Title: People v. Nieves

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SANDI DAWN NIEVES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
S092410 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
PA030589-01 
 
 
May 3, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban and Jenkins concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
S092410 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted Sandi Dawn Nieves of the first degree 
murder of her daughters Nikolet Amber Nieves, Rashel Hollie 
Nieves, Kristl Dawn Folden, and Jaqlene Marie Folden (Pen. 
Code, § 187),1 attempted murder of her son, F.D.  (§§ 664, 187), 
and arson (§ 451, subd. (b)).  The jury found true the special 
circumstance allegations that defendant committed multiple 
murders, and that each murder was committed while lying in 
wait and while engaged in the crime of arson.  (§ 190.2, subds. 
(a)(3), (a)(15), (a)(17).)  Following the penalty phase of trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s motion to modify the death penalty verdict and her 
motion for a new trial (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced her to 
death.  This appeal is automatic.   
We affirm Nieves’s convictions but reverse her death 
sentence due to the trial court’s misconduct.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase Evidence 
Defendant called 911 to report a fire at her home in early 
July 1998.  When paramedics arrived, the fire had been out for 
some time and defendant was covered in soot and sitting in the 
living room with her 14-year-old son F.D.  Defendant’s four 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
daughters, ages 12, 11, 7, and 5, were lying on sleeping bags on 
the kitchen floor and had all died of smoke inhalation.  The oven 
was open with burned items inside and gasoline had been 
poured and lit in the hallway and bedrooms.    
1. Relevant relationships 
The father of F.D. and defendant’s two older daughters 
was her first husband Fernando Nieves.2  Defendant had two 
daughters with her second husband, David Folden, who 
eventually adopted her three older children.  Some years later, 
as defendant was divorcing Folden, she had an affair with 
Fernando.  When he ended the affair, defendant sent Fernando 
her will and life insurance policies and told him she wanted him 
to have custody of all the children if she died.  Later, unhappy 
about the end of the affair, she sent an angry letter telling 
Fernando he could no longer have contact with her or the 
children.  
Defendant began seeing Scott Volk several months before 
the crime.  They dated briefly before Volk ended the 
relationship.  Upset over the breakup, defendant threatened to 
commit suicide; she sent the children to stay with their fathers 
and wrote a suicide note but did not end her life.  When she faced 
eviction for unpaid rent, defendant moved to the town where 
Volk lived and they eventually resumed a relationship.  Volk 
broke up with defendant again after learning she was pregnant.   
2. Events surrounding the fire 
Defendant had an abortion on a Thursday the week before 
the fire.  She told Volk’s mother that abortion had been out of 
 
2  
Given his shared surname with defendant, we will refer to 
Fernando Nieves by his first name to avoid confusion. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
the question until she began to think of suicide as a solution to 
her circumstances.  The weekend after the abortion, attorneys 
served defendant with notice that Folden intended to revoke his 
adoption and child support for her three older children.  When 
Fernando spoke to defendant afterward, she was “furious” at the 
prospect of losing child support.    
Defendant sent a note to Folden that was postmarked on 
the day of the fire.  She wrote: “Now you don’t have to support 
any of us!  FUCK YOU you are scum!”  In a letter to Volk that 
he received a few days after the fire, defendant wrote:  “I was 
always here for you — you just couldn’t see it.  Now you never 
will.  [¶]  I can’t live without you in my life . . .  I have nothing 
left you took it all[.]”   
 
Defendant’s son F.D. testified that on the night of the fire 
defendant declared they would have a “slumber party” in the 
kitchen.  F.D. did not want to sleep in the kitchen but defendant 
insisted.  Sometime in the night during the fire, defendant shook 
F.D. and his sisters to wake them up.  She told them to breathe 
into their pillows and stay where they were because the fire 
could be coming from outside.  F.D. lost consciousness, but later 
got up and could see his mother and sisters lying on the floor.  
He lay down again and when he awoke it was light outside and 
his mother was up but did not answer when he asked what had 
happened.   
3. Defense case 
Defendant’s friends testified that defendant was active in 
the Mormon Church and was a caring and devoted mother.  
Defendant was very depressed after her abortion and regretted 
it.  Those who spoke to defendant just before the fire said she 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
was upset about recent events but had plans for the immediate 
future and did not seem to be thinking about suicide.   
When defendant testified, the prosecutor asked about her 
interview with a defense expert, whose notes showed that 
defendant reported writing letters to Folden and Volk the night 
of the fire and going to the post office to mail them at 
approximately 1:00 a.m.  When testifying, defendant said she 
did not remember writing and mailing the letters or telling the 
expert about it.  She claimed that she lay down near her children 
to warm her feet on the oven, woke up with no idea where the 
fire was coming from, and did not remember anything else about 
the night of the fire.  She thought she dreamed about holding a 
lighter and seeing flames, but when she saw scorched hair on 
the back of her hand she realized it was not a dream.  
Defendant said she had been hysterical about having an 
abortion; subsequently, she started taking phentermine, a diet 
medication, and the antidepressant Zoloft.  A toxicology report 
after the fire confirmed that defendant had phentermine in her 
system but no screen had been done for Zoloft. 
The experts who testified for the defense included two 
psychiatrists, Dr. Philip Ney and Dr. Gordon Plotkin, and a 
neuropsychologist, Dr. Lorie Humphrey. 
Dr. Ney testified that a combination of Zoloft and 
phentermine could cause serotonin syndrome, a condition 
capable of triggering seizures.  Defendant’s descriptions of the 
night of the fire, and history of seizures in early childhood, were 
consistent with having had a seizure.  Dr. Ney explained that a 
seizure could have induced a dissociative state, which would 
cause a person to be “basically unconscious” even while engaged 
in complex behaviors.   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Dr. Plotkin confirmed that Zoloft and phentermine could 
trigger serotonin syndrome and seizures and result in delirium 
that might cause a person to do “unusual” things.  On cross-
examination, Dr. Plotkin conceded that actions such as writing 
letters and driving to the post office were not consistent with 
delirium.  He testified that a seizure or serotonin syndrome 
would not cause dissociation, as Dr. Ney had claimed.   
Dr. Humphrey administered neuropsychological tests to 
assess defendant for brain damage.  Results showed some 
impairment that made it harder for defendant to function under 
stress, rendered her more impulsive, and affected her memory.   
4. Rebuttal 
A psychiatrist testifying for the prosecution disputed Dr. 
Ney’s testimony that defendant was in a dissociative state on 
the night of the fire: there was too much she remembered; her 
memory was selective; and the diagnosis was inconsistent from 
one examiner to another.  Prosecution experts also included a 
neurologist and a medical toxicologist, who found no evidence 
that defendant experienced serotonin syndrome, a seizure, or 
any type of unconscious state at the time of the fire.  Two experts 
on psychological testing also disputed Dr. Humphrey’s 
conclusions.  They found evidence that defendant tried to 
manipulate the psychological testing and identified mistakes 
and omissions throughout Dr. Humphrey’s report.   
B. Penalty Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution case 
 
Fernando Nieves, his wife Charlotte Nieves, and his 
mother Minerva Serna gave victim impact statements on the 
deaths of the children and the funeral.  Fernando also recounted 
how, within a month of the crimes, defendant tried to have F.D. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
removed from Fernando’s custody and sent to live with a 
maternal relative in Indiana whom F.D. had never met.  Serna 
expressed her belief during cross-examination that defendant 
was “vicious and malicious” in the way she had tried to break up 
Fernando’s relationships and keep him from seeing his children.   
 
David Folden described coping with his daughters’ deaths 
and his resentment at defendant’s efforts to turn her older 
children against him.  He felt that one thing F.D. gained from 
the deaths of his sisters was freedom — his mother had been so 
controlling she would not even let the children play in the front 
yard.  
 
In addition to victim impact testimony, the prosecution 
showed a video of defendant’s children playing in various 
settings and displayed poster boards mounted with photographs 
of the victims engaged in activities with family members.  
2. Defense case 
 
The defense presented one expert witness, Dr. Robert 
Suiter, who evaluated defendant and Folden during their 
divorce proceedings.  He explained his recommendation from 
that time, approximately a year before the crime, that defendant 
was best suited to have custody of the children.  
Character witnesses included a number of defendant’s 
friends, defendant’s maternal aunt, stepfather, and a bishop 
from defendant’s church.  They described defendant’s mother as 
verbally and physically abusive during defendant’s childhood 
and noted that defendant had experienced previous periods of 
severe depression.  Defendant’s life revolved around her 
children and she was an active and loving mother.  The 
witnesses believed defendant could not have been in her right 
mind if she killed her children; they concluded she must have 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
been very depressed and viewed her as a “good mother who lost 
touch with reality.”  
 
A chaplain from the county jail testified concerning 
defendant’s remorse and her desire to repair her relationship 
with her son.   
3. Rebuttal 
The prosecution introduced a letter to defendant from one 
of her daughters who threatened to run away and expressed 
feeling ignored and unloved.  Testimony from a neighbor and 
staff from the victims’ school characterized defendant as a 
controlling, overbearing, and manipulative parent whose 
children seemed to fear her.  Neighbors who knew defendant 
and Folden during their divorce concluded that defendant lied 
about the relationship and tried to turn her children against 
Folden.  Defendant seemed extremely angry, especially 
regarding Folden.   
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Jury Selection 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by conducting 
voir dire that was inadequate to reveal prospective jurors’ 
disqualifying attitudes about the death penalty in violation of 
her Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
Specifically, defendant claims the jury questionnaire was 
deficient because it omitted defense questions about the impact 
that evidence concerning young victims would have on 
prospective jurors’ decisionmaking, and it used questions that 
were too confusing to elicit meaningful information about 
prospective jurors’ views.  Defendant also contends the trial 
court’s “rushed” voir dire and restrictions on defense 
questioning was inadequate to inform defendant’s exercise of 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
challenges for cause and use of peremptory challenges.  We find 
no merit to these claims. 
1. Background 
 
The trial court prepared a jury questionnaire that 
incorporated proposals from defense and prosecution drafts.  
The defense proposed amendments to the court’s draft 
questionnaire, addressing case-specific issues such as the 
impact of unpleasant photographs and defendant’s abortion.  
The defense also requested additional questions about whether 
a crime involving four young victims would cause prospective 
jurors to vote for the death penalty regardless of mitigating 
evidence.  The trial court incorporated most of the defense 
amendments but rejected additional questions about the age of 
the victims, which was instead referenced in a preamble to 
questions about the death penalty.  
 
The trial court rejected a defense motion to include two 
revised questions referencing the age of the victims but agreed 
to defense counsel’s alternate request to have bolded references 
to the victims’ ages appear in close proximity to particular 
questions.  The defense then expressed agreement with two 
bolded references to the victims’ ages and their location in the 
questionnaire.     
 
The final jury questionnaire contained eleven death 
penalty questions.  Question Nos. 60 to 63 asked if prospective 
jurors felt the death penalty was used too much or too little, had 
changed their view on the death penalty over the years, or 
belonged to groups that advocated increased use or abolition of 
the death penalty.  After question No. 63, the questionnaire 
explained the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial, 
informed 
prospective 
jurors 
concerning 
the 
special 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
circumstances defendant faced, and explained the jury’s 
responsibility to determine the penalty.  The guidance 
concluded in bolded print set apart from the preceding 
paragraph:  “Also assume for the purposes of questions 64–
67, that the evidence may tend to show that the four 
deceased victims were the children of the defendant and 
ranged in age from age five to age twelve.”   
 
Question Nos. 64 to 66 asked whether prospective jurors 
would, because of their views on capital punishment, refuse to 
find the defendant guilty of first degree murder or special 
circumstances to avoid deliberating on a penalty phase, or if 
they would automatically vote for life without parole without 
considering any aggravating or mitigating factors.  Appearing a 
second time in bold print directly before question No. 67 was the 
instruction:  “Assume for purposes of question 67 that the 
evidence may tend to show that the four deceased 
victims were the children of the defendant and ranged in 
age from age five to age twelve.”   
Question No. 67 asked if prospective jurors would 
automatically vote for the death penalty:  “Assume for the sake 
of this question only, that the jury has found the defendant 
guilty of first degree murder and has found one or more of the 
special circumstances true and that you are in the penalty 
phase.  Would you, because of any views that you may have 
concerning capital punishment, automatically refuse to vote in 
favor of the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole and automatically vote for a penalty of death, without 
considering any of the evidence, or any of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors (on which you will be instructed) regarding 
the facts of the crime and the background and character of the 
defendant?”   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
 
The remaining questions asked prospective jurors: 
whether those who would automatically vote for a particular 
penalty would change their approach if ordered by the court to 
consider and weigh the evidence and the aggravating and 
mitigating factors; whether they could set aside their feelings 
about what the law ought to be and follow the law as instructed 
by the court; and what they understood the meaning of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole to be.   
 
The jury questionnaire instructed prospective jurors to 
mark questions they did not understand with a question mark 
or by writing “I don’t understand” and informed them that the 
trial court and counsel would question them about any 
difficulties they had filling out the questionnaire.  Before 
prospective jurors filled out the questionnaire, the trial court 
orally advised them to mark the questionnaire when they did 
not understand something or wanted to answer in a confidential 
manner, provided them a written summary of the charges, 
explained trial court procedures for  death penalty cases in 
California and the jury’s role in determining the penalty, and 
verbally reiterated that the charges included the murder of 
children.   
 
For oral voir dire, the trial court required the parties to 
submit any proposed followup questions in writing, and the trial 
court then determined whether to include them in the oral 
examination.  The court did not intend to question prospective 
jurors about their views on the death penalty when no basis for 
disqualification appeared in their questionnaires. 
 
The trial court identified for individual questioning 
prospective jurors whose questionnaire answers appeared 
facially 
disqualifying 
or 
raised 
questions 
about 
death 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
qualification.  Defense counsel identified additional prospective 
jurors for questioning based on their questionnaires.  The trial 
court then individually questioned these prospective jurors in 
the jury box.  The defense participated in questioning a majority 
of the prospective jurors, though there were some for whom the 
court completed questioning without defense input, and others 
the defense did not question, although offered an opportunity to 
do so. 
During selection of the sitting jury, the trial court excused 
nine prospective jurors for cause based on their views about the 
death penalty, five who would always vote for the death penalty, 
and four who would always vote against it.  The court also 
excused some prospective alternate jurors for cause, and no 
alternate jurors ultimately deliberated in defendant’s trial.3  
The defense used 13 of its 20 peremptory challenges.   
2. Analysis 
 
Prospective jurors are disqualified from serving on a 
capital jury when their views about capital punishment would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
in accordance with their instructions and oath.  (Wainwright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  This standard does not 
require bias to be “ ‘unmistakably clear’ ” and is met when “the 
trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective 
juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the 
law.”  (Id. at pp. 425–426.)  A trial court’s ruling in this regard 
is entitled to deference given its ability to consider demeanor, “a 
 
3  
Any error in excluding a prospective alternate juror for his 
or her views on capital punishment is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt when no alternate juror participates in jury 
deliberations.  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 44–45.)  
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and 
qualifications of potential jurors.”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 
U.S. 1, 9.)   
 
Under the two-part inquiry of Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 
476 U.S. 162, it is important to consider not only whether a 
prospective juror’s views on capital punishment would 
“generally lead to an automatic vote, one way or the other,” but 
also “the possibility that such a juror might be able to set aside 
those views and fairly consider both sentencing alternatives, as 
the law requires.”  (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 592 
(Leon); see also Lockhart, at p. 176.)  “A juror might find it very 
difficult to vote to impose the death penalty, and yet such a 
juror’s performance still would not be substantially impaired 
under Witt, unless he or she were unwilling or unable to follow 
the trial court’s instructions.”  (People v. Stewart (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 425, 447, italics omitted; People v. Armstrong (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 735, 764.)   
 
To ensure meaningful and reliable death-qualifying voir 
dire, “both the [trial] court and counsel ‘must have sufficient 
information regarding the prospective juror’s state of mind,’. . . 
[citation],” though the trial court retains “broad discretion over 
the number and nature of questions about the death penalty.”  
(People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 540; see also People v. 
Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 901.)  Ultimately, 
death-qualification voir dire “must not be so abstract that it fails 
to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties 
as jurors in the case being tried” and “it must not be so specific 
that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty 
issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating 
evidence likely to be presented.”  (People v. Cash (2002) 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
28 Cal.4th 703, 721–722.)  In striking this balance, the trial 
court may not categorically deny the defense an opportunity to 
inform prospective jurors of case-specific factors that could 
invariably cause them to vote for death.  (People v. Carasi (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 1263, 1287 (Carasi); Cash, at p. 721.)  Unless voir 
dire is so inadequate as to render the ensuing trial 
fundamentally unfair, it is not a basis for reversal.  (People v. 
Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 235.) 
a. Adequacy of the juror questionnaire  
Defendant claims the questionnaire should have included 
specific inquiries about the impact of young victims on 
prospective jurors’ decisionmaking and more questions about 
the death penalty in general.  She also argues that the questions 
posed were too confusing to uncover bias.  
Preliminarily, the People argue that defense counsel’s 
willingness to do away with or significantly limit use of a jury 
questionnaire at trial constitutes invited error.  Although 
defense counsel did agree to dispose of the questionnaire, the 
trial court rejected this approach and proceeded to create a 
questionnaire with the input of both parties.  The record 
therefore does not establish that “ ‘defense counsel intentionally 
caused the trial court to err,’ ” and no invited error appears.  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.)  
 
The People also contend that defendant forfeited claimed 
inadequacies in the jury questionnaire by failing to object to 
them.  Defendant argues that the defense continued objecting to 
the questionnaire and attempted to question jurors about the 
effect of young victims on their decisionmaking.  In this context, 
defense counsel’s concession to using the questionnaire after his 
efforts to limit and amend it failed does not forfeit defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
claim that the trial court erred in omitting proposed defense 
questions.  (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 83.)   
 
A trial court’s discretion regarding the scope of voir dire 
extends to the wording of the questionnaire.  (Leon, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 586.)  Here, “[w]here the court exercises its 
discretion to exclude certain questions from the questionnaire, 
we will affirm unless the voir dire was so inadequate that the 
resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.”  (Ibid.)  We find no 
such inadequacy.  The final questionnaire conveyed sufficient 
case-specific information, twice instructing prospective jurors to 
consider the number and age of the victims when answering 
death-qualification questions — facts the trial court also 
highlighted in oral instructions regarding the questionnaire.  
After receiving these case-specific factors before death 
qualification, it is “logical to assume” that when prospective 
jurors are asked whether they would automatically vote for life 
or death, “they have answered the question with those case-
specific factors in mind.”  (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1287; 
see also Leon, at p. 587.)   
 
Defendant argues that the questionnaire did not elicit 
sufficient information about death qualification, comparing the 
number and types of questions in her questionnaire to more 
extensive model questioning endorsed by the Judicial Council 
after defendant’s trial.  In People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
838, we addressed challenges to excusals for cause based on 
written questions that were identical to question Nos. 66 
through 69 on defendant’s jury questionnaire.  (Id. at pp. 861–
862.)  There, we determined that the trial court’s handling of 
ambiguous responses to the questions was error but recognized 
that the questions themselves “called for responses that could 
adequately inform the trial court whether a prospective juror 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt.”  (Id. at 
p. 864.)  Although subsequent formulations may have expanded 
upon these questions, we accept, as we did in Covarrubias, that 
they were adequate for assessing prospective jurors’ views about 
the death penalty. 
 
Defendant also contends that the death qualification 
questions were “practically unintelligible,” citing problems such 
as compound questions, confusing language, and “legalese” 
above the education level of most prospective jurors.  The People 
are correct that defendant did not object to the wording of 
questions as compound or confusing, and any claimed 
inadequacies on that basis have thus been forfeited.  Even if 
preserved, the claim would not establish error. 
Defendant cites United States v. Littlejohn (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
489 F.3d 1335, 1341–1342, and Cabe v. Superior Court (1998) 
63 Cal.App.4th 732, 742, in support of her argument that the 
questionnaire was confusing; however, problems with compound 
questions addressed in those cases were not present in 
defendant’s questionnaire.   
Defendant also points to prospective jurors who left death-
qualification questions blank or could not answer questions as 
an indication that the questionnaire must have caused 
confusion.  The examples defendant cites are unconvincing.  
Some of the prospective jurors who failed to answer death-
penalty questions had trouble throughout the questionnaire, 
reflecting a broader difficulty not specific to the death-
qualification questions.  One prospective juror who left some 
questions blank responded to other, more complex, questions to 
indicate that she would automatically vote for the death 
penalty, a position she reiterated in oral voir dire.  Another 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
prospective juror did not answer questions “yes” or “no” as 
prompted but gave narrative responses reflecting 
her 
uncertainty.  The record thus reflects difficulties that, “ ‘ “[g]iven 
the juror’s probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the 
law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective 
juror in a capital case, . . . should be expected.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779.)     
 
The questionnaire also accounted for the fact that some 
prospective jurors might find it confusing and instructed them 
to mark questions they did not understand so that the trial court 
and counsel could address them in individual voir dire.  The 
record shows that whether marked or not, the trial court 
individually questioned prospective jurors about missing, 
incomplete, or equivocal responses, an appropriate approach to 
an adequate voir dire.  (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
592, 618.)       
 
Defendant also asserts that the wording of question 
No. 67, which asked whether prospective jurors would 
“automatically vote for a penalty of death, without considering 
any of the evidence,” was inadequate to identify unqualified, 
death-oriented jurors.  Defendant argues that the disqualifying 
condition in question No. 67 — voting without “considering” 
evidence — was more stringent than the appropriate standard 
of automatically voting “regardless of” the evidence.  This claim 
of deficiency is not persuasive.   
 
The standard enunciated in Witt recognizes that “[a] juror 
who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case 
will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.”  
(Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, italics added.)  
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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Although the wording used in defendant’s questionnaire is 
consistent 
with 
this 
standard, 
and 
past 
model 
juror 
questionnaires in California have relied on the same phrase 
(People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447, fn. 12), the high 
court has also explained that “[r]elevant voir dire questions 
addressed to [death qualification] need not be framed 
exclusively” by reference to “a particular verb” (Witt, supra, 469 
U.S. at pp. 433–434).  The trial court’s questionnaire here 
adequately reflected the proper standard. 
b. Adequacy of oral voir dire 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s “rushed” voir 
dire denied the defense an opportunity to learn about 
prospective jurors’ potential biases, prevented the selection of 
an impartial jury, and resulted in an inadequate record 
concerning the ensuing grant or denial of challenges for cause.  
Defendant also contends the trial court erred by denying defense 
efforts to ask direct questions about whether prospective jurors’ 
ability to vote for a life or death sentence would be affected by 
crimes involving a mother’s murder of her four children.  We 
reject these claims. 
 
As evidence of a generally “cursory” voir dire, defendant 
points to the length of death qualification, which took somewhat 
less than two days.  We have determined that death 
qualification lasting “approximately three hours and 20 
minutes” was not “unduly rapid or otherwise improper” where 
the record showed that the trial court was “merely efficient.”  
(People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 618.)  Nothing in the 
length of the death qualification of defendant’s jury, standing 
alone, points to inadequate voir dire.     
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
 
Defendant asserts the trial court’s limitations on defense 
questioning during voir dire prevented adequate examination of 
prospective jurors’ views.  In one instance defendant cites, the 
trial court found Prospective Juror No. 7166’s written answers 
concerning the death penalty questions sufficient for death 
qualification where he responded unequivocally that he would 
not automatically vote for life or death, his other answers were 
not disqualifying, and his only written remark was that the 
“punishment should fit the crime.”  The court denied defense 
counsel’s request to ask the prospective juror whether the 
nature of the crimes in defendant’s case would cause him to 
automatically vote for the death penalty.       
 
