employees acting 
within the scope of their employment unless the employees are culpably 
negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee 
and his dependents against any other person." (Emphasis 
added.)

Thus, the grant 
of immunity applies to (1) an employer, (2) who pays into the worker's 
compensation fund, (3) as required by law. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
supra; Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Co., supra. Although Fremont is clearly 
covered, the district court also held as a matter of law that Admiral was a 
joint employer benefiting from the requisite fund contributions and was likewise 
entitled to the immunity. This is the appeal issue which presents our 
disagreement with the trial court.

IV. JOINT 
EMPLOYMENT

[¶18.]  First considered is any sustainable 
factual issues of whether Admiral was a joint employer. If not presented with 
contention of factual dispute, the question whether an entity is an employer for 
purposes of the worker's compensation law is determinable as a matter of law. 
Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Co., supra. This was the trial court decision 
in perceiving joint employment and consequent immunity. The law-fact distinction 
in an employment situation has been described in this 
manner:

"`* * * any discrepancies 
in the facts would be for a jury to resolve; however, whether the facts as they 
are determined to exist constitute an employment relationship is strictly a 
question of law.'" Joyce v. Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc., 815 F.2d 943, 947 
(3rd Cir. 1987), quoting English v. Lehigh County Authority, 286 Pa. Super. 312, 322, 428 A.2d 1343, 1348 (1981).

[¶19.]  The definitions found in § 27-12-102 
provide only minimum guidance in determining whether or not an employment 
relationship exists. The relevant provisions are:

"(a)(viii) `Employee' 
means any person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract 
of services or apprenticeship with an employer engaged in an extrahazardous 
occupation, * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"(a)(ix) `Employer' means 
any person employing individuals in any extrahazardous occupation; * * 
*."

It is 
established under Wyoming law that the primary test to determine 
the existence of an employment relationship is right of control of the alleged 
employer. Claims of Naylor, Wyo., 723 P.2d 1237 (1986); Tauer v. Williams, 69 
Wyo. 388, 242 P.2d 518 (1952); Fox Park Timber 
Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736 (1938). Decisional 
factors include the method of payment, the right to fire, the furnishing of 
equipment, the scope of the work, and the control of the premises where the work 
is to be done. Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, supra; 1C Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 44.00 at 8-40 (1986).

[¶20.]  The right to control is similarly a 
necessary component in a finding of joint employment. Professor Larson describes 
joint employment in this fashion:

"Joint employment occurs 
when a single employee, under contract 
with two employers, and under the simultaneous control of both, 
simultaneously performs services for both employers, and when the service for 
each employer is the same as, or is, closely related to, that for the other. * * 
*" (Emphasis added.) 1C Larson, supra, § 48.41 at 8-511.

See also, 
Mission Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 Or. App. 159, 697 P.2d 1382, 1383 (1985). The 
elements of joint employment are: (1) express or implied contract of employment 
with both employers; (2) simultaneous control of both employers; and (3) the 
advancing of both employers' interests. 1C Larson, supra, §§ 48.41 and 48.44, at 
8-511, 531, 532. The existence of a contract of hire with the employee is the 
critical threshold inquiry. In Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 
(E.D.Tenn. 1974), the court stated:

"Because the employee's 
acceptance of a contract of hire is necessarily followed by his loss of right to 
maintain a common lawsuit against his special employer, such acceptance cannot 
be lightly inferred. It is clear, therefore, that an employee cannot consent to 
work for a special employer in the dark; `[f]or compensation purposes, [the 
employee] cannot have an employer thrust upon him against his will or without 
his knowledge.' * * *" (Emphasis in original.) Citing an unidentified edition of 
Larson, supra, § 48.10 at 211.

[¶21.]  In discussing the necessity of a contract 
of hire, Professor Larson observes:

"Compensation law, 
however, is a mutual arrangement between the employer and employee under which 
both give up and gain certain things. Since the rights to be adjusted are 
reciprocal rights between employer and employee, it is not only logical but 
mandatory to resort to the agreement between them to discover their 
relationship. To thrust upon a worker an employee status to which he has never 
consented would not ordinarily harm him in a vicarious liability suit by a 
stranger against his employer, but it might well deprive him of valuable rights 
under the compensation act, notably the right to sue his own employer for 
common-law damages. This reasoning 
applies not only to the question whether there is any employment relation at 
all, but also to the question whether one of two or more persons is an 
employer. * * *" [Footnotes omitted.] (Emphasis added.) 1C Larson, supra, § 
47.10 at 8-287, 289.

