Title: In re Bustamante

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Bustamante, 100 Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-4828.] 
 
 
IN RE BUSTAMANTE. 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BUSTAMANTE. 
[Cite as In re Bustamante, 100 Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-4828.] 
Attorneys at law — Motion for termination of felony suspension denied — 
Petition for reinstatement denied. 
(Nos. 1993-1418 and 1996-1977 — Submitted May 14, 2003 — Decided 
September 24, 2003.) 
ON MOTION for Termination of Felony Suspension (No. 1993-1418). 
ON PETITION for Reinstatement and Request for Exception (No. 1996-1977). 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In 1993, respondent, John Henry Bustamante of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0009679, was convicted in a federal district court of 
participating in a scheme to defraud an insurance company.  The federal court 
placed respondent on probation for five years and ordered him to make restitution 
to the insurance company. 
{¶2} 
In case No. 1993-1418, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(3), we 
indefinitely suspended respondent from the practice of law in Ohio on July 29, 
1993, because of his felony conviction.  In re Bustamante (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 
1416, 616 N.E.2d 244. 
{¶3} 
Effective November 18, 1993, respondent was disbarred by the 
Supreme Court of Florida.  Florida Bar v. Bustamante (Fla.1995), 662 So.2d 687.  
Under Florida law, respondent could apply for readmission in Florida at any time 
after November 18, 1998.  Florida State Bar Rule 3-5.1(f).  Therefore, in case No. 
1996-1977, we indefinitely suspended respondent from the practice of law in 
Ohio pursuant to the reciprocal-discipline provision of Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with permission to apply for reinstatement after November 18, 1998, “if he has 
been readmitted to the practice of law in Florida.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Bustamante (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 676 N.E.2d 516.  Our order in case No. 
1996-1977 specifically precluded respondent’s reinstatement unless he “files 
evidence with the Clerk of this Court and with Disciplinary Counsel 
demonstrating his reinstatement to the practice of law in Florida.” 
{¶4} 
Respondent has now filed a motion for termination of his felony 
suspension in case No. 1993-1418 and a petition for reinstatement in case No. 
1996-1977.  Respondent informs us that on January 20, 2001, the President of the 
United States pardoned him for the federal offense of which he was convicted.  
He asserts that he has complied with all requirements for reinstatement set forth in 
Gov.Bar R. V(10), except that he has not made full restitution to those harmed by 
his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(10)(E)(1).  Claiming that he has no assets and 
could find no work after disbarment, respondent requests that we grant him an 
“exception to further restitution as a condition for the reinstatement.” 
{¶5} 
Respondent overlooks, however, that restitution is not the only 
remaining obstacle to his reinstatement in Ohio.  As previously noted, our order 
of March 26, 1997, specifically required that respondent submit evidence of his 
reinstatement to the practice of law in Florida.  Respondent has failed to make, or 
even to attempt, any such showing.  In fact, his petition gives us no reason to 
suppose that he has so much as applied for reinstatement in Florida.  Moreover, 
respondent does not request to be exempted from the requirement that he be 
reinstated in Florida before being reinstated in Ohio.  He simply ignores the entire 
issue. 
{¶6} 
We deny respondent’s request for exception from the conditions 
for reinstatement.  Since respondent has not submitted evidence demonstrating his 
reinstatement to the practice of law in Florida, we find that his petition for 
reinstatement in case No. 1996-1977 is facially insufficient.  We therefore deny 
January Term, 2003 
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the petition for reinstatement forthwith, without referring it to the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline for hearing.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(10)(F). 
{¶7} 
In case No. 1993-1418, we also deny respondent’s motion for 
termination of felony suspension, pending respondent’s showing of full 
compliance with all conditions for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(10), 
and in our order of March 26, 1997.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Reinstatement denied, request for 
exception denied, and motion denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and Charles F. Clarke, for 
respondent. 
__________________