We have observed that “parsimony in death qualification 
voir dire is not commendable.”  (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 
p. 589; see also People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 721.)4   
Recognizing, however, that “the trial court has broad discretion 
over the number and nature of questions about the death 
penalty,” we have found no error where courts have relied 
heavily on general questions tracking death qualification 
standards and when “the court and/or counsel asked additional 
questions to clarify ambiguous responses.”  (People v. Stitely, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 540.)  Here, the prospective juror’s 
responses to adequate written questions were not ambiguous 
and the questionnaire twice instructed him to consider the 
 
4  
At the time of defendant’s trial, Code of Civil Procedure 
former section 223 dictated voir dire be conducted by the trial 
court, with supplemental questioning from the parties allowed 
upon a showing of good cause; later amendments to the statute 
allowed “each party an expanded but not unlimited right to 
examine prospective jurors through direct oral questioning.”  
(People v. Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 233, fn. 10.) 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
nature of the charged crimes when answering.  The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by declining to repeat questions in 
oral voir dire that had already been answered.  “Counsel are 
entitled to ascertain a prospective juror’s true views on the 
death penalty.  Once those views have been made clear, the 
court is not obliged to question them further.”  (People v. 
Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 236.) 
Defendant claims the trial court also prevented adequate 
voir dire of Prospective Juror Nos. 3801 and 8318, who gave 
equivocal answers.  Defendant relies on United States v. 
Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1109, 1114, to support her 
argument that equivocal answers are not sufficient to dispel 
potential bias.  This federal decision is not binding on us and 
does not relate to death qualification; it addressed standards for 
reviewing bias in a non-capital case under circumstances not 
present here.   
A trial court’s ruling on a prospective juror’s death 
qualification “ ‘may be upheld even in the absence of clear 
statements from the juror that he or she is impaired because 
“many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to 
reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably 
clear.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 779.)  
“ ‘ “ ‘On review, if the juror’s statements are equivocal or 
conflicting, the trial court’s determination of the juror’s state of 
mind is binding.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 
429; see id. at pp. 427–428.)  The trial court did not limit defense 
questioning of Prospective Juror No. 8318, who indicated that 
she would have difficulty imposing the death penalty.  The trial 
court also allowed defense questioning of Prospective Juror 
No. 3801, who was not sure she could consider a life sentence 
but would “try.”  We find the trial court’s voir dire in these 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
instances adequate and defer to its determination of the 
prospective jurors’ qualifications, as we must.  
Finally, defendant argues that voir dire was inadequate 
because the trial court was unwilling to allow additional oral 
questioning regarding prospective jurors’ views in light of the 
number and age of the victims.  We reject this claim.  The trial 
court orally advised prospective jurors of the number and age of 
the victims and the questionnaire itself prominently conveyed 
that information.  Accordingly, the court could properly assume 
the jurors had those factors in mind when asked, either orally 
or in writing, whether they would automatically vote for life or 
death.  (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1287.)   
The record demonstrates that voir dire in defendant’s case 
was not so cursory that it constituted an abuse of discretion or 
deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial.  The trial court 
properly “err[ed] on the side of caution” to question prospective 
jurors whose responses to the written questionnaire were 
ambiguous or potentially disqualifying.  (People v. Wilson, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 790.)  
B. Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1. Access to impeachment evidence   
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to 
enforce defense subpoenas for records and witnesses related to 
her son’s statements and mental health following the fire.  She 
argues the trial court’s errors violated Evidence Code section 
912, as well as her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
We conclude there was no error. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
a. Background 
 
Before trial, defendant issued subpoenas for F.D.’s mental 
health records to a Dr. Jacobs, and to county social workers who 
interviewed F.D. and his father after the fire.  
During a hearing in which he asserted F.D.’s privilege to 
prevent disclosure of records from Dr. Jacobs, Fernando Nieves 
testified that he took F.D. and other family members to the 
doctor for therapy following the deaths of F.D.’s sisters.  When 
defendant petitioned to have F.D. removed from Fernando’s 
custody, Dr. Jacobs wrote a letter to the dependency court on 
behalf of Fernando; the letter provided brief observations about 
F.D.’s adjustment to living with Fernando’s family and noted 
F.D.’s desire remain with them.  By the time of defendant’s trial, 
Fernando had been named F.D.’s legal guardian.   
The trial court rejected defendant’s argument that 
Fernando waived F.D.’s psychotherapist-patient privilege by 
having Dr. Jacobs submit a letter to the dependency court and 
found no defense interests sufficient to override the privilege.  
F.D. later testified in the prosecution’s case-in-chief and was 
excused subject to recall.   
 
When counsel for the social workers appeared to oppose 
defense counsel’s subpoena for their records, the trial court 
ruled that section 827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
required defendant to petition the juvenile court for access to the 
records.  The defense filed a petition with the juvenile court a 
few days later.  When the social workers later responded to 
subpoenas to testify for the defense, they again asserted state 
confidentiality protections.  Defense counsel provided the trial 
court with a copy of the social workers’ report but declined to 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
elaborate on how their testimony was relevant, and the trial 
court sustained the claims of confidentiality. 
 
Later in the trial, defense counsel announced that the 
juvenile court had granted his petition for access to records from 
the social workers and Dr. Jacobs.  When the defense sought to 
impeach the rebuttal testimony of Fernando Nieves with 
statements from the social workers’ report, the trial court 
sustained the prosecution objection that the witness’ prior 
statements could not be used because they did not qualify as 
inconsistent statements.          
b. Analysis 
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to 
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication 
between the patient and his or her psychotherapist.  (Evid. 
Code, §§ 1014, 1012.)  Waiver of the privilege occurs when the 
holder of the privilege has disclosed a significant part of the 
communication or consented to disclosure.  (Evid. Code, § 912, 
subd. (a).)  The “ ‘holder of the privilege’ ” is the patient, or a 
guardian or conservator of the patient.  (Evid. Code, § 1013.)  
A person invoking the psychotherapist-patient privilege has the 
initial burden of showing that the privilege is presumptively 
applicable.  The burden then shifts to the party seeking 
disclosure to establish that the privilege is inapplicable.  (People 
v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 372.)  The psychotherapist-
patient privilege is to be liberally construed in favor of the 
patient.  (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 554.)   
Section 827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code contains 
protections concerning the confidentiality of juvenile records, 
whether or not they are covered by other state or federal 
privileges, and vests the juvenile court with exclusive authority 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
to determine the extent to which those records may be released 
to third parties.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827; T.N.G. v. Superior 
Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 778.)   
 
When a defendant proposes to impeach a critical 
prosecution witness with privileged information, the trial court 
may be called upon to balance the defendant’s rights under the 
Sixth Amendment to access such material at trial against the 
state policies supporting the privilege.  (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 
415 U.S. 308, 319; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 
1127 (Hammon).)  In Hammon, we concluded that a Sixth 
Amendment right to access protected information does not 
extend to pretrial disclosure, given the possibility that 
subsequent developments may eliminate the justification for 
invading a patient’s statutory privilege.  (Ibid.)  
 
Defendant concedes that the Sixth Amendment does not 
confer a right to discover privileged psychiatric records before 
trial.  (Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  She argues 
instead that F.D.’s father waived the privilege for family 
therapy records when he asked Dr. Jacobs to submit a letter in 
connection with dependency proceedings.  The trial court did not 
err in sustaining the psychotherapist-patient privilege with 
regard to these records.   
The letter from Dr. Jacobs to the dependency court did not 
disclose a “significant part” of communications between F.D. 
and his doctors that would constitute waiver.  (Evid. Code, § 912, 
subd. (a).)  But even if there had been a significant disclosure of 
protected communications, we would not conclude on this record 
that F.D. or his legal guardian consented to it.  When, as here, 
a guardian ad litem is required for dependency proceedings (In 
re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 679), we would not assume 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
that Fernando Nieves, or defendant, could legally waive the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege during their custody dispute 
(see In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 911, fn. 3), and 
disclosure by Dr. Jacobs did not otherwise constitute waiver 
(Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 341). 
 
Defendant contends the trial court violated her Sixth 
Amendment and due process rights by preventing her from 
impeaching F.D. with records or testimony from the social 
workers.  Defendant failed to preserve these constitutional 
claims.  They also lack merit.   
Defendant argues that the trial court should have 
reviewed the social workers’ records to determine their 
materiality to the defense, citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 
480 U.S. 39, 58–60 and People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 494, 
517.  In Webb, we recognized that due process requires the 
government to provide a defendant with material exculpatory 
evidence in its possession even when it is subject to a state 
privacy privilege.  (Id. at p. 518.)  Those principles do not apply 
here, however, where defendant already had the social workers’ 
report.  We discern no error in the trial court’s ruling “when 
defendant made no offer of proof at trial explaining why the 
witness[es] should have been permitted to [testify].”  (People v. 
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 727, fn. omitted; see also Evid. 
Code, § 354 (a); People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 44–45.) 
Defendant argues that the trial court continued to sustain 
confidentiality protections after the juvenile court granted 
defendant’s petition for disclosure of the social workers’ report, 
denying her the opportunity to introduce impeachment 
evidence.  The record does not bear this out.  After the juvenile 
court’s ruling, defendant did not try to use the report to impeach 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
F.D. at all, though he was still subject to recall.  (People v. 
Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 583 [inconsistent out-of-court 
statement admissible when witness is subject to recall].)  The 
defense did attempt to use the report to impeach Fernando 
Nieves, but rather than resolving that effort based on 
confidentiality protections, the trial court ruled that the prior 
statements were not inconsistent.  
 
We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred 
by allowing the prosecution to address questions of privilege 
related to F.D.’s records.  We have held that a trial court may 
entertain argument from the opposing party on third party 
discovery and that a prosecutor’s submission of argument in 
such a matter — as occurred in defendant’s trial — is not 
improper.  (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 737, 750–754; see also Facebook, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 358 [reiterating 
legitimate role of prosecution concerning third party discovery 
disputes].)   
 
Defendant argues that, as a witness for the prosecution, 
Fernando Nieves had a conflict of interest that should have 
disqualified him from asserting a privilege on behalf of F.D.  
Defendant did not raise this issue at trial and thus forfeits it on 
appeal.  Defendant also argues that she should have been 
granted access to F.D.’s records based on her status as his 
parent.  (Fam. Code, § 3025 [non-custodial parents may access 
minor child’s records].)  We have no need to examine this claim 
when the record shows that defendant either obtained the 
records she sought or was entitled to access them by order of the 
juvenile court.    
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
2. Compelled psychological testing of defendant  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by requiring her 
to submit to psychological examination by prosecution experts 
and rejecting her request to have a defense expert attend that 
examination.  Defendant argues that after she declined to 
submit to the examination, the trial court further erred by 
instructing the jury concerning her refusal and by allowing the 
prosecution to comment on it.  We reject each of these claims.   
a. Background 
 
Before trial, the defense conducted evaluations of 
defendant and provided the prosecution with reports from six 
defense experts.  The trial court executed orders pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 730 authorizing the appointment of four 
prosecution experts to interview defendant, analyze test results 
from defense experts, and provide other assistance to the 
prosecution.  
 
When the parties addressed defendant’s examination by 
prosecution experts, defendant agreed to submit to the 
examinations provided that a defense expert could be present to 
observe them.  The trial court held a hearing to address the 
implications of having a defense representative present during 
prosecution interviews and concluded that such presence would 
be 
unnecessary, 
inappropriate, 
and 
might 
invalidate 
prosecution expert results. 
 
Defense counsel did not object to the examination by 
prosecution experts but continued to argue for the presence of a 
defense expert.  The trial court reiterated its order that 
defendant was required to submit to interviews without defense 
monitoring at those interviews and ultimately found that the 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
continued defense objections constituted a refusal by defendant 
to be examined.   
 
The prosecution later proposed an instruction regarding 
defendant’s refusal: if jurors found defendant had refused to 
submit to prosecution examinations, they could consider that as 
consciousness of any required mental state.  The trial court said 
that if the prosecution wanted such an instruction, the jury 
would need to hear evidence of refusal, which could be 
established through testifying witnesses.   
Over objections, a prosecution expert testified that he had 
been told that defendant refused to be evaluated by him.  On 
cross-examination, the defense attempted to ask the expert 
whether he would have any concerns about the conditions 
defendant requested for examination by a prosecution expert.  
The trial court sustained objections to this questioning and 
admonished the jury: “I am going to tell the jury at this point 
that the defendant — when the defendant submits their mental 
state as an issue in the case, the defendant must submit to 
examination by the prosecution experts without any conditions.  
That was not forthcoming this this case.”  Two more prosecution 
experts then testified that defendant refused their requests for 
an examination.   
 
Ultimately, the trial court rejected instructions submitted 
by the defense and prosecution seeking to address defendant’s 
response to examinations by prosecution experts and concluded 
that the issue was a matter for argument to the jury.  During 
closing argument, the prosecution repeated the court’s 
comments that defendant was required to submit to 
examination by prosecution experts and, without objection, 
argued that her refusal could be viewed as an attempt to 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
suppress or conceal evidence, affect the weight given to defense 
expert opinions, and undermine the validity of defense claims.   
b. Analysis 
 
In Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096 
(Verdin), we held that courts may not compel a defendant’s 
mental examination by a prosecution expert unless “authorized 
by some . . . ‘express statutory provision[]’ (§1054, subd. (e).)”  
(Id. at p. 1109.)  This ruling applies retroactively to defendant’s 
trial in 2000.  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 939.)  “We 
have made clear that even in cases governed by Verdin, trial 
courts had the power to order defendants to submit to a 
psychological examination by a court-appointed expert pursuant 
to Evidence Code section 730.”  (People v. Banks (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 1113, 1193, italics omitted.) 
 
Defendant claims the trial court did not have authority 
under Penal Code section 1054 to order her examination by 
prosecution experts.  The record shows, however, that the trial 
court exercised its authority under Evidence Code section 730, 
an 
appropriate 
basis 
for 
compelling 
her 
psychological 
examination.  (People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1193.)   
 
Defendant insists the trial court also erred by requiring 
her to submit to an “unconditional” examination, one without a 
defense representative present.  We have recognized that the 
presence of defense counsel or other third parties during a court-
ordered psychological examination may invalidate its results (In 
re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 411; Edwards v. Superior Court 
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 905, 911) and have concluded that the presence 
of counsel at such an examination is not constitutionally 
required (In re Spencer, at p. 412; People v. Ledesma (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 641, 698 (Ledesma)).  The trial court therefore did not 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant’s request to have a 
defense expert present. 
 
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court’s 
admonition and the prosecutors’ arguments violated her 
constitutional rights and her rights under Evidence Code 
section 913.5  Once defendant placed her mental state at issue, 
she waived her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to object to 
the prosecution examinations.  (People v. Gonzales (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 894, 929.)  Subsequent testimony about defendant’s 
refusal to cooperate did not violate those rights (People v. 
McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190), and the jury could 
properly consider the refusal (People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 413).   
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury that her refusal was insufficient to establish 
guilt, and that this had the effect of lessening the prosecution’s 
burden.  Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to request a 
clarifying instruction at trial (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
1067, 1134), but it would nonetheless fail on the merits.  The 
trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the 
reasonable doubt standard and there is no reasonable likelihood 
the jury would have interpreted the trial court’s limited 
comment to indicate that defendant’s refusal to submit to 
examination was sufficient to prove her guilt.  (Ibid.) 
 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred by 
allowing the prosecution to reference defendant’s refusal during 
 
5  
Evidence Code section 913 provides that no comment can 
be made or inference drawn from the invocation of a privilege 
not to testify or to disclose any matter.  (Evid. Code, § 913, subd. 
(a).)   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
closing argument.  This argument is forfeited by defendant’s 
failure to object at trial (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
347, 372), and in any event it lacks merit.  The prosecutor 
argued that evidence of defendant’s refusal was relevant to the 
weight of defense expert testimony, a consideration we have 
recognized as proper.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 412.)  Defendant cites no authority for her view that she did 
not personally refuse to be examined, and she offers no reason 
to dispel the general rule that absent complaint at trial, the acts 
of her counsel are imputed to her.  (People v. Marsden (1970) 
2 Cal.3d 118, 125.)   
3. Scope of expert testimony 
 
Defendant contends the trial court imposed limitations on 
mental health testimony by defense experts in violation of her 
federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to present a defense, 
and to a reliable penalty determination.  Specifically, she claims 
the court erred by striking testimony by arson expert Del 
Winter, precluding other experts from relying on hearsay 
statements about her background, and sustaining objections to 
testimony about her mental condition at the time of the fire 
pursuant to Penal Code sections 28 and 29.6  We assume some 
error only concerning the court’s mental state rulings but find it 
harmless.  
a. Background 
The trial court struck a portion of testimony by defense 
expert Del Winter, a retired fire investigator.  Winter testified 
 
6  
Section 28 allows for the admission of evidence of mental 
impairment related to whether the accused “actually formed” a 
required mental state (§ 28, subd. (a)), but section 29 prohibits 
expert testimony on that question (§ 29). 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
that the fire at defendant’s house was set in several places and 
that a very small amount of gasoline was used.  He found it odd 
that the fire was set where it was not likely to cause significant 
damage and the gas can was put back in its place after use.  He 
concluded that “the fire didn’t make a lot of sense.”  Winter could 
not recall a similar type of fire, stating, “This is pretty unusual.”  
Addressing scorched items in the oven, Winter testified that 
“[i]t’s just like the rest of this case.  It just doesn’t make any 
sense as far as logic.”  
 
At the conclusion of his testimony, Winter identified 
several classifications of arson, such as insurance fraud and 
crime cover-up and a category he called “psycho fires,” in which 
the motive for the fire is obscure.  Although Winter was allowed 
to opine over objection that defendant’s fire fell into the “psycho” 
category, the next day the trial court revisited the ruling and 
struck the testimony.   
 
Addressing defendant’s mental health experts, the trial 
court ruled that they would not be allowed to recount hearsay 
statements during their testimony.  The experts relied on 
statements by defendant and her friends and family members 
for information about her background, including anoxia (lack of 
oxygen) at birth, epilepsy and hospitalization at an early age, a 
difficult upbringing, and use of antidepressant and diet 
medication shortly before the fire.  The trial court determined 
that the underlying statements and predicate facts did not 
reflect indicia of reliability and would have to be established 
through live witness testimony.   
Following 
the 
court’s 
ruling, 
defendant 
testified 
concerning details leading up to the fire, including her use of 
diet medication and Zoloft after having an abortion.  The defense 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
also recalled defendant’s stepfather Albert Lucia to testify about 
defendant’s childhood seizures and verbal and physical abuse by 
her mother.   
 
Dr. Humphrey then testified regarding defendant’s 
background and possible traumas to her brain, stating that the 
sources she considered to reach her opinion included interviews 
with defendant and letters written by her, interviews with 
Albert Lucia and defendant’s aunt, consultations with a non-
testifying expert (Dr. Kaser-Boyd), defense team members who 
spoke to other witnesses, and records such as police reports and 
prior assessments.  The trial court sustained an objection to Dr. 
Humphrey referencing defendant’s anoxia at birth, but Dr. 
Humphrey went on to testify that defendant experienced other 
risk factors consistent with brain damage early in life: being hit 
hard in the head by her mother several times a day; an incident 
at age 18 months that Dr. Humphrey interpreted as consistent 
with seizure disorder; and fainting after the seizure incident 
consistent with brain malfunction. 
 
Dr. Ney conducted two examinations of defendant.  He 
testified that he relied on the examinations and interviews with 
defendant, transcripts of witness testimony, reports by Drs. 
Humphrey and Kaser-Boyd, police reports, statements by 
defendant and her son to law enforcement, and statements from 
defendant’s friends.  Although the defense argued that Dr. Ney 
should be allowed to explain defendant’s statements to him, the 
trial court reiterated its prior ruling that experts would not be 
allowed to repeat inadmissible hearsay. 
 
During Dr. Ney’s testimony, the trial court also sustained 
numerous objections under section 29.  Dr. Ney testified that he 
considered the possibility that defendant was trying to commit 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
suicide on the night of the fire.  The trial court sustained section 
29 objections to several additional questions on this topic and 
struck an answer in which Dr. Ney began to testify that he found 
defendant’s actions consistent with suicide.  The court overruled 
a section 29 objection concerning whether defendant “was in a 
depressive state” at the time of the fire but sustained section 29 
objections to questions about whether she experienced a seizure, 
serotonin syndrome, or dissociative state at the time of the fire 
and to questions regarding defendant’s general mental condition 
at the time of the fire.  The court also struck Dr. Ney’s comment 
that “it’s quite apparent that this was an organically determined 
dissociative state.”    
 
Despite these rulings, Dr. Ney testified about factors 
affecting defendant at the time of the fire and his opinion that 
they could have induced a seizure and related dissociation that 
would render a person effectively unconscious.  Dr. Ney testified 
that defendant heard a roaring on the night of the fire, which he 
interpreted as an epileptic “aura” preceding a seizure.  
 
On surrebuttal, when Dr. Plotkin testified concerning 
defendant’s increased risk for experiencing seizures and 
delirium, the court sustained a section 29 objection to defense 
counsel’s question that began by asking Dr. Plotkin to assume 
that someone was in a dissociative state when lighting the fire.   
b. Analysis 
i. Arson expert 
 
Defendant claims that the trial court’s decision to strike 
Del Winter’s opinion about a “psycho” fire was erroneous under 
sections 28 and 29, and that it was improper for the court to 
make the ruling on its own motion.  The trial court had broad 
discretion to determine the relevance of the testimony and 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
assess whether it was unduly misleading under Evidence Code 
section 352.  (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 54.)  The 
trial court could also properly limit questions and interpose its 
own objections under Penal Code section 1044, which outlines a 
judge’s duty to control trial proceedings and limit the 
introduction of evidence to relevant and material matters.  
(People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1241 (Sturm).)   
 
The trial court was well within its discretion to exclude 
Winter’s opinion as misleading and irrelevant.  We found no 
abuse of discretion when, as here, the trial court excluded as 
irrelevant mental state testimony offered by a detective “who 
was not a psychologist or a psychiatrist, was not qualified to 
render an opinion as to whether defendant suffered from a 
mental illness at the time [of the crime,]” and was not “qualified 
to testify generally about the relationship between mental 
illness and certain types of behavior.”  (People v. Vieira (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 264, 292.)  Winter was similarly unqualified to 
suggest that the person who set the fire in defendant’s home was 
mentally unwell, or “psycho.”   
 
Instructing the jury to disregard Winter’s “psycho” label 
did not undercut the defense claim that the motive behind the 
fire was mysterious or missing, as defendant contends.  Winter 
testified that the fire in defendant’s case was intentionally but 
poorly set, unusual, and did not make sense.  The trial court’s 
limited instruction to disregard the reference to a “psycho” fire, 
which Winter had added to those attributes, was not error.   
ii. Expert reliance on hearsay statements 
 
When an expert testifies concerning case-specific out-of-
court statements to explain the bases for his or her opinion, 
those statements must be properly admitted through an 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
applicable 
hearsay 
exception 
or 
admitted 
through 
an 
appropriate witness and presented to the expert through a 
properly worded hypothetical question.  (People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684.)  In Sanchez, we disapproved of the 
conclusion in prior decisions such as People v. Gardeley (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 605, 618, that expert testimony about case-specific 
hearsay is not admitted for its truth and thus not subject to 
hearsay rules.  (Sanchez, at p. 686, fn. 13.)  Gardeley nonetheless 
correctly reflected the fundamental rule that “any material that 
forms the basis of an expert’s opinion testimony must be 
reliable” (Gardeley, at p. 618) and recognized that a trial court 
“ ‘has considerable discretion to control the form in which the 
expert is questioned to prevent the jury from learning of 
incompetent hearsay.’ ” (id. at p. 619). 
 
Defendant contends the trial court’s rulings prevented 
defense experts Drs. Humphrey and Ney from relying on 
hearsay statements that described defendant’s background — 
an essential element of her mental state defense.  Drs. 
Humphrey and Ney both testified, however, that they relied on 
a variety of out-of-court statements in reaching their opinions.  
Dr. Humphrey testified about specific background and risk 
factors she identified from those sources and Dr. Ney testified 
that defendant’s history and symptoms fit the diagnoses 
underlying the defense.   
 
What the trial court did limit was testimony regarding 
specific hearsay it found unreliable, such as defendant’s post-
arrest statements about her own background and medication 
use.  This was well within the court’s discretion.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1252; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 129–130.)  
Defendant also contends the trial court’s rulings prevented Dr. 
Kaser-Boyd from testifying at all, but the trial court did not rule 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
on the admissibility of her testimony and there is no evidence in 
the record to indicate why — among many possible reasons — 
the defense decided not to call her.   
iii. Mental state testimony 
 
Penal Code sections 28 and 29 “permit introduction of 
evidence of mental illness when relevant to whether a defendant 
actually formed a mental state that is an element of a charged 
offense, but do not permit an expert to offer an opinion on 
whether a defendant had the mental capacity to form a specific 
mental state or whether the defendant actually harbored such a 
mental state.”  (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 
582.)  Under these sections, an expert may testify to establish 
“defendant’s mental disorders at the time of the commission of 
the crimes” and “whether the defendant’s conduct in committing 
the crimes was consistent with the expert’s diagnosis of the 
defendant’s mental condition.”  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 795, 836–837.)  Thus, for example, “[a]n expert’s opinion 
that a form of mental illness can lead to impulsive behavior is 
relevant to the existence vel non of the mental states of 
premeditation and deliberation.”  (Coddington, at pp. 582–583.)   
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by limiting 
questioning of Drs. Ney and Plotkin that would have allowed the 
jury to infer that defendant did not premeditate or deliberate 
murder.  She also asserts the conditions at issue — serotonin 
syndrome, a dissociative state, and epilepsy — are not mental 
diseases, defects, or disorders within the scope of section 29 
limitations.  Defendant did not raise her contention about the 
scope of section 29 at trial, where she successfully argued that 
all of her conditions were mental disorders that the jury should 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
consider in determining required mental states.  This aspect of 
defendant’s claim is therefore forfeited.   
 
We need not decide whether all the trial court’s limitations 
on defense questioning under section 29 were justified because 
any error was harmless.  Defendant claims the trial court 
“eviscerated the defense” by preventing Drs. Ney and Plotkin 
from testifying about the psychological and medical factors 
affecting her at the time of the crimes, but the record reveals 
otherwise.   
 
Although the trial court struck Dr. Ney’s opinion that 
defendant was suicidal, defense experts were otherwise able to 
testify concerning the substance of what defendant sought to 
present.  Dr. Ney testified that defendant was likely 
experiencing a combination of factors — depression, hormonal 
changes, serotonin syndrome caused by diet and antidepressant 
drug interactions, and seizure activity — that induced a 
dissociative state on the night of the fire.  Dr. Plotkin testified 
that these factors would have caused delirium, a condition 
distinct from dissociation, and provided additional medical 
evidence of a seizure close to the time of the fire.  Both experts 
testified that such factors could cause a person to be unconscious 
or semi-conscious while engaged in complex-seeming behavior.   
 