See also, 
Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 827 (D.Colo. 
1983).

[¶22.]  The question of whether the above 
elements of joint employment are present often arises, as here with affiliated 
corporations. The related employer status question is whether corporate 
separateness should be disregarded for immunity purposes. In Fiscus, we cited 
Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., supra for the majority rule that, on issues of 
immunity, courts have refused to disturb the separate corporate identity of 
parent and subsidiary as stating:

"`[A] business enterprise 
has a range of choice in controlling its own corporate structure. But reciprocal 
obligations arise as a result of the choice it makes. The owners may take 
advantage of the benefits of dividing a business into separate corporate parts, 
but principles of reciprocity require that courts also recognize the separate 
identities of the enterprises when sued by an injured employee.'" Fiscus v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 742 P.2d  at 201, quoting Boggs v. Blue Diamond 
Coal Co., supra, 590 F.2d  at 662.

[¶23.]  In Fiscus, the plaintiff had brought a 
personal injury claim against, inter alia, Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), 
the parent company of the employer. The district court granted ARCO's motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that ARCO was an employer entitled 
to immunity. We reversed holding that since ARCO itself was not contributing to 
the fund, it could not claim tort immunity. Consequently, it was not necessary 
for us to determine if ARCO was an actual employer and the question of joint 
employment did not arise. Thus, the topic of joint employment by affiliated 
corporations as one of first impression in Wyoming, leaves its resolution to 
other jurisdictions for precedent and adaptation.

[¶24.]  In Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., supra, 
the employee of a wholly owned subsidiary brought suit for personal injuries 
against the parent corporation. Operational facts involved the ownership 
relation between the parent and subsidiary, account and payroll records of the 
corporations were kept at the same location by the same personnel, and a 
consolidated income tax return was filed. Both companies had workers' 
compensation under the same policy, and the parent exercised the ultimate 
control over operations, including policy-making and the right to hire and fire. 
The court, however, found that although the relationship between the 
corporations was close, it was not one of functional identity; observing that 
corporate records were not consolidated except for tax purposes, and the 
subsidiary did pay its share of worker's compensation premiums, that the 
subsidiary maintained a payroll account and was initially responsible for its 
costs of operation. In denying the parent corporation's motion for summary 
judgment, the court, by application of Colorado law, discerned that absent a 
contract for hire, the exclusive remedy of worker's compensation is not found. 
With respect to the parent/subsidiary relationship, the court surveyed several 
cases, cited Professor Larson, and concluded that:

"* * * attempts to 
`pierce the corporate veil' predicated upon common insurance coverage, common 
payroll funding, and identity of management have failed. * * *" Peterson v. 
Trailways, Inc., supra, 555 F. Supp.  at 833.

The court then 
stated what it perceived to be the majority rule:

"* * * In the absence of 
a `contract of hire' between the `employee' and the parent corporation, the bar 
of workmen's compensation may obtain only in those instances where the facts 
compel disregard of the subsidiary's separate existence." Id. at 
833.

[¶25.]  In Latham v. Technar, Inc., supra, a 
wrongful death action was brought against the parent of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. The decedent had been hired by the subsidiary. The parent and 
subsidiary maintained adjacent factories with the parent manufacturing 
automobile air bags and the subsidiary manufacturing seat belts. Subsidiary paid 
the decedent on its own paychecks, and although the name of the parent did 
appear on these paychecks, the subsidiary's name was most prominent. In 
addition, a collective bargaining agreement including decedent's signature was 
submitted to the court showing the subsidiary and union as parties. 
Approximately two months before her death, decedent was transferred to the 
parent's air bag operations, although she continued to be paid by the subsidiary 
and listed as an employee on the subsidiary's payroll reports. Testimony at 
trial indicated the decedent likely understood that she continued to be employed 
by the subsidiary since she lacked notice of employment by the parent. After a 
plaintiff's verdict, the parent moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
with assertion that the two corporations were a single entity or, in the 
alternative, that the decedent was a "loaned employee," a concept similar in 
required elements to joint employment.

