Title: Diana G. Brunell v. Wildwood Crest Police Department

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The facts surrounding the Brunell matter are as follows. In 1995, Diana Brunell was employed by the Wildwood Crest Police Department (Wildwood Crest) as a civilian police dispatcher. On June 2, Brunell dispatched Officer Miglio to the scene of a vehicle stop. A suspect scuffled with the officer, resulting in his suffering cardiac arrest. Officer Miglio died later that evening. Brunell did not witness the incident directly, but she sent the officer to the scene, called for medical assistance, consoled members of the department, and arranged for notification of Officer Miglio s widow. Immediately after the incident, Brunell suffered from symptoms of anxiety, depression, nightmares, irritability, fatigue, insomnia, and exaggerated startle response. She became increasingly tense as time passed. In 1999, Brunell experienced problems at work and was suspended for a week. She was diagnosed in August of 1999 with PTSD as the direct result of the incident in 1995. In January 2000, Brunell filed a claim petition seeking workers compensation benefits. In the petition, she stated that the date of her accident or occupational exposure was June 2, 1995, and that she suffered from delayed onset PTSD as a result of Officer Miglio s death. In April 2000, Wildwood Crest denied relief for failure to timely file her claim petition and, ultimately, moved to dismiss the claim petition. The facts underlying the Stango matter are as follows. Samuel Stango was a uniformed patrolman for the Lower Township Police Department (Lower Township) for nine years before he resigned in 2000. On February 18, 1994, Stango and a fellow officer, David Douglass, responded to the scene of a domestic dispute. Officer Douglass was shot in the throat at the scene. Stango came upon Douglass after the shots had been fired. Stango held Douglass, who was bleeding from the mouth and ears, and watched him die. Following the incident, Stango noticed an increased anxiety level and began having problems with panic attacks at night, as well as flashbacks and bad dreams. Stango continued to work and did not report his symptoms to Lower Township, believing that his symptoms would disappear over time. In February 2000, Stango experienced a trigger incident while carrying a balloon that burst, which led to an increase in his anxiety level. The pop sound of the bursting balloon triggered a flashback, which, in turn, led to a series of disturbing dreams involving snipers. After this incident, Stango reached out to various sources for help. On April 5, 2000, Stango was relieved of his duties and referred to an employee-assistance program. On April 13, 2000, Stango filed two claim petitions for workers compensation benefits, one alleging that the date of his accident or occupational exposure was February 13, 2000 (the date of the balloon-popping flashback), and the other alleging the date as February 18, 1994 (the initial shooting incident). Lower Township s compensation carrier refused to cover Stango s treatment. On May 3, 2000, a psychiatrist diagnosed Stango with ongoing, chronic PTSD relating back to the shooting incident, and recommended treatment. On June 6, 2000, Stango filed a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, requesting payment for psychological/psychiatric treatment and payment for time lost from work as a result of his work-related injury. Lower Township filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the petitions for failure to comply with the relevant statutory limitations period. The Stango and Brunell cases were consolidated before the Division of Workers Compensation for adjudication. The judge of compensation granted the motions to dismiss because the claim petitions were not timely filed within two years of the accident. On appeal, the Appellate Division focused on whether the claims for compensation based on PTSD should be adjudicated under the two-year accident statute of limitations, or under the discovery-rule limitations period prescribed for occupational diseases. Relying on case law, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that PTSD is compensable under the accident provisions of the Act when it arises from a single event. Because the accidents suffered by Brunell and Stango preceded the filings by more than two years, the Appellate Division ruled that the claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: Depending on the circumstances, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder may qualify as either an accidental injury or an occupational disease and, when the facts of the case fit both categories, a worker is entitled to file both claims. Moreover, in the narrow class of accident cases that result in latent or insidiously progressive injury, the accident statute of limitations does not begin to run until a worker knows or should know that he or she has sustained a compensable injury. 