Dr. Ney’s opinion that defendant was suicidal not only 
conflicted with evidence defendant presented from several other 
witnesses that she was not considering suicide, but it also 
supported the prosecution theory that defendant had a suicidal 
plan to kill herself and her children to spite her ex-husbands 
and boyfriend.  Precluding defense questioning on this topic, and 
limiting questioning about defendant’s other conditions, did not 
prejudice the defense.   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
4. PET scan evidence 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding 
evidence of her positron emission topography (PET) scan.7  
Although the trial court erred in ruling PET scan evidence 
inadmissible under the Kelly rule,8 the court also excluded the 
PET scan evidence as irrelevant and misleading, a conclusion 
that was not an abuse of discretion.   
a. Background 
Dr. Michael Gold conducted a neurological examination of 
defendant.  He reviewed her PET scan and determined it 
showed impairment in some regions of her brain.  Based on the 
neuropsychological assessment by Dr. Humphrey, Dr. Gold 
concluded that the impairments shown on the PET scan 
predated defendant’s carbon monoxide poisoning and were 
mostly likely related to a prior head trauma.  
 
The prosecution orally requested a Kelly hearing on the 
admissibility of PET scan evidence and the trial court granted 
its request and set the hearing the following week to 
accommodate a prosecution expert’s schedule.  The trial court 
dismissed defense counsel’s concern about the availability of 
defense experts and rejected a subsequent defense motion to 
 
7  
We address post, in part II.C.1.b., defendant’s claims 
regarding the exclusion of PET scan evidence in the penalty 
phase. 
8  
Formerly known as the Kelly-Frye rule, based on the 
rulings of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly) and Frye v. 
United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013, the rule is now the 
Kelly rule in California after changes to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence that superseded Frye.  (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 515, 545.) 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
either reconsider the need for a hearing or to continue the 
hearing and allow the defense time to prepare for it.     
 
After receiving a written motion from the prosecution a 
few minutes before the Kelly hearing was to begin, defendant 
asked the court to strike the last-minute motion or give the 
defense an opportunity to review the cases it cited.  In addition 
to arguments to exclude the PET scan under Kelly, the 
prosecution motion claimed the PET scan was irrelevant or 
unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  The 
prosecution also stated that several articles filed with the trial 
court, which discussed hearings in California and other 
jurisdictions challenging the use of PET scans, supported 
exclusion of the evidence.  The trial court determined that the 
hearing would begin immediately, would be framed by the 
prosecution motion, and would settle all issues regarding 
admissibility of the proposed PET scan evidence.   
 
The defense presented three experts, Dr. Gold, Dr. Arthur 
Kowell, and Dr. Mark Mandelkern.  They testified that PET 
scans had been in use since the 1970s and were accepted in the 
scientific community as a legitimate measure of brain function, 
particularly for specific conditions such as temporal lobe 
epilepsy.   
Drs. Gold and Mandelkern found abnormalities in 
defendant’s PET scan that were consistent with temporal lobe 
epilepsy.  The abnormal regions of her brain were responsible 
for judgment, memory, and verbal functions, they affected the 
way a person would act and interpret data, and they were 
consistent with indications of defendant’s impairment shown by 
neuropsychological testing.  Although it was not possible to 
determine 
when 
defendant’s 
brain 
was 
injured, 
the 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
abnormalities were consistent with defendant’s childhood 
trauma and were not patterns that would occur from carbon 
monoxide poisoning.  Dr. Mandelkern testified that the PET 
scan could not explain defendant’s functioning on the night of 
the crimes or indicate whether she had seizures.   
 
The prosecution presented testimony from Dr. Helen 
Mayberg and Dr. Edwin Amos, who confirmed that PET scans 
were used to identify temporal lobe epilepsy.  They did not find 
defendant’s PET scan consistent with epilepsy, however, and 
questioned whether it showed any abnormality at all.  Both 
experts testified that defendant’s PET scan was presented in a 
way that exaggerated abnormalities that might be trivial, thus 
skewing the results.  They explained that any abnormality on a 
PET scan would not provide information about defendant’s past 
behavior or events in defendant’s case. 
 
The trial court concluded that the PET scan did not meet 
the Kelly test, ruling that there was no substantial agreement 
in the scientific community about its reliability for the uses 
defendant intended.  The trial court also found the evidence had 
little if any relevance because it was highly speculative — there 
was dispute whether the PET scan showed abnormality at all, 
and, moreover, any perceived abnormality could not be linked to 
any impact on defendant at the time of the crimes.  The court 
ruled that under Evidence Code section 352 any relevance was 
outweighed by the undue consumption of time, confusion of the 
issues for the jury, and undue prejudice.   
 
Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that she did 
not have time to prepare for the Kelly hearing nor notice that 
the prosecution would argue that proper procedures for 
administering and reading the PET scan were not followed.  She 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
also reiterated arguments that the PET scan was admissible in 
the guilt and penalty phases of her trial.  The trial court denied 
the motion for reconsideration for the guilt phase and deferred 
a decision on admissibility for the penalty phase.  
b. Analysis 
 
Under the Kelly rule, “ ‘when faced with a novel method of 
[scientific] proof, [we] have required a preliminary showing of 
general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant 
scientific community’ before the scientific evidence may be 
admitted at trial.”  (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 
Cal.5th 790, 831, quoting Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.)  Kelly 
“renders inadmissible evidence derived from a ‘new scientific 
technique’ unless the proponent shows that (1) ‘the technique is 
generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific 
community’; (2) ‘the witness testifying about the technique and 
its application is a properly qualified expert on the subject’; and 
(3) ‘the person performing the test in the particular case used 
correct scientific procedures.’ ”  (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 269, 315–316.)  The party offering the evidence has the 
burden of proving its admissibility by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  (People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 970.)  We 
review de novo the trial court’s evaluation regarding whether a 
new scientific technique is generally accepted as reliable in the 
relevant scientific community.  (Id. at 971.)   
 
Defendant proposed using the PET scan to corroborate 
defendant’s history of seizure disorder and related cognitive 
impairment.  At the Kelly hearing, expert testimony established 
that PET scans had been used for decades to evaluate brain 
abnormality, and defense and prosecution experts alike testified 
that PET scans were widely accepted and reliable for identifying 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
brain abnormalities caused by temporal lobe epilepsy.  That the 
experts disagreed about whether defendant’s PET scan showed 
such abnormality was a difference of opinion going to the weight 
of the evidence, not to its admissibility.  (People v. Fierro (1991) 
1 Cal.4th 173, 214; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 953.) 
 
The People argue there was evidence that defense experts 
did not use correct scientific procedures when manipulating the 
PET scan images to highlight deficits.  Yet prosecution expert 
Dr. Mayberg testified that the type of manipulation seen in 
defendant’s PET scan images was something radiologists did 
“all the time.”  The record does not support a finding that correct 
scientific procedures were lacking.  
 
Although the trial court erred in its ruling under Kelly, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the PET scan 
under Evidence Code section 352.  The trial court retains 
discretion to exclude even relevant evidence when its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 
admission will either necessitate undue consumption of time or 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusing the 
issues, or misleading the jury.  (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
905, 931.)  “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence ‘for abuse of discretion, and [the ruling] will not be 
disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in 
an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 
951.)  A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding 
evidence that produces only speculative inferences.  (People v. 
Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 81, disapproved on other grounds 
in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
 
In excluding evidence of the PET scan, the trial court 
found it minimally relevant because it was highly speculative.  
The court cited consensus among the experts that any abnormal 
feature on the PET scan could not be linked to defendant’s 
condition or actions at the time of the fire.  After three days of 
testimony from experts who disagreed about what, if anything, 
defendant’s PET scan showed, it was not an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to determine that undue consumption of time 
and confusion of issues for the jury outweighed what limited 
relevance the PET scan might have. 
 
Defendant claims exclusion of PET scan evidence violated 
her right to present a defense.  We have explained, however, 
that “the ordinary rules of evidence, including the application of 
Evidence Code section 352, do not infringe on the accused’s due 
process right to present a defense.”  (People v. Frye (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 894, 948.)  “ ‘Although we recognize that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant 
evidence of significant probative value in [her] favor 
[citations], “. . . the proffered evidence must have more than 
‘slight-relevancy’ to the issues presented.” ’ ”  (People v. Homick 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865.)  Here, defense experts agreed the 
PET scan could not shed light on whether defendant 
experienced a seizure on the night of the fire.  Furthermore, any 
abnormality affecting defendant’s judgment or impulsivity had 
no apparent bearing on the guilt-phase defense, which was 
based on defendant’s allegedly unconscious actions.  Under 
these circumstances, the PET scan had little probative value 
and its exclusion did not violate defendant’s constitutional 
rights. 
 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying her request for a continuance to prepare for the Kelly 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
hearing, and that any insufficient showing by the defense was 
caused by the court forcing counsel to proceed, resulting in a 
fundamentally unfair hearing.  Exclusion of the evidence under 
section 352, however, was not the result of an inadequate 
showing by the defense.  Defendant’s experts unequivocally 
endorsed key facts that supported the trial court’s section 352 
ruling: the PET scan could not be correlated to particular 
conditions or behaviors at the time of the fire or used to conclude 
that defendant had experienced a seizure.  There is no evidence 
on this record to suggest that additional time to prepare would 
have altered these conclusions. 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court also abused its 
discretion and deprived her of due process by allowing the 
prosecution to challenge the relevance of PET scan evidence and 
to seek its exclusion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 
without proper notice to the defense.  This argument is forfeited 
by defendant’s failure to raise it in the trial court.  (People v. 
Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 304.)  It also lacks merit.  In her 
motion to reconsider the PET scan exclusion, defendant 
acknowledged that she had notice of prosecution challenges to 
relevance and prejudicial effect.  The prosecution motion raised 
these issues, the trial court expressed its intent to address them, 
and defendant ultimately presented evidence and argument on 
them.   
 
Finally, defendant contends discovery statutes did not 
authorize prosecution cross-examination of defense experts 
outside the Kelly framework.  Evidence Code sections 403 and 
402 plainly permit the trial court to preview evidence and hear 
testimony 
before 
ruling 
on 
questions 
of 
admissibility.  
Furthermore, “ ‘[i]n determining the admissibility of evidence, 
the trial court has broad discretion.’ ”  (People v. Jackson, supra, 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
1 Cal.5th at p. 320.)  “ ‘When the relevance of proffered evidence 
depends upon the existence of a preliminary fact, the trial court 
must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit the 
jury to find the preliminary fact true by a preponderance of the 
evidence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 321.)  Discovery of potential testimony, by 
both parties, was an unavoidable consequence of the court’s 
proper function.  (Cf. Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 
22 Cal.3d 584, 588 [discovery benefit to accused is incidental to 
preliminary hearing for probable cause determination].)   
5. Failure to disqualify a prosecution expert 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it allowed 
Dr. Alex Caldwell, whose company scored defendant’s 
psychological testing, to testify on rebuttal for the prosecution.  
Defendant argues that Dr. Caldwell’s appointment allowed 
prosecutors access to confidential and privileged information 
and violated her Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  We conclude that no error occurred.   
a. Background 
 
Defense 
psychologist 
Dr. 
Kaser-Boyd 
administered 
psychological tests to defendant in 1999 that included the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).  Dr. 
Kaser-Boyd sent the MMPI-2 results to Dr. Caldwell’s scoring 
service and obtained a computer-generated report that scored 
and interpreted them according to his proprietary algorithm.  
Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s report analyzed the 1999 testing and the 
results of another MMPI-2 administered to defendant in 1997 
during family court proceedings.   
 
Defense counsel’s disclosures to the prosecution included 
Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s report, the MMPI-2 test results, and Dr. 
Humphrey’s report, which indicated that she reviewed Dr. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
Kaser-Boyd’s report and the MMPI-2 testing.  After defense 
counsel announced he would call Dr. Humphrey to testify, the 
prosecutors obtained the appointment of Dr. Caldwell pursuant 
to Evidence Code section 730 to assist them and prepare to 
provide rebuttal testimony regarding the MMPI-2.  The trial 
court denied defendant’s motion to vacate Dr. Caldwell’s 
appointment.   
 
During cross-examination, Dr. Humphrey confirmed that 
she reviewed Dr. Caldwell’s report.  She acknowledged that his 
report found a strong possibility that defendant had 
exaggerated her test responses or falsified them, a detail Dr. 
Humphrey had not mentioned in her own report or direct 
testimony.  Dr. Humphrey also acknowledged that the 1997 
MMPI-2 found defendant trying hard to present herself in a 
favorable light, likely invalidating the profile.  Dr. Caldwell 
testified on rebuttal that the 1999 and 1997 results were 
“strikingly opposite” and suggestive of someone consciously 
distorting the results.   
b. Analysis 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing to 
vacate 
Dr. 
Caldwell’s 
appointment, 
arguing 
that 
disqualification was required because he received confidential 
and privileged information from the defense.  Defendant relies 
primarily on federal civil cases to support her theory that 
disqualification was required for “a ‘switching sides’ expert — 
an expert who is initially retained by one party, dismissed, and 
employed by the opposing party in the same or related 
litigation.”  (Erickson v. Newmar Corp. (9th Cir. 1996) 87 F.3d 
298, 300.)  Defendant has forfeited this argument by failing to 
present it to the trial court.  The civil disqualification concerns 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
are also inapplicable in this setting, in which Dr. Caldwell’s 
report and the underlying data were plainly confidential and yet 
were voluntarily disclosed to the prosecution pursuant to 
criminal discovery obligations.   
 
We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court 
violated her right against self-incrimination by allowing the 
prosecution to retain Dr. Caldwell and use confidential 
information in his report against her.  “By presenting, at trial, a 
mental-state defense to criminal charges or penalties, a 
defendant waives his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to the 
limited extent necessary to allow the prosecution a fair 
opportunity to rebut the defense evidence.  Under such 
circumstances, the Constitution allows the prosecution to 
receive unredacted reports of the defendant’s examinations by 
defense mental experts, including any statements by the 
defendant to the examiners and any conclusions they have 
drawn therefrom.”  (Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 1112, 1125.)  Once a defendant calls a defense expert 
to the stand, she waives “any protections that the attorney-
client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination afforded [her] regarding all 
matters that [her testifying experts] considered or on which they 
relied.”  (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 864 (Combs); 
see also Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695.)   
 
Furthermore, an expert witness may be cross-examined 
concerning “the matter upon which his or her opinion is based 
and the reasons for his or her opinion.”  (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. 
(a)(3).)  “The scope of cross-examination permitted under section 
721 is broad, and includes examination aimed at determining 
whether the expert sufficiently took into account matters 
arguably inconsistent with the expert’s conclusion.”  (Ledesma, 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695.)  The prosecution may not only cross-
examine a defense expert about an otherwise privileged report 
the expert considered, but also may call the non-testifying 
author of such a report to testify as a rebuttal witness for the 
prosecution.  (Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 864; People v. 
Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1323.)   
 
Defendant cites Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 
14 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1270, to support her argument that she 
did not waive her privilege against self-incrimination when she 
disclosed Dr. Caldwell’s report.  The appellate court in 
Rodriguez did not address Fifth Amendment protections, ruling 
instead that attorney-client privileges applied to pretrial 
discovery and that defendant’s statements about the charged 
offense could properly be redacted from an otherwise 
discoverable 
defense 
expert’s 
report. 
 
(Ibid.) 
 
Such 
considerations are not relevant here, where defense counsel 
voluntarily disclosed all reports related to MMPI-2 testing to the 
prosecution.   
 
Defendant also claims that Dr. Humphrey’s testimony did 
not result in a waiver of privileges because Dr. Humphrey did 
not base her opinions on Dr. Caldwell’s report and the defense 
did not “open the door” by asking Dr. Humphrey about the 
report during direct examination.  This argument, which 
defendant raises for the first time in her reply briefing, is one 
we have rejected.  (Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 864.)  When 
testifying experts have “read and considered” a non-testifying 
expert’s report, all privileges regarding the report are waived.  
(Ibid.; Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 696.)   
 
Here, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant waived 
her Fifth Amendment rights and other privileges regarding Dr. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
Caldwell’s report when she presented the testimony of Dr. 
Humphrey.  Dr. Humphrey testified that she considered 
defendant’s MMPI-2 reports but she ignored the implications 
they raised about defendant’s truthfulness.  The prosecution 
was entitled to call Dr. Caldwell as a witness to address “all the 
circumstances involved in the testing, not merely the truncated 
version defendant desire[d].”  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
771, 824; see also People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1326.)   
Defendant claims Dr. Caldwell’s appointment to assist the 
prosecution was improper because it preceded Dr. Humphrey’s 
testimony, but defendant points to no authority to suggest that 
the prosecution is prohibited from preparing for anticipated 
rebuttal.  On the contrary, such preparation, even before trial, 
does not violate defendant’s constitutional rights or other 
privileges.  (People v. Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–
1133.)  Under Evidence Code section 730, the authority under 
which Dr. Caldwell was appointed, trial courts may appoint 
experts to assist the prosecution with rebuttal concerning a 
mental state defense.  (People v. Banks, supra, at p. 1193; 
Maldonado, at p. 1125.)   
 
Defendant also contends the trial court’s decision to allow 
Dr. Caldwell to testify against her violated her Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel and 
the ancillary services of mental health experts.  “A criminal 
defendant has the due process right to the assistance of expert 
witnesses, including the right to consult with a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, if necessary, to prepare his [or her] defense.  (Ake 
v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 83.)  The Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution also guarantee 
a defendant’s right to present the testimony of these expert 
witnesses at trial.”  (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
661–662.) 
 
These propositions, focusing on a defendant’s access to 
confidential expert assistance to prepare a defense, are 
inapposite here, where the record reveals at least eight experts 
who assisted the defendant with her mental state defense.   
6. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct 
 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by asking Dr. Plotkin to opine about the credibility 
and veracity of defense witness testimony by Albert Lucia and 
defendant.  Defendant argues that the questioning constituted 
misconduct under California law and violated her federal 
constitutional rights to a fair trial.  We reject these claims. 
a. Background 
 
Albert Lucia, defendant’s stepfather, spoke to her the day 
before the fire and testified about her state of mind at that time.  
After the trial court ruled that defense experts would not be 
allowed to relate Lucia’s description of defendant’s childhood, 
the defense recalled him to testify concerning defendant’s 
history of seizures, hospitalization, and loss of consciousness as 
a child.   
Defendant testified regarding events before, during, and 
after the fire.  She testified that she began taking Zoloft after 
her abortion.  She also claimed that she did not recall writing 
letters just before the fire that various people received from her; 
she said that obscenities in one letter, which said “fuck you,” 
were not her “normal way of talking.”  During cross-
examination, the prosecutor highlighted defense expert notes 
indicating that defendant did recall writing the letters and in 
rebuttal presented evidence that a code defendant used to access 
her pager messages was “fuck you.”  The prosecution also 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
questioned defendant’s veracity during its case-in-chief, 
presenting evidence that when renting her home defendant 
falsely stated that she was married with three, rather than five, 
children, and forged her ex-husband’s signature on the rental 
application.   
 
Dr. Plotkin testified on surrebuttal that defendant’s 
childhood health issues, as described by Lucia, were consistent 
with childhood seizures, which contributed to his opinion that 
defendant’s actions could have been affected by a seizure at the 
time of the fire.  On cross-examination, Dr. Plotkin explained 
that Lucia’s testimony was compelling because it was unlikely a 
lay person could give the proper sequence of events to reflect 
seizure disorder.  In response to questions suggesting that Lucia 
could have been coached before he returned to testify a second 
time, Dr. Plotkin agreed that without more information it was 
as likely as not that he was coached. 
 
Dr. Plotkin also described the potential effects of 
defendant’s medication interactions, basing his conclusions on 
defendant’s claim that she took Zoloft.  The prosecutor asked 
whether it would affect Dr. Plotkin’s view of defendant’s 
truthfulness to know that she had a history of malingering on 
psychological tests, as established by Dr. Caldwell’s analysis of 
her MMPI-2 test results, and had fabricated a rental agreement 
and committed fraud on her landlord.  Apparently referencing 
the testimony regarding defendant’s use of obscenities and her 
pager code, the prosecutor asserted that defendant lied and 
committed perjury on the witness stand and that physical 
evidence proved her to be a liar.  Dr. Plotkin conceded that if 
defendant had lied in the past she might lie again.   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
b. Analysis 
 
“A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such 
actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when 
they infect the trial with such ‘ “unfairness as to make the 
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’  [Citations.]  
Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits 
misconduct even when those actions do not result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial.  [Citation.]  In order to preserve a 
claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection 
and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not 
have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for 
review.”  (People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1328; see also 
People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 380 [objection to 
misconduct at trial must be timely “and on the same ground” as 
that raised on appeal].) 
 
Defendant first argues that the prosecution committed 
misconduct by eliciting speculative and irrelevant testimony 
from Dr. Plotkin about Lucia’s veracity.  Defendant’s failure to 
object on this basis at trial forfeits the claim.  Defendant argues 
that she adequately preserved the misconduct claim with 
objections that the prosecution misstated the evidence, but this 
unrelated objection did not give the trial court “an opportunity 
to correct the asserted abuse.”  (People v. Young (2005) 
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1186.)  Even were the claim preserved, we 
would conclude that it lacks merit. 
 
“ ‘[I]t is well settled that the scope of cross-examination of 
an expert witness is especially broad.’ ”  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 746.)  It is therefore permissible 
to “cross-examine an expert witness more extensively and 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
searchingly than a lay witness, and . . . to attempt to discredit 
the expert’s opinion.”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 
519; accord People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1325.)  “ ‘In 
cross-examining a psychiatric expert witness, the prosecutor’s 
good faith questions are proper even when they are, of necessity, 
based on facts not in evidence.  [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Wilson 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 358.)   
 
Defendant asserts an expert witness may not express an 
opinion on witness credibility and that questions concerning 
that topic improperly called for irrelevant testimony.  We have 
recognized, however, that “[t]here is no reason to categorically 
exclude” such questioning.  (People v. Chatman, supra, 
38 Cal.4th at p. 382.)  Dr. Plotkin accepted Lucia’s testimony as 
credible because he doubted Lucia could fabricate a sequence of 
events indicative of seizure disorder.  The prosecutor’s 
subsequent questioning about whether Lucia could have been 
coached was a “plausible alternative” to Dr. Plotkin’s 
interpretation that was relevant and permissible in order to 
explore those assertions.  (People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 
453, 479; see also Chatman, at p. 382.)  
 
Defendant next contends the prosecution committed 
misconduct when questioning Dr. Plotkin about defendant’s 
credibility by stating that she had lied and committed perjury.  
Defendant argues that by objecting to such questions as 
misstating or mischaracterizing the evidence, she preserved the 
claim.  Even if that were case, we would conclude that the claim 
lacks merit.   
 
“An expert witness may be cross-examined on, among 
other subjects, the matter upon which his or her opinion is based 
and the reasons for the opinion, including any statements by the 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
defendant that formed the basis for the expert’s opinion.”  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 85; Evid. 
Code, § 721, subd. (a).)  Although it is misconduct to misstate 
evidence during witness questioning (People v. Hill (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 800, 825), a prosecutor may address the credibility of 
witnesses by reference to facts in the record (People v. Peoples, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 796).  “Prosecutors tread on dangerous 
ground, however, when they resort to epithets to drive home the 
falsity of defense evidence.”  (People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 
529, 539.)   
 
Characterizing defendant as a liar and perjurer based on 
an obscene pager code was questionable; defendant’s testimony 
on cross-examination, however, raised the possibility that she 
attempted to falsely deny responsibility for writing a highly 
inculpatory note to her ex-husband.  We conclude that the 
“single reference” to alleged perjury (People v. Ellis, supra, 
65 Cal.2d at p. 540) did not rise to the level of “ ‘deceptive or 
reprehensible methods’ ” that amounted to misconduct (People 
v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29), and the prosecutor’s other 
questions — about defendant’s exaggerated or false MMPI-2 
responses and misrepresentation and forgery in her rental 
application — were proper subjects for cross-examination based 
on evidence before the jury.   
7. Instructional error related to discovery violations 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury that she concealed and failed to timely 
disclose material related to defense experts and lay witnesses.  
Although the trial court erred, we conclude the error was 
harmless.    
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
a. Background 
 
Before trial, the defense disclosed reports from its arson 
expert and experts addressing defendant’s mental state.  The 
prosecutors moved for additional discovery of interviews and 
other materials considered by defense experts, with defendant 
arguing that they were not entitled to pretrial discovery of such 
information.  The trial court’s pretrial discovery order tracked 
the language of section 1054.3, requiring defendant to disclose, 
among other things, names, addresses, written statements, and 
reports of statements by witnesses the defense intended to call 
and expert reports and the results of any physical or mental 
examinations the defense intended to offer in evidence at trial.   
 
As trial approached, the prosecution continued requesting 
discovery from defense experts, including material they relied 
upon, notes about their testing and communications with other 
experts, and the methodology experts used to obtain and analyze 
test results.  The defense disclosed some of its experts’ notes 
concerning the tests administered to defendant but again 
argued that other notes and materials were protected until the 
experts testified.  The trial court ruled that defendant was 
entitled to withhold additional privileged information at least 
until the prosecution rested.  
 