[¶26.]  In denial, the district court had held 
that the companies were separate entities and that neither common ownership and 
management nor common compensation fund insurer separately or jointly 
establishes a single-employer unit. The court found persuasive facts from the 
separate payroll deductions, the collective bargaining agreement, and the 
subsidiaries' name on decedent's paychecks.5 The court also concluded that the 
decedent was not a "loaned employee" because the record was devoid of evidence 
indicating the decedent consented to an employment relationship with the parent, 
i.e., there was not an express or implied contract of hire. The court said that 
the fact that the decedent's activities may have been controlled by the parent 
was insufficient to establish an employment relationship in the absence of an 
express or implied contract of hire. Of similar effect and with similar result, 
see: Joyce v. Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc., supra, 815 F.2d 943, (suit by 
employee of a subsidiary against related subsidiary); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal 
Co., supra, 590 F.2d 655; Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314 
(C.D.Cal. 1980) (overwhelming weight of authority is that parent/subsidiary or 
subsidiary/sibling corporations are separate entities not to be treated as joint 
employers); Choate v. Landis Tool Co., supra, 486 F. Supp. 774; O'Brien v. 
Grumman Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965) (joint employment requires a contract of hire express or 
implied, between the employee and the dual or borrowing employer irrespective of 
any arrangement between the two employers); Gaber v. Franchise Services, Inc., 
Colo. App., 680 P.2d 1345 (1984); Nutt v. Pierce Waste Oil Service, Inc., 112 
Ill. App.3d 612, 68 Ill.Dec. 284, 445 N.E.2d 928 (1983); and Hearn v. Petra 
Intern. Corp., Okla.App., 710 P.2d 769 (1985).

[¶27.]  The cases cited to us by Admiral, 
reaching a different result, represent the minority position and are factually 
distinguishable. Antonini v. Hanna Industries, 94 Nev. 12, 573 P.2d 1184 (1978) 
involved a "labor broker" situation where the immediate employer contracted with 
a customer to provide workers for the customer similar to a temporary help 
service. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the suit against the 
customer-employer in finding an employment relationship. Of importance to its 
decision was that court's policy of liberally construing immunity provisions of 
Nevada's worker's compensation legislation. In addition, the defendant in that 
case clearly had and exercised a right of control over the details of the 
plaintiff's work and arguably, although not addressed by the court, the facts 
presented, including employee consent, could justify finding an implied contract 
of hire.

[¶28.]  Mission Ins. Co. v. Miller, supra, 73 Or. 
App. 159, 697 P.2d 1382, also cited to us by Admiral, is not on point. That case 
did not involve a question of employer immunity from suit, but rather which 
compensation insurer of two separate corporations with identical ownership 
should pay the benefits to the injured claimant. The claimant had been hired by 
each corporation on separate dates and he was paid separately by each until the 
companies experienced financial difficulties and their bank demanded 
consolidation of both companies' funds into one account. Claimant performed 
services for each corporation every day. The court found the corporations were 
distinct legal entities but both insurers were liable because the claimant was a 
joint employee. That decision is in accord with a policy of liberally construing 
benefit provisions in worker's compensation cases. Matter of Johner, Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 (1982).

[¶29.]  Having examined the law of joint 
employment, we return to the evidence in this case to determine if summary 
judgment was properly granted to Admiral as a matter of law. With reference to 
the elements of joint employment, it is clear on the record that Stratman's 
activities at the plant advanced the interests of both Fremont and Admiral. On 
the question of the existence of a contract of hire, express or implied, the 
evidence is conflicting. There is neither evidence of an express contract nor 
any direct evidence whether the employee had knowledge of or consented to an 
employment relationship with Admiral. Both parties rely on evidentiary 
inferences for factual argument. Admiral submitted Stratman's weekly time cards 
with notations on them indicating that for various weeks her time was allocated 
to either Fremont or Admiral. Again, however, the record does not disclose 
whether these notations were made before or after the time cards were turned in 
by Stratman. In addition, Admiral submitted into evidence a letter to Newell 
Sargent from appellant, written about three weeks after Stratman's death, in 
which appellant, as widower, indicated that he had applied for employment with 
Admiral and stated that his wife had enjoyed working at Pepsi. Admiral argues 
that, by inference, this letter indicates that Stratman knew that Admiral was a 
plant employer.