1. Because of the ameliorative effect that the Act was intended to achieve (swift payment to injured employees), it has been characterized as important social legislation entitled to liberal construction. Overall, the Act is to be construed to bring as many cases as possible within its coverage. The Act provides a remedy to an employee who suffers injury arising out of and in the course of employment either by accident or by contracting a compensable occupational disease. Different notice and claim provisions apply to each of those categories. (Pp. 8-11) 2. To be a compensable accident, there must be an unintended or unexpected occurrence that produces hurt or loss. The occurrence of the injury is the trigger for the worker to notify the employer. The injury must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite time, place, occasion, or cause. To be a compensable occupational disease, the injury is due in a material degree to causes and conditions that are or were characteristic of, or peculiar to, a particular trade, occupation, process, or place of employment. The basic unexpectedness ingredient of an accident is missing in an occupational disease. (Pp. 11-17) 3. A diagnosis of PTSD can cover a broad variety of stressors and symptoms and may result from a single traumatic event, such as a fire or explosion, or from continued exposure to traumatic events, such as occurs in combat or domestic abuse. Symptoms of PTSD can lay dormant until at least six or more months have passed, in which case it is classified as delayed onset PTSD. PTSD is cognizable under the Act and is recognized in case law. The courts in Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have concluded that, depending on the facts, PTSD may be either an occupational disease or an accidental injury. Generally, each of those cases found PTSD to be an occupational disease when it developed over time from multiple stressors unique to the employment. These cases aptly apply to the situations presented here. There is nothing inherent in a diagnosis of PTSD that would preclude its treatment either as an accidental injury or an occupational disease, depending on the facts. That reading of the Act accords most fully with its beneficial aims of providing coverage to as broad a class of workers as possible. (Pp. 17-29) 4. The mere happening of a definable, traumatic event does not automatically equate with an accident for workers compensation purposes. There is nothing about a single, traumatic event, standing alone, that would preclude a worker from filing an occupational-disease claim, so long as the claimant otherwise met the relevant statutory standards. A worker could actually file both claims. (Pp. 29-32) 5. An employee claiming an occupational disease must notify his employer within ninety days after the employee knew or should have known the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment. He must file a compensation claim petition within two years after he knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment. In respect of accidental injury, an employee must give notice to the employer within ninety days of the occurrence of injury and must file a claim petition within two years of the date the accident occurred. PTSD is an example of an insidious disease process of which the worker is unaware at the time of the original traumatic event because ascertainable disease symptoms surface much later in time. Thus, in the limited class of cases in which an unexpected traumatic event occurs and the injury it generates is latent or insidiously progressive, an accident for workers compensation filing purposes has not taken place until the signs and symptoms are such that they would alert a reasonable person that he had sustained a compensable injury. (Pp. 32-47) 6. Nothing in the history of the Legislature s enactment of the discovery rule in the occupational-disease statute suggests that the Legislature would not have been concerned equally over the fate of workers who suffer a traumatic event resulting in a delayed onset or insidiously developing disease. Had the Legislature been faced with the narrow class of accident cases involving latency and insidious onset diseases, it would have included them under the discovery-rule umbrella. (Pp. 47-52) 7. Stango and Brunell should have an opportunity, in separate trials, to present their proofs to the compensation court, which shall determine whether the facts established fit best within the occupational disease model, the accidental injury model, or neither. If on remand, the court concludes that one or more of the claims meet the requirements of occupational-disease statute, timeliness remains to be decided. If the court characterizes either of the claims as accidental, it will be necessary to assess its timeliness in light of the standards established here. (Pp. 52-55) 8. The Court s disposition should not be taken as a commentary on the quality, sufficiency, or timeliness of the parties claims, but only as a ruling that the claimants are not prohibited from raising them. (P. 56) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the cases are REMANDED to the Division of Workers Compensation for consideration of that substance and timeliness of the claimants contentions under the standards to which we have averted. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE LONG S opinion. Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILDWOOD CREST POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. SAMUEL STANGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LOWER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. Argued January 6, 2003 Decided May 21, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 348 N.J. Super. 