At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, defense 
counsel provided what he claimed was all remaining discovery 
from the defense experts, including notes, interviews, testing, 
and communications with defendant.  The prosecution asked for 
a month-long continuance to review the new material and 
prepare to cross-examine defense experts.  The prosecution also 
complained that some of the experts’ handwritten notes were 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
illegible and the prosecutors would need time to review them 
with its experts.  
At the same time, it came to light that defense counsel had 
not disclosed statements by the first lay witnesses he intended 
to call, Debbie Wood and Rhonda Hill.  Counsel then turned over 
interview notes for Hill and Wood, and for Albert Lucia and 
Penny Lucia, claiming he overlooked them because they were in 
his paralegal’s files.  The trial court ruled that those defense 
witnesses would not be allowed to testify until the court could 
determine what sanctions to impose for the discovery violations: 
“It may be that there’s no prejudice to the prosecution, but I am 
not going to know that until I have a hearing on it.”  
The trial court then informed the jury: “Ladies and 
gentlemen, under the law in California, the laws of discovery 
require that the prosecution and the defense are required to 
disclose to each other before trial the evidence each intends to 
present at trial.  The reason for doing that is to promote the 
ascertainment of truth, save court time, and avoid surprise 
which may arise during the course of trial.  [¶]  Disclosures of 
evidence are required to be made at least 30 days in advance of 
trial.  Any new evidence discovered within 30 days of trial must 
be disclosed immediately.  [¶]  This morning, and in one case 
this afternoon, [defense counsel] provided the prosecution for 
the first time statements of witnesses that should have been 
disclosed 30 days before trial.  [¶]  Because it is late disclosure 
the court is going to give the People sufficient time to prepare as 
to one witness, and the court will consider what will happen as 
the other two or more witnesses. . . .  I’ll give you further 
instructions on this discovery noncompliance later on when the 
issues are more clarified.”   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
 
The prosecutors’ primary concern regarding the lay 
statements was whether the defense experts had considered 
them.  After determining that those experts had not considered 
the Wood and Hill statements, the prosecutors stated that they 
were prepared to cross-examine them without delay but 
requested additional time to prepare for the testimony of Albert 
and Penny Lucia.  The trial court decided the testimony would 
proceed as scheduled, with the prosecution allowed to recall the 
Lucias to address any issues raised by the new discovery.  The 
untimely statement from Albert Lucia was brief, and addressed 
an incident involving defendant’s mother.  During his 
testimony, the court sustained objections to the incident as 
irrelevant.  
 
Regarding newly disclosed expert materials, the trial 
court stated that the options were to preclude defense expert 
testimony entirely or grant a continuance to allow the 
prosecution time to prepare.  The court faulted the defense for 
the prospect of a two to four week continuance it found 
“outrageous.”  To avoid further delay during which time the 
prosecution would attempt to decipher experts’ notes, the trial 
court ordered one of the defense experts to provide the 
prosecution with a typed transcription of his notes and ordered 
two others to dictate their notes to court reporters, who would 
then provide a transcription. 
The trial court then informed the jury there would be a 
two-week recess: “And I wanted to tell you the reason why we’re 
taking this two-week delay.  [¶]  The defense has indicated their 
intention to call psychologists and/or psychiatrists in the 
defense.  The People were provided with the information from 
their experts — and they need to prepare for this presentation 
— fairly recently.  [¶]  And the timing of that disclosure, which 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
is permitted by law; in other words, the defense doesn’t have to 
provide that information until the witnesses testify.  But the 
delay in the disclosure has necessitated a need to continue this 
case so that the People can prepare to examine the witnesses.  
[¶]  Also the time is needed because the notes of some of their 
experts are indecipherable to a great degree, and there’s going 
to be a need for time to get those notes put into some kind of a 
form where they can be read and interpreted by the People’s 
experts.”    
The trial court then immediately proceeded to address the 
discovery violation regarding the lay witnesses, advising the 
jury with CALJIC former No. 2.28 that “defendant has 
concealed and failed to timely disclose evidence regarding 
witness statements — witness statements of Debbie Woods, 
Rhonda Hill, Al Lucia, Penny Lucia, Delores Morris, and Aunt 
Lenore.”9  The court also imposed a $500 monetary sanction on 
defense counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5.  
 
9  
The full instruction provided the following: “Also a slightly 
different issue, and I gave you an instruction on this, I believe, 
last week.  [¶]  That is that the prosecution and defense are 
required to disclose to each other before trial evidence each 
intents to present at the trial so as to promote the ascertainment 
of truth, save court time, and avoid any surprise which may 
arise during the course of the trial.  [¶]  Concealment of evidence 
and delay in the disclosure of evidence may deny a party a 
sufficient opportunity to subpoena necessary witnesses or 
produce evidence which may exist to rebut the non-compliant 
party’s evidence.  [¶]  Disclosure of evidence is required to be 
made at least 30 days in advance of trial.  Any new evidence 
discovered within 30 days of trial must be disclosed 
immediately.  [¶]  In this case, the defendant has concealed and 
failed to timely disclose evidence regarding witness statements 
— witness statements of Debbie Woods, Rhonda Hill, Al Lucia, 
 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
 
Defense counsel objected to the court referencing the 
statements of Morris and Lenore Frey — their statements came 
from defense expert files but they were not defense witnesses.  
Defense counsel later raised additional objections to the 
discovery sanction, to the court’s remarks to the jury about the 
two-week delay, and to the trial court “lump[ing] everything 
together” when it addressed the continuance and discovery 
violations at the same time. 
 
During Dr. Humphrey’s cross-examination, she revealed 
that she did not use standard normative data to score one of the 
tests she administered to defendant.  She acknowledged that 
she had been told to provide prosecutors with everything she 
consulted, but she had not given them information about the 
new data.  
 
Just before Dr. Ney testified, the defense turned over the 
doctor’s recent interview with Albert Lucia, several pages of 
research articles he considered, and a package of material he 
planned to reference that included his opinions about a number 
of conditions and differential diagnoses.  Dr. Ney also 
acknowledged that he interviewed defendant the night before 
testifying, and, at defense counsel’s suggestion, did not take 
notes.  The prosecution informed the court that there was a 
 
Penny Lucia, Delores Morris, and Aunt Lenore.  [¶]  Although 
this concealment and failure to timely disclose evidence was 
without lawful justification, the court will, under the law, 
permit the production of this evidence during the trial.  [¶]  The 
weight and significance of any concealment and delay of 
disclosure are matters for your consideration.  [¶]  However, 
when you do start to deliberate in this case, you should consider 
whether the concealed and untimely disclosed evidence pertains 
to a fact of importance, something trivial, or subject matters that 
are established by other credible evidence.”   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
“huge amount” of new information in the recently disclosed 
material.  
The trial court concluded that the recent disclosures 
appeared to violate the court’s ruling made a week prior, 
requiring Dr. Ney to produce everything he relied upon in 
forming his opinion.  The court then explained to the jury that, 
given the new disclosure, “I am going to have to make a decision 
on whether this is a violation of the discovery rules.”   
Upon further examination, it appeared the disclosures 
included a prior, undisclosed report of Dr. Ney’s conclusions and 
a “pregnancy loss questionnaire” regarding defendant that he 
had not turned over to the prosecution.  The court ordered the 
defense to make Dr. Ney’s entire file available to the prosecution 
for review, which in turn revealed additional reports, notes, and 
articles not previously disclosed.  The prosecutor stated that she 
was not inclined to ask for more time to review the material 
because doing so would not be fair to the jury, but she requested 
monetary sanctions against both Dr. Ney and defense counsel, 
as well as a jury instruction, which the defense opposed.   
The trial court denied the request for sanctions against Dr. 
Ney but agreed over additional defense objections to instruct the 
jury with CALJIC No. 2.28.  The trial court rejected the 
prosecution’s argument that the initial mid-trial disclosure of 
defense expert material, and two-week delay, justified the 
instruction.  The prosecutors also conceded the instruction was 
not appropriate with regard to Penny Lucia’s statement, which 
they received before her testimony, or for statements from 
Morris and Frey, who did not testify.  The trial court stated that 
the wording of violations pertaining to Drs. Ney and Humphrey 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
was meant to be broad enough to address Dr. Ney’s failure to 
take notes when interviewing defendant.   
When giving guilt phase instructions, the trial court read 
to the jury CALJIC former No. 2.28, describing defendant’s 
violations as concealing and failing to timely disclose “[w]itness 
statements of Debbie Wood, Rhonda Hill, and Al Lucia” and to 
provide “[r]eadable notes and reports and other materials relied 
upon [by] witnesses Dr. Philip Ney and Dr. Lorie Humphrey.”  
The prosecution also referenced the instruction in closing 
argument: “You also received an instruction with respect to 
discovery violations and the failure to produce evidence 30 days 
prior to trial.  [¶]  [The] People, along with the Sheriff’s 
Department, gave all the evidence to the defense in accordance 
with the law.  We can’t say the same for the defense.  [¶]  The 
point of it is you can’t find defendant guilty because they hid 
stuff.  The point is why.  Why hide?  Why hide your defense?  [¶]  
I[’ll] tell you why.  Desperation.  The evidence in this case is so 
overwhelming, so enormous, and so vast, what are you going to 
do?  [¶]  It’s in order to prevent the prosecution from being able 
to prepare; in order to gain a strategic advantage.” 
b. Analysis 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred when it sanctioned 
her for failing to provide the prosecution with items the criminal 
discovery statutes did not obligate her to disclose and for 
discovery violations that did not hinder the prosecution.  She 
also argues that the particular instruction given, CALJIC 
former No. 2.28, was flawed in several respects.   
i. Scope of discovery violations 
 
Defendant argues preliminarily that there was no 
discovery violation related to the disclosure of statements from 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
witnesses Morris and Frey, “readable” notes from defense 
experts, and materials relied upon by defense experts.  We agree 
that defendant’s disclosure of these items did not violate the 
criminal discovery statute or the trial court’s pretrial discovery 
rulings.  Defendant also contends that discovery violations that 
did occur 
were limited and of little consequence, a 
characterization we find incomplete in that it refers only to 
disclosures regarding lay witness. 
First, defendant claims that her disclosure of the Morris 
and Frey statements did not constitute a discovery violation 
because she did not intend to call them as witnesses in the guilt 
phase.  The record indicates that the statements were among 
the disclosed files of a defense expert, but Morris and Frey did 
not testify during the guilt phase, and the prosecutors later 
conceded that guilt phase instructions about discovery 
violations should not reference Morris and Frey.   
The People argue that the statements were discoverable 
because defense experts relied on them.  Although the 
prosecution was entitled to material upon which testifying 
experts relied (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695), the trial 
court ruled that defendant’s disclosure of expert materials 
shortly before their testimony was lawful.  There was no 
discovery violation because the statements did not pertain to 
witnesses the defense intended to call (§ 1054.3) and the defense 
disclosed them as a basis for expert opinion at a time the trial 
court condoned.  The People assert defendant forfeited her 
argument by disclosing the Morris and Frey statements without 
objection, but this does not establish forfeiture of the claim that 
discovery sanctions were unwarranted, an objection defendant 
raised at trial. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
63 
The People also argue that the defense improperly delayed 
disclosures related to Frey.  They assert that because she was 
later called as a penalty phase witness, her statements should 
have been disclosed 30 days before the guilt phase.  The trial 
court 
addressed 
discovery 
violations 
related 
to 
Frey’s 
statements during the penalty phase when they arose but this 
posed no discovery violation with regard to the guilt phase, as 
the prosecution ultimately acknowledged.   
 
Second, defendant claims that because she was not 
required to disclose notes and other material relied upon by 
defense experts until they were called to testify, there was no 
discovery violation that warranted the trial court’s instruction 
that she concealed and failed to disclose “readable” notes.  
The People assert that the criminal discovery statute 
requires defendants to disclose an expert’s raw written notes, 
citing Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1103–1104, and 
Thompson v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 480, 486.  
These cases do not support such a broad proposition.  In Verdin 
we addressed compelled pretrial examination of a defendant by 
prosecution experts and merely observed that the defendant in 
that case did not object to disclosing “written or recorded 
information” possessed by the defense expert; we also 
determined that the description of discovery in Penal Code 
sections 1054.1 and 1054.3 did not exclude other types of 
materials from the reach of the criminal discovery statutes.  
(Verdin, at pp. 1103–1104.)   In Thompson, the appellate court 
determined that raw notes of a witness interview constituted 
witness statements for purposes of Penal Code sections 1054.1 
and 1054.3.  (Thompson, at p. 485.)   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
64 
Defense counsel’s pretrial disclosures included expert 
notes concerning their testing of defendant.  The notes at issue 
regarding the later disclosures included defendant’s statements 
to experts and consultations among defense experts and other 
defense team members, information normally protected from 
disclosure until presentation of the expert’s testimony waives 
applicable privileges.  (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695; 
§ 1054.6; see also Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).)   
Although an expert’s handwritten notes may be 
discoverable 
pursuant 
to 
section 
1054.3 
under 
some 
circumstances (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 
1233), the trial court here ruled that defense counsel was not 
required to disclose privileged information and work product 
before trial and acknowledged that defendant was entitled to 
delay disclosure of notes and other expert materials until her 
experts testified.  We therefore conclude that regardless of their 
legibility, defendant was not required to disclose the expert 
notes before trial.  “Rather, because the record does not 
demonstrate the [defendant] failed to disclose any discoverable 
material, and the undisclosed . . . information fell outside the 
scope of the discovery statute, no discovery violation appears.”  
(People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 290–291.)     
 
The People contend that defendant did not object to her 
experts creating legible versions of their notes and thus forfeited 
the claim.  This point, which defendant disputes, does not relate 
to defendant’s claim that disclosure of the notes was not 
untimely.  The claim is not forfeited when, as here, defense 
counsel consistently argued that he was entitled to withhold 
experts’ notes until they testified. 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
65 
Third, defendant contends there was no discovery 
violation regarding “other materials relied upon” by Drs. Ney 
and Humphrey.  Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s 
ruling that Dr. Humphrey withheld test data from the 
prosecution in violation of section 1054.3.  We do not identify 
other discovery violations at issue relating to Dr. Humphrey and 
the parties do not point to any.  Regarding disclosures from Dr. 
Ney, the People argue that “other materials” refers to his notes 
on defendant’s mental state — not, as defendant argues, to texts 
or reference works.  Neither party offers a citation to the record 
on this point.   
The trial court stated that disclosures from Dr. Ney 
violated the court’s order, issued shortly before his testimony, 
that he produce all material on which he relied.  This was 
consistent with the trial court’s earlier rulings that prosecutors 
were not entitled to outstanding defense expert materials until 
they testified and reflected the prosecution’s right to access the 
information for cross-examination, pursuant to Evidence Code 
section 721, rather than for pretrial discovery, pursuant to 
Penal Code section 1054.3.  (Cf. People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
1229, 1264 [trial court may order disclosure of unredacted 
defendant statements before testimony of an expert the defense 
“ ‘definitely’ ” will call]; Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695.)  
The trial court also indicated that the discovery sanction 
addressed Dr. Ney’s failure to take notes when interviewing 
defendant just before he testified, a concern similarly outside 
the scope of the discovery statute.  We therefore conclude that 
defendant did not violate her discovery obligations regarding 
“materials relied upon” by Dr. Ney.   
Finally, defendant claims the trial court’s instructions 
were unnecessary when the statements that were not timely 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
66 
disclosed were brief, uncomplicated, and in some respects 
unrelated to the guilt phase.  Defendant’s argument focusses on 
statements from lay witnesses — Woods, Hill, Albert Lucia, and 
Penny Lucia.  After receiving late disclosure of statements from 
Wood and Hill, the prosecutors determined that they did not 
need additional time to prepare to cross-examine them.  The 
untimely statement from Albert Lucia addressed an incident the 
court later ruled was irrelevant.  And the prosecutors 
determined that having received Penny Lucia’s statement 
before she testified, no further sanction was warranted.  
Although defendant does not address the impact of withholding 
Dr. Humphrey’s normative data or Dr. Ney’s reports, it appears 
the prosecution had little trouble managing the late disclosure 
of lay statements. 
To summarize, the trial court twice instructed the jury 
concerning discovery violations regarding lay witnesses: the 
first time naming Woods, Hill, Albert Lucia, Penny Lucia, 
Morris, and Lenore Frey; and the second time naming just 
Woods, Hill, and Albert Lucia.  We have concluded that there 
was no discovery violation regarding statements from Morris 
and Frey and, as we have just observed, the prosecutors at trial 
appeared unaffected by delayed statements from the remaining 
four lay witnesses. 
Regarding expert witnesses, the trial court instructed the 
jury that defendant failed to timely disclose “[r]eadable notes 
and reports and other materials relied upon” by Drs. Ney and 
Humphrey.  We have concluded that the notes at issue here were 
not discoverable pursuant to section 1054.3, readable or 
otherwise.  We have also determined that there was no discovery 
violation in defense counsel’s disclosure of “other materials 
relied upon” by Dr. Ney.  In other words, discovery violations 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
67 
regarding defense expert materials were limited to reports by 
Dr. Ney and test data from Dr. Humphrey.   
ii. Instruction on specific discovery violations 
Defendant contends that by citing alleged defense failures 
that were not discovery violations and referring to discovery 
violations that did not hinder the prosecution, the trial court’s 
instructions to the jury were arbitrary, disproportionate, 
unwarranted, and deprived her of a fair trial and due process.  
Defendant further claims that the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury with CALJIC former No. 2.28.   
The trial court commented generally on discovery 
compliance and delays by the defense and also instructed the 
jury about specific discovery violations.  We address the trial 
court’s general comments relating to discovery compliance in 
conjunction 
with 
defendant’s 
claims 
regarding 
judicial 
misconduct, post, part II.D.  Concerning the specific discovery 
violations, we conclude that it was error to instruct the jury with 
CALJIC former No. 2.28, given the deficiencies we have 
identified in that instruction (People v. Thomas (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 449, 483 (Thomas)) and the scope of discovery 
violations in defendant’s case.   
First, the instruction informed the jury that the 
“defendant” concealed and failed to timely disclose evidence 
when there was no indication defendant played any such role.  
It was therefore “ ‘misleading to suggest that “the defendant” 
bore any responsibility’ [citation] for [her] attorney’s failure to 
provide discovery.”  (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 483.)   
Second, 
although 
the 
instruction 
indicated 
that 
concealment and late disclosure could affect the prosecution, 
there was no evidence that this “had actually deprived the 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
68 
prosecutor ‘of the chance to subpoena witnesses or marshal 
evidence in rebuttal.’ ”  (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 483.)  
This was particularly true in defendant’s case, where the trial 
court instructed jurors to consider late disclosures: for Morris 
and Frey, although there was no discovery violation related to 
their statements; for Wood, Hill, and Penny Lucia, although the 
prosecution claimed it was unaffected by the timing of their 
disclosures; for Albert Lucia, whose statement the court later 
found irrelevant; and for a broadly articulated category of 
“readable notes” and “other material” from Drs. Humphrey and 
Ney that was, on review, inapplicable. 
Finally, the instruction “was deficient in informing the 
jury that ‘ “[t]he weight and significance of any delayed 
disclosure are matters for your consideration,” ’ because it 
offered ‘no guidance on how this failure might legitimately affect 
their deliberations.’ ”  (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 483.)   
iii. Prejudice 
Defendant asserts the erroneous discovery instructions 
constitute structural error.  “ ‘[M]ost constitutional errors can be 
harmless.’  [Citation.]  ‘[I]f the defendant had counsel and was 
tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption 
that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred 
are subject to harmless-error analysis.’ ”  (Neder v. United States 
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8.)  We have therefore recognized that 
structural error is limited to circumstances in which the error 
“necessarily affected the whole framework within which the 
trial proceeded” or “defies analysis for prejudice.”  (People v. 
Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 901.)  Neither of these 
conditions apply here.   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
69 
We conclude that it is not reasonably probable that an 
outcome more favorable to defendant would have resulted 
absent the error (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), 
and any federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 
24).   
Defendant did not dispute starting the fire that killed her 
children and instead testified that she did not remember 
starting it or sending letters that appeared to reference her 
planned murder-suicide.  There were significant reasons to 
doubt her defense of experiencing a dissociative state that 
rendered her unconscious on the night of the fire.  Defense 
experts gave different explanations for defendant’s condition, at 
times contradicting each other.  There was evidence that 
defendant wrote letters, drove to the post office, and poured and 
lit gasoline throughout her house, all while allegedly 
unconscious.  Defendant also displayed a selective memory of 
the evening, remembering some events but not others.  
Defendant’s son testified regarding her apparent planning for 
the crime, describing her insistence that the children sleep 
together in the kitchen the night she set the fire.  The jury took 
less than a day to reach its verdict.   
The prosecution briefly referenced the discovery violations 
in closing and argued that the defense was trying to obstruct the 
prosecution’s preparation.  We conclude, however, that when, as 
here, the defense was “highly improbable,” the case was “not 
close,” and the jury reached its verdict quickly, the erroneous 
instruction was harmless.  (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 484.)    
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
70 
8. Failure to instruct on lesser included offenses 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser 
included offense of murder.  She claims the jury could have 
(1) concluded that she was unconscious due to her voluntary 
intoxication or (2) found her guilty of a misdemeanor for 
unlawfully causing a fire, and that either of these findings 
supported 
the 
lesser 
included 
offense 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter.  We reject these claims.  
 
Investigators found two beer bottles and two wine cooler 
bottles in defendant’s trash following the fire.  Defendant 
testified that she did not remember how much she drank and 
her friend also “had a couple of drinks” while at her house.  The 
trial court found no evidence that defendant was unconscious 
due to her ingestion of alcohol.  Defense counsel initially sought 
an involuntary manslaughter instruction but later argued the 
instruction was not warranted because defendant did not 
anticipate the use of prescription medication would cause 
delirium or unconsciousness, a result experts explained was 
quite rare.   
The trial court did not give an involuntary manslaughter 
instruction but instructed the jury to consider defendant’s 
voluntary intoxication in deciding whether defendant possessed 
the required specific intent or mental state at the time of the 
charged crimes and special circumstances.  The trial court also 
instructed the jury that if defendant was not conscious but 
acting “while asleep or while suffering from a delirium, a fever, 
or because of an attack of epilepsy, a blow on the head, the 
involuntary taking of drugs, or the involuntary consumption of 
intoxicating liquor, or any similar cause” she could not be found 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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guilty.   
Defense counsel requested instruction on the lesser 
included offense of arson, arguing that defendant could be found 
guilty of negligently spilling gasoline, a misdemeanor.  The trial 
court found no evidence to support a lesser included offense and 
rejected counsel’s argument as “ridiculous.”   
 
“A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included 
offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever 
evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is 
substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.”  (People 
v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 414, fn. omitted.)  The 
obligation to give an instruction on lesser included offenses 
exists even when a defendant expressly objects to it.  (People v. 
Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 114.)  We review de novo the trial 
court’s determination.  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 
1218.)   
 
Involuntary manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice . . . in the commission of an 
unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of 
a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, 
or without due caution and circumspection.”  (§ 192, subd. (b).)   
“Unconsciousness, 
if 
not 
induced 
by 
voluntary 
intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge.”  (People 
v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 417; see also Penal Code, 
§ 26.)  However, “[w]hen a person renders himself or herself 
unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in that 
state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in self-
intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary 
manslaughter.”  (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423; 
People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1227.)  Intoxication 
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may not be voluntary when an individual used prescription 
medication but “did not know or have reason to anticipate the 
drug’s intoxicating effects.”  (People v. Mathson (2012) 
210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1313; see also People v. Chaffey (1994) 
25 Cal.App.4th 852, 856.) 
 
A person is guilty of arson when “she willfully and 
maliciously sets fire to or burns . . . any structure, forest land, 
or property.”  (§ 451.)  A person is guilty of “unlawfully causing 
a fire” when she “recklessly sets fire to or burns or causes to be 
burned, any structure, forest land or property.”  (§ 452.)  Under 
section 452, it is a felony to unlawfully cause a fire that results 
in great bodily injury (§ 452, subd. (a)), burns an inhabited 
structure or inhabited property (§ 452, subd. (b)), or sets fire to 
a structure or forest land (§ 452, subd. (c)), and it is a 
misdemeanor to cause a fire to property (§ 452, subd. (d)).   
We conclude there was insufficient evidence to support an 
involuntary manslaughter instruction based on voluntary 
intoxication.  There is no substantial evidence of alcohol 
intoxication; instead, the record reflects that defendant 
consumed “relatively small amounts of alcohol” (People v. 
Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 685) and no evidence suggested 
that it affected her consciousness.  As defense counsel argued, 
any intoxication defendant experienced from prescription 
medications was involuntary as a matter of applicable law if 
defendant was unaware of a potentially intoxicating and rare 
drug interaction.  (People v. Chaffey, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 856.)  The trial court properly instructed the jury that 
involuntary intoxication, if proved, would be a complete defense.  
 
We also find no evidence to support a misdemeanor for 
causing the fire.  Even if we were to assume that unlawfully 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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73 
setting fire to the house is a lesser included offense of arson 
(People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1218) and that 
defendant’s actions were reckless rather than willful, the 
evidence established that a fire set to burn an inhabited 
structure killed four children, thus constituting felonies under 
section 452.  Although we have recognized that “an 
unintentional homicide committed in the course of a 
noninherently dangerous felony may properly support a 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter” (People v. Burroughs 
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835), setting fire to an inhabited structure 
“ ‘by its very nature . . . cannot be committed without creating a 
substantial risk that someone will be killed’ ” (People v. Howard 
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129, 1135–1136) — and is hence inherently 
dangerous (see Cole, at p. 1218).   
9. Lying-in-wait special circumstance 
 
Defendant initially contends the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance is unconstitutional because it fails to adequately 
perform the narrowing function required by the Eighth 
Amendment.  We have repeatedly rejected this claim (People v. 
Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1178; People v. Delgado (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 544, 576; People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 849), 
and decline to reconsider the issue here.  Defendant also argues 
that the evidence at her trial was insufficient to support the 
lying-in-wait special circumstances because the jury would have 
had to speculate about the timing of relevant events to find those 
allegations true.  We reject this argument as well. 
 