[¶30.]  Countering this evidence was appellant's 
evidence that paychecks were all issued by Fremont, specifying Fremont as 
"payor." In addition, appellant submitted the "Fremont Beverages, Inc. Employees 
Handbook" received by Stratman when she entered employment at the plant. 
Recognizing that a contract of hire will not be lightly inferred and that there 
must be a showing of informed consent to an employment relationship, Latham v. 
Technar, Inc., supra, 390 F. Supp. 1031, we conclude that the existence of a 
contract of hire presents a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary 
judgment in favor of Admiral. Greaser v. Williams, Wyo., 703 P.2d 327 
(1985).

[¶31.]  Similarly, we find material factual 
issues with respect to the right of control. On this issue, Admiral submitted 
evidence that the ownership and senior management of the corporations were the 
same, and that under their accounting arrangement, Stratman's hours were 
variously allocated between Fremont or Admiral. Admiral also submitted the 
affidavit of Forrest L. Clay, the president of Admiral and secretary-treasurer 
of Fremont. In his affidavit, Mr. Clay testified that since 1970, Admiral and 
Fremont jointly managed and operated the plant, the two companies had never 
considered the employees to be solely employed by Fremont, the employees worked 
simultaneously for both companies, and the agreement did not alter the daily 
operation of the plant. Countering this evidence, appellant submitted the 
Management and Operating Services Agreement which clearly conferred management 
functions at the plant upon Fremont, including hiring, training, supervision, 
and termination of employees, and directed Fremont to pay salaries and wages to 
"employees of Fremont who have performed services for Admiral." In addition, 
Fremont submitted the deposition testimony of Forrest Kelly Clay that, "Admiral 
Beverage cooperative is responsible for canning beverages only in owning 
equipment for their respective members," which included Fremont and at least 
nine other bottlers.

[¶32.]  On this issue of control, we perceive 
that Admiral's evidence and argument, as based on identity of senior management, 
substantially disregard both the separate corporate identities and the specific 
agreement between them. As in Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 742 P.2d  
at 201, we will continue to adhere to the majority rule that, on issues of 
immunity, the separate corporate identity of affiliated corporations will not be 
disturbed. Similarly, we find the accounting arrangement allocating employee 
hours between the two companies unpersuasive as to the right of control. 
Nevertheless, the testimony of Forrest L. Clay regarding joint management 
conflicts with the Management and Operating Services Agreement6 and with certain testimony of 
Forrest Kelly Clay, thus creating a factual issue not amenable to summary 
judgment. In summary, therefore, on the issue of joint employment, we hold that 
the record discloses genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of a 
contract of hire between Stratman and Admiral and as to Admiral's right of 
control over Stratman. It was error for the district court, as a matter of law, 
to hold on this evidence that Admiral was a joint employer of Stratman. See 
Leithead v. American Colloid Co., Wyo., 721 P.2d 1059 
(1986).

V. CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
STATE FUND

[¶33.]  Next presented is whether the district 
court was correct in ruling, for summary judgment purposes, that Admiral was 
contributing to the worker's compensation fund. Upon remand, this question will 
only arise if, after trial, the fact finder determines Admiral was a joint 
employer of Stratman. Coverage of affiliated corporations under the same 
worker's compensation insurance policy or state account is not relevant to the 
issue of whether the employee of one affiliate is also the employee of the 
other. Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., supra, 555 F. Supp. 827; Stoddard v. 
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., supra, 513 F. Supp. 314; Choate v. Landis Tool Co., 
supra, 486 F. Supp. 774; Latham v. Technar, Inc., supra, 390 F. Supp. 1031; 
Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., supra, 244 F. Supp. 151. If Stratman was not an employee 
of Admiral, Admiral is not immune from suit by appellant regardless of whether 
Admiral was making fund payments.