180 (2002). Christine DiMuzio argued the cause for appellant Diana G. Brunell (Hoffman, DiMuzio & Hoffman, attorneys). Carmine J. Taglialatella argued the cause for appellant Samuel Stango (Press & Long, attorneys). Michael S. Affanato argued the cause for respondents (Margolis Edelstein, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. These consolidated appeals present the issue of whether Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an accidental injury or an occupational disease under the workers compensation statute. We conclude that the condition may qualify, depending on the circumstances, as either and that when the facts of a case straddle both categories, a worker is entitled to file both claims. Finally, we hold that in the narrow band of accident cases that result in latent or insidiously progressive injury, the accident statute of limitations does not begin to run until the worker knows or should know that he has sustained a compensable injury. I A. Dr. Miley reaffirmed that Brunell s symptoms were the direct result of the 1995 incident. On January 6, 2000, Brunell filed a claim petition seeking workers compensation. In the petition, she declared that the date of her accident or occupational exposure was June 2, 1995, and that she suffered from delayed onset PTSD as a result of Officer Miglio s death. On April 3, 2000, the Department denied relief for failure to timely file a claim for an injury which occurred on June 2, 1995 and ultimately moved to dismiss the claim petition. [Larson, supra, 42.02 at 42-6.] [American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 463 (4th ed. 2000) ( DSM-IV ).] The development of a concise diagnosis for that set of psychological symptoms began in the late nineteenth century when the first forays into psychological treatment began to address the issue of hysteria. Symptoms of motor loss, convulsions, amnesia, and hyper-vigilance were examined and determined to be the result of a mental disorder peculiar to women. Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery 10-12 (1997). Later, during and after the First World War, similar symptoms were discovered in men whose wartime experiences had left them shell-shocked. Interest in the lasting mental effects of trauma remained strong through the Second World War, as psychologists struggled to treat soldiers who had witnessed, perpetrated, and been subject to the atrocities of war. Id. at 20, 26. But it was not until the Vietnam War that a broader political and psychological inquiry into the effects of combat trauma was undertaken. The experiences of Vietnam veterans who spoke out about the persistent mental difficulties that they had faced as a result of the traumatic incidents of combat led to a far-reaching rethinking of the ways in which trauma affects the individual psyche. Id. at 27. Post-traumatic stress disorder was recognized as a mental disorder and added to the DSM-IV in 1980, largely as a result of the grassroots efforts of Vietnam veterans and their allies to give credence to the symptomology that plagued so many soldiers who had returned from that conflict. Id. at 28. Since its initial application to combat trauma, large-scale diagnoses of PTSD have been made in cases of survivors of domestic violence and childhood sexual abuse, asylum-seekers fleeing political violence and torture, survivors of natural disasters, and, most recently, rescue workers and others involved in the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Karen E. Krinsley & Frank W. Weathers, The Assessment of Trauma in Adults, 6 PTSD Res. Q. 1, 1-2 (Summer 1995) (describing wide variety of traumas that can lead to PTSD); National Institute of Mental Health, Reliving Trauma: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Publication No. 01-4597 (2001), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/reliving/cfm (discussing widespread appearance of PTSD in aftermath of September 11th attacks). The diagnostic criteria for PTSD are as follows: The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been present: 1. the person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others. 2. the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, it may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior. B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways: 1. recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed. 2. recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: in children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content. acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: in children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur. 4. intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. 5. physiologic reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following: 1. efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma 2. efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma 3. inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma 4. markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities 5. feeling of detachment or estrangement from others 6. restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings) 7. sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span) D. Persistent symptoms of increasing arousal (not present before the trauma), indicated by at least two of the following: 1. difficulty falling or staying asleep 2. Irritability or outbursts of anger 3. Difficulty concentrating 4. Hyper-vigilance 5. Exaggerated startle response E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than one month. F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. [DSM IV, supra, at 467-68 (emphasis added).] As can be seen from the foregoing, a diagnosis of PTSD can cover a broad variety of stressors and symptoms. It may result from a single traumatic event such as a fire or explosion that causes or threatens death or serious injury to the witness or others. Glenn R. Schiraldi, The Post-Trumatic Stress Disorder Sourcebook 1 (2000); Herbert Lasky, 1 Psychiatric Claims in Workers Compensation and Civil Litigation 16 (1993). It may also result from continued exposure to traumatic events such as occurs in combat, undercover police work, domestic abuse, or childhood sexual abuse. Jimmy P. Mann & John Neece, Workers Compensation for Law Enforcement Related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 Behav. Sci. & L. 447, 447-48 (1990) (describing wide variety of stressors that result in police officers suffering from PTSD and stating that officers experiencing cumulative traumas are much more likely to develop PTSD); Krinsley & Weathers, supra, 6 PTSD Res. Q., at 1-2 (suggesting that some cases of PTSD may result from culmination of traumatic events over span of time). Symptoms may present quickly and last less than three months, in which case the PTSD is denominated as acute. If symptoms last more than three months, the condition is called chronic. Schiraldi, supra, at 6; Mann & Neece, supra, 8 Behav. Sci. & L. at 49 (noting that after police officer witnesses traumatic event, PTSD symptoms may last days or several years). Although the symptoms may appear immediately after a traumatic event, they also may remain dormant until at least six months or more have passed, in which case the PTSD is specified a with delayed onset. Schiraldi, supra, at 6. In short, PTSD is a catchall phrase for an array of reactions to stress that can arise in various employment settings. [Ibid. (emphasis added).] Schwarz reflects the basic rule that when there is an unexpected traumatic event leading to an injury that results in lost wages, the incurring of medical bills, and a diagnosis of possible future surgery, and the worker knows he has suffered a compensable injury for workers compensation purposes, the filing clock begins to run and the employee cannot put off filing until the full extent of his injury is determined. Nothing in Schwarz (or any other reported decision) suggests even obliquely that the notice and claim statutes begin to run on a worker who is wholly unaware that he has suffered any injury whatsoever. Schwarz therefore does not answer the question presented here. Here, and presumably in other delayed onset and insidious development cases, ascertainable disease symptoms emerge long after the time of the traumatic event. On the date of the initial incident, the worker is completely ignorant of an injury of which to notify the employer or with respect to which to file a claim. Indeed, it is theoretically possible for PTSD and other diseases with a quiescent period to remain dormant until more than two years after the traumatic event. If the statute is read to time the notice and the filing of a claim from the traumatic event, a worker s right could expire before there was any evidence whatsoever that he had been injured. The Departments claim that that is the correct reading of the statute because we are an accident state in which workers injured accidentally who suffer latent and progressive conditions are simply out of luck. We conclude otherwise. Because the Workers Compensation Act does not contemplate notice or the filing of a claim in the absence of injury, those time periods do not begin to run until the worker is, or reasonably should be, aware that he has sustained a compensable injury. Indeed, almost fifty years ago in Panchak, supra, 15 N.J. at 13, we declared that to be the law regarding notification of injury to the employer under the accident notice statute. N.J.S.A. 34:15-17. In that case, the worker felt a sharp jab in his back while lifting mattresses. Panchak, supra, 15 N.J. at 15. A month later, he experienced pain over his thigh. He saw several doctors and seven months later was diagnosed with a herniated disc. Id. at 16. At that point he advised the employer, who resisted payment because it had not been notified within ninety days of the injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-17. Although recognizing that the accidental injury notice provision is designed to afford to the employer the benefits of timely investigation and is mandatory, the Court nevertheless refused to accept the employer s argument that the lifting of the mattresses and the sharp jab triggered notification. Justice Jacobs, speaking for the Court, stated: As was suggested in Bobertz v. Hillside Township, 125 N.J.L. 321, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1940), [aff d, 126 N.J.L. 416 (E. & A. 1941)], workmen rightly "do not regard every slip in the day's work as a matter to be publicly recorded." The trivial daily bruises which do not result in incapacity or disability are not compensable (Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko, [ 113 N.J.L. 195, 200 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff d 114 N.J.L. 254 (E. & A. 1935)]) and any requirement that they forthwith be reported and investigated would place an undue burden on employees and employers alike. We find nothing in R.S. 34:15-17 which imposes such burden. It requires notice after the occurrence of the injury and provides that in the event of default, no compensation shall be due or allowed. It would seem clear from its terminology that the Legislature was referring to disabling or incapacitating injury for which compensation might be sought. Cf. Textileather Corp. v. Great American, etc., Co., 108 N.J.L. 121, 124 (E. & A. 1931). Despite the tremendous advancement of medical knowledge in relation to industrial accidents, no one can yet accurately foretell the consequences of seemingly trivial hurts, as the instant matter well illustrates. The sharp jab on March 19, 1951 was so fleeting that the employee, acting reasonably, thought nothing more of it. He could hardly have been expected to have then reported it to the foreman nor could he have been expected to relate it to his subsequent general ill feeling and pain in his thigh. It was not until he was examined by Dr. Ehrlich on November 1 that he knew or had reason to know that he had a compensable injury and then he immediately served notice on his employer. This notice may justly be deemed sufficient within the contemplation of the legislative requirement in R.S. 34:15-17. [Id. at 24 (emphasis added).] Although it is clear that Panchak was limited to the notification statute, its reasoning is equally applicable to the two-year claim filing limitation of N.J.S.A. 