“To determine whether the evidence supports a special 
circumstance finding, we must review ‘ “the entire record in the 
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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74 
such that a reasonable jury could find” ’ the special circumstance 
allegation true ‘ “beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028.)   
 
At the time of defendant’s crime, “the special circumstance 
of murder while lying in wait (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) 
required 
‘an 
intentional 
murder, 
committed 
under 
circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a 
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune 
time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on 
an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.’ ”  (People 
v. Casares, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 827.)  “ ‘ “If there is a clear 
interruption separating the period of lying in wait from the 
period during which the killing takes place, so that there is 
neither an immediate killing nor a continuous flow of the 
uninterrupted lethal events, the special circumstance is not 
proved.” ’ ”  (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 248.)  
Evidence is insufficient to support a lying-in-wait special 
circumstance when the theory of surprise requires a specific 
sequence of events that “cannot be pinpointed” by the evidence.  
(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1262; see also People v. 
Becerrada, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1029.)   
 
Defendant argues that evidence of lying in wait was 
insufficient because the evidence did not establish when the fire 
began or what defendant was doing immediately before it 
started.  Given the evidence, however, “the jury could 
reasonably find no lapse in defendant’s culpable mental state 
between the homicide and the period of watchful waiting.”  
(People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 249.)   
 
On the night of the fire, defendant announced a “slumber 
party” in the kitchen, which was unusual.  Defendant’s son, 
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75 
F.D., did not want to sleep in the kitchen but she insisted.  
During the evening, defendant wrote and mailed letters that 
appeared to reveal a plan to kill herself and her children.  F.D. 
did not think he had been asleep for very long when he and his 
sisters woke up coughing from the fire and his mother told them 
to stay where they were.  From this evidence the jury could 
reasonably find a “continuous flow” of lethal events in which 
defendant concealed her purpose and waited until her children 
fell asleep so that she could set a fire to kill them and herself.  
This satisfies the elements of the charged lying-in-wait special 
circumstances.  
10. Arson-murder special circumstance 
 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to 
support the “independent felonious intent required for the 
arson-murder special circumstance.”  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 
24 Cal.4th 130, 183 (Mendoza).)  “The requirement of an 
independent felonious purpose applies to felony-murder special-
circumstance findings under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).  
[Citation.]  This subdivision authorizes a special circumstance 
finding when the murder ‘was committed while the defendant 
was engaged in . . . the commission of [or] the attempted 
commission of’ various other specified felonies.  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17).)”  (People v. Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 953.)   
 
As we explained in Mendoza, “[a] felony-murder special 
circumstance, such as arson murder, may be alleged when the 
murder occurs during the commission of the felony, not when 
the felony occurs during the commission of a murder.  
[Citations.]  Thus, to 
prove a felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the 
defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of 
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76 
the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely 
incidental to an intended murder.”  (Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th 
at p. 182.)  “Concurrent intent to kill and to commit an 
independent felony will support a felony-murder special 
circumstance.”  (Id. at p. 183; see also People v. Raley (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 870, 903.)  We must therefore determine whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could have concluded that 
defendant had a purpose for the arson apart from the murder.”  
(Mendoza, at p. 183.) 
 
Defendant argues that the prosecution was required to 
show that she committed murder “to advance” the independent 
purpose of committing arson, citing People v. Green (1980) 
27 Cal.3d 1, 61.  In Green, we concluded that a murder “to 
advance an independent felonious purpose” satisfied special 
circumstance requirements whereas a felony “merely incidental 
to the murder” did not.  (Ibid.)  We have explained, however, 
that “[t]here is nothing magical about the phrase ‘to carry out or 
advance’ the felony.”  (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 
908.)  A jury “ ‘ “is not required to assign a hierarchy to the 
defendant’s motives . . . [and] need only determine whether 
commission of the underlying felony was or was not merely 
incidental to the murder.” ’ ”  (People v. Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th 
at p. 955.)   
 
Here, there is substantial evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded that defendant’s “purpose for the arson 
apart from the murder” was suicide.  (Mendoza, supra, 
24 Cal.4th at p. 183.)  In a note to her ex-husband sent just 
before the fire, defendant wrote, “Now you don’t have to support 
any of us!”  She sent a letter to her ex-boyfriend at the same 
time, stating, “I can’t live without you in my life.”  After lighting 
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77 
gasoline throughout the house, defendant lay down with her 
children and stayed with them while the fire and smoke 
overwhelmed 
them; 
at 
one 
point 
when 
he 
regained 
consciousness, defendant’s son saw that she was unconscious on 
the floor with his sisters.  In her testimony, defendant 
acknowledged that she had contemplated suicide most of her 
life.   
 
Because killing oneself is a purpose separate from killing 
one’s victims, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to establish 
that defendant committed arson with “independent, albeit 
concurrent, goals” of killing herself and killing her children.  
(Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 183.)   
Defendant also argues that the arson-murder special 
circumstance instructions regarding the “independent felonious 
purpose” requirement were confusing and misleading and failed 
to adequately advise the jury of the applicable law.  The trial 
court modified CALJIC No. 8.81.17, adding a sentence to 
indicate that the arson-murder special circumstance could be 
established when there was a concurrent intent to kill and to 
commit arson:  “To find that the special circumstance referred 
to in these instructions as murder in the commission of arson is 
true, it must be proved:  (1) the murder was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in the commission of arson, and; (2) the 
murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the 
commission of the crime of arson, or to facilitate the escape 
therefrom, or to avoid detection.  Moreover, this special 
circumstance is still proven if the defendant had the separate 
specific intent to commit the crime of arson, even if she also had 
the specific intent to kill.  In other words, the special 
circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established 
if the arson was merely incidental to the commission of the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
78 
murder.”   
 
Defendant acknowledges that the added, italicized 
language was a correct statement of the law, but argues that, as 
a whole, the instruction misled the jury into thinking that a 
concurrent intent to commit arson and to kill could mean that 
the arson was not “merely incidental” to the murder.  If the 
jurors reached this conclusion, and they apparently did, it was 
permissible under the law.  “We have repeatedly held . . . that a 
defendant’s possession of the intent to kill concurrently with the 
intent necessary to support a predicate felony does not 
necessarily render commission of the predicate felony incidental 
to the murder.”  (People v. Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 954.)   
 
We reject defendant’s claim that the instruction allowed 
the jury to find the arson-murder special circumstance true 
without finding a separate and independent purpose for 
committing arson.  “[W]e have never suggested that . . . any 
precise language was required to explain the concept [of 
independent felonious purpose] to the jury” (People v. Horning, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 908), and we find that the instruction 
given here adequately conveyed the applicable law and 
requirements of the arson-murder special circumstance.   
 
Defendant argues that the modified instruction given to 
her jury was deficient for the same reasons we found to be error 
in People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 613 (Brents).  There, 
the trial court modified the standard instruction, CALJIC 
No. 8.81.17, so that it referred to two different target offenses, 
assault by force and kidnapping.  In that context, the first and 
second sentences of the second paragraph did not refer to the 
same target offense and created confusion about what findings 
were required.  (Brents, at p. 613.)  There could have been no 
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79 
such confusion here.  The instructions focused on the proper 
predicate felony — arson — and correctly informed the jury that 
“the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not 
established if the arson was merely incidental to the commission 
of the murder.”  The danger in Brents, that the jury may have 
found the special circumstance satisfied without finding true the 
correct predicate felony, was not present in this trial.    
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
Defendant raises evidentiary challenges to the penalty 
phase of the trial and contends the death penalty was 
disproportionate to her individual culpability.  Because we 
ultimately reverse the penalty verdict due to the trial court’s 
misconduct, we need not address each of these challenges.  
(People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 477.)  Instead, we 
discuss here the errors that shed light on the trial court’s 
misconduct — improper exclusion of mitigating evidence and 
erroneous instruction regarding discovery violations — and 
address their prejudicial impact in our analysis of the judicial 
misconduct claim.   
1. Exclusion of mitigation evidence 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred when it excluded 
evidence related to neuropsychological testing and PET scan 
results, and erred when it sustained objections to lay witness 
testimony about defendant’s good character.  We agree that the 
trial court’s exclusion of this evidence was error.  
 
“ ‘The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the 
jury in a capital case to hear any relevant mitigating evidence 
that the defendant offers, including “ ‘any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 
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less than death.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 
346.)  “However, while the range of constitutionally pertinent 
mitigation is quite broad [citation], it is not unlimited.”  (Carasi, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1313).  Trial courts retain the authority 
to “ ‘apply[] ordinary rules of evidence to determine whether 
such evidence is admissible’ ” (People v. McDowell (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 395, 434) and “to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence that 
has no logical bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, 
or the circumstances of the capital offense” (Carasi, at p. 1313).  
a. Neuropsychological testing expert 
 
Defendant contends the trial court violated her rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when it 
excluded testimony by Dr. Kyle Boone regarding defendant’s 
neuropsychological test results and cognitive impairment.   
i. Background 
Before the penalty phase began the trial court noted that 
jurors were “getting a little antsy.”  After excusing an alternate 
juror for preplanned travel, and after hearing of a sitting juror’s 
personal scheduling problems, the trial court worried about 
losing jurors and stated its belief that “penalty phase witnesses 
should not take very long.”  
On the first day of defense testimony, counsel informed 
the court and prosecutors that he would be calling a new 
neuropsychological expert, Dr. Kyle Boone, that afternoon.  Dr. 
Boone’s report acknowledged that Dr. Humphrey used incorrect 
normative data but concluded that the testing revealed 
“consistent evidence” of defendant’s impaired memory, frontal 
lobe skills, and math ability, but otherwise showed average 
scores and intelligence.  The defense estimated Dr. Boone’s 
testimony would take about 45 minutes and would rehabilitate 
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81 
Dr. Humphrey’s findings, show the impact of defendant’s 
impairment on her life, evoke sympathy, and explain, if not 
excuse, the crime.   
The prosecutors strenuously objected to Dr. Boone’s 
testimony.  They argued that Dr. Humphrey’s testimony had 
already addressed section 190.3, factor (k) evidence and that 
they would need a lengthy continuance to prepare if Dr. Boone 
testified.  
 
The trial court ruled that Dr. Boone’s testimony would be 
cumulative, “take days,” and involve an undue consumption of 
time, noting that, at any rate, Dr. Boone would not be allowed 
to testify about how Dr. Humphrey obtained the wrong 
normative data because such testimony would be speculative.  
ii. Analysis 
 
In excluding Dr. Boone’s testimony, the trial court 
implicitly engaged in analysis under Evidence Code section 352 
and found that concerns regarding delay “substantially 
outweighed” the probative value of the evidence.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352; People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1168.)  A trial 
court may exclude from the penalty phase “ ‘ “particular items 
of evidence” . . . [that are] misleading, cumulative, or unduly 
inflammatory.’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 357), 
although evidence “ ‘identical in subject matter to other 
evidence should not be excluded as “cumulative” when it has 
greater evidentiary weight or probative value.’ ” (People v. 
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 669; see also Skipper v. South 
Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 8).   
 
Defendant cites People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, in 
support of her claim that she was entitled to have the jury 
consider Dr. Boone’s testimony.  There, we addressed the 
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exclusion of expert testimony about a defendant’s mental 
condition in the penalty phase.  Although one defense expert 
was allowed to testify about the condition, we declined to find 
similar testimony by a second expert cumulative when there 
was “considerable debate” regarding the methods by which the 
first examiner reached his conclusions.  (Id. at pp. 1031–1032.)  
We also observed that when the prosecution seeks to impeach 
the testimony of the first defense expert, it might be “very 
important for defendant to be able to show that not only one, but 
two mental health experts” had reached the same conclusion.  
(Id. at p. 1031.) 
Dr. Humphrey was the only expert to testify about 
cognitive impairment that may have been related to defendant’s 
childhood abuse and seizures.  The People argue that Dr. 
Boone’s testimony was properly excluded because it would have 
merely repeated Dr. Humphrey’s conclusions.  As defendant 
argued, however, Dr. Boone’s testimony would have addressed 
defendant’s mental condition as a mitigating factor and was 
therefore distinct from evidence presented in the guilt phase.  
Furthermore, impeachment and rebuttal of Dr. Humphrey’s 
testimony raised significant questions about her credibility.  (Cf. 
People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 632.)  Testimony from 
Dr. Boone had the potential to carry greater evidentiary weight 
and was not merely cumulative.  (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 669; People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1031.)   
 
The probative value of Dr. Boone’s testimony was also 
relatively substantial, given that expert assessment of 
neuropsychological test data was both necessary and relevant to 
establishing mitigating factors related to defendant’s mental 
functioning.  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1282–
1283.)  The high court has reiterated that “ ‘ “defendants who 
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83 
commit criminal acts that are attributable . . . to emotional and 
mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who 
have no such excuse.” ’ ”  (Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman (2007) 
550 U.S. 233, 251–252.)  This concern is reflected in section 
190.3, factor (k), which directs the jury to consider “ ‘any other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime,’ [and] 
therefore allows consideration of any mental or emotional 
condition.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 966.)  The 
testimony was also probative of defendant’s state of mind under 
section 190.3, factor (a).  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 1154.)   
 
We next consider whether undue consumption of time 
“substantially outweighed” the probative value of Dr. Boone’s 
testimony.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  In People v. Fuiava (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 622, we concluded the trial court did not err when it 
excluded mitigation evidence regarding the settlement of 
lawsuits that alleged misconduct by sheriff’s deputies and was 
offered to support defendant’s reasonable fear of them.  (Id. at 
p. 723.)  The probative value of such evidence depended on 
establishing the merits of the lawsuits notwithstanding the 
settlement, and we concluded the trial court acted well within 
its discretion to prevent “trials within a trial” that would have 
required an undue investment of time and “might have 
unreasonably distracted the jury.”  (Ibid.)   
No 
such 
similar 
complications 
accompanied 
the 
presentation of Dr. Boone’s testimony, which was directly 
related to relevant mitigating considerations.  The trial court 
indicated that it would not allow Dr. Boone to address Dr. 
Humphrey’s reasons for using improper normative data and 
could have further limited other potentially distracting 
testimony that focused on Dr. Humphrey’s reputation rather 
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84 
than defendant’s test results and functioning.  The defense 
estimated that direct testimony would take under an hour.  The 
trial court anticipated that the prosecution response and other 
issues related to the testimony would extend the time needed to 
a matter of days.  The trial court worried about having to excuse 
jurors, but three alternate jurors were available to “guard 
against the risk of a mistrial [had] a juror become unable to 
serve.”  (People v. Cottle (2006) 39 Cal.4th 246, 258; see also 
§ 1089; Larios v. Superior Court of Ventura County (1979) 
24 Cal.3d 324, 332 [no legal necessity for mistrial when 
alternate juror is available].)   
 
“ ‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion under [Evidence 
Code] section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the court 
abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised its discretion in 
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.’ ”  (People 
v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 521.)  When “a specific statute 
affects the extent and nature of a trial court’s discretion, we 
examine a trial court’s actions in light of the specific law bearing 
on that discretion.”  (People v. Rodriguez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 676, 
685.)  Section 190.3 expressly authorizes the presentation of 
“any matter” relevant to mitigation, including “defendant’s 
character, background, history, mental condition and physical 
condition” (§ 190.3), and a trial court’s discretion to limit 
mitigating evidence is informed by this broad charge (see People 
v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 680).  In this context, we 
conclude the trial court’s exclusion of relevant, non-cumulative, 
expert testimony about defendant’s mental condition was an 
abuse of discretion.   
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b. PET scan results 
 
Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling excluding PET 
scan evidence from the penalty phase denied her rights to 
present a meaningful defense, to offer mitigating evidence, and 
to a reliable sentence in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.   
Defense experts concluded that defendant’s PET scan 
showed abnormality in regions of her brain that could affect her 
judgment, memory, and ability to interpret data, among other 
functions, and that impairment in those areas would be 
consistent with defendant’s neuropsychological testing.  In 
arguing for the admission of PET scan evidence in the penalty 
phase, the defense stated that “[w]e are not trying to present a 
diagnosis of a particular mental illness or disease.  [¶]   . . .  If 
they feel sympathy for her because she has a defect or an 
abnormality in her brain, even though, hypothetically, we could 
not reliably show a connection with the crime or even her day-
to-day behavior, they could still feel sympathy for her.”  The 
prosecution objected to the evidence under Kelly and Evidence 
Code section 352.   
 
The trial court determined that the PET scan evidence 
could be used only if scientific consensus recognized a reliable 
correlation between the scan and a particular condition, and 
that although mental and emotional conditions were admissible 
under factor (k), the PET scan did not reliably show any such 
condition.  The trial court ruled that the evidence would also be 
excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it had little 
probative value and would cause undue consumption of time 
and confusion of issues.  
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As we observed when addressing the exclusion of PET 
scan results from the guilt phase, the evidence established that 
PET scans had been used for decades to evaluate brain 
abnormality.  The trial court’s reliance on Kelly to exclude the 
evidence from the penalty phase, as in the guilt phase, was 
therefore error.  We concluded the evidence of brain abnormality 
had little probative value in the guilt phase because it was not 
possible to associate it with any condition or behavior affecting 
defendant at the time of the crime.  The scope of mitigating 
evidence admissible in the penalty phase differs, however, and 
is “quite broad.”  (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1313; see 
§ 190.3.)   
Thus, whether or not specifically related to her crime, 
evidence of defendant’s brain damage was relevant in the 
penalty phase  (see People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 359), 
and it would have contributed to defense efforts to portray 
defendant as a woman of limited mental resources who broke 
down in a time of adversity.  “Because ‘at the penalty phase the 
jury decides a question the resolution of which turns . . . on the 
jury’s moral assessment,’ ‘[i]t is not only appropriate, but 
necessary, that the jury weigh the sympathetic elements of 
defendant’s background against those that may offend the 
conscience.’ ”  (People v. Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 680.)  
Given “how circumscribed is the court’s discretion to exclude 
evidence at the penalty phase” (id.), we conclude that the trial 
court erred when it excluded defendant’s PET scan results. 
c. Character witness testimony 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in sustaining 
objections to defense questioning of lay witnesses and thus 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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excluded relevant mitigating testimony in violation of her 
federal constitutional rights.   
 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by preventing 
defense witnesses from telling the jury what they valued about 
defendant.  The trial court sustained relevance objections to 
questions posed to three of defendant’s friends regarding what 
they would miss about her and the value she brought to their 
lives, and to questions for a jail chaplain and Albert Lucia 
addressing whether defendant could be a help to others.  
Defense counsel argued that such testimony was relevant under 
section 190.3, factor (k), and that witnesses should be allowed to 
express their feelings about defendant “as a friend, as a 
companion.”   
 
Evidence that a defendant “ ‘is loved by family members 
or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live . . . 
is relevant because it constitutes indirect evidence of the 
defendant’s character.’ ” (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 88.)  
It was therefore error to exclude as irrelevant testimony that 
witnesses valued defendant’s friendship and felt she had 
potential to help others.  (People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 
647 [questions were “not facially irrelevant” when the “range of 
constitutionally pertinent mitigation is so broad”].)   
 
The trial court also sustained objections based on 
relevance when defense counsel tried to elicit testimony from 
defendant’s friends that she was a nonviolent person and that 
the crime was out of character for her.  As we have noted, 
however, “ ‘[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require 
the jury in a capital case to hear any relevant mitigating 
evidence that the defendant offers, including “ ‘any aspect of a 
defendant’s character . . . that the defendant proffers as a basis 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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88 
for a sentence less than death.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Rogers, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at p. 346.)  Character evidence regarding defendant’s 
nonviolence was relevant in mitigation and it was error to 
exclude it.   
 
A chaplain from the jail testified about defendant’s 
remorse.  Defendant contends the trial court improperly 
sustained relevance objections to questions supporting the 
chaplain’s credibility — including how infrequently she testified 
for the thousands of inmates to whom she ministered and 
whether she believed in the death penalty.  We agree.  Such 
questions were relevant and admissible (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 
351, 780, subds. (c), (f), (j)) and should have been allowed.    
2. Instructional error related to discovery violations  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by finding that 
the defense violated discovery obligations and by instructing the 
jury to consider those alleged violations, and that these asserted 
errors violated her statutory and constitutional rights.  We 
conclude that giving the instruction was indeed error.    
 
Less than a week before the start of the penalty phase, the 
defense for the first time provided contact information for eight 
penalty witnesses, along with their corresponding statements 
and documents, most of which were one to two years old.  
Counsel explained that when the trial court excluded the PET 
scan evidence from the penalty phase, the defense decided to call 
additional witnesses, prompting the new disclosures.  The trial 
court found the explanation implausible and concluded the 
defense had willfully delayed disclosure.  The trial court stated 
it would initiate contempt proceedings against defense counsel 
for discovery violations and instruct the jury with CALJIC 
No. 2.28 regarding the late disclosure.   
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89 
 
When the prosecutors subsequently notified the defense of 
ten new witnesses, the trial court rejected defense counsel’s 
request for a continuance to investigate them.  Dismissing 
counsel’s argument that the prosecution should be sanctioned 
for late discovery, the trial court stated, “[M]aybe they will just 
call Mr. Folden and Mr. Nieves, and these are people that you’ve 
known about for two years.”  Prosecutors later confirmed their 
intention to call three of the new witnesses.   
 
The trial court included CALJIC former No. 2.28 among 
the penalty phase instructions, informing the jury as follows: “In 
this case, the defendant failed to timely disclose the following 
evidence:  [¶]  1.  The name and address of witnesses Lelia 
Mrotzek and Lynn Jones.  [¶]  2.  The name and address and 
statements of witnesses Shirley Driskell, Cindy Hall, Carl Hall, 
Shannon North, Tammy Pearce and Tricia Mulder.  [¶]  . . . .  
The weight and significance of any delayed disclosure are 
matters for your consideration.  [¶]  However, you should 
consider whether the untimely disclosed evidence pertains to a 
fact of importance, something trivial, or subject matters already 
established by other credible evidence.”   
 
“A trial court’s discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  [Citation.]  The trial court possesses the discretion 
to determine what sanction is appropriate to ensure a fair trial.”    
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 466.)  We 
review for substantial evidence the trial court’s decisions 
regarding compliance with discovery disclosure requirements.  
(People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 306.)   
Preliminarily, we note that under section 1054.5 court 
discretion to advise the jury about untimely disclosures is 
conditional “upon a showing that the moving party complied 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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90 
with the informal discovery procedure.”  (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).)  
Here the record reflects late discovery disclosures by the 
prosecution, the moving party — yet the record reflects no 
explanation for that delay.  The necessary showing of informal 
discovery compliance by the moving party is not apparent.  
Under these circumstances, it appears the trial court exceeded 
its discretion by advising the jury of late disclosures.   
The trial court erred by instructing the jury pursuant to 
CALJIC former No. 2.28.  The deficiencies we identified with the 
instruction in the guilt phase were also present in the penalty 
phase: the instruction was misleading by twice informing the 
jury that “defendant” was at fault for delayed disclosure, 
suggesting without evidence that the delay affected the 
prosecution case, and by directing the jurors to consider 
defendant’s unlawful conduct without guidance concerning how 
it might legitimately affect their deliberations.  (Thomas, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at pp. 483–484.) 
Defendant contends that by faulting her for discovery 
violations during the penalty phase, the instruction also 
impermissibly set forth a nonstatutory aggravating factor for 
the jury’s consideration.  We agree.  “The penalty jury may 
consider in aggravation only matters coming within one of 
section 190.3’s factors.”  (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
104, 140.)  Accordingly, “ ‘[a]ggravating evidence must pertain 
to the circumstances of the capital offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), 
other violent criminal conduct by the defendant (id., factor (b)) 
or prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)); only these three 
factors, and the experiential or moral implications of the 
defendant’s age (id., factor (i)), are properly considered in 
aggravation of penalty. . . . ’ ”  (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
198, 222.)  The trial court therefore erred by using an instruction 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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91 
during the penalty phase that put before the jury bad acts 
attributed to defendant but unrelated to statutorily permissible 
considerations.  (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1202; 
People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 439.)   
 
Although we have engaged in harmless error analysis 
concerning similarly erroneous instructions in the guilt phase 
(Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 484; Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 311), we have not addressed such error in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial (cf. People v. Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 767).  Defendant argues that the instruction in the penalty 
phase constitutes structural error, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana 
(1993) 508 U.S. 275.  In Sullivan, the high court ruled that 
erroneous instruction on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” 
deprived the defendant of a jury verdict on guilt, a structural 
defect that “ ‘def[ied] analysis by “harmless-error” standards.’ ”    
(Id. at p. 281.)   
Regarding penalty phase errors, the high court has 
condoned the use of harmless error analysis concerning 
instructions that directed a jury to consider an invalid 
aggravating factor (Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738, 
741; see also People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 531), and we 
have reviewed for harmlessness a trial court’s error in 
instructing a penalty phase jury on witness credibility (People v. 
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 587).  The instructional error here 
is akin to these circumstances and is not a structural error that 
“rendered the trial ‘fundamentally unfair’ ” or was “ ‘necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminate.’ ”  (People v. Aranda (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 342, 366, italics omitted.)    
 