[¶34.]  To determine if Admiral was "making 
contributions required by this act," § 27-12-103(a), we first look to the 
provisions of the act controlling employer contributions. Section 27-12-201(a) 
specifies payroll reporting requirements and provides in pertinent 
part:

"Each employer shall 
forward to the director, on forms provided by the director, a true copy of the 
payroll of his employees engaged in extrahazardous employment during the current 
calendar month, or quarterly reporting period, certified and affirmed by himself 
or a person having knowledge of the payrolls, under penalty of perjury. Payroll 
reports and monthly payments required by this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 
27-12-804] shall be submitted on or before the fifteenth day of the month 
following the month for which the earnings are computed and 
paid."

Sections 
27-12-202, 204 and 205 describe the specific periodic amounts each employer must 
pay. Section 27-12-207(a) and (b) provides penalties and enforcement mechanisms 
available to the state against non-complying employers described 
as:

"Any employer who does 
not apply for and fully qualify an account under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 
27-12-804] for the coverage of his eligible employees or having an account, 
fails, neglects or refuses to make the monthly or quarterly period payments as 
provided by this act * * *."

and

"Any employer who fails 
to furnish a true copy of his payroll of his employees * * * or to make payments 
required by this act to the director 
* * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶35.]  The record shows that Admiral was filing 
inactive payroll reports and not making direct contributions. Appellant 
submitted the affidavit of Betty Lou Dunagan, State Division Payroll Compliance 
Supervisor, as testimony that Admiral had only the inactive account and had not 
filed any payroll reports listing Stratman as an employee. Attached to her 
affidavit were copies of Admiral's payroll reports to the Division for the years 
1985 and 1986 showing an inactive account without any employees and payment of 
only an administrative fee. Ms. Dunagan testified in her affidavit with appended 
payroll reports that Fremont, at the same time, did maintain an active account 
with the Division and had listed Stratman as an employee during the course of 
her plant employment.

[¶36.]  To provide factual support for its motion 
for summary judgment, Admiral submitted documents to prove contribution. Much of 
this material consisted of internal accounting documents showing how Stratman's 
and other employees' time were allocated between Fremont and Admiral, and 
establishing that Admiral reimbursed Fremont for premium payments on a pro-rata 
basis for allocated time depending on work done. Admiral additionally submitted 
the affidavit of Forrest L. Clay as testimony that the companies, in the early 
1970's, decided to "consolidate the worker's compensation payroll reports and 
premium payments on Fremont's existing account with the Worker's Compensation 
Division." Admiral also submitted a separate affidavit of Betty Lou Dunagan. In 
this affidavit, Ms. Dunagan testified that she was familiar with the manner in 
which employers make their payroll reports and with the history of the 
Division's policy with respect to such reports. She further testified 
that:

"There are several 
accounts with the Worker's Compensation Division which include payrolls for more 
than one corporation if that corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary or 
division of the parent corporation which holds the account. These corporations 
report their payroll and pay their premiums, and that of their separate 
subsidiaries and divisions, through a single account 
number."

[¶37.]  Admiral correctly observes in its brief 
that this court has never determined exactly what payment and reporting 
procedures must be followed in order "to be contributing as required by this 
act." In Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 742 P.2d 198, we held that 
ARCO, as the parent corporation to the subsidiary employing the claimant, was 
not entitled to immunity because there was no evidence or even an allegation of 
fund payment.

[¶38.]  In Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 
supra, 631 P.2d 13, we were confronted with the question of whether the owners 
of property, who were deemed a surety for their contractor's responsibility for 
compensation fund contributions by the statute then in effect,7 were statutory employers entitled 
to immunity.8 We held in Bence that because they 
were only potentially liable to the fund as sureties, the owners were not 
entitled to immunity. In so holding, we said that:

"* * * The statute does 
not grant immunity to those responsible for making payments to the fund nor does 
it say anything about granting immunity to those having a potential liability to 
the fund. The grant of immunity is set out in § 27-50, W.S. 1957, and it extends 
to `any employer contributing, as required by law.'" Id. at 
18.