34:15-41 that runs, not from the injury, but from date of the accident. As noted in Part IV, supra, there is no accident for the purpose of filing a claim without an injury. Likewise, we think that is the reason why filing a claim requires the description of the injury. N.J.S.A. 34:15-51; N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.1(a)(6). It is simply inconceivable to us that the Legislature contemplated knowledge of injury as a trigger for notifying the employer but not for filing a claim. See LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 431 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Jersey City Chap. Prop. Owner's Protective Ass'n v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 100 (1969)) ( When all is said and done, the matter of statutory construction ... will not justly turn on literalisms, technisms, or the so-called formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation. ). Obviously, it is notice that should precede filing, yet, if the Panchak reasoning is limited to notification, the right to file a claim would expire before notice was required in many latency cases. We are, therefore, satisfied that in the limited class of cases in which an unexpected traumatic event occurs and the injury it generates is latent or insidiously progressive, an accident for workers compensation filing purposes has not taken place until the signs and symptoms are such that they would alert a reasonable person that he had sustained a compensable injury. As Larson explains, it would be odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the survival of this fragment of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical forfeitures of statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory that one forfeits rights only when inexcusably delaying assertion of them. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. [Larson, supra, 31.02 at 661.] That, to us, is pivotal. Statutes of limitations generally are designed to stimulate diligence in litigants and to protect defendants from the unfair surprise of stale claims. Martinez v. Cooper Hosp.-University Med. Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 51 (2000). As Larson points out, the former goal is not achieved by applying the statute to bar the claim of a worker who does not know he has been injured because no amount of diligence would have altered the result. Regarding stale claims, in Panchak, supra, Justice Jacobs said this: We are not impressed by the suggestion that this view may encourage questionable claims. The employee must still satisfactorily discharge his affirmative burden of establishing that his injury was work-connected and that he gave notice within the prescribed time after he knew or had reason to know that he had a compensable injury. Measured against the shocking injustice to the workman which would result from a stricter approach, the additional responsibility placed upon the employer seems rather inconsequential. [13 N.J. at 25 (emphasis added).] We fully agree with that analysis, which we hold to be equally relevant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-34. That is the conclusion that has been reached in the majority of our sister states addressing this issue. To be sure, some states have achieved that result by legislation. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. 23.30.105 ( It is additionally provided that, in the case of latent defects pertinent to and causing compensable disability, the injured employee has full right to claim as shall be determined by the board, time limitations notwithstanding. ); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, 41 ( No proceedings for compensation . . . shall be maintained ... unless any claim for compensation due with respect to such injury is filed within four years from the date the employee first became aware of the causal relationship between his disability and his employment. ); N.D. Cent. Code 65-05-01 ( The date of injury for purposes of this section is the first date that a reasonable person knew or should have known that the employee suffered a work-related injury and has either lost wages because of a resulting disability or received medical treatment. ); R.I. Gen. Laws 28-35-57(a) (claims will be barred unless filed within two years of the occurrence or manifestation of the injury or incapacity ) (emphasis added). Generally, however, and most likely because accident-related latent injury is such a narrow category that most legislation does not address it, courts have been left to fill in that legislative gap. Larson points out that whether the particular state statute times the statute of limitations from the accident or the injury, the great majority of courts have been sufficiently impressed with the acute unfairness of a literal application of a limitations period, regardless of the facts surrounding the onset of injury, that they have suspended the running of the accident statute in latency cases until by reasonable care and diligence it is apparent that an injury has been sustained. Larson, supra, 126.05[02] at 126-20. Indeed, there are numerous examples of judicial construction of injury statutes to provide a discovery rule in the case of latent injuries. See, e.g., Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 829 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-501) (providing that statute of limitations commences to run when the true extent of the injury manifests and causes an incapacity to earn wages for the period long enough to qualify a claimant to receive benefits. ); City of Boulder v. Payne, 426 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1967) (interpreting one-year statute of limitation running from injury to include discovery