We consider the prejudicial effect of this instructional 
error, and the errors we have identified in the exclusion of 
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92 
mitigating evidence, in the following sections concerning the 
trial judge’s misconduct.   
D. Judicial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the trial judge was “impatient, 
undignified, and discourteous” to the defense, engaging in 
conduct that established bias and misconduct in violation of her 
state and federal constitutional rights.10  The People argue that 
the trial judge’s apparent intemperance must be viewed in light 
of defense counsel’s “shenanigans,” and indeed, the judge 
characterized the defense as “one of the most unprofessional 
performances” he had ever seen.  The trial judge’s response to 
this challenge, however, failed to maintain the high standards 
of fairness we demand.   
We have cautioned that “[t]rial judges ‘should be 
exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of 
a jury’ ” (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237) and their 
comments “ ‘must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, 
and scrupulously fair’ ” (id. at 1232).  “ ‘Although the trial court 
has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the 
trial [citation], the court “commits misconduct if it persistently 
makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel 
so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is 
allying itself with the prosecution” [citation].  Nevertheless, “[i]t 
is well within [a trial court’s] discretion to rebuke an attorney, 
sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate 
questions, ignores the court’s instructions, or otherwise engages 
in improper or delaying behavior.” ’ ”  (People v. Woodruff (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 697, 768.) 
 
10  
The trial judge is now deceased. 
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As the following section details, the trial judge here 
frequently employed a variety of strategies to properly manage 
defense counsel’s noncompliance with court procedures.  
Throughout the trial, however, the trial judge also made 
inappropriately disparaging and sarcastic remarks to defense 
counsel, impugning his performance, chastising him for 
improper behavior, and sanctioning and citing him for contempt 
in front of the jury.   
The trial judge also directed improper comments and 
questions to witnesses, openly doubting the credibility of one 
defense expert by asking argumentative and hostile questions 
and remarking on the possibility that another defense expert 
“just doesn’t know what he’s talking about.”  When confronted 
with a juror who had been exposed to extrajudicial information 
that was likely to enhance the credibility of a prosecution expert, 
the trial court revealed the information to the entire jury.  In 
the penalty phase, the trial judge needlessly reprimanded and 
belittled a lay witness who testified for the defense.   
We conclude that this conduct by the trial judge reflects “a 
pattern of disparaging defense counsel and defense witnesses in 
the presence of the jury, and convey[ing] the impression that he 
favored 
the 
prosecution,” 
and 
it 
therefore 
constitutes 
misconduct.  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1238.)  Although 
the 
misconduct 
did 
not 
prejudicially 
affect 
the 
guilt 
determination, we conclude that it was prejudicial in the penalty 
phase and requires reversal of the penalty judgment.  
1. Treatment of defense counsel 
Defendant contends the trial judge committed misconduct 
by expressing “deep hostility” toward defense counsel at the 
outset of the case and making disparaging comments to him 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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throughout the trial.  The record shows that the trial judge spent 
considerable effort attempting to control counsel’s disregard for 
evidentiary rules and orders; it also reveals frequent 
breakdowns in the trial judge’s composure as he faced this 
challenge.   
Although the trial judge’s admonishments to counsel were 
often measured, he also made comments in front of the jury that 
portrayed counsel as engaging in deliberately improper tactics, 
wasting the court’s and jury’s time, purposely misleading the 
jury, and engaging in unlawful conduct subject to sanctions and 
contempt.  As we have indicated, we must conclude that the trial 
court’s 
persistent, 
discourteous 
commentary 
constituted 
misconduct.   
a. Background 
At a break in defense counsel’s opening statement outside 
the presence of the jury, the trial judge warned that much of the 
statement was argument and the he would begin to sustain 
objections on that basis if raised.  After sustaining the first 
objections, the judge sent the jury out to warn defense counsel 
again that his opening statement was “way over the line as far 
as argument.”   
During the remaining two hours of the defense opening 
statement, the trial judge sustained 15 of 18 objections to 
improper argument.  In the jury’s presence, the judge initially 
reminded counsel to avoid argument with a brief comment:  
“let’s confine ourselves to a statement of what you believe the 
evidence will show, not argument.”  When counsel continued to 
draw objections, the judge became more pointed, exclaiming, 
“that is pure argument.  Stop it.”  As the opening statement 
continued, the judge became sarcastic — after counsel’s 
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reference to evidence showing that defendant had demons to 
overcome, the judge twice chided counsel by asking, “You’re 
going to present evidence of a demon?”  
Throughout the trial, the trial judge regularly but briefly 
admonished defense counsel for violating the court’s rule 
against speaking objections and for making other extraneous or 
argumentative comments.  When defense counsel failed to 
observe the rules of evidence during his examination of 
witnesses, the trial judge made periodic comments in front of 
the jury to highlight proper legal parameters.  The judge also 
curtly admonished defense counsel to “move on” to a different 
area of questioning on numerous occasions, including when: 
counsel did not have related exhibits ready; after sustaining 
objections to counsel’s questions; when evidentiary issues 
needed to be resolved outside the presence of the jury; and when 
the judge sought to limit topics he found cumulative or an undue 
consumption of time.  
In addition to regular, brief admonitions and other 
comments to control defense counsel’s questioning and 
presentation of evidence, the trial judge periodically expressed 
general impatience and irritation with counsel’s courtroom 
behavior with comments such as:  “Why don’t you just ask a 
simple question[?]”; “[D]on’t talk, except to ask a question”; “You 
don’t listen do you?”; “Stop saying ‘ah’ every time you get an 
answer”; “Don’t say ‘okay’ anymore”; “Just ask the question in a 
proper way”; and “What does it take to get the point that you 
can’t talk at the same time [as the witness?]”  
At other times, the trial judge more pointedly portrayed 
defense counsel as inept or wasting time: remarking, “[y]ou are 
using valuable court time for something that doesn’t need to be 
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used”; responding to counsel’s question about an exhibit number 
by stating, “Look at the tag on the front; it might give you a 
clue”; responding to counsel’s question that began, “I appreciate 
the fact that . . .” with, “[w]hat your appreciation level is, is not 
pertinent or helpful”; observing that defense could have done “a 
little legwork” to develop the evidence “rather than doing some 
kind of guessing game”; characterizing counsel’s “ridiculous 
question” as appropriate only for “comic books or the movies”; 
noting counsel was unprepared to examine witnesses; 
exclaiming, “Why didn’t you say that when the jury was out?”; 
referring to counsel’s “tongue wagging” and admonishing him to 
“get on to something meaningful”; urging counsel, “if you get to 
some questions that are proper, you might finish sooner rather 
than later”; noting, “[i]f you thought there was going to be a 
problem, you should have addressed it when we don’t have to 
keep the jury waiting”; raising the court’s own objection to 
counsel’s “nonsensical question”; commenting that the witness 
cannot answer counsel’s question “unless he’s superman and has 
x-ray eyes”; and exclaiming, “Can’t you figure that out before we 
resume?”, among other comments.   
The trial judge also reprimanded counsel in front of the 
jury for offering improper comments and questions, often 
referencing counsel’s violation of prior rulings: “If you don’t 
understand my rulings, I’ll stop the examination now”; “I’ve 
ruled on this in chambers . . . I will not permit you to question 
him further”; “If I have to tell you one more time about no 
speaking objections, we’re going to have a problem, you and I”; 
“That is improper, and you know it”; “You don’t want to [read 
the entire prior question to the witness], so I will to make sure 
it’s accurate”; “Well, you’re wrong . . . just ask questions rather 
than expressing your beliefs”; “[Counsel’s question is] in 
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violation of the court’s order at the 402 hearing”; “I warned you 
repeatedly that you’re not to make extrinsic comments”; “You’re 
not to comment on the evidence, and don’t do it again”; You are 
admonished not to editorialize[] or make gratuitous comments”; 
“[Counsel’s questioning] contravenes the court’s prior ruling”; 
“I’ve warned you repeatedly.  Don’t editorialize.  Don’t make 
gratuitous comments”; “I have already advised you that you 
can’t say that, and you’re disobeying a lawful court order”; 
“[Counsel’s question is] false and misleading”; “[T]his is a 
violation of the court’s order before the jury came in”; “[D]on’t 
ask questions that call for irrelevant responses and are 
improper questions”; “I warned you not to ask any questions 
that call for hearsay”; and “I’ve warned you, [counsel].  You’re 
not to make any statements in front of the jury.  You’re not to 
make speaking objections.  You’re not to make comments.” 
The trial judge made a point of telling jurors when counsel 
had been reprimanded outside their presence for his conduct in 
the courtroom — “He’s not supposed to do it[,] I admonished him 
not to do it again” — and when the judge had concerns about 
counsel’s discovery compliance.  Although the trial judge later 
decided to formally instruct the jury on discovery violations by 
the defense, upon learning of late disclosures, he immediately 
notified the jury of counsel’s potential wrongdoing, noting that 
he would have to provide “further instructions on this discovery 
noncompliance later on when the issues are more clarified,” and 
stating, “I am going to have to make a decision on whether this 
is a violation of the discovery rules.”  After counsel lawfully 
disclosed expert materials midtrial, the trial judge nonetheless 
informed the jury that counsel’s “delay in the disclosure” was to 
blame for a two-week continuance.   
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Two times during defense counsel’s opening statement for 
the penalty phase, the trial judge interrupted to reprimand 
counsel in front of the jury.  When defense counsel argued in his 
penalty phase closing that defendant’s “personal background 
and the manner and method which she was brought up by her 
mother . . . is also a factor to consider in mitigation,” the trial 
court sustained an objection that counsel misstated the law and 
also remarked that “[t]he statement is a misstatement.  The jury 
will disregard it.”  The following morning, concluding that the 
defense improperly attempted to count each piece of mitigating 
evidence as a separate statutory factor, the trial court further 
instructed the jurors, informing them that defense counsel was 
“wrong” to suggest that there were numerous “factors” involved 
in factor (k) mitigating evidence.   
Outside the jury’s presence, the trial judge took additional 
measures to control what he viewed as improper behavior, 
threatening to cut off defense questioning he deemed 
inappropriate, requiring additional hearings to preview defense 
evidence and testimony, and imposing sanctions.  After repeated 
warnings, the trial judge imposed a $500 sanction pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 for defense counsel’s 
speaking objections.  The trial judge explained:  “I rarely impose 
sanctions on a lawyer, that is not my rule, generally.  [¶]  But I 
have warned you over and over and over again in this trial no 
speaking objections, and I don’t accept the proposition that you 
don’t understand it.  I do not accept the proposition that you are 
incapable of complying with it.  You’re not an inexperienced 
attorney, you have trial skills, if you care to use them.”   
The trial judge imposed six additional monetary sanctions 
on defense counsel — one for a discovery violation, three more 
for speaking objections, and two for commenting on testimony 
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and evidence.  After observing that the monetary sanctions had 
no effect, the trial judge later cited counsel for contempt for 
additional discovery violations and for commenting on the 
evidence.11   
Some of the sanctions were levied in the presence of the 
jury.  In one instance, the trial judge imposed monetary 
sanctions on counsel for violating a court order.  In another, 
after counsel disagreed with a witness, the trial judge informed 
counsel, “I’m citing you for misconduct for making that 
comment, and I’ll cite you later for contempt. . . .  I have warned 
you repeatedly about stating your opinion in front of this jury.”   
In eight motions for mistrial and a motion to disqualify the 
trial judge, the defense asserted judicial bias.  Near the end of 
the prosecution case-in-chief, defense counsel made an oral 
motion for mistrial, in which he asserted that the trial judge 
believed he was a liar and was therefore placing unfair 
limitations on his cross-examination of witnesses.  In another 
motion for mistrial, defense counsel accused the trial judge of 
having a “personal vendetta” against him and denying 
defendant a fair trial.  In subsequent motions and objections, 
defense counsel claimed the trial judge: violated defendant’s 
federal and state constitutional rights by demeaning and 
showing animosity to the defense, among other misconduct; 
limited and chastised the defense during examination of 
witnesses while allowing the prosecution “excessive leeway”; 
belittled counsel and referred to sanctions in front of the jury; 
 
11  
After the jury returned with a death sentence, the trial 
court set aside all pending sanctions and contempt proceedings 
against defense counsel, except the first, noting that “given the 
jury’s verdict in this case, I think that’s probably enough.”  
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made counsel look bad by reprimanding him in front of the jury; 
and indicated to the jury that defense counsel’s comment about 
access to a prosecution expert was “false and misleading.”  
The defense also moved to disqualify the trial judge under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, citing the requirement of 
disqualification when “[a] person aware of the facts might 
reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 
impartial.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).)  Citing his 
authority to do so under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, 
subdivision (c), the trial judge ordered the trial to continue 
notwithstanding the motion.  
The trial judge made it clear outside the jury’s presence 
that he disapproved of defense counsel’s conduct.  He believed 
counsel was dishonest, refused to “play by the rules,” and was 
trying to inject error into the case.  Late in the trial, the judge 
noted: “[I]f there was ever a case in my experience that stood for 
a proposition that appellate courts have to give great deference 
to the trial court’s ruling, this is the case, because if you read 
the sterile record in this case, you don’t get the flavor of what 
[counsel] is trying to do.”  
b. Analysis 
The People acknowledge that “there was indeed an 
argumentative, contentious atmosphere during the trial 
between [counsel] and the trial judge” but contend that because 
the court was responding to defense counsel’s “relentless 
gamesmanship” and efforts to inject error into the trial, the trial 
judge cannot be viewed as having committed misconduct.12  
 
12  
The People do not assert forfeiture of misconduct claims 
premised on the trial court’s allegedly disparaging treatment of 
 
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Although the People focus at some length on defense counsel’s 
conduct, our cases have never suggested that a trial court is 
relieved of its obligation to remain temperate and impartial 
when confronted with a lawyer’s provocative or improper 
behavior.   
A trial court’s “frustration and irritation at counsel’s 
repeated efforts” to violate evidentiary rules can be viewed as 
“ ‘friction between court and counsel, [that] while not desirable, 
[is] virtually inevitable in a long trial.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 825.)  Furthermore, “isolated 
comments in a lengthy trial in which the court exhibited some 
impatience with counsel’s argumentative comments and 
questions do not demonstrate misconduct or bias.”  (People v. 
Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 772; see also People v. Geier 
(2007) 41 Cal. 4th 555, 614 [“four fleeting remarks” during 
lengthy trial did not constitute judicial misconduct]; People v. 
Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 605 [“momentary and isolated 
expression of irritation” did not indicate bias]; People v. Snow 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 79 [“occasional impatience” with defense 
questions did not convey bias].) 
We do not fault the trial judge here for the brief 
admonitions he gave to enforce court rules and procedures.  And 
 
defense counsel.  Although defense counsel did not object to each 
instance of claimed misconduct, or objected only generally, the 
discord between the trial judge and defense counsel, and the 
number of admonitions and remarks at issue, would have made 
it “unfair to require defense counsel to choose between 
repeatedly provoking the trial judge . . . or, alternatively, giving 
up his client’s ability to argue misconduct on appeal.”  (Sturm, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.)  On this record, we conclude the 
claim is preserved.     
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some of the court’s expressions of impatience and frustration 
with defense counsel might be excused as inevitable given the 
demands of controlling what the trial judge viewed as an 
exceptionally unprofessional performance.  There are numerous 
instances, however, in which the trial judge disparaged counsel 
in a manner we cannot condone.   
The trial court directed stern remarks and periodic 
sarcasm toward defense counsel that impugned counsel’s 
competence and “inevitably conveyed to the jury the message 
that the trial court thought that defense counsel was wasting 
the court’s — and the jury’s — time by asking inappropriate 
questions.”  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1242.)  Indeed, the 
court commented on counsel wasting “valuable court time,” 
referred to counsel asking “ridiculous” and “nonsensical” 
questions, admonished counsel to move onto “meaningful” 
matters, urged counsel to ask “proper” questions to save time, 
and commented about counsel inconveniencing the jury.   
This was not a case in which the trial court also expressed 
sarcasm, impatience, and annoyance toward the prosecution, 
which might have “indicat[ed] its comments were a matter of 
personal style, not the result of a belief that any of the attorneys 
was incompetent or that the defense case lacked merit.”  (People 
v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 914; see also People v. Bell, supra, 
40 Cal.4th 582, 605 [court made remarks critical of defense 
counsel but also expressed annoyance at prosecutor]; People v. 
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 79 [noting the trial judge 
“frequently addressed the prosecutors in an equally brusque 
manner”].)  Instead, the trial court spared the prosecution such 
treatment while “repeatedly and improperly disparaging 
defense counsel, which conveyed to the jury the message that 
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the court was allied with the prosecution.”  (Sturm, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 1240.)   
A trial court may not “impl[y] to the jury that defense 
counsel was deliberately asking improper questions in order to 
place inadmissible evidence in front of the jury.”  (Sturm, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1240.)  “ ‘It is completely improper for a judge to 
advise the jury of negative personal views concerning the 
competence, honesty, or ethics of the attorneys in a trial . . . .’  
[Citation.]  This principle holds true in instances involving a 
trial judge’s negative reaction to a particular question asked by 
defense counsel, regardless of whether the judge’s ruling on the 
prosecutor’s objection was correct; even if an evidentiary ruling 
is correct, ‘that would not justify reprimanding defense counsel 
before the jury.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
Here, the trial judge not only reprimanded counsel for 
posing improper questions, but, by referencing proceedings 
outside the jury’s presence in which the court had ruled against 
the defense, implied that counsel deliberately attempted to skirt 
the court’s rulings.  When the trial judge chastised counsel for 
speaking objections and other extraneous comments, he 
highlighted the repeated warnings and admonitions counsel had 
violated, again conveying to the jury that counsel was flouting 
court rules to inject impermissible matters into the trial.  By 
voicing concerns about counsel’s discovery compliance and 
blaming counsel’s lawful disclosures for a delay in the 
proceedings, the trial judge contributed to the impression that 
he doubted counsel’s honesty and found his conduct improper. 
The trial judge also commented concerning defense 
counsel misstating the law during his penalty phase closing 
argument and admonished the jury to disregard counsel’s 
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statement that aspects of defendant’s background could be 
considered mitigating.  Focusing on counsel’s reference to 
multiple “factors” to consider under section 190.3, factor (k), 
instead of using the word “circumstances,” the trial court 
informed the jury that counsel had been “wrong” to suggest that 
each piece of evidence was a separate factor to consider.  
Particularly when the jury was instructed with CALJIC 
No. 8.88, which used “factor” and “circumstance” synonymously 
in the course of addressing the consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating evidence, the trial judge’s comments needlessly 
suggested additional wrongdoing by defense counsel and 
implied that the defense was trying to improperly inflate the 
case in mitigation.   
On a few occasions, the trial court directly accused counsel 
of trying to place inaccurate or inadmissible evidence before the 
jury, telling counsel, “That is improper, and you know it,” 
referring to another of counsel’s representations as “false and 
misleading,” and remarking that counsel did not want to provide 
the jury with an accurate version of evidence.  In his remarks in 
the presence of the jury, the trial judge informed counsel that he 
would be sanctioned and cited him for misconduct and contempt.   
“Jurors rely with great confidence on the fairness of 
judges, and upon the correctness of their views expressed during 
trials.  For this reason . . . a judge should be careful not to throw 
the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or 
against the defendant.”  (People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 
626–627 (Mahoney).)  With his disparaging commentary 
regarding counsel’s performance, and “by accusing counsel of 
unethical and unlawful conduct in front of the jury, the court 
overstepped the bounds of propriety.”  (People v. Banks, supra,  
59 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)  These were not “relatively brief and 
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mild” references (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754) or 
showings of “occasional impatience” (People v. Snow, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at p. 79), but persistent, discourteous, and improper 
remarks that amounted to misconduct (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th 
at p. 1233).  
Although we conclude that the trial court engaged in 
misconduct, we do not agree with all of defendant’s contentions 
regarding the court’s assertedly improper treatment of defense 
counsel.  As explained below, we reject some of defendant’s 
claims in this regard.   
Defendant contends the trial judge violated her federal 
constitutional rights by unfairly curtailing defense questioning.  
Defendant points to no state law error in the examples she cites 
(People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1202; People v. Abilez 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503), and “ ‘ “[a] trial court’s numerous 
rulings against a party — even when erroneous — do not 
establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are 
subject to review” ’ ” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 
405).  Defendant also asserts that the trial judge admonished 
the defense more frequently than the prosecution to “move on.” 
than it did to the prosecution.  “[A] numerical disparity between 
sua sponte interventions . . . does not on its own constitute 
misconduct.”  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1241–1242.)  The 
remarks, which the trial judge also made to the prosecution, 
were within the court’s discretion in controlling the conduct of 
the trial.  (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 79.) 
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial judge 
showed bias by assertedly treating the defense and prosecution 
unequally in witness scheduling, discovery compliance, and 
expert funding.  The trial judge played no role in defense expert 
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funding (Pen. Code, § 987.9, subd. (a)), and his other rulings are 
not sufficient to establish judicial bias, particularly when they 
are subject to review (People v. Buenrostro, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 405).  We have separately addressed defendant’s claims 
regarding discovery, and defendant does not assert error in the 
court’s rulings regarding witness scheduling.     
 