and

"* * * Neither the 
constitution nor statutes specifically grant immunity to a surety, guarantor, or 
general contractor who has contracted to reimburse the employer, who actually 
makes the payment." Id. at 18.9

With respect to 
the owners' contracts to reimburse the contractor in Bence, we stated that the 
arrangement was not entitled to any significance because the owners and the 
contractor could not, by contract, limit the cause of action of the injured 
employee of the contractor. Id. at 15. The facts in this case are 
distinguishable from Bence. In Bence, the owners were clearly not employers of 
the injured worker. The reimbursement arrangement in Bence was not between 
related corporations and did not involve a purportedly consolidated account 
between affiliated employers as here.

[¶39.]  The question which we now decide is 
whether two or more affiliated corporations as joint or co-employers may report 
their payroll and submit their premium payments to the Division under one 
consolidated account and thereby be "making contributions as required by this 
act." If we answer that question in the affirmative, the further question is 
whether a valid consolidated account is accomplished by an arrangement such as 
the one that existed here between Admiral and Fremont.

[¶40.]  The Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, as 
in effect for this case, does not address consolidated accounts. Betty Dunagan's 
affidavit indicated that the Division has in practice allowed affiliated 
corporations to consolidate their accounts. We have said that the construction 
placed upon a statute by the agency charged with its execution is entitled to 
some deference. Matter of Hasser, Wyo., 647 P.2d 66 (1982); Demos v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Natrona County, Wyo., 571 P.2d 980 (1977). In construing a 
statute, we must consider the interpretation given the statute by the agency 
administering it. Matter of Hasser, supra; Langdon v. Lutheran Broth., Wyo., 625 P.2d 209 (1981).

[¶41.]  Additionally, as Admiral points out in 
its brief, the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, as revised effective July 1, 
1987 (§§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804, W.S. 1977), expressly recognizes 
consolidated accounts for affiliated employers. Under the new act, the Division 
is directed to establish employment classifications based on the varying hazards 
of different employments and the claim experience of specific employers, and to 
set premium rates for the various classifications accordingly. Section 
27-14-201. Section 27-14-202(d) in reference to payroll reporting requirements, 
provides in relevant part:

"Any employer, or multiple employers under 
common control, employing employees covered under this act that would 
qualify as separate classifications may elect to report the payrolls of these 
entities as required by this section under one (1) employment classification or 
under separate employment classifications. The division shall classify the 
employer's payroll or payrolls in accordance with W.S. 27-14-201. * * * Any employer or multiple employer under 
common control employing employees covered by this act who elects to report 
the payrolls under one (1) employment classification shall be treated as a single employer for 
all purposes of this act." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, multiple 
employers under common control are now to be treated as a single employer if 
they elect to report their payroll under one classification since the new act 
envisions consolidated accounts for affiliated employers. Although not 
conclusive, subsequent enactments by the legislature are entitled to 
consideration as an aid in interpreting an ambiguous statute. Inexco Oil Co. v. 
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1065 (1971); Wyoming 
Hospital Ass'n.v. Harris, 527 F. Supp. 551 (D.Wyo. 1981), aff'd 727 F.2d 936 
(10th Cir. 1984).

[¶42.]  Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded 
that, under the act as it existed in relation to this case, affiliated 
corporations could report their payroll and pay their premiums under a single 
consolidated account. We additionally perceive, however, that such an 
arrangement requires the express approval and knowledge of the Division to 
qualify as "contributing as required by this act."10 The affidavit of Betty Dunagan in 
which she testifies to the Division's practice of allowing consolidated accounts 
reflects that required knowledge and approval in accord with § 27-14-202(d) of 
the current act. The penalty provisions of the act, as it existed in relation to 
this claim, also required such approval and knowledge. Section 27-12-207(a) 
makes certain penalties and remedies available to the Division as against "[a]ny 
employer who does not apply for and fully 
qualify an account under this act * * *." (Emphasis added.) By holding that 
a consolidated account with the Division for affiliated corporations constitutes 
"making contributions required by this act" only where such an arrangement is 
expressly approved by the Division, we do not vitiate our policy of narrowly 
construing immunity provisions in the act. Such an arrangement allows the 
Division to monitor compliance with payroll reporting and premium payment 
requirements without elevating form over substance in determining who is 
contributing as required. Established liability for premium payment is a 
necessary coordinate for defined coverage and provided 
immunity.