rule); Rines v. Scott, 432 A.2d 767, 771 (Me. 1981) ( We hold that the incident triggering a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, when present and subjectively connected together, continues to mark the point of commencement of the time limitations . . . . ) (emphasis added); Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 230 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Mich. 1975) (reiterating utility of discovery rule and rejecting distinction between occupational diseases and personal injuries for purpose of establishing notice requirement with respect to statute of limitations); Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Taplin, 586 So. 2d 823, 827 (Miss. 1991) (reasoning that limitations period begins to run when the claimant is or reasonably should be aware of having sustained compensable injury, but the statute is deemed not to have begun running if the claimant's reasonably diligent efforts to obtain treatment yield no medical confirmation of compensable injury ); Miller v. Lake Area Hosp., 551 N.W.2d 817, 820-21 (S.D. 1996) ("The time period for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of the injury or disease."); Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tenn. 1981) ( It is now settled that the date the employee's disability manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident, triggers the statute of limitations. ). Moreover, a large number of states with statutes that time claims from the accident judicially have adopted discovery rules to protect workers with latent accidental injuries. See American Cyanamid v. Shepherd, 668 So. 2d 26, 28 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (citing 2B A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 78.42(a) (1982)) (reasoning that discovery rule is only logical and humane solution for cases involving latent injuries); Rose v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Ctr., 668 A.2d 782, 790 n.5 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995), aff'd sub nom., Rose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 676 A.2d 906 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating in dicta that Delaware s accident statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of the injury ) (emphasis in original); Lofgren v. Pieper Farms, 540 N.W.2d 834, 836-37 (Minn. 1995) (finding that claimant, whose eye injury did not manifest itself until after limitations period had closed, consequently was not barred from recovery where his employer provided him with mistaken advice, causing him to delay in filing claim); Jones v. Thermo King, 461 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. 1990) ( [F]or both personal injury and occupational disease, the statute of limitations begins to run when the employee has sufficient information of the nature of the injury or disease, its seriousness, and probable compensability. ); Lorenz v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 60 S.W.3d 677, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that claimant's request to amend his claim for workers' compensation benefits, due to aggravation of manic depression, was not barred by statute of limitations when it was made within two years of date upon which medical personnel diagnosed such aggravation); Cemer v. Huskoma Corp., 375 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Neb. 1985) (citing Maxey v. Fremont Dep t of Utils., 371 N.W.2d 294 (Neb. 1985)) (construing Nebraska s statute of limitations, which is facially accident statute, to provide discovery exception when the injury is deemed to be, at the outset, latent and progressive, thereby precluding accrual of the statute of limitations until such time when the employee discovers or should have discovered that he has a compensable disability ); Johansen v. Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha, 156 N.W. 511, 512 (Neb. 1916) ( [I]t cannot be said that the injury resulted from the accident, within the meaning of the statute, before the time it was discovered that it might become permanent.... ); Mauldin, supra, 416 S.E.2d at 641 (rejecting mechanical application of accident statute of limitations in favor of discovery rule for accident statute of limitations when claimant could not have known seriousness and work-relatedness of injury until after expiration of limitations period); see also Garnsey v. Concrete Inc. of Hobbs, 922 P.2d 577, 580 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting literal approach to workers compensation statute of limitations running from accidental injury as leading to absurd consequences ); State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 52 P.3d 1257, 1265 n.4 (Utah 2002) (citing Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm n, 74 P.2d 657, 658 (Utah 1937)) (reasoning that unless a statute otherwise provides, generally the plaintiff must have suffered damages before a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes ); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm n, 74 P.2d 657, 658 (Utah 1937) ( A mere accident does not impose the duty to pay. Accident plus injury there from does not impose the duty. But accident plus injury which results in disability or loss gives rise to the duty to pay. ). But see DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 677 A.2d 73 (Md. 1996) (holding that statute of limitations started to run from date that nurse first hoisted patient to keep him from falling, even though claimant only felt minor strain in neck at that time, continued to work, and did not experience severe pain or discover spur in neck until months after the accident); Perdue v. Daniel Intern. Inc., 296 S.E.2d 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (barring recovery for claimant