Defendant argues the trial court exhibited bias by having 
ex parte communications with the prosecution about disclosure 
obligations 
regarding 
impeachment 
evidence 
and 
brief 
exchanges concerning the order of witnesses, the status of sealed 
material, and prosecution expert funding.  In People v. 
Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, noting that section 1054.7 
“contains no express prohibition on ex parte hearings,” we 
concluded there was no violation of state law when the trial 
court held an ex parte hearing to address discovery obligations, 
as the court did here.  (Id. at p. 1099.)  Although defendant 
contends the trial judge improperly advised the prosecution on 
discovery obligations, “[t]he judge’s fleeting comment was at 
most a suggestion, rather than the rendition of advice.”  
(Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 197.)  The ex parte discussion 
of impeachment evidence related to a defense expert who never 
testified, and other issues briefly addressed were not improper.  
(Ibid.)  
2. Treatment of witnesses 
Defendant contends the trial judge engaged in misconduct 
and violated her federal constitutional rights when: he 
assertedly disparaged defense experts Drs. Humphrey, Ney, 
Plotkin, and Suiter, and lay witness Carl Hall; “glamorized” a 
prosecution expert; and humiliated defendant when she was on 
the stand.  We agree that some of the trial judge’s remarks and 
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questions were improper — those regarding Drs. Plotkin and 
Ney, Carl Hall, and the prosecution expert — and reject 
defendant’s other claims.   
a. Background 
i. Dr. Plotkin 
Dr. Plotkin testified for the defense that a diet drug and 
antidepressant interaction could have provoked a seizure that 
impaired defendant’s volitional functioning at the time of the 
fire.  On cross-examination, Dr. Plotkin explained that he 
conducted a search of medical literature, a “PubMed” search, 
and found a number of articles indicating, contrary to testimony 
by a prosecution expert, that the diet drug and antidepressant 
interaction could cause “serotonin syndrome,” which in turn 
could result in seizures.  Echoing the prosecutor, the trial court 
stated, “[a] lot of these PubMeds deal with rats and monkeys 
and other animals other than humans, correct?”  
When Dr. Plotkin explained that a “volume of literature” 
documented the drug interaction resulting in serotonin 
syndrome, the trial court interrupted and the following 
exchange occurred:  
“The court:  Wait, Wait.  Please.  [¶]  When you say that 
you found volumes of articles, do you mean to say that you found 
volumes of abstracts of articles?  
“The witness:  That’s correct. 
“The court:  And you haven’t read any of the articles 
themselves; is that correct? 
“The witness:  Right.  All from the same search. . . . 
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“The court:  Didn’t you see when you were online on the 
internet that you can simply log on and order the document by 
e-mail[?] 
“The witness:  Well, I did this Saturday. 
“The court:  Didn’t you see that when you were online that 
all [sic] do you have do is log on and become a user and you can 
order the articles online?  [¶]  Did you see that? 
“The witness:  I don’t think you can log on on a Saturday 
to become a user.  But it didn’t phase [sic] me to do that.  I had 
enough data, I felt, to make that opinion. . . .  The [prosecution] 
expert testified that he based his opinion on a PubMed search 
and not reading articles which explained it. . . . 
“The court:  But he is a board certified toxicologist, correct? 
“The witness:  This is about serotonin syndrome. . . .  He’s 
not an expert in that.”   
In further cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. 
Plotkin to confirm that it was a “medical certainty” that 
defendant did not have serotonin syndrome, noting that a Dr. 
Ordog had examined her at the time of the fire and ruled out the 
syndrome.  Dr. Plotkin observed that the only evidence about 
Dr. Ordog’s opinion was that two years after the fire a 
prosecution expert, Dr. Phillips, testified that he spoke to Dr. 
Ordog, who claimed to have ruled out serotonin syndrome.  The 
trial court then intervened:   
“The court: Well, why would you assume that Dr. Ordog is 
making something up two years later? 
“The witness:  Your Honor, that’s absolutely not what I 
said. 
“The court:  Well, what are you saying? 
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“The witness:  I am saying that in my reading of Dr. 
Ordog’s notes, at the time it was not considered in the 
differential.  [¶]  So how can I say that he ruled it out at the 
time? 
“The court:  But how do you know that Dr. Ordog doesn’t 
have an independent recollection of what happened that may 
not be reflected in [his] notes? 
“The witness:  As I said before, I believe that Dr. Phillips 
in good faith represented his conversation with Dr. Ordog, who 
said two years later that he ruled it out. . . .  But I am saying 
here that I — that how can you say that a hundred percent, if I 
am a third party in this?”   
The prosecutor later asked Dr. Plotkin a series of 
questions about his failure to personally interview defendant, 
despite his ethical obligations to strive to do so.  When Dr. 
Plotkin explained that it would have been best to interview 
defendant but he did not have enough time, the trial court 
asked, “Then why did you accept the appointment?”  Dr. Plotkin 
stated that in retrospect he should not have taken the 
appointment, in part because “the defense experts have been 
suggested as liars to begin with, and had I known that, I 
wouldn’t have taken on the personal insults the way I have.”   
On redirect, Dr. Plotkin testified that after a seizure a 
person would experience a state of delirium; he believed the 
defense expert Dr. Ney misspoke when he referred to the effect 
of a seizure as “dissociation.”  The trial court then interrupted, 
and the following exchange occurred: 
“The court:  When you say you believed he misspoke, you 
never talked to him, did you? 
“The witness:  No.  From reading his testimony.  
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“The court:  For all you know, he said exactly what he 
meant to say and he just doesn’t know what he’s talking about.  
[¶]  You don’t know that, do you? 
“The witness:  That’s correct. . . . 
“The court:  So why don’t you confine your answers to that, 
and don’t assume what is in Dr. Ney’s mind if you’re [sic] never 
talked to the man.”   
The trial court also reprimanded Dr. Plotkin outside the 
presence of the jury; after Dr. Plotkin remarked that he had not 
been allowed to explain his answers, the trial court threatened 
to have him removed from the county panel of approved experts.   
ii. Dr. Ney 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to 
impeach Dr. Ney by referencing his prior testimony that he had 
not previously qualified as an expert on relevant topics.  In 
response to repeated defense objections to the questioning, the 
trial court advised the prosecutor to “just ask a direct question, 
and if it’s inconsistent then you can impeach him with the 
transcript.”  After Dr. Ney gave equivocal answers to questions 
about his qualifications, the trial court allowed the prosecutor 
to read the prior testimony in which Dr. Ney acknowledged that 
he had never qualified to testify as an expert concerning 
epilepsy, neurology, or carbon monoxide poisoning.   
Dr. Ney gave evasive responses to many other prosecution 
questions and denied or claimed not to remember making 
statements in his report and prior testimony.  Prosecutors 
accused Dr. Ney of making inappropriate faces and gestures 
while testifying, and the trial court admonished him to stop 
mumbling to himself on the stand.  Dr. Ney’s testimony about a 
variety of unusual conditions was disjointed, with many 
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nonresponsive tangents, and appeared to suggest inconsistent 
theories concerning defendant’s behavior.  Some of his claims 
strained credulity:  he testified that some dissociation could go 
on for months, during which time a person could unknowingly 
travel or take a job; he also maintained that abortion interfered 
with a mother’s instinct to protect her offspring and made her 
more likely to kill her other children.   
During a hearing on discovery matters held outside the 
presence of the jury, the trial court asked Dr. Ney questions 
regarding his affiliation with “pro-life” organizations and later 
marked as a People’s exhibit three items from the internet that 
referenced Dr. Ney’s work, which the court found when 
researching Dr. Ney’s background.  In another hearing outside 
the jury’s presence, the trial court threatened to have Dr. Ney 
arrested after learning of suggestions that he might not return 
to court to testify as ordered.     
iii. Dr. Humphrey 
Dr. Humphrey testified on cross-examination that she 
used nonstandard normative data for one of the tests she 
administered; she explained that the unpublished data was new 
and that she had obtained it from the test authors.  During her 
testimony, the trial judge admonished Dr. Humphrey three 
times to refrain from interrupting the prosecutor’s questions 
before he sent the jury out and informed her that he would 
impose sanctions against her if she did not stop interrupting.   
At a hearing regarding her normative data held outside 
the jury’s presence, Dr. Humphrey acknowledged that the data 
was not new, as she had testified.  She nonetheless defended her 
reliance on the data, claiming that one of the test authors, Dr. 
Satz, had recommended it to her.  When the prosecutor’s 
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questioning 
suggested 
that 
Dr. 
Humphrey 
might 
be 
contradicting Dr. Satz’s version of events, the trial court 
warned, “If you’re not sure, you can say that.  But if you 
specifically deny that and it’s not true, you have a problem.”  The 
trial court ordered Dr. Humphrey to leave the courtroom before 
a prosecution expert testified that Dr. Satz had denied making 
any suggestion to Dr. Humphrey regarding the use of 
unpublished data.   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court asserted 
that Dr. Humphrey was “an out-and-out liar” and stated that he 
found her explanations “inherently unbelievable.”  The court 
concluded it was “clear” that Dr. Humphrey had committed 
perjury and if she testified further the prosecution might want 
to have someone from Attorney General’s office present to avoid 
a conflict in prosecuting her.  The court added that if Dr. 
Humphrey returned to testify, “[m]aybe someone wants to 
advise her of her right to have an attorney present.  I am not 
going to do that, because I don’t want to interfere with the 
defense and dissuade a witness, and that’s one of the reasons I 
asked her to step outside.”     
On rebuttal, the prosecution expert highlighted a number 
of mistakes in Dr. Humphrey’s report and recounted 
information from the hearing that had occurred outside the 
jury’s presence, explaining that the data Dr. Humphrey 
characterized as new was in fact outdated and that Dr. Satz and 
another test author had refuted Dr. Humphrey’s claim that they 
had advised her to use nonstandard normative data.  Although 
the defense had planned to reopen Dr. Humphrey’s testimony, 
she did not return to testify for any portion of the trial.   
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At the penalty phase, the defense made an offer of proof 
regarding testimony by a new neuropsychologist, Dr. Boone, 
arguing that Dr. Boone was needed to rehabilitate Dr. 
Humphrey’s psychological testing because the prosecution had 
so undermined her competence and integrity before the jury.  
The defense also represented that the circumstances of Dr. 
Humphrey “being called a liar and a perjurer, and the distress 
she was in over all of that” prevented the defense from relying 
on her further as a witness.  
iv. Defendant’s testimony 
On cross-examination, defendant testified that she did not 
remember seeing her deceased daughters on the kitchen floor 
and thought they were asleep.  She remembered going into the 
backyard after the fire, which she would have accessed by going 
through a sliding door near the kitchen.  The prosecution 
attempted to challenge defendant’s testimony by showing her 
photographs of the victims that reflected how she would have 
had to step over their bodies to go through the sliding door.  
Defendant testified that she did not remember stepping over her 
children.  When she would not turn to look at the display of 
photographs, the trial court ordered, “Put it in front of her then.”   
After defense counsel objected to the placement of the 
photographs, the court responded, “All right.  Put it back on the 
board.  [¶]  Miss Nieves, you’re ordered to turn around and look 
at the photographs.”  When defendant again refused, stating, “I 
am not looking at my children if they’re dead,” the court 
reiterated, “I am ordering you to turn around and look at the 
photos.”  When defendant would not comply, the court sent the 
jury out and ordered defendant to look at the photographs and 
be questioned regarding them or be found in contempt of court.  
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The court denied counsel’s request to allow defendant a moment 
to compose herself before bringing the jury back in.   
When 
cross-examination 
resumed, 
defense 
counsel 
objected to the form of the prosecutor’s cross-examination and 
her continued reference to photographs of the victims.  The court 
overruled the objections and denied counsel’s request for a 
recess due to defendant being distraught.  The prosecutor then 
ended her examination and the jury was excused.   
v. Dr. Suiter 
Dr. Suiter was the court-appointed expert in defendant’s 
divorce and custody proceedings.  During the penalty phase, he 
testified about evaluating defendant and her family and the 
bases for his recommendation in 1997, approximately a year 
before the crime, that she receive custody of her children.   
On cross-examination, the prosecution tried to impeach 
facts that defendant provided to Dr. Suiter during his 
evaluation, such as her high school grades.  The trial court 
sustained an objection to the relevance of one such question and 
interposed its own objection to another, stating: “How would he 
know that?  There is no foundation.”  After sustaining another 
objection to similar questioning, the court stated, “He’s here to 
talk about what happened in 1997,” and to Dr. Suiter added, 
“[Y]ou don’t have a crystal ball, do you?”   
The trial judge then questioned Dr. Suiter himself, 
reminding Dr. Suiter of defendant’s conviction for killing four of 
her children and asking: “[Y]ou would probably want to change 
your opinion made back in 1997, wouldn’t you, if you could do 
it?”  The trial judge appeared surprised when Dr. Suiter said he 
would not change his opinion, responding, “You wouldn’t?”  Dr. 
Suiter explained that he stood by his recommendation, which 
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was based on the data available to him at the time.  The trial 
judge then instructed the prosecutor to “get on to something 
else.”   
When 
the 
prosecutor 
continued 
to 
ask 
whether 
defendant’s high school record might cause Dr. Suiter to change 
his 1997 opinion, the trial court sent the jury out and 
admonished the prosecutor to stop the line of questioning:  
“I asked him the most extreme question and it doesn’t change 
his opinion.  So anything subsidiary to that, that’s argument.”  
The trial court added, “[T]he point is . . . this jury is getting tired 
of hearing evidence.  Let’s just get on with it.  A lot of this 
examination is unnecessary.”   
In response to a subsequent prosecution question 
concerning whether he was afraid of being sued for his custody 
recommendation, Dr. Suiter responded: “No. . . .  I had no 
crystal ball. . . .  I mean, of course anybody in retrospect, I would 
think, would not have the children present with the mother at 
all . . . given what happened.  [¶]  But again, as I stated earlier, 
given the data that I had at the particular time, I am confident 
of my recommendation.  [¶]  There was not even any appreciable 
complaint about the mother on the part of Mr. Folden.”   
The prosecution, which had aggressively sought to prevent 
the introduction of Folden’s statements about defendant’s 
parenting, quickly moved to strike Dr. Suiter’s final comment as 
nonresponsive.  The trial court responded to the prosecutor, “Yes 
it is, [counsel].  It is overruled.”  Noting Dr. Suiter’s confusion at 
the interruption, the court assured him, “You didn’t do anything 
wrong.  [¶]  Have you finished your answer?”  The court then 
allowed Dr. Suiter to further explain:  “There were no 
allegations made to me by Mr. Folden that the children were at 
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any risk [from] being with their mother in terms of being 
physically harmed.  Those were not the elements of the 
evaluation as, quite frankly, is often the case.”  
vi. Carl Hall 
During Hall’s penalty phase testimony about his 
friendship with defendant, the trial court struck several of his 
answers as nonresponsive or irrelevant and admonished Hall 
not to expound on his answers:  “I think you’ve answered the 
question”; “If the answer calls for yes or no, just try to answer it 
that way, okay?”; and finally, “Look, just answer the question.  
Don’t add all the other information, okay?”  After Hall again 
began a nonresponsive answer, the trial court sent the jury out 
and told Hall, “If you answer another question like you just did 
. . . and try to get before this jury improper evidence that I’ve 
already ruled upon, I will hold you in contempt of court, put you 
in jail for five days, fine you up to $1,000 or impose monetary 
sanctions of up to $1,500. . . .  Do you understand that?”  
When the jurors returned, the trial court informed them, 
“The last statement of the witness was stricken, and I have 
admonished the witness not to get anything else before the jury 
that is not responsive to the question.”  When Hall resumed 
testifying, he began to answer a question while an objection was 
pending.  Defense counsel advised Hall, “You have to wait,” and 
the trial court added, “Do you understand when there’s an 
objection, you’re not supposed to answer the question?  [¶]  Do 
you understand that?”  When Hall answered, “Okay,” the trial 
court continued:  “Then why did you just make that response 
when there was an objection raised?  [¶]  Why did you just make 
that response when there was objection?  [¶]  You don’t know do 
you?”  Hall stated that he was very nervous.  
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During cross-examination, Hall testified that defendant 
would not have killed her children if she were in her right mind.  
The prosecutor twice asked who suggested defendant was not in 
her right mind without receiving a direct answer, after which 
the trial court interjected, “Why don’t you just answer the 
question.  [¶]  Who told you that?”  When Hall replied, “Nobody 
told me,” the trial court remarked, “[T]hen why didn’t you just 
answer the question that way?”   
vii. Prosecution expert 
John Dehaan testified as a fire reconstruction expert for 
the prosecution.  During that testimony, Juror No. 7 relayed to 
the bailiff that he recognized Dehaan from a television program, 
possibly on the Discovery Channel, but that it would not 
influence how he viewed Dehaan’s testimony.  The bailiff wrote 
a note to the court conveying this information.  
At the conclusion of Dehaan’s testimony, in the presence 
of the jurors, the trial court asked Dehaan whether he had 
appeared on the Discovery Channel.  Dehaan replied 
affirmatively, adding he had also appeared on the Fox Family 
Channel.  The court then excused all jurors save Juror No. 7 and 
elicited the juror’s assurances that he would not be influenced 
by recognizing Dehaan on television.  Defense counsel objected 
to the court questioning Dehaan, argued it suggested a pro-
prosecution bias, and moved for a new trial, which the trial court 
denied without comment.   
The prosecution later advised the court that Dehaan was 
scheduled to appear on the Fox Channel the following day.  At 
the end of the day, the court told jurors, “[T]here’s going to be a 
program [on television] that involves one of the witnesses who 
has testified in this case.”  The court ordered jurors not to watch 
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the Fox Channel at 9:00 p.m. the next day, or to otherwise “get 
information from anybody else that may have looked at it.  Just 
avoid it at all costs.”     
b. Analysis 
We reiterate that judicial questioning and comment 
during witness testimony should be “temperate rather than 
argumentative.”  (People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 408.)  
“A trial court has both the discretion and the duty to ask 
questions of witnesses, provided this is done in an effort to elicit 
material facts or to clarify confusing or unclear testimony.  
[Citations.]  The court may not, however, assume the role of 
either the prosecution or of the defense” and “it must not convey 
to the jury the court’s opinion of the witness’s credibility.”  
(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597; see also Sturm, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1238.)   
Defendant 
asserts 
the 
trial 
court’s 
questioning 
undermined Dr. Plotkin’s testimony and improperly assisted the 
prosecution.  The People contend defendant forfeited this claim 
by failing to object at trial.  By the time Dr. Plotkin testified, 
however, the trial court had denied six defense motions for 
mistrial based on the court’s asserted bias against the defense, 
and it was proceeding with trial while the defense motion to 
disqualify the court was pending.  In this context, we agree with 
defendant that additional objections likely would have been 
futile.  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) 
The trial court’s initial question to Dr. Plotkin about his 
PubMed searches underscored the prosecutor’s point that 
research articles supporting the defense were not based on 
human studies, a point of clarification within the court’s 
discretion to elicit.  It was strikingly inappropriate, however, for 
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the court to disparage Dr. Plotkin’s review of online literature 
with repeated, argumentative questions about the ease with 
which he could have downloaded articles (Sturm, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at pp. 1238–1239), and to do so by making personal 
observations about access to articles on the PubMed website — 
facts that had not been presented to the jury (People v. Abel, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 917 [trial court erred by using personal 
knowledge to comment on testimony]; People v. Gonzales and 
Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 323 [same]).  In response to Dr. 
Plotkin’s observation that the prosecution expert had also relied 
on abstracts of research, the trial court’s comment, “[b]ut he is a 
board certified toxicologist,” implied the court’s belief that the 
prosecution expert had greater expertise than Dr. Plotkin and 
contributed to the impression that the court discounted Dr. 
Plotkin’s testimony. 
The trial court’s questions posed to Dr. Plotkin about Dr. 
Ordog, rather than merely clarifying testimony, reprimanded 
Dr. Plotkin for questioning the prosecution evidence.  When Dr. 
Plotkin cited a lack of contemporaneous documentation for Dr. 
Ordog’s conclusions, the court’s response — “how do you know 
that Dr. Ordog doesn’t have an independent recollection of what 
happened that may not be reflected in [his] notes?” — was 
accusatory, disparaging, and a pointed defense of the 
prosecution’s evidence.  By contrast, the trial court’s remarks 
about Dr. Ney — “[f]or all you know, he said exactly what he 
meant to say and he just doesn’t know what he’s talking about” 
— were highly improper, both harsh and demeaning to Dr. 
Plotkin and blatantly contemptuous of Dr. Ney.  If there were 
any question about the tenor of the trial court’s remarks, Dr. 
Plotkin’s unchallenged comment that defense experts had been 
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made out to be liars provided further indication of their hostile 
and disparaging impact.   
The trial court also improperly chastised and demeaned 
penalty phase witness Carl Hall.  The People claim that Hall 
was a “recalcitrant witness” whose behavior the trial court 
properly attempted to control.  It is not clear why the court 
believed Hall attempted to flout a prior ruling limiting his 
testimony, but it was improper for the court to tell the jury that 
it had admonished Hall “not to get anything else before the jury 
that is not responsive to the question.”  (See Sturm, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1239.)  It is also not apparent whether Hall 
understood he should refrain from testifying while an objection 
was pending, but we see no reason for the trial court to berate 
him for it in front of the jury.  “The court’s questioning must be 
‘ “temperate, 
nonargumentative, 
and 
scrupulously 
fair” ’ 
[citation], and it must not convey to the jury the court’s opinion 
of the witness’s credibility.”  (People v. Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 597.)  The trial court’s failure to maintain such composure 
when addressing Hall was improper.   
Defendant 
contends 
the 
trial 
court 
improperly 
“glamorized” prosecution expert John Dehaan, demonstrating a 
pro-prosecution bias.  The trial court was addressing a 
circumstance in which a juror had been exposed to extraneous 
facts about Dehaan’s credentials that may have added to his 
credibility.  (Cf. In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 313.)  Our 
cases establish that a “juror’s ‘receipt of information about a 
party or the case that was not part of the evidence received at 
trial,’ ” even if “passive or involuntary,” constitutes juror 
misconduct.  (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 507.)  
Rather than simply dispel any potential prejudice from the 
juror’s inadvertent exposure (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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121 
at p. 1213), the trial court elicited and highlighted Dehaan’s 
television appearances for the entire jury, a matter unnecessary 
to the clarity or completeness of his testimony.  In this context, 
the trial court’s questioning of Dehaan was improper, “even if no 
impropriety was intended.”  (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
at p. 614.)  
Defendant advances additional claims about the trial 
court’s allegedly improper treatment of defense witnesses.  We 
find no merit in defendant’s remaining contentions.  
Defendant argues that the court’s treatment of the defense 
neuropsychologist, 
Dr. 
Humphrey 
— 
particularly, 
the 
suggestion the court made outside the presence of the jury, that 
she committed perjury — prevented her from returning to 
testify and thus violated defendant’s right to present a defense.  
“The government violates a defendant’s constitutional right to 
compulsory process when it interferes with the exercise of a 
defendant’s right to present witnesses on [her] own behalf.”  
(People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1008.)  Our cases require 
a defendant to show that interference was “egregious and 
improper” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 55), “was a 
substantial cause of [the] witness’s refusal to testify,” and “ ‘at 
least a reasonable possibility that the witness could have given 
testimony that would have been both material and favorable.’ ” 
(Capers, at p. 1008).  Defendant does not meet this burden.   
Defense counsel offered two reasons why he did not bring 
Dr. Humphrey back to testify.  First, the prosecution 
questioning and rebuttal — which showed that she used 
incorrect data, was apparently dishonest about it, and made 
other mistakes and omissions in her report — undermined Dr. 
Humphrey’s credibility to the extent that she could not 
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122 
effectively defend her testing and conclusions before the jury.  
Second, Dr. Humphrey was distressed by the trial court’s 
suggestions that she had lied and committed perjury.   
It is not apparent on this record that the trial court’s 
remarks were “a substantial cause” for Dr. Humphrey’s failure 
to return to testify for the defense.  (People v. Capers, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 1008.)  Moreover, considering defense counsel’s 
observation that the prosecution successfully impeached Dr. 
Humphrey’s credibility with the jury, defendant has not 
established that the trial court’s remarks “deprived defendant 
of beneficial testimony.”  (People v. DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
at p. 56.)  We thus see no reasonable possibility that further 
testimony by Dr. Humphrey would have been favorable to the 
defense, notwithstanding any impropriety in the trial court’s 
remarks or their possible role in deterring her testimony.  
(People v. Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1008.) 
Defendant asserts the trial court committed misconduct 
when it threatened Dr. Humphrey and other defense witnesses.  
The trial court’s threat of sanctions and comments regarding Dr. 
Humphrey’s veracity took place outside the presence of the jury, 
as did its threats to Dr. Ney, Dr. Plotkin, and Hall.  Although 
several of the remarks were excessively punitive, we cannot 
conclude that they amounted to misconduct when the record 
does not demonstrate how they might have influenced the jury 
or otherwise affected the trial.  (People v. Peoples, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 790.)   
For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that the 
trial court’s research into Dr. Ney’s views on abortion was 
misconduct.  Each of the cases defendant cites in support of her 
argument addressed a judicial officer injecting extrajudicial 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
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123 
evidence into key fact finding, a circumstance not present here.  
Although the trial court marked material it found as People’s 
exhibits, they were not received into evidence and there is no 
indication the court’s research and questioning outside the 
presence of the jurors affected their consideration of Dr. Ney’s 
testimony or other matters in the trial.  (People v. Peoples, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 790.)   
Defendant claims the trial court’s comment about 
impeaching Dr. Ney’s testimony suggested to the jury that Dr. 
Ney might lie on the stand.  The People argue that defendant 
forfeited the claim by failing to object at trial.  Even if the claim 
were preserved, we would conclude that it lacks merit.  It was 
not improper for the trial court to make a single remark to 
forestall additional objections by the defense and oblige the 
prosecutor to lay a foundation for impeaching Dr. Ney.  (People 
v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 783; People v. Melton, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 736.)  
Citing Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 630, and 
other shackling cases, defendant argues that when the trial 
court ordered her to look at a photo of her deceased children the 
court undermined her dignity and presumed innocence by 
“figuratively pointing” to her guilt in a manner akin to visibly 
shackling her in front of the jury.  Defendant does not claim any 
error regarding the prosecutor’s questions and use of 
photographic evidence but argues that it was improper for the 
trial court to order her to respond to them when there were “less 
cruel” ways of eliciting the same information.  We do not 
condone the trial court’s harsh tenor in addressing defendant’s 
apparent distress.  Once defendant became a witness, however, 
the prosecution could attempt to impeach her credibility by 
confronting her with photographic evidence (cf. People v. Batts 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
124 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 693), defendant had a “duty to testify in 
accordance with the rules of evidence,” and it was within the 
trial court’s discretion to enforce that duty (People v. Smith 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 624; see also § 166, subd. (a)(6); § 1044).   
Defendant also contends that during cross-examination of 
her penalty phase expert, Dr. Suiter, the trial court intervened 
to assist the prosecution and interfered with defendant’s ability 
to present mitigating evidence.  The People argue that 
defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the trial 
court’s question.  Assuming the issue was preserved, we find no 
impropriety. 
Although the trial court’s question — whether Dr. Suiter 
would want to change his 1997 opinion in light of the charges 
against defendant — might appear dismissive of the doctor’s 
prior opinion, it is not improper when viewed in context.  (People 
v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 460.)  “While it is ordinarily the 
better practice for the trial court to let counsel develop the case, 
a trial court properly may ‘undertake the examination of 
witnesses . . . when it appears that relevant and material 
testimony will not be elicited by counsel.’ ”  (People v. Guerra, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)  Here, where the prosecutor 
appeared poised to exhaustively challenge Dr. Suiter’s prior 
opinion with minor details such as defendant’s high school 
grades, the trial court’s effort to reframe the point directly and 
limit argumentative questioning was not improper.  (Ibid.; 
People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1061.) 
The trial court ultimately limited prosecution efforts to 
impeach Dr. Suiter, allowed him to strengthen the basis for his 
1997 recommendation by referencing the absence of complaints 
about defendant’s parenting, and provided him an opportunity 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
125 
to reiterate the court’s point that he did not have a “crystal ball” 
and to acknowledge the obvious, that he would not have made 
the same recommendations if he had known defendant would 
kill her children.  In all, the result underscored Dr. Suiter’s 
professionalism and bolstered his testimony that defendant 
appeared to be a suitable caretaker before the fire.   
3. Structural error 
Defendant contends the trial judge’s conduct reflected bias 
and constitutes structural error.13  “ ‘A criminal defendant has 
due process rights under both the state and federal 
Constitutions to be tried by an impartial judge.’ ”  (People v. 
Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 788.)  Establishing a violation of 
this 
right 
requires 
“an 
objective 
assessment 
of 
the 
circumstances in the particular case” and “ ‘ “the probability of 
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is 
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’ ”  (Freeman, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 996; Rippo v. Baker (2017) ___ U.S.___ [137 S.Ct. 
905, 907]; Peoples, at p. 788.)  “[I]t is the exceptional case 
presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be 
found.”  (Freeman, at p. 1005.)   
 
13  
In addition to asserting violation of her constitutional 
rights, defendant references her statutory right under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 170.1.  This statutory right to 
impartiality is raised through a motion to disqualify an 
assertedly biased judge (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6), the resolution 
of which is reviewable only by writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 170.3, subd. (d)).  (People v. Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 786; People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 999–1000.) 
(Freeman).)  Because section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the 
exclusive procedure for resolving statutory claims, we address 
only 
defendant’s 
constitutional 
due 
process 
contention.  
(Peoples, at p. 787.) 
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126 
The “controlling principle” of unconstitutional bias rests 
on a “general concept of interests” that may prevent 
adjudicators from remaining “ ‘disinterested in the conviction or 
acquittal of those accused.’ ”  (Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 
(2009) 556 U.S. 868, 878, 880; see also Freeman, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 1005.)  Though traditionally focused on pecuniary 
influences (Freeman, at pp. 1001–1002), the high court has 
explained that there may be a disqualifying interest in the 
outcome of criminal proceedings that “rests on the relationship 
between the judge and the defendant.”  (Caperton, at p. 881.)  A 
judge would be unlikely to remain neutral, for example, when 
presiding over criminal contempt proceedings involving a 
defendant with whom the judge had a “ ‘running, bitter 
controversy.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Appellate opinions we cited in Freeman 
provide additional examples of bias that reflect a judge’s 
relationship to the parties before it (Freeman, at p. 1006, fn. 4): 
in those cases, trial judges made inappropriate comments about 
women, in cases decided against women (Catchpole v. Brannon 
(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 237; In re Marriage of Iverson (1992) 11 
Cal.App.4th 1495), about lawyers, when the defendant was an 
attorney (Hall v. Harker (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 836, 840–841), 
and about noncitizens, when one party was a foreign national 
(Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 460–461).   
 
We 
therefore 
consider 
whether 
the 
trial 
judge’s 
inappropriate comments reflect a constitutionally intolerable 
possibility that he harbored an interest in the outcome of 
defendant’s trial.  We conclude that they do not.  The judge did 
not express bias toward defendant or a group to which she 
belonged, as in the appellate cases just cited.  Nor has there been 
a showing of past controversy between the judge and defendant, 
pecuniary interests, or other “influence at issue.”  (Caperton, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
127 
supra, 556 U.S. at p.  884.)  Ultimately, the judge’s comments 
disparaging the performance of defense counsel and witnesses, 
though highly inappropriate, did not convey an interest in 
defendant’s conviction or sentence; the misconduct thus falls 
short of the “extreme facts” that would raise an objective 
likelihood that the trial judge here was actually biased against 
the defendant.  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)  
Accordingly, we find no structural error, and will assess the 
court’s misconduct for prejudice.  (People v. Abel, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 914; Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  
4. Prejudice 
We consider the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s 
misconduct in order to assess prejudice that may arise from a 
variety of factors.  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  We 
have observed that the timing of a judge’s improper remarks 
may increase their potential for prejudice, such as comments 
made during counsel’s closing argument (People v. Abel, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 916) and comments that interfere with the 
defense presentation of evidence (Sturm, at p. 1241).  The 
frequency of improper comments is another consideration.  In 
Sturm, where the trial court interjected in the defense 
presentation of mitigation more than 30 times and made 
additional remarks that disparaged defense counsel and 
witnesses (ibid.), we concluded that the “numerous instances of 
misconduct created an atmosphere of unfairness” that 
contributed to prejudice (id. at p. 1243).  We found the trial 
court’s misconduct in Sturm prejudicial, in part, because the 
penalty verdict “was by no means a foregone conclusion” and 
there was evidence the jury could have credited to reach a 
different outcome.  (Id. at p. 1244.)  Evidence beneficial to the 
defense is therefore another factor that informs our analysis.  
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128 
The substance of comments is also an important measure — 
improper remarks may be particularly prejudicial when the trial 
court has “interjected itself unnecessarily and inappropriately 
into the adversary process” or “undermined the defense theory 
of the case.”  (Id. at p. 1243.)     
In reviewing the record, the trial court’s disdain for and 
distrust of defense counsel is inescapable — as is the perception 
the court found evidence from Dr. Ney, Dr. Plotkin, and Hall “ ‘to 
be questionable, at best.’ ”  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  
Although we conclude that the court’s misconduct could not 
have altered the jury’s guilt determination, we are unable to 
reach that conclusion regarding the penalty trial, thus finding 
prejudicial misconduct that requires reversal of the penalty 
judgment.   
a. Guilt phase 
The prosecution case against defendant included her 
surviving son F.D. describing how she gathered his sisters 
together to sleep in the kitchen and insisted that F.D. join them 
when he resisted.  Defense and prosecution experts agreed the 
fire was intentionally set and defendant essentially admitted 
starting the fire.  There was also compelling evidence that just 
before the fire defendant sent a note to her ex-husband angrily 
taunting him with her plan of murder-suicide and sent a letter 
to her ex-boyfriend appearing to blame their breakup for her 
impending acts. 
Defendant’s testimony that she lay down with her 
children, turned the oven on to warm her feet, and remembered 
little else, was difficult to credit.  The prosecution effectively 
impeached defendant’s claimed memory loss with notes from a 
defense expert that documented defendant’s description of 
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129 
events, including writing letters to her ex-husband and ex-
boyfriend late in the evening, driving to the post office to mail 
them, and holding a lighter and seeing a flash of flames. 
The defense relied on the jury accepting a theory, set forth 
in testimony by Drs. Ney and Plotkin, that defendant may have 
had a seizure or suffered from a medical syndrome that caused 
her behavior and lack of memory.  Dr. Ney was a psychiatrist 
with unusual credentials who had never qualified to testify as 
an expert regarding the medical conditions he addressed.  He 
was cavalier, and on basic details shown to be inaccurate, in his 
far-reaching claims about the medical and mental health 
processes that might have affected defendant’s behavior.  The 
trial court’s suggestion that Dr. Ney “just doesn’t know what 
he’s talking about,” though egregious, ultimately was not 
prejudicial given the other factors that independently, and 
severely, undermined Dr. Ney’s credibility — his questionable 
expertise, evasive and inconsistent testimony, unprofessional 
demeanor, substantial impeachment, and dubious claims that 
undermined the defense, including his suggestion that 
defendant was more likely to kill her children after having an 
abortion.  
We closely examine the prejudicial effect of the trial 
judge’s inexcusably hostile questioning and commentary during 
the testimony of Dr. Plotkin, who was potentially more credible 
than Dr. Ney.  Dr. Plotkin found evidence to suggest that 
defendant had a seizure on the night of the fire.  If true, it was 
possible that she was unaware of some of her actions due to a 
seizure-induced delirium.  Dr. Plotkin also explained, however, 
that a person in a delirium would not be capable of complex 
behavior and thought.   
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The evidence that defendant deliberately set a fire to kill 
her family included testimony that she planned ahead to compel 
her children sleep together on the kitchen floor, wrote letters 
indicating that she intended to kill herself and her children, 
drove to the post office to mail her letters, and intentionally 
poured and lit gasoline throughout the house.  Confronted with 
this evidence on cross-examination, Dr. Plotkin agreed that a 
person could not engage in such activities while experiencing 
delirium.  Under these circumstances, even if the jury fully 
credited Dr. Plotkin’s testimony, it did not offer a theory that 
reduced defendant’s culpability.   
The 
trial 
judge’s 
misconduct 
included 
pervasive 
mistreatment of defense counsel that began at the outset of trial.  
The judge disparaged defense counsel during his opening 
statement for suggesting that defendant had demons to 
overcome.  The timing of those remarks and their substance — 
sarcasm about defendant’s troubled history — increased their 
potential for prejudice.  (People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 916.)  The many inappropriate remarks that followed focused 
on defense counsel’s violation of court rules, lack of preparation, 
and improper cross-examination of prosecution witnesses; and 
disparaging and erroneous comments about defense counsel’s 
discovery violations also suggested that the defense was trying 
to obstruct the prosecution.  Nonetheless, the improper 
comments were not as numerous as in Sturm, and the 
misconduct did not directly implicate defense theories or 
interfere with the presentation of defendant’s case-in-chief.  
(Cf. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1241, 1243.)     
In Mahoney, supra, 201 Cal. 618, we concluded that the 
trial judge’s misconduct resulted in a “miscarriage of justice,” 
referring to former section 4½ of article VI of the California 
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Constitution (id. at pp. 626–627) — the basis for our state 
harmless error standard (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 
pp. 835–836).  There, the trial judge disparaged defense counsel 
and witnesses and on numerous occasions “took to himself the 
task of examining witnesses.”  (Mahoney, at p. 622.)  The judge’s 
examination of witnesses focused on his belief in the defendant’s 
guilt, “eliminating the possibility” of defenses the witnesses 
might otherwise have endorsed.  (Id. at p. 623.)  Similarly, in 
Sturm, we observed that the trial court, by making more than 
30 sua sponte objections to the defense presentation of evidence 
(Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1241), “interjected itself 
unnecessarily and inappropriately into the adversary process” 
(id. at p. 1243).  The trial court informed the jury that 
premeditation was a “ ‘gimme’ ” in the penalty retrial, when the 
lack of premeditation was central to defendant’s case in 
mitigation, and thus “also substantively undermined the 
defense theory of the case.”  (Ibid.) 
As we noted in Mahoney, “[t]he fact that a record shows a 
defendant to be guilty of a crime does not necessarily determine 
that there has been no miscarriage of justice.”  (Mahoney, supra, 
201 Cal. at p. 627.)  When the trial court disparages defense 
counsel and witnesses and “discredits the cause of the defense” 
(ibid.) with recurring, substantive interventions, “ ‘[w]hatever 
the degree of guilt of [the defendant] . . . those who know the 
circumstances surrounding his [or her] conviction are likely to 
feel that the verdict resulted from the conduct of the judge and 
not from the evidence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 626.)   
 
Although the trial judge here expressed doubts about the 
credibility of key defense experts and disparaged the 
performance of defense counsel, this was not the persistent, 
direct interference with the presentation of defense evidence 
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that we saw in Mahoney and Sturm.  Considering the entirety 
of the guilt phase evidence and argument, we are not persuaded 
“ ‘that the verdict resulted from the conduct of the judge and not 
from the evidence.’ ”  (Mahoney, supra, 201 Cal. at p. 626.)   
Defense counsel presented inconsistent and implausible 
theories that gave the jury little, if any, reason to doubt 
defendant’s guilt.  We express no view concerning the adequacy 
of counsel’s performance.  We simply observe that defendant has 
not shown that the trial judge’s inappropriate conduct was to 
blame for this performance or that the judge undermined 
defense evidence the jury might have credited to reach a more 
favorable result.  (Sturm, at pp. 1243–1244; Mahoney, at p. 623.)  
Considered “in the context of the trial as a whole” (People v. Abel, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 916), we can say under either the 
Chapman or Watson standards of review (Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 836) that the jury would have reached the same 
verdict in the absence of the court’s misconduct.     
b. Penalty phase 
Our prejudice inquiry is more difficult with respect to the 
penalty phase, where the jury’s role “is not merely to find facts, 
but also — and most important — to render an individualized, 
normative determination about the penalty appropriate for the 
particular defendant.”  (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 
448.)   
In the penalty phase closing arguments, the prosecutor 
highlighted evidence to counter the view that defendant had 
been a warm, caring person: school staff believed that defendant 
was overbearing and cold; a family member thought defendant’s 
children feared her; neighbors felt defendant lied during her 
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133 
divorce and tried to turn her children against Folden; and 
Fernando Nieves described defendant’s efforts to have F.D. 
removed from his custody after the fire and sent to live in 
another state.  In seeking the death penalty, the prosecutor 
argued that defendant’s actions were manipulative and 
calculating — and that her suicide note to Folden revealed not 
depression, but anger, revenge, spite, and control.  The 
prosecutor urged jurors to reject any suggestion that defendant 
was mentally unstable and noted that defense experts had not 
found evidence of psychosis when they examined her.  
Reiterating defendant’s plan to burn her children to death, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant “tried to kill herself because 
she knew her own crimes were so hideous she didn’t want to be 
around for the aftermath.”  
Abandoning the position that defendant acted in an 
unconscious delirium, in the penalty phase defense counsel 
reiterated evidence that defendant was distraught over her 
relationships, abortion, and finances and argued that she had 
come “unglued.”  Defense counsel portrayed defendant as an 
emotionally fragile woman troubled by an abusive childhood, 
devoted to her children, and overcome by depression and 
thoughts of suicide.  Pointing to defendant’s intent to commit 
suicide as extreme mental and emotional disturbance, counsel 
asked the jury to show mercy for “a tortured soul who all the 
days of her life will have to relive an act of madness, and the . . . 
nightmares that go with it.”  
Evidence of mental disturbance from the guilt trial, which 
defendant’s claim of unconsciousness had rendered superfluous, 
lent some support to her penalty phase argument.  (See People 
v. Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 953, fn. 34.)  Defendant’s son 
testified that she woke the children during the fire to help them 
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134 
avoid breathing the smoke, a fact the defense highlighted to 
show defendant’s confusion after setting the fire and her desire 
to protect the children from it.  The defense reiterated the 
conclusion of a prosecution expert that defendant could be 
vulnerable to psychotic episodes that might arise due to 
depression or bipolar disorder.  Dr. Plotkin later noted that in 
addition to her depression, defendant had been diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder and was being treated for it in jail.  The defense 
also highlighted research by a prosecution expert showing that 
most women who killed their children were not “coldhearted” 
but experienced psychosis, depression, and other mental health 
disorders.  On cross-examination during the guilt phase, and 
contrary to her defense, defendant admitted that she had been 
thinking about suicide her entire life.   
Defense counsel began his opening penalty phase 
statement by remarking on his disappointment in the jury’s 
guilt verdict, the challenge of appearing before the jury again 
after his guilt phase arguments had been rejected, and his 
respect for the jury’s guilt phase decision.  After sustaining 
objections to each of counsel’s remarks as improper argument, 
the trial judge admonished counsel in front of the jury: “If you 
can’t tell us what you expect the evidence will show, sit down 
and don’t say anything more.”     
Later in the opening statement, dismissing counsel’s 
insistence that he was addressing matters the evidence would 
establish, the trial judge sustained additional objections to 
improper argument when defense counsel began to comment on 
defendant’s relationship with her ex-husband.  The judge then 
abruptly demanded to know, “How much more do you have?”  As 
counsel responded — stating, “I would respectfully ask for the 
court’s indulgence.  I am trying to put in what I believe . . .” — 
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the court interrupted: “[D]on’t explain to me what you are trying 
to do.  [¶]  I am telling you what you cannot do.  If you continue 
to do it, I will terminate your opening statement.”  The trial 
judge’s display of such disregard for counsel as he made his 
initial plea to spare defendant’s life increased the potential for 
prejudice flowing from the judge’s comments.  (People v. Abel, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 916.) 
As noted earlier, in comments before the jury during the 
guilt phase, the trial judge ridiculed defense counsel, portrayed 
him as wasting the jury’s time, highlighted his violation of court 
rules, accused him of purposely misleading the jury, and 
announced the imposition of a monetary sanction.  The trial 
judge suggested that a key defense expert did not know what he 
was talking about, and his hostile questioning led another 
defense expert to remark that the defense experts were made 
out to be liars.  Though we concluded that this misconduct was 
not prejudicial in the guilt phase, it undoubtedly impressed 
upon the jury the court’s disdain and served to “discredit[] the 
cause of the defense.”  (Mahoney, supra, 201 Cal. at p. 627; 
People v. Woodruff, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 768.)   
In the penalty phase, the trial judge continued to impugn 
defense counsel’s performance and cited him for misconduct and 
contempt in front of the jury.  We have observed that when a 
judge regularly denigrates the performance of counsel “ ‘it is not 
the lawyer who pays the price, but the client.’ ”  (Sturm, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1240; cf. Sacher v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 
1, 10 [to “pronounce [a lawyer] guilty of contempt is not unlikely 
to prejudice his client”].)  When defendant’s friends testified, the 
prosecution exhibited pictures of the deceased victims and 
mocked the witnesses for voicing fondness, admiration, and 
sympathy for defendant following her conviction.  The trial 
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judge appeared to echo this contempt when he chastised Carl 
Hall and accused him of wrongdoing.   
The trial judge erroneously sustained objections to 
questions that sought to bolster the testimony of a chaplain 
attesting to defendant’s remorse for the crimes; the judge also 
repeatedly and erroneously sustained objections to questions 
about defendant’s nonviolence and the value she brought to the 
lives of others.  The “very act” of sustaining those objections 
“tended to mislead the jury” (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 
1009) — by minimizing defendant’s mitigating evidence and 
communicating that defendant’s valued attributes were “not 
worth considering” (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1239).  The 
trial judge’s hostility and impatience with the defense were 
further evident in the judge’s erroneous exclusion of whole 
categories of mitigating evidence — Dr. Boone’s testimony 
regarding defendant’s neuropsychological test results and 
cognitive impairment and PET scan results portraying brain 
injury consistent with defendant’s childhood traumas and 
neuropsychological testing.   
The trial court also improperly instructed the jury to 
consider the “weight and significance” of defendant’s failure to 
provide timely discovery concerning eight of twelve penalty 
phase witnesses — an error we earlier found harmless when 
viewed in isolation.  Because the trial court repeatedly chastised 
defense counsel and expressed doubts about the defense, 
however, the erroneous instruction and improper aggravating 
factor were apt to contribute to the perception that defendant 
was manipulative and that her mitigating evidence was not to 
be trusted.  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
137 
During defense counsel’s closing argument, the trial judge 
unnecessarily remarked about defense counsel misstating the 
law and admonished the jury to disregard counsel’s argument 
that aspects of defendant’s background were mitigating.  The 
judge later gave a cautionary instruction that gratuitously 
implied that defense counsel was improperly characterizing the 
case in mitigation.  As with the judge’s remarks during counsel’s 
opening statement, the timing of these interventions increased 
their prejudicial effect.  (People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 916.)   
“Considered in the aggregate,” the impact of the trial 
judge’s misconduct grew as his inappropriate comments 
continued throughout the trial; the judge’s improper remarks 
also increased in frequency during the short span allowed for 
the penalty trial — not quite five days from start to finish — and 
included threats and disparaging comments whose timing 
interfered with both the opening statement and closing 
argument for the defense.  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  
Ultimately, the trial judge’s conspicuous disdain for defense 
counsel and witnesses, and his repeated references to their 
improper or untrustworthy conduct, lent credence to the 
prosecution’s argument that defendant was manipulative and 
deceitful.  These were the very characteristics the prosecution 
highlighted to justify the death penalty.  The trial judge 
effectively threw “the weight of his judicial position” (Mahoney, 
supra, 201 Cal. at p. 627) behind the prosecution’s case and 
erroneously excluded relevant and potentially beneficial 
mitigating evidence, thus “undermin[ing] the defense theory of 
the case.”  (Sturm, at p. 1243). 
We rely on a capital sentencing jury to “confront and 
examine the individuality of the defendant” and consider any 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
138 
“ ‘compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the 
diverse frailties of humankind.’ ”  (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 
472 U.S. 320, 330.)  That critical function was compromised 
here, where “numerous instances of misconduct created an 
atmosphere of unfairness and were likely to have led the jury to 
conclude that ‘the trial court found the People’s case against 
[defendant] to be strong and [defendant]’s evidence to be 
questionable, at best.’ ”  (Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)   
We consider how the jury “might have responded 
differently” (People v. Smith (2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 60) in 
undertaking its sentencing decision in a trial unaffected by such 
misconduct.  It is not difficult to imagine the horror a jury might 
feel in response to defendant’s actions.  Nonetheless, a juror 
could regard the stunning enormity of the crime, and the fact 
that defendant intended to take her own life, as a sign of 
significant mental instability.  Absent the trial judge’s 
persistent, disparaging remarks, a juror might have viewed 
these circumstances with greater sympathy and concluded the 
crime was a tragedy lacking the moral culpability to warrant 
death.  A juror might also have given greater weight to 
defendant’s remorse and evidence she had been a loving mother 
to conclude that life in prison, confronted each day with what 
she had done to her children, was a fitting punishment.  
Although we cannot be certain the jury would have reached a 
different verdict in the absence of the judge’s commentary, we 
are unable to say the penalty “verdict was ‘ “surely 
unattributable” ’ to the trial court’s [misconduct].”  (People v. 
Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 723.)  Instead, we find “a 
‘reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility’ ” (ibid.) that the outcome 
would have been different without the weight of judicial 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
139 
authority favoring the prosecution and hence we must set aside 
the judgment of death.    
E. Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that claims considered harmless in 
isolation are nonetheless cumulatively prejudicial.  We have 
found or assumed seven errors:  (1) erroneous guilt phase 
instructions regarding discovery violations; (2) error limiting 
mental state testimony by defense experts in the guilt phase; 
(3) exclusion of a neuropsychological expert in the penalty 
phase; (4) exclusion of defendant’s PET scan results from the 
penalty phase; (5) exclusion of mitigating evidence from lay 
witnesses; (6) erroneous penalty phase instructions regarding 
discovery violations; and (7) judicial misconduct, which we have 
concluded was prejudicial in the penalty phase.   
Regarding the guilt phase, we have held that the 
erroneous discovery violation instruction and limitation on 
expert testimony were harmless when considered individually.  
We concluded that experts were not prevented from addressing 
the bulk of information the defense sought to convey and that 
the erroneous instruction did not affect the outcome of this trial.  
Considered cumulatively, these errors do not warrant reversal 
of the guilt judgment. 
Although we need not address the cumulative effect of 
penalty phase errors given our resolution of the judicial 
misconduct claim, we note that the prejudicial impact of 
additional penalty phase errors — the improper exclusion of a 
neuropsychological expert, PET scan results, and mitigating 
testimony from lay witnesses, and the erroneous instruction 
related to penalty phase discovery violations — increases when 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
140 
considered in conjunction with the judicial misconduct, an effect 
we have noted in our prejudice discussion for that claim.   
F. Restitution 
Defendant contends the trial court violated her rights to 
due process and to confront evidence against her when, in her 
absence, it imposed a restitution fine and ordered payment of 
victim restitution.  She claims the trial court further erred by 
failing to make findings concerning her ability to pay.   
During defendant’s sentencing, the trial court neglected to 
impose a restitution fine required by section 1202.4, subdivision 
(b) or order direct victim restitution as required by section 
1202.4, subdivision (f).  Defendant was not present at 
subsequent hearings that addressed restitution: one in which 
the trial court imposed a maximum $10,000 fine, and another in 
which the court ordered victim restitution of $24,579.99 
regarding claims already filed and left some future claims to be 
determined.  There were no reasons given for defendant’s 
absence and no indication she waived her presence at the 
hearings.  Defense counsel opposed the restitution fine, citing 
defendant’s inability to pay, and challenged the direct victim 
restitution on several bases, including by offering a showing 
that victims’ family members had already received payments 
from life insurance policies maintained by defendant. 
A criminal defendant has a “constitutional and statutory 
right to be present at [a] sentence modification hearing and 
imposition of sentence.”  (People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
18, 60; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Pen. Code, §§ 977, subd. 
(b)(1), 1193.)  We have acknowledged restitution as “a 
significant aspect of a criminal sentence.”  (Briggs v. Brown 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 831; see also People v. Tillman (2000) 
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
141 
22 Cal.4th 300, 301 [judgment of conviction includes restitution 
fine]; cf. Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160, 171 [sentencing 
determinations include “statutorily prescribed fines and orders 
of restitution”].)  And we have confirmed defendant’s right to be 
present when the trial court imposes restitution.  (See People v. 
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027 [striking restitution not 
imposed in open court and in defendant’s presence].) 
The People argue that any rights defendant had to be 
present at either of the restitution hearings were forfeited by 
defense counsel’s failure to object to her absence.  A defendant 
may waive her constitutional right to be present for sentencing 
“as long as [her] waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”  
(People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531.)  “[A] defendant’s 
statutory ability to waive [her] presence in a capital case is more 
circumscribed than the associated ability to waive [her] 
constitutional right.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 
135.)  There is no indication that defendant made any valid 
waiver of her right to be present, and counsel’s failure to object 
does not forfeit the claim.  (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 
126, 162.) 
We therefore consider whether the error prejudiced 
defendant.  (People v. Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 163; 
People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532.)  The People observe 
defense counsel was present at both hearings, raised 
defendant’s inability to pay the restitution fine, and disputed 
payment of victim restitution, and they assert that defendant 
would not have made any additional contributions if present.  
Defendant claims that she was in the best position to address 
her ability to pay and details about her life insurance policy.   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
142 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant 
would have added any significant information about her 
inability to pay beyond that presented by defense counsel.  
Defense counsel received notice of the proposed victim 
restitution almost two months prior to the hearing and thus 
“had ample opportunity to discuss the contents with defendant 
and to seek [her] assistance . . . .  Assuming [counsel] did so, 
defendant’s presence at the hearing would have added little to 
[her] attorney[’s] ability to argue” the propriety of the victim 
restitution payments.  (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 533.)  We conclude that defendant’s absence from the 
restitution proceedings was therefore harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
We also reject defendant’s contention that the trial court 
erred by failing to make findings regarding her ability to pay.  
Defendant cites People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959 in 
support of her claim; however, the reference to findings in that 
case concerned requirements that had been repealed and are 
inapplicable here.  (Id. at p. 1038.)  The provisions of section 
1202.4 in effect at defendant’s trial, as now, state that “[e]xpress 
findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of 
the fine shall not be required.”  (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).)  “[T]he 
absence of any findings does not demonstrate [the court] failed 
to consider this factor.  Thus, we cannot say on this record that 
the trial court abused its discretion.”  (People v. Gamache, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 409.)   
Defendant further claims the trial court failed to consider 
her ability to pay when ordering direct victim restitution.  This 
argument fails because section 1202.4 provides that inability to 
pay shall not be a consideration in determining the amount of a 
restitution order.  (§ 1202.4, subd. (g).)   
PEOPLE v. NIEVES 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
143 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
We reverse the death sentence and affirm the judgment in 
all other respects.  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR , J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Nieves 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S092410  
Date Filed:  May 3, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior       
County:  Los Angeles       
Judge:  L. Jeffrey Wiatt         
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Amitai Schwartz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and 
Moira Duvernay for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. 
Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, 
Pamela C. Hamanaka and James William Bilderback II, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Keith H. Borjon, Mary Sanchez, Jaime L. Fuster 
and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Amitai Schwartz 
Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz 
2000 Powell St., Suite 1286 
Emeryville, CA 94608 
(510) 597-1775 
 
Kristen J. Inberg 
Deputy Attorney General 
3000 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6189