[¶43.]  There is no evidence in this record that 
the arrangement between Admiral and Fremont was approved by the Division, and 
evidence indicating whether the Division even had knowledge of the arrangement 
is equivocal at best.11 In reality, the evidence in the 
record tends to show simply a pro forma or ad hoc agreement between the two 
related corporations to facilitate their accounting procedure. Thus, on the 
issue of whether Admiral was contributing as required by the act, the materials 
submitted by Admiral were substantively insufficient to support its motion for 
summary judgment under stage three of the Cordova analysis. Cordova v. Gosar, 
supra, 719 P.2d  at 634, 635. Admiral failed to meet its initial burden of a 
prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact. 
Consequently, Admiral was not entitled to summary judgment regardless of how 
appellant responded. Davenport v. Epperly, supra, 744 P.2d 1110; Matthews v. 
Wyoming Dept. of Agriculture, Wyo., 719 P.2d 216 (1986).

[¶44.]  In conclusion, we hold that genuine 
issues of material fact exist relating to (1) whether Admiral was a joint 
employer of Stratman; and (2) whether Admiral was contributing to the worker's 
compensation fund as required by the act, and reverse the entry of summary 
judgment granting Admiral immunity from suit.

VI. PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR APPELLANT

[¶45.]  As a final matter, we address appellant's 
argument that the district court erred in failing to grant partial summary 
judgment in his favor on the question 
of immunity for Admiral. Although in certain cases we will reverse the grant of 
summary judgment and remand with instructions to the district court to enter 
summary judgment or partial summary judgment in favor of the opposing party, 
Leithead v. American Colloid Co., supra, 721 P.2d 1059, this is not such a case. 
Seay v. Vialpando, Wyo., 567 P.2d 285 (1977). Having determined that litigable 
issues of fact exist, appellant is no more entitled to summary judgment than was 
Admiral.12

VII. 
CONCLUSION

[¶46.]  Summary judgment granted to Fremont 
Beverages, Inc. is affirmed; summary judgment granted to Admiral Beverage 
Corporation is reversed; and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Normally an order 
denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. Kimbley v. City of 
Green River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 (1983). In addition, by notice of appeal, 
appellant stated it to be an "* * * appeal from the September 18, 1987 Order of 
this Court to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The Plaintiff specifically appeals that 
action taken by this Court's final Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment 
And For Final Judgment In Favor Of Admiral Beverage Corporation and Fremont 
Beverages, Inc. * * *."

2 Pertinent provisions of 
the Management and Operating Services Agreement include:

"1. 
APPOINTMENT:

"Admiral hereby appoints 
and employs Fremont as exclusive management agent and appoints it in such 
capacity to act as general manager, to supervise, direct and control all phases 
of the management and operation of Admiral's canning, warehousing, storage, 
office and related activities for a term of five years from the date hereof, 
subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter stated.

"2. MANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATIONAL SERVICES:

"Fremont herein agrees to 
perform the following services for Admiral:

"(a) Selection, 
employment, termination, supervision, direction, and training of such employees 
as Fremont determines to be reasonably necessary for the operation of the 
canning, warehousing, storage and office facilities of Admiral. Fremont shall 
provide all accounting and bookkeeping services for all accounts receivable and 
accounts payable of Admiral. However, said accounts shall be and remain the sole 
and separate property of Admiral and Fremont shall have no proprietary interest 
therein.

"(b) Fremont herein 
agrees to establish all on-site warehousing and canning procedures and the 
billing, collection, receipt and giving of receipts for all services rendered by 
or on behalf of Admiral's Worland operation and such other operations as Admiral 
may undertake from time to time.

* * * * * 
*

"6. 
SALARIES:

"Fremont shall pay all 
salaries and wages due to employees of Fremont, who have performed services for 
Admiral in it's canning, warehousing, storage and office operations hereto, and 
shall bill Admiral on a period basis for the cost of the services performed by 
the employees of Fremont. All FICA taxes, Social Security taxes and Workmen's 
Compensation taxes paid by Fremont, shall be passed on to Admiral in proportion 
to the amount of services performed by said employees for 
Admiral."