who filed out of time even though doctor told him he had merely strained back muscle and claimant did not discover he had broken his back until three years after initial fall). We subscribe to the majority holdings, which are reflective of the modern view of workers compensation law. [Sponsor s Statement to L. 1974, c. 65.] As is evident, the entire focus of the Legislature s enactment of the discovery rule and elimination of the statute of repose was to avoid the fundamental unfairness to workers who suffer latent or insidiously developing diseases and could potentially lose their workers compensation claims before they even knew they had been injured. Nothing in that history suggests that the Legislature would not have been concerned equally over the fate of workers who suffer a traumatic event resulting in a delayed onset or insidiously developing disease. Indeed, it seems likely that the Legislature failed to address specifically accident-related latent injuries in the ameliorative scheme it developed for insidious occupational diseases because it was operating under the generally correct impression that the typical industrial accident (traumatic event, plus simultaneous disabling injury) is the sole accident model and that no modification of the accident statute was necessary. On the contrary, as we have indicated, there is a narrow band of accident cases in which there are latent and insidiously progressive conditions that ordinarily mark an occupational disease. The question presented is how the Legislature would have intended us to calculate the claim provisions of the statute in those circumstances. As we have observed, in enacting the occupational disease discovery rule, the Legislature clearly addressed insidiously developing diseases and expressed a desire to abrogate the burdensome and arbitrary time restrictions ... which in fact may easily lapse before even the symptoms of the disease are evident. Sponsor s Statement to L. 1974, c. 65. Against that backdrop, it seems evident that if the Legislature had been faced expressly with the narrow class of accident cases involving latency and insidious onset diseases, it would have included them under a discovery-rule umbrella. In reaching that conclusion, we have performed a classic judicial function -- determining the essential purpose and design of a statute in order to effectuate the goals underlying it. Aponte-Corea v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000). In so doing, we have considered the fundamental goal of the Act and interpreted it in a manner consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman had he anticipated the matter at hand. New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 193-94 (2002), certif. denied Forrester v. New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 673, 154 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2002); Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001); Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 (1999); A.N.M., Inc. v. Township of S. Brunswick Rent Leveling Bd., 93 N.J. 518, 524-25 (1983). That is not to suggest a wholesale importation of the discovery rule that is a part of the occupational disease statute into all accidental injury cases. Notice and claim limitations in classic industrial accidents involving simultaneous traumatic event and injury will continue to be calculated from the date of the traumatic event. It is only in the narrow band of accident cases involving latency and insidious onset diseases that we think the Legislature would have intended the kind of leeway it developed to avoid a legitimately injured worker losing an occupational claim to be equally applicable to latent injury accidents. Moreover, it should be noted that applying a discovery-type rule to that narrow class of accident cases will not result in the obliteration of the distinction between accidental injury and occupational disease for notice and filing purposes. It remains the fact that the accident calculation begins when the worker knows or should know he has incurred any compensable injury (for example, medical bills, temporary disability, or permanent disability). On the contrary, the occupational disease clock does not begin to run until the worker knows the true nature and seriousness of the disability. Earl, supra, 158 N.J. at 161. That distinction gives the worker more latitude in notifying the employer and filing a claim based on occupational disease, presumably because there the employer could have anticipated such a disease as a natural hazard of the job. Less latitude is afforded the worker who is injured in an unexpected accident. Once he knows he has sustained any compensable injury, he must act. Finally, we note that our analysis of the timeliness issue will be critical not only to the claimants here, but also to the many workers in ordinary occupations who develop insidious onset diseases from a trauma and cannot invoke the occupational disease statute. Without it, those workers, who the Legislature clearly intended to be the beneficiaries of the Workers Compensation Act, would otherwise lose their claims two years from the traumatic event even if, at that point, they were totally unaware that they had sustained an injury. We therefore hold that an accidental injury for reporting and filing purposes has not occurred until the point at which a reasonable person would know he had sustained a compensable injury. DIANA G. BRUNELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILDWOOD CREST POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. SAMUEL STANGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LOWER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. DECIDED May 21, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY