Title: Wells v. Johnson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

152 S.E.2d 229 (1967) 269 N.C. 192 June F. WELLS v. Mary Susan Carroll JOHNSON. No. 193. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 20, 1967. *230 Hogue, Hill & Rowe, by Ronald D. Rowe, Wilmington, for defendant appellant. Aaron Goldberg, Wilmington, for plaintiff appellee. PARKER, Chief Justice. Plaintiff's evidence tends to show the following facts: In the town of Wallace, Boney Street runs generally east and west, and College Street runs generally north and south. The intersection is controlled by a traffic light. Plaintiff is a 25-year-old man, who runs an upholstery shop in the town of Wallace. Defendant is a resident of Wallace, and has been a school teacher for many years. About 5 p. m. on 8 November 1963 plaintiff parked his automobile on the east side of College Street. He got out of his automobile, walked to the intersection of East Boney and South College Streets, and started to cross Boney Street at the intersection. He testified: As a result of being struck by defendant's automobile, plaintiff sustained physical injuries. Plaintiff testified in substance on cross-examination, except when quoted: He saw defendant's automobile about the time he (plaintiff) called Marvin Carter. He was already in the street about six feet when he saw her automobile. He did not proceed any further across the street. He did not turn around and come back. He froze and started to turn around, and she was coming. He was walking about a normal pace. The light was green when he stepped off the curb. Defendant was operating her automobile in an easterly direction on Boney Street within the town limits of Wallace. Plaintiff testified: Plaintiff testified in substance on redirect examination: When he was injured he was dressed in a white shirt and blue pants. It was broad daylight. There was nothing to prevent a person traveling east on East Boney Street, as it approached South College Street, from having a clear view down the street. As he stood at the intersection of East Boney Street and South College Street and looked westward, he could see a block. There are no obstructions there to prevent anyone from seeing. Marvin Carter testified in substance, except when quoted: Plaintiff called his name and that is the first time he saw him. At that time plaintiff was coming off the sidewalk or curb into the intersection. He was at a place where pedestrians would walk. About the time plaintiff called him, he saw the car driven by Mrs. Johnson. He testified: On cross-examination Carter testified in substance: Mrs. Johnson's car traveled about the length of the car before it completely stopped after it struck plaintiff. Defendant testified in substance, except when quoted: She was driving her automobile east on Boney Street within the town limits of Wallace to pick up some friends. Her friends lived on Boney Street about 75 feet from the intersection of Boney Street and College Street. She testified: She testified in substance on cross-examination: She could see for one or two blocks eastward. She did not see Mr. Carter or plaintiff on the sidewalk any place before the impact. She knew plaintiff came from the right. She did not blow her horn. She did not see plaintiff after then until he was carried to his home from the hospital. She testified: Floyd Murry at the time of the accident was a policeman in the town of Wallace. He arrived at the scene of the collision here at 5:10 p. m. He investigated the scene. He found impressions from stopping, about five feet, more or less. He saw glass from the headlights of the car about two feet from where the car was stopped. The headlight of defendant's car was broken out, and the rim around the headlight was bent a little. Defendant assigns as error the denial of her motion for judgment of compulsory nonsuit made at the close of all the evidence. Defendant states in her brief: Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which defendant must plead and prove. G.S. § 1-139. Nevertheless, the rule is firmly embedded in our adjective law that a defendant may avail himself of his plea of contributory negligence by a motion for a judgment of compulsory nonsuit under G.S. § 1-183, when the facts necessary to show contributory negligence are established so clearly by plaintiff's own evidence that no other conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Pruett v. Inman, 252 N.C. 520, 114 S.E.2d 360, and cases cited. But the court cannot allow a motion for judgment of compulsory nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence on plaintiff's part in an action for damages for personal injury, as here, if it is necessary for the court to rely on any part of the evidence offered by defendant. Donlop v. Snyder, 234 N.C. 627, 68 S.E.2d 316. Paragraph 4 of the complaint reads as follows: Defendant's answer in paragraph 4 alleges: Defendant's contention that plaintiff was guilty of legal contributory negligence, as alleged in her answer, barring any recovery of damages by him necessitates an appraisal of plaintiff's evidence and the judicial admissions in defendant's answer. Plaintiff's evidence and the judicial admissions in defendant's answer tend to show the following facts: That traffic, pedestrian and vehicular, at and in the intersection of College Street and Boney Street in the town of Wallace is governed *233 by an automatic signal device, duly installed and operated pursuant to an ordinance of the town of Wallace, which controls the movement of all traffic therein and which was in operation at the time plaintiff was struck by defendant's automobile. College Street runs generally north and south, and Boney Street runs generally east and west. Defendant was driving her automobile in an easterly direction on Boney Street towards its intersection with College Street, and when plaintiff started to cross Boney Street the traffic light facing defendant at the intersection was red. We take judicial notice of the fact that when a duly installed automatic traffic control signal shows red it means stop, and when it shows green it means go. As he stood at the intersection of East Boney Street and South College Street and looked westward, he could see a block. There are no obstructions there to prevent anyone from seeing. When he got six feet from the curb into the intersection, he looked and saw defendant's car traveling about 45 miles an hour a half a block away. When he saw her car was not going to stop for the red light, he "froze." He did not move from the time he saw defendant's car until the time he was hit. He saw defendant's automobile about the time he called Marvin Carter. This is said in 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 420, p. 968: "A pedestrian crossing a street intersection with a favorable traffic signal is still required to exercise ordinary care and caution for his own safety. He is under a duty to keep some lookout for approaching motorists and a change in the signal." "In the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary, a pedestrian crossing a street or highway on a favorable signal has a right to assume that operators of approaching vehicles will obey the law and will observe and not disregard the signal, and he is not required to anticipate that a motorist will not comply with the traffic signal." 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 470 f (3), p. 59. This is said in 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 420: See Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 833, 161 P.2d 673, 164 A.L.R. 1, and *234 annotation thereto entitled "Liability for accident at street or highway intersection as affected by reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign, signal, or marking," pp. 8-312. There is no imperative rule of law requiring a pedestrian under all circumstances to look for approaching automobiles before crossing a street or highway. Annot., 79 A.L.R. 1074, where cases from many jurisdictions are cited. Applying the applicable law, plaintiff's evidence does not show contributory negligence on his part so clearly that no other conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Whether, under the circumstances shown by the record, plaintiff was guilty or not guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury to determine. The court correctly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of compulsory nonsuit, and submitted the case to the jury. Defendant assigns as error that the court's instructions to the jury permitted the jury to find that the defendant ran through a red light. Plaintiff's evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, would tend to show that defendant ran through a red light. As we understand defendant's brief as quoted above, it in subtance concedes this. We have carefully examined the other assignments of error to the charge of the court and to its failure to charge, and we are of the opinion that they are without merit and raise no new question or feature requiring discussion. Neither reversible nor prejudicial error has been made to appear. The verdict and judgment below will be upheld. No error.