3 Forrest L. Clay and 
Forrest Kelly Clay are separate individuals and their relationship is not stated 
in the record.

4 In 1986, Chapter 12 of 
Title 27 (Worker's Compensation, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-805, W.S. 1977) was 
repealed and recreated as present Chapter 14 (§§ 27-14-101 through 27-14-804, 
W.S. 1977) effective July 1, 1987. Appellant's claims arose under the prior act 
and, unless otherwise specified, reference in this opinion will be to the 
earlier act.

5 With respect to the 
paycheck, the court said:

"* * * The court cannot 
turn its back to the fact that the principal name appearing on the face of a 
payroll check has a major influence upon a wage earner. * * *" Latham v. 
Technar, Inc., supra, 390 F. Supp.  at 1035.

6 Appellant does not raise 
an issue as to the admissibility of the testimony of Forrest L. Clay 
contradicting the agreement and we need not decide the question in reversing the 
summary judgment granted to Admiral. We note, however, that the question of 
whether the parol evidence rule may be asserted by or against third parties is 
not clear under the law. Although text writers generally answer the question in 
the affirmative, many cases hold to the contrary. See Calamari and Perillo, The 
Law of Contracts, § 3-8 at 164 (3d. ed. 1987); 4 Williston, Williston on 
Contracts, § 647 at 1154 (3d. ed. 1961); 3 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 596 at 
572 (1960); Annotation, Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule in Favor Of Or 
Against One Not a Party to Contract of Release, 13 A.L.R.3d 313 (1967); and 
Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule and Third Parties, 41 Fordham L.Rev. 945 
(1973).

7 Section 27-60, W.S. 1957 
provided in relevant part:

"(D) * * * in private 
work the contractor, prime or general, shall be responsible, primarily and 
directly to the industrial accident fund for all obligations against the total 
payroll of the work and for the amounts due it, and the owner of the property 
affected by the contract shall be surety for such 
payments."

8 Whether Admiral could be 
considered a statutory employer pursuant to § 27-12-109(e) and (f) was not 
raised in the instant case and we do not consider the question. Immunity, based 
on the status of being a statutory employer, is an affirmative defense. The 
failure to raise the defense is a waiver. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 
Wyo., 511 P.2d 963 (1973).

9 The current version of 
the act, Section 27-14-206(e) and (f), W.S. 1977 (1987 Replacement), 
specifically grants immunity to a contractor who pays premiums on behalf of the 
employees of a subcontractor and provides that an owner shall be deemed a 
contractor in certain circumstances.

10 Obviously involved is joint liability for premium 
payments.

11 The official copies of 
Fremont's payroll reports, verified by Division employee Betty Dunagan as being 
those received by the Division, which were submitted to the district court by 
appellant, do not contain the accounting notations demonstrating allocation of 
employee salary between Admiral and Fremont as are found in the copies of the 
same reports submitted by Admiral from it's office 
records.

12 It is also questionable 
whether the denied summary judgment is a proper subject of this appeal if we 
consider the specific text of the notice of appeal quoted in footnote 
1.

BROWN, Justice,1 specially 
concurring.

1 Chief Justice, Retired, 
June 30, 1988.

[¶47.]  I concur in the result reached by the 
court in this case. I think, however, that the standard for determining the 
existence of an employment relationship, under the circumstances of this case, 
is more accurately set out in Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 712-713 (Wyo. 1987), where we said:

We determine the 
existence of an employment relationship as a matter of law when only one 
reasonable inference about the existence of the asserted relationship can be 
drawn from the facts. Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, Wyo., 656 P.2d 1154, 1160 
(1983). The controlling inquiry in 
determining if an employment relationship exists is whether the alleged employer 
retained the right to control the alleged employee's work. Id., (citing Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (1978)). If the 
right of control has been exercised, but never retained, an employment 
relationship does not exist for that reason only. Battlefield, Inc. v. 
Neely, supra, at 1161. (